■ ■: \:-r . ' ■ ; . ,'
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
Postage and Fees Paid
Department of State
STA-501
Second Class
Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted service, please renew your subscription promptly when you
receive the expiration notice from the Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time required to process
renewals, notices are sent out three months in advance of the expiration date. Any problems involving your
subscription will receive immediate attention if you write to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. See inside front cover for subscription rates and mailing address.
Departmen t
bulletin
he Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy /Volume 81 / Number 2052
July 1981
•M* *
IU»purtmvnt of S1ui<>
bulletin
Volume 81 / Number 2052 / July 1981
Cover Art :
President Reagan, President Lopez Portillo.
and Italia Morayta (interpreter)
at Camp David luncheon.
(White House pholo by Michael Evans)
The Department of State Bulletin ,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and
government agencies with information
on developments in U.S. foreign
relations and the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service.
The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials;
special features and articles on
international affairs; selected press
releases issued by the White House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission
to the United Nations; and treaties and
other agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party.
ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
Secretary of State
WILLIAM J. DYESS
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
PAUL E. AUERSWALD
Director,
Office of Public Communication
NORMAN HOWARD
Acting Chief, Editorial Division
PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor
JUANITA ADAMS
Assistant Editor
The Secretary of State has determined that
the publication of this periodical is
necessary in the transaction of the public
business required by law of this
Department. Use of funds for printing this
periodical has been approved by the
Director of the Office of Management and
Budget through January 31. 1986.
NOTE: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the
Department of State Bulletin as the
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is
indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical
Literature.
For sale by the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
Price: 12 issues plus annual index —
$19.00 (domestic) $23.75 (foreign)
Single copy— $3.25 (domestic) $4.10 (foreign)
Index, single copy— $2.25 (domestic) $2.85 (foreig
CONTENTS
FEATURE
1 Visit of Mexican President Lopez Portillo (President Reagan, President Lopez
Portillo)
4 The United States and Mexico (Everett E. Briggs)
5 Mexico— A Profile
"he Secretary
8
Peaceful Progress in Developing
Nations
News Conference of May 22
Secretary Participates in St.
Louis Town Hall Forum
Secretary Participates in Foreign
Policy Conference
ast Asia
l Khmer Relief Efforts
xonomics
4 International Ecomomic Policy
Priorities (Robert D. Hormats)
8 U.S. Subscription to the World
Bank (Ernest B. Johnston)
9 S.708: A Viable Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (Ernest B.
Johnston)
0 International Investment Issues
tJuhn T. McCarthy)
•nergy
2 Strategic Petroleum Reserve
(Robert D. Hormats)
4 U.S. Competition in International
Coal Trade (John P. Ferriter)
40
43
44
23d Report on Cyprus
(Message to the Congress)
First and Second Reports on Cy-
prus (Message to the Congress)
West German Chancellor Visits
United States (Joint Statement)
Middle East
45 U.S. Asks Libyans to Close Peo-
ple's Bureau; Travel Advisory
Issued (Department Statement)
Military Affairs
46 Requirements of Our Defense Pol-
icy (Caspar W. Weinberger)
Oceans
48 U.S. Policy and the Law of the
Sea (James L. M alone)
Security Assistance
51 Arms Transfers and the Na-
tional Interest (James L.
Buckley)
United Nations
54 Infant Formula Code (Elliot
Abrams, M. Peter McPher son)
Western Hemisphere
56 U.S. Assistance to El Salvador
(Foreign Relations Outline)
Treaties
57 Current Actions
Chronology
60 May 1981
Press Releases
60 Department of State
60 U.S.U.N.
Publications
62 International Law Digest, 1978
62 Department of State
Index
:urope
North Atlantic Council Meets in
Rome tiling. Final Communi-
que, Minutes Extract, Declara-
tion on Terrorism)
NATO Defense Planning Commit-
tee Meets in Brussels (Final
( 'ommunique)
SPECIAL (See Center Section)
Atlas of United States Foreign Relations: Economics— Part 1
SUPEI
BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY '
EN1 OF [iQCUivlcNlb
| i i\_/*-'
I 0 1981
DEPOSITORY
FEATURE
Presidents Reagan and Lopez Portillo at
White House Welcoming Ceremony.
The President with John Gavin. U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, and President Lopez Portilli
following the afternoon's horseback ride at Camp David.
President Reagan greets President Lopez
Portillo before the evening barbeque at
tamp David.
Presidents Reagan and Lopez Portillo exchange toasts during the evening barbeque.
(Whits HuUSl- pi - lij Mii'harl Kvans)
Feature
Visit of Mexican President Lopez Portillo
Mexican President Jose Lopez Por-
illo y Pacheco made an official visit to
he United States June 7-9, 1981. Follow-
ng are remarks made at the arrival
eremony on June 8, an exchange of
uncheon toasts on May 9, and President
leagan's remarks made on the departure
f President Lopez Portillo on May 9.
ARRIVAL CEREMONY,
UNE 8, 19811
'resident Reagan
warmly welcome President Lopez Por-
illo on Behalf of the people of the
Jnited States. But I also want to convey
iy personal greetings because of my
ersonal respect and affection. The rela-
ionship we've built as individuals is in-
icative of a new dimension that we are
ringing to the friendship between our
wo countries.
Our planned meeting of 2 months
go, which I was looking forward to
dth great anticipation, was abruptly
ancelled. And I want to thank you for
le consideration you've shown in
isiting us here in Washington. You've
one us a great honor in your visit to
le White House.
You will recall the last time we met
has in the Museum of Art, part of Mex-
;o's rich cultural past — that was in
'iudad Juarez. We were surrounded
lere by magnificent pieces of art, part
f Mexico's rich cultural past. It was ap-
ropriate that we should meet in such a
lace, for art transcends time and
mterial consideration.
The same is true of the friendship
etween the peoples of Mexico and the
Jnited States. In a world filled with
eighbors who resort to violence,
eighbors who've lost sight of the shared
alues and mutual interests, the goodwill
etween Mexico and the United States is
- blossom whose beauty we meet here to
herish and protect.
God made Mexico and the United
Utates neighbors, but it is our duty and
he duty of generations yet to come to
hake sure that we remain friends. I
j/elcome you today with the pledge that
his Administration will sincerely and
iiligently strive to maintain a relation-
hip of mutual respect and cooperation
between our two nations, and the deci-
sions which affect both sides of our
border will be made only after the
closest consultation between our govern-
ments.
Our very proximity is an opportunity
to demonstrate to the world how two
nations, talking together as equals, as
partners, as friends, can solve their
problems and deepen their mutual
respect. You are a scholar, a man of art,
and a political leader of a proud and in-
dependent nation. There are many items
of importance on our agenda. I look for-
ward to a far-reaching exchange of
views that will cement the ties between
us. The personal friendship we're
developing must be equaled by the
closeness between our two peoples.
President Lopez Portillo2
Under the sign of friendship which
began in Ciudad Juarez, it is now for me
a great pleasure to be here in the capital
city of your great country. We are very
sorry that we did not see you in Tijuana
as we had planned. But I am very happy
that we are meeting now here at the
White House, and it also pleases me
enormously to see that you have totally
recovered from the attempt that was
brought on by absurd violence. I am
very happy to see that you have enor-
mous capacity of recovery. And in your
health and in your strength, I can see
the good health and the strength of your
nation.
There are few countries in the world
that have so many items to deal with
among themselves as the United States
and Mexico. We are not only neighbors,
we are also the representatives of two
worlds. Literally and geographically
speaking, we represent the north and
the south along 3,000 kilometers of
border. Therefore, there are structural
matters between us that have been
shaped by our history and our
geography.
We also represent the relationship
between the developing world and the
world that has already been developed.
And we are also immersed in a regional
context that shapes our relationship.
I come here now as a friend without
any prejudice to talk over these matters
with you and to prove with my coming
that there can be friendship among
friends and that this friendship can have
as its main pillar and basis the rule of
reason. In an absurd world, the
reasonable thing to do can be the possi-
ble thing to do. And what is reasonable
is based on respect and on the law.
There are many problems that we
have to deal with. We will be very happy
to find our similarities. And when we do
not have coinciding opinions, and it is
very possible that in this world of
plurality there may be times when we do
not have coinciding opinions, then we
will talk things over without arrogance.
Arrogance is a very dangerous deviation
of those who are in a weaker position.
The other very dangerous aspect is sub-
mission. We will select the road of
respect and the rule of reason without
any submission and without any ar-
rogance.
I believe that few times in our
history has there been an opportunity
for good understanding as there is today
to understand each other well and to
deepen and make headway in our rela-
tionship. I feel that you have great good
will and a friendly feeling. I feel that
you are a decent individual and an
honest one. I shall make a great effort
to respond to the kindnesses that you
have with me.
We have established a friendship
which no doubt will be both symbolic
and solid. I am absolutely certain that
we will be able to achieve what our two
peoples and nations want of us. We
want to be understood, and, in turn, we
want to understand. We want to
respect, and we want to be respected.
We want a solid relationship that will
seek out the mutual interest of two
countries that are neighbors and friends.
I am very certain that if we go beyond
rhetoric and prejudice, we shall be able
to achieve our goals. And this will be for
the good of both countries.
LUNCHEON TOASTS,
JUNE 9, 198F
President Reagan
Some years ago when I was Governor of
California, I was inspecting areas in our
State which had been enormously
damaged by one of those natural
catastrophies that we sometimes see on
the Pacific Coast — great mud slides that
can sweep away a man's home in a mat-
ter of moments.
lulv 1981
Feature
One of these belonged to an old
gentleman from your country who was
standing in the middle of what, before
the slide, had been his living room. We
were both knee-deep in mud. It must
have been heartbreaking for him
because his home had obviously been
newly furnished. Now it was a scene of
ruin. With quiet dignity and the utmost
sincerity, he said: "Governor Reagan, mi
casa es su casa," — my house is your
house. I was deeply moved, and I real-
ized that I was a witness to what was
purely and traditionally Hispanic — per-
sonal pride and courage in the face of
adversity.
Today, the entire nation is happy to
have you with us here in the White
House, and since this house belongs to
all of them, may I say on behalf of my
fellow citizens, mi casa es su casa. [Ap-
plause]
From the moment of our meeting on
the Friendship Bridge at Ciudad Juarez
last January, I was certain that we
would make our relationship more than
symbolic, not only because our peoples
expect certain cordiality between their
leaders but because the leader of the
Mexican people exemplifies so well the
proud culture and heritage of his people.
When you took that highly symbolic
step across the boundary to grasp my
hand, I knew that our future relation-
ship would be that of personal friends.
Your concern and good wishes during
my period of hospitalization were deeply
appreciated. The Vice President told me
of your concern for my health and of
your most generous offer to travel to
Washington for this meeting even
though protocol called for me to visit
you.
At your first meeting, you gave me
a splendid example of your own artistry,
drawings of horses etched on glass,
drawn by you that are now proudly
displayed behind my desk in the Oval Of-
fice, and I value greatly the volumes on
beautiful art of your country. But it
would be difficult to match the gift that
arrived at our ranch shortly before my
inauguration— El Alamino, a magnifi-
cent horse, your personal mount. That
was more than friendship, you took me
into your family. [Laughter]
But I remember, too, that you
presented me with a bound volume of a
book that you wrote on Quetzalcoatl. It
has much to say about your people. It
The President and guests are entertained by the Army Strolling Strings during a White
House luncheon.
also says much about the man who leads
them today. I found especially relevant
to your land the words of Quetzalcoatl
to his new-born son: "You are made with
the fibers of joy and sorrow, of laughter
and tears. You are at the edge of all the
possibilities and soon you will have the
strength to choose. You will be the
course and the measure of the richness
and the misery. You will be the eagle
and the serpent. With your pain, you
will maintain the conscience of the
universe, with your laughter, the dignity
of Man."
Later in the book, Quetzalcoatl,
perplexed by the problems of governing,
said something we can both relate to:
"Despite its regularity, this world is a
confused sphere of arbitrary things."
The art of politics is sometimes
frustrating, but there are other times of
confidence and optimism and your visit
has been such a time. I listened very
carefully to you in our meetings, noting
the content and the spirit with which
you spoke. Your presence inspires con-
fidence that we can calm any of the ten-
sions that inevitably arise between two
such close neighbors. During your elec-
tion campaign in 1976, you traveled
through all 31 of Mexico's states,
spreading new hope. The message you
brought to the Mexican people is
something that can serve as a cor-
nerstone for our relationship as well. If
problems arise between us, we must
always remember we are the solution.
There is nothing that with mutual
respect and honest communication we
cannot work out together.
I look forward to our next meeting
in Cancun, Mexico, in October. In
saluting you today, I thank you for your
generosity, but more, I thank you for
the continued good will between our two
peoples that your visit represents. And
so I ask all of you to join me in a toast
to Jose Lopez Portillo, the President of
Mexico.
President Lopez Portillo2
I must confess that I am moved. I must
confess that I have spoken before an
auditorium in this same place three
times before, and I have never been so
moved as I feel today. It is true that
I had always been sincere but also
cautious. I had always spoken frankly,
but I have always measured the weight
of each one of my words because the
relationship, for some reason or another
had always been a tense one. A relation-
ship between neighbors that are so dif-
ferent are always difficult. It is difficult
for the one side and for the other. But I
confess for the first time now I have felt
totally relaxed. For the first time a
President of the United States has used
with me that very generous formula of
"my home is your home." [Applause]
And for we who understand the
greatness and dignity that are behind
that expression, what I have heard from
the President today has deeply moved
me. As I can understand very well that
he felt deeply moved also when he hearc
that old man who had no roof over his
head and who was offering him his
home, because a home is the environ-
ment of respect for the intimacy of the
Department of State Bulletir
Feature
luman being. And when one gives one's
ntimaey in friendship, it is that that he
s giving.
We understand this to be so, and we
hank you for this. But I must also say
hat it has not only been the external
>ehavior but also the substantive part of
>ur relationship that has always been
jenerous, kind, and affectionate.
If all the powerful people in the
/orld were to truly understand what
espect means to the weak people, the
rorld would totally change. It is not on-
i to give, not only to help; the most im-
ortant thing of all is to respect. He
'ho gives without respect is usually of-
ensive. Very frequently I am reminded
tnd I remind others that the first civic
xpression that we learn as children is
he one that was said by one of our
reat men and presidents, the counter-
art, so to speak, of Abraham Lincoln,
[e said: "Respect for the rights of
thers is peace." The first word that we
llexicans learn in our civic behavior is
le word "respect." And this is the way
hich we have been treated. We have
|sen treated with respect and with
•iendship, and these are basic qualities
> us.
On that basis, everything can be
ailt. One can coincide, one can be sent,
jman beings are made in many and
| irious different ways and shapes. And
i our plurality, we should learn to coex-
k and to tolerate one another.
. olerance in itself is respect. And when
human relationship is built on respect,
is indestructable. We have spoken
oout many things. Fortunately, we
ive agreed on most of them. We have
ssented on some. But with the
reatest respect we have agreed to talk
oout the matters on which we dissent
; order to find appropriate solutions.
Intolerance has not come to cancel
it opportunity, and that is very impor-
fcnt for a good relationship between
juntries such as ours. It is important
^cause it is a representative sample of
hat is happening in the world — the
ilationship between the countries that
ave been able to develop and the
eveloping nations. And in a geographi-
il analogy, we could say that this is an
Impression of the North-South relation-
. lip. We are the most significant rela-
onship between the North and the
South. That is why I have felt so happy
and so grateful that you have accepted
our invitation to come to Cancun;
because we do not only have concepts in
mind, but we have direct experiences
and reciprocal experiences. I am very
certain that the special characteristics of
our relationship — North-South relation-
ship, that is, United States-Mexico — can
be taken to generalization and that it
will be useful, that it can be useful, and
this is what we fervently wish — it can
be useful for the rest of mankind.
We want appropriate communica-
tions so that political will can be ex-
pressed. And political will has been ex-
pressed here and now today in the
United States as regards to Mexico and
with reference to Mexico as regards to
the United States with an environment
of good will, peace, respect, and con-
sideration for each other.
I believe that in Cancun we can be a
stimulating example to help and par-
ticipate in the detente of this world
which is so complex and at times so ab-
surd, because if the disasters brought on
by nature that creates all these thing for
human beings are absurd in them-
selves—these disasters that leave old
men without a roof over their heads but
still with their dignity, nature, in that
case, as nature has its own strength and
will, cannot be controlled by us. But
there is something that leaves man
without a roof over his head and which
is not nature, and I'm talking about pas-
sions, ambition, intolerance, vio-
lence— vices all of human will. And it is
up to the will of the human being to cor-
rect these mistakes. Perhaps we can do
nothing against nature, but we can do a
great deal with our will if we're talking
about good will, and I do believe that
good will is possible. And I believe that
in Cancun, we shall have the opportunity
to say that it is possible and to confirm
that we're speaking the truth.
I would hope that we will know how
to lay bridges that will make it possible
for all men and women in the world to
say to each other: "My friends, this is
your home." To the health of President
Reagan and his beautiful wife; to the
friendship of Mexico and the United
States; to your health.
PRESIDENT REAGAN,
JUNE 9,1981J
I just want to express my appreciation
for President Lopez Portillo's changing
his schedule and coming to Washington
to accommodate us. The talks that we've
had were frank, they were valuable, and
they led to a closer relationship between
our two countries. In addition to that,
I'm very proud, personally, to say that
we have a warm and a close personal
relationship between the two of us.
Our frank agreement or discussion
revealed basic agreement on the need to
strengthen the economies of the less-
developed nations, to bring about social
and economic development of their
peoples. We agreed that this was the
best way to assure the region's future
stability, and we'll be exchanging ideas
on how best to bring about such develop-
ment. We agreed that the special nature
of our relations required a special
framework for doing business. We de-
cided to form a bilateral foreign
secretary's commission to assure in-
tegrated handling of matters of common
concern. It will be cochaired by
Secretary Haig and Secretary
Castaneda. They will submit a report by
December 31, 1981.
Because trade problems are essen-
tially and especially urgent, we also
decided to set up immediately a Cabinet-
level trade committee to recommend
how to go about dealing with outstand-
ing bilateral trade questions. The com-
mittee will be cochaired by the Mexican
and United States Secretaries of Com-
merce and the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative. The committee will begin work as
soon as possible.
We also agreed to address outstand-
ing fisheries problems on a similar
urgent basis. An important agreement
providing for supply of substantial quan-
tities of U.S. grain to Mexico during
1982 was signed by Secretary Block for
the United States and Secretary de la
Vega for Mexico. Attorney General
Smith briefed the Mexican party in
detail on the various options we're now
considering to deal with the un-
documented migrant problem. And I
assured the President that the United
uly 1981
Feature
States would take Mexico's interest in
this problem fully into consideration, as
well as the interests and rights of the in-
dividual migrants themselves.
I had the great pleasure of inform-
ing the President that the legislature
has acted— the Congress has acted— and
we are going forward with construction
of the Otay Mesa additional border
crossing to relieve the logjam that we
have at the San Ysidro crossing there. It
is badly needed on the California Baja
border. And we agreed that it would be
an important boost to tourism in both
directions.
President Lopez Portillo formally in-
vited me to participate in a meeting of
heads of government, an international
meeting to be held in Cancun, Mexico, in
October, and I happily accepted that in-
vitation. I look forward to the informal
discussion of North-South questions
which will occur at that meeting and as
well as additional meetings that we have
spoken of.
The United States and Mexico
'Made on the South Lawn of the White
House (text from White House press release).
President Lopez Portillo spoke in
Spanish, and his remarks were translated by
an interpreter.
3Made at a luncheon in the East Room of
the White House (text from White House
press release).
4Made on the North Portico of the White
House (text from White House press
release). ■
by Everett E. Briggs
Statement, prepared for delivery
before the Subcommittee on Inter-
American Affairs of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee on June 10, 1981. Mr.
Briggs is Acting Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.1
The just-concluded 2-day session at
Camp David and at the White House is
the fifth presidential-level meeting for
the United States and Mexico in the 4V2
years Jose Lopez Portillo has been in of-
fice. It is the second time this year that
President Reagan has met with his Mex-
ican counterpart, and the two expect to
be meeting again later this year at a
time and place to be determined.
Since January 20 there have been
several telephone exchanges, as well as
visits by special emissaries.
The frequency of these high-level en-
counters and the pace of diplomatic ac-
tivity reflect a new appreciation of the
intensity and importance of the unique
relationship between our two countries.
This relationship is as complex, exten-
sive, intertwined, and interdependent as
any for the United States.
There is scarcely an agency of our
government that is not involved in pro-
grams which directly or indirectly affect
the relationship. Contacts between ex-
perts on both sides are constant; in-
dividual agencies have a wide variety of
agreements and arrangements with their
counterparts on issues ranging from
housing and health to culture, tourism,
aviation, narcotics control, customs
cooperation, environmental protection,
science and technology, to name just a
few. Our Embassy in Mexico is the
largest in the world because so many
agencies find it necessary to be repre-
sented there: 11 in all.
There exists a long-time, active rela-
tionship between our Congress and the
Mexican legislature, and within a few
days a delegation of distinguished
American Congressmen and Senators
will go to Mexico for the annual meeting
of the U.S. -Mexico Interparliamentary
Commission — that in addition to fre-
quent visits back and forth by individual
members or delegations interested in
specific issues.
Under the leadership of Governor
Clements of Texas, periodic meetings of
border governors from both sides are
now taking place — a development we
welcome and which contributes directly
to improved understanding and in-
creased possibilities for cooperation at
the local level.
There are literally thousands of bina-
tional organizations; hardly a week goes
by without a conference on U.S. -Mexi-
can relations sponsored by academia,
foundations, or private enterprise. Tran-
sit— tourism and business — between the
two countries is the heaviest in the
world: over 800,000 persons legally
cross the border daily. This accounts for
the fact that 12% of our worldwide con-
sular resources are dedicated to Mexico,
at our Embassy and 10 consulates.
We now have upward of 12 million
Americans of Mexican extraction, and
the historical, cultural, and political im-
pact of this fastest growing portion of
our population is a fact of life neither
legislators nor policymakers can ignore.
Such is the environment within
which U.S. -Mexican relations prosper as
well as occasionally encounter dif-
ficulties, as is inevitable, given that we
are both proud, individualistic, and
independent-minded nations, each with i
role to play on the world scene and our
own ideas of our national interests. But
as next-door neighbors with a shared in-
terest in prosperity and progress, we
share a common determination to
cooperate where possible, to minimize
and isolate differences where they can-
not be avoided, and to consult closely or
all issues which arise between us. This i:
the Administration's approach.
The bilateral component in our rela-
tionship overshadows all else, and the
three main categories are economic rela
tions (principally trade), migration, and
border relations. I should like to addres:
each of these, as well as regional issues,
a component of secondary importance t(
the overall relationship, but one which
requires special sensitivity on both sides
Trade and Investment
During the past few years, trade be-
tween the United States and Mexico ha:
grown dramatically. It increased 50%
from 1979 to 1980, reaching almost $28
billion, and making Mexico our third-
ranking trading partner after Canada
and Japan. Trade has tripled in 4 years
and if the upward swing continues, as
Department of State Bulletii
Feature
/e have every right to expect, Mexico
rill be in second place.
Considering the size of this trade
nd its rapid growth, we have had few
erious problems. Because Mexico is not
member of the General Agreement on
ariffs and Trade (GATT) and has not
dhered to the negotiated code of con-
uct on countervailing duties and export
ubsidies of the multilateral trade
egotiations (MTN), and given our own
rade laws and our traditional,
uiltilateral approach to foreign trade,
lere is the potential for serious trade
isputes to arise between us. If these oc-
ur, there may be some interruption of
-ade in specific products, but overall
-ade should continue to grow.
According to U.S. Department of
ommerce statistics, U.S. exports to
|[exico in 1980 reached $15.1 billion, up
;3% over 1979. U.S. imports increased
) $12.5 billion, up 42%, with oil and
atural gas accounting for slightly over
3%. The main U.S. exports were
,^ricultural products, capital goods, and
itermediate goods. The U.S. bilateral
i ade surplus was $2.6 billion, up from
II billion in 1979. For Mexico, total ex-
; jrts of goods and services generate
i ore than 15% of GDP, and almost two-
lirds of Mexico's trade is with us, so
! lr trade policy has a tremendous im-
kct on the Mexican economy. As Mex-
<o's export potential grows, market ac-
;ss issues and export promotion
easures (such as export subsidies) will
;come increasingly important to
.S. -Mexican relations.
U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico
st year swelled to $2.5 billion, more
lan doubling from a year earlier. Mex-
o became our third largest agricultural
(port market, accounting for 7% of our
>tal agricultural exports. Grain and
) ;her bulk commodities were crucial in
lis increase. These exports took place
lader a bilateral U.S. -Mexico grain
^reement, negotiated in early 1980, ex-
inded later in the year, and renewed
l)r 1981. We have agreed to enter into a
1 milar pact for 1982. Under the agree-
ment, the U.S. Government facilitates
I le purchase of agreed-upon quantities,
Mainly by offering tenders. The two
lovernments cooperate on resolving
iransportation problems — getting the
Brain across the busy border and
D trough congested ports.
The Mexican Government decided
list year that the time was inopportune
pr it to join the GATT or the subsidies
ijode, noting that these would place un-
jue restraints on Mexican development
policy, without the nontariff measure
codes of conduct and the MTN trade
concessions offering sufficient advan-
tages to outweigh these restraints.
What this means, under our own
laws, is that U.S. petitioners requesting
the imposition of countervailing duties
on Mexican products need only to prove
the existence of subsidies and not that
these subsidies cause or threaten injury.
Such findings then trigger the imposi-
tion of countervailing duties. The indica-
tions are that barring some bilateral
agreement or Mexican adherence to
GATT, several Mexican subsidies will be
countervailable.
In fact, on April 10, 1981, counter-
vailing duties of 5% were levied on im-
ports of leather wearing apparel from
Mexico. The U.S. Department of Com-
merce determined that Mexican
manufacturers of leather wearing ap-
parel are receiving subsidies from the
Government of Mexico. Mexican exports
to the United States of this product be-
tween January 1979 and May 31, 1980,
were worth $26 million. We are con-
sulting with Mexico on this problem.
Mexico is worried about U.S.
graduation policy. Graduation refers to
the phasing out and eventual elimination
of special and differential trade treat-
ment for advanced developing countries.
It has been U.S. policy to apply gradua-
tion to the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP— the system by which
certain listed products from Mexico and
other developing countries enter the
United States duty free, unless those
products are especially sensitive or ex-
tremely competitive). Mexico ranks
fourth among the 140 beneficiaries of
the U.S. GSP program. Its utilization of
GSP has doubled over the last 5 years,
increasing to $509 million in 1980.
Graduation this year eliminated GSP on
two Mexican items worth only $14
million; petitions on other items were
turned down. Mexico regained eligibility
on over $14 million in previously ineligi-
ble products and gained eligibility on 47
items newly added to the list, 3 of which
Mexico— A Profile
Geography
Area: 764.000 sq. mi. Capital: Mexico D.F.
(pop. 15 million, 1980 est.). Other Cities:
Guadalajara (2.4 million), Monterrey (2
million), Cuidad Juarez (680,000), Puebla
(600,000).
People
Population: 69 million (1980 est.). Annual
Growth Rate: 2.7%. Ethnic Groups: Indian
Spanish (mestizo) 60%, American Indian
30%, Caucasian 9%, other 1%. Religion:
Roman Catholic 97%. Language: Spanish.
Literacy: 74%. Life Expectancy: 65 yrs.
(1975).
Government
Official Name: The United Mexican States.
Type: Federal republic. Independence: First
proclaimed Sept. 16, 1810; republic estab-
lished 1822. Constitution: Feb. 5, 1917.
Branches: Executive — President (Chief of
State and Head of Government). Legisla-
tive—bicameral Congress (66-member Senate
and 300-member Chamber of Deputies).
Judicial — Supreme Court, local and federal
systems. Political Parties: Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action
Party (PAN), Popular Socialist Party (PPS),
Authentic Party of the Revolution (PARM);
three other parties — the Socialist Workers
Party (PST), the Mexican Democratic Party
(PDM), and the Mexican Communist Party
(CPM)— and four political associations
registered. Suffrage: Universal over age 18.
Administrative Divisions: 31 states and the
Federal District.
Economy
GDP (1980): $128 billion. Per Capita GDP:
$1,800. Annual Growth Rate: 7.4%. Annual
Inflation Rate: 28%. Natural Resources:
Petroleum, silver, copper, gold, lead, zinc,
natural gas, timber. Agriculture: Corn, cot-
ton, coffee, sugarcane, vegetables. In-
dustries: Food processing, chemicals, basic
metal and metal products, petroleum. Trade:
Exports — $15.3 billion: petroleum, coffee, cot-
ton, fruits and vegetables, sulfur. Partners —
U.S. (64%), EC, Japan. Imports— $18.6
billion: grains, machinery, equipment, in-
dustrial vehicles, intermediate goods. Part-
ners— U.S. (65%), EC, Japan. Average Ex-
change Rate (1980): 23.5 pesos = US$1.00
Membership in International Organizations
U.N., International Atomic Energy Agency,
International Civil Aviation Organization,
Seabeds Committee, Inter-American Defense
Board, Organization of American States,
Latin American Free Trade Association,
INTELSAT.
Principal Government Officials
Mexico: President — Jose Lopez Portillo;
Minister of Foreign Relations— Jorge
Castaneda de la Rosa; Ambassador to the
U.S.— Hugo B. Margain. United States:
Ambassador to Mexico— John Gavin. ■
llulv 1981
Feature
should result in substantia] Mexican ex-
ports to the United States.
Another important trade and invest-
ment area has been the in-bond industry
program, initiated by the Mexicans in
1965 to reduce serious border unemploy-
ment aggravated by the 1964 termina-
tion of the bracero program. Par-
ticipating factories produce articles in
Mexico, primarily from imported U.S.
components, and are given tax, duty,
and regulatory exemptions. Assembled
goods — 70% electronic and 10% ap-
parel— are exported mainly to the
United States, under sections 807.00 and
806.3 of the U.S. tariff system subject
only to duties on the value added abroad
on U.S. goods exported for assembly or
processing. Value added in these plants
in Mexico in 1980 reached $778 million.
The program is controversial.
American labor contends that the pro-
gram costs U.S. jobs, but defenders of
the program contend that it exports only
the most labor-intensive part of produc-
tion, reserving for U.S. workers the best
paying portion of the production cycle.
Moreover, there are often "twin plants"
on the U.S. side of the border, providing
jobs in otherwise somewhat depressed
areas. Finally, the wages paid to in-bond
plant workers are often spent on the
U.S. side of the border.
Energy is an important part of our
trading relationship with Mexico. Last
year, oil and natural gas accounted for
over 50% of U.S. imports from Mexico.
The United States received an average
of 560,000 barrels per day (b/d) of crude
and gas liquids, worth a total of $6
billion, and an average of 300 million
cubic feet per day of natural gas, worth
approximately $500 million annually.
The United States will likely receive
more Mexican oil this year than ever
before. In 1981, weather permitting,
Mexican oil exports to the United States
will probably reach 744,000 b/d by the
second quarter, out of total oil exports
of 1.5 million b/d. Production, now near
2.6 million b/d, might reach 2.9 million
b/d by summer, with the yearly average
to be slightly above 2.75 million b/d.
Production and export figures could
vary, of course, if the present softness
in the world oil market continues.
Mexico has followed OPEC
[Organization for Petroleum Exporting
Countries] pricing patterns for crude oil.
U.S. oil companies deal directly with
PEMEX, the Mexican national oil com-
pany, with no direct U.S. Government
involvement, an arrangement our com-
panies and PEMEX prefer. Mexican
natural gas sales take place under a
government-to-government framework
agreement negotiated in 1979. Under
the agreement, a consortium of U.S.
companies imports 300 million cubic feet
per day at a price set according to the
price of a basket based on crude oil
prices. Over most of the last year, under
an Energy Regulatory Administration
ruling, Mexico has received a price equal
to the border price of Canadian gas.
Mexico's energy policy has empha-
sized careful control of production and
export levels, so that oil revenues will
not exceed the capacity of the economy
to absorb them. The Mexican national
energy program (announced in late
1980) sets export limits through 1990 of
1.5 million b/d for oil and 300 million b/d
for gas. The program is less explicit on
production levels but seems to dis-
courage sharp increases in production of
oil and gas.
Mexican leaders have emphasized
their belief that Mexico must diversify
its oil markets to avoid making any one
country (meaning the United States)
overly dependent on Mexican oil. The
national energy program says that oil
exports to one country will not exceed
50%. of total oil exports. They have also
tried to use oil to gain technology, in-
vestment, and trade on favorable terms
from other countries, including France,
Sweden, and Japan, while exempting the
United States from this linkage.
U.S. investment is important in
Mexico's economy. Out of total foreign
investment in Mexico of approximately
$7.5 billion, the U.S. share is worth over
$5 billion, or 69%. The U.S. share has
remained fairly constant over the last
few years, with the U.S. total growing
to match sharp increases in the overall
total. Mexico has strict regulations
governing foreign investment, but has
tried to utilize those regulations with
sufficient pragmatism so that develop-
ment is encouraged, not discouraged.
Migration
The question of illegal immigration is
one of the most sensitive and complex of
U.S. -Mexican issues. The Administration
has been studying the problem. It has
exchanged views with the Mexican
Government on a frequent basis at the
diplomatic and technical levels. In 1977
the Carter Administration proposed a
legislative package to deal with immigra-
tion issues. There was no concensus at
the time, and Congress established a
select commission to review immigration
and refugee policy. The commission's
report, published in February 1981,
recommended:
• Legal status for those here illegal-
ly, based on criteria such as length of
residence and absence of grounds for ex-
clusion;
• Enforcement of strenghtened im-
migration laws and regulations; and
• Enactment of sanctions against
employers of illegal aliens.
The Reagan Administration has set
up a task force to examine the commis-
sion's recommendations and to advise
the President on structuring the Ad-
ministration's policy. The task force's
conclusions are expected momentarily.
We have reviewed extensively
with the Mexicans both the select com-
mission's findings and the various alter-
natives open to us and explored in a
general way the possibility of some joint
actions both to improve legal travel and
curtail illegal movement. We expect
these exchanges will continue.
One of the most difficult aspects of
the migration problem is the lack of
reliable or consistent data. Estimates of
the number of illegal aliens in the Unitec
States range from 500,000 to 12 million,
and the annual flow probably has rangec
from half a million to several million.
We also lack firm information about
length of stay, type of jobs, etc. Some
recent studies conclude that more and
more illegal immigrants are taking
skilled employment, meaning Mexico
may be losing some of those whom it
needs for its own development. One
thing seems certain: Mexicans constitute
the largest proportion, probably well
over a half, of illegal migrants.
Border Relations
In general, these can be characterized a;
excellent. Citizens' groups along the
border regularly proclaim that they
understand each other and are able to
resolve most local problems without in-
terference from the bureaucrats in the
distant capital cities who are out of
touch with reality. In fact, we in the
capitals are intensely interested in the
welfare of our border citizens and work
cooperatively with State and local
authorities as well as with our Federal
counterparts in seeking solutions to sue
Department of State Bulleti
Feature
[iverse problems as river use; flood con-
rol; joint energy development and alter-
Late energy sources; environmental pro-
ection and pollution control; improve-
nent of sanitation; cooperative law en-
orcement efforts, including narcotics,
tolen vehicles, tourism, etc. I should
ike to concentrate on two areas, nar-
otics and tourism, as illustrative of this
elationship.
Narcotics. Our antinarcotics pro-
gram with Mexico has been marked by
is high a degree of cooperation as with
iny country anywhere. While it has not
>een possible to wipe out the problem
dtogether, the program has made
remendous progress in lessening the
Irug flow from Mexico to the United
States.
Illicit production of opium and
leroin in Mexico became a serious prob-
em for the United States in 1974-75,
vhen Mexican production grew to meet
he demand created by disruption of the
French connection." By 1975, 90% of
he heroin consumed in the United
[States was from Mexico.
The U.S. -Mexico cooperative an-
inarcotics program has stressed two ap-
' iroaehes: the most extensive has been
J 'he effort to eradicate illicit opium pop-
pies in the fields; a parallel approach has
ioeen bilateral law enforcement coopera-
liion in exchange of intelligence, joint in-
'estigation, interdiction, and prosecu-
ion.
The eradication campaign, primarily
i Mexican effort, has met with much
success. At first, the Mexicans used
Tianual cutting, but met difficulty in
-emote mountain areas. In 1975 the
Mexicans began to use aerially applied
lerbicides. Mexico spends approximately
£40 million on the program, mainly for
lerbicides and other operational costs.
The State Department provides approx-
imately $9 million per year in assistance
funds, mainly to purchase and maintain
reconnaissance and spray aircraft for
the Mexican Attorney General's office.
The amount of Mexican heroin
entering the United States has fallen
from 6 tons per year to 1.5 tons, 45% of
the total entering the United States.
Deaths from overdose from brown
heroin have dropped dramatically. This
law enforcement cooperative program
has immobilized many international nar-
cotics traffickers.
Tourism. Tourism earnings are im-
portant to both countries. Revenues
from tourism have accounted for almost
7% of Mexico's export earnings. U.S.
visitors provide between 60% and 70%
of Mexico's total earnings from tourism.
Tourism income is only 5% of U.S. ex-
port earnings, but approximately 25% of
U.S. tourism earnings come from Mex-
ican tourists. Under our bilateral
tourism agreement with Mexico, we
have been working with the Mexicans on
exchange of statistics, training, develop-
ment of third-country tourism, and
tourism facilitation. We have also agreed
to open a new border crossing at Otay
Mesa near San Diego and Tijuana, now
scheduled for completion in 1985.
A recent trend has been that Mex-
ican tourism to the United States is in-
creasing faster than U.S. tourism to
Mexico. Inflation in Mexico and the
overvaluation of the Mexican peso have
lessened Mexican competitiveness in
tourism. We have suggested that lower
airfares and stopover rights for U.S.
carriers (carrying U.S. passengers be-
tween certain points in Mexico) might
encourage U.S. tourism there, and we
will be pursuing this approach.
Border Trade. As to the border
itself, along the 2,000 miles from
Brownsville to San Diego most of the
goods in our bilateral trade pass. Rail
and truck traffic across the border has
expanded enormously in the last 3 years
and presents both countries with new
challenges which will have to be met
very soon. Additional border crossing
facilities are needed. We are ap-
proaching these questions in the
cooperative spirit that characterizes our
border relations.
Regional Issues
Although Mexico shares our regional
goals of self-determination, democracy,
stability, and peaceful, political resolu-
tion of conflicts, we have had sometimes
well-publicized differences over the best
means to achieve those shared goals.
The Administration has exchanged
views on a close and frequent basis with
Mexico on regional developments,
especially concerning the Caribbean
Basin area, and we intend to continue to
do so.
Mexico's decision to break relations
with the Somoza regime in May 1979
signaled a new Mexican activism in the
region and Mexico has taken several ac-
tions to influence events in Central
America, including:
• Firm support for the Sandinista
regime in Managua;
• Extensive travel by President
Lopez Portillo, including to Cuba;
• Encouragement to leftist political
groups opposing the Duarte government
in El Salvador (while keeping diplomatic
ties with the junta); and
• Generous economic assistance to
the region through a joint petroleum
financing facility with Venezuela.
This last point merits further com-
ment. The purpose of the Mex-
ican/Venezuelan oil facility is to help the
oil-poor countries of Central America
and the Caribbean (except Cuba, which
is not included). Under this arrange-
ment, oil is sold at market prices with
concessionary loans financing 30% of
sales.
We have had differences with the
Mexicans. They have publicly voiced op-
position to U.S. military support for the
Duarte government in El Salvador. They
have questioned our suspension of aid to
the Nicaraguan Government and they
have continued to maintain cordial rela-
tions with Castro (Mexico never broke
relations with Cuba, even when the rest
of the Organization of American States
did). Mexico has, however, stated its op-
position to any form of hegemony in the
hemisphere and is strongly opposed to
interference from outside. Mexico shares
our belief that economic and social prob-
lems are at the roof of regional dif-
ficulties; its oil facility, which has been
extended to such countries as El
Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua,
Panama, and Jamaica, has been aimed
at helping ease those problems.
The question is how Mexico and the
United States can emphasize the many
values which unite us in our separate
views of the Caribbean Basin. We are
working on this. These are the issues
that concern both countries and the
bounds within which we seek to main-
tain and enhance a strong and healthy
relationship with Mexico based on
mutual respect and a realization that our
fates and our futures are inextricably
bound together.
■The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
July 1981
THE SECRETARY
Peaceful Progress in Developing
Nations
Commencement address at Fairfield
University in Fairfield, Connecticut on
May 2k, 1981.
All of us pray today for the Holy
Father's full and speedy recovery. Only
a few weeks ago, it was my great
privilege to have an audience with His
Holiness when I visited Rome for the
NATO meeting. Our conversation
covered many subjects. We talked about
the search for restraint and reciprocity
in East-West relations, efforts to rein-
vigorate the Atlantic alliance, and the
President's economic proposals. I was
struck by the Pope's knowledge of inter-
national politics and especially by his
keen interest in the people of the
developing countries.
Much of the world today is engaged
in the drama of development and the
search for social justice. That this strug-
gle for a better life merits both our sym-
pathy and our support cannot be in
question. Its outcome affects our vital in-
terests and, at the same time, con-
stitutes a moral imperative. I want to
explore today our approach to this
challenging situation.
Recent American policy toward the
developing countries has been influenced
by three distortions: first, that we have
nothing to offer beyond material
assistance; second, that we are defend-
ers of the status quo; and third, that in-
tervention by the Soviet Union and its
surrogates does not really matter.
American Principles
Does America actually have anything to
say to the developing world? We some-
times hear it argued that our political in-
stitutions and economic system are ir-
relevant to the modernizing experience.
There could be no greater mistake.
America is important to developing
countries. Our principles speak to their
aspirations. Our accomplishments speak
to their future.
Our own history demonstrates that
independence, economic development,
and individual liberties thrive together.
The American Revolution was the first
modern struggle for colonial independ-
ence. Once free, our diplomacy was
dedicated to keeping us free. For these
reasons, we Americans should under-
stand the sensitivity of newly independ-
ent nations to anything that com-
promises their sovereignty.
We should also recognize that the
process of modernization means more
than simply anticolonialism. It includes
the building of political institutions
which are the best guarantee of the
achievement of human potential. Here
the United States offers a successful ex-
ample of individual liberty, government
by the consent of the governed, and a
society under the rule of law. We believe
that these principles foster the develop-
ment of the individual, free to dream his
own dreams and to work for a better
future. This is no idle fantasy; our
fathers and forefathers made it a
reality.
Another argument we often hear is
that the United States opposes change,
that we are interested only in the pres-
ervation of our prerogatives. But a
status quo of poverty and injustice must
be repugnant to us as it should be to all
nations. Thus we must recognize that
historic change may be as desirable as it
is inevitable. And we should also
recognize that this change is most effec-
tive when it is allowed to occur in an en-
vironment of peace and stability.
Soviet Intervention
The third distortion — that Soviet inter-
vention does not really matter — bears
directly on this question of peaceful
change in the developing world.
Some would argue that a policy to
promote peaceful progress in the
developing countries through economic
and humanitarian assistance is enough.
We are told that the developing nations
will eventually turn to the West for the
help they need — help that only the West
can provide. We are urged to ignore
Soviet intervention on the grounds that
Soviet influence cannot last. It is, there-
fore, convenient to conclude that
America can afford to be passive in the
face of Soviet interventionism.
The trouble with this view is not
with the facts but with the conclusion
drawn from the facts. Yes, the position
of the West will improve as the develop-
ing states turn from their memories of
colonialism to their prospects for the
future. This trend has already begun,
and we are ready to foster it. But we
cannot sit idly by in the face of illegal
Soviet intervention which seeks actively
to reverse this trend. There are compel-
ling reasons for our actions in this
regard.
Reasons for U.S. Action
First, we must be active because we
want development to succeed. Develop-
ment is one of the first victims of
conflict. Scarce resources are devoted to
arms. Energies better spent in building
up are wasted in tearing down, and
progress toward social justice is halted.
All local disputes are obviously not
made in Moscow. Yet the Soviet Union
has manifested a peculiar interest in
conflict. Internal political struggle in the
developing states calls forth the arms
that Moscow produces in abundance,
bringing an otherwise unattainable
political influence. But the costs — and
the human suffering — are paid by the
local parties. Can we ignore such suffer-
ing today while waiting for the Soviets
to lose their influence tomorrow?
Restraining Soviet intervention is an
urgent act — a task of humanitarian con-
cern.
Second, we cannot ignore Soviet ac-
tivity in the developing nations because
our passivity alters the calculations of
other countries. It makes further Soviet
expansion or Soviet-backed destabiliza-
tion appear to be inevitable. It gives the
appearance — and it is no more than an
appearance — that Marxism in the Soviet
mode is the wave of the future. This has
several implications for the policies of
the developing states. Domestically,
Marxism is seen as the vehicle for
development, when in fact it is little
more than a vehicle for keeping political
control in the hands of a small elite. In
foreign policy there is a tendency to
adopt the slogans and positions of the
Soviet Union as a form of accommoda-
tion to what is believed to be the wave
of the future. We must challenge these
myths.
Third, we must also recognize that
Soviet interventions and meddling are
not random. Moscow displays a keen in-
terest in regions where there are
Department of State Bulletin
The Secretary
strategic resources or routes vital to the
economic well-being and political in-
dependence of the West. When the
Soviet Union exploits local conditions for
its own strategic aims, the problem is no
longer local but a strategic threat to our
own survival. We cannot ignore this
threat.
Fourth, illegal Soviet intervention
calls into question the whole range of
our relations with Moscow. It violates
the restraint and reciprocity we seek in
our relations and makes a world order,
governed by the rule of international
law, all the more difficult to achieve.
We are, therefore, concerned by
Soviet intervention because:
• It harms the prospects for
development;
• It takes a terrible toll of human
suffering;
• It alters the calculations of other
nations;
• It threatens our strategic in-
terests; and
• It makes unachievable a just and
^sponsible relationship with the Soviet
Union itself.
Ultimately, what is in jeopardy is
;he dream of an international system
-narked by peaceful change and the
^solution of disputes short of war.
And as we assess these realities in
the context of the dynamics of the
developing world, our perceptions have
sometimes been clouded by an artificial
distinction between the goal of security
and the goal of development. In fact,
they reinforce each other. Security is the
best environment for peaceful progress.
Peaceful progress is the best antidote
against outside exploitation of injustice
or discontent. Our concern with security
is an essential element of our commit-
ment to peaceful progress.
It will not be easy to establish a
iimore effective and responsible relation-
ship with the Third World. And it is a
mistake to pretend that we have all of
the answers. But we must seek a more
•active and realistic policy, based on the
relationship between security and
development.
This relationship— between security
; and development — is a reflection not
just of American interests but of fun-
i damental truths about human, political,
and economic development. We are a liv-
ing, vibrant example of how the human
spirit grows. Our legacy to each other
and to the developing world must be to
provide an environment in which such
growth can occur worldwide. We must
meet challenges to that growth with
firmness and steadfastness.
As you assume the burdens of
leadership — and you will be
leaders — you will become the trustees of
this legacy. I hope you will retain the
unity of right reason and faith that you
have learned at Fairfield. I hope you will
remember, as university graduates, that
America is a place where politics and
freedom of the mind are compatible.
And when you think of your country
and its place in the world, I hope you
will be guided by the words of Abraham
Lincoln, who sought to discover the
great principal or idea that had pre-
served this nation; it was, he concluded,
"that sentiment in the Declaration of In-
dependence which gave liberty not alone
to the people of this country, but hope
to all the world, for all future time."
Press release 155.1
News Conference
of May 22
I want to say I just left Chancellor
Schmidt, and I'd like to reiterate some
of the observations he made to me,
which I received his permission to do,
before this group. The first comment
would be that the Chancellor emphasized
that he was 100% satisfied with the out-
come of his visit here to Washington. He
stated that he found no surprises which
is a confirmation of the already intense
level of consultation between Washing-
ton and Bonn. He said he found the
President to be the man he thought he
was: a thoughtful man of deep convic-
tion; a man who recognizes the essen-
tiality of sound, intimate relationships
on a bilateral basis between Bonn and
Washington; recognition of the impor-
tance of the alliance; and a keen recogni-
tion of the necessity to maintain an
East- West dialogue in the period ahead.
I think the essential bottom line of
this visit was a convergence of views be-
tween the two leaders. The question of
Western policies, vis-a-vis the Third
World, was explored in detail between
the two leaders and among the staffs of
the two sides, and there was a complete
convergence there.
The question of the two tracks, the
decision of December 1979 was dis-
cussed— the equal weight to both tracks
and the confirmation that the United
States would proceed and was already
undertaking preliminary talks with the
Soviet Union on the arms control track;
the confirmation by the Chancellor that
he was in full agreement and endorsed
totally the contents of the Rome com-
munique with respect to the two tracks.
I think the area of German defense
contributions to alliance security was
thoroughly explored. It is recognized
that, while in general we in the United
States would like to see all parties to the
alliance do more in the face of worsen-
ing military trends, we also, clearly,
recognize the great and continuing con-
tributions of the Federal Republic of
Germany to Western defense needs.
This is an historic reality of over 10
years' duration.
Lastly, I think the Chancellor was
able to effectively raise his concerns that
we in Washington, as we undertake the
revolutionary economic program of the
Reagan Administration, do so with a
clear awareness of the impact of
American economics and economic
policies on our Western family of na-
tions. I think that this was successfully
done and that President Reagan assured
the Chancellor that we were keenly
aware.
This is the essence and the bottom-
line issues that were touched upon in the
intensive 2 days of discussions, all of
which are delineated in more specific
and in very detailed terms in the joint
statement which has been issued earlier
today.
Q. In the recent time you have
been talking to Ambassador Dobrynin
three times, and as we understand it,
you have been touching in those con-
versations the subject of theater
nuclear forces (TNF) talks with the
Soviet Union. Could you enlighten a
little bit what your impression was
about the response of Mr. Dobrynin in
those three talks?
A. I wouldn't limit it to three talks.
I've had quite a few more discussions,
informally, with the Soviet Ambassador,
Mr. Dobrynin. It was the last talk that
was held about a week ago that I had in
which I debriefed him on the outcome of
the Rome discussions of the NATO min-
isterial and laid out in specific terms the
program for the initiation of TNF
negotiations, which we view as compati-
ble with reality in the context of prepar-
ing ourselves, not only on the U.S. side
but within the NATO family as well.
And, as you know, there are some
studies that we hope to have concluded
before formal negotiations commence.
I emphasize that I will discuss the
specifics, the modalities, and the timing
July 1981
The Secretary
for the formal negotiations with Foreign
Minister Gromyko at the United Na-
tions, and nothing in those discussions
would suggest that the Soviet side is not
ready and willing to participate on that
schedule, all with a view toward having
formal negotiations commence by the
end of the year. Of course, this is a two-
sided situation. We can't just lay out
categorically on our side when these
talks will start. It will take a con-
vergence of views, and I'm sure there
are considerations on the Soviet side as
well.
Q. One of your recent congres-
sional visitors quoted you as saying
there's been a massive flow of arms in-
to El Salvador again. Is this true? Is
he quoting you accurately? And are
you doing anything or do you plan to
do anything about cutting it off at the
source?
A. I think in the first place, that's
what I'd call a straw-man attack on a
straw man because I never made such a
statement. There were only two occa-
sions when such a statement might have
been made: one was a meeting before
the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
and it did not occur there. Another was
a breakfast for a group of Republican
members, and what I did say was that
the flow of arms into El Salvador
dropped off after the highlighting of that
flow and certain actions that the U.S.
Government took.
Then the major level of that flow
from Nicaragua to El Salvador, especial-
ly the airlift of those arms, had dropped
off or perhaps terminated, and that
there were now signs that different
routes were being used to introduce
arms into El Salvador, not at a massive
level — and no one has said such a
thing — and that there is also some in-
dication that there is a fragmentation of
the flow, that it is not just going ex-
clusively to El Salvador, but we find it
going into other target areas: Honduras,
Guatemala, and recently the revelations
about Colombia are very clear to all. I
also made the point that the level of
arms flowing into Nicaragua itself was
substantial and had not terminated.
Q. When you say that the Presi-
dent is about to maintain the East-
West dialogue, is that restricted to
talks about strategic weapons, the
TNF talks which are about to begin,
or do you mean by that a wider scope
of dialogue with the Soviet Union?
And, if so, could you please tell us
what the scope of it would be?
A. I don't think it's good diplomacy
to lay out the content of exchanges con-
ducted in diplomatic channels. But I will
suggest to you that we have already,
Mr. Dobrynin and myself, been engaged
in a number of discussions involving a
number of substantive issues, and there
are very few that have not been dis-
cussed in the context of the affairs that
concern the United States and the
Soviet Union, both bilaterally and in
East- West terms in a broader sense.
Q. Could you tell us what the
preparations are concerning future
SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks] talks, which are of interest in
context of the TNF talks?
A. The question was "What is being
done about future SALT talks?" And the
answer to that is that the U.S. side —
and the Soviet Union is aware of this —
is engaged in an intensive overall review
of the broad strategic arms limitation
subject. That review has not been con-
cluded; and until such time as it is con-
cluded and approved specifically by the
President, we are not prepared to enter
into bilateral discussions with the Soviet
Union.
Q. Last week you said that time
was running out in the Lebanese
crisis. Now the President is quoted as
saying that Mr. Habib has made con-
siderable progress on his mission.
Has, in fact, the crisis in Lebanon sub-
sided? And, if so, how did this come
about?
A. No, the crisis has not subsided.
It is clear it remains very, very delicate.
It is also clear that there are time con-
straints for a solution. It is also clear
that we continue to maintain a level of
hope that a peaceful solution will be ar-
rived at.
The great difficulty of situations of
this complexity is that public statements
by one side or the other, or of officials
who are participating in providing good
offices or whatever term you care to ap-
ply to the U.S. effort, sometimes compli-
cate the outcome you seek. And that
hasn't changed with respect to the Mid-
dle East situation. So we are being
necessarily very circumspect about how
we express publicly the details of the
talks that have been underway. May I,
finally, say that as long as the
President's emissary is active in the
region, we have hopes that a peaceful
outcome is achievable.
Q. It has been widely understood
that you and Secretary Weinberger
presented a well-documented picture
of the Soviet threat to the NATO
assembly recently in Brussels and in
Rome. My question is: Wouldn't it be
possible and helpful for public opinion
in Europe to publish on the same scale
a well-documented threat assessment
in the same way that may be more suc-
cessful than the white book on El
Salvador that was published?
A. I think this is a question that in-
volves alliance policy. It is a question, of
course, that requires a consensus among
the member states of the alliance, and,
as you know, it's not a new issue in
NATO. During my incumbency I recall
that it came up repeatedly. I do recall
also that — I think it was 1977 — we had
some very detailed briefings presented
in each of the capitals, that were pre-
pared by the intelligence branch of the
NATO staff in Brussels, with a very
high impact on those who witnessed it
and saw the facts as they were pre-
sented.
I think in this case I would not want
to get out in front of our NATO col-
leagues and impose my views publicly
but rather suggest to you that this issue
has been under discussion.
Q. This morning it was reported
that the State Department had con-
ducted some kind of a review of the
charges that Dr. Lefever [Ernest W.
Lefever, designate for Assistant Sec-
retary for Human Rights and Humani-
tarian Affairs] was involved in some
element of a conflict of interest. Toda;
we were told the State Department
had not conducted any such review,
and I'm wondering why not if, indeed,
there are members of the U.S. Senate
who believe that there is an evident
conflict of interest in his case? And
what is your position on his appoint-
ment at this time?
A. Clearly, Dr. Lefever is the Presi-
dent's candidate for the important post
he's been nominated for, and we con-
tinue to have confidence in Dr. Lefever
and hope that he will be duly confirmed.
With respect to your other question,
I'm not fully up to date on it. I did see
the article. We are concerned when alle-
gations are made, whether they are
substantiated or not, and I can assure
you that we are very much aware of
them and are not investigating in the
context of the question that you asked
or the article, but we are fully aware of
them and looking into them.
Q. We learned this morning that
on his way back to Bonn, Chancellor
10
Department of State Bulletir
The Secretary
Schmidt would make a touchdown in
Paris. Do you want any special
message to be conveyed to [French]
President Mitterrand, or are you pre-
paring yourself to go to Paris yourself
very soon?
A. First, I think the President
[Reagan] at the request of the
Chancellor provided him a message. I
would leave unpublic if it hadn't been
stated so already, so the Chancellor has
already asked the President if he could
convey some message. Clearly, I am
very anxious at the earliest possible time
when my counterpart is announced and
appointed — and I think that happened
today, did it not? It was supposed to — to
meet with my counterpart at the earliest
possible time, but I had nothing
definitive on that other than to suggest
that your question is both timely and
pertinent.
Q. There has been an undercur-
rent of criticism from this Administra-
tion of some of the European allies on
the grounds of an alleged rise of
pacifism or antiatomic-weapon feeling
in Europe. Is that still a concern of
the Administration? Was that issue
addressed when the President met the
Chancellor, and is there a greater
sense of sureness of our allies'
staunchness?
A. I don't like to indulge in value
judgments about the internal affairs of
allied countries. I have seen some of the
speculation, as have you, and, incidental-
ly, we have some of that in this country.
It's associated with a number of issues,
from peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to
the MX-basing controversy. It's not
unusual in open, democratic societies.
I think the answer to your question
is that we have a Rome communique
which addresses those aspects of this
issue that involve Western European
security, which is evidence of the
unanimity of view and the dedication of
the member governments of the alliance
to proceed with the necessary moder-
nization of our theater nuclear
capabilities, along with the other aspect
of the dual track that we've already
touched upon.
While no one is complacent about
both justified concerns in opposition and
those that are not justified, I don't see
any reason for us to be unduly alarmed
at this juncture. And I don't think there
was any excess laboring with that prob-
lem during this visit.
Q. The Chancellor in Washington
raised the prospect or the proposal or
the idea of the United States initiating
a new Marshall Plan for the assistance
and help of the countries in Central
America and the Caribbean, with the
support of Venezuela and Mexico,
under the condition that those coun-
tries which would be assisted would
not accept arms from the Soviet Union
or Cuba. I wonder how your Ad-
ministration is reacting to that idea.
A. You're talking about the com-
ments of the Chancellor in the Con-
gress?
Q. Yes.
A. The Chancellor spoke to me
about this issue, and I think he had
discussed it with the President of Brazil
during that President's visit to Bonn last
week. It is very compatible — although I
don't want to get ahead of reality
here — with our thinking here in the
State Department and in the inter-
Departmental deliberations on this geo-
graphic region that have already taken
place and have been underway for a
period of about, I think, 12 weeks now.
We will have something on this in the
very near future which will, again, show
some convergence of attitude.
Q. Since we last met, we have had
a visit from the Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister of Japan. After go-
ing back home, our senior ally in Asia
lost its foreign minister because of the
word "alliance" being used in the com-
munique. And there has been a series
of disclosures about American nuclear
weapons in Japan. Could you address
yourself now as to what the United
States expects of Japan in the way of
this alliance and to these stories that
the United States, in violation some-
how of our commitments, had placed
nuclear weapons in Japanese waters?
A. I think, first, I would like to
describe this controversy as an internal
matter in Japan, primarily and ex-
clusively. That doesn't mean that certain
unfortunate coincidences of events have
not converged to complicate and perhaps
intensify this problem.
I don't think it serves any useful
purpose for me here in Washington to, if
you will, intervene in an important, in-
ternal political situation and debate in
Japan other than to underline for you
that it was not, according to my under-
standing of the information we have
received officially, a consequence of the
term "alliance" in the joint statement. It
had to do with the timing and the
release of that statement and some in-
ternal difficulties within the Japanese
bureaucracy.
The point I would like to make in
answer to your question is this: We still
consider that the visit of the Prime
Minister to the United States was a
highly successful one, that the term
"alliance" itself underlines the com-
patibility of outlook with respect to our
basic values, those in Japan and here in
the United States. I believe that the
period ahead is going to demonstrate a
continuing improvement in strengthen-
ing the Japanese-American relationships,
despite the current problems inside
Japan.
Q. Would you address yourself to
these stories about the nuclear
weapons?
A. I will, to the degree that I play
for you that famous old record of every
Administration official that has ever
been asked this question since the period
of the 1960s, I think perhaps it was that
Mr. Ellsberg [Daniel Ellsberg, former
Defense Department official] or some-
body recalled, I think it was just yester-
day, and that is that we do not discuss
the presence of nuclear weapons on
foreign territory.
Q. Would you consider to speed
up the timetable of negotiations with
the Soviet Union if this would make it
easier for Western European govern-
ments to implement a decision?
A. That is a question that really has
no fiber. The simple facts are that if we
had started the talks with the Soviet
Union, we have a lot of preliminary
work to do, both here in the United
States unilaterally and within the NATO
family — the two studies that were
agreed to be conducted in the Rome ses-
sion. And, clearly, we're after concrete
results, not artificially established time-
tables. I think that this pace that has
been agreed upon and the broad outlines
of it, which is rather flexible at the far
end, as you know — it says "by the end of
the year" — provides for the necessary
flexibility for the two sides to decide
jointly when and where they want to
start the formal negotiations.
Q. On that same point, do you see
any problem in the modalities for the
TNF talks? For example, would the
United States have any objection to
the inclusion of forward-based
July 1981
11
The Secretary
systems, as a matter of discussion?
Would we like the Backfire bomber to
be included on the Soviet side?
A. Your very question underlines
the importance of lining up, if you will,
not only the U.S. approach to these and
other equally vexing and complicated
questions, but to do so in a way that our
European partners who have a stake in
the outcome are fully cognizant and
comfortable with the approach we make.
You will notice that we, again,
underline that these negotiations would
be conducted within the framework of
SALT. It is, indeed, those "gray area"
systems, as some have referred to them,
that make the conduct of the theater
nuclear discussions intimately related to
discussions which will ultimately take
place in strategic systems. But I can't
answer your question today because,
quite frankly, we have not concluded
how we will approach these questions.
Q. Do you see a problem? Certain-
ly, you must have a position on
whether you would like to have the
forward-based systems included or
not, or is that still a question in your
mind?
A. I wouldn't say it is a question or
it isn't a question, and I just don't want
to get ahead of our ultimate position
which will be presented to the President
for his approval.
Q. There seems to be a widening
gap developing in Europe between
public opinion there and formulation
of U.S. foreign policy here in Foggy
Bottom. How do you expect to bridge
that gap without publishing some of
your assessments of the so-called
"common danger" of the Soviet inten-
tions?
A. Not to be too curt or too brash, I
think as you know, over the last 5 years
that I was in Europe, there was hardly a
speech I gave that didn't touch upon
that subject and the worsening trends
between East and West in the military
area.
I think there is a plethora of
material available. That's not to belittle
your question because it was raised over
here as well, and it's a serious question.
I think one of the great problems we
have is avoiding the dangers of exag-
geration of Soviet military power and
painting them in 10-foot-tall proportions
or in underestimating what have been
very serious worsening trends between
ourselves in the West and Soviet
capabilities. I think the Atlantic Associa-
tion, just yesterday, published something
touching upon that concern, and with
some data to support it. I recall not so
long ago, Bonn publishing a white paper
on this subject — very detailed, very
specific. I think it was in 1978, as I
recall. It hasn't changed too much since
then. It has just continued at the same
level of increased spending on the part
of the Soviets.
Q. I think the question is, does
the public buy your view?
A. I can't answer that question. It
has always been controversial. I
remember my arrival in NATO in 1975
when not only would people question
whether or not there was an increase in
Soviet capability, they questioned
whether there was a threat at all.
As I look back, I would say there
has been considerable progress in both
public and official recognition of the
situation. I only refer you again to the
NATO communique emanating from
Rome and the comparable defense
ministers' communique from Brussels. I
think this issue is highlighted une-
quivocally. It has the support of all the
member nations.
Q. As I understand, the Soviets
have suggested an international con-
ference on Lebanon. Do we have any
interest in participating in such a con-
ference? And if not, can you tell us
something about what is the current
level of American-Soviet contact over
that problem?
A. First, I think we are interested
in an international conference which
would focus on the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan. That's the first order of
business, and that's our major concern
today.
Secondly, we have discussed the
situation in Lebanon with the Soviet
Union. We have been in communication
with them on it. It's too early to say
whether they make a constructive or a
counterproductive contribution to the
situation.
Thirdly, I think our effort in
Lebanon is designed first and foremost
to quiet the situation down and to play a
role which would permit the parties to
return to a status quo ante, if you will, a
situation that has prevailed in Lebanon
from 1976 until very recently. And that
is not an overly ambitious effort, but it's
a vitally important one, which would
permit longer term efforts in the direc-
tion of a return to normalcy in Lebanon
and hopefully and always, from the U.S.
point of view, the strengthening of the
central government of Lebanon and its
ultimate control.
Q. You don't see any use in having
a conference on Lebanon now?
A. No.
Q. The Chancellor and you and the
President discussed also the situation
in Poland. The Chancellor seems to
have a fairly pessimistic view on this
situation. I wonder what your assess-
ment is also in projection toward the
Polish Party Congress?
A. Yes. I wouldn't necessarily join
the premises of your question that the
Chancellor necessarily has a pessimistic
view of the situation. I don't know. That
may be so; it may be not. There was, of
course, extensive discussion of the situa-
tion in Poland between the President
and the Chancellor, and also between
the Chancellor's colleagues in the
Foreign Office and elsewhere, and me
and my colleagues.
Clearly, the bottom line of the conse
quences of those discussions are
reflected in the joint statement, and thai
is that this is a situation that remains
delicate and of great, great significance,
a profound significance, and that we are
strenuously opposed to outside interven-
tion in this situation.
There are various benchmarks, one
of which you mentioned, which could
reflect raising levels of tensions once
again. But it remains to be seen, and I
don't think anyone has an assured
assessment on that.
Q. By saying in your last answer
before one that the United States
wanted a return to the status quo
ante, you're in effect going along with
the way Mr. Begin has also described
the goal of Israel. But my question is
whether the United States also shares
the specific goals as outlined by Mr.
Begin recently, such as the removal o
all the missiles from Lebanon, as well
as the new ones placed on the Syrian
side of the border and a commitment
by Syria not to fire at Israeli planes
A. I think nothing could be more
counterproductive than for me to enga]
in commenting on positions taken by on
side or the other, and I'm not going to
do it. It's too important.
n
12
Department of State Bulleti
The Secretary
Q. Could you at least, then, give a
broader scope of when you say the
status quo ante? Is there something
you might want to add to that answer?
A. No, other than what I had said
before. I think a week or two ago that
was reported rather extensively at the
time, that we're talking about a return
to normalcy. You can't describe Lebanon
since 1976 as normal, not by any set of
circumstances. But you can quiet down
current tensions by a return to that
situation as we continue to work on the
longer range problems which would in-
volve, in my view, the ultimate creation
of a central government which is capable
of ruling all of Lebanon, an independent
and sovereign Lebanon.
Q. On the multinational force in
the Sinai, could you please confirm
that Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand have been asked to help the
United States in forming the force?
And when do you expect the force to
be in place?
A. First, I would prefer not to deny
it, and suggest there may have been
others contacted as well. There have
been what I consider to be rather pre-
mature discussions of this subject over
the last week, and we still have a great
deal to be worked out between the par-
ties, and I will just leave it there.
Q. Did you discuss your policy on
terrorism, and does the Chancellor
share your definition of terrorism?
A. No, we didn't discuss it, so I
can't speak for the Chancellor. I'm not
sure I'd presume to do so anyway; he's
very capable of speaking for himself.
Secretary Participates in
St. Louis Town Hall Forum
Press release 154.1
Secretary Haig was the guest at the
St. Louis Town Hall Forum, sponsored
by the St. Louis Regional Commerce and
Growth Association, on May 29, 1981.1
The essence of President Reagan's
foreign policy is a policy which some
describe as being less than clear at the
moment. I will accept the charge that
we have not set out some grand design,
some conceptual framework which from
day-to-day provides a scorecard for con-
temporary critics.
We have, however, established a
fundamental bedrock of national objec-
tives, and that is to recreate a world
structure hospitable to the values and
ideals of the American people — the
freedom and dignity of the in-
dividual— and to recognize that
necessary and desirable historic change
must occur through the accepted rules
of international law and the mores of
Western civilization rather than through
bloodshed, terrorism, and resort to so-
called wars of national liberation.
These objectives are structured over
what I call "four pillars," the first pillar
of which is the attempt to establish a
relationship with the Soviet Union built
on restraint and reciprocity and a clear
recognition that such a goal and such a
pillar cannot be structured until the
United States reverses the worsening
trends in military balances between East
and West.
Secondly, we have recognized the
imperative of refurbishing traditional
alliances and bilateral relationships with
those nations in the world which share
our values. This can only be done with a
new spirit of consultation, built on
reliability in the American approach to
our relationships with our friends
abroad, built on a recognition of tradi-
tional friendships, and a need for con-
sistency in manifesting our recognition
of those friendships.
Thirdly, to recognize that we have to
construct in this changing world a just
and responsible relationship with the
developing world and to do so with full
cognizance that there are changing at-
titudes in this developing world today.
Increasingly, developing leaders in black
Africa, this hemisphere, and in Asia are
recognizing that a close alignment with
Marxist-Leninism in the Soviet model
brings with it bayonets and bullets, per-
vasive presence, and frequently a client-
state relationship. Whereas relationships
with the Western industrialized world
bring economic growth, development,
technology, medicine, human develop-
ment, and participation in a world
market community where performance
and work dictate rewards.
And, finally, this new foreign policy
structured by President Reagan
recognizes first and foremost that
America cannot once again lead abroad
until it cleans up its own economic situa-
tion here at home.
I've witnessed the American dollar
decline in value over an extended period
in Europe and with it American prestige
and influence. And the impact of ill-
disciplined, runaway double-digit infla-
tion here at home on foreign perceptions
of America's ability to carry out its in-
ternational tasks is sometimes stagger-
ing.
So all of these things together repre-
sent what I call a four-tiered structure
to achieve these objectives I touched
upon.
Where do we stand in the task? The
jury, of course, is still out. But I think
it's a remarkable period in American
history, one unique in my 20 years of
public service at a relatively high level,
where I see a remarkable consensus of
the American people, the American Con-
gress, and the American executive
branch to roll up our sleeves and to put
America back in action again.
It's a source of great comfort and
pride to me. It's also a source of certain
caution that those of us in Washington
who today carry out your tasks have a
great responsibility not to abuse this
wonderful consensus that has been so
hard fought and so long in coming. I'm
optimistic that will not happen.
Q. You mentioned a new and a
somewhat different policy to the
Soviet Union. I think it is widespread
knowledge that Secretary [of
Agriculture John R.] Block had talked
earlier on in the campaign of perhaps
using the food weapon, I think was
the word he used — that's been toned
down some. I know you and he are
talking soon with Soviets and Chinese
alike. You in China, probably in a
couple of weeks. Is there any hope
that we may use that one thing that
we produce so well — food— to help us
achieve the foreign policy goals that
you're searching for?
A. That's a very perceptive ques-
tion, and I suspect thei-e's more to it
July 1981
13
The Secretary
than just the words of it, since we have
just lifted the grain embargo on the
Soviet Union. And I must be very
careful not to say something to con-
tradict that reality.
I have always maintained, and I
know President Reagan has always
maintained, that food alone — agricul-
tural restraints or sanctions, if you
will — are not adequate to exercise the
kind of sanction power that you might
need from time to time in international
affairs. The President himself has ex-
pressed repeatedly before his election
and before his inauguration that he in-
tended to lift the grain embargo. I spoke
about it all around the country because I
had had some firsthand experiences in
the early 1970s with the application of a
grain embargo, and we frankly shot
ourselves in the foot.
From the President's point of view, I
think that he felt — and correctly — that
the value of his word, his commitment,
was a very precious commodity that he,
himself, would not squander. He did
restrain himself for some 4 months and
I would think primarily as a result of my
counsel to him to go slowly, to be sure
that the Soviet Union would not misread
the lifting of the grain embargo.
A grain embargo alone is too nar-
rowly based, and in diplomatic terms it
could have caused us increasing prob-
lems as other partners — those which
share our values in Europe and in
Asia — were less than strict in their ap-
pliance of that sanction. Increasingly,
the American farmer would have been
the isolated bearer of the burdens of this
grain embargo.
I would hope that in the future,
should it ever be necessary — for Poland
or some other situation — to apply sanc-
tions to the Soviet Union or any other
state, that it would be approached in a
far more broadly based way— trade
across the board and other sanctions
across the board, rather than to ask one
segment of the American society to bear
alone the burden of disciplining an inter-
national problem.
Q. Can we use that food to
bargain with the Soviets in perhaps
attaining certain kinds of goals, cer-
tain attempts to have them see things
more clearly in the kind of world that
you stated the Reagan Administration
would like to live in?
A. I don't discount the importance
of America's greatest single and most
successful accomplishment and that's
from the agricultural sector, because, in-
deed, that is one of the greatest ac-
complishments of our American system.
But I would not delude myself, and I
don't think others should, that a
disciplined Soviet or Marxist leader is
necessarily going to modify fundamental
policy decisions which are based on their
own vital national interests even by such
an important factor as food — especially
if it's a unilateral American attitude.
There are other sources available and
there are transfer capabilities from
other customers of the United States, as
we saw in this last grain embargo,
where we would restrain wheat, sell it
to other countries, it would be refined
into flour, and shipped into the Soviet
Union. I think you have to be extremely
careful in your hopes, and there is also a
very important human aspect to that
question which I won't go into.
Q. We point to your China trip in
a couple of weeks. There's been some
question as to whether or not the
Reagan Administration has a China
policy. We have the friends in China;
we have the friends in Taiwan. Are
the two compatible under the Reagan
policy?
A. Let me assure you that Presi-
dent Reagan does have a China policy,
and I've been exposed to it first-hand
from day one so I'm very familiar with
it, and it is as follows.
We recognize the strategic im-
perative of strengthening and improving
and normalizing our relationships with
the People's Republic of China; there
can be no question about that.
Secondly, we see no incompatibility
with that and both our legal and moral
obligations to abide by the provisions of
the Taiwan Relations Act which require
a degree of relationship with the people
of Taiwan. This is an unofficial relation-
ship in government-to-government
terms, and we see these as completely
compatible and two tracks which we can
pursue successfully. And I hope to con-
firm that once again with the People's
Republic government this coming
month.
Q. Since Africa is probably one of
the largest storehouses of raw
materials and the future of the indus-
trial world, my question concerns
Africa. Since the United States is
already committed to free elections in
Namibia, which will ultimately lead to
independence, has the United States
any plans for aid or assistance in the
development of an area such as
Namibia, thereby precluding another
Angola situation?
A. First, let me recall the informal
remarks I made at the outset and that
was that we clearly must seek a just and
responsible relationship with the
developing world — and that includes
southern Africa and maybe especially
southern Africa.
Secondly, let me remind you that
this Administration was the highest
donor to the recent contributions of the
donor nations to Zimbabwe in southern
Africa. This Administration was the
highest donor to the recent Geneva con-
ference on African refugees — black
African refugees — most of whom,
unfortunately, were the victims of
Marxist-Leninist activity in Africa.
We have set about in the context of
the U.N. Resolution 435 to lend all of
our weight to the objective of achieving
an internationally recognized independ-
ent Namibia, and to do so within the
framework of 435, but to do so in such a
way that we elaborate that framework
from the current text of the U.N. resolu-
tion to include certain constitutional
guarantees.
Those guarantees would provide for
the rights of minorities. They would pro-
vide for a recurrent vote by the popula-
tions— not one man, one vote, one
time — and they would provide for
nonalignment, true nonalignment, and
nonforeign presence in Namibia.
We have stated, and I would restate
today, that there's an empirical relation-
ship between the ultimate independence
of Namibia and the continuing Soviet
and Cuban presence in Angola.
Although we intend to proceed
unilaterally along the line toward
Namibian independence, we cannot ig-
nore this empirical relationship.
Finally, let me tell you that we just
had a visit from the South African
Foreign Minister in Washington, Mr.
Pik Botha; and, while we are not totally
satisified that we have a convergence of
view, I think we have enough confidence
as a result of those discussions to sug-
gest that this process can continue
within 435 and in the context of the so-
called contact group in Europe — Britain,
France, West Germany, and
Canada — which has been working on
this problem with us.
I remain optimistic, although it's a
very complex and difficult task. And
ultimately, if we succeed, there will, of
course, be incentives to insure that that
success is carried forward by necessary
assistance to a new government. [Ap-
plause]
14
Department of State Bulletin
The Secretary
Q. The question concerns
Afghanistan. Could you give us an up-
date on what the military situation is
there now? And also what the Ad-
ministration's policy is with respect to
assistance, direct or indirect, to the
Afghan freedom fighters?
A. You used all the right language,
and I liked especially your reference to
freedom fighters. [Applause] The situa-
tion has clearly been something far less
than I would anticipate the Soviet
leadership expected when they con-
ducted their second intervention in
Afghanistan. You know they conducted
two.
The first was to install a puppet
leader a year before the actual invasion.
It was unfortunate that at that time I
read in the editorial of an unnamed
Eastern newspaper, "Stay Cool in
Kabul." And that was Eastern press
jargon to suggest that we should not be
concerned about that initial Soviet in-
tervention in the installation of a puppet
leader in Kabul.
The step from that, unchallenged, to
the massive intervention of Soviet forces
a year later is a very small step to take.
And I would say that we in the West
have some obligation and some culpabili-
ty for that second step having occurred
in the first place.
The Soviets are not succeeding. I
wouldn't want to suggest the freedom
effort is overwhelming and is achieving
major military successes, but the control
that the Soviets would like to exercise
over the countryside in Afghanistan is
very, very limited. It involves a cir-
cumventerental road which they control
periodically and some of the cities which
they control, but the countryside is a
very risky place for Soviet forces.
The last part of your question I'm
going to fall back on an old habit, and
that is, never pop off in public about
things that you are doing or may want
to do or you will create all the pressures
that are necessary to prevent you from
doing anything at all. [Laughter and ap-
plause]
Q. Along with the plans to in-
crease the U.S. military defenses, are
there any associated plans to improve
our civil defense posture, particularly
as it relates to chemical and biological
warfare?
A. First, let me suggest that I
would prefer to let my friend, Cap
Weinberger, field that question. I can
tell you that in general the Defense
Department and our own political-
military policy planners are very, very
conscious of the low state today of our
readiness in civil defense.
We are extremely conscious of the
great assets applied by the Soviet Union
to that sector of their defense capability.
Unfortunately, we're dealing with a
number of conflicting priorities. I would
suspect that as important as this subject
is, it is not quite as high on the priority
list as some of our other defense needs.
But it will get increased resources and
increased attention under Cap
Weinberger and President Reagan, I can
assure you.
With respect to those two more
sophisticated areas, we have been
engaged, as you know, and just won a
very important vote in the Congress — a
vote that allocated some $20 million to
create a binary offensive capability in
the chemical weapons area. We felt this
was necessary, because since 1969 the
United States has absolutely left untend-
ed its chemical weapons inventory while
the Soviet Union has built steadily.
It's been our view that you cannot
sit down and negotiate unless you have
something in your larder with which to
talk. That's why we've been totally un-
successful in that span of 11 years to get
the Soviet Union to sit down with us
and arrive at some coherent restraints
which we would all, of course, seek.
There is no activity in the
radiological area because it is banned by
international agreement, subscribed to
by both the Soviet Union and ourselves.
Q. How can President Reagan,
and I presume with the concurrence of
the State Department, justify the sup-
plying of the AWACS [airborne warn-
ing and control system aircraft] and
other sophisticated — highly sophisti-
cated— weapons to Saudi Arabia as a
defense against Russia when the
Saudis themselves say that— practical-
ly have said it themselves that they
want them as an offensive weapon
against the very existence of the State
of Israel? And even with our being
there to watch these weapons and so
forth, isn't it quite a danger that they
could become used for the purpose of
which I have just stated?
A. I think that's a very important
and certainly very urgent contemporary
question in Washington today. First, let
me challenge one of the premises of
your question and that is that I am not
aware, and I seriously doubt, that
there's been any exposition on the part
of the Saudi Arabian leadership that
would attribute the employment of
AWACS to the motives you subscribed
it to in your question.
Secondly, I think it's vitally impor-
tant for Americans to understand that
the situation in the Persian Gulf area
and in Southwest Asia at large has
changed profoundly over the last few
years. We've had the collapse of the
Shah of Iran, who was the traditional
policeman of that area, who frequently
combated Soviet-inspired and Marxist-
inspired insurgencies in a number of the
sheikdoms, and whose very presence
and armed forces and overall demeanor
were a stabilizing force. With his col-
lapse, the outbreak of the conflict be-
tween Iran and Iraq, uncertainties have
grown.
We have had, of course, the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and no prospect
at the present time for their orderly
withdrawal.
Thirdly, we have had the situation
develop in the Horn of Africa which
poses a dagger-like threat to the viabili-
ty of the oil fields in Saudi Arabia which
are fundamentally important, not only to
U.S. interests but to Western in-
dustrialized interests at large.
Fourth, we have seen the takeover
of South Yemen by Soviet-inspired in-
surgencies and recent efforts about 18
months ago, or 24 months ago, to over-
take and to overwhelm the North
Yemen border with Saudi Arabia.
I think it's vitally important for
Americans to understand that Saudi
Arabia's security, its general pro-
Western orientation — And, if one may
ask the question, I ask one to think back
as recently as a week ago at Geneva
where the Saudi Arabian Government
was the leading advocate of no increases
in OPEC [Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries] oil prices and
where the Saudi Arabian Government
has been involved in high levels of pro-
duction to actually create a glut de-
signed to drive oil prices down which are
in the interest of Western, industrialized
societies and developing societies as
well.
I think I would suggest that our
questioner reflect on the past 3 weeks,
the anguishing work of Phil Habib [the
President's emissary to the Middle
East], who I just left in Washington,
who has asked and received great
assistance from the Government of
Saudi Arabia as we seek to reestablish a
status quo normalcy in an extremely
15
The Secretary
dangerous situation which continues to
be dangerous today.
I think we must be very, very
careful in our value judgments about the
importance of this provision of arms to
Saudi Arabia which are designed to de-
fend against the threats I just spoke to.
I would also emphasize that the AWACS
itself is a defensive weapon whose
technical capabilities are somewhat more
limited than some of the misinformed
suggestions that we are reading in the
press today.
I don't mean to suggest by that that
our friends in Israel do not have reason
to be concerned. We have been in the
process of discussing this issue with
them. I've discussed it with them.
We are in the process now of for-
mulating the modalities for the sale of
this system to Saudi Arabia, and I would
suggest that prudent people who may be
concerned hold their fire until they see
and are able personally to assess what
these modalities will be. I think you'll
find they're far less frightening than the
questioner might have suggested.
Q. Following that meeting with
you. President Reagan, and Mr. Habib
this morning, did you send him
away — back to this shuttle diplo-
macy— with any special tools or any
special instructions that we might
want to know about?
A. One of the greatest tools we can
give him is not to pop off in public and
complicate his tasks at the cutting edge
of diplomacy. [Laughter]
I just left President Reagan and
Phil, and we had a very long discussion
where the President was asked to be
brought abreast of the diplomatic efforts
undertaken by Phil. These are efforts all
in the direction of the objective of peace
and stability in the area.
I notice some of the press suggest
the mission is a failure. Nothing could be
farther from the truth. Four weeks ago
when this mission was launched, we
were on the verge of conflict, the expan-
sion of which could not be predicted.
We've had 4 weeks of, let's say,
reasonable peace. We hope and we have
perceived that none of the parties ap-
pear to want a broader conflict. That's a
very good premise from which to con-
tinue this effort.
This effort will continue. Mr. Habib
only returned home because there was a
natural break in the dialogue among the
parties, and it gave him an opportunity
to bring the President abreast of the
situation. He will be returning shortly.
We haven't fixed the date yet. The proc-
ess will continue. We continue to have
hope, although it's an extremely complex
and anguishing problem, and it still re-
mains in my view somewhat of a long-
shot. But with each passing day, we've
accomplished greater chances for the
maintenance of peace which we seek.
Q. The Strategic Arms Limitation
Treaty has been stalled for over a year
and a half. What is the policy of this
Administration toward those negotia-
tions, and how soon will we see some
action?
A. First, I think if you watch
carefully, you'll see there has been some
action. We have already committed
ourselves to a time schedule to initiate
discussions — formal negotiations — with
the Soviet Union on theater nuclear
arms control. These are the systems
deployed in Western Europe and
deployed in the Soviet Union which
threaten Western Europe. These discus-
sions will be conducted within the
framework of SALT. I will discuss the
actual modalities and timing with
Foreign Minister Gromyko this
September at the United Nations, and I
would anticipate shortly thereafter the
formal negotiations would begin.
With respect to what we referred to
as SALT II, a lot of Americans seem to
think SALT II was stalled out on the
rocks of Afghanistan. Let me tell you
nothing could be further from the truth.
SALT II was dead in the American Con-
gress before Afghanistan, and it fell on
its own substantive shortcomings.
Now we are in the process of
reassessing. It is President Reagan's
policy to support arms control negotia-
tions which are verifiable, which are
balanced and just and equitable, and
which bring about reductions — actual
reductions — in levels of nuclear arma-
ment and don't provide functional
highways for the continuing growth,
which is one of the problems with SALT
II.
So I anticipate these studies will
continue on the U.S. side, that there will
be discussions at the appropriate time,
and that that timing itself is also going
to be a reflection of that term "linkage,"
other aspects of Soviet international
behavior, as it should be.
Q. Considering Richard Nixon's
background in China, wouldn't he be
the best man for Ambassador to the
People's Republic of China?
A. Well — [Laughter and applause]
Certainly not an unserious or unimpor-
tant question — a very important one and
very much justified, I think, by the
former President's qualifications and
background. But I don't anticipate it will
be happening.
Q. Earlier this month an event oc-
curred in which the repercussions
have not totally been felt. This event
in Europe is the election of France of
a Socialist government in which the
Communists will obviously have a
part. This may represent once again
the fall of France.
During the years of which the
U.S. Government foreign policy has
been based on appeasement to the
Soviet Union, France has stood up
against the Communists — in Africa
and in the Arab Horn of Africa and in
other Arab nations.
What now, since the Government
of France has fallen, can the United
States do to pick up the slack to stop
the Soviet Union from continually ex-
panding?
A. You've got a lot of very tough
questions wrapped into one there.
First, let me tell you I would not
necessarily accept the premise of your
question that there will inevitably be
Marxist participation in the Government
of France under the Mitterrand electoral
mandate. I think a very important
aspect of that question will be arrived at
in the parliamentary elections which will
be coming late in the month of June.
But frankly this is an internal question.
The important thing to remember is tha"
France is a trusted, a true, and in-
valuable ally and that the formulation of
their internal government is France's
business.
Needless to say, we will watch that
with great care, and the outcome of the
ultimate government will have an in-
fluence on ultimate relationships in-
evitably, as it always does. But I think
at this juncture, it's far too soon to draw*
the kinds of conclusions that your ques-
tion suggested.
Q. Can you tell if the United
States would be willing to join the
Soviet Union in a total withdrawal of
forces from Europe?
A. Let me suggest to you there
might be some anomalies, very
dangerous ones, in that the United
States is what? — how many thousand
miles away? — and it takes months to
build up forces. The Soviet Union is
1R
Department of State Bullet i
The Secretary
right on the border, and I could not
imagine anything more self-defeating
than a concept that would visualize total
withdrawal of both sides.
If you're talking about total disarma-
ment by both sides, why, that's another
question which I'm afraid has certain
ephemeral overtones that are mind-
aoggling for me to perceive.
If you're talking about the recent
proposal in the CSCE [Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe]
made by the Government of France and
oelatedly supported by the U.S. Govern-
ment after President Reagan came into
office to support a confidence-building
set of proposals in a zone from the
Atlantic— that is, the European shores
}f the Atlantic— to the Ural Mountains
vvhere there would be notification of
'orce movements that could be wor-
■isome to either side, then we are in the
orocess of supporting and fleshing out
such a proposal today. Then I think it
nas certain values, and that's why I
ecommended to President Reagan that
we join the French and the British and
our other Western partners in support-
ng it,
Q. What is the current status in
he Iran-Iraq situation? Is this a lull
>efore the storm and perhaps Mr.
labib's next assignment, or do you
;ee that it could go into a permanent
'unk here?
A. There are people being killed.
There are people dying every day in this
•onflict. But the level and the intensity
)f conflict has been very, very low for
in extended period.
American policy has been to be ab-
solutely and strictly impartial in this
onflict, and we intend to remain that
ivay for the foreseeable future.
There are a number of efforts
inderway. I just met with our Swedish
:olleague, Olaf Palme, this past week in
ny office, and he has been undertaking,
mder the auspices of the United Na-
tions, a peacekeeping effort. There have
Deen also peacekeeping efforts by the
Arab regimes in the area. Thus far there
nave been no signs of progress, and I
would not predict any progress in the
foreseeable future, but I think Mr.
Habib will leave the Lebanon situation,
delighted at the prospect of returning to
that happy retirement that he just left,
as a great patriot that he is.
Q. Poland now owes Western
banks $29 billion. The total loans to
the Third World and Communist na-
tions are over $500 billion. A default
by any of these nations could cause
severe economic problems for our
economy. What is being done so that
we're not at the mercy of a blackmail
situation, considering that many of
our banks are holding these loans?
A. A great deal has been done.
We've already contributed well over
$500 million to the Polish Government in
commodity credits. We have just joined
the other 14 donor nations, which hold
these debts you are speaking of, to defer
for a year the outstanding interest or
the carrying responsibilities of the Polish
debt, which is in the order of magnitude
precisely as you described it.
In addition to that, during the recent
visit of the Deputy Premier to Washing-
ton about 3 weeks ago, we gave another
$72 million of special rate food com-
modities. That's a substantial sum
already provided to deal with the prob-
lem you raise, not only in terms of the
internal problem but the debt-servicing
problem as well.
We are now, I think, at the end of
that road for this year with this recent
deferral action. We do anticipate that
the Soviet Union has a very heavy
obligation, and not to look exclusively to
Western industrialized nations to con-
tribute to relieving these internal prob-
lems in Poland today.
Q. A lot of us have been watching
Africa for the last 10-12 years, and
we've been really concerned about
Qadhafi over in Libya and all the
things that he's done.
We've been reading now in the
paper, and is it a possibility that there
is a growing lack of support of
Qadhafi by the people? And, if there
is, would there be any possibility of
the people succeeding against
Qadhafi?
A. That's a difficult question. You
are correct: How could it be otherwise,
when the resources — and they are
substantial— received by Qadhafi from
his natural resources — oil — are almost
exclusively diverted to the purchase of
armaments, the training of international
terrorists, and the conduct of direct in-
terventionism in the neighboring states
in northern Africa, the most recent of
which being the invasion of Chad.
It's clear that the very modest
population of Libya who witnesses these
extravagant expenditures for objectives
that do not meet their vital interests
must be increasingly asking themselves
whether or not they have a visionary as
the head of state.
I don't have to tell you that we in
the West are increasingly concerned
about Mr. Qadhafi's lawless activity in a
direct military sense and in his support
for bloodshed and terrorism worldwide.
As recently as 2 weeks ago, he again
espoused the right of the Libyan people
to destroy their opponents.
We don't mind the rhetoric, but
when he applies assets, training, and in-
dulges in work— even in this hemisphere
and in these United States— which are
reflective of that leadership, then we
have a problem and one which we in the
Western world are going to have to give
increasing attention to and coordinate to
deal with.
Q. Can we expect help from our
Western allies in the whole fight
against terrorism? Have they pledged
their support to that?
A. I think there's a growing con-
sciousness of the problem of interna-
tional terrorism which is something dif-
ferent than the so-called wars of libera-
tion. It's probably phase one of a war of
liberation.
We have continued to be plagued.
We've had four major hijackings to deal
with since this Administration has been
in office. I find a growing sense of con-
cern. There was reference to it in recent
communiques among our allies, and I
think it's a question of leadership
emanating from the United States. I am
very comfortable that our Western
European partners will work with us.
Q. My question has to do with the
vote earlier this month in the World
Health Organization when the United
States cast the only opposing vote
about the code of marketing breast
milk substitutes. Considering your
statements of how dependent we are
upon the developing nations for
resources, how do you perceive this
kind of thing affecting diplomatic
relations?
A. I think it's difficult to say, and I
would make the broad observation that
this is a difficult and was an anguishing
question for the President and for the
Administration — especially for our AID
Administrator, Mr. McPherson.
We did feel that the forum is not ap-
propriate to engage in that kind of a
restrictive activity; and there are very,
very serious and well-meaning people on
both sides of that issue, as is always the
case on tough decisions. I think it re-
mains to be seen what the consequences
JLZ_
The Secretary
will be of that decision for American
diplomacy.
Q. I understand that the Reagan
Administration looks favorably on the
new Administration in Jamaica, Ed-
ward Seaga, and I was wondering if
you could outline basically your
policies toward Jamaica as a country
and maybe tell us anything about any
other planned assistance without pop-
ping off in public. And any other
thoughts you might have on the Carib-
bean in general.
A. I think a reflection of President
Reagan's interest in and support for the
Seaga government in Jamaica was
underlined by the reality that he was our
first, official foreign visitor in
Washington.
Of course, we are extremely in-
terested in the future development of
the Seaga regime, because it represents
the first regime that has cast off in the
Caribbean basin the extreme Marxist-
Socialist approach to government.
Mr. Seaga inherited an economic
shambles left to him by his predecessor.
So we have been engaged in a broad-
front program involving not only federal
support for Mr. Seaga but, more impor-
tantly, activity in the private sector. At
the time of Mr. Seaga's visit, I asked
David Rockefeller, in behalf of the Presi-
dent, to chair a group of the private sec-
tor here in America. The Canadians
have done the same, and they've been
coordinating together to get private in-
vestment going into Jamaica, and with
some promising success.
Just yesterday we got an agreement
to provide the convention for Jamaica
which the Prime Minister addressed in
the Parliament yesterday. So I want you
to know that we consider this to be a
vitally important issue for the whole
security of the Caribbean basin, that
Jamaica succeeds as the model state
that has cast off the shackles of extreme
leftist activity.
Secretary Participates in
Foreign Policy Conference
■Press release 17(i.
Secretary Haig participated in a Na-
tional Foreign Policy Conference for
U.S. Editors and Broadcasters at the
Department of State on June 2, 1981. l
First, I want to thank you for that
warm reception, the kind I so richly
deserve and so seldom receive. [Laugh-
ter] You know, I have been basking in
the adulation of official Washington
recently. Some of it has to do with my
rhetoric.
The other day, when I was speaking
to a group of editors here in Washington
at their annual meeting, I was intro-
duced by Mike O'Neill, of The New York-
Daily News, and he said, "Secretary
Haig is the most articulate spokesman
we have had in Washington since
Dwight Eisenhower." [Laughter] And I
said, "Thank you very much, Mike. That
probably explains why I've never re-
ceived a Pulitzer Prize. It may explain
why I'll never have to give one back."
[Laughter and applause]
But I want you to know things are
getting better. There was a story in The
Washington Star the other night that
said, "Haig has now taken to reading the
text, and he does it quite well. It's only
when he gets to ad libbing in the
question-and-answer period that
everything becomes a shambles again."
[Laughter]
So I want you to know, this after-
noon I haven't brought a text; and I said
there was a lesson to be drawn from
that, as I fired my speech writer the
other day.
I think one of the problems is com-
munication and jargon. You know, I
think back to my experiences in NATO
and I was raised in the military
discipline, so sometimes my military
jargon is a little different. On this occa-
sion, we had a specialist from The New
York Times who was doing a study on
"the military mind," and he spent 2 days
in our headquarters interviewing
military figures.
Finally, one night I took him on my
helicopter to Bonn, from our head-
quarters in Mons, Belgium. As he got in
the plane with his tablet, he leaned up
and tapped the pilot on the shoulder and
said, "Say, young fellow, when was the
last time you've been out with a member
of the opposite sex?"
The fellow looked at him and said, "I
think it was about 1950."
He said, "You poor devil."
Then the fellow looked at his watch
and said, "Well, it's only 2030 now."
[Laughter]
So you see, sometimes it's just a
question of the jargon.
There has been some comment
recently that perhaps we have some con-
fusion about our conceptual framework
for President Reagan's foreign policy;
and let me assure you, nothing could be
further from the truth. We have, cer-
tainly, a fundamental objective that we
seek — and that, first and foremost, is to
help to structure an international en-
vironment that is hospitable, at least, to
the values that we Americans cherish —
freedom of the individual and the dignity
of the individual in society.
We feel also that this can only be
achieved in an international environmenl
in which necessary and desirable historic
changes occur within the accepted rules
of international law and the mores of
modern civilization, and not by resort to
force, bloodshed, terrorism, and so-
called wars of national liberation.
Now we have structured this on fou
fundamental pillars: the first of which is
to recognize that the fundamental objec-
tives will be unachievable until we
establish a relationship with the Soviet
Union that is based upon restraint and
reciprocity in our dealings with them.
We have concluded long since that such
restraint and reciprocity must be ac-
companied by an improvement in the
worsening military balances between
East and West, and especially the
United States and the Soviet Union.
The second pillar that we are struc-
turing our foreign policy on is the
recognition that the United States must
refurbish traditional alliances — NATO,
ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, U.S.
security treaty], and others — that we
must establish a relationship with those
who share common values with us
around the world and do so with a
greater level of consultation so that our
own policies are perceived to reflect an
understanding and sensitivity to the
needs of our friends and allies
worldwide.
That means that we have to
eliminate systematically a number of
contemporary aggravations, ranging in
number of functional areas from human
18
Department of State Bulleti
The Secretary
rights, nonprofileration, and fundamen-
tal economic policies as well.
Thirdly, we believe that in the
period ahead — and it is increasingly im-
portant in this period ahead — we focus
on establishing a just and responsible
relationship with the developing world.
In that process, we are acutely con-
scious of a growing trend in which Third
World leaders and Third World people
are increasingly leery of close associa-
tion with the Russian Marxist-Leninist
model which has brought with it merely
bullets and armaments, a pervasive
presence, and, in special cases where a
strategic geographic objective is served,
a client-state relationship. We are not
about to proceed in our efforts to
establish a just and responsible relation-
ship with the developing world in such a
way that we will have the practical con-
sequences of reversing this growing
favorable trend.
That underlines why the United
States was one of the major contributors
to Zimbabwe's aid requirements this
past year. It underlines why this Ad-
ministration was the highest donor to
the black African refugee conference in
Geneva 2 months ago. And it underlines
why we are dedicated, within the
general framework of U.N. Resolution
435, to seek an independent, interna-
tionally recognized Namibia — but to do
so in a way in which it is clear that we
also recognize the sensitivities and con-
cerns of the Government of South Africa
in this process.
Lastly, and the fourth pillar upon
which we structure our foreign policy to-
day is one in which we clearly recognize
that the United States cannot proceed to
reestablish its modified, though tradi-
tional, leadership role internationally if
we preside over an economic shambles
here at home and that a key aspect of
successful foreign policy is an orderly,
productive, domestic economy. That is a
fundamental aspect of Reagan foreign,
as well as domestic, policy.
As we look at the prospects for the
achievement of the objectives I have
outlined under the four pillars we have
cited, of course the jury is still out — as
it will be for some time. But I think we
go about our task with the clear recogni-
tion that there is an historic change here
in America. There is a new consensus
among the American people, the
American legislature, and the executive
branch to roll up our sleeves and get
back in an active international role and
to provide the assets in the military sec-
tor that are necessary to insure our ef-
fectiveness in that role.
Now I want to tell you that this Ad-
ministration, those of us here at the
Department of State, and I know the
President, are acutely aware that we
have a responsibility not to abuse this
new-found consensus which is so promis-
ing for America. Therefore, we go about
our tasks with a great degree of
diligence and perhaps not so much con-
ceptual "hoop-la" as some would like.
But while the jury remains out, I am
certainly optimistic that we are making
progress along all the lines I have just
listed.
Q. The warnings that the Ad-
ministration gave to you in regards to
the weapons to El Salvador have
resulted in less weapons coming into
El Salvador. However, we still know
that some weapons are going. We
have the situation in Grenada where a
submarine and a big airport — military
airport — is being built. What else can
the United States do to stop Cuba as a
center of subversion for the Central
and the Caribbean areas?
A. I think it's always prudent not to
lay out explicitly in a public forum con-
tingency planning and future planning,
because it usually reduces your flexibili-
ty to execute it in the first instance —
and that is certainly not untrue of this
particular situation.
It is true that our policies with
respect to El Salvador have had the
practical consequence of reducing the
flow of illicit arms into El Salvador to-
day. But they have not terminated, and,
indeed, there are high levels of wor-
risome armaments flowing, especially in-
to Nicaragua but also into such ter-
ritories as Guatemala, Honduras, and
Colombia.
History never tells what would have
happened if you had pursued another
course; but several of the local and inter-
national figures that I have spoken to
recently have suggested that had we
done something less than we did in El
Salvador, we might be facing another
totalitarian regime there today.
I think it is awfully important, with
the controversy associated with this
issue, that we recognize that the level of
assistance to El Salvador has thus far
been very, very modest in dollar terms,
especially in the security-related area.
We are talking on an order of
magnitude of military trainers of about
50 to 55 — some of whom have already
been withdrawn. But this level of
assistance is roughly one-third of what
we have been providing in the economic
support area to that government.
It is clear that Castro's Cuba con-
tinues to engage in subversive activity
throughout the hemisphere. It is clear
that we have laid out clearly the unac-
ceptability of this activity in a long-term
sense to the United States and, I think,
to many of our allies in the hemisphere.
It remains to be seen whether or not the
Cuban leadership — which is itself
plagued with economic dilemmas of a
tremendous character at home — is going
to continue to indulge in this activity
which is not limited to this hemisphere
but which involves the exportation of
troops to the Continent of Africa —
literally thousands of miles away —
where they are also engaged in similar
activities.
I would say that it is important for
all to recognize that this does not meet
the vital interests of those who share
our conception of a world that permits
peaceful, historic change and welcomes
it.
In the period ahead we will be en-
gaged in additional measures designed
to deal with this — and we are going to
deal with it, not in an exclusively
security-oriented fashion but rather with
a clear awareness that we must also
deal with the situations, the cause, ef-
fects, that make insurgency and external
interventionism possible and acceptable
in the target areas. That means
economic and social development. These
will be the twin approaches that we will
pursue, but I am going to avoid
referencing any specific measures.
Q. I am from Miami. I was with
the assembly of the ASNE [American
Society of Newspaper Editors], and I
asked you about the intervention of
Castro in Central America. And now I
have to ask you something about the
news that appeared this morning in
The Washington Post about the Soviet
tanks that have been sent to
Nicaragua and to Central America.
That means that the Nicaraguan
Government is receiving very heavy ar-
maments from the Soviet Union. Am I
correct?
A. First, I think you are referring
to a newspaper report.
Q. Yes. [Laughter]
A. I am not being critical, but I am
going to be very careful about making
reference to newspaper reports which I
July 1981
19
The Secretary
haven't had an opportunity to study and
don't know the source of that report.
I can say this categorically: We have
been watching with increasing concern
the levels of sophisticated armaments
being provided to the Government of
Nicaragua, transshipped from Soviet,
Eastern European, Libyan, and
ultimately through Cuban assembly
areas into El Salvador.
And we are also concerned about the
high level of manpower being assigned
by the Sandinista government in
Nicaragua to purely military
duties— both in the active sense and at
an extremely high level in the reserve
sense. We do not see any threats in the
local area that would justify that level of
manpower, nor do we visualize a re-
quirement for the sophistication in the
level of armaments that we see have
already arrived and which we under-
stand are programmed to arrive. Let me
just leave it there.
Q. On the board outside this
room, under your name, are 44 policy-
level posts in the State Department.
There are only 16 names opposite
them. Is that enough people to run the
store? Are you satisfied with that?
And what is holding up the implemen-
tation of your staff?
A. Not at all. But don't let that list
deceive you. These are fellows that are
through the system, formally confirmed,
and are at their desks in a confirmed
status.
Almost every vacancy, from the
Assistant Secretary level up, has been
filled. I think we only have one that re-
mains to be filled. But the process of
running them through the Hill confirma-
tion process — with other legislative
agenda items facing the committee—
And I would not be exaggerating a
bit to suggest that some of our conflict-
of-interest rules that have emerged in
recent months or years are mind-
boggling in the administrative burden
that they impose. But we are well-
staffed, well-manned, and are function-
ing every day. Some of our fellows sort
of back into the pay table because they
haven't had their rank formally assign-
ed. [Laughter]
Q. Are we sending arms to
Afghanistan and, if we're not, why
aren't we?
A. There again, there's an old
bureaucratic game that when you're
asked about sensitive questions and
when you're talking about contingency
planning, the very act of discussing
them publicly makes it impossible to pur-
sue them. I would have no comment on
that subject.
Q. You don't think that the
American people are entitled to the
answer to that question?
A. I think that's a hard way of put-
ting the question which would be tanta-
mount to: "When did you stop beating
your wife?" So I'm not going to answer
in the context of your question. But I do
think that the President has commented
on this subject, and I think I commented
on it in a recent interview in U.S. News
& World Report where I said the Presi-
dent said if the freedom fighters were to
ask for assistance that we would be very
serious about considering meeting that
request.
I say the issue involved here is a
double standard. It is clear the Soviet
Union insists, and has historically and
categorically insisted, on its rights to
support such freedom movements or
liberation movements in target areas of
their selection. It hardly seems consist-
ent that they could oppose such activity
on the part of the West under similar
circumstances.
Q. One of the first issues you
faced as Secretary of State was the
Russian grain embargo. At first you
were not in favor of pulling that.
Since this is over, what's your reac-
tion to its effect?
A. When the President heard my
views on it, when he made his decision, I
supported that decision fully and com-
pletely. I have the luxury as the
Secretary of State to confine my advice
to the President to exclusively foreign
policy-related considerations. Needless
to say, early on I was opposed to lifting
the embargo on those grounds.
But the President is President of the
United States, and he must make his
decisions on a full range of considera-
tions and interests. First and foremost
of those interests was the fact that the
President had consistently and
categorically opposed the grain embargo
prior to his election and committed
himself to lifting it if he were to be
elected.
He does not squander his words
lightly, and frankly I don't think he
should. I can also suggest consistency in
my own view. I was opposed to the
grain embargo when it was imposed. I
was opposed to it because I had lived
with the experiment with the grain em-
bargo in the early 1970s, and we shot
ourselves in the foot. It's too narrowly
based a sanction. It asks only one seg-
ment of the American society to bear
the burden of the sanction.
More importantly, it even had long-
term foreign policy implications, because
had we continued with the grain embar-
go as some of our Western European
partners and other partners worldwide
were less enthusiastic — some didn't join
in the first place, some dropped off —
there would have been an increasing
disunity evolve in foreign policy terms,
as only a few "hung tough," if you will.
Even from that point of view it was a
tightly balanced judgment. I think the
President made the right decision. I sup-
port him fully.
Q. The EEC [European Economic'
Community] is going to become in-
volved in Northern Ireland because
many of its members see it as a poten-
tially grave threat to both itself and
NATO. The British Government is
now spending $2 'A billion a year in
both subsidies and security in Nor-
thern Ireland at a time when we hear
that it may reduce its naval NATO
force as well to about 15 ships. And
we have an Irish-American constituen-
cy in this country of between 16-20
million people, including. I believe,
yourself.
Given all these considerations and
many more, why does our govern-
ment—why does the Reagan Admini-
stration— insist on treating this as an
internal British matter?
A. I think precisely because it is
that. That does not suggest that there
aren't external forces involved from timt
to time in one or another aspect of this
anguishing problem. But I think it's
clear that this is a problem that must be
worked out internally by the parties. It's
an historic agony for those parties and
has been. One might make the case if
there were not a Great Britain playing
the role that it's playing there today, we
might have to create one to prevent a
blood bath.
I think what we are all interested in
is patiently and sympathetically to do all
we can in an empathetic way to seek a
resolution to these historic problems but
to recognize that they are internal and
that for a public official in my position
to make offhand public comments about
it only aggravates a problem which
needs no aggravation; so I won't do it.
Q. When President Reagan said
that: "We will transcend communism
rather than to contain it," was he sug-
gesting a new foreign policy slogan,
20
Hpnartmpnt of .^tatp Rnllptin
The Secretary
possibly like detente or containment?
And, if so, what does "transcending
communism" really mean?
A. I wouldn't presume to speak for
the President; he does very well at it
himself. But I think he was suggesting
that those charges from time to time
that we were guilty of fixation with
communism are less than enlightened
critiques of our concerns.
I think we do believe that recent
Soviet activity internationally is prob-
ably the greatest threat to world peace
that exists today, either directly or in
exploiting historic tensions that exist to-
day in this period of transition.
I think he has also made the
point— and I have made it— that this is
not a Soviet Union that is relieved of the
burdens that any nation has; and, in the
case of the Soviet Union, they are prob-
ably historically unprecedented
today— in agriculture, economics, in the
areas of systematic effectiveness of the
Marxist-Leninist system in the Soviet
model.
They are heavily engaged in a no-
end conflict in Afghanistan, which cer-
tainly did not turn out the way those
who proposed that that aggression take
place visualized. They are today engaged
in the support of 200,000 North Viet-
namese troops in Kampuchea in a no-
win conflict which is costing the Soviet
Union about $200 million a day. They
are faced with the mind-boggling com-
plexities of the situation in Poland.
I think all of this suggests that as
we pursue our relationship with the
Soviet Union, we must do so with a
clear recognition that they, too, are
plagued with many fundamental chal-
lenges and problems. It isn't a simplistic
question of building up enough arm-
aments to force them to do our will, as
some would suggest our policies repre-
sent. That is not the case at all.
The thrust of your question, I think,
suggests that perhaps there are other
issues with which we will have to deal,
and I cited three of them in three of the
pillars.
Q. Would you care to comment on
Prime Minister Begin's statement that
there is a limit to how long Israel can
wait for success in the diplomatic ef-
forts being exercised to solve the
Syrian missile crisis?
A. I don't make it a habit at a time
like this, when the United States is
engaged in an intensive effort to
preserve the peace such as it is and
shaky as it has been in that difficult area
of the world, to indulge in comments
about public statements from one or the
other parties to the conflict.
I think what we have suggested in
our efforts to maintain peace and stabili-
ty, to at least achieve in the near term a
return to the status quo ante — and I'm
talking about a return to the situation
that has existed de facto and formally as
well since 1976 — is to work on those
problems and, hopefully, to relieve them.
I do think there is a time limit.
There is a time limit because there has
been a change in the status quo. From
that point of view one might say that
there is some urgency — although I don't
call it an immediate sense of urgen-
cy— but there is a time limit to achiev-
ing some progress, and I'm hopeful we
will.
Q. Your second pillar was refur-
bishing traditional alliances. Given
your experience as a military com-
mander at NATO and our recent re-
quest of Japan that they do a little bit
of helping, are you pleased with the
European attitude toward its own
defense, and isn't it about time Uncle
Sam stops being leaned on as heavily
by the Common Market, as it were,
militarily? Or am I wrong in that
assumption?
A. First let me answer your ques-
tion by suggesting that I believe the
worsening trends between East and
West require that all of us do a bit more
in the defense sector. That is not to sug-
gest that we're totally helpless and
behind today but rather that these
trends are increasingly worse, and they
need tending.
One thing that bothers me frequent-
ly is the charge that Americans make
that our European partners are not car-
rying their share of the burden. I heard
it for 5 years in my position in NATO-
Europe when congressional groups and
others would come over, pound the
table, and say: "We're going to get equal
sharing of the burden."
I would always say, "Let me remind
you, my friend, that over the last 10
years, NATO partners in Europe have
increased their expenditures for security
needs by some 22%." The United States,
on the other hand, until this past year
where our defense spending increased,
had declined and decreased in its con-
tributions to the NATO alliance by 13%.
The point of departure was
drastically different, because at the
onset of NATO, the United States did
bear most of the burden, our Western
European partners having been the vic-
tims of a conflict that had just been con-
cluded. But as they built up their ability
to do so, they have taken increasing
burdens.
I think it's important for Americans
to remind themselves about this alliance
—NATO. When I was in NATO, if I had
gone to war, I would have gotten 90%
of my ground forces from European
powers, 80% of my air forces, and 75%
of my naval forces from European
powers. It was a very cost-effective
operation and remains one for the
United States.
I think it was my old friend Jim
Schlesinger who had a study made when
he was Secretary of Defense to analyze
what it would cost the American tax-
payer to get an equivalent level of
security if we did not belong to NATO
and we did it on our own. He estimated
that we would have to double our outlay
of gross national product to defense
needs without the benefits of the NATO
alliance we have today, so it's a very
cost-effective endeavor.
Q. I hate to bring you back to a
report in the newspaper again. There
are, however, some of us who still
have a little faith in those journals.
A. So do I, incidentally.
Q. But I'm talking about the
report the other day about the changes
in the wind, apparently a leak out of
the State Department, in the U.S.
relationship with the Government of
South Africa. Would you care to com-
ment about the leak? Would you care
to comment about what changes might
be forthcoming?
A. First, let me suggest that the
leaks were atrocious and appalling to
me. It has sometimes been to me in-
conceivable that public officials on the
public payroll feel they have a right to
protect their constituted leadership from
itself because leaks don't just happen;
they are in many instances executed in
order to set up backwashes and to pre-
vent policy decisions.
With respect to those papers, let me
also advise you that these were both out-
dated and, in some instances, very low-
level staff effort papers — in one instance
not— and they are not necessarily a
reflection of American policy in southern
Africa today, nor were they ever.
Having said that, let me establish
for you those policies. Those policies to-
day are, under U.N. Resolution 435, to
I,, I, 1QQ-I
21
The Secretary
achieve an internationally recognized in-
dependent Namibia at the earliest possi-
ble date.
We, however, believe that 435
alone — as it was previously conceived
and as we sought to implement it
earlier — is not adequate for the purpose.
There is no sense in trying to sail again
in a leaky ship. We believe that 435
needs to be fleshed out and expanded
and that that expansion would involve
the provision of constitutional, or at
least ironclad, guarantees which will
cover the rights of minorities in indepen-
dent Namibia; that would provide for a
franchise regularly exercised and not
one man, one vote, one time; and that it
would provide for a totally, truly
nonaligned Namibia which will not be
burdened by foreign presence or foreign
troops. We don't think that that's an ex-
ceptionally excessive requirement for us
to lend our weight — along with the con-
tact group, along with the front-line
states, and, hopefully, with the Govern-
ment of South Africa — to achieve this
long-sought goal.
We also seek to do it, incidentally,
through these guarantees in such a way
that the Government of South Africa
can sense that it is in its interests to
participate in this process. After all,
that's a key aspect of the whole ap-
proach. I hope I've answered your ques-
tion.
Q. First, let me say, I wish that in
1956 you were Secretary of State.
That's for the Hungarian freedom
fighters. Then I would like to ask you,
first of all, is the United States going
into negotiations on a SALT II or a
different agreement? And secondly,
when are we going to attempt to catch
up with the Russians militarily?
A. I think you want to be careful,
and I will answer the last part first.
Sometimes there is a great tendency to
paint the Soviet military capabilities in
10-foot tall proportions. It has been my
experience — and it's a prudent ex-
perience— that those involved in those
estimates always tend to view the oppo-
nent in somewhat more healthy terms,
and that's a prudent approach. I
wouldn't change it. And in many areas
of strength it's true; the Soviet Union
has surpassed the United States. In
many others, they have not at all. And I
would put in the central strategic
nuclear area the fact that we are still in
an area of rough equivalents. But I
would emphasize that were current
trends to continue, and were current
trends even under SALT II to continue,
we would be faced in 1985 or 1986 with
rather substantial deficiencies in the
American capabilities.
What is necessary is to reverse the
trend. How long it will take will depend
on a number of imponderables, not the
least of which is the level of spending
the Soviets are willing to engage in dur-
ing the period that we have increased
ours.
With respect to SALT II, many say
that SALT II fell on the rocks of
Afghanistan. Nothing could be farther
from the truth. SALT II fell on the
substantive inadequacies of the
agreements themselves. I can tell you
because I've testified, and I can assure
you that there was not the adequate
consensus in the American Senate and
House to ratify.
I can also suggest to you without
any question that SALT II is not an ade-
quate basis for future arms control
negotiations with the Soviet Union. We
felt that while it limited certain levels of
strategic building, it permitted func-
tional freeways for unusual growth as
well.
It is President Reagan's view that he
will negotiate SALT agreements with
the Soviet Union and wishes to do so.
He wants those agreements to be fair,
equitable, and to result in actual reduc-
tions, not in continuing growth.
We are in the process of studying
this issue with great intensity in the
bureaucracy today. It involves a number
of potential options which could include
dramatic changes in the SALT II
framework, an entirely different
framework in which maybe functional
progress in particular areas were
sought, or it might involve a whole new
approach.
We have not gotten far enough
along for me to suggest which way we'll
come out on that. I would also suggest
that the timing of when we sit down and
discuss strategic arms control limitations
is going to also take into consideration
worldwide, global Soviet conduct and
the term "linkage."
As you know, we agreed in the
Rome ministerial to begin talks — and
they have begun with the Soviet Union
on long-range theater nuclear arms con-
trol for Europe. We anticipate discuss-
ing the precise move into formal
negotiations in the September meeting
between myself and Foreign Minister
Gromyko in New York. Shortly follow-
ing that, I would anticipate we will be
into formal negotiations on this issue
within the framework of SALT.
Q. I think you are the first
Secretary of State ever to appear
before press briefing like this with
Secret Service protection.
A. Yes. Watch 'em. [Laughter]
Q. In that connection, knowing
that you have already had one attempt
on your life that we know about, what
is the role of terrorism in foreign
policy today? Is it coordinated? Is the
Soviet Union the primary source of it?
And could you give us any other com-
ments on it?
A. Incidentally, my wife might have
a few other experiences to describe
where my life was in jeopardy.
[Laughter]
I made some comments early on in
my incumbency about international ter-
rorism. I made some comments at the
time I was almost blown out of my
Mercedes in Belgium about 2 years ago,
about international terrorism. Those
comments are clearly on the record. I
haven't changed my view one bit. And
while the Soviet Union clearly doesn't
bear the responsibility for all acts of ter-
rorism internationally, it's a hemorrhag-
ing phenomenum.
I did say that they bear a major
responsibility, however, because they
have been engaged in the funding, train-
ing, and philosophic underpinnings
which suggest historic change by rule of
force is an acceptable code for interna-
tional behavior.
I know there have been a number of
charges about "Secretary Haig doesn't
know the difference between terrorism
which is just stealing an airplane and
perhaps wars of liberation, which is a
higher level of insurgency." What I
would suggest is that they are all inter-
related and that terrorism in-
volves— especially if it is state-supportec
terrorism of the kind that the Govern-
ment of Libya is heavily engaged in to-
day with the benefit of high levels of
Soviet armament, Soviet advisers
technically in their country — that one
cannot turn one's face to the respon-
sibilities that this kind of activity brings
with it, especially as we have seen.
We have presided in this Depart-
ment just since we came in in four majo
international aircraft hijackings. I
22
Department of State Bulletit
EAST ASIA
Khmer Relief Efforts
Since autumn of 1979, when widespread
famine inside Kampuchea sent
thousands of starving Khmer to the Thai
border in search of food, the massive
response from the international com-
munity has been essential to the survival
of the Khmer people. Through the end
of 1980, Western donor nations had con-
tributed to the Kampuchea relief effort
over $450 million, while private Western
donations through voluntary agencies
amounted to well over $100 million. The
Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc
countries made substantial bilateral
donations as well.
Although the situation is much im-
proved, Kampuchea will be dependent
on international relief food at least
through 1981. In addition, special
emergency needs include health care and
elementary agricultural rehabilitation.
Failure to continue relief assistance
could result in new calamities and a
return to the terrible days of 1979.
Moreover, some 200,000 displaced
Khmer remain in Thailand — in UNHCR
[U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees]
holding centers and in makeshift camps
along the Thai-Khmer border — and
these unfortunate people are totally
dependent upon international assistance
until some more lasting solution is found
for them. The United States plans to
continue to make significant contribu-
tions toward the basic humanitarian
needs of the Khmer people in 1981 and
into 1982 and is encouraging other
donors to do so as well.
U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS
The U.S. Government contributed
$128,861,700 to the relief effort in FY
1980, all but a small fraction of which
went to international organizations. In
the first 7 months of FY 1981, we have
contributed another $38,691,400. In the
breakdown that follows, figures are
rounded to the nearest $100, with FY
1981 grants listed individually. Contribu-
tions for FY 1980 have been combined
into a single total.
Amount Reason/Date
UNICEF
$20,307,600 Total contribution (FY 1980)
4,000.000 UNICEF "Common Fund"
(12/80)
5,800,000 Reimbursement for food pur-
chased by UNICEF/ICRC
(11/80)
$30,107,600
International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC)
$8,560,500 Total contribution (FY 1980)
Support for ICRC in FY 1981
included in $5.8 million
granted to UNICEF
World Food Program
$64,987,100 Total contribution (FY 1980)
495,400 Food management in Thailand
(4/81)
494,600 Monitoring, transportation,
and warehousing in Thailand
(4/81)
wouldn't attribute those in every in-
stance to the Soviet Union. I might sug-
gest that in one instance they had a
very heavy hand. I think all of these
things require very careful analytical
thougth. And it makes no sense for peo-
ple not to face reality. We'll have more
to say on this in the period ahead, and I
hope with greater specificity and explici-
ty.
Q. Just what are the basic
qualities that you and President
Reagan find in Mr. Lefever [Ernest
W. Lefever, Assistant Secretary-
designate for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs] to nominate
him for the human rights divisions
responsibility in your department?
A. I am not going to tick off the
man's academic credentials, which are
substantial and are open in public record
for anyone to see. He is a man who
dedicated a good portion of his life to
the very activities he is being asked to
assume responsibility for.
One may disagree with his views on
that subject, but I don't think anyone
can disagree with his qualifications to
hold those views and to bring his talents
for the work of the American people.
Mr. Lefever is going to be working
in this Department, That means that he
is going to be loyal to the views of the
President of the United States who was
elected by the American people. And I
think the President has every right to
choose whom he selects to serve him, as
he seeks to carry out the popular man-
date.
10,000,000 Food for Peace commodities
including shipping costs (4/81)
$75,977,100
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR)
$21,435,500 Total contribution (FY 1980)
1 ,11(10,000 Returnee program (10/80)
9,000,000 Holding centers in Thailand
(10/80)
$31,435,500
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
$5,000,000 Total contribution (FY 1980)
2,000,000 1981 Seed rice purchases
(12/80)
$7,000,000
National Council for International Health
$87,200 Medical assistance clear-
inghouse (FY 1980)
15,000 Continuation of clearinghouse
(10/80)
$102,200
Cambodia Crisis Center
$80,900 Startup costs (FY 1980)
American Friends Service Committee
$589,300 Total contribution (2 grants)
(FY 1980)
CARE
$ 155,800 Total contribution (2 grants)
(FY 1980)
1,576,400 Rice seed for Kampuchea
(3/81)
$1,732,200
Church World Service
$2,400,000 Total contribution (2 grants)
(FY 1980)
International Rescue Committee
$199,000 Pediatrics ward at Khao I
Dang (2/81)
Pathfinder Fund
$69,000 Community-based mater-
nal/child health care in Khao I
Dang (11/80)
World Relief Corporation
$1,000,000 Total contribution (1 grant)
(FY 1980)
'Press release 180 of June 3, 1981.
July 1981
23
ECONOMICS
World Vision Relief Organization
$3 103 300 Total contribution (1 grant)
(FY 1980)
4,012,000 Rice seed and other
agricultural inputs for Kam-
puchea (4/81)
$7,115,300
Office of the U.N. Secretary General's
Special Representative for Kampuchean
Humanitarian Relief
$150,000 Startup costs for office (FY
1980)
U.S. Embassy Bangkok
$69 000 Emergency funds for Khmer
relief (FY 1980)
30,000 Contingency funds for Kam-
puchean Emergency Group in
Thailand (10/80)
International Economic Policy
Priorities
$99,000
Thai Red Cross
$125,000 Total contribution (two grants)
(FY 1980)
Task Force 80 (Thai Supreme Command)
$13,000 Office supplies for Coordinator
(FY 1980)
Airlift
$382,500 Special airlift of medical and
other relief supplies in
response to the President's
11/13 decision (11/79)
Administrative Costs
$550,000 Travel and administrative ex-
penses of staffing Khmer relief
program in Thailand (10/79,
9/80)
$167,553,100 Total contributions to date
(4/81)
$ 19,308,600 Pledged to U.N. Joint Mission
for Khmer relief for 1981, but
not yet allocated
$186,861,700 Total contributions plus
pledges
Press release 145 of May 13, 1981.
by Robert D. Hormats
Address before the International In-
surance Advisory Commission in New
York City on May 19, 1981. Mr. Hor-
mats is Assistant Secretary for
Economic and Biisiness Affairs.
International economic issues are in-
creasingly important to the U.S.
economy as well as to American foreign
policy. Access to reasonably priced
energy supplies for ourselves and our
allies, for example, is an essential com-
ponent of our economic well-being and
our security. The financial stability of
our friends and allies has a direct bear-
ing on our prosperity and our foreign
policy interests. Trade issues are central
to our relations with many countries,
and trade expansion is increasingly im-
portant to our economic growth. In-^
evitably, the Reagan Administration's
domestic economic policies will affect -
and will be affected by -international
developments.
I would like to describe for you to-
day some of the foreign economic policy
priorities of the Administration. I will
group them under five main headings.
• Strengthening the U.S. economy
and improving economic cooperation
with the other industrialized democra-
cies; these together are the cornerstones
of our international economic policy;
• Reducing the vulnerability of the
United States and our friends and allies
to disruptions in the international oil
market;
• Promoting open trade on the basis
of fair and effective rules and helping
U.S. exporters to take advantage of in-
ternational trading opportunities;
• Insuring a smoothly functioning
international financial system -with an
effective International Monetary Fund
(IMF) -capable of facilitating recycling
and adjustment and underpinning ex-
panding trade and investment; and
• Building durable and mutually
beneficial economic ties with developing
nations based on a greater private sec-
tor role and supported by an effective
and adequate foreign assistance pro-
gram.
Strong U.S. Economy and
International Cooperation
A strong American economy and close
cooperation with other industrialized
democracies are the cornerstones of
TJ S international economic policy and
our foreign policy as well. The success of
the President's program to reduce infla-
tion through increased investment and
productivity growth will give this
nation's competitiveness a powerful
boost. It will also facilitate adjustment
to high energy prices, which will lead to
more efficient use of oil, and enable us
better to adjust to changing market con-
ditions, which will reduce protectionist
pressures. It will lead to sustained, low-
inflation growth at home, thereby im-
proving economic prospects and lower-
ing interest rate pressures abroad. And
it will permit us to generate strong
domestic support and adequate re-
sources for our security and foreign
assistance programs.
We and our industrialized country
partners recognize that our economic
and foreign policy prospects are inex-
tricably linked. And while differences ot
approach or emphasis often receive the
preponderance of public attention, the
fundamental interdependence of our
economies and the similarity of our in-
ternational and domestic objectives
make cooperation among us imperative
and attempts to work at cross-purposes
patently futile and unproductive.
The prosperity of our major trading
and financial partners will directly in-
fluence our own. In addition, it will im-
prove their ability to muster resources
and public support for contributions to
the Western security and economic as-
sistance effort. The energy performance
of these nations, like our own, will have
a direct impact on the world oil market,
on which we and they continue to be
heavily dependent. Our mutual efforts to
reduce oil imports will in turn benefit us
all A common policy toward economic
relations with the Soviets can balance
our commercial and our security con-
cerns and enable us to respond de-
cisively to such provocations as the inva-
sion of Afghanistan. Our nations can
benefit from a common, constructive ap-
proach to the developing nations, insur-
ing that as we attempt to meet their
interests, they respect ours. And we to-
gether must find new types of coopera-
tion in research and development to
24
Department of State Bulletin
Economics
bring to our societies and the world the
benefits of the prodigious talents of our
peoples and the potential of our tech-
nologies.
Energy Policy
The international energy situation repre-
sents the single greatest threat to the
well-being of this nation, and most
others, in this decade. It makes our
economies vulnerable to disruptions and
our foreign policy and alliances vulner-
able to threats.
Strong national and international
efforts are required to reduce the
unhealthy dependence of the United
States and our economic partners on im-
ported oil. We have already seen how
rapid oil price rises and occasional sup-
ply interruptions play havoc with eco-
nomic growth and inflation and sow
discord among friends.
Due in large measure to efforts to
reduce oil use in the face of sharply in-
creasing prices and supply insecurity,
U.S. imports of oil have declined dra-
matically to 6.3 million barrels per day
(b/d) from their highs of 8.6 million b/d
in 1977. But we cannot allow this prog-
ress, or the present softness in the oil
market, to lull us into complacency.
Much more remains to be done to reduce
our vulnerability.
The President's decision to decontrol
the price of domestic oil, coupled with
the legislatively mandated phased dereg-
ulation of natural gas prices, are essen-
tial steps in eliciting increased produc-
tion and discouraging inefficient use of
energy. The Administration is also in-
creasing its efforts to resolve regulatory
and institutional problems inhibiting the
use of nuclear power and will reform
regulatory policies to promote greater
production and use of other energy
resources, particularly coal. And we will
explore— in the International Energy
Agency (IE A) and at the Ottawa eco-
nomic summit— ways to reduce impedi-
ments to the export and use of such
resources.
Yet increased production and more
efficient energy use in the United States
addresses only part of the energy prob-
lem. Supplies can be disrupted, as we
have seen, by war and social upheaval
and by national shortfalls caused by sud-
den demand surges. The obvious ex-
amples of these dangers stem from the
Middle East; less visible is Western
European dependence on the Soviet
Union for substantial amounts of natural
gas, which has the potential for
unhealthy influence in a crisis.
We and our allies are preparing to
counter threats to our energy security
through intensified national action and
international cooperation. Nationally, an
effective strategic petroleum reserve
(SPR) is crucial. I am pleased to report
that we have begun to fill the SPR at an
annual rate of over 200,000 b/d and
hope to reach a level of 750 million bar-
rels before the end of this decade. This
could offset the loss of 3 million b/d of
U.S. imports for a full year.
Internationally, the International
Energy Agency is the prime forum for
cooperation with other industrialized
democracies. The IE A has an emergency
oil allocation system, designed to
counter significant shortfalls. This is the
keystone of Western energy security
policy. In addition, we have learned
from the recent past that smaller, or
even threatened, shortfalls can lead to
harmful price rises. We and our col-
leagues in the IEA must insure that in
the event of supply disruptions, such as
those which followed the Iranian revolu-
tion, there is no repetition of sharp price
increases, which could thwart our anti-
inflation program. Nor can we permit oil
to be used as an instrument of political
pressure on our allies or friends. IEA
consultations are underway to try to
find appropriate contingency measures
for these situations.
We must also develop new sources
of conventional and nonconventional
energy. Good relations with reliable sup-
pliers must be maintained, and a few
might be encouraged to develop addi-
tional excess capacity for use during
supply interruptions. Investment
climates need to be improved;
discriminatory policies, such as those
favoring domestic investment, can
reduce optimal energy investment to
everyone's detriment.
And we will continue to help
developing nations to reduce their
dependence on imported oil. Their in-
ability to do so can only lead to greater
instability in the developing world, and
disruptions in the international financial
and trading systems.
Trade
We now face challenges arising out of
the success— in both foreign policy and
economic terms -of the basic policies we
adopted after World War II. Our goal
then in establishing the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and
urging a more open and market-oriented
trading system was to increase both
world prosperity and international in-
terdependence through the expansion of
trade. World trade expanded fivefold
between 1970 and 1980. By 1979 the
average tariff levels in the developed
countries had fallen to 10.6%. Cuts
agreed to in that year, in the Tokyo
Round of multilateral trade negotiations,
will reduce them to 4.5%.
At the same time, a number of new
problems in the trade area have become
increasingly important. In order to con-
tinue into the future the expansion of
trade, which has contributed so much to
our prosperity and added stability to the
international environment, we will have
to deal with these. Our trade policy is
based on several key elements:
• Effective implementation of rules
already negotiated;
• Negotiating, or improving rules
and understandings in new problem
areas of trade policy;
• Removal of domestically imposed
disincentives to U.S. exports, and im-
proved U.S. export promotion efforts;
and
• A prosperous U.S. economy which
promotes adjustment.
First, we intend to insure effec-
tive implementation of the "rules of
the game" already agreed to. One of
the major accomplishments of the Tokyo
Round was to make a start at dealing
with what I consider the key trade prob-
lem of this decade— nontariff barriers. In
an era of relatively low duties, these act
as the major impediments to interna-
tional trade. The "codes" agreed to dur-
ing these negotiations are being put into
effect. We will insist that our trading
partners live up to the spirit and the let-
ter of these agreements; we know that
they will expect the same of us. We will
use these same agreements, now em-
bodied in U.S. law, to insure that our
firms and workers are protected against
unfair trade practices by other coun-
tries.
Second, we will endeavor to
negotiate or improve rules to deal
with new trade problems. A number of
areas important to U.S. trade interests
hitherto have not been the subject of
much international discipline. One good
example relates to trade in services.
Trade in services is an increasingly
important component of U.S. exports.
U.S. service exports have grown nearly
400% since 1971 and are continuing to
grow at a rapid rate. Here at home, our
services industries provide employment
for about 70% of the U.S. workforce.
Given these statistics, there is no
July 1981
25
Economics
wonder that U.S. trade representative
Brock recently stated that "service trade
is the frontier for expansion of U.S. ex-
ports."
At present, no coherent interna-
tional framework exists for resolving
trade problems in services. The
Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) in Paris has
several ongoing projects to identify bar-
riers to such trade. The United States
strongly supports this work.
We will seek a political endorsement
in June from OECD ministers to con-
tinue and to emphasize the ongoing
work on services. In the longer term, we
hope to pursue liberalized trade in ser-
vices in multilateral negotiations. If we
are successful, the insurance industry
will reap substantial benefits. In the in-
terim, we will continue to utilize existing
bilateral channels for resolving specific
problems.
Another challenge we must meet
stems from the increasingly important
role of the developing countries in world
trade. Our trade with the developing
countries has expanded rapidly over the
past decade: imports by 25% per year,
exports by 18% per year, compared with
a 15% increase in trade with the
developed countries. The developing
countries as a group are now a larger
market for U.S. exports than the Euro-
pean Communities and Japan taken
together.
Within this group, a small number of
countries often referred to as the "newly
industrializing countries" account for
three-fourths of developing-country
trade with the United States. We seek
to integrate these more fully into the in-
ternational trading system. This involves
insuring that they undertake obligations
commensurate with their stage of
development. This will help insure that
the poorer developing nations are
treated in ways appropriate to their less
advantaged positions.
In addition, we will want to insure
that the international community
vigorously addresses investment incen-
tives and performance requirements,
such as those which mandate local con-
tent or exports as a percentage of pro-
duction, and thereby distort trade. Both
developed and developing nations will
also need to avoid the temptation to
negotiate bilateral deals to "lock up" sup-
plies of raw materials or energy in
return for commitments of investment
or market access in processed goods.
These practices serve to undermine the
multilateral trading system and con-
tribute to intense international friction.
Finally, we will press hard for
agreement to significantly reduce, and
hopefully eliminate, the subsidy element
in government export credits. The large
subsidy element in the export financing
of many countries is a waste of scarce
resources. It is practically absurd when
one considers the fact that a large por-
tion of the benefits of this folly go to in-
dustries in Eastern Europe, which com-
pete with us, and the subsidy is paid by
the Western taxpayer.
Third, removal of export disincen-
tives and improved U.S. export promo-
tion efforts are necessary components
of U.S. trade policy. For too long we
have failed to recognize the cumulative
adverse impact on U.S. exports of in-
hibiting U.S. regulations and laws. The
trend will be reversed. In this connec-
tion, the Administration supports the ex-
port trading company bill now before
the Congress, as well as legislative ac-
tion to modify the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act and to reduce the income
tax burden on Americans working
abroad. We need also to use the
resources of State, Commerce, and
Agriculture Departments more effective-
ly to promote exports. I can assure you
that the Department of State and U.S.
ambassadors abroad stand ready to
vigorously support U.S. exporters.
Underlying a successful U.S. trade
effort must be a successful domestic
economic policy. Our efforts to continue
the progress made so far in developing a
more orderly trading system and our
efforts to respond to new competitive
challenges will ultimately fail unless they
are backed by a vigorous U.S. economy.
We often are critical of Japan's vigorous
export efforts. And it is true that Japan
is frequently insensitive to the impact of
their exports on others and that it has
not fulfilled adequately its responsibility
to open its economy to others.
But we should never lose sight of
the fact that Japan's rates of savings
and investment, its productivity in-
creases and its technical innovations,
are, more than any other factors, the
reasons for its success. Unless the
United States can reverse its weakening
productivity, savings, investment, and
research and development picture, even
the most aggressive export promotion
effort will be fruitless. And the self-
defeating notion will take hold that the
United States cannot compete and
should, instead, shelter itself from
foreign competition. Improved growth,
investment, and productivity perfor-
mance will, on the other hand, facilitate
our ability to adjust to and compete in
dynamic international markets.
International Finance and Investment
In an increasingly interdependent world,
the smooth operation of the financial
system is as essential to world prosperi-
ty as is trade. The two proceed hand-in-
hand. Two aspects of international
finance have an especially important
bearing on our broader economic and
foreign policy interests.
Role of the IMF. The first is the
central role of the IMF in the "recycling"
process. The 1979-80 oil price increase
has allowed the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
to build current account surpluses,
which reached about $120 billion last
year. The counterpart to this enormous
surplus was a $50 billion deficit among
the industrialized countries and a $70
billion deficit among the non-oil develop-
ing countries.
It is expected that the OPEC
surplus and the industrialized countries
deficit will moderate this year. The com-
bined current account deficit of the non-
oil developing countries, however, may
reach $100 billion this year, and this
prospect raises questions about the
future financial stability of these coun-
tries. Many of these countries have not
adequately adjusted their domestic
economic policies to the last round of oil
price increases. Essentially, they have
tried to finance growth, as many did
successfully during the mid-1970s,
through domestic credit expansion and
external borrowing.
What distinguishes the current situa-
tion from that of the mid-1970s is that
interest rates are now three times what
they were and debt service costs now
absorb 20% of the developing countries'
export earnings, up from 13% in the
mid-1970s. Private financial markets
have thus far been able to channel ade-
quate funds to deficit countries and un-
doubtedly will continue to play the
predominant role in the recycling pro-
cess. And the International Monetary
Fund, through access to its own
resources and its influence on the
judgments of the private market, has
effectively supplemented this for coun-
tries attempting to adjust in order to
reduce serious payments imbalances. To
strengthen its efforts, the IMF is in-
creasing its resources— in part through
26
Department of State Bulletin
Economics
borrowing from OPEC and tailoring its
conditionality guidelines to current re-
quirements.
The United States is encouraging
this expansion of the IMF's role and
resources. We believe it is especially
well placed to encourage countries to ad-
just their economic policies to current in-
ternational realities. And this effort will
also involve OPEC countries with a very
constructive form of recycling.
U.S. Investment Policy. The second
aspect is U.S. investment policy. This
Administration believes that market
forces rather than government fiat
result in the most efficient distribution
of investments. This Administration will
not seek to influence the decision of an
investor as between investment at home
and investment abroad. But when a firm
has decided to invest abroad, the U.S.
Government will provide maximum sup-
port: such as making available informa-
tion on market prospects, facilitating
contacts with appropriate officials, and
supporting company efforts to resist un-
fair treatment. Our policy calls for in-
sistence on national treatment for U.S.
enterprises abroad -i.e., that such enter-
prises be treated no less favorably than
local investors; and for prompt, ade-
quate, and effective compensation in the
event of expropriation.
In those countries where they exist,
we will encourage removal of unjustified
impediments and disincentives to foreign
investment -for example, in the tax and
regulatory area. Our objective is not to
force countries to accept U.S. invest-
ment but to insure that where in-
vestments are made, they are given
equitable treatment. One of our major
economic goals will be to win sup-
port—by working bilaterally through
bilateral investment treaties and
multilaterally in the OECD and United
Nations— for the goal of an open and
fair investment system.
Support for Economic Development
The last area of the Administration's
foreign economic policy I would like to
discuss with you today is our approach
to economic development. The most visi-
ble part of our policy in this area is
foreign aid. You are all familiar with the
grim poverty which is a fact of life in
many parts of the developing world and
with the traditional humanitarian con-
cerns which have been a strong
motivating element in our aid policy
from the start. Our aid programs also
serve other interests which have been
less prominent in our public discussions
of foreign assistance policy. They bolster-
countries of strategic importance to the
United States -notably in the Middle
East. They are part of our relations with
countries which supply critical raw
materials. The economic expansion they
support reduces the likelihood of long-
term social instability in certain coun-
tries and increases market opportunities
for U.S. goods.
The Administration intends to insure
that our policies in this area accord
closely with our tangible economic and
security interests in developing coun-
tries. Our aid allocations will reflect
these interests as well as our
humanitarian concerns. Historically, our
aid has been extended both as direct
bilateral assistance and through multi-
lateral institutions. We are examining
the balance between these channels, in
an attempt to insure that our choice of
aid tools reflects the different interests
our aid programs should serve.
The overall magnitude of our aid
contributions will be affected by the Ad-
ministration's economic policies, and, in
particular, by the drive to reduce
Federal budget expenditures. Conse-
quently, this is a good time to recall that
our policies toward economic develop-
ment include other elements besides aid.
In fact, while aid is the most important
contribution we can make to many of
the poorer countries, other elements of
policy play a greater role in promoting
the prosperity of many other developing
nations. I would single out:
• Open markets and smooth adjust-
ment to the exports of developing coun-
tries;
• Domestic economic policies that
facilitate overall growth; and
• Access to capital markets.
We have dramatically increased our
imports of developing-country manufac-
tured goods over the last decade. U.S.
imports from developing countries in
1978 were nearly nine times our official
aid flows. The same type of relationship
holds for all the Western aid-giving na-
tions as a group. U.S. direct investment
in the developing countries runs at or
above the level of aid, and private
capital markets provide bank loans and
bond issues in an amount which far ex-
ceeds that of development assistance.
These factors suggest that we
should pay greater attention to the role
of the private sector in the development
process. They also suggest that a
favorable climate for investment, for at-
tracting capital flows, and for encourag-
ing exports without trade-distorting
subsidies -will be increasingly important
in this decade. The Administration, in
consultation with the business communi-
ty, is reviewing what we might do to
facilitate private sector involvement in
the development process while fully
respecting its private character.
Conclusion
Let me conclude by trying to pick out a
few guiding themes for U.S. foreign
economic policy.
First, we need to recognize the
domestic impact of international
economic policy, the international impact
of domestic economic policy, and the
essential relationship of both to our
foreign policy and security interests.
Second, the Administration believes
in the efficiency of the marketplace and
has considerable skepticism about the
effectiveness of government efforts to
supplant it. This belief will affect our
views on the policy tools appropriate for
pursuing our economic objectives.
Third, close ties between the
government and the private sector are
essential in helping us develop and im-
plement our international economic
policy. Likewise, close cooperation with
the Congress is essential. As interna-
tional economic policy becomes increas-
ingly important to our domestic
economy and to our international
political and security interests, so effec-
tive cooperation among the executive
branch, Congress, and the private sector
become imperative in the making of that
policy.
Fourth, we are persuaded that the
more effective integration of the various
considerations which affect economic
policy is essential to our well-being, both
economically and politically. Energy
security, vigorous exports and open and
fair trade, a world investment climate
which encourages the development of
productive enterprises, smoothly func-
tioning financial markets, and the sound
economic expansion of the developing
countries— these are the key re-
quirements for an improved U.S. and
world economy. They also are essential
contributions to world peace and fruitful
political relations among countries. ■
July 1981
27
Economics
U.S. Subscription to the World Bank
by Ernest B. Johnston
Statement before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on April 21, 1981.
Mr. Johnston is Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Economic and Business
Affairs.1
I appreciate the opportunity to appear
again before the committee to discuss an
important part of President Reagan's
foreign assistance program: the U.S.
subscription to the $40 billion general
capital increase of the World Bank [In-
ternational Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD)].
For over 35 years, World Bank
loans to countries of importance to the
United States have raised productivity,
stimulated economic growth, and con-
tributed to political stability. For exam-
ple, in its early years, the Bank was in-
strumental in raising capital to rebuild
the war-torn economies of Western
Europe and Japan. Today, these coun-
tries are again strong and prosperous
and are key members of the Western
alliance. They are also major con-
tributors to the ongoing work of the
World Bank.
Promoting Economic Progress
More recently, the World Bank has con-
centrated on the difficult task of foster-
ing economic growth in the developing
nations. Here, too, its lending has made
a difference. Partially as a result of its
work, the economies of such key coun-
tries as Finland, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Singapore, and Spain have pro-
gressed to the point where they no
longer need Bank assistance. We expect
other major borrowers will also
graduate from Bank lending during the
1980s.
One reason for the Bank's success in
promoting economic progress is that it is
fundamentally a market-oriented institu-
tion engaged in lending for development.
It is not a welfare agency. Its projects
must generate a stream of goods and
services which exceed in value the cost
of the resources utilized. They should
also stimulate further growth by
creating the conditions for additional in-
vestment, both private and public. The
Bank is by far the largest multilateral
development institution. Although it lent
about $7.6 billion in 1980, it provides
barely 1% of total investment in the
developing countries. Therefore, if it is
to be effective, it must act as a catalyst
for development. A few examples of
projects financed by the Bank in 1980 il-
lustrate the point.
• The Bank lent $63 million to
Brazil for a rural development project
with a total cost of $184.6 million. The
funds will be lent to about 30,000 small
farmers and 1,100 nonfarm enterprises.
In addition, the project will provide im-
proved agricultural extension services. It
is expected that the value of the produc-
tion of the small farmers will increase by
about $30 million annually in constant
prices.
• In Indonesia, a $116 million bank
loan will help to increase the production
of basic food crops by about 234,000
tons a year. In addition, 800,000 farm
families will benefit from improved ir-
rigation, drainage, and flood protection
systems. The total project cost is $186.7
million.
• A $60 million loan to Korea will
be relent to small- and medium-sized
private companies to meet the foreign
exchange costs of their investment proj-
ects. The loan supports the
government's policy of promoting a
greater regional dispersal of employ-
ment opportunities. Twenty-five million
dollars is earmarked for small, labor-
intensive ventures.
• In Swaziland, a $10 million loan,
combined with $5 million in local fund-
ing, will improve the access of rural and
underprivileged children to education by
financing the construction of 31 primary
and 6 secondary schools, as well as pro-
viding textbooks and teacher training.
The loan will create 11,000 new places
at the primary level and 2,600 places at
the secondary level.
• A $15.5 million loan to Fiji will
reduce the country's dependence on im-
ported energy by doubling the size of a
dam and financing the costs of addi-
tional generating equipment. The total
project cost is $50 million, with bilateral
donors providing a good part of the rest
of the funds.
• A Bank loan of $42.5 million to
Tunisia will provide one-third of the
funds necessary to expand two ports so
that they can efficiently accommodate
traffic up to the year 2000. The funds
will be used to dredge access channels;
construct new quays, jetties, and
warehouses; and purchase cargo-
handling and workshop equipment.
Promoting Rational Use of Local
Resources
The World Bank does more than lend
development capital. For most of its bor-
rowers, it is also an influential adviser
on economic policy. With its substantial
financial leverage, particularly through
the use of program loans, the Bank en-
courages developing countries to follow
policies based on the workings of the
market and the rational use of local
resources. This serves our long-term in-
terests because it promotes economic ef-
ficiency and, thus, growth and stability.
It also leads to a more open interna-
tional economy from which developing
and developed nations — including the
United States — can benefit.
The general capital increase will
double the resources available to the
Bank from $40 billion to about $80
billion and permit it to continue its im-
portant work through the mid-1980s.
Although our share will amount to about
$8.7 billion, or 22% of the total, the ac-
tual cost to the United States is relative-
ly small. This is because the other donor
countries, many of which used to borrow
from the Bank, will provide several
times more than we do. The budgetary
cost is sharply reduced because only
7.5%, or $658 million, of our total
subscription will be paid in cash. The
rest will be in the form of callable
capital guarantees. These would be used
by the Bank only if it could not other-
wise repay its debts.
In over 35 years, the Bank has
never made a call, and the chances of it
doing so in the future are extremely
remote. The reason is that the Bank's
loans are based on sound economic per-
formance criteria and on adequate rates
of financial and economic return. As a
result of this leveraging, each dollar the
United States pays in to the capital in-
crease will support up to $65 in loans tc
promote economic growth and stability
in the developing world.
Maintaining U.S. Leadership
I want to stress the importance that the
U.S. subscription to the increase must
not be cut. We have already made the
only cut that could responsibly have
been made. We plan to stretch our
subscription over 6 years instead of re-
questing appropriations and program
limitations for the full amount in FY
1982. This will reduce the impact on the
FY 1982 budget by $548 million. But ar
propriation of the full $658 million over
28
Department of State Bulletii
Economics
S.708: A Viable Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act
by Ernest B. Johnston
Statement before a joint hearing of
the Subcommittees on International
Finance and on Securities of the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs on May 20, 1981. Mr.
Johnston is Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Economic and Business Affairs. 1
Thank you for allowing me to comment
to the subcommittee on S.708 and to ex-
press the State Department's support
for that bill. We believe S.708 will lessen
some of the undesirable consequences of
the current Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, which create problems in our
foreign relations and unnecessarily cut
down U.S. exports.
Bribery by American citizens and
firms works against the foreign interests
of the United States. It harms the good
name of this country, and it is contrary
to the principles which our people hold
dear. Though corruption may be more
prevalent in some countries than it is in
our own, Americans do not wish to have
our citizens associated with it.
Corruption of foreign officials is not
in the long-run interest of our com-
panies. Bribery does not add to the
number of goods being produced. It does
not increase the goods being consumed.
It is a cost which either must be shaved
off profits, passed on to the consuming
public, or shared — for the enrichment of
particular individuals at the cost of
society. Such payments can also corrode
political stability and good relations.
Side-Effects of the 1977 Act
The 1977 act has had three undesirable
and, in some cases, unintended side-
effects.
First, many U.S. firms do not clear-
ly understand which acts are proscribed
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
in its present form. This has caused
some companies to retrench their export
efforts.
Second, it has placed U.S. firms at
a disadvantage in relation to their
foreign competition.
Finally, investigation and prosecu-
tion tend to raise extraterritorial issues
which are difficult to reconcile with
widely varying local laws and customs.
Reports from our Foreign Service
posts indicate the act has had a restrain-
ing effect on U.S. exports, although the
amount is impossible to quantify. Con-
gress envisaged that some exports
would be lost as a consequence of the
act. However, ambiguities associated
with the act also have caused law-
abiding firms to forgo legitimate and
profitable transactions. Business ex-
ecutives frequently err on the side of
caution, often on the advice of counsel,
in order to avoid any possibility of a
violation of the act. For example, last
year our Embassy in Muscat reported
the next 6 years is necessary if we are
to honor our commitments to our allies
and to the developing countries. To do
less would risk a permanent loss of our
veto over amendments to the World
Bank charter and a relinquishment of
the U.S. leadership role in the Bank.
This must not occur.
I want to mention completion of the
authorization for U.S. participation— as
negotiated— in the fifth replenishment
of the Inter-American Development
Bank and the second replenishment of
the Asian Development Fund. Apart
from the value of the work of these
regional institutions, full participation is
very important because if we expect
others to keep their promises to us, we
must surely meet our agreements with
them.
As I stressed in my March 25 state-
ment, the Administration is committed
to an all-out effort to pass the legislation
in support of the multilateral develop-
ment banks. This bill is particularly im-
portant because:
• It will improve the prospects for
economic growth and political stability in
developing countries and thereby help
our security and well-being;
• It will contribute to expanded in-
ternational trade and investment;
• It is cost-effective; and
• It reaffirms the willingness of the
United States, even in a time of severe
budgetary strictures, to continue in a
strong international leadership role.
'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
that a U.S. firm apparently lost a
$20-$30 million deal largely because of
delays caused by a lengthy internal
review to determine the application of
the act to the proposed transaction.
Clarifications contained in S.708 regard-
ing proscribed acts will greatly facilitate
the ability of Americans to make timely
decisions and to compete more effective-
ly-
The second side-effect derives from
the fact that while U.S. firms are con-
strained by U.S. laws, foreign firms may
operate without such restraints. There is
no other exporting country with a law
which has the extraterritorial reach of
the current act. The current act, because
of its broad sweep and lack of clarity,
also gives the impression that American
business is basically corrupt and a great
corrupter of others. S.708 should lessen
somewhat the unjustified competitive
edge which foreign firms have enjoyed.
Finally, the 1977 law attempted to
lay down strict rules for our firms but
failed to take sufficient account of vary-
ing national standards. Charges against
a U.S. firm may bring into question the
honor and integrity of local officials
without regard to local laws and
customs. Simply put, the problem is one
of balancing two competing interests:
restricting potentially harmful business
practices overseas by U.S. firms while
refraining from imposition of our own
standards on others. The approach in
S.708 achieves such balance by ex-
cluding actions which are legal in a
specific country and by permitting
customary, lawful payments to facilitate
or expedite transactions. It will go far to
meet the genuine concerns of our
business people, while reducing our own
censorious judgments on standards
other countries choose to set for
themselves.
Sections 2 (B)(5) and 10: Illicit
Payments Agreement
The State Department agrees complete-
ly that we must continue to seek a solu-
tion at the international level. The
United States has vigorously pressed the
negotiation of an international agree-
ment on illicit payments since 1976.
Although a U.N. Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) committee completed
lengthy preparatory work on a largely
agreed-upon draft agreement on illicit
payments in 1979, the ECOSOC and the
U.N. General Assembly have each failed
July 1981
29
Economics
for 2 consecutive years to take any ac-
tion to conclude an agreement. This was
largely due to the insistence of the
developing countries on linking an illicit
payments treaty with the code of con-
duct for transnational corporations. The
United States and its major Western
allies consistently opposed such linkage.
At the Venice economic summit in
June 1980, the U.S. Government made a
commitment to work in the United Na-
tions toward an illicit payments agree-
ment but, if that effort faltered, to seek
to conclude an agreement among the
summit countries, open to all, with the
same objective.
After the fall of 1980, the General
Assembly failed to reach agreement on
the treaty. The U.S. representative
stated that the United States intended
to consult with other interested states
regarding alternative means of achieving
a treaty outside the United Nations. The
Administration has been considering the
best way to proceed to secure such an
international agreement, and we intend
to confer with other interested nations
in the coming months.
While we cannot now predict the
final form of any international agree-
ment, we will strive for positive en-
forceable, objective criteria that can be
clearly applied by governments and
adhered to by business. Legislation
along the lines of S.708 will significantly
enhance our efforts to achieve this objec-
tive.
The sense of the Congress will be an
important force in our efforts. The
Department of State has noted the
language in the bill regarding reports to
the Congress, and I can assure you that
we intend to consult fully with you.
I am pleased to associate the
Department of State with the Ad-
ministration's support of this bill. We
look forward to continuing dialogue with
Congress as this legislation moves for-
ward. S.708 provides a more realistic
standard for U.S. corporate activities
overseas, will alleviate an impediment to
U.S. exports, and will enhance our
efforts to reach an acceptable interna-
tional arrangement on illicit payments.
International Investment Issues
■The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from trie Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
by John T. McCarthy
Statement before the Subcommittee
on Mines and Mining of the House In-
terior and Insular Affairs Committee on
May 7. 1981. Mr. McCarthy is Acting
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Economic and Business Affairs.1
I am pleased to be here today to present
the State Department's views on inter-
national investment issues as they relate
to H.R. 2826 which is now before the
committee. The United States has long
favored an open international invest-
ment climate which we believe has
served us well by facilitating capital
flows and promoting the efficient alloca-
tion of resources throughout the world.
When capital is free to move without
hindrance, all nations can benefit
through expanding world output. The
State Department is concerned with the
implications of the proposed legislation
for U.S. policy in three areas: invest-
ment, energy, and strategic materials.
Because H.R. 2826 legislation would
have a direct impact on investment in
certain sectors of the U.S. economy and
a potential impact on U.S. investment
abroad as well, I would like to begin
with brief remarks on the overall U.S.
posture toward foreign investment.
U.S. Investment Policy
U.S. policy for many years has been the
same for both inward and outward in-
vestment— the United States neither
promotes nor discourages international
investment flows or activities. This does
not imply lack of interest toward inter-
national investment; we believe that in-
creasing levels of global investment are
essential for all economies to grow and
prosper. It means, however, that we
seek to minimize government interven-
tion in the decisionmaking process
related to individual investments.
This policy rests on our belief in an
open international environment for
global economic relations in which
market forces rather than government
fiat result in the most efficient distribu-
tion of investments. Such a policy calls
for U.S. application of the general prin-
ciple of national treatment for foreign
enterprises — i.e., foreign enterprises are
treated no less favorably than U.S. in-
vestors in like situations. This is a cen-
tral element of both our bilateral rela-
tionships— in particular under treaties of
friendship, commerce, and navigation
and our multilateral relationships —
especially in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) — and we attempt to promote
the broadest possible acceptance of the
principle of national treatment by other
governments.
Government Protection
Among the benefits of increased direct
investment flows are more jobs, more
capital, transfers of new, improved
technology and management skills, in-
creased production, and greater com-
petition.
The government has means of
overseeing investment in order to pro-
tect national security and other vital in-
terests. U.S. law provides a number of
safeguards which are designed to pro-
tect our essential security and other in-
terests. The vast bulk of this legislation
is nondiscriminatory, applying equally to
all investment in the United States
regardless of the nationality or owner-
ship. Some of these laws do constitute
exceptions to national treatment but are
widely recognized as legitimate restric-
tions justified on essential security or
other grounds.
Foreign investment is restricted, for
example, in sectors of the U.S. economy
relating to national defense, nuclear
energy, transportation, and exploitation
of federally owned land. A number of
states also have their own limited
restrictions on foreign investment in
such areas as banking, insurance, and
land ownership. And, of course, the Con-
gress has provided the President with
extensive authority and policy guidance
on the control of both imports and ex-
ports.
In addition, the U.S. Government
monitors trends in foreign investment
through the Committee on Foreign In-
vestment in the United States. The pur-
pose of this group, chaired by the
Treasury Department, is to monitor the
impact of inward investment, including
the review of foreign investments which
might have major implications for U.S.
national interests and to coordinate U.S.
policy implementation. The committee
30
Department of State Bulletin
Countries of the World Classified Economically
This atlas divides the world's nations in-
to the following three economic groups:
Developed market economies—
technologically advanced countries
where the private sector is dominant;
Centrally planned economies—
U.S.S.R., Eastern European countries
(except Yugoslavia), and other countries
with state-run economies tied to the
Soviet bloc; and
Developing market economies—
relatively underdeveloped countries
trading primarily with developed market
economies.
China is in a separate category
because of economic reforms currently
under way and the special character of
its foreign economic relations.
The threefold classification is widely
used, partly because it reflects the ac-
tual economic blocs that have formed
since the end of World War II.
However, there is no settled usage as to
names and which countries belong in
each category. Each international
economic organization has its own ter-
minology and modified classification
system.
□
Developed market economies
Developing market economies
Centrally planned economies
China: evolving toward market
socialism
us.
u3'(
The Bahamas
Ham
Dominican Republic
Dominica
St Lucia
St Vincent and
the Grenadines
/// ^Barbados
Venezuela
n . ' Guyana
Colombia
r Grenada
Trinidad and
— Tobago
Cape
Verde^
Ecuador
Surmame
Peru
Brazil
\
Bolivia
Paraguay
Uruguay
Chrfe
Argentina
'0,
Ireland United NeUV y ' D ,
CHKiftgdom j, G'DR™3'
< Lux F R G-prech
FranceSwitzAus H
Romania
Bulgaria
Tunisia, M .
■Morocco Mana
Western
Sahara »,„ria
Algeria Libya
Turkey
'"*<* Cyprus Syria
lran Afghanistan
lay /—Kuwait
Egypt
Mauritania
rSenega
Maldives
lsraet Jordan^ C
Bahrain Pakistan
Qatar^;
Saudi
Arabia Ojrian
Mal' Niaer -Yemen Yei, -
.7 /-The Gambia « Chad Sudan ,Sanaa) (Aden)
Guinea ^Z Benin D„bou.i
'7„ .Togo'f"3 CAR E,h'°Pia
Coast .. - * Cameroon
Uganda Somalia
Gabon Rwanda KenV3/
-Congo - Burundi
Tanzania Seychelles
Comoros
Angola Malawi a
Zambia
■J /--Madagascar
».«..».. " Zimbabwe
' Mauritius
Botswana -,Mozambid,ue
Swaziland
Sou,h Lesotho
Nefial Bhutan
Bangladesh
India
/
Burma.K"JJ-J^ ■' "C"°"9 "°'""u
Laos' ,*. '-M.cBulPorl l
i-Tti$lland';,S;etnam
Sri Lanka
4f
-.Kampuchea
Malaysia
Philippines
Ghana-1
Sao Tome and
Principe
-Liberia
■Sierra Leone
Guinea-Bissau
Equatorial
Guinea
, V~N^ Papua
Indonesia NewGuine
"■." i>*
Solomon
Islands
Vanuatu
Kiribati
Tuvalu
Western
Samoa
Fiji
\^-r-
Tonga
Australia
New
Zealand y
i
Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative
o
o
o o
o o o o o
o
r-
ir
cm a>
CM CO -3- O r--
CM
O) O
OCD
n in m n n
CM
IT)
m
in cm
*- O O O O)
O)
00
to
Ni
o>
T-
to
»
?
F
-*
o
o
CD
c
en
(0
co
1
Q.
03
F
>>
O
LU
C CO
o>
U
co c
O CO CD
i3 E "to
E
a>
a.
< -r
■Q Is c "g w
-t
5
3
CO
"O CD
CD N
c 5
p « CD O -o
m E "O »- CD
3 a> S» c
'5
c
Z3
T3
0)
Q.
^O Z) w
jDcosdid
<
CO
1-1 '5 '*
^ -I
cO -o
g£.S
o 2:=
en *^ .b
& <» c
CO - CD
— ' Oh -*
• ZC
5o 2
co 3
a
33
Qs
- - CD
9fso
£3 ct> —
lil =
CO CO 0) ^
n --Jig.
-° r^ M
COM-
i -£h IS •
tjio^so
Sio h cu ©
in °"i
11 j° 5
aS *
5 o cB
CO .— c
Oh C 8«
■^ -y cu
6 5 >
* — - a at
OtH_
!.§>§
O. „. M
<S & =-
c -a
o Oh c
co CO O
CO -J O
O o.'XS
<D
^ en
0)
c y
o ?
-rs !-
B3
en
U3
3 *~ 3
gg § O
O to O
Oh -O
fi °
O bo
a
c o
1-, CD
cO 3
<D "3
>>£
j= CJ
S bo
bo2
o,'-S o
O cf g
3
CD
o en
HT3fc
§ £Z
CO
a >
2 j<j
U CM
CO so-
Ih o
CD S
CJ
gp
O. <U
en x:
CD -»->
o .
2 ft;
CD CTi
en i— <
o
o
Q
O
LU
LU
O
1*-
l
O
o
O
3
(0
</>
O
U_
O
CO
o
O
(fl
e
(0
0)
>
o
o
a>
CO
o
I
o
c
o
o
UJ
y. ■
C o
CO -S
C73 T3
O 0)
■4-3
U U
o cp
"-1 a.
g^ cp
S to
CD
CO
<D
—
1!
X
+J
U
+J
C
c«
a
'■j
+-»
cS cO
ft
fa T3
o cp
CM to
o
£ .
,2 J.
-fa 3
§°
P CO
o
CO
3 >>-m
o
00 o
2#
a> o
^§
>)CM
ft fc,
ft CO
3 cp
co >,
CO
c
CD
O
CO
o
o
DD
CP C
fa O -O
S — «*
to cO 3
C c5
co -tJ
C T3 co
O g 0)
& * >
cp i2 -^
o
a
CO
O
£ ft a;
fa cp s-
_co ^
3
3
5^
^ cy -p
'co C C
»} oi eg
O^ c
fc o +3
£
ft
E
3 co
to c3
S M
o ,
u"c0
■!-> u
C 3
co eg
cp C
ft^3
C
3-
a! 5
■S c
-2 -5
M o
C
o u
C to
062tj" cs _ cp "5
12 co o ^^ fa a> «*
_c0 t, OJ to o "O jj",-i -o
^co^cotofceufag
■ScuS^cocptuS0
CP CO tO^^j; U ^ jg
b »i ib c^u u as-
cpt,t0o,c04-Jt-faH
>tOObftS"t0 3
5 m cp a> "co
05 -^'
CP O
c o .£.22
CP -i-i -i_> Sh .
V V» ^
a _
.- c rt
co *-
CD O)
*" co
2 §
— 1
a
>u
a
CD
—
3
o
ro
01
<u
o
.:
i-
rrt
3
hr
o
r!
sd
cu
E
a
X>
a; .22
±5 0)
a- c
a o
o c
co .ti c
ES'E
CD ^3 -3
-O CO £
-£ .S <D
Co O- —
£ -u "*
c -S i
.- o J*
c 5
c
o
c
cd
M
c
'S
*-> O '
co *~r
O <■£
E.
a; cd
MS H
.o _co
'co CO '
T3
CD
-D
CO
w< E
O 0)
a c
a>
cd 53
S » «
u s
CO -~ CO
15 C M
+j . * f-
CD £ CO
E B.E
0)
>
o „,
S =: M
0) o c
^Xl in
H co •-
w a> "2
0) _c o
5 °3
■C CD
.S CO
co .a
s- E
cu o
" e
c
CO
>>—
CO £
CD
<w
(A
O
r •
a.
•
a]
•.
TD
/•
2
•
o
++ •
•
c
<v*
'.
• • <
(0
*
• •
••
• •
<D
r^
£^-
••
*c» • *
0
T3
SL
•>
•
•
•
•
c
7j0
(S
0
•
'•..••
O
•
h-
- •
01
a>
•
■ '
' . •
®
c
i
•
• •
•
•
• •
»• —
(0
• ••
• •
c
o
(0
a>
(/)
1
'. 1
•
• •
•
CO #
cu
o
" t
E
£
o
E
• •
• •
®
3
C
c
Cu
u
• •
•
O
o
o
to
a_
f
•
•J-
• ••»•
a.
o
m
a)
•
•
O
Z
c
09
CL
•
••••
<
•
•
o
CO
a>
o
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
c
o
CO
z
c
«
_
a
•
c
q
•
•
CD
c\i
5
o
•
E"3
^ £
CO -C
a;H
-4->
■g4S
3 CO
CO *-
A g
xj ■■=
c E
CO __
- cu
>- 3
Oj <+h
a. c
o. o
o c
CJ , ,
«•§
« 3
CO
o
c ™
CO s-
c 'S
O A.
u -"
CU CO
u e
3 C
-O 3
E.S
a, E
-° ^
C CO
CO -
~_ Q>
^ &
- s
J3 -
- CD
c/} CD
CD J3
Cu o
§ IS
&_£
>> 3
c c
CO JZ
C 3
>-, o
O s-
T3 *°
CD U2
cd -r
a .
o
»°1
cu O _; 2J
Mag£
s., cu .y z3
CO "D *~ C
C cu c o
£ o CO
<" !P §
!- CD -a s
o y c£
^ c
_S CO
> co CO
E?
O
g E5 S
S H co
o
U Ul !fl
« §'§ 3 E
•g E a.3 g
i; ;J- cu *j .E
c3-SloM
o cu .— J2 3
W O 03,^
c ° t «°
'7 S £ fe ca
co *i 5 o o
m CO cu .O £
to -° c a J*
CD _c J O ^=
1) ° ^ .- rj r
™+j cu CD o 3
(O C (0
!"<*§
t rt •*- CJ>
3 ° O T-
CO -■= - _-
n ° c C
°?^
Si**
^ Q> — O
£ ^ « Q.
rac S o
«5 II
So oo
CO -i* "- —
CO S > CD
CD
CD
cz
CD
O
CO
CO
CD
CO
"D co
"c
ft
CD
C CD
CD
CO
O
O
CO
O cn
-£Z
CD
c
>- c=
° o
J- 3
CO
CO
CO
o
o -o
CD
O
c
CD O
CD
ft
CJ)
X
^ Q.
<
CD
c/5
□
c
3 '
O
o
73
CD ,
+->
_c0 (
3
ft
o
&
•?
CO
CD
-C
CD
£
o
EC
t a>
he »h
C 2
3
co
ft-C
CO
CD
3
ho CD
c o .£ -c
73 tuO g
cO ■
CO CO
CD en
■ ■ CO
O CD
CM _C
CD -S
-, a)
t- "co ^ 3
I « CO co
I - CD 73
i CO ft 3
1 g-ftg
?i-s co Sb
-^- CD
73 -C
CD «
co £
CD o
co ,-
CD — -
S, C O
CO Si r-
CD p
CO CO
CO
CO -^
CD CD
§ bo
s.s
CO
CD
3 >>"E
ft?t2 -e
co c c
■- ■" CCJ
43
CO
CD <C
« cci t3 .O
cc t: CO
=«£ 8
O ctl
. CD >
>si , c
o * =3
co O "^
. co -^
hp C _c
§ fc <*
c "S
o c
^ CD
bo ft
■§ *
-^ 3
CO CO
^ CO
CD .CD
? C
o o
,CM U
CD .
-tJ u
CD "g «
'SblS '5
-Si & J=
O CO
"So
ft c
3 co
co "^
co "
CO
-a ■
c
cO
-^ CO
73 CD
Si co
j y o
' .3 °<
■ CD 3
,-K ft
i S »-
j -O CD
iai
o
bo
c C .2
2 o -a
E *3 c
. co _co >— !
^"S S.B5r
,S 5 ftCO
2^ °^
T3 +J "^ t— T
T3-- Cp
C "° 2 <D
=« >>« "
Si c —
cd ,„- 5
g<_co .-y 2
-C cs
o Si
CO O
^"'co
■S <D
■C >
3 u
cr o
— CD
e sj >- cd
2 Si.S "co
«-> .22 c5 "O
>aT3 03 +J
73 i2 H D
ho o § CD
iSo 8h
CO &
• - .2
5 ^ »-
O IJtH
*4— i ^
CO j CO
2 3.S
15 -U
CD-? 73
CO iS CO
-C O- ^
_> o .S
2 *- 73
.S ° c
CO ? _Q
g ft
CO P
CJ
&«?
^^
73
c aj
co^
CO 73
73 C
CO CO
^ C72
co -a
CO . —
3 C
C
3
O
g
CO
13
3
cy
CD
_>>
CD
2 S
ft CD
CO ft
o -
c
CO >>
2 £
&
P o
CO
v £
o o
ft o
E he
— ' c
s- o
0) c
-^ s
•4-3 TO
O-a
c
3
O
£>e 1
3 3 5
k&22
■S.2
.a
« CD
^t-t ^ '
O 03
ft-C'
p a
V >
c
: .
o
0)
C3 f_.
<3j
c
e
bo
§-.s
ft s-
o <
in
sg
CO
CO ^o
o
^
-■?
CM
c -3-
x:
co
CO
CD
o
0 N J I O <
■ 2
E
UJ
~
JZ
■ CO
o
CO
CD
3
ll
a:
z>
5
c
1
■ ■
1
1
*
00
r«.
i
<o
N.
a>
(0
s *
O W
11
S°
W CO
a. **.
CO ^.
(J) CVJ
o
5
o
CO
CO
"O
OJ
c
3
;hina 17.0%
izil 15.0%
FAO, Production Yearbook, 1978
UN Statistical Yearbook, 1979
I
|
8.0%
on figures in
I on figures in
I
I
Others
• Based
"Baser.
en ctj a i
ni 0) V- "
en
.2 o
3 §
o
en
X
o 2 fe
c ^ S
c o &
c« a)
u ft
o
9 a; oj
CO CJ
5 o o
jj- ft+J
o-S
-C
CD
£
o
o
- CD
r/j u ft^ a!
-1 P E o
J-i CO
H *
O +J
ftcV2
£t3
— 0)
c .-y
'3 .»
JZ>?
ai
™ 5 3 d
_^^ 5 S
:fe^
eg
£
CO
41
M
CD
bo
Fh
K
— '
CO
O'O'O
u
C
Fh
BfH
o
o
o
0)
^
^H
CO
CD
a>
O
a>
^r
3 -C
-+-»
T3
^^
t/3
5
^3
-*-T
c
o s^ o
£ 3 *
*" <D CO
C
O
cS
CD
^^ — I c_j j_
" c a>
CO
CD
CO ^»
CD H
bo
n3
CO
CD
- C T3
cue
rt a> aj
5"° c
«1 „c
CD
m <^ "+-i
€|1
o*_5
Q co CO
§p
3 O
-a j3
o >
u >
ft w
9
9
CO
CD
H CD
+J.S ft
S c
ft>— i
X
3 O
p .a
C -C
co ^
S2 3
ft l- _Q
co o
c -a 2
cfl CD £
I- J 1)
■§"S
1/3
2 I CD
ET co S
3. 2 ^
co i„ •—
+j -a cd
c S -c
* °2
CO TO
CD
&
3 •
t*H O tD
O _Q C
fc, * °
* in C
t « «!
CO
3
~
CD
o
^-a 3
« i s
CD ? .2
a
e« O
-C ft
^
ft^
93
"I
3
CD
-C J3
CD
'fS'
^tfr
co
cfl _cfl
.2 15
T3 ft
* a* °
cp J^
O ft-w -y
CD tD
is o
3 2
co 3
CD c
^^
H CD
(33 "C
CD +j
> P
^ ft
CD X
JS tD
S s
p s
c«
3
„ tD
boj= -c
SO?
' " P » Ifl
_ (0 TJ CM ■
lllllll.
N.
0)
I8-
C o
EL m"
- °
S e
"^ o
2 *~
o
CM
CO
o
CO
ro
CO
■o
0)
c
1
CD
2 S « £ # « g
f % ■> o n P
5 M * * -« w
1? ? » J«n tcq
■ ■5u! s l*|s
ill
•1'
o
Q--0
S m
2? <=
a; g
°-°
CM Q.
£ S
en it
CD F
CD
CM =>
O CO
jd
E
(13
CD
cr
en
CD
Q.
a)
c
o
o £2
CO a>
Q-
CD
cr
CD
Q.
CD
Q-
CM
CM
CD
>
O
I
LO
CM
D DD
S5II251IIII;
io m i- cm I n -n1
I w? I I
Q.
O
CO
P H o*
o 3 -c
> 3 to
s * 5=
c « CO
O O CM 00 i- CO CM O m j 2
»5 °
CO 3*
-i ra o
<a
ia
CD
C
CD ™ — — aj
Uji. DO
;5 °>.!2
6 £ => 3 I 3 m iS S. §
a> Q.-J"
co x ^
as a> -;
CQ-L ^
cu b
3 CD
S CD
' J3 CD
) <-* CO -r -*-3
)£ 0) o„
' £ 3-D 13
i CD g-2<«
CO
-c +3
O co
CD o
CO -C
03 £
J3 —
" 'o
,o3
£-.2 13
«:SS •
*— • T3 -r3 CD
_a cu p -£
rt u h cB
*2 c ™ i«
-Q CD _- _
03 3 03 *3
■^ *3 3
CI)
„ 3
CD § .52
I S.S2
CO ^ -^
C 3H
CO
CO
b ~°
TO r-
3
ft
o
Oh
3 u
CO 33
CD £
x- o3
CO
— CD
c -°
o °
'"" ho
2 -r J= >-
03 _
„ h h
S 5 £
"CD O ~3 CD
CO co cj _C
-.2 3 <*
CD -^ CO -m
1 -2 -Q -s- _c
;S-c >,«
^.aS S
5a
c
Q.
O
CD
>
<D
Q
CD
CM
3
■a
c
•o
c
<B
C
o
3
Q.
O
Q.
.2 St:
□)■- o
<d raz
^ ra ra
M 3 ni"
•D O S-
caE
.2,ai
nj to c
EJj££
cnTi en i;
OTJ -_,
h2^D
« §
D cm
r O
<U
4-3
3P3
01 ^
G en
a:
05
iS n! C
CO - CJ
i> S- 0>
a* cd"
CD g
+J o
.s fe
en <u
0> i-
•J3 ?U
2 :> c
■2-a c
t3 J3 a!
O 03
2d £
03 '43
c- en
•£3 CD
„ N
ai ■ —
Ih C
O o3
E-fi
.a oj
be tp
CD 01 -g
01 _Q tj
oj
0)
c" °
'J3 "p
o3 OJ
0)
S-S £ 2 2 >>3
XI c»
03 •-
A o
03 —
T3 >-
C >-
03 Jl
5b i
03 to
CM OJ
>5.0
0)
c .5
O) -*-»
£s
9" to
E.2
fc. 'S
Oi 3
Cu o c
-Q ft.O
ch O.*!
° ° g
l* X3 —
to S n3
c
o
"O
CD
~o
c:
o
O
o
CM
O
to
CO
c
o
CD
E
o
O)
<
c
CO
(0
CD
to
T3
O
o
CO
2
E
o
c
o
o
LU
(3
o
r-
01
*- ^ 11/
6.5 E
0; JS
*- "5
S a.
03 •-a
4-j 3 c
>, a *
& 2 m
. o. c
03 0> >
-C J3 O
+J +J +-> C 03
_ C .H
* .2 -fa
y +3 In
« C3 3
£X3.S
01 0) _
1> *- u
zj cd <^
T3
5
o
<U
Q.
O
o
o>
>
■o
CD
e
Q
o
CO
o
~
Q.
■o
C
CO
£
£
i_
o
CD
k.
CD
C5
>
o
CN
CO
CM
o>
O
O
O
CM
O
CO
o
CO
-%
\
\
<3.-,
>
\
°6
^
%
"*>,
%
%
%
,
o
IT)
in
CO
o
o
o
|
1
es
3
CO
0)
> .
cS 0>
a
_i«S
• "\
ping
)lled
opment
co
to
m
CM
CO
o X^
S «
cS (33
£.8
03 CJ
1* CD
, , S-<
5 to
§■■§
-u 3
'£ °
^^ £ «-
**£$
a o ° <u
C *-, i, ,c
.5 £1 fl> ^
O 3 c 3
M 0) o 41
o <d tic c
is es < -a
-3 -C -ai
o c .5 $
a es c o
Q) -*->
be—
C co
C3 "-'
■^ +j
0) CS
> -a
cS O
2 c'
3-2
c es
.2 3
cS o
a
-a
c
e .S E O-
s-s § >>
3 3 -S
O +-> a co
O O O CD
-o ""a! ""
a; to >
a'""1 a>
o c -a
CD TO
-a
a
3
O
CO
a>
—
&&&
0)
c >
CD o
5td u
5 to
CD ■£
73
C
*J
■
CS
— 1
-
™
'-C
b
t/1
c
/
to
M
s-, C
? s
d> cS
'F?-3
9 -^
to
C7i O
S"E
o +j
+3 C
e« 3
"3 °
° ^ c
a _2 cs
efl
tp
o, <u aji
» o2
a^
o -*
a fc,,
° I
to
Ci o
^H O
es
T3 13 J3
i/
g a
a o
|£
3 o
W c
eu i ^2
o »-.
to _c
*»OlL WT
c
E
■o
a)
CO
_
o
IT)
CO
OS
CO
CM
I ,*
CO
! w
CD
UJ
tr c
CO a;
- ra
3 ixi
•
2?
3
.2>
c
o
Q.
O
CL
8 2
DD
*
1 s
fcT04^
CO
'Sf
h-
co
CO
CO
c
■J
CM
CO
n)
Q
o
t
■•.I
c
^5
C —
CO ~
E ro
< °
2 >.
o
u
LU
a> cf
•o
2 2?
<D
CO
3
a3
«-
c
CD
V)
5 »
C
Q.
c
o
3
i—
.",
O
"O w
n
3
-C
<D
-C
§§
~
c/>
."t^
T3
■^
g
c
S
C
c
CO
o
(0
O
c
o
CO
c
o
CO
CO
£5
i_
3
LL
en
CD
LX
E
O)
OJ
tr
E
3 .0
CO TO
" F
D □
C3
.9-
£ *>
a§
cd ^3
-c ca
«.&>
£ E
- CO
5 OJ
— V, *
^ "o O
14 C O
ca ca
2 <•>
bo
c
r- £ -
3 c c
u t. c i« cs
£ .SPcm J J
CO
02
-73 u
CD <*H
."S o
D .0
oj "S
CO
CD
T3
Ji> OJ .-,
is §■§
CD E
S»8
8 * m
<"-<-> CD
ft -a „
•-0/1)
r c o)
ft^> 5J
cd cd -O
+-» -t-j .2
co o
CO
i-< ca -y <;
c °s c ~
_ o — o c
2'5 5 co cs
co oj ja
■G o .5 £ ca
J5 E
C co
— <u
-a M
01
"Be . s.fc
OJ <u rt '£ qj
feb
0) -
3 C
cr o
oj ■ J3
E *
8. 1
o E
C c«
O E
c o
O -n
'• ca
c
-~,
C J3
2 oj e'
ft_C o
c3"a '-5
E G ™
ca
■ 2-c
3 a
o oj
CD Q
T3
OJ
+j
C
3
! 8
! 3
1 c
: o
Si" p. ^
CD
t- CO
nl CD
■B.&
CD V.
cci
C OJ
O r-
C P
CO,
o CD
ca o
CO
CD O
oj -3
cj ca
„ 3 r-
O T3 CD 2
U) Cj S- +J
c
CD
S OJ o.
^ o -^
12 "3 W
CO >
«M OJ
O T3
1h
E CD
*. £
C 3
CD •— ' E
C !— '
ca l.23
CD •=* .
_ Q--o c
"^ =" T °
S ° o
So s-. >
•= OJ 1-*
E -° ^ _
E CO rl>
c o — :
3 Q.°
E "— 1
, CD -,_
OJ *^ _
bo c ca
o a
CO
cfl
V
CO
CD
>
o _
=W 5 CO
O ' — ' -^
cd oj c ca
O-CJ I
£~ fcl, I
o
cS .
CJ CD
3 o
0 is
ft 3
eW
.2 c
— Sh
^3 CD
E CO
^w
^£
ca o
OJ ,H
O C
fei^
CO
CD
CD
be
- ,3
CJ ^4— <
c <u
£»
•»■ A
Ol
*£* /
1 o V^'>~0s
\ *y j /
V7 * /
s s ->^t
ki y 'i^w
c nj -V rvC
\x|fe
*4ir^
a c
o o
* \
m =
ropean O
er 7.5 Mil
^\vU~
gb.
3 >
m o
\*> \^
I- o
M <°
3 03
» 8
*-: -t-»
C
3
O
g
3. 3
c o
he g
s .£
S-, O
£J5
o
CD CX
-i -3 x
■s ° £
w to 3
5 fc< 4>
-° £
_£ £ «
C£0h
2 01 a!
■2 a> >-
£-u<
l"0 1z <+*
J£ 3 °
r= o c
.* " O
3 «5
3 C «5
3 .3 N
O 3 g
"Of3
CD o t*
M E. A
£ w
O *-
a, a)
E*
■- o
6*
O a» a*
CD as as
^) C a>
M u "
C Hi 5
3 -m as
O
.0
«
c
co
w_
O)
"E
c
co >>
33
"So.
= cd
"3 o
C to
C -3
'■£ S
as
- cd
he to
3 CD
Si
£ 3
o -^
Q..3
6^
3 .£
*S -"->
O c
> a>
•£ ctf) co
h C b
,5£
6f
0
O)
JJ
CD
en
—
O
■*-
H—
c
C3)
C
O)
><
F
O
a.
CO
F
i_
(i)
n
c/>
as
c
c
O
a>
a)
c
rt >
O c^
O, w
E >^
a> u a> ^
3-a '
to a>
s- 3.
1) o
-£1
I s
> -a
&•!
C
-
o
* S
o -Q
D
V 3
-a ^
CD 3
— as
a> ■
CD
CU^
-« a> £
0) t* o
as fc,
JS as S
3 -iS
aS
CO
0>
o
o
CO
O
CO
CD
O
O
c
ro
LI 0
o
o
UJ
o
o <2 £2 ™ =
o
ui
s
o
o
ss»g|f§«<3ig«!_
ZJ=SCDcDa>C™Qj >- ?? CD CO m
<<CDOQu_u_u_
"8
; "g 03
CO
CO
^ CD ^ co
c E coN ™ ™,
co CD n > s £ -
ZZZQ.UB9)
a> =
<1J CD CD
£ co
• u.
a co
E 2>.
^ N CD
s mooo
co a. co o -o c c^
P cd ai o) c co OT
oc £ £ « £
£ O O "- I
T 5 a_ cr r> >
g E 8.
* c ■
» ■ •
III
O O B
o o <
? s « I
S £ O g
5 Pcfl
O < < LU
o) 5;
s 1 1
CD ° CD
c
O
o
C v)
o c J
£ °
0) irt
c°o
iS
12 "> "£
0 «
c ° a>
™T3 .
1> C C
2 CTJ
k. <o *-
CD ■ 2
C T3 CJ
» ~ c
O Q (0
0 °I
CD C 3
ui nj cd
ti-^
>c 0
2 »r
£— c
l/>£ J
Ol O —
_ M CO
CD — C
c — -
> CD 10
UJ
h
0
-* Ol —
4) 0 >
0 £ 73
™ 3 C
CD CI 3
1- 2 J
iio
z
1- -O J3
CD >,X3
n jd co
5 £>
CO CO CO
CO z
o 3
° p
(0 CD O O
CD
S CO CD CD CO
S" 9 .9>.9) E
z z z: z: o ol
ro J= « 3
Q_
a)
CO CO CO CD
Q. £L Q.O.
>- CO
£ ■ T3 a? co
1 m-l O
CO
co -*
s Ooio; "SE d: "rorjc
Q. O n rr co to cococococococococococococOHhi-
CO CO -Q -Q
i -1 >,
!S
» — CO
: c co
; CD C
"O CO co
1 < CO >
5
CO _Q
ii|l|8a.|S
• - — IU
3 3 h-
CTCraCL^0jCD^cDCDZ3COcO5=
■"■33>>5>->->NNN
O
CD co
(0 T3
C CO CO -^ p
r q, o oj ^ - F1J
^°>c ?-cora £ co o
EEEdErar
■ CO co 0 C
o ^ d j co (0 0 i: r oooo 3 >-0 o o oiJ or£ .=* <n ^z
<<<<mmmmcommcDCDaQaDOOOOOOOOOOOQQQLiJuj'
CO ca
-o 2
E o
" E
o
cn2 co d O F E
c inn cl-O t t
o —
■5 _ > H
CO Q. CO CO
§6
1 £ -r
1 tr co co
I CD CD CD
>- Z> 3 D 3 CO O "O "O CO
ujujujajU-Oh-OOOOaOII^^-.
ji ° o
o Z CO
i Q. tO co CO S
i CO CD O O 3
> ^ ¥ * ^ M
CO CO
O JD
CO CD
Economics
■so oversees the efforts of several
bvernment agencies such as the
departments of Treasury, Commerce,
Ind Agriculture to collect and analyze
lata on foreign investment.
)eclaration and Related Decision on
[Jational Treatment
pi 1976 the United States joined other
|>ECD member governments in par-
Icipating in the consensus adopting a
declaration and related decision on na-
tional treatment. The declaration and
lecision were reviewed and reaffirmed
ki 1979 by a consensus of OECD coun-
tries in which the United States also
tarticipated. The declaration states in
lart "that Member countries should,
onsistent with their needs to maintain
riublic order, to protect their essential
ecurity interests, and to fulfill com-
mitments relating to international peace
md security, accord to enterprises
Operating in their territories and owned
br controlled directly or indirectly by na-
ionals of another member
country. . . treatment under their laws,
•egulations, and administrative practices
•onsistent with international law and no
ess favorable than that accorded in like
situations to domestic
■nterprises. ..."
Since the declaration and related
lecision on national treatment were
idopted in 1976, progress has been
nade toward refining the concept in-
cluding a listing of those exceptions
which now exist and their rationales.
Continuing work is in progress with a
stated goal of extending the application
jf national treatment over time. The
Department believes that the very ex-
stence of the declaration and related
decision has dissuaded member countries
from implementing new derogations
from the principle.
1920 Mineral Lands Leasing Act
The Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920
provides for a reciprocity test (30 USC
181) in permitting foreign interests to
bid for Federal leases of lands for ex-
ploration and development of oil, gas,
coal, phosphates, and certain other
minerals. The Department of Interior
administers the act, including the
maintenance of a list of countries that
have been deemed "reciprocating" — i.e.,
countries that grant to U.S. interests
like or similar privileges for develop-
ment of their mineral resources.
For its determination of reciprocity,
the Department of Interior works with
the Department of State to gather infor-
mation concerning restrictions on
mineral leases of foreign countries. For
example, the Department of State has
assisted in gathering the appropriate
foreign statutes through our embassies
overseas. Updated information on coun-
tries once designated as reciprocating is
provided periodically. Information for
countries not on a current list of
reciprocating countries is sought on an
ad hoc basis as needed for new deter-
minations.
H.R. 2826
H.R. 2826 contains a provision which
would place a moratorium on foreign in-
vestment in excess of 25% of the voting
securities in a mineral resource corpora-
tion which meets certain criteria. The
Department opposes this provision of
the bill on investment, energy, and
strategic materials policy grounds.
Investment. From the investment
policy standpoint, such a moratorium
would represent a probable exception to
the principle of national treatment to
which we have obligated ourselves inter-
nationally and toward which industri-
alized countries have been working for
mutual benefit. More generally, the
moratorium would be inconsistent with
longstanding U.S. policy in support of
free capital movements and might en-
courage the spread of economic nation-
alism to the detriment of all countries.
In addition, in an era when the
United States must increasingly look
overseas for important mineral re-
sources, a moratorium on investment in
our mineral sector could set an unfor-
tunate example for other nations while
at the same time discouraging foreign
investment from helping to develop U.S.
domestic resources.
Energy. We are also concerned
about the implications of this provision
for U.S. energy policy. A basic tenet of
our international energy policy is the
need to promote rapid development of
alternative energy resources by oil-
importing countries. U.S. coal reserves
loom large in this picture because of the
extensive supplies available. Many
resource-poor countries have manifested
interest in purchasing coal from the
United States and have offered to pro-
vide capital in the form of equity invest-
ment to finance the expansion of U.S.
coal production capacity.
We need this capital for several
reasons. First, foreign investment in
coal resources companies will stimulate
U.S. output and employment. Secondly,
it will reinforce foreign confidence in the
United States as a reliable supplier of
coal and assist foreign countries in ex-
panding their use of coal in substitution
for oil, thus assuring us of increased ex-
ports and also reducing pressure on the
world oil market.
Strategic Materials. The proposed
moratorium could also have unforeseen
and possibly negative ramifications on
investments by U.S. nationals overseas,
particularly in strategic materials sec-
tors. The United States is the largest in-
vestor in foreign countries and has been
a major force in world mining develop-
ment. The book value of U.S. direct
foreign investment in mining stood at $7
billion as of 1979.
As we look to a future where the
United States is likely to be increasingly
reliant on imports for a number of
crucial raw materials, it is apparent that
we continue to have a major interest in
maintaining maximum freedom of in-
vestment and capital flows in world min-
ing. Not only will continued U.S. par-
ticipation in foreign mining enhance the
security of our future supplies, but
without such investment from the
United States and other industrialized
countries, it is doubtful that mineral-
producing developing countries will be
able to meet the sharply increased
capital costs of new mining investments.
U.S. Decision
Given these circumstances the Depart-
ment believes that it would not be in the
U.S. interest to enact a moratorium on
certain types of foreign investment in
U.S. mining companies as required by
H.R. 2826. This action could be wrongly
interpreted by other countries as a
signal that the United States was mov-
ing toward an inward-looking policy on
access to its domestic resources which,
in turn, could make it more difficult for
other governments to resist nationalistic
pressures related to natural resources
and lead to further foreign restrictions
on energy and minerals investment. This
would be the wrong direction for the
world to move in an era of increasing in-
terdependence and reliance on natural
resources as a foundation for modern in-
dustrialized societies, and it could
July 1981
31
ENERGY
adversely affect long-term mineral
prices and the availability of strategic
materials to the United States.
To summarize our views on section
three of H.R. 2826, the State Depart-
ment opposes the proposed moratorium
as contrary to U.S. international obliga-
tions on national treatment of invest-
ment, inconsistent with longstanding
U.S. policy favoring an open investment
climate and on the grounds that it
creates a potential precedent and
justification for retaliation by foreigners
against U.S. investment abroad, par-
ticularly in the strategic minerals sectors
which are vital to our national interest.
If the proposed legislation is motivated
by a concern over maintaining U.S. con-
trol of our mineral resources, the
Department of State believes that ade-
quate authorities are already available
under existing legislation, especially the
Export Administration Act and regula-
tions established thereunder, which are
administered by the Department of
Commerce in consultation with the
Department of State and other agencies.
Foreign-controlled firms operating in
the United States are fully subject to,
and accountable under, U.S. laws and
regulations.
Another provision of H.R. 2826 pro-
vides that the Secretary of the Interior,
in consultation with other appropriate
Departments, should undertake a com-
prehensive study of indirect foreign in-
vestment in mineral resources on lands
owned by the United States and to
report to Congress. The Department op-
poses this provision as unnecessary.
Legislation need not be enacted for the
Administration to proceed.
We urge the Congress in its con-
sideration of this bill to be mindful of
the large stake the United States has in
the efficient functioning of the interna-
tional investment system. The Depart-
ment opposes the legislative requirement
for a comprehensive study of foreign in-
vestment in mineral resources on United
States lands, and we oppose the propos-
ed moratorium on foreign investment in
mineral resource corporations. We
believe that the United States has more
to lose by suspending free investment in
our minerals sector than we can hope to
gain through a moratorium.
Strategic Petroleum Reserve
•The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
by Robert D. Hormats
Statement before the Subcommittee
on Energy and Mineral Resources of the
Senate Energy and Natural Resources
Committee on May 8, 1981. Mr. Hormats
is Assistant Secretary for Economic and
Business Affairs. l
This testimony is particularly mean-
ingful for me both because it is my first
as Assistant Secretary for Economic and
Business Affairs and because it ad-
dresses a subject which I consider of
profound importance to the interest of
the United States. In my judgment, the
international energy situation presents
the most serious threat to the well-being
of this country, and the industrialized
democracies as a whole, in this decade.
It raises the potential for sharp price in-
creases and supply interruptions, which
would seriously disrupt our societies and
our economies. And it causes vulnera-
bilities which could weaken the very
foundations of our alliances and our
political cooperation.
As this country moves toward the
imperative of dramatically reducing its
dependence on imported oil over the
longer run, we must take bold and pur-
poseful actions to enhance our energy
security for the immediate future. Fill-
ing the strategic petroleum reserve at
the highest feasible rate, especially dur-
ing this period of market softness, is
essential to that security. Failure to do
so would be a mistake of historic
significance.
I know that many members of this
committee need no convincing on this
subject. In fact, many of you, quite ap-
propriately, have been critical of the ex-
ecutive branch, in the past, for not fill-
ing the strategic petroleum reserve.
That is why this is a particularly con-
structive forum in which to explain, in
some detail, the importance of adequate
financing for the strategic petroleum
reserve in order to reinforce the momen-
tum, recently established, toward achiev-
ing overall fill objectives.
Structure of the International
Oil Market
The structure of the international oil
market has changed significantly over
the last decade. In 1973-74, less than
10% of OPEC's [Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries] oil
flowed outside the majors' channels. The
companies were then able to act as buf-
fers between producers and consumers.
They had the flexibility to allocate oil,
based on changes in demand and supply,
among their markets.
Since that time, the situation has
changed substantially. OPEC countries
have, to state the obvious, steadily
assumed greater control over production
and price policy. Less obviously, these
same countries have assumed increasing
control over sales and distribution chan-
nels. Today over 45% of crude oil traded
by OPEC is handled directly by pro-
ducers. Trading by the major oil com-
panies has increasingly been reduced by
OPEC direct sales to foreign govern-
ments. In addition, destination restric-
tions, by which some OPEC countries
prohibit the resale of their oil outside
certain designated areas, have become
more common. Thus, the ability of the
majors to manage a curtailment of pro-
duction has been significantly reduced.
At the same time, events during the
last 2 years have shown us that the
potential for disruption is real and ever
present. In 1979, when stocks were well
below normal, the Iranian revolution
caused that country's production to drop
sharply — from an earlier peak of 6
million barrels per day (b/d) to less than
1 million b/d for a short period. Com-
panies and governments engaged in
defensive stock building. Spot-market
prices shot upward.
The war between Iran and Iraq
again disrupted world supplies. About
3.8 million b/d were lost almost as soon
as the war broke out. Had stocks not
been unusually high and consumption on
a downward path, or if Saudi Arabia
and other countries had not raised their
production, prices might have risen fur-
ther.
The Present Situation
Given this recent history, we should
draw little comfort from current oil
surpluses. Our oil lifeline is fragile; it
will remain so for years.
This nation, along with other oil im-
porters, is vulnerable to disruptions
caused by wars — such as that between
Iran and Iraq and the 1973 Arab-Israeli
war. We are vulnerable to disruptions
from internal turmoil — such as the
strikes and chaos during the Iranian
revolution. We are vulnerable to
deliberate cutoffs of oil designed to app-
32
DeDartment of State Bulletin
■
Energy
ly political pressure by particular expor-
ting countries. And we are vulnerable to
disruptions caused by accidents — such as
a ruptured pipeline, the sinking of a ship
in a strategic strait, or a fire in a major
refinery complex.
Importance of the
Strategic Petroleum Reserve
Our reliance on insecure sources of sup-
ply has led this Administration to place
a high priority on energy security. A
great deal of time and effort already
have been spent on reexamining energy
security alternatives.
One alternative for reducing our
vulnerability has already been put into
action. The President's prompt action on
oil price decontrol will further reduce
U.S. oil imports. U.S. imports of crude
oil and products peaked at 8.6 million
b/d in 1977. Through 1980, they had
fallen an incredible 27%. This year will
also show another substantial drop. Un-
fortunately, the reduction in oil imports
alone is not enough. We are still vulner-
able to supply interruptions.
To cope with this situation the Ad-
ministration has begun comprehensive
reviews of energy security issues. We
are examining the emergency sharing
program of the International Energy
Agency (IEA) to see what changes, if
any, may be needed; we are studying
our own domestic contingency planning;
and we are again reviewing the role the
international oil companies can play in
conjunction with IEA in alleviating the
effects of supply interruption.
Though not yet complete, our
energy security review has come to one
clear conclusion: that a sizable strategic
petroleum reserve is vital to our energy
security effort in order to counter the
potential effects of an oil-supply inter-
ruption.
The Administration is committed to
carrying out the existing plan to build a
strategic petroleum reserve of 750
million barrels. We believe that protec-
tion against unforeseen shortages must
begin with an effective reserve. The
benefits are significant. A strategic
petroleum reserve could:
• Substantially shelter the United
States from the effects of a severe sup-
ply interruption. A 750-million-barrel
reserve and existing private safety
stocks could offset the loss of 3 million
b/d in U.S. imports for a full year;
• Act as a deterrent to threats of an
oil cut-off for purposes of political black-
mail; and
• Provide a measure of flexibility in
lnternati<
anal Energy
Agency
Member
Countries
Australia
Luxembourg
Austria
Netherlands
Belgium
New Zealand
Canada
Norway
Denmark
Portugal
Germany
Spain
Greece
Sweden
Ireland
Switzerland
Italy
Turkey
Unitea Kingdom
Japan
United States
dealing with a supply crisis or in con-
ducting the diplomacy needed to
eliminate the cause of the disruption. If
we can draw on a strategic reserve for a
period of months in the event of inter-
rupted imports, our response to the
situation can be a more measured one;
our diplomacy can proceed in a less
pressured atmosphere, and we may, as a
result, have more options available to
What We Need To Do
Regrettably, despite the clear need, one
could not characterize the history of the
reserve as smooth and steady progress.
As many in this room know only too
well, filling the reserve has been an on-
again-off-again proposition. While Con-
gress authorized a 500-million-barrel
reserve in 1975, as of mid-1980 we had
only 92 million barrels in storage.
We are still far from what I would
consider an adequate reserve at this mo-
ment. However, the fill rate has
dramatically increased. Under this Ad-
ministration, a very successful effort has
been mounted to buy oil on the open
market. We have already bought enough
oil so that the average for the fiscal year
will exceed 200,000 b/d, and more pur-
chases are underway. The strategic
petroleum reserve now totals above 132
million barrels; excellent momentum has
been established.
Now is an ideal time for rapidly
building our reserve. The world oil
market is slack; oil is widely available at
relatively modest prices. I do not need
to recall for this committee the sorts of
pressures that exist internationally
against filling the reserve when the oil
market is tight. Many important pro-
ducers, not to mention our fellow oil
consumers, are concerned about the
potential price consequences of our fill-
ing in a tight market. While I believe we
have learned from past mistakes and
can manage these pressures more effec-
tively, it remains true that it is far
easier to maintain a sustained fill rate in
a slack market. Once established, a
higher fill rate can be more easily ac-
cepted as an ongoing feature of the
market.
These steps are required to continue
this excellent momentum.
First, approval by the Congress of
DOE's [U.S. Department of Energy]
supplementary request for $1.3 billion
for purchases of oil this fiscal year to be
delivered next fiscal year. These funds
would make up for money which is not
being received because the entitlements
program was cancelled upon decontrol.
The reserve had been partly funded by
payments received from U.S. refiners
through the entitlements system, which
was scheduled to continue through
September. Entitlements payments
evened out the impact on U.S. refiners
and the reserve of differing levels of
reliance on price-controlled domestic
crude and uncontrolled or imported
crude.
Second, assured, continuous financ-
ing for the reserve for the FY 1982 and
beyond.
I realize these programs are expen-
sive, and in a time of budgetary re-
straint, expenditures for the strategic
petroleum reserve loom large. Questions
as to whether the reserve should be on-
budget or off-budget and whether it
should be publicly financed or privately
financed have been appropriately raised.
My colleagues from Treasury, DOE,
and OMB [Office of Management and
Budget] have already addressed the
financing question. The overriding con-
cern from my Department's perspective
is that there be an assured source of
funding to purchase oil for the reserve.
We may never have a better oppor-
tunity to act to enhance our energy
security. Market conditions are right.
Storage is available. The international
political climate is favorable.
The strategic petroleum reserve is
an important part of our energy security
program. It is admittedly expensive. But
consider the enormous economic prob-
lems and security consequences of facing
a major disruption of supplies and not
having adequate reserves to protect our
strategic interests. It is a risk that the
United States cannot afford to take.
'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402.B
July 1981
33
Energy
U.S. Competition in International
Coal Trade
by John P. Ferriter
Statement before the Subcommittee
on International Economic Policy of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
April 28, 1981. Mr. Ferriter is Director
of the Office of Energy Consumer-
Country Affairs.1
Expansion of coal exports serves a
multitude of U.S. policy interests, both
domestic and foreign. Coal exports help
us economically by strengthening our
balance of payments and increasing
employment in key regions of the coun-
try. They bolster our national security
by alleviating the dependence of our
allies on unreliable sources of energy.
Finally, they contribute to our energy
policy goal of reducing pressure on
world petroleum production and, thus,
the potential for harm arising from oil-
supply interruptions. Meanwhile,
obstacles to expanded coal exports by
and large are technical ones which we
can and will overcome.
Developing International Energy and
Coal Export Policies
Of primary concern is the continued
heavy dependence of a large part of the
world, including the United States and
most of its allies, on imports of oil. In
the first quarter of 1981, the 21 in-
dustrial country members of the Inter-
national Energy Agency (IEA) con-
sumed 35.4 million barrels per day of oil;
55% of this oil was imported. As events
of the past several years have demon-
strated, interruptions of even a small
part of those imports can have very
serious consequences for the economies
of all oil-consuming countries.
As a result, governments around the
globe have committed themselves to
reducing their national dependence on
oil imports as a matter of highest priori-
ty. In pursuing this objective, we in the
United States recognized at an early
stage that international cooperation was
essential and this was a driving force in
the creation, in 1974, of the IEA as a
forum for such cooperation among the
Western industrial countries. The IEA
has two principal functions.
First is its crisis management func-
tion. Recognizing that reduction of oil-
import dependence will be accomplished
only over the longer term and, hence,
that we will remain vulnerable to harm
from oil-supply disruptions for some
time to come, the IEA has developed a
standby emergency system for respond-
ing to such disruptions. A primary aim
of the system is to prevent self-defeating
competition for oil among major oil-
importing countries in the face of a
disruption. The system provides for
coordinated and equitable implementa-
tion of demand restraint measures,
drawdown of oil stocks, and, as
necessary, sharing of oil supplies among
member countries.
Second, the IEA coordinates mem-
ber country efforts to reduce long-term
dependence on imported oil. This is a
very broad effort. Attention is being
given both to conservation and to
development of alternative sources of
energy— coal, nuclear, gas, hydroelec-
tricity, geothermal, solar, biomass, and
synthetic fuels. The United States at-
taches great importance to this effort.
Sharing of experiences, information, and
analyses and pooling of resources have
permitted us and other member coun-
tries to improve significantly our in-
dividual national energy programs.
Coal: A Practical Substitute?
We are concerned fundamentally with
the extent to which coal, especially U.S.
coal, constitutes a practical substitute
for imported oil for ourselves and other
countries. Coal enjoys a price advantage
over oil. Even mined underground,
transported long distances over land and
sea, and burned in plants fully equipped
for environmental protection, coal is,
and is generally expected to remain,
substantially cheaper than oil on a
dollar-per-BTU-generated basis. It is
also plentiful. Coal reserves are much
larger than oil reserves not only in the
United States but throughout the world.
Economically recoverable world reserves
of coal are estimated at upwards of 600
billion tons. Estimated total coal re-
sources are some 15 times that amount.
This compares very favorably with cur-
rent annual world consumption of about
3.5 billion tons.
Despite these advantages, use of
coal has risen rather slowly since 1974.
There are three major reasons.
First, coal is difficult to transport,
handle, and burn relative to other fuels.
Second, coal has traditionally been
burned near to where it was mined.
Trade, at least in steam coal, has been
very small. Hence, there remain many
countries in the world, even some in-
dustrial ones, which have never burned
much coal, have little experience with it,
and, therefore, are somewhat wary of
converting to it.
Third, recent events have called into
doubt whether the sources of supply of
coal are substantially more reliable than
the sources of oil. Political and labor
unrest in Poland have caused a 50%
decline in its coal exports in the last 6
months. South African coal exports
may, at some point, be affected by such
difficulties too. Australia's exports were
seriously disrupted by a coal miners'
strike last summer. U.S. exports are
currently suffering from the United
Mine Workers strike.
In order for coal to fulfill its poten-
tial as a substitute for oil, trade in steam
coal must increase geometrically. We
and our trading partners are giving high
priority to achievement of this objective.
At the 1979 Tokyo economic summit,
participants agreed to a reciprocal
pledge not to interrupt coal trade under
long-term contracts unless required to
do so by a national emergency. That
same year, IEA ministers adopted a list
of principles for action on coal, aiming
at expanding coal demand, supply, and
trade. A coal industry advisory board
was established in 1980 to counsel the
IEA and its individual members in their
implementation of the coal principles
and is now actively involved in analyzing
problems associated with increasing coal
use. Finally, the IEA is devoting special
attention to coal in its program of re-
views of member country energy
developments and policies.
We are also seeking to promote use
of coal in developing countries through
both multilateral and bilateral develop-
ment assistance programs. Over the past
several years, we have significantly ex-
panded coal-related technical assistance
in the U.S. bilateral assistance program.
Australia and perhaps other donor coun-
tries have similar programs.
Supply and Demand
The United States has enormous coal
reserves, about one-quarter of the world
total. Current production— 840 million
tons last year— is the largest in the
world and accounts for almost one-
quarter of the world total. Even at that
level of production, the U.S. coal sector
had an estimated 100 million tons of
surplus capacity left unused for lack of
demand. U.S. bituminous coal exports—
34
Department of State Bulletin
Energy
9.9 million tons in 1980 — were nearly
ouble those of our nearest competitor,
ustralia. Only about 30% of
lese — 26.8 million tons — was steam
oal. Analysts project that steam coal
xports alone will surpass 100 million
letric tons annually some time in the
980s.
As I noted at the outset, coal ex-
orts offer important benefits to the
Jnited States. We, therefore, strongly
upport examination of means for pro-
moting expansion of U.S. coal exports,
specially in response to the substantial
icreases in world demand for steam
oal projected to occur in coming years.
Ve can identify a number of areas for
iction.
Efforts must be made to accelerate
he expansion of foreign demand for
J.S. coal. The coal-supply chain is
lemand-initiated, and infrastructure
apacity will not expand rapidly in the
ibsence of assurances of long-term de-
nand for use of that capacity.
However, we must also recognize
hat there is a chicken-and-egg problem
lere. While domestic producers await
oreign assurances of long-term demand
o justify new investments, prospective
'oreign buyers are reluctant to under-
ake long-term commitments where bot-
lenecks in the supply system remain
;erious. The United States must,
;herefore, resolve problems on the sup-
Dry side, too. Of priority concern must
3e our lack of infrastructure to export
arger quantities of coal. In particular,
existing coal port terminals must be
modernized and new ones built.
Beyond expanding our physical
capacity for exporting coal, there may
oe other steps which the United States
:an take to enhance the competitiveness
and, thus, the volume of its coal exports.
First, of course, U.S. coal exporters can
seek to improve productivity and,
thereby, lower the price of their prod-
uct. Given the substantial cost advan-
tages of other suppliers in furnishing
coal to most markets, the extent to
which such price reduction will lead to
expanded quantities of exports is
unclear. On the other hand, there are a
few markets where U.S. coal is price
competitive. For example, we currently
can deliver coal to Europe at about the
same price as the Australians. Hence,
efforts by U.S. coal exporters to reduce
prices could well stimulate increases at
the margin in demand for U.S. coal,
especially in an expanding market.
Reinforcing this conclusion is the
fact that current price is not the sole
basis for competition in the coal market,
especially where long-term contracts are
1980 World Coal Exports and Imports
Exports Imports
Canada
Other
Germany,
F.R
U.S.S.R.
South
Africa
Rep.
L. America
Other
United n
States America
Japan
Poland
Total 270
(Million Short Tons)
Australia
EEC
Other
W. Europe
East Europe
Total 270
(Million Short Tons)
concerned. Expectations as to price
escalation play an important role. So, in-
creasingly, does reliability of supply.
Foreign coal purchasers may be willing
to pay a premium in order to obtain ac-
cess to our coal exports because they are
more reliable than those of other coun-
tries.
Private Companies and the
U.S. Government
With the foregoing considerations in
mind, we see a broad scope for action to
expand U.S. coal exports. In this con-
text, I note that one of the most salient
features of the U.S. coal market is its
general independence from supports and
controls by the U.S. Government. The
Administration admires the independent
spirit of U.S. coal companies and intends
to leave them the broadest possible
latitude for actions to facilitate coal ex-
ports.
Private companies are already acting
in all of the areas we might identify as
helpful by:
• Expanding port and inland
transportation infrastructure;
• Expanding coal production;
• Financing both of the above;
• Seeking to lower costs;
• Seeking to enhance reliability in
fulfillment of contract provisions — tim-
ing of delivery, prices, quality specifica-
tions, avoidance of disruptions in the
flow of coal supplies; and
• Increasing responsiveness to pur-
chase requirements of foreign markets
and buyers.
In our view, actions in all of the
above areas should be governed by nor-
mal considerations of profitability and
should, therefore, be left in the private
domain. The U.S. Government should
not subsidize coal exports nor should it
interpose itself in any other way directly
in coal trade.
This judgment is full borne out by
current developments in the coal export
sector. For example, ambitious port
modernization and expansion projects
are underway and capacity will begin to
expand rapidly next year. Domestic pro-
ducers are engaged in a widening dia-
logue with prospective foreign buyers,
improving their understanding of the
buyers' needs and seeking to satisfy
those needs. U.S. coal exports grew by
almost 40% last year. We have no doubt
that they will continue to expand rapidly
without direct government involvement
in the future. At the same time, certain
functions do fall to the Federal Govern-
ment by logic and by tradition.
First, we have a responsibility to
minimize, consistent with other national
interests, regulatory burdens on the coal
market. We are aware of proposals to
reduce such burdens in the area of coal
exports and will examine these pro-
posals carefully in the context of the
July 1981
35
Energy
Projected World Steam Coal Imports
(Million Tons)
IE
1 2
IE
Denmark
France
Italy
Netherlands
W. Germany
Japan
Korea
Taiwan
Imports
1980
1985
1990
From U.S. Total
2| ~|8
3| |13
J"
21
A.
22
24
17
H
41
K
lL
A.
]L
15
15
IE
25
25
48
11 15
"11 |8
16
16
10
20
30
40
DOE/IC
overall Administration review of Federal
regulation. Moreover, we will uphold the
commitment of the U.S. Government not
to interrupt coal trade under contractual
commitments unless forced to do so by a
national emergency.
Secondly, the Federal Government
can help to promote foreign demand for
U.S. coal. The U.S. Department of Com-
merce has programs to promote exports.
We would urge that coal be given high
priority in those programs.
Third, the Federal Government
should also take an active role in
discussing coal policy and U.S. coal ex-
port issues with foreign governments,
seeking to stimulate their interest in
coal and seeking to improve access for
U.S. coal in their markets.
There are significant benefits to be
gained from exchanges with other gov-
ernments of information and analyses
concerning coal and coal policy. In addi-
tion, we can take advantage of the fact
that many foreign governments play a
much greater role in determining energ :
utilization among utilities, industry, and
households in their economies than does
the U.S. Government in ours. Stimulat-
ing the interest of these governments in
U.S. coal exports and allaying fears
about the reliability of those exports car
have a direct impact in expanding de-
mand. Necessarily, efforts in this area
36
Department of State Bulletir
EUROPE
North Atlantic Council
Meets in Rome
Secretary Haig departed Washing-
on, D.C., on May 1, 1981, and arrived
n Rome May 2 to attend the regular
;emiannual session of the North Atlantic
'ouncil ministerial meeting (May 4-5).
ie stopped in Brussels on May 5 and
•eturned to the United States on May 6.
Following are the texts of the Secre-
ary's news conference in Rome and the
Vorth Atlantic Council final communi-
que, the minutes extract, and the declara-
tion on terrorism.
NEWS CONFERENCE,
MAY 5, 19811
First, let me emphasize what a great
pleasure it is to be back in a community
with which I am somewhat familiar; I
am especially pleased to be back in
Rome. Visits to Italy during my in-
cumbency in NATO, whether for rest or
[recreation or business, were always op-
portunities to be seized with enthusiasm.
I think, in substantive terms, I
would want to emphasize that the North
Atlantic Council meeting just concluded,
in the words of the Secretary General,
was perhaps one of the most important
that the alliance has held in the recent
past. The most fundamental conclusion
to be drawn from the deliberations that
we have just concluded over the last day
and a half was the reaffirmation, in the
most conclusive terms, of the continuing
unity and solidarity existing within the
members of the alliance and, most im-
portantly, in a trans-Atlantic context.
I think this meeting afforded me an
opportunity to present to the other
members of the council President
Reagan's fundamental approaches to
foreign policy and national security
affairs. I am very pleased to emphasize
that these policies were strongly-
approved and endorsed by all of the
members of the North Atlantic Council.
In that regard, I would refer you
especially to the first paragraph of to-
day's communique describing our
deliberations.
With respect to specific accom-
plishments achieved over the past year
and a half, I think President Reagan's
- decision with respect to the second track
of the 1979 decision on theater nuclear
modernization enabled us to insure one
another, without equivocation and
without reservation, that the full im-
plementation of the 1979 decision will be
realized by the alliance. The achievement
will be accomplished despite the heavy
level of propaganda flowing from the
East with respect to the modernization
decision itself. Therefore, in that impor-
tant context this past day and a half has
reaffirmed the indivisibility of our
NATO alliance.
I think there was a strong consensus
developed during these meetings of the
essentiality of working together to elicit
greater restraint on the part of the
Soviet Union; not just in the sense of
threats directly to the alliance but in the
context of increasing Soviet involvement
in the Third World. There was clearly a
consensus to make all resources avail-
able that are necessary to strengthen
the deterrence and the defense of the
alliance. I refer you to the language of
the communique in that regard.
There was strong language agreed
to in the communique itself with respect
to the unacceptable intervention of the
Soviet Union in Afghanistan and a reaf-
firmation of the warnings previously put
will require coordinated involvement by
the Departments of State, Energy, and
Commerce.
We in the government are providing
support to U.S. coal producers by em-
phasizing to our foreign interlocators
both bilaterally and in the IE A the need
for them to provide assurances — e.g.,
through agreement to long-term coal
purchase contracts or investment in U.S.
coal production and transportation proj-
ects—of their long-term demand for
U.S. coal in order to encourage expan-
sion of export infrastructure.
In sum, we see a bright future for
U.S. coal exports. We will continue to
work with foreign buyers and govern-
ments to foster demand for U.S. coal
and enhance the reputation of the
United States as a supplier of coal. At
the same time, we have a strong tradi-
tion in the United States of reliance on
the private sector for the conduct of coal
trade, and we intend to adhere to that
tradition.
•The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402.B
forward with respect to the grave conse-
quences of Soviet intervention in Poland.
In that regard it was clearly noted that
there would be fundamental changes in
the international environment should
that happen.
Finally, I think there was a strong
consensus that only the Western
world — members of the alliance and
those which share our values — can
bring to developing states the nation-
building assets which are so essential for
their aspirations. That is in somewhat
sharp contrast to Soviet activity in the
Third World, which is primarily based
on the provision of arms, pervasive in-
fluence, and, in many instances, a client-
state relationship.
In sum I think this was an unusually
successful North Atlantic Council
meeting, and I have participated in
many over the last 6 years. I am ex-
tremely pleased that the fundamental
solidarity and unity of our alliance has
not only been maintained but
strengthened as a consequence of our
discussions.
Q. We are told that you will be
meeting [Soviet Foreign Minister] Mr.
Gromyko in September. How will U.S.
contacts with the Soviet Union over
reduction of theater nuclear forces
and perhaps eventually over central
strategic systems proceed thereafter?
A. This, of course, is a two-sided
situation, and I cannot speak for the
Soviet leaders with respect to what they
will seek in the way of modalities. But I
would anticipate some preliminary talks
at the ambassadorial level designed to
put together a framework which would
permit the meeting of the Foreign
Ministers in the fall to proceed promptly
to the agreement for negotiations — for-
mal negotiations — with the Soviet Union
by the end of the year. That, of course,
will ultimately derive its character from
the viewpoints of the Soviet Union as
well as the United States.
Q. Could you tell us whether
President Reagan's letter to Mr.
Brezhnev comprises the proposals that
you made at this council about the
resumption of tactical arms control
talks with the Soviet Union, and tell
us anything else about what Mr.
Reagan had to say to Mr. Brezhnev?
A. I noted that the fact of such a
letter managed to seep out of the
heretofore impregnable walls of our con-
fidential discussions, and, therefore, it
would be foolish for me to suggest there
was not such a letter. But I will abide by
July 1981
37
Europe
the very strong principle that we always
abide by and that is not to discuss the
contents and characters of such ex-
changes in the public forum. I'm sorry.
Q. You have set forth a timetable
and plan on the TNF [theater nuclear
forces] negotiations with the Soviet
Union. Does the Administration have a
plan or timetable on the strategic
weapons systems discussions with the
Soviet Union?
A. No, we do not. Clearly, Presi-
dent Reagan has reiterated his will-
ingness and desire to engage in a full
range of negotiations that are necessary
to provide equitable, balanced reductions
in nuclear weaponry — and I emphasize
reductions. This is a problem associated
with a host of technical issues associated
with the arms control of central stra-
tegic systems themselves, but it is also
clearly related to Soviet international
behavior and overall relationships be-
tween East and West. And I do not
foresee in the immediate future a
resumption of those talks.
Now you will note in the language of
the communique that we refer to the
conduct of the theater nuclear discus-
sions as being within the framework of
SALT. That suggests two things: First,
it suggests that all nuclear systems
represent somewhat of a continuum
whether they be theater-based — and to
our European partners it makes very lit-
tle difference whether it's a theater
system or a central strategic system;
theater systems from the Soviet side
represent a strategic importance to our
Western European partners. So, it sug-
gests a continuum and, if you will, con-
firms that there are no separate
theaters of nuclear concern. We talk
about shared risks, shared burdens, and
total unity in a trans-Atlantic sense in
nuclear terms.
Secondly, clearly the interrelation-
ship between theater systems — long-
range TNF, if you will— and central
strategic systems is blurred and a grey
area in many respects. So coherent arms
control negotiations in the theater area
should always be conducted in the light
of strategic balances and long-term ob-
jectives in arms control in that regard.
It does not mean that the resumption of
the initiation of our talks with the Soviet
Union and formal negotiations with
it — discussions of central strategic
systems in the American sense, does
not; they can proceed separately but in
full cognizance of the interrelationship
one with the other.
Q. If we are to read into the final
communique a lesson from the number
of references to the notion of detente,
what should that signify to those peo-
ple who are going to discuss the com-
munique?
A. As I recall there is no specific-
reference to detente in the communique,
and it is further clarified by the term
"genuine" detente. I think, clearly, the
whole character of the communique
bespeaks very clearly the increasing
awareness of all in the alliance of the
need to concert together to insist on
Soviet restraint internationally, both in
areas of vital concern within the con-
fines of the alliance itself and beyond.
Q. Still on detente, will you ac-
cept this definition of detente as an
overall and nonmilitary wav to defeat
the West?
A. I get the chemical character of
your question. Somebody said that Mr.
Weinberger [Secretary of Defense
Caspar W. Weinberger] and Mr. Haig
are not getting along very well; I want
to discount that. Nothing could be fur-
ther from the truth. Just the other day
Mr. Weinberger gave me a personally
autographed copy of the American Con-
stitution.
Q. But the quotation actually is
not from Mr. Weinberger but from
Mr. Allen [Richard V. Allen, Assistant
to the President for National Security
Affairs].
A. Then the problem is even less of
concern. I think clearly on both sides of
the Atlantic there has been growing con-
cern about the implications of and the
proclivity by the Soviet leadership to in-
dulge in risk-taking. One need only tick
off the various situations that have
developed starting with Angola in 1976;
running to Ethiopia, Southern Yemen,
Northern Yemen; Afghanistan on two
occasions, culminating in a blatant in-
terventionism; the overrunning of Kam-
puchea by proxy forces of the Soviet
Union. As an American — and I know
here in Europe — there is great concern
about increased proxy activity in the
Western Hemisphere once again —
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and other nations of the Cen-
tral American republics. All of this,
clearly, has raised our level of concern. I
think today's communique and the
discussions over it in the past day and a
half strongly affirm that growing level
of concern.
Q. In view of that checklist, is it
your expectation that the Soviet Union
will be required to act with much
greater restraint if the dialogue we
are about to enter into with Mr.
Gromyko is to have any chance of suc-
cess?
A. It goes without saying that we
all recognize the implications of the term
"linkage." But we are not entering into
theater nuclear arms control discussions
as a favor or a gift to the Soviet Union.
We are engaged in these negotiations
once they commence, as certainly an im-
plementation of the agreed moderniza-
tion decision of 1979 and with full
recognition that it is in Western in-
terests as well. If we are successfully to
halt and to roll back the growth of
nuclear weapons here on the European
Continent, that does not suggest for a
moment that we would in any way aban-
don our concern about linkage for exam-
ple when we speak in the context of in-
tervention in Poland, of profound
changes, we would include a very im-
portant consequence for arms control
discussions as well along with other in-
terfaces with the East — economic and
political — as well as arms control.
Q. The positive result of this
meeting with the negotiations now
scheduled for next autumn are seen as
a victory for the European side of the
alliance. What is vour comment to
that?
A. I wouldn't describe it as a vic-
tory. I would describe it more impor-
tantly as a strong, unequivocal affirma-
tion of continuing Western solidarity
with the members of the alliance and
especially in a trans-Atlantic context.
Clearly in recent months— and this is
not unusual in cycles of 4 years in deal-
ing with your American partners —
unsettlements develop until the full
scope of the new American Administra-
tion's policies are known and under-
stood. I think my ability to bring here to
our Western European partners a clear
articulation of President Reagan's
foreign policy objectives and goals, and
above all his reaffirmation that the
NATO alliance is the bedrock and the
anchor of American foreign policy as it
has been in the past, was reassuring to
all. The reaffirmation of our intention of
following through with the obligations
on theater nuclear modernization— the
two tracks— was clearly a reassuring
message.
All of these things together con-
verged to make this a very robust, if you
will, a very happy and a very construc-
tive North Atlantic Council meeting. I
think the consequences are in the direc-
tion of solidarity and unity and the in-
ability of the East, despite rather
38
Department of State Bulletin
Europe
ubstantial efforts to effect differences
etween our European partners and the
Jnited States, is not going to succeed in
hese efforts.
Q. My question concerns the forth-
■oming agreement on the U.S. bases
n Greece. Have you accepted, during
Kour meeting with the Greek Foreign
Minister, the Greek demands on the
seven to ten ration in the military aid
|to Greece and Turkey and the Greek
demand for a commitment by the U.S.
Government to oppose any threat to
the Aegean?
A. Let me assure you that the
discussions I had with the Greek
Foreign Minister on Sunday were most
cordial, most constructive, and most im-
portant as a further step toward the
completion of the necessary future
agreement between the United States
and Greece. I think in every area — and
there were some four specific areas
raised by the Foreign Minister of Greece
which are associated with our ongoing
discussions — we were able to move the
problem somewhat constructively for-
ward. I think it was a very successful
discussion that we had. I will avoid
answering the specifics of your question
because they were neither appropriate
to those discussions that we conducted
nor do they serve any useful purpose.
Q. If there is a military putsch in
Spain, will the United States give sup-
port to the Spanish regime?
A. I think that is a horse that has
been beaten almost out of insensibility. I
discussed this issue at length in my re-
cent visit to Madrid, and I think it is
clearly understood that it is the policy of
the U.S. Government to neither favor
nor condone the outcome your questions
connoted.
Q. You mentioned the intention of
following through with American
obligations to TNF. Why should there
have been any doubt about those in-
tentions and if there were — which we
here in Europe gather there
were — what did you do to quell those
doubts?
A. I think there has been some con-
cern here in Europe about the character
of various American proclamations and
statements from a number of different
sources. I think it is not unusual that
that would raise well-meaning and
understandable concerns with respect to
American intentions. After all, it was
the U.S. Government that agreed in
1979 to the provisions of the moderniza-
tion concensus that involved two tracks,
and I think the mere fact that I, based
on President Reagan's decision this past
week, was able to reaffirm not only our
commitment to proceed on these two
tracks but to do so in fairly timely
fashion, clearly was a source of relief
and a welcome reassurance on the part
of our European partners.
Q. Do you have any doubts about
your ability to continue to proceed on
that track?
A. None whatsoever. I know
everyone understands that it takes two
to tango, and the Soviet Union is in-
volved in the negotiations on theater
nuclear arms control. So one cannot
answer that. But with respect to the
U.S. decision to abide by the two obliga-
tions incurred by all the parties which
are directly involved, that means the
modernization track itself and the arms
control negotiating track will proceed
without delay.
Q. Turning to Southwest Asia.
How would the United States view
German arms sales to Saudi Arabia
with a view to helping stabilize the
region?
A. I carry enough scar tissue to
know how imprudent it is for a Foreign
Minister or even an official of one
government to comment on the internal
affairs of another, and it is not my prac-
tice to do so.
Q. You are going to Brussels this
afternoon, and you are going to meet
Mr. Eyskens, the Belgian Prime
Minister. What do you plan to discuss
with him, and will you touch upon the
reserves some partners in the Belgian
Government have against the installa-
tion of the new missiles on Belgian
territory?
A. No. I don't seek to use the op-
portunity to meet my friend and former
acquaintance from my days in Brussels
on the issue you raised, because I think
this matter is in the proper NATO chan-
nels now, and we are all aware of the
complications facing Belgium on this
issue. While remaining basically op-
timistic about the ultimate outcome, I
will use this as an opportunity to bring
the Prime Minister abreast of these
talks here and a number of other
bilateral relationships between the
United States and Belgium which I think
are so important.
FINAL COMMUNIQUE,
MAY 5, 19812
The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial
session in Rome on 4th and 5th May 1981,
deeply concerned at the continuing threats to
security and international stability. Determin-
ed to counter these threats by effective
restraints including firmness in defense and
persistence in the search for peaceful solu-
tions, Ministers in that spirit agreed to the
following:
1. The strength and cohesion of the
Alliance remain indispensable to guarantee
the security of its members and thereby to
foster stable international relations. This
stability requires that all nations act with
restraint and responsibility. Claims by the
Soviet Union that it too subscribes to such
policies are not borne out by Soviet deeds.
The more constructive East- West relationship
which the Allies seek requires tangible signs
that the Soviet Union is prepared to abandon
the disturbing build-up of its military
strength, to desist from resorting to force
and intimidation and to cease creating or ex-
ploiting situations of crisis and instability in
the Third World.
2. The Soviet invasion and occupation of
Afghanistan is a particularly flagrant exam-
ple of violation of the principles of restraint
and responsibility in international affairs.
This occupation is now in its second year,
with a mounting toll of human suffering and
loss of life. It remains and will remain totally
unacceptable to the Allies and to world opin-
ion. The Soviet Union has ignored interna-
tional condemnation of its actions and appeals
by the United Nations, the Islamic Con-
ference and the non-aligned movement.
Soviet forces must be withdrawn and a
political settlement must be found enabling
the Afghan people to exercise fully their
rights of independence and self-determination
and permitting the two million refugees to
return to their homes.
3. In Europe, efforts to restore East-
West co-operation and exchanges on the basis
of the Helsinki Final Act cannot but be
severely undermined by the use of threat of
force for intervention in the affairs of other
countries. Poland must be left free to resolve
its own problems. Any outside intervention
would have the gravest consequences for in-
ternational relations as a whole and would
fundamentally change the entire international
situation. The Allies, for their part, will con-
tinue to adhere strictly to their policy of non-
intervention and they call on all other states
to do the same.
4. In this situation, the Allies will
strengthen their capability to deter aggres-
sion and act, individually or collectively, to
encourage Soviet restraint and responsibility
in international affairs with the goal of laying
a stable basis for East- West relations. In pur-
suance of the established policies of the
Alliance they will seek these objectives in
particular in the following areas.
July 1981
39
Europe
5. They will ensure their solidarity, con-
sulting closely in the North Atlantic Council
on all matters affecting security and East-
West relations. In the same spirit, they will
strive, in particular by providing assistance
for the economically less advanced member
countries, to strengthen the economic and
social stability of the Alliance as a whole in
accordance with Article 2 of the North Atlan-
tic Treaty.
6. In the area of military capability, the
increase in Warsaw Pact military power has
created a disturbingly adverse trend in the
military balance between East and West, par-
ticularly in Europe. The Allies agree that
assuring an overall military balance between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact is fundamental
to the security of the Alliance, the enforce-
ment of restraint and the maintenance of
peace. They are resolved to make available all
the resources needed to provide the requisite
strengthening of their deterrent and defense
forces.
7. Genuine non-alignment is an important
factor for stability in the world. The Allies
will continue to consult among themselves
and to work together with others to en-
courage stability and reduce the risks of
crisis in the Third World, especially where
the independence of sovereign nations is
threatened. The maintenance of this in-
dependence, peace and international
equilibrium is a vital interest of the West.
Political settlements must be found to crisis
or conflict situations, especially when they af-
fect sensitive areas such as the Middle East,
South-East and South- West Asia or Southern
Africa; the Allies desire to work to this end
in co-operation with other countries.
The stability and genuine non-alignment
of Third World countries also depend on the
freedom to develop economically and socially
without outside interference. All states must
refrain from exploiting social problems or
fomenting instability for political advantage.
Equally, all must contribute actively to
strengthening the economies of developing
countries and to the fight against hunger,
poverty and under-development. For their
part, the Western nations also offer these
countries the trade technology and respect
for political sovereignty that are vital for
their independence and economic well-being.
A number of allied countries possess, or
are determined to acquire, the capability to
deter aggression and to respond to requests
by nations for help in resisting threats to
their security or independence.
8. They will maintain a dialogue with the
Soviet Union and will work together for gen-
uine detente and the development of East-
West relations, whenever Soviet behavior
makes this possible. The principles and provi-
sions of the Helsinki Final Act provide a code
of conduct that must be observed by all the
signatories. At the CSCE [Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe] meeting
in Madrid, the Allies seek substantive and
balanced results which will lead to better im-
23d Report
on Cyprus
MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
JAN. 19, 19811
In accordance with the provision (if Public
Law 95-384, I am submitting the following
report on progress made during the past 60
days toward reaching a negotiated settlement
of the Cyprus problem.
As I noted in my last report, the inter-
communal talks between representatives of
the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities,
which resumed in August 1980, have con-
tinued their substantive examination of the
issues which divide the island. Under the
chairmanship of the UN Secretary General's
Special Representative on Cyprus, Am-
bassador Hugo Gobbi, both sides have pur-
sued analysis and discussion of the four basic
areas agreed upon for examination. Meetings
were held on November 19 and 26 and
December 3 and 8 before breaking for a
mutually-agreed end-of-year recess. The talks
resumed routinely with a meeting on January
7 and can be expected to continue in weekly
sessions.
We have been encouraged by the serious,
nonpolemic approach taken by the
negotiators in their effort to devise mutually
acceptable positions. Throughout the discus-
sions, the negotiating atmosphere has re-
mained businesslike and positive.
The United Nations has continued
to pay close attention to Cyprus develop-
ments. In his December 1 report on Cyprus,
Secretary General Waldheim reviewed
developments to date, noting that "Some
common ground has been indicated on certain
practical questions." He suggested that while
"progress so far has been slow, the discus-
sions have been on the whole construc-
tive . . ." and cautioned that a problem lying
ahead is "the difficult issue of how and where
to start the actual give-and-take which is the
essence of an effective negotiating process."
The Secretary General also expressed the
judgment that while a complex negotiating
process such as the Cyprus intereommunal
talks must proceed with caution, "... it
must also, if it is to maintain its credibility,
produce concrete results."
I have noted with pleasure that the
Secretary General intends to remain directly
engaged in the negotiating process. He met
in New York in mid-December with Cyprus
Foreign Minister Rolandis and with Kenan
Atakol, foreign affairs spokesman for the
Turkish Cypriot community.
The United States continues fully to sup-
port the Secretary General's efforts and
those of his Special Representative on Cyprus
to reach mutually agreeable solutions to the
Cyprus problem. This support has been con-
veyed on several occasions to Secretary
General Waldheim and was expressed also by
Secretary Muskie to Turkish Foreign
Minister Turkmen and to Greek Foreign
Minister Mitsotakis in separate meetings at
the NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels
December 10-11, 1980.
I am also pleased to note that on
December 11, 1980, the Security Council
passed without dissent a resolution extending
the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force
in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to June 15, 1981.
Other Security Council members continue to
share our view that UNFICYP plays a vital
role in maintaining the atmosphere of calm
conducive to fruitful negotiation within the
intereommunal talks.
The Cyprus problem remains on the in-
ternational agenda. Its historical complexities
suggest that only perseverance, patience and
political courage of the highest order will
bring about a just and lasting settlement. I
remain hopeful that the good start
represented by the intereommunal negotia-
tions will evolve in the near future into a
comprehensive solution that will benefit all
the people of Cyprus.
Sincerely,
Jimmy Carter
1 Identical letters addressed to Thomas P.
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of
Represtentatives, and Charles H. Percy,
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee (text from the Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents of January
20, 1981). ■
plementation of these principles and provi-
sions, including respect for human rights, im-
proved human contacts, a freer flow of infor-
mation and enhanced security and co-
operation. This would clearly demonstrate the
continuing value of the CSCE process.
The Allies reaffirm their support for the
French proposal for a conference of disarma-
ment in Europe aimed at achieving in an in-
itial phase an agreement on a coherent set of
militarily significant, binding and verifiable
confidence-building measures, applicable
throughout the European Continent from the
Atlantic to the Urals. Underlining the impor-
tance they attach to such a conference taking
place as an integral part of the CSCE pro-
cess, they consider that it would be for a
future CSCE followup meeting to examine
ways of continuing their efforts for security
and disarmament, in the light of the progress
achieved by the end of the initial phase of the
conference and taking into account other cur-
rent negotiations. While welcoming the prog-
ress made so far, they express the hope that,
as part of a balanced outcome, agreement can
be reached at Madrid on a precise and unam-
biguous mandate incorporating the above
criteria.
40
Department of State Bulletin
Europe
9. Arms control and disarmament,
jether with deterrence and defense, are in-
gral parts of Alliance security policy. The
lies support negotiations to achieve mean-
jful restraints on Soviet military power and
improve security. The object of this policy
a stable military balance, if possible at
duced levels of forces. The Allies stress the
lue of stabilizing, equitable and verifiable
ms control through limitations of Soviet
id U.S. strategic arms. They recognize that
ms control negotiations can only lead to
uitful results in an international climate of
nfidence.
10. The Allies taking part in the Vienna
jgotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force
'ductions continue in their determination to
hieve genuine manpower parity in the form
a common collective ceiling based on
*reed data. They regret that no substantial
ogress has been made in the negotiations,
rgely because the Eastern participating
ates are still unprepared to make the re-
jired contribution to the clarification of the
ita problem.
11. The Allies continue to attach par-
cular importance to the maintenance of the
,1m situation in and around Berlin. The
rict observance and full implementation of
le Quadripartite Agreement of 3 September
971 remain vitally important for security in
,urope, East-West relations and the interna-
jonal situation as a whole. The Alliance con-
i nues to support the efforts being made by
le Federal Republic of Germany to secure
j le cancellation of the increase in the
linimum exchange requirements imposed by
ne GDR [German Democratic Republic],
/hich is having a particularly adverse effect
■n the number of tourists and visitors travel-
ing to the GDR and East Berlin.
12. The Allies who participated in the
lecember 1979 NATO decision on LRTNF
ong-range theater nuclear force] moderniza-
ion and arms control reaffirmed their com-
litment to that decision. They emphasized
hat in light of increasing Soviet LRTNF
.eployments which in the case of the SS-20
Jready exceed the total LRTNF deployment
ilanned by NATO, the modernizing of
-JATO's LRTNF is more essential than ever,
ind offers the only realistic basis for parallel
rNF arms control. Since the December 1979
lecision, Soviet threats and efforts to divide
;he Allies have only strengthened their
"esolve to take the steps necessary to main-
:ain deterrence, redress the imbalance of
LRTNF, and ensure their security. The latest
Soviet proposal for a moratorium of LRTNF
deployments is wholly unacceptable to these
Allies. It would freeze them into inferiority
by blocking the NATO modernization pro-
gramme altogether. Moreover, the proposal
would permit the Soviets to increase the
threat to NATO by failing to limit systems
capable of striking Allied territory from east
of the Urals.
These Allies welcome the intention of the
United States to begin negotiations with the
Soviet Union on TNF arms control within the
SALT framework by the end of the year. The
American Secretary of State intends to
discuss the timing and procedures for these
negotiations with Foreign Minister Gromyko
in September at the United Nations. These
negotiations will rely on an updated Alliance
threat assessment and a study of functional
requirements for NATO TNF to be under-
taken within the framework of the Special
Consultative Group and the High Level
Group as matters of immediate priority.
DECLARATION ON TERRORISM
MAY 4, 1981
The Foreign Ministers and representatives of
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United
Kingdom and the United States recalled
previous declarations regarding the condem-
nation, prevention and suppression of all acts
of terrorism including those involving attacks
on the personnel of diplomatic and consular
missions and their premises. They noted with
deep concern the suffering inflicted on human
lives as well as the negative impact of the
continuation and spread of such acts on the
social and political institutions of individual
countries and on international relations. They
deplored the recent resurgence of armed at-
tacks, hi-jacking and kidnapping aimed at ob-
taining political concessions. They vigorously
condemned all acts of terrorism regardless of
their origins, causes or purposes as a flagrant
violation of human dignity and rights. They
agreed on the necessity, in accordance with
the legislation of each country, for effective
bilateral and multilateral co-operation to pre-
vent and combat all acts of terrorism. Par-
ticularly reprehensible are those sponsored,
supported or endorsed by governments. They
expressed their determination to take all
necessary measures to ensure effectively the
security of all official representatives and
persons who participate on their territories in
activities within the scope of diplomatic, con-
sular and other official relations.
MINUTES EXTRACT,
MAY 5, 1981
Extracts for Publication
From the Minutes
of the Ministerial Meeting
of the Council
In addition to the communique, the Foreign
Ministers decided to publish the following ex-
tracts from the minutes of their meeting of
the 4th and 5th May 1981:
Economic Co-operation
and Assistance Within the Alliance
In the light of continued economic difficulties
which in particular affect the less advanced
members, Ministers noted that further
assistance was necessary to help Turkey to
overcome her severe economic problems, and
that this question would be discussed shortly
in the OECD [Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development]. They ex-
pressed satisfaction at the general improve-
ment in the economic situation in Portugal
over the last year, noting however the need
for further assistance. They welcomed the ac-
cession of Greece to the European Communi-
ty, expecting this to strengthen her ties with
member countries and over the longer term
to lead to a steady improvement of the Greek
economy. Ministers underlined that continued
support was essential for solving the longer
term economic problems of these countries
which would contribute to the consolidation
of Alliance strength and solidarity.
In this connection they re-emphasized the
need to bear in mind the interests of these
countries in co-operative arrangements, both
in the sphere of defence equipment and in the
general scientific field, so that they can play
a fuller part in making more effective use of
the resources of the Alliance as a whole.
The Situation in the Mediterranean
Ministers noted the report on the situation in
the Mediterranean prepared on their instruc-
tions and underlined again the necessity of
maintaining the balance of forces in the
whole area. They requested the Council in
permanent session to continue to consult on
the question and submit a further report at
their next meeting.
Infrastructure
Ministers considered a report on substantive
elements of the current NATO infrastructure
programme.
Civil Emergency Planning—
State of Civil Preparedness
Ministers examined a report on the state of
civil preparedness in the Alliance. They noted
that improvements had been achieved over
the last two years, but endorsed the view
that enhanced planning and devotion of
budgetary allocations were needed to enable
the remaining weaknesses and deficiencies to
be overcome. This would help civil emergency
planning to play a better part in strengthen-
ing the security of the Alliance. To that end,
Ministers issued guidance for civil emergency
planning over the next four years.
.Inlw 1QR1
41
Europe
NATO Defense Planning Committee
Meets in Brussels
The Defense Ministers of the NATO
members met in Brussels May 12-13, 1981.
The following final communique was issued
on May 13.
The Defence Planning Committee of NATO
met in ministerial session in Brussels on
12th/13th May, 1981.
Defence Ministers reaffirmed what the
member nations of the North Atlantic
Alliance expressed at the meeting of the
NATO Council in Rome on 4th and 5th May,
1981. They shared the deep concern at the
continuing threats to security and interna-
tional stability. A strong and cohesive North
Atlantic Alliance remains indispensable to
guarantee the security of its members and
foster stable international relations. Such
stability requires all nations to act with
restraint and responsibility, in the interests
of promoting genuine detente and of develop-
ing East-West relations, whenever Soviet
behavior makes this possible. Claims by the
Soviet Union that it too subscribes to such
policies are not borne out by Soviet deeds
such as its invasion and occupation of
Afghanistan. Efforts to achieve a more con-
structive East- West relationship are severely
undermined by the use or threat of force for
intervention in the affairs of other countries.
Poland must be left free to solve its own
problems. The more constructive East-West
relationship which the Allies seek requires
tangible signs that the Soviet Union is
prepared to abandon the disturbing build-up
of its military strength, to desist from resort-
ing to force and intimidation and to cease
creating or exploiting situations of crisis and
instability in the Third World. The nations of
the Alliance expressed their determination to
counter the continuing threat to security and
international stability by effective restraints
including firmness in defense and persistence
in the search for peaceful solutions.
For their part, Defence Ministers agreed
that the past decade has seen an unrelenting
build-up of Soviet military strength across
the complete spectrum of capabilities encom-
passing the strategic, theatre nuclear and
conventional fields. This is in contrast to
numerous Soviet statements advocating
peace and disarmament. This disturbing
growth in military strength allows the Soviet
Union to exert pressure in many parts of the
world, particularly through the increasing
global mobility of its forces and the develop-
ment of a major maritime capability. All this
has been in parallel with continuing im-
provements in the forces confronting the
Alliance in Europe and the Atlantic. These
steady increases in Soviet military power
over the past decade, despite unreciprocated
Alliance restraint, have created for NATO a
situation demanding intensified action to en-
sure an adequate future deterrence. The
prospects for continued peace and stable
political relations between East and West de-
pend on the requisite strengthening of
NATO's deterrent and defence forces and on
the maintenance of an overall military
Science and Technology
Ministers recognized that scientific resources
and the aptitude for technological innovation
constitute a major contribution to increases
of productivity and hence to economic expan-
sion and international competitiveness. They
expressed their concern over the problems
faced by research and experimentation as a
consequence of the current economic situa-
tion in many Alliance countries. Ministers
urged the strengthening of innovative capaci-
ty in the productive sector and basic research
in universities; they invited the members of
the Alliance to support appropriate measures
to foster the mobility of scientists and
engineers and to encourage the adoption of
technical change in a truly international
spirit.
'Press release 140 of May 6, 1981.
2Press release 137 of May 8, 1981.
balance, if possible at a lower level, between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
In response to this continuing build-up in
Soviet military strength, nations have achiev-
ed considerable improvements in the forces
which they contribute to the Alliance. But the
rate at which these have been achieved has
not been commensurate with the sustained
growth in the Soviet and other Warsaw Pact
forces. Assessment of the military balance is
a complex equation and cannot be determined
simply by counting men, ships and aircraft.
However, it is clear that there is a disturb-
ingly adverse trend in the military balance
between East and West, particularly in
Europe.
Although the policies which nations adopt
outside the NATO area are a matter for na-
tional decision, the Allies have recognized
that situations outside NATO's boundaries
may, whenever peace, international
equilibrium and the independence of
sovereign nations are affected, threaten the
vital interests of the West and therefore have
implications for the security of members of
the Alliance. Ministers recognized that when
considering policies intended to protect such
vital interests, nations should be prepared to
participate fully in consultations within the
Alliance to enable NATO Governments to
share, and as far as possible coordinate, their
assessments of the threat and its implications
and to identify common objectives. It is
especially important that such consultations
should be undertaken when
nations in a position to do so are considering
out-of-area deployment of forces, in order to
deter aggression and to respond to requests
from other nations for help in resisting
threats to their security or independence. The
effect of such deployment on Alliance securi-
ty and defense capabilities should be examin-
ed collectively in the appropriate NATO
bodies. Ministers also recognized that com-
mon objectives identified in such consulta-
tions may require members of the Alliance to
facilitate out-of-area deployments in support
of the vital interests of all.
The United States and other nations have
already responded to challenges
arising from situations outside the NATO
area. Future deployment of the United States
rapid deployment force to deter aggressn >n
and respond to requests by nations for help
could involve possible changes in the
availability of combat and support forces cur-
rently committed to NATO in a reinforce-
ment role. At the same time as the United
States carries out its efforts to strengthen
defence capabilities elsewhere, Allied
capabilities to deter aggression and to defend
NATO Europe should also be maintained and
strengthened. This situation only heightens
the need for all Allies to maintain levels and
standards of forces necessary for defence and
deterrence in the NATO area.
42
Department of State Bulletin
1
Europe
-irst and Second
Reports on Cyprus
MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
MAR. 20, 19811
In accordance with provisions of Public Law
■5-384, I am submitting the following report
In progress made during the past sixty days
toward reaching a negotiated settlement of
[he Cyprus problem.
A just, fair and lasting resolution to the
liroblems of Cyprus will remain a priority for
Iny Administration.
The talks between representatives of the
preek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot com-
Inunities are continuing. Under the chairman-
ship of United Nations Secretary General's
[special Representative on Cyprus, Am-
bassador Hugo Gobbi, the two sides are
undertaking detailed analytic review of basic
Issues. The parties have been addressing the
(following topics in rotation on the basis of
pne topic each meeting:
(A) Reaching agreement on the resettle-
ment of Varosha under United Nations
iuspices.
(B) Initial practical measures to promote
good will.
(C) Constitutional aspects.
(D) Territorial aspects.
Meetings were held on January 16, 21,
and 28 and February 4, 11, and 18. After a
mutually agreed upon recess, the meetings
resumed on March 11. We expect the
negotiations to continue on a regular basis.
Throughout this period both sides have
engaged in serious discussion of the issues in-
volved. Each side has advanced proposals and
the negotiators have been seeking to identify
areas of agreement and reduce differences.
Throughout these discussions the parties
have maintained a congenial negotiating at-
mosphere, seriously addressing points for
negotiation.
I am convinced that through these
negotiations a foundation for a stable, endur-
ing settlement on Cyprus is being laid. Both
sides are seriously discussing steps to
mitigate long-standing conflicts and, as was
anticipated, progress is slow. However, the
opportunity for a just and lasting settlement
will not remain indefinitely. Therefore, the
need for patience and persistent negotiating
must be complemented by innovative and
flexible approaches to the outstanding prob-
lems. After six years of effort, it is time to
see a fair settlement that will benefit and
serve all of the Cypriot people.
In this, my first report to Congress on
Cyprus, I unhesitantly reaffirm the support
of the United States for the efforts of the
Secretary General and his Special Represen-
tative on Cyprus. They have been vigorously
and persistently seeking a just and lasting
solution of the Cyprus problem, The
Secretary General and other United Nations'
officials have been creative in their proposals
and unflagging in their patience from the in-
ception of the negotiations. I commend their
professional conduct and offer the commit-
ment of my Administration to assist in their
endeavors to resolve the Cyprus issue.
Sincerely,
Ronald Reagan
MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
MAY 19, 19811
In accordance with the provision of Public
Law 95-384, I am submitting the following
report on progress made during the past
sixty days toward reaching a negotiated set-
tlement of the Cyrpus problem.
The intercommunal negotiations between
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
representatives continue under the chairman-
ship of the Secretary General's Special
Representative on Cyprus, Ambassador Hugo
Gobbi. The two sides are proceeding in their
detailed review of the four basic, mutually
agreed-upon issues and continuing to devote
each session to one topic.
Meetings were held on March 18, April 2,
15, and 29, and May 6. The pace of weekly
sessions has slowed somewhat as both Greek
and Turkish Cypriots prepare for elections. A
reduced schedule in May and June is an-
ticipated with resumption of a regular
schedule in July. Both sides have continued
their talks in a congenial negotiating at-
mosphere.
Although not directly connected to the in-
tercommunal talks, the problem of missing
persons in Cyprus has been a significant issue
dividing the communities. Consequently, we
are pleased to note a significant, positive
development in this area. Ambassador Gobbi
announced on April 22 that an intercommunal
agreement had been reached on the terms of
reference for a Committee on Missing Per-
sons (text attached). The date for the first
meeting of the Committee will be fixed soon
following coordination with the International
Committee of the Red Cross and appointment
of members of the Commitee.
The issue of setting up a Committee on
Missing Persons could, in our view, only be
resolved with cooperation of both Cypriot
communities. Consequently, we are gratified
by the United Nations' announcement and
hope that subsequent discussion in the Com-
mittee will be productive and lead to a resolu-
tion of this important, humanitarian question.
We also believe the formation of a Com-
mittee will contribute to a positive
negotiating atmosphere facilitating progress
in the intercommunal talks. The agreement
reached to form a Committee suggests that
patient, persistent negotiating between both
communities, under United Nations aegis,
holds the potential for success even on the
most difficult of issues. I am confident that
the productive attitudes characterized by the
formation of a Committee on Missing Persons
can be employed in the pursuit of a just and
lasting settlement of the Cyprus question.
Sincerely,
Ronald Reagan
Statement of Agreement on Missing
Persons Committee
Following is the text of a statement made
April 22 by SRSG Gobbi at the Ledra Palace
in Nicosia, Cyprus:
"On behalf of the Secretary-General, I am
very pleased to announce that agreement has
been reached by the two sides on the terms
of reference for the establishment of a com-
mittee on missing persons in Cyprus.
"The Secretary-General has asked me to
thank both sides for their important coopera-
tion which has made this agreement possible.
In particular, I wish to thank the representa-
tives of the two sides who, over the past few
months, were engaged in intensive efforts to
bring about the setting up of this committee.
The Secretary-General also wishes to thank
the Internationa] Committee of the Red
Cross for its cooperation in facilitating this
significant achievement. On the basis of this
agreement it is possible now to proceed to
the establishment of the committee. This
development represents a very important
step forward in the solution of a long-
standing issue of great concern to the two
sides.
"Furthermore, we hope the efforts of the
committee on missing persons will strengthen
the spirit of cooperation and the joint
endeavor undertaken in the framework of the
intercommunal talks."
'Identical letters addressed to Thomas P.
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and Charles H. Percy,
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee (text of the second report from
Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of May 25, 1981). ■
NATO will continue to seek to negotiate
equitable, militarily significant, binding and
fully verifiable arms control agreements in
order to achieve a balance of forces at lower
levels and provide better security. The Allies
recognize the arms control negotiations can
only lead to fruitful results in an interna-
tional climate of confidence.
It is against this broad political and
strategic background that the new ministerial
guidance, both for nations and the NATO
military authorities, has been developed. This
guidance which has today been approved by
Ministers addresses what needs to be done in
the current political and economic situation,
to ensure the continued viability of NATO's
deterrent strategy in light of the Warsaw
Pact military capabilities. In particular, it
gives direction for the preparation of NATO
force proposals for 1983-1988 including
guidelines for the correction of the most im-
portant deficiences in the conventional forces.
July 1981
43
Europe
The planning period covered by the
guidance will also see SACEUR's reinforce-
ment plan take effect; this will facilitate the
rapid and co-ordinated deployment to Europe
of large numbers of United States, United
Kingdom and Canadian reinforcements in
times of tension or hostilities.
Recognizing that nations not responding
to situations outside NATO's boundaries may
need to assume additional tasks within the
NATO area, national defence planning should
make provision towards compensating for
changes in the availability of forces commit-
ted to NATO because of diversion or tasking
on a national basis to carry out operations
outside NATO's boundaries in support of the
vital interests of Allied countries.
The critical strategic importance of the
southern region and the Mediterranean is
recognized as is the need for continued sup-
port and assistance to Greece, Portugal and
Turkey whose economic situation does not
permit them to provide from their own
resources all the defence capabilities
necessary for the implementation of Alliance
strategy.
There is a continuing necessity for NATO
to maintain strong, diverse and flexible
nuclear forces as part of the NATO triad and
thereby to ensure deterrence. NATO will
move ahead with its planned schedule of long-
range theatre nuclear force (LRTNF) mod-
ernization whilst at the same time making
efforts to reach balanced, equitable and
verifiable arms control agreements limiting
such forces as was decided on 12th
December, 1979. In this respect, Ministers
welcomed the intention of the United States
to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union
by the end of the year on theatre nuclear
force arms control within the SALT
framework as declared in Rome, and endors-
ed plans for the high level group and the
special consultative group to undertake
urgently agreed studies.
Ministers discussed the status of the long-
term defence programme and approved
recommendations designed to ensure continu-
ing progress in a number of key areas.
The Alliance is engaged in many longer
term planning efforts. As reflected in the
guidance, these include the development of
concepts and of long-term planning guidelines
in certain specific areas. The guidance
underlines the need for further efforts in the
area of armaments co-operation, including
continued emphasis on NATO-wide planning
procedures and the extension of the family of
weapons concept. Special attention will be
given to long-term armaments planning
especially where there will be opportunities
for taking advantage of advanced
technologies and for energy conservation. At-
tention is drawn to the need for control over
the transfer of advanced technology to War-
saw Pact countries, within the framework of
existing international consultations.
Other matters to which the Alliance is
currently giving increased attention concern
the provision of adequate infrastructure
funds; Ministers approved financing for the
programme for the current year.
Confronted with all these tasks and not-
withstanding economic and financial con-
straints the standing Allied commitment to
the 3 percent formula guidance has been con-
firmed. In the light of the worsening military
situation as well as the emerging need to
cope with the implications of contingencies
outside the NATO boundaries the Allies have
also agreed to do their utmost to make
available all the resources needed to provide
the requisite strengthening of their deterrent
and defence forces. This general guidance on
resources is only one of a number of factors
which are relevant to determining the
defence efforts which nations should under-
take. It therefore needs to be accompanied by
more specific considerations for each nation
taking account of the quality and quantity of
its past and present defence efforts, the most
critical deficiencies in its forces and the
necessary improvements which should be
achieved as soon as possible within the plann-
ing period. Greater emphasis should be
placed on performance, such as reflected in
the achievement of force improvements. In
this regard Ministers welcomed the signifi-
cant efforts made by the United States to
strengthen its defence capability in the in-
terest of the Alliance as a whole. ■
West German
Chancellor Visits
United States
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the
Federal Republic of Germany made an
official visit to Washington, D.C., May
20-23, 1981, to meet with President
Reagan and other government officials.
Following is the text of the joint
statement issued on May 22.1
During the official visit of Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic
of Germany to the United States from
May 20-23, 1981, President Reagan and
the Federal Chancellor held detailed
talks on a wide range of political and
economic questions. They noted with
satisfaction that they share a common
assessment of the international situation
and its implications for the Western
alliance. They agreed that their two
countries have a common destiny found-
ed on joint security interests and firmly
rooted in their shared values of liberty,
a democratic way of life, self-
determination, and belief in the in-
alienable rights of man.
They regard the reliable and proven
U.S. -German partnership as an essential
factor in international stability and
Western security based on the North
Atlantic alliance. They agreed that
substantive and effective consultations
are a mainstay of the relations between
Western Europe and the United States.
The President and the Federal
Chancellor welcomed and reaffirmed the
results of the recent NATO ministerial
meetings in Rome and Brussels as
renewed proof of the political strength
of the alliance and the continuity of
alliance policy. They stressed the deter-
mination of alliance members to take the
necessary steps to work with their
NATO partners to strengthen the
Western defense posture and to address
adverse trends due to the Soviet
military buildup. Together with deter-
rence and defense, arms control and
disarmament are integral parts of
alliance security policy.
The President and the Federal
Chancellor affirmed in this connection
their resolve to implement both elements
of the NATO decision of December 1979
and to give equal weight to both
elements. The Federal Chancellor
welcomed the U.S. decision to begin
negotiations with the Soviet Union on
the limitation of theater nuclear
weapons within the SALT framework by
the end of this year. He also welcomed
the fact that the U.S. Secretary of State
44
Department of State Bullet
MIDDLE EAST
ias initiated preparatory discussions on
heater nuclear forces with the Soviet
Jnion, looking toward an agreement to
jegin formal negotiations. The President
ind the Federal Chancellor agreed that
JTNF [theater nuclear force] moderniza-
;ion is essential for alliance security and
is a basis for parallel negotiations
eading to concrete results on limitations
)f theater nuclear forces. They further
igreed that the preparatory studies
;alled for in the Rome communique
should be undertaken as matters of im-
mediate priority by the relevant NATO
jodies.
The President and the Federal
Chancellor assessed very favorably the
close cooperation between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the three
Ipowers in matters relating to Berlin and
(Germany as a whole. The Federal
[Chancellor thanked the President for his
reaffirmation of the pledge that the
lUnited States will continue to guarantee
Ithe security and viability of Berlin. They
agreed that the maintenance of the calm
[situation in and around Berlin is of
[crucial significance for European securi-
|ty and stability.
The European Community plays an
important part in maintaining interna-
tional political and economic stability.
The United States will continue to sup-
port the process of European unifica-
tion.
Both sides noted that a serious inter-
national situation has been created by
Soviet expansionism and armaments ef-
forts. To meet this challenge and to
secure peace, they are determined to
respond with firmness and to maintain a
dialogue with the Soviet Union.
The President and the Federal
Chancellor agreed that it is important
for the stabilization of East-West rela-
tions that the current CSCE [Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe] review conference in Madrid
agree on a balanced substantive con-
cluding document which includes en-
hanced respect for human rights, in-
creased human contacts, a freer flow of
information, and cooperation among and
security for all of the participants. In
this regard, and as part of such a
balanced result, the President and the
Chancellor favor agreement on a precise
mandate for a conference on disarma-
ment in Europe, providing for the ap-
plication of militarily significant, bind-
ing, and verifiable confidence-building
measures covering all of the continent of
Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.
Poland must be allowed to solve its
problems peacefully and without exter-
nal interference. The President and the
Federal Chancellor reaffirmed unequiv-
July 1981
ocally their view that any external in-
tervention would have the gravest
consquences for international relations
and would fundamentally change the en-
tire international situation.
Genuine nonalignment of the states
of the developing world is an important
stabilizing factor in international rela-
tions. The Chancellor and the President
support the independence and the right
of self-determination of the states of the
developing world. They will, in concert
with their allies and the countries af-
fected, oppose any attempts, direct or
indirect, by the Soviet Union to under-
mine the independence and stability of
these states. They confirmed their will-
ingness to continue their cooperation
with these states on the basis of equal
partnership and to continue their sup-
port of their economic development.
The President and the Federal
Chancellor reaffirmed their view that
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is
unacceptable. They demanded the
withdrawal of Soviet troops from
Afghanistan and respect for that coun-
try's right to return to independence and
nonalignment. The destabilizing effects
which the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan has on the entire region
must be counted.
Both sides stressed the importance
of broad-based cooperation with the
states of the gulf region.
The President and the Federal
Chancellor agreed that the United
States and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, the latter within the framework
of European political cooperation, should
continue the search for a comprehensive,
just, and lasting peace in the Middle
East. Their efforts should continue to be
complementary and build upon what has
been achieved so far.
Both sides reaffirmed the determina-
tion to strengthen further the open
system of world trade and to oppose
pressure for protectionist measures.
They stressed the vital importance
for political and economic stability of
further energy conservation and diver-
sification measures to reduce the high
degree of dependence on oil. The press-
ing energy problems can only be
mastered on the basis of worldwide
cooperative efforts that strengthen
Western energy security and reduce the
vulnerability of the West to potential
supply cutoffs from any source. The sup-
ply problems of the developing countries
require particular attention.
The President and the Federal
Chancellor agreed on the need in fram-
ing their economic policies to give high
priority to the fight against inflation and
to the creation of improved conditions
for renewed economic growth and in-
creased productivity. Both sides stressed
the need for a close coordination of
economic policies among the industrial
countries.
Both sides stressed the need for
close and comprehensive exchange of
views on the U.N. Conference on the
Law of the Sea while the U.S. Govern-
ment reviews its position.
The President and the Federal
Chancellor noted that their talks once
more demonstrated the friendly and
trusting relationship that has linked
their two countries for over 30 years.
They welcomed all efforts which serve
to broaden mutual contacts and
underlined the responsibility of the
coming generation for maintaining and
developing German-American friendship.
■Text from White House press release.
Arrival remarks, dinner toast, and departure
remarks were also issued as White House
press releases. ■
U.S. Asks Libyans To
Close People's Bureau;
Travel Advisory Issued
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
MAY 6, 19811
From the first days of the Administra-
tion, both the President and Secretary
Haig have made known their very real
concern about a wide range of Libyan
provocations and misconduct, including
support for international terrorism.
We have also been concerned by a
general pattern of unacceptable conduct
by the People's Bureau in Washington,
which is contrary to internationally ac-
cepted standards of diplomatic behavior.
We have, therefore, asked the
Libyans to close their People's Bureau in
Washington and have given them 5
working days, starting today, to
withdraw their personnel. This action
reduces our relations with Libya to the
lowest level consistent with the
maintenance of diplomatic relations.
A new travel advisory is being
issued today: "Due to unsettled relations
between the U.S. Government and the
Government of Libya, the Department
of State warns American citizens
against any travel to or residence in
Libya. Travelers should also be informed
that the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli is
closed, and the U.S. Government is not
in a position to provide consular protec-
tion and assistance to Americans
presently in Libya."
1 Made available to news correspondents
by Department spokesman Dean Fischer. ■
45
MILITARY AFFAIRS
Requirements of Our Defense Policy
by Caspar W. Weinberger
Address before the I rnited Press In-
ternational (UPI) luncheon of the
American Newspaper Publishers
Assiiriul iiitt in Chicago on May 5, 1981.
Mr. Weinberger is Secretary of Defense.'1
Today I want to talk to you about the
defense policy of (he Reagan Adminis-
tration as we have been shaping it over
the recent months. I want to say
something about our goals, about our
strategies for meeting different threats
and contingencies, and about the urgent
task of rebuilding our capabilities.
Necessarily, this will be an in-
complete description of our defense
policy. I do not want to tax your pa-
tience with details; I only want to give
you some highlights. Yet, in reality, our
defense policy must be comprehensive
and cover many aspects of our security.
It must enable us to cope with all the
significant threats, with all the plausible
contingencies that might endanger our
security. When it comes to the security
of our country, we cannot prepare for
only those threats that are easy to
handle. In the final analysis our ultimate
goal is to do everything necessary to
preserve peace with freedom and to do
it in time.
The fundamental goal of our defense
effort, as I have said, is to preserve
peace with freedom. Peace alone is not
enough. Poland is technically at peace.
We must secure peace with freedom, not
only for today but for the future; not
only for ourselves and our descendants,
but for those many other nations which
have joined us in an alliance for the com-
mon defense.
From our alliance commitments
stem some important constants for our
strategy, tactics, and deployment,
because these matters have been ar-
ranged by common agreement. And if,
because of a growing threat or new
technology change is needed, we will
again seek common agreement to bring
it about.
Thus, among the constants of our
defense policy, is the agreed basic
strategy for NATO, which requires
strong conventional, theater nuclear,
and strategic nuclear forces to provide
the full spectrum of deterrence. We are
also recommitted to strengthen U.S.
conventional forces in Europe, to im-
prove their readiness, and to move for-
ward with the agreed modernization of
theater nuclear weapons and our
associated effort at arms control
negotiations.
Changes in Policy
What has changed in our determination
to respond realistically to the growing
threats wherever they confront our na-
tional security? For well over a decade,
the Soviet Union's spending on conven-
tional armaments has been about double
our own. And its investment in strategic
nuclear armaments has been triple that
of the United States. These facts aren't
particularly in the vital regions of the
Middle East. During this same period,
we have let our strategic superiority be 1
eroded. We have long tolerated this
deterioration in our relative nuclear
strength because we hoped that the
nuclear balance could be stabilized
through arms control agreements and
that the Soviet leadership, in fact,
shared our goal for such a stable nuclear
balance.
It is an unfortunate, indeed, a
tragic, fact that this hope of ours has
been badly disappointed— the Soviet ex-
penditures for armaments, in particular
strategic arms, grew more rapidly and
more steadily during the period called
"detente" than during the so-called cold
war. This is not to say detente caused
We must secure peace with freedom, not only for today but for the
future; not only for ourselves and our descendants, but for those many other
nations which have joined us in an alliance for the common defense.
new; you have heard them before.
What is new is that Americans, last
fall, reasserted their belief that our na-
tion must restore its military strength as
President Reagan promised. What is
new is that we have decided that
America can, and in fact must, remain a
great power if we are to keep peace and
freedom. What is new is the determina-
tion of President Reagan, and those of
us who serve him, to cut back Federal
spending and reduce the role of govern-
ment, thereby making room for a
vigorous expansion in our defense effort,
without causing more inflation.
The Soviet buildup in armaments
over the last 15 years is not the only
changed threat we must address. During
the same period, Soviet power has been
growing in other important ways. The
Soviet Union has greatly extended its
geostrategic reach by establishing
military outposts in the Middle East, in
Africa, and elsewhere. Soviet footholds
in Ethiopia, Yemen, and Afghanistan
threaten the vital oilfields of the Middle
East and, indeed, the peace of the
world. These bases and facilities were
formerly neutral or accessible to us. And
Soviet forces have increasingly been
designed and deployed to take advan-
tage of this farflung access they have
gained.
As Soviet ability to project its power
abroad has grown, American and allied
access to bases and airspace has de-
clined in many areas of critical concern,
the Soviet buildup, as some European
journalists felt I have said. It is to say
that detente slowed only our investment
in strategic arms.
As I am stressing the need to re-
spond to the relentless growth in Soviet
arsenals, I do not want to be misunder-
stood to mean that Soviet military
power is the only threat of concern to
the Defense Department. We and our
allies have come to be critically depend-
ent on places in the world which are
subject to great instability. Many of our
vital resources come from such areas in
the world. And in those areas, some na-
tions are both strongly armed and
hostile toward us. These local threats to
our interest, and local instabilities, in
general, often present a temptation to
various forms of Soviet intervention.
They constitute the troubled waters that
are a favorite fishing ground of the
Soviets. We need only to look at Syria,
Iran, and Iraq, to say nothing of the
Caribbean disturbances, to see this.
We cannot meet alone all the
farflung challenges that may arise. We
have to count on increased and closer
cooperation with our friends and allies.
Indeed, the commitments and interests
that we are bound to support in almost
every quarter of the globe are not
isolated points of concern. For example,
what we do to assure uninterrupted ac-
cess to oil from the Persian Gulf affects
Japan and Israel and all our European
allies. What Japan does to strengthen its
46
Department of State Bulletin
Military Affairs
fense enhances our ability to fulfill our
leaty obligations to Australia and New
aland. What Australia and New
aland contribute to safeguarding the
istern approaches to the Indian Ocean
creases our capabilities and NATO's to
mnter any coercive threats on NATO's
stant flanks— Turkey and Norway.
ur interests and commitments, our
liances and our treaties, are both
ligations and assets at once.
This interlock of interests and com-
litments of the free world creates
utual obligations to share in the
urdens of our common defense. I
lieve President Reagan set an example
f courage and political leadership by
imming back sharply many domestic
overnment expenditures with large
jnstituencies, while expanding our
sources needed to meet the growing
ilitary threat. I know our allies have
een deeply impressed by this example,
hope that many of them will find it
ossible to follow it. As partners in the
Dmmon defense, we must all assume an
ppropriate effort at appropriate levels.
In the past, we and our allies en-
>yed a commanding lead in technology
nd its defense applications. Today we
annot take for granted that this lead
xists and will be maintained in matters
nportant for our defense. I am confi-
ent that the United States has the
uman resources to hold and keep that
^ad — the skills, the imagination, the in-
enuity. But we have not sufficiently
iewed our technology as a valuable, and
mited, national resource, and we
leglected that part of this resource
v'hich must be devoted to keeping our
lation strong and free. We have to
ealously guard technology that has
nilitary applications. Let us realize that
vhen we talk about "East- West
echnology transfer," we are not talking
ibout a transfer of national assets in
me direction— from West to East.
)efense Strategy
t is a primary mission of the Depart-
nent to be prepared to wage war,
iecause we invite aggression if we are
mprepared to meet it, and we invite
lisaster if we are forced to meet aggres-
ion unprepared. The grim paradox we
ace, constantly, is that in trying to
ireserve peace with freedom we must
trengthen ourselves with weapons we
till never use if we are successful. We
know from nearly 20 years' experience
with the Soviets that unilateral restraint
is the most dangerous of all policies and
the policy most likely to produce expan-
sionism or subjugation.
To fulfill our mission, we must
restore our ability to mobilize our forces
quickly and to support them in the com-
bat we hope thus to deter. Accordingly,
we have added major investments in
readiness in our revisions of the FY
1981-82 defense budgets.
But all the investments in equipment
Our interests and commitments,
our alliances and our treaties, are
both obligations and assets at once.
and personnel would not suffice if we
are unprepared to respond adequately to
warnings. And we have learned from
history that warning of attack is often
ambiguous. We must develop and imple-
ment improvements to strengthen our
ability to respond to warning. We are
acquiring better command and com-
munications systems that are survivable
and, thus, can properly function in a
war.
The new Soviet projection forces do
not merely give an unprecedented reach
to Soviet military ventures into regions
of greatest importance to us, but they
are also inherently capable of swift ex-
ecution. Hence, we have to be able to
move our forces quickly. The scale and
the speed of the invasion of Afghanistan
has demonstrated that a country's
capital and all its airfields can fall under
Soviet military control in a matter of
hours.
We must, frankly, recognize the
possibility of a similar military operation
against other countries where the
Western interest would be vital. In the
middle of any night, I may be awakened
to be told that the Soviet Union is ac-
tually in the process of invading a coun-
try that we must defend but where we
have neither bases nor troops. To be
sure, we have contingency plans, but are
our forces truly ready to carry them
out? To be sure, there are crisis-
management arrangements, but are we
also administratively and psychologically
ready to follow up with all the detailed
steps necessary for farreaching and
swift military movements? This is why I
put so much stress on improving our
ability to mobilize our forces and to
mobilize quickly. We may not again have
the preparation time we had to get
ready for World War II, which was
barely enough then.
Even more important, we have to
build up a stronger military presence in
vital areas to meet potential aggression
before it can become an accomplished
fact. This is the reason for the effort we
now put into rapid deployment forces
for the Middle East. This is also the
reason for important elements in our
security assistance bill, now pending
before Congress, which is designed to
help such countries as Turkey, Egypt,
Sudan, and Israel.
However, within the next few years,
we and our allies cannot rebuild our
strength sufficiently to meet all risks of
military aggression. Soviet-backed
aggression against some of our vital in-
terests in distant regions of the world
might overwhelm some of our forces.
What counts in a war is not winning the
first battle, but the last. More and more
it is apparent that we cannot and, in-
deed, should not rely exclusively on
strategic forces and that we will need a
strong conventional capacity to counter
conventional strength that may be
deployed against us.
We have to be prepared to launch
counteroffensives in other regions and
to exploit the aggressor's weaknesses
wherever we might find them. That is to
say, we must be prepared for waging a
conventional war that may extend to
many parts of the globe, if persistent
local aggression by superior forces can-
not be turned around. It is in this con-
text that our need for naval superiority
acquires special dimension.
Historically, we have always relied
heavily on our industrial base. We recall
how our productive genius was decisive
in bringing us victory in both the great
wars of this century. Today, we must, of
course, rely on our ready nuclear forces
to deter nuclear attack, as well as to
help deter conventional attack against
our principal alliance system. But our
large and latent capacity to expand
defense production has always provided
an added and powerful deterrent against
piecemeal aggression in other regions
where we have vital interests.
Yet, we cannot take this asset for
granted. Over the years, we have
neglected our capacity to mobilize in-
dustry for defense. I have instituted
luly 1981
47
OCEANS
changes in our methods for purchasing
arms— the so-called acquisition proc-
ess—designed to reduce costs and
delays in our arms purchases in
peacetime. In addition, these reforms
will also improve our capability to
mobilize industry in time of war or dur-
ing a major emergency.
First, putting ourselves in position
to expand our defense effort greatly, if
we should have to, will be a very low-
cost aspect of our defense program, yet
one that brings great returns in defend-
ing our security.
Second, such steps have particular
importance in countries like ours.
Democracies find it difficult to conduct
and persevere in an active, long-term
defense and foreign policy. As De
Tocqueville long ago pointed out:
"Foreign policies demand scarcely any of
those qualities which are peculiar to
democracy; they require, on the con-
trary, the perfect use of almost all those
in which it is deficient." By the same
token, democracies are naturally adverse
to maintaining huge armaments and
large bodies of men on a war footing in
peacetime. We cannot hope, nor would
we want to match our adversaries in
ground forces during peace. Hence, the
readiness with which we could mobilize
our industrial potential serves as our
countervailing reserve of military
strength.
Now, as our defense policies are
developed and put into effect, some will
carry on the earnest hunt for some easy
label, some simplified tag to describe it
so it will fit into a headline. I don't
doubt that we will learn about "X's
strategy," or "Y's doctrine." But in our
fluid and complex world, the policies and
doctrines that must guide our defense
can never be final and complete, or be
locked into dogmatic terms.
What we propose to do is clear. Why
we do it should also be clear. There has
been an enormous increase in Soviet
strength. This is an ever-growing im-
balance between their forces and ours.
• We feel we must strengthen the
deterrent capabilities of our nuclear
forces and move to redress the present
strategic imbalance.
• We must maintain fully our con-
ventional and nuclear deterrent commit-
ment to NATO.
• Our global interest and com-
mitments dictate that our armed forces
acquire greater range, mobility, and sur-
vivability. That means naval power able
U.S. Policy and the Law of the Sea
I
by James L. Malone
Statement before the Subcommittee
on Oceanography of the House Merchant
Marine and Fisheries Committee on
April 28, 1981. Mr. Malone is Chairman
of the U.S. delegation to the Law of the
Sea Conference and Assistant Secretary-
designate for Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs.1
It is a pleasure to be given the oppor-
tunity to speak today about the recently
concluded session of the Law of the Sea
Conference and the Administration's
policy review process. My statement will
attempt to put into perspective this Ad-
ministration's approach to the Third
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea
and the reasons why we adopted the
decision to slow down the negotiating
process just as it may have been about
to finalize the draft convention text.
Preparation for the Third U.N. Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea began in
1966. During the 15-year history of
these negotiations, the United States
has sought to protect U.S. oceans in-
terests and has pressed for urgent solu-
tions to what it perceived to be the prob-
lems of the law of the sea. The develop-
ing countries have approached the
negotiators with a different perspective
and sought economic concessions from
the industrialized world, chiefly in the
deep seabed part of the negotiations. In-
creasingly, important compromises to
developing country interests were ac-
cepted by our negotiators in order to
achieve the protection of U.S. interests
as they defined them.
>
Informal Draft Convention
When this Administration took office, it
was confronted with an informal draft
convention on the Law of the Sea con-
taining a number of provisions raising
concerns. We were informed that the
conference was on the verge of finalizing
this text and that there was an expecta
tion that the negotiations would con-
clude in 1981.
Many of the provisions of the draft
convention prompted substantial criti-
cism from industry, Congress, and the
American public. There was also some
question whether this draft convention
was consistent with the stated goals of
the Reagan Administration. Therefore,
the Administration decided that it would
be better to face criticism in the United
Nations than to proceed prematurely to
finalize a treaty that might fail to fur-
ther our national interests. Many com-
ments were made by foreign delegates
and in the U.S. press about the manner
in which we announced our decision to
conduct a policy review and to appoint a
new chief negotiator.
The decision to conduct the review
was made as rapidly as possible, consist-
ent with the many burdens and com-
peting priorities faced by any new
Administration. A change in the leader-
ship of the American delegation was
essential in order to ensure that other
countries clearly understood our
seriousness of purpose with respect to
the review. That action was also neces-
sary in order to send the signal to other
delegations that the United States could
not be induced to return immediately
to command the sealanes vital to us and
our allies. It means developing, urgently,
a better ability to respond to crises far
from our shores and to stay there as
long as necessary.
• The Arabian Gulf is such a vital
area for us and our allies. The West's
dependence on its oil means we must
make sure we can respond effectively to
threats in this region.
• This idea that all conventional
wars will be short has been overtaken by
events. Conventional wars could come in
all sizes; if we value our freedom, we
must be able to defend ourselves in wars
of any size and shape and in any region
where we have vital interests.
We do not expect to do all these
things overnight. Some of the tasks thai
face us are obviously continuing tasks. I
we persevere— and the American peopk
are determined to persevere— we can
bring about changes not only in the
strategic balance. Improved defense will
bring with it greater international
stability and a continuing hope that we
can pass on to our descendents the in-
estimable privilege of peace with
freedom.
defense Department press release
176-81. ■
48
DeDartment of State Bulletir
Oceans
id, thus, prematurely, to the bargain-
ig table by offers of minor technical
langes to the draft convention. I am
ire you can also appreciate that it
ould be less difficult for a new head of
elegation to adhere to a negotiating
osture that diverged from our past ap-
roach.
The argument has been made by
ime that the United States is failing to
eep its commitments by reviewing its
olicy and possibly changing its position
n subjects of importance. This, in my
ldgment, is an unconvincing argument,
hortly before the Carter Administra-
on took office, leading representatives
f the developing countries at the con-
?rence rejected treaty provisions they
ad previously negotiated and demanded
ubstantial changes to the draft text
len on the table as the price of future
greement. Those delegates entertained
le hope that more favorable conces-
ions could be extracted from a new ad-
linistration which was thought to be
lore sympathetic to developing country
ositions in U.N. forums.
It has always been well understood
.t the Law of the Sea Conference that a
uccessful treaty must be based on a
lackage deal. The position that the Ad-
ninistration will take toward the eon-
ents of that package remains to be
letermined in the course of the review
process. No nation is committed to the
I ext in the sense that it is bound by it.
n this regard I would like to quote from
I .he conference president's preparatory
lote to the draft convention.
This text like its predecessor will be
nformal in character. It is a negotiating text
md not a negotiated text, and does not prej-
ldice the position of any delegation.
Features of the Present Convention
Some of the features of the present
draft convention raise questions as to
whether they are consistent with U.S.
interests. I will not, today, seek to iden-
tify other features of the text which
have been considered to preserve or pro-
mote other U.S. interests. This will be
part of the review process. The areas of
concern include the following:
• The draft convention places under
burdensome international regulation the
development of all of the resources of
the seabed and subsoil beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction, representing
approximately two-thirds of the Earth's
submerged lands. These resources in-
clude polymetallic nodules. They also in-
clude mineral deposits beneath the sur-
face of the seabed, about which nothing
is known today but which may be of
very substantial economic importance in
the future.
• The draft convention would estab-
lish a supranational mining company
called the Enterprise, which would
benefit from significant discriminatory
advantages relative to the companies of
industrialized countries. Arguably, it
could eventually monopolize production
of seabed minerals. Moreover, the con-
vention requires the United States and
other nations to fund the initial
capitalization of the Enterprise, in pro-
portion to their contributions to the
United Nations.
• Through its transfer of technology
provisions, the convention compels the
sale of proprietary information and
technology now largely in U.S. hands.
Under the convention, with certain
restrictions, the Enterprise, through
mandatory transfer, is guaranteed ac-
cess on request to the seabed mining
technology owned by private companies
and also technology used by them but
owned by others. The text further
guarantees similar access to privately
owned technology by any developing
country planning to go into seabed min-
ing. We must also carefully consider
how such provisions relate to security-
related technology.
• The draft convention limits the
annual production of manganese nodules
from the deep seabed, as well as the
amount which any one company can
mine for the first 20 years of produc-
tion. The stated purpose of these con-
trols is to avoid damaging the economy
of any country which produces the same
commodities on land. In short, it at-
tempts to insulate land-based producers
from competition with seabed mining. In
doing so, the draft treaty could
discourage potential investors, thereby
creating artificial scarcities. In allocating
seabed production, the International
Seabed Resource Authority is granted
substantial discretion to select among
competing applications. Such discretion
could be used to deny contracts to quali-
fied American companies.
• The convention creates a one-
nation, one-vote international organiza-
tion which is governed by an assembly
and a 36-member executive council. In
the council, the Soviet Union and its
allies have three guaranteed seats, but
the United States must compete with its
allies for any representation. The
assembly is characterized as the
"supreme" organ, and the specific policy
decisions of the council must conform to
the general policies of the assembly.
• The convention provides that,
after 15 years of production, the provi-
sions of the treaty will be reviewed to
determine whether it has fulfilled over-
riding policy considerations, such as pro-
tection of land-based producers, promo-
tion of Enterprise operations, and
equitable distribution of mining rights. If
two-thirds of the states' parties to the
treaty wish to amend provisions con-
cerning the system of exploitation, they
may do so after 5 years of negotiation
and after ratification by two-thirds of
the states' parties. If the United States
were to disagree with duly ratified
changes, it would be bound by them,
nevertheless, unless it exercised its op-
tion to denounce the entire treaty.
• The draft convention imposes
revenue-sharing obligations on seabed
mining corporations which would signif-
icantly increase the costs of seabed min-
ing.
• The convention imposes an inter-
national revenue-sharing obligation on
the production of hydrocarbons from the
continental shelf beyond the 200-mile
limit. Developing countries that are net
importers of hydrocarbons are exempt
from the obligation.
• The convention contains provi-
sions concerning liberation movements,
like the PLO [Palestine Liberation
Organization], and their eligibility to ob-
tain a share of the revenues of the Sea-
bed Authority.
• The convention lacks any pro-
visions for protecting investments made
prior to entry into force of the conven-
tion.
On the basis of the foregoing dif-
ficulties and others, it is the best judg-
ment of this Administration that this
draft convention would not obtain the
advice and consent of the Senate. Of
course, since the treaty would require
implementing legislation, the House
would also have a major role that must
be considered. We have reason to doubt
that the House of Representatives would
pass the necessary legislation to give ef-
fect to a treaty containing provisions
such as these.
Administration's Review
The provisions I have mentioned raised
questions for this Administration. We
must seriously consider whether those
provisions should be included in a treaty
to which the United States would be-
come a party, unless there were a
July 1981
49
Oceans
countervailing national policy interest.
The review will evaluate all of our na-
tional interests and objectives, including
national security, to determine the ex-
tent to which they are protected by the
draft convention, to identify necessary
modifications to the convention. The
review will also examine, with great
care, whether these same interests and
objectives would fare better or worse in
the absence of a treaty.
During the course of the review, we
will consult with the Congress, with
other nations, including our principal
allies, and with a broad spectrum of the
private sector. We anticipate that this
will be a fairly lengthy process. The Ad-
ministration believes that any decision
concerning a subject as comprehensive
and complex as this one must be taken
with deliberation and with keen under-
standing of foreign and domestic reac-
tions. Accordingly, we have determined
that the policy review process cannot be
fully completed before the resumed 10th
session of the Law of the Sea Con-
ference in Geneva this August. We must
have time to insure adequate opportuni-
ty to test our tentative views with the
widest possible number of countries.
At the recently concluded session of
the conference, disappointment and ap-
prehension were, indeed, registered at
the decision of the United States to
undertake such a sweeping review,
although this reaction was not universal.
The Administration realizes the concern
and disappointment that this decision
has engendered. However, we feel
strongly that the American people would
wish to see this review occur rather
than being plunged headlong into this
treaty.
We think that the world community,
too, will be better served if we return to
the conference with a realistic assess-
ment of what will satisfy our people and
our Congress. The Administration does
not wish to be in a position of mis-
leading other countries into concluding a
treaty they will expect us to ratify a
treaty which, in many respects, is be-
lieved by them to satisfy our national in-
terests and then find us unable to par-
ticipate in the final result.
Summary of New York Session
As could have been expected in the light
of the U.S. position, the session in New
York this spring was, relative to
previous sessions, inactive. We were not
in a position to negotiate on substance
and, because our participation is vital to
the formation of consensus, participants
in the conference were unwilling to pro-
ceed without us. There was some activi-
ty, however, which I will now briefly
summarize.
The first week of the conference was
devoted to electing a President to suc-
ceed the late Ambassador Hamilton
Shirley Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka. Am-
bassador Tommy Koh of Singapore, an
able and experienced diplomat, was
elected to replace him.
In Committee I— that is the commit-
tee dealing with seabed mining —
Chairman Paul Engo of the United
Republic of Cameroon focused attention
on the draft resolution setting up the
preparatory commission of the Interna-
tional Seabed Resource Authority. The
developing states attacked, and the
developed states defended, the require-
ment set out in the text that the rules,
regulations, and procedures adopted by
the commission be applied by the Seabed
Resource Authority until others are
recommended to the assembly by a con-
sensus of council members and are
adopted by the assembly. Some devel-
oped countries, with the United States
reserving its position at this session,
have regarded this approach as essential
to assuring those ratifying the treaty
that the Seabed Resource Authority
would operate in a foreseeable manner.
Participation in the commission — the
so-called ticket-of-admission problem-
was also debated. Those industrialized
countries expressing a view preferred
that signatories of the final act of the
conference be full participants in the
work of the commission and in its deci-
sionmaking procedures in order to pro-
vide the broadest possible participation.
The developing countries wanted
membership reserved to those states
which had expressed the intent to
become parties to the treaty by signing
it. The developing states, at that point,
offered a compromise that would have
allowed those states that had signed the
final act of the conference but not the
treaty itself, to participate as observers
in the commission's work. Other Com-
mittee I issues were treated only super-
ficially.
The U.S. delegation confined its par-
ticipation in the seabed discussions to
several brief interventions reserving our
position pending completion of the
Committee II, which deals with
navigation and coastal state jurisdiction,
held four informal meetings without
agenda to permit delegations to raise
any questions deemed important to
them. Some states favored requiring
prior authorization or notification of
warship passage in the territorial sea. Of
the approximately 70 states which ex-
pressed views on the subject, roughly
one-half favored the amendment and
one-half opposed it. Among those favor-
ing the amendment, a small number
thought that notification, alone, might
be acceptable.
Brazil argued that the text should be
revised to exclude military exercises in
the exclusive economic zone unless
authorized by the coastal state. This pro-
posal received support and opposition
along the same lines as did that relating
to warship passage.
Argentina pressed its suggestions
for a change in the text to provide for
cooperation among affected states for
the conservation of so-called straddling
stocks — that is, fish stocks found both
within and without the exclusive
economic zone.
Disagreement continued to be ex-
pressed as to the relative weight to be
placed upon "equitable principles" and
the "median or equidistance line" in the
formula for the delimitation of maritime
boundaries of the exclusive economic
zone between opposite and adjacent
states. Finally, there was some discus-
sion concerning artificial islands.
At the conclusion of the Committee
II meetings, Chairman Aguilar of
Venezuela noted that while there were
widely divergent views expressed, a
practical consensus existed along the
basic lines of the Committee II package
and that there remained only a very few
questions of interest to a substantial
number of delegations. As in the case of
Committee I, no changes in the text
emerged as a result of work regarding
Committee II subjects.
Committee III, dealing with marine
scientific research and pollution, met
only once during the session. Chairman
Yankov of Bulgaria stated that, in his
view, negotiations had been completed
at the ninth session and that any at-
tempt to reopen substantive negotiations
would seriously endanger the com-
promises already achieved. Several
delegations expressed agreement with
50
Department of State Bulletir
SECURITY ASSISTANCE
iese views. The United States reserved
s position on the status of the work of
le committee, pending the outcome of
lr review. Further, the United States
lade clear that there also remained
veral minor, essentially technical,
ranges that needed to be discussed at
jme point.
The drafting committee did exten-
ve work directed toward conforming
nd harmonizing the texts. However, a
reat deal of additional work confronts
lat committee.
Finally, the conference scheduled a
week session beginning August 3 in
eneva with the option to extend the
)nference for an additional week. The 5
■eeks prior to the August resumed ses-
on will be dedicated to drafting efforts.
I would like to emphasize that it is
ur intention to keep members of this
ibcommittee and other interested
lembers fully informed throughout the
olicy review. We will welcome your
iews, and you, in turn, may expect
om us candid and continuous reports
n our progress.
'The complete transcript of the hearings
ill be published by the committee and will
i available from the Superintendent of
ocuments, U.S. Government Printing Of-
ce, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
Arms Transfer and the National
Interest
by James L. Buckley
Address before the Aerospace In-
dustries Association in Williamsburg,
Virginia, on May 21, 1981. Mr. Buckley
is Under Secretary for Security
Assistance, Science and Technology.
I am delighted to be with you today in
this superb setting. Some of the great
debates defining the goals of what was
to be the American Revolution took
place here in Williamsburg. The seeds
sown here and elsewhere along the
Atlantic seaboard took root and pro-
duced the greatest experiment in
human freedom the world has ever
witnessed.
This new republic, which the patriots
who walked the streets of Williamsburg
two centuries ago helped design, has
evolved into a great and powerful na-
tion. We are no longer merely the
world's foremost example of the bless-
ings that freedom brings; but of
historical necessity, we are now the
primary guardians of the very concepts
of individual freedom and the inherent
dignity of man on which this country
was founded and from which it con-
tinues to draw its strength.
We Americans have never sought
the responsibilities of world leadership,
but we cannot avoid them or the
burdens they impose on us. Irving
Kristol described our obligations as a
great power in an essay written in 1967
when some in the United States were
beginning to call for a withdrawal from
Vietnam, a reduction in our foreign com-
mitments, and a return to "Fortress
America." With a provocative reference
to the United States as an "Imperial
Power," Kristol wrote:
There are a great many people who ap-
pear to think that a great power is only the
magnification of a small power, and that the
principles governing the actions of the latter
are simply transferable -perhaps with some
modification— to the former. In fact, there is
a qualitative difference between the two con-
ditions, and the difference can be summed up
as follows: A great power is "imperial"
because what it does not do is just as signifi-
cant, and just as consequential, as what it
does. Which is to say, a great power does not
have the range of freedom of action— derived
from the freedom of inaction -that a small
power possesses. It is entangled in a web of
responsibilities from which there is no hope
of escape; and its policy-makers are doomed
to a strenuous and unquiet life.
We are now experiencing the bitter
consequences of the attempt by
American policymakers in recent years
to escape from this reality.
Experience of the Last Decade
Over the past decade, first the Congress
and then the Carter Administration
presided over an American withdrawal
from world responsibilities that con-
tributed to a dramatic shift in global
power relationships.
Ten years ago, we enjoyed unques-
tioned nuclear superiority. Our Navy
still dominated the world's oceans; and
even though the bulk of our military
forces were committed to Vietnam, the
Soviets could not safely challenge us
elsewhere on the globe. As recently as
the fall of 1973, during the Middle East
war, an American President could still
head off the introduction of a Soviet
division into Egypt by signaling a
worldwide alert of U.S. forces. The oil
fields in the Middle East were circled by
nations friendly to the West.
Today, we have lost our strategic
superiority, and the Soviets are forging
ahead in long-range nuclear weaponry.
Our naval combatant forces have been
reduced by half, and we can no longer
guarantee the safe passage of American
merchantmen over more than one ocean
at a time. The major oil producing states
of the Persian Gulf are flanked by an
unstable regime in Iran, Soviet satellites
in the Horn of Africa and South Yemen,
and by the Soviet Union itself in
Afghanistan. And when an American
President, just 1 year ago, declared that
we would protect our interests in the
Persian Gulf by military force if
necessary, people openly wondered
whether we could— or would.
But that is only part of the story. At
the same time that we allowed our
military strength to deteriorate while
the Soviets established strategic
beachheads in Africa and the Middle
East, the Carter Administration adopted
policies toward the transfer of arms to
friends and allies that substituted
theology for a healthy sense of self-
preservation.
It was the Carter view that such
transfers were inherently evil or morally
July 1981
51
Security Assistance
reprehensible, or both. Therefore, the
United States world henceforth, in prin-
ciple, refrain from selling arms except
under the most restricted circumstances.
Representatives of U.S. arms manufac-
turers abroad were to be treated as
pariahs by American diplomatic
representatives even when engaged in
transactions duly licensed by the govern-
ment itself. Never mind the fact that
our unilateral restraint proved less than
contagious and had the net effect of
lessening U.S. influence over the arms
policies of other nations by encouraging
them to seek the weapons they needed
from other suppliers. And never mind
that, in practice, the countries which
were important strategically continued
to receive support, while the burden of a
restrictive policy fell on those nations
less able to fight back either with U.S.
policymakers or American public opin-
ion. Pragmatism and realism are at least
philosophically defensible on their own
terms as a basis for policy; but when
used in practice, but masked by a
moralistic smoke screen, they are not.
To compound these self-inflicted in-
juries, the Congress adopted a series of
restrictions on sales to nations whose
behavior -in the case of human
rights -or intentions -in the case of
nuclear proliferation -we disapprove of.
While these well-intentioned efforts have
had little detectable impact on such
behavior or intentions, they did lead at
times to the awkward result of under-
cutting the capabilities of strategically
located nations in whose ability to de-
fend themselves we have the most im-
mediate and urgent self-interest.
Pakistan is a spectacular case in point.
The net effect of all of this is that
we find ourselves, in 1981, not only with
deteriorated military and strategic posi-
tions but with far fewer nations in a
position to work with us in defending
common interests and deterring threats
by the Soviet Union and its surrogates.
Thus we are faced not only with the
need to rebuild and modernize our own
military forces but to help other nations
in the free world rebuild theirs.
It is for all of these reasons that the
Reagan Administration has concluded
that the strengthening of other nations
with which we share common security
interests is an essential component of
our total effort to restore effective
deterrence to aggression.
Nothing worthwhile in the world
community is possible -neither economic
growth nor political or social reform in
an atmosphere of increasing instability.
And there is little reason to assume that
the decade of the 1980s will witness a
basic change in this situation, unless the
United States is prepared to meet the
security needs of its friends and allies as
well as its own. Military power alone
cannot solve the large array of problems
which currently beset the community of
nations; nor can it provide the founda-
tions for an international society in
which equity and security prevail. What
it can do, given the growing disorder
that we confront today, is help to
reestablish some sense of equilibrium.
All of this will require the best of
American leadership abroad and at
home. We must not only demonstrate
that we have the will to lead but the
capacity to back that will with the
necessary military and economic power.
This will require the revitalization of our
defenses and the building of stronger
alliances and cooperative relationships
as well as the rebuilding of our own
economic strength. This is why the adop-
tion of the President's economic pro-
gram is as essential to our ultimate na-
tional security as the increased requests
for defense and security assistance ap-
propriations.
My own responsibilities are focused
on the last, so I would like to take the
time to describe some of the attitudes
and policies that I expect will be applied
to the sale of weapons and related goods
and services. These and other related
objectives are being spelled out in a
policy statement that we expect will be
released in the near future.
U.S. Attitudes and Policies
For starters, this Administration
believes that arms transfers, judiciously
applied, can complement and supplement
our own defense efforts and serve as a
vital and constructive instrument of
American foreign policy. In revising our
practices in this area, we seek to achieve
the following:
• Enhancement of the state of
preparedness of our friends and allies;
• Revitalization of our alliances;
• The fashioning of more coherent
policies and strategies that bear on
East-West relations; and
• The buttressing of our own
defense production capabilities.
Arms transfers can thus serve as an
important adjunct to our own security
by helping deter acts of aggression, by
enhancing the self-defense capabilities o
nations with which we share close
security ties, and by facilitating access
by American forces to military facilities
abroad.
The Administration's new approach
to arms transfers will emphasize the
need for flexibility and rapid response to
meet changing circumstances affecting
American security interests. We will
evaluate requests for support in terms
of their contribution to deterrence and
defense. We will accord high priority to
requests from members of our major
alliances and from those nations with
which we have developed cooperative
relationships.
Assessing Requests
In assessing arms transfer requests, th<
United States will continue to give due
consideration to such factors as the
degree to which the equipment re-
quested corresponds to the military
threat facing the recipient, the manner
in which such equipment will serve to
maintain stability within regions where
friends of the United States are on less
than the best terms one with the other;
and whether the proposed transfer can
be absorbed by the recipient without
overburdening its military support
system or financial resources.
We believe that particular care mus
be taken to avoid an adverse impact on
allied and friendly nations by encourag-
ing them to assume burdens for which
their economies are ill-prepared. For
this reason, we are prepared to en-
courage the efforts of American
manufacturers to produce equipment
which, in terms of cost, complexity, an«
sophistication, is more appropriate to
the needs of nonindustrialized nations.
At the same time, the United States wi
continue to strive with its NATO allies
to achieve a high degree of equipment
standardization in order to achieve our
mutual goal of interoperability of equip
ment.
Recognizing, as we do, that in
today's economic climate a number of
nations cannot afford to purchase equip
ment on commercial terms, we are re-
questing congressional authority to help
finance some such purchases at conces-
sional rates. At the same time we are
seeking other statutory provisions that
will simplify procedures and achieve
significant economies in the production
and sale of items in high demand.
Requests for transfer of tech-
nologically sensitive materials will be
52
Department of State Bulleti
Security Assistance
insidered on a case-by-case basis. Such
•ansfer will not be approved if a signifi-
int possibility of compromise of sen-
tive information or equipment exists,
r if justification on the basis of over-
ding U.S. interest cannot be made. We
ill also give serious consideration to
iture requests for coproduction, or
^assembly, of military equipment pro-
uced by American manufacturers, while
nderstanding the extreme complexity
f this particular subject as well as the
otential for conflict between foreign
nd domestic economic policy objectives,
'or this reason, I would particularly
'elcome your views as the Administra-
on works to develop specific guidelines
1 the area of coproduction and
oassembly.
Finally, as one of my first actions in
lis position, we rescinded the Carter
idministration's so-called leprosy letter,
rhich instructed U.S. officials overseas
ot to assist U.S. businessmen seeking
d meet the military needs of friendly
tates. Henceforth, U.S. Government
epresentatives overseas will be ex-
acted to provide the same courtesies
nd support to firms that have obtained
censes to market items on the U.S.
lunitions list as they would to those
larketing other American products. In
lue course we will be reviewing our
censing procedures to see how they can
e simplified.
lultilateral Restraint
know there will be those who will con-
lude that these new policy changes will
•.erald a period of unrestrained military
ales. They will not. We remain
ledicated to the goal of mutual restraint
n arms transfers. What we advocate is
similar dedication to the goal of serv-
ng U.S. interests; and in those cases
vhere arms transfers are the best
neans of doing so, we will make them.
The difference between this Administra-
ion and its predecessor is in the
oerception of where those interests lie,
now and by whom they are challenged,
Mid how best to advance them.
Though I believe it was well-inten-
ioned, Presidential Determination 13
Was, after all, issued by a President
who, some 2V2 years later, after Soviet
croops had invaded Afghanistan, admit-
ted he had learned more about the Rus-
sians in the immediately preceding 10
days than in his entire prior time in
office. This Administration starts with
no illusions as to Soviet purposes. Soviet
support for so-called wars of national
liberation has never been qualified, even
during the halcyon days of detente. It is,
therefore, not surprising that there has
been little or no interest in arms
transfer limitations manifested by the
Soviet Union— or, for that matter, by
the majority of other arms producing
nations.
We will, nonetheless, continue to ex-
amine ways to secure a regime of
multilateral restraint. But in the mean-
time this Administration will face up to
the realities of Soviet aggrandizement,
and it will pursue a sober, balanced, and
responsible arms transfer policy, one
which is essential for the protection of
our national security interests.
Security and Cooperation
Which brings me to the last point I
would like to make. Despite our inherent
strength, there are limits to what we
can accomplish alone. We are as depen-
dent on the cooperation of other
sovereign nations for the defense of our
larger security interests as we are
dependent on foreign sources for oil and
such other strategic minerals as cobalt,
manganese, titanium, chrome, and a
host of others to support the high
technology on which our economy is
based.
The alliances and cooperative ar-
rangements we need to forge with other
nations cannot be coerced. They require
of us a new maturity in our relationships
with other nations, one that recognizes
the sovereignty and dignity of other
societies as well as the enormous diversi-
ty of cultures that exists among them. If
we build our security relationships on
the bedrock of mutual interests, then
they will prove durable -provided
always that we can once again restore
confidence in the reliability of American
undertakings.
We are the essential partner in any
credible network of free world relation-
ships because we are the only power
that has the capacity to hold in check
the aggressive opportunism of the
Soviet enterprise. Our attempt in recent
years to downgrade our world respon-
sibilities has proven catastrophic for
precisely the reason that only we are in
a position to make the difference. As
Irving Kristol pointed out in the essay I
cited earlier: "It is the world situa-
tion -and the history which created this
situation -that appoints imperial powers,
not anyone's decision or even anyone's
ambition. And power begets respon-
sibility -and above all the responsibility
to use this power responsibly."
That is our challenge: not to strip
ourselves of power but to focus that
power for the achievement for the com-
mon good. And that common good these
days is to restore a world order in which
each nation can work out its own
destiny, free of fears of external threat.
What we have to offer other nations as
we seek to forge new and effective part-
nerships is the prospect of global stabili-
ty in which the United States can be
relied upon to use its influence and
strength to protect the peace and re-
quire that rogue nations observe a code
of behavior that eschews resorts to force
or subversion in international affairs.
This is the stated objective of the
Reagan Administration, and it is one
that is based on the long overdue reaf-
firmation of our confidence in ourselves
and in the rightness of our cause. We
are the last best hope on Earth; and we
have no responsible choice but to act ac-
cordingly.
I know that conservatives are often
accused of being simplistic; and as a self-
confessed, card-carrying member of that
fraternity, I might as well confess that I
harbor the simplistic notion that on the
world's stage today it is possible to
divide the principal actors between the
good guys and the bad guys; and we
might as well understand that the bad
guys are serious and playing for keeps.
A few years ago that great
American philosopher, Leo Durocher,
made the observation that good guys
finish last. It is the intention of this Ad-
ministration to prove him wrong. ■
July 1981
53
UNITED NATIONS
Infant Formula Code
The following statements were made
by Elliot Abrams, Assistant Secretary
for International Organization Affairs,
on May 15, 1981, M. Peter McPherson,
Administrator of the Agency for Interna-
tional Development (AID), on May 18,
and Assistant Secretary Abrams before
the Subcommittee on International
Operations of the House Foreign Affa i rs
Committee on May 20.
PRESS STATEMENT BY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS,
MAY 15, 1981
After very careful consideration of this
issue at all levels of the Administration
and by several agencies, we have deter-
mined that the U.S. delegation to the
assembly of the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO) must cast a negative vote on
the draft code of marketing of
breastmilk substitutes. A formal an-
nouncement of the vote will come, as
you would expect, when the matter
comes up on the agenda in Geneva,
which will be, roughly, a week from
now.
This has been a very difficult deci-
sion. It's a very highly emotional issue,
and in arriving at our decision, we have
tried to take into account both the
positive and negative aspects of the
draft code, in the context of our own
social, legal, and constitutional system.
The code causes us serious prob-
lems, both on constitutional and legal
grounds and on economic and commer-
cial grounds. It seeks to proscribe cer-
tain commercial practices, such as
advertising and association between con-
sumers and manufacturers, which con-
tradict our constitutional guarantee of
free speech and freedom of association
and our antitrust laws. It does not pro-
vide the flexibility governments, com-
panies, and health workers need in ac-
cordance with varying legal, social,
economic, or cultural conditions of the
member states of WHO.
There is ambiguity regarding the
scope of the code. That is, it could easily
be read to apply to foods other than in-
fant formula.
Some of the provisions seek to cur-
tail the free flow of admittedly truthful
information to the public regarding
products available to the public, and,
more generally, it would curtail commer-
cial practices without adequate evidence
linking those practices to a decline in
breastfeeding.
Fundamentally, we think it would be
hypocritical for the United States to
vote for a code which we could not and
would not wish to adopt or implement in
this country. We cannot recommend its
implementation here, and, therefore, we
cannot recommend its implementation to
others. We remain committed to the
promotion of breastfeeding as the
preferred form of infant feeding and to
measures to improve infant and mater-
nal health worldwide. We very much
support WHO's efforts in this area and
will continue to provide bilateral
assistance to other countries, with the
object of improving nutrition for infants
and mothers.
press statement by
mr. Mcpherson,
MAY 18, 1981
The World Health Assembly, currently
meeting in Geneva, is considering a pro-
posed code of marketing practices for
breastmilk substitutes. After very
careful consideration, the Administra-
tion has decided to oppose this code.
AID fully supports that decision.
AID has consistently endorsed the
promotion of breastfeeding as the
preferred form of infant nutrition. AID
has many programs around the world
where encouragement of breastfeeding
is part of the health education effort. It
also continues to support the WHO in
fostering improved health for all the
peoples of the world. However, the Ad-
ministration feels that it is inappropriate
for an agency of the United Nations to
move in the direction of regulating
economic activity.
This is not the only example of a
U.N. agency proposing a bad interna-
tional code.' UNESCO [U.N. Educational
Scientific and Cultural Organization] is
currently attempting to restrict press
freedom by establishing a so-called new
world information order. This code
would undermine respect for press in-
tegrity and legitimize attempts by the
Soviet bloc and its allies to control the
flow of information. Clearly, it is not the
role of WHO or UNESCO to legislate
these types of restrictions. However well
intended, these codes set dangerous
precedents which the United States will
continue to oppose.
STATEMENT BY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS,
MAY 20, 19811
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss
the U.S. position on the WHO draft in-
ternational code of marketing of
breastmilk substitutes. As you know, we
expect the World Health Assembly to
discuss and vote on the code today or
tomorrow.
Major Events Leading to Code
The concern with infant nutrition and
the decline of breastfeeding in the
developing countries began a number of
years ago. In October 1979, WHO and
UNICEF [U.N. Children's Fund] jointly
sponsored a meeting including govern-
ment and development assistance
officials, companies, health professionals
and public interest groups to discuss the
problems of infant nutrition and the pro |
motion of breastfeeding in particular.
The participants agreed that breast-
feeding, clearly, is the preferred form ov
infant nutrition, a position long taken b;
the U.S. Government and propounded
most clearly in statements of the
Surgeon General. One of the major
issues at that October meeting was the
role of the manufacturers of infant for-
mula in the worldwide effort to promote
breastfeeding. Agreed language was
achieved at that meeting, including a
recommendation that advertising or pre
motion of infant formula should not be
to the detriment of breastfeeding.
Following the October meeting, the
World Health Assembly at its 33rd an-
nual meeting in May 1980, unanimously
agreed to authorize WHO to draft an in
ternational code for the marketing of
breastmilk substitutes. This was to be
done in close consultation with health
professionals, governments, manufac-
turers, and public interest groups. The
original U.S. position at that assembly
was that a code should be drafted, that
it should be done by means of inter-
governmental negotiations rather than
by an international secretariat. An in-
tergovernmental negotiation would havt
led more easily to a code that reflected
the differing needs of the countries
represented. To our regret, the U.S.
position was rejected.
54
Department of State Bulletir
United Nations
During the intervening year, WHO
as presented four drafts for considera-
lon by interested parties. The fourth
raft is the one being presented to the
orld Health Assembly this week. The
Inited States has been actively involved
i the development of this draft code
nd has had some influence on the actual
erms of the code. Unfortunately, such
ignificant problems as a recommended
omplete ban on advertising to the
■eneral public and highly detailed re-
uirements concerning labeling and con-
act by marketing professionals with
nothers and expecting women have not
ieen changed, notwithstanding our
^presentations during the past year.
During this entire time, we expressed
eservations about the propriety of
VHO becoming involved in a commer-
ial code in addition to our comments on
he specifics of this particular draft
ode.
During all of the discussions on the
/arious drafts, the U.S. position was
presented clearly on a number of issues,
ilthough when it became apparent that
t would be impossible to change the ap-
Droach taken to such issues, we did not
necessarily press on that issue to the ex-
clusion of all others; in effect, we made
pur views known on virtually all issues
n the code. Unfortunately, we did not
Ivvin on the most important questions.
Our goal throughout this effort was not
to derail a code but rather to develop a
useful statement of principles upon
which each member of WHO could draw
in light of its own special circumstances.
U.S. Position
I would like to emphasize that this issue
has received very careful consideration
at all levels of the Administration and by
several agencies. It was pursuant to
those deliberations that we determined
that the U.S. delegation to the World
Health Assembly must cast a negative
vote on the draft code of marketing of
breastmilk substitutes.
This has been a difficult question and
one that has received widespread and, I
might add, emotional attention. In arriv-
ing at our decision we have tried to take
into account both the positive and
negative aspects of the draft code, in the
context of our own social, legal, and con-
stitutional system.
The code contains provisions that
raise significant legal and constitutional
questions for the United States. For ex-
ample, one provision seeks to ban all
advertising, which raises serious ques-
tions concerning our constitutional doc-
trines of freedom of expression. In addi-
tion, some of the provisions raise con-
cerns regarding our laws on competition
among business entities, i.e., antitrust
laws.
Another problem is that although
the code appears to provide flexibility
for governments, its overall effect is to
prescribe a rigid set of rules applicable
to companies, health workers, and
health care systems in all parts of the
world. It does not provide the flexibility
that these parties need to take account
of varying legal, social, economic, and
cultural conditions. There is also am-
biguity regarding the scope of the
code — specifically, whether it would be
applicable to products other than breast-
milk substitutes.
The decision on the code was especi-
ally difficult here because of the absence
of adequate evidence demonstrating that
the practices at issue have an adverse
impact on breastfeeding or infant health.
Some of the provisions seek to curtail
the free flow of truthful information to
the public regarding products available
to the public, and some provisions would
also curtail commercial practices without
adequate evidence linking those prac-
tices to a decline in breastfeeding.
We recognize the right of a govern-
ment to ban or restrict the marketing of
harmful products and substances. We
also recognize, in our laws, the respon-
sibility of manufacturers to adhere to
honest and ethical standards in the
preparation and marketing of their prod-
ucts. But the United States cannot sup-
port the proposed code because it would
be, if applied in the United States, an
unwarranted invasion of the freedom of
men and women to make informed
choices, on the basis of all the truthful
information available about a product
which appears to them to best meet
their needs.
Finally, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, as we could not and would not
recommend the implementation of this
code at home, we cannot, in good con-
science, recommend the code for im-
plementation by other countries.
I would emphasize that this Ad-
ministration is deeply concerned about
maternal and infant health, and we sup-
port an extensive program in this field
in our own country and throughout the
world. We strongly support efforts to
promote and protect breastfeeding as
the ideal form of infant nutrition, and
we strongly support the work of WHO
in fostering improved health for all the
people of the world. The United States
remains committed to improving infant
and child health, and we believe that our
own bilateral assistance programs en-
compassing education, training, and the
dissemination of information on the pro-
motion of breastfeeding and the im-
provement of infant and maternal nutri-
tion attest to this commitment.
•The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
July 1981
55
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
U.S. Assistance to
El Salvador
Foreign Relations Outline1
Background
The Government of El Salvador is work-
ing to improve the quality of life for the
people through social and economic
reforms. Extremists of both left and
right have used violence to try to block
the reforms. Salvadoran guerrillas have
received large quantities of arms and
other assistance from Cuba and other
Communist governments. On January
10, 1981, they launched a general offen-
sive intended to bring down the govern-
ment. Although it failed, the offensive
taxed the poorly trained and ill-equipped
Salvadoran Armed Forces.
U.S. Policy
We believe that Central American coun-
tries should be free to solve their inter-
nal problems without intimidation or
violence supported by Cuba and other
Communist governments. Our policy is
to support President Napoleon Duarte's
interim government as it implements
reforms, moves toward free and open
elections, and works to end all forms of
terrorism. In addition to diplomatic sup-
port, the United States provides
economic and military assistance, with
economic aid more than 3V2 times the
amount of military aid.
Economic Aid
Because of the violence and the many
difficulties of implementing basic
reforms, El Salvador's production has
declined by more than 15% in the past 2
years. Violence and terrorism will con-
tribute to a further decline in 1981. The
foreign exchange shortfall is estimated
to be at least $143 million. Continuing
unemployment of about 20% is expected.
Venezuela and Mexico provide signifi-
cant assistance by allowing El Salvador
to apply part of its oil costs to develop-
ment programs. Financial assistance
also is provided by international lending
organizations.
U.S. economic assistance emphasizes
support for certain land reform ac-
tivities, creation of jobs, provision of
food, and increased credit to the private
sector. In FY 1980 we provided $58.8
million in aid; $63 million was originally
scheduled for FY 1981. Because of the
continuing economic decline, additional
assistance is required urgently to help
the government meet basic needs,
especially to finance essential imports of
food, agricultural chemicals, and in-
dustrial materials for the private sector.
Therefore, the United States is pro-
ceeding with an additional $63.5 million
in aid, bringing our total economic
package in FY 1981 to $126.5 million.
Security Assistance
Until the guerrillas' January offensive,
the United States had earmarked $5
million for loan guarantees to help
finance Salvadoran purchases of
nonlethal military equipment, such as
trucks, and $440,000 for military educa-
tion and training. As an immediate
response to the offensive, the United
States leased six U.S. Army helicopters
to El Salvador and made available a
small number of U.S. military personnel
to help with their delivery and assembly
and to train Salvadorans in their use. On
January 16, 1981, President Carter
agreed to provide defense articles and
services valued at $5 million to meet the
emergency resupply needs of the
Salvadoran forces. Under this authoriza-
tion, the United States supplied arms
and ammunition to the Salvadoran
Government for the first time since
1977.
In March 1981 President Reagan
authorized another $25 million in securi-
ty assistance to provide for additional
equipment and the assignment of addi-
tional training personnel. This increased
the level of FY 1981 security assistance
from $10.4 million to $35.4 million. The
new U.S. assistance will provide four ad-
ditional transport helicopters (bringing
the total number to 10), jeeps, trucks,
tents, tools, and first-aid supplies, as
well as small arms, grenade-launchers,
mortars, and ammunition.
Military Training Personnel
In the fall of 1980, there were 33 U.S.
military personnel assigned to El
Salvador: 20 U.S. Embassy Marine
security guards, 4 security assistance ad-
ministrators in the Embassy military
group, 4 officers and enlisted personnel |
in the defense attache's office, and 5
officers and enlisted personnel assigned
as an operational planning assistance
team to the Salvadoran high command.
The additional training personnel will
consist of:
• A 5-man addition to the opera-
tional planning assistance team working
with the Salvadoran high command and
regional commands on communications,
intelligence, and planning;
• Three 5-man army teams working
outside the capital, providing small unit
training, particularly in counterinfiltra-
tion techniques, to the Salvadoran
Army's newly created quick-reaction
forces (training will be conducted ex-
clusively inside Salvadoran military gar-
risons);
• A 6-man naval team to instruct
Salvadoran personnel in interdiction at
sea and maintenance of patrol craft and
to survey the need for upgrading the
boats and for further training; and
• A 14-man helicopter maintenance
and pilot training team.
In the spring of 1981, the 6-man
naval training team completed its mis-
sion and withdrew, the administrative
staff of the U.S. military group in-
creased by 8, and 1 Marine security
guard was added. These changes left 76
U.S. military personnel positions in El
Salvador; 51 security assistance posi-
tions, 21 Marine security guards, and 4
positions in the defense attache's office.
War Powers Resolution
The war powers resolution requires the
executive branch to consult with Con-
gress before U.S. Armed Forces are in-
troduced into hostilities or into a situa-
tion where the circumstances clearly in-
dicate that hostilities are imminent. It
also requires a report within 48 hours
after such an introduction as well as a
report, but not prior consultation,
whenever U.S. Armed Forces equipped
for combat are sent into foreign ter-
ritory. The Administration has conclud-
ed that present circumstances do not in-
dicate an imminent involvement of U.S.
personnel in hostilities.
Since January the level of hostilities
has declined. Our personnel will be sta-
tioned in San Salvador or in carefully
56
Department of State Bulletin
TREATIES
current Actions
H'LTILATERAL
itriculture
Invention on the Inter-American Institute
I Cooperation on Agriculture. Done at
Ishington Mar. 6, 1979. Entered into force
C. 8, 1980. TIAS 9919.
Itification deposited: Argentina, May 6,
pi.
lomic Energy
Ireement amending and extending the
t-eement of Sept. 15, 1976 (TIAS 8655), on
liearch participation and technical exchange
Ithe U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Is of fluid test (LOFT) research program.
I.ted Jan. 28, 1981. Entered into force Mar.
I, 1981; effective Oct. 20, 1980.
nation
jnvention on the international recognition
frights in aircraft. Done at Geneva June 19,
148. Entered into force Sept. 17, 1953.
feS2847.
Ilherences deposited: Guinea, Aug. 13,
BO; Togo, July 2, 1980.
otocol relating to certain amendments to
\s convention on International Civil Aviation
[IAS 1591). Done at Montreal June 14,
I 54. Entered into force Dec. 12, 1956. TIAS
[56.
itifications deposited: El Salvador, Feb. 13,
80; Sao Tome and Principe, Sept. 18, 1980.
■otocol relating to amendment of Article
i(a) of the Convention on International Civil
/iation (TIAS 1591) to increase membership
the Council from 21 to 27. Adopted at
ontreal June 21, 1961. Entered into force
ily 17, 1962. TIAS 5170.
atification deposited: Sao Tome and Prin-
pe, Sept. 18, 1980.
rotocol relating to an amendment to the
onvention on International Civil Aviation
'IAS 1591) (to increase number of parties
hich may request holding an extraordinary
leeting of assembly). Done at Rome Sept.
5, 1962. Entered into force Sept. 11, 1975.
IAS 8162.
.atifications deposited: El Salvador, Feb. 13,
980; Guatemala, Apr. 29, 1980; Sao Tome
nd Principe, Sept. 18, 1980.
'rotocol relating to an amendment [Article
0(a)] to the Convention on International
Civil Aviation (TIAS 1591). Done at New
York Mar. 12, 1971. Entered into force Jan.
16, 1973. TIAS 7616.
Ratification deposited: Sao Tome and Prin-
cipe, Sept. 18, 1980.
Protocol relating to an amendment [Article
56] to the Convention on International Civil
Aviation (TIAS 1591). Done at Vienna July 7,
1971. Entered into force Dec. 19, 1974. TIAS
8092.
Ratifications deposited: El Salvador, Feb. 13,
1980; Sao Tome and Principe, Sept. 18, 1980.
Protocol relating to an amendment [Article
50(a)] to the Convention on International
Civil Aviation (TIAS 1591). Done at Montreal
Oct. 16, 1974. Entered into force Feb. 15,
1980. TIAS 9702.
Ratifications deposited: Cape Verde, Apr. 18,
1980; Senegal, Aug. 4, 1980; Panama, Aug.
28, 1980; Sao Tome and Principe, Sept. 18,
1980.
Protocol relating to an amendment to the
Convention on International Civil Aviation
(TIAS 1591) (to add Russian as an authentic
language of the convention). Done at Mon-
treal Sept. 30, 1977.1
Ratifications deposited: Greece, Oct. 23,
1980; Guatemala, May 12, 1980; Lebanon,
Sept. 15, 1980; Switzerland, Mar. 4, 1980;
Yemen, People's Dem. Rep. of, Jan. 9, 1980.
Commodities — Common Fund
Agreement establishing the Common Fund
for Commodities, with schedules. Done at
Geneva June 27, 1980.1
Signatures: Bangladesh, Dec. 23, 1980; Italy,
Dec. 17, 1980; Luxembourg, Dec. 29, 1980;
Malawi, Mar. 17, 1981; Malaysia, Dec. 30,
1980; Mexico, Dec. 19, 1980; Sudan, May 13,
1981; Switzerland, Mar. 30, 1981; U.K., Dec.
16, 19802; Zaire, Mar. 17, 1981.
Ratifications deposited: Denmark, Philip-
pines, May 13, 1981.
Conservation
Convention on the conservation of Antarctic
marine living resources, with annex for an ar-
bitral tribunal. Done at Canberra May 20,
1980.1
Ratification deposited: Australia, May 6,
1981.
Cotton
Articles of agreement of International Cotton
Institute. Done at Washington Jan. 17, 1966.
Entered into force Feb. 23, 1966. TIAS 5964.
Accession deposited: Argentina, May 6, 1981.
elected regional military garrisons, and
pecial precautions will be taken to pro-
ide security for them. They will not go
m patrol or combat missions with
salvadoran forces nor will they other-
vise be placed in situations where com-
lat is likely. Although U.S. personnel
ire authorized to carry sidearms, they
nay use them only in self-defense or to
irotect other Americans. They will not
serve as combat advisers. Instead they
will train Salvadoran personnel who
come to the training centers.
'Taken from the Department of State
publication in the GIST series, released May
1981. This outline is designed to be a quick
reference aid on U.S. foreign relations. It is
not intended as a comprehensive U.S. foreign
policy statement. ■
Human Rights
International covenant on civil and political
rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966.
Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.3
Accession deposited: Central African Re-
public, May 8, 1981.
International covenant on economic, social,
and cultural rights. Adopted at New York
Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3,
1976.3
Accession deposited: Central African Re-
public, May 8, 1981.
Judicial Procedure
Convention on the taking of evidence abroad
in civil or commercial matters. Done at The
Hague Mar. 18, 1970. Entered into force
Oct. 7, 1972. TIAS 7444.
Ratification deposited: Netherlands, Apr. 28,
1981.4
Maritime Matters
Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London
Oct. 17, 1974. Entered into force Apr. 1,
1978. TIAS 8606.
Acceptance deposited: El Salvador, Feb. 12,
1981.
Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London
Nov. 14, 1975.1
Acceptance deposited: St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Apr. 29, 1981.
Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended on the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London
Nov. 17, 1977.'
Acceptance deposited: St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Apr. 29, 1981.
Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended on the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London
Nov. 15, 1979. '
Acceptances deposited: Denmark, May 12,
1981; St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
Apr. 29, 1981; Yugoslavia, May 15, 1981.
Patents — Microorganisms
Amendments to the regulations under the
Budapest treaty on the international recogni-
tion of the deposit of microorganisms for the
purposes of patent procedure. Adopted at
Geneva on Jan. 20, 1981.
Entered into force: Jan. 31, 1981.
Pollution
International convention relating to inter-
vention on the high seas in cases of oil-
pollution casualties, with annex. Done at
luly 1981
57
Treaties
Brussels Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force
May 6, 1975. TIAS 8068.
Ratification deposited: Ireland, Aug. 21,
1980.
Accession deposited: Kuwait, Apr. 2, 1981.
International convention on civil liability for
oil-pollution damage. Done at Brussels
Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force June 19,
1975.3
Accessions deposited: Kuwait, Apr. 2, 1981;
Maldives, Mar. 16, 1981.
International convention on the establishment
of an international fund for compensation for
oil-pollution damage. Done at Brussels
Dec. 18, 1971. Entered into force Oct. 16,
1978.3
Accession deposited: Kuwait, Apr. 2, 1981.
Postal
Constitution of the Universal Postal Union
with Final Protocol of July 10, 1964. Entered
into force Jan. 1, 1966. TIAS 5881.
Accessions: St. Vincent and Grenadines,
Feb. 3, 1981; Tuvalu, Feb. 3, 1981.
Additional protocol to the Constitution of the
Universal Postal Union with Final Protocol of
July 10, 1964. Done at Tokyo Nov. 14, 1969.
Entered into force Jan. 1, 1971. TIAS 7150.
Ratification deposited: Ivory Coast, Jan. 27,
1981.
Accessions: St. Vincent and Grenadines,
Feb. 3, 1981; Tuvalu, Feb. 3, 1981.
Second additional protocol to the Constitution
of the Universal Postal Union of July 10,
1964. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. En-
tered into force Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8231.
Ratifications deposited: Ivory Coast, Jan. 27,
1981; Portugal, Feb. 12, 1981.
Accessions: St. Vincent and Grenadines,
Feb. 3, 19814; Tuvalu, Feb. 3, 1981.4
General regulations of the Universal Postal
Union, with final protocol and annex, and the
universal postal convention with final proto-
col and detailed regulations. Done at Rio de
Janeiro Oct. 26, 1979. Enters into force July
1, 1981.4
Ratifications deposited: Switzerland, Mar. 4,
1981; U.S., May 5, 1981.
Accessions: Maldives, Mar. 12, 1981; St.
Vincent and Grenadines, Feb. 3, 1981. 4
Money orders and postal travellers' checks
agreement with detailed regulations with
final protocol. Done at Rio de Janeiro Oct. 26,
1979. Enters into force July 1, 1981.
Ratifications deposited: Switzerland, Mar. 4,
1981; U.S., May 5, 1981.4
Postal Americas and Spain
Constitution of the Postal Union of the
Americas and Spain. Done at Santiago
Nov. 26, 1971. Entered into force July 1,
1972. TIAS 7480.
Ratification deposited: Bolivia, Dec. 24, 1980.
Additional protocol to the constitution of the
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain,
general regulations, regulations governing
the International Office and the Transfer
Office, and convention with final protocol and
detailed regulations. Done at Lima Mar. 18,
1976. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1976. TIAS
9206.
Ratification deposited: Bolivia, Dec. 24, 1980.
Parcel post agreement, final protocol, and
detailed regulations of the Postal Union of
the Americas and Spain. Done at Lima Mar.
18, 1976. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1976.
TIAS 9206.
Ratification deposited: Bolivia, Dec. 24, 1980.
Property— Industrial-Classification
Nice agreement concerning the international
classification of goods and services for the
purposes of the registration of marks of June
15, 1957, as revised. Done at Geneva May 13,
1977. Entered into force Feb. 6, 1979.3
Ratification deposited: Norway, Apr. 6, 1981.
Red Cross
Geneva convention for the amelioration of the
condition of the wounded and sick in armed
forces in the field. Done at Geneva Aug. 12,
1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for
the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3362.
Geneva convention for the amelioration of the
condition of the wounded, sick, and ship-
wrecked members of armed forces at sea.
Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into
force Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S., Feb. 2,
1956. TIAS 3363.
Geneva convention relative to the treatment
of prisoners of war. Done at Geneva Aug. 12,
1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for
the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3364.
Geneva convention relative to the protection
of civilian persons in time of war. Done at
Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into force
Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956.
TIAS 3365.
Notifications of succession: Tuvalu, Feb. 19,
19816; Grenada. Apr. 13, 1981.6
Notification of accession: St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Apr. 1, 1981.
Refugees
Protocol relating to the status of refugees.
Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered
into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1,
1968. TIAS 6577.
Accession deposited: Lesotho, May 14, 1981.
Safety at Sea
Protocol of 1978 relating to the international
convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974
(TIAS 9700). Done at London Feb. 17, 1978.
Entered into force May 1, 1981.
Proclaimed by the President: May 15, 1981.
Seals
1980 Protocol amending the interim conven-
tion of Feb. 9, 1957, as amended and ex-
tended, on the conservation of North Pacific
fur seals (TIAS 3948, 5558, 6774, 8368).
Done at Washington Oct. 14, 1980.1
Ratification deposited: Japan, May 28, 1981.
Transportation
Agreement on the international carriage of
perishable foodstuffs and on the special equi]
ment to be used for such carriage (ATP),
with annexes. Done at Geneva Sept. 1, 1970.
Entered into force Nov. 21, 1976.3
Accession deposited: Morocco, Mar. 5, 1981.
U.N. Industrial Development Organization
Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Develop-
ment Organization, with annexes. Adopted a
Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. '
Signatures: Ukrainian S.S.R., Dec. 12, 1980;
Dominican Republic, May 8, 1981;
Guatemala, May 13, 1981; Comoros, May 18,
1981.
Ratifications deposited: Brazil, Dec. 10, 1980
Argentina, Mar. 6, 1981; Austria, May 14,
1981; Zambia, May 15, 1981.
Wheat
1981 protocol for the sixth extension of the
wheat trade convention, 1971 (TIAS 7144,
9878). Done at Washington Mar. 24, 1981.
Enters into force July 1, 1981, if by June 30,
1981, certain provisions have been met.
Signatures: Algeria, Guatemala, Peru, South
Africa, Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, U.S.S.R.
May 15, 1981; Argentina, Belgium, Denmark
EEC, France, F.R.G., Greece, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands, U.K.7, May 14, 1981;
Australia, Finland, Japan, Vatican City State
May 12, 1981; Austria, Korea, Rep. of,
Mauritius, May 7, 1981; Cuba, U.S., May 8,
1981; Iraq, May 11, 1981; Kenya, Apr. 16,
1981; Portugal, May 13, 1981; Saudi Arabia,
Apr. 30, 1981; Switzerland, May 6, 1981;
Venezuela, May 5, 1981.
Declarations of provisional application
deposited: Belgium, EEC, F.R.G., Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands8,
U.N., May 14, 1981; Cuba, May 8, 1981;
Finland, May 12, 1981; Spain, May 15, 1981;
Tunisia, Apr. 29, 1981.
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, May 6,
1981.
1981 protocol for the first extension of the
food aid convention, 1980. Done at
Washington Mar. 24, 1981. Enters into force
July 1, 1981, if by June 30, 1981, certain pro
visions have been met.
Signatures: Argentina, Belgium, Denmark,
EEC, France, F.R.G., Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, U.K.7, May 14,
1981; Australia, Finland, Japan, May 12,
1981; Austria, May 7, 1981; Spain, May 15,
1981; Switzerland", May 6, 1981; U.S., May
8, 1981.
Declarations of provisional application
deposited: Belgium, EEC, F.R.G., Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands8,
U.K., May 14, 1981; Finland, May 12, 1981;
Spain4, May 15, 1981.
Ratification deposited: Switzerland4,
May 6, 1981.
58
Department of State Bulletin
Treaties
imen
wention on the elimination of all forms of
crimination against women. Adopted at
w York Dec. 18, 1979.1
;nature: Uruguay, Mar. 30, 1981.
LATERAL
nada
;aty on Pacific coast albacore tuna vessels
1 port privileges, with annexes. Signed at
ishington May 26, 1981. Enters into force
an the exchange of instruments of ratifica-
n.
ministrative arrangement for the im-
mentation of the agreement on social
'urity concluded on Mar. 11, 1981. Signed
Washington May 22, 1981. Enters into
•ce on the date of entry into force of the
reement on social security.
•morandum of understanding on coopera-
>n in geological sciences. Signed at Reston
)r. 2, 1981. Entered into force Apr. 2,
81.
■eaty to submit to binding dispute settle-
nt the delimitation of the maritime bound-
y in the Gulf of Maine area with annexed
Teements. Signed at Washington Mar. 29,
79.
nate advice and consent to ratification:
3r. 29, 1981 with amendments.
emorandum of understanding on coopera-
Iin in remote sensing. Signed at Reston
3r. 2, 1981. Entered into force Apr. 2,
81.
ink Islands
greement relating to the establishment of a
lace Corps program in the Cook Islands,
ffected by exchange of notes at Wellington
id Rarotonga Apr. 28, 1981. Entered into
rce Apr. 28, 1981.
gypt
greement amending the agreement for sales
'agricultural commodities of Dec. 14, 1980.
ffected by exchange of notes at Cairo Apr.
I, 1981. Entered into force Apr. 21, 1981.
nana
greement for sales of agricultural com-
odities, relating to the agreement of Apr.
1, 1980 (TIAS 9738), with agreed minutes,
gned at Accra Mar. 31, 1981. Entered into
rce Mar. 31, 1981.
idia
greement amending the agreement of
ec. 30, 1977, as amended (TIAS 9036, 9232,
i78, 9663, 9764, 9913), relating to trade in
itton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and
xtile products. Effected by exchange of let-
rs at Washington Apr. 22 and 23, 1981.
ntered into force Apr. 23, 1981.
orea
greement establishing the Korean-American
iltural Exchange Committee. Effected by
exchange of notes at Seoul Apr. 17, 1981.
Entered into force Apr. 17, 1981.
Lebanon
Investment incentive agreement. Effected by
exchange of notes at Beirut Sept. 17, 1980
and Feb. 10, 1981.
Entered into force: Apr. 30, 1981.
Mexico
Agreement relating to additional cooperative
arrangement to curb the illegal traffic in nar-
cotics. Effected by exchange of letters at
Mexico Apr. 8, 1981. Entered into force Apr.
8, 1981.
Agreement amending the agreement of July
25, 1980 (TIAS 9822) relating to additional
cooperative arrangements to curb the illegal
traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of
letters at Mexico Mar. 31, 1981. Entered into
force Mar. 31, 1981.
Memorandum of understanding covering
scientific cooperation in earth resources.
Signed at Washington Jan. 19, 1981. Entered
into force Apr. 8, 1981.
Papua New Guinea
Search and rescue memorandum of
understanding. Signed at Honolulu and Port
Moresby Nov. 8, 1980 and Feb. 26, 1981.
Entered into force Feb. 26, 1981.
Portugal
Agreement amending the agreement for sales
of agricultural commodities of June 24, 1980.
Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon Mar.
27 and Apr. 8, 1981. Entered into force Apr.
8, 1981.
Romania
Program of cooperation and exchanges in
educational, cultural, scientific, technological,
and other fields for the years 1981 and 1982,
with annex. Signed at Bucharest May 21,
1981. Entered into force May 21, 1981; effec-
tive Jan. 1, 1981.
Sierra Leone
Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of Aug.
31, 1978 (TIAS 9210), with memorandum of
negotiations. Signed at Freetown Mar. 25,
1981. Entered into force Mar. 25, 1981.
Sri Lanka
Agreement amending the agreement of July
7, 1980 (TIAS 9869), relating to trade in cot-
ton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and
textile products. Effected by exchange of
notes at Colombo Mar. 16, 1981. Entered in-
to force Mar. 16, 1981.
Sweden
Supplementary convention on extradition.
Signed at Washington May 27, 1981. Enters
into force upon the exchange of ratifications.
Tanzania
Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of June
15, 1976 (TIAS 8310), with minutes of
negotiating meeting. Signed at Dar es
Salaam May 5, 1981. Entered into force May
5, 1981.
Venezuela
Agreement continuing in effect safeguards
and guarantee provisions of the agreement of
Oct. 8, 1958, as amended (TIAS 4416, 6945),
for cooperation concerning civil uses of
atomic energy. Effected by exchange of notes
at Caracas Feb. 18, 1981. Entered into force
Feb. 18, 1981.
Memorandum of understanding on coopera-
tion in earth resources and geological
phenomena. Signed at Washington and
Caracas Feb. 5 and 7, 1980. Enters into force
upon signature by both parties or upon entry
into force of Jan. 11, 1980 agreement for
scientific and technological cooperation,
whichever date is later.
Yugoslavia
Agreement amending and extending the
memorandum of understanding relating to
the air transport agreement of Dec. 15, 1977
(TIAS 9364). Effected by exchange of notes
at Belgrade Mar. 13 and 26, 1981. Entered
into force Mar. 26, 1981; effective Apr. 1
1981.
Zaire
Implementation agreement regarding the
consolidation and rescheduling of repayments
due under Agency for International Develop-
ment loans. Signed at Kinshasa Apr. 8, 1981.
Entered into force Apr. 8, 1981.
'Not in force.
2With statement.
3Not in force for the U.S.
4With reservation(s).
5Effective from date of independence,
Oct. 1, 1978.
6Effective from date of independence,
Feb. 7, 1974.
'With territorial application to: The
Bailiwick of Guernsey, the Isle of Man,
Belize, Bermuda, Bn'tish Virgin Islands,
Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Montserrat, St.
Helena and dependencies.
"With respect to the Kingdom in
Europe. ■
uly 1981
59
CHRONOLOGY
May 1981
PRESS RELEASES
May 1
Secretary Haig visits Rome May 1-6 to
attend North Atlantic Council ministerial
meeting. He also stops in Brussels on May 5.
May 2
President Reagan announces the appoint-
ment of George H. Aldrich to serve on the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, pursuant to the
Jan. 19, 1981, claims settlement agreement.
May 4
Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki
makes official visit to the U.S. May 4-9, and
to Washington, D.C., May 7-8.
North Atlantic Council ministerial
meeting is held in Rome May 4-5. A joint
communique is issued May 5 expressing deep
concern "at the continuing threats to security
and international stability" and welcoming
"the intention of the United States to begin
negotiations with the Soviet Union on theater
nuclear forces arms control within the SALT
framework by the end of the year." The coun-
cil also issues a declaration on terrorism, May
4, and extracts from minutes of the meeting,
May 5.
May 5
President Reagan appoints Philip C.
Habib as special emissary to the Middle East.
Ambassador Habib will meet with leaders of
Lebanon, Syria, and Israel to explore ways to
diffuse tension resulting from recent
developments surrounding the situation in
Lebanon.
May 6
U.S. orders Libya to close its People's
Bureau in Washington, D.C. and expels its
diplomats, because of that nation's support
for international terrorism and disregard for
the norms of international behavior. A new
travel advisory is also issued warning
"American citizens against any travel to or
residence in Libya."
May 10
Francois Mitterrand, the Socialist Party
leader, defeats President Valery discard
d'Estaing in France's presidential elections.
May 12
NATO Defense Planning Committee
meets in Brussels May 12-13. The committee
issues a final communique reaffirming the
NATO Council's "concern at the continuing
threats to security and international stability"
and which also expresses the determination
to counter the threat "by effective restraints
including firmness on defence and persistence
in the search for peaceful solutions."
May 13
South African Foreign Minister F. Roelof
Botha visits Washington, D.C. May 13-16
and meets with President Reagan, Secretary
Haig, and other White House officials to
discuss progress on negotiations for establish-
ment of an independent nation of Namibia.
Pope John Paul II is seriously wounded in
an attempted assassination. The alleged
assassin, Mahmet Ali Agca, a Turkish citizen,
is arrested.
May 16
Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito
resigns. Sunao Sonoda is appointed his suc-
cessor.
May 20
West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
makes official visit to Washington, D.C. May
20-23.
May 21
World Health Organization (WHO) for-
mally approves 118 to 1 (U.S.) an interna-
tional code of marketing of breastmilk
substitutes. The code seeks to promote
breastfeeding by recommending limitations
on methods of marketing infant formulas.
Japan, South Korea, and Argentina abstain.
May 25
The 60th OPEC conference meeting is
held in Geneva May 25-26. A communique is
issued announcing that 12 OPEC member na-
tions (except Saudi Arabia) will freeze oil
prices at current levels and cut production by
at least 10%.
May 28
Stephen Cardinal Wyszynski, Roman
Catholic Primate of Poland, dies.
May 30
Bangladesh President Ziaur Rahman is
assassinated during an attempted coup. ■
Department of State
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
No. Date Subject
*131 5/1 Program for the official
visit of Japanese Prime
Minister Suzuki, May 4-9.
"132 5/1 Haig: statement before the
Senate Subcommittee on
Appropriations.
*133 5/5 Shipping Coordinating Com-
mittee (SCC), Subcommit-
tee on Safety of Life at
Sea (SOLAS), working
group on lifesaving ap-
pliances, May 21.
"134 5/5 Advisory Committee on
Oceans and International
Environmental and Scien-
tific Affairs, May 20.
*135 5/5 SCC, SOLAS, working group
on the carriage of
dangerous goods, June 4.
*136 5/6 Haig: remarks following
meetings with Italian
Prime Minister Forlani and
Foreign Minister Colombo,
May 2.
137 5/8 Final communique— North
Atlantic Council, May 5.
"138 5/7 U.S., Panama Joint Com-
mission on the Environ-
ment, Washington, D.C,
May 4-6.
139 5/8 Digest of U.S. Practice in
International Law, 1978.
140 5/6 Haig: news conference,
Rome, May 5.
*141 5/8 Haig: statement to members
of Japanese press corp.
142 5/11 Haig: address at Syracuse
University, N.Y.
*143 5/11 Secretary's Advisory Com-
mittee on Private Interna-
tional Law.
*144 5/12 William P. Clark sworn in as
Deputy Secretary of State
(biographic data), Mar. 25.
145 5/13 U.S. contributions to interna-
tional Khmer relief.
*146 5/14 U.S. Organization for the In-
ternational Telegraph and
Telephone Consultative Com-
mittee (CCITT). working
party on Integrated Services
Digital Network (ISDN),
June 3.
*147 5/14 Advisory Committee on Law
of the Sea, June 8-9 (par-
tially closed).
148 5/18 Haig: address at Hillsdale
College, Michigan, May 16.
*149 5/18 Overseas Schools Advisory
Council, June 18.
*150 5/19 Program for the official
visit of German Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt, May
20-23.
60
Department of State Bulletin
Press Releases
5/19
5/21
5/22
5/22
5/26
5/26
John Gavin sworn in as
Ambassasor to Mexico
(biographic data), May 13.
Foreign Policy Conference
for U.S. editors and broad-
casters, Washington, D.C.,
June 1-2.
Oceans and International En-
vironmental and Scientific
Affairs Advisory Com-
mitee, June 15 (partially
closed).
Haig: news conference.
Haig: commencement ad-
dress at Fairfield Univer-
sity, Connecticut, May 24.
SCC, SOLAS, working group
on international multimodal
transport and containers,
June 10.
SCC, SOLAS, working group
on the carriage of danger-
ous goods, June 23.
John A. Burroughs, Jr.,
sworn in as Ambassador to
Malawi (biographic data).
U.S., Canada agreement on
albacore tuna vessels.
Advisory Committee on In-
ternational Investment,
Technology, and Develop-
ment, working group on in-
ternational data flow, June
17.
Advisory Committee on In-
ternational Investment,
Technology, and Develop-
ment, June 30.
U.S., Sweden sign supple-
mentary extradition con-
vention.
John H. Holdridge sworn in
as Assistant Secretary for
East Asian and Pacific
Affairs (biographic data).
Haig: remarks at the award
ceremony, Airline Hijack-
ing Task Force par-
ticipants, May 27.
Arthur H. Woodruff sworn in
as Ambassador to the Cen-
tral African Republic
(biographic data).
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick sworn
in as U.S. Permanent
Representative to the U.N.
(biographic data), Feb. 4.
Richard T. Kennedy sworn in
as Under Secretary for
Management (biographic
data), Feb. 28.
U.S., Thailand amend
bilateral textile agreement,
Mar. 30 and Apr. 27.
U.S., Colombia amend
bilateral textile agreement,
Feb. 18 and Mar. 12.
170 5/29 Deane R. Hinton sworn in as
Ambassador to El Salvador
(biographic data), May 21.
■171 5/29 John J. Louis, Jr., sworn in
as Ambassador to the
United Kingdom, May 8
(biographic data).
•172 5/29 Robert Dean Nesen sworn in
as Ambassador to
Australia and Nauru
(biographic data).
•Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■
U.S.U.N.
Press releases may be obtained from the
Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the
United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza,
New York, N.Y. 10017.
No.
»1
Date Subject
1/5 McHenry to lead U.S. dele-
gation to Geneva con-
ference on Namibia.
*2 1/15 Schwebel elected U.S.
judge to the International
Court of Justice (bio. data).
*3 1/15 Vanden Heuvel to present
Freedom Medal to Roger
N. Baldwin, founder of the
American Civil Liberties
Union.
♦4 1/20 McHenry completes his
tenure as U.S. Permanent
Representative to the U.N.
*5 2/10 Kirkpatrick: founding meet-
ing of the committee for
the Free World.
*6 3/2 Kirkpatrick: credentials of
the South African
representatives.
*7 3/6 Lowman: relief to Kam-
puchea, relief donors'
meeting.
*8 3/6 Kirkpatrick: Namibia,
UNGA.
*9 3/11 U.S. delegation to the 10th
session of the Third U.N.
Law of the Sea Con-
ference, New York, Mar.
9-Apr. 24.
3/17 Malone: LOS conference.
3/26 Rosenstock: non-use of
force, Special Committee.
*10
•11
•12 4/1 White House statement on
travel plans to Africa of
Assistant Secretary of
State-designate for African
Affairs Chester A. Croker.
•13 4/2 White House statement that
Ambassador Kirkpatrick
will represent the U.S. at
the International Con-
ference on Assistance to
Refugees in Africa
(Geneva) instead of Vice
President Bush.
•14 4/3 Stromayer: preparatory
work for the U.N. Con-
ference on New and
Renewable Sources of
Energy.
•15 4/7 Strasser: Guam, Special
Committee on Decoloniza-
tion.
16 4/10 U.S. perspective on the 35th
U.N. General Assembly.
•17 4/9 Kirkpatrick: FY 1982 budget
request, U.S. Senate Com-
mittee on Appropriations.
18 4/9 Kirkpatrick: refugees in
Africa, International Con-
ference on Assistance to
Refugees in Africa
(Geneva).
19 4/14 Western five statement on
Namibia.
*20 4/16 Cerny: social development,
Commission for Social
Development.
•21 4/16 Clark: narcotics, Committee
II.
•22 4/21 Sorzano: Decade for Action
to Combat Racism and
Racial Discrimination,
ECOSOC.
•23 4/21 Reynolds: women, ECOSOC.
•24 4/21 Kirkpatrick: Namibia, Se-
curity Council.
•25 4/23 Kirkpatrick: Namibia, Se-
curity Council.
*26 4/27 Clark: disaster relief assist-
ance, ECOSOC.
•27 4/28 Cardwell: credentials for a
minority rights group,
ECOSOC.
28 4/30 Kirkpatrick: Namibia, Se-
curity Council.
•29 5/1 Novak: human rights,
ECOSOC.
•30 5/1 Kirkpatrick: birthday of
Andrei Sakharov, New
School for Social Research,
New York, May 2.
•Not printed in the Bulletin ■
61
i ill/ 1QH1
PUBLICATIONS
International Law
Digest, 1978
The Digest of United States Practice in
International Law, 1978, published by
the Office of the Legal Adviser of the
Department of State, was released on
May 8, 1981.
The size of the 1,802-page volume,
sixth in the series of annual Digests,
reflects, first, the special circumstance
that several U.S. foreign policy ini-
tiatives in train for a number of years
came to fruition in 1978, and second, the
substantial increase during the period
1977-78 of litigation that challenged the
conduct of foreign affairs.
Two matters brought to conclusion
came before both Congress and the
courts: ratification of the Panama Canal
Treaty and establishment of diplomatic
relations with the People's Republic of
China, combined with notice of termina-
tion of the defense treaty with Taiwan.
Other less politically controversial
aspects of foreign policy were litigated
as well (e.g., extradition, prisoner
transfer, implementation of fisheries
conventions, the making of aviation
agreements, and U.S. actions to seize
narcotics cargoes and to participate in
other nations' efforts to eradicate nar-
cotics production).
The 1978 volume discusses a number
of domestic legislative provisions with
major impact upon U.S. practice in in-
ternational and transnational law and
U.S. treaty activity, both multilateral
and bilateral. More published source
material has been reproduced than in
former years. Nonjudicial and
nonlegislative material includes a variety
of official correspondence and
statements. The volume also indicates
the role of mediation in U.S. diplomacy.
Publication of annual Digests concen-
trating completely upon U.S. practice in
international law began with the volume
for the year 1973. Over the previous
century, beginning with Cadwalader's
one-volume Digest (1877), the Depart-
ment of State issued at intervals com-
prehensive, encyclopedic-type surveys of
the entire field of international law that,
nevertheless, emphasized U.S. practice.
The distinguished Digests by Marjorie
M. Whiteman (15 v., 1963-73), Green
Haywood Hackworth (8 v., 1940-44),
John Bassett Moore (8 v., 1906), and
Francis Wharton (3 v., 1887) are con-
sidered authoritative for their respective
periods of coverage and are heavily
relied upon by practitioners, scholars,
government officials, and jurists
throughout the world.
The Office of the Legal Adviser has
existed in its current form since July 1 ,
1931. Prior thereto the Department's
legal officer had been designated as its
Solicitor under an act of March 3, 1891,
and as its Examiner of Claims under an
act of July 25, 1866. The Department
has had a legal officer as a distinct,
statutorily established entity since 1848.
The Legal Adviser of the Depart-
ment of State during the year 1978 was
Herbert J. Hansell. The Acting Legal
Adviser at the present time is Mark B.
Feldman. The Editor of the Digest of
United States Practice in International
Law, 1978, is Marian Lloyd Nash (Mrs.
Harold Herbert Leich) of the Office of
the Legal Adviser.
Orders for the 1978 Digest and/or
earlier annual Digests should be sent
to the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402, and should be
accompanied by check or money order,
made payable to the Superintendent of
Documents. Remittances from foreign
countries may be made by international
postal money order, by draft on an
American or Canadian bank, or by
UNESCO coupons; an additional 25%
handling charge is required for orders to
foreign countries.
Ordering data is as follows:
• 1978: Digest
International Law,
044-000-01762-8)
• 1977: Digest
International Law
004-000-01720-2)
• 1976: Digest
International Law,
004-000-01645-1
• 1975: Digest
International Law,
044-000-01605-2)
• 1974: Digest
International Law,
044-000-01566-8)
(796 pp.).
• 1973: Digest
International Law,
044-000-01525-1)
of U.S. Practice in
$19.00 (Stock No.
(1,802 pp.).
of U.S. Practice in
, $12.75 (Stock No.
(1,158 pp.).
of U.S. Practice in
$9.50 (Stock No.
(850 pp.).
of U.S. Practice in
$11.00 (Stock No.
(947 pp.).
of U.S. Practice in
$11.00 (Stock No.
(2d printing)
of U.S. Practice in
$7.50 (Stock No.
(618 pp.).
Press release 139 of May 8, 1981.1
Department of State
Free, single copies of the following Depart-
ment of State publications are available frot
the Public Information Service, Bureau of
Public Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.
Secretary Haig
Peaceful Progress in Developing Nations, aci
dress at Fairfield University, Fairfield,
Conn., on May 24, 1981 (Current Policy
#280).
Foreign Policy and the American Spirit,
address at Hillsdale College, Hillsdale,
Mich., on May 16, 1981 (Current Policy
#277).
NATO and Restoring U.S. Leadership,
address at Syracuse University, Syracuse,
N.Y., on May 9, 1981 (Current Policy
#276).
East Asia
Background Notes on Indonesia (May 1981).
Economics
International Economic Policy Priorities,
Assistant Secretary Hormats before the Ii
ternational Insurance Advisory Council,
New York on May 19, 1981 (Current Polic
#278).
Economic Growth of OECD Countries,
1970-80, INR report of Mar. 9, 1981
(Special Report #82). U.S. Trade Policy
(GIST, May 1981).
Refugees
Indochinese Refugees (GIST, May 1981).
Security Assistance
Arms Transfers and the National Interest,
Under Secretary Buckley before the
Aerospace Industries Association in
Williamsburg, Va., on May 21, 1981 (Cur-
rent Policy #279).
South Asia
Background Notes on Maldives (Apr. 1981).
Western Hemisphere
U.S. Assistance to El Salvador (GIST, May
1981).
Background Notes on Mexico (Apr. 1981). I
62
Department of State Bulletir
NDEX
luly 1981
lo\. 81, No. 2052
ifghanistan. Secretary Participates in
St. Louis Town Hall Forum 13
frica. Secretary Participates in St. Louis
Town Hall Forum 13
merican Principles. Peaceful Progress in
Developing Nations (Haig) 8
rms Control
forth Atlantic Council Meets in Rome (Haig,
final communique, minutes extract,
declaration on terrorism 37
ecretary Haig's News Conference of
May 22 9
ecretary Participates in Foreign Policy
Conference 18
ecretary Participates in St. Louis Town Hall
Forum 13
hina. Secretary Participates in St. Louis
Town Hall Forum 13
ongress
'irst and Second Reports on Cyprus (message
to the Congress) 43
ifant Formula Code (Abrams, McPherson) 54
-iternational Investment Issues (McCarthy) 30
.708: A Viable Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(Johnston) 29
trategic Petroleum Reserve (Hormats) . . .32
3d Report on Cyprus (message to the Con-
ress) ' 40
I.S. Competition in International Coal Trade
(Ferriter) 34
he United States and Mexico (Briggs) 4
i.S. Policv and the Law of the Sea (Malone) 48
I.S. Subscription to the World Bank (John-
ston) 28
vprus
irst and Second Reports on Cyprus (message
to the Congress) 43
3d Report on Cyprus (message to the Con-
gress) 40
lepartment of State. Secretary Participates
in Foreign Policy Conference 18
leveloping Countries
'eaceful Progress in Developing Nations
(Haig) 8
■Vest German Chancellor Visits United States
(joint statement) 44
leonomics
vtlas of United States Foreign Relations:
Economics— Part 1 A
nternational Economic Policy Priorities
(Hormats) 24
nternational Investment Issues (McCarthy) 30
i.708: A Viable Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(Johnston) 29
Strategic Petroleum Reserve (Hormats) . . .32
J.S. Subscription to the World Bank (John-
ston) 28
i\ Salvador
Secretary Haig's News Conference of
May 22 9
Secretary Participates in Foreign Policy Con-
ference 18
J.S. Assistance to El Salvador (foreign rela-
tions outline) 56
Energy
nternational Economic Policy Priorities
(Hormats) 24
Strategic Petroleum Reserve (Hormats) . . .32
U.S. Competition in International Coal Trade
(Ferriter) 34
The United States and Mexico (Rriggs) 4
West German Chancellor Visits United States
(joint statement) 44
Europe
Secretary Haig's News Conference ot
May 22 ......9
Secretary Participates in Foreign Policy Con-
ference 18
West German Chancellor Visits United States
(joint statement) 44
Food. Secretary Participates in St. Louis
Town Hall Forum 13
Foreign Aid. U.S. Assistance to El Salvador
(foreign relations outline) 56
France. Secretary Participates in St. Louis
Town Hall Forum 13
Germany
Secretary Haig's News Conference of
May 22 9
West German Chancellor Visits United States
(joint statement) 44
Greece. North Atlantic Council Meets in Rome
(Haig. final communique, minutes extract,
declaration on terrorism) 37
Health. Infant Formula Code (Abrams,
McPherson) 54
Jamaica. Secretary Participates in St. Louis
Town Hall Forum 13
Japan. Secretary Haig's News Conference of
May 22 . . . .' 9
Immigration. The United States and Mexico
(Briggs) 4
Kampuchea. Khmer Relief Efforts 23
Latin America and the Caribbean. Secretary
Haig's News Conference of May 22 9
Law of the Sea. U.S. Policy and the Law of
the Sea (Malone) 48
Lebanon. Secretary Haig's News Conference
of May 22 ....'. 9
Libya. Secretary Participates in St. Louis
Town Hall Forum 13
U.S. Asks Libyans to Close People's Bureau;
Travel Advisory Issued (Department state-
ment) ' 45
Mexico
Mexico— A Profile 5
The United States and Mexico (Briggs) 4
Visit of Mexican President Lopez Portillo
(Lopez Portillo, Reagan) 1
Middle East
Secretary Participates in Foreign Policy Con-
ference 18
Secretary Participates in St. Louis Town Hall
Forum 13
Military Affairs
Arms Transfer and the National Interest
(Buckley) 51
NATO Defense Planning Committee Meets in
Brussels (final communique) 38
Requirements of Our Defense Policy (Wein-
berger) 46
Monetary Affairs. U.S. Subscription to the
World Bank (Johnston) 28
Namibia. Secretary Participates in Foreign
Policy Conference 18
Narcotics. The United States and Mexico
(Briggs) 4
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO Defense Planning Committee Meets in
Brussels (final communique) 38
North Atlantic Council Meets in Rome (Haig,
final communique, minutes extract,
declaration on terrorism) 37
Requirements of Our Defense Policy (Wein-
berger) 46
Secretary Participates in Foreign Policy Con-
ference 18
West German Chancellor Visits United States
(joint statement) 44
Oceans. U.S. Policy and the Law of the Sea
(Malone) 48
Petroleum. Strategic Petroleum Reserve
(Hormats) 32
Poland. Secretary Participates in St. Louis
Town Hall Forum 13
Presidential Documents
First and Second Reports on Cyprus (message
to the Congress) 43
23d Report on Cyprus (message to the Con-
gress) 40
Visit of Mexican President Lopez Portillo
(Lopez Portillo, Reagan) 1
Publications
Department of State 62
International Law Digest, 1978 62
Refugees. Khmer Relief Efforts 23
Security Assistance
Arms Transfer and the National Interest
(Buckley) 51
Requirements of Our Defense Policy (Wein-
berger) 46
U.S. Assistance to El Salvador (foreign rela-
tions outline) 56
Spain. North Atlantic Council Meets in Rome
(Haig, final communique, minutes extract,
declaration on terrorism) 37
Terrorism
North Atlantic Council Meets in Rome (Haig,
final communique, minutes extract,
declaration on terrorism) 37
Secretary Participates in Foreign Policy Con-
ference 18
Trade
International Economic Policy Priorities (Hor-
mats) 24
The United States and Mexico (Briggs) 4
Treaties. Current Actions 57
U.S.S.R.
Arms Transfer and the National Interest
(Buckley) 51
North Atlantic Council Meets in Rome (Haig,
final communique, minutes extract,
declaration on terrorism) .37
Peaceful Progress in Developing Nations
(Haig) 8
Requirements of Our Defense Policy (Wein-
berger) 46
Secretary Participates in Foreign Policy Con-
ference 18
Secretary Participates in St. Louis Town Hall
Forum 13
West German Chancellor Visits United States
(.joint statement) 44
United Kingdom. Secretary Participates in
Foreign Policy Conference 18
United Nations
Infant Formula Code (Abrams, McPherson) 54
U.S. Policy and the Law of the Sea (Malone) 48
Name Index
Abrams, Elliot 54
Briggs. Everett E 4
Buckley, James L 51
Carter, President 40
Ferriter, John P 34
Haig, Secretary 8, 9, 13, 18, 37
Hormats, Robert D 24, 32
Johnston, Ernest B 28, 29
Lopez Portillo y Pacheco, Jose 1
Malone, James L 48
McCarthy. John T 30
McPherson. M. Peter 54
Reagan, President 1,43
Weinberger, Caspar W 46
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
Postage and Fees Paid
Department of State
STA-501
Second Class
U.S.MAIL
Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted service, please renew your subscription promptly when you
receive the expiration notice from the Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time required to process
renewals, notices are sent out three months in advance of the expiration date. Any problems involving your
subscription will receive immediate attention if you write to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. See inside front cover for subscription rates and mailing address.
Hvpttvtmvss t
\3
£0£3
If of State If If J •
bulletin
\'e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 81 / Number 2053
August 1981
Department of State
bulletin
Volume 81 / Number 2053 / August 1981
The Department of State Bulletin ,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and
government agencies with information
on developments in U.S. foreign
relations and the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service.
The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials;
special features and articles on
international affairs; selected press
releases issued by the White House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission
to the United Nations; and treaties and
other agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party.
ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
Secretary of State
DEAN FISCHER
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
PAUL E. AUERSWALD
Director,
Office of Public Communication
MARTIN JUDGE
Chief, Editorial Division
PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor
JUANITA ADAMS
Assistant Editor
The Secretary of State has determined that
the publication of this periodical is
necessary in the transaction of the public
business required by law of this
Department. Use of funds for printing this
periodical has been approved by the
Director of the Office of Management and
Budget through January 31, 1986.
NOTE: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the
Department of State Bulletin as the
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is
indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical
Literature.
For sale by the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
Price: 12 issues plus annual index —
$19.00 (domestic) $23.75 (foreignl
Single copy— $3.25 (domesticl $4.10 (foreign)
Index, single copy— $2.25 (domestic) $2.85 (for.
CONTENTS
FEATURE
1 President Reagan Attends Economic Summit in Canada (Press Briefings,
Statements by Participants, Declaration, Statements Released to the Press)
' e President
Z News Conference of June 16
(Excerpts)
ie Vice President
Visit to Paris and London (Toast,
News Conferences)
Visit to the Philippines (Arrival
Statement, Toast, Statement to
the Press)
ie Secretary
Arms Control for the 1980s: An
American Policy
Visit to China: Attends ASEAN
and ANZUS Meetings
(Secretary Haig, Joint News
Conferences, ANZUS Communi-
que)
New Initiatives on Afghanistan
and Kampuchea
Interview on "Face the Nation"
Irica
U.S. Policy on Namibia
(Chester A. Crocker)
< U.S. Response to OAU Criticism
(Department Statement)
Strengthening U.S. -African Rela-
tions (Chester A. Crocker)
i Western Sahara (Department
Statement)
"ms Control
I America's Blueprint for Control-
ling Nuclear Weapons
(Eugene V. Rostow)
Europe
65
71
73
77
U.S. Policy Toward Western
Europe and Canada
(Lawrence S. Eagleburger)
France (Department Statement)
U.S. Policy Toward the U.S.S.R.,
Eastern Europe, and Yugoslavia
(Lawrence S. Eagleburger)
East Berlin Volkskammer Elec-
tions (Allied Public Statement)
Human Rights
78 U.S. Contributions to the ICRC
Middle East
79 Israel's Raid on Iraq's Nuclear
Facility (Secretary's Letter to
Congress, Department State-
ment, Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.)
80 Situation in the Middle East
(President Reagan, Statement by
White House Deputy Press
Secretary)
81 U.S. Defers Shipment of F-16s to
Israel (Secretary Haig)
82 Multinational Force in the Sinai
(Department Statement)
South Asia
83 U.S. Assistance to Pakistan (Joint
Statement)
United Nations
84
86
Security Council Meets to Con-
sider Israeli Raid (Jeane J.
Kirkpatrick, Text of Resolution)
International Conference on Kam-
puchea (Secretary Haig,
Declaration, Resolution)
Chronology
90 June 1981
Press Releases
92 Department of State
Publications
92 Department of State
93 GPO Sales
Index
Treaties
88 Current Actions
President Reagan
Attends Economic Summit
in Canada
Feature
President Reagan attended the seventh economic summit of the industrialized na-
tions July 19-21, 1981, at the Chateau Montebello (62 miles east of Ottawa) and in Ot-
tawa The other participants were Canadian Prime Minister Pierre-Elliott Trudeau,
chairman of the summit; French President Francois Mitterrand; West German
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt; Italian Prime Minister Giovanni Spadohni; Japanese
Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki; British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher; and
European Communities Commission President Gaston Thorn.
Following are the texts of press briefings held by Secretary Haig and Treasury
Secretary Donald T. Regan; the declaration issued at the conclusion of the summit;
the concluding statements of the eight participants; and statements released to the
press on a summary of political issues and terrorism.
Secretary Haig's
Press Briefing
Washington
July 19, 19811
As you know, this is the seventh of our
major industrial power economic sum-
mits. This one at Montebello, Canada;
it's outside of Ottawa proper.
The first one of these was held at
Rambouillet [France] in 1975, and it was
really conceived to deal with the conse-
quences of the 1973 war and the oil
crisis and its impact on the Western in-
dustrialized nations. Ottawa thus com-
pletes the first cycle of the meetings
hosted by each of the principles. It is,
like its predecessors, essentially an
economic summit. But there will be op-
portunities, as there always are on such
occasions, for political discussions. And
on this occasion, I'm sure it will be no
exception.
The purposes of the summit are to
enable the heads of government to get
to know each other personally, to ex-
change views on major problems and
prospects in a relaxed, informal at-
mosphere and setting, and to seek
agreement on what we refer to as
"cooperative approaches;" the major
focus, of course, will be economics.
There are broad topics under that
heading: macroeconomic policy involving
all Western industrialized nations in
which there are common prob-
lems—economic growth, levels of
employment, and the common struggle
against inflation. There will also be
discussions on the North-South dialogue,
if you will, on relations between
developed and developing nations. There
will be discussions on energy, trade, and
East-West economic relations.
These summit meetings express a
basic and inescapable reality— that the
participating nations, with the most ad-
vanced economics in the world, are in-
creasingly interrelated. We used that
term some years ago. It's a manifesta-
tion of the emerging interdependence
among developed states and the coor-
dination of policies which recognize that
imperatives have become increasingly
important.
Developments in policies in one area
affect policies and developments in
another. This requires close and con-
tinuous consultation not only to consider
their own interests, that is, the world
system at large. It has never been more
true in the history of mankind that we
either hang together or hang separately.
Our enormous power has to be matched
by equivalent responsibility.
These summits are primarily ad-
dressed to economic subjects of common
interest, and this is the way it should be.
But economics and politics are closely in-
tertwined. Our economic policies in-
evitably have important political implica-
tions, both domestically and abroad. And
that will clearly surface during this sum-
mit.
Each of the participating nations
faces, in various degrees, difficult
economic problems today. It's a common
situation that we're all faced with,
characterized by rising inflation, high
levels of unemployment, slow economic
growth, excessive dependence on im-
ports of oil, and other increasingly
scarce raw materials as well.
The President came into office com-
mitted to trying to put the U.S.
economy on the path of sustained,
noninflationary growth. He proposed a
major recovery program to the
American people, and it's been very well
received. That reflects the disappoint-
ment and frustration with past policies
that failed to address fundamental and
economic problems. I believe that
Americans are committed to the solution
of the fundamental problems and are
willing to accept short-term costs that
are entailed with improvement.
Achieving once again a dynamic
American economy is the best way we
can go right now for the world economy.
In other words, it clearly has overlap-
ping impact on the economies of the
developed states in Western Europe and
in Japan, and U.S. difficulties translate
very rapidly into those economies.
Our policies, in regard to our own
recovery program, were not adopted out
of this regard for the impact on other
countries. On the contrary; we have
been, and remain and will be in the
future, sensitive and aware of the effect
that our economic policies here in the
United States have on those economic
situations within our partner countries.
Strong economies in all summit coun-
tries are essential to address common in-
ternational tasks with confidence and
support here at home. This is true if we
are to achieve our goals in trade,
energy, and, perhaps most importantly,
in our relationships with the developing
countries of the world.
Relationships between the developed
and developing countries are, and have
been from January on, a key aspect of
President Reagan's foreign policy. It's
one on which our perspective has not yet
been fully spelled out but will be in the
period ahead. The summit is a very good
opportunity for us to do that with our
Western industrialized partners. The
Cancun summit in October will be
another. And I think you know it's
somewhat unusual for an American
President to join such a meeting as that
which will take place in Mexico in Oc-
tober. Our approach will be both con-
structive and positive. And I only
highlight for you, as specific examples,
this Administration's approach to the
developing world — a pilot case of the
development of Jamaica, which has been
underway since the visit of Prime
Minister Seaga; the efforts which we
concluded last week in Nassau to join in
a social economic development program
for the Caribbean basin — the islands of
the Caribbean and of Central America;
the fact that the United States is one of
the leading contributors to the economic
development of Zimbabwe; the fact that
the United States was the highest donor
at the black African refugee conference
in Geneva.
We think there will be at the summit
a wide measure of agreement among the
leaders on several points, and they are
particularly in the macroeconomic area.
We will seek commonly to reduce infla-
tion and unemployment, to strengthen
savings and investment, to assist growth
and productivity, to facilitate adjustment
to new worldwide economic circum-
stances— the least of those associated
with rising costs of energy. There may
be differences on the choice of policy in-
struments between one nation or the
other; I think they are commonly united
on these major macroeconomic objec-
tives.
On trade they agree on the need to
resist protectionism, to maintain an
open trading system, and in the period
ahead to address trade restrictions not
yet subject to international discipline.
And it's the policy of this Administration
to be a leading proponent of free trade
worldwide and to adopt the necessary
measures to insure that that objective is
broadened and expanded in the period
ahead — not only among our Western in-
dustrialized trading partners but
perhaps even more importantly among
developing nations in the North-South
context.
On energy they recognize the need
to continue to conserve the use of
energy and increase supplies — especially
coal and nuclear— through price
mechanism, to reduce dependence on im-
ports, and decrease our vulnerability to
oil supply and disruption.
They are committed to a major ef-
fort to help promote economic and social
progress in the developing countries and
to integrate these countries more fully
into the international economic system.
On East- West economic relations— a
new agenda topic proposed by the
United States for this conference— we
look to a probing discussion on which we
can build after Ottawa to bring our own
economic relations with the Soviets, col-
lectively, in alignment with our political
and our security objectives.
More purely political discussion will
take place in an unstructured way at the
conference, such as at luncheons and
dinners, where heads of government will
participate together. There will also be a
series of bilateral meetings between
heads of state and government and
President Reagan and his counterparts.
There is no formal political agenda for
this summit. The leaders will raise
whatever subjects are of particular cc|
cern to them. I would expect, howeve
that events between now and the sun
mit itself will tend to shape the ageno
in the political area, but certainly the1
topics which include Poland, perhaps
relations with the Soviets in general,
arms control, the Middle East, south]
Africa, and possibly Central America
The political talks, while not the
centerpeice of the economic summit,
nevertheless, of very great value. A
word about the participants. The othi
heads of government at the summit a
Prime Minister Thatcher of the Uniti
Kingdom; Chancellor Schmidt of the
German Federal Republic; President
Mitterrand of France; Prime Ministe
Spadolini of Italy; Prime Minister Su
of Japan; and the host, Prime Minist
Trudeau of Canada, who was here la
week as you know. The President of
European Commission, Mr. Gaston
Thorn, will also be a participant. He
was here last week. Only three of tb
eight principals have attended any oi
previous six summits. Chancellor
Schmidt, of course, is the veteran of
of them. And Prime Ministers Trudei
and Thatcher have also participated
the past. The heads of government \
be accompanied at their meeting by
their foreign and finance ministers.
The session will begin this Sunda
evening with a get-acquainted dinner'
and a discussion. It will be limited tc
heads of state and government
themselves, and there will be a cor-
responding dinner, that I'm aware o1
for the foreign ministers— a parallel
ner. It will end some time in the afte
noon— this overall conference— Tues
with a joint press conference by the
heads of government, all participate
It's important that the press and
public should not expect a summit of
this kind— and that's been true in thj
past as well— to reach momentous cc
elusions. The value of this meeting, <
with previous summits, has been a si1
ing of perceptions, and it will seek tx
so on this occasion, increasing
understanding and insuring that the
proaches to problems are not workin
crossed purposes but are mutually re
forcing. This is not the stuff of dram
but it is important. And as you know
and you may care to explore, there a
some differing viewpoints among the
participants on a number of— primal
Department of State Bull.
Feature
Economic Summit
Ottawa, 1981
omic but not exclusively so— related
:s.
Let me conclude my brief presenta-
by summarizing what I believe to be
oasic objectives at this summit— to
;o know the other leaders personal-
evelop rapport with them, under-
d their concerns, and make clear our
itivity to these concerns; to explain
economic and foreign policy goals;
amonstrate to the other leaders our
rmination to create a strong U.S.
omy with stable prices, accepting
ssary short-term costs in this effort;
xengthen our defenses and to keep
commitment to international con-
ition and cooperation and to keep it
and enduring; to discuss the East-
t relations, as well as other major
i?s areas.
The summit nations and the in-
| rialized democracies as a whole are
id together by more than trade
s. Our ties transcend purely
jiomic relations. What Chancellor
rnidt has written recently about the
I ntic alliance is absolutely correct
I applies as well to our friends in the
I fie. What unites us and makes us
ue is the purpose for which we ap-
pur wealth and our power — namely,
Iromote respect for the freedom of
pns and the dignity of individuals.
Lt we decide on specific issues we
| leave this summit essentially and
ifully more sensitive to each other's
/s and concerns, more united, and
>ugh shared challenges we can
eve the international growth and
jlopment that all of our member
es seek.
Q. Do you envision an agreement
he nations on some future get-
ether where you would discuss
iging economic policies, in relation
he Soviet Union, in line with
itical and the security objectives?
A. Not in the specific sense that
r question suggests. I think there are
amber of ongoing fora that permit
t to happen, both in the Economic
nmunity and the OECD [Organiza-
i for Economic Cooperation and
'elopment] where they have always
a specific focus on East- West trade
. the data associated with that trade.
;re will, hopefully, be some further
:ussions within the COCOM [Coor-
ating Committee for East- West
Trade Policy] apparently designed to put
a more coherent East- West trade policy
in the security-related area together, as
an example.
Q. Could you be a little more
specific as to what the United States
will propose to its allies on East-
West?
A. I think it doesn't serve a healthy
purpose at this point to get ahead of the
discussions. And, incidently, with
respect to whether there would be
something as a result of the discussions
at the summit that the heads of state, of
government, would put together, I could
not predict, because they're free agents
and their agenda is open and somebody
could propose such a thing. But it's not
visualized at this time.
With respect to East- West in
general, I think a broad set of discus-
sions involving the interrelationship of
the political, economic, and security
aspects of East- West relations, in a very
general sense, would be the kind of a
backdrop I would anticipate in Ottawa.
Q. How important will it be in Ot-
tawa to come to some kind of a new
game plan or understanding on TNF
[theater nuclear forces] with the allies
and how to proceed on TNF?
A. I don't anticipate that this will
come up unless it comes up in the
margins or in bilaterals. Essentially, our
situation with respect to TNF and the
two-track decision made in December of
1979, reaffirmed last May in Rome, is in
good shape. Our European partners
know precisely what we are doing.
We've been in the process, since the
Rome summit, of coordinating together
with our allies in putting together a
common threat assessment, common re-
quirement assessments, and that's been
underway. I believe that the speech that
I gave earlier this week in New York
again underlined our commitment to
follow through with the two-track com-
mitment and to have discussions with
Foreign Minister Gromyko in September
with respect to fleshing out the precise
time when the formal negotiations will
begin sometime between mid-November,
mid-December, I would anticipate.
Q. You said events between now
and the summit in the political field
may shape the agenda of what they'll
bring up. One of those events is ex-
pected to be the release of the F-16s
to Israel. Are you going to be able to
tell our partners that we have some
assurance from Israel that in the
future this equipment will not be used
in possible violation of U.S. law?
A. First, with respect to the deci-
sion itself, I don't want to prejudge that
because as of this session the President
has not formally made such a decision. I
would anticipate he will in the very near
future.
With respect to that topic as an
agenda item, I would not expect it
would be the focus of much discussion.
But we are prepared to deal in timely
fashion with the exchanges that we've
had with the Government of Israel on
this subject, and I will certainly be
prepared, and the President will be
prepared to do that.
Q. Regarding your personal effect
on the summit, especially from the
standpoint of dedication to achieving
peace, one of your Foreign Service of-
ficers, James Kleskin, has written in a
national magazine that the corps of
cadets at West Point are, in his
words, "sworn warmakers." Since he
works for you, you went to West
Point— you're a graduate of West
Point— do you think it's fair or ac-
curate to call West Pointers "sworn
warmakers?"
A. It really depends on what you
meant when you said that. If you meant
they are sworn-in to defend this country,
why, the answer to that is, of course,
they are. If it means that they are
something beyond that, I would like to
have the benefit of reading the article,
and you certainly titillated my appetite
to do so.
Q. On the subject of East- West
trade, does the United States have a
position or a paper that it will pre-
sent, at the very least, for discussion
purposes at the summit, and if not,
how does the United States expect
discussions to get started when it's
this country that initiated the idea of
putting it on the agenda in the first
place?
A. First, there are some very broad
aspects of this topic that I think we feel
the participants will benefit from an ex-
change on, such as linkage, such as the
interrelationship between economic,
m ict -t no -I
political, and security-related policies,
especially Soviet military capabilities.
As you know, we've been in the
process in the Administration of review-
ing very thoroughly East- West trade.
That process is drawing to a conclusion.
That does not necessarily mean that the
completion of that very extensive review
lends itself to public disclosure or even,
necessarily, exchanges with our Euro-
pean partners in the context that the
review has been conducted. Where they
have an interest and are involved, of
course, we will consult. So the answer to
your question is we don't view that kind
of a litany as being presented. We do
view a broad interrelationship discus-
sion.
Q. Do you expect that nuclear pro-
liferation and the problems of pro-
liferation will be an important topic?
A. It's clear that all of our member
governments are seized with this prob-
lem. As you know, there again we have
just brought it to a conclusion and will
soon have something to say, if it hasn't
already been said. It did go today as
scheduled. Yes, I would anticipate that.
But it is not a major agenda item. The
agenda item of energy will inevitably
lead to future American policies and at-
titudes on peaceful uses of nuclear
energy and the associated improvements
we hope to see achieved in international
safeguards.
Q. Do you anticipate any unified
approach to the problems in the Mid-
dle East and particularly does the
President feel determined to go for-
ward with the sale of the AW ACS
[airborne warning and control system
aircraft] to Saudi Arabia?
A. Let me answer your last ques-
tion first, and the answer to that is a
very positive yes. The President will
proceed with that project.
With respect to the discussions on
the Middle East, I think you all know
there's been a lot of background at-
mospherics with respect to the so-called
European initiative on the Middle East
and a certain degree of frustration with
the slow pace, if not the stalemate, in
the Camp David process, which was
probably a consequence of electoral
deadlines here in the United States and
certainly in Israel.
I would expect there would be a
free-flow exchange of views between the
leaders on the importance of the
peacekeeping effort in the Middle East.
I have already been engaged in a
number of discussions with our Euro-
pean partners, especially the President
of the Economic Community, Peter Car-
rington— British Foreign Minister. Thus
far we have been assured and we are
still confident that what our European
partners would visualize undertaking in
this effort in the near term would be
mutally reinforcing and cooperative ef-
forts with whatever U.S. led activities
might be undertaken in the near term.
Q. Since all the nations need
energy, I presume you all are really
going to take up some unified ap-
proach to how we get some other
energy than OPEC [Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries] and
maybe use some of these great alter-
native energy sources like Canada has
so much of.
A. I would anticipate this will be one
of the really major topics at the summit,
both in the working group specialist
areas and in the heads of state and
government sessions and along the
margins and during bilaterals as well.
Clearly, we are looking for major ef-
forts, commonly applied throughout the
membership of this summit, to seek to
reduce dependency on Middle Eastern
oil resources, and perhaps beyond that,
Eastern oil resources, either of which
are subject to cutoff in crises.
We are anxious to look very careful-
ly at what the United States can con-
tribute in this area— the area of peaceful
uses of nuclear energy— and the vast
coal deposits which exist here in North
America. We're interested in also ex-
ploring what contributions can be made
in other non-OPEC, non-Eastern-
producing areas, such as the northern
part of Europe and Canada. All of these
things, I am confident, will be carefully
explored.
Q. When you talk about the
developing world, do you include in
that China and do you expect the new
U.S. relationship with China to come
up?
A. I think it would be unusual if,
either in my discussions with the foreign
ministers or in the President's discus-
sions with the heads of state and
government, we did not get into the re-
cent trip I made to China and the
results of that trip and the outlook fo
the future as we see it.
Q. You seemed to underline the
East- West trade question and then
later questions you've been, to my
mind anyway, vague about exactly
what is going to be said. Are we go
ing to initiate long discussions tryii
to get some notion of where these
other leaders are, what their thinki
is, with the idea that down the roa<
we will have some sort of a new
agreement or is the President goinj I
make some sort of proposal for disc
sion?
A. I wouldn't go looking for any
dramatic U.S. -sponsored proposal, an
am sorry if you got the impression I
tried to jazz that topic up in my prest
tation. I must have been gasping for .
at the moment. But it's just another
agenda item. It's an important agend;
item. The point I was trying to make
that I think there will be an effort on
the part of the United States— it's om
of the main reasons we're anxious to
have it on the agenda— to demonstra
the importance we feel this particulai
topic enjoys and its interrelationship
with the political and economic and
security-related concerns that we hav
today in East- West terms.
Q. What hope do you have of co
vincing the allies to shoulder any m
of the burden either financially or i
terms of equipment in Europe and
would you couple that, as you talk i
them, with any hint that we might
reduce what we are doing there oth
wise?
A. Do you mean are we going to
engage in verbal blackmail threats?
Q. Whatever the right words ar<
A. No, I would not anticipate the
topic coming up in the context of you
question. I do think that the
macroeconomic issues that we will be
discussing and the example being set
the United States in which we are
engaged in substantial reductions in a
number of our Federal expenditures,
while simultaneously adding at the le\
of about 7% increase a year for the m
5 to our defense needs, is an example
that we feel is both necessary because
the slippage in our own military
capabilities but also an example that \
hope our European friends and our
Department o^tat^uHe
Feature
Economic Summit
Ottawa, 1981
nese friends will be impressed by as
make their own calculations in a
tough economic environment.
J. Your tone would be as soft as
' That is the tone that you're go-
o take on it? You won't be cam-
rung any harder for them to make
»ater effort?
\. No, I don't anticipate a confron-
n. As you know, there are a number
;ues that are of concern to both
. There is the issue of Japanese-
ipean trade relationships. There are
s of vehicles that impede the kind
3e trade that we are seeking. There
icern in Europe about high
rican interest rates and the impact
5 having on European economies.
These are going to be areas of very
• discussion. I hope they are not go-
0 be areas of tension or disagree-
t but, rather, exchanging views and
;htening one another with respect to
:oncerns of all.
b. A number of observers, sea-
lid or otherwise, who have return-
Irom Europe in recent weeks bring
je the judgment that the Euro-
is, for the most part, do not like
economic policies and to the ex-
they are familiar with our foreign
:y they don't like that either. Do
think that 2 days with the Presi-
. is going to change much of that?
A. First, I won't share your broad
:ralization. I do not find that our
apean partners are discomforted by
foreign policy. There is a specific
of that foreign policy that they
; been less than happy with. In fact,
e are two. The one is the pace at
:h we have been willing to enter into
s control negotiations with the
let Union, and that's intimately in-
ed in their own domestic climate
i respect to nuclear weapons.
mdly, I think there's been some con-
i expressed by some about the tone
ur approaches to the East. I think
;ntly President Mitterrand has made
e equally vigorous statements on
; subject. So I don't accept what you
1 do accept that our economic
cies, especially our interest rates,
e been the subject of concern and in-
ising concern in recent weeks. But I
nt 5 years in Europe, and during that
lod they were also disturbed with
erican economic programs. At that
time their concern was what they
perceived to be a lack of discipline here
in the U.S. economy, a situation where
we are letting inflation run rampant, a
situation when we were letting the
dollar suffer what they referred to as
"benign neglect," and a situation in
which they felt that lack of discipline in
our own domestic energy program was
being translated onto their shoulders
through declining dollar values.
We've turned that around. This Ad-
ministration has put together a
coherent, comprehensive program
designed to get inflation under control,
to get economic growth proceeding more
rapidly in a positive direction. It has, of
course, been perceived in Europe to
some degree with resulting high levels
of interest rate to be a cause of their
problems.
We understand their concern. We've
been sensitive to it from the beginning,
and we are going to be increasingly sen-
sitive to it as we proceed down the road.
I think another problem that bothers our
European friends, and I'm speaking very
frankly, is that they have different
systems than we do here. They don't
welcome American officials suggesting
how they should correct their economic
deficiencies, and they have many. I think
it's important that there be a free ex-
change of views on these relative con-
cerns, and I anticipate there will be, but
I think it's going to be a very cordial and
constructive dialogue that will take
place.
Q. The Canadian Government has
released logistical and security details
on the Ottawa summit trip. They are
permitting hostile demonstrations in
the near vicinity of the summit. Are
you satisfied with the Canadian
Government's security arrangements?
A. I would leave that to the ex-
perts. I haven't dug into those matters
that you're speaking of. I think we do
welcome the fact that Canada is a
democratic society and an open society
and we like that.
Q. Do we have a contingency
agreement with our allies to radically
cut trade with the Soviet Union in the
event of an invasion of Poland?
A. I think we have discussed this
issue repeatedly over the last 6 months
and it was discussed at length before
this Administration came in. There's no
question that there's been extensive
planning and coordinating discussions
between the members of NATO and
those Western industrialized states out-
side of NATO, and which are focusing,
primarily, on political, economic, and
diplomatic reactions that might be
undertaken in the event of a situation in
Poland of the kind you describe. Beyond
that I won't say. And that doesn't mean
there are any a priori triggering
mechanisms for a complete set but a
menu.
Q. Given the different approaches,
given the fact that you said that the
allies will try to reach a mutual
understanding on a different subject,
on the subject of Central America,
does that mean that the United States
would be willing to change its posi-
tion on Central America?
A. I think our Assistant Secretary
for Latin American Affairs is giving a
speech today on this subject, and I
would refer you to that. It's a clear ex-
position of what our current policy is
and will remain. On the other hand, I
would like to take the opportunity of
your question to suggest that what we
are talking about in there is our view of
a political solution and reaffirming that
a political solution is our objective.
We are faced with two problems.
One is a security-related problem. And
the other is a problem of dealing with
the condition of, whether you refer to
them as economic deprivation or
socioeconomic or social justice objec-
tives, to which an entirely different set
of programs have to be designed and
tailored. That's precisely what we've
been doing in the case of our Caribbean
basin development plan and the discus-
sions we have had with Mexico,
Venezuela, and Canada.
We would visualize, if this plan takes
shape with the agreement and participa-
tion of all, that we would expand the
donor countries. I think that deals more
precisely with the question of the
socioeconomic environment in Central
America and the opportunities it affords
for external mischiefmaking.
Q. Do you expect the annual
economic summits to continue after
this one?
A. Yes, I would anticipate it, but it
depends on the heads of state and
government. It will be one of the topics
they will discuss, I am sure.
Secretary Haig's
Press Briefing
Montebello
July 19, 19812
What I'm really trying to do for you
tonight is to give you a very quick and
cryptic description of the bilaterals that
were held between the President and
Chancellor Schmidt of West Germany
and French President Mitterrand.
As you know, the President will con-
duct bilaterals not only with these two
but with Japan and Great Britian. He
has talked to Canada. He's talked to the
Economic Community; of course, finally
with Italy. After each we'll give you a
flavor of what occurred.3 That is all we
are going to talk about.
First, the meeting with Chancellor
Schmidt was an extension of a relation-
ship which has already begun, as you
know, both as a result of the
Chancellor's earlier visits to Washington.
There was a very lengthy discussion and
exchange on the economies. The
Chancellor, of course, raised his con-
cerns about the impact of the perception
of high U.S. interest rates on European
economies in general. The President
went into considerable length to explain
to the Chancellor that high interest
rates do not represent American policy,
that these were inherited economic con-
ditions, and that it is the policy of the
United States to pursue a broadly based
program involving fiscal, tax, and
monetary reform and fiscal
restraint — all designed to bring our in-
flation levels under control — and that
the consequence of that would be a
responsive drop in the interest rate. At
the same time, the President made it
very clear that he understood the con-
cerns of our European partners and
Helmut Schmidt's particular concerns
about the current high level of interest
rates.
Beyond these economic questions
Chancellor Schmidt was, of course, very
interested in our current state of
knowledge of the critical situation in the
Middle East. And there was an ex-
change on the activity we have under-
way with Ambassador Habib's [Philip C.
Habib, the President's special emissary
to the Middle East] mission, the discus-
sions that the Ambassador had with
Prime Minister Begin — two discussions
today. We've just gotten the report on
the second, and the situation remains
tense and worrisome.
There were discussions in general on
East- West matters between the
Chancellor and the President. The Presi-
dent registered his concerns about ex-
cess dependency on Soviet natural gas
and the pipeline issue and offered to
present to the Chancellor a host of alter-
native programs that the United States
is prepared to cooperate and support on
UPl photo
which might eliminate dependency or
reduce dependency in that area.
The President also raised the issue
of other aspects of East- West trade and
the desirability of having a high-level
meeting this fall to look at the possibility
of tightening up in certain areas and
perhaps loosening up in other areas. But
the main objective would be to tighten
up in military-related issues involving
end items and technology. With respect
to technology, the focus would be on
military-related trade as distinct from
specific military trade. Military-related
trade, items that could have an impact
more indirectly — that would be reserved
to technology.
All in all, the meeting was fast-
moving, cordial, and reflected the fact
that the two leaders have spoken
together in the past and have already
established a level of frankness and rap-
port that enabled us to do a lot of
business.
The President used this meeting also
to once again reaffirm the American in-
tention to proceed with the two tracks
of the TNF modernization, deployment,
and negotiation. The President noted
that I would meet with [Soviet Foreign
Minister] Gromyko in the fall at the
U.N. General Assembly with a view
toward having specific negotiations
begin between mid-November and mi
December of this year.
The meeting with Mr. Mitterranc
was [inaudible]. In other words, this
the first occasion that the two leader
had an opportunity to meet one anot
I, as an observer, was very impresse
with the cordial relationship which w
established at this first meeting. The
was an initial exchange of personal
observations by the two men which,
think, helped to establish that. There
were discussions again on the econor
situation in Europe and in the Unitei
States. Mr. Mitterrand made it clear
that he was not going to attempt to 1
ture the United States on our econor
policy but at the same time pointed c
that at some point this interest rate
problem could have a profound impai
not only in Western Europe but perl
in a broader global context.
The President thanked Mr. Mitte |
rand for the recent statements of tht
President himself— President Mitter-
rand— and his Foreign Minister and
other government officials on suppor
for the two-track decision of the thej
nuclear modernization and negotiatic
and the French President's repeated
reference to the need to maintain ou:
defense levels.
There were discussions, which wi
brief and yet important, on East- We;
relations, exchanges between the twc
men. President Reagan used this as ;
opportunity — recognizing the French
terest in North-South relations — to
outline with some specificity his grea
interest and the high priority he give
U.S. and Western policies vis-a-vis
developing nations.
This is an interest which the Pres
dent came into office with which has
been sharpened as a result of discuss:
early on in his Administration with tl
President of Mexico, Lopez Portillo, i
with Prime Minister Trudeau. They'vi
been reflected in this hemisphere by t
pilot model program the President ha
launched for the economic developme
of Jamaica and the subsequent efforts
we've made to launch a program desij
ed to assist with the social-economic
needs of the Caribbean basin area anc
the Central American countries, whic.
was the focus, as you know, of the
meeting we had with Mexico, Canada
Venezuela, and ourselves in Nassau a
Feature
Economic Summit
Ottawa, 1981
;nd ago.
resident Mitterrand expressed a
i to continue and expand the
ral talks started today and to pro-
lese discussions into a longer
futuristic timeframe— 3-4 years
he future, and because he felt it
mportant that we not exclusively
re ourselves in immediate problems
jut look toward longer range
s. I think the President warmly
med that. The President used this
ion to invite President Mitterrand
le with him and to meet with him
illiamsburg at the time of the
town celebration this fall where, as
erstand, an invitation had already
to President Mitterrand from the
oring organization. President Mit-
nd expressed a warm reception to
oroposal, and I anticipate that will
l.ppening at Williamsburg. We bet-
let the date on that because I don't
it in my left pocket.
.II in all, I think the discussions
i both leaders were an auspicious
I as preliminaries to the multilateral
issions which will proceed tomorrow
i ing; and as a prelude to tonight's
Ir which will be participated in or
ded by the principals only, and dur-
'hich I anticipate all of the leaders
express themselves in greater detail
vith a greater exchange of views in
irger venue.
^. You said in the discussion with
icellor Schmidt, the President—
>e these were your words, the sit-
in in the Middle East remains
i and worrisome. What did you
is by that?
A. I think that anyone who has
witnessing the escalating cycle of
nee in the Middle East cannot but
mcerned as casualties mount and in-
nt noncombatants become the vic-
of these exchanges. I don't want to
ery much beyond that because that's
:ubject of another set of events yet
:cur, as I say.
J. You mentioned that the Presi-
offered Chancellor Schmidt
ral options on a natural gas supply
rest Germany.
A. No, he didn't mention several op-
;. He suggested that it would be
rul if we could offer to our Euro-
partners, especially those engaged
e pipeline project, some alternative
approaches to their energy need prob-
lem. And this was done as an offer to
see whether or not there might be better
alternatives for both West Germany and
France in this instance and whether or
not in the long term these would better
meet their interests and our mutual in-
terests.
Q. So he offered nothing specific
and —
A. In general, we are talking about
coal, a peaceful nuclear power, plus
alternative gas and fuel oil solutions,
where we are somewhat more limited,
as are they.
Q. Did President Reagan bring up
in his bilateral talk with President
Mitterrand the four Communists that
have joined his government in France?
A. No, that subject was not discuss-
ed. It is clearly a subject that has been
discussed in the past and is behind us.
Q. Did the President discuss with
Mitterrand the Middle East situation
and what was Mitterrand's response?
A. No, that did not come up, and I
think it did not come up simply because
the two leaders ran out of time. We had
to use an interpreter for that meeting so
the substantive exchange was somewhat
slower.
Q. I'm just wondering about
Chancellor Schmidt, whether or not
you could be more specific? Did he
give any particular view on what he
felt the U.S. posture should be vis-a-
vis Israel, or what the Western com-
munities' posture should be vis-a-vis
Israel?
A. No, I think that he expressed
very specifically his deep concern about
the escalating cycle of violence and was
anxious to both register that concern
and to hear President Reagan's own
outlook with respect to recent events.
We provided that, but it's a little
premature yet and I think inappropriate
to go farther than that.
Q. Did the President tell him his
decision on the F-16s, and when will
the press be notified about that?
A. No, he did not and there's been
no decision on that subject. I would an-
ticipate one in the very near future, but
we leave this up to the President, of
course. It's his responsibility, and he just
h?d not made it yet.
Q. Can you say whether either
Chancellor Schmidt or President Mit-
terrand raised concerns and expressed
them to the President about U.S.
policy in Central America, particularly
El Salvador?
A. No, this subject did not arise in
either of the bilaterals. As I mentioned
earlier, however, President Reagan went
into considerable detail about his think-
ing with respect to the developing
world, and especially the socioeconomic
objectives associated with the Caribbean
basin plan.
Q. Did the question of the Com-
munist participation in the Cabinet in
France come up?
A. No, as I say, I believe that sub-
ject is behind us.
Q. Did either of the European
leaders give an estimate to the Presi-
dent as to how long their economies
could tolerate high interest rates in
this country — 6 months, a year? And
what would happen if the high rates
did not come down by a specified
time?
A. Clearly there was some discus-
sion about durability in the context of
the current levels of high interest rates.
And incidentally, many of our other
European partners have equally high in-
terest rates of their own. I think the
President noted that we were number
four among some of the major in-
dustrialized countries in that regard. But
I think, in the case of the discussion
with President Mitterrand, there was
some exchange that would have sug-
gested that the toleration level has limits
in terms of duration, perhaps the end of
the year.
There was some hope expressed on
the U.S. side that as we are watching
current or previous levels of inflation
start to come down that there's a basis
for some optimism that, in the not too
distant future, there will be a
corresponding lowering of American in-
terest rates. But I think it's also impor-
tant that all of us bear in mind, and the
President emphasized himself, that we
do not control interest rates. They are
set by an independent agency, the
Federal Reserve Board, and it is impor-
tant, I think, that we recognize that,
too, in the context of assessing the abili-
ty of the United States to manipulate
monetary policy in that way.
ust1981
Declaration
of
Economic
Summit
Ottawa
July 21, 19814
1. We have met at a time of rapid change and
great challenge to world economic progress
and peace. Our meeting has served to rein-
force the strength of our common bonds. We
are conscious that economic issues reflect and
affect the broader political purposes we
share. In a world of interdependence, we
reaffirm our common objectives and our
recognition of the need to take into account
the effects on others of policies we pursue.
We are confident in our joint determination
and ability to tackle our problems in a spirit
of shared responsibility, both among
ourselves and with our partners throughout
the world.
The Econony
2. The primary challenge we addressed at
this meeting was the need to revitalize the
economies of the industrial democracies, to
meet the needs of our own people and
strengthen world prosperity.
3. Since the Venice Summit the average
rate of inflation in our countries has fallen,
although in four of them inflation remains in
double figures. In many countries unemploy-
ment has risen sharply and is still rising.
There is a prospect of moderate economic
growth in the coming year but at present it
promises little early relief from unemploy-
ment. The large payments deficits originating
in the 1979-80 oil price increase have so far
been financed without imposing intolerable
adjustment burdens but are likely to persist
for some time. Interest rates have reached
record levels in many countries and, if long
sustained at these levels, would threaten pro-
ductive investment.
4. The fight to bring down inflation and
reduce unemployment must be our highest
priority and these linked problems must be
tackled at the same time. We must continue
to reduce inflation if we are to secure the
higher investment and sustainable growth on
which the durable recovery of employment
depends. The balanced use of a range of
policy instruments is required. We must in-
volve our peoples in a greater appreciation of
the need for change: change in expectations
about growth and earnings, change in
management and labor relations and prac-
tices, change in the pattern of industry,
change in the direction and scale of in-
vestments and change in energy use and sup-
ply-
5. We need in most countries urgently to
reduce public borrowing; where our cir-
cumstances permit or we are able to make
changes within the limits of our budgets, we
will increase support for productive invest-
ment and innovation. We must also accept
the role of the market in our economies. We
must not let transitional measures that may
be needed to ease change become permanent
forms of protection or subsidy.
6. We see low and stable monetary
growth as essential to reducing inflation. In-
terest rates have to play their part in achiev-
ing this and are likely to remain high where
fears of inflation remain strong. But we are
fully aware that levels and movements of in-
terest rates in one country can make
stabilization policies more difficult in other
countries by influencing their exchange rates
and their economies. For these reasons, most
of us need also to rely on containment of
budgetary deficits, by means of restraint in
government expenditures as necessary. It is
also highly desirable to minimize volatility of
interest rates and exchange rates; greater
stability in foreign exchange and financial
markets is important for the sound develop
ment of the world economy.
7. In a world of strong capital flows ant
large deficits it is in the interests of all tha'
the financial soundness of the international
banking system and the international finan-
cial institutions be fully maintained. We
welcome the recently expanded role of the
IMF [International Monetary Fund] in final
ing payments deficits on terms which en-
courage needed adjustment.
8. In shaping our long term economic
policies, care should be taken to preserve tl
environment and the resource base of our
planet.
Relations With Developing Countries
9. We support the stability, independence a
genuine non-alignment of developing coun-
tries and reaffirm our commitment to
cooperate with them in a spirit of mutual in
terest, respect and benefit, recognizing the
reality of our interdependence.
10. It is in our interest as well as in
theirs that the developing countries should
grow and flourish and play a full part in the
international economic system commensural
with their capabilities and responsibilities ai
become more closely integrated in it.
11. We look forward to constructive anc
substantive discussions with them, and
believe the Cancun Summit offers an early
opportunity to address our common problerr
anew.
12. We reaffirm our willingness to ex-
plore all avenues of consultation and coopen
tion with developing countries in whatever
forums may be appropriate. We are ready tx
participate in preparations for a mutually ac
ceptable process of global negotiations in cir
cumstances offering the prospect of mean-
ingful progress.
13. While growth has been strong in mo:
middle income developing countries, we are
Department of State Bulletii
Feature
Economic Summit
Ottawa, 1981
conscious of the serious economic
ms in many developing countries, and
im poverty faced especially by the
among them. We remain ready to sup-
he developing countries in the efforts
nake to promote their economic and
development within the framework of
own social values and traditions. These
s are vital to their success.
1. We are committed to maintaining
intial and, in many cases, growing
of Official Development Assistance and
»ek to increase public understanding of
portance. We will direct the major por-
f our aid to poorer countries, and we
articipate actively in the United Nations
rence on the Least Developed Coun-
We point out that the strengthening
own economies, increasing access to
larkets and removing impediments to
d flows contribute larger amounts of
;d resources and technology and thereby
lement official aid. The flow of private
|d will be further encouraged insofar as
Uveloping countries themselves provide
l ances for the protection and security of
Itments.
3. The Soviet Union and its partners,
i ; contributions are meagre, should make
i development assistance available, and
( i greater share of exports of developing
ries, while respecting their in-
ldence and non-alignment.
7. We will maintain a strong commit-
to the international financial institu-
and work to ensure that they have, and
ffectively, the financial resources for
important responsibilities.
8. We attach high priority to the resolu-
jf the problems created for the non-oil
loping countries by the damaging effects
lem of high cost of energy imports
,ving the two oil price shocks. We call on
urplus oil-exporting countries to broaden
valuable efforts to finance development
>n-oil developing countries, especially in
ield of energy. We stand ready to
erate with them for this purpose and to
ore with them, in a spirit of partnership,
ible mechanisms, such as those being ex-
ied in the World Bank, which would take
account of the importance of their finan-
contributions.
19. We recognize the importance of ae-
rated food production in the developing
Id and of greater world food security, and
need for developing countries to pursue
id agricultural and food policies; we will
■nine ways to make increased resources
lable for these purposes. We note that
Italian Government has in mind to
uss within the European Community pro-
ils to be put forward in close cooperation
l the specialized U.N. institutions located
tome for special action in this field
narily directed to the poorest countries.
20. We are deeply concerned about the
implications of world popuation growth.
Many developing countries are taking action
to deal with that problem, in ways sensitive
to human values and dignity; and to develop
human resources, including technical and
managerial capabilities. We recognize the im-
portance of these issues and will place
greater emphasis on international efforts in
these areas.
Trade
21. We reaffirm our strong commitment to
maintaining liberal trade policies and to the
effective operation of an open multilateral
trading system as embodied in the GATT
[General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade],
22. We will work together to strengthen
this system in the interest of all trading coun-
tries, recognizing that this will involve struc-
tural adaptation to changes in the world
economy.
23. We will implement the agreements
reached in the Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions and invite other countries, particularly
developing countries, to join in these mutual-
ly beneficial trading arrangements.
24. We will continue to resist protec-
tionist pressures, since we recognize that any
protectionist measure, whether in the form of
overt or hidden trade restrictions or in the
form of subsidies to prop up declining in-
dustries, not only undermines the dynamism
of our economies but also, over time, ag-
gravates inflation and unemployment.
25. We welcome the new initiative
represented by the proposal of the Con-
sultative Group of Eighteen that the GATT
Contracting Parties convene a meeting at
Ministerial level during 1982, as well as that
of the OECD countries in their programme of
study to examine trade issues.
26. We will keep under close review the
role played by our countries in the smooth
functioning of the multilateral trading system
with a view to ensuring maximum openness
of our markets in a spirit of reciprocity, while
allowing for the safeguard measures provided
for in the GATT.
27. We endorse efforts to reach agree-
ment by the end of this year on reducing sub-
sidy elements in official export credit
schemes.
Energy
28. We are confident that, with
perserverance, the energy goals we set at
Venice for the decade can be achieved, ena-
bling us to break the link between economic
growth and oil consumption through struc-
tural change in our energy economies.
29. Recognizing that our countries are
still vulnerable and energy supply remains a
potential constraint to a revival of economic
growth, we will accelerate the development
and use of all our energy sources, both con-
ventional and new, and continue to promote
energy savings and the replacement of oil by
other fuels.
30. To these ends we will continue to rely
heavily on market mechanisms, supplemented
as necessary by government action.
31. Our capacity to deal with short-term
oil market problems should be improved, par-
ticularly through the holding of adequate
levels of stocks.
32. In most of our countries progress in
constructing new nuclear facilities is slow.
We intend in each of our countries to en-
courage greater public acceptance of nuclear
energy, and respond to public concern about
safety, health, nuclear waste management
and non-proliferation. We will further our ef-
forts in the development of advanced
technologies, particularly in spent fuel
management.
33. We will take steps to realize the
potential for the economic production, trade
and use of coal and will do everything in our
power to ensure that its increased use does
not damage the environment.
34. We also intend to see to it that we
develop to the fullest possible extent sources
of renewable energy such as solar, geother-
mal and biomass energy. We will work for
practical achievements at the forthcoming
United Nations Conference on New and
Renewable Sources of Energy.
35. We look forward to improved
understanding and cooperation with the oil
exporting countries in the interests of the
world economy.
East-West Economic Relations
36. We also reviewed the significance of
East- West economic relations for our political
and security interests. We recognized that
there is a complex balance of political and
economic interests and risks in these rela-
tions. We concluded that consultations and,
where appropriate, coordination are
necessary to ensure that, in the field of East-
West relations, our economic policies con-
tinue to be compatible with our political and
security objectives.
37. We will undertake to consult to im-
prove the present system of controls on trade
in strategic goods and related technology
with the USSR.
Conclusion
38. We are convinced that our democratic,
free societies are equal to the challenges we
face. We will move forward together and
with all countries ready to work with us in a
spirit of cooperation and harmony. We have
agreed to meet again next year and have ac-
cepted the invitation of the President of the
French Republic to hold this meeting in
France. We intend to maintain close and con-
tinuing consultation and cooperation with
each other.
gust 1981
Concluding
Statements
Ottawa
July 21, 19815
Prime Minister Trudeau
I should wish first on behalf of my col-
leagues at the table here to express our
welcome to the press here and in accord-
ance with the practices, established
practices, and as chairman of the sum-
mit meeting this year, I must make a
statement summarizing the main points
we have dealt with in the course of the
last few days, and each of my colleagues
will in turn speak to you.
The Ottawa summit was met at a
time of rapid change and great challenge
to world economic progress and peace.
East- West relations have been affected
by the increase in the armed forces of
the U.S.S.R. and its ever increasing
presence in the world. The political and
economic situation of many countries
has made it difficult for them to adapt
to the new changes. The members of the
summit meeting have also been victims
of these changes, and whatever we have
attempted to do in the course of the last
years was not necessarily carried out.
We have had to reexamine the situation
and restructure our activities so that, of
course, there has been some pessimism
about this summit.
Of course, it seemed to have been a
difficult one but in my dual capacity as a
participant and chairman I am able to
say, "No, the pessimists were not
justified." We have met for many hours,
and these contacts have promoted
mutual trust and confidence in facing
the crises we may have to — which
challenge us. We've had very com-
prehensive discussions and frank discus-
sions during our meetings. We have not
tried to hide our divergences. We realize
that we are dealing with economies
which have different structures and
have different reactions to the evolving
situation. We have agreed that we could
not revitalize our economies by isolating
ourselves from one another. We have
agreed on the fundamentals and realize
we must take into account in our politics
the impact it may have on our partners.
The whole burden of that fight can-
not be made on monetary policy alone.
And third, levels and movements of in-
terest rates in one country can make life
more difficult for other countries by in-
fluencing the exchange rates. This is
something to which we must all remain
sensitive and which we must try to
minimize. We must also pursue responsi-
ble trade policies.
Over the years, as summit partners,
we have warned against succumbing to
the temptation of protection. These
warnings have served us well. If we had
drifted into protectionism, we might
have conjured up an economic crisis
similar to that of the 1930s. We have
reiterated our strong commitment to an
open, liberal, and multilateral trading
system. We have agreed to deal with
trade distortions. But we are determined
not to lay the burdens of adjustment at
the doorstep of our neighbors. We are
looking forward to working with others
on a trade agenda for the 1980s. I
regard this consensus about trade policy
as one of the most important to have
emerged from our meeting, not least for
a major trading nation like Canada.
One of the uncertainties hovering
over this summit was how it would deal
with the North-South relationship. It's
no secret to anyone that I attach very
great importance to that relationship as
an element of fundamental equity, of
mutual interests and benefits, and of
global security.
The Ottawa summit was the first of
a series of important meetings this year
where the North-South relationship will
be at the center of the agenda. It seem-
ed important to me, therefore, that the
signal emanating from Ottawa should be
clear and that it should be positive. For
the signal to be persuasive, it had to
come from all of us jointly. That was the
purpose of much of the travel, that as
chairman of this year's meetings, I
undertook in the weeks immediately
preceding the summit.
The world looked to the Ottawa
summit for some sign of movement,
some basis for hope that progress is
possible, that the logjam can be broken.
I'm very pleased with what we've been
able to achieve. Our discussions showed
a common appreciation of the
magnitude of the problem and a com-
mon readiness to respond to it. There ;
now a disposition on the part of all sur
mit countries to pursue any opportunit
for meaningful progress, including whs
are known as "global negotiations." Th,
openness to the process of global
negotiations represents a consensus
which did not exist before our summit
and seemed very remote not too many
months ago.
The message we send from this
meeting to the developing countries is
the following: First, we respect your ii
dependence and support genuine non-
alignment as a contribution to interna-
tional peace and stability and as a basi
for cooperation. Second, we look to yoi
to play a full part in the international 1
economic system and to become closelj
integrated to it. Third, we are ready t(
participate with you in preparations fo
a process of global negotiations. Fourt
we appreciate the problems of energy i
supply which you are encountering anc |
are prepared to join with the surplus o j
exporting countries in examining how j
best we might jointly help you in
developing your indigenous energy
reserves. Five, we recognize the impor
ance of more food production in your
countries and of greater world securitj
and will try to make increased resourc
available for these purposes. Six, we v4
maintain our strong multilateral comm
ment to the international financial in-
stitutions and to the role they have
played in alleviating the problems of
development. And lastly, we will direct
the major portion of our aid to the
poorer countries.
On the occasion of this year's sum-
mit meeting, it seemed to us we could
not ignore the fact that the strength-
ening of the armed forces in the Soviet
Union has had an impact on the
resources of our country and on the
orientations which we have had to
follow. We are convinced of the need f(
a strong defense capability, but we're
also open to the possibility of dialogue
and negotiation with the Soviet Union,
particularly as regards nuclear ar-
maments and security with less ar-
maments and diminished cost.
I should wish, in conclusion, as
Prime Minister of Canada, to say that
we were very happy to be the host na-
tion of this summit meeting. I am par-
ticularly grateful to all of those who
10
Department of State Bulleti
Feature
Economic Summit
Ottawa, 1981
accepted the challenge for this
endeavor and have provided the
num in assuring success. May I be
tted also to express deep gratitude
colleagues at this table for having
my task so easy and to wish them
)eed as they return to their own
ries.
(dent Reagan
sure I speak for all of us in thank -
ou for the welcome we've had and
ospitality that we've enjoyed during
days together in Montebello.
ou've been a most gracious host
ny fellow countrymen and I shall
be grateful. Not long ago the con-
onal wisdom was that our seven na-
were more sharply divided than
rime in years. Only three of us had
ided an economic summit before
ihe rest of us are still in the first
B — the first year class.
'o the outside world this looked like
>uld be a difficult summit. Inflation
. are running at incredible levels,
nployment disrupts the lives of
ons of people and new fears of pro-
onism are sweeping across our con-
its. The agenda of Montebello
esented an enormous challenge for
? us. The true measure of these past
/s— days filled with candid but
ys friendly talks— is that we leave
a true sense of common under-
ding and common purpose. We've
issed at great length how each one
; is addressing economic problems at
e while working in concert to assure
we are sensitive to the impact of
actions upon our partners.
I'm grateful to the other leaders
for their degree of understanding
support for the economic policies
e embarked upon in the United
es. We have also resolved that we
l resist protectionism and support an
I expanding system for multilateral
e. And, as you have been told by the
ne Minister, we shall work together
in helping the developing nations move
toward full partnership in that system.
As Chancellor Schmidt has told us,
our unity in economic matters is the best
insurance we have against a return to
the disastrous "beggar-thy-neighbor"
policies of another era.
Economic unity and political unity
are two great goals we must continue to
pursue. All our nations share democratic
institutions based on a belief in human
dignity, freedom, and the preeminence
of the individual. I believe that we
depart with fresh confidence and op-
timism about the future of democratic
values and our societies.
Many uncertainties still lie ahead;
much remains to be done. But, as an
American, I would like to recall for you
an inspiring story of my native land. It's
the story of young Franklin Roosevelt,
who was struck down by polio in the
prime of life and then, struggling to
cover and to scale new heights. I men-
tion it because much of that struggle
took place on a little island not too far
from here in New Brunswick, Canada,
and the story is remembered by a very
appropriate title, "Sunrise at
Campebello."
Today, as we leave Montebello, I
just can't resist the suggestion that over
the past few years our nations have suf-
fered from an affliction too, an economic
affliction. I hope sometime in the future
people will look back and say that here,
in these talks, we began to put our na-
tions back on the road to economic
recovery and that a new sun rose at
Montebello. That is a hope I know all of
us share.
President Mitterrand
I too would like to express my thanks to
Mr. Pierre-Elliott Trudeau, Prime
Minister, and I would like to thank the
Canadian Government for its excellent
welcome and for the very favorable con-
ditions under which the Ottawa, or
Montebello, summit was carried out.
These conditions were so favorable
that we were able to progress, to
achieve work, and even to achieve some
conclusions. You know that France has
an original policy — a new policy, if you
like— within this framework as com-
pared to the theme generally put for-
ward. I call this an original policy. It is
our own peculiar policy. We have our
own objectives, and it was important for
us to see whether it was possible — and I
had no doubt this was possible — for us
to fulfill this policy in harmony with the
others. By the others, I mean our main
partners— those represented here and a
few others as well.
This has been possible partly
because everybody participated, partly
because everybody has realized what
elements in our own policies can harm
other countries' policies and what must,
therefore, be set aside.
We have all realized what can be
favorable to our common success and
should, thus, be supported. But this has
succeeded also because France is in
favor of solidarity. We support, first of
all, our friends. We think of history, par-
ticularly the history of the past half cen-
tury in which we have seen disruptions,
crises, and war, and we, thus, are united
behind a certain number of fundamental
changes particularly freedom — freedom
concerning the international level and
freedom concerning democracy and
democratic values within each of our
countries.
We stand solidly behind our friends,
and we also fully support those who,
without being represented here, have
been kept in mind many of our discus-
sions and in many, in fact, of our deci-
sions. I'm thinking more particularly of
the countries of the Third World, more
particularly the poorer among the coun-
tries of the Third World.
Right from the beginning, I wanted
to emphasize the fact that we have to
cooperate, to restrict as much as pos-
sible erratic exchange rates in our cur-
rencies, and to avoid as much as pos-
sible, as well, high interest rates. This is
not a French problem. It is a European
problem. In fact, I can say that this is a
worldwide problem. I can say this taking
into account possible consequences of
present trends.
If you have a look at the text of our
communique, you will see that there are
11
a certain number of points being put for-
ward concerning these issues. Similarly,
right from the start, our position was in
favor of everything that is able to bring
down protectionism provided, of course,
that right from the start we are all
familiar with the whole set of existing
mechanisms— mechanisms which mean
that here and there protectionism is
much too present.
Concerning trade with East bloc
countries, as the communique says, a
new examination of the situation will be
carried out shortly. I have expressed the
hope that, concerning this issue as con-
cerning all the others, we take stock
very precisely of the state of trade with
those countries and that we take stock
of the strategic consequences that might
arise. This is also a point included in the
communique.
In addition to this, priority had to be
given during our talks to a policy toward
countries of the Third World, what we
call North-South relations. This is
necessary not simply because it is our
duty but also because it is in our own in-
terest. We must be distrustful of any at-
titude that I would term paternalistic. It
is when we will be able to expand trade
on stable bases, when we will be able to
stabilize raw material prices; once this is
done it will be possible for those coun-
tries to set up lasting development
plans, and once they have done this, we,
the industrialized countries, will be able
to fulfill our tasks.
I think that along the lines of what
we call the energy affiliate and along the
lines of global negotiations, which will be
referred to again at Cancun, and also
concerning international relations, I
would say that on all these points prog-
ress has been achieved. We have been
able to outline our objectives clearly.
And then, particularly during our in-
formal meetings, we discussed problems
concerning international relations, con-
cerning the balance of forces. The posi-
tion of France has always been as
follows: equilibrium above anything else.
Of course, equilibrium has to dominate
not simply the matter of forces but it
should determine the nature, the type of
negotiation to be opened up. The aim be-
ing to insure disarmament and peace.
In conclusion, I would like to say
that in Paris, or perhaps I should say in
France, the next summit will be held. As
you know, we have reached the end of a
first cycle here in Canada. This was the
seventh summit. So a new cycle of such
summit meetings will begin, and I am
very happy that the first element, the
first step in this cycle, will take place in
France. I will be happy to welcome
them, my friends and partners, gathered
here today, and since it is my task, I will
continue to put forward and defend the
interests of my country, but I will make
sure that the summit of the industrial-
ized countries will make it possible for
us to continue along the path of under-
standing of our common interests and of
our common tasks.
Chancellor Schmidt
First of all, I too would like to thank
you very warmly for the welcome, the
hospitality of your country, and for the
way you have acted as chairman. You
have been a very fair, a very just, chair-
man.
I think that we have found many
areas in which we have been able to
agree, and there were also many other
areas or sectors in which close coopera-
tion is possible and in which I think we
can achieve or have already achieved a
compromise. We have all expressed our
desire to fight inflation and unemploy-
ment and to achieve competent and
strong world trade and world economy.
I would like to stress these points
because this time, even more so than in
the past, the countries were represented
by heads of state who use different
economic policies or recipes, if I can call
them this, in their own countries, in the
range between monetarism and Keyne-
sian theory.
I would like to bring up four points.
First, the main role played by trade
policy: We agreed here that we do not
wish to adopt any policies that take ac-
count only of national goals and do not
take account of the repercussions they
may have on the world economy. We di
not wish to pursue such national
policies.
I'd like to refer you to points 21
through 24 of the communique more
particularly. We all face considerable
pressure toward protectionism in our
own governments, and we have all here
expressed the desire to avoid such pro-
tectionism with a view toward maintair
ing the strength and freedom of world
trade.
Second, another important subject
was that concerning the problems
caused by high interest rates. We had i
very detailed and interesting discussion
without any accusations from one of thl
other parties, and several participants
mentioned what negative repercussions*
a long-lasting, high interest rate would
have on their national economies. This
true in any case for the German
economy — particularly if you keep in
mind the fact that the European
economies have already been more
strongly affected by the second oil prio
rise than was expected a couple of yeai
ago.
We also welcome the fact that the
United States of America has expresse I
the intention to do its very best to brin
down these high interest rates. Presi-
dent Reagan, too, has told us that the
American economy is also suffering
from high interest rates.
It has not yet been able to see
whether the fight against inflation in tl
United States might take certain dif-
ferent paths, which is why I have had 1
point out that my government, when I
go back to Bonn, will begin to take cer-
tain decisions concerning the fact that,
unfortunately for the time being, we wi|
still have to deal with high interest rate
and that we will thus have to take cer-
tain measures.
The third point, North-South rela-
tions, I would like to emphasize what
Prime Minister Trudeau said a moment
ago, and I would like to say, quite clear
ly, that we have full respect toward tru
ly nonaligned countries, toward genuinf
nonalignment, which we consider to be
an essential element of stability
throughout the world.
I would also like to announce that
the federal government in Bonn will su]
port the organization of global negotia-
tions in the near future. I am happy thj
12
Department of State Bulletir
Feature
Economic Summit
Ottawa, 1981
lave already been able to hold
assions on the upcoming summit in
cun.
Fourth, I would like to emphasize
importance of the exchange of views
lving the basic agreement concern-
East- West relations where we are
ing about equilibrum in military
es, dialogue, and preparedness to
>eration. An exchange of views
it present-day problems, about arms
tation and arms control, were par-
arly important to me. And I was
very much interested in the ex-
lge of views about the present-day
ation in the Middle East. We have
■essed the common desire to see
:e be established in that part of the
Id in the near future. We all want
vicious circle of the use of violence
lat part of the world to be ended.
In conclusion, I would like to thank
warmly President Reagan, Presi-
Mitterrand, my colleagues Prime
iister Thatcher, Mr. Spadolini, Mr.
oki, and, more particularly, to our
:, Prime Minister Trudeau. I would
| to thank you all for the openness,
I frankness with which you all spoke.
par as I am concerned, I have been
\i much enriched by this summit
i ting, and I have to say that I'm hap-
,o note that we have become better
iiainted and that we are all deter-
ed not to accept that we should act
i lout taking account of each other's
iDlems. But quite on the contrary, we
le said strongly that we will take into
hunt everybody else's interests and
IDlems. These are two essential points
me Minister Thatcher
1 1 join my colleagues in paying a
y warm tribute to your skilled chair-
nship and thorough preparations. I
ik our success at this summit owes a
at deal to those two things. I'd like
d to say thank you to our Canadian
;ts for the excellent arrangements
they made, both in Montebello and in Ot-
tawa.
This is my third economic summit.
And over that period, we've increasingly
given time in our discussions to the ma-
jor political issues of the day, such as
Afghanistan and the Middle East as well
as to the economic problems that we
face. I think this development reflects
reality because political issues and
economic matters can't be isolated from
one another and treated separately.
They interact at every level— national
and international. And I think this reali-
ty was recognized more at this summit
than at any other. The result, I think,
was a workmanlike, balanced discussion
which comprehended all of the major
problems, whether economic or political,
that face the Western world.
On these substantive issues, I'd like
to confine my comments to four points:
First, the world economy. At the last
two summits in Tokyo and Venice, our
work was dominated by the impact of
the second oil price shock on the world
economy. We then considered the im-
pact it would have and how we should
react to it. This time, of course, we met
in the trough of the recession which that
shock produced. But we've had to look
at the whole range of economic ques-
tions, at the twin evils of inflation and
unemployment, the need to adapt our
economies and attitudes in order to beat
unemployment, and of monetary
disorders producing high interest rates
and volatile exchange rates.
We all agreed on the need to fight
inflation as the precondition for
defeating unemployment as you have
emphasized, Mr. Chairman, and on the
need for low monetary growth, on the
need for containing public borrowing,
and for tight control of government ex-
penditure. We are all giving effect to
these principles in our own policies ac-
cording to our own different cir-
cumstances.
The second substantive issue on
which I'd like to comment is developing
countries. I think I take away three
salient thoughts from our discussions on
relations with developing countries. The
first is that we share many of the prob-
lems of the world economy with
them— the need to develop energy
resources, to encourage investment, to
fight inflation and unemployment, and
to expand trade. All of these things we
share with them. The second thing that
we share is that we welcome discussion
with them in whatever ways or groups
are useful. And the third is, we must
pay particular regard to the needs of the
poorer countries. We agreed to direct a
major portion of our aid to the poorer
countries, and I would like to stress that
the United Kingdom has a particularly
good record on that.
Third, a few comments about the
Middle East. We have been meeting in
the shadow of a further outbreak of
fierce fighting in the Middle East. Once
again, the unfortunate people of
Lebanon are bearing the brunt of a con-
flict that is not of their seeking. And
whatever any of us may think about the
causes, we all agree on the need for an
urgent cease-fire in Lebanon, for an end
to the loss of innocent civilian life there,
and, above all, for a solution to the con-
flict between Arabs and Israelis from
which this violence flows. In the United
Kingdom, we shall continue to use all
our influence for this purpose.
The last issue on which I'd like to
comment is East- West relations. We
discussed this scene and the concern
that we all feel about the extent of the
Soviet military threat to our interests.
Speaking for Britain, I've been heart-
ened by the strength of common purpose
that I sensed in our discussions. We all
agreed, and we agreed with real deter-
mination, on the need to maintain a
strong defense capability and to insist on
the need for military balance. Of course,
that goes hand-in-hand with our
readiness to negotiate arms control
agreements to insure genuine security at
a lower level of weaponry and resources.
Our discussions have linked the two
aspects of the preservation of the free
world and the free market economy
which sustains it, namely, defense and
the maintenance of peace and the health
and soundness of the world economy.
Altogether, a very successful summit on
which you, Mr. Chairman, and Canada
deserve our thanks and congratulations.
jgust1981
13
Prime Minister Suzuki
For this most successful conclusion of
this Ottawa summit, we are indebted to
the outstanding chairmanship of Prime
Minister Trudeau and the most generous
cooperation by the Government of
Canada. I am grateful, Mr. Prime
Minister, beyond expression.
The fundamental task of sum-
mitry—particularly this summit— is for
us to deal with political and economic
difficulties that threaten the peace and
the prosperity of the world. It is in this
sense that as the sole representative
having crossed the Pacific Ocean to join
this summitry to say that the nations of
Asia and the Pacific also have much ex-
pectation of and interest in this summit.
As regards the fruits of this summit,
there have been many fruits— on East-
West relations, North-South issues, and
various problems that face all of us in
the West within us. We have committed
ourselves and expressed this commit-
ment that we should tackle these prob-
lems with a common perception and
sense of common objectives in a way
that befits our respective nations and its
strength and circumstances.
Another fruit is that we have felt
strongly that we should demonstrate
that the Western political, economic, and
social institutions are superior to those
in the East and also to step up our
cooperation with the Third World, and
pledging ourselves to the steadfast
maintenance of free trade institutions is
a most important fruit out of this sum-
mit. I believe this is, indeed, the
message from Ottawa to the world. Our
participants have expressed our solidari-
ty and cooperation, and this strong ex-
pression, I believe, is a most valuable
and irreplaceable achievement of this
summit.
Above all, I am satisfied that we
have been able to build friendship and
mutual confidence among the leaders of
these summit nations.
The North-South question was an
important item on our agenda. We have
been united in recognition that our in-
terdependence in the international com-
munity is becoming more important than
ever, and we are committed to further
expand official development assistance.
In conclusion, I would like to say
that for this most successful summit
conference, I am again grateful to Prime
Minister Trudeau personally and to the
people of Canada for their most
generous support and cooperation and,
with that note of thanks, I would like to
conclude my comments.
Prime Minister Spadolini
The Government of the Italian Republic
is very grateful to the Canadian Govern-
ment and in particular to Prime Minist
Trudeau, who was the animator and
coordinator of our discussion, for the
perfect organization of this summit
meeting of the main industrial countrie
of the Western world — a summit
meeting which has coincided with one <
the most difficult moments of the
periods of the Western industrial coun-
tries and after many events which hav<
affected our countries, which has had a
impact on all our countries, and which
has made it necessary to search for ne'
points of view and coordinated views.
In this case, also, as in the past, thi
work of the summit meeting developed!
in a spirit of civil and constructive con-
frontation and a framework of tolerant
and a mutual understanding within the
framework of a common understanding,
of our pluralistic, complex society, whk
is shaken by serious events. In a short
period of time, the societies we have
constructed on the basis of a reliance o
and a firm belief in our values have goi
over to uncertainty and doubt. And it I
our responsibility to interpret and to
understand the reasons for these
upheavals, which are affecting the very
Summary
of
Political
Issues
July 21, 1981*
1. Our discussion of international affairs con-
firmed our unity of view on the main issues
that confront us all. We are determined to
face them together in a spirit of solidarity,
cooperation and responsibility.
2. We all view with concern the continu-
ing threats to international security and
stability. Lasting peace can only be built on
respect for the freedom and dignity of na-
tions and individuals. We appeal to all
governments to exercise restraint and
responsibility in international affairs and to
refrain from exploiting crises and tensions.
3. In the Middle East, we remain con-
vinced that a solution must be found to the
Arab-Israeli dispute. We all deplore the
escalation of tension and continuing acts of
violence now occurring in the region. We are
deeply distressed by the scale of destruction,
particularly in Lebanon, and the heavy
civilian loss of life on both sides. We call on
all states and parties to exercise restraint, :
particular to avoid retaliation which only
results in escalation; and to forego acts whi <
could lead, in the current tense situation in
the area, to further bloodshed and war.
4. We are particularly concerned, in thi:
respect, by the tragic fate of the Lebanese
people. We support the efforts now in prog-
ress to permit Lebanon to achieve a genuini
national reconciliation, internal security and
peace with its neighbours.
5. In East- West relations, we are seriou
ly concerned about the continuing build-up (
Soviet military power. Our concern is
heightened by Soviet actions which are in-
compatible with the exercise of restraint an<
responsibility in international affairs. We
ourselves, therefore, need a strong defence
capability. We will be firm in insisting on a
balance of military capabilities and on
political restraint. We are prepared for
dialogue and cooperation to the extent that
the Soviet Union makes this possible. We ar
convinced of the importance of working
towards balanced and verifiable arms contrc
and disarmament agreements in pursuit of
undiminished security at lower levels of ar-
mament and expenditure.
6. We welcome the fact that, at the
Madrid Conference on Security and Coopera
tion in Europe, Western countries have just
14
Department of State Bulletii
Feature
Economic Summit
Ottawa, 1981
dation of our societies, in order to
alize our societies and to broaden
snsus and trust in our political
)cratic institutions based on stability
ir economy and the social progress.
The Italian Government has ex-
ed its own policy in the field of
omics and social policies as well,
h are aimed at controlling inflation
igh a range of initiatives and ac-
es aimed at reducing the
—government costs — and con-
ing the interests of unions and
igement, just as all of the nations
cipating in these matters. We are
inced that we must defeat this
jter of inflation and unemployment
they absorb ever-increasing
irces and leave very little room for
uctive investments.
Ve consider it very significant that
pint communique refers explicitly to
ommon desire of the seven govern-
j,s that the fluctuations of interest
|. cause difficulties for other coun-
l in pursuing their affairs.
! ^he problem of foreign exchange
I stability of markets is considered
I important for the proper and con-
sistent development of our economies.
We have also dealt with the problems of
energy and the North-South dialogue.
We have emphasized our interest in
developing alternative sources of energy
starting with nuclear energy.
As regards the problems affecting
our societies, many derived from the
need to find a common measure between
industrialized countries and developing
countries, mindful of the mutual in-
terdependence the summit has made
toward progress in this. We are well
aware that developing countries — that is
to say, the Third World— their public
debt has reached proportions which can
no longer be sustained, and, therefore,
there is an urgent need to provide aid to
those countries so that they will not be
burdened with further debts. We have
given appropriate priority to the har-
monious development of relations be-
tween the North and South. If we
forego this aid, we would be abdicating
our responsibility as regards peoples
who are faced with those problems of
underdevelopment and hunger. That is
why we have proposed that Italy should
assume, as soon as possible, in concert
] another major initiative aimed at defin-
le area to be covered by the measures
( roposed European Disarmament Con-
jce would negotiate. Equally important,
i; nave proposed a number of human
I ; provisions that would give new hope
Idividuals deprived of their freedom. We
re that Soviet acceptance of these mi-
les would enable a balanced conclusion of
lladrid meeting and a substantial reduc-
if tension in Europe.
. As regards Afghanistan, about which
jblicly stated our firm and unanimous
on at last year's Venice Summit, we
that the situation remains unchanged,
jfore, with the overwhelming majority of
ns, we continue to condemn the Soviet
iry occupation of Afghanistan. We sup-
international efforts to achieve the corn-
withdrawal of Soviet troops and to
re to the Afghan people, who are
.ng a war of liberation, their right to
mine their own future. We note with ap-
il the constructive proposal of the Euro-
Council for an international conference
ing about this result and call upon the
;t Union to accept it. We are grateful for
S eport given us by Foreign Secretary
I ington on his recent visit to Moscow, and
liscussions there, on behalf of the Ten, on
International conference proposal.
8. Believing as we do that the Kam-
puchean people are entitled to self-
determination, we welcome and support the
Declaration of the International Conference
on Kampuchea.
9. Together with other states and
regional organizations, we are resolved to do
what is necessary to enhance regional securi-
ty and to ensure a peace built on the in-
dependence and dignity of sovereign nations.
All peoples should be free to chart their own
course without fear of outside intervention.
To that end, we shall continue to promote
peaceful resolution of disputes and to address
underlying social and economic problems. We
reaffirm our conviction that respect for inde-
pendence and genuine non-alignment are im-
portant for international peace and security.
10. Recalling the statement on refugees
adopted at the Venice Summit, we are
seriously concerned over the growing plight
of refugees throughout the World. We reaf-
firm our support for international relief ef-
forts and our appeal to all governments to
refrain from actions which can lead to
massive flows of refugees.
with the European economy the develop-
ment of specific proposals for action in
the field of food and agriculture, in coor-
dination with the international agencies
in Rome and that priority interest
should be devoted to those countries.
One of the results of our summit
meeting has been to unite our bonds
even stronger on the basis of effective,
common activities and pursuits beyond
all rhetoric and ritual. And this is a bat-
tle which, as Chancellor Schmidt in-
dicated, is of essential importance.
Italy reaffirms, just as France— as
President Mitterrand — its solidarity
with the Western powers in the
knowledge that there is a close link be-
tween Europe and the United States,
and this has been again confirmed by
President Reagan. We may say that it is
a great satisfaction for us to observe
that we have — there are many common
points on which we have agreed — social
justice, international peace, and other
items are all indivisible problems for us.
'Issued to the press in Ottawa by Prime
Minister Trudeau, chairman of the summit,
on behalf of all the participants.
President Thorn
I'm sure it's no exaggeration to be the
seventh to thank you. And I would like
to say that the heads of state and of
governments represented here have
decided to start up a new cycle, a second
cycle, of summits. They have done so
because the results quite justify such a
second cycle. This is because the con-
ference was very well prepared, of
course, and also because the welcome
extended by Canada and the beautiful
site at which the conference took place
favored such success. Moreover, Prime
Minister Trudeau had taken up the
pilgrim staff and has made sure that
debates be restricted as much as pos-
sible so that as many results be achieved
as possible.
Speaking on behalf of the Communi-
ty, on behalf of the Commission of the
European Communities, I'm not speak-
ing at the same level and not speaking
on behalf — for example, I'm not wishing
to take the place of Mrs. Thatcher,
y,..„.
A5^
who's President of the Council at the
time being.
But I would like to say that the
Community, particularly countries not
represented at the summit, wish to be
heard— wish to speak. And we have
been heard. It is being sufficiently often
said that times are very hard. They are
particularly hard for the European Com-
munity. Why is this so? Because in
terms of trade, we are more vulnerable
than anybody else. We depend much
more on foreign trade and also because,
in monetary terms, our interdependence
is greater and, thus, perhaps we suffer
more greatly from the repercussions of
policies carried out in other industrial-
ized countries. Moreover, perhaps our
commitment is greater toward the Third
World since we are committed to the
Lome convention, for example which
binds us to a large number of Third
World countries.
It has been said that it was impor-
tant for us to get to know each other. It
was particularly important through per-
sonal contact to become aware of the
limits of everybody, to understand why
perhaps each of us has adopted
somewhat different attitudes. I think
that once this understanding exists,
there should no longer be any unclarity
among ourselves. We understand the
essential points. We agree, although we
do, all of us, understand that sometimes
we have to act differently. We agree
that trade at the world level must re-
main open, that protectionism is
something we all should avoid, that free
trade is a common rule that has to be
respected by everybody, and this is why
another conference at the ministerial
level will perhaps be organized.
We also understand why the United
States follows a certain policy while
other countries adopt another policy,
and we have to see, as the Chancellor of
Germany has just said, we will have to
see how each of us will have to react to
the results of this conference between
us. You will have to react as well, of
course.
Finally, I would like to say that I'm
very happy that during this summit of
the industrialized nations we did not
concern ourselves only with industrial-
ized nations. We dealt also with other
countries, with the developing countries,
not for reasons of charity but because
we know that the future of those coun-
tries will play an important part in our
16
own future. I am happy, on behalf of the
European Community, to be able to see
that on this point people have moved
closer together, and that dialogue,
perhaps even global negotiations, and
perhaps even the energy affiliate, on all
these points I think that we have achiev
ed greater agreement. We are happy to
see that concerning substantive matters;
we all agree and once again I would like
to thank Canada warmly for its ex-
cellent organization of this summit.
I
0£.\i*- ' ■ r
$W*i#**:
Statement on Terrorism
July 21, 1981*
1. The Heads of State and Government,
seriously concerned about the active support
given to international terrorism through the
supply of money and arms to terrorist
groups, and about the sanctuary and training
offered terrorists, as well as the continuation
of acts of violence and terrorism such as air-
craft hijacking, hostage-taking and attacks
against diplomatic and consular personnel
and premises, reaffirm their determination
vigorously to combat such flagrant violations
of international law. Emphasizing that all
countries are threatened by acts of terrorism
in disregard of fundamental human rights,
they resolve to strengthen and broaden ac-
tion within the international community to
prevent and punish such acts.
2. The Heads of State and Government
view with particular concern the recent hi-
jacking incidents which threatened the safety
of international civil aviation. They recall and
reaffirm the principles set forth in the 1978
Bonn Declaration and note that there are
several hijackings which have not been
resolved by certain states in conformity with
their obligations under international law.
They call upon the governments concerned to
discharge their obligations promptly and
thereby contribute to the safety of interna-
tional civil aviation.
3. The Heads of State and Government
are convinced that, in the case of the hijack-
ing of a Pakistan International Airlines air-
craft in March, the conduct of the Babrak
Karmal government of Afghanistan, both
during the incident and subsequently in giv-
ing refuge to the hijackers, was and is in
flagrant breach of its international obliga-
tions under The Hague Convention to which
Afghanistan is a party, and constitutes a
serious threat to air safety. Consequently th
Heads of State and Government propose to
suspend all flights to and from Afghanistan
in implementation of the Bonn Declaration
unless Afghanistan immediately takes steps
to comply with its obligations. Furthermore,
they call upon all states which share their
concern for air safety to take appropriate ac
tion to persuade Afghanistan to honor its
obligations.
4. Recalling the Venice Statement on th<
Taking of Diplomatic Hostages, the Heads ol
State and Government approve continued
cooperation in the event of attacks on
diplomatic and consular establishments or
personnel of any of their governments. They
undertake that in the event of such incidents
their governments will immediately consult
on an appropriate response. Moreover, they
resolve that any state which directly aids ant
abets the commission of terrorist acts con-
demned in the Venice Statement, should fact
a prompt international response. It was
agreed to exchange information on terrorist
threats and activities, and to explore
cooperative measures for dealing with and
countering acts of terrorism, for promoting
more effective implementation of existing
anti-terrorist conventions, and for securing
wider adherence to them.
•Issued to the press in Ottawa by Prime
Minister Trudeau, chairman of the summit,
on behalf of all the participants.
Department of State Bulle
,tir,
Feature
Economic Summit
Ottawa, 1981
ess Briefing
Secretaries
ug and Regan
awa
y 21, 1981s
Ve were told that the United
,es wanted some kind of language
tie communique pointing out the
ger, vulnerability, and over-
jndence on Soviet trade. Such
;uage is not in there. So why isn't
nd how much of a disappointment
that it's not there?
i Secretary Haig. I think, in the first
e, what we came here to do was not
pok for language in communiques
rather, to have a very detailed ex-
lge on the interrelationships between
e with the East and, most par-
.arly, the Soviet Union, and the
lical and security implications of
ii trade. We are very pleased. If you
i refer to, I think it's paragraph 12 of
fcommunique, I think we have some
I • specific language there and in the
mage preceding it. It's not 12. I
Lk it's in the back page of the com-
irique, the penultimate paragraph.
And the paragraph preceding that is
• :isely what we were seeking. That's
ugraphs 36 and 37. I think what's im-
j ant to recognize here is what we are
i ing about is reviewing and con-
l.ng together to tighten up the
■bushed procedures for controlling
[flow of military-related end items
, technology and technology-related
security- related trade with the Soviet
on. So I can't accept the premise of
r question, although I certainly
erstand the reasons for it.
Q. Then you would say that it
lly makes no difference that there
0 such reference in there?
Secretary Haig. No, I specifically
r you to the two paragraphs that I
mentioned, and I think you will find
•e is a very clear reference to it.
1 think you've heard a lot of
ruage and probably you've never
n as briefed as you've been on this
unit. Clearly, we are all very, very
sfied with the summit because of the
y of view that emerged from it. I
lk from the political point of
view— and as you know, this is the key
aspect of this summit, economics — and
those discussions that were held in the
margins and during meals and which
were primarily political in character, I
think we are extremely pleased, and the
manifestation of that pleasure was con-
tained in the briefing of the chairman of
the summit yesterday afternoon, Prime
Minister Trudeau. In that declaration
there was a strong reference to the need
for international restraint. In the con-
duct of international affairs there was a
reference to the collective concern of the
member governments about the growth
in Soviet military power and in the
growing proclivity of the Soviet Union
to use that power. There was specific
reference to the Middle East situation
and the current tensions there. There
was a clear manifestation of what I call
the balanced exposition of what is
American policy and, clearly, the unified
policy of the member governments, and
that is that we are seeking to maintain a
military balance with the Soviet Union
while being prepared for a dialogue to
include the initiation of arms control
talks leading toward balance and a
verifiable arms control outcome.
As you know, we made reference in
that statement to the CSCE conference
[Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe] in Madrid and a new
initiative made yesterday by the
Western powers, and specifically, Mr.
Kampelman [head of the U.S. delegation
to the CSCE], in which we attempt to
clarify the recent French initiative
designed to achieve the confidence-
building measures from the Atlantic to
the Urals, and we're hopeful that the
Soviets will respond. There was
reference to the unsatisfactory situation
in Afghanistan, endorsement of the re-
cent U.N. conference on Kampuchea, in
which two-thirds of the member states
of the United Nations joined in a plea
for the withdrawal of North Vietnamese
forces from Kampuchea and an ap-
propriate political settlement which
would reflect the will of the Khmer peo-
ple.
There were references to refugees,
and I think there was an extremely im-
portant separate document released by
Prime Minister Trudeau on the subject
of terrorism. As you know, this has been
an issue that we in the United States
have had a very keen interest in for an
extended period of time in this Ad-
ministration, and so we are very, very
pleased with the consensus arrived at on
that subject. And it was timely, because
here we have another aircraft hijacking
today.
I think, all in all, from the political
point of view, we are extremely pleased
from the U.S. side with the outcome of
this and, most importantly, pleased at
the consensus that exists between all the
member governments.
Secretary Regan. From an
economic point of view, I think the Ot-
tawa summit was very useful and very
successful. It gave President Reagan an
opportunity to explain his economic
recovery program. He was able to
reflect on his vision of leadership and, at
the same time, to express concern over
economic conditions both at home and
abroad.
I would say that the President re-
mained firm in the defense of his pro-
gram and in the methods that he is us-
ing—his four-point program— in order
to combat inflation and to see that his
program is successful.
I think the two problems that
everyone expressed concern about— the
two economic problems that face the
world that are of the greatest impor-
tance at this moment— are inflation and
unemployment. We pledged to reduce in-
flation, and the general consensus was
that the proper ways to do it were
through limited monetary growth and
through controlling budget deficits.
Everyone there deplored high interest
rates, including the United States. We
all agreed that stable foreign exchange
policy was desirable. We all agree again
on a liberal trade policy, saying that that
was necessary for trade, not only among
us but trade with the less developed na-
tions. And we considered how we could
be helpful in the area of economic help
for these less developed countries.
We maintained our faith in the inter-
national financial institutions and
reiterated that we should work through
them. Then we talked about energy and
we came back to reliance, primarily on
market forces, in energy.
All in all, I would say that the
results of the summit and what is in that
communique hit on all fours with the
President's program.
Q. It was 1 year ago at the Venice
economic summit that the Europeans
got together and published their own
.12-
initiative on the Middle East, which
would have a larger role or a role for
the Palestinians. A year has passed
and nothing appears to have happened
on that initiative, and it did not ap-
pear to have come up during this sum-
mit. Is there some understanding be-
tween you and the Europeans that
they will hold back until the United
States has had a full run at the Camp
David process?
Secretary Haig. Not in the context
of your question. I think it's important
to remember that there have been a
number of events over the past year
which have had a somewhat slowing ef-
fect on the Camp David peace process,
which is the process underway — elec-
tions here in the United States, elections
in Israel, and, I think, a de facto consen-
sus by all who are concerned that until
these political events were behind us it
would difficult to achieve progress,
although some progress has been
achieved— specifically the Sinai
peacekeeping force arrangements that
were initialed a week ago which would
lead to the withdrawal of Israeli forces
from the Sinai by May of next year. I
would anticipate, following the meetings
of the Prime Ministers to Washington,
some further movement in the autonomy
talks.
In the meantime, our European
partners have been engaged in an essen-
tially fact-finding process which ran well
into last spring. That is what the Euro-
pean initiative thus far has amounted to
and I think even the so-called European
initiative is a misnomer. Our European
partners are fully cognizant of the pace
and direction of U.S. efforts and
especially those recent efforts that have
been taking place over the last month or
so associated with the crisis in Lebanon.
There were free, full, and very, very ex-
tensive exchanges between both the
foreign ministers and the heads of state
and government on the current situa-
tion. I had an opportunity to talk in
detail to the foreign ministers about
longer term aspects of the peace
process.
Q. Did you bring up the Sinai
multinational force with any of these
European allies, and did any of them
suggest that they will be able or
would be willing to contribute troops
to it?
Secretary Haig. Clearly that's a
very sensitive question because we do
not want to get a checklist of who's been
asked and whom we've discussed until
we have put the force together. But I
can answer it to the extent that I would
suggest to you, yes, there were some
such discussions along those lines.
Q. If you have now had official
word about the qualified acceptance
by Prime Minister Begin, reported
earlier of the attempt at a cease-fire
by Ambassador Habib, how do you
evaluate it and how far does it go
toward meeting what the United
States was hoping would happen, and,
finally, what contribution would that
make toward a decision to resume the
delivery of F-16 planes to Israel?
Secretary Haig. As you know, Am-
bassador Habib has had several
meetings with Prime Minister Begin and
awaited the third meeting that he had
on this round until the completion of a
very lengthy cabinet meeting by the
Government of Israel. Following that
meeting, the Government of Israel
authorized, or at least concurred in, Am-
bassador Habib's travel tomorrow morn-
ing to Lebanon where he will attempt to
negotiate a calming of the situation and
a return to normalcy.
I think that is a positive response
. . . our West European
partners welcome what
they, to me, have referred
to as an American awak-
ening . . .
from the Israeli Government and,
therefore, we continue to have hope that
Ambassador Habib is going to be able to
put together a quieting framework or a
situation that will enable us to achieve
at least a temporary peace or a cease-
fire, if you care to use that term. And
that process will continue.
What it will mean with respect to
the second part of your question remains
to be seen. Clearly we have seen some
improvement in the military situation
over the last 24 hours. There's been a
very, very perceptible drop in the shell-
ings across both sides of the border and
some very limited air attack activities,
as I understand it, over the last 24
hours.
Q. In their final statements,
several of the leaders— President Mil
terrand, Chancellor Schmidt, among
others— were still complaining, it
seemed to me, about high interest
rates. I wonder if you have any com-
ment on that and also whether or not
you would have anything to say about
Chancellor Schmidt's suggestion thati
when he goes back home to Bonn, ho
was going to have to take new
measures to respond to the fact that,
unhappily or unfortunately, he said,
interest rates are going to stay high
for some additional time.
Secretary Regan. I don't think tha
anyone is happy about high rates of in-j
terest. I would suggest that not only ai
the heads of state unhappy about it bud
the finance ministers are, including tha
head of state of the United States and
the finance minister of the United
States. No one likes high interest rates
We are trying, however, to get inflatio
down. I know of no economist in the
world who can suggest a way to have
high inflation and low rates of interest!
Accordingly, after we got through ex-
plaining this to them and asking for sui
gestions if there were any from our
friends who were here at the summit,
they all agreed we should stick to what
we're doing.
But I think that one of the better
remarks was made by the head of the
EEC [European Economic Community
as he was leaving and said goodbye to
me. He said: "Hurry it up, will you? W<
can't wait too long." And I think that's
the attitude that everyone has. If we
would just get inflation down as quickh
as possible and, therefore, interest rate
down, they would be very happy.
As far as Chancellor Schmidt is con
cerned and what he is going to have to
tell his people upon his return, each
leader has to solve his own economic
problems in his own way. We can offer
sympathy but certainly no advice on ho
to handle his situation. None of us, I
repeat myself, want this condition. We
inherited it, and we're doing our best tc
overcome it.
Q. Did Chancellor Schmidt in-
dicate in his session with you just
what sort of measures he has in mind
Secretary Regan. I got the impres
18
Department of State Bulleti
Feature
Economic Summit
Ottawa, 1981
but with no definitiveness, that it
d be along the budgetary lines.
J. You mean tighter budget
sures?
Secretary Regan. Yes.
J. There were many questions
about President Reagan's ability
cplain his foreign policy to the
d leaders and how much support
I'ould get for that here. How suc-
ful was he? Is there more support
y for America's foreign policy
than there was before he came
Secretary Haig. First let me sug-
I and let me assure you, now, the
lident has seen, of course, Mrs.
cher and Chancellor Schmidt. He
I lot met President Mitterrand or
I e Minister Spadolini. He had met
I e Minister Suzuki and, of course,
i e Minister Trudeau, whom he had
I Dn two occasions,
n answering your question, I don't
| to accept its premise. I can assure
i ;hat our partners who are here at
! conference have never had any
! tion about America's foreign policy
e President's ability to articulate it.
lisely the opposite. In my meetings
kia at ASEAN [Association of South
! Asian Nations], where I met with
! apanese Foreign Minister and in
i iscussions with the Japanese
: ign Minister on Monday, again, this
i :. There was clear and unusual ac-
■1 for President Reagan's foreign
y, his articulation of it, and their
I rstanding of it. It came up this
i ling at breakfast, as a matter of
I with the Prime Minister. That is
true, clearly, with Mrs. Thatcher
| Chancellor Schmidt and in the case
e new Italian Prime Minister and
iiew French President. This was
first opportunity, and I must tell
anyone observing President
jan's performance, personal perfor-
ce, at this summit, could not but
i with a deep sense of respect and
iration for his grasp of the substan-
issues discussed. I'm not an
iomist but I know that my colleague
I will say that there are few men,
I leaders in the Western world today,
have a clearer picture of where he
ts to go and how he wants to get
e in our economic affairs, both
estic and international.
But secondly, he also reflected a
very clear grasp from start to finish of
the interrelationship, if you will, and the
complexity of the political, economic,
and security nexus which [inaudible] of
all of our nations which share common
values.
Thirdly, I think as an observer and
on a personal observation basis, the
man's ability to deal in moments of
stress and tension where there are clear-
The United States has
probably been the least
effective in increased
levels of spending of all
the NATO countries . . .
ly potential disagreements around the
table, to bring himself above those petty
bureaucratic squabbles, and to set a tone
which leads all participants to focus on
the importance of solidarity and unity
and commonness of purpose was an
outstanding demonstration of our Presi-
dent's qualities. I don't think any of the
leaders who sat down with him over
these last 2 days left that experience
without a profound sense of respect for
the President's performance here.
Q. Before the summit began it was
considered that some of the European
allies thought the President's policies
toward the Soviet Union were too
tough. Do you regard what happened
here, and primarily and specifically
the tying of trade to security and
political issues, as an endorsement of
the American policy toward the Soviet
Union?
Secretary Haig. Again, I want to be
sure and emphasize my own assessment
of what sometimes appears to be dif-
ferences in atmospherics in the trans-
atlantic sense, and I've had some ex-
perience in that over the last 7 years.
Surely, some of the American initial
rhetoric, which was such a sharp depar-
ture in a dialectic sense from previous
policies of the American government,
came as a different style and a different
approach. In some instances, it raised
concerns, especially associated with the
tensions in Poland and the aftermath of
Afghanistan and the great European
concern about the need to get on with
the task of arms control negotiations.
But let me also assure you that our
West European partners welcome what
they, to me, have referred to as an
American awakening— an awakening
which recognizes that America has a
leadership role to play in this decade of
the 1980s and that we had not been
playing it very well in the decade of the
1970s. They are all enjoying somewhat
of a sigh of relief that the American peo-
ple are willing once again to pick up the
burdens of international leadership in a
modified way which gives greater
weight to the views of our partners and
which is structured on largely enhanced
consultation of the kind we have just
finished here.
I think the answer to your question
is if you read the political summary — the
chairman's summary — put out yester-
day, I think you will find that it is
replete with the affirmation of the kind
of statements this Administration has
been making and which President
Reagan has been making since he ar-
rived in Washington. I don't call that the
consequence of a selling job because
that's not what it was but, rather, a con-
vergence of views among the member
states, which are all threatened by the
dangerous international situation we
face today.
Q. On the Middle East situation;
from your comments that the situation
seemed to be at least temporarily a bit
better, is there some U.S. understand-
ing in any form with the Palestinians
and the Israelis that they would at
least slow down their conflict at this
point and, secondly, how could Am-
bassador Habib hope to proceed all the
way to a solution if he's dealing with
the Lebanese officials who may not
have that much influence with the
Palestinians?
Secretary Haig. I think, first, there
is clearly some kind of an understanding
with the Government of Israel. Am-
bassador Habib will go to Lebanon and
talk with the internal parties there, and
especially President Sarkis. I don't think
anyone has to play any games that there
are a number of channels of communica-
tion to the Palestinian guerrillas who
have been operating along the border of
northern Israel. There have already
been some assurances, as I understand,
none that were generated by the United
19
States, because we are not in the
business of negotiating directly with the
Palestinians and have not been until cer-
tain conditions, established 6 years ago,
are met, and that is that they would ac-
cept the provisions of 242 and 338.
None of this means that we are fac-
ing an impossible task; not at all;
precisely the opposite. There are ways
and ways of doing things in the Middle
East, and we've been living through that
maze for too long, I'm afraid. But
nonetheless, we've been living through
that maze and it is an achievable objec-
tive.
The most important thing for us all
to remember is that we've had an
escalating cycle of violence with in-
creased levels of casualties, especially to
noncombatants. This is a tragic situa-
tion, and it's going to require the best
efforts of all. It is not going to require a
departure from longstanding American
policy with respect to whom we
negotiate with.
Q. Can you describe those under-
standings at all?
Secretary Haig. You mean with
Mr. Begin?
Q. With Mr. Begin and, presum-
ably, with the Palestinians?
Secretary Haig. No. I have no
understandings with the Palestinians.
The U.S. Government has no under-
standings. I thought I made that clear.
There are no understandings. There
have been discussions, I know, through
U.N. channels, which we have been
made privy to, but they do not represent
the consequence of any American
negotiations or contacts with the PLO
[Palestine Liberation Organization].
In the case of Mr. Begin I think we
told you that we have at least had the
authorization of the Israeli Government
for Ambassador Habib to go on to
Lebanon, to see President Sarkis and
others involved, and to see what can be
done to quiet down the situation which
is the most important and urgent task
before us.
Q. What decided in terms of
Western aid for Third World energy
development? Will it be in the context
of a World Bank affiliate, and what
role should the OPEC nations play in
Third World energy development?
Secretary Regan. There was accent
in the paragraphs in the communique
that refer to energy — let me refer to
them myself — that had to do mostly
with the free market and utilization of
existing organizations rather than trying
for new organizations. There was a
statement about nuclear energy. And
the actual statement there says: "... in
most of our countries, progress in con-
structing new nuclear facilities is slow.
No one likes high interest
rates . . . I know of no
economist in the world
who can suggest a way to
have high inflation and
low rates of interest.
We intend in each of our countries to
encourage greater public acceptance of
nuclear energy, and respond to public
concern about safety, health, and
nuclear waste management and non-pro-
liferation . . . We will take steps to
realize the potential for the economic
production trade and use of coal and will
do everything in our power to ensure
that its increased use does not damage
the environment."
What we're talking about there is
there can be greater alliance on the
private market system in conjunction
with the World Bank rather than to set
up a new affiliate. There's nothing in the
communique, although the matter was
discussed, to indicate the desire on the
part of those attending the summit to
start out anew with a separate energy
affiliate.
Q. In terms of the nuclear energy,
does that also include helping under-
developed nations develop their
nuclear energy capacity?
Secretary Regan. Where that is
feasible, although in most cases that is
not needed where other methods of im-
proving their energy condition can be
used rather than nuclear.
Q. Yesterday Prime Minister
Trudeau said that if he had to draw a
conclusion from the summit, it would
be that the Americans have been sen-
sitized to the effect of their policies
on their partners. Would you comme
on that? Do you agree with that?
Secretary Regan. That's a good
word, "sensitized." I thought we were
sensitive to their feelings about high ir
terest rates long before the summit.
They did reemphasize it at the summit
We did get a greater understanding — .
more personal understanding — of wha
their problems are. And, as we make
decisions in the future affecting our
economic policies — naturally now that
we know them better and that we've
talked to them and have understood
their problems better — we will take
those into consideration as we make o\
own policies.
Q. Do you feel you've been given
deadline to do something on interest
rates?
Secretary Regan. No, we don't.
They just kept saying do it as quickly i
possible. President Mitterrand told us
that he had problems concerning
unemployment in France that would
soon reach a critical stage and he hope |
that long before that, we would be abl I
to get our interest rates down because I
he thought then the rest of the world
could have lower interest rates and th;
in turn, would help small business in
France, which in turn would help his
unemployment problem. The connectio
is there.
Q. Before you sent the message
yesterday from the President to Prii
Minister Begin suspending the
shipments of the F-16s, how many
other messages had gone from you t
Prime Minister Begin?
Secretary Haig. I don't make it &ti
habit of outlining the numbers of
messages other than I can tell you the
was another message that day.
Q. The reason I ask is that befor
the Israeli official announcement
which you have, it referred to Begin
reporting to the cabinet his conversa
tion with Habib and also the persons
messages— plural— from Secretary o1
State Haig.
I
Secretary Haig. That's what I thi
I just answered. There was a message
the morning. There was a message in
the night, both of which were approve!
by the President in full conformance
with his wishes.
20
Department of State Bull€
Feature
Economic Summit
Ottawa, 1981
J. Can you tell us what was in the
fcage"'
sage.
Secretary Haig. I hope you will
some sympathy for my reluctance
> so. We would have no diplomacy if
/ere to engage in that kind of actH
tivi-
J. The earlier message that you
send to Prime Minister Begin, did
espond to that one? To the one
re the suspension of the F-16s?
Secretary Haig. Yes, in effect, of
se. We're in constant touch with our
iassy in Israel. We know precisely
i a message has been delivered and
the reaction to the message was
the response. Sometimes we get a
formal response. Sometimes we
in a fast-moving situation,
;thing less than that.
don't know where you're driving,
t's a very foggy speculation.
b. In the direction that you
howledged. I was driving toward
Uarlier message which you would
share and asked for sympathy,
:h I offered, and [laughter] that's
!re I was driving.
Secretary Haig. That's what I call a
»ry at the end of a 2V2 day summit.
I ghter]
4. Before the start of this con-
tnce, serious questions were being
;d about the future strength of the
nee. What specifically do you
in when you say that the con-
mce has been successful? Can you
us some assessment of the future
do you feel the alliance is going to
ther the current economic and
tical storms?
Secretary Haig. I will take a piece
then I will ask my colleague to take
ther piece, which involves the ec-
mic leg of the question.
With respect to the alliance, this was
an alliance gathering, but rather the
ailed seven plus one. As you know,
alliance would involve 15 of our
TO member states. But, in essence, I
k, clearly — and this would force me
eflect back to the Rome ministerial
JATO and the political summary
jed upon here — that the consistency
the unity of purpose and the
larity of outlook and concern are
f reassuring factors in the Atlantic
community today. I must add that this
summit was unique and that we had our
main Pacific partner also participating
and also sharing a commonality of view
and outlook and concern.
All of that suggests some reason for
optimism. The security aspects of the
alliance have been a focus of mine for
almost 7 years, as you know. And I
think, steadily, over those 7 years, there
has been an awakening, if you will, of
the dangers facing us commonly in the
military terms and a somewhat
strengthened dedication to deal with
those dangers in a more integrated and
effective way. I left NATO 2 years ago
absolutely convinced that the integration
of the alliance had achieved levels never
before achieved.
The United States has probably been
the least effective in increased levels of
spending of all the NATO countries for
a rather prolonged period — someone
said a 20% drop in real term spending
by the American Government over the
last decade.
Our West European partners, on the
other hand — while they're not doing as
much as we'd all like to see — have been
generally more responsive and have
moved up in their levels of expenditure.
One who lives in West Germany today
might say: "Well, we've been carrying a
heavy burden for an extended period,"
and, indeed, they have, but that's not
unique. All of these things would sug-
gest that there is a keen awareness on
the part of the alliance as a whole that
we are facing dangerous times. One of
the great complications and aggrava-
tions in dealing with the political- and
the security-related aspects of our prob-
lem is the economic, and I'd like Don to
comment on that.
. . . the knitting together
of the nations, to me, was
the most important
aspect from an economic
point of view.
Secretary Regan. From the point of
view of the economic side, I would say
that we came away from here more in
agreement than I would have imagined
as the summit started.
The finance ministers got along ex-
ceedingly well. We had several very
frank, very open, you might almost
phrase it as no-holds-barred, type of
discussion. It was very free-wheeling, in
which the questions arose about each
other's economies and each other's
political and economic — mainly
economic — philosophies were discussed
and the methods of arriving at conclu-
sions as to how to handle the various
economic problems that confront the
world today.
From that, we drew the conclu-
sion— and incidentally, you know that
80% of the gross national product of the
free world was represented at this sum-
mit among the seven finance ministers
who sat down together — that we
understood what each other was doing
and our mutual independence.
Let's take just the subject of trade
as an example. There we realized that
some of the export subsidies and some
of the internal, hidden subsidies that are
going on in promoting trade among each
other were damaging all of us and that
this was something we should try to
work to eradicate.
When you can reach that type of
conclusion with the finance ministers,
this will be reflected in what our — as we
call them — our masters and one
mistress would have to say. From the
point of view that the free world has to
get together in order to solve these
problems mutually, there's no way that
one country can do it on its own.
Chancellor Schmidt reminded us of
something; if this were taking place in
the 1930s, first of all, there probably
wouldn't even be such a conference
among such a group of nations. Second-
ly, certainly we wouldn't be on a first
name basis. And thirdly, we would not
under any conditions have agreed to try
to help each other out from an economic
point of view. In those days it was
beggar-thy-neighbor rather than what
we have today — mutual understanding
and mutual cooperation.
From the point of view of this sum-
mit, the knitting together of the nations,
to me, was the most important aspect
from an economic point of view.
Q. Judging by the communique
and the content of our briefings,
there's been limited discussion of
Poland at this summit. I wonder if
that reflects a belief on the part of the
leaders that the danger of a Soviet in-
vasion has passed, and beyond that
was there any discussion among the
economic ministers and the foreign
ministers of how to solve Poland's
economic crisis?
Secretary Haig. The answer to that
is yes in both instances. There were
rather extensive discussions among the
foreign ministers on the subject of
Poland, and these assessments were
shared in the margins by the heads of
state and government as well and I
know by the finance ministers.
With respect to the situation in
Poland, I think there is a definite sense
of relief that the recent party congress
was permitted to proceed peacefully on
the terms decided by the Polish people.
There was an unprecedented secret
ballot which selected the new member-
ship— political leadership — in Poland,
and that represents well over a 90%
turnover. The character of that turnover
is yet to be manifested and the days
ahead will be a reflection of that, but it
looks like a continuation of the
moderating' trends.
All of these things, I want to
underline, are the business of the people
of Poland, and from that point of view I
think we are all encouraged that this
process has taken place. There was
great concern expressed, both in
economic and, more importantly I sup-
pose in the near term because of the in-
terrelationship with the political, of the
dire economic situation in Poland today.
There were many exchanges of view
among the leaders in the bilaterals and
the multilaterals and among the foreign
ministers with respect to developing a
consensus that we in the Western world
are going to have to help Poland.
There are many ways under which
that will take place, from food transfer
to economic support. Don, would you
care to comment?
Secretary Regan. From our point of
view, we discussed how our represen-
tatives were getting along, discussed the
Polish debt, the rollover of the Polish
debt, both principal and interest. We dis-
cussed the role of the private banks and
how they were progressing in their talks
with Poland regarding their loans. We
also discussed the effects on our nations
of this Polish loan question and further
aid — whether we could afford it, how it
could be done, things of that nature.
Let me at this point make a very
definite statement. No conclusions were
reached. This is a process that is in
development, and it's a process that
must continue, not only now but in the
future as well.
Q. What was the Japanese
response to calls for freer trade, and
can you detail changes in export sub-
sidies and internal hidden subsidies?
Secretary Regan. The Japanese
said they were for free trade. As a mat-
ter of fact, Prime Minister Suzuki made
quite a statement on this subject. He
was listened to very carefully. There
were some questions put to the Japanese
regarding some of their trading prac-
tices. They answered them that they
welcomed foreign investment in Japan,
that they recognized that some manufac-
turing companies and some service com-
panies had difficulty in selling in the
Japan market. They thought this was
because they didn't understand the
Japanese consumer. They thought that
there was very little impediment from
the governor's point of view standing in
the way of free trade.
Q. Do you agree with that? Are
you in accord with that?
Secretary Regan. We had our own
points of view which we stressed to
them on the necessity for things that we
thought could be done to make it a more
open trade. We recognize that Japan has
a favorable balance of trade, not only
with the European nations but with us
as well. We thought that there is more
they could be doing to alleviate that con-
dition.
Q. And can we expect any changes
because of the summit — with Japan,
trading with Japan?
Secretary Regan. I wouldn't want
to put my finger specifically on it and
point to any changes in the near future,
but I think it's something that Japan will
definitely start considering as far as its
long-range economic policies are con-
cerned.
Q. You might have heard the
Soviet press commentaries on the U.S.
approach to the summit, saying that
you are trying to line up your partners
to pursue a cold war policy against the
Soviet Union. Do you have any com-
ment on that?
Secretary Haig. Why, of course.
[Laughter] I suppose for many years
we've been exposed to that kind of pr<
aganda. If one would reflect back ovei
the last 5 years, the problems that ha\
developed between East and West, an
the United States and the Soviet Unio
in particular, have been with few exce
tions — and there have been a few — th'
consequence of Soviet international ac
tivity, in Africa, Angola, Ethiopia,
southern Yemen, northern Yemen, an
Afghanistan in the first instance wher
puppet ruler was installed and in the
second instance when an unprecedenti
invasion occurred in that country; Kai
puchea where the Soviet Union sup-
ported the invasion of a neighboring
country by some 200,000 North Viet-
namese troops who occupy Kampuche
today; the stepping up of insurgency
supported by Eastern bloc weapons; a
subversion and training in this
hemisphere. It would hardly be an obj
five witness who would not suggest tl
it is time that the United States and
those of us in the Western world who
share our values suggest to the Sovie'
Union leadership that this kind of inte
national activity is a risk to internatic
peace and that if they hope to enjoy t
benefits of normal intercourse with tr
West — and I clearly believe they
do — and trade, political, nuclear arms
control, and a whole host of other ink
faces, that it's time that we had some
understanding on this activity.
We made it very clear and we ha1
from the outset, we are prepared to s
down and negotiate these differences.
All we need is an indication that the
other side is willing to do so. We
discussed at this conference the recen
visit of the British Foreign Minister,
Peter Carrington, to Moscow, where 1
resurfaced and highlighted the Europ
Community initiative on Afghanistan,
which would seek a withdrawal of Sc
forces and self-determination for all o
the people. It's disappointing that the
Soviet leadership did not respond
positively.
'Held in the Old Executive Office
Building (press release 245 of July 21, 198
2Held at the Montebello press center
(press release 241 of July 20).
Administration officials gave press br
ings after the President's bilateral meeting
the texts of which were issued as White
House press releases.
4Text from White House press release
5Held at the National Arts Center (tex
from White House press release).
6Held at the Skyline Hotel (press relea
247 of July 22). ■
22
nani^mant r\t Ctato PiiIIj:
IE PRESIDENT
ews Conference of June 16
Excerpts)
ast month you told graduates at
re Dame that Western civilization
transcend communism and that
munism is, in your words, "A sad,
irre chapter in human history
>se last pages are even now being
tten."
In that context, do the events of
last 10 months in Poland con-
ute the beginning of the end of
iet domination of Eastern Europe?
A. What I meant then in my
larks at Notre Dame and what I
eve now about what we're seeing tie
sther. I just think that it is im-
sible— and history reveals this— for
form of government to completely
y freedom to people and have that go
nterminably. There eventually comes
nd to it. And I think the things
■e seeing, not only in Poland but the
orts that are beginning to come out
tussia itself about the younger
eration and its resistance to long-
e government controls, is an indica-
1 that communism is an aberration,
not a normal way of living for
nan beings, and I think we are seeing
first, beginning cracks, the begin-
g of the end.
Q. Have you learned anything in
past 10 days that would support
ael's contention that its attack on
Iraqi nuclear plant was defensive?
it was defensive, was it proper? If
vasn't defensive, what action
>uld the United States take beyond
idemnation?
A. I did make a statement in which
Dndemned that and thought that
re were other options that might
re been considered — that we would
re welcomed an opportunity, for ex-
ple, to try and intervene with the
;nch who were furnishing the nuclear
1 and so forth.
I can't answer the last part of your
istion there about future action,
ause this is still under review. Under
law I had to submit to the Congress
fact that this did appear to be a
lation of the law regarding American
ipons that were sold for defensive
poses. But I've not heard back yet
m the Congress, and that review is
yet complete.
On the other hand, I do think that
i has to recognize that Israel had
reason for concern in view of the past
history of Iraq, which has never signed a
cease-fire or recognized Israel as a na-
tion, has never joined in any peace ef-
fort for that— so, in other words, it does
not even recognize the existence of
Israel as a country.
But I think the biggest thing that
comes out of what happened is the fact
that this is further evidence that a real
peace — a settlement for all of the
Mideast problems— is long overdue, that
the area is torn by tension and hostility.
We have seen Afghanistan invaded with
the Soviets, Iran invaded by Iraq, and
that was in violation of a treaty.
Lebanon's sovereignty has been violated
routinely. Now this latest act. And I
think that what it should be is a compel-
ling move — and this I have stated to the
representatives of several Arab coun-
tries— a compelling reason why we
should once and for all settle this matter
and have a stable peace.
Q. But in this case, can you say
was it — do you think now that it was
a defensive move? Are there any — any-
thing which indicates that yet?
A. No, I can't answer that, because,
as I say, this review has not been com-
pleted. But what I would have to say is I
think, in looking at the circumstances
that I outlined earlier, that we can
recognize that very possibly in conduct-
ing that mission, Israel might have
sincerely believed it was a defensive
move.
Q. A couple of times in recent
weeks your staff has told us that you
were not quite ready to make a major
foreign policy address and declined
the opportunity to do so. In light of
recent events in the Middle East and
in Eastern Europe, have you given
some serious thought to a foreign
policy program across the board, and,
if so, could you give us today some of
the outlines of your foreign policy
beyond your often-expressed deter-
mination to stand up to the Soviets?
A. There seems to be a feeling as if
an address on foreign policy is somehow
evidence that you have a foreign policy,
and until you make an address, you
don't have one. And I challenge that. I'm
satisfied that we do have a foreign
policy.
I have met with eight heads of state
already, representatives of nine other
nations. The Secretary of State is mak-
ing his second trip and is now in China
and is going to meet with the ASEAN
[Association of South East Asian Na-
tions] in the Philippines and then go on
for a meeting in New Zealand. The
Deputy Secretary of State has been in
Africa and is now returning by way of
Europe. I have been in personal com-
munication by mail with President
Brezhnev.
I don't necessarily believe that you
must, to have a foreign policy, stand up
and make a wide declaration that this is
your foreign policy. I've spoken about a
number of areas. We are going forward
with a program— a tripartite pro-
gram—dealing with Central America
and the Caribbean. We have tried to
deal with various areas of the
world— both Asia, Africa, and in
Europe. And so as to an address, I
definitely did not do one at com-
mencements, because I happen to
believe, as I said at Notre Dame, that it
has been traditional for people in my
position to go and use a graduation
ceremony as a forum for making an ad-
dress that was of no interest particularly
or no connection to the occasion but just
for wide dissemination. And I thought
that the young people who were
graduating deserved a speech, whether
good or bad, that was aimed at them.
Q. Several of the Mideast leaders,
most particularly Syria, say that
because of the Israeli raid and the
U.S. response to it that envoy Habib's
[Philip C. Habib, the President's
special emissary to the Middle East]
peace mission is virtually eliminated,
that it's permanently damaged. Do you
agree with that, and if so, why not?
A. I hope it isn't. I know that he's
still there, and he has left Saudi Arabia
now for Damascus. And I think that he's
done a miraculous job so far when you
stop to think that when we sent him
there, they literally had the weapons
cocked and ready for war. And it's been
several weeks now, and no war has hap-
pened. It would be just further tragic
evidence if this latest happening should
turn this off. But until he comes home
and says, "I give up," why, I'm going to
believe that we can do it.
Q. How appropriate do you believe
is Israel's decision not to sign the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and
not to submit to inspections by the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency?
gust 1981
23
The President
-'
A. I haven't given very much
thought to that particular question
there, the subject about them not sign-
ing that treaty or, on the other hand,
how many countries do we know that
have signed it that very possibly are go-
ing ahead with nuclear weapons. It's,
again, something that doesn't lend itself
to verification.
It is difficult for me to envision
Israel as being a threat to its neighbors.
It is a nation that, from the very begin-
ning, has lived under the threat from
neighbors that they did not recognize its
right to exist as a nation.
I'll have to think about that question
you asked.
Q. What do you think the proper
role of the United States is in prevent-
ing the spread of nuclear weapons and
nuclear weapons technology?
A. Our position is— and it is un-
qualified—that we're opposed to the pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons and do
everything in our power to prevent it. I
don't believe, however, that that should
carry over into the development of
nuclear power for peaceful purposes.
And so, it increases the difficulty, if
you're going to encourage the one,
because you have at least opened a
crack in the door where someone can
proceed to the development of weapons.
But I'm not only opposed to the pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons, but, as
I've said many times, I would like to
enter into negotiations leading toward a
definite, verifiable reduction of strategic
nuclear weapons worldwide.
Q. Every President since Dwight
Eisenhower seems to believe that if
the Soviet Union and the United
States actually get into a shooting
war, say, in Europe, it can't be con-
tained and it would spread to a ther-
monuclear war. Do you agree?
A. It's a frightening possibility, and
history bears it out. If we want to look
for one little bit of optimism anyplace,
the only time that I can recall in history
that a weapon possessed by both sides
was never used was in World War
II — the use of poison gas. And possibly
it was because the weapon was available
to both sides. But the weapons are
there, and they do extend to the bat-
tlefield use as well — the tactical
weapons as well as the strategic.
And I have to believe that our
greatest goal must be peace, and I also
happen to believe that that will come
through our maintaining enough
strength that we can keep the peace.
Q. I ask the question, because I
suppose that your defense stategy
depends on whether you think if the
Soviets invade Western Europe, a tac-
tical nuclear war could be fought
there and contained, or whether you
think that it would spread inevitably
to a thermonuclear exchange. What do
you think?
A. I thought I answered it. I try to
be optimistic and think that the threat
of both sides would keep it from happen-
ing, and yet, at the same time, as I say,
history seems to be against that, that
there comes a moment in desperation
when one side tries to get an advantage
over the other.
Q. As you know, the Israeli
Government has made the threat that
it might take military action to wipe
out the Syrian missiles in Lebanon. If
that were to be done against our
wishes, would you consider that a
violation of the terms of the laws
under which the Israelis have obtained
those weapons?
A. This one's going to be one, I'm
afraid, that I can't answer now as to
how— I would hate to see this happen.
They're defensive weapons. There's no
question about the direction in which
they're aimed. I'm speaking now of the
Syrian weapons. This would end our
prospects for trying to bring peace to
Lebanon, I know.
We're going to use every effort we
can to see that they, on either
side — that there isn't a firing of those
missiles.
Q. Secretary Haig, as you know,
announced in China today that the
United States is lifting its ban against
lethal weapons sales to the People's
Republic of China. I want to know if
you would explain to the American
people why you've decided to help the
People's Republic of China rearm
militarily and how you think the
Soviet Union will react to your action?
A. I don't know how the Soviet
Union will react, but all we have done
is — with the People's Republic of China
we've wanted — and I've said for a long
time — to improve relations with them,
move them to the same status of many
other countries and not necessarily
military allies of ours, in making certain
technology and defensive weapons
available to them. And I think this is a
normal part of the process of improving
our relations there.
Q. You said earlier that you
strongly oppose the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. Yet at the same
time, you are asking Congress to
waive an American law so that
Pakistan, which has refused to sign
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
can receive $3 billion in American ai
Do we have any assurances from
Pakistan that they will not seek to
build an atomic bomb?
A. Let me just say with regard to
Pakistan — and I won't answer the last
part of the question — we have had a
long-time treaty with Pakistan in a
mutual aid pact. But Pakistan is also i
a very strategic position now in view c
what has happened to Afghanistan. Ai
I believe it is in our best interest to be
supportive of Pakistan.
Q. How do you assess the curreml
situation in Poland? And the second I
part of that is whether the warming j
up of relations, especially in the
strategic military area with China, h I
any connection in your mind with
events in Poland?
A. No, I don't see any connection
between China and what's going on in j
Poland. I think the Poland situation is
going to be very tense for quite some
time now. The Soviet Union is faced
with a problem of this crack in their
once Iron Curtain and what happens i
they let it go. But on the other hand,
what is going to be the impact if they
take a forceful action? The impact on
the rest of the world, I think, would b
tremendous in the reaction that would
come from all the—
Q. The point of my question wa>
that there was a list being made up
the Pentagon of weapons which mig
be supplied to China in the event tlu
the Soviets invaded Poland. There h:
been a connection drawn by General
Haig and others that one way to det
the Soviets in Poland is to make it
clear that they might have to pay by
increased American aid to China. Do
that exist in—
A. These might have been con-
tingencies that were discussed. Certair
they are not policy in our Administra-
tion.
Q. Returning once to that questic
of lifting of the lethal arms sales
shipments to China, does that affect
any way our relationship with Taiwa
and if so, how? Does that move us in
any direction either to or away from
the government of Taiwan?
24
Department of State Bullet
IE VICE PRESIDENT
ice President Visits Paris and London
Vice President Bush departed
hington June 23, 1981, to confer with
ich and British Government of-
is. He was in Paris June 2^-25, in
ion June 25-26, and arrived back in
■hington June 26. On June 27 he
\ to California to meet with Presi-
Reagan.
Following are statements the Vice
sident made in Paris after his lunch-
with President Mitterrand at Elysee
ice, his new conference in London,
his news conference in California
after his meeting with President
jan.
lTEMENT,
MS,
JE 24, 1981
mid like to very briefly characterize
| discussion with President Mitterrand
irank, friendly, and constructive in
l Wishing a better understanding of
government's policies and his
lerstanding of the broad economic
I foreign policy objectives of Presi-
l Reagan.
We talked a lot about the economic
iation. President Reagan is looking
irard to meeting President Mitter-
i i. They will, of course, meet at the
Uwa summit and at Cancun, but we
: very hopeful of another visit as well.
Of particular interest was our
i ussions regarding the upcoming Ot-
| a summit— my explanation of our
I ninistration's economic intentions
I goals with particular emphasis on
problem that is plaguing us and con-
ling our French friends, of interest
js. This is an area of particular con-
a, very articulately explained to me
President Mitterrand.
The subject of security problems in
Middle East was also discussed, and
A. No, and I have not changed my
ling about Taiwan. We have an act, a
] called the Taiwan Relations Act,
,t provides for defensive equipment
ng sold to Taiwan as well as other
ngs in the relationship. And I intend
live up to the Taiwan Relations Act.
it is not an overstatement to say that we
found many, many areas of agreement.
Our European allies are sovereign
nations. The decisions on how they are
governed rest with their citizens and
with their elected representatives.
However, the position of the United
States on the subject of Communist par-
ticipation in the governments of our
allies is well known. This participation is
bound to cause concern, but having said
that, I do want to emphasize at the con-
clusion of these remarks that the talks
were warm, productive, and I expect
them to continue in that fashion
throughout the day. I would be remiss if
I didn't express my deep personal ap-
preciation to the President of France for
his extraordinary courtesy shown to me
as Vice President of the United States.
NEWS CONFERENCE,
LONDON,
JUNE 26, 1981
Let me just say that we've had a very
good visit, and I want to take this op-
portunity to thank the Prime Minister
for an extraordinarily hospitable dinner
last night, [British Foreign Secretary]
Lord Carrington for his generous
amount of time allocated to what I think
was a very useful exchange of views. I
leave here at the conclusion of a very
quick trip— 1 day in Paris, 1 day in Lon-
don—with a renewed sense of con-
fidence about the alliance. Our visit here
has been most reassuring, and I hope
that is reciprocal in every way. We
covered, with Lord Carrington,
almost— not every, but almost— every
issue one can think of. I had an oppor-
tunity for a rather private visit with the
Prime Minister and that also was most
useful, most relaxed. I would be remiss
if, before taking your questions, I didn't
express my gratitude and my thanks to
everyone involved in this visit.
Q. I assume you discussed the
Middle East with Lord Carrington,
who'll be the head of the Common
Market initiative in the Middle East,
and I was wondering what impression
you got as to how active a role
Western Europe plans to take in the
Middle East this year and whether it
conflicts with what the United States
is trying to do.
tt from Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
, Documents of June 22, 1981. ■
A. Let me answer the second part
first. I see no conflict at all. It is hard to
quantify on something as difficult as the
Middle East— a degree of initiative— but
we see no incompatibility between the
European Community initiative and the
Camp David process.
Q. We've heard that there is an in-
creasing amount of alarm being ex-
pressed in Washington about what
sometimes is called the growing
pacifist movement in Europe at the
moment, particularly in West Germany
and the Benelux countries, and, as you
know, the Labor Party here is commit-
ted to unilateral disarmament. Could
you give us your thoughts on that?
Are you worried about that?
A. I don't think we're so worried
about it because we do feel that the
governments involved will keep NATO
commitments. I think you're right that a
concern has been expressed in the past
on this subject, but I've seen nothing on
this trip to alarm me and to make me go
back with any heightened degree of con-
cern on that.
Q. On the subject of real com-
mitments, as you probably know, the
British Government is moving toward
a reduction in surface ships in its
Navy in the Eastern Atlantic. Is there
any concern that this will leave a gap
in Britain's NATO commitment?
A. We're more inclined, I think, to
look at the positive aspects of it, which
show that in the face of financial dif-
ficulties here— just as we have them at
home— the commitments are being kept.
I expect that the question you most
understandably ask will be discussed not
by me in a public forum but by our
Secretary of Defense and the Minister of
Defense, and I expect these will be
through negotiations accommodation.
The thing to emphasize is not the
negative aspects of this story but the
positive aspects and that is that the
United Kingdom is keeping its commit-
ment.
Q. [Inaudible but the subject was
the rapid deployment force in the Per-
sian Gulf area.]
A. I think everyone who is here is
familiar with the U.S. policy on this. I've
been in multilateral diplomacy from time
to time, and I've seen resolutions
passed, come and go; nobody is going to
jgust1981
25
The Vice President
inflict upon governments external force.
That is not our goal with the rapid
deployment force, but we have many
friends in that area and we have obliga-
tions in that area and I, again without
being Pollyannish about it, am not in-
clined to look for difficulty over a resolu-
tion. We will do what the President of
the United States and our Secretary of
Defense has indicated, and if there is
cooperation here so much the better.
But I wouldn't read too much into
multilateral pronouncements. We take
them very seriously, but we also have
strong bilateral relationships in the area,
and we have commitments that involve
international waters, for example, where
we act within international law and that
could well encompass certain parts of
this rapid deployment force concept.
Q. Is there any link between the
agreement now to put American
troops into the Sinai area being en-
forced and plans for, say, a rapid
deployment force?
A. No, I wouldn't say there is
linkage. I'd look at this Sinai force as a
step toward peace, a fulfillment of the
Camp David accords which we feel very
strongly about.
Q. If I may look back at your visit
to France, I see that Mr. Cheysson has
spoken of an error of evaluation on
the part of the U.S. Administration
about the presence of Communists in
the government. Could you comment?
A. In the first place, the story I
read today was quite inaccurate, talking
about a statement made after I left
Paris — Mr. Cheysson's interview —
unless there was another one. It took
place on a radio station — one of these
drive-time radio stations — before I left,
and, very frankly, as is his style — and
very courteously I might add — the
Foreign Minister discussed this state-
ment with him, and I've indicated over
there the U.S. position. I just have a
feeling that when all sides understand
each other that there won't be in the
French situation the complications that
s^me might think. You had a more
specific part to your question, and if
you'd ask it again I'll try to be a little
more specific.
Q. Could you comment on Mr.
Cheysson's reported remarks in a
radio interview that there was an
error of evaluation "by the United
States Administration about the com-
position of the French Government"?
A. I think that there was a very
helpful effort by President Mitterrand
and by the Foreign Minister to explain
exactly what it is they were doing in this
regard, and I would not plead guilty to
any error of evaluation. I do think that
given the time they gave me to explain
this the best thing would be not to fully
air it here but to go back and discuss
with our President and our Secretary of
State the position explained to me in
great detail by President Mitterand and
by the Foreign Minister. I don't think
that there is an error of evaluation on
our part. I do think that they were very
forthcoming and that the most confiden-
tial discussion we had, when their posi-
tions are explained and evaluated, that
it will be very helpful to our govern-
ment. I would not plead guilty to any
error of evaluation.
Q. Why is it taking your govern-
ment so long to get into arms limita-
tion talks with the Russians?
A. I am not sure it's taking so long.
This is a good opportunity to explain our
view. In the first place, you have noted
in theater nuclear forces a willingness to
negotiate. On strategic arms limitation,
the President's views — you've got to go
back to the campaign, because there is
an odd thing about this President; he in-
tends to do what he said he would do
and keep his word to the American peo-
ple. What he said he'd do is to be
prepared to negotiate and to negotiate
for a reduction in nuclear weapons and
one that is totally verifiable. We have
not been enthusiastic about SALT II;
that's very well known. That's something
that in our country was just a matter of
continuous discussion. That does not
mean, however, as some of our friends
think here and at home, that we are not
prepared to negotiate. The President
also, when he talks about negotiation,
does feel that there should be a wide ar-
ray of subjects to be negotiated. There is
another point and that is that we are
determined to correct the trends that
have set in — the adverse trends — in
terms of military strength. I can't give
you a definitive date or time, but I can
tell you that there is nothing changed in
the President's willingness to talk along
the broad lines that I have outlined here
today.
Q. The European Community has
put forward a proposal for negotia-
tions with the Soviet Union on
Afghanistan. Do you think there
should be any linkage between those
talks that come about and theater
nuclear forces discussions?
A. I would refer you, I think, to th
Community on that initiative and to se«J
their views. But as it was explained to [
me, there was no linkage foreseen; thai I
is an EC initiative. The answer to your I
question I think should best come from |
them.
Q. There have been reports that
the United Kingdom is seeking
logistical facilities with the rapid
deployment force from Pakistan as
part of the new military aid package
to that country. Would you like to
comment?
A. No, I would not like to commen:
on that.
Q. On the question of Namibia
which you discussed with Lord Car-
rington, how do you reconcile your
Administration's seeking some kind <
preelection constitutional agreement I
with the Security Council plan which
the five Western partners still sup-
port?
A. Our view was that our plan
would advance Security Council Resolu
tion 435. Our plan is that what we wan>
is a settlement in Namibia, and we wai
some progress. We have already passei |
a resolution— 435— but we felt in takir |
the initiative that we did, admittedly
with not too much success, that we we
advancing the cause of settlement, not
obstructing it. It does seem to us, and |
believe that the United Kingdom woulc
agree with this and I know others agn
with it, that there has to be some
guarantee of constitutional rights. Tha
was what we were trying to do at the
United Nations. I was Ambassador at
the United Nations and, without being
too critical, we passed many resolution
there where everyone knew nothing w;
going to happen. This contributed to th'
irrelevance of the United Nations in
some ways. I made a speech on this in
New York before the U.N. Association
or 3 weeks ago. Now I am more of a
critic of the United Nations than I was
there but I'm more of a supporter. Our
support, which is not personally what I
think, but the U.S. Government suppor
can be much greater if we feel that the
United Nations can take meaningful
multilateral initiatives, do something
that's going to effect something. That,
fact, is what we were trying to do
rather than simply reiterate an old posi
tion. I really think we're trying to brin£
things forward in what we were doing
there at the United Nations.
Q. Did the subject of Northern
Ireland come up in your talks?
26
Department of State Bulletii
The Vice President
A. Yes. During the course of yester-
, I had a good explanation of the
ernment's position on that. I think
■yone here is familiar with the U.S.
tion.
Q. Since last September talks have
n going on in Madrid on European
irity. Do you think this exercise
been productive from the Western
it of view and how much longer is
United States prepared to allow it
ontinue?
A. I'll be honest with you. I don't
w the answer to your question. I
't know how — I can't quantify the
ree of the productivity of that
;ting. I'm sorry, I just can't help you
t, and it's a lack of reading up on it.
Q. We've heard various versions,
nely from Israel, about the United
tes knowing that Iraq is working
an atomic bomb or knowing that it
t. What did the United States
iw, and when did it know it?
A. Again, I feel that we said at the
ted Nations, in this instance really,
that constructively needs to be said
ut that event. I don't think it would
aseful to go into a charge and
ntercharge, to be more responsive to
ary penetrating question on who
w what and what papers — alleged
iers — that are classified said or didn't
I don't think I can be helpful to you
that. The United States, as you
>w, took the position in condemning
act that it did not approve of. I'll
ve it there, and that probably says
te a bit about all the facts to the case.
iWS CONFERENCE,
INT MUGU NAVAL AIR STATION,
NE 27,1981
ist had a good visit at the ranch with
i President — reported to him on our
p to France and to England, filled him
on a visit that I had with Phil Habib
lilip C. Habib, the President's special
lissary to the Middle East], who flew
:k with us from England with a very
ef stop in Ireland. Then we discussed
ittle bit of our forthcoming visit to the
ilippines which, in a sense, is
■emonial, but also I will be having
iteral meetings with the Prime
raster of Thailand, I believe with Lee
.an Yew of Singapore, and probably
; Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr.
Vice President Bush and French President Mitterrand. (White House photo)
Sonoda. We talked about those forth-
coming meetings, and that was the pur-
pose for my visit here. I'll be glad to re-
spond to a few questions.
Q. What did you tell him about the
Communist participation in the French
Government and how we should relate
to it and what should be our policy?
A. We have a policy and that is not
to intervene in the internal affairs of
France. We expressed concern. I had a
long, very frank, very cordial discussion
with the President of France. The U.S.
Government has stated its position, and
there's no point in restating its position.
France is a strong ally of the United
States, and we're going to work closely
with France. That's what I'm sure the
President wants, and that's the way it's
going to be.
Q. There's an open wound with the
U.S. -French relations now. The
Minister of France for External Af-
fairs has said, in so many words,
"please mind your own business."
A. I think France probably would
prefer that we not express concern
about what they view as an internal
matter. Our concerns relate to external
matters, and I don't happen to believe
there's any open wound. And I'll bet you
President Mitterrand doesn't believe
there's an open wound. Everybody's
positioned now on this question. I can
tell you I've had a very long visit not
just with him but with the Prime
Minister and with the Foreign Minister,
Cheysson, and I just don't happen to
agree that there's any open wound.
There may be a little difference here and
there, but some of it's their business and
some of — if it has international aspects
and affects U.S. policy then it's ours.
Q. [Inaudible] the U.S. position is
"unacceptable."
A. Don't believe that without see-
ing it in the total context. I talked to
him at length, and if he's changed his
position within the last 48 hours, all I
can do is tell you what it was like when
I was there. And I just can't believe that
he feels that our overall relations with
them are unacceptable or what position
he doesn't accept— I just don't believe it.
Q. What can you tell us about the
progress, or the lack thereof, of the
Habib mission?
A. I really would prefer for Phil to
mention it, but you know, in the first
place the President feels, and I concur
totally, that Phil Habib has done a very,
very good job. He went there with that
whole situation very, very tense, and I'm
not suggesting that the matter is re-
solved, but I think he deserves a great
deal of credit for the diplomacy that he
performed in lessening tension. I don't
think there's no end in sight on this
thing, but I do believe that he is owed a
vote of thanks so far for keeping the
matter defused.
There's a lot of discussions with him
that I'm sure the Secretary of State will
jgust 1981
27
The Vice President
•
have as to when he goes back and what
happens from here on, but that's about
all I can say about it.
Q. The President is not on record
yet with his views of the French
Government. What did he tell you to-
day?
A. I can't tell you what I discussed,
what the President said in various
words. The position of the United States
is stated on the French situation. Are
you referring to the make-up of their
cabinet?
Q. Yes.
A. We have expressed ourselves on
that, and the views expressed by the
State Department reflect the President's
views, so that's all I can say. But he's
not hyping that. There are so many
other areas of common grounds with
France, and we're not talking about this
one thing. What we should also focus on
is the fact that President Mitterrand has
made some statements in the area of
foreign policy that we very much sup-
port and taken positions that the United
States very much supports. I think we
have a tendency to take a point of possi-
ble difference and highlight it, and that
overshadows the common ground.
The relations with France are ex-
tremely important to us and they're fun-
damental and they are deep and they're
strong, and those are the points I want
to make here— not just to emphasize the
points of difference.
Q. Are you convinced that Britain
is going to live up to their commit-
ment to NATO with the 3% increase
[in military spending] in real terms
each year?
A. So far we're quite encouraged
about that, and the British have certain-
ly stated very recently their intentions
to do that. France itself, without details
of percentages, I think, has a very
realistic view of the problems that the
free world faces — the Soviet Union. And
I'm heartened. If you look at what Presi-
dent Mitterrand said in his campaign, I
think he's quite realistic about Soviet in-
tentions.
Q. Did you discuss with President
Mitterrand the access of secret NATO
information — Communist members of
his government? You didn't ask for
any—
A. No, I did not discuss that.
Q. There were reports in
Washington that the U.S. Government
was reassured that those defense
secrets would be —
A. I'm not going to go into those
kinds of details. I can't see any
usefulness to expand on what we've said
and I'm just not going to go into it fur-
ther.
Clearly, the United States is not pro-
Communist, and I believe that President
Mitterrand in France is not pro-
Communist. But what you get into
beyond that — I mean, if you see a com-
munist government in NATO, which we
don't have in France, that would cause
us tremendous concern. Our expression
of concern relates to eventualities
beyond where France stands right now.
Q. Did you receive any reassur-
ances from President Mitterrand that
he would not tell any NATO secrets to
these Communists?
A. I feel very strongly that Presi-
dent Mitterrand is quite realistic about
the Communist Party, which he's been
running against for a long, long time.
Q. Mr. Cheysson has just recently
indicated that France is going to
rebuild the Iraqi reactor. Was that a
subject of your talks with him?
A. No. That didn't come up, and I'm
not familiar with that position.
Q. Would that be a matter of con-
cern?
A. No.
Q. From time to time we hear of
repressions in the Philippine Govern-
ment, in a sort of pictorial manner at
times about President Marcos. Are
you going to discuss this with him in
any way?
A. I don't know whether we'll even
have bilateral discussions with the Presi-
dent. This is a very ceremonial occasion,
but we want better relations with the
Philippines.
We noticed, quite hearteningly, that
they have removed martial law, they've
had elections, and when we have human
rights differences with countries, we'll, I
think, feel free to at least express the
position of the United States. But I
think you're going to see that done much
more quietly than it's been done in the
past. We believe that that's the way to
affect change, maybe not beating our
breast about it out there in public, but
the President feels strongly that the way
to affect change is to make forceful
representations — to sometimes do it
quietly. But I would think this would not
be the case for that.
Q. Can we take your trip to mean \
that the Reagan Administration fully
approves the way Marcos' governmen
is handling things now?
A. Let me tell you what to take th
trip to mean — that we want to improvi
relations with the Philippines, that we
have historically good and strong rela-
tions with the Philippines. It's gone
through some ups and downs, and it's
our intention to demonstrate from this
that we do want better relations with
them — that we view them as a very iro
portant friend in the Pacific, and we
need more friends in the Pacific. That's
the way I view it.
Q. When you were in London, di<
you discuss with Mrs. Thatcher the
Thatcher government announcement
about major restructuring of the
British Navy— that is, diverting mon
from conventional ships to Trident
submarines? And what's your view oi-
that that you brought back?
A. Not with her, but I did discuss
that. I had an additional meeting with
Mrs. Thatcher, meetings with [Foreign
Secretary] Peter Carrington, and then
saw Mr. Nott, Defense Minister and
others in the British Government at a
luncheon. But, generally, we're pleasec |
that they're keeping their commitment
But this is a matter how— what forces i
are — they aren't able to do as much
with. That's a matter that has been
discussed with the Defense Departmer
between their Defense Minister Nott a-/
[U.S. Defense Secretary] Cap
Weinberger. I really think he'd be bett
qualified. We didn't go into that much
detail on it.
Q. Is it the American intention ti
take up the slack which will be
created by the diversion of funds for
British Trident?
A. No, we didn't go into that kind
of detail at all in the subject of defense
It was more very broad brush on that.
We didn't go into that.
Q. There's still some comments
about lack of foreign policy in the
Reagan Administration while you
were gone. Did you find comments
abroad in terms of wanting some
definition of some announcement,
some findings of where the Reagan
Administration stands?
A. No, not on a question of whethi
there's any foreign policy. But there
were plenty of questions about differed
areas of the world — what the
28
Department of State Bulleti
The Vice President
esident's view was on them, which I
nk you'd expect in any foreign visit.
1 1 didn't find the suggestion that
;re was no foreign policy.
Q. Were they unclear where the
Iministration's values were?
A. Perhaps they're more clear now.
Q. Why?
A. Because I answered a lot of
estions. Just like I wish everybody
re might be, but I don't know.
Q. What do you think the
cretary of State meant when he said
e other day that our relations with
e People's Republic of China has
len steadily on the decline for the
1st 3 years?
I A. I've not talked to him. And I
link what he was talking about is
lat — I know from my own experience
| China — they have been concerned in
je past, and I'm not here to condemn
(r predecessors or anything like that,
| what they have felt has been an
urealistic assessment of Soviet inten-
1ms. And so perhaps it was that area
lat the Secretary was addressing
Imself. I've not talked to Al on that
ice I've come back here.
Q. Did the President talk about
I e Haig trip at all? There's been some
nestion about their meeting the other
A. We talked about the trip, yes.
Q. Did the President feel that it
as a triumph when he talked about
A. We didn't talk about winning and
sing, but I think he feels it was a suc-
:ssful visit, yes.
Q. Could you elaborate on what
au said about the meeting in the
hilippines — those specific questions
lat you want to take up?
A. No, but those people will be
lere and what we're doing is setting up
bilateral with them. I mean, the
ecretary covered a lot of ground in the
lSEAN [Association of South East
Lsian Nations] meeting. But I am one
mo firmly believes that the United
'tates has a very useful role to play in
tie Pacific. I also believe the more high-
;vel contact we have with these coun-
ries, particularly those that I named,
he more useful it can be. I think they'll
e interested in exchanging views on
what's happening in Europe and other
places. There's no set agenda if that's
your question. I think it will be a wide
discussion of interests of common con-
cern.
Q. Do you think that we should
arm China against Russia?
A. My view is you don't play the
China card. I think there's a demeaning
concept in that in terms of our relations
with the People's Republic of China, our
relations with the Soviet Union, and
anybody else. We're not playing a
card — do something to make somebody
else do something different. That's not
the foreign policy of President Reagan
as I understand it, and I don't believe
that is what is involved. I think the
Secretary of State's discussion on that
matter — that this was a natural evolu-
tion as relations develop — is a very clear
explanation of what it is we're trying to
do.a
Visit to the Philippines
Vice President Bush departed the
United States June 27, 1981, to head the
U.S. delegation to the inauguration of
President Ferdinand Marcos of the
Philippines. He was in Manila
June 29 -July 1 and returned to
Washington June 3.
Following are the Vice President's
arrival statement, his luncheon toast,
and his statement to the press after the
luncheon with President Marcos.
ARRIVAL STATEMENT,
MANILA,
JUNE 29, 1981
I want to express my pleasure and that
of our entire delegation at being here in
the Philippines, your wonderful country,
to represent the United States at the in-
auguration of President Marcos.
For me and other members of the
delegation, I can say that it is a real
honor and it is a pleasure to be here,
and we are made doubly welcome by
having Mrs. Marcos, the first lady, and
my good and dear personal friend,
Foreign Minister Carlos Romulo, here to
greet us. You honor us; you both honor
us.
Our two peoples have much in com-
mon. We share deep and longstanding
ties and affection for each other, and
our mutual esteem and friendship have
remained firm over the years. We both
aspire to peace and prosperity for
mankind— aspirations that President
Eisenhower reflected when he sum-
marized the basic message of Jose Rizal,
the Philippine national hero whose
monument I plan to visit today. He ex-
pressed that message in these words:
"Filipinos, Americans, forever
strengthen your brotherhood. Forever
grow together in knowledge; in wisdom;
in your faith as a people of God . . .
for all peoples' good and His glory."
For more than three decades we
have worked together fruitfully and har-
moniously to enhance the security of
both our countries, and I know we can
count on each other to continue to do so.
You may also be assured that we
respect the important work that the
Philippines is doing with its fellow
members in the Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in enhanc-
ing peaceful cooperation in the region
and in speeding its economic develop-
ment.
For any American a visit to the
Philippines has a special significance.
We are always aware of the great
courage, dedication, and sacrifices of the
Philippine people who have done more
than their share in facing aggression
whenever it threatened freedom. You
have stood shoulder to shoulder with us
in peace and war, and we can never,
never forget that. It is a particular
honor for me to be here as a represen-
tative of my country to participate in the
inauguration of your President. I look
forward to my stay here and to the op-
portunity to meet with President Mar-
cos, members of the government, and
the Philippine people.
LUNCHEON TOAST,
MANILA,
JUNE 30, 1981
I am delighted to be here representing
our President. We feel the same kind of
proximity that you very generously
talked about in your toast. And you,
rhetorically, asked why do we stand and
have stood traditionally close to the
United States, and you very generously
recounted some of the principles that
our country feels so strongly about.
\uaust1981
29
The Vice President
It's that, but I also hope when those
children who were there to greet us at
the airport yesterday asked the question
why do we stand close to the United
States, that, indeed, they will under-
stand our values, but that they'll also
know that part of the answer is because
we stand with the Philippines. We stand
with you.
And our President, our country has
a deep commitment in the Pacific; a
great respect not only for the Philip-
pines but for the other ASEAN coun-
tries. We love your adherence to
democratic principle and to the
democratic processes. And we will not
leave you in isolation to the degree we
have any vibrant strength — it would be
turning our backs on history if we did.
I couldn't help but notice as I went
to my bedroom last night, the medals
that were modestly displayed — but
displayed nevertheless — in a corner of
the room, and I saw the Silver Star,
Distinquished Service Cross, and the
Purple Heart, and many, many
others — President Marcos' service to
freedom and to our country.
Standing there with Foreign
Minister Romulo, I think also of the
same history and dedication and
sacrifice. One million of 16 million
Filipinos giving their lives for freedom.
And so we are pleased and privi-
leged to be here today. You have
honored this delegation by singling us
out — of all your distinguished foreign
visitors — and it means a great deal to
us, and it will to my President when we
get back there and tell him about it. But
with no further ado, I would like to
again say thank you. I would like to try
to tell you what the relationship between
these two countries means to us, and,
more than that, it's got to mean to those
countries that treasure freedom.
And so I would propose that we
drink a toast, celebrating the inaugura-
tion of Ferdinand Marcos as President,
drink a toast to the President, to the
first lady, and to the great and lasting
friendship between the American people
and people of the Philippines.
Vice President Bush and Philippine President Marcos. (White House photo)
STATEMENT TO THE PRESS,
MANILA,
JUNE 30, 1981
I just want to make a very brief report
on our activities so far. We have just
concluded a very lovely luncheon given
by President and Mrs. Marcos for the
U.S. delegation. I had there an oppor-
tunity to express to them our gratitude,
not just for that but for so many
courtesies shown us here.
I also had an opportunity to tell
President Marcos that it is the intention
of the Reagan-Bush Administration, and
of President Reagan, to improve and
strengthen relations with the Philip-
pines, to take into consideration at all
times the importance of the ASEAN
countries, to recognize that we have not
diminished our interest in fulfilling our
responsibilities in the Pacific area, and,
indeed, to make sure he understood tha
we want to help where can with the
reforms and the development that he
talked about in his inaugural address.
We were privileged to be here; I
mean that from the bottom of my heart
and, indeed, we really have been ac-
corded great hospitality. We look for-
ward to this evening and then we are
pushing off tomorrow and heading back
to the States after seeing some of our
military activities in this area. But it ha:
been a most enjoyable visit so far.H
30
Department of State Bulleti
IE SECRETARY
rms Control for the 1980s:
American Policy
Secretary Haig's address before the
eign Policy Association in New York
My U, 1981.1
want to say I'm very, very pleased to
> an opportunity to talk again before
Foreign Policy Association. I've al-
s believed that an effective policy
ad must be the product of support for
policy here at home. And this asso-
on and its activities have clearly
e a major contribution to that re-
ement here in America. It has always
■pened the issues for the American
)le and enabled them to decide for
nselves on these fundamental issues,
it is just such an issue that I would
to discuss today, and that is the vi-
important issue of the future of arms
rol in this decade of the 1980s facing
ericans. There is hardly a subject
ch enjoys or is a focus of greater in-
lational attention, especially recently,
ng our allies in Western Europe, and
good cause.
This is true because we are living in
cge when man has conceived the
ins of his own destruction. The su-
-ne interest of the United States has
n to avoid the extremes of either nu-
r catastrophe or nuclear blackmail,
inning with the Baruch plan, every
sident has sought international
jement to control nuclear weapons
to prevent their proliferation. But
i Chief Executive has also recogniz-
hat our national security and the
irity of our allies depend on
erican nuclear forces as well.
President Reagan stands in this trad-
i. He understands the dangers of un-
ked nuclear arms. He shares the uni-
isal aspiration for a more secure and
seful world. But he also shares the
/ersal disappointment that the arms
trol process has delivered less than it
promised.
One of the President's first acts was
rder an intense review of arms con-
policy, the better to learn the lessons
he past in the hope of achieving more
ing progress for the future. Two fun-
lental conclusions have emerged from
: review.
First, the search for sound arms con-
agreements should be an essential
nent of our program for achieving and
ntaining peace.
Second, such agreements can be
reached if negotiations among adver-
saries about their national security inter-
ests are not dominated by pious hopes
and simplistic solutions.
The task of arms control is enor-
mously complex. It must be related to the
nation's security needs and perspectives.
Above all, arms control policy must be
seen in the light of international realities.
As Churchill put it: "You must look at
the facts because they look at you." An
American arms control policy for this
decade must take into account the facts
about our security and the lessons that
we have learned about what works — and
what does not work — in arms control.
Despite the extraordinary efforts at
arms control during the 1970s, the world
is a less secure place than it was 10 years
ago. We began the process with the ex-
pectation that it would help to secure the
deterrent forces of both the United
States and the Soviet Union. But
Moscow's strategic buildup has put at
risk both our crucial land-based missiles
and our bombers. Simultaneously, the
Soviets have continued a massive buildup
of conventional forces and have used
them with increasing boldness. Their ar-
mies and those of their surrogates have
seized positions that threaten resources
and routes critical to Western security.
We cannot blame our approach to
arms control alone for our failure to
restrain the growth and use of Soviet
power. The Soviet Union did not feel
compelled to agree to major limitations
and adequate verification in part because
the United States did not take steps
needed to maintain its own strategic and
conventional capabilities. Nor did we re-
spond vigorously to the use of Soviet
force. The turmoil of the 1960s, Vietnam,
and Watergate all contributed to this
passivity. As a result, the basis for arms
control was undermined. We overesti-
mated the extent to which the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks would help to ease
other tensions. We also underestimated
the impact that such tensions would have
on the arms control process itself.
This experience teaches us that arms
control can only be one element in a com-
prehensive structure of defense and for-
eign policy designed to reduce the risks of
war. It cannot be the political centerpiece
or the crucial barometer of U.S. -Soviet
relationships, burdening arms control
with a crushing political weight. It can
hardly address such issues as the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq
war, the Vietnamese invasion of Kam-
puchea - which is the subject of our U.N.
conference here this week — the Libyan
invasion of Chad, or Cuban intervention
in Africa and Latin America. Instead,
arms control should be an element — a
single element — in a full range of politi-
cal, economic, and military efforts to
promote peace and security.
Principles
The lessons of history and the facts of in-
ternational life provide the basis for a
realistic set of principles to guide a more
effective approach to arms control. All of
our principles are derived from a recogni-
tion that the paramount aim of arms con-
trol must be to reduce the risks of war.
We owe it to ourselves and to our pos-
terity to follow principles wedded exclu-
sively to that aim.
Our first principle is that our arms
control efforts will be an instrument of,
not a replacement for, a coherent allied
security policy. Arms control proposals
should be designed in the context of the
security situation we face, our military
needs, and our defense strategy. Arms
control should complement military pro-
grams in meeting these needs. Close con-
sultation with our allies is an essential
part of this process, both to protect their
interests and to strengthen the Western
position in negotiations with the Soviet
Union.
If, conversely, we make our defense
programs dependent on progress in arms
control, then we will give the Soviets a
veto over our defenses and remove their
incentive to negotiate fair arrangements.
Should we expect Moscow to respect par-
ity if we demonstrate that we are not
prepared to sacrifice to sustain it? Can
we expect the Soviets to agree to limita-
tions if they realize that, in the absence of
agreement, we shall not match their ef-
forts? In the crucial relationship between
arms and arms control, we must not put
the cart before the horse. There is little
prospect of agreements with the Soviet
Union that will help solve such a basic se-
curity problem as the vulnerability of our
land-based missiles until we demonstrate
that we have the will and the capacity to
solve them without arms control, should
that be necessary.
oust 1981
31
The Secretary
Our second principle is that we will
seek arms control agreements that
truly enhance security. We will work for
agreements that make world peace more
secure by reinforcing deterrence. On oc-
casion it has been urged that we accept
defective agreements in order "to keep
the arms control process alive." But we
are seeking much more than agreements
for their own sake. We will design our
proposals not simply in the interest of a
speedy negotiation but so that they will
result in agreements which genuinely en-
hance the security of both sides.
That is the greatest measure of the
worth of arms control, not the money
saved nor the arms eliminated. Indeed,
valuable agreements can be envisioned
that do not save money and that do not
eliminate arms. The vital task is to limit
and to reduce arms in a way that renders
the use of the remaining arms less likely.
Just as arms control could not aim
simply at reducing numbers, so it should
not try simply to restrict the advance of
technology. Some technological advances
make everyone safer. Reconnaissance
satellites, for instance, discourage sur-
prise attacks by increasing warning and
make verification of agreements possible.
Submarines and other means of giving
mobility to strategic systems enhance
their survivability, reduce the advantage
of preemptive strikes, and thus help to
preserve the peace. Our proposals will
take account of both the positive and the
negative effects of advancing technology.
Whether a particular weapons sys-
tem, and therefore a particular agree-
ment, undermines or supports deterrence
may change with the development of
other weapons systems. At one time,
fixed intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) were a highly stable form of
strategic weapons deployments, but
technological change has altered that. We
need to design arms control treaties so
that they can adapt flexibly to long-term
changes. A treaty that, for example, had
the effect of locking us into fixed ICBM
deployments would actually detract from
the objectives of arms control.
Our third principle is that we will
seek arms control bearing in mind the
whole context of Soviet conduct
worldwide. Escalation of a crisis pro-
duced by Soviet aggression could lead to
a nuclear war, particularly if we allowed
an imbalance of forces to provide an in-
centive for a Soviet first strike. Ameri-
can foreign policy and defense policy, of
which arms control is one element, must
deter aggression, contain crisis, reduce
sources of conflict, and achieve a more
stable military balance — all for the pur-
pose of securing the peace. These tasks
cannot be undertaken successfully in iso-
lation one from the other.
Soviet international conduct directly
affects the prospects for success in arms
control. Recognition of this reality is es-
sential for a healthy arms control process
in the long run. Such "linkage" is not the
creation of U.S. policy: It is a fact of life.
A policy of pretending that there is no
linkage promotes reverse linkage. It ends
up by saying that in order to preserve
arms control, we have to tolerate Soviet
aggression. This Administration will
never accept such an appalling conclu-
sion.
Our fourth principle is that we will
seek balanced arms control agree-
ments. Balanced agreements are neces-
sary for a relationship based on reciproc-
ity and essential to maintaining the secu-
rity of both sides. The Soviet Union must
be more willing in the future to accept
genuine parity for arms control to move
ahead. Each agreement must be balanced
in itself and contribute to an overall bal-
ance.
Quantitative parity is important, but
balance is more than a matter of num-
bers. One cannot always count different
weapons systems as if they were equiva-
lent. What matters is the capacity of
either side to make decisive gains
through military operations or threat of
military operations. Agreements that do
not effectively reduce the incentives to
use force, especially in crisis situations,
do nothing at all to enhance security.
Our fifth principle is that we will
seek arms controls that include effec-
tive means of verification and mecha-
nisms for securing compliance. Unveri-
fiable agreements only increase uncer-
tainties, tensions, and risks. The critical
obstacle in virtually every area of arms
control in the 1970s was Soviet unwilling-
ness to accept the verification measures
needed for more ambitious limitations. As
much as any other single factor, whether
the Soviets are forthcoming on this ques-
tion will determine the degree of progress
in arms control in the 1980s.
Failure of the entire arms control
process in the long run can be avoided
only if compliance issues are clearly re-
solved. For example, there have been ex-
tremely disturbing reports of the use
chemical weapons by the Soviets or tl
proxies in Afghanistan and in SoutheE
Asia. With full Western support the
United Nations is now investigating t
issue of chemical weapons. Similarly, i
the spring of 1979, there was an extra
dinary outbreak of anthrax in the Sov
city of Sverdlovsk. Despite continued
probing, we still await a serious Sovie
explanation as to whether it was linke
activities prohibited under the biologi
weapons convention.
Our sixth principle is that our
strategy must consider the totality <
the various arms control processes i
various weapons systems, not only
those that are being specifically neg
ated. Each U.S. weapons system mus
understood not merely in connection \
a corresponding Soviet system, but ir
lation to our whole strategy for deter
the Soviets from exploiting military f<
in general. In developing our theater
clear arms control proposals, for exan
we should consider the relationship ol
theater nuclear forces to NATO's over
strategy for deterring war in Europe
cannot overlook the fact that our Eur
pean strategy has always compensate
for shortfalls in conventional capabilit
through a greater reliance on theater
strategic nuclear forces. If we are to )i
less on the nuclear elements in the fu
ture, the conventional elements will r
to be strengthened.
Prospects
What then are the prospects for arms
control in the 1980s? We could achieve
quick agreements and an appearance
progress if we pursued negotiation fo:
own sake or for the political symbolis
continuing the process. But we are co
mitted to serious arms control that tr
strengthens international security. Tl
is why our approach must be prudent
paced, and measured.
With a clear sense of direction an
dedication to the serious objectives ol
arms control, this Administration will
strive to make arms control succeed,
will put our principles into action. We
conduct negotiations based on close c<
sulfation with our allies, guided by th
understanding that our objective is e*
hanced security for all of our allies, m
just for the United States. We will w<
with the Congress to insure that our :
32
Department of State Built
The Secretary
■ol proposals reflect the desires of our
le, and that, once agreements are
tiated, they will be ratified and their
'mentation fully supported. We will
ily with agreements we make, and
ill demand that others do likewise.
By the end of the year, the United
;s will be embarked upon a new arms
ol endeavor of fundamental im-
ince, one designed to reduce the
it nuclear threat to our European al-
The impetus for these negotiations
back to the mid-1970s when the
ets began producing and deploying a
e new generation of nuclear systems
rned not to threaten the United
;s — for their range was too short —
o threaten our European allies,
e new weapons, and in particular the
ly 3,000-mile-range SS-20 missile,
not just modernized replacements
lder systems. Because of their much
ter range, their mobility, and above
leir multiplication of warheads on
missile, these new systems pre-
sd the alliance with a threat of a new
r of magnitude.
The pace of the Soviet buildup is in-
dng. Since the beginning of last year,
Soviets have more than doubled their
!0 force. Already 750 warheads have
deployed on SS-20 launchers. The
et Union has continued to deploy the
ange Backfire bomber and a whole
y of new medium- and short-range
ar missiles and nuclear-capable air-
. This comprehensive Soviet arms
lup is in no sense a reaction to
'O's defense program. Indeed, NATO
/ery little as this alarming buildup
ressed.
In December 1979 the alliance finally
onded in two ways. First, it agreed
jploy 464 new U.S. ground-launched
ie missiles in Europe and to replace
medium-range Pershing ballistic mis-
already located there with modern-
versions of greater range. Second,
alliance agreed that the United States
ild pursue negotiated limits on U.S.
Soviet systems in this category.
This two-track decision represents
icit recognition that arms control
lot succeed unless it is matched by a
r determination to take the defense
.sures necessary to restore a secure
ince. On taking office, as one of its
; foreign policy initiatives, this Ad-
istration announced its commitment
oth tracks of the alliance decision —
loyments and arms control. Last May,
tome, we secured unanimous alliance
orsement of our decision to move
ad on both tracks and of our plan for
lgso.
Since then I have begun discussions
in Washington with the Soviet Ambas-
sador on this issue. When I meet with
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at the
United Nations this September, I will
seek agreement to start the U.S. -Soviet
negotiations on these weapons systems
by the end of this year. We would like to
see the U.S. and Soviet negotiators meet
to begin formal talks between mid-
November and mid-December of this
year. We intend to appoint a senior U.S.
official with the rank of Ambassador as
our representative at these talks.
Extensive preliminary preparations
for this entirely new area of arms control
are already underway in Washington and
in consultation with our NATO allies in
Brussels. Senior U.S. and European offi-
cials will continue to consult after the be-
ginning of U.S. -Soviet exchanges. We
and our allies recognize that progress can
only come through complex, extensive,
and intensive negotiations.
We approach these negotiations with
a clear sense of purpose. We want equal,
verifiable limits on the lowest possible
level on U.S. and Soviet theater nuclear
forces. Such limits would reduce the
threat to our allies and bring to Europe
the security undermined today by the
Soviet buildup. We regard the threat to
our allies as a threat to ourselves, and we
will, therefore, spare no effort to succeed.
We are proceeding with these negoti-
ations to limit the theater threat within
the framework of SALT — the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks designed to limit
the nuclear threat to the United States
and to the Soviet Union. In this area, too,
we have initiated intense preparations.
These preparations must take into ac-
count the decisions we will take shortly
on modernizing our intercontinental bal-
listic missiles and our strategic bombers.
In the course of 10 years of SALT
negotiations, conceptual questions have
arisen which must be addressed. For in-
stance, how have improvements in moni-
toring capabilities, on the one hand, and
new possibilities for deception and con-
cealment, on the other, affected our abil-
ity to verify agreements and to improve
verification? Which systems are to be in-
cluded in a SALT negotiation, and which
should be discussed in other forums? How
can we compare and limit the diverse
U.S. and Soviet military arsenals in the
light of new systems and new technolo-
gies emerging on both sides?
In each of these areas there are seri-
ous and pressing questions which must be
answered to insure the progress of SALT
in the 1980s and beyond. Only in this way
can SALT become again a dynamic pro-
cess that will promote greater security in
the U.S. -Soviet relationship. We are de-
termined to solve these problems and to
do everything necessary to arrive at bal-
anced reductions in strategic arsenals on
both sides.
We should be prepared to pursue in-
novative arms control ideas. For exam-
ple, negotiated confidence-building meas-
ures in Europe could provide a valuable
means to reduce uncertainty about the
character and purpose of the other side's
military activities. While measures of this
sort will not lessen the imperative of
maintaining a military balance in Europe,
they can reduce the dangers of miscalcu-
lation and surprise.
We are eager to pursue such steps in
the framework of a European disarma-
ment conference based on an important
French proposal now being considered at
the Madrid meeting of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe. We
call upon the Soviets to accept this propo-
sal, which could cover Soviet territory to
the Urals. As we proceed in Madrid, we
will do so on the basis of a firm alliance
solidarity, which is the key to bringing
the Soviets to accept serious and effec-
tive arms control measures.
Our efforts to control existing nu-
clear arsenals will be accompanied by
new attempts to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons. The Reagan Adminis-
tration is developing more vigorous
policies for inhibiting nuclear prolifera-
tion. We expect the help of others in this
undertaking, and we intend to be a more
forthcoming partner to those who share
responsibility for nonproliferation prac-
tices. Proliferation complicates the task
of arms control: It increases the risk of
preemptive and accidental war, it de-
tracts from the maintenance of a stable
balance of conventional forces, and it
brings weapons of unparalleled destruc-
tiveness to volatile and developing re-
gions. No short-term gain in export rev-
enue or regional prestige can be worth
such risks.
It may be argued that the "genie is
out of the bottle," that technology is al-
ready out of control. But technology can
also be tapped for the answers. Our
policies can diminish the insecurities that
motivate proliferation. Responsible ex-
port practices can reduce dangers. And
international norms can increase the cost
of nuclear violations. With effort we can
help to assure that nuclear plowshares
are not transformed into nuclear swords.
33
The Secretary
In sum, the United States has a
broad agenda of specific arms control ef-
forts and negotiations already underway
or soon to be launched. The charge that
we are not interested in arms control or
that we have cut off communications with
the Soviets on these issues is simply not
true.
The approach I have discussed today-
stands in a long and distinguished Ameri-
can tradition. We are confident that it is a
serious and realistic approach to the
enduring problems of arms control. The
United States wants a more secure and a
more peaceful world. And we know that
balanced, verifiable arms control can con-
tribute to that objective.
We are also confident that the Soviet
leaders will realize the seriousness of our
intent. They should soon tire of the pro-
posals that seek to freeze NATO's mod-
ernization of theater nuclear weapons be-
fore it has even begun, while reserving
for themselves the advantages of hun-
dreds of SS-20s already deployed. They
should see that the propaganda campaign
intended to intimidate our allies and frus-
trate NATO's modernization program
cannot and must not succeed. Arms con-
trol requires confidence, but it also re-
quires patience.
Americans dream of a peaceful
world, and we are willing to work long
and hard to create it. This Administration
is confident that its stance of patient op-
timism on arms control expresses the
deepest hopes and the clearest thoughts
of the American people.
It is one of the paradoxes of our time
that the prospects for arms control de-
pend upon the achievement of a balance
of arms. We seek to negotiate a balance
at less dangerous levels but meanwhile
we must maintain our strength. Let us
take to heart John F. Kennedy's reminder
that negotiations "are not a substitute for
strength — they are an instrument for the
translation of strength into survival and
peace."
Secretary Haig Visits China:
Attends ASEAN
and ANZUS Meetings
■Press release 233.1
Secretary Haig departed the United
States June 10, 1981, to visit Hong Kong
(June 12-14), Beijing (June U-17),
Manila (June 17-20) to participate in the
foreign ministers' meeting of the Associa-
tion of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN), and Wellington (June 21-23)
for the 30th meeting of the ANZUS
(Australia, New Zealand, United States
pact) Council. He returned to the United
States (Hawaii) on June 23 and on June
25 was in Los Angeles to report on his
trip to the President.
Following are the Secretary's
remarks and news conferences made on
carious occasions during the trip, as
well as the text of the communique issued
at the conclusion of the ANZUS meeting.
BANQUET TOAST,
BEIJING,
JUNE 14, 19811
Nearly 10 years ago, it was my pleasure
to visit your country, and I am proud to
have participated in the historic renewal
of contacts between the United States
and the People's Republic of China. Our
rapproachement was based on strongly
held national interests, and the interven-
ing years confirmed that judgment. Con-
tacts between our two nations have
grown, friendship has flowered, and
mutual advantage has been served. Our
relations are now firmly based on the
joint communique that normalized our
diplomatic ties.
Four American Presidents-
including President Reagan — have at-
tached the highest importance to the
development and expansion of friendly
relations with your government. Our
cooperation serves our mutual in-
terests— it is essential to peace and
stability, not only in the Asia-Pacific
region but also to the world. I have
come to China in recognition of this fact.
Chinese-American cooperation is all
the more important today, when we con-
front serious threats to peace and tran-
quility, your statesmen have been warn-
ing of the dangers of aggression for
some time. You have long argued for
concerted action to prevent such
dangers.
President Reagan has pledged t9
the United States, working with its
allies and friends, will act with couraj
and consistency to resist aggression,
this effort, the United States conside
China to be a close and valued friend
Our national interests are parallel in
many respects; our policies can often
complement each other. We regard
China's strength, security, and well-
being as fundamental to the global
balance that is the basis for our own
security.
The President is committed to th
steady strengthening of our relations
was my honor today to explore with
ways to achieve this objective. I look
ward to further discussions, both wit
you and other Chinese leaders in the
days to come.
In this spirit, I propose a toast tc
the health of China's leaders; to your
health, Mr. Vice Premier; and to gro
ing friendship and cooperation betwe
the peoples and governments of our
countries.
BANQUET TOAST,
BEIJING.
JUNE 16, 19812
I arrived here in the spirit of friends
born of common interests. American
policy and Chinese policy are both
rooted in an objective appraisal of
strategic realities. My discussions wi"
you, with Vice Chairman Deng, Pren
Zhao, Vice Premier Geng, Vice Prerr
Bo, and others have confirmed that c
appraisals of the international situati
are, indeed, very similar and, therefc
that the prospects for our bilateral rt
tions are bright.
We have achieved this converger
of views despite the fact that our
peoples seek collective well-being anc
dividual fulfillment on different path;
But neither of us seeks to extend oui
economic or social systems by force,
our relations are based on mutual
respect. Thus I am convinced that wi
patience and far-sighted statesmansh
the differences history has bequeathe
us can be peacefully resolved. As we
proceed to build closer ties based on
common interests, we stand together
34
Department of State Built
The Secretary
desire to work toward a world order
id on equality and mutual respect
ng nations.
In the 1980s, the prospects for such
)rld order are under challenge. From
end of Asia to the other — in Kam-
lea, Afghanistan, and the Middle
t, in Europe, in Africa, in Central
;rica and the Caribbean — the hard-
independence of smaller nations is
opardy. Our talks have shown that
jricans and Chinese can work
ither to oppose efforts by other na-
to achieve global or regional
;mony. It is imperative that we con-
e to consult closely with each other
re\\ as with our respective friends
allies. The United States is corn-
ed to do so.
During my visit, I assured China's
ers that we intend to develop our
tions in accordance with the joint
munique on the establishment of
pmatic relations between us. This
was of unusual significance. It
pled us to dispel misapprehensions
to convey the resolve of the United
jes, under President Reagan's leader-
, to further expand cooperation be-
im our two nations. During the past
|ys, a solid basis has been laid for
[ficant progress in every field — in
lomic and technological cooperation,
efense, and in the development of
mon approaches to international
js of mutual concern.
On many of the key international
es of the day our policies and posi-
3 complement each other and are
■ closely aligned. We share the con-
on that the future of Poland,
Jianistan, and Kampuchea must be
rmined by the peoples of those coun-
i. Where aggression has occurred,
stand together with the peoples of
occupied nations in demanding an
ediate, complete, and unconditional
idrawal of all foreign forces.
My discussions with you and other
lese leaders over these last few days
3 been among the most productive of
experience. I am confident that
na— and the United States— will do
.t is necessary to insure that indepen-
t nations— great and small— can pur-
their aspirations for a better life in
ze. These talks have advanced our
ity to coordinate our efforts in every
ere to this end.
I will bring this important message
he next stop on my journey — the
;ting of the foreign ministers of the
ociation of the South East Asian Na-
is. The ASEAN governments lead
the international efforts to turn back
foreign- supported aggression in
Southeast Asia. They seek a region free
of great power rivalry, a goal supported
by both the United States and China.
In my meeting shortly thereafter
with our allies in the South Pacific, I
shall tell them that China and the
United States share with them a com-
mon determination to preserve the
peace of the Asian-Pacific region.
Finally, I will report to the Presi-
dent and to our allies and friends that
U.S. -China relations are strong and im-
proving.
It is now my honor to propose a
toast: to the health of all the Chinese
leaders with whom I have held such
fruitful talks during my visit; to the
health of all here tonight; to the friend-
ship and close cooperation of the United
States and China; and to world peace.
NEWS CONFERENCE,
BEIJING,
JUNE 16, 19813
I came to China to clear the air, dispel
some misapprehensions, and convey the
President's desire to inject new momen-
tum into our bilateral relationship with
China. Specifically, I came to discuss
with leaders of China major develop-
ments in the global strategic environ-
ment, regional issues of mutual concern,
and some bilateral questions.
My discussions over the past 3 days
have been unusually productive. They
confirmed the importance we attach to
high-level contact with the leaders of the
People's Republic. They also bore out my
expectation that we face important op-
portunities for moving our cooperative
ties with China on to a new plateau.
With regard to international issues,
it is apparent that the strategic realities
which prompted reconciliation between
the United States and China more than
a decade ago are more pressing than
ever. U.S. and Chinese perceptions of
the international situation have never
been closer. Our common resolve to
coordinate our independent policies in
order to limit the Soviet Union's oppor-
tunities for exploiting its military power
has, likewise, grown stronger. It is
clearer that China appreciates the steps
taken by President Reagan to restore
our military power, reinvigorate our
alliances and ties to friendly nations,
develop equitable relations with Third
World countries, and place our economy
on a sound footing.
With respect to regional issues, we
found that we shared objectives on vir-
tually all issues, even though our tactical
approaches may differ on some. Natural-
ly, much of our discussion focused upon
the challenges posed by the Soviet
Union and its proxies in Afghanistan
and in Indochina. We shared a common
determination to prevent the pressure of
other events from deflecting attention
away from this twin strategic challenge.
Our objectives in both areas coin-
cide— above all, in our resolve to press
for the complete withdrawal of foreign
military forces from Afghanistan and
Kampuchea.
On other issues, where our ap-
proaches differ to some extent as in the
Middle East and southern Africa, the
discussions were useful in narrowing the
range of disagreement.
On bilateral issues we made genuine
progress. Regarding Taiwan, I explained
that the unofficial relationship which has
characterized the contacts between the
people of the United States and the peo-
ple of Taiwan since normalization of
relations with the People's Republic of
China will be continued, and this was
understood.
I underscored our intent to promote
the evolution of our bilateral relations
with China on the basis of principles em-
bodied in the joint communique on nor-
malization. We discussed a number of
specific ways in which cooperation can
be expanded to our mutual benefit.
• I conveyed the President's intent
to treat the People's Republic as a
friendly nation with which the United
States is not allied but with which it
shares many interests.
• I informed them of the Adminis-
tration's intent to introduce legislation
amending U.S. laws which lump the
P.R.C. with the Soviet bloc.
• I outlined some changes in export
control procedures which we hope will
facilitate expanded trade with China.
There were a number of other more
specific results of these discussions.
• I extended, on behalf of President
Reagan, an invitation to Premier Zhao
Ziyang to visit the United States.
Premier Zhao accepted the invitation
and will visit our country sometime next
year. Premier Zhao also reconfirmed his
invitation to President Reagan to visit
the People's Republic.
• As you may know, some of our oil
companies have been concerned about
possible problems of double taxation
because of the way the Chinese tax code
■met 1QR1
_as_
The Secretary
is written. I raised these concerns, and
Bo Yibo welcomed my suggestion that
U.S. tax experts visit China to discuss
the matter, which is of potentially great
significance to future foreign investment
in oil exploration.
• With respect to economic coopera-
tion, the Chinese and we agreed to hold
the second joint economic committee
meeting, headed by Treasury Secretary
Regan and Vice Premier Bo Yibo, in
China this autumn.
• Bo Yibo also responded positively
to the suggestion that a separate joint
U.S.-P.R.C. commission on commerce
and trade be established and agreed to
consider a specific proposal at an early
date.
• I said in Hong Kong that I was
not coming to China on an arms selling
mission. But we did agree that ex-
changes between our respective defense
establishments would continue to ex-
pand. And Vice Chief of the PLA [Peo-
ple's Liberation Army], Liu Huanqing,
will bring a delegation to the United
States in August.
• With regard to consular matters,
we reached agreement on an exchange
of notes that will enable the P.R.C. to
open an additional consulate in New
York and the United States to open one
in Shenyang.
Because of our heavy schedule of of-
ficial discussions, my colleagues and I
had no opportunity to explore the world-
famed classical attractions of Beijing.
That extremely pleasant experience fell
to my wife, who visited the Palace
Museum, Great Wall, Ming Tombs, Sum-
mer Palace, and an experimental
elementary school. She was also par-
ticularly pleased to have had an oppor-
tunity to meet with Madame Kang
Keqing, Vice Chairman of the National
People's Congress and Vice Chairman of
the All-China Women's Federation.
I would also like to pay tribute to
the many Chinese friends and American
colleagues who worked so hard and so
effectively to assure the success of this
visit. I believed it was unusually signifi-
cant and successful. It foreshadows the
prospect that President Reagan's Ad-
ministration will be marked by a major
expansion of Sino-American friendship
and cooperation.
Q. You said the Chinese under-
stood your policy on Taiwan. Did they
accept it?
A. I think the issue is best ex-
plained by the words that I used. They
understand it.
Q. Were you able to assure the
Chinese that the United States will
not sell advanced fighter planes to
Taiwan, or what position did you take
on that question?
A. It is clear that the subject of arm
sales to Taiwan is a very sensitive issue
with the People's Republic of China, and
these issues were discussed. But this is
neither the time nor the place to go fur-
ther into that matter beyond the state-
ment I have just made.
Q. Did you discuss with them
what to buy, or is that something that
will occur when the Deputy Chief of
Staff— is that who you said is coming
to Washington?
A. The PLA's joint staff. Clearly
there were discussions revolving around
this subject, but, as I emphasized in
Hong Kong and continued to emphasize
during the visit, we were not here to
discuss the details associated with the
provision of armament sales or arms-
related technology. I would anticipate
that this will be explored in some depth
by the Chinese delegation that will visit
Washington. As I have emphasized re-
peatedly in the past, each issue will be
dealt with on a case-by-case basis follow-
ing the necessary coordination with af-
fected allies and with the American Con-
gress.
Q. Did you have any answer for
them on these computers that are be-
ing held up at the Pentagon?
A. No, I don't know which com-
puters you're talking about. You're talk-
ing about the census-related computers;
that issue has already been resolved. It
was before we came.
Q. What was the resolution?
A. They will be provided. We're
talking about the census computer.
Q. You said there's going to be the
effect of relaxation of trade restric-
tions. Could you give us an idea of
what items the Chinese will be able to
buy that they wouldn't have been able
to buy before, and what items they
may, in fact, be interested in purchas-
ing?
A. That's very difficult to be specific
on. I would say, in general, there would
be substantial loosening up of dual-use
technology. That's the common phrase
used to describe some high technology
items. It will remain to be seen what the
Chinese side might be interested in, and
then again we would deal with each re-
quest on a case-by-case basis. No, in
context of armaments unless it's arm
related but on a case-by-case basis
within the established procedures in i
bureaucracy. But the instructions to
American bureaucracy have already
gone out, and they will have the eff&
of loosening up former restrictions
maybe in the order or magnitude as
twice as loose.
Q. I don't understand the term
dual-use technology.
A. There are a number of compi
related and electric-related items whi
have an application in both the comir
cial and potentially the military field
that's the area where usually there's
most sensitivity in COCOM [Coor-
dinating Committee for East- West
Trade Policy] and other restriction
areas.
Q. Before you came, China saic
would make a strong response if tr
United States continued to sell
weapons to Taiwan. After your dis j
sions here, what is your understam
ing? Will they make a strong respo
to continued weapons sales?
A. I've said that this is a very se
sitive issue here, and we conducted s
discussions on it. I think both sides
understand one another, and that's f:i
enough.
Q. Has a decision been made ii
connection with the visit of the De
ty Chief of the Joint Staff to
Washington that the United States
ready to provide or sell lethal arms
nonlethal or some kind of military
equipment other than technological
equipment to China besides specifii
items? Has a policy been made that
this man would come to Washingto
to discuss what he might be interes
in buying?
A. Basically munitions-list restri
tions will be removed in general and
specific Chinese requests will be con-
sidered in conjunction with appropria
consultation with affected allies. Tha
means, in general, that there is a loo:
ing up over what has been previous
policy which was affected by munitioi
list restrictions.
Q. Are you able to outline in
general terms what type of equipmt
you are talking about?
A. I would view that this questio
serves no useful purpose to get out
ahead of reality. We may find that th
Chinese side is not particularly in-
36
Department of State Bulk
The Secretary
Ited in arms purchases. We may
Ithat it is interested in some arms
J would be imprudent to provide at
juncture. On the other hand we
lize the evolution of this relation-
that will be slow and measured and
ent and that would represent close
dination by both parties. That
n't answer your question because
juestion can't be answered, but it
give you some general guidelines
pproach.
Q. Are you thinking in terms of
ng China in a category such as
regards Yugoslavia which ob-
sly still regards itself as a Com-
ist country but is eligible for cer-
end items?
A. With, of course, the special in-
luality of the People's Republic of
1a being the overall criteria as well.
Q. Did you get any specific indica-
from the Chinese that they too
that these meetings were un-
dly productive? I ask that because
jclose reading of Foreign Minister
jng Hua's response to your toast
jcates a slightly lower level of en-
liasm.
I A. No, I don't presume to
| acterize the Chinese on this, but my
lassions today made it very clear to
:hat they are pleased with the out-
e of this visit as are we, that
iuse of some of the atmospherics
preceded the visit that it was an ex-
ionally important and significant
and I think from both of those
Its of view that it was a successful
and I merely refer to you — you
a> everyone reads what they want to
1 in a statement, and you can read
Vice Premier's statement a number
'ays, but I think he described it as
j successful. He described it as hav-
deepened our understanding and
iing positive results. Now I don't
w to tell you that it is not schooled
he People's Republic language that
;'s a significant term, positive results,
iddition he said I congratulate you
■mly for your successful visit — that's
ler explicit. Again I wouldn't
sume to put further words into their
aths but this was what has been said.
Q. The reason I asked you was for
previous phrase which is this point
never be overstressed which is
t we must prove with our own ac-
ns that our relationship can stand
t.
A. Absolutely, and I don't know
that anything about the outcome of this
visit runs counter to that statement.
Q. You mentioned fulfilling the
joint communique on establishment of
diplomatic relations. You made no
mention of the Taiwan Relations Act?
What was said in your discussions
about the Taiwan Relations Act?
A. I think I have already addressed
Taiwan to the degree that it is appro-
priate to do it, and if you look at my
original statement on it that will have to
suffice.
Q. What was achieved in terms of
security cooperation of some of the
things you talked about Kampuchea?
A. I think it goes without saying
that both the United States and the Peo-
ple's Republic of China have been ex-
tremely concerned about the situation in
Afghanistan, its implications for future
peace and stability in this region.
Clearly one of the discussions in-
volved the importance of the security of
Pakistan in this situation and the con-
vergence of views with respect to the
need to be sure that Pakistan has the
ability to defend itself and to maintain
its truly nonaligned posture. As you
know Under Secretary [for Security
Assistance, Science, and Technology
James L.] Buckley has just returned
from a trip to Pakistan where he con-
tinued with the discussions that I had
launched with the Pakistan Foreign
Minister in Washington several weeks
ago and from all reports — and I haven't
talked to Jim yet, but I will as soon as I
get back to Washington — that was a
very successful meeting which carried
forward the discussions that I had with
the Foreign Minister.
There is one area, rather specific, of
mutual concern. It was discussed where
a consensus of views was arrived at;
now we are also equally concerned about
the proxy forces of the Soviet Union
emanating from Hanoi, 200,000 of whom
are now occupying the neighboring state
of Kampuchea. We feel that it is fun-
damentally important that these two
issues not be submerged in the give-and-
take of other international preoccupa-
tions— for example, Poland — and that
major diplomatic and political efforts be
applied to the regimes concerned to
effect the prompt and total withdrawal
of forces from both of those countries
and to permit the people of those coun-
tries to determine their own future, free
of external coercion.
Q. Can you outline in a little more
detail what you mean by the major
diplomatic and political efforts?
A. As you know there are — this will
be a topic for example at the ASEAN
meeting; the situation in Afghanistan
but more importantly even in Kampu-
chea. As you know the U.S. Secretary
General is sponsoring a meeting on this
subject in the fall. A number of states
have already agreed to participate in it.
As you know Hanoi has recently at-
tempted to deflect this international
movement by attempting to convene a
regional conference which both the Peo-
ple's Republic of China and ourselves
consider to be no more than a ploy.
Q. Was there any agreement on
helping to establish a united front, or
united anti-Vietnamese front, in Kam-
puchea by the United States and
China?
A. I think we have some differences
of nuance on that issue, but we are
essentially of one mind as a united front
or a front that would be representative
of the wishes and the aspirations of the
Khmer people be formed and that free
elections determine the ultimate out-
come of the final regime there, and in no
way could the current puppet regime
established by Hanoi be representative
of a popular government.
Q. Was there any discussion of the
financing of Chinese military pur-
chases in the United States or loans or
soft finances?
A. No, but you'll recall when Vice
President Mondale — I believe 1979 there
was reference made to a $2 billion inter-
national loan which is still under active
consideration and which I hope will be
ultimately approved. There are some re-
maining technical difficulties with
respect to the U.S. contribution to the
international — what we call the Bretton
Woods instrument.
Q. You mentioned political and
diplomatic pressure being put on
Hanoi and Kampuchea. Are you and
the Chinese ready to do anything more
than simply political and diplomatic
pressure that has proved to be ab-
solutely useless in the case?
A. I think there are a number of ad-
ditional steps that can be considered and
that have been undertaken; for example,
the United States has been actively
engaged in a very high level of economic
support for the refugees. There are
other activities which one can con-
template in the future. I don't mean to
nnct 1Q«1
37
The Secretary
suggest there were not any active
discussions of that here. There was not
nor are we contemplating what I think
your question is driving toward and if it
were, I wouldn't say it.
Q. Is it correct to say from what
you said about removing the munitions
list controls that the United States
has agreed in principle to sell arms to
China but that the details of what it
will sell will be determined on a case-
by-case basis? Is that the upshot of it?
A. Yes, but you know that's not
that dramatic a change in the context of
the past, and in the past we did make
available certain dual-capable
systems — aircraft and what have you,
trucks and other things. Now we have
agreed to consider a much broader
range of requests on a case-by-case
basis, and, as I say, we would anticipate
that that would evolve in a steady
measured way.
Q. This would include not just
equipment but actual arms?
A. It might. It might indeed, and
such requests would be considered.
Q. At who's initiative is this being
done — considering arms on a case-by-
case basis? Did you come here propos-
ing this to the Chinese or did they say
they would like the United States to —
A. No, no. I think you will recall we
discussed this in Washington. This is a
decision that has been approved by the
President, recognizing, of course, that
case-by-case issues will have to be coor-
dinated with the appropriate Members
of Congress.
Q. In addition to talking about
possible defense sales exchange, train-
ing of members of the Chinese defense
establishment in the United States or
by U.S. military personnel or any
other planned exchange?
A. No, but that doesn't foreclose the
possibility of this topic coming up in the
future. Should the Chinese indicate that
they would be interested, we would be
willing to consider it.
ARRIVAL STATEMENT,
MANILA,
JUNE 17, 19814
I want to express the great pleasure of
Mrs. Haig and myself to be here in
Manila for this ASEAN dialogue. My
presence here, I think, confirms un-
equivocally the great level of support
that the United States has for this
regional grouping and the importance
the United States attaches to the
bilateral relationships it maintains with
each of the member nations of ASEAN.
ASEAN has become an international
symbol of the great accomplishments of
peaceful cooperation here in Southeast
Asia, and this dialogue here in Manila
once again underlines its fundamental
importance. During the next few days, I
would hope to use my time here to in-
dulge in consulations with the ASEAN
member foreign ministers, with the
other dialogue participants and
observers, and to conduct these con-
sultations in a range of focus that will
include global issues, important regional
security issues, and, of course, the equal-
ly important bilateral relationships be-
tween the United States and each of the
governments.
In particular, I think, this con-
ference will focus on the dangerous ac-
tivities of Vietnam with the encourage-
ment and with the support of the Soviet
Union, and specifically the U.N. interna-
tional conference scheduled for July
which I hope to participate in myself. I
will seek to enrich myself with the views
of the foreign ministers of the ASEAN
organization in preparation for that
meeting.
Finally, it is a wonderful pleasure
for my wife Pat and I to return to
Manila — to the Philippines, a nation
with which the United States has en-
joyed historic relationships, character-
ized by mutual trust and friendship. I
look forward, of course, to the honor
and opportunity of visiting once again
with President Marcos and also for the
opportunity to hold discussions with this
year's chairman of the dialogue, a distin-
guished international leader who has
become a legend in his own time. Gen.
Romulo [Philippine Foreign Minister].
DINNER TOAST,
MANILA,
JUNE 19, 19815
It is my privilege, on behalf of the
distinguished representatives here, to
respond, and I want you to know that
our distinguished Foreign Minister of
the Philippines is a very naughty man. I
also want you to know that I'm going to
keep my remarks very brief because I
don't want to cut into his slumber time.
As a matter of fact, "His Madame Kho-
meini" told me that ASEAN had three
golden rules for responses — that is a
snappy beginning; rule two, get a
snappy ending; and rule three, the m
important of all, is keep the two as cl
together as possible.
But I'm going to tell you a story
about generals, especially the worst
kind — retired generals. You know, w
I retired from NATO and went lookii
for work in the American industrial
scene, I was fingering through the w,
ads and I found an ad that said: Brai
transplants. And I read the number e
I called this New York number and s
enough a foreign-speaking medical e>
pert got on and he said: "Yes, you ca
the right number, I do brain trans-
plants." And he said: "I'm glad you
called today. I have a special this we<
And I said: "What do you mean?" He
said: "Well, I have an exbureaucrat's
brain for $10,000." He said: "I have a
retired foreign minister's brain —
$15,000!" He said: "I have a retired
defense minister's brain — $20,000."
He said: "But I have a real special. I
have a retired general's brain — $30,0
I said: "My God, why is the general's
brain so expensive?" He said: "It's sir
pie, it's like brand new — it's never be
used before."
I can assure you that Gen. Romu
brain is like brand new, and he has
proved it time after time during this
conference. Indeed, I think I'm the tl
consecutive Secretary of State from I
United States to participate in the
dialogue. And I know my predecesso
and myself leave the experience with
great sense of admiration and awe fc i
the dynamic character of this ASEAi
association spawned clearly from the
initiative of nations in the region
itself — spawned out of a sense of pui
pose and dedication, which has enabli
it, in its short life, to overcome the d
ferences of background, customs, anc
perspective; to develop a unity of pur
pose and action which is unique, peril
in all the world.
Our discussions over this period
have focused first and foremost, of
course, on the development and well-
being of the peoples of the region— c
mercial, trade, and, to some degree ii
directly, security. And, indeed, the fit
ble character of this association has
enabled it to shift that focus when
necessary to immediate threats to the
well-being and security of the region,
it has done with respect to the interv
tions in Kampuchea and the concertei
effort to deal effectively with that in-
tervention.
But I think one thing which im-
pressed me more than anything else i
my participation in the dialogue — anc
there are many things to be impresse
_^_
38
ripnartmpnt nf Staff
The Secretary
t — the skill and great dedication of
dreign ministers of the member five
rnments — but perhaps more impor-
ly, there was a common thread, and
common thread was interest in the
are of the common man in the
on. Perhaps the words of that great
world leader— Winston Churchill—
iciated some four decades ago, best
ure the essence of the challenge fac-
all free men today. And it was the
ds that suggested that this is the age
le common man, that unfortunately,
rchill stated: "It is this age that has
lessed more common men destroy
e common men with greater efficien-
han at any other five centuries in the
ory of mankind."
And so it is the purpose of ASEAN,
le who participate in the dialogue of
association, to dedicate ourselves to
good and the welfare of the common
of all of our nations and to dedicate
rselves to the proposition that our
rs, our concerted efforts, our com-
lality of purpose in thought and ac-
would be to insure that we do not
e a more frightened legacy in this
lear age to our children and their
dren. And that is the purpose of our
, and it is in that spirit that I would
to ask all here assembled to join me
toast, first to the Philippine nation
the Philippine people who have
le our stay here this week so en-
ible and so productive in substantive
ns; to our host, the distinguished
eign Minister of the Philippines and
wife, Gen. Romulo and Mrs. Romulo;
his dynamic and admirable ASEAN
Delation and all members of the
ogue; and, above all, to the good of
imon free men everywhere — to the
imon man.
ATEMENT TO
EAN MINISTERS,
iNILA,
NE 20, 1981
EAN is a unique organization —
nging together five great nations,
:h having achieved a different state of
^elopment. This rich diversity is but
3 example of why categories such as
i "Third World" are misleading as a
ide to policy. The U.S. approach
vard the developing world seeks to be
xible, recognizing both regional and
tional differences. And yet, as with
y policy, we are guided by principles
i beliefs which provide the overall
ection for our policy.
I would like to discuss two broad
aspects of our policy and how these two
principles help shape our relations with
ASEAN.
First, the United States remains
deeply committed to and concerned with
the development process. We under-
stand that historical change may be
desirable as it is inevitable, and we in
the industrialized free market economies
believe that we have something to offer
to this process of historical change. We
see a shift occurring — away from the
Soviet Union, which offers only arms, a
pervasive presence, and, in areas of
strategic interest, a client-state relation-
ship. We find that the Soviets are most
welcome where there is conflict, and we
know, as do you, that development and
national growth are the first victims of
conflict. On the other hand, the free
market model offers trade, credits,
technology, medicine, and the political
buildingblocks of modern society. And
its adoption brings participation in an in-
ternational marketplace where perfor-
mance determines rewards.
However, this growing momentum
toward the free market system and
away from the Soviet Union can only
flourish in an environment of peace and
security. And this is the second aspect
of our policy — that security and develop-
ment are intimately related and that we
are equally committed to both. The
economic and political growth that ac-
company the development process can-
not occur in an environment character-
ized by violence, bloodshed, and so-called
wars of national liberation. Because we
are concerned with development and
because we have seen so much progress,
we cannot sit idly by and permit the
Soviet Union and its proxies actively to
undermine and threaten the prospects
for development. The United States,
under President Reagan, is determined
to challenge blatant illegal Soviet in-
terventionism wherever it occurs.
Because these actions by the Soviets or
their proxies remain the greatest threat
to international peace, they are
simultaneously the greatest obstacle to
the development of free societies. And in
this very region, the threat to the prog-
ress of free societies grows increasingly
serious.
For the people of Vietnam, Laos,
and Kampuchea, the past 6 years have
meant no progress but stark tragedy
and misery. The Communist rulers of a
supposedly unified Vietnam have failed
New Initiatives on
Afghanistan and Kumpuchea
SECRETARY'S STATEMENT,
JUNE 30, 19811
I wish to underline the profound impor-
tance and promise of two new
diplomatic initiatives. Today the Euro-
pean Community announced a fresh at-
tempt to open the way to a political solu-
tion of the problem of Afghanistan-
proposing a major international con-
ference for this fall. On July 13th, a
U.N. conference opens in New York to
try to resolve the problem of Kam-
puchea.
These two issues are at the very
heart of the increase in international
tension in recent years. The combination
of Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea in
1978 and the Soviet Union's invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979 created a strong
reaction on the part of the vast majority
of members of the United Nations. The
continuing occupation and conflict in
these countries represent a major threat
to security in key regions. The vast
number of refugees reflects the terrible
human costs. And both conflicts are a
major barrier to the development of a
more constructive East- West relation-
ship.
Let there be no doubt about where
we stand. The Afghan and Kampuchean
people must control their own destiny.
The purpose of negotiation is not to im-
pose a solution from outside as the Viet-
namese and Soviets have attempted to
do by force of arms. Rather we seek to
achieve the full withdrawal of Soviet and
Vietnamese forces, to eliminate outside
intervention, and to restore the
nonaligned and neutral status of these
two countries.
This serves the genuine security in-
terests of all parties, including the
Soviet Union and Vietnam, and is the
only way to assure the long-range
stability of these troubled regions.
'Read to news correspondents on the
Secretary's behalf by Department spokesman
Dean Fischer. ■
jgust 1981
39
The Secretary
totally to build a society which answers
the needs of the Vietnamese people, be
they north or south. Instead of peaceful
reconstruction, the Hanoi government
has chosen to focus its efforts on
military adventure and the imposition of
a thinly disguised vassalage upon Viet-
nam's neighbor states.
Equally unwelcome, there has been
the intrusion into the region of a Soviet
military presence in the form of opera-
tion facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and
elsewhere in Vietnam and increased
military activity in the waters and air
space of the Western Pacific and
Southeast Asia. Fortunately, however,
heightened regional concern and
vigilance have prevented the Soviets
from translating this temporary
strategic gain into lasting political ad-
vantage.
U.S. recognition of the stark con-
trasts in the region — the prospects for
peaceful development and the threat to
that development — is what shapes our
policy toward ASEAN.
U.S. policy rests on three com-
mitments:
• Our commitment to economic
development and a commerce of mutual
benefit;
• Our commitment to promote fruit-
ful bilateral relations with each of your
countries; and
• Our commitment to consult on
regional and global issues — to a genuine
dialogue between equals on matters of
common political concern.
Concerning economic development,
one cannot but be impressed by the
remarkable growth rates of the ASEAN
economies over the last decade, averag-
ing over 10% per year. Trade between
the United States and ASEAN has in-
creased rapidly, reaching a record of $21
billion in 1980. ASEAN is now
America's fifth largest trading partner,
and all indications point to 1981 being
another banner year for commerce be-
tween our two regions.
Our successful economic dialogue
with ASEAN governments will continue
with the next meeting of senior
economic officials scheduled for October
in Washington.
In addition, the ASEAN-U.S.
Business Council plays an active, con-
structive part in our growing economic
relationships. The council is sponsoring
joint meetings between ASEAN and
U.S. banking and automotive industry
leaders to seek new ways for greater
mutual support and cooperation. These
activities fit perfectly into our intention
to place greater emphasis upon the role
of private enterprise in international
development. We expect this part of our
relationship to grow in breadth and
magnitude.
With regard to our second commit-
ment, I would underscore the excellent
bilateral relations which the United
States enjoys with each of your coun-
tries.
With two members of
ASEAN— Thailand and the Philip-
pines— the United States has a mutual
security relationship. With regard
specifically to Thailand, the United
States intends to honor its obligations
under the Manila pact. Likewise we will
carry out the letter and the spirit of our
commitments to the Philippines under
our Mutual Defense Treaty.
In these countries and elsewhere in
the region the United States provides
substantial bilateral economic and securi-
ty assistance programs. We intend to
maintain these programs and to improve
their effectiveness. Where our resources
permit, we will expand them to meet the
needs of our ASEAN friends.
Let there be no doubt that the
United States will maintain and
strengthen its own military capability in
the Pacific and Asia as a contribution to
the security of the area in the face of
the Soviet military buildup.
The Indochinese refugee tragedy
continues to evoke our common concern
and to demand our concerted action.
The world commends the courageous
and constructive policies of first asylum.
The thrust of our own refugee program
is clear: to seek to reduce the burden of
refugee camp populations through
prompt resettlement of large numbers of
refugees in the United States and in
other resettlement countries. We also
believe that the time has come for a
more concerted effort to deal with this
longstanding and anguishing human
problem at its source. In this connection,
the United States has appointed a
special commission which will be visiting
Southeast Asia in July to consult with
you on all aspects of this problem.
Finally U.S. bilateral relations with
each one of the five ASEAN countries
contain a mutual trust and reciprocal
good will that exist independently from
our relations with ASEAN itself yet in-
evitably strengthen our posture toward
your association.
With regard to our third commit-
ment, the American dialogue and con-
sultations with ASEAN have developed
in a way unforeseen in 1975. Vietnam's
invasion and continuing occupation of
Kampuchea have provided the catalyst
for a new range of consultations which
extend to the United States, other clos
friends in Asia and Europe, and to the
nonaligned world which focus on mean
to oppose Soviet-supported Vietnames<
aggression in Kampuchea.
Today the greatest threats to the ii
terests, prosperity, and well-being of tl
peoples of Southeast Asia are the
policies of Vietnam. We deeply regret
that Hanoi has been unwilling to conve'
its military machine into more produc-
tive endeavors. While ASEAN and its
friends would welcome a more construe
tive path, Hanoi's intrasigence stands i
the way, perverts the aspirations of its-
people, and generates instability in the
region.
The United States remains firmly (
the side of those who oppose the Viet-
namese occupation of Kampuchea. Our
support is durable. We regard the U.NI
General Assembly resolution on Kam-
puchea, sponsored by ASEAN, to be
both just and the best basis for a con-
structive settlement of the Kampuchea
issue. We are ready to work with all th
parties to develop such a constructive
alternative, which builds peace and
stability on the basis of sovereignty ani
respect for the independence of all the
nations of the region — not on the tram
pled sovereignty of other nations. The
development of our policies will also be
guided by the recognition that the situ: <
tion in Kampuchea affects most directl
the interests of Thailand as the front-
line ASEAN state.
The United States also strongly en
dorses the convening of an internation;
conference to deal with the Kampuche;
issue. I intend to personally participate
We urge all the parties, including Viet-
nam, to join the dialogue which can
bring general progress to Southeast
Asia. Only Vietnam can end its isolatio
and attendance at the international cor
ference could signal Hanoi's interest to
do so.
There is one additional point which
must emphasize: The United States wil
not normalize relations with a Vietnam
that occupies Kampuchea and remains
source of trouble to the entire region.
We will continue to question seriously
any economic assistance to Viet-
nam—whatever the source — so long as
Vietnam continues to squander its
scarce resources for aggressive pur-
poses.
Our dialogue in hospitable Manila
this week demonstrated once again tha
equal and sovereign nations can work
together to achieve an international cor
sensus based on established and proved
40
Department of State Bulleti
The Secretary
is of international behavior. We
, through this dialogue, harmonized
ring perspectives and backgrounds
way which will contribute to con-
id action. Time and time again corn-
opposition to aggression has suc-
ed in reversing its course. Be
red that the United States will con-
i to actively participate in your ef-
to achieve this vital goal. We look
to our discussions with ASEAN as
nost promising framework for
;ving a productive future for
heast Asia.
VS CONFERENCE,
ULA,
IE 20, 19816
re there any reservations among
of the delegations that a rearmed
la might also pose an eventual
at to the peace and security of
theast Asia?
I Secretary Haig. There is a great
ipatibility among generals, always. I
k the question is somewhat irrele-
; in the context in which it was
id, not the topic. Clearly some por-
of our dialogue was focused on the
•nt visit of the U.S. delegation to the
pie's Republic of China, to include
•ific reference to the fact that there
been no decision on the sale of arms
;hina but rather there had been a
sion — an internal decision in the
. bureaucracy — to change the
:gory in which we had held the Peo-
5 Republic of China both in the con-
: of potential arms sales and in the
text of dual use of technology
isfer, in the commercial sector.
The point was made that we intend
>roceed on this issue based on re-
sts we may or may not receive from
People's Republic of China, on a
e-by-case basis with consultations
h our allies and those whom we feel
aid have a particular interest in the
lie, as well as with the American Con-
ss. So if someone is going to ask the
ft question, did you consult before
l made an internal decision in the
3. Government to change the category
which you are carrying the People's
public of China, the answer is no.
d, indeed, that is what the answer
mid be. If there is to be a decision in
i future for such a sale, we will con-
ct the necessary consultation, and our
5EAN friends were so informed, as
ire our dialogue partners. I hope I
ve answered your question in a way
it gets this nettlesome question in bet-
• focus.
Foreign Minister Romulo. I have
been asked many times, as I entered this
room, by several newspapermen about
this arms sale. I must say that we have
not taken up this question. Nobody took
it up in the dialogue nor in the ASEAN
foreign ministers' meeting. We did not
discuss it at all. I am saying this because
I do not want to be bothered when I go
out.
Q. I learned here in Manila that
before you left for Beijing, the
Australian and Japanese Governments
were made aware as to what kind of
subject you would discuss there. In
the context of your global strategy
policy, what grade do you give to your
relations with the ASEAN?
If I may address my question at
the same time to Minister Rithaud-
deen. What kind of hopes do we have
now after your dialogue with
Secretary Haig on the question of the
sixth ITA [International Tin Agree-
ment] which is going on in Geneva?
Secretary Haig. First, I do not
make it a habit of publicly revealing
diplomatic dialogues with one country or
another, but I don't believe there were
any particular surprises with respect to
those nations with which we have con-
ducted the dialogue traditionally on our
visit to Beijing. I think in the category
of where we put ASEAN, I don't know
whether you want a Kissinger-like
grade, in which case it would be a plus. I
do want to emphasize that, as I pointed
out in my official statement this after-
noon in our U.S. -ASEAN dialogue, we
consider it to be an extremely important
relationship which the United States has
with ASEAN, and we think the
dynamics of the region are such that it
is becoming more— not less— important
than it was at the time of its original
conception, as important as it was then.
And that is the way we view it in
Washington.
Foreign Minister Rithauddeen. I
did bring up this matter in the dialogue
with the U.S. delegation, with Secretary
Haig, the importance, emphasizing the
need for the conclusion of the tin agree-
ment which is now underway in Geneva.
And have impressed that the participa-
tion of all the consumers, of all the pro-
ducers, in the sixth tin agreement will
be beneficial to all of us. The coopera-
tion among the consumers and the pro-
ducers as reflected in the fifth tin agree-
ment should be continued in the sixth tin
agreement. And I have asked Secretary
of State Haig to bring this back to his
colleagues so that by the 26th of this
month we will be able to conclude the
sixth tin agreement. I have urged upon
him, I have exhorted upon him, I have
told him that he should prevail upon his
colleagues to do so when he goes back to
Washington.
Q. According to page 5, I am get-
ting the impression that you seem to
think that the military gains the
Soviet Union has made are only tem-
porary, because you speak of tem-
porary gains. Would you please
elaborate on what you mean by only
temporary gains, thinking of the
facilities they are building up in Viet-
nam, Kampuchea, and Laos?
You also say we cannot sit idly by
and permit the Soviet Union and its
proxies actively to undermine and
threaten the prospect for development.
What do you mean by undermining
and threatening, and what actions
would you take when you feel the
Soviet Union is undermining and
threatening, plus what will you do
when the Reagan Administration is
determined to challenge blatant, il-
legal Soviet interventionism? What
kind of determination is that? Is that
military determination or how shall
we understand that?
Secretary Haig. I think any objec-
tive assessment of the involvement of in-
vasion forces, whether it would be in
Kampuchea or in Afghanistan, today is
that anticipated success which was prob-
ably the product of the weight of the in-
tervention forces— in the case of Kam-
puchea some 200,000 North Vietnamese
regulars and in the case of Afghanistan
somewhere in the neighborhood of
80,000 regular Soviet forces. That initial
momentum has stalled, and the pros-
pects for a sucessful future outcome re-
main in serious doubt.
Now with respect to the undermin-
ing action of Soviet agressiveness, there
may have been some skepticism in your
question as to whether or not there is
such aggressiveness, and I could only
ask you to reflect back on global events
since the Cuban proxy intervention in
Angola in 1976, followed by the in-
tervention in Ethiopia, the creation of a
puppet state in Southern Yemen by in-
tervention, the effort to overthrow the
status quo in northern Yemen, the first
phase of Afghanistan in which a puppet
regime was established by the Soviet
Union internally, and the second phase
which involved unprecedented interven-
tion by Soviet forces. The kind of ac-
tivity we are witnessing today in the
Western Hemisphere which is spawned
igust 1981
41
The Secretary
by direct Cuban involvement through
the provision of huge amounts of arm-
aments, advice, and some command and
control and direction of insurgent
movements in El Salvador. All of these
have set a pattern that would be hard
for the objective observer to deny, pos-
ing a threat to international peace and
stability.
The point that I made and a point
that has been made consistently by
President Reagan and those who are in
his Administration is that the time has
come to make it clear to the Soviet
Union and its proxies that this is unac-
ceptable international behavior, and if
they hope to participate as full-fledged
members of a healthy, viable interna-
tional community, it is important that
restraint and reciprocity characterize the
relationships between East and West.
One could make the case that it has not
done so in recent months and years.
I don't make it a habit of suggesting
how we would deal with that issue, but
let me emphasize the fact that recourse
to military action is not a normal or an-
ticipated approach to this problem,
which I feel can be handled effectively
through other demographic aspects of
Western capability.
Q. My first question I don't think
was answered because you referred to
Cam Ranh Bay and facilities. That's
what I mean, and if you consider that
this is temporary, I would like to ask
you what you are going to do about
that it will be temporary.
Secretary Haig. I apologize. I did
not hear your question and clearly did
not answer it but I used it as a good
vehicle to answer what I wanted to say
anyway. I think we all watch with con-
siderable and growing concern the relin-
quishment of Vietnamese territory to
the interest of the Soviet Union by the
current leadership in Hanoi today,
despite the frequent assurances to all of
us that this would not happen. The only
answer I can have is the very answer of
this conference, and that is if we are
dedicated in ASEAN— and those in-
volved in the dialogue — and I saw an
unusual degree of unity with respect to
this question — to make it clear to Hanoi
by a host of actions — political, economic,
and diplomatic — that they will be an
isolated member of the international
family of nations if they continue to per-
sist in pursuing policies not only in Kam-
puchea but elsewhere which unsettle the
regional stability that is so important to
economic progress and peace.
Q. You were quoted as saying that
there's a new America which will lead
and show, if necessary, those en-
dangered on the frontlines. What does
this mean? Does it mean that America
is again willing to go to war? In Asia?
Or is it just empty talk? About
China, the reclassification of the
status of China, does it mean that the
embargo on U.S. arms sales in China
has been lifted or will be lifted?
Secretary Haig. I think to suggest
that the message that we are attempting
to bring forward during my visit, and
other public pronouncements that the
United States is going to participate in
this region of the world, is going to con-
tinue and in many respects reinvigorate
its posture in a role history has placed
on our shoulders. That is one way to be
sure that threatened states in this
region, which share our values and our
aspirations for a peaceful world or that
economic development and progress is
the objective, can feel that they have an
active partner in Washington, and that I
would reiterate that is so. I think the
alternative of war or peace, as such a
question suggested, really are irrelevant
and counter to the concept that I have
put forward. It is where uncertainty
about Western resolve and willingness
to pursue their vital interests develop in
reality or perception that the miscalcula-
tions that lead to conflict are favored
and, indeed history shows, occur. I
would hope that what we are espousing
is a policy which seeks to improve the
prospects for world peace and stability
and economic development in the area.
The second part of your question is
we have not had an arms embargo, as
such, on China. We have carried the
People's Republic of China in a category
which tended to lump it with the Soviet
Union in our internal bureaucratic
system. We've now modified that
category to put them in a category
similar perhaps to that of Yugoslavia — a
friendly, nonaligned state. We have not
in that process offered, suggested,
urged, or promoted arms sales nor do
we intend to. We are willing to listen if
the Chinese Government comes and
makes a request. We will then assess it
on its own merits, very carefully. We
will consult with our friends, and we will
consult with the American Congress
which has an important role to make in
American arms sales. I would anticipate
this will be a very slow, revolutionary,
carefully orchestrated process, and we
may, indeed, never be faced with the
question in the first place because I did
• not sense while in the People's Republic
of China an appetite for U.S. arms.
After all, the European markets have
been open to China for a number of
years, and they have not been visited
with great regularity and certainly not
with a large measure of armaments pui
chases.
Q. Judging from what you said
about your posture in this part of the
world and other areas of the world
against the Soviet Union, you give mt
the impression that you are still talk-
ing with the Soviet Union, or is
detente really dead?
Secretary Haig. Of course, we are
conducting discussions with the Soviet
Union. I have met with the Soviet Am-
bassador in Washington on more than
half a dozen occasions over the last 4
months. Our deputy chief of mission in
Moscow has been engaged in intensive
dialogue with the host government in
Moscow. I don't mean to suggest by th;
that that dialogue contributes to the
kind of dialogue that the Soviet Union
would be pleased with. We are clearly
seeking as a first priority to get heavilj
engaged in arms control discussions — I
will discuss this with Foreign Minister
Gromyko in New York in September.
Following that period formal negotia-
tions will begin, and I anticipate, shortl
thereafter.
With respect to the broader questic
of SALT, we are not prepared at this
point to conduct such discussions
because we are reviewing the entire ap
proach to strategic arms control talks,
was clear that SALT II was inadequate
failed to garner the necessary support
from the American Congress and Senai
to permit its ratification. We do not
want to have a repeat of that situation.
Beyond that we talked about linkage ar
that is the clear interrelationship of
functional areas of dialogue between
ourselves and the Soviet Union —
whether it be arms control, credit
transfer, trade — will be carefully
measured against overall international
Soviet behavior, and that will be appliec
here.
Are we in favor of talks, negotia-
tions— if you want to call it detente —
of course we are. We believe that it is
absolutely essential to maintain the
dialogue with the leadership in Moscow.
We intend to pursue it. We have been
pursuing it. We also expect that it woul
be conducted against the background of
greater restraint in Soviet worldwide ac
tivity and a degree of greater reciprocit
than we have witnessed in the recent
past.
42
Department of State Bulletir
The Secretary
;. In view of the dangers that you
said in all your public statements
do you foresee in the near future
this grouping — these five member
tries of ASEAN — should go into
sort of a military grouping, if
mstances dictate it?
Secretary Haig. Not at all. I don't
it is for the United States to have
iv on this subject. I think ASEAN
pawned at the initiative of the
nal nations. It has flourished and
oped under their initiative and
igh their concerted action. It is
itially political, economic, with clear
ity overtones. But the decisions of
ive member nations of ASEAN with
set to their defense capabilities is
s alone to make, and we would not
lme to intervene in that process.
. There is danger that the
etary has sounded and do you
i this aggrupation [sic] will evolve
a military grouping?
Foreign Minister Romulo. We
always said and we underscore
to you right now, to the mass
a. The ASEAN does not intend to
military alliance. We do not intend
ive any military commitments. We
ve that in the case of Kampuchea,
'ant to support the people of Kam-
ea to have self-determination and to
)le to express their views freely
Dut 200,000 troops breathing on
necks, without any military sup-
from us. We want that to be very
'. ASEAN is not and will not be a
ary alliance.
^. You now have the advantage of
ng had talks with both ASEAN
the People's Republic of China on
subject of Kampuchea when you
assed these two groups. Did you
any differences in their approach?
if so, what were they? And in
vering your question, could you
•ess yourself to the proposition
n expressed that China is more
:erned perhaps with bleeding Viet-
i through Kampuchea than achiev-
a quick peace in the region?
Secretary Haig. First let me say
the interrelationship between my
; here for the ASEAN dialogue and
earlier visit to Beijing is circumstan-
rather than one designed to reflect
nterrelationship between those two
s. I don't make it a habit, of course,
ublicly detailing discussions I've had
rivate sessions, either here in
ASEAN or in Beijing. I would expect
there would be a number of differences
between two so different and diversive
sets of interests. I didn't find any excep-
tions to that; there were some dif-
ferences. I would also say that I found
in Beijing a sharp degree of concern
about the presence of North Vietnam's
troops in Kampuchea, and they sug-
gested a level of support for the interna-
tional conference which is designed to
effect the withdrawal of those troops. In
a broad sense I think that suggests some
compatibility with — or at least the U.S.
view on what I've learned here today
and yesterday— the ASEAN view.
I think you would be better served
perhaps to ask one of the ASEAN
members the question you've asked me.
It would neither be appropriate for me
to tick off the score card on that ques-
tion. The last part of your question is
not something that I would be comfor-
table with, if that were, indeed, a
motive.
Q. In your opening remarks, you
emphasized one point that United
States will not normalize relations
with a Vietnam that occupies Kam-
puchea and remains a source of trou-
ble to the entire region and will con-
tinue to question security and
economic assistance to Vietnam from
whatever source. Considering the tone
of the joint communique of the
ASEAN ministers, do you think that
this statement in the ASEAN venue
and the ASEAN region helps the ef-
fort of ASEAN to seek and reach a
comprehensive political solution on
the Kampuchean problem? What is
your argument there?
Secretary Haig. I don't know
whether it did or it did not, and I don't
see that my intervention here at
ASEAN was designed to develop
unanimity necessarily. I think one of the
great values of ASEAN and the par-
ticipation of dialogue states in the proc-
ess is to bring the divergence of views
forthrightly to the attention of the
member governments. I did not discern
the existence of serious divergence on
this subject between the United States
and ASEAN based on the dialogue con-
ducted. So maybe you're head hunting.
Now, that's very flippant, and I don't
mean it to sound that flippant. Clearly
the tone of the communique is very
moderate with respect to Vietnam, and I
think intentionally so.
Q. The tone is conciliatory, and
your statement is rather hard.
Sometimes it turns Vietnam to be
harder on you if you push it harder,
and ASEAN tends to invite Vietnam
to the table to negotiate.
Secretary Haig. We joined that in-
vitation. And as a matter of fact, in my
comments this afternoon I urged Hanoi
to sit down at the table as a first indica-
tion of their willingness to find a
politically negotiated solution which we
strongly favor; that is not inconsistent
with the position taken earlier in my
remarks to the effect that while Viet-
nam is involved in the squandering of its
scarce resources — in supporting invasion
forces in Kampuchea — the United States
sees no practical value. In fact, we see
just the opposite in permitting them to
have their cake and eat it too.
Q. How do you feel about the tone
and tenor of Secretary Haig's
statements and commitments today?
Foriegn Minister Siddhi. I listened
to Secretary Haig at the end of our
meeting. I just showed my appreciation
about his repeated pledge to keep com-
mitments to Thailand on the Manila
pact. What I feel about Secretary Haig's
remarks is we are assuring Thailand's
security as we are a front-line state.
Foreign Minister Kusumaatmadja.
Secretary Haig has made remarks on a
number of subjects, so I don't know
what you mean. But the general tenor of
the remarks he made is reassuring. I'll
take, for instance, the remarks or the
answers he gave to the questions: Are
you not engaged in an exchange of
views or dialogue or whatever you call it
with the Soviet Union? He clearly said
that he has been; I mean over six times
in the past 4 months or something. So
this is a completely different thing from
the image one gets from newspaper
reports.
Q. Because we are from Thailand
we are interested in that refugee
question you referred to. When you
mentioned about taking this problem
right to the source, that means Viet-
nam. How do you think you could do
it?
Secretary Haig. It is a very com-
plex question. Clearly, we would seek
through political and diplomatic ex-
changes and economic levers to try to
influence the nations which generate the
source of these human tragedies, to
ameliorate the conditions that brought
them about; in one instance — in
Afghanistan — we have open conflict.
That means the best resolution to that is
just 1981
43
The Secretary
to withdraw Soviet forces immediately
and promptly from Afghanistan. More
intensified pressure in that direction, I
think, is in order, although all of the
Western world, all of ASEAN, is united
on the necessity to do that.
In the case of Kampuchea, here
again this is combat-related, conflict-
related. So there again, the withdrawal
and return to self-determination by the
peoples of Kampuchea would clearly
resolve that problem.
So we get to the real heart of your
question and that is Vietnam and the
Vietnamese boat people who are really
the consequences of the internal
economic and living tragedies, which
really have been aggravated somewhat
and are related clearly to the diversion
of resources and efforts in Kampuchea
but also involve a number of other
essential political reforms internally. We
don't feel it is our role to tell a nation
how to conduct itself internally but we
do have a right, when their actions bring
hardships to us, to bring it forcefully to
their attention politically, diplomatically,
and, if necessary, economically.
Q. As the United States develops a
more substantial relationship with the
People's Republic of China, do you
feel that it should seek from Beijing
certain assurances — firm assur-
ances—that China will not again
create trouble for non-Communist
countries in Southeast Asia; for exam-
ple, by prevailing upon Beijing to cut
its links— its party-to-party
links — with Communist-led insurgent
movements in Southeast Asia?
Foreign Minister Kusumaatmadja.
We have made known our view of the
subject you mentioned to the Chinese
but not through the United States.
Through our friends — also directly
because we prefer to deal directly —
because there is some contact going on
through the United Nations in New
York, and they know our views and we
have communicated to them, either
through our friends or directly. But not
through the United States.
Foreign Minister Rithauddeen.
First of all, I would like to say that we
have made ourselves clear — Malaysia —
with regard to party-to-party contact of
our unhappiness to the Chinese on this,
because it would hinder the further
enhancement of our bilateral relations.
But with regard to the question of
relations between the United States and
China, this is a matter for the United
States and China to develop good rela-
tions— we like to see good relations
developed between one country and
another country. I think this is what we
like to see in the world today, that every
country should have good relations with
one another. I think we should en-
courage it, particularly between the
United States and China. But as far as
relations between Malaysia and China,
this is a matter that we must bring up
bilaterally with China. We hope that
China will see the need that good rela-
tions exist between all countries in
ASEAN, and we hope that good rela-
tions will continue in the years to come.
Q. Will the United States provide
military assistance to the united Kam-
puchean front? And if so, do you
believe that the arms supplies to the
united Kampuchean front, as well as
the economic, political, and military
pressures on Vietnam, will help in a
certain way to solve the Kampuchean
problem?
Secretary Haig. I know of no deci-
sion nor do I know of any suggestion of
a decision which would lead to the provi-
sion of U.S. arms to the united front
resistance movement in Kampuchea. So
the answer to your question is no. It's
been U.S. policy that we will provide
and continue to provide humanitarian
support to the tragic human conse-
quences of this Vietnamese intervention,
and we have continued to do that. We
will lend our political support to the ef-
forts of ASEAN with respect to that
subject. As I have mentioned, I will par-
ticipate in the U.N. conference on this
topic with great enthusiasm and with
the full level of the support that I can
render to ASEAN in their efforts in the
regional context to bring forcefully to
Hanoi's attention the urgency of dealing
with this question constructively.
Q. Both Indonesia and Malaysia
are notable pillars of nonaligrtment in
this block. There are signs— very
definite signs— that Vietnam and the
Soviet Union and a number of other
supporters will not participate in the
meeting in New York. I wonder if you
would comment on what you think the
nonaligned movement then should be
after the New York meetings, if the
situation is not resolved there?
Foreign Minister Rithauddeen.
We are members — Malaysia, Indonesia,
and Singapore — of the nonaligned move-
ment. From what we can see the
temperature of the resolution that we
had last year — 35/6 — and I would say
that a good preponderance of nonaligned
members supports the resolution. I
would reckon that from what I can
see — from the last that we heard— 62 1
countries have responded positively or I
attending the international conference J
on the 13th of July and this is not yet |
the last figure. I would imagine more
countries will participate, and these ai
reflecting support on the issue of Kan
puchea. There is a tremendous suppor
from nonaligned countries.
ARRIVAL STATEMENT,
WELLINGTON,
JUNE 21, 19817
This is the first visit that I have had a
opportunity to make to New Zealand,
and I have been looking forward to it
with great enthusiasm, both in the coi
text of New Zealand-American bilater
relationships, and in that context, I v«
much look forward to seeing the inter
Prime Minister as soon as I can. I am
here, as you know, for the 30th ANZI
meeting, and I think this durable
trilateral relationship, which is design
to integrate and coordinate foreign
policies and security policies of the thi
member states, has by its own durabil |
confirmed its utility. I look forward
while I'm here to discuss with the oth
two governments global, regional, anc
relative bilateral matters of mutual cc
cern. Now we are here, the American
delegation, first and foremost to listei |
and to learn from the other two mem
states of the region, whose sensitivity
to, and feeling for, the realities of thi!
vitally important region are much mo i
finely tuned than our own, and so we
look forward to learning while we are
here.
It's a great, great pleasure for tlw
U.S. delegation and I know I speak oi
behalf of all of them and my wife to b«
here and we look forward to a very g
stay.
DINNER REMARKS,
WELLINGTON,
JUNE 2, 19818
It is a great honor to participate in su
a distinguished gathering of friends,
allies, and kinsmen. Although this is a«
festive occasion, I must begin upon a
note of sadness— New Zealand's very
distinguished Brian Talboys has in-
dicated his intention to retire. This is
most regrettable, but I can tell him th
when I retired I found my services mc
in demand than I had expected.
44
Department of State Bulle
The Secretary
n fact, you see before you one of
rica's most popular speakers. The
ia in the United States have been
lendously impressed with my
tery of the English language. For in-
ce, there was an article just a short
e ago in a Washington newspaper
Haigspeak." The author pointed out
my speeches, when read from the
were excellent — articulate, well-
nized, and thoughtful. But when I
irted from the text — off-the-
— my speech became inaudible to the
an ear. Now there is a profound
>n here, and I explained it to my
ichwriter as I fired him.
Last June Foreign Minister Talboys
inded his fellow countrymen— and
f us— that we live in a world
inated by change and uncertainty.
;," he said, "in the great battle of
deal ideologies and principles that
ie it, there is no doubt that New
and's place is on the side of those
share the belief in freedom and
ocracy that New Zealanders
ish."
Here are two themes that might be
oted by us all: appreciation of the
ities, the dangers, and the oppor-
ties of this world and certainty that
who believe in freedom and
locracy must rally together to
serve our principles. And I would
Dose tonight that we add a third
ne: the free association of like-
ded peoples in the best guarantee of
dom and democracy. Our participa-
in ANZUS has taught us the value
hese three themes and I would add a
iment on each of them.
Let there be no doubt that we con-
it a dangerous international situa-
.. The dangers, however, should not
d us to the opportunities, especially
opportunities that can be created
)ugh our joint collaboration. Let us
in with the brighter side for a
nge. We can take some encourage-
it from developments in the South
■ific and Oceania.
Democracy prevails in the South
:ific. The assistance, advice, and par-
pation of New Zealand and Australia
'e been of vital importance to the new
ntries in the region and their
;anization— the South Pacific Forum.
3 United States is also seeking to help
continued peaceful development of
islands. Finally, we are pleased to
1 with Australia and New Zealand in
isting the programs of the South
cific Commission, a commission that
; fostered economic development in
island countries for over three
:ades. And for more than four
decades this area has been free of major
conflict, a fact that has surely been
perpetuated by the close consultations
among us.
Unlike the South Pacific, the situa-
tion in Southeast Asia can only be
described as dangerous. The cause of
this danger is simple: Vietnam seeks
control over the whole of Indochina and
does so with the support of the Soviet
Union. We have had important talks
here and in Manila on this subject and
the threat to the other countries of the
region. But even in Southeast Asia, the
free association of nations truly in-
terested in peaceful progress is yielding
important results. The five independent,
non-Communist countries of ASEAN
have cooperated successfully together
for over a decade. They have developed
a high degree of mutual tolerance,
eliminating many of the traditional fric-
tions that impeded even bilateral
cooperation in the past. This tolerant
reconciliation of differences — the spirit
of ASEAN— has facilitated remarkable
political, social, and economic progress.
ASEAN does not function in a
vacuum. Strong economic, educational,
and technical assistance has been provid-
ed to its five members by the ANZUS
governments. Perhaps most importantly,
ANZUS itself contributes to an interna-
tional environment where promising ex-
periments in cooperation can flourish.
The United States, Australia, and New
Zealand have consulted closely to insure
the maximum effectiveness of their sup-
port for ASEAN. These bilateral and
collective relationships have undoubtedly
bolstered the self-confidence and sta-
bility of the members.
These few remarks about the situa-
tion in the Pacific and Southeast Asia
can lead to only one conclusion: The
dangers have not paralyzed us; we have
worked together for our principles; and
our free association has helped the prog-
ress and stability of the region.
Yet there is something more about
ANZUS we may be inclined to overlook.
An observer once described diplomacy
as a talk, followed by a duel, followed by
a pact. We have our pact; but we have
never had a duel. This spirit of coopera-
tion, this regard for the common benefit,
makes ANZUS an uncommon associa-
tion. Secure in our past accomplish-
ments, let us rededicate ourselves to the
security of our future accomplishments
together.
JOINT COMMUNIQUE,
WELLINGTON,
JUNE 23, 1981
The 30th meeting of the ANZUS Council was
held in Wellington on 22 and 23 June 1981.
The Rt. Hon. B.E. Talboys, C.H. Minister of
Foreign Affairs of New Zealand, the Rt. Hon.
D.S. Thomson, Minister of Defence of New
Zealand, the Hon. A.A. Street, Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Australia, and the Hon.
Alexander Haig, Secretary of State of the
United States, represented their respective
governments.
Opening the meeting, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of New Zealand noted that
the previous meeting, scheduled to be held in
New Zealand in mid-1980, had been held
early in Washington following the Soviet in-
vasion of Afghanistan. The heightening of in-
ternational tension, he said, had enhanced the
significance of the alliance and added to the
importance of high-level consultations among
the ANZUS partners and other allies on
issues of international security. He stressed
that this was a time for the ANZUS members
to stand together.
The Council members agreed that the
Soviet invasion and continuing occupation of
Afghanistan was a direct violation of the fun-
damental principles governing international
relations. The Soviet action remained totally
unacceptable to the international community
and constituted a serious threat to global and
regional stability and to the independence of
all states. The treaty partners agreed on the
urgent need for the withdrawal of the Soviet
forces and the achievement of an early
political settlement in Afghanistan. The
Council noted that the treaty partners had
responded with firmness to the Soviet in-
tervention. The Council also noted that the
Soviet Union had been left in no doubt of the
grave consequences for international peace
and stability that would arise from any in-
tervention in Poland. The Council members
reaffirmed their belief that Poland should be
left to settle its own affairs without outside
intervention. The treaty partners agreed to
continue to consult closely over their policy
towards the Soviet Union.
The Council members, acknowledging the
obligation on each treaty partner to maintain
and develop its individual and collective
capacity to resist armed attack, reviewed
military cooperation by the partners since the
last Council meeting. They noted with
satisfaction the close consultation that had
occurred on defence policy initiatives to help
meet the Soviet challenge. The Council noted
the heavy requirements for safeguarding
Western security interests in the Pacific and
Indian Oceans and noted in this regard the
increased naval deployments into the Indian
Ocean region which had been made by the
United States and Australia on an indepen-
dent national basis following the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan. The United States Coun-
cil member noted the benefit to United States
and allied interests of B-52 surveillance of
the Indian Ocean. Some B-52 aircraft con-
ducting low-level navigation training missions
over Australia were now staging through
igust 1981
45
The Secretary
Darwin to carry out Indian Ocean
surveillance missions. The Australian and
New Zealand Council members reaffirmed
their commitments to enhancing their
defence cooperation activities in the South
East Asian and South West Pacific regions.
The Council expressed satisfaction with the
continuing program of exchanges, exercises
and visits between the treaty partners, in-
cluding cooperation — such as the recent
Beacon South maritime exercise — taking
place bilaterally and multilaterally outside the
treaty context.
The Council members stressed their con-
tinued firm commitment to the goal of arms
limitation through negotiations which could
lead to effective, balanced and verifiable
agreements, but also noted that this could
not be a substitute for the necessary efforts
which the West had to undertake to redress
the adverse trend in the military balance.
The Council members emphasized the
need to sustain efforts to prevent the further
spread of nuclear weapons, and reaffirmed
their commitment to strengthen the interna-
tional non-proliferation regime.
The treaty partners welcomed the con-
tribution which the Association of South East
Asian Nations (ASEAN) had made to the
peace and stability of the region since its
establishment and reaffirmed support for its
efforts in this direction. They noted par-
ticularly the impressive economic progress
which had been made. They expressed their
determination to continue to provide
economic and technical assistance to the
ASEAN member countries and agreed on the
importance of maintaining close consultations
with them on developments affecting the
region. The treaty partners also welcomed
the opportunities that had presented
themselves for closer cooperation with the
ASEAN member countries.
The Council members reaffirmed their
support for the United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 35/6 on Kampuchea,
and called for further efforts to be made
towards its implementation. The members ex-
pressed their appreciation for ASEAN's in-
itiatives to attain a peaceful resolution of the
situation in Kampuchea. They emphasised the
need for an early political settlement reflect-
ing the wishes of the Kampuchean people,
which would result in a neutral, non-aligned
Kampuchea which would not pose a threat to
any of its neighbors. The Council members
expressed their particular concern that any
settlement should provide adequate
guarantees of the security and territorial in-
tegrity of Tliailand. To the end, they wel-
comed the forthcoming international con-
ference on Kampuchea and expressed the
hope that all parties would attend. Members
further agreed to continue essential
humanitarian assistance to the Khmer people.
The Council noted the contribution made by
ASEAN member countries in providing first
asylum and processing facilities for refugees
fleeing Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea.
The Council noted with regret that in
North Asia the Korean Peninsula remained
an area of tension and armed confrontation.
The Council welcomed the re-establishment of
constitutional order to maintain its military
commitments to the ROK [Republic of
Korea]. The Council reaffirmed its support
for the political integrity and international
recognition of the Republic of Korea and
called upon the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea to take up the offer of direct
dialogue with the Republic of Korea as the
essential prerequisite to an easing of tension
in the area.
The Council welcomed statements by the
Government of Japan that its development
assistance to the Pacific region would be ex-
panded. The treaty partners considered the
Japanese could play an important part in the
overall economic development and continued
stability of the region. They noted that
Japan's increased political role in the region
contributed positively to the region's affairs
and expressed understanding and support for
the Japanese policy of improving its self-
defence capability while not seeking a wider
regional security role.
The Council also welcomed the further
improvement in China's relations with a
number of countries in the region, and
China's continued commitment to moderniza-
tion and to a need for a peaceful environ-
ment.
The Council members reviewed
developments in the Middle East peace proc-
ess and discussed the role of the proposed
Sinai peacekeeping force. They expressed
concern at the continuing high level of ten-
sion and outbreaks of hostility in the region.
They called for a determined effort on the
part of all to move forward in a constructive
search for a just and lasting peace.
Reviewing developments in the South
Pacific, Council members expressed satisfac-
tion that the region remained overall an area
of peace and stability. The Council members
reiterated their commitment to continue to
cooperate with the South Pacific countries in
support of a common interest in a secure and
peaceful environment in which those coun-
tries could most effectively pursue their na-
tional policies. They welcomed the accession
to independence of Vanuatu and the continu-
ing expansion of self-government in
Micronesia.
The Council members agreed that effec-
tive regional institutions were important to
the region's progress. Specifically, they
acknowledged the importance of the South
Pacific Forum as a focus for discussion
amongst heads of government of major issues
affecting the area, of the South Pacific
Bureau for Economic Cooperation in foster-
ing common approaches to economic issues
and of the South Pacific Commission in help-
ing promote social and economic development
in the island countries. The Council welcomed
the steps taken during the past year to afford
additional island governments direct par-
ticipation in the activities of both the Forum
and the Commission. Recognising that
despite the achievements of recent years,
many of the Pacific island countries remained
vulnerable because of fragile economies, the
Council members agreed to encourage, where
appropriate, public and private sector
economic development through aid, trade and
investment. In this regard, the Council
members welcomed the coming into effect o
the South Pacific Regional Trade and
Economic Cooperation Agreement in Januai
1981. The ANZUS partners reaffirmed their
commitment to cooperate with the Govern-
ments of the island states of the South
Pacific in pursuing economic and social
development.
The Australian and New Zealand Counci
members emphasised the importance of suc-
cessfully completing the negotiations on the
Law of the Sea treaty and expressed the
hope that the United States would shortly b
in a position to participate actively in the co
eluding stages of the negotiating process. Tl"
United States member noted the Australian
and New Zealand views and undertook to
consult closely with its friends and allies as
determined its position.
The treaty partners discussed the pros-
pects for the world economy in general, inte
national economic development issues and tl
forthcoming Ottawa, Commonwealth and
Mexico summit meetings. The Council agree
that the energy situation remained serious
and that many non-oil producing developing
countries in particular continued to face
severe economic problems. The foremost
among these were the widening of their
balance of payments deficits and accumula-
tion of debt which threatened to curtail
severely their essential social and economic
development programs. The Council noted
that it was in the interest of developed stati
to address the economic development prob-
lems of developing countries, and to seek tc
ensure that they derived maximum benefit
from participating in the international
economic system. The maintenance of a
cooperative and effective framework for th<
conduct of international trade and monetar;
affairs was also important. Council member
acknowledged the need to ensure that the ii
ternational financial institutions were able t
make available adequate financial resources
on appropriate terms to developing countrit
They expressed their concern at the recent
growth of protectionist pressures in many
countries, and reaffirmed their commitment
to the principles of free trade.
The Council agreed to hold the next
ANZUS Council meeting in Canberra in 19S
at a date convenient to all members.
JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE,
WELLINGTON,
JUNE 23, 1981
Foreign Minister Talboys. It's been m
privilege and my pleasure to have the
Secretary of State, Mr. Haig, and the
Minister of Foreign Affairs from
Australia, Mr. Street, with us for this
30th ANZUS Council meeting.
Like other council meetings, this or
has benefited immensely from the
presence of the Secretary of State. It
has not always been possible for the in-
46
Department of State Bulletir
The Secretary
ual bearing the responsibilities of
office to attend council meetings in
part of the world. But I'm delighted
Secretary of State Haig has been
to come because his presence, of
se, adds immensely to the value of
liscussions. He can bring that wide
view of the political and economic
;, and I know that Mr. Street joins
me in that appreciation.
Squally, though, of course, do I
ome Mr. Street on which is his sec-
visit to New Zealand. Now that we
completed the work of the council,
1 just inform you that today we
; discussing Pacific island develop-
t, the Law of the Sea, prospects for
Dttawa summit, and North-South
;s. A communique has been issued,
I hope that you have had time to
a look at it, and you can direct
questions to any one of the three of
Q. Just how important is
■tralia's participation in the Sinai
Irekeeping force for American
llility of that force? I ask you if you
■confident that Australian reserva-
js about participation can be over-
le and are you confident that
itralia will actually participate?
Secretary Haig. With respect to the
I part of your question, we are still
i le process of formulating the com-
Ition of the peacekeeping force in
i lultation with a number of potential
i.icipants. We have yet, as you know,
i Dnclude the final agreement between
pt and Israel on the force itself,
ough we've made great progress,
we are approaching the point where
agreement can be concluded in the
r near future. I say that with the
•rvation that some unforeseen cond-
ition doesn't arise.
In that broad context we are, of
~se, very anxious to have participa-
in a very modest way from both
tralia and New Zealand and to give
laracter to the force itself that we
ild hope would be achievable. But we
e not felt that it was — we were at
appropriate time to make a formal
aest of the two nations to participate
lough they have, as a result of our
:ussions here, a clearer view of the
pe of what we would be looking
■ard them for, in the way of a con-
ation, plus some additional observa-
is of the importance of the
cekeeping process itself and the over-
timing desirability to continue with
mentum in that process, which I
lk is achievable in this area, and will
achievable in the foreseeable future
with respect to the autonomy talks
themselves. So I think it would be
premature to press for a — it's certainly
inappropriate for me to make a forecast;
there are two foreign ministers here
who can do that better than can I, but it
would be premature to do so in any
event until we can get a little further
clarification on the overall composition
of the peacekeeping force. At this junc-
ture, it goes without saying we would be
very anxious to have participation from
both Australia and New Zealand,
recognizing the difficulties here.
Q. There are reports in the New
Zealand papers this morning that you
disagree philosophically with the ap-
proach taken by the United States
toward Vietnam; that you feel
isolating Vietnam and making it into
an international pariah would only
tend to push it further into Moscow's
arms. Could you discuss this?
Foreign Minister Talboys. The
observation I would make is this: that
what we are agreed upon is the need to
find an early political solution to the
problem. The continuation of the conflict
has inherent in it the danger that the
conflict could overflow into Thailand,
and the continuation of the conflict
necessarily means that Vietnam's
dependence on the Soviet Union is likely
to increase. What we are agreed upon is
to support ASEAN in its search for a
political solution; we will also be seeking
to make our contribution to the interna-
tional conference, which is to be called
together on the 13th of July in New
York, in the hope that through that con-
ference we can speed the process of
finding a political solution.
Q. On this trip you have been
sounding the anti-Soviet theme, and I
wonder if you could take a retrospec-
tive look on the three stops you have
made so far and share with us your
findings as to what extent you found a
sympathetic ear on the anti-Soviet
theme of the Reagan Administration
here with the ANZUS council,
ASEAN, and China.
Secretary Haig. It's somewhat
presumptuous of me to speak for the
hosts in all three [inaudible] you've cited,
but I think it goes without saying that
there is a general consensus that the
greatest threat to peace and stability in
the area has been the growing aggres-
siveness of, and encroachment of, the
Soviet Union into the area, both directly
and through proxy, and I did not find
that as a matter of contention in any of
the three sets of discussions that we
conducted.
On the other hand, I think it's vitally
important that we do not view the ac-
tivities, especially those in Manila and
here in ANZUS, in the context of a brit-
tle East-West preoccupation. We have
viewed a broad range of objectives in
these discussions both in ASEAN and in
ANZUS and focused on the desirability
of economic development, the desir-
ability of creating a climate and con-
tributing to the creation of a climate in
which peace, stability, economic growth,
and development in the interests of the
free peoples of the area be enhanced. A
very important aspect of that is the
dangers to that process that are the
result of Vietnamese activity in Kam-
puchea, the extension of Soviet bases in
Vietnam, and the increasing presence of
Soviet naval and air forces in the region.
Q. Can I ask Mr. Street and Mr.
Talboys that following their discus-
sions with the U.S. Secretary of State,
what Australia's position is on the
Sinai peacekeeping force now and
what New Zealand's position is like?
Foreign Minister Street. We were
very interested to receive further
clarification from the Secretary of State
as to what he had in mind for the Sinai
peacekeeping force, and I shall be
reporting that back, of course, im-
mediately for consideration in Australia.
It's well known that we have been seek-
ing further information that the
Secretary of State mentioned as to the
composition of the force — command
structure and things of that kind. As he
mentioned a minute ago, negotiations
are still proceeding with the three coun-
tries immediately concerned — the
United States, Egypt, and Israel. On
that latter point we are still awaiting the
results of that. But certainly the further
information that we have received here
will be taken into consideration by
Australia, and I'll be reporting on it im-
mediately.
Foreign Minister Talboys. I can
add nothing to that. I mean, we are vir-
tually in the same position, and we have
benefited from the discussion we have
had with the Secretary of State, and I
shall certainly be reporting on those
discussions to cabinet.
Q. I wonder if you could comment
on the New Zealand case for increased
access for its exports to the United
States as an essential prerequisite of
gust 1981
47
The Secretary
being economically strong and,
therefore, an effective ANZUS part-
ner. What is the reaction of the
United States to this proposition?
Secretary Haig. We are, of course,
acutely conscious of New Zealand's re-
quirements for the American market. I
do not foresee for the remainder of this
year any change in the current levels,
but this remains a matter of focus for
the most intimate of consultations and
discussions. We are going to continue
that under that framework, recognizing
that in the past there have been occa-
sions where it's been less than produc-
tive from the New Zealand point of
view. But we have very, very broad
discussions and detailed discussions on
the multilateral aspects of trade in the
agricultural— and particularly in the
meat— area, and we are hopeful that we
are going to be able to concert together
to achieve further progress.
Q. Referring to page 2 of your
communique. You refer to the
safeguards. [Inaudible] United States
and Australia are already taking some
unilateral action in that area. Would
you see a place for increased New
Zealand participation in that area, par-
ticularly the Indian Ocean, bearing in
mind we have troops in Singapore, of
course?
Secretary Haig. Frankly I think we
do not anticipate that in the context of
your question. We are very, very
grateful for the contributions that New
Zealand has made and continues to
make in the southern Pacific— the
maritime and the air and ground force
contributions— and the presence of the
battalion in Singapore. But no, the
answer to your question would be that
we did not address nor do we con-
template addressing that aspect of the
question.
Q. The communique is rather
sharp on Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan and warns about Poland.
But on Kampuchea it really doesn't
even mention the Vietnam aggression
there. Is that because you are trying
to persuade them to come to the
United Nations?
Foreign Minister Talboys. No.
There is agreement amongst us as far as
our concern with the Vietnamese
presence in Kampuchea, and as I said
earlier what we seek to do is assist
ASEAN in formulating a political solu-
tion which will, we hope, lead to the
withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces
from Kampuchea.
Q. Can you give us some indica-
tion of your thinking on the structure
of the Sinai force, specifically what
role you would like Australia and New
Zealand to play?
Secretary Haig. I think I'd prefer
to not go into further detail on this
because we are in the process of discuss-
ing potential contributions from a
number of donors. Suffice to say that it
is a very limited one, but a very impor-
tant one that we had in mind for possi-
ble contributions by New Zealand and
Australia, and I say limited in terms of
size and specialized in terms of role. But
to go beyond that today I think it would
be premature until we have gotten
somewhat greater clarification on the
overall structure we're going to be able
to put together.
Q. Was there any discussion on
possible U.S. military hardware sales
to Australia and New Zealand?
Secretary Haig. Not in the formal
context of our discussions, no, no.
Foreign Minister Street. As it is
well-known, Australia is considering at
the moment the replacement of the
Mirage by another tactical fighter. The
choice is between two American aircraft.
That wasn't discussed, but it is in the
context of the current defense con-
siderations. But it wasn't discussed in
the conference.
Q. [Inaudible] Sinai peacekeeping
force. I wonder if you might be able
to give us a date or a deadline by
which time the United States on
behalf of Egypt and Israel [inaudible]?
Secretary Haig. I would say it's in
the very near future and that we are
hoping to have the overall agreement
completed perhaps as early as the end of
the month but certainly before the end
of the month.
Q. On your reservations about the
Sinai, which of them were dispelled by
what you have heard from the
Secretary?
Foreign Minister Talboys.
[Laughter] We've been given some
useful information by the Secretary of
State about attitudes toward the force
that will certainly be taken into con-
sideration as we discuss it in cabinet.
Q. Whose attitudes?
Foreign Minister Talboys. The at-
titudes in the region.
Foreign Minister Street. If I cou
add our point of view on that, the sort
of concerns that we have have been
made public by us, quite deliberately,
because we wish to stimulate a public
debate on this. It would be very unusu
for Australia to participate in a
non-U. N. force, and, therefore, we
wished a wide debate to take place anc
the reservations that we have had are,
therefore, well-known and public, and,
we show the clarification that we
sought. This process is still going on a:
we have said that we would not, even
though we haven't received a formal 1
quest as the Secretary of State said, w
wouldn't be in a position to make any
decision until we had all the relevant h
formation. We have had some further
formation over the last couple of days
which will add to that which we alread
have and which we still have to get,
depending on conclusions of the
agreements for us to take into con-
sideration.
Q. Shall I interpret that to mean j
that none of the reservations have
been dispelled, or did you hear
something like which did help
alleviate your reservations?
Foreign Minister Street. No, you(
can't read that into your interpretatior
at all. We have received further infor-
mation which will be useful to us in co^
ing to a decision should a formal requt i
be made to us.
Q. Regarding Vietnam, Mr.
Talboys has emphasized a couple of
times your support in ASEAN in try
ing to solve the problem, but could
you tell me how you feel about the
policy of political isolation and cutti
back on any kind of economic inter-
change with Vietnam. Meantime, if
you would like to comment on the
policy toward Vietnam, we'd like to
hear that.
Foreign Minister Talboys. At th«
present time what those concerned are
seeking to do is to apply pressure to
Vietnam— political and economic and
military pressures— and at the same
time work out with ASEAN a political
solution in the hope that the pressures
and the nature of the solution will help
to persuade Vietnam to move.
Foreign Minister Street. We agrr
completely with what Mr. Talboys has
said. We have ceased bilateral aid to
Vietnam because we believe that their
invasion of a neighboring country was
such as to warrant the cutting off of
Australian aid and as an indication tha
that sort of international behavior was
48
Department of State Bulleti
The Secretary
cceptable to us, and until there is
ie movement along the lines that Mr.
wys has suggested — some indication
movement toward a political set-
lent— that would remain our at-
de, but we would wish to be
>ciated, as Mr. Talboys has indicated,
i these efforts to reach a political
lement.
Q. In the context of Mr. Talboys'
answer, which of those concerned
applying military pressure on Viet-
P?
Foreign Minister Talboys. There is
tary pressure being applied by Kam-
hea. And, of course, what ASEAN is
cing to assist Kampucheans to bring
united front to bring together those
:es opposing the Vietnamese
sence in Kampuchea.
Q. This aid-to-Kampuchea clause
s seem rather mild and is, in fact,
t milder than things you said
■tier on in this visit— earlier in your
|r about Vietnam. Was that clause
feted because of concerns expressed
Australia and New Zealand?
Secretary Haig. No, I think we are
Idly consistent on the approach under
j ASEAN initiative and the U.N. con-
;nce, which will take place in July
ch seeks a political settlement, as
Talboys has reiterated. That does
change the value judgment of the
ilications and the character of the
tnamese intervention in Kampuchea.
iat we are talking about here is an
iative, multilateral and, hopefully,
which can be extensively and broad-
upported which is designed to
ieve a political settlement. And while
:cept the thrust of your question, I
lk it doesn't change the character of
value judgment of the United States
1 1 have made with respect to Viet-
nese intervention. Both are serving a
erent purpose in effect. One is a
ae judgment, the other is a political
irt to achieve a settlement.
Q. Are there any reservations
mt the U.S. decision to sell arms to
ina— the decision in principal?
Foreign Minister Talboys. I think
t before I answer that question, I
tik one should give Secretary Haig an
jortunity to indicate what precisely
position is so that then you can ask
question in a different way.
Secretary Haig. That question
ne from an individual who's heard
it position repeatedly, and it is that
there has been no decision to sell arms
to the People's Republic of China but
rather a decision to change the category
in which the People's Republic has been
carried in the American bureaucracy,
which will enable them to request, as
any other nonaligned, friendly govern-
ment, specific assistance if they decide
to do so, in which case we will assess
that, we will weigh it, we will consult
with allies, we will consult with the
American Congress, and a decision will
be forthcoming.
Foreign Minister Talboys. All I
can add to that is that I've heard the
Secretary of State make that statement,
I'm not sure how many times, but still
he gets the same question that you
asked originally and the fact is, as he
has pointed out that no decision has
been made, there is no request at this
time, so there is no decision that we can
agree with or disagree with.
Q. With respect to the position
that you have just enunciated — the
change in category, the clearing of the
way to make arms sales possible if
there is a request — what is your reac-
tion to that?
Foreign Minister Talboys. I'm
happy with that.
Foreign Minister Street. The new
Administration has made it clear from
the outset about its willingness to con-
sult on issues of major concern to them,
with its friends and like-minded coun-
tries, and we welcome the reference to
consultation which the Secretary of
State had made, should a request ever
come and before a decision is made. I
think it's a good example, a good
manifestation, if you like, of the will-
ingness to consult which we welcome
from the new Administration.
Q. Would it be correct to state
that the U.S. Government's position
that you would like ANZUS and
ASEAN to look more toward the In-
dian Ocean and have you had any suc-
cess in persuading the Australian and
New Zealand Governments of the
necessity for that?
Secretary Haig. I think the context
of your question is not exactly consistent
with the discussions we have had here.
We feel that the contributions made to-
day by both Australia and New Zealand
are indispensable. We welcome them,
and we are grateful for them. We have
also, in the case of Australia, been very
pleased that unilaterally they have, from
time to time, increased their presence in
the Indian Ocean, and that's been a
unilateral decision based on, I'm sure,
unilateral concerns. We have also rather
substantially increased our presence in
that critical and dynamic area. We are
clearly cognizant of each other's posture
in that regard, and for the United
States, I can say we are very, very com-
fortable with what Australia has done.
Q. My question concerns the com-
mand structure of the proposed
peacekeeping force in the Sinai.
Would you want to see such a force
under the command of Australia and
New Zealand, having in mind that that
would tend to allay any criticism that
the United States had some sinister
motive in establishing a force in a for-
ward position in the Middle East?
Secretary Haig. Let me answer
your question to the degree that I would
say the United States is not interested
in commanding the peacekeeping force.
As a matter of fact, the United States,
in the initial negotiations with respect to
that force, preferred not to participate
at all. But in order to bring the two par-
ties together— and this was really one of
the crucial aspects of the tripartite
discussions — it was necessary for the
United States to agree to participate in
very definite and somewhat restricted
way. We do not visualize nor do we seek
American command of the force—
precisely the opposite for perhaps not
only the reasons you mention but others
of even broader character.
Q. Did you agree with that [inaudi-
ble]?
Secretary Haig. I think that ques-
tion is premature as to who should do it,
and that would clearly be something that
would be decided only after the final
character and contributors —
Q. That's just a couple of hurdles.
Let's assume that Australia and New
Zealand come in—
Secretary Haig. That's a premature
thing to do because, clearly, it's not a
question that would give us any prob-
lem. We are openminded on who should
command the force, with the single ex-
ception that we do not seek to on the
U.S. side.
Q. The Labor Party policy here is
to ban nuclear ships of whatever coun-
try from our ports. In your discussions
with Mr. Rowling [William "Bill"
Rowling, leader of the opposition
party] yesterday, did you need to can-
vass that point, from the American
point of view if your warships or
jgust1981
49
The Secretary
nuclear ones are banned from our har-
bors, what difficulty would that pre-
sent to you and how would you see
that affect the ANZUS alliance?
Secretary Haig. I think our position
on this subject is clearly known and
understood, and I'm not going to use
this press conference as a vehicle for in-
terposing myself in the domestic political
affairs of New Zealand. It would be in-
appropriate, and I'm going to avoid it
like the plague.
Q. I noticed that in the second to
last paragraph of this communique the
three partners pledge themselves to
reaffirm their commitment to prin-
ciples of free trade. At the same time
the Secretary of State has told us that
he expects no change in the American
barriers to New Zealand exports. How
important to New Zealand's economy
is greater access to American
markets? And how satisfied are you
with your discussions with the
Secretary of State on that session?
Foreign Minister Talboys. The im-
portance of access — let me make it
abundantly plain— it is not just a ques-
tion of access to the U.S. market. If you
look around the world you will find that
the industrialized countries, and I look
at the European Community, Japan, the
United States— the industrialized coun-
tries generally — have, to a greater or
lesser degree, some form of quantitative
control on imports of livestock products.
What we seek to do is in whatever form
we have the opportunity to make the
point that for an economy like New
Zealand, where livestock products are
the engine, it is vitally important to ex-
pand access to markets. Not that we
have a capacity to meet the world de-
mand or any nonsense like that, but
simply we say to the international com-
munity that when we talk about trade,
let's recognize the fact that for
economies like ours, economies like
Australia, trade must include livestock
products, otherwise it is virtually mean-
ingless. We can talk about liberalized
trade, free trade in industrial products,
and we are seeking in this country to
liberalize the trading opportunities, and
what we have said in the communique is
that there is a commitment to move
toward free trade. It's going to take
time for us because we have industries
in New Zealand that have been pro-
tected and some that will continue to be
protected — many that will continue to
be protected in various ways. But most
of those industries are protected by
tariffs. If all we had to contend with in
the international market was tariffs,
then we are up against a different prop-
osition. What we object to is the quan-
titative controls. And in my discussions
with the Secretary of State, I know that
he understands fully the position here. I
recognize that there are some political
difficulties to be overcome in the United
States, and what we seek to do is to
mobilize support in overcoming those
problems.
Q. I said that there was apparently
no progress being made here toward
the goal that the foreign minister has
outlined and you shook your head to
indicate that I was wrong.
Secretary Haig. No, it was the
language that the premises of your ques-
tion that I shook my head on. It always
is a question of whether the bottle's half
full or half empty. What I said was that
the current levels for the remainder of
this year between the United States and
New Zealand would not be tampered
with. There are some who would view
that as good news. There are some who
might view it as bad news. That has
nothing to do with the detailed answer
that Mr. Talboys gave and with which I
am in full agreement, and that's the
answer to your question.
REMARKS TO THE PRESS,
LOS ANGELES,
JUNE 25, 19819
I just had an extensive discussion with
the President reporting on my trip to
Asia. We discussed the visit in Beijing
and the communications that we had
there with the People's Republic of
China, various leaders— the Vice
Premier and the Vice Chairman, the
Premier and Foreign Minister, Defense
Minister. We went on to discuss the
meeting of ASEAN in Manila and the
ANZUS meeting that was subsequently
held in New Zealand.
With respect to the China visit, I, of
course, expressed satisfaction that it
was a successful visit, one which had the
clear consequence of clearing the air be-
tween Washington and Beijing which
will enable us to move now from a new
plateau of improving relationships. It
was clear also in the ASEAN meetings
in Manila that there is a fundamental
convergence of view, although some dif-
ferences in nuance between allied and
nonallied members of ASEAN. But
these are merely tactical differences.
There's a fundamental consensus of con-
cern about the situation in Kampuchea,
the need to improve commmercial and
economic ties among those five nations,
and their relationships with the United
States and the rest of the Pacific area.
The ANZUS meeting in Wellington,
New Zealand, was marked by the kind
of intimate relationship that has
characterized that alliance for its
30-year history, and I consider it to be
both highly successful and highly
beneficial for me because it was educa-
tional in the sense of learning the sen-
sitivities of those two long-standing
allies and their views with respect to th
Pacific Basin.
Q. Did the subject of controversy
involving you and Ambassador
Kirkpatrick [Jeane J. Kirkpatrick,
U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.] come
up?
A. It's your controversy; it's not
mine. I have no controversy. I made
that very clear yesterday, and it was
discussed, of course, but in passing.
Q. Was it discussed at length?
A. It was discussed in passing, yes.
Q. Did the President say he was
angry about the reports?
A. Not at all.
Q. That he was angry about what
your aides said?
A. No. Look, we have a lot of
serious business to do in the conduct of
America's foreign policy. These kinds oi
things happen as they have happened ir
the past. If we allow them to divert us
from the serious business that we are
about, I think we are not serving the
American people and their interest prop
erly and I'm not going to do it.
Q. Did you bring up the AWACS
[airborne warning and control system
aircraft] with the President?
A. No, we didn't discuss that today,
no. Only in a very glancing way.
Q. Are you going to take any ac-
tion against your two aides who were
quoted in this story?
A. I'm not taking any action againsl
them other than to be very concerned
that the situation came up, sorry and
disappointed that it did, because it
doesn't reflect reality and that's fre-
quently the case in such personality,
speculative stories.
50
Department of State Bulletin
The Secretary
J. When you were out of the
try there was a fair amount of
rial criticism which you may or
not have seen about your decision
11 weapons to China, that you got
ing in return, that we're giving
!hinese something and we got
ing in return. Would you care to
»nd to that editorial comment?
V. In the first place, I made it clear
ighout my trip and I reiterate today
there's been no decision to sell arms
lina. There has been a decision to
je that category in which we have
;d China as a potential arms pur-
;r from one that was restricted to
capable systems to one which is no
ir on the munitions list.
Ihould China want some arms, they
ie considered on a case-by-case
following consultation with the
ress and affected allies and friends
Iwide who might have an interest
affected by such a decision. I
Id view a relationship in the arms
with China as very evolutionary,
! measured, and very paced in
Lcter.
Jj. What did you get in return?
A.. I'll leave that to you to speculate
V^e have an improved relationship
i the People's Republic of China. For
I ast 3 years that relationship has
on the decline, steadily. And I
it is very important that we get
; on the track in a constructive way,
t won't go beyond that.
^. How are you going to explain
1 e Saudis that Congress is not go-
! o approve AWACS this year?
fb.. I hope that's not going to be the
1
5. Isn't that the reading, though,
Mr. Allen [Richard V. Allen,
istant to the President for Na-
il Security Affairs] got from the
|as late as today?
I A. No. I think the reading that Mr.
1 has and that I have as well is that
ave a lot of work to do and that
? about that work and we hope that
i who have expressed opposition
d be patient and take the time to
irsthand for themselves the condi-
| under which that sale will be made.
haven't had that opportunity yet,
I'm optimistic that when they've had
ley're going to change their view-
t.
,Q. Did you discuss the inclusion
lommunists in the French cabinet
1 the President?
A. Yes.
Q. And can you tell us just some
reaction of what the feeling is?
A. I think the State Department
and the Vice President have made a
statement on this subject. We put an of-
ficial statement out yesterday in
Washington, and I won't go a step
beyond it.
Q. As a former NATO commander
how do you feel about it?
A. Just precisely the way our view
was expressed in the State Department
yesterday.
Q. Have you said anything to your
aides, though, about the policy in
general of criticizing other Admini-
stration officials?
A. Oh, golly, I suppose a lot of us
discuss that subject from time to time.
'Made in response to a toast by Vice
Premier and Foreign Minister Huang Hua,
who hosted the banquet (press release 193 of
June 16, 1981).
2Made at a banquet for Vice Premier and
Foreign Minister Huang Hua (press release
197 of June 22).
3Press release 196 of June 17.
4Press release 198 of June 22.
6Made in response to a toast by Foreign
Minister Romulo, who hosted the dinner
(press release 201 of June 23).
6Press release 199 of June 22.
'Press release 202 of June 26.
8Made at the ANZUS dinner (press
release 203 of June 26).
9Made outside the Century Plaza Hotel
(press release 208 of June 29). ■
Secretary Haig Interviewed on
"Face the Nation"
Secretary Haig was interviewed on
CBS's "Face the Nation" on June 28,
1981, by George Herman, CBS News and
moderator; Karen Elliott House,
diplomatic correspondent for The Wall
Street Journal; and Robert Pierpoint,
CBS News diplomatic correspondent.1
Q. Pravda says that the American
decision to sell weapons to Beijing is,
in their words, reckless, highly
dangerous for the cause of peace. So
I'd like to ask you if you think,
because of this Soviet reaction, if the
world is in for a period of worsening
relations between the United States
and the Soviet Union, or is that just
talk?
A. I think the process of worsening
relationships has been underway for
some time. The problem of China,
however, must be dealt with in its own
terms, and I do not believe, for one, that
it would be advisable for the United
States to conduct its relationships with a
billion people under the specter of a
Soviet veto. And I think that's very im-
portant for the American people to
understand as we seek to improve our
relationships with both Moscow and
Beijing.
Q. In answer to my first question,
you said the relationships between the
United States and the Soviet Union
have been worsening for some time. I
wonder if, for my benefit, you could
give a beginning point and what you
hope might be an end point for the
decline in relations between these two
countries?
A. I think the basic problem started
perhaps as early as Angola, 1976. This
trangressed through Ethiopia, southern
Yemen, northern Yemen; the two
phases of Afghanistan, which find
80,000 Soviet forces occupying that
country today; the invasion of Kam-
puchea by a Soviet proxy, North Viet-
nam; Vietnam; and all of these things I
think were a rather shocking conse-
quence of the great hopes and expecta-
tions that were generated in the early
1970s under detente, the SALT I agree-
ment, and since that time our relation-
ships have been deteriorating, and clear-
ly as a consequence of Soviet, not
American, action.
Q. Could you explain to us what is
our policy toward the Soviet Union?
Are we trying to be tough in the hopes
that at some point we can talk to
them, or do we simply just want to
shove them around the way we feel
they've shoved the rest of the world
around?
A. No, I don't think that is a correct
characterization at all. I think what the
United States hopes, and I know what
President Reagan hopes, is to establish a
new relationship with the Soviet Union
built on restraint and reciprocity in our
lust 1981
51
The Secretary
mutual relationships - restraint in the
sense that the Soviet Union will cease
and desist from instigating, supporting,
and carrying out efforts to effect
historic change by rule of force, whether
it be through proxy or the direct in-
volvement of Soviet forces, as is true in
Afghanistan. We believe this can be
done only with the clear recognition
in Moscow that the current activity of
the Soviet Union is unacceptable in
terms of improving East-West relation-
ships and that we would seek to work
with them to elicit the restraint that the
basic policy has established as our goal.
Q. Does this mean that
policies— such as the SALT talks, the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and
other detente efforts to ease relation-
ships with the Soviet Union— those
policies are dead until the Soviet
Union changes its course?
A. Not at all. I think clearly that
would be an expectation that would
neither be realistic nor achievable. On
the other hand, we do feel that there is
an urgent requirement for some fun-
damental understandings on future
directions for some reciprocity, if you
will, and this does not mean that SALT
II cannot begin until Soviet forces are in
effect withdrawn from Afghanistan. It
does mean that there are certain
understandings with respect to the
whole range of U.S. -Soviet relationships
and East- West relationships in which
there is a better consensus and a clear-
ing of the air between us.
Q. But it seems to me that what
you're saying is that somewhere down
the line the Soviet Union has got to
change before we're willing to talk
SALT. What are you waiting for? The
Soviets themselves claim that we're
stalling.
A. First, the premise of your ques-
tion suggests that these discussions have
not been going on. We have, as you
know, scheduled formal discussions
before the end of the year to be hopeful-
ly triggered and launched during a
meeting between myself and Foreign
Minister Gromyko in New York this
September, and these will involve the
theater nuclear arms control efforts, on
which we have worked very carefully
with our Western European partners
and who have a vital stake in the out-
come of these discussions.
Beyond that, we're dealing with a
whole host of internal reviews associated
with strategic arms limitations, and
these are complex in the extreme. It's
the President's hope, I know, that the
objective of such discussions will be the
actual reduction of the growth of
strategic armaments, and I would expect
that these discussions will take place
sometime next year without any firm
deadlines being set one way or the
other.
Q. Let me just go back to the
burden of my first question. You said,
quite understandably, that the United
States should not conduct its policy,
its relations with China, on the basis
of Soviet opinion. Nevertheless, it is a
factor. If the Soviets— if any country
thinks that what you're doing with
another country is a threat to it, that
has to be taken into consideration. It
really is a kind of a triangle, is it not,
and do our relations with China—
Pravda says they're a threat— do you
think that this is provocative to the
Soviet Union or that they consider it
provocative?
A. In the first place, I would hope
that they would not consider it pro-
vocative because—
Q. But Pravda says they do.
A. —there is no basis for that. On
the other hand, I think it is very impor-
tant that Americans recognize that our
relationships with China must stand on
their own, and it doesn't mean that they
do not affect our interrelationships with
the Soviet Union; it would be specious to
suggest so. But if we allow that so-called
China card to become the dominant fac-
tor in our relationships with a billion
Chinese people, why, we will have, if ef-
fect, given the Soviet Union a veto over
those relationships. I think that would
be very, very serious and a mistake.
Q. You're aware, of course, of one
of your predecessors, Cyrus Vance,
who calls the announcement of the
arms sales to China a needless pro-
vocation of the Soviet Union?
A. I think that's a debate that raged
in the Carter Administration for the en-
tire period that Mr. Vance was
Secretary of State. It was well known
and recognized. The simple facts are
that in the first instance we have not
made a decision to provide particular
armaments to the People's Republic. We
have merely internally changed the
category under which they've been held,
which lumped them together with the
Soviet Union.
Q. But all of us who've been in
Washington any length of time know
that changing a category in these lit-
tle bureaucratic terms ends up in
enormous changes of action.
A. This depends on the future and
the decisions made on a case-by-case
basis. First, what requests we may get
from the Soviets. We would then const
with the Congress—
Q. From the Chinese.
A. I mean, from the Chinese. We
would then consult, of course, with the
Congress and with affected allies and
friends, and so we view this as a very
evolutionary thing. What we've done is
put China, for all intents and purposes
in the same category as Yugoslavia, as
friendly, nonallied state.
Q. There have been reports that
the Chinese have been willing to
cooperate with us by providing listei
ing posts in China for us to spy on tl
Soviet Union. Can you confirm those
A. It's been our policy not to discii
any such arrangements, and I'm not g
ing to depart from that policy today.
Q. Without you confirming or d<
nying the intelligence reports, the
reports of planned weapon sales are
obviously true, if the Chinese decide
to buy weapons. If it isn't— as
Secretary Vance says — using our
China card prematurely, what is the
point of our selling arms to China?
A. I think the point of our makinj
the category different for China is a
clear recognition that they are differe
that they are a friendly regime in whi
we have a number of converging in-
terests, and we've been in a 10-year p
cess in an effort to normalize our rela
tionships with China. It goes without
saying that— it was made very clear t<
me in China, from the officials with
whom I spoke, that they have not bee
satisfied with the evolution of these re«
tionships over perhaps the last 2 or 3
years, and that is a consequence of—
Q. Did the word Taiwan creep i
to some of those discussions?
A. Yes, it did, and as it would be
expected to, as it did from the first
period of normalization, where I was i
timately involved, in 1972. And this is
again, a question of, if you will, han-
dling this very sensitive issue with
prudence and great care. We happen
believe we can do so; we can meet oui
obligations to the peoples of Taiwan a
continue with the normalization proce:
with China.
52
Department of State Bullel
The Secretary
\. Does that include new arms
to Taiwan as well? Do they need
i sophisticated planes?
V. It includes the meeting of our
litments to the people of Taiwan,
the provision of defensive arm-
ts as necessary to provide for their
vital interests, and such future ac-
will be taken precisely on that
and this is understood in Beijing.
j. Are you saying, in effect, that
ither tacitly or explicitly told the
le's Republic of China leaders,
whom you met, that Taiwan
d not get a new weapons system,
ding FX planes, unless there was
eat from Beijing? Is that really
this is all about?
\.. No, and I think that's far too
ly drawn. I think it was made clear
?m that we have obligations,
ric and under law, to provide
,sary defensive armaments to the
e of Taiwan. This is known and
nade known in Beijing. Now, clear-
e basis for such decisions will be
efensive needs of Taiwan.
I. Is it your opinion that Pakistan
Mrking toward a nuclear-weapon
fcility?
W. This is a subject which, of
ke, we are keenly attuned to and
sensitive about. As you know,
r Secretary [for Security
;tance, Science, and Technology
s L.] Buckley just returned from a
o Pakistan, where he held lengthy
ssions with President Zia, and
e he was assured by President Zia
they would not seek the develop-
of nuclear arms. I think he
ied to this effect a week or so ago.
really, this is one of the underlying
ises of our new approach to
stan, to remove the appetite, if you
for nuclear weaponry which comes
an intense sense of vulnerability to
its from the Soviet Union and—
^. From India?
b.. Perhaps, although clearly today
alanee between the two powers is
idly skewed that it would hardly be
ional acceptable balance in the
i of a threat.
IQ. How about some of Pakistan's
Ihbors? You noticed that the Presi-
of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, has
d for all Arab nations, perhaps all
|lim nations, which might bring in
stan, to have nuclear-weapon
capability in the view of Israel's
capability to produce such a weapon.
A. I, of course, saw that statement
and we're looking into it now because
it's an appalling statement. It's one
which is not in consonance with fun-
damental policies under the Reagan Ad-
ministration, and that is, there should be
no question about President Reagan's in-
tent to pursue, as vigorously as we can,
the nonproliferation policies of this Ad-
ministration.
Q. In that context, has the State
Department asked Turkey to not pro-
vide material that—
A. I saw that newspaper report
today—
bomb?
-would help Pakistan build a
A. Yes, and I haven't had a chance
to look into it to the depth that would be
necessary, but let me assure you that
any indication we have, official or unof-
ficial, which would suggest any broaden-
ing of the proliferation problem would
be sufficient to trigger counteraction on
our part to attempt to prevent it.
And, secondly, let me tell you that
the Government of Turkey is a signatory
to the Nonproliferation Treaty, and they
have rigidly reaffirmed, as we would ex-
pect, their adherence to that treaty, and
that means that they will not assist the
expansion of nuclear weaponry. Now, it
doesn't mean that we can take these
things complacently, so if we have a
report that suggests to the contrary,
we're going to follow up on it, and that's
just a responsible diplomacy.
Q. Is it possible there could be a
State Department cable asking Turkey
not to provide materials to Pakistan
that would help build a bomb, and you
wouldn't know about such a cable?
A. No, not at all. Oh, of course, it's
possible in the sense that I've been out
of the country, and this is a fairly
routine procedure that whenever we
would have a report of that kind, there
would be a followup message sent. It's
not the kind that would necessarily come
to the Secretary's attention. It's very
consistent with that policy.
Q. In the view of Saddam
Hussein's call for all Arab nations to
produce atomic weapons, what do you
suppose the Iraqi reactor was up to?
Was it strictly for peacetime, or was
there a weapons capability on the bot-
tom of it?
A. This is the subject of an intense
investigation which is continuing. You'll
note that President Reagan did approve
a condemnation of the Israeli attack,
while recognizing some of the concerns
that may have caused that attack to
take place. Our basic objection was the
fact that we felt that all diplomatic
recourse had not been pursued before
resort to arms was undertaken. That
does not mean that we don't remain con-
cerned about the Iraqi nuclear develop-
ment.
Q. In that review of the Israeli at-
tack on Iraq, you said that there may
have been a violation of the use of
U.S. military weapons by the Israelis.
I wonder if there has been, and if the
American public is ever going to be
told that there has been a violation by
Israel, or are we going to carry out
the usual policy of simply ignoring
whether there has or not and going on
and renewing our arms deliveries to
Israel?
A. I want to assure you that the
considerations that were launched at the
time of the attack and are still underway
are continuing. Now, this will involve
consultation with the appropriate com-
mittees on the Hill, especially the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. We've
already conducted some testimony there,
in which we are continuing to examine
the facts. Now I don't want to make any
prediction at this juncture as to when a
judgment would be made with respect to
your question, or whether we are going
to— when and under what circumstances
we will resume the shipment of the four
F-16s involved, but—
Q. Is that a yes or a no?
A. —it is not going to change our
basic relationship with the Government
of Israel and our obligation with respect
to it.
Q. But, given that, is that a yes or
a no to my question as to whether the
American public is ever going to know
whether the Israelis violated the
agreement?
A. I don't know whether we alone
are going to be able to give a juridical
answer to that question. I think the best
we can do, along with the Congress, is
to study it with the intensity we have
thus far and to try to arrive at a conclu-
sion. Now, if that conclusion is juridical,
as distinct from political, the conclusion
we already made, then we will make it
known.
List 1981
53
The Secretary
Q. I was not along on the trip and
I did not hear the statements, but I
read them in the newspaper, and my
question is, in the U.N. debate, with
Ambassador Kirkpatrick [U.S. Perma-
nent Representative to the United Na-
tions] taking part, and the reactions
that came from various parts of the
country, did two of your spokesmen
speak out with or without your ap-
proval when they were critical of Am-
bassador Kirkpatrick's action?
A. I can assure you that they not
only— to the degree that they were ac-
curately portrayed in the article— they
were not only proceeding without my
authority, but they were proceeding
along lines which were not represen-
tative of the facts. And I've already
made my position very, very clear on
that; and I think it's not an uncommon
event in this town, and I think it's im-
portant we put it behind us, because it is
not representative of reality.
Q. While we were on that trip to
China and the Far East, some impor-
tant developments occurred in France.
The new President of France, Mr. Mit-
terrand, installed the four Communists
in his Cabinet. There seems to be
some difference of opinion within the
Reagan Administration as to
whether — as to how serious an event
that was. The Vice President, when he
was there, simply said it was of some
concern to us and dismissed it. The
State Department put out a statement
saying that the tone and content
would be affected, the tone and con-
tent of relationship with France and
the United States would be affected by
this. How will the tone and content of
our relations with France be affected?
A. First, let me make it very, very
clear that there is no difference of
opinion in President Reagan's Ad-
ministration on this subject. Every state-
ment that has been made was cleared
and discussed with the President per-
sonally, and I can assure you that it
doesn't mean that every spoksman poll-
parrots every particular line, and it's
clear that there's a total consistency.
And we are concerned, as we have been
historically, since the Second World War
with this subject. On the other hand, it's
important we also recognize that this is
an internal French matter. It's up to the
French people to decide the composition
of their government.
Having said that, we make no ex-
cuses or no bones about our concern.
Why? It's simply a fact of life that Com-
munist regimes, whether thay are close-
ly affiliated with Moscow or not, pursue
policies which are not consistent with
those of the Western family of nations.
Q. Yes, but what's the point of
publishing it?
A. But the future will decide.
Q. What is the point of publish-
ing—as you say, it is a fact of life;
they are installed; France is an
ally— what good does it do to say,
"We're disappointed in you. We don't
like what you're doing"?
A. It does a great deal of good. In
the first place, it has been the consistent
policy of the U.S. Government since the
Second War, with every President mak-
ing this clear. You will recall it in the
Italian situation some 2 or 3 years ago,
and it is very important for that reason
that all of our Western European part-
ners faced with the same decisions know
that these decisions are not favorably
viewed here in Washington.
Q. Can I take you back to the Mid-
dle East? Is there any thought in this
Administration— do you intend to
delay further the sale, your decision
on the sale of AWACS [airborne warn-
ing and control system] to Saudi
Arabia?
A. Precise timing is a question
which will ultimately be decided by the
Senate leadership. I do want to assure
you, however, there is no question about
our intention to proceed with the sale.
We feel this is vitally important, not
only for U.S. regional objectives in the
area but also for our future relationships
with Saudi Arabia.
Q. But you may delay it further? I
mean, Senator Laxalt has suggested
that you delay it further. Are you con-
sidering delaying it past July?
A. We're in the process now of
developing the arrangements under
which the sale will be made, and we
think it's very important that these ar-
rangements be known and understood
by those who have reservations about
that sale. We've asked them to be pa-
tient. And I think that is a major con- .
sideration on timing, as is the judgmei
of our senatorial leadership, who are,
after all, going to have to carry this b;
tie forward.
Q. So can I conclude from that
answer that there may be further
delay?
A. Of course, you can, but it will
not be substantial, and it will not chair
the intent of the President to proceed
with this sale.
Q. What would happen if the sail
were rejected by the Congress? Wha
would be the effect on our relations
with Saudi Arabia and the oil we bu
from them?
A. I don't view it in the context ol
oil. I don't think our Saudi friends or I
dialogue that we've been conducting
with them has been associated with th
vital issue. What we are concerned
about is the security of that oil, and t\ I
contribution that AWACS would maki
to insuring that security. And second!
what we are interested in is our overaj
regional security, which we've been
working so intensely on, and the con-
tribution AWACS will make to that.
•Press release 211 of June 30, 1981. ■
54
Department of State Bullel
RICA
I.S. Policy on Namibia
"hester A. Crocker
tatement before the Subcommittee
frica of the House Foreign Affairs
mittee on June 17, 1981. Mr.
ker is Assistant Secretary for
can Affairs. '
libia is an issue to which this Ad-
stration has devoted enormous
gy and one whose resolution we
ider of considerable importance to
ichievement of peace in southern
ca.
This Administration took office only
; after the Geneva conference
hed a total impasse. At that time,
South African Government indicated
it was not willing to agree to a date
,he implementation of U.N. Security
ncil Resolution 435. Various theories
! been put forward to explain the
tion the South African Government
. I think it is clear that Pretoria had
me increasingly uncertain through-
1980 about the desirability— from its
dpoint — of implementing the U.N.
for Namibia. That uncertainty was
■d upon the South African Govern-
t's analysis of a number of factors
lging the southern African
le — distrust of the United Nations'
ty to play an impartial role, concern
• the future political direction of an
pendent Namibia, fears arising from
election results at the time of Zim-
i are's independence, and domestic
tical considerations. Some have sug-
;ed that the results of our own elec-
here in the United States encour-
i the South African Government to
; the stand it did at Geneva. I believe
facts and the realities show that to
llusory. The negotiations had reached
mpasse over unresolved issues.
suits of Review
en this Administration took office we
agnized the importance of finding an
^nationally acceptable solution to the
blem of Namibia. In fact, since then
as been perhaps the single African
le to which I and others in the
Dartment of State have devoted the
3t time. We began with an exhaustive
iew of the negotiations which the
•ter Administration had undertaken,
situation in which we found our-
res, and policy directions which we
jht undertake to achieve our desired
objectives. Some key results of that
review include the following:
• We recognize that the people of
Namibia have the right to self-
determination.
• We recognize that the search for
that self-determination has involved a
complicated negotiation process sym-
bolized in Resolution 435. We have no
intention of usurping the United Na-
tions' role or departing from the U.N.
context; however, we cannot be con-
strained by a rigid adherence to the let-
ter of Resolution 435 if, by so doing, an
internationally acceptable settlement in
Namibia is impeded rather than aided.
• We are fully aware that the con-
tinuation of the conflict in Namibia com-
plicates our relations with black Africa
at a time when there appears to be more
and more common ground between black
Africa and the West. We attach major
importance to U.S. interests in Africa as
a whole, and we have no intention of
permitting such issues or the behavior of
third parties to impede our growing
cultural, political, economic, and
strategic links with the nations of
Africa.
• We are well aware that our Cana-
dian, British, French, and German allies
in the contact group have significant in-
terests at stake in Africa based upon
their involvement in the Namibia
negotiations. The solidarity of the con-
tact group allies remains a basic ingre-
dient in the elaboration of a settlement.
• Finally, we recognize the in-
escapable fact that Pretoria holds the
main key to a settlement and, therefore,
must have a minimum of confidence in
any settlement if it is to be im-
plemented.
Consultative Process
Over the past 5 months, we have engag-
ed in an exhaustive consultative process
with the various relevant actors, in-
cluding our contact group [France,
Federal Republic of Germany, United
Kingdom, United States, Canada] part-
ners, the front-line states [Angola,
Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zam-
bia], and Nigeria, and with South Africa.
That was the purpose of my trip to
Europe and Africa in April. It was the
primary purpose of Pik Botha's [South
African Foreign Minister Roelof F.] visit
to Washington in May, and it is the con-
text within which Judge Clark's [Deputy
Secretary William P.] trip to Cape
Town, Windhoek, and Salisbury took
place during June 10-13.
The central purpose of the review
and consultative process has been our
attempt to determine whether enough
Chester A. Crocker
was born in New York
City on October 29,
1941. He received his
B. A. from Ohio State
University, graduating
(1963) cum laude, with
distinction in history.
He received his M.A.
(1965) and Ph.D.
(1969) from Johns
Hopkins University's
School of Advanced International Studies.
Dr. Crocker served as Director of African
Studies at Georgetown University's Center
for Strategic and International Studies from
January 1976 until 1981. He directed
research and policy analysis involving experts
and leaders from the executive branch, the
Congress, universities and foundations, the
private sector, the media, and from African
and other nations. He first joined
Georgetown University in August 1972 as
Director of the university's Master of Science
in Foreign Service Program, serving concur-
rently as Assistant (later Associate) Professor
of African Politics and International Rela-
tions. While at Georgetown he was also a
consultant to the Department of State, the
CIA, the Army War College, the Murphy
Commission, the Rockefeller Foundation, and
private firms.
Dr. Crocker's other professional ex-
perience includes work as news editor of
Africa Report magazine (1968-69), lecturer in
African government and politics at American
University (1969-70), and staff officer at the
National Security Council (1970-72), where
he coordinated interagency policy studies and
action papers involving Middle Eastern,
African, and Indian Ocean issues.
During the past 15 years, Dr. Crocker
has lectured, written, and consulted on a
broad range of international issues, especially
those involving Africa. His research and
writings have appeared in numerous books,
newspapers, and journals, including the
Washington Post, Orbis, The New Republic,
Africa Today, Foreign Policy, Foreign Af-
fairs, and the Washington Quarterly. He is
the coeditor of South Africa into the 1980s, a
book published in 1979.
Dr. Crocker was sworn in as Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs on June 9,
1981.
nust 1QR1
55
Africa
common ground exists on Namibia
within the changing circumstances of
southern Africa to warrant our involve-
ment with a renewed effort to reach an
internationally acceptable settlement.
We have done so because of southern
Africa's growing role in U.S. and
Western interests. But this Administra-
tion has a very full foreign policy
agenda, the implication of which is that
we will not engage ourselves in the
Namibia equation if we feel the pros-
pects for success are bleak. We have
been frank with all of our interlocutors
on these points. Our approach is
realistic. The United States will not per-
mit its energies, time, and credibility to
be frittered away on a drawn out and
fruitless diplomatic charade in southern
Africa.
With this in mind, we believe that
the key focus of our analysis is whether
South Africa's concern over a settlement
can be made congruent with an interna-
tionally acceptable settlement; one which
uses Resolution 435 as its basis and is
supported by the international commu-
nity, in particular the countries of
Africa. We believe that all those who
share our goals will appreciate fully the
care, the time, and the energy we have
devoted to this issue to date.
Judge Clark's trip to Cape Town and
Windhoek was another key step in this
process. In Cape Town we held in-depth
and intensive discussions over a 2-day
period with senior officials of the South
African Government, including Prime
Minister P. W. [Pieter Willem] Botha,
Foreign Minister Botha, and Defense
Minister [Magnus] Malan. As a result,
we believe we now have a much clearer
idea of the South African Government's
views on Namibia and on the region.
In Windhoek we met with all of the
internal parties, including AKTUR, the
DTA [Democratic Turnhalle Alliance],
SWANU [South West African National
Union], NIP [Namibia Independence
Party], the Federal Party, CDP [Chris-
tian Democrat Party], SWAPO [South
West Africa People's Organization]
Democrats, and the internal wing of
SWAPO. In these sessions we were able
to appreciate directly the concerns of
these various groups about the future of
Namibia. A meeting with leaders of the
major religious groups provided us with
a unique insight into the human dimen-
sions of the Namibian problem.
In Salisbury we had frank and
friendly discussions with Prime Minister
Robert Mugabe and other Zimbabwean
officials in which we were able to define
more carefully those areas of the
Namibia situation about which the Zim-
babwean Government has strong views
and to explore future avenues in which
we hope to move together on this and
other issues. As a key southern African
state whose successful development
receives strong support from
Washington, Zimbabwe is clearly one of
our major interlocutors on the Namibia
issue.
Internal Review
We now begin a period of intensive in-
ternal review of the information we have
gathered. At the end of that period,
perhaps by the end of June, we will
make a judgment at the highest level on
whether enough common ground exists
upon which to build an internationally
acceptable settlement. We recognize
that Resolution 435 must be the basis
for that settlement — a fact which we
have underlined in all of our consulta
tions. At the conclusion of the review
we expect to be in touch promptly wi
the relevant parties, both in the confc
group and among the front-line state
and South Africa.
I cannot prejudge what our decis
will be, nor can I predict a timeframe
for Namibia's independence if we cho
to go forward. I can assure you, how
ever, of our good faith in this exercis
and the seriousness of purpose with
which we continue to approach it.
'The complete transcript of the hearir
will be published by the committee and wi |
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of |
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
U.S. Response to
OAU Criticism
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
JUNE 30, 19811
There have been a number of questions
concerning our reactions to the recent
Organization of African Unity (OAU)
summit held at Nairobi, Kenya. I have a
statement.
First, I would remind you of our
statement at yesterday's briefing in
which we applauded King Hassan's ini-
tiative on the Western Sahara and
hoped that his proposals would lead to
an early resolution of the problem. Our
reaction to other developments at the
summit are less positive.
We found the OAU resolutions on
both South Africa and Namibia to con-
tain serious distortions of the policy that
we are actually pursuing in those areas
and unhelpful contributions to our com-
mon efforts. It should be absolutely
clear from our actions in recent months
that the United States is firmly com-
mitted to pursuing an internationally
recognized independence for Namibia.
We continue to believe that U.N. Securi-
ty Council Resolution 435 provides a
solid basis for a settlement. Such a
settlement can be reached only through
negotiations with all involved parties, in-
cluding South Africa. Our contacts with
South Africa on that issue and on other
matters of common interest in no way
serve as the basis for suggestions, such
as those in the OAU resolutions, that
the United States is pursuing policies
supportive of South Africa's racial
policies or of its continued control of
Namibia. Such suggestions are untru(
unhelpful, and do not advance in any
way our mutual efforts in pursuit of
peace and stability in southern Africa
We are disappointed that the OA
summit did not condemn the clear vie i
tions of OAU principles in the intern
tion by Libya in the Chadian conflict
the occupation of Chad by Libya. We
look forward to early installation of t
peacekeeping force called for in Chad
the OAU so that the Libyans may be
quickly withdrawn and so that peace
economic development may once agai
take root in that troubled land.
The OAU meeting decided to hole
its 1982 summit at Tripoli, Libya. We
note that it is traditional for the OAL
select the host head of state or gover
ment as its next chairman. If that tra
tion were followed in 1982, we would
look upon it with deep regret, since w
believe Libya to be a most inappropri,
spokesman for the principles of peace
and regional stability for which the 0
stands and which we wholeheartedly
support. Libya's support for interna-
tional terrorism, its intervention in th
affairs of neighboring states — includir
its incursion into Chad— and its
assassination campaign against Libya
dissidents abroad hardly qualify it to 1
the spokesman for Africa to the work
'Read to news correspondents by Depi
ment spokesman Dean Fischer. ■
56
npnartmPntnfRtatfiB.llle-
Africa
rengthening U.S.-Africa^
Chester A. Crocker
\Address before the African-American
t'.tute Conference in Wichita, Kansas,
une 20, 1981. Mr. Crocker is Assist-
mSecretary for African Affairs.
I subject of this conference, the atten-
I it has drawn, and the degree of par-
lation it has attracted are, I believe,
Ictly related to the goals which we in
■Reagan Administration want to
leve in our policy toward Africa. In
lign policy as in domestic policy,
Isident Reagan has set some tough
(is for this nation. To achieve them
| require first that the American
Inle understand them. And it will re-
le a shared sense of what our
Ion's interests and priorities are, at
lie and abroad. To rebuild the image
j, more important, the reality of a
jng America also requires the
deration of a broad spectrum of
(;e institutions and groups which can
(-v upon the vitality and genius of in-
dual Americans. And just as certain
■ifices will be necessary to achieve
domestic economic reforms we need,
nust we make choices in the alloca-
of resources abroad. We live in an
where such choices cannot be avoid-
But the challenge the President has
for us all is, I believe, both a
essary challenge and one that we can
»t.
This conference is making a signifi-
t step in these directions. It has
ught us together to enhance our
lerstanding of a continent which is
oming increasingly important to the
ited States in the pursuit of our
3al objectives. It has brought us in
Reagan Adminstration together with
African friends and the business
imunity of the heartland of the na-
1. We wish to work together to
eive our and Africa's objectives. We
i to be better prepared to meet the
llenges to our shared interests in the
ade of the 1980s. And we seek to
ness with skill, creativity, and pur-
e the human and material resources
America and Africa.
To do so will require a renewed
se of purpose in our foreign policy so
t we may project in Africa the same
iciples that govern our policies
;where. As Secretary Haig has stated
m, those principles are: consistency
he pursuit of U.S. interests,
reliability as a force for peace and
stability, and balance in our approach to
individual issues and the orchestration of
policy. As a nation we can no longer af-
ford a foreign policy that confuses the
American public because it lacks
coherence, that confounds our allies
because it lacks consistency, or that
comforts our adversaries through its
vascillation or ineptitude.
While certain African problems and
issues are unique to that continent, we
ignore to our own— and Africa's— peril
the geopolitical and economic realities
that tie Africa to the international com-
munity in which we all exist. Africa is
an integral and increasingly important
part of the global competitive system.
We did not cause this to happen. It is a
reflection of the reality of African in-
dependence and a result of the abiding
characteristics of world politics. Africa's
leaders can have little confidence in an
America that speaks with the condescen-
sion or paternalism of a bygone era. A
mature U.S. relationship with African
states can be an important force for in-
ternational as well as U.S. national
security.
U.S. Objectives
We began this Administration by
setting forth what U.S. objectives in
Africa should be.
• We seek to promote peace and
regional security and deny opportunities
to those who seek contrary objectives.
• We will support proven friends
and be known as a reliable partner, in
Africa as elsewhere.
• We want to maintain open market
opportunities, access to key resources,
and contribute to expanding African and
American economies.
• We support negotiated solutions
to the problems of southern Africa.
• We seek to expand that group of
nations whose development policies pro-
duce economic progress and which have
flourishing democratic institutions.
• We shall do our part in meeting
Africa's humanitarian needs and in
fostering basic human liberties in keep-
ing with both our principles and our in-
terests.
Meeting these objectives is, of
course, no easy task. But we begin with
several advantages. First, we have laid
out objectives which we can al! under-
stand. Second, these objectives are in
keeping with basic American values. The
policies we implement will not conceal
them. To do so would indicate our own
lack of confidence in those values and
principles for which we as Americans
have long been admired. They are an in-
tegral part of the comparative advan-
tage we as Americans and the Western
world in general have in Africa.
Africa and Africans are already
largely oriented toward the West. Yet
that orientation, that advantage, cannot
be taken for granted. Events of the last
decade have proven only too clearly that
the objectives we seek in Africa are in-
creasingly threatened by political in-
stability, external intervention, and
declining economic performance. Soviet-
Cuban and Eastern bloc intervention in
African affairs, the presence of
thousands of Cuban troops in Angola
and Ethiopia, the presence of Libyan
troops in Chad, and the massive
transfers of arms by Eastern bloc na-
tions all serve to undermine U.S. and
Western interests in Africa and to
thwart our and Africa's objectives. The
globe's leading sources of destabilization
are active in Africa. This Administration
has no hesitation in stating that frankly,
categorically, and for the record.
Nor do we hesitate in our belief that
economic development, a central im-
perative for a continent which contains
two-thirds of the world's poorest na-
tions, cannot take place in an environ-
ment of instability or insecurity. In this
respect, African nations are no different
from other developing nations. Roads
cannot be built, railroads cannot trans-
port goods, wells cannot be dug, nor
crops harvested when a nation is at war
with itself or its neighbors. We will do
our part in addressing Africa's security
needs. We have already proposed to the
Congress increased levels of security
assistance to certain key African nations
in support of our objectives in Africa
and in the Persian Gulf. By defining
carefully our interests and commitments
and by backing them up in credible
ways, we believe the United States, in
concert with our major allies, can play a
significant role in addressing Africa's
security problems. We will stand
together with our proven friends in
Africa, offering them assistance and
counsel rather than turning our backs on
them in their time of need. To do other-
wise would do injustice to our own
values as a people, and it would prevent
us from achieving our goals of peace,
regional security, economic progress,
and the expansion of human liberties.
gust 1981
57
Africa
But let me make it quite clear that
we do not choose nor have we any man-
date to be the policeman of Africa. No
nation has such a mandate. Our pre-
ferred choice is to foster and help
implement, where we can, diplomatic
solutions to Africa's conflicts. In
southern Africa as in the Horn of
Africa, we seek a reduction of regional
tensions. Those who characterize this
Administration's goals differently are,
simph put. wrong. We are committed to
playing our proper role in creating a
context for successful negotiations
leading to internationally recognized in-
dependence for Namibia. We believe it is
the task of the Western world to en-
courage purposeful, evolutionary change
in South Africa toward a nonracial socie-
ty. And we believe that all those who
share our opposition to foreign interven-
tion on African soil will acknowledge the
need to find means to remove any
pretexts for the presence of foreign
troops in Angola.
Concerns With Southern Africa
Our concerns with southern Africa,
from Zaire to the Cape, are born out of
our recognition of the strategic, political,
ami economic importance of this region
to the United States and the Western
world. Southern African nations play an
important role in meeting U.S., Euro-
pean, and Japanese requirements for
critical minerals such as chrome ore,
cobalt, industrial diamonds, manganese,
platinum, vanadium, copper, tin. and
asbestos. The Western world must re-
main engaged in this geopolitical ly im-
portant region during periods of strife
and uncertainty. Southern African states
form the littoral to one of the vital
lifelines of the industrial democracies.
We must work actively and play our
proper role— diplomatic, strategic, com-
mercial, and economic— in this key arena
to prevent destabilization and economic
decline and to foster a secure and
prosperous regional order.
Failure to be an active participant in
the affairs of southern Africa can only
lead to heightened regional tension,
polarization, and Soviet-backed adven-
turism. That is why we have not shied
away from the difficult negotiations on
Namibia; why we have not abandoned
South Africans of all races who are
seeking constructive changes and who
are committed to purposeful movement
away from apartheid; and why we have
not been dissuaded from pursuing an
end to the internationalized strife in
Angola. The stakes are too high, the
threats to our mutual interests too
great, and, above all, the costs to the
peoples of southern Africa too heavy for
us to turn away from the challenges of
this region.
Economic Concerns
I mentioned at the beginning of my
remarks the tough goals which Presi-
dent Reagan has set for us in restoring
our own economic well-being and in con-
tributing to development efforts in
Africa as elsewhere in the Third World.
In an interdependent world, the trends
which we see in Africa today should
cause us alarm; declining per capita food
production, falling per capita growth
rates for most nations, staggering im-
port bills for non-oil-exporting nations,
desertification, high rates of inflation
and deteriorating terms of trade, and
population and urbanization growth
rates which are the highest in the world.
Already fragile economies are being
undermined steadily by these
developments. Even more fragile
political systems, some of which are
struggling to provide greater human
liberities and broadened political par-
ticipation, are being undermined by
these economic trends. It is a vicious cir-
cle, one which has a decidedly negative
impact upon our efforts to expand the
Western Sahara
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
JUNE 29, 19811
The United States welcomes the pro-
posals made by King Hassan II of
Morocco on June 26 in his speech to the
Organization of African Unity (OAU)
summit concerning the modalities for
compliance with the objectives with the
OAU's Wise Men's2 recommendations.
The United States believes that the
King's proposals constitute an important
step in seeking a peaceful resolution of
the contentious issue of the Western
Sahara and hopes that plans for the pro-
posed referendum can be formulated
and accepted by the parties concerned in
the near future.
'Read to news correspondents by Depart-
ment spokesman Dean Fischer.
2An ad hoc committee of five chiefs of
state appointed by the OAU in 1979 to at-
tempt to facilitate negotiations for a settle-
ment of the Western Sahara dispute. ■
linkages between our own and Africa!
economies and upon our shared goals
economic progress.
To break this cycle will require a
concerted effort on our part, on your
part, and on the part of Africans
themselves. It will require some
sacrifices, closer attention to prioritie
specific definition of objectives and be
ter coordination of our assistance pro'
grams with our foreign policy goals. V
are not ashamed to back winners. We'
want to expand that group of African
nations whose development policies pi
duce economic progress. We want to
help those who help themselves and
want to work with us on the basis of
mutual respect and common in-
terest—like Malawi and Kenya, Sudai
and Cameroon.
But our official assistance resourc
and those of our allies are not infinite
We want to engage the American
private sector more fully in the econo
development process— in the creation
jobs, in overall growth, and in
establishing a sustaining source of
revenue. We recognize that the privai
sectors of other industrial democracie
are already competing effectively in
Africa, yet we believe that U.S. firms
have a comparative advantage in son:
critical areas, such as agribusiness ac
tivities. We plan to do our part to ass
you, by reexamining present govern-
ment policies which act as an un-
necessary disincentive to business ac-
tivities abroad, by exploring ways in
which our own Agency for Internatio
Development and other government
agencies can support your activities, ;
by coordinating our trade aid and inv
ment instruments in supportive ways
In a larger sense, we believe that
our own policies at home and abroad
create the environment in which U.S.
business can operate more effectively
This Administration seeks to rely mo.
on market forces at home and to en-
courage the growth of market econor
abroad. We can set an example on bo
fronts, one which, when weighed
together with the dismal results of
government-run enterprises in Africa
elsewhere, will encourage the trends
seek. At the same time, African gove
merits themselves will need to make c
tain changes — in management, in corr
modity pricing policies, in resource
allocation, and in economic planning,
can no longer afford to provide scare*
bilateral assistance, to encourage
multilateral lending, or to promote
private sector investment in countries
58
Department of State Bulle
«MS CONTROL
Inerica's Blueprint
lr Controlling Nuclear Weapons
Eugene V. Rostow
Statement before the Senate Foreign
Uions Committee on June 22, 1981.
Rostow is Director-designate of the
is Control and Disarmament
ncyj
I always an honor to come before this
imittee. I am proud to be here as
sident Reagan's nominee for the
ictorship of the Arms Control and
irmament Agency (ACDA). The
sident regards the functions en-
;ted to the agency as among the
t important in the arsenal of our
omacy. So do I.
President Reagan has said that "the
t and foremost" objective of our
;ign and defense policy is "the
tblishment of lasting world peace."
ice with freedom is and always will
;he most fundamental of our national
rests in world politics. But in the
lear age, peace is more than an in-
)se policies do not produce results,
do otherwise would undermine our
eign policy goals and lose us your
port and the support of the
•erican people.
Yet there are reasons for optimism,
ne African governments have already
run an agonizing reappraisal of their
nomic performance and policies.
■re is a new determination to reverse
eriorating economic conditions. U.S.
/ate investment is more actively be-
encouraged and the opportunities for
1. firms are there— in food processing
ustries; in telecommunications; in ir-
ition, mining, construction, and
lical equipment; in Earth satellite
:ions; and in computer technology,
i have this Administration's pledge
t we will work toward creating a
•e favorable environment in Africa
private sector initiatives. We believe
t Africans, if given the choice, will
i strengthened relations with us and
i you. We have shared goals. We
e the wherewithal to produce results,
values and institutions upon which
greatness of this country was built
r a solid basis for the continued
■ngthening of African-American rela-
S.l
terest; it is virtually a commandment.
The President is convinced that a just
and stable system of peace can be
restored by peaceful means. In his view,
the task can be accomplished through
the diplomacy of regional coalitions
backed by credible military deterrence.
Such action is imperative now because
our vital national interests in many
parts of the world are threatened by the
recent decline in world public order.
Many look to arms control
agreements as magical guarantees of
peace. The history of the subject should
persuade us to accept more modest ex-
pectations. Fair, balanced, and verifiable
arms control agreements can play a
significant role both in achieving and
maintaining peace. They cannot do so of
themselves.
The Versailles treaty and the naval
agreements of the 1920s and 1930s were
the most important arms control and
disarmament agreements thus far dur-
ing this century. These words have
somber echoes. Much has been said
about the moral justification of the Ver-
sailles treaty. Viewed only as an arms
control agreement, however, Versailles
and the other arms control treaties of
the period clearly failed. When they
were tested, the United States was still
in the grip of neutralism; the United
Kingdom had lost faith in its com-
mitments; and France could not act
alone. The Second World War was the
result.
There is at least one successful arms
control agreement in modern history —
the Rush-Bagot agreement of 1817,
which still limits the level of naval power
we and Canada can deploy on the Great
Lakes. The fact that everything about
the Rush-Bagot agreement is rather dull
is the most convincing evidence of its
success. It was by no means self-evident
in 1817 that the agreement would work.
The passions of the Revolutionary War
and the War of 1812 survived and
rankled. There was great tension be-
tween the United States and the United
Kingdom over Canada on several occa-
sions during the 19th century. In these
periods, the Rush-Bagot agreement was
a genuine influence for restraint.
What is the moral of the experience
I have just recalled? I should venture
these conclusions. Where there is a
general political understanding about the
limits of rivalry, arms control
agreements can help to prevent friction
and conflict from degenerating into war.
This was the case with the Rush-Bagot
agreement but not with the Versailles
treaty or the naval agreements of the
period. The Western nations simply
refused to recognize the aggressive
nature of German and Japanese policy in
the 1930s. Disarmed frontiers and arms
control treaties cannot prevent war
when democratic nations pursue blind,
foolish, and inadequate policies, tempt-
ing aggressors beyond endurance.
In short, arms limitation agreements
can help to reinforce the state of peace
when it already exists, or when it is
close to being the norm. They cannot do
so where the will to peace is missing and
the rules of peace are not fully accepted
and enforced. Arms control agreements
are neither good nor bad in themselves.
Whether they turn out to be useful or
harmful can be determined only in rela-
tion to all the other factors playing on
the formation and execution of our
foreign and defense policy.
It would be premature for me to at-
tempt an outline of Administration
policies in the areas committed by
statute to the Arms Control and Disar-
mament Agency. I have not yet fully
taken up the duties of the office, nor
consulted in detail about its programs.
What I propose to do in this statement
is to consider the background of the
problem as I see it and then list a series
of questions I intend to address before
recommending changes in the substance
of the agency's work.
ACDA's Mandate
ACDA is a pioneer agency. The United
States was the first among the nations
to create a separate government entity
devoted entirely to arms control and
disarmament. The statutes entrust a
number of functions to ACDA as the
organization charged with "primary
responsibility" for this field:
• To conduct research and recom-
mend arms control initiatives "to the
President, the Secretary of State, other
officials of the executive branch, and the
Congress";
• To prepare and manage U.S. par-
ticipation in international arms control
negotiations;
• To determine whether arms con-
trol agreements are adequately verified;
• In the language of the statute, to
"assess the effect of [arms control pro-
grams] upon our foreign policies, our na-
tional security policies, and our
economy" and to evaluate our interna-
iust1981
RQ
Arms Control
tional arms and technology transfer and
export programs; and
• To coordinate and disseminate
public information concerning arms con-
trol and disarmament.
In addition to its inherent authority
with respect to nonproliferation under
the ACDA statute, the agency has also
been assigned wide-ranging responsi-
bilities by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Act of 1978. In all these activities, save
those entrusted by statute to the agency
alone, the Director reports to the Presi-
dent and acts under the direction of the
President and Secretary of State.
The centrality of ACDA's research
responsibility is self-evident. I propose
to give the ACDA research program a
great deal of emphasis, because I believe
it is of quite particular importance today
that ACDA be an intellectually vigorous
and autonomous agency, making its own
contribution to the flow of ideas
reaching the President. In carrying out
its research function, it is my wish that
ACDA draw on original minds
throughout the government and the na-
tion and in other nations as well. No one
has a corner on the market for ideas.
Originality in ACDA's research is
especially needed because we have
entered a new era in arms control. Our
10 years of experience with Salt I and
Salt II have been painful and unsatisfac-
tory. Our first task, therefore, is to
reassess the role of arms limitation
agreements in our foreign and defense
policy.
Role of Limitation Agreements
It is hardly remarkable that our course
in this novel realm has been one of trial
and error, as we tested first one
hypothesis and then another in our
search for solutions to the puzzle of
peace.
In the beginning of the nuclear age,
many believe that our monopoly of
nuclear weapons would be enough in
itself to guarantee the peace. Strong ar-
mies and navies would be unnecessary.
The nuclear weapon would be Merlin's
wand.
We soon learned how naive this view
was. Bertrand Russell even proposed
that we turn on our wartime ally, the
Soviet Union, and insist under threat of
nuclear attack that it become an open
society. The idea was contrary to our
nature and could not be considered
seriously.
Then we went through a period in
which we espoused a policy of "massive
retaliation," only to discover that it too
could not become a day-by-day working
rule for our diplomacy.
But despite the disappointments and
the setbacks, our foreign policy since
President Truman's time has never
stopped trying for effective international
controls to minimize the risk of nuclear
war and encourage the peaceful use of
nuclear energy. Under President
Reagan, this will emphatically remain
the case.
Since 1947, behind the shield of the
Truman doctrine— the doctrine of con-
tainment—the United States has relied
upon five interdependent lines of policy
to assure and enrich the peace:
• A system of alliances for collective
self-defense, backed by military forces
deployed in key areas around the world
to maintain the balance of power and
the peace;
• A progressive and integrated
capitalist world economy, which serves
the interests of the industrialized and
the developing countries alike, and those
of the Communist nations as well;
• Special programs to assist the
developing nations in their quest for
modernization— next to peace itself the
most pressing and fundamental problem
of world politics;
• Peaceful international cooperation,
through the United Nations and other-
wise, to encourage the recognition of
human rights, the spread of education,
and improvement in the quality of life;
and
• The search for nuclear controls.
These themes in our foreign policy
are embodied in a series of programs
going back to the four freedoms, Bret-
ton Woods, the Marshall plan, point
four, the Baruch plan, and NATO. Some
of these programs have been extremely
successful, others successful in part.
Only one, the effort to eliminate the risk
of nuclear war, has thus far been unsuc-
cessful.
Together, these related principles
constitute a coherent foreign and
defense policy. While there has been
fluctuation and even some uncertainty in
their application over the years, they re-
main of necessity the heart of U.S.
foreign and defense policy, because they
reflect our character as a people and our
permanent interests in world affairs.
Changing circumstances require suitable
changes in our programs. But these
abiding principles will continue to shape
our foreign and defense policy for the in-
definite future.
In the late 1940s, immediately after
World War II, the United States offered
the Soviet Union and the nations of
Eastern Europe not only the Marshal
plan but also the Baruch plan, which
proposed to entrust our monopoly of
nuclear science to an international
agency for peaceful development. Eve
American can be proud that our gove
ment was willing to take so bold and
imaginative a risk in the cause of pea
In retrospect it is clear that the Sovie
refusal to consider the proposal was a
of the bitter turning points in the
history of the cold war.
Since the Soviet rejection of the
Baruch plan, the United States has pa
tiently pursued many other approach*'
to the goal of limiting or eliminating
nuclear arms — multilateral treaties lil
those dealing with nuclear proliferate
bilateral agreements with the Soviet
Union with regard to antiballistic
missiles and strategic arms, and so on
Many of these have achieved imp«
tant objectives. But so far the high
hopes of peace which attended their
signing have been disappointed. As
Secretary of Defense Weinberger saic
recently, "rarely in history have we on
any other great nation pursued such I
ble goals, risked so much, and yet
gained so little." The state of world
politics is not better now than it was
1963, when the first of these agree-
ments, the Limited Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty, was signed and ratified. It is
much, much worse.
To understand the condition we 9
today, and the significance of the gro.<
ing Soviet nuclear arsenal, I turn brie*
to the influence of the nuclear weapon
on warfare and, therefore, on politics
Influence of the Nuclear Weapon
The nuclear weapon is a major chang'
the nature of world politics— revolu-
tionary in its implications, perhaps m<
revolutionary than any previous evenl
man's history. The nuclear balance af-
fects every aspect of diplomacy— and
fects it with increasing intensity.
In the immediate postwar period,
the United States had a monopoly of
nuclear weapons and then, for a long*
time, obvious nuclear superiority. The
Soviet Union, rejecting the course of
cooperation with the United States,
began to expand its domain through t
use of its own forces, proxy forces, an
methods of subversion. These episode*
took place first in Eastern Europe anc
the Middle East and later in many otb
parts of the world. Although the Unite
States had warned the Soviet Union tl
there could be no peace between our
peoples until the Soviet Union honorec
60
DfinartrrmntnfStatRBulle-
Arms Control
edge of free elections in Eastern
ipe, the Soviets soon discovered that
'ere not then inclined to challenge
!e facto Soviet sphere of influence in
ern Europe. Furthermore, the
;t Union concluded that we would
:eriously consider using nuclear
>ons to stop Soviet aggression out-
of Europe in areas they thought we
rded as of secondary importance,
in Berlin and Cuba we contained
it aggression with the threat to use
entional weapons, not nuclear
)ons, although in each case the
ing shadow of the American nuclear
>on played a decisive role. In the
in missile crisis of 1962, for exam-
the Soviets withdrew when they
that we had more than 200,000
js in Florida and the supporting
1 and air forces necessary for the in-
>n of Cuba. Both in Berlin and in
i, American nuclear superiority was
that it would have been wholly im-
ent for the Soviet Union to have
idered escalating the confrontation.
\s our lead in nuclear power
nished, our capacity to control the
lation of crises diminished cor-
ondingly. So did our capacity to use
entional forces or credibly to
aten their use. In Korea, at a point
ounting American frustration,
etary of State Acheson's secret
ar hints, in response to what we
ght might be Soviet signals of a
e to end the war, produced the
nning of negotiations, although it
a second hint from President
nhower to obtain the armistice. But
lar secret American messages
ird the end of the Vietnam war
d to produce a similar reaction. By
ate 1960s, the nuclear relationship
/een the Soviet Union and the
..ed States had become more nearly
il.
If the United States and its allies
ild fail to carry through the pro-
tis of rearmament on which they are
embarked, the Soviet Union would
l reinforce its widespread conven-
al force superiority with a position of
nous strategic strength. The Soviet
on is now close to acquiring a
ure from which it could gain an im-
ant strategic advantage by striking
I or threatening to strike first in a
is. If we allow our strategic forces to
iain vulnerable to that threat, the
ilyzing specter of Soviet military
eriority could prevent us from
nding our national interests with
:e if diplomacy and deterrence fail. In
rt, we could be exposed to nuclear
■kmail.
These profound changes in the
political-military environment require us
to review the policies we have been pur-
suing in relation to control of strategic
nuclear armaments. Policies which were
plausible 10 or 15 years ago may well be
obsolete today.
Possible Negotiating Approaches
There are several ways in which Presi-
dent Reagan could approach the problem
of negotiating agreements with the
Soviet Union for limiting and reducing
nuclear arms.
The first would be to break off the
SALT negotiating process altogether, or
at least defer it until after we have fully
corrected the military balance between
the United States and its allies and the
Warsaw Pact nations. President Reagan
has rejected this course. He wishes to
pursue every feasible opportunity for
genuine negotiation with the Soviet
Union on nuclear arms.
A second possible policy would be to
accept any SALT agreement we can get,
on the ground that even a poor SALT
agreement is better than no agreement
at all and that all SALT agreements,
however weak, contribute to peace, keep
things from getting worse, or save
money — perhaps all three. This ap-
proach too has been firmly rejected by
the President.
In view of what has happened since
the first SALT agreements were signed
in 1972, it is impossible to defend the
view that even a poor SALT agreement
would contribute to peace. Since 1972
we have endured the most dangerous
period of the cold war and called it
"detente." Adverse changes in the
balance of power have been ignored
because of the excessive hopes we in-
vested in the SALT process and in
nuclear arms limitation agreements. It is
even more obvious that SALT agree-
ments have not saved money.
A third possible major premise for a
SALT policy would be to seek an agree-
ment that would make a nuclear attack
on the United States— but not on its
allies— unlikely. For the United States,
this premise has always been rejected as
a totally inadequate standard for nuclear
negotiation. It would "decouple" us from
our allies and leave us prisoners in "For-
tress America." Facing the Soviet
strategic arsenal which such a SALT
policy would imply, we should be in no
position to use conventional or nuclear
force in defense of our interests in
Europe, the Far East, the Middle East,
or elsewhere. Since 1945, the United
States has made many security com-
mitments to other countries, through
treaties, congressional resolutions, and
otherwise. Those commitments are the
cement of the world political system. A
SALT policy based on the "Fortress
America" premise would remove the
nuclear umbrella over those com-
mitments and leave them worthless.
A fourth policy is to have a clear,
credible, and unchallengeable second-
strike nuclear capability— a "margin of
safety," in President Reagan's
words — as the essential basis of a
countervailing strategy. Such a position
on our part should make it possible to
achieve one of the primary goals of our
policy— to eliminate from world politics
the threat that nuclear weapons could be
used or brandished for aggressive pur-
poses. Two fundamental national in-
terests require the United States to pur-
sue this aim: (1) to protect the United
States, its allies, and its vital interests
against nuclear attack or the threat of
nuclear attack and (2) to permit us to
use military force in defense of our in-
terests with comparative freedom if it
should become necessary to do so not
only in Europe but in other strategically
critical parts of the world. In my
view — and here I speak for President
Reagan— this must remain the minimal
goal of our nuclear arsenal and our
minimal goal in arms limitation negotia-
tions.
Proliferation and World Order
However, the record of our arms control
experience and Soviet expansionism
since 1972 requires us to seek more than
this minimal goal. Of course we must at
least maintain the nuclear stalemate.
And of course nuclear balance must
never again be allowed to dull our
vigilance or reduce our capacity to pro-
tect our interests by other means. But a
nuclear balance should not be a license
for aggression throughout the world
backed by conventional forces, ter-
rorism, subversion, and psychological
warfare, in the pattern we have wit-
nessed for many years and are witness-
ing today on an expanding scale. The
Soviet Union has been the principal fac-
tor in this process of spreading anarchy,
both through its own actions and those
of nations and groups it has supported
and protected. But it is by no means
alone. Maintaining nuclear balance in
order to allow the Soviet Union, its
proxies, and its proteges to carry on the
cold war as usual may be all we can
achieve through negotiation and rearma-
ment. But making the world safe for
conventional and covert war is hardly an
appetizing prospect for the United
nuct 1Qf<1
61
Arms Control
States, for tht.' Soviet Union, or for the
rest of the world, either.
The Soviet drive for empire is ac-
celerating in momentum and is becoming
more and more difficult to contain and
to confine. It is beginning to produce
Western claustrophobia, and this is ex-
tremely dangerous. World politics is not
a chess game. War comes when human
beings are swept away by emotional
tides they cannot control— by rage, by
frustration, and, above all, by fear. Con-
fronting the fact, the course of wisdom
is to move decisively toward stability— a
condition of world politics where no
state need fear its neighbor and where
progress can be sought by peaceful
means.
The crumbling of world public order
during the last decade has had another
most unfortunate consequence. It has
created an environment in which
beleaguered nations have become more
interested in acquiring nuclear weapons.
However delusive the belief may be,
some countries facing grave risks are
convinced that a nuclear weapons
capability could protect them against ag-
gression or nuclear blackmail. We and
other nations have frequently said that
in a world where many states have
nuclear weapons, politics will become
nearly unpredictable and instability will
reach the level of explosiveness.
The magnitude of this danger was
translated from the realm of forecast to
that of reality by the Israeli attack on a
nuclear reactor in Iraq on June 7. Israel
perceived the potential development of
nuclear capabilities in Iraq as a mortal
threat, despite Iraq's adherence to the
Nonproliferation Treaty and its agree-
ment with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). While we have
condemned that action, we should be
aware that we are dealing here, as Dean
Acheson said at the time of the Cuban
missile crisis, with events which touch
the nerve of sovereignty and survival.
President Reagan made the same point
in his news conference last week.
The deadly volatility of politics in a
world of nuclear proliferation cannot be
cured by threats or reassuring words or
pious votes in the United Nations. The
phenomenon will continue until interna-
tional public order is restored. Unless
we, our allies, and other nations move
decisively to restore world public order,
and to deal with problems of regional in-
stability, there is little or no chance to
prevent nuclear proliferation on a large
scale. And if nuclear proliferation on a
large scale should take place there
would be little or no chance for success
in restoring world public order.
I should stress as well in any pro-
gram to prevent nuclear proliferation,
the necessity for strengthening IAEA
safeguards and for strengthened policies
on the part of the main industrial na-
tions that supply nuclear materials and
technology. After the flash of lightening
of the Israeli raid in Iraq, the world
community should follow even more
strictly an agreed and concerted policy
based on the principles of the Non-
proliferation Treaty and the bilateral
and multilateral arrangements which
have developed from it.
Thus wherever one starts, analysis
returns to the fundamental problem of
stability and order. Secretary of State
Haig addressed the issue in his impor-
tant speech of April 24, 1981. The lesson
he drew from the experience of the last
10 years is that the United States, its
allies, and all the other nations which
cherish peace should return to the con-
tainment policy pursued between
Truman's time and the American
withdrawal from Vietnam.
The containment policy was one of
collective self-defense against aggres-
sion. In areas where their interests were
affected, the United States and other
nations worked together, especially to
prevent Soviet expansion and coercion.
The policy applied only where the Soviet
Union sought to expand its empire by
methods of aggression which violated
the rules of the U.N. Charter regarding
the international use of force. Those
rules codify the necessary conditions of
peaceful cooperation among the
members of the state system.
But the Charter of the United Na-
tions is not a suicide pact. It cannot sur-
vive as an influence in world politics
unless the Soviet Union is finally per-
suaded that the imperatives of the
nuclear age require strict and reciprocal
respect for its most fundamental
rules — those dealing with the inter-
national use of force. As Secretary of
State Haig said on April 24: "We have a
right, indeed a duty, to insist that the
Soviets support a peaceful international
order, that they abide by treaties, and
that they respect reciprocity."
Unless effective containment is
restored, we cannot expect to pursue
detente and arms control fruitfully. The
restoration of containment should be the
predicate for useful arms control
agreements with the Soviet Union,
which could then reinforce the policy
and help to sustain it during periods of
stress. Even competing nations have
common interests in peace, if they can
be brought to accept them. It should be
possible, whatever difficulties, to
1
translate those interests into
agreements to limit and control ar
maments. And such agreements, in tf
could reduce the risk of war by in
advertence, moderate arms eompetitS
and promote political cooperation.
What I suggest, therefore, is a fil
possible approach to arms limitation J
negotiations to be developed with oum
allies in the period ahead— a policy
which would link arms control to theH
fective revival of the Truman doctrinl
and the acceptance by the Soviet Una
of the rules of the Charter of the Una
Nations regarding the international us
of force. Such an approach is well v/m
the reach of Western policy. The
Western nations have more than eno«
power and potential power to accompli
that goal. What has been lacking is at
shared perception of the problem and!
the political will to deal with it.
I do not wish to be misunderstood
When I emphasize the significance ofl
the rules of the Charter of the United
Nations governing the international us
of force, I distinguish the Charter itsel-
from the institutions of the United Na-
tions and the abuse of those institution
for purposes of political warfare. That
tendency in recent years has been
deplorable, and I hope that the United!
States and its friends will succeed in
restoring an atmosphere of civility and
responsibility to the work of the Unit©
Nations. The Charter, however, exists
independently as an agreed code of lav
to be enforced by the Security Council
or, where the Security Council is unabi1
to act, by methods of individual and coi
lective self-defense. The Charter is the
only code for detente there is— the in-fl
escapable starting point for all our ef*
forts to improve delations with the
Soviet Union and other nations which
use war as an instrument of national
policy.
The Future of Arms Control
I come now to the final question: What
to be done, and, more particularly,
what's to be done about arms control?
The first step has been taken. WitB
its votes on the future of the military
budget, the Congress has joined Presi-
dent Reagan in launching a program to
rebuild America's defenses. Without th;
decision, nothing else could be ac-
complished. We have ended our vain at-
tempt to retreat to isolation and have
started on the long march back to
security.
When I mention the figure of 9
months as a timeframe, I am suggesting
only an estimate, a target, a hope, not i
promise or a deadline. The intellectual
62
D e p a r t m e ntofStateBulletil
Arms Control
ems ahead are formidable, and
lucracy has its own tempo,
/hat are the implications of this im-
e decision for arms control policy?
believe it is now possible and
able for us to resume the search for
ced and verifiable arms control
■merits. While we must not permit
icissitudes of the negotiating pro-
to interfere with the restoration of
econd-strike nuclear capability and
onventional force posture, we must
imine the chief elements of our
f with regard to strategic and long-
? theater nuclear weapons— an ef-
vhich, in the strategic area, should
at least 9 months or so— and then
;ed forthwith to the negotiating
. Our policy will be to accept only
;ments that contribute positively to
•wn security and to the stability of
tate system. The linkage we seek
een Soviet behavior and arms con-
ihould not be merely a transitory or
;ed Soviet action— the sight of a
upon the troubled waters— but the
ration of world order sustained by
rrence. The process of seeking arms
ol agreements should play a
ive part in that effort,
should like now to list the ques-
I believe we must address in reex-
ing our policy for the control of
i ar weapons.
,ALT II Treaty. The first item on
genda, obviously, is the SALT II
ty still technically before the
te. Should it be renegotiated or
•d we proceed on what is loosely
d the agenda for SALT III? Before
:t, all aspects of this important sub-
I should be studied with care by all
■;rned in the executive branch and
ienate and discussed with our allies.
The Administration has reached no
lusions on this subject, beyond the
iction that the SALT II Treaty is
|ily flawed and should not be ratified
present form. We should make a
start in seeking both arms control
arms reduction; and we should
se the course that will contribute
; positively to the goals I have iden-
d in the earlier parts of this
ment— allied solidarity behind
:>nal programs of containment in the
ntic area, the Middle East, the Far
;, or elsewhere as circumstances
require. From now on, I suggest,
hould have a new acronym— not
;T but START, for strategic arms
iction talks.
Verification. I shall recommend a
lamental review of the whole prob-
of verification, monitoring, and
Soviet compliance with arms control
agreements and of our policies concern-
ing them, perhaps including talks on the
subject with the Soviet Union when our
internal review has been completed. The
possibility of reasonable SALT, or
rather START, agreements and other
arms limitation agreements depends on
the ability of each party to verify com-
pliance with full confidence. Given the
closed nature of the Soviet system and
the increasing complexity of nuclear and
other highly technical weapons systems,
we can never expect that weapons
verification in the 1980s will be as sim-
ple a problem as the verification of the
Rush-Bagot agreement. But the discus-
sion of the issue during the active
debate on SALT II during the last 3
years has left me, for one, deeply con-
cerned about our capacity to verify
Soviet compliance and to monitor
developments in Soviet nuclear
capabilities. Obviously, if nuclear arms
limitation agreements do not reduce
uncertainty about each side's arsenal,
they can do little to improve security.
Data. Similarly, I believe that we
must examine once again the perennial
problem of the data used in arms control
negotiations with the Soviet Union. Un-
til now, the data have been supplied
almost entirely by the United States.
While there was some improvement in
this area during the SALT II negotia-
tions, the Soviets must be more forth-
coming in the provision of data in future
negotiations, as the North Atlantic
Council concluded in its Rome communi-
que a few weeks ago.
Nature of Agreement. We must
consider the nature of the arms control
agreement we want. Should we seek a
comprehensive agreement or a relatively
simple one? One for a period of years or
one of indefinite duration, like the ABM
Treaty? What should we be trying to
limit or reduce? The number of deployed
launchers? There is now serious concern
that this approach is no longer adequate.
Should we try to limit or reduce the
number and types of missiles? The
number and power of warheads on
missiles? Their throw-weight? In this
connection, we should recall former
Secretary of State Rusk's incisive com-
ment that there is no use building a dam
halfway across a river. These questions
have to be answered satisfactorily in
order to produce an overall measure or
measures of capacity and scope which
could serve as the foundation for effec-
tive arms limitation agreements.
Theater Nuclear Forces. How
should the difficult question of theater
nuclear forces be approached? The
history of that issue is complex, and
positions have changed. It is a problem
on which allied opinion is of quite special
significance. Here, as on many other
sensitive issues, we should move only
after full consultations with our allies.
Strategic Deterrent. President
Reagan has made the strengthening of
our strategic deterrent one of his major
defense priorities. This step is indispens-
able to the possibility of meaningful
arms control. How can we best integrate
our strategic force acquisition and arms
control policies? How can we hope to
achieve the President's goal of deep and
reciprocal reductions in strategic nuclear
weapons? I have little confidence in the
"bargaining-chip" style of negotiations.
On the other hand, we know from long
experience that the Soviet pattern of
negotiations rests on the principle of
"nothing for nothing." We should never
again defer actions essential to our
security in the hope that the Soviet
Union will follow suit. That approach
has been followed, and it has failed.
Equally, we should refuse to settle for
cosmetic or ambiguous agreements and
resolve to persevere in our armaments
programs whether the news from the
negotiating table is favorable or un-
favorable.
Will it be possible to negotiate and
verify a dramatic and equitable cut in
each side's arsenal— to achieve a real
breakthrough in the mad spiral of arms
accumulation? Such proposals have been
made from time to time— notably by
Paul H. Nitze in 1971 and by George
Kennan a few weeks ago. Under present
circumstances, such an approach might
be feasible, perhaps by starting with the
largest missiles. No American Adminis-
tration could reject such a possibilty out
of hand, despite the fact that President
Carter's arms reduction proposals in
1977 were abruptly dismissed by the
Soviet Union.
The world is becoming so unstable,
war is so frequent, and the spread of
nuclear weapons is gaining so much
momentum that agreements which now
seem hopelessly quixotic may well
become practical politics. I, for one,
devoutly hope so. All I can say on this
subject is that we shall study and ex-
plore all reasonable approaches to the
goal of arms control and arms reduction
and pursue the most promising with all
the energy and imagination at our com-
mand.
63
Arms Control
Antisatellite Weaponry. Continued
Soviet efforts to develop and test anti-
satellite weaponry underline the impor-
tance of possible technological break-
throughs which could revolutionize the
problem of security as much as the
nuclear weapon did. We must examine
the potential impact of a whole range of
technological developments both on our
defense programs and on our arms con-
trol policies. Given the difficulties of
monitoring what goes on in the Soviet
Union, we must ask ourselves whether
limitations on such systems as antisatel-
lite weapons are feasible and in our
security interests.
ABM Treaty. The Antiballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty comes up for
review in 1982. I take it as obvious that
the review should not be pro forma but
searching.
Nuclear Nonproliferation. What
about the proliferation of the nuclear
weapons and the future of the Non-
proliferation Treaty? I commented
earlier in this statement on the
significance of proliferation both as a
consequence and as a cause of the break-
down of world public order. I have little
to add here. If a strengthened non-
proliferation policy is to be successful in
containing the spread of nuclear
weapons and explosives, it must be dealt
with in the overall context of interna-
tional security.
It must be dealt with also in the con-
text of the world energy problem and of
President Reagan's commitment to the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Our
nonproliferation policy should fully ac-
cept the energy security needs of our
allies and other countries. The ex-
perience of the last few years should
teach us that policies that fail to
recognize legitimate energy security
needs cannot succeed.
Finally, our nonproliferation policies
need to reflect realism, commitment,
and flexibility — in particular, a recogni-
tion that dealing with proliferation is a
shared reponsibility. We cannot try to
impose our policies on others; we can,
however, constructively commit the
United States to a position of leadership
in a truly international effort at reduc-
ing the incentives and opportunities for
proliferation while working to develop
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes at
home and abroad.
1 intend to take a strong role in sup
porting U.S. nonproliferation efforts and
in meeting ACDA's statutory respon-
sibilities in this important area.
U.S. Alliances. Finally, what is the
role of arms limitation negotiations and
agreements in deepening the solidarity
of our alliances throughout the world? I
believe that role is fundamental. As the
Western world has reluctantly come to
recognize the expansionist nature of
Soviet policy, people have become more
fearful about the possiblity of war, and
particularly of nuclear war. This
heightening of anxiety is altogether
natural and reasonable. People want to
be certain that their governments are
doing everthing possible to reach fair
agreements with the Soviet Union and
exploring every rational opening for
peace, especially in the arcane and
rather forbidding area of arms control.
It follows, I believe, that we should
enlarge the practice of consulting with
our allies on the problems we face in our
bilateral arms control negotiations with
the Soviet Union and continue the suc-
cessful practice of working together in
multilateral negotiations. The more we
and our allies understand each other, the
stronger our alliances will be — provided,
of course, that we pursue reasonable
policies!
On that footing, I suggest, we
should put a great deal of emphasis on
effective and realistic programs of public
information and education. The Soviet
Union has scored several quite un-
necessary propaganda victories in recent
years by exploiting the horror of nuclear
war. The purpose of those propaganda
campaigns is clear: to separate the
United States from its allies and to
discourage Western rearmament. I shall
press for information programs that ful-
ly recognize the importance of the
political, psychological, and ideological
dimensions of security. Peace with
freedom cannot be achieved without the
discipline of power. But a balance of
power does not of itself guarantee
peace.
Conclusion
The heart of the dilemma of our foreign
policy is that the Soviet Union is not
seeking a few border changes but is
challenging the system of peace we have
known since 1945. The issue was recent-
ly stated with compelling force by the
Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore,
Sinnathamby Rajaratnam:
Unless the Soviet challenge is made the con.'
of the U.S. foreign policy and met with the
same resolve and sense of realism the Soviets
bring to their cause, then a Fax Sovietica is a
high probability in the 1980s. . . . That is not
what we in Asia want, but if that is the only
item on the shelf, that is what we will have
to settle fur.
I believe that President Reagan «
succeed in his ambitious program of
coalition diplomacy to renew and res
the system of peace. I am an optimis
although I do not believe that men ai
likely to become angels very soon. Bi
believe that the NATO allies, Japan,
Australia, New Zealand, Israel, Egyj
and a number of other countries, pur
ing a rational policy of containment,
should be able to convince the Soviet
Union that the imperatives of survive
the nuclear age demand strict and
reciprocal respect by all nations for t
rules of world public order governing
the international use of force. Fair ai
verifiable arms limitation agreements
can help to fortify that conviction onj
is established and to protect it agains
temptation, as the Rush-Bagot agree
ment has helped since 1817 to defeat
pulses and pressures hostile to good
relations among the United Kingdom
Canada, and the United States.
Despite the long history of disap-
pointment with the results of arms cl
trol negotiations, the peoples of the
West continue to support such effort
with tenacity and faith— sometimes \
excessive faith. The firmness of their
faith bespeaks one of the finest and
most powerful themes of Western
civilization: our devotion to the ideal I
law. The quest for disarmament trea I
is meaningless except as part of a lai
quest to bring international society
under the control of an effective ami
universal system of international law
We are people of the book and peopl
the law. In the Arms Control and Di
mament Act, the Congress declared )
it is "an ultimate goal of the United .
States" to subordinate the internatioi"
use of force to the rule of law. This i t
goal we can't help seeking. On this cJ
tracting and interdependent planet,
where modern science offers mankini
both infinite promise and infinitely
hideous dangers, the course of law is
most promising foundation for the m
tional security of the United States. ]|
assure you that my efforts in the offi
will be directed by the compass of th«
law. The rule of law has been the
guiding principle of my life. It is too .
for me to change now.
'ACDA press release 1. The complete
transcript or the hearings will be publishe
by the committee and will be available frc
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C. 20402. ■
64
Department of State Bulle
JROPE
IS. Policy Toward Western Europe
lid Canada
Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Etatement before the Subcommittee
I'm rope and the Middle East of the
me Foreign Affairs Committee on
w 2, 1981. Ambassador Eagleburger
Assistant Secretary for European
li'rs.1
■come this opportunity to discuss
I you U.S. relations with West
Ipe and Canada. I look forward to
ling; with you next week to review
l-elations with the Soviet Union,
pslavia, and the nations of Eastern
|)pe. Your main interest is U.S.
ly.
j» What are the priorities of the
ran Administration?
|» What major problems do we face?
'• What have we achieved so far?
j» What issues lie ahead?
Kfou want, in short, the lay of the
| and a look ahead. To that end, I
(outline the following dimensions of
diplomacy:
k Our overall framework for action;
k Our overriding concern for the
|,ary security and economic well-
g of the transatlantic community;
• Our clear commitment to good bi-
-al relations throughout the region.
>JERAL FRAMEWORK FOR U.S.
IEIGN POLICY
discussion of U.S. policy toward
it Europe and Canada must be put
broader perspective. The Reagan
ninistration has made clear that the
on is now launched on a new begin-
{. We are proceeding, with a re-
ed sense of purpose and direction, to
ore American leadership and to
ieve a world free from threat or use
orce.
President Reagan and Secretary
g have designed a foreign policy with
r main points:
First, our insistence on restraint
reciprocity in East- West relations;
Second, our determination to
mgthen our alliances, particularly
TO;
Third, our intention to play a con-
ictive role in the developing nations
he world; and
Fourth, our fundamental resolve to
strengthen our economy and our
defenses.
Each of these four points bears on
U.S. relations with West Europe and
Canada — directly or indirectly. And each
concern relates to the others. Without
progress on the President's economic
reform program, we cannot marshal the
resources for increased defense capabili-
ty. Nor can we manifest the leadership
needed to renew the North Atlantic
alliance. Without a resolute demonstra-
tion of collective will among the allies,
we cannot build the basis for construc-
tive East- West relations. And, without
cooperation with the other nations of the
transatlantic community, we cannot ad-
dress the underlying problems of
developing nations — problems which are
significant on their own terms and which
can provide openings for Soviet adven-
turism.
But, with balanced, consistent, and
reliable emphasis on the four pillars of
the Reagan Administration's policy, we
can achieve progress. That progress
toward the common defense and com-
mon welfare can serve not only our na-
tional interests but also those of Canada
and the nations of Western Europe.
DEFENSE OF THE WEST
The Reagan Administration considers
restoration of Western defense capabili-
ty and allied cohesion an overriding
priority. It is in concert with our NATO
partners that U.S. foreign policy can
achieve full effectiveness. The Atlantic
alliance has stood the test of time. It has
preserved the security of the United
States, Canada, and Western Europe.
And, based as it is on shared values and
a common heritage, it will continue to
play this essential role.
The Administration, as one of its
primary goals, has tried to lay the foun-
dation for an improved relationship with
its allies. The meetings of NATO foreign
and defense ministers in May marked
important steps in this direction. The
Lawrence S.
Eagleburger was born
in Milwaukee on
August 1, 1930. He
received his B.S.
degree from the
University of Wiscon-
sin (1952) and, after
serving as a First
Lieutentant in the
U.S. Army (1952-54),
earned an M.S. degree
(1957), also from the University of Wisconsin.
He entered the Foreign Service in 1957
and was assigned to Honduras until 1959. He
served as Political Analyst for Cuba in the
Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the
Department of State until 1961. Following
Serbo-Croation language training, he was
assigned to the economic section of the U.S.
Embassy in Belgrade (1961-65). Mr.
Eagleburger returned to the Department of
State to join the Secretariat staff dealing
with European affairs and then became
special assistant (March-July 1966) to former
Secretary of State Dean Acheson during the
latter's special assignment as Adviser to the
President on Franco-NATO matters. His next
position was that of Acting Director of the
Secretariat Staff.
In October 1966, Mr. Eagleburger joined
the National Security Staff and was responsi-
ble for European affairs. He became Special
Assistant to the Under Secretary of State in
October 1967.
From November 1968 until January 1969
Mr. Eagleburger was assistant to Dr. Henry
A. Kissinger in New York during the
presidential transition; he then became Ex-
ecutive Assistant to Dr. Kissinger at the
White House. In September 1969 he was
assigned to the U.S. Mission to NATO in
Brussels as Political Adviser and Chief of the
Political Section. From August 1971 to
January 30, 1973, Mr. Eagleburger was
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Council Affairs, Policy
Plans, and National Security Council Affairs;
until May 25, 1973 he was Acting Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Securi-
ty Affairs. He became Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Opera-
tions in June 1973 and served in that position
until the following September when he was
named Executive Assistant to Secretary of
State Kissinger. In 1975 he became Deputy
Under Secretary of State for Management.
Mr. Eagleburger was sworn in as U.S.
Ambassador to Yugoslavia on June 10, 1977,
and became Assistant Secretary for Euro-
pean Affairs on May 15, 1981.
Ambassador Eagleburger has been
awarded the Department of Defense's
Distinguished Civilian Service Medal (1973)
and the President's Award for Distinguished
Federal Civilian Service (1976).
just 1981
65
Europe
solidarity, consensus, and mutual
confidence achieved there provide a firm
basis on which to build.
Early in the new Administration, the
United States resolved to strengthen its
economy; to bolster its military power
substantially; and to provide active,
confident, and consistent leadership in
foreign policy in the context of close and
genuine consultation. Our allies have
welcomed this approach as an important
contribution to a healthy alliance.
The central element in U.S. foreign
policy, and one in which allied support is
crucial, is the approach to East- West
relations. The United States has been
active in working to develop a shared
allied perception of the problems and
directions in East-West policy. At the
NATO ministerial meetings, the alliance
took significant steps toward forging a
new consensus on a firmer, more
realistic approach to the Soviet Union.
This approach has several components,
as outlined by Secretary Haig.
First, an insistence that Soviet
restraint and reciprocity in East-West
relations must be a key element. The
communique for the NATO ministerial
put the Soviets on notice that a stable
and constructive East- West relationship
depends on Soviet restraint. In the same
document, the Soviets were warned that
grave consequences would follow from
any intervention in Poland. The alliance
reiterated the unacceptability of the
Soviet invasion and occupation of
Afghanistan and called again for a with-
drawal of Soviet forces.
Second, the alliance must be
strengthened in order to restore the
military balance. The NATO foreign
ministers thus reaffirmed the decision
made in December 1979 to proceed with
theater nuclear forces (TNF) moderniza-
tion. At the NATO Defense Planning
Committee ministerial, the allies
confirmed the standing allied commit-
ment to the 3% formula for annual real
defense spending increases and agreed
to do their utmost to make available all
of the resources needed to strengthen
NATO's deterrent and defense forces.
The United States and its allies will con-
tinue to work to improve NATO defense
planning, emphasizing defense output as
a standard in addition to the 3% bench-
mark.
Third, the United States and its
allies intend to play an active and
positive role in the developing nations of
the world. The West has much to offer
the developing countries in terms of
humanitarian and economic assistance,
aid in the peaceful resolution of interna-
tional problems, and, when appropriate,
assistance in deterring or defending
against threats to their security. The
United States and its allies recognize
global nature of the Soviet threat,
whether it is exerted directly or throi
surrogates. The allies have expanded
their horizons of concern beyond Eun
because of appreciation for the fact tr
events outside the NATO area can
threaten vital Western interests. How
ever, a formal extension of NATO's ai<
of responsibility is not necessary and :
under consideration. We will strive fo
better consultation and cooperation 1
among the allies on out-of-area concer
and for greater efforts, in accordance
with the capabilities of members of th
alliance, to meet threats in Southwest
Asia and elsewhere.
Fourth, we will use East- West
negotiations — while carefully assuring
that the homework has been done so
that U.S. and Western security inters
will be served — as a means of achievir
stability through restraint. The United
States and our allies will maintain a
dialogue with the Soviet Union. At the
Madrid review meeting for the Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation ii
Europe (CSCE), we and our allies seel
to achieve substantive and balanced
results leading to better implementatif
of CSCE provisions, including respect
North Atlantic Treaty Organization: European Members
Iceland
Portu.
■"-»'
The U.S. Government has not recognized the incorpora-
tion ot Estonia. Lativa, and Lithuania into the Soviet
Union
t(
NATO provides for the stationing of
U.S. military units in Europe as part <
a common NATO defense force in
peacetime. Out of a total of 2 million i
tive duty U.S. military personnel in
1979, 485,000 were stationed overseas
Of these the total number assigned in
Europe was 300,000 of which 193,000
were U.S. Army personnel stationed ii
West Germany.
NATO's European Members: Belgiurr
Denmark, France,* the Federal Repub
of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Lu
embourg, the Netherlands, Norway, P<
tugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom.
North American Members: Canada
United States.
ti
* France withdrew its forces from
NATO's international commands in 1966 bin
remains a member of the alliance.
66
Department of State Bullet1
Europe
human rights and enhanced security
cooperation. We support the French
)Osal for a conference on disarma-
it in Europe. The United States and
alliance partners favor realistic,
need, and verifiable arms control. In
regard, the reaffirmation at this last
ting of NATO foreign ministers of
1 tracks of the 1979 decision on TNF
imes particular importance. That
sion had two elements: deployment
arms control, which were to be pur-
i together. Since the decision, NATO
is have moved forward on TNF
loyment.
The arms control element of the
r decision is also moving ahead. At
Rome meeting of NATO foreign
isters, the allies welcomed the an-
ncement of the United States that
would be meeting with the Soviets to
in negotiations on TNF arms control
lin the SALT [Strategic Arms
litation Talks] framework by the end
his year. Since then, Secretary Haig
met with Ambassador Dobrynin to
lin laying the groundwork for his
kiting with Mr. Gromyko in Septem-
! at the U.N. General Assembly.
. These are the basic elements of
1 ign policy on which we are working
iiin the alliance. They have won
jeral acceptance from our NATO
|;ners. At the same time, it is realistic
lay that we have only made a start,
ierences exist in perceptions of the
iiet threat between publics and
liaments in Europe and the United
les. The pressures upon our govern-
i its often differ. So does our sense of
! rities on some of the major issues of
I day. But, we have achieved a signifi-
; common sense of purpose and
ction, and will continue, with our
fs' help, translating these concepts in-
pecific actions. To succeed, we each
d the long-term support and under-
lding of our publics and parliaments.
ONOMIC STRENGTH
R THE WEST
:re can be no lasting military defense
he West without economic strength,
momic vigor is essential to provide
resources for the security of the
ince and to assure the political
Dility of the region. Uncertainty in
global economic situation can compli-
; our collective efforts to improve the
urity posture of the alliance. Low
wth rates, excessive inflation, and
h levels of unemployment are not
.ducive to political stability. Energy
:es and availability of supply are
another critical area of mutual concern.
Economic troubles generate protec-
tionist pressures. There is a particular
need to avoid restrictive measures which
would impede necessary structural
change and increase our partners'
economic problems.
The Reagan Administration recog-
nizes the primacy of economic issues in
U.S. relations with Canada and Western
Europe. Progress toward sound nonin-
flationary growth within the U.S.
economy may well be the most signifi-
cant contribution we can make for im-
proving both the global economic situa-
tion and the economic lot of our allies. It
is for this reason that the President has
put economic reform at the top of his
roster of concerns.
The Reagan Administration appre-
ciates the fact that we cannot succeed in
our economic objectives if we act alone.
Nor can we succeed if we act at cross
purposes with the economic interests of
the other industrial democracies. It is
for these reasons that the Administra-
tion places special emphasis on close
consultation and cooperation with the
Canadians and West Europeans. Recog-
nition of the need to work well together
on shared challenges to our economic
well-being is the reason for convening
the economic summit to be held in Ot-
tawa this July. And it underscores our
particular commitment to two multilat-
eral institutions: the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) and the European Community
(EC).
The next major meetings of the
OECD and the International Energy
Agency (IEA), an independent agency
within the OECD framework, merit
mention. The OECD ministerial,
June 16-17, will address OECD member
countries' relations with developing na-
tions, cooperation on energy matters,
trade among OECD countries and with
nonmember countries, export credits,
and the overall economic situation.
Deputy Secretary of State Clark and
Deputy Secretary of the Treasury
McNamar will head the U.S. delegation.
These issues will also be considered by
the summit countries' heads of govern-
ment when they meet, July 19-21, at Ot-
tawa, where the agenda will also include
a discussion of East- West economic rela-
tions. The IEA Governing Board will
meet at ministerial level, June 15, in
Paris. Secretary of Energy Edwards
and Deputy Secretary of State Clark
will lead the U.S. delegation. Despite the
present oversupply of crude oil on world
markets and the recent OPEC [Organi-
zation of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries] ministerial decision to freeze
prices for the rest of 1981, we need to
continue our cooperative efforts to diver-
sify sources of supply, develop alter-
native energy sources, and improve
emergency-sharing arrangements.
The United States remains steadfast
in its support for the process of Euro-
pean integration, exemplified by the
evolution of the European Community.
The Reagan Administration considers
progress toward European unity impor-
tant for Europe, the West, and the
world. We thus place special significance
on our continuing consultations, cover-
ing both economic and political issues,
with the European Community and its
10 member governments.
The latest round of semiannual high-
level U.S. -EC consultations was held,
May 20-21, in Brussels. Under Secre-
tary-designate for Economic Affairs
Rashish led the U.S. delegation. We
discussed a series of specific trade prob-
lems, North-South issues, the future
development of the Community's Com-
mon Agricultural Policy, and energy
security. We also exchanged views on
current political issues of mutual in-
terest. Given the volume and content of
trade between the United States and the
EC — according to Commerce Depart-
ment statistics, our exports to the EC
were valued at $53.7 billion in 1980 and
our imports from the EC at $36.1
billion, resulting in a $17.5 billion
surplus in our favor — it is not surprising
that problems arise from time to time.
We work closely with the European
Commission and the member govern-
ments to manage and resolve these
problems. We believe that they should
not be permitted to fester to the point
where they affect our political and
security relationships.
We follow the process of European
integration with interest. We welcomed
British, Danish, and Irish membership in
the mid-1970s and are pleased that
Greece became the 10th member of the
EC on January 1, 1981. Spain and Port-
ugal are actively negotiating the terms
of their accession and are expected to
join in the mid-1980s. But, while the
Community is expanding its member-
ship, the internal process of economic in-
tegration has slowed, partly because of
the wide disparity in rates of growth
and inflation among its members. The
Community has delayed movement of
the European monetary system into its
second stage. The Community is faced
with difficult, interrelated problems-
most notably, budget reform and modifi-
gust 1981
67
Europe
cation of the Common Agricultural
Policy. Both problems are complicated
by expansion of the Community. The
European Commission and the member
governments are grappling with severe
structural problems in the steel, textile,
and automobile industries. The directly
elected European Parliament is seeking
a more active role in the Community's
budgetary and policymaking processes.
Although internal economic integra-
tion has temporarily slowed, there has
been significant progress on political
cooperation by the EC- 10 [the 10 mem-
bers of the European Community]. This
development has occurred even though
political cooperation is an area outside
the scope of the Treaty of Rome. There
has been a conscious and increasingly
successful effort to coordinate the
foreign policies of the Community's
member states. A "European political
correspondents" network has been estab-
lished which permits rapid direct com-
munications among the EC- 10 Foreign
Ministries. The country serving as Presi-
dent of the Council — currently the
Netherlands but the United Kingdom
will take over on July 1 — provides
secretariat services. Political directors
meet regularly. A number of expert
working groups, each with regional or
institutional responsibilities, have been
established to do the staff work.
Such developments have increasing
significance for the United States. Over
the past year or so, there has been a
common EC-10 response to events such
as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
the Iran hostage situation, recent devel-
opments in Poland, and the Middle East
peace process. The result has been
higher visibility for EC political action
and the expectation that the Ten will be
compelled to take a position on major
political events and developments. A
unified EC-10 position can be helpful to
the United States, as was the case with
the Community's statement on the in-
tegrity of passage through the Strait of
Hormuz when the Iran-Iraq war broke
out. We are consulting closely with the
EC-10 to insure that their Middle East
initiative will be complementary to our
own efforts to establish peace ifi the
region.
Our political dialogue with the
EC-10 is an ongoing process covering a
wide range of issues of mutual interest.
As part of this dialogue, Secretary Haig
stopped in Brussels on May 5, following
the NATO ministerial in Rome. We have
been assured, however, that the EC in-
tends to use NATO as the forum for
discussion of Western defense issues, in
large part because Ireland is not a
member of the alliance.
BILATERAL RELATIONS
Those four pillars of policy for the
Reagan Administration, which provide
the foundation for our economic and
military security, are important in the
pursuit of mutually satisfactory bilateral
relations as well. Let me thus turn to
those ties — addressing, in turn, the
developments to date and issues before
us, in our relations with: Switzerland,
Austria, and the Federal Republic of
Germany; nations of northern Europe;
nations of central and southwestern
Europe; nations in the eastern Mediter-
ranean; and Canada.
Federal Republic of Germany, Austria,
Switzerland
Federal Republic of Germany. The
Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.) is
a key factor in all aspects of U.S. policy
toward Europe. The just-concluded visit
of Federal Chancellor Schmidt marked
the culmination of a series of high-level
contacts here and in Bonn which have
established a sound foundation for
cooperation between the Reagan Admin-
istration and the Federal Republic in the
difficult times ahead. This visit demon-
strated a high degree of commonality in
the basic objectives and policies of the
two countries. In view of the crucial im-
portance of the F.R.G. in our security
posture in Europe, in relations with the
U.S.S.R., and in problems beyond
Europe, we were gratified to confirm
that we have this broad area of agree-
ment with the Federal Republic.
The Federal Republic is inevitably
on the front line in meeting the
challenge posed by the Soviet Union.
Through its performance over the last
15 years, its leadership role in imple-
menting the dual NATO decision on
TNF, and its large and growing con-
tribution to the common defense, the
Federal Republic has demonstrated the
ability and the will, together with the
United States and its other allies, to
meet this challenge.
The Chancellor's visit also made
clear that the U.S. -German relation-
ship— including its political, military,
and economic aspects — has reached a
level of maturity at which we can
achieve consensus despite differences
due to history, geography, and differing
roles in the world. We have developed
means for dealing with the inevitable
points of difference frankly and ex-
peditiously, and in a manner which
minimizes the impact of these minor
frictions on the overall relationship.
Berlin. U.S. policy in Berlin con-
tinues to be to maintain allied rights ai
responsibilities for the city as a whole
and to insure four-power compliance f
with the terms and the spirit of the
Quadripartite Agreement of 1971. We
can thus best defend Berlin against an;
Soviet or German Democratic Republic
(G.D.R.) threat to its security, whether
that threat is directed against the city"!
four-power status, rights of land and a
access, or the city's developing ties to 1
the F.R.G. Our policy of maintaining tl
four-power commitments helps provide1
the calm atmosphere Berlin needs in
which to develop and prosper.
Our priorities are to encourage con
tinued Soviet commitment to the four-
power regime (done recently, for exam
pie, by the conclusion of a four-power
agreement on railway tariffs) and to en
courage the development of Berlin's ec
nomic, cultural, and political ties with
the F.R.G. and the West. The major j
potential problem is how to keep Berlii
isolated from increasing East- West teirt
sions created by the Soviet armaments
buildup, the Soviet invasion of Afghani |
stan, and the situation in Poland.
Austria. As obliged under the 193
State Treaty and as a matter of policy,
we support the permanent neutrality o
Austria. That policy has enabled Austr
to pursue its basic Western orientation
and has facilitated the broad con-
vergence of Austria's international
policies with U.S. interests. There are
no serious bilateral problems, although
we have differed with Chancellor
Kreisky on Middle East policy.
Good opportunities for expanded
bilateral relations exist in the areas of
energy and security. We are talking
with the Austrians about sales of
American coal and about technology e>
change on the problem of nuclear spen
fuel disposal and we are also encourag-
ing Austria to choose an American air-
craft in its search for an interceptor fo
its air force. We admire and support
Austria's role in refugee resettlement,
and we are reviewing an Austrian re-
quest to restore a cut in the visa
numbers we allot for Eastern Europeai
refugees from Austria.
Switzerland. We support the
neutrality of Switzerland and that na-
tion's active international role. Swiss
representation of U.S. interests in Cube
and more recently in Iran, has been an
outstanding contribution to improved bi|
lateral relations. Switzerland's Western!
orientation has produced sympathetic I
understanding of our views on such
.
68
Department of State Bulletir
Europe
es as Afghanistan. The United
;es supports Swiss efforts to main-
an effective defense establishment
ipped with modern weapons. We
e had continuing discussions with the
ss concerning our common nuclear
proliferation objectives. We will con-
e enhanced cooperation with the
ss in ways fully consistent with their
trality and where Switzerland's
al leadership can contribute to the
herance of our objectives, as in the
}E and in multilateral aid efforts for
key and for refugee relief.
them Europe
i United States seeks close relation-
»s with the nations of northern
•ope. Our links with the majority of
se states are strengthened by com-
i membership in NATO, and it is the
irity relationship that is the principal
ing force in our collective endeavors.
:ourse, not all states in the region
[e chosen NATO membership:
i?den, Finland, and Ireland remain
outside the alliance. Moreover,
economic, psychological, and historic
forces, even among allies, can strain, as
well as strengthen, relationships. Grow-
ing protectionist sentiment throughout
northern Europe and the rise in anti-
nuclear and pacifist sentiment in many
countries challenge the strength of ties
that have been nurtured since the Sec-
ond World War. Our own relations with
these nations are conducted both bi-
laterally and multilateral^. The two
strands intertwine and reinforce each
other.
United Kingdom. In the United
Kingdom, the Conservatives, led by
Prime Minister Thatcher, remain in
office. The visit of Mrs. Thatcher to
Washington in the second month of the
new U.S. Administration symbolizes the
close ties that bind the United States
and the United Kingdom. The Thatcher
government is fully committed to a
strong NATO defense, despite the per-
sistent problems of the U.K. economy.
U.K. defense expenditures are expected
to show a real increase of 8% in the
3-year period that began in 1980-81.
Her Majesty's Government also con-
tinues to modernize both its nuclear and
conventional deterrents, with the deci-
sion to purchase Trident warheads il-
lustrative of its continued nuclear com-
mitment. At the same time, the
Thatcher government remains fully com-
mitted to NATO's two-track TNF deci-
sion. Preparations for ground-launched
cruise missile deployments in the United
Kingdom are proceeding apace, and the
British participate actively in the
deliberations of the NATO Special Con-
sultative Group addressing the arms
control track of the alliance decision.
The Thatcher government also ac-
cepts the fact that alliance interests dic-
tate a presence in the Persion Gulf. To
this end, the United Kingdom has
agreed to participate in an alliance rapid
deployment force and has made tem-
porary deployments of small-scale units
to the area. The British have also
cooperated with U.S. efforts to enhance
lestern Europe*
] Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
1 European Communities (EC)
~~1 European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
e: Finland is an associate member of EFTA.
i June 1981 Department of State Bulletin for description and membership
s of OECD, EC, and EFTA.
Area: 1.7 million sq. mi.
Population: 382 million (1978)
GNP: $2.5 trillion (1978)
GNP Per Capita: $6,500
Share of World GNP: 26%
Share of World Trade: 48% (1979)
Value of Merchandise Imports from
U.S.: $68 billion (1980)
Value of Exports to U.S.: $46 billion
(1980)
'Includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, West Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom.
The U.S. Government has not recognized the incorpora-
tion of Estonia. Lativa. and Lithuania into the Soviet
Union.
Ugust 1981
69
Europe
our ability to respond to contingencies in
the region.
U.S. policy with regard to northern
Ireland, which has traditionally been one
of impartiality, was outlined in the
President's statement of March 17,
1981. We will continue to urge the par-
ties to come together for a just and
peaceful solution, and we will continue
to condemn all acts of terrorism and
violence. The President also called on all
Americans to question closely any ap-
peal for financial or other aid from
groups involved in the conflict to insure
that contributions do not end up in the
hands of those who perpetrate violence,
either directly or indirectly.
Republic of Ireland. With the
Republic of Ireland, excellent relations
reflect the enormous reservoir of recip-
rocal good will with the United States.
There is, however, no formal treaty rela-
tionship between us. Northern Ireland
remains the single most important issue
that we face jointly. But, with Ireland's
membership in the EC, our consultations
now extend across a wide range of inter-
national problems. During this current
U.N. assembly, Ireland assumed a seat
in the Security Council and held the
Council presidency in April, gaining an
important voice in the U.N. forum. We
have made clear our support and ap-
preciation for Ireland's considerable con-
tribution to peace in the Middle East
through participation in the U.N.
peacekeeping forces in Lebanon.
Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxem-
bourg. Traditionally, our relations with
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxem-
bourg have been marked by an absence
of bilateral problems. Representative of
the strength and continuity of these ex-
cellent relations is the fact that, in 1982,
we will celebrate the 200th anniversary
of the establishment of U.S. -Dutch diplo-
matic relations, the longest unbroken
friendly relationship in our history.
The important issues which the
United States and the Benelux nations
face together are predominantly related
to security concerns. They are actively
involved in support of the alliance, for
example, participating in host nation
support for U.S. rapid reinforcement of
NATO. Belgium and the Netherlands, as
countries for TNF deployment, par-
ticularly welcome the Administration's
reaffirmation of TNF arms control as an
integral part of NATO's 1979 decision to
modernize its theater nuclear forces.
The Belgian Government's decision on
TNF deployment is consistent with the
NATO decision. The Netherlands has in-
formed its NATO partners that it will
decide the issue of TNF deployment by
the end of 1981. The decision will be
taken by a Dutch Government to be
formed in the aftermath of the May 26
elections. The visit to Washington of the
then Dutch Prime Minister in May em-
phasized the Administration's desire for
the closest possible consultations with all
members of NATO and the EC. Both
Belgium and the Netherlands maintain
significant aid programs which con-
tribute to stability in developing coun-
tries, such as Zaire and Indonesia.
Finland, Sweden, Norway, Den-
mark, Iceland. The Nordic area — in-
cluding Finland, Sweden, Norway, Den-
mark, and Iceland — is one of increasing
strategic importance. The buildup of
Soviet forces in the Kola Peninsula con-
tinues unabated and poses a growing
threat to NATO, as well as to the non-
aligned states of the region. As a step
toward redressing the imbalance in the
area, we concluded with Norway a
memorandum of understanding in
January which provides for the pre-
positioning in central Norway of equip-
ment for a U.S. Marine amphibious
brigade of 10,000-12,000 men. As a
result, in time of crisis, U.S. reinforce-
ments will be able to link up quickly
with their equipment and supplies.
It is because of the presence of
Soviet forces in the area that we view
with concern recent discussions about a
Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone. While
we endorse measures which lessen ten-
sion in the region, the concept of the
Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone is un-
balanced, ignoring the massive nuclear
armaments in the Kola Peninsula and in
the Baltic region. Realizing the asym-
metry of the proposal, the governments
of NATO allies in the region have op-
posed the plan which excludes Soviet
territory from the area of applicability.
The Nordic states may not all share
the same perspective on security affairs.
But, they are a closely knit group with
many common views on international
issues such as human rights, assistance
for developing states, arms control, and
U.N. peacekeeping. We enjoy a close
consultative relationship with these
countries on a wide range of subjects
and welcome the many high-level con-
tacts we have had in recent months. The
visits of the Icelandic foreign minister
and the chairman of the Greenland
Home Rule Authority are indicative of
the importance which the United States
attaches to these consultations.
Countries of Central and
Southwestern Europe
As the Reagan Administration confrori
the worldwide Soviet challenge, we an
trying to improve the quality of securii
cooperation with our friends and allies
Europe. The focal point for the effort i
NATO, but we also have important bi-
lateral security relationships with
several NATO members, as well as wit
Spain. The Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation with Spain expires on
September 21, 1981. We have begun n
gotiating a successor to it. The first
meetings have gone well.
Spain and Portugal. Although no
related to the bilateral negotiations, th
question of Spain's entry into NATO is
an important one. We believe member-
ship in the alliance would benefit both
Spain and NATO. The Government of
Spain is actively considering the ques-
tion. If it decides to seek an invitation
join, we will give our strong support. J
During the coming year, we will ahi
begin the process of updating our secu.|
ty relationship with Portugal. The bi- j
lateral agreement that governs our usH
of the Portuguese air base at Lajes in
the Azores expires in early 1983. As \M
renegotiate that agreement, we will al:
be exploring areas where both sides
might benefit from expanded coopera-
tion.
We watched with admiration durir
the past year as the young democracie
in Iberia met the challenge posed in P>
tugal by the tragic death of a popular
prime minister and in Spain by an at-
tempted coup. Both nations reconfirmi -
their commitment to democracy. Both
governments understand and apprecia
that our support for democracy in Spa
and Portugal is strong and unequivoca i
Because rumors persist in Spain
about other possible coup attempts, I
would like to take this occasion to
reiterate this Administration's strong
support for democratic government in
Spain. We are confident that the con-
solidation of democratic government w
continue so that Spain will be able to
assume its rightful place in Europe am
in the Western alliance. We would be
strongly opposed to any attempt to tui
back the clock since it would be a grea
tragedy for Spain and a terrible blow t
the Western democratic world.
France. We are following with in-
tense interest developments in France
and the workings of French democracj
which brought a new president to pow'
in May and will elect a new legislature
later this month. We look forward to
70
Department of State Bulleti
Europe
Wishing the same kind of close and
lerative relationship with President
errand and Prime Minister Mauroy
we enjoyed with their predecessors,
ough elements of the bilateral rela-
hip between our governments may
lge in some areas, we expect it to
inue to be among the most impor-
for the United States.
Italy. Italy is of great strategic im-
ance to NATO and the United
es. Italian contributions to NATO's
hern flank are vital in insuring that
:ea remains open and free. Italy has
1 directing greater attention to its
role in the Mediterranean. Italian
ical democracy, its status as a major
trading partner, and traditional
; with the United States make for a
partnership. Italy has joined with
nd with its northern neighbors in
tough but necessary decisions like
ter nuclear force modernization,
tions between the United States and
continue to be close and produc-
The depth of that relationship was
onstrated once again by the support
h the U.S. Congress and private
ricans gave to Italy following the
ic earthquake in November 1980 —
million in U.S. Government con-
ations and many more millions in
ate contributions are being dedicated
econstruction efforts.
The government of Prime Minister
aldo Forlani resigned on May 26.
owing political consultations, Presi-
t Pertini asked Forlani to attempt
nation of a new government. Forlani
arated his commitment to Atlantic
.nee initiatives undertaken by Italy
to the struggle against inflation and
orism. We consulted closely with the
lani government and fully expect the
e kind of cooperative relationship
l its successor, whether led by
lani or another person designated by
Italian President.
stern Mediterranean
:ece. U.S. policy toward Greece
ognizes that that nation is a key ally,
ying a valuable role in the common
ense — particularly in this period of
ical developments in regions border-
on the eastern Mediterranean. The
ited States continues firmly to sup-
■t the Greek people's commitment to
nocratic ideas, strong democratic in-
utions, and a vigorous democratic
icess that will include parliamentary
:tions later this year. This commit-
nt to democracy was strengthened
en Greece joined the EC on Jan-
uary 1 and deepened its ties with
Europe. Although there will be some ad-
justments in U.S. trade with Greece as a
result, we welcome Greek accession.
Greece has moved in recent times to
strengthen its defense relationship with
the West — first, by returning its mili-
tary forces to the alliance's integrated
command structure on October 20, 1980,
and, second, by entering into negotia-
tions for a new defense and economic
cooperation agreement with the United
States. Greece's reintegration into
NATO closed a 6-year gap in the
southern flank and augurs well for
alliance solidarity in the face of the War-
saw Pact threat. It also provided an in-
dication of improved relations between
Greece and Turkey: Both nations now
are making an effort to cooperate within
the alliance and to continue bilateral
talks at regular intervals to resolve their
differences. The cooperation agreement
negotiations are designed to modernize
and update provisions under which U.S.
military activities will be conducted.
Talks are continuing intensively in
Athens under the direction of our Am-
bassador, and we expect that an effec-
tive and mutually satisfactory agree-
ment will result.
Cyprus. As stated in the President's
report to Congress on Cyprus
(March 20), a just, fair, and lasting reso-
lution to the problems of Cyprus is an
Administration priority. After almost 7
years of effort, it is time for a fair set-
tlement which will benefit all the Cypriot
people. The United States strongly sup-
ports the intercommunal negotiations
under the stewardship of the United Na-
tions. We are convinced that, while the
negotiating path may be protracted and
difficult, it is only through direct negoti-
ations between the communities that a
stable, enduring settlement on Cyprus
can be found.
Since the U.N. -sponsored intercom-
munal talks resumed in August 1980,
developments have been regrettably
slow. This pace reflects the complexities
of the problems, the longstanding inter-
communal differences, and a slowdown
in the schedule of meetings associated
with elections on Cyprus. However, we
believe that the continuation of the talks
and the good atmosphere surrounding
them constitute a positive development
in the search for a solution to the
Cyprus problem.
We are also encouraged by the deci-
sion on April 22 for agreement on the
terms of reference for a committee on
missing persons. Because this issue has
been one of the most emotionally
charged and divisive aspects of the
Cyprus problem, the agreement —
achieved after 2 years of painstaking
negotiation — suggests that patient, per-
sistent negotiating between both com-
munities, under U.N. aegis, holds the
potential for success, even on apparently
intractable issues.
Cypriot Foreign Minister Nicos
Rolandis, who visited Washington,
May 18-19, had useful meetings with
Secretary Haig and Vice President
Bush. These discussions complement
talks held with Turkish Foreign Minister
liter Turkmen on April 1 in Washington
and on May 4 at the NATO ministerial
in Rome, and with Greek Foreign Minis-
ter Constantinos Mitsotakis on May 3 at
the NATO ministerial. The meetings
were helpful, including useful exchanges
of views on Cyprus.
France
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
JUNE 24, 19811
France is a valued ally and friend of the
United States. As a sovereign
democratic nation, France has chosen a
new President and a new legislature.
We welcome the opportunity to continue
the excellent relationship between our
two countries.
The Vice President is currently in
Paris for consultations with President
Mitterrand on the full range of issues of
joint concern to the United States and
France. He is continuing the high-level
exchanges of views which have included
messages between President Reagan
and President Mitterrand and a visit
here by Minister Cheysson [Foreign
Minister Claude Cheysson].
While we fully recognize and respect
the right of the Government of France
to determine its own composition, it is a
fact that the tone and content of our
relationship as allies will be affected by
the inclusion of Communists in that
government or in any government of our
West European allies. Since the end of
World War II, all U.S. Administrations
have pursued policies reflecting this
view. Our policies have not changed.
'Made available to news correspondents
by acting Department spokesman David
Passage. ■
innot 1Q01
Europe
We believe that there is some poten-
tial for positive development this sum-
mer but such can only come about
through the U.N. negotiations. The
United States, however, will continue to
work closely with all parties to the
discussion in order to encourage patient,
flexible negotiating and creative ap-
proaches to longstanding problems.
Turkey. The lifting of the partial
arms embargo in September 1978, the
conclusion of the comprehensive defense
and economic cooperation agreement in
March 1980, and sustained and generous
U.S. military and economic assistance
have put our relations with Turkey, a
major ally, on an excellent footing. The
Turkish Government is strongly pro-
NATO and pro-United States. The
smooth implementation of the coopera-
tion agreement has enabled us to
operate our military logistical and in-
telligence collection facilities effectively
and efficiently.
The central feature of our relation-
ship is our shared commitment to the
security of the Atlantic alliance. Con-
tinued high levels of assistance are
essential to support our policy goals—
that is, that Turkey regain economic
health and political stability; play an
effective role in NATO; continue ongoing
efforts to resolve bilateral differences
with Greece; and promote a negotiated
solution to the Cyprus problem.
A healthy, growing Turkish economy
will provide the basis for a stable society
and a return to democractic institutions.
The Turkish authorities have committed
themselves to a courageous program for
economic stabilization. The economy is
showing signs of recovering from the
deep financial crisis of the late 1970s,
but significant levels of economic
assistance from the United States and
other OECD donors will be necessary
for at least the next several years. On
the military side, the Turkish Armed
Forces have embarked upon a long over-
due modernization program which will
help Turkey fulfill its NATO role.
Turkey's strategic importance to NATO
and the West has been underlined
dramatically by events to Turkey's south
and east.
Canada
Although U.S. relations with Canada do
not fall under the responsibility of this
subcommittee, some note concerning our
close relations with our major trading
partner and nearest ally may be in
order. U.S. -Canadian relations cover a
broad range of concerns— economic,
political, commercial, cultural, and
defense. We share the same general
point of view and the same goals on a
broad range of both bilateral and inter-
national questions.
President Reagan's visit to Ottawa
in March was valuable in reassuring
Canada of the important place it holds in
U.S. foreign policy, and in reconfirming
the positive tone of the U.S. -Canadian
relationship. The most important
bilateral issues concern trade, invest-
ment, energy, fisheries, and boundary
questions, and the environment. The two
countries have worked cooperatively to
resolve outstanding questions, although
our interests and outlooks differ on
many issues.
We have been concerned that Can-
ada's energy policies might adversely
affect U.S. firms. I am pleased that
Canada recently announced measures
which meet some of our principal con-
cerns. For Canada, the question of
transboundary air pollution, or acid rain,
is a volatile political issue. We are deter-
mined to continue to move ahead on our
joint scientific work related to the air
pollution problem, and we will open for-
mal negotiations on an air pollution
agreement later this month.
Canada takes an active role in
NATO, and Canada expects this year to
meet the 3% goal for annual increase in
defense spending. Canada and the
United States have worked together in
seeking solutions to ongoing problems in
southern Africa, Southwest Asia, and
the Middle East. Finally, Canada's role
in international peacekeeping has been
second to none.
CONCLUSIONS
The Reagan Administration has made a
solid start in foreign affairs in general
and in relations with West Europe and
Canada in particular.
• Together with those nations, we
have sent a clear signal to the Soviet
Union that it must exercise much
greater restraint in the face of renewed I
Western resolve.
• We have begun to restore our ]
allies' confidence that we appreciate
their concerns and take them into ac-
count, as we demonstrate the leadershi[ I
they respect.
• We are working with Canada and
the nations of Western Europe to en-
courage stability and reduce the risk o«
war in developing nations.
• And we are restoring the econom
ic health of the United States which wl
in turn, serve the broader interests of (
the West as a whole.
In sum, we recognize the enormous
challenges before us. But, we have set ]
clear priorities for a consistent and
balanced policy. We are prepared, in
close consultations and cooperation with
the nations of Western Europe and
Canada, to move forward with confi-
dence on issues of shared concern.
'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
72
Department of State Ri.llet
Europe
S. Policy Toward the U.S.S.R.,
stern Europe, and Yugoslavia
awrence S. Eagleburger
Statement before the Subcommittee
'urope and the Middle East of the
;e Foreign Ajfairs Committee on
' 10, 1981. Ambassador Eagleburger
isistant Secretary for European
have asked me to meet with you
I for a review of U.S. policy toward
pe. I welcome the opportunity to
_ he policy of this Administration
!ie record. Last week I focused on
-elations with Western Europe. I
Ised our interest in the military
Irity and economic well-being of the
jsatlantic community and our clear
Initment to good bilateral ties
Lghout the region.
[Today I will concentrate on our reta-
il with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia,
[the nations of Eastern Europe. I
Emphasize our concern with the
I enge from adversaries and our corn-
pent to building constructive ties
I time that promote lasting peace,
irhis week, as last, I speak against
lackdrop of the Reagan Administra-
s overall foreign policy. It is a policy
four points that bear on our rela-
; not only with Western Europe but
with those nations I address today:
• Our insistence on restraint and
jrocity in East- West relations;
• Our determination to strengthen
alliances, particularly NATO;
• Our intention to play a construc-
role in the developing nations of the
id; and
• Our resolve to strengthen our
lomy and our defenses.
A fundamental point of departure
this presentation is the distinction
veen the Soviet Union and Eastern
ope and, indeed, among the coun-
5 of Eastern Europe themselves,
hing could serve our interests in that
; of the world worse than to lump
n into one bloc. Each nation presents
|ue problems and unique oppor-
ties for the United States.
The U.S. -Soviet relationship remains
most important element of U.S.
ign policy. As it has since the end of
•Id War II, the Soviet Union
■esents the primary threat to U.S.
irity and interests. Our efforts to
deal with that threat have the most pro-
found implications for our national
defense posture, our budget, and the
rest of American diplomacy. Failure to
deal adequately with the challenges
presented us by the Soviet Union would
have the most serious of consequences,
for the United States and for the rest of
the world.
Yugoslavia and each of the nations
of Eastern Europe have their own
distinctive character and dynamics. In
our relations with the Warsaw Pact
countries of Eastern Europe, we seek to
encourage evolutionary change toward
greater diversity and national in-
dependence. We do so because of the
conviction that this approach will serve
best our interest in stability and peace in
Europe. Yugoslavia — a unique, non-
aligned nation — is of special importance
to the United States. Our relations with
that nonaligned country are qualitatively
different from those of the Warsaw Pact
countries of Eastern Europe. We have
not had relations with Albania since
World War II.
Bearing these distinctions in mind,
let me turn to:
• Relations with the Soviet Union:
status of that relationship, the new ap-
proach of the Reagan Administration,
progress to date, and prospects for the
future; and
• Relations with Yugoslavia and the
nations of Eastern Europe: our general
interests and instruments of policy and
ties with the individual countries.
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
Status of the Relationship
Relations between the United States and
the Soviet Union have rarely been more
troubled than at the present. The roots
of current bilateral tensions are buried
in fundamentally different systems and
world views. But, in recent years, a
number of factors have sharpened
dramatically the differences between our
two countries. The most significant of
these factors has been a growing lack of
restraint on the part of the Soviet
Union. This tendency has manifested
itself in a variety of ways.
First, there has been an un-
precedented Soviet military buildup.
Soviet military expenditures have grown
steadily over the past 20 years at an
average of 4%-5% a year. As a result, a
conservative estimate of our spending
and theirs shows that the Soviets out-
spent us by 30% in 1979 alone. The
Soviet effort has allowed the U.S.S.R. to
pull abreast of us in strategic and naval
forces and in other areas of traditional
U.S. predominance, while improving in
both quantitative and qualitative terms
its margin of superiority around its
borders. It has also given the Soviet
Union unprecedented capabilities for the
projection of power.
Second, the Soviets have shown a
growing propensity to use force as an
instrument of policy. Directly, as in
Afghanistan, or acting through proxies,
as in Angola and Ethiopia, the Soviets
have shown a growing preference for
military solutions to regional issues. At
the same time, their support of so-called
movements of national liberation and
organizations engaging in international
terrorism has continued unabated,
despite its impact on relations with the
West.
Even in Europe — an area the
Soviets have tried to make an "island of
detente" in order to further Soviet
economic and political goals and to in-
sure access to Western credits and
technology — the Soviet Union has
resorted to the most blatant tactics of
intimidation to influence events in
Poland. While the military situation in
and around that country is not as alarm-
ing as earlier this year, heavy Soviet
political pressure continues and Soviet
military intervention could still come
with little warning.
The Soviet Union's increasingly
assertive behavior stems only partly
from its enhanced military capabilities.
It can also be attributed to the lack of
credible constraints on the part of the
United States and other nations. For
whatever reasons — and they are many
and complex— the Soviet leadership in
recent years has shown little regard for
the ability and/or the will of the West to
respond effectively to its challenges.
And, when the West has responded, it
has too often been without coherence or
real credibility.
A New Relationship
The Reagan Administration has moved
forcefully in its first 4 months in office
to reverse these trends. We seek a rela-
tionship with the Soviet Union which
better serves U.S. interests — a relation-
ship grounded in realities, not hopes.
Such a relationship must be based on
two principles: restraint and reciprocity.
lust 1981
73
Europe
Restraint. We cannot expect the
Soviet Union to renounce the use of
force and violence as instruments of
foreign policy if such means continue to
pay benefits. Bringing about greater
Soviet restraint will involve
demonstrating that there is no attractive
alternative. This approach will require,
first of all, that the United States im-
prove its capabilities in areas where our
interests and the Soviets come into con-
flict. Our focus will be threefold.
• First, we will improve the defense
balance to insure our security, avoid the
prospect of political blackmail, and
reestablish allied confidence.
• Second, we will repair our
alliances. As I noted in my earlier
presentation, this approach will require
much closer and more effective consulta-
tions than we have conducted in the
past. Our perceptions and interests will
never coincide perfectly with those of
our allies, but it is important that we
share a general sense of strategy and
tactics in our approach to East-West
problems.
• Finally, we will expand our
capabilities for meeting Soviet
challenges to our interests in the
developing world. Doing so will require
that we take better advantage than in
the past of our political, economic, and
other assets — and those of our allies.
And, it will demand a greater invest-
ment of scarce economic and other
resources. It will also take a greater
effort in the realm of security — both
directly and by strengthening the
capabilities of our friends in areas
threatened by Soviet expansionism. Our
efforts in each of these fields will require
great sensitivity to local conditions to in-
sure that we do not create more prob-
lems for ourselves than we resolve.
Reciprocity. Demonstrating to the
Soviets, by expanding our own capabili-
ties, that there is no alternative to
restraint is a sine qua non to the success
of our approach. But, we recognize as
well the value and long-term necessity of
giving the Soviets incentives to act with
greater restraint.
The Reagan Administration does not
view cooperation with the Soviet Union
as an end in itself. Nor does it believe
that the prospect of cooperative ac-
tivities will necessarily induce the Soviet
Union to moderate its policies. Linkage
will be an operative principle. The
leaders of the Soviet Union cannot ex-
pect to enjoy the benefits of joint ac-
tivities in areas of interest to them, even
as they seek to undercut our interests.
But, in the context of adequate and
credible U.S. defense and regional
capabilities and on a basis of strict
reciprocity of benefits, the United States
is open to an expansion of mutually
beneficial activities, if justified by Soviet
behavior. The United States is prepared
to respond positively to constructive in-
itiatives by the Soviet Union. However,
given the lessons of recent history, it is
clear that we cannot be satisfied with
words alone. Soviet actions in Afghan-
istan and elsewhere have created the
existing obstacles to expanded relations.
Soviet actions will be required to remove
them.
The areas where our insistence on
reciprocity will have its most direct ap-
plications are arms control and economic
policy. With respect to arms control, the
Administration's review remains under-
way. The issues are complex and related
to basic decisions on U.S. military pro-
grams which will be made only in the
months ahead. We have nonetheless
made clear our recognition of the poten-
tial value of verifiable, balanced arms
control agreements which enhance our
national security. The President has ex-
pressed his commitment to the SALT
process. It is also our intention to begin
negotiations with the U.S.S.R. on
theater nuclear forces (TNF) arms con-
trol by the end of the year. We are con-
tinuing to participate, along with our
NATO allies, in the mutual and balanced
force reduction talks in Vienna.
With regard to economic policy, the
challenge for us is to develop an ap-
proach which minimizes the West's
vulnerability to Soviet pressure, denies
the Soviets technology and goods which
would enhance their military capabilities,
maximizes our own leverage, and is fair
to U.S. producers. We will be working
with our allies and economic partners in
the months ahead toward this end. In
both these areas, Soviet international
conduct will have a major impact on the
possibilities for real progress.
Progress on New Approach
These are the broad outlines of the ap-
proach the Reagan Administration will
take in its dealings with the U.S.S.R. I
would like to describe briefly the prog-
ress we have made in implementing our
policy.
With respect to improving our abili-
ty to restrain Soviet actions, we have
moved dramatically in a range of areas
to restore U.S. credibility and the
capabilities which underlie it. In the
defense sphere, our budgetary decisions
have made clear to the Soviets and
others the impossibility of their attainit
superiority over the United States in jj
any critical measurement of capabilities
At the same time, our decisions have J'
given our allies and others an example
to follow, and us, a sound position fron
which to urge greater allied efforts.
• With the ministerial of the North
Atlantic Council, held in Rome in May,
we have made a solid start at building i
new NATO consensus on East- West
relations based on a shared recognition*
of the need to restrain Soviet power. I
• The meeting of the Defense Plan*
ning Group in May resulted in solid
NATO reendorsement of a greater
defense effort and in moving ahead on j
schedule with TNF modernization in
Europe.
• Prime Minister Suzuki undertook
in May to increase Japanese efforts in
behalf of their own defense and to
enhance support for U.S. forces in
Japan in the interests of Far Eastern ,
security.
Elsewhere, we are handling a varie
ty of regional issues in ways designed t1
foster the climate of peaceful interna-
tional change in which U.S. and Westef
advantages can best be brought to beaw
in our competition with the Soviet
Union.
• We are working more effectively
with the Government of Pakistan than i
at any time in the recent past to
strengthen that strategically important
nation in the face of Soviet aggression I
across its border into Afghanistan.
• At the same time, we continue tc
work closely with Pakistan and other n <
tions to keep pressure on the Soviet
Union to withdraw from Afghanistan
and allow a political settlement there id
keeping with the desires of the Afghan
people.
• We are working with a variety ol
concerned governments in the region oi
the Persian Gulf to bolster security
there in the wake of the Soviet invasior
of Afghanistan and the opportunities fo»
further Soviet expansion presented by
continuing instability in Iran and the
Iran-Iraq conflict.
• We are engaged actively in effort
to resolve the current Israeli-Syrian im-
passe in a manner which prevents fur-
ther expansion of Soviet influence in
that critical and unstable region.
• In El Salvador, we have signaled
our determination not to allow Soviet-
backed subversion to topple a legal
government seeking to implement badly
needed internal reforms. We have made
clear our determination to go to the
source to prevent such subversion, if
necessary.
74
Department of State Bullet
Europe
We are working with the Associa-
f Southeast Asian Nations
AN) states to build pressure on
am to end its Soviet-backed oc-
ion of Kampuchea.
We are proceeding in a responsi-
anner in building an expanded rela-
lip with the People's Republic of
We are working with all in-
ed parties to resolve such African
as a peaceful settlement of prob-
m Namibia in ways which deny the
t Union further opportunities to ex-
its influence through violent
jects for the Future
activities have conveyed to the
ts an unmistakable signal of our
asness and have significantly ex-
d our ability to influence their
'ior. We must build on these efforts
in the months ahead. At the same time,
we have left open channels of com-
munication with the Soviet Union. Our
dialogue with the Soviet Union continues
at all levels here and in Moscow. And
we will build on that dialogue during the
meeting in New York with Soviet
Foreign Minister Gromyko this
September.
We have made clear to the Soviets
our preparedness for an improved rela-
tionship if Soviet behavior warrants it.
The President's decision to lift the par-
tial grains embargo in fulfillment of his
campaign pledge could not have been
taken had the Soviet Union intervened
militarily in Poland. Our decision to
enter into preliminary discussions with
the Soviet Union on setting a date for
resumption of TNF discussions should
be seen in the same context. It should be
clear that any Soviet move against
Poland would have significant conse-
quences for all aspects of East- West
relations.
By the same token, further concrete
evidence of Soviet willingness to accept
peaceful change would allow a broader
expansion of the relationship. Movement
toward a settlement of the Afghanistan
issue on terms which would insure the
complete withdrawal of Soviet forces
would be particularly important.
In the absence of this or similar in-
itiatives, the United States and its allies
have no alternative but to insure that we
are in a position to deal more firmly and
credibly than in the past with Soviet
lack of restraint. We will direct our
efforts over the months ahead toward
that end.
U.S. RELATIONS WITH EASTERN
EUROPE
Eastern Europe is not a monolith. Each
country in the area has its unique
S.S.R. and Eastern Europe'
U.S.S.R.
G.D.R.
Poland
Czechoslovakia
Area: 9 million sq. mi. (8.7 million sq.
mi. is the Soviet Union)
Population: 369 million (1978); (261
million in the Soviet Union)
GNP: $1.3 trillion (1978)
GNP Per Capita: $3,500
Share of World GNP: 16%
Share of World Trade: 8% (1979)
Value of Merchandise Imports from
U.S.: $4 billion (1980)
Value of Exports to U.S.: $1 billion
(1980)
— I... o j /■> -i i n . i r- « /^^..i-^^..., 'Includes Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East
J Warsaw Pact and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania.
//] Members of Group of 77 (G-77)
~\ Member of nonaligned movement
s: Albania has no international affiliation except with the United Nations.
June 1981 Department of State Bulletin for description and
nbership lists of COMECON, G-77, and nonaligned movement.
The U.S. Government has not recognized the incorpora-
tion of Estonia. Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet
Union.
mst 1981
75
Europe
history and culture, and the trends in
the region are toward increasing
economic, social, and even political
diversity. U.S. policy toward the War-
saw Pact member states of Eastern
Europe — Poland, Hungary, Romania,
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and the Ger-
man Democratic Republic — is tailored to
our interests and to the situation
prevailing in each country. We differen-
tiate between these countries and the
U.S.S.R. to the degree that they pursue
independent foreign policies and/or more
liberal domestic policies.
U.S. Interests
Our primary interests are:
• A strong and legitimate security
interest based on the proposition that a
peaceful Eastern Europe, which is
engaged in constructive interaction with
the rest of Europe and the world, can be
a force for stability in Europe.
• A deep, humanitarian interest in
the welfare of the peoples of Eastern
Europe, both because of their interna-
tionally recognized rights and because
millions of Americans trace their
heritage to the area.
• A growing interest in trade and
other forms of economic cooperation.
Our bilateral relations with most of
the Warsaw Pact member states of
Eastern Europe have improved
significantly in recent years. This Ad-
ministration is prepared to work toward
further improvements. In doing so, it
will be guided by the following con-
siderations:
• The degree to which individual
Eastern European governments
demonstrate both the desire and ability
to reciprocate our interests in improved
relations, and demonstrate sensitivity to
U.S. interests;
• Indications that these govern-
ments are willing to play a constructive
role in Europe, both through the CSCE
[Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe] process and in their
bilateral relations with other European
countries; and
• Indications that the Eastern Euro-
pean governments are sensitive to the
traditions and aspirations of their
peoples and seek to fulfill their com-
mitments under the provisions of basket
3, as well as other sections of the
Helsinki Final Act.
Policy Instruments
Our instruments to further U.S. in-
terests and improve relations with the
countries of Eastern Europe include
high-level visits, cultural and scientific
exchanges, and trade and other forms of
economic cooperation. We will welcome
high-level contacts with leaders of those
Eastern European countries with which
our relations are positive and are
susceptible to significant improvement.
We will encourage cultural and scientific
exchanges with Eastern Europe in the
belief that they enhance mutual
understanding and enable Eastern Euro-
peans to experience the diversity of the
United States and the vitality of its
democratic institutions.
Bilateral trade has become an impor-
tant component of our relations with
Eastern Europe. Trade relations based
on most favored nation (MFN) status
now exist with Poland, Romania, and
Hungary. In 1980, our total trade with
Eastern Europe was $3.3 billion, and
U.S. exports exceeded imports by well
over $1 billion. In our trade and
economic policy toward Eastern Europe,
we seek to strike a prudent balance
among our political, trade, and security
interests. We seek, together with our
allies, to offer Eastern Europe alter-
natives to even heavier reliance on trade
with other members of the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance. We also
want the American farmer and worker
to share in the benefits of expanded ex-
port markets. At the same time, we do
not intend to export technology which
could adversely affect U.S. security in-
terests.
The extension of MFN tariff treat-
ment to Romania and Hungary has
served our commercial interests and
removed an obstacle to improved rela-
tions in other areas. It has also permit-
ted substantial progress on emigration
and humanitarian issues. The President's
recommendation concerning continuation
of his waiver authority on MFN status
for Hungary and Romania, under Sec-
tion 402 of the Trade Act of 1974, is
subject to congressional review this
month. We strongly support the con-
tinuation of the waiver for both coun-
tries. This recommendation does not ig-
nore the fact that problems in emigra-
tion continue and that U.S. humani-
tarian concerns have not been entirely
eliminated. But, it does take account of
the progress that has been made and the
likelihood of more positive results if the
waiver is renewed.
Relations With Warsaw Pact
Countries
In view of the diversity of Eastern
Europe and our policy of differentiatir
among the individual countries, it is ni
surprising that our bilateral relations
vary substantially from country to cou
try.
Poland. The dramatic developmeji
in Poland over the past 1 1 months haii
captured the attention of the world. W
welcome changes which correspond to
the aspirations and traditions of the I
Polish people. But, we will continue to
refrain from words or actions which
would complicate the resolution of
Poland's problems by the Poles
themselves. We continue to believe thai
the resolution of Poland's internal pro!
lems can be achieved best in an at-
mosphere of calm and moderation, fra
from all outside interference. We rema
committed to the NATO communique i
December 12, 1980, which stated that
any intervention in Poland would fun-
damentally alter the entire internation*
situation and that the allies would be
compelled to react in a manner which
the gravity of this development would
require.
We have noted with concern the
economic hardships faced by the PolisI
people and the detrimental effect of
Poland's economic difficulties on effort \
to continue the process of peaceful
renewal. Together with other Western
countries, we have taken steps to ease
Poland's economic difficulties.
• Poland received the largest allod
tion to any country of Commodity Crec
Corporation agricultural guarantees in
fiscal year 1981— $670 million.
• In April, as Poland's food supplie
continued to deteriorate, we authorizeo
the sale of $71 million of surplus dairy
products (30,000 tons of dried milk and
30,000 tons of butter) and permitted
payment in Polish currency.
• We joined other Western coun-
tries in easing Poland's financial positio
by rescheduling repayments of official
debt for the remainder of 1981. Appro*
imately $400 million in principal and in-
terest owed to the U.S. Government wi
be affected. Together with other
creditor governments, we will consider
the possibility of rescheduling
repayments for subsequent years.
In taking these steps, we have em-
phasized to the Polish authorities that
we expect the Polish Government and
people to make meaningful efforts to
reinvigorate the Polish economy and to
-- .
76
D e p a r t m e n ^^tat^uMeti t
Europe
e Poland's creditworthiness. We
ilso stressed the need for com-
e steps by Poland's Warsaw Pact
particularly the Soviet Union. We
mtinue to underscore these points
are discussions on Poland's
mic and financial problems.
jmania. Romania continues to pur-
i independent foreign policy, as ex-
ied by its positions on Afghanistan
le Middle East and its constructive
i the CSCE context. Romania car-
it more than 50% of its trade with
ommunist countries. The United
; has become Romania's third
t trading partner,
lis Administration has already
a high-level political dialogue with
nia. Last month President Reagan
ecretary Haig met with Foreign
;er Andrei in Washington, and
lerce Secretary Baldrige traveled
:harest for the* U.S. -Romanian
Economic Commission and met
with President Ceausescu.
tary Haig underlined to Minister
;i our recognition of Romania's uni-
Dsition in Eastern Europe and sup-
or the principle of self-
nination. He also emphasized that
nian responsiveness to U.S. con-
relating to emigration and
arian issues would contribute to
irther development of our
bns.
lungary. Hungary has embraced
SCE process, using it as a
|?work for relations with Western
|pe and the United States. We are
jiuing to build upon the momentum
j-ated by the return of the Crown of
Itephen and the signing of the
{Hungarian Trade Agreement in
I Hungary is particularly interested
Iproving economic relations with the
Pd States, and our trade relations
i eveloping in a positive and
lesslike fashion. Hungary's record
Inigration continues to be positive,
Its leaders permit a relatively broad
l?e of expression on other than
leal topics.
iulgaria. We have made measured
Iress in improving relations with
|aria over the past several years,
J ugh this progress has slowed
what in the past year. We have a
1st but active educational, scientific,
■•ultural exchange program with
laria, and the maritime agreement
loneluded at the beginning of this
linistration is working out satisfac-
Ir. U.S. trade with Bulgaria, while
Rxtensive, is balanced in our favor,
and the Bulgarian Government is in-
terested in expanding exports to the
United States and developing economic
relations in other ways.
Czechoslovakia. Our relations with
Czechoslovakia have been poor for some
time due to the Czechoslovak Govern-
ment's harsh repression of dissent and
its close adherence to Soviet positions on
foreign policy. Negotiations are pres-
ently underway on a settlement of
postwar nationalization claims of U.S.
citizens against Czechoslovakia. Some
progress has been made toward an
agreement, but it is far from certain
that an acceptable settlement will be
reached. We are consulting closely with
the Congress on the progress of the
negotiations.
German Democratic Republic.
Despite deep differences between the
United States and the G.D.R., we have
sought and achieved practical im-
provements in our bilateral relations.
Since the signing of the consular conven-
tion in 1979, we have begun negotiations
on a cultural agreement, and may soon
begin negotiating on claims. We have
encouraged the G.D.R. to exercise
restraint in Poland and in the developing
world, to settle the claims of our citizens
as well as Jewish claims, and to improve
its implementation of the Helsinki Final
Act. For its part, the G.D.R. has ex-
pedited the resolution of cases of divided
families with the United States. The
G.D.R. seeks MFN treatment with us,
but we have made clear that it must
first settle claims and give assurances
required by the Jackson-Vanik amend-
ment.
U.S. RELATIONS WITH
YUGOSLAVIA
The position of nonaligned Yugoslavia is
intrinsically different from that of the
East Berlin Volkskammer Elections
ALLIED PUBLIC STATEMENT,
JUNE 14, 19811
On June 14, 1981, the authorities of the
G.D.R. [German Democratic Republic]
held elections in the Eastern sector of
Berlin in which deputies from that sec-
tor were, for the first time, directly
elected to the G.D.R. Volkskammer. The
Governments of France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States,
through their Embassies in the Soviet
Union, have [today] presented formal
diplomatic protests to the Soviet
Government concerning this action.
These elections were held on the
basis of an amendment of the G.D.R.
election law approved by the Volkskam-
mer on 28 June 1979. They constituted a
change in the previous practice whereby
the representatives of the Eastern sec-
tor of Berlin were not directly elected
but were nominated to the Stadt-
verordnetenversammlung of Berlin
(East). The practice was part of the ex-
isting situation to which the Quadripar-
tite Agreement of 3 September 1971
refers. The new procedures which the
G.D.R. has introduced in the Eastern
sector of Berlin treat this sector as
though it were part of the territory of
the G.D.R. This is in contradiction with
the wartime and postwar agreements
defining the status of the special Berlin
area and, accordingly, also in contradic-
tion with the Quadripartite Agreement
of 3 September 1971 which applies to
the whole of Berlin.
In the London declaration of May 9,
1977, the Governments of the United
States, France, and the United Kingdom
reaffirmed that the status of the special
area of Berlin could not be modified
unilaterally. They also stated that they
would continue to reject all attempts to
put in question the rights and respon-
sibilities which the United States,
France, the United Kingdom, and the
Soviet Union retain relating to Germany
as a whole and to all four sections of
Berlin. These points were reiterated in
the 29 June 1979 statement in Tokyo by
the foreign ministers of France, the
United Kingdom, the United States, and
the Federal Republic of Germany and in
the protest delivered in Moscow by the
Embassies of France, the United King-
dom, and the United States on 9 July
1979.
Accordingly the three allied govern-
ments wish to reemphasize the position
which they have publicly expressed on
many previous occasions: No unilateral
decision taken by the G.D.R. authorities
can affect the legal situation of greater
Berlin. The three governments will con-
tinue to exercise their full rights and
responsibilities in Berlin.
'Press release 192 of June 15, 1981.1
77
HUMAN RIGHTS
member states of the Warsaw Pact, and
we deal with Yugoslavia on the basis of
its unique status. Yugoslavia's collective
leadership has made it clear that it will
continue to pursue the course set by
President Tito: nonalignment in foreign
policy and self-management at home.
An independent, economically viable
Yugoslavia capable of resisting external
pressure is a factor for stability and
peace in the Balkans, the Mediterra-
nean, and Europe as a whole. We firmly
support Yugoslavia's independence,
political unity, and territorial integrity.
U.S. -Yugoslav relations are excellent. In
recent years, we have created an exten-
sive range of relations.
• We have maintained a mature and
frank political dialogue and this Ad-
ministration has furthered the dialogue.
• The United States has become
Yugoslavia's fourth largest trading part-
ner, and we are the leading foreign in-
vestor in Yugoslavia.
• Various agreements on culture,
science, and technology provide the
framework for a vigorous program of
exchanges and joint projects.
• We are engaged with the
Yugoslav military authorities in a
modest program of visits, arms
transfers, and training.
Despite this significant record of
good relations, problems remain.
Although we have made considerable
progress in combating terrorist activity
against Yugoslav officials and
establishments in the United States,
both we and the Yugoslavs are con-
cerned over the continued existence of
such activity in the United States. We
are determined to deter such activity
and to punish terrorists to the full ex-
tent of the law. We are pleased that 5
anti-Yugoslav terrorists were convicted
recently by a court in New York City
and that at present some 17 convicted
terrorists are behind bars.
ALBANIA
We have not had diplomatic relations
with Albania since World War II. Since
the termination of its special relationship
with the People's Republic of China in
the summer of 1978, Albania has fol-
lowed a course independent of major
outside powers. Albania has moved to
improve relations with Greece and
Western Europe. The process of improv-
ing Albanian-Yugoslav relations had ad-
vanced significantly before the outbreak
of violent demonstrations by ethnic Al-
banians in Yugoslavia's autonomous
Province of Kosovo in April and May.
Albania's leaders have made it clear that
they do not presently seek to improve
relations with the United States. Should
Albania display an interest in resuming
relations with us, we would be prepared
to respond.
BALTIC STATES
Some reference to U.S. policy toward
the three Baltic States— Lithuania, Lat-
via, and Estonia — is in order. Our policy
of not recognizing their forcible incor-
poration into the U.S.S.R. remains un-
changed. We continue to recognize and
deal with diplomatic representatives of
the last three Baltic governments.
CONCLUSION
This assessment of U.S. relations with
Yugoslavia, Albania, and the Warsaw
Pact nations of Eastern Europe bring;
me full circle. I conclude, as I began,
with reference to the overriding prin-
ciples that govern foreign policy undei
the Reagan Administration.
• Ours is a policy that reflects '
respect for the territorial integrity of i
tions and the dignity of individuals.
• Ours is a policy that demonstra|
determination to be firm in the face of
aggression but forthcoming when then
is constructive response to the shared
challenges of the 1980s.
1 The complete transcript of the hearin
will be published by the committee and wil
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402.B
U.S. Contributions to the ICRC
The Department of State announced on
June 1, 1981, that, in response to urgent
humanitarian needs in war-torn areas,
the U.S. Government is making a con-
tribution of $4.15 million to the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) for the following purposes:
• $1.5 million as a contribution to
the worldwide ICRC program for pro-
tection and assistance to political de-
tainees;
• $500,000 as an additional con-
tribution to the ICRC general program
budget (in addition to a previous con-
tribution of $1 million), bringing the
total U.S. contribution for 1981 to $1.5
million; and
• $2.15 million against various
special appeals, as follows:
a) Lebanon — $1 million for
emergency medical assistance and relief
goods to victims of the conflict;
b) El Salvador— $500,000 for relief
to persons displaced by the armed con-
flict;
c) Nicaragua— $250,000 to support
relief activities;
d) Indonesia (East Timor) —
$200,000 for food and medical assistance
and to trace missing persons and
facilitate family reunification; and
e) Iraq/Iran— $200,000 to finance
visits to prisoners of war, to assist
civilians in combat areas, and to trace
persons displaced by military operations.
This announcement is made on the
occasion of a visit to Washington of Mr.
Jean-Pierre Hocke, Director of Opera-
tions of the ICRC. This current visit i
one of a series of periodic visits that I
Hocke makes to Washington to discus |
matters of mutual concern.
The ICRC is a nongovernmental, !
nonreligious Swiss organization, base; |
on the principles of neutrality and
humanitarianism, which is primarily c i
cerned with giving protection and
assistance to the victims of armed cor
flict. The Geneva conventions, which I
ICRC helped develop, assign the follo'l
ing specific tasks to the ICRC:
• Visiting and interviewing
prisoners of war and civilian internees
• Providing relief to the civilian
population of occupied territories;
• Searching for missing persons;
and
• Offering its good offices to
facilitate the establishment of hospital
zones and safety zones.
Among the general reponsibilities
the ICRC are insuring the proper im-
plementation of the Geneva conventior
and acting as a neutral intermediary b
tween the parties to a conflict.
U.S. contributions to the ICRC are
an essential part of a coordinated U.S.
effort to assist refugees and displaced
persons in urgent need throughout the
world by means of cooperation with th
U.N. system, the ICRC and other inter
national organizations, and private
voluntary agencies.
Press release 173.1
78
Department of State Bullet!
si i.
IDLE EAST
rael's Raid on
aq's Nuclear Facility
Mowing are two Department
tents of June 8, 1981; the text of
ary Haig's letter of June 10 to
is P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the
of Representatives, and Senator
?s H. Percy, Chairman of the
i Foreign Relations Committee;
statement by Under Secretary for
-M Affairs Walter J. Stoessel, Jr..
the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
: on June 18.
IRTMENT STATEMENT,
: 8, 19811
overnment of Israel has informed
nited States that the Israeli Air
attacked the Iraqi nuclear
•ch facility at Tuwaitha on June 7.
nd no prior knowledge of the raid,
le have no further information. We
|iw seeking more information con-
ig the attack. This is clearly a very
s development and a source of ut-
poncern.
•e have no first-hand details of the
or of the overall damage, in-
Lg casualities. Our initial estimate
ential radiation effects is that they
! probably be minimal and limited
| immediate vicinity of the installa-
|?his is based on preliminary infor-
n about the amount and quality of
I ial in the facility at the time of the
I . The U.S. Government is ready to
lid to any requests for help in
bring the extent of any nuclear ef-
Lnd in dealing with any other
\i problems.
lice we have additional informa-
Ive will have more to say on the
It.
kRTMENT STATEMENT,
; 8, 19811
.S. Government condemns the
;ed Israeli air strike on the Iraq
ir facility, the unprecedented
:ter of which cannot but seriously
the already tense situation in the
Available evidence suggests
>rovided equipment was employed
sible violation of the applicable
ment under which it was sold to
and a report to this effect is be-
■epared for submission to the U.S.
•ess in accordance with the rele-
J.S. statute.
SECRETARY'S LETTER
TO THE CONGRESS,
JUNE 10, 198P
I am providing the following information pur-
suant to section 3 (c) (2) of the Arms Export
Control Act.
The Department of State has learned that
on June 7, 1981, the Government of Israel
carried out an air attack against a nuclear
reactor under construction in Iraq. Israeli Air
Force units taking part in this attack were
reportedly equipped with defense articles
that have been furnished to Israel by the
United States under the Foreign Military
Sales program, including F-15 and F-16 air-
craft.
Sales to Israel under the Foreign Military
Sales program are governed by a Mutual
Defense Assistance Agreement of July 23,
1952 (TIAS 2675), which provides in perti-
nent part:
"The Government of Israel assures the
United States Government that such
equipment, materials, or services as may
be acquired from the United States . . .
are required for and will be used solely to
maintain its internal security, its
legitimate self-defense, or to permit it to
participate in the defense of the area of
which it is a part, or in United Nations
collective security arrangements and
measures, and that it will not undertake
any act of aggression against any other
state."
In these circumstances, I must report on
behalf of the President that a substantial
violation of the 1952 Agreement may have
occurred. We are conducting a review of the
entire matter and will consider the contention
of Israel, that this action was necessary for
its defense because the reactor was intended
to produce atomic bombs and would become
operational very soon and that, once it
become operational, an attack would have
been impossible because it could not be car-
ried out without exposing the inhabitants of
Baghdad to massive radioactive lethal fallout.
While our discussions with Israel con-
tinue, and while your Committee is consider-
ing this matter the President has directed the
suspension for the time being of the im-
mediate shipment of four F-16 aircraft which
had been scheduled for this week.
In responding to this incident we will
make clear the seriousness with which we
view the obligations of foreign countries to
observe scrupulously the terms and condi-
tions under which the United States furnishes
defense articles and defense services. We
will, of course, inform the Congress of the
outcome of our discussions with the Govern-
ment of Israel and our deliberations on the
response warranted.
Sincerely,
Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
UNDER SECRETARY STOESSEL,
JUNE 18, 198F
Thank you for this opportunity to report
to the committee on June 7, 1981,
Israeli air attack against a nuclear reac-
tor under construction in Iraq.
You have received the Secretary's
June 10, 1981, letter on this attack pur-
suant to section 3 (c) (2) of the Arms
Export Control Act. In his letter, the
Secretary notified Congress that a
Substantial violation of the Mutual
Defense Assistance Agreement of
July 23, 1952, with Israel may have oc-
curred and indicated that we were
conducting a review of this entire mat-
ter, which is the subject of our session
today.
The Mutual Defense Assistance
Agreement with Israel includes
assurance by Israel that U.S. weapons
provided under the terms of the agree-
ment would be used solely to maintain
internal security, meet legitimate self-
defense needs, or permit it to participate
in the defense of the area of which it is
part or in U.N. collective security ar-
rangements and measures. The agree-
ment also provides that Israel will not
undertake any aggression against any
other state.
Israeli Air Force units participating
in Israel's attack were equipped with
defense articles furnished to Israel by
the United States under the foreign
military sales program pursuant to the
1952 agreement with Israel.
Israel contends that the Iraqi reac-
tor was intended to produce the re-
quired weapons-grade material for use
in atomic weapons. Israel notes that a
state of war exists between the two
countries and has further contended that
Iraq had made clear its intention to pro-
duce such a weapon for use against
Israel. Israel indicated its belief that the
reactor would become operational very
quickly. Israel has pointed out that once
the reactor became operational, an air
attack would have been impossible since
it would have exposed the inhabitants of
Baghdad to massive lethal radioactive
fallout. Israel also indicated that it had
exhausted all diplomatic remedies prior
to the attack. The Israelis, therefore,
sincerely believe that their attack was
an act of legitimate self-defense and not
in violation of their 1952 agreement with
the United States.
Iraq denies that its nuclear program
has any application other than the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It
points out that it has ratified the Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT) and notes
that Israel has not and that Iraq's reac-
ist1981
79
Middle East
tor and supply of enriched uranium were
subject to International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) controls. Iraq further
points out that no violations were found
and that all enriched uranium supplied
to Iraq was accounted for. Iraq,
therefore, believes Israel's action was
unprovoked aggression.
The United States is deeply con-
cerned about nuclear proliferation. We
have long been concerned about the Ira-
qi nuclear facility because it could give
Iraq the capability to build atomic
weapons if other elements were added.
Furthermore Iraq has made no secret of
its enmity toward Israel. We have
shared these concerns in the past with
appropriate governments and made
clear our view that global adherence to,
and respect for, the most stringent
safeguards is essential. While the NPT
and IAEA safeguards regime are still
critical to any nonproliferation effort,
we can all agree that we should work to
strengthen today's safeguards to further
allay the kind of suspicion and mistrust
that contributed to Israel's action.
It is also important to understand
that although safeguards are vital, there
are other critical elements required to
deal with the proliferation problem. For
example, material that is in a nearly
weapons-usable form presents special
dangers and should be minimized or
avoided. This is why we believe that sup-
pliers must exercise care in their nuclear
activities, and particularly so in volatile
areas of the world. The nonproliferation
policy guidelines we will soon be discuss-
ing with you take explicit account of
these facts.
The United States was not consulted
in any way about any phase of the
Israeli action, nor were we informed of
it in advance. Although we had concerns
about the potential of Iraq's nuclear pro-
gram, we do believe that the Israelis had
not exhausted all the diplomatic options
available for alleviating their concerns.
We further believe that the un-
precedented character of the Israeli air
attack could not but seriously add to the
already tense situation in the area and
seriously complicate our effort to resolve
the various problems in the area through
peaceful means. For these reasons we
condemned Israel's attack. In addition,
the President decided to suspend the
scheduled delivery of four F-16s to
Israel while the Congress considered the
issue and while we consulted with Israel
and others.
Neither our condemnation nor the
suspension of delivery of the four air-
craft implied that we had reached any
determination of the legal questions
under the Arms Export Control Act that
may have been raised by Israel's action.
We have not made such a determination
under the act. Nor should our condem-
nation be construed as implying that we
did not ourselves have serious misgiv-
Situation in the
Middle East
STATEMENT BY WHITE HOUSE
DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY,
JUNE 11, 1981'
The President today is meeting with the
Ambassadors to discuss his initiatives
for peace in the Middle East.2 He wants
the Ambassadors of the various coun-
tries to be aware of his commitment and
the commitment of the United States to
the furtherance of the peace process in
that critical region of the world. He
wishes the Ambassadors to convey this
to their respective governments. The
President will welcome their views on
this matter.
The mission of Ambassador Habib
[Philip C. Habib, the President's special
emissary to the Middle East] continues
today with the important goals as out-
lined by the President when he asked
the Ambassador to undertake this im-
portant venture. This is to seek a reduc-
tion of the tensions and a lessening of
the possibility of conflict arising out of
developments in Lebanon which affect
the entire region. The President regards
this goal to be of utmost importance. He
wishes that the Habib mission will con-
tinue in cooperation with the concerned
parties, whom we hope share our sense
of the mission's continued importance.
[The President said,] "The incident3
earlier this week is evidence the only
answer in the Middle East is to achieve
a true peace. As long as there is suspi-
cion among the nations, the specter of
further tragedies will hang over us."
■Read at the daily press briefing at the
White House by Larry M. Speaks (text from
Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of June 15, 1981).
zOn the afternoon of June 1 1 , the Presi-
dent held meetings with, first, the Am-
bassadors of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Morocco,
Jordan, and Sudan, and then with the Am-
bassador of Israel.
3The Israeli bombing of the Osirak
nuclear facility near Tuwaitha, Iraq.H
ings regarding the ultimate character
and direction of the Iraqi nuclear pre
gram.
We are concerned by the damage
that resorting to violence does to the
cause of peace in the region. But we J
must note that Iraq has not recognize
the legitimacy of Israel, has refused t
ascribe to U.N. Security Council Resc
tions 242 and 338 and rejected the &
David accords, and has not played a c
structive role in the peace process.
We continue to believe that force
and hostility are not the answers to til
problems of the Middle East. The peo
of the Middle East yearn for peace so-
that the vast human, natural, and
technical resources of the region cani
turned to the pursuits of peace and sc
that this area can become a model for
coexistence and cooperation among m
tions. This yearning can only be realia
through redoubled efforts by all partii
to find negotiated solutions to the pro
lems they face. The issues before us t
day only accentuate this fact.
Since the attack, we have been I
engaged in consultations with Israel a
other appropriate governments. Our
consultations are continuing, and wel
not prepared today to render any
judgments on the merits of the issues
reach any determinations. We believe
that the issue in its essence is politica
rather than legal, and for this reason
our efforts are directed toward politic
solutions. This is a grave matter that
must not be treated in haste. Therefo
our efforts and our review are contini
ing. We will keep the committee in-
formed as we continue our review of
issues.
■Read to news correspondents by Depaj
ment spokesman Dean Fischer.
identical letters were sent to House
Speaker O'Neill and Senator Percy (text ol-
the letter to Senator Percy was issued as i\
White House press release).
3The complete transcript of the hearing
will be published by the committee and wit
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
80
Department of State Bullet
Middle East
5. Defers F-16 Shipment to Israel
tETARY'S PRESS BRIEFING,
WA,
20, 19811
resident has authorized me to
the following statement.
le President has decided to defer
ipment of F-16s to Israel. This
r remains under review.
The obvious question is why are
eferring a decision on the ship-
>
.. Clearly, the President has con-
1 that the escalating cycle of
ce in the Middle East at this time
make a decision to ship this equip-
inappropriate.
I Is this still part of the original
iv of Israel's raid into Iraq, or
i now shifted primarily to the
lion in Lebanon?
. The basic review, of course, is
lated with the raid against the
(•eactor. But, as I said Sunday
|ng, it would be specious to suggest
lie escalating cycle of violence in
liddle East, the casualties among
Smbatants on both sides of the
I between Lebanon and Israel, was
s contributing factor to the delay in
!-esident's ultimate decision on this
Ir, and he has decided to defer.
I What has been the problem in
I to get a cease-fire commitment?
du try to get a cease-fire commit-
ifrom [Prime Minister] Begin
I; making your decision?
I . No. This decision is not related
J way to the discussions ongoing
jen Ambassador Habib [Philip C.
I, the President's special emissary
i Middle East] and his efforts to
lure a calming of the situation and,
Lily, a cease-fire among the par-
rhis is a decision that is made
■dally in the context of the overall
le in the Middle East in which the
l)f violence has been increasing in
I: days.
1. Did the President consult with
e summit members here, and did
Jjffer their support and en-
Ugement for this position?
I. No, he did not consult on the
lie decision. This is a decision that
pen made by the President alone
(consultation with his key advisers
within the U.S. Government. Incidental-
ly, the view of his advisers was unani-
mous on this subject.
Having said that, I want to also sug-
gest to you that there have been a
number of expressions of concern by all
of the summit participants with respect
to the worsening situation in the Middle
East and the dangers that it poses for
future peace in the area.
Q. Can you tell us the latest on the
Habib mission? Has Mr. Begin been
asked to agree to a cease-fire, and has
he refused to do so?
A. No, I wouldn't describe the situa-
tion in those terms at all. I think we
have been, after attempting with all of
the parties, directly and indirectly, to
structure a cease-fire— an immediate
cease-fire — to terminate the dangers to
especially innocent noncombatants who
have been involved, unfortunately, on
both sides of the border. We have
discussed this with Prime Minister
Begin. He has not rejected the concept,
but I think he feels, and correctly so,
that he is a parliamentary government
and he has to discuss this with his
cabinet. That's scheduled to take place,
as I understand, tomorrow.
There are a number of very difficult
questions facing Mr. Begin and his cabi-
nent with respect to this subject.
However, it is our strong conviction that
the elimination of the violence is the
best method by which to proceed and to
establish a more lasting peace.
Q. Does this apply to all 10 of the
aircraft, and would you say that the
suspension is indefinite?
A. I wouldn't describe it as in-
definite or temporary or prolonged. It
does involve all F-16 shipments, the
four originally involved in the Iraqi raid
and that suspension decision, plus the
six which were scheduled to leave on the
21st— tomorrow morning.
Q. Under what conditions would
you decide to send the planes in the
future?
A. I don't want to establish precon-
ditions. I think the situation has
escalated to such a degree that the
President felt it would have been highly
inappropriate to send additional ar-
maments into the area while this level of
violence continues and until the situation
clarified.
Q. Has this been communicated to
the Israeli Government, and is there
no time limit? I mean, it's an in-
definite delay as we see it now.
A. The announcement I made here
a few moments ago has been conveyed
to the Israeli Government— prior to the
announcement being made here.
Q. And it is an indefinite delay?
That is an appropriate way to state it?
A. I would say the review continues
and, clearly, the future level of violence
in the area will have a very special im-
pact on when that review will be com-
pleted and the ultimate decision that's
made. But I do want to make the point
that this is not a decision that's linked to
any specific action on the part of the
Government of Israel but rather our
concern that any action that the United
States would take at a tense period such
as this must be dominated by what we
consider to be a contributor to modera-
tion and to a return to status quo ante
and normalcy in the area.
Q. Was this decision colored by
the expressions of concern that the
President heard here? Would he have
made a different decision had he not
been here?
A. No. I think, frankly, he would
have made his decision regardless of
whether or not he had been here in Ot-
tawa for a summit. I think the decision
was based on the objective realities of
the situation in the Middle East today.
Q. There are other F-16s and
F-158 that are being built for Israel
and are coming up for shipment next
month. Are all of them suspended as
well?
A. I would certainly anticipate that
the circumstances of the moment which
have contributed to the deferral decision
this evening will be behind us. But it's
too early to say and it would be
premature for me to do so.
Q. What message is being sent to
Mr. Begin by deferring the shipment?
A. It isn't a question of messages to
Mr. Begin. It's a question of appropriate
actions that the United States would
take in a situation of increasing danger
and in stability in the Middle East area,
and I think it's very important we focus
on that as the logic which determined
the President's course of action this
evening.
Q. If you had sent the planes,
would that not have been sending a
message?
st 1981
81
Middle East
A. I suppose you could say what-
ever you did would have sent a message
one way or the other. The simple facts
are that that was not the deciding factor
in the President's decision but rather the
escalating level of violence and a deci-
sion on the President's part which would
be designed to contribute to greater
moderation in the area.
Q. Since the Israeli aggression in
Lebanon undermines continuously the
American influence and Israel knows
very well that it can get away with
this since Israel has tremendous in-
fluence over the U.S. Congress, I
wonder if your government would
negotiate this mattter with the U.S.
Jewish congress?
A. Without joining some of the
premises of your question, which I'm not
sure that I could do, let me assure you
that we have been in rather constant
touch with the leadership on this matter.
There were, I believe, hearings today
that touched upon this subject, and
while there will be differing viewpoints
in the Congress, we feel that we have
consulted appropriately in conjunction
with this decision.
Q. Do you think the Israeli aggres-
sion in Lebanon is undermining
American influence in the Middle
East?
A. I'm not sure I understood what
you said. I think you said, "is this situa-
tion undermining American influence in
the Middle East."
Q. Yes.
A. I think the United States bears a
very special responsibility for the situa-
tion in the Middle East — it's been
historically so. Anything that occurs in
the Middle East, good or bad, the
United States tends to enjoy or to suffer
from the consequences. This is no excep-
tion.
Q. A good deal of other military
materiel has been in the
pipeline— U.S. to Israel. Is that
materiel continuing to be sent and
that includes, I believe, air-to-air
missiles and air-to-ground missiles?
A. This deferral decision this eve-
ning involves the F-16 aircraft, the four
and the six that I mentioned earlier. It
does not involve other equipment in the
pipeline and en route to Israel.
Q. Could you explain to us the
logic of that if the U.S. Government
believes that it's not advisable to send
additional weaponry in because of the
escalating violence, why is it going
ahead and sending other weaponry in?
A. I think the question at hand and
the decision facing the President this
evening and over the past 48 hours has
been the F-16 issue, and that issue has
been addressed and that decision has
been made. The other aspects of the
problem do not apply in the delibera-
tions that have taken place, and I'll just
leave it there.
Q. Could you elaborate a little bit
more on this decision— exactly when
it was made tonight, who took part in
that decision, and, specifically, when
and how this decision was made by
the President?
A. I don't think it's appropriate to
lay out a litany of the checklist of who
was involved. But clearly, everyone who
is responsible for national security af-
fairs in the broad sense, together with
the President's closest advisers and his
personal staff, have been engaged in this
matter for an extended period of time. I
don't have to suggest otherwise because
it wouldn't be true. We had meetings
last week on this subject, before we
came here to Ottawa, and we have had
meetings here at Ottawa with respect to
that subject.
The decision was made this evening
by the President, and we had the benefit
of the advice of all appropriate officials
of the executive branch. He had the
benefit of consultative advice from cer-
tain leaders of the Congress, and in the
face of that advice and the President's
own responsibilities to be the ultimate
decisionmaker, he made his decision.
Q. You have said that this decision
is not linked to any specific action by
Israel. But won't the decision be read
in this country, and perhaps else-
where, as indicating that this Admin-
istration feels that Israel is more to
blame than the Palestinians in the cur-
rent wave of escalating violence?
A. I would hope that that specific
value judgment would not be made but
rather that the facts of the situation, as
I described them, would be the over-
riding contributor to the President's
decision; that is, and I repeat, the Presi-
dent's personal conviction that the
United States must conduct itself at this
time in such a way that its actions will
contribute to a peaceful solution to this
anguishing and very tense situation in
the Middle East today.
Q. Against the background of
Israel holding a cabinet meeting
tomorrow, was the President's deci-
sion designed to put pressure on the
cabinet to accept a cease-fire; and
secondly, if the cabinet should, in
fact, accept a cease-fire, will the
suspension be lifted?
A. Not at all. I think those of yoi
and I know you are among those whc
follow this situation very, very closeh
know precisely the sequence of event
which has led to tonight's decision, ai
in no way could that be attributed to
effort to apply pressure one way or t
other on an important national meeti;
which will take place in Israel tomorr
This is a decision which I reiterat1
again, and you gentlemen and ladies
knew precisely, as deadlines approacl
and shipment schedules faced us that
there was no way that the President
could have manipulated the cir-
cumstances, or that we could have,
which would have made tonight's dec
sion any different. Something could h
happened that would have made it mi
easier, but, nonetheless, that would b
very incorrect logic that you just out-
lined.
■Press release 244.1
Multinational Force
in the Sinai
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
JUNE 25, 19811
We are very pleased by the announce
ment today in Cairo that Egyptian,
Israeli, and U.S. negotiators have
reached preliminary agreement on th
texts of documents relating to the
establishment of a multinational force
and observers to carry out the terms
the Treaty of Peace Between Egypt i\
Israel.
These documents are being submii
ted to their respective governments f«i
confirmation. It is expected that they
will be initialed within a matter of da;.
Formal signing by the three parties I
would then take place later next mom
This negotiation is a major step ft'
ward in the implementation of the Tp
ty of Peace Between Israel and Egyp
and the strengthening of the relations
between them. We congratulate the
negotiators on their success.
■Read to news correspondents l>> acS
Department spokesman David Passage.H
82
Department of State Bulle
XITH ASIA
5. Assistance to Pakistan
r STATEMENT,
15, 19811
L. Buckley, Under Secretary of
for Security Assistance [Science,
3chnology], and a team of U.S. of-
from Washington, concluded their
visit to Pakistan today and will fly
o the United States from Karachi
>n the morning of June 16. During
it, Mr. Buckley met for 2 days of
vith senior Pakistan leaders and
Is including President [Moham- •
ia-ul-Haq; Foreign Minister Aga
Finance Minister Ghulam Ishaq
the Secretaries General of the
) and Defense Ministries, S. Shah
and Maj. Gen. (retired) M. Rahim
Foreign Secretary Riaz Piracha;
n. Ejaz Azim; Ambassador-
ate to Washington, Lt. Gen. K. M.
^hief of Staff to the President; and
Mr. Buckley also visited Murree
fugee camps in the northwest
ir province and Baluchistan.
. Buckley's visit, at the invitation
Government of Pakistan, was part
continuing dialogue established
en the Pakistan Government and
S. Government during the last 4
is and aimed at finding ways for
lited States to assist Pakistan in
lg the unprecedented threats it
to its independence and sovereign-
i consequence of the developments
region. The previous round in
talks had taken place in April
Foreign Minister Agha Shahi
d a team of senior Pakistani of-
for talks with Secretaries Haig
'einberger [Secretary of Defense
r W. Weinberger] in Washington,
r. Buckley's official talks in
ibad, which took place on June 13
i, centered on U.S. proposals to
le economic assistance and to
ate sales of military equipment to
:an. Detailed discussion took place
'ious levels of assistance and the
>sition of assistance required by
an. The talks also provided an op-
lity for discussions of urgent
;ani military requirements which
nited States has agreed to look in-
h a view toward determining
ones the United States might be
3 satisfy through its foreign
ry sales program,
iring the talks, the two sides
sed the serious threat to the
region posed by the presence of foreign
troops in neighboring Afghanistan. Both
sides agreed that a strong and independ-
ent Pakistan is in the mutual interest of
the United States and Pakistan, as well
as of the entire world. Mr. Buckley af-
firmed American determination to assist
Pakistan and to support Pakistan's
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The Pakistani side explained
Pakistani policies, especially Pakistan's
commitment to the principles and pur-
poses of the nonaligned movement and
the Organization of the Islamic Con-
ference. Both sides agreed that U.S.
assistance as proposed is consistent with
these principles and with Pakistan's
nonaligned status. Mr. Buckley
specifically disclaimed any American in-
terest in military bases or in establishing
any new alliances.
The United States and Pakistan
discussed the dimensions of an overall
framework for American efforts to
assist Pakistan over the next 6 years.
This includes a program of cash military
sales during this year. It also includes a
5-year program of economic support
funds, development assistance, and loans
for foreign military sales— the total
value of which is expected to be approx-
imately $3 billion, subject to annual ap-
proval by the U.S. Congress.
The multiyear approach is in
response to the seriousness and im-
mediacy of the threat to Pakistan's
security. The United States has agreed
to the sale of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan
to assist Pakistan to improve its air
defense capabilities; terms, timing, and
numbers will be determined in a later
meeting, likely to take place in
Washington, between Pakistani and
American military representatives. The
United States agreed, also, to the early
delivery of selected defense equipment
urgently needed by Pakistan defense
forces to meet the threats Pakistan
faces.
Mr. Buckley invited the Government
of Pakistan to send a team of military
and defense officials to Washington to
discuss military equipment needs and
availabilities in detail. This visit is ex-
pected to take place before the end of
June.
'Made available to news correspondents
by acting Department spokesman David
Passage. ■
st 1981
83
UNITED NATIONS
Security Council Meets
To Consider Israeli Raid
The UN. Security Council met June
12-19, 1981, to consider measures to be
taken following the Israeli raid on Iraqi
nuclear facilities. Following are two
statements byJeaneJ. Kirkpatrick. U.S.
Permanent Rrpresentatire t<> the United
Nations, made on June 19 and the text of
the resolution unanimously adopted that
day.
AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK1
I wish to thank the Ambassador from
Mexico, who has acquitted himself with
such distinction in carrying out the
difficult responsibilities, showing so keen
a sense of the importance which the in-
ternational community attaches to these
deliberations. May I also congratulate
the distinguished Ambassador from
Japan, who last month earned the
esteem of the entire Council by man-
aging our affairs with singular deftness.
The issue before the Security Coun-
cil in the past week— Israel's attack upon
the Iraqi nuclear reactor— raises pro-
found and troubling questions that will
be with us long after the conclusion of
these meetings. The Middle East, as one
prominent American observed last week,
"provides combustible matter for inter-
national conflagration akin to the
Balkans prior to World War I," a cir-
cumstance made all the more dangerous
today by the possibility that nuclear
weapons could be employed in a future
conflict.
The area that stretches from
Southwest Asia across the Fertile Cres-
cent and Persian Gulf to the Atlantic
Ocean, is, as we all know, torn not only
by tension and division but also by deep-
ly rooted, tenacious hostilities that erupt
repeatedly into violence. In the past 2
years alone, one country in the area,
Afghanistan, has been brutally invaded
and occupied but not pacified. Afghan
freedom fighters continue their deter-
mined struggle for their country's in-
dependence. Iraq and Iran are locked in
a bitter war. And with shocking
violence, Libya, whose principal exports
to the world are oil and terror, invaded
and now occupies Chad. Lebanon has its
territory and its sovereignty violated
almost routinely by neighboring nations.
Other governments in the area have,
during the same brief period, been the
84
object of violent attacks and terrorism.
Now comes Israel's destruction of the
Iraqi nuclear facility. Each of these acts
of violence undermines the stability and
well-being of the area. Each gravely
jeopardizes the peace and security of the
entire area. The danger of war and
anarchy in this vital strategic region
threatens global peace and presents this
Council with a grave challenge.
My government's commitment to a
just and enduring peace in the Middle
East is well-known. We have given our
full support to efforts by the Secretary
General to resolve the war between Iran
and Iraq. Our abhorrence of the Soviet
Union's invasion and continued occupa-
tion of Afghanistan— against the will of
the entire Afghan people— requires no
elaboration on this occasion. For weeks,
our special representative Philip Habib
has been in the area conducting talks
which we still hope may help to end the
hostilities in Lebanon and head off a con-
flict between Israe1 and Syria. Not least,
we have been engaged in intensive
efforts to assist in the implementation of
the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, efforts that
have already strengthened the forces for
peace in the Middle East and will, we
believe, lead ultimately to a comprehen-
sive peace settlement of the Arab-Israeli
conflict in accordance with Resolutions
242 and 338 of the Security Council.
As in the past, U.S. policies in the
Middle East aim above all at making the
independence and freedom of people in
the area more secure and their daily
lives less dangerous. We seek the securi-
ty of all the nations and peoples of the
region.
• The security of all nations to
know that a neighbor is not seeking
technology for purposes of destruction.
• The security of all people to know
they can live their lives in the absence of
fear of attack and do not daily see their
existence threatened or questioned.
• The security of all people dis-
placed by war, violence, and terrorism.
The instability that has become the
hallmark and history of the Middle East
may serve the interests of some on this
Council; it does not serve our interests;
it does not serve the interests of our
friends, be they Israeli or Arab.
We believe, to the contrary, that the
peace and security of all the nations in
the region are bound up with the pea<
and security of the area.
It is precisely because of my govi
ment's deep involvement in efforts to
promote peace in the Middle East th;
we were shocked by the Israeli air sti
on the Iraqi nuclear facility and prom
ly condemned this action, which we
believe both reflected and exacerbate!
deeper antagonisms in the region whi
if not ameliorated, will continue to le£
to outbreaks of violence.
However, although my governme;
has condemned Israel's act, we know
is necessary to take into account the
context of this action as well as its co
sequences. The truth demands nothin
less. As my President, Ronald Reagai
asserted in his press conference:
... I do think that one has to recogni
that Israel had reason for concern in view
the past history of Iraq, which has never
signed a cease-fire or recognized Israel as
nation, has never joined in any peace effoi
for that .... [I]t does not even recognize
existence of Israel as a country.
With respect to Israel's attack on
the Iraqi nuclear reactor, President
Reagan said: "... Israel might hav<
sincerely believed it was a defensive
move."
The strength of U.S. ties and con
mitment to Israel is well known to th
members of this Council. Israel is an
portant and valued ally. The warmth
the human relationship between our
peoples is widely understood. Nothinj
has happened that in any way alters
strength of our commitment or the
warmth of our feelings. We in the
Reagan Administration are proud to
Israel a friend and ally.
Nonetheless we believe the meant
Israel chose to quiet its fears about tl
purposes of Iraq's nuclear program hi
hurt and not helped the peace and
security of the area. In my governme
view, diplomatic means available to
Israel had not been exhausted, and th
Israeli action has damaged the region
confidence that is essential for the pe;
process to go forward. All of us with
interest in peace, freedom, and natior
independence have a high stake in the
process. Israel's stake is highest of all
My government is committed to
working with the Security Council to
remove the obstacles to peace. We rm
clear from the outset that the United
States will support reasonable actions
this body which might be likely to con
tribute to the pacification of the regio
We also made clear that my governmi
would approve no decision that harme
Israel's basic interests, was unfairly
United Nations
nitive, or created new obstacles to a
it and lasting peace.
The United States has long been
jply concerned about the dangers of
:lear proliferation. We believe that all
;ions should adhere to the Non-
iliferation Treaty. It is well known
it we support the International
umic Energy Agency (IAEA) and will
iperate in any reasonable effort to
engthen it.
We desire to emphasize, however,
t security from nuclear attack and
lihilation will depend ultimately less
treaties signed than on the construc-
i of stable regional order. Yes, Israel
uld be condemned; yes, the IAEA
uld be strengthened and respected by
lations. And yes, too, Israel's
jhbors should recognize its right to
t and enter into negotiations with it
esolve their differences.
The challenge before this Council
to exercise at least the same degree
estraint and wisdom that we demand
le parties directly involved in Middle
I tensions. Inflammatory charges,
i as the Soviet statement that the
i ed States somehow encouraged the
. or that we knew of the raid
: rehand, are false and malicious. One
.' speculate about whose interest is
| ed by such innuendo. Certainly the
t of truth, restraint, or peace is not
id by such innuendo. Certainly the
jss of peace is not forwarded.
Throughout the negotiations of the
i days, my government had sought
I to move us closer to the day when
i ine peace between Israel and its
r neighbors will become a reality,
i lave searched for a reasonable out-
l of the negotiations in the Security
i cil, one which would protect the
I) interests of all parties, and damage
e ital interests of none, which would
I orate rather than exacerbate the
I erous passions and division of the
B In that search we were aided by
B ^operative spirit, restrained posi-
i and good faith of the Iraqi
H gn Minister Sa'dun Hammadi. We
K -ely believe the results will move
II urbulent area a bit closer to the
i .vhen all the states in the region
Uthe opportunity to turn their
Hies and resources from war to
M, from armaments to development,
<r anxiety and fear to confidence and
1) eing.
SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 487
The Security Council,
Having considered the agenda contained
in document/agenda/2280,
Having noted the contents of the
telegramme dated 8 June 1981 from the
Foreign Minister of Iraq,
Having heard the statements made to the
Council on the subject at its 2280th through
2288th meetings;
Taking note of the statement made by the
Director General of IAEA to the Agency's
Board of Governors on the subject on 9 June
1981, and his statement to the Council at its
2288th meeting on 19 June 1981,
Further taking note of the resolution
adopted by the Board of Governors of the
IAEA on 12 June 1981 on the "military at-
tack on the Iraq nuclear research centre and
its implications for the agency",
Fully aware of the fact that Iraq has
been a party to the Non-proliferation Treaty
since it came into force in 1970, that in
accordance with that treaty Iraq has accepted
IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear activities,
and that the agency has testified that these
safeguards have been satisfactorily applied to
date,
Noting furthermore that Israel has not
adhered to the NPT,
Deeply concerned about the danger to in-
ternational peace and security created by the
premeditated Israeli air attack on Iraqi
nuclear installations on 7 June 1981, which
could at any time explode the situation in the
area with grave consequences for the vital in-
terests of all states,
Considering that, under the terms of Ar-
ticle 2, Paragraph 4 of the United Nations
Charter: "All members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the purposes
of the United Nations",
1. Strongly condemns the military attack
by Israel in clear violation of the United Na-
tions Charter and the norms of international
conduct;
2. Calls upon Israel to refrain in the
future from any such acts of threats thereof;
3. Further considers that the said attack
constitutes a serious threat to the entire
IAEA safeguards regime which is the founda-
tion of the NPT;
4. Fully recognizes the inalienable
sovereign right of Iraq, and all other states,
especially the developing countries, to
establish programmes of technological and
nuclear development to develop their
economy and industry for peaceful purposes
in accordance with their present and future
needs and consistent with the internationally
accepted objectives of preventing nuclear
weapons proliferation;
5. Calls upon Israel urgently to place its
nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards;
6. Considers that Iraq is entitled to ap-
propriate redress for the destruction it has
suffered, responsibility for which has been
acknowledged by Israel;
7. Requests the Secretary General to
keep the Security Council regularly informed
of the implementation of this resolution.
AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK2
Like other members of this Council, the
United States does not regard this as a
perfect resolution. With respect to the
resolution, I must point out that my
country voted against the resolution in
the International Atomic Energy Agen-
cy which is referred to in the present
resolution. We continue to oppose it. In
addition, our judgment that Israeli ac-
tions violated the U.N. Charter is based
solely on the conviction that Israel failed
to exhaust peaceful means for the
resolution of this dispute. Finally, we
also believe that the question of ap-
propriate redress must be understood in
the full legal context of the relationships
that exist in the region.
Nothing in this resolution will affect
my government's commitment to Israel's
security and nothing in these reserva-
tions affect my government's determina-
tion to work with all governments of the
region willing to use appropriate means
to enhance the peace and security of the
region.
'USUN press release 39.
ZUSUN press release 41.1
ist 1981
85
United Nations
International Conference on Kampuchea
The U.N. International Conference
on Kampuchea was held in New York on
July 13-17, 1981. Following are a state-
ment made at the conference by Secretary
Haig, head of the U.S. delegation, on
July IS and the texts of the declaration
and resolution adopted by the conference
on July 17.
SECRETARY HAIG,
JULY 13, 19811
Our purpose in meeting here today is
one of compelling importance— to
restore Kampuchea's sovereignty and in-
dependence. The conquest of one nation
by another represents the most fun-
damental violation of the U.N. Charter.
The international community cannot and
will not acquiesce in the eradication of
Kampuchea's sovereign identity through
the aggression of its neighbor.
The great majority of the members
of that community have already ex-
pressed their desire for a comprehensive
solution to the Kampuchea problem
through U.N. General Assembly Resolu-
tion 35/6, which mandates this con-
ference. Our gathering owes much to
the initiative of ASEAN [Association of
South East Asian Nations], which,
besides the Kampuchean people
themselves, represents those nations
most affected by the situation. The
United States will continue to work
closely with ASEAN in seeking to
resolve the Kampuchea issue while
recognizing that the interests of
Thailand are most directly threatened.
A successful conference will be of
great importance to the entire world
community, but most particularly to the
smaller nations which are increasingly in
danger of foreign intervention. Most of
all. our efforts are crucial to the Khmer
people, whose national life has been
marred over the past 15 years by a suc-
cession of horrors. The position of the
United States is clear: We believe that
the world community has an obligation
to assure the Khmer people their right
to choose their own government and to
live in peace and dignity.
Vietnam
The facts of the Kampuchean problem
are not less appalling for being well-
known. In December 1978 Vietnam, sup-
ported and financed by the Soviet
Union, invaded Kampuchea and installed
a puppet regime. The puppets are main-
tained in power by an occupation army
200,000 strong. Vietnam's seizure of
Kampuchea poses a direct threat to the
security of Thailand and undermines the
stability of the whole region. It is, thus,
the source of tensions that inevitably af-
fect the entire international situation.
We, therefore, see this conference as
having two closely related goals:
• The restoration of a sovereign
Kampuchea free of foreign intervention,
whose government genuinely represents
the wishes of the Khmer people; and
• A neutral Kampuchea that
represents no threat to any of its
neighbors.
These goals can be realized through
the implementation of U.N. Resolution
35/6, which calls for U.N.-supervised
withdrawal of all foreign forces and
restoration of Khmer self-determination.
The achievement of these goals would
remove the main cause of conflict in the
Southeast Asian region, greatly improv-
ing the prospect for resolving other
regional disputes and for easing global
tensions. All nations in the area —
including Vietnam— would benefit from
such an achievement.
Unfortunately, the Vietnamese
authorities have been blind to their own
best interests. They have rejected all
serious efforts to negotiate the substan-
tive issues of the Kampuchea problem,
maintaining that the present arrange-
ment there is an "irreversible" condition.
We are, therefore, asked by Vietnam to
ignore the facts, to pretend that there is
no Kampuchea problem and that, in-
stead of this forum, a regional meeting
should be held between the ASEAN
countries and an "Indochina bloc." Such
a formulation is a thinly disguised effort
to gain acceptance of Vietnam's actions
in Kampuchea; the Kampuchea issue
would be reduced to a mere border prob-
lem with Thailand. We cannot accept
such a negotiating format. This is no
minor squabble. The principles of self-
determination and independence are at
stake.
Vietnam is paying a price for its
blindness in the form of an ever deepen-
ing diplomatic and economic isolation
from the world community. Vietnam
must recognize that participation in tr
conference provides the best opportun
to escape the dead end of internationa
reproach and economic depression. Th
work being done here offers the avem
for Vietnam to rejoin the world com- |
munity and to work toward a solution |
which protects its own interests as we
as those of the other nations of
Southeast Asia.
The United States has no intentio:
of normalizing relations with a Vietna
that occupies Kampuchea and
destabilizes the entire Southeast Asiai
region. We will also continue to quest
seriously any economic assistance to
Vietnam— from whatever source — as
long as Vietnam continues to squande
its scarce resources on aggression.
Soviet Union
Vietnam is not the only party to this
tragedy missing here today. We belie^ i
that the Soviet Union, the financier od
the Vietnamese military occupation ol |
Kampuchea, has a special obligation 1 1
cooperate in this effort to resolve a rr
jor source of international tension.
Soviet participation in this conference
and in the proposed conference on
Afghanistan will indicate Moscow's in i
terest in surmounting these major ba
riers to the development of more con-
structive East- West relations.
The dictates of self-interests canr-i
be ignored forever, even by Vietnam
the Soviet Union. In the meantime, til
rest of the world community must pr<
ceed vigorously to search for a soluti<
to the Kampuchea tragedy. This pres
session provides the opportunity to c«
sider the broad outlines of a settleme
Our fundamental obligation is to 1
suffering Khmer people, heirs of a pr
history and rich culture. They deservi
our best efforts to restore peace and
self-determination to their land. We
have seen already that the world com
munity can act to help Kampuchea.
Fourteen months ago, a meeting in_
Geneva put in motion a massive reliei
effort that saved thousands of Khmer
lives, helping to insure the survival oi
the Khmer people. The same spirit of
ternational cooperation can insure the
survival of an independent Khmer na-
tion.
86
Department of State Bulle
United Nations
Ilaration
K 17, 1981
firsuant to Articles 1 and 2 of the
fter cf the United Nations and to General
Inbly resolution 35/6, the United Nations
ftned the International Conference on
Auchea at its Headquarters in New York,
■ 13 to 17 July 1981, with the aim of find-
1 comprehensive political settlement of
■Lampuchean problem.
I, The Conference reaffirms the rights
I States to the inviolability of their
leignty, independence and territorial in-
y and stresses their obligation to
ct those rights of their neighbours. The
;rence also reaffirms the right of all
es to determine their own destiny free
foreign interference, subversion and
ion.
The Conference expresses its concern
;he situation in Kampuchea has resulted
the violation of the principles of respect
e sovereignty, independence and ter-
al integrity of States, non-interference
internal affairs of States and the inad-
lility of the threat or use of force in in-
tional relations.
. The Conference takes note of the
is international consequences that have
l out of the situation in Kampuchea. In
lular, the Conference notes with grave
rn the escalation of tension in South-
Asia and major Power involvement as a
; of this situation.
. The Conference also takes note of the
us problem of refugees which has
;ed from the situation in Kampuchea and
winced that a political solution to the
ict will be necessary for the long-term
ion of the refugee problem.
The Conference stresses its conviction
the withdrawal of all foreign forces from
puchea, the restoration and preservation
. independence, sovereignty and ter-
ial integrity and the commitment by all
;s to non-interference and non-
vention in the internal affairs of Kam-
ea are the principal components of any
and lasting solution to the Kampuchean
lem.
The Conference regrets that the
gn armed intervention continues and
the foreign forces have not been
drawn from Kampuchea, thus making it
>ssible for the Kampuchean people to ex-
s their will in free elections.
1. The Conference is further convinced
a comprehensive political settlement of
Kampuchean conflict is vital to the
blishment of a Zone of Peace, Freedom
Neutrality in South-East Asia.
). The Conference emphasizes that Kam-
lea, like all other countries, has the right
i independent and sovereign, free from
external threat or armed aggression, free
jrsue its own development and a better
for its people in an environment of peace,
ility and full respect for human rights.
10. With a view to reaching a comprehen-
political settlement in Kampuchea, the
ference calls for negotiations on, inter
, the'following elements.
(a) An agreement on cease-fire by all par-
ties to the conflict in Kampuchea and
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kam-
puchea in the shortest time possible under
the supervision and verification of a United
Nations peace-keeping force/observer group;
(b) Appropriate arrangements to ensure
that armed Kampuchean factions will not be
able to prevent or disrupt the holding of free
elections, or intimidate or coerce the popula-
tion in the electoral process; such ar-
rangements should also ensure that they will
respect the result of the free elections;
(c) Appropriate measures for the
maintenance of law and order in Kampuchea
and the holding of free elections, following
the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the
country and before the establishment of a
new government resulting from those elec-
tions;
(d) The holding of free elections under
United Nations supervision, which will allow
the Kampuchean people to exercise their
right to self-determination and elect a
government of their own choice; all Kam-
pucheans will have the right to participate in
the elections.
11. The Conference appreciates the
legitimate security concerns of all States of
the region and, therefore, deems it essential
for Kampuchea to remain non-aligned and
neutral and for the future elected govern-
ments of Kampuchea to declare that Kam-
puchea will not pose a threat to or be used
against the security, sovereignty and ter-
ritorial integrity of other States, especially
those sharing a common border with Kam-
puchea.
12. The Conference also deems it essen-
tial for the five permanent members of the
United Nations Security Council, all States of
South-East Asia as well as other States con-
cerned to declare, in conjunction with
paragraph 11 above, that:
(a) They will respect and observe in every
way, the independence, sovereignty, terri-
torial integrity and non-aligned and neutral
status of Kampuchea and recognize its
borders as inviolable;
(b) They will refrain from all forms of in-
terference, direct or indirect, in the internal
affairs of Kampuchea;
(c) They will not bring Kampuchea into
any military alliance or other agreement,
whether military or otherwise, which is incon-
sistent with its declaration under paragraph
11 nor invite or encourage it to enter into
any such alliance or to conclude any such
agreement;
(d) They will refrain from introducing in-
to Kampuchea foreign troops or military per-
sonnel and not establish any military bases
in Kampuchea;
(e) They will not use the territory of any
country, including their own, for interference
in the internal affairs of Kampuchea;
(f) They will not pose a threat to the
security of Kampuchea or endanger its sur-
vival as a sovereign nation.
13. The Conference expresses the hope
that, following the peaceful resolution of the
Kampuchean conflict, an intergovernmental
committee will be established to consider a
programme of assistance to Kampuchea for
the reconstruction of its economy and for the
economic and social development of all States
of the region.
14. The Conference notes the absence of
Viet Nam and other States and urges them to
attend the future sessions of the Conference.
In this context, the Conference takes note of
the current bilateral consultations among the
countries of the region and expresses the
hope that these consultations will help to per-
suade all countries of the region and others
to participate in the future sessions of the
Conference.
15. The Conference expresses the hope
that Viet Nam will participate in the
negotiating process which can lead to a
peaceful solution of the Kampuchean problem
and to the restoration of peace and stability
to the region of South-East Asia. This will
enable all the countries of the region to
devote themselves to the task of economic
and social development, to engage in con-
fidence building and to promote regional co-
operation in all fields of endeavour, thus
heralding a new era of peace, concord and
amity in South-East Asia.
RESOLUTION
JULY 17, 1981
The International Conference on Kam-
puchea,
Recalling its Declaration on Kampuchea
of 17 July 1981,
1. Decides to establish an Ad Hoc Com-
mittee of the International Conference on
Kampuchea, consisting of Japan, Malaysia,
Nigeria, Senegal, Sri Lanka, the Sudan and
Thailand, and authorizes the President of the
Conference, in consultation with the members
of the Conference, to include additional
members in the Committee;
2. Entrusts the committee with the
following tasks:
(a) To assist the Conference in seeking a
comprehensive political settlement of the
Kampuchean question, in accordance with
General Assembly resolution 35/6 of 22 Oc-
tober 1980;
(b) To act as an advisory body to the
Secretary-General between sessions of the
Conference;
(c) To undertake missions, where ap-
propriate, in consultation with the Secretary-
General and taking into account his recom-
mendations, in pursuit of a comprehensive
political settlement to the conflict in Kam-
puchea;
(d) To advise the President of the Con-
ference, after consultations with the
Secretary-General, when to reconvene the
Conference;
3. Requests the Committee to submit
reports to the Conference;
4. Recommends that the General
Assembly should request the Secretary-
General to consult with, to assist and to pro-
vide the Committee with the necessary
facilities to carry out its functions;
TREATIES
5. Recommends that the General
Assembly should request the Secretary-
General to make a preliminary study of the
possible future role of the United Nations,
taking into account the mandate of the Com-
mittee and the elements for negotiations set
out in paragraph 10 of the Declaration on
Kampuchea;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to
transmit the report of the Conference to the
General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;
7. Recommends that the General
Assembly should authorize the reconvening of
the Conference, at an appropriate time, upon
the recommendation of the President of the
Conference.
'Press release 228.1
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Antarctica
Recommendations relating to the fur-
therance of the principal and objectives of
the Antarctic Treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted
at Washington Oct. 5, 1979. •
Notifications of approval: Belgium, Japan,
May 26, 1981; New Zealand, June 4, 1981.
Aviation
Convention on offenses and certain other acts
committed on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo
Sept. 14, 1963. Entered into force Dec. 4,
1969. TIAS 6768.
Accession deposited: United Arab Emirates,
Apr. 16, 1981.
Biological Weapons
Convention on the prohibition of the develop-
ment, production, and stockpiling of
bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons
and on their destruction. Done at
Washington, London, and Moscow Apr. 10,
1972. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975.
TIAS 8062.
Ratification deposited: Netherlands,
June 22, 1981.2
Commodities— Common Fund
Agreement establishing the Common Fund
for Commodities, with schedules. Done at
Geneva June 27, 1980. '
Acceptance deposited: Japan, June 15, 1981.
Ratification deposited: Bangladesh, June 1,
1981.
Signatures: Australia, May 20, 1981; Mali,
June 17, 1981; Spain, May 27, 1981.
Conservation
Convention on the conservation of Antarctic
marine living resources, with annex for an ar-
bitral tribunal. Done at Canberra May 20,
1980.1
Approvals deposited: Japan, U.S.S.R.,
May 26, 1981.
ftft
Cultural Property
Statutes of the International Centre for the
Study of the Preservation and Restoration of
Cultural Property. Adopted at New Delhi
Nov. -Dec. 1956, at the 9th session of the
UNESCO general conference, as amended at
Rome Apr. 24, 1963, and Apr. 14-17, 1969.
Entered into force May 10, 1958; for the U.S.
Jan. 20, 1971. TIAS 7038.
Accession deposited: Chile, Feb. 3, 1981.
Convention for the protection of cultural
property in the event of armed conflict, and
regulations of execution. Concluded at The
Hague May 14, 1954. Entered into force
Aug. 7, 1956.3
Accession deposited: Tunisia, Jan. 28, 1981.
Environmental Modification
Convention on the prohibition of military or
any other hostile use of environmental
modification techniques, with annex. Done at
Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force
Oct. 5, 1978; for the U.S. Jan. 17, 1980.
TIAS 9614.
Ratification deposited: Canada, June 11,
1981.
Genocide
Convention on the prevention and punish-
ment of the crime of genocide. Adopted at
Paris Dec. 9, 1948. Entered into force Jan.
12, 1951.3
Accession deposited: Vietnam, June 9, 1981.
Load Lines
Amendments to the international convention
on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720),
relating to amendments to the convention.
Done at London Nov. 12, 1975.'
Acceptances deposited: F.R.G., Apr. 29,
1981;4 Hungary, June 5, 1981; Romania,
Mar. 5, 1981.
Amendments to the international convention
on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720).
Adopted at London Nov. 15, 1979.1
Acceptances deposited: Bahamas, May 15,
1981; F.R.G., Apr. 29, 1981;4 Madagascar,
Apr. 28, 1981.
Maritime Matters
Convention on the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed
at Geneva Mar. 6, 1948. Entered into force
Mar. 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.
Acceptance deposited: Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Apr. 29, 1981.
Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London
Nov. 14, 1975.
Acceptances deposited: Oman and
Switzerland, May 22, 1981.
Enters into force: May 22, 1982, except for
article 51.
Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London
Nov. 17, 1977. »
Acceptances deposited; Argentina, May 26
1981; Oman and Switzerland, May 22, 197'
Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, j
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmera [
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at Lond< j
Nov. 15, 1979. >
Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, May 2i
1981.
Narcotic Drugs
Convention on psychotropic substances. Dc
at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into fore
Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. July 15, 1980.
Accession deposited: Cameroon, June 5,
1981.
Ratification deposited: Turkey, Apr. 1, 198
Patents-Microorganisms
Budapest treaty on the international recog
tion of the deposit of microorganisms for ti
purposes of patent procedure, with regula-
tions. Done at Budapest Apr. 28, 1977.
Entered into force Aug. 19, 1980.
Accession deposited: Liechtenstein, May IS
1981.
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, May li |
1981.
Patents-Plant Varieties
International convention for the protection
new varieties of plants of Dec. 2, 1961, as
revised. Done at Geneva Oct. 23, 1978. >
Ratification deposited: Ireland, May 19, 19
Pollution
Convention on long-range transboundary a
pollution. Done at Geneva Nov. 13, 1979.1
Ratification deposited: Bulgaria, June 9,
1981.
Postal
General regulations of the Universal Postal
Union, with final protocol and annex, and t
universal postal convention with final pro-
tocol and detailed regulations. Done at Rio
Janeiro Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force
July 1, 1981.
Ratification deposited: Bhutan, Feb. 22,
1980.
Refugees
Protocol relating to the status of refugees.
Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered :
to force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1,
1968. TIAS 6577.
Accessions deposited: Egypt and Sierra
Leone, May 22, 1981.
Rubber
International natural rubber agreement,
1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979. Entere<
into force provisionally Oct. 23, 1980.
Ratification deposited: U.S., May 28, 1981.
Safety at Sea
Protocol of 1978 relating to the internations
convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974
(TIAS 9700). Done at London Feb. 17, 1978
Entered into force May 1, 1981.
Accessions deposited: Finland, Apr. 30, 198!
U.S.S.R, May 12, 1981.
Treaties
irotocol amending the interim conven-
Feb. 9, 1957, as amended and extend-
conservation of North Pacific fur seals
3948, 5558, 6774, 8368). Done at
ngton Oct. 14, 1980.1
i advice and consent to ratification with
tending: June 11, 1981.
ng
Nations convention on the carriage of
by sea, 1978. Done at Hamburg
1, 1978.1
sion deposited: Morocco, June 12, 1981.
nent governing the activities of states
moon and other celestial bodies,
id at New York Dec. 5, 1979.1
ation deposited: Philippines, May 26,
ure: Uruguay, June 1, 1981.
rism
ntion on the prevention and punish-
)f crimes against internationally pro-
persons, including diplomatic agents.
ed at New York Dec. 14, 1973.
id into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 8532.
sion deposited: Turkey, June 11, 1981.
ational convention against the taking of
;es.
ed at New York Dec. 18, 1979.1
sion deposited: Bahamas, June 4, 1981.
nation deposited: Honduras, June 1,
0
tution of the United Nations Industrial
bpment Organization, with annexes.
>ed at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.1
:ations deposited: Denmark, May 27,
Finland, June 5, 1981.
;ures: German Democratic Republic,
!8, 1981; Vietnam, June 16, 1981.
Drotocol for the sixth extension of the
trade convention, 1971 (TIAS 7144).
at Washington Mar. 24, 1981. Entered
jrce July 1, 1981.
'tance deposited: U.S.S.R., June 15,
sions deposited: Canada, India, and
tan, June 29 1981; Panama, June 11,
rations of provisional application
ited: Algeria, June 1, 1981; Argentina,
|10, 1981; Bolivia, June 25, 1981; Brazil,
23, 1981; Egypt, Peru, June 22, 1981;
:e and Japan, June 29, 1981; Guatemala,
17, 1981; U.S., June 23, 1981.6
[cations deposited: Australia, June 4,
Cuba, June 30, 1981; Denmark,
29, 1981; Korea, Republic of, May 29,
Mauritius, June 9, 1981; Norway and
i Africa, June 26, 1981; Saudi Arabia,
16, 1981; Sweden, June 9, 1981;
iad and Tobago, June 16, 1981; Vatican
State, June 25, 1981.
Food aid convention, 1980 (part of the inter-
national wheat agreement, 1971, as extended
(TIAS 7144)). Done at Washington Mar. 11,
1980. Entered into force July 1, 1980.
Ratification deposited: U.K., June 30, 1981.
1981 protocol for the first extension of the
food aid convention, 1980. Done at
Washington Mar. 24, 1981. Entered into
force July 1, 1981.
Accession deposited: Canada, June 29, 1981.
Declarations of provisional application
deposited: Argentina, June 10, 1981; France,
Japan,6 June 29, 1981; United States,6
June 23, 1981.
Ratifications deposited; Australia, June 4,
1981; Denmark, June 29, 1981; Norway,
June 26, 1981; Sweden, June 9, 1981.
World Health Organization
Amendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the
Constitution of the World Health Organiza-
tion. Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976 by the
29th World Health Assembly.1
Acceptance deposited: Fiji, May 20, 1981.
Amendment to Article 74 of the Constitution
of the World Health Organization, as amend-
ed. Adopted at Geneva May 18, 1978 by the
31st World Health Assembly.1
Acceptances deposited: Egypt, Mar. 4, 1981;
Libya, Apr. 20, 1981.
Women
Convention on the elimination of all forms of
discrimination against women. Adopted at
New York Dec. 18, 1979. '
Ratification deposited: Norway, May 21,
1981.
Signature: Guatemala, June 8, 1981.
World Heritage
Convention concerning the protection of the
world cultural and natural heritage. Done at
Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force
Dec. 17, 1975. TIAS 82^6.
Ratification deposited: Mauritania, Mar. 2,
1981.
BILATERAL
Austria
Agreement extending the agreements of
Feb. 25 and Mar. 3, 1977 (TIAS 8685, 8686),
on research participation and technical ex-
change in the USNRC LOFT research pro-
gram, and research participation and
technical exchange in the USNRC PBF
research program. Effected by exchange of
letters at Vienna and Washington Mar. 18
and Apr. 9, 1981. Entered into force Apr. 9,
1981; effective Mar. 3, 1981.
Argentina
Convention for the avoidance of double taxa-
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with
respect to taxes on income and capital, with
related protocol. Signed at Buenos Aires May
7, 1981. Enters into force upon the exchange
of instruments of ratification.
Canada
Agreement on East coast fishery resources.
Signed at Washington Mar. 29, 1979.
Returned from Senate at request of the Pres-
ident: June 17, 1981.
Treaty to submit to binding dispute settle-
ment the delimitation of the maritime bound-
ary in the Gulf of Maine Area, as amended,
with annexed agreements. Signed at
Washington Mar. 29, 1979. '
Instrument of ratification signed by the
President: June 3, 1981.
Colombia
Agreement amending the agreement of
Aug. 3, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9515, 9645,
9713, 9874), relating to trade in cotton, wool,
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod-
ucts. Effected by exchange of letters at
Bogota Feb. 18 and Mar. 12, 1981. Entered
into force Mar. 12, 1981.
Egypt
Agreement for cooperation concerning the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with annex
and agreed minute. Signed at Washington
June 29, 1981. Enters into force on date par-
ties exchange notes that they have complied
with all applicable requirements for its entry
into force.
France
International express mail agreement, with
detailed regulations. Signed at Washington
and Paris Mar. 17 and Apr. 13, 1981.
Entered into force May 18, 1981.
Convention relating to the initiation of
reciprocal Express Mail/Postadex service.
Signed at Washington and Paris June 6 and
24, 1975. Entered into force June 24, 1975;
effective June 16, 1975. TIAS 8841.
Terminated: May 18, 1981.
Federal Republic of Germany
Technical exchange and cooperative arrange-
ment in the field of reactor safety research
and development, with appendix. Signed at
Washington Apr. 30, 1981. Entered into
force Apr. 30, 1981.
Guinea
Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of
Apr. 21, 1976 (TIAS 8378), with memoran-
dum of understanding. Signed at Conakry
May 9, 1981. Entered into force May 9, 1981.
Haiti
Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of
June 8, 1979, with memorandum of under-
standing. Signed at Port-au-Prince May 25,
1981. Entered into force May 25, 1981.
Honduras
Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of
Feb. 27, 1979 (TIAS 9521). Signed at
Tegucigalpa May 22, 1981. Entered into
force May 22, 1981.
ust1981
89
Treaties
CHRONOLOGY
International Centre for the Study of the
Preservation and the Restoration of
Cultural Property (ICCROM)
Agreement relating to a procedure for United
States income tax reimbursement. Effected
by exchange of letters at Rome Apr. 1 and
May 4, 1981. Entered into force May 4, 1981;
effective Jan. 1, 1981.
Italy
Arrangement for the exchange of technical
information and cooperation in nuclear safety
matters, with appendices and patent adden-
dum. Signed at Washington Apr. 1, 1981.
Entered into force Apr. 1, 1981.
Japan
Memorandum of understanding relating to
the protocol of Apr. 25, 1978, amending the
international convention for the high seas
fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, as
amended, (TIAS 9242). Signed at Washington
June 3, 1981. Entered into force June 3,
1981.
Kenya
Agreement amending the agreement for sales
of agricultural commodities of Dec. 31, 1980
(TIAS 9969). Effected by exchange of letters
at Nairobi May 4 and 22, 1981. Entered into
force May 22, 1981.
Korea
Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of
June 7, 1979 (TIAS 9562), with negotiating
minutes. Signed at Seoul May 18, 1981.
Entered into force May 18, 1981.
Kuwait
Memorandum of agreement for the
U.S.-Kuwait technical cooperation program in
health. Signed at Geneva May 8, 1981.
Entered into force May 8, 1981.
Liberia
Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, or
guaranteed by the U.S. Government and its
agencies, with annexes. Signed at Monrovia
May 7, 1981. Enters into force upon receipt
by Liberia of written notice from the U.S.
Government that all necessary legal re-
quirements for entry into force of this agree-
ment have been fulfilled.
Mauritius
Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of June
29, 1979 (TIAS 9541), with minutes of
negotiation. Signed at Port Louis May 27,
1981. Entered into force May 27, 1981.
Mexico
Arrangement for the exchange of technical
information and cooperation in nuclear safety
matters. Effected by exchange of letters at
Mexico and Washington July 30 and Oct. 15,
1980, with implementing procedures signed
at Bethesda Apr. 8, 1981. Entered into force
Apr. 8, 1981.
Agreement amending the agreement of Nov.
9, 1972, as amended (TIAS 7697, 9436,
90
9647), concerning frequency modulation
broadcasting in the 88 to 108 MHz band. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Mexico and
Tlatelolco Feb. 18 and May 20, 1981. Entered
into force May 20, 1981.
Morocco
Agreement for cooperation concerning
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with annex
and agreed minute. Signed at Washington
May 30, 1980.
Entered into force: May 16, 1981.
Netherlands
Treaty on mutual assistance in criminal mat-
ters, with exchange of notes. Signed at The
Hague June 12, 1981. Enters into force 30
days after the exchange of instruments of
ratification.
Norway
Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts
of the U.S., with annex and agreed minutes.
Signed at Washington Jan. 26, 1981.
Entered into force: May 15, 1981.
Pakistan
Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of certain debts owed to the
U.S. Government and the Agency for Inter-
national Development, with annexes. Signed
at Islamabad May 10, 1981. Enters into force
upon receipt by Pakistan of written notice
from the U.S. Government that all necessary
legal requirements for entry into force have
been fulfilled.
Peru
Agreement amending the cooperative agree-
ment of July 24, 1980 (TIAS 9823), to assist
the Government of Peru in expanding a pro-
gram to combat Mediterranean fruit fly
(MEDFLY). Signed at Lima Dec. 10, 1980.
Entered into force Dec. 10, 1980.
Agreement amending the cooperative agree-
ment of July 24, 1980, as amended (TIAS
9823), to assist the Government of Peru in
expanding a program to combat Mediterra-
nean fruit fly (MEDFLY). Signed at Lima
Jan. 26 and Feb. 9, 1981. Entered into force
Feb. 9, 1981.
Sri Lanka
Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of
Mar. 25, 1975 (TIAS 8107), with agreed
minutes. Signed at Colombo May 29, 1981.
Entered into force May 29, 1981.
Agreement extending the agreement of
May 12 and 14, 1951, as amended and ex-
tended (TIAS 2259, 4436, 5037, 8414),
relating to the facilities of Radio Ceylon. Ef-
fected by exchange of letters at Colombo
Apr. 9 and 16, 1981. Entered into force
Apr. 16, 1981.
Thailand
Agreement amending the agreement of
Oct. 4, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9215, 9462,
9643, 9717, 9937), relating to trade in cotton,
wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile
products. Effected by exchange of letters at
Bangkok Mar. 30 and Apr. 27, 1981. Entered
into force Apr. 27, 1981.
Turkey
Agreement amending the agreement of
Aug. 15 and 31, 1979 (TIAS 9588), cone fl-
ing the grant of defense articles and ser :e<
under the military assistance program. I
fected by exchange of notes at Ankara
Apr. 13 and May 27, 1981. Entered into
force May 27, 1981.
United Kingdom
Agreement regarding support to the Roj
Air Force detachment at Hickam Air Fo j
Base. Signed at Honolulu Apr. 21, 1981.
Entered into force Apr. 21, 1981.
Arrangement for the exchange of technii
information and cooperation in nuclear s; i
matters. Signed at Washington May 15,
1981. Entered into force May 15, 1981.
Zaire
Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of
May 30, 1980, with memorandum of
understanding. Signed at Kinshasa May '
1981. Entered into force May 7, 1981.
'Not in force.
2On behalf of the Kingdom in Europe d
the Netherlands Antilles.
3Not in force for the U.S.
4With declaration.
6With reservation. ■
June 1981
June 3
Secretary Haig transmits the 10th si i-
annual report on implementation of the .
Helsinki Final Act to Chairman Dante F I
of the Commission on Security and Coop i
tion in Europe. The report covers the pe c
December 1980-May 31, 1981.
In Geneva, the 67th annual Internati a
Labor Organization conference is held Ji
3-24.
June 4
The following newly appointed Am- |
bassadors presented their credentials to ;
President Reagan: Mohamoud Haji Nur < !
Somali; Salah HADJI Farah Dirir of Djit 1
Henricus A. F. Heidweiller of Suriname; :
Jose Rafael Molina Morillo of the Domini !
Republic; and Dr. Joseph Saye Guannu o
Liberia.
French Foreign Minister Claude
Cheysson makes official visit to Washing I
D.C. June 4-7.
June 7
Mexican President Jose Lopez Portill |
Pacheco makes official visit to Washingtc ;
D.C. June 7-9.
June 8
U.S. Government condemns the June
raid on the Iraqi nuclear facility near
Tuwaitha.
June 9
Having arrived in the U.S. for consul
tions on May 28, U.S. envoy Philip Habib
Department of State Bull
Chronology
jeparts for the Middle East for a second
hind of talks with area leaders aimed at
t during tensions in Lebanon.
Members of the U.S. -Iran Claims
ibunal (three appointed by the U.S. and
iree by Iran), acting within the framework
f the Algiers declarations, mutually agree to
ppoint the remaining three members of the
ibunal. Those selected are Justice Gunnar
agergren of Sweden, Justice Pierre Bellett
E France, and Justice Nils Mangard of
weden. Previous appointments of three U.S.
id three Iranian members, respectively, are
oward M. Holtzmann, George H. Aldrich,
id Richard M. Mosk; and Mahmoud M.
ashani, Seyyed Hossein Enayat, and Shafey
bafeiei.
Deputy Secretary Clark departs U.S. for
official visit to South Africa June 10-14 to
mtinue discussions begun during Foreign
inister Botha's visit to Washington (May 14)
1 an internationally acceptable settlement of
amibian independence. He is accompanied
' Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary for
iternational Organization Affairs and
lester Crocker, Assistant Secretary-
isignate for African Affairs.
ine 10
Secretary Haig departs for an official
sit to Hong Kong June 12-14; Beijing to
scuss U.S. -China bilateral relations
ne 14-17; to Manila to attend the Associa-
>n of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
nf ere nee June 17-20; and to Wellington to
tend the ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand,
lited States pact] Council meeting
ne 21-23.
In response to the June 7 Israeli raid on
3 Iraqi nuclear facility, President Reagan
spends delivery of four F-16 aircraft to
•ael pending a review of possible violation
that country of the 1952 Mutual Defense
(isistance Agreement.
nel2
' The following newly appointed Am-
ssadors presented their credentials to
esident Reagan: Arturo J. Cruz of
i caragua; Nelson Thompson Mizere of
• ilawi; Ernesto RIVAS Gallont of El
< lvador; Georges N. Leger, Jr. of Haiti; and
Lsco Luis Caldeira Coelho FUTSCHER
CREIRA of Portugal.
)ne 14
The U.S. and Pakistan announce agree-
tnt on the dimensions of a U.S. assistance
]ckage providing $3 billion in economic aid
id military sales.
Ine 15
! Representing the Secretary of State,
i'puty Secretary Clark attends the Interna-
Inal Energy Agency ministerial meeting in
ris.
I President El Hadj Omar Bongo of Gabon,
ring a private visit to Washington, D.C.
f;ets with the President and Vice President.
' Organization of African Unity Council of
Snisters holds 37th ordinary session in
jiirobi, Kenya, June 15-24.
June 16
Deputy Secretary Clark heads U.S.
delegation to the OECD [Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development]
ministerial meeting in Paris June 16-17.
June 17
Deputy Secretary Clark visits Brussels
June 17-18 to meet with Belgian, NATO, and
European Community officials.
Assistant Secretary-designate for Inter-
American Affairs Thomas 0. Enders visits
Latin America June 17-22 to initiate a series
of consultations on bilateral and regional
issues with Latin American leaders and to
seek views of new U.S. policy direction.
June 19
By vote of 15 to 0, U.N. Security Council
adopts a resolution condemning the Israeli at-
tack on an Iraqi nuclear facility as a violation
of the U.N. Charter, calls on Israel to refrain
from such acts in the future, considers that
Iraq is entitled to appropriate redress, and
calls for Israel to place its nuclear facilities
under IAEA [International Atomic Energy
Agency] safeguards.
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of
Singapore, during a private visit to the U.S.,
visits Washington, D.C. June 16-19 for
meetings with the President and other U.S.
officials.
June 20
Deputy Secretary Clark visits Austria to
participate in the Alpbach "Dialogue Con-
gress Western Europe-U.S.A." June 20-22.
He addresses the opening session of the Con-
gress on the 21st and goes to Vienna June
23-25 to meet with high-level Austrian of-
ficials to address a meeting (June 24) of the
Austrian Foreign Policy Association.
June 21
In the final round of the French elections,
the Socialists win an absolute majority of the
National Assembly's 491 seats.
June 22
In view of improved emigration and
human rights policies in China, Romania, and
Hungary, the Reagan Administration asks
the Congress to continue most-favored-nation
(MFN) trade status for these Communist
countries.
Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini dismisses
President Bani-Sadr after the Iranian Parlia-
ment declares him politically imcompetent.
An arrest warrant is issued for the ex-
President (June 25) who is in hiding.
Two U.S. diplomats, First Secretary John
David Finney and Public Affairs Officer
Michael Francis O'Brien, are expelled from
Zambia for alleged CIA activities in that
country. State Department denies the allega-
tions of interference in Zambian internal af-
fairs.
June 23
Vice President Bush makes official visit
to France and the United Kingdom June
23-26.
A three-member ruling council assumes
duties of Iran's ousted President Bani-Sadr.
The council consists of clerical hardliners led
by the Ayatollah Mohamaed Beheshti.
French President Mitterrand appoints a
Socialist dominated Cabinet which includes
four Communist ministers. The Communists
will hold the Ministries of Transport, Civil
Service, Health, and Professional Training.
June 24
Fifty-nation OAU [Organization of
African Unity] opens annual summit meeting
June 24-27.
June 26
U.S. envoy to the Middle East, Philip
Habib, returns to Washington for consulta-
tions.
June 27
OAU Council of Ministers adopts a
unanimous resolution condemning the U.S.
for "undertaking steps to forge close links
with the aparthied regime" of South Africa
and denouncing the U.S., France, and the
U.K. for vetoing the U.N. Security Council
resolution calling for sanctions against that
country. The resolution also condemns certain
Western countries, particularly the U.S., for
"overt or covert collusion with the South
African racists" and "rejects sinister
schemes" by "certain members of the
Western contact group, particularly the U.S.,
to circumvent efforts made by the U.N. to
achieve a settlement in Namibia." The U.S.
issues a statement finding the OAU resolu-
tions to "contain serious distortions" of U.S.
policy and contends that the U.S. is "firmly
committed to pursuing an internationally
recognized independence for Namibia."
June 29
Australian Prime Minister J. Malcolm
Fraser makes official visit to Washington,
D.C. June 29-July 1.
Vice President Bush heads U.S. delega-
tion to the inauguration of President Marcos
in Manilla June 29-July 1.
In Iran, Ayatollah Beheshti, Chief Justice
and leader of the Islamic Republican Party,
and 71 other members of the party are killed
by a bomb explosion during a meeting at the
party's headquarters. Iran's security forces
blame the bombing on the U.S., its agents,
and internal leftist groups. Secretary Haig
rejects Iranian allegations of U.S. complicity.
Khomeini names a new Chief Justice, Iran's
Prosecutor General, Abdolkarim Musavi
Ardebili, to replace Beheshti.
U.S. and Egypt sign a peaceful nuclear
cooperation agreement. The agreement
culminates a negotiating process begun in
1974.
June 30
Israel holds parliamentary elections. Ear-
ly projections suggest a close race between
the Likud and Labor Parties, with an official
tally expected shortly.
Garret Fitzgerald is elected Prime
Minister of Ireland.
3USt1981
91
PRESS RELEASES
PUBLICATIONS
No.
Date
173
6/1
174
6/1
"175 6/1
176 5/29
'177 6/1
Results of July 16 Philippines elections
show President Ferdinand Marcos wins 88%
of the vote. He is inaugurated for another
6-year term.B
Department of State
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
Subject
U.S. contributions to ICRC.
James L. Malone sworn in as
Assistant Secretary for
Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific
Affairs (bio. data).
Lawrence S. Eagleburger
sworn in as Assistant
Secretary for European Af-
fairs, May 15
(bio. data).
Haig: address and question-
and-answer session before
the St. Louis Town Hall
Forum.
Philip C. Habib named as
personal representative to
the President, May 5 (bio.
data).
Leonore Annenberg sworn in
as Chief of Protocol, Mayl5
(bio. data).
James L. Buckley sworn in as
Under Secretary for Securi-
ty Assistance, Science, and
Technology, Feb. 28 (bio.
data).
Haig: remarks before the
National Foreign Policy Con-
ference for U.S. Editors and
Broadcasters, June 2.
Shipping Coordinating
Committee (SCC), Sub-
committee on Safety of Life
at Sea (SOLAS), panel on
bulk cargoes of the working
group on containers and
cargoes, June 17.
Jacob K. Javits named as
special adviser to the
Secretary (bio. data).
Conference for Young
Political Leaders, June 12.
Program for the official visit
to the U.S. of President
Lopez Portillo of Mexico,
June 7-9.
SCC, SOLAS, working group
on radiocommunications,
June 18.
Three additional members
appointed to the U.S. -Iran
Claims Tribunal.
Foreign fishing allocations.
Chester A. Crocker sworn in
as Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs, June 9
(bio. data).
'178
"179
6/2
6/2
180 6/3
'181 6/3
"182 6/3
*183
6/4
*184
6/5
*185
6/8
*186
6/9
*187
6/10
*188
6/10
*189 6/11 U.S. delegation named to the
intergovernmental council of
the international program
for the development of
communication.
•190 6/12 Robert D. Hormats sworn in
as Assistant Secretary for
Economic and Business Af-
fairs, May 21 (bio. data).
*191 6/12 Ronald D. Palmer sworn in
as Ambassador to Malaysia
(bio. data).
192 6/15 Allied public statement on
East Berlin Volkskammer
elections, June 14.
193 6/16 Haig: toast at a banquet
hosted by Vice
Premier and Foreign
Minister Huang Hua,
Beijing, June 14.
*194 6/16 U.S. Organization for the
International Telegraph and
Telephone Consultative Com-
mittee (CCITT), study group
A, June 30.
*195 6/16 Advisory Committee on
International Investment,
Technology, and Develop-
ment, July 9.
Haig: news conference,
Beijing, June 16.
Haig: toast at a banquet for
Vice Premier and Foreign
Minister Huang Hua, Bei-
jing, June 16.
Haig: arrival statement,
Manila, June 17.
Haig: news conference,
Manila, June 20.
Haig: remarks at the
American cemetery and
memorial, Manila, June 18.
201 6/23 Haig: toast at a dinner
hosted by Foreign Minister
Romulo, Manila, June 20.
Haig: arrival statement,
Wellington, June 21.
Haig: remarks at the ANZUS
dinner, Wellington, June 2C.
Maxwell M. Rabb sworn in
as Ambassador to Italy (bio.
data).
Theodore E. Cummings
sworn as Ambassador to
Austria (bio. data).
Program for the official visit
of Prime Minister J. Malcolm
Fraser of Australia,
June 29- July 1.
*207 6/26 Arthur F. Burns sworn in
as Ambassador to the
Federal Republic of Ger-
many (bio. data).
6/29 Haig: remarks to the press,
Los Angeles, June 25.
6/29 Myer Rashish sworn in as
Under Secretary for
Economic Affairs (bio. data).
*210 6/29 Thomas O. Enders sworn in
as Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs (bio.
data).
196
6/17
197
6/22
198
6/22
199
6/22
200
6/23
202
203
•204
•205
•206
6/26
6/26
6/24
6/25
6/26
208
•209
211 6/30 Haig: interview on "Face t
Nation," June 28.
*212 6/30 President's commission on
hostage compensation, J
and 7.
*213 6/30 Advisory Committee on
International Investmen
Technology, and Develoj
ment, July 15.
*214 6/30 Advisory Committee on th
Law of the Sea, July 23
July 24 (partially closed)
* Not printed in the Bulletin. ■.
9
Department of State!
Free, single copies of the following Depa
ment of State publications are available I
the Public Information Service, Bureau (
Public Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.
Secretary Haig
Interview on "Face the Nation," June 28
1981 (Current Policy #291).
News conference, May 22, 1981 (Current
Policy #281).
Africa
Background Note on Cape Verde (May 1
Khmer Relief (GIST, June 1981).
Background Notes on China (June 1981)
Economics
U.S. Prosperity and the Developing Cou
tries (GIST, June 1981).
Europe
U.S. Policy Toward the U.S.S.R., Eastei
Europe, and Yugoslavia, Assistant
Secretary Eagleburger, June 10, 1981
(Current Policy #284).
U.S. Policy Toward West Europe and
Canada, Assistant Secretary Eaglebur
June 2, 1981 (Current Policy #283).
Middle East
Israeli Raid Before the Security Council,
Ambassador Kirkpatrick, June 19, 198'
(Current Policy #288).
South Asia
Background Notes on Pakistan (April 19
Terrorism
International Terrorism, Under Secretar
Kennedy, June 10, 1981 (Current Polk
#285).
International Terrorism (GIST, June 198
Western Hemisphere
U.S.-Mexican Relations, Acting Deputy
Assistant Secretary Briggs, June 10, 1
(Current Policy #286).
Tasks for U.S. Policy in the Hemisphere
Assistant Secretary -designate Enders,
June 3, 1981 (Current Policy #282).H
92
Department of State Bui
Publications
) Sales
itions may be ordered by catalog or
umber from the Superintendent of
ents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
ngton, DC 20U02. A 25% discount is
m orders for 100 or more copies of any
blication mailed to the same address,
ances, payable to the Superintendent of
ents, must accompany orders. Prices
below, which include domestic postage,
pject to change.
ground Notes: These short, factual
l&ries describe the people, history,
junent, economy, and foreign relations
In country. Each contains a map, a list
(cipal government officials and U.S.
latic and consular officers, a reading
ad information for tourists. (A complete
|a.U Background Notes in stock— $31
Itic; $37 foreign. A 1-year subscription
f for about 60 updated or new
l-$16; $20 foreign; plastic binder— $2.)
I copies are available at $1.50; and
(foreign. They are available by country
pind date. Notes issued before April
lost $1; $1.90 for foreign. The following
• were published in April 1981.
a 7pp.
enstein 4pp
4pp
ral 8pp
bwe 7pp
iltural Commodities. Agreement with
ragua. TIAS 9798. 5pp. $1. (Cat. No.
0:9798.)
iiltural Commodities. Agreement
Kenya. TIAS 9815. 5pp. $1. (Cat. No.
0:9815.)
| ration in Agriculture. Agreement
Nigeria. TIAS 9819. 5pp. $1.50. (Cat.
S9.10:9819.)
| on— Technical Assistance and Serv-
. Agreement with Oman. TIAS 9824.
p. $1.50. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9824.)
Security. Agreement with
zerland. TIAS 9830. 67pp. (Cat. No.
0:9830.)
ral Relations. Agreement with the
Die's Republic of Bulgaria. TIAS 9831. 8
51.25. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9831.) _
ic Energy— Research Participation
I Technical Exchange. Agreement with
[Federal Republic of Germany and
Itn. TIAS 9835. 15 pp. $1.50. (Cat. No.
1 0:9835.)
til Defense Assistance — Cash Con-
dition by Japan. Agreement with
Bin. TIAS 9837. 6pp. $1.50. (Cat. No.
1.0:9837.)
I in Textiles and Textile Products.
jeement with Mexico. TIAS 9839. 4pp.
■Cat. No. S9. 10:9839.)
I ultural Commodities. Agreement with
feria. TIAS 9841. 25pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.
10:9841.)
cultural Commodities. Agreement with
fpt. TIAS 9843. 8pp. $1.25. (Cat. No.
1.0:9843.)
Trade in Textiles and Textile Products.
Agreement with the Republic of Korea
TIAS 9844. 13pp. $1.25. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9844.)
Military Assistance— Defense Articles and
Services. Agreement with Portugal. TIAS
9846. 5pp. $1. (Cat. No. S9.10:9846.)
Military Assistance — Defense Articles and
Services. Agreement with the Philippines.
TIAS 9847. 3pp. $1. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9847.)
Scientific Cooperation. Agreement with
Finland. TIAS 9848. 7pp. $1.25. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9848.)
Exchange of Military Personnel. Agree-
ment with the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland. 9pp. $1.25.
(Cat. No. S9.10:9849.)
Sockeye and Pink Salmon Fisheries. Agree-
ment with Canada. TIAS 9854. 8pp. $1.75.
(Cat. No. S9.10:9854.)
Military Assistance— Defense Articles and
Services. Agreement with Jordan. TIAS
9850. 4pp. $1.50. (Cat. No. S9.10:9850.)
Basic Village Services. Agreement with
Egypt. TIAS 9851. 27pp. $2.25. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9851.)
Rural Health and Family Planning Serv-
ices. Agreement with Nepal. TIAS 9852.
23pp. $2.25. (Cat. No. S9.10:9852.)
Cooperation in Environmental Protection.
Agreement with Japan. TIAS 9853. 7pp.
$1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:9853.)
Preservation of Halibut Fishery of North-
ern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea. TIAS
9855. 38pp. $2.00. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9855.)
Transboundary Air Pollution. Agreement
with Canada. TIAS 9856. 27pp. $1.75.
(Cat. No. S9.10:9856.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with
Mozambique. TIAS 9857. 23pp. $1.75. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:9857.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with
Israel. TIAS 9858. 8pp. $1.25. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9858.)
Criminal Investigations. Agreement with
Colombia. TIAS 9860. 3pp. $1.00. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9860.)
Resource Conservation and Utilization.
Agreement with Nepal. TIAS 9859. 20pp.
$1.50. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9859.)
Air Transport Services. Memorandum of
Consultations with Japan. TIAS 9861. 4pp.
$1.00. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9861.)
International Military Education and
Training (IMET). Agreement with
Cameroon. TIAS 9862. 4pp. $1.00. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:9862.)
Atomic Energy— Transfer of Research Re-
actor and Enriched Uranium to Malaysia.
TIAS 9863. Agreement with the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency and
Malaysia. 16pp. $1.50. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9863.)
Environmental Protection. Memorandum of
Understanding with Nigeria. TIAS 9864. 8
pp. $1.50. (Cat. No. S9.10:9864.)
Scientific and Technological Cooperation.
Agreement with Nigeria. TIAS 9865. 8pp.
$1.25. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9865.)
International Military Education and
Training (IMET). Agreement with Togo.
TIAS 9866. 5pp. $1.50.(Cat. No.
S9.10:9866.)
Technical Cooperation in Testing of Iron
Ore. Agreement with Saudi Arabia. TIAS
9867. 5pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. S9.10:9867.)
Air Transport Services. Agreement with
Jordan. TIAS 9868. 15pp. $1.50. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9868.)
Trade in Textiles and Textile Products.
Agreement with Sri Lanka. TIAS 9869.
10pp. $1.25. (Cat. No. S9.10:9869.)
Joint Committee for Economic Relations.
Agreement with Morocco. TIAS 9870. 5pp.
$1.00. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9870.)
Atomic Energy— Technical Information
Exchange and Cooperation in Nuclear
Safety Matters. Agreement with Finland.
TIAS 9871. 14pp. $1.25. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9871.)
Housing and Community Upgrading for
Low Income Egyptians. Agreement with
Egypt. TIAS 9872. 4pp. $1.00. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9872.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with
Peru. TIAS 9873. 20pp. $1.50. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9873.)
Trade in Textiles and Textile Products.
Agreement with Colombia. TIAS 9874.
3pp. $1.50. (Cat. No. S9.10:9874.)
Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Mutual
Defense Purposes. Agreement with the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland. TIAS 9688. 4pp.
$1.00. (Cat. No. S9.10:9688.)
Satellite Based Global Positioning and
Navigation Svstem. Memorandum of
Understanding with Canada. TIAS 9689.
19pp. $1.50. (Cat. No. S9.10:9689.)
Technical Cooperation. Agreement with
Saudi Arabia. TIAS 9691. 4pp. $1.00.
(Cat. No. S9.10:9691.)
Cooperation in Agriculture. Joint State-
ment with the People's Republic of
Bulgaria. TIAS 9692. 11pp. $1.25. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:9692.)
Narcotic Drugs — Illicit Crop Detection
System. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS
9693. 5pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. S9.10:9693.)
Trade. Agreement with Trinidad and Tobago.
TIAS 9694. 4pp. $1.00. (Cat. No.
S9.10-.9694.)
Narcotic Drugs — Additional Cooperative
Arrangements to Curb Illegal Traffic.
Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 9695.
5pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9695.)
Narcotic Drugs — Salary Supplements.
Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 9696.
5pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. S9.10:9696.)
Atomic Energy — Technical Information Ex-
change and Nuclear Safety Matters.
Arrangement with Spain. TIAS 9697.
32pp. $2.00. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9697.)
Finance — Consolidation and Rescheduling
of Certain Debts. Agreement with Peru.
TIAS 9698. 23pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9698.)
Safety of Life at Sea, 1974. Agreement
with Other Governments. TIAS 9700.
246 pp. (Cat. No. S9.10:9700.)
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade —
Bovine Meat. Arrangement with Other
Governments. TIAS 9701. 29pp. $1.75.
(Cat. No. S9.10:9701.)
_aa_
Publications
International Civil Aviation. Protocol with
Other Agreements. TIAS 9702. 5pp.
$1.00. (Cat. No. S9.10:9702.)
Air Transport Services. Agreement with
Thailand. TIAS 9704. 26pp. $1.75. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:9704.)
Trade — Color Television Receivers. Agree-
ment with the Republic of China. TIAS
9707. 10pp. $1.25. (Cat. No. S9.10:9707.)
Weather Stations. Agreement with the
Netherlands. TIAS 9708. 12 pp. $1.25.
(Cat. No. S9. 10:9708.)
Defense Areas in the Turks and Caicos
Islands. Agreement with the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland. 26pp. $1.75. TIAS 9710. (Cat.
No. S9.10:9710.)
Turnover of Airfield at Grand Turk Auxil-
iary Air Base. Agreement with the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland. TIAS 9711. 10pp.
$1.25. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9711.)
Trade in Textiles and Textile Products.
Agreement with Macao. TIAS 9712. 17
pp. $1.50. (Cat. No. S9.10:9712.)
Trade in Textiles and Textile Products.
Agreement with Colombia. TIAS 9713.
4pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9713.)
Trade in Textiles and Textile Products.
Agreement with Hong Kong. TIAS 9714.
9pp. $1.25. (Cat. No. S9.10:9714.)
Trade in Textiles and Textile Products.
Agreement with Haiti. TIAS. 9715. 5 pp.
$1.25. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9715.)
Trade in Textiles and Textile Products.
Agreement with Thailand. TIAS 9717.
3pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. S9.10:9717.)
Trade in Textiles and Textile Products.
Agreement with Malaysia. TIAS 9718.
3pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9718.)
Trade in Textiles and Textile Products.
Agreement with Singapore. TIAS 9719.
3pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. S9.10:9719.)
Privileges and Immunities. Agreement with
Nicaragua. TIAS 9720. 3pp. $1.00. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:9720.)
Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agree-
ment with Spain. TIA 9721. 7pp. $1.25.
(Cat. No. S9.10:9721.)
Air Transport Services. Agreement with the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland. TIAS 9722. 5pp.
$1.00. (Cat. No. S9.10:9722.)
Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported
Aircraft Products. Agreement with the
Polish People's Republic. TIAS 9723.
9pp. $1.25. (Cat. No. S9.10:9723.)
Aviation — Application to Land Berlin of
Agreement of March 12 and May 31,
1974, Relating to Certificates of Air-
worthiness for Imported Aircraft.
Agreement with the Federal Republic of
Germany. TIAS 9724. 5pp. $1.00. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:9724.)
Narcotic Drugs — Psychotropic Substances.
Agreement with Other Governments.
TIAS 9725. 212pp. (Cat. No. S9.10:9725.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with
Tunisia. TIAS 9726. 9pp. $1.25. (Cat.
No. S9.10:9726.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with
Tunisia. TIAS 9727. 9pp. $1.25. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:9727.)
Status of United States Forces — Educa-
tional Program. Agreement with the
Federal Republic of Germany. TIAS
9729. 9pp. $1.25. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9729.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with
the Dominican Republic. TIAS 9730.
23pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. S9.10:9730.)
Maritime Boundary. Agreement with Cuba.
TIAS 9732. 5pp. $1.00. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9732.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with
Indonesia. TIAS 9734. 18pp. $1.50. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:9734.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with
Kenya. TIAS 9735. 21pp. $1.50. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:9735.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with
Tanzania. TIAS 9736. 8pp. $1.25. (Cat.
No. S9.10:9736.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with
Sri Lanka. TIAS 9737. 10pp. $1.25. (Cat.
No. S9.10:9737.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with
Ghana. TIAS 9738. 20pp. $1.50. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9738.)
Reimbursement of Income Taxes. Agree-
ment with International Coffee Organiza-
tion. TIAS 9739. 4pp. $1.00. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:9739.)
Finance — Consolidation and Rescheduling
of Certain Debts. Agreement with Togo.
TIAS 9740. 14pp. $1.25. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:9740.)
Telecommunications — Voice of America
Relay Facility. Agreement with
Botswana. TIAS 9741. 10pp. $1.25. (Cat.
No. S9. 10:9741.)
International Military Education and
Training (IMET). Agreement with
Botswana. TIAS 9742. 3pp. $1.00. (Cat.
No. S9.10:9742.)
International Military Education and
Training (IMET). Agreement with
Malawi. TIAS 9744. 3pp. $1.00. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9744.)
International Military Education and
Training (IMET). Agreement with
Burma. TIAS 9745. 7pp. $1.25. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9745.)
Telecommunications — Assignment of Tele-
vision Channels Along United States-
Mexican Border. Agreement with Mex-
ico. TIAS 9746. 7pp. $1.25. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9746.)
Atomic Energy — Research Participation
and Technical Exchange. Agreement
with Japan. TIAS 9747. 5pp. $1.00. (Cat.
No. S9.10:9747.)
Narcotic Drugs — Additional Cooperative
Arrangements to Curb Illegal Traffic.
Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 9749. 5pp.
$1.00. (Cat. No. S9.10:9749.)
Army Tactical Data Systems. Agreement
with the Federal Republic of Germany.
TIAS 9751. 22pp. $1.50. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9751.)
Reimbursement of Income Taxes. Agref
ment with the South Pacific Commiss.
TIAS 9752. 4pp. $1.00. (Cat. No.
S9.10:9752.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement j
the Dominican Republic. TIAS 9753.!
$1.00. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9753.)
Trade in Textiles and Textile Products.
Agreement with Malaysia. TIAS 9763
2pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9763.)
Scientific and Technological Cooperatio
Agreement with the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. TIAS 9769. J
$1.25. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9769.)
Treaties — Continued Application to Tuv
of Certain Treaties Concluded Betw
the United States and the United
Kingdom. Agreement with Tuvalu. T)
9770. 3pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. S9.10:977(
Extradition. Agreement with the Federa
Republic of Germany. TIAS 9785. 6fl
(Cat. No. S9. 10:9785.) ■
34
n, ~ ~ ~ - * r»>^~ * ~< o
_^_^__
O...M
:=x
Must 1981
81, No. 2053
gjistan. New initiatives on Afghanistan
£ Kampuchea (Haig) 39
■thening U.S. -African Relations
|>cker) 57
fti Sahara (Department statement) . .58
control
m's Blueprint for Controlling Nuclear
fepons (Rostow) 59
fontrol for the 1980s: An American
Icy (Haig) 31
fry Haig Interviewed on "Face the
lion" 51
Jolicy Toward the U.S.S.R., Eastern
jope, and Yugoslavia (Eagleburger) .73
lilicy Toward Western Europe and Can-
I (Eagleburger) 65
lesident Visits Paris and London (toast,
!s conferences) 25
i
nt Reagan Attends Economic Summit
Canada (press briefings, statements by
ticipants, declaration, statements re-
sed to the press) 1
'olicy Toward Western Europe and
lada (Eagleburger) 65
■nt Reagan's News Conference of June
(excerpts) 23
iry Haig Interviewed on "Face the
:ion" 57
iry Haig Visits China; Attends ASEAN
I ANZUS Meetings (Haig, joint news
i ferences, ANZUS communique) ... .34
■^resident Visits Paris and London
list, news conferences) 25
unism. President Reagan's News Con-
ence of June 16 (excerpts) 23
lass
la's Blueprint for Controlling Nuclear
I'apons (Rostow) 59
I Raid on Iraq's Nuclear Facility (Sec-
ary's letter to Congress, Stoessel, De-
•tment statements) 79
alley on Namibia (Crocker) 55
Dolicy Toward the U.S.S.R, Eastern
rope, and Yugoslavia (Eagleburger) .73
alicy Toward Western Europe and Cana-
(Eagleburger) 65
mics
ent Reagan Attends Economic Summit
Canada (press briefings, statements by
rticipants, declaration, statements re-
ised to the press) 1
Policy Toward the U.S.S.R., Eastern
irope, and Yugoslavia (Eagleburger) . 73
'olicy Toward Western Europe and Can-
a (Eagleburger) 65
. Multinational Force in the Sinai
epartment statement) 82
ie.
ent Reagan Attends Economic Summit
Canada (press briefings, statements by
rticipants, declaration, statements re-
ised to the press) 1
Policy Toward the U.S.S.R., Eastern
irope, and Yugoslavia (Eagleburger) .73
'olicy Toward Western Europe and Can-
a (Eagleburger) 65
>ean Communities. U.S. Policy Toward
estern Europe and Canada (Eagle-
rger) 65
?n Aid
;ary Haig Visits China; Attends ASEAN
id ANZUS Meetings (Haig, joint news
nferences, ANZUS communique) ... .34
Assistance to Pakistan (joint state-
;nt) 83
France
France (Department statement) 71
Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Face the
Nation" 51
Vice President Visits Paris and London (toast,
news conferences) 25
Germany. East Berlin Volkskammer Elections
(allied public statement) 77
Iraq
Israel's Raid on Iraq's Nuclear Facility (Secre-
tary's letter to Congress, Stoessel, Depart-
ment statements) 79
Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Face the
Nation" 51
Security Council Meets to Consider Israeli
Raid (Kirkpatrick, text of resolution) . .84
Israel
Israel's Raid on Iraq's Nuclear Facility (Secre-
tary's letter to Congress, Stoessel, Depart-
ment statements) 79
Multinational Force in the Sinai (Department
statement) 82
Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Face the
Nation" 51
Security Council Meets to Consider Israeli
Raid (Kirkpatrick, text of resolution) . .84
U.S. Defers F-16 Shipment to Israel (Haig) 81
Japan. President Reagan Attends Economic
Summit in Canada (press briefings, state-
ments by participants, declaration, state-
ments released to the press) 1
Kampuchea
International Conference on Kampuchea
(Haig, declaration, resolution) 86
New Initiatives on Afghanistan and Kampu-
chea (Haig) 39
Secretary Haig Visits China; Attends ASEAN
and ANZUS Meetings (Haig, joint news
conferences, ANZUS communique) ... .34
Libya. U.S. Response to OAU Criticism (De-
partment statement) 56
Middle East
President Reagan's New Conference of
June 16 (excerpts) 23
Secretary Haig Visits China; Attends ASEAN
and ANZUS Meetings (Haig, joint news
conferences, ANZUS communique) ... .34
Situation in the Middle East (Reagan, White
House deputy press secretary's state-
ment) 80
Vice President Visits Paris and London (toast,
news conferences) 25
Morocco. Western Sahara (Department state-
ment) 58
Namibia
U.S. Policy on Namibia (Crocker) 55
U.S. Response to OAU Criticism (Department
statement) 56
Vice President Visits Paris and London (toast,
news conferences) 25
New Zealand. Secretary Haig Visits China;
Attends ASEAN and ANZUS Meetings
(Haig, joint news conferences, ANZUS
communique) 34
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
U.S. Policy Toward Western Europe and Can-
ada (Eagleburger) 65
Vice President Visits Paris and London (toast,
news conferences) 25
Nuclear Policy
President Reagan's News Conference of
June 16 (excerpts) 23
Pakistan
President Reagan's News Conference of
June 16 (excerpts) 23
Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Face the
Nation" 51
U.S. Assistance to Pakistan (joint state-
ment) 83
Philippines
Secretary Haig Visits China; Attends ASEAN
and ANZUS Meetings (Haig, joint news
conferences, ANZUS communique) ... .34
Vice President Bush Visits the Philippines
(arrival statement, toast, statement to the
press) 29
Poland. President Reagan's News Conference
of June 16 (excerpts) 23
Presidential Documents
President Reagan Attends Economic Summit
in Canada (press briefings, statements by
participants, declaration, statements re-
leased to the press) 1
President Reagan's New Conference of
June 16 (excerpts) 23
Situation in the Middle East (Reagan, White
House deputy press secretary's state-
ment) 80
Publications. Department of State 92
Refugees
Secretary Haig Visits China; Attends ASEAN
and ANZUS Meetings (Haig, joint news
conferences, ANZUS communique) ... .34
U.S. Contributions to the ICRC 78
Saudi Arabia. Secretary Haig Interviewed on
"Face the Nation" 51
Security Assistance
Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Face the
Nation" 51
Secretary Haig Visits China; Attends ASEAN
and ANZUS Meetings (Haig, joint news
conferences, ANZUS communique) .... 34
U.S. Assistance to Pakistan (joint state-
ment) 83
South Africa. U.S. Response to OAU Criti-
cism (Department statement) 56
Terrorism. President Reagan Attends Eco-
nomic Summit in Canadw (press briefings,
statements by participants, declaration,
statements released to the press) 1
Treaties. Current Actions 88
Turkey. Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Face
the Nation" 51
United Kingdom. Vice President Visits Paris
and London (toast, news conferences) . .25
United Nations
International Conference on Kampuchea
(Haig, declaration, resolution) 86
Security Council Meets to Consider Israeli
Raid (Kirkpatrick, text of resolution) . .84
U.S.S.R.
Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Face the
Nation" 51
Secretary Haig Visits China; Attends ASEAN
and ANZUS Meetings (Haig, joint news
conferences, ANZUS communique) ... .34
U.S. Policy Toward the U.S.S.R., Eastern
Europe, and Yugoslavia (Eagleburger) .73
Name Index
Bush, Vice President 25, 29
Crocker, Chester A 55, 57
Eagleburger, Lawrence S 65, 73
Haig, Secretary ... 1, 31, 34, 39, 51, 79, 81, 86
Kirkpatrick, Jeane J 84
Kusumaatmadja, Mochtar 34
Mitterrand, Francois 1
Reagan, President 1, 23, 80
Regan, Donald T 1
Rithauddeen, Tengku Ahmad 34
Romulo, Carlos P 34
Rostow, Eugene V 59
Schmidt, Helmut 1
Siddhi Sawetsila 34
Spadolini, Giovanni 1
Stoessel, Walter J., Jr 79
Street, Anthony A 34
Suzuki, Zenko 1
Talboys, Brian 34
Thatcher, Margaret 1
Thorn, Gaston 1
Trudeau, Pierre-Elliott 1
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
Postage and Fees Paid
Department of State
STA-501
Second Class
Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted service, please renew your subscription promptly when you
receive the expiration notice from the Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time required to process
renewals, notices are sent out three months in advance of the expiration date. Any problems involving your
subscription will receive immediate attention if you write to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. See inside front cover for subscription rates and mailing address.
mwi'pi
if of State If ~MW j £»
bulletin
Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 81 / Number 2054
September 1981
Dvpttrtmvnl of Stale
bulletin
Volume 81 / Number 2054 / September 1981
Cover Photo:
A view of the "Sacred Cow," the
president's plane, taken in August 1948.
(Cover and article photos courtesy of the
U.S. Air Force, the National Archives,
and the White House.)
The Department of State Bulletin ,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and
government agencies with information
on developments in U.S. foreign
relations and the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service.
The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials;
special features and articles on
international affairs; selected press
releases issued by the White House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission
to the United Nations; and treaties and
other agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party.
ALEXANDER M.HAIG, JR.
Secretary of State
DEAN FISHER
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
PAULE. AUERSWALD
Director,
Office of Public Communication
MARTIN JUDGE
Chief, Editorial Division
PHYLLISA. YOUNG
Editor
JUANITAADAMS
Assistant Editor
The Secretary of State has determined that
the publication of this periodical is
necessary in the transaction of the public
business required by law of this
Department. Use of funds for printing this
periodical has been approved by the
Director of the Office of Management and
Budget through January 31, 1986.
NOTE: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the
Department of State Bulletin as the
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is
indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical
Literature.
For sale by the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
Price: 12 issues plus annual index—
$19.00 (domestic) $23.75 (foreign)
Single copy— $3.25 (domestic) $4.10 (foreign)
Index, single copy— $2.25 (domestic) $2.85 (ft
CONTENTS
FEATURE
1 Presidents Abroad
Secretary
A Strategic Approach to
American Foreign Policy
Question-and-Answer Session
Following ABA Address
Relationship of Foreign and
Defense Policies
International Trade
Interview on "Issues and
Answers"
Interview for The Wall Street
Journal
Interviews on the "Today" Show
Interview on "Nightline"
Question-and-Answer Session
Following Foreign Policy
Association Address
nomics
Secretary Negotiates Procedures
for Cancun Summit (Secretary
Haig)
WHO Infant Formula Code
(Elinor Constable)
OECD Ministerial Meeting Held in
Paris (William P. Clark)
ppe
Challenge for Progress on the
Helsinki Final Act (Max M.
Kampelman)
CSCE Review Conference
20th Anniversary of the Berlin
Wall
iian Rights
I U.S. Commitment to Human
Rights (Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.)
rigration
U.S. Immigration Policy (Presi-
dent Reagan)
Middle East
44 Sinai Multinational Force and
Observers (Secretary's Letters to
Egyptian and Israeli Foreign
Ministers, Protocol, Annex,
Appendix, Nicholas A. Veliotes)
51 Visit of Egyptian President Sadat
(President Reagan, Anwar al-
Sadat)
54 Secretary Haig's News Conference
on President Sadat's Visit
58 Secretary Haig Interviewed on
CBS Morning News
59 U.S. and Egypt Sign Nuclear
Energy Agreement (Department
Announcement)
Nuclear Policy
60 Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy
(President Reagan)
Security Assistance
61 Conventional Arms Transfers
(White House Announcement,
James L. Buckley)
Terrorism
65 International Terrorism (Richard
T. Kennedy)
Western Hemisphere
68 Secretary Attends Caribbean
Development Meeting (Secretary
Haig, William E. Brock)
69 Caribbean Basin Development
(Thomas 0. Enders)
70 El Salvador: The Search for Peace
(Thomas 0. Enders)
73 Belize (Department Statement)
Treaties
74 Current Actions
Chronology
76 July 1981
Press Releases
77 Department of State
Publications
78 Foreign Relations Volume
Released
78 Department of State
Index
SPECIAL (See Center Section)
Atlas of United States Foreign Relations: Economics - Part 2
President Theodore Roosevelt was the first U.S. President to travel abroad, in 1906.
Presidents
Abroad
Feature
*~
Smwi^u
Air Force One taxis to a stop at the
edge of the red carpet. The honor
guard comes to attention and a
smiling President descends the ramp
waving to the crowd. Thus begins a
typical trip abroad for an American
President. But such trips for a Chief Ex-
ecutive were not always so routine. In
fact, some felt a President surrendered
his authority at the territorial limits of
the U.S., or even at the boundary of the
District of Columbia.
In 1876 when President Grant
returned to Washington, D.C., from a
trip within the U.S., he was asked by
the House of Representatives if he had
performed any official duties far from
the "seat of government" and whether
such duties were "incompatible with the
public interest." Grant's reply cited
various official acts performed by his
predecessors outside the District, and he
contended that "the telegraph affords to
the President . . . quick intercourse with
the Departments at Washington as may
be maintained while he remains in the
capital."
Theodore Roosevelt was the first
President to break with tradition when
he sailed to Panama in 1906 to inspect
progress on the "big ditch." While his
journey aroused much comment, it
caused few constitutional questions. He
traveled aboard a U.S. warship and was
outside U.S. jurisdiction for only a short
time during a stop in Panama City.
William Howard Taft's trips to
Panama and Ciudad Juarez created little
comment, but in 1918, Woodrow
Wilson's trip to Paris caused a furor.
Much of the criticism was partisan
in nature and concerned American policy
at the Paris peace conference, but there
also was concern about the conduct of
the government during the prolonged
absence of the President. "An eminent
jurist" wrote in The New York Times
that since Congress had to present
enacted bills to the President, the Vice
President would lawfully assume the
duties of office once the President was
on the high seas.
Concurrent resolutions were intro-
duced in congressional committees
stating that the President's absence
from the U.S. rendered him unable to
discharge his official powers under the
Constitution. The House proposal re-
quired the Vice President to assume
power during the President's absence.
The Senate resolution went so far as to
declare the office of the President va-
cant. Neither resolution, however, was
reported out of committee, and Vice
President Marshall told the Cabinet that
he was informally presiding over its
meetings at the President's request.
In a 1918 article in The Washington
Post, former President Taft defended
Wilson's trip, arguing that the Constitu-
tion empowered the President to make
treaties, and it was, therefore, "a
curious error to assume that the Presi-
dent himself may not attend a con-
ference to which he can send a
delegate." Taft wrote that most official
duties could be transacted by cable. The
question of whether the President's
authority traveled with him was never
raised again.
It was Franklin Roosevelt's World
War II meetings with Allied leaders that
finally established foreign travel as an
accepted means of conducting U.S.
foreign relations.
The following chronology lists visits
by Presidents and Presidents-elect, in-
cluding all places they met with a chief
of state or head of government, stops
made en route, and the purpose of the
visit. The characterization "state" or "of-
ficial" visit is included when it appeared
in an official announcement.
*$!**E3Sm
Theodore Roosevelt
November 14-17, 1906. Panama: Colon,
Panama City. Inspected construction of
the Panama Canal; departed the United
States on November 9 and returned
November 26. First foreign visit by any
President or President-elect.
lember 1981
As President-elect, William
Howard Toft visited Panama
in 1909 to inspect construction
of the canal.
In 1923 President Harding
returned from Canada aboard
the U.S.S. Henderson.
William Howard Taft
January 29-February 7, 1909 (as
President-elect). Panama: Colon, I
Panama City. Inspected construction
the Panama Canal; met with Presider
Obaldia.
October 16, 1909. Mexico: Ciudad
Juarez. Part of an exchange of visits
with President Diaz across the iiordei
Woodrow Wilson
December 14-25, 1918. France: Paris
Chaumont. Preliminary to the Paris I
peace conference; departed the Unite
States on December 4.
December 26-28, 1918. United
Kingdom: London, Carlisle, Manches
Met with Prime Minister Lloyd GeoM
and King George V.
January 1-6, 1919. Italy: Rome,
Milan, Genoa, Turin. Met with King
tor Emmanuel III and Prime Ministc
Orlando.
January 4, 1919. Vatican City. /
Audience with Pope Benedict XV.
January 7-February 14, 1919.
France: Paris. Attended Paris peace
conference; departed for the United
States on February 15.
March 14-June 18,1919. France:
Paris. Attended Paris peace conferei
departed from the United States on .
March 4.
June 18-19, 1919. Belgium:
Brussels, Charleroi, Malines, Louvaii
Met with King Albert; addressed the
parliament.
June 20-28. 1919. France: Paris,
tended Paris peace conference; retur
to the United States on July 8.
Warren G. Harding
November 24, 1920 (as President-
elect). Panama: Colon, Balboa. InfoB
visit to the Canal Zone.
Department of State Bull*
Feature:
Presidents
Abroad
!6, 1923. Canada: Vancouver,
il reception during return from
a.
in Coolidge
iry 15-17, 1928. Cuba: Havana.
;ssed the 6th international con-
le of American states.
>ert Hoover
inber 26-December 23, 1928 (as
ident-elect). Honduras: Amapala
1 Salvador: Cutuco (November 26);
igua: Corinto (November 27);
Rica: San Jose (November 28);
Mor: Guayaquil (December 1); Peru:
(December 5); Chile: Antofagasta,
igo (December 10-11); Argentina:
is Aires (December 13-15);
pay: Montevideo (December 16-18);
I: Rio de Janeiro (December 21-23).
ivill trip.
klin D. Roosevelt
-12, 1934. Haiti: Cap Haitien
3); Colombia: Cartagena (July 10);
na: Panama City (July 11-12). In-
1 visits en route to vacation in
ii.
:tober 16, 1935. Panama: Balboa,
nal visit with President Arias while
ling to Washington, D.C., from the
Coast.
ily 31, 1936. Canada: Quebec. Of-
/isit; met with Governor General
Tweedsmuir.
ovember 27, 1936. Brazil: Rio de
■o. Addressed the congress.
ovember 30-December 2, 1936.
itina: Buenos Aires. Attended ses-
f the Inter-American Conference
e Maintenance of Peace.
ecember 3, 1936. Uruguay:
video. Official visit; met with
lent Terra.
August 4-5, 1938. Panama: Balboa.
Informal visit with President Arosemena
during vacation in the Caribbean.
August 18, 1938. Canada: Kingston.
Received honorary degree from Queens
University; dedicated Thousand Islands
Bridge.
February 27, 1940. Panama:
Cristobal, Balboa. Met informally with
President Boyd during vacation.
August 9-12, 1941. United
Kingdom: Newfoundland, Argentina.
Conferred with Prime Minister
Churchill.
January 11-13, 1943. United
Kingdom: Trinidad (January 11); Brazil:
Belem (January 12); United Kingdom:
Bathurst (The Gambia) (January 13).
Overnight stops en route to Casablanca.
January 14-25, 1943. Morocco:
Casablanca. Attended Casablanca Con-
ference.
January 25, 1943. United Kingdom:
Bathurst (The Gambia). Overnight stop
en route from Casablanca.
January 26-27, 1943. Liberia:
Monrovia. Informal visit; met with
President Barclay.
January 28, 1943. Brazil: Natal. In-
formal visit; met with President Vargas.
January 29, 1943. United Kingdom:
Trinidad. Overnight stop en route from
Casablanca.
April 20, 1943. Mexico: Monterrey.
Part of an exchange of visits with Presi-
dent Avila across the border.
August 17-25, 1943. Canada:
Quebec, Ottawa. First Quebec con-
ference with British Prime Minister
Churchill.
November 20, 1943. France: Oran
(Algeria). Disembarked en route to
Cairo.
November 21, 1943. Tunisia: Tunis.
Overnight stop en route to Cairo.
November 22-26, 1943. Egypt:
Cairo. First Cairo conference with
British Prime Minister Churchill and
Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
November 27-December 2, 1943.
Iran: Tehran. Tehran conference with
Soviet Premier Stalin and British Prime
Minister Churchill.
December 2-7, 1943. Egypt: Cairo.
Second Cairo conference with British
Prime Minister Churchill and Turkish
President Inonu.
While on a trip to Europe,
President Wilson visited Rome
to consult with King Victor
Emmanuel III.
In late 19U3 President
Roosevelt met with Premier
Stalin and Prime Minister
Churchill in Tehran.
mber 1981
President Eisenhower con-
sulted with President Laniel
and Prime Minister Churchill
in Bermuda in late 1953.
In Potsdam in 191,5 President
Truman participated in a con-
ference with Prime Minister
Attlee and Premier Stalin.
December 2-8, 1943. Tunisia:
Tunis. Conferred with General
Eisenhower.
December 8, 1943. United Kingdom:
Malta and Italy: Sicily, Castel Ventrano.
Visited Allied military installations.
December 9, 1943. France: Dakar
(Senegal). Reembarked for the United
States.
September 11-16, 1944. Canada:
Quebec. Second Quebec conference with
British Prime Minister Churchill.
February 2, 1945. United Kingdom:
Malta. Malta conference with Prime
Minister Churchill.
February 3-12, 1945. U.S.S.R.:
Yalta. Yalta conference with Soviet
Premier Stalin and British Prime
Minister Churchill.
February 13-15, 1945. Egypt: Great
Bitter Lake, Suez Canal, Alexandria.
Met with King Farouk, Ethiopian
Emperor Haile Selassie, Saudi King Ibn
Saud, and British Prime Minister
Churchill.
February 18, 1945. France: Algiers
(Algeria). Briefed U.S. Ambassasdors to
the United Kingdom, France, and Italy
on the Yalta conference.
Harry S. Truman
July 15, 1945. Belgium: Antwerp,
Brussels. Disembarked en route to
Potsdam.
July 16-August 1, 1945. Germany:
Potsdam. Potsdam conference with
British Prime Ministers Churchill and
Attlee and Soviet Premier Stalin.
August 2, 1945. United Kingdom:
Plymouth. Informal meeting with King
George VI.
March 3-6, 1947. Mexico: Mexico
D.F. State visit; met with President
Aleman.
June 10-12, 1947. Canada: Ottawa.
Official visit; met with Governor General
Alexander and Prime Minister Macken-
zie King.
September 1-7, 1947. Brazil: Rio de
Janeiro. State visit; addressed Rio con-
ference and the congress.
Dwight D. Eisenhower
December 2-5, 1952 (as President-
elect). Korea: Seoul. Visited combat
zone.
October 19, 1953. Mexico: Nuevc
Guerrero. Dedicated Falcom Dam. !
November 13-15, 1953. Canadsji
tawa. State visit; addressed joint sessn
of the parliament.
December 4-8, 1953. United
Kingdom: Bermuda. Attended con- 1
ference with Prime Minister Churchill
and French President Laniel.
July 18-23, 1955. Switzerland:
Geneva. Attended conference with
British Prime Minister Eden, French
Premier Faure, and Soviet Premier
Bulganin.
July 21-23, 1956. Panama: Panair
City. Attended a meeting of the
Presidents of the American republics.
March 21-24, 1957. United
Kingdom: Bermuda. Met with Prime
Minister Macmillan.
December 16-19, 1957. France:
Paris. Attended meeting of NATO hft
of government.
July 8-11, 1958. Canada: Ottawa
Informal visit; addressed joint session
the parliament.
February 19-20, 1959. Mexico:
Acapulco. Informal meeting with Pre
dent Lopez Mateos.
June 26, 1959. Canada: Montreal.
Joined Queen Elizabeth II in ceremon;
opening the St. Lawrence seaway. •
August 26-27, 1959. Germany:
Bonn. Informal meeting with Chancel
Adenauer and President Heuss.
August 27-September 2, 1959.
United Kingdom: London, Balmoral,
Chequers. Informal visit; met with
Prime Minister Macmillan and Queen
Elizabeth II.
September 2-4, 1959. France: Par
Informal meeting with President De
Gaulle and Italian Premier Segni; ad-
dressed North Atlantic Council.
December 4-6, 1959. Italy: Rome.
Informal visit; met with President, Gro
chi.
December 6, 1959. Vatican City.
Audience with Pope John XXIII.
December 6-7, 1959. Turkey:
Ankara. Informal visit; met with Pres
dent Bayar.
n
Department ot State Bulle:
Feature:
Presidents
Abroad
)ecember 8, 1959. Pakistan:
ichi. Informal visit; met with Presi-
Ayub Khan.
)ecember 9, 1959. Afghanistan:
ll. Informal visit; met with King
immed Zahir.
)ecember 9-14, 1959. India: New
Agra. Met with President Prasad
Prime Minister Nehru; addressed
larliament.
)ecember 14, 1959. Iran: Tehran,
with Shah Mohammed Reza
ivi; addressed the parliament.
)ecember 14-15, 1959. Greece:
ns. Official visit; met with King
and Prime Minister Karamanlis;
;ssed the parliament.
December 17, 1959. Tunisia: Tunis,
.vith President Bourguiba.
>ecember 18-21, 1959. France:
>n, Paris. Conferred with President
laulle, British Prime Minister Mac-
n, and German Chancellor
.auer.
(ecember 21-22, 1959. Spain:
i id. Met with Generalissimo Franco.
lecember 22, 1959. Morocco:
Iblanca. Met with King Mohammed
ebruary 23-26, 1960. Brazil:
ilia, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo. Met
I President Kubitschek; addressed
s ongress.
'ebruary 26-29, 1960. Argentina:
os Aires, Mardel Plata, San Carlos
', iriloche. Met with President Fron-
ebruary 29-March 2, 1960. Chile:
Lago. Met with President Alessan-
larch 2-3, 1960. Uruguay:
evideo. Met with President Nar-
|lay 15-19, 1960. France: Paris,
erred with President De Gaulle,
sh Prime Minister Macmillan, and
it Premier Khrushchev.
lay 19-20, 1960. Portugal: Lisbon,
ial visit; met with President
laz.
une 14-16, 1960. Philippines:
la. State visit; met with President
une 18-19, 1960. China: Taipei,
with President Chiang Kai-shek.
lune 19-20, 1960. Korea: Seoul. Met
Prime Minister Chung; addressed
lational assembly.
October 24, 1960.
Acuna. Informal visit;
dent Lopez Mateos.
Mexico: Ciudad
met with Presi-
John F. Kennedy
May 16-18, 1961. Canada: Ottawa. State
visit; addressed joint session of the
parliament.
May 31-June 3, 1961. France; Paris.
State visit; met with President De
Gaulle; addressed North Atlantic Coun-
cil.
June 3-4, 1961. Austria: Vienna.
Met with President Schaerf; held talks
with Soviet Premier Khrushchev.
June 4-5, 1961. United Kingdom:
London. Private visit; met with Queen
Elizabeth II and Prime Minister Mac-
millan.
December 16-17, 1961. Venezuela:
Caracas. Met with President Betancourt.
December 17, 1961. Colombia:
Bogota. Met with President Lleras
Camargo.
December 21-22, 1961. United
Kingdom: Bermuda. Met with Prime
Minister Macmillan.
June 29-July 1, 1962. Mexico: Mex-
ico D.F. State visit; met with President
Lopez Mateos.
December 18-21, 1962. United
Kingdom: Nassau (Bahamas). Conferred
with Prime Minister Macmillan; conclud-
ed Nassau agreement on nuclear defense
systems.
March 18-20, 1963. Costa Rica: San
Jose. Attended conference of Presidents
of the Central American republics.
June 23-26, 1963. Germany: Bonn,
Cologne, Frankfurt, Wiesbaden, Berlin.
Met with Chancellor Adenauer.
June 26-29, 1963. Ireland: Dublin,
Wexford, Cork, Galway, Limerick. Ad-
dressed the parliament; visited ancestral
home.
June 29-30, 1963. United Kingdom:
Birch Grove, Sussex. Informal visit; met
with Prime Minister Macmillan.
July 1-2, 1963. Italy: Rome, Naples.
Met with President Segni and NATO of-
ficials.
July 2, 1963. Vatican City.
Audience with Pope Paul VI.
■
' ■' 1
T'fi?
Thousands of Mexicans wel-
comed President Kennedy to
Mexico City in June 1962.
ember 1981
While in Bonn in 1967, Presi-
dent Johnson met with Presi-
dent Luebke and President
DeGaulle.
Lyndon B. Johnson
September 16, 1964. Canada: Van-
couver. Informal visit; met with Prime
Minister Pearson in ceremonies related
to the Columbia River Treaty.
April 14-15, 1966. Mexico: Mexico
D.F. Informal visit; met with President
Diaz Ordaz.
August 21-22, 1966. Canada: Cam-
pobello Island, Chamcook. Laid cor-
nerstone at Roosevelt-Campobello Inter-
national Park; conferred informally with
Prime Minister Pearson.
October 19-20, 1966. New Zealand:
Wellington. State visit; met with Prime
Minister Holyoake.
October 20-23, 1966. Australia:
Canberra, Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane,
Townsville. State visit; met with Gover-
nor General Casey and Prime Minister
Holt.
October 24-26, 1966. Philippines:
Manila, Los Banos, Corregidor. At-
tended summit conference with the
heads of state and government of
Australia, South Korea, New Zealand,
the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.
October 26, 1966. Vietnam: Cam
Ranh Bay. Visited U. S. military person-
nel.
October 27-30, 1966. Thailand:
Bangkok. State visit; met with King
Bhumibol Adulyadej.
October 30-31, 1966. Malaysia:
Kuala Lumpur. State visit; met with
Prime Minister Rahman.
October 31-November 2, 1966.
Korea: Seoul, Suwon. State visit; met
with President Park and Prime Minister
Chung.
December 4, 1966. Mexico: Ciudad
Acuna. Informal meeting with President
Diaz Ordas; inspected construction of
Armistad Dam.
April 11-14, 1967. Uruguay: Punta
del Este. Summit meeting with Latin
American chiefs of state.
April 14, 1967. Suriname:
Paramaribo. Refueling stop en route
from Uruguay.
April 23-26, 1967. Germany: Bonn.
Attended funeral of Chancellor
Adenauer; conversed with various heads
of state.
May 25, 1967. Canada: Montreal,
Ottawa. Attended Expo 67; conferred
informally with Prime Minister Pears
October 28, 1967. Mexico: Ciudad
Juarez. Attended transfer of El
Chamizal from the U.S. to Mexico; elm
ferred with President Diaz Ordaz.
December 21-22, 1967. Australia:
Canberra. Attended funeral of Prime
Minister Holt; conferred with other I1
attending heads of state.
December 23, 1967. Thailand: j
Khorat and Vietnam: Cam Ranh Bay.
Visited U.S. military personnel.
December 23, 1967. Pakistan: I
Karachi. Met with President Ayub
Khan.
December 23, 1967. Italy: Rome.
Met with President Saragat and Prim
Minister Moro.
December 23, 1967. Vatican Ciffll
Audience with Pope Paul VI.
July 6-8, 1968. El Salvador: SaM
Salvador. Attended meeting of the I
Presidents of the Central American
republics.
July 8, 1968. Nicaragua: Managui
Informal visit; met with President \
Somoza.
July 8, 1968. Costa Rica: San JoM
Informal visit; met with President
Trajos.
July 8, 1968. Honduras: San PedH
Sula. Informal visit; met with Preside
Lopez Arrelano.
July 8, 1968. Guatemala: Guatem
City. Informal visit; met with Preside
Mendez.
Richard Nixon
February 23-24, 1969. Belgium:
Brussels. Attended North Atlantic Co
cil meeting; met with King Baudouin .
February 24-26, 1969. United
Kingdom: London. Informal visit; helt
conversations with Prime Minister
Wilson; received by Queen Elizabeth I
February 26-27, 1969. Germany:
Cologne, Bonn, Berlin. Addressed the
Bundestag.
February 27-28, 1969. Italy: Rom
Department of State Bullelf
Feature:
Presidents
Abroad
vith President Saragat and Prime
ter Rumor.
ebruary 28-March 1, 1969. France:
. Met with President De Gaulle.
larch 2, 1969. Vatican City.
;nce with Pope Paul VI.
uly 26-27, 1969. Philippines:
la. State visit, met with President
OS.
uly 27-28, 1969. Indonesia:
ta. State visit, met with President
rto.
uly 28-30, 1969. Thailand:
kok. State visit, met with King
libol Adulyadej.
uly 30, 1969. Vietnam: Saigon, Di
/let with President Thieu; visited
military personnel.
uly 31-August 1, 1969. India: New
State visit; met with Acting Presi-
Hidayatullah.
.ugust 1-2, 1969. Pakistan: Lahore.
) visit; met with President Yahya
.ugust 2-3, 1969. Romania:
larest. Official visit; met with Presi-
iCeausescu.
.ugust 3, 1969. United Kingdom:
cnhall Air Force Base. Informal
i.ng with Prime Minister Wilson.
eptember 8, 1969. Mexico: Ciudad
}a. Dedicated Armistad Dam.
.ugust 20-21, 1970. Mexico: Puerto
Irta. Official visit; met with Presi-
iDiaz Ordaz.
eptember 27-30, 1970. Italy:
L Naples. Official visit; met with
jdent Saragat; visited NATO
jiern Command.
j eptember 28, 1970. Vatican City.
Knee with Pope Paul VI.
eptember 30-October 1, 1970.
Islavia: Belgrade. State visit; met
I President Tito.
>ctober 2-3, 1970. Spain: Madrid.
I- visit; met with Generalissimo
Ico.
|)ctober 3, 1970. United Kingdom:
[uers. Met informally with Queen
Ibeth II and Prime Minister Heath.
|)ctober 3-5, 1970. Ireland:
Irick, Timahoe, Dublin. State visit;
Ivith Prime Minister Lynch.
November 12, 1970. France: Paris,
rided memorial services for former
[dent De Gaulle.
December 13-14, 1971. Portugal:
Terceira Island (Azores). Discussed in-
ternational monetary problems with
French President Pompidou and Por-
tuguese Prime Minister Caetano.
December 20-21, 1971. United
Kingdom: Bermuda. Met with Prime
Minister Heath.
February 21-28, 1972. China: Bei-
jing, Hanzhou, Shanghai. State visit;
met with Chairman Mao Zedong and
Premier Zhou Enlai.
April 13-15, 1972. Canada: Ottawa.
State visit. Met with Govenor General
Michener and Prime Minister Trudeau;
addressed the parliament.
May 20-22, 1972. Austria: Salzburg.
Informal visit; met with Chancellor
Kreisky.
May 22-30, 1972. U.S.S.R.: Moscow,
Leningrad, Kiev. State visit; met with
Premier Kosygin and General Secretary
Brezhnev.
May 30-31, 1972. Iran: Tehran. Of-
ficial visit; met with Shah Mohammed
Reza Pahlavi.
May 31-June 1, 1972. Poland: War-
saw. Official visit; met with First
Secretary Gierek.
May 31-June 1, 1973. Iceland: Reyk-
javik. Met with President Eldjarn,
Prime Minister Johanneson, and French
President Pompidou.
April 5-7, 1974. France: Paris. At-
tended memorial services for former
President Pompidou; met with French
interim President Poher, Italian Prime
Minister Leone, British Prime Minister
Wilson, West German Chancellor
Brandt, Danish Prime Minister Hartling,
Soviet President Podgorny, and
Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka.
June 10-11, 1974. Austria: Salzburg.
Met with Chancellor Kreisky.
June 12-14, 1974. Egypt: Cairo,
Alexandria. Met with President Sadat.
June 14-15, 1974. Saudi Arabi:
Jidda, State visit; met with King Faisal.
June 15-16, 1974. Syria: Damascus.
Met with President Assad.
June 16-17, 1974. Israel: Tel Aviv,
Jerusalem. Met with President Katzir
and Prime Minister Rabin.
June 17-18, 1974. Jordan: Amman.
State visit; met with King Hussein I.
June 18-19, 1974. Portugal: Lajes
Field (Azores). Met with President
Spinola.
President and Mrs. Nixon
toured the Great Wall in China
in February 1972.
i:ember 1981
President Ford met with
General Secretary Brezhnev in
Vladivostok, U.S.S.R., in 197A-
June 25-26, 1974. Belgium:
Brussels. Attended North Atlantic Coun-
cil meeting; met with King Baudouin I,
and Queen Fabiola, Prime Minister
Tindemans; also met with German
Chancellor Schmidt, British Prime
Minister Wilson, and Italian Prime
Minister Rumor.
June 27-July 3, 1974. U.S.S.R.:
Moscow, Minsku, Oreanda. Official visit;
met with General Secretary Brezhnev,
President Podgorny, and Premier
Kosygin.
Gerald R. Ford
October 21, 1974. Mexico: Nogales,
Magdelena de Kino. Met with President
Echeverria; laid a wreath at the tomb of
Padre Eusebio Kino.
November 19-22, 1974. Japan:
Tokyo, Kyoto. State visit; met with
Prime Minister Tanaka.
November 22-23, 1974. Korea:
Seoul. Met with President Park.
November 23-24, 1974. U.S.S.R.:
Vladivostok. Met with General Secretary
Brezhnev and discussed limitations of
strategic arms.
December 14-16, 1974. France:
Martinique. Met with President Giscard
d'Estaing.
May 28-30, 1975. Belgium: Brussels.
Attended NATO summit meeting; ad-
dressed the North Atlantic Council; met
with NATO heads of state and govern-
ment.
May 31-June 1, 1975. Spain:
Madrid. Met with Generalissimo Franco;
received keys to city from Mayor of
Madrid.
June 1-2, 1975. Austria: Salzburg.
Met with Chancellor Kreisky and Egyp-
tian President Sadat.
June 3, 1975. Italy: Rome. Met with
President Leone and Prime Minister
Moro.
June 3, 1975. Vatican City.
Audience with Pope Paul VI.
July 26-28, 1975. Germany: Bonn,
Linz. Met with President Scheel and
Chancellor Schmidt.
July 28-29, 1975. Poland: Warsav
Krakow. Official visit; met with First
Secretary Gierek.
July'29-August 2, 1975. Finland:
Helsinki. Attended the opening sessio
of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); signe
the Final Act of the CSCE (August It
met with the heads of state and goven
ment of Finland, United Kingdom,
Turkey, West Germany, France, Ital}
and Spain; also met with Soviet Gene
Secretary Brezhnev.
August 2-3, 1975. Romania:
Bucharest, Sinaia. Official visit; met
with President Ceausescu.
August 3-4, 1975. Yugoslavia:
Belgrade. Official visit; met with Pres
dent Tito and Prime Minister Bijedic.
November 15-17, 1975. France:
Rambouillet. Attended an economic s»
mit meeting of the heads of state and
government of France, West German
Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdon ]
December 1-5, 1975. China: Beiji j
Official visit; met with Chairman Mac j
Zedong and Vice Premier Deng Xiao-
ping.
December 5-6, 1975. Indonesia:
Jakarta. Official visit; met with Presi i
dent Suharto.
December 6-7, 1975. Philippines:
Manila. Official visit; met with Presidl
Marcos.
Jimmy Carter
May 5-11, 1977. United Kingdom: Lo
don, Newcastle. Attended an econom:
summit meeting (May 7-8) with the ]'
heads of state and government of
France, West Germany, and the Unit
Kingdom; also met with Prime Minist
of Belgium, Turkey, Norway, the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the |
President of Portugal; addressed the
North Atlantic Council (May 10).
May 9, 1977. Switzerland: Geneva
Official visit; met with President Furg
and Syrian President Assad.
December 29-31, 1977. Poland:
Warsaw. Official visit; met with First
Secretary Gierek.
Department of State Bullel
Feature:
Presidents
Abroad
ecember 31, 1977-January 1,
Iran: Tehran. Official visit; met
3hah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and
nian King Hussein I.
inuary 1-3, 1978. India: New
Daulatpur-Nasirabad. Met with
lent Reddy and Prime Minister
; addressed the parliament.
inuary 3-4, 1978. Saudi Arabia:
h. Met with King Khalid and
n Prince Fahd.
anuary 4, 1978. Egypt: Aswan,
vith President Sadat and West Ger-
hancellor Schmidt.
anuary 4-6, 1978. France: Paris,
andy, Bayeux, Versailles. Met with
dent Giscard d'Estaing and Prime
ter Barre.
anuary 6, 1978. Belgium: Brussels,
vith King Baudouin I and Prime
ter Tindemans; attended meetings
Commission of the European
nunities and the North Atlantic
al.
;arch 28-29, 1978. Venezuela:
as. Met with President Perez; ad-
ssd the congress; signed maritime
:lary agreement.
larch 29-31, 1978. Brazil: Brasilia,
le Janeiro. Official visit; met with
dent Geisel; addressed the con-
iarch 31-April 3, 1978. Nigeria:
j3. Met with President Obasanjo;
Ijtate visit of a U.S. President to
i ahara Africa.
j.pril 3, 1978. Liberia: Monrovia.
J vith President Tolbert.
une 16-17, 1978. Panama: Panama
Invited by President Lakas and
ral Torrijos to sign protocol confir-
exchange of documents ratifying
ma Canal treaties; met informally
Presidents Perez (Venezuela),
z Michelson (Colombia), Lopez Por-
;Mexico), Carazo (Costa Rica), and
e Minister Manley (Jamaica).
(uly 13-15, 1978. Germany: Bonn,
•baden, Erbenheim Air Force Base,
tkfurt, Berlin. State visit; met with
ident Scheel and Chancellor
nidt.
(uly 16-17, 1978. Germany: Bonn,
nded an economic summit meeting
ie heads of state and government of
ice, West Germany, Canada, Italy,
.n, and the United Kingdom.
January 4-9, 1979. France:
Guadeloupe. Met informally with Presi-
dent Giscard d'Estaing, German
Chancellor Schmidt, and British Prime
Minister Callaghan.
February 14-16, 1979. Mexico: Mex-
ico D.F. State visit; met with President
Lopez Portillo; addressed the congress.
March 7-10, 1979. Egypt: Cairo,
Alexandria, Giza. State visit; met with
President Sadat; addressed the national
assembly.
March 10-13, 1979. Israel: Tel Aviv,
Jerusalem. State visit; met with Presi-
dent Navon and Prime Minister Begin;
addressed the Knesset.
March 13, 1979. Egypt: Cairo. Met
with President Sadat.
June 14-18, 1979. Austria: Vienna.
State visit; met with President Kerch-
schlager and Chancellor Kreisky; met
with Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev
to sign the SALT II Treaty (June
16-18).
June 25-28, 1979. Japan: Tokyo,
Shimoda. State visit; met with Emperor
Hirohito and Prime Minister Ohira.
June 28-29, 1979. Japan: Tokyo.
Attended an economic summit meeting
with the heads of state and government
of Canada, France, West Germany,
Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom.
June 30-July 1, 1979. Korea: Seoul.
State visit; met with President Park and
Prime Minister Choi.
June 19-21, 1980. Italy: Rome.
State visit; met with President Pertini.
June 21, 1980. Vatican City.
Audience with Pope John Paul II.
June 21-24. Italy: Venice. Attended
economic summit meeting with the
heads of state and government of
Canada, France, West Germany, Italy,
Japan, and the United Kingdom.
June 24-25, 1980. Yugoslavia:
Belgrade. Official visit; met with Presi-
dent Mijatovic.
June 25-26, 1980. Spain: Madrid.
Official visit; met with King Juan Carlos
and Prime Minister Suarez.
June 26, 1980. Portugal: Lisbon. Of-
ficial visit; met with President Eanes
and Prime Minister Sa Carneiro.
July 9-10, 1980. Japan: Tokyo. Of-
ficial visit; attended memorial services
for Prime Minister Ohira; met with
Chinese Premier Hua Guofing. ■
At Giza, Egypt, President and
Mrs. Carter were the guests of
President and Mrs. Sadat.
This list has been
prepared annually by the
Office of the Historian,
Bureau of Public Affairs,
and was most recently
updated by Evan M.
Duncan, Research and
Reference Historian.
ember 1981
THE SECRETARY
A Strategic Approach
to American Foreign Policy
At Secretary Haig's address before
the American Bar Association in New
Orleans on August 11, 1981.1
Americans admire law. At its best, it ex-
presses our sense of justice, moderation,
and fair play. It also reflects our na-
tional character— our enthusiastic
idealism and our famous pragmatism.
Uncoordinated, these traits could lead us
in contradictory directions. Yet when
they are in balance, they give us the
strength, confidence, and skill that has
made us great.
We have discovered that foreign
policy, like law, must be rooted in the
strength of our national character. A
foreign policy that forsakes ideals in
order to manipulate interests offends
our sense of right. A foreign policy that
forsakes power in order to pursue
pieties offends our sense of reality. Only
a vision with worthy ideals can capture
our imagination. Only a practical pro-
gram for achieving those ideals can be
worthy of our support.
Despite the vicissitudes of history,
Americans have always rallied to the vi-
sion of a world characterized by free-
dom, peace, and progress. President
Reagan shares this vision. He also
understands that progress toward such
a world depends on the strength of the
United States. More than money and
arms, such strength comes from our
willingness to work for our convictions
and even to fight for them.
In the 1980s, these convictions will
be put to a hard test. Familiar patterns
of alliance and ideology are breaking
down, and strategic changes have
already occurred that demand a
different approach to American foreign
policy. Let me summarize these changes
briefly.
• The Communist bloc, once the
tightly disciplined instrument of Soviet
power, has been shaken by the Sino-
Soviet schism. Increasingly severe inter-
nal problems afflict the Soviet-controlled
states. And chronic economic failure has
eroded the appeal of Marxist-Leninist
theories.
• At the same time, the Third
World has emerged in all of its diversity.
The fragile initial solidarity of the
modernizing states has begun to frag-
ment. Their internal stability is threat-
ened by sudden social, political, and eco-
nomic change. Simultaneously, the West
has become increasingly dependent on
their natural resources.
• The prospects for peaceful prog-
ress have been overshadowed, not only
by regional conflict but also by the
emergence of the Soviet Union as a
global military power. The Soviets have
chosen to use their power to take ad-
vantage of instability, especially in the
developing world. They have become
bolder in the promotion of violent
change.
• The new Soviet military capability
has not been offset by Western strength.
The United States has gradually lost
many of the military advantages that
once provided a margin of safety for the
West— in some cases by choice, in others
through neglect and error. Our partner-
ship with Western Europe and Japan
has been shaken by quarrels over politi-
cal and economic issues.
These strategic changes raise im-
portant questions about Western securi-
ty in the decade ahead.
• Can the United States and its
allies finance the rebuilding of their
military strength? The answer is yes.
Despite our economic troubles, we
possess resources far exceeding those of
potential adversaries. But this depends
on popular support for defense polices
and a diplomacy that encourages cooper-
ation.
• Can the Atlantic alliance and
other collaborative institutions survive in
the new environment? The answer is
yes. The cooperative impulse still exists.
But this impulse may not survive
another decade of relative military
decline or sterile economic rivalry.
• Can the West and the developing
countries find common interests? The
answer is yes. The West alone offers the
technology and know-how essential to
overcoming the barriers to moderniza-
tion. The developing countries, whatever
their ideology, are beginning to recog-
nize this fact. But a successful relation-
ship also demands an imaginative ap-
proach on our part to both the economic
and the security aspects of moderniza-
tion.
• Can the United States hold to
gether its allies and friendships, des
adverse strategic changes? The ansv
is yes. But our allies and friends mu
confident of American leadership. T
must also be confident that the secu
arrangements deterring the Soviet
Union are effective, and we are the
linchpin of these arrangements. The
American role remains unique and ii
dispensable.
These crucial questions can all b
answered in the affirmative if Amer
foreign policy is sensitive to both
American ideals and the changes in
strategic environment. President
Reagan believes that the key to succt
lies in a strategic approach. The tinv
long past when we could pursue forn
defense, and economic policies inder.
ently of each other. In today's worlc
failure of one will beget the failure o
the others. Instead, each of these
policies must support the others if a
to succeed. And success in each mal
for the success of all.
Pillars of Support
This strategic approach provides tb
support for a new foreign policy str
ture with four pillars: first, the rest*
tion of our economic and military
strength; second, the reinvigoration
our alliances and friendships; third,
promotion of progress in the develo
countries through peaceful change; ;i
fourth, a relationship with the Sovk
Union characterized by restraint am
reciprocity.
The first pillar of our foreign p
is the restoration of America's econ<
and military strength. The Presiden
understands that a weak American i
omy will eventually cripple our effor
abroad. His revolutionary programs
budgetary reductions, tax cuts, and
vestment incentives have earned the
overwhelming support of the Amerii
people and the Congress. After year
persistent problems, American econi
recovery will not be easy. But hope ;
better future— a sounder dollar, mor
creative enterprise, and a more effec
government— has been raised.
At the same time, the President
taking long overdue action to correc
our military deficiencies. This includi
modernization and balanced expansii
10
Department of State Bull
The Secretary
r existing forces. It also includes
nprovement of our industrial base.
1 efforts will make it easier for the
;d States, our allies, and other na-
to resist threats by the Soviet
a or its surrogates,
'he American people's willingness to
>rt this program, even in time of
rity, is the indispensable signal that
•e prepared to defend our vital in-
ts. But we should not delude our-
5. A beginning is not enough. If we
) follow through on these forecast
>vements to our defenses, then our
;n policy, our prosperity, and ulti-
[y our freedom will be in jeopardy.
he second pillar is the reinvigora-
»f our alliances and friendships. We
been working toward a more effec-
Vestern partnership, sensitive to
jncerns of our allies and built on a
sophisticated process of consulta-
Already, we have taken action
her on such issues as the Polish
and theater nuclear forces. We are
vorking on common approaches to
roblems of southern Africa. Finally,
ttawa summit has enabled the
rs of the West to deepen their
■standing of each other's policies,
i merican leadership means coopera-
Irith friends as well as with allies.
I cooperation is not a favor, it is a
[sity. We need friends to succeed,
noth we and our friends must be
lg and faithful to each other if our
Ists are to be preserved. Our ac-
I in the Far East, in Southwest
i and in the Middle East have
tnstrated that the era of American
|/ity is over.
he third pillar of our policy is our
Uitment to progress in the develop-
Duntries through peaceful change.
I 'ant to establish a just and respons-
• elationship with the developing
|.ries. This relationship will be
a., in part, on our belief that our
Jiples speak to their aspirations and
|)ur accomplishments speak to their
je. But it will also be based on our
Jal interest in modernization,
lern capital, trade, and technology
Issential to this process.
I'he United States stands ready to
I: the developing countries and to
|:ipate in the so-called North-South
bue. President Reagan recognizes
[the essence of development is the
lion of additional wealth rather than
•elective redistribution of existing
l:h from one part of the world to
lier. Progress depends on both
|;stic economic policies and on the
Igth of the world economy. The
governments of the developed and
developing countries, along with the
private sector, each have their special
roles to play in establishing the close
and constructive relationships that are
crucial to success.
The United States has already begun
to put this new approach into practice
through a unique program with Jamaica.
We are also acting with Mexico, Vene-
zuela, and Canada to create a Caribbean
Basin plan. And we are looking forward
to the Cancun summit. We believe that
this summit, free of a confrontational at-
mosphere, will facilitate the dialogue on
problems of the developing countries.
Western assistance for development
intensified, the instrument of tension-
Soviet military power— was strength-
ened. This buildup gained momentum
from a remarkably stable and pros-
perous period in Soviet history.
As the Soviet arsenal grew and the
West failed to keep pace, Moscow's in-
terventionism increased. The achieve-
ment of global military power, justified
as parity with the West but exceeding it
in several categories, assumed a more
ominous role: the promotion of violent
change, especially in areas of vital in-
terest to the West. Today's Soviet
military machine far exceeds the re-
quirements of defense; it undermines the
balance of power on which we and our
Over a century ago, Alexis de Tocqueville predicted that the United
States and Russia were destined to become the world's most powerful
states.
stands in stark contrast to the actions of
the Soviet Union, which offers little eco-
nomic aid. Instead, Moscow and its sur-
rogates seek to exploit historic change
and regional conflict to the detriment of
peaceful progress. The United States
and its allies are working with regional
partners to arrest the trend toward
violence and instability, and we have in-
creased our security assistance in recog-
nition of the crucial link between moder-
nization and political stability.
The fourth pillar is a relationship
with the Soviet Union marked by
greater Soviet restraint and greater
Soviet reciprocity. I want to discuss this
pillar at length today because Soviet-
American relations must be at the
center of our efforts to promote a more
peaceful world.
Over a century ago, Alexis de
Tocqueville predicted that the United
States and Russia were destined to
become the world's most powerful
states. This prophecy has come to pass
in the nuclear age. Our unreconciled
differences on human rights must, there-
fore, not be permitted to bring a global
catastrophe. We must compete with the
Soviet Union to protect freedom, but we
must also search for cooperation to pro-
tect mankind.
This search has been both difficult
and disappointing. Most recently, we in-
vested extraordinary efforts in the
decade-long search for detente. But even
as the search for a reduction in tensions
allies depend, and it threatens the peace
of the world. An international system
where might— Soviet might— makes
right, endangers the prospects for
peaceful change and the independence of
every country.
Perhaps predictably, the Soviet at-
tempt to alter the balance of power has
produced a backlash. The American peo-
ple have shown that they will not sup-
port unequal treaties; they will not ac-
cept military inferiority. The once-
staunch Chinese ally has become an im-
placable opponent of the Soviet quest for
hegemony. And Moscow has earned the
enmity and fear of many nonaligned
states through such actions as the oc-
cupation of Afghanistan and support for
Vietnam's subjugation of Kampuchea.
This backlash comes at a time when
Soviet prospects are changing for the
worse. The economies of Moscow's East
European allies are in various stages of
decline. The Soviet economy itself may
have lost its capacity for the high
growth of the past. Ambitious foreign
and defense policies are, therefore,
becoming more of a burden. Perhaps
most seriously, as events in Poland have
demonstrated, the Soviet ideology and
economic model are widely regarded as
outmoded.
The decade of the 1980s, therefore,
promises to be less attractive for
Moscow. But the troubles and power of
the Soviet Union should give pause to
lember 1981
11
The Secretary
the world. Moscow's unusual combina-
tion of weakness and strength is
especially challenging to the United
States.
What do we want of the Soviet
Union? We want greater Soviet restraint
on the use of force. We want greater
Soviet respect for the independence of
others. And we want the Soviets to
abide by their reciprocal obligations,
such as those undertaken in the Helsinki
accords. These are no more than we de-
mand of any state, and these are no less
than required by the U.N. Charter and
international law. The rules of the
Charter governing the international use
of force will lose all of their influence on
the behavior of nations if the Soviet
Union continues its aggressive course.
Our pursuit of greater Soviet
restraint and reciprocity should draw
upon several lessons painfully learned
over the past decade in dealing with the
Soviet Union.
• Soviet antagonism toward
Western ideals is deeply rooted. We can-
not count upon a convergence of Soviet
and Western political principles or
strategic doctrines. Convergence should
not be, and cannot be, a goal in negotia-
tions. As a corollary, we should avoid
dangerous optimism about the prospects
for more benign Soviet objectives.
• The Soviet Union does not create
every international conflict, but it would
be dangerous to ignore Soviet interven-
tion that aggravates such conflict. Even
as we work to deal with international
problems on their own terms, we must
deal with Soviet interventionism. A
regional approach that fails to appreci-
ate the strategic aspect of Soviet activi-
ty will fail ultimately to resolve regional
conflicts as well.
• A working relationship with the
Soviet Union depends on a balance of
alternatives and our ability to com-
municate to Moscow that such alter-
natives exist. We must indicate our will-
ingness to reach fair agreements that
speak to the legitimate interests of both
the Soviet Union and the United States.
But we must also be prepared to defend
our interests in the absence of such
agreements. Our ability to do so will be
a major inducement for Soviet coopera-
tion.
• Finally, the search for real reduc-
tions in tension with Moscow must cover
the full spectrum of our relationship. We
have learned that Soviet-American
agreements, even in strategic arms con-
trol, will not survive Soviet threats to
the overall military balance or Soviet en-
croachment upon our strategic interests
in critical regions of the world. Linkage
is not a theory; it is a fact of life that we
overlook at our peril.
U.S. Actions
Based on these guidelines, the United
States has taken steps toward the
achievement of a more stable and
beneficial relationship with the Soviet
Union. Our actions have been shaped
both by the lessons of the past and by
Winston Churchill's observation that the
key to the Soviet riddle was Soviet na-
tional interest.
President Reagan has written Presi-
dent [Leonid I.] Brezhnev that we want
a constructive and mutually beneficial
relationship with the Soviet Union.
What, in turn, do we offer the
Soviets? We offer a reduction in the ten-
sions that are so costly to both our
societies. We offer diplomatic alterna-
tives to the pursuit of violent change.
We offer fair and balanced agreements
on arms control. And we offer the
possibility of Western trade and tech-
nology.
But such a relationship can only be
the consequence of a pattern of greater
Soviet restraint. In the absence of such
restraint, our military capability, our
alliances, and our friendships will enable
us to protect our interests.
Over the last 6 months, this message
has been reinforced by over 50 direct
contacts at senior diplomatic levels. And
we have prepared a concrete agenda of
the outstanding problems between us in
these areas: geopolitical issues, arms
control, and economic relations.
Geopolitical Issues. The most per-
sistent troubles in U.S. -Soviet relations
arise from Soviet intervention in
regional conflicts, aggravating tensions,
and hampering the search for peaceful
solutions. Unless we can come to grips
with this dimension of Soviet behavior,
everything else in our bilateral relation-
ship will be undermined, as we have
seen repeatedly in the past.
The Soviet Union must understand
that it cannot succeed in dominating the
world through aggression. A serious and
sustained international reaction will be
the inevitable result, with greater
dangers for everyone— including
Moscow. The Soviet Government must
recognize that such a reaction has finally
occurred, provoked by the crises of
Afghanistan and Kampuchea. And the
international community has proposed
ways and means for resolving those •
crises to the satisfaction of all legitim; l:
interests.
The people of Afghanistan over- 1 1
whelmingly oppose the Soviet occupat f
and the Babrak Karmal regime. The
vast majority of the world's nations ar
challenging the Soviets to come to the
negotiating table, to agree to a politic
solution, to withdraw their forces, and
to restore Afghanistan's nonaligned
status. The proposal of the European
Community for a two-stage conference
is a sound step toward the achievemer
of these objectives. But the Soviet Uni
still prefers to promote a bizarre them
that the United States is unwilling to
negotiate about questions of critical in
ternational concern; that the United
States wants a return to the cold war;
that the United States is the source 1
the trouble in Afghanistan.
The Soviet Union must begin to
understand that Afghan resistance am
international pressure will be sustains j
By supporting initiatives such as that
the European Community, we offer th
Soviet Union the alternative of an
honorable solution.
The same is true for Kampuchea.
The U.N. conference and the attempts
of the ASEAN [Association of South
East Asian Nations] nations to find a
political solution to the Soviet-support
Vietnamese occupation have won broa
support. Here, too, the international
community has been rebuffed by Viet-
namese and Soviet refusal even to at-
tend the conference. Here as well, we
believe that patience and perseveranct
and the design of sound diplomatic sol
tions— offer the Soviets and their sur-
rogate the choice: international isolatii
and failure or international cooperatio
and a way out.
I have often mentioned the activiti
of the Soviet Union and its Cuban pro:
in aggravating tentions from Central
America to southern Africa. Can there
be a greater contrast between their
efforts and those of the West in trying
to resolve the political, economic, and
security problems of these regions?
It is time for those who preach
peace to contribute to peace. The way
do it is through new restraint, both in
Moscow and Havana.
Arms Control. Our past hopes for
relaxation of tensions with the Soviet
Union were eventually concentrated or
the search for arms control. But we
overestimated the extent to which arm
control negotiations would ease tension
elsewhere. And we underestimated the
12
Department of State Bulleti
The Secretary
;t of conflict elsewhere on the arms
ol process itself. The attempt to
ate and reduce nuclear weapons
remain an essential part of the
West agenda, but we must focus
central purpose: to reduce the risk
r.
nly balanced and verifiable agree-
3 that establish true parity at
:ed levels can increase our security,
e already addressed the broader
iples that govern our approach. As
:gin this part of the dialogue, it is
tial to recognize that fair agree-
3 can be reached with patience and
verance. Above all, we must
nstrate that we can sustain the
ce by our own efforts if agreements
> do so. Indeed, if we do not cause
oviets to believe that in the absence
us control they face a more difficult
e, they will have little or no incen-
o negotiate seriously.
On this basis, we have commenced
sions with the Soviets on theater
ar forces, and we have proposed
brmal negotiations open before the
f this year. We want equal,
able limits at the lowest possible
of U.S. and Soviet long-range
er nuclear weapons.
We have also launched a frank
3sion of compliance with existing
control agreements.
We have initiated the intense
rations and conceptual studies that
i precede a resumption of progress
i'ategic Arms Limitation Talks .
j We and our European allies have
|>sed an innovative new set of
Ilence-building measures in Europe,
i could provide a valuable means to
■e uncertainty about the character
urpose of the other side's military
ties.
is now up to the Soviet Govern-
to put its rhetoric of cooperation
iction.
conomic Relations. East- West
mic ties are also on our agenda
the Soviet Union. Over the past
ie, these ties have grown rapidly,
ley have not restrained the Soviet
f force. The time has come to
hion East- West economic relations,
hall seek to expand those ties that
gthen peace and serve the true in-
ts of both sides,
he Soviets have looked toward
ern agriculture, technology, trade,
inance in order to relieve the press-
conomic problems of Eastern
Europe and of the Soviet Union itself.
But the Soviet leaders must understand
that we cannot have full and normal eco-
nomic relations if they are not prepared
to respect international norms of
behavior. We must, therefore, work to
constrain Soviet economic leverage over
The four pillars of foreign policy
that I have described today will not be
easy to build. International reality tells
us that the hazards are great and the
tasks enormous. We can expect disap-
pointments. We should be prepared for
reverses. Some will tell us that we are
. . . Soviet leaders must understand that we cannot have full and nor-
mal economic relations if they are not prepared to respect international
norms of behavior.
the West. Above all, we should not allow
the transfer of Western technology that
increases Soviet war-making capabilities.
Summary
In sum, American strategy toward the
Soviet Union is proceeding on two
fronts simultaneously.
First, we are creating barriers to
aggression. We are renewing American
strength. We are joining with our allies
and friends to protect our joint in-
terests. And we are making strenuous
efforts to resolve crises which could
facilitate Soviet intervention.
Second, we are creating incentives
for Soviet restraint. We are offering a
broader relationship of mutual benefit.
This includes political agreements to
resolve outstanding regional conflicts. It
encompasses balanced and verifiable
arms control agreements. And it holds
the potential benefits of greater East-
West trade.
We are not under any illusion that
agreement with the Soviets will be easy
to achieve. The strong element of com-
petition in our relations is destined to re-
main. Nonetheless, we believe that the
renewal of America's confidence and
strength will have a constructive and
moderating effect upon the Soviet
leaders. By rebuilding our strength,
reinvigorating our alliances, and pro-
moting progress through peaceful
change, we are creating the conditions
that make restraint and reciprocity the
most realistic Soviet options. The
Soviets will eventually respond to a
policy that clearly demonstrates both
our determination to restrain their con-
tinued self-aggrandizement and our will-
ingness to reciprocate their self-
restraint.
dreaming of a world that can never be.
Others will tell us that the reassertion of
American leadership is out of tune with
the times.
An American foreign policy of
cynical realpolitik cannot succeed be-
cause it leaves no room for the idealism
that has characterized us from the incep-
tion of our national life. An America
that accepts passively a threatening
strategic environment is not true to
itself or to the world. The test of our
foreign policy is ultimately the test of
our character as a nation.
Winston Churchill once said: "The
only real sure guide to the actions of
mighty nations and powerful govern-
ments is a correct estimate of what they
are and what they consider to be their
own interests." Our foreign policy must
partake of what we are, what we repre-
sent to ourselves and to the world. Sure-
ly, the secret of America's ability to
renew itself is our fundamental confi-
dence in the individual. We stand for the
rights, responsibilities, and genius of the
individual. We rely on the individual's
capacity to dream of a better future and
to work for it. This is the conscience,
even the soul of America. Ultimately
this is what America is about. Ultimate-
ly, we must be prepared to give our for-
tunes, lives, and sacred honor to this
cause.
'Press release 271.
13
The Secretary
Question-and-Answer Session
Following ABA Address
At the conclusion of Secretary Haig's
address before the American Bar
Association in New Orleans on August
11, 1981, he answered the following ques-
tions from the audience. 1
Q. Last week, President Anwar Sadat
of Egypt was in Washington, ap-
parently attempting to lobby the Ad-
ministration into recognizing the
Palestinian terrorist organization. I
wonder how firm is the commitment
of the U.S. Government and this Ad-
ministration to refuse to do so until
those organizations recognize the
right of the State of Israel to exist
behind secure and defensible borders?
A. The question was, President
Sadat, during his visit to Washington
last week, suggested that we include the
PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization],
or the Palestinians — and there is a dif-
ference, of course — in the Middle East
peace negotiations. The question was,
how firm is President Reagan's commit-
ment to the State of Israel that we will
neither recognize nor negotiate with the
PLO until they accept Israel's right to
exist and until they accept the provisions
of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338. I put a
little more in your question because —
the commitment is very clear. It was ex-
plained in detail to President Sadat, who
understands that commitment and, I
believe, accepts it. He, of course, has the
right to express his own opinion, as he
did both in London prior to arriving in
Washington and repeatedly during his
stay in Washington.
I think it is important that we bear
in mind that there is, of course, under
the provisions of the Camp David ac-
cords the anticipated participation of the
Palestinian inhabitants on the West
Bank and Gaza. That is not an aspect of
the commitment which your question
suggests. But in terms of the U.S. com-
mitment, it is firm, it remains firm; and
I see no possibility of its being modified
in the days ahead.
We believe — I know President
Reagan believes very strongly — that
such commitment must be met by the
United States whether they involve the
State of Israel or whether they involve
our Arab friends. If the United States is
seen to be unreliable in this peace proc-
ess, the whole catalyst for the achieve-
ment of progress will be in jeopardy.
Q. I am very concerned about the
role you have in mind for us with the
United Nations, how that Organiza-
tion can assist in establishing better
world peace — the four pillars on
which you want to build this peaceful
relationship. What is the role to be
played by the United Nations and [in-
audible] by both the United Nations
and the United States in working
together for peace?
A. I think the past anticipated
hopes for the United Nations as a world
body that could effectively deal with all
international crises and resolve them in
a just and responsible way has been
somewhat put in question as a result of
the experiences and the limitations of
the world body.
That does not suggest for a moment
that the United Nations has not in the
past, and must not in the future, play an
extremely important role in the conduct
of global international affairs. I think
one could look back and say that the
contributions have been unique,
disappointing, but nonetheless substan-
tial in their own way, especially in func-
tional areas of responsibility carried out
by the United Nations today. There is no
other body that could effectively conduct
these functional activities.
Secondly, it has always been, if you
will, a platform for the exchange of
views between the member states,
whether they be characterized, as unfor-
tunately is the case too frequently, with
animosity and rhetoric; but also it does
provide a vehicle for communication. We
have seen this. The United Nations has
played a very constructive role in our re-
cent efforts at peacekeeping in Lebanon:
it was, indeed, the United Nations that
contributed to a communicating
framework. It is the United Nations that
we will have to work with if we seek to
strengthen, as we are doing today, the
peacekeeping force along the northern
border with Israel and southern
Lebanon. I think it is important, as
Americans, that we do not expect too
much, that we insist with clarity and
courage on reforms that experience in-
dicates must be undertaken by the body,
and at the same time to continue to su;
port that body as we have in the past,
and I'm confident will in the future. I
Q. During the course of your
speech I've heard you speak of
reciprocity between ourselves and tilt
Soviet Union. What effect will the
neutron bomb have on the reciprocity
between the two countries now?
A. I think a dandy effect. [Ap-
plause] The question was, reciprocity j
and the impact of President Reagan's r>
cent decision to follow the mandate of
the Congress and proceed with the pro
duction and stockpiling of the various
components of what we call the "en- 1
hanced radiation warhead" which we k
already started to build as the result of
President Carter's decision of 1978. \
There has been a lot of talk about
the ERW— or so-called neutron
bomb — and clearly, the Soviet propagai
da mills are churning out 24 hours a da
since that announcement was made. In-
deed, they have been churning rather
heavily anyway on other issues! I only
wish that objective international
judgments were applied with equal
ferocity to the relentless deployment of
SS-20 missiles by the Soviet Union, cot
ceived in the early 1970s and initiated
with unprecedented speed and efficient
starting about the mid-1970s to the
point where they have deployed well
over 200 such systems threatening all t
Western Europe and all of China todaj
One might ask a word about the
neutron bomb. The press has made it
very clear that I had some reservations
about the timing, not the substance, of
the decision. People forget what deter-
rence is all about. We Americans and
those in the Western world view
ourselves as defensive in character.
Never once has the West, in the Euro-
pean context, indulged in policies which
militarily threatened the Soviet Union.
It's all been the other way. It is the
Soviet Union which is today developing
military capabilities which far exceed
their defensive needs, and it is the Wes
which is behind in the power curve in
rectifying the balances and the trends ii
those balances.
People say that a neutron bomb,
because it is more efficient in
technological terms, because it effects
casualties on combatants as distinct
from noncombatants — the innocent
14
Department of State Bulletin
The Secretary
ms — in other words, it limits the
ge. It also limits the damage to
;ures— somehow this is going to
nuclear war easier. Anyone who
s that claim doesn't understand
rence; and deterrence automatically
les that we are on the defensive.
re trying to maintain a military
re that is going to prevent the
side from indulging in warfare of
ind, and particularly nuclear war-
; is the usability of the systems that
aintain that give credibility to our
gness to use whatever is necessary
;vent conflict, and it is ludicrous to
fit that because a system is easier
t is, therefore, going to be used.
really is the case is that the Soviet
1 is going to be less inclined,
se we have this array of weaponry,
dertake actions that would make
t to force likely, because they know
ive the ability to respond at every
lacross the spectrum. And if you
I gaps in that spectrum, they are
to be filled by Soviet actions which
I generate the very outcome you
l;o prevent. And that's what deter-
i is all about.
1 answering your question as to
ner that is reciprocity vis-a-vis the
it Union, I only wish you would ask
ime questions about the massive
II [intercontinental ballistic missile]
i ruction program they have had
I- way, even under SALT— large
i, multiple warheads, increasing ac-
iy, the deployment of the SS-20,
ramatic growth in their submarine
j e-launching capability— longer
I than those which float outside the
jrn shores of the United States and
loving increasingly into the regions
i" Pacific, formerly areas of
lern interest.
No, I'm not worried about reciproci-
ty. I'm more worried about sitting down
and negotiating seriously to get the
growth of these armaments under con-
trol.
Q. We here have a particular in-
terest in our relationships with Latin
America. We also are geographically,
in a way, situated between Cuba and
Mexico— and I believe at this time
President Portillo is meeting with Mr.
Castro. I would like for you, if you
will, in summary form to state the Ad-
ministration's policy on Latin
America, and what, if anything, will
be done with regard to Cuba's rela-
tionship with Mexico.
A. Of course, it is not for the
United States to determine what Cuba's
relationship with Mexico should be any
more than it should be Mexico's respon-
sibility to determine what our relation-
ship with Cuba might be.
I can comment on our relationships
with Cuba. Clearly, we have been
witnessing an extended period of unac-
ceptable Soviet-sponsored, Cuban,
worldwide activity. Today, they have
some 30,000-40,000 mercenary forces
operating on the African Continent— in
Angola and in Ethopia— with advisers
spread from Southern Yemen and a
number of other African and Middle
Eastern countries.
We have seen a step-up in Cuban
subversive activity once again in this
hemisphere— in Nicaragua— where they
have 1,600-some advisers today creating
an armed force that cannot be justified
by any objective assessment of threats
facing the Government of Nicaragua.
I made the comment 2 weeks ago
that in this past year, Cuba has received
from the Soviet Union more armaments
than in any single year since the 1962
missile crisis, which we all remember so
vividly. These levels of armaments are
not only going into the Cuban force
structure, which far exceeds any poten-
tial threat emanating from this
hemisphere, but also are being used to
provide the risk for the shipments of il-
licit arms into such target countries as
Nicaragua and El Salvador. There are
also recent manifestations of such ar-
maments transshipped from Vietnam via
Cuba into Guatemala. This is unaccept-
able Cuban activity from the U.S. point
of view.
We are prepared to deal construc-
tively with Cuba, just as we are with the
Soviet Union; but this is going to require
a new level of restraint not manifested
in the recent past. We are prepared to
deal with the situation whether Cuba
"trims its sails" or whether it continues
to engage itself in this illicit and very
dangerous interventionism. We are
prepared in either event.
'Press release 271A of Aug. 12, 1981.
lember 1981
15
The Secretary
Relationship of Foreign and
Defense Policies
Secretary's Haig's statement before
the Senate Armed Services Committee on
July SO, 1981.1
It is a pleasure to appear before you to-
day to discuss the relationship between
foreign policy and the role of military
power. This is an important, indeed
critical, subject for our nation. It
deserves the fullest attention of the
legislative as well as executive branch of
our government.
There can be no easy distinction
drawn between foreign and defense
policy. They are inextricably linked.
Together with economic policy, they
comprise a strategic approach to inter-
national relations which this country
must pursue if we are to remain free
and prosperous. Moreover, we must
coordinate this approach within the ex-
ecutive branch, between the executive
and legislative branches, and with our
friends and allies around the world.
Historically, this nation has
sometimes ignored the interrelationship
between military power and foreign
policy. Too often, we have assumed that
military strength had no relation to the
pursuit of peace, that preparations for
war began only after diplomacy had
failed. Rather than recognizing the utili-
ty of military power in preventing war,
we frequently sought refuge behind our
oceans, legal constructs, or moral
idealism.
But the world has changed dramat-
ically since World War II. Intercontinen-
tal missiles and bombers, armed with
nuclear weapons, can span ocean bar-
riers in minutes or hours. Resource
dependence and the global economy
have linked our fate and well-being with
other regions as never before. We can
no longer accept a policy which draws
an artificial line between diplomacy and
the ability to project military power.
While the desire to avoid conventional
war was insufficient to bring about this
integration in the past, the responsibility
of deterring nuclear war should offer a
forceful incentive today.
The Soviets clearly understand the
relationship of foreign policy and
military power. Following World War II,
they rapidly developed atomic weapons.
After their humiliation in the Cuban
missile crisis, they accelerated improve-
ment of their power projection forces
and their global capability to challenge
ours.
Today, the Soviet Union is a global
military power. Its capabilities are
worldwide in reach and massive both in
conventional and nuclear forces. As a
result, the United States has no alter-
native but to achieve and maintain
balancing capabilities. We can no longer
afford to seek a shortcut by trying to
offset conventional deficiencies with
nuclear preponderance. Likewise, we
can no longer view the world as divided
into distinct strategic zones in which
wars can be discretely fought and con-
tained. We must recognize that a
U.S. -Soviet war anywhere is likely to
spread to other fronts and may become
global very quickly.
In an era when editorial writers
speak of the "impotence of power," the
Soviets and their surrogates have suc-
cessfully employed unsheathed military
might in Angola, Kampuchea, Ethiopia,
and Afghanistan. Most recently, the
Soviets have sought to intimidate Polish
Government domestic actions by mass-
ing forces along the border.
This last example illustrates a reality
which we in the United States have not
always appreciated. Military force alters
political perceptions through the capaci-
ty to intervene as well as through in-
tervention itself. Military power is not
This Administration is determined
to deny the Soviets any opportuni-
ty to conduct a foreign policy
aimed at exploiting real or
perceived American military
weaknesses.
an end in itself, nor is it a substitute for
diplomacy. It is, however, a critical
backdrop for conducting a successful
foreign policy. It is an essential precon-
dition for a coherent strategic approach
to international relations.
For a time following World War II,
we understood this relationship. We set
about to rebuild and protect Europe
with all of the instruments at our dispos-
al— political, military, and economic.
The result was a highly successful stra-
tegic approach which led to NATO a
European economic recovery.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the
hesion of our foreign, defense, and
economic policies disintegrated. Viet-
nam, Watergate, and prolonged econ
ic problems led to an inability or disi:
clination to define and implement an
fective strategic approach. While dor
tically debating the utility of military
power, we watched a vigorous Soviet
military modernization program take
shape without pursuing compensate
actions. By failing to compete effecti
ly, we allowed the military balance tc
shift toward the Soviets. In addition,
high oil prices, inflation, limited invei
ment, and even smaller gains in proo
tivity caused our economy to stagnat
As a result, U.S. ability to shape eve
decreased. In particular, as Soviet
military power increased, our ability
deter Soviet adventurism declined
dramatically.
Integrated Approach
President Reagan fully appreciates t<
historical perspective. He has a clear
sense of our objectives in foreign pol
a world hospitable to our society andj
ideals, a world where peaceful chang
the norm and nations can settle disp
without war. The President also has!
coherent strategic approach for atta: i
ing these objectives and restoring U. |
leadership. Let me map out the four |
basic elements of this integrated ap- I
proach as I see them.
First is U.S. -Soviet relations. W
recognize the inevitability, and in mH
instances the desirability, of change,
we insist that the Soviets avoid the 1 1
of military force, coercion, subversio
or support for terrorism. They must
restrain their international activities
within the bounds of peaceful action
the conventions of international law,
In order to enhance our security
demonstrate our resolve in pursuing
new course of U.S.-Soviet relations,
are embarking upon a major prograr
improve our military capabilities. Thi
Administration is determined to denj
the Soviets any opportunity to condu
foreign policy aimed at exploiting res
perceived American military weak-
nesses. In addition, we will seek,
through stricter export controls, to c
tail the sale of military or dual-use
technology to the Soviet Union.
16
Department of State Bulle
The Secretary
Second is our effort to revitalize
Ice relationships and to strengthen
feral relationships with friends who
It our strategic interests. We can on-
ncomplish this goal with a new spirit
kinsultation, a frank give-and-take
big close friends. We must pursue
kiinated foreign, defense, and
fcmic policies, as was our objective
te Ottawa summit. At the same
I we must show again that America
reliable partner, consistent in our
■oach to international problems and
[iced in our policies. Above all, the
ptrial democracies must achieve the
pry strength, confidence, and unity
■rpose necessary to deter or defend
J ist those who threaten our vital in-
to.
Third we intend to construct helpful
responsive relations with the less in-
itialized nations. We recognize that
I: are significant cultural and, in
V cases, political differences between
l; countries and the United States,
lever, we all share an interest in
J; and economic development. More-
I unlike the Soviets, the United
J;s has offered markets, as well as
iiological assistance and humani-
jn aid, without the demeaning en-
llement of a client-state relationship.
[ire to continue to do so, and to ex-
on these efforts, could weaken
ical stability in these regions, en-
•er our access to vital resources, and
the East- West political-military
ice against us.
n approaching the developing
i, we do not construct any false
>tomies between North-South and
-West issues, treating the former as
omic and the latter as military.
er, we recognize that progress in
•elations with the many nations of
•outh is dependent, in part, on our
ess in dealing with East- West
Irity problems. Moreover, peaceful
lomic development and political
!ge can only take place when people
isecure and free from threat. Our in-
|ated program of economic and
Irity assistance is directed toward
I end. To the extent that we succeed
-oviding security and stability in
■loping countries, we remove targets
pportunity from the Soviets and
!- surrogates.
Fourth and finally, the President
this entire Administration are corn-
ed to strengthening the domestic
lomy. All our other policy goals de-
i on success in this area. Without a
stable and growing economy, we can
sustain neither a robust defense policy
nor a strong foreign policy.
Policy Linkage
I would like to turn now to a more
specific discussion of how our military
and foreign policies interrelate. Earlier
this year, Cap Weinberger [Secretary of
Defense Caspar Weinberger] submitted
. . . in providing security and
stability in developing countries,
we remove targets of opportunity
from the Soviets and their sur-
rogates.
this Administration's first steps to rec-
tify the mistakes of the past in his ex-
tensive additions to the FY 1981 and
1982 defense budgets. Our defense im-
provements, as part of a balanced na-
tional security effort, emphasize both
nuclear and conventional forces.
Improvements in strategic nuclear
forces will enhance our ability to deter
attack or threats of attack on ourselves
or our allies. These measures will
remove the perception of U.S. vulner-
ability to nuclear blackmail. Theater
nuclear forces form the bridge between
America's global military posture and
regional defense commitments. Improve-
ments in this area will allow us to re-
assure allies that temporary convention-
al force imbalances in their regions will
not result in intimidation.
Our conventional military improve-
ments will further bolster friends and
allies in the knowledge that we are
reliable and consistent partners. They
will also provide the initial — and
crucial — deterrent to Soviet initiation of
hostilities which, once started, could
escalate to the nuclear level. In par-
ticular, improvements for U.S. naval
forces and strategic mobility will
reassure our security partners. They
demonstrate that we are willing and
able to aid them and that we can sustain
that aid against any challenge to our
lines of communication.
In NATO conventional and theater-
nuclear improvements are intended to
improve the military balance in that
region. Our efforts are directed at en-
couraging greater allied defense con-
tributions by example rather than com-
pulsion. We are encouraging the allies to
provide additional critical forces, and we
will continue to do so. At the same time
we should recognize that they already
make important contributions — in man-
power, for example — and that public
criticism is often counterproductive. Im-
proved European security will also
benefit us elsewhere in the world. Confi-
dent of their security at home, West
European nations may individually be
more willing to assist us in external ef-
forts in behalf of our common interests.
In Northeast Asia our conventional
force improvements are directed toward
similar goals. In particular, our naval
improvements will enhance our force
posture in the western Pacific where we
rely primarily upon sea-based deploy-
ments to maintain an effective forward
defense. In addition, we have decided to
maintain our current ground force levels
in Korea.
In Southwest Asia, the United
States is seeking a strategic consensus
among our friends directed toward the
common Soviet threat. We are attempt-
ing to convince them that we are a
reliable and capable security partner,
serious about defending our vital in-
terests in their region in partnership
with them. The U.S. naval presence in
the Indian Ocean, our efforts to improve
security relations with Pakistan, and the
generally expanded security assistance
budget requests for Southwest Asia are
examples of this.
There are, of course, other problems
in Southwest Asia. The United States is
seeking to bring an end to the current
tensions in Lebanon, to build upon the
breakthrough of Camp David, and, in
general, to ameliorate the impasse be-
tween Israel and the Arab states. We
recognize fully the need to pursue these
efforts in parallel with our strategy to
counter the Soviets.
Throughout the developing world we
seek through a combination of security
and development assistance to help in
the maintenance of a secure and stable
environment. A secure environment for
these nations also helps to remove the
incentive for nuclear proliferation.
In many cases creating a stable en-
vironment requires only economic assist-
ance. In some cases, where external ag-
gression and subversion are significant,
we will offer security assistance to
restore stability and provide an oppor-
tunity for peaceful change. Security
assistance, however, will often be paired
with economic aid. In El Salvador, for
example, our economic aid is over three
times the size of our military assistance.
Our broad approach to these problems is
itember 1981
17
The Secretary
...
best illustrated by our program for the
Caribbean basin in which we are asking
regional states to join us in a social-
economic program that deals with the
root causes of internal instability.
As the Department of State is
responsible for U.S. arms transfer and
security assistance policies, the linkage
of foreign and defense policies in this
area is particularly important to me.
Cap Weinberger and I regard U.S.
defense expenditures in combination
with arms transfers and security
assistance as an integrated strategic
program to strengthen U.S. and friendly
military capabilities and defend our in-
terests around the world. Arms
transfers and security assistance also
lend credibility to U.S. foreign policy ef-
forts to revitalize our alliances and other
strategic relationships. They also sup-
port secure and stable environments in
the developing world.
As in the other areas of the military
balance, it is worth noting that the
Soviet Union spent $16 billion in 1980
for arms to the developing world; the
United States transferred only $10
billion in equipment. Soviet arms
shipments to Cuba provide a dramatic il-
lustration of this global phenomenon.
Soviet military deliveries to Cuba have
increased sharply this year. They
reached near record levels during the
second quarter of 1981. The total for the
first 7 months of the year is more than
twice the volume in all of 1980; even
with moderate additions over the rest of
the year, this will lead to a 1981 total
higher than any yearly figure since
1962. While most of the tonnage is be-
lieved to be earmarked for Cuba's
regular Armed Forces and its newly
created territorial militia, there is solid
evidence that some of the goods are be-
ing reshipped to Central America.
As you know, the President recently
announced this Administration's conven-
tional arms transfer policy. Arms trans-
fers are a logical extension of our na-
tional defense effort. They allow friends
and allies to defend not only their own
but also common interests. It is essential
in important strategic areas that we
maximize indigenous capabilities to deter
local and regional violence while press-
ing ahead in parallel with our own ef-
forts to counter threats which clearly re-
quire U.S. involvement. A coherent,
forthcoming, measured response to local
and regional military equipment re-
quirements, coupled with steadfast
adherence to our treaty commitments,
will reassure our friends and allies that
they can rely on us.
One important element of our arms
transfer policy is the establishment of a
special defense acquisition fund. The
Administration is requesting authoriza-
tion of such a fund in the international
development and security cooperation
bill currently before the Congress. The
fund would procure long leadtime and
other important military equipment in
anticipation of foreign military sales. It
would enable us to respond rapidly to
equipment requests from allies and other
strategic friends without diversions from
the U.S. military. It would also aid in
expanding the defense industrial base
for mobilization contingencies. Our re-
cent efforts at putting together an
equipment package to offer for near-
term delivery to Pakistan in support of
our evolving bilateral security relation-
ship vividly demonstrated the need for
such a fund.
Because many important recipients
are unable to purchase major weapons
systems with their own resources or
otherwise to provide fully for their
defense, an expanded security assistance
budget is an essential part of the arms
transfer effort. Security assistance of-
fers political, financial, and military
backing to our strategic approach in the
same way the defense budget does. In a
number of cases, it is the most efficient
way to defend U.S. interests in a par-
ticular area; in some cases, it is the only
way.
The current state of affairs in the
Congress regarding security assistance
is alarming. If the foreign aid budget
does not pass, it will be the third year in
a row in which we will have operated
from a continuing resolution. This short-
sighted approach to security assistance
cripples our foreign policy and places
U.S. credibility on the line. I must state
in all candor that we are liable to serious
consequences if we do not remedy this
depressing situation in FY 1982.
Arms Control
Finally, I would like to touch on arms
control and its relationship with foreign
and defense policy. As you know, the
search for sound arms control agree-
ments is essential to our efforts to
achieve and maintain peace. Sound
agreements will require the careful in-
tegration of foreign and defense con-
cerns. In discussing this issue with the
Foreign Policy Association 2 weeks ago,
I set forth six principles that are the
core of President Reagan's approach.
• Arms control efforts will be an in-
strument of, not a replacement for, a
coherent national and allied security
policy.
• We will seek agreements thatfe
ly enhance security.
• We will pursue arms control bet
ing in mind the whole context of Sovie
relations.
• We will seek balanced agree-
ments.
• We will seek controls that inclu
effective means of verification and
mechanisms for securing compliance.
• We will pursue arms control by
considering the totality of the various
arms control processes and the various
weapons systems and not just those!
agreements and weapons systems beiit
specifically negotiated.
Let there be no misunderstanding:
We intend to maintain the arms conte
process and to conclude agreements!
from a position of secure and confiden1
military power. Arms control agree-
ments are not a substitute for military
capabilities. Only a strong and balance
military force will provide sufficient in
centive for the Soviets to negotiate '
meaningful agreements.
Only a strong and balanced
military force will provide suffi-
cient incentive for the Soviets to
negotiate meaningful agreements
Conclusion
I have attempted to outline a clear anc
coherent vision of our foreign policy
goals and a strong view on the need to
integrate foreign and defense policies!
a strategic approach to international
relations. Cap Weinberger and I are co
ordinating the efforts of our two depar
ments on a regular basis. We share an
understanding of the threats to our na-
tion and the importance of integrating
foreign and defense policies. The State
Department supports the expansion of
our defense capabilities as an essential
ingredient of a strategic approach. Stai
and Defense together support an ex-
panded security assistance budget. We
recognize the challenge posed by the
need to coordinate foreign, defense, ain
economic policies into a coherent whole
Your understanding and support will b>
crucial to our effort.
•Press release 258.1
18
Department of State Bulleti
ternational Trade
The Secretary
Secretary Haig's statement before the
ommittee on International Trade of
enate Finance Committee on
28, 198 1.1
ne thank you for this opportunity to
ss key elements of the Administra-
> approach to international trade
the part it plays in U.S. foreign
y. International economic develop-
s are of central concern to the
j Department and every Secretary
ate must devote a great deal of
and attention to them. I am, there-
particularly grateful for your in-
ion to testify on our international
omic policy before this committee,
resident Reagan has recognized
a strong American economy is the
srstone of our national security. The
igth we seek depends first and fore-
on the success of the President's
iDmic recovery program. A pros-
Jjs, well-functioning world trading
I'm will make an important contribu-
ito that success.
'.e Administration's approach to
I is shaped by the recognition that
i' is an increasingly powerful source
i lovation and growth for the Ameri-
I'conomy. We gain from access to
i/orld's markets and the spur of in-
itional competition. Our producers
:onsumers benefit from access to
gn goods and raw materials. Trade
ly reinforces the President's
!stic efforts to reduce inflation, to
ase production, and to expand
oyment. In addition trade can con-
te to mutually beneficial coopera-
imong nations. Healthy trade rela-
can strengthen friendships and
ices and can help integrate coun-
into the market-oriented trading
■m which has served us so well.
Trade Policy
current trade policy has its roots in
rical experience. Following World
II the major industrial nations
jmized that the bilateral ar-
ements and protectionist policies
led by many nations during the
-war period had done severe harm
eir economies, played havoc with
iternational economy, and con-
ted to the frictions and tensions
I ultimately led to the outbreak of
war. The United States and its partners,
therefore, set out to create a new
trading system based on fair trading
rules, on nondiscrimination among
trading partners, and on the commit-
ment to reduce trade barriers, especially
high tariffs.
That system is embodied in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). Despite its imperfections and
departures from certain of its principles,
this system has brought enormous
benefits to virtually every nation in the
world and served American interests
well. The dramatic growth in trade since
the war has strengthened our own
economy and that of our trading part-
ners. U.S. exports grew from $10.8
billion in 1950 to $221 billion in 1980.
This has meant millions of jobs for
American farmers, workers, shippers,
railroad workers, truckers, longshore-
men, insurers, and bankers— all of whom
have directly benefited. And, while we
often face difficult problems with some
of our developed-country trading part-
ners, we would be considerably worse off
if we had chosen a trading system based
on more restrictive principles and rules.
Such a system might well have brought
prolonged economic weakness to our
trading partners and, as a consequence,
poor markets for our exports, economic
instability in Europe, and reduced
Western resources for defense. In-
evitably, the United States would have
had to bear a much larger defense
burden.
Today, there are strains in the
system. Competition among developed
countries and with developing countries
is more intense than it was years ago.
And slower growth in many developed
nations increases the difficulty of ad-
justing to rapid increases in imports. In
the face of keener competition, many
countries face enormous pressures to
protect industries by restricting imports
or supporting noncompetitive exports.
They are tempted to work out bilateral
trade arrangements which protect cer-
tain patterns of trade or limit trade. In-
vestment practices are increasingly used
as a means of forcing increased procure-
ment or increased exports. Barriers ex-
ist in services, where the United States
is very competitve. Certain countries
that benefit greatly from the trading
system have failed to open their markets
adequately, even while they take advan-
tage of open markets in other countries.
Unless we resolve these problems
and distortions, they will severely
weaken the international trading
system. Efforts to strengthen our
domestic economy will be complicated,
the world economy will be disrupted,
and international cooperation among
both the developed and developing na-
tions will be threatened.
The Ottawa summit [July 19-21,
1981] provided a fresh impetus to ad-
dress the problems and distortions in in-
ternational trade. But this momentum
must be sustained by firm leadership,
not just by one or two nations but by the
industrial and developing nations
together.
The United States will play its part.
President Reagan has committed this
Administration to the support of an
open trading system on the basis of
agreed rules. At the same time, we have
asked for similar undertakings from
other countries. We were, therefore,
pleased that we and our partners at Ot-
tawa agreed to ". . . reaffirm our strong
commitment to maintaining liberal trade
policies and to the effective operation
of an open multilateral trading sys-
tem. ..." and to ". . . work together to
strengthen this system in the interest of
all trading countries. ..." The meeting
of the members of the GATT at
ministerial level during 1982 and the
study of the trade problems of the 1980s
by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD)
provide excellent opportunities to reduce
and remove key trade distortions. Close
consultation among ministers of the
United States, European Community,
and Japan can contribute significantly to
the success of both efforts, as they did
to the achievements of the Tokyo
Round. For the sake of our own
economy— which will benefit from gen-
uinely open world trade— and of the
world economy, we and our trading
partners must take advantage of these
opportunities.
Promoting U.S. Exports
Just as we will work toward maintaining
and improving the world trading system
to increase opportunities for U.S. ex-
ports and for mutually beneficial trade
among all nations, so we will want to
help our citizens to take advantage of
these opportunities. Fundamental to our
export prospects is a strong, competitive
American economy. Without this, the
best of intentions and the best of export
ember 1981
19
The Secretary
programs cannot fully succeed. As the
President's program brings down our
rate of inflation and stimulates our pro-
ductivity, it will permit our firms to im-
prove their international competitive-
ness.
Such efforts need effective govern-
ment support. The U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative, Bill Brock, has conveyed to
this committee the Administration's
strong attempts to reduce self-imposed
export disincentives and to improve U.S.
export promotion programs. I fully sup-
port the work of Ambassador Brock and
of Secretaries Baldrige and Block
[Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Bald-
rige, Secretary of Agriculture John R.
Block] to increase exports. In May I sent
a cable to our ambassadors abroad ask-
ing them personally to take the lead at
their posts and to deploy their entire
country teams— not just economic and
commercial officers— in this effort. And
as a major part of this program, I have
also emphasized to our ambassadors the
importance I attach to increasing U.S.
agricultural exports. I expect them to
play an enthusiastic role in supporting
such exports.
The State Department also supports
the very vigorous efforts being made by
the Department of Commerce and the
office of the U.S. Trade Representative
to insure that other countries live up to
the spirit and the letter of the Tokyo
Round agreements. Other countries ex-
pect us to do the same. And you can be
sure that our trade negotiators will
bargain hard to reduce impediments to
U.S. exports.
Trade with Developing Countries
Let me now address the specific issues
related to trade with the developing na-
tions. Trade between the United States
and the developing countries has grown
rapidly over the last decade. U.S. ex-
ports to these countries have grown
from $10.8 billion in 1970 to $82 billion
in 1980. The developing countries taken
together are now a larger export market
for U.S. goods than Japan and the Euro-
pean Community combined, accounting
for 37% of our exports. These countries
have also become formidable competi-
tors in our markets. Some have accepted
multilateral trading rules; others have
been reluctant to do so. Some have
benefited enormously from an open
trading system; others are so poor that
they have very little to export.
Over the next decade, access of
developing-country exports to developed-
country markets is crucial for the
growth that is fundamental to the eco-
nomic and political stability of the
developing world. For many of the
developing countries, export earnings,
combined with private investment, are
far more important than official aid
flows. And for the United States and
other developed countries, open and
flourishing markets in the developing
world will be increasingly important to
our own export performance and to the
domestic economy.
Developed and developing countries
will have to work more closely than ever
in the GATT to address the problems of
the trading system. We intend to main-
tain open markets for developing-
country products, and we expect devel-
oping nations that have demonstrated
international competitiveness to open
their markets to our products. Together
we need to insure access to our markets
for the products of the poorer nations,
to broaden developing-country participa-
tion in the GATT codes, and to address
the distortions— such as those imposed
by investment performance require-
ments—to international trade. An open
trading system, based on common
adherence to agreed rules, is an objec-
tive shared by developed and developing
countries. We must work, in the context
of the GATT, to attain it.
More specifically, we have devoted
considerable attention over recent
months to the Caribbean Basin. We see
a special need to work with countries of
the region to promote the well-being of
its people. We have begun careful and
and actions by the Caribbean countries
to stimulate their own growth and
development are all potential com-
ponents.
East-West Trade
The last area I would like to cover is I
East- West trade. Here the links betwe
trade policy and foreign policy are clea
We are not dealing with free market I
forces, and we face many issues in
which security and political principles
must override commercial concerns. Ch
central objectives in this area are two!
fold. First, our trade relations, and oui
broader economic relations, must rein-i
force our efforts to counter the Soviet
Union's military buildup and its irrespo
sible conduct in a number of areas of j
world. While clearly we have commerci
interests which must and will be taken
into account, security concerns must re
main paramount. Second, we must
strengthen cooperation among friends
and allies in this area. We cannot carrj
out an effective East- West economic I
policy unilaterally. We must take into
account the complex interrelationships
that exist among our allies and OECD
partners and among the individual com
tries of the Warsaw Pact.
Over the last several months we I
have carefully reviewed our policy on
East- West trade in the context of
overall East- West relations. We did so
because we wanted to be as precise an
as clear as possible at the Ottawa sum-
mit about our concerns and about our
proposals for addressing them. We did
so not because we wished to impose an
U.S. exports to [the developing countries] have grown from $10.8 billio
in 1970 to $82 billion in 1980.
thorough discussions with Canada, Mex-
ico, and Venezuela, along with other in-
terested countries, about the best ap-
proach to promote economic progress.
We have also begun intensive consulta-
tions with the Congress, from which we
welcome advice and suggestions.
Our overall aim is to create an ac-
tion program for regional development.
It is too early to define the final form of
the program. Much will depend on our
consultations with other countries and
the Congress. Trade liberalization,
domestic and foreign investment, aid,
particular solutions on the countries
represented there, but because we
wanted to initiate a serious discussion (
East- West trade relations at the highes
level.
I would like to touch briefly on two
major elements of our policy.
20
Department of State Bulletir
The Secretary
strategic Trade Controls. The
ed States and its allies have main-
id controls on the export of strate-
oods and technology to the Soviet
n and Eastern Europe since 1949.
objective has been to restrict the
of advanced hardware and
nology in order to preserve our
nological edge and to inhibit and
ent advances in Soviet military
bility.
3n the basis of our policy review, we
luded that a tightening of restric-
on goods and technology which
i upgrade Soviet production in areas
rant to Soviet military strength was
desirable and necessary. The Presi-
presented our general approach to
)ther leaders at Ottawa, not expect-
;heir immediate agreement but
sing the importance he attaches to
dng with them to achieve tighter
"ictions. We look forward to discuss-
)ur proposals, and the ideas of other
!OM [Coordinating Committee for
;-West Trade Policy] countries, in
ing weeks and months and, in par-
ar, at a high level COCOM meeting
fall.
We recognize the strong possibility
several countries will differ on
ils and degree. Some have more ex-
ive commercial links with the East
our own. Others believe that
iomic ties moderate political
ivior. But while we may not always
eye to eye on specifics, I am en-
raged by the recognition, embodied
; le Ottawa communique, that we
t ". . . ensure that, in the field of
t-West relations, our economic
hies continue to be compatible with
(political and security objectives."
that we will "... consult to improve
ipresent system of controls on trade
rategic goods and related tech-
gy with the USSR."
[i also believe that any tightening of
}rt controls must be accompanied by
eased efforts to police these controls
to improve the efficiency of our
lagement. The Soviet Union and
e of its Warsaw Pact partners are
aged in a major effort to obtain em-
joed equipment and technology. We
our allies must improve our coopera-
enforcement efforts. We have begun
ussions with other COCOM countries
ard this end.
We must also make decisions more
:kly on requests by other countries to
items currently on the COCOM list,
ally, we should seek, where possible,
to relax restrictions on items at the very
low end of the technology scale, the con-
trol of which penalizes our exporters
rather than the Soviets.
Foreign Policy Controls. A second
key area for enhanced cooperation is
contingency planning — the need for the
industrialized democracies to react clear-
ly to Soviet adventurism and the use of
because of our great concern over the
Soviet Union. Over the last several
years, there has been an awakening to
the common dangers we face and a
stronger dedication to deal with these
dangers in a more integrated and effec-
tive way. Our objective is not to impose
our views on our friends and allies but
to make our case firmly and clearly on
The United States and its allies have maintained controls on the export
of strategic goods and technology to the Soviet Union since 1949 . . . to
restrict the flow of advanced hardware and technology ....
force. The economic measures taken
after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
indicate that controls are more effective
when implemented collectively and when
the burden is not borne dispropor-
tionately by specific sectors or only a
small group of countries. Coordination
should take place in advance of a crisis.
Much work has been done bilaterally and
in NATO to anticipate and plan common
approaches for contingencies. Discus-
sions in Ottawa underlined a common in-
terest in systematic and sustained ex-
changes on this subject.
These are two of the most important
areas of East- West trade relations. We
and our OECD partners have strong
views on East-West trade relations
the basis of common interests with the
aim of reaching agreement on a common
approach.
Conclusion
To conclude, please accept my thanks
for the opportunity to participate in
your hearings. I have come here today
because of my conviction that our trade
policy — which you and your colleagues
are so instrumental in shaping — has a
major bearing on the health of our
economy and on our country's place in
the world.
An active and effective U.S. trade
policy can strengthen our domestic
economy and improve our political ties
with developed and developing countries
alike. An effective trade policy toward
the Soviet bloc countries can permit
commercial exchanges in certain sectors
while insuring that we and our major
trading partners limit such exchanges
where required by our security interests.
The Department of State and our
ambassadors and officials abroad stand
ready to play an active role in support of
U.S. trade interests and to work closely
with Ambassador Brock and Secretaries
Baldrige and Block to support their
efforts. We will also pursue close and
cooperative working relations with you
in the Congress.
1 Press release 256 of July 29, 1981.
Dtember 1981
21
The Secretary
Secretary Haig Interviewed
on "Issues and Answers"
Secretary Haig was interviewed on
ABC's "Issues and Answers" by Frank
Reynolds, ABC News, in Washington,
D.C., July 19, 1981.1
Q. I know the Ottawa summit
[July 19-21] is, of course, very impor-
tant, and we'll discuss it later in this
broadcast. But the situation in the
Middle East seems to be at a par-
ticularly critical stage now. There are
reports that perhaps more than 300
persons lost their lives in the Israeli
raid on Beirut and other targets in
Lebanon last Friday. There has been
more rocket fire in the Israeli towns,
even this morning. Ambassador Habib
[Philip C. Habib, President's special
emissary to the Middle East] has met
with Prime Minister Begin today. Do
you have any reason to believe that
this cycle of attack and counterattack
can be stopped? Have you had a report
from Mr. Habib?
A. The President and I have been
following this situation minute by
minute, since the escalation started 3 or
4 days ago, when the level of violence in-
creased so dramatically. Mr. Habib was
in a meeting this morning, Israeli time,
with Prime Minister Begin. He'll return,
Israeli time, this afternoon, to meet with
the Prime Minister.
We've been very active in the United
Nations with our European partners
and, of course, with friendly govern-
ments in the Middle East to try to pro-
vide some tamping down of the situa-
tion, hopefully to achieve a cease-fire.
We're not altogether discouraged that
that might be possible. But the period
ahead, of course, is a very tense and im-
portant one.
Q. The United States has a deci-
sion; perhaps it's already made it. Are
you going to ship the F-16s to Israel
Tuesday as scheduled?
A. I know there's been a lot of
static on the airways on this subject, but
the President has not made his decision
with respect to that shipment, and I
think in the context of that shipment,
the important aspect of the problem is
to get a moderation of the current level
of tensions and a reduction of the
violence. And that particular issue is not
specifically related but rather to the
Israeli raid on the Iraqi reactor. It
would be specious to suggest that in this
climate, however, it does not have an
effect on it. And I think we must ad-
dress this issue from a standpoint of
whether or not it contributes to more
moderate policies on the part of the two
protagonists in this particular situation.
That would be our hope.
Q. So you are waiting then for
what? Some assurance from one of the
parties, Mr. Begin?
A. No, I don't want to suggest that
we are waiting for anything. We have
no deadline on this, other than the
scheduled shipment date sometime Tues-
day, and I would judge that we will have
completed our review, which is largely
complete; and we've conducted consulta-
tions with both the Foreign Relations
and Foreign Affairs Committees of the
Senate and the House; and that the
President will be prepared to make his
decision very, very shortly.
Q. And the Israeli raid on Friday,
does that have a bearing on this deci-
sion? I know it's related specifically to
the raid on the Iraq reactor.
A. No, we've been very careful not
to link these two issues. And I think it's
important that we not. That does not
suggest for a moment that they are not
broadly interrelated in the context of
events in the Middle East, and
America's policy to seek to return to
moderation, status quo ante, if you will,
in the particular Lebanon crisis and to
get on with the longer term objectives of
establishing a lasting peace in the
region.
Q. Weren't you all set to an-
nounce though on Friday that the
F-16s would be shipped?
A. We had target dates which sug-
gested Friday, with further clarification,
of shipment schedules and the recogni-
tion that there would have to be move-
ment from factory to jump-off points.
We had additional time, and I think the
President wanted to use that time, and
quite correctly.
Q. But the Israeli raid on Friday
is what caused him to utilize addi-
tional time.
A. I don't even want to suggest
that. As I said, we've maintained that
these issues are not directly linked. It
serves no useful purpose to link them at
this juncture, and we've avoided that
very, very carefully. The point to be
made is that the decision— which there's
speculation about, due to some inside
speculation, I must add, because the
press reports only what it gets — was
somewhat premature.
Q. It's only a week ago that the
Counselor of the State Department,
Mr. [Robert C] McFarlane, reached
what was described as an understan
ing with Mr. Begin, about the use o
American military equipment. Was 1
raid on Beirut on Friday consistent
with that understanding? Or did it <
ceed the bounds —
A. That's a judgment that's yet tfl
be made, and clearly I don't think the
United States ever visualized that the
in providing equipment to Israel it did
not have the right to employ that equ;
ment in legitimate self-defense. I
recognize there are many controversy
points of view, differing points of viev
held by honest people, with respect to
whether a particular issue was legiti-
mate self-defense or whether it exceei
that criteria.
We didn't make that judgment in
context of the Iraqi raid; rather, we f<
that— and we so stated our condemna
tion of the act both unilaterally and in I
joining a United Nations resolution wH
respect to that. We also, as you know
suspended the shipment of the four
F-16s that were scheduled to leave
several weeks ago.
The problem is, with respect to tM
Iraqi raid, that we felt the available
diplomatic steps that might have
preceeded whatever other decision wi
respect to use of force was made wen
not followed. Clearly, that's not the vi
of the Israeli Government, and we
understand that. But they also under-
stand that we have a commonality of
terests in achieving stability in the Mi
die East and in providing for the cont
uing existence and viability of the Sta
of Israel. But also we want them to c(
sider our interests in these matters as
well as their own, and I think there's
been a clearing of the air with respect
that issue.
Q. What was the understanding
that Mr. McFarlane reached with Mi
Begin?
A. I wouldn't call it any under-
standing. I think we expressed our coi
cerns, they expressed their point of
view. We did not see unacceptable
incompatibilities between the two. Anc
based on that understanding and the
feeling that our fundamental purposes
all that has passed is to employ those
events to add to promise for peace anc
tranquility in the period ahead, and th;
must dominate American policy on this
this very volatile area.
Q. A good many people, I think,
22
Department of State Bulleti
J I':
The Secretary
beginning to wonder whether the
ted States has any influence over
id, and certainly it has very little
lence over the Palestine Liberation
anization (PLO), which is respon-
e for the rocket bombing of Kiryat
lona and the other towns in north-
Israel. I wonder if you believe
; — let's put it bluntly, because of
estic political considerations in
country, Prime Minister Begin
eves there is not much the United
es can do or will do to temper his
ons.
A. No, I wouldn't share that judg-
^t at all, and I think it's very impor-
that those in the executive and leg-
ive branches responsible for Ameri-
policy in the Middle East not be de-
ed or influenced by domestic political
iderations. And I know that that's
the President's approach to these
ng problems, but rather to focus,
larily if not exclusively, on measures
policies designed to bring about an
nate peaceful solution to a historic
jlem.
After all, this is not a new set of
jlems for the United States. I've had
e 20 years in government at a fairly
1 level in periodic cycles, and the
die East situation has wrenched
erican leadership. And I think it, un-
unately, will continue for the period
id.
Q. But hasn't it entered a new
se now? I mean there is a new
leli policy of striking at military
jets even though they are located
leavily populated, civilian popu-
d areas. Doesn't this introduce a
i element, disturbing element?
A. Any escalation of violence,
jcially violence which might include
lage or injury or death to noncom-
mts, is a matter of increasing con-
l to all of us.
Q. What would be the reaction in
n; country and in the Government of
I United States if Tel Aviv had been
libed and 300 people had been
led?
. A. I suspect it would be one of
jck and dismay; just as we expressed
Inay on Friday as we learned of the
iensive level of noncombatant casual-
I; in the Beirut area.
, Q. The Arabs, the PLO are
■ding the United States directly re-
i|knsible for the Israeli raid. They are
»ing that Mr. Begin could not have
rfered this raid without the active
illusion of the United States.
\\ A. You have to be very careful
len you read the rhetoric of any of the
parties involved in this tragic situation
and not necessarily be overly impressed
by one news report or one public state-
ment or another; rather to recognize the
anguish associated with this terrible
problem, and that anguish hits both
sides. I think we Americans have got to
be, as always, a responsible, moderating
influence. And that's the policy that
President Reagan is attempting to pur-
sue in this current crisis.
Q. Do you think we can be per-
ceived as a responsible moderating
influence in light of Friday's raid if we
go ahead with the shipment of the
F-16s? I mean, perceived in the Arab
world.
A. It isn't a question of perceptions.
It's a question of what policy pursued by
the United States will contribute first
and foremost to the outcome we seek.
You know, it's unprecedented that the
United States engage in the kind of con-
demnation we did on the Iraqi raid; not
only unilaterally but at the United Na-
tions as well.
But it isn't as though we haven't
made our view very, very clear in that
regard. On the other hand, I think it's
awfully important that we not succumb
to the emotions or tensions of the mo-
ment, from whatever side, and keep a
steady eye on the overall objective we
seek to achieve. And that's sometimes
difficult in a highly charged climate of
the kind we're in today.
Q. It's particularly difficult now.
You have President Sadat coming
here; Prime Minister Begin later on.
Do you think that now there is any
realistic chance for progress on the
Palestinian autonomy talks?
A. Why, of course. And you know,
people forget several weeks ago we
were on the verge — we were perhaps
hours away from a major conflict in
Lebanon. It was President Reagan's
decision to send Mr. Habib there, and
he's been conducting his own mini-
shuttle, I would call it, except this is a
three-sided one because he's come back
to Washington repeatedly.
We're still hopeful that this process
can continue and the superimposition, if
you will, of this current crisis on Phil's
platter, and the President's decision to
engage him in this crisis, is, I think,
both a wise one and a hopeful one.
Q. I'll do now what I know you
want to do in terms of Ottawa. You
have said it is important not to expect
momentous conclusions from the sum-
mit in Ottawa. Four of them are get-
ting together for the first time, in this
summitry business. Can this be more
than a get-acquainted session? That
can be valuable, too, can't it?
A. I think the very fact of the
meeting, with four first-time meetings,
and five of the leaders having not par-
ticipated in the past, on its own merits,
such an exchange focusing primarily on
economic conditions, which we are joint-
ly experiencing the consequences of to-
day, but also to provide a venue for
some political exchanges, is both timely
and invaluable.
Q. And you expect to go to Ot-
tawa and be able to disagree
agreeably, is that right?
A. I think we have to be very care-
ful not to focus exclusively on differ-
ences, which are inevitable in relation-
ships between major industrial powers
of the kind to be assembled here. There
is nothing new about that. It is an
historic reality. I think the important
point about this upcoming summit is
convergence of objectives and outcomes
sought by all of the leaders in which we
refer to as the macroeconomic objec-
tives. And what am I speaking about? I
am talking about a return to more prom-
ising economic growth levels in all of our
societies. We are talking about achieving
a reduction in the runaway levels of
inflation that we have all be plagued by.
We are talking about increasing levels of
unemployment.
It's when you get to the micro
aspects of these problems, how you
achieve these ends, there are natural
and to-be-anticipated differences. After-
all, we are a capitalist market economy,
free enterprise system, here in the
United States. We participate in a world
where Socialist regimes are also in
power. It would be natural that each
would visualize for itself different routes
to achieving common macroeconomic ob-
jectives.
And we have to understand here in
the United States that sometimes our
policies are perceived, at least, to com-
plicate the objectives of our European
partners, as with Japan as well. We
have to be sensitive to that. It doesn't
mean we have to change our policies,
and I don't think we intend to. But I do
think they must know that we are sen-
sitive to their needs, just as they must
be aware of our own particular needs
here in the United States. And I think
this is an important outcome to be
achieved at Montebello.
Q. So the air will be cleared? I
mean, they will complain. You will ex-
plain your policies, the President's
economic policies. They will say that
these policies are having an adverse
impact on their own economies. And
that will be that?
A. No. It's not that simple. In the
first place, I don't expect complaint, the
atember 1981
23
The Secretary
way you have characterized it. I think
that expressions of concern are in-
evitable and desirable. Then I think it is
also inevitable and desirable that respon-
sible leaders will exchange views on why
we hold certain principles important.
And that in itself is an across-the-
Atlantic and across-the-Pacific educa-
tional process.
Q. In your briefing the other day,
you said you expect a probing discus-
sion on trade with the Soviets, to
bring trade with the Soviets into line
with political and security considera-
tions. The Europeans want more, not
less, trade with the Soviets. Are we
going, really, to push for a more re-
strictive policy on trade, particularly
on the exchange of high technology
items?
A. In the first place, I would not
join the assessment that the Europeans
seek more trade with the Soviet Union
than we do. I think the issue is that both
of us, for example, would favor im-
proved trade relationships with Eastern
Europe and the nations of Eastern
Europe. I think both of us are always
concerned about the degree to which
trade with the Soviet Union contributes
to the Soviet's ability to pursue the
kinds of policies that it has been pursu-
ing in the last 6 years, increasing use of
armed force to effect historic change.
And I think we, jointly, are con-
cerned about this issue. I think what we
would like to do at the summit is to
enlarge these concerns by focusing on
specific measures that we might take in
COCOM [Coordinating Committee for
East- West Trade Policy] or in other
broad East- West trade issues to be sure
that we are not, in the classic sense,
providing the Marxist system the rope
through which to hang the Western
world.
And I don't see very broad differ-
ences between the two sides on this. I
do think that, in specific policies that
each are pursuing, that these kinds of
exchanges help to bring those policies in
line.
Q. If you do succeed in clarifying,
let's say, the U.S. view about giving
the Marxist system the rope with
which to hang the West, isn't it likely
that somebody is going to raise the
question of the grain embargo which
the U.S. Government relaxed? To be
candid? I mean, the Soviets are still in
Afghanistan, as far as we know.
A. That is correct. And there's been
a great deal of pressure applied, not on-
ly by the United States on that subject,
but by our Western European partners,
24
as well, particularly the European
Economic Community initiative that
Great Britain has launched with respect
to the future of Afghanistan. The recent
visit of the Foreign Minister of Great
Britain, Mr. Carrington, to Moscow, and
the essentially less-than-forthcoming
response to the Soviets is a matter of
concern to resolve. And it will be
discussed, I am sure, at Ottawa.
Now, there's no question but the
grain embargo represented, in the Euro-
pean eyes, somewhat of a contradiction.
However, I think it's been very clear
from the outset that this President,
President Reagan, has never felt that
that kind of a sanction imposed on one
segment of the American complex, eco-
nomic complex, was a sound way in
which to proceed; and I share in that
view.
Q. You said this week that arms
control is no longer the centerpiece of
U.S. -Soviet relations. What is the
centerpiece?
A. I think the centerpiece of, not
only U.S. -Soviet relations but American
policy at large, is the preservation of
peace and stability in a global sense.
And to, in that way, insist that historic
change occur through accepted rules of
international law and the mores of
Western society, not by resort to blood-
shed and terrorism and so-called wars of
liberation.
Now, in that context, arms control
plays an important role, but it must not
be the centerpiece. The centerpiece must
be what contributes to the security of
the American people, to international
peace and stability. That always is the
criteria against which any arms control
initiative must be carefully measured.
Q. This week, as you know, the
Soviets indicated their willingness to
step up their strategic capability, in
direct response to the rhetoric or to
the determination on the part of
Washington to increase our strategic
capability. This sounds, to a great
many people, I suspect, like an arms
race.
A. It clearly can sound that way.
But the simple facts are that for a
number of years now the United States
has been exercising unilateral restraint.
Since 1970 we have reduced arms spend-
ing, roughly about 20% in real terms.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand,
has unilaterally increased its spending
levels at the rate of a 4-5% increase, in
real terms, each year, every year, for
the past 12. Now, I don't think we can
afford to be deflected on our determina-
tion to build up America's strength as is
necessary by expressions of Soviet prop-
aganda.
Q. What is your view of what is j
taking place right now in Poland?
Isn't this a tremendous event, really? «
People are voting in secret ballots tw
elect leadership in a Communist
country.
A. I think one could describe the
events as — in Poland— historically, as J
one of the most significant events of th
century. It certainly is among them, i
Now, it's an evolutionary process. The
recent elections which have just been '
concluded and which changed over 9011
of the leadership, the party leadership,
in Poland, is, in itself, a rather dramati
event. I think it is somewhat too early
make a value judgment with respect to
what the consequences of this change
would be. But the change itself is un- ]
precedented. And from that, I think m
can all derive some sense of satisfactioi
The situation has been determined by
the Polish people without excessive ex-
ternal intervention. There clearly has !
been some, both by blackmail and threa
and internal manipulation. But I think
the essence of the process is one from
which we must draw some encourage-
ment.
Q. Do you agree with the Presi-
dent who believes that recent events
in Poland are the first cracks in the
Soviet domination of Eastern Europe
the beginning of the end?
A. I think what the President was.'
trying to suggest is that we are seeing
number of signs, and perhaps the Polis
situation is the most significant, but
these signs have been on the airways f(
years. I watched certain East Europeai
powers stand up several years ago and
reject the pleas of the Soviet Union to i
increase defense spending. We saw
repeated situations in Eastern Europe
which would suggest a growing
restiveness, not just in Poland. All of I
these things, I think, are both natural
historically and inevitable. The main
problem facing the world is whether or
not the Soviet leadership can recognize
the inevitability of these changes and ai
just their own policies accordingly.
Q. I'd like to ask you if you have
any more information about the killin
of the nuns in El Salvador? The peopl
are under arrest, but do you have any
better idea of who ordered the killing
A. No. And there's been a lot of
speculation in that regard, and it serves
no useful purpose for me to contribute
further to it. I think we can draw some
encouragement from the fact that
suspects have been detained by the
Government of El Salvador and the in-
vestigations continue.
'Press release 240 of July 20, 1981.B
Department of State Bulletin
.i ii ,1
The Secretary
Secretary Haig Interviewed
f»r The Wall Street Journal
[The following interview with
•etary Haig appeared in The Wall
*t Journal on July 9, 1981.
Vhere do you see U.S. -Soviet rela-
s in, say, 5 years?
A. I think it's a difficult picture to
v with clarity at this juncture. So
:h depends on the reaction of the
iet leadership. It remains our view
most of the irritants — not all but
t — that have emerged over the last
ars between Moscow and
shington have been the result of
cies initiated in Moscow. It is our
e that by being somewhat more
nitive and clear with respect to the
cceptability of some of these policies,
tter understanding will develop be-
ien the two sides.
! Historically one of the great prob-
is with democratic societies in the
iduct of international affairs is that
Lr day-to-day performance sometimes
serates confusion within more
liplined or dictatorial or authoritarian
s mes. Frequently that confusion
iilts in miscalculation.
Q. But what is it you're trying to
te them understand?
A. We feel, and I think history will
Igest, that if you analyze Soviet ac-
i;y over the past 5 years, there's been
: ncreasing proclivity to support
mge — either directly or indirect-
•by rule of force, by bloodshed, ter-
Ism, so-called wars of liberation. At
r last the American people have
•ided that this is no longer acceptable
liet activity.
, I think it's in our mutual interests to
|e a clear understanding. We've at-
pted to do that, not only through
toric but through a host of resultant
cies; not in a rigid, inflexible way,
ause these things are never black and
te; there must be a nuance, there
st be a combination of incentives and
ncentives — carrots and sticks, if you
Q. What are the carrots?
A. Some of those are yet to be
•ified in the sense of what is the early
iod of an emerging dialogue.
Q. At what point would a Reagan-
;znnev meeting be warranted?
A. The President's view on sum-
ry is that summitry for its own sake
can be self-deluding and can result in
euphoric expectations which quite often
historically have not been realized. He
believes that summitry must be preced-
ed by the most careful preparation on
every one of the issues which are likely
to arise and that there is some indication
that summitry would result in progress.
This does not suggest that summitry
must be abandoned in any situation in
which that preparation and that an-
ticipated outcome is not there, but it
means, in general, that that would be
the President's approach, and I expect
he'll live by that. My upcoming talks
with [Soviet Foreign Minister] Gromyko
are rather important in that sense, to
see whether or not there are prospects
that offer some promise of higher level
talks.
Q. You've said, as has the Presi-
dent, that the Communist system faces
a lot of difficulties over the next 10
years, but at this moment they are
militarily very powerful. Is it wise to
push the Russians so hard?
A. I don't believe we are pushing
too hard. It's been our belief that there
was a need for a greater clarity with
respect to the unacceptable aspects of
Soviet policy. The conduct of interna-
tional affairs is essentially dialectic, and
you have a sine curve of attitudes. We
felt that there had to be some clearing
of the air.
Q. Isn't there a fundamental con-
tradiction, though, between the view
that the Soviet system is fading and
the view that their behavior can be
ameliorated over a period of time?
A. No. From an historic point of
view, there are a number of indicators
which suggest some fundamental
systemic failures — failures with respect
to levels of production in the Soviet
Union, failures in the agricultural sector,
worrisome signs in the future with
respect to raw materials, energy,
demographic problems. All of these
things are clearly signs on the horizon
today, which in historic terms — not in
contemporary terms — will have an im-
pact on the future evolution of the
Marxist-Leninist system in the Soviet
model.
What we would hope is the Soviet
leadership would read these signposts
and redirect their priorities. We hope
they move from an excessive reliance on
expenditures for military purposes to
those which are designed to solve the in-
ternal contradictions— which are becom-
ing increasingly evident — to meet the
needs of the Russian people and the non-
Russian populations in the Soviet Union.
This would increasingly make the
resulting policies of the Soviet Union
more compatible with the world view I
talked about: restraint, reciprocity, ac-
ceptance of historic change by rule of
law and not by force of arms. These are
not contradictions.
Q. There seems to be some drift in
relations with our allies. How do you
explain the growing opposition in
Western Europe to modernization of
the theater nuclear forces there?
A. First let me tell you that there is
a great tendency in day-to-day affairs to
focus on differences. I am more en-
couraged by the consensus that has been
forged and which remains firm today to
proceed with theater nuclear moderniza-
tion and arms control under the two-
track decision of December 1979 and
reaffirmed in Rome this past spring.
Having said that, it is clear also that
there are a number of very legitimate
and strongly held concerns on the part
of Europeans that Europe not become
an exclusive nuclear battlefield in which
the superpowers themselves might be
sanctuaries. That is not a new set of
concerns in Europe; it's classic. That's
been joined by a very heavily or-
chestrated Eastern offensive which has
seized the issue to suggest that there is
a compulsive desire on our part to
return to the cold war. That sometimes
falls on hospitable ears in Europe.
Q. What kind of progress would
you like to see on actual deployment
of modernized theater nuclear forces
before we enter into serious discus-
sions with the Soviets?
A. I think we are proceeding. We
have a consensus, sites are being
selected in Europe, the production is
under way, and I think that's all that's
necessary. That must continue on the
time schedule that has been understood
and agreed upon.
Q. Realistically though, isn't there
some doubt that Belgium or the
Netherlands will actually go along
with deployment?
A. We have residual questions in
both of those countries, but we also have
a firm consensus in the necessary coun-
tries. We feel that the others should
join, too, ultimately. We have the West
German and the Italian and the British
consensus.
ptember 1981
25
The Secretary
Q. Some of the West Europeans
have objected strongly to Administra-
tion and Federal Reserve economic
policies, particularly on interest rates.
France's foreign minister has asked
how the United States can go it alone
on the economic front while demand-
ing more political and military
cooperation. What's your answer to
that?
A. It was the Europeans who were
most critical of the policies over the last
4 years here in the United States
because of lack of discipline. Now the
President has adopted a series of inter-
related policies which are tightly bal-
anced and designed to get inflation
under control. These will have the prac-
tical consequence, if they succeed, of
driving down the interest rates which
concern our European partners. While
the Europeans can be expected to com-
plain bitterly, they must also recognize
that we are working on solutions which
are long-term and permanent and of
which they will be the beneficiaries when
they succeed.
Q. President Sadat is scheduled to
come here with the declared purpose
of putting the Palenstinian issue back
at the top of the Middle East agenda.
Is it in our interests to have the
Palestinian issue front and center?
A. I think it's in our interest to have
a renewed sense of momentum in the
peace process in the broadest sense of
that term.
Q. Is it your intention to name
another negotiator to carry on these
talks?
A. It's too early to say. We did not
feel it would serve any useful purpose,
given the current status of the peace
process itself. I am somewhat leery of
such a high-level American official being
appointed unless we know that that in-
dividual would be a catalyst toward
progress.
Q. What I hear you saying is that
you don't want to highlight Palestin-
ian autonomy talks until you have
some sense that you're going to make
some progress there.
A. I think one of the worst things
we do day-to-day in the conduct of our
affairs is to raise expectations. It usually
is a self-defeating process.
Q. After Israel bombed the Iraqi
reactor, this Administration suspend-
ed the shipment of four F-16s, and I
gather the policy now is to go ahead
and send the six that are scheduled
for delivery in the middle of July. So
what have you accomplished by—
A. No, that's not the policy. The
policy is to recognize that we have made
a suspension and to conduct a review of
the circumstances that led to that deci-
sion and to complete that review as
quickly as possible. Hopefully we will do
so before the next delivery date.
Q. If you don't, the other six
planes don't go?
A. The decision itself was on the
shipment of the four, and that's all that
is relevant at the moment.
Q. What do you think would be the
effect on U.S. -Saudi relations if the
AWACS [airborne warning and con-
trol system aircraft] sale doesn't go
through?
A. It would have serious impact; not
just on our bilateral relationship with
the Saudi Government but also with
respect to our objectives in the region.
Q. North-South issues seem to be a
high priority with some of our allies.
A. They're a high priority with us.
Q. There's been a lot of opposition
in Congress to foreign aid. What is
your philosophy of —
A. It's very understandable that
there would be opposition to foreign aid
of any kind, and especially multilateral
foreign aid. But I think it's important
for us to recognize that we are dealing
with a subject which is profoundly
related to the national security of the
United States. It is sometimes far more
efficient and far more beneficial through
aid and security assistance to develop
the capabilities of nations which share
our values than to spend some billions
for a nice-to-have and important
unilateral military asset.
Q. There are those who are
pushing to eliminate U.S. contribu-
tions to such multilateral institutions
as the World Bank—
A. Just plain decapitate this activi-
ty. I would hope they would step back
and look at the positive aspects of
multilateral institutions and work with
us to correct the unacceptable aspects of
funding allocations. We have com-
mitments and obligations. If we were to
renege on them, it would have a pro-
found impact on American credibility.
Having said those things, I under-
stand and am sympathetic with the need
to funnel greater proportions of our for-
eign assistance into bilateral channels.
Q. It is often said that Presiden
Reagan is not fully focused, yet
anyway, on foreign policy issues am
is spending most of his time on
domestic programs.
A. I think it is a distortion. I thin
he came into office disinclined to suc-
cumb to the syndrome that many of h
predecessors followed; that is, that
foreign affairs is the exciting part of 1 1
presidency. He came in with the clear
recognition that the United States coi |
not reinvigorate its leadership world-
wide and be effective internationally i
he presided over an economic shamble
here at home.
I'm very sympathetic to that becav
I thought the interrelationship of our
economic failures here at home with t
problems we had in Europe during rm
time as a NATO commander were pre
found. What the President has conclui
ed is that he's got to deal with them
because they are the foundation on
which all of the others can be successi
ly pursued.
In the meantime, he's already in-
itiated in every area of foreign policy .
whole host of departures from past
policy. I have met with 42 foreign
ministers, more than half that number
of heads of state or government, and
they understand we have a foreign
policy, and they welcome it. There is i
question in their minds about it.
Q. What previous Secretary of
State do you admire most?
A. I suppose being a man who cai
through the military, I haven't given ii
great deal of thought. I tend to focus •
military leadership. I suppose also hav
ing experienced the job for a brief
period, I have nothing but the utmost
respect for all of my predecessors.
I have been a great admirer, becai
I had a chance to watch him in the for
mative period, of Dean Rusk, an unusi
public servant. In historic terms, of
course, I guess I admire Dulles too
because he had a conceptual view. But
you can go back in the earlier period o
history and find that there were certai
Secretaries of State who made the dec
sions courageously that built our natioi
into what it is, decisions that were ver
very controversial at the time. I think
it's a controversial job. Few emerge
without a few layers of scar tissue.
Q. Do you have a few scars to
show already?
A. I have more than I thought my
carcass could tote around. ■
26
Department of State Bulleti
The Secretary
terviews on the "Today" Show
at the table with the Soviet Union on
that question, before the end of the
Secretary Haig was interviewed on
JBC "Today" Show by Tom Brokaw
uly 14, 1981, in Neiv York and on
ist 5 in Washington, D.C.
Y 14, 19811
he Soviet Union and their client
, Vietnam, which have a major
in Kampuchea, are boycotting this
erence [the U.N. conference on
puchea]. You have said in the past
our future relations with the
et Union will depend, in part, on
• behavior in places like Kam-
ea. This is not a very encouraging
al from them, is it?
A. Not necessarily. I don't think
>ne expected them to rush with
mess to a conference which is
=sented by over 70 nations, all con-
ling the actions of Hanoi and Kam-
ea and the sponsorship of those ac-
by the Soviet Union. It's unfor-
te that neither side chose to par-
ate and to join in our efforts to
;ve a political settlement.
Q. But the end result will not be
i positive at all if the Soviet Union
iVietnam which, in fact, control
i puchea now do not respond to
lit you decide to do here.
J A. That remains to be seen. Clearly,
Irould have preferred that they par-
late, but the very fact of the con-
lice — a large group of nations that
ie to participate— is a firm indication
lie growing resistance worldwide to
■et interventionism.
ib. There is a report in the Daily
is that later today, in New York,
jwill tell a New York audience that
jUnited States, that the Reagan
Junistration is, in fact, interested
irms control negotiations and that
■ocess can begin before the end of
1 year. Is that an accurate report?
I A. There is nothing newsworthy
It that. I think President Reagan has
Ie it very clear that he is an advocate
Lrms control, and especially reduc-
fe— actual reductions— in the levels
Irategic nuclear weapons.
- The reference to the initiation of
Is control talks before the end of the
§• goes back to the already announced
Ision of the North Atlantic Council in
((ie this past spring, which was itself
a reaffirmation of a decision made in
1979 to get on with the dual tracks for
theater nuclear modernization on the
one hand and discussions for reductions
of theater nuclear weapons on the other.
Q. I think that there may be some
confusion on the part of the American
people about just what is going on.
Can we go ahead and have discussions
with the Soviet Union about the
reduction of missiles in Western
Europe and in the Soviet Union until
we have totally unified NATO alliance
on the role of our own middle-range
nuclear weapons in that part of the
world?
A. First, let me suggest that there
has been for 35 years a rather unified
position by the NATO alliance on the
role of the nuclear weapon in the
defense of NATO Europe. The problem
today is to be sure that all the details
associated with that strategic consensus,
if you will, are understood by both Euro-
peans and ourselves before we enter into
these discussions. That process is under-
way and should be completed well before
the end of the year.
Q. But I know that there is con-
cern within the State Department and
within the Reagan Administration on
the part of the resistance of the
Netherlands, for example, to the
placement of those kinds of weapons;
the growing pacifistic movement
within Western Germany, for example,
some criticism, some ambivalence
about the role of those missiles. Won't
that have an effect on our attitude
toward starting talks with the Soviet
Union?
A. Not necessarily. We have today
the essential concensus for deployment
of new systems on the Western side— in
Italy, West Germany, and in Britain. We
would like very much to have both the
Netherlands and Belgium join in that
consensus, and I'm optimistic that, over
time, they will do so. In the meantime,
we have what is necessary to get on
with both the modernization and the
discussions with the Soviets.
Q. Can you expect that in October,
November, or December of the next
year that there will be a sitting down
year:
A. Yes. I anticipate that will hap-
pen. I am scheduled to discuss it here in
New York at the United Nations in
September with Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko, and I would anticipate formal
discussions beginning shortly thereafter.
Q. What about the larger question
of SALT talks? Will that begin, do you
think, any time in the foreseeable
future?
A. Clearly, it is our posture and our
policy to enter into such talks when a
number of things have been completed,
and that is our own internal assessment
on this important subject— and I will
talk to it today in my speech— and also
when we have had a feeling of assurance
that such discussions will be accom-
panied by other political activities which
make the prospects for these talks
promising.
Q. Some linkage between SALT
and other activity in the world?
A. Of course, linkage is a fact of in-
ternational life. Those who claim that it
is not are accepting the opposite
premise — the antithesis of that— and
that is that we have to accept Soviet ag-
gression in order to have progress in
arms control.
Q. Will the Soviets have to do
something other than what they're do-
ing right now in Afghanistan before
we're interested in SALT talks?
A. That remains to be seen. There
is no one who would suggest that the
problem has to be totally solved, but I
think there have to be some mutual
understandings with respect to progress
on that subject.
Q. Before we can sit down and
talk about SALT?
A. I would anticipate that would be
one of the governors.
Q. Are we going to deliver to the
Israelis the F-16s that they feel are
due this Friday [July 17]?
A. This is a decision for the Presi-
dent to make. As you know, I've had
Mr. McFarlane [Robert C. McFarlane,
Counselor of the Department of State]
in Israel. He concluded discussions
yesterday with the Begin government
and will be back today to report to me
Member 1981
27
The Secretary
and, subsequently, this week to report
personally to the President. At that
time, it will be necessary, following a
Presidential decision, to conduct con-
sultations with the appropriate commit-
tees and members on the Hill.
Q. But based on what you know
so far, does it seem likely that we will
deliver the F-16s, if not this Friday,
in the short-term future?
A. In fairness to the President who
has to make this decision, I think it
would be premature to speculate. I've
noted there has been quite a bit.
Q. Prime Minister Begin will rule
now with a very slim majority. There
are many who believe that he is being
held hostage by very conservative
groups that make up part of his
government, groups that do not want
to give up in any fashion any part of
the West Bank, which is crucial to an
overall Middle Eastern settlement in
that part of the world. Does this make
it, if not impossible, very, very dif-
ficult to carry out the full accords of
Camp David?
A. First, with respect to the overall
subject of the peace process, this has
always been difficult. We are now on the
verge of initialing the Sinai agreement,
which will permit the return of the Sinai
to Egypt. There have been expressions
already from the Israeli Govern-
ment— that government being
formed— suggesting that they must get
on with the autonomy talks. These are
the two remaining aspects of the Camp
David accords.
Beyond that, the longer term
aspects of peace are, of course, very,
very difficult, but I'm optimistic that
with goodwill on both sides and a sense
of urgency, which must be forthcoming,
that there will be progress in the near
future.
AUGUST 5, 19812
Q. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat is
in Washington today for meetings
with President Reagan and Secretary
of State Haig in an effort to get the
Middle East peace talks started again.
We have Secretary of State Haig in
our Washington studios this morning.
The President is talking a great
deal about an expanded role or some
kind of a role for the Palestinians in
any Middle East peace talks. Will you
be able to offer him any encourage-
ment that the United States will now
reconsider its attitude toward a role
for the Palestinians? We have always
opposed that.
A. Our position on this is longstand-
ing. The requirements for PLO
[Palestine Liberation Organization] par-
ticipation in the peace process are clear:
acceptance of U.N. Resolutions 242 and
338 and recognition of the existence and
right of Israel to exist. I don't see any
changes in that set of requirements and
I think they are known by all parties.
Q. Has Israel's recent attacks on
the PLO strongholds in some Beirut
civilian neighborhoods made it more
difficult for the United States to de-
fend our position against the Palestin-
ians around the world, diplomatically?
A. I think any escalation of violence
from whatever side exacerbates the ef-
forts to communicate and to effect a
moderation on the part of the parties.
We, of course, now are enjoying the con-
sequence of a consensus which is de-
signed to hold that violence down and to
cease such actions on either side of the
Israeli border with Lebanon, and we are
very encouraged by that, although the
situation remains fragile.
Q. But something has to give on
the Palestinian question, doesn't it,
not only from the Palestinians but
from the point of view of the Israeli
Government?
A. I don't see that it necessarily re-
quires give on both sides if the condi-
tions are met which have been estab-
lished, then obviously we are then in a
new framework and that remains to be
seen.
Q. So it is entirely up to the PLO
to meet the U.N. resolutions and to
recognize Israel's right to exist as a
state.
A. I think that's very clear.
Q. Is there any chance that you'll
try to arrange a summit meeting be-
tween President Sadat and Prime
Minister Begin on this question of a
role for the Palestinians alone?
A. I think it's much too early to
speculate about such a possibility. We
are now just entering into a new phase.
We're going to have the opportunity in
the next few days to hear President
Sadat's views on how to proceed with
the autonomy talks and other peacekeep-
ing efforts. We will, in September, ha |
Prime Minister Begin here in lr!
Washington where again the fundame, jj
tal assessments of where we go from |i
here can be finalized.
Q. You will also be talking abou
military aid between the United Stal
and Egypt. Is there any chance that
the United States will accept the off
that he has made several times in tin
past to establish a real American tro
presence within Egypt which will bt
able to make a strike anywhere in th
Persian Gulf area?
A. I don't anticipate that Presidet
Sadat or the United States is looking!
a kind of permanent presence your qui j
tion suggests. I think President Sadat '
has very generously offered facilities t
American forces which would be movii
in and through the area. These subject |
will clearly be discussed during the
President's visit here in the next 2 daj
Q. Do you think that's a good id
for the United States to have that ki ;
of facility available to it there?
A. I think the access to facilities i
crucially important in this period of th
increasing danger and threat to our oi
resources and, more importantly, to oi
overall strategic posture in the Middle
East.
Q. May I ask you about the situa
tion in Poland which seems to be
deteriorating in terms of — once
again— its relation with the Soviet
Union. The Soviets today accused
Solidarity of creating anarchy in
Poland. The streets are jammed in
Poland once again with trucks and
demonstrators of one kind or anothe
What happens? Is there any new Ui
position if the Soviet Union begins t
make some kind of a move or put ad
tional pressure on Poland?
A. It's true that the situation is
growing increasingly tense due to fooc
shortages, improper distribution of coi
modities within the society, and mouni
ing and tremendously complex fiscal
problems. It is our hope and continues
to be American policy that these are
matters to be determined by the Polisl
people without external intervention ii
their internal affairs. And this policy i:
longstanding. It is shared with our alii'
in Western Europe, and the conse-
quences of a violation of those conditio
would clearly have profound and lastin
impact on East- West relations at large
Q. What is your judgment on the
28
Department of State Bullet
The Secretary
step on the part of the Soviet
n, however, based on the in-
;ence that you have available to
low?
We are still watching the situa-
-ery carefully. There's no sign of
:ularly worrisome increases in
levels of the kind we witnessed on
arlier occasions, but the situation
change and, therefore, requires
lost careful overview.
, Right after the Ottawa summit,
German Chancellor Schmidt
back to his country and almost
ntly lowered the percentage of
udget that's being spent on
ise matters in West Germany. Did
surprise you?
L Clearly, the United States is hop-
>r increasing contributions of the
vel by all of our participating
3 nations and if one or another
it unable to meet these obligations
ommitments, we, of course, regret
y much. I think it's too early to say
i the German case.
;. [Inaudible.]
IL Not at all. I think there have
many very good friends of America
nave been proposing the kinds of
hunications that President Sadat
lied yesterday in London— for a
j period, and they have not
■nted the kind of cooperation that
lave had with President Sadat in the
(and they won't in the future. I
5 it's clear to all Americans that
[dent Sadat is a man of peace and
liusual international figure who has
j so much in the past. I am confident
1 11 continue in the future to bring a
I ructive outcome of events in the
lie East.
I
J. What would happen if the PLO
i to say suddenly: "Alright, we
irnize Israel's right to exist."
|t do you think the reaction of
le Minister Begin would be? Great
licion?
\\. I think that's up to Prime
liter Begin, but I think the condi-
I have long since been established by
liovernment of Israel and if they
I met, I would anticipate there
Id be a constructive response.
b. Are we going to sell the
IVCS [airborne warning and con-
Isystem] airplanes to Saudi Arabia
he next 24 hours or so?
(JA. I think it may be a little longer
I 24 hours, but we are and the Presi-
dent is determined to proceed with this
sale. We think it is the right thing to do
both in terms of Middle Eastern
strategic objectives of the United States,
the need of the Saudi Arabian Govern-
ment's own defense requirements, and in
the long-term, it will meet Israel's in-
terests as well.
Q. Let me ask you about our
general overall policy in the Middle
East. Earlier this year you were talk-
ing about, and your people were talk-
ing about, a kind of strategic consen-
sus there in an effort to keep the
Soviet Union from staking out too
large a role in the Middle East. It now
seems to outsiders, at least, where it
has come down to this role for the
Palestinians— that we have had to
focus on a much smaller point than
you might have liked to have. Is that a
fair assessment?
A. No, not at all. This is not the
case. You know, when we spoke of a
strategic consensus, we were speaking
of an already evident reality. It's been
that reality— the coordination between
the Arab League states, Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Syria, and the Government of
Lebanon— that have brought the prog-
ress that we are enjoying today along
with, of course, appropriate Israeli
cooperation. There is, indeed, a chang-
ing strategic environment in the Middle
East which is an historic reality and not
the creation of U.S. policy. What we
have to do as Americans is recognize
this change and use it to reinforce the
peace process while also reinforcing our
protective policies against Soviet en-
croachment in the area.
Q. Could you give us your assess-
ment of the new cabinet of Prime
Minister Begin, which appears to be
very conservative and hard-line and
maybe even less flexible than his old
government had been?
A. It would be highly inappropriate
for me to offer value judgments on in-
ternal Israeli affairs, and I won't do it
this morning. What we are glad to see is
a government formed with which we can
deal, and we are anxious, of course, to
get on with the peace process itself.
Q. Back to this matter of a kind of
dramatic summit meeting between
Prime Minister Begin and President
Sadat sponsored by the United States,
give us your bottom line assessment of
the chances of that happening in the
next 9 months or so.
A. I think you know that President
Reagan's longstanding stated policy with
respect to summitry is that we know
where we are going to come out before
we go in, and that the summitry itself
which raises such hopes and expecta-
tions will, in fact, produce progress, and
that's still not clear.
'Press release 232.
2Press release 262.
Interview on
ABC's
"Nightline"
While at the economic summit in Ot-
tawa, Secretary Haig announced that the
President had decided to defer shipment
ofF-16 aircraft to Israel.1 Following is
an interview with the Secretary on
July 20, 1981, by Ted Koppel of ABC
News.2
Q. You sat there very patiently and
listened to [Sam] Donaldson, [Barrie]
Dunsmore, and Koppel give their
analysis of why the delay. How about
giving us yours?
A. I think the situation is very clear
to any observer. We have had an
escalating cycle of violence in the Middle
East, primarily in Lebanon, and in such
an atmosphere it would be highly inap-
propriate for us to send such lethal
weapons to Israel. The President,
therefore, decided to defer that ship-
ment, to continue the review which has
been underway with respect to the first
4 aircraft, and now to include all F-16s,
the four and six that were scheduled to
leave early this morning.
Q. How do you avoid this kind of
delay being interpreted generally
throughout the world as a slap on the
wrist of the Israelis?
A. I think anyone would read in
what he cares to read in. The simple
facts are that it would have been inap-
propriate in this tense situation, with
violence escalating, with high casual-
ties—especially of the tragic kind— non-
combatants on both sides of the border,
creating a situation where it just
wouldn't make good sense to send these
aircraft on.
itember 1981
29
The Secretary
Q. Where do we stand at the mo-
ment? Is there a U.S. review of its
policies toward Israel going on at the
moment, a continuation of the review
that you announced 5 weeks ago?
A. No, and that review had to
do— the earlier review— with the strike
on the Iraqi reactor. We are today at-
tempting to lend good offices to a peace
effort which hopefully might achieve a
cease-fire or, at a minimum, a return to
lower levels of violence so that we can
get on with the peace process that Am-
bassador Habib [Philip C. Habib, the
President's special emissary to the Mid-
dle East] started some weeks ago.
Q. Then, the review on the Iraqi
raid was over and had been resolved
one way or another, and we were led
to believe a few days ago, here in
Washington, that it was reviewed and
settled favorably to the Israelis— that
the planes would be sent. So one is
forced to the conclusion then that this
particular decision is specifically
linked to the raids in Lebanon.
A. This particular situation is linked
to the overall atmosphere in the Middle
East in which there is an escalation of
violence on both sides and should be in-
terpreted strictly in that light. It's clear
that the situation will have to be
ameliorated by whatever outcome we
ultimately see before an appropriate
decision would be called for.
Q. It is kind of hard to see how
you are affecting both sides in this by
withholding planes from Israel. What
are you doing to slap the wrists of the
PLO [Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion] or those who are firing rockets
into Israel?
A. Again, the efforts to achieve
peace are not associated with the F-16
decision. The F-16 decision is based on
the situation itself— the objective reality
in the area. We have a number of in-
itiatives underway that are trying to
achieve the peace settlement. Discus-
sions with Mr. Begin and the Govern-
ment of Israel, efforts with the friendly
Arab states to achieve some return to
lessen violence on the other side, plus
the longer-term efforts that Ambassador
Habib has been involved with.
Q. The point that I am trying to
make is if, in fact, there is blame on
both sides for the violence right now,
it seems disproportionately unfair to
the Israelis to punish them, and it is,
after all, a punishment if they don't
get the planes that they are counting
on and not do anything to the other
side.
A. I think you know we are not pro-
viding armaments to the PLO and those
elements of the PLO in Lebanon who
are involved in rocket and artillery fir-
ings against Israel. I don't think your
question has the appropriate texture.
Q. No, but that's exactly my point.
You're not in a position to punish one
side, so you end up punishing only the
Israelis, and that hardly seems fair.
A. No, not at all. I think if we were
providing armaments to the other side
under these circumstances we would be
equally reluctant to continue with those
shipments. The simple facts are it would
be inappropriate to send such lethal
weapons into the Middle East at this
very, very tense period.
Q. You are, nevertheless— if I
heard you correctly earlier this even-
ing—continuing to send other lethal
weapons to Israel. They're in the
pipeline; they're not being stopped.
It's all a little mind-boggling. You
must understand that those of us on
the outside had a little trouble
understanding how one distinguishes
between lethal weapons.
A. One never has accused you of
having a boggled mind and I won't
tonight. Simple facts are that this was a
very high profile act which the President
was faced with making a decision on. He
made that decision based on the
unanimous recommendations of
everyone in the executive branch and
following a certain degree of consulta-
tion with the legislature. I am not so
sure your premise is precisely on mark.
Q. But, I mean, there are other
lethal weapons still going to Israel,
and you have no intention of stopping
those?
A. No, there has been no decision to
do that and, as a matter of fact, I em-
phasize again, this F-16 decision which
you correctly noted was delayed earlier,
in the light of escalating violence in the
area, has again been delayed. And it is
precisely because of the circumstances in
the Middle East today and certainly
justified on those grounds alone.
Q. What has to happen before that
decision is going to be reconsidered? I
mean would it help, for example, if
the Israelis were to announce tomor-
row that from their side, at least,
there is going to be a cease-fire?
A. I think answering that questie;
the way it has been worded would sug
gest that it is linked to that decision,
and that would be incorrect. I think ar
number of things could happen which
would justify a resumption of the
shipment— a quieting down of the situ
tion perhaps, a cease-fire, progress in
Phil Habib's efforts with all of the par-
ties to achieve a return to status quo '.
ante, which is, of course, our objective
In the near term, we think a cease-fire
is justified because of the intensity of
the violence that has occurred.
Q. Is there going to be some kin i
of general reappraisal of U.S. policy
toward Israel?
A. I do not anticipate this. Israel
a longstanding, historic friend and ally i
And our relationship with the Govern- i
ment of Israel will continue to be base |
precisely on that longstanding, historii i
relationship.
Q. This is the first opportunity
that the President has had to meet
with his six democratic, industrial
partners. I wonder what their reacti
has been to what has seemed to be,
least, a rather tough anti-Soviet line
and anti-Soviet posture which this A
ministration has deliberately struck
over its first 6 months in office?
A. We have already had some ex-
tensive political discussions in the
margins and during the meals here at
Montebello. Clearly, there is a consent
among all of the participants that the
cent Soviet activity, dating back from
the period of about 4 or 5 years ago, i
basically unacceptable. And I think th<
is a fundamental unanimity and solida
ty emerging from this conference with
respect to that issue. In the past, trier
have been some questions, of course.
But it has been the President's view tl
his policy toward the Soviet Union rnu
be clear and unequivocal— that means
reciprocity and restraint and willingne
to negotiate as well.
Q. Do our European partners see
to feel that it is necessary for the
Soviets to make the first move in thi
direction or have they been putting i
little pressure on the President and
you?
A. No. I think we all are aware th
there has been a certain degree of
pressure on theater nuclear arms cont
talks and the decision made last May I
Rome and reaffirmed as recently as la;
week by me in a speech in New York
30
Department of State Bullet
m
The Secretary
Jy do hope that we will get on with
Ifee talks, and we intend to. But the
Re consensus up here at Montebello is
m reassuring and, surprisingly, one of
hi solidarity on most of the major
kes we are dealing with.
Q. The conventional wisdom prior
i) he summit was that there would
ttainly be a number of requests from
n allies to get moving on talks on a
toe range of issues with the Soviet
fjon. First, has that pressure
serialized or have those requests
serialized, and what has the Presi-
fet's response been?
I A. No, they have not. In the area of
Ideal consensus here there has been
kng concern expressed about Afghan-
In, about Kampuchea, about Soviet
L of responsiveness in the meetings in
prid, about international ter-
ism— a very important paper was
jeed to on that topic. I would say that
I general level of agreement was both
larkable and encouraging.
Q. What do you think is the
latest accomplishment in foreign
licy so far of the Reagan Ad-
liistration? Is there one to which
I would like to point?
A. There are a host of ac-
nplishments. I think one could
lerate after this week that our rela-
iiships with our European partners
i with Japan have never been better.
I think we have established a unique
new relationship with our northern
neighbor Canada and our southern
neighbor Mexico. I think we have
launched a host of initiatives in the
Caribbean and in Central America of
fundamental importance, and I think, in
general, this peace period in American
foreign policy has been one that has
been devoid, except for the Middle East
area and the problems we have had in
El Salvador, with the kind of crisis
which frequently has characterized other
Administrations in their earlier period.
Q. You know that your critics say
that your policy is floundering, it
seems to have no direction.
A. I would anticipate that those
who don't agree with our policy to make
such charges, and we have plenty of
that, and it is not unusual. I think our
policies thus far have been moving very,
very well, very, very successfully. And if
the American people will stop and think
they are recognizing [inaudible] that
after talking to some 40 foreign
ministers, of half that many heads of
state and government, there is a grow-
ing respect for the new direction of
President Reagan's foreign policy. I
think this meeting is ample testimony to
that.
•For text of announcement see August
1981 Bulletin, page 81.
2Press release 243 of July 21, 1981. ■
uestion-and-Answer Sess
allowing Foreign Policy
ssociation Address
ion
At the conclusion of Secretary Haig's
ress before the Foreign Policy
relation in New York on July lh,
(see August BULLETIN, page 31), he
ijuered the following questions from
audience. l
tVhat is, in your opinion, the pro-
lility that the Soviet Union will in-
:/ene with force in Poland if current
;ls of labor unrest in that country
Itinue?
A. There are, I suppose, two
pols of thought on this subject: The
f-full theory and the half-empty
pry. There are many who suggest, in
ological terms, that the process of
modernization and loosening up of
Marxist-Leninist discipline in the Soviet
model has already progressed to a point
where inevitable retrenchment will be
demanded, either by direct intervention
or some other modification which would
result in turning the clock back.
There are other theories that sug-
gest that the consequences of direct or
indirect intervention for the Soviet
leadership are so grave, that the train
has, in fact, left the station, that the
process is so far forward, and that the
cost of retrenchment so grave that we
will be the witnesses of a continuing
evolution of a process already underway.
I do not think it serves our purpose
as Americans to indulge in speculations
about one theory or another but merely
to reiterate, with increasing clarity, the
unacceptability of Soviet direct or in-
direct interventionism into the internal
affairs of the Polish people; to make it
clear that should such a decision be
made, that the price and the conse-
quences would be both grave and
longlasting. This has been our position,
and whether you are an optimist or a
pessimist and whether or not the terms
themselves accurately reflect reality is
something I think we best leave un-
tended.
Q. Nonetheless, do you intend or
contemplate using military force to
counter Soviet military intervention in
Poland?
A. I think that is a question that
has long since developed its own consen-
sus, both within the NATO family and
here at home, and I would not visualize
military reaction to such an outcome
should it occur. I think we have been
considering, together with our allies in a
very unified way, a host of political,
economic, and diplomatic activities that
would be the consequence of such an in-
tervention.
Q. Do you feel that our policy
toward Israel, and particularly the
Begin government, has been too le-
nient in view of its attack on Iraq and
its professed intention to settle addi-
tional people on the West Bank?
A. I would not like to label with a
value judgment what American policy
has been in the context of the question.
I think it's awfully important that we
Americans recognize that every
American President since the founding
of the State of Israel has joined in the
American commitment for the preserva-
tion of that state and for its future
vitality. This is a profound and serious
obligation for Americans everywhere.
Secondly, I think it would be hard to
suggest that as oil diplomacy and other
considerations, including improvement
and moderation in the Arab world, have
sometimes placed obstacles in the contin-
uing consistency of American policies
with respect to this subject.
This does not relieve us of the
obligation to call a spade a spade as we
have done recently in the United Na-
tions with respect to the raid on the
Iraqi nuclear reactor. But I think we
Americans are best served by recogniz-
ing that American credibility is always
at stake in such fundamental issues in
both human and international relations
terms; I do not accept the premises of
the question that was asked.
ptember 1981
31
The Secretary
Q. What ultimate resolution to the
Palestinian situation do you suggest?
A. We are engaged in a number of
overlapping and intimately interrelated
problem areas. The first, of course, is
the F-16 issue itself, and I'm waiting
this afternoon the return of Mr.
McFarlane [Robert C. McFarlane,
Counselor of the Department of State]
with a report to me which will ultimately
go to the President for a decision in con-
sultation with the Congress with respect
to the possible resumption of arms
shipments of the F-16s that were
suspended to Israel.
Secondly, we have a peace mission
underway in the Middle East dealing
with the Lebanon crisis that Mr. Phil
Habib [Philip C. Habib, the President's
special emissary to the Middle East] is
engaged in. In that process he has en-
joyed, not to the total satisifaction of
everyone, the cooperation of both the
State of Israel and a number of Arab
states. The very fact that the process
continues and that conflict has not
emerged from the crisis in Lebanon, I
think, is testimony to the prudence and
wisdom of the effort in the first place,
and it constitutes a continuing source of
hope that we will resolve that issue
peacefully.
Then we have the problem of the
Camp David peace process itself. In an
immediate sense that involves the
ultimate withdrawal of Israeli forces
from the Sinai and the introduction of a
non-U. N. peacekeeping force in that
area, as well as the so-called autonomy
talks themselves.
I'm optimistic that we will soon ini-
tial, perhaps as early as this week, the
Sinai disengagement proposal, and it has
been the progress that has taken place
following my trip to the Middle East in
May and as a result of great flexibility
and forthcomingness on the part of the
Egyptians and the Israelis.
I think it was just 2 days ago that
an Israeli official who will be associated
with the new government urged that the
autonomy talks resume at the earliest
possible date. We have visits coming in
August from President Sadat and short-
ly thereafter by the new Israeli Prime
Minister who it appears will be Mr.
Begin, and I would anticipate that as a
result of those meetings that this peace
process will be resumed with greater
vigor and with greater hopes for a suc-
cessful outcome.
The longer term and more
anguishing aspects of the Middle East
peace process remain to be developed in
the context of our consultation with both
governments and other affected parties
in the area.
Q. In terms of your use of the
phrase, "the new government in
Israel," can we conclude from what
you have said that you expect that
government to be headed by Menahem
Begin?
A. I think most analysts today
would suggest that it looks very much
that way, but I think it's far too soon in
a highly dynamic and unpredictable
political environment to say so with
assurance.
Q. Can you please explain how this
Administration's policy of cuddling up
to South Africa can achieve the
declared objective of reducing Soviet
and Cuban influence in Angola?
A. Some time ago we had U.N.
Resolution 435 which initiated a U.N.
sponsored process that was picked up by
the contact group — West Germany,
France, the United Kingdom, the United
States, and Canada. This resulted in ef-
forts which stalled out badly in the face
of what some described as South
African intransigence or lack of
cooperativeness.
When this Administration came in,
we were faced almost from the first
hours with a highly volatile, unsuccessful
Geneva conference where the South
African Government vetoed almost
every effort that was made.
It was in the light of that that we
assessed very carefully how we could go
and how we could move to get the peace
process moving and to ultimately
achieve a fully independent, interna-
tionally recognized Namibia. Certainly,
one of the urgent requirements was to
re-establish a level of credibility and in-
fluence in the South African Govern-
ment.
We have been in the process of do-
ing that. We've been in the process of
seeking some means to offer a hopeful
formula. That process continues. One
must recognize that it does no good to
indulge in theology when you're dealing
with very practical problems of vital in-
ternal concern to the parties in the
southern African region.
I am not especially optimistic nor am
I especially pessimistic that we have
made a sufficient level of progress to
soon indicate that there will be some
further movement. But let me assure
you it's a tough and anguishing job and,
unfortunately, only the United States
can bring this about.
It is very easy for South Africa to
sit in a situation of intransigence over
an extended period of time, given the I
assets available to them. Even in the
case one might lament where we cut ol
arms shipments to South Africa. Todaj k
it's the fifth largest arms producer in I
the world. So these are people not
without their own resources.
Q. The United States has just
lifted an arms embargo against four J
South American countries because of
alleged improvements in human right
in those countries. How do you recon
cile this, with Amnesty International' I
recent report that the human rights
situation has not improved there?
A. Let me assure this audience, tfl
Amnesty International report not-
withstanding, that we carefully assessa
the human rights situation in each of t|
recipient countries described and name
and without exception, in each case, tfflj
improvement has been dramatic.
That improvement does not repre4 j
sent a corresponding level of complacer
cy here in Washington that all that mui
be done has been done, but we do not I
believe that it serves any useful purposi \
to indulge in isolation and public punish
ment and public admonishment in the l
face of internal improvements that havi
already taken place. We want an incen-
tive for that process to continue, and
that's what that decision represented. I
can tell you that over the last 6 months
that approach has achieved a great dea
more than ostracizing and criticizing
publicly nations which are sovereign an
which best respond to quiet diplomacy.
[Applause]
Q. West Germany and France plai
to oppose U.S. economic policy at the
Ottawa meeting [economic summit
held in Ottawa, Canada, July 19-21].
What impact do you feel this will
have?
A. First, I want to be very careful
not to charge the fourth estate with ex-
cess reporting because it's been my ex-
perience they report what they are
given. They have been given, in a
number of instances, a lot of robust,
threatening language from some source
in Western Europe. But let me assure
you, I do not anticipate that the upcom-
ing Ottawa summit will be characterizec
by West European bludgeoning of the
United States on the high interest rate
problem.
I think our European partners look
at this meeting as an opportunity in that
area to express their concerns to the
American leadership with respect to the
impact that those high interest rates are
having on their economic situations in
32
Department of State Bulletin
ECONOMICS
ern Europe, which is serious and,
•ne cases, bordering on grave.
Mr high interest rates have the im-
of, in practical terms, adding
■ntage points to already existing, in-
1 levels of inflation. It makes invest-
patently impossible, and it results
low of European money to New
markets. All of that is difficult,
here's another aspect of the
rican-European problem in the
omic sector. We are a market
omy, a free enterprise system— a
alist system, if you will. Many of
European partners preside over
tlistic systems whose fundamental
>ok departs from that of ours,
>ugh I could name several Socialist
sis in Western Europe that are not
lifferent from our own with respect
lilosophic approaches to internal
1C6.
3ut I think our European partners
ot like to hear Americans on the one
1 insist that we are going to con-
i with the reform program that we
underway in order to get inflation
r control because that's in their
interest— and it is— and at the
3 time tell them how to handle their
■nal affairs, their social spending, or
x aspects of their internal, economic
ution.
fit should be enough for Americans
uy for 4 years you Europeans carped
■the devil about our lack of economic
spline here at home. You even ac-
ad us at times of letting the
Sirican dollar go into benign neglect
s.use you were unwilling to discipline
*i -selves on the crucial sector of
Igy-
Now we have gone about a com-
L, tightly balanced reform program
Is fiscal, regulatory, and highly
lere, and I think our West European
ainers should recognize that getting
jition under control is inevitably go-
]to bring interest rates down. If we
ilge in artificial pumping or
nipulation of interest rates, we're go-
to contribute to increased inflation,
the cycle of despair that we've
lessed for so long is going to con-
I think our European partners also,
le they hear that message— and they
take it patiently up to a point— they
't want to be lectured on how to han-
their own internal affairs with dif-
;nt systems. I think that's the kind of
hange we will see at Ottawa; I think
■ill be helpful for both sides.
Secretary Negotiates Procedures
for Cancun Summit
Secretary Haig attended a
preparatory meeting of foreign ministers
in Cancun, Mexico, August 1-2, 1981, to
discuss the arrangements for the October
international meeting on cooperation
and development. Following are the
Secretary's remarks to the press aboard
his plane en route to Cancun and his
departure statement from Cancun.
REMARKS EN ROUTE,
JULY 31, 19811
As you probably know, this is a first,
really an historic first— this meeting— in
which for the first time national
leaders— in October— of the developed
world and the developing world will
meet together. Historically they have
met in separate venues— with the excep-
tion of the Commonwealth meeting— of
the kind that are taking place in the
Pacific this September.
This is the third preparatory
meeting for the October 22-23 Cancun
summit, but it is the first in which the
11 invited nations will be represented,
and, of course, the first one in which the
United States has participated. The 22
nations represented here comprise some
2.8 billion of the world's people and a
combined gross product of about $6.6
trillion.
Conceptually, as I say, it is a first.
And so what we seek first and foremost
to do is to establish interpersonal lines
of communication between national
leaders who have not met in similar
venues in the past.
This meeting in October and this
preliminary meeting will occur at a time
when the international economic en-
vironment is under great stress— second
rounds of energy costs with dramatic
impact on developed and especially
developing nations: declining economic
growth rates, runaway inflation, in-
creased unemployment. These stresses
tend to contribute to an inclination
toward protectionism. And we believe all
of these issues will be part of the discus-
sions, which we hope will remain infor-
mal and free-wheeling. It is, of course,
our view that cooperative efforts to
solve these problems are necessary, but
they depend fundamentally on national
economic policies.
^ress release 233A of July 15, 1981.
.
tember 1981
I think it's important also to
highlight in the setting that we find
ourselves the changing trade patterns,
the emerging interdependence between
the developed world and the developing
world. For example, the United States
today conducts about 36% of its trade
with the developing world, and it's grow-
ing. This represents more than a com-
bined total trade of the United States
with the Economic Community and
Japan exports. You will find similar pat-
terns as we saw in ASEAN [Association
of South East Asian Nations] with such
other developed nations as Australia,
New Zealand, and Japan, so the world
trading patterns are changing.
I think you also see the interrelation-
ship between these economic realities
and developing political realities. Take,
for example, the Middle East where the
recent crisis was successfully
managed— at least for the time being, as
fragile as the situation is— by
cooperating between developing and
developed nations in a political sense.
The Arab nations of the Arab
League— the four— not only worked
constructively on the initial Lebanon
crisis, but they played a vitally impor-
tant role in the recently established
cessation of hostilities across the border
of Lebanon and Israel.
I think in this upcoming meeting the
effort will be toward mutual,
cooperative efforts. From the U.S. point
of view, we look at it as mutually
cooperative. In other words, there are
mutual responsibilities between the
developed nations and the developing
nations. The creation of circumstances
in the developing nations serves as a
catalyst to improve trade, improve in-
vestments, and participation in the
developing nations serves as a catalyst
to improve trade, improve investments,
and participation in a worldwide finan-
cial system. We seek to approach this
problem much the way we have already
started out under President Reagan.
Take for example the pilot program that
has been developed for Jamaica, which
is broadly based and involves in-
vestment—the private sector. It in-
volves multinational participation in the
critical country which is both regional
and worldwide in context. It seeks to
shape our programs based on the views
not only of the nations externally but
the recipient nation. So it is a mutually
33
Economics
shaped program, and we would seek
that in our future efforts in the develop-
ing world. In other words, we don't like
a template put upon the developing na-
tions and broad common approaches, as
distinct from individually tailored ap-
proaches, first individually, then
regionally.
Q. By that do you mean bilateral?
A. No, we look at the conditions in
each country because they are all
distinctly different, and we tailor our
programs together with that country to
meet its individual needs.
The Reagan policy for Jamaica —
which was a policy, a pilot policy— has
now been expanded into the efforts we
are seeking to achieve for the Caribbean
Basin. And we see in the future other
similarly shaped and tailored regional
programs. In this broad approach that
the President visualizes, we will, of
course, use all of the international fora
that are available abroad — worldwide
fora, the regional fora, and bilateral fora
as well.
I think, essentially, we hope this
meeting this weekend — and, more im-
portantly, the meeting in October— will
get away from the classic North-South
approach, which has proved to be both
confrontational and sterile, and to struc-
ture a whole new cooperative, mutually
beneficial approach to the developed-
developing problem.
Q. How about your bilaterals?
What are the important ones?
A. This meeting will give me a
chance also for some important
bilaterals. The Foreign Minister of India;
the Foreign Minister of Brazil, with
whom I have not met; the Foreign
Minister of Saudi Arabia; Tanzania; and
I hope— although I haven't arranged it
yet— to see the Foreign Minister of
Yugoslavia. In addition to that I will
have a chance to have bilateral talks
with the French, German, British, and
hopefully, with Foreign Minister
Castaneda [of Mexico] as well, and
[Chinese Foreign Minister] Huang Hua.
Q. What did you mean by confron-
tation as being sterile? What, in
essence, do you believe is confronta-
tional and/or sterile about the tradi-
tional mode of conversation?
A. What it is usually is that they
meet in separate organizational struc-
tures and the one side places demands
on the other. Now for the first time we
are sitting down as select nations,
developed and developing, so I hope we
can get away from that traditional ap-
proach.
Q. Since it has come up several
times, what's the story on Cuba's rela-
tionship to this whole affair, going
back to the time when the President
agreed at Ottawa to take part in the
summit?
A. I think, as I understand it, Cuba
has not been included by the sponsoring
nations. And I understood they dis-
cussed that in New York earlier this
week, and the decision was that Cuba
would not be included in this round of
talks.
Q. This round— did that cause any
problems with [Mexican President]
Lopez Portillo?
A. Not that I'm aware of. We did
not participate in those conferences, so
you will have to ask them.
Q. You say not in this round. Is it
possible that they could be invited as
observers in October?
A. I would doubt that from what I
understand the consensus of the spon-
soring nations to be.
Q. That would have a bearing on
whether the President goes or not. He
is going, isn't he?
A. President Reagan is going, yes.
Q. Even if Cuba should turn up as
an observer?
A. I think he accepted the invitation
with the understanding that Cuba would
not participate. It would be premature
for me to answer your question should
that premise change.
DEPARTURE STATEMENT,
CANCUN,
AUG. 2, 19812
We have been very pleased at the
results of this preliminary ministerial
conference for Cancun. The procedures
agreed to will provide a framework for
an informal exchange of views on major
areas of concern to the developed and to
the developing world and on ways to
strengthen international cooperation
among us.
The spirit in which these discussions
took place, I feel, was unusually con-
structive. I believe that all of us
recognize that we have an historic op-
portunity in October at Cancun to make
a new beginning in relations among our
nations. This new beginning would reject
the North-versus-South confrontation
and, instead, examine what we can do to
make the world better for all of us and
to address the particularly pressing
'Press release 261 of Aug. 4,
2Press release 263 of Aug. 5.
1981.
problems faced by a number of the
developing countries.
This spirit owes much to the posith I
outcome of the Ottawa summit. At that |
summit, President Reagan stressed the
very great importance which he attachf
to close and constructive working rela-
tionships between the United States ani
the developing world. I know President
Reagan will come to Cancun with that
same positive approach. At the same
time, President Reagan has stressed
that progress can only come as a result
of shared commitment and acceptance (
shared responsibility for mutual benefit
Economic development depends
primarily on domestic economic policies
That is why President Reagan devoted
so much time and attention to
strengthening the American economy.
Similarly, the success of others will de-
pend primarily on their own sound
policies. At the same time, strengthen-
ing the world economy can complement
and support these mutual and individual
efforts. For this, also, each of our coun-
tries has a responsibility because each c
us will be the beneficiaries of success.
Working together at the summit in Can
cun and in a variety of other fora, we
can make constructive progress.
I'd also like to take this opportunity
to express my sincere gratitude to Pres
dent Lopez Portillo of Mexico and
[Austrian] Chancellor Bruno Kreisky fa
their far-sightedness in convening this
very unusual group. And on behalf of
myself and the American delegation, I
also want to thank the Mexican people
for their warm reception and gracious
hospitality for a constructive, valuable,
and enthusiastic conference.
WHO Infant
Formula Code
by Elinor Constable
Statement before the Subcommittee
on International Economic Policy and
Trade of the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee on June 16, 1981. Ms. Constable it
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Economic and Business Affairs. J
I welcome the opportunity to comment
on the World Health Organization
(WHO) infant formula code and
specifically on the future implications for
34
Department of State Bulletin
Economics
United States. It seems to me that
e has been undue attention given to
U.S. vote against the code. There
i been charges that the U.S. Govern-
t is not interested in the health of
es. There have been exaggerated
ns that the vote makes it more dif-
t for the United States to carry out
tive foreign relations. There have
suggestions that the U.S. vote in-
tes a lack of support for WHO or for
U.N. system. All of these claims are
fig-
[n terms of infant nutrition, par-
arly in the developing world, U.S.
•national programs will certainly
inue. Programs to educate mothers
le optimal methods of infant feeding
continue, as will training programs
lealth workers. The Agency for In-
ational Development has several
frams in health family planning and
ition which support breastfeeding,
lopment of weaning foods, and
ishment of nursing mothers. Ac-
ies of the Center for Disease Con-
the National Institutes of Health,
Peace Corps, and other agencies also
e to promote breastfeeding, which is
ersally recognized as the preferred
of infant feeding. The Department
tate strongly supports this activity
Ihese other U.S. Government agen-
And we also support the work that
0, UNICEF, and other international
linizations are doing to promote bet-
I nfant nutrition and especially to
ar and protect breastfeeding.
The U.S. vote against the WHO in-
I formula code carries no negative
i ications for U.S. support for these
j ly important programs. It should be
i;trued solely as a U.S. commentary
he specific document that was placed
•ont of us. We believe that in all in-
.ational organizations, we have an
Ration to examine carefully any
•lution, code, or document presented
s for a vote. Some have suggested
we should have voted in favor of
code on infant formula marketing
;tices, regardless of what it con-
ed. We believe that would have been
sponsible.
We did examine this code, and, in-
i, we participated in discussions and
otiations on it over more than 16
iths. One thing we found was that
ly of its provisions were largely ir-
vant to the United States— a coun-
where there is an educated populace,
■re there is safe drinking water, and
re there is extensive health care,
lough the problems of promotion of
nt formula occur primarily in devel-
ig nations — where often there is in-
)tember 1981
adequate health care, unsafe drinking
water, and low levels of literacy— the
code was not addressed to the cir-
cumstances of developing nations alone
but proposed a uniform and highly
specific set of standards addressed to
every member state.
We also found that many of the
specific provisions of the code simply
could not be implemented in the United
States, that they raised questions under
our Constitution and laws, and con-
tained ambiguities which cast doubt on
the intended and real impact of the code
in certain key areas. In the cir-
cumstances, a positive vote would have
carried with it the implication that we
supported these specific provisions and
recommended them to others, when the
facts were quite the contrary. Honesty
simply required us to vote no.
Did our vote have negative foreign
relations implications? I think not. Cer-
tainly, there may be some officials in
some countries who are puzzled or
disappointed by the U.S. vote. But we
deal with health and development of-
ficials in developing nations all the
time— on a bilateral basis and in interna-
tional organizations. They well know the
extensive and historic concern of the
United States to improve health and
other conditions of life, they know of ouf
generosity, and they know that our
substantive programs to support
breastfeeding and the improvement of
infant and maternal nutrition will con-
tinue. I believe that our explanations
about the unacceptability of many provi-
sions of the code within the legal, social,
and economic context of the United
States are understood by most of these
officials. In fact, the United States
stands to gain respect for having the
courage— on a well-publicized and con-
troversial issue — to stand alone and say
what it believes.
Further in relation to the develop-
ment of new codes in the U.N. system,
we think that our vote will have specific
foreign relations value. Up until the
adoption of the WHO infant formula
code, there had never been an interna-
tional code dealing with the marketing
of a specific product. It is a troubling
development. The problems that are
faced by individual countries — on issues
such as infant formula — are far from
uniform. The place to address those
problems is at the national level. Where
there are good reasons for control of the
private sector, then we believe national
legislative and regulatory mechanisms
should be responsive. But we are con-
cerned about the prospect of a new
series of international codes addressing
the marketing of specific products, and
we believe our negative vote at the
World Health Assembly served as a
clear signal — to the international agen-
cies and to other nations as well — of our
views.
What about our relations with
WHO? We are very strong supporters of
that organization and of its Director
General, Halfdan Mahler. It would be er-
roneous for any contrary conclusion to
be drawn from the U.S. vote. Although
the United States may be outvoted on
some issues by other member govern-
ments, the WHO staff and secretariat
have been enormously responsive to
U.S. expressions of interest and concern
on various issues. Indeed, the staff was
so responsive to this Administration's in-
terest in more frugal financial manage-
ment in the U.N. system that we were
able to vote in favor of the proposed
program and budget for WHO for
1982-83, at the same assembly at which
we voted no on the infant formula code.
The code itself is recommended to
each WHO member government,
regardless of how- each member may
have actually voted. Since it is a recom-
mendation, we have no obligation to im-
plement it. We are free to accept some
of it or none of it, to adapt it or reject
it — in short, to do whatever we consider
appropriate in light of our own cir-
cumstances. Article 62 of the WHO con-
stitution provides that each member
shall report annually on action taken
with respect to recommendations to it
by WHO, and this article has been
specifically cited within the WHO infant
formula code. We expect that a report
on this subject will be assembled by
WHO prior to the World Health
Assembly in May 1982, and we would
expect — as a member that honors its
treaty obligations and supports
WHO— that the U.S. Government would
provide a report at that time on U.S. ac-
tivity in promoting improved infant
nutrition and, in relation to the prin-
ciples of the code, what we are already
doing, what we plan to do, and what we
do not plan to do. In short, we would
honor our obligations to WHO to report
on any steps taken regarding this
recommendatory code.
We are also considering providing
governmental guidance regarding the
relevance of the code, both within the
United States and internationally, to the
companies that could be affected by it.
This would be in accord with standard
State Department practice regarding
other newly adopted international codes.
Unlike these other codes, however,
guidance in this case would also indicate
which provisions are not relevant in the
United States. It would also, I am cer-
tain, point out that, subject to the limita-
35
Economics
OECD Ministerial Meeting
Held in Paris
Deputy Secretary of State William
P. Clark represented the Secretary of
State in Paris June 16-17, 1981, at the
meeting of the Council of the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) at ministerial
level. Following is his statement made
before the council on June 16.
It is a great pleasure for me to repre-
sent the Secretary of State at this, the
first OECD ministerial since President
Reagan assumed office in Washington.
As a new Administration, we have,
of course, undertaken to assess the
situation we face, to define our
priorities, and to fashion our policies.
While this process is well underway in
Washington, it is possible to state cer-
tain fundamental positions which
underlie our policy. These apply as well
to this organization and to the important
business which we, as other member
countries, deal with here.
Fundamentals of U.S. Policy
First, the success of U.S. foreign policy
requires a dynamic, productive domestic
economy. The most important contribu-
tion the United States can make to
global economic health is to revitalize
our own economy, restore noninfla-
tionary growth, and stimulate pro-
ductive enterprise. To achieve this,
President Reagan has proposed to the
Congress a bold, four-part program that
tions of international law and
agreements, states have the right to
prescribe conditions under which enter-
prises operate within their jurisdictions
and that enterprises located in a country
are subject to the law of the country.
It is our understanding that the
three American companies which are ex-
porting infant formula have been con-
cerned about the charges of improper
marketing practices— probably more
than manufacturers of other countries.
We are confident that the companies
will continue to give serious attention to
the questions raised by the WHO code.
l The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402 ■
will attack the root causes of our
economic problems rather than just cope
with short-term factors or the symptoms
of these problems. These proposals call
for great sacrifice by the American peo-
ple, but there is broad support to do
what is clearly necessary.
The past 5 months in Washington
have been eventful and exciting. We
have already made dramatic progress,
thanks to President Reagan's leadership.
Success of this program must lead to
success in our foreign policy in the
OECD, and beyond.
Second, the United States fully ap-
preciates the growing interdependence
linking the economies of OECD na-
tions—indeed, of member and
nonmember nations as well. We are all
affected by one another's successes and
failures. We all recognize this inter-
dependence is growing and affecting
more and more aspects of our economic
life. This interdependence is both a con-
tributing cause as well as a result of the
extraordinary economic progress of our
countries since World War II. We all
know the contribution trade and invest-
ment liberalization has made and the
role of the OECD in providing an im-
petus to opening up the channels of
world commerce.
Third, the United States, therefore,
remains committed to an open world
trading system, with minimum barriers
to the flow of goods, services, capital,
and technology across national bound-
aries— a system that allows all nations
to advance in an environment of peace-
ful competition and mutual advantage.
The United States remains firm in its
resolve to resist protectionism. We and
our trading partners must reaffirm our
support for an open trading system. We
can give effect to this resolve by full im-
plementation of the commitments each
of us made in the Tokyo Round of trade
negotiations and in the OECD's declara-
tion on trade policy and by continuing
the effort to reduce barriers to trade
and investment. The importance we
assign to this subject will be further
underlined in the statement which the
U.S Trade Representative, Ambassador
William Brock, will make later today.
Fourth on this abbreviated list of
fundamentals, the United States sup-
ports the OECD as an indispensable
forum for dealing with our common
economic problems. This organization
has played a valued and unique role in
fostering economic cooperation among
the industrial democracies. We expects
to remain a positive force in on-going
cooperation and consultations among
member countries.
Our agenda today reflects the rang [
of our concerns as well as our preoc- 1
cupation with global problems, and this \
is characteristic of the OECD.
Relations With Nonmembers
Our relations with nonmember coun-
tries, the first agenda item, should be
considered in a broad context. We
believe that the most valuable contribu-
tions the United States can make to
development are to restore and maintai
a growing U.S. economy, free of infla-
tion and unfettered by needless barriers
to production and innovation, and to '
provide a secure and peaceful interna-
tional climate. Our own domestic
economic health will enable us to keep
our markets open to the exports of
developing countries, facilitate invest-
ment in such countries, increase their
access to capital, and promote their
development thereby. The same crucial
connection between economic health at
home and vigorous development abroad
applies to all OECD countries. Both de-
veloped and developing nations must pa
greater attention to the vital role of the
private sector in the development proc-
ess.
Concentration on the relatively sma
official aid contributions sometimes
leads us to forget these much larger
flows from the rest of our economy.
U.S. imports from non-oil developing
countries in 1979 were $58.6 billion,
more than ten times our official aid
flows. One out of every $4 of U.S.
manufactured imports originates in the
Third World. U.S. direct investment in
the developing countries runs at, or
above, the level of aid, and less devel-
oped countries' use of private capital
markets results in commercial bank
loans and bond issues far exceeding
development assistance. In 1979 alone
commercial banks provided $37 billion t(
the less developed countries, while total
flows of official development assistance
from all OECD countries were $22
billion. While noting these more signifi-
cant contributions from other sources, I
do want to emphasize that for FY 1982,
the level of U.S. aid contributions will
increase 18%, and, further, we will
honor our commitments to the multilat-
eral development banks.
The developing nations constitute a
mosaic of diversity — not a monolith with
one set of needs and one set of objec-
36
Department of State Bulletin
EUROPE
3. They require the same individual
.ideration and policy attention which
"D nations expect from one another,
recognize the growing interdepend-
! between OECD nations and
:loping countries and support the
of this organization in fostering
lerative, mutually beneficial relations
veen members and nonmembers.
ie and Investment Issues
ie and investment likewise warrant
continuing attention if we are to
ore vigor to our own economies and
;e of our trading partners. The
Led States remains committed to
ntaining an open, multilateral, and
ket-oriented world trading system,
well-being of our people is more
ctly dependent than ever on inter-
onal trade. Between 1970 and 1980,
ZD exports — as a share of
:>_rose from 10.7% to 16%. At the
e time, however, because of low
jvth, high unemployment, and
.nce-of-payments pressures, protec-
ist forces are growing stronger in all
countries. We need to work together
L solid trade agenda for the coming
Lde. None of us can afford to let the
inentum toward liberalization that
I generated in the Tokyo Round slow
) n. We must deal with such pressing
liediate issues as export credit sub-
hs and renewal of the multifiber ar-
ijement. We must also work out our
: roach to issues like trade in services
i investment performance require-
Its, which have not yet been address-
hdequately.
International investment also
Lents challenges and opportunities.
I Reagan Administration believes that
I kef forces rather than government
i produce the most efficient distribu-
( of investment capital and the most
jsible allocation of scarce resources.
I OECD committee on international
Lstment has played an important role
istablishing a common framework for
J'Stment. The committee has done
Jdcularly valuable work to define and
Iport the concept of national treat-
lit for enterprises under foreign con-
I and to assure that such enterprises
I treated no less favorably than
liestic entities in like situations. The
■ted States takes this opportunity to
■firm its strong support for national
Bitment and urges all OECD member
Intries to support extension of this
I principle. At a time when many are
Vfering from high inflation, excessive
tember 1981
Challenge for Progress
on the Helsinki Final Act
by Max M. Kampelman
Statement made in a plenary session
of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in
Madrid on July 28, 1981. Ambassador
Kampelman is chairman of the U.S.
delegation.
We have decided to recess at the close
of our proceedings today and to
reconvene on October 27. Many of us
began to meet here in Madrid on
September 9. Our inability, in more than
10 months of active and tiring delibera-
tions, to complete the tasks assigned to
us by the Helsinki Final Act is a regret-
table but understandable reflection of
the international reality. The same cor-
rosive tensions that formed the back-
ground of our meeting in September re-
main with us today.
The American delegation is not sur-
prised by our inability to conclude our
work. The Helsinki Final Act, as we and
most delegations here have pointed out
during the initial review of the im-
plementation phase of our meeting, has
been grossly violated. It continues to be,
in its basic essentials, defiantly chal-
lenged by those who choose not to live
up to its provisions, in spite of their
commitment to do so.
Nevertheless, our delegation and
others continue to work and to consider
new proposals, with the thought that we
might at least agree on words to
strengthen the Final Act; and with the
hope that these words might in turn
later produce the compliance that has
been so conspicuously absent.
Western Proposal on Security
Eleven days ago, in an effort to move
this meeting to a constructive ending,
our delegation joined a number of others
in a package proposal. During informal
meetings with every delegation here, we
proposed language to resolve our dif-
ferences on defining a mandate for a
conference on the military aspects of our
security. Our basis was the language
proposed in the neutral and nonaligned
text. Out of respect for the yearnings in
this body for a conference on confidence
and security-building measures and
disarmament in Europe and in response
to a real need to deal with the threat of
surprise military attack in realistic,
unemployment, and inadequate growth,
we must make every effort to eliminate
unjustified impediment and disincentive
to investment flow.
Energy Security
Energy security likewise remains a
crucial topic for all of us. While market
pressures on oil prices and supply uncer-
tainties have recently lessened, now is
not the time to relax our coordinated ef-
forts to deal with our common energy
problems. Rather, as our colleagues at
yesterday's International Energy Agen-
cy ministerial meeting agreed, we must
use this respite— however long it may
last— to sustain and intensify our efforts
to reduce dependence on imported oil
and limit vulnerability to energy supply
interruptions in time of crisis.
In the United States we have
witnessed gratifying success in cutting
our reliance on oil imports. After a
sharp buildup through 1977 we have
steadily reduced oil consumption and im-
ports to below 1973 levels. The Reagan
Administration is emphasizing, in the
first instance, market-oriented policies
to expand supply and insure that energy
is used efficiently. A key element has
been President Reagan's February deci-
sion to decontrol oil prices. Other
supply-oriented policies are now in mo-
tion, including accelerated leasing of off-
shore oil and gas, restoration of public
confidence in nuclear energy, and relax-
ation of regulatory constraints on coal
production and use.
Thus all of us can agree on one
undeniable fact: We have a very full
agenda, not just for this meeting but for
the 1980s. Our problems are many, our
resources limited. But in trying to
understand— and cope with— our com-
mon difficulties and challenges, we must
not ignore our strength. We member na-
tions have the strongest economies on
Earth. We are blessed with strength and
vitality. Our job is to harness and
enhance these energies and return our
economies to a path of growth and in-
novation without ruinous inflation. If we
can restore the momentum that once
sustained an unprecedented rise in living
standards, expanding employment, and
technological advance, we will serve the
interests of people in all nations. ■
37
Europe
significant, and verifiable terms, we
made our proposal.
This is not an American proposal. It
is a Western proposal, with the full sup-
port of all Western delegations here. At
the Ottawa summit meeting last week,
our proposal was characterized by Presi-
dent Reagan and those other heads of
CSCE participating states there as a
major Western initiative. They called on
the Soviet Union to accept it and thus
bring our meeting to a constructive end-
ing, thereby substantially reducing ten-
sion in Europe.
A number of delegates here, not
authors with us of the proposal, told us
it was a proper response and repre-
sented forward movement. We tabled
that proposal formally 8 days ago in the
appropriate forum.
The other objective of our package
proposal was to satisfy the concept of
balance by a listing of the important
categories not yet agreed upon in the
areas of human rights, human contacts,
and information. The package, we said
and still believe, would provide a bal-
anced document that should be accept-
able to all 35 participants.
Our proposal was, furthermore, ac-
companied by a stated willingness on
our part to meet at any time, including
over the weekend, to negotiate and
define that vital human ingredient for
our final document.
Finally, we made it clear in private
discussions with many delegations here
that if there were no agreement on a
military conference, we would be ready
to consider the convening of an experts
meeting as proposed by some delega-
tions with the responsibility of making
intensive efforts to agree on a mandate
for a conference and thus move our
process forward.
Regrettably, our package initiative
was quickly dismissed as unacceptable;
that rejection was obviously the right of
those who responded.
Regrettably, our offer to meet over
the weekend to negotiate on the human
rights and related issues was not taken
up; that, too, was the right of those to
whom we made the suggestion.
Regrettably, our language, designed
to bring us together toward a con-
ference on disarmament in Europe, not
only was rejected but was met with the
introduction of a completely new pro-
posed formula far from the basis of our
previous discussions and obviously unac-
ceptable to most of us here. It led many
of us, in all candor, to ask ourselves
whether those who proposed it really
want a conference on disarmament in
Europe; here, too, those who proposed
the formula had the right to do so.
And regrettably, our willingness to
consider an experts meeting met with a
decidedly negative attitude on the part
of the other side; that, too, was, of
course, their right.
But we also have a right. It is the
right to state our own views as clearly
as we can; and a right to evaluate this
meeting in the light of those rejections.
We will continue to advance our
language on the mandate. We believe it
represents the most promising road to
agreement on a conference on disarma-
ment in Europe. We hope that those
who rejected it will reconsider their posi-
tion. But even if they do not, they
should know that our position was not
put forward as a negotiating position.
Our views are firmly held and represent
our security interests. They will not
change. Our position will be the same in
December as it is today, because it is a
reasonable and responsible position. It
opens the way to the progress that
would advance genuine security for all
of us. It does not damage the security
interests of any other state.
Negative International Atmosphere
As I have suggested, a major reason
why we have not reached agreement
here in Madrid is the international at-
mosphere outside our conference hall.
The invasion of Afghanistan and the
continued occupation of that tragic coun-
try by Soviet troops have had a cor-
rosive effect on our meetings. Recently,
as the delegate of the United Kingdom
noted on Friday, the European Com-
munity presented an imaginative plan
for a political settlement of the crisis in
Afghanistan. The Soviet Union has not
responded to it positively. That, too, has
its negative effect here.
Moreover, the Soviet Union is con-
tinuing its military buildup, which inten-
sified while my country, in the spirit of
"detente," took significant disarmament
steps. That buildup, as I noted in this
hall several weeks ago, is the most
massive that the world has ever known.
On behalf of my government, I state
with deep conviction that it must end.
Continued military escalation and activi-
ty by the Soviet Union will not attain
the security or respect they seek. It may
instill fear in some, but it instills deter-
mination in many more. Military power,
no matter how great, does not confer
moral legitimacy.
There has been much debate at our
meeting over the word I just used,
"detente." The word is meant to describe
a condition of relaxation of tension be- '
tween states. I submit again that the :
Soviet Union's actions and attitudes
toward its neighbors and its massive J
military buildup demonstrate to us that
such a condition does not exist today. If
a general pattern of aggression and in-
timidation can be referred to as
"detente," then surely the continued use
of the word is bereft of any significance
That is why our delegation has been
reluctant to use it in our final document
We will not permit its use as an attempt
to camouflage a policy of force.
Repression of Human Rights
Within the Soviet Union, the repression
of human rights continues with cruel re-
lentlessness. Even if we look only at
what has happened since April 10, when
the last recess of our meeting began, we
see that specific Soviet transgressions of
the Final Act have increased in number;
and intensity.
Here in Madrid, we have had some
movement in strengthening written com
mitments to reduce barriers to the
reunification of families. But that move-
ment on paper has not been reflected in
the practice of Soviet authorities.
Emigration figures for Armenians and
for ethnic Germans who want to rejoin
their families have dropped substantial-
ly. The number of Jews allowed to
emigrate is dropping at an even greater
rate. In the first 6 months of 1979,
24,794 Jews left the Soviet Union; in the
first 6 months of this year only 6,668
left— a decline of 73% in only 2 years.
For those Jews remaining, condi-
tions have continued to deteriorate. We
and other delegations have already
noted with deep regret and condemna-
tion the sentencing on June 18 of Viktor
Brailovsky. New arrests have taken
place. My files are filled with names and
letters reflecting individual human
tragedy inflicted by an insensitive
bureaucracy.
Here in Madrid, we have had diffi-
culty in negotiating a text on religious
freedom, in large part because of an in-
sistence on a variety of loopholes which
would enable real commitments to be
evaded. One of the loopholes is that our
commitments are to be qualified by the
"national traditions" of participating
states. Let us look at what that phrase
"national traditions" might mean.
June 27, exactly a month ago,
marked the third anniversary of the day
two devout Pentecostal families from far
Siberia sought refuge in the American
Embassy in Moscow. This desperate ac-
tion by the Vashchenko and
Chmykhailov families culminated 20
38
Department of State Bulletin
St
o c
© o
E"-
E °>
o a
O 2 o
•rWlO
0 ^ o>
— a t-
£ * >•
1 c =
H*> £
SoS
?■ '
co£K
.. « _
10 • ra
2 S 5
3 <0 C
O 3 C
</> m «*
^ o
-P a>
133 C«
sJ
<« £
W o
-O o
O C
l- O
-C to
t/i a)
12-2
.5 W
0)
_c <u
*^ u
<*-> c
o •-
*i ft
23 in
O aj
2 o
-w a,
-a £ o
.£ a>
T3
c« C
3 — '
a- c
J3 '3
o bo
S3 J3
O 3
o S
p, TO
£ ■"*
•- t-
O tH
g.So
n-o°p
ft-2o>
4) P_t>
ft p. to
tn +j ^
•S _ oo
<S 5 °°
-4-3 eg oo
-a
*■> t" c
0)
0)
2. c
111
oi me
o i>
£*<» -o o
« 1.^ «
9) S O
w s 12 <»
g § § S
S bo be S
o a> a> c
<C "5 o — ■
T3CJT3 -p
I
> to
0) S
en
K
j>
T~
vi
i/i
E
a>
m
c
0)
o
0
■o
—
CO
.o
F
c
o
c
o
c
3
ID
■o
(0
(0
.*:
a>
r
CO
5 ^
?»° oi
o
D
"O
o
e
D
CD
O
OJ
<D
C
'n
o
ro
E
~Sj
CJ
O
0)
LU
Clothing (not fur)
Organic chemicals
Motor vehicle parts
Plastic materials
Nonelectrical powe
Office machines
»§£
CO -= (U
en « ■=
co^d)
— tr -o
0) Q CC
*" © To
O § £
Z J oi
CO
CO
in
t-\C1C0S o
r- O O 1^- tD CD
co co rt "
en
c
o
O)
c
03
eg nj
co E
c _ 9- 2 — • 16 "> 0)
w 00
* .3 § CO ^ °
3 O (/)
r- oi o
§.= Is
& = 2 5.
ra co
co E
■o £ c S
= ° I I * >•
;= . Q. CD ^ —
CO
■o
c
erf
CO £
<*> m '
3 2 I
t>
o
o
3~.
CO
"8 £•
■3 C CO 4>
llj O
*- a a a)
.a a £ *
a g ra -a
S 8 co *
c3 9
-d J> .5 'o
•2 5 OJ -jj> . r
^ J3 co-
co <^
V
co -a 5b'
eg -s fc.
3
- O
O c73
2 SJ.5
t; u 'S -a ^ co
S c a c j= a>
- oj e e & e
Sl§l|i
-S 2 > t -2 |
o H -o art o
be
c
o
«
13
C
.3
'3
-c
OJ
° s
if ^
c rt
•35 ri
"a §
.2 o-t;
w C _ o °
•E co o oj t^
■B J3 -G > oo
CO oi *to
^ » -S '5 "2
" o oj a
£ 5,g
•a" =*
°"2
C oj
'Sra Pi
> =f'
Ci) i3
-OT3P
ftX
C3 ^-^
=«Z
ojO
_ -a — -
13 oj -M
• - S-. o
& -^ a
0>
OJ !— 1
J3 -^
0J
z *-
3 «
O
8*i-a-tp
c o
.2 c
T3 O
i « Si'
I'
oj -»-> s a t— i
•a <k -2 c O
ip S -B im oj
^ & c=2 S
°5 .S *^
CO ^^ o
~g?
o
a) -a
>>"S c
$ bo -
•- a w
S^'il^
o
0J CO
CO
oj £
t>^ a +^ +^ —
= a - 5ft ?
2 8 2? ?? ><
a ct o^o^ c
c °«§
o >>^
H C to
to *S
a £H
CO <H ■
8 a E?
ffiS-^
? oj ,o
iS co "«
S£«
<u o u
OJ +^ wr S -a
p^' — ! ^ « O C3
c
3
s
u
C
s 2 "* k.
b~<< T3 O ■ rt c •-
IS
CD
c
3
O
s
nj
CO
(D
O
o
■o
o
E
E
o
u
330
:=.W g-O
LL Q.
CO
o
15
.c
Q.
CO
o
Q.
O ra
= §>§!
5 5
to
S §£ o c
2> o « 2 q
CO
'53 1 E § c CTi "'IS
F
->
a
n
-O
^z
2cn
CO
CD
n
< CD
<D
3
ISJ
CI)
(i)
*0 tO
CD .!=
□
3
•- H
c
O
C uj
CD
3
>
<:_--
0)
3
CO
CD
E ° c
•I 5 $ 5 I -?
^rag^COgcO^
S5|3sq|~
Z DC CO c/>
CD
3
CO
O
co
E
c
CO
CD
>
5
CD
O P
CD
cu «
ft TO
O E
CD
ft
ft
O
O
O
CO
0.
ft
CD
?!
1
0><J
,±
C>
3 0
O
CO
CO
1-
N
N
<
m
CO
c£
E o
CD
>-
< a
s -a
cs c
-1 a
JD
O
CD
ft
CD :
c
CO
CJ
._ CD < O c
■o a) « — o
§ o
E
3
0)
o
% o ? 8
cfv-^r=Cn^:r)fflr<.
od30t;2o"2o2'd>-'=5:os-, ocoo— o
< cd otr o " ^" "•
a
5 5
o
o>
CO c
.0 g
o
CO
co
E
CO CO
.c i_ o ,_
CO CO T3 CO
CO
i_ CO
CD 2 •
i£i>s§,<»§:S|;5|3
<Dw-Sw~o-go>-wE<cm.EO
.r-cO-CO^mCOi-
j-mOOO-jQ-i-
,_ co
co <J
CO ^'(O
CD
i fS«ci
iOCOiJ
C c CO CO T3
— « c "D "■
CO CO
CD
CD
n
n
in
CD
a.
a
CD
en
C 1
ti
m
3
CO
3
E
CJ
>.
O
0
CO
2 ^ g eo
is -2 £ <& cu
° £ CD
go-3
co O
bo i
S §
c c
o«ig
1 O .5 .2 cu cd
-oft
cO
CO „
►—l ^ CO
a. s
x °
0) CD
^ -3
co <d
.2
3 co*
co cd .a .3
£ fe CD £.22
O co cd # to
CD -g S 5 w
-- ~ 'C cO ■
3 SP
o _g
—-H
2 -a
- - o -3 ^c
j.li^"S
£ £3
q m td
S-jo-g
O W
§0.
PQT3
.. CO
CO T3 CO
o'Sb
cS «« o
J2
rv 3 CO q
o 3
CD o
cd CD r^3
E "
3
a
CD
CO tn
c«
CD
-o «
CD *^
> CD
c 3
^ CO
CD
£-23£.h
Hj r w nj d
o cu S
c ° °*
CD -O CD
> OjS
CO fc* -*J
* ao
rt c
13 CD
CO 'tt
CO C3
CU ^~.
CJ CO
1.2
CO ft
cu -a
■gs
£'£
el ^J
I p
•e u
CO o CD
2 CD O C
CD
CJ*J o,
3 E CD
O rt co
2£.S
co A
CD
a. S co
O CD
P« ft
CO 2
CD |
ft ,
O 1
3 c0
cO t-
£|.
cu S
1 S o
? 3
"S 3-^3
J C0T3 CO
m X 5 a.
CD CD g ^
§•53 .c £
O >h " CD
0 o 3 S
t*-, co .2
CU CD co O
> T3 +*
t ft o
S 4) >>«=!
<« T3 ^2 CD
CD
>
JS
CO c
CD -3
"* co
£ 1
8 §
CJ
cu .
£ S
co g
«M 3
° CD
cu _
CJ -3
-a *
o ^
ft CD
CD 3
-3 '3
+J -a,
cb o-a.S'
CD «n C -3
foco-13 a
CD £ U '
CO _C 'C J;
_£« 5,2,
^^C3.S
S bo«-3
C C °» 3
cu S t> 3
fe12 o
CO CD -S «
-3 "2 O co
§ % 8"S
•2 2 £ o
1o ^is « =0
3 ^2 -S in 3
CD 3 bfifS CD
-M CD C "5 +J
,S£°2£
CD
ft
ft
o
0
c
cu _,
£ §
CD CJ
^ CO c
CO CO
3 SJ
O 43
"" 'S
c
E
£
c
o
ud K co
w CD cO
£ co £
■o CW
ft o Cu
^O co
- Cu cj
.2 .2 a
£ £^3
&§^
co cd hn-S"
-J5 ™ CD
3 2^
CO ft CJ
E -s
3 +j
2 3
O CD
is £
CD CD
ft CU
cd Ed
23 co
CO
cu _c
1- bo
c 3
£ o
3 -3
O co
<r> bo
S Jo
-a a>
CD -M
"SI
<S CD
c
01
E
o
h
5 ■= ?
e
en
CO
E
c
0
0)
o
c
CO
CD
O
CD
5
o
0)
CD
c
n
ID
n
uxembo
etherlar
nited Ki
QJ
D
Li.
CD
i
s
_l 2 3
O co
c
3 M
• -
ul
o
-z s
c
°5
M ™ E
£ a °
a
CD
c
nj
0)
to
CD
5
cs
:— .:= co O
o
1
0-
U- 3cT 0- CO
h-
t-
CO
C
2i
to
o
tn
CO >
m
.n
T3 i-
a
o
co a.
t-
CO
a> a.
13 Z>
N
M
<_>
E "o
= ; „ -s
S.e3-§
.5 n - =>
I-IIIQOUtBO)!-
|,=
CO CO
2 2
c
«
w CO
3 co
§ S-.2 I
= 3 co o
2ZZIB)(/10H/)l/l»!ini-l-
o
E
o
LU
Hi
■a
c
(0
a
u
<
.13 B
5.9
3
CO
CO ,_
co m
■? o
g s° «
2 Q C « CO g _
C000t3c.^£?
3 — 13 (« CO ._ — E-
jj <j£3 30
CO
co h. co cO
=o|5s««
CO ._
CO o> >
OoaiS""
> ^ J J 2 2
CO
o
3 C CD
E
CO CO
CO
o
5
E
o o =.
0> o
< CD 00 CO O O O OOOQ
o c
S-" c+_(
o o
CD en
J3 a>
£
o
O
O) J« c«
u coCU
e *■< e
I c 3
esc
- o
.- o
CJ O
<D \p
*- c
e.2
03
E
o
c
o
H -2 -s C
U CD
O 0) d>
. >
to C
a> o
SO
c
CO
c<3 Pc'ep
0) w > H
hB?5
cp Q)
c »-
m
e
u
c cp w 53 c
3 o 3 S -c M
§>£ $%
>,S« c
C ^ <« g
ccj o
E-a
.^O
C QJ
^ is
Qi «
& ^
-3 O)
eu g E
^5 cM'Su bJoS-5 &<
C~ CO -—
» D o
CO ^
co
c ~
o a;
o Xi
u E
O 0)
£
■->-<
■sill is-gp
o
00
o
a.
x
UJ
o
(A
c
£
u
• (
ra
= < -
- P 0)
0) ♦- to
c ^ to
3 5
n O
&
o
c w
c a.
< O
O -J 51
« is s
< -3 O O
CO
• cr
if) a
(0 £
Z> O
Si <o
S3 u o S <2
.£ ** <=• g
• 5 3 TO Cu
°Q | op-;
o J>» * — o —
BS *"§>£<#
t, 3 73 ft 2 W
° c ° ^ co M
jg S m« « -g
w -£ "2 .2 .2 -S
5 -1 "2
to o , — ,
>» ft u
3 x r
J3 a> "
5 $ g '_
li-
CO
ill
O — <D
O t) -o
- £ E
o *" o
— t °
c o ^
® S.Q
E x _-
e *u S
O J to
=j £ §
„ t o
8|d
C/3 I 0>
£
"3
_3
3
x
•22-
o
s-
r/i
CO
>> o
4> »
■K +J ft u
2 fe 2 <"
1 to <u
o o
ctj .*
.2- • »: 3
£:<*>. Q £
£ x
't? c
C ft
h3 So-o
>
a>
43
|o &
g rj^r
1 3 3 | * 1 |
83-0^
to c3 ft o J£ M
bo— <D
C to 13
^tS "g is
* ° c
o S5
-a
C
CO
£
s
■a
C
5
—
8
a .
a
s
o
o
M
*- oj to ?- t- *- r*- •«* co *- m
^ in T ■* co co cm
O
o.
E
a>
to
tj
c
as
£
U
u.
0)
o
w^
c E
■2 ^ o£
— p in m
t» I-
o 5 o -j
CO UJ
1o
O w
lu Q.
o. O
O _:
_: ^
x S. «
a)
S. a.
if §3|
< < O 3 o
l'§1°
1 6 s «
-2'S-c.S
" * 2
.S$ £.£>
§ ft£ 2
3 £ 5 g
ft © «« u
S ° to bo
8 § S <»
Bill
3e
3 •-
-a <D
o >
ft c
ecu
-, ft
s *
CP d>
"3 «
% 2
ft £
v
ca
8.2
e -
— CjJ
■o n
S E
S bo
'33
3
3 0) t-
0) js as
"© -"-> ■-•
111
Pi _D "5
E x
a. <0 ^-'
aj fP +j
V It o
ft-C ft
t«E
■c 3
If 8
(/) l O)
3
o
00
to
r
o
a.
X
HI
■o
£
U
o
? P o co
o
n
(0
** c
'■= < ~
5?
IS
C CO
•^ C
CO CO
_i O
o^ to
C CO
CD
< ™ < o => o
T3
3)
■§e«i
ho <D — )
« ho°
'a $
.2 bo
>- c
3
8
bJj i
S uj
ft-^
>
T3 '
y *. to
PC"5
° r ■*
O *B
;-£
CO c
0) ^3
o
ft
~- r^ ro
"^ ft^J
ho ctf £
Sod 2 *
<o°fl
DiSo
■c " -
0) O) ® «
o -=: Q o>
^ ■*= ~~ P
o?go
to I o> Q
in— jj-C in
aj goo >> . g
Eh & s 5 e S
<4-H C
+j © w 03
iliiti
<U a) T3 —; -a w
a) j: o 2 S o>
m"^ as jf£
■n c« 3 b 3 u
CD c -P o c a>
CD
3
£
B
a
u
a. m
Su
<
O
-„JSS
■g jS < -' oc -|
I 2 « = I Iri S |
in
u. o
. in
«J 1-
ID 2
" t °
E a°?
E 6 w
O — 03
2?E
O w CD
*- r- o
i- s <n
^ 8 £
CO ° f
d2»
■c y
bj oi «
= 0°
o>o ">
¥ f Z>
I O) =i
T3 J3
M "a, <i> "2
° -P c a
a, £ o d
GO
c<S P -C ™ h
-C a, cn.fi 5?
o> -a o> Sfi
O CD _ O
X TO
G
„- O +j
« 3
c fi
to to
M -
.£ ■-
'to to
Eh
>i a
TJ-S
to 13
c« cS
^ o, p £ nS tJ fe
_e -n -p £ a?© ¥
-P '3 "§ 5 g<cg
|al 1:3 8
to w
to "2
<sj a
-a c«
-Bel)
., G oi S
eg en -C
6< £
is a"
a
s
ta
oo £
as S
.ss
C« ^
o
Uj
00
an
CD
T-
,_
m
CM
CM
CM
en
CM
T-
r-
1—
i—
CO
CD
CM
CM
1—
CM
CM
T-
*f
T_
o
00
o>
y—
(A
l»
n
m
a
01
0
X
HI
5
s
a
JZ
O
c
<
3
E
0
T3
C
to
a
LU
3
0)
c
CO
CO
(0
CO
n
o
CO
O
7]
D
f-
fc
o
C
cr
to
w
k.
hi
01
tu
Y
' '
o>
<
CO
05
c
O
j5
-1
<
o
c
In
03
JZ
"5
z
5
■D
c
3
c
CL
<
c
O
X
2
in
IX
CO
CO
3
CO
c
r
X
CD
U
03
c
a5
_)
b<>
1-
—3
-I
<
-1
O
<
O
U
11 3 «?•£
+j • CO O*
MC0 *_.
_-C2
§3
W ^o -C
Is
c
V
3
o .
CD O ^
SH'S.S
4- CO
5 °?
o
< ra
»- CO
o to
_ CD
E P
3 C
to
3
OJ
2^C0
s- -i-i
O Bl^
r ^ «« "s '
i U II S
>>c »«
if**
c .3
OJ O
oj §; c« -w a
^ § OJ °
to 3 ■<-» _c >o
•~ *i 3 55?
3 2 t, "5
3 |l!
.1*
3i
3
•5
0)
co
■ P. OJ
-g ,g oj oj
.S to 0JU
■" u o to
-53 afe cf
OJ
w
re
oj
oj
X V o
E " S O ?
re
£
j=
^
-i
o
o
u
"(H
'/!
~
CI
^
■.;
OJ
3
ft
J3
CJ
3S
1 -
're
51
o
re
!I)
'T.
c
oj J2
rH
o
Si
2
H
C
■a
u
,0J
OJ
OJ
T3
3
O
re
o
■a
re
^r
C
o
C
re
re
_
4-3
X TO
- c
O
■fiSS
a '
" -; oj
CO •
C ^ cS °J
& CS >> OJ
3 =« 2
.
O 3 £
r- ■o nj
O
- E S
O
00
^r rou ^
Q O
, £ °
:§§
K S3 9
0)
TO O
§>£ g
c ° S
8 £ E
ft 'to 0>
.53 *- t.
a, ^
«.S
oo &
0» w
-- CD nj
E 3 -2
§ 8
C 03
•- ft
s 'C
o c
+3 'C
ft ft
£ cd
3 _C
H
£ CT>
TO- >— I
e
O T3
5 a
CO co
a) en
3 T~
£0 to
• 0>
CO C
-j <D
3 E
tu p
3 00
° =>.
00 £■
0
ft
£^
3
co <;
CD
C JO
CD
In
co O
« » P
he ->-j a v.
rOtS
03
►3 Sb cd
.5 CD '5 £
8.S
si
11
.5 c
+j cd
to c
° o
S co
CD
CO
■a c
TO Q>
T3 CD
c o
cd '_J3
•&c
CD cd
03 +-»
* c
T3
CD
cp.-S
o>-,a
c CD J3
,2j; J
e. •- jo
"*"" .9 CO
O CD w _
«• g.s-a
cS^"£
^ 2 « CD
CO .3 TO O -^ .rt ,n
o SoO m ° CO JS
CD _,
& S
O 2
CO
to
3 _
O T3
co C
— nS
a s
CO ■
cw
CD
B-S-1 6
-SftDS
c c
cs .5
5 £
o
a S
E S
3 ft
- Z <&
CD
'&,"2 co"
^ §S
3 &^
to -a en
&
CD CD
o § ^
c "ii
O Ph CD
• CO
3^ >,
CD -^
a, cd _c«
CD ^3 gj
(0
0)
u
3
O
o
o
I'D
w
CO
to
o
CO
-i>
in
o
CD
U")
*
is. ■«•
s
00
s
in
-^
n
m
CM
CM
CJ
CN
*~
*~
*■"
-
(0
■o
e
10
E
3
0
O <i>
5 °
Q. =
■" £
W
<n
0
2
E
LU
n
CO
<
CO
o
t-
E
o
E •"
- J2
co
co
co
CO
13
C
•a
c
CO
o
C3)
c
O t)
a S:
-1
<
1-
o
n
C3>
<
13
3
co
.Q
CD
3
N
CD
C
5
CD
o
o
X
CD
C
O
C
m
co
13
co
c
CO
<
■o
c
cd
13
co
13
c
13
CO L
II
> Q.
i-
.z
CO
-J
>
<
i
O
3
^
p-
3
z o
CO >>
-u c 9
- «ft
.So.m
Q- c =«
O 5 12
S_ O CO
^£ s
0) S
>
CD
t- o
a. v
03 E 3
en •— ra
* c= £
IS oJ>
a;
CD
H
£°
5 O1
S.S
CO +J
X _»»
a) co
— -O
°|
.SO
3 to •
^ -2 %
£3 s
^M o
_ ^3 w
-a cd 3
o +^ o
'S '2 —
oP's
-p 01 P
CO -C DC
** O V.
■g-gt.
3 o c
" S ST
cd i? £:
EJ52
E -o m-
o <i> "
O | o
— S a-
- »i
c « —
CD «- CO
| O |
to T; cu
Q w co
co § S
3 - in
. . co m
to P i-
CD *- o
2 2 «n
2 ra "~
O w 5
CO CO ±
. £
""«? CO
£^ e
-2 m CD
> fc« CO
cd o 5
■w cfl -w
«> ^^ 2
— fc, J3
co 0) ^-.
1) U CO
-^ 3 -;r
pi 3
o So>;
&■§§;
CO CD _ c
2 > co
ft O -13
£ k «
£ Oh CD
-e . 4-> v.
« • — ■ S-i o
11
E^
3 tt
cd a.
■o 3
_ CO
<D CO
O, CD
■83^'
co O
«!
Cu.S t(- H
C t- vfT3
•§ ^ H & 2
S§E §1
3 £ _ « efl
la "t: -B * -^
CO «+h
O .3 S °
^--^^ ho S o
2-3^ ho|
o
a.
x
LU
c
o
2 E
t: 3
o <n
a. c
E °
3
0)
5 >H
01
■c
01 _c
> *3
o
'E => ^
t
,-S s .a
Q.
" O i. o>
<t
gftl
1
eg
CO (-, -^
X OJ o
CO
==SC
■O
O
O
13 * £
E
. >- o a>
3
o
0) o
*- CO
9-S
J3 I.J5
01
R.2,5*
< c
JSES
en
CO Q.
? *
C
urths
eum E
result
-n
B
oi .2
<2 fa 4)
s-
0)
c
® 3
3%©-o ro
c
w O >
o) «n 33
•sl"§
oj rt b
U N 1
= ft-g «
co
01
c
a
~
c
0
§2
J O OS
-t->
3c "h
J 3 C r-
,5
E
'E S c
ftpi o
B
01
-more
ganizal
ntries.
01
mi 2
to *^ o
4J
01
OJ o
-O CJ
0,-n
» fc 3
J2 tM Q
3sO o
so0U
BS
3 °
in m.a
» 53 S
01
c
« 5
-M CO
^ k£ hf- '
r/j
>> M
§i 2 - i
OJ
O.S 2
3
CO
C -p
ft-^ S E
8V 2 o
-5 O <*5 D
+3
, 0
W S 5
Ph 2 u
O SU
0> fe
be S
CO
(/)
0)
0)
<D
T3
(0
i_
I-
<D
0)
o.
to
E
o>
X
c
k.
<D
•*—
(0
° "3,,
r\ <*> C
•s si ca
ca © c
C &cj
■ a x u
"S *>■£
_S2 "S <"
S3<!
^ 0) C
Is -wis
S O cfl
H30
.2 cu
+^ ~
C Cfl
«<*H
cu O
J#
~§
"° e
CO
CU CO
s- cu
cu .£
J3 ccj
Cc*-3
05 Cfl
'£■»
cu £
CU cu
+5 -C
a
CO
-JO S *-
p" °
• >.°"5
I C« 10 5
3 ss*.
ca
o
cu
.•a
c .0
cu -»-*
■° S
'5 8
O 3
c >
cu °
-C 05
"• ca
M Oh
c .
"5 g
£ Cfl
05 H-
2 °
., 3 cu '
>j O -C
o> "-S 3 -!2
e < =a is
cj -O Cfl =3
E _ca -a
o c
cu 03 j
-C 05
G 52 cfl .5
'" £ -"2
-a ca ca 2
«j;-o c
-a ca ca «u
-gmSo
^ cu s-<
5 js o 2 .2
CU 05
o -
c
^. cu
.5 ca c
o o g S*
{3 Q u -a
c
O o
Ol
« ***
c V
5 S
c >■
. . <D
O ^
C/3 O
8
§
g
§
s
) r
1 2
..
I
O)
C
TJ
c
CO
O
a. co £ Q.
° »S| « T,
5 i: J3 » CO
sss I € IS ga
Q I < 5 Q I 3 §
5 c c° £c E =
£ 3 = -O £ a a>«
— o CSC — o ~ c
OO J a OO £3
6
o
O +3
q5
*a
ft c
il.
bfl en .&
22E
- s*8
<» £ o>
o 2 «-
® w «;
1st
»- -> «
O oj CO
- « •
c ~ c
E ° I
as c
n " S ,_
£-1 -Q *- «
*■ 3 CO
DSo>
hi c; ^ cd
O W fl) 3
3 co & o
O 2 3 0)
00 00 00 U-
il
0>
s-
4_j en
c .
a) en
s
{J
tn
:?21
9> O^^,
ec
P
2 O
B o
3) o>
5 ~
- -o
a »
3 a
o «
=19
2^
<c o .
_ to
0J
CO
>
S
3
e
£
o
O
t/3
CO
<u
0)
bo-
* o -
s?:o
V T3
C e8
C3 o
ft (-1
CS XI
1-5 OS
31
O
c
c
u
W
c
ft
O
o to
,2 ^ ^
"T? __. -i-i
.£ ►=;
£ c
« J2 a-a
Europe
of frustrated attempts to emigrate
Duntry where they could practice
'aith freely. There are at least
) Pentecostals who want to
ate and are denied the right to do
evout Christian believers of all
linations have faced years of
;ution, imprisonment, and
natic discrimination in education
-nployment. Indeed, during
ius efforts to emigrate, four of the
henko children were placed by the
rities in a state orphanage, and
father was forcibly confined in a
iatric hospital. During the last 3
at least 250 Christians, to our
edge, have been imprisoned in the
.R. for pursuing the dictates of
faith and conscience. These include
sts, Adventists, Pentecostals, Rus-
)rthodox, True Orthodox, Greek
'lies, Roman Catholics, and
ah's Witnesses.
e have every reason to wonder
ler this pattern of arrests may not
■ "national tradition" we are asked
idone. This kind of "national tradi-
has no place in any document
ht forth by our meeting.
major objective of many delega-
jat Madrid, including our own, has
i:o seek language in our final docu-
I that calls for the removal of
bles preventing the individual from
jssing his views and otherwise
ling and acting upon his rights and
I in the human rights area, in-
lig those concerning the implemen-
i of the Final Act. The basis for
is in principle VII of the Final Act.
• therefore, relevant to examine
I has happened to the human rights
sts and groups in the Soviet Union,
|2 purpose is exactly to concern
selves with the implementation of
ielsinki Final Act.
ince early June, three members of
sychiatric watch group, which was
p to monitor the abuse of
liatric medicine to inflict political
hment, have been sentenced to
n terms.
)ne of them, Anatoly Koryagin, a
liatrist, was sentenced on June 5 to
irs in a labor camp plus 5 years of
nal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation
Dropaganda." Koryagin's crime was
test to the sanity of Aleksie Nikitin,
aing engineer who was forcibly com-
id to the Dnepropetrovsk special
hiatric hospital for protesting
ist unsafe working conditions of
rs in the Donetsk region.
In a plenary statement on May 12,
I noted the fifth anniversary of the
Moscow Helsinki monitoring group.
Since then, that group, and the Lithua-
nian and Ukrainian monitoring groups
as well, have been further decimated by
arrests and trials. This is the occasion to
remember that the health of the Moscow
group's founder, Yuri Orlov, and of
founding member Anatoly Shcharansky,
continues to worsen in prison, as does
the health of Estonian rights advocate
Mart Niklus, who is serving a 15-year
sentence.
Raisa Rudenko, the wife of the
founder of the Ukrainian Helsinki
monitoring group, Mykola Rudenko, who
is himself serving a 12-year sentence,
was arrested on May 12 in Kiev. We
have only recently learned of the re-
arrest on March 24 of Ivan Kandyba,
founding member of the Ukrainian
group, who now faces the possibility of
yet another 15-year sentence, which
would bring the total years he will have
spent in confinement to 30.
We learned, too, that two new
members of the Lithuanian monitoring
group, Vytautas Vaiciunas and
Mecislovas Jurivicius, were arrested and
charged with "anti-Soviet fabrications"
and participating in religious proces-
sions.
And in Latvia on June 9, Juris
Bumeisters, a 63-year-old electrical
engineer, was sentenced to 15 years of
strict regimen camp for treason,
reportedly in connection with his in-
volvement in the Latvian Social
Democratic Party, which belongs to the
Socialist International.
And Andrei Sakharov remains
banished to Gorky, weaker in physical
strength, isolated by the Soviet
authorities— but not forgotten by the
world.
I am aware that we have mentioned
many names today. I only wish that the
list of arrests and persecutions since
April 10 was much smaller, indeed,
nonexistent. Let me only state that the
names mentioned were but a few, il-
CSCE Review Conference
The CSCE [Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe] review con-
ference in Madrid has agreed to recess
until late October, when it will
reconvene for about 8 weeks. The inflex-
ible position taken by the Soviet Union
on both security issues and human rights
has made a constructive outcome im-
possible and precipitated the recess. The
NATO nations, with the expressed ap-
preciation of members of the neutral/
nonaligned group, attempted during the
past 2 weeks to bridge East- West dif-
ferences. Toward this end we presented
a major initiative for a balanced outcome
at Madrid. It proposed movement for-
ward in the human rights area, along
with a revised formulation for the man-
date for the French-proposed conference
on disarmament in Europe which would
negotiate confidence-and-security-
building measures in Europe.
The Soviet Union, however, rejected
both the human rights and security com-
ponents of this initiative out of hand and
tabled a counterproposal which reflected
no forward movement whatsoever and
was recognized quickly by the Western
nations as being so extreme as to close
off any serious negotiations. The im-
passe reached at Madrid has highlighted,
once again, the serious shortcomings of
the Soviet Union in carrying out CSCE
obligations, as well as its record of
human rights violations generally. At
the same time, the Soviet response to
the West's efforts to reach agreement
on a disarmament conference man-
date— and particularly the continuing
Soviet refusal to permit all of its Euro-
pean territory to be covered by a
confidence- and security-building meas-
ures regime — reinforces serious doubts
about Moscow's commitment to the arms
control process and to practical efforts
to reduce international tensions.
Developments in Madrid have
underlined, once again, the importance
of the allied unity and firmness which
have characterized the negotiations
throughout the conference. We and our
allies value highly the CSCE process.
We remain dedicated to a dialogue on
humanitarian and arms control issues
wherever serious dialogue is possible.
But this depends on Soviet willingness
to participate in meaningful negotiations
and to seek constructive solutions. We
hope such an attitude will be reflected in
the East's positions when the Madrid
meeting resumes in the fall and will
enable the participants to agree on a
balanced and substantive concluding
document by mid-December.
CSCE press release of July 27, 1981 (made
available to news correspondents by Depart-
ment spokesman Dean Fischer). ■
tember 1981
39
Europe
lustrative of many more men and
women who have become victims of
state oppression.
What we have witnessed during the
entire life of this Madrid meeting— while
the Soviet delegation has been profess-
ing its fidelity to the Final Act— is a
systematic effort by the regime to
destroy the entire human rights move-
ment in the Soviet Union. No human
rights group has been left untouched.
But these men and women know they
have friends. They are not forgotten.
We remember them here. Their friends
will continue to remember. Books
published all over the world will recall
their deeds for new generations to
remember.
We have on another occasion noted
that in Czechoslovakia human rights
champions are facing similar dangers.
On July 9, Jiri Gruntorad, a young
fighter for human rights and a signer of
Charter 77, was sentenced to 4 years in
prison for subversion. Following mass
arrests on April 28, trials have begun
for members of Charter 77 and VONS
(the Committee for the Defense of the
Unjustly Persecuted). Just yesterday,
the trial of spokesman Rudolph Battek
took place. There are reports that other
trials are imminent. We deeply hope
that the Czechoslovak regime will recon-
sider before it does new damage to its
standing at this conference and its rela-
tions with the states represented here.
The head of the Soviet delegation
has reminded us many times of the
small number of human rights activists
that exist in his country. Then why is his
government so afraid of them? Has it so
little confidence in itself that it cannot
tolerate the activities of a handful of
people? Why is a state that calls for
peaceful coexistence unable to coexist
with its own internal differing views?
Why must it punish people for asking
their government to observe the com-
mitments it assumed of its own free
will?
I will make a prediction— not a
warning, a prediction. The regime can,
by force, weaken and even come close to
obliterating the formal human rights
movement in the Soviet Union. We
know from recent history that any
totalitarian regime can, if it is ruthless
enough, succeed with repression— in the
short run. But the struggle for liberty
will remain alive. The movement will
survive and in time flourish. It will re-
main alive because new people will
emerge to take the place of those who
have fallen. It will survive because the
whole of history has shown that no
method of police brutality has yet been
devised to crush the human spirit.
Let me now state that we do not
here seek, nor do we have a right to
seek under the Helsinki Final Act, to in-
terfere with the political, social,
economic, and cultural system of any
other participating state. We do not do
so. But we have every right to insist
that participating states conform to the
provisions of the act. What state here
maintains that human brutality and
repression are an integral part of its
system? What state here maintains that
to abide by the terms of the Helsinki
Final Act is incompatible with its
system? To insist that respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms be
maintained is our right under the act; in-
deed, it is our duty if we are to take the
Helsinki Final Act seriously.
I speak for the American people
when I say we want the peoples gov-
erned by the Soviet Union to become the
great contributors to civilization that
they aspire to be. We look to the day
when their government can unlock the
genius of its peoples— great peoples
with profound cultures and proud
histories. We pray that the government
will gain the self-confidence and the
moral courage to advance human rights
rather than suppress them because that
is the key to the genius and greatness of
any people.
The transgressions of the Final Act
here cited, all of them applying to the
short period since our last recess, are
raised to underscore a point essential to
the success of the Madrid meeting.
Events outside our conference cloud the
possibility of significant achievements
here. Their improvement will be
reflected in an improved spirit here.
The Tasks Ahead
The U.S. delegation will return in Oc-
tober with determination to fulfill its
responsibilities under the Helsinki Final
Act. We join nearly all of the delega-
tions here in our determination to bring
this meeting to a close with positive,
substantial, and balanced results. What
we need to accomplish this objective is a
reciprocal commitment. We need a
demonstration that the Soviet Union in-
tends to abide by the provisions of the
Final Act. Our peoples have every right
to ask what good it does to talk about
new promises when the old ones are not
kept.
The delegation of the United States
will persevere in our efforts here for
peace, security, and understanding and
for the building of the CSCE process
What we have already done in a loru
months in Madrid is inadequate, but
can provide a good basis on which w
can build.
It is our view that the best wayl
build is by:
• Finding language which make;
mistakable reference to the importac
role that Helsinki monitors can play;
• Agreeing to discuss our proble
in the human rights area and human
contacts in a serious, thoughtful, and
constructive spirit at post-Madrid ex-
perts' meetings;
• Putting specific content into tf
Final Act language on freedom of
religion;
• Reaching consensus on a stroni
information text. It is the unique gift
thought which distinguishes man fror
the animal world. The right to hear £
and ideas through, among other thing
the unimpeded dissemination of broai
cast information is an integral part ol
that thought process, as is clear protf |
tion for professional journalists, a via i
channel through which facts and idea
are communicated; and
• Agreeing on a final document
which sets an early date for the next
follow-up meeting. In the very first di
of the Madrid meeting last Septembe)
urged that the best way to show com-
mitment to the Helsinki process was I
agree at the very outset that we woul
have another follow-up meeting at a
reasonable time following the close of
this one. For more than 10 months, tl
Soviet Union has refused to join us in
this commitment.
These objectives can be met in the
weeks that remain to us. Indeed, they
could have been met in these last few
weeks if our offer to negotiate on the
issues I have just listed had been ac-
cepted.
As we look ahead to our reconvene
session, it is important to take care thi
the length of this meeting does not I
distort its original and intended balanc
This would not be healthy for the
Helsinki process. We must not turn tht
CSCE into a military forum or our
meeting into a preparatory one for a
military conference. Thus, when we J
return, our delegation intends to assurt
an equitable balance by continuing to
press for our human rights proposals;
and we will continue to refer to im-
plementation issues as events require.
We cannot treat this meeting as if it
were an ivory tower, above the clouds
which darken the world.
40
Department of State Bulletii
Europe
finally, let us face the fact that the
lession is, in all likelihood, our last
iv for a substantial concluding docu-
D We note here the realism of the
I delegate last Friday. To proceed
Ud December without agreement
»ell risk scorn for the CSCE proc-
I: is too early to contemplate such a
pointing result. But we have less
lhan we think. Facing reality early
lelp us to mobilize ourselves for the
■positive results we seek,
lo delegation represented here will
late more seriously in the 8 weeks
I us than the U.S. delegation. We
means return home today deter-
I to continue to do our part to
I the full contribution that the
I process and the aims of security
poperation require of all of us. I
1 that in this we are joined by
. We pray that we will be joined by
th Anniversary
Ithe Berlin Wall
ist 13, 1981, marks the 20th an-
Isary of the construction of the
h Wall. During the past two
sles, this ugly barrier has provided a
[ant reminder of the tragic division
U German nation and the European
rinent. It has provided poignant
i nee of the painful human divisions
f^ht about by Soviet hegemony in
sarn Europe and the German
Dcratic Republic. It has also been
l.atic proof of the inability of Com-
1st systems throughout Europe to
Ithe allegiance of their peoples,
ror more than 30 years, the situa-
:in Berlin has drawn the attention of
men everywhere. Construction of
Berlin Wall in August 1961 followed
inprecedented exodus of more than
llion East Germans fleeing from
ical oppression. In that same year,
ietermined people of West Berlin
snstrated anew the spirit that has
led them to maintain the freedom of
tVestern Sectors 110 miles inside
munist territory. This determination
:ontinued unabated during the past
ears. Today, as in the past, West
in remains a vibrant, prosperous
The variety of its economic,
tical, and cultural achievements
ds in stark contrast to the controlled
otone of the East.
The United States is honored to
itain with the British and French
Between 1946 and 1961, more than 4 million people fled from East Berlin to the West.
Since the construction of the wall in August 1961, the number of refugees has been re-
duced to a trickle. The Berlin Wall (shown here) is being constantly reinforced by East
German authorities.
allies the responsibility for defense of
freedom in the Western Sectors of
Berlin. It also views its commitment to
maintenance of Four Power rights and
responsibilities for all of Berlin as one of
the cornerstones of the American
presence in Europe. In times of crisis,
the United States has demonstrated its
determination to help preserve the
democratic system in West Berlin, with
military means if necessary. When com-
promise appeared possible, the United
States took the lead in seeking
pragmatic solutions to the problems
which plagued the divided city. The
Quadripartite Agreement of September
3, 1971, is a prime example of the type
of understandings which can be reached
between East and West if the Western
nations demonstrate clearly their inten-
tion of seeking practical and beneficial
solutions without abandoning their
readiness to defend their interests when
necessary.
The United States remains commit-
ted to seeking practical solutions to
problems which cause tensions in and
around Berlin. It views seriously the
commitments contained in the
Quadripartite Agreement, including the
reaffirmation of quadripartite rights and
responsibilities for Berlin and Germany
as a whole. This means that these joint
rights and responsibilities apply to all
sectors of Berlin, including East Berlin.
At the same time, the United States
views this 20th anniversary of the tragic
division of Berlin through the Berlin
Wall as an occasion to reaffirm its com-
mitment to the freedom of the human
spirit which has refused to die in Berlin.
The continued need of the East German
regime to maintain the Berlin Wall is
proof that Berliners in both East and
West have not abandoned their ties to
each other. They have not lost their at-
tachment to one of the most basic of
human desires— the desire to be allowed
to live one's life as one chooses without
undue interference from the state. At a
time when the complexity of problems
facing the world is severely taxing the
abilities of societies everywhere, the ex-
ample provided by Berliners, despite the
ugly East German Wall, demonstrates
anew the flexibility, adaptability, and
basic human appeal of a free, pluralistic
way of life.
Press release 276 of Aug. 12, 1981.1
tember 1981
41
HUMAN RIGHTS
U.S. Commitment
to Human Rights
by Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.
Statement before the Subcommittee
on Human Rights and International
Organizations of the House Foreign Af-
fairs Committee on July U, 1981. Am-
bassador Stoessel is Under Secretary for
Political Affairs. 1
Under this Administration, the protec-
tion and enhancement of human rights is
a principal goal of our foreign policy. In-
deed, it shapes the fundamental pur-
poses and helps define the context of
our international relationships. This
commitment to human rights, like our
entire foreign policy, is an expression of
values deeply held by the American peo-
ple themselves. In the debate over how
best to pursue human rights, we should
not lose sight of the broad consensus
that exists about most human rights
issues. It is recognized the world over
that America, as a nation, is in the
forefront in the struggle to advance
human rights. Americans object to viola-
tions of human rights wherever they oc-
cur. We believe that human rights prac-
tices are an important factor in our rela-
tions with other countries, and we
Americans believe that when things are
wrong, they should be set right— that is
our duty to help. Our law and our policy
reflect these deep feelings and draw
strength and inspiration from them.
As the spokesman for the American
people, this Administration opposes the
violation of human rights whether by
ally or adversary, friend or foe. Ours is
not a policy of "selective indignation."
Rather, it is one of balanced and even-
handed condemnation of human rights
violations wherever they occur.
Secretary Haig has outlined the main
tenets of this Administration's foreign
policy:
• Our emphasis on defending U.S.
national security;
• Our determination to work closely
with our allies and friends and to
strengthen our alliances;
• Our dedication to improving our
relations with developing countries; and
• The President's economic program
which is transforming and revitalizing
the nation's economy and providing the
material basis for a sound foreign policy.
Our commitment to human rights is
fundamental. It is an integral element of
this Administration's foreign policy,
which must be considered along with—
not against— these other factors in mak-
ing particular foreign policy decisions.
Just as the consideration of human
rights should not be a mere afterthought
in the foreign policy process, neither
should it be isolated and pursued as if it
were the only goal in our relations with
other countries. We believe that human
rights are not only compatible with our
national interest; they are an indispen-
sable element of the American ap-
proach—at home and abroad. Our objec-
tive is to make our security interests
and our human rights concerns mutually
reinforcing so that they can be pursued
in tandem.
U.S. human rights policy also should
be directed toward attaining real results.
It should utilize the approaches most
likely to attain a real improvement in
human rights. It should be effective.
This has usually been the American ap-
proach, one of effective pragmatism. In
pursuing this course, we recognize that
the countries of the world vary tremen-
dously in political, economic, and
cultural terms, representing a diverse in-
heritance of historical traditions and
contemporary circumstances. We need,
in the 1980s, the sophistication to apply
our instruments of influence in ways
that correspond to— and respect— the
complex international system, while
working to move all countries to show
greater respect for the internationally
agreed standards of human rights. Our
task is to translate these agreements in-
to reality.
The United States has a number of
instruments with which we can— and
will— promote human rights. If the
United States is to show leadership in
the cause of human rights, we must lead
in the first instance by our own exam-
ple. This is a precondition for success.
We need to be an example to other na-
tions—both of strength and pros-
perity—and of our vibrant democratic in-
stitutions, for we cannot call on others
to meet high human rights standards
unless we do so ourselves. President
Reagan has captured this concept clearly
in speaking of the United States as a
city upon a hill. We have much to be
proud of in this regard.
We must match our commitment
principle with strong political resolv*
Our influence on human rights can a
tend only as far as our reputation fos
reliability to friends and allies and th
respect we generate from our adver-
saries. This Administration will meej
these preconditions for a successful!
human rights policy.
We believe that the use of tradi-
tional diplomacy is generally more ac-
tive than other approaches and is nn
likely to lead to results. Traditional I
diplomacy has always combined pubB
and private aspects but with greater
reliance on private approaches becau
of their flexibility and precision andl
because they avoid injury to the dip
of sovereign states. If we want other
governments to curb human rights i
abuses in their countries we should I
speak to them privately first and in I
ways which do not threaten them wil
public loss of face, which often leads
only to obstinacy. We should speak b
them, where possible, in the framewi
of friendly relations grounded in trus
and reciprocity.
In a large number of countries in
areas of the world we are undertakir.
vigorous diplomatic interventions, bo j
to remind governments of our contin
concern about general human rights
ditions and to seek relief for particul;
victims. We have done the latter witi
governments whose relationships wit
us are very diverse. But in pursuing
diplomacy, it is particularly importan
avoid any attitude that seems patron
ing or arrogant.
While private diplomacy will be t\
preferred approach of this Adminstr?
tion, it is, of course, vital not to forgi
that public expressions of concern ca!
also be a useful instrument of human
rights policy. We will continue to use
this instrument where it is needed. A
one example, the Administration was
pleased to be able recently to contribi
$1.5 million to the International Com'
mittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in su]
port of its program for protecting am
assisting political detainees in many j
countries. This was the first U.S. con
tribution, in response to an appeal wl
ICRC made in early 1980. The progra
is a valuable means of providing supp
to political prisoners through neutral
channels and also is consonant with tl
Administration's intention to heighten
international consciousness of human
rights problems.
We will never be in the position 01
seeming, through silence, to renounce
what America stands for. But in using
42
Department of State Bulle
IMMIGRATION
,cy to raise the world's con-
less of human rights, we will
nproductive posturing that could
;ate real progress.
o current examples of our public
rights diplomacy are the Ad-
•ation's approach to the Con-
; on Security and Cooperation in
! (CSCE) and the 37th session of
•J. Human Rights Commission.
\t Madrid the U.S. delegation has
ltly upheld the banner of human
while throwing full light on viola-
y the Soviet Union and some East
?an states, and pressing hard for
e steps which will assist in the
tion of human rights.
At the U.N. Human Rights Com-
1 meeting, which opened barely 2
after the inauguration, we em-
id the continued U.S. interest in
rights. The major achievement
e commission's adoption of the
ation on the Elimination of All
of Intolerance and Discrimination
on Religion or Belief. Also
3rthy were the resolutions con-
l Soviet activities in Afghanistan
man rights violations in Kam-
Ithose instances where nothing
or will be effective and where
! emains a need to make our posi-
|iequivocally clear to preserve in-
lonal standards, we will be
[ed to deal with human rights
bns with the various diplomatic
:onomic measures available to us.
lally, to encourage a better world
f for human rights, we are at-
ing to strengthen adherence to in-
onal legal standards whenever
e. The international sense of what
nissible and impermissible can be
beneficial to the suffering people
1 the world. We do not nurture
ternational sense of acceptable
or if we respond weakly to
;es against our citizens and
lats or fail to defend our rights,
is reason, we have declared we
)t negotiate with hostage takers,
e have begun a serious program to
:r international terrorism which
rates some of the crudest viola-
>f human rights,
dealing with specific human
problems, we will be applying a
;r of common sense criteria.
• We should act in ways that are
most likely to improve actual human
rights conditions. This is our most im-
portant principle.
• At the same time, we should con-
sider the absolute as well as the relative
human rights conditions. There can be
cases where human rights violations are
so extreme that even improved condi-
tions should not make us change our at-
titude.
• Trends are important. Improve-
ments—as well as deterioration in past
performance— should be weighed
carefully.
• In a few cases we must take a
stand even if it will have no immediate
effect. In a case like the Kampuchean
genocide we must speak out simply to
maintain our conception of decency and
to preserve the shreds of international
consensus on human rights standards.
• When we decide on an action pro-
moting a right or remedying a violation,
we must weigh the importance of the
particular human rights involved. Tor-
ture and physical abuse are especially
abhorrent. We also attach particular im-
portance to promotion of political rights.
• We also realize that there are dif-
ferences in the universality with which
we can secure various rights. Some
rights can easily be instituted
everywhere, given good will; others re-
quire complex preconditions. It follows
that we demand the first category more
universally than the second. Some parts
of the world have longer and deeper
traditions of respect for human rights.
There is, of course, no general for-
mula for how we weigh the criteria with
one another in all parts of the world,
and these criteria are only illustrative.
Moreover, human rights considerations
will be weighed with other foreign policy
concerns. In short, we must decide
human rights issues on a case-by-case
basis, but in the light of American prin-
ciples. We are developing our criteria in
light of experience and welcome this op-
portunity to gain the wisdom of the com-
mittee on this subject.
To conclude, in making decisions on
human rights policy we are likely to con-
front many dilemmas. We will face
many difficult cases, and it will be hard
to be sure that we have made the right
decision; sometimes we may err, but, if
we are guided by our principles and
learn from our experience, we will refine
our judgments as we proceed. We will
move closer to our goal of serving
human rights and our national interest,
of living in a world that is both safer
and more just.
'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
U.S. Immigration
Policy
PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
JULY 30, 1981 '
Our nation is a nation of immigrants.
More than any other country, our
strength comes from our own immigrant
heritage and our capacity to welcome
those from other lands. No free and
prosperous nation can, by itself, accom-
modate all those who seek a better life
or flee persecution. We must share this
responsibility with other countries.
The bipartisan select commission
which reported this spring concluded
that the Cuban influx to Florida made
the United States sharply aware of the
need for more effective immigration
policies, and the need for legislation to
support those policies.
For these reasons, I asked the At-
torney General last March to chair a
Task Force on Immigration and Refugee
Policy. We discussed the matter when
President Lopez Portillo visited me last
month, and we have carefully considered
the views of our Mexican friends. In ad-
dition, the Attorney General has con-
sulted with those concerned in Congress
and in affected States and localities and
with interested members of the public.
The Attorney General is undertaking
administrative actions, and submitting to
Congress, on behalf of the Administra-
tion, a legislative package based on eight
principles. These principles are designed
to preserve our tradition of accepting
foreigners to our shores but to accept
them in a controlled and orderly fashion.
• We shall continue America's tradi-
tion as a land that welcomes peoples
from other countries. We shall also, with
other countries, continue to share in the
responsibility of welcoming and reset-
tling those who flee oppression.
• At the same time, we must insure
adequate legal authority to establish con-
trol over immigration: to enable us,
mber 1981
43
MIDDLE EAST
when sudden influx of foreigners occur,
to decide to whom we grant the status
of refugee or asylee; to improve our
border control; to expedite (consistent
with fair procedures and our Constitu-
tion) return of those coming here illegal-
ly; to strengthen enforcement of our fair
labor standards and laws; and to
penalize those who would knowingly en-
courage violation of our laws. The steps
we take to further these objectives,
however, must also be consistent with
our values of individual privacy and
freedom.
• We have a special relationship
with our closest neighbors, Canada and
Mexico. Our immigration policy should
reflect this relationship.
• We must also recognize that both
the United States and Mexico have
historically benefitted from Mexicans ob-
taining employment in the United
States. A number of our States have
special labor needs, and we should take
these into account.
• Illegal immigrants in considerable
numbers have become productive
members of our society and are a basic
part of our work force. Those who have
established equities in the United States
should be recognized and accorded legal
status. At the same time, in so doing,
we must not encourage illegal immigra-
tion.
• We shall strive to distribute fairly,
among the various localities of this coun-
try, the impacts of our national immigra-
tion and refugee policy, and we shall im-
prove the capability of those agencies of
the Federal Government which deal with
these matters.
• We shall seek new ways to in-
tegrate refugees into our society without
nurturing their dependence on welfare.
• Finally, we recognize that im-
migration and refugee problems require
international solutions; we will seek
greater international cooperation in the
resettlement of refugees and, in the
Caribbean Basin, international coopera-
tion to assist accelerated economic
development to reduce motivations for
illegal immigration.
Immigration and refugee policy is an
important part of our past and fun-
damental to our national interest. With
the help of the Congress and the
American people, we will work toward a
new and realistic immigration policy, a
policy that will be fair to our own
citizens while it opens the door of oppor-
tunity for those who seek a new life in
America.
Sinai Multinational Force
and Observers Established
'Text from White House press
release. ■
At a ceremony at the Department of
State on August 3, 1981, Ephraim
Evron, Ambassador of Israel to the
United States, and AshrafA. Gorbal,
Ambassador of Egypt to the United
States, signed the protocol establishing
the Sinai multinational force and
observers (MFO). Secretary Haig signed
as witness for the United States.
Following are the texts of identical
letters from Secretary Haig to Yitzhak
Shamir, Foreign Minister of Israel, and
Kamal Hasan Ali, Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs of Egypt, of August 3; the protocol,
annex, and appendix; and a statement by
Nicholas A. Veliotes, Assistant Secretary
for Near Eastern and South Asian Af-
fairs, before the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee on July 20, 1981.
SECRETARY'S LETTER
TO EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI
FOREIGN MINISTERS,
AUG. 3, 1981
Dear Mr. Minister:
I wish to confirm the understandings con-
cerning the United States' role reached in
your negotiations on the establishment and
maintenance of the Multinational Force and
Observers:
1. The post of the Director-General will
be held by U.S. nationals suggested by the
United States.
2. Egypt and Israel will accept proposals
made by the United States concerning the ap-
pointment of the Director-General, the ap-
pointment of the Commander, and the finan-
cial issues related to paragraphs 24-26 of the
Annex to the Protocol, if no agreement is
reached on any of these issues between the
Parties. The United States will participate in
deliberations concerning financial matters. In
the event of differences of view between the
Parties over the composition of the MFO, the
two sides will invite the United States to join
them in resolving any issues.
3. Subject to Congressional authorization
and appropriations:
A. The United States will contribute an
infantry battalion and a logistics support unit
from its armed forces and will provide a
group of civilian observers to the MFO.
B. The United States will contribute
one-third of the annual operating expenses of
the MFO. The United States will be reim-
bursed by the MFO for the costs incurred in
the change of station of U.S. Armed Forces
provided to the MFO and for the costs in-
curred in providing civilian observers to the
MFO. For the initial period (July 17,
1981-September 30,1982) during which the:
will be exceptional costs connected with tktl ^
establishment of the MFO, the United Stat)
agrees to provide three-fifths of the costs,
subject to the same understanding concent
reimbursement.
C. The United States will use its bed
efforts to find acceptable replacements for
contingents that withdraw from the MFO.
D. The United States remains prepar
to take those steps necessary to ensure the
maintenance of an acceptable MFO.
I wish to inform you that I sent today:
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel [of
Egypt] an identical letter, and I propose tk
my letters and the replies thereto constitut-
an agreement among the three States. '
Sincerely,
Alexander M. Haig.Ji
PROTOCOL
In view of the fact that the Egyptian-Israeli
Treaty of Peace dated March 26, 1979 i
(hereinafter, "the Treaty"), provides for the
fulfillment of certain functions by the Unite
Nations Forces and Observers and that the
President of the Security Council indicated
on 18 May 1981, that the Security Council
was unable to reach the necessary agreeme;
on the proposal to establish the UN Forces
and Observers, Egypt and Israel, acting in
full respect for the purposes and principles
the United Nations Charter, have reached t
following agreement:
1 . A Multinational Force and Observers
(hereinafter, "MFO") is hereby established a
an alternative to the United Nations Forces
and Observers. The two parties may considi
the possibility of replacing the arrangement
hereby established with alternative ar-
rangements by mutual agreement.
2. The provisions of the Treaty which
relate to the establishment and functions au
responsibilities of the UN Forces and
Observers shall apply mutatis mutandis to
the establishment and functions and respon-
sibilities of the MFO or as provided in this
Protocol.
3. The provisions of Article IV of the
Treaty and the Agreed Minute thereto shall
apply to the MFO. In accordance with
paragraph 2 of this Protocol, the words
"through the procedures indicated in
paragraph 4 of Article IV and the Agreed
Minute thereto" shall be substituted for "by
the Security Council of the United Nations
with the affirmative vote of the five perma-
nent members" in paragraph 2 of Article IV
of the Treaty.
4. The Parties shall agree on the nations
from which the MFO will be drawn.
44
Department of State Bulletii
Middle East
The mission of the MFO shall be to
ike the functions and responsibilities
;ed in the Treaty for the United Na-
orces and Observers. Details relating
nternational nature, size, structure
jration of the MFO are set out in the
d Annex.
The Parties shall appoint a Director-
1 who shall be responsible for the
in of the MFO. The Director-General
ubject to the approval of the Parties,
; a Commander, who shall be responsi-
the daily command of the MFO.
relating to the Director-General and
Timander are set out in the attached
The expenses of the MFO which are
rered by other sources shall be borne
by the Parties.
Disputes arising from the interpreta-
d application of this Protocol shall be
d according to Article VII of the
This Protocol shall enter into force
ach Party has notified the other that
onstitutional requirements have been
11. The attached Annex shall be regard-
9 n integral part hereof. This Protocol
1? communicated to the Secretary
j.l of the United Nations for registra-
) acccordance with the provisions of Ar-
>I2 of the Charter of the United Na-
3 Government of the
Republic of Egypt:
F A. Gorbal
Government of
ite of Israel:
1M EVRON
;sed by:
InderM. Haig, Jr.
e Government of the
States of America
or-General
Parties shall appoint a Director-
il of the MFO within one month of the
z, of this Protocol. The Director-General
erve a term of four years, which may
ewed. The Parties may replace the
or-General prior to the expiration of his
The Director-General shall be responsi-
• the direction of the MFO in the fulfill-
)f its functions and in this respect is
•ized to act on behalf of the MFO. In
lance with local laws and regulations
ie privileges and immunities of the
the Director-General is authorized to
e an adequate staff, to institute legal
;dings, to contract, to acquire and
e of property, and to take those other
s necessary and proper for the fulfill-
ed his responsibilities. The MFO shall
not own immovable property in the territory
of either Party without the agreement of the
respective government. The Director-General
shall determine the location of his office, sub-
ject to the consent of the country in which
the office will be located.
3. Subject to the authorization of the Par-
ties, the Director-General shall request those
nations agreeable to the Parties to supply
contingents to the MFO and to receive the
agreement of contributing nations that the
contingents will conduct themselves in
accordance with the terms of this Protocol.
The Director-General shall impress upon con-
tributing nations the importance of continuity
of service in units with the MFO so that the
Commander may be in a position to plan his
operations with knowledge of what units will
be available. The Director-General shall ob-
tain the agreement of contributing nations
that the national contingents shall not be
withdrawn without adequate prior notifica-
tion to the Director-General.
4. The Director-General shall report to
the Parties on developments relating to the
functioning of the MFO. He may raise with
either or both Parties, as appropriate, any
matter concerning the functioning of the
MFO. For this purpose, Egypt and Israel
shall designate senior responsible officials as
agreed points of contact for the Director-
General. In the event that either Party or the
Director-General requests a meeting, it will
be convened in the location determined by
the Director-General within 48 hours. Access
across the international boundary shall only
be permitted through entry checkpoints
designated by each Party. Such access will be
in accordance with the laws and regulations
of each country. Adequate procedures will be
established by each Party to facilitate such
entries.
Military Command Structure
5. In accordance with paragraph 6 of the Pro-
tocol, the Director-General shall appoint a
Commander of the MFO within one month of
the appointment of the Director-General. The
Commander will be an officer of general rank
and shall serve a term of three years which
may, with the approval of the Parties, be
renewed or curtailed. He shall not be of the
same nationality as the Director-General.
6. Subject to paragraph 2 of this Annex,
the Commander shall have full command
authority over the MFO, and shall pro-
mulgate its Standing Operating Procedures.
In making the command arrangements
stipulated in paragraph 9 of Article VI of An-
nex I of the Treaty (hereinafter "Annex I"),
the Commander shall establish a chain of
command for the MFO linked to the com-
manders of the national contingents made
available by contributing nations. The
members of the MFO, although remaining in
their national service, are, during the period
of their assignment to the MFO, under the
Director-General and subject to the authority
of the Commander through the chain of com-
mand.
7. The Commander shall also have
general responsibility for the good order of
the MFO. Responsibility for disciplinary ac-
tion in national contingents provided for the
MFO rests with the commanders of the na-
tional contingents.
Functions and Responsibilities of the MFO
8. The mission of the MFO shall be to under-
take the functions and responsibilities
stipulated in the Treaty for the United Na-
tions Forces and Observers.
9. The MFO shall supervise the im-
plementation of Annex I and employ its best
efforts to prevent any violation of its terms.
10. With respect to the MFO, as ap-
propriate, the Parties agree to the following
arrangements:
(a) Operation of checkpoints, recon-
naissance patrols, and observation posts
along the international boundary and Line B,
and within Zone C.
(b) Periodic verification of the im-
plementation of the provisions of Annex I
will be carried out not less than twice a
month unless otherwise agreed by the Par-
ties.
(c) Additional verifications within 48
hours after the receipt of a request from
either Party.
(d) Ensuring the freedom of navigation
through the Strait of Tiran in accordance
with Article V of the Treaty of Peace.
11. When a violation has been confirmed
by the MFO, it shall be rectified by the
respective Party within 48 hours. The Party
shall notify the MFO of the rectification.
12. The operations of the MFO shall not
be construed as substituting for the undertak-
ings by the Parties described in paragraph 2
of Article III of the Treaty. MFO personnel
will report such acts by individuals as
described in that paragraph in the first in-
stance to the police of the respective Party.
13. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article II
of Annex I, and in accordance with
paragraph 7 of Article VI of Annex I, at the
checkpoints at the international boundary,
normal border crossing functions, such as
passport inspection and customs control, will
be carried out by officials of the respective
Party.
14. The MFO operating in the Zones will
enjoy freedom of movement necessary for the
performance of its tasks.
15. MFO support flights to Egypt or
Israel will follow normal rules and procedures
for international flights. Egypt and Israel will
undertake to facilitate clearances for such
flights.
16. Verification flights by MFO aircraft
in the Zones will be cleared with the
authorities of the respective Party, in accord-
ance with procedures to ensure that the
flights can be undertaken in a timely manner.
17. MFO aircraft will not cross the inter-
national boundary without prior notification
and clearance by each of the Parties.
18. MFO reconnaissance aircraft
operating in Zone C will provide notification
to the civil air control center and, thereby, to
the Egyptian liaison officer therein.
ember 1981
45
Middle East
Size and Organization
19. The MFO shall consist of a headquarters,
three infantry battalions totalling not more
than 2,000 troops, a coastal patrol unit and
an observer unit, an aviation element and
logistics, and signal units.
20. The MFO units will have standard ar-
mament and equipment appropriate to their
peacekeeping mission as stipulated in this An-
nex.
21. The MFO headquarters will be
organized to fulfill its duties in accordance
with the Treaty and this Annex. It shall be
manned by staff-trained officers of ap-
propriate rank provided by the troop con-
tributing nations as part of their national con-
tingents. Its organization will be determined
by the Commander, who will assign staff
positions to each contributor on an equitable
basis.
Reports
22. The Commander will report findings
simultaneously to the Parties as soon as
possible, but not later than 24 hours, after a
verification or after a violation has been con-
firmed. The Commander will also provide the
Parties simultaneously a monthly report sum-
marizing the findings of the checkpoints,
observation posts, and reconnaissance
patrols.
23. Reporting formats will be worked out
by the Commander with the Parties in the
Joint Commission. Reports to the Parties will
be transmitted to the liaison offices to be
established in accordance with paragraph 31
below.
Financing, Administration, and Facilities
24. The budget for each financial year shall
be prepared by the Director-General and shall
be approved by the Parties. The financial
year shall be from October 1 through
September 30. Contributions shall be paid in
U.S. dollars, unless the Director-General re-
quests contributions in some other form. Con-
tributions shall be committed the first day of
the financial year and made available as the
Director-General determines necessary to
meet expenditures of the MFO.
25. For the period prior to October 1,
1981, the budget of the MFO shall consist of
such sums as the Director-General shall
receive. Any contributions during that period
will be credited to the share of the budget of
the contributing state in Financial Year 1982,
and thereafter as necessary, so that the con-
tribution is fully credited.
26. The Director-General shall prepare
financial and administrative regulations con-
sistent with this Protocol and submit them no
later than December 1, 1981, for the ap-
proval of the Parties. These financial regula-
tions shall include a budgetary process which
takes into account the budgetary cycles of
the contributing states.
27. The Commander shall request the ap-
proval of the respective Party for the use of
facilities on its territory necessary for the
proper functioning of the MFO. In this con-
nection, the respective Party, after giving its
approval for the use by the MFO of land or
existing buildings and their fixtures, will not
be reimbursed by the MFO for such use.
Responsibilities of the Joint Commission
Prior to Its Dissolution
28. In accordance with Article IV of the Ap-
pendix to Annex I, the Joint Commission will
supervise the implementation of the ar-
rangements described in Annex I and its Ap-
pendix, as indicated in subparagraphs b, c, h,
i, and j of paragraph 3 of Article IV.
29. The Joint Commission will implement
the preparations required to enable the
Liaison System to undertake its respon-
sibilities in accordance with Article VII of
Annex I.
30. The Joint Commission will determine
the modalities and procedures for the im-
plementation of Phase Two, as described in
paragraph 3(b) of Article I of Annex I, based
on the modalities and procedures that were
implemented in Phase One.
Liaison System
31. The Liaison System will undertake the
responsibilities indicated in paragraph 1 of
Article VII of Annex I, and may discuss any
other matters which the Parties by agree-
ment may place before it. Meetings will be
held at least once a month. In the event that
either Party or the Commander requests a
special meeting, it will be convened within 24
hours. The first meeting will be held in El-
Arish not later than two weeks after the
MFO assumes its functions. Meetings will
alternate between El-Arish and Beer Sheba,
unless the Parties otherwise agree. The Com-
mander shall be invited to any meeting in
which subjects concerning the MFO are
discussed, or when either Party requests
MFO presence. Decisions will be reached by
agreement of Egypt and Israel.
32. The Commander and each chief
liaison officer will have access to one another
in their respective offices. Adequate pro-
cedures will be worked out between the Par-
ties with a view to facilitating the entry for
this purpose of the representatives of either
Party to the territory of the other.
Privileges and Immunities
33. Each Party will accord to the MFO the
privileges and immunities indicated in the at-
tached Appendix.
Schedule
34. The MFO shall assume its functions at
1300 hours on April 25, 1982.
35. The MFO shall be in place by 1300
hours, on March 20, 1982.
APPENDIX
Definitions
1. The "Multinational Force and Observers :
(hereinafter referred to as "the MFO") is t >
organization established by the Protocol. I
2. For the purposes of this Appendix, l i
term "Member of the MFO" refers to thai [
Director-General, the Commander and any :
person, other than a resident of the Recei\
ing State, belonging to the military con- I
tingent of a Participating State or otherwi
under the authority of the Director-Genera
and his spouse and minor children, as ap-
propriate.
3. The "Receiving State" means the 1
authorities of Egypt or Israel as appropria
and the territories under their control.
"Government authorities" includes all natk
and local, civil and military authorities call
upon to perform functions relating to the
MFO under the provisions of this Append!
without prejudice to the ultimate responsit
ty of the Government of the Receiving Sfe
4. "Resident of the Receiving State" i|
eludes (a) a person with citizenship of the
Receiving State, (b) a person resident
therein, or (c) a person present in the ter4
ritory of the Receiving State other than a I
member of the MFO.
5. "Participating State" means a State!
that contributes personnel to the MFO.
Duties of members of the MFO in the
Receiving State:
6. (a) Members of the MFO shall respect tl
laws and regulations of the Receiving Stat
and shall refrain from any activity of a
political character in the Receiving State i
from any action incompatible with the inte
national nature of their duties or inconsist
with the spirit of the present arrangemenl
The Director-General shall take all ap-
propriate measures to ensure the observar
of these obligations.
(b) In the performance of their dutii
for the MFO, members of the MFO shall
receive their instructions only from the
Director-General and the chain of comman
designated by him.
(c) Members of the MFO shall exerc
the utmost discretion in regard to all matt
relating to their duties and functions. The)
shall not communicate to any person any il
formation known to them by reason of the:
position with the MFO which has not been
made public, except in the course of their
duties or by authorization of the Director-
General. These obligations do not cease up
the termination of their assignment with tl
MFO.
(d) The Director-General will ensure
that in the Standing Operating Procedures
the MFO, there will be arrangements to
avoid accidental or inadvertent threats to t
safety of MFO members.
46
Department of State Bullet
Middle East
ind exit: Identification
idual or collective passports shall be
w the Participating States for
rs of the MFO. The Director-General
>tify the Receiving State of the names
leduled time of arrival of MFO
rs, and other necessary information,
■ceiving State shall issue an individual
Ktive multiple entry visa as ap-
ite prior to that travel. No other
aits shall be required for a member of
?0 to enter or leave the Receiving
Members of the MFO shall be exempt
nmigration inspection and restrictions
ering or departing from the territory
Receiving State. They shall also be ex-
rom any regulations governing the
tice of aliens in the Receiving State, in-
t registration, but shall not be con-
l as acquiring any right to permanent
ice or domicile in the Receiving State,
eceiving State shall also provide each
Br of the Force with a personal identity
rior to or upon his arrival.
Members of the MFO will at all times
their personal identity cards issued by
jceiving State. Members of the MFO
e required to present, but not to sur-
;, their passport or identity cards upon
id of an appropriate authority of the
ring State. Except as provided in
raph 7 of this Appendix, the passport or
i:y card will be the only document re-
I for a member of the MFO.
J If a member of the MFO leaves the
les of the Participating State to which
Jongs and is not repatriated, the
|,or-General shall immediately inform
mthorities of the Receiving State, giving
particulars as may be required. The
I;or-General shall similarly inform the
Irities of the Receiving State of any
Eer of the MFO who has absented
Iff for more than twenty-one days. If an
liion order against the ex-member of the
lhas been made, the Director-General
ijbe responsible for ensuring that the per-
Dimcerned shall be received within the
lary of the Participating State concern-
rdiction
Jhe following arrangements respecting
Jnal and civil jurisdiction are made hav-
igard to the special functions of the
1 and not for the personal benefit of the
i>ers of the MFO. The Director-General
Jcooperate at all times with the ap-
liate authorities of the Receiving State
I'ilitate the proper administration of
J-e secure the observance of laws and
-lations, and prevent the occurrence of
Abuse in connection with the privileges,
■Anities, and facilities mentioned in this
•ndix.
minal jurisdiction
k.) Military members of the MFO and
Iters of the civilian observer group of the
1 shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of their respective national states in
respect of any criminal offenses which may
be committed by them in the Receiving State.
Any such person who is charged with the
commission of a crime will be brought to trial
by the respective Participating State, in ac-
cordance with its laws.
(b) Subject to paragraph 25, other
members of the MFO shall be immune from
the criminal jurisdiction of the Receiving
State in respect of words spoken or written
and all acts performed by them in their of-
ficial capacity. .
(c) The Director-General shall obtain
the assurances of each Participating State
that it will be prepared to take the necessary
measures to assure proper discipline ot its
personnel and to exercise jurisdiction with
respect to any crime or offense which might
be committed by its personnel. The Director-
General shall comply with requests ot the
Receiving State for the withdrawal from its
territory of any member of the MFO who
violates its laws, regulations, customs, or
traditions. The Director-General, with the
consent of the Participating State, may waive
the immunity of a member of the MFO.
(d) Without prejudice to the foregoing,
a Participating State may enter into a sup-
plementary arrangement with the Receiving
State to limit or waive the immunities of its
members of the MFO who are on periods ot
leave while in the Receiving State.
Civil jurisdiction
12 (a) Members of the MFO shall not be sub-
ject to the civil jurisdiction of the courts of
the Receiving State or to other legal process
in any matter relating to their official duties_
In a case arising from a matter relating to of-
ficial duties and which involves a member ot
the MFO and a resident of the Receiving
State, and in other disputes as agreed the
procedure provided in paragraph 38(b) ot this
Appendix shall apply to the settlement
(b) If the Director-General certifies
that a member of the MFO is unable because
of official duties or authorized absence to pro-
tect his interests in a civil proceeding in
which he is a participant, the court or
authority shall at his request suspend the
proceeding until the elimination of the
disability, but for not more than ninety days.
Property of a member of the MFO which is
certified by the Director-General to be need-
ed by him for the fulfillment of his official
duties shall be free from seizure for the
satisfaction of a judgment, decision, or order,
together with other property not subject
thereto under the law of the Receiving State.
The personal liberty of a member of the Mb U
shall not be restricted by a court or other
authority of the Receiving State in a civil
proceeding, whether to enforce a judgment,
decision, or order, to compel an oath of
disclosure, or for any other reason.
(c) In the cases provided for in sub-
paragraph (b) above, the claimant may elect
to have his claim dealt with in accordance
with the procedure set out in paragraph 38(b)
of this Appendix. Where a claim adjudicated
or an award made in favor of the claimant by
a court of the Receiving State or the Claims
Commission under paragraph 38(b) of this
Appendix has not been satisified, the
authorities of the Receiving State may
without prejudice to the claimant s rights,
seek the good offices of the Director-General
to obtain satisfaction.
Notification: certification
13 If any civil proceeding is instituted
against a member of the MFO, before any
court of the Receiving State having jurisdic-
tion, notification shall be given to the
Director-General. The Director-General shall
certify to the court whether or not the pro-
ceeding is related to the official duties of
such member.
Military police: arrest: transfer of custody
and mutual assistance
14 The Director-General shall take all ap-
propriate measures to ensure maintenance of
discipline and good order among members ot
the MFO. To this end military police
designated by the Director-General shall
police the premises referred to in paragraph
19 of this Appendix, and such areas where
the MFO is functioning.
15 The military police of the MFO shall
immediately transfer to the civilian police ot
the Receiving State any individual, who is not
a member of the MFO, of whom it takes tem-
porary custody. . ,
16 The police of the Receiving State
shall immediately transfer to the MFO any
member of the MFO, of whom it takes tem-
porary custody, pending a determination con-
cerning jurisdiction.
17 The Director-General and the
authorities of the Receiving State shall assist
each other concerning all offenses in respect
of which either or both have an interest in-
cluding the production of witnesses, and in
the collection and production of evidence, in-
cluding the seizure and, in proper cases, the
handing over, of things connected with an of-
fense The handing over of any such things
may be made subject to their return within
the time specified by the authority delivering
them. Each shall notify the other of the
disposition of any case in the outcome of
which the other may have an interest or in
which there has been a transfer of custody
under the provisions of paragraphs 15 and lb
of this Appendix.
18. The government of the Receiving
State will ensure the prosecution of persons
subject to its criminal jurisdiction who are ac-
cused of acts in relation to the MFO or its
members which, if committed in relation to
the forces of the Receiving State or their
members, would have rendered them liable to
prosecution. The Director-General will take
the measures within his power with respect
to crimes or offenses committed against
citizens of the Receiving State by members of
the MFO.
,
47
tember 1981
Middle East
Premises of the MFO
19. Without prejudice to the fact that all the
premises of the MFO remain the territory of
the Receiving State, they shall be inviolable
and subject to the exclusive control and
authority of the Director-General, who alone
may consent to the entry of officials to per-
form duties on such premises.
MFO flag
20. The Receiving States permit the MFO to
display a special flag or insignia, of design
agreed upon by them, on its headquarters,
camps, posts, or other premises, vehicles,
boats, and otherwise as decided by the
Director-General. Other flags or pennants
may be displayed only in exceptional cases
and in accordance with conditions prescribed
by the Director-General. Sympathetic con-
sideration will be given to observations or re-
quests of the authorities of the Receiving
State concerning this last-mentioned matter.
If the MFO flag or other flag is flown, the
flag of the Receiving State shall be flown
alongside it.
Uniform: Vehicle, boats and aircraft mark-
ings and registration: Operating
permits
21. Military members of the MFO shall nor-
mally wear their national uniform with such
identifying MFO insignia as the Director-
General may prescribe. The conditions on
which the wearing of civilian dress is
authorized shall be notified by the Director-
General to the authorities of the Receiving
State and sympathetic consideration will be
given to observations or requests of the
authorities of the Receiving State concerning
this matter. Members of the MFO shall wear
civilian dress while outside the areas where
they are functioning. Service vehicles, boats,
and aircraft shall not carry the marks or
license plates of any Participating State, but
shall carry the distinctive MFO identification
mark and license which shall be notified by
the Director-General to the authorities of the
Receiving State. Such vehicles, boats, and
aircraft shall not be subject to registration
and licensing under the laws and regulations
of the Receiving State. Authorities of the
Receiving State shall accept as valid, without
a test or fee, a permit, or license for the
operation of service vehicles, boats, and air-
craft issued by the Director-General. MFO
drivers shall be given permits by the Receiv-
ing State to enable them to drive outside the
areas where they are functioning, if these
permits are required by the Receiving State.
Arms
22. Members of the MFO who are off-duty
shall not carry arms while outside the areas
where they are functioning.
Privileges and immunities of the MFO
23. The MFO shall enjoy the status,
privileges, and immunities accorded in Article
II of the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations
(hereinafter, "the Convention"). The provi-
sions of Article II of the Convention shall
also apply to the property, funds, and assets
of Participating States used in the Receiving
State in connection with the activities of the
MFO. Such Participating States may not ac-
quire immovable property in the Receiving
State without agreement of the government
of the Receiving State. The government of
the Receiving State recognizes that the right
of the MFO to import free of duty equipment
for the MFO and provisions, supplies, and
other goods for the exclusive use of members
of the MFO, includes the right of the MFO to
establish, maintain, and operate at head-
quarters, camps, and posts, service institutes
providing amenities for the members of the
MFO. The amenities that may be provided by
service institutes shall be goods of a con-
sumable nature (tobacco and tobacco prod-
ucts, beer, etc.), and other customary articles
of small value. To the end that duty-free im-
portation for the MFO may be effected with
the least possible delay, having regard to the
interests of the government of the Receiving
State, a mutually satisfactory procedure, in-
cluding documentation, shall be arranged be-
tween the Director-General and the customs
authorities of the Receiving State. The
Director-General shall take all necessary
measures to prevent any abuse of the exemp-
tion and to prevent the sale or resale of such
goods to persons other than the members of
the MFO. Sympathetic consideration shall be
given by the Director-General to observations
or requests of the authorities of the Receiv-
ing State concerning the operation of service
institutes.
Privileges and immunities and delegation
of authority of Director-General
24. The Director-General of the MFO may
delegate his powers to other members of the
MFO.
25. The Director-General, his deputy, the
Commander, and his deputy, shall be accord-
ed in respect of themselves, their spouses,
and minor children, the privileges and im-
munities, exemptions, and facilities accorded
to diplomatic envoys in accordance with inter-
national law.
Members of the MFO: Taxation, customs,
and fiscal regulations
26. Members of the MFO shall be exempt
from taxation by the Receiving State on the
pay and emoluments received from their na-
tional governments or from the MFO. They
shall also be exempt from all other direct
taxes, fees, and charges, except for those
levied for services rendered.
27. Members of the MFO shall have the
right to import free of duty their personal ef-
fects in connection with their first taking up
their post in the Receiving State. They shall
be subject to the laws and regulations of the
Receiving State governing customs and
foreign exchange with respect to personal
property not required by them by reason of
their presence in the Receiving State wiii
the MFO. Special facilities for entry or $i
shall be granted by the immigration, cus!
and fiscal authorities of the Receiving St »
to regularly constituted units of the MFC i
provided that the authorities concerned I >
been duly notified sufficiently in advance •,
Members of the MFO on departure from i>
area may, notwithstanding the foreign ej i
change regulations, take with them such i
funds as the Director-General certifies wi r
received in pay and emoluments from th< l
respective national governments or from j
MFO and are a reasonable residue therec
Special arrangements between the Direcl
General and the authorities of the Receiv
State shall be made for the implementati
the foregoing provisions in the interests}
the government of the Receiving State ai<
members of the MFO.
28. The Director-General will cooperj
with the customs and fiscal authorities <&
Receiving State and will render all assist!
within his power in ensuring the observffl
of the customs and fiscal laws and regula
tions of the Receiving State by the memn
of the MFO in accordance with this Appa
or any relevant supplemental arrangemei
Communications and postal services
29. The MFO shall enjoy the facilities in
respect to communications provided for ii
Article III of the Convention. The Directi
General shall have authority to install am
operate communications systems as are
necessary to perform its functions subjec
the provisions of Article 35 of the Intern;
tional Telecommunications Convention of
April 11, 1973, relating to harmful in-
terference. The frequencies on which any
such station may be operated will be dulj
communicated by the MFO to the approp
authorities of the Receiving State. Ap- |
propriate consultations will be held betwe
the MFO and the authorities of the Recei
State to avoid harmful interference. The
right of the Director-General is likewise
recognized to enjoy the priorities of govei
ment telegrams and telephone calls as pn
ed for the United Nations in Article 39 ar.
Annex 3 of the latter Convention and in 1
cle 5, No. 10 of the telegraph regulations
nexed thereto.
30. The MFO shall also enjoy, within!
areas where it is functioning, the right of
unrestricted communication by radio,
telephone, telegraph, or any other means,
and of establishing the necessary facilities
maintaining such communications within a
between premises of the MFO, including t
laying of cables and land lines and the
establishment of fixed and mobile radio se
ing and receiving stations. It is understoo(
that the telegraph and telephone cables an
lines herein referred to will be situated
within or directly between the premises of
the MFO and the areas where it is functioi
ing, and that connection with the system o
telegraphs and telephones of the Receiving
State will be made in accordance with ar-
rangements with the appropriate authoritii
of the Receiving State.
48
Department of State Bullel
Middle East
The government of the Receiving
■ecognizes the right of the MFO to
irrangements through its own facilities
processing and transport of private
Idressed to or emanating from
>rs of the MFO. The government of the
ing State will be informed of the
of such arrangements. No interference
ike place with, and no censorship shall
lied to, the mail of the MFO by the
iment of the Receiving State. In the
that postal arrangements applying to
! mail of members of the MFO are ex-
to operations involving transfer of
cy, or transport of packages or parcels
le Receiving State, the conditions
which such operations shall be con-
in the Receiving State will be agreed
etween the government of the Receiv-
ite and the Director-General.
vehicle insurance
e MFO will take necessary ar-
nents to ensure that all MFO motor
s shall be covered by third party liabili-
lrance in accordance with the laws and
tions of the Receiving State.
roads, waterways, port facilities,
ids, and railways
Ihen the MFO uses roads, bridges, port
Jes, and airfields it shall not be subject
iment of dues, tolls, or charges either
jy of registration or otherwise, in the
iwhere it is functioning and the normal
i of access, except for charges that are
Id directly to services rendered. The
j-ities of the Receiving State, subject to
1 arrangements, will give the most
ible consideration to requests for the
to members of the MFO of traveling
ies on its railways and of concessions
egard to fares.
r, electricity, and other public utilities
ie MFO shall have the right to the use
ter, electricity, and other public utilities
Ies not less favorable to the MFO than
to comparable consumers. The
irities of the Receiving State will, upon
?quest of the Director-General, assist
!FO in obtaining water, electricity, and
utilities required, and in the case of in-
ption or threatened interruption of serv-
'111 give the same priority to the needs
! MFO as to essential government serv-
rhe MFO shall have the right where
sary to generate, within the premises of
'FO either on land or water, electricity
ie use of the MFO and to transmit and
bute such electricity as required by the
sncy of the Receiving State
be Government of the Receiving State
f requested by the Director-General,
available to the MFO, against reim-
ment in U.S. dollars or other currency
illy acceptable, currency of the Receiv-
ing State required for the use of the MFO,
including the pay of the members of the na-
tional contingents, at the rate of exchange
most favorable to the MFO that is officially
recognized by the government of the Receiv-
ing State.
Provisions, supplies, and services
36. The authorities of the Receiving State
will, upon the request of the Director-
General, assist the MFO in obtaining equip-
ment, provisions, supplies, and other goods
and services required from local sources for
its subsistence and operation. Sympathetic
consideration will be given by the Director-
General in purchases on the local market to
requests or observations of the authorities of
the Receiving State in order to avoid any
adverse effect on the local economy.
Members of the MFO may purchase locally
goods necessary for their own consumption,
and such services as they need, under condi-
tions prevailing in the open market.
If members of the MFO should require
medical or dental facilities beyond those
available within the MFO, arrangements shall
be made with the appropriate authorities of
the Receiving State under which such
facilities may be made available. The
Director-General and the appropriate local
authorities will cooperate with respect to
sanitary services. The Director-General and
the authorities of the Receiving State shall
extend to each other the fullest cooperation
in matters concerning health, particularly
with respect to the control of communicable
diseases in accordance with international con-
ventions; such cooperation shall extend to the
exchange of relevant information and
statistics.
Locally recruited personnel
37. The MFO may recruit locally such person-
nel as required. The authorities of the Receiv-
ing State will, upon the request of the
Director-General, assist the MFO in the
recruitment of such personnel. Sympathetic
consideration will be given by the Director-
General in the recruitment of local personnel
to requests or observations of authorities of
the Receiving State in order to avoid any
adverse effect on the local economy. The
terms and conditions of employment for local-
ly recruited personnel shall be prescribed by
the Director-General and shall generally, to
the extent practicable, be no less favorable
than the practice prevailing in the Receiving
State.
Settlement of disputes or claims
38. Disputes or claims of a private law
character shall be settled in accordance with
the following provisions:
(a) The MFO shall make provisions for
the appropriate modes of settlement of
disputes or claims arising out of contract or
other disputes or claims of a private law
character to which the MFO is a party other
than those covered in subparagraph (b) and
paragraph 39 following. When no such provi-
sions have been made with the contracting
party, such claims shall be settled according
to subparagraph fb) below.
(b) Any claim made by:
(i) a resident of the Receiving State
against the MFO or a member thereof, in
respect of any damages alleged to result from
an act or omission of such member of the
MFO relating to his official duties;
(ii) the Government of the Receiving
State against a member of the MFO;
(iii) the MFO or the Government of
the Receiving State against one another, that
is not covered by paragraph 40 of this Ap-
pendix;
shall be settled by a Claims Commission
established for that purpose. One member of
the Commission shall be appointed by the
Director-General, one member by the Govern-
ment of the Receiving State, and a Chairman
jointly by the two. If the Director-General
and the Government of the Receiving State
fail to agree on the appointment of a chair-
man, the two members selected by them shall
select a chairman from the list of the Perma-
nent Court of Arbitration. An award made by
the Claims Commission against the MFO or a
member or other employee thereof or against
the Government of the Receiving State shall
be notified to the Director-General or the
authorities of the Receiving State as the case
may be, to make satisfaction thereof.
39. Disputes concerning the terms of
employment and conditions of service of
locally recruited personnel shall be settled by
administrative procedure to be established by
the Director-General.
40. All disputes between the MFO and
the Government of the Receiving State con-
cerning the interpretation or application of
this Appendix which are not settled by
negotiation or other agreed mode of settle-
ment shall be referred for final settlement to
a tribunal of three arbitrators, one to be
named by the Director-General, one by the
Government of the Receiving State, and an
umpire to be chosen jointly who shall preside
over the proceedings of this tribunal.
41. If the two parties fail to agree on the
appointment of the umpire within one month
of the proposal of arbitration by one of the
parties, the two members selected by them
shall select a chairman from the list of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration. Should a
vacancy occur for any reason, the vacancy
shall be filled within thirty days by the
methods laid down in this paragraph for the
original appointment. The tribunal shall come
into existence upon the appointment of the
chairman and at least one of the other
members of the tribunal. Two members of
the tribunal shall constitute a quorum for the
performance of its functions, and for all
deliberations and decisions of the tribunal a
favorable vote of two members shall be suffi-
cient.
:ember 1981
49
Middle East
Deceased members: disposition of personal
property
42. The Director-General shall have the right
to take charge of and dispose of the body of a
member of the MFO who dies in the territory
of the Receiving State and may dispose of his
property after the debts of the deceased per-
son incurred in the territory of the Receiving
State and owing to residents of the Receiving
State have been settled.
Supplemental arrangements
43. Supplemental details for the carrying out
of this Appendix shall be made as required
between the Director-General and ap-
propriate authorities designated by the
Government of the Receiving State.
Effective date and duration
44. This Appendix shall take effect from the
date of the entry into force of the Protocol
and shall remain in force for the duration of
the Protocol. The provisions of paragraphs
38, 39, 40, and 41 of this Appendix, relating
to the settlement of disputes, however, shall
remain in force until all claims arising prior
to the date of termination of this Appendix
and submitted prior to or within three
months following the date of termination,
have been settled.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
VELIOTES, JULY 20, 19811
My purpose today is to begin the process
of seeking congressional authorization
for U.S. participation in and financial
support for the multinational force and
observers (MFO), which is being
established in connection with the
withdrawal of Israeli forces to the inter-
national border with Egypt, in keeping
with the Treaty of Peace between them.
On July 17 in London, representatives of
Egypt and Israel, together with Am-
bassador Michael Sterner [Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs] representing
the United States, initialed the protocol
and related documents which constitute
the international agreement which
establishes the MFO and determines its
functions. The texts of the protocol and
all related documents have been fur-
nished to this committee. We have
benefited, greatly, from your wise
counsel during these months of negotia-
tion.
It is important to U.S. interests in
the Middle East that the MFO be
established in as smooth a manner as
possible and that it be enabled to carry
out its functions as efficiently and effec-
tively as possible. The establishment of
this force represents the final step in the
implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli
treaty which, in turn, is the first step
toward comprehensive peace in the Mid-
dle East. It is fair to say, therefore, that
the documents we are discussing today
represent the end of the beginning in
our search for a just and lasting peace in
that troubled region.
At the outset, the Treaty of Peace
Between Egypt and Israel calls for the
presence of a peacekeeping force and
observers to monitor the parties' com-
pliance with the terms of the treaty and
to perform specified functions designed
to enhance the mutual confidence of the
parties. The treaty specifically mandates
that the force should be under the direc-
tion of the U.N. Security Council.
In response to a formal request from
the Permanent Representative of Egypt,
however, the President of the Security
Council on May 18 reported that the
members of the Council were unable to
reach the agreement necessary for the
United Nations to provide a force and
observers as envisioned in the treaty.
This possibility had been foreseen and
provided for during the treaty negotia-
tions. In connection with the signing of
the treaty, President Carter provided
each party with a letter in which he
assured them that, in the event the
United Nations failed to provide a force,
"the President will be prepared to take
those steps necessary to ensure the
establishment and maintenance of an ac-
ceptable alternative multinational force."
Pursuant to that assurance, a U.S.
delegation led by Ambassador Sterner
has participated over the past several
months in negotiations with Egyptian
and Israeli delegations which have
resulted in the agreement package
which has been provided to the commit-
tee.
Financial Commitments
We have undertaken certain financial
commitments, subject to congressional
approval. Beginning in FY 1983, Egypt,
Israel, and the United States will each
provide one-third of the annual
operating costs of the MFO, which we
tentatively estimate will be approximate-
ly $35 million for each country. During
the period prior to September 30, 1982,
there will be unusual startup costs
associated largely with necessary con-
struction activities. We have under-
taken, again subject to congressional
authorization, to provide 60% of those
costs, with Egypt and Israel dividing the
remainder equally. Accordingly, the
legislation we are submitting today, in
addition to providing for the partici]
tion of U.S. personnel in the MFO,
authorizes the appropriation of $125:
million for our FY 1982 contribution
We also intend to reprogram $11
million in FY 1981 from economic si
port fund assistance to the peacekeev
operations account to assist with the
funding of initial activities necessary
prepare for the establishment of the
MFO. Egypt and Israel are each ma)
$20 million available immediately fro
their own resources for the same pui
pose.
We have agreed to contribute to
force an infantry battalion, a logistic
support unit, and a group of civilian
observers. The number of American-
sonnel will be slightly more than l,0t
or a bit less than one-half of the tota
complement of the MFO, which mayi
proach 2,500 persons.
The Administration intends to co
ply voluntarily with the reporting r«
quirements of the war powers resolu
concerning the introduction of U.S. I
Armed Forces equipped for combat i
foreign countries.
The committee should also be aw I
that the United States has undertake
to propose to the parties a U.S. natit
to serve as Director-General of the J
MFO. In this connection, Egypt and
Israel, on Friday, presented to Am-H
bassador Sterner letters in which the
appoint Mr. Leamon R. Hunt, a retit
Foreign Service officer, to serve as il
terim Director-General.
Additional Actions
The United States has assured the pi
ties that it will take certain additiona
actions as required and, as appropria
subject to congressional authorization
• In the event the parties are urn
to agree on the appointment of the I
Director-General, the appointment of
force commander, or MFO financial n
ters, the United States will make pro-
posals which the parties will accept. I
• The United States will use its B
efforts to find acceptable replacement
for contingents that withdraw from tl
MFO.
• The United States will take stej
necessary to insure the maintenance o
an acceptable MFO.
Finally, let me say a word about
troop contributions from other coun-
tries. Egypt and Israel have asked the
United States to assume the primary
role in approaching potential con-
tributors. In this we have had encoura
ing success. It appears thus far that w
50
Department of State Bullet
Middle East
able to count on one battalion
itin America and another from
owever, our approaches con-
ongoing diplomatic discussions
within the countries concerned,
sidered politically sensitive. I,
re, believe that that subject
jest be addressed in closed ses-
Visit of Egyptian President Sadat
sion
1 be consulting with Egypt and
concerning a mutually agreeable
r the protocol to be signed, an
it which the United States will act
less as was the case with the
of Peace. The agreement will
>me into force when each party
tified the other that all its con-
mal requirements have been
i. In the meantime Mr. Hunt, as
i Director-General, is empowered
parties to undertake construction
/ in the Sinai and other activities
ary to assure that the MFO can
lace by March 20, 1982, as
e conclusion of this agreement
ents a victory for creative
acy. It also reflects the deter-
on of both Egypt and Israel to
Id with the strengthening of peace
In them despite severe obstacles,
ivn undertakings are nothing more
j'hat should be expected of a na-
; at has been, and is pledged to re-
ia full partner in their historic
Lor. It is in this light that I re-
ikis committee to lend its support
lit is truly an essential cornerstone
1 emerging structure of peace in
IddleEast.
Lould like to emphasize the urgen-
Ahe task before us. Much remains
rfione before the MFO can be in
4 All available FY 1981 funds will
ijigated by September, and legisla-
. ; essential if the necessary prepara-
ire to continue without interrup-
. October and be completed by
vlarch. I know that you will
illy examine the joint resolution we
oroposed. My colleagues and I are
red to respond to your questions
i be of all possible assistance in
:onsideration of this important
ition. I hope that you will be able
lclude your deliberations as soon as
ile and report the resolution
ibly with a view to its early
ge-
Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat
made a state visit to the United States
August U-9, 1981, to meet with President
Reagan and other government officials.
Following are remarks made at the ar-
rival ceremony on August 5, an exchange
of dinner toasts that evening, and ^
remarks made on President Sadat's
departure from the White House on
August 6.
he complete transcript of the hearings
■ published by the committee and will
liable from the Superintendent ot
lents, U.S. Government Printing 01-
/ashington, D.C. 20402.B
amber 1981
ARRIVAL REMARKS,
AUG. 5, 19811
President Reagan
It's an honor and a very great pleasure
to welcome President and Mrs. Sadat,
those who have accompanied them here
from their country, and for their family.
Egypt and the United States enjoy a
warm and a strong relationship,
testimony to the honest good will of the
people of both nations and recognition of
President Sadat's foresight and leader-
ship.
We are today friends and partners.
We've come to trust each other so much
that the bonds of unity grow stronger
each day. We are a young country;
Egypt a nation mature and rich with the
blessings of time, a nation which cradled
Western civilization in its arms. History
will record that in the last half of the
20th century, Egypt reemerged as a
significant force among the nations, not
by conquest but because one man, with
the courage that it took, set out to lead
mankind toward peace.
In 1799 the Rosetta Stone was
discovered, a tablet that served as a key
to the understanding of Egypt's history.
Like that famous stone, President Sadat
serves as a key to understanding the
depth and character of the Egyptian
people, opening the eyes of the world to
new opportunities for peace.
Mr. President, earlier this year you
said: "The answer to our present anxiety
and fears in the world is not for us to
cling to the past, with all its negative
aspects, but to forge ahead toward a
happier future."
Those words exemplify the values
that speak well of your roots— roots
planted deeply in the great and ancient
culture of Egypt, roots planted deeply in
the village culture of which you have
spoken so often and so eloquently. We
know what you have done was not in-
tended to bring the blessing of peace
just to your own nation, itself a
lauditory goal, but to all the people of
the Middle East, something smaller
minds had discarded as impossible.
There are those who claim the
engrained hatred can never be over-
come To them I assert President Sadat
has shown the way. There are those who
think that distrust will always submerge
and suffocate faith. To them I assert
President Sadat has shown the way.
And there are those who say that peace
is impossible, and are afraid to reach
out. And, again, I assert President
Sadat has shown the way.
You were a soldier. But your
greatest victory came in preventing
bloodshed and thereby capturing the
hearts of peaceloving people every-
where. Your courage in taking the first
step, your good faith in pursuing a
tangible agreement with a former
enemy, your maturity and moderation in
the face of frustration since Camp
David— all of these are worthy of a man
whom history will undoubtedly label one
of the 20th century's most courageous
peacemakers.
I welcome this opportunity to get to
know you personally and to discuss ways
to strengthen our bilateral relations. We
want you to know that although the
Americans have changed Presidents, we
have not altered our commitment to
peace or our desire to continue building
upon the achievements of Camp David.
Our mutual concern for the regional
stability of the Middle East is a timely
matter for discussion. External threats
and foreign-inspired subversion menace
independence. As we both know, the on-
ly beneficiary of violence, chaos, and
blind hatred will be our adversaries.
But good men, with the help of God,
cooperating with one another, can and
will prevail over evil. We're anxious to
explore with you the road ahead and to
see that the Egyptian people enjoy the
fruits of peace and security from aggres-
sion. You have taken the first steps on a
long and arduous journey with many
obstacles to overcome. But today, I
assure you and the Egyptian people that
we will walk that road together and that
we will not be deterred from reaching
our destination. [Applause]
President Sadat
Thank you for your very kind words. It
is with pleasure and happiness that I
51
Middle East
meet with you, and I'm going to hold a
dialogue which is certain to strengthen
the structure of peace and enrich our
perception of the world today. We look
upon you with admiration and esteem.
You're a man of faith and determination.
Your leadership is inspiring. Your com-
mitment is unwavering. Since you
assumed your awesome responsibility as
the leader of this great nation, you've
set an admirable record of achievement
and fulfillment.
You vowed to work for a stronger
America, capable of confronting the
challenges of our age. You pledged to
exert tireless efforts in order to make
the world more secure and just. You
promised to introduce a better interna-
tional equilibrium for the benefit of free
nations. Within a few months much has
been achieved through your vigor and
determination. We remain hopeful that
much more will be attained in the
months and years ahead. We are holding
our talks at a crucial moment. It is
crucial for our region, for the Middle
East, for the United States, and for the
world at large. The rising tension and
violence which we witnessed during the
past few weeks in our area is a living
evidence of the urgent need for a com-
prehensive peace in the Middle East.
No other goal is more pressing or
crucial. At the same time, no other na-
tion is more qualified to serve and
safeguard the noble cause than your
great nation. I am confident that you
will assume this responsibility with a
sense of purpose and history, and I'm
sure also that you will continue to play
the role of the full partner willingly and
vigorously.
We are equally committed to the
cause of peace. No event or development
can shake our belief that peace is the
word of God and the only road to a hap-
py future. It is a sacred mission that
doesn't belong to a few persons or to
one nation; rather, it belongs to
mankind.
While I look forward to our talks to-
day and in the days ahead with op-
timism and confidence, I am sure much
will depend on our common strategy for
peace and stability. Much needs to be
done to strengthen peace in the Arab
world, in Africa, and in the Third
World. New steps have to be taken to
introduce a global balance that does not
leave small nations under the mercy of
those who possess the means of pressure
and intervention.
I would like to address a word of ap-
preciation and gratitude to the gallant
American people. We are proud of our
friendship and cooperation. You are a
great companion and a most reliable
friend, and like us in Egypt you are a
nation of believers. We shall do all that
we can to bolster this friendship and in-
tensify our cooperation in all fields. May
God Almighty illuminate our way and
guide our steps. Together we shall over-
come. [Applause]
EXCHANGE OF TOASTS,
AUG. 5, 19812
President Reagan
Tonight we welcome a man who leads a
nation recognized for its magnificent
contributions to mankind. His depth of
character and hard-won accom-
plishments suggest that Egypt's con-
tributions will not be limited to those of
antiquity.
In the recent past, there have been
few foreign leaders who have truly cap-
tured the hearts of the American people.
Anwar Sadat is one of those rare excep-
tions. Historians often argue about
whether events are shaped by people or
people by events. There's little doubt
that the man we honor this evening is
an individual who shaped history.
It's truly an honor to have you with
us. I know that you struggled many
years and played a prominent role in
creating an organization which brought
independence to your country. But then
on the night of the revolution when it
actually began, you were in a movie
theater watching a picture with your
family. You wouldn't by chance
remember who happened to be in that
movie, would you? [Laughter; applause]
I never won an Oscar but a revolution
would do. [Laughter]
But seriously, those charged with
enormous responsibility are, after all,
people and must have a very human
quality of flowing with events. Never-
theless, some, like the man we hon^
tonight, do more than live through b
history — they make it. And you con t
have let the flow of events continue i
checked. Instead, with brilliant insij
you recognized an opportunity and t
seized the moment.
During your historic journey to f
Jerusalem, you explained — there col
moments when it becomes imperatr
for those endowed with wisdom anc
lucidity of vision to penetrate beyot
past with all its complications a-"
vestiges to usher in an undaunted ti
toward new horizons. More than
wisdom, it takes courage to make fi
damental decisions — the kind thatj
talked about.
Time and time again, he has
demonstrated that vital courage as
as a majestic sense of decency and
dedication to universal human princ
Instead of pounding on podiums anrj
romanticizing the illusionary glory <
conflict, President Sadat set goals i
his people of peace, prosperity, anoV
freedom. As your people have strivt
for these ends, Americans and Egy |
tians have unavoidably been drawn I
together — unavoidably because we
the same goals. And as many who 1
visited both nations point out, we—
Egyptians and Americans — are sim I
people. Certainly our love of freedo i
and independence unites us.
In a passage reminiscent of oui
Thomas Jefferson, President Sadat
penned his definition of freedom in
autobiography: "Freedom," he said, I
the most beautiful, holy, and precic
fruit of our culture. And individual!
should never be made to feel that h
the mercy of any force or coercion
that his will is subordinated to that
others."
We're grateful to have in Egyp
full partner in achieving our mutua
goals which include our common de*
mination to making the blessings ol
peace available to all the people of
Middle East. We will sincerely endc
to help where possible, and we wan:
to know that all of your efforts, yoi-
forbearance in times of frustration,
most of all, your goodwill, is ap-
preciated. You are following a path
is natural for us. You've said: "No r,
can be honest with others unless he
true to himself."
The ancient pharaohs built pyra
to their glory. Your monuments are
strong and healthy young men alive
day because you pursued peace— sfl
bols to all mankind that there is a b
way.
52
Department of State Bui
Middle East
sk all of our friends who are with
1 tonight to join me in a toast to
|k-ptian people and to their gallant
■nt and his lovely wife.
;nt Sadat
overwhelmed by your genuine
lity and warmth. The sentiments
nt Reagan expressed toward me
i Egyptian people clearly reflect
ids of friendship and amity which
iday between our nations.
■ years we worked hand-in-hand
iur relations on the course which
>atible with the long history of
respect and admiration between
>ples. We are determined to ce-
lis friendship even further,
r meeting today was an historic
any measure. Let me state first
was delighted to meet you and
in everlasting friendship with
ou are a statesman of conviction
npassion. You have a clear vision
world and our duty to make it
nd happier for the living genera-
nd those to come. Your priorities
htly set. I was pleased that we
full agreement over the issues we
ed.
ur nation has played a pivotal role
g about peace in the Middle East,
igress, as I told you in the morn-
Mild have been made without such
ve and dynamic role. No result
have been achieved, but with your
e have taken gigantic steps on the
) peace.
nen we launched our peace ini-
, we had in mind the support of
nerican people. And as we
ed for the second stage we count
ir continued interest and backing,
ler we shall continue to work
usly until the sacred mission is
d. What I heard from you today
?ry encouraging, indeed,
e believe that the time is right for
sumption of the peace process,
vent in the area demonstrated
i any doubt that we cannot wait
we are to spare the region fur-
estruction and devastation. We
:ake additional steps promptly and
at delay in order to maintain the
ntum for peace. We are deter-
to complete our mission. We will
• deterred or discouraged by any
>pment.
new initiative, a bright side of this
was the willingness of the Pales-
s to accept a cease-fire in Lebanon
phold it. This is a turning point
hould not escape our notice. In ef-
t means that for the first time the
Palestinians have come close to endors-
ing the peaceful solution. Those who are
genuinely interested in peace in the Mid-
dle East should recognize this positive
development and build upon it for the
good of all nations.
At the same time this is an added
ammunition for our goal for mutual and
simultaneous recognition between the
Israelis and the Palestinians. As I have
repeatedly said, the answer to persisting
fears and suspicions is a real willingness
to coexist and live together as good
neighbors. We have set a good example
with the establishment of peace between
Egypt and Israel within the context of a
comprehensive settlement. That model
applies to the relation between Israel
and the other party.
You can help this process of recon-
ciliation by holding a dialogue with the
Palestinians through their represen-
tatives. This is certain to strengthen the
forces of moderation among them. It
would also undermine the designs of
those who exploit the present state of
affairs for their own self ends. It would
be an act of statesmanship and vision.
If we succeed to achieve tangible
progress with respect to the Palestinian
problem, a whole new situation will
emerge. We will be able to confront the
real challenges we face. They are
challenges which involve the survival of
many nations and the protection of the
vital interests of the West. I am confi-
dent that we will meet these challenges
decisively and without hesitation.
I came here hopeful and optimistic.
After our first session, I have become
most confident and certain under your
upright and under your inspiring leader-
ship; this great country can realize its
dreams and reach its goals.
On behalf of the Egyptian people I
invite you and your family to visit
Egypt. This will give our people an op-
portunity to express to you directly their
feelings of gratitude and respect. Such a
visit will also serve the cause of peace
and stability in the Middle East. It will
enable us to pursue this stimulating
dialogue and bolster the bonds of friend-
ship and mutual understanding.
Allow me to invite you to rise in a
tribute to President Reagan, Mrs.
Reagan, and the friendly people of the
United States.
DEPARTURE REMARKS,
AUG. 6, 19813
President Reagan
Sadly the time has come for a farewell. I
hope it will only be an au revoir and
that we will be meeting again soon. My
meetings with President Sadat have now
ended, and I want to say how valuable
our exchanges have been and how en-
couraged I am with the progress that
has been made and how much I per-
sonally have learned from President
Sadat about the complexities of the
problems that we all face in seeking a
just and lasting peace in the Middle
East.
I am greatly impressed with his in-
timate knowledge and his passionate
concern. Our talks covered three general
areas; first, the growing strategic threat
to the region posed by the growth of
Soviet military power and the activities
of Soviet surrogates in the Near East,
Southwest Asia, and Africa. The second
issue, discussed in great detail, was the
peace process, and here, to be complete-
ly candid, I was a willing listener. We
are both anxious to insure that the
negotiating process stemming from the
Camp David agreements will resume
and succeed. President Sadat has urged
that the United States continue to play
an important role in this process and
this we will do. I will be meeting with
other Middle East leaders in the coming
months to continue the process of shar-
ing views with our friends about our
common goals of peace, stability, and
security in the area.
The third area that we discussed had
to do with the growing bilateral rela-
tions between the United States and
Egypt. We covered issues of mutual
security, military cooperation, and
economic matters. President Sadat
shares our belief that a strong defense
and a strong economy go hand-in-hand.
We will work closely with Egypt as full
partners in our search for peace and
stability in the Middle East.
And finally, let me add another per-
sonal note. I had, of course, heard a
great deal about President Sadat and
was optimistic that we would establish a
close rapport. My optimism was
justified. I respected him for all that he
has done and getting to know him has
vastly increased that respect. I share his
belief that with courage, determination,
foresight, and a bold vision of the
future, we can succeed in our common
endeavors.
jmber 1981
53
Middle East
We have been delighted to have
President Sadat and his family here with
us, and we look forward to meeting
again.
President Sadat
I quite agree— full agreement with what
President Reagan has said. If I am to
add anything it is expressing my deep
gratitude to President Reagan for this
kind invitation to meet with him and to
survey all the problems that we are fac-
ing together and then to meet again
with the American people with whom I
cherish the full pride to be friends, to be
understanding. I am happy to tell the
American people as always I have told
them, I am very happy because after
this visit I can say that I enjoy the
friendship of President Reagan as a
great leader of a great nation.
Again, I shall end like I have always
ended. I shall never let you down.
'Made on the South Lawn of the White
House (text from White House press release).
2Made at the dinner in the State Dining
Room (text from White House press release).
3Made on the North Portico (text from
White House press release). ■
Secretary Haig's News Conference
on President Sadat's Visit
Secretary Haig held a news con-
ference on August 6, 1981, to brief news
correspondents on President Reagn // s
meetings with Egyptian President
Sadat.1
I'm very pleased to welcome the press
contingent traveling with President
Sadat. We're pleased to have you here,
and after I make a very few opening
remarks, I want to be sure to give our
first questions to our visiting press per-
sonnel from Egypt. So if you have one
or two questions, ask them, and then
we'll open it up to the group at large. I
understand we also have some White
House press corps here, and that's an
unusually flattering thing for us here at
State.
At the outset I want to emphasize
that I think there's a strong consensus
on both sides that President Sadat's visit
here over the last 2 days has been an
outstanding success from almost any
point of view you care to list.
As you probably know, we really
sought four objectives from the Presi-
dent's visit to Washington.
The first, and perhaps the most im-
portant, given the character of the two
leaders, was the establishment of a per-
sonal relationship — a rapport, if you
will — between two world leaders who
bear great responsibility. I'll say more
about that in a moment.
The second objective was the ex-
change of views on strategic matters,
global and with specific focus on the
Middle East region.
The third objective was to exchange
views and, in the words of the Presi-
dent, to listen carefully — for President
Reagan to listen carefully — to the obser-
vations of President Sadat on the peace
process in the Middle East, based on
President Sadat's enormous contribu-
tions to this process and his vast ex-
perience with it.
The fourth objective, of course, was
to deal with a number of ongoing bi-
lateral matters between the Government
of Egypt and the Government of the
United States.
Turning first to the strategic discus-
sions, which in many respects were the
greatest contributors to the personal
rapport objective as well as the very
constructive exchange of views on a
number of important matters.
In the restricted session the first
day, President Reagan anticipated Presi-
dent Sadat's sense of concern and in-
terest and sense of urgency for regional
threats emanating from the Soviet
Union and its surrogates, ranging as far
as Afghanistan in the east through the
entire Middle East area to the west
coast of Africa. Anticipating that, he
provided several maps in the Oval Office
which President Sadat very effectively
employed to launch what was about a
30-minute tour d'horizon, encompassing
the entire area I've described — without
notes — and one of the most effective
overviews, and sensitive overviews, that
I've heard in some time.
During this period President Reagan
asked a number of questions and joined
in and elaborated on a number of obser-
vations. The conclusion of this overview
was clearly almost total unanimity of
views on the importance and the criti-
cality of developments in that area and
the need for the Government of Egypt
and the Government of the United
States to continue and intensify col-
laboration in the future, to take the.
necessary steps to vigorously resist j
Soviet direct or inspired aggression,
an area of traumatic and dynamic
change, and to work together in c<&
to establish the conditions conduciw
peace and stability in the area.
With respect to the peace proces
think the President looked forward.'!
mendously on this visit to drinking i;
you will, the experiences of PresidA'
Sadat, who in many respects launcht
the hopeful progress we've realizedit
date and our anticipated progress li
future by his courageous visit to
Jerusalem some years ago. During ft
exchange on the peace process, Pr&i
dent Reagan made very clear his clj
tinuing and firm commitment to pd
the Camp David peace process as m
to by the Governments of Egypt, ffij
and the United States.
The two Presidents discussed stt
to further this process in the period
ahead and to provide a new impetus
the process itself. Both agreed tha|l
would continue these discussions wft
Prime Minister Begin of Israel in m
period ahead.
The President also reiterated tht
U.S. commitment to continuing its r
as a full partner in the search for pe
in the Middle East. President Sadat
pressed his strong view — which has
been made public both in London pr
to arrival here and during his visit
here — of what he viewed as the imp
tance of dealing with the Palestiniar
and urged the United States to esta
contact with the PLO (Palestine Lib
tion Organization).
President Reagan explained the
American stand on this issue and j
reiterated the American commitmen
Israel not to recognize or negotiate'
the PLO until the PLO itself recogni
Israel's right to exist and accepts U.
Resolutions 242 and 338.
In his response, President Reagi
emphasized his own personal convict
that American fidelity to all of its co
mitments — whether they be to Israe
Egypt, or to the other important frit
ly nations in the region — are a fundi
mental aspect in our own hopes to I
achieve peace and stability in the art
wanted to make this comment at the
outset.
I think both leaders understood]
cisely the position of one another on
and accepted the position of each off
on this issue.
Our third objective in these disci)
sions was to expand on and to impro
the U.S. -Egyptian bilateral relationsl
and to consider ways to promote the
54
Department of State Bulk
Middle East
c development of Egypt and to
its military modernization
During the discussions involving
future, President Sadat de-
very poignantly to President
the difficulty he had during the
lys of his incumbency as a leader
rn Egypt in just accumulating a
lollars to prevent the bankruptcy
t.
nk this underlies and underpins
ay Egypt is clearly on an im-
economic growth path. It is
g an increasingly important
of the international community
ader in the region. President
xpressed great gratitude to the
in Government and people on a
an basis for the assistance that
ye given to the growth and
ment — which is increasingly
ig — in Egypt. I think this
s his success story and the im-
e of American foreign assistance
jrity assistance to our friends
the world.
he case of Egypt, of course, the
path is still in its early stages,
continuing need for a high level
ncan support was very evident,
nt Reagan emphasized categori-
i intention to maintain a high
I support to Egypt.
I illy, I want to say a word about
port between the two men
I think it was the most impor-
bect of the visit itself. As you
President Reagan is a new player
international scene. President
U an experienced veteran who has
ijreat deal and whose own inter-
|1 stature is perhaps unparalleled
contemporary scene. He is
as a man of vision, a man of
ind a man of courage. I know
esident Reagan had looked for-
ith great anticipation to an ex-
of views with him.
link from President Sadat's point
—and it's presumptuous of me to
or him— but he found an equally
dve, though a somewhat less ex-
ied, counterpart: a man who sees
rid from the same point of view
i man who believes that Ameri-
nmitments, American reliability,
an consistency of policy are the
al aspects of a successful Ameri-
eign policy and will be the ingre-
l the Middle East which will be
idamental catalyst to a peace
5 in which all the parties can view
ited States as a responsible part-
it will meet its commitments and
engaged in this process and will
the leaders, wherever they may
be located, to accept risks for peace with
the confidence that the United States
will carry out its obligations for this
process.
I welcome your questions, and I will
turn first to our distinguished friends
from Egypt.
Q. When you were discussing the
question of the PLO, how can you pro-
ceed in enlarging this peace process
when you have the Palestinians out, or
the PLO, when you have the Saudis
and the Jordanians out? How can you
bring these people of these countries
to this peace process?
A. I think that's a very important
question, and the real question here is
how best to achieve the progress we
seek. I think in that context American
commitments and reliability to all of the
parties and with all of the parties, as I
said a moment or so ago, will be the
essential catalyst for creating conditions
under which the parties involved can ac-
cept risks for peace. That's step one.
Step two is: I think it's important —
and we've talked about a strategic con-
sensus—that the U.S. policies in the
near term create a sense of confidence
to do what can be done to disperse fear
so that, for example, radical minorities
cannot pursue policies which will upset
the progress underway.
Third, and the most important thing
of all in response to your question, is the
recognition that we have got to pursue
our own policies in such a way that long-
term objectives do not derail achievable,
realistic, near-term progress. That's
probably the essence of the question that
you asked.
In that context, Egypt, Israel, and
the United States committed themselves
to a process under the Camp David
framework. And there has been prog-
ress. First, as you know, this past week
we signed the agreement for the Sinai
peacekeeping and observation force
which will seek to put in place the condi-
tions to permit the withdrawal from the
entire Sinai of Israeli forces by spring of
next year.
We discussed during this visit the
need to get on with the autonomy talks
which, while not satisfying the long-term
objectives that you've outlined in your
question, would represent the further
progress on the West Bank and in Gaza
for the Palestinian populations there and
to create conditions under which future
progress can be achieved in a realistic
way.
I think it's very important that we
keep realism on our agenda day to day
as we approach this historically anguish-
ing problem. It doesn't answer your
question as to how we are going to
ultimately get there; but you know we
have other activities under way today,
too, that have been brought about by the
crisis in Lebanon — the work that is
under way under the auspices of the
Arab League and the four Arab states
which have been involved actively in
contributing, along with Israel, along
with the internal parties, in Lebanon,
and with the help of the United Nations,
to a reduction in hostilities.
Those efforts with respect to Leba-
non, within the framework established,
are going to continue, and I see these
two processes, while not linked, nonethe-
less in a de facto sense mutually re-
inforcing.
Q. The other day when you had
the meeting with some Arab ambassa-
dors here, their impression was that
you had told them that we are now at
the turning point as far as the Middle
East situation is concerned. And then
you told them that you are seriously
now looking into the question of Pale-
stine. And on Lebanon you gave them
some, but I want to ask you the ques-
tion that you made -or the communi-
que that you issued in Ottawa— and
then you said in your communique, the
political communique, that the dis-
putes between the Arab and the
Israelis must be solved [sic].
Secondly, you made, I think, [in-
audible] that you support the recon-
ciliation efforts within Lebanon among
the Lebanese. When you said that, I
would like you to elaborate what you
meant by that particular thing. Does
that mean that the seven are going to
help Lebanon to be created back into a
sovereign state with a central govern-
ment and all these differences among
them are to be reconciled? Are you go-
ing to achieve this?
A. I want to be careful not to en-
dorse everything you said I said. I'm not
sure that I did say all those things.
Sometimes in the retelling distortions
creep in, and understandably in human
terms they do. But with respect to the
Lebanon problem, we are looking at a
number of steps and we've already
begun to work actively in the wake of
Ambassador Habib's return to the
United States— the ultimate objective of
which will, of course, be to strengthen
the central government of Lebanon to
seek a reconciliation of the parties there
and to create conditions for a peaceful,
stable Lebanon in the future.
tment of State Bulletin
55
Middle East
We are considering such things as
enlarging the sphere of responsibility for
the UNIFIL (U.N. Interim Force in
Lebanon) contingent along the Israeli
border. We are considering specific
measures along with those states which
can help— both in the region and in
Europe— to strengthen the central
government of Lebanon; and these re-
inforce previous actions we have been
taking with respect to that objective
which has been long held by the U.S.
Government.
We feel and hope that in the interest
of peace and stability in Lebanon all
responsible parties will recognize the
need to defuse the situation with respect
to the provision of heavy armaments to
the PLO. We would look especially to
the Soviet Union, to Libya, perhaps
Syria. In the long run I think this proc-
ess, which has already begun and has
managed to survive two specific crises,
is a very encouraging development in
the Middle East at large; and that is
what triggered my comment to the Arab
ambassadors recently.
Q. Could you be more specific
about your phrase that the two men
discussed steps to provide new im-
petus to the talks? Specifically what
steps? And, also, could you tell us
about Mr. Sadat's three-point scenario
that he was going to propose to Ad-
ministration officials?
A. His three-point scenario?
Q. He spoke of a three-point
scenario.
A. I'll have to go back to my office
and start counting becuase I'm not sure
that I got that clear.
Q. Maybe it wasn't three points,
but it was a new scenario.
A. I think, as President Reagan
mentioned this morning, he was essen-
tially in a listening mode. As you know,
President Sadat's visit is the first visit
we had this summer and in September
Prime Minister Begin will be here. So
President Reagan listened carefully, not
only to President Sadat's views but also
very carefully to the historic evolution of
developments which brought us to the
current situtation we find ourselves in.
This was extremely valuable to
President Reagan, and he very clearly
told President Sadat. And I think Presi-
dent Sadat not only expected but ac-
cepted and agreed with the need to now
listen to Prime Minister Begin on how
we can proceed, then reassess and meet
at the necessary levels to try to concert
all three parties in progress. We're talk-
ing about autonomy talks within the
Camp David framework.
Q. Following up on that, from
what you heard from President Sadat
and what you know of Mr. Begin's
position, could you tell us if there is
support for an early resumption of the
autonomy talks?
A. Yes.
Q. And can you give us some
sense of timing on that?
A. Well, clearly, I think my last
question tended to answer it. We will
have to conduct discussions with Prime
Minister Begin, of course, and then
assess where we stand with respect to
the views of both Egypt and Israel.
Q. Is there a possibility of a non-
PLO participation by the Palestinians
which might square this circle which
you appear to be involved in?
A. Let me just go back to the Camp
David accords themselves which
visualize Palestinian participation.
Palestinian inhabitants on the West
Bank and Gaza clearly will have a role;
and this is visualized under what I call a
Camp David framework, which I em-
phasize is a realistic approach to pro-
gress toward longer-term objectives.
Q. In the real world as it exists
today, is there a non-PLO Palestinian-
type participation possible?
A. I think, as I say, that is both
within the framework and the spirit of
the Camp David accords, in the context
of the West Bank inhabitants and the
Gaza inhabitants.
Q. On the Sinai force, did you get
into specific countries? And, if so, can
you name them? And what progress
are you making with Canada,
Australia, New Zealand for example?
And when do you expect to announce
those countries?
A. I'm going to have to refrain from
labeling or giving a progress report on
the conduct of the discussions which are
seeking participation in that force,
because it tends to put it in jeopardy. I
am confident it will be announced when
it's firm.
Q. I'm confused. Did President
Sadat lay out a scenario here — that is,
at least his own ideas about how to
get the talks going again, and not only
to get the talks going again but how
to get some progress?
A. Of course.
Q. And, if so, can you tell us
something about what it is?
A. No, I don't think it serves I
useful purpose to do that, and I del
think President Sadat would expect
we would do it publicly. There wass [
very clear and frank exchange on hi
President Sadat sees progress. Bui
want to make it clear that he know
recognizes, and did in the discussicl
that we now have to hear how Mr.,
Begin would approach the problem!
the direction of progress. Until then
would serve no purpose to reveal 01
side's views.
Q. Could you anticipate a thre
way summit at some point this ye»
following your talks with Prime
Minister Begin?
A. I think it's too early to sajl
Clearly, we have to hear the views*
both sides. We would probably havfl*
discuss this at ministerial level. Aim
wouldn't anticipate a summit-level
meeting until we knew precisely whi
would be achieved by it and what til
outcome would be, and I think both I
President Sadat and President Reag I
were very, very clear on this — the i
to have preparations in place rathe} |
than to convene an ad hoc situation j
outcome of which you would not beW
to anticipate.
Q. As you know, there has bei
over the years a good deal of deba
over the exact terms of the 1975
pledge to Israel regarding the PLI-
exactly how far it goes. I believe i
says the United States will not nep
ate with or recognize the PLO asl
as they don't do these things that;
called for. Do you see any room ft*
complishing Mr. Sadat's objective
encouraging moderation on the PL
by doing something that doesn't gt
far as to negotiate with or recogni
but some kind of lesser U.S. man©
or action or reciprocal move towar
the PLO?
A. No. I think the conditions an
very clear and they are understood.:
Having said that, it is also clear that
PLO is well aware of that and has bt
aware of it in the context of the situ:
tion in Lebanon. So maybe you've
answered your own question.
Q. You talked about a "strateg
consensus." Would you please, defi
for me what the strategic consensu
in the Middle East and who agrees
with your assessment of it, once yo
have given us the assessment?
56
Department of State Bull
Middle East
t's presumptious of me to say
ees or doesn't agree. What I
're talking about when we
i strategic consensus is a great
:oncern over and above the
ions and concerns associated
Arab-Israeli dispute, with the
ment brought about by historic
which has been and can in the
e even more dramatically ex-
>y the Soviet Union or its surro-
large number of the Arab
)day are extremely aware of
d that awareness has been
led by a number of events in the
iast: the fall of the Shah of Iran,
it they perhaps view as the
States own inadequacies during
•iod; secondly, the conflict be-
ran and Iraq which followed it;
the Soviet invasion of Afghani-
d the threat that it poses in a
1 sense; and fourthly, the un-
;ed and very worrisome aspects
)la, Ethiopa, and Southern
in the attack against Northern
of these things have heightened
ireness of the leaders in the area
•eality that they are not only
ith the frustrations of the Arab-
Iproblem and the threat that has
! ally posed, but they are equally —
rhaps as greviously — threatened
other events that I spoke of.
chat context, as we deal with that
id-threat problem or that surro-
Ireat problem and concert to deal
we also contribute to conditions
make the solution to the long-
iig Middle East dilemmas some-
;iore tractable, just as progress in
iddle East peace process facili-
le development of this consensus,
u say, "Who accepts it?" Clearly,
mt Sadat not only accepts it but
a leader in expressing his con-
this area. He was at the
>nt of warning the world about
lituations.
From the feedback you have
ed so far through indirect con-
ind direct contacts, do you
e that Saudi Arabia would be
to enter the peace process dur-
e coming phase?
. I can't speak for Saudi Arabia,
earlier position on the Camp
accords is well known. On the
hand, I would be remiss were I
note and highlight the great
mce they have been — and I mean
indamental way— to the moderat-
ogress we've made in Lebanon.
Q. Do you think there's a change
in the stance of the Saudis at present?
A. I wouldn't want to speak for the
Saudis on that.
Q. As you described President
Sadat's approach on the PLO, he
urged us to begin contacts with the
PLO and President Reagan referred to
the 1975 pledge and the matter was
dropped. I just wonder whether there
might not have been more to it than
that and whether President Sadat sug-
gested that the PLO was about to take
some step toward accepting 242 or
that you should deal with them
through Saudi Arabia or some other
way that's not quite black and white.
A. No, he didn't, but you remember
there are ways and ways. We know,
under Camp David. We expect Palestin-
ian, as distinct from PLO, participation
in Camp David. That's as visualized in
the accords themselves. There are other
aspects of that, direct and indirect,
which were discussed but in a very
general way.
Q. Could you please amplify for us
or reiterate as to the U.S. position
with regard to several points which
have not been mentioned? One is, as I
remember it, you had described the
PLO as a terrorist organization
without qualification — which is in line
with the President's own statement
before and after his election.
Two, the United States has been —
apparently, at least— committed for
several years now against a Palestin-
ian state in any shape or form on the
West Bank and Gaza. Would you com-
ment on those two points? And then
the third point is about the facilities
for the U.S. military in Egypt.
A. Let me start with the easiest
first, and that's the last one. As you
know, President Sadat has offered
Egyptian facilities — and I'm being very
clear in making a distinction between
facilities and bases — to American forces.
He has made public a letter to President
Reagan offering Ras Banas. And we are
in the process of seeking the necessary
support from the American Congress to
give us the resources to develop that
facility— as a facility, not as a base.
With respect to the other questions
you asked, they are old historic hookers.
I think, again, I would refer you to what
I've already said as the framework of
our discussions — and I've been precise
about what the framework of our discus-
sions was — and just leave it there.
Q. There has been a great deal of
talk here today about Soviet surro-
gates. Do you consider the PLO to be
a Soviet surrogate?
A. I would prefer not to classify
them as that. I think there are certain
elements of the PLO that would clearly
fit under that mantle. But when you talk
of the PLO, you're talking about a
diverse group and organization, some of
the differences of which may be evident
in the very recent past.
Q. Was the Egyptian President
told when the F-16s would be going to
Israel?
A. I don't think he was, because a
decision hasn't been made.
Q. On the resumption of autonomy
talks, I just want to make sure we
understand what you are saying. Was
there an agreement or a statement by
the President that the United States
would like to see the three-way
autonomy talks resumed in about the
same type of format that existed in
the last Administration — that is, the
last time they were held? And, second-
ly, have you decided in your own mind
how the United States should handle
that? Do you have in mind a special
envoy, do you plan to do it yourself, or
what?
A. I think the essence of that ques-
tion is that there were two approaches
under the Camp David framework for
the autonomy talks. Initially, the United
States, under Ambassador Strauss,
tended to join a process in which a very
detailed set of arrangements were
sought. That seemed to be a reflection
more of the Israeli wish than it was the
Egyptian wish. That seemed to stall out.
During Ambassador Linowitz' period,
there seemed to be more pressure for
going toward some broad principles.
And, of course, we haven't made a deci-
sion on this.
I don't see any difference developing
from past viewpoints in Israel on one
side and Egypt on the other. I think the
important thing is that whatever we
ultimately seek to adopt — more detailed
or rather broad principles, which seem
somewhat easier in a sense — it must be
a reflection of a three-way consensus
that it's the best hope for the progress
we seek.
With respect to a negotiator or a
high-level U.S. representative, I think
it's too early to say. We will clearly
make that decision on our own judgment
and on the judgment of the other two
mber 1981
57
Middle East
-
parties as to what would be the best
contributor to progress. We have no
biases for it or against it.
Q. Is President Sadat advocating
that you involve Palestinians in the
talks when they resume or that you
make an effort to involve Palestinians
in that?
A. No, not at all. We're talking
about ultimate arrangements agreed
upon in which the Palestinian in-
habitants would be clear participants,
whatever government or arrangements
would be agreed to in the West Bank
and Gaza.
Q. Did President Sadat specifically
ask for any new defense commitments
or security assistance commitments,
and did he receive any?
A. I think it goes without saying
that any of America's friends who go
into security assistance relationships
with us are concerned about delivery
schedules and times. It's a consequence
of a long period of neglect here in the
United States of our own industrial com-
plex that supports defense industries,
and it usually means long delays bet-
ween the agreement to provide a system
and its actual delivery. I think that's at
the center of the Egyptian concerns, and
it's not an uncharacteristic set of con-
cerns because most of our security part-
ners experience the same concerns.
As you know, Secretary Weinberger
is working very actively on this today,
and we have asked for a contingency
fund in the fiscal year 1983 program
that will enable us to purchase ahead
certain equipment so that we wouldn't
then have to be faced with these delays.
Q. But there wasn't a commitment
for new ones or new machinery?
A. No. There was a discussion, in a
broad sense. It is the United States in-
tention to maintain a high level of
security assistance support for Egypt,
because we feel this is in our American
vital interest, and Egypt, because of a
convergence of strategic views, serves
not only its own security needs and the
security needs of the region but the vital
interests of the American people as well.
Q. Have you promised to get the
F-16s to the Egyptians faster than
they are currently scheduled to reach
there?
A. These discussions are going on
and have been going on in the Pentagon.
And you know there are long delays.
Secretary Haig Interviewed on
CBS Morning News
■Press release 267.1
Secretary Haig was interviewed on
CBS-TV morning news on July 2U, 1981,
by Robert Pierpoint and Jed Duvall of
CBS News.1
Q. We have some good news which
has just broken as you've heard; name-
ly, it appears that Prime Minister
Begin has agreed to Ambassador
Habib's [Philip C. Habib, the Presi-
dent's special emissary to the Middle
East] and President Reagan's request
for a cease-fire. What do you know
about it?
A. What Mr. Habib has announced
this morning after discussions with
Prime Minister Begin and his contacts
with the other elements involved in the
situation would suggest that the
hostilities will cease from both sides of
the border, and, of course, we're very
encouraged by this development.
Q. You say the hostilities will
cease on both sides of the border, and
I think it was actually to take effect
about 3 minutes ago. How do we
know that the PLO [Palestine Libera-
tion Organization] is going to go along
with this cease-fire?
A. We've had the necessary
assurances to make this a very serious
effort by the parties. Of course, it has
taken a degree of moderation and
responsibility on all sides, and we're en-
couraged.
Q. You say assurances, so you feel
confident that both sides are going to
go along with this, at least, for the
time being?
A. Yes, it should have been effec-
tive as of 12 noon, local time, so that's
about IV2 hours ago.
Q. Yes, so I was a little off on the
timing of it, but, in other words, it
ought to already be in effect.
A. That's correct.
Q. What do you think is the next
step in achieving a peace in that area
now?
A. I think with the reduced levels of
violence, which is an encouraging sign,
and an agreement to maintain that — and
we'll have to see in the period
ahead— that the process that Ambassa-
dor Habib started earlier to try to arrive
at a status quo ante in Lebanon and
now, clearly, the border area of
southern Lebanon is an additional f;
that will have to be dealt with, and
hope effectively.
Q. Are you talking now about
ing back to the problem of the Syr
antiaircraft missiles and the probl>
surrounding the Israeli strikes in I
area?
A. I think all of these problems
ternally in Lebanon are an aspect of
peace effort that Ambassador Habik
going to have to deal with and has,i
deed, been dealing with.
Q. Ambassador Habib has had
some difficulty up until today in gi
ting the Israelis to agree to a ceai
fire; in fact, they haven't even wan
to use the words "cease-fire." Whs
you think has been the Israeli goal
its escalation of the violence in thi
last couple of weeks?
A. I think the important factor
day is that we have achieved the
necessary consensus for the cessatio
hostilities either emanating from Isr
into Lebanon or from Lebanon into
Israel.
Q. What did it? What did Hab
do differently last night or this m<
ing that hasn't been done over the
few weeks? In other words, what
unlocked it?
A. I don't think there were any
tricky, little keys that were involved
just a yeoman, professional effort de
ing with all of the elements that can
fluence this situation with a great dc
of cooperation and help from some I
states and, also, Israel as well.
Q. We have been pressing Mr.
Begin for some weeks now to agre
a cease-fire. This morning he ap-
parently has. I think Jed's question
deserves a little further explanatioi
agree with him. What happened? fl
it, for instance, the speaking out 0!
Defense Secretary [Caspar]
Weinberger and of your Deputy, Mi
[Deputy Secretary William P.] Clarl
when they criticized Mr. Begin rati
strongly the day before yesterday?
Was it that kind of pressure that
brought the Israelis to this point?
A. I think it serves no useful pur
pose to engage in that kind of
Washington fun and games. We are 1
58
Department of State Built
Middle East
very serious business. Our deal-
;h all of the governments, the
se Government, with other Arab
hat have been involved, and with
;e of Israel must be serious,
and private, and that is precisely
ley have been.
I assure you that I'm not
rig in fun and games. I don't
ither Mr. Clark, when he criti-
lr. Begin, or the Defense
iry were engaging in that. They
bviously and are obviously men
iderstand the thinking of the
istration and of the President,
ey did directly criticize Mr.
My question again to you is:
at help bring about this situa-
were they simply speaking on
wn and didn't really mean what
lid?
I think there have been a lot of
ations made about a lot of people
thing. I think the White House
/esterday to the issue, and
has been said about it.
You mentioned in your answer
| that some— what indicated
lis some new move by some Arab
lies or some new contacts with
Inericans and some Arab coun-
ihat contributed to the cease-
s some new element there that
In't know about?
i No, there is nothing new or
u.1. It was done and has been
ivay for a considerable period of
, n the earlier peace effort engaged
Embassador Habib, these same
|;ls were applied, and the same
E were extremely helpful.
. I gather that since Mr. Habib
ifrom Saudi Arabia today that the
B have been particularly involved
b, is that correct?
. They have been very helpful
he very outset.
. What has been the effect on
■lationship with the Saudis and
members of the Arab world— of
mtinuing support of Israel
te the escalation of the violence
•. Begin's government?
.. I think it's important, at this
ire, while this delicate process is
ming and after this, I think, very
tant achievement, that we just
those kind of observations out of
ix.
. Are the F-16s on the way now?
l. No, they are not.
Q. Will they be soon?
A. This remains to be seen.
Q. You are going to continue the
review then of the bombing of the Ira-
qi nuclear reactor installation by the
Israelis?
A. I think we all know very well
that that review, as such, has been
largely concluded, and it was the en-
vironment in the area that made it inap-
propriate for the President to go ahead
and send that kind of lethal equipment
into Israel. That means that we are go-
ing to be watching the situation very
carefully in the hours, days, and,
perhaps, weeks ahead.
Q. Why has it been that you
undertook review of the bombing of
the Iraqi installation, but you have
declined to undertake a review of the
bombing by Israel of downtown
Beirut, of the Palestinian head-
quarters in Beirut?
A. I think the important thing here
is to bear in mind that there are two
sides to this situation. There are
rockets, Kaytushas, and 130-millimeter
artillery rounds that have been falling in
Israel with equally grave consequences
to innocent noncombatants, and these
are the mutually, escalating conditions
that lead to conflict in the first instance.
Our concerns are strictly involved in try-
ing to return to a state of moderation,
status quo ante, and to get on with the
process which is vitally important for all
the parties, and that is the return to
peace.
Q. And you think we're on that
path now as a result of this morning's
developments?
A. I think it's a very encouraging
first step. And after all, we have
achieved what we hoped for in the im-
mediate sense.
Q. And there is a cease-fire, and
that is a good note for us to end with.
1 Press release 249.
U.S. and Egypt Sign
Nuclear Energy Agreement
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT,
JUNE 29, 19811
At 11:30 this morning, Secretary Haig
signed an agreement for cooperation
concerning peaceful uses of nuclear
energy with Egypt's Minister of Elec-
tricity, Maher Abaza. The signing took
place at the State Department. The
agreement culminates a process begun
in 1974 when the United States offered
to share peaceful nuclear technologies
with both Egypt and Israel.
In 1976 we initialed identical draft
cooperation agreements with both coun-
tries. Due to subsequent developments
in the Middle East and then to the
review of U.S. nonproliferation policy,
these agreements were never signed or
forwarded to the Congress.
In May 1979 we again presented
identical draft agreements, revised to in-
clude provisions conforming with the re-
quirements for such agreements
established in the Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion Act of 1978, to both Israel and
Egypt. The Israelis indicated that they
were not interested in proceeding with
such an agreement at this time. Two
negotiating sessions were held with the
Egyptians in 1979.
During 1980 the Egyptians reviewed
their plans for peaceful development of
nuclear energy. At year end, they an-
nounced that Egypt would ratify the
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPF), which
they had signed in 1968, and that oil-
export revenues would be set aside to
finance nuclear power development.
Egypt's parliament approved the NPT
on February 16, 1981, and Egypt's in-
strument of ratification was deposited in
London on February 26.
The agreement signed today
specifies terms and conditions forming
the framework within which various
cooperative activities and exchanges
may take place. These activities include
possible purchase by Egypt from U.S.
suppliers of nuclear power reactors and
low-enriched uranium fuel to provide, at
the outset, a generating capacity of
about 2,000 megawatts. Private sup-
pliers and Egyptian authorities would
have to agree on the terms of any pur-
imber 1981
59
NUCLEAR POLICY
chases Egypt may decide to make. The
agreement is, in many respects, the
same as agreements which the United
States has concluded with a number of
other countries and also contains special
provisions which the executive branch
believes should apply generally to U.S.
peaceful nuclear cooperation in the
region. Such agreements are required
under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended, for the export of reactors,
enriched uranium fuel, and other items.
Additionally, the export of such items
must still be licensed by the United
States in accordance with our law.
For the United States, further pro-
cedures necessary before the agreement
may enter into force are specified in the
Atomic Energy Act. The signed agree-
ment now will be transmitted to Con-
gress. The statute provides that it may
enter into force after 60 days of con-
tinuous congressional session unless dur-
ing that time the Congress adopts a con-
current resolution disapproving the
agreement.
In addition, under article III of the
NPT, Egypt is obliged to conclude an
agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The
treaty requires that the agreement with
the IAEA provides for the application of
safeguards on all nuclear materiel in all
peaceful nuclear activities in Egypt,
under its jurisdiction, or carried out
under its control anywhere. No coopera-
tion can take place under our agreement
until Egypt's safeguards agreement with
the IAEA is in effect. Egypt and the
IAEA initialed such an agreement on
June 25.
U.S. Government financing support
is not dealt with in the present agree-
ment. Egypt has stated that it will ear-
mark up to $500 million annually from
its oil-export revenues for alternative
sources of energy, including nuclear
power. Nuclear power plant suppliers
from the United States and other coun-
tries are keenly interested in par-
ticipating in Egypt's peaceful nuclear
power development program.
The U.S. Government wishes to
reiterate its support and appreciation
for Egypt's decision to ratify the NPT.
This is an important step toward con-
trolling the dangers of the spread of
nuclear explosives and yet another affir-
mation of Egypt's commitment to peace
and stability in the Middle East and
Africa under the courageous and
statesmanlike leadership of President
Sadat.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy
'Made available to news correspondents
by Department spokesman Dean Fischer. ■
PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
JULY 16, 1981. '
Our nation faces major challenges in in-
ternational affairs. One of the most
critical is the need to prevent the spread
of nuclear explosives to additional coun-
tries. Further proliferation would pose a
severe threat to international peace,
regional and global stability, and the
security interests of the United States
and other countries. Our nation has been
committed on a bipartisan basis to
preventing the spread of nuclear ex-
plosives from the birth of the Atomic
Age over 35 years ago. This commit-
ment is shared by the vast majority of
other countries. The urgency of this task
has been highlighted by the ominous
events in the Middle East.
The problem of reducing the risks of
nuclear proliferation has many aspects,
and we need an integrated approach to
deal with it effectively. In the final
analysis, the success of our efforts
depends on our ability to improve
regional and global stability and reduce
those motivations that can drive coun-
tries toward nuclear explosives. This
calls for a strong and dependable United
States, vibrant alliances and improved
relations with others, and a dedication
to those tasks that are vital for a stable
world order.
I am announcing today a policy
framework that reinforces the long-
standing objectives of our nation in non-
proliferation and includes a number of
basic guidelines. The United States will:
• Seek to prevent the spread of
nuclear explosives to additional coun-
tries as a fundamental national security
and foreign policy objective;
• Strive to reduce the motivation
for acquiring nuclear explosives by
working to improve regional and global
stability and to promote understanding
of the legitimate security concerns of
other states;
• Continue to support adherence to
the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of
Nuclear Weapons and to the Treaty for
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America (treaty of Tlatelolco) by
countries that have not accepted those
treaties;
• View a material violation of these
treaties or an international safeguards
agreement as having profound conse-
quences for international order and U.S.
bilateral relations and also view any
nuclear explosion by a non-nuclear-
weapon state with grave concern; I
• Strongly support and continue
work with other nations to strengtha
the International Atomic Energy AgB
cy (IAEA) to provide for an improved
international safeguards regime;
• Seek to work more effectively
with other countries to forge agreemi
on measures for combating the risks*
proliferation; and
• Continue to inhibit the transfer
sensitive nuclear material, equipment
and technology, particularly where thi
danger of proliferation demands, and
seek agreement on requiring IAEA
safeguards on all nuclear activities in
non-nuclear-weapon state as a condirj
for any significant new nuclear supph
commitment.
I am also announcing that I will
promptly seek the Senate's advice anc
consent to ratification of protocol I of
the treaty of Tlatelolco.
The United States will cooperate
with other nations in the peaceful use
of nuclear energy, including civil nucli
programs to meet their energy securi:
needs, under a regime of adequate
safeguards and controls. Many friend'
and allies of the United States have a
strong interest in nuclear power and
have, during recent years, lost con-
fidence in the ability of our nation to
recognize their needs.
We must reestablish this nation a
predictable and reliable partner for I
peaceful nuclear cooperation under ad
quate safeguards. This is essential to
nonproliferation goals. If we are not
such a partner, other countries will te
to go their own ways, and our influem
will diminish. This would reduce oure
fectiveness in gaining the support we
need to deal with proliferation problei
To attain this objective, I am:
• Instructing the executive brand
agencies to undertake immediate effoi
to insure expeditious action on export
requests and approval requests under
agreements for peaceful nuclear coop-
eration where the necessary statutory
requirements are met; and
• Requesting that the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission act expedi-
tiously on these matters.
The Administration will also notii
hibit or set back civil reprocessing anc
breeder reactor development abroad ii
nations with advanced nuclear power
60
Department of State Bullet
:URITY ASSISTANCE
iventional Arms Transfers Policy
lowing are a White House an-
nent concerning a Presidential
e on U.S. arms transfers policy
9, 1981, and a statement by
rj. Buckley, Under Secretary for
y Assistance, Science, and
ogy, before the Senate Foreign
ns Committee on July 28.
3 HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT,
), 19811
8, the President signed a direc-
conventional arms transfer
which superseded Presidential
/e 13 of May 13, 1977. The new
ansfer policy follows.
; challenges and hostility toward
lental U.S. interests, and the in-
of its friends and allies, have
significantly in recent years,
rends threaten stability in many
and impede progress toward
political and economic develop-
8 United States cannot defend the
>rld's interests alone. The United
must, in today's world, not only
hen its own military capabilities
prepared to help its friends and
d strengthen theirs through the
r of conventional arms and other
)f security assistance. Such
Irs complement American security
cments and serve important U.S.
l/es. Prudently pursued, arms
|rs can strengthen us.
litis where it does not constitute a
ration risk.
ie United States will support
programs and other international
•ative efforts in the areas of
r safety and environmentally
nuclear waste management.
) carry out these policies, I am in-
ing the Secretary of State, work-
th the other responsible agencies,
e priority attention to efforts to
proliferation risks, to enhance
ternational nonproliferation
e, and, consistent with U.S. securi-
grests, to reestablish a leadership
Dr the United States in interna-
nuclear affairs.
ext from Weekly Compilation of
jntial Documents of July 20, 1981. The
House issued a fact sheet on the Presi-
statement on July 16. ■
The United States, therefore, views
the transfer of conventional arms and
other defense articles and services as an
essential element of its global defense
posture and an indispensable component
of its foreign policy. Applied judiciously,
arms transfers can:
• Help deter aggression by enhanc-
ing the states of preparedness of allies
and friends;
• Increase our own Armed Forces'
effectiveness by improving the ability of
the United States, in concert with its
friends and allies, to project power in
response to threats posed by mutual
adversaries;
• Support efforts to foster the
ability of our forces to deploy and
operate with those of our friends and
allies, thereby strengthening and
revitalizing our mutual security relation-
ships;
• Demonstrate that the United
States has an enduring interest in the
security of its friends and partners and
that it will not allow them to be at a
military disadvantage;
• Foster regional and internal sta-
bility, thus encouraging peaceful resolu-
tion of disputes and evolutionary
change; and
• Help to enhance U.S. defense pro-
duction capabilities and efficiency.
Attainment of these objectives in
turn requires effective U.S. Government
control and direction over arms trans-
fers. Because of the diversity of U.S.
security interests, this Administration
will tailor its approach to arms transfer
requests to specific situations and exer-
cise sufficient flexibility to respond
promptly to changes affecting the
mutual interests of the United States
and its allies and friends. We will review
such requests with care.
The United States will evaluate re-
quests primarily in terms of their net
contribution to enhanced deterrence and
defense. It will accord high priority to
requests from its major alliance partners
and to those nations with which it has
friendly and cooperative security rela-
tionships. In making arms transfer deci-
sions the United States will give due
consideration to a broad range of factors
including:
• The degree to which the transfer
responds appropriately to the military
threats confronting the recipient;
• Whether the transfer will enhance
the recipient's capability to participate in
collective security efforts with the
United States;
• Whether the transfer will promote
mutual interests in countering externally
supported aggression;
• Whether the transfer is consistent
with U.S. interests in maintaining
stability within regions where friends of
the United States may have differing ob-
jectives;
• Whether the transfer is compati-
ble with the needs of U.S. forces,
recognizing that occasions will arise
when other nations may require scarce
items on an emergency basis;
• Whether the proposed equipment
transfer can be absorbed by the recip-
ient without overburdening its military
support system or financial resources;
and
• Whether any detrimental effects
of the transfer are more than counter-
balanced by positive contributions to
U.S. interests and objectives.
All requests will be considered on a
case-by-case basis. Those for coproduc-
tion, or the transfer of sensitive or ad-
vanced technology, will receive special
scrutiny, taking into account economic
and industrial factors for both the
United States and other participating
countries, the importance of arms
cooperation with NATO and other close
friends and allies, potential third party
transfers, and the protection of sensitive
technology and military capabilities.
Particular care must be taken to
avoid any adverse impact on allied and
friendly nations by encouraging them to
assume burdens for which their
economies are ill-prepared. Therefore,
careful consideration will be given to
lower-cost alternatives including adapta-
tions of military equipment for sale
abroad, recognizing that first-line
systems may not suit the needs of many
countries. This consideration of the full
range of available American alternatives
will take place at every stage of review.
U.S. Government representatives
overseas will be expected to provide the
same courtesies and assistance to firms
that have obtained licenses to market
items on the U.S. munitions list as they
would to those marketing other
American products.
The policy changes being initiated
should not be seen as heralding a period
of unrestrained military transfers. The
United States retains a genuine interest
in arms transfer restraint and remains
prepared to consider specific proposals
directed toward that end. There has
mber 1981
61
Security Assistance
been, however, little or no interest in
arms transfer limitations manifested by
the Soviet Union, or the majority of
other arms-producing nations. In the
absence of such interest, the United
States will not jeopardize its own securi-
ty needs through a program of unilateral
restraint. At the same time, recognizing
the special role that its major allies can
play in strengthening common friends, it
will seek to develop complementary
policies with those allies.
The realities of today's world de-
mand that we pursue a sober, responsi-
ble, and balanced arms transfer policy, a
policy that will advance our national
security interests and those of the free
world. Both in addressing decisions as to
specific transfers and opportunities for
restraint among producers, we will be
guided by principle as well as practical
necessity. We will deal with the world as
it is, rather than as we would like it to
be.
UNDER SECRETARY BUCKLEY,
JULY 28, 19812
I am pleased to be here today to discuss
the Administration's conventional arms
transfer policy and to answer any ques-
tions you may have about it. The policy
directive signed by the President on
July 8 capped an interagency effort of
several months to design an approach to
arms transfer that would support the
President's foreign policy and national
security goals. Those goals include
restoration of a greater degree of global
stability and balance that will allow in-
dividual societies to develop their own
economies and pursue their own political
and social destinies in peace free of out-
side intervention or coercion.
That objective cannot be achieved,
however, without an America that is
strong enough to protect its own
legitimate interests around the globe
while helping other strategically located
nations to enhance their own ability to
protect themselves. The fact that must
be recognized, in assessing the Ad-
mistration's arms transfer policy, is the
degree to which key regions of the
world have become destabilized in recent
years, and critical American interests
brought under potential challenge.
This statement raises obvious ques-
tions: What are those U.S. interests that
are being challenged, and what are the
sources of this instability? In keeping
with the committee's interest today, I
am addressing these issues in the nar-
row context of arms transfer policy.
Thus the policy rationale which follows
makes no attempt to deal comprehen-
sively with the many other interests en-
compassed by our foreign policy. It does
not, for example, include an analysis of
the economic, political, human rights,
and other considerations which are ma-
jor factors in our approach to the Third
World, nor of the powerful impact on
our policy of our ties with traditional
allies.
Regional Concerns
We must maintain and strengthen the
NATO alliance in all its political,
economic, and military dimensions. But
we also have the most obvious interest
in a stable and lasting peace in the Mid-
dle East and in continued access to its
oil resources and to the peaceful transit
of Western shipping through the Persian
Gulf and the Suez Canal. In Africa, we
need to preserve our access to stra-
tegically important minerals on which
our high-technology economy literally
depends; while in Southeast Asia, we,
along with other Pacific industrial
powers, require assurance that the
Strait of Malacca will remain open to
our commerce. In our own backyard, we
have the most obvious interest in
preventing the colonization of Central
America by an ideology hostile to every
value in which we believe and which can
be counted upon, if successful, to pose a
threat to the stability of the American
hemisphere.
And who today feels insecure? Some
of the most strategically important na-
tions of the Third World: the oil-produc-
ing states of the Arabian Peninsula, for
example, when a Soviet-supplied South
Yemen is made militarily stronger than
Saudi Arabia; when Iranian fighters can
cruise unopposed down the eastern coast
of the Arabian Peninsula to underscore
a threat to close the Persian Gulf to
Western shipping; when Soviet client
states flank the entry to the Red Sea;
and when Soviet divisions march into
Afghanistan, bringing their tactical
fighters within range of the Strait of
Hormuz.
The more moderate nations of north
Africa feel insecure when an oil-rich
Libya acquires an arsenal more than
twice the size of that of all its neighbors
combined, sends its troops into Chad,
and threatens other neighbors in Niger
and the Sudan while stirring up trouble
around the globe.
Thailand and the other states
bordering Indochina feel insecure as the
Vietnamese send their troops into Kam-
puchea, set up a puppet government,
and then engage in a policy of military
harassment against Thailand.
And nations in our own hemisplk
are begining to feel insecure as a cAj
tion of Marxist states, spearheaded b|
Cuba, train and equip revolutionary
groups operating in a half dozen cm
tries, and seek to topple a moderatf
government in El Salvador while cot
tributing to the buildup of a military
established in Nicaragua unprecedeffl
in Central American history.
A quick tour of the globe thus
reveals a dramatic deterioration in h
of the developing world of special inm
tance to the West. And it is no coin!
cidence that here, over the past 4 yj
Soviet transfers of some of the mosf
sophisticated weapons have surpassec
those of the West by impressive
margins.
This is a fact of absolute importer:
for the Congress to understand if itjs
place the Reagan arms transfer policy!
proper perspective. Impressions that]
United States will destabilize regions1
pouring additional billions of dollars o:
high technology weapons into the I
developing world, in what one former
Carter Administration spokesman
describes, in a recent article in the W
Street Journal, as a "burning desire ti
resume our role ... as the world's
leading arms merchant," are simply m
founded.
Gross dollar figures can be
misleading, but no one quarrels witht
fact that the Soviet Union's arms
transfers exceeded those of the Unite
States this past year by any calculate
What is of critical importance, howeve
is to know what is being sold, and whj
billion dollars of Soviet military equip-
ment cannot be equated with a billion
dollars of American sales.
When concerns are raised about in
stability arising from increased U.S.
arms transfers, they are focused on tin
developing world. Yet almost half of oi
military sales are to our NATO allies
and Japan, Australia, and New Zealan
A large part of the balance is repre-
sented by support services and installa-
tions, such as the construction of port
facilities, hospitals, and military
academies and housing, as in our Sauc
program.
What is key to understanding the
impact of arms transfers on regional
stability— as reflected by a given coun-
try's perception of its ability to defend
itself against a hostile neighbor— is the
quantity and quality of the weapons
transferred. Here are some facts on
which to judge the Reagan Administra-
tion's policy on arms transfers and our
security assistance proposals, which at
respond to that policy.
62
Department of State Bullet'
Security Assistance
the past 4 years (from 1977
L980), Soviet sales to the Third
ceeded ours by a margin of
h; but what is really important,
■ested, is what it is the Soviets
their clients in comparison with
provided our friends and allies.
a moment at the numbers of
Dund and air weapons in six ma-
ories that were delivered by the
rpowers to developing nations
lis 4-year period: From 1977
1980, the Soviets delivered (in
rures) 6,000 tanks and self-
1 guns to the Third World ver-
) by the United States; 7,600 ar-
ersonnel carriers and recon-
e vehicles versus 7,200; 10,500
pieces versus 2,300; 1,800
lie combat aircraft versus 500;
ionic combat aircraft versus 200;
urface-to-air missiles versus
l other words, in four out of the
r categories of lethal weapons,
ets out-delivered the United
y margins ranging 2-to-l to
-to-1, while edging out the
States in the remaining two.
'iproach
lin indication of some of the
j with which we have to deal,
pr not, there exist today signifi-
lillenges to U.S. and Western in-
i But we cannot meet them alone,
p, is a reality we must address;
1; here that a prudent policy of
ansfers can play a critical — in
essential — role in shaping our
policy to achieve our most fun-
al security goals,
ress the word "prudent" because
ninistration's new policy steers a
course between unrestricted
nd the use of arms transfers
illy as political capital to be
d without reference to the
i needs of the recipient, and the
at arms transfers are inherently
e in their impact and must,
re, be restrained for the sake of
it.
j latter approach was, at least
:ally, the policy in effect when
ministration took office. It was
m the belief that arms transfers
;sentially wrong and, therefore,
igaged in only in exceptional cir-
nces. At least in principle, the
Administration sought unilateral
it in the sale of arms and hoped,
r, to inspire others to follow our
e. In practice, neither the
it nor the example proved par-
y effective. The total dollar value
of agreements under the foreign military
sales (FMS) program did drop from FY
1976 to FY 1977, but it began rising
steadily thereafter under the im-
peratives of the security needs of our
friends and allies in NATO, the Middle
East, and elsewhere. At the same time,
there was not discernible slackening in
the activities of the Soviet Union and
other major arms suppliers.
The policy of this Administration,
enunciated earlier this month, will deal
with arms transfers as a resource to be
used along with other resources for the
achievement of national goals. We in-
tend to employ them as an instrument
that can and should be used flexibly and
carefully to serve our interest. We
believe that with effective U.S. Govern-
ment control and direction, but without
the arbitrary prohibitions and annual
ceilings of the past, arms transfers can
help to enhance the state of readiness of
friends and allies; to demonstrate U.S.
determination to respond to threats to
our interests and thus help deter such
threats; to revitalize our alliances and
cooperative security relationships and
develop new ones; and to make a modest
contribution to the needed upgrading of
our own defense manufacturing base.
For these reasons, the Administra-
tion believes that arms transfers,
properly employed, complement and sup-
plement our efforts to improve our own
defense capabilities and are an indispen-
sible component of our foreign policy. To
use arms transfers for these purposes,
we have fashioned a policy that is
responsive to individual circumstances
and that can be applied flexibly and
promptly. We will judge each prospec-
tive transfer in the light of both U.S. in-
terests and its own particular merits. In
so doing we will consider a wide spec-
trum of factors, including:
• The military justification for
transfer, including the nature of the
threat, how the article would help re-
spond to this threat, and whether it
would enhance potential collective
security efforts;
• The ability of the recipient to
absorb the transfer in terms of its
technical capacity, military support
system, and financial resources;
• The effect of the transfer on
regional stability, particularly where
friends of the United States may be at
odds with one another; and
• Whether the needs of U.S. forces
would be adversely affected by the
transfer, bearing in mind that, on occa-
sion, scarce items may be needed by
friends to meet emergencies.
These, of course, are not the only
factors we will be taking into account as
we make our case-by-case examination
of specific arms purchase requests.
Human rights considerations are an ob-
vious case in point and not merely
because we are required by law to take
them into account. It is hard to imagine
any Administration worthy of represent-
ing the American people that will not
use its influence to the maximum to en-
courage other societies to meet our
standards in this regard. It should be
kept in mind, however, that our prin-
cipal purpose in transferring arms to
another country is not to help a par-
ticular regime but to buttress our own
security and serve our own interests.
There are other significant factors
to consider, such as those which take in-
to account the varying capabilities of the
nations with which we wish to establish
security relationships. Some requests,
for example will present compelling
reasons in favor of coproduction or the
transfer of defense technology. In these
cases, we will give special attention to
domestic economic and industrial aspects
of the proposed transfer, to its relation-
ship to our arms cooperation programs
with NATO and other allies, and to the
possible subsequent need for third-party
transfers. The need to protect advanced
and sensitive U.S. technology against
possible compromise will also remain a
central factor in our decisionmaking.
We must also discriminate between
the widely varying threats faced by
friends and allies who have widely vary-
ing military needs and absorptive
capacities. Some may well require our
front-line equipment, while others would
be better off with less costly and
sophisticated alternatives. Perhaps most
important, even when some countries
are capable of absorbing the most
sophisticated systems, it may make bet-
ter military sense for them to deploy
larger numbers of less expensive and
more easily maintained systems. Accord-
ingly, we will continue to support the
concept of export or "FX" aircraft
because such aircraft are needed to
satisfy the requirements of nations
which desire and need a capability be-
tween, for example, the F-5E, and the
more advanced, complex, and costly
systems now in service with our air
force; and we intend to encourage their
consideration.
The countries with which we share
strategic concerns differ in another
respect as well, and that is in their abili-
ty to pay for the military equipment
which is required to meet our own
ultimate foreign policy and national
nber 1981
63
Security Assistance
security objectives as well as theirs. This
is why, given current inflationary price
increases and skyrocketing interest
rates, we have asked authority to offer
selected countries significantly better-
than-market interest rates to help them
finance the purchase of the arms they
need. This offer of concessional rates
does not represent an act of altruism on
our part but, quite the contrary, a most
deliberate calculation of our own self-
interest.
As I stressed earlier, we in the
United States are no longer capable of
the unilateral defense of every area that
is vital to our national welfare. We need
to work with other nations which are
either long-term allies or share common
strategic concerns. If we ourselves are
not prepared or able to project adequate
military strength into a particular region
that is important to us, then we must do
what we can to help cooperative nations
within that region achieve the capability
of meeting their own defensive
needs— and, in the process, to serve our
own.
It is an unfortunate fact that in
many areas of greatest importance to
us, such as the Middle East, portions of
Africa, and Southeast Asia, the nations
on which we must rely do not have the
economic capacity to buy the weapons
they need to meet existing threats at
prices they can pay without inviting
economic collapse. The interest subsidies
we propose to provide such nations as
Turkey, Egypt,- Sudan, Kenya, and
Thailand represent as economical an ex-
penditure of U.S. dollars to advance
American security interests as any pro-
posed for direct defense expenditures.
In short, the basic goals which have
shaped and justified our arms transfer
policy require, in appropriate cases, that
we be prepared to finance those
transfers on terms that will enable them
to take place. Otherwise we, just as
much as the recipient, stand to lose the
benefits that justify the proposed sales
in the first place.
All of which emphasizes the basic
thrust of the Administration's policy; it
is to recognize that arms transfers,
properly considered and employed,
represent an indispensable instrument of
American policy that both complements
and supplements the role of our own
military forces.
There are cynics, I know, who claim
that economic considerations are the
main driving force behind the Ad-
ministration's new policy and that, in
practice, there will be few if any con-
trols over American transfers and that
industry will have carte blanche to sell
anything, anywhere. These allegations
are patently false. I assure you that the
executive branch will continue to be in-
volved at all levels of the transfer proc-
ess in order to exercise the evaluation,
judgment, and control required by law,
policy, and principal alike. In this
regard, I have established a senior in-
teragency mechanism to be called the
arms transfer management group. It
will assist me in making recommenda-
tions to the Secretary of State on arms
transfer and security assistance issues.
Membership will consist of senior-level
representatives of all government agen-
cies involved and interested in the
transfer process. This will guarantee a
full hearing of relevant views on all
significant issues.
There may be some concern that the
new policy will lead to a large rise in the
volume of new military sales, with
billions of dollars of the most sophisti-
cated equipment crisscrossing the skies
on their way to hitherto remote and
bucolic corners of the world. Again,
nothing could be further from the truth.
The objective of our policy is not in-
creased sales per se; nor is it likely that
it will result in significant increases in
the total dollar value of transfers that
will be authorized under its terms. The
enormous cost of modern weapons and
the state of the world economy provide
their own restraints on the capacity and
appetite of would-be purchasers. In fact,
we would anticipate that 1982 sales
would remain approximately where they
are today, namely at the $15 billion
level. We do not, however, propose some
artificial ceiling in advance.
What we do expect to see, as our
policy is applied, is a qualitative shift in
the kinds of countries with which we will
be concluding sales. They will include a
larger number of developing countries
which desperately need more effective
means of defending themselves against
very real potential threats, countries
with which we will want to develop
cooperative relationships so that, in
times of crisis, we may be able more ef-
fectively to project our own power and
thus help deter aggression. In short, we
need the greater flexibility required to
merge foreign and defense policy goals
through enhanced assistance to friends
and allies in areas of the world where
the United States has the most self-
evident interest in the enhancement and
maintenance of regional security.
Finally, a recognition of the role that
arms transfers can play in the existing
world environment to help achieve our
international objectives does not repre-
;
sent a retreat from a desire for gr
restraint in the global disseminatio
sophisticated weapons. We remain I
vinced that such restraint is a goal
worth pursuing provided it is not f
unilateral and does not sacrifice fui I
mental American interests. We renl1
prepared to examine ways to pursi I
regime of multilateral restraint ancl
consider seriously the proposals of I
others. We are not prepared, howel
to sacrifice American interests and
interests of our friends abroad by s
ing to go it alone.
One final point: Throughout my
statement I have stressed the link 1
tween our foreign arms transfer pfli
and our own national security. I hax
done so because I have noticed, ov&
past several months, that a signifies
part of the opposition I have found!
the Administration's security assisa
proposals is based on a fundamenta
understanding of their nature and f
pose. Although I know our foreign
assistance requests are not themseB
the subject of this hearing, they, na
theless, reflect the translation of th?
policies I have been describing into-
tual practice. Therefore, I feel it aj»j
propriate to touch upon this mattew
because it goes to the heart of what
Reagan Administration is seeking b
achieve through the prudent use ofl
transfers as an instrument of foreijji
policy.
Contrary to the impression so ni
have of security assistance as some!
akin to an international military foot
stamp program, it is, in fact, a
necessary extension of our national
defense effort. The marginal U.S. M
loaned under FMS to the Turkish A<
or the Thai or Pakistani Air Force i
dollar that we would otherwise hav«
spend outright on our own forces to
job that the Turks and Thais and 1
Pakistanis can do better and at less:
Not only are security assistance dol
spent in the United States for U.S.J
equipment, not only are they ultima!
paid back even if the interest charge
may sometimes be at less than mark
rates, but we get the security benefit
the force improvements those dollars
buy for friendly foreign government!
I, therefore, urge you, as you col
sider the merits of our new policy, tc
focus on the facts that we have a poi
ful self-interest in contributing to W
self-defense of allies and friends and
that our own defense is inextricably 1
64
Department of State Bulle
UORISM
»rnational Terrorism
Maid T. Kennedy
moment before the Senate Foreign
ms Committee on June 10, 1981.
mnedy is Under Secretary for
merit. l
:iate this opportunity to appear
ou to discuss international ter-
med the protection of diplomats
ind this Administration's efforts
with these problems. The Ad-
.tion welcomes the broad interest
port which has been demon-
by your committee and the new
mittee on Security and Ter-
)f the Judiciary Committee. Both
own an understanding of the
ide menace of terrorism and the
r a clear and coherent govern-
isponse. We intend to work close-
your committee to develop an ef-
program.
0 was a record year for interna-
errorism. There were 760 inter-
1 terrorist acts, which resulted in
isualties than in any year since
. Government began keeping
;s on terrorism in 1968. Last
42 people were killed in interna-
fcerrorist attacks; 1,078 were
t;d. Ten Americans were among
Id; 94 Americans were injured,
iitistics in 1980 reflect the trend
|e past few years toward increas-
|.th and injury from terrorist
e. Of the 760 acts, 278, or 38%,
iirected against Americans or
an property. So far in 1981,
as been a continuation of last
ligh frequency of terrorist at-
Preliminary statistics show that
vere 312 acts of international ter-
worldwide during the first 5
s of 1981; 37% of those were
d against Americans or American
ty.
;e who occupy strategic
iphic areas or control strategic
ces and have the will but not the
ces to protect themselves.
xt from Weekly Compilation of
ntial Documents of July 13, 1981.
e complete transcript of the hearings
published by the committee and will
fable from the Superintendent of
nits, U.S. Government Printing Of-
ashington, D.C. 20402. ■
The statistics however do not ade-
quately tell the story. They do not con-
vey the fear and instability generated by
terrorist attacks, nor do they document
the enormous psychic and financial costs
to free societies. Let me recall for you
some of the terrorist acts involving
American citizens so far this year:
• In January, terrorist captivity
ended for our hostages in Iran;
• In March, terrorist hijackings in
Pakistan, Honduras, and Indonesia (one
of these the longest in aviation history),
our embassies in El Salvador and Beruit
attacked, Marine guards injured in a
bombing in Costa Rica, an American
missionary murdered in Colombia;
• In April, another violent attack on
our embassy in El Salvador;
• In May, the hijacking of a Turkish
aircraft to Bulgaria and a rocket attack
on our embassy in Beruit.
These incidents occurred in a
5-month period which saw literally
scores of additional attacks around the
globe. There were murders, bombings,
kidnappings, and attacks on diplomats
and businessmen alike. Hundreds of peo-
ple in addition to our own citizens have
this year been taken hostage; thousands
more, families and friends, have suf-
fered during these incidents.
International terrorism is an assault
on civilization itself. In addition to the
lives and freedom of the innocent, the
rights of the individual, democratic in-
stitutions, and the rule of law are under
attack. In a real sense, terrorism strikes
at our vital national interests and those
of our closest friends and allies. The
priority which this Administration is giv-
ing to the fight against terrorism
reflects that fact.
We cannot solve this problem
without a deeper understanding of the
sources and dynamics of international
terrorism. At a conference in May in the
Department, we brought together a
group of leading academic and govern-
ment experts to discuss all aspects of
the terrorist phenomenon, particularly
the linkages among terrorists groups,
the problem of patron-state support, and
government responses to terrorist
violence. The conference helped us to
sharpen our analytical tools to better
understand the phenomenon and to
move toward more effective ways of
combatting it. A report on the con-
ference will be published in the near
future.
But academic analysis is only a first
step toward a realistic government
response. All governments must firmly
resist terrorist blackmail and vigorously
pursue the terrorists with the full force
of law. Governments such as the Soviet
Union, Cuba, and Libya— which directly
or indirectly sponsor, train, finance, and
arm the terrorists — must be clearly told
that their behavior is unacceptable in a
world seeking peace and prosperity. The
international community must act
together to express its unequivocal
disapproval of such conduct.
This Administration is taking firm
and purposeful action to counter ter-
rorism. We have publicly put terrorists
on notice that they can expect no con-
cessions from us. We will not pay ran-
som or release prisoners. We will not
bargain for the release of hostages. We
hope other governments will
demonstrate similar firmness, and we
are actively encouraging them in this
direction. Governments which engage in
or actively support acts of terrorism
against us can expect a rapid and cer-
tain response. We will use all ap-
propriate resources at our disposal, be
they diplomatic, political, economic, or
military, to respond to such acts of in-
ternational intimidation and extortion.
This Administration has taken a
number of concrete steps to enhance our
ability to prevent terrorist incidents and
to manage those incidents which occur.
Early in the new Administration,
Secretary Haig instituted an inter-
departmental group on terrorism and in-
structed it to carry out an intensive
review of our counterterrorist policies
and programs. This review has focused
upon embassy security, contingency
planning and incident management,
training, and international initiatives.
Embassy Security
Because attacks on our embassies take
place with alarming frequency, we have
continued the Department's security
enhancement program to address the
threat of mob violence and large-scale
attack against our Foreign Service mis-
sions and stepped up our security pro-
gram to deal with other threats. Using
the funds provided by Congress, we are
focusing expert attention on the protec-
tion of the staff at our overseas fa-
cilities. We are constructing safehavens
in our embassies and consulates, improv-
ing building-access controls, installing
nonlethal denial systems, and concen-
trating on other life-safety measures.
We are also implementing programs for
the protection of national security infor-
nber 1981
65
Terrorism
mation. We have established a special
office, the Special Program and Liaison
Staff, within the State Department to
manage all facets of this program.
Recently I attended a conference in
Panama of security officers from all
Latin American posts. We discussed all
aspects of embassy security in the
region, including the special security
enhancement program.
The Department has already con-
ducted comprehensive security enhance-
ment surveys at 25 most seriously
threatened posts. Major construction is
about to begin in San Salvador, and
other construction projects have been
started at a number of other posts. Fur-
ther major construction work will be
contracted and begun within the next
several months. In addition, since
September 1980, the Department has
funded security requirements amounting
to over $20 million at some 116 Foreign
Service posts.
Contingency Planning and Incident
Management
However, even with the most ap-
propriate security measures, we will not
be able to prevent every act of terrorism
directed against us. We have, therefore,
developed a systematic program of con-
tingency planning and preparedness
testing, both in Washington and in the
field, to upgrade our readiness and to in-
sure that we are not caught unaware
and unprepared in a future terrorist at-
tack.
In order to make certain that we are
able to react effectively in any future
Tehran-type or other terrorist incident,
we have:
• Made certain that our embassies
and consulates have contingency plans
for dealing with terrorist incidents -
these include hostage and hijacking
plans;
• Asked all our embassies to work
out special coordination and mutual help
procedures with our closest allies;
• Instructed all ambassadors to
review their internal defense plans, par-
ticularly command and control pro-
cedures for the use of lethal force, and
we have encouraged them to hold
regular drills of these procedures;
• Authorized all our missions to in-
form host governments of our policy in
hostage events— particularly the no-
concession aspects of that policy — and
to urge governments to adopt a similar
stance; and
• Instituted an expanded 2-day
course on "Coping with Violence
Abroad." This course, which includes
segments on hostage survival, bomb
recognition, and residential security,
among other topics, is required for all
State, Agency for International Develop-
ment, and U.S. International Com-
munication Agency personnel assigned
overseas, and we have strongly urged
other agencies whose personnel are
assigned to our overseas missions to
have those employees attend the course.
It is designed to enable our personnel to
make an individual contribution to the
deterrence of terrorism through security
awareness and to prepare them for the
personal trauma of victimization by ter-
rorists should they be attacked. The
course has met with a favorable reaction
from those who have taken it. I would
be happy to invite members of this com-
mittee or staff to attend the course as
observers should you think it useful.
We are undertaking urgent efforts
to upgrade our lookout and forged docu-
ment identification procedures at our
overseas posts and ports of entry. These
systems were designed to screen out
customs and immigration violators. We
are modifying them to enable us to
detect terrorists who might attempt to
enter the United States.
We have also recently conducted a
number of domestic and international
incident-management exercises which
have tested our ability to respond to ter-
rorist attacks. These realistic exercises
have enhanced our confidence in our
crisis management capabilities. We
would be happy to brief the committee
on a classified basis on these exercises
and their results.
In an effort to improve management
and resource utilization in the counter-
terrorism and security areas, the
Department is considering alternative
organizational arrangements. The
Secretary and the Deputy Secretary
already have directed that the Office for
Combatting Terrorism report directly to
me as the Under Secretary for Manage-
ment. This means that planning and
policy, as reflected in the counterter-
rorism office, and the resources for
response to threats represented in the
security office, will both be under single
jurisdiction. We are now looking at ways
in which we may further integrate these
activities with a view to enhance our
capability to identify and respond to the
terrorist threat. As our deliberations go
forward, we will keep the committee in-
formed.
International Cooperation
Combatting terrorism is not a task
the United States alone. The probli
too complex and universal to be dt
with by one nation. We are commit
to working with other nations to |
establish a peaceful and stable worl
order, in which we may be free fro
threat of political violence. Let mi
outline some of the elements of offl
gram of international initiatives toe
bat terrorism and comment upon a
of the steps which we and like-mini
nations are already taking to deter;
prevent terrorist violence.
First, as the President and
Secretary Haig have noted, this Ad-
ministration has given high priority
combatting international terrorism,
are making a major effort both puM
and in traditional diplomatic channel
demonstrate to the other nations f 1
world the seriousness with which ft.
United States views this problem an
implications for world peace and sfe
ity. We have spoken out to conderar
practice of terror and to make cleat
those who facilitate terrorism that
violent attacks on innocent persons:
beyond the bounds of civilized behav
and must be outlawed. We are work I
with the international community 1$ i
establish a consensus under internat
law to bring to justice all those who :
commit terrorist attacks. Within the
United Nations, the United States k
encouraged and supported all the
various conventions that deal with ir.
national terrorism, beginning with Oi
1972 initiative to develop a broad u#
national convention against the exrjs
of terrorism. Since that time, the W
States has worked actively for the ad
tion of conventions outlawing terrore
acts: The Hague Convention Against
jacking, the Montreal Convention
Against Aircraft Sabotage, the New
York Convention for the Prevention I
Punishment of Crimes Against Intern
tionally Protected Persons, the Conp
tion on Physical Protection of Nuclei:
Materials, and the Convention Again1'
the Taking of Hostages. We have en-
couraged all nations to become partis
to these conventions. Over 100 countn
have become parties to both The Hag«
and Montreal conventions.
Our support for these convention;
demonstrates our traditional national
commitment to the rule of law. Tend
acts are illegitimate criminal acts, w
can be deterred through swift and ap-
propriate judicial action. These convet
tions, by establishing in international
law recognized norms for behavior,
66
Department of State Bil
Terrorism
,o discourage nations which
ndone terrorists,
measures are now pending
lis committee which will con-
o this effort. The Administra-
;s that the committee promptly
and report these conventions to
te. We hope for expeditious ad-
consent to their ratification.
International Convention
the Taking of Hostages was
y the United States in December
lis convention, originally an in-
>f the Federal Republic of Ger-
nposes binding legal obligations
parties either to extradite, or
o their competent authorities for
ion, alleged hostage-takers
ithin their jurisdictions. A state
nply with this obligation without
o where the alleged hostage-
/as committed. States parties to
ention are obligated to
;e in preventing hostage-taking
is of internal protective
s, exchange of information, and
ition of enforcement activities,
ough the penal codes of most
s contain provisions proscribing
extortion, kidnapping, and other
crimes inherent in hostage-
this is the first time a legal
sm has been created to insure
ishment of offenders wherever
; found and cooperation among
;s to prevent hostage-taking
second measure, the Convention
Physical Protection of Nuclear
1, establishes a similar scheme to
hat those who commit serious of-
nvolving nuclear material will be
d. It also provides for an in-
measure of international
.tion in providing security for
material. This convention was a
tiative, first proposed in 1974
cessfully negotiated at meetings
•national Atomic Energy head-
s between 1977 and 1979. The
States signed the convention on
3, 1980, and it was promptly sub-
to the Senate for advice and con-
ratification. We believe it is im-
for the Senate to act quickly on
vention, not only because such
hip is appropriate on a matter
,s a U.S. proposal initially but
;ause the convention fills a key
;he current international struc-
aling with the physical protection
;ar material from theft or other
1 misuse by terrorists or others.
! convention provides for physical
l during international nuclear
rt and international cooperation
in recovering stolen nuclear material.
Following the precedents of The Hague,
Montreal, and protection of diplomats
conventions, it defines serious offenses
involving nuclear material. States par-
ties are to make these offenses
punishable and subject to a system of
extradition or submission for prosecu-
tion. As a former Commissioner of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, I can
attest personally to the importance to
our national interest of becoming a par-
ty to this convention.
Both conventions will require im-
plementing legislation to enable the
United States to comply with the obliga-
tions we have undertaken. The Ad-
ministration's proposal for implementing
legislation of the Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear
Materials, submitted to the Senate on
April 7, is currently before the Judiciary
Committee. Proposed implementing
legislation for the hostages convention
will be forwarded shortly to the Con-
gress.
In addition to these two measures,
we consider that implementation of the
Montreal Convention for the Suppres-
sion of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation is a matter of
great priority. The United States
ratified this important convention in
1972, but it has not been fully im-
plemented by appropriate amendments
to U.S. law. Implementing provisions
are contained in two bills pending before
the Senate, S. 635 and S. 873. However,
it is our view that these provisions
should be considered separately and
promptly enacted. We will be working
with Congress to attain this objective.
As long as we fail to implement our
obligations under the Montreal conven-
tion, in certain limited circumstances we
would be unable to prosecute or ex-
tradite alleged offenders whose acts
were committed beyond our territorial
jurisdiction. We freely undertook this
obligation by ratifying the convention,
and it is essential that we have the
ability to comply fully with those obliga-
tions.
In addition to these conventions, we
are undertaking other steps to enhance
the degree of international consensus
and cooperation against terrorism.
Recently, we have consulted extensively
with our economic summit partners on
the implications of the recent rash of
terrorist hijackings in light of the Bonn
antihijacking declaration of 1978 and on
measures under that declaration. We
will be discussing terrorism and further
joint steps to combat it with our
economic summit partners in Ottawa
later this year.
Over the next few months, we will
also be working strenuously toward
possible U.N. action on terrorism. The
U.N. General Assembly will be consider-
ing this fall both the general problem of
terrorism and the specific issue of pro-
tection of diplomatic personnel and
premises. Through contact groups of
like-minded countries, we will be seeking
additional adherences to existing con-
ventions. We will also be exploring ways
to make these conventions more effec-
tive and considering whether additional
conventions are needed to cover other
categories of terrorist acts such as
assassinations and bombings.
In conclusion, let me once again ex-
press my appreciation for the interest of
this committee and the Congress in the
problem of international terrorism. We
are working to find solutions, but the
path will be difficult. This complex and
difficult problem will not be solved by a
single answer. It will require the
cooperative efforts of the Administra-
tion, the Congress, the American people,
and other nations before the cycle of ter-
rorist violence, death, and destruction
can be reduced. Ratification of the two
international conventions and imple-
mentation of the Montreal convention
are important and urgently needed con-
tributions in this direction.
■The complete transcript of the hearings
will he published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402.B
iber 1981
67
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Secretary Attends Caribbean
Development Meeting
Secretary Haig met with the Foreign
Ministers of Canada, Mexico, and
Venezuela in Nassau, the Bahamas, on
July 11-12, 1981, to discuss a
cooperative approach to addressing the
economic problems of the Caribbean
basin area. Following is a joint com-
munique issued on July 11, and excerpts
from a news conference held by the
Secretary and William- E. Brock, U.S.
Trade Representative, on July 12.
JOINT COMMUNIQUE,
JULY 11, 1981
We are repeating below the Communique
agreed upon by the Foreign Ministers of
Canada, Mexico and Venezuela, Secretary
Haig, and U.S. Trade Representative Brock
at the Conference of Ministers on Caribbean
Basin Development on July 11, 1981.
Communique of Conference of Ministers
on Caribbean Basin Development, July 11,
1981— Nassau, Bahamas. Secretary of State
for External Affairs Mark MacGuigan of
Canada, Secretary for External Relations
Jorge Castaneda of Mexico, Secretary of
State Alexander M. Haig of the United
States of America, William E. Brock, United
States Trade Representative, and Foreign
Minister Jose Alberto Zabrano Velasco of
Venezuela met at Nassau, the Bahamas, July
11, 1981 to discuss an initiative to stimulate
the economic and social development of the
Caribbean Basin area.
The Ministers had full and very cordial
discussions of their common concern regard-
ing the economic and social problems which
face the countries in the Caribbean and Cen-
tral America.
They agreed that their efforts must be
based on a consultative process by which
potential donors and recipients come to a
realistic understanding of the problems and
aspirations of the Basin countries based on
the national plans and priorities of those
countries and the means to address their
problems.
Dynamic and balanced development will
contribute not only to the welfare of the peo-
ple in the Caribbean Basin area, but also to
the peace and prosperity of the entire
hemisphere.
The Ministers noted that many countries
within and outside the region are already ad-
dressing the problems of development iii the
Caribbean Basin through a variety of pro-
grams and on a substantial scale. Never-
theless, they recognized the need for more
comprehensive efforts by countries
cooperating with the region, taking into ac-
count the different approaches and develop-
ment stages of these countries. The success
of these actions also depends directly on the
efforts of the countries in the region on their
own behalf.
Given the overriding common interest in
promoting development in the region, the
Ministers concluded that there are significant
advantages to an economic and social
development approach without military con-
siderations or political preconditions. Each
country in the Caribbean Basin could benefit
from such economic cooperation. At the same
time, donor countries must be free to choose
the countries with which they cooperate and
the ways they can best be of help.
Mindful of the diversity as well as the
common interests of the nations in the
region, the Ministers recognized the separate
identities of Central America and the Carib-
bean. They took note of the views expressed
by the Central American countries that the
specific character of their development prob-
lems and their long-standing efforts towards
economic integration should not only be taken
into account but even strengthened by out-
side cooperation. They also took note that the
governments of Central America and govern-
ments in the Caribbean have expressed the
need to participate actively in the formulation
of any development plan for the area.
On the basis of these principles, the
Ministers agreed to begin immediate con-
sultations with the governments of Central
America and the Caribbean, as well as with
other countries and international financial in-
stitutions. The purpose of the consultations
would be to determine the best approach for
an action plan for facilitating those trade, in-
vestment or development cooperation
measures which would stimulate sustained
and balanced economic and social develop-
ment in the region. The Ministers agreed to
meet again before the end of the year to
review the results of the consultations.
The Ministers of Canada, Mexico,
Venezuela and the United States expressed
their profound satisfaction at having met for
the first time at a high political level in a
joint examination of the problems of
economic and social development of Central
America and the Caribbean. They affirmed
their own political will to continue their ef-
forts and expressed the hope that regional
and non-regional governments would, in a
similar expression of political will, associate
themselves with the promotion of integral
and sustained development in the area.
NEWS CONFERENCE (EXCERl
JULY 12, 19811
Q. Is the Cuban Government goij|
be receiving aid under this progai
that going to be possible?
Secretary Haig. I think ther4
several aspects to the program as
visualize it, and we are merely cons
ing, now, the consultative procedfi
and approach. First, it is essentiall;
social, economic development effoit
not a vehicle for military assistant
There are no automatic exclusions
any obligations for inclusions, and
look carefully at the communique tt
is rather explicit reference to thatf
answer to your question is no excm
no obligations for inclusions. Eaclt]
ticipating donor state will make aj
sion based on its own judgments. I
Q. In effect, are we giving the
green light to giving aid to Cuba.'
Secretary Haig. We are givim
red lights; we are giving no green!
and, at this juncture, we are still at
formulation stage.
Q. The content of the agreeme
you signed, does it in any way chj
the U.S. policy of military assistan
for certain governments, or do we
follow the same line that we have
been following so far?
Secretary Haig. This is not all
signed agreement of any kind. It Ml
merely a communique summarizing'
conclusions of our day-long delibera-
tions. Secondly, in the body of thatf
munique, it is very explicit that this.-
not a program visualized to include
military assistance or military matte?
any kind, and they were not the su)jf-;
of our discussion.
Q. [Inaudible]
Secretary Haig. I think it is imp
tant that we understand that this is si
an exploratory effort. There are con-
sultations underway which will contifl
I hope, at an increased pace as a rU
of our meetings today. We enter infcj
this with a multiplicity of vehicles tjcl
could be used to assist in the area: tri
and investment, economic and technid
assistance, training, help from within
the region, from without the region, I
self-help of the recipient nations. Then
have been, at this juncture in our cot-
68
Department of State Bulle'
Western Hemisphere
Process, no specific programs
a broad potpourri approach in
lare seeking relief for the
mic plight of the area and of
ential recipients.
mid you talk about what
; lifficulties you anticipate in
sell trade concessions and in-
■ »f development to the Con-
I the American public that
I affected? I am speaking par-
rl at the goods that are now set
I hat may reduce the duty,
i come in and discourage the
U MIS.
-M ;tary Haig. It's premature.
i : 1 1 let Bill Brock deal with that
i] is our expert, and I think he
i t with greater skill.
i Jrock. Basically, we have not
determination as to the
eas of endeavor, but I think,
political difficulties are con-
/erything that will be done will
2 price. In order to determine
to fashion the American pro-
I ,s context, we will engage in
consultation with business,
congressional leaders to try
;: * that which would most ap-
y benefit the affected region. I
k we will have too much trou-
there any developed plan
oi are looking at that you might
■>
ir.3rock.We have looked at a
■Jplete list of potential options
eould consider within the United
-jut the most important question
I lve to be asked of the
i J-y nations. I think each package
<il to be tied to the needs of the
"wountry, and they are going to
"Jell us what their needs are.
A will see how best to try to ac-
ol.te them, but that's a question
<Hild best be directed to them, not
Joes this meeting establish a
rJtionship with Latin America,
ol with the Foreign Ministers
here but also with other
nerican leaders?
( -etary Haig. It certainly does
lew partnership still in the con-
phase. We will seek to consider
for establishing economic and
velopment.
Caribbean Basin Development
by Thomas O. Enders
Statement before the Subcommittee
on Inter-American Affairs of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee on July 28,
1981. Ambassador Enders is Assistant
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.1
In recent years we have become more
and more sensitive to developments in
the area immediate to the south of us —
the Caribbean Basin. In the mid-1970s
we debated the Panama Canal and its
vital importance to us. More recently,
we have been concerned with immigra-
tion from Cuba and Haiti, a revolution
and its aftermath in Nicaragua, and a
foreign-supported leftist insurgency in
El Salvador. In each case, difficult
Caribbean Basin problems have directly
touched American interests and have,
thereby, reminded us that these are
peoples with whom we must live. Their
problems often become immediate U.S.
concerns. Their success improves the en-
vironment in which we live.
Basin Conditions
Unfortunately, many of the countries of
the Caribbean Basin are weakened and
vulnerable. Their size makes them
uniquely dependent on the outside
world — to a degree that we Americans
can only dimly imagine. And recently,
the outside world has not been favorable
to their interests. Commodity prices
other than oil are falling, energy costs
are rising, world markets stagnate, and
tourism is growing less rapidly than nor-
mal. Throughout the Caribbean area in-
come is falling, per capita income even
more.
But there are internal problems as
well. Not all of the countries of the area
have been able to create conditions in
which their substantial human talent —
professional people and entrepreneurs-
could be fully engaged. Many of these
people have migrated. Similarly, there is
substantial capital flight from some
countries, as entrepreneurs prefer to put
their money in Miami rather than local
enterprise. Some of these problems are
structural — beyond the immediate con-
trol of governments. But in many cases
government policies have also been
responsible.
What Can Be Done
In approaching this problem, we have
worked from a number of premises.
First, we must work in close
cooperation with the other interested
countries — above all, Venezuela, Mexico,
and Canada. Not only are the Caribbean
Basin countries their neighbors too, but
they are already contributing relatively
more official assistance than we. Our
trade preferences and private capital
flows are, of course, also valuable con-
tributions.
That is why President Reagan
turned to President Lopez Portillo [Mex-
ican President Jose Lopez Portillo y
Pacheco] in early June. Since then we
contacted the leaders of Venezuela and
Canada. Earlier this month Secretary
Haig met with his counterparts from the
other three countries in Nassau to agree
on the need for a multilateral approach
and to decide to draw up an action plan
together.2
There have been differences among
the four, of course. Mexico wanted Cuba
automatically included. We can contem-
plate no aid to Cuba, so we agreed to
disagree and went on to emphasize what
we do have in common — a commitment
to helping the area. We believe we have
established a firm partnership for pro-
ceeding.
Second, we can succeed only if the
developing countries of the area are
fully engaged in the planning and execu-
tion of what is to be done. After all,
development starts at home, and no
donor will provide new economic oppor-
tunities on any scale unless he believes
recipients will take the action needed to
assure that they are well used.
This is why there is and will be no
big "made-in-the-USA mini-Marshall
plan." Instead, the four partners will
now proceed to consult, first, the Cen-
tral American countries, then the coun-
tries of the Caribbean, before deciding
how to draw up the action plan. This is
also why the eventual plan will clearly
recognize the separate identities of the
two groups of countries.
Third, we think the place to begin is
the supply side— how to help Caribbean
Basin countries to create new, com-
petitive production capacity and take
better advantage of its existing
resources in people and capital.
We will be asking these countries as
we meet them: What can you do to re-
s release 227.
ber 1981
Western Hemisphere
tain your skilled labor and capital? How
can you create predictable, favorable
conditions for enterprise? Such ideas as
insurance against political risk for
domestic as well as foreign investment,
investment treaties insuring fair treat-
ment, regional investment codes, and, in
general, more favorable tax and legal
treatment for investment should be con-
sidered.
Fourth, we recognize that supply
alone can't do it; action on demand is
also needed. This is one place where the
United States has a potentially large
role to play. We take nearly three-fifths
of the area's exports and provide even a
larger portion of its tourists. Our ar-
rangements are already generous — 86%
of our imports from the basin are duty
free the tourist allowance is substantial.
But further access to the U.S.
market could have major impact in these
small countries. Because they are so
small, new access, if appropriately
designed and safeguarded, need not
upset the balance of the market in the
United States. We recognize that the re-
maining 14% of our imports from the
area that are dutiable are nearly all sen-
sitive items. We hope to work closely
with industry, labor, and the Congress
to make sure those interests are ap-
propriately listened to and secured.
Fifth, a coherent plan cannot be put
together without more official assistance
than the area is now receiving. That
assistance can come from other donors
in Europe and Japan. Importantly, it
can come from the international finan-
cial institutions. But it must also come
from the United States.
The President has determined that
we must respect existing budget
guidelines, but that within that con-
straint, a substantial additional effort
for the Caribbean Basin will be made.
Increased assistance from us should be
closely geared to supporting private in-
vestment opportunities through
agricultural and industrial credit and
some infrastructure projects.
Finally, while the overall concept of
action should be multilateral, actual
benefits should be given on a bilateral
basis, so that the conditions of each
recipient and each donor can be
satisfied.
What Happens Next?
Ambassador [U.S. Trade Representative
William E.] Brock has been asked by the
President to coordinate positions on
trade, investment, and aid for the action
plan. This is the first time, I believe, we
have attempted a comprehensive ap-
proach to development combining the
three areas. It should give us a capabili-
ty we have not had before. The U.S.
Trade Representative will begin con-
sulting with industry, labor, and the
Congress in the early fall.
On the international side, the next
key date is the second meeting of the
four partners, probably in Bermuda.
That is when decisions on how to draw
up the action plan will be taken.
Conclusion
I do not want to belittle in any way the
obstacles ahead. We have never before
attempted a broad collective effort of
this kind for a whole region, nor have
we attempted to combine trade, invest-
ment, and aid in a coordinated approach.
No doubt the initiative will take longer
and be more difficult to carry off thp
even now, we believe.
Nor do I want to give the impret
that economic development can alon
solve the security and political probl
of the area. They must receive militi
and political answers. But only in
economically successful countries cal
truly democratic political institution!
flourish. Creating the conditions fori
is our objective.
Bui
'The complete transcript of the heart
will be published by the committee and ty
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing 0
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402.
2Secretary Haig met with Foreign
Ministers of Canada, Mexico, and Venezt
to discuss Caribbean economic cooperatio
Nassau, the Bahamas, July 10-12. A join
communique was issued July 11 to begin <
mediate consultation with Caribbean and
Central American governments in an efff
to stimulate the social and economic deve
ment of the Caribbean Basin area.B
El Salvador: The Search for Peace
by Thomas O. Enders
Address before the World Affairs
Council in Washington, D.C, on July
16, 1981. Ambassador Enders is Assis-
tant Secretary for Inter-American Af-
fairs.
This winter one of our neighbors, El
Salvador, was the target of a deadly
challenge. On January 10, insurgent
groups that had developed in El
Salvador — but had united with Cuban
help, had trained many of their people in
Cuba, and had just obtained infusions of
modern arms through Cuba — launched a
"final offensive" to overthrow the
Salvadoran Government.
Timing was critical to the guerrillas.
On January 9, the insurgents' Radio
Liberation boasted from Nicaragua that
the offensive to be launched the next
day meant that the new President of the
United States would come to office too
late to stop the guerrilla victory. But an
unspoken internal factor was probably
more important. In 1980 the new
Salvadoran Government — after its
predecessors had for years ignored
pressing socioeconomic problems — had
started a program of land reform to
benefit the poor. The reform addressed
key issues that the insurgents had hoped
to exploit as their own. Every passing
day was demonstrating that the guer-
rillas' premises — that they were deal
from strength at home and abroad—
were wrong.
El Salvador is, in area, the smalM
mainland country of Latin America,
has not quite 5 million people. But it
our neighbor. When El Salvador ap-
pealed for our help to ward off an e;
nally armed attack, both the Carter
Reagan Administrations responded,
reason is simple. We cannot be indif-
ferent to outside threats to the secui
of any friendly country so close to oi
shores.
A vital fact must be recognized:
Cuba is manipulating and feeding th<
violence in El Salvador. Cuba helped
Marxist groups to unify and has beei
backing them with military training,
arms, and propaganda. This pattern
not unique.
• Cuba applied it in Nicaragua, i
to help overthrow the government, t
to influence the new one.
• With variations, Cuba is attem
ing to repeat this pattern in Guatem;
and elsewhere in Central America.
• And in South America last
February, armed insurgents landed i
Colombia in an attempt to undermine
one of the hemisphere's most respect
democracies. The landing force had j
completed 3 months of combat traini
in Cuba.
\
70
Department of State Bullel
d the United States not respond-
11 Salvador's appeal for help, no
if i/ in the area could have con-
11 4 1 itself safe from Cuban-backed
Ipn
e.
day, as in the past, the basic
of the United States is to try to
solve the problems of frail
iment institutions, of poverty, and
i| erdevelopment that create
.bilities to this form of aggres-
iut when trained guerrillas with
backing take up machineguns,
s, and recoilless rifles, no amount
ilizers, schools, or clinics can pre-
nem from sowing terror or at-
ng to seize power by force. That
we responded to the appeals of
lvadoran Government to supple-
iur economic assistance with
y assistance, and that is why we
we should continue military aid
small amounts we are providing.
mtrary to the insurgents' expecta-
the Salvadorans contained the im-
te January offensive on their own.
ssistance since has enabled the
government to prevent the in-
its from turning their continuing
e support to new military advan-
Even more importantly, our
mce gives the Salvadoran people a
to defend their right to self-
fiination by developing a political
n to the conflict.
*Jeed for a Political Solution
Mhat is what I would like to talk
■ today: a political solution. For just
i j conflict was Salvadoran in its
lis. so its ultimate resolution must
I lvadoran.
I or more than 18 months, El
.i.dor has had a government with a
a stent and stable policy, one that
Aasizes domestic reform, closer
m and diplomatic relations with
Jiboring nations, and firm resistance
I tside intervention.
|]1 Salvador, however, remains a
>ed country. It is divided between
nsurgents and a great majority that
ses the extreme left's violent
lods and foreign ties. It is divided
'een an equally violent minority on
xtreme right that seeks to return
alvador to the domination of a small
and a great majority that has
omed the political and social
lges of the past 18 months.
The insurgents are divided within
r own coalition — between those who
t to prolong their ill-starred guerrilla
Hpaign and those who are disillu-
led by their failure to win the quick
military victory their leaders had pro-
claimed inevitable; between those who
despise democracy as an obstacle to
their ambitions to seize power and those
who might be willing to engage in
democratic elections.
Finally, the vast majority of
Salvadorans in the middle are also di-
vided— over whether to emphasize the
restoration of the country's economic
health or the extension of the country's
social reforms; between those who honor
the army as one of the country's most
stable and coherent institutions and
those who criticize it for failing to pre-
vent right-wing violence; between those
who see the need to develop par-
ticipatory institutions and those who
maintain that there is no alternative to
the old personalistic politics.
Only Salvadorans can resolve these
divisions. Neither we nor any other
foreign country can do so. It is,
therefore, critical that the Salvadoran
Government itself is attempting to over-
come these divisions by establishing a
more democratic system. We whole-
heartedly support this objective - not out
of blind sentiment, not out of a desire to
reproduce everywhere a political system
that has served Americans so extraor-
dinarily well, and certainly not because
we underestimate the difficulties in-
volved. Rather we believe that the solu-
tion must be democratic because only a
genuinely pluralistic approach can enable
a profoundly divided society to live with
itself without violent convulsions,
gradually overcoming its differences.
Western Hemisphere
Proposed Steps
How can a country beset by so many
troubles get from here to there? The
first thing to say is that promises
must be kept.
One can debate endlessly about El
Salvador's land reform — whether the
takeover of the big farms might have a
high penalty in lost production for ex-
port, whether one can really give clear
titles to over 200,000 individual peasant
workers, and so forth. But the changes
that have already taken place are real.
The issue is no longer whether land
reform is advisable or not. The issue
now is how to consolidate and perfect
what has been done. Individual titles are
a practical necessity if peasants are to
know that their new opportunities to
work their own way out of subsistence
poverty are fully legitimate. There is no
other choice if economic and social chaos
and an eventual guerrilla victory are to
be avoided.
This understood, the compensation
promised should also be provided and
on a just and effective basis. This is not
only a matter of right, it is a practical
necessity. El Salvador is known for the
vigor and skill of its modern en-
trepreneurs, but entrepreneurs will not
stay and work in El Salvador or
anywhere else if they cannot expect fair
treatment.
Titling and compensation would
bring important elements of stability to
the reform process. In addition, the
assurance that existing reforms will be
made to work before new economic
changes are introduced, and that pre-
dictable rules of the game will be
developed in consultation with both
Thomas O. Enders
was born in Hartford,
Connecticut, on
November 28, 1931.
He graduated first in
his class with a B.A.
degree in history and
economics from Yale
(1953), took a Doctor
of University degree
in colonial history
from the University of Paris (1955), and
received an M.A. degree in economics from
Harvard (1957).
Ambassador Enders entered the Foreign
Service in 1958 and was assigned to the
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research. In 1960 he was assigned to
Stockholm. He subsequently served in the
Bureau of European Affairs, as Special
Assistant to the Under Secretary for Political
Affairs, and in 1968 became Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary for International Monetary
Affairs in the Bureau of Economic Affairs.
He was Deputy Chief of Mission at the
U.S. Embassy in Belgrade in 1969 and at the
Phnom Penh in 1970; at the latter post, he
served as Charge d'Affaires beginning in
September 1973.
Ambassador Enders was Assistant
Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs
from July 1974 until February 1976 when he
was appointed Ambassador to Canada.
He was U.S. Representative to the European
Communities in Brussels from November
1979 until June 23, 1981, when he was sworn
in as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American
Affairs. Ambassador Enders is a Career
Minister in the Foreign Service and received
the Arthur S. Fleming award as one of the
10 outstanding young men in the Federal
Government in 1970.
'tember 1981
71
Western Hemisphere
employers and workers, would go a
long way to consolidate moderate forces,
frustrate the guerrillas' economic war-
fare, and help restore El Salvador's
economy.
Second, there must be demon-
strable progress in controlling and
eliminating violence from all sources.
Violence of the left and violence of the
right are inextricably linked. Since the
failure of the January offensive, the
tragic cycle of violence and counter-
violence has been most evident in
Chalatenango and Morazan, the remote
areas where guerrilla forces are concen-
trated, and where most of the violent in-
cidents recently attributed to the far
right and to government forces have
taken place. Elsewhere, the violence has
tended to fall as the level of nationwide
insurgent activity has declined. The in-
vestigations into the murders of the four
American Catholic women and the two
AIFLD [American Institute of Free
Labor Development] experts, though
still unfortunately incomplete, have led
to detentions.
But more needs to be done. Cuban
and Nicaraguan supplies to the guer-
rillas must stop. There is no doubt that
Cuba was largely behind the arms traf-
ficking that fueled the guerrilla offensive
this winter. In April, when Socialist In-
ternational representative Wischnewski
confronted Castro with our evidence of
Cuban interference, Castro admitted to
him that Cuba had shipped arms to the
guerrillas — just as we had said.
After their arms trafficking was ex-
posed, Cuba and Nicaragua reduced the
flow in March and early April. Recently,
however, an ominous upswing has oc-
curred, not to the volume reached this
winter but to levels that enable the guer-
rillas to sustain military operations
despite their inability to generate fresh
support.
The other side of the coin is that
more Salvadoran Army leadership is
needed, both to fight rightist death
squads and to control security force
violence. This is a primary objective of
our training effort. There must be im-
provement. The basic reality, however,
is that violence will likely be countered
by violence until a rational and
legitimate political process is devised to
break this vicious circle.
This brings me to my third point,
that all parties that renounce violence
should be encouraged to participate in
the design of new political institutions
and the process of choosing represen-
tatives for them. The Government of El
Salvador has announced that it will hold
presidential elections in 1983. Prior to
that, a constituent assembly to be
elected in 1982 will develop a new con-
stitution. Four months ago, in March,
President Duarte appointed an electoral
commission to develop the necessary
procedures. Last week, the government
officially approved measures recognizing
the legal status of registered parties and
setting the procedures whereby these
parties, and any new parties that come
legally into existence, can participate in
the election.
The parties already legally regis-
tered include two groups associated with
the insurgent political front: the Na-
tional Revolutionary Movement led by
Guillermo Ungo and the Democratic Na-
tional Union, the electoral vehicle of the
traditional Communist Party. These par-
ties, and any others that may wish to do
so legally, now have before them the op-
portunity to test their strength against
reformist and conservative parties
according to the ultimate test of
democracy: ballots, not bullets.
Before developing this critical point
further, let me note that the value and
importance of elections as a means for
resolving and overcoming differences
should not be underestimated in Central
America today. Costa Rica has been able
to resolve its political differences
peacefully largely because elections have
been held uninterruptedly since
1948 — and are scheduled again next
February.
Honduras elected a constituent
assembly in April 1980 and will elect a
president and a legislative assembly this
coming November. The courage of Hon-
duran leaders in standing by their elec-
tion commitments despite regional tur-
moil and economic difficulties deserves
recognition as an important contribution
to the advancement of peaceful political
processes in their country and in the
region as a whole.
Guatemala this month began a cam-
paign that is to lead to constitutionally
mandated presidential elections next
March. All of Guatemala's friends hope
the campaign will evolve in a climate
free of violence and contribute to the
resolution of Guatemala's serious prob-
lems.
In all of Central America, only
Nicaragua has no elections scheduled in
the months ahead. The government has
reneged on its promises to the people
who overthrew Somoza 2 years ago and
has said only that elections may be
possible sometime in the future — maybe
in 1985. What an extraordinary contrast
between this clear lack of self-confidence
on the part of the new revolutionary
i
rulers of Nicaragua and the invitat "
from the embattled Salvadoran revf'
tionary junta to the political partiejT
El Salvador to organize for free elf
tions
As basic expressions of self-det
mination and national sovereignty,
tions involve many delicate questioi
They include technical matters (sua
steps to insure an accurate tally),
confidence-building measures (suchi
providing witness of fairness and j
absence of coercion or intimidation,
any source), and a host of fundamei
matters (such as the design of instil
tions, security for participants, and
assurances that the results will be
respected.)
But one asks: Can a campaign I
held in El Salvador? There are sorra
cent indications it can. Two months
the leading peasant union, the UCa
[Salvadoran Campesino Union] held
rally of 10,000 people without incidj
A month ago, the Christian Democr
Party held a national congress, witl
2,500 delegates — many of them
women — in attendance. The elector
commission has made clear it welca
observers "not only for the day of t i|l:
tions but also in anticipation of theft
observing the entire process."
Nonetheless, before elections cup
take place, all parties would want U
know how campaign security will b*
assured, and whether extremists m^
ultimately permit an actual election
paign without violence. If elections
held, would the results be respectec i
The government's intentions are clw
El Salvador's new military leaders .
made the reform process possible. I
army confident that its integrity wU
respected, and that elections will be
can also be effective in curbing viol
from the right as well as from the 1
But it is only realistic to recognize t
extremists on both left and right sti
pose elections, and that an army
suspicious that its institutional integ
might not be respected could itself
become a destabilizing element. In 1
regard, we should recognize that El
Salvador's leaders will not — and she
not — grant the insurgents, through
negotiations, the share of power the
rebels have not been able to win on
battlefield. But they should be — and
are — willing to compete with the in-
surgents at the polls.
To develop a serious, reliable ele
toral process in El Salvador, all non-
violent political groups, whatever th«
relationship to the current governmt-
will have to make their views known
each other and to the electoral comn
72
Department of State Bull
Western Hemisphere
,'tr
^his will doubtless require careful
sion and quite possibly negotiation
', the parties.
ections are quintessential^ mat-
f internal policy. But there may be
other nations can assist. If re-
id by the Government of El Salva-
and desired by those involved —
countries might be invited to
ite such contacts and discussions
otiations on electoral issues
I eligible political parties. The
i States is prepared, if asked, to
thers in providing good offices to
the Salvadorans in this task,
could prove critical to the search
•political solution to the conflict,
'e have no preconceived formulas.
.. now that elections have failed in
ist. We have no illusions that the
low will be anything but difficult.
re believe that elections open to all
ire willing to renounce violence and
by the procedures of democracy
elp end El Salvador's long agony.
have one more thing to say. That
it the search for a political solu-
ivill not succeed unless the
id States sustains its assistance
I Salvador.
8 his spring, after their offensive
lied their lack of popular support,
democratic Revolutionary Front
r.:feit — we know from their own
■ments — that negotiations should be
I as a delaying tactic while the in-
t Imts attempted to regroup militari-
liould members of the guerrilla com-
Jl believe that they can make gains
i ilitary means, no participation in
ions, no meaningful negotiations, no
( leal solutions are likely to be f orth-
Ing. The point is not that sustained
I assistance might lead to a govern-
I military victory. It is that a
I- lical solution can only be achieved if
Ifuerrillas realize they cannot win by
i; of arms.
Iro insure a climate in which a
lical solution can take place, the
led military programs we now have
lid be sustained. Our economic
l;tance, already more than three
»s our military aid, must continue to
:mt the guerillas' efforts to prolong
Iwar by sabotaging the economy.
direction to this local insurgency and by
giving it global propaganda backing,
Cuba and other radicals have intensified
and widened the conflict and greatly in-
creased the suffering of the Salvadoran
people.
Our concern for El Salvador is not
unique. The United States has met
challenges like this before. Since World
War II, under Democratic and
Republican Presidents alike, the United
States has used all appropriate instru-
ments— political, economic, and mili-
tary— to help friends and allies secure
their vital interests as well as our own.
Our help for El Salvador is really
very small, but it is vital. With it, El
Salvador is making progress. The
government, the church, the trade
unions, agrarian organizations, profes-
sional bodies, and organizations of
businessmen are now all increasingly
engaged in seeking a peaceful outcome
to the conflict. Last March, the guer-
rillas' use of violence led the Apostolic
Administrator to comment that "most of
the public has turned its back on them."
Elections now offer to those among
them who want to end the violence a
chance to work for peace.
The culmination of the search for
peace is necessarily the responsibility of
Salvadorans. But Salvadorans look to us
for understanding and assistance. We
can help by:
• Extending economic and military
assistance to counter the disaster visited
upon El Salvador by enemies of
democracy;
• Standing by our friends while they
work out a democratic solution; and
• Identifying and seizing oppor-
tunities to help such a solution actually
take shape. ■
Belize
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
JULY 14, 19811
The United Kingdom, Belize, and the
Republic of Guatemala have been work-
ing for the past year to achieve a for-
mula which would allow Belize to attain
independence and establish friendly rela-
tions between the two neighbors.
Guatemala has long claimed the ter-
ritory of Belize. Last March [1981], the
three parties reached an agreement in
principle. It was hoped that a treaty of
settlement would be negotiated between
the parties by which the longstanding
dispute between the United Kingdom
and Guatemala would be resolved. Last
week the three parties met in New York
and yesterday issued a communique on
that meeting.
The United States has been gratified
by the tone of mutual respect and
cooperation displayed in the talks. We
are disappointed that it has not, so far,
been possible to reach a full agreement
on all the issues.
We continue to hope that a com-
prehensive peaceful settlement of all
outstanding issues will be reached by the
parties in their further contacts. We are
pleased by the reaffirmation by all par-
ties of their desire to promote and
preserve peace in the region.
'Made available to news correspondents
by Department spokesman Dean Fischer. ■
I. Role
I war is a terrible ordeal for the
Iradoran people. Many thousands of
Ions have lost their lives. The conflict
leeply rooted in domestic Salvadoran
jjtical and socioeconomic problems.
I by providing arms, training, and
^Member 1981
73
TREATIES
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Antarctica
Recommendations relating to the furtherance
of the principles and objectives of the Antarc-
tic treaty (TIAS 4780). Done at Washington
Oct. 5, 1979.1
Notification of approval: U.S., June 29, 1981;
Chile, June 24, 1981; Poland, June 15, 1981.
Recommendations relating to the furtherance
of the principles and objectives of the Antarc-
tic treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Wel-
lington Nov. 10, 1972. Entered into force
May 29, 1975 for recommendations VII- 1
through VII-3, VII-6 through VII-8. TIAS
8500.
Notification of approval: Chile, June 24, 1981
for recommendations VII-4 and VII-9.
Atomic Energy
Agreement amending the agreement of
Sept. 22, 1980 (TIAS 9863) concerning the
transfer of a research reactor and enriched
uranium to Malaysia. Signed at Vienna June
12 and July 22, 1981. Entered into force July
22, 1981.
Signatures: IAEA, Malaysia, June 12, 1981;
U.S., July 22, 1981.
Protocol prolonging the agreement of Sept.
30, 1968 (TIAS 6692), between the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency, Turkey, and
the U.S. for the application of safeguards.
Signed at Vienna June 30, 1981. Entered into
force June 30, 1981.
Signatures: IAEA, Turkey, U.S., June 30,
1981.
Coffee
International coffee agreement 1976, with an-
nexes. Done at London Dec. 3, 1975. Entered
into force provisionally, Oct. 1, 1976;
definitively, Aug. 1, 1977. TIAS 8683.
Accessions deposited: Sri Lanka, June 24,
1981; Thailand, July 7, 1981.
Commodities — Common Fund
Agreement establishing the Common Fund
for Commodities, with schedules. Done at
Geneva June 27, 1980. 1
Ratifications deposited: Norway, July 15,
1981; Sweden, July 6, 1981.
Signatures: Austria, July 8, 1981; Cameroon,
June 30, 1981.
Conservation
Convention on international trade in en-
dangered species of wild fauna and flora,
with appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3,
1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS
8249.
Accessions deposited: Cameroon, June 5,
1981; Zimbabwe, May 19, 1981.2
Convention on the conservation of Antarctic
marine living resources, with annex for an ar-
bitral tribunal. Done at Canberra May 20,
1981.1
Ratification deposited: Chile, July 22, 1981.
74
Copyright
Universal copyright convention, as revised.
Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into
force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.
Accession deposited: Portugal, Apr. 30, 1981.
Cultural Property
Convention on the means of prohibiting and
preventing the illicit import, export, and
transfer of ownership of cultural property.
Adopted at Paris Nov. 14, 1970, at the 16th
session of the UNESCO general conference.
Entered into force Apr. 24, 1972.3
Acceptance deposited: Sri Lanka, Apr. 7,
1981.
Ratification deposited: Turkey, Apr. 21, 1981.
Customs
Convention establishing a Customs Coopera-
tion Council, with annex. Done at Brussels
Dec. 15, 1950. Entered into force Nov. 4,
1952; for the U.S. Nov. 5, 1970. TIAS 7063.
Accession deposited: Swaziland, May 15,
1981.
Energy
Agreement on an international program.
Done at Paris Nov. 18, 1974. Entered into
force provisionally Nov. 18, 1974; definitive-
ly, Jan. 19, 1976. TIAS 8278.
Notification of consent to be bound deposited:
Turkey, Apr. 24, 1981.
Implementing agreement for the establish-
ment of a project on control of nitrogen ox-
ides emissions during coal combustion, with
annexes. Done at Paris Mar. 21, 1980.
Entered into force Mar. 21, 1980.
Signatures: Canada, Denmark, Sweden, U.S.,
Mar. 21, 1980.
Implementing agreement for a program of
research, development and demonstration on
coal/oil mixtures. Done at Paris Mar. 23,
1981. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1981.
Signatures: Canada, Japan, Netherlands,
Spain, Sweden, U.S., Mar. 23, 1981.
Environmental Modification
Convention on the prohibition of military or
any other hostile use of environmental
modification techniques, with annex. Done at
Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force
Oct. 5, 1978; for the U.S., Jan. 17, 1980.
TIAS 9614.
Succession deposited: Solomon Islands, June
18, 1981.
Maritime Matters
Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London
Nov. 15, 1979. '
Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, June 29,
1981.
Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London
Nov. 17, 1977.1
Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, June 29,
1981.
Narcotic Drugs
Convention on psychotropic substances. J
at Vienna Feb. 2l", 1971. Entered into for
Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. July 15, 1980'
TIAS 9725.
Accessions deposited: Colombia, May 121
1981; Nigeria, June 23, 1981.
Protocol amending the single convention!
narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva Ma
25, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 8, 1975
TIAS 8118.
Accessions deposited: Nigeria, June 24, 1
Sri Lanka, June 29, 1981.
yi1
Nuclear Material — Physical Protection
Convention on the physical protection of)
nuclear material, with annexes. Done at!
na Oct. 26, 1979.1
Signatures: Brazil, May 15, 19814; Soutfl
Africa, May 18, 1981.2
Patents— Plant Varieties
International convention for the protects
of new varieties of plants Dec. 2, 1961, as
revised. Done at Geneva Oct. 23, 1978.1
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, June if
1981.
Postal
General regulations of the Universal Post
Union, with final protocol and annex, and
universal postal convention with final pre
tocol and detailed regulations. Done at R:
Janeiro Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force
July 1, 1981; except for Article 124 of thl
general regulations which became effectr
Jan. 1, 1981.
Approvals deposited: Canada, June 1, 19:
Korea, May 22, 1981; Mauritius, Jan. 26,
1981; Niger, Apr. 10, 1981.
Ratifications deposited: Liechtenstein, A\{
29, 1981; Qatar, May 14, 1981; Tunisia, J
3, 1981.
Money orders and postal travelers' check
agreement, with detailed regulations witl
final protocol. Done at Rio de Janeiro 0<r
26, 1979. Entered into force July 1, 1981
Approvals deposited: Korea, May 22, 198
Niger, Apr. 10, 1981.
Ratifications deposited: Liechtenstein, A]
29, 1981; Qatar, May 14, 1981; Tunisia, 4
3, 1981.
II
Postal — Americas and Spain
Additional protocol to the constitution of
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain
general regulations, regulations governin)
the International Office and the Transfer
fice, and convention with final protocol ar
detailed regulations; parcel post agreemei
final Protocol and detailed regulations; m<
order agreement and final protocol. Done
Lima Mar. 18, 1976.
Accession deposited: Ecuador, May 4,
1981.2
Refugees
Convention relating to the status of refug
with schedule and annex. Signed at Gene\
July 28, 1951. Entered into force Apr. 22,
1954.3
Accession deposited: Angola, June 23, 198
Department of State Built
.
Treaties
-
tional natural rubber agreement,
)one at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979. Entered
ce Oct. 23, 1980, provisionally.
on deposited: Nigeria, June 26, 1981.
tion deposited: Peru, June 30, 1981.
I Disarmament
i on the prohibition of the emplacement
i ear weapons and other weapons of
estruction on the seabed and the ocean
nd in the subsoil thereof. Done at
lgton, London and Moscow Feb. 11,
Entered into force May 18, 1972. TIAS
tion deposited: Central African
*ic, July 9, 1981.
tirotocol amending the interim conven-
Feb. 9, 1957, as amended and extend-
conservation of North Pacific fur seals
3948, 5558, 6774, 8368). Done at
igton Oct. 14, 1980.
ment of ratification signed by the
ent: July 2, 1981.
tations deposited: Canada and the U.S.,
imed by the President: July 27, 1981.
1981.
jd into force:
July 2, 1981.
ment governing the activities of states
Moon and other celestial bodies.
ed at New York Dec. 5, 1979. »
aire: Peru, June 23, 1981.
tational convention against the taking of
;es. Adopted at New York Dec. 17,
sion deposited: Iceland, July 6, 1981.
p 'ment extending the fifth international
■ Teement (TIAS 8607). Adopted by the
tt lational Tin Council in London on
■ .4, 1981, at its 21st session. Entered in-
|ce July 1, 1981.
Iv'a (1979) protocol to the General Agree-
I on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
1 30, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1,
I TIAS 9629.
Iptance: Poland, June 3, 1981.
[oval deposited: Yugoslavia, June 2,
locations deposited: Belgium, May 7,
I; Spain, June 19, 1981.
■ement on trade in civil aircraft. Done at
va April 12, 1979. Entered into force
1, 1980. TIAS 9620.
:ptance: Greece, Feb. 2, 1981.5
roval deposited: Netherlands, Apr. 14,
fication deposited: Belgium, May 7,
Agreement on import licensing procedures.
Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into
force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9788.
Acceptances: Czechoslovakia, Dec. 9, 1980;
Pakistan, May 21, 1981; Philippines, Mar. 30,
1981.2
Ratification deposited: Chile, Mar. 12, 1981.
Agreement on technical barriers to trade.
Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into
force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9616.
Acceptances: Greece, Feb. 2, 1981s; Pakistan,
May 21, 1981; Philippines, Feb. 13, 1981;
Tunisia, Feb. 17, 1981.
Approvals deposited: Netherlands, June 17,
1981; Yugoslavia, June 2, 1981.
Ratifications deposited: Belgium, May 7,
1981; Chile, Mar. 12, 1981; Spain, June 19,
1981.
Agreement on government procurement.
Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into
force Jan. 1, 1981.
Acceptances: Canada, Singapore, Dec. 30,
1980.
Acceptances deposited: European Economic
Community, Dec. 22, 1980; Switzerland, Dec.
31, 1980.
Ratification deposited: Sweden, Dec. 17,
1980.
Agreement on implementation of article VI
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (antidumping code). Done at Geneva
Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1,
1980.
Acceptances: Pakistan, May 21, 1981;
Poland, June 3, 1981.
Ratification deposited: Spain, June 19, 1981.
Agreement on interpretation and application
of articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (subsidies
and countervailing duties). Done at Geneva
Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1,
1980. TIAS 9619.
Ratification deposited: Chile, Mar. 12, 1981.
Agreement on implementation of article VII
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (customs valuation). Done at Geneva
Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1,
1981.
Acceptance: Korea, Jan. 6, 1981.6
Ratifications deposited: Austria, Dec. 9,
1980; Spain, June 19, 1981.
Protocol to the agreement on implementation
of article VII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva Nov. 1,
1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1981.
Acceptances: Canada, Dec. 30, 1980; Korea,
Jan. 6, 1981. 6
Ratifications deposited: Austria, Apr. 6,
1981; Spain, June 19, 1981; Switzerland, Jan.
5, 1981.
Treaties
Vienna convention on the law of treaties,
with annex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969.
Entered into force Jan. 27, 1980.3
Accession deposited: Japan, July 21, 1981.
U.N. Industrial Development Organization
Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Develop-
ment Organization, with annexes. Adopted
at Vienna April 8, 1979. '
Signatures: Lesotho, June 18, 1981; Jordan,
June 29, 1981; Oman, July 6, 1981.
Ratifications deposited: Lesotho, June 18,
1981; Mauritania, June 29, 1981; Oman,
July 6, 1981.
Whaling
International whaling convention and
schedule of whaling regulations. Done at
Washington Dec. 2, 1946. Entered into force
Nov. 10, 1948. TIAS 1849.
Notification of adherence: Dominica, July
9, 1981; Jamaica, July 15, 1981; Saint Lucia,
June 29, 1981; Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, July 22, 1981; Uruguay, July 15,
1981.
Notification of withdrawal: Canada, June 24,
1981, effective June 30, 1982.
Wheat
1981 protocol for the sixth extension of the
wheat trade convention, 1971. Done at
Washington Mar. 24, 1981. Entered into
force July 1, 1981.
Ratification deposited: Kenya, July 8, 1981.
Accessions deposited: Barbados, July 24,
1981; Malta, July 7, 1981.
Declarations of provisional application
deposited: El Salvador, July 10, 1981; Moroc-
co, July 2, 1981.
World Health Organization
Amendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the
Constitution of the World Health Organiza-
tion. Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976 by
the 29th world health assembly.1
Acceptance deposited: Denmark, July 1,
1981.
BILATERAL
Argentina
International express mail agreement, with
detailed regulations. Signed at Buenos Aires
and Washington Sept. 4 and 26, 1980.
Entered into force: Jan. 1, 1981.
Agreement for cooperation in the fields of
agriculture, livestock, and forestry. Signed
at Washington May 20, 1981. Entered into
force May 20, 1981.
Memorandum of understanding relating to
cooperation and mutual assistance in map-
ping, charting, and geodesy, with annex.
Signed at Buenos Aires June 23, 1981.
Entered into force June 23, 1981.
Australia
Agreement amending the agreement of
May 29, 1980 (TIAS 9781), providing for the
continuation of a cooperative program
facilitating space flight operations. Effected
by exchange of notes at Canberra July 21,
1981. Entered into force July 21, 1981.
Member 1981
75
Treaties
CHRONOLOGY
Bangladesh
Agreement amending the agreement for sales
of agricultural commodities of Aug. 2, 1978
(TIAS 9389), with agreed minutes and related
letter. Effected by exchange of letters at
Dacca June 26, 1981. Entered into force June
26, 1981.
Canada
Memorandum of understanding concerning
cooperation in marine transportation
technology and systems research and
development. Signed at Ottawa June 18,
1981. Entered into force June 18, 1981.
Treaty on Pacific Coast albacore tuna vessels
and port privileges, with annexes. Signed at
Washington May 26, 1981.
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
July 20, 1981.
Instrument of ratification signed by
the President: July 27, 1981.
China
Agreement concerning the enlargement of
existing consular districts. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Beijing June 16, 1981.
Entered into force June 16, 1981.
Agreement concerning the establishment of
additional consulates general, with annex and
related letter. Effected by exchange of notes
at Beijing June 16, 1981. Entered into force
June 16, 1981.
Egypt
Mapping, charting, and geodesy cooperative
and exchange agreement, with annexes.
Signed at Washington June 25, 1981.
Entered into force provisionally June 25,
1981; definitively, upon completion of con-
stitutional procedures in the Arab Republic of
Egypt.
Grant agreement to finance the foreign ex-
change costs of certain commodities and
commodity-related services. Signed at Cairo
June 28, 1981. Entered into force June 28,
1981.
Loan agreement to finance the foreign ex-
change costs of certain commodities and
commodity-related services. Signed at Cairo
June 28, 1981. Entered into force June 28,
1981.
Agreement amending the agreement for sales
of agricultural commodities of Mar. 20, 1979
(TIAS 9683). Signed at Cairo June 28, 1981.
Entered into force June 28, 1981.
El Salvador
Agreement amending the agreement for sales
of agricultural commodities of Jan. 22, 1981.
Signed at San Salvador June 16, 1981.
Entered into force June 16, 1981.
France
Memorandum of understanding concerning
the operation and maintenance of OMEGA
station Le Reunion, with appendices. Signed
at Washington June 24, 1981. Entered into
force June 24, 1981.
76
Hungary
Joint statement on the development of
agricultural trade and cooperation. Signed at
Washington May 13, 1981. Entered into force
May 13, 1981.
India
Agreement amending the agreement of Dec.
30, 1977, as amended (TIAS 9036, 9232,
9578, 9663, 9764, 9913), relating to trade in
cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and
textile products. Effected by exchange of let-
ters at Washington June 2 and 11, 1981.
Entered into force June 11, 1981.
Israel
Second amendment to agreement of Dec. 3,
1980 (TIAS 9941), as amended, for additional
cash transfer assistance. Signed at
Washington July 1, 1981. Entered into force
July 1, 1981.
Jamaica
Protocol amending the convention for the
avoidance of double taxation and the preven-
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on
income, signed at Kingston on May 21, 1980,
with exchange of notes. Signed at Kingston
July 17, 1981. Enters into force upon the ex-
change of instruments of ratification.
Japan
Agreement extending the Sept. 12, 1977 joint
declaration and joint communique for
reprocessing of special nuclear material of
U.S. origin, as extended (TIAS 8734, 9821).
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington
June 1, 1981. Entered into force June 1,
1981.
Morocco
Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of May
17, 1976 (TIAS 8309). Signed at Rabat July
3, 1981. Entered into force July 3, 1981.
Pakistan
Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of Mar.
25, 1980 (TIAS 9782), with agreed minutes.
Signed at Islamabad June 4, 1981. Entered
into force June 4, 1981.
Peru
Agreement extending the agreement of July
24, 1980 (TIAS 9823) to assist the Govern-
ment of Peru in expanding a program to com-
bat Mediterranean fruit fly (MEDFLY).
Dated Aug. 28, 1980; signed at Washington
and Lima. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1980.
Seychelles
Agreement amending the agreement of June
29, 1976 (TIAS 8385), relating to the
establishment, operation, and maintenance of
a tracking and telemetry facility on the island
of Mahe. Effected by exchange of notes at
Victoria Mar. 16 and June 19, 1981. Entered
into force June 29, 1981.
Singapore
Agreement concerning the provision of train-
ing related to defense articles under the U.S.
international military education and training
(IMET) program. Effected by exchange i i
notes at Singapore May 12 and June 23, t"
1981. Entered into force June 23, 1981. j:
Sri Lanka
Agreement amending the agreement of
7, 1980, as amended (TIAS 9869), relatini '
trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber
tiles and textile products. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Colombo June 22, 198. f'r
Entered into force June 22, 1981.
United Kingdom
Memorandum of understanding concerniii
the shared use of communications facilitif
the northern F.R.G., with annexes. Signe
May 11 and June 2, 1981. Entered intol
June 2, 1981.
'Not in force.
2With reservation.
3Not in force for the U.S.
4Ad referendum National Congress.
6Subject to ratification.
6With statements. ■
July 1981
July 1
Regular summer session of U.N.
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
held in Geneva July 1-24, U.S. Ambassai
to the U.N., Jeane Kirkpatrick, leads Ui
delegation.
July 2
By a unanimous vote, U.S. Supreme
Court rules that former President
Jimmy Carter acted legally in clearing
transfer of frozen Iranian funds from U.I '
banks in negotiating freedom of U.S.
hostages. The decision resulted from a si
brought against the U.S. Government by
California-based engineering firm seeking
protect a court award against Iran.
July 7
Pope John Paul II names Bishop Jose
Glemp as the new Archbishop of Gniezo ;
Warsaw and the Primate of Poland to su>
ceed the late Stefen Cardinal Wyszynski.
July 8
U.N. Security Council votes unanimoi '!
to admit Vanuatu as the 155th U.N. merr
state.
July 9
Official results of the Israeli elections '
show that the Likud bloc takes a one-seat u
lead over the Labor Party. Likud is awar
48 seats and Labor 47 of the 120-seat Pa; ;
ment.
Canadian Prime Minister Pierre-Ellio1
Trudeau makes official visit to Washingtc
D.C., July 9-10.
Department of State Build
PRESS RELEASES
(fflton Thorn, President of the Commis-
the European Community, visits
f gton, D.C., July 9-13 to meet with
] sident, Vice President, and other Ad-
i ition officials.
eign Ministers of Canada, Mexico, and
ela, and Secretary Haig and U.S.
tepresentative William E. Brock at-
eeting on Caribbean economic coopera-
Nassau, The Bahamas, July 10-12. A
mmunique is issued July 11, to begin
ate consultations with Caribbean and
American governments in an effort
ulate the social and economic develop-
1 f the Caribbean Basin area.
| ; following newly appointed Am-
irs presented their credentials to
nt Reagan: Lawrence Mfama Mncina
ziland, Rinaldo Petrignani of Italy,
ibudu Jesufu Eke of Nigeria, An-
Baiteke of Kiribati, and Dr. Refik
ii of Syria.
I
i*I. conference on Kampuchea is held in
ork July 13-17; Secretary Haig heads
^legation. In its declaration the con-
; calls for negotiation on a cease-fire
parties to the conflict in Kampuchea
ithdrawal of all foreign forces from
r— —
ilun
■i ecre
■: int
ly7
1 itish Foreign Secretary Lord Car-
Ma visits Washington, D.C., to discuss in-
•« ional issues with Secretary Haig and
ie U.S. officials.
vegian Foreign Minister Knut
llund visits New York for a meeting
ecretary Haig to discuss matters of
interest.
Ij8
I light of the July 17 Israeli bombing of
a ,, President Reagan asks special
lary to the Middle East, Philip C. Habib,
g to" Israel to meet with Prime Minister
■ as the first step in an effort to
■ ate a cease-fire across the Lebanon-
m border.
: 9
Jjven-nation economic summit is held in
Jsbello and Ottawa, Canada, July 19-21.
I' nations participating are Canada, U.S.,
Ii., Italy, Japan, U.K., and France. A
J-ation is issued on July 20 on political
J> deploring the "escalation of tension
■ ontinuing acts of violence" in the Middle
M expressing concern about the continued
flip of Soviet military power and con-
■dng Soviet military occupation of
lanistan; supporting the declaration
Id at the international conference on
Bpuchea expressing their belief that the
■puchean people have the right to self-
1-mination; and expressing their serious
■em over the growing plight of refugees
■ighout the world. Participants also issue
p.tement on terrorism.
July 20
U.S. announces its decision to defer ship-
ment of F-16 aircraft to Israel indefinitely
because of the escalating level of violence in
the Middle East.
July 21
By a unanimous vote, U.N. Security
Council adopts a resolution on the current
fighting between Israel and Lebanon calling
for the "immediate cessation of all armed at-
tacks," reaffirming a commitment to
Lebanon's "sovereignty, territorial integrity
and independence," and requesting that the
Secretary General report to the Council the
resolution's implementation within 48 hours
from its adoption.
July 22
Foreign Ministers of the Western
five— Canada, France, F.R.G., U.K., and
U.S. — issue a communique in which they
agree on the need to continue efforts to bring
about the independence of Namibia in accord-
ance with U.N. Security Council Resolution
435 "in a manner that will command interna-
tional approval."
New Zealand Prime Minister Robert D.
Muldoon visits U.S. July 22-25.
July 23
Finnish Foreign Minister Paavo
Vayrynen makes official visit to Washington,
D.C., to consult with Secretary Haig.
July 24
Israel and Palestinian forces agree
separately to a cease-fire across the Israel-
Lebanon border.
July 26
Ambassador Habib returns to
Washington.
July 29
Prince Charles, heir apparent to the
British throne, and Lady Diana Frances
Spencer are wed at London's St. Paul
Cathedral.
The deposed President of Iran,
Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, is granted political
asylum in France.
July 31
Secretary Haig, along with foreign
ministers of 25 other nations, attends a
preparatory meeting Aug. 1-2, of the North-
South summit to be held in October, in Can-
cun, Mexico. ■
Department of State
Press releases may be obtained from
the Office of Press Relations, Depart-
ment of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
Subject
Ernest Henry Preeg sworn in as
Ambassador to Haiti
(biographic data).
J. William Middendorf sworn in
as Ambassador to the OAS
Olographic data).
Richard M. Fairbanks III sworn
in as Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations.
Charles W. Bray III sworn in
as Ambassador to Senegal
(biographic data).
Haig: remarks to the U.S.
Business Committee on
Jamaica, July 2.
Robert Lyle Brown sworn in as
Inspector General (biographic
data).
U.S. pledges more aid for
Afghan refugee relief.
Program for the working visit
of Canadian Prime Minister
Trudeau, July 9-10.
Foreign Relations of the U.S.
1952-54, Vol. XVI: The
Geneva Conference.
International Telegraph and
Telephone Consultative Com-
mittee (CCITT), study group
B, July 23.
President's Commission on
Hostage Compensation, July
23-24.
Richard Smyser named U.N.
Deputy High Commissioner
for refugees (biographic data).
Haig: news conference, Nassau,
July 12.
Haig: statement before the
international conference on
Kampuchea, New York.
Joint communique agreed on by
the Foreign Ministers of
Canada, Mexico, Venezuela,
and the U.S. at the Con-
ference on Caribbean Basin
Development, Nassau, July
14.
U.S., Pakistan sign bilateral
textile agreement.
U.S., India amend textile agree-
ment.
Haig: interview on the "Today"
Show, New York.
Haig: address before the
Foreign Policy Association,
New York.
Haig: question-and-answer
session following Foreign
Policy Association address,
July 14.
No.
Date
215
7/1
216
7/1
217
7/1
218
6/30
219
7/6
220
7/8
221
7/9
222
7/9
223
7/11
224
7/13
"225
7/13
"226
7/10
227
7/13
228
7/13
229
7/13
*230 7/14
"231 7/14
232 7/14
233 7/14
233A 7/15
itember 1981
77
PUBLICATIONS
:*
234 7/15
*235 7/15
*236 7/16
*237 7/16
*238 7/16
*239 7/16
240 7/20
241 7/20
•242 7/20
243 7/21
*244 7/20
245 7/21
246 7/21
247 7/22
*248 7/23
249 7/24
*250 7/24
*251 7/27
*252 7/27
*253 7/27
"254 7/28
*255 7/28
256
7/29
*257
7/29
258
7/30
*259
Daniel J. Terra sworn in as
Ambassador at Large for
Cultural Affairs (biographic
data).
Jacques J. Gorlin named Ex-
ecutive Assistant to the
Under Secretary for
Economic Affairs (biographic
data).
CCITT, study group A, Aug. 6.
CCITT, modem working party,
study group D, Aug. 6.
CCITT, study group D, Aug. 7.
International Radio Con-
sultative Committee (CCIR),
study group 7, Aug. 13.
Haig: interview on "Issues and
Answers," July 19.
Haig: press briefing, Ottawa,
July 19.
Jane Abell Coon sworn in as
Ambassador to Bangladesh,
July 17 (biographic data).
Haig: interview on
"Nightline," July 20.
Haig: press briefing, Ottawa.
Haig: press briefing on Ottawa
summit, July 19.
U.S., Canada meeting on Hyde
Park agreement.
Haig: press briefing at Skyline
Hotel, Ottawa, July 21.
Robert Gerhard Neumann
sworn in as Ambassador to
Saudi Arabia (biographic
data).
Haig: remarks on CBS-TV
morning news.
Richard L. Walker sworn in as
Ambassador to Korea
(biographic data).
William Lacy Swing sworn in as
Ambassador to Liberia
(biographic data).
Monteagle Stearns sworn in as
Ambassador to Greece
(biographic data).
U.S., Sri Lanka amend textile
agreement, June 22.
Shipping Coordinating Commit-
tee (SCC), Subcommittee on
Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS), working group on
bulk chemicals, Aug. 31.
Advisory Committee on Interna-
tional Investment, Tech-
nology, and Development,
working group on interna-
tional data flows, Sept. 10.
Haig: statement before Senate
Subcommittee on Interna-
tional Trade, July 28.
President's Commission on
Hostage Compensation, Aug.
6-7.
Haig: statement before the
Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee.
[Not issued.]
"Not printed in the Bulletin. I
78
Foreign Relations
Volume Released
The Department of State released today
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1952-1954, vol. XVI, "The Geneva Con-
ference." This is the second volume to be
released of 16 volumes scheduled for the
years 1952-1954. Volume III, U.N. Affairs,
was issued by the Department in 1979. The
Foreign Relations series has been published
continuously since 1861 as the official record
of U.S. foreign policy.
This volume presents 1,597 pages of
previously unpublished documentation (much
of it newly declassified) on the Geneva Con-
ference of 1954. The volume contains two
sections: the first on the conference on
Korea, which met from April 26 to June 15,
the second on the conference on Indochina,
which ran from May 8 to July 21. Both sec-
tions contain numerous preconference
documents as well as records of proceedings,
side talks, and communications between the
U.S. delegations and Washington.
Developments covered in the Korea sec-
tion include the efforts of the 15 allied na-
tions supporting the Republic of Korea to
resolve with the Soviet Union, the People's
Republic of China, and the Democratic Peo-
ple's Republic of Korea fundamental issues
relating to Korean unification and permanent
ending of hostilities in the area. The large
section on Indochina presents the record of
the varying proposals put forth on Indochina
by France, its allies including the United
States, and the three Communist states
represented— the Soviet Union, the People's
Republic of China, and the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam. Also included is
documentation on discussion among the allied
powers of potential collective security
measures and material on the position taken
by the United States on the results of the
conference. Closely related documentation
will appear in Volume XIII, Indochina, which
is scheduled for release later this year and in
Volume XII, East Asia and the Pacific, slated
for subsequent publication.
Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XVI,
was prepared in the Office of the Historian,
Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of
State. Copies of vol. XVI (Department of
State publication 9167) may be obtained for
$20.00 (domestic postpaid). Checks or money
orders should be sent to the GPO Bookstore,
Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.
Press release 223 of July 11, 1981.
Department of State
Free single copies of the following Depart-
ment of State publications are available from
the Public Information Service, Bureau of
Public Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.
President Reagan (611
Statement on nuclear nonproliferation, j JDj
16, 1981 (Current Policy #303).
Secretary Haig
International trade, Subcommittee on In J
national Trade of Senate Finance CoM™
tee, July 28, 1981 (Current Policy #30 f"
Interview on "Issues and Answers," JuM-
1981 (Current Policy #298).
Arms Control for the 1980s: An Americil
Policy, Foreign Policy Asso., New Ya
July 14, 1981 (Current Policy #292).
Africa
Strengthening U.S. -African Relations, I
ant Secretary Crocker, African-Ameri
Institute Conference, Wichita, June 1
1981 (Current Policy #289).
Background Note on Zaire (July 1981),
Economics
Approach to Foreign Economic Issues, 1 1
Secretary Rashish, Joint Economic Coiu
mittee of Congress, July 14, 1981 (Cur J.
Policy #294).
Energy
Energy in U.S. Foreign Policy, Assistanl a
Secretary Hormats, Japan-American ■.'(
Energy Forum, June 22, 1981 (Curreiji
Policy #290).
Europe
Background Note on Austria (June 1981' fi
Background Note on Czechoslovakia (Ma *
1981).
Human Rights
U.S. Commitment to Human Rights, Urn 2.
Secretary Stoessel, Subcommittee on
Human Rights and International Orgai*;
tions of House Foreign Affairs CommiM
July 14, 1981 (Current Policy #293).
Middle East
Background Note on Jordan (June 1981). k
Background Note on Kuwait (June 1981) h
Narcotics
International Narcotics Control (GIST, Ji
1981).
I
South Asia
Afghanistan: 18 Months of Occupation,
Eliza Van Hollen, Bureau of Intelligenc [J'
and Research, August 1981 (Special Re J
#86).
Background Note on Bangladesh (June 1J il
United Nations
General View of the U.N. System, Assist;
Secretary Abrams, United Nations
Association-USA, New York, June 5
(Current Policy #287).
"
Western Hemisphere
El Salvador: The Search for Peace, Assist [
Secretary Enders, World Affairs Counc
July 16, 1981 (Current Policy #296).B
Department of State Bulk
K
smber 1981
1, No. 2054
■an. A Strategic Approach to
i»,»fMan Foreign Policy (Haig) 10
itrol
on the "Today" Show (Haig) .... 27
id-Answer Session Following ABA
4s (Haig) 14
jlize (Department statement) .... 73
M Basin Development (Enders) . . .69
lal Arms Transfers Policy (Buckley,
House announcement). . . .' 61
*ial Terrorism (Kennedy) 65
■kMraX Trade (Haig) 19
jjip of Foreign and Defense Policies
16
tinational Force and Observers
ished (Veliotes, Secretary's letters,
ol, annex, appendix) 44
—nitment to Human Rights
**eD 42
Hnt Formula Code (Constable) ... .34
•stion-and-Answer Session Following
Vddress (Haig) 14
nal Trade (Haig) 19
inisterial Meeting Held in Paris
) 36
g Countries
Attends Caribbean Development
ng (joint communique, Haig,
) 68
Negotiates Procedures for Cancun
t(Haig) 33
c Approach to American Foreign
(Haig) 10
I int Formula Code (Constable) .... 34
•s
United States Foreign Relations
imics — Part 2 A
Basin Development (Enders) . . .69
inisterial Meeting Held in Paris
) 36
ind-Answer Session Following For-
3olicy Association Address (Haig) .31
' Attends Caribbean Development
ing (joint communique, Haig,
' 68
Negotiates Procedures for Cancun
nit (Haig) 33
s News Conference on President
s Visit (Haig) 54
ultinational Force and Observers
]lished (Veliotes, Secretary's letters,
>col, annex, appendix) 44
Egypt Sign Nuclear Energy Agree-
(Department announcement) .... 59
Egyptian President Sadat (Reagan,
t) 51
ador. El Salvador: The Search for
ie (Enders) 70
OECD Ministerial Meeting Held in
s (Clark) 36
fe for Progress on the Helsinki
' Act (Kampelman) 37
leview Conference 39
ws on the "Today" Show (Haig) 27
I Ministerial Meeting Held in Paris
Irk) 36
lin-and-Answer Session Following
leign Policy Association Address
ig) 31
ry Haig Interviewed for The Wall
let Journal 25
iry Haig Interviewed on "Night-
" 29
Foreign Aid
Caribbean Basin Development (Enders) ... 69
Secretary Attends Caribbean Development
Meeting (joint communique, Haig,
Brock) 68
Secretary Haig Interviewed for The Wall
Street Journal 25
Germany. 20th Anniversary of the Berlin
Wall 41
Health. WHO Infant Formula Code (Con-
stable) 34
Human Rights
Challenge for Progress on the Helsinki
Final Act (Kampelman) 37
CSCE Review Conference 39
U.S. Commitment to Human Rights
(Stoessel) 42
Immigration. U.S. Immigration Policy
(Reagan) 43
Industrialized Democracies
OECD Ministerial Meeting Held in Paris
(Clark) 36
Secretary Negotiates Procedures for Cancun
Summit (Haig) 33
Israel
Secretary Haig Interviewed on CBS Morning
News (Haig) 58
Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Nightline" . 29
Sinai Multinational Force and Observers
Established (Veliotes, Secretary's letters,
protocol, annex, appendix) 44
Kampuchea
Interviews on the "Today" Show (Haig) .... 27
A Strategic Approach to American Foreign
Policy (Haig) 10
Latin America and the Caribbean
Belize (Department statement) 73
Caribbean Basin Development (Enders) . . .69
Secretary Attends Caribbean Development
Meeting (joint communique, Haig,
Brock) 68
Lebanon
Secretary Haig Interviewed on CBS Morning
News (Haig) 58
Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Nightline" . 29
Middle East
Interviews on the "Today" Show (Haig) .... 27
Question-and-Answer Session Following ABA
Address (Haig) 14
Question-and-Answer Session Following For-
eign Policy Association Address (Haig) .31
Secretary Haig Interviewed for The Wall
Street Journal 25
Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Issues and
Answers 22
Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Nightline" .29
Secretary's News Conference on President
Sadat's Visit (Haig) 54
Military Affairs. Relationship of Foreign and
Defense Policies (Haig) 16
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Inter-
views on the "Today" Show (Haig) 27
Nuclear Policy
Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy (Reagan) . . 60
U.S. and Egypt Sign Nuclear Energy Agree-
ment (Department announcement) .... 59
Poland
Question-and-Answer Session Following
Foreign Policy Association Address
(Haig) 31
Secretary Haig Interviewed on "Issues and
Answers" 22
Presidential Documents
Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy (Reagan) . .60
Presidents Abroad 1
U.S. Immigration Policy (Reagan) 43
Visit of Egyptian President Sadat (Reagan,
Sadat) 51
Publications
Department of State 78
Foreign Relations Volume Released 78
Security Assistance
Conventional Arms Transfers Policy
(Buckley, White House announcement) .61
Relationship of Foreign and Defense Policies
(Haig) _ 16
South Africa. Question-and-Answer Session
Following Foreign Policy Association
Address (Haig) 31
Terrorism. International Terrorism
(Kennedy) 65
Trade.
Caribbean Basin Development (Enders) . . .69
International Trade (Haig) 19
Treaties
Current Actions 74
Sinai Multinational Force and Observers
Established (Veliotes, Secretary's letters,
protocol, annex, appendix) 44
U.S. and Egypt Sign Nuclear Energy Agree-
ment (Department announcement) .... 59
U.S.S.R.
CSCE Review Conference 39
International Trade (Haig) 19
Interviews on the "Today" Show (Haig) .... 27
Question-and-Answer Session Following For-
eign Policy Association Address (Haig) .31
Relationship of Foreign and Defense Policies
(Haig) 16
Secretary Haig Interviewed for The Wall
Street Journal 25
Question-and-Answer Session Following For-
eign Policy Association Address (Haig) .31
WHO Infant Formula Code (Constable) 34
Name Index
Buckley, James L 61
Brock, William E 68
Clark, William P 36
Constable, Elinor 34
Enders, Thomas O 69, 70
Haig, Secretary . . 10, 14, 16, 19, 22, 25, 27, 29,
31, 33, 44, 54, 58, 68
Kampelman, Max M 37
Kennedy, Richard T 65
Reagan, President 43, 51, 60
Stoessel, Walter J. Jr 42
'«SST§I
3 9999
06352
801 0
I
Live Music Archive
Librivox Free Audio
Metropolitan Museum
Cleveland Museum of Art
Internet Arcade
Console Living Room
Books to Borrow
Open Library
TV News
Understanding 9/11