Skip to main content

Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

See other formats 


Superintendent  of  Documents 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Washington,  D.C.  20402 


Second  Class  Mall 

Postage  and  Fees  Paid 

U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 

ISSN  0041-7610 


OFFICIAL  BUSINESS 
Penalty  for  Private  Use  S300 


Subscription  Renewals:  To  Insure  uninterrupted  service,  please  renew  your 
subscription  promptly  when  you  receive  the  expiration  notice  from  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents.  Due  to  the  time  required  to  process  renewals, 
notices  are  sent  3  months  In  advance  of  the  expiration  date.  Any  questions  In- 
volving your  subscription  should  be  addressed  to  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402 


of  SUiiv 


buUetEn 


3: 

Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  88  /  Number  2136 


July  1988 


Canada/21 


^^''otiio^r'^'^'^ 


*-  (^,  ^. 


^S23 


Budget/8,  28 
Terrorism/62 


Dpparim4*ni  of  Siate 

bulletin 


Volume  88  /  Number  2136  /  July  1988 


Cover  photo: 

Prime  Minister  Mulroney  and  President 

Reagan. 

(White  Huusf  photo  by  David  Johnson) 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and  govern- 
ment agencies  with  information  on  de- 
velopments in  U.S.  foreign  relations 
and  the  work  of  the  Department  of 
State  and  the  Foreign  Service.  The 
Bulletin's  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  se- 
lected press  releases  issued  by  the 
White  House,  the  Department,  and  the 
U.S.  Mission  to  the  United  Nations; 
and  treaties  and  other  agreements  to 
which  the  United  States  is  or  may  be- 
come a  party.  Special  features,  articles, 
and  other  supportive  material  (such  as 
maps,  charts,  photographs,  and  graphs) 
are  published  frequently  to  provide  ad- 
ditional information  on  current  issues 
but  should  not  necessarily  be  inter- 
preted as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 

Secretary  of  State 

CHARLES  REDMAN 

Assistant  Secretary 
for  Public  Affairs 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

NORMAN  HOWARD 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON  R.  HAYNES 

Assistant  Editor 


The  Secretary  of  State  has  determined  that 
the  publication  of  this  periodical  is  neces- 
sary in  the  transaction  of  the  public  busi- 
ness required  by  law  of  this  Department. 
Use  of  funds  for  printing  this  periodical 
has  been  approved  by  the  Director  of  the 
Office  of  Management  and  Budget  through 
September  W.  1988. 


Department  or  State  Bulletin  (ISi 
0041-7610)  is  published  monthly  (plus  a 
nual  inde.x)  by  the  Department  of  State 
2201  C  Street.  NW,  Washington,  D.C. 
20520.  Second-class  postage  paid  at  Wa 
ington,  D.C,  and  additional  mailing  of 
fices.  POSTMASTER:  Send  address 
changes  to  Superintendent  of  Documer  , 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Wasl 
ington.  D.C.  20402. 


NOTE:  Most  of  the  contents  of  this  pub- 
lication are  in  the  public  domain  and 
not  copyrighted.  Those  items  may  be  re- 
printed; citation  of  the  Department  of 
State  Bulletin  as  the  source  will  be 
appreciated.  Permission  to  reproduce 
ail  copyrighted  material  (including  pho- 
tographs) must  be  obtained  from  the  origi- 
nal source.  The  Bulletin  is  indexed  in 
the  Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Literature 
and  in  the  PAIS  (Public  Affairs  Informa- 
tion Service.  Inc.)  Bulletin. 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Docun-  its. 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington.  D.C.  20402. 


CONTENTS 


ie  President 

Reflections  on  U.S. -Soviet 

Relations 
Our  Human  Rights  Agenda  With 

the  Soviet  Union 


16  Secretary 

Achievements  of  the  INF  Treaty 
FY  1989  Foreign  Policy  Budget 
Interview  on  "This  Week  With 
David  Brinkley" 


rms  Control 

U.S.  Arms  Control  Initiatives 


anada 

Visit  of  Canadian  Prime  Minister 
(Brian  Mulroney.  President 
Reagan) 
U.S. -Canada  Relations 
U.S.-Canada  Free  Trade 
Agreement 

epartment 

1  The  "Budget  Crunch"  and  the 
Foreign  Service  (Ronald  I. 
Spiers) 


<ast  Asia 

!       Elections  in  Korea  (Gaston  J. 

Sigur,  Jr.) 
1       FY  1989  Assistance  Requests  for 

East  Asia  and  the  Pacific 

(Gaston  J.  Sigur,  Jr.) 


Economics 

39        Toward  a  Stronger  International 

Economy  (John  C.  Whitehead) 
41        World  Ti-ade  Week,  1988 

(Proclanuition) 
43       The  U.S.  and  Japan:  Partners  in 

Global  Economic  Leadership 

(W.  Allen  Wallis) 
45       Japan  Continues  Quotas  on  Beef, 

Citrus  Imports  (Clayton 

Yeutter) 
47        U.S.  Foreign  Economic  Policy, 

1981-87 

Europe 

50  Update  on  Europe  (Rozanne  L. 

Ridgway) 

51  Visit  of  Finnish  Prime  Minister 
53        NATO  Nuclear  Planning  Group 

Meets  in  Brussels  (Final 
Communique) 


Foreign  Assistance 

54  FY  1989  Request  for  Foreign 
Assistance  Programs  (Alan 
Woods) 


IVIiddle  East 

60  Secretary  Meets  with  Israeli 

Foreign  Minister  (Secretary 
Shultz) 

61  U.S.  to  Extend  Protection  to 

Neutral  Ships  in  Persian  Gulf 
(Frank  C.  Carlucci  III) 


l\/lilitary  Affairs 

61        Canadian  Acquisition  of  Nuclear- 
Powered  Submarines 
(Department  Statement) 


Terrorism 

62        Essential  Ingredients  in  the 
Fight  Against  Terrorism 
(L.  Paul  Bremer,  111) 

65        High  Technology  Terrorism 
(L.  Paul  Bremer,  III) 


United  Nations 

68  Policies  for  the  Americas  in  the 

1990s  (Richard  S.  Williamson) 

69  U.S.  Supports  Security  Council 

Resolution  on  Chemical 

Weapons  (Vernon  A.  Walters, 

Text  of  Resolution) 
71        FY  1989  Assistance  Requests  for 

Organizations  and  Programs 

(Richard  S.  Williamson) 
73        UN  Security  Council  Resolution 

on  Southern  Lebanon  (Version 

A.  Walters) 


Western  Hemisphere 

75        Transfer  of  U.S.  Funds  to 
Panama  (White  House 
Statement) 

75        Pan  American  Day  and  Week, 
1988  (Proclamation) 


Treaties 

76        Current  Actions 

Press  Releases 

78        Department  of  State 
78        USUN 


Publications 

79       Department  of  State 

79  Foreign  Relations  Supplement 

Released 

80  Digest  of  United  States  Practice 

in  Internatioyial  Law  Released 

81  Current  Documents,  1983 

Supplement  Released 


Index 


■^>  '  JULs^ 


HE  PRESIDENT 


eflections  on  U.S. -Soviet  Relations 


President  Reagan's  remarks  before 
•/  World  Affairs  Council  of  Western 
yssachitsetts  in  Springfield  on 
^■il  21.  1988^ 

(  n  delighted  to  be  here  with  you,  and 
jiBcially  in  the  State  where  America's 
)'i  struggle  for  freedom  began.  "I'm 
III  aware,"  John  Adams  wrote  in  1776, 

•  the  toil  and  blood  and  treasure  that 
rill  cost  us  to  support  and  defend 
^36  States.  Yet  through  all  the 

})m,  I  can  see  the  rays  of  ravishing 
1 1  and  glory." 

Historians  have  wondered  ever 
ii  '6  what  it  was  that  made  men  like 
'ims  and  that  outnumbered  band  of 
,^  mists  believe  they  could  overthrow 
:j  power  of  the  mightiest  empire  on 
ij  -th.  How  appropriate  it  seemed, 
3  ;ars  later,  when  the  British  band 
:  '-ed  at  Yorktown,  The  World  Turned 
t  iide  Down.  Ti-uly,  the  predictions  of 
:  wiser  heads  in  Europe  had  been 
;  van  wrong.  The  boldness,  the  vision, 
;  ,  yes,  the  gift  for  dreaming  of  a  few 
i  ners,  merchants,  and  lawyers  here 
;  ;hese  shores  had  started  a  revolu- 
:  I  that  today  reaches  into  every 
:  ner  of  the  world,  a  revolution  that 

•  I  fires  men's  souls  with  the  ravishing 
i  it  and  glory  of  human  freedom. 

As  members  of  the  World  Affairs 
:  incil,  as  active  students  of  global 
:tics,  all  of  you  here  today  can  tes- 
te how  unlikely  the  prospects  for 
idem  seemed  at  the  start  of  this 
ade.  You  can  recall  democracy  on 
defensive  in  country  after  country, 
■  unparalleled  buildup  of  nuclear 
:is,  hostages  in  Iran,  the  Soviet  inva- 
n  of  Afghanistan,  predictions  of  eco- 
nic  contraction,  and  global  chaos, 
iging  from  food  and  fuel  shortages  to 
.'ironmental  disaster.  All  of  these 
re  the  unrelenting  themes  of  so  much 
A'hat  we  read  and  heard  in  the  me- 
■  With  the  economic  recovery  of  the 
ited  States  and  the  democracies, 
vever,  much  of  this  talk  abated.  And 
s  economic  recovery,  anticipated  in 
issachusetts  in  1981  and  1982  with  re- 
ced  State  and  local  ta.x  rates,  was 
,  elf  rooted  in  the  insight  that  was  at 
j^  heart  of  the  revolution  begun  here 
|0  centuries  ago.  Trust  the  people,  let 
jvernment  get  out  of  the  way,  and 
I  ve  unharnessed  the  energy  and  dy- 
imism  of  free  men  and  women. 


New  Candor  in  the  Relationship 

I  have  come  here  today  to  suggest  that 
this  notion  of  trusting  the  power  of  hu- 
man freedom  and  letting  the  people  do 
the  rest  was  not  just  a  good  basis  for 
our  economic  policy;  it  proved  a  solid 
foundation  for  our  foreign  policy  as 
well.  That  is  what  we  have  given  to  the 
people,  why  we  have  repeated  what 
they  instinctively  knew  but  what  the 
experts  had  shied  away  from  saying  in 
public.  We  spoke  plainly  and  bluntly. 
We  rejected  what  Jeane  Kirkpatrick 
calls  moral  equivalency.  We  said  free- 
dom was  better  than  totalitarianism. 
We  said  communism  was  bad.  We  said  a 
future  of  nuclear  terror  was  unaccept- 
able. We  said  we  stood  for  peace,  but 
we  also  stood  for  freedom.  We  said  we 
held  fast  to  the  dream  of  our  Founding 
Fathers — the  dream  that  someday 
every  man,  woman,  and  child  would  live 
in  dignity  and  in  freedom.  And  because 
of  this,  we  said  containment  was  no 
longer  enough;  that  the  e.xpansion  of 
human  freedom  was  our  goal.  We  spoke 
for  democracy,  and  we  said  that  we 
would  work  for  the  day  when  the  peo- 
ple of  every  nation  enjoyed  the  blessing 
of  liberty. 

At  first,  the  experts  said  this  kind 
of  candor  was  dangerous,  that  it  would 
lead  to  a  worsening  of  Soviet- American 
relations.  But  far  to  the  contrary,  this 
candor  made  clear  to  the  Soviets  the 
resilience  and  strength  of  the  West;  it 
made  them  understand  the  lack  of  illu- 
sions on  our  part  about  them  or  their 
system.  By  reasserting  values  and  de- 
fining once  again  what  we  as  a  people 
and  a  nation  stood  for,  we  were,  of 
course,  making  a  moral  and  spiritual 
point.  And  in  doing  this,  we  offered 
hope  for  the  future,  for  democracy;  and 
we  showed  we  had  retained  that  gift  for 
dreaming  that  marked  this  continent 
and  our  nation  at  its  birth. 

In  all  this,  we  were  also  doing 
something  practical.  We  had  learned 
long  ago  that  the  Soviets  get  down  to 
serious  negotiations  only  after  they  are 
convinced  that  their  counterparts  are 
determined  to  stand  firm.  We  knew  the 
least  indication  of  weakened  resolve  on 
our  part  would  lead  the  Soviets  to  stop 
the  serious  bargaining,  stall  diplomatic 
progress,  and  attempt  to  exploit  this 
perceived  weakness. 


We  were  candid.  We  acknowledged 
the  depth  of  our  disagreements  and 
their  fundamental,  moral  import.  In 
this  way,  we  acknowledged  that  the  dif- 
ferences which  separated  us  and  the 
Soviets  were  deeper  and  wider  than 
just  missile  counts  and  number  of  war- 
heads. As  I  have  said  before,  we  do  not 
mistrust  each  other  because  we  are 
armed;  we  are  ai'med  because  we  mis- 
trust each  other.  And  I  spoke  those 
words  to  General  Secretary  Gorbachev 
at  our  vei-y  first  meeting  in  Geneva. 
That  was  why  we  resolved  to  ad- 
•  di-ess  the  full  range  of  the  real  causes 
of  that  mistrust  and  raise  the  crucial 
moral  and  political  issues  directly  with 
the  Soviets. 

Moral  and  Political  Issues 

In  the  past,  the  full  weight  of  the  So- 
viet-American relationship  all  too  often 
seemed  to  rest  on  one  issue — arms  con- 
trol, a  plank  not  sturdy  enough  to  bear 
up  the  whole  platform  of  Soviet-Ameri- 
can relations.  We  adopted  not  just  a 
one-part  agenda  of  arms  control  but  a 
broader  four-part  agenda.  We  talked 
about  regional  conflicts,  especially  in 
areas  like  Afghanistan,  Angola,  and 
Central  America,  where  Soviet  expan- 
sionism was  leading  to  sharp 
confrontation. 

We  insisted  on  putting  human 
rights  on  our  bilateral  agenda,  and  the 
issue  of  Soviet  noncompliance  with  the 
Helsinki  accords.  We  also  emphasized 
people-to-people  exchanges,  and  we 
challenged  the  Soviets  to  tear  down  the 
artificial  barriers  that  isolate  their  cit- 
izens from  the  rest  of  the  world. 

As  for  the  final  item  on  the 
agenda — arms  control — even  that  we 
revised.  We  said  we  wanted  to  go  be- 
yond merely  establishing  new  limits 
that  would  permit  even  greater 
buildups  in  nuclear  arms.  We  insisted 
on  cutting  down,  reducing,  not  just 
controlling,  the  number  of  weapons — 
arms  reductions,  not  just  arms  control. 

And  now  this  approach  to  the  Sovi- 
ets— public  candor  about  their  system 
and  ours,  a  full  agenda  that  put  the 
real  differences  between  us  on  the 
table — has  borne  fruit.  Just  as  we  look 
at  leading  indicators  to  see  how  the 
economy  is  doing,  we  know  the  global 
momentum  of  freedom  is  the  best  lead- 
ing indicator  of  how  the  United  States 


IrPartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


THE  PRESIDENT 


is  doing  in  the  world.  When  we  see  a 
freely  elected  government  in  the  Re- 
public of  Korea;  battlefield  victories  for 
the  Angolan  freedom  fighters;  China 
opening  and  liberalizing  its  economy; 
democracy  ascending  in  Latin  America, 
the  Phillippines,  and  on  every  other 
continent — where  these  and  other  indi- 
cators are  strong,  so  too  is  America 
and  so  too  are  our  hopes  for  the  future. 

Yet  even  while  freedom  is  on  the 
march,  Soviet-American  relations  have 
taken  a  dramatic  turn  into  a  period  of 
realistic  engagement.  In  a  month,  I  will 
meet  Mr.  Gorbachev  in  Moscow  for  our 
fourth  summit  since  1985.  Negotiations 
are  underway  between  our  two  govern- 
ments on  an  unparalleled  number  of  is- 
sues. The  INF  [Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear  Forces]  Ti-eaty  is  reality,  and 
now  the  Senate  should  give  its  consent 
to  ratification.  The  START  [strategic 
arms  reduction]  treaty  is  working 
along.  And  I  know  that  on  everyone's 
mind  today  is  this  single,  startling  fact: 
The  Soviets  have  pledged  that  next 
month  they  will  begin  withdrawing 
from  Afghanistan.  And  if  anyone  had 
predicted  just  a  few  years  ago  that  by 
the  end  of  this  decade,  a  treaty  would 
be  signed  eliminating  a  whole  class  of 
nuclear  weapons,  that  discussions 
would  be  moving  along  toward  a 
50%  reduction  in  all  strategic  nuclear 
arms,  and  that  the  Soviets  had  set  a 
date  certain  for  pulling  out  of 
Afghanistan,  that  individual  would  have 
faced  more  than  a  little  skepticism.  But 
that,  on  the  eve  of  the  fourth  summit, 
is  exactly  where  we  are. 

Let  me  now  summarize  for  you 
some  of  the  issues  that  need  crucial 
definition  as  we  approach  this  summit. 
Let  us  begin  with  Afghanistan. 

Afshanistan — The  Soviet  Pledge 
of  Withdrawal 

History  records  few  struggles  so  heroic 
as  that  of  the  Afghan  people  against 
the  Soviet  invasion.  In  8  years,  more 
than  a  million  Afghans  have  been  killed; 
more  than  5  million  have  been  driven 
into  exile.  And  yet,  despite  all  this  suf- 
fering, the  Afghan  people  have  fought 
on — a  determined  patriotic  resistance 
force  against  one  of  the  world's  most 
powerful  and  sophisticated  armies.  Yes, 
their  land  has  been  occupied,  but  they 
have  not  been  conquered.  Now  the  So- 
viets have  said  that  they  have  had 
enough.  The  will  for  freedom  has  de- 
feated the  will  for  power  as  it  always 
has  and,  I  believe,  always  will. 


Let  me  say  here  that  the  next  few 
months  will  be  no  time  for  complacency, 
no  time  to  sit  back  and  congratulate 
ourselves.  The  Soviets  have  rarely  be- 
fore, and  not  at  all  in  more  than  three 
decades,  left  a  country  once  occupied. 
They  have  often  promised  to  leave,  but 
rarely  in  their  history,  and  then  only 
under  pressure  from  the  West,  have 
they  actually  done  it.  Afghanistan  was 
a  critical,  strategic  prize  for  the  Sovi- 
ets. The  development  of  air  bases  near 
Afghanistan's  border  with  Iran  and 
Pakistan  would  have  dramatically  in- 
creased the  Soviet  capability  to  project 
their  power  to  the  Strait  of  Hormuz 
and  to  threaten  our  ability  to  keep  open 
that  critical  passage.  We  believe  that 
they  still  hope  to  prop  up  their  dis- 
credited, doomed  puppet  regime,  and 
they  still  seek  to  pose  a  threat  to 
neighboring  Pakistan,  to  which  we  have 
a  longstanding  defense  commitment. 

So  we  ask:  Have  the  Soviets  really 
given  up  these  ambitions?  We  do  not 
know.  We  cannot  know  until  the  drama 
is  fully  played.  We  must  make  clear 
that  any  spreading  of  violence  on  the 
part  of  the  Soviets  or  their  puppets 
could  undo  the  good  that  the  Geneva 
accords  promised  for  East-West 
relations. 

The  Soviets  are  now  pledged  to 
withdraw  their  forces  totally  from 
Afghanistan  by  next  February  15th  at 
the  latest.  In  the  meantime,  they  know 
that  as  long  as  they  are  aiding  their 
friends  in  Kabul,  we  will  continue  to 
supply  the  iiiHJahidhi  by  whatever 
means  necessary.  Let  me  repeat;  We 
will  continue  to  support  the  >ni(jahidin 
for  as  long  as  the  Soviets  support  the 
Kabul  regime.  The  Soviets  understand 
that  this  is  our  position  and  that  we 
would  not  have  entered  into  this  agree- 
ment without  it.  It  is  more  than  a  posi- 
tion; this  is  a  hard  and  fast  commitment 
on  my  part,  backed  up  by  a  unanimous 
resolution  of  the  U.S.  Senate. 

From  the  start,  our  policy  in 
Afghanistan  has,  of  course,  been  di- 
rected at  restoring  that  country  to  an 
independent,  nonaligned  status  in 
which  the  Afghan  people  could  decide 
their  own  future  and  to  which  their  ref- 
ugees could  return  safely  and  with 
honor — the  same  goals  as  those  stated 
in  successive  UN  General  Assembly 
resolutions  over  the  years.  But  these 
are  not  the  only  goals  of  our  policy 
there.  In  a  broader  sense,  our  policy  is 
intended  to  nurture  what  you  might  call 
more  normal  relations  between  East 
and  West.  Just  as  a  Soviet  Union  that 


oppresses  its  own  people,  that  viol 
the  Helsinki  accords  on  human  rigl 
to  which  it  is  a  party,  that  continucui 
suppress  free  expression  and  religi^s 
worship  and  the  right  to  travel — ju  a 
such  a  Soviet  Union  can  never  havi 
truly  normal  relations  with  the  Un 
States  and  the  rest  of  the  free  woi- 
neither  can  a  Soviet  Union  that  is 
ways  trying  to  push  its  way  into  ot  u- 
countries  ever  have  a  normal  rela-  j 
tionship  with  us.  And  that  is  what  js 
happened  in  countries  like  Angola,  ^ic 
aragua,  and  Ethiopia.  The  Soviet  l^io: 
has  helped  install  or  maintain  clier  re- 
gimes against  the  will  of  the  peopl 

None  of  these  regimes  has  brc  fhl 
peace  or  a  better  life  to  their  peop  i  < 
Each  has  brought  misery  and  hare  lip 
Each  is  an  outrage  to  the  conscien  " 
mankind,  and  none  more  so  than 
Ethiopia. 

Ethiopia — A  Human  Catastrophe 
in  the  Making 

Two  years  ago,  a  pitying  world  be  ve 
that  at  last  the  hopes  of  all  compa  lOr 
ate  people  had  been  realized  and  t  t 
the  famine  in  Africa  had  come  to  ; 
end.  Humanity  prayed  that  it  wou 
never  again  see  pictures  of  childre 
with  bloated  stomachs  or  hear  sto  .^ 
of  families  dying  one  by  one  as  th 
walked  dozens  of  miles  to  reach  fe  lini 
stations.  But  now  in  one  country,   e 
famine  has  returned. 

Ethiopia  suffers  from  drought  Vei 
and  even  more,  it  suffers  from  ina  - 
quate  agricultural  policies.  But  ncto 
drought  and  failed  policy  has  beer 
added  a  third,  even  more  deadly  e  ■ 
ment — war.  The  Ethiopian  Army  1 5 
recently  suffered  major  defeats  in  ,s 
long  war  with  the  Eritrean  succes 
sionist  forces.  The  combination  of 
drought  and  the  dislocations  of  we  is 
the  immediate  cause  of  famine  in  '  at 
part  of  the  country.  But  the  Ethic  an 
regime  recently  ordered  all  foreig  fan 
ine  relief  workers  to  leave  the  affi  ted 
northern  region.  That  leads  us  to  le 
horrible  conclusion  that  starvatioi  ind 
scorched  earth  are  being  consider  at 
weapons  to  defeat  the  rebellion. 

The  subject  of  Ethiopia  has  In: 
been  on  the  U.S. -Soviet  agenda.  I  i 
now  it  is  more  urgent  because  of  t.s 
tremendous  human  catastrophe  in  le 
making.  Is  the  world  to  know  anoier 
holocaust?  Is  it  to  see  another  poUca. 
famine?  The  Soviets  are  the  princ  al 
arms  supplier  and  primary  backer  o 
the  regime  in  Addis  Ababa.  They  * 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Jul«|6fi. 


THE  PRESIDENT 


.  supplying  250,000  tons  of  food  this 
\  They  can  stop  this  disaster  before 
ippens.  And  I  appeal  to  them  to 

■  uade  the  Ethiopian  regime,  as  only 

can,  to  change  its  decision  and  to 
A  the  famine  relief  efforts  to  con- 
i'.  And,  let  me  add,  I  hope,  as  well, 
the  Soviet  Union  will  join  us  and 
r  concerned  governments  in  work- 
t'lward  a  peaceful,  negotiated  solu- 
to  the  civil  war. 

Ethiopia,  of  course — for  that  mat- 
r  111  every  country  in  which  the  Sovi- 
I  have  imposed  a  regime,  the  issues 
:  iiman  rights  and  regional  conflicts 
i;t'  into  one  greater  issue:  that  of 
it  intentions,  designs,  and  behavior 
1  at  home  and  across  the  Earth. 
Several  years  ago,  the  French  po- 
u  al  thinker  and  writer,  Jean-Francois 
R  el,  reported  on  a  conversation  that 
a  ember  of  the  French  Cabinet  had 
;  a  high  Soviet  official.  The  Soviet 
lal,  in  reviewing  the  history  of  the 
'-.  said,  as  Revel  writes,  "We  took 
nla,  and  you  did  not  protest.  We 
'  I  he  fact  and  included  it  in  our 
■s."  The  Soviet  official  continued, 
we  took  Mozambique.  Forget  it; 
lidii't  even  know  where  it  is.  Then 
jHik  Ethiopia,  a  key  move.  No  re- 

■  .\nd  he  went  on,  "Then  we  took 

'  11  and  set  up  a  powerful  Soviet  base 
e.  Aden!  On  the  Arabian  Peninsula! 
1  he  heart  of  your  supply  center!  No 
r  lonse."  And  the  Soviet  official  con- 
ed by  saying,  "So  we  noted,  we  can 

■  Aden." 

The  years  of  Western  passivity  in 
face  of  Soviet  aggression  ended,  of 
rse,  7  years  ago.  But  the  issue  here 
ii  hat  the  mentality  that  produced 
e  n  analyses,  as  the  Soviet  official 
"  ed  them,  has  not  ended.  Until  it 
-,  the  world  cannot  know  true 


aragua — The  Stolen  Revolution 

T  it  is  a  lesson  we  should  apply  closer 
'  lome,  in  Nicaragua.  A  few  months 
iie  the  Soviets  launched  their  inva- 

■  1  111  Afghanistan,  the  Soviets  also 
hped  Sandinista  communists  in  Nic- 

i  gua  to  steal  a  democratic  revolution. 

'  '  communists  promised  democracy 
I  human  rights,  but  they,  instead, 
M-ised  a  cruel  dictatorship,  massively 
itarized,  and  began  a  secret  war  of 
iversion  against  Nicaragua's  peaceful 
shbors. 
The  people  of  Nicaragua  took  up 

■  ns  against  the  communists,  and  they 
•1'e  fought  a  valiant  struggle.  But  our 

ngress,  instead  of  giving  the  Nic- 
iguan  resistance  the  same  steady 


support  the  Afghans  have  received,  has 
repeatedly  turned  aid  on  and  off  Even 
now,  while  the  Soviet  bloc  pours  half  a 
billion  dollars  of  arms  a  year  into  Nic- 
aragua, Congress  has  denied  the  free- 
dom fighters  the  support  they  need  to 
force  the  Sandinistas  to  fulfill  their 
democratic  promises.  I  think  it  is  about 
time  that  Congress  learned  the  lessons 
of  Afghanistan. 

America,  by  supporting  freedom 
fighters  against  brutal  dictatorships,  is 
helping  to  advance  the  values  we  hold 
most  dear:  peace,  freedom,  human 
rights,  and,  yes,  democracy.  At  the 
same  time,  we  are  helping  to  secure 
our  own  freedom  by  I'aising  the  cost  of 
Soviet  aggression  and  by  extending  the 
battle  for  freedom  to  the  far  frontier. 
Some  say  the  Soviet  Union  is  reap- 
praising its  foreign  policy  these  days  to 
concentrate  on  internal  reform.  Clearly, 
there  are  signs  of  change.  But  if  there 
is  change,  it  is  because  the  costs  of 
aggression  and  the  real  moral  differ- 
ence between  our  systems  were 
brought  home  to  it.  If  we  hope  to  see  a 
more  fundamental  change,  we  must  re- 
main strong  and  firm.  If  we  fulfill  our 
responsibility  to  set  the  limits,  as  well 
as  offering  constructive  cooperation, 
then  this  could,  indeed,  turn  out  to  be 
a  turning  point  in  the  history  of  East- 
West  relations. 

Soviet  Opportunity  to  Build  Trust 

By  starting  now  to  show  real  respect 
for  human  rights  and  abandoning  the 
quest  for  military  solutions  to  these  re- 
gional conflicts,  the  Soviet  Union  would 
also  be  working  to  build  trust  and  im- 
prove relations  between  our  two  coun- 
tries. Regional  conflicts  and  human 
rights  are  closely  intertwined.  They  are 
issues  of  moral  conscience.  They  are  is- 
sues of  international  security.  Because 
when  a  government  abuses  the  rights  of 
its  own  people,  it  is  a  grim  indication  of 
its  willingness  to  commit  violence 
against  others. 

Two  of  the  most  basic  rights  that 
we  have  called  on  the  Soviets  to  comply 
with  under  the  Helsinki  accords  are  the 
right  to  emigrate  and  the  right  to 
travel.  How  can  we  help  but  doubt  a 
government  that  mistrusts  its  own  peo- 
ple and  holds  them  against  their  will? 
And  what  better  way  would  there  be  to 
improve  understanding  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
than  to  permit  free  and  direct  contact 
between  our  two  peoples?  In  the  new 
spirit  of  openness,  why  doesn't  the  So- 
viet Government  issue  passports  to  its 


citizens?  I  think  this  would  dramatically 
improve  U.S. -Soviet  relations. 

Of  course,  the  World  Affairs  Coun- 
cil here  is  a  major  sponsor  of  USIA's 
[U.S.  Information  Agency]  Interna- 
tional Visitors'  Program.  I  do  not  have 
to  tell  you  the  importance  of  people-to- 
people  exchanges.  And  I  want  to  thank 
all  of  you  who  have  provided  assistance 
and  hospitality  to  foreign  visitors. 

I  just  left  a  meeting  in  the  Oval 
Office  to  come  up  here,  and  that  meet- 
ing, brought  about  by  Director  Wick  of 
USIA,  was  a  meeting  with  an  as- 
semblage of  media  and  publishing  peo- 
ple from  the  Soviet  Union.  That,  I 
think,  is  a  first  in  our  relationship.  I 
have  often  reflected  in  public  on  how  if 
our  planet  was  ever  threatened  by 
forces  from  another  world,  all  nations 
and  all  people  would  quickly  come  to- 
gether in  unity  and  brotherhood. 

You  here  today  at  the  World  Af- 
fairs Council  understand  better  than 
most  this  lesson  about  how  much  all  of 
us  have  in  common  as  members  of  the 
human  race.  It  is  governments,  after 
all,  not  people,  that  put  obstacles  up 
and  cause  misunderstandings.  When  I 
spoke  at  the  United  Nations  several 
years  ago,  I  mentioned  some  words  of 
Gandhi,  spoken  shortly  after  he  visited 
Britain  in  his  quest  for  independence  in 
India.  "I  am  not  conscious  of  a  single 
experience  throughout  my  3  months  in 
England  and  Europe,"  he  said,  "that 
made  me  feel  that  after  all  East  is  East 
and  West  is  West.  On  the  contrary,  I 
have  been  convinced  more  than  ever 
that  human  nature  is  much  the  same, 
no  matter  under  what  clime  it  flour- 
ishes and  that  if  you  approached  people 
with  trust  and  affection,  you  would 
have  tenfold  trust  and  thousandfold  af- 
fection returned  to  you." 

You  in  the  World  Affairs  Council 
have  done  much  praiseworthy  work  in 
this  area.  I  am  hopeful  that  American 
foreign  policy,  based  as  it  has  been  on 
strength  and  candor,  is  opening  a  way 
to  a  world  where  trust  and  affection 
among  peoples  is  an  everyday  reality. 
This  is  my  hope  as  I  prepare  to  leave 
for  Moscow.  I  am  grateful  for  your 
prayers  and  for  your  support. 


'Opening  comments  deleted  here;  text 
from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  "of  Apr.  25,  1988. ■ 


"Ipartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Our  Human  Rights  Agenda 
With  the  Soviet  Union 


President  Reagan's  address  before 
the  National  Strategy  Forum  in  Chi- 
cago on  May  Jt,  1988J 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  be  in  Chicago  and 
an  honor  to  be  able  to  speak  to  you, 
the  members  of  the  National  Strategy 
F''orum. 

Our  agenda  for  U.S. -Soviet  rela- 
tions has  four  main  parts — regional 
conflicts,  bilateral  exchanges,  arms 
reductions,  and  human  rights.  I  have 
spoken  elsewhere  at  some  length 
about  the  first  three.  Today  I  would 
like  to  take  a  moment  to  discuss  with 
you  the  subject  of  human  rights. 

Our  Concept  of  Human  Rights 

We  Americans,  of  course,  often  speak 
about  human  rights,  individual  liber- 
ties, and  fundamental  freedoms.  We 
know  that  the  promotion  of  human 
rights  represents  a  central  tenet  of  our 
foreign  policy;  we  even  believe  that  a 
passionate  commitment  to  human  rights 
is  one  of  the  special  characteristics  that 
helps  to  make  America  America.  It  was 
Lincoln  himself  who  said  that  the  Dec- 
laration of  Independence  granted  lib- 
erty not  to  our  nation  alone  but 
"...gave  promise  that  in  due  time  the 
weights  would  be  lifted  from  the  shoul- 
ders of  all  men " 

It  is  important  to  note  that  this 
American  emphasis  on  human  rights 
represents  much  more  than  merely  a 
vague  respect  for  human  dignity.  No, 
part  of  our  heritage  as  Americans  is  a 
very  specific  and  definite  understanding 
of  human  rights — a  definition  of  human 
rights  that  we  can  assert  to  challenge 
ourselves  and  our  own  institutions  and 
that  we  can  hold  up  as  an  example  for 
all  the  world. 

Ultimately  our  view  of  human 
rights  derives  from  our  Judeo-Christian 
heritage  and  the  view  that  each  individ- 
ual life  is  sacred.  It  takes  more  detailed 
form  in  the  works  of  the  French  and 
English  writers  of  the  18th  century  En- 
lightenment. It  is  the  notion  that  gov- 
ernment should  derive  its  mandate 
from  the  consent  of  the  governed,  this 
consent  being  expressed  in  free,  con- 
tested, regular  elections.  And  there  you 
have  a  first  human  right — the  right  to 
have  a  voice  in  government,  the  right  to 
vote. 


Elected  governments  would  reflect 
the  will  of  the  majority,  but  the  En- 
lightenment writers  and  our  own 
Founding  Fathers  gave  the  concept  of 
human  rights  still  more  definite,  spe- 
cific form.  For  they  held  that  each  indi- 
vidual has  certain  rights  that  are  so 
basic,  so  fundamental  to  his  dignity  as 
a  human  being,  that  no  government — 
however  large  the  majority  it  repre- 
sents— may  violate  them. 

Freedom  of  speech.  Freedom  of  re- 
hgion.  Freedom  of  assembly.  Freedom 
of  the  press.  These  and  other  rights 
enshrined  in  our  Constitution  and  Bill 
of  Rights  consist  in  severe  limitations 
upon  the  power  of  government.  They 
are  rights — and  this  is  another  basic 
point — that  every  citizen  can  call  upon 
our  independent  court  system  to  up- 
hold. They  proclaim  the  belief — and 
represent  a  specific  means  of  enforcing 
the  belief — that  the  individual  comes 
first;  that  the  government  is  the  serv- 
ant of  the  people  and  not  the  other  way 
around. 

Contrast  With  Soviet  System 

That  contrasts  with  those  systems  of 
government  that  provide  no  limit  on  the 
power  of  the  government  over  its  peo- 
ple. Within  the  Soviet  Union,  decision- 
making is  tightly  concentrated  at  the 
top.  The  authority  of  the  Communist 
Party  is  not  determined  by  a  docu- 
ment— a  constitution,  if  you  will — but 
by  the  leadership  who  determine  what 
is  right  for  the  people.  Rights  such  as 
free  speech,  free  press,  and  free  assem- 
bly are  granted  if  they  are  "in  accord- 
ance with  the  interests  of  the  people 
and  in  order  to  strengthen  and  develop 
the  socialist  system." 

I  have,  in  the  past,  stressed  these 
contrasts  between  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union — the  fundamental 
and  profound  differences  between  our 
philosophies  of  government  and  ways  of 
life.  And  I  have  always  said  that  our 
negotiations  must  be  undertaken  with 
precisely  this  sort  of  realism,  this  sort 
of  candor. 

Yet  while  establishing  this  context 
is  essential  and  reminding  ourselves  of 
these  basic  distinctions  always  useful, 
today  I  have  something  additional  in 
mind.  For  in  recent  months,  the  Soviet 
Union  has  shown  a  willingness  to  re- 


spect at  least  some  human  rights,  lis 
my  belief  that  thei-e  is  hope  for  fuiker 
change,  hope  that  in  the  days  ahet'thi 
Soviets  will  grant  further  recognit  n 
to  the  fundamental  civil  and  politi( 
rights  of  all. 

Before  discussing  our  hopes  f(  th^ 
future,  I  would  like  to  turn  for  a  r  - 
ment  to  a  subject  that  the  Soviets 
themselves  often  raise. 


Soviet  Questions  About 

U.S.  Economic  and  Social  Right 

The  United  States  may  recognize  -il 
and  pohtical  rights,  but  what  of  e( 
nomic  and  social  rights?  The  Sovit 
point  out,  for  example,  that  the  U  te( 
States  has  an  unemployment  pi'ob  n. 
Or  they  point  to  the  American  pn  en 
of  homelessness.  Or  to  racial  disci  li- 
nation.  It  deserves  a  full  response 

To  begin  with,  so-called  econc  ic 
and  social  rights  belong  to  an  ess( 
tially  different  category  from  civil  nd 
political  rights.  The  economic  and  )ci 
conditions  in  any  society  are  cons  itl 
changing — new  social  groupings  c  - 
stantly  taking  shape;  new  market 
forming  as  old  markets  disappear 

Yet  there  is  nothing  shifting    ou 
civil  and  political  rights,  like  free(  m 
speech  or  worship;  they  are  const;  t 
and  immutable,  forever  basic  to  tl 
dignity  of  each  human  being.  The;  ire 
fundamental — fundamental  to 
everything. 

Yes,  the  United  States  has  so  al 
and  economic  shortcomings.  Uner  loi 
ment,  for  one.  As  a  free  people,  v 
have  created  an  economic  expansi- 
that  over  the  past  5  years  has  ere  3(1 
nearly  16  million  jobs — but  we  net  tn 
do  more.  Homelessness  is,  indeed  I 
problem — an  agonizing  one.  To  soi$ 
extent,  we  are  bound  in  dealing  \\  h  i 
by  our  very  commitment  to  libert.  fn 
while  we  seek  to  help  the  homele^  in 
every  way  possible,  we  must  avoic  it 
all  costs  coercive  solutions.  It  is  t  e 
that,  as  a  free  people,  we  spend  hi- 
dreds  of  millions  of  dollars  a  year 
through  our  Federal,  State,  and  iijl 
governments  to  care  for  the  homess 
As  a  free  people,  our  churches,  s; 
agogues,  and  a  host  of  volunteer  ( 
nizations  do  much  to  provide  the 
homeless  with  food,  clothing,  and  led 
cines.  And  yet  there  is  no  denyinjihs 
a  problem  remains.  1 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Julv|9£ 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Racial  discrimination;  our  strides 
a  free  people  during  just  the  past 
ee  decades  have  been  dramatic.  Yet 
problem  lingers,  and  we  continue  to 
tie  bigotry  and  prejudice. 
The  problems,  as  I  said,  are  seri- 
^ft— no  one  would  seek  to  deny  that. 
^  in  freedom,  we  are  constantly  con- 
fnting  them,  criticizing  ourselves, 
&  king  to  do  better— in  full  view  for 
a  to  see. 


j  let  Economic  Conditions 

( :  consider,  if  you  will,  the  economic 
(litions  of  the  Soviet  Union.  I  do  not 
ill  to  suggest  that  the  Soviet  econ- 
c  y  has  made  no  progress.  But  the 
I  ited  successes  of  the  past  arose 
'  1  rely  from  constant  additions  to  the 
1,  or  force  and  the  availability  of  inex- 
[  isive  resources.  Now  that  these  have 
11,  to  a  great  extent,  depleted,  there 
;  lains  a  gap  between  the  Soviet 
I  ion  and  the  West.  Indeed,  given  the 
,,t  irmous  advances  in  Western  tech- 
:'  ogy,  the  gap  is  likely  to  widen. 
1  do  not  bring  this  up  simply  for 
.sake  of  sounding  critical.  I  mention 
1  lere  because  in  recent  months — and 
1 5  is  a  development  of  tremendous 
;i  nificance — they  have  begun  to  men- 
,t  1  it  themselves,  just  like  Americans 
I  about  their  problems.  Soviet  econo- 
;  ;ts  have  published  articles  about  So- 
t  shortages — one  recent  article  dealt 
h  the  inadequacies  of  Soviet  hous- 
,  .  The  Soviet  press  now  carries  sto- 
5  about  the  need  for  progress.  And, 
:ourse,  Soviet  economic  progress  is 
'  of  Mr.  Gorbachev's  chief  aims. 


iman  Rights-Economic  Growth 
nnection 

is  brings  us  back  to  the  subject  of 
'  day — human  rights.  For  I  believe 
it  the  Soviets  may  be  coming  to  un- 
rstand  something  of  the  connection — 
;  necessary  and  inextricable  connec- 
n— between  human  rights  and  eco- 
mic  gi'owth. 

The  connection  between  economic 
aduetivity  and  certain  kinds  of  free- 
m  is  obvious.  Private  plots  of  land 
.J  ike  up  only  3%  of  the  arable  land  in 
je  Soviet  Union  but  account  for  a 
arter  of  the  produce.  The  free  flow  of 


jl'ormation,  to  provide  another  exam- 
i,  will  clearly  prove  vital  for  Soviet 
ience  and  technology  to  have  hope  of 
aching  new  and  higher  standards. 
And  yet  there  is  a  still  deeper 

,i|nnection.  For  it  is  the  individual  who 
always  the  source  of  economic 


creativity — the  inquiring  mind  that  pro- 
duces a  technical  breakthrough,  the 
imagination  that  conceives  of  new  prod- 
ucts and  markets.  And  in  order  for  the 
individual  to  create,  he  must  have  a 
sense  of  just  that — his  own  individu- 
ality, his  own  self-worth.  He  must 
sense  that  others  respect  him — and, 
yes,  that  his  nation  respects  him.  Re- 
spects him  enough  to  permit  him  his 
own  opinions.  Respects  the  relationship 
between  the  individual  and  his  God 
enough  to  permit  him  to  worship  as  he 
chooses.  Even  respects  him  enough  to 
permit  him,  if  he  chooses  to  do  so,  to 
leave. 

The  Soviets  should  recognize  basic 
human  rights  because  it  is  the  right 
thing  to  do.  They  should  recognize  hu- 
man rights  because  they  have  accepted 
international  obligations  to  do  so,  par- 
ticularly in  the  Helsinki  Final  Act.  But 
if  they  recognize  human  rights  for  rea- 
sons of  their  own — because  they  seek 
economic  growth  or  because  they  want 
to  enter  into  a  more  normal  rela- 
tionship with  the  United  States  and 
other  nations,  I  want  to  say  [here]  and 
now,  that  is  fine  by  me. 

Over  the  past  3  years,  some  300 
political  and  religious  prisoners  have 
been  released  from  labor  camps.  More 
recently,  the  incarceration  of  dissidents 
in  mental  hospitals  and  prisons  has 
slowed  and,  in  some  cases,  stopped 
completely.  While  the  press  remains 
tightly  controlled  by  the  party  and 
state,  we  have  seen  the  publication  of 
stories  on  topics  that  used  to  be  forbid- 
den— topics  like  crime,  drug  addiction, 
corruption,  even  police  brutality. 

These  changes  are  limited,  and  the 
basic  standards  contained  in  the 
Helsinki  accords  still  are  not  being 
met.  But  we  applaud  the  changes  that 
have  taken  place — and  encourage  the 
Soviets  to  go  farther.  We  recognize  that 
changes  occur  slowly;  but  that  is  better 
than  no  change  at  all. 

If  I  may,  I  would  like  now  to  share 
with  you  a  brief  summary  of  the  human 
rights  agenda  that  I  will  be  discussing 
in  my  meetings  in  Moscow.  It  has  four 


Moscow  Summit  Agenda 

First,  freedom  of  religion.  Despite  the 
recent  relaxation  of  some  controls  on 
the  exercise  of  religion,  it  is  still  true 
that  churches,  synagogues,  mosques,  or 
other  houses  of  worship  may  not  exist 
without  government  permission.  Many 
have  been  imprisoned  in  the  past  for 


acts  of  worship.  And  yet — to  quote  the 
Universal  Declaration  of  Human 
Rights — "Everyone  has  the  right  to 
freedom  of  thought,  conscience  and  re- 
ligion...." And  General  Secretary  Gor- 
bachev has  indicated  a  willingness  to 
consider  "a  new  law"  on  the  freedom  of 
conscience. 

Second,  freedom  of  speech.  There 
are  still  many  serving  long  prison  sen- 
tences for  offenses  that  involve  only  the 
spoken  or  written  word.  Yet  the  clear, 
internationally  recognized  standard  as 
defined,  once  again,  in  the  Universal 
Declaration  of  Human  Rights,  is  that 
"Everyone  has  the  right  to  freedom  of 
opinion  and  expression — "  Today  there 
is  more  such  freedom  in  the  Soviet 
Union  than  2  years  ago.  Many  persons 
imprisoned  for  expressing  dissenting 
views  have  been  released  from  prison. 
This  issue  can  be  removed  by  granting 
full  recognition  to  this  basic  human 
right.  And  I  know  you  join  me  in  urg- 
ing the  freeing  of  people  imprisoned  for 
nothing  more  than  the  expression  of 
their  views. 

Emigration,  third,  has  long  repre- 
sented a  matter  of  great  concern  to  us. 
The  Universal  Declaration  states  that, 
"Everyone  has  the  right  to  leave  any 
country,  including  his  own,  and  to  re- 
turn to  his  country."  It  is  true  that 
during  the  past  12  months,  the  rate  of 
people  permitted  to  leave  the  Soviet 
Union  has  been  significantly  higher 
than  during  the  preceding  6  years.  It  is 
true,  as  well,  that  the  number  of  those 
permitted  to  leave  for  short  trips — of- 
ten family  visits — has  gone  up.  We  are 
heartened  by  this  progress.  Our  hope  is 
that  the  Soviets  gi-ant  all  their  peoples 
full  and  complete  freedom  of  movement. 
And  one  point  in  particular;  the  Soviets 
refuse  many  the  right  to  leave  on  the 
grounds  that  they  possess  secret  infor- 
mation— even  though  they  had  ended 
their  secret  work  many  years  before 
and  whatever  information  they  had  has 
become  public  or  obsolete.  I  hope  such 
cases  will  be  rationally  reviewed,  and 
the  decision  will  be  made  to  free  these 
people  and  their  families. 

This  brings  me  now  to  the  fourth 
and  final  area  I  want  to  discuss — mak- 
ing the  progress  more  permanent.  As  I 
have  said  a  number  of  times  now,  we 
welcome  the  human  rights  progress 
that  the  Soviets  have  made  and  believe 
there  is  good  reason  to  hope  for  still 
more.  Yet  it  is  only  being  realistic  to 
point  out  that  we  have  seen  progress  in 
the  Soviet  Union  before.  Khrushchev 
loosened  things  up  a  bit.  The  intellec- 
tual and  cultural  life  of  the  Soviet 
Union  underwent  a  kind  of  thaw,  a  kind 
of  springtime. 


ppartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


THE  SECRETARY 


But  it  was  a  springtime  followed  by 
a  winter,  for  Khrushchev's  relaxations 
reversed,  and  for  the  nearly  three  dec- 
ades until  our  own  day,  oppression  and 
stagnation  once  again  became  the  de- 
termining characteristics  of  Soviet  life. 
That  is  why  those  of  us  in  the  West, 
both  publicly  and  in  direct  conversation 
with  the  Soviets,  must  continue  to 
make  candor  and  realism  the  basis  of 
our  bilateral  relationship.  My  Chief  of 
Staff  Howard  Baker  told  me  recently  of 
an  old  Tennessee  saying,  "Plain  talk — 
easy  understood."  Exactly.  And  just  as 
previous  hopeful  moments  in  Soviet  his- 
tory ended  all  too  soon,  so,  too, 
glas-iiost — today's  new  candor — will  suc- 
ceed if  the  Soviets  take  steps  to  make 
it  permanent,  to  institutionalize  it. 

Freedom  of  religion,  freedom  of 
speech,  freedom  to  emigrate — and  the 
willingness  to  make  new  freedoms  per- 
manent. These  are  our  hopes;  these  are 
our  prayers  for  the  future  of  human 
rights  in  the  Soviet  Union,  in  the 
world,  in  our  own  country. 

In  granting  greater  liberty,  I  am 
confident  that  the  Soviets  will  discover 
that  they  have  made  possible  economic 
growth.  But  even  more  important,  this 
recognition  of  human  rights  will  ad- 
vance the  cause  of  peace.  For  in  the 
words  of  Andrey  Sakharov — a  man  who 
suffered  much  under  the  Soviet  system, 
but  who  has  also  experienced  the  bene- 
fits of  glasnost — "I  am  convinced  that 
international  confidence,  mutual  under- 
standing, disarmament,  and  interna- 
tional security  are  inconceivable 
without  an  open  society  with  freedom 
of  information,  freedom  of  conscience, 
the  right  to  publish,  and  the  right  to 
travel  and  choose  the  country  in  which 

one  wishes  to  live Peace,  progress, 

and  human  rights— these  three  goals 
are  insolubly  linked." 

Since  I  have  been  speaking  today 
about  the  relationship  of  human  rights 
and  economic  progress,  let  me  say  a 
few  words  about  the  present  situation 
in  Poland,  a  nation  with  which  millions 
of  Americans  share  bonds  of  kinship. 
We  hope  and  pray  that  the  Polish  Gov- 
ernment will  hear  the  voice  of  the  Pol- 
ish people  and  that  economic  reform 
and  recovery  will  soon  begin.  The  Pol- 
ish people  have  long  been  ready  for  it. 


Achievements  of  the  INF  Treaty 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  9,  1988.1 


Secretary  Shultz's  staiement  before 
the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Commit- 
tee on  May  16,  1988A 

This  is  my  third  opportunity  to  testify 
before  this  committee  on  behalf  of  the 
INF  [Intermediate-Range  Nuclear 
Forces]  Treaty.  In  the  2  months  since 
my  last  appearance  here,  discussion  of 
the  treaty  has  often  centered  on  ques- 
tions of  detail,  especially  some  of  the 
specifics  of  the  treaty's  verification  re- 
gime. As  part  of  the  technical  imple- 
mentation discussions,  it  became  clear 
that  it  was  essential  to  ensure  that  the 
Soviets  understood  and  acknowledged 
their  obligations  under  this  treaty.  In 
some  cases,  we  needed  to  clarify  "ques- 
tions that  had  arisen  about  how  to  im- 
plement those  obligations. 

Together,  the  Senate  and  the  Ad- 
ministration identified  nine  key  imple- 
mentation issues.  I  am  pleased  to 
report  that,  as  is  recorded  in  the  docu- 
ment agreed  to  by  the  treaty  parties 
last  week  in  Geneva,  we  have  resolved 
all  nine  issues  to  our  satisfaction. 

But,  as  the  Senate  prepares  to  be- 
gin debate  on  this  treaty,  I  hope  that 
the  focus  will  not  be  limited  to  the  de- 
tails we  have  just  been  discussing.  I 
hope  that  debate  will  center  on  the 
merits  of  the  treaty  as  a  whole.  As  I 
said  in  my  last  appearance,  "There  is 
one  fundamental  question  you  are 
called  on  to  answer  as  you  consider  this 
or  any  other  arms  control  treaty:  is  it 
in  the  security  interests  of  the  United 
States?" 


INF  and  NATO 

I  said  then,  and  I  repeat  now:  this 
treaty  is  in  our  security  interests.  The 
collective  security  commitment  embod- 
ied in  the  NATO  alliance  has  been  fun- 
damental to  our  national  security  since 
1949.  This  treaty  removes,  forever,  a 
Soviet  nuclear  threat  that  has  con- 
fronted our  NATO  allies— and,  I  should 
add,  our  friends  and  allies  in  Asia  and 
the  Pacific— for  over  80  years.  This 
treaty  strengthens  NATO.  By  doing  so. 
It  strengthens  the  security  of  the 
United  States. 


The  treaty  represents  the  suc- 
cessful outcome  of  a  strategy  whici 
NATO  adopted  in  December  1979. 
alliance  was  confronted  with  the  tl 
highlighted  by  the  deployment  of  t 
SS-20,  of  the  growing  disparity  be 
tween  NATO  and  the  Warsaw  Pact 
INF  missiles.  The  alliance  agreed 
course  of  action  to  reduce  this  disj 
ity:  a  program  of  U.S.  deployment 
Europe,  and  an  offer  of  U.S./Sovit 
gotiations  to  establish  a  balance  at 
lowest  possible  level. 

We  have  done  better  than  we 
hope  in  1979.  We  have  not  just  red 
the  disparity  in  INF  missiles;  we  '. 
eliminated  it.  When  President  Ret 
proposed  the  INF  zero  outcome  ir 
1981 — with  the  unanimous  support 
the  Senate — our  allies  agreed  this 
would  be  the  best  possible  way  to 
achieve  the  objectives  that  NATO 
established  in  1979.  They  reaffirm 
this  judgment  throughout  the  6  yt 
the  negotiations.  They  feel  the  sai 
way  today. 

Only  the  United  States  and  tl 
viet  Union  are  directly  parties  to 
treaty.  But  our  allies — who  have  c 
so  much  to  bring  this  treaty  abou' 
it  as  their  agreement,  too. 

When  I  last  testified  before  y 
described  the  unanimous  endorsei 
this  treaty  received  at  the  March 
NATO  summit.  Since  then,  NATC 
fense  ministers  met  in  Brussels  fc 
regular  session  of  the  Nuclear  Pla 
Group.  They  could  not  have  made 
views  about  the  treaty  any  cleare 
me  quote  from  their  communique: 

The  recently  concluded  INF  agn 
ment  between  the  United  States  and  i 
Soviet  Union  is  a  milestone  in  our  ef ' 
to  achieve  a  more  secure  peace  at  lo\  ' 
levels  of  arms.  The  solidarity  and  de  i 
mination  of  the  Alliance  members  hs 
made  the  achievement  of  this  long-sl 
NATO  arms  control  objective  possib 
look  forward  to  the  early  entry  into 
of  this  agreement.  ' 

When  I  met  with  my  counter  i"!* 
at  NATO  headquarters  in  Brusse^last 
Friday,  on  the  way  back  from  Gei^a, 
they  made  clear  that  they  feel  thilam 
way.  ' 


he 


id  in 
tee 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Julil98k. 


THE  SECRETARY 


^  ving  the  Course: 
iloyments  and  Negotiations 

he  defense  ministers  noted,  acliiev- 
;his  objective  was  not  easy.  We 
111  have  gotten  nowhere  in  the  nego- 
.iiis  had  we  not  taken  the  necessary 
,-ures  to  preserve  our  security. 
rO  had  the  courage  of  its  convic- 
<  to  go  forward  with  the  agreed  de- 
ment of  U.S.  Pershing  II  and 
•I  se  missiles,  in  the  face  of  enormous 
jitieal  pressure.  These  deployments 
•v  e  absolutely  essential  to  our  success 
u'lieva.  Ratification  of  this  treaty 
\  indicate  our  friends,  particularly 
le  INF  basing  countries — the 
eral  Republic  of  Germany,  Italy,  the 
ted  Kingdom,  Belgium,  and  the 
Jvherlands — who  stood  by  their  com- 
;,T.  Tients  when  the  going  got  tough. 
Deployments  were  essential.  But 
1  •  alone  could  not  guarantee  a  good 
'  ty.  Translating  a  strategic  concept 
iu'ecise  details  took  firmness,  pa- 
:e,  and  hard  work  at  the  negotiat- 
table,  to  make  good  on  the  courage 
1  steadfastness  of  our  allies.  Ambas- 
•  ir  Nitze  began  the  job  which  Am- 
D  iador  Glitman,  as  part  of  the  NST 
1  'lear  and  space  talks]  delegation 
.a  :ied  by  Ambassador  Kampelman, 
.  li  r  brought  to  a  successful  conclusion. 
I  oughout,  the  Congress  fully  sup- 
p  ;ed  our  efforts,  both  on  the  deploy- 
.  n  it  track  and  in  the  negotiations, 
I  iiding  through  the  Senate  observers 
.  ip. 

I  should  have  noted  at  the  begin- 
1 ;  that  I  am  joined  here  by  Ambas- 
['  *  )r  Max  Kampelman,  who  is  in 
'  "ge  of  our  overall  nuclear  and  space 
:  s;  Ambassador  Glitman,  who  nego- 
?d  the  INF  Ti-eaty  and  who  was 
■»  1  me  in  Geneva  and  who  negotiated 
-    ie  nine  issues;  and  Director  Burns, 
^  Director  of  AC  DA  [Arms  Control 
,'lj'  Disarmament  Agency]. 

i^iievements  of  INF  Treaty 

1'  result  is  the  treaty  that  the  Presi- 
]  t  and  Mr  Gorbachev  signed  here  in 
V^hington  last  December.  It  meets 
'■  criteria  we  and  our  allies 
-^^iblished: 

;.--  •  Equality  of  rights  and  limits; 
Kl  •  Limits  on  U.S.  and  Soviet  sys- 

:1S  only; 

.  •  Global  limits,  with  no  transfer  of 

I  threat  from  Europe  to  Asia,  or  vice 

■  sa; 


•  No  adverse  effect  on  NATO's  con- 
ventional defenses;  and 

•  Effective  verification. 

The  treaty  protects  future  options 
as  NATO  moves  ahead  to  maintain  a 
credible  nuclear  deterrent  and  sustain 
its  strategy  of  fle.xible  response.  It  does 
not  affect  existing  patterns  of  coopera- 
tion with  our  allies  or  future  coopera- 
tion in  modernization.  It  sets  important 
precedents  as  we  pursue  our  other 
arms  control  priorities.  In  this  regard, 
allied  leaders  at  the  NATO  summit  sin- 
gled out  asymmetrical  reductions  and 
the  treaty's  stringent  verification  provi- 
sions as  particularly  important 
precedents. 

Reductions  and  Verification 

These  reflect  two  of  the  top  objectives 
the  President  set  when  he  came  to  of- 
fice. One  was  to  end  the  era  when  arms 
control  only  guided  the  growth  of  nu- 
clear weapons  and  to  begin  the  process 
of  negotiating  nuclear  reductions,  just 
as  you  pointed  out  in  your  opening 
statement,  Mr.  Chairman  [Claiborne 
Pell].  The  other  was  to  raise  the  stan- 
dards for  verification — among  other 
ways,  by  no  longer  letting  the  Soviets 
just  say  "no"  to  onsite  inspection. 

On  these  important  points,  the 
President  has  succeeded  in  getting  the 
Soviets  to  deal  with  our  arms  control 
agenda.  The  facts  about  the  INF 
Treaty's  reductions  are  by  now  well 
known.  The  Soviets  will  have  to  destroy 
missiles  capable  of  carrying  some  four 
times  as  many  warheads  as  the  de- 
ployed missiles  which  we  will  eliminate. 

I  might  say,  Mr.  Chairman,  while  I 
agree  with  you  that  the  potential  reduc- 
tions in  strategic  arms  are  militarily  of 
immense  significance — no  doubt  more 
than  these  reductions  would  be — when- 
ever you  take  out  missiles  that  carry 
some  2,000  nuclear  warheads,  well,  it's 
something.  (Chairman  Pell:  It  helps.)  I 
wouldn't  minimize  it.  That's  a  lot  of  nu- 
clear wallop.  It  helps. 

I  would  like  to  speak  at  slightly 
greater  length  on  the  other  point  which 
NATO  leaders  highlighted — the  treaty's 
verification  regime.  The  allies  know 
what  they  are  talking  about  on  this 
subject:  much  of  the  regime  applies  di- 
rectly to  their  territory.  Just  as  the 
INF  process  has  been  an  alliance  effort 
all  along,  our  allies  are  doing  their  part 
to  bring  the  verification  regime  into  be- 


ing. They  are  taking  the  necessary  leg- 
islative and  executive  steps  to  ensure 
that  we  can  carry  out  all  actions  associ- 
ated with  the  treaty  that  occur  on  allied 
soil.  The  vote  in  the  German  Bundestag 
to  put  these  measures  into  effect  was 
unanimous. 

This  committee,  as  well  as  the 
Armed  Services  Committee  and  the  Se- 
lect Committee  on  Intelligence,  have 
heard  from  me  and  others  on  the  de- 
tails of  this  regime.  It  is  the  most  de- 
tailed, the  most  intrusive,  and  the  most 
effective  in  the  history  of  arms  control. 

We  are  breaking  new  ground  with 
this  treaty.  Onsite  inspection  is  a  major 
forward  step  in  U.S. /Soviet  nuclear 
arms  control  agreements.  We  shouldn't 
be  surprised  if  this  process  is  not  al- 
ways smooth.  It  was  for  this  reason 
that  we  began  talking  to  the  Soviets 
before  the  treaty  entered  into  force 
about  how  we  would  actually  carry 
out  the  procedures  we  and  they  had 
agreed  to. 

When  differences  surfaced,  we 
worked  them  out.  Some  of  these  prob- 
lems were  resolved  at  the  working 
level,  others  required  attention  from 
more  senior  people.  As  I  have  men- 
tioned, during  my  meetings  with  For- 
eign Minister  Shevardnadze  last  week, 
we  ironed  out  the  nine  key  technical 
details  related  to  the  onsite  inspection 
regime. 

Of  course,  to  ensure  smooth  imple- 
mentation of  the  treaty,  we  will  con- 
tinue to  talk  to  the  Soviets  on  admini- 
strative matters — such  as  the  details  of 
living  arrangements.  Additional  tech- 
nical talks,  which  were  previously 
scheduled,  will  get  underway  this  week 
in  Vienna.  So  this  is  an  ongoing  proc- 
ess, to  straighten  out  all  these  admin- 
istrative details. 

But  I  can  report  to  you  today  that, 
as  a  result  of  the  discussions  we  just 
concluded  in  Geneva,  we  and  the  Sovi- 
ets agree  on  the  rights  and  obligations 
established  in  this  treaty. 

There  is  no  such  thing  as  absolute, 
100%  verification.  But  it  is  our  judg- 
ment that  this  treaty,  through  its  suc- 
cessive layers  of  procedures,  contains 
the  measures  needed  for  effective  ver- 
ification. Achieving  the  President's  goal 
of  an  INF  zero  outcome  pays  real  divi- 
dends for  verification.  The  bottom  line 
is  that  the  verification  provisions  of  this 
treaty  get  the  job  done. 


iipartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


THE  SECRETARY 


other  Issues:  Futuristics 
and  Interpretation 

In  the  course  of  Senate  consideration  of 
the  treaty,  a  question  arose  which  goes 
beyond  verification.  I  refer  to  the  so- 
called  futuristics  issue.  This  is  the 
question  of  whether  all  ground- 
launched  cruise  and  ballistic  missiles 
which  are  weapon-delivery  vehicles  of 
the  ranges  covered  by  this  treaty  would 
be  banned,  including  those  carrying 
"futuristic"  weapons.  The  Administra- 
tion believes  that  the  treaty  te.xt — 
viewed  in  conjunction  with  the  nego- 
tiating record  in  light  of  customary  in- 
ternational law  as  reflected  in  the 
Vienna  Convention  on  the  Law  of  Trea- 
ties— demonstrates  that  the  two  parties 
had  agreed  that  such  systems  are 
banned.  After  consultation  with  the 
Senate,  we  confirmed  this  fact  with  a 
formal  exchange  of  diplomatic  notes  last 
week  in  Geneva.  Ambassador  Kam- 
pelman  signed  the  note  on  our  behalf; 
Ambassador  Karpov  on  theirs. 

There  is  one  final  question  pertain- 
ing to  this  treaty  which  I  must  address. 
That  is  the  wish  by  some  in  the  Senate 
to  attach  a  condition  to  the  resolution 
of  advice  and  consent  to  ratification 
which  would  restrict  the  President's  au- 
thority to  interpret  treaties. 

I  am  sure  you  are  all  familiar  with 
the  reasons  why  we  oppose  such  a  con- 
dition. The  testimony  of  Administration 
witnesses  within  their  authorized  scope 
is  authoritative.  We  believe  that  you 
should  not  allow  the  INF  Treaty  to  be- 
come entangled  in  a  divisive  constitu- 
tional debate  but,  instead,  should 
consider  the  treaty  on  its  own  merits. 

Conclusion 

I  have  described  the  merits  of  the 
treaty  to  you,  briefly  in  my  testimony 
today  and  at  greater  length  in  my  ear- 
lier appearances.  The  treaty  is  the  re- 
sult of  the  President's  leadership,  but  it 
is  also  a  significant  bipartisan  achieve- 
ment, as  well  as  testimony  to  the 
strength  and  purpose  of  the  NATO  al- 
liance. It  is  a  good  deal  for  NATO  and 
a  good  deal  for  the  United  States.  I  ask 
the  Senate  to  give  the  President  its 
consent  to  ratification  of  this  treaty, 
without  amendments  or  conditions. 


FY  1989  Foreign  Policy  Budget  Requer 


'Press  release  92.  The  complete  tran- 
script of  the  hearings  will  be  published  by 
the  committee  and  will  be  available  from' 
the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington, 
D.C.  20402.B 


Secretary  Shvltz's  statement  before 
the  Suhroitnnittee  on  Commerce,  Jus- 
tice. State,  and  Jiidiciart/  of  the  Senate 
Appropriations  Committee  on  April  28, 
1988A 

I  am  pleased  to  come  before  the  com- 
mittee to  discuss  our  FY  [fiscal  year] 
1989  budget  request.  It  is  an  austere 
request  that  complies  with  both  the  let- 
ter and  the  spirit  of  the  budget  summit 
compromise.  If  this  Administration  and 
the  coming  Administration  ai'e  to  do 
the  job  we  must  do  in  today's  turbulent, 
complex,  and  changing  world,  we  will 
need  every  cent  we  are  asking  for — and 
we  will  need  much  greater  latitude  in 
applying  those  appropriated  funds. 

For  the  sake  of  our  national  well- 
being  and  for  the  sake  of  our  most 
cherished  values,  America  must  remain 
a  fully  engaged  force  around  the  globe 
for  peace,  prosperity,  democracy,  and 
human  rights.  'This  requires  well 
thought-out,  well-executed  policies  and 
programs.  I'll  come  back  to  this  a  little 
later.  Our  effective  engagement  also  re- 
quires highly  skilled,  well-trained  per- 
sonnel, deployed  to  best  advantage  and 
supported  with  the  infrastructure, 
equipment,  and  technical  resources 
needed  to  function  effectively.  Without 
such  personnel,  policies,  and  programs, 
we  cannot  advance  our  fundamental  in- 
terests in  an  increasingly  complex,  tur- 
bulent, and  changing  world. 

The  Department  of  State  is  essen- 
tially a  salaries-and-expenses  agency. 
We  are  our  nation's  diplomatic  presence 
around  the  world.  We  don't  have  large 
programs  which  we  can  cut  or  stretch 
out  over  a  long  period  in  order  to  cut 
costs.  The  Department  of  State — one  of 
the  oldest  and  the  most  essential  de- 
partments of  our  government — is  also 
one  of  the  smallest.  Our  1989  request  is 
for  only  the  most  vital  resources  we 
need.  Even  if  this  request  is  fully  ap- 
propriated— and  it  must  be — the  funds 
you  provide  will  only  minimally  support 
the  infrastructure  that  is  vital  to  the 
conduct  of  this  nation's  foreign  policy. 

At  the  core  of  our  diplomacy  are 
our  efforts — both  bilateral  and  multi- 
lateral— to  ensure  the  strength  and 
unity  of  our  alliance  relations,  the  effec- 
tive management  of  East- West  issues, 
the  peaceful  resolution  of  regional  con- 
flicts, and  the  advancement  of  our 
broader  security  and  economic 
interests. 


Our  Foreign  Policy  Agenda 

The  Reagan  Administration  is  comi 
ted  to  a  busy  and  challenging  foreig 
policy  agenda  in  1988.  We  know  thai 
the  United  States  cannot  afford  the 
luxury  of  any  letup  in  our  leadershi 
The  realities  of  our  time  also  dictate 
that  the  United  States  cannot  achie 
our  interests  and  objectives  alone, 
can  we  do  so  with  insufficient  re- 
sources. Other  countries  around  th' 
world  cannot  adequately  protect  thi 
security,  ensure  their  domestic  weW 
or  protect  their  democratic  institut 
absent  the  active  support  of  the  Ui  fed 
States.  That  is  why  President  Rea;  i 
has  worked  so  hard  to  ensure  that   r 
European  alliance  is  strong  and  vit 
and  why  we  have  also  strengthenec  Ur 
security  and  economic  relationships  \ 
Asia  and  elsewhere  in  the  world — i  i- 
tionships  that  will  be  crucial  to  glo  1 
prosperity  and  regional  security  wi 
into  the  next  century. 

A  brief  review  of  just  some  of  :' 
major  issues  confronting  our  world 
demonstrates  the  critical  need  for 
engaged,  active,  and  effective  Amt  'a. 

East-West  Relations.  The  imj  - 

tance  of  worldwide  U.S.  engageme 
came  through  loud  and  clear  to  the 
President  during  his  recent  meetir 
with  his  counterparts  at  the  NATC 
summit.  In  Brussels,  we  and  our  > 
partners  agreed  that  if  we  expect  t 
advance  our  interests  further  with 
East,  we  must  demonstrate  our  re 
and  be  prepared  to  commit  the  nee 
sary  resources,  just  as  we  did  in  o 
pursuit  of  the  INF  [Intermediate- 
Range  Nuclear  Forces]  Treaty.  Ou 
achievement  of  that  treaty  offers  ci 
vincing  proof  that  success  in  advari 
our  peaceful  objectives  depends  no 
only  on  military  strength  and  alliai 
cohesion,  but  also  on  the  poHtical  \ 
to  provide  the  means  necessary  to 
our  objectives.  The  INF  Treaty  en 
hances  United  States  and  allied  se 
curity.  We,  therefore,  trust  that  th 
Senate  will  give  its  early  consent  t 
ratification  of  the  INF  Treaty,  sigr 
December  by  President  Reagan  an 
General  Secretary  Gorbachev  [Sov 
General  Secretary  Mikhail  S. 
Gorbachev]. 

Through  strength  and  stead- 
fastness, the  United  States  and  ou 
lies  have  set  in  motion  a  number  ol 
other  eforts  that,  with  Soviet  coop 
tion,  would  bring  major  strides  to\ 
a  safer,  more  secure,  and  more  hur 
world. 


k 


111 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/July 


THE  SECRETARY 


As  you  know,  I  have  just  returned 
[1  my  second  trip  to  Moscow  thus  far 
..  year.  My  meetings  in  Moscow  cov- 
ed the  gamut  of  issues  that  comprise 
5V  East-West  agenda  for  the  next 
iniit  and  beyond.  We  will  continue  to 
~ut'  vigorously  human  rights  issues, 
n  1  as  they  relate  to  individual  cases 
ai  to  principles  enshrined  in  the 
Hsinki  Final  Act  and  other  interna- 
al  human  rights  instruments. 
On  regional  conflicts,  our  policy  of 
ching  diplomatic  perseverance  with 
ini't  for  freedom  fighters  has  in- 
ised  the  odds  for  negotiated 
I  laments. 

•  On  April  14,  we  signed  the  Ge- 

ni  i  agreement  on  Afghanistan.  After 
s  ng  years,  the  courage  and  determin- 
at  n  of  the  Afghan  freedom  fighters — 
U  our  steadfast  support  for  their 
"*  rts — are  paying  off  Under  the 
•cment,  the  Soviets  are  committed 

tVnnt-loaded  withdrawal  of  their 
I's  within  9  months  after  the  agree- 
it  goes  into  effect  on  May  15,  with 

i)f  them  leaving  within  90  days  of 

I  late.  We  expect  them  to  be  out  by 
..  end  of  1988. 

We  have  made  it  clear  to  the  Sovi- 
e!  that  our  military  assistance  to  the 
A  han  resistance  will  continue,  though 
w  will  show  restraint  in  doing  so  in 
n  jonse  to  Soviet  restraint  in  provid- 
ii  military  assistance  to  the  puppet 
p  me  in  Kabul.  It  is  our  judgment 

8;,  absent  the  presence  of  Soviet 
es,  the  Kabul  government  will  be 
n  natch  for  the  mujahidin. 

We  welcome  the  fact  that  Mr.  Cor- 
d  ez  [UN  negotiator  Diego  Cordovez] 
V  work  in  a  personal  capacity  to 
b  ig  about  a  government  which  re- 
fl  ts  the  will  of  the  Afghan  people  and 
t  msure  a  rapid,  safe  return  of  the  5 
n  lion  Afghan  refugees  to  their  home- 
is  1  Without  such  a  government, 
'  ;hanistan's  stability  cannot  be 
-  iired. 

•  We  must  continue  to  support 

•  .se  fighting  for  their  freedom  in  Nic- 
a  gua,  Angola,  and  Cambodia. 

Meanwhile,  we  are  striving  for  ad- 
(  onal  progress  in  arms  control. 

•  We  will  press  ahead  with  the 

:itegic  arms  reduction  talks 
ART).  We  have  made  headway  on 
Mii-tant  issues,  but  a  good  deal  more 

I'k  remains; 

•  If  the  Soviets  are  prepared  to 
tch  our  efforts,  a  verifiable  agree- 
nt  leading  to  a  50%  reduction  in 


U.S.  and  Soviet  strategic  offensive  nu- 
clear weapons  will  be  possible.  At  the 
same  time,  we  will  continue  to  preserve 
our  right  to  pursue  a  vigorous  Strategic 
Defense  Initiative; 

•  We  will  work  to  improve  stability 
in  Europe  by  rectifying  the  conven- 
tional imbalance; 

•  And,  we  will  continue  efforts  to- 
ward a  truly  verifiable  global  ban  on 
chemical  weapons. 

On  bilateral  issues,  the  President 
remains  committed  to  implementing  his 
1985  agreement  at  the  Geneva  summit 
to  exchange  consulates  in  Kiev  and 
New  York.  For  the  past  year,  we  have 
been  concentrating  our  efforts  in 
Moscow  on  work  being  done  at  our  ex- 
isting chancery  and  on  planning  for  our 
new  chancery.  The  resource  commit- 
ment required  by  these  Moscow  proj- 
ects makes  it  impractical  to  proceed  at 
this  time  with  our  original  plans  for  a 
full-fledged,  classified  operation  in 
Kiev.  However,  a  small  post — six  people 
at  most — without  classified  facilities 
could  be  set  up  quickly  in  Kiev  and 
would  be  a  cost-effective  way  to  open 
up  an  important  area  of  the  Soviet 
Union  to  us.  During  my  discussions  last 
week  with  Mr.  Shevardnadze  [Soviet 
Foreign  Minister  Eduard  Shev- 
ardnadze], he  accepted  in  principle  lim- 
iting the  size  of  each  side's  consulate  to 
the  numbers  we  have  in  mind. 

After  my  visits  last  week  to  Kiev 
and  Tbilisi,  I  am  more  convinced  than 
ever  that  we  will  be  making  a  mistake 
if  we  fail  to  follow  through  with  our 
plans  to  establish  a  consulate  in  Kiev. 
We  have  no  task  more  important  than 
to  understand  the  changes  taking  place 
in  the  Soviet  Union.  We  can  no  more 
claim  that  our  view  from  Moscow  accu- 
rately represents  the  progress  of 
perestroika  (restructuring),  than  a  for- 
eigner could  claim  to  understand  the 
mood  of  the  American  people  on  the 
basis  of  Washington  gossip.  I  am  mind- 
ful of  the  legislation  relating  to  Kiev 
and  we  will  be  consulting  with  Con- 
gress as  our  plans  for  Kiev  evolve  to 
ensure  that  all  U.S.  interests  are  fully 
protected.  I  hope  we  will  have  your 
support. 

The  Middle  East.  We  are  engaged 
intensively  in  an  active  process  to 
achieve  a  comprehensive  peace  in  the 
Middle  East  through  negotiations.  This 
is  a  time  for  decisions.  The  situation  on 
the  ground  does  not  serve  anyone's  in- 
terests. Rapid,  positive  change  can  oc- 
cur. My  discussions  with  the  leadership 


in  Israel,  Jordan,  Syria,  and  Egypt 
have  focused  on  the  need  for  realism 
and  movement  in  the  peace  process. 

The  initiative  we  developed,  which 
the  parties  are  now  considering,  is  am- 
bitious and  compelling.  The  initiative 
we  have  put  forward  meets  everyone's 
fundamental  concerns  and  provides  for 
serious  negotiations.  The  key  elements 
of  our  proposal  are  clear:  face-to-face, 
bilateral  negotiations  based  on  Resolu- 
tions 242  and  338;  early  negotiations  on 
transitional  arrangements  interlocked 
with  final  status  negotiations  beginning 
on  a  date  certain;  a  pre-agreed,  rapid 
timetable;  and  a  properly-structured  in- 
ternational conference  to  launch  nego- 
tiations. The  conference  is  specifically 
enjoined  from  imposing  solutions  or 
vetoing  what  has  been  agreed  bilater- 
ally. The  United  States  will  not  permit 
the  conference  to  become  authoritative 
or  plenipotentiary,  or  to  exceed  its  ju- 
risdiction as  agreed  by  the  parties  di- 
rectly involved. 

The  procedural  aspects  of  our  ini- 
tiative should  not  obscure  our  objec- 
tive— a  comprehensive  peace. 

•  Israeli  security  can  be  enhanced. 
A  new  relationship  of  peace  with  its 
Arab  neighbors  can  emerge.  Israelis 
can  be  free  from  the  increasing  human 
and  moral  burdens  of  occupation — able 
to  devote  their  considerable  talents  and 
energies  to  building  a  better  future. 

•  The  Palestinian  people  can 
achieve  significant  control  over  political 
and  economic  decisions  which  directly 
affect  their  lives.  They  should  partici- 
pate actively  in  negotiations  to  deter- 
mine their  political  future.  In  this  way, 
the  Palestinian  people  can  achieve  their 
legitimate  rights  and  live  lives  of  dig- 
nity and  self-respect. 

•  The  Arab  world  can  turn  a  corner 
by  resolving  this  festering  conflict.  The 
refugee  problem  can  be  solved.  A  sta- 
ble new  environment  can  be  created  in 
which  the  human  and  economic  re- 
sources of  the  Middle  East  can  flourish. 

The  commitment  of  the  United 
States  is  stronger  and  more  determined 
than  ever.  We  are  carrying  the  initia- 
tive forward  into  a  new  and  more  de- 
tailed, operational  stage.  This  is  a 
moment  of  testing  for  the  leaders  of  the 
Middle  East.  This  is  a  time  for  leaders 
everywhere  to  say  "yes": 

•  Yes,  to  a  comprehensive  peace 
through  negotiations  based  on  all  the 
provisions  and  principles  of  Resolution 
242. 


ui  ipartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


THE  SECRETARY 


•  Yes,  to  security  for  all  parties, 
especially  Israel. 

•  Yes,  to  the  legitimate  rights  of 
the  Palestinians. 

The  Western  Hemisphere.  In  Cen- 
tral America,  we  must  continue  our 
strong  and  determined  efforts  for  de- 
mocracy, development,  and  security. 
The  severe  problems  in  Panama  and 
Nicaragua  should  not  obscure  the  fact 
that  our  longstanding  efforts  in  the  re- 
gion have  had  impressive  results. 

Ten  years  ago  in  Centi'al  America, 
for  example,  Costa  Rica  was  the  re- 
gion's only  civilian-led  democracy.  To- 
day, the  military  dictators  who  ruled 
three  of  the  other  four  countries  are 
gone.  These  countries — El  Salvador, 
Guatemala,  and  Honduras — are  moving 
in  Costa  Rica's  direction,  with  in- 
creasingly open  societies  and  with  civil- 
ian presidents  chosen  in  competitive 
elections.  We  believe  this  ti-end  is  en- 
couraging and  it  will  continue  despite 
disturbances  like  the  one  that  occurred 
recently  in  Honduras. 

What  we  face  in  Panama  is  a  threat 
to  democracy  and  a  threat  to  our  ability 
to  stop  the  international  drug  traf- 
fickers. We  will  not  shirk  our  responsi- 
bility to  defend  ourselves  against  these 
threats.  We  believe  that  General  Nor- 
iega would  best  serve  his  country  by 
complying  with  the  instruction  of  Presi- 
dent Delvalle  to  relinquish  his  post. 
The  earlier  Noriega  leaves,  the  better 
Panama's  interests  will  be  served  and 
a  resolution  to  the  political  crisis 
achieved.  We  will  continue  to  fulfill  our 
obligations  under  the  canal  treaties  and 
cooperate  with  President  Delvalle  and 
his  government.  And,  we  are  prepared 
to  resume  our  working  relationships 
with  the  Panamanian  Defense  Forces 
once  civilian  government  and  constitu- 
tional democracy  are  reestablished. 
Once  Panamanians  achieve  these  goals, 
we  will  work  with  them  to  help  restore 
Panama's  economic  health. 

In  Nicaragua,  for  the  last  8  years, 
the  Sandinistas  have  monopolized  the 
government  by  combining  brute  force, 
cunning,  and  a  genius  for  propaganda. 
The  return  of  Nicaraguan  resistance 
leaders  to  Managua  for  negotiations  is  a 
sign  that  we  have  entered  a  new  and 
more  political  phase  of  the  struggle 
there.  We  must  ensure  that  the  door 
finally  opened  by  the  strength  and  per- 
severance of  the  resistance  is  not 
slammed  shut.  We  intend  to  cooperate 
with  the  freedom  fighters  and  with  the 
four  democracies  in  the  region  on  how 
the  United  States  can  best  further  the 
prospects  for  both  peace  and  freedom 
in  Nicaragua. 


In  each  of  these  cases,  as  else- 
where in  the  hemisphere,  we  believe 
that  democratic  leaders  and  groups  are 
the  key  to  success  in  combatting  illegal 
drug  dealers,  communist  insurgencies, 
and  other  enemies  of  peace  and  free- 
dom. We  are  proud  to  support  their 
struggles. 

Persian  Gulf.  In  the  Persian  Gulf, 
sustained  American  commitments  re- 
main essentia!  to  international  stability 
and  Western  economic  interests.  The 
President's  decision  to  respond  in  a  firm 
and  measured  way  to  the  resumption 
by  Iran  of  minelaying,  causing  damage 
to  a  U.S.  Navy  ship  and  injury  to  its 
crew,  has  served  notice  that  Iran  must 
pay  for  such  reckless  and  provocative 
conduct.  We  do  not  seek  a  military  con- 
frontation with  Iran,  but  we  will  con- 
tinue to  act  with  resolve  to  defend  our 
interests.  The  bipartisan  support  the 
Congress  has  shown  for  the  President's 
decision  has  sent  a  clear  message  to 
Iran  that  the  American  people  are 
united  in  support  or  our  efforts  to  de- 
fend freedom  of  navigation  in  the  gulf 

During  my  visit  to  Moscow,  I  dis- 
cussed the  escalation  in  the  gulf  war 
with  Foreign  Minister  Shevardnadze, 
urging  that  the  Soviet  Union  cooperate 
with  efforts  in  the  UN  Security  Council 
to  bring  the  war  closer  to  an  end  by 
imposing  an  arms  embargo  against 
Iran.  We  now  continue  to  work  inten- 
sively in  the  Security  Council  to  imple- 
ment Resolution  598,  which  demands 
an  immediate  cease-fire  and  withdrawal 
without  delay.  The  use  of  chemical 
weapons  against  civilians  and  the  con- 
tinuation of  the  "war  of  the  cities"  be- 
tween Iran  and  Iraq  reinforces  the 
need  for  accelerated  efforts  to  bring 
this  interminable  conflict  to  an  end. 

Africa.  In  South  Africa,  our  goal 
remains  the  rapid  and  peaceful  demise 
of  apartheid,  the  principal  source  of 
South  Africa's  problems  and  of  in- 
stability in  the  southern  African  region 
as  a  whole.  To  that  end,  we  are  work- 
ing to  foster  a  dialogue  among  all  ele- 
ments of  South  Africa's  population  that 
will  lead  to  the  creation  of  a  democi-atic 
society  with  equal  rights  for  all.  At  a 
time  when  the  repressive  actions  of  the 
South  African  Government  are  stifling 
the  interplay  of  ideas  so  essential  for 
the  evolution  of  a  free  society,  and  iso- 
lating South  Africa  from  the  free 
world,  we  must  do  all  we  can  to  keep 
dialogue  alive  and  new  ideas  coming  in. 
Despite  the  recent  serious  escalation  of 
repression  in  South  Africa,  we  remain 
firm  in  our  belief  that  this  can  best  be 


accomplished  through  a  mix  of  dipl( 
matic  and  political  pressures  on  thtji 
hand  and  a  series  of  positive  initiat  [ 
on  the  other. 

We  face  a  continuing  tragedy  ii 
Ethiopia.  As  you  know,  we  have  pr 
vided  food  on  a  humanitarian  basis 
to  all  Ethiopians  in  distress.  We  ar 
dismayed  by  the  Ethiopian  Govern- 
ment's recent  decision  to  expel  fort  i 
relief  workers  from  the  north  and 
transfer  their  food  and  assets  to  th 
government-run  Relief  and  Rehabi  • 
tion  Commission.  The  effect  of  this  i 
cision  has  been  a  virtual  halt  of  rel  i 
operations  which  threatens  over  2  : 
lion  people  with  starvation.  We  are 
working  with  the  United  Nations, 
allies,  and  the  Soviet  Union  to  see 
reconsideration  of  Ethiopia's  decisi  . 

Asia.  The  strength  of  our  seci  t 
and  economic  relationships  in  Asia 
be  crucial  to  regional  security  and 
global  prosperity  well  into  the  nex 
century.  Of  course,  the  cornerston  i 
American  policy  in  Asia  is  our  rel; 
tionship  with  Japan,  our  principal  i 
ally  and  largest  trading  partner,  a 
our  security  ties  with  Korea,  Thai 
the  Philippines,  and  ANZUS  [Aus 
tralia.  New  Zealand,  United  State 
curity  agreement].  It  is  in  Japan  t 
our  policy  of  encouraging  democra 
had  its  earliest  and  most  spectacu 
success  in  Asia.  Now,  the  remark; 
worldwide  trend  toward  democrat 
government  has  borne  fruit  in  the 
Philippines  and  South  Korea.  We 
must  actively  support  them  if  thee 
democracies  are  to  thrive  and  to  g 
Also,  we  must  sustain  our  support 
ASEAN  [Association  of  South  Eat 
Asian  Nations]  and  the  Cambodiai 
communist  resistance  in  their  effo 
bring  about  a  political  solution  to 
Cambodian  conflict  through  a  com 
Vietnamese  troop  withdrawal  fron 
Cambodia  and  self-determination  i 
the  Cambodian  people.  As  my  rec 
conversations  with  Singapore's  Pri 
Minister  Lee  reminded  me,  we  an 
tunate  to  have  friends  in  ASEAN 
share — and  who  have  benefited  by 
commitment  to  open  markets  and 
stitutional  democracy.  The  visit  la 
month  of  Chinese  Foreign  Ministe 
testifies  to  the  continued  positive 
opment  of  our  bilateral  relationshi 
with  the  Peoples'  Republic.  China' 
creasingly  open  economy  and  relia 
on  maket  approaches  are  ensuring 
economic  development  and  Integra 
into  the  global  economy. 


id, 


Wi 


10 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/JulyfiS 


THE  SECRETARY 


Global  Issues  and  Concerns. 

jMnoting  domestic  prosperity  is  a  cen- 
1 1  foreign  policy  objective.  It  used  to 
l.said  that  when  the  United  States 
s-ezed  the  rest  of  the  world  got  pneu- 
nnia.  Now,  it  works  the  other  way 
t .  Our  own  economic  fortunes  have 
:  ays  been  closely  linked  to  conditions 
he  world  economy.  This  is  especially 
I  e  now  that  economic  and  tech- 
r  ogical  changes  have  turned  the  world 
tde  and  financial  system  into  a  single, 
regrated  global  marketplace.  A 
hlthy,  growing  world  economy  is  thus 
r  re  than  ever  vital  to  our  own  pros- 
•  ^  -ity.  We  have  a  stake  in  the  strength 
r  only  in  the  economies  of  Europe 
ilJapan,  but  increasingly  in  the  eco- 
r  nic  health  of  the  developing  coun- 
•  s  in  Latin  America,  Africa,  and 
.  where  in  Asia  as  well. 

And,  especially  now,  when  the  dan- 
i  >  of  terrorism  and  the  broad  range 
hreats  to  many  societies  posed  by 
■niational  narcotics  trafficking  are 
liming  so  stark,  we  must  marshal 
I   means  necessary  to  counter  these 
i  aults  on  human  dignity  and  civilized 
'  iety.  I  have  committed  the  Depart- 
i;t  of  State— and  you  have  my  per- 
lal  commitment — to  use  every 
)ortunity  and  all  our  resources  to 
.  nbat  these  twin  scourges. 

ir  Funding  Request 

you  can  see,  our  foreign  affairs 
?nda  is  a  full  one.  The  daily  effort  to 
fend  our  security,  to  establish  more 
ible  and  workable  relations  with  our 
versaries,  to  ensure  continued  eco- 
mic  growth,  and  to  achieve  negoti- 
'd  settlements  in  strife-ridden  areas 
a  costly  e.xercise.  But,  instability, 
ignation,  repression,  and  war  are 
?n  costlier,  and  not  just  in  monetary 
■ms. 

Last  September,  when  the  funding 
ospects  for  1988  appeared  to  be  very 
?ak,  I  addressed  all  of  the  State  De- 
rtment  employees  on  changes  that 
ght  be  required  as  a  result  of  the 
tentially  severe  shortage  of  funding 
•  salaries  and  expenses.  The  budget 
mmit,  the  support  from  you,  Mr. 
lairman,  and  the  actions  of  your  com- 
ittee  and  others  in  the  Congress  re- 
iced  the  urgency  to  take  immediate 
astic  action  of  a  kind  which  could  se- 
lusly  threaten  our  foreign  policy  in- 
rests  and  institutions.  But  we 
cognize  that  we  must  not  relax  our 
forts  to  streamline  our  internal 
)erations. 


We  remain  committed  to: 

•  Reexamining  our  activities  to 
focus  on  those  that  deserve  the  highest 
priority  and  to  eliminate  or  sharply  re- 
duce those  that  are  marginal; 

•  Eliminating  overlap  and  duplica- 
tion, which  in  turn  will  enable  us  to 
abolish  unnecessary  positions  and  con- 
trol employment  levels;  and 

•  Improving  the  system  under 
which  the  Department  is  reimbursed 
for  services  it  provides  to  other 
agencies. 

For  foreign  affairs,  or  function  150 
in  total,  we  seek  $18.1  billion  in  discre- 
tionary spending  authority  for  FY  1989. 
This  represents  the  budget  summit 
agreed  increase  of  2%  over  the  amount 
made  available  to  us  in  the  FY  1988 
continuing  resolution.  It  is  2.9%  less 
than  the  actual  amount  appropriated  in 
FY  1987,  including  the  Central  America 
portion  of  the  supplemental.  In  fact, 
keeping  in  mind  the  decline  in  the  value 
of  the  dollar  overseas,  the  real  value  of 
the  resources  we  plan  to  commit  to  for- 
eign affairs  in  FY  1989  is  worth  less 
than  this  year's  amount. 

For  1989,  we  are  requesting  appro- 
priations for  State  Department  opera- 
tions totaling  $2.75  billion.  This  is  an 
increase  of  1.8% — well  within  the  limits 
of  the  budget  summit  agreement. 

Our  request  covers  the  four  catego- 
ries of  appropriations:  the  administra- 
tion of  foreign  affairs,  international 
organizations  and  conferences,  interna- 
tional commissions,  and  other  appropri- 
ations. Let  me  now  review  the  specifics 
category  by  category. 

We  request  $2.2  billion  for  the  key 
component  of  our  nation's  diplomacy, 
the  administration  of  foreign  affairs. 
These  funds  would  cover  the  Depart- 
ment's basic  diplomatic  and  consular 
functions,  salaries,  operating  expenses, 
allowances,  overseas  building  construc- 
tion and  maintenance,  and  diplomatic 
security. 

This  request  represents  a  $43.2 
million  net  increase  over  the  1988  level. 
Nearly  all  of  this  increase  goes  to  com- 
pensate for  inflation,  for  a  permanent 
home  for  the  Foreign  Service  Institute 
and  for  replacing  Foreign  Service  na- 
tionals (FSNs)  in  Eastern  Europe.  Our 
request  is  comprised  of  the  following. 
Salaries  and  Expenses — $1.5  bil- 
lion, an  increase  of  $94  million.  Of  this 
increase: 

•  $56  million  is  for  net  mandatory 
built-in  changes,  including  anticipated 
price  and  wage  increases  here  and 
abroad; 


•  $30  million  is  for  the  first  perma- 
nent home  that  the  Foreign  Service  In- 
stitute will  have  in  its  64-year  history. 
This  is  a  subject  to  which  I  have  given 
a  lot  of  time  and  thought.  I  attach  a 
great  deal  of  importance  to  this  partic- 
ular request.  A  permanent  and  up-to- 
date  facility  is  vital  to  ensure  that  the 
people  who  represent  the  United  States 
abroad  meet  the  highest  standards  of 
excellence  and  that  they  are  fully  effec- 
tive in  their  assigned  positions.  The 
new  institute  would  not  only  provide 
language,  area,  and  professional  train- 
ing to  State  Department  employees, 
but  also  to  personnel  from  some  40 
other  agencies  such  as  DOD  [Depart- 
ment of  Defense],  AID  [Agency  for  In- 
ternational Development],  and  USIA 
[U.S.  Information  Agency]; 

•  $7.7  million  is  for  improving  the 
security  in  our  East  Eui'opean  missions 
through  the  replacement  of  selected 
Foreign  Service  national  staff  with 
cleared  Americans;  and 

•  Note  that  the  diplomatic  security 
program  has  been  held  at  1988  levels, 
requiring  the  absorption  of  inflation. 

Foreign  Buildings  Program — $240 
million,  a  decrease  of  $73  million  from 
the  1988  continuing  resolution  level.  In 
addition  to  ongoing  programs,  this  level 
of  funding  provides  for  major  rehabili- 
tation projects  only  at  our  chancery 
buildings  in  Tel  Aviv  and  Bonn.  We  are 
not  requesting  funds  for  any  new  cap- 
ital projects,  effectively  putting  our 
security  buildings  program  on  hold. 
However,  during  FY  1989,  the  Depart- 
ment will  continue  work  on  61  capital 
projects  that  were  funded  in  previous 
years. 

Foreign  Service  Retirement  and 
Disability  Fund— $107.7  million,  a 
mandatory  increase  of  $22  million  made 
necessary  by  a  lower  than  expected 
rate  of  conversion  by  employees  to  the 
new  Federal  Employees  Retirement 
System. 

For  international  organizations  and 
conferences,  the  Department  requests 
$524.9  million  to  make  payments  of  as- 
sessed contributions  to  international  or- 
ganizations of  which  the  United  States 
is  a  member;  contributions  for  UN 
peacekeeping  activities;  and  American 
participation  in  multilateral  interna- 
tional conferences. 

Under  the  heading  of  international 
commissions,  we  are  requesting  $31.4 
million  to  meet  our  treaty  commitments 
under  boundary  agreements  with  Can- 
ada and  Mexico — and  to  cover  our  share 
of  expenses  as  a  member  of  11  interna- 
tional fisheries  commissions. 


iiilfkoartment  of  State  Bulletin/Julv  1988 


THE  SECRETARY 


Finally,  in  the  "other  appropria- 
tions" category,  we  are  requesting  $16.8 
million  for  bilateral  science  and  tech- 
nology agreements  with  Yugoslavia, 
the  Asia  Foundation,  the  Soviet-East 
European  Research  Training  Fund,  the 
Fishermen's  Protective  Fund,  and  Fish- 
ermen's Guaranty  Fund. 

Diplomatic  Security 
and  Building  Programs 

Turning  now  to  the  important  subject 
of  diplomatic  security  and  our  building 
programs:  In  section  163  of  the  Foreign 
Relations  Authorization  Act,  for  fiscal 
years  1988  and  1989,  the  Secretary  of 
State  is  required  to  "implement  a  pro- 
gram of  counterintelligence  polygraph 
examinations  for  members  of  the  Diplo- 
matic Security  Service  during  fiscal 
years  1988  and  1989."  When  the  Presi- 
dent signed  the  authorization  act,  he 
noted  that  with  respect  to  this  provi- 
sion, he  was  interpreting  it  (and  I 
quote)  "consistent  with  my  position 
concerning  the  discretion  of  agency 
heads  to  determine  when  polygraph 
examinations  will  be  conducted  in 
specific  cases." 

It  is  no  secret  to  the  Congress  or 
to  this  committee  that  I  have  consist- 
ently opposed  the  use  of  "lie  detector" 
tests  as  a  tool  for  screening  or  manag- 
ing people.  Nor  do  I  believe  that  we 
can  single  out  one  class  of  State  De- 
partment employees  for  special  treat- 
ment just  because  they  are  called  a 
security  service.  If  our  security  objec- 
tives are  to  be  met,  then  our  security 
program  and  whatever  use  there  is  of 
lie  detector  tests  in  that  program, 
should  apply  to  all  employees. 

We  are  complying  with  the  require- 
ments of  that  act.  Regulations  have 
been  drafted  that  allow  me  to  authorize 
lie  detector  testing  for  any  Department 
of  State  employee  under  three  circum- 
stances with  the  voluntary  consent  of 
the  individual. 

1.  When  warranted  during  the 
course  of  a  criminal,  counterintelligence 
or  personnel  security  investigation 
after  all  other  reasonable  investigative 
steps  have  been  taken. 

2.  When  an  employee  requests  to 
take  such  a  test  for  the  purpose  of 
exculpation. 

3.  When  a  State  Department  em- 
ployee volunteers  to  work  in  an  intel- 
ligence agency  that  requires  polygraph 
tests,  or  volunteers  to  participate  in 
certain  special  access  programs — specif- 
ically designated  by  me — which  involve 
joint  programs  with  the  intelligence 


community  where  the  community  re- 
quires a  lie  detector  test. 

These  regulations  comply  with  the 
requirements  of  section  163.  The  reg- 
ulations are  modeled  on  those  in  use 
by  the  Department  of  Defense  and,  as 
required  by  our  authorization  act, 
incorporate  all  provisions  concerning 
scope  and  conduct  of  examinations  and 
rights  of  individuals  subject  to  such 
examinations. 

I  believe  these  regulations  are 
good,  because  they  are  clear,  circum- 
spect in  scope,  and  protect  individual 
rights.  But  I  am  deeply  concerned 
about  the  attitudes  and  atmosphere  in 
this  town  at  present  regarding  these 
so-called  lie  detectors. 

Take  a  look  at  the  science — or 
rather  the  lack  of  science — in  these 
tests.  I  don't  even  like  to  use  the 
phrase  "polygraph"  because  it  implies 
precision  where  precision  does  not  ex- 
ist. We  all  know  what  they  pretend  to 
be — lie  detectors.  But  the  truth  is,  as 
the  Congress'  own  Office  of  Technology 
Assessment  (OTA)  has  pointed  out, 
that  those  machines  cannot  detect  lies 
in  a  scientifically  reliable  manner. 

Congress'  Office  of  Technology  As- 
sessment found  meaningful  scientific 
evidence  of  polygraph  validity  only  in 
the  area  of  criminal  investigations. 
Even  there  results  ranged  from  17  to 
100%  for  correct  guilty  detections.  But 
consider  this  striking  fact.  In  screening 
situation's  (where  one  in  1,000  may  be 
guilty)  OTA  pointed  out  that  even  if  one 
assumed  that  the  polygraph  is  99%  ac- 
curate, the  laws  of  probability  indicate 
that  one  guilty  person  would  be  cor- 
rectly identified  as  deceptive  but  10 
persons  would  be  incorrectly  identified 
as  deceptive  (false  positives).  An  ac- 
curacy rate  of  something  less  than 
100%  may  be  acceptable  in  attempting 
to  forecast  the  weather.  It  should  never 
be  acceptable  in  matters  affecting  the 
reputations  and  the  livelihoods  of 
individuals. 

Lie  detector  tests  have  a  limited 
place  in  our  security  program,  to  a  dif- 
ferent extent  in  different  agencies.  But 
they  must  not  become  an  excuse  or  a 
substitute  for  a  real  security  program. 
There  are  both  physical  and  psychologi- 
cal dimensions  to  such  a  program.  That 
is,  we  must  have  physically  secure 
places  in  which  to  work  and  everyone 
doing  the  work  must  be  security  con- 
scious. It's  like  safety  in  the  workplace. 
It  can  be  done  very  effectively  through 
persistent  and  continuous  effort  with 
everyone  lending  a  hand. 


Over  the  last  several  years,  we 
have  acted  on  numerous  recommeni 
tions  to  put  such  a  program  in  plac' 
Our  efforts  to  improve  State  Depar 
ment  security  reflect  both  our  own 
ideas  and  those  of  special  study  grc  ds 
such  as  the  Inman  panel  and  the  L;  d 
commission.  Congress  approved  a  •'' 
billion  program  based  on  the  Inmai 
panel's  proposals  in  1985.  That  sam^ 
year,  we  established  the  Diplomatic  Se- 
curity Service  and  elevated  its  chie  o 
the  assistant  secretary  level. 

Throughout,  the  State  Depart 
ment's  security  program  has  been  . 
the  top  of  my  personal  list  of  prior  - 
Of  course,  we  cannot  go  over  everj 
thing  we  have  done  in  open  session  3u 
let  me  cite  a  few  examples  in  the  a  as 
of  greatest  need. 

First,  espionage: 

•  All  of  the  FSNs  in  Moscow  h  e 
been  eliminated.  After  some  initia 
problems  in  screening  and  sorting   t 
what  kind  of  employees  we  need,  \ 
have  a  system  there  that  seems  to  ; 
working. 

•  We  are  now  going  to  apply  t  se 
lessons  to  other  posts  in  Eastern  1  - 
rope.  In  the  near  future,  we  expe(  to 
replace  other  FSNs  in  Eastern  bl( 
countries. 

•  In  Eastern  Europe,  we  are  i  ab 
lishing  CORE  areas  of  the  embass  ~ 
where  no  one  but  cleared  America 
will  be  allowed.  Our  aim  is:  ensun  hat 
classified  is  processed  in  areas  fre 
from  all  foreign  nationals  or  other  \- 
cleared  personnel. 

•  The  typewriter  bugging  in 
Moscow  led  us  to  increased  rigor  i 
protecting  our  office  equipment.  T  ■■ 
new  plain  text  processing  equipmt ,  fa 
cility — which  we  have  set  up  joint 
with  the  CIA  [Central  Intelligence 
Agency] — allows  us  tight  control  c  ir 
the  office  equipment  that  may  be  ;  o- 
ject  to  tampering.  Purchase,  ship]  ig, 
and  maintenance  are  all  handled  b 
trained  American  personnel. 

•  Embassy  construction  is  nov 
done  by  cleared  American  firms.  (  n- 
struction  sites  are  guarded  by  ele;6d 
Americans.  Construction  security  (o- 
grams  are  in  place  at  14  new  office ' 
buildings  and  will  be  part  of  all  fu  ri 
projects.  Materials  are  screened  a  I 
protected  from  the  time  of  purcha  tun 
til  final  disposal.  ;' 

Second,  counterintelligence:  J 

•  We  have  gotten  help  from  th 
FBI  [Federal  Bureau  of  Investigai 
with  our  counterintelligence  (CI)  ) 


nsV 


12 


Deoartment  of  State  Bulletln/Julvl 


THE  SECRETARY 


I  111,  The  new  chief  of  our  CI  shop  is 
!(ian  from  the  FBI.  We  also  have  a 
Sessional  trainer  from  the  Bureau  to 
P  VIS  build  up  our  own  talent  in  this 

•  Our  CI  program  is  oriented  to- 
ri I  the  protection  of  classified  infor- 
iioii.  Consequently,  the  program 

.  pliasis  is  on  training,  security 
iiireness,  employee  screening  (over 
■;)  applicants  were  denied  security 
c  arances  last  year),  and  selection. 

•  We  pursue  an  active  program  to 

;  lire  that  our  employees  comply  with 
ipiilicable  regulations  regarding 

ii-  eiinduct.  If  they  do  not,  we  take 
I  ■  appropriate  steps.  Last  year,  40 
f  ployees  had  their  clearances  sus- 
pded,  downgraded,  or  revoked  be- 
( ise  of  personal  security  issues.  We 
I  iducted  over  1,200  update  investiga- 

is  (in  our  current  employees. 

•  We  have  worked  to  raise  the  level 
iwareness  in  the  Foreign  Service  to 
lionage.  Each  Ambassador  has  been 

'  1  to  establish  a  counterintelligence 
rking  group  (CIWG)  to  focus  atten- 
1  on  CI  matters  at  a  high  level  at 
■h  post.  And  each  Ambassador  has 
'n  made  personally  accountable  for 
•urity  at  his  mission.  All  personnel 
ng  assigned  during  the  summer  cy- 
to  the  bloc  countries  are  required  to 
end  a  1  week  counterintelligence 
ining  program  jointly  sponsored  by 
ite  and  the  CIA. 

•  We  have  instituted  a  more  inten- 
e  use  of  counterintelligence  debrief- 
;  and  are  developing  a  new  program 

I    screening  to  use  before  selecting  in- 
itijidduals  for  such  assignment. 

"^    Third,  security  standards: 

intli  j    •  Last  fall  we  put  out  strict  new 
jtf'i-ysical  and  procedural  security  stand- 
ds  for  any  embassy  that  is  to  handle 
issified  information.  Posts  are  being 
i  ought  into  compliance.  We  have  re- 
:   ced  the  level  of  classified  material  au- 
orized  at  several  posts  and  have 
certified  dozens  of  facilities  from  the 
orage  of  any  classified  material  until 
e  new  standards  are  met.  This  is  a 
inful  process  for  many  posts  in  the 
ort  run.  But  in  the  long  run  it  will 
fi^prove  their  ability  to  do  their  work. 

•  I  have  talked  to  Bill  Webster 
i^)OUt  how  the  intelligence  community 
n  help  us  to  make  sure  our  standards 
e  what  they  should  be — especially  in 
eas  like  technical  security  where 
1  lere  are  very  few  qualified  experts, 
'e  will  be  establishing  an  organization 
hich  can  give  me  an  independent  look 


at  our  technical  security  standards 
without  building  up  a  big  new  bureau- 
cracy and  without  tangling  the  lines  of 
responsibility. 

Our  job  will  never  be  finished. 
There  is  more  to  be  done  and  we  are 
trying  to  do  it.  But  what  we  are  doing 
is  the  best  way  to  achieve  our  objec- 
tives. To  divert  our  resources  and  at- 
tention from  these  constructive 
activities  to  the  destructive  alternative 
of  lie  detector  tests  would  be  a  serious 
blow,  not  just  to  morale  but  to  security 
itself 

In  August  1986,  Congress  passed 
and  the  President  signed  the  Omnibus 
Diplomatic  Security  and  Anti-Terrorism 
Act.  This  landmark  legislation,  care- 
fully crafted  by  Congress,  gave  us  the 
authority,  and  a  major  start  on  the  re- 
sources we  needed,  to  implement  the 
recommendations  of  the  Advisory  Panel 
on  Overseas  Security  chaired  by  Admi- 
ral Bobby  Inman. 

This  legislation  authorized  a  world- 
wide diplomatic  security  effort.  Subse- 
quently, we  began  a  multi-year 
program  to  replace  and  upgrade  facili- 
ties at  our  most  vulnerable  posts  over- 
seas. The  Inman  panel  found  that 
buildings  at  134  of  our  263  posts  were 
substantially  below  minimum  security 
standards.  We  began  the  most  exten- 
sive construction  program  in  the  De- 
partment's history.  We  also  started 
making  improvements  in  security  oper- 
ations and  organizations. 

Unfortunately,  today's  budget  real- 
ities are  forcing  us  to  slow  the  program 
down.  In  both  FY  1988  and  FY  1989, 
there  will  be  no  newly  authorized  starts 
in  the  security  building  program.  In  ad- 
dition, we  propose  to  hold  the  Diplo- 
matic Security  salaries  and  expenses  to 
the  1988  level.  Because  this  does  not 
compensate  for  inflation,  this  means  a 
real  decrease  in  operations. 

I  accept  the  need  to  hold  down 
expenditures  in  the  interest  of  the  na- 
tion's economic  and  financial  health. 
The  State  Department  is  doing  its  part 
in  that  effort.  But  I  also  fear  that  if  we 
continue  to  constrain  diplomatic  se- 
curity expenditures  in  future  years,  the 
momentum  toward  improving  the  se- 
curity of  our  operations  will  be  lost.  In 
short,  it  is  critical  that  the  levels  re- 
quested for  security  be  viewed  as  part 
of  the  Department's  response  to  the 
budget  process— not  as  a  reduced  com- 
mitment to  security  by  the  Administra- 
tion or  Congress. 


fthartmant  nf  Qtato  Rllllptin/JulV  1988 


With  specific  respect  to  the 
Moscow  Chancery,  a  subject  in  which 
this  committee  has  expressed  a  particu- 
lar interest,  we  continue  to  make  good 
progress  on  rehabilitating  the  existing 
chancery.  At  the  same  time,  we  are 
moving  ahead  with  planning  on  how  to 
achieve  a  new  security  chancery  facility 
in  Moscow. 

The  Department  has  worked 
closely  with  other  agencies  represented 
in  Moscow  to  reach  a  consensus  on  the 
most  feasible  long-term  solution  to  our 
needs  in  Moscow.  Before  expending  sig- 
nificant additional  funds  to  a  specific 
approach,  we  want  to  be  certain  that 
the  design  and  logistics  of  fully  secur- 
ing a  building  are  feasible  in  the  harsh 
security  environment  of  the  U.S.S.R. 
To  get  those  answers,  we  have  awarded 
a  contract  for  an  engineering  and  se- 
curity survey  of  the  new  building  to 
determine  options  for  the  present 
structure  and  development  of  a  fully  se- 
cure building.  Concurrently,  the  survey 
will  also  look  at  the  feasibility  of  re- 
structuring the  present  chancery  into  a 
totally  secure  facility;  a  much  less  de- 
sirable option,  in  my  view. 

We  will  have  the  results  of  the  sur- 
vey in  hand  by  late  summer  and  will 
then  prepare  a  proposed  course  of  ac- 
tion for  the  consideration  of  the  Con- 
gress. We  expect  to  be  able  to  present 
a  package  complete  with  funding  re- 
quirements before  the  end  of  the  fiscal 
year.  In  this  regard,  I  should  note  that 
we  believe  no  new  funding  for  recon- 
struction of  a  new  office  building  will  be 
required  prior  to  fiscal  year  1990. 

Let  me  now  try  to  drive  home 
some  funding  realities  which  demand 
attention.  We  fully  understand  the  di- 
lemma everyone  faces  under  current 
budget  limitations.  And,  we  fully 
intend  to  operate  within  the  level 
agreed  upon  at  the  budget  summit,  as 
our  austere  budget  request  indicates. 

Contributions  to  International 
Organizations 

Following  on  the  $480  million  appropri- 
ated for  FY  1988,  and  in  line  with  the 
budget  summit  compromise  of  late  last 
year,  the  President's  FY  1989  budget 
requests  only  $489.9  miUion  for  the 
contributions  to  international  organiza- 
tions account.  This  is  $166  million  less 
than  estimated  1989  net  requirements 
(a  shortfall  of  over  25%)  for  which  we 
normally  would  seek  U.S.  funding.  This 
will  bring  our  cumulative  shortfall  to 
over  $500  million  by  the  end  of  1989— a 
record  high. 


13 


THE  SECRETARY 


This  significant  shortfall  for  FY 
1989  forces  us  once  again  to  confront  an 
extremely  difficult  decision  about  the 
allocation  of  very  limited  funds.  No  one 
receiving  less  than  100^7^  funding  will  be 
fully  satisfied.  But  the  facts  dictate 
that  many  organizations  will  have  to  re- 
ceive less  than  100%  funding  because 
the  Administration  must  seek  less  than 
75%  of  full  requirements  for  this 
account. 

I  recognize  our  budget  problems 
and  the  need  to  live  within  the  budget 
summit,  yet  I  must  point  out  my  con- 
cern over  the  growing  shortfalls  in  our 
payments.  Looking  ahead  to  1990  in 
this  account,  if  we  continue  virtually  to 
straightline  our  appropriations,  we  will 
be  falling  even  further  behind. 

If  we  do  not  reverse  this  trend  to- 
ward further  shortfalls  in  our  assessed 
contributions  to  international  organi- 
zations, the  United  States  could  lose  its 
right  to  vote  in  some  organizations. 
More  immediately,  continued  shortfalls 
in  our  contributions  undermine  our 
efforts  to  achieve  implementation  of  the 
important  budgetary  reforms  which 
have  been  approved  in  the  United  Na- 
tions and  key  affiliated  agencies  at 
our  initiation. 

There  are  some  who  view  the  solu- 
tion to  this  problem  as  negotiating  a 
reduction  in  our  assessments.  Others 
argue  just  as  forcefully  that  for  the 
United  States  to  seek  an  assessment 
reduction  would  be  tantamount  to  ac- 
cepting a  diminished  American  role  in 
world  affairs — a  diminished  ability  for 
America  to  pursue  our  most  fundamen- 
tal security,  humanitarian,  and  eco- 
nomic interests  around  the  world.  They 
further  argue  that  such  negotiations 
would  most  probably  be  contentious 
and  provide  our  adversaries  with 
another  opportunity  to  attack  the 
United  States. 

There  is  no  easy  solution  to  this 
dilemma.  The  Department  is  studying 
the  problem  and  is  taking  a  hard  look 
at  all  of  the  alternatives.  This  process 
will  require  e.xtensive  consultation  with 
Congress  over  the  next  year.  I  ask  for 
your  support  in  this  difficult 
reassessment. 

State  Department  Improvements 

In  difficult  times  such  as  these,  there  is 
a  temptation  to  put  off  badly  needed 
programs  and  projects.  Inevitably,  sev- 
eral years  later,  it  will  be  painfully  evi- 
dent that  such  a  response  to  budget 
constraints  was  extremely 
shortsighted. 


The  construction  of  an  up-to-date 
Foreign  Affairs  Ti-aining  Center  is  a 
high  priority  for  me.  I  urge  the  com- 
mittee to  approve  this  project.  The  is- 
sue is  simple:  ensuring  the  professional 
excellence  and  effectiveness  of  the  men 
and  women  who  represent  our  country 
abroad.  I  am  convinced  that  the  ability 
of  the  United  States  to  effectively  carry 
out  its  diplomatic  functions  is  directly 
related  to  the  skills  of  our  professional 
staff  At  a  time  of  declining  numbers  in 
our  workforce,  it  is  particularly  impor- 
tant that  the  quality  of  our  personnel 
be  the  highest  that  is  possible.  The  new 
Foreign  Affairs  Training  Center  will 
provide  an  adequate  facility  to  address 
this  need. 

We  must  press  ahead  with  skill  de- 
velopment through  training  and  the  use 


of  current  technology.  We  must  tak  fic- 
tion now  to  ensure  the  future.  1 

In  closing,  let  me  say  again  thijif 
we  fail  to  provide  the  resources  tha 
give  substance  to  our  words,  lend  cid- 
ibility  to  our  commitments,  and  peiit 
the  effective  execution  of  our  plans  ve 
will  be  shortchanging  our  most  fun  - 
mental  national  goals  and  interests  ily 
colleagues  and  I  recognize  that  we  usi 
have  the  cooperation  of  Congi-ess  t( 
achieve  all  our  foreign  policy  object  es 
We  are  committed  to  working  with  )u, 
and  we  welcome  your  close  scrutin;  )f 
our  budget  proposals. 


'Press  release  81  of  May  2,  1988.  1 ; 
complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  w  be 
published  by  the  committee  and  will  t 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  1  CU' 
ments,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Off  . 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. ■ 


Secretary's  Interview  on  "This  Week  With 
David  Brinkley" 


Secretary  Shultz  was  interviewed 
on  ABC-TV's  "This  Week  With  David 
Brinkley"  on  May  22,  1988,  by  David 
Brinkley,  Sam  Donaldson ,  and  John 
McWethy  of  ABC  News.'' 

Q.  Tell  us  what  you  think  of  the 
Gorbachev  interview? 

A.  It's  an  interesting  interview.  As 
always,  he  has  lots  to  say  about  many 
different  subjects.  In  terms  of  tone,  it's 
quite  apparent  that  he  wants  to  see 
things  move  forward,  and  I  think  that's 
good. 

Q.  Is  there  anything  new  in  there 
that  you  had  not  seen  or  heard 
before? 

A.  I  haven't  had  a  chance  to  read  it 
in  all  of  its  detail.  He  did  make  one 
proposal  about  a  space  mission  that 
caught  a  lot  of  attention;  and  that's 
something  that's  been  talked  about,  but 
it's  a  long  way  from  being  agreed  on. 

Q.  Do  you  think,  however,  the 
United  States  would  like  to  pursue  it 
and  would  like  to  eventually  agree  to 
do  it? 

A.  We  have  a  space  agreement  that 
we  finished  about  a  year  ago.  Under 
that  agreement,  particular  projects  get 
taken  up  and  we  examine  them  and  de- 
cide whether  to  go  forward  with  them 
or  not,  so  I  presume  this  will  come  up 
under  that  heading. 


Q.  It  doesn't  sound  like  you    nt 
to  put  it  on  the  front  burner. 

A.  By  the  time  you  talk  about 
sending  something  to  Mars — and  it 
wasn't  clear  to  me  whether  it's  an  i  ■ 
manned  or  a  manned  flight.  I've  s€ 
that  report  both  ways.  I  saw  it  uni  n- 
ned,  but  then  I  thought  in  your  rui  ip 
newscast  it  said  "manned."  But  at   y 
rate,  obviously  this  has  to  be  studi 
carefully  and  gone  forward  right,  i 
eluding  we  always  have  to  be  caref 
with  problems  of  technology  transf 

Q.  Let  me  ask  you  about  son  • 
thing  that  obviously  will  come  uj 
What  difference,  real  difference,   'es 
it  make  if  the  INF  [Intermediate 
Range  Nuclear  Forces]  Treaty  is    t 
completely  finished  by  the  Senati  - 
assuming  it  is  finished  at  some  p  nt 
before  long — before  you  and  the  I  ;si 
dent  go  to  Moscow?  Does  it  make  ny 
real  difference? 

A.  It  helps,  certainly,  to  have  'iii- 
pleted  something  and  to  register  tl  t 
fact.  Let  me  point  out  also  that  it  6 
been,  I  think,  since  1972  that  we 
haven't  ratified  a  treaty  with  the  S 
Union,  and  we've  had  several  on  th 
table.  So  it's  good  to  register  the  fi 
that  we  can  do  it. 

Q.  Do  you  have  any  particul: 
words  of  advice  to  the  leadership'ip- 
parently  you're  going  to  Capitol  liH 


It  nt  Qtato  Riillotin/.liilu  188 


THE  SECRETARY 


fiorrow  to  try  to  move  the  process 
«ng.  What  are  you  going  to  be  tell- 
them? 

A.  Actually,  I  think  the  process 
i,nine  well,  and  I  have  only  compli- 
n  its  for  the  Senate  in  the  way  in 
•^  ch  they've  handled  this.  It's  been  a 
\  thorough  process.  We've  had  over 
learings.  We've  answered  over  1,300 
stions.  I've  appeared  three  times 
-I'll'.  We  have  pinned  things  down 
I  iieople  wanted  to  pin  down,  and  I 
ik  it's  been  thorough  going.  Now  the 
ity  is  being  debated.  I  think  there's 
una  time  for  hearings  and  a  time  for 
qstions  and  a  time  for  critiques  and  a 
t  e  for  debate;  and  there  also  has  to 

■  e  le  a  time  to  decide,  and  I  think 
V  re  about  there. 

Q.  Wouldn't  it  be  embarrassing 
t  you  and  the  President  to  have  con- 
i  vative  Republicans  leading  the  op- 
I  iition  against  this  treaty  in  the 

11 !  late  and  trying  to  delay  it,  ob- 

'll '  usiy,  past  the  Moscow  summit? 
A.  I  don't  know.  I  wouldn't  try  to 
I .  down  any  motives.  But  certainly  it's 
!  ood  thing  to  have  people  who  probe 

,|.j  1  struggle  and  criticize.  It  helps  to 
i  ure  people  that  there's  been  no  stone 

,,  1 ;  unturned. 

ii     Q.  There  are  a  number  of  indica- 
Ntns  at  this  point  that  the  Admin- 

i  ration  may  be  changing  its  position 

I  SDI,  the  Strategic  Defense  Initia- 
r. le.  The  Defense  Science  Board  has 
i  I  ommended  that  the  Administration 

'  ce  a  much  lower  first  step  than  had 
?n  advocated  in  years  past  by  the 
ministration.  Are  you  taking  some- 
ng  new  with  you  to  the  Soviet 
lion  next  week  that  will  indicate  a 
^   ghtly  different  approach  to  SDI? 

A.  The  President's  position,  insofar 
.    negotiations  are  concerned,  has 
,  ^ver  changed.  It  is  that  basically  he 
^1^  11  not  agree  to  anything  that  in  any 

^  y  impedes  the  development  of  our 
[^|ility  to  figure  out  how  to  defend  our- 
^,  |.ves  against  ballistic  missiles,  if  we 

ti  do  it.  That  has  always  been  his 
,  ,sition. 

.,,    That  still  leaves  room  for  a  lot  of 
"jings  with  the  Soviet  Union,  such  as  a 

riod  of  nonwithdrawal  from  the  ABM 
,  ^  ntiballistic  Missile]  Ti-eaty,  that  pro- 
;,  lie  assurances  on  both  sides  of  what 

■  je  general  environment  is  going  to  be 

■  lien  we  have  massive  cuts  in  our  of- 
insive  forces. 

iltij    Personally,  I  think  that  we,  as  well 
i !  they,  are  well  advised  to  want  to  see 
\lha.t  that  atmosphere  is  going  to  be.  So 
ose  are  things  we  have  negotiated 

lOUt. 


There  are  a  variety  of  things  on  the 
table  that  we're  struggling  with.  We 
did  agree  on  some  language  here  at  the 
Washington  summit,  that  both  sides 
agreed  on.  The  only  difficulty  with  that 
language  is  that  we  also  agree  that  we 
don't  agree  on  what  it  means,  so  we 
still  have  a  lot  of  work  to  do. 

Q.  Gorbachev  also  said,  "Who 
would  have  thought  in  the  '80s  that 
Ronald  Reagan  would  have  been — 
would  become — the  first  President  to 
sign  a  nuclear  arms  treaty  with  the 
Soviet  Union."  He  refers,  of  course, 
to  the  days  when — 

A.  Nuclear  arms  reduction. 

Q.  What  did  I  say? 

A.  You  said  "agreement." 

Q.  All  right. 

A.  There  have  been  agreements, 
but  they've  been  agreements  under 
which  nuclear  weapons  were  allowed  to 
increase,  and  the  President  has  always 
objected  to  that.  He  said  what  he 
wants  to  do  is  decrease  them. 

Q.  Anyway,  I  was  referring  to  his 
— he  was  referring  to  the  '80s  when 
the  President  was  saying  "the  evil  em- 
pire" and  so  on.  What's  changed  him? 
You've  watched  him  all  this  time.  He's 
come  quite  a  long  way. 

A.  We  need  to  remind  ourselves 
that  in  1981  President  Reagan  proposed 
the  zero  option.  I  presume  he  would 
have  signed  it  then  if  the  Soviets  would 
have  agreed  to  it.  They  wouldn't  agree 
to  it. 

In  1982  he  proposed  50%  cuts  in 
strategic  arms.  We  have  completed  an 
agreement  on  the  zero  option,  and  we 
have  all  of  the  basic  structure  of  a  50% 
reduction  arrangement  there,  although 
there  are  immense  amounts  of  addi- 
tional difficult  undej'structure  to  that 
agreement  yet  to  be  done.  So  these  are 
things  that  have  been  consistently  pur- 
sued objectives  on  the  part  of  our 
President. 

Q.  So.  as  you're  seeing  it  then, 
who  would  have  believed  that  Gor- 
bachev would  be  the  first  to  sign  a 
nuclear  reduction  treaty  with  the 
United  States? 

A.  Mr.  Gorbachev  is  new  in  power, 
in  a  sense.  He's  been  there  now  for 
about  3  years.  I  would  have  to  tell  you, 
from  the  first  time  I  met  him,  which 
was  assisting  Vice  President  Bush  at 
the  Chernenko  funeral — we  met  for 
about  an  hour  and  a  half — I  went  away 
from  that  meeting  saying  this  is  a  dif- 
ferent kind  of  Soviet  leader  from  what 
we've  seen  in  the  past.  You  could  see  it 
immediately. 


Q.  Bring  us  to  date  on  the  Nor- 
iega negotiations  in  Panama?  Where 
do  we  stand? 

A.  We  have  had  a  lot  of  discussion 
with  him,  and  we  haven't  concluded  any 
agreement.  Our  objective  is  to  have 
him  give  up  his  command  of  the  Pan- 
amanian Defense  Forces  and  to  leave 
Panama,  and  to  have  the  forces  of  de- 
mocracy there  and  national  reconcilia- 
tion have  a  political  opening  so  that 
they  can  basically  get  in  charge  of  that 
country. 

I  think  in  terms  of  what  it  cost 
somebody  to  get  involved  in  drugs  and 
violate  the  U.S.  law,  a  penalty  such  as 
having  to  leave  his  command  is  a 
great — although  we  would  wish  for 
more — penalty. 

Q.  On  that  point,  it  is  reported 
that  you  would  be  willing  to  drop  the 
drug  indictments  against  Noriega  as 
part  of  an  agreement  which  leads  to 
the  objective  you've  just  outlined.  Is 
that  true?  And,  if  so,  why? 

A.  I  give  my  advice  to  the  Presi- 
dent, so  I'm  not  going  to  talk  about 
anybody's  position,  but  I  will  talk  about 
the  proposition. 

Q.  All  right.  T^lk  about  your  par- 
ticular position. 

A.  Let  me  just  talk  about  the 
proposition.  We  have  pushed  very  hard 
for  more  democracy,  more  freedom, 
more  rule  of  law  throughout  our  hemi- 
sphere, and,  for  that  matter,  through- 
out the  world.  We've  seen  a  great  deal 
of  success  in  that,  although  we've  also 
seen  setbacks.  We  certainly  want  that 
same  thing  in  Panama.  We've  pushed 
for  it  there. 

With  General  Noriega  and  his  com- 
mand of  the  armed  forces  there  now, 
that's  a  setback.  It's  particularly  a  set- 
back when  we  see  that  he's  involved  in 
drugs.  So  we  have  the  two  objectives. 
Now  we  want  to  pursue  both  of  those 
objectives  as  part  of  our  general  policy 
in  that  area. 

We  have  in  our  hands  a  variety  of 
tools.  We  have  great  economic  stroke 
which  people  have  felt  and  Noriega  has 
felt.  We  have  various  other  possible 
things  we  can  do.  We  do  want  to  be 
very  strict  in  our  observance  of  the 
Panama  Canal  treaties  and  not  in  any 
way  do  anything  that  disrupts  that. 

We  also  have  the  fact  that  there  is 
an  indictment  against  him.  It's  an  in- 
dictment for  violation  of  U.S.  law,  and 
it  would  be  desirable  to  bring  him  to 
the  United  States  and  try  him  here. 
However,  we  have  no  way  of  doing  that. 
We  have  no  ability  to  extradite  him 


.JiPartmont  »f  Qt;.tP  R..llfttin/.l..lv  1QBB 


15 


ARMS  CONTROL 


from  Panama.  So  you  ask  yourself, 
which  situation  are  we  better  off  in:  to 
have  Noriega  more  or  less  in  charge  in 
Panama  and  us  with  an  indictment  that 
we  can't  do  much  about,  but  nev- 
ertheless holding  onto  it;  or  having 
Noriega  giving  up  power  in  Panama 
and  leaving  Panama,  but  also,  having 
paid  that  penalty,  not  having  the  indict- 
ment hang  over  his  head? 

There  are  very  important  argu- 
ments to  be  made  on  all  sides  of  that 
issue.  It's  a  real  judgment  to  be  made, 
and  it's  a  difficult  judgment. 

Q.  You  know  what  the  next  argu- 
ment is — that  is,  if  you  set  a  prece- 
dent of  deciding  that  this  objective  is 
important  enough  to  drop  the  indict- 
ments, then  that  sends  a  signal  to  the 
next  guy  that  we  want  to  indicate 
that  if  you'll  just  hang  tough,  the 
United  States  will  give  in. 

A.  It's  not  a  question  of  hanging 
tough.  We  have  indicted  lots  of  people. 
If  you  have  a  person  who  isn't  the  head 
of  state,  you  have  a  chance  of  getting 
that  person.  We've  had  people  extra- 
dited from — 

Q.  Noriega  isn't  a  head  of  state. 

A.  We  recognize  Delvalle  as  the 
constitutional  President  of  Panama — 

Q.  But  you're  going  to  change 
that,  I  understand. 

A.  Noriega  has  a  great  deal  of  con- 
trol there,  and  so  that's  what  we  want 
to  see — 

Q.  But  I  understand  you're  going 
to  change  that,  that  you  might  agree 
to  recognize  Solis  Palma,  the  Noriega 
guy. 

A.  No.  I  don't  know  where  you  get 
that  understanding.  There's  nothing  to 
that. 

Q.  If  he  were  to  go  to  some  other 
country,  leave  Panama  and  go  to 
some  other  country — not  this  one — 
the  indictment  would  essentially  be 
meaningless,  wouldn't  it? 

A.   If  he  went  to  some  other  coun- 
try from  which  we  could  extradite  him, 
it  wouldn't  be  meaningless.  That's  an 
argument  for  holding  onto  it. 

Q.  Read  the  extradition  laws — 

A.  In  effect,  you  make  him  a  pris- 
oner in  Panama,  to  a  certain  extent.  Of 
course,  many  countries  don't  have  ex- 
tradition treaties  with  us.  Some  do. 

Q.  Since  the  United  States  began 
imposing  different  sanctions  on  Pan- 
ama, the  opposition  claims  that  they 


are  losing  power — the  opposition 
which  the  United  States  is  support- 
ing. Noriega  is  still  there.  He  is  still 
stringing  you  along,  and  it  is  looking 
more  and  more  like  a  sucker  play, 
that  Noriega  is  just  playing  the 
United  States  for  all  it's  worth  and 
hanging  in  there,  seeing  how  much  he 
can  get. 

A.  There  is  a  balance  of  pressure 
on  both  sides.  The  pressures  on  him,  as 
a  result  of  inability  to  meet  military 
payrolls  and  things  of  that  kind,  are 
quite  great.  And  so  the  fact  that  his 
presence  there  constitutes  a  major 
problem  for  Panama,  not  just  with  us 
— and  here  I  agi'ee  with  something 
Senator  [Sam]  Nunn  said  on  the  pro- 
gram— but  also  with  other  countries 
around  there.  Other  countries  are  en- 
gaged and  they  do  care,  and  they  would 
like  to  see  him  out.  So  he  is  a  figure  of 
unpopularity. 

Q.  One  other  point  on  the  inter- 
view with  Gorbachev.  He  admitted 
that  there  was  some  opposition. 
Could  you  add  anything  to  that?  Do 
you  know  how  strong  it  is,  how  much 
opposition  he  has  within  his  own 
government? 


A.  Our  Ambassador  to  Moscow, 
Jack  Matlock,  has  had  three  tours  ol 
duty  in  that  country.  He  says  now,  f 
the  first  time,  he  really  enjoys  readi 
the  papers  because  it's  full  of  contro 
versy  and  people  arguing  this,  that, 
and  the  other  thing.  So  there  has  be  i 
a  change.  Of  course,  when  there's  co 
troversy,  that  means  there  are  peop 
arguing  for  things  and  people  arguii 
against  them,  as  is  the  case  here. 

Q.  Gorbachev  also,  in  the  inte 
view,  talked  about  continuing  the    ■ 
gotiation  on  the  START  [strategic 
arms  reduction  talks]  treaty.  He  s;  I 
he  was  optimistic  about  it,  and  he 
would  do  it  even  though  the  Presi- 
dent, Mr.  Reagan,  is  about  done.  I 
you  think  a  START  treaty  can  be  <  i- 
eluded  before  the  end  of  the  Presi- 
dent's term? 

A.  It's  certainly  possible.  I  feel 
certain  that  at  the  Moscow  summit   ' 
will  both  want  to  agree  to  keep  wor 
ing  on  it  hard.  But  whether  it  actu;  ■ 
will  happen  or  not,  I  don't  know.  Tl 
issues  are  tough. 


'Press  release  96  of  May  23,  1988.1' 


U.S.  Arms  Control  Initiatives 


Following  is  the  latest  in  a  series  of 
updates  on  current  U.S.  arms  control 
initiatives. 

Arms  reduction  negotiations  are  one  el- 
ement in  the  Administration's  strategy 
for  ensuring  peace  and  strengthening 
security.  Through  arms  reductions,  the 
United  States  seeks  to  preserve  a  sta- 
ble strategic  balance  at  the  lowest 
possible  levels  of  military  force,  thus 
reducing  the  risk  of  conflict.  The 
United  States  took  an  important  step 
toward  this  goal  when  President 
Reagan  signed  the  INF  Ti-eaty  in 
Washington  last  December. 

As  part  of  our  efforts  to  make  the 
world  safer,  we  have  undertaken  a 
number  of  arms  reduction  initiatives, 
including  proposals  for: 

•  A  stabilizing  and  effectively 
verifiable  50%  reduction  in  U.S.  and 
Soviet  strategic  offensive  arsenals; 

•  A  managed  transition  to  deter- 
rence based  increasingly  on  defenses — 
which  threaten  no  one — rather  than  on 
the  threat  of  nuclear  retaliation; 


•  An  effective,  verifiable,  and  t  ly 
global  ban  on  chemical  weapons; 

•  Effective  verification  provisio 
for  existing  treaties  limiting  nuclea 
testing; 

•  A  strengthened  nuclear  non- 
proliferation  regime; 

•  Reductions  of  conventional  fo  3S 
in  Europe  to  equal  levels;  and 

•  Confidence-  and  security-buil  ig 
measures. 


Intermediate-Range  Nuclear  Fore 

The  INF  negotiations  have  concludi 
successfully.  On  December  8,  1987, 
President  Reagan  and  General  Seer 
tary  Gorbachev  signed  the  historic  IF 
Treaty.  The  treaty  provides  for  the 
elimination  of  all  U.S.  and  Soviet 
ground-launched  INF  missile  systen 
in  the  range  of  500-5,500  kilometer: 
(about  300-3,400  miles)  and  the  elir 
ination  of  related  support  facilities    d 
support  equipment  within  3  years  aer 
it  enters  into  force.  The  treaty  ban; ill 
production  and  flight  testing  of  the; 
missiles  immediately  upon  entry  int 


rtctn'irtmant    n<    Ctoto    Di  illatin  /  ll  llll    MR 


ARMS  CONTROL 


f  as  well  as  the  production  of  any 
sik'  stages  or  launchers  for  these 
,-iles.  After  the  3-year  period  of 
i  lination,  neither  side  may  possess 
a(  INF  missiles,  launchers,  support 
jtietures,  or  support  equipment.  The 
trity  contains  the  most  comprehensive 
vr  fication  provisions  in  the  history  of 
jjis  control,  including  various  types  of 
slrt-notice,  onsite  inspections  as  well 
a^nspection  by  resident,  onsite  teams 
ai  key  missile  facility  in  each  country. 

The  success  of  these  negotiations  is 
a  rect  consequence  of  the  President's 
sddfast  commitment  to  achieving  real 
ajis  reductions  rather  than  merely 
li  ting  increases  as  in  previous  trea- 
'• .  The  treaty  is  also  the  result  of 
■  ro  solidarity  in  responding  to  the 

at  posed  by  Soviet  deployment  of 

_'(!  missiles. 

On  -January  25,  1988,  the  treaty 

submitted  to  the  U.S.  Senate  for 

iilvice  and  consent  to  ratification. 

-  itcRic  Offensive  Forces 

I'liited  States  places  highest  pri- 
y  on  its  efforts  to  reach  an  equita- 
u  and  effectively  verifiable  agreement 
v  n  the  Soviet  Union  for  deep  and  sta- 
b  ',ing  reductions  in  strategic  nuclear 
-,  In  particular,  the  United  States 
s  reductions  in  the  most  destabiliz- 
11  nuclear  arms — fast-flying  ballistic 
n  siles,  especially  heavy,  interconti- 
r  tal  ballistic  missiles  with  multiple 
V  -heads. 

As  a  concrete  step  toward  this  end, 
t  United  States  presented  a  draft 
t  ity  at  the  strategic  arms  reduction 
t  ;s  in  Geneva  on  May  8,  1987.  This 
c  ft  treaty  reflected  the  basic  areas  of 
a  eement  on  strategic  arms  reductions 
r  ched  by  President  Reagan  and  Gen- 
6 1  Secretary  Gorbachev  at  Reykjavik 
i  Dctober  1986  to  achieve  50%  redue- 
tis  in  U.S.  and  Soviet  strategic  nu- 
c  ir  arms.  The  Soviets  presented  a 
ft  treaty  on  July  31,  1987.  While  the 
let  draft  contained  some  areas  of 
Milarity  to  the  U.S.  proposal,  it  of- 
fed  no  movement  on  the  major  out- 
snding  issues.  The  U.S.  and  Soviet 
ijift  treaties  provided  the  elements  for 
i'oint  draft  treaty  text,  which  con- 
ues  to  be  the  basis  of  negotiations. 

During  their  meetings  in  Wash- 
•  ton  in  December  1987,  President 
agan  and  General  Secretary  Gor- 
'  'hev  agreed  to  instruct  their  nego- 
tor.s  to  work  toward  completion  of  a 
ART  agreement  at  the  earliest  possi- 
';  date.  The  negotiators  are  building 
•  'on  areas  of  agreement:  50%  reduc- 
i^ns  as  reflected  in  the  joint  draft 


START  treaty  text,  including  ceilings  of 
no  more  than  1,600  strategic  offensive 
delivery  vehicles  with  6,000  warheads 
and  1,540  warheads  on  154  heavy 
ICBMs  as  well  as  the  agreed  rule  of 
account  for  heavy  bombers  and  their 
nuclear  armament. 

During  the  Washington  summit, 
the  two  leaders  made  further  progress 
on  START,  including  agreement  on  a 
sublimit  of  4,900  for  the  total  number  of 
ballistic  missile  warheads,  the  numbers 
of  warheads  attributed  to  existing 
types  of  ballistic  missiles,  and  approxi- 
mately a  .50%  reduction  in  the  existing 
aggregate  throw-weight  of  Soviet  inter- 
continental ballistic  missiles  and  sub- 
marine-launched ballistic  missiles,  with 
this  level  not  to  be  exceeded  by  either 
side  for  the  duration  of  the  treaty.  The 
leaders  also  agreed  on  guidelines  for 
effective  verification  of  a  START  treaty, 
including  short-notice,  onsite  inspec- 
tions, data  exchanges,  and  continuous 
onsite  monitoring  of  critical  facilities. 

In  recognition  of  the  importance  of 
details  for  effective  verification,  the 
United  States  has  presented  a  number 
of  key  verification  documents,  including 
a  draft  protocol  on  conversion  or  elim- 
ination (October  1987),  a  draft  protocol 
on  inspection  and  monitoring  (February 
1988),  and  a  draft  memorandum  of  un- 
derstanding on  data  exchange  (March 
1988).  After  the  Soviets  had  put  forth 
their  own  versions  of  these  documents, 
the  negotiators  were  able  to  develop 
joint  draft  texts,  a  step  critical  to  com- 
pletion of  a  START  treaty. 

However,  important  substantive 
differences  remain  on  issues  such  as 
mobile  intercontinental  ballistic  mis- 
siles; a  warhead  sublimit  on  ICBMs; 
modernization  of  existing  types  of  So- 
viet heavy  ICBMs;  counting  rules  for 
air-launched  cruise  missiles;  sea- 
launched  cruise  missiles;  and  the  details 
of  an  effective  verification  system.  In 


Acronyms 

ABM — Antiballistic  Missile  Treaty 
CORRTEX— continuous  reflectometry 

for  radius  versus  time  experiment 
IAEA— International  Atomic 

Energy  Agency 
ICBM — intercontinental  ballistic  missile 
INF— intermediate-range  nuclear  forces 
MBFR— mutual  and  balanced  force 

reductions 
SDI — Strategic  Defense  Initiative 
START — strategic  arms  reduction  talks 


apartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


addition,  the  Soviets  continue  to  link 
agreement  on  strategic  arms  reductions 
with  U.S.  acceptance  of  measures 
which  would  cripple  the  U.S.  Strategic 
Defense  Initiative.  The  United  States 
has  repeatedly  told  the  Soviets  that 
such  measures  are  unacceptable. 

The  United  States  seeks  a  fair  and 
durable  agreement  to  bring  about — for 
the  first  time  in  history — deep  reduc- 
tions in  the  strategic  nuclear  arsenals 
of  the  United  States  and  the  U.S.S.R. 
We  believe  such  an  agreement  could  be 
reached  this  year  if  the  Soviet  Union 
will  match  our  constructive  approach  to 
the  Geneva  negotiations. 

Defense  and  Space  Issues 

In  the  defense  and  space  forum,  the 
United  States  seeks  to  discuss  with  the 
Soviets  the  relationship  between  strate- 
gic offense  and  defense.  We  also  seek  to 
discuss  how,  if  we  establish  the  feasi- 
bihty  of  effective  defenses,  the  United 
States  and  U.S.S.R.  could  jointly  man- 
age a  stable  transition  to  deterrence 
based  increasingly  on  defenses — which 
threaten  no  one — rather  than  on  the 
threat  of  retaliation  by  offensive  nu- 
clear weapons. 

During  their  December  1987  meet- 
ings in  Washington,  President  Reagan 
and  General  Secretary  Gorbachev — tak- 
ing into  account  the  preparation  of  the 
START  treaty — instructed  their  Geneva 
negotiators  to  work  out  an  agreement 
that  would  commit  the  sides  to  observe 
the  Antiballistic  Missile  Treaty  as 
signed  in  1972,  while  conducting  their 
research,  development,  and  testing  as 
required,  which  are  permitted  by  the 
ABM  Treaty,  and  not  to  withdraw  from 
the  ABM  Treaty  for  a  specified  period 
of  time.  They  agreed  that  intensive  dis- 
cussions of  strategic  stability  shall  be- 
gin not  later  than  3  years  before  the 
end  of  the  specified  period,  after  which, 
in  the  event  the  sides  have  not  agreed 
otherwise,  each  side  will  be  free  to  de- 
cide its  own  course  of  action.  Such  an 
agreement  would  have  the  same  legal 
status  as  the  START  treaty,  the  Anti- 
ballistic  Missile  Treaty,  and  other  sim- 
ilar, legally  binding  agreements  and 
would  be  recorded  in  a  mutually  satis- 
factory manner. 

On  January  22,  1988,  the  United 
States  put  a  draft  defense  and  space 
treaty  on  the  table  at  the  Geneva  nego- 
tiations. This  draft  fulfilled  the  instruc- 
tions of  President  Reagan  and  General 
Secretary  Gorbachev.  The  U.S.  draft 
treaty  seeks  to  transform  the  areas  of 
agreement  reached  at  the  Washington 
summit  into  treaty  language  and  to 


17 


ARMS  CONTROL 


identify  and  resolve  areas  of 
disagreement. 

The  U.S.  draft  calls  for  a  new  and 
separate  treaty  and  incorporates  the 
following  elements: 

•  Entry  into  force  contingent  upon 
entry  into  force  of  a  START  treaty; 

•  Agreement  not  to  withdraw  from 
the  ABM  Treaty  for  a  "specified  period 
of  time"  to  be  determined  through 
negotiations; 

•  Observance  of  the  ABM  Treaty 
through  that  period  and  until  either 
party  chooses  a  different  course  of  ac- 
tion; and 

•  After  the  "specified  period  of 
time,"  either  party  is  free  to  choose  its 
own  course  of  action,  including  deploy- 
ment of  strategic  missile  defenses  be- 
yond the  limitations  of  the  ABM  Ti*eaty, 
after  giving  the  other  party  6-months 
written  notice  of  its  intention  to  do  so. 

The  United  States  also  proposes 
confidence-building  measures — in  the 
form  of  a  protocol  on  predictability — 
as  an  integral  part  of  the  defense  and 
space  treaty.  Such  measures  would 
provide  predictability  regarding  each 
side's  strategic  defense  programs.  On 
March  15,  1988,  the  United  States  pro- 
posed a  draft  predictability  protocol  to 
its  January  22  di-aft  treaty,  including  an 
annual  e.xchange  of  programmatic  data 
on  planned  strategic  defense  activities, 
reciprocal  briefings  on  respective  stra- 
tegic defense  efforts,  reciprocal  visits 
to  associated  research  facilities,  and  es- 
tablishment of  procedures  for  reciprocal 
observation  of  strategic  defense  tests. 

In  early  May  1988,  the  Soviets  pre- 
sented drafts  for  a  separate  defense 
and  space  agreement  and  associated 
side  agreements.  Although  these  Soviet 
drafts  use  the  agreed  language  from 
the  Washington  summit,  the  Soviets 
have  made  clear  that  they  continue  to 
maintain  an  interpretation  of  the  ABM 
Treaty  that  is  more  restrictive  than 
agreed  to  by  the  parties  in  1972.  The 
Soviet  proposal  fails  to  meet  funda- 
mental U.S.  concerns  such  as  the 
retention  of  rights  of  withdrawal 
recognized  under  international  law. 
f\irthermore,  Soviet  violations  of  the 
ABM  Treaty  continue.  The  United 
States  cannot  agree  to  any  further  ob- 
ligations until  the  Soviets  deal  with 
these  violations  satisfactorily. 

We  hope  that  the  Soviets  will  join 
us  in  serious  discussions  to  conclude  a 
defense  and  space  treaty  that  achieves 
the  important  goals  which  the  two  lead- 
ers identified  at  the  Washington  sum- 
mit. We  hope  that  such  a  treaty  will 


hasten  progi-ess  toward  a  safer,  more 
stable  world — one  with  reduced  levels 
of  nuclear  arms  and  an  enhanced  ability 
to  deter  war  based  on  the  increasing 
contribution  of  effective  strategic  de- 
fenses against  ballistic  missile  attack. 

Nuclear  Testing 

The  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  have  undertaken  step-by-step  ne- 
gotiations on  nuclear  testing.  In  these 
talks,  the  two  countries  agreed  as  a 
first  step  to  negotiate  effective  verifica- 
tion measures  for  two  existing  but  un- 
ratified nuclear  testing  treaties,  the 
Threshold  Test  Ban  Treaty  and  the 
Peaceful  Nuclear  Explosions  Treaty. 
Once  these  verification  concerns  have 
been  satisfied  and  the  treaties  ratified, 
the  United  States  will  propose  negotia- 
tions on  ways  to  implement  a  step-by- 
step  parallel  program — in  association 
with  a  program  to  reduce  and  ulti- 
mately eliminate  all  nuclear  weapons — 
of  limiting  and  ultimately  ending  nu- 
clear testing. 

We  are  making  progi'ess  toward 
our  goal  of  effective  verification  of  the 
two  existing  treaties.  During  the  De- 
cember 1987  summit  in  Washington,  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
agreed  to  design  and  conduct  a  joint 
verification  experiment  intended  to  fa- 
cilitate agreement  on  effective  verifica- 
tion of  these  two  treaties.  This  joint 
experiment,  which  will  take  place  at 
each  other's  nuclear  test  site,  will  pro- 
vide an  opportunity  to  measure  the 
yield  of  nuclear  explosions  using  tech- 
niques proposed  by  each  side.  Through 
this  experiment,  we  hope  to  provide 
the  Soviet  Union  with  all  the  informa- 
tion it  should  need  to  accept  U.S.  use 
of  CORRTEX— the  most  accurate  tech- 
nique we  have  identified  for  verification 
of  the  Threshold  Test  Ban  Treaty  and 
the  Peaceful  Nuclear  Explosions 
Ti-eaty. 

During  their  April  20-22,  1988, 
meetings  in  Moscow,  Secretary  Shultz 
and  Foreign  Minister  Shevardnadze 
approved  a  schedule  for  the  joint  veri- 
fication experiment  as  well  as  an 
agreement  on  its  conduct.  They  also  in- 
structed the  negotiators  to  complete 
annexes  to  the  agreement  which  would 
contain  technical  details  of  the  experi- 
ment. Preparations  for  the  experiment 
are  already  underway,  and  it  is  ex- 
pected the  experiment  will  be  con- 
ducted this  summer. 

At  their  April  meeting,  the  two 
ministers  also  instructed  their  nego- 
tiators to  complete  work  on  a  verifica- 


tion protocol  to  the  Peaceful  Nuclea  ' 
Explosions  Treaty  for  signature  at  t 
Moscow  summit.  In  the  case  of  the 
Threshold  Test  Ban  Treaty,  however 
the  Soviets  have  insisted  that  the  e.\ 
periment  is  necessary  before  the  pn,  > 
tocol  can  be  finalized.  The  negotiato 
are  now  focusing  on  arrangements  f 
conducting  the  experiment  as  soon  : 
possible,  at  the  same  time  continuin 
to  work  on  the  protocols.  We  hope  t 
Soviets  will  continue  to  work  with 
us  toward  agreement  on  effective 
verification  measures  that  would  pe  it 
these  treaties  to  be  ratified — a  long 
time  goal  of  the  Administration. 

Nuclear  Risk  Reduction  Centers 

On  April  1,  1988,  the  U.S.  Nuclear  sk 
Reduction  Center,  which  is  located 
the  Department  of  State,  officially 
opened.  This  center,  along  with  its   - 
viet  counterpart  in  Moscow,  was  esi  i- 
lished  through  an  agi-eement  signet  y 
Secretary  Shultz  and  Soviet  Foreig 
Minister  Shevardnadze  on  Septem- 
ber 15,  1987.  These  centers,  which  ; 
the  direct  result  of  a  U.S.  initiative 
are  practical  measures  that  strengt  n 
international  security  by  reducing  t 
risk  of  conflict  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  that  n'  lit| 
result  from  accident,  misinterpreta  n, 
or  miscalculation.  The  centers  exch  g« 
information  and  notifications  requii 
under  certain  existing  and  possible 
future  arms  control  and  confidence- 
building  measures  agreements.  For 
ample,  the  centers  would  be  used  t 
transmit  notifications  related  to  sh( 
notice  inspections  conducted  under 
INF  Ti-eaty. 

Nuclear  Nonproliferation 

In  January  1988,  the  United  States  ' 
the  Soviet  Union  held  the  10th  roui 
in  an  ongoing  series  of  consultation 
which  began  in  December  1982,  on 
nuclear  nonproliferation.  These  con 
tations  have  covered  a  wide  range 
of  issues,  including  prospects  for 
strengthening  the  international  noijj 
proliferation  regime,  support  for  tl  J 
Nuclear  Nonproliferation  Ti'eaty,  a\ 
the  mutual  desire  of  the  United  Sti 
and  the  U.S.S.R.  to  strengthen  thd 
ternational  Atomic  Energy  Agency| 
These  consultations  are  not  negotia 
tions  but,  rather,  discussions  to  rev 
in  depth  various  issues  of  common 
cern  related  to  efforts  to  prevent  til 
spread  of  nuclear  weapons.  The  ne;l 
consultations  will  be  held  around  til 
time  of  the  June  IAEA  Board  of  G'l 
nors  meeting. 


18 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/July^ 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Chronology:  January  1,  1986-May  13,  1988 


C5.-S0VIET  ARMS 
CNTROL  NEGOTIATIONS 

Nclear  and  Space  T^lks 

Bind  IV:  January  16-Mareh  4,  1986 
^md  V:  May  8-June  26,  1986 
Ijind  VI:  September  18-Novem- 

ler  13,  1986 
Find  VII:  January  15-March  6,  1987 

INF  continued  to  March  26) 
fand  VIII:  April  23-December  7,  1987 

I  INF);  May  5-November  23,  1987 

START  and  defense  and  space) 
I  md  IX:  Began  on  January  14,  1988 

(inference  on  Confidence- 
ii  Security-Building  Measures 
ii  Disarmament  in  Europe 
(I  ultilateral) 

1  and  IX:  January  28-March  15,  1986 
1  und  X:  April  15-Mav  23,  1986 
i  und  XI:  June  10-July  18,  1986 
1  und  XII:  August  19-September  19, 
986 — agreement  concluded 

I  nference  on  Security 
;  d  Cooperation  in  Europe 

■st  Round  of  FoUowup  Conference: 

\Iovember  4-December  20,  1986 

jiiiid  Round  of  FoUowup  Conference: 

lanuary  27-April  11,  1987 

inl  Round  of  FoUowup  Conference: 

Vlay  4-July  31,  1987 

urth  Round  of  FoUowup  Conference: 

September  22-December  18,  1987 

fth  Round  of  FoUowup  Conference: 

January  22-March  25,  1988 

<th  Round  of  FoUowup  Conference: 

Began  April  15,  1988 

)nference  on  Disarmament 
lultilateral) 

lemical  Weapons  Committee  Rump 

Session:  January  13-31,  1986 

)ring  Season:  February  4-April  25, 

1986 

immer  Session:  June  10-August  29, 

i;)<s6 

(lemical  Weapons  Committee  Chair- 
man's Consultations:  November  24- 
December  17,  1986 
lemical  Weapons  Committee  Rump 
Session:  January  6-30,  1987 
iring  Session:  February  2-April  30, 
1!IS7 

-immer  Session:  June  8-August  26, 
19X7 


Chemical  Weapons  Committee  Rump 

Session:  November  30-December  16, 

1987 
Chemical  Weapons  Committee  Rump 

Session:  January  11-29,  1988 
Spring  Session:  February  2-April  28, 

1988 
Summer  Session:  To  begin  July  7,  198^ 

Mutual  and  Balanced  Force 
Reductions  (Multilateral) 


Round  38: 
Round  39: 
Round  40: 

1986 
Round  41: 
Round  42: 
Round  43: 

1987 
Round  44: 
Round  45: 


January  30-March  20,  1986 
May  15-July  3,  1986 
September  25-December  4, 

January  29-March  19,  1987 
May  14-July  2,  1987 
September  24-December  3, 

January  28-March  17,  1988 
To  begin  May  19,  1988 


Nuclear  Risk  Reduction  Centers 

Round  I:  January  13,  1987 

Round  II:  May  3-4,  1987— agreement 

concluded,  ad  referendum; 

agreement  signed  in  Washington  on 

September  15,  1987 

Nuclear  Testing  Talks 

Round  I:  November  9-20,  1987 
Round  II:  Began  on  February  15,  1988 


U.S.-SOVIET  ARMS  CONTROL 
EXPERT-LEVEL  MEETINGS 

Mutual  and  Balanced 
Force  Reductions  Tklks 

August  6-7,  1986,  in  Moscow 
September  10-11,  1986,  in  Washington 

Conference  on  Confidence- 
and  Security-Building  Measures 
and  Disarmament  in  Europe 

August  14-15,  1986,  in  Stockholm 

Chemical  Weapons  Treaty  Talks 

January  28-February  3,  1986,  in  Geneva 
April  15-25,  1986,  in  Geneva 
July  1-18,  1986,  in  Geneva 
October  28-November  18,  1986,  in  New 
York  City 


February  16-March  5,  1987,  in  Geneva 
July  20-August  7,  1987,  in  Geneva 
November  30-December  17,  1987,  in 

Geneva 
March  8-25,  1988,  in  Geneva 

Biological  and  Toxin 
Weapons  Convention 

March  31-April  15,  1987,  in  Geneva 

Chemical  Weapons 
Nonproliferation  Discussions 

March  5-6,  1986,  in  Bern 
September  4-5,  1986,  in  Bern 
October  7-8,  1987,  in  Bern 


Conventional  Stability 
Mandate  Consultations 
(Multilateral) 

February  17-April  6,  1987,  in  Vienna 
May  11-July  31,  1987,  in  Vienna 
September  28-December  14,  1987,  in 

Vienna 
January  25-March  24,  1988,  in  Vienna 
April  20,  1988,  began  in  Vienna 

Nuclear  Testing 

First  Session:  July  25-August  1,  1986, 
in  Geneva 

Second  Session:  September  4-18,  1986, 
in  Geneva 

Third  Session:  November  13-25,  1986, 
in  Geneva 

Fourth  Session:  January  22,  1987  re- 
cessed on  Februai'y  9;  resumed  on 
March  16;  concluded  on  March  20  in 
Geneva 

Fifth  Session:  May  18-29,  1987,  in 
Geneva 

Sixth  Session:  July  13-20,  1987,  in 
Geneva 

Nuclear  Risk  Reduction  Centers 

May  5-6,  1986,  in  Geneva 
August  25,  1986,  in  Geneva 

Nuclear  Nonproliferation  Talks 

December  15-18,  1986,  in  Washington 
July  28-30,  1987,  in  Moscow 
January  11-14,  1988,  in  Washington 


ihHepartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


19 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Chemical  Weapons 

In  April  1984,  the  United  States  pre- 
sented, at  the  40-nation  Conference  on 
Disarmament  in  Geneva,  a  draft  treaty 
banning  development,  production,  use, 
transfer,  and  stockpiling  of  chemical 
weapons  to  be  verified  by  various 
means,  including  short-notice,  man- 
datory onsite  challenge  inspection.  At 
the  November  1985  Geneva  summit, 
President  Reagan  and  General  Secre- 
tary Gorbachev  agreed  to  intensify  bi- 
lateral discussions  on  all  aspects  of  a 
comprehensive,  global  chemical  weap- 
ons ban,  including  verification.  Since 
then,  we  have  held  eight  rounds  of  bi- 
lateral talks  on  a  chemical  weapons 
treaty.  A  ninth  round  is  proposed  for 
July  1988.  These  discussions  have  nar- 
rowed differences  in  a  few  areas,  in- 
cluding early  data  exchange  and 
destruction  of  production  facihties. 

Until  March  1987,  the  Soviets— 
who  possess  by  far  the  world's  largest 
chemical  weapon  stockpile — had  not  ad- 
mitted that  they  even  had  such  weap- 
ons. In  April  1987,  they  claimed  that 
they  had  stopped  producing  them,  had 
no  chemical  weapons  positioned  outside 
their  borders,  and  were  building  a  facil- 
ity to  destroy  existing  stocks.  They  also 
hosted  a  visit  by  Conference  on  Disar- 
mament representatives  to  the  Soviet 
chemical  weapon  facility  at  Shikhany  in 
October.  In  addition,  the  Soviets  finally 
accepted  a  longstanding  U.S.  invitation 
to  observe  the  U.S.  chemical  weapon 
destruction  facility  in  Tooele,  Utah;  on 
November  19-20,  1987,  a  delegation  of 
Soviet  experts  visited  that  facility.  We 
see  these  moves  as  useful  steps  toward 
building  confidence,  which  will  facilitate 
negotiation  of  an  effectively  verifiable 
ban  on  chemical  weapons. 

Nonetheless,  a  number  of  key  is- 
sues remain,  including  how  to  ensure 
participation  of  all  states  that  could 
pose  a  chemical  weapons  threat;  how  to 
strengthen  verification  in  light  of  new 
technologies,  the  continuing  prolifera- 
tion of  chemical  weapons,  and  the 
nature  of  chemical  industries  capable  of 
both  military  and  civihan  production; 
how  to  maintain  security  under  a  con- 
vention; and  how  to  protect  sensitive 
information  not  related  to  chemical 
weapons  during  inspections. 


At  the  December  1987  Washington 
summit.  President  Reagan  and  General 
Secretary  Gorbachev  reaffirmed  the 
need  for  intensified  negotiations  toward 
conclusion  of  a  truly  global  and  verifia- 
ble convention  encompassing  all  chem- 
ical weapons-capable  states.  They  also 
agreed  on  the  importance  of  greater 
openness  and  confidence-building  mea- 
sures. The  United  States  is  prepared  to 
work  constructively  with  other  mem- 
bers of  the  Conference  on  Disarmament 
to  resolve  outstanding  issues. 

In  addition  to  treaty  discussions, 
we  are  working  with  allies  and  other 
friendly  countries  as  well  as  with  the 
Soviets  on  preventing  the  proliferation 
of  chemical  weapons.  Primarily  in  re- 
sponse to  the  continuing  use  of  chem- 
ical weapons  in  the  Iran-Iraq  war,  the 
United  States  and  18  other  Western  in- 
dustrialized countries  have  been  con- 
sulting since  1985  to  harmonize  export 
controls  on  commodities  related  to 
chemical  weapon  production  and  to  de- 
velop other  mechanisms  to  curb  the  il- 
legal use  of  such  weapons  and  their 
dangerous  spread  to  other  countries. 
Also,  in  bilateral  discussions  with  the 
Soviets  on  chemical  weapon  non- 
proliferation,  we  have  reviewed  export 
controls  and  political  steps  to  limit  the 
spread  and  use  of  chemical  weapons. 

Conference  on  Confidence- 
and  Security-Building  Measures 
and  Disarmament  in  Europe 

In  September  1986,  after  almost  3 
years  of  negotiations,  the  35-nation 
Stockholm  Conference  on  Disarmament 
in  Europe  adopted  a  set  of  concrete 
measures  designed  to  increase  openness 
and  predictability  of  military  activities 
in  Europe.  These  measures,  which  are 
built  around  NATO  proposals,  provide 
for  prior  notification  of  certain  military 
activities  above  a  threshold  of  13,000 
troops  or  300  tanks,  observation  of  cer- 
tain military  activities  above  a  thresh- 
old of  17,000  troops,  and  annual 
forecasts  of  upcoming  notifiable  mili- 


tary activities.  The  accord  also  conta 
provisions  for  onsite  air  and  ground  i 
spections  for  verification,  with  no  rig 
of  refusal.  Although  modest  in  scope, 
these  provisions  were  the  first  time  t 
Soviet  Union  agreed  to  inspection  on 
its  own  territory  for  verification  of  ai 
international  security  accord.  The 
United  States  is  encouraged  by  the  r 
cord  of  implementation  to  date  which 
generally  reflects  both  the  letter  and 
the  spirit  of  the  Stockholm  document 
On  August  30,  1987,  the  United 
States — under  the  terms  of  the  Stocl 
holm  document — successfully  complei  I 
the  first-ever,  onsite  inspection  of  a  !r 
viet  military  exercise.  Since  then,  se 
eral  inspections  have  been  conducted  , 
both  NATO  and  the  Warsaw  Pact.  M 
recently,  the  United  States  conduete' 
an  inspection  in  April  of  troops  from 
the  German  Democratic  Republic  an( 
the  Soviet  Union  in  East  Germany. 
This  was  the  first  inspection  by  a  We  ■ 
ern  state  of  a  non-notified  activity.  Ii 
early  May,  Bulgaria  conducted  an  in- 
spection of  a  NATO  amphibious  exer 
cise  in  Italy.  The  United  States 
considers  inspections  an  integral  par  f 
the  Stockholm  agreement  and  an  im|  - 
tant  step  in  the  process  of  increasinj; 
openness  and  building  confidence  am 
security  in  Europe. 

Further  Negotiations  on  Confidenc 
and  Security-Building  Measures 

At  the  Vienna  CSCE  followup  meeti 
in  July  1987,  NATO  proposed  that  tl 
35  CSCE  participating  countries  re- 
sume negotiations  on  confidence-  anc 
security-building  measures  in  order 
build  on  and  expand  the  work  begun 
Stockholm.  Warsaw  Pact  and  neutral 
and  nonaligned  states  also  support  ri 
sumption  of  these  negotiations.  How 
ever,  final  agreement  to  resume  such 
negotiations  can  only  come  as  part  o 
balanced  outcome  to  the  Vienna  CSC 
Followup  Conference,  including  signi 
cant  progress  in  Eastern-bloc  human 
rights  performance. 

Conventional  Stability  T^lks 

NATO  began  consultations  with  the 
Warsaw  Pact  in  February  1987  to  de- 
velop a  mandate  for  new  negotiations 
on  conventional  stability  in  Europe.  . 


20 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/July  I'jg 


CANADA 


Jiy  1987,  representatives  of  NATO 
psented  a  draft  mandate  for  negotia- 
t  IS  between  the  countries  belonging 
t;;he  NATO  alliance  and  the  Warsaw 
Fl't,  covering  their  conventional  forces 
o'land  from  the  Atlantic  Ocean  to  the 
lal  Mountains.  These  negotiations 
wjld  take  place  within  the  framework 

0  he  CSCE  process  but  would  be  au- 
tiomous  regarding  subject  matter, 

ticipation,  and  pi-ocedures. 
Ill  the  ensuing  months,  the  ne- 
g  iators  have  reached  preliminary 
a'eement  on  several  aspects  of  the 
-  ndate,  including  procedures,  partici- 
its,  objectives  and  methods,  and  ver- 
atiiin.  Discussion  continues  on  the 
,  laiiiing  issues.  We  hope  to  conclude 

M'  mandate  discussions  in  1988  so  we 
c   get  the  new  negotiations  underway. 
i  with  the  negotiations  on  confidence- 
al  security-building  measures,  our 
lily  to  proceed  with  new  conven- 
lai  stability  negotiations  depends  on 
achievement  of  a  balanced  outcome 
he  Vienna  CSCE  Followup  Confer- 
.  e,  including  progress  in  Eastern- 
\  c  human  rights  performance. 

1  itual  and  Balanced 
1  -ce  Reductions 

(   December  5,  1985,  NATO  pre- 
.-  ited,  at  the  MBFR  negotiations,  a 
I  jor  initiative  designed  to  meet  East- 
( 1  concerns.  The  proposal  deferred 
I  ■  Western  demand  for  data  agree- 
I  nt  on  current  forces  prior  to  treaty 
i  nature.  The  Soviets  had  claimed  that 
(  s  Western  demand  was  the  primary 
I  idblock  to  agreement.  The  proposal 
o  called  for  a  time-limited,  first- 
ise  withdrawal  from  Central  Europe 
'5,000  U.S.  and  11,500  Soviet  troops, 
1  lowed  by  a  3-year,  no-increase  com- 
:  tment  by  all  parties  with  forces  in 
s  zone.  During  this  time,  residual 
ce  levels  would  be  verified  through 
tional  technical  means,  agreed  entry/ 
It  [loints,  data  exchange,  and  30 
nual  onsite  inspections.  Effective 
rification  of  a  conventional  arms 
reement  requires  such  special  mea- 
res.  The  Soviets  have  not  responded 
nstructively  to  the  Western 
itiative.H 


Visit  of  Canadian  Prime  Minister 


<iri»iiiTimn'nir 


^^^^9KfF^' 


F  TTTTTrajf  Tt^l^ 


Prime  Minister  Brian  Mulroney  of 
Canada  made  an  official  working  visit 
to  Washington,  D.C.,  April  26-28, 
1988,  to  meet  with  President  Reagan 
and  other  government  officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
President  Reagan  and  Prime  Minister 
Mulroney  at  the  arrival  ceremony  on 
April  27 A 

President  Reagan 

Bienvenue  [Welcome],  Brian  et  Mila. 
Nancy  and  I  welcome  you  in  the  name 
of  all  Americans.  Your  visit  is  more 
than  the  last  Washington  meeting  of 
two  fortunate  Irishmen  who  became 
leaders  of  their  two  countries.  To- 
gether, we're  looking  ahead  to  a  new 
era  of  growth  and  well-being  for  our 
two  countries.  In  1988  we're  witnessing 
a  dream  come  into  being  that  many  on 
both  sides  of  the  border  have  worked 
for:  an  agreement  created  to  drastically 
reduce  trade  and  tariff  barriers  be- 
tween our  two  great  nations.  We  shall 
show  by  deed  and  dedication,  after  the 
legislative  process  has  been  completed, 
that  the  lowering  of  tariffs  and  trade 
barriers  is  the  way  to  a  more  pros- 
perous world.  Protectionism  is  out,  and 
trade  expansion  is  in. 

We're  embarking  on  an  exciting 
new  beginning.  Our  free  trade  agree- 
ment is  recognized  beyond  North 


America  as  a  venture  never  before  at- 
tempted on  such  a  scale  by  two  sov- 
ereign and  independent  nations.  When 
accepted  by  Parliament  and  Congress, 
the  agreement  will  become  one  of  the 
most  important  achievements  of  my 
tenure  in  Washington.  President 
Eisenhower  asked  "the  free  world  to 
recognize  that  trade  barriers,  although 
intended  to  protect  a  country's  econ- 
omy, often  in  fact  shackle  its  pros- 
perity." Ike  would  be  satisfied,  I'm 
certain,  with  our  efforts  this  past  year. 
We  are  unshackling  our  trading  rela- 
tionship in  a  broad-based  effort  to 
make  our  two  countries  more  pros- 
perous at  home  while  making  ourselves 
more  competitive  abroad.  We're  players 
in  a  world  economy,  and  our  free  trade 
agreement  will  help  make  us  the  world- 
class  competitors  we  must  be. 

Our  agreement  is  remarkable  in 
many  ways.  It  has  balance  and  offers 
mutual  gains  for  two  huge  trading  part- 
ners. Permit  me,  Brian,  to  salute  the 
very  special  and  dedicated  Canadians 
and  Americans  who  worked  to  put  this 
agreement  together  and  who  made  it 
happen.  We  both  fielded  teams  of  big 
league  negotiators,  and  the  agreement 
is  indeed  a  product  of  their  combined 
abilities.  Our  countries  and  peoples 
have  been  well  served. 


rii$artment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


21 


CANADA 


I  am  confident  that  the  legislatures 
in  both  of  our  countries  will  vote  favor- 
ably on  this  historic  free  trade  agree- 
ment. Important  as  that  step  is,  there 
are  still  other  steps  to  be  taken  on  the 
global  economic  stage.  You  and  I  will 
be  meeting  again,  in  Toronto  this  June, 
at  the  economic  summit,  where  we  will 
have  discussions  with  our  colleagues 
from  Europe  and  Japan.  We  hope  to 
move  the  process  of  international  eco- 
nomic coordination  forward.  These  dis- 
cussions will  also  speed  the  way  to 
what  we  trust  will  be  a  successful 
GATT  [General  Agreement  on  Tariffs 
and  Trade]  round  of  negotiations.  We 
know  that  Canada  shares  with  us  our 
concerns  about  those  many  barriers  to 
agricultural  and  services  trade  that  are 
damaging  to  world  trade. 

We  both  attach  great  importance  to 
GATT.  While  the  tasks  of  the  present 
round  are  formidable,  it  is  essential 
that  we  give  substance  to  a  comprehen- 
sive multilateral  reform  of  the  interna- 
tional trading  system.  This  will  not  be 
easy  to  accomphsh,  but  it  must  be  un- 
dertaken. And  our  objectives  must  in- 
clude meaningful  progress  on 
agriculture.  Agriculture  is  fundamental 
to  both  our  economies,  and  it  is  an  ex- 
port area  in  which  we're  highly  com- 
petitive in  a  free  and  open  world 
market.  The  United  States  actively 
seeks  the  elimination  of  all  subsidies  in 
agriculture  as  a  top  priority.  Together 
we  must  be  successful  in  order  to  re- 
store market  forces  in  world 
agriculture. 

Cooperation  is  the  hallmark  of  our 
relationship  in  other  areas.  We  will  be 
working  with  Canada  on  the  largest  co- 
operative high-technology  project  we 
have  ever  undertaken:  the  permanently 
manned  civil  space  station.  Cooperation 
has  also  been  the  basis  of  our  nearly 
80-year  tradition  of  shared  concern  for 
our  environment.  Much  has  already 
been  done,  and  experts  on  both  sides  of 
the  border  recognize  the  results  that 
have  been  achieved.  Both  our  countries 
have  made  substantial  progress  in  im- 
proving air  quality.  We  have  advanced 
our  efforts  to  improve  the  water  quaHty 
of  the  Great  Lakes.  More  can  be  done 
to  protect  our  environment  as  science 
clearly  points  the  way,  but  make  no 
mistake,  we  are  moving. 

Ours  is  a  relationship  of  people  and 
their  ability  to  hold  personal  rela- 
tionships across  a  national  border.  They 
form  them  easily  and  quickly,  in  good 
times  and  during  times  of  stress.  Today 
warm  and  close  professional  working 
ties  are  enjoyed  and  valued  by  serv- 


icemen and  women  of  both  our  armed 
forces.  It  has  made  for  an  everyday  ca- 
maraderie that  has  become  both  unique 
among  armed  forces  and  commonplace 
in  our  bilateral  security  relations.  It  is 
of  great  benefit  to  the  smooth  operation 
of  NORAD  [North  American  Aerospace 
Defense  Command]  and  NATO  and  our 
shared  responsibilities  for  the  defense 
of  North  America. 

In  recent  years  we've  been  heart- 
ened by  Canada's  renewed  efforts  to 
strengthen  its  military  forces — efforts 
forcefully  spelled  out  in  last  year's  de- 
fense white  paper.  With  this  strength- 
ening has  gone  the  Canadian 
Government's  commitment  to  enlarge 
its  contribution  to  the  defense  effort  of 
the  West  and  to  support  this  commit- 
ment with  the  necessary  budgets.  This 
is  but  another  illustration  of  a  shared 
sense  of  purpose  that  Canada  and  the 
United  States  nurture  to  make  the  al- 
liance stronger. 

As  I  prepare  for  Moscow,  I  wel- 
come your  thoughts  on  how  we  can  fur- 
ther relieve  international  tensions. 
Thus,  Brian,  we  have  our  work,  as  al- 
ways, cut  out  for  us  during  our  visit. 
Let's  go  to  it. 

Prime  Minister  Mulroney 

I  want  to  thank  you,  Mr.  President,  for 
your  kind  words  and  generous  welcome. 
It's  a  pleasure  to  be  back  among  good 
friends. 

The  friendship  between  our  people 
stretches  back  generations  and 
stretches  across  a  continent.  Our  rela- 
tionship is  a  model  for  civilized  con- 
duct. It  reflects  what  is  best  in  the 
democratic  values  on  which  free  so- 
cieties are  based.  On  more  than  one 
occasion  we  have  made  common  cause 
in  the  defense  of  the  values  we  hold 
dear,  and  we  remain  vigilant  in  the  de- 
fense of  freedoms  we  cherish.  As  one  of 
my  distinguished  predecessors,  John 
Diefenbaker,  once  put  it — he  happened 
to  be  a  conservative  as  well — "We  are 
the  children  of  our  geography,  products 
of  the  same  hopes,  faith,  and  dreams." 

Last  year,  Americans  made  almost 
37  million  visits  to  Canada,  the  world's 
largest  tourist  invasion,  save  one, 
which  would  be  the  nearly  45  million 
visits  made  last  year  by  Canadians  to 
the  United  States.  And  I  think  that 
gives  you  an  indication  of  what  really 
goes  on  in  February  in  Canada.  [Laugh- 
ter] Don't  try  and  call  a  meeting. 
[Laughter]  You  would  be  quick  to  note 
an  imbalance  in  those  figures,  and  I 
point  this  out  to  Secretary  Baker  [Sec- 


retary of  the  Ti-easury  James  A.  Baki 
III] — there's  an  imbalance  in  those  fi{ 
ures,  an  imbalance  in  your  favor.  But) 
assure  you,  we  have  no  plans  to  legis* 
late  against  it. 

I  was  determined  when  I  took  ofi 
fice  to  approach  relations  between  oui 
countries  in  a  spirit  of  openness  and 
perseverance  in  dealing  with  the  prol 
lems  that  faced  us.  I  found  in  you  a 
leader  of  warmth  and  directness.  We 
have  met  regularly.  In  fact,  our  seriei 
of  annual  meetings  is  unprecedented 
the  history  of  Canada-U.S.  relations,, 
and  I  would  hope  that  it  is  now  a  pen 
manent  feature  of  our  relationship.  Iv 
the  President's  second  term  of  office- 
and  in  what  I  hope  will  be  known  afti 
wards  as  my  first  [laughter] — we  havi 
done  much  to  repair  and  refurbish  tU 
relationship  between  Canada  and  the« 
United  States.  I  haven't  the  slightest 
doubt  that  the  President  could  go  on 
and  on — to  quote  Mrs.  Thatcher's  [U. 
Prime  Minister  Margaret  Thatcher] 
noted  turn  of  phrase — but  I  gather  ye 
have  something  in  this  country  callec 
the  22d  amendment.  But  the  principl 
we  set  out  for  ourselves  at  Quebec  in* 
1985,  by  this  President  and  myself,  I| 
believe  have  served  us  well. 

We  have  reinforced  our  links  in  t' 
largest  trading  partnership  in  the  hia 
tory  of  the  world.  In  January  the  Pre! 
dent  and  I  signed  the  free  trade 
agreement,  under  which  both  countri* 
stand  to  gain.  As  Secretary  Baker  sa 
in  Ottawa  last  week,  this  achievement 
will  grow  in  stature  and  importance 
over  time.  Its  geopolitical  potential  is 
most  significant.  And  I,  too,  want  toi 
pay  tribute  to  Jim  Baker  and  Claytoi* 
Yeutter  [U.S.  Trade  Representative] 
for  the  very  constructive  role  they 
played  with  our  top  people  at  a  most! 
critical  juncture  of  the  negotiations. 
The  implications  of  the  free  trade 
agreement  go  far  beyond  our  border 
and  far  beyond  the  shores  of  this  con 
nent,  for  what  transpires  between  thi 
world's  largest  trading  partners  hold 
certain  significance  in  the  multilaten 
context. 

We  have  renewed  our  defense  re, 
tionship  with  the  modernization  of  al 
defense  arrangements  and  enhanced 
contributions  to  NATO.  We  have 
reached  a  pragmatic  solution  on  the  i 
sue  of  transit  through  the  Northwes' 
passage.  The  issue  of  acid  rain  remai 
a  challenge  for  us.  This,  as  you  said- 
Quebec  City,  Mr.  President,  is  a  prdl 
lem  that  belongs  to  both  of  us.  We  m 
continue — and  we  shall — to  work  to- 
gether for  an  equitable  solution  to  t| 
important  challenge. 


22 


Department  of  State  Builetin/Julv  lifA 


CANADA 


And  so,  we  have  a  good  deal  to 
iiss  together  and  with  our  officials. 
ik  forward  to  my  lunch  today  with 
letary  Shultz,  as  well  as  my  meet- 
with  the  congressional  leadership 
.  in  a  special  way,  my  meetings  with 
\'ice  President. 

1  want  to  thank  you  again  for  the 
inth  and  genuineness  of  your  wel- 
e.  Mila  and  I  are  delighted  to  be 
1  .\()u  and  Nancy  again.  And  if  I 
(.iinclude,  Mr.  President,  I  will  by 
liuling  with  a  remark  that  you 
le  to  me  in  Quebec  City  when  you 


were  leaving,  as  you  observed  Nancy 
and  Mila  getting  out  of  their  car  to 
come  and  join  us.  And  you  took  one 
look  at  it,  and  you  said  to  me,  "Brian, 
well,  for  two  Irishmen,  we  certainly 
married  up."  [Laughter] 

Thank  you,  Mr.  President. 


B  kgrround 

T  relationship  between  Canada  and 
United  States  is  both  productive 
ti implex — more  so  than  our  ties  to 
I  it  her  country.  We  each  play  a  dis- 
t  1 1  lit  compatible  role  in  world  af- 
,  and  our  security  interests  are 
t lieable.  We  are  each  other's  most 
iitant  economic  partner.  With  two 
CI  itries  as  interdependent  as  ours,  oc- 
c;  onal  differences  naturally  arise,  but 
b  1  Prime  Minister  Mulroney  and 
P  sident  Reagan  have  placed  a  high 
p  irity  on  maintaining  the  good  rela- 
ti  s  that  now  e.xist. 

In  September  1984,  the  two  agreed 
ti  neet  annually  (this  year,  April  27-28 
ii  Vashington)  to  cover  bilateral  and 
g  3al  concerns,  and  Cabinet  officers 

*  e  encouraged  to  talk  frequently 

V  h  their  counterparts.  Secretary 

S  iltz  meets  at  least  four  times  a  year 

V  h  Canadian  Secretary  of  State  for 
I  ternal  Affairs  Joe  Clark. 

Irlier  Summits 

I  March  1985,  the  President  met  with 

*  Prime  Minister  at  Quebec  City. 
>  signed  a  number  of  important 
uiiients,  including  declarations  on 

i  ernational  security  and  trade  rela- 
tns;  agreed  on  the  modernization  of 
■'  rth  American  air  defenses;  and 
'.'hanged  ratifications  on  a  Pacific 
'  Imon  Treaty.  They  also  agreed  to 

:)oint  special  envoys  to  examine  the 

d  rain  issue. 
During  their  March  1986  meeting  in 

ishington,  the  President  and  Prime 
inister  signed  a  5-year  renewal  of  the 
jjrth  American  Aerospace  Defense 

ORAD)  Agreement  and  committed 

^mselves  to  implementing  the  acid 

m  report. 


'Made  on  the  South  Portico  of  the 
White  House  where  Prime  Minister 
Mulroney  was  accorded  a  formal  welcome 
with  full  military  honors  (te.xt  from  Weekly 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  of 
May  2,  1988).B 


LS. -Canada  Relations 


The  April  1987  summit  in  Ottawa 
underlined  the  importance  the  two 
leaders  attached  to  their  bilateral  trade 
initiative,  focused  on  the  Arctic  sov- 
ereignty issue,  and  reviewed  environ- 
mental concerns. 

Global  Interests 

Canada  and  the  United  States  are 
founding  members  of  the  United  Na- 
tions and  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Or- 
ganization (NATO).  Both  are  active  in 
international  affairs  and  consult  exten- 
sively on  development  assistance,  arms 
control  efforts,  and  peacekeeping 
issues. 

Security  Relations 

In  addition  to  being  NATO  allies,  the 
United  States  and  Canada  maintain  the 
joint  NORAD  Command.  A  unique  ar- 
rangement to  develop  and  procure  de- 
fense goods  also  exists.  Our  security 
relationship  is  coordinated  by  the  Per- 
manent Joint  Board  on  Defense. 

Economic  Relations 

The  volume  of  U.S. -Canadian  trade  has 
tripled,  from  $39  billion  in  1974  to  more 
than  $125  billion  in  1987,  accounting  for 
about  22%  of  total  U.S.  trade  and  more 
than  75%  of  Canada's  exports.  Our  ex- 
ports to  Canada  amount  to  one-and- 
one-half  times  the  total  exported  to 
Japan,  our  next  largest  customer. 

Canada  is  also  our  largest  invest- 
ment partner.  In  1987  U.S.  investment 
in  Canada  totaled  about  $57  billion, 
20%  of  U.S.  investment  abroad.  Can- 
ada's private  direct  investment  in  the 
United  States  amounted  to  about  $20 
billion. 


The  duty-free  bilateral  trade  in  ve- 
hicles and  parts  we  share  with  Canada 
was  established  under  a  1965  agree- 
ment. The  total  exchange  for  auto- 
motive products  in  1987  was  about  $45 
billion. 

The  United  States  and  Canada 
have  the  world's  largest  bilateral  trad- 
ing relationship,  and  it  is  now  to  be 
dramatically  strengthened.  On  January 
2,  1988,  the  President  and  Prime  Minis- 
ter signed  a  historic  free  trade  agree- 
ment that  Congress  and  the  Canadian 
Parliament  must  now  approve.  Over  10 
years,  it  will  remove  all  tariffs;  remove 
virtually  all  import  and  export  restric- 
tions; reduce  or  eliminate  many  non- 
tariff  barriers;  resolve  many 
longstanding  bilateral  irritants;  estab- 
lish an  effective  trade  dispute  settle- 
ment mechanism;  and  liberalize  trade  in 
several  areas,  including  agriculture, 
autos,  energy,  financial  services,  and 
government  procurement.  By  applying 
binding  rules  to  guide  trade  in  services 
and  setting  agreed  rules  to  govern  bi- 
lateral investment  activity,  the  free 
trade  agreement  breaks  new  gi-ound. 

Energy 

At  the  1985  Quebec  summit,  both  coun- 
tries declared  their  intention  to 
strengthen  their  market  approach  to  bi- 
lateral energy  trade.  Since  then  Canada 
has  removed  certain  legislative  and  reg- 
ulatory measures  that  discriminated  un- 
fairly against  U.S.  and  other  foreign 
investors,  while  the  United  States  has 
continued  to  deregulate  its  energy  mar- 
kets. Canada  is  by  far  our  largest  sup- 
plier of  imported  energy — oil,  uranium, 
natural  gas,  and  electricity — and  this 
relationship  will  be  made  secure  under 
the  free  trade  agreement. 

During  1987  Canada  also  was  the 
largest  market  for  U.S.  coal  exports. 
The  total  value  of  two-way  energy  trade 
has  grown  to  $9.3  billion. 

Environment 

Canada  and  the  United  States  both  de- 
sire to  protect  the  North  American  en- 
vironment. Environmental  cooperation 
has  a  long  history;  the  joint  cleanup  of 
the  Great  Lakes  following  a  U.S. -Can- 
ada agreement  in  1972  is  a  recent  suc- 
cess story.  Canadian  controls  on  air 
pollution  and  toxic  chemicals  generally 
have  been  less  stringent  than  U.S.  reg- 
ulations, although  the  Canadian  Gov- 
ernment has  moved  to  tighten  some 
standards. 


artment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


23 


CANADA 


An  important  bilateral  issue  is  acid 
rain,  a  form  of  transboundary  air  pollu- 
tion that  Canadians  fear  threatens  their 
forests  and  freshwater  streams;  they 
have  proposed  that  both  countries  be- 
gin soon  to  reduce  the  emissions  be- 
lieved responsible.  Canada  has  initiated 
a  program  to  reduce  its  sulfur  dioxide 
emissions  50%  by  1994.  The  United 
States  is  continuing  to  reduce  emissions 
under  current  laws  while  devoting  large 
sums  to  intensive  research  and  pilot 
demonstration  projects,  as  part  of  a 
multi-year,  $5-billion  joint  Federal- 
private  industry  program.  The  special 
envoys'  joint  report  on  acid  rain  has 
been  completed  and  is  being 
implemented. 

Maritime  Boundary  and  Fisheries 

In  October  1984,  the  International 
Court  of  Justice,  at  the  request  of  the 
United  States  and  Canada,  ruled  on  the 
disputed  boundary  in  the  Gulf  of  Maine. 
The  ruling  settled  the  boundary,  which 
gave  Canada  jurisdiction  over  about 
one-si.xth  of  the  rich  Georges  Bank  fish- 
ing grounds. 

With  the  signature  of  the  Arctic 
Cooperation  Agreement  in  January 
1988,  the  United  States  and  Canada 
solved  their  dispute  concerning  the  wa- 
ters off  the  Canadian  Arctic  Islands. 
Canada  claims  these  waters  are  inter- 
nal, a  claim  the  United  States  does  not 
recognize.  The  agreement  will  permit 
the  United  States  and  Canada  to  in- 
crease their  cooperation  in  the  Arctic 
without  prejudicing  the  legal  position  of 
either  country. 


U.S.-Canada  Free  Trade  Agreement 


Taken  from  the  GIST  series  of  April  1988, 
published  by  the  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs, 
Department  of  State.  Editor;  Harriet 
Culley.B 


On  January  2,  1988,  President  Reagan 
and  Prime  Minister  Mulroney  of  Canada 
signed  the  U.S.-Canada  Free  Trade 
Agreement  (FTA).  This  historic  agree- 
ment represents  the  culmination  of 
efforts  stretching  back  more  than  100 
years.  When  approved  by  the  U.S. 
Congress  and  the  Canadian  Parliament, 
it  will  strengthen  an  already  extensive 
trading  relationship  and  will  enhance 
economic  opportunity  on  both  sides  of 
our  common  border. 

Each  year  the  United  States  and 
Canada  exchange  more  goods  and  serv- 
ices than  any  two  countries  in  the 
world.  Bilateral  trade  in  goods  and 
services  exceeded  $166  billion  in  1987. 
The  elimination  of  tariffs  and  most 
other  barriers  to  trade  between  the 
two  countries  under  the  FTA  will  in- 
crease economic  growth,  lower  prices, 
expand  employment,  and  enhance  the 
competitiveness  of  both  countries  in 
the  world  marketplace. 

While  the  FTA  does  not  eliminate 
all  trade  problems  between  the  United 
States  and  Canada,  it  does  provide  a 
consultative  framework  in  which  these 
problems  can  be  managed  before  they 
create  serious  economic  and  political 
frictions.  Predictably  in  the  years 
ahead,  industries  in  both  the  United 
States  and  Canada  can  expect  to  un- 
dergo some  structural  readjustment  to 
adapt  to  changing  market  conditions. 
However,  freer,  less  restricted  trade 
permitted  by  the  FTA  will  spur  both 
the  American  and  Canadian  economies 
to  higher  growth  rates,  increased  effi- 
ciency, and  improved  competitiveness 
with  other  trading  partners. 

The  FTA  is  fully  consistent  with 
U.S.  and  Canadian  obligations  under 
the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Ti-ade  (GATT).  It  does  not  lessen  com- 
mitments to  achieve  multilateral  trade 
liberalization.  Rather,  it  establishes 
useful  precedents  for  such  negotiations 
and  encourages  worldwide  trade  liber- 
alization. 

The  GATT  system  has  served  trad- 
ing nations  well  for  40  years.  However, 
this  global  system  has  traditionally 
been  restricted  to  trade  in  goods.  Serv- 
ices and  investment  have  become  in- 
creasingly important  aspects  of 
international  economic  activity,  how- 
ever, and  the  United  States  and  Canada 
are  working  together  in  the  ongoing 
Uruguay  Round  of  multilateral  trade 
talks  to  expand  GATT  coverage  to  in- 


clude investment  and  services.  Ratil  i- 
tion  of  the  FTA  this  year  is  importa. 
in  providing  needed  impetus  to  thesi 
negotiations. 

The  FTA  and  implementing  legi 
lation  must  be  approved  by  the  U.S. 
Congress,  which  under  "fast  track"    j- 
cedures  has  90  legislative  days  for  C( 
sideration;  amendments  are  not  per- 
mitted. The  Administration  agreed  ( 
February  17,  1988,  to  work  with  the 
appropriate  congressional  committer 
in  drafting  the  implementing  legisla  n 
and  not  to  submit  the  bill  until  aftei 
June  1,  1988.  In  turn,  the  congressic  .1 
leadership  agreed  to  vote  on  the  bill 
during  its  current  session. 

In  Canada,  entry  into  an  intern 
tional  agreement  is  exclusively  a  poi  r 
of  the  Prime  Minister  and  Cabinet,    i- 
liament  only  approves  the  implemen  ig 
legislation.  The  parliamentary  syste 
which  ensures  party  discipline  in  th 
House  of  Commons,  should  lead  to  j  - 
sage  of  the  FTA  bill.  Although  the  i  i- 
ate,  which  is  controlled  by  the  oppo 
tion,  also  must  approve  the  bill,  the 
appears  to  be  significant  support  fo 
in  that  body.  Article  103  of  the  FTA 
obligates  Canada  to  ensure  that  the 
needed  changes  to  provincial  laws  a 
regulations  are  made.  Prime  Minist 
Mulroney  has  stated  that  Canada  wi 
implement  the  agreement,  as  sched- 
uled, on  January  1,  1989. 

Assuming  that  the  U.S.  Congre 
and  the  Canadian  Parliament  appro' 
the  FTA  during  1988,  the  agreemen 
will  enter  into  force  on  January  1,  1!  I. 
The  two  governments  will  then  esta 
lish  a  joint  Canada-U.S.  Ti-ade  Com 
mission  to  oversee  its  implementatic 
A  secretariat  in  each  capital  (Wash- 
ington, D.C.,  and  Ottawa)  will  be  tl 
principal  government  office  responsi  e 
for  that  country's  implementation  of  le 
agreement.  In  the  United  States,  g( 
ernment  agencies  will  continue  to  st  < 
the  views  of  business  and  industry  i 
the  FTA  is  implemented,  including  i  J 
possible  expansion  of  the  agreement 
scope. 

SUMMARY  OF  KEY  PROVISION 

The  agreement  contains  provisions 
covering  virtually  every  traded  sect 
The  following  is  a  synopsis  of  these 
provisions.  , 


24 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/July  1)6 


CANADA 


.i  lagement  of  Trade 

Tariffs:  Eliminates  all  tariffs  on 
'    and  Canadian  goods  by  1998. 
,  tariffs  will  be  removed  immedi- 
>  i.Ianuary  1,  1989,  if  agreement  ap- 
ed in  1988),  while  the  others  will  be 
fil  out  over  5-10  years. 
Rule  of  Origin:  Rules  of  origin  de- 
fii  goods  eligible  for  FTA  treatment 
'  prevent  "free  riding."  Goods  wholly 
( liK-ed  in  the  United  States  or  Can- 
(lualify  for  FTA  treatment.  Goods 
cc.aining  imported  components  qualify 
if  ifficiently  transformed  to  change 
,,  ff  classification.  In  some  cases  there 
.  1  additional  requirement  that  50% 
'St  of  manufacturing  be  in  the 
•.111  States  or  Canada. 

Customs:  Ends  customs  user  fees 
fc  goods  and  most  duty  drawback  pro- 
-  Tis  (in  which  importers  have  duty 
-  ited)  by  1994  for  bilateral  trade; 

-  duty  waivers  linked  to  perform- 

■  requirements  by  1998  (except  for 

Auto  Pact). 

Quotas:  Eliminates  import  and  ex- 
p  ;  quotas  unless  consistent  with  the 
G  TT  or  explicitly  grandfathered  (al- 
k  =d  to  remain  in  place)  by  the  FTA. 

National  Treatment:  Reaffirms 
IT  principle  preventing  discrimina- 
against  imported  goods. 

Standards:  Prohibits  use  of  prod- 
u  standards  as  a  trade  barrier  and 
p  ddes  for  national  treatment  of  test- 
fa  labs  and  certifications  bodies. 

Emergency  Action:  Allows  tempo- 
T  y  import  restrictions  to  protect  do- 
ll 5tic  industries  harmed  by  increased 
ii  lorts  from  the  other  country  in  lim- 
it I  circumstances. 

A-iculture  and  Industry 

Agriculture:  Eliminates  all  bilat- 
e  1  tariffs  and  export  subsidies  and 
1:  its  or  eliminates  quantitative  restric- 
t:s  on  some  agricultural  products,  in- 
I'ding  meat.  Eliminates  Canadian 
i  rort  licenses  for  wheat,  oats,  and 
'ley  when  U.S.  crop  price  supports 
e(|ual  to  or  less  than  those  in  Can- 
- ;.  Increases  Canadian  poultry  and 
<!?  import  quotas.  For  20  years,  allows 
'  iffs  on  fruits  and  vegetables  to  be 
mposed  to  protect  the  domestic 
I'ket  if  prices  fall  below  the  5-year 
■  'rage. 


Energy:  Prohibits  most  import  and 
export  restrictions  on  energy  goods,  in- 
cluding minimum  export  prices.  Re- 
quires any  export  quotas  designed  to 
enforce  either  short  supply  or  conserva- 
tion measures  to  ensure  continuation  of 
the  historical  proportionate  share  of  re- 
sources. Provides  for  Alaskan  oil  ex- 
ports of  up  to  50,000  barrels  per  day  to 
Canada  under  certain  conditions. 

Autos:  Replaces  eligibility  rule  for 
duty-free  Auto  Pact  imports  into  the 
United  States  with  tougher  FTA  rule  of 
origin.  (Most  auto  trade  already  is  duty 
free  under  the  1965  U.S. -Canada  Auto 
Pact.)  FTA  continues  Auto  Pact  and 
programs  allowing  pact-qualified  com- 
panies to  import  duty  free  into  Canada 
but  does  not  allow  new  firms  to  qualify 
for  pact  membership.  Permits  U.S. 
auto  and  parts  exports  that  meet  the 
FTA  rule  to  enter  Canada  at  FTA  tariff 
rates,  which  will  be  reduced  to  zero  by 
1998.  Ends  by  1996  Canadian  non-Auto 
Pact  production-based  duty  remission 
programs  (under  which  producers  pay 
less  duty  for  automotive  imports  into 
Canada  for  meeting  Canadian  produc- 
tion requirements)  and  export-based 
programs  by  1998  (those  based  on  ex- 
ports to  the  United  States  will  be 
ended  on  January  1,  1989). 

Wine  and  Distilled  Spirits: 

Removes  most  discriminatory  pricing 
and  listing  practices  against  wine  or 
spirits  imported  from  the  other  coun- 
try. Prohibits  new  restrictions  on  beer. 

Softwood  Lumber:  Preserves  the 
1986  Memorandum  of  Understanding 
with  Canada  on  lumber  pricing  prac- 
tices of  Canadian  provinces. 

Cultural  Industries:  Exempts  in- 
dustries such  as  publishing,  broadcast- 
ing, and  films.  However,  if  this  exemp- 
tion results  in  practices  that  restrain 
trade  (otherwise  inconsistent  with  the 
FTA),  the  injured  party  may  take  mea- 
sures of  equivalent  commercial  effect 
without  resort  to  dispute  settlement. 

Services 

Government  Procurement: 

Expands  the  size  of  federal  government 
procurement  markets  open  to  compet- 
itive bidding  by  suppliers  from  the 
other  country. 

Services:  Commits  governments 
not  to  discriminate  against  covered 
service  providers  of  the  other  country 
when  making  future  laws  or  regulations 
(transportation  services  are  excluded). 


Business  Travel:  Facilitates  cross- 
border  travel  for  business  visitors — in- 
vestors, traders,  professionals,  or  exec- 
utives transferred  within  the  company. 

Investment  and  Financial  Services 

Investment:  Provides  national 
treatment  for  establishment,  acquisi- 
tion, sale,  conduct,  and  operation  of 
businesses  (exempts  transportation). 
Commits  Canada  to  end  review  of  indi- 
rect acquisitions  by  U.S.  companies 
and  raises  the  threshold  for  review  of 
direct  acquisitions  in  most  sectors  to 
C$150  million  (constant  1992  Canadian 
dollars).  Bans  imposition  of  most  per- 
formance requirements  (i.e.,  local  con- 
tent, export,  import  substitution,  and 
local  sourcing  requirements)  imposed 
on  foreign  investments. 

Financial  Services:  Exempts  U.S. 
bank  subsidiaries  from  Canada's  16% 
ceiling  on  Canadian  domestic  banking 
assets  allowed  to  be  held  by  foreign 
banks.  Ends  Canada's  foreign  owner- 
ship restriction  on  U.S.  purchases  of 
shares  in  federally  regulated  financial 
institutions.  Assumes  that  reviews  of 
U.S.  firms'  applications  for  entry  into 
Canadian  financial  markets  will  be  on 
the  same  basis  as  Canadian  firms'  ap- 
plications. Permits  banks  in  the  United 
States  to  underwrite  and  deal  in  debt 
securities  fully  backed  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  Canada  or  Canadian  political 
subdivisions. 

Resolving  Disputes 

General  Dispute  Settlement 

(except  for  cultural  industries— publish- 
ing, broadcasting,  film,  etc. — financial 
services,  countervailing  duty,  and  anti- 
dumping cases):  Establishes  a  bina- 
tional  commission  to  resolve  disagree- 
ments; allows  for  arbitration  if  the  par- 
ties desire. 

Dispute  Settlement  for  Counter- 
vailing Duty  and  Antidumping  Cases: 

Countries  will  continue  to  apply  exist- 
ing national  laws,  but  court  review  of 
administrative  agency  determinations  in 
either  country  will  be  replaced  by  a 
binational  panel.  The  panel  will  apply 
the  same  standard  and  scope  of  review 
as  would  the  relevant  court. 


ipartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


25 


CANADA 


QUESTIONS  ABOUT  THE  FTA 

The  following  are  frequently  asked 
questions  about  how  the  FTA  is  ex- 
pected to  operate  and  how  it  might 
affect  various  sectors  of  the  U.S. 
economy. 


General 

Q:  Does  the  United  States  have  a 
free  trade  agreement  with  countries 
other  than  Canada? 

A:  The  United  States  has  a  less 
comprehensive  free  trade  agreement 
with  Israel. 

Q:  What  other  free  trade 
agreements  is  the  Administration 
planning? 

A:  The  Administration  has  no  plan 
at  this  time  to  negotiate  other  free 
trade  agi'eements.  If  the  Administra- 
tion were  to  consider  negotiating  an- 
other agreement,  it  would  need  to 
consult  with  and  seek  special  authority 
from  the  Congress. 

Q:  Why  is  the  United  States  plan- 
ning to  eliminate  its  duties  on  such 
sensitive  products  as  textiles  and  ap- 
parel, lead,  zinc,  and  certain  fish 
products,  etc.,  when  these  industries 
are  in  economic  distress. 

A:  Both  countries  agreed  to  elimi- 
nate duties  on  all  products,  including 
sensitive  ones.  Canada  also  must  elimi- 
nate duties  on  sensitive  products.  The 
total  elimination  of  tariffs  between  the 
United  States  and  Canada  is  the  only 
way  to  achieve  the  widest  trade  liber- 
alization possible  in  goods  and  services. 
However,  recognizing  the  sensitivity  of 
certain  industrial  sectors  in  both  coun- 
tries, the  FTA  provides  for  a  10-year 
phase-out  period  for  duty  elimination — 
the  maximum  period  of  time  permissi- 
ble under  the  agreement. 

Q:  What  does  the  United  States 
gain  from  the  FTA's  services  provi- 
sions? 

A:  The  United  States  gains  three 
important  benefits  because  the  FTA: 

•  Ensures  that  the  U.S. -Canadian 
market,  already  substantially  open  in 
services  trade,  will  become  more  open 
through  the  prospective  establishment 
of  national  treatment; 

•  Establishes  a  mechanism  to  re- 
solve trade  disputes  for  scores  of  serv- 
ice sectors  and  creates  a  forum  for 
bringing  other  sectors  into  the  FTA; 
and 


•  Provides  a  useful  precedent  for 
ongoing  negotiations  in  the  Uruguay 
multilateral  trade  round. 

Agriculture 

Q:  Will  the  FTA  impair  Congress' 
ability  to  change  domestic  support 
programs? 

A:  The  agreement  will  not  affect 
the  ability  of  either  country  to  change 
domestic  support  programs  for  agri- 
cultural products.  Of  course,  the  pro- 
grams would  need  to  be  consistent  with 
the  other  provisions  of  the  agreement 
regarding  such  matters  as  import  du- 
ties and  export  subsidies. 

Q:  Has  the  United  States  given 
up  protection  from  unfair  import 
competition  under  Section  22  of  the 
Agriculture  Adjustment  Act  and  cor- 
responding GATT  protection? 

A:  Both  countries  reserve  the  right 
to  impose  or  reimpose  import  restric- 
tions on  a  particular  grain  (specifically 
wheat,  oats,  barley,  rye,  corn,  triticale, 
and  sorghum)  if  imports  increase  signif- 
icantly as  a  result  of  a  substantial 
change  in  either  country's  support  pro- 
grams for  that  grain.  The  United 
States  may  use  section  22  when  there  is 
(1)  a  significant  increase  in  imports  re- 
sulting from  (2)  a  substantial  change  in 
the  price  support  programs  of  either 
country  and  (3)  provided  the  conditions 
of  section  22  are  otherwise  met.  Past 
trade  patterns  are  not  likely  to  be  af- 
fected by  the  elimination  of  the  small 
U.S.  duties  on  grain  from  Canada.  It  is 
not  expected  that  U.S.  imports  of  Ca- 
nadian grain  will  increase  significantly 
as  a  result  of  the  removal  of  trade  re- 
strictions by  the  FTA. 

Q:  How  will  the  FTA  affect  trade 
in  wheat? 

A:  Canada  has  agreed  to  eliminate 
import  licenses  for  U.S.  wheat,  barley, 
oats,  and  their  products  when  U.S. 
Government  support  for  the  particular 
grain  is  equal  to  or  less  than  that  of 
Canada.  Each  country  will  calculate  its 
own  support  level  in  accordance  with 
the  agreement;  it  contains  a  mechanism 
to  resolve  any  disagreement  over  cal- 
culations. The  elimination  of  import  li- 
censes will  provide  improved  mutual 
access  to  respective  markets  for  both 
grains  and  processed  products  contain- 
ing grains. 


Auto  Trade 

Q:  Why  didn't  the  United  Sta 
renegotiate  the  1965  Auto  Pact  to  • 
move  its  inequities,  such  as  Cana  in 
performance  requirements  (local   n- 
tent,  etc.)  and  multilateral  sourci; 
incentives? 

A:  Automotive  trade  was  one  c  ;hc 
most  difficult  issues  in  the  FTA  ne  - 
tiations.  The  Auto  Pact,  under  whi 
most  auto  trade  has  been  conducte  ibr 
over  20  years,  essentially  provides  i- 
duty-free  trade  in  automotive  good  be- 
tween Canada  and  the  United  Stat  if 
certain  content  requirements  are  n ' 
In  addition,  Canada  has  duty  remiion 
(waiver)  programs  based  on  meetir 
certain  performance  requirements,  he 
FTA  leaves  the  Auto  Pact  in  place  it 
limits  eligible  firms  for  duty-free  e  ry 
into  Canada  to  a  specified  list.  Fui  er- 
more,  Canada  agreed  to  restrict  b(  ;- 
fits  such  as  duty  remission  progi'ai 
based  on  production  in  Canada  for  In- 
pact  members  to  a  limited  number 
firms.  These  programs  will  termin  ■ 
by  1996.  Programs  which  tie  benef  tc 
exports  to  the  United  States  will  t  mi' 
nate  on  January  1,  1989. 

Q:  Why  didn't  the  FTA  requi  a 
60%  direct  cost  of  processing  rub  or 
autos  to  increase  the  benefits  to  IS. 
industry  and  labor? 

A:  U.S.  negotiators  explored    ' 
possibility  of  moving  to  a  60*^  Noi 
American  rule.  The  Canadians,  hf 
ever,  were  concerned  that  this  woi   b( 
too  restrictive  for  new  foreign  aut 
motive  manufacturing  subsidiaries  lat 
recently  have  invested  in  Canadiai 
operations.  The  FTA  did,  however 
toughen  the  Auto  Pact's  50%  rule 
origin  for  entry  into  the  United  Si  es 
by  basing  it  on  manufacturing  cos  in- 
stead of  value  added,  as  is  custom  ily 
the  case.  Profits  and  costs,  such  a  »d- 
vertising  and  administrative  overh  id. 
will  no  longer  count  toward  the  5C . 

Q:  Under  the  FTA,  the  Cana  an 
production-based  duty  remission 
(waiver)  schemes  are  not  elimina  d 
until  January  1,  1996,  but  in  the 
meantime  they  continue  to  disto 
trade.  Shouldn't  they  be  elimina  d 
immediately  or  be  subject  to  GA" 
challenge? 

A:  No,  we  have  achieved  an  ec  ita- 
ble,  but  not  perfect,  solution  to  th 
unfair  Canadian  trade  practice.  U  '.  in 
dustry  still  may  challenge  Canadit 


26 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Jul>IS8t 


CANADA 


.ii-mance  requirements  under  U.S. 
if  their  continuation  under  the  FTA 
asonably  burdens  or  restricts  U.S. 
nierce  or  materially  injures  U.S. 

r^try. 

I  ural  Industries 

Q:  Whv  aren't  cultural  industries 
,n  uded  in  the  FTA? 

A:  The  United  States  is  sensitive 
aiiadian  interests  in  fostering  its 
net  cultural  heritage.  Therefore, 
ain  cultural  industries  are  exempt 
1  the  FTA  provisions.  These  include 
nablication,  sale,  distribution,  or 
I'ltion  of  books,  magazines,  and 
-|ia|:iers;  film  and  video  recordings; 

111-  video  music  recordings;  and 
li.  television,  and  cable  dissemina- 

Hdwever,  the  FTA  recognizes  that 
adian  cultural  policies  should  not 
titute  a  discriminatory  barrier  to 
.  trade.  For  example,  the  FTA  in- 
es  the  elimination  of  tariffs  on  vid- 
rccords,  and  printed  material, 
.  -d  investment  provisions  for 
■  of  cultural  industries,  and 
uht  protection  for  the  retransmis- 
iif  commercial  broadcasts.  Further- 
.  f,  the  United  States  retains  the 
ri  t  to  rebalance  concessions  with 
m  sures  of  equivalent  effect  if  future 
ci  ural  policies  are  detrimental  to  our 
C(  mercial  interests.  The  agreement 
4  ;  not  require  invocation  of  its  dis- 
ft  i  settlement  provisions  in  order  to 
IR '  such  countermeasures. 

Q:  Doesn't  the  cultural  exception 
t  ersely  affect  U.S.  firms? 

A:  No,  the  FTA  improves  Canadian 
ti  itment  of  U.S.  commercial  interests 
ir  he  cultural  area.  It  provides  for  tar- 
'  liniination  (e.g.,  on  videos,  records, 
itfd  material),  improved  provisions 
sale  of  cultural  industries,  and 
'  I'l^ht  protection  for  broadcast  re- 
ismissions.  In  addition,  the  FTA 
w  -  the  United  States  to  take  mea- 
■s  (if  equivalent  commercial  effect  in 
fvciit  that  Canada  enacts  additional 
-iirtions  which  impair  U.S.  access  to 
I  aiiadian  market.  This  right  should 
'  as  a  disincentive  to  the  use  of  the 
ural  exception  for  measures  that, 
'•lough  nominally  cultural,  have  sig- 
'  cant  commercial  effects. 

Q:  How  is  border  broadcasting 
Sected  by  the  FTA? 

A:  The  FTA  will  remedy  the  prob- 
1  of  unauthorized  and  uncompensated 
ransmission  by  Canadian  cable  sys- 
is  of  copyrighted  television  pro- 


grams. By  January  1,  1990,  Canada  will 
need  to  provide  a  right  of  remuneration 
(royalty)  to  the  copyright  holder  for  the 
simultaneous  and  unaltered  retransmis- 
sion of  copyrighted  programming.  In 
addition,  the  FTA  generally  prohibits 
the  nonsimultaneous  or  altered  re- 
transmission of  copyrighted  program- 
ming except  with  permission  of  the 
copyright  holder. 

Energy 

Q:  How  will  the  FTA  improve  our 
energy  security? 

A:  The  FTA  will  provide  the 
United  States  with  more  secure  access 
to  Canadian  energy  supplies  to  meet 
our  long-term  energy  needs.  This  ac- 
cess to  secure  Canadian  resources  is 
important  to  reduce  our  dependence  on 
OPEC  supplies.  The  Canadians  have 
agreed  that,  even  in  the  event  of  a  sup- 
ply disruption,  they  will  continue  to 
provide  the  United  States  with  its  his- 
torically proportionate  share  of  their 
energy  supplies.  Furthermore,  the  Ca- 
nadians have  agreed  that  they  will  not 
discriminate  against  U.S.  consumers  in 
the  pricing  of  their  energy  resources, 
ensuring  that  U.S.  consumers  will  not 
be  cut  off  suddenly  in  the  event  of 
shortages. 

Q:  What  barriers  to  energy  trade 
will  be  removed  by  the  FTA? 

A:  There  are  virtually  no  barriers 
today  in  our  bilateral  energy  trade. 
However,  in  order  to  preserve  gains  we 
have  made,  both  sides  agreed  to  pro- 
hibit restrictions  on  imports  or  exports 
in  terms  of  supply,  price,  or  taxes.  Nei- 
ther country  may  impose  any  taxes, 
duties,  or  charges  on  imported  or 
exported  goods  that  also  are  not  im- 
posed in  equal  quantities  on  the  same 
products  for  domestic  use. 

Neither  country  may  discriminate 
against  suppliers  or  consumers  in  the 
other  country,  relative  to  its  own  do- 
mestic suppliers  or  consumers,  in  the 
pricing  of  energy  supplies.  (For  exam- 
ple, under  current  Canadian  regula- 
tions, exporters  of  Canadian  electricity 
may  not  chai'ge  a  price  for  that  elec- 
tricity which  is  significantly  less  than 
the  least  cost  energy  alternative  avail- 
able to  their  U.S.  customers.  Canadian 
regulations  have,  in  the  past,  required 
that  the  minimum  price  for  oil  and  gas 
exports  be  higher  than  the  prevailing 
price  to  Canadian  consumers.  These 
practices  will  be  eliminated  under  the 
FTA.) 


Q:  What  impact  will  the  FTA 
have  on  U.S.  oil  and  gas  producers? 

A:  The  agreement  is  not  expected 
to  have  any  direct  effect  on  U.S.  oil  and 
gas  producers,  large  or  small.  The  FTA 
should  not  change  the  level  of  Canadian 
exports  of  oil  or  gas,  since  the  Canadi- 
ans are  not  currently  restraining  ex- 
port levels  or  discriminating  against 
U.S.  consumers  in  the  pricing  of  their 
exports.  The  United  States,  in  turn,  is 
not  restricting  imports. 

Financial  Services 

Q:  How  does  the  agreement  affect 
U.S.  commercial  banks? 

A:  The  FTA  will  remove  current 
limits  on  growth,  capital,  and  market 
share  in  Canada.  Specifically,  U.S. 
banks  will  be  exempt  from  the  16*7^  ceil- 
ing on  domestic  assets  of  all  foreign 
banks  in  Canada,  as  well  as  the  individ- 
ual capital  limits  used  to  implement  the 
ceiling. 

Q:  How  does  the  FTA  affect  U.S. 
insurance  companies? 

A:  They  will  have  the  same  rights 
as  Canadian  insurance  companies  to  di- 
versify in  the  federally  regulated  finan- 
cial sector  They  can  either  establish  or 
acquire  a  closely  held  bank,  an  insur- 
ance or  a  trust  company.  As  a  result  of 
Ontario  provincial  reforms,  they  also 
will  be  able  to  acquire  Canadian  se- 
curities firms.  (Ontario  is  the  center  of 
Canada's  securities  industry.) 

Q:  How  are  securities  firms 
affected? 

A:  As  a  result  of  the  FTA,  U.S. 
securities  firms  are  granted  access  to 
Canada  and  will,  for  the  first  time,  be 
able  to  diversify  their  activities  in  Can- 
ada by  affiliating  with  insurance  com- 
panies, trust  and  loan  companies,  or 
closely  held  commercial  banks.  Through 
a  financial  holding  company,  they  can 
enter  these  new  areas  of  business  ei- 
ther as  new  companies  or  by  acquiring 
an  existing  firm. 

Prior  to  this  agreement,  U.S.  se- 
curities firms  established  in  Canada 
were  not  primary  distributors  of  Cana- 
dian Government  paper  or  money  mar- 
ket funds.  The  FTA  assures  that  their 
applications  to  engage  in  these  ac- 
tivities will  be  considered  on  an  equal 
basis  with  Canadian  firms. 

Q:  Is  the  FTA  consistent  with  the 
principles  of  the  Glass-Steagall  Act? 

A:  The  FTA  is  fully  consistent  with 
the  Glass-Steagall  Act  but  broadens  its 
application  to  allow  Canadian  (and 


li'^partment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


27 


DEPARTMENT 


other)  banks  in  the  United  States  to 
underwrite  and  deal  in  debt  obligations 
fully  backed  by  the  Canadian  Govern- 
ment and  its  political  subdivisions  (the 
vast  majority  of  current  business  of  Ca- 
nadian securities  firms).  This  conforms 
with  the  existing  ability  of  banks  in  the 
United  States  to  underwrite  and  deal  in 
securities  of  the  U.S.  Government  and 
its  political  subdivisions,  now  permitted 
under  the  act.  In  addition,  any  future 
Glass-Steagall  liberalization  would  auto- 
matically apply  to  Canadian,  as  well  as 
to  U.S.,'  financial  institutions. 

Trade  Remedies 

Q:  Does  the  FTA  change  U.S. 
antidumping  and  countervailing  duty 
laws? 

A:  No,  the  FTA  preserves  the 
rights  of  U.S.  companies  to  obtain  re- 
lief from  injurious  dumping  and  govern- 
ment subsidies  under  such  laws.  It 
creates  a  procedure  under  which  bina- 
tional  panels,  substituting  for  national 
courts,  will  review  determinations  in 
U.S.  or  Canadian  cases  on  products  of 
the  other  country. 

Q:  Is  it  constitutional  to  have  a 
binational  panel — instead  of  U.S. 
courts — review  antidumping  and 
countervailing  duty  determinations? 

A:  There  is  no  constitutional  right 
to  have  a  federal  court  hear  an  appeal 
of  administrative  decisions  in  such 
cases.  The  Congress  has  the  power  to 
prescribe  or  limit  the  jurisdiction  of 
federal  courts;  indeed,  it  was  only  in 
1980  that  the  Congress,  by  statute,  pro- 
vided for  the  range  of  appeals  to 
federal  courts  that  are  now  available. 
Moreover,  there  is  no  constitutional 
right  to  import  or  to  be  subject  to  a 
particular  tariff.  Consequently,  elim- 
inating judicial  review  of  determina- 
tions in  cases  against  Canadian 
products  does  not  raise  due  process 
problems. 

Q:  Why  doesn't  the  FTA  elimi- 
nate Canadian  subsidies? 

A:  Although  the  negotiators  at- 
tempted to  achieve  greater  discipline 
over  subsidies  by  both  governments, 
there  is  little  international  consensus 
on  what  constitutes  a  subsidy.  Both  the 
United  States  and  Canada  continue  to 
have  subsidies.  This  issue  will  continue 
to  be  addressed  over  a  5-  to  7-year  pe- 
riod in  bilateral  negotiations.  Our  joint 
aim  is  to  develop  agreed  discipline  on 
government  subsidies  that  will  ensure 
fair  trade  within  the  FTA.B 


The  "Budget  Crunch" 
and  the  Foreign  Service 


by  Ronald  I.  Spiers 

Address  during  Foreign  Service 
Day  at  the  Department  of  State  on 
May  6,  1988.  Ambassador  Spiers  is 
Under  Secretary  for  Management. 

This  is  the  fourth  Foreign  Service  Day 
on  which  I  have  been  asked  to  meet 
with  you  and  review  the  major  devel- 
opments of  the  past  year  which  have 
affected  the  Foreign  Service  of  the 
United  States,  of  which  you  have  all 
been  a  part.  I  have  always  welcomed 
this  opportunity.  Your  presence  here 
bespeaks  your  continuing  interest  in 
the  institution  you  have  all  served  well 
and  truly. 

In  a  larger  sense  Foreign  Service 
Day  is  an  opportunity  to  pay  our  re- 
spects to  the  great  traditions  of  Ameri- 
can diplomatic  history  in  practice  and 
to  those  who  have  so  recently  been  re- 
sponsible for  the  conduct  of  our  diplo- 
macy. It  is  also  an  occasion  to  talk 
among  ourselves  about  current  policy 
and  problems. 

Foreign  Affairs  Budget 

It  will  not  surprise  any  of  you  that  our 
major  concern  over  the  past  year  has 
been  the  financial  resources  which  will 
be  available  for  the  conduct  of  U.S.  for- 
eign affairs.  You  will  recall  that  at  this 
time  last  year  the  budget  situation  for 
the  Department  was  grim.  We  were  pre- 
paring for  a  looming  shortfall  of  at  least 
$84  million  in  our  salaries  and  e.xpenses 
appropriation,  deep  cuts  in  the  foreign 
buildings  program,  and  only  two-thirds 
of  the  funds  necessary  to  pay  our  con- 
tributions to  the  various  international 
organizations  to  which  we  belong. 

The  November  budget  summit 
agreement  gave  us  a  12th-hour  stay  of 
e.xecution.  Our  budget  was  restored  to 
a  level  that  will  enable  us  to  meet  cur- 
rent service  requirements  and  fund 
a  very  limited  amount  of  program 
growth,  although  we  face  grave  diffi- 
culties in  meeting  our  obligations  to  in- 
ternational organizations,  and  many 
stringencies  in  a  range  of  programs. 

As  one  colleague  has  observed, 
what  we  got  was  a  reprieve  and  not  a 
pardon.  We  face  deep  uncertainties 
with  regard  to  the  funds  we  will  have 
for  operations  in  the  fiscal  year  that 


begins  this  coming  October.  Even  jw, 
only  6  months  before  that  date,  w(lo 
not  know  within  a  range  of  perhap 
$100  million  just  what  our  shortfal  fi\ 
be.  There  are  many  variables  to  ta 
into  account:  What  will  overseas  iia- 
tion  rates  do  to  our  requirements?  j 
What  new  emergencies  will  arise  \  jidi 
will  place  further  demands  on  our  ^■ 
sources?  Will  the  Congress  approv 
disapprove,  or  alter  the  Administr 
tion's  FY  1989  request?  Will  we  ha 
more  e.xchange  rate  losses?  Until 
have  clearer  answers  to  these  que: 
tions,  we  do  not  know  whether  we  rill 
face  a  $35-million  problem  or  a  $lf 
million  problem.  This  makes  resou  e 
planning  very  difficult  indeed. 

Exchange  rate  losses  have  be( 
devastating  for  the  Department  in  je 
last  2  years.  In  this  period  the  cos  Df 
running  two  of  our  largest  Embas  es- 
Tokyo  and  Bonn — has  doubled.  E'  7 
time  the  dollar  drops  one  pfennig 
value,  our  bills  in  the  Federal  Re)  oli 
of  Germany  go  up  $200,000. 

Wliat  is  beyond  argument  is  1  it 
the  Department  of  State  will  face  \n 
ous  resource  constraints  over  a  pi 
longed  period  ahead.  Over  the  pa  tw 
decades,  our  resources  have  grow 
slowly  but  measurably.  We  are  no  jpt 
haps  at  the  end  of  an  era.  It  seen 
clear  that  the  American  public  is   ite 
mined  to  deal  effectively  with  the  ud 
get  deficit.  That  concern  over  the 
deficit  is  already  affecting  every  i  in 
and  every  part  of  the  Federal  bud  it. 
Given  the  cuts  already  made  in  d(  es 
tic  programs  and  the  cuts  about  t  be 
made  in  those  programs  and  in  th  mi 
tary,  it  is  highly  unlikely,  in  my  v  A', 
that  the  American  public  or  the  C  1- 
gress  will  allow  the  Department  ( 
State  to  escape  the  consequences  ' 
this  determination.  Therefore,  I  c  m 
think  that  we  face  a  temporary  si  a- 
tion  that  can  be  dealt  with  by  ad  <c 
cuts  here  and  there  or  by  pushing;  in 
lems  off  for  a  year  or  two.  We  fac  a 
protracted  period  of  diminished  n 
sources,  and  we  must  accept  the  'ti- 
sequences  of  that  fact. 

Twenty-three  years  ago,  I  wa'D 
rector  of  NATO  Affairs  and  deepl-ir 
volved  in  a  debate  which,  for  all  Iim 
may  still  be  going  on:  was  it  betttit( 
maintain  a  larger  defensive  force  in 
ture  at  the  expense  of  war-fightin  c; 
pability  or  to  spend  the  money  nele 


28 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Juhl9 


DEPARTMENT 


iiivide  ammunition  and  training 
>sary  for  effective  military  action 

i  if  it  meant  a  smaller  force  struc- 
'  I  was  one  of  those  who  felt  that 

latter  was  the  correct  alternative. 

!\  I  feel  that  the  Department  of 

r  faces  the  same  kind  of  strategic 

Accordingly,  we  have  been  looking 
j^'fully  at  both  our  Washington  orga- 
"  linn  and  the  pattern  of  our  repre- 
atiiin  overseas.  I  believe  that  it  is 
ilile  to  consolidate  and  streamline 
Washington  organization,  reduce 
.  ring  and  duplication,  and  reverse 
r  proliferation  of  new  organizational 
ii  ties.  Overseas  it  is  important  to 

0  carefully  at  where  we  maintain  our 
II  s  and  how  we  staff  them.  Our  rela- 

:  ly  dense  network  of  consulates  in 
i|ie  contribute  to  meeting  our  for- 
[Milicy  interests  and  respon- 
iiies.  Nevertheless,  many  were 
lilished  in  the  1800s  and  early  1900s 
n  transportation  and  communica- 

,  s  facilities  wei'e  not  what  they  are 
ly.  Furthermore,  requirements  for 

1  jjosts  constantly  arise.  Recently, 
I  ?.\ample,  we  have  opened  three 

'  s  in  the  South  Pacific,  with  a  fourth 

It  to  be  launched.  We  have  also  es- 

Hhed  an  embassy  in  Mongolia,  and 

opening  of  a  second  consulate  in  the 

^  let  Union  is  under  active  considera- 

.  All  of  these  take  resources,  and, 
I    have  indicated,  we  are  not  just  in  a 
;  i-sum  game,  we  are  in  a  minus  zero- 
u'ame.  In  a  shrinking  resource  en- 
nment,  prioritizing  our  functions 
1  become  more  crucial  and  important 
:'i  1  it  has  ever  been  before. 

Nevertheless,  there  are  strong 
I'll  intei'ests  against  taking  some  of 
.-^teps  that  our  resource  constraints 
ruire.  There  are  vested  interests  in 
1  ntaining  bureaus  and  positions  in 
,'*  Aington  which  might,  if  they  were 
ilished,  even  increase  our  effective- 
1  s.  There  are  strong  lobbies  against 
iiit,'-  posts  overseas.  Last  year,  Con- 
-.^  almost  adopted  provisions  which 
■'  lid  have  penalized  us  heavily  for 
-'  iing  overseas  posts  and  which  would 
■  1  e  required  us  to  establish  a  new 
.  ■  ler  secretary  for  security,  a  new 

eau  for  south  asian  affairs,  and  two 
I  V'  ambassadors  at  large.  Proposals 
*)  additional  geographic  bureaus  for 
Caribbean  and  Eastern  Europe 
■e  not  far  behind.  Whatever  the  ab- 
,  act  merits  of  these  organizational 
iij'posals,  they  would  have  imposed 
ivy  personnel  and  financial  require- 
nts  on  us  at  a  time  our  resources 
re  being  reduced.  Thanks  to  help 
iieim  a  few  of  our  friends  in  the 


ijipartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


Congress,  these  proposals  were  struck 
in  the  final  hour.  They,  nevertheless, 
continue  to  have  advocates. 

It  is  still  far  from  clear  how  we  will 
face  the  future  resource  situation.  The 
slogan  "cut  things,  not  people"  has  a 
surface  attraction,  but  the  fact  is  that 
we  have  already  cut  too  deeply  into 
"things."  We  cannot  continue  to  fall 
behind  in  the  modernizaton  of  our  com- 
munications facilities,  our  information- 
handling  capabilities,  our  building  and 
maintenance  programs,  and  our  profes- 
sional training.  If  we  continue  on  this 
road,  the  Department  of  State  will  be- 
come increasingly  irrelevant.  Our  se- 
curity program  in  1989  will  be  limited 
to  the  funds  it  received  in  1988.  It  will 
have  to  absorb  price  increases  and  thus 
we  will  be  $39  million  short  in  the  up- 
dating of  our  security  programs,  both 
personnel  and  counterintelligence, 
which  has  been  a  major  objective  of 
this  Administration.  Our  building  pro- 
gram received  no  new  money  in  either 
1988  or  1989.  In  fact,  the  appropriations 
that  we  expect  for  1989  will  not  even 
cover  the  costs  of  routine  maintenance 
of  our  2,500  U.S. -owned  properties 
abroad.  What  we  have  done  in  recent 
years  to  meet  our  budget  challenge  are 
things  that  we  cannot  keep  doing: 
postponing  maintenance  and  equipment 
purchases;  cutting  travel  funds;  cutting 
language  training;  cutting  publication 
procurement;  forcing  embassies  to  take 
long  staffing  gaps,  which  mean  that  ac- 
cumulated contacts,  e.xperience,  and 
knowledge  of  one  officer  cannot  be  ef- 
fectively handed  on  to  a  successor. 

There  are  only  two  new  programs 
in  our  1989  budget.  One  is  a  request 
for  $7  million  to  permit  us  to  assign 
American  personnel  to  potentially  sen- 
sitive jobs  heretofore  held  by  Foreign 
Service  nationals  (FSNs)  in  Eastern 
Europe.  This  program  has  been  man- 
dated by  the  Congress  and  strongly 
supported  in  the  Department  of  State. 
The  second  new  request  is  for  $30  mil- 
lion to  begin  construction  of  a  new  For- 
eign Service  training  center  in 
Arlington  Hall  on  72  acres  of  land  that 
the  Congress  deeded  to  the  Depart- 
ment for  this  purpose  2  years  ago.  This 
will  give  FSI  [Foreign  Service  In- 
stitute] the  first  permanent  home  in  its 
64-year  history  and  permit  us  to  escape 
from  the  hot,  crowded,  noisy,  inade- 
quate quarters  we  now  rent  in  Rosslyn. 
Our  aim  is  to  make  FSI  the  world's 
best  training  establishment,  worthy  of 
the  Foreign  Service  and  the  35  other 
institutions  it  serves.  Our  ability  to 
sustain  the  Department's  leadership 


role  in  foreign  affairs  will  depend  in- 
creasingly on  our  ablity  to  equip  our- 
selves with  the  highest  level  of 
knowledge  and  professional  skills — es- 
pecially in  a  period  of  declining  re- 
sources. Furthermore,  the  General 
Services  Administration  estimates  that 
this  will  save  the  American  taxpayer — 
and  the  State  Department  budget — up 
to  $61  million  in  rental  payments  over 
the  next  30  years. 

Foreign  Affairs  Management 

Especially  in  view  of  the  need  to  live 
with  fewer  resources  in  coming  years, 
there  are  many  fundamental  questions 
which  I  believe  need  to  be  looked  at 
long  and  carefully  as  we  move  into  the 
transitional  period  leading  to  a  new  ad- 
ministration. I  believe  we  need  a  kind 
of  a  Hoover  Commission  look  at  how 
the  foreign  affairs  function  in  the  U.S. 
Government  is  organized.  In  my  view 
the  Secretary  of  State  must  become  re- 
sponsible for  the  planning  of  all  foreign 
affairs  (Function  150)  funds.  This  ac- 
count is  now  fragmented  among  many 
agencies,  and  there  is  no  one  coordinat- 
ing authority  recommending  to  the 
President  how  these  funds  should  be 
allocated  among  competing  foreign  pol- 
icy requirements. 

There  are  also  a  number  of  other 
important  management  policy  issues 
which  need  to  be  looked  at,  including: 

•  The  desirability  and  practicability 
of  reconsolidated  foreign  affairs  respon- 
sibilities, now  divided  among  USIA 
[United  States  Information  Agency], 
the  State  Department,  AID  [Agency 
for  International  Development],  and 
ACDA  [Arms  Control  and  Disarma- 
ment Agency]; 

•  The  need  for  a  new  mechanism 
within  both  the  executive  and  legisla- 
tive branches  to  permit  comprehensive 
evaluation  of  how  we  spend  our  foreign 
affairs,  intelligence,  and  international 
security  dollars; 

•  How  to  achieve  a  more  candid 
and  cooperative  relationship  with  the 
Congress,  reversing  the  thrust  toward 
organizational  micromanagement  and 
extensive  earmarking; 

•  How  a  leaner  and  less  layered 
structure  of  the  Department  might  bet- 
ter serve  the  conduct  of  foreign  policy; 

•  How  to  enhance  chiefs  of  mis- 
sion's ability  to  coordinate  the  activities 
of  organizations  over  which  they  pres- 
ently have  only  nominal  control,  includ- 
ing issues  of  staffing  and  the  effective 
use  of  resources; 

•  Improving  methods  of  cost  alloca- 
tion and  cost  recovery  for  services  to 
the  public:  passports,  visas,  information 
services,  licenses,  etc.,  and  to  other 

29 


DEPARTMENT 


agencies  of  government  for  buildings 
and  housing,  administrative  support, 
communications  and  security,  and  so  on; 

•  Whether  we  should  follow  the  ex- 
ample of  the  Department  of  Defense 
and  others  in  adopting  capital  budget- 
ing to  ensure  reliable  funding  for  the 
construction  and  maintenance  of  our 
facilities  abroad,  which  ai-e  currently 
valued  at  over  $10  billion; 

•  Whether  we  are  inundating 
Washington  with  unassimilable  quan- 
tities of  information; 

•  How  to  control  the  staffing  levels 
of  our  posts  overseas,  where  72%  are 
non-State  Department  personnel; 

•  Whether  all  our  posts  overseas 
are  necessary  and  whether  they  could 
be  more  austerely  staffed;  and 

•  How  can  we  improve  the  teaching 
and  development  of  leadership,  manage- 
ment, and  organizational  skills  which 
do  not  come  naturally  to  a  service 
which  encourages  the  solo  performer, 
the  writer  of  telegrams  and  memo- 
randa, the  individual  virtuoso. 

These  are  just  a  few  of  the  issues 
which  I  believe  our  budget  situation 
makes  more  compelling.  A  change  in 
administration,  before  patterns  are  set 
and  vested  interests  established,  is  pos- 
sibly the  only  occasion  in  which  this  can 
be  done. 

We  have  been  able  to  take  a  few 
steps  which  should  be  helpful  in  dealing 
with  our  future  challenges.  For  exam- 
ple, we  are  in  the  process  of  establish- 
ing a  Department  regional  center  in 
Miami  that  will  permit  us  to  pull  back 
some  of  our  regional  personnel  now 
posted  overseas  at  substantially  greater 
expense.  We  now  have  33  posts  in  our 
Special  Embassy  Program  which  should 
permit  us  to  control  and  perhaps  re- 
duce staffing  at  our  smaller  missions 
and  to  maintain  them  on  a  more  austere 
and  less  expensive  basis.  We  are  reduc- 
ing modestly  the  number  of  deputy 
assistant  secretaries  which  have 
proliferated  unconscionably  in  recent 
years.  I  anticipate  that  we  will  be  able 
to  save  some  positions  by  reducing 
some  overlapping  of  functions  in  Wash- 
ington. We  are  setting  up  our  own 
household  effects  storage  facilities, 
which  should  save  us  some  of  the  claims 
that  we  have  had  to  pay  as  a  i-esult  of 
many  unsatisfactory  experiences  with 
commercial  storage  companies.  Each  of 
these  will  make  a  small  contribution  to 
our  savings  requirements.  Since  65%  of 
our  salaries  and  expenses  costs  are  per- 
sonnel related,  anything  that  permits 
us  to  reduce  further  the  demand  for 
people  will  help  us  toward  living  within 
our  resources. 


Secretary  Shultz  has  labeled  the 
budget  problem  as  his  number  one  for- 
eign policy  issue.  I  believe  he  is  en- 
tirely correct.  This  issue  will  be  one  of 
the  most  challenging  to  be  faced  by 
those  who  will  succeed  us  in  handling 
responsibilities  for  the  management  of 
our  foreign  affairs. 

Let  me  report  on  two  other  areas 
which  have  continued  to  preoccupy 
us  in  the  past  year;  security  and 
personnel. 

Security 

Some  in  the  Foreign  Service  have  ques- 
tioned the  resources  that  we  have  de- 
voted in  recent  years  to  security.  They 
fear  that  our  embassies  will  be  turned 
into  fortresses;  that  our  personnel  will 
be  inhibited  from  getting  out  and  mak- 
ing contacts  and  doing  their  jobs;  that 
we  are  diverting  money  and  effort  away 
from  our  primary  function  of  diplomacy; 
that  a  "Big  Brother  Is  Watching  You" 
atmosphere  will  result  from  an  over- 
whelming secui'ity  apparat. 

I  believe  these  concerns  are  mis- 
placed. I  believe  we  owe  our  people 
abroad  a  work  and  home  environment 
that  will  provide  security  for  them  and 
their  families  and  will  protect  our  infor- 
mation against  the  determined  intel- 
ligence efforts  of  adversaries.  Our 
experience  in  Moscow  has  proved  that 
this  is  no  academic  problem.  The  sad 
truth  is  that  the  threats  we  face — from 
terrorism  on  the  one  hand  to  espionage 
on  the  other — have  become  increasingly 
sophisticated  and  menacing.  The  De- 
partment simply  cannot  afford  to  re- 
main indifferent  and  unconcerned  in 
the  face  of  this  threat. 

Although  the  Congress  has  not  ap- 
propriated all  that  it  has  authorized  and 
our  security  funds,  as  I  indicated  ear- 
lier, are  likely  to  be  frozen  at  their  cur- 
rent level,  we  have  made  substantial 
improvements  in  our  situation  over  the 
past  year  Congress  authorized  a  $2.5- 
billion  program  based  on  the  Inman 
panel's  proposals  in  1985.  That  same 
year,  we  established  the  Diplomatic 
Security  Service  and  elevated  its  chief 
to  the  assistant  secretary  level. 

Throughout,  the  State  Depart- 
ment's security  program  has  been  at 
the  top  of  the  Secretary's  personal  list 
of  priorities.  Let  me  cite  a  few  exam- 
ples of  what  we  have  done  in  the  areas 
of  greatest  need. 

First,  espionage — Our  dependence 
on  Soviet  national  employees  in  Moscow 
has  been  ended.  After  some  initial 
problems  in  screening  and  sorting  out 


what  kind  of  employees  we  need,  \ 
have  a  system  there  that  seems  to 
working.  We  are  well  on  our  way  t 
having  a  mission  that  is  not  only  nre 
secure  but  also  better  managed  an 
more  efficient.  We  are  now  going  t 
apply  those  lessons  to  other  posts 
Eastern  Europe.  We  expect  to  rej: 
another  50-75  FSNs  in  other  bloc  un 
tries  by  the  end  of  this  year. 

In  Eastern  Europe,  we  are  es  ()- 
hshing  core  areas  of  the  embassies! 
where  no  one  but  cleared  America - 
will  be  allowed.  Our  aim  is  to  have 
whole  buildings  where  classified  ii  <r- 
mation  is  processed  free  from  all  1  • 
eign  nationals  or  other  uncleared 
personnel. 

The  typewriter  bugging  in  M(  iow 
led  us  to  increased  rigor  in  protee  Itr 
our  office  equipment.  The  new  Pis 
Text  Processing  facility — which  wi  ur 
set  up  jointly  with  the  CIA — allov  us 
tight  control  over  the  office  equipi  nt 
that  may  be  subject  to  tampering,  tir 
chase,  shipping,  and  maintenance  e 
all  handled  by  trained  American 
personnel. 

Construction  security  prograi  ar 
in  place  at  14  new  embassy  constr  tio 
sites  and  will  be  part  of  all  future  ip- 
ital  projects.  The  use  of  cleared  A  ?ri 
can  firms  and  personnel  for  the  c( 
struction  and  protection  of  our  bu  jinj 
projects  is  essential  if  we  are  to  a  id 
damaging,  costly,  and  politically  e  mi 
rassing  security  compromises  like  le 
one  that  occurred  in  Moscow. 

Second,  counterintelligence-  tVe 

have  gotten  help  from  the  F'BI  wi  oi 
counterintelligence  (CI)  program,  ae 
new  chief  of  our  CI  office  is  on  lot 
from  the  FBI.  We  also  have  a  pro  •• 
sional  trainer  from  the  Bureau  to  'Ip 
us  build  up  our  own  talent  in  this  'ea 
Our  CI  program  is  oriented  t'lar 
the  protection  of  classified  inform;  on 
the  compromise  of  which  would  bt 
damaging  to  the  national  interest.  A 
the  heart  of  the  program  is  greatl  e.v 
panded  training  to  make  all  empk  ies 
more  aware  of  and  better  able  to  ( oe 
with  the  sophisticated  espionage  t  h- 
niques  being  deployed  against  us.  .s 
part  of  that  training  program,  all  tr- 
sonnel  being  assigned  during  the  :  m- 
mer  cycle  to  the  bloc  countries  ar 
required  to  attend  a  1-week  count' - 
intelligence  training  program  join  / 
sponsored  by  State  and  the  CIA.  I  tl 
field,  chiefs  of  mission  have  establ'hei 
Counterintelligence  Working  Groui  t' 
focus  attention  on  CI  matters  at  a  iel 
level. 


30 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/July>98 


DEPARTMENT 


As  part  of  the  effort  to  heighten 
irity  awareness,  we  have  also  had 
lili.tration  to  strengthen  procedures 
granting  individuals  access  to  our 
mi's  most  sensitive,  classified  infor- 
i.in.  Consequently,  we  have  in- 
ised  the  frequency  with  which 
iiity  clearances  are  updated  and 
II  steps  to  ensure  that  employees 
A  and  follow  applicable  regulations 
ii'ding  security  and  conduct.  We 
instituted  a  more  intensive  use  of 
•  iterintelligence  debriefing  and  are 
ii  sloping  a  program  for  more  careful 
K'ening  of  individuals  selected  for 
;i  1  assignment. 

Third,  security  standards — Last 
a  we  put  out  new  physical  and  pro- 
« Jral  security  standards  for  the  han- 
j  g  of  classified  information.  Posts  are 
n    being  brought  into  compliance  with 
!:l;e  new  standards.  In  the  interim, 

lave  had  to  reduce  the  level  of  clas- 

(1  material  authorized  at  several 
f>  ,s  and  have  temporarily  withdrawn 
,  B  n  a  number  of  facilities  the  author- 
k  to  store  any  classified  material  until 
ti  new  standards  are  met.  This  is  a 
.^  iful  process  for  many  posts  in  the 
s!  i-trun.  But  in  the  long  run,  it  will 
ii  rove  their  ability  to  do  their  work — 
D  vided  we  e.xpeditiously  develop  solu- 

s  to  the  problems  that  led  to  decer- 

ation.  We  can  and  must  find  ways  of 
a  wing  posts  abroad  to  take  full  ad- 
V  tage  of  the  dramatic  advances  in 
c  imunications  and  informations  sys- 
1 1  technology — and  of  the  cost  sav- 
ri  s  inherent  in  these  new  technol- 
8  js.  As  I  said  earlier,  we  simply  can- 
D  continue  to  fall  behind  others  in 
t  se  critical  areas. 

There  are  still  controversial  issues 
tore  us,  and  perhaps  the  most  contro- 
'  .-^ial  of  all  is  polygraphing.  This  is  an 
:  le  in  which  the  Secretary  of  State 
r  iself  has  taken  a  direct,  strong,  and 
l^hly  principled  position.  There  have 
t  'n  substantial  pressures  on  the  De- 
F  tment  and  directly  on  the  Secretary 
I  accede  to  the  kind  of  lie  detector 
seening  which  some  advocate. 

Recently,  Secretary  Shultz  said 
tore  the  Senate  Appropriations 
fmmittee: 

Congress'  Office  of  Technology  Assess- 
'  nt  (OTA)  found  meaningful  scientific 
''';dence  of  polygraph  validity  only  in  the 
'H  of  criminal  investigations.  Even  these 
iults  ranged  from  17%  to  100%  for  cor- 
i<!|t  guilty  detections.  But  consider  this 
-(iking  fact.  In  screening  situations 
..Jhere  one  in  1,000  may  be  guilty),  OTA 
nted  out  that  even  if  one  assumed  that 
'■  polygraph  is  99%  accurate,  the  laws  of 
ibability  indicate  that  one  guilty  person 
uld  be  correctly  identified  as  deceptive 


but  10  persons  would  be  incorrectly  identi- 
fied as  deceptive  (false  positives).  An  ac- 
curacy rate  of  something  less  than  100%' 
may  be  acceptable  in  attempting  to  fore- 
cast the  weather.  It  should  never  be  ac- 
ceptable in  matters  affecting  the  reputa- 
tions and  the  livelihoods  of  individuals. 

As  you  know,  the  State  Depart- 
ment authorization  bill  adopted  last  De- 
cember contains  a  provision  requiring 
the  Department  to  establish  proce- 
dures, modeled  on  those  currently  in 
force  at  the  Department  of  Defense,  for 
the  use  of  the  polygraph,  specifically 
with  respect  to  personnel  of  the  Diplo- 
matic Security  Service.  Importantly, 
these  regulations  still  leave  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  State  the  authority  to  deter- 
mine the  e.xact  circumstances  under 
which  polygraphs  may  be  used,  author- 
ity which  President  Reagan  in  signing 
the  authorization  bill  reaffirmed. 

Accordingly,  the  regulations 
drafted  pursuant  to  that  legislation 
would  permit  the  Secretary  to  author- 
ize lie  detector  testing  under  the  follow- 
ing circumstances: 

•  During  the  course  of  a  criminal, 
counterintelligence,  or  personnel  se- 
curity investigation  after  all  other  rea- 
sonable investigative  steps  have  been 
taken; 

•  When  an  employee  requests  to 
take  such  a  test  for  the  purpose  of 
e.xculpation; 

•  When  a  State  Department  em- 
ployee volunteers  to  work  in  an  intel- 
ligence agency  that  requires  polygraph 
tests  or  volunteers  to  participate  in  cer- 
tain special  access  programs — specifi- 
cally designated  by  the  Secretary — 
which  involve  joint  programs  with  the 
intelligence  community  where  the  com- 
munity requires  a  lie  detector  test.  In 
each  instance,  a  lie  detector  test  can 
only  be  administered  with  the  volun- 
tary consent  of  the  employee 
concerned. 


Personnel 

The  final  topic  I  want  to  touch  on  is 
personnel.  In  the  past  several  years,  I 
have  reported  to  you  on  the  travails  and 
agonies  that  the  Foreign  Service  has 
gone  through  in  implementing  and  ad- 
justing to  the  1980  Foreign  Service  Act. 
I  agree  that  this  has  been  a  very  di- 
visive factor  within  the  Foreign  Serv- 
ice, and  I  very  much  regret  that  fact. 
So  far  we  have  lost  many  good  of- 
ficers as  a  result  of  the  operation  of 
both  the  6-year  window  and  of  the  Lim- 
ited Career  E.xtension  (LCE)  system. 
It  is  probably  also  true  that  many  have 
left  who  should  not  have  been  con- 
tinued in  this  very  competitive  service. 


We  have  tried  to  be  fair  in  managing  it 
so  that  a  disproportionate  part  of  the 
burden  falls  neither  on  the  members  of 
the  Senior  Foreign  Service  (SFS)  or  on 
the  Class  1  officers  who  have  opted  to 
open  their  promotion  windows.  The 
bottom  line  remains,  however,  that  in 
an  "up-or-out"  system  some  will  go 
"up"  and  some  will  go  "out,"  and  there 
can  always  be  question  about  the  equity 
of  individual  cases. 

The  system  itself  was  mandated  by 
the  Congress  of  the  United  States  with 
the  support  of  the  Department  of  State 
and  of  the  Foreign  Service,  and  it  must 
be  administered  in  accordance  with  the 
objectives  of  those  who  drafted  and  ap- 
proved it.  Since  1983,  155  senior  officers 
have  had  to  retire  involuntarily  because 
they  did  not  receive  LCEs;  and  since 
1986,  81  FS-ls  have  had  to  retire  invol- 
untarily because  they  were  not  pro- 
moted within  the  6-year  window.  We 
believe  an  unusual  combination  of  cir- 
cumstances contributed  to  the  high  loss 
of  FS-1  officers  through  the  "6-year 
window"  and  that  this  problem  will 
gradually  abate  as  FS-ls  recalculate 
their  promotion  prospects  and  adjust 
their  window  decisions  accordingly.  The 
Limited  Career  Extension  procedure 
will  no  doubt  continue  to  be  the  instru- 
ment through  which  the  SFS  will  be 
kept  competitive. 

So  far  this  morning,  the  message 
that  I  share  with  you  has  been  fairly 
somber.  But  that  is  not  the  note  I  wish 
to  leave  with  you  today.  On  the  con- 
trary, what  always  gives  me  heart  is 
our  basic  resource — and  the  resource 
that  absorbs  the  greatest  part  of  our 
budget — the  people  in  the  Foreign 
Service  and  Civil  Service. 

Their  dedication  has  been  recog- 
nized, in  part,  through  the  presentation 
of  awards.  I  have  reviewed  many  of 
these.  They  bear  witness  to  the  notable 
accomplishments  of  those  people  with 
whom  we  casually  v/ork  every  day  and 
whose  devotion  we  take  for  granted. 
These  men  and  women  should  be  proud 
of  their  accomplishments,  and  we 
should  take  pride  in  their  sense  of  pur- 
pose. All  have  shown  a  strong  commit- 
ment to  public  service,  a  disciplined 
approach  to  their  work,  and  a  will  to 
continue.  The  quality  of  these  award 
recipients  mirrors  the  overall  quality  of 
the  Foreign  Service,  and  I  remain  con- 
fident that  potential  for  leadership  of 
the  service  is  as  good  as  ever. 

I'd  like  to  give  you  a  brief  report 
on  how  we  stand  as  regards  women  and 
minorities.  I  believe  we  are  making 
progress.  Several  years  ago,  I  noted  we 
had  no  career  minority  officers  and  few 


*!partment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


31 


EAST  ASIA 


women  in  the  key  positions  of  deputy 
chief  of  mission,  principal  officer,  dep- 
uty assistant  secretary,  or  office  direc- 
tor. We  now  have  29  minorities  and  32 
nonminority  women  in  these  positions, 
which  are  often  principal  stepping 
stones  to  chief  of  mission  and  assistant 
secretary.  There  are  presently  only  five 
career  minorities  and  eight  career 
women  in  jobs  at  this  level.  Since  we 
are  a  bottom  entry  system,  these  sta- 
tistics should  steadily  improve  in  the 
future.  Last  year,  34%  of  our  entering 
Foreign  Service  officers  were  women; 
17%  were  minorities.  I  anticipate  these 
statistics  will  hold  up,  and  we  will  be 
on  our  way  to  achieving  our  objective  of 
a  more  representative  service,  while  we 
maintain  our  high  competitive 
standards. 

Family  Liaison  Office 

Finally,  I  want  to  conclude  by  recogniz- 
ing that  this  has  been  the  10th  anniver- 
sary of  one  of  the  most  important  and 
fruitful  organizational  innovations  I 
have  seen  during  my  30-plus  years  in 
the  Department:  the  establishment  of 
the  Family  Liaison  Office  (FLO)  in 
Washington  and  Community  Liaison  Of- 
fices (CLO)  overseas.  These  have  given 
us  an  unusually  productive  instrument 
for  dealing  with  some  of  the  most  diffi- 
cult problems  of  foreign  service.  In  a 
real  sense  they  are  the  equivalent  of 
the  kind  of  community  support  in- 
frastructure we  take  for  granted  here 
at  home.  We  are  about  to  open  our 
144th  CLO;  only  24  of  our  embassies 
are  still  without  them.  These  units  are 
intimately  involved  with  security, 
health,  education,  family  evacuation, 
and  community  activity  planning. 

As  you  can  appreciate,  spouse  em- 
ployment in  this  era  of  two-career  fami- 
lies is  a  major  concern  for  the  Foreign 
Service.  Thanks  to  FLO,  we  now  have 
reciprocal  work  arrangements  with  66 
countries  and  formal  bilateral  agree- 
ments with  22.  A  skills  data  bank  has 
been  launched  and  our  posts  can  now 
know  in  advance  what  skills  spouses  are 
bringing  to  post  and  plan  for  the  use  of 
these  skills  rather  than  turning  to  out- 
siders. It  is  appropriate  on  this  anni- 
versary to  pay  tribute  to  the  foresight 
of  our  colleagues  of  10  years  ago  who 
initiated  these  changes. 

This  ends  my  review  of  our 
past  year  and  my  look  at  the  problems 
which  lie  just  ahead.  I  look  forward  to 
discussing  these  or  any  other  issues 
you  wish  to  pursue.  ■ 


Elections  in  Korea 


by  Gaston  J.  Sigur,  Jr. 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
May  12,  1988.  Mr.  Sigur  is  Assistant 
Secretary  for  East  Asian  and  Pacific 
Affairs.^ 

Thank  you  for  the  opportunity  to  dis- 
cuss with  you  once  again  the  very  posi- 
tive process  of  political  change — of 
democratization — in  the  Republic  of 
Korea.  Thank  you,  too,  for  the  support 
which  you  and  your  colleagues  have 
given  this  process. 

Our  gi-eatest  congratulations  go 
once  again  to  the  Korean  people.  Over 
the  past  year  the  Korean  people  have 
made  things — very  positive  things — 
happen.  They  demanded  the  creation  of 
a  more  open,  democratic  political  proc- 
ess in  order  to  settle  important  issues 
through  dialogue  and  compromise  in 
the  chambers  of  government,  rather 
than  in  the  streets  with  rocks  flying 
and  the  air  polluted  by  tear  gas.  The 
Korean  people  are  determined  to  create 
a  political  system  with  the  vitality  and 
stability  to  lead  Korea's  entry  into  the 
21st  century.  We  enthusiastically  ap- 
plaud their  resolve  and  commend  their 
remarkable  achievements. 

I  would  also  like  to  congratulate  all 
of  the  successful  candidates  in  the  re- 
cent election.  The  leaders  of  each  of  the 
major  political  parties  have  pledged  to 
work  together  constructively  to  address 
the  challenges  their  nation  faces.  We 
admire  that  spirit.  Moreover,  we  look 
forward  to  working  together  with  all  of 
the  Korean  parties  to  strengthen  our 
firm  alliance,  to  promote  the  ongoing 
process  of  political  change,  and  to  re- 
solve in  mutually  beneficial  ways  the 
occasionally  thorny  trade  issues  before 


The  April  26 

National  Assembly  Election 

The  April  26  National  Assembly  elec- 
tion reaffirmed  the  Korean  people's  de- 
termination to  continue  the  process  of 
orderly  political  change.  The  main  con- 
testants— the  Democratic  Justice  Party 
(DJP),  the  Peace  and  Democracy  Party 
(PPD),  the  Reunification  Democratic 
Party  (RDP),  and  the  New  Democratic 
Republican  Party  (NDRP)— fought 
hard,  just  as  they  did  in  last  fall's  presi- 


dential election.  Over  a  thousand  c 
dates  ran  in  224  districts.  Candida 
spoke  openly  and  vigorously;  the  r 
covered  the  campaigns  e.xtensively 

The  previous  assembly  contaii 
two  members  per  district.  The  ne\ 
sembly  law  enacted  earlier  this  ye 
calls  for  single-member  districts.  ' 
change  created  a  heated  winner-ta 
atmosphere  during  this  election.  T 
were  some  violent  incidents.  Also 
some  candidates  apparently  attem 
to  influence  the  voters  through  ilk 
or  unethical  means.  Nevertheless, 
75%  of  the  eligible  voters  turned  c 
cast  their  votes  for  the  men  and  w 
of  their  choice.  The  results  attest 
the  Korean  people  again  demonsti 
their  firm  determination  to  make 
mocracy  work. 

Frankly,  the  results  surprise! 
observers.  The  government  party 
never  before  won  less  than  a  majt 
in  the  assembly,  but  failed  to  achi 
one  this  time.  The  DJP  did  win  tl 
most  votes  among  the  parties  and 
has  the  most  seats.  Its  candidates- 
ceived  34%  of  the  popular  vote  an 
of  the  299  seats.  The  PPD  swept 
Dae  Jung's  home  region  in  the  Ch 
Provinces  and  did  well  in  Seoul,  v 
ning  19%  of  all  votes  and  70  seats. 
PPD's  success  makes  it  the  larges 
position  party  in  the  assembly.  T\ 
RDP,  led  by  Kim  Young  Sam,  act 
finished  second  in  total  votes  with 
but  came  up  with  only  59  seats,  ii 
because  the  DJP  and"  RDP  split  tl 
vote  in  the  Kyongsang  Provinces  ( 
southeast.  President  Roh  comes  f: 
the  Taegu  area,  and  Pusan  is  Kim 
Young  Sam's  home  base.  Last  but 
tainly  not  least,  former  Prime  Mil 
Kim  Jong-Pil's  NDRP  did  better  t 
expected,  drawing  on  its  strength 
Mr.  Kim's  home  Chungchong  Prov 
to  win  15%  of  the  vote  for  35  seat: 
Many  news  organizations  have  cor 
mented  on  the  potentially  pivotal 
of  the  NDRP,  inasmuch  as  its  35  \ 
would  produce  a  majority  if  combi 
with  either  the  ruling  party  or  wi 
two  other  opposition  parties.  Inde 
ents  or  minor  party  candidates  w( 
seats,  though  one  of  these  indepei 
assemblymen  plans  to  join  the  PP 

Everyone  realizes  that  the  re: 
of  this  election  mark  another  maj( 
step  in  the  democratization  proces 
The  old  days  when  the  governmen 
party  could  get  its  way  any  time  i 


itc 


th( 


Itei 


32 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Jul>98 


President  Roh  has  pledged  to 

with  the  new  assembly  and  has 
led  his  party's  leadership  to  facili- 
that  process.  There  are  reports 
the  government  is  considering  an- 
■  prisoner  amnesty — we  certainly 
hat  is  needed.  All  the  parties  have 
red  to  cooperate  in  the  new  assem- 
kim  Dae  Jung  recently  affirmed 
ersonal  commitment  to  dialogue 
K'ompromise,  and  pledged  to  work 
If,  successful  Olympics  in  particular, 
democratization  is  a  process,  as  I 

stated  previously.  There  is  still 
1  111  be  done.  The  new  assembly 

oiivene  soon  to  organize.  The 

mi;-  session  will  provide  all  the  par- 

lu'ir  first  opportunity  to  demon- 

I  ,  their  willingness  to  cooperate  in 
.  niistructive  manner  the  Korean 

.  I'xpect.  The  dynamics  of  Korean 
>  <  are  changing  rapidly.  The  new 
iiial  Assembly  consists  mainly  of 
liiTs  with  no  previous  experience 
lisiative  politics;  members  must 
f  ti)  the  new  situation  and  learn  to 
ite  in  new  ways.  Clearly,  Korea 
a  irogressed  tremendously;  Koreans 
i  levertheless  continue  to  push  for- 
-  their  country's  political  develop- 
.  They  will  grapple  with  serious 
i-ms  of  governance — introduction 
al  autonomy,  distribution  of  re- 
es,  priorities  of  economic  develop- 
.  and  human  rights,  including 
•ii's  rights.  It  is  natural  for  any 
.  y-  ty  to  have  to  work  to  address 
n  '  problems.  The  important  point  is 
;  «  Korea's  present  government,  in- 
it  ng  the  new  National  Assembly,  has 
■  w  nitted  itself  to  shaking  off  the  au- 

II  tarian  past  and  moving  into  a  new 
e  )cratic  future.  President  Roh,  with 
'\  n  I  met  in  early  April,  has  commit- 

k  J<  limself  publicly  and  often  to  such 
rress,  as  have  the  leaders  of  the  op- 
'0  ion  parties. 

The  road  is  new;  there  will  be  diffi- 
.  u  es.  Koreans  will  have  to  build  this 
i'.oi  as  they  go.  Making  the  necessary 
if.dstments  may  cause  considerable 
f  tus— that  is  only  natural.  But  we  be- 
.',e  that  the  election  results  show  that 
jl'ans  want  a  government  based  on 
l>ks  and  balances — on  cooperation 
a  er  than  confrontation.  We  also  be- 
'    that  the  actors  in  the  political 
ess  understand  that  and  are  as 
nitted  as  the  Korean  people  to 
'  ing  democratization  work. 


Implications  for  U.S. -Korean 
Relations 

We  heartily  welcome  the  changes  tak- 
ing place  in  Korea.  Korea's  rapid  prog- 
ress in  economic,  social,  and  political 
development,  won  through  the  diligent 
efforts  of  its  citizens,  impresses  us.  The 
National  Assembly  election,  together 
with  the  presidential  election  last  year, 
constitute  historic  developments  in 
Korea's  political  evolution.  These  events 
will  produce  far-reaching  benefits  for 
Korea  as  well  as  for  our  bilateral  rela- 
tions. Democratic  government  will  be 
no  easier  in  Korea  than  anywhere  else. 
We  recognize  that  the  new,  more  open 
political  environment  in  Korea  may 
make  dealing  with  some  bilateral  issues 
more  complex  in  the  short  term.  That 
is  fine.  We  Americans  have  some  e.xpe- 
rience  in  governments  with  executive 
and  legislative  branches  controlled  by 
rival  parties.  The  cooperation  and  fun- 
damental agreement  that  we  are  enjoy- 
ing today,  between  this  subcommittee 
of  a  Democrat-controlled  Congress  and 
myself  as  a  representative  of  a  Re- 
publican Administration,  illustrates  the 
point  nicely.  Shared  democratic  ideals 
will  allow  our  friendship  to  grow  even 


EAST  ASIA 


warmer.  Our  alliance  will  remain  firm. 
Bilateral  trade,  already  large,  should 
continue  to  expand.  I  am  sure  that  you 
gentlemen  here  look  forward,  as  I  do, 
to  the  continued  development  of  our  re- 
lationship with  our  good  friends  and 
close  allies  in  Korea. 

Ten  years  ago,  Korea  faced  an  eco- 
nomic slump  with  democracy  nowhere 
in  sight.  It  would  have  been  difficult  to 
imagine  choosing  the  country  as  an  in- 
ternational showcase  for  anything.  This 
year  Korea  will  host  the  Summer  Olym- 
pics in  an  atmosphere  of  openness  and 
prosperity.  All  Koreans  can  justifiably 
take  pride  in  their  nation's  achieve- 
ments. As  athletes  and  spectators  from 
around  the  world  prepare  to  gather  in 
Korea  for  the  Olympic  Games,  I  cannot 
imagine  a  more  fitting  place  for  such  a 
celebration  of  sport,  peace,  and  human 
determination.  That  same  spirit  of  de- 
termination— to  set  new  goals,  then 
surpass  them — accounts  in  large  meas- 
ure for  the  accomplishments  of  the  cit- 
izens of  the  Republic  of  Korea. 


■The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee 
and  will  be  available  from  the  Superin- 
tendent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.1 


FY  1989  Assistance  Requests 
for  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific 


by  Gaston  J.  Sigur,  Jr. 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Foreign  Operations  of  the  House  Ap- 
propriations Committee  on  March  30, 
1988.  Mr  Sigur  is  Assistant  Secretary 
for  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs.^ 

It  is  with  great  pleasure  that  I  come 
before  you  this  morning  to  discuss  the 
Administration's  policies  in  Asia  and 
the  Pacific  and  to  request  your  support 
for  much  needed  economic  and  military 
assistance  to  a  handful  of  important  de- 
veloping nations  in  this  region. 

The  past  year  was  a  benchmark 
year  for  American  interests  in  Asia. 
Signs  of  democratic  advancement  were 
abundant.  Transitions  in  leadership 
were  managed  successfully  in  the  Re- 
public of  Korea,  the  People's  Republic 
of  China  and  Taiwan,  and  democratic 
institutions  became  more  deeply  rooted 
in  Thailand.  Korea's  peaceable  election 
and  inauguration  of  President  Roh  'Kie 
Woo  is  nothing  short  of  remarkable  and 


demonstrates  that  nation's  full  emer- 
gence into  the  community  of  democratic 
and  world  class  nations.  In  the  Philip- 
pines, a  democratic  constitution  was 
adopted  and  a  new  congress  was 
elected  and  seated.  Also  in  Southeast 
Asia,  the  members  of  ASEAN  [Asso- 
ciation of  South  East  Asian  Nations] 
celebrated  the  20th  anniversary  of  the 
founding  of  their  organization  at  a  sum- 
mit in  Manila. 

Progress  was  also  made  in  our  rela- 
tions with  China.  A  series  of  high-level 
exchanges  took  place  with  the  Chinese 
which  carried  with  them  agreements  on 
a  range  of  issues,  economic  and  scien- 
tific, which  are  in  the  interests  of  both 
our  peoples.  The  past  year  has  also 
seen  Japan  increase  her  role  in  the  re- 
gion not  only  as  the  economic  dynamo 
of  Asia,  but  as  the  largest  foreign  aid 
donor  as  well. 

Through  the  increased  realization 
of  democratic  ideals  in  Asia,  through 
the  growth  of  trade  among  Asian  na- 
tions and  between  Asian  nations  and 


iiartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


33 


EAST  ASIA 


the  United  States,  and  through  the  im- 
proved and  noticeable  consumer  life- 
styles and  distribution  of  wealth  inside 
many  of  these  countries,  the  United 
States  can  draw  much  hope  that  Asia's 
future  is  a  bright  one,  one  which,  with 
continued  wise  action  and  assistance  on 
our  part,  will  enhance  our  future  as 
well. 

One  of  the  most  important  objec- 
tives of  the  United  States  in  this  region 
is  the  maintenance  of  a  stable,  peaceful 
environment  conducive  to  continued 
economic,  political,  and  social  progress. 
We  hope  to  see  the  further  emergence 
of  more  representative  governments, 
more  open  markets  and  adoption  of  free 
trade  principles,  more  consultations  be- 
tween allies  and  adversaries  alike,  and 
greater  security  through  mutual  confi- 
dence as  well  as  a  stable  deterrence 
framework.  To  attain  these  goals,  how- 
ever, and  to  truly  profit  from  the  oppor- 
tunities this  vast,  diverse  region  holds 
for  us,  it  is  going  to  be  necessary  for  us 
to  continue  to  demonstrate  by  our  eco- 
nomic and  security  assistance  that  we 
are  determined  to  be  a  part  of  Asia's 
future. 

While  this  region  enjoys  fairly 
broad  tranquility  today,  there  is  ample 
need  for  concrete  action  to  resolve  spe- 
cific sources  of  tension.  The  Vietnamese 
occupation  of  Cambodia,  a  communist 
insurgency  in  the  Philippines,  a  con- 
tinued Soviet  interest  in  asserting  in- 
fluence in  the  region,  and  residual 
problems  of  poverty  are  just  a  few  rea- 
sons the  United  States  needs  to  provide 
economic  and  security  assistance  to  na- 
tions there. 

While  my  colleagues  Rich  Armi- 
tage  from  Defense  [Assistant  Secretary 
for  International  Security  Affairs  Rich- 
ard Armitage]  and  Julia  Chang  Bloch 
from  AID  [Agency  for  International 
Development!  will  join  with  me  this 
morning  in  emphasizing  the  Admin- 
istration's commitment  to  support  of 
the  Aquino  government  in  the  Philip- 
pines, I  ask  the  committee  to  consider 
our  requests  for  other  countries  in  the 
region  as  well.  On  my  visits  to  Asia 
over  the  last  2  years,  I  have  always 
stressed  the  reliability  of  America's 
commitments  and  our  intention  to  as- 
sist as  much  as  we  are  able  in  the  re- 
gion's development. 

For  this  reason,  I  am  submitting  in 
my  testimony  for  the  record  a  complete 
outline  of  our  security  and  economic  aid 
recommendations  for  13  countries  and 
three  regional  programs  in  East  Asia 
and  the  Pacific.  In  toto,  this  assistance 
program  amounts  to  $442  million,  or 
S.TVf  of  all  U.S.  bilateral  and  regional 


assistance  funding.  A  small  amount 
compared  to  the  return  the  United 
States  receives  on  this  investment  in 
the  continued  friendship  and  coopera- 
tion of  the  dynamic  nations  of  this 
important  region. 

Foreign  aid  has  never  been  popular 
in  this  country,  nor  in  the  Congress. 
For  as  long  as  I  can  remember  it  has 
been  the  whipping  boy,  the  hook  on 
which  we  like  to  hang  our  traditional 
reluctance  to  play  the  role  thrust  upon 
us  by  our  national  wealth  and  power 
and  the  ideals  we  stand  for.  In  submit- 
ting our  request  this  year,  however,  I 
am  concerned  that  unless  these  levels 
are  met,  we  will  be  jeopardizing  funda- 
mental U.S.  interests  in  the  Asia- 
Pacific  region.  Failure  to  support  our 
friends  in  this  part  of  the  world  with 
the  minimum  assistance  I  am  recom- 
mending will  send  signals  to  them  to 
look  elsewhere  for  support  and  provide 
the  Soviet  Union  with  a  comparatively 
ine.xpensive  way  of  expanding  its 
influence. 

I  do  not  make  this  assertion 
lightly.  There  are  plenty  of  positive  rea- 
sons for  dispensing  foreign  aid — eco- 
nomic and  humanitarian.  But  we  also 
provide  it  because  of  the  direct  impact 
it  has  upon  the  security  and  foreign 
policy  interests  of  the  United  States. 
For  all  these  reasons,  I  ask  you  to  look 
favorably  upon  our  request. 

I  would  now  like  to  review  the  indi- 
vidual country  programs  in  greater 
detail. 

Philippines 

A  stable,  democratic,  and  prosperous 
Philippines,  with  friendly  ties  to  and 
continued  close  security  cooperation 
with  the  United  States,  is  important  to 
the  peace  and  stability  of  Southeast 
Asia  and  to  U.S.  interests  both  within 
and  outside  the  region.  The  Philippines 
are  host  to  U.S.  Air  Force  and  Naval 
facilities  that  are  important  to  the  se- 
curity of  the  United  States,  the  Asia- 
Pacific  region,  and  the  Philippines  in 
the  face  of  an  expanding  Soviet  pres- 
ence. These  military  facilities  are  vital 
to  U.S.  power  projection  capability  into 
the  western  Pacific  and  Indian  Ocean- 
Southwest  Asia  regions  and  to  protec- 
tion of  economically  vital  sealanes. 

Our  interests  in  the  Philippines  are 
much  greater  than  the  presence  of  U.S. 
mihtary  facilities,  however  The  U.S. 
Government  has  an  important  interest 
in  assisting  Filipinos  consolidate  politi- 
cal gains  they  have  made  over  the  past 
2  years.  The  Philippine  people  can  jus- 
tifiably be  proud  of  the  peaceful  transi- 


tion to  democracy  in  February  198 
We,  on  our  part,  are  pleased  that 
support  was  helpful  at  this  critical 
juncture.  As  President  Reagan  de  rt 
in  his  November  1987  radio  addreson 
the  Philippines  "we  have  a  moral  t  d- 
gation  to  help  all  democracies  suc<  (d. 
. . .  We  will  work  with  President  Ac  mo 
to  build  a  safer  home  for  democrai  in 
the  Philippines.  Most  of  the  respo  ibi' 
ity  belongs  to  the  people  of  the  PI  : 
pines,  but  we  can  and  will  lend  a 
hand."  I  continue  to  be  impressed 
the  progress  the  Aquino  governmt 
has  made  in  restoring  democracy 
by  the  depth  of  popular  support  f(  he 
government.  President  Aquino  ha 
asked  for  our  assistance  in  helping  ro 
mote  economic  recovery  and  defer  ng 
democracy.  We  must  do  what  we  c  i  tt 
help. 

The  level  of  our  security  assis  m 
commitment  established  in  the  Pr  i- 
dent's  "best  efforts  pledge"  growii 
out  of  the  1983  review  of  the  U.S. 
Philippine  military  bases  agreeme 
(MBA)  provides  the  current  floor   ■ 
our  assistance  program.  President  .ea 
gan  pledged  his  "best  efforts"  to  1 1- 
vide  $475  million  in  economic  supj  1 
funds  (ESF)  and  $425  million  in  n  - 
tary  assistance  grants  and  credits  ji- 
ing  the  period  FY  (fiscal  year)  19!  M 

While  U.S.  assistance  progra 
will  assist  the  Government  of  the   il- 
ippines  in  strengthening  democrai  an 
accelerating  economic  growth,  thf  'V- 
els  of  foreign  assistance  funding  t^  he 
Philippines  envisioned  in  the  Pres 
dent's  best  efforts  pledge  are  insu  - 
cient  to  address  adequately  the 
enormous  Philippine  economic  anc  e- 
curity  requirements.  Over  the  pas  I 
years,  the  needs  of  the  Aquino  go  rn- 
ment  for  greater  military  and  ecoi  piii 
aid  have  led  us  to  provide  assistar  \ 
beyond  proportional  levels  necess; ' ' 
fulfill  the  President's  best  efforts 
pledge  and  also  to  seek  higher  lev  • 
for  FY  1989  than  would  be  necess.  ^  i 
complete  the  ESF  commitment.  Of 
ESF  request  of  $124  million  is  low 
than  ESF  commitments  in  FY  19? am 
FY  1987  of  $219.6  and  $250  milliore- 
spectively  at  a  time  when  Philippi ' 
political  and  economic  needs  rema . 

In  both  FY  1986  and  FY  1987  J.i 
economic  assistance,  largely  as  bu?et 
support,  was  adequate  to  show  a  t^on 
political  commitment  to  the  Aquir 
government  and  to  ensure,  in  comlna 
tion  with  generous  debt  reschedul  gs 
and  international  donor  commitmecs, 
that  the  Government  of  the  Philip  nes 
could  meet  its  foreign  currency  firnc- 
ing  needs  while  stimulating  its  ec'  - 


34 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Juiv ! 


EAST  ASIA 


r.S.  economic  assistance  can 
iiue  to  be  an  important  element  of 
olution  to  the  Philippines  funding 
kins  and  ideally  should  grow 
r  than  shrink  as  currently  contem- 
il,  hut  budget  restrictions  leave  us 
iiernative. 

lialanced,  sustainable  economic 
th,  which  leads  to  greater  employ- 
and  higher  rural  incomes  is  essen- 
.1  combatting  the  widespread  and 
istent  communist  insurgency  which 
sents  the  major  threat  to  democ- 
m  the  Philippines.  U.S.  assistance 
lams  play  a  vital  role  in  helping 
liilippine  Government  meet  politi- 
11(1  economic  challenges  to  its  au- 
I  \ .  In  order  to  counter  the  appeal 
insurgents,  the  government  must 
-trate  that  newly  created  demo- 
mstitutions  represent  a  real 
jc  and  that  elected  officials  will  be 
'iisive  to  popular  demands  for  es- 
al  services  including  health  care, 
at  ion,  improved  infrastructure  as 
K  as  preservation  of  law  and  order 
in  dispensation  of  justice. 

Xir  economic  assistance  programs 
alldw  US  to  engage  the  Government 
'■  Philippines  in  a  useful  policy  di- 
ii-  which  promotes  Philippine  eco- 
e  reforms  intended  to  produce 
u  lined  free-market-based  growth. 
i(  Tnment  reforms  such  as  import  lib- 
■r  zation,  privatization,  and  the 
:  ku|(  of  monopolies  contributed  to 
y'l  economic  growth  in  1987  after 
•  iif  decline.  My  distinguished  col- 
li  from  AID,  Julia  Chang  Bloch, 
(  umment  in  more  detail  on  the  role 
''iiomic  assistance  in  promoting 
'  ppine  development. 
U.S.  security  assistance  requests 
if  10  million  in  MAP  [military  as- 
pince  programs]  and  $2.6  million  in 
jf  IT  [international  military  education 
.#  training  program],  while  sufficient 
•  leet  only  the  highest  priority  AFP 
jSned  Forces  of  the  Philippines] 
■  It  Is,  are  all  that  is  possible,  given  our 
U  budget  constraints.  Security  as- 
Jiance  resources  are  of  critical  impor- 
'•:e  to  the  Armed  Forces  of  the 
W  ippines.  AFP  resources  are  so  lim- 
;!li  that  U.S.  military  assistance  cur- 
'.»::ly  constitutes  83%  of  the  AFP's 
(-■(rations,  maintenance,  and  procure- 
iiyit  budgets.  Rich  Armitage  will  com- 

3 it  on  the  positive  effort  our  security 
stance  has  on  enhancing  AFP 
abilities, 
i,  j  I  do  have  some  final  comments, 
^:Ji'ever.  The  Administrations  FY  1989 
'IJ.P  request  for  the  Philippines  is  the 
m\  amount  of  the  President's  5-year 


best  efforts  pledge  made  at  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  1983  review  of  the  military 
base  agreement.  The  U.S.  Govern- 
ment's fulfillment  of  commitments  made 
in  previous  negotiations  is  essential  to 
maintaining  consensus  for  continued 
unhampered  access  to  military  facilities 
in  the  Philippines  by  demonstrating 
U.S.  reliability  as  a  democratic  partner 
and  military  ally. 

Indonesia 

Strategically  placed  astride  vital  air- 
and  sealanes  between  the  Pacific  and 
Indian  Oceans,  Indonesia's  continued 
political  and  economic  stability  is  essen- 
tial for  U.S.  interests  in  Asia.  Indo- 
nesia is  also  an  important  source  of 
valuable  raw  materials,  especially  oil 
and  natural  gas.  Over  the  past  two  dec- 
ades, the  Soeharto  government  has 
managed  an  impressive  economic  devel- 
opment effort,  maintained  political  sta- 
bility, and  played  a  constructive  role  in 
international  affairs  as  a  moderate  non- 
aligned  state.  Indonesia  is  a  leader  in 
ASEAN's  efforts  to  end  the  Vietnamese 
occupation  of  Cambodia. 

The  largest  country  in  Southeast 
Asia  and  the  fifth  most  populous,  Indo- 
nesia is  still  relatively  poor  and  heavily 
dependent  on  e.xports  of  petroleum  and 
natural  gas.  In  1986,  the  collapse  of  oil 
prices  precipitated  Indonesia's  worst 
economic  reverse  in  two  decades.  Ex- 
ternal debt,  e.xacerbated  by  changes  in 
the  yen-dollar  rate,  now  stands  at 
about  $43  billion,  with  a  debt  service 
ratio  approaching  40%.  The  Indonesian 
Government's  response  to  these  exter- 
nal shocks  has  been  impressive.  Aus- 
terity budgets,  prudent  macroeconomic 
management,  and  major  trade  and  in- 
dustrial policy  reforms  have  helped  In- 
donesia, now  expanding  its  non-energy 
exports  at  an  annual  15%  rate,  through 
difficult  years.  Nonetheless,  with  an 
annual  per  capita  income  of  about  $400 
and  2  million  new  entrants  into  the  la- 
bor force  each  year,  Indonesia  needs 
continued  bilateral  and  multilateral  for- 
eign assistance  to  ensure  continued  eco- 
nomic development  and  domestic 
tranquility. 

Our  economic  assistance  for  Indo- 
nesia consists  of  development  assistance 
and  food  aid  under  PL  480  Title  I  and 
Title  II.  It  is  increasingly  focused  on  a 
coordinated  effort  to  improve  long- 
term,  sustainable  employment  and  in- 
come-generating opportunities  through 
means  that  promote  efficiency  and  pro- 
ductivity. These  include  human  re- 
sources development,  primary  health 


care  and  family  planning,  agricultural 
productivity,  and  support  for  a  more 
open  and  trade  oriented  economy.  De- 
centralization and  private  sector  in- 
volvement are  key.  Policy  analysis  and 
policy  dialogue  are  strengthened 
through  research  and  projects  designed 
to  test  policy  options  for  the  Indonesian 
Government. 

We  have  requested  $45  million  in 
development  assistance  for  FY  1989. 
These  funds  will  support  our  tradi- 
tional, ongoing  economic  development 
programs,  as  well  as  projects  to  encour- 
age and  reinforce  Indonesia's  commit- 
ment to  economic  and  trade  deregula- 
tion. Despite  a  minor  drought,  our  $10 
million  request  for  PL  480  Title  I  is 
only  30%  of  the  FY  1987  program.  Our 
$8.i  million  request  for  PL  480  Title  II 
funds  will  support  a  variety  of  effective 
voluntary  agency  programs. 

The  security  assistance  program 
for  FY  1989  includes  $1.9  million  in 
IMET  and  $10  million  MAP  which  is 
almost  the  same  as  the  FY  1987  level. 
The  Indonesian  military  has  been  com- 
pelled to  swallow  a  disproportionate  cut 
in  an  already  austere  national  budget. 
MAP  will  help  Indonesia  to  continue  to 
purchase  U.S.  equipment,  such  as  a 
limited  number  of  F-16s.  The  Indone- 
sian Armed  Forces  view  our  security 
cooperation  as  an  important  indication 
of  our  concern  for  the  security  needs  of 
their  country. 

Faced  with  an  austere  budget  cli- 
mate, Indonesia's  Armed  Forces  also 
appreciate  and  fully  utilize  the  IMET 
program,  which  offers  advanced  and 
specialized  training  for  Indonesian 
Armed  Forces  command  and  manage- 
ment personnel.  Numerous  senior  Indo- 
nesian military  officers  have  received 
U.S.  training;' the  FY  1989  IMET  fund- 
ing request  will  permit  as  many  as  250 
younger  military  officers  to  have  the 
same  opportunity. 

Thailand 

Thailand,  the  only  U.S.  treaty  ally  on 
the  Southeast  Asian  mainland,  is  also 
the  front-line  state  resisting  the  Viet- 
namese occupation  of  Cambodia.  The 
Thai  coped  admirably  with  a  domestic 
but  externally  supported  communist  in- 
surgency which  threatened  stability  in 
the  1960s  and  1970s.  They  must  now 
restructure  their  military  forces  to  face 
not  only  the  indigenous  armies  of  Laos 
and  the  Heng  Samrin  regime  in  Cam- 
bodia, but  also  the  more  than  150,000 
Vietnamese  forces  in  those  countries. 


ftpartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


35 


EAST  ASIA 


Together,  these  armies  significantly 
outnumber  the  Royal  Thai  Army,  with- 
out considering  the  even  larger  and 
better  equipped  military  units  in  Viet- 
nam itself. 

The  threat  to  Thailand  is  real  and 
immediate.  In  1987,  the  Thai  fought  an 
intense  series  of  bloody  engagements  to 
oust  Vietnamese  forces  from  Thai  ter- 
ritory where  Thailand,  Laos,  and  Cam- 
bodia meet.  This  year,  they  have 
suffered  hundreds  of  casualties  as  they 
fought  to  drive  the  army  of  communist 
Laos  from  positions  in  Thailand.  While 
a  cease-fire  betwen  Laos  and  Thailand 
is  now  in  place,  and  there  is  hope  that 
this  situation  can  be  resolved  through 
negotiations,  the  recent  battles 
Thailand  has  had  to  fight  with  foreign 
intruders  is  vivid  evidence  that 
Thailand's  status  as  a  front-line  state  is 
not  simple  rhetoric. 

I  think  it  important  to  remember 
that  instability  elsewhere  in  the  region 
and  the  growth  of  Soviet  military  power 
in  Asia — as  exemplified  by  their  base  at 
Cam  Ranh  Bay — have  increased  the 
strategic  importance  of  Thailand  to  the 
United  States.  Thailand's  stability,  in- 
dependence, and  territorial  integrity 
are  critical  to  the  stability  of  Southeast 
Asia  and  to  our  strategic  position  west- 
ward into  the  Indian  Ocean.  However, 
as  you  know,  we  have  been  forced  to 
reduce  substantially — by  more  than 
half — our  security  assistance  pi-ogram 
in  Thailand  from  the  modest  FY  1985 
levels.  It  should  come  as  no  surprise  for 
me  to  tell  you  that  as  security  as- 
sistance funding  has  diminished,  our  in- 
fluence relative  to  that  of  others  has 
diminished  as  well.  This  trend  does  not 
bode  well  for  our  ability  to  defend  our 
interests  in  the  future. 

Thailand  shares  with  the  United 
States  a  commitment  to  suppress  nar- 
cotics trafficking.  Like  the  United 
States,  Thailand  is  a  net  importer  of 
narcotics.  It  is  aLso  the  main  transit 
route  for  drugs  produced  in  Laos  and 
Burma,  both  major  sources  of  opiates. 
The  Royal  Thai  Government  has  de- 
ployed police,  paramilitary,  and  even 
regular  army  units  to  assist  in  the 
eradication  of  crops,  destruction  of  re- 
fineries, and  interdiction  of  supply 
routes.  By  helping  to  modernize  the 
communications  and  transportation  ca- 
pabilities of  the  Thai  Armed  Forces, 
the  U.S.  security  assistance  program 
also  contributes  directly  to  our  efforts 
to  combat  the  drug  menace. 

The  tragedy  that  befell  Laos,  Cam- 
bodia, and  South  Vietnam  when  the 
communists  won  power  on  the  bat- 
tlefield continues  and  the  tens  of  thou- 


sands of  Indochinese  refugees  who  flee 
each  year  bear  witness  to  the  misery 
wreaked  upon  their  homelands.  Be- 
cause of  Thailand's  proximity  to  Viet- 
nam and  its  common  borders  with  Laos 
and  Cambodia,  most  of  those  who  seek 
temporary  shelter  or  first  asylum  do  so 
in  Thailand.  On  February  24th,  I  testi- 
fied before  the  East  Asia  and  Pacific 
Subcommittee  of  the  House  Foreign  Af- 
fairs Committee  on  the  current  refugee 
situation  in  Thailand.  I  will  not  repeat 
that  extensive  presentation.  I  would, 
however,  like  to  note  briefly  that  the 
Royal  Thai  Government  views  this  situ- 
ation as  one  which  poses  a  threat  to 
Thai  security,  as  an  economic  drain,  but 
also  as  a  problem  which  begs  for  a  hu- 
manitarian response.  By  bolstering  the 
resources  of  the  Royal  Thai  Govern- 
ment as  it  copes  with  the  problems  of 
development,  weak  markets  for  many 
traditional  commodities,  and  increasing 
protectionist  sentiment  toward  its  ex- 
ports of  manufactured  goods,  the  U.S. 
security  assistance  program  enhances 
the  fragile  ability  of  Thailand  to  sustain 
a  generous  first  asylum  policy. 

Our  funding  for  development  as- 
sistance to  Thailand  has  suffered  much 
the  same  fate  as  our  security  assistance 
efforts.  Once  the  largest  source  of  de- 
velopment assistance,  the  United 
States  now  ranks  ninth  among  donors 
to  Thailand.  To  give  you  some  idea  of 
the  disparity  between  the  United 
States  and  others,  Japan  alone  now  ac- 
counts For  about  40  times  as  much  de- 
velopment assistance  as  the  United 
States.  Our  modest  program  today  is 
concentrated  on  areas  where  we  have  a 
comparative  advantage  vis-a-vis  other 
donors  and  where  we  think  we  can  play 
a  catalytic  role  in  initiating  new  pro- 
grams. These  areas  include  science  and 
technology,  rural  industries  and  devel- 
opment, a  sophisticated  policy  dialogue, 
and  natural  resources  and  environment. 
We  also  have  requested  ESF  monies 
which  help  Thailand  to  offset  the  im- 
pact of  refugee  influxes  on  its  borders 
with  Laos  and  Cambodia. 

Korea 

As  Korea  continues  its  progress  toward 
a  more  open,  democratic  society,  the 
United  States  has  a  vital  interest  in 
assisting  the  efforts  of  the  Republic  of 
Korea  to  strengthen  its  own  defense  ca- 
pabilities. In  the  process,  we  hope  to 
help  maintain  peace  and  stability  in 
Northeast  Asia  while  providing  a  shield 
on  the  peninsula  for  continued  Korean 
political  and  economic  progress. 


The  United  States  and  Korea  in' 
a  continuing  close  and  mutually  b( 
ficial  security  relationship.  U.S.  fi 
in  the  Republic  help  to  provide  th 
terrent  shield  against  attack  from 
well-armed  and  unpredictable  Noi 
Recognizing  Korea's  economic  pro 
we  ended  in  1986  our  funded  prog 
there;  we  continue  an  active  IME 
gram  and  FMS  [foreign  military  .- 
cash-sales  program,  under  which  ire 
continues  to  obtain  much  of  the  si  • 
plies  and  equipment  for  its  contin  i? 
defense  modernization. 

The  proposed  FY  1989  securi- 
sistance  program  continues  suppn 
the  modernization  of  Korea's  defei 
capabilities.  The  upcoming  decisii  .-; 
Korean  FX  advanced  fighter  aircr :, 
the  largest  single  item  under  acti 
consideration,  features  major  Am  lea 
companies  in  the  bidding.  Korea  \ } 
also  continue  to  obtain  munitions,  jp^ 
plies,  and  technological  upgrades    iU 
air,  land,  and  sea  systems.  In  add  on 
the  IMET  program  in  Korea  stim  ite 
better  understanding  within  the  1  rea 
military  of  U.S.  military  doctrine  id 
traditions,  including  the  role  of  tl  mi 
itary  in  a  democratic  system.  Tht  ro- 
gram  will  further  strengthen  our 
important  security  and  overall 
relationship. 

Malaysia 

Strategically  located  on  the  Malai 
Straits,  Malaysia's  continued  polit  il 
stability  and  economic  developme  an 
essential  to  U.S.  interests  in  Sou 
Asia.  Confronted  with  the  Vietna 
occupation  of  Cambodia  and  a  ma    : 
viet  base  at  Cam  Ranh  Bay,  Mala  la 
has  been  in  the  forefront  of  ASE.;  I's 
strategy  to  compel  a  withdrawal  ( 
Vietnamese  forces  from  Cambodi;  ind 
secure  a  negotiated  settlement  en  jrin 
the  rights  of  the  Cambodian  peop 

A  stable  parliamentary  demo  ^c.v 
Malaysia  is  nonaligned,  but  staun  ^y 
anticommunist.  Gradually  emergi  f 
from  its  first  economic  recession  ;  ice 
independence,  Malaysia  greatly  ai  re- 
ciates  U.S.  security  assistance,  tl 
only  form  of  aid  it  now  receives  fi  n 
the  United  States.  Faced  with  coi 
tinued  austere  defense  budgets,  t  ■ 
Malaysian  Government  is  looking  r 
ways  to  maximize  the  armed  forc( 
ability  to  utilize  current  equipmei  am 
manpower.  The  $1.1  million  IMETro- 
gram  we  are  requesting  in  FY  19>|w 
play  an  important  role  in  helping  fC 
Malaysian  Armed  Forces  meet  thtr 
training  needs  as  they  adjust  to  aioK 
conventional  force  structure  and  i)re 
sophisticated  equipment. 


36 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Jui\l98i 


EAST  ASIA 


achieving  independence  in  1984, 
;.i  has  strengthened  cooperation 
ii>  ASEAN  neighbors  and  the 
:!  States.  U.S.  Pacific  Command 
itu's,  including  visits  by  U.S.  war- 

.;  ami  miUtary  aircraft,  have  fos- 
!  military  cooperation,  an 
itaiit  dimension  of  our  bilateral  re- 
1...  For  the  first  time,  a  $50,000 
r  Item  for  Brunei  has  been  in- 
,1  111  the  FY  1989  foreign  as- 
,Ke  request.  A  small  IMET 
ram  will  strengthen  our  military 
ill  It  only  lowering  overall  costs  of 
a IV  training,  but  also  encouraging 
„  ltd  look  to  the  United  States  for 

;  ing-  and  equipment. 

I  apore 
a] Hire's  location  on  the  Straits  of 
oa  places  it  at  a  strategically 
It  ant  chokepoint  for  maritime  traf- 
t  ween  the  Pacific  and  Indian 
US.  Its  modern  and  efficient  har- 
airfields,  and  maintenance  facilities 
made  it  a  valuable  port  of  call  for 
military  ships  and  aircraft.  The 
i-nment  of  Singapore  shares  our 
-■rns  about  Vietnamese  expan- 
,(  sm  and  the  Soviet  presence  in 
i(  heast  Asia.  Singapore  is  a  leader  of 
V;  ;AN's  efforts  to  compel  Vietnam  to 
■  draw  its  occupation  forces  from 
hodia  and  publicly  supports  the 
J    facilities  in  the  Philippines. 

Singapore  is  a  stable  parliamentary 
1(  ncracy.  Internationally,  it  pursues  a 
iligned,  but  strongly  anticommunist 
un  policy.  Its  free-market  policies 
fostered  rapid  economic  develop- 
t.  For  many  years  the  only  U.S. 
;un  assistance  to  Singapore  has 
11  the  form  of  a  modest  IMET  pro- 
!i.  The  $50,000  we  are  requesting  in 
;T  this  year  will  allow  the  Sing- 
e  defense  forces  to  continue  to 
t  key  training  needs  and  help  solid- 
lur  military  links  with  this  impor- 
Southeast  Asian  democracy. 

nbodian  Resistance 

-  modest  assistance  program  for  the 
1  Lommunist  Cambodian  resistance  is 
i  ty  element  in  our  support  for 
'  BAN'S  effort  to  compel  Vietnam  to 
;  -pt  a  negotiated  settlement  in  Cam- 
"  ia  and  to  return  that  country  to  the 
■  trol  of  the  Cambodian  people. 
EAN's  united  approach  in  dealing 
h  Vietnamese  aggression  has  been  a 
jor  factor  in  preserving  the  security 
Thailand  and  the  pohtical  and  eco- 


nomic stability  of  Southeast  Asia. 
Moreover,  even  this  low  level  of  fund- 
ing, supplemented  by  financial  support 
from  other  countries,  contributes  to  the 
abihty  of  the  Cambodian  noncom- 
munists  to  maintain  their  campaign 
against  the  Vietnamese  and  to  stand  up 
to  the  still  powerful  Khmer  Rouge. 
Continued  U.S.  support  is  essential  as 
the  various  parties  involved  in  the  con- 
flict maneuver  for  political  position  in 
anticipation  of  possible  negotiations. 

The  U.S.  initiative  to  provide  funds 
to  the  noncommunist  resistance  has 
been  hailed  by  ASEAN  and  others  as  a 
positive  measure  of  American  support 
for  efforts  to  reach  a  settlement  to  the 
Cambodian  conflict.  The  money  allo- 
cated is  currently  being  used  to  provide 
nonlethal  training  and  equipment  to 
noncommunist  resistance  fighters. 

Burma 

Relations  between  the  United  States 
and  Burma  are  the  best  that  they  have 
been  in  the  Ne  Win  era.  Burma's  aging 
leaders  will  transfer  power  to  a  new 
generation  by  the  turn  of  the  century. 
The  new  leadership  will  likely  come 
from  the  military,  whose  attitudes  to- 
ward the  United  States  are  friendly  but 
less  informed  than  earlier  as  a  result  of 
a  considerable  period  during  which  con- 
tact was  quite  limited.  I  should  add 
that  Burma  follows  a  policy  of  genuine 
nonalignment.  In  fact,  Burma,  which 
was  one  of  the  founders  of  the  non- 
aligned  movement,  left  the  nonaligned 
movement  when  it  concluded  the  orga- 
nization had  strayed  from  its  original 
principles  and  become  too  pro-Soviet. 

Since  independence  in  1948,  the 
Burmese  Government  has  been  battling 
myriad  insurgent  groups,  most  based 
on  Burma's  many  ethnic  minorities. 
Fighting  between  the  Burma  Army  and 
the  insurgents  or  among  the  insurgents 
themselves  often  spills  over  into 
Thailand  and  occasionally  into  China. 
Most  of  the  insurgents,  including  the 
Burmese  Communist  Party,  finance 
their  operations  through  drug  produc- 
tion and  trafficking,  and  often  possess 
more  firepower  than  the  Burma  Army 
units  which  oppose  them.  It  is  not  an 
exaggeration  to  say  that  some  of  these 
groups  are  little  more  than  armed  com- 
mercial drug  dealers  hiding  behind  al- 
leged minority  grievances.  For  its  part, 
the  Burmese  Government  has  sup- 
ported strongly  U.S.  narcotics  goals, 
including  initiating  in  1985  an  aerial 


spraying  program  with  U.S.  support 
that  has  eradicated  an  increased  area  of 
poppy  plantings  each  year  of  its 
existance. 

Burma's  ability  to  defeat  the  insur- 
gents and  narcotics  traffickers  is  se- 
verely limited  by  the  parlous  state  of 
the  economy.  Burma  was  recently  ac- 
corded "least  developed  developing 
country"  status  by  the  United  Nations, 
certifying  it  as  among  the  poorest  of 
the  poor.  Despite  its  economic  difficul- 
ties, Burma  is  a  land  of  rich  potential. 
U.S.  oil  companies  believe  that  Burma 
may  possess  some  of  the  richest  hydro- 
carbon reserves  outside  the  Middle 
East  and  several  have  maintained  an 
active  dialogue  with  the  Burmese  Gov- 
ernment aimed  at  cooperation  in  ex- 
ploiting these  resources. 

Our  very  small  IMET  program  is 
needed  to  help  develop  a  Burmese  mili- 
tary capable  of  effectively  combatting 
the  insurgencies  and  drug  traffickers. 
Not  only  has  U.S.  military  training 
contributed  to  a  more  effective  Bur- 
mese military,  IMET  also  has  provided 
one  of  the  principal  avenues  of  contact 
between  Burmese  officers  and  the 
United  States,  in  a  relationship  where 
such  opportunities  are  still  relatively 
few. 

Our  $7  million  dollar  AID  program 
is  designed  to  assist  the  people  of 
Burma  by  encouraging  the  government 
to  move  toward  more  pragmatic  and  ef- 
fective economic  policies.  In  the  agri- 
cultural sector,  our  efforts  focus  on 
increased  production  of  oilseeds,  a  sta- 
ple in  the  Burmese  diet  and  a  food  item 
which  is  in  chronic  shortage.  In  the 
realm  of  health,  we  have  projects  to 
improve  primary  health  care  and  child 
survival  services.  We  also  have  a  train- 
ing program  that  provides  a  growing 
number  of  Burmese  with  an  opportu- 
nity to  acquire  needed  technical  skills 
in  the  United  States,  thereby  also  ex- 
posing them  to  the  workings  of  a  free 
enterprise  system  in  a  political 
democracy. 

Recent  developments  such  as  the 
decontrol  of  rice  prices  and  the  freeing 
of  trade  in  basic  food  crops  mark  the 
most  significant  change  in  Burmese 
economic  policy  in  the  last  25  years.  We 
are  encouraged  by  these  developments 
and  believe  that  a  sustained  effort  on 
our  part  will  help  Burma  realize  its  tre- 
mendous potential. 

Fiji 

The  statutory  hold  on  assistance  under 
Section  513  of  the  FAA  [Federal  Avia- 


ijjartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


37 


EAST  ASIA 


tion  Administration]  has  been  suc- 
cessful in  demonstrating  U.S.  support 
of  democratic  institutions.  The  Govern- 
ment of  Fiji  is  aware  of  our  keen  inter- 
est in  encouraging  a  process  that  will 
lead  to  the  restoration  of  elections  and 
a  constitutional  government  with 
broadly  based  support.  In  view  of  re- 
cent developments  in  Fiji  that  indicate 
that  the  interim  government  is  on  a 
course  leading  to  the  restoration  of  con- 
stitutional government,  we  have  begun 
consultations  with  the  Congress  to  e.\- 
plore  ways  of  restoring  our  economic 
assistance  programs  in  Fiji.  As  we  take 
this  step  we  note  that  all  of  Fiji's  tradi- 
tional friends  have  restored  economic 
assistance  to  that  country.  Further,  the 
dislocation  in  Fiji's  economy  brought 
about  by  12  months  of  political  uncer- 
tainty has  placed  great  strains  on  all  of 
Fiji's  institutions  and  its  people.  We 
intend  to  work  with  the  appropriate 
committees  in  Congi-ess  to  find  a  way 
to  join  with  the  other  nations  of  the 
West  in  resuming  economic  assistance 
to  Fiji. 

When  the  hold  on  bilateral  as- 
sistance is  lifted  and  subsequently  a  de- 
cision is  made  to  resume  military 
assistance,  our  MAP  and  IMET  pro- 
grams are  designed  to  enhance  Fiji's 
ability  to  carry  out  internationally 
important  peacekeeping  responsibilities 
in  the  United  Nations  Interim  Force  in 
Lebanon  (UNIFIL)  and  the  Sinai  Mul- 
tinational Force  and  Observers  (MFO). 
Specifically,  our  IMET  program  is 
geared  to  enhance  Fiji's  military  skills 
for  peacekeeping  operations.  More  im- 
portantly, it  provides  exposure  to  U.S. 
military  traditions,  including  the  demo- 
cratic concepts  of  the  separation  of  po- 
litical powers  and  the  noninvolvement 
of  the  military  in  the  political  process. 

Papua  New  Guinea 

Papua  New  Guinea  is  the  largest,  most 
populous  nation  in  the  South  Pacific  re- 
gion. A  country  of  vast  economic  poten- 
tial, it  has  a  vigorous  democratic,  free 
enterprise  tradition.  The  $.')(), 0(1(1  IMET 
program  provides  command  and  staff 
training  to  its  national  defense  force  at 
the  highest  levels  as  well  as  offering 
speciality  courses  in  technical  areas  not 
otherwise  available.  These  courses  in- 
crease the  overall  effectiveness  of  the 
Papua  New  Guinea  military  and  build 
strong  bonds  between  our  two 
countries. 


-I 


Solomon  Islands 

The  Soloman  Islands  play  an  in- 
creasingly influential  role  in  regional 
and  subregional  (that  is  Melanesian)  af- 
fairs, while  occupying  a  strategic  geo- 
graphic position  in  the  southwestern 
Pacific.  The  proposed  $30,000  IMET 
progi-am  will  provide  professional,  man- 
agerial, and  technical  training  for  ap- 
proximately three  military  personnel.  A 
key  element  of  the  training  is  ordnance 
disposal  skill  which  is  especially  impor- 
tant given  the  continued  presence  of 
unexploded  World  War  II  ordnance  in 
and  around  the  nation's  capital. 

Tonga 

Tonga  is  one  of  our  most  steadfast 
friends  in  the  South  Pacific.  Our  IMET 
program  allows  us  to  provide  needed 
assistance  to  a  reliable  friendly  nation 
which  actively  supports  a  U.S.  pres- 
ence in  the  region  and  which  has 
warmly  welcomed  visits  from  U.S. 
ships.  At  the  same  time,  Tonga's  par- 
ticipation in  training  exposes  officers 
from  other  nations  to  the  strong  pro- 
U.S.,  anti-Soviet  views  of  the  Tongan 
defense  force. 


South  Pacific  Oceanographic 
Research 

Aside  from  their  fishery  resources,  the 
small  island  nations  of  the  South  Pacific 
have  few  resources.  The  oceanographic 
research  program  has  been  highly  suc- 
cessful in  terms  of  the  data  it  has  accu- 
mulated on  off-shore  minerals  and 
hydrocarbons,  and  as  a  counter  to  So- 
viet efforts  to  establish  a  presence  in 
the  region  through  scientific  exchange 
programs.  The  $200,000  in  ESF  re- 
quested for  FY  1989  will  support  the 
further  development  and  skills  of  the 
regional  marine  research  organization. 
Australia  and  New  Zealand  have  also 
contributed  to  this  effort  and  are  ex- 
pected to  continue  their  roles. 

South  Pacific  Regional 
Development  Program 

This  fiscal  year  we  are  seeking  $4  mil- 
lion in  development  assistance  and 
$1  million  in  ESF  for  this  program,  a 
sum  which  we  believe  is  the  minimum 
we  can  safely  invest  in  the  development 
of  this  strategic  one-eighth  of  the 
earth's  surface.  The  development  as- 
sistance portion  of  the  program  is 
aimed  primarily  at  private  sector 
growth,  agriculture,  health,  and  educa- 


tion in  10  of  the  region's  11  indeperi 
or  self-governing  nations.  The  ESI' 
funded  portion  of  this  program  is  < 
signed  to  help  the  South  Pacific  re 
develop  an  indigenous,  private-sec 
oriented  fishing  industry.  The  pro| 
is  extremely  popular  in  the  region 
accurately  reflects  local  needs  and 
pabilities.  It  also  helps  counter  So 
bloc  efforts  to  use  the  region's  inte 
in  fishing  as  a  means  of  expanding 
political  and  economic  influence  in  le 
area. 

South  Pacific  Tuna  [ 

Frustration  with  U.S.  tuna  policy 
threatened  vital  national  security  ;er 
ests  in  the  region  and  prompted  i.^ 
states  to  look  at  issues  such  as  shi 
access  and  support  for  U.S.  positi 
international  fora  as  means  of  exp 
ing  their  discontent  with  the  U.S. 
tion.  This  resentment  also  afforde  .he 
Soviet  Union  a  rare  opportunity  t'  :m- 
barrass  the  United  States  and  ex(  id 
its  influence  by  offering  financialb  t- 
tractive  fisheries  agreements  to  S  th 
Pacific  nations. 

The  regional  fisheries  treaty  , 
dresses  these  problems  by  providi   ;ii 
cess  for  the  U.S.  fleet  to  the  regi  - 
fisheries  while  compensating  islan 
states  for  the  resource.  The  $10  n  lor 
ESF  program  developed  in  conjur  ior 
with  the  treaty  provides  economic  - 
sistance  to  the  island  nations  par- 
ticipating in  the  treaty  with  the  g    n 
strengthening  the  region's  self-suf 
ciency  and  lowering  its  long-term   • 
pendence  on  foreign  assistance.  T 
program  also  helps  counter  aid  ofi  ^ 
that  are  linked  to  the  establishme  ol 
a  permanent  Soviet  presence  in  tl  is- 
lands. FY  1989  will  be  the  second  'ai 
of  this  program. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  t  !r- 
ings  will  be  published  by  the  commit  i 
and  will  be  available  from  the  Superi  pn 
ent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  fir 
ing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.» 


! 


38 


Departnfient  of  State  Bulletin/Jul.vS 


ONOMICS 


^tWard  a  Stronger  International  Economy 


ihn  C.  Whitehead 

lldress  before  the  Municipal  Pro- 
oii  the  Toronto  Snin)nit  of  the 
,  for  International  Studies  in 
i„  on  April  21,  1988.  Mr  White- 
ns Deputy  Secretary  of  State. 

iiu"  19,  when  the  14th  economic 
lit  convenes,  the  world's  attention 
ncus  on  Canada  for  the  second 
this  year.  The  similarities  between 
lithcoming  events  in  Toronto  and 
I'lt'nt  doings  in  Calgary  are,  how- 
iV'w  indeed.  Economic  summitry 
iKit  only  the  beauty,  but  also  the 
:  inty,  of  Olympic  sport.  In  summi- 
,  here  are  no  clear  "winners"  and 
[■-,"  despite  a  sometimes  vigorous 
1  itition  of  ideas.  And  I  must  tell 
hat  not  even  the  most  charming  of 
clans  or  agile  of  government  offi- 

la-  can  hold  a  candle  to  the  natural 

r^ '  of  an  Elizabeth  Manley. 

i:  lomic  Summitry 

ADvy  of  economic  summitry  began 
thf  breakdown  of  the  Bretton 
i.~  system  in  1971  and  the  first 
.  <'  oil  price  and  supply  shocks  in 
The  curtain  then  went  up  on  a 
e  form  of  economic  consultation — one 
hi  involved  the  highest  elected  offi- 
ii  of  the  world's  foremost  industrial 
a  ns. 

[n  his  impressive  lecture  of  last 
)(  mber.  Ambassador  Gotlieb  [Cana- 
ii  Ambassador  to  the  United  States] 
10  1  the  significance  of  Canada's  par- 
ic  ation  in  the  economic  summits, 
le  ining  with  the  second  summit  in 
'^'    He  kindly  mentioned  the  part 
•il  by  the  United  States  and  Japan 
iciiuraging  this  happy  and  appro- 
'■  development.  As  Ambassador 
u'b  described,  "It  confirmed,  and  in 
ii  sense  validated,  Canada's  new  posi- 
k  in  the  world." 

'   Though  the  curtain  was  raised  on 
■c  omic  summitry  in  the  mid-1970s, 
h  prologue  was  being  written  and  the 
was  being  set  years — even  dec- 
'  arlier.  The  playwrights  were 
>f  millions  of  the  world's  peo- 
iiiled  by  intelligent  economic 
I's  that  rewarded  effort  and 
•  mraged  growth.  Between  them  they 
0'  e  possible  history's  first  global 
ketplace. 


Yet,  for  the  sake  of  perspective,  let 
us  begin  even  earlier  than  the  postwar 
period.  Indeed,  let  us  venture  back  two 
centuries,  to  the  time  when  Europeans 
were  just  beginning  to  lift  themselves 
from  the  hardship  of  life  in  societies 
with  traditional,  precapitalist 
economies. 

In  one  of  his  recent  books,  the- 
ologian Michael  Novak  reported  that  in 
1795  four  out  of  five  French  families 
devoted  90%  of  their  incomes  to  buying 
bread — merely  bread — to  stay  alive. 
Life  expectancy  in  France  in  1795  was 
27.3  years  for  women  and  23.4  for  men. 

Nor  were  French  conditions — de- 
spite the  revolution  and  the  chaos  that 
followed — dramatically  different  from 
the  conditions  found  elsewhere  in  Eu- 
rope. In  the  whole  of  Germany  in  1800, 
fewer  than  1,000  people  had  incomes  as 
high  as  $1,000.  Such  statistics  are  the 
more  remarkable  when  one  recalls  that 
this  was  the  level  of  prosperity  on  the 
world's  most  economically  advanced 
continent. 

In  less  than  two  centuries — a 
proverbial  drop  in  the  bucket  in  the 
course  of  human  history — conditions 
have  improved  so  dramatically  that  such 
pervasive  poverty  is  today  scarcely 
imaginable  to  people  living  in  modern, 
advanced  economies.  What  wrought 
this  extraordinary  improvement  in 
living  conditions?  The  answer  is:  two 
intellectual  giant  steps. 

First,  and  most  important,  was  the 
liberation  of  human  initiative  made  pos- 
sible by  the  idea  that  individuals  could 
improve  their  conditions  by  their  own 
efforts  and  by  the  growing  realization 
on  the  part  of  governments  that  indi- 
viduals had  a  right  to  the  fruits  of  their 
labors;  and 

Second,  there  was  the  crucial  un- 
derstanding that  when  wealth  was  in- 
vested in  economic  enterprises — rather 
than,  as  had  been  the  case,  consumed 
in  the  purchase  of  luxury,  sport,  or  tri- 
fles— more  wealth  might  thereby  be 
created. 

This  is  what  Walter  Lippmann  was 
referring  to  some  years  ago,  when  he 
wrote: 

For  the  first  time  in  human  history, 
men  had  come  upon  a  way  of  producing 
wealth  in  which  the  good  fortune  of  others 
multiplied  their  own... for  the  first  time 
men  could  conceive  a  social  order  in  which 
the  ancient  moral  aspii-ation  for  liberty, 
equality,  and  fraternity  was  consistent 
with  the  abolition  of  poverty  and  the  in- 
crease of  wealth. 


Global  Economic  Integration 

The  increase  of  wealth — not  only  in  fi- 
nancial terms  but  also  in  improvements 
in  health,  in  life  expectancy,  and  in  the 
decline  in  infant  and  child  mortality — 
has  been  greater  in  our  own  century 
than  in  any  other.  At  the  same  time, 
particularly  in  recent  decades,  advances 
in  economics,  finance,  and  technology 
have  caused  the  world's  nations,  and  es- 
pecially the  most  advanced  of  them,  to 
become  evermore  integrated.  We  see 
evidence  of  this  new  reality  everywhere 
we  turn. 

•  Consider  the  tremendous  expan- 
sion in  world  trade.  Since  1950,  the  vol- 
ume of  world  exports  has  increased 
ninefold,  and  the  volume  of  world  out- 
put has  increased  fivefold. 

•  Dramatic  increases  in  interna- 
tional financial  flows  have  accompanied 
this  expansion  of  trade.  Consider  that 
the  daily  volume  of  foreign  exchange 
transactions,  at  over  $1  trillion  per  day, 
is  about  the  same  as  the  annual  budget 
of  the  U.S.  Government. 

•  Consider,  also,  the  growing  inter- 
national exchange  of  technology.  It, 
too,  is  a  mark  of  the  extent  to  which 
national  economies  are  increasingly  in- 
tegrated. Today  over  40%  of  the  stu- 
dents enrolled  in  engineering  doctoral 
programs  in  the  United  States  are  for- 
eign students,  as  are  over  two-thirds  of 
the  postdoctoral  engineering  students. 

•  And,  as  with  technology,  produc- 
tion and  manufacturing  now  also  spill 
over  national  borders.  Consider,  for  ex- 
ample, that  even  "North  American" 
General  Motors  automobiles  consist  of 
parts  made  in  Brazil,  Japan,  Mexico, 
France,  West  Germany,  Singapore,  the 
United  Kingdom,  Italy,  and  Australia. 

Economists  have  long  asserted  that 
an  open  international  economic  system 
accelerates  economic  growth.  Open 
markets  facilitate  economies  of  scale 
and  allow  countries  to  specialize  in 
fields  in  which  they  have  the  greatest 
relative  advantage.  Yet  the  most  per- 
suasive arguments  for  an  open  system 
arise  not  from  abstract  reasoning  but 
from  experience.  Ti-ade  across  borders 
and  prosperity  within  borders  are  inti- 
mately linked. 

The  postwar  successes  of  the 
United  States,  Canada,  our  West  Euro- 
pean allies,  and  Japan  have  not  been 
lost  on  the  rest  of  the  world.  In  1960, 
the  combined  gross  national  products  of 


yltartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


39 


ECONOMICS 


the  NATO  countries  exceeded  those  of 
the  Warsaw  Pact  bv  some  $2.5  trillion 
(in  1986  dollars).  By  1986,  the  gap  had 
more  than  doubled,  to  $5.5  triUion. 

How  was  this  made  possible? 
The  answer  is  clear  to  us — and,  in- 
creasingly, to  the  leaders  of  Third 
World  countries  interested  in  economic 
development.  The  West  European  econ- 
omies were  relatively  free  to  expand, 
while  the  ingenuity  of  the  peoples  of 
Eastern  Europe  and  the  Soviet  Union 
were  smothered  by  red  tape,  bureau- 
cratic directives,  and  central  plans. 

Perhaps  the  most  dramatic  exam- 
ple of  the  success  of  market-based, 
open  economies  is  the  spectacular 
growth  performance  of  the  newly  indus- 
trialized economies  of  Asia — Taiwan, 
South  Korea,  Hong  Kong,  and  Singa- 
pore. During  the  past  25  years,  this 
group  has  grown  at  a  rate  exceeding 
109!:  per  year  in  real  terms. 

Again,  how  did  it  happen?  Despite 
their  considerable  differences  in  form  of 
government,  in  defense  commitments, 
and  in  their  political  economies,  each  of 
these  economies  shares  two  common 
traits.  First,  the  governments  have 
avoided  the  temptation  to  set  prices 
themselves,  thus  permitting  market- 
based  allocation  of  their  resources  ac- 
cording to  decentralized  price  signals. 
And  second,  they  have  maintained  out- 
ward-looking development  strategies 
based  on  the  global  marketplace.  These 
four  Asian  economies  are  home  to  a 
mere  2%  of  the  total  population  of  the 
world's  developing  countries,  and  yet — 
as  incredible  as  it  sounds — they  account 
for  over  half  the  manufactured  goods 
exported  by  all  the  developing  coun- 
tries of  the  world. 

Nikita  Khrushchev  used  to  predict 
that  it  would  be  in  Asia  that  commu- 
nism would  win  the  world's  masses.  As 
it  happens,  it  has  been  the  success  of 
Asia's  newly  industrialized  countries 
that  has  dimmed  the  attraction  of 
Marxist  ideology.  Many  developing 
countries  that  adopted  import-substitu- 
tion policies  and  central  planning  in 
decades  past  have  begun  to  rethink 
their  approaches. 

Perhaps  the  most  dramatic  changes 
are  occurring  in  China.  After  nearly  30 
years  of  seclusion,  China  has  opened  its 
borders  to  trade,  investment,  tech- 
nology, and  tourism.  The  Chinese  econ- 
omy has  responded.  From  1980  to  1986, 
it  grew  at  a  real  rate  of  8.69f^  per  year. 

Would  that  the  story  ended  there. 
But  it  doesn't.  For  just  as  the  weight  of 
historical  evidence  is  winning  the  intel- 
lectual battle  for  open  markets,  open 
market  policies  have  come  under  attack 
in  some  of  the  world's  most  developed 
industrial  countries.  The  large  trade 


imbalances  of  the  1980s  have  fueled  i-is- 
ing  concern  about,  and  frustration 
with,  the  world  ti-ading  system.  Protec- 
tionist measures  have  gained  support  as 
a  misguided  remedy.  And  recently,  in 
the  United  States,  alarm  over  foreign 
investment  has  led  to  proposals  to  reg- 
ulate, or  even  limit,  such  investment. 
Such  proposals  may  be  well  inten- 
tioned,  but  they  are  woefully  mis- 
guided. It  would  be  tragic — truly 
tragic — if  at  this  juncture  the  industri- 
alized countries  were  to  turn  their 
backs  on  the  open  economic  arrange- 
ments that  have  contributed  so  much  to 
our  well-being  and  lighted  the  way  to 
future  prosperity  for  the  less  developed 
nations. 

Policymakers  in  our  democracies 
face  conflicts  between  the  generalized 
benefits  that  accompany  global  eco- 
nomic integration  and  the  interests  of 
particular  domestic  constituencies.  Flir- 
thermore,  the  integration  of  the  world 
economy  over  the  past  40  years  has 
markedly  increased  the  intensity  of 
competition  and  forced  structural 
changes  with  which  it  is  sometimes 
quite  difficult  to  cope.  In  such  circum- 
stances, policies  that  soothe  powerful 
domestic  interests  by  promoting  isola- 
tionism and  claiming  to  advance  self- 
sufficiency  have  a  natural  but  super- 
ficial attractiveness. 

What  our  current  situation  re- 
quires, therefore,  is  genuine  states- 
manship: the  overcoming  of  fragment- 
ing forces  of  domestic  interests  for  the 
greater  good  of  our  national  and  the 
world's  economic  well-being.  That  is  a 
tall  orde'r.  It  means,  in  some  cases, 
swimming  against  the  tide  of  unin- 
formed opinion. 

But  a  return  to  economic  na- 
tionalism must  be  avoided  at  all  costs. 
How,  then,  might  we  avoid  it? 

GATT  and  Trade  Liberalization 

The  United  States  and  its  trading  part- 
ners are  currently  engaged  in  a  wide 
range  of  activities  to  preserve  and 
strengthen  our  open  international  eco- 
nomic arrangements.  The  most  impor- 
tant effort  involves  the  current 
Uruguay  Round  of  multilateral  trade 
negotiations,  conducted  by  the  General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade,  or 
GATT. 

GATT  has  played  a  major  role  in 
lowering  the  average  tariff  on  manufac- 
tured goods  among  major  countries 
from  about  50%  in  the  1930s  to  roughly 
5%  today.  But  the  popularity  of  trade 
agreements  that  are  illegal  under 
GATT  rules,  as  well  as  the  falling  share 
of  world  trade  conducted  under  GATT, 
have  led  some  to  conclude  that  GATT  is 
not  worth  salvaging.  Clearly,  it  does 


I 


not  command  the  respect  that  oth  ij) 
ternational  organizations  do,  such 
the  World  Bank  and  the  Internatii' 
Monetary  Fund. 

So  how  can  we  revitalize  GAT' 
First,  we  must  improve  its  instituim 
framework.  Perhaps  most  imports  i, 
the  existing  consensual  method  of  tt- 
tling  disputes  should  be  replaced  ■  th 
system  that  is  decisive,  expeditioi 
and  binding  on  the  disputants. 

Second,  GATT  needs  a  survei  ,nc 
mechanism,  to  provide  internatioi 
scrutiny  and  discipline  of  member  iui 
tries'  trade  policies.  The  surveillai  ■ 
function  should,  furthermore,  incl  e 
developing  countries,  which  heret  )re 
have  been  accorded  "special  and  d  ier- 
ential"  treatment  under  GATT.  It  i  e 
sential  that  the  developing  countr  t, 
and  especially  the  newly  industris  led 
countries,  begin  to  shoulder  the  f  in 
sponsibilities  of  membership  in  G.  T. 
In  addition,  the  GATT  frame  rk 
must  be  extended  to  new  areas,  s 
trade  in  services.  In  the  past,  GA 
rules  have  been  applied  primarily 
manufactured  goods.  Yet  the  argi 
ments  that  support  free  trade  in  ,i  <> 
apply  equally  to  services.  Furthei  on 
liberalization  of  trade  in  services   11 
promote  free  trade  in  goods,  sine  he 
two  are  closely  linked. 

Although  many  developing  cc  - 
tries  initially  opposed  the  inclusic  of 
services  in  the  Uruguay  Round  o 
GATT,  it  now  seems  likely  that  a  de 
on  services  can  be  negotiated.  Se  ice 
account  for  a  growing  share  of  mc 
economies,  in  developing  as  well ; 
developed  countries.  In  Mexico,  f 
example,  services  now  account  fo 
about  40%  of  the  gross  national  p  i- 
uct.  A  number  of  developing  cour  les 
have  relaxed  their  opposition  to  a  We 
on  services,  upon  realizing  that  n  ly 
lesser  developed  countries  enjoy  ( ti- 
parative  advantages  in  service  sei  irs 
The  newly  industrialized  Asian  co  i- 
tries,  for  example,  are  internatioi 'ly 
competitive  in  such  fields  as  ship]  \g, 
financial  services,  and  constructic' 

Agricultural  trade  is  another  ^ea 
that  must,  at  a  minimum,  be  broilt 
under  normal  GATT  discipline.  M  'y 
nations,  particularly  developed  ntDn; 
including  the  United  States  and  C  h- 
ada,  have  pursued  farm  policies  tit 
are  inconsistent  with  liberalized  tide 
in  order  to  achieve  other  goals — sth 
income  maintenance  for  farmers.   '.- 
strictive  agricultural  policies  impc 
tremendous  costs  on  consumers  a 
taxpayers — costs  that  far  exceed  i  - 
gains  to  farmers.  By  some  estima  s, 
world  gross  national  product  couli  in- 
crease by  at  least  $40  billion  annujly 
the  major  industrial  countries  wei'to 
even  partially  liberalize  agricultui. 


40 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Jul) ! 


ECONOMICS 


riu'  skyrocketing  costs  of  current 
ulturai  policies  have  created  an  op- 
iiutv  to  reach  an  agreement  on  ag- 
inv  for  the  new  GATT  round.  Last 
ihf  United  States  proposed  the 
nation — gradually,  over  10  years — 
subsidies  that  distort  agricultural 
lis.  The  U.S.  initiative  was  consis- 
with  proposals  put  forward  by 
.  I  la.  as  well  as  by  the  Cairns 
|i,  an  informal  organization  of  14 
uoclaimed  nonsubsidizing  nations, 
ling  major  exporters  from  both 
nyvd  and  developing  nations. 
\  final  issue  in  the  new  GATT 
1  addresses  the  protection  of  intel- 
al  property  rights.  This  is  an  ex- 
.  ly  important  matter,  not  only  for 
II >  such  as  the  United  States  and 
:1a — who  are  pioneering  the  tech- 
iis  of  tomorrow — but  also,  ulti- 
I,,  for  future  generations  through- 
iif  globe,  who  will  benefit  or  suffer 
I  iliiig  to  whether  technological  in- 
iiiti  is  rewarded  or  stifled.  Unfor- 
rly,  copyright  piracy  is  wide- 
iil  in  many  parts  of  the  world,  and 
my  countries  patents  are  violated 
'  impunity.  According  to  the  U.S. 
■national  Ti'ade  Commission,  intel- 
al  piroperty  infringements  cost 
'  .S20  billion  annually  in  lost  sales, 
u  he  ultimate  losses  from  intellectual 
'1,  'v — which  stifles  the  very  incentive 
0  novate — cannot  be  measured. 

I  should  mention  that  the  Canada- 
J,   free  trade  agreement  (FTA)  has 
'■  Ided  an  example  for  worldwide 
■   '  liberalization  under  GATT.  The 
■'   highlights  the  unique  relationship 
i£  'een  the  United  States  and  Canada 
n  out  disadvantaging  other  countries 
ir,  irly.  It  is  the  first  major  agreement 
0  ^tablish  rules  for  trade  in  services, 
it  itablishes  useful  precedents  for 
D  ilateral  negotiations  and  encour- 
ii   trade  liberalization  worldwide.  Its 
i>ions  regarding  services, 
-inient,  elimination  of  export  re- 
in ms,  and  efficient  resolution  of 
ales  are  especially  instructive.  The 
.  has  another  strength.  It  can  be 
ited  to  a  changing  environment 
unh  consultations  and  mutual 
ifement. 

I  cannot  leave  the  topic  of  trade 
ilralizaton  and  the  Uruguay  Round 
Hint  saying  a  word  or  two  on  the 
If  l)ill  now  before  the  U.S.  Con- 
>.  1  recognize  that  there  is  great 
ri'st  here  and  elsewhere  in  the  om- 
is  trade  bill,  in  large  part  because  it 
•v,  originally  highly  protectionist.  As 
-iigress  looked  at  the  legislation  more 
'  ely.  they  eliminated  many,  but  not 

iif  the  most  most  objectionable 
'Visions.  Congress  continues  to  make 
(^isions,  but  it  still  contains  some 


World  Trade  Week,  1988 


PROCLAMATION  5814, 
MAY  5,  1988' 

Setting  aside  a  week  in  celebration  of  in- 
ternational trade  is  a  fitting  way  to  remind 
ourselves  of  the  countless  benefits  of  world 
trade  for  Americans  and  for  people  around 
the  globe,  and  to  remember  that  freedom 
is,  and  must  be,  an  essential  element  in 
economic  life — individual,  national  and 
international. 

International  trade  can  link  individuals 
and  nations  alike  by  providing  oppor- 
tunities for  the  interchange  of  goods  and 
services,  the  fruit  of  human  talents  that 
transcend  boundaries  of  geography  and 
culture.  The  key  ingredient  in  every  act  of 
trade  is  freedom.  Only  freedom  respects 
the  inherent  rights,  dignity,  conscience  and 
worth  of  individuals;  only  freedom  encour- 
ages individuals  to  develop  their  creative 
abilities  to  the  fullest  and  to  command  fair 
return  for  their  labor;  and  only  freedom 
provides  a  rational  and  humane  basis  for 
economic  decision-making.  The  freedom  of 
exchange  that  is  at  the  heart  of  every  gen- 
uine economic  transaction  benefits  all  par- 
ties and  builds  competition,  enterprise, 
prosperity,  justice,  cooperation  and  social 
well-being  as  people  achieve  economic  suc- 
cess by  finding  their  fellow  man's  unmet 
needs  and  filling  them  well. 

Our  country's  prosperity  likewise  de- 
pends on  our  ability  to  identify  needs  and 
markets  for  goods  and  services  and  to 
meet  them  well.  Our  free  market  economy, 
our  belief  in  free  but  fair  trade  on  a  global 
basis  and  the  American  people's  ingenuity 
and  ability  all  make  our  products  among 
the  world's  most  competitive — and  we 
intend  to  keep  it  that  way. 

My  Administration  has  worked  to  im- 
prove the  climate  for  international  trade  by 
seeking  a  renaissance  in  American  com- 
petitiveness. Last  year,  as  American  goods 
regained  price  competitiveness  overseas, 
exports  hit  a  record  level;  more  than 
407,000  manufacturing  jobs  were  created; 
and  employment  surged  with  more  Ameri- 
cans in  the  labor  force  than  ever  before. 
Exports  spell  opportunity  for  American 
business;  thousands  of  U.S.  firms  have  in- 
creased their  profit  margins  by  exporting, 
and  thousands  are  beginning  to  discover 
their  untapped  potential  to  succeed  in  ex- 
port markets.  This  year's  World  Trade 


Week  theme,  "Export  Now,"  champions 
the  message  that  I  have  joined  the  Secre- 
tary of  Commerce  in  sending  and  ex- 
emplifies America's  winning  spirit. 

Foreign  markets  are  now  more  open  to 
American  goods  than  in  the  past,  but  we 
have  far  to  go  in  the  quest  to  undo  unfair 
restrictions  on  trade.  We  seek  to  encour- 
age removal  of  foreign  barriers  to  free 
trade,  but  we  simultaneously  work  to  dis- 
courage domestic  protectionism — more  ac- 
curately described  as  "destructionism," 
because  it  stifles  progress  and  prosperity 
by  preventing  competition  and  economic 
transactions  that  people  everywhere  desire 
and  need.  We  also  reiterate  the  intention  of 
the  United  States  Government  to  ensure 
that  our  trade  policies  serve  to  reinforce 
our  national  security  interests  around  the 
world.  International  trade  policies  and 
practices  must  promote  the  causes  of  free- 
dom, human  rights  and  economic  growth 
everywhere. 

World  Trade  Week  is  a  truly  appropri- 
ate time  to  remember  the  many  benefits 
international  trade  has  conferred  on  our 
country  and  to  reflect  on  the  many  bless- 
ings the  spread  of  economic  freedom  has 
brought,  and  can  bring,  to  people  in  every 
nation. 

Now,  Therefore,  I  Ronald  Rea- 
gan, President  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  by  virtue  of  the  authority  vested 
in  me  by  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the 
United  States,  do  hereby  proclaim  the 
week  beginning  May  22,  1988,  as  World 
Trade  Week.  I  invite  the  people  of  the 
United  States  to  join  in  appropriate  obser- 
vances to  reaffirm  the  great  promise  of  in- 
ternational trade  for  creating  jobs  and 
stimulating  economic  activity  in  our  coun- 
try and  for  generating  prosperity  every- 
where freedom  reigns. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  I  have  here- 
unto set  my  hand  this  fifth  day  of  May,  in 
the  year  of  our  Lord  nineteen  hundred  and 
eighty-eight,  and  of  the  Independence  of 
the  United  States  of  America  the  two  hun- 
dred and  twelfth. 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  9,  1988.1 


lu^llaartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


41 


ECONOMICS 


provisions  we  oppose,  such  as  manda- 
tory sanctions  against  non-U. S.  com- 
panies in  cases  involving  the  export  of 
controlled  goods  or  technology  to  the 
Eastern  bloc  of  countries.  We  believe 
such  sanctions  would  weaken,  not 
strengthen,  the  security  of  the  West 
because  they  would  undermine  support 
for  multilateral  efforts  to  control  tech- 
nology tranfers. 

Because  such  troublesome  provi- 
sions remain,  President  Reagan  is  faced 
with  a  difficult  decision  within  the  next 
week  or  two — whether  to  veto  this  bill. 
Congress  must  decide,  in  the  mean- 
time, whether  it  will  override  a  presi- 
dential veto.  Few  pieces  of  legislation 
have  received  such  widespread  atten- 
tion in  the  United  States— or  have  pre- 
sented issues  that  have  been  so  difficult 
to  resolve.  Our  goal  is  to  ensure  that 
the  resulting  legislation  is  not  protec- 
tionist in  nature. 

International  Investment 

Important  as  they  are,  renovating 
GATT  and  liberalizing  trade  policies 
are  not  our  only  concerns.  There  is  a 
need  as  well  to  move  toward  a  free 
market  in  international  investment.  By 
doing  so,  we  will  contribute  to  moi'e 
efficient  use  of  investment  capital  and 
at  the  same  time  promote  more  favor- 
able circumstances  for  improved  trade 
in  goods  and  services.  A  lessening  of 
restrictions  on  foreign  investment  will 
greatly  assist  developing  countries  as 
they  strive  for  economic  gi'owth. 

One  of  the  reasons  for  the  debt 
problem  of  the  developing  countries  is 
that  they  financed  long-term  equity  in- 
vestments with  short-term  loans  from 
international  banks.  Had  they  relied  on 
foreign  investment  capital  instead,  they 
would  have  avoided,  or  dramatically 
lessened,  the  debt-servicing  problems 
that  resulted  from  the  adverse  develop- 
ments of  the  early  1980s. 

One  of  the  goals  of  U.S.  policy, 
therefore,  is  to  encourage  conditions  fa- 
vorable to  greater  investment  in  devel- 
oping countries.  One  initiative — the 
creation,  just  last  week,  of  the  Multi- 
lateral Investment  Guarantee  Agency — 
will  ensure  investments  in  member 
countries  against  expropriation,  against 
political  violence,  and  in  cases  where 
there  is  a  breach  of  contract  or  where 
earnings  are  not  convertible.  We  also 
seek  an  end  to  such  restrictions  on 
trade-related  investment  as  domestic- 
content  regulations,  export  require- 
ments, and  exchange  controls.  I  might 
also  mention,  parenthetically,  that  since 
1982  the  United  States  has  signed  bilat- 
eral treaties  with  10  developing  coun- 


tries as  part  of  our  efforts  to  promote 
growth-oriented  policies  and  a  more  fa- 
vorable investment  climate. 

Economic  summits,  such  as  the  one 
you  will  host  in  June,  reflect  the  in- 
creasing desire  on  all  our  parts  for 
greater  coordination  of  international 
policy  than  existed — or,  indeed,  than 
was  necessary — in  decades  past.  It  is 
one  of  a  number  of  innovations  of  recent 
years  intended  to  help  us  deal  with  the 
new  reality  of  a  global  economy. 

International  Policy  Coordination 

International  policy  coordination  has 
made  considerable  progress  during  the 
past  few  years.  As  each  trading  nation 
experiences  effects  resulting  from  the 
decisions  of  other  trading  partners,  the 
usefulness  of  consultation  and  policy  co- 
ordination becomes  increasingly  clear. 
Of  course,  there  are  still  those  who 
maintain  that  such  matters  as  monetary 
and  fiscal  policy,  and  structural  ques- 
tions involving  labor  markets  and  sub- 
sidies, are  strictly  domestic  issues.  This 
is  an  understandable  position — but,  I 
think,  an  unrealistic  one.  In  our  in- 
creasingly integrated  international 
economy,  it  is  in  everyone's  interest 
that  decisionmakers  be  aware  of  the 
impact  of  their  economic  policies  on 
other  nations. 

Recognizing  this,  the  leaders  of  the 
summit  countries  have  encouraged  the 
evolution  of  a  mechanism  for  economic 
policy  coordination,  with  the  participa- 
tion of  the  International  Monetary 
Fund.  This  institutional  mechanism  is 
working. 

When  the  leaders  of  the  Group  of 
7  countries  meet,  monetary  and  fiscal 
policies  grab  the  headlines.  Yet  these 
macroeconomic  issues  do  not  exhaust 
the  agenda  for  policy  coordination. 
Over  the  past  several  years,  for  exam- 
ple, the  OECD  [Organization  for  Eco- 
nomic Cooperation  and  Development] 
has  pioneered  analysis  of  micro- 
economic,  or  structural,  issues — with 
particular  attention  to  their  effects  on 
the  functioning  of  market  economies. 
Since  1985,  successive  OECD  minis- 
terial meetings  have  emphasized  the 
importance  of  these  structural  issues. 
In  other  coordination  efforts,  the 
United  States  and  its  allies  are  attend- 
ing to  security  issues.  One  effort  has 
been  to  strengthen  the  Coordinating 
Committee  for  Multilateral  Export 
Controls,  or  COCOM.  COCOM  is 
emerging  from  the  shadows  in  which  it 
spent  its  first  years  of  existence.  At  a 
meeting  I  attended  in  January,  the 
member  countries  agreed  to  improve 
coordination  and  enforcement  of  the 
rules  governing  the  export  of  high- 
technology  products  to  the  Soviet  bloc. 


Particularly  noteworthy  have  been 
measures  taken  by  Japan  in  the  wt 
the  Toshiba  machine  affair.  Tokyo  ] 
expanded  its  export-screening  stafi 
lengthened  prison  terms  for  violat* 

Now  I  know  that  all  of  us  here 
member,  perhaps  all  too  well,  the 
culties  that  followed  the  interrupt! 
oil  supplies  in  the  1970s.  In  anothe 
ample  of  coordination,  the  Westerr 
countries,  through  the  Internation 
Energy  Agency,  have  undertaken 
stockpiling  effort  to  guai-d  against 
disruptive  effects  of  future  temper 
interruptions  of  oil  supplies. 

Assistance  for  Third  World  ec 
nomic  development  also  requires  ii) 
national  cooperation.  The  developi 
countries  benefit  from  a  system  oti 
ternational  institutions  that  provio| 
them  financial  assistance  and  tech 
support.  The  World  Bank,  establif 
initially  to  channel  reconstruction  nd 
to  Europe,  is  the  preeminent  insti  ■ 
tion  for  development  lending. 

Recently,  the  executive  direct 
the  Bank  agreed  to  a  general  capi 
increase  of  approximately  $75  biUi  to' 
support  continued  lending  to  deve  ii! 
countries.  Furthermore,  in  recent 
the  Bank  has  enlarged  its  efforts 
provide  policy  advice  and  assistan  ic 
client  nations.  In  addition,  it  has  j  lec 
with  the  International  Monetary  I  id 
to  encourage  sound,  market-basec  ?o- 
nomic  policies  conducive  to  growtl  i 
developing  countries. 

Already  we  have  touched  on  a 
great  number  of  topics:  GATT,  lib 
alized  trade,  intellectual  property, 
proving  the  international  investmi 
climate,  COCOM,  the  World  Bank  i  ^ 
quite  a  long  list.  Yet  all  our  effort  o  I 
strengthen  the  international  econc  c 
system  have  one  thing  in  common: 
they  will  succeed  only  if  all  of  us  \  ' 
benefit  from  the  system  cooperate  • 
improve  it. 

The  United  States  led  the  wo) 
economy  in  the  postwar  period,  w  ,  a 
gross  national  product  equal  to  (50  ,of 
the  combined  gross  national  prodii  '^* 
the  OECD  countries.  Today  U.S.  > 
national  product  equals  roughly  S'l 
Some  say  this  decrease  in  the  IKS 
share  of  world  trade  and  output  is 
indication  of  America's  decline.  Bu  :: 
fact,  this  trend  demonstrates  the  iw 
ing  strength  of  international  trade  knc 
this  strengthening  is  good  for  the  ' 
United  States.  The  growing  roles  at 
the  European  Community,  Japan,  .d 
Canada  share  in  world  production  id 
trade  demonstrate  their  contributik  t' 
a  healthy  global  economy.  That  gnfth 
brings  with  it  a  responsibility — th:i 
Canada  and  others  have  assumed- o 


42 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Jul>^ 


ECONOMICS 


tiister  a  more  open  and  efficient 

I  economy. 

This  is  the  responsibility  of  Clevel- 
and developing  nations  alike.  As 
11 1  ling  countries — and  especially 
v\\\\  industrialized  countries — 
nue  to  advance,  they  must  gradu- 
iicept  the  responsibilities  of  full 
iiiTship  in  the  global  economic 
r  lunity. 

I  lusion 

lit'ijan  by  speaking  of  conditions  in 
]if  two  centuries  ago,  perhaps  I 
il  conclude  with  a  few  words  about 
li  .America  at  that  same  time.  This 

II  IK  I  left  a  city — Washington, 
that  in  1788,  200  years  ago,  corn- 
el a  trading  post  called  George- 

rather  large  swamp,  and  four 


farms  on  what  is  now  called  Capitol 
Hill.  Like  Toronto — which  began  as  a 
fort  and  for  a  time  changed  its  name  to 
"York"— Washington,  D.C.,  has  come  a 
long  way  in  the  intervening  200  years. 
When  it  comes  to  foresight,  how- 
ever, you  simply  cannot  be  equaled. 
The  city  returned  to  its  original  name 
of  "Toronto"  in  1834.  "Toronto"  was  a 
Huron  Indian  word  meaning — etymo- 
logists are  uncertain  about  this — either 
"a  place  of  meeting,"  as  in  summit 
meeting,  or  meaning  "plenty,"  as  in 
economic  abundance.  Does  that  not 
convince  you  that  Toronto  is  the  per- 
fect city  in  which  to  hold  an  economic 
summit?  It  certainly  convinces  me. 
It  also  convinces  me  that  you  have 
thought  of  everything  to  make  the 
summit  a  success.  You  are  e.xemplary 
hosts,  indeed.  ■ 


1 


le  U.S.  and  Japan: 
Firtners  in  Global  Economic  Leadership 


.  Mien  Wallis 

Address  before  the  Federation  of 
iiiiiiic  Organizations  (Keidanren) 
n  jkyo  on  April  19.  1988.  Mr.  Wallis 
s  nder  Secretari/  for  Economic  Af- 
(I  :  a)id  Agriculture. 

Ki'idanren  is  one  of  the  most  influ- 
II  il  and  respected  groups  of  its  kind 
n  e  world,  so  it  is  a  special  privilege 
0  '  invited  to  speak  to  you  today.  I 
h  k  you  for  the  honor 

1  want  to  discuss  the  importance  of 
'  iimic  relations  between  the  United 
■>  and  Japan  and  how  the  relations 
'\nlving.  First,  I  will  review  the 
111  (if  our  increasingly  close  rela- 
aiifl  our  cooperation  on  economic 
■s,  which  is  impressive.  It  involves 
iiation  not  only  on  bilateral  issues 
ulsii  on  global  matters.  Then,  I  will 
-  nil  the  importance  of  adjusting 
-tinctures  of  our  economies,  and  of 
h  global  economy,  in  order  to  ensure 
a  imum  sustained  gi-owth.  Finally,  I 
■  fli.scuss  the  agenda  that  lies  before 
laiticularly  in  the  Uruguay  Round 
lultilateral  trade  negotiations. 

-.Japan  Economic  Ties 

iiiiiarkable  that  two  countries 
■h  are  so  different  in  customs,  lan- 
4f,  and  tradition — and  which  com- 
'  SI  I  vigorously  in  world  markets — 
lid  form  a  partnership  as  close  and 
etive  as  ours  is  today.  Both  coun- 


tries for  much  of  our  histories  have 
looked  inward,  but  those  times  have 
passed.  With  our  combined  economies 
accounting  for  so  much  of  the  world's 
economic  activity,  we  cannot  escape 
leadership.  Our  prosperity  requires  a 
sound  international  financial  system, 
free  and  open  markets,  and  the  flexibil- 
ity to  adjust  to  changing  international 
economic  conditions. 

The  strength  and  increasing  com- 
plexity of  our  economic  ties  are,  of 
course,  no  secret  to  you.  Nonetheless, 
I  would  like  to  cite  some  impressive 
statistics. 

•  In  1987  our  combined  gross  na- 
tional products  (GNP)  totaled  over  $7 
trillion,  which  is  about  40%  of  the  total 
GNP  of  the  world  and  some  60%  of  the 
GNP  of  the  Western  industrialized 
nations. 

•  Last  year,  Japan  bought  about 
$28  billion  worth  of  U.S.  exports,  far 
more  than  any  other  country  except 
Canada. 

•  The  United  States  bought  38%-  of 
Japan's  exports  in  1987.  By  contrast,  in 
1982  the  figure  was  26%.  " 

•  The  two-way  trade  between  our 
two  countries  in  1987  was  $116  billion, 
for  Japan  its  largest  trading  relation- 
ship and  for  the  United  States  the 
largest  except  for  Canada.  Six  years 
ago,  our  two-way  trade  was  only  half  as 
much. 


•  The  total  direct  investment 
in  each  other's  economies  was  over 
$43  billion  in  1987.  In  1982,  it  was  only 
$16  billion.  During  the  past  5  years, 
Japanese  investment  in  the  United 
States  grew  from  less  than  $10  billion 
to  nearly  $31  billion,  and  it  continues  to 
grow  rapidly.  U.S.  investment  in  Japan 
grew  during  those  5  years  from  about 
$6  billion  to  almost  $13  billion. 

These  are  more  than  just  numbers. 
They  represent  better  jobs;  more  effi- 
cient production  and  exchange;  more 
choices  and  higher  standards  of  living 
for  our  consumers.  They  indicate  viv- 
idly just  how  interlinked  and  interde- 
pendent our  economies  have  become. 
And  they  indicate  what  the  future 
holds:  even  closer  ties,  a  mushrooming 
of  linkages,  and  fuller  interpenetration 
of  each  other's  economies. 

Perception  and  Reality: 
Competition  and  Cooperation 
Between  Economic  Equals 

In  conversations  with  Japanese  busi- 
nessmen and  other  Japanese  people 
outside  government  circles,  I  am 
amazed  that  many  Japanese  still  see 
Japan  as  a  small  island  nation  with  a 
fragile  economy  that  requires  special 
protective  measures  and  government 
support  to  compete  in  world  markets. 
The  reality  could  not  be  farther  from 
this  perception.  Japan's  $2.7  trillion 
economy  is  the  second  largest  in  the 
entire  world  and  one  of  the  most  dy- 
namic. Its  per  capita  GNP  of  some 
$19,000  surpasses  that  of  the  United 
States  at  current  exchange  rates. 
Thanks  to  a  strong  spirit  of  cooperative 
discipline  and  striving  for  excellence, 
Japan  has  caught  up  with,  and  in  some 
instances  surpassed,  the  rest  of  the  in- 
dustrialized world.  It  is  a  leader  in 
fields  as  diverse  as  automobiles,  bio- 
technology, electronics,  machine  tools, 
robotics,  supercomputers,  artificial  in- 
telligence, and  superconductivity. 

Today  Japan  is  an  economic  super- 
power. The  United  States  and  Japan  are 
peers.  This  has  important  implications 
for  the  future  course  of  the  relation- 
ship. First,  it  means  that  our  economic 
partnership  must  be  a  two-way  street 
grounded  in  mutual  trust  and  openness. 
This  is  essential  if  we  in  the  United 
States  are  to  continue  to  resist  protec- 
tionism and  promote  open  commercial 
competition  between  our  industries. 
Second,  it  means  that  Japan  must 
shoulder  a  greater  share  of  the  lead- 
ership of  the  world  economy,  in  part- 
nership with  the  United  States  and  the 
other  industrialized  economies. 


iDartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


43 


ECONOMICS 


In  practical  terms,  this  means  that 
Japan  should  redouble  its  efforts  to 
open  markets,  including  opening  to  de- 
veloping countries,  and  its  efforts  to  re- 
solve troublesome  bilateral  problems, 
particularly  in  trade.  We  have  made 
much  progress  during  the  last  6  or  7 
years — for  example,  in  standards,  tele- 
communications, the  other  so-called 
MOSS  [market-oriented,  sector- 
specific]  sectors,  and  other  ai-eas — 
but  much  remains  to  be  done. 

The  United  States  has  benefited 
gi-eatly  from  Japan's  economic  gi-owth 
and  development.  We  have  received 
quality  products  at  competitive  prices, 
enormous  amounts  of  capital,  and  the 
spur  of  technological  competition,  all 
strengthening  our  own  economy.  But 
that  is  potentially  only  half  of  the  equa- 
tion. On  its  side,  Japan  could  benefit 
more  from  our  relationship  if  its  market 
were  as  open  as  the  United  States  mar- 
ket is.  That  also  would  help  us  to  gen- 
erate greater  income  to  pay  for  the 
goods  and  services  we  purchase  from 
Japan.  If  both  markets  were  open,  both 
Japan  and  the  United  States,  as  well  as 
the  rest  of  the  world,  would  gain. 
Greater  exchange  based  on  comparative 
advantage  would  allocate  resources 
more  efficiently — we  would  each  pro- 
duce more  of  what  we  are  best  at  pro- 
ducing— and  raise  further  the 
standards  of  living  of  both  our  peoples. 
Such  a  contribution  by  Japan  would 
be  all  the  more  appropriate  since  the 
United  States  and  the  major  West  Eu- 
ropean nations  devote  substantially 
greater  shares  of  GNP  to  defense  than 
does  Japan,  with  all  the  attendant  polit- 
ical as  well  as  economic  costs  involved. 
This  is  why  I  believe  Japan  also  should 
play  a  greater  leadership  role  on  other 
international  issues,  for  example,  by 
further  increasing  the  amount  and  en- 
hancing the  quality  of  its  economic  as- 
sistance to  developing  countries,  by 
being  more  active  on  international  debt 
problems,  and  by  coordinating  on  other 
monetary  and  financial  matters.  Some 
would  call  this  "burden  sharing,"  but 
that  misses  the  point.  It  is  in  Japans 
own  interest  to  open  markets,  to  pro- 
mote growth  in  developing  countries, 
and  otherwise  to  strengthen  its  own 
and  the  international  economy.  That  is 
why  I  am  confident  that  Japan  will  con- 
tinue to  move  on  these  fronts,  and  at  an 
accelerating  rate. 


International  Imbalances  and  the 
Importance  of  Structural  Adjustment 

One  area  where  Japan  has  already  dem- 
onstrated considerable  leadership,  and 
where  I  hope  it  will  continue  its 
efforts,  is  in  helping  to  reduce  interna- 
tional imbalances.  Fimdamentally,  the 
problem  is  to  adust  continuously  to 
changes  in  the  world  economy  and 
thereby  promote  sustained  growth. 

You,  Japan's  business  leadership, 
understand  well  that  change  is  always 
with  us.  New  economic  conditions  de- 
velop: exchange  rates  shift;  new  tech- 
nologies appear;  new  products  enter 
the  market.  The  less  innovative,  less 
productive,  and  less  efficient  producers 
shrink  and  disappear.  As  painful  as  this 
process  of  adjustment  may  be  to  indi- 
vidual companies,  overall  it  strengthens 
our  economies  and  helps  us  reach 
higher  levels  of  growth  by  promoting 
the  more  efficient  and  more  productive. 

This  assumes,  of  course,  that  gov- 
ernment policies  and  programs,  as  well 
as  private  attitudes  and  practices,  allow 
adjustment  to  proceed.  In  our  market 
systems,  adjustment  is,  and  must  be,  a 
natural  part  of  economic  life.  The  econ- 
omy does  not  change  abruptly;  if  there 
are  no  barriers  to  adjustment,  it  ad- 
justs continuously. 

As  we  move  toward  the  last  decade 
of  this  century,  the  pace  of  change  is 
accelerating  and  the  imperative  to  ad- 
just is  increasing.  In  the  case  of  the 
United. States  and  Japan,  our  huge  ex- 
ternal imbalances  signal  an  urgent  need 
for  further  adjustment. 

International  imbalances  are  not  in- 
herently bad,  at  least  not  in  economic 
terms.  Whether  they  are  detrimental  to 
our  two  economies,  or  to  the  global 
economy,  depends  largely  on  the  effi- 
ciency with  which  each  economy  oper- 
ates. They  can  be  detrimental  if  saving 
or  consumption  is  artificially  encour- 
aged or  discouraged  by  governmental 
action,  if  investment  decisions  are  di- 
rected or  distorted  by  public  policy,  or 
if  the  public  sector  is  simply  too  over- 
bearing, either  through  regulation  or 
sheer  weight.  In  these  circumstances, 
international  imbalances  will  reflect 
policy-induced  domestic  imbalances  and 
inefficiencies. 

Policies  that  inhibit  adjustment  to 
change  interfere  not  only  in  the  domes- 
tic economy  but  also  in  the  economic 
relations  among  countries.  That  is  why 
large  imbalances,  especially  trade  defi- 
cits, lead  to  political  problems,  espe- 
cially when  the  markets  of  the  surplus 
countries  are  closed  or  appear  to  be 


closed.  That  is  a  prescription  for  n 
pant  protectionism,  as  most  recent 
manifested  in  the  numerous  trade 
posals  put  forward  in  the  U.S. 
Congress. 

We  know,  of  course,  that,  fund 
mentally,  trade  balances  are  deter- 
mined by  savings,  investment,  and 
international  capital  flows.  If  we  d 
work  to  identify  ways  to  reduce  th  io 
mestic  imbalances  among  these  ini  • 
ences  and  make  our  economies  opt  te 
more  efficiently,  then  the  political  b 
will  persist,  in  spite  of  our  best  ef  J|' 
to  open  markets  and  liberalize  traiJl* 

Moving  Toward  Better  Global  Ba  nc 

If  the  United  States  and  other  coi  1 
tries  with  current  account  deficits 
to  increase  their  exports,  then  con 
sumption  and  investment  in  countf 
with  current  account  surpluses  neij 
grow  at  a  greater  rate  than  outpun 
There  needs  to  be  a  greater  focus 
"homegrown"  growth  in  trade  sur 
countries.  If  other  countries  were 
follow  policies  that  made  their  eco  - 
mies  as  attractive  to  investors  as    ! 
U.S.  economy,  that  would  reduce  ail 
trade  surpluses  and  lower  the  U.^  lei 
icit.  This  is  why  we  have  frequent 
urged  Japan  and  Germany  to  ado]  ■'-' 
icies  that  would  provide  an  attrac 
climate  for  investment.  This  is  th' 
soundest  way  to  expand  their  don  .Ui 
economic  growth.  Economic  gi-owi  re- 
quires freeing  up  their  economies  la 
ket  forces — free  enterprise  and  fr 
choice  for  consumers — must  be  th 
guiding  principles.  ^ 

The  issue  of  structural  adustr  nt 
has  become  one  of  the  major  item  m 
the  international  economic  agenda 
Building  on  the  consensus  reache(  t 
the  economic  summit  at  Williamsl  e 
in  1983  and  extended  since  then,  e 
nomic  officials  of  the  major  indust 
alized  countries  in  September  198!: 
outlined  in  the  Plaza  Agreement  a  m 
priate  domestic  structural  measur  . 
These  included  reducing  rigidities  i  li 
bor  and  capital  markets  and  provic  Jg 
sound  basis  for  more  balanced,  su!| 
tained  noninflationary  growth.  Thi| 
strategy  was  reconfirmed  at  the  Ty( 
and  Venice  economic  summits,  ant , 
think  even  greater  emphasis  may  1  a 
corded  to  the  importance  of  struct  fa 
adjustment  at  the  Toronto  economi 
summit  in  June.  In  fact,  I  think  wlw 
see  the  issue  of  structural  adjustn'.'it 
playing  a  more  prominent  role  in  j  lic 
coordination  as  summit  nations,  ot-'f 


\ 


44 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/July  9i 


ECONOMICS 


-trialized  economies,  and  the  newly 
strialized  countries  search  for  ways 
istain  growth  into  the  1990s. 
I'he  United  States  has  approached 
\vn  structural  reform  with  four 
ipal  economic  priorities  aimed  at 
ni;-  our  economy  responsive  to  mar- 
"I'ees: 

il)  Deregulating  our  domestic 
Hiiiiy; 

(2)  Curtailing  the  growth  of  gov- 
■rjient  expenditures; 

(3)  Reforming  our  tax  system;  and 
I  I )  Opening  the  international  mar- 
in  part  by  resisting  protectionism 
line  and  championing  a  new  round 
:i(le  negotiations  internationally. 

We  have  not  done  badly.  Tax  re- 
is  a  reality.  Far-reaching  steps 
lit'en  taken  in  deregulation.  A  new 
iiiund  has  been  launched,  and  we 
ii;i;ressively  tackling  the  most  in- 
able  problem — excessive  govern- 
expenditure — which  is  the  cause 
1-  excessive  government  deficits. 
ia\e  begun  to  make  good  progress 
11)1  this  front,  and  our  Federal  def- 
aiid  the  growth  in  Federal  spend- 
iie  declining. 

All  told,  this  is  a  strong  record  and 
latistics  again  speak  for  them- 
:  The  U.S.  economy  has  created 
~t  1(5  million  net  new  jobs  since 
,  unemployment  has  fallen  to  its 
St  level  in  14  years,  interest  rates 
fallen  dramatically  from  their  lev- 
if  the  early  1980s,  inflation  has  been 
rolled,  and  the  American  economy 
.^    its  65th  month  of  sustained 
?i  rth. 
We  also  see  major  shifts  taking 
I'.  Growth  in  real  GNP  exceeded 
ith  in  real  domestic  demand  by 
at  It  one  percentage  point  last  year.  In 
Mirt  industries,  growth  in  investment 
II  employment  is  strong.  Real  net  ex- 
s  improved  by  $11  billion  last  year, 
the  trade  deficit,  in  volume  terms, 
ln'en  falling  in  each  of  the  last  15 
li>.  This  year  we  expect  the  im- 
1  nient  in  real  net  exports  to  con- 
iite  nearly  half  of  our  economic 
vth.  In  short,  the  U.S.  economy  is 
ne.  healthy,  and  vigorous. 

•lapan  Structural  Dialogue 

I'riflay,  I  will  be  leading  the  U.S. 
Ill  discussion  with  our  Japanese 
1  riiment  counterparts  in  the  U.S.- 
111  structural  dialogue.  This  fourth 
tint;-  of  the  dialogue  is  an  important 
;  of  our  mutual  progress  on  struc- 
il  issues.  We  organized  this  dialogue 
luse  both  sides  recognized  that  it 


Japan  Continues  Quotas 
on  Beef,  Citrus  Imports 


Folloiving  is  a  statement  by  U.S. 
Trade  Representative  Clayton  Yeutter 
on  May  S.  1988. 

I  have  met  with  Japanese  Agriculture 
Minister  T^kashi  Sato  for  nearly  a  week 
trying  to  reach  an  agreement  that 
would  liberalize  Japan's  beef  and  citrus 
markets.  Regrettably  the  final  Japanese 
proposal  offered  only  a  modest  increase 
in  access,  and  it  would  have  left  in 
place  provisions  that  the  United  States 
considers  to  be  incompatible  with  the 
GATT  [General  Agreement  on  Tariffs 
and  Trade]  rules. 

The  United  States  has  been  seek- 
ing an  elimination  of  the  Japanese  beef 
and  citrus  quotas  by  a  certain  date 
along  with  a  transparent  and  compre- 
hensive package  which  would  assure 
U.S.  beef  and  citrus  producers  full  ac- 
cess to  Japan's  market.  In  addition,  the 
United  States  sought  an  immediate  end 
to  the  GATT-illegal  citrus  juice  blend- 
ing requirement  as  well  as  substantial 
cuts  in  Japan's  citrus  tariffs. 

The  Japanese  were  willing  to  make 
concessions  in  some  areas;  however,  for 


beef  they  wanted  to  substitute  other 
measures  that  would  sustain  a  high 
level  of  import  protection.  In  addition, 
none  of  our  citrus  concerns  were  ad- 
dressed to  our  satisfaction.  Under  the 
Japanese  proposal,  U.S.  exporters  and 
Japanese  consumers  would  continue  to 
bear  the  cost  and  burden  of  Japan's  in- 
sistence on  constraining  agricultural 
imports. 

Tomorrow,  the  GATT  council  will 
meet  in  Geneva,  Switzerland,  and  the 
United  States  will  for  a  second  time 
ask  for  the  establishment  of  a  panel  to 
review  our  complaint  about  Japan's  ob- 
structive beef  and  citrus  import  prac- 
tices. We  hope  that  Japan  will  live  up  to 
its  international  obligations  and  agi'ee 
to  this  action. 

It  is  essential  that  the  Japanese 
Government  join  the  United  States  and 
other  major  trading  partners  in  pursu- 
ing and  promoting  open  global  trade — 
in  agricultural  as  well  as  industrial 
goods.  The  continuation  of  GATT  incon- 
sistent quotas,  or  alternative  schemes 
of  a  similarly  constricting  nature,  do 
not  meet  that  responsibility.  ■ 


was  time  to  give  greater  emphasis  to 
the  fundamental  domestic  imbalances 
that  underlie  external  imbalances. 

Together,  we  have  studied  the  evo- 
lution of  the  external  imbalances,  the 
relationships  between  savings  and  in- 
vestment in  our  two  countries,  and  how 
imbalances  between  these  elements  un- 
derlie external  imbalances.  Going 
deeper  into  these  issues,  we  also  have 
examined  a  number  of  specific  sectors, 
including  agriculture,  housing,  con- 
sumer credit,  labor  relations,  and  com- 
petition policies — all  of  which  influence 
savings  and  investment  in  our  respec- 
tive economies. 

The  structural  dialogue  provides 
the  analytical  underpinning  necessary 
to  make  structural  issues  an  integral 
part  of  international  coordination.  The 
dialogue  is  not  a  formal  negotiation  but 
an  enlightening  and  sometimes  spirited 
discussion  of  topics  that  are  inherently 
domestic  but  which  unquestionably  are 
related  to  achieving  our  common  goal  of 
sustained,  noninflationary  growth  in 
the  differing  circumstances  of  the  two 
countries.  Fundamentally,  structural 


adjustment  means  nations  doing  what 
is  in  their  own  best  economic  interest. 
This  means  overcoming  special  interests 
that  are  resistant  to  change  and  unwill- 
ing to  submit  to  free  competition  and 
open  markets.  Nations  may  find  the 
process  of  international  coordination 
helpful  in  placing  their  long-term  na- 
tional interests  over  short-term  and 
short-sighted  special  concerns. 

Japan's  Adjustment  and  the  Need 
for  Further  Structural  Reform 

Japan's  economy  has  undergone  re- 
markable adjustments  during  the  last  3 
years  in  response  to  shifts  in  exchange 
rates  and  other  changes  in  the  interna- 
tional economy,  and  Japan  is  to  be  ad- 
mired and  commended  for  its 
accomplishments.  After  a  difficult  year 
in  1986,  when  corporate  profits  dropped 
an  average  of  25%  and  growth  of  GNP 
was  relatively  weak,  the  Japanese  econ- 
omy is  now  booming,  thanks  largely  to 
policies  designed  to  increase  domestic 
demand.  GNP  grew  nearly  4.2%  last 
year,  with  the  growth  over  5%  in  do- 


liartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


45 


ECONOMICS 


mestic  demand  contributing  to  adjust 
ment,  in  real  terms,  of  Japan's  high 
trade  and  current  account  surpluses. 
As  I  see  it,  Japan  now  needs  to 
build  a  solid  domestic  basis  for  sus- 
tained growth  by  reducing  structural 
impediments  to  economic  activity  and 
otherwise  reducing  inefficiencies  in  its 
economy.  Thus,  I  hope  that  .Japan  will 
undertake  a  thorough  assessment  of 
policies  which  affect  the  allocation  of 
resources  among  sectors  and  between 
consumption  and  savings.  If  govern- 
ment policies  interfere  with  the  trans- 
mission of  market  signals,  the  structure 
of  the  economy  is  distorted.  This  has 
adverse  consequences  for  both  the  cur- 
rent economic  situation  and  the  future. 
A  stronger,  more  flexible  domestic  mar- 
ket is  important  to  meet  the  immediate 
problem  of  external  imbalances  and  also 
to  prepare  Japan's  economy  for  the  fu- 
ture, when  newly  industrialized  coun- 
tries will  increase  competition  in  export 
markets  traditionally  dominated  by  Jap- 
anese products.  In  essence,  Japan 
needs  to  increase  the  attractiveness  of 
its  economy  to  investors — both  Jap- 
anese and  non-Japanese. 

As  we  prepared  for  the  structural 
dialogue,  we  identified  a  number  of 
areas  that  we  want  to  discuss  with  our 
Japanese  colleagues,  including  Japan's 
cumbersome  retailing  and  distribution 
systems;  depressed  industries  and  car- 
tel pohcies;  buying  practices;  consumer 
credit  and  housing  loans. 

From  a  U.S.  point  of  view,  how- 
ever, it  is  Japan's  agriculture  which  pro- 
vides the  most  striking  example  of  the 
costs  of  inefficiency  and  the  need  for 
reform.  The  maintenance  of  high  sup- 
port prices  and  restrictive  import  bar- 
riers hinders  structural  adjustment  in 
the  agricultural  sector  and  throughout 
the  economy  and  results  in  the  mis- 
allocation  of  resources — both  in  Japan 
and  abroad.  Various  studies  indicate 
that  the  total  cost  of  such  policies  to 
Japan's  taxpayers  and  consumers  is 
about  $50-$60  biUion  annually.  Japanese 
consumers  spend  $40  billion — 5  triUion 
yen — more  on  food  than  they  would 
spend  if  they  paid  world  prices. 

For  beef  the  Japanese  consumer 
pays  three  to  five  times  the  world 
price.  The  beef  for  which  Japanese  con- 
sumers now  pay  $20  billion  would  cost 
them  only  $4  to  $7  billion  if  they  could 
buy  beef  at  world  prices.  Rice  prices 
in  Japan  are  six  times  the  world  price 
and  cost  Japanese  consumers  another 
$10  billion  extra.  Additional  rice  sup- 
ports paid  to  farmers  cost  Japan's  tax- 
payers several  billion  dollars  more.  All 


told,  Japanese  consumers  spend  ap- 
proximately 24%  of  their  income  on 
food,  compared  with  12%  in  the  United 
States  and  15%  in  the  United  Kingdom 
and  the  Netherlands. 

The  relatively  high  percentage 
of  income  spent  on  food  reduces  the 
amount  of  income  available  for  other 
uses,  such  as  housing  and  imports.  The 
same  studies  indicate  that  Japan's  agri- 
cultural policies  subsidize  producers  on 
the  order  of  70%  for  major  commodities 
as  compared  to  28%  in  the  United 
States.  In  other  words,  the  total  value 
of  government  support  programs  equals 
about  70%  of  total  agricultural  income 
in  Japan.  This  means  that  more  than 
two-thirds  of  farm  income  is  really  so- 
cial welfare  transfers,  not  earnings. 
Sectors  other  than  agriculture  are  be- 
ing made  less  competitive,  resulting  m 
a  loss  of  economic  growth  and 
efficiency. 

Japan  is  the  largest  customer  for 
U.S.  agricultural  exports.  Yet,  Amer- 
ica's farmers,  who  are  many  times  as 
productive  as  Japan's,  could  provide 
substantially  greater  amounts  of  food  to 
Japanese  consumers  at  a  much  lower 
cost  than  they  pay  currently.  They  are 
prevented  from  doing  so,  in  many  cases, 
by  quotas  and  high  tariffs,  state  trad- 
ing, and  other  restrictive  arrange- 
ments. It  does  not  make  economic 
sense  for  Japan  to  restrict  severely  im- 
ports of  products  in  which  its  trading 
partners  enjoy  an  overwhelming  com- 
parative advantage,  especially  since 
those  partners  welcome  products  in 
which  Japan  has  a  comparative  advan- 
tage, such  as  electronics,  robotics,  and 
automobiles.  If  Japan  must  support 
farmers  for  political  and  social  reasons, 
it  should  do  so  in  ways  that  do  not 
distort  trade.  The  70%  of  farm  income 
that  consists  of  social  welfare  payments 
should  be  transferred  in  ways  that  are 
not  related  to  production. 

Japan's  quotas  on  beef  and  citrus 
products  are  of  immediate  concern  and 
are  a  source  of  great  friction  between 
our  two  countries.  I  realize  the  process 
of  adjustment  will  be  difficult  for  some 
Japanese  farmers,  just  as  it  has  been 
for  U.S.  farmers.  Yesterday,  I  visited 
with  two  beef  and  dairy  farmers  and 
listened  firsthand  to  their  concerns. 
However,  it  is  time  for  Japan  to  ehmi- 
nate  the  quotas  and  bring  other  aspect; 
of  the  trade  into  conformance  with  the 
GATT  [General  Agreement  on  Tariffs 
and  Trade]. 


Changing  Course  in  Japan 

Japanese  leaders  recognize  the  ne 
further  restructuring  of  Japan's  t'( 
omy.  The  efforts  made  over  the  lasj 
several  years  underscore  their  detd 
mination.  Indeed,  there  has  been  ai 
change  in  Japanese  attitudes  towar  j 
Japan's  role  in  the  global  economy.  I 
believe  there  now  is  consensus  builj 
for  the  kinds  of  economic  adjustmel 
have  discussed.  This  prestigious  or  j 
zation,  Keidanren,  has  strongly  su 
ported  Japan's  need  for  structural  I 
reform.  You  have  recommended  thJ 
Japan  should  remove  all  import  red 
tions,  abolish  tariffs  on  manufactuij 
goods,  undertake  thorough  deregu  m 
of  the  economy,  and  achieve  openn  ^  •■ 
administrative  systems  and  operat 
I  encourage  you  to  press  toward  t! 
goal. 

Structural  Adjustment  at 
the  Multilateral  Level 

Our  two  nations  have  responsibilit 
that  are  not  limited  to  our  domest 
economies  and  our  bilateral  relatic 
ship.  As  the  two  largest  industrial  id. 
economies,  we  have  responsibilitie  or 
international  leadership  as  well.  V 
cannot  prosper  without  an  open  ai 
fair  worid  trading  system.  Trade  i  k 
mechanism  by  which  structural  ac  st 
ment  is  transmitted  internationall  Ai 
the  pace  of  change  picks  up,  it  is  t  en 
tial  that  the  guidelines  for  trade,  '  ; 
rules  of  the  road  for  international  m 
merce,  be  kept  up-to-date  to  help  S- 
tain  global  growth. 

Our  two  governments  have  an 
important  stake  in  the  success  of  i  • 
Uruguay  Round.  GATT  has  playec 
major  role  in  expanding  world  tra 
and  economic  growth  in  these  last  u 
decades.  Much  of  the  increase  in  t 
standard  of  living  of  the  Japanese  ^c 
pie  was  fueled  by  trade.  In  fact,  J  a 
has  secured  sure  sources  of  suppb  |ii 
major  markets  abroad  on  a  scale  i , 
greater  than  was  imagined  by  the  |i 
tary  rulers  of  the  1930s  who  so  tn 
icaily  sought  to  achieve  such  acces  ^ 
through  military  conquest. 

Now  the  GATT  must  address 
areas,  as  technology  and  changinu 
cumstances  vastly  increase  the  po  i 
tial  and  scope  of  economic  dealinti 
^  between  nations.  Services,  invest i 
and  protection  of  intellectual  prop 
erty— formerly  of  only  domestic  i- 
(■ern— are  now  part  of  the  arena  « 
world  commerce  and  must  be  incl  i 
in  any  arrangement  that  seeks  to 


46 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Jul^' 


ECONOMICS 


n  international  trade.  The  United 

>  and  Japan  need  to  lead  in  these 

lATT  efforts.  By  and  large,  we 

the  same  interests  in  these  new 

,  and  there  is  great  scope  for  co- 
ition between  us. 
tilt  the  work  of  the  new  trade 
1  must  not  neglect  the  traditional 

sectors  where  problems  remain. 

important,  we  must  tackle  the 
i  tiuricultural  mess.  The  new  trade 
I  provides  us  with  a  chance  to  es- 
-h  a  world  trading  structure  that 
aiTv  mankind  to  new  levels  of  en- 
ist',  opportunity,  and  well-being. 
•wv.  that  goal  cannot  be  achieved 
lut  broad,  compi-ehensive  reform  of 
ultui-al  policies  worldwide.  We 

ti  good  starting  point  is  the  sub- 
i\e  proposal  on  agriculture  that 

nited  States  has  set  forth  aimed 
tting  agricultural  production  and 

on  a  market-oriented  basis. 

iiless  decisive  common  action  is 
1,  the  growing  burden  of  our  mis- 
med  farm  policies  could  overwhelm 
n  the  major  Western  economies, 
iiect  and  indirect  cost  of  farm  sub- 
-  now  exceeds  $250  billion  at  cur- 

'xhange  rates,  according  to  the 
I M  Organization  for  Economic  Co- 
ition  and  Development].  This  is  a 
Hi-  misallocation  of  resources  on  a 
il  scale  which  prevents  our  econo- 
-;  from  reaching  the  growth  of  which 
1  are  capable. 
We  would  like  to  see  the  total  elim- 
iiii  (luring  the  next  10  years  of  farm 
'1  subsidies,  quotas,  nontariff  bar- 
,  and  all  other  distortions  of  agri- 
iial  markets.  As  a  result,  world 
insts  would  be  cut,  government 
ifts  pared,  wasteful  practices  elimi- 
'1,  and  economic  growth  stimulated 
ir  broad  international  scale.  By  the 
T  of  the  century,  we  envision  an  open 
u"  free  trading  system  in  agricultural 
)r  lucts.  For  Japan,  I  can  think  of  no 
^  i  Striking  proof  that  it  accepts  its 

iiornational  leadership  than  by 
ivith  us  in  this  effort  to  ra- 
auze  agriculture. 

■  nomic  Leadership 

uiiimary,  the  United  States  and 
•i  m  face  two  related  sets  of  economic 
r  eratives  which  demand  action  and 
t  ership.  For  their  own  prosperity 
\\('ll-being,  they  must  free  up  their 
ifstic  economies  so  that  they  will  be 
•  tu  adapt  more  efficiently  and  more 
i'll,\'  to  change.  Success  in  removing 
'  riers  to  economic  activity — in  addi- 
1  to  the  beneficial  effects  on  their 
pective  economies — will  provide  in- 


creased growth  opportunities  for  their 
trading  partners,  including,  and  espe- 
cially, developing  countries. 

Our  two  nations  have  important  in- 
ternational economic  responsibilities  as 
well.  We  cannot  exert  real  leadership 
just  through  technological  development 
or  export  expansion.  We  must  exert 
leadership  in  the  overall  functioning  of 
the  international  economy.  I  mentioned 
the  new  trade  round,  but  there  are  also 
other  important  multilateral  tasks — in- 


cluding monetary  stability:  debt  and 
economic  assistance  to  developing  na- 
tions— where  the  United  States  and 
Japan  must  lead. 

Our  extensive  political  cooperation 
and  close  economic  links  make  it  possi- 
ble to  address  these  issues  together 
with  confidence.  Moreover,  it  is  in  our 
own  national  interests  to  promote  the 
kinds  of  growth-oriented  economic  pol- 
icies I  have  discussed — which  is  why  I 
think  we  will  succeed  to  the  benefit  of 
all  mankind.  ■ 


U.S.  Foreign  Economic  Policy,  1981-87 


Free  Trade.  The  Reagan  Administra- 
tion continues  to  pursue  the  goal  of  free 
and  fair  international  trade  in  order  to 
promote  effective  economic  develop- 
ment in  the  United  States  and  through- 
out the  globe.  At  U.S.  urging  and  as 
part  of  our  effort  to  reduce  record  U.S. 
trade  deficits,  foreign  governments 
have  eliminated  some  of  their  barriers 
to  U.S. -exported  goods  and  services. 
The  United  States  has  signed  impor- 
tant free  trade  agreements  with  Can- 
ada and  Israel  that  will  eliminate  tariffs 
and  other  obstacles  to  bilateral  trade 
and  investment.  The  United  States 
played  a  major  role  in  the  initiation 
of  a  new  round  of  multilateral  trade 
negotiations  under  the  auspices  of 
the  General  Agreement  on  Tkriffs  and 
Trade  (GATT)  in  order  to  strengthen 
the  international  trading  system. 

Economic  Assistance.  The  United 
States  has  provided  substantial  aid  to 
developing  countries  in  order  to  pro- 
mote economic  growth  based  on  private 
sector  initiative  and  market-oriented 
policies.  More  prosperous  foreign  coun- 
tries are  better  markets  for  U.S. 
goods,  services,  and  investment.  U.S. 
emergency  food  aid  and  disaster  relief 
have  been  sent  to  numerous  countries, 
particularly  in  Africa,  for  humanitarian 
reasons.  The  United  States  also  has  en- 
couraged private  foreign  investment  in 
developing  countries  as  an  important 
part  of  the  economic  development 
process. 

External  Debt  of  Developing  Coun- 
tries. Since  1982,  the  United  States  has 
provided  leadership  in  forging  a  strat- 
egy to  solve  the  acute  debt  problems  of 


developing  countries  without  endanger- 
ing the  long-term  growth  prospects  of 
the  debtors  or  the  integrity  of  the  in- 
ternational financial  system.  With  the 
international  financial  institutions,  es- 
pecially the  International  Monetary 
Fund  (IMF)  and  the  World  Bank,  at 
the  center,  the  strategy  involves  all 
concerned  parties — the  debtors,  the 
commercial  banks,  and  the  creditor 
governments.  A  key  element  is  the  en- 
couragement of  debtor  countries  to 
adopt  growth-oriented  structural  ad- 
justment policies,  and  thereby  foster 
new  lending  by  commercial  and  multi- 
lateral development  banks. 

Exchange  Rate/Monetary  Coordina- 
tion. Since  1985,  major  industrial  coun- 
tries— United  States,  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany  (F.R.G.),  United  Kingdom, 
France,  Japan,  Canada,  and  Italy — 
have  renewed  efforts  to  consult  closely 
on  coordination  of  domestic  economic 
policies  in  order  to  restrain  inflation, 
encourage  growth,  and  provide  stability 
to  exchange  rates  and  exchange  mar- 
kets. 

Energy  Security.  The  Reagan  Admin- 
istration has  strengthened  U.S.  energy 
security  by  decontrolling  the  price  of 
oil,  deregulating  domestic  natural  gas 
prices,  promoting  coal  and  nuclear 
power,  building  up  the  Strategic  Pe- 
troleum Reserve,  and  promoting  the 
coordinated  use  of  oil  stocks  by  Inter- 
national Energy  Agency  countries  in 
the  event  of  an  oil  crisis. 


ihartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


47 


ECONOMICS 


1981 


January  28:  President  Reagan  signs  an 
executive  order  abolishing  price  con- 
trols on  most  domestic  crude  oil  and  its 
byproducts.  This  decontrol  allows  oil 
companies  to  raise  the  price  of  domestic 
crude  to  world  levels,  in  order  to  pro- 
mote conservation  and  increase  U.S. 
production  of  crude. 

April  16:  United  States  stops  interven- 
ing in  currency  markets.  The  purpose 
of  the  new  policy  is  to  allow  the  cur- 
rency e.xchange  rates  of  the  major  trad- 
ing countries  to  find  more  realistic 
levels  through  the  operation  of  market 
forces. 

April  24:  President  Reagan  ends  the 
U.S.  embargo  of  grain  and  phosphate 
fertilizer  exports  to  the  U.S.S.R.; 
keeps  controls  on  strategic  technology 
products  and  foreign  policy  controls  on 
oil  and  gas  equipment.  He  says  that  the 
grain  embargo  was  ineffective  and  was 
harmful  to  U.S.  farmers.  The  lifting  of 
the  embargo  is  designed  to  increase 
U.S.  farm  exports  to  an  important 
market. 

July  19-21:  Economic  summit  meeting 
in  Ottawa.  President  Reagan  raises  the 
themes  of  reliance  on  market  forces  and 
the  urgency  of  structural  reform.  (The 
leaders  of  seven  industrial  countries — 
the  Group  of  7,  comprised  of  the  United 
States,  Japan,  F.R.G.,  United  King- 
dom, France,  Italy,  and  Canada — meet 
annually  to  discuss  and  make  decisions 
on  a  wide  range  of  international  eco- 
nomic and  political  issues.) 

October  22-2.3:  The  International  Meet- 
ing for  Cooperation  and  Development 
convenes  in  Cancun,  Mexico.  Leaders 
of  8  industrial  countries  and  14  develop- 
ing nations  plus  the  UN  Secretary  Gen- 
eral discuss  the  development  challenges 
of  the  poorer  nations.  President  Reagan 
declares  that  free  trade  and  free  eco- 
nomic development  are  the  keys  to 
prosperity  for  the  developing  world. 

1982 

February  24:  President  Reagan  an- 
nounces to  the  Organization  of  Ameri- 
can States  a  six-point  plan  aimed  at 
improving  the  economies  of  the  Carib- 
bean region.  The  centerpiece  of  the 
Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  is  duty-free 
treatment  for  Caribbean  Basin  products 
(except  textiles  and  apparel  products) 
exported  to  the  United  States  for  the 
next  12  years.  He  requests  additional 
economic  assistance  of  $350  million  and 


additional  security  assistance  of  $60 
million  for  Caribbean  nations  for  FY 
1982.  The  Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  is 
designed  to  foster  economic  growth  in 
the  region  and  increased  trade  and  in- 
vestment flows  between  the  United 
States  and  Caribbean  countries. 

June  4-6:  Economic  summit  meeting  in 
Versailles.  The  seven  leaders  launch  the 
process  of  greater  economic  coordina- 
tion among  their  countries. 

August  20:  United  States  assists  Mex- 
ico with  a  bridge  loan  in  the  context  of 
commercial  bank  rescheduling  arrange- 
ments. Representatives  from  more  than 
100  foreign  commercial  banks  agree  to 
postpone  repayment  of  Mexico's  $10  bil- 
lion foreign  debt  now  due  and  to  pro- 
vide $1  billion  in  new  credits.  The  debt 
package  not  only  assists  the  U.S.  bank- 
ing system  but  also  provides  a  more 
viable  basis  for  future  economic  growth 
in  Mexico. 

December  9-10:  United  States,  F.R.G., 
United  Kingdom,  France,  and  Japan 
(the  Group  of  5)  agree  to  a  50%  in- 
crease in  the  basic  lending  resources  of 
the  IMF,  which  provides  loans  to  devel- 
oping countries  to  help  finance  balance- 
of-payments  deficits  in  conjunction  with 
a  program  of  necessary  economic  policy 
reforms  designed  to  restore  external 
balance. 

1983 

March  10:  Pi-esident  Reagan  proclaims 
an  exclusive  economic  zone  in  which  the 
United  States  will  exercise  sovereign 
rights  over  its  living  and  nonliving  re- 
sources within  200  nautical  miles  of  the 
U.S.  coast.  The  policy  is  designed  to 
protect  valuable  offshore  assets,  such 
as  fish  and  minerals. 

May  10:  Organization  for  Economic  Co- 
operation and  Development  (OECD) 
ministers  agree  that  "their  countries 
would  seek  to  avoid  undue  dependence 
on  any  one  source  of  gas  imports  and  to 
obtain  future  gas  supplies  from  secure 
sources,  with  emphasis  on  indigenous 
OECD  sources." 

May  28-30:  Economic  summit  meeting 
in  Williamsburg,  Virginia.  It  lays  the 
groundwork  for  our  international  debt 
strategy,  which  evolved  into  the  Baker 
Plan  (see  October  8,  1985). 

July  28:  United  States  and  U.S.S.R. 
reach  agreement  on  a  new  long-term 
grain  agreement  for  5  years.  The 
U.S.S.R.  will  purchase  a  minimum 
of  9  million  metric  tons  of  U.S.  grain 


annually  in  approximately  equal 
quantities  of  wheat  and  corn. 

September  9:  President  Reagan  an- 
nounces U.S.  international  investme 
policy.  Its  fundamental  premise  is  ti 
foreign  investment  flows  which  resp 
to  private  market  forces  will  lead  tc 
more  efficient  international  product 
to  the  benefit  of  both  home  and  hoa 
countries. 

1984 


January  30:  United  States  announo 
an  aid  initiative  for  Africa  to  provic 
food  and  promote  economic  reform 
development.  In  addition  to  ongoinji 
sistance  programs,  the  economic  pa 
initiative  is  expected  to  cost  appro 
mately  $500  million  over  a  5-year  ps 
and  is  directed  to  those  African  cou 
tries  that  carry  out  economic  refom 
a  manner  that  will  use  the  money  itt 
effectively. 

May  29:  United  States  and  Japan  a| 
nounce  a  series  of  measures  aimed  • 
opening  Japan's  financial  markets  a« 
increasing  the  use  of  the  Japanese 
as  an  international  currency.  The  tl! 
main  provisions  of  the  agreement  e< 
pand  the  market  for  international  t! 
issues  denominated  in  yen,  dereguM 
Japanese  domestic  capital  markets,', 
give  foreign  companies  greater  acc«i 
to  Japanese  financial  markets.  U.S' 
ficials  hope  that  the  measures  will 
to  a  stronger  yen  and  a  consequent 
provement  in  the  U.S.  balance  oft) 
with  Japan. 

June  7-9:  Economic  summit  meetin 
London.  It  builds  constructively  on 
foundations  for  international  coope: 
tion  established  at  the  two  previous 
summits. 

September  18:  President  Reagan  a•^ 
nounces  that  his  Administration  wi 
seek  to  negotiate  voluntary  restrai< 
agreements  with  foreign  governmei 
in  order  to  protect  domestic  steel ) 
ducers  from  rising  imports.  He  rej| 
steel  industry  requests  for  imposit; 
strict  quotas  or  higher  tariffs  on  i 
ported  steel. 

1985 


« 


48 


January  3:  President  Reagan  an- 
nounces a  comprehensive  African  h 
ger  relief  initiative.  Total  U.S.  com 
ment  to  Africa  for  emergency  and 
regular  food  aid  and  disaster  relief 
grams  will  exceed  $1  billion  duringi 
1985.  On  the  economic  developmem 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/July, 


ECONOMICS 


r.S.  efforts  in  Africa  will  con- 
sul three  fronts:  policy  reform, 
ultural  research,  and  human  re- 
r  development. 

ary  28:  United  States  and  Japan 
1  ti-ade  negotiations  and  agree  to 
\  tniir  market  areas — telecom- 

,  cat  ions,  pharmaceuticals,  com- 
i>  and  electronics,  and  forest 
acts — in  which  the  United  States 
IS  that  Japan  unfairly  discriminates 

.  1st  U.S.  goods  and  services.  These 
llfd  MOSS  (market-oriented,  sec- 
lit'cific)  talks,  which  last  until  Jan- 
1!)S(;,  are  successful  in  opening  up 
use  markets  for  U.S.  exports  of 
-  and  medical  and  telecommunica- 
ri|uipment.  MOSS  negotiations  on 
h  sector — transportation  equip- 
liegin  in  June  1986. 

■h  1:  United  States  announces  a 
IS. -Israel  free  trade  agreement 
! ruinate  all  tariffs  between  the  two 
ti'ies  by  1995.  The  agreement  is  ex- 
mI  to  increase  trade  and  other  eco- 
c  ties  between  the  two  countries. 

H  ch  18:  President  Reagan  and  Cana- 
Kj  Prime  Minister  Mulroney  agree  to 
.■  itf  talks  toward  establishment  of  a 
trade  area,  which  would  liberalize 
iiicrease  trade  in  goods  and  serv- 
I  and  investment  between  the  two 
'  tries.  (The  United  States  and  Can- 
have  the  largest  bilateral  trade 
Mids  and  services  in  the  world — 
cding$166  bilhon  in  1987.) 

--1:  Economic  summit  meeting  in 
;  II.  It  plays  a  key  role  in  initiating 
h  Uruguay  Round  of  multilateral 
'  e  negotiations  under  the  GATT  in 
nnlier  1986. 

1  [finber  22:  Senior  economic  officials 
1  the  United  States,  F.R.G.,  United 

.  Ilium.  France,  and  Japan  agree  that 
111-  further  orderly  appreciation  of 
main  nondollar  currencies  against 
diiHar  is  desirable"  and  are  "ready 
iHiperate  more  closely  to  encourage 
,"  The  Plaza  Accord  is  an  attempt 
nive  at  more  realistic  e.xchange 

:  ■  I'ldationships  that  better  reflect 
iniderlying  economic  conditions  of 

I  major  industrial  countries  in  order 
ichicve  more  balanced  growth. 

~  itcmber  23:  President  Reagan  an- 

iici's  a  new  sei'ies  of  measures  de- 

ud  to  identify  and  combat  unfair 

hiiir  practices  by  other  nations  in 

II-  to  allow  more  U.S.  exports  to 

.    iun  markets.  The  centerpiece  of  the 

jjn  is  the  establishment  of  a  $300-mil- 

yi  "war  chest"  in  the  Export-Import 


Bank  to  counter  subsidized  export 
credit  offers  by  other  industrial 
nations. 

October  8:  At  IMFAVorld  Bank  meet- 
ings in  Seoul,  South  Korea,  U.S.  Treas- 
ury Secretary  Baker  pi-oposes  a 
"Program  for  Sustained  Growth,"  a 
three-point  approach  to  debt  problems 
of  large  middle-income  developing  coun- 
tries. The  Baker  Plan  includes  an  in- 
crease in  annual  World  Bank  and  Inter- 
American  Development  Bank  disburse- 
ments, a  key  role  for  the  IMF  in  foster- 
ing economic  reform,  and  net  new 
lending  by  commercial  banks  of  approx- 
imately $20  billion  over  a  3-year  period. 
A  major  goal  of  the  program  is  to  en- 
courage principal  debtor  countries  to 
adopt  comprehensive,  growth-oriented 
macroeconomic  and  structural  adjust- 
ment policies. 

December  23:  President  Reagan  signs 
the  Food  Security  Act  of  1985.  The  law 
establishing  U.S.  farm  programs  for 
1986-90  is  designed  to  improve  U.S. 
competitiveness  in  world  markets, 
where  our  agricultural  exports  have 
been  slipping  since  1981.  The  act  au- 
thorizes export  subsidies  for  wheat  and 
other  agricultural  products  to  selected 
markets,  creates  favorable  crop  loan  re- 
payment terms  that  can  assist  rice  and 
cotton  exports,  and  progressively  re- 
duces price  support  levels  for  several 
major  export  commodities. 

1986 

January  19:  Senior  economic  officials 
from  the  United  States,  F.R.G.,  United 
Kingdom,  France,  and  Japan  coordinate 
reductions  in  their  interest  rates  in 
order  to  promote  economic  growth  with 
low  inflation. 

May  4-6:  Economic  summit  meeting  in 
Tokyo.  It  elaborates  the  process  of  in- 
ternational economic  coordination  and 
places  agricultural  reform  squarely  on 
the  international  economic  agenda. 

July  31:  United  States  and  Japan  reach 
agreement  on  a  5-year  trade  pact  in- 
volving computer  chips.  Japan  agi-ees  to 
let  U.S.  semiconductor  manufacturers 
gain  a  larger  share  of  its  market  and  to 
prevent  Japanese  producers  from  en- 
gaging in  predatory  pricing  in  the 
United  States  or  in  third  countries.  The 
United  States  agrees  to  suspend  tariffs 
on  Japanese  chips  that  had  been  im- 
posed as  penalties  for  the  alleged 
dumping. 


September  20:  74  countries  belonging 
to  the  GATT  agree  to  an  agenda  for  the 
8th  (Uruguay)  round  of  multilateral 
trade  negotiations.  Major  U.S.  objec- 
tives of  these  talks,  expected  to  last 
3^  years,  are  to  liberalize  international 
trade  in  services;  promote  freer,  more 
market-oriented  agricultural  trade;  re- 
duce nontariff  barriers  to  trade  and  so 
improve  market  access;  eliminate  trade- 
distorting  investment  policies;  end  the 
international  piracy  of  patents,  trade- 
marks, and  copyrights;  and  strengthen 
the  GATT's  procedures  for  settling 
disputes.  The  overall  purpose  of  the 
Uruguay  Round  is  a  more  effective 
international  trading  system  with 
freer  trade  in  goods  and  services. 

October  31:  United  States  and  Japan 
announce  a  broad  agreement  on  eco- 
nomic cooperation.  Japan  promises  to 
cut  interest  rates  and  taxes  and  in- 
crease government  spending,  while  the 
United  States  agrees  to  continue  seek- 
ing reductions  in  the  budget  deficit.  A 
major  purpose  of  the  agi-eement  is  to 
reduce  the  large  external  trade  im- 
balances in  both  the  United  States 
and  Japan. 

1987 

February  22:  United  States,  F.R.G., 
United  Kingdom,  France,  Japan,  and 
Canada  agree  (the  Louvre  Accord)  to 
cooperate  closely  in  official  currency 
market  interventions  as  may  be  neces- 
sary, as  part  of  the  process  of  better 
economic  policy  coordination. 

June  8-10:  Economic  summit  meeting 
in  Venice.  The  leaders  agree  on  the 
need  for  effective  structural  adjustment 
policies,  especially  for  creating  jobs. 

September  29:  Secretary  Baker,  in  his 
address  to  the  IMF/World  Bank  annual 
meetings,  calls  for  creation  of  an  exter- 
nal contingency  mechanism  by  the  IMF 
to  assist  developing  countries  overcome 
unfavorable  developments  in  the  world 
economy  which  might  otherwise  derail 
their  adjustment  efforts. 

October  3:  United  States  and  Canada 
agree  to  a  historic  free  trade  pact  that 
would  eliminate  tariffs  in  three  stages 
over  a  10-year  period  and  end  most 
other  bilateral  trade  barriers.  The 
agreement  also  would  liberalize  U.S. 
and  Canadian  investment  regimes, 
thereby  facilitating  cross-border  invest- 
ment by  the  private  sectors  of  both 
countries.  President  Reagan  and  Prime 
Minister  Mulroney  sign  the  final  text  on 


Ipartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


49 


EUROPE 


January  2.  1988.  The  agreement  is  sub- 
ject to  the  approval  of  the  U.S.  Con- 
gress and  the  Canadian  Parliament. 

December  29:  The  U.S.  Treasury  De- 
partment announces  that  it  will  cooper- 
ate in  a  plan  proposed  by  Mexico  and 
J.  P.  Morgan  &  Company  to  swap  up  to 
$20  billion  of  Mexican  external  debt — 
almost  one-fifth  of  the  total — into  se- 
curities backed  by  Mexican  purchase 
of  U.S.  Treasury  bonds.  Commercial 
banks  would  trade  their  Mexican  loans 
with  a  face  value  of  almost  twice  that  of 
the  new  securities.  The  purpose  of  the 
proposal  is  to  allow  Mexico  to  reduce 
both  its  debt  and  its  burdensome  inter- 
est payments. ■ 


Update  on  Europe 


by  Rozanne  L.  Ridgway 

Prepared  statement  before  the  Sub- 
committee on  Europe  and  the  Middle 
East  of  the  House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee  on  Matj  18,  1988.  Ambas- 
sador Ridgway  is  Assistant  Secretary 
for  European  and  Canadian  Affairs  A 

I  am  pleased  to  be  back  with  you  for 
one  of  our  periodic  updates  in  open  ses- 
sion of  developments  affecting  U.S.  in- 
terests in  Europe. 

U.S. -Soviet  Relations 

At  the  weekend  I  returned  from  Ge- 
neva, from  the  fifth  U.S. -Soviet  minis- 
terial so  far  this  year.  Preparations  for 
the  Moscow  summit  continue  in  full 
gear.  We  view  the  Moscow  meeting  not 
only  as  an  "event" — though  it  surely 
will  be  that — but  also  as  an  integral 
step  in  the  process  undertaken  by  the 
President  to  construct  a  stable,  sus- 
tainable framework  for  U.S. -Soviet  re- 
lations. Our  approach  is  grounded  in  a 
realistic  appraisal  of  the  basically  com- 
petitive nature  of  our  relationship.  But 
at  the  same  time  it  recognizes  the  im- 
portance of  imparting  stability  to  that 
competition,  and  also  the  potential  sig- 
nificance of  changes  currently  under- 
way in  the  Soviet  Union.  Our  policy  is 
designed  to  make  the  most  of  any  op- 
portunities that  change  may  provide. 

At  Moscow,  as  in  the  previous  two 
summits,  the  President  intends  to  pur- 
sue meaningful  progress  across  the  en- 
tire spectrum  of  our  broad  agenda. 


including  arms  control,  human  rights, 
regional  issues,  and  bilateral  matters. 
His  policy  and  program  have  yielded 
significant  achievements  and  he  plans 
to  build  on  them,  both  in  Moscow  and 
in  the  remaining  months  of  his 
Administration. 

We  hope  the  two  leaders  will  be 
able  to  exchange  instruments  of 
ratification  of  the  INF  [Intermediate- 
Range  Nuclear  Forces]  Treaty  in 
Moscow. 

Considerable  progr-ess  has  been 
made  toward  achieving  a  balanced,  ver- 
ifiable .50%  reduction  in  our  strategic 
nuclear  arsenals.  We  will  work  to  make 
as  much  additional  progress  as  possible 
in  the  coming  months. 

We  have  also  registered  significant 
forward  movement  on  other  arms  con- 
trol issues:  among  other  things,  we 
have  begun  nuclear  testing  negotiations 
and  are  working  in  the  CSCE  [Confer- 
ence on  Security  and  Cooperation  in 
Europe]  context  to  develop  a  mandate 
for  conventional  stability  talks. 

With  the  April  14  signing  of  the 
Geneva  accords,  something  has  begun 
which  many  thought  until  recently 
would  never  occur — the  withdrawal  of 
Soviet  troops  from  Afghanistan. 

Our  bilateral  dialogue  on  regional 
issues  continues.  We  will  review  the  sit- 
uation in  Afghanistan,  as  well  as  the 
Middle  East,  southern  Africa  and  Cam- 
bodia, and  other  areas  where  conflict 
has  brought  tension  to  our  relations 
with  the  Soviet  Union.  As  the  Wash- 
ington summit  joint  statement  presents 
it,  our  objective  in  the  U.S. -Soviet  di- 
alogue on  regional  issues  is  "to  help  the 
parties  to  regional  conflicts  find  peace- 
ful solutions  that  advance  their  inde- 
pendence, freedom  and  security." 
Assistant  Secretary  of  State  Crocker 
[Assistant  Secretary  for  African  Affairs 
Chester  A.  Crocker]  and  Soviet  Deputy 
Foreign  Minister  Adamishin  will  meet 
again  before  the  summit  to  discuss 
southern  Africa. 

Recently  the  Soviets  have  been 
willing  to  engage  in  discussion  of  hu- 
man rights  issues.  Since  the  beginning 
of  the  summit  process  in  Geneva  in 
1985,  we  have  seen  the  resolution  of 
many  individual  cases,  some  well- 
known,  others  not.  We  have  seen,  from 
the  1985  starting  point,  substantial  in- 
crease in  emigration.  As  of  today,  the 
monthly  rates  are  well  over  2,000  for 
ethnic  Germans,  over  1,000  Armenians, 
and  about  1,000  Soviet  .Jews. 

But  thousands  more  want  to  leave, 
and  they  are  frustrated  by  an  arbitrary 
system  which  does  not,  in  practice,  rec- 


ognize the  basic  right  to  emigrate, 
much  moi'e  needs  to  be  done,  for  ir 
viduals  and  for  categories  (political 
tivists,  religious  believers,  and 
psychiatric  abuse)  to  remove  the  ar-l 
bitrariness.  We  are  working  for  im-. 
provement  in  the  institutions  and 
procedures. 

A  recent  downturn  on  human 
rights  issues,  the  arrests  of  Gri- 
goryants  and  Ayrikyan,  is  a  curren' 
concern.  We  hope  these  reverses  wi 
righted  by  the  time  of  the  summit. 

U.S. -Soviet  exchanges  have  ex-; 
panded  significantly.  We'll  continue 
pursue  opportunities  to  broaden  ouj 
knowledge  of  one  another  and  brealt 
down  old  stereotypes. 

We  are  working  on  a  number  oli 
lateral  agreements  which  would  be 
signed  during  the  Moscow  summit, 
aim  is  to  take  advantage  of  oppor- 
tunities that  exist  to  take  mutual  b« 
fit  from  areas  of  shared  interest. 

The  Alliance 

We  could  not  have  gotten  where  w» 
with  the  Soviets  without  a  strong  m 
liance,  and  a  strong  alliance  consenn 
behind  us.  When  I  last  appeared  bw 
this  subcommittee,  I  shared  with  y 
some  of  the  hopes  we  had  for  the  IV  ch 
NATO  summit.  Let  me  now  say  a  \  fd_ 
about  the  actual  results. 

I  was  taken,  as  I  know  the  Sec 
tary  was,  by  the  sense  of  common  ] 
pose  which  we  encountered  in  Brus» 
The  INF  experience  was  really  a  vtt 
important  lesson  for  all  of  us  on  thw 
need  to  stick  to  basic  principles.  It 
the  determination  of  the  allies  to  mi 
tain  our  deterrent  strength,  while 
the  same  time  remaining  open  to  di* 
alogue,  which  brought  the  Soviets  1 
the  bargaining  table  and  made  the 
Treaty  possible.  The  summit  declar 
tion  made  it  clear  that  this  will  ren  n 
our  approach  to  the  East. 

The  declaration  was  equally  cle 
regarding  the  alliance  commitment 
basic  human  rights.  We  will  contimto 
press  the  Soviets  and  the  other  cou 
tries  of  the  East  to  remove  the  bar:'rs 
to  freedom  which  currently  charac- 
terize life  in  those  societies.  In  thatfe 
gard,  we  and  the  allies  are  committ 
to  a  balanced  outcome  to  the  CSCE 
review  conference  in  Vienna — and 
are  willing  to  remain  at  the  table  u 
we  get  one. 

The  NATO  summit  also  produc'  '< 
constructive  statement  on  conventic  al 
defense.  On  this  score,  we  and  the  - 


i 


50 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/July  '86 


EUROPE 


icreed  that  Soviet  conventional 
;iiy  superiority  is  the  most  de- 
lizing  factor  in  the  Atlantic  se- 
>  equation.  We  have  challenged  the 
ts  to  work  with  us  in  Vienna  to 
1  a  mandate  for  negotiations  on 
I  iitional  forces  which  would  lead  to 
ii'  stable  balance  at  lower  and 
1  levels  in  Europe.  We  and  the  al- 
,\  ill  not  neglect  ongoing  efforts  to 
ove  our  own  conventional  defense 
hilities  while  such  negotiations  are 
■nijress. 

Dver  the  years,  NATO  has  been 
ed  with  exceptional  leaders.  At 
lime  9-10  NATO  ministerial  in 
rill,  we  will  be  saying  goodbye  to 
n  )l'  them.  Peter  Carrington,  Secre- 
,8)  General  for  the  last  4  years,  will 
le  loving  on  in  July.  He  has  done  an 
-  Ititely  magnificent  job  at  NATO  in 
I  tnric  period  of  severe  challenge  and 
idi'dinary  opportunity.  Former  Ger- 
Defense  Minister  Manfred 
iier  will  be  taking  over  the  reins  at 
( I.  We  look  forward  to  working  as 
■ly  with  him  as  we  have  with  Lord 
,  iiigton. 

i  Southern  Flank:  Maturing 
nerships  and  Base  Negotiations 

-,-  NATO's  southern  flank,  we  have 
iiiiiships  with  several  allies  eharac- 
e  ,ed  by  maturing  partnerships,  with 
I :  ige  of  deepening  and  broadening 
if   In  all  of  these  the  security  rela- 
-hip  and  its  contribution  to  NATO 
lulls  remain  important,  even  as  it 
-  account  of  changing  times.  In  two 
iiies,  as  you  know,  base  negotia- 
.1.  ^  are  in  progress  on  our  future  se- 
X  ty  relationships. 

We  are  working  toward  the  early 
liision  of  the  negotiations  with 
n.  Working  groups  are  continuing 
(liiir  to  negotiate  final  texts  to  re- 
!■  the  old  accord,  which  expired  last 
k.  Although  our  rights  and  priv- 
>  remain  protected  for  1  year,  we 
1  t(i  wrap  this  up  soon.  Major  ele- 
1^,  such  as  continued  use  of  Rota 
l>ase,  Bardenas  Reales  bombing 
if.  and  other  Spanish  installations 
e  aijreed  last  January.  However, 
h  work  remains  to  be  done  to  reach 
tisfactory  conclusion.  The  new  ac- 
I's  longer  8-year  term,  an  end  to 
nity  assistance  programs,  and  plan- 
:  fill-  use  of  Spanish  bases  to  rein- 
■!■  NATO  in  time  of  crisis  or  war,  are 
iiajor  improvements.  We  remain  dis- 
iinted  by  the  Spanish  Government's 
ision  that  our  F-16  Wing  must  leave 
■  111  within  3  years. 


Visit  of  Finnish  Prime  IVIinister 


President  Reagan  welcomed  Prime  Minister  Harri  Holkeri  to  the  White  House  on 
May  2,  1988,  as  part  of  the  celebration  of  the  Year  of  Friendship  With  Finland.  The 
Prime  Minister  presented  the  President  with  a  medal  commemorating  the  350th  anni 
versary  of  the  first  Finnish  settlement  in  America  in  what  is  now  Wilmington, 
Delaware. 


We  appreciate  the  willingness  of 
the  Italian  Government  to  consider  the 
possibility  of  accepting  the  401st  Tac- 
tical Fighter  Wing  should  NATO  so  rec- 
ommend. This  is  another  example  of 
Italy's  broad  range  of  support  for  West- 
ern security  interests.  The  fate  of  the 
401st  is  up  "to  NATO.  We  have  some 
important  details  yet  to  work  out.  But 
I  am  reasonably  confident  the  unit  can 
remain  forward  deployed  under  condi- 
tions acceptable  to  us  and  to  Congress. 

Our  current  base  agreement  with 
Greece  is  terminable  on  December  20, 
1988.  In  accordance  with  its  terms  we 
expect  the  Greek  Government  will  give 
the  required  notice  of  termination  5 
months  before  that  date.  We  have  be- 
gun negotiations  for  a  new  post-1988 
agreement.  The  last  round  was  held 


here  May  9-13.  The  negotiations  con- 
tinue to  be  marked  by  orderly  progress 
and  a  professional  atmosphere.  The  sev- 
enth round  of  negotiations  will  take 
place  in  Athens  the  week  of  June  20. 

In  February,  as  you  know,  the 
Turkish  Government  ratified  the  exten- 
sion of  our  1980  Defense  and  Economic 
Cooperation  Agreement  through  1990. 
The  continuing  Modernization  of  Turk- 
ish forces  and  the  further  strengthen- 
ing of  Turkish-American  relations  are 
important  to  the  security  of  the  United 
States,  NATO,  and  Turkey. 

Additionally,  as  you  know  from  Por- 
tuguese Prime  Minister  Cavaco  Silva's 
visit  here  in  February,  the  Portuguese 
have  requested  consultations  on  our  re- 
lationship. The  opening,  procedural 
round  took  place  in  Lisbon  on  April  29. 


Ipartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


51 


EUROPE 


Although  a  formal  agenda  has  yet  to  be 
agreed  upon,  we  expect  the  consulta- 
tions to  review  our  bilateral  cooperation 
efforts  and  explore  ways  to  strengthen 
and  broaden  cooperation  in  light  of  po- 
litical and  economic  developments  since 
1983. 

While  the  talks  will  address  se- 
curity cooperation  matters,  we  also  an- 
ticipate examining  prospects  for 
expanding  nonsecurity  aspects  of  our 
relationship.  In  requesting  the  con- 
sultations, Portuguese  Prime  Minister 
Cavaco  Silva  has  stressed  that  Portugal 
does  not  intend  to  reduce  U.S.  access 
to  mihtary  facilities  on  Portuguese  soil, 
but  instead  to  identify  and  overcome 
difficulties  in  order  to  strengthen  the 
relationship.  We  share  that  approach. 

Eastern  Europe 

Change  is  the  word  today  in  Eastern 
Europe.  Aging  leaderships,  a  chronic 
sense  of  illegitimacy,  and  declining 
economies  are  creating  a  more  fluid  sit- 
uation. Pressure  from  the  Soviet  Union 
to  become  more  efficient  economically 
adds  to  the  indigenous  pressures  for 
change,  as  does  the  example  of  Gor- 
bachev's reform  program. 

East  European  regimes  are  fearful 
of  rapid  change  and  see  openness  as  a 
threat  to  their  stability.  Most  lead- 
erships want  better  functioning  econo- 
mies, but  not  at  the  cost  of  losing 
control. 

The  situation  in  Poland  confirms 
the  risks  inherent  in  trying  to  move  on 
economic  reform  without  acquiring  pub- 
lic support  for  the  program.  The  strikes 
were  spontaneous  and  indicated  pent-up 
frustration  with  the  austerity  element 
of  reform  measures.  The  lesson  to  be 
learned  is  that  the  Government  in  Po- 
land must  obtain  popular  support  and 
must  engage  in  a  process  of  national 
dialogue,  reconciliation,  and  broad  re- 
form if  economic  reform  is  to  have  a 
chance. 

We  witness  in  Hungary  an 
amazingly  open  debate  on  reform.  The 
authorities  are  also  fearful  of  public  re- 
action to  economic  reforms  which  will 
bring  austerity.  The  Hungarian  Govern- 
ment too  must  seek  popular  support. 

Czechoslovakia  and  Bulgaria  are 
making  motions  toward  economic  re- 
form but  give  no  concrete  indication  of 
political  reform.  Romania  rejects  re- 
form altogether. 

The  prospects  for  change  in  East- 
ern Europe  present  the  United  States 
with  both  challenges  and  opportunities. 


Our  influence  is  limited,  but  there  are 
new  openings  to  promote  Western  val- 
ues and  encourage  genuine  reform.  We 
have  seen  change  coming  for  2  years 
now  and  have  adopted  a  more  active 
and  flexible  approach  with  change  in 
mind.  Deputy  Secretary  Whitehead 
[Deputy  Secretary  of  State  John  C. 
Whitehead]  has  now  visited  the  area 
four  times  and  will  be  going  again  in 
June. 

With  every  country  we  have  put  in 
place  a  kind  of  "challenge  program"  of 
practical  activities  which  would  be  to 
mutual  benefit  if  our  partners  are  will- 
ing to  take  our  concerns  into  account. 
With  most  we  have  made  some  prog- 
ress. They  have  in  general  been  recep- 
tive to  this  approach.  The  topics  differ 
from  country  to  country,  but  in  every 
case  they  involve  greater  dialogue, 
gi'eater  openness,  more  contacts,  and 
more  efficient  means  of  solving 
problems. 

While  the  countries  of  the  region 
want  political  dialogue  and  cultural 
ties,  and  we  mean  to  pursue  these, 
what  they  want  most  from  us  is  eco- 
nomic support.  We  are  prepared  to  ex- 
pand economic  and  trade  ties  in 
nonstrategic  areas,  but  we  are  not  will- 
ing to  let  trade  get  out  in  front  of  the 
rest  of  our  agenda,  and  we  recognize 
Western  economic  support  will  be 
squandered  without  meaningful  reform 
and  support  from  the  people. 

Our  policy  is  well-suited  to  the 
challenge.  Holding  to  a  realistic,  sus- 
tainable framework  for  relations,  we 
will  be  able  to  weather  the  inevitable 
ups  and  downs  while  pursuing  our  in- 
terests in  the  area.  This  will  require 
patience  and  a  long-term  perspective. 

OECD  Ministerial 

Of  late,  we've  talked  together  about 
NATO  summits  and  U.S. -Soviet  sum- 
mits. There  is  a  third  summit  ahead  of 
us  on  the  calendar,  which  also  touches 
on  vital  U.S.  interests.  As  we  speak. 
Secretaries  Baker  [Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  James  A.  Baker,  III],  Verity 
[Secretary  of  Commerce  F.  William 
Verity],  Lyng  [Secretary  of  Agriculture 
Richard  E.  Lyng],  Ambassador  Yeutter 
[U.S.  Trade  Repre.sentative  Clayton 
Yeutter [,  Chairman  Sprinkel  [Chairman 
of  the  Council  of  Economic  Advisers 
Beryl  W.  Sprinkel],  and  Deputy  Secre- 
tary Whitehead  are  participating  in  the 
annual  OECD  [Organization  for  Eco- 
nomic Cooperation  and  Development] 
ministerial  in  Paris,  a  meeting  which 
traditionally  sets  the  stage  for  the  eco- 


nomic summit,  this  year  in  Toronto 
June  19-21.  As  is  evident  from  our  ■ 
net-level  delegation,  this  is  an  impo 
tant  session.  It  is  an  opportunity  fo 
the  industrialized  democracies  to  m 
a  collective  statement  on  the  directi 
of  the  world  economy  and  the  polici 
we  are  prepared  to  pursue  to  meet 
day's  economic  challenges — and 
tomorrow's. 

I  believe  we  will  find  broad  agi  - 
ment  among  ministers  on  fundamer  Is, 
OECD  economies  have  proven  resili 
after  the  October  market  crash  and 
generally  performing  well,  but  we  ( 
face  important  challenges — strengt  i- 
ing  our  open  trading  system,  reduc  ; 
structural  rigidities  in  and  among  c  j 
economies  and,  for  Europe,  tacklin; 
high  levels  of  unemployment.  Thesf 
two  issues  are  closely  tied  and  the   It- 
age  is  increasingly  recognized  by  o 
European  partners. 

There  is  less  consensus  when  vi 
move  to  the  specifics  of  trade  and  i 
culture.  The  U.S.  is  seeking  in  Par  a 
strong  impetus  for  progress  at  the   d- 
term  review  of  the  GATT  [General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade]  I  • 
guay  Round,  scheduled  for  Decemt  in 
Montreal.  At  the  top  of  our  agenda 
long-term,  market-oriented  agricul  'al 
reform,  which  is  essential  if  we  are  ■ 
end  costly  and  inefficient  farm  pro 
grams  and  eliminate  constant  debil  t- 
ing  trade  disputes  with  Europe.  Oi 
partners  take  a  much  more  cautiou  p- 
proach,  but  I  believe  we  will  close    ; 
meeting  tomorrow  with  a  strengthi  'd 
commitment  to  concrete  results  in 
December. 


k- 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  he  ■ 
ings  will  be  published  by  the  committi 
and  will  be  available  from  the  Superin  id- 
ent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  I  it- 
ing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. ■' 


52 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/July 


M\TO  Nuclear  Planning 
Soup  Meets  in  Brussels 


EUROPE 


.The  Nuclear  Planning  Group  of 

lnMorth  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 

\  TO)  met  in  Brussels  April  27-28, 

The  United  States  was  repre- 

,,l  hi/  Secretary  of  Defense  Frank 

'iirlKcci  III.  Following  is  the  final 

.  Ill  unique  issued  on  April  28. 

NATO  Nuclear  Planning  Group  (NPG) 
111  ministerial  session  at  NATO  head- 
•.  IS,  Brussels  on  27th  and  28th  April, 
I.  I'land  attended  as  an  observer  We 
■.(1  a  variety  of  security  matters  per- 
'o  NATO's  nuclear  forces,  such  as 
arms  control  negotiations,  the  im- 
mis  of  the  INF  [Intermediate-Range 
,  ar  Forces]  Treaty,  the  status  of  im- 
intation  of  the  1983  Montebello  deci- 
thf  activities  of  several  study  groups 
luture  NPG  work. 

I   (Hir  discussions  were  pursued  in  the 
xt  (if  the  commitments  expressed  in 
iiclaration  of  the  NATO  Summit  of 
'    l!iS8.  The  Heads  of  State  and  Gov- 
!  of  the  Alliance  noted  that,  while 
III'  encouraging  signs  of  changes  in 
"licies  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  some 
.  alhes,  they  had  witnessed  no  relaxa- 
"!'  the  military  effort  pursued  for 
-  liy  the  Soviet  Union  and  that  this 
.    i\e  force,  much  greater  than  required 
0  iefenee,  constituted  a  fundamental 
w  ce  of  tension  between  East  and  West. 
n  '  reaffirmed  the  long-standing  Alliance 
t)  Tiitment  to  a  balanced  security  policy 
p  iding  both  the  strategy  of  deterrence, 
-^  d  on  adequate  military  strength,  and 
so  tractive  dialogue  and  cooperation  with 
th  East,  of  which  arms  control  is  an  inte- 


gral part.  They  also  expressed  their  deter- 
mination to  ensure  the  continued  viability, 
credibility  and  effectiveness  of  an  appropri- 
ate mix  of  conventional  and  nuclear  forces, 
including  nuclear  forces  in  Europe,  which 
will  continue  to  be  kept  up-to-date  where 
necessary. 

3.  For  the  foreseeable  future  nuclear 
forces  will  continue  to  play  an  integral  role 
in  providing  for  deterrence  against  all 
forms  of  aggression,  and  their  presence  in 
Europe  is  therefore  essential.  We  recalled 
the  framework  established  in  Montebello  in 
1983  to  maintain  a  credible  nuclear  deter- 
rent posture  at  the  minimum  necessary 
level  of  weapons.  This  has  allowed  us  to 
reduce  the  number  of  NATO's  nuclear 
weapons  to  the  lowest  level  in  twenty 
years.  At  this  meeting,  we  have  reviewed 
and  re-validated  this  framework,  taking 
into  account  our  security  requirements, 
arms  control  developments  and  the  for- 
midable array  of  capabilities  deployed  by 
the  Warsaw  Pact.  We  have  confirmed  that 
the  forces  remaining  after  the  INF  Treaty 
must  be  kept  survivable,  responsive  and 
effective,  and  structured  in  an  adequate 
and  balanced  way.  In  that  regard,  we  re- 
affirmed our  continuing  support  for  na- 
tional efforts  to  meet  requirements 
stemming  from  Montebello.  We  also  en- 
dorsed our  step-by-step  approach  towards 
the  measures  necessary  to  achieve  our  ob- 
jectives and  have  provided  further  guid- 
ance on  the  way  ahead.  This  ongoing 
process  will  continue  to  be  pursued  in  ac- 
cordance with  our  comprehensive  and  inte- 
grated concept  for  security  and  arms 
control  as  it  is  further  developed.  This  will 
in  no  way  undercut  the  real  reduction  in 


NATO's  nuclear  weapons  resulting  from 
the  implementation  of  the  INF  agreement. 
4.  The  recently  concluded  INF  agree- 
ment between  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  is  a  milestone  in  our  efforts 
to  achieve  a  more  secure  peace  at  lower 
levels  of  arms.  The 
solidarity  and  determination  of  the 
Alliance  members  have  made  the 
achievement  of  this  long-standing  NATO 
arms  control  objective  possible.  We  looked 
forward  to  the  early  entry  into  force  of  this 
agreement.  But,  while  eliminating  an  en- 
tire class  of  nuclear  weapons,  it  will  not 
prevent  the  Soviet  Union  from  continuing 
its  evident  force  modernization  and  im- 
provement efforts  which  build  upon  its  ad- 
vantages in  other  areas,  including 
conventional  and  chemical  and  those  nu- 
clear forces  not  covered  by  the  agreement. 
We  nevertheless  expressed  the  hope  that 
this  treaty  indicates  a  fundamental  and 
lasting  change  in  Soviet  policies  towards  a 
constructive  and  more  stable  political  as 
well  as  military  situation  between  East  and 
West.  In  that  connection,  we  fully  support 
the  United  States  position  in  the  START 
[strategic  arms  reduction]  negotiations 
aiming  at  a  50% 

reduction  in  the  strategic  nuclear 
arsenals  of  the  United  States  and  the  So- 
viet Union  and  would  welcome  rapid  pro- 
gress in  that  area. 

5.  We  accepted  with  pleasure  the  invi- 
tation of  The  Netherlands  Government  to 
hold  our  next  NPG  ministerial  meeting  in 
The  Netherlands  in  Autumn  1988. 

6.  Greece  has  expressed  its 
views  in  a  statement  included  in  the 
minutes. ■ 


irtment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


53 


FOREIGN  ASSISTANCE 


FY  1989  Request 

for  Foreign  Assistance  Programs 


by  Alan  Woods 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Foreign  Operations  of  the  Senate 
Appropriations  Committee  on  April  26, 
1988.  Mr.  Woods  is  Acting  Director  of 
the  International  Development  Cooper- 
ation Agency  (IDC A)  and  Admiyi- 
istrator  of  the  Agency  for  International 
Development  (AID).^ 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  appear  before  you  to 
present  the  Administrations  FY  (fiscal 
year)  1989  proposed  program  for  for- 
eign economic  assistance. 

The  overall  fiscal  framework  estab- 
lished by  the  budget  summit  in 
November  has  challenged  us  to  formu- 
late a  budget  request  that  will  meet 
our  country's  highest  priority  foreign 
policy  and  economic  assistance  objec- 
tives with  extremely  limited  resources. 
Because  of  these  fiscal  limitations,  our 
FY  1989  request  is  essentially  straight- 
lined  from  FY  1988. 

A  combination  of  critical  foreign 
policy  needs  that  must  be  met  through 
the  foreign  assistance  budget,  changing 
country  requirements,  and  severely  lim- 
ited budgetary  resources  demands  that 
we  look  very  carefully  at  our  whole  pro- 
gram to  ensure  that  we  are  pursuing 
our  objectives  in  the  most  effective 
way. 

Foreign  aid  is  critical  to  the 
achievement  of  U.S.  foreign  policy  ob- 
jectives— objectives  which  are  inex- 
tricably tied  to  the  economic  health  of 
our  country.  The  economic  growth  and 
development  of  other  nations  is  clearly 
in  the  interest  of  the  United  States — 
just  as  it  is  in  the  national  interest  of 
the  countries  to  which  we  provide  as- 
.sistance.  Domestically,  however,  these 
linkages  often  are  understood  poorly, 
particularly  in  times  of  overall  budget 
stringency. 

Benefits  to  the  United  States 

Political  stability  based  on  economic 
stability  in,  for  example,  the  Middle 
East  and  Central  America  is  basic  to 
U.S.  national  security  interests.  With- 
out U.S.  assistance,  the  prospects  are 
grim  for  economic  growth  in  many 
Third  World  countries  that  are  in- 
creasingly important  to  us  politically 
and  as  trading  partners. 


The  returns  on  U.S.  investments  in 
the  economic  growth  of  other  countries 
are  demonstrable.  Some  of  this  invest- 
ment began  40  years  ago.  Today,  West- 
ern Europe  and  Japan,  helped  by  the 
United  States  following  World  War  II, 
are  economically  sound — they  are  our 
allies — and  they  are  also  leading  con- 
sumers of  U.S.  exports. 

Dramatic  progress  has  also  been 
made  by  early  recipients  of  U.S.  eco- 
nomic assistance  that  began  about  25 
years  ago.  Korea,  Tkiwan,  Brazil,  and 
Greece  are  examples.  Many  countries 
that  received  U.S.  assistance  when 
they  were  "developing"  are  now  "newly 
industrialized."  As  such  they  have  be- 
come important  trading  partners  of  de- 
veloped countries  and  they  are  also  in  a 
position  to  help  other  less  developed 
countries  (LDCs). 

Our  foreign  aid  investments  over 
the  past  25  years  have  resulted  in  sig- 
nificant economic  benefits  to  the  United 
States. 

•  Tkken  together  the  developing 
and  newly  industrialized  countries  pur- 
chase more  than  35%  of  all  U.S. 
exports. 

•  For  1987,  exports  to  these  nations 
were  worth  $81.6  billion  to  the  United 
States. 

•  Our  sales  of  manufactured  goods 
to  developing  nations  are  impressive.  In 
1987,  34%  of  our  earnings  in  America's 
top  export  line — machinery  and  trans- 
port equipment — came  from  sales  to 
developing  countries. 

High  rates  of  economic  growth  in 
other  countries  for  the  last  several  dec- 
ades have  benefited  U.S.  farmers.  De- 
veloping countries'  agricultural  imports 
from  the  United  States  increased 
15-fold  from  1970  to  1981. 

•  Of  the  50  largest  buyers  of  U.S. 
farm  goods,  21  are  countries  that  used 
to  receive  PL  480  food  aid  from  the 
United  States. 

•  Korea  now  buys  as  much  from 
U.S.  farmers  in  1  year  as  it  received  in 
its  25  years  as  a  PL  480  recipient. 


Benefits  to  LDCs 

U.S.  foreign  aid  brings  substantial  im- 
provements in  the  quality  of  life  in 
LDCs.  As  a  result,  our  assistance  is 


1 

1 


one  of  the  most  important  means  of  i 
promoting  the  humanitarian  ideals  i 
democratic  values  of  the  American 
people. 

Without  our  food  aid,  an  estima 
20  million  people  would  have  died  ini 
sub-Saharan  Africa  in  one  of  the  wo 
droughts  in  history.  Americans  are 
justly  proud  of  their  role  in  this  eni' 
gency  relief,  and  we  will  continue  tc 
respond  to  such  needs  in  the  future 
The  challenge  from  this  experience 
help  countries  develop  to  the  point 
where  they  can  survive  their  short- 
term  crises  and  resume  strategies 
aimed  at  growth  and  development 
rather  than  continue  to  depend  on 
amounts  of  external  relief. 

There  are  many  sustained  impri 
ments  in  the  quality  of  life  in  LDCsi 
with  which  we  are  proud  to  have  bi 
associated: 

•  Substantial  progress  toward  r 
ducing  world  poverty  and  improving  ie 
basic  conditions  of  life.  Between  19( 
and  the  early  1980s  GNP  [gross  na- 
tional product]  per  capita  in  develo]  g 
countries,  excluding  China  and  the  jh 
income  oil  exporters,  rose  by  75%. 

•  The  reduction  of  child  mortali 
by  one  half: 

•  The  elimination  of  smallpox  fi  i 
the  world: 

•  The  entrance  into  primary  scl  )l 
of  the  majority  of  children  in  develc  ig 
countries; 

•  A  10-20  year  increase  in  life  e 
pectancy  in  the  Third  World; 

•  The  ability  of  many  couples 
throughout  developing  countries  to  1- 
untarily  plan  the  number  and  spacinof 
their  children. 

A  Strategy  for  Economic 
Development 

A  strategy  for  broad-based  and  sus, 
tainable  economic  development  inchps 
a  number  of  critical  and  mutually  n  i- 
forcing  elements:  a  political  and  ecc 
nomic  climate  in  which  economic 
gi-owth  can  occur:  a  vital  private  seor; 
the  human  capital  necessary  for  prt  Ji' 
tivity;  institutional  structures  that  |11 
sustain  growth  and  broaden  partici- 
tion  of  the  people;  access  to  technolo 
with  which  to  improve  productivity 
health,  and  communications;  ami,  a  a- 
tional  capacity  to  manage  rather  thi 


54 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/July  |88i 


FOREIGN  ASSISTANCE 


ly  exploit  resources — financial, 
ral,  and  human. 

1  would  like  to  cite  some  successful 
ipk's  of  AID'S  strategy  upon  which 
itiiul  to  build  in  the  future. 

Economic  Growth.  The  first  ele- 
ne;  in  our  strategy  is  a  sound  eco- 
loi  c  policy  climate  to  stimulate 
Tolh  and  promote  efficient  resource 
■:(  Many  economic  problems  in  devel- 
j  iduntries  result  from  economies 
■ullfd  by  the  government  and 
iUmI  from  the  operation  of  market 
s.  Through  experience,  AID  has 
itit'd  and  targeted  for  change  spe- 
.lolieies  which  are  detrimental  to 
th  in  developing  countries. 

•  I'rice  control  policies,  protec- 

st  trade  regimes,  and  regulations 
limit  broad  participation  in  the 
(imy  or  shield  government-owned 
;n  rprises  from  private  sector  com- 
)e  ion  all  work  against  the  nations 
-  aiiply  them— while  offering  these 
ms  the  illusion  of  being  in  control 
eir  economic  destiny. 

•  Instead  of  harnessing  the  en- 

f<  reneurial  energies  of  their  people, 
nf  these  nations  are  driving  their 
■eneurs  underground,  as  a  recent 
111  Peru  and  anecdotal  informa- 
fnim  many  other  countries  attests. 

The  trends  toward  economic  policy 
«  -m  have  already  been  embraced  by 
!0  ?  developing  countries,  for  example 
ria,  without  donor  involvement. 
\er  the  transition  to  a  more  ap- 
)i  a-iale  economic  policy  environment 
re  :ires  difficult  decisions  that  many 
n  rnments  predictably  resist.  Recog- 
it;  this,  the  United  States  and  other 
ii-s  must  include  in  their  assistance 
tegies  measures  to  ameliorate  the 
t-term  consequences  of  policy  re- 
1.  while  at  the  same  time  improving 
indigenous  capacity  to  analyze  pol- 
'idblems  and  alternatives  and  to 
ai;e  the  reform  program.  Our  Af- 
11  economic  policy  reform  program 
ib  tempting  to  do  just  that  in  several 
c(  itries,  by  providing  temporary  bal- 
ii  ?  of  payments  and  budgetary  sup- 
along  with  technical  assistance  and 
ning  in  support  of  significant  reform 
jrams. 

Substantial  progress  has  been 
le  in  adopting  economic  policy  and 
'  itutional  changes  necessary  for 
\\  th  in  a  number  of  countries  includ- 
Bangladesh,  the  Dominican  Re- 
lic, Costa  Rica,  Ecuador, 
itemala,  the  Gambia,  Ghana,  Ja- 
i-a,  Indonesia,  Tunisia,  Senegal, 
:er,  Swaziland,  and  Mauritius. 


In  Bangladesh,  policy  reforms  have 
stimulated  economic  growth  while  also 
meeting  the  needs  of  the  poor.  For  ex- 
ample, PL  480  Title  III  food  aid  has 
been  used  to  elicit  important  opera- 
tional and  policy  changes  that  encour- 
age farmer  production.  Food  subsidies 
to  segments  of  the  population  have  also 
been  cut  by  up  to  75%.  Buffer  stocks 
and  distribution  management  have  been 
used  to  stabilize  prices  and  make  food 
more  affordable  to  the  rural  poor.  Prior 
to  the  recent  floods,  wheat  production 
in  Bangladesh  was  dramatically  in- 
creased and  near  self-sufficiency  in  rice 
production  had  been  achieved. 

As  a  result  of  other  reforms,  asso- 
ciated with  the  Fertilizer  Distribution 
Improvement  Project,  farmers  in 
Bangladesh  are  now  paying  more  rea- 
sonable prices  and  using  more  fertilizer 
to  produce  more  food  and  increase  their 
incomes.  When  AID-sponsored  analysis 
revealed  that  fertilizer  subsidies  and 
government  marketing  costs  threatened 
to  absorb  the  country's  entire  agri- 
culture budget,  Bangladesh  officials  in- 
stituted reforms  to  encourage 
participation  by  private  fertilizer  re- 
tailers. These  private  entrepreneurs 
significantly  expanded  the  reach  of  the 
distribution  system  at  competitive 
prices. 

Guatemala  now  has  an  impressive 
record  of  successful  economic  reforms 
and  an  improved  business  climate.  The 
country  is  on  a  tenuous  but  credible 
path  back  to  sustainable,  positive  eco- 
nomic growth  rates  as  a  result  of  these 
reforms.  Inflation  has  been  brought 
down  from  more  than  30%  in  late  1986 
to  under  10%  in  1987.  Foreign  debt  re- 
payments have  been  kept  current.  The 
exchange  rate  has  remained  stable  for 
more  than  15  months.  From  January  to 
June  1987,  foreign  investment  was  up 
by  $90  million  over  the  same  period  in 
1986.  The  Bank  of  Guatemala  reports  a 
2.5%  growth  rate  for  1987— only  the 
second  positive  real  GDP  [gross  domes- 
tic product]  growth  rate  in  5  years. 

Private  Enterprise.  Most  govern- 
ments in  all  parts  of  the  woHd  have 
begun  to  realize  that  their  public  re- 
sources will  never  be  adequate  to  pro- 
vide all  the  goods  people  need  or  the 
kind  of  income  and  employment  oppor- 
tunities that  are  key  to  sustained  eco- 
nomic growth.  Policy  changes  that  open 
up  new  opportunities  for  the  operation 
of  market  forces  both  domestically  and 
internationally  are  essential  to  provide 
the  climate  within  which  to  increase  the 
private  sector  involvement  in  develop- 
ment. In  addition  to  encouraging  such 


policy  reforms,  AID  is  working  directly 
with  the  private  sector  to  produce  in- 
creased incomes,  self-sustained  employ- 
ment, and  higher  standards  of  living. 
Our  commitment  to  this  focus  is  ex- 
emplified by  a  wide  range  of  activities 
in  such  areas  as  investment  and  export 
promotion,  management  and  skills 
training,  credit  and  financial  markets 
development,  and  technology  transfer. 
Jamaica  has  made  major  strides  in 
restructuring  its  economy  for  growth, 
following  7  consecutive  years  of  eco- 
nomic decline.  Major  government  enter- 
prises have  been  sold  to  the  private 
sector,  eliminating  a  major  drain  on  the 
government  budget,  and  the  tax  system 
has  been  greatly  improved.  As  a  result, 
the  economy  is  now  recovering,  and  un- 
employment among  job  seekers  has 
fallen  "below  10%  for  the  first  time  in 
more  than  a  decade. 

Human  Capital.  The  beneficiaries 
of  economic  growth  are  people.  Those 
same  people  are  also  the  human  capital 
for  that  economic  growth.  The  economic 
and  political  chmate  must  engage  the 
energies  of  people  and  offer  productive 
employment  opportunities  that  allow  in- 
dividuals the  means  to  contribute  and 
to  provide  for  themselves  and  their 
families.  Without  education,  skills,  and 
technology,  people  in  developing  coun- 
tries are  handicapped  in  their  attempts 
to  improve  their  own  lives  and  to  parti- 
cipate in  and  contribute  to  the  economic 
growth  of  their  societies.  AID  projects 
to  raise  the  level  and  quality  of  educa- 
tion, health,  and  participation  in  soci- 
ety are  a  direct  investment  in  the 
human  capital  of  a  country  and  an 
important  part  of  its  overall  economic 
growth  strategy.  Countries  such  as  Jor- 
dan, Tunisia,  Taiwan,  and  many  others 
have  grown  exceptionally  rapid  over  the 
past  three  decades,  meeting  the  needs 
of  their  citizens  much  more  effectively 
and  equitably  than  most  of  their  neigh- 
bors. They  have  done  so  by  investing  in 
strategies  which  improved  health  and 
education  and  relied  on  relatively  free 
markets  and  private  initiatives. 

AID  has  given  particular  impor- 
tance to  education  in  areas  such  as 
Central  America  and  the  Caribbean. 
Though  many  qualitative  and  admin- 
istrative problems  remain,  most  coun- 
tries have  made  major  progress  toward 
full  enrollment.  In  Honduras,  El  Sal- 
vador, and  Costa  Rica,  for  example, 
most  children  are  now  enrolled  and  al- 
most 60%  complete  primary  school. 


Apartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


55 


FOREIGN  ASSISTANCE 


Botswana,  an  example  from  a  very 
different  part  of  the  world,  has  moved 
rapidly  from  few  educated  people  at  in- 
dependence to  a  situation  today  in 
which  most  children  can  expect  to  com- 
plete at  least  primary  school  and  plan- 
ners are  beginning  to  worry  about  how 
to  match  school  graduates  with  avail- 
able jobs. 

Institutional  Structures.  Our  aid 

is  also  directed  toward  strengthening 
the  institutional  structures  that  are  crit- 
ical to  sustainable  development  and 
democratic  processes  in  developing 
countries. 

In  some  countries,  such  as  Kenya 
and  Indonesia,  we  are  working  to  liber- 
alize the  financial  system  and 
strengthen  the  capital  markets  and 
stock  exchanges.  In  many  of  the  Carib- 
bean and  Central  American  countries, 
we  are  supporting  business  and  trade 
associations  that  help  the  private  sector 
present  its  views  to  host  governments. 
We  have  also  provided  funding  for  trade 
and  investment  promotion  groups  that 
promote  trade  between  U.S.  and  devel- 
oping country  private  enterprises. 

The  rural  savings  project,  initiated 
in  1982  to  address  credit  constraints  to 
small  farm  producers,  has  shown  that 
the  mobilization  of  local  savings  could 
not  only  strengthen  rural  financial  in- 
stitutions, but  also  provide  local,  and 
therefore,  sustainable  funds  for  lend- 
ing. Morever,  transaction  costs  to  farm- 
ers distant  from  banks  were  too  high, 
due  to  the  expenses  of  transportation, 
lodging,  and  time  lost  from  work — all 
burdens  required  of  farmers  in  order  to 
secure  a  loan.  The  project  recom- 
mended approaches  that  capitalized  on 
local  informal  institutions,  connecting 
them  with  a  second  tier  of  credit 
unions,  thus  reducing  costs  and  increas- 
ing reliability  of  credit  delivery  to  re- 
mote small  farmers.  These  approaches 
have  proved  successful  in  locations  as 
diverse  as  Honduras,  Bangladesh,  and 
Niger. 

Institutional  strengthening  has 
been  successful  in  other  arenas  as  well, 
such  as  the  activities  to  improve  demo- 
cratic participation  in  the  Central 
American  countries  of  Guatemala,  Hon- 
duras, El  Salvador,  and  Costa  Rica. 
These  efforts  are  intended  to  achieve 
economic  stability  and  renewed  long- 
term  growth,  to  promote  "broader  par- 
ticipation in  development,  and  to 
strengthen  democratic  institutions  and 
respect  for  human  rights,  thereby  con- 
solidating the  region's  progress  toward 
democracy  and  helping  to  deal  with  the 
underlying  sources  of  social  and  politi- 
cal unrest. 


Changes  become  permanent  only 
when  a  broad  segment  of  society  values 
them  and  benefits  from  them.  That  is 
why  we  work  so  hard  to  ensure  that 
the  people  who  need  to  be  involved  in 
creating  change  are  actually  involved. 
We  know  that  in  many  situations,  it  is 
the  women  of  a  country  who  play  a  crit- 
ical role  in  institutionalizing  new  behav- 
ior— on  the  farm  and  in  businesses  as 
well  as  in  the  family.  Our  programs 
must  reach  them  and  engage  their 
energies. 

Technology.  Through  our  as- 
sistance programs,  we  are  making 
available  and  more  accessible  tech- 
nology, developed  by  the  United  States, 
that  can  make  a  critical  difference  in 
productivity,  health,  and  communica- 
tions. The  development  of  a  malaria 
vaccine,  the  institutionalization  of  the 
use  of  oral  rehydration  therapy  (ORT) 
for  treating  diarrheal  disease,  "the 
green  revolution"  in  agriculture,  and 
access  to  education  through  radio  in  re- 
mote village  areas  evidence  the  impor- 
tance of  technology  to  the  survival  and 
quality  of  life  of  millions. 

The  technology  for  oral  rehydration 
has  been  successfully  institutionalized 
in  Egypt  with  AID  assistance.  In  1979, 
AID  undertook  an  experimental  ORT 
progi-am  that  cut  the  infant  mortality 
rate  by  40%  in  just  a  few  months.  A 
subsequent  $36  million  AID  project  be- 
gun in  1981  and  extended  through  1990 
has  helped  to  extend  the  program  na- 
tionwide. The  oral  rehydration  salts  are 
packaged  by  a  private  Egyptian  firm; 
60%  of  the  packets  are  marketed 
through  private  pharmacies  and  over 
90%.  of  pharmacies  now  have  oral  re- 
hydration salts  available  for  sale. 

Capacity  to  Manage  Natural  Re- 
sources. Most  developing  countries  de- 
pend principally  on  their  renewable 
natural  resource  endowments  for  eco- 
nomic growth,  and  will  continue  to  do 
so  for  the  foreseeable  future.  Yet  the 
resources  essential  to  economic  growth 
in  developing  countries  are  thi-eatened 
by  rapid  population  growth;  extreme 
poverty;  resource  tenure  problems;  pol- 
lution of  the  air,  water  and  soil;  short- 
sighted economic  policies;  and  economic 
and  political  instability.  The  agency's 
central  environmental  objective  is  to 
promote  environmentally  sound,  long- 
term  economic  growth  by  assisting  de- 
veloping countries  to  conserve  and  pro- 
tect the  environment  and  manage  their 
exploited  resources  for  sustainable 
yields. 


A  salient  example  of  the  types 
activities  supported  by  AID  to  achi  r 
this  objective  is  the  Regional  Inte- 
grated Pest  Management  Project  in 
Central  America.  This  project  strei  li- 
ens national  and  regional  capabiliti( 
for  integrated  pest  management,  tl 
control  of  pests  that  destroy  crops 
using  a  variety  of  techniques  that  n  i- 
mize  application  of  chemical  pesticii ;. 
As  a  result  farmers  can  cut  produc  n 
costs  while  maintaining  or  increasii 
yields.  In  addition  to  increasing  inc  le 
and  improving  sustainability,  a  redi 
tion  in  pesticide  use  also  has  the  pc  n- 
tial  to  improve  local  water  quality  ; 
improve  health  by  reducing  exposu  to 
pesticides. 

This  integrated  strategy  for  au 
ing  broad-based  and  sustainable  ec 
nomic  growth  and  improving  the  qi  it\ 
of  life  in  developing  countries  is  re- 
flected in  our  FY  1989  request. 

FY  1989  Request 

For  the  FY  1989  bilateral  economic  ■ 
sistance  programs,  AID  is  request! 
an  authorization  and  appropriation 
$5,485,651,000  for  development  as- 
sistance and  the  economic  support  id 
(ESF). 

The  FY  1989  request  reflects 
agreement  between  the  Administn  in 
and  the  Congi-ess  on  overall  levels 
in  the  bipartisan  budget  summit,  i 
though  essentially  straightlined,  tl 
FY  1989  budget  reflects  slight  in- 
creases in  ESF,  the  education  and  - 
man  resources  account  (Section  lOt 
and  the  private  sector,  environmen  .no 
energy  (Section  106)  account.  Criti 
ESF  funds  in  a  number  of  base  rig  • 
and  Caribbean,  Central  American,  id 
Andean  countries  were  cut  or  elim 
nated  in  FY  1988.  Some  funding  hi 
been  restored  for  the  Caribbean  ar 
Andean  countries  in  the  FY  1989  r 
quest.  The  education  and  106  accoi  is 
are  particularly  important  to  our  a  lit) 
to  continue  certain  priorities  whicl  he 
Congress  shares — in  the  case  of  ed  a- 
tion;  basic  education  efforts  and  pf  ici 
pant  and  regional  training;  in  the  c  e 
of  Section  106 — to  permit  continue( 
support  of  PVOs  [private  volunteei  r- 
ganizations],  funding  for  energy,  eii- 
ronment,  and  private  sector 
development  activities. 

The  FY  1989  request  reflects  itig- 
nificant  effort  on  our  part  to  take  Hy 
into  account  congressional  concern  is 
to  the  appropriate  mix  of  program; 
within  that  agreed  ceiling,  as  refleed 


56 


Department  of  State  Bulietin/JulyiS 


FOREIGN  ASSISTANCE 


he  FY  1988  continuing  resolution, 
ivsulting  budget  request  for  FY 
I,  we  hope,  will  persuade  Congress 
!-.i\ide  the  Administration  a  greater 
; \i'  of  flexibility  in  the  programing 
jf  inds  in  FY  1989  as  a  result  of  agree- 
m  it  on  the  basic  priorities  of  the  for- 
'i  I  assistance  program. 

Jielopment  Fund  for  Africa 

F(  FY  1989,  AID  is  requesting  $510 
"inn  for  the  Development  Fund  for 
<a  (DFA).  In  FY  1988,  Congress 
nved  the  Administration's  request 
I  sjjecial  funding  mechanism  for 
.  Saharan  Africa  to  replace  the  tradi- 
:i'  al  functional  account  divisions  (as 
wj  as  the  Sahel  Development  Pi'ogram 
¥.  lint)  and  provide  for  greater  flexi- 
\  in  addressing  the  complex  prob- 
•  that  continue  to  beset  that 
iiu-nt.  We  believe  that  this  fund 
It  also  be  a  forerunner  of  the  future 
::  etion  for  AID  overall. 

With  the  establishment  of  the  De- 
v(  pment  Fund  for  Africa,  AID  has 
1i  latitude  it  needs  for  a  broad-based 
?i  vth  strategy.  We  intend  to  use  this 
til  ibility  to  make  our  program  more 
p<  ormance  based  by  shifting  re- 
3(  'ces  to  countries  and  programs 
w  re  results  are  being  achieved  and  to 
in  grate  nonproject  and  project  re- 
S(  -ces  in  a  more  coherent  package.  In 
at  ffort  to  prioritize,  the  FY  1989  re- 
qi  st  is  based  on  a  further  shift  in  re- 
3(  -ces  toward  the  more  populous 
c(  itries,  the  poorer  countries  and 
tl  ;e  that  are  most  committed  to  creat- 
in  an  environment  in  which  growth 
ai  development  can  take  place. 

0  er  Functional  Development 
A  istance 

T  agency's  FY  1989  request  for  the 
fi.;tional  development  assistance  pro- 
T  m  outside  of  Africa  totals  $1,140  bil- 
The  comparable  FY  1988  appro- 
ited  level  is  $1,161  biUion. 

Aiculture,  Rural  Development, 
«l  Nutrition 

f.  appropriation  of  $461,062,000  (not 
i)  uding  agriculture  activities  funded 
D  ler  the  Development  Fund  for  Af- 

i  lis  requested  in  FY  1989  for  the 
'  Kulture  account  compared  to  an  FY 
'i'^  appropriation  of  $488,715,000. 
^  3's  FY  1989  agriculture,  rural  devel- 
'  nent,  and  nutrition  program  focuses 

increasing  the  incomes  of  the  poor 


majority  and  assuring  the  availability  of 
food,  while  maintaining  the  natural  re- 
source base.  This  is  based  on  recogni- 
tion that  efforts  to  address  virtually  all 
development  problems,  including  hun- 
ger, infant  mortality,  disease,  illiteracy, 
and  inadequate  shelter  will  be  frus- 
trated unless  rural  incomes  increase 
sufficiently  to  stimulate  sustained  eco- 
nomic growth.  Activities  are  designed 
to:  increase  farm  and  nonfarm  employ- 
ment and  income;  promote  private  agri- 
cultural marketing  and  distribution 
systems;  develop  sustainable  improved 
agricultural  technologies;  encourage 
market-oriented,  efficient  low-cost  pro- 
duction of  food  and  other  crops  on  small 
family  farms;  provide  targeted  food  as- 
sistance to  children  and  women  in  low 
income  families;  and  incorporate  sound 
nutritional  and  food  consumption  princi- 
ples into  the  design  and  implementation 
of  agricultural  and  rural  development 
activities. 

Examples  of  activities  we  expect  to 
fund  in  FY  1989  in  Asia  and  the  Near 
East  and  Latin  America  and  the  Carib- 
bean include:  agricultural  research  in 
Bangladesh  ($3  million),  Pakistan  ($5 
million).  El  Salvador  ($5  million),  and 
Honduras  ($4.8  million);  irrigation  man- 
agement and  training  in  India  ($3  mil- 
lion) and  Pakistan  ($5  million);  and 
forestry  and  watershed  management  in 
India  ($5.6  million),  Costa  Rica  ($5  mil- 
lion), and  Haiti  ($5.3  million). 

Population  Planning 

AID  is  requesting  $190,940,000  for  pop- 
ulation assistance  in  FY  1989,  not  in- 
cluding population  activities  funded 
under  the  Development  Fund  for  Af- 
rica. This  compares  to  $197,940,000  ap- 
propriated for  the  population  account  in 
FY  1988. 

Initial  estimates  for  FY  1989  indi- 
cate that  80%  of  the  population  budget 
will  be  directed  to  family  planning  serv- 
ices; 89c  is  planned  for  data  collection 
and  policy  analysis,  6%  for  operational 
and  biomedical  research,  and  6%  for 
specific  information  and  training 
initiatives. 

In  FY  1989,  AID's  program  will  as- 
sist in  improving  the  management  and 
cost-effectiveness  of  public  and  PVO 
programs.  We  will  continue  to  pursue 
private  sector  approaches  to  voluntary 
family  planning,  including  assisting 
firms  to  add  family  planning  to  the 
health  services  offered  to  their  employ- 
ees. Natural  family  planning,  the  trans- 
fer of  policy  analysis  technology  to 


population  and  development  planners, 
and  the  use  of  mass  media  channels  to 
communicate  messages  about  i-esponsi- 
ble  parenthood  remain  an  important 
part  of  the  portfolio.  As  in  the  past,  no 
AID  funds  will  be  provided  to  foreign 
nongovernmental  organizations  that 
promote  or  perform  abortions  with 
funds  from  any  source  or  to  organiza- 
tions that  support  or  participate  in  the 
management  of  programs  of  coercive 
abortion  or  involuntary  sterilization. 

Health 

For  FY  1989,  AID  requests  a  total  of 
$210  million  in  funding  for  health-re- 
lated activities  under  three  separate  ac- 
counts. Of  this  amount  $114,000,000  is 
in  the  health  account.  This  amount  is 
exclusive  of  health  activities  funded  un- 
der the  Development  Fund  for  Africa. 
This  compares  to  $119,000,000  appropri- 
ated in  FY  1988. 

In  FY  1989,  AID  will  support  ma- 
jor health  projects  which  contain  child 
survival  components  in  Bangladesh, 
Yemen,  Nepal,  and  Honduras.  The  proj- 
ect in  Honduras  will  also  fund  rural 
water  and  sanitation  activities.  In  the 
Dominican  Republic,  health  funds  will 
be  used  for  a  private  sector  health  care 
project  to  create  a  private  sector  deliv- 
ery system  that  provides  basic  health 
services,  including  child  survival 
interventions. 

Centrally  funded  health  projects 
include  the  Water  and  Sanitation  for 
Health  Project  and  the  Vector  Biology 
and  Control  Project.  Health  funds  will 
support  research  on  development  and 
field  testing  of  a  malaria  vaccine;  on 
diarrheal  disease;  on  tropical  diseases, 
including  onchocerciasis;  on  aging  in 
LDCs;  and  operations  research  to  im- 
prove management  and  cost  effective- 
ness of  child  survival  and  other  health 
programs. 

Child  Survival  Fund 

AID  is  requesting  $66,000,000  for  the 
Child  Survival  Fund  in  FY  1989,  the 
same  level  as  appropriated  in  FY  1988. 
The  Child  Survival  Fund  is  used  for 
oral  rehydration  therapy,  immunization, 
birth  spacing,  and  focused  child  nutri- 
tion activities  including  breastfeeding. 
In  addition,  other  interventions  that 
contribute  substantially  to  child  sur- 
vival in  some  countries,  such  as  treat- 
ment of  malaria  and  acute  respiratory 
infection  in  young  children,  are  sup- 
ported with  Child  Survival  funds. 


"jpan 


partment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


57 


FOREIGN  ASSISTANCE 


In  FY  1989,  AID  will  support  a 
competitive  grants  program  for  U.S.- 
based  PVOs  to  undertake  child  survival 
projects  in  child  survival  emphasis 
countries.  Additional  funds  will  support 
the  Rotary  International  PolioPlus  im- 
munization campaign.  We  will  continue 
to  support  the  Latin  America  and  Car- 
ibbean regional  effort  to  strengthen  im- 
munization programs,  in  cooperation 
with  other  donors  (PAHO  [Pan  Ameri- 
can Health  Organization],  UNICEF 
[UN  Children's  Fund],  Rotary,  and  the 
Inter-American  Development  Bank). 

Several  major  centrally  funded  ac- 
tivities will  support  child  survival 
efforts  worldwide.  The  Technology  for 
Primary  Health  Care  Project  will  pro- 
vide technical  assistance  and  logistical 
and  financial  support  for  ORT  and  im- 
munization programs,  as  well  as  as- 
sistance in  health  care  financing.  Child 
Survival  funds  will  support  major  bilat- 
eral projects  in  several  child  survival 
emphasis  countries  in  FY  1989,  includ- 
ing Pakistan,  India,  Bangladesh,  Peru, 
and  Honduras. 

AIDS  Prevention  and  Control 

For  AIDS  [Acquired  Immune  Defi- 
ciency Syndrome]  prevention  and  con- 
trol $30  million  is  requested.  This 
funding  will  support  the  WHO  [World 
Health  Organization]  global  program 
for  AIDS  ($15  million);  funding  for 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  ($3 
million);  and  centrally  funded  AIDS 
projects  at  $12  million.  Funds  will  be 
used  for  the  global  AIDS  technical  sup- 
port project  to  provide  short-  and  long- 
term  technical  assistance,  training,  op- 
erations research  and  commodities,  and 
equipment  to  countries  on  request  in 
Africa,  Asia  and  the  Near  East,  and 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean.  Con- 
tinuing database  and  modeling  ac- 
tivities and  condoms  for  AIDS 
prevention  will  also  be  supported.  Di- 
rect bilateral  and  regional  AIDS  pre- 
vention and  control  activities  will 
continue  to  be  supported  under  the  De- 
velopment Fund  for  Africa. 

Education  and  Human  Resources 
Development 

AID  is  requesting  $129, .541, 000  for  FY 
1989  education  and  human  resources 
programs,  exclusive  of  those  funded  un- 
der the  Development  I"\ind  for  Africa. 
This  compares  to  $117,000,000  appropri- 
ated for  this  account  in  FY  1988. 

About  40*?^  of  the  request  will  sup- 
port training  for  administrators,  man- 
agers, scientists,  and  technicians. 


About  30%  supports  elementary,  sec- 
ondary, and  adult  education;  9%  voca- 
tional-technical training;  and  7%  labor 
programs.  The  balance  supports  plan- 
ning and  research,  PVO  programs, 
women-in-development,  and  other  hu- 
man resources  development  activities. 
About  53%  of  the  FY  1989  request 
will  support  programs  in  Latin  America 
and  the  Caribbean,  where  there  is  a 
major  emphasis  on  participant  training 
as  well  as  attention  to  strengthening 
basic  schooling  and  skills  training  sys- 
tems. Appro.ximately  39%  will  support 
participant  training,  education,  labor, 
and  PVO  activities  in  Asia  and  the 
Near  East.  The  remainder  of  the  re- 
quest, about  8%,  will  provide  central 
bureau  support  for  research  and  de- 
velopment, evaluations,  administra- 
tion of  participant  training,  women-in- 
development,  and  PVO  programs. 

Private  Sector,  Environment, 
and  Energy 

AID  is  requesting  $135,957,000  in  FY 
1989  for  the  106  Account,  not  including 
$8,662,000  for  the  Office  of  the  Science 
Advisor.  This  compares  to  $129,371,000 
appropriated  in  FY  1988.  Neither  year 
includes  programs  funded  under  the 
Development  Fund  for  Africa. 

The  106  Account  provides  as- 
sistance to  stimulate  sustained  eco- 
nomic growth  by  supporting  the 
development  of  market-oriented  econo- 
mies and  by  mobilizing  developing 
country  human  and  capital  resources. 
This  account  provides  funding  for  ac- 
tivities designed  to  encourage  the  adop- 
tion of  sound  economic  policies  which 
stimulate  private  enterprise,  mobilize 
domestic  and  foreign  capital,  and  en- 
courage the  privatization  of  production 
and  service  activities  which  can  most 
efficiently  be  performed  outside  of  the 
public  sector.  It  also  assists  countries 
in  meeting  their  long-term  energy 
needs  and  in  addressing  envii-onmental 
problems  in  urban  areas.  The  fle.xibility 
of  106  Account  funds  has  been  invalu- 
able to  aid's  privatization  initiative. 
The  presence  of  an  economic  and  politi- 
cal climate  that  encourages  individual 
productivity,  human  rights,  and  the 
management  of  natural  resources  is  es- 
sential to  long-term  sustainable  eco- 
nomic growth. 

Unlike  the  other  more  narrowly 
focused  functional  accounts  which  are 
designed  to  address  specific  develop- 
ment problems  related  to  population, 
health,  agriculture,  or  education,  the 
106  Account  supports  programs  that 


provide  the  foundation  required  to  su 
tain  and  expand  the  output  of  goods 
and  services  in  all  economic  social  sei 
tors.  Thus,  activities  supported  by  tl 
106  Account  complement  the  more  ta; 
geted  assistance  provided  by  the  oth( 
functional  accounts. 

Specifically,  categories  of  activiti 
funded  under  this  account  include: 


•  Support  for  private  enterprise  i 
velopment  and  efforts  to  reform  gov- 
ernment policies  and  institutions; 

•  Research  and  technical  assistari 
activities  to  alleviate  energy  con- 
straints to  development; 

•  The  promotion  of  human  rightsi 
and  democratic  initiatives; 

•  Support  for  the  activities  of  pri* 
vate  and  voluntary  organizations  and} 
cooperatives;  and 

•  Environmental  activities  in  urM 
areas. 

These  activities  together  with 
funding  for  policy  reform  efforts  andi 
the  program  development  and  evaluaij 
tion  activities  of  regional  bureaus  an 
field  missions  account  for  about  80% 
funding  in  this  account. 

In  addition  to  supporting  econoi 
and  political  policies,  the  106  Accour 
also  assists  countries  to  meet  their 
long-term  energy  needs.  Energy  is  eJM 
sential  for  development.  Developing 
countries  cannot  expand  their  econO' 
mies  without  adequate,  affordable,  i 
reliable  supplies  of  energy  services. 
Agriculture,  industry,  transportatioi 
commercial  activities,  and  the  provis 
of  many  social  services  depend  on  ei 
ergy.  Without  increases  in  energy  s{ 
ices,  political  and  economic  stability 
threatened,  private  entrepreneurshij 
lags,  and  the  development  engine  slit 
dramatically. 

The  106  Account  makes  a  small 
significant  contribution  to  AID's  env 
ronmental  activities  through  suppor 
urban  environmental  activities.  Eco- 
nomic growth  is  inextricably  linked 
with  a  country's  natural  resource  has 
and  environment.  Protecting  the  env 
ronment  and  managing  natural  re 
sources  assure  a  supply  of  raw 
materials  and  the  maintenance  of  en 
ronmental  systems  that  are  necessar 
for  sustainable  development.  Activiti! 
funded  through  106  help  developing 
countries  improve  regulation  of  haz- 
ardous chemicals  and  promote  indus-l 
trial  health  and  safety. 


58 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/July  1'i^ 


i 


FOREIGN  ASSISTANCE 


Projects  and  activities  which  will 
■ecive  funding  from  the  106  Account  in 

'^1989  include  an  industrial  produc- 
tfchnology  project  in  the  Domin- 

,  iiepublic  to  expand  the  production 

A)bilities  of  small-  and  medium-sized 
•n  rprises.  The  project  will  rely  upon 

'•  the  International  Executive  Serv- 
ni'lis  and  commerical  banks.  In  El 
tdor  a  privatization  project  will 
id;,'  technical  assistance,  training, 
I  it  her  support  to  the  Government  of 
alvador  to  help  it  in  the  privatiza- 
(if  trovernment-owned  enterprises. 
Rural  Electrification  Project  con- 

I   s  to  strengthen  the  institutional 
tichnical  base  needed  to  reach  the 
n{  rural  Central  Americans  who 
lack  access  to  electricity.  The  En- 
I'lilicy  Development  and  Conserva- 
I'l-dject  will  support  prefeasibility 
ks  in  economically  viable  systems, 
as  clean  coal  technology  and  en- 
rtficiency  and  will  improve  the 
I  cement  of  environmental  impacts 
risks  associated  with  energy  pro- 
inii.  The  Environmental  Planning 
Miinagement  Project  strengthens 
apabilities  of  developing  country 

!  tut  ions  to  better  manage  and  con- 
f  their  natural  resources  for  sus- 
ilile  development. 

t  nomic  Support  Fund 

Pi  FY  1989,  AID  is  requesting  an  ap- 
!  iation  of  $3,281  billion  for  the  eco- 
-upport  fund.  The  request  is  up 
.    .iightlv  from  the  FY  1988  appro- 
pi  ted  level  of  $3,201  billion.  The  in- 
n  ,se  is  necessary  in  view  of  serious 
we  were  forced  to  take  in  this  ac- 
ii  in  FY  1988.  In  Central  America, 
n  aica,  and  the  Dominican  Republic 
w  have  restored  support  we  were 
fc  ed  to  eliminate  in  FY  1988  which 
hi  funded  economic  reform,  expansion 
o1  he  private  sector,  and  continued  par- 
ti nation  in  the  Caribbean  Basin  Initia- 
ti  .  Portugal  and  Turkev  were  cut  in 
F  1988,  and  our  FY  1989  budget  in- 
dies minimum  funds  for  these  base 
nits  countries.  This  request  will  in- 
ise  funding  for  Andean  countries  to 
)iiit  support  for  strugghng  econo- 
-  and  to  support  narcotics  control 
Its.  Key  elements  of  the  FY  1989 
I    I'equest  include:  continued  efforts 
"liieve  peace  and  stability  in  the 
Mlt  East  through  economic  aid  for 
1  ael,  Egypt,  Jordan,  the  West  Bank 
a}l  Gaza,  and  regional  cooperation  ac- 
t  ities  among  Israel,  Egypt,  and  other 
lihhoring  countries;  economic  as- 
aiice  to  base  rights  and  military  ac- 
{ 


cess  countries  such  as  the  Philippines, 
Turkey,  Portugal,  and  several  in  Africa; 
economic  reform  in  the  Dominican  Re- 
public and  Jamaica;  assistance  to  Cen- 
tral American  democracies  for  the 
achievement  of  economic  stability  and 
gi'owth  and  strengthening  their  demo- 
cratic institutions  and  respect  of  human 
rights. 

Operating  Expenses 

For  FY  1989,  AID  requests 
$414,000,000  in  new  budget  authority 
for  its  operating  expense  appropriation. 
This  represents  an  increase  of  $8.0  mil- 
lion over  the  FY  1988  appropriation  and 
a  reduction  of  $12  million  from  the  FY 
1988  request.  The  FY  1989  request  in- 
cludes less  than  the  amount  necessary 
to  cover  inflation  and  the  recent  rapid 
increase  in  costs,  especially  in  Africa, 
as  a  result  of  the  declining  value  of  the 
dollar.  Currency  devaluations  have  a 
major  impact  on  our  ability  to  cover  the 
administrative  costs  of  operating  over- 
seas. AID  is  looking  for  ways  to  realize 
savings  through  management  improve- 
ments and  changes  in  the  way  the 
agency  conducts  its  overseas  program. 

The  Challenge  for  the  Future: 
An  Agenda  for  the  1990s 

Despite  striking  progress  by  some 
countries,  economic  growth  is  stagnat- 
ing in  many  developing  countries.  In 
some  countries  the  economic  base  is  ac- 
tually deteriorating — and  individual  in- 
comes are  declining — as  a  function  of 
negative  growth  rates  over  the  past 
5  to  10  years.  Neither  educated  guesses 
nor  straightline  projections  of  past 
trends  really  tell  us  what  will  happen  in 
the  future.  Nevertheless,  projections 
can  suggest  quite  vividly  what  could 
occur  if  existing  trends  persist.  A  con- 
tinuation of  recent  and  current  rates  of 
economic  growth  in  developing  coun- 
tries will  result  in  an  even  greater  gap 
between  their  levels  of  income  and 
those  of  developed  countries.  One  thing 
is  certain:  without  growth,  the  quality 
of  life  in  developing  countries  is  not 
going  to  improve  on  a  sustainable  basis. 

Targeted  development  assistance 
programs  have  helped  to  improve  life 
expectancy  in  these  situations,  and  to 
increase  the  likelihood  that  children 
will  be  protected  against  major  diseases 
and  have  a  minimal  education.  These 
gains  are  important,  but  in  and  of 
themselves,  they  are  not  enough  and 
under  stagnating  or  deteriorating  eco- 
nomic conditions,  they  may  not  be 
sustainable. 


Despite  what  we  know  about  the 
common  threads  that  tie  together  the 
economic  growth  and  development  ex- 
periences of  diverse  countries,  and 
about  what  are  the  most  important  ele- 
ments of  an  economic  growth  strategy, 
there  is  much  that  we  do  not  know.  The 
critical  point  is  that  each  country  is 
unique  and  the  type  and  timing  of  the 
interventions  to  implement  a  growth 
strategy  must  be  tailor-made  for  each 
country  situation. 

The  country-by-country  approach 
to  development  entails  not  only  some 
risktaking  and  experimentation,  but 
also  flexibility  in  where,  when,  and 
what  type  of  assistance  we  provide. 
Flexibility  in  our  funding  allows  us  to 
invest  in  the  right  opportunities  at  the 
right  time  and  to  target  our  assistance 
based  on  actual  country  performance. 

The  Development  Fund  for  Africa 
reflects  the  kind  of  mechanism  that  is 
best  suited  to  the  implementation  of 
such  a  strategy.  It  is  designed  to  imple- 
ment programs  that  integrate  struc- 
tural economic  reforms  with  specific 
assistance  projects  in  traditional  devel- 
opment areas.  With  the  fund  we  are 
able  to  follow  up  on  successful  policy 
dialogue  undertakings  by  supporting 
positive  performance  in  a  particular 
country. 

A  Strategy  for  Advanced 
Developing  Countries 

Our  investment  must  not  stop  with  the 
very  poor  countries,  although  it  will  be 
different  in  those  which  have  reached  a 
certain  level  of  development.  As  a  re- 
sult of  25  years  of  foreign  assistance, 
there  are  now  a  number  of  advanced 
developing  countries  (ADCs)  that  no 
longer  need  the  type  of  economic  as- 
sistance they  once  received  from  AID. 
Their  relationship  with  the  United 
States  has  not  ended,  but  it  has 
changed. 

We  are  now  developing  a  strategy 
that  will  be  the  basis  for  more  produc- 
tive bilateral  relationships  between  the 
United  States  and  a  selected  group  of 
advanced  developing  countries,  such  as 
Brazil  and  Mexico.  In  addition  we  will 
focus  on  assistance  strategies  to  help 
those  countries  approaching  ADC  sta- 
tus do  so  more  quickly,  while  laying  a 
strong  institutional  foundation  for  a  ma- 
ture ADC  relationship.  These  new  rela- 
tionships would  facilitate  the  eventual 
transition  from  traditional  U.S.  eco- 
nomic assistance  programs  to  a  differ- 
ent type  of  assistance  designed  to 


Itpartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


59 


MIDDLE  EAST 


preserve  and  extend  valuable  bilateral 
institutional  linkages.  We  have  already 
initiated  ADC  programs  in  sevei-al 
Latin  American  countries,  which 
strengthen  the  ties  established  earlier 
between  U.S.  and  host  country  institu- 
tions while  securing  nongovernmental 
funding  to  support  common  efforts  in 
the  exchange  of  science  and  technology. 

The  evolution  from  a  relationship 
dominated  by  an  economic  assistance 
program  to  one  that  is  varied  and  com- 
plex is  not  easy,  but  now  is  the  appro- 
priate time  to  develop  such  a  strategy. 
We  want  to  consult  Congress  on  this 
initiative  at  the  appropriate  time. 

Conclusion 

Although  the  remaining  challenges  of 
economic  development  are  sobei'ing, 
foreign  assistance  has  brought  substan- 


Secretary  Meets  With  Israeli 
Foreign  Minister 


tial  accomplishments  as  well  as  a 
wealth  of  experience  upon  which  to 
base  investments  in  future  progress. 

We  need  to  forge  a  new  consensus 
on  foreign  assistance  that  will  allow  us 
to  meet  the  particular  needs  of  individ- 
ual developing  countries  that  will  at  the 
same  time  unite  the  Congress,  the  ex- 
ecutive branch,  and  the  people  of 
America  behind  foreign  policy  objec- 
tives and  foreign  aid.  I  look  forwai'd  to 
working  with  you  in  this  effort. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee 
and  will  be  available  from  the  Superin- 
tendent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.1 


Secretary  Shultz's  statement  fol- 
lowing his  meeting  with  Israeli  Foreign 
Minister  Shimon  Peres  on  May  17, 
1988.^ 

I've  just  finished  now  about  5  or  6 
hours  I  guess  altogether,  over  the  last 
couple  of  days,  with  the  Foreign  Minis- 
ter, my  friend,  Shimon  Peres.  Much  of 
our  discussion  has  been  about  the  peace 
process.  So,  I'd  like  to  make  a  state- 
ment about  it. 

At  President  Reagan's  request,  I 
will  return  to  the  Middle  East  in  early 
June  in  order  to  continue  efforts  to 
bring  about  negotiations.  The  United 
States  is  for  comprehensive  peace 
achieved  through  negotiations.  The  peo- 
ple of  the  Middle  East  require  peace. 
The  situation  is  not  improving,  and  the 
status  quo  remains  unacceptable.  So,  I 
am  returning  to  the  region  to  reaffirm 
our  belief  that  a  workable  avenue  to 
peace  exists. 

Surely,  the  odds  against  a  break- 
through are  high.  Pessimism  and 
cynicism  run  deep.  But  the  United 
States  will  keep  moving  forward.  We 
have  a  plan — the  only  plan  pn  the 
table — and  we  will  pursue  it.  Some 
have  tried  to  say  the  plan  won't  work, 
but  they  have  failed.  'The  plan  can 
work.  It  can  bring  about  negotiations. 
It  can  help  achieve  peace. 


60 


Our  plan  for  achieving  comprehen- 
sive peace  through  negotiations  rests 
on  the  solid  and  internationally  ac- 
cepted basis  of  UN  Security  Council 
Resolutions  242  and  338.  All  of  Resolu- 
tion 242's  provisions  and  principles — in- 
cluding its  promise  of  an  exchange  of 
territory  for  peace — will  apply  to  each 
negotiation  between  Israel  and  its 
neighbors.  Bilateral,  direct  negotiations 
between  Israel  and  the  Arabs  can  begin 
soon. 

Negotiations  between  the  Israeli 
and  Jordanian-Palestinian  delegations 
are  central,  reflecting  the  historic  rela- 
tionship between  Jordan  and  the  Pal- 
estinian people.  The  initial  challenge 
will  be  to  formulate  transitional  ar- 
rangements. Political  and  economic  au- 
thority will  pass  from  Israel  to 
Palestinians,  and  Palestinians  will — for 
the  first  time  in  their  history — be  able 
to  exercise  real  authority  over  political 
and  economic  decisions  that  affect  their 
lives. 

These  negotiations  will  be  inter- 
locked with  negotiations  on  the  final 
status  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  That 
is,  final  status  negotiations  will  begin 
on  a  specified  date,  before  transitional 
arrangements  are  implemented.  This 
will  give  both  sides  the  confidence  in 


the  process  required  for  successsful  1 1  J 
gotiations.  The  negotiations  will  be    . 
launched  by  a  properly  structured  in     ■ 
ternational  conference,  attended  by  t 
five  permanent  members  of  the  Se- 
curity Council  and  the  parties  to  the 
conflict.  This  conference  will  facilitat 
negotiations — not  interfere  with  ther 
impose  a  settlement,  or  veto  agree- 
ments reached  bilaterally. 

This  process  of  negotiations  will 
achieve  what  is  needed  in  the  Middle 
East.  Palestinians  will  achieve  their 
gitimate  rights  through  negotiations 
which  they  will  participate  actively, 
this  way,  they  will  be  able  to  enjoy  li  • 
of  security,  dignity,  and  freedom.  Isi . 
elis  will  achieve  the  recognition  and 
curity  which  they  deserve.  The  Arab 
will  achieve  an  end  to  a  conflict  whic 
drains  resources  that  should  be  di- 
rected at  human  and  economic 
development. 

But  this  plan  requires  partners 
willing  to  participate.  Each  party  fa 
a  simple  but  historic  test:  stop  what! 
you  are  doing  for  a  moment  and  con-l 
sider  whether  you  want  to  continue 
down  the  road  of  animosity  and  vio- 
lence, or  whether  your  energies  wow 
be  better  directed  at  the  tough  roadi 
peace.  Ikke  a  look  at  what  you  migh 
miss.  Consider  whether  you  want  to 
lose  out  on  another  opportunity  to 
make  peace. 

So,  we  will  continue  our  work  o 
this  realistic  plan.  We  will  continue 
work  actively  and  creatively  with  am 
one  prepared  to  work  with  us. 

This  readiness  to  engage — cre- 
atively and  constructively — marked 
talk  with  Shimon  Peres  today,  as  it 
marked  our  collaboration  in  the  past) 
Peace  is  not  a  matter  of  choice;  it  is 
matter  of  necessity.  Israel — strong  < 
secure  as  it  is  now — can  be  stronger! 
and  more  confident  in  implementing! 
agreements  reached  through  negoti; 
tions  with  its  Arab  neighbors.  I  app 
ciate  Foreign  Minister  Peres' 
commitment  and  resolve  to  achieve  •■ 
good  negotiating  process,  and  I  look 
forwai-d  to  continuing  our  efforts 
together. 


'Press  release  94. 


MILITARY  AFFAIRS 


IS.  to  Extend 
i^^^otection  to 
i^utral  Ships 
ir  Persian  Gulf 


Stiifement  by  Secretary  of  Defense 
:ik  Carlucci  on  April  29,  1988. 

I'l-esident  has  decided  to  provide 
stance  under  certain  circumstances 
hips  in  distress  in  the  Persian  Gulf 
Strait  of  Hormuz  in  keeping  with 
standing,  time-honored  Navy  and 
itinie  tradition.  Such  aid  will  be 
•ided  to  friendly,  innocent  neutral 
els  flying  a  nonbelligerent  flag,  out- 
declared  war/exclusion  zones,  that 
not  carrying  contraband  or  resist- 
legitimate  visit  and  search  by  a 
iian  Gulf  belligerent.  Following  a 
lest  from  the  vessel  under  attack, 
stance  will  be  rendered  by  a  U.S. 
ship  or  aircraft  if  this  unit  is  in  the 
lity  and  its  mission  permits  render- 
such  assistance.  With  this  as- 
mce,  we  anticipate  no  increase  in 
current  force  levels. 
We  are  not  the  policemen  of  the 
,  nor  do  we  wish  to  be.  For  over  200 
•s,  U.S.  policy  has  been  to  help  pro- 
freedom  of  navigation  in  interna- 
al  waters.  This  assistance  is  a 
:al  and  humanitarian  outgrowth  of 
•nt  events  in  the  gulf  which  further 
ngthens  our  adherence  to  this  prin- 
i.  We  cannot  stand  by  and  watch 
icent  people  be  killed  or  maimed  by 
ieious,  lawless  actions  when  we  have 
means  to  assist,  and  perhaps  pre- 
,  them.  We  do  not  intend  to  de- 
be  our  specific  rules  of  engagement 
he  methods  we  plan  to  use  in  ren- 
ing  this  assistance.  We  see  no  rea- 
to  give  advantage  to  those  who 
h  us  ill. 


Canadian  Acquisition 
of  Nuclear-Powered  Submarines 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
APR.  27,  1988' 

As  you  know,  last  year  the  Canadian 
Government  announced  its  intention  to 
acquire  a  fleet  of  10  to  12  nuclear- 
powered  attack  submarines. 

The  Canadians  further  announced 
that  they  would  make  a  decision  this 
year  between  competing  British  and 
French  submarine  design. 

U.S.  involvement  will  be  required 
if  the  Canadians  select  the  British  de- 
sign for  their  submarines.  This  is  be- 
cause the  nuclear  propulsion  plant  for 
the  British  Ti-afalgar-class  submarine  is 
derived  from  U.S.  technology  furnished 
to  the  United  Kingdom  under  the  1958 
U.S. -U.K.  agreement  for  cooperation 
on  the  use  of  atomic  energy  for  mutual 
defense  purposes. 


As  a  result,  the  British  formally 
requested  U.S.  assurances  that,  if  the 
Canadians  select  the  British  design,  the 
United  States  would  allow  the  transfer 
of  the  necessary  technology. 

After  careful  review  of  the  views  of 
his  senior  advisers,  the  President  has 
determined  that,  if  the  Canadians  se- 
lect the  Trafalgar  design,  the  interests 
of  the  United  States  are  best  served  by 
agreeing  to  the  British  request.  We 
have  so  informed  both  the  British  and 
Canadian  Governments. 

I  should  stress  that  the  President's 
determination  was  made  only  because 
of  the  unique  circumstances  involving 
the  United  Kingdom  and  Canada,  two 
of  our  oldest  and  closest  allies.  U.S. 
policy  remains  opposed  to  the  transfer 
of  nuclear  submarines  to  other  nations. 


•Read  to  news  correspondents  by  De- 
partment spokesman  Charles  Redman. ■ 


With  regard  to  mines,  I  have  con- 
sulted with  our  allies  who  were  attend- 
ing the  nuclear  planning  group  meeting 
in  Brussels  last  week.  We  all  agreed 
that  we  should  provide  each  other  mu- 
tual support  and  cooperation  in  the  in- 
terest of  keeping  the  international 
waterways  free  from  this  threat. 

Finally,  this  policy  should  not  be 
construed  as  a  tilt  in  either  direction  in 
the  war.  Our  policy  has  been  and  will 
continue  to  be  one  of  strict  neutrality. 
We,  along  with  the  rest  of  the  civilized 
international  community,  want  this  war 
to  end.  In  this  respect  we  support 
strongly  implementation  of  UN  Se- 


curity Council  Resolution  598  and  pas- 
sage of  a  second  resolution  imposing  an 
arms  embargo  on  that  belligerent  that 
does  not  accept  598  as  a  means  to  reach 
diplomatic  settlement  of  this  tragic  war. 
We  also  want  to  see  an  end  to  the  wan- 
ton waste  of  human  life  that  has  charac- 
terized this  war.  In  that  regard,  we 
especially  deplore  the  use  of  chemical 
warfare  by  either  belligerent  which  has 
become  one  of  the  most  regrettable  de- 
velopments in  this  protracted  conflict. 
This  policy  will  go  into  effect  once 
we  have  informed  those  free  world, 
nonbelligerent  countries  that  maintain 
shipping  interests  in  the  gulf  ■ 


partment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


61 


TERRORISM 


Essential  Ingredients  in 
the  Fight  Against  Terrorism 


by  L.  Paul  Bremer,  III 

Address  before  the  Commonwealth 
Club  in  San  Francisco  on  May  12, 
1988.  Ambassador  Bremer  is  Ambas- 
sador at  Large  for  Counter-Terrorism . 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  speak  to  you  today 
about  terrorism,  a  worldwide  problem 
that  periodically  seizes  the  world's  at- 
tention as  it  has  in  the  past  few  weeks. 
The  dramatic  hijacking  of  a  Kuwaiti  air- 
liner— and  bombings  in  Italy,  Spain, 
Afghanistan,  and  Lebanon — all  serve  to 
remind  us  that  terrorism  is  still  very 
much  a  part  of  the  international  scene. 

Over  the  past 
2  years,  we  have  made  considei-able 
progress  in  the  fight  against  interna- 
tional terrorism.  The  number  of  inci- 
dents has  decreased  significantly  in 
some  areas,  and  state  sponsorship  of 
terrorism  is  down.  Fewer  Americans 
have  been  killed.  More  terrorists  have 
been  arrested  and  convicted  by  courts 
from  Paris  to  Ankara,  from  Rome  to 
Tokyo. 

In  1987  the  number  of  anti-U.S.  at- 
tacks worldwide  was  25%  lower  than  in 
1985.  International  terrorism  in  Latin 
America  dropped  32%  in  the  same  pe- 
riod. Terrorism  is  steadily  declining  in 
Europe,  falling  31%  there  in  the  past  2 
years.  There  were  only  two  terrorist 
hijackings  in  1986,  and  only  one  last 
year,  which  is  the  lowest  number  we 
have  recorded  since  we  began  keeping 
tallies  20  years  ago.  The  recent  Kuwait 
Air  hijacking,  which  is  still  fresh  in  our 
minds,  was  a  deadly  and  professional 
operation.  It  is  still  being  investigated 
to  determine  how  the  weapons  got  on 
board.  But  it  has  been  the  only  ter- 
rorist hijacking  so  far  this  year. 

In  spite  of  these  successes,  the 
overall  number  of  terrorist  attacks  rose 
last  year  to  over  800,  making  1987  the 
worst  year  ever.  It  was  also  the  blood- 
iest year;  more  persons  were  wounded 
in  terrorist  attacks  than  ever  before- 
well  over  2,000.  Over  600  persons  died 
in  terrorist  attacks. 

Clearly,  the  problem  of  interna- 
tional terrorism  is  very  much  with  us, 
and  it  will  certainly  last  for  years  to 
come.  The  modest  successes  that  our 
country  has  enjoyed  have  given  us  some 
pespective  on  fighting  the  problem.  We 
have  an  idea  of  what  works  and  what 


does  not  work.  And  we  know  what  kind 
of  a  policy  is  needed.  This  is  what  I 
want  to  discuss  with  you  today. 

There  are  three  essential  elements 
to  any  successful  counterterrorism 
strategy:  good  intelligence  information 
about  the  threat,  the  capacity  to  act  on 
the  basis  of  that  information,  and  the 
political  will  to  take  action.  America 
has  recognized  the  need  for  these  in- 
gredients and  has  put  together  a  strat- 
egy based  on  them. 

Good  Intelligence 

The  fundamental  underpinning  of  a 
counterterrorist  policy  is  good  intel- 
ligence— or  information — about  the  ter- 
rorists, their  plans,  and  their 
capabilities.  Without  solid  and  timely 
intelligence,  no  government  can  formu- 
late polices  and  take  effective  action 
against  terrorists. 

We  need  to  know  things  like: 

•  Which  terrorist  groups  are  we 
dealing  with? 

•  What  are  their  political  goals? 

•  Who  are  the  members? 

•  What  are  their  nationalities  and 
ages? 

•  How  and  why  were  they 
recruited? 

•  How  well  armed  and  trained  are 
they? 

•  Do  they  carry  out  their  threats? 

•  Where  are  their  bases  of 
operation? 

Terrorists  operate  in  the  shadows. 
They  change  their  names,  rearrange 
their  internal  loyalties  and  groupings, 
and  change  operating  areas  with  frus- 
trating frequency.  They  take  great 
pains  to  cover  their  movements  and 
make  their  weapons  untraceable.  Their 
tightly  knit  structure  maximizes  se- 
crecy and  minimizes  the  chance  that  in- 
formation about  the  group  or  its 
planned  operations  will  leak  out. 

But  another  factor  makes  it  even 
more  difficult  to  get  information  about 
terrorists.  That  is  the  support  which 
many  terrorists  get  from  state  spon- 
sors. Nations  like  Iran,  Libya,  Syria, 
and  North  Korea  use  terrorism  as  an 
integral  part  of  their  foreign  policies 
and  provide  extensive  support  networks 
for  their  operatives.  These  networks 
can  give  the  terrorists  training,  false 


I 


passports,  forged  travel  documents, 
transportation  on  state-owned  airlim 
and  safe  houses.  And,  of  course,  it  i; 
more  difficult  for  us  to  get  good  info 
mation  about  terrorist  groups  when 
they  hide  under  the  protective  umbr  a 
of  a  nation  state. 

In  order  to  uncover  and  unravel 
these  networks,  two  types  of  intel- 
ligence information  are  available  to  i 
The  technical  kind,  such  as  spy  sate) 
lites  and  secret  detection  equipment 
provides  some  useful  data  on  terrori  ■ 
But  the  most  useful  information  con 
from  human  intelligence — agents  wh 
penetrate  a  terrorist  group  and  otb 
people  who  report  on  movements,  ii 
tities,  and  planned  attacks. 

Penetrating  terrorist  groups — 
placing  an  agent  on  the  inside — is  ei 
mously  difficult.  Terrorist  organizat 
are  secretive  by  nature;  some  accep' 
members  only  people  with  a  given  ei 
nic,  religious,  or  even  family  back- 
ground. Even  then,  the  "entry  fee 
join  can  be  very  high.  For  example, 
Sendero  Luminoso,  one  of  the  world( 
most  highly  disciplined  and  dangero 
terrorist  groups,  operating  in  Peru, 
quires  that  before  being  allowed  int 
the  group,  an  aspiring  new  memben 
tablish  his  or  her  credentials  by  fira 
killing  a  judge  or  policeman.  Only  ai 
that  will  their  application  for  mem 
bership  be  considered.  Obviously,  tl 
makes  placing  agents  in  such  a  groui 
difficult  or  impossible.  And  in  the  c^ 
of  the  United  States  anyway,  illegalj, 

In  spite  of  the  difficulties,  we  h» 
had  some  successes  in  recruiting  agj 
in  some  terrorist  outfits.  Not  all  ten 
rorist  groups  are  as  secure  as  their 
leaders  would  hke  to  think. 

Yet  once  we  have  agents  in  plao 
the  intelligence  work  has  only  begun 
We  will  receive  bits  and  pieces  of  in 
ligence,  pieces  of  a  puzzle.  We  may 
have  a  photo  here,  an  overheard  con 
sation  there,  two  false  passport  nun 
bers,  and  three  airplane  tickets.  Th 
challenge  is  to  analyze  the  pieces  an 
fit  them  together  in  order  to  get  thi 
whole  picture  in  time  for  us  to  take 
effective  counteraction. 

It  is  rather  like  trying  to  do  a  j 
saw  puzzle  without  knowing  what  tl 
picture  is  supposed  to  look  like.  Ant 
the  more  help  we  can  get  putting  tl 
pieces  together,  the  better.  That  is 


I 


Ii 


62 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/July 


TERRORISM 


ring  intelligence  with  our  allies  is  so 
ortant.  I  will  extend  the  picture 

;le  analogy  just  a  bit  further:  A 
ikle  with  half  its  pieces  in  place  is 
m'e  than  twice  as  comprehensible  as 
a  only  a  quarter  solved.  InteUigence 
shring  helps  us  solve  more  of  the 
pizle  faster  than  we  could  do  alone. 

For  e.xample,  last  November  a  pair 
of  Jorth  Korean  terrorists  planted  a 
b(ib  on  a  South  Korean  plane  that 
ld?d  all  115  passengers  aboard.  We  ini- 
cily  had  very  little  information  about 
W)  was  responsible.  The  plane  had 
bin  destroyed,  and  one  of  the  suspects 
cnmitted  suicide  by  swallowing  poison 
fc  wing  his  arrest.  However,  after  ex- 
el  nging  bits  and  pieces  of  information 
Wh  a  number  of  other  countries,  we 
we  able  to  develop  a  complete  travel 
iterary  of  the  terrorists,  a  history  of 
tJ  terrorist  training  they  received,  de- 
ti  5  of  how  the  bomb  was  supplied  and 
Pi  ited,  and  direct  evidence  of  North 
K  'ean  culpability  in  the  act. 

But  even  without  the  complete  pic- 
'.  i,  we  can  find  useful  information. 
F   example,  we  might  discover  that  a 

V  ipon  found  at  an  Irish  Republican 
Pny  [IRA]  shootout  matches  weapons 
1 1  were  manufactured  in  Libya.  Or 

V  might  find  that  a  newly  appointed 

I  nian  diplomat  in  a  European  country 
li   a  history  of  involvement  in  ter- 

r  ism,  dating  back  to  the  seizure  of 
t   American  Embassy  in  Tehran.  Or 

I I  a  passport  carried  by  a  terrorist 

a  ually  belongs  to  an  innocent  Tunisian 
c  zen  but  which  was  confiscated  by 
I  lyan  authorities  and  provided  to  the 
t  rorist. 

A  recent  bit  of  intelligence  was 
I  'd  as  evidence  at  a  terrorist  trial  in 
^  st  Germany.  A  ransom  note  demand- 
i    the  exchange  of  a  Gei'man  hostage 
t  a  Lebanese  terrorist  carried  the  la- 
l  it  fingerprint  of  the  terrorist's 
1  )ther.  When  the  brother  fiew  to  Ger- 
iiny,  he  was  arrested  and  charged 
Uh  hostage-taking.  Just  3  weeks  ago 
ut  man,  Abbas  Hammedi,  was  sen- 
I  iced  by  German  courts  to  13  years  in 
;  1  for  his  role  in  the  hostage  taking. 
Recognizing  the  importance  of  in- 
J-mation  gathering  to  the  fight  against 
"rorism.  Congress  2  years  ago  gave 
■^  State  Department  $2  million  for  a 
iigram  to  offer  rewards  for  informa- 
iii  leading  to  the  prosecution  of  ter- 
'rists  for  specific  terrorist  attacks.  We 
'tend  to  expand  that  program  soon  to 
:lude  payment  of  money  for  informa- 
in  leading  to  the  prevention  of  a  ter- 
rist  attack  against  U.S.  citizens  or 


property.  This  new  progi-am  will  be 
widely  publicized  both  domestically  and 
overseas  and  will,  we  hope,  make  it 
more  dangerous  for  terrorists. 

The  increased  cooperation  and  in- 
telligence sharing  with  the  United 
States  and  among  European  countries 
themselves  has  been  a  key  factor  in  re- 
ducing terrorism  in  Western  Europe  by 
one-third  since  1985.  And  our  increased 
intelligence  gathering  and  exchange  has 
helped  us  prevent  more  than  200  ter- 
rorist attacks  during  the  past  3  years. 

Actions  Speak  Louder  Than  Words 

No  amount  of  intelligence  information 
will  help  a  government  catch  terrorists 
unless  the  government  has  the  ability 
to  act  on  that  information.  The  second 
essential  element  in  countering  ter- 
rorism is  the  capacity  to  act  against 
terrorists.  This  requires  trained  per- 
sonnel and  equipment  that  can  do  the 
job. 

In  the  past  5  years,  terrorism  has 
become  a  matter  of  urgent  concern  not 
only  to  governments  and  policymakers 
but  also  to  police,  scientists,  so- 
ciologists, historians,  and  the  military. 

The  number  and  variety  of  counter- 
terrorist  personnel  may  surprise  you. 
They  include: 

•  Analysts  in  the  intelligence  com- 
munity, who  can  trace  a  pattern  of  at- 
tacks for  a  given  terrorist  group, 
develop  modus  operandi  for  terrorists, 
identify  terrorists  by  name,  and  project 
trends; 

•  Technicians  skilled  in  the  field  of 
communications,  including  people  who 
can  establish  secure  telephone  lines 
through  the  use  of  tactical  satellites  for 
long-distance  exchanges  of  classified 
information; 

•  Experts  in  forensics  and  ballistics 
and  a  multitude  of  other  highly  spe- 
cialized fields  who  can  examine  clues  in 
the  aftermath  of  a  terrorist  attack; 

•  Policy  officers,  hke  those  in  my 
office  who  meet  regularly  with  their 
counterparts  in  other  countries  to  fos- 
ter cooperation  and  to  coordinate 
actions; 

•  Negotiators  skilled  in  hostage  ne- 
gotiations whose  main  task  is  to  resolve 
a  situation  without  loss  of  life,  to  gain 
time,  wear  down  the  terrorists,  and 
withhold  substantive  concessions;  and 

•  Specialized  military  counterter- 
rorist  units,  which  become  invaluable 
when  attempts  to  resolve  a  situation 
without  violence  fail. 


The  United  States  actively  recruits 
people  in  all  these  fields.  We  develop 
and  offer  specialized  training  where 
needed.  Getting  the  most  qualified  per- 
sonnel is  a  top  priority  for  us,  and  al- 
though the  cost  is  substantial,  we 
believe  the  benefits  we  get  in  return 
justify  our  commitment.  As  cooperation 
with  foreign  governments  has  in- 
creased, the  United  States  has  been 
able  to  draw  from  its  reservoir  of  well- 
trained  analysts  and  technical  spe- 
cialists to  help  foreign  governments  in- 
vestigating terrorist  attacks.  Just  last 
week,  we  had  about  a  dozen  experts  in 
Kuwait  helping  that  government  collect 
evidence  on  the  Kuwaiti  Air  hijacking. 

Often  the  efforts  of  these  people 
are  only  as  good  as  the  equipment  with 
which  they  work.  The  equipment  that  is 
needed  to  fight  terrorism  includes: 

•  Research  laboratories  to  examine 
evidence  and  to  develop  new  ways  to 
detect  explosives; 

•  All  types  of  defensive  equipment 
to  thwart  terrorist  attacks,  such  as  con- 
crete barriers,  shatter-proof  glass,  ar- 
mored vehicles.  X-ray  machines,  and 
bomb-sniffing  dogs; 

•  Sophisticated  computers  that  can 
store  complete  databases  on  terrorists 
and  can  read  digitized  fingerprints;  and 

•  The  full  range  of  offensive  equip- 
ment, such  as  special  weapons,  sur- 
veillance devices,  night  vision 
binoculars,  and  eavesdropping  gear. 

Not  all  nations  engaged  in  fighting 
terrorism  have  all  these  personnel  and 
equipment  available  to  them,  but  most 
Western  democracies  do.  The  allocation 
of  funds  to  pay  trained  personnel  and  to 
buy  and  maintain  the  proper  equipment 
is  clear  evidence  of  a  nation's  commit- 
ment to  fighting  terrorism. 

The  United  States  is  committed  to 
helping  other  countries  get  the  best 
personnel  and  equipment.  For  example, 
my  office  is  responsible  for  offering 
antiterrorism  training  assistance  to 
friendly  nations  so  that  they  can  better 
defend  themselves  and  American  inter- 
ests located  in  their  countries.  During 
the  last  3  years,  we  have  trained  over 
6,000  civilian  law  enforcement  au- 
thorities from  50  countries.  We  also 
help  to  coordinate  similar  training  pro- 
grams offered  by  allied  governments  to 
eliminate  overlap. 

In  addition,  my  office  manages  a 
congressionally  funded  research  pro- 
gram to  develop  new,  practical  ways  to 
identify,  track,  and  apprehend  ter- 
rorists. The  aim  of  the  program  is  to 


spartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


63 


TERRORISM 


anticipate  potential  new  tactics  by  ter- 
rorists and  to  improve  existing  tech- 
nology to  thwart  them. 

Among  other  subjects,  we  are  cur- 
rently funding  research: 

•  To  help  us  better  detect  and  more 
rapidly  and  safely  disarm  explosives; 

•  To  meet  the  menace  of  chemical 
and  biological  attacks;  and 

•  To  provide  our  hostage  rescue 
forces  with  better  weapons  and 
equipment 

Counterterrorism  research  and  de- 
velopment is  a  new  and  challenging 
field.  Our  effort  involves  25  government 
agencies  as  well  as  private  companies 
and  universities. 

Political  Will  Must  Be  Present 

All  the  intelligence,  manpower,  and 
equipment  are  to  no  avail  if  a  govern- 
ment is  not  willing  to  use  them.  Politi- 
cal will,  therefore,  is  the  third  essential 
element  in  fighting  terrorism. 

Twenty  years  ago,  most  of  the 
West  clearly  lacked  the  political  will  to 
confront  terrorism.  Countries  reacted 
to  the  new  wave  of  terrorism  in  a  con- 
fused way.  We  were  on  the  defensive 
against  both  domestic  and  international 
terrorists.  Some  governments  believed 
that  appeasement  was  the  answer,  and 
some  even  made  quiet  deals  with  the 
terrorists,  offering  not  to  disturb  the 
terrorists  in  exchange  for  the  terrorists' 
pledge  not  to  commit  attacks  on  home 
turf. 

By  the  end  of  the  1970s,  however, 
the  outrage  at  terrorist  acts  slowly  be- 
gan to  turn  the  tide  of  opinion  in  the 
West.  Increasingly,  people  realized  that 
nothing  justified  the  wanton  slaughter 
of  innocent  civilians.  Public  pressure 
forced  governments  to  face  the  problem 
and  to  develop  the  political  will  and  a 
coherent  strategy  to  oppose  terrorism. 

In  the  past  few  years,  the  West  has 
made  important  measurable  progress  in 
developing  a  coherent  counterterrorist 
strategy  and  the  required  political  will 
to  carry  it  out.  The  U.S.  military  strike 
against  terrorist  facilities  in  Libya  was 
the  watershed.  Immediately  thereafter, 
European  governments  began  to  show 
an  increased  willingness  to  fight  ter- 
rorists. Two  years  ago,  the  nations  of 
Western  Europe,  in  a  major  show  of 
collective  political  will,  closed  down  Lib- 
ya's terrorist  infrastructure  of  embas- 
sies, "businessmen,"  and  "students." 
Several  months  later,  after  Syrian  sup- 
port for  terrorism  was  proven  in  two 


well-publicized  trials  in  London  and 
West  Berhn,  the  European  Community 
imposed  a  series  of  sanctions  against 
Syria. 

Confronting  terrorist  states  with 
collective  political  will  works — that  is, 
it  changes  the  behavior  of  states  using 
terrorism.  Libyan-sponsored  attacks 
dropped  by  two-thirds  last  year.  Syria 
expelled  the  Palestinian  terrorist  Abu 
Nidal  from  its  borders  last  year,  and  we 
have  detected  no  direct  Syrian  involve- 
ment in  terrorist  attacks  for  the  past  18 
months. 

Because  of  the  West's  growing 
counterterrorist  consensus,  terrorists 
are  also  finding  it  harder  to  get  refuge 
and  overt  support.  For  example,  the 
Abu  Nidal  Organization  was  expelled 
from  Iraq  in  1983  and  from  Syria  in 
1987.  In  Eastern  Europe,  efforts  have 
been  made  to  disrupt  a  network  of  en- 
terprises of  the  Abu  Nidal  Organiza- 
tion. Newspaper  stories  about  the 
terrorist  links  of  a  Syrian  family  named 
Qassar,  notorious  for  arms  trafficking 
with  terrorists,  have  led  to  action 
against  them  by  Spain  and  Austria  last 
year  Colonel  Hawari,  the  infamous 
leader  of  the  special  operations  group  of 
the  Palestine  Liberation  Organization 
[PLO],  was  expelled  from  Iraq  in  June 
1987.  When  he  subsequently  entered 
Yugoslavia  illegally,  he  was  expelled 
from  that  nation. 

More  Needs  to  Be  Done 

Still,  the  record  of  action  against  ter- 
rorists remains  mixed.  There  is  plenty 
of  room  for  improvement.  Three  areas 
come  to  mind. 

We  have  all  read  accounts  of  pur- 
ported "deals"  in  order  to  gain  the  re- 
lease of  hostages.  These  undercut 
Western  solidarity  in  meeting  terrorism 
head-on.  In  other  instances,  some  coun- 
tries, such  as  Austria,  are  reluctant  to 
act  vigorously  against  Libyan  diplo- 
matic missions,  even  when  they  are 
caught  red-handed  supporting  a  ter- 
rorist action.  Some  European  countries 
accredit  ambassadors — notably  from 
Iran — who  have  well-documented  rec- 
ords of  personal  involvement  in  ter- 
rorist actions,  such  as  the  seizure  of  the 
U.S.  Embassy  in  Tehran. 

As  we  fight  terrorism,  we  must  re- 
member some  important  facts. 

First,  there  is  no  cheap  or  fast  way 
to  prevail.  As  with  crime,  the  scourge 
of  terrorism  cannot  be  entirely  eradi- 
cated, and  as  we  make  gains  in  one 
area,  the  terrorists  have  proven  their 
ability  to  shift  tactics  and  threaten 
other  areas. 


Second,  it  is  important  to  be  fir 
against  terrorists,  for  behavior  re- 
warded is  behavior  repeated.  Makin; 
concessions  to  terrorists  only  encoui 
ages  more  terrorism.  The  policy  is 
strongly  supported  by  the  people  of 
this  country  and  by  most  Western 
democracies. 

A  policy  of  firmness  is  not  easy,' 
especially  when  it  involves  American 
hostages  and  when  it  appears  that  ni 
ing  concessions  will  lead  to  their  re- 
lease. But  the  government  has  an 
important  responsibility  to  the  genei 
public,  all  of  whom  would  become  mi 
vulnerable  to  hostage-taking  were  W 
to  reward  the  kidnappers  in  LebanoM 
As  Thomas  Jefferson  said  when  he 
counseled  against  the  ransom  paymei 
demanded  by  the  Barbary  pirates  iro 
1787:  "This  is  cruelty  to  the  individvM 
now  in  captivity,  but  kindness  to  tha 
hundreds  that  soon  would  be  so,  wen 
we  to  make  it  worth  the  while  of  tho 
pirates " 

And  finally,  we  must  be  willingy 
take  risks,  even  to  risk  tactical  failu 
in  order  to  gain  strategic  advantagel 
We  cannot  become,  as  Secretary  Sh| 
said,  "the  Hamlet  of  nations."  We 
be  ready  to  undertake  bold  efforts. 
There  is  an  important  place  in  our 
counterterrorism  policy  for  covert  at 
tions  and,  where  necessary,  for  milil 
action.  The  American  raid  against  ti 
rorist  targets  in  Libya  was  full  of  ril 
We  lost  two  American  pilots  during  I 
that  raid.  But  the  raid  was  a  watera^ 
event  in  the  West's  fight  against  terl 
rorism.  It  catalyzed  the  Europeans  [ 
warned  terrorist  sponsors. 

Conclusion 

We  have  learned  at  the  cost  of  blood 
and  treasure  what  works  and  what  ( 
not  work  in  dealing  with  terrorism.  1 
And  we  know  that  each  of  the  three! 
elements  I  have  described — intel- 
ligence, resources,  and  political  will-] 
necessary  but  not  by  themselves  suff 
ent  to  suppress  terrorism.  This  undJ 
standing  has  shaped  our  policy,  and  [ 
is  paying  off. 

Our  progress  has  been  uneven, 
we  have  made  progress.  I  expect  we 
will  continue  to  show  gains  as  we  md 
against  international  terrorism.  But! 
must  understand  that  suppressing  ' 
rorism  is  a  long-term  business.  Therl 
are  no  simple  knock-out  punches.  Bii 
we  continue  to  devote  resources  to 
countering  terrorism  and,  most  impd 
tant  of  all,  if  we  maintain  our  politici 
will,  we  can,  in  the  long  run,  prevailf 


64 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/July  <l 


TERRORISM 


-frgh  Technology  Terrorism 


I'aul  Bremer,  III 

<tiilf'inent  before  the  Subcommitfee 

ciniology  and  the  Law  of  the  Seri- 

iiiliriary  Committee  on  May  19, 

Ambassador  Bremer  is  Ambas- 

ur  at  Large  for  Counter-Terrorism  A 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  appear  before 

(•(immittee  to  discuss  the  Admin- 
i  inn's  assessment  of  the  threat  pre- 
d  hy  high  technology  terrorism 
n  brief  you  on  the  Administration's 
iiise  to  that  threat.  Throughout  my 

•  iiioiiy,  I  will  use  the  committee's 
It  ion  of  high  technology  terrorism: 
actual  or  potential  use  of  advanced 
ipliisticated  technology  by  ter- 
ts  to  achieve  their  objectives." 
With  your  permission,  I  propose  to 
CSS  the  first  two  questions  you 
i\  to  the  Administration;  the  use  of 
isticated  technologies  to  conduct 
villi!  of  terrorist  attacks  we  have 
M,\  seen  and  the  possibility  of  ter- 
i>  turning  to  weapons  of  mass  de- 
tion — nuclear,  biological,  or 

,!  ileal  weapons. 

ifa  lent  Use  of  Older  Technologies 

Oi  age  is  almost  defined  by  tech- 
nt  gical  advance.  The  transistors  that 
w  I  the  marvel  of  the  1950s  are  passe. 
1  h  of  this  testimony  was  written  on 
a  me  lap-top  computer  which  would 
hi '  filled  an  entire  room  20  years  ago. 

Yet  terrorists  mostly  use  weapons 
te  nologies  developed  50-100  years 
aj  —pistols,  hand  grenades,  and  ma- 

I'  guns.  State  Department  figures 

\  that  the  bomb  remains  the  ter- 
.1  st.s'  preferred  weapon.  Consistently 
ov  the  past  20  years,  50%-60%  of  all 
ttorist  incidents  have  been  bombings, 
IT  it  of  which  have  used  explosives  and 
di^nators  available  for  decades. 

Terrorists  generally  use  the  sim- 
p  5t  technology  available  for  their  at- 
t;<ts.  There  are  solid  reasons  for  them 

lo  so. 

•  Simpler  technology  is  less  expen- 
■  and  often  more  reliable. 

•  Low  tech  equipment  is  easier  to 
ain  and  attracts  less  attention.  A 

lib  made  from  agricultural  chemicals 
y  not  be  as  powerful  as  one  made 
m  the  latest  plastic  explosives,  but 
.  .one  can  buy  and  transport  a  truck- 


load  of  fertilizer  without  arousing  sus- 
picion. More  important,  the  operatives 
who  carry  out  the  attacks  need  less 
training  with  low  tech  equipment. 

•  Finally,  the  older  weapons  and 
technologies  are  as  effective  now  as 
they  have  been  in  the  past.  Terrorists 
continue  to  receive  wide-ranging  pub- 
licity for  their  attacks  using  older  or 
simpler  technology  and  weaponry. 

As  the  targets  originally  preferred 
by  terrorists  have  become  "harder" — 
that  is  to  say,  better  defended — ter- 
rorists have  usually  switched  targets 
rather  than  turn  to  new  technologies  to 
penetrate  defenses.  When  an  embassy 
is  too  well  protected,  terrorists  may 
switch  to  unprotected  individuals  or 
businesses  associated  with  the  target 
country.  Or  they  may  decide  to  attack 
the  same  country's  embassy  in  another 
nation. 

The  phenomenon  of  target  switch- 
ing has  been  particularly  notable  in  at- 
tacks against  civil  aviation.  As 
enhanced  security  on  flights  to  Israel 
made  it  difficult  to  smuggle  weapons 
into  the  cabin,  the  Japanese  Red  Army 
and  the  Popular  Front  for  the  Libera- 
tion of  Palestine  (PFLP)  switched  tar- 
gets. Rather  than  try  to  seize  an 
aircraft,  they  checked  their  grenades 
and  machine  guns  and  attacked  pas- 
sengers in  the  baggage  claim  area  of 
Israel's  international  airport.  After  ex- 
amination of  checked  baggage  became 
more  common  on  high-risk  flights,  tar- 
gets were  switched  again  and  the 
check-in  counters  were  attacked,  for 
example  by  the  Abu  Nidal  group  at  the 
Rome  and  Vienna  airports  in  December 
1985.  More  recently,  in  Karachi,  ter- 
rorists chose  not  to  confront  security 
measures  in  the  terminal  at  all  and, 
instead,  stormed  a  Pan  American  air- 
plane from  the  tarmac. 

In  short,  there  is  no  persuasive  ev- 
idence yet  that  the  availability  of  higher 
technologies  has  led  to  their  automatic 
or  widespread  use  by  terrorists.  In 
fact,  in  each  of  the  incidents  mentioned 
above,  the  terrorist  weapons  of  choice 
remained  largely  the  same— handguns, 
automatic  weapons,  and  hand  grenades. 

New  Technologies  Are  Available 

There  are,  however,  no  grounds  for 
complacency  about  the  utilization  of 
modern  technologies.  Several  terrorist 


groups  have  used  sophisticated  bat- 
teries and  integrated  circuits  to  im- 
prove the  timing  devices  used  on 
bombs.  The  Provisional  Irish  Re- 
publican Army  bomb  intended  to  kill 
Prime  Minister  Margaret  Thatcher  at 
Brighton  Beach  3  years  ago  used  a 
long-delay  timing  device  (days  rather 
than  hours).  Terrorists  have  also  used 
more  sophisticated  trigger  mechanisms 
for  bombs,  using  radio  signals  instead 
of  wires  leading  from  the  device  to  a 
switch.  The  Greek  terrorist  group, 
November  17,  used  this  technique  to  at- 
tack a  U.S.  military  bus  last  year. 

In  some  cases,  the  bombs  them- 
selves have  changed.  The  Czech  plastic 
explosive  Semtex,  more  powerful  and 
less  detectable  than  traditional  ex- 
plosives, is  becoming  very  popular  with 
those  groups  which  can  gain  access  to 
it.  Lebanese  terrorist  Mohammed  Ali 
Hammadei,  accused  of  helping  direct 
the  hijacking  of  TWA  #847  in  1985,  was 
captured  last  year  trying  to  enter  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  with  the 
volatile  liquid  explosive  methyl  nitrate 
concealed  in  hquor  bottles. 

The  Popular  Front  for  the  Libera- 
tion of  Palestine-General  Command 
(PFLP-GC)  used  a  modern,  but  not  es- 
pecially sophisticated,  technology  when 
it  launched  an  attack  into  Israel  on 
motorized  hang-gliders.  One  group 
in  the  Far  East  has  used  frequency- 
jamming  equipment  to  block  police 
communications  during  its  attacks, 
while  another  has  constructed  and  uti- 
lized home-made  mortars  to  conduct 
standoff  attacks  against  buildings  and 
other  targets  of  interest. 

There  are  other  off-the-shelf  mod- 
ern technologies  or  products  which 
have  been  or  could  be  used  by  ter- 
rorists. Nonmetallic  weapons  made 
from  polymers  can  cause  problems  for 
current  detection  devices.  The  ter- 
rorists know  that  certain  kinds  of  ex- 
plosives are  much  less  susceptible  to 
dogs  and  mechanical  sniffers  than  oth- 
ers. Night  vision  devices  and  stand-off 
weapons,  such  as  mortars  and  rocket 
propelled  grenades,  could  enhance  ter- 
rorist capabilities  and  thus  present 
greater  risks.  Lasers  and  high-powered 
microwave  transmitters  are  also  poten- 
tial threats.  Increasingly  sophisticated 
and  available  photoreproduction  equip- 
ment can  make  document  forgery 
easier  than  in  the  past. 


sartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


65 


TERRORISM 


Dynamics  of  Weapons  and  Tactics 

While  we  have  some  abihty  to  track 
past  uses  of  modern  technologies,  we 
cannot  forecast  with  precision  future 
uses.  One  thing  we  can  do  is  watch  the 
dynamic  relationship  between  protec- 
tive measures  and  terrorist  targeting 
and  tactics.  Most  of  the  terrorists'  pri- 
mary targets  are  better  defended  to- 
day. Secondary  and  tertiary  targets  are 
also  being  "hardened."  So  far  when  ter- 
rorists are  presented  with  a  well- 
defended  target,  they  would  rather 
switch  than  fight.  But  there  may  come 
a  point  at  which  our  success  in  protect- 
ing current  targets  will  drive  terrorists 
to  use  new  technologies. 

Turning  to  new  technologies  does, 
however,  present  the  terrorists  some 
problems.  Many  of  the  newer  technolo- 
gies available  require  greater  e.xpertise 
than  members  of  many  terrorist  groups 
now  have.  Some  weapons,  such  as  re- 
motely piloted  vehicles  and  rockets,  re- 
quire considerable  space  for  testing  and 
training.  There  are  entire  areas  of  the 
world  where  that  much  space  is  simply 
not  available  for  use  as  a  terrorist  fir- 
ing range.  The  costs  of  some  new  tech- 
nologies would  also  be  prohibitive  for 
all  but  the  largest  and  best-financed 
terrorist  organizations. 

The  requirements  for  training, 
money,  and  test  areas  suggest  that  the 
terrorists  most  likely  to  employ  the 
products  of  new  technologies  are  those 
who  already  have,  or  who  can  acquire, 
state  sponsorship.  A  sovereign  state 
can  dispense  sums  of  money  impossible 
for  an  organization  to  raise  alone.  And 
almost  any  country  can  provide  training 
and  testing  facilities  at  a  closed  mili- 
tary base. 

The  need  for  technical  expertise 
could  most  readily  be  overcome  by  ter- 
rorist groups  whose  programmatic  ob- 
jectives already  attract  to  them  highly 
educated  individuals.  For  example, 
violence-prone  elements  in  some  anti- 
nuclear,  extreme  environmentalist,  and 
animal  rights  groups  might  find  among 
their  members  the  expertise  requisite 
to  move  to  "high-tech"  terrorism. 

Nuclear,  Biological, 
and  Chemical  Terrorism 

Much  has  been  said  and  written  in  re- 
cent years  about  the  possibility  of  ter- 
rorists employing  nuclear,  chemical,  or 
biological  terrorism.  Our  government 
has  confidential  assessments  on  this 
topic  which  I  would  be  pleased  to  dis- 
cuss in  closed  session.  For  this  hearing, 
I  can  make  some  general  observations. 


First,  we  should  understand  that 
there  have  not  been  any  actual  nuclear 
terrorist  attacks,  and  we  do  not  assess 
that  as  a  likely  possibility  in  the  near 
future.  Chemical  substances,  on  the 
other  hand,  have  been  used  for  malev- 
olent purposes  by  a  variety  of  groups 
and  individuals  and  must  be  considered 
as  presenting  a  somewhat  more  likely 
terrorist  choice. 

While  not  an  act  of  political  ter- 
rorism, we  can  remember  the  poisoning 
of  medicines  which  have  caused  deaths 
in  the  United  States.  Though  no  case  in 
the  United  States  has  been  traced  to 
political  terrorists,  the  possibility  of 
terrorists  ultimately  using  this  tactic 
against  us  or  other  nations  is  sobering. 
There  have  been  similar  instances  in 
other  countries.  Several  years  ago  ter- 
rorists poisoned  .Jaffa  oranges,  which 
had  a  disastrous  effect  on  Israeli  citrus 
exports.  More  recently,  a  threat  to  poi- 
son the  air  in  another  Mediterranean 
nation  with  dioxin — which  was  later 
proven  specious — initially  caused  grave 
concern. 

According  to  our  analysis,  up  to 
now  there  have  been  technical  and  psy- 
chopolitical  constraints  on  the  use  of 
nuclear,  biological,  and  chemical 
terrorism. 

Technical  constraints  are  especially 
important  when  considering  nuclear 
terrorism.  While  the  basic  principles  of 
nuclear  weaponry  are  available  in  any 
research  library,  the  actual  acquisition 
of  the  correct  materials  and  assembly  of 
a  workable  nuclear  device  remains  an 
immensely  complicated  undertaking. 
Moreover,  handling  nuclear  materials 
can  be  e.xtremely  dangerous  to  the  ter- 
rorists. In  our  view,  few  groups,  and 
certainly  none  without  considerable 
state  support,  have  the  technical  capac- 
ity to  acquire,  fabricate,  and  employ  a 
nuclear  device. 

Steahng  an  existing  nuclear 
weapon  is  a  theoretical  alternative. 
However,  our  government  has  taken  ex- 
traordinary precautions  to  protect 
against  this  possibility.  It  is  also  con- 
ceivable that  a  state  could  make  a  nu- 
clear device  available  to  a  terrorist 
group.  However,  we  also  judge  this  as  a 
remote  possibihty. 

Development  of  biological  and 
chemical  weapons  present  similar  al- 
though less  compelling  technical  con- 
straints. The  major  problem  here  is 
that  the  raw  materials  with  which  to 
construct  at  least  a  crude  chemical  or 
biological  device  are  more  readily  avail- 
able to  the  terrorists  than  are  the  ma- 
terials and  equipment  needed  to 
develop  a  nuclear  weapon. 


For  example,  virulent  biological 
agents  can  be  grown  or  acquired  froi 
variety  of  sources.  Toxic  chemical  mf 
rials  are,  of  course,  widely  available 
through  manufacture  or  theft  in  mos 
open  societies.  Poisonous  gases  and 
chemicals  are  routinely  transported 
through  many  countries  to  support  e 
sential  economic  activities.  The  acci- 
dent at  the  Union  Carbide  plant  at 
Bhopal,  India,  demonstrates  how 
deadly  modern  chemicals  can  be.  A  i 
liberate  terrorist  attack  against  such 
plant  or  possibly  against  the  transpo 
tation  vehicles  conveying  such  mate« 
anywhere  in  the  world  might  have  di 
astrous  consequences. 

Psychopolitical  Constraints 
on  Terrorists 

Of  course  technical  barriers  can  even 
ally  be  overcome.  However,  there  alii 
may  be  some  psychopolitical  constrai 
to  terrorists'  use  of  such  weapons.  Tl 
fundamental  question  is  whether  tea 
rorists  will  actually  act  to  cause  mas 
casualties — a  thousand  or  more  in  a 
gle  incident — through  the  use  of  nu- 
clear, chemical,  or  biological  terrorii 

Many  experts  point  out  that  tei 
rorist  actions  may  disgust  us,  but  tl 
are  not  without  a  certain  logic.  Man 
terrorist  acts  are  intended  to  accom 
plish  specific  political  goals  in  both 
short  and  longer  terms.  For  many 
groups,  the  long-range  goal  is  often 
tainment  of  power  in  a  new  or  existi 
sovereign  state.  These  experts  belie 
that  terrorist  groups  have  not  and 
not  resort  to  using  weapons  causing 
mass  casualties  because  such  an  atti 
would  do  severe  damage  to  their  Ion 
term  goals.  Put  another  way,  a  cred 
threat  to  kill  100,000  people  in  a  maj 
city  may  get  a  terrorist  colleague  ou  if 
prison.  But  the  general  revulsion  en 
gendered  may  make  establishment  c 
the  new  political  order  impossible,  e 
pecially  if  mass  casualties  occur. 

While  there  is  a  certain  logic  he  , 
we  should  also  recognize  that  terror:  s 
with  the  technical  sophistication  to  i  i 
weapons  of  mass  destruction  may  ve 
well  also  have  the  political  sophistic; 
tion  to  protect  their  long-range  goal 
while  acting  in  the  nearer  term.  For 
example,  terrorists  could  overcome  t  ■ 
constraints  on  using  such  weapons  s;  - 
ply  by  downscaling  the  initial  weapo 
so  that  it  produces  only  a  low  or  mo(;r- 
ate  number  of  casualties.  This  wouldj 
offer  a  demonstration  of  the  credibil)' 
and  lethality  of  their  threat  to  inflict 
mass  casualties  later  if  their  demanc 
are  not  met  now. 


66 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/July  ISj 


TERRORISM 


Moreover,  some  terrorist  groups 
already  showing  little  aversion  to 
rtiiig  large  numbers  of  casualties. 
((•  ladical  Sikh  and  T^mil  elements, 
.■  irroups  in  Lebanon,  and  Sendero 
liiioso  in  Peru  have  used  conven- 
:il  weapons  in  attacks  in  which  hun- 
l>  have  died.  These  groups  may  be 
hesitant  than  others  about  switch- 
id  even  more  lethal  weapons.  Or,  if 
1(1  opinion  becomes  jaded,  these  or 
■V  terrorist  groups  could  move  to 
s  casualty  terrorism  to  attract 
iition. 

linally,  of  course,  chemical  weap- 
:ire  known  to  be  in  the  hands  of 
-  such  as  Iran  and  Iraq  which  have 
I  iced  terrorism.  The  world  commu- 
lias  shown  little  outrage  at  the  re- 
ii.'^e  of  chemical  weapons  by  both 
I  I  and  Iraq  in  their  war.  Perhaps  a 
hiilogical  barrier  has  already  been 
u'li  for  terrorists  to  use  them. 

Wat  Are  We  Doing 
K  )ut  the  Threat? 

Administration's  response  to  the 
at  of  high  technology  terrorism  is 
!( ised  in  the  Inter-Departmental 
G  up  on  Terrorism  (IG/T),  which  I 
c!  in  This  is  because  the  President  has 
d  ignated  the  State  Department  as 
k  1  agency  on  international  terrorism. 
-  interagency  group  has  directed  in- 
L^ciice  analysis  into  the  potential 
■at  from  high  technology  terrorism. 
T  '  IG/T  has  also  worked  to  coordinate 
'.    U.S.  Governments  policy  response, 
e  ecially  concerning  research  and  de- 
V  jpment  efforts  to  counter  nuclear, 
b  logical,  and  chemical  threats. 

Under  IG/T  leadership,  we  are  pur- 
s  ag  an  aggressive  research  and  devel- 

0  nent  program  on  emerging  tech- 
rogies  which  could  be  used  by  ter- 

r  ists  or  by  those  fighting  terrorism. 

1  listinguished  panel  of  scientists  has 
hped  the  IG/T  identify  and  prioritize 
CT  70  projects  for  research.  These 
pjects  are  concentrated  in  areas 

\  ere  there  seems  to  be  no  private  sec- 
t  initiative  on  readily  available  fund- 
i ;  from  other  government  agencies. 
<  r  program,  funded  through  a  State 

partment  account,  has  so  far  allo- 
'  ed  $17  million  to  22  different 
ojects. 
Our  concept  is  to  use  our  limited 

ids  as  seed  money.  Once  a  project 


has  proven  viable,  we  seek  to  turn  re- 
sponsibility for  project  followup  to  the 
appropriate  government  agency.  We 
have  concentrated  our  research  and  de- 
velopment efforts  in  five  main  areas. 
Two  of  these  in  particular  may  be  of 
interest  to  this  committee.  Specifically, 
we  have  devoted  a  great  deal  of  effort 
to  developing  means  to  detect  newer 
varieties  of  explosives  and  detonating 
mechanisms.  We  are  also  attempting  to 
discover  new  methods  and  equipment  to 
detect  chemical  and  biological  agents. 

In  the  past  year,  we  have  begun  a 
program  to  coordinate  our  research  and 
development  efforts  on  high  technology 
terrorism  with  research  in  like-minded 
countries.  To  date  we  have  proposed 
such  activity  with  the  United  Kingdom, 
Canada,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many, and  Japan.  This  effort  is  still  in 
its  initial  phase,  but  I  am  hopeful  that 
it  will  yield  high  dividends  in  future 
years. 

We  have  also  established  a  Nuclear 
Biological  Chemical  (NBC)  Working 
Group.  This  specialized  group  is  exam- 
ining our  government's  capacity  to  re- 
spond to  nuclear,  biological,  and 
chemical  threats.  While  I  cannot  go 
into  detail  in  open  session,  I  can  assure 
you  that  the  Federal  Government  has 
substantial  capacity  to  respond  to 
threats  of  nuclear  terrorism. 

We  are  working  to  develop  similar 
capacities  to  respond  to  chemical  and 
biological  threats.  The  NBC  working 
group  has  also  developed  an  active  pro- 
gram of  exercises  to  test  our  response 
capability.  Various  exercises  have  in- 
volved the  Federal  Government  alone, 
the  Federal  Government  coordinating 
with  State  and  local  government,  and 
the  Federal  Government  acting  with 
other  countries. 

What  Remains  To  Be  Done? 

The  relative  scarcity  of  high  tech  ter- 
rorism up  until  now  gives  us  no  basis 
for  complacency.  While  I  have  offered 
some  views  about  relative  threat  levels, 
I  must  emphasize  to  you  that  assess- 
ments grounded  on  predicting  terrorist 
behavior  cannot  be  taken  as  protection. 
There  is  too  much  uncertainty. 


It  should  be  clear  that  to  some  ex- 
tent there  is  a  race  between  terrorist 
adaptations  of  new  technologies  and  the 
development  and  application  of  counter- 
measures.  A  key  factor  will  be  the  U.S. 
Government's  ability  to  conduct  re- 
search into  countermeasures  quickly 
and  effectively.  I  believe  it  only  prudent 
that  we  devote  more  money  to  these 
research  and  development  efforts. 

There  are  also  ways  in  which  Con- 
gress can  help  without  straining  the 
Federal  budget.  We  should  work  to- 
gether to  examine  the  possibility  of  re- 
quiring that  taggants  be  included  in  all 
explosives,  weapons,  and  ammunition 
manufactured  in  or  imported  into  the 
United  States.  Such  a  measure  would 
greatly  simplify  efforts  to  detect  con- 
cealed explosives  and  weapons  and  im- 
prove our  ability  to  investigate  terrorist 
acts  which  have  already  occurred.  We 
should  also  explore  the  possibility  of 
taggants  for  detonators. 

Congress  has  before  it  pending  leg- 
islation which  would  help  control  the 
importation,  production,  and  possession 
of  nonmetallic  firearms.  This  is  an  area 
of  special  concern  to  the  airline  indus- 
try, indeed  to  the  entire  counterter- 
rorism  community.  I  urge  quick  and 
favorable  congressional  action  on  this 
legislation. 

Conclusion 

I  congratulate  the  committee  for  its  ini- 
tiative in  convoking  these  hearings  to 
examine  the  risks  of  high  technology 
terrorism.  While  the  counterterrorism 
community's  assessment  is  that  current 
risks  are  modest,  the  long-term  picture 
is  much  less  clear.  One  of  the  ironies  we 
face  is  that  successful  protection  of 
more  and  more  targets  may  drive  ter- 
rorists to  use  higher  technologies.  That 
is  why  it  is  so  important  that  we  work 
together  to  turn  the  new  technologies 
to  our  advantage  in  fighting  terrorism. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee 
and  will  be  available  from  the  Superin- 
tendent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.1 


lijgpartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


67 


UNITED  NATIONS 


Policies  for  the  Americas  in  the  1990s 


by  Richard  S.  Williamson 

Address  before  the  Economic  Com- 
mission for  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean  (ECLAC)  in  Rio  de  Janeiro 
on  April  26,  1988.  Ambassador 
Williamson  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
International  Organization  Affairs. 

I  would  like  to  take  just  a  minute  to 
note  this  40th  anniversary  of  the  found- 
ing of  the  commission.  This  organiza- 
tion has  the  ability  to  provide  clear, 
analytic,  and  insightful  work  to  the 
countries  of  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean.  The  need  for  such  guidance 
has  never  been  greater.  We  wish  you 
gi'eat  success  over  the  coming  years 
of  your  service  to  our  hemisphere. 

This  22d  session  of  ECLAC  is  an 
opportunity  to  review  the  past  four 
decades  and  the  wide  swings  of  the  eco- 
nomic pendulum  which  have  occurred. 
As  ECLAC  embarks  on  its  fifth  dec- 
ade, we  hope  a  consensus  can  emerge 
on  the  approach  we  must  take  to  even 
out  some  of  the  economic  swings  and 
begin  a  steady  climb  of  sustained  eco- 
nomic progress.  ECLAC  can  help  solid- 
ify this  consensus.  ECLAC  can  help  all 
of  us  to  focus  our  efforts  toward  the 
difficult  adjustments  critical  to  eco- 
nomic development,  toward  greater  pri- 
vate sector  contribution  to  growth,  and 
toward  the  development  of  strong  cap- 
ital markets  in  debtor  countries. 

Relationship  Between 
Economic  and  Political  Freedom 

Underlying  the  strictly  economic  issues 
which  we  will  discuss  in  this  22d  ses- 
sion is  the  direct  relationship  and  inter- 
play between  economic  and  political 
freedom.  This  is  a  basic  tenet  of  U.S. 
Government  policy. 

For  Latin  America,  the  decade  of 
the  1980s  has  been  marked  by  profound 
political  change.  It  is  a  decade  where 
freedom  has  been  on  the  march  in 
Latin  America.  Democratically  elected 
governments  have  come  to  power  in  11 
countries,  replacing  dictatorships  or 
military  regimes.  Over  90%  of  the 
peoples  of  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean  now  live  under  democratic 
regimes,  as  compared  to  only  one-third 
in  1976.  This  profound  advance  for  de- 
mocracy is  tremendously  encouraging. 


The  acceleration  of  democratization 
in  Latin  America  is  exciting  and  vital. 
But  it  is  not  in  itself  sufficient.  Even 
some  believers  in  political  democracy 
have  misguidedly  infringed  upon  eco- 
nomic and  personal  freedoms  in  the 
service  of  statist  or  other  restrictive 
theories  of  economic  life.  The  United 
States  is  committed  to  the  proposition 
that  economic  freedom  and  political 
freedom  are  inseparably  linked.  Presi- 
dent Reagan  is  personally  dedicated  to 
this  principle,  which  is  founded  on  the 
lessons  of  hard  e.\perience.  The  evi- 
dence of  the  failure  of  the  statist  model 
is  seen  whenever  and  wherever  it  is 
compared  with  one  based  upon  individ- 
ual freedom  of  economic  choice. 

This  connection  is  clear  in  the  ex- 
perience of  Latin  America  in  the  1980s. 
The  shift  to  democracy  coincided  with 
a  period  of  economic  difficulties  that 
made  the  job  of  elected  governments 
harder.  Economic  gains,  particularly  in 
per  capita  income,  were  eroded  by  fall- 
ing commodity  prices,  global  recession, 
and  by  internal  debt  servicing  costs. 
Above  all,  democracies  were  beset  by 
lack  of  confidence  in  their  own  econo- 
mies by  citizens  who  withdrew  huge 
amounts  of  capital  from  the  region.  It 
became  clear,  more  than  ever  before, 
that  fiscal  deficits  could  not  be  covered 
by  foreign  borrowing.  Deficiencies  in 
the  economic  policies  of  most  govern- 
ments in  the  region  were  identified  as 
the  root  cause  of  economic  instability, 
of  the  massive  capital  flight,  and  of 
stagnation. 

The  task  of  newly  elected  demo- 
cratic leaders  in  consolidating  democ- 
racy consequently  has  been  complicated 
by  the  need  to  reduce  and  reorient  the 
government's  dominant  role.  Govern- 
ments have  begun  to  see  the  need  to 
begin  to  shift  to  market-oriented  pol- 
icies in  order  to  permit  their  citizens  to 
produce  at  levels  closer  to  their  true 
potential.  We  should  never  underesti- 
mate the  ability  and  resourcefulness  of 
our  citizens  to  work  toward  a  better 
future.  As  governments,  we  must  be 
sure  that  we  don't  stand  in  their  way. 

Sustaining  Economic  Growth 

The  serious  debt  problem  is  symptoma- 
tic of  the  general  economic  difficulties 
confronting  debtor  countries.  However, 
a  narrow  focus  on  the  debt  burden 
alone  too  often  has  obscured  and  dis- 
tracted attention  from  the  underlying 


and  more  important  issue — how  to  f 
our  economies  on  a  path  of  noninflal 
ary  economic  growth  which  is  sustai 
ble  over  the  long  term.  For  this  reaj 
the  "international  debt  strategy"  pli 
emphasis  on  the  measures  needed  t* 
achieve  that  kind  of  gi'owth.  The  me 
ings  of  the  Interim  Committee  and 
Development  Committee  of  the  Wor 
Bank,  just  concluded  in  Washington 
reaffirmed  the  importance  of  contini 
a  case-by-case  approach  to  debt  proi 
lems.  The  Interim  Committee  stresi 
the  importance  of  maintaining  open^ 
growing  markets  for  debtor  countrirt 
exports  and  timely  financial  supporil 
facilitate  the  pursuit  of  growth-orie; 
adjustment  policies  in  debtor  counti 
Clearly,  the  debt  problems  of  tl 
region  remain  of  fundamental  concel 
to  us,  and  we  recognize  that  a  strort 
cooperative  approach  must  be  contij 
to  address  these  problems.  Economi 
growth  is  the  basis  of  that  approacHi 
the  context  of  comprehensive  progri 
of  reform  supported  by  adequate  fijl 
cing  to  support  the  reform  process, 
international  strategy  to  address  da 
problems  of  the  region  is  a  dynamic* 
evolving  one.  The  development  of  at 
"menu"  approach  to  commercial  bai< 
financing  packages  provides  additioi 
flexibility  for  both  new  financing  flw 
and  new  debt  conversion  techniquefi 
And  while  all  of  us  would  wish  for 
faster  progress,  the  results  to  date 
been  greater  than  generally  realizei 
According  to  the  World  Bank,  grow- 
last  year  for  the  five  major  debtors 
globally  averages  2.5%-3%  versus  £ 
negative  growth  in  1983.  Export  eai. 
ings  rose  sharply  last  year  to  13%, 
imports  were  up  7%.  Debt  service 
ratios  have  fallen,  and,  in  some  cast- 
capital  flight  has  begun  to  be  reveri 
And  while  growth  in  a  few  countrie 
faltered  last  year,  we  expect  the  im 
mentation  of  sound  economic  reforn 
programs  will  allow  for  sustained 
growth  in  the  period  ahead.  We  exp 
the  international  environment  to  re 
main  supportive  with  another  year 
solid  global  growth;  near  3%  in  indi 
trial  countries  and  3.5%  or  more  foi 
non-oil  LDCs  [less  developed  coun- 
tries]. Industrial  country  inflation  v 
remain  low,  and  global  trade  volumt 
will  continue  to  expand. 


68 


UNITED  NATIONS 


In  this  context,  the  policy  prescrip- 
i  which  we  make  here  today  are 
d  on  recognition  that  a  free  mar- 
lace  is  the  most  efficient  and  pro- 
ive  model.  The  functions  of  a 
imic  market  require  a  sound  mac- 
inomic  setting:  realistic  exchange 
5,  greater  fiscal  discipline,  market- 
rmined  pricing  of  goods  and  serv- 
control  of  inflation,  more  liberal 
J  policies,  and  reducing  other  dis- 
lons  which  impede  the  function  of 
marketplace.  We  believe  ECLAC 
Id  devote  much  more  of  its  efforts 
ludying  the  introduction  and  imple- 
.ation  of  these  tried  and  true  pre- 
itions.  The  market  makes  choices 
d  on  efficiency  and  effectiveness.  A 
imarket  is  the  answer  to  achieving 
Ificant  and  lasting  long-term  bene- 
particularly  in  terms  of  more  effi- 
.  use  of  resources,  sustainable  and 
d-based  growth,  and  greater  flexi- 
l  in  response  to  external  change, 
laring  government  can  avoid  re- 
■sibility  for  the  future,  for  the  well- 
g  of  the  next  generation  and  the 
hfter  that.  Time  and  again,  the  re- 
^1  of  such  price  controls  has  re- 
fld  in  increased  supplies,  and 
ally  higher  prices  have  then  fallen — 
ne  would  expect  from  the  operation 
lee  markets. 

iBureaucratic  and  legal  constraints 
ivestment  protect  the  firms  pres- 
f  operating  in  a  market.  However, 
jcation  of  such  constraints  will  per- 
JBntry  of  new  firms  and  in  this  way 
jte  far  greater  economic  benefits, 
iter  employment,  increase  in 
Ler  skills,  increased  tax  revenues, 
la  wider  choice  of  goods  and  serv- 
:for  consumers  are  the  result. 
The  hard  experiences  of  the  1980s 
i  prompted  most  countries  in  our 
lisphere  to  take  steps  toward  a  con- 
•.us  that  economic  growth  requires  a 
lamental  shift  away  from  the  statist 
•oach.  It  is  this  emerging  consensus 
:h  I  believe  will  set  the  policy 
lework  for  the  Americas  (North, 
tral,  and  South)  in  the  1990s.  For 
Tiple,  Mexico,  supported  by  World 
k  trade  policy  loans,  has  signifi- 
.ly  reduced  both  tariff  and  nontariff 
riers  to  trade,  even  surpassing  Bank 
I  targets.  Bolivia  has  undertaken  a 
lamental  restructuring  of  its  econ- 
'.  Colombia,  Chile,  and  Uruguay 
linated  many  price  controls  and  im- 
iii  iments  to  pi-ivate  sector  activity. 
ta  Rica,  the  Dominican  Repubhc, 
ninica,  and  Jamaica  have  adopted 
'6  export-oriented  policies  which 


;  lartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


ke 


U.S.  Supports  Security  Council  Resolution 
on  Chemical  Weapons 


Following  are  a  statement  by  Ver- 
non A.  Walters,  U.S.  Permanent  Rep- 
resentative to  the  United  Nations, 
before  the  Security  Council  on  May  9, 
1988,  and  the  text  of  the  UN  Security 
Council  resolution  adopted  that  day. 


AMBASSADOR  WALTERS' 
STATEMENTi 

The  United  States  fully  supports  this 
strong  action  by  the  Security  Council. 
We  condemn  without  reservation  illegal 
use  of  chemical  weapons  by  both  sides 
in  the  gulf  conflict.  The  report  submit- 
ted April  25  by  the  Secretary  General 
notes  a  recent  alarming  escalation  in 
such  use. 

As  the  other  Council  members  are 
aware,  we  have  condemned  in  the 
strongest  terms  the  recent  use  of  chem- 
ical weapons  in  violation  of  the  1925 
Geneva  protocol.  In  particular,  use  of 
chemical  weapons  against  noncombat- 
ants  is  an  egregious  offense  against  civ- 
ihzation  and  humanity. 

We  are  also  troubled  by  evidence 
that  both  Iraq  and  Iran  are  continuing 
to  enhance  their  chemical  weapons  ca- 
pability through  acquisition  of  precur- 
sors for  chemical  weapons  production. 
We  continue  to  urge  those  states  that 
have  not  already  done  so  to  adopt  strict 
controls  on  the  export  of  chemical 
weapons  precursors  to  both  parties. 

It  is  imperative  to  act  to  prevent 
further  erosion  of  existing  international 
constraints  on  chemical  weapons  use. 
We  reiterate  our  appeal  to  both  sides  to 
cease  use  of  chemical  weapons  and  to 
abide  by  the  terms  of  customary  and 
conventional  international  law,  includ- 
ing the  Geneva  protocol  to  which  they 
both  subscribe. 


The  horror  of  this  recent  illegal  use 
of  chemical  weapons  underscores  the 
urgency  of  achieving  a  negotiated  set- 
tlement to  the  gulf  war  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible through  implementation  in  full  of 
UN  Security  Council  Resolution  598, 
the  agreed  framework  for  ending  this 
senseless  conflict.  We  call  on  members 
of  the  Council  to  rededicate  themselves 
to  this  vital  effort. 


UN  SECURITY  COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION  612^ 

The  Security  Council. 

Having  considered  the  report  of 
25  April  1988  (S/19823)  of  the  Mission  dis- 
patched by  the  Secretary-General  to  inves- 
tigate allegations  of  the  use  of  chemical 
weapons  in  the  conflict  between  the  Isla- 
mic Republic  of  Iran  and  Iraq, 

Dismayed  by  the  Mission's  conclusions 
that  chemical  weapons  continue  to  be  used 
in  the  conflict  and  that  their  use  has  been 
on  an  even  more  intensive  scale  than 
before, 

1.  Affirms  the  urgent  necessity  of 
strict  observance  of  the  Protocol  for  the 
Prohibition  of  the  Use  in  War  of  Asphyx- 
iating, Poisonous  or  Other  Gases,  and  of 
Bacteriological  Methods  of  Warfare,  signed 
at  Geneva  on  17  June  1925; 

2.  Condemns  vigorously  the  continued 
use  of  chemical  weapons  in  the  conflict  be- 
tween Iran  and  Iraq  contrary  to  the  obli- 
gations under  the  Geneva  Protocol; 

3.  Expects  both  sides  to  refrain  from 
the  future  use  of  chemical  weapons  in  ac- 
cordance with  their  obligations  under  the 
Geneva  Protocol; 

4.  Calls  upon  all  States  to  continue  to 
apply  or  to  establish  strict  control  of  the 
export  to  the  parties  to  the  conflict  of 
chemical  products  serving  for  the  produc- 
tion of  chemical  weapons; 

5.  Decides  to  remain  seized  of  the  mat- 
ter and  expresses  its  determination  to  re- 
view the  implementation  of  this  resolution. 


'USUN  press  release  41. 
-Adopted  by  a  unanimous  vote. I 


69 


UNITED  NATIONS 


have  enabled  them  to  take  advantage  of 
the  benefits  of  the  U.S.  Caribbean 
Basin  Initiative. 

Over  the  past  several  years,  the 
Central  American  democracies  have 
adopted  macroeconomic  policies  and 
programs  designed  to  stimulate  export- 
led  growth  generated  by  the  private 
sector.  The  fact  that  the  average  real 
growth  rate  of  these  five  countries  im- 
proved from  a  negative  4%  in  1982  to  a 
positive  2.5%  in  1987  is  a  remarkable 
achievement.  Argentina,  Chile,  and 
Guyana  have  taken  steps  to  make  state- 
run  enterprises  more  efficient  and  in 
some  cases  to  convert  them  to  more 
dynamic  and  productive  private  sector 
management. 

Despite  these  and  other  examples, 
the  process  toward  free  market  and 
growth-oriented  policies  has  been  slow 
and  there  has  been  some  backsliding.  It 
is  difficult.  This  process  forces  hard 
choices  and  requires  governments  to  tell 
some  special  interest  constitutents  that 
favorite  programs  cost  too  much.  How- 
ever, evidence  shows  that  where  gov- 
ernments encourage,  rather  than  hin- 
der, the  development  of  entrepre- 
neurship,  private  initiative  will  point 
the  way  toward  economic  growth.  The 
role  of  the  government  needs  to  be 
carefully  limited  and  defined  to  provide 
a  clear  and  level  playing  field  for  busi- 
ness activity.  Privatization  of  state- 
owned  enterprises  is  only  one,  but  an 
increasingly  important,  means  to 
achieve  this  end. 

As  we  have  seen  many  times,  pri- 
vate investment — whether  domestic  or 
foreign — shies  away  from  climates  of  in- 
stability and  overregulation.  The  mas- 
sive capital  flight  experienced  by  Latin 
American  countries  in  the  last  decade 
was  the  result  of  unfavorable  and  shift- 
ing investment  climates.  It  will  be  re- 
versed only  if  the  owners  of  capital 
believe  that  the  rules  have  changed  for 
the  long  haul.  Likewise,  foreign  invest- 
ment will  follow  adoption  of  sound  eco- 
nomic policies. 

The  United  States  is  prepared  to 
assist  in  efforts  to  encourage  flows  of 
foreign  investment  capital,  where  inves- 
tors are  attracted  by  favorable  domestic 
policies  and  business  potential.  We  have 
ratified  the  newly  created  Multilateral 
Investment  Guarantee  Agency  and 
support  the  agency  in  its  efforts  to  di- 
rect equity  capital  to  developing  coun- 
tries. We  encourage  those  governments 
of  the  region  who  have  not  yet  done  so, 
to  take  a  careful  look  at  the  potential 
benefits  membership  could  offer  to 
their  economies. 

Liberalization  of  financial  markets 
and  the  development  of  strong  capital 
markets  in  developing  countries  are  es- 


sential areas  in  which  increased  focus 
can  reap  large,  significant,  long-term 
benefits.  For  economic  development  to 
be  self-sustaining,  the  financial  sector 
must  operate  on  a  market  basis  and  be 
capable  of  functioning  efficiently,  free 
of  excessive  regulation.  Mobilizing  sav- 
ings, domestic  as  well  as  foreign,  and 
the  efficient  allocation  of  these  savings 
are  critical  to  sustaining  economic 
growth. 

The  Need  for  an  Open  Trading  System 

Finally,  economic  growth  is  strongly 
dependent  upon  international  com- 
petitiveness. Developing  country  lead- 
ers are  recognizing  the  costs  and 
limitations  of  inward-looking  trade  pol- 
icies. The  benefits  of  import  substitu- 
tions are  quickly  exhausted.  Such 
policies  leave  as  their  inheritance  high- 
cost  industries  which  are  confined  to 
small  domestic  markets  and  dependent 
on  high  levels  of  protection. 

Such  a  waste  of  economic  potential 
is  particularly  tragic  at  a  time  when 
new  technologies  in  production  and  in- 
formation are  revolutionizing  the  world 
economy.  Our  capacity  for  producing 
and  distributing  goods  and  services  is 
changing  and  growing  in  ways  unim- 
agined  just  a  few  years  ago.  Technology 
is  creating  an  increasingly  interdepend- 
ent and  specialized  world  economy.  The 
benefits  of  participating  in  such  an 
economy  are  large  and  growing.  At- 
tempts to  live  quietly  and  securely  be- 
hind protectionist  walls  are  a  harsh 
sentence  to  economic  stagnation,  stran- 
gulation, and  poverty. 

The  countries  of  Latin  America 
and  the  Caribbean  have  the  natural  and 
human  resources  to  play  a  major  role 
in  the  world  economy.  Fortunately,  a 
number  of  them  have  begun  to  take  the 
steps  necessary  to  fulfill  their  po- 
tential— more  rational,  more  market- 
based,  and  more  open  trading  regimes. 
Reduced  protection  and  greater  trans- 
parency in  policymaking  and  admin- 
istration of  trade  regimes  will 
encourage  more  efficiency  and  in- 
novation in  production,  improved  com- 
petiveness  internationally,  and 
improved  allocation  of  domestic  re- 
sources. There  are  costs  to  these  policy 
changes.  They  disrupt  entrenched  in- 
terests and  force  adaptation  and 
change.  But  the  benefits  are  enormous. 
Real  lasting  economic  growth  will  be 
achieved  that  far  exceeds  any  transitory 
dislocation  costs. 


It  is  fortuitous  that  the  current  I 
series  of  global  trade  negotiations  is*  i 
designated  by  the  name  of  an  ECL.^' 
country.  The  Uruguay  Round  serve.^ 
a  symbol  of  the  contributions  made 
the  region  to  the  world  economy  an()f 
the  need  for  greater  participation  in  he 
international  trading  system.  As  coi  • 
tries  of  the  region  achieve  greater  d 
velopment  and  trade  competitivenes 
they  have  both  the  right  and  the  ob  a- 
tion  to  participate  more  fully  in  the 
shared  responsibility  for  the  interna 
tional  trading  system. 

The  Uruguay  Round  is  aimed  a( 
major  liberalization  of  trade  barrier 
both  in  industry  and  in  agi-iculture- 
sector  which  is  of  crucial  importance 
to  so  many  countries  of  the  region. 
Clearly,  developed  countries  have  a  - 
sponsibility  to  lead  the  Internationa 
progress  toward  trade  liberalization  Ki 
the  same  time,  the  countries  of  Lat 
America  and  other  developing  regio 
also  have  an  increasingly  important  •- 
sponsibility  in  this  process,  commer  i- 
rate  with  their  growing  importance 
the  world  trading  system. 

Another  major  objective  of  the 
round  is  to  increase  the  effectivenet  of 
the  GATT  [General  Agreement  on  ''  ■- 
iffs  and  Ti-ade],  so  that  its  rules  are  ot 
only  improved  but  also  are  respecte 
more  fully.  Again,  the  advanced  de\  ■ 
oping  countries  will  have  a  crucial  i  ? 
in  ensuring  the  implementation  of 
agreed  rules  negotiated  in  the  roun 

Finally,  the  round  is  aimed  at 
adapting  the  international  trading  t  .- 
tern  to  the  profound  changes  which 
technology  has  brought  and  will  cor 
tinue  to  bring  to  international  econi  lic 
exchanges.  Ti-ade  used  to  be  definei  n 
terms  of  "a  barrel  of  port  and  a  boh  f 
cloth"  moving  between  London  and 
Lisbon.  It  now  includes  such  exchai  es 
as  an  electronic  impulse  sent  by  a  c  i- 
puter  in  Kuala  Lumpur  to  a  comput ' 
in  San  Francisco  or  a  set  of  technic; 
specifications  from  an  engineer  in  S 
Paolo  to  an  engineer  in  Rome.  The 
rules  of  the  international  trading  sy 
tern  must  adapt  to  these  new  dynan ; 
types  of  trade.  Developing  countriet 
have  an  enormous  stake  in  ensuring 
that  the  benefits  of  technological  ini  - 
vation  are  exchanged  as  freely  and 
competitively  as  possible. 

The  United  States  has  long  beeia 
leader  in  the  drive  toward  a  more  o  m 
and  integrated  international  economi 
system.  We  remain  strongly  commiljd 
to  resisting  protectionist  pressures,  iot 
only  because  we  believe  such  a  worli 
best  serves  our  own  long-term  interjts 


70 


Deoartment  of  State  Bulletin/Julv  108 


UNITED  NATIONS 


"'ffj  ;  also  because  it  is  the  surest  and 

I  test  route  to  long-term,  self-sustain- 
Kl  ;  growth  for  the  developing  world. 

,Jnclusion 

delegation  came  to  the  22d  session 
Asti  ECLAC  because  we  remain  con- 
ned, engaged,  and  optimistic  about 
i  economic  future  of  our  hemisphere, 
of  us  have  long  pointed  to  the  great 
ential  which  e.xists  for  many  coun- 
ilensles  in  the  region  and  for  the  hemi- 
ere  as  a  whole.  The  United  States  is 
imitted  to  help  realize  this  potential 
i  our  bilateral  relations  and  through 
iiltilateral  institutions  and  organiza- 
t  n.-^.  We  will  continue  our  support  for 
t '  international  financial  institutions 
;  evidenced  most  recently  by  the 
;  reement  on  a  general  capital  increase 
(the  World  Bank.  We  will  continue  to 
I  iport  and  further  the  objectives  of 
r  international  institutions  as  we 
i\e  to  maintain  a  domestic  market 
-11  to  the  exports  of  developing 
iiiti'ies. 

Our  hope  is  that  the  governments 
our  Latin  American  and  Caribbean 
ighbors  will  be  able  to  use  the  avail- 
le  support  to  develop  the  untapped 
man.  material,  and  financial  re- 
Ji-ces  of  the  hemisphere.  To  succeed, 
iically  important  economic  policies  to 
pport  sustained  growth  must  be  put 
place.  However,  if  we  work  together, 
'  can  look  forward  to  realizing  the 
tential  for  dynamic,  sustained  eco- 
mie  growth  too  long  unfulfilled. 
It  is  up  to  us,  the  members  of 
I3LAC,  to  insist  that  our  organization 
eet  the  needs  of  the  present  and  of 
e  future — not  those  of  times  past. 
lis  can  be  an  important  forum  for  in- 
llfctual  leadership  to  spur  economic 
uwth  and  advance  human  dignity. 

I  began  my  talk  with  a  reference  to 
le  40  years  which  have  passed  since 
le  founding  of  this  organization.  I  will 
S|mclude  with  the  observation  that  the 
rst  inter-American  conference,  called 
/  Simon  Bolivar,  met  more  than  160 
itjears  ago.  There  is  no  more  fitting  time 
)  rededicate  ourselves  to  the  dream  of 
le  Americas.  ■ 


FY  1989  Assistance  Requests 
for  Organizations  and  Programs 


by  Richard  S.  Williamson 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Foreign  Operations  of  the  House  Ap- 
propriations Committee  on  April  13, 
1988.  Ambassador  Williamson  is  As- 
sistant Secretary  for  International  Or- 
ganization Affairs.^ 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  appear  before  you 
today  in  support  of  the  President's 
fiscal  year  (FY)  1989  budget  request  of 
$200  million  for  the  "International  Or- 
ganizations and  Programs"  account. 
This  request  is  a  sound  one.  As  you 
know,  this  account  funds  U.S.  volun- 
tary contributions  to  development,  hu- 
manitarian, and  scientific  assistance 
programs  of  the  United  Nations  and 
the  Organization  of  American  States 
(OAS). 

Our  request  represents  a  modest 
3%  increase  over  last  year's  request  but 
is  below  what  was  actually  appropriated 
for  FY  1988.  The  increase  in  our  re- 
quest arises  from  our  sensitivity  to  the 
priority  which  Congress  attaches  to  the 
programs  in  this  account,  tempered  by 
a  realistic  assessment  of  what  they  can 
achieve  and  the  Administration's  com- 
mitment to  maintaining  the  budget 
summit  compromise  reached  with  the 
Congress  last  year.  We  have  done  our 
best  to  include  sufficient  funding  for 
the  organizations  usually  included  in 
our  request  as  well  as  for  several  items 
added  by  the  Congress  in  past  years  to 
our  requests. 

As  you  know,  our  contributions 
funded  by  this  account  are  voluntary. 
As  a  result,  the  Congress  and  the  Ad- 
ministration always  have  been  able  to 
exercise  a  greater  measure  of  control 
over  the  size  of  the  account  as  a  whole 
as  well  as  the  amounts  allocated  to  the 
individual  components.  Therefore,  the 
key  question  before  us  today  is — how 
can  we  best  assure  that  the  use  of  tax- 
payers' money  for  voluntary  contribu- 
tions promotes  the  interests  and  values 
of  the  American  people?  We  have  done 
our  best  to  strike  what  we  believe  is  a 
realistic  balance  in  behalf  of  taxpayer 
interests. 

My  statement  today  will  focus, 
first,  on  three  general  points:  the  diver- 
sity of  the  activities  and  programs  in 
this  account,  the  need  for  multilateral 
programs  to  address  global  challenges 
that  no  one  nation  can  tackle  alone,  and 


the  direct  benefit  of  those  activities  for 
U.S.  citizens.  I  will  then  turn  to  a 
more  detailed  review  of  the  account, 
weighing  the  importance  and  effective- 
ness of  the  programs  against  the  four 
criteria  which  we  have  used  to  help  as- 
sure that  they  do,  in  fact,  serve  signifi- 
cant U.S.  interests. 

Diversity  of  Account  Activities 

This  account  addresses  some  of  the 
most  critical  global  challenges  of  this 
decade.  It  ranges  from  the  outstanding 
efforts  in  child  survival  of  the  United 
Nations  Children's  Fund  (UNICEF),  to 
the  monitoring  of  ecosystems  and  storm 
systems  of  the  World  Meteorological 
Organization  (WMO)  and  United  Na- 
tions Environment  Program  (UNEP), 
to  the  efforts  to  harness  nuclear  energy 
safely  and  efficiently  of  the  Interna- 
tional Atomic  Energy  Agency  (IAEA). 

There  are  less  well-known  pro- 
grams, which  also  affect  important 
global  issues.  For  example,  the  UN 
Capital  Development  Fund  is  helping 
the  Government  of  Somalia  to  rehabili- 
tate reservoirs  which  provide  some 
700,000  nomads  and  their  livestock  with 
water  during  the  dry  season.  The  UN 
Educational  and  Training  Program  for 
Southern  Africa  has  tried,  by  awarding 
scholarships  to  college-age  black  South 
Africans  and  Namibians,  to  provide 
support  to  those  opposed  to  apartheid. 
U.S.  contributions  to  the  UN  Voluntary 
Fund  for  Victims  of  Torture  provide 
medical  and  legal  assistance  to  victims 
of  oppression. 

Need  for  a  Multilateral  Approach 

U.S.  voluntary  contributions  to  interna- 
tional organizations  are  a  small,  but 
important,  part  of  our  involvement  in 
the  international  system.  In  many  in- 
stances, U.S.  unilateral  activity  would 
not  be  as  effective  or  have  as  broad  an 
impact  as  does  a  multilateral  effort.  It 
would,  in  many  instances,  cost  us  more. 
For  example,  weather  forecasting  by 
WMO  gives  us  fast,  effective  access  to 
data  from  many  other  nations  which  we 
could  not  collect  ourselves. 

Multilateral  progi-ams  are  also  able 
to  operate  in  areas  of  genuine  need 
where  an  identifiable  U.S.  program 
might  be  unwelcome.  In  addition,  UN 


l()epartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


71 


UNITED  NATIONS 


agencies  can  often  assume  a  coordinat- 
ing role  in  urgent  and  sensitive  situa- 
tions. UNICEF  has  made  an  important 
contribution  tlirough  its  partnership 
with  the  international  donor  community 
in  providing  emergency  relief  in  war- 
torn  countries — far  exceeding  U.S.  ca- 
pability for  outreach. 

Because  of  UNEP's  global  approach 
to  environmental  issues,  such  as  protec- 
tion of  the  ozone  layer  and  control  of 
pollution  of  regional  seas,  including  the 
Caribbean,  we  can  maximize  collective 
efforts  to  protect  the  international  en- 
vironment. The  success  of  recent  nego- 
tiations to  protect  the  ozone  layer  is  an 
example  of  the  kind  of  problem  that  the 
United  States  cannot  tackle  alone. 

Another  example  of  the  need  to 
find  multilateral  answers  to  multilateral 
problems  is  the  safeguards  system  of 
the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency.  By  U.S.  law,  the  United  States 
is  required  to  apply  IAEA  safeguards 
to  U.S.  nuclear  exports.  Without  the 
international  safeguards  system,  we 
would  be  forced  by  our  own  laws  to 
implement  our  own  safeguards  system. 
Such  a  system  would  almost  certainly 
be  less  effective.  It  would  definitely  be 
more  costly  than  the  current  interna- 
tional system. 

Under  our  budget  constraints,  and 
as  OECD-nation  [Organization  for  Eco- 
nomic Cooperation  and  Development] 
economic  assistance  to  developing  coun- 
tries remains  static,  the  effectiveness  of 
UN  system  programs  is  more  impor- 
tant than  ever  U.S.  contributions  to 
these  programs,  though  small  by  com- 
parison with  the  billions  the  United 
States  provides  annually  in  economic 
assistance,  give  us  considerable  influ- 
ence on  the  content  and  management  of 
UN  programs,  making  the  United 
States  a  key  voice  in  the  way  the  inter- 
national system  addresses  development 
problems. 

Benefits  to  Americans 

Too  often  there  is  a  temptation  to  dis- 
miss the  international  organizations  and 
programs  account  as  simply  "foreign 
aid."  Although  it  does  indeed  assist 
those  abroad,  it  is  important  to  under- 
score that  U.S.  citizens  benefit  directly 
and  significantly  from  the  activities 
funded  through  this  account. 

Many  of  the  activities  funded  with 
international  organizations  and  pro- 
grams money  (for  example,  training) 
are  undertaken  here  in  the  United 
States,  or  use  U.S.  experts,  services, 


and  equipment.  A  significant  portion  of 
this  funding  never  leaves  the  United 
States,  or  it  returns  home  to  American 
pockets  in  the  form  of  salaries  or  ex- 
penses. These  economic  and  profes- 
sional ties,  moreover,  have  long-range 
implications.  None  of  us  can  say  with 
certainty  just  how  many  follow-on  con- 
tracts have  gone  to  U.S.  firms,  how 
many  U.S.  experts  have  been  re- 
quested by  name  by  other  govern- 
ments, and  how  much  U.S.  equipment 
has  been  purchased  as  a  spin-off  of 
U.S.  assistance  provided  by  interna- 
tional organizations  and  programs 
activities. 

The  FY  1989  Request 

Let  us  now  turn  to  a  more  detailed 
review  of  our  request.  Our  congres- 
sional presentation  for  FY  1989  indi- 
cates proposed  funding  for  each 
organization,  including  a  comparison 
with  last  year's  funding  levels.  As  I 
noted  at  the  outset,  we  have  also  made 
a  concerted  effort  to  ensure  that  funds 
appropriated  for  FY  1989  are  used 
wisely  to  serve  the  interests  of  the 
American  people.  In  considering  ac- 
tivities for  inclusion  in  our  funding  re- 
quest, we  have  applied  four  criteria  in 
screening  these  activities.  I  believe  that 
these  four  criteria  would  enjoy  broad 
support  among  the  American  people. 
According  to  these  criteria,  expend- 
itures from  this  account  should: 

•  Serve  national  interests  that  can- 
not be  met  more  effectively  through  ei- 
ther unilateral  or  bilateral  actions; 

•  Demonstrate  tangible  U.S.  sup- 
port for  humanitarian  activities; 

•  Encourage  reliance  on  market 
forces  and  the  private  sector  which  are 
the  real  engines  for  development;  and 

•  Reflect  a  cost-effective  approach 
to  implementation  of  projects  and  pro- 
gi'ams.  The  operational  improvements 
which  the  United  States  has  encour- 
aged for  organizations  receiving  our  as- 
sessed contributions  should  apply  also 
to  those  receiving  our  voluntary 
contributions. 

In  preparing  our  request,  every 
effort  was  made  to  assure  that  the  ac- 
tivities to  be  funded  by  our  proposed 
contributions  meet  these  criteria.  I  be- 
lieve we  have  succeeded  in  our  efforts. 
These  agencies  are  generally  responsive 
to  U.S.  concerns.  We  do  believe,  how- 
ever, that  most  of  the  organizations  in 
this  account  could  do  a  much  better  job 
at  hiring  more  Americans.  We  have 


made  this  point  consistently  and  wi 
continue  to  work  to  assure  equitabl 
U.S.  representation  in  these  intern 
tional  organizations. 

Keeping  in  mind  these  criteria, 
which  helped  to  shape  our  budget  i 
quest,  I  would  now  like  to  focus  on  le 
individual  programs  within  the  acciiit 

The  largest  item  in  the  accounika 
$112  million  request  for  the  United  la- 
tions  Development  Program  (UNI'). 
This  amount  represents  a  significar  in- 
crease over  our  FY  1988  request  ai 
reflects  our  longstanding  policy  to 
strengthen  the  UNDP  as  the  prim;/ 
source  of  funding  and  overall  coord  i- 
tion  for  technical  cooperation  activ:  b 
conducted  by  UN  system  agencies   d 
programs. 

Administrator  William  Draper, 
U.S.  citizen,  has  strengthened  the 
management  reform  effort  begun  l 
Brad  Morse,  your  former  colleague  n 
1985,  aimed  at  improving  program  .al- 
ity  and  strengthening  its  impact.  1  ■ 
internal  management  review  syste 
that  Administrator  Draper  has  put  i 
place,  coupled  with  the  increased  c  r- 
sight  made  possible  by  members 
through  the  UNDP  Governing  Con  il's 
Working  Group  of  the  Committee  (  :h( 
Whole,  has  opened  up  new  avenue;  o 
the  improvement  of  progi'am  desig 
implementation,  and  financing. 

Administrator  Draper,  with  co  cil 
members  from  both  donors  and  rei  i- 
ent  countries,  is  committed  to  add  >s- 
ing  the  tough  management  probler  of 
far-flung  field  programs  and  makii 
sure  UNDP's  activities  make  a  me  ar- 
able difference.  One  aspect  of  this  n- 
cern  is  the  dispersion  of  programs  to 
many  small  activities.  With  this  cc 
cern  in  mind,  we  have  encouraged 
UNDP  to  focus  its  efforts.  UNDP  is 
been  responsive  to  this  concern  in,  Dr 
example,  its  careful  review  of  its  p  - 
grams  in  Africa.  UNDP  can  play  a  at- 
alytic  role  and  needs  to  retain  a  b£  mo 
between  flexibility  and  focus  in  its  ro- 
graming.  UNDP  is  also  playing  an  \- 
creasingly  important  role  in  the 
structural  adjustment  process  in  d  el- 
oping countries  by  helping  them  fi  , 
in  conjunction  with  the  World  Ban 
appropriate  ways  to  address  the  scial 
issues  in  the  design  of  future  strucfra 
adjustment  programs  and  strengtln- 
ing  the  capability  of  developing  coiltn 
officials  to  manage  these  complex 
programs. 

The  second  largest  item  in  ourje- 
quest  is  $32  million  for  the  United  ■ 
Nations  Children's  Fund.  This  is  ;; 
modest  increase  of  $2  million  over  ir 


72 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/JulybSi 


UNITED  NATIONS 


UtSS  request.  UNICEF's  widely  ac- 
nied,  cost-effective  measui'es  in 
J  health — particularly  immunization 
iirams  against  the  six  major  child- 
li  diseases  and  the  promotion  and 
( if  oral  rehydration  therapy — are 
iiiiated  to  avoid  up  to  40,000  child- 
il  deaths  per  week.  The  fund  is  also 
lived  in  other  important — if  less 
;  publicized — programs,  such  as 
'■  supply  and  sanitation.  Our  re- 
reflects  our  dual  commitment  to 
ihstantive  work  of  the  organiza- 
i  and  the  necessity  for  fiscal 
ti'aint. 
The  third  largest  item  in  our 
r  uest  is  $24  million  for  the  Inter- 
n  ional  Atomic  Energy  Agency. 
1  s  request  represents  a  7.6%  increase 
1  V  our  FY  1988  request.  This  increase 
tmues  our  longstanding  effort  to  re- 
iice  the  overall  credibility  and  effec- 
•iii'ss  of  international  nuclear 
miards.  Approximately  one-third  of 
iiital  U.S.  voluntary  contributions 
IAEA  for  FY  1989  will  be  spent  in 
iljort  of  the  safeguards  system.  This 
s  iport  is  increasingly  critical  in  light 
[  p-owing  demands  on  the  IAEA  for 
£  )anded  safeguards  coverage,  due  to 
t   increasing  number  and  complexity 
[  luclear  facilities.  Strong  U.S.  finan- 
( I  support  for  safeguards  is  essential 
i  he  effectiveness  of  this  central  ele- 
'  nt  of  international  efforts  to  prevent 
lurther  spread  of  nuclear  weapons 
II  be  maintained.  Although  we 
:  iingly  support  the  safeguards  pro- 
.  mi,  we  have  registered  our  concerns 
warding  the  downward  trend  of  U.S. 
c  izens  employed  in  the  safeguards  de- 
I'tment.  I  personally  have  had  discus- 
ns  with  Director  General  Blix  on  this 
jjfct,  and  he  is  well  aware  of  my 
s.i.pectations  in  this  regard. 
,  I    Members  of  the  Organization  of 
nerican  States  look  to  the  United 
ates  for  support  in  what  they  con- 
ler  to  be  their  primary  concern — 
•hnical  assistance  for  development. 
11'  request  of  $15  million  represents  a 
increase  over  our  FY  1988  request. 
'  believe  it  demonstrates  the  con- 
lued  U.S.  commitment  to  the  inter- 
iierican  system  and  will  influence  the 
■  el  (if  support  which  the  United 
atis  can  expect  from  other  OAS 
iiibers  on  issues  of  concern  to  us, 
eluding  respect  for  human  rights,  fair 
ade,  private  investment,  and  narcot- 
5  control. 

Our  request  for  $6.8  million  for  the 
N  Environment  Program  is  a  signifi- 
int  increase  over  our  FY  1988  request, 
he  increase  is  a  reflection  of  our  satis- 
ction  that  UNEP's  programs  and  ac- 


epartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


UN  Security  Council  Resolution 
on  South  Lebanon 


by  Vernon  A.  Walters 

Statement  before  the  UN  Security 
Council  on  May  10,  1988.  Ambassador 
Walters  is  U.S.  Permanent  Represen- 
tative to  the  United  Nations. '^ 

The  United  States  today  has  voted 
against  the  draft  resolution  on  southern 
Lebanon.  As  we  have  explained  on  pre- 
vious, similar  occasions,  we  believe  the 
Security  Council  should  not  address  the 
problems  of  southern  Lebanon  in  reso- 
lutions that  fail  to  recognize  the  attacks 
and  reprisals  originating  on  both  sides 
of  the  Israeli-Lebanese  border. 

The  United  States  strongly  sup- 
ports the  independence,  territorial  in- 
tegrity, and  unity  of  Lebanon.  We  have 
called  publicly  and  repeatedly  for  the 
withdrawal  of  all  foreign  troops  from 
Lebanon  and  the  extension  of  central- 
government  authority  throughout  the 
country.  This  is  still  our  position. 

We  are  deeply  concerned  by  the  re- 
cent heavy  casualties,  the  devastation 
of  property  and  displacement  of  individ- 
uals, and  by  the  cross-border  shellings 
and  other  activities  in  both  directions. 

The  sad  truth  remains  that  as  long 
as  armed,  extremist  elements  use 
southern  Lebanon  to  stage  terrorist  at- 
tacks against  Israel,  the  border  be- 


tween Israel  and  Lebanon  cannot  be 
secure.  All  those  who  provide  funds 
and  arms  to  militias  and  other  groups 
that  operate  in  southern  Lebanon, 
while  denying  the  authority  of  the  cen- 
tral Lebanese  Government,  must  share 
the  responsibility  for  the  continued  in- 
stability in  that  area. 

The  United  States  is  aware  that 
armed  Palestinian  elements,  supported 
by  Hizballah  and  other  groups,  have 
made  repeated  attempts  in  the  last  4 
months  to  enter  Israel  from  Lebanon  to 
carry  out  violent  acts.  Therefore,  we 
cannot  accept  a  resolution  that  does  not 
acknowledge  the  well-known  fact  that 
hostile  acts  against  Israel  are  originat- 
ing in  Lebanon. 

My  government  reaffirms  its  com- 
mitment to  UN  Security  Council  Reso- 
lution 425.  We  abhor  the  senseless  loss 
of  life  and  recurrent  terrorist  violence 
that  afflict  the  lives  of  those  on  either 
side  of  the  Israeli-Lebanese  border  who 
desire  to  live  peacefully.  We  remain 
ready  to  work  with  all  parties  for  the 
restoration  of  peace  and  security  for 
both  Lebanon  and  Israel.  We  continue 
to  believe  it  is  essential  that  there  be 
agreed  security  arrangements  to  assure 
stability  and  security  in  this  area. 


'USUN  press  release  44. 


tivities  closely  parallel  U.S.  interests 
and  complement  efforts  to  improve  our 
own  environment.  We  continue  to  be- 
lieve that  other  donors  must  contribute 
a  greater  share  and  that  we  would  like 
to  see  more  Americans  employed  by 
UNER 

For  some  years,  U.S.  payments  to 
the  International  Fund  for  Agri- 
cultural Development  (I FAD)  have 
been  included  in  this  account.  IFAD  is 
nearing  the  end  of  its  second  replenish- 
ment period,  and  the  $2.5  million  re- 
quested will  complete  our  obligation. 
Negotiations  for  the  third  replenish- 
ment are  getting  underway,  and  they 
face  many  of  the  same  problems  that 
existed  at  the  time  the  last  replenish- 
ment was  negotiated — specifically,  the 
capacity  of  the  OPEC  [Organization  of 
Petroleum  Exporting  Countries]  to  con- 
tinue to  share  the  burden  with  OECD 
donors.  We  continue  to  believe  that 
IFAD  has  a  unique  and  important  role 


to  play  in  responding  to  the  needs  of 
small  farmers  and  the  landless  poor. 
This  role  has  increased  in  importance 
as  developing  countries,  especially 
those  in  Africa,  have  recognized  the 
need  to  take  effective  steps  to  revitalize 
their  agricultural  sector. 

The  World  Meteorological  Organi- 
zation serves  important  U.S.  economic 
and  strategic  interests  by  providing  vi- 
tal worldwide  weather  information 
through  its  World  Weather  Watch  Pro- 
gram. These  data  would  otherwise  be 
inaccessible  to  the  United  States  or 
available  only  through  the  establish- 
ment of  costly  bilateral  arrangements. 
This  information  assists  the  United 
States  in  the  military,  commercial,  and 
civilian  sectors,  through  such  ca- 
pabilities as  storm  detection,  agri- 
cultural forecasting,  and  the 
determination  of  international  shipping 
and  air  traffic  routes.  To  assist  funding 


73 


UNITED  NATIONS 


this  program,  we  are  seeking  $2.0  mil- 
lion for  FY  1989. 

The  request  for  $1.8  million  for 
International  Convention  and  Scien- 
tific Organization  Contributions 
(ICSOC)  is  related  to  the  U.S.  with- 
drawal from  UNESCO  lUN  Educa- 
tional, Scientific  and  Cultural 
Organization].  With  the  withdrawal, 
the  United  States  no  longer  contributes 
its  share  of  costs  for  some  specific  ac- 
tivities supported  directly  by  UNESCO 
which  significantly  benefit  U.S.  domes- 
tic interests.  The  programs  proposed 
for  funding  under  the  rubric  "Interna- 
tional Convention  and  Scientific  Organi- 
zation Contributions"  protect  the  more 
important,  direct  benefits  to  American 
scientific,  educational,  cultural,  and 
business  communities — benefits  which 
were  formerly  derived  through  U.S. 
membership  in  UNESCO.  ICSOC  will 
finance  continued  U.S.  participation  in 
critical  UNESCO  activities  such  as  the 
Universal  Copyright  Convention, 
the  Intergovernmental  Oceanographic 
Commission,  and  the  Man  and  the  Bio- 
sphere Program.  Additionally,  we  have 
included  under  the  ICSOC  request 
funding  for  two  major  international 
conventions  on  the  environment,  the 
Vienna  Convention  on  the  Protection 
of  the  Ozone  Layer  and  the  Cartegena 
Convention  for  the  Protection  and  De- 
velopment of  the  Marine  Environment 
of  the  Wider  Caribbean  Region  and 
related  protocols. 

The  United  Nations  Capital  De- 
velopment Fund  (UNCDF)  provides 
seed  capital,  on  a  grant  basis,  for  small 
development  projects  using  technology 
appropriate  to  community-based  devel- 
opment activities.  Because  of  their  size, 
these  projects  are  unlikely  to  attract 
financing  by  multilateral  development 
banks.  Our  request  of  $1.5  million  will 
enable  UNCDF  to  continue  to  assist  in 
projects  financed  jointly  with  bilateral 
agencies  and  other  multilateral 
institutions. 

Our  request  of  $800  thousand  for 
the  UN  Educational  and  Training 
I*rogram  for  Southern  Africa,  coupled 
with  our  request  of  $250  thousand  for 
the  UN  Trust  Fund  for  South  Africa, 
provides  tangible  evidence  of  a  U.S. 
commitment  to  peaceful  change  in 
southern  Africa  and  a  positive  indica- 
tion of  our  support  for  the  forces  op- 
posed to  apartheid. 

Our  $500  thousand  request  to  fund 
the  UN  Industrial  Development  Orga- 
nization (UNIDO)  Investment  Promo- 
tion Service  office  in  Washington, 


D.C.,  does  not  represent  an  increase 
over  last  year's  request,  but  does  repre- 
sent a  sizeable  increase  over  the 
amount  appropriated.  We  have  re- 
quested this  increase  because  promo- 
tion of  private  sector  development  is  a 
major  U.S.  priority  both  in  interna- 
tional organization  affairs  and  in  devel- 
opment assistance.  UNIDO's 
Investment  Promotion  Service  provides 
one  of  the  clearest  examples  within  the 
UN  system  of  the  importance  of  private 
investment  capital  in  the  development 
process.  The  program  stimulates  the 
private  sector  in  developing  countries, 
which  leads  to  increased  markets  for 
U.S.  goods  and  services.  A  contribu- 
tion of  $500  thousand  to  the  Wash- 
ington Investment  Promotion  Service 
office  would,  for  the  first  time,  fully 
fund  the  activities  of  the  office. 

In  FY  1989,  the  Convention  on  in- 
ternational Trade  in  Endangered  Spe- 
cies (CITES)  will  continue  its  role  as  a 
major  contributor  to  international  con- 
servation efforts  and  the  primary  inter- 
national mechanism  governing 
international  trade  in  wildlife.  CITES 
will  continue  work  on  major  projects 
such  as  the  investigation  of  legal  and 
illegal  trade  in  key  species.  Our  request 
includes  $200  thousand  for  CITES. 

We  have  also  included  a  request  for 
the  UN  Voluntary  Fund  for  Victims  of 
Torture.  Our  contribution  to  the  fund 
complements  our  objectives  in  the  UN 
Human  Rights  Commission  and  U.S. 
bilateral  human  rights  efforts.  A  U.S. 
contribution  of  $100  thousand  will  help 
the  fund  expand  to  include  some  social 
services  to  torture  victims  and  to  their 
families  along  with  its  present  empha- 
sis on  medical  and  psychological 
treatment. 

I  would  now  like  to  address  three 
items  included  in  our  request,  which 
the  Congress  has  often  added  to  our 
request  in  past  years. 

The  first  of  these  items  is  a  contri- 
bution of  $200  thousand  to  the  United 
Nations  Fellowship  Program.  These 
funds  will  be  used  to  reimburse,  at  es- 
sentially a  token  level,  U.S.  Govern- 
ment offices  which  administer 
placement  of  UN-funded  trainees  who 
come  to  study  in  the  United  States. 

The  next  such  item  in  our  request 
is  the  World  Heritage  Fund.  Our  .$200 
thousand  contribution  will  assist  na- 
tions to  protect  universally  acclaimed 
cultural  and  natural  sites  from  deterio- 
ration and  destruction.  I  am  pleased  to 
announce  that  in  1987  with  the  inscrip- 
tion of  Chaco  Culture  World  Heritage 
Site  in  New  Mexico;  Hawaii  Volcanoes 


National  Park  in  Hawaii;  and  the  M( 
ticello/University  of  Virginia  Jeffer.*; 
Thematic  in  Virginia,  the  United  St, 
now  has  the  most  sites  inscribed  on  ' 
World  Heritage  list. 

The  final  item  is  our  $150  thous.ii 
request  for  the  UN  Development  Fid 
for  Women  (UNIFEM)  which  will  s, 
ply  critical  financial  support  to  enal 
UNIFEM  to  assure  that  considerati 
of  gender  issues  is  integrated  into 
mainstream  development  activities. 
Given  the  stage  at  which  the  UN  s> 
tem  is  in  taking  issues  of  "Women  ii 
Development"  into  account  in  progr  i 
and  project  design.  It  is  important   ■ 
UNIFEM  to  strengthen  its  budget; 
practices  and  management  to  assun 
that  these  monies  will  be  used 
effectively. 

Conclusion 

Before  concluding  my  statement  I 
would  like  to  emphasize  one  point 
which  is  too  often  overlooked.  We  h  e 
not  achieved  such  an  extraordinary 
gree  of  influence  in  the  multilateral 
tem  simply  through  the  size  of  our 
contributions  alone.  We  enjoy  this  j  ;i- 
tion  because  we  are  recognized  as  t 
leading  thinker  on  development  issi  ;, 
and  we  bring  an  unrivaled  level  of  t  h- 
nical  expertise  to  the  international   fii- 
munity.  In  fact,  our  ideas  and  expe  se 
are  often  more  important  than  the 
number  of  dollars  contributed.  It  is  le 
combination  of  U.S.  resources — inti 
lectual,  financial,  and  technical — th 
makes  us  the  major  force  in  the  mi  - 
lateral  system.  I  believe  that  the  r( 
quest  before  you  today  is  sufficient  > 
maintain  our  role  as  the  major  forc'  m 
the  international  development  seem  in 
fact,  our  voluntary  contributions  to  le 
international  system  continue  to  dw  "f 
those  of  the  Soviet  Union.  Accordii  to 
documentation  provided  by  the  Uni  fl 
Nations,  our  voluntary  contribution  to 
the  UN  system  in  1986  were  almost  0 
times  higher  than  those  of  the  Sovi 
Union. 

We  believe  that  U.S.  contribut  n.< 
to  the  "International  Organizations  id 
Programs"  account  both  reflect  the  i- 
terests  of  U.S.  citizens  and  serve  tl 
needs  of  other  nations. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  he  ■• 
ings  will  be  published  by  the  committf 
and  will  be  available  from  the  Superimpd- 
ent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  PiJt- 
ing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.B   i 


74 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/July  kB8 


;STERN  HEMISPHERE 


lansfer  of  U.S.  Funds  to  Panama 


W  ITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 

11 R.  31,  19881 

,  iimmend  those  persons  who  are 
-mig  General  Noriega's  threats 
mtimidations  to  provide  him  with 
iicial  resources.  We  urge  all  U.S. 
ipanies  and  persons  to  comply 
1  the  lawful  requests  of  President 
\alle  concerning  payment  of  finan- 
(ihligations  to  the  Government  of 
aiiia.  Meanwhile,  the  U.S.  Gov- 
lii'iit  is  taking  the  following  steps 

,  ,i|i|)ort  of  the  legitimate  Govern- 

;  It  of  Panama. 

•  U.S.  Government  payments  due 
1  liiivernment  of  Panama  are  to  be 

isited  in  an  account  of  the  Govern- 
i  it  uf  Panama  at  the  Federal  Reserve 
8:k  of  New  York.  This  account  will  be 
»  up  at  President  Delvalle's  request. 
,-:  •The  Department  of  Justice  will 

Iticipate  in  actions  by  private  parties 
)  have  debts  to  the  Government  of 
ama  to  declare  that  President  Del- 
i"  e  is  the  leader  of  the  recognized 
;  ernment  of  Panama.  Pursuant  to 
,'  rt  orders,  the  Seci'etary  of  the 
1  asury  will  assist  in  the  establish- 
1  It  of  an  account  to  be  available  for 
i  deposit  of  funds. 

'?  •The  Internal  Revenue  Service  will 
le  guidance  to  U.S.  taxpayers  ex- 
ining  how  tax  credit  may  be  claimed 
I  Panamanian  income  taxes  paid  into 
account  to  be  specified  at  the 
leral  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York. 

Through  these  measures,  we  are 

;  ing  U.S.  companies  and  persons  an 

c^ntive  and  opportunity  not  to  pro- 

1  e  financial  support  to  the  Noriega 

r  ime.  Should  these  measures  prove 

1  ufficient,  we  will  review  additional 

al  steps  that  may  be  necessary  to 

ly  transfer  of  funds  to  the  Noriega 

'  ;ime  from  U.S.  companies  and 

[•sons. 

I    These  measures  are  in  addition  to 
il:< !  following  actions  that  were  an- 
is  tinced  on  March  11. 


Withdrawal  of  trade  preferences 
iilable  to  Panama  under  the  gener- 
zed  system  of  preferences  and  the 
ribbean  Basin  Initiative. 

•  Increased  scrutiny  of  Panama  by 
2  Immigration  and  Customs  Services 

ff  order  to  apprehend  drug  traffickers 
■  d  money  launderers. 

•  Placing  in  escrow  certain  pay- 
ents  by  the  Panama  Canal  Commis- 
)n  to  the  Government  of  Panama. 


The  United  States  remains  commit- 
ted to  the  goal  of  restoring  democratic 
government  and  constitutional  order  in 
Panama.  When  that  goal  is  achieved, 
the  United  States  is  fully  prepared  to 
work  with  the  Government  of  Panama 
to  help  restore  quickly  Panama's  eco- 
nomic health.  In  addition,  the  U.S. 
Government  is  providing  one-quarter 
million  dollars  to  support  the  Caritas 
emergency  feeding  program  in  Panama. 
We  will  continue  to  examine  the  food 
needs  of  the  poor  in  Panama. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  4,  1988.1 


Pan  American  Day 
and  Week,  1988 


PROCLAMATION  5793, 
APR.  11,  1988' 

For  nearly  six  decades,  the  observance  of 
the  annual  Pan  American  Day  has  told  the 
world  that  the  nations  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere  share  a  unique  harmony  of 
ideals — the  love  of  liberty,  independence, 
and  democracy;  the  willingness  to  seek 
these  treasures  and  to  preserve  them 
wherever  they  are  found;  and  firm  and  pro- 
found opposition  to  totalitarianism.  Each 
year  the  United  States  joins  with  countries 
throughout  the  Americas  in  pledging 
fidelity  to  these  ideals  so  vital  to  our 
future. 

Almost  a  century  ago,  in  Washington, 
D.C.,  the  First  International  Conference  of 
American  States  made  the  idea  of  hemi- 
spheric unity  a  reality  by  establishing  the 
International  Union  of  American  Re- 
publics, the  predecessor  of  the  Organiza- 
tion of  American  States  (OAS).  The 
common  aspirations  of  the  peoples  of  the 
Americas  for  freedom,  independence,  de- 
mocracy, peace,  security,  and  prosperity 
inspire  the  OAS,  which  is  charged  with  up- 
holding and  defending  these  critical  objec- 
tives within  the  Inter-American  System. 

The  past  decade  has  witnessed  several 
victories  for  freedom  and  democracy  in  the 
Americas.  Ten  years  ago,  the  great  major- 
ity of  Latin  Americans  lived  under  oppres- 
sion; today,  more  that  90%  of  the  people  of 
the  Americas  live  under  democratic  gov- 
ernment. We  can  all  be  truly  grateful  for 
these  transformations  to  democracy. 

On  April  30,  the  OAS  will  celebrate 
the  40th  anniversary  of  the  signing  of  its 
charter  in  Bogota  in  1948— a  charter  that 
declares,  "the  solidarity  of  the  American 


States  and  the  high  aims  which  are  sought 
through  it  require  the  political  organiza- 
tion of  those  States  on  the  basis  of  the 
effective  exercise  of  representative  democ- 
racy." This  principle  continues  to  encour- 
age brave  men  and  women  in  the  fight  for 
liberty  and  democracy. 

The  OAS  Charter  establishes  the  basis 
for  hemispheric  cooperation  in  the  peaceful 
settlement  of  disputes,  economic  and  social 
development,  education,  and  the  protection 
of  human  rights.  In  recent  years,  the  OAS 
has  added  a  new  dimension  to  its  regional 
problemsolving  by  creating  the  OAS  Drug 
Abuse  Control  Commission  to  combat  nar- 
cotics trafficking  and  drug  abuse.  The 
United  States  of  America  accords  special 
priority  to  the  crucial  work  of  the  OAS  in 
the  fields  of  human  rights  and  narcotics 
control. 

The  foundations  of  the  Inter-American 
System  emerged  from  the  Americas'  inde- 
pendence movements,  but  its  consolidation 
dates  from  the  signing  of  the  OAS  Charter; 
so  it  is  especially  fitting  that  we  renew  our 
commitment  to  the  principles  of  the  Orga- 
nization of  American  States  and  its  spe- 
cialized agencies  on  Pan  American  Day  this 
year  as  40th  anniversary  celebrations  take 
place. 

Now,  Therefore,  I,  Ronald  Rea- 
gan, President  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  by  virtue  of  the  authority  vested 
in  me  by  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the 
United  States,  do  hereby  proclaim  Thurs- 
day, April  14,  1988,  as  Pan  American  Day, 
and  the  week  of  April  10  through  April  16, 
1988,  as  Pan  American  Week.  I  urge  the 
Governors  of  the  fifty  States,  the  Governor 
of  the  Commonwealth  of  Puerto  Rico,  and 
officials  of  other  areas  under  the  flag  of  the 
United  States  of  America  to  honor  these 
observances  with  appropriate  ceremonies 
and  activities. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  I  have  here- 
unto set  my  hand  this  eleventh  day  of 
April,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  nineteen 
hundred  and  eighty-eight,  and  of  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  United  States  of  America 
the  two  hundred  and  twelfth. 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr  18,  1988.1 


ijepartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


75 


TREATIES 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Antarctica 

The  Antarctic  Treaty.  Signed  at  Wash- 
ington Dec.  1,  1959.  Entered  into  force 
June  23,  1961.  TIAS  4780. 
Accession  deposited:  Canada,  May  4,  1988. 

Aviation 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful 
seizure  of  aircraft.  Done  at  The  Hague 
Dec.  16,  1970.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  14, 
1971.  TIAS  7192. 

Accession  deposited:  Yemen  (Aden), 
Apr  20,  1988.' 

Protocol  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful 
acts  of  violence  at  airports  serving  interna- 
tional civil  aviation.  Done  at  Montreal 
Feb.  24,  1988.  [Senate]  Treaty  Doe.  No. 
100-19.2 

Transmitted  to  the  Senate  for  advice  and 
consent:  May  20,  1988. 

Judicial  Procedure 

Convention  on  the  civil  aspects  of  interna- 
tional child  abduction.  Done  at  The  Hague 
Oct.  25,  1980.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  1, 
1983;  for  the  U.S.  July  1,  1988  [Senate] 
Treaty  Doc.  99-11. 

Ratification  deposited:  U.S.,  Apr.  29, 
1988.-'-' 

Jute 

International  agreement  on  jute  and  jute 
products,  1982,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Ge- 
neva Oct.  1,  1982.  Entered  into  force  provi- 
sionally Jan.  9,  1984;  definitively  Aug.  26, 
1986. 

Accession  deposited:  Portugal,  Apr.  28, 
1988. 

Marine  Pollution 

Convention  for  the  protection  and  develop- 
ment of  the  marine  environment  of  the 
wider  Caribbean  region,  with  annex.  Done 
at  Cartagena  Mar.  24,  1983.  Entered  into 
force  Oct.  11,  1986.  [Senate]  Treaty  Doc. 
98-13. 

Protocol  concerning  cooperation  in  combat- 
ting oil  spills  in  the  wider  Caribbean  re- 
gion, with  annex.  Done  at  Cartagena  Mar 
24,  1983.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  11,  1986. 
Ratification  deposited:  Colombia,  Mar.  3 
1988. 

Maritime  Matters 

International  convention  on  maritime 
search  and  rescue,  1979,  with  annex.  Done 
at  Hamburg  Apr.  27,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  June  22,  1985. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Poland,  Feb.  26, 
1988;  U.S.S.R.,  Mar.  25,  1988. ■' 


Pollution 

Convention  for  the  protection  of  the  ozone 
layer,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Vienna 
Mar.  22,  1985.-  [Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  99-9. 
Ratification  deposited:  Egypt,  May  9,  1988. 
Accession  deposited:  Hungary,  May  4, 
1988;  Maldives,  Apr.  26,  1988. 

Postal 

Constitution  of  the  Universal  Postal  Union. 
Done  at  Vienna  July  10,  1964.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  1,  1966.  TIAS  5881. 
Additional  protocol.  Done  at  Tokyo 
Nov.  14,  1969.  Entered  into  force  July  1, 
1971.  TIAS  7150. 

Second  additional  protocol.  Done  at 
Lausanne  July  5,  1974.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  1,  1976.  TIAS  8321. 
Ratification  deposited:  Nicaragua,  Feb.  15, 
1988. 

Third  additional  protocol  to  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  Universal  Postal  Union  of 
July  10,  1964,  general  regulations  with  an- 
nex, and  the  universal  postal  convention 
with  final  protocol  and  detailed  regula- 
tions. Done  at  Hamburg  July  27,  1984.  En- 
tered into  force  Jan.  1,  1986;  for  the  U.S. 
June  6,  1986. 

Accessions  deposited:  Albania,  Feb.  15, 
1988;  Nicaragua,  Feb.  15,  1988. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Australia,  Feb.  9, 
1988;  France,  Jan.  19,  1987;  Israel,  Mar.  18, 
1988;  San  Marino,  Mar.  14,  1988. 
Money  orders  and  postal  travelers'  checks 
agreement,  with  detailed  regulations  with 
final  protocol.  Done  at  Hamburg  July  27, 
1984.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  1.  1986;  for 
the  U.S.  June  6,  1986. 
Ratifications  deposited:  France,  Jan.  19, 
1987;  San  Marino,  Mar.  14,  1988. 
Postal  parcels  agreement  with  final  pro- 
tocol and  detailed  regulations.  Done  at 
Hamburg  July  27,  1984.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  1,  1986;  for  the  U.S.  June  6,  1986. 
Accessions  deposited:  Albania,  Feb.  15, 
1988;  Nicaragua,  Feb.  15,  1988. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Australia,  Feb.  9, 
1988;  France,  Jan.  19,  1987;  Israel,  Mar.  18, 
1988;  San  Marino,  Mar.  14,  1988. 
Satellite  communications  systems  agree- 
ment relating  to  the  International  Telecom- 
munications Satellite  Organization 
(INTELSAT),  with  annexes.  Done  at 
Washington  Aug.  20,  1971.  Entered  into 
force  Feb.  12,  1973.  TIAS  7532. 
Accession  deposited:  Swaziland,  May  18, 
1988. 

Operating  agreement  relating  to  INTEL- 
SAT, with  annex.  Done  at  Washington 
Aug.  20,  1971.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  12, 
1973.  TIAS  7532. 

Signature:  Posts  and  Telecommunications 
Corporation  (Public)  [Swaziland],  May  18, 


Amendments  [aeronautical  services]  to 
convention  and  the  operating  agreemei 
the  International  Maritime  Satellite  Or 
nization  (INMARSAT)  of  Sept.  3,  1976 
(TIAS  9605).  Adopted  at  London  Oct.  1 
1985.2 

Acceptances  deposited:  Australia,  Mar. 
1987  (conv.),  July  10,  1987  (op.  agt.);  Bv 
garia,  June  3,  1987;  Belorussian  S.S.R, 
Dec.  22,  1986;  Canada,  Mar.  14,  1988; 
Chile,  Feb.  24,  1988;  China,  May  15,  19 
Denmark,  Jan.  12,  1987;  Finland,  Jan.  ( 
1987;  Kuwait,  Jan.  25,  1988;  Netherlani 
May  13,  1987;  Norway,  July  1,  1986;  Phi 
pines,  Aug.  17,  1987;  Poland,  Dec.  2,  18 
Portugal,  June  1,  1987;  Saudi  Arabia,  I 
9,  1986;  Sri  Lanka,  June  10,  1986;  Swed 
Dec.  15,  1986;  Ukrainian  S.S.R.,  Oct.  1 
1986  (conv.),  Nov.  28,  1986  (op.  agt.); 
U.S.S.R.,  Nov.  25,  1986;  U.K.,  May  12J 
1986;  U.S.,  Apr.  6,  1988. 


Seabed  Disarmament 

Treaty  on  the  prohibition  of  the  empL 
ment  of  nuclear  weapons  and  other  wej 
ons  of  mass  destruction  on  the  seabed 
the  ocean  floor  and  in  the  subsoil  then 
Done  at  Washington,  London,  and  Mogi 
Feb.  11,  1971.  Entered  into  force  May  ij 
1972.  TIAS  7337. 

Ratification  deposited:  Brazil,  May  10, 
1988.  ■■> 


Telecommunications 

International  telecommunications  conv* 
tion,  with  annexes  and  protocols.  Don^ 
Nairobi  Nov.  6,  1982.  Entered  into  for»r 
Jan.  1,  1984;  definitively  for  the  U.S. 
Jan.  10,  1986.  [Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  99-| 
Ratification:  Nepal,  Jan.  4,  i988 


Terrorism 

Convention  on  the  prevention  and  punn 
ment  of  crimes  against  internationally 
tected  persons,  including  diplomatic 
agents.  Done  at  New  York  Dec.  14,  19'' 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  20,  1977.  TIAS 
8532. 

Accession  deposited:  Syrian  Arab  Re 
public,  Apr  25,  1988. 

International  convention  against  the  ta 
of  hostages.  Done  at  New  York  Dec.  1' 
1979.  Entered  into  force  June  3,  1983; 
the  U.S.  Jan.  6,  1985. 
Accession  deposited:  Gei'man  Dem.  Re 
May  2,  1988. 

Torture 

Convention  against  torture  and  other 
cruel,  inhuman,  or  degrading  treatmei 
punishment.  Adopted  at  New  York  De 
1984.  Entered  into  force  June  26,  1987 
[Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  100-20. 
Signatures:  Afghanistan,  Argentina, 
Belgium,  Bolivia,  Costa  Rica,  Denmar 
Dominican  Republic,  Ecuador,  Finland 
France,  Greece,  Iceland,  Italy,  Nethei 
lands,  Norway,  Portugal,  Senegal,  Sp£ 


76 


en,  Switzerland,  Uruguay,  Feb.  4, 
Algeria,  Nov.  26,  1985;  Austria,  Mar. 
185;  Brazil,  Sept.  23,  1985;  Bulgaria, 
10,  1986;'  Belorussian  S.S.R.,  Dec. 
185;'  Canada,  Aug.  23,  1985;  Chile, 

23,  1987;  China,  Dec.  12,  1986;'  Co- 
,a,  Apr.  10,  1985;  Cuba,  Jan.  27,  1986; 
IS,  Oct.  9,  1985;  Czechoslovakia,  Sept. 
16;'  Gambia,  Oct.  23,  1985;  German 

Rep.,  Apr.  7,  1986;'  Germany,  Fed. 
of,  Oct.  13,  1986;  Guinea,  May  30, 
Guyana,  Jan.  25,  1988;  Hungary,  Nov. 
186;'  Indonesia,  Oct.  23,  1985;  Israel, 
22,  1986;  Liechtenstein,  June  27,  1985; 
imbourg,  Feb.  22,  1985;  Mexico,  Mar. 
(85;  Nicaragua,  Apr.  15,  1985;  Panama, 
22,  1985;  Peru.  May  29,  1985;  Sierra 
e,  Mar.  18,  1985;  Sudan,  June  4,  1986; 

Mar.  25,  1987;^  Tunisia,  Aug.  26, 

Turkey,  Jan.  25,  1988;  Ukrainian 
I.,  Feb.  27,  1986;'  U.S.S.R.,  Dec.  10, 

U.K.,  Mar.  15,  1985;  U.S.,  Apr.  18, 
'  Venezuela,  Feb.  15,  1985. 
ssions  deposited:  Belize,  Mar.  17,  1986; 


roon,  Dec.  19,  1986;  Dominica, 

9,  1986;  Egypt,  June  25,  1986;  Philip- 

,  June  18,  1986,  Uganda,  Nov.  3,  1986. 

ications  deposited:  Afghanistan, 


1,  1987;'  Argentina,  Sept.  24,  1986; 
k-ia,  July  29,  1987;-*  Bulgaria,  Dec.  16, 
'  Belorussian  S.S.R.,  Mar.  13,  1987;' 
«da,  June  24,  1987;  Colombia,  Dec.  8, 

Denmark,  May  27,  1987;  Ecuador, 

30,  1988;  France,  Feb.  18,  1986;''^  Ger- 
IDem.  Rep.,  Sept.  9,  1987;'  Hungary, 

15,  1987;'  Luxembourg,  Sept.  29, 

3  Mexico,  Jan.  23,  1986;  Norway, 

9,  1986;''  Panama,  Aug.  24,  1987;'  Sen- 

Aug.  21,  1986;  Spain,  Oct.  21,  1987;3 
«erland,  Dec.  2,  1986;3  Togo,  Nov.  18, 
3  Ukrainian  S.S.R.,  Feb.  24,  1987;' 
S.R.,  Mar  3,  1987;'  Uruguay,  Oct.  24, 

ismitted  to  the  Senate  for  advice  and 


int:  May  20,  1988 

Ities 

*na  convention  on  the  law  of  treaties 
feen  states  and  international  organiza- 
or  between  international  organiza- 
.,  with  annex.  Done  at  Vienna  Mar.  21, 

2 

fication  deposited:  Sweden,  Feb.  10, 


DO 

ititution  of  the  United  Nations  Indus- 
Development  Organization  (UNIDO), 
annexes.  Done  at  Vienna  Apr.  8,  1979. 

;red  into  force  June  21,  1985. 

;ssions  deposited:  Albania,  Apr.  19, 


Maldives,  May  10,  1988. 
fication  deposited:  El  Salvador, 


29,  1988. 


BILATERAL 

Argentina 

Swap  agreement  between  the  U.S. 
Treasury  and  the  Central  Bank  of  the 
Argentine  Republic/Government  of  the 
Argentine  Republic,  with  related  letter 
and  amendment.  Signed  at  Washington  and 
Buenos  Aires  Feb.  23,  1988.  Entered  into 
force  Feb.  23,  1988. 

China 

Agreement  relating  to  relief  from  double 
income  on  shipping  profits.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  letters  at  Beijing  Nov.  18, 
1981.  Entered  into  force  Nov.  18,  1981. 
Notice  of  termination  by  U.S.:  May  5, 
1988. 

Dominica 

Agreement  for  the  exchange  of  information 
with  respect  to  taxes.  Signed  at 
Washington  Oct.  1,  1987. 
Entered  into  force:  May  9,  1988. 

Egypt 

Agreement  amending  the  agreements  for 
sale  of  agricultural  commodities  of  June  7, 
1974  (TIAS  7855),  and  Dec.  30,  1986. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Cairo 
Aug.  26-27,  1987.  Entered  into  force 
Aug.  27,  1987. 

Agreement  relating  to  the  agreement  of 
June  7,  1974,  for  sale  of  agricultural 
commodities,  as  amended  (TIAS  7855). 
Signed  at  Cairo  Mar.  21,  1988.  Entered  into 
force  Mar.  21,  1988. 

France 

Agreement  of  social  security.  Signed  at 

Paris  Mar.  2,  1987. 

Administrative  arrangement  concerning 

the  application  of  the  agreement  on  social 

security  of  Mar.  2,  1987.  Signed  at 

Washington  Oct.  21,  1987. 

Entered  into  force:  July  1,  1988. 

Gabon 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to, 
guaranteed  by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S. 
Government  and  its  agencies,  with 
annexes.  Signed  at  Libreville  Feb.  11,  1988. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  21,  1988. 

Hungary 

Agreement  amending  agreement  of  Feb.  15 
and  25,  1983  (TIAS  10666),  as  amended  and 
extended,  relating  to  trade  in  wool  and 
manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  prod- 
ucts. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Budapest  Apr.  8  and  15,  1988.  Entered  into 
force  Apr.  15,  1988. 

Israel 

Memorandum  of  agreement  regarding  joint 
political,  security,  and  economic  coopera- 
tion. Signed  at  Washington  and  Jerusalem 
Apr.  21  and  28,  1988.  Entered  into  force 
Apr.  21,  1988. 


TREATIES 


Japan 

Agreement  concerning  the  acquisition  and 
production  of  the  EP-3  aircraft  in  Japan. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Tokyo 
Mar.  29,  1988.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  29, 


Malaysia 

Agreement  amending  agreement  of  Aug.  3, 
1987,  as  amended,  relating  to  trade  in  tex- 
tiles and  textile  products.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Kuala  Lumpur  Mar.  29 
and  Apr.  19,  1988.  Entered  into  force 
Apr.  19,  1988;  effective  .Jan.  1.  1988. 

Mexico 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Feb.  27,  1985,  concerning  trade  in  certain 
steel  products  and  trade  liberalization 
measures  for  certain  other  products.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  letters  at  Wash- 
ington and  Mexico  Dec.  29,  1987.  Entered 
into  force  Dec.  29,  1987. 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
July  31,  1970,  as  amended  and  extended 
(TIAS  6941,  7927),  for  a  cooperative  mete- 
orological observation  program  in  Mexico. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Mexico 
Mar.  28  and  Apr.  25,  1988.  Entered  into 
force  Apr.  25,  1988;  effective  Apr.  1,  1988. 

Philippines 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
July  8,  1985,  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, with  annexes.  Signed  at  Manila 
Apr.  14,  1988.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  14, 
1988. 

Sudan 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for 
sales  of  agricultural  commodities  of  Feb. 
28,  1988.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Khartoum  Mar.  31,  1988.  Entered  into 
force  Mar.  31,  1988. 

Thailand 

Treaty  on  mutual  assistance  in  criminal 
matters,  with  attachments.  Signed  at 
Bangkok  Mar.  19,  1986. ^  [Senate]  Treaty 
Doc.  199-18. 

Transmitted  to  the  Senate  for  advise  and 
consent:  Apr.  25,  1988. 

Tunisia 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  Tunis  Mar.  16,  1988. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  16,  1988. 


'With  reservation(s). 
'Not  in  force. 
-'With  declaration(s). 
^With  designation  of  U.S.  Central 
Authority. 

^With  understanding  and  statement. 
••Not  in  force  for  the  U.S.H 


k 


artment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


77 


PRESS  RELEASES 


Department  of  State 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

No.  Date  Subject 

*81  5/2  Shultz:  statement,  Senate 
Appropriations  Commit- 
tee, Apr.  28. 

*82      5/6        George  A.  Trail  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Malawi 
(biographic  data). 

*83      5/4        Shultz:  address.  National 
Conference  on  Soviet 
Jewry,  May  3. 

*84    •  5/6        Shultz:' remarks  at  the  23d 
annual  Foreign  Service 
Day. 

*85      5/9        Shultz,  Shankle:  remarks  at 
dedication  of  new  memo- 
rial plaque  names.  May  6. 


USUN 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Public  Affairs  Office,  U.S.  Mission  to  the 
United  Nations,  799  United  Nations  Plaza, 
New  York,  N.Y.  10017. 

No.  Date  Subject 

*1         1/5        Okun:  situation  in  the  Israeli 
occupied  territories.  Se- 
curity Council. 

2  1/14      Walters:  situation  in  the  oc- 

cupied territories,  Security 
Council. 

3  1/18      Walters:  situation  in  south 

Lebanon,  Security  Council. 

*4         2/1         Okun:  situation  in  the  oc- 
cupied territories,  Security 
Council. 

*5  2/16  Smith:  outer  space,  Commit- 
tee on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of 
Outer  Space  (COPUOS). 

*6        2/17      Walters:  Korean  Air  Flight 
858,  Security  Council. 

*7        2/17       Hodgkins:  space  applications 
program.  Scientific  and 
Technical  Sub-committee, 
COPUOS. 

*8         2/18       USUN  Review  of  the  42d 
General  Assembly. 


*86      5/9 


*87      5/11 


*90      5/16 


92      5/16 


*9 

2/22 

*10 

2/19 

*11 

2/22 

*12 

2/23 

*13 

2/24 

*14 

2/24 

*15 

2/24 

*16 

2/24 

*17 

2/25 

*18       3/2 


Shultz:  dinner  toast  in 
honor  of  China's  Vice  Pre- 
mier Tian  Jiyun,  May  8. 

American  Art  of  the  20th 
Century  at  U.S.  Embassy 
in  Moscow. 

Shultz:  arrival  statement, 
Geneva,  May  11. 

Shultz:  news  conference  fol- 
lowing U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
ministerial  meeting,  Ge- 
neva, May  12. 

Shultz:  news  conference, 
NATO  headquarters, 
Brussels,  May  13. 

Digest  of  United  States 
Practice  in  International 
Law,  1980,  released. 

Shultz:  statement,  Senate 
Foreign  Relations 
Committee. 

American  Foreign  Policy: 
Current  Documents, 
1983, released. 


Smith:  space  transportation, 
COPUOS,  Feb.  19. 

Smith:  International  Geo- 
sphere  Biosphere  Program, 
COPUOS. 

Smith:  geostationary  orbit, 
COPUOS,  Feb.  19. 

Smith:  remote  sensing 
COPUOS. 

Nicogossian:  life  science, 
COPUOS. 

Smith:  planetary  exploration, 
COPUOS. 

Smith:  astronomy,  COPUOS. 

Smith:  space,  COPUOS. 

Walters:  key  foreign  policy 
issues.  Subcommittees  on 
Human  Rights  and  Inter- 
national Organizations  and 
on  International  Opera- 
tions, House  Foreign  Af- 
fairs Committee. 

Okun:  Report  of  the  Commit- 
tee on  Relations  with  the 
Host  Country,  General 
Assembly. 

Okun:  South  Africa,  Security 
Council. 


*97      5/24 


5/24 
5/25 


Shultz:  statement  follo] 
meeting  with  Israeli 
eign  Minister  Peres. 

Shultz:  interview  on  US 
"Worldnet." 

Shultz:  interview  on  AB 
TV's  "This  Week  With 
David  Brinkley,"  May 

Frederick  M.  Bernthal 
sworn  in  as  Assistant 
retary  of  Internationa 
Environmental  and  S( 
tific  Affairs  (biograph 
data). 

Shultz:  interview  on  C! 

Shultz,  Armacost,  Abri 
news  conference 

Shultz:  interview  on  CB 
TV's  "Face  the  Natioi 
Moscow,  Mav  29 


«! 


"Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


*20       3/10       Note  to  Correspondents 
Human  Rights  Situatiw 
Cuba. 

*21       3/16       Byrne:  donors  meeting,  (I 
gram  of  Humanitarianl 
Assistance  to  the 
Kampuchean  People. 

*22  3/17  Okun:  Falkland  and  Mal- 
vinas.  Security  Couno 

*23  .3/17  Okun:  Falkland  and  Mal- 
vinas.  Security  Counci" 

*24  3/18  Note  to  Correspondents! 
Clarification  of  Ambasi 
sador  Walters'  remark; 
Geneva. 

*25  3/18  Okun:  Nicaragua,  Secur 
Council. 

*26  3/18  Okun:  Nicaragua,  Secur 
Council. 

*27  3/22  Okun:  Nicaragua,  Secur 
Council. 

*28  3/23  Okun:  closing  the  PLO  I 
manent  Observer  Miss 
General  Assembly. 

*29  3/31  Okun:  Occupied  Territor 
Security  Council. 

*30  3/31  Note  to  Correspondents 
U.S.  Issues  Visas  on  1 
manitarian  Grounds 

*Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


la 


78 


Deoartment  of  State  BuKetin/Julv 


tBLICATIONS 


;i3artment  of  State 


single  copies  of  the  following  Depart- 
ni  State  publications  are  available 
I  111'  Public  Information  Division,  Bu- 
i[  I'ublic  Affairs,  Department  of 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

lary  Shultz 
leViiunng  Hand:  American  Leadership 
«;  the  Global  Economy.  Massachusetts 
Iititute  of  Technology  annual  dinner, 
Hshington,  D.C,  Apr.  28,  1988  (Cur- 
tit  Policy  #1070). 

Lavements  of  the  INF  Treaty,  Senate 
Heign  Relations  Committee,  May  16, 
1(8,  (Current  Policy  #1075). 
I 

illl  Control 

■J  Arms  Control  Initiatives,  May  13, 
lis  (Special  Report  #177). 

Mrtment  of  State 

'hj  Budget  Crunch"  and  the  Foreign 
S  vice.  Under  Secretary  Spiers,  For- 
e  n  Service  Day,  May  6,  1988  (Current 
i  icy  #1073). 

h.  )epartment  of  State  Today,  March 
'  "<  I  Public  Information  Series). 

1  .\sia 

Philippines  Relations  (GIST,  May 

1  .s). 

"  oiiiics 

S    and  the  Pacific  Basin:  Trade  and 
Mi.-tment  Issues,  Undersecretary 
Ills.  Asia  Society,  New  York  City, 
r   2iS,  1988  (Current  Policy  #1069). 
'    '  S.  and  Japan:  Partners  in  Global 
iiMimic  Leadership,  Under  Secretary 
Ills.  Federation  of  Economic  Organiza- 
Keidanren),  Tokyo,  Apr.  19,  1988 
>  lit  Policy  #1072). 

I  a  Stronger  International  Economy 
puty  Secretary  Whitehead,  Municipal 
■  uram  on  the  Toi-onto  Summit,  Centre 
International  Studies,  Toronto,  Apr. 
V.ixS  (Current  Policy  #1074). 
Foreign  Economic  Policy,  1981-87, 
lltSS  (Public  Information  Series). 
in  Community  (GIST,  May  1988). 
vui-ld  Debt  (GIST,  May  1988). 

c  Policy  Coordination  and  the  Dol- 
■  IST,  Mav  1988). 
; ,  ade  Policy  (GIST,  May  1988). 
Priisperity  and  the  Developing  Coun- 
.•-  (GIST,  May  1988). 

u-al  Adjustment  and  Economic  Per- 
nce  (GIST,  May  1988). 

East 

rican  Vision  of  Peace  in  the  Middle 
.Assistant  Secretary  Murphy, 
a.-limgton  Institute  on  Near  East  Pol- 
.,  .\pr.  18,  1988  (Current  Policy  #1067). 


Military  Affairs 

Controlling  Transfer  of  Strategic  Tech- 
nology (GIST,  May  1988). 

Conventional  Forces  in  Europe  (GIST,  May 
1988). 

Science  &  Technology 

International  Communications  and  Infor- 
mation Policy  Agenda,  Acting  U.S.  Coor- 
dinator and  Director  of  the  Bureau  of 
International  Communications  and  Infor- 
mation Policy  Borg,  Subcommittee  on 
Communications,  Senate  Committee  on 
Commerce,  Science,  and  Transportation, 
Apr.  19,  1988  (Current  Policy  #1066). 


South  Asia 

Agreements  on  Afghanistan,  Apr.  1988  (Se- 
lected Documents  #26). 

Terrorism 

International  Terrorism  (GIST,  May  1988). 

United  Nations 

Policies  for  the  Americas  in  the  1990s,  As- 
sistant Secretary  Williamson,  ECLAC, 
Rio  de  Janeiro,  Apr.  26,  1988  (Current 
Policy  #1071). 

Third  UN  Special  Session  on  Disarmament 
(GIST,  May  1988).B 


Foreign  Relations  Supplement  Released 


The  Department  of  State  on  April  15, 
1988,  released  the  microfiche  publica- 
tion, "Memoranda  of  Conversation  of 
the  Secretary  of  State,  1947-1952,"  a 
supplement  to  the  Foreign  Relations  of 
the  United  States  series.  The  publica- 
tion presents  a  chronological  recoi'd 
from  April  1947  through  December  1952 
of  1,729  meetings  and  telephone  conver- 
sations between  the  Secretary  of 
State — either  George  Marshall 
(1947-49)  or  Dean  Acheson  (1949-53)— 
or  their  principal  deputies  and  major 
U.S.  and  foreign  officials.  Many  meet- 
ings confront  the  broad  issues  of  war 
and  peace  in  varying  contexts:  postwar 
peace  settlements  involving  Germany, 
Austria,  and  Japan;  the  threat  of  Soviet 
aggression  against  Germany  and 
Berlin,  Greece,  Turkey,  and  Korea;  con- 
flicts involving  emerging  nations,  espe- 
cially Indonesia  and  the  French  and 
former  Italian  protectorates  in  North 
Africa;  the  Kashmir  dispute  involving 
India  and  Pakistan;  and  the  longstand- 
ing attempts  to  reconcile  Jewish  and 
Arab  claims  to  Palestine. 

The  records  in  this  collection  re- 
flect the  foreign  affairs  problems  that 
concerned  Secretaries  Marshall  and 
Acheson.  A  number  of  meetings  are  de- 
voted to  post- World  War  II  reconstruc- 
tion, the  enactment  and  implementation 
of  the  Marshall  Plan  in  Europe,  and  the 
movement  toward  greater  economic  and 
political  unity  in  reaction  to  the  consol- 
idation of  Soviet  power  in  Eastern  Eu- 
rope. Department  principals  also 
discussed  the  question  of  foreign  as- 
sistance to  non-Marshall  Plan  countries, 
such  as  China  and  Yugoslavia,  which 


were  threatened  either  by  internal  sub- 
version or  external  aggression.  The 
growth  of  political  and  economic  unity 
is  another  recurrent  theme,  with  em- 
phasis on  fostering  European  economic 
unity  and  achieving  greater  interna- 
tional economic  cooperation  through  the 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade  (GATT)  and  the  Bretton  Woods 
monetary  system.  There  is  also  much 
documentation  on  the  founding  and 
early  development  of  regional  defense 
pacts,  such  as  the  North  Atlantic 
Treaty  Organization  (NATO)  and  the 
Organization  of  American  States  (OAS), 
established  at  the  1948  Bogota 
conference. 

These  memoranda  of  conversation 
comprise  a  unique  file  that  was  origi- 
nally maintained  by  the  Executive  Sec- 
retariat of  the  Department  of  State. 
The  memoranda  are  generally  carbon 
copies  whose  originals  were  filed  else- 
where, usually  in  the  Department's  cen- 
tral files.  Many  of  these  documents, 
however,  are  not  located  there  or  in 
other  Department  files.  This  publica- 
tion presents  these  documents  in  the 
same  chronological  order  in  which  they 
were  originally  maintained  for  the 
Secretary  of  State  and  also  includes 
attachments,  such  as  routing  chits, 
supporting  memoranda,  and  aides- 
memoire,  when  these  documents  were 
in  the  file.  It  contains  all  documents 
except  for  a  few  papers  which  could  not 
be  declassified  in  whole  or  in  part  be- 
cause of  continued  sensitivity  on  na- 
tional security  or  privacy  grounds.  The 
original  documents  in  the  file  have  been 
transferred  to  the  National  Archives. 


I  partment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


79 


This  publication  is  part  of  the  De- 
partment's effort  to  make  the  official 
foreign  affairs  record  more  widely  avail- 
able to  scholars,  libraries,  and  other 
users.  These  microfiche  publications 
present  significant  and  unique  collec- 
tions of  historical  documents,  only  a 
small  part  of  which  can  be  printed  in 
Foreign  Relations  volumes.  The  series 
editors  are  obliged  to  select  for  the  vol- 
umes onlv  the  most  vital  documents 


from  a  foreign  policy  record  that  has 
markedly  increased  in  size  in  the  last 
three  decades. 

"Memoranda  of  Conversation  of  the 
Secretary  of  State,  1947-1952,"  com- 
prising about  4,700  pages  on  49  micro- 
fiche cards  and  accompanied  by  a 
119-page  printed  guide  containing  a 
comprehensive  list  of  documents,  was 
prepared  by  the  Office  of  the  Historian, 
Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Department 


Digest  of  United  States  Practice 
in  International  Law  Released 


The  Digest  of  United  States  Practice  iv 
International  Law,  1980  is  now  avail- 
able at  the  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office  (1,134  pp.).  The  eighth  in  the  an- 
nual series,  the  volume  also  includes 
the  final  3  weeks  of  President  Carter's 
Administration  in  January  1981  and  in- 
dicates developments  in  certain  fields 
subsequent  to  the  period  of  coverage. 

The  1980  Digest  was  edited  by  Mar- 
ian Nash  Leich,  an  attorney  in  the  Of- 
fice of  the  Legal  Adviser,  and  contains 
an  introduction  by  the  Legal  Adviser  of 
the  Department  of  State,  Abraham  D. 
Sofaer.  The  Department's  Legal  Ad- 
viser in  1980  was  Roberts  B.  Owen. 

Describing  legal,  diplomatic,  and 
other  responses  by  the  United  States 
to  Iran's  continuing,  lawless  detention 
of  the  American  hostages  captured  in 
1979,  the  volume  conveys  the  totahty  of 
the  U.S.  response  to  the  crisis.  It  sets 
out  actions  undertaken  by  the  Presi- 
dent and  the  executive  branch,  includ- 
ing appearances  by  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment in  domestic  litigation  and  before 
the  International  Court  of  Justice.  It 
summarizes  the  negotiations  that  led  to 
the  resolution  of  the  crisis,  under  the 
catalytic  effect  of  an  impending  change 
in  U.S.  Presidents,  and  e.xplains  the 
legal  issues  considered  in  formulating 
the  Algiers  Declarations,  including  the 
establishment  of  the  Iran-United  States 
Claims  lYibunal  at  The  Hague. 


The  1980  Digest  details  measures 
undertaken  to  curb  foreign  govern- 
ment-sponsored (Libyan)  terrorism 
within  the  United  States,  which  culmi- 
nated in  the  closing  of  the  Libyan  Peo- 
ple's Bureau  in  Washington.  In  another 
area  involving  Libya,  the  Digest 
discusses  the  U.S.  Government's  sup- 
port, amicus,  in  judicial  proceedings 
brought  by  an  American  corporate 
claimant  to  enforce  a  foreign  arbitral 
award  obtained  against  Libya  (the 
LIAMCO  case). 

Other  government  participation  in 
domestic  litigation  involved  interpreta- 
tions of  the  Foreign  Sovereign  Immu- 
nities Act  and  the  act  of  state  doctrine, 
as  well  as  various  provisions  of  the  Im- 
migration and  Nationality  Act.  In  re- 
gard ta  the  latter,  the  United  States 
succeeded  in  revoking  the  naturaliza- 
tion of  a  former  Nazi  death  camp 
guard;  this  resulted  in  his  deportation 
and  in  a  number  of  successful  similar 
efforts.  A  challenge  to  the  constitu- 
tionality of  that  act's  legislative  veto 
provision,  which  would  have  required 
deportation  of  an  East  Indian  individual 
seeking  adjustment  of  status,  was  also 
successful  (the  Chadha  case). 


of  State.  Copies  of  the  publication  (] 
partment  of  State  Publication  No.  9 
GPO  Stock  No.  044-000-02207-9)  in 
be  purchased  for  $25.00  from  the  Si 
perintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  G( 
ernment  Printing  Office,  Washingto; 
D.C.  20402.  Checks  or  money  order 
should  be  made  payable  to  the  Supe 
tendent  of  Documents. 


Press  release  65  of  Apr.  15,  1988. 


i\ 


W 


The  volume  outlines  the  legal  ai 
other  problems  presented  by  the  IS) 
Mariel  boatlift  from  Cuba  and  by  t! 
waves  of  illegal  migrants  from  Haitt 
also  relates  government  efforts  to  «■ 
elude  common  crimes  of  violence  fn 
the  political  offense  exception  to  ex- 
dition,  initially  in  arguments  before 
U.S.  extradition  magistrates  and  cc 
(and,  finally,  through  renegotiation 
key  extradition  treaty  provisions). 

Lastly,  the  1980  Digest  traces  '< 
enlargement  of  the  U.S.  role  in  Mi 
East  peacekeeping,  which  was  to  r  i! 
in  the  establishment  of  the  Multint 
tional  Force  and  Observers. 

Digest  of  United  States  Practit 
International  Law,  1980  may  be  pu  ,, 
chased  for  $39.00  (domestic)  from  1 1 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S  I 
Government  Printing  Office,  Wash- 1 
ington,  D.C.  20402  (GPO  Stock  No  ■ 
044-000-02064-5).  Checks  or  mone;  n- 
ders  made  payable  to  the  Superinti  i- 
ent  of  Documents  must  accompany 
order  Remittances  from  foreign  co  - 
tries  may  be  made  by  international 
postal  money  order,  by  draft  on  an 
American  or  Canadian  bank,  or  by 
UNESCO  coupons;  an  additional  2. 
handling  charge  is  required  for  ord  s 
to  foreign  countries. 


Press  release  91  of  May  16,  1988.1 


80 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/July 


ih' 


PUBLICATIONS 


A  rent  Documents,  1983  Supplement 
•eased 


itpartment  of  State  on  May  18, 
•  I'rleased  American  Foreign  Pol- 
'inrent  Documents,  1983.  Supple- 
I   This  microfiche  publication 
iiiients  the  printed  volume 
■K'dii  Foreign  Policy:  Current  Doc- 
ts.  I98.i,  published' in  1985. 
"he  1983  supplement  comprises  495 
nrnts  totaling  about  6,000  pages 

microfiche  cards  and  reproduces 
lil  texts  of  several  documents 
■d  in  part  in  the  printed  volume. 
Ills  microfiche  publication  pre- 

the  complete  texts  of  Department 
itf  and  White  House  special  press 
'  iius  (on-the-record  and  back- 
id  In-iefings  on  specific  issues  or 
s)  and  Department  of  State  daily 

liiiefings  in  1983.  Subjects  cov- 
in detail  in  these  briefings  include 
trategic  Defense  Initiative,  the 
;r  I  strategic  arms  reduction  talks] 
XI"  [intermediate-range  nuclear 
<i  arms  control  talks,  the  Williams- 
,  t'Cdnomic  summit.  President  Rea- 
di  trip  to  Japan  and  Korea,  and 
e(  'tary  Shultz's  trips  to  Western  Eu- 


rope, North  Africa,  and  Asia,  negotia- 
tions on  the  withdrawal  of  foreign 
troops  from  Lebanon,  visits  to  the 
United  States  by  foreign  leaders,  the 
repercussions  from  the  Soviet  Unions 
shooting  down  of  the  Korean  airliner, 
NATO  ministerial  meetings,  U.S.  mili- 
tary involvement  in  Grenada,  and  de- 
velopments in  Nicaragua  and  El 
Salvador. 

This  microfiche  supplement  is  di- 
vided into  two  parts:  I.  Department  of 
State  and  White  House  Special  Press 
Briefings;  and  II.  Department  of  State 
Daily  Press  Briefings.  An  accompany- 
ing printed  guide  contains  a  table  of 
contents  and  a  list  of  the  documents  for 
part  I.  For  part  II,  the  guide  includes  a 
comprehensive  index  of  subjects  and 
names  mentioned  in  the  Department  of 
State  daily  press  briefings. 

This  supplement  is  part  of  the  De- 
partment of  State  American  Foreign 
Policy  series  begun  in  1950.  In  addition 
to  the  1983  book,  volumes  for  1981, 
1982,  1984,  1985,  and  1986  have  also 
been  printed  recently.  Microfiche  sup- 
plements for  1981  and  1982  were  pub- 


lished in  1985  and  1987,  and 
supplements  for  1984  and  subsequent 
years  are  being  prepared. 

The  American  Foreign  Policy 
series  presents  official  public  ex- 
pressions of  policy  that  best  set  forth 
the  goals  and  objectives  of  U.S.  foreign 
policy.  The  texts  of  the  major  official 
addresses,  statements,  interviews, 
press  conferences,  and  communications 
by  the  White  House,  the  Department  of 
State,  and  other  officials  involved  in  the 
foreign  policy  process  are  included. 

American  Foreign  Policy:  Current 
Docuynents,  1983.  Supplement  was  pre- 
pared in  the  Office  of  the  Historian, 
Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Department 
of  State.  Copies  may  be  purchased  for 
$25.00  from  the  Superintendent  of  Doc- 
uments, U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office  (Department  of  State  Publi- 
cation No.  9631,  GPO  Stock 
No.  044-000-02204-4).  Checks  or 
money  orders  should  be  made  payable 
to  the  Superintendent  of  Documents. 


Press  release  93  of  May  18, 


iiartment  of  State  Bulletin/July  1988 


81 


Atlas  of  United  States 
Foreign  Relations 

The  Atlas  of  United  States  Foreign  Relations, 
December  1985,  provides  basic  information 
about  U.S.  foreign  relations  for  easy  refer- 
ence and  as  a  educational  tool.  This  is  the 
second,  revised  edition  of  the  atlas  (first 
published  in  1983).  For  this  edition,  most  of 
the  displays  have  been  revised  or  updated, 
and  some  have  been  expanded  or  recast  to 
reflect  recent  developments.  Comprising  100 
pages  with  90  maps  and  charts,  it  is  divided 
into  six  sections  dealing  with: 

■  Foreign  relations  machinery; 

■  International  organizations; 

a  Elements  of  the  world  economy; 

■  Trade  and  investment; 

■  Development  assistance;  and 

■  U.S.  national  security. 


GPO  Order  Form 


copy(ies)  of  the  Atlas  of  United  States  Foreign  Relations 


Please  send  me 

@  $5.00  per  copy  (S/N  044-000-02102-1) 

Any  customer  ordering  100  or  more  copies  for  delivery  to  a  single  destination  will  be  allowed  a  25%  discount. 


Superintendent  of  Documents 
Mail  to:     U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Washington,  D.C.  20402 


GPO  prices  are  subject  to  change  without  noti 

(Confirm  by  calling  202-783-32 


Enclosed  is  $^ 


D  check  or    n  money  order  (payable 


to  Superintendent  of  Documents)  or  charge  to  my 


Credit  Card  Orders  Only 

Total  charges  $ 

Credit 
Card  No. 


^) 


Expiration  daite 
Month/Year 


Deposit 
Account  No. 


■D 


Order  No. 


Please  Print 

Company  or  personal  name 


1   1  1  1  1  1  1  I  1  1  I   1  1  1  {  1  1  1  1  I  1  I  1  I  1  1  1  I  I   1 

Additional  address  line 

Street  address 

City                                                                                   State      Zip  Code 

1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  !  I.j  iiJl^LU  Li  J  LiJ_LiJ 

(or  Country) 

For  Office  Use  Only 

Quantity 

Publications  . 

• Subscriptions - 

Special  shipping  charges 
International  handling 
Special  charges 
OPNR 


UPNS 

Balance  Due 
Discount 
Refund 


Charges 


iiiex 


Jjly  1988 
Volume  88,  No. 


2136 


.%]hanistan.  Reflections  on  U.S. -Soviet 

elations  (Reagan) 1 

\l  ca.  FY  1989  Request  for  Foreign 

ssistance  Program  (Woods) 54 

ills  Control 

.Vievements  of  the  INF  Treaty 

;hultz)    6 

F  1989  Foreign  Policy  Budget  Request 

;hultz)    8 

S«!-etary's  Interview  on  "This  Week 

'ith  David  Brinkley"    14 

U  .  Arms  Control  Initiatives 16 

U  late  on  Europe  (Ridgway)    50 

Ciada 

C  adian  Acquisition  of  Nuclear- 

5wered  Submarines 

.)epartment  statement)   61 

TJ  ard  a  Stronger  International 

■;  conomy  (Whitehead) 39 

d  .-Canada  Free  Trade  Agreement    ..  24 

C  ..-Canada  Relations 23 

V  t  of  Canadian  Prime  IVIinister 

■  Julroney,  Reagan)    21 

C igress 

A  ievements  of  the  INF  Treaty 

;hultz)    6 

E  ctions  in  Korea  (Sigur) 32 

F  1989  Assistance  Requests  for 

ast  Asia  and  the  Pacific 

5igur)    33 

f  1989  Assistance  Requests  for 

rganizations  and  Programs 

iVilliamson) 71 

I  1989  Foreign  Policy  Budget  Request 

ihultz)    ." 8 

F  1989  Request  for  Foreign  Assistance 

rograms  (Woods)    54 

I  ;h  Technology  Terrorism  (Bremer)   .  .  65 

I  date  on  Europe  (Ridgway)   50 

I  partment  and  Foreign  Service 

I   1989  Foreign  Policy  Budget  Request 

^hultz)    8 

■I'.udget  Crunch"  and  the  Foreign 

<  r\  ice  (Spiers)    28 

i  st  Asia.  FY  1989  Assistance  Requests 

or  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific 

Sigur)    33 

1  onomics 

1  ■  1989  Request  for  Foreign  Assistance 

-■rograms  (Woods)    54 

'i)an  Continues  Quotas  on  Beef,  Citrus 

mports  (Yeutter)    45 

llicies  for  the  Americas  in  the  1990s 

Williamson)    68 

'ward  a  Stronger  International 

iilconomy  (Whitehead) 39 

e  U.S.  and  Japan:  Partners  in  Global 

Economic  Leadership  (Wallis) 43 

S.  Foreign  Economic  Policy. 

1981-87  47 

hiopia.  Reflections  on  U.S. -Soviet 

Relations  (Reagan) 1 

jrope.  Update  on  Europe  (Ridgway)   .  50 

inland.  Visit  of  Finnish  Prime 

I  Minister    51 


Food.  FY  1989  Request  for  Foreign 

Assistance  Programs  (Woods)  54 

Foreign  Assistance 

FY  1989  Assistance  Requests  for  East 

Asia  and  the  Pacific  (Sigur) 33 

FY  1989  Foreign  Policy  Budget  Request 

(Shultz)    8 

FY  1989  Request  for  Foreign  Assistance 

Programs  (Woods)   54 

Health.  FY  1989  Request  for  Foreign 

Assistance  Programs  (Woods)   54 

Human  Rights 

FY  1989  Request  for  Foreign  Assistance 

Programs  (Woods)    54 

Our  Human  Rights  Agenda  With  the 

Soviet  Union  (Reagan)    4 

Update  on  Europe  (Ridgway)    50 

Iran.  U.S.  Supports  Security  Council 

Resolution  on  Chemical  Weapons 

(Walters,  text  of  resolution) 69 

Iraq.  U.S.  Supports  Security  Council 

Resolution  on  Chemical  Weapons 

(Walters,  text  of  resolution) 69 

Israel.  Secretary  Meets  With  Israeli 

Foreign  Minister  (Shultz) 60 

Japan 

Japan  Continues  Quotas  on  Beef.  Citrus 

Imports  (Yeutter)    45 

The  U.S.  and  .Japan:  Partners  in  Global 

Economic  Leadership  (Wallis) 43 

Korea.  Elections  in  Korea  (Sigur)   32 

Lebanon.  UN  Security  Council  Resolution 

on  South  Lebanon  (Walters)    73 

Middle  East.  U.S.  to  Extend  Protection 

to  Neutral  Ships  in  Persian 

Gulf  (Carlucci) 61 

Military  Affairs 
Canadian  Acquisition  of  Nuclear- 
Powered  Submarines 

(Department  statement)  61 

U.S.  to  Extend  Protection  to  Neutral 

Ships  in  Persian  Gulf  (Carlucci)    61 

Nicaragua.  Reflections  on  U.S. -Soviet 

Relations  (Reagan) 1 

North  .Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 
Achievements  of  the  INF  Treaty 

(Shultz)    6 

NATO  Nuclear  Planning  Group  Meets  in 

Brussels  (final  communique)    53 

U.S.  Arms  Control  Initiatives 16 

Update  on  Europe  (Ridgway)    50 

Organization  of  American  States.  Pan 

American  Day  and  Week,  1988 

(proclamation) 75 

Pacific.  FY  1989  Assistance  Requests 

for  East  Asia  and  the 

Pacific  (Sigur) 33 

Panama 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "This  Week 

With  David  Brinkley"    14 

Transfer  of  U.S.  Funds  to  Panama 

(White  House  statement)   75 

Presidential  Documents 

Our  Human  Rights  Agenda  With  the 

Soviet  Union 4 

Pan  American  Day  and  Week,  1988 

(proclamation) 75 

Reflections  on  U.S. -Soviet  Relations  ...     1 
Visit  of  Canadian  Prime  Minister 

(Mulroney,  Reagan)    21 

World  Trade  Week,  1988 

(proclamation) 41 


Publications 

Current  Documents.  19S.i  Supplement 

Released 81 

Department  of  State  79 

Digest  of  United  States  Practice  in 

International  Law  Released    80 

Foreign  Relations  Supplement 

Released    79 

Terrorism 

Essential  Ingredients  in  the  Fight 

Against  Terrorism  (Bremer)    62 

High  Technology  Terrorism  (Bremer)   .  .  65 

Trade 

Japan  Continues  Quotas  on  Beef,  Citrus 

Imports  (Yeutter)    45 

Policies  for  the  Americas  in  the  1990s 

(Williamson)    68 

Toward  a  Stronger  International  Economy 

(Whitehead) 39 

The  U.S.  and  Japan:  Partners  in  Global 

Economic  Leadership  (Wallis) 43 

U.S. -Canada  Free  Trade  Agreement    ..  24 
U.S.  Foreign  Economic  Policy, 

1981-87  47 

World  Trade  Week,  1988 

(proclamation)  41 

Treaties.  Current  Actions  76 

U.S.S.R. 

Achievements  of  the  INF  Treaty 

(Shultz)    6 

Our  Human  Rights  Agenda  With  the 

Soviet  Union  (Reagan)    4 

Reflections  on  U.S. -Soviet  Relations 

(Reagan)  1 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "This  Week  With 

David  Brinkley"    14 

U.S.  Arms  Control  Initiatives 16 

Update  on  Europe  (Ridgway)   50 

United  Nations 

FY  1989  Assistance  Requests  for 

Organizations  and  Programs 

(Williamson) 71 

FY  1989  Foreign  Policy  Budget  Request 

(Shultz)    8 

Policies  for  the  Americas  in  the  1990s 

(Williamson)    68 

UN  Security  Council  Resolution  on 

South  Lebanon  (Walters)   73 

U.S.  Supports  Security  Council  Resolution 

on  Chemical  Weapons  (Walters,  text  of 

resolution)   69 

Western  Hemisphere 

Pan  American  Day  and  Week,  1988 

(proclamation) 75 

Policies  for  the  Americas  in  the  1990s 

(Williamson)    68 

Name  Index 

Bremer,  L.  Paul,  III    62,65 

Carlucci,  Frank  C,  III 61 

Mulroney,  Brian   21 

Reagan,  President 1,4,21,41,75 

Ridgway,  Rozanne  L  50 

Shultz,  Secretary 6,8,14,60 

Sigur,  Gaston  J.,  Jr   32,33 

Spiers,  Ronald  I 28 

Wallis,  W.  Allen  43 

Walters,  Vernon  A   69,73 

Whitehead,  John  C    39 

Williamson,  Richard  S 68,71 

Woods,  Alan   54 

Yeutter,  Clayton 45 


Superintendent  of  Documents 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Washington,  D.C.  20402 


Second  Class  Mail 

Postage  and  Fees  Paid 

U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 

ISSN  0041-7610 


OFFICIAL  BUSINESS 
Penalty  for  Private  Use  $300 


Subscription  Renewals:  To  insure  uninterrupted  service,  please  renew  your 
subscription  promptly  when  you  receive  the  expiration  notice  from  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents.  Due  to  the  time  required  to  process  renewals, 
notices  are  sent  3  months  in  advance  of  the  expiration  date.  Any  questions  in- 
volving your  subscription  should  be  addressed  to  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402 


_J 


D^tpariinvit  i 


J 


t/a  137 


im  of  stuiv  -^  -w  J  ^ 

buUetBii 


13  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Eoj^ifln  PonGW^VolumeuBS  /  Number  2137 


*- IIP  10 11 

wKrM  mm 


August  1988 


Moscow  Summit 


ij^HlHB      $ 


SOMMET-TORONTO-SUMMIT 


Cover: 

President  Reagan  and  General  Secretary 
Gorbachev  on  their  walk  to  Red  Square 
with  St.  Basil's  Cathedral  in  the  back- 
ground. 

(White  House  photo  by  Pete  Souza) 


Dppartm4»ni  of  Staip 

bulletin 


Volume  88  /  Number  2137  /  August  M 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and  govern- 
ment agencies  with  information  on  de- 
velopments in  U.S.  foreign  relations 
and  the  work  of  the  Department  of 
State  and  the  Foreign  Service.  The 
Bulletin's  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  se- 
lected press  releases  issued  by  the 
White  House,  the  Department,  and  the 
U.S.  Mission  to  the  United  Nations; 
and  treaties  and  other  agreements  to 
which  the  United  States  is  or  may  be- 
come a  party.  Special  features,  articles, 
and  other  supportive  material  (such  as 
maps,  charts,  photographs,  and  graphs) 
are  published  frequently  to  provide  ad- 
ditional information  on  current  issues 
but  should  not  necessarily  be  inter- 
preted as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 

Secretary  of  State 

CHARLES  REDMAN 

Assistant  Secretary 
for  Public  Affairs 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

NORMAN  HOWARD 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON  R.  HAYNES 

Assistant  Editor 


The  Secretary  of  State  has  determined  that 
the  publication  of  this  periodical  is  neces- 
sary in  the  transaction  of  the  public  busi- 
ness required  by  law  of  this  Department. 
Use  of  funds  for  printing  this  periodical 
has  been  approved  by  the  Director  of  the 
Office  of  Management  and  Budget  thrcjugh 
September  :Hi.  198«. 


DErAKTMENT  OK  St.^TE   BULLETIN  (ISS 

0041-7610)  is  published  monthly  (plus  ai  |i 
nual  inde.x)  by  the  Department  of  State 
2201  C  Street,  NW,  Washington,  D.C. 
20520.  Second-class  postage  paid  at  Wa: 
ington,  D.C,  and  additional  mailing  of 
fices.  POSTMASTER:  Send  address 
changes  to  Superintendent  of  Documen 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Wash|< 
ington,  D.C.  20402. 


NOTE:  Most  of  the  contents  of  thus  pub- 
lication are  in  the  public  domain  and 
not  copyrighted.  Those  items  may  be  re- 
printed; citation  of  the  Department  dk 
State  Bulletin  as  the  source  will  be 
appreciated.  Permission  to  reproduce 
all  copyrighted  material  (including  pho- 
tographs) must  be  obtained  from  the  origi- 
nal source.  The  Bulletin  is  inde.xed  in 
the  Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Literature 
and  in  the  PAIS  (Public  Affairs  Informa- 
tion Service,  Inc.)  Bulletin. 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Docu 
ments,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Offic( 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


CONTENTS 


FEATURE 


1  Moscow  Summit  (Vice  President  Bush,  Mikhail  S. 

Gorbachev,  President  Reagan,  Secretary  Shultz, 

Joint  Statement) 
42        Summary  of  U.S. -Soviet  Agreements  Signed  in 

Moscow 
46        Toronto  Economic  Summit  (President  Reagan, 

Political  and  Ecoyiojyiic  Declaratioyis,  Chairman's 

Statemeyit,  White  House  Statement) 
55        U.S. -Japan  Agreement  on  Cooperation  in  Science  and 

Teclinology  (White  House  Fact  Sheet) 


Th  Secretary 

Sfr     Interview  on  "Meet  the  Press" 

Alica 

58  The  Potential  Impact  of  Impos- 
ing Sanctions  Against  South 
Africa  Uohv  C.  Whitehead) 

62     Review  of  Events  in  Ethiopia 
(Chester  A.  Crocker,  Charles 
Gladson,  Richard  S. 
Williamson) 

A  IIS  Control 

67  U.S.,  Soviet  Union  Sign  Joint 

Verification  Experiment 
Agreement  (Text  of  Agreement) 

68  President  Welcomes  Entry  Into 

Force  of  INF  Treaty  (Letter  to 
the  Senate) 

hit  Asia 

69  China  and  the  U.S.:  Presnet  and 

Future  (Michael  H.  Armacost) 


Economics 


72 


The  United  States  in  the  World 
Economy  (W.  Allen  Wallis) 


Europe 

76  North  Atlantic  Council  Meets  in 
Madrid  (Final  Communique) 

76  37th  Report  on  Cyprus  (Message 
to  the  Congress) 


Foreign  Assistance 

77  Humanitarian  Aid  to 

Nicaragua  (Alan  Woods) 

78  Aid  to  the  Nicaraguan  Demo- 

cratic Resistance  (President 
Reagan) 


Human  Riglits 

79        U.S.  Signs  UN  Convention 

Against  Torture  (Message  to 
the  Senate,  Text  of  Convention) 


Middle  East 

83  President's  Meeting  With  Israeli 
Foreign  Minister  Peres  (White 
House  Statement) 


United  Nations 


84 


84 


Third  Special  Session  on  Disar- 
mament Convenes  (U.S.  State- 
ment) 

Arms  Control:  Progress  and 
Global  Challenges  (Secretary 
Shiiltz) 


Western  Hemisphere 


88 


91 


Situation  in  Panama  (Elliott 
Abrams,  Michael  H.  Arma- 
cost, Secretary  Shultz) 

Cuban  Independence  Day 
(President  Reagan) 


Treaties 

92        Current  Actions 

Press  Releases 

94        Department  of  State 

Publications 

94        Department  of  State 


Index 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/August 


I 


FEATURE 
Moscow  Summit 


Moscow  Summit 

President  Reagan  and  Mikhail  S.  Gorbachev, 

General  Secretary  of  the  Ceritral  Committee 

of  the  Communist  Party  of  the  Soviet  Union, 

met  in  Moscow,  May  29-June  2,  1988. 

En  route  to  Moscow,  President  Reagan 

visited  Helsinki  (May  25-29);  and 

he  visited  London  (June  3), 

before  returning  to  Washington. 

Following  are  various  remarks 

made  during  his  trip. 


SroENT'S  DEPARTURE 

1  :marks, 

b  white  house, 

L  25,  19881 

■lliiw  Americans  and  all  our  Ambas- 
s  ( if  our  friends  and  allies  who  are 
'  nil  the  eve  of  my  fii'st  meeting  with 

■  I'al  Secretary  Gorbachev  in  1985,  I 

!  ou  that  my  mission,  simply  stated, 
ffl  I  mission  for  freedom  and  peace.  I 
■a  ed  to  sit  down  across  the  table  from 
'•  Hii-hachev  and  try  to  set  out  with 
i  liasis  for  peaceful  discourse  and  co- 
it  n  in  between  our  two  countries,  at 
;iiiie  time  working  to  advance  the 
and  frontiers  of  human  freedom. 

■  approached  that  first  meeting  in  Ge- 
.  I  wanted  to  establish  a  better 

lilt:  relationship  with  the  Soviet 
II — one  no  longer  subject  to  the  dan- 
•  IS  highs  and  lows  of  the  past;  a 
'0  jng  relationship  that  would  be  based 
1  'alities,  not  merely  on  a  seeming  re- 
it  m  of  tensions  between  our  two 
i lies  that  could  quickly  disappear. 
enmplish  that,  the  United  States 
1(1  to  see  solid  and  steady  progress 
ir  major  areas:  human  rights,  re- 
il  conflicts,  arms  reductions,  and  bi- 
ll exchanges. 

\Vt 've  come  a  long  way  since  then. 
.  as  1  depart  on  this  trip  to  Moscow, 
liiiu'  the  agreement  I  made  vrith  Gen- 
Secretary  Gorbachev  back  in  1985 
w f  would  visit  each  other's  country, 
I  piiint  to  achievements  we  can  all  be 
il  "f  in  each  of  the  areas  of  our  four- 
aecnda.  The  United  States  and  the 


Soviet  Union  have  signed  the  Geneva  ac- 
cords providing  for  the  vrithdrawal  of  all 
Soviet  troops  from  Afghanistan,  and  the 
first  withdrawals  have  begun.  We  have 
signed  an  amis  reduction  treaty  that  will 
reduce  the  level  of  nuclear  arms  for  the 
first  time  in  history,  eliminating  an  en- 
tire class  of  U.S.  and  Soviet  nuclear  mis- 
siles. We've  made  progress  on  the  main 
points  of  a  treaty  that  will  cut  in  half  our 
arsenals  of  strategic  offensive  nuclear 
weapons.  Our  new  Nuclear  Risk 
Reduction  Centers  are  already  transmit- 
ting messages  that  reduce  the  risk  of 
conflict.  Our  representatives  have  held 
broad-ranging  discussions  on  human 
rights,  and  we've  seen  concrete  steps 
taken.  The  levels  of  emigration  have 
risen.  Some  political  and  religious  prison- 
ers have  been  released,  and  a  number  of 
divided  families  have  been  reunited. 
Somewhat  more  diversity  of  expression 
is  permitted.  There  has  been  a  recogni- 
tion of  religious  persecution  in  the  past 
and  a  pledge  that  some  restrictions  on 
the  right  to  worship  will  be  eased.  We 
have  greatly  expanded  our  bilateral  ex- 
changes. The  number  of  travelers  be- 
tween our  two  countries  is  rising 
sharply,  with  unprecedented  totals  ex- 
pected this  year.  There's  more,  of 
course,  but  I'd  miss  my  plane  if  I  went 
through  the  entire  list  [laughter].  And 
yet  impressive  as  these  achievements 
may  be,  they  represent  only  a  beginning. 

In  my  talks  with  General  Secretary 
Gorbachev  next  week,  we  will  be  looking 
to  the  future,  for  there  remains  much  to 
be  done.  Permit  me  to  outline  the  sub- 


stance of  our  four-part  agenda  for  those 
talks. 

On  human  rights,  I  will  press  to  see 
that  the  positive  trends  I've  mentioned 
continue  and  the  reforms  are  made  per- 
manent. We  certainly  welcome  the  re- 
cent signs  of  Soviet  progress  toward 
greater  freedom  of  religion,  greater  free- 
dom of  speech,  greater  freedom  of  move- 
ment. There  have  been  indications  that 
this  progress  may  be  written  into  Soviet 
law  and  regulations  so  that  it  can  be  a 
more  permanent  part  of  Soviet  life.  We 
will  be  doing  all  we  can  to  encourage  just 
that. 

Concerning  regional  conflicts,  we'll 
be  looking  for  Soviet  actions  to  help  ad- 
vance negotiations  on  the  Angola  and  Na- 
mibia problems  and  to  support  UN  ef- 
forts to  end  the  Iran-Iraq  war.  We  will 
ask  the  Soviets  to  use  their  influence 
with  the  Ethiopian  Government  to  pre- 
vent a  manmade  crisis  of  starvation 
there.  We'll  urge  the  Soviets  to  help 
move  the  Middle  East  peace  process 
closer  to  a  just  and  lasting  solution.  And 
we'll  look  for  ways  to  help  the  parties  re- 
solve other  regional  conflicts  in  Africa, 
Asia,  and,  yes.  Central  America. 

Regarding  arms  reductions,  we'll 
strive  to  resolve  the  issues  that  still 
stand  in  the  way  of  our  agreement  to  cut 
U.S.  and  Soviet  strategic  offensive  nu- 
clear arms  in  half.  As  we  make  progress, 
our  negotiators  will  be  able  to  move  for- 
ward in  their  work  on  the  draft  START 
[strategic  arms  reduction  talks]  treaty. 
We'll  continue  to  seek  ways  to  improve 
the  verification  procedures  of  two  exist- 


|artment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


ing  treaties  on  nuclear  testing — the 
Peaceful  Nuclear  Explosions  Treaty  and 
the  Threshold  Tfest  Ban  Treaty— so  that 
those  treaties  can  be  ratified.  And  I  will 
urge  the  Soviets  to  move  ahead  at  the 
Vienna  followup  meeting  of  the  Confer- 
ence on  Security  and  Cooperation  in 
Europe.  At  these  discussions,  negotia- 
tors from  35  nations  are  working  on  ways 
to  advance  human  rights  and  strengthen 
the  confidence-  and  security-building 
measures  they  negotiated  at  Stockholm 
in  1986.  Separately,  the  23  members  of 
the  Atlantic  alliance  and  Warsaw  Pact 
are  negotiating  a  mandate  for  new  talks 
on  conventional  forces.  Success  here 
means  the  Soviets  must  make  continued 
progress  on  human  rights,  for  the  secu- 
rity in  Europe  involves  much  more  than 
military  arrangements.  It  must  be  based 
on  a  solid  foundation  of  respect  for  the 
rights  of  individuals. 

Concerning  the  final  portion  of  our 
four-part  agenda,  our  bilateral  relations, 
we  wall  address  both  new  agreements 
and  renewals  of  existing  agreements  to 
extend  the  areas  in  which  we  cooperate. 
This  will  include  everything  from  practi- 
cal matters  of  nuclear  safety  to  radio- 
navigation  and  the  protection  of  our 
global  environment.  We'll  seek  to 
broaden  still  further  our  people-to-peo- 
ple contacts  and,  especially,  to  give  more 
of  our  young  people  the  opportunity  to 
participate  in  such  exchanges. 

So,  as  you  see  from  the  outline  of 
that  agenda,  there  will  be  plenty  of  work 
for  Mr.  Gorbachev  and  me  in  Moscow 
next  week.  I  don't  expect  it  to  be  easy. 
We  may  have  many  differences,  deep  dif- 
ferences, moral  differences,  but  we're 
still  fellow  human  beings.  We  can  still 
work  together  to  keep  the  peace.  And  in 
working  with  the  Soviet  Union,  the 
United  States  can  still  remain  true  to  its 
mission  of  expanding  liberty  throughout 
the  world. 

Since  my  first  meeting  with  Mr.  Gor- 
bachev, we  have,  as  I've  said,  come  a 
long  way.  My  task  next  week  wall  be  to 
go  still  farther — farther  in  the  interests 
of  peace,  farther  toward  a  universal  re- 
spect for  fundamental  human  rights,  far- 
ther toward  world  freedom,  and  farther 
toward  a  safer  world  for  all  people.  And 
now,  as  I  embark  upon  this  great  task,  I 
ask  for  your  prayers. 


PRESIDENT'S  REMARKS 
PAASIKIVI  SOCIETY 

AND  LEAGUE  OF 

FINNISH-AMERICAN 

SOCIETIES, 
HELSINKI, 
MAY  27,  19882 

Let  me  begin  by  saying  thank  you  to  our 
hosts,  the  Finnish  Government,  the 
Paasikivi  Society,  and  the  League  of 
Finnish- American  Societies.  It's  a  par- 
ticular honor  for  me  to  come  here  today. 
This  year — the  Year  of  Friendship,  as 
Congress  has  proclaimed  it,  between  the 
United  States  and  Finland — this  year 
marks  the  350th  anniversary  of  the  am- 
val  of  the  first  Finns  in  America  and  the 
establishment  of  a  small  Scandinavian  col- 
ony near  what  is  today  Wilmington,  Dela- 
ware— an  ancient  people  in  a  new  world. 
And  that  is  the  story,  not  only  of  those 
Finns,  but  of  all  the  peoples  who  braved 
the  seas,  to  settle  in  and  build  my  coun- 
try, a  land  of  freedom  for  a  nation 
of  immigrants. 

Yes,  they  founded  a  new  world,  but 
as  they  crossed  the  oceans,  the  moun- 
tains, and  the  prairies,  those  who  made 
America  carried  the  old  world  in  their 
hearts — the  old  customs,  the  family  ties, 
and  mo.st  of  all,  the  belief  in  God,  a  belief 
that  gave  them  the  moral  compass  and 
ethical  foundation  by  which  they  ex- 
plored an  uncharted  frontier  and  con- 
structed a  government  and  nation  of,  by, 
and  for  the  people. 

And  so,  although  we  Americans  be- 
came a  new  people,  we  also  remain  an  an- 
cient one,  for  we're  guided  by  ancient 
and  universal  values — values  that  Prime 
Minister  [Karri]  Holkeri  spoke  of  in  Los 
Angeles  this  February  when,  after  recall- 
ing Finland's  internationally  recognized 
position  of  neutrality,  he  added  that  Fin- 
land is  "tied  to  Western  values  of  free- 
dom, democracy,  and  human  rights." 
And  let  me  add  here  that  for  America, 
those  ties  are  also  the  bonds  of  our  friend- 
ship. America  respects  Finland's  neutral- 
ity. We  support  Finland's  independence. 
We  honor  Finland's  courageous  history. 
We  value  the  creative  statesmanship 
that  has  been  Finland's  gift  to  world 
peace.  And  in  this  soaring  hall,  which  is 


the  great  architect  Alvar  Aalto's  stat<  | 
ment  of  hope  for  Finland's  future,  w(| 
affirm  our  hope  and  faith  that  the  fri| 
ship  between  our  nations  will  be  unen  j 
ing-  i 

We're  gathered  here  today  in  this  | 
hall  because  it  wasliere,  almost  13  ye  | 
ago,  that  the  35  nations  of  the  Confer  | 
ence  on  Security  and  Cooperation  in 
Europe  (CSCE)  signed  the  Helsinki 
Final  Act,  a  document  that  embodies 
same  ethical  and  moral  principles  anc 
same  hope  for  a  future  of  peace  that 
Finns  and  so  many  other  European  ii 
grants  gave  America.  The  Final  Act  i 
singular  statement  of  hope.  Its  "thret 
baskets"  touch  on  almost  every  aspec 
of  East- West  relations,  and  taken  to- 
gether form  a  kind  of  map  through  th 
wilderness  of  mutual  hostihty  to  oper 
fields  of  peace  and  to  a  common  home 
trust  among  all  of  our  sovereign  na- 
tions— neutrals,  nonaligned,  and  allia 
members  alike.  The  Final  Act  sets  n6 
standards  of  conduct  for  our  nations  i 
provides  the  mechanisms  by  which  tc 
apply  those  standards. 

Yes,  the  Final  Act  goes  beyond 
arms  control — once  the  focus  of  inter 
tional  dialogue.  It  reflects  a  truth  the 
have  so  often  noted:  nations  do  not  di 
trust  each  other  because  they  are  ar 
they  are  armed  because  they  distrust 
each  other.  The  Final  Act  grapples  w 
the  full  range  of  our  underlying  diffe: 
ences  and  deals  with  East- West  rela- 
tions as  an  interrelated  whole.  It  re: 
the  belief  of  all  our  countries  that  hui 
rights  are  less  likely  to  be  abused  wl 
nation's  security  is  less  in  doubt;  thai 
economic  relations  can  contribute  to 
rity,  but  depend  on  the  trust  and  con 
dence  that  come  from  increasing  ties 
tween  our  peoples,  increasing  openni 
and  increasing  freedom;  and  that  th( 
no  true  international  security  wathot 
spect  for  human  rights. 

I  can  hardly  improve  on  the  wor 
President  [Mauno]  Koivisto  used  in  t 
hall  2  years  ago  when  he  recalled  tha 
"security  is  more  than  the  protection 
borders  and  social  structures.  It  is  er 
phasized  in  the  Final  Act  that  Individ 
persons  who  live  in  the  participating 


FEATURE 
Moscow  Summit 


■  's  have  to  feel  in  their  own  lives  secu- 

■  \\  hich  is  based  on  respect  for  funda- 
tal  human  rights  and  basic  free- 

s  ■■  And  beyond  establishing  these 
aated  standards,  the  Final  Act 
lilishes  a  process  for  progress.  It 
up  a  review  procedure  to  measure 
nrmance  against  standards.  And  de- 
'  the  doubts  of  the  critics,  for  the 
i:'.  years,  the  signatory  states  have 
:  tci-t'd  the  pohtical  will  to  keep  on 
kinp  and  making  progress.  Let  me 
tliat  it  seems  particularly  appropri- 
ii'  me  that  the  Final  Act  is  associated 
iiist'ly  with  this  city  and  this  country. 
!■  than  any  other  diplomatic  docu- 
.1  t,  the  Final  Act  speaks  to  the  yearn- 
in  :hat  Finland's  longtime  President, 
[J  0  Kekkonen,  spoke  of  more  than  a 
'ttT  century  ago  when  he  said,  in  his 
lis:  "It's  the  fervent  hope  of  the  Finn- 
iniple  that  barriers  be  lowered  all 
■  I'Airope  and  that  progress  be  made 
J  }y  the  road  of  European  unity."  And 
bi  dded  that  this  was,  as  he  put  it,  "for 
tt  good  of  Europe,  and  thus  of  human- 
it  as  a  whole."  Well,  those  were  vision- 
x  words.  That  vision  inspired  and 
si  3ed  the  drafting  of  the  Final  Act  and 
iiiues  to  guide  us  today. 
Has  the  Final  Act  and  what  we  call 
!  Helsinki  process  worked  or  not? 
i\  say  it  hasn't,  but  I  believe  it  has. 
Ill-  security  field,  I  would  point  to  the 
t  recent  fruit  of  the  process:  the 
kholm  document  of  confidence-  and 
i  I \-building  measures  in  Europe.        i 
ureement  lays  dovm  the  rules  by 
rt  ch  our  35  states  notify  each  other  of      : 
B  oming  military  activities  in  Europe;       ' 
i  vides  detailed  information  on  these  ac-  ■ 
pties  in  advance;  and  lets  the  others 
'W  their  plans  for  very  large  military 
ivities  1  or  2  years  in  advance  and 
ees  not  to  hold  such  maneuvers  un- 
5  this  notice  is  given;  invites  observ- 
to  their  larger  military  activities;  and 
Tnits  onsite  inspections  to  make  sure 
agreement  is  honored. 
I  am  happy  to  note  that  since  our 
ffesentatives  shook  hands  to  seal  this 
reement  a  year  and  a  half  ago,  all  35 
tes  have,  by  and  large,  honored  both 
letter  and  the  spirit  of  the  Stockholm 
:ument.  The  Western  and  neutral  and 
laligned  states  have  set  a  strong  e.xam- 
in  providing  full  information  about 


artment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


III 

i 

/    350  Years  of 

1     RiXiishAmerican 

L^,  Fnen^ 

■  1638^1988 

pgnjandaHal 
^   HebiikiRSid 

"i 

President  Reagan's  address  before  the  Paasikivi  Society  and  the  League  of  Finnish- 
American  Societies  at  Finlandia  Hall  where  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  was  signed  13 
years  ago. 


their  military  activities.  In  April,  Fin- 
land held  its  first  military  activity  sub- 
ject to  the  Stockholm  notification  require- 
ments and  voluntarily  invited  observers 
to  it.  The  Soviet  Union  and  its  allies  also 
have  a  generally  good  record  of  im- 
plementation, though  less  forthcoming 
than  the  West.  Tfen  onsite  inspections 
have  been  conducted  so  far,  and  more 
and  more  states  are  exercising  their 
right  to  make  such  inspections.  I  can't 
help  but  believe  that  making  inspections 
a  matter  of  routine  business  will  improve 
openness  and  enhance  confidence. 

Nor  was  Stockholm  the  end  of  the 
process.  In  Vienna,  all  35  signatory 
states  are  considering  how  to  strengthen 
the  confidence-  and  security-building 
measures,  in  the  context  of  a  balanced 
outcome  at  the  CSCE  followup  meeting 
that  includes  significant  progress  on 
human  rights. 

In  the  economic  field,  as  in  the  secu- 
rity field,  I  believe  there  has  been  prog- 
ress, but  of  a  different  kind.  Issues  and 
negotiations  regarding  security  are  not 
simple,  but  military  technology  makes 
arms  and  armies  resemble  each  other 
enough  so  that  common  measures  can  be 
confidently  applied.  Economic  relations, 
by  contrast,  are  bedeviled  by  differences 
in  our  systems.  Perhaps  increases  in  non- 
strategic  trade  can  contribute  to  better 
relations  between  East  and  West,  but 
it's  difficult  to  relate  the  state-run  econo- 
mies of  the  East  to  the  essentially  free- 
market  economies  of  the  West.  Perhaps 
some  of  the  changes  underway  in  the 
state-run  economies  will  equip  them  bet- 
ter to  deal  with  our  businessmen  and 
open  new  arenas  for  cooperation.  But 
our  work  on  these  issues  over  the  years 
has  already  made  us  understand  that 
differences  in  systems  are  serious  obsta- 
cles to  expansion  of  econ  omic  ties,  and 
since  understanding  of  unpleasant  reali- 
ties is  part  of  wisdom,  that,  too,  is 
progress. 

The  changes  taking  place  in  the  East- 
em  countries  of  the  continent  go  beyond 
changes  in  their  economic  systems  and 
greater  openness  in  their  military  activi- 
ties. Changes  have  also  begun  to  occur  in 
the  field  of  human  rights,  as  was  called 
for  in  the  Final  Act.  The  rest  of  us  would 
like  to  see  the  changes  that  are  being  an- 
nounced actually  registered  in  the  law 
and  practice  of  our  Eastern  partners  and 


in  the  documents  under  negotiation  in 
the  Vienna  followoip  to  the  Helsinki  con- 
ference. 

Much  has  been  said  about  the  human 
rights  and  humanitarian  provisions  in  the 
Final  Act  and  the  failure  of  the  Eastern 
bloc  to  honor  them.  Yet,  for  all  the  bleak 
winds  that  have  swept  the  plains  of  jus- 
tice since  that  signing  day  in  1975,  the  ac- 
cords have  taken  root  in  the  conscience 
of  humanity  and  grown  in  moral  and,  in- 
creasingly, in  diplomatic  authority.  I  be- 
lieve that  this  is  no  accident.  It  reflects 
an  increasing  realization  that  the  agenda 
of  East- West  relations  must  be  compre- 
hensive, that  security  and  human  rights 
must  be  advanced  together  or  cannot 
truly  be  secured  at  all.  But  it  also  shows 
that  the  provisions  in  the  Final  Act  re- 
flect standards  that  are  truly  universal  in 
their  scope.  The  accords  embody  a  funda- 
mental truth,  a  truth  that  gathers 
strength  with  each  passing  season  and 
that  will  not  be  denied — the  truth  that, 
like  the  Finnish  settlers  in  America,  all 
our  ancient  peoples  find  themselves 
today  in  a  new  world  and  that,  as  those 
early  settlers  discovered,  the  greatest 
creative  and  moral  force  in  this  new 
world,  the  greatest  hope  for  survival  and 
success,  for  peace  and  happiness,  is 
human  freedom. 

Yes,  freedom — the  right  to  speak,  to 
print;  the  right  to  worship,  to  travel,  to 
assemble;  the  right  to  be  different — the 
right,  as  the  American  philospher, 
Henry  David  Thoreau,  wrote,  "to  step  to 
the  music  of  a  different  drummer." — 
this  is  freedom  as  most  Europeans  and 
Americans  understand  it  and  freedom  as 
it  is  embodied  in  the  Universal  Decla- 
ration of  Human  Rights  and,  yes,  in  the 
Helsinki  accords.  And  far  more  than  the 
locomotive  or  the  automobile,  the  air- 
plane or  the  rocket,  more  than  radio, 
television,  or  the  computer,  this  concept 
of  liberty  is  the  most  distinct,  peculiar, 
and  powerful  invention  of  the  civilization 
we  all  share. 

Indeed,  without  this  freedom  there 
would  have  been  no  mechanical  inven- 
tions, for  inventions  are  eccentricities. 
The  men  and  women  who  create  them 
are  visionaries,  just  hke  artists  and  writ- 
ers. They  see  what  others  fail  to  see  and 
trust  their  insights  when  others  don't. 


The  same  freedom  that  permits  litera- . 
ture  and  the  arts  to  flourish,  the  same  i 
freedom  that  allows  one  to  attend        I 
church,  synagogue,  or  mosque  withou  ( 
apprehension,  that  same  freedom  fron 
oppression  and  supervision  is  the  free 
dom  that  has  given  us,  the  peoples  of 
Western  Europe  and  North  America, 
our  dynamism,  our  economic  growth, 
and  our  inventiveness.  Together  with 
Japan  and  Australia,  and  many  others 
we  have  hved  in  this  state  of  freedom 
this  house  of  democracy,  since  the  em 
the  Second  World  War.  The  house  of  ( 
mocracy  is  a  house  whose  doors  are  o] 
to  all.  Because  of  it,  because  of  the  lib 
erty  and  popular  rule  we've  shared, 
today  we  also  share  a  prosperity  mon 
widely  distributed  and  extensive,  a  p 
cal  order  more  tolerant  and  humane  t 
has  ever  before  been  known  on  earth. 

To  see  not  simply  the  immediate 
the  historic  importance  of  this,  we  sh 
remember  how  far  many  of  our  natioi 
have  traveled  and  how  desolate  the  fi 
ture  of  freedom  and  democracy  once 
seemed.  For  much  of  this  century,  th 
talitarian  temptation,  in  one  form  or 
other,  has  beckoned  to  mankind,  also 
promising  freedom,  but  of  a  different 
kind  than  the  one  we  celebrate  today 
This  concept  of  liberty  is,  as  the  Czec 
Slovak  writer,  Milan  Kundera,  has  pi 
"the  age-old  dream  of  a  world  where 
erybody  would  live  in  harmony,  unit( 
by  a  single  common  will  and  faith,  wi 
out  secrets  from  one  another" — the 
dom  of  imposed  perfection. 

Fifty,  forty,  even  as  recently  as 
thirty  years  ago,  the  contest  betweer 
this  Utopian  concept  of  freedom  on  or 
hand  and  the  democratic  concept  of  fi 
dom  on  the  other  seemed  a  close  one. 
Promises  of  a  perfect  world  lured  ma 
Western  thinkers  and  miOions  of  othe 
besides.  And  many  believed  in  the  co 
dent  prediction  of  history's  inevitabl 
umph.  Well,  few  do  today.  Just  as  d 
cratic  freedom  has  proven  itself  incre 
ibly  fertile — fertile  not  merely  in  a  r 
rial  sense,  but  also  in  the  abundance 
has  brought  forth  in  the  human  spirit 
so,  too,  utopianism  has  proven  brutal 
and  barren. 

Albert  Camus  once  predicted  thf 
in  his  words,  "when  revolution  in  the" 
name  of  power  and  of  history  become  |a 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/August  0 


FEATURE 
Moscow  Summit 


lit  Tdus  and  immoderate  mechanism, 
\  ifbellion  is  consecrated  in  the 
I '  (if  moderation  of  Hfe."  Isn't  this 
t  ly  what  we  see  happening  across 
!  iinuiitains  and  plains  of  Europe  and 
!  beyond  the  Urals  today?  In  West- 
-urope,  support  for  Utopian  ideolo- 
iiK-luding  support  among  intellectu- 
als all  but  collapsed,  while  in  the 
I  inocratic  countries,  leaders  grapple 
(lie  internal  contradictions  of  their 
111  and  some  ask  how  they  can  make 
system  better  and  more  productive. 
-ruse,  the  front  line  in  the  competi- 
)t'  ideas  that  has  played  in  Europe 
\merica  for  more  than  70  years  has 
mI  East.  Once  it  was  the  democra- 
hut  doubted  their  own  view  of  free- 
'  and  wondered  whether  Utopian  sys- 
inight  not  be  better.  Today  the 
t  IS  on  the  other  side. 
Ill  just  2  days,  I  will  meet  in  Moscow 
1  I kneral  Secretary  Gorbachev.  It 

■I-  our  fourth  set  of  face-to-face 
i) .  since  1985.  The  General  Secretary 
n  I  have  developed  a  broad  agenda  for 
-Soviet  relations — an  agenda  that  is 
il  directly  to  the  agenda  of  the  Final 
"lis,  as  does  the  Final  Act,  we  will 
security  issues.  We  wall  pursue 
-s  in  arms  reduction  negotiations 
-.s  ihe  board  and  continue  our  ex- 
h  ges  on  regional  issues.  Yes,  we  will 
1:  discuss  economic  issues,  although, 
the  Helsinki  process,  we  have  seen 
( int  years  how  much  the  differences 
ir  systems  inhibit  expanded  ties  and 
difficult  it  is  to  divorce  economic  re- 
:•  ns  from  human  rights  and  other  ele- 
1'  ts  of  that  relationship.  And,  yes,  as 
t  countries  did  at  Helsinki,  we  will 
1  up  other  bilateral  areas,  as  well,  in- 
ing  scientific,  cultural,  and  people- 
eople  exchanges,  where  we've  been 
B 1  at  work  identifying  new  ways  to  co- 
l-ate. In  this  area,  in  particular,  I  be- 
3  we'll  see  some  good  results  before 
week  is  over. 

And  like  the  Final  Act,  our  agenda 
■  includes  human  rights  as  an  integral 
ponent.  We  have  developed  our  dia- 
ls and  put  in  place  new  mechanisms 
discussion.  The  General  Secretary 
spoken  often  and  forthrightly  on  the 
blems  confronting  the  Soviet  Union. 


In  his  campaign  to  address  these  short- 
comings, he  talks  of  glasnost  and  peres- 
troika,  openness  and  restructuring, 
words  that  to  our  ears  have  a  particu- 
larly welcome  sound.  And  since  he  began 
his  campaign,  things  have  happened  that 
all  of  us  applaud.  The  list  includes  the  re- 
lease from  labor  camps  or  exile  of  people 
like  Andrey  Sakharov,  Irina  Ratush- 
inskaya,  Anatoliy  Koryagin,  Josif  Begun, 
and  many  other  prisoners  of  conscience; 
the  publication  of  books  like  Dr.  Zh  ivago 
and  Children  of  the  Arbaf;  the  distribu- 
tion of  movies  like  Repentance,  that  are 
critical  of  aspects  of  the  Soviet  past  and 
present;  allowing  higher  levels  of  emigra- 
tion; greater  toleration  of  dissent; 
General  Secretary  Gorbachev's  recent 
statements  on  religious  toleration;  the 
beginning  of  Soviet  withdrawal  from 
Afghanistan. 

All  this  is  new  and  good.  But  at  the 
same  time,  there  is  another  list,  defined 
not  by  us  but  by  the  standards  of  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act  and  the  sovereign 
choice  of  all  participants,  including  the 
Soviet  Union,  to  subscribe  to  it.  We  need 
look  no  further  through  the  Final  Act  to 
see  where  Soviet  practice  does  not — or 
does  not  yet — measure  up  to  Soviet  com- 
mitment. 

Thirteen  years  after  the  Final  Act 
was  signed,  it's  difficult  to  understand 
why  cases  of  divided  families  and  blocked 
marriages  should  remain  on  the  East- 
West  agenda  or  why  Soviet  citizens  who 
wish  to  exercise  their  right  to  emigrate 
should  be  subject  to  artificial  quotas  and 
arbitrary  rulings.  And  what  are  we  to 
think  of  the  continued  suppression  of 
those  who  wash  to  practice  their  religious 
beliefs?  Over  300  hundred  men  and 
women  whom  the  world  sees  as  political 
prisoners  have  been  released.  There  re- 
mains no  reason  why  the  Soviet  Union 
cannot  release  all  people  still  in  jail  for 
expression  of  political  or  religious  belief, 
or  for  organizing  to  monitor  the  Helsinki 
Act. 

The  Soviets  talk  about  a  "common 
European  home"  and  define  it  largely  in 
terms  of  geography.  But  what  is  it  that 
cements  the  structure  of  clear  purpose 
that  all  our  nations  pledged  themselves 
to  build  by  their  signature  of  the  Final 
Act?  What  is  it  but  the  belief  in  the  inal- 
ienable rights  and  dignity  of  every  single 


human  being?  What  is  it  but  a  commit- 
ment to  true  pluralist  democracy?  What 
is  it  but  a  dedication  to  the  universally 
understood  democratic  concept  of  liberty 
that  evolved  from  the  genius  of  Euro- 
pean civilization?  This  body  of  values — 
this  is  what  marks,  or  should  mark,  the 
common  European  home. 

Mr.  Gorbachev  has  spoken  of,  in  his 
words,  "the  artificiality  and  temporari- 
ness  of  the  bloc-to-bloc  confrontation 
and  the  archaic  nature  of  the  'iron  cur- 
tain.' "  Well,  I  join  him  in  this  belief 
and  welcome  every  sign  that  the  Soviets 
and  their  allies  are  ready  not  only  to  em- 
brace but  to  put  into  practice  the  values 
that  unify,  and,  indeed,  define  contempo- 
rary West  European  civilization  and  its 
grateful  American  offspring. 

Some  30  years  ago — another  period 
of  relative  openness — the  Italian  social- 
ist, Pietro  Nenni,  long  a  friend  of  the  So- 
viet Union,  warned  that  it  was  wrong  to 
think  that  the  relaxation  could  be  perma- 
nent in,  as  he  said,  "the  absence  of  any 
system  of  judicial  guarantees."  And  he 
added  that  only  democracy  and  liberty 
could  prevent  reversal  of  the  progress  un- 
derway. 

There  are  a  number  of  steps,  which, 
if  taken,  would  help  ensure  the  deepen- 
ing and  institutionalization  of  promising 
reforms.  First,  the  Soviet  leaders  could 
agree  to  tear  down  the  Berlin  Wall  and 
all  barriers  between  Eastern  and  West- 
ern Europe.  They  could  join  us  in  making 
Berlin  itself  an  all-European  center  of 
communications,  meetings,  and  travel. 
They  could  also  give  legal  and  practical 
protection  to  free  expression  and  wor- 
ship. Let  me  interject  here  that  at  one 
time  Moscow  was  knowoi  as  the  City  of 
the  Forty  Forties  because  there  were 
1,600  belfries  in  the  churches  of  the  city. 
The  world  welcomes  the  return  of  some 
churches  to  worship  after  many  years, 
but  there  are  still  relatively  few  function- 
ing churches  and  almost  no  bells.  Mr. 
Gorbachev  recently  said,  as  he  put  it, 
"Believers  are  Soviet  people,  workers, 
partriots,  and  they  have  the  full  right  to 
express  their  conviction  with  dignity." 
Well,  I  applaud  Mr.  Gorbachev's  state- 
ment. WTiat  a  magnificent  demonstration 
of  good  will  it  would  be  for  the  Soviet 
leadership  for  church  bells  to  ring  out 


iartment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


again  not  only  in  Moscow  but  throughout 
the  Soviet  Union. 

But  beyond  these  particular  steps, 
there's  a  deeper  question.  How  can  the 
countries  of  the  East  not  only  grant  but 
guarantee  the  protection  of  rights?  The 
thought  and  practice  of  centuries  has 
pointed  the  way.  As  the  French  constitu- 
tional philosopher,  Montesquieu,  wrote 
more  than  200  years  ago,  "There  is  no  lib- 
erty if  the  judiciary  power  be  not  sepa- 
rated" from  the  other  powers  of  govern- 
ment. And  like  the  complete  independ- 
ence of  the  judiciary,  popular  control 
over  those  who  make  the  laws  provides  a 
vital,  practical  guarantee  of  human 
rights.  So  does  the  secret  ballot.  So  does 
the  freedom  of  citizens  to  associate  and 
act  for  political  purposes  or  for  free  col- 
lective bargaining. 

I  know  that  for  the  Eastern  coun- 
tries such  steps  are  difficult,  and  some 
may  say  it's  unrealistic  to  call  for  them. 
Some  said  in  1975  that  the  standards  set 
forth  in  the  Final  Act  were  unrealistic, 
that  the  comprehensive  agenda  it  embod- 
ied was  unrealistic.  Some  said,  earlier  in 
this  decade,  that  caOing  for  global  ehmi- 
nation  of  an  entire  class  of  U.S.  and  So- 
viet intermediate-range  nuclear  missiles 
was  unrealistic,  that  calling  for  50%  re- 
ductions in  U.S.  and  Soviet  strategic  of- 
fensive arms  was  unrealistic,  that  the  So- 
viets would  never  withdraw  from  Af- 
ghanistan. Well,  is  it  realistic  to  pretend 
that  rights  are  truly  protected  when 
there  are  no  effective  safeguards  against 
arbitrary  rule?  Is  it  realistic,  when  the 
Soviet  leadership  itself  is  calling  for 
glasno.st  and  democratization,  to  say  that 
judicial  guarantees,  or  the  independence 
of  the  judiciary,  or  popular  control  over 
those  who  draft  the  laws,  or  freedom  to 
associate  for  political  purposes  are  unre- 
alistic? And  finally,  is  it  realistic  to  say 
that  peace  is  truly  secure  when  political 
systems  are  less  than  open? 

We  believe  that  realism  is  on  our 
side  when  we  say  that  peace  and  freedom 
can  only  be  achieved  together,  but  that 
they  can  indeed  be  achieved  together  if 
we're  prepared  to  drive  toward  that 
goal.  So  did  the  leaders  who  met  in  this 
room  to  sign  the  Final  Act.  They  were  vi- 
sionaries of  the  most  practical  kind.  In 
shaping  our  pohcy  toward  the  Soviet 


Union,  in  preparing  for  my  meetings 
with  the  General  Secretary,  I  have  taken 
their  vision — a  shared  vision,  subscribed 
to  by  East,  West,  and  the  proud  neutral 
and  nonaligned  countries  of  this  conti- 
nent— as  my  guide.  I  believe  the  stand- 
ard that  the  framers  of  the  Final  Act  set, 
including  the  concept  of  liberty  it  em- 
bodies, is  a  standard  for  all  of  us.  We  can 
do  no  less  than  uphold  it  and  tiy  to  see  it 
turn,  as  the  Soviets  say,  into  "life 
itself." 

We  in  the  West  will  remain  firm  in 
our  values,  strong  and  vigilant  in  defense 
of  our  interests,  ready  to  negotiate  hon- 
estly for  results  of  mutual  and  universal 
benefit.  One  lesson  we  drew  again  from 
the  events  leading  up  to  the  Intermedi- 
ate-Range Nuclear  Forces  (INF)  Treaty 
was  that,  in  the  world  as  it  is  today, 
peace  truly  does  depend  on  Western 
strength  and  resolve.  It  is  a  lesson  we 
will  continue  to  heed. 

But  we're  also  prepared  to  work 
with  the  Soviets  and  their  allies  when- 
ever they're  ready  to  work  with  us.  By 
strength  we  do  not  mean  diktat,  that  is, 
an  imposed  settlement;  we  mean  confi- 
dent negotiation.  The  road  ahead  may  be 
long,  but  not  as  long  as  our  countries  had 
before  them  44  years  ago  when  Finland's 
great  President  J.K.  Paasikivi,  told  a  na- 
tion that  had  shown  the  world  uncommon 
courage  in  a  harrowing  time:  "A  path 
rises  up  from  the  slope  from  the  floor  of 
the  valley.  At  times  the  ascent  is  grad- 
ual, at  other  times  steeper.  But  all  the 
time  one  comes  closer  and  closer  to  free, 
open  spaces,  above  which  God's  ever 
brighter  sky  can  be  seen.  The  way  up 
will  be  difficult,  but  every  step  will  take 
us  closer  to  open  vistas." 

I  believe  that  in  Moscow,  Mr.  Gor- 
bachev and  I  can  take  another  step  to- 
ward a  brighter  future  and  a  safer  world. 
And  I  believe  that,  for  the  sake  of  all  our 
ancient  peoples,  this  new  world  must  be 
a  place  both  of  democratic  freedom  and 
of  peace.  It  must  be  a  world  in  which  the 
spirit  of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  guides  all 
our  countries  like  a  great  beacon  of  hope 
to  all  mankind  for  ages  to  come. 

Thank  you  and  God  bless  you.  And 
bear  with  me  now — Onneaja  menestysta 
koko  Suornen  kansalle  [Good  luck  and 
success  to  the  entire  Finnish  people]. 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
HELSINKI, 

MAY  27.  19882 

I  am  very  pleased  with  the  action  oft 
U.S.  Senate  in  consenting  to  ratificati 
of  the  INF  Treaty.  In  2  days,  I  will  ai 
rive  in  the  Soviet  Union  to  meet  with 
General  Secretary  Gorbachev  to  disci 
our  four-part  agenda.  Today's  action  I 
the  Senate  clearly  shows  support  for  i 
arms  reduction  objectives. 

I  want  to  e.xpress  my  appreciatio 
for  the  leadership  demonstrated  by  M 
jority  Leader  Bob  Byrd  and  Republic 
Leader  Bob  Dole  in  securing  the  time 
approval  of  this  treaty.  I  have  invited 
them  to  join  me  for  the  exchange  of  ri 
cation  documents  in  Moscow. 

I  continue  to  have  concerns  abou 
the  constitutionality  of  some  provisio! 
of  the  resolution  of  ratification,  partic 
larly  those  dealing  with  interpretatio 
and  I  will  communicate  with  the  Sens 
on  these  matters  in  due  course. 


PRESIDENT'S  RADIO  ADDRESS, 
HELSINKI, 

MAY  28,  19882 

As  this  pretaped  broadcast  reaches  y 
I'm  in  Helsinki,  Finland,  on  my  way  t 
the  Soviet  Union,  where  I  arrive  on 
Sunday. 

When  I  meet  in  the  coming  days 
with  Soviet  General  Secretary  Gor- 
bachev, it  will  be  our  fourth  set  of  fac 
to-face  talks  in  3  years.  Through  our 
versations,  U.S. -Soviet  relations  hav 
moved  forward  on  the  basis  of  frankn  s 
and  realism.  This  relationship  has  not 
rested  on  any  single  issue,  but  has  be 
built  on  a  sturdy  four-part  agenda  t  h: 
includes  human  rights,  regional  cdiif  :: 
arms  reduction,  and  bilateral  exchain- 
What  has  been  achieved  in  this  biii  i 
span  of  time  offers  great  hope  for  a 
brighter  future  and  a  safer  world. 

Through  Western  firmness  and  r 
solve,  we  concluded  the  historic  INF 
Treaty  that  provides  for  the  global  t  n 
nation  of  an  entire  class  of  U.S.  and  i*- 
viet  intermediate-range  nuclear  mis- 
siles. Soviet  Armed  Forces  are  now  Ul 
drawing  from  Afghanistan,  a  historic 
event  that  should  lead  finally  to  peaci 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/August  tl 


FEATURE 
Moscow  Summit 


hdetermination,  and  healing  for  that 
■suffering  people,  and  to  an  inde- 
lent  and  undivided  Afghan  nation. 
It  is  also  encouraging  to  hear  Gen- 
>r  Secretary  Gorbachev  speak  forth- 
tly  about  glas>iost  and  perestroika — 
uii'ss  and  restructuring  in  the  Soviet 
111 — words  that  to  Western  ears  have 
I'ticularly  welcome  sound.  And  since 
■  it'iran  his  campaign,  we  can  list  devel- 
I  c'lits  that  the  free  world  heartily  ap- 
il>.  We've  seen  many  well-known 
liners  of  conscience  I'eleased  from 
h  labor  camps  or  strict  internal 
,  courageous  people  like  Josif  Begun 
Audrey  Sakharov. 
Soviet  authorities  have  permitted 
]mhlication  of  books,  like  Dr. 
I"/",  and  the  distribution  of  movies, 
I  a-  Repentance,  that  are  critical  of 
its  of  the  Soviet  past  and  pres- 
i  Ireater  emigration  has  been  al- 
'il.  (ireater  dissent  is  being  toler- 
1   And  recently.  General  Secretary 
T  liachev  has  promised  to  grant  a  meas- 
iif  religious  freedom  to  the  peoples  of 
lI  Soviet  Union. 

"     All  this  is  new  and  good.  But  at  the 
3!  le  time,  there's  another  list  that  the 
V  ••X  cannot  ignore.  While  there  are  im- 
p  venients,  the  basic  structure  of  the 
s;  ;em  has  not  changed  in  the  Soviet 
L  on  or  in  Eastern  Europe,  and  there 
'•■  lain  significant  violations  of  human 
it.s  and  freedoms.  In  Asia,  Africa,  and 
itral  America,  unpopular  regimes  use 
ut  arms  to  oppress  their  own  people 
iiimmit  aggression  against  neighbor- 
;  -tales.  These  regional  conflicts  ex- 

t  a  terrible  toll  of  suffering  and 
'eaten  to  draw  the  United  States  and 
Soviet  Union  into  direct  confronta- 

These  and  related  concerns  will  be 
he  top  of  my  agenda  in  the  days 
ad.  I  shall  say,  among  other  things, 
t't  the  Soviet  Union  should  fully  honor 
I  ■  Helsinki  accords.  In  view  of  that 
( 'ument,  signed  in  Helsinki  in  1975,  it 
i  iifficult  to  understand  why  almost  13 
;  irs  later,  cases  of  divided  families  and 
licked  mamages  should  remain  on  the 
•I'St-West  agenda  or  why  Soviet  citi- 
is  who  wish  by  right  to  emigrate 
jukl  not  be  able  to  do  so.  And  there 
,r|l;  other  issues:  the  recognition  of  those 


who  wish  to  practice  their  religious  be- 
liefs and  the  release  of  all  prisoners  of 
conscience. 

In  working  for  a  safer  world  and  a 
brighter  future  for  all  people,  we  know 
arms  agi'eements  alone  will  not  make  the 
world  safer;  we  must  also  reduce  the  rea- 
sons for  having  arms.  As  I  said  to  Gen- 
eral Secretary  Gorbachev  when  we  first 


met  in  1985,  we  do  not  mistrast  each 
other  because  we're  armed;  we're  armed 
because  we  mistrust  each  other.  History 
has  taught  us  that  it  is  not  weapons  that 
cause  war  but  the  nature  and  conduct  of 
the  governments  that  vrield  the  weap- 
ons. So,  when  we  encourage  Soviet  re- 
forms, it  is  vrith  the  knowledge  that  de- 
mocracy not  only  guarantees  human 


Andrei  Gromyko.  Chairman  of  the  Presidium  of  the  Supreme  Soviet,  and  Soviet 
Foreign  Minister  Eduard  Shevardnadze  welcome  President  and  Mrs.  Reagan  to 
Moscow  at  Vnukovo  II  Airport. 


siipartment  of  State  Bulletin/ August  1988 


^W. 


Arrival  ceremony  in  St.  George's  Hall  at  the  Grand  Kremlin  Palace. 


rights,  but  also  helps  prevent  war,  an ; 
in  truth,  is  a  form  of  arms  control.  So 
ally,  our  whole  agenda  has  one  purpo; 
to  protect  peace,  freedom,  and  life  its 

We  would  like  to  see  positive 
changes  in  the  U.S.S.R.  institutiona 
so  that  they'll  become  lasting  feature: 
Soviet  society.  And  I  would  like  to  se 
more  Soviet  young  people  come  here 
experience  and  learn  from  our  societj 
And  that's  why  we're  ready  to  work 
the  Soviets,  to  praise  and  criticize  ani 
work  for  greater  contact  and  for  char 
because  that  is  the  path  to  lasting  pe; 
greater  freedom,  and  a  safer  world. 


ARRIVAL  REMARKS, 
THE  KREMLIN, 
MOSCOW, 
MAY  29,  19883 

General  Secretary  Gorbachev^ 

On  behalf  of  the  people  and  Governn- 
of  the  Soviet  Union,  I  extend  to  you 
sincere  greetings  on  the  occasion  of  j 
visit.  Welcome. 

It  is  now  almost  6  months  since 
meeting  in  Washington,  which  went 
down  in  history  as  a  major  milestone 
Soviet-American  and  in  internation; 
lations.  Now,  on  this  return  trip,  yoi 
Mr.  President,  have  traversed  the  gi 
distance  that  lies  between  our  two  a 
tals  to  continue  our  political  dialogue 
This  is  a  fact  we  duly  appreciate.  As 
is  our  fourth  meeting,  we  can  alread; 
make  some  meaningful  assessments. 
we  see  it,  long-held  dislikes  have  be( 
weakened;  habitual  stereotypes  sten 
ming  from  enemy  images  have  been 
shaken  loose.  The  human  features  of 
other  nation  are  now  more  clearly  vi 
ible.  This  in  itself  is  important,  for  ; 
turn  of  the  two  millenniums,  history 
objectively  bound  our  two  countries 
common  responsibility  for  the  destin 
of  mankind.  The  peoples  of  the  work 
and,  in  the  first  place,  the  Soviet  ano 
American  people  welcome  the  emerg 
positive  changes  in  our  relationship  i 
hope  that  your  visit  and  talks  here  w 
be  productive,  providing  a  fresh  imp 
in  all  areas  of  dialogue  and  interactic 
tween  our  two  great  nations. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/August  It 


FEATURE 
Moscow  Summit 


You  and  I  are  conscious  of  our  two 
■»•  pies'  longing  for  mutual  understand- 
cooperation,  and  a  safe  and  stable 
111.  This  makes  it  incumbent  upon  us 
N'uss  constructively  the  main  as- 
if  disarmament:  the  set  of  issues 
1  to  50%  cuts  in  strategic  offensive 
I.-,  while  preserving  the  1972  ABM 
titiallistic  Missile]  Treaty;  problems 
■uinating  chemical  weapons;  reduc- 

I  armed  forces  and  conventional  ar- 
nts  in  Europe;  cessation  of  nuclear 
iiiu.  The  world  is  also  looking  to  us 
ris|ionsible  judgments  on  other  com- 
;  issues  of  today,  such  as  the  settle- 
it  I  if  regional  conflicts;  improving 
I  I'liational  economic  relations;  pro- 
I  ing  development,  overcoming  back- 
dness,  poverty,  and  mass  diseases; 
humanitarian  problems.  And  of 
rse,  we  shall  discuss  bilateral 
•tions. 

Our  previous  meetings  have  shown 
t  constructive  Soviet-U.S.  relations 
possible.  The  treaty  on  intermediate 
shorter  range  missiles  is  the  most  im- 
issive  symbol  of  that.  But  even  more 
hplex  and  important  tasks  lie  ahead. 
H  so,  you  and  I  still  have  a  lot  of  work 
lo.  And  it  is  good  when  there  is  a  lot 
vork  to  be  done  and  people  need  that 
rk.  We  are  ready  to  do  our  utmost  in 
se  coming  days  in  Moscow. 
Mr.  President,  you  and  Mrs.  Reagan 
here  on  your  first  visit  to  the  Soviet 
ion,  a  country  which  you  have  so  often 
ntioned  in  your  public  statements. 
are  of  your  interests  in  Russian  prov- 
■Jfs,  let  me  add  another  one  to  your  col- 
*  (ion:  "It  is  better  to  see  once  than  to 
"pra  hundred  times."  Let  me  assure 
1  that  you  can  look  forward  to  hospital- 
,  warmth,  and  good  will.  You  wdll 
ve  many  meetings  with  Soviet  people, 
ey  have  a  centuries-old  history  behind 
^  !m.  They  love  their  land  and  take 
''de  in  their  accomplishments.  They  re- 
it  things  that  are  presently  standing 
their  way,  and  they  are  heatedly  dis- 
"jssing  how  their  country  can  best 
^'  3gress.  They  are  full  of  plans  for 
3  future. 
Being  ardent  patriots,  Soviet  people 
't'  e  open  to  friendship  and  cooperation 
'"  th  all  nations.  They  harbor  sincere  re- 
ect  for  the  American  people  and  want 


good  relations  with  your  country.  Here, 
within  the  walls  of  the  ancient  Kremlin, 
where  one  feels  the  touch  of  history,  peo- 
ple are  moved  to  reflect  over  the  diver- 
sity and  greatness  of  human  civilization. 
So,  may  this  give  greater  historical 
depth  to  the  Soviet-American  talks  to  be 
held  here,  infusing  them  with  a  sense  of 
mankind's  shared  destinies. 

Once  again,  I  bid  you  welcome. 

President  Reagan 

Thank  you  for  those  kind  words  of  wel- 
come. We've  traveled  a  long  road  to- 
gether to  reach  this  moment — from  our 
first  meeting  in  Geneva  in  November 
1985,  when  I  invited  you  to  visit  me  in 
Washington  and  you  invited  me  to 
Moscow.  It  was  cold  that  day  in  Geneva, 
and  even  colder  in  Reykjavik  when  we 
met  the  followdng  year  to  work  on  the 
preparations  for  our  e.xchange  of  visits. 
We've  faced  great  obstacles,  but  by  the 
time  of  your  visit  to  Washington  last  De- 
cember, although  we  still  had  to  grapple 
with  difficult  issues,  we  had  achieved  im- 
pressive progress  in  all  the  areas  of  our 
common  agenda — human  rights,  regional 
issues,  arms  reduction,  and  our  bilateral 
relations. 

We  signed  a  treaty  that  will  reduce 
the  level  of  nuclear  arms  for  the  first 
time  in  history  by  eliminating  an  entire 
class  of  U.S.  and  Soviet  intermediate- 
range  missiles.  We  agreed  on  the  main 
points  of  a  treaty  that  will  cut  in  half  our 
arsenals  of  strategic  offensive  nuclear 
arms.  We  agreed  to  conduct  a  joint  ex- 
periment that  would  allow  us  to  develop 
effective  ways  to  verify  limits  on  nuclear 
testing.  We  held  full  and  frank  discus- 
sions that  planted  the  seeds  for  future 
progress. 

It  is  almost  summer.  And  some  of 
those  seeds  are  beginning  to  bear  fruit, 
thanks  to  the  hard  work  we  have  both 
done  since  our  last  meeting,  including 
monthly  meetings  by  our  Foreign  Minis- 
ters and  the  first  meeting  of  our  Defense 
Ministers.  We  have  signed  the  Geneva  ac- 
cords, providing  for  the  withdrawal  of  all 
Soviet  troops  from  Afghanistan,  and  the 
first  withdrawals  have  begun.  We  and 


our  allies  have  completed  technical  ar- 
rangements necessary  to  begin  imple- 
menting the  INF  Treaty  as  soon  as  it  en- 
ters into  force.  For  the  next  major  step 
in  arms  control,  reductions  in  U.S.  and 
Soviet  strategic  offensive  arsenals,  our 
negotiators  in  Geneva  have  produced 
hundreds  of  pages  of  joint  draft  treaty 
text  recording  our  areas  of  agreement, 
as  well  as  those  issues  yet  to  be  resolved. 

Our  new  Nuclear  Risk  Reduction 
Centers  have  begun  their  transmissions 
of  routine  notifications  to  reduce  the  risk 
of  conflict.  Our  scientists  are  instalhng 
the  equipment  for  our  joint  experiment 
to  verify  limits  on  nuclear  testing.  Our 
experts  have  held  broad-ranging  discus- 
sions on  human  rights,  and  important 
steps  have  been  taken  in  that  area.  We 
have  gi-eatly  expanded  our  bilateral  ex- 
changes since  we  signed  our  agreement 
in  1985.  I  hope  you'll  agree  with  me  that 
more  of  our  young  people  need  to  partici- 
pate in  these  exchanges,  which  can  do  so 
much  to  lay  the  basis  for  greater  mutual 
understanding  in  the  next  generation. 

I  could  go  on — the  list  of  accomplish- 
ments goes  far  beyond  what  many  antici- 
pated. But  I  think  the  message  is  clear: 
despite  clear  and  fundamental  differ- 
ences, and  despite  the  inevitable  frustra- 
tions that  we  have  encountered,  our 
work  has  begun  to  produce  results. 

In  the  past,  you've  taken  note  of  my 
liking  for  Russian  proverbs.  And  in  order 
not  to  disappoint  anyone  on  this  visit,  I 
thought  I  would  mention  a  literary  say- 
ing from  your  past,  another  example  of 
your  people's  succinct  wisdom:  Rodilsiya 
ne  toropilsiya — it  was  born,  it  wasn't 
rushed. 

Mr.  General  Secretary,  we  did  not 
rush.  We  have  taken  our  work  step  by 
step.  And  I  have  come  here  to  continue 
that  work.  We  both  know  it  will  not  be 
easy.  We  both  know  that  there  are  tre- 
mendous hurdles  yet  to  be  overcome. 
But  we  also  know  that  it  can  be  done  be- 
cause we  share  a  common  goal:  strength- 
ening the  framework  we  have  already 
begun  to  build  for  a  relationship  that  we 
can  sustain  over  the  long  term — a  rela- 
tionship that  will  bring  genuine  benefits 
to  our  own  peoples  and  to  the  world. 


[partment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


PRESIDENT'S  REMARKS, 
DANILOV  MONASTERY, 
MOSCOW, 
MAY  30,  19882 

It's  a  very  great  pleasure  to  visit  this 
beautiful  monastery  and  to  have  a  chance 
to  meet  some  of  the  people  who  have 
helped  make  its  return  to  the  Russian  Or- 
thodox Church  a  reality.  I  am  also  ad- 
dressing in  spirit  the  35  million  believers 
whose  personal  contributions  made  this 
magnificent  restoration  possible. 

It's  been  said  that  an  icon  is  a  win- 
dow between  heaven  and  earth  through 
which  the  believing  eye  can  peer  into  the 
beyond.  One  cannot  look  at  the  magnifi- 
cent icons  created,  and  recreated  here 
under  the  direction  of  Father  Zinon, 
without  experiencing  the  deep  faith  that 
lives  in  the  hearts  of  the  people  of  this 
land.  Like  the  saints  and  martyrs  de- 
picted in  these  icons,  the  faith  of  your 
people  has  been  tested  and  tempered  in 
the  crucible  of  hardship.  But  in  that  suf- 
fering, it  has  grown  strong,  ready  now  to 
embrace  with  new  hope  the  beginnings 
for  a  second  Christian  millennium. 

We  in  our  country  share  this  hope 
for  a  new  age  of  religious  freedom  in  the 
Soviet  Union.  We  share  the  hope  that 
this  monastery  is  not  an  end  in  itself  but 
the  symbol  of  a  new  policy  of  religious  tol- 
erance that  will  extend  to  all  peoples  of 
all  faiths.  We  pray  that  the  return  of  this 
monastery  signals  a  willingness  to  return 
to  believers  the  thousands  of  other 
houses  of  worship  which  are  now  closed, 
boarded  up,  or  used  for  secular  purposes. 

There  are  many  ties  of  faith  that 
bind  your  country  and  mine.  We  have  in 
America  many  churches,  many  creeds, 
that  feel  a  special  kinship  with  their  fel- 
low believers  here — Protestant,  Catho- 
lic, Jewish,  Orthodox,  and  Islamic.  They 
are  united  with  believers  in  this  country 
in  many  ways,  especially  in  prayer. 

Our  people  feel  it  keenly  when  reli- 
gious freedom  is  denied  to  anyone  any- 
where and  hope  with  you  that  soon  all 
the  many  Soviet  religious  communities 
that  are  now  prevented  from  registering 
or  are  banned  altogether,  including  the 
Ukrainian  Catholic  and  Orthodox 
Churches,  will  soon  be  able  to  practice 
their  religion  freely  and  openly  and  in- 
struct their  children  in  and  outside  the 
home  in  the  fundamentals  of  their  faith. 


President  Reagan's  visit  to  the  Danilov  Monastery  which  was  founded  in  1282. 
Disbanded  shortly  after  the  revolution  in  1917,  the  monastery  was  returned  to  th 
Russian  Orthodox  Church  in  198.3. 


We  don't  know  if  this  first  thaw  will 
be  followed  by  a  resurgent  spring  of  reli- 
gious liberty — we  don't  know,  but  we 
may  hope.  We  may  hope  that  perestroika 
will  be  accompanied  by  a  deeper  restruc- 
turing, a  deeper  conversion,  a  men- 
tanoya,  a  change  in  heart,  and  that 
glasnost,  which  means  giving  voice,  will 
also  let  loose  a  new  chorus  of  belief,  sing- 
ing praise  to  the  God  that  gave  us  life. 

There  is  a  beautiful  passage  that  I'd 
just  like  to  read,  if  I  may.  It's  from  one 


of  this  country's  great  writers  and 
ers,  Aleksandr  Solzhenitsyn,  aboui 
faith  that  is  as  elemental  to  this  Ian 
the  dark  and  fertile  soil.  He  wrote: 

When  you  travel  the  by-roads  of  ( 'i 
Russia,  you  begin  to  understand  the  sci 
the  passifying  Russian  countryside.  It  i 
churches.  They  lift  their  belltowers— u 
shapely,  all  different — high  over  munil:i 
timber  and  thatch.  From  villages  that  a 
off  and  invisible  to  each  other,  they  soa 
same  heaven.  People  who  are  always  sr 


10 


DeDartment  of  Statp  Riillptin/Aiinuchalii 


FEATURE 
Moscow  Summit 


)ften  unkind — but  the  evening  chimes  used 
ig  out,  floating  over  the  villages,  fields, 
voods,  reminding  men  that  they  must 
don  trivial  concerns  of  this  world  and  give 
and  thought  to  eternity. 

1  our  prayers  we  may  keep  that 
^e  in  mind:  the  thought  that  the  bells 
ring  again,  sounding  throughout 
cow  and  across  the  countryside,  clam- 
g  for  joy  in  their  new-found  freedom. 


CSIDENT'S  REMARKS  TO 
ELECTED  SOVIET  CITIZENS, 
SO  HOUSE, 

Iscow, 

f  30,  19885 

■r  the  discussions  we've  just  had,  I 
ight  it  might  be  appropriate  for  me 
3gin  by  letting  you  know  why  I  so 
ted  this  meeting  to  take  place.  You 
I  wanted  to  convey  to  you  that  you 
i  the  prayers  and  support  of  the 
jrican  people,  indeed  of  people 
ughout  the  world.  I  wanted  to  con- 
this  support  to  you  that  you  might  in 
1  convey  it  to  others,  so  that  all  those 


working  for  human  rights  throughout 
this  vast  land — from  the  Urals  to 
Kamchatka,  from  the  Laptev  Sea  to  the 
Caspian — might  be  encouraged  and  take 
heart. 

In  one  capacity,  of  course,  I  speak  as 
a  head  of  government.  The  United 
States  views  human  rights  as  fundamen- 
tal to  our  relationship  with  the  Soviet 
Union  and  all  nations.  From  the  outset  of 
our  Administation,  we've  stressed  that 
an  essential  element  in  improving  rela- 
tions between  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  is  human  rights  and  Soviet 
compliance  with  international  covenants 
on  human  rights. 

There  have  been  hopeful  signs — in- 
deed I  believe  this  a  hopeful  time  for 
your  nation.  Over  the  past  3  years  more 
than  300  political  and  religious  prisoners 
have  been  released  from  labor  camps. 
Fewer  dissidents  and  believers  have 
been  put  in  prisons  and  mental  hospitals. 
And  in  recent  months,  more  people  have 
been  permitted  to  emigrate  or  reunite 
with  their  families. 

The  United  States  applauds  these 
changes,  yet  the  basic  standards  that  the 


Soviet  Union  agreed  to  almost  13  years 
ago  in  the  Helsinki  accords,  or  a  genera- 
tion ago  in  the  Universal  Declaration  of 
Human  Rights,  still  need  to  be  met.  If  I 
may,  I'd  like  to  share  with  you  the  main 
aims  of  our  human  rights  agenda  during 
this  summit  meeting  here  in  Moscow. 

Freedom  of  religion — in  the  words  of 
the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human 
Rights,  "Everyone  has  the  right  to  free- 
dom of  thought,  conscience,  and  reh- 
gion."  I'm  hopeful  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment will  permit  all  the  peoples  of  the  So- 
viet Union  to  worship  their  creator,  as 
they  themselves  see  fit,  in  liberty. 

Freedom  of  speech — again  in  the 
words  of  the  Universal  Declaration  of 
Human  Rights,  "Everyone  has  the  right 
to  freedom  of  opinion  and  expression." 
It  is  my  fervent  hope  for  you  and  your 
country  that  there  will  soon  come  a  day 
when  no  one  need  fear  prison  for  offenses 
that  involve  nothing  more  than  the  spo- 
ken or  written  word. 

Freedom  of  travel — I've  told  the 
General  Secretary  how  heartened  we  are 
that  during  the  past  year  the  number  of 
those  permitted  to  emigrate  has  risen. 


ipartment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


We're  encouraged  as  well  that  the  num- 
ber of  those  permitted  to  leave  for  short 
trips,  often  family  visits,  has  gone  up. 
And  yet  the  words  of  the  Universal  Dec- 
laration go  beyond  these  steps,  "Every- 
one has  the  right  to  leave  any  country,  in- 
cluding his  own,  and  to  return  to  his  own 
country."  It  is  our  hope  that  soon  there 
will  be  complete  freedom  of  travel. 

In  particular,  I've  noted  in  my  talks 
here  the  many  who  have  been  denied  the 
right  to  emigrate  on  the  grounds  that 
they  held  secret  knowledge,  even  though 
their  secret  work  had  ended  years  before 
and  their  so-called  secrets  had  long  since 
either  become  public  knowledge  or  obso- 
lete. Such  cases  must  be  rationally  re- 
viewed. 

And  finally,  institutional  changes  to 
make  progress  permanent. 

I've  come  to  Moscow  with  this 
human  rights  agenda  because,  as  I  sug- 
gested, it  is  our  belief  that  this  is  a  mo- 
ment of  hope.  The  new  Soviet  leaders  ap- 
pear to  grasp  the  connection  between  cer- 
tain freedoms  and  economic  growth.  The 
freedom  to  keep  the  fruits  of  one's  own 
labor,  for  example,  is  a  freedom  that  the 
present  reforms  seem  to  be  enlarging. 
We  hope  that  one  freedom  will  lead  to  an- 
other and  another,  that  the  Soviet  Gov- 
ernment will  understand  that  it  is  the  in- 
dividual who  is  always  the  source  of  eco- 
nomic creativity,  the  inquiring  mind  that 
produces  a  technical  breakthrough,  the 
imagination  that  conceives  of  new  prod- 
ucts and  markets;  and  that  in  order  for 
the  individual  to  create,  we  must  have  a 
sense  of  just  that— his  own  individuality, 
his  own  self-worth.  He  must  sense  that 
others  respect  him,  and,  yes,  that  his  na- 
tion respects  him — respects  him  enough 
to  grant  him  all  his  human  rights.  This, 
as  I  said,  is  our  hope,  yet  whatever  the 
future  may  bring,  the  commitment  of  the 
United  States  will  nevertheless  remain 
unshakable  on  human  rights.  On  the  fun- 
damental dignity  of  the  human  person, 
there  can  be  no  relenting,  for  now  we 
must  work  for  more,  always  more. 

And  here  I  would  like  to  speak  to 
you  not  as  a  head  of  government,  but  as 
a  man,  a  fellow  human  being.  I  came 
here  hoping  to  do  what  I  could  to  give 
you  strength.  Yet  I  already  know  it  is 
you  who  have  strengthened  me,  you  who 
have  given  me  a  message  to  carry  back. 


12 


While  we  press  for  human  rights  through 
diplomatic  channels,  you  press  with  your 
very  lives,  day  m,  day  out,  year  after 
year,  risking  your  jobs,  your  homes, 
your  all. 

If  I  may,  I  want  to  give  you  one 
thought  from  my  heart.  Coming  here, 
being  with  you,  looking  into  your  faces,  I 
have  to  believe  that  the  history  of  this 
troubled  century  will  indeed  be  re- 
deemed in  the  eyes  of  God  and  man,  and 
that  freedom  will  truly  come  to  all,  for 
what  injustice  can  withstand  your 
strength,  and  what  can  conquer  your 
prayers.  And  so  I  say  with  Pushkin:  "It's 
time  my  friend,  it's  time.  The  heart  begs 
for  peace,  the  days  fly  past,  it's  time,  my 
friend,  it's  time." 

Could  I  play  a  little  trick  on  you  and 
say  something  that  isn't  written  here? 
Sometimes  when  I'm  faced  with  an  unbe- 
liever, an  atheist,  I  am  tempted  to  invite 
him  to  the  greatest  gourmet  dinner  that 
one  could  ever  serve.  And  when  we  fin- 
ished eating  that  magnificent  dinner,  to 
ask  him  if  he  believes  there's  a  cook. 


DINNER  TOASTS, 
THE  KREMLIN, 
MOSCOW, 
MAY  30,  1988« 

General  Secretary  Gorbachev  * 

I  welcome  you  in  the  Moscow  Kremlin. 
For  five  centuries,  it  has  been  the  site  of 
events  that  constituted  milestones  in  the 
life  of  our  state.  Decisions  crucial  to  the 
fate  of  our  nation  were  made  here.  The 
very  environment  around  us  is  a  call  for 
responsibility  to  our  times  and  contempo- 
raries, to  the  present,  and  to  the  future. 

It  is  here  that  we  wish  to  emphasize 
the  importance  of  the  newly  discovered 
truth  that  it  is  no  longer  possible  to  set- 
tle international  disputes  by  force  of 
arms.  Our  awareness  of  the  realities  of 
the  present-day  world  has  led  us  to  that 
conclusion.  I  Uke  the  notion  of  realism, 
and  I  also  like  the  fact  that  you,  Mr. 
President,  have  lately  been  uttering  it 
more  and  more  often. 

Normal  and,  indeed,  durable  Soviet- 
American  relations,  which  so  powerfully 
affect  the  world's  political  climate,  are 
only  conceivable  within  the  framework  of 


realism.  Thanks  to  realism,  for  all  our 
ferences,  we  have  succeeded  in  arrivii 
at  a  joint  conclusion  which,  though  ve 
simple,  is  of  historic  importance:  a  nu 
clear  war  cannot  be  won  and  must  ne' 
be  fought.  Other  conclusions  follow  w 
inexorable  logic.  One  of  them  is  whetl 
there  is  any  need  for  weaponry  which 
cannot  be  used  without  destroying  ou 
selves  and  all  of  mankind.  I  believe  tl 
realization  of  this  became  Reykjavik'; 
pivotal  idea. 

Our  Warsaw  treaty  aUies  firmly 
here  to  this  position.  This  is  our  pow 
support  in  all  matters  related  to  nucb 
disarmament.  They  have  given  the  S 
viet  leadership  a  clear  mandate  to  ne 
ate  radical  nuclear  arms  limitations  a 
reductions  with  the  United  States.  IV 
talks  vrith  leaders  of  socialist  countri 
and  with  authoritative  representativ 
other  nations  make  it  clear  to  me  tha 
there  is  a  common  desire  to  overcom 
mihtary  confrontation  and  to  end  the 
race  in  both  nuclear  and  conventiona 
arms. 

To  this,  it  should  be  added  that 
alistic  approach  is  making  a  way  for 
in  all  directions  and  on  all  continents 
And  the  idea  of  resolving  today's  pre 
lems  solely  by  political  means  is  gain 
increasing  authority.  There  is  an  ev€ 
broadening  desire  of  the  most  divers 
litical  and  social  forces  for  dialogue, 
exchanges,  for  better  knowledge  off 
other,  and  for  mutual  understanding 
this  is  indeed  so,  if  this  is  the  will  of 
peoples,  an  effort  is  needed  to  ensur 
that  the  stocks  of  the  ferment  of  rea  ; 
policies  keep  growing  and  never  run  i 
For  that,  it  is  essential  to  understan 
each  other  better,  to  take  into  accou 
the  specific  features  of  life  in  variou; 
countries,  the  historical  conditions  t) 
shape  them,  and  the  choice  made  by 
their  peoples. 

I  recall  the  words  you  once  spol 
Mr.  President,  and  I  quote:  "The  on 
way  to  resolve  differences  is  to  unde 
stand  them."  How  very  true.  Let  m( 
just  add  that  seeking  to  resolve  diffi 
ences  should  not  mean  an  end  to  bei 
diffei-ent.  The  diversity  of  the  world 
powerful  wellspring  of  mutual  enricl 
ment,  both  spiritual  and  material. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  comrade 
the  word  perestroika  does  not  sount 


FEATURE 
Moscow  Summit 


chronistic,  even  within  these  ancient 
Is,  for  renewal  of  society,  humaniza- 

of  life,  and  elevated  ideals  are  at  all 
!es  and  everywhere  in  the  interests  of 

people  and  of  each  individual.  And 
!n  this  happens,  especially  in  a  gi'eat 
ntry,  it  is  important  to  understand 

meaning  of  what  it  is  going  through, 
i  this  desire  to  understand  the  Soviet 
on  that  we  are  now  seeing  abroad, 
i  we  regard  this  as  a  good  sign  be- 
36  we  do  want  to  be  understood  cor- 
,ly.  This  is  also  important  for  civilized 
:mational  relations.  Everyone  who 
its  to  do  business  vdth  us  will  find  it 
ful  to  know  how  Soviet  people  see 
■nselves. 

We  see  ourselves  even  more  con- 
ned that  our  socialist  choice  was  cor- 
;,  and  we  cannot  conceive  of  our  coun- 
developing  without  socialism  based 
my  other  fundamental  values.  Our 
gram  is  more  democracy,  more 
most,  more  social  justice  with  full 
sperity  and  high  moral  standards. 
•  goal  is  maximum  freedom  for  man, 
the  individual,  and  for  society.  Inter- 
ionally,  we  see  ourselves  as  part  of  an 
?gral  civihzation,  where  each  has  the 
it  to  a  social  and  political  choice — to  a 
■thy  and  equal  place  within  the  com- 
nity  of  nations. 

On  issues  of  peace  and  progress,  we 
ieve  in  the  primacy  of  universal 
nan  values  and  regard  the  preserva- 
1  of  peace  as  the  top  priority.  And 
t  is  why  we  advocate  the  establish- 
nt  of  a  comprehensive  system  of  inter- 
ional  security  as  a  condition  for  the 
•vival  of  mankind.  Linked  with  this  is 
0  our  desire  to  revive  and  enhance  the 
e  of  the  United  Nations  on  the  basis  of 

original  goals  which  the  Soviet  Union 
i  the  United  States,  together  with 
ir  allies,  enshrined  in  the  charter  of 
it  organization.  Its  very  name  is  sym- 
lic — the  United  Nations — united  in 
ir  determination  to  prevent  new 
igedies  of  war,  to  banish  war  from  in- 
national  relations,  and  to  affirm  just 
inciples  securing  a  worthy  life  for  any 
tion,  whether  large  or  small,  strong  or 
ak,  rich  or  poor. 

We  want  to  build  contacts  among 
ople  in  all  forums,  to  expand  and  im- 
ove  the  quality  of  information,  and  to 


develop  ties  in  the  spheres  of  science,  cul- 
ture, education,  sports,  and  any  other 
human  endeavor.  But  this  should  be  done 
without  interfering  in  domestic  affairs, 
without  sermonizing  or  imposing  one's 
views  and  ways,  without  turning  family 
or  personal  problems  into  a  pretext  for 
confrontation  between  states.  In  short, 
our  time  offers  great  scope  for  action  in 
the  humanitarian  field.  Nations  should 
understand  each  other  better,  know  the 
truth  about  each  other,  and  free  them- 
selves from  bias  and  prejudice. 

As  far  as  we  know,  most  Americans, 
just  like  us,  want  to  get  rid  of  the  demon 
of  nuclear  war,  but  they,  just  like  us, 
just  like  all  people  of  earth,  are  becoming 
increasingly  concerned  over  the  risks  of 
environmental  disaster.  Such  a  risk  can 
only  be  averted  if  we  act  together.  In- 
creasingly urgent  is  the  truly  global  prob- 
lem of  the  economic  state  of  the  world — 
in  the  North  and  South,  in  the  West  and 
East  of  this  planet.  The  economic  founda- 
tion of  civilization  vrill  be  destroyed  un- 
less a  way  is  found  to  put  an  end  to  the 
squandering  of  funds  and  resources  for 
war  and  destruction,  unless  the  problem 
of  debt  is  settled  and  world  finances  are 
stabilized,  unless  the  world  market  be- 
comes truly  worldwide  by  incorporating 
all  states  and  nations  on  an  equal  footing. 

It  is  across  this  spectrum  of  issues 
that  we  approach  international  affairs 
and,  of  course,  our  relations  with  the 
United  States  of  America.  We  are  moti- 
vated by  an  awareness  of  the  realities 
and  imperatives  of  the  nuclear  and  space 
age,  the  age  of  sweeping  technological 
revolution  when  the  human  race  has 
turned  out  to  be  both  omnipotent  and 
mortal.  It  was  this  awareness  that  engen- 
dered the  new  thinking,  which  has  made 
possible  a  conceptual  and  practical  break- 
through in  relations  between  us  as  well. 

This  meeting,  while  taking  stock  of  a 
fundamentally  important  period  in  So- 
viet-American relations,  has  to  consoli- 
date our  achievements  and  give  new  im- 
petus for  the  future.  Never  before  have 
nuclear  missiles  been  destroyed.  Now  we 
have  an  unprecedented  treaty,  and  our 
two  countries  will  be  performing  for  the 
first  time  ever  this  overture  of  nuclear 
disarmament.  The  performance  has  to  be 
flawless. 


The  Soviet  Union  and  the  United 
States  are  acting  as  guarantors  of  the  Af- 
ghan political  settlement.  This,  too,  is  a 
precedent  of  tremendous  importance.  As 
guarantors,  our  two  countries  face  a 
very  responsible  period,  and  we  hope 
they  both  will  go  through  it  in  a  befitting 
manner.  The  whole  world  is  watching  to 
see  how  we  are  going  to  act  in  this  situ- 
ation. 

Our  main  task  continues  to  be  the 
working  out  of  an  agreement  on  50%  re- 
ductions in  strategic  offensive  arms 
while  observing  the  ABM  Treaty.  In  our 
talks  today,  you  and  I  devoted  a  lot  of  at- 
tention, and  with  good  cause,  to  discuss- 
ing the  entire  range  of  these  problems. 
We  are  expected  to  ensure  that  the 
Moscow  summit  open  up  new  horizons  in 
the  Soviet-American  dialogue — in  rela- 
tions between  the  U.S.S.R.  and  the 
United  States  for  the  benefit  of  our  two 
nations  and  the  entire  world.  This  is 
worth  any  effort  and  any  amount  of  good 
will. 

To  cooperation  between  the  Soviet 
Union  and  the  United  States  of  America, 
to  their  better  mutual  knowledge  and  mu- 
tual understanding.  I  wish  good  health 
and  happiness  to  you,  Mr.  President,  to 
Mrs.  Nancy  Reagan,  and  to  all  our  distin- 
guished guests. 

President  Reagan 

I  want  to  thank  you  again  for  the  hospi- 
tality that  we've  encountered  this  eve- 
ning and  at  every  turn  since  our  arrival 
in  Moscow.  We  appreciate  deeply  the  per- 
sonal effort  that  you,  Mrs.  Gorbachev, 
and  all  of  your  associates  have  expended 
on  our  behalf. 

Today  has  been  a  busy  day.  I  want 
to  thank  you  for  the  opportunity  to  meet 
with  so  many  divergent  members  of  So- 
viet society.  As  you  know,  I  traveled  to 
Danilov  and  met  there  with  the  clergy  at 
that  ancient  monastery  and  later  in  the 
day  had  most  interesting  exchanges  with 
other  members  of  Soviet  society  at  Spaso 
House.  These  meetings  only  confirmed 
the  feelings  of  admiration  and  warmth 
that  Americans  harbor  toward  the  peo- 
ples of  the  Soviet  Union.  As  wartime  al- 
lies, we  came  to  know  you  in  a  special 
way.  But  in  a  broader  sense,  the  Ameri- 
can people,  Hke  the  i-est  of  the  world,  ad- 
mire the  saga  of  the  peoples  of  the  Soviet 


13 


*  %  ^ 


President  Reagan  makes  dinner  toast  at 
state  dinner  at  St.  Vladimir's  Hall  at  the 
Grand  Kremlin  Palace. 


Union.  The  clearing  of  the  forest,  the 
struggle  to  build  a  society,  the  evolution 
into  a  modern  state,  and  the  struggle 
against  Hitler's  armies.  There  are  other 
ways,  too,  that  we  know  you:  "Happy  or 
sad,  my  beloved,  you  are  beautiful,  " 
says  one  of  your  folk  songs,  "as  beautiful 
as  a  Russian  song,  as  beautiful  as  a  Rus- 
sian soul." 

As  expressed  in  the  great  music,  ar- 
chitecture, art — we  need  only  look  about 
us  this  evening — and  literature  that  over 
many  centuries  you've  given  the  world, 
we  have  beheld  the  beauty  and  majesty 
of  your  peoples'  national  experience. 


And  without  belittling  the  serious  busi- 
ness before  us,  all  of  the  fundamental  is- 
sues that  separate  our  governments,  I 
hope  you'll  peiTnit  me  tonight  to  say  that 
in  the  eyes  of  the  American  people,  your 
people  truly  are,  as  the  song  suggests,  a 
people  of  heart  and  mind,  a  people — to 
use  our  vernacular — with  soul.  And 
that's  why  we  beheve  there's  common 
ground  between  our  two  peoples,  and 
why  it  is  our  duty  to  find  common  ground 
for  our  two  governments. 

Over  the  next  3  days,  General  Secre- 
tary Gorbachev  and  I  will  review  what 
has  been  accomplished  over  the  past  3 
years  and  what  our  two  nations  might  ac- 
complish together  in  the  months  to  come. 
We  have  a  great  deal  to  discuss  on  both 
accounts.  What  we  have  achieved  is  a 
good  beginning.  We  have  taken  the  first 
step  toward  deep  reductions  of  our  nu- 
clear arsenals.  We  have  taken  the  first 
step  toward  dealing  with  the  reality  that 
much  of  the  tension  and  mistrust  be- 
tween our  two  countries  arises  from  very 
different  concepts  of  the  fundamental 
rights  and  role  of  the  individual  in  soci- 
ety. We  have  taken  the  first  step  to  build 
that  network  of  personal  relationships 
and  understanding  between  societies,  be- 
tween people,  that  are  crucial  to  dispel- 
ling dangerous  misconceptions  and 
stereotypes. 

These  are  good  first  steps,  and  we 
can  both  take  pride  in  them,  but  as  I 
said,  they  are  just  a  start.  Nuclear  arse- 
nals remain  too  large.  The  fighting  con- 
tinues needlessly,  tragically  in  too  many 
regions  of  the  globe.  The  vision  of  free- 
dom and  cooperation  enshrined  in  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act  remains  unrealized. 
The  American  and  Soviet  peoples  are  get- 
ting to  know  each  other  better,  but  not 
well  enough.  You  and  I  are  meeting  now 
for  the  fourth  time  in  3  years — a  good 
deal  more  often  than  our  predecessors. 
And  this  has  allowed  our  relationship  to 
differ  from  theirs  in  more  than  a  quanti- 
tative state  of  sense. 

We  have  established  the  kind  of 
working  relationship  I  think  we  both  had 
in  mind  when  we  first  met  in  Geneva. 
We've  been  candid  about  our  differences 
but  sincere  in  sharing  a  common  objec- 
tive and  working  hard  together  to  draw 
closer  to  it.  It's  easy  to  disagree,  and 
much  harder  to  find  areas  where  we  can 


agree.  We  and  our  two  governments 
have  both  gotten  into  the  habit  of  look 
for  those  areas.  We  found  more  than  w 
expected. 

I  intend  to  pursue  the  search  for 
common  ground  during  the  months  left 
to  me  as  President.  When  I  pass  the  jc 
on  to  my  successor,  I  intend  to  tell  hir 
is  a  search  that  must  be  continued. 
Based  on  the  achievements  of  the  last 
few  years,  I  will  also  tell  him  it  is  a 
search  that  can  succeed. 

Once  again,  Mr.  General  Secretar 
I  want  to  extend  my  thanks  for  your  1 
pitality.  I  also  hope  you'll  permit  me  t( 
mention  that,  as  you  have  been  a  gra- 
cious host,  we've  tried  to  be  gracious 
guests  by  bringing  along  some  small  e 
pressions  of  our  gratitude.  There's  on« 
gift  in  particular  that  I  wanted  to  men 
tion,  not  only  in  view  of  my  own  formf 
profession,  but  because  it  has,  I  think 
something  important  to  say  to  us  aboL 
what  is  underway  this  week  in  Mosco\ 
It  is  a  film — not  as  well  knowTi  as  som 
but  an  American  classic.  It  is  a  power 
fully  acted  and  directed  story  of  famil; 
and  romantic  love,  of  devotion  to  the 
land  and  dedication  to  higher  principle 
It  is  also  fun,  it  has  humor.  There's  a 
renegade  goose,  a  mischievous  young 
boy,  a  noisy  neighbor,  a  love-struck  t 
ager  in  love  with  a  gallant  soldier,  an  ; 
lescent  struggling  for  manhood,  a  lov 
highly-principled  wife,  and  a  gentle  bi 
strong  father.  It's  about  the  good  and 
sometimes  difficult  things  that  happer 
between  man  and  wife,  and  parent  an> 
child.  The  films  also  has  sweep  and  m; 
esty  and  power  and  pathos.  For  you  s 
it  takes  place  against  the  backdrop  of 
American  epic,  the  Civil  War.  And  be 
cause  the  family  is  of  the  Quaker  rehg 
and  renounces  violence,  each  of  its  ch: 
acters  must,  in  his  or  her  own  way,  fa 
this  war  and  the  moral  dilemma  it  pos 
The  film  shows  not  just  the  tragedy  o 
war,  but  the  problems  of  pacifism,  tht 
bility  of  patriotism,  as  well  as  the  lov( 
peace. 

I  promise  not  to  spoil  its  outcom( 
you,  but  I  hope  you'll  permit  me  to  de 
scribe  one  scene.  Just  as  the  invadinj 
mies  come  into  southern  Indiana — om 
our  States — the  Quaker  farmer  is  ap- 
proached by  two  of  his  neighbors.  On^  s 
also  a  Quaker  who  earlier  in  the  story 


14 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/August  iBa 


FEATURE 
Moscow  Summit 


en  times  were  peaceful,  denounces  vio- 
ce  and  vows  never  to  lift  his  hand  in 
ijer.  But  now  that  the  enemy  has 
Tied  his  barn,  he's  on  his  way  to  battle 
i  criticizes  his  fellow  Quaker  for  not 
ling  him  in  renouncing  his  religious  he- 
's. The  other  visitor,  also  on  his  way  to 
tie,  is  the  intruding  but  friendly  neigh- 
•.  Yet  it  is  this  neighbor,  although  a 
(believer,  who  says  he's  proud  of  the 
aker  farmer's  decision  not  to  iight.  In 
face  of  the  tragedy  of  war,  he's  gi-ate- 
as  he  says,  that  somebody's  holding 
for  a  better  way  of  settling  things. 
It  seems  to  me  that  in  pursuing 
•se  summit  meetings,  we  too  have 
m  holding  out  for  a  better  way  of  set- 
g  things.  And  by  the  way,  the  film's 
e  is  more  than  a  little  appropriate, 
called  "Friendly  Persuasion." 
So,  Mr.  General  Secretary,  allow  me 
raise  a  glass  to  the  work  that  has  been 
le,  to  the  work  that  remains  to  be 
18,  and  let  us  also  toast  the  art  of 
;ndly  persuasion,  the  hope  of  peace 
■h  freedom,  the  hope  of  holding  out  for 
etter  way  of  settling  things.  Thank 
1  and  God  bless  you. 


tESIDENT'S  REMARKS, 
)SCOW  STATE  UNIVERSITY, 
)SCOW, 

iY  31,  1988^ 

i  a  great  pleasure  to  be  here  at 
iscow  State  University,  and  I  want  to 
ink  you  all  for  turning  out.  I  know  you 
ist  be  very  busy  this  week,  studying 
i  taking  your  final  examinations.  So 
■  me  just  say  zhelayu  vain  uspekha  [I 
sh  you  success].  Nancy  couldn't  make 
oday  because  she's  visiting  Lenin- 
id,  which  she  tells  me  is  a  very  beauti- 
city,  but  she,  too,  says  hello  and 
shes  you  all  good  luck. 

Let  me  say  it's  also  a  great  pleasure 
once  again  have  this  opportunity  to 
eak  directly  to  the  people  of  the  Soviet 
lion.  Before  I  left  Washington,  I  re- 
ived many  heartfelt  letters  and  tele- 
ams  asking  me  to  carry  here  a  simple 
2ssage — perhaps,  but  also  some  of  the 
Dst  important  business  of  this  summit: 
is  a  message  of  peace  and  good  will  and 
pe  for  a  growing  friendship  and  close- 
ss  between  our  two  peoples. 


As  you  know,  I've  come  to  Moscow 
to  meet  with  one  of  your  most  distin- 
guished graduates.  In  this,  our  fourth 
summit,  General  Secretary  Gorbachev 
and  I  have  spent  many  hours  together 
and  I  feel  that  we're  getting  to  know 
each  other  well.  Our  discussions,  of 
course,  have  been  focused  primarily  on 
many  of  the  important  issues  of  the  day, 
issues  I  want  to  touch  on  with  you  in  a 
few  moments.  But  first  I  want  to  take  a 
little  time  to  talk  to  you  much  as  I  would 
to  any  group  of  university  students  in 
the  United  States.  I  want  to  talk  not  just 
of  the  realities  of  today  but  of  the  possi- 
bilities of  tomorrow. 

Standing  here  before  a  mural  of  your 
revolution,  I  want  to  talk  about  a  very 
different  revolution  that  is  taking  place 
right  now,  quietly  sweeping  the  globe 
without  bloodshed  or  conflict.  Its  effects 
are  peaceful,  but  they  will  fundamentally 
alter  our  world,  shatter  old  assumptions, 
and  reshape  our  lives.  It's  easy  to  under- 
estimate because  it's  not  accompanied  by 
banners  or  fanfare.  It's  been  called  the 
technological  or  information  revolution, 
and  as  its  emblem,  one  might  take  the 
tiny  silicon  chifi — no  bigger  than  a  finger- 
print. One  of  these  chips  has  more  com- 
puting power  than  a  roomful  of  old-style 
computers. 

As  part  of  an  exchange  program,  we 
now  have  an  exhibition  touring  your 
country  that  shows  how  information  tech- 
nology is  transforming  our  lives — replac- 
ing manual  labor  with  robots,  forecasting 
weather  for  farmers,  or  mapping  the  ge- 
netic code  of  DNA  [deoxyribonucleic 
acid]  for  medical  researchers.  These  mi- 
crocomputers today  aid  the  design  of  ev- 
erything from  houses  to  cars  to  space- 
craft; they  even  design  better  and  faster 
computers.  They  can  translate  Enghsh 
into  Russian  or  enable  the  bhnd  to  read 
or  help  Michael  Jackson  produce  on  one 
synthesizer  the  sounds  of  a  whole  orches- 
tra. Linked  by  a  network  of  satellites 
and  fiber-optic  cables,  one  individual 
with  a  desktop  computer  and  a  telephone 
commands  resources  unavailable  to  the 
largest  governments  just  a  few  years 
ago. 

Like  a  chrysalis,  we're  emerging 
from  the  economy  of  the  Industrial  Revo- 
lution— an  economy  confined  to  and  lim- 
ited by  the  earth's  physical  resources — 
into,  as  one  economist  titled  his 


sttspartment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


book  The  Economy  in  Mind,  in  which 
there  are  no  bounds  on  human  imagina- 
tion and  the  freedom  to  create  is  the 
most  precious  natiu-al  resource. 

Think  of  that  little  computer  chip. 
Its  value  isn't  in  the  sand  from  which  it 
is  made  but  in  the  microscopic  architec- 
ture designed  into  it  by  ingenious 
human  minds.  Or  take  the  example  of 
the  satellite  relaying  this  broadcast 
around  the  world,  which  replaces  thou- 
sands of  tons  of  copper  mined  from  the 
earth  and  molded  into  wire.  In  the  new 
economy,  human  invention  increasingly 
makes  physical  resources  obsolete. 
We're  breaking  through  the  material  con- 
ditions of  existence  to  a  world  where 
man  creates  his  own  destiny.  Even  as  we 
explore  the  most  advanced  reaches  of  sci- 
ence, we're  returning  to  the  age-old  wis- 
dom of  our  culture,  a  vrisdom  contained 
in  the  book  of  Genesis  in  the  Bible:  in  the 
beginning  was  the  spirit,  and  it  was  from 
this  spirit  that  the  material  abundance  of 
creation  issued  forth. 

But  progress  is  not  foreordained. 
The  key  is  freedom — freedom  of  thought, 
freedom  of  information,  ft-eedom  of  com- 
munication. The  renowned  scientist, 
scholar,  and  founding  father  of  this  uni- 
versity, Mikhail  Lomonosov,  knew  that. 
"It  is  common  knowledge,"  he  said, 
"that  the  achievements  of  science  are  con- 
siderable and  rapid,  particularly  once  the 
yoke  of  slavery  is  cast  off  and  replaced 
by  the  freedom  of  philosophy."  You 
know,  one  of  the  first  contacts  between 
your  country  and  mine  took  place  be- 
tween Russian  and  American  explorers. 
The  Americans  were  members  of  Cook's 
last  voyage  on  an  expedition  searching 
for  an  Arctic  passage;  on  the  island  of 
Unalaska,  they  came  upon  the  Russians, 
who  took  them  in,  and  together,  with  the 
native  inhabitants,  held  a  prayer  service 
on  the  ice. 

The  explorers  of  the  modern  era  are 
the  entrepreneurs,  men  with  vision,  with 
the  courage  to  take  risks  and  faith 
enough  to  brave  the  unknown.  These  en- 
trepreneurs and  their  small  enterprises 
are  responsible  for  almost  all  the  eco- 
nomic growth  in  the  United  States.  They 
are  the  prime  movers  of  the  technologi- 
cal revolution.  In  fact,  one  of  the  largest 
personal  computer  firms  in  the  United 


15 


President  Reagan's  address  before  students  and  faculty  of  Moscow  State  Univer- 
sity; founded  in  1755,  it  is  the  largest  and  oldest  continuously  operating  university 
in  the  Soviet  Union. 


States  was  started  by  two  college  stu- 
dents, no  older  than  you,  in  the  garage 
behind  their  home. 

Some  people,  even  in  my  own  coun- 
try, look  at  the  riot  of  experiment  that  is 
the  free  market  and  see  only  waste. 
What  of  all  the  entrepreneurs  that  fail? 
Well,  many  do,  particularly  the  success- 
ful ones — often  several  times.  And  if  you 
ask  them  the  secret  of  their  success, 
they'll  tell  you  it's  all  that  they  learned 
in  their  struggles  along  the  way;  yes,  it's 
what  they  learned  from  failing.  Like  an 
athlete  in  competition  or  a  scholar  in  pur- 
suit of  the  truth,  experience  is  the  great- 
est teacher. 

And  that's  why  it's  so  hard  for  gov- 
ernment planners,  no  matter  how  sophis- 
ticated, to  ever  substitute  for  milhons  of 
individuals  working  night  and  day  to 
make  their  dreams  come  true.  The  fact 
is,  bureaucracies  are  a  problem  around 
the  world.  There's  an  old  story  about  a 
town — it  could  be  anywhere — with  a  bu- 
reaucrat who  is  known  to  be  a  good-for- 
nothing,  but  he  somehow  had  always 
hung  on  to  power.  So  one  day,  in  a  town 
meeting,  an  old  woman  got  up  and  said 


16 


to  him,  "There  is  a  folk  legend  here 
where  I  come  from  that  when  a  baby  is 
born,  an  angel  comes  down  from  heaven 
and  kisses  it  on  one  part  of  its  body.  If 
the  angel  kisses  him  on  his  hand,  he  be- 
comes a  handyman.  If  he  kisses  him  on 
his  forehead,  he  becomes  bright  and 
clever.  And  I've  been  trying  to  figure 
out  where  the  angel  kissed  you  so  that 
you  should  sit  there  for  so  long  and  do 
nothing."  [Laughter  and  applause.] 

We  are  seeing  the  power  of  eco- 
nomic freedom  spreading  around  the 
world — places  such  as  the  Republic  of 
Korea,  Singapore,  l^iwan  have  vaulted 
into  the  technological  era,  barely  pausing 
in  the  industrial  age  along  the  way. 
Low-tax  agricultural  policies  in  the  sub- 
continent mean  that  in  some  years  India 
is  now  a  net  exporter  of  food.  Perhaps 
most  exciting  are  the  winds  of  change 
that  are  blowing  over  the  People's  Re- 
public of  China,  where  one-quarter  of 
the  world's  population  is  now  getting  its 
first  taste  of  economic  freedom. 

At  the  same  time,  the  growth  of  de- 
mocracy has  become  one  of  the  most  pow- 
erful political  movements  of  our  age.  In 


Latin  America  in  the  1970s,  only  a  thin 
of  the  population  hved  under  democrati 
government;  today  over  90%  does.  In 
the  Philippines,  in  the  Republic  of  Kor 
free,  contested,  democratic  elections  ai 
the  order  of  the  day.  Throughout  the 
world,  free  markets  are  the  model  for 
gr'owth.  Democracy  is  the  standard  by 
which  governments  are  measured. 

We  Americans  make  no  secret  of 
belief  in  freedom.  In  fact,  it's  somethir 
of  a  national  pastime.  Every  4  years  tl 
American  people  choose  a  new  presid( 
and  1988  is  one  of  those  years.  At  one 
point  there  were  13  major  candidates  r 
ning  in  the  two  major  parties,  not  to  nr 
tion  all  the  others,  including  the  social 
and  hbertarian  candidates — all  trying 
get  my  job.  About  1,000  local  televisic 
stations,  8,500  radio  stations,  and  l,7t 
daily  newspapers — each  one  an  indepi 
ent,  private  enterprise,  fiercely  inde- 
pendent of  the  government — report  o 
the  candidates,  grill  them  in  interviev 
and  bring  them  together  for  debates, 
the  end,  the  people  vote;  they  decide 
who  will  be  the  next  president. 

But  freedom  doesn't  begin  or  end 
with  elections.  Go  to  any  American 
town,  to  take  just  an  example,  and  yc 
see  dozens  of  churches,  representing 
many  different  beliefs — in  many  plact 
synagogues  and  mosques — and  you'll 
famihes  of  every  conceivable  national 
worshiping  together. 

Go  into  any  schoolroom,  and  thei 
you  will  see  children  being  taught  the 
Declaration  of  Independence,  that  th< 
are  endowed  by  their  Creator  with  ce 
tain  inalienable  rights — among  them  '. 
hberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness- 
that  no  government  can  justly  deny  t 
guarantees  in  their  Constitution  for 
dom  of  speech,  freedom  of  assembly, 
freedom  of  religion. 

Go  into  any  courtroom,  and  ther 
will  preside  an  independent  judge,  b( 
holden  to  no  government  power.  The 
every  defendant  has  the  right  to  a  tri 
by  a  jury  of  his  peers,  usually  12  mei 
women — common  citizens,  they  are  t 
ones,  the  only  ones,  who  weigh  the  e 
dence  and  decide  on  guilt  or  innocenc 
In  that  court,  the  accused  is  innocent 
until  proven  guilty,  and  the  word  of 
liceman,  or  any  official,  has  no  great< 
legal  standing  than  the  word  of  the 
cused. 


nartartmont  rtf   Qtata   RiillAti 


FEATURE 
Moscow  Summit 


(Id  to  any  university  campus,  and 
hf  you'll  find  an  open,  sometimes 
Kted  discussion  of  the  problems  in 
A  erican  society  and  what  can  be  done 
r  oi-rect  them.  Tlirn  on  the  television, 
11  >()u'll  see  the  legislature  conducting 
!  business  of  government  right  there 
K  ire  the  camera,  debating  and  voting 
■:  hv  legislation  that  will  become  the 
the  land.  March  in  any  demonstra- 
,11(1  there  are  many  of  them;  the 
pir  s  right  of  assembly  Is  guaranteed 
lir  Constitution  and  protected  by  the 

( ;i)  into  any  union  hall  where  the 
I  iiliers  know  their  right  to  strike  is 
)  iccted  by  law.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
I   I  if  the  many  jobs  I  had  before  this 

was  being  president  of  a  union,  the 
-  rill  Actors  Guild.  I  led  my  union  out 
)  strike;  and  I'm  proud  to  say,  we  won. 
But  freedom  is  more  even  than  this. 
«dom  is  the  right  to  question  and 
nge  the  established  way  of  doing 
igs.  It  is  the  continuing  revolution  of 
marketplace.  It  is  the  understanding 
t  allows  us  to  recognize  shortcomings 
seek  solutions.  It  is  the  right  to  put 
h  an  idea,  scoffed  at  by  the  e.xperts, 
I  watch  it  catch  fire  among  the  people. 
s  the  right  to  dream — to  follow  your 
am,  or  stick  to  your  conscience,  even 
ou're  the  only  one  in  a  sea  of  doubt- 


11 


ellll 


Freedom  is  the  recognition  that  no 
gle  person,  no  single  authority  or  gov- 
iment,  has  a  monopoly  on  the  truth; 
,  that  every  individual  life  is  infinitely 
icious,  that  every  one  of  us  put  on  this 
rid  has  been  put  there  for  a  reason 
I  has  something  to  offer. 

America  is  a  nation  made  up  of  hun- 
ids  of  nationalities.  Our  ties  to  you  are 
re  than  ones  of  good  feeling;  they're 
3  of  kinship.  In  America,  you'll  find 
ssians,  Armenians,  Ukrainians,  peo- 
■s  from  Eastern  Europe  and  Central 
ia.  They  come  from  every  part  of  this 
5t  continent,  from  every  continent,  to 
e  in  harmony,  seeking  a  place  where 
h  cultural  heritage  is  respected,  each 
k'alued  for  its  diverse  strengths  and 
auties  and  the  richness  it  brings  to  our 

Recently,  a  few  individuals  and  fami- 
Ms  have  been  allowed  to  visit  relatives 


in  the  West.  We  can  only  hope  that  it 
won't  be  long  before  all  are  allowed  to  do 
so,  and  Ukrainian- Americans,  Baltic- 
Americans,  and  Armenian-Americans 
can  freely  visit  their  homelands,  just  as 
this  Irish- American  visits  his. 

Freedom,  it  has  been  said,  makes 
people  selfish  and  materiahstic,  but 
Americans  are  one  of  the  most  religious 
peoples  on  earth.  Because  they  know 
that  liberty,  just  as  life  itself,  is  not 
earned,  but  a  gift  from  God,  they  seek  to 
share  that  gift  with  the  world.  "Reason 
and  e.xpericence,"  said  George  Washing- 
ton, in  his  farewell  address,  "both  forbid 
us  to  expect  that  national  morality  can 
prevail  in  exclusion  of  religious  principle. 
And  it  is  substantially  true,  that  virtue 
or  morality  is  a  necessary  spring  of  popu- 
lar government." 

Democracy  is  less  a  system  of  gov- 
ernment than  it  is  a  system  to  keep  gov- 
ernment limited,  unintrusive:  a  system 
of  constraints  on  power  to  keep  politics 
and  government  secondary  to  the  impor- 
tant things  in  life,  the  true  sources  of 
value  found  only  in  family  and  faith. 

But  I  hope  you  know  I  go  on  about 
these  things  not  simply  to  extol  the  vir- 
tues of  my  own  country,  but  to  speak  to 
the  true  greatness  of  the  heart  and  soul 
of  your  land.  Who,  after  all,  needs  to  tell 
the  land  of  Dostoevski  about  the  quest 
for  truth,  the  home  of  Kandinski  and  the 
Scriabin  about  imagination,  the  rich  and 
noble  culture  of  the  Uzbek  man  of  let- 
ters, Alisher  Navoi,  about  beauty  and 
heart? 

The  great  culture  of  your  diverse 
land  speaks  with  a  glowing  passion  to  all 
humanity.  Let  me  cite  one  of  the  most 
eloquent  contemporary  passages  on 
human  freedom.  It  comes,  not  from  the 
literature  of  America,  but  from  this  coun- 
try, from  one  of  the  greatest  writers  of 
the  20th  century,  Boris  Pasternak,  in  the 
novel  Dr.  Zkivago.  He  writes: 

I  think  that  if  the  beast  who  sleeps  in  man 
could  be  held  down  by  the  threats— any  kind  of 
threat,  whether  of  jail  or  of  retribution  after 
death— then  the  highest  emblem  of  humanity 
would  be  the  lion  tamer  in  the  circus  with  his 
whip,  not  the  prophet  who  sacrificed  himself. 
But  this  is  just  the  point — what  has  for 
centuries  raised  man  above  the  beast,  is  not  the 
cudgel,  but  an  inward  music — the  irresistible 
power  of  unarmed  truth. 


.nartmont  of  Rtate  Bulletin/Auaust  1988 


The  irresistible  power  of  unarmed 
truth.  Today  the  world  looks  expectantly 
to  signs  of  change,  steps  toward  greater 
freedom  in  the  Soviet  Union.  We  watch 
and  we  hope  as  we  see  positive  changes 
taking  place.  There  are  some,  I  know,  in 
your  society  who  fear  that  change  will 
bring  only  disruption  and  discontinuity — 
who  fear  to  embrace  the  hope  of  the 
future. 

Sometimes  it  takes  faith.  It's  like 
that  scene  in  the  cowboy  movie  "Butch 
Cassidy  and  the  Sundance  Kid,"  which 
some  here  in  Moscow  recently  had  a 
chance  to  see.  The  posse  is  closing  in  on 
the  two  outlaws,  Butch  and  Sundance, 
who  find  themselves  trapped  on  the  edge 
of  a  cliff,  with  a  sheer  drop  of  hundreds 
of  feet  to  the  raging  rapids  below.  Butch 
turns  to  Sundance  and  says  their  only 
hope  is  to  jump  into  the  river  below,  but 
Sundance  refuses.  He  says  he'd  rather 
fight  it  out  with  the  posse,  even  though 
they're  hopelessly  outnumbered.  Butch 
says  that's  suicide  and  urges  him  to 
jump,  but  Sundance  still  refuses,  and  fi- 
nally admits,  "I  can't  swim."  Butch 
breaks  up  laughing  and  says,  "You  crazy 
fool,  the  fall  will  probably  kill  you." 
And,  by  the  way,  both  Butch  and  Sun- 
dance made  it,  in  case  you  didn't  see  the 
movie.  I  think  what  I've  just  been  talk- 
ing about  is  perestroika  and  what  its 
goals  are. 

But  change  would  not  mean  rejec- 
tion of  the  past.  Like  a  tree  growing 
strong  through  the  seasons,  rooted  in  the 
earth  and  drawing  life  from  the  sun,  so, 
too,  positive  change  must  be  rooted  in 
traditional  values — in  the  land,  in  cul- 
ture, in  family,  and  community — and  it 
must  take  its  life  from  the  eternal  things, 
from  the  source  of  all  life,  which  is  faith. 
Such  change  will  lead  to  new  understand- 
ings, new  opportunities,  and  to  a  broader 
future  in  which  the  tradition  is  not  sup- 
planted but  finds  its  full  flowering.  That 
is  the  future  beckoning  to  your  genera- 
tion. 

At  the  same  time,  we  should  remem- 
ber that  reform  that  is  not  institutional- 
ized will  always  be  insecure.  Such  free- 
dom will  always  be  looking  over  its  shoul- 
der. A  bird  on  a  tether,  no  matter  how 
long  the  rope,  can  always  be  pulled  back. 
And  that  is  why,  in  my  conversation  with 


17 


General  Secretary  Gorbachev,  I  have 

spoken  of  how  important  it  is  to  institu- 
tionalize change — to  put  guarantees  on 
reform.  And  we've  been  talking  together 
about  one  sad  reminder  of  a  divided 
world:  the  Berlin  Wall.  It's  time  to  re- 
move the  barriers  that  keep  people 
apart. 

I'm  proposing  an  increased  exchange 
program  of  high  school  students  between 
our  countries.  General  Secretary  Gor- 
bachev mentioned  on  Sunday  a  wonder- 
ful phrase  you  have  in  Russian  for  this. 
"Better  to  see  something  once  than  to 
hear  about  it  a  hundred  times."  Mr.  Gor- 
bachev and  I  first  began  working  on  this 
in  1985.  In  our  discussion  today,  we 
agreed  on  working  up  to  several  thou- 
sand exchanges  a  year  from  each  country 
in  the  near  future.  But  not  everyone  can 
travel  across  the  continents  and  oceans. 
Words  travel  lighter,  and  that's  why 
we'd  like  to  make  available  to  this  coun- 
try more  of  our  11,000  magazines  and  pe- 
riodicals and  our  television  and  radio 
shows  that  can  be  beamed  off  a  satellite 
in  seconds.  Nothing  would  please  us 
more  than  for  the  Soviet  people  to  get  to 
know  us  better  and  to  understand  our 
way  of  life. 

Just  a  few  years  ago,  few  would 
have  imagined  the  progress  our  two  na- 
tions have  made  together.  The  INF 
Treaty,  which  General  Secretary  Gor- 
bachev and  I  signed  last  December  in 
Washington  and  whose  instruments  of 
ratification  we  will  exchange  tomorrow — 
the  first  true  nuclear  arms  reduction 
treaty  in  history,  calling  for  the  elimina- 
tion of  an  entire  class  of  U.S.  and  Soviet 
nuclear  missiles.  And  just  16  days  ago, 
we  saw  the  beginning  of  your  withdrawal 
from  Afghanistan,  which  gives  us  hope 
that  soon  the  fighting  may  end  and  the 
healing  may  begin  and  that  that  suffering 
country  may  find  self-determination, 
unity,  and  peace  at  long  last. 

It's  my  fervent  hope  that  our  con- 
structive cooperation  on  these  issues  will 
be  carried  on  to  address  the  continuing 
destruction  on  conflicts  in  many  regions 
of  the  globe  and  that  the  serious  discus- 
sions that  led  to  the  Geneva  accords  on 
Afghanistan  will  help  lead  to  solutions  in 
southern  Africa,  Ethiopia,  Cambodia, 
the  Persian  Gulf,  and  Central  America. 


President  Reagan  and  General  Secretary  Gorbachev  greet  Soviet  citizens  during 
their  tour  of  the  Kremlin. 


I  have  often  said,  nations  do  not  dis- 
trust each  other  because  they  are  armed; 
they  are  armed  because  they  distrust 
each  other.  If  this  globe  is  to  live  in 
peace  and  prosper,  if  it  is  to  embrace  all 
the  possibilities  of  the  technological  revo- 
lution, then  nations  must  renounce,  once 
and  for  all,  the  right  to  an  expansionist 
foreign  poUcy.  Peace  between  nations 
must  be  an  enduring  goal,  not  a  tactical 
stage  in  a  countinuing  conflict. 

I've  been  told  that  there's  a  popular 
song  in  your  country — perhaps  you  know 
it — whose  evocative  refrain  asks  the 
question:  "Do  the  Russians  want  a 
war?"  In  answer  it  says,  "Go  ask  that  si- 
lence lingering  in  the  air,  above  the  birch 
and  poplar  there;  beneath  those  trees 
the  soldiers  he.  Go  ask  my  mother,  ask 
my  wife;  then  you  will  have  to  ask  no 
more,  'Do  the  Russians  want  a  war?'  " 
But  what  of  your  one-time  allies?  What 
of  those  who  embraced  you  on  the  Elbe? 
What  if  we  were  to  ask  the  watery 
gi-aves  of  the  Pacific  or  the  European  bat- 
tlefields where  America's  fallen  were 
buried  far  from  home?  What  if  we  were 


to  ask  their  mothers,  sisters,  and  sons 
do  Americans  want  war?  Ask  us,  too, 
and  you'll  find  the  same  answer,  the 
same  longing  in  every  heart.  People  di 
not  make  wars,  governments  do.  And 
mother  would  ever  willingly  sacrifice 
sons  for  temtorial  gain,  for  economic 
vantage,  for  ideology.  A  people  free  tc 
choose  will  always  choose  peace. 

Americans  seek  always  to  make 
friends  of  old  antagonists.  After  a  colo 
nial  revolution  with  Britain,  we  have  c 
mented  for  all  ages  the  ties  of  kinship 
tween  our  nations.  After  a  temble  civ 
war  between  North  and  South,  we 
healed  our  wounds  and  found  true  unit 
as  a  nation.  We  fought  two  world  war 
my  lifetime  against  Germany  and  one 
vrith  Japan,  but  now  the  Federal  Rej 
lie  of  Germany  and  Japan  are  two  of  oi 
closest  allies  and  friends. 

Some  people  point  to  the  trade  dii 
putes  between  us  as  a  sign  of  strain,  b 
they're  the  frictions  of  all  families,  anc 
the  family  of  free  nations  is  a  big  and 
vital — and  sometimes  boisterous — one 
can  tell  you  that  nothing  would  please 


18 


rtonartmont  r>f  ^tato  R 


illotin/Aiiniict  1CB 


Moscow  Summit 


V  heart  more  than  in  my  lifetime  to  see 
\ierican  and  Soviet  diplomats  grap- 

lu  with  the  problem  of  trade  disputes 
w ifn  America  and  a  growing,  exuber- 
txporting  Soviet  Union  that  had 
iitii  up  to  economic  fi-eedom  and 
_•  \\th. 

And  as  important  as  these  official 
1  |ilf-to-people  exchanges  are,  nothing 
\  lid  please  me  more  than  for  them  to 
1  niiu'  unnecessary,  to  see  travel  be- 
.'  't'li  East  and  West  become  so  routine 
tit  university  students  in  the  Soviet 
Ijion  could  take  a  month  off  in  the  sum- 
ni-  and— just  like  students  in  the  West 
j  now— put  packs  on  their  backs  and 
b  vel  from  country  to  country  in  Europe 

V  h  barely  a  passport  check  in  between. 
J  thing  would  please  me  more  than  to 

fl  the  day  that  a  concert  promoter  in, 
4  .  England  could  call  up  a  Soviet  rock 
:  I  h— without  going  through  any  gov- 

■iit  agency— and  have  them  playing 
,. ,  erpool  the  next  night.  Is  this  just  a 
am?  Perhaps.  But  it  is  a  dream  that  is 
.  ■  responsibility  to  have  come  true. 

Your  generation  is  living  in  one  of 
t  most  exciting,  hopeful  times  in  So- 
\  t  history.  It  is  a  time  when  the  first 
\  'ath  of  freedom  stirs  the  air  and  the 
1  u-t  beats  to  the  accelerated  rhythm  of 
1  )e.  when  the  accumulated  spiritual  en- 
t  ;^es  of  a  long  silence  yearn  to  break 

ie.  I  am  reminded  of  the  famous  pas- 
;e  near  the  end  of  Gogol's  Dead  Souls. 
mparing  his  nation  to  a  speeding 
.ika,  Gogol  asks  what  will  be  its  desti- 
tion.  But  he  writes,  "There  was  no  an- 
er  save  the  bell  pouring  forth  mar- 
lous  sound." 

We  do  not  know  what  the  conclusion 
11  be  of  this  journey,  but  we're  hopeful 
at  the  promise  of  reform  will  be  ful- 
.ed.  In  this  Moscow  spring,  this  May 
88,  we  may  be  allowed  that  hope  — 
ifiiii  at  freedom,  like  the  fresh  green  sap- 
««  \g  planted  over  Tolstoy's  grave— will 
jii(  Dssom  forth  at  last  in  the  rich  fertile 
111  Ml  of  your  people  and  culture.  We  may 
oiit'n  :  allowed  to  hope  that  the  marvelous 

und  of  a  new  openness  will  keep  rising 
sde*  rough,  ringing  through,  leading  to  a 
i«l  iw  world  of  reconciliation,  friendship, 
es. a*  id  peace. 

fd      Thank  you  all  very  much  and  du  bla 
H*  tslovit  vas  grospod— God  bless  you. 


SECRETARY'S  INTERVIEW, 
"MACNEDL/LEHRER 

TSFEWSHOUR," 
MOSCOW, 

MAY  31,  1988« 

Q.  Is  the  U.S.  side  feeling  as  positive  as 
the  Soviets  sound  today  about  the  possi- 
bilities of  a  START  treaty  being  signed 
this  fall? 

A.  It's  certainly  possible,  and  we  did 
make  some  headway  during  the  course  of 
this  meeting  in  our  working  group.  It's 
not  certain,  of  course,  because  the  prob- 
lems ahead  are  difficult  ones,  and  I  think 
it's  fair  to  say  that  both  sides  want  to  see 
the  job  done  right.  So  we'll  work  on  it 
very  hard,  but  I  wouldn't  want  to  make  a 
flat  prediction. 

Q.  Does  that  mean  that  progress  has 
been  made  on  any  of  the  four  areas 
dividing  the  two  sides?  We  had  them 
listed  for  us  the  other  day— SDI  [Strate- 
gic Defense  Initiative],  how  you  count 
ALCMs  [air-launched  cruise  missiles], 
how  you  verify  whether  the  submarine- 
launched  are  conventional  or  nuclear, 
how  to  verify  the  mobile  missiles  or  to 
ban  them.  On  any  or  all  of  those  areas, 
has  significant  progress  been  made? 
A.  I  think  significant  progress  has 
been  made  on  the  air-launched  cruise 
missile  question  and  on  the  great,  diffi- 
cult problems  of  verifying  mobile  mis- 
siles, if  you  allow  them.  And  so  those  are 
the  two  important  areas  where  I  think 
some  real  headway  was  made. 

It's  possible  that  we  have  made 
headway  on  the  others,  although  that 
headway  hasn't  emerged  into  things  that 
are  concrete  and  identifiable.  But  you 
know,  when  you  talk  over  your  positions 
back  and  forth,  you  lay  the  groundwork 
for  people  going  back  and  sort  of  think- 
ing it  over  again  and  saying,  "Well,  you 
know,  they  said  this  and  they  said  that, 
and  maybe  there's  a  point  here."  It's 
that  kind  of  thing  that  also  makes  prog- 
ress, but  you  can't  identify  it  in  any- 
thing. 

Q.  Has  the  progress  you've  made 
here  been  unexpectedly  good?  I  mean, 
did  you  make  more  than  you  came  here 
thinking  you  might  make? 


A.  Everybody  came  thinking  dif- 
ferent things  probably.  I  felt  that  we 
would  make  some  and  we  did,  and  I  think 
I'll  just  leave  it  at  that. 

Q.  How  do  you,  at  this  level,  really 
make  significant  progress  on  issues  that 
are  so  fiendishly  complicated?  It  has  to 
be  on  a  fairly  simple  level— I  mean,  like 
one  side  saying,  "Well,  we'll  reduce 
our  demands  on  that  thing  or  we'll  drop 
that."  Is  that  the  kind  of  level  on  which 
progress  is  made  at  the  summit  level? 
A.  There  has  been  an  evolution  in 
the  way  of  working  at  these  problems 
that  I  think  is  quite  interesting  and 
seems  to  work  well.  Here's  what  hap- 
pens: we  bring  here,  and  the  Soviets 
have  here,  all  of  the  expert  people  who 
know  about  this  subject— the  negotiators 
from  Geneva,  the  people  who  do  the 
work  in  Washington  and  their  counter- 
parts in  Moscow.  When  we  started  out, 
the  President  and  the  General  Secretary 
had  a  one-on-one  meeting.  Shortly  there- 
after, I  had  one  with  Foreign  Minister 
[Eduard]  Shevardnadze;  and  at  that 
meeting  we  had  around  us  this  great  big 
bunch  of  experts  on  all  kinds  of  sub- 
jects—on human  rights  subjects,  on  re- 
gional issues,  on  bilateral  problems,  on 
the  range  of  arms  control  issues,  not  just 
START  and  SDI— and  we  established 
working  groups.  And  while  we  have  been 
having  these  various  meetings,  the  work- 
ing groups,  who  are  technically  very  well 
quahfied,  have  been  meeting  themselves. 
Being  in  the  atmosphere  of  the  summit 
meeting,  there  is  the  potential  for  inter- 
action up  and  down  the  line  from  the  po- 
litical level  of  decisions  to  the  technical 
level,  and  that  tends  to  give  a  stimulus. 
By  and  large,  I  think,  in  each  one  of  the 
summit  meetings  we've  made  progi-ess 
working  that  way  and  we've  become  in- 
creasingly confident  that  that's  a  good 
pattern. 

Q.  So,  if  I  understand  correctly,  it's 
the  atmosphere  of  the  summit,  with  all 
the  leaderships  present  and  all  the  ex- 
perts present,  which  makes  them  more 
likely  to  make  some  progress  than  when 
they're  sitting  there  without  all  of  you 
sitting  on  top  of  them  in  Geneva.  Is  that 
what  you  mean? 


lepartment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


19 


A.  There  are  a  variety  of  things. 
First,  the  people  in  Geneva  who  are  the 
negotiators  often  get  frustrated  with  the 
people  in  Washington,  and  maybe  about 
Moscow.  I  can't  speak  about  that  and  I 
don't  know.  But  they  say,  "Come  on 
Washington,  make  up  your  mind.  Give  us 
an  answer  to  our  questions  that  have 
come  up."  And  the  Washington  people, 
of  course,  are  watching  the  negotiations 
and  trying  to  evaluate  the  proposals  that 
are  being  made,  and  so  on.  So  when  you 
have  all  these  people  together  in  one 
place — 

Q.  And  clear  them  through  the 
bureaucracy — 

A.  Right.  So  when  you  have  them 
all  together  in  one  place,  it's  all  there, 
and  there  can  be  an  interchange  that's 
pretty  rapid.  At  the  same  time,  there 
are  political  decisions  to  be  made,  so  to 
speak,  and  there  is  a  kind  of  encourage- 
ment to  that  out  of  the  summit  process. 

Q.  What  did  Mr.  Reagan  mean 
today  when  he  said  in  the  Kremlin  when 
reporters  were  asking  questions, 
"We're  settled  on  SDI?" 

A.  I  think  he  must  have  meant  that 
as  far  as  the  United  States  is  concerned, 
as  far  as  he  is  concerned,  he  intends  to 
pursue  this  effort  to  find  out  whether  we 
can  defend  ourselves  against  ballistic  mis- 
siles. He  feels  it's  a  vitally  important 
matter  to  learn  how  to  do  that  if  we  can. 
As  far  as  he's  concerned,  he's  not  going 
to  agree  to  anything  that  would  prevent 
that  effort  from  going  forward.  And  I 
think  that  all  the  people  working  with 
him — certainly  me — support  him  in  that. 

Q.  He  didn't  mean  it  was  settled 
between  himself  and  the  Soviets? 

A.  Oh,  no.  It's  not  settled  by  any 
means,  although  compared  with  where 
we  were,  say,  2  years  or  so  ago,  or  when 
we  went  to  Reykjavik,  we've  come  a 
long  way.  So  there  have  been  a  number 
of  things  worked  out. 

Q.  There  have  been  hints,  indica- 
tions, whatever,  in  the  past  that  the 
Soviets  for  their  own  reasons  might  find 
it  convenient  to  accept  a  form  of  words 
that  would  enable  the  United  States  to  go 
on  developing,  testing,  whatever,  SDI  in 


the  way  Mr.  Reagan  wants  to.  Do  you 
get  a  sense  that  that  is  a  possibility  now, 
that  they  will  simply  accept  a  form  of 
words  that  lets  the  United  States  inter- 
pret the  ABM  Treaty  the  way  it  wants  to 
and  the  Soviets  can  interpret  it  the  way 
they  want  to?  Or  is  that  not  coming 
together? 

A.  That  isn't  a  good  idea  because  if 
you  have  something  that  has  been  agreed 
to  in  words  and  you  both  know  that  you 
have  a  different  view  of  what  those 
words  mean,  you're  just  heading  for 
trouble  because  as  soon  as  there's  any 
real  pressure  on  the  subject,  that  dis- 
agreement will  emerge.  We  believe — and 
I  think  the  Soviets  believe — that  it's  bet- 
ter to  drive  ahead  and  try  to  come  to 
some  kind  of  an  agreement  that's  clear. 

Q.  And  on  the  final  thing,  you 
mentioned  the  air-launched  cruise  mis- 
siles, and  you  mentioned  the  mobile 
missiles. 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  The  fourth  thing  was — you  didn't 
mention — the  submarine-launched  mis- 
siles. No  progress  on  that? 

A.  It's  on  submarine-launched 
ballistic  missiles,  we  really  don't  have — 
that  we've  basically  handled  that. 

Q.  I  should  have  said  cruise  mis- 
siles? 

A.  It's  the  question  of  cruise  mis- 
siles that  the  Soviets  have  raised.  And 
we  don't  see  how  you  can  verify  a  hmit 
on  cruise  missiles  on — it's  not  just  subma- 
rines, on  any  naval  ship — and  be  consist- 
ent with  operating  the  Navy.  Of  course, 
you  can  verify  things  by  having  all  of  our 
ships  being  swarmed  with  Soviets  all  of 
the  time,  but  that  doesn't  allow  the 
Navy  to  operate.  So  you've  got  to  find 
something  that  will  really  work  and 
allow  normal  operations,  and  we  don't 
see  where  to  find  that.  At  the  same  time, 
they've  put  forward  a  lot  of  ideas  and 
we're  evaluating  them,  but  we  really 
haven't  made  much  progress  on  that. 

Q.  Assistant  Secretary  Ridgway 
[Assistant  Secretary  for  European  and 
Canadian  Affairs  Rozanne  L.  Ridgway] 
told  us  the  other  day  that  if  there  was  to 
be  a  START  treaty  signed  before  Mr. 
Reagan  left  office,  that  would  depend  on 


the  progress  made  here.  Has  the  prog 
ress  made  here  been  sufficient  that  tli 
is  not  now  an  impossibility?  Is  that  wl 
you  were  saying  earlier? 

A.  Yes,  I'd  agree  with  that  double 
negative. 

Q.  In  other  words,  enough  progr 
has  been  made  here  to  raise  hopes  of 
strategic  arms  reduction  treaty  being, 
signed  before  Mr.  Reagan  leaves  offi^ 

A.  It's  still  possible.  I  don't  want  t 
get  in  the  position  of  predicting  that  it 
will  happen. 

Q.  Right. 

A.  But  we'll  work  at  it,  and  we'd 
like  it  to  happen.  The  President  would 
very  much  hke  it  to  happen. 

Q.  And  if  it's  possible,  then  a  fift 
summit  meeting  presumably  would  b» 
possible? 

A.  Certainly,  but  there's  no  plan 
it.  I  think  that  actually  if  there's  a  goo 
reason  to  have  a  meeting,  it's  not  that 
difficult  to  arrange  one,  but  there  nee( 
to  be  a  good  reason. 

Q.  On  one  agreement  which  was- 
signed  today,  which  you  and  Mr. 
Shevardnadze  signed,  on  the  24  hourr< 
least  prior  notification  of  the  test 
launching  of  strategic  missiles — 

A.  Any  ballistic  missiles. 

Q.  Any,  excuse  me.  I'm  curious  i 
know  what  happened.  Just  over  a  we 
ago,  you,  having  talked  to  him  in  Ge 
neva,  came  out  and  said  this  is  a  real 
possibility — 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  —we'll  pull  this  out  of  STAR11 
and  sign  it.  Then  it  all  seemed  to  go  s 
just  a  few  days  ago  and  looked  like  n 
possibility  at  all.  What  happened  to 
make  it  suddenly  come  about? 

A.  We  made  a  proposal,  and  they 
seemed  to  be  agreeable  to  it.  Then  a  k 
of  things  were  added  to  it  that  we 
couldn't  accept,  and  we  said  so.  The 
press  discovered  that  we  were  having 
that  argument  and  decided  that  some- 
thing that  we  were  going  to  get,  we 
thought,  wasn't  going  to  be  gotten.  Th 
was  the  story.  But  we  kept  working  o) 


?0 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/August  U 


I 


FEATURE 
Moscow  Summit 


And  they  basically  said,  "Well,  all 
;ht,  let's  do  what  we  started  out  to  do 
Geneva.  But  here  are  these  other 
ings  over  here  that  we're  interested 
and  we'd  like  to  study  them  and  see  if 
couldn't  bring  something  forward 
re."  And  we  said,  "fine." 

Q.  As  a  separate — 

A.  As  a  separate  matter,  to  study, 
iich  is  only  to  say  that  as  this  relation- 
p  has  moved  along  there  is  an  increas- 
jly  mature  capability  of  looking  at  prob- 
ns  and  going  back  and  forth  and  hav- 
l  disagreements  and  working  them 
rough  and  resolving  them.  Every  once 
la  while,  in  this  very  open  atmosphere 
at  we  work  in,  people  take  a  photo- 
aph  and  they  see  the  disagreements 
d  they  jump  to  conclusions  that  are  not 
cessarily  warranted. 

Q.  One  final  area,  the  Middle  East, 
le  Soviets  have  said  things  today  that 
e  rather  positive  about  your  peace 
itiative  in  the  Middle  East.  You're 
injj  back  there  yourself? 

A.  Yes,  I  am. 

Q.  Are  you  heading  back  with  some 
ssibility  now,  or  promise,  of  Soviet 
rticipation  in  the  process? 

A.  They  want  to  participate  in  the 
ocess,  and  I  think  they  have  come  to 
are  with  others,  including  ourselves,  a 
usilnse  that  the  situation  there  is  not  sta- 
w  e.  It's  not  going  to  stay  the  same;  it's 
f,e  Mng  to  change.  The  status  quo  is  not  an 
ition.  And,  of  course,  it's  a  very  ex- 
osive  area,  particularly  now  that  we 
te  all  of  these  ballistic  missiles  and 
^emical  weapons  around.  So  we'd  like  to 
»e  something  worked  out,  and  we've 
id  some  worthwhile  discussions  with 
em.  But,  of  course,  if  it's  going  to  be 
orked  out,  it  will  have  to  be  basically 
itween  Israel  and  each  of  its  neighbors 
.  those  bilateral  negotiations.  That's 
ihere  the  action  has  to  be.  Our  ques- 
ons  always  are:  Is  there  something  we 
in  do  to  help  bring  that  process  about? 

Q.  And  is  that  made  more  likely  by 
Dur  talks  here? 

A.  Maybe  a  little  bit.  But  it's  diffi- 
alt.  It's  tough. 

Q.  The  Soviet  official  whom  we  had 
n  the  show  just  before  you  said  in  this 


summit  he  would  raise  atmosphere  [as 
of]  first  importance,  substance  second. 
What  is  your  rating? 

A.  I  think  I  would  disagree  with  him 
in  wanting  to  rate  them,  because  I  think 
there  is  always  an  interplay.  That's  the 
real  point.  If  there's  no  worthwhile  sub- 
stance, the  atmosphere  doesn't  mean 
much.  And,  at  the  same  time,  a  good  at- 
mosphere can  contribute  to  substance. 
So  the  real  point  is  that  there  has 
evolved — and  this  is  the  big  story,  it 
seems  to  me — a  greater  maturity,  a 
greater  breadth  in  the  relationship,  a 
genuine  willingness  to  discuss  practically 
anything,  and  progress  across  the  board. 
It's  not  a  one-issue  relationship.  It's  not 
an  arms  control  relationship.  It's  got  all 
four  categories  of  subjects — human 
rights,  bilateral  issues,  regional  prob- 
lems, and  arms  control  issues — all  in  it. 
They  all  get  discussed  very  extensively, 
and  we've  made  progress  across  the 
board.  That's  the  really  important  point. 


DINNER  TOASTS, 
SPASO  HOUSE, 
MOSCOW, 
MAY  31,  19882 

President  Reagan 

It's  a  pleasure  to  host  all  of  you  tonight 
and  to  reciprocate,  in  a  small  way,  the 
hospitality  you  lavished  upon  us  yester- 
day evening.  While  the  General  Secre- 
tary and  I  had  already  held  three  meet- 
ings before  this  one  began  here  in 
Moscow,  each  of  those  earlier  encounters 
took  place  in  the  autumn.  The  days  were 
growing  short,  the  weather  ever  grayer 
and  colder.  It  makes  for  a  bracing,  de- 
lightful change  to  have  this  meeting  take 
place  at  the  high  point  of  spring,  a  time 
of  long,  light-filled  days. 

I  know  that  Nancy  found  her  spring- 
time visit  to  Leningrad  earlier  today 
both  magnificent  and  moving.  The  play 
of  light  upon  the  rivers  and  canals  added 
the  special  splendor  of  the  season  to  a 
city  splendid  in  any  season.  And  every- 
where, Nancy  has  told  me,  there  was  a 
sense  of  history,  especially  of  Lenin- 
grad's immense  courage  and  sacrifice 


;  epartment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


during  the  Second  World  War,  surely 
one  of  the  most  stirring  epics  in  the 
whole  human  story. 

Here  in  Moscow,  I've  been  re- 
minded a  number  of  times  during  this 
springtime  visit  of  a  passage  in  a  book 
about  your  country  by  Laurens  Van  der 
Post.  Especially  struck  by  the  city's 
churches,  Van  der  Post  wrote  that  when 
he  caught  his  first  sight  of  the  Moscow 
skyline  he  saw,  "The  light  of  an  unusu- 
ally pure  evening  upon  it.  That  light  was 
alchemical  and  it  transformed  Moscow 
into  a  city  of  gold,  the  tops  of  the  spires 
and  pinnacles  drawing  the  rigid  forms  of 
the  skyscrapers  after  them  into  arrows 
of  gold  aimed  at  the  arched  and  timeless 
blue."  We,  too,  have  found  Moscow  a 
city  of  beauties.  A  city,  especially,  whose 
pinnacles  and  spires  reminded  one  at  vir- 
tually every  turn  of  man's  ancient  capac- 
ity for  aspiration,  for  reaching  out  to- 
ward the  light. 

It's  a  particular  pleasure  to  be  able 
to  welcome  you  to  Spaso  House — a  house 
of  considerable  beauty  in  its  own  right — 
the  residence  of  our  Ambassadors  to  the 
Soviet  Union.  During  the  55  years  of  dip- 
lomatic relations  between  our  two  na- 
tions, Spaso  House  has  served  as  one  of 
the  principal  settings  for  e.\changes  be- 
tween us — exchanges  formal  and  infor- 
mal alike. 

There  have  been  some  splendid  mo- 
ments within  these  walls.  Prokofiev  once 
conducted  his  marvelous  "The  Love  for 
Three  Oranges"  in  this  very  room.  As 
wartime  allies,  our  representatives  met 
often  under  this  roof.  And  Ambassador 
[Jack  F.  Matlock,  Jr.]  and  Mrs.  Matlock 
have  continued  the  tradition  of  making 
Spaso  House  a  centerpiece  of  American 
culture,  a  place  to  receive  and  talk  with 
Soviet  officials  and  with  people  from  all 
walks  of  life  and  from  all  parts  of  the  So- 
viet Union. 

But  there  have  also  been  quiet  times 
in  this  house — unnaturally  quiet  times. 
Times  when  difficult  relations  between 
us  meant  that  this  house,  this  huge,  mag- 
nificent house,  stood  virtually  empty  of 
visitors.  I'm  told  that  it  was  even  possi- 
ble to  hear  the  Moscow  Metro  rumbling 
past,  ever  so  faintly,  deep  in  the  earth 
below. 


21 


Senate  Minority  Leader  Robert  Dole  and  Mrs.  Reagan  with  General  Secretary 
Gorbachev  during  a  state  dinner  at  Spaso  House. 


Mr.  General  Secretary,  we  know 
that  on  matters  of  great  importance,  we 
will  continue  to  differ  profoundly.  And 
yet,  you  and  I  have  met  four  times  now, 
more  often  than  any  previous  president 
and  general  secretary.  While  our  discus- 
sions have  sometimes  been  pointed  or 
contentious,  we  possess  an  enlarged  un- 
derstanding of  each  other  and  of  each 
other's  country.  On  specific  matters  of 
policy,  we  have  made  progress — often 
historic  progress.  And  perhaps  most  im- 
portant, we  have  commited  our  nations 
to  continuing  to  work  together,  agi-eeing 
that  silence  must  never  again  be  permit- 
ted to  fall  between  us. 

We  have  agreed  always  to  continue 
the  interchanges  between  our  nations  be- 
cause, I  believe,  we  both  hear  the  same 
voice,  the  same  overwhelming  impera- 
tive. What  that  voice  says  can  be  e.\- 
pressed  in  many  ways.  But  I  have  found 
it  in  vivid  form  in  Pasternak's  poem, 
"The  Garden  of  Gethsemane."  Listen,  if 
you  will,  to  Pasternak's  account  of  that 
famous  arrest: 

There  appeared — no  one  knew  from 
where — a  crowd  of  slaves  and  a  rabble  of 
knaves,  with  lights  and  swords  and,  leading 
them,  Judas  with  a  traitor's  kiss  on  his  lips. 


Peter  repulsed  the  ruffians  with  his 
sword,  and  cut  off  the  ear  of  one  of  them.  But 
he  heard:  "You  cannot  decide  a  dispute  with 
weapons;  put  your  sword  in  its  place,  0  man." 

That's  the  voice:  "Put  your  sword  in 
its  place,  0  man."  This  is  the  impera- 
tive, the  command.  And  so  we  will  work 
together,  that  we  might  forever  keep  our 
swords  at  our  sides. 

Spaso  House  has,  as  I  said,  seen 
quiet  times — yet  the  animated  conversa- 
tion of  this  evening  has  already  done 
much  to  make  up  for  them.  And  so,  I 
would  like  to  raise  a  glass  to  the  contin- 
ued interchange  between  our  two  nations 
and,  if  I  may,  to  Spaso  House  itself,  as  a 
symbol  of  our  relations.  May  this  lovely 
home  never  lack  for  visitors,  and  shared 
meals,  and  the  sounds  of  spirited  conver- 
sation, and  even  the  peal  of  hearty  laugh- 
ter. 

Thank  you  and  God  bless  you.  And 
to  the  General  Secretary,  to  Mrs.  Gor- 
bachev, to  the  relationship  that  I  beheve 
must  continue. 

General  Secretary  Gorbachev  ^ 

I  thank  you,  Mr.  President  for  the  words 
of  greeting  you  just  addressed  to  us. 


Two  gi'eat  nations  have  given  the  two  o 
us  a  mandate  to  determine  what  Soviet' 
American  relations  should  be  like.  Since' 
our  first  meeting  in  Geneva,  relations  I ' 
tween  our  two  countries  have  overcomt " 
a  long  drawn  out  period  of  confrontatioi ) 
to  reach  an  acceptable  level  from  which  I 
it  is  now  easier  to  move  forward.  In 
Reykjavik,  in  Washington,  and  in  this 
present  visit  of  yours,  our  dialogue  has 
been  intense.  Its  most  important  result 
has  been  the  now  ratified  first  treaty  t( 
reduce  nuclear  weapons.  A  search  is  ci 
tinuing  to  find  a  solution  to  problems  n 
lating  to  50%  cuts  in  strategic  offensive  , 
arms.  The  general  accord  in  Afghanists 
has  come  into  force.  We  now  have  as 
many  as  47  bilateral  agreements  on  cO' 
eration.  The  visit  by  a  President  of  the 
United  States  to  the  Soviet  Union  is  ar 
occasion  for  a  glance  at  the  past  and  a 
look  into  the  future.  The  history  of  rek 
tions  between  our  two  countries  has 
known  all  kinds  of  things,  good  and  ba( 
Of  the  good  things,  we  remember  parti 
larly  well  the  Soviet-American  comra 
ship  in  arms  in  World  War  II.  Those 
ginm  years  saw  the  emergence  of  the 
first  shoots  of  Soviet-American  friend- 
ship. And  there  was  not  one  single  So- 
viet citizen  who  did  not  feel  bitter  whe 
that  glorious  page  in  the  history  of  our 
lations  gave  way  to  cold  war.  That  was 
hard  test  of  our  peoples.  The  world  foi 
itself  in  a  dangerous  situation.  We  all : 
the  breath  of  impending  catastrophe. 
Even  today,  we're  sometimes  chilled  b 
cold  winds. 

But  world  developments  in  their 
main  tendency  are  turning  toward  a 
search  for  political  solutions,  toward  cc 
operation  and  peace.  We  are,  all  of  us, 
witnesses  to  momentous  changes,  thoi 
a  lot  still  has  to  be  done  to  achieve  ir- 
reversible change.  Although  everythin 
urges  cooperation  and  trust,  prejudice; 
and  stereotypes  are  still  with  us,  as  is 
valry,  above  all  in  the  military  sphere, 
great  deal  has  been  said  at  this  meetinj 
too,  about  how  pointless  and  catastrop 
it  is.  More  importantly,  we  can  registe 
some  headway  toward  better  mutual  u 
derstanding  in  this  area  as  well. 

Tbday,  I  would  hke  to  address  an- 
other major  world  problem:  the  situatii 


0. 


FEATURE 
Moscow  Summit 


I'  developing  world,  which  cannot 
itTect  our  countries,  too.  The  prob- 

•  «  hich  the  developing  countries  face 
^ '  turned  out  to  be  difficult  to  the 

it  I  if  tragedy.  Glaring  backwardness, 
.  ;tr,  poverty,  and  mass  diseases  con- 
; ,'  t(i  beset  entire  nations.  An  incred- 
hitrh  debt  has  become  an  excruciat- 
.;  md  universal  problem.  It  would 

I  that  everybody  could  see  its  com- 

-  it\-,  involving  as  it  does  extremely  di- 

•  (■  and  truly  vital  interests,  and  un- 
taiid  that  a  way  out  must  be  solved. 
We  believe  that  if  the  international 
iiiinity  and,  above  all,  the  great  pow- 
iii'  to  be  of  any  help,  the  starting 

t  and  the  essential  thing  is  to  recog- 
uiiconditionally  the  freedom  of 
r.  We  are  insisting  on  fairness.  We 
.  ■  seriously  studied  the  economic  sys- 
iii  developing  nations,  and  I  am  con- 
■d  that  a  way  out  is  possible  along 
lies  of  a  radical  restructuring  of  the 
II  e  system  of  world  economic  rela- 
i<  ^,  without  any  discrimination  for  po- 
t  il  reasons.  This  would  promote  a  po- 
ll settlement  of  regional  conflicts 

II  not  only  impede  progress  in  that 
nithe  world  but  also  cause  turmoil 
!■  entire  world  situation.  With  such 
p|ii-(iach,  our  differences  as  to  what 

!    nf  a  future  awaits  the  Third  World 
'Id  not  take  on  confrontational  forms, 
.n  this  matter  too,  our  relationship  is 
ned  to  have  an  international  dimen- 

Tlirning  now  to  our  bilateral  rela- 
s,  we  envision  there  opportunities 
prospects  primarily  in  light  of  inter- 
2volution  in  both  countries,  but  also 
le  conte.xt  of  world  developments. 
ly  Americans  who  are  studying  us 
who  have  visited  the  U.S.S.R. — and 
,  I  hope,  those  present  here  as 
— have  been  able  to  see  for  them- 
es the  sweeping  scope  of  change  in 
country.  It  is  based  on  comprehen- 
democratization  and  radical  eco- 
lic  reform. 

I'm  gratified  to  note  that  today  the 
sident  and  I  have  had  an  indepth  ex- 
^ge  of  views  on  this  subject.  We  have 
discussed  our  perestroika  a  number 
imes  vrith  other  Americans.  This  is  all 
he  good.  It,  too,  is  a  sign  of  a  change 
ur  relationship. 


We,  for  our  part,  are  trying  to 
closely  follow  the  profound  trends  in  the 
United  States.  We  see  how  little  similar- 
ity there  is  between  what  is  happening  in 
our  country  and  in  yours,  in  two  very  dif- 
ferent societies  based  on  different  val- 
ues. But  we  do  not  regard  this  as  an  ob- 
stacle to  identifying  promising  areas  for 
mutually  beneficial  ties  or  for  coopera- 
tion in  the  interests  of  the  two  peoples. 
We're  in  favor  of  competition  and  com- 
parison. 

And  another  thing,  whatever  the 
ups  and  downs  of  our  dialogue  with 
America,  Soviet  representatives  have 
been  upholding  the  interests  of  the  So- 
viet state.  In  their  contacts  with  us, 
American  officials  have  been  acting  in  ex- 
actly the  same  way,  vis-a-vis  their  own 
interests.  The  truth  is  that,  in  building 
their  relationship,  the  Soviet  Union  and 
the  United  States  can  effectively  serve 
their  own  interests  only  if  they  have  a  re- 
alistic view  and  take  account  of  each 
other's  interests  and  intentions.  We 
must  learn  the  difficult  art  of  not  just  ex- 
isting side  by  side,  but  of  building 
bridges  of  mutually  beneficial  coopera- 
tion. 

Soviet  and  American  people  want  to 
live  in  peace  and  communicate  in  all 
areas  in  which  they  have  a  mutual  in- 
terest. The  interest  is  there,  and  it  is 
growing.  We  feel  no  fear.  We  are  not 
prejudiced.  We  believe  in  the  value  of 
communication.  I  see  a  future  in  which 
the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United  States 
base  their  relations  on  disarmament,  a 
balance  of  interest,  and  comprehensive 
cooperation  rather  than  deterring  each 
other  or  upgrading  their  military  capabili- 
ties. 

I  see  a  future  in  which  solutions  to 
real  problems  are  not  impeded  by  prob- 
lems historically  outdated  or  artificially 
kept  alive,  inherited  from  the  times  of 
the  cold  war,  and  in  which  the  policies  of 
confrontation  give  way  to  a  joint  quest 
based  on  reason,  mutual  benefit,  and 
readiness  to  compromise. 

I  see  a  future  in  which  our  two  coun- 
tries, without  claiming  any  special  rights 
in  the  world,  are  always  mindful  of  their 
special  responsibility  in  a  community  of 
equal  nations.  It'll  be  a  world  that  is 
safer  and  more  secure,  which  is  so  badly 


needed  by  all  people  on  earth — by  their 
children  and  grandchildren — so  that  they 
could  gain  and  preserve  the  basic  human 
rights:  the  right  to  life,  work,  freedom, 
and  the  pursuit  of  happiness.  The  path  to- 
ward this  future  can  be  neither  easy  nor 
short.  We  may  be  standing  at  the  thresh- 
old of  a  uniquely  interesting  period  in  the 
history  of  our  two  nations.  This  new 
meeting  between  the  two  of  us,  Mr. 
President,  confirms  that  3  years  ago  in 
Geneva,  we  took  the  right  decision. 
May  the  years  to  come  bring  a 
healthier  international  environment. 
May  life  be  triumphant.  Tb  the  very  good 
health  of  the  President,  to  the  very  good 
health  of  Mrs.  Nancy  Reagan,  to  coopera- 
tion between  our  two  peoples. 


EXCHANGE  OF  INF  TREATY 

DOCUMENTS, 
THE  KREMLIN, 
MOSCOW, 
JUNE  1,  1988« 

General  Secretary  Gorbachev  * 

We  are  approaching  the  end  of  the  meet- 
ing between  the  leaders  of  the  Soviet 
Union  and  the  United  States  of  America, 
the  fourth  such  meeting  in  3  years.  The 
visit  of  the  U.S.  President  to  our  country 
is  drawing  to  a  close. 

The  President  and  I  have  summed 
up  the  results  of  a  dialogue  between  our 
two  countries  at  the  highest  level.  We 
have  discussed  both  the  immediate  and 
longer  term  prospects  for  Soviet-U.S.  re- 
lations. We  have  signed  documents 
which  record  what  has  been  achieved  and 
provide  guidelines  for  the  future.  Among 
them,  a  historic  place  will  belong  to  the 
ratification  documents  which  give  effect 
to  the  treaty  on  intermediate  and  shorter 
range  missiles.  The  exchange  a  few  min- 
utes ago  of  the  instruments  of  ratifica- 
tion means  that  the  era  of  nuclear  disar- 
mament has  begun. 

Assessing  the  work  done  over  these 
past  few  days,  we  can  say  our  satisfac- 
tion, say  that  what  has  been  happening 
these  days  in  Moscow  is  big  politics,  poli- 
tics that  affect  the  interests  of  millions 
and  millions  of  people.  Each  such  meet- 
ing dealt  a  blow  at  the  foundations  of  the 


Itartment  of  State  Biilletin/Auaust  laflB 


_23_ 


President  Reattan  and  General  Secretary  Gorbachev  sign  and  exchange 
instruments  of  ratification  for  the  INF  Treatv. 


(White  House  photos  by  Bill  Fitz-Patrick). 


cold  war.  Each  of  them  made  huge 
breaches  in  the  cold  war  fortress  and 
opened  up  passages  to  modern,  civiliz 
world  politics  worthy  of  the  truly  nev 
times. 

But  big  politics  means  difficult  pi 
tics  in  which  every  step  is  not  easy  tc 
take.  Weighing  carefully  each  one  of  ( 
new  steps,  we  measure  it  against  the 
curity  interests  of  our  two  nations  an 
the  world  as  a  whole,  for  that  is  the  c 
way  to  achieve  truly  substantial  resu 
with  the  necessary  margin  of  viabilit; 
Big  politics  also  means  big  responsib 
and  so  it  cannot  be  built  on  pursuing 
one's  own  interest,  which  is  always  ii 
ently  one-sided.  Such  politics  also  m 
great  idea.  Humankind  has  conceivec 
that  idea  in  the  pangs  of  wars  and  dis 
ters,  tragedies  and  calamities,  strivii 
and  discoveries  of  the  20th  century. 
This,  in  our  view,  is  the  idea  of  a  nu- 
clear-free and  nonviolent  world.  It  is 
that  idea  that  is  inscribed  in  the  mar 
which  the  Soviet  people  give  to  their 
resentatives  at  the  start  of  any  negol' 
tions.  This  particularly  applies  to  ou^ 
gotiations  with  the  United  States  of 
America. 

Addressing  the  Soviet  people  an 
the  Americans,  addressing  all  nation, 
from  these  hallowed  steps  of  the  Mo&< 
Kremlin,  I  hearby  declare  we  have  b- 
working  honestly  and  with  persever 
and  we  shall  continue  to  do  so  to  fujfi 
that  historic  mandate. 

The  first  lines  have  already  beer 
wTitten  into  the  book  of  a  world  with 
wars,  violence,  or  nuclear  weapons, 
lieve  that  no  one  can  now  close  that  1: 
and  put  it  aside.  President  Ronald  R' 
gan  and  I  have  agreed  that  the  imme 
ate  task  before  us,  which  is  to  conclu 
treaty  on  a  50%  reduction  in  strateg 
fensive  arms,  can  and  must  be  accom 
plished.  In  our  joint  endeavors  and  di 
cussions,  we  have  learned  to  underst 
each  other  better,  to  take  into  accouii 
each  other's  concerns,  and  to  search 
solutions. 

The  atmosphere  in  our  relations 
improving.  We're  working  to  make  it 
constant,  not  only  in  our  official  cont 
but  also  in  the  day-to-day  manageme 
of  Soviet-U.S.  relations.  In  this,  too,, 
are  guided  by  a  mandate  from  our  pe 
pies. 


24 


Denartment  of  State  Bulletin/Auaust  k 


FEATURE 
Moscow  Summit 


Thanks  to  the  atmosphere  of  the 
uim's  in  Washington  and  in  Moscow, 
a  result  of  the  agreements 
'  I ,  Americans  and  Soviet  people 
nave  more  opportunities  for  commu- 
i;  lull  and  for  getting  to  know  each 
jr.  I'm  convinced  that  scientists,  stu- 
ts,  schoolchildren,  cultural  personali- 
,  ordinary  tourists,  athletes,  and  of 
rse,  businessmen  will  continue  to  en- 
:e  and  add  new  colors  to  the  fabric  of 
perative  and  even  friendly  relations, 
netimes,  they  can  do  that  better  than 
tticians. 

Historians  who  will  one  day  describe 
evaluate  what  is  now  being  done 
e  probably  not  yet  been  born.  But 
f  ry  day,  babies  are  being  born  who 
«  live  in  the  21st  century  and  to  whom 
must  bequeath  a  safe  and  humane 

.V  -Id. 

I  On  behalf  of  the  Soviet  leadership 
I  the  Soviet  people,  I  wish  to  tell  all 
Ise  who  are  concerned,  and  yet  hopeful 
t  ut  the  future,  we  shall  work  to 

ieve  that  goal,  and  we  can  only  do  it 

working  together. 

«sident  Reagan 

ise  are  historic  moments.  As  we  ex- 
V  «  nge  these  documents,  the  instru- 

.:lnts  of  ratification,  this  treaty — the 
ms  of  which  we  formally  agreed  to 
;  December  in  Washington — enters 
D  force. 

Mr.  General  Secretary,  you  know 
.t  our  way  here  has  not  been  easy.  At 
icial  moments  your  personal  interven- 
a  was  needed  and  proved  decisive,  and 
this  we  are  grateful.  So  you  are 
iare  of  how  important  the  objective  not 
t  of  arms  control  but  of  arms  reduc- 

.j  n  has  been  to  my  own  thinking,  and  to 
policy  of  my  Administration  since  its 

l  tset. 

Seven  years  ago,  when  I  first  sug- 

iiiJsted  the  concept  of  a  double-zero 

4l  saty,  there  were  those  who  said  that 
.s  was  so  unrealistic  an  idea  that  it  was 
esponsible  to  even  propose  it.  Others 

il  nply  dismissed  the  concept  as  a  propa- 
nda  ploy  or  a  geopolitical  gambit.  But 
epticism  and  doubt  bring  a  barren  har- 
st.  And  today,  on  this  table  before  us, 

^ ;  see  the  fruits  of  hope — evidence  of 


what  candor  and  realism  can  accomplish. 
We  have  dared  to  hope,  and  we  have 
been  rewarded. 

For  the  first  time  in  history,  an  en- 
tire class  of  U.S. -Soviet  nuclear  missiles 
is  ehminated.  In  addition,  this  treaty  pro- 
vides for  the  most  stringent  verification 
in  history.  And  for  the  first  time,  inspec- 
tion teams  are  actually  in  residence  in 
our  respective  countries.  And  while  this 
treaty  makes  possible  a  new  dimension 
of  cooperation  between  us,  much  remains 
on  our  agenda.  We  must  not  stop  here, 
Mr.  General  Secretary;  there  is  much 
more  to  be  done. 

As  will  be  seen  in  our  joint  state- 
ment later  today,  more  progress  has 
been  made  toward  a  strategic  arms 
treaty  during  our  meetings.  We  must  try 
to  move  forward  in  the  months  ahead  to 
complete  this  START  treaty  as  soon  as 
possible.  So  let  us  continue  to  expand  the 
frontiers  of  trust,  even  as  we  verify,  Mr. 
General  Secretary,  even  as  we  verify. 

We've  agreed  many  times  that  there 
remain  differences,  important  fundamen- 
tal differences,  between  us.  Yet  as  we 
work  over  the  long  run  to  narrow  these 
differences,  as  we  work  for  what  I  hope 
will  be  a  new  era  of  peace  and  expanded 
human  freedom,  we  must  also  acknowl- 
edge our  solemn  responsibility  to  take 
steps  now  to  reduce  the  chances  of  con- 
flict and  to  prevent  war.  This  we  have 
done  today,  a  first  step  toward  a 
brighter  future,  a  safer  world.  America's 
allies  and  friends  welcome  this  treaty 
too.  We  consulted  them  fully  during  its 
negotiations.  We  made  clear  that  we 
would  never  put  their  security  or  their  in- 
terests at  risk,  that  on  the  contrary  we 
would  sign  a  treaty  only  if  it  enhanced 
their  security,  as  this  one  does. 

And  finally,  if  I  may,  I  would  like  to 
take  a  moment  to  thank  the  U.S.  Senate 
for  their  work  on  this  treaty.  The  way  of 
democracy  is  sometimes  a  complicated 
way  and  sometimes  trying,  but  it  is  a 
good  way,  and  we  believe  the  best  way. 

And  once  again,  Mr.  General  Secre- 
tary, I  want  to  extend  to  you  and  to  all 
those  who  labored  so  hard  for  this  mo- 
ment, my  warmest  personal  thanks. 


JOINT  STATEMENT, 

MOSCOW, 

JUNE  1,  19882 

In  accordance  with  the  understanding 
reached  during  the  U.S. -Soviet  summit 
meeting  in  Geneva  in  November  1985, 
and  confirmed  at  the  Washington  summit 
in  December  1987,  Ronald  W  Reagan, 
President  of  the  United  States  of  Amer- 
ica, and  Mikhail  S.  Gorbachev,  General 
Secretary  of  the  Central  Committee  of 
the  Communist  Party  of  the  Soviet  Union 
(CPSU),  met  in  Moscow  May  29-June  2, 
1988. 

Attending  on  the  U.S.  side  were 
Secretary  of  State  George  P.  Shultz; 
Secretary  of  Defense  Frank  C.  Carlucci, 
III;  presidential  Chief  of  Staff  Howard  H. 
Baker,  Jr.;  assistant  to  the  President  for 
national  security  Colin  L.  Powell; 
Ambassador  at  Large  and  special  adviser 
to  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of 
State  on  arms  control  matters  Paul  H. 
Nitze;  special  adviser  to  the  President 
and  the  Secretary  of  State  on  arms 
control  matters.  Ambassador  Edward  L. 
Rowny;  Ambassador  of  the  U.S.  to  the 
U.S.S'.R.  Jack  F.  Matlock;  and  Assistant 
Secretary  of  State  for  European  and 
Canadian  Affairs  Rozanne  L.  Ridgway. 

Attending  on  the  Soviet  side  were 
Member  of  the  Politburo  of  the  CPSU 
Central  Committee,  Chairman  of  the 
Presidium  of  the  U.S.S.R.  Supreme  So- 
viet, Andrei  A.  Gromyko;  Member  of  the 
Politburo  of  the  CPSU  Central  Commit- 
tee, Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the 
U.S.S.R.  Eduard  A.  Shevardnadze; 
Member  of  the  Politburo  of  the  CPSU 
Central  Committee,  Secretary  of  the 
CPSU  Central  Committee  Alexander  N. 
Yakovlev;  Alternate  Member  of  the 
Pohtburo  of  the  CPSU  Central  Commit- 
tee, Minister  of  Defense  of  the  U.S.S.R., 
Dimitri  T.  Yazov;  Secretary  of  the  CPSU 
Central  Committee  Anatoly  F.  Dobrynin; 
Assistant  of  the  General  Secretary  of  the 
CPSU  Central  Committee  Anatoly  S. 
Chernyaev;  Deputy  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  of  the  U.S.S.R.  Alexander  A. 
Bessmertnykh;  and  Ambassador  of  the 
U.S.S.R.  to  the  United  States  of  America 
Yuri  V.  Dubinin. 


ibnartmont  nf  StatP  Riillotin/Aiiniigt  IQHB 


25 


The  President  and  the  General  Sec- 
retary view  the  Moscow  summit  as  an 
important  step  in  the  process  of  putting 
U.S. -Soviet  relations  on  a  more  produc- 
tive and  sustainable  basis.  Their  compre- 
hensive and  detailed  discussions  covered 
the  full  agenda  of  issues  to  which  the  two 
leaders  agreed  during  their  initial  meet- 
ing in  Geneva  in  November  1985 — an 
agenda  encompassing  arms  control, 
human  rights  and  humanitarian  matters, 
settlement  of  regional  conflicts,  and  bilat- 
eral relations.  Serious  differences  remain 
on  important  issues;  the  frank  dialogue 
which  has  developed  between  the  two 
countries  remains  critical  to  surmounting 
these  differences. 

The  talks  took  place  in  a  constructive 
atmosphere  which  provided  ample  oppor- 
tunity for  candid  exchange.  As  a  result, 
the  sides  achieved  a  better  understanding 
of  each  other's  positions.  The  two  leaders 
welcomed  the  progress  achieved  in  vari- 
ous areas  of  U.S. -Soviet  relations  since 
their  last  meeting  in  Washington,  not- 
withstanding the  difficulty  and  complex- 
ity of  the  issues.  They  noted  with  satis- 
faction numerous  concrete  agreements 
which  have  been  achieved,  and  expressed 
their  determination  to  redouble  efforts  in 
the  months  ahead  in  areas  where  work 
remains  to  be  done.  They  praised  the 
creative  and  intensive  efforts  made  by 
representatives  of  both  sides  in  recent 
months  to  resolve  outstanding  differ- 
ences. 

Assessing  the  state  of  U.S. -Soviet 
relations,  the  President  and  the  General 
Secretary  underscored  the  historic 
importance  of  their  meetings  in  Geneva, 
Reykjavik,  Washington,  and  Moscow  in 
laying  the  foundation  for  a  realistic  ap- 
proach to  the  problems  of  .strengthening 
stability  and  reducing  the  risk  of  conflict. 
They  reaffirmed  their  solemn  conviction 
that  a  nuclear  war  cannot  be  won  and 
must  never  be  fought,  their  determina- 
tion to  prevent  any  war  between  the 
United  States  and  Soviet  Union,  whether 
nuclear  or  conventional,  and  their  dis- 
avowal of  any  intention  to  achieve  mili- 
tary superiority. 

The  two  leaders  are  convinced  that 
the  expanding  political  dialogue  they  have 
established  represents  an  increasingly 
effective  means  of  resolving  issues  of 


mutual  interest  and  concern.  They  do  not 
minimize  the  real  differences  of  history, 
tradition,  and  ideology  which  will  con- 
tinue to  characterize  the  U.S. -Soviet 
relationship.  But  they  beheve  that  the 
dialogue  will  endui'e,  because  it  is  based 
on  realism  and  focused  on  the  achieve- 
ment of  concrete  results.  It  can  serve  as 
a  constructive  basis  for  addressing  not 
only  the  problems  of  the  present  but  of 
tomorrow  and  the  next  century.  It  is  a 
process  which  the  President  and  the 
General  Secretary  believe  serves  the  best 
interests  of  the  peoples  of  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  and  can 
contribute  to  a  more  stable,  more  peace- 
ful, and  safer  world. 

I.  Arms  Control 

The  President  and  the  General  Secre- 
tary, having  expressed  the  commitment 
of  their  two  countries  to  build  on  progress 
to  date  in  arms  control,  determined  ob- 
jectives and  next  steps  on  a  wide  range 
of  issues  in  this  area.  These  will  guide  the 
efforts  of  the  two  governments  in  the 
months  ahead  as  they  work  with  each 
other  and  with  other  states  toward  equi- 
table, verifiable  agreements  that 
strengthen  international  stabihty  and 
security. 

INF 

The  President  and  the  General  Secretary 
signed  the  protocol  on  the  exchange  of 
instruments  of  ratification  of  the  Treaty 
Between  the  United  States  of  America 
and  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Repub- 
lics on  the  Elimination  of  Their  Interme- 
diate-Range and  Shorter  Range  Missiles. 
The  two  leaders  welcomed  the  entry  into 
force  of  this  historic  agreement,  which  for 
the  first  time  will  eliminate  an  entire  class 
of  U.S.  and  Soviet  nuclear  arms,  and 
which  sets  new  standards  for  arms  con- 
trol. The  leaders  are  determined  to 
achieve  the  full  implementation  of  all  the 
provisions  and  understandings  of  the 
treaty,  viewing  joint  and  successful  work 
in  this  respect  as  an  important  precedent 
for  future  arms  control  efforts. 


Nuclear  and  Space  Talks 

The  two  leaders  noted  that  a  joint  t  i 
text  of  a  treaty  on  reduction  and  lin  i 
tion  of  strategic  offensive  arms  has  1  ^ 
elaborated.  Through  this  process,  th  ; 
sides  have  been  able  to  record  in  the. 
draft  text  extensive  and  significant  a  I 
of  agreement  and  also  to  detail  posit  i 
on  remaining  areas  of  disagreement. 
While  important  additional  work  is  1 1 
quired  before  this  treaty  is  ready  fo  j 
signature,  many  key  provisions  are   j 
corded  in  the  joint  draft  text  and  ar 
considered  to  be  agreed,  subject  to 
completion  and  ratification  of  the  tn 

Taking  into  account  a  treaty  on 
tegic  offensive  arms,  the  sides  have 
tinued  negotiations  to  achieve  a  sepi 
agreement  concerning  the  ABM  Tre 
building  on  the  language  of  the  Was 
ton  summit  joint  statement  dated  De 
ber  10,  1987.  Progress  was  noted  ir 
preparing  the  joint  draft  text  of  an 
associated  protocol.  In  connection  w 
their  obligations  under  the  protocol 
sides  have  agreed  in  particular  to  us 
Nuclear  Risk  Reduction  Centers  foi 
transmission  of  relevant  information 
leaders  directed  their  negotiators  to 
pare  the  joint  draft  text  of  a  separf 
agreement  and  to  continue  work  on 
associated  protocol. 

The  joint  draft  treaty  on  reduc 
and  hmitation  of  strategic  offensive 
reflects  the  earlier  understanding  o 
tablishing  ceilings  of  no  more  than 
strategic  offensive  dehvery  system; 
6,000  warheads  as  well  as  agreeme 
subceilings  of  4,900  on  the  aggregat 
ICBM  [intercontinental  baUistic  mi 
and  SLBM  [submarine-launched  ba 
missile]  warheads  and  1,540  warhea 
154  heavy  missiles. 

The  draft  treaty  also  records  tl 
sides'  agreement  that  as  a  result  of 
reductions  the  aggregate  throw-wei 
of  the  Soviet  Union's  ICBMs  and  SI 
will  be  reduced  to  a  level  approxin- 
50%  below  the  existing  level  and  this 
will  not  be  e.xceeded. 

During  the  negotiations  the  two 
have  also  achieved  understanding  th 
future  work  on  the  treaty  they  will  a 
the  understanding  that  on  deployed 
ICBMs  and  SLBMs  of  existing  type 
counting  rule  will  include  the  numt 


26 


Deoartment  of  State  Bullelin/Auoust: 


FEATURE 
Moscow  Summit 


wheads  refen-ed  to  in  the  joint  state- 

Sit  of  December  10,  1987,  and  the 
iber  of  warheads  which  will  be  attrib- 

i|ll  to  each  new  type  of  ballistic  missile 

•  be  subject  to  negotiation. 

In  addition,  the  sides  agreed  on  a 
iting  rule  for  heavy  bomber  arma- 
its  according  to  which  heavy  bombers 
ipped  only  for  nuclear  gravity  bombs 
SRAMs  [short-range  attack  missiles] 
count  as  one  delivery  vehicle  against 
1,600  limit  and  one  warhead  against 
6,000  limit. 

The  delegations  have  also  prepared 
t  draft  te.xts  of  an  inspection  protocol, 
inversion  or  elimination  protocol,  and 
emorandum  of  understanding  on  data, 
ch  are  integral  parts  of  the  treaty, 
se  documents  build  on  the  verification 
dsions  of  the  INF  Treaty,  extending 
elaborating  them  as  necessary  to 
!t  the  more  demanding  requirements 

I'.TART  The  START  verification 
isures  will,  at  a  minimum,  include: 

A.  Data  exchanges,  to  include  dec- 
.tions  and  appropriate  notifications  on 
number  and  locations  of  weapons 

;ems  limited  by  START,  including 

ftions  and  facilities  for  production, 
1  assembly,  storage,  testing,  repair, 
'ning,  deployment,  conversion,  and 
lination  of  such  systems.  Such  decla- 
ons  will  be  exchanged  between  the 
;s  before  the  treaty  is  signed  and 
lated  periodically. 

B.  Baseline  inspections  to  verify  the 
uracy  of  these  declarations. 

C.  Onsite  observation  of  elimination 
strategic  systems  necessary  to  meet 

agi'eed  limits. 

D.  Continuous  onsite  monitoring  of 
perimeter  and  portals  of  critical  pro- 

;tion  facilities  to  confirm  the  output  of 
apons  to  be  limited. 

E.  Short-notice  onsite  inspection  of: 

(i)  Declared  locations  during  the 
i)cess  of  reducing  to  agreed  limits; 
fli|    (ii)  Locations  where  systems  covered 
this  treaty  remain  after  achieving  the 
reed  limits;  and 

(iii)  Locations  where  such  systems 
|ve  been  located  (formerly  declared 
ilities). 


F.  Short-notice  inspection,  in  ac- 
cordance with  agreed  upon  procedures,  of 
locations  where  either  side  considers  cov- 
ert deployment,  production,  storage,  or 
repair  of  strategic  offensive  arms  could  be 
occurring. 

G.  Prohibition  of  the  use  of  conceal- 
ment or  other  activities  which  impede 
verification  by  national  technical  means. 
Such  provisions  would  include  a  ban  on 
telemetry  encryption  and  would  allow  for 
full  access  to  all  telemetric  information 
broadcast  during  missile  flight. 

H.  Procedures  that  enable  verifica- 
tion of  the  number  of  warheads  on  de- 
ployed ballistic  missiles  of  each  specific 
type,  including  onsite  inspection. 

I.  Enhanced  observation  of  activities 
related  to  reduction  and  limitation  of 
strategic  offensive  arms  by  national  tech- 
nical means.  These  would  include  open 
displays  of  treaty-limited  items  at  missile 
bases,  bomber  bases,  and  submarine 
ports  at  locations  and  times  chosen  by  the 
inspecting  party. 

The  two  sides  have  also  begun  to 
exchange  data  on  their  strategic  forces. 

During  the  course  of  this  meeting  in 
Moscow,  the  exchanges  on  START  re- 
sulted in  the  achievement  of  substantial 
additional  common  ground,  particularly  in 
the  areas  of  ALCMs  and  the  attempts  to 
develop  and  agree,  if  possible,  on  a 
solution  to  the  problem  of  verification  of 
mobile  ICBMs.  The  details  of  this  addi- 
tional common  ground  have  been  re- 
corded in  documents  exchanged  between 
the  sides.  The  delegations  in  Geneva  will 
record  these  gains  in  the  joint  draft  text 
of  the  START  treaty. 

The  sides  also  discussed  the  question 
of  limiting  long-range,  nuclear-armed 
SLCMs  [submarine-launched  cruise  mis- 
siles]. Ronald  Reagan  and  M.S.  Gor- 
bachev expressed  their  joint  confidence 
that  the  extensive  work  done  provides  the 
basis  for  concluding  the  treaty  on  re- 
duction and  limitation  of  strategic  offen- 
sive arms  which  will  promote  strategic 
stability  and  strengthen  security  not  only 
of  the  peoples  of  the  U.S.S.R.  and  the 
U.S.A.,  but  of  all  mankind. 

Guided  by  this  fundamental  agree- 
ment, the  U.S.  President  and  the  General 
Secretary  of  the  Central  Committee  of 


the  CPSU  agreed  to  continue  their  efforts 
in  this  area  energetically  and  pur- 
posefully. The  delegations  of  the  two 
countries  have  been  instructed  to  return 
to  Geneva  on  July  12,  1988.  It  has  been 
agreed  as  a  matter  of  principle  that,  once 
the  remaining  problems  are  solved  and 
the  treaty  and  its  associated  documents 
are  agreed,  they  will  be  signed  without 
delay. 

Ballistic  Missile  Launch  Notifications 

The  agreement  between  the  U.S.  and  the 
U.S.S.R.  on  notifications  of  launches  of 
intercontinental  ballistic  missiles  and 
submarine-launched  ballistic  missiles, 
signed  during  the  Moscow  summit,  is  a 
practical  new  step,  reflecting  the  desire 
of  the  sides  to  reduce  the  risk  of  outbreak 
of  nuclear  war,  in  particular  as  a  result 
of  misinterpretation,  miscalculation,  or 
accident. 

Nuclear  Tfesting 

The  leaders  reaffirmed  the  commitment 
of  the  two  sides  to  conduct  in  a  single 
forum  full-scale,  stage-by-stage  negotia- 
tions on  the  issues  relating  to  nuclear 
testing.  In  these  negotiations  the  sides  as 
the  first  step  vrill  agree  upon  effective 
verification  measures  which  will  make  it 
possible  to  ratify  the  U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
Threshold  Tfest  Ban  Treaty  (TTBT)  of 
1974  and  Peaceful  Nuclear  Explosions 
Treaty  of  1976,  and  proceed  to  negotiat- 
ing further  intermediate  limitations  on 
nuclear  testing  leading  to  the  ultimate 
objective  of  the  complete  cessation  of 
nuclear  testing  as  part  of  an  effective 
disarmament  process.  This  process, 
among  other  things,  would  pursue,  as  the 
first  priority,  the  goal  of  the  reduction  of 
nuclear  weapons  and,  ultimately,  their 
ehmination.  In  implementing  the  first 
objective  of  these  negotiations,  agree- 
ment upon  effective  verification  measures 
for  the  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Threshold  Tfest 
Ban  Treaty  of  1974,  the  sides  agreed  to 
design  and  conduct  a  joint  verification 
experiment  at  each  other's  test  sites. 

The  leaders,  therefore,  noted  with 
satisfaction  the  signing  of  the  Joint  Veri- 
fication Experiment  Agreement,  the  con- 
siderable preparation  underway  for  the 


lipartment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


27 


experiment,  and  the  positive  cooperation 
being  exhibited  in  particular  by  the  sub- 
stantial numbers  of  personnel  now  en- 
gaged in  work  at  each  other's  test  sites. 
They  also  noted  the  substantial  progress 
on  a  new  protocol  to  the  Peaceful  Nuclear 
Explosions  Treaty  and  urged  continuing 
constructive  negotiations  on  effective 
verification  measures  for  the  Threshold 
Ttest  Ban  Treaty. 

Expressing  their  conviction  that  the 
progress  achieved  so  far  forms  a  solid 
basis  for  continuing  progress  on  issues 
relating  to  nuclear  testing,  the  leaders 
instructed  their  negotiators  to  complete 
expeditiously  the  preparation  of  a  proto- 
col to  the  Peaceful  Nuclear  Explosions 
Treaty  and  to  complete  the  preparation 
of  a  protocol  to  the  Threshold  Tfest  Ban 
Treaty  as  soon  as  possible  after  the  joint 
verification  experiment  has  been  con- 
ducted and  analyzed.  They  confirmed 
their  understanding  that  verification 
measures  for  the  TTBT  will,  to  the  extent 
appropriate,  be  used  in  further  nuclear 
test  limitation  agreements  which  may 
subsequently  be  reached. 

They  also  declared  their  mutual  in- 
tention to  seek  ratification  of  both  the 
1974  and  1976  treaties  when  the  corre- 
sponding protocols  to  the  Threshold  Ttest 
Ban  Treaty  and  the  Peaceful  Nuclear 
Explosions  Treaty  are  completed  and  to 
continue  negotiations  as  agreed  in  the 
Washington  joint  summit  statement. 

Nuclear  Nonproliferation 

The  two  leaders  noted  that  this  year 
marks  the  20th  anniversary  of  the  Nu- 
clear Nonproliferation  Treaty  (NPT),  one 
of  the  most  important  international  arms 
control  agreements  with  over  130  adher- 
ents. They  reaffirmed  their  conviction 
that  universal  adherence  to  the  NPT  is 
important  to  international  peace  and  se- 
curity. They  expressed  the  hope  that  each 
state  not  a  party  to  the  treaty  will  join 
it,  or  make  an  equally  binding  com- 
mitment under  international  law  to  forego 
acquisition  of  nuclear  weapons  and  pre- 
vent nuclear  weapons  proliferation.  This 
will  enhance  the  possibility  of  progress 
toward  reducing  nuclear  armaments  and 
reduce  the  threat  of  nuclear  war. 


The  two  leaders  also  confirmed  their 
support  of  the  International  Atomic  En- 
ergy Agency,  and  agreed  that  they  would 
continue  efforts  to  further  strengthen  it. 
They  reaffirmed  the  value  of  their  regular 
consultations  on  nonproliferation  and 
agreed  that  they  should  continue. 

Nuclear  Risk  Reduction  Centers 

The  leaders  expressed  satisfaction  over 
the  activation  of  the  new  communications 
hnk  between  the  Nuclear  Risk  Reduction 
Centers  in  Moscow  and  Washington,  es- 
tabhshed  in  accordance  with  the  U.S.- 
Soviet agreement  of  September  15,  1987. 
It  was  agreed  that  the  centers  can  play 
an  important  role  in  the  context  of  a 
future  treaty  on  reducing  U.S.  and  Soviet 
strategic  nuclear  arms. 

Chemical  Weapons 

The  leaders  reviewed  the  status  of  on- 
going multilateral  negotiations  and  bilat- 
eral U.S. -Soviet  consultations  toward  a 
comprehensive,  effectively  verifiable, 
and  truly  global  ban  on  chemical  weapons 
(CWs),  encompassing  all  chemical  weap- 
ons-capable states.  They  also  expressed 
concern  over  the  grovring  problem  of 
chemical  weapons  proliferation  and  use. 

The  leaders  reaffirmed  the  impor- 
tance of  efforts  to  address,  as  a  matter 
of  continuing  urgency,  the  unique  chal- 
lenges of  a  chemical  weapons  ban  and  to 
achieve  an  effective  convention.  While 
noting  the  progress  already  achieved  in 
the  talks  and  the  difficult  problems  with 
regard  to  effective  monitoring  of  the 
global  prohibition  of  chemical  weapons 
and  the  non-use  of  dual-capable  chemi- 
cals for  chemical  weapons  purposes,  the 
leaders  underlined  the  need  for  concrete 
solutions  to  the  problems  of  ensuring 
effective  verification  and  undiminished 
security  for  all  convention  participants. 
They  gave  instructions  to  their  respective 
delegations  to  this  effect. 

Both  sides  agreed  on  the  vital  impor- 
tance of  greater  openness  by  all  states  as 
a  way  to  build  confidence  and  strengthen 
the  foundation  for  an  effective  conven- 
tion. The  leaders  also  emphasized  the 
necessity  of  close  coordination  on  a 
multilateral  basis  in  order  to  ensure  the 


participation  of  all  CW-possessing  anc  i 
CW-capable  states  in  the  convention,  n 
Both  sides  strongly  condemned  tl 
dangerous  spread  and  illegal  use  of 
chemical  weapons  in  violation  of  the  1 1 
Geneva  protocol.  They  stressed  the  iif 
portance  of  both  technical  and  politic; 
solutions  to  this  problem  and  confirm 
their  support  for  international  investi  I 
tions  of  suspected  violations.  Noting  | 
initial  efforts  being  made  to  control  t 
export  of  chemicals  used  in  manufact 
ing  chemical  weapons,  the  leaders  ca 
on  all  nations  vrith  the  capability  of 
producing  such  chemicals  to  institute 
stringent  export  controls  to  inhibit  th 
proliferation  of  chemical  weapons. 

Conventional  Arms  Control 

The  leaders  emphasized  the  important 
of  strengthening  stability  and  securit; 
the  whole  of  Europe.  They  welcomed 
progress  to  date  on  development  of  a 
mandate  for  new  negotiations  on  armu 
forces  and  conventional  armaments.  T' 
expressed  their  hope  for  an  early  anc 
balanced  conclusion  to  the  Vienna  CS 
folio woip  meeting.  The  President  and 
General  Secretary  also  noted  that  ful 
implementation  of  the  provisions  of  tl 
document  of  the  Stockholm  Conferenct 
Confidence-  and  Security-Building 
Measures  and  Disarmament  in  Europ 
can  significantly  increase  openness  an 
mutual  confidence. 

They  also  discussed  the  situatioi 
the  mutual  and  balanced  force  reducl 
(MBFR)  negotiations  in  Vienna. 

Conference  on  Security 
and  Cooperation  in  Europe 

They  expressed  their  commitment  to 
further  development  of  the  CSCE  pi 
ess.  The  U.S.  and  U.S.S.R.  will  contii 
to  work  with  the  other  33  participants 
bring  the  Vienna  CSCE  followup  meet 
to  a  successful  conclusion  through  sig 
nificant  results  in  all  the  principal  ar 
of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  and  Madrid 
concluding  document. 


28 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/August  ia 


FEATURE 
Moscow  Summit 


igistic  Missile  Tfechnology 
^  iferation 

leaders  agreed  to  bilateral  discus- 
-  at  the  level  of  experts  on  the 
l(  111  of  proliferation  of  ballistic  mis- 
!( ihnology. 

id  Special  Session  of  the 
Mieneral  Assembly 

'•■  I'li-sident  and  the  General  Secretary 
111  t  he  importance  of  the  ongoing  Third 
lal  Session  on  Disarmament. 


I  li  MAN  Rights 

^    Hr.VlANITARlAN  CONCERNS 

'resident  and  the  General  Secretary 
I  in  a  detailed  discussion  of  human 
and  humanitarian  concerns.  The 
,   IS  reviewed  the  increasingly  broad 
detailed  U.S. -Soviet  dialogue  in  this 
11(1  agreed  that  it  should  be  con- 
at  all  levels  in  order  to  achieve 
I'd,  concrete  progress.  They  noted 
IS  dialogue  should  seek  to  maximize 
anee  of  the  rights,  freedoms,  and 
.1  an  dignity  of  individuals;  promotion 
)f  leople-to-people  communications  and 
'  ts:  active  sharing  of  spiritual,  cul- 
iiistorical,  and  other  values;  and 
1-  mutual  understanding  and  re- 
;  I  between  the  two  countries.  Toward 

(11(1,  they  discussed  the  possible 
^  lilishment  of  a  forum  which,  meeting 
■(:  ilarly,  would  bring  together  partici- 

II  s  from  across  the  range  of  their  two 
.1  ics.  They  noted  steps  already  taken 

'  stablish  the  exchange  of  information 
II  contacts  between  legislative  bodies  of 
K 1  countries,  as  well  as  discussions 
■    en  legal  experts,  physicians  and 

ciitatives  of  other  professions  di- 
!,  involved  in  matters  pertaining  to 
lan  rights,  and  between  representa- 
s  of  nongovernmental  organizations. 


Regional  Issues 

President  and  the  General  Secretary 
roughly  discussed  a  wide  range  of 
ional  questions,  including  the  Middle 


East,  the  Iran-Iraq  war,  southern  Africa, 
the  Horn  of  Africa,  Central  America, 
Cambodia,  the  Korean  Peninsula,  and 
other  issues.  They  expressed  satisfaction 
with  the  April  1988  conclusion  in  Geneva 
of  accords  on  an  Afghanistan  settlement. 
Although  the  discussions  revealed  serious 
differences  both  in  the  assessment  of  the 
causes  of  regional  tensions  and  in  the 
means  to  overcome  them,  the  leaders 
agreed  that  these  differences  need  not  be 
an  obstacle  to  constructive  interaction 
between  the  U.S.  and  U.S.S.R. 

They  reaffirmed  their  intention  to 
continue  U.S. -Soviet  discussions  at  all 
levels  aimed  at  helping  parties  to  regional 
conflicts  find  peaceful  solutions  which 
advance  their  independence,  freedom, 
and  security.  They  emphasized  the 
importance  of  enhancing  the  capacity  of 
the  United  Nations  and  other  interna- 
tional institutions  to  contribute  to  the 
resolution  of  regional  conflicts. 


IV.  BiL.\TERAL  Affairs 

The  President  and  the  General  Secretary 
reviewed  progress  in  further  expanding 
bilateral  contacts,  exchanges,  and  coop- 
eration since  their  meeting  in  Washing- 
ton, D.C.,  in  December  1987.  They  noted 
the  increasingly  important  role  that  mu- 
tually beneficial  interchange  between  the 
two  countries  can  play  in  improving 
mutual  understanding  and  providing 
stability  in  the  U.S.-Soviet  relationship. 
They  stated  their  intention  to  intensify 
such  ties. 

They  noted  with  particular  satisfac- 
tion that  concrete  agreements  had  been 
reached  in  most  of  the  areas  identified  at 
their  meetings  in  Geneva,  Reykjavik,  and 
Washington. 

Bilateral  A^eements 
and  Cooperative  Activities 

The  President  and  the  General  Secretary 
welcomed  the  conclusion  of  a  number  of 
bilateral  agreements  which  open  new 
opportunities  for  fruitful  cooperation  in 
the  following  fields:  cooperation  in 
transportation  science  and  technology; 
maritime  search  and  rescue;  operational 
coordination  between  U.S.  and  Soviet 
radionavigation  systems  in  the  Northern 


artment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


Pacific  and  Bering  Sea;  and  mutual  fish- 
eries relations. 

The  two  leaders  welcomed  the  recent 
signing  of  a  new  Memorandum  on  Civihan 
Nuclear  Reactor  Safety  under  the  bilat- 
eral agreement  on  Peaceful  Uses  of 
Atomic  Energy.  There  was  an  exchange 
of  notes  to  extend  that  agreement. 

They  expressed  satisfaction  with  the 
recent  signing  of  a  new  protocol  under  the 
bilateral  housing  agreement  for  coop- 
eration in  construction  research  relating 
to  extreme  geological  and  unusual  cli- 
matic conditions. 

They  reviewed  the  status  of  nego- 
tiations between  the  two  countries 
concerning  maritime  shipping,  the  U.S.- 
U.S.S.R.  maritime  boundary,  basic 
scientific  research,  and  emergency  pollu- 
tion cleanup  in  the  Bering  and  Chukchi 
Seas.  They  instructed  their  negotiators  to 
accelerate  efforts  to  achieve  mutually 
acceptable  agreements  in  these  areas  at 
the  earliest  opportunity. 

The  two  leaders  welcomed  the  start 
of  bilateral  discussions  on  combatting 
narcotics  trafficking.  They  noted  vrith 
satisfaction  ongoing  consultations  be- 
tween the  two  sides  concerning  law  of  the 
sea,  air  and  sea  transportation  safety,  and 
areas  of  mutual  interest  in  the  field  of  law. 

Cultural  and  People-to-People 
Exchanges 

Noting  the  expansion  of  exchanges  in  the 
areas  of  education,  science,  culture,  and 
sports  under  the  general  exchanges 
agreement,  the  two  leaders  welcomed  the 
signing  of  a  new  implementing  program 
for  1989-91  under  the  agreement  and 
expressed  their  intention  to  continue 
expansion  of  such  exchanges.  During  the 
time  in  which  this  program  is  in  force,  the 
two  sides,  taking  into  consideration  their 
mutual  interest  as  well  as  financial  and 
technical  conditions,  will  conduct  ne- 
gotiations on  the  opening  of  culture/ 
information  centers  in  the  U.S.  and  the 
U.S.S.R.  with  the  aim  of  signing  an 
appropriate  agreement  on  behalf  of  the 
governments  of  both  countries. 

They  expressed  satisfaction  that, 
over  the  course  of  their  dialogue,  people- 
to-people  contacts  and  exchanges  be- 
tween nongovernmental  organizations 


29 


have  sigTiificantly  increased  and  become 
one  of  the  most  dynamic  elements  in  the 
bilateral  relationship.  They  reaffinried 
their  commitment  to  further  growth  of 
such  exchanges,  which  contribute  to  mu- 
tual understanding,  and  welcomed  plans 
for  increased  exchanges  of  young  people 
in  the  future.  In  this  context,  they  ex- 
pressed their  readiness  to  consider  in 
practical  terms  the  idea  of  further  devel- 
oping exchanges  of  high  school  students. 
They  cited  recent  joint  U.S. -Soviet  ini- 
tiatives on  culture,  theater,  and  the 
cinema  as  examples  of  new  opportunities 
to  engage  those  involved  in  the  creative 
arts. 

Noting  the  rapidly  growing  sports 
ties  between  the  two  countries,  includ- 
ing their  national  Olympic  committees, 
the  two  leaders  expressed  their  support 
for  the  international  Olympic  move- 
ment, which  promotes  international 
cooperation  and  understanding  through 
athletic  competition. 

Other  Cooperative  Activities 

The  President  and  the  General  Secretary 
noted  the  successful  expansion  of  scien- 
tific cooperation  within  the  framework  of 
bilateral  agreements  in  environmental 
protection,  medical  science  and  public 
health,  artificial  heart  research  and  de- 
velopment, agriculture,  and  studies  of  the 
world  ocean,  and  expressed  their  in- 
tention to  continue  to  expand  activities 
under  these  agreements  in  areas  of  mu- 
tual benefit  to  the  two  sides. 

The  President  and  the  General  Sec- 
retary noted  with  pleasure  the  com- 
mencement of  work  on  a  conceptual  de- 
sign of  an  international  thermonuclear 
experimental  reactor  (ITER),  under  the 
auspices  of  the  International  Atomic  En- 
ergy Agency,  between  scientists  and 
experts  from  the  United  States,  Soviet 
Union,  European  Atomic  Energy  Com- 
munity, and  Japan.  The  two  leaders  noted 
the  significance  of  this  next  step  toward 
the  development  of  fusion  power  as  a 
cheap,  environmentally  sound,  and  es- 
sentially inexhaustible  energy  source  for 
the  benefit  of  all  mankind. 

The  President  and  the  General  Sec- 
retary welcomed  agreement  by  represen- 
tatives of  the  United  States,  Soviet 


Union,  Canada,  and  France  to  institu- 
tionalize in  the  near  future  the  COSPAS/ 
SARSAT,  [a]  space-based,  life-saving 
global  search  and  rescue  system. 

Both  leaders  reaffirmed  their  sup- 
port for  the  WHO/UNICEF  [World 
Health  Organization/UN  Children's 
Fund]  goal  of  reducing  the  scale  of  pre- 
ventable childhood  death  through  the 
most  effective  methods  of  saving  chil- 
dren. They  urged  other  countries  and  the 
international  community  to  intensify  ef- 
forts to  achieve  this  goal. 

Global  Climate 

and  Environmental  Change  Initiative 

The  two  leaders  expressed  their  satisfac- 
tion with  activities  since  the  Washington 
summit  in  expanding  cooperation  with 
respect  to  global  climate  and  environ- 
mental change,  including  in  areas  of 
mutual  concern  relating  to  environmental 
protection,  such  as  protection  and  conser- 
vation of  stratospheric  ozone  and  a  possi- 
ble global  warming  trend.  They  empha- 
sized their  desire  to  make  more  active  use 
of  the  unique  opportunities  afforded  by 
the  space  programs  of  the  two  countries 
to  conduct  global  monitoring  of  the 
environment  and  the  ecology  of  the 
earth's  land,  oceans,  and  atmosphere. 
They  underscored  the  need  to  continue  to 
promote  both  bilateral  and  multilateral 
cooperation  in  this  important  area  in  the 
future. 

Initiative  for  Expanded 
Civil  Space  Cooperation 

Recognizing  the  long-standing  commit- 
ment of  both  countries  to  space  science 
and  exploration,  and  noting  the  progress 
made  under  the  1987  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Co- 
operative Agreement  in  the  Exploration 
and  Use  of  Outer  Space  for  Peaceful 
Purposes,  the  two  leaders  agreed  to  a 
new  initiative  to  expand  civil  space 
cooperation  by  exchanging  flight  oppor- 
tunities for  scientific  instruments  to  fly 
on  each  other's  spacecraft,  and  by  ex- 
changing results  of  independent  national 
studies  of  future  unmanned  solar  system 
exploration  missions  as  a  means  of  as- 
sessing prospects  for  further  U.S. -Soviet 
cooperation  on  such  missions.  They  also 
agreed  to  expand  exchanges  of  space 


science  data  and  of  scientists,  to  enha ; 
the  scientific  benefit  that  can  be  deri  j 
from  the  two  countries'  space  researci 
missions.  They  noted  scientific  missio 
to  the  Moon  and  Mars  as  areas  of  poss  s 
bilateral  and  international  cooperatioi 

Arctic  Contacts  and  Cooperation 

Taking  into  account  the  unique  enviil 
mental,  demographic,  and  other  chai  • 
teristics  of  the  Arctic,  the  two  leadei 
reaffirmed  their  support  for  expandec  \ 
bilateral  and  regional  contacts  and      i 
cooperation  in  this  area.  They  noted  pi  ( 
and  opportunities  for  increased  scien  i 
and  environmental  cooperation  under  , 
number  of  bilateral  agreements  as  we!  i 
within  an  International  Arctic  Scienc 
Committee  of  states  with  interests  in 
region.  They  expressed  their  support 
increased   people-to-people   contacts 
tween  the  native  peoples  of  Alaska  a 
the  Soviet  north. 

The  President  and  the  General 
retary  noted  the  positive  role  playec 
the  multilateral  Antarctic  Treaty  anc 
emphasized  the  importance  of  U.S.- 
Soviet scientific  and  environmental 
cooperation  in  that  region. 

Trade  and  Economic  Affairs 

The  two  sides  reconfirmed  their  stro 
support  for  the  expansion  of  mutuall, 
beneficial  trade  and  economic  relatioi 
and  noted  recent  activity  in  this  are. 
They  reiterated  their  behef  that  com 
mercially  viable  joint  ventures  compl 
ing  with  the  laws  and  regulations  of 
both  countries  could  play  a  role  in  t? 
further  development  of  commercial  i 
tions.  They  welcomed  the  results  of 
meeting  of  the  Joint  U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
Commercial  Commission  in  April  anc 
noted  with  satisfaction  that  working 
groups  had  been  created  under  the  c 
mission  to  further  the  establishment 
better  conditions  under  which  mutua 
advantageous  trade  can  develop.  Ta) 
note  of  the  1974  joint  statement  and 
protocol  amending  the  Long-lferm 
Agreement  Between  the  United  Stat 
of  America  and  the  Union  of  Soviet 
cialist  Repubhcs  to  Facilitate  Econo: 
Industrial,  and  Technical  Cooperatioi 
sued  at  the  conclusion  of  the  Joint  C 
mercial  Commission,  they  agreed  ths 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/August  I'i 


FEATURE 
Moscow  Summit 


t;  commission  should  continue  to  meet 
t  build  upon  the  forward  momentum 
vich  has  been  generated. 

The  two  leaders  cited  expanding 
rations  between  Aeroflot  and  PanAm 
i 'lines  under  the  government-to- 
gv'ernment  Civil  Air  Transportation 
.-reement  as  a  positive  example  of 
ritually  beneficial  cooperation. 

( nsulates  Exchanges/Diplomatic 
i  d  Consular  Missions 

'  e  President  and  the  General  Secretary 
r  iffirmed  their  agreement  to  open  Con- 
E  ates  General  in  Kiev  and  New  York  as 
5  m  as  practicable. 

The  two  leaders  discussed  questions 
1  ating  to  ensuring  adequate  and  secure 
(iditions  for  U.S.  and  Soviet  diplomatic 
i  i  consular  establishments  and  their 
I  "sonnel  in  each  other's  territory.  They 
i  'eed  on  the  need  to  approach  problems 
1  ating  to  such  matters  constructively 
i  1  on  the  basis  of  reciprocity. 


'  FiTURE  Meetings 

'  e  President  and  the  General  Secre- 
( 7,  recognizing  the  importance  of 
t;ir  personal  involvement  in  the  devel- 
( ment  of  relations  in  the  months 
oad,  instructed  Secretary  of  State 
1  ultz  and  Foreign  Minister  Shevard- 
idze  to  meet  as  necessary  and  to  re- 
jrt  to  them  on  ways  to  ensure  contin- 
id  practical  progress  across  the  full 
nge  of  issues.  Expert-level  contacts 
ill  also  continue  on  an  intensified  basis. 

F  ESroENTS  NEWS 

ONFERENCE, 

\S()  HOUSE. 
.  )SCOW. 

|NE  1,  19882 

'St,  if  just  this  one  time  I  might  speak 
all  of  you  as  well  as  myself,  I  would 
;  to  extend  my  thanks  to  General 
"  tiretary  Gorbachev,  all  of  his  associates 
the  Soviet  Government,  and  the  people 
'^Moscow  for  all  they've  done  to  make 
stay  here  a  pleasant  one  and  this 
nmit  conference  the  success  it  has 
3n. 


This  is  my  fourth  summit.  For  some 
in  our  governments  and  some  of  you  in  the 
media,  the  number  is  higher.  But  a  good 
deal  of  important  work  has  been  ac- 
complished here  in  Moscow.  And  the 
relationship  between  Mr.  Gorbachev  and 
me,  and  the  various  members  of  our 
respective  delegations,  has  continued  to 
deepen  and  improve.  But  personal 
relationships  and  hopes  for  peace  are  not 
by  themselves  enough.  I  think  history  will 
note  that  in  our  approach  to  the  summit 
process,  the  United  States  has  sought  a 
consistency  of  expression  as  well  as  pur- 
pose. While  at  every  turn  I've  tried  to 
state  our  overwhelming  desire  for  peace, 
I  have  also  tried  to  note  the  existence  of 
fundamental  differences.  And  that's  why 
it's  a  source  of  great  satisfaction  that 
those  differences,  in  part  as  a  result  of 
these  meetings,  continue  to  recede. 

In  addition,  spokesmen  for  the  Soviet 
Government  have  noted  the  change  of 
policy,  indeed,  the  profound  change  of 
policy  that  has  occurred  in  their  own 
government.  The  United  States  is  fully 
cognizant  of  this  change  and  aware  of  its 
implications.  In  noting  the  differences 
that  still  stand  between  us,  therefore,  my 
desire  has  not  been  to  sound  a  note  of 
discouragement  but  one  of  realism,  not  to 
conduct  a  tutorial  but  to  give  the  kind  of 
emphatic  testimony  to  the  truth  that, 
over  the  long  run,  removes  illusion  and 
moves  the  process  of  negotiation 
forward. 

From  our  standpoint,  this  approach 
has  borne  fruit  at  previous  meetings  and 
at  this  summit  conference.  And  here, 
permit  me  to  go  back  for  just  a  moment 
to  our  first  summit  meeting  at  Geneva. 
There  we  agreed  on  certain  fundamental 
realities  that  would  govern  our  relations: 
that  a  nuclear  war  cannot  be  won  and 
must  never  be  fought,  that  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  bear  special 
responsiblities  for  avoiding  the  risk  of 
war,  that  neither  side  should  seek  mili- 
tary superiority  over  the  other.  We  af- 
firmed our  determination  to  prevent  war, 
whether  nuclear  or  conventional,  and  our 
resolve  to  contribute  in  every  way  possi- 
ble, along  with  other  nations,  to  a  safer 
world. 


artment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


We  also  set  out  a  broad  agenda  and 
initiated  a  new  process  of  dialogue  to 
address  the  sources  of  tension  in  U.S.- 
Soviet relations.  Since  Geneva,  we  have 
achieved  through  a  sustained  effort  prog- 
ress across  this  broad  agenda.  Our  first 
discussions  here  in  Moscow  focused  on  the 
important  matter  of  human  rights,  in- 
dividual freedoms.  The  United  States 
views  human  rights  as  fundamental  to  our 
relationship  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  all 
nations.  From  the  beginning,  we've 
stressed  this  point  and  are  encouraged  by 
recent  signs  of  progress  in  the  Soviet 
Union.  I  beUeve  that  where  people  have 
the  right  to  speak,  write,  travel,  and 
worship  freely,  creative  energies  are 
released.  On  several  occasions  I've  said 
that  nations  do  not  distrust  each  other 
because  they're  armed,  they  are  armed 
because  they  distrust  each  other. 

For  the  past  3  years.  General  Secre- 
tary Gorbachev  and  I  have  worked  to 
build  a  relationship  of  greater  trust.  And 
we  both  recognize  that  one  way  to  do  that 
is  to  improve  understanding  between  our 
two  countries  through  broader  people-to- 
people  contacts.  A  series  of  agreements 
to  expand  U.S. -Soviet  bilateral  coopera- 
tion, including  cultural  exchanges,  have 
been  concluded.  We  agreed  to  expand  our 
student  exchange  programs,  with  a  goal 
of  allowing  hundreds,  and  eventually 
thousands,  of  Soviet  and  American  high 
school  students  to  study  in  each  other's 
classrooms.  For  our  relations,  academic, 
cultural,  and  other  exchanges  are  of 
greater  importance. 

'Riming  to  regional  issues,  Mr.  Gor- 
bachev and  I  agree  that  there  must  be 
peaceful  solutions  to  these  conflicts.  Our 
goal  is  to  advance  independence,  security, 
and  freedom.  The  Soviet  decision  to 
withdraw  from  Afghanistan  is  significant, 
and  we  agree  that  building  on  the  Afghan 
settlement  leads  to  an  approach  to  other 
regional  problems.  Our  discussions  also 
dealt  with  Cambodia,  Angola,  Ethiopia, 
the  Middle  East  and  the  Persian  Gulf  and 
Central  America. 

Each  of  our  summit  meetings  moved 
us  farther  toward  an  INF  Treaty,  capped 
by  today's  exchange  of  ratification  instru- 
ments, which  now  makes  it  a  reality. 
Each  meeting  has  also  moved  us  farther 
toward  meeting  the  even  greater  chal- 
lenge of  crafting  a  treaty  to  reduce  our 
strategic  nuclear  arsenals. 


31 


In  Geneva,  the  General  Secretary 
and  I  agi'eed  on  the  concept  of  50% 
reductions;  and  in  Reykjavik  on  numeri- 
cal limits  for  warheads  and  delivery 
vehicles;  in  Washington,  on  intensive 
work  to  complete  a  START  treaty,  in- 
cluding comprehensive  verification  provi- 
sions building  upon  those  in  INF.  Here 
in  Moscow,  we've  made  important  addi- 
tional strides  toward  that  objective. 
Verification  is  one  of  the  most  important 
and  most  difficult  issues  for  us,  and  I'm 
pleased  to  report  progress  in  this  area 
too. 

We've  moved  forward  in  other  areas 
as  well,  including  agreements  on  an  ex- 
periment to  improve  the  verification  of 
existing  nuclear  testing  treaties  and  on 
notification  of  strategic  ballistic  missile 
launches. 

Finally,  let  me  say  how  deeply  mov- 
ing I  have  found  my  discussions  with 
various  citizens  of  the  Soviet  Union.  The 
monks  of  Danilov,  the  dissidents  and 
refuseniks,  the  writers  and  artists,  the 
students  and  young  people  have  shown 
once  again  that  spiritual  values  are  cher- 
ished in  this  nation.  It's  my  fervent  hope 
that  those  values  will  attain  even  fuller 
expression. 

And  now,  I  will  be  happy  to  take  your 
questions. 

Q.  I  know  you've  touched  on  this, 
but  at  your  first  news  conference  in 
1981,  you  said  that  the  Soviets  lie  and 
cheat  and  pursue  their  ends  of  world 
domination.  What  has  really  changed 
your  mind?  Can  the  American  people 
really  trust  the  Russians  now?  And  I'd 
like  to  follow  up. 

A.  That  was  the  first  press  confer- 
ence that  I'd  held  since  being  elected 
President.  And  the  question  that  came 
to  me  was,  could  we  believe  the  Rus- 
sians or  would  they  lie  to  us.  And  my 
answer  at  that  time  was  not  expressing 
my  opinion.  I  said,  I  will  answer  that 
with  their  own  words.  And  then  I  cited 
some  of  the  leaders  of  the  communist 
movement  in  the  Soviet  Union  who  said 
that  the  only  immorality  was  anything 
that  slowed  the  growth  of  sociaUsm; 
and  that  there  was  no  immorality  in 
lying,  or  cheating,  or  doing  anything  of 
that  kind  as  long  as  it  advanced  the 
cause  of  socialism.  Now,  that  was  my 
answer.  So,  it  wasn't  an  opinion — I  was 


quoting  what  their  leaders  themselves, 
the  beginners  of  that  particular  sys- 
tem— said. 

Q.  That's  what  you  thought  then. 
Do  you  still  think  that,  and  can  you  now 
declare  the  cold  war  over? 

A.  I  think  right  now,  of  course,  as 
I've  said,  dovorey  no  provorey — trust 
but  verify. 

Q.  Is  that  the  atmosphere  now? 

A.  But  I  think  that  there  is  quite  a 
difference  today  in  the  leadership  and 
in  the  relationship  between  our  two 
countries.  And  we  have  held  very  pro- 
ductive meetings  that  I  think  were  pro- 
ductive for  both  sides. 

Q.  On  the  START  treaty,  what  are 
the  areas  of  progress,  and  what's  the 
specific  progress  that  you  achieved 
here?  And  why  do  you  think  that  you 
can  conclude  a  treaty  this  year  when 
Senate  leaders  are  urging  you  to  go 
slow,  and  this  summit,  with  all  its 
momentum,  wasn't  able  to  break  the 
impasse? 

A.  The  Senate  leaders  themselves 
brought  the  verification — or  the  ratifica- 
tion papers  here  that  we  just  received 
today  on  the  INF  Treaty.  It  meant 
changing  their  own  schedules  a  gi'eat 
deal  and  speeding  up  the  ratification 
process.  I  think  that  we  could  count  on 
them  to  feel  the  same  if  we  are  coming 
to  final  agreement  on  a  START  treaty. 

But  I  want  to  remind  you  of  one 
thing  that  we've  said  over  and  over 
again.  The  START  treaty  is  infinitely 
more  complex  than  the  INF  Treaty, 
and  therefore,  there  is  going  to  be  con- 
tinued negotiation  on  a  number  of 
points.  And  then  it  will  depend  on  the 
Senate  once — if  we  have  agreed  upon  a 
treaty,  it  is  their  responsibility  to  thor- 
oughly study  that  treaty  and  then  issue 
ratification  of  it  if  they  find  it 
satisfactory. 

We  can  hope.  I  would  hope  that  be- 
fore the  year  is  out  that  we  could  elimi- 
nate the  differences  that  still  exist,  but 
if  not,  I  would  hope  that  my  successor 
would  continue,  because  here  we  are 
getting  at,  I  think,  the  most  important 
reduction  that  should  take  place  in  nu- 
clear weapons.  The  most  destabilizing 
are  the  intercontinental  ballistic  mis- 
siles in  which  someone  pushes  a  button 


and  minutes  later  a  part  of  the  earth  i 
blows  up.  And  the  thing  that  I  expre  I 
my  hope  about  is  that  not  only  have  ( 
said  50%,  but  in  that  first  meeting  in  i 
Geneva,  the  General  Secretary  pro- 
posed the  idea  also  of  reducing  by  ha 
our  nuclear  missiles. 

Q.  Tb  follow  up,  could  you  go  o 
the  areas  of  progress  on  START  that ; 
achieved  here? 

A.  No,  I  don't  think  that  I  shouL  • 
go  on.  The  conversations  are  still  goi 
on,  and  there  are  things  still  being  d;  i 
cussed.  And,  as  I  say,  progress  has  j 
been  made  or  we  wouldn't  still  be  tal  j 
ing  the  way  we  are.  I 

Q.  Is  there  something  in  Soviet 
American  relations  that  you  would  ■ 
vise  your  successor  to  leave  behind,  i  j 
is  there  something  that  you  would  e:  ■ 
cially  advise  to  take  to  the  future? 

A.  Wait  a  minute.  If  I  heard  the 
entire  question — special  advice  on 
what? 

Q.  Is  there  something  in  Soviet' 
American  relations  that  you  would 
vise  your  successor  to  leave  behind, 
is  there  something  specific  that  yoi 
would  advise  him  to  take  to  the  futi 

A.  To  follow  up,  yes.  Yes.  If  the 
negotiations  and  so  forth  are  still  goi 
on,  I  will  do  everything  I  can  to  per- 
suade my  successor  to  follow  up  and 
continue  and — as  a  matter  of  fact,  I 
think  I'll  tell  him  that  he  vdll  find  th 
Russian  people  most  warm  and  hosf 
ble  and  friendly. 

Q.  Soviet  officials  have  told  us  t 
have  dossiers  on  all  of  the  dissidents 
that  some  of  those  people — in  fact, 
they've  said  that  all  those  people  are 
the  best  people  representing  Soviet  s 
ety.  How  do  you  feel  about  the  fact  1 
they  have  kept  dossiers  on  these  d» 
dents  with  whom  you  met,  and  doe 
that  contradict  your  view  that  there  h 
been  improvements  here  and  that  th 
a  more  open  society  under  Mr.  Gor 
bachev? 

A.  No,  the  figures  themselves  n 
veal  that  improvements  have  been 
made.  Some  300  people  have  been  ft 
from  imprisonment.  The  lists  that  w( 
bring  are  names  that  have  been 
brought  to  our  attention  by  relatives 
friends — their  own  relatives,  for  exas 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/August  I'l 


FEATURE 
Moscow  Summit 


p,  living  in  our  country  now — and  I 
h'e  brought  those  names  to  the  Gen- 
eil  Secretary  and  explained  the  per- 
gial  interest  that  we  have  in  them, 
./da  gi'eat  many  of  them  have  since 
l^;n  allowed  to  come  to  our  country  or 
t| other  countries  that  they  preferred, 
■h  as  Israel.  And  so,  I  think  there 
i  been  a  sizable  improvement,  and 
still  are  going  to  continue  doing 
t^it. 

'    Q.  What  about  the  fact  that  the  very 
p)ple  with  whom  you  met  have  now 
tm  investigated  by  Soviet  authorities 
si  might  be  subject  to  some  form  of 
r  aliation?  Mr.  Gorbachev  said  today 
t  it  you  no  longer  feel  that  this  is  the 
( 1  empire,  that  you  told  him  that 
1  ;hin  the  Kremlin  walls.  Doesn't  this 
c  itradict  your  new  feeling  of  optimism 
i  jut  the  Soviet  Union? 

A.  No,  because  I  say,  he  has  re- 
c  ved  the  latest  list  that  I  brought 
\  -e,  and  previous  experiences  with 
1 5 — a  great  many  of  those  people 
1  .e  been  allowed  to  come  to  our 
( in try. 

Q.  Yesterday  you  did  say  you  no 
liger  believed  the  Soviet  Union  is  an 
'  n\  empire."  You  said  that  was  an- 
( ler  time,  another  era.  What's 
( anged?  Is  it  just  Mr.  Gorbachev's 
t  :cession  to  the  general  secretaryship, 
«  have  you  yourself  changed  or  ex- 
I  nded  your  view  of  the  Soviet  Union? 
A.  No,  I  think  that  a  great  deal  of 
-  due  to  the  General  Secretary, 
i  I  have  found  different  than  previ- 
iviet  leaders  have  been,  but  that 
-  we  have  pursued  this,  we  have 
them  willing  to  enter  into  negotia- 
with  us.  And  I  think  that  enough 
i  jgress  has  been  made  that  we 
<  1  look  with  optimism  on  future 
'ffiitiations. 

Q.  I  suppose  I'm  asking  if  you  think 
jat  there's  anything  that  you  have 
'Urned,  that  you  personally  have  ex- 
inded  or  changed  your  views  because 
u've  had  an  opportunity  to  learn  more 
out  this  country  over  the  years,  and 
jjout  their  system,  so  that  you  think 
']'U  are  part  of  the  process,  or  is  it  just 
')rbachev? 

A.  A  large  part  of  it  is  Mr.  Gor- 

chev  as  a  leader,  and  I  think  there 

Sve  been  changes  here  as  they  have 


sought  to  make — well,  I  read  Peres- 
troika,  and  I  found  much  in  it  that  I 
could  agree  with. 

Q.  Mr.  Gorbachev  said  in  his  news 
conference  that  he  thought  you  could 
have  achieved  more  in  this  summit. 
Specifically,  he  went  on  to  say  that  on 
the  issue  of  the  ABM  interpretation  of 
the  treaty — said  that  you  had  gone  back 
on  your  word,  that  in  Geneva  you  had 
agreed  that  you  would  no  longer  seek 
military  superiority,  and  that  by  holding 
to  the  development  of  SDI  you  were 
seeking  superiority  in  outer  space,  and 
that,  therefore,  you  had  gone  back  on 
your  word.  Are  you  seeking  superiority 
in  outer  space?  Can  you  reach  a  START 
agreement  without  some  accommoda- 
tion on  SDI  and  the  ABM  question? 

A.  SDI,  in  my  mind — maybe  some 
of  my  people  wouldn't  agree  with  me — 
but  the  whole  thing  was  my  idea,  to 
see  if  there  could  not  be  developed  a  de- 
fensive weapon  that  would  make  it  vir- 
tually impossible  for  nuclear  missiles  to 
get  through  to  their  targets  in  another 
country.  And  from  the  very  beginning, 
I  have  said  that  if  and  when  such  a  sys- 
tem can  be  developed,  I  would  support 
the  idea  of  making  it  available  world- 
wide, because  since  we  all  know  how  to 
make  nuclear  missiles,  sometime  there 
could  be  a  madman  come  along,  as  a 
Hitler  came  along,  who  could  then 
make  those  missiles,  but  that  my  idea 
would  be  the  sharing  of  the  knowledge 
of  SDI,  as  a  defensive  weapon,  would 
be  accompanied  by  the  total  elimination 
of  nuclear  weapons.  And  I  happen  to 
believe  that  this  will  be  a  lot  better 
world  if  we  get  rid  of  all  the  nuclear 
weapons.  And  that  is  what  my  dream 
of  SDI  is:  that  it  can  be  the  tool  by 
which  we  eliminate. 

Q.  Mr.  Gorbachev  said  today  that  he 
did  not  believe  that  it's  for  defensive 
purposes. 

A.  I  know  you  said  that  before,  and 
I— 

Q.  You  failed  to  convince  him, 
despite  the  fact  that  you're  on  such  good 
terms  with  him. 

A.  Maybe  he  just  doesn't  know  me 
well  enough.  But  from  the  very  first,  I 
have  said  that  that  is  my  goal  for  that 
defensive  weapon.  There  is  nothing 
offensive  about  it.  It  cannot  hurt  or  kill 


anyone.  It  can  just  make  it  impossible 
for  missiles  to  get  through  the  screen. 

Q.  I  want  to  ask  you  about  this 
effort  you  again  stated  today  to  try  to  get 
a  START  treaty  before  you  leave  office. 
You  have  less  than  8  months  left  in 
office.  Mikhail  Gorbachev  could  have  20 
years.  By  setting  up  any  kind  of  dead- 
line, no  matter  how  unofficial,  aren't 
you  putting  all  the  pressure  on  the  U.S. 
side? 

A.  Oh,  no.  We  set  no  deadline.  I 
said  we're  going  to  continue  working  to- 
ward that.  And  I  could  hope  that 
maybe  in  that  period  of  time — but,  no, 
I  am  dead  set  against  deadlines.  You 
don't  make  a  treaty  just  to  simply  have 
it  be  achieved  at  a  certain  point  in 
time.  The  treaty  is  ready  when  it  is  a 
good  treaty  and  good  for  all  sides  in- 
volved. And  that's  what  we'll  do  in- 
stead of  setting  a  deadline  and  then  say- 
ing, well,  let's  sign  it  because  we've 
reached  the  deadhne.  It  has  to  be  good. 

Q.  There  is  also  talk  about  a  fifth 
summit  sometime  this  year  to  sign  a 
treaty,  which  might  come  sometime  in 
the  fall.  Td  prevent  U.S. -Soviet  rela- 
tions from  being  mixed  up  in  politics, 
are  you  willing  to  rule  out  a  summit 
until  the  presidential  campaign  is  over 
in  November? 

A.  I'd  make  any  decision  of  that 
kind  based  on  how  I  thought  it  could  af- 
fect the  situation.  And  if  it  gave  a 
promise  of  success,  then  go  for  it. 

Q.  You  were  asked  by  one  of  the 
students  at  Moscow  University  yester- 
day about  the  practice  in  the  United 
States  of  limiting  presidential  terms.  I 
believe  you  said  you  were  going  to  go 
out  on  the  mashed  potato  circuit  next 
year  and  campaign  for  repeal  of  that 
constitutional  amendment.  Were  you 
aware  that  Mr.  Gorbachev,  as  part  of  his 
reforms,  is  promoting  the  idea  of  limited 
terms  for  the  leader  of  the  Soviet  Union? 
And  do  you  think  it's  a  good  idea  for  the 
Soviet  Union? 

A.  I  would  hesitate  to  comment  on 
that.  I  mean,  this  system  of  govern- 
ment here — you  do  not  have  a  national 
election  in  which  all  of  the  people  vote 
to  see  who  would  be  the  leader.  My  ob- 
jection to  the  constitutional  amendment 
that  was  passed  in  our  country,  limiting 
a  president  to  two  terms,  was  the  fact 


ipartment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


33 


that  that  is  the  only  office  in  the 
United  States  in  which  all  the  people 
vote  for  the  candidates  for  that  office. 
And  it  seems  to  me  that  it  is  an  in- 
fringement on  the  rights  of  our  people 
in  a  democracy  to  tell  them  that  they 
can't  vote  for  someone  because  of  a 
time  limit.  I  think  it  impinges  on  their 
right  to  vote  for  whomever  they  want 
to  vote  for  as  many  times  as  they  want 
to  vote  for  them.  That  is  the  principle 
of  democracy. 

Q.  If  I  may  just  ask  one  more 
question  on  the  students,  you  talked  a 
lot  about  how  it  is  a  positive  thing  for 
students  from  both  countries  to  mix  and 
mingle,  to  get  to  know  each  other,  to 
understand  each  other.  Do  you  think 
part  of  your  positive  feeling  about  the 
Soviet  Union  these  days  comes  as  a 
result  of  greater  tolerance  that  you've 
developed  as  a  result  of  your  meetings 
with  Mr.  Gorbachev  over  the  past  few 
years? 

A.  I  have  found  that  Mr.  Gorbachev 
and  I  have  a  very  satisfactory  relation- 
ship. But,  at  the  same  time,  I  am  never 
going  to  relax  my  belief  in  the  need  for 
verification  of  agreements  that  we 
might  make,  and  I'm  quite  sure  he 
feels  the  same  way. 

Q.  I  understand  that  in  your  first 
meeting  with  Mr.  Gorbachev,  he  sug- 
gested the  reduction  of  half  a  million 
military  personnel  as  a  certain  condi- 
tion, but  there  was  no  followup,  as  it 
were.  Was  this  subject  raised  again,  and 
what  was  your  response? 

A.  No,  this  proposal — that  was 
just — a  suggestion  made  of  the  removal 
of  a  half  a  million  men  on  the  NATO 
line  in  the  European  front.  This  has  to 
be  considered.  We  think  that  we  are 
coming  to  a  point — and  that  he  himself 
is  willing  to — of  reductions  in  conven- 
tional weapons  along  that  front  and  con- 
ventional forces  as  well  as  the  nuclear 
forces.  But  the  simple  removing  of  a 
half  a  million  men  would  not  be  exactly 
equal  because  his  military  would  be 
moved  a  short  distance  back  away  from 
the  front.  Well,  there's  a  3,000-mile 
ocean  between  where  our  men  would 
have  to  be  moved  and,  in  the  event  of 
an  emergency,  we'd  have  an  ocean  to 
cross  to  get  our  men  back  there  and 
equal.  So  that  has  to  be  considered. 


34 


Q.  General  Secretary  Gorbachev,  in 
his  remarks  earlier  this  afternoon,  was 
talking  about  your  comments  here  on 
human  rights,  and  he  said,  "I  did  not 
have  a  lot  of  admiration  for  that  part  of 
the  trip."  When  you  met  with  the 
General  Secretary  privately,  we  know, 
of  course,  that  you  discussed  human 
rights.  Did  he  say  anything  to  you 
specifically  about  the  meeting  with  dis- 
sidents, or  your  remarks  at  Danilov 
Monastery  or  the  remarks  yesterday  at 
the  writers  union? 

A.  No,  but  I  do  know  that  he  and 
others  have  had  a  feeling  that  in  some 
way  our  concern  with  this  is  interfering 
with  your  internal  government  policies. 
I  have  explained  to  him,  and  I  think 
maybe  he  has  seen  the  point. 

Our  country  is  very  unique.  All  of 
us,  either  by  ourselves  or  through  our 
ancestors  or  our  grandparents  or  par- 
ents, came  from  someplace  else — about 
the  only  nation  in  the  world  that  can 
say  that.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  esti- 
mate is  that  one  out  of  eight  Americans 
trace  their  parentage  and  their  heri- 
tage, if  not  their  own  immigration,  to 
the  Eastern  bloc.  And  so,  I  have  put  it 
this  way,  that:  you  don't  stop  loving 
your  mother  because  you've  taken  unto 
yourself  a  wife.  So  the  people  in  Amer- 
ica do  have  a  feeling  for  the  countries 
of  their  heritage.  In  my  case,  it  was  a 
great-grandfather  on  one  side  and  a 
grandmother  and  gi-andfather  on  my 
mother's  side.  Well,  Americans  retain 
that  feehng  of  friendship  and  loyalty  to 
the  countries  that,  as  I  say,  are  their 
heritage.  And  so,  when  we  feel  that 
people  are  being  unjustly  treated— 
imprisoned  for  something  that  in  our 
country  would  not  be  a  crime,  calling 
for  such  a  sentence — our  people  get 
aroused,  and  they  come  to  us,  and  they 
want  help.  They  want  something  done. 
A  wife,  who  has  been  waiting  for  8 
years  for  her  husband  to  be  allowed  to 
leave  this  country  to  join  her— things  of 
this  kind  we  don't  think  are  really  in- 
terfering with  someone  else's  business. 
We  think  it's  very  much  our  business 
to  bring  it  to  the  attention  where  we 
feel  that  there  is  an  injustice  to  the 
government.  And  I  have  explained  this 
to  the  General  Secretary,  and  I  think 
he  has  seen  the  justice  of  what  I've 
said  because  many  of  the  individuals 
that  we've  brought  to  his  attention 


have  now  been  released  from  confine- 
ment here  and  have  been  allowed  to 
emigrate — come  to  other  countries,  to 
our  country. 


Q.  Mr.  Gorbachev  says  that  he  |, 
proposed  a  draft  statement  that  woij. 
use  the  words  "peaceful  coexistenc 
And  he  said  that  your  first  response . 
that  was,  I  like  it.  But  that  when  y  , 
came  back  from  meeting  with  your 
aides,  you  seem  to  have  changed  yo 
mind.  Did  you,  and  why? 

A.  I  liked  the  whole  tone,  the  ge , 
eral  tone  of  it,  and  what  it  was  seeki  | 
to  achieve  was  what  we're  both  seekf 
to  achieve.  But  I  said  at  the  same  tii , 
I  would  take  it  to  our  people;  and  I    ^ 
took  it  there,  and  they  studied  it  and  | 
saw  where  there  could  have  been  cer  , 
tain  ambiguities  in  there  that  would  j 
achieve  the  general  thought  of  what    ^ 
was  being  proposed.  We  were  in  ag)  | 
ment  with  the  general  thought.  So, 
some  rewriting  was  done  by  our  own 
people.  And  when  the  total  statemen 
is  released  to  you,  I  think  you  will  fi  i 
that  we  have  achieved  what  it  was  h 
had  with  the  paragraph  that  he  pro- 
posed. And  it's  been  achieved  and  im 
proved  to  the  point  that  it  is  clear  ar 
unmistakable,  that  it  achieves  the  pu 
pose  that  he  had  in  mind. 

Q.  You've  sort  of  teased  us  now 
you  could  give  us  some  sense  of  wh 
you've  proposed  to  substitute  for  pes 
ful  coexistence?  What's  the  better  t( 
that  your  aides  had  advised  you  to  i 
A.  No,  peaceful  coexistence — bot 
pieces  achieve  the  same  end,  but  the 
other  one  had  ambiguities  in  it.  And 
don't  think  they  were  intentional,  bui 
they  could  have  been  used  to  justify 
doing  something  else  that  was  not  in 
keeping  with  the  entire  goal  of  the 
statement  here. 

Q.  If  I  could  follow  up  on  your 
comments  on  emigration:  yesterday 
when  you  were  talking  about  a  fam 
denied  the  right  to  emigrate,  you  ca 
it  a  bureaucratic  problem;  you  said 
blamed  the  bureaucracy.  Do  you  beli 
that  essentially  it  is  just  bureaucra 
lethargy  that  has  caused  that  probl 
in  the  Soviet  Union? 

A.  Well,  now,  somebody  distract 
me  back  there.  I  think  someone  else 
thought  I  had  pointed  at  them  inste£ 
of  you. 
Department  of  State  Bulletin/August  1 


FEATURE 
Moscow  Summit 


Q.  Yesterday  when  you  spoke  to  the 
gidents  about  emigration,  and  a  family 
ii  particular  that  had  been  denied  the 
rht  to  emigrate,  and  you  said  you 
bimed  the  bureaucracy — do  you  view 
t  •  emigration  problem  from  the  Soviet 
I  ion  as  essentially  a  problem  of  just 
aethargic  bureaucracy? 
":    A.  I'm  afraid  that  I  have  to  confess 
••  you  that  I  think  one  of  the  sins  of 
. , I  inment,  and  one  with  which  we 

St  (leal  and  never  have  been  able  to 
c  completely  successful  with — and  this 
1  hules  our  own  government — is  that 
t'  bureaucracy  once  created  has  one 
fidamental  rule  above  all  others — 
p 'serve  the  bureaucracy.  And  I  think 
t  it  governments  will  always  find  that 
t  y  are  having  to  check  on  bureauc- 
r  y  and  make  sure  that  it  is  not  abid- 
i    by  its  own  rules  and  taking  the  easi- 
f   course.  And  so  I  wouldn't — picking 
c  one  government  other  than  another. 

Q.  If  I  could  follow  up,  you  said  that 
J  J  believed  you  persuaded  Mr.  Gor- 
t  :hev  on  some  of  these  emigration 
( Bstions.  But  he  said  on  human  rights 
i  the  United  States  that  he  did  not  find 
jar  agruments  convincing.  Do  you 
insider  that  a  failure  in  this  summit? 

A.  I  think  that  there  is  a  mistaken 
\  w — and  oh,  how  I  yearn  to  have  him 
c  ne  to  our  country  for  long  enough  to 
g  •  some  of  our  country — I  think  there 
i  1  mistaken  view  about  the  things 
I' it  it  occasionally  dominate  the  press 
'  4|)Ut  prejudice,  racial  or  religious,  in 
''  t  *  country,  about  the  so-called  street 
p)ple  that  apparently  have  no  place  to 
is.  And  I  think  these  are  socioeco- 
ll-nic  problems  in  our  land;  we  have 
tim,  of  course.  We  also  try  to  deal 
n;h  them.  But  I  don't  think  he  could 
cite  understand  a  recent  situation:  a 
Jiang  lady  living  on  the  sidewalks  of 
Jiw  York — living  out  there  on  the  side- 
Ik,  winter  and  summer — and  so,  for 
d  <•  own  sake,  the  police  picked  [her] 
to  bring  her  to  where  she  could  be 
iced  in  a  shelter.  And  she  took  her 
e  to  court  and  won  her  case  in  court 
it  she  should  be  allowed  to  go  back 
d  sleep  on  the  sidewalk  where  she 
d  been,  because  that's  what  she  pre- 
Ted  to  do. 
4    Well,  when  you  have  a  free  coun- 
how  far  can  we  go  in  impinging  on 
freedom  of  someone  who  says  this 


is  the  way  I  want  to  live.  And  I  think 
we  can  straighten  him  out  if  he  saw 
what  we  did  in  our  country. 

Q.  In  this  room  on  Monday,  you 
heard  moving  stories  of  people  who  had 
been — [inaudible] — and  you  wrote  it  off 
to  bureaucracy.  Is  that  really  your  view 
that  it  is  only  the  bureaucracy?  It  is  not 
a  willful  policy  of  the  government  here 
to  keep  these  people  from  emigrating? 

A.  No.  I  can't  say  that  it's  one;  I 
don't  know  that  much  about  the  sys- 
tem. But  it  was  a  question  presented  to 
me  on  the  basis  that  it  possibly  was  a 
bureaucratic  bungle.  Maybe  I  should 
illustrate  to  you  why  I  feel  the  way  I 
do  about  bureaucracies.  Once  during 
the  war,  I  happened  to  be  involved  in  a 
situation  in  which  one  level  of  the  mili- 
tary wanted  a  warehouse  full  of  filing 
cabinets — wanted  permission  to  destroy 
the  files  so  they  could  use  those  filing 
cases — and  they  were  able  to  prove 
that  the  documents  had  no  historic 
value.  They  had  no  bearing  on  present- 
day  government  at  all;  they  were  just 
useless.  And  so  the  message  went  up 
through  the  ranks,  requesting  permis- 
sion to  destroy  these  obsolete  files.  And 
then,  back  down  through  the  ranks, 
from  the  top  command,  endorsed  by 
each  level  of  command,  came  the  reply: 
permission  granted,  providing  copies 
were  made  of  each  file  destroyed. 

Q.  Don't  you  think  you're  letting 
Mr.  Gorbachev  off  a  little  easy  on  just 
saying  it's  a  bureaucracy? 

A.  No.  As  I  said,  I  don't — the  way 
the  question  was  framed  I  thought  that 
there  was  a  possibility  of  that.  No,  but 
I  just  have  to  believe  that  in  any  gov- 
ernment some  of  us  do  find  ourselves 
bound  in  by  bureaucracy,  and  then 
sometimes  you  have  to  stomp  your  foot 
and  say,  unmistakably,  I  want  it  done. 
And  then  maybe  you  get  through  with 
it.  But  I  have  great  confidence  in  his 
ability  to  do  that. 

Q.  You  said  starting  at  the  begin- 
ning of  this  year  and  going  into  this 
summit  that  if  there  was  this  progress 
toward  a  START  treaty,  you  would  be 
willing  to  come  together  a  fifth  time  and 
sign  it,  but  only  if  it  was  a  good  treaty. 
You've  referred  to  that  today  again 


several  times.  What  is  your  judgment, 
your  best  judgment,  on  the  basis  of  this 
summit?  Have  you  made  enough  prog- 
ress that  you  now  think  that  a  START 
treaty  is  likely  within  your  term? 

A.  I  honestly  cannot  answer  that.  I 
don't  know.  Let  me  just  give  you  what 
the  mechanics  are:  that  our  people  have 
been  steadily  in  Geneva — both  sides,  So- 
viet people  and  our  people — working  on 
this  treaty,  knowing  what  we  hope  to 
achieve,  and  they're  working  there. 
And,  as  I  say,  they've  made  progress. 
There  is  no  way  to  judge,  and  there  is 
no  way  that  I  would  give  them  a  date 
and  say,  please,  you  have  to  get  this  by 
such  and  such  a  time  because  that's  not 
the  way  to  get  a  good  treaty.  I  want  a 
good  treaty. 

Q.  Is  the  only  condition  under 
which  you  would  have  a  fifth  summit 
with  Mr.  Gorbachev  is  if  there  was,  in 
fact,  what  you  thought  was  a  good 
START  treaty  ready  to  be  signed? 

A.  You  can't  rule  out — something 
else  might  come  up  that  necessitates 
our  getting  together  and  settling  some- 
thing other  than  that  particular  treaty. 
So,  no  one  can  say  no,  there  will  be  no 
need  for  a  summit. 

Q.  What  have  you  learned  about  the 
Soviet  Union?  What  have  you  learned  in 
your  first  trip  to  Moscow? 

A.  I'm  going  to  do  one  [last]  an- 
swer because  I've  wanted  to  say  this, 
and  I  say  it  anytime  I  get  a  chance.  I 
think  that  one  of  the  most  wonderful 
forces  for  stability  and  good  that  I  have 
seen  in  the  Soviet  Union  are  the 
Russian  women. 


DEPARTURE  CEREMONY, 
THE  KREMLIN, 
MOSCOW, 
JUNE  2,  19883 

General  Secretary  Gorbachev  ^ 

One  hour  from  now  you  will  be  leaving 
Moscow.  In  the  first  place,  I  want  to 
thank  you  and  your  colleagues  for  coop- 
eration, openness,  and  a  businesslike 
approach  to  the  talks  that  we've  had 
here.  I  believe  that  both  of  us  have  every 
reason  to  regard  this  meeting  and  your 
visit  as  a  useful  contribution  to  the 


Ipartment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


35 


development  of  dialog-ue  between  the 
Soviet  Union  and  the  United  States. 

Mr.  President,  you  and  I  have  been 
deahng  with  each  other  for  3  years  now. 
From  the  first  e.\change  of  letters  to  the 
conclusion  of  this  meeting,  we've  come  a 
long  way.  Our  dialogue  has  not  been 
easy,  but  we  mustered  enough  realism 
and  political  will  to  overcome  obstacles 
and  divert  the  train  of  Soviet-U.S. 
relations  from  a  dangerous  track  to  a 
safer  one.  It  has,  however,  so  far  been 
moving  much  more  slowly  than  is  re- 
quired by  the  real  situation,  both  in  our 
two  countries  and  in  the  whole  world. 

But  as  I  have  understood,  Mr. 
President,  you're  willing  to  continue  our 
joint  endeavors.  For  my  part,  I  can 
assure  you  that  we  will  do  everything  in 
our  power  to  go  on  moving  forward. 
Now,  with  the  vast  experience  of  Ge- 
neva, Reykjavik,  Washington,  and 
Moscow,  and  backed  up  by  their  achieve- 
ments, we  are  in  duty,  bound  to  display 
still  greater  determination  and  consis- 
tency. That  is  what  the  Soviet  and 
American  peoples,  international  public 
opinion,  and  the  entire  world  community 
are  expecting  of  us. 

I  hope  you  will  have  pleasant  memo- 
ries of  your  stay  in  this  country.  When 
you  return  to  America,  please  convey  to 
the  American  people  best  washes  from 
the  peoples  of  the  Soviet  Union.  Over  the 
past  3  years,  our  two  nations  have  come 
to  know  each  other  better.  They  have 
'  now  taken  a  really  good  look  in  each 
other's  eyes  and  have  a  keener  sense  of 
the  need  to  live  together  on  this  beautiful 
planet  earth.  I  wish  you  good  journey 
back  home,  Mr.  President  and  Mrs. 
Reagan.  To  you  and  to  all  members  of 
the  U.S.  delegation,  I  wish  good  health. 
Goodbye. 

President  Reagan 

Mr.  General  Secretary,  Mrs.  Gorbachev, 
this  is  an  emotional  moment  for  Mrs. 
Reagan  and  me.  We  have  been  truly 
moved  by  the  warmth  and  the  generous 
hospitality  we  have  received  from  all  of 
our  Soviet  hosts  during  this  brief  visit — 
but  most  especially,  from  the  two  of  you. 
During  this  meeting,  as  in  all  of  our 
previous  meetings,  I  appreciated  and 
valued  our  exchanges  and  the  long  hours 
of  hard  work  that  we  and  our  experts  put 


in  to  make  progress  on  the  difficult 
issues  we  face.  But  this  meeting  has 
added  something  else  for  Mrs.  Reagan 
and  me.  Our  time  here  has  allowed  us  to 
know,  if  only  briefly,  your  art  treasures 
and  your  people:  artists,  writers,  indi- 
viduals from  all  walks  of  life — people  who 
were  wiUing  to  share  with  us  their 
e.xperiences,  their  fears,  their  hopes. 

It  is  fitting  that  we  are  ending  our 
visit,  as  we  began  it,  in  this  hall  named 
for  the  Order  of  St.  George.  I  would  like 
to  think  that  our  efforts  during  these 
past  few  days  have  slayed  a  few  dragons 
and  advanced  the  struggle  against  the 
evils  that  threaten  mankind — threats  to 
peace  and  to  liberty.  And  I  would  hke  to 
hope  that,  like  St.  George,  with  God's 
help,  peace  and  freedom  can  prevail.  And 
Mr.  General  Secretary,  if  you  will  permit 
me  just  one  more  proverb,  I  think  a  very 
old  and  popular  saying  you  have  here 
about  last  Sunday,  the  day  of  our  arrival, 
spoke  to  the  promise  that  we've  seen 
fulfilled  at  this  summit  in  this  Moscow 
spring.  Truly,  then,  Tmitsa  ves  les 
raskroitsya — at  the  Feast  of  Trinity,  the 
whole  forest  blossoms. 

And  now,  if  I  might  just  conclude  on 
a  personal  note.  Eariier  this  week  at 
Moscow  State  University,  I  mentioned  to 
the  young  people  there  that  they  ap- 
peared to  my  eyes  exactly  as  would  any 
group  of  students  in  my  owti  country  or 
anywhere  else  in  the  world,  so,  too,  did 
Nancy  and  I  find  the  faces,  young  and 
old,  here  on  the  streets  of  Moscow.  At 
first,  more  than  anything  else,  they  were 
curious  faces,  but  as  the  time  went  on, 
the  smiles  began  and  then  the  waves. 
And  I  don't  have  to  tell  you,  Nancy  and 
I  smiled  back  and  waved  just  as  hard. 

Mr.  General  Secretary,  I  think  you 
understand  we're  not  just  grateful  to 
both  you  and  Mrs.  Gorbachev,  but  want 
you  to  know  we  think  of  you  as  friends. 
And  in  that  spirit,  we  would  ask  one 
further  favor  of  you.  Itell  the  people  of 
the  Soviet  Union  of  the  deep  feelings  of 
friendship  felt  by  us  and  by  the  people  of 
our  country  toward  them.  Ifell  them,  too, 
Nancy  and  I  are  gi-ateful  for  their  coming 
out  to  see  us,  grateful  for  their  waves 
and  smiles,  and  tell  them  we  will 
remember  all  of  our  days,  their  faces — 
the  faces  of  hope — hope  for  a  new  era  in 
human  history,  an  era  of  peace  between 
our  nations  and  our  peoples. 

Thank  you  and  God  bless  you. 


President  Reagan's  address  before 
members  of  the  Royal  Institute  of 
International  Affairs  at  Guildhall. 


PRESIDENTS  ADDRESS, 
GUILDHALL, 
LONDON 
JUNE  3,  19882 

I  wonder  if  you  can  imagine  what  it  is  f 
an  American  to  stand  in  this  place.  Bac 
in  the  States,  we're  terribly  proud  of  ar 
thing  more  than  a  few  hundred  years  ol 
some  even  see  my  election  to  the  presi- 
dency as  America's  attempt  to  show  oui 
European  cousins  that  we  too  have  a 
regard  for  antiquity  [Laughter] 

Guildhall  has  been  here  since  the 
15th  century  and  while  it  is  comforting 
my  age  to  be  near  anything  that  much 
older  than  myself — [laughter] — the  v 
erable  age  of  this  institution  is  hardly 
that  impresses.  Who  can  come  here  ar 
not  think  upon  the  moments  these  wal 
have  seen,  the  many  times  that  people 
this  city  and  nation  have  gathered  her 
in  national  crisis  or  national  triumph? 
the  darkest  hours  of  the  last  World  W 
when  the  tense  drama  of  Edward  R. 
Murrow's  opening,  "This  is  London" 
was  enough  to  impress  on  millions  of 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/ August  U 


I 


FEATURE 
Moscow  Summit 


iiiericans  the  mettle  of  the  British 
pDple,  how  many  times  in  those  days  did 
p)ceedings  continue  here,  a  testimony 
tthe  cause  of  civilization  for  which  you 
sod?  From  the  Marne  to  El  Alamein,  to 
^nhem,  to  the  Falklands,  you  have  in 
ts  century  so  often  remained  steadfast 
i  what  is  right — and  against  what  is 
"ipng.  You  are  a  brave  people,  and  this 
Ij  d  truly  is,  as  your  majestic,  moving 
fc-nn  proclaims,  a  "land  of  hope  and 

Sry."  And  it's  why  Nancy  and  I,  in  the 
sing  days  of  this  historic  trip,  ai'e  glad 
tibe  in  England  once  again.  After  a  long 
J  rney,  we  feel  among  friends,  and  with 
a  our  hearts  we  thank  vou  for  having  us 
t-e. 

<    Such  feelings  are,  of  course,  espe- 
c  lly  appropriate  to  this  occasion;  I  have 
one  from  Moscow  to  report  to  you,  for 
t  ly  the  relationship  between  the 
I  ited  States  and  Great  Britain  has 

I  'n  critical  to  NATO's  success  and  the 
c  ise  of  freedom. 

This  hardly  means  that  we've  always 

I I  a  perfect  understanding.  When  I 

t  a  visited  Mrs.  Thatcher  [Prime  Min- 
i  'v  Margaret  Thatcher]  at  the  British 
1  ibassy  in  1981,  she  mischievously 
r  iiiiided  me  that  the  huge  portrait 
c  niiiating  the  grand  staircase  was  none 
'  er  than  that  of  George  III,  though  she 
(   ui'aciously  concede  that  today  most  of 
I  ■  countrymen  would  agree  with  Jeffer- 
:  I  t  hat  a  little  rebellion  now  and  then  is 
'  iiud  thing.  [Laughter.] 

S(i  there  has  always  been,  as  there 
iulil  be  among  friends,  an  element  of 
-  i  aliDUt  our  differences.  But  let  me 
uic  you,  it  is  how  much  we  have  in 
niiKin  and  the  depth  of  our  friendship 
it  tiuly  matters. 

I  have  often  mentioned  this  in  the 
ites,  but  I  have  never  had  an  opportu- 
y  to  tell  a  British  audience  how  during 
'  first  visit  here  40  years  ago  I  was, 
e  most  Americans,  anxious  to  see 
■ne  of  the  sights  and  those  400-year- 
I  inns  I  had  been  told  abound  in  this 
antry.  Well,  a  driver  took  me  and  a 
iple  of  other  people  to  an  old  inn,  a  pub 
lUy — and  what  in  America  we  would 
IJ  a  "mom  and  pop  place."  This  quite 

Iierly  lady  was  waiting  on  us,  and 
ally,  hearing  us  talk  to  one  another, 
e  said,  "You're  Americans,  aren't 
u?"  And  we  said  we  were.  "Oh,"  she 


13 


said,  "there  were  a  lot  of  your  chaps 
stationed  down  the  road  during  the 
war."  And  she  added,  "They  used  to 
come  in  here  of  an  evening,  and  they'd 
have  a  songfest.  They  called  me  Mom, 
and  they  called  the  old  man  Pop."  And 
then  her  mood  changed  and  she  said,  "It 
was  Christmas  Eve,  and  you  know,  we 
were  all  alone  and  feeling  a  bit  down. 
And  suddenly,  they  burst  through  the 
door,  and  they  had  presents  for  me  and 
Pop."  And  by  this  time  she  wasn't 
looking  at  us  anymore;  she  was  looking 
off  into  the  distance,  into  memory,  and 
there  were  tears  in  her  eyes.  And  then 
she  said,  "Big  strapping  lads  they  was, 
from  a  place  called  loway."  [Laughter.] 

From  a  place  called  loway — and 
Oregon,  California,  Tfexas,  New  Jersey, 
Georgia — here  with  other  young  men 
from  Lancaster,  Hampshire,  Glasgow, 
and  Dorset — all  of  them  caught  up  in  the 
terrible  parado.xes  of  that  time:  that 
young  men  must  wage  war  to  end  war, 
and  die  for  freedom  so  that  fi-eedom  itself 
might  live.  And  it  is  those  same  two 
causes  for  which  they  fought  and  died — 
the  cause  of  peace,  the  cause  of  freedom 
for  all  humanity — that  still  brings  us, 
British  and  American,  together. 

For  these  causes,  the  people  of 
Great  Britain,  the  United  States,  and 
other  allied  nations  have,  for  44  years, 
made  enormous  sacrifices  to  keep  our 
alliance  strong  and  our  military  ready. 
For  them,  we  embarked  in  this  decade  on 
a  new  postwar  strategy,  a  forward 
strategy  of  freedom,  a  strategy  of  public 
candor  about  the  moral  and  fundamental 
differences  between  statism  and  democ- 
racy, but  also  a  strategy  of  vigorous 
diplomatic  engagement;  a  policy  that 
rejects  both  the  inevitability  of  war  or 
the  permanence  of  totalitarian  rule,  a 
policy  ba.sed  on  realism  that  seeks  not 
just  treaties  for  treaties'  sake  but  the 
recognition  and  resolution  of  fundamen- 
tal differences  with  our  adversaries. 

The  pursuit  of  this  policy  has  just 
now  taken  me  to  Moscow,  and  let  me 
say,  I  beUeve  this  policy  is  bearing  fruit. 
Quite  possibly,  we're  beginning  to  take 
down  the  barriers  of  the  postwar  era; 
quite  possibly,  we  are  entering  a  new  era 
in  history,  a  time  of  lasting  change  in  the 
Soviet  Union.  We  will  have  to  see.  But  if 
so,  it's  because  of  the  steadfastness  of 


.||j  ipartment  of  State  Bulletin/ August  1988 


the  allies — the  democracies — for  more 
than  40  years,  and  especially  in  this 
decade. 

The  history  of  our  time  will  un- 
doubtedly include  a  footnote  about  how, 
during  this  decade  and  the  last,  the 
voices  of  retreat  and  hopelessness 
reached  a  crescendo  in  the  West — 
insisting  the  only  way  to  peace  was 
unilateral  disarmament,  proposing  nu- 
clear freezes,  opposing  deployment  of 
counterbalancing  weapons  such  as 
intermediate-range  missiles  or  the  more 
recent  concept  of  strategic  defense  sys- 
tems. 

These  same  voices  ridiculed  the 
notion  of  going  beyond  arms  control,  the 
hope  of  doing  something  more  than 
merely  establishing  artificial  limits 
within  which  arms  buildups  could  con- 
tinue all  but  unabated.  Arms  reduction 
would  never  work,  they  said,  and  when 
the  Soviets  left  the  negotiating  table  in 
Geneva  for  15  months,  they  proclaimed 
disaster. 

And  yet  it  was  our  double-zero 
option,  much  maligned  when  first  pro- 
posed, that  provided  the  basis  for  the 
INF  Treaty,  the  first  treaty  ever  that 
did  not  just  control  offensive  weapons, 
but  reduced  them  and,  yes,  actually 
eliminated  an  entire  class  of  U.S.  and 
Soviet  nuclear  missiles.  This  treaty,  last 
month's  development  in  Afghanistan,  the 
changes  we  see  in  the  Soviet  Union — 
these  are  momentous  events;  not  conclu- 
sive, but  momentous. 

And  that's  why,  although  history 
will  duly  note  that  we,  too,  heard  voices 
of  denial  and  doubt,  it  is  those  who  spoke 
with  hope  and  strength  who  will  be  best 
remembered.  And  here  I  want  to  say 
that  through  all  the  troubles  of  the  last 
decade,  one  such  firm,  eloquent  voice,  a 
voice  that  proclaimed  proudly  the  cause 
of  the  Western  alliance  and  human 
freedom,  has  been  heard.  A  voice  that 
never  sacrificed  its  anticommunist  cre- 
dentials or  its  realistic  appraisal  of 
change  in  the  Soviet  Union,  but  because 
it  came  from  the  longest-serving  leader 
in  the  alliance,  it  did  become  one  of  the 
first  to  suggest  that  we  could  "do 
business"  with  Mr.  Gorbachev.  So  let 
me  discharge  my  first  official  duty  here 
today.  Prime  Minister,  the  achievements 
of  the  Moscow  summit  as  well  as  the 


37 


Geneva  and  Washington  summits  say 
much  about  your  valor  and  strength  and, 
by  virtue  of  the  office  you  hold,  that  of 
the  British  people.  So  let  me  say,  simply: 
at  this  hour  in  history,  Prime  Minister, 
the  entire  world  salutes  you  and  your 
gallant  people  and  gallant  nation. 

And  while  your  leadership  and  the 
vision  of  the  British  people  have  been  an 
inspiration,  not  just  to  my  own  people 
but  to  all  of  those  who  love  freedom  and 
yearn  for  peace,  I  know  you  join  me  in  a 
deep  sense  of  gratitude  toward  the 
leaders  and  peoples  of  all  the  democratic 
allies.  Whether  deploying  crucial  weap- 
ons of  deterrence,  standing  fast  in  the 
Persian  Gulf,  combatting  terrorism  and 
aggression  by  outlaw  regimes,  or  helping 
freedom  fighters  around  the  globe, 
rarely  in  history  has  any  alliance  of  free 
nations  acted  with  such  firmness  and 
dispatch,  and  on  so  many  fronts. 

In  a  process  reaching  back  as  far  as 
the  founding  of  NATO  and  the  Common 
Market,  the  House  of  Western  Europe, 
together  with  the  United  States,  Can- 
ada, Japan,  and  others — this  House  of 
Democracy — engaged  in  an  active  diplo- 
macy while  sparking  a  startling  growth 
of  democratic  institutions  and  free  mar- 
kets all  across  the  globe;  in  short,  an 
expansion  of  the  frontiers  of  freedom  and 
a  lessening  of  the  chances  of  war. 

So,  it  is  within  this  context  that  I 
report  now  on  events  in  Moscow.  On 
Wednesday,  at  08:20  Greenwich  time, 
Mr.  Gorbachev  and  I  exchanged  the 
instruments  of  ratification  of  the  INF 
Treaty.  So,  too,  we  made  tangible 
progress  toward  the  START  treaty  on 
strategic  weapons.  Such  a  treaty,  with 
all  its  implications,  is,  I  believe,  now 
within  our  grasp.  But  part  of  the  realism 
and  candor  we  were  determined  to  bring 
to  negotiations  with  the  Soviets  meant 
refusing  to  put  all  the  weight  of  these 
negotiations  and  our  bilateral  rela- 
tionship on  the  single  issue  of  arms 
control.  As  I  never  tire  of  saying,  nations 
do  not  disti-ust  each  other  because  they 
are  armed,  they  are  armed  because  they 
distrust  each  other. 

So  equally  important  items  on  the 
agenda  dealt  with  critical  issues,  like 
regional  conflicts,  human  rights,  and 
bilateral  exchanges.  With  regard  to 
regional  conflicts,  here,  too,  we  are  now 
in  the  third  week  of  the  pullout  of  Soviet 


38 


troops  from  Afghanistan.  The  impor- 
tance of  this  step  should  not  be  under- 
estimated. Our  third  area  of  discussion 
was  bilateral  contacts  between  our  peo- 
ples, an  expanding  program  of  student 
exchanges  and  the  opening  of  cultural 
centers — progress  toward  a  broader  un- 
derstanding of  each  other.  And  finally, 
on  the  issue  of  human  rights — granting 
people  the  right  to  speak,  write,  travel, 
and  worship  freely — there  are  signs  of 
greater  individual  freedom. 

Now  originally,  I  was  going  to  give 
you  just  an  accounting  on  these  items. 
But,  you  know,  on  my  first  day  in 
Moscow,  Mr.  Gorbachev  used  a  Russian 
saying:  "Better  to  see  something  once 
than  to  hear  about  it  a  hundred  times." 
So  if  I  might  go  beyond  our  four-part 
agenda  today  and  offer  just  a  moment  or 
two  of  personal  reflection  on  the  country 
I  saw  for  the  first  time. 

In  all  aspects  of  Soviet  life,  the  talk 
is  of  progress  toward  democratic  re- 
form— in  the  economy,  in  political 
institutions,  and  in  rehgious,  social,  and 
artistic  life.  It  is  called  glasnost — 
openness;  it  is  perestroika — restructur- 
ing. Mr.  Gorbachev  and  I  discussed  his 
upcoming  party  conference,  where  many 
of  these  reforms  will  be  debated  and 
perhaps  adopted:  such  things  as  official 
accountability,  limitations  on  length  of 
service  in  office,  an  independent  judici- 
ary, revisions  of  the  criminal  law,  and 
lowering  taxes  on  cooperatives;  in  short, 
giving  individuals  more  freedom  to  run 
their  ow^n  affairs,  to  control  their  own 
destinies. 

To  those  of  us  familiar  with  the 
postwar  era,  all  of  this  is  cause  for 
shaking  the  head  in  wonder.  Imagine, 
the  President  of  the  United  States  and 
the  General  Secretary  of  the  Soviet 
Union  walking  together  in  Red  Square, 
talking  about  a  growing  personal  ftnend- 
ship,  and  meeting  together  average 
citizens,  realizing  how  much  our  people 
have  in  common.  It  was  a  special 
moment  in  a  week  of  special  moments. 
My  personal  impression  of  Mr.  Gor- 
bachev is  that  he  is  a  serious  man 
seeking  serious  reform.  I  pray  that  the 
hand  of  the  Lord  will  be  on  the  Soviet 
people — the  people  whose  faces  Nancy 
and  I  saw  everywhere  we  went.  Believe 
me,  there  was  one  thing  about  those 


faces  that  we  will  never  forget — they  I 
were  the  faces  of  hope,  the  hope  of  a  ne  I 
era  in  human  history,  and,  hopefully,  ail 
era  of  peace  and  freedom  for  all.  I 

And  yet,  while  the  Moscow  summill 
showed  great  promise  and  the  response  I 
of  the  Soviet  people  was  heartening,  lei ' 
me  interject  here  a  note  of  caution  and,  i 
hope,  prudence.  It  has  never  been  I 
disputes  between  the  free  peoples  and  i 
the  peoples  of  the  Soviet  Union  that  ha  I 
been  at  the  heart  of  postwar  tensions  ai  i 
conflicts.  No,  disputes  among  govern-  | 
ments  over  the  pursuit  of  statism  and 
expansionism  have  been  the  central  poi 
in  our  difficulties. 

Now  that  the  allies  are  strong  and 
expansionism  is  receding  around  the 
world  and  in  the  Soviet  Union,  there  is 
hope.  And  we  look  to  this  trend  to 
continue.  We  must  do  all  we  can  to  ass 
it.  And  this  means  openly  acknowledgi 
positive  change  and  crediting  it.  But  le 
us  also  remember  the  strategy  that  we 
have  adopted  is  one  that  provides  for 
setbacks  along  the  way  as  well  as 
progress.  Let  us  embrace  honest  char 
when  it  occurs;  but  let  us  also  be  wary 
let  us  stay  strong;  and  let  us  be 
confident,  too. 

Prime  Minister,  perhaps  you  re- 
member that  upon  accepting  your  gra- 
cious invitation  to  address  the  member 
of  the  Parliament  in  1982,  I  suggested 
then  that  the  world  could  well  be  at  a 
turning  point  when  the  two  great  thre; 
to  life  in  this  century — nuclear  war  an( 
totalitarian  rule — might  now  be  over- 
come. In  an  accounting  of  what  might 
ahead  for  the  Western  alliance,  I  sug- 
gested that  the  hard  evidence  of  the 
totalitarian  experiment  was  now  in  and 
that  this  evidence  had  led  to  an  uprisinj 
of  the  intellect  and  will,  one  that  re- 
affirmed the  dignity  of  the  individual  in 
the  face  of  the  modem  state. 

I  suggested,  too,  that  in  a  way  M 
was  right  when  he  said  the  political  on 
would  come  into  conflict  with  the  eco- 
nomic order,  only  he  w^as  wrong  in 
predicting  which  part  of  the  world  thi: 
would  occur  in,  for  the  crisis  came  not 
the  capitalist  West  but  in  the  commur 
East.  Noting  the  economic  difficulties 
reaching  the  critical  stage  in  the  Sovie 
Union  and  Eastern  Europe,  I  said  thai 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/August  IS 


FEATURE 
Moscow  Summit 


ifr  times  in  history  the  ruHng  ehtes 
la  faced  such  situations  and,  when  they 
niuntered  resolve  and  determination 

I  free  nations,  decided  to  loosen  their 
It  was  then  I  suggested  that  the 

-  iif  history  were  running  in  the  cause 
"i-ty,  but  only  if  we,  as  free  men  and 
u'li.  Joined  together  in  a  worldwide 
iiiient  toward  democracy,  a  crusade 
'  i'ledom,  a  ciTisade  that  would  be  not 
.  luch  a  struggle  of  armed  might,  not 
i  uK'h  a  test  of  bombs  and  rockets  as  a 
e:  of  faith  and  will. 

I  Well,  that  crusade  for  freedom,  that 
•r  ade  for  peace  is  well  underway.  We 

■  found  the  will.  We  have  held  fast  to 
1  faith.  And,  whatever  happens,  what- 
!V  ■  triumphs  or  disappointments  ahead, 
m  nust  keep  to  this  strategy  of 
*'  ntrth  and  candor,  this  strategy  of 
— hope  in  the  eventual  triumph  of 

■I    Inm. 

Mut  as  we  move  forward,  let  us  not 
1 1  note  the  lessons  we've  learned 
111  g  the  way  in  developing  our  strat- 
ig  We  have  learned  the  first  objective 
i  le  adversaries  of  freedom  is  to  make 
Ti  nations  question  their  own  faith  in 
T(iom,  to  make  us  think  that  adhering 
'  11-  principles  and  speaking  out 
-  ii.-t  human  rights  abuses  or  foreign 
■i'>si(jn  is  somehow  an  act  of  belliger- 

W'ell,  over  the  long  run,  such 
uiiiins  make  free  peoples  silent  and 
nately  half-hearted  about  their 
(■   This  is  the  first  and  most  impor- 
-■  defeat  free  nations  can  ever  suffer, 
'  \  hrn  free  peoples  cease  telling  the 
:'  h  about  and  to  their  adversaries, 
I  case  telling  the  truth  to  them- 
I-.-.  In  matters  of  state,  unless  the 
1"  h  be  spoken,  it  ceases  to  e.xist. 
It  is  in  this  sense  that  the  best 
'5  -ator  of  how  much  we  care  about 
il..m  is  what  we  say  about  freedom;  it 
tills  sense  that  words  truly  are 
'ii>.  And  there  is  one  added  and  quite 
a-ii-(linary  benefit  to  this  sort  of 
iMii  and  public  candor:  this  is  also  the 
\\  ay  to  avoid  war  or  conflict.  Too 
n  111  the  past,  the  adversaries  of 
'luin  forgot  the  reserves  of  strength 
I' solve  among  free  peoples;  too 

II  they  intei-preted  conciliatory  words 
lakness;  and  too  often  they  miscal- 

•»  led  and  underestimated  the  wilHng- 


ness  of  free  men  and  women  to  resist  to 
the  end.  Words  of  freedom  remind  them 
otherwise. 

This  is  the  lesson  we've  learned  and 
the  lesson  of  the  last  war  and,  yes,  the 
lesson  of  Munich.  But  is  is  also  the  lesson 
taught  us  by  Sir  Winston  [Churchill],  by 
London  in  the  blitz,  by  the  enduring 
pride  and  faith  of  the  British  people.  Just 
a  few  years  ago.  Her  Majesty,  Queen 
Elizabeth  and  I  stood  at  the  Normandy 
beaches  to  commemorate  the  selflessness 
that  comes  from  such  pride  and  faith.  It 
is  well  we  recall  the  lessons  of  our 
alliance.  And,  I  wonder  if  you  might 
permit  me  to  recall  one  other  this 
morning. 

Operation  Market  Garden  it  was 
called — 3  months  after  Overlord  and  the 
rescue  of  Europe  began — a  plan  to 
suddenly  drop  British  and  American 
airborne  divisions  on  the  Netherlands 
and  open  up  a  drive  into  the  heart  of 
Germany.  A  battalion  of  British 
paratroopers  was  given  the  great  task  of 
seizing  the  bridge  deep  in  enemy  teiri- 
tory  at  Arnhem.  For  a  terrible  10  days 
they  held  out. 

Some  years  ago,  a  reunion  of  those 
magnificent  veterans — British,  Ameri- 
cans, and  others  of  our  allies — was  held 
in  New  York  City.  From  the  dispatch  by 
The  New  York  Times  reporter  Maurice 
Carroll,  there  was  this  paragraph: 

"Look  at  him,"  said  Henri  Knap,  an 
Amsterdam  newspaperman  who  headed  a 
Dutch  underground's  intelligence  operation  in 
Ai-nhem.  He  gestured  toward  General  John 
Frost,  a  bluff  Briton  who  had  committed  the 
battalion  that  held  the  bridge.  "Look  at 
him — still  with  that  black  moustache.  If  you 
put  him  at  the  end  of  a  bridge  even  today  and 
said  'keep  it,'  he'd  keep  it." 

The  story  mentioned  the  wife  of 
Cornelius  Ryan,  the  American  writer 
who  immortalized  Market  Garden  in  his 
book,  A  Bridge  Too  Far,  who  told  the 
reporter  that  just  as  Mr.  Ryan  was 
finishing  his  book — writing  the  final 
paragraphs  about  General  Frost's  valiant 
stand  at  Arnhem  and  about  how  in  his 
eyes  his  men  would  always  be  unde- 
feated— her  husband  burst  into  tears. 
That  was  quite  unlike  him;  and  Mrs. 
Ryan,  alarmed,  rushed  to  him.  The 
writer  could  only  look  up  and  say  of 
General  Frost:  "Honestly,  what  that 
man  went  through."  A  few  days  ago, 


seated  there  in  Spaso  House  with  Soviet 
dissidents,  I  had  that  same  thought,  and 
asked  myself:  What  won't  men  suffer  for 
freedom? 

The  dispatch  about  the  Arnhem 
veteran  concluded  with  this  quote  from 
General  Frost  about  his  visits  to  that 
bridge. 

"We've  been  going  back  ever  since. 
Every  year  we  have  a — what's  the  word — 
reunion.  Now,  there's  a  word."  He  turned  to 
his  wife,  "Dear,  what's  the  word  for  going  to 
Arnhem?" 

"Reunion,"  she  said. 

"No,"  he  said,  "there's  a  special  word." 

She  pondered,  "Pilgrimage,"  she  said. 

"Yes,  pilginmage,"  General  Frost  said. 

As  those  veterans  of  Arnhem  view 
their  time,  so,  too,  we  must  view  ours; 
ours  is  also  a  pilgrimage,  a  pilgrimage 
toward  those  things  we  honor  and  love: 
human  dignity,  the  hope  of  freedom  for 
all  peoples  and  for  all  nations.  And  I've 
always  cherished  the  belief  that  all  of 
history  is  such  a  pilgrimage  and  that  our 
Maker,  while  never  denying  us  free  will, 
does  over  time  guide  us  with  a  wise  and 
provident  hand,  giving  direction  to  his- 
tory and  slowly  bringing  good  from 
evil — leading  us  ever  so  slowly  but  ever 
so  relentlessly  and  lovingly  to  a  moment 
when  the  will  of  man  and  God  are  as  one 
again. 

I  cherish,  too,  the  hope  that  what  we 
have  done  together  throughout  this 
decade  and  in  Moscow  this  week  has 
helped  bring  mankind  along  the  road  of 
that  pilgrimage.  If  this  be  so,  prayerful 
recognition  of  what  we  are  about  as  a 
civilization  and  a  people  has  played  its 
part.  I  mean,  of  course,  the  great 
civilized  ideas  that  comprise  so  much  of 
your  heritage:  the  development  of  law- 
embodied  by  your  constitutional  tradi- 
tion, the  idea  of  restraint  on  centralized 
power  and  individual  rights  as  estab- 
lished in  your  Magna  Carta,  the  idea  of 
representative  government  as  embodied 
by  the  mother  of  all  parliaments. 

But  we  go  beyond  even  this.  Your 
own  Evelyn  Waugh  who  reminded  us 
that  "civilization — and  by  this  I  do  not 
mean  talking  cinemas  and  tinned  food  nor 
even  surgery  and  hygienic  houses  but  the 
whole  moral  and  artistic  organization  of 
Europe — has  not  in  itself  the  power  of 
survival."  It  came  into  being,  he  said. 


li)artment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


39 


through  the  Judeo-Christian  tradition 
and  "without  it  has  no  significance  or 
power  to  command  allegiance.  It  is  no 
longer  possible,"  he  wrote,  "to  accept 
the  benefits  of  civilization  and  at  the 
same  time  deny  the  supernatural  basis 
on  which  it  rests." 

And  so,  it  is  first  things  we  must 
consider.  And  here  it  is,  a  story,  one  last 
story,  that  can  remind  us  best  of  what 
we're  about.  It's  a  story  that  a  few  years 
ago  came  in  the  guise  of  that  art  form  for 
which  I  have  an  understandable  affec- 
tion— the  cinema. 

It's  a  story  about  the  1920  Olympics 
and  two  British  athletes:  Harold  Abra- 
hams, a  young  Jew,  whose  victory — as 
his  immigrant  Arab-Italian  coach  put 
it — was  a  triumph  for  all  those  who  have 
come  from  distant  lands  and  found 
freedom  and  refuge  here  in  England;  and 
Eric  Liddell,  a  young  Scotsman,  who 
would  not  sacrifice  religious  conviction 
for  fame.  In  one  unforgettable  scene, 
Eric  Liddell  reads  the  words  of  Isaiah. 
"He  giveth  power  to  the  faint,  and  to 
them  that  have  no  might,  he  increased 
their-  strength,  but  they  that  wait  upon 
the  Lord  shall  renew  theu*  strength. 
They  shall  mount  up  with  wings  as 
eagles.  Tliey  shall  run  and  not  be 
weaiy" 

Here  then  is  our  formula  for  com- 
pleting our  crusade  for  freedom.  Here  is 
the  strength  of  our  civilization  and  our 
belief  in  the  rights  of  humanity.  Our  faith 
is  in  a  higher  law.  Yes,  we  believe  in 
prayer  and  its  power.  And  like  the 
Founding  Fathers  of  both  our  lands,  we 
hold  that  humanity  was  meant  not  to  be 
dishonored  by  the  all-powerful  state  but 
to  live  in  the  image  and  likeness  of  Him 
who  made  us. 

More  than  five  decades  ago,  an 
American  President  told  his  generation 
that  they  had  a  rendezvous  with  destiny; 
at  almost  the  same  moment,  a  Prime 
Minister  asked  the  British  people  for 
their  finest  hour.  This  rendezvous,  this 
finest  hour,  is  still  upon  us.  Let  us  seek 
to  do  His  will  in  all  things,  to  stand  for 
freedom,  to  speak  for  humanity. 

"Come,  my  friends,"  as  it  was  said 
of  old  by  Tfennyson,  "it  is  not  too  late  to 
seek  a  newer  world."  Thank  you. 


RETURN  REMARKS, 
ANDREWS  AIR  FORCE  BASE, 
JUNE  3,  19882 

Vice  President  Bush 

Mr.  President  and  Mrs.  Reagan,  I'm 
delighted  to  say  on  behalf  of  the  people  of 
the  United  States  of  America,  welcome 
home,  and  well  done.  Everyone  in 
America  watched  your  historic  trip  and 
hoped  for  the  best  and  pulled  for  you. 
And  now  it's  over,  and  we  can  all  say 
that  you  made  a  historic  contribution  to 
peace  in  the  world. 

On  arms  control,  Mrs.  Thatcher 
probably  put  it  best  when  she  said  that 
you  have  bravely  gone  forward  in  spite  of 
the  voices  of  denial  and  doubt.  You 
showed  the  only  way  to  succeed  is  by 
retaining  your  resolve  and  speaking  with 
conviction. 

As  for  the  latter,  I  suspect  you 
know,  Mr.  President,  that  you  caught  a 
Httle  flack  for  bringing  up  the  issue  of 
human  rights  so  forcefully  right  there  in 
the  heart  of  the  Soviet  system.  But  most 
Americans  felt  as  I  did:  we  have  a 
tradition  of  freedom  and  a  history  of  free 
speech,  and  what's  wrong  with  telling 
the  other  guy  how  you  feel? 

The  fact  is  you  made  us  proud.  This 
week  an  American  President  strode  the 
hard  ground  of  Red  Square  and  reminded 
the  world  through  the  sureness  of  his 
step  and  the  lilt  of  his  words  what  a 
bracing  thing  freedom  is — what  a  moving 
and  bracing  thing. 

So,  welcome  back,  Mr.  President. 
It's  good  to  see  you.  God  bless  you  and 
Nancy. 

President  Reagan 

As  some  of  you  may  have  heard,  Mr. 
Gorbachev  and  I've  been  trading  Russian 
proverbs  this  week.  [Laughter]  But  you 
know,  flying  back  across  the  Atlantic 
today,  it  was  an  American  saying  that 
kept  i-unning  through  my  mind.  Believe 
me,  as  far  as  Nancy  and  I  are  concerned, 
there's  no  place  like  home. 

We  want  to  thank  all  of  you  for 
coming  out  today.  We're  grateful  for 
your  enthusiasm  and  for  the  warmth  of 
your  welcome.  And  take  it  from  me,  all 
this  red,  white,  and  blue  scenery  hits 


these  two  weary  travelers  right  when  I 
we  hve.  If  I  might  paraphrase  George  I 
Cohen:  some  may  call  it  a  flag  waving  i 
but  right  now  I  can't  think  of  a  better  | 
flag  to  wave.  I 

We're  a  little  tired,  but  we're        ) 
exhilarated  at  what  has  happened,       \ 
exhilarated,  too,  at  the  thought  of  the  I 
future  and  what  may  lie  ahead  for  the  i 
young  people  of  America  and  all  of  the 
world.  The  events  of  this  week  in 
Moscow  were  momentous — not  conclu 
sive  perhaps,  but  momentous.  And  be 
heve  me,  right  now  momentous  will  d  I 
just  fine. 

You  know,  it's  occurred  to  me  th 
time  does  have  a  way  of  sorting  thing 
out.  For  many  years  now,  Americans 
have  seen  the  danger  of  war  and  plea 
the  cause  of  peace.  And  other  Americ 
have  seen  the  danger  of  totalitarianisi 
and  pleaded  the  cause  of  freedom.  So. 
was  just  thinking,  why  don't  we  just 
agree  today  on  something  that  maybe 
should  have  been  saying  to  each  othei 
along:  that  we're  all  Americans  and  t 
we  all  have  one  and  the  same  burning 
cause  in  our  hearts — the  cause  of  wor 
peace  and  the  cause  of  world  freedom 

Peace  and  freedom  are  what  this 
was  about,  and  we  saw  some  real 
progress  in  several  areas  in  Moscow- 
human  rights,  on  regional  conflicts,  oi 
greater  contacts  between  the  people  ( 
the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United  Sta 
We  exchanged  the  documents  that  pu 
into  force  a  historic  treaty  that  elimi- 
nates for  the  first  time  an  entire  clas 
U.S.  and  Soviet  nuclear  weapons  and 
establishes  real  breakthroughs  in 
verification  procedures.  And  we  made 
tangible  progress  toward  an  even  moi 
historic  treaty  on  strategic  weapons- 
yes,  a  50%  reduction  in  nuclear  weapc 
All  of  this  was  good  and  promising  foi 
the  future. 

But  there's  something  else  I  wan 
tell  you  about.  I  wish  you  could've  sei 
the  faces  we  saw  in  the  Soviet  Union. 
I  said  to  the  young  people  at  Moscow 
State  University,  it  was  hard,  really, 
tell  them  apart  from  any  other  group 
students — in  our  country  or  anywhert 
else  in  the  world. 

And  as  I  told  Mr.  Gorbachev,  the 
were  also  the  faces,  young  and  old,  w 
saw  on  the  streets  of  Moscow.  At  firs 


40 


FEATURE 
Moscow  Summit 


hall  an.vthing  else  they  were 
I'aces,  but  as  time  went  on,  the 
•cgan  and  then  the  waves.  And  I 
i\e  to  tell  you  Nancy  and  I  smiled 
il  waved  just  as  hard.  The  truth 
line  to  us  once  again.  It  isn't 
hut  governments  that  make  war. 
:>n't  people,  but  governments 
ct  barriers  that  keep  us  apart. 
;ih  is  happening  in  the  Soviet 
We  hope  and  pray  that  the  signs 
-e  continue  there.  Our  pledge — 
rhachev  and  I — is  to  work  to 
■  building  a  better  understanding 
II  our  two  countries.  But  let's 
niT,  too,  that  just  as  our  forward 
y  of  peace  and  freedom  antici- 
li  positive  changes,  it  remains  ready 
ki'  us  over  any  bumps  in  the  road. 
at's  because  our  strategy  is  based 
m  the  eventual  triumph  of 
..-  iVeedom. 

Tliat  faith  in  freedom,  that  abiding 
f  111  what  the  unfettered  human 
an  accomplish,  defines  us  as  a 
and  a  nation.  And  you  know,  I've 
1(1  that  even  a  few  veteran 
ists  said  a  chill  went  through 
lis  week  at  a  sight  they  never 
!  they  would  see  in  their  lifetime: 
rican  President  there  in  the  heart 
'iw  talking  about  economic,  politi- 
I  individual  freedoms  to  the  future 
I  if  the  Soviet  Union;  explaining 
'('(lom  makes  a  difference,  and 
iiig  how  freedom  works;  talking, 
'  lut  the  possibility  of  a  new  age  of 
ity  and  peace,  where  old  antago- 
n'tween  nations  can  someday  be 
iind  us,  a  new  age  that  can  be  ours 
we'll  reach  out  to  it. 
I. allies  and  gentlemen,  all  across  our 
tr\-  during  these  weeks  of  spring  it's 
lion  time.  And  I  hope  our  young 
('S  know  what  a  sudden,  starthng 
may  now  be  before  them,  a  future 
;  about  by  a  technological  and 
luiiion  revolution  based  on  a  grow- 


ing understanding  of  the  nexus  between 
economic  growth  and  creative  freedom. 
But  I  hope,  too,  that  young  Americans — 
and  all  Americans — will  always  remem- 
ber that  this  revolution  is  only  the 
continuation  of  a  revolution  begun  two 
centuries  ago,  a  revolution  of  hope,  a 
hope  that  someday  a  new  land  might 
become  a  place  where  ft'eedom's  light 
would  beacon  forth.  That  faith  in  free- 
dom, that  belief  in  the  inalienable  rights 
of  man,  begun  in  Cai-penters  Hall  in 
Philadelphia  traveled  last  week  to  the 
Lenin  Hills  in  Moscow.  It  was  the 
selflessness  of  so  many  Americans  that 
brought  it  there,  selflessness  by  Ameri- 
cans for  over  two  centuries,  but  espe- 
cially by  those  Americans  who  fought 
what  has  truly  been  called  the  twilight 
stiniggle  of  the  postwar  years,  a  struggle 
where  national  interest  was  not  always 
clearly  defined  or  adversaries  easily 
identified  or  sacrifice  fully  appreciated. 
Now,  more  than  ever,  we  must  continue. 
The  judgment  of  future  generations  will 
be  harsh  upon  us  if,  after  so  much 
sacrifice  and  now  at  the  hour  of  hope,  we 
falter  or  fail.  Let  us  resolve  to  continue, 
one  nation,  one  people,  united  in  our  love 
of  peace  and  freedom,  determined  to 
keep  our  defenses  strong,  to  stand  with 
those  who  struggle  for  freedom  across 
the  world,  to  keep  America  a  shining 
city,  a  light  unto  the  nations. 

And  let  us  remember,  too,  that 
there's  work  remaining  here  at  home, 
that  whatever  the  accomplishments  of 
America,  we  must  never  be  prideful 
toward  others.  We  have  much  to  learn 
from  peoples  of  foreign  lands  and  other 
cultures,  nor  should  we  ever  grow 
content.  Let  us  never  rest  until  every 
American  of  every  race  or  background 
knows  the  full  blessing  of  liberty,  until 
justice  for  all  is  truly  justice  for  all.  And 
most  of  all,  let  us  remember  that  being 
an  American  means  remembering  an- 
other loyalty,  a  loyalty,  as  the  hymn  puts 


it,  "to  another  country  I  have  heard  of,  a 
place  whose  King  is  never  seen  and 
whose  armies  cannot  be  counted." 

And  yet  if  patriotism  is  not  the  only 
thing,  it  is  one  of  the  best  things.  And  we 
can  be  grateful  to  God  that  we  have  seen 
such  a  rebirth  of  it  here  in  this  country. 
And  you  know,  it's  true,  frequently  when 
such  moments  happen  in  a  nation's 
history,  there's  a  popular  saying  or  song 
that  speaks  for  that  time.  And  just 
maybe  this  verse  sounds  familiar  to  you: 
"If  tomorrow,  all  things  were  gone  I'd 
worked  for  all  my  life,  and  I  had  to  start 
again  vrith  just  my  children  and  my  wife, 
I'd  thank  my  lucky  stars  to  be  living  here 
today  'cause  the  flag  still  stands  for 
freedom  and  they  can't  take  that  away." 

Nancy  and  I  have  full  hearts  today. 
We're  grateful  to  all  of  you  and  to  the 
American  people,  grateful  for  the  chance 
to  serve,  grateful  for  all  the  support  and 
warmth  that  you've  given  us  over  the 
years.  And  you  know  what  else?  We 
think  our  friend  Lee  Greenwood  has  it 
just  right,  "All  our  days,  and  especially 
today,  there  ain't  no  doubt  we  love  this 
land.  God  bless  the  U.S.A." 


'Tfext  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  May  30,  1988. 

-Tfe.xt  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  June  6,  1988. 

^Made  in  St.  George's  Hall  at  the  Grand 
Kremlin  Palace  (text  from  Weekly  Compila- 
tion of  Presidential  Documents  of  June  6). 

^General  Secretary  Gorbachev  spoke  in 
Russian,  and  his  remarks  were  translated  by 
an  interpreter. 

'Made  in  the  ballroon  of  the  U.S.  Ambas- 
sador's residence  (text  from  Weekly  Compila- 
tion of  Presidential  Documents  of  June  6). 

''Made  in  St.  Vladimir's  Hall  at  the  Grand 
Kremlin  Palace  (text  from  Weekly  Compila- 
tion of  Presidential  Documents  of  June  6). 

'Question-and-answer  session  following 
President  Reagan's  remarks  is  not  printed 
here  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  June  6). 

^Press  release  101  of  June  2.  ■ 


irtment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


41 


Summary  of  U.S. -Soviet  Agreements 
Signed  in  IVIoscow 


Joint  Verification  Experiment 

The  security  and  arms  control  working 
group  completed  the  technical  details  of 
the  joint  verification  experiment  (JVE) 
enabling  us  to  sign  the  agreements  on 
May  31,  1988.  The  technical  agreements 
cover  some  160  pages  including  37 
annexes.  ^ 

This  is  an  important  step  toward 
agreement  on  effective  verification  meas- 
ures that  would  permit  ratification  of  the 
Threshold  T?st  Ban  Treaty  (TTBT)  and 
the  Peaceful  Nuclear  Explosions  Treaty 
(PNET). 

The  agreements  on  the  JVE  will 
provide  the  opportunity  for  each  side  to 
measure,  using  its  preferred  techniques, 
the  yield  of  one  nuclear  explosion  by  the 
other  party. 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  joint  verifi- 
cation experiment  process,  which  will 
include  analysis  by  each  side  and  ex- 
change of  data,  the  United  States  hopes 
that  the  Soviets  will  be  in  a  position  to 
accept  routine  U.S.  use  of  CORRTEX 
[continuous  reflectrometry  for  radius  vs. 
time  experiment]  as  an  appropriate 
method  of  verification.  We  hope  the  joint 
verification  experiment  can  be  completed 
this  summer. 

The  two  tests  to  be  conducted  will  be 
greater  than  100  kilotons  and  will  ap- 
proach the  TTBT  limit  of  150  kilotons. 
The  U.S.  test  will  be  at  the  Nevada  test 
site  and  the  Soviet  test  will  be  at  the 
Semipalatinsk  test  site. 

Peaceful  Uses  of  Atomic  Energy 

The  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  Agreement  on  Scien- 
tific and  Tfechnical  Cooperation  in  the 
Field  of  Peaceful  Uses  of  Atomic  Energy 
was  originally  signed  in  June  1973  by 
President  Nixon  and  General  Secretary 
Brezhnev.  The  Department  of  Energy 
administers  the  implementation  of 
cooperation  and  has  the  programmatic 
and  oversight  responsibility  for  U.S. 
participation  in  activities  under  the 
agreement. 


42 


The  agreement  provides  for  joint 
cooperation  in  the  fields  of  fusion  and  high 
energy  physics  and  will  continue  to  serve 
as  the  basis  for  future  bilateral  activities 
in  civilian  uses  of  atomic  energy. 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  seventh 
meeting  of  the  joint  committee  for  the 
agreement,  which  concluded  May  2,  1988, 
in  Washington,  the  two  sides  endorsed  a 
1-year  extension  of  the  agreement  to 
permit  the  conclusion  of  amendments  to 
the  original  intellectual  property  rights. 
The  two  sides  expressed  their  interest  in 
extending  the  agreement  for  a  period  of 
5-10  years  when  these  amendments  are 
completed.  They  also  endorsed  new  work 
progi-ams  in  fusion  and  physics  and  signed 
into  force  a  new  Memorandum  of  Coop- 
eration on  Civilian  Nuclear  Reactor 
Safety. 

In  hght  of  the  benefits  resulting  from 
this  longstanding  agreement  and  given 
the  significance  of  the  new  nuclear  safety 
accord,  the  two  sides  agreed  that  e.xten- 
sion  of  the  agreement  should  be  effected 
by  an  exchange  of  diplomatic  notes  on  the 
occasion  of  the  visit  of  President  Reagan 
to  the  Soviet  Union. 

Transportation  Science  and  Tbchnology 

The  major  interest  of  the  United  States  in 
pursuing  cooperation  is  to  achieve  a 
higher  degree  of  safety  in  national  and 
international  transportation  systems  by 
the  exchange  of  technical  information  and 
operational  experience  with  the  Soviets. 
Specific  areas  for  cooperation  identified  in 
the  agreement  are  civil  aviation  naviga- 
tion systems,  aviation  medicine,  and  air 
accident  investigation;  railroad  safety, 
including  locomotive  engineer  selection 
and  training,  human  factors  affecting 
crew  performance,  and  railway  bridge 
inspection;  highway  bridge  construction; 
and  highway  and  traffic  safety  programs. 
No  formal  agreement  on  cooperation 
in  transportation  has  existed  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  since 
September  1983  when  the  Soviet  Union 
shot  down  Korean  Air  Lines  #007.  At  that 


time.  President  Reagan  cancelled  plans 
for  negotiations  for  renewing  the  1973  ; 
transportation  agreement,  thus  allowir| 
it  to  lapse.  Since  then  cooperative  con- 
tacts have  been  limited  to  work  in  intei 
national  organizations,  such  as  the  Int 
national  Civil  Aviation  Organization 
(ICAO),  and  ad  hoc  bilateral  meetings 
aviation  safety  problems. 

During  the  1986  Reykjavik  summi 
President  Reagan  and  General  Secret 
Gorbachev  agreed  that  the  two  sides 
should  explore  interest  in  a  new  agree 
ment  in  bilateral  transportation  coopf 
tion.  During  1987  the  two  sides  ex- 
changed lists  of  possible  areas  for  coop 
eration.  They  met  in  January  1988  in 
Washington  for  exploratory  talks  on 
these  areas.  Negotiations  followed  in 
April  1988  in  Moscow  and  an  agreeme) 
was  initialed  ad  referendum  in  Washir 
ton  on  May  13,  1988. 

Maritime  Search  and  Rescue 

The  U.S.  Coast  Guard  and  the  Soviets 
began  discussions  in  1985  in  an  effort  i 
improve  coordination  between  U.S.  ai 
Soviet  search-and-rescue  centers  in  th 
North  Pacific-Bering  Sea  area.  The  ai 
of  these  negotiations  was  to  improve 
safety  for  seamen  of  all  nations  in  the 
area.  Further  rounds  of  talks  were  hel 
1987  and  1988,  the  last  round  resultin 
conclusion  of  an  agreement. 

Under  this  Search  and  Rescue 
Agreement,  procedures  are  establish^ 
to  coordinate  search-and-rescue  opera 
tions  in  the  North  Pacific  and  Bering  i 
including  provisions  for  effective  com 
nication  between  U.S.  and  Soviet  sea 
and-rescue  centers  and  control  and  c 
dination  of  search  activities. 


Comprehensive  Fishing 

Since  implementation  of  the  Magnuso 
Fishery  Conservation  and  Manageme 
Act  in  1977,  Soviet  vessels  have  fishf 
U.S.  waters  under  the  terms  of  a  Gov 
ing  International  Fisheries  Agreemer 
Until  recently  U.S.  fishermen  were  u 
able  to  utilize  the  total  available  catch 
U.S.  waters  off  Alaska,  and  surplus 
stocks  were  allocated  to  the  Soviet  U 
and  other  nations  for  direct  harvest  a 
mutually  beneficial  joint  ventures.  I 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/August  J 


FEATURE 
Moscow  Summit 


V  ■,  now  that  U.S.  fishermen  are  able  td 
a.est  nearly  all  available  fish  in  U.S. 
■.■;M-'^,  they  are  interested  in  fishing 
iiM  unities  in  waters  of  other  nations. 
I  ifsult,  Secretary  Shultz  and  Foreign 
\>U'V  Shevardnadze  signed  an  interim 
•nis  agreement  on  February  21, 
dividing  U.S.  fishermen  equal 
o  Soviet  waters.  U.S.  fishermen 
,  ;  .inarily  interested  in  fishing  for 
• ',  pdUuck,  and  other  species  off  the 
;i  (.iiast  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

We  have  now  negotiated  a  new  5- 
t  ■  Comprehensive  Fishing  Agreement 
' !  the  Soviet  Union  replacing  both  the 
filling  International  Fisheries  Agi-ee- 
t  and  the  interim  fishing  agi-eement  of 
I  iiary  21.  The  agreement  will  govern, 
,    r  similar  terms,  access  to  the  200- 
i£  ical-mile  zones  of  both  countries  by 
if  ng  vessels  of  the  other  country. 
J  er  its  terms,  U.S.  and  Soviet  fisher- 
II  are  likely  to  undertake  joint  ventures 
IT  other  cooperative  arrangements  in 
b  zones  of  the  two  countries. 

The  Comprehensive  Fishing  Agree- 
n  t  also  identifies  areas  of  mutual  inter- 
ns n  the  field  of  fishery  science  and 
;o  ervation,  such  as  fisheries  in  the 
n  rnational  waters  of  the  Bering  Sea 
ir  high  seas  salmon  fisheries.  It  also 
!S  blishes  a  U.S. -Soviet  Intergovern- 
n:  tal  Fisheries  Committee  to  review, 
>r  regular  basis,  all  aspects  of  the 
)i  eral  fisheries  relationship. 

>  er  Space 

iipril  1987,  Secretary  Shultz  and  For- 
I  Minister  Shevardnadze  signed  the 
eement  for  Cooperation  in  the  Explo- 
Dn  and  Use  of  Outer  Space  for  Peace- 
purposes.  The  agreement  provides  for 
establishment  of  five  joint  working 
ips  in  the  fields  of  solar  system  explo- 
on,  space  astronomy  and  astro- 
sics,  earth  sciences,  solar  ten-estrial 
sics,  and  space  biology  and  medicine, 
five  joint  working  groups  have  met. 
ir  agendas  have  been  based  on  one  or 
■e  of  the  initial  16  cooperative  projects 
ch  are  listed  in  the  annex  to  the  Outer 
ce  Agreement. 

In  light  of  the  progress  made  under 
Outer  Space  Agreement,  both  sides 


Secretary  Shultz  and  Foreign  Minister 
Shevardnadze  shake  hands  after  signing 
the  Soviet-U.S.  Strategic  Ballistic  Mis- 
sile Launch  Notification  Agreement. 
The  agreement  is  a  practical  new 
step  designed  to  reduce  the  risk  of  misin- 
terpretation, miscalculation,  or  accident. 
In  the  START  negotiations,  both  sides 
have  proposed  that  there  be  notification 
of  launches  of  ICBMs  and  SLBMs.  Both 
sides  launch  such  missiles  from  time  to 
time  for  purposes  of  testing,  training, 
and  maintaining  their  reliability.  The 
sides  have  very  similar  language  to  im- 
plement such  notifications  in  the  joint 


draft  text  of  the  START  agreement  in 
Geneva.  Given  this  common  approach  to 
launch  notification,  the  United  States 
proposed — at  the  meeting  of  foreign  min- 
isters in  mid-May  in  Geneva — that  we 
separate  this  provision  from  the  START 
treaty  and  reach  an  agreement  on  this 
subject  now.  The  agreement  requires  no- 
tification of  all  ICBM  and  SLBM 
launches  at  least  21  hours  in  advance. 
The  notification  would  include  the 
planned  date  of  launch,  the  launch  area, 
and  the  impact  area.  The  notifications 
will  be  made  through  the  Nuclear  Risk 
Reduction  Centers. 


i)s!ffl)artment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


43 


have  agreed  to  continue  to  expand  coop- 
eration in  space  science.  They  have 
agreed  to  expand  exchanges  of  space 
science  data  and  exchanges  of  scientists, 
as  well  as  to  exchange  opportunities  for 
the  flight  of  scientific  instruments  on  each 
other's  manned  and  unmanned  space- 
craft. Finally  they  have  undertaken  to 
exchange  the  results  of  independent  na- 
tional studies  on  future  unmanned  solar 
system  exploration  missions  as  a  means  of 
assessing  prospects  for  future  U.S.- 
Soviet cooperation  on  such  missions. 

Radionavigation 

The  United  States  and  the  U.S.S.R.  each 
operates  low  frequency  long-range  radio- 
navigation  systems  (U.S. — Loran-C; 
U.S.S.R. — Chayka).  Because  of  the  na- 
ture of  these  systems,  there  e.xists  the 
possibility  of  their  interfering  with  each 
other,  degrading  their  usefutaess.  Inter- 
ference may  render  some  portions  of  the 
systems  unusable,  thus  creating  situ- 
ations which  could  result  in  navigation 
safety  problems. 

To  deal  with  such  potential  problems 
and  to  provide  safe  and  efficient  radio- 
navigation  services,  the  U.S.  Coast 
Guard  and  the  Soviets  began  talks  in 
1980.  Further  rounds  of  discussions  were 
held  in  1985,  1987,  and  1988  dealing  with 
technical  issues,  including  developing 
common  terms  for  the  glossary  of  radio- 
navigation  systems,  resolving  interfer- 
ence problems,  and  exploring  ways  in 
which  the  systems  might  be  made  inter- 
operable. 

In  Leningrad  in  April  1988,  the  Coast 
Guard  and  the  Soviets  concluded  work  on 
an  agreement  establishing  operational  co- 
ordination between  a  U.S.  radio- 
navigation  station  in  Alaska  and  three 
Soviet  stations  in  Siberia,  providing  cov- 
erage in  the  North  Pacific  and  Bering  Sea 
areas.  The  agreement  will  provide  for 
safer  and  more  efficient  marine  and  avia- 
tion navigation  in  those  areas. 


Cooperation  and  Exchanges,  1989-91 

On  November  21,  1985,  at  the  Geneva 
summit.  President  Reagan  and  General 
Secretary  Gorbachev  witnessed  the  sign- 
ing by  Secretary  Shultz  and  Foreign  Min- 
ister Shevardnadze  of  a  new  bilateral 
agreement  on  cooperation  and  exchanges 
in  the  broad  fields  of  culture,  informa- 
tion, and  education.  The  agreement, 
known  as  the  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  General 
Exchanges  Agreement,  is  in  force  for  6 
years  (1986-91)  and  renews  an  official 
exchange  relationship  that  dates  back  to 
the  late  1950s.  There  was  no  intergovern- 
mental agreement  during  the  6  years  fol- 
lowing the  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghani- 
stan. 

The  General  Exchanges  Agreement 
serves  two  functions. 

First,  it  mandates  specific  exchanges 
to  be  carried  out  by  each  government, 
such  as  exchanges  of  performing  artists 
and  groups,  distribution  of  USIA's  Rus- 
sian-language magazine  America  and  the 
Soviet  Enghsh-language  pubhcation  So- 
viet Life  ,  a  variety  of  educational  and 
academic  exchanges,  and  an  exchange  of 
traveling  thematic  exhibitions. 

Second,  the  General  Exchanges 
Agreement  encourages  the  broadest  pos- 
sible people-to-people  contact  between 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union. 
Many  of  these  pi'ograms  are  handled  by 
the  Office  of  the  President's  U.S. -Soviet 
Exchange  Initiative  at  the  U.S.  Infor- 
mation Agency  (USIA)  in  cooperation 
with  the  U.S.  private  sector;  many  others 
are  entirely  private. 

The  agreement  signed  at  the  summit 
is  an  implementing  accord  for  the  next  3 
years  (1989-91)  under  the  General  Ex- 
changes Agreement.  It  is  no  mere  exten- 
sion of  the  previous  agreement,  however, 
but  an  expansion  and  an  improvement 
which  reflects  the  good  will  of  both 
parties. 

Some  of  the  key  areas  of  improve- 
ment in  the  new  program  are: 

•    Agreement  to  conduct  negotia- 
tions during  this  period  on  the  opening  of 


culture  and  information  centers  with  tl  i 
goal  of  signing  an  agreement  to  this  | 
effect;  ! 

•  Strong  support  for  a  variety  of  • 
exchanges  of  young  people,  at  the  highi 
school  and  university  level,  including  1 
guage  study,  regular  academic  courses 
summer  programs,  camps,  home  visits 
and  so  forth; 

•  Increased  distribution  of  the 
magazine  America; 

•  The  first  official  exchanges  be- 
tween conservatories  and  art  institute: 

•  Improved  financial  conditions  fc 
U.S.  scholars  in  the  U.S.S.R.;  and 

•  Language  reflecting  a  wide  var 
ety  of  agreements  between  U.S.  and 
Soviet  organizations  such  as  the  Libra 
of  Congress  and  the  Lenin  Library,  th 
National  Archives  and  the  U.S.S.R,  N 
Administration  for  Archives,  as  well 
other  projects,  such  as  a  possible  U. 
U.S.S.R.  cultural  exhibition. 


The  establishment  of  an  Americai 
culture  and  information  center  in  the 
Soviet  Union  has  been  a  longstanding 
objective  of  the  U.S.  Government.  Th 
U.S.  Information  Agency  operates  sue 
centers  in  scores  of  countries  around  t 
world  and  has  long  believed  that  the 
establishment  of  such  centers  on  a 
reciprocal  basis  would  be  a  major,  eve 
historic,  step  in  the  development  of  ou 
bilateral  relationship. 

Under  the  General  Exchanges 
Agreement,  we  have  now  agreed  with 
Soviet  Union  to  conduct  negotiations  ( 
the  opening  of  culture  and  informatior 
centers  between  now  and  1991  with  th 
goal  of  signing  an  agreement  to  this  ef 
and  establishing  such  centers  as  soon 
possible. 

Culture  and  information  centers  £ 
gage  in  a  vidde  range  of  activities: 

•  Lending  libraries  for  books,  pe 
odicals,  videotapes,  and  even  video  eq 
ment; 

•  Seminars  and  round-tables  on 
topics  of  interest; 

•  Participation  in  live  satellite  in 
actives; 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/August  V 


FEATURE 
Moscow  Summit 


•  Shdvvings  of  films  and  live  televi- 

•  Art  shows  and  exhibits; 

•  Engligh-language  teaching  and 
si  dent  counseling;  and 

•  Presentation  of  speakers  on  topics 

■  lit  crest. 

H  :h  School  Exchange  Proposal 

I  'resident  proposed,  and  General 

-  n  tary  Gorbachev  agreed,  to  expand 
i  i'l-csident's  U.S. -Soviet  Exchange 
.;  laiive,  established  by  agreement  in 
J  ie\a  in  1985. 

Negotiations  will  begin  immediately 
u  reate  student  exchange  programs 
bt  ween  100  American  and  100  Soviet 
fa  1  schools  per  year,  with  a  goal  of 
"•  hanging  1,000-1,500  high  school  stu- 
ts  ill  each  direction  within  2  years. 
!■  current  agreements  would  allow  no 
■i  than  50  Soviet  and  American  stu- 
t-  pursuing  studies  in  the  other  coun- 
u  annually.) 

Specific  programs  would  be  negoti- 
ai  i  for  the  exchange  schools,  but  the 
g  eral  guidelines  would  provide  for  stu- 
d  ts  to  study  in  each  other's  schools  for 
p  iods  of  at  least  1  month.  The  program 
w  lid  focus  on  academics  with  a  foreign 
la  ^age  emphasis. 

The  goal  in  the  first  year  would  be  to 
d  elop  student  exchange  programs  in 

II  >  public  and  private  schools  and  to 
il  100  schools  in  each  country  in  the 

5(  )nd  year. 


Currently  there  are  over  500  U.S. 
schools  with  some  Russian  language  pro- 
grams; another  300  schools  have  potential 
for  such  programs. 

Many  Soviet  students  would  live  with 
American  families.  The  American  stu- 
dents would  either  stay  in  Soviet  homes 
or  live  in  dormitories  with  shared  home 
hospitality  and  meals  shared  with  a  Soviet 
family. 

The  host  school  would  arrange  at 
least  one  trip  for  visiting  students  to  a 
city  for  a  program  of  sightseeing  and 
cultural  events. 

The  American  Council  of  Tfeachers  of 
Russian  (ACTR)  and  the  National  Asso- 
ciation of  Secondary  School  Principals 
(NASSP)  have  been  actively  involved  in 
U.S.-U.S.S.R.  student  exchanges  and 
are  interested  in  being  involved  in  this 
project.  Other  private  sector  organiza- 
tions will  be  invited  to  support  the  pro- 
gram. There  are  already  three  such  ex- 
changes in  existence. 

•    Phillips  Academy  in  Andover, 
Mass.,  and  the  Physics  Mathematics  In- 
stitute in  Novosibirsk  signed  an  agree- 
ment for  an  annual  5-week  exchange  of  10 
students  and  two  leaders.  The  schools 
conducted  the  first  exchange  in  March- 
April  1987  and  the  second  exchange  in 
September-Octoer  1987.  The  Novosi- 
birsk students  met  with  R-esident  Rea- 
gan in  October  1987.  The  third  exchange 
is  scheduled  for  September-October 


•  Choate  Rosemary  Hall  in 
Walhngford,  Conn.,  and  Moscow  School 
#18  signed  an  agreement  in  January  1988 
for  an  annual  4-week  exchange  of  five 
students  and  one  leader.  The  first  group 
of  Moscow  School  #18  students  has  been 
studying  at  Choate  from  April  17  to  May 
20.  The  first  group  of  Choate  students  will 
visit  Moscow  in  September  1988. 

•  Under  the  rubric  of  sister-cities 
exchange,  the  McDonogh  School  in  Balti- 
more sent  a  group  of  students  to  Odessa 
for  3  weeks  in  September  1987  and  Odessa 
School  #119  sent  a  group  of  students  to 
Baltimore  for  3  weeks  in  March-April 
1988.  The  Odessa  school  students  met 
with  Vice  President  Bush  in  late  March. 
The  next  exchange  is  scheduled  for  the 
spring  of  1989. 

These  are  private  schools  in  the 
United  States.  The  first  public  school 
invitation  (Lakeside  School  in  Seattle, 
Wash. ,  invited  Moscow  School  #20)  has 
not  yet  been  accepted. 


'For  text  of  the  agreement  (without  an- 
nexes), see  p.  67.  ■ 


|>artment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


45 


Prime  Minister  Mulroney  and  President  Reagan  at  welcoming  ceremony. 


46 


FEATURE 


JO.W.IET  TORONTO  SL'MMIT 


Toronto  Economic  Summit 


President  Reagan  attended  the  lith  economic  summit 

of  the  industrialized  nations  in  Toronto 

June  19-21,  1988,  which  was  hosted  by 

Canadian  Prime  Minister  Brian  Mulroney. 

The  other  participants  were 

President  Francois  Mitterrand  (France), 

Chancellor  Helmut  Kohl  (West  Germany), 

Prime  Minister  Ciriaco  De  Mita  (Italy), 

Prime  Minister  Noboru  Takeshita  (Japan), 

Prime  Minister  Margaret  Thatcher  (United  Kingdom), 

and  Jacques  Delors,  President 

of  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities. 


PiLITICAL  DECLARATION, 
J  NE  20,  1988 


e  t-West 

I.  'e  the  leaders  of  our  seven  countries,  and 
i  •e|)resentatives  of  the  European  Commu- 
li ,  uphold  common  principles  of  freedom, 

■  lit  for  individual  rights,  and  the  desire  of 
III!  t(]  Uve  in  peace  under  the  rule  of  law. 
I'^nples  stand  in  solidarity  within  the 

■  -irk  of  our  existing  alliances  for  the 
I  freedom,  to  safeguard  democracy  and 
verity  which  it  has  produced.  In  our 
hins  we  considered  how  these  goals  and 
I  Duld  be  pursued  in  the  field  of  foreign 

■  ii's.  particularly  with  regard  to  East-West 
Tttion.s. 

We  discussed  a  wide  range  of  regional 

i  <tiiins  and  these  discussions  are  continuing 

'  Hii;h(iut  the  Summit. 
\\V  confirmed  our  belief  in  constructive 
n-alistic  dialogue  and  cooperation,  in- 
iiiK  arms  control,  human  rights,  and  re- 

-  lal  is.-iues,  as  the  way  to  build  stabiUty 
'.  >in  East  and  West  and  enhance  security 
>\\>-y  levels  of  arms.  We  also  reaffmned 

.  .  fur  the  foreseeable  future  nuclear  deter- 

■  .-e  and  adequate  conventional  strength  are 
.eniarantees  of  peace  in  freedom. 

In  several  important  respects  changes 
f  taken  place  in  relations  between  Western 

■  ntnes  and  the  Soviet  Union  since  we  last 
.  For  our  part  this  evolution  has  come 

iiut  because  the  industrialized  democracies 


have  been  strong  and  united.  In  the  Soviet 
Union  greater  freedom  and  openness  will  offer 
opportunities  to  reduce  mistrust  and  build 
confidence.  Each  of  us  will  respond  positively 
to  any  such  developments. 

5.  We  welcome  the  beginning  of  the  Soviet 
withdrawal  of  its  occupation  troops  from  Af- 
ghanistan. It  must  be  total  and  apply  to  the 
entire  country.  The  Afghan  people  must  be 
able  to  choose  their  government  freely.  Each  of 
us  confirms  our  willingness  to  make  our  full 
contribution  to  the  efforts  of  the  international 
community  to  ensure  the  return  of  the  refugees 
to  their  homeland,  their  resettlement,  and  the 
reconstruction  of  their  country.  We  now  look  to 
the  Soviet  Union  to  make  a  constructive 
contribution  to  resolving  other  regional  con- 
flicts as  well. 

6.  Since  our  last  meeting,  progress  has  been 
made  between  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  in  agreeing  to  reduce  nuclear 
weapons  in  a  manner  which  accords  fully  with 
the  security  interests  of  each  of  our  countries. 
The  INF  [Intermediate-Range  Nuclear 
Forces]  Treaty,  the  direct  result  of  Western 
firmness  and  unity,  is  the  first  treaty  ever 
actually  to  reduce  nuclear  arms.  It  sets  vitally 
important  precedents  for  future  arms  control 
agreements;  asymmetrical  reductions  and  in- 
trusive verification  arrangements.  We  now 
look  for  deep  cuts  in  U.S.  and  Soviet  strategic 
offensive  ai-ms.  We  congratulate  President 
Reagan  on  what  he  has  already  accomplished, 
along  with  General  Secretary  Gorbachev,  to- 
wards this  goal. 

7.  Nonetheless,  the  massive  presence  of 
Soviet  conventional  forces  in  Eastern  Europe, 


the  ensuing  conventional  superiority  of  the 
Warsaw  Pact,  and  its  capacity  to  launch 
surprise  attacks  and  large  scale  offensive 
operations,  lie  at  the  core  of  the  security 
problem  in  Europe.  The  Soviet  military 
buildup  in  the  Far  East  is  equally  a  major 
source  of  instability  in  Asia.  These  threats 
must  be  reduced.  Our  goal  is  enhanced  security 
and  stability  at  lower  levels  of  forces,  after 
having  ehminated  the  present  imbalances.  We 
seek  the  early  establishment  of  a  comprehen- 
sive, effectively  verifiable,  and  truly  global  ban 
on  chemical  weapons. 

8.  Genuine  peace  cannot  be  established 
solely  by  arms  control.  It  must  be  firmly  based 
on  respect  for  fundamental  human  rights.  We 
urge  the  Soviet  Union  to  move  forward  in 
ensuring  human  dignity  and  freedoms  and  to 
implement  fully  and  strengthen  substantially 
its  commitments  under  the  Helsinki  process. 
Recent  progi'ess  must  be  enshrined  in  law  and 
practice,  the  painful  barriers  that  divide  people 
must  come  down,  and  the  obstacles  to  emigra- 
tion must  be  removed. 

9.  We  pay  special  attention  to  the  countries 
in  Eastern  Europe.  We  encourage  them  to 
open  up  their  economies  and  societies,  and  to 
improve  respect  for  human  rights.  In  this 
context  we  support  the  continuation  and 
strengthening  of  the  Helsinki  process. 

10.  We  take  positive  note  of  Eastern  coun- 
tries' growing  interest  in  ending  their  eco- 
nomic isolation,  for  example  in  the  estab- 
lishment and  development  of  relations  with  the 
European  Community.  East-West  economic 
relations  can  be  expanded  and  serve  our 


«partment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


47 


Summit  participants  from  left  to  right:  President  Delors, 
Prime  Minister  De  Mita,  Prime  Minister  Thatcher,  Presi- 


dent Reagan,  Prime  Minister  Mulroney,  President  Mitter- 
rand, Chancellor  Kohl,  and  Prime  Minister  Takeshita, 


common  interests  so  long  as  the  commercial 
basis  is  sound,  they  are  conducted  within  the 
framework  of  the  basic  principles  and  the  rules 
of  the  international  trade  and  payments  sys- 
tem, and  are  consistent  with  the  security 
interests  of  each  of  our  countries. 


Tferrorism 

11.  We  strongly  reaffirm  our  condemnation  of 
terrorism  in  all  its  forms,  including  the  taking 
of  hostages.  We  renew  our  commitment  to 
policies  and  measures  agreed  at  previous 
Summits,  in  particular  those  against  state- 
sponsored  terrorism. 


12.  We  strongly  condemn  recent  threats  to 
air  security,  in  particular  the  destruction  of  a 
Korean  airliner  and  the  hijacking  of  a  Kuwaiti 
airliner.  We  recall  the  principle  affirmed  in 
previous  declarations  that  terrorists  must  not 
go  unpunished.  We  appeal  to  all  countries  who 
are  not  party  to  the  international  conventions 
on  civil  aviation  security,  in  particular  The 
Hague  Convention,  to  accede  to  those 
conventions. 

13.  We  express  support  for  work  cuiTently 
under  way  in  the  International  Civil  Aviation 
Organization  aimed  at  strengthening  interna- 
tional protection  against  hijackings.  We  wel- 
come the  most  recent  declaration  adopted  by 


the  ICAO  Council  which  endorses  the  prir 
that  hijacked  aircraft  should  not  be  allowe 
take  off  once  they  have  landed,  e.xcept  in 
circumstances  as  specified  in  the  ICAO  de 
ration. 

14.  We  welcome  the  adoption  this  year  i 
Montreal  and  Rome  of  two  international  a 
ments  on  aviation  and  maritime  security  t 
enhance  the  safety  of  travellers. 

15.  We  reaffirm  our  determination  to  co 
tinue  the  fight  against  terrorism  through  i 
application  of  rule  of  law,  the  policy  of  no 
concessions  to  terrorists  and  their  sponsoi 
and  international  cooperation. 


48 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/ August ; 


FEATURE 


S0M,\1£TT0R0NT0-SUM/\1IT 


totics 

'he  illegal  use  of  drugs  and  the  illicit 
.eking  in  them  poses  grave  risks  to  the 
,es  of  Summit  countries  as  well  as  the 
,es  of  source  and  transit  countries.  There 
urgent  need  for  improved  international 
^ration  in  all  appropriate  fora  on  programs 
unter  all  facets  of  the  illicit  drug  problem, 
rticular  production,  trafficking,  and  fi- 
ng  of  the  drug  trade.  The  complexity  of 
roblem  requires  additional  international 
•ration,  in  particular  to  trace,  freeze,  and 
5cate  the  proceeds  of  drug  traffickers,  and 
rb  money  laundering. 
J  We  look  foi-ward  to  the  successful  nego- 
ai  n  in  Vienna  in  November  of  a  United 
fa  ms  Convention  on  illicit  trafficking. 
i  We  supported  the  initiative  of  the  Gov- 
nj  ent  of  the  United  States  for  a  special  task 
)r  to  be  convened  to  propose  methods  of 
iving  cooperation  in  all  areas  including 
gl  nal,  bilateral,  and  multilateral  efforts  in 
K  ght  against  narcotics. 


URMAN'S  SUMMARY 
|))F  POLITICAL  ISSUES, 
IE  20,  19881 

ollowing  represents  an  agreed  summary 
'  discussions  on  the  Middle  East,  South 
I  a,  and  Cambodia. 

le  East 

xpress  our  deep  concern  at  the  increasing 
bility  in  the  Near  East.  The  current 
nee  in  the  Occupied  Tbrritories  is  a  cleai- 
that  the  status  quo  is  not  sustainable.  An 

negotiated  settlement  to  the  underlying 
i/IsraeU  dispute  is  essential.  We  declare  ou>- 
ort  for  the  convening  of  a  properly  struc- 
1  international  conference  as  the  appropri- 
ramework  for  the  necessary  negotiations 
een  the  parties  directly  concerned.  In  this 
oective  we  salute  current  efforts  aimed  at 
•ving  a  settlement,  particulai-ly  the  initia- 
pui-sued  by  Mr  Shultz  since  February.  We 

the  parties  to  cooperate  fully  in  the  seai'ch 

solution. 

5  have  pursued  our  consultations  about  the 
nuing  war  between  Iran  and  Iraq,  which 
lins  a  source  of  profound  concern  to  us.  We 
irm  our  support  for  Security  Council  Reso- 
n  598,  which  was  adopted  unanimously.  We 
ess  our  warm  appreciation  for  the  efforts  of 
secretary  General  to  work  for  a  settlement 


on  this  basis  and  reiterate  oiu-  firni  determina- 
tion to  ensure  implementation  of  this  man- 
datory resolution  by  a  follow-up  resolution.  We 
condemn  the  use  of  chemical  weapons  by  either 
party,  deplore  proliferation  of  balhstic  missies  in 
the  region,  and  renew  ow  commitment  to  up- 
hold the  piinciple  of  freedom  of  navigation  in 
the  Gulf. 


South  Africa 

We  declare  our  abhon-ence  of  apartheid,  which 
must  be  replaced  through  a  process  of  genuine 
national  negotiations  by  a  non-racial  democ- 
racy. 

We  expressed  our  urgent  opinion  on  three 
particular  matters: 

(1)  All  legal  options  available  in  South  Africa 
should  be  used  to  secure  clemency  for  the 
Sharpeville  Six; 

(2)  The  enactment  of  legislation  designed  to 
deprive  anti-apartheid  organisations  of  over- 
seas aid  would  place  severe  strain  on  the 
relations  each  of  us  has  with  South  Africa; 

(3)  We  strongly  support  the  current  nego- 
tiations seeking  national  reconciliation  within 
Angola,  an  end  to  the  Angola/Namibia  conflict, 
and  early  implementation  of  UN  Security 
Council  Resolution  435. 


Cambodia 

As  the  recent  message  from  Prince  Sihanouk 
has  reminded  us,  the  continuing  Cambodian 
conflict  and  the  suffering  of  the  Cambodian 
people  is  of  deep  concern.  We  join  the  vast 
majority  of  the  nations  of  the  world  in  calling 
for  the  prompt  withdrawal  of  all  Vietnamese 
troops.  We  support  a  political  settlement  in 
Cambodia  which  will  provide  for  Cambodian 
self-determination  and  lead  to  the  re- 
emergence  of  a  free  and  independent 
Cambodia. 


ECONOMIC  DECLARATION, 
JUNE  21,  1988 

1.  We,  the  Heads  of  State  or  Government  of 
seven  major  industrial  nations  and  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Commission  of  the  European 
Communities,  have  met  in  Toronto  for  the 
fourteenth  annual  Economic  Summit.  We  have 
drawn  lessons  from  the  past  and  looked  ahead 
to  the  future. 

2.  Over  the  past  fourteen  years,  the  world 
economy  and  economic  policy  have  undergone 


ysl|  lartment  of  State  Bulletin/ August  1988 


profound  changes.  In  particular,  the  informa- 
tion-technology revolution  and  the  globaliza- 
tion of  markets  have  increased  economic  inter- 
dependence, making  it  essential  that  govern- 
ments consider  fully  the  international  dimen- 
sions of  their  deliberations. 

3.  We  observed  a  sharp  contrast  between  the 
1970s  and  1980s.  The  former  was  a  decade  of 
high  and  rising  inflation,  declining  productivity 
growth,  policies  dominated  by  short-term 
considerations,  and  frequently  inadequate  in- 
ternational policy  cooperation.  In  the  1980s 
inflation  has  been  brought  under  control, 
laying  the  basis  for  sustained  strong  growth 
and  improved  productivity.  The  result  has 
been  the  longest  period  of  economic  growth  in 
post-war  history.  However,  the  1980s  have 
seen  the  emergence  of  large  external  imbal- 
ances in  the  major  industrial  economies, 
greater  exchange  rate  volatility,  and  debt- 
servicing  difficulties  in  a  number  of  developing 
countries.  Our  response  to  these  developments 
has  been  an  increased  commitment  to  interna- 
tional cooperation,  resulting  in  the  intensified 
process  of  policy  coordination  adopted  at  the 
1986  Tokyo  Summit  and  further  strengthened 
at  the  Venice  Summit  and  in  the  Group  of 
Seven. 

4.  Summits  have  proven  an  effective  forum 
to  address  the  issues  facing  the  world  econ- 
omy, promote  new  ideas,  and  develop  a  com- 
mon sense  of  purpose.  Especially  in  the  1980s 
they  have  helped  bring  about  an  increasing 
recognition  that  the  eradication  of  inflation  and 
of  inflationary  expectations  is  fundamental  to 
sustained  gi-owth  and  job  creation.  That  recog- 
nition has  been  underpinned  by  a  shift  from 
short-term  considerations  to  a  medium-term 
framework  for  the  development  and  implemen- 
tation of  economic  poUcies,  and  a  commitment 
to  improve  efficiency  and  adaptability  through 
greater  reliance  on  competitive  forces  and 
structural  reform.  Over  this  period  we  have 
also  singled  out  for  concerted  attention  a 
number  of  other  issues  of  decisive  importance: 
the  overriding  need  to  resist  protectionism  and 
strengthen  the  open,  multilateral  trading  sys- 
tem; to  maintain  and  strengthen  an  effective 
strategy  to  address  the  challenge  of  develop- 
ment and  alleviate  the  burden  of  debt;  and  to 
deal  with  the  serious  nature  of  the  world 
agricultural  problem. 

5.  Since  we  last  met,  our  economies  have 
kept  up  the  momentum  of  growth.  Employ- 
ment has  continued  to  expand  generally,  infla- 
tion has  been  restrained,  and  progress  has 
been  made  toward  the  correction  of  major 
external  imbalances.  These  encouraging  devel- 
opments are  cause  for  optimism,  but  not  for 
complacency.  To  sustain  non-inflationary 
growth  will  require  a  commitment  to  enhanced 
cooperation.  This  is  the  key  to  credibility  and 
confidence. 


49 


INTERNATIONAL  ECONOMIC 
POLICY  COOPERATION 

Macroeconomic  Policies 
and  Exchange  Rates 

6.  The  Tokyo  and  Venice  Summits  have  devel- 
oped and  strengthened  the  process  of  coordi- 
nation of  our  economic  policies.  Developments 
in  the  wake  of  the  financial  strains  last  October 
demonstrate  the  effectiveness  and  resilience  of 
the  arrangements  that  have  emerged.  The 
policies,  the  short-term  prospects,  and  the 
medium-term  objectives  and  projections  of  our 
economies  are  being  discussed  regularly  in  the 
Group  of  Seven.  The  policies  and  performance 
are  assessed  on  the  basis  of  economic  indica- 
tors. We  welcome  the  progress  made  in  refin- 
ing the  analytical  use  of  indicators,  as  well  as 
the  addition  to  the  existing  indicators  of  a 
commodity-price  indicator.  The  progress  in 
coordination  is  contributing  to  the  process  of 
further  improving  the  functioning  of  the  inter- 
national monetary  system. 

7.  Fiscal,  monetary,  and  structural  policies 
have  been  undertaken  to  foster  the  adjustment 
to  more  sustainable  economic  and  financial 
positions  in  the  conte.xt  of  non-inflationary 
growth.  Efforts  in  those  directions,  including 
continued  reduction  of  budetary  deficits,  will 
continue.  We  need  to  maintain  vigilance 
against  any  resurgence  of  inflation.  We  reaf- 
firm our  determination  to  follow  and,  wherever 
feasible,  strengthen  our  agreed  strategy  of 
coordinated  efforts  to  reduce  the  growth  of 
spending  in  countries  with  large  e.xtemal 
deficits  and  to  sustain  the  momentum  of 
domestic  demand  in  those  with  large  external 
surpluses.  The  reduction  of  large  external 
imbalances,  however,  will  require  not  only  our 
cooperative  efforts,  but  also  those  of  smaller 
economies,  including  newly  industrializing 
economies,  with  large  external  surpluses. 

8.  The  exchange  rate  changes  in  the  past 
three  years,  especially  the  depreciation  of  the 
U.S.  dollar  against  the  Japanese  yen  and  the 
major  European  cuiTencies,  have  played  a 
major  role  in  the  adjustment  of  real  trade 
balances.  We  endorse  the  Group  of  Seven's 
conclusion  that  either  excessive  fluctuation  of 
exchange  rates,  a  further  dechne  of  the  dollar, 
or  a  rise  in  the  dollar  to  an  extent  that  becomes 
destabilizing  to  the  adjustment  process,  could 
be  counterproductive  by  damaging  growth 
prospects  in  the  world  economy. 

Structural  Reforms 

9.  International  cooperation  involves  more 
than  coordination  of  macroeconomic  policies. 
Structural  reforms  complement  macro- 
economic  policies,  enhance  their  effectiveness, 
and  provide  the  basis  for  more  robust  growth. 


We  shall  collectively  review  our  progress  on 
structural  reforms  and  shall  strive  to  integrate 
structural  policies  into  our  economic  coordina- 
tion process. 

10.  We  will  continue  to  pursue  structural 
reforms  by  removing  barriers,  unnecessary 
controls,  and  regulations;  increasing  competi- 
tion, while  mitigating  adverse  effects  on  social 
groups  or  regions;  removing  disincentives  to 
work,  save,  and  invest,  such  as  through  tax 
reform;  and  by  improving  education  and  train- 
ing. The  specific  priorities  that  each  of  us  has 
identified  are  outlined  in  the  attached  Annex 
on  Structural  Reforms. 

11.  We  welcome  the  further  development  of 
the  OECD's  [Organization  for  Economic  Coop- 
eration and  Development]  surveillance  of 
structural  reforms.  Such  surveillance  would  be 
particularly  useful  in  improving  pubhc  under- 
standing of  the  reforms  by  revealing  their 
impact  on  government  budgets,  consumer 
prices,  and  international  trade. 

12.  One  of  the  major  structural  problems  in 
both  developed  and  developing  countries  is  in 
the  field  of  agricultural  policies.  It  is  essential 
that  recent  significant  policy  reform  efforts 
undertaken  by  a  number  of  parties  be  contin- 
ued through  further  positive  action  by  all 
Summit  participants.  More  market-oriented 
agricultural  policies  should  assist  in  the 
achievement  of  important  objectives  such  as 
preserving  rural  areas  and  family  farming, 
raising  quality  standards,  and  protecting  the 
environment.  We  welcome  the  OECD's  in- 
creased emphasis  on  structural  adjustment  and 
development  in  the  rural  economy. 

13.  Financial  and  technological  innovations 
are  rapidly  integi'ating  financial  markets  inter- 
nationally, contributing  to  a  better  allocation  of 
capital  but  also  increasing  the  speed  and  extent 
to  which  disturbances  in  one  country  may  be 
transmitted  to  other  countries.  We  will  con- 
tinue to  cooperate  with  other  countries  in  the 
examination  of  the  functioning  of  the  global 
financial  system,  including  securities  markets. 


MULTILATERAL  TRADING 
SYSTEM/URUGUAY  ROUND 

14.  A  successful  Uruguay  Round  will  assure 
the  integrity  of  an  open,  predictable  multilat- 
eral trading  system  based  on  clear  i-ules  and 
will  lead  to  trade  expansion  and  enhanced 
economic  growth.  At  Punta  del  Este,  Ministers 
committed  themselves  to  further  trade  liber- 
alization across  the  wide  range  of  goods  and 
services,  including  such  new  areas  as  trade- 
related  intellectual  property  and  trade-related 
investment  measures,  to  strengthen  the  multi- 
lateral trading  system,  and  to  allow  for  early 
agreement  where  appropriate.  Countries  must 
continue  to  resist  protectionism  and  the  temp- 
tation to  adopt  unilateral  measures  outside  the 


framework  of  GATT  [General  Agreement 
Tariffs  and  Trade]  rules  and  to  allow  for  e; 
agreements  where  appropriate.  In  order  t 
preserve  a  favourable  negotiating  climate 
participants  should  conscientiously  impler 
the  commitments  to  standstill  and  rollbacl 
they  have  taken  at  Punta  del  Este  and  sul 
quent  international  meetings. 

15.  We  strongly  welcome  the  Free  Trac 
Agreement  between  Canada  and  the  US.;* 
the  steady  progi'ess  towards  the  target  o! 
European  Community  to  complete  the  ini 
market  by  1992.  It  is  our  policy  that  thesi 
developments,  together  with  other  moves 
wards  regional  cooperation  in  which  our  c 
tries  are  involved,  should  support  the  ope 
multilateral  trading  system  and  catalyze  i 
liberalizing  impact  of  the  Ui-uguay  Round 

It).  We  attach  major  importance  to  stn 
ening  the  GATT  itself.  It  is  vital  that  the 
become  a  more  dynamic  and  effective  org 
zation,  particularly  in  regard  to  the  surv( 
lance  of  trade  policies  and  dispute  settlen 
procedures,  with  greater  Ministerial  invc 
ment,  and  strengthened  linkages  with  otl 
international  organizations.  GATT  discip' 
must  be  improved  so  that  members  accei 
their  obligations  and  ensure  that  dispute: 
resolved  speedily,  effectively,  and  equita 

17.  Trade  plays  a  key  role  in  developm 
We  encourage  the  developing  countries, 
cially  the  newly  industrializing  economie: 
undertake  increased  commitments  and  ol 
tions  and  a  greater  role  in  the  GATT,  coi 
surate  with  their  importance  in  internatic 
trade  and  in  the  international  adjustmeni 
process,  as  well  as  with  their  respective 
of  development.  Equally,  developed  cour 
should  continue  to  strive  to  ensure  more 
markets  for  the  exports  of  developing  coi 
tries. 

18.  In  agriculture,  continued  political  i 
petus  is  essential  to  underpin  the  politica 
difficult  efforts  at  domestic  policy  reform 
to  advance  the  equally  difficult  and  relat( 
process  of  agricultural  trade  refonn.  Alt 
significant  progress  was  made  in  1987  in 
Uruguay  Round  negotiations,  with  the  t; 
of  major  proposals,  it  is  necessary  to  ens 
that  the  Mid-Tferm  Review  in  Montreal  ir 
December,  1988  adds  impetus  to  the  neg' 
tions  in  this  as  in  other  fields.  We  suppor 
efforts  to  adopt  a  framework  approach, 
ing  short  as  well  as  long-term  elements  v 
will  promote  the  reform  process  as  launc 
last  year  and  relieve  current  strains  in  a 
tural  markets.  This  would  be  facilitated  1 
device  for  the  measurement  of  support  a) 
protection.  Also,  ways  should  be  develop 
take  account  of  food  security  and  social  c 
cems.  To  move  the  issue  forward,  and  nc 
among  other  things  the  diversity  of  our  a 
cultural  situations,  our  negotiators  in  Ge 
must  develop  a  framework  approach  whi' 


50 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/August 


les  short-term  options  in  line  with  long- 
goals  concerning  the  reduction  of  all 
,  and  indirect  subsidies  and  other  meas- 
iffecting  directly  or  indirectly  agricultural 

The  objective  of  the  framework  ap- 
h  would  be  to  make  the  agincultural 
•  more  responsive  to  market  signals. 
As  the  Uruguay  Round  enters  a  more 
ilt  phase,  it  is  vital  to  ensure  the  momen- 
if  these  ambitious  negotiations.  The  Mid- 
Review  will  provide  a  unique  opportu- 
0  send  a  credible  political  signal  to  the 
ig  world.  The  greatest  possible  advance 
be  made  in  all  areas  of  the  negotiations, 
ling,  where  appropriate,  decisions,  so  as 
ch  before  the  end  of  the  year  the  stage 
?  tangible  progress  can  be  registered.  To 
nd,  we  support  efforts  to  adopt  a  frame- 
approach  on  all  issues  in  the  negotiations, 
iform  of  the  GATT  system  and  rules, 
5t  access,  agriculture,  and  new  issues 
as  trade  in  services,  trade-related  intel- 
il  property  rights,  and  trade-related  in- 
lent  measures).  For  our  part,  we  are 
jtted  to  ensure  that  the  Mid-Tbrm  Re- 
establishes a  solid  base  for  the  full  and 
ete  success  of  the  negotiations,  in  accord- 
Adth  the  Punta  del  Este  Declai-ation. 
We  all  recognize  the  critical  and  expand- 
ile  of  international  investment  in  the 
economy  and  share  a  deep  concern  that 
ised  protectionism  would  undermine  the 
its  of  open  investment  policies.  We  re- 
to  progressively  liberalize  international 
:ment  policies  and  urge  other  countries  to 
iewise. 


«»  ILY  INDUSTRIALIZING 
lONOMIES 

ertain  newly  industrializing  economies 
s)  in  the  Asia-Pacific  region  have  become 
isingly  important  in  world  trade.  Al- 
h  these  economies  differ  in  many  impor- 
■espects,  they  are  all  characterized  by 
nic.  e.xport-led  growth  which  has  allowed 
to  treble  their  share  of  world  trade  since 
Other  outward-oriented  Asian  countries 
so  beginning  to  emerge  as  rapidly- 
mg  exporters  of  manufactures.  With  in- 
'?  ed  economic  importance  come  gi-eater 
0*  fiational  responsibilities  and  a  strong  mu- 
nterest  in  improved  constructive  dialogue 
ooperative  efforts  in  the  near  term 
^  sen  the  industrialized  countries  and  the 
<  I  NIEs,  as  well  as  the  other  outward- 
ted  countries  in  the  region.  The  dialogue 
ooperative  efforts  could  centre  on  such 
fil  r  areas  as  macroeconomic,  currency, 
(iilf  tural,  and  trade  to  achieve  the  intema- 
*  1  adjustment  necessary  for  sustained, 
oiiri  ced  growth  of  the  world  economy.  We 


«n> 


encourage  the  development  of  informal  proc- 
esses which  would  facilitate  multilateral  dis- 
cussions of  issues  of  mutual  concern  and  foster 
the  necessary  cooperation. 


DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  AND  DEBT 

22.  The  performance  of  developing  countries  is 
increasingly  important  to  the  world  economy. 
Central  to  the  prospects  of  the  developing 
countries  are  a  healthy  global  economic  envi- 
ronment and  an  open  ti-ading  system,  adequate 
financial  flows,  and,  most  important,  their 
commitment  to  appropriate  economic  reform. 
The  problems  of  many  heavily  indebted  devel- 
oping countries  are  a  cause  of  economic  and 
political  concern  and  can  be  a  threat  to  political 
stability  in  developing  countries.  Several  coun- 
tries find  themselves  in  that  situation  in 
various  regions  of  the  world:  Latin  America, 
Africa,  and  the  Pacific,  particularly  the  Philip- 
pines, and  that  merits  our  special  attention. 

Middle-Income  Countries 

23.  A  number  of  highly  indebted  middle- 
income  countries  continue  to  have  difficulties 
servicing  their  external  debt  and  generating 
the  investment  necessary  for  sustainable 
growth.  The  market-oriented,  growth-led 
strategy  based  on  the  case-by-case  approach 
remains  the  only  viable  approach  for  overcom- 
ing their  external  debt  problems. 

24.  We  are  encouraged  that  many  indebted 
countries  have  begim  the  difficult  process  of 
macroeconomic  adjustment  and  structural  re- 
form necessary  for  sustained  progress,  encour- 
aging the  return  of  flight  capital  and  new  in- 
vestment flows.  The  success  of  these  efforts  is 
essential  for  improving  the  economic  perform- 
ance and  strengthening  the  creditworthiness  of 
these  countries. 

25.  Official  financing  has  played  a  central 
role  in  the  debt  strategy  through  the  Paris 
Club  (US$73  billion  of  principal  and  interest 
have  been  consolidated  since  1983)  and  the 
flexible  policies  of  export  credit  agencies.  The 
international  financial  institutions  will  continue 
to  have  a  pivotal  role.  We  endorse  the  recent 
initiatives  taken  by  the  International  Mone- 
tary Fund  to  strengthen  its  capacity  to  support 
medium-term  programs  of  macroeconomic  ad- 
justment and  sti-uctural  refoi-m  and  to  provide 
greater  protection  for  adjustment  programs 
from  unforeseen  external  developments.  We 
strongly  support  the  full  implementation  of  the 
World  Bank's  US$75  billion  General  Capital 
Increase  to  strengthen  its  capacity  to  promote 
adjustment  in  middle-income  countries.  We 
also  support  greater  awareness  by  interna- 
tional financial  institutions  of  the  environ- 
mental impact  of  their  development  programs. 


artment  of  State  Bulletin/ August  1988 


FEATURE 


Mil  TORONTO  SL  M.\\IT 


26.  Commercial  banks  have  played  an  impor- 
tant role  in  supporting  debtor  countries'  re- 
form efforts  through  an  expanded  menu  of 
financing  options  which  has  facilitated  the 
channelling  of  commercial  bank  lending  into 
productive  uses.  Their  continued  involvement 
is  indispensable  to  the  debt  strategy.  In  this 
regard,  the  World  Bank  and  IMF  can  play  an 
important  catalytic  role  in  mobilizing  additional 
financing  from  private  (and  official)  sources  in 
support  of  debtor  countries'  adjustment  pro- 
grams. 

27.  We  note  that  in  recent  years  there  has 
been  increasing  recourse  to  innovative  financ- 
ing techniques.  The  important  characteristics 
of  these  techniques  are  that  they  are  volun- 
tary, market-oriented,  and  applied  on  a  case- 
by-case  basis.  The  "menu  approach"  has 
engendered  new  financial  flows  and,  in  some 
cases,  reduced  the  existing  stock  of  debt.  The 
flexibility  of  the  present  strategy  would  be 
enhanced  by  the  further  broadening  of  the 
menu  approach  and  the  encouragement  of 
innovative  financing  techniques  to  improve  the 
quality  of  new  lending,  but  particular  initia- 
tives would  have  to  be  carefully  considered. 

28.  International  direct  investment  plays  an 
important  role  in  spurring  economic  gi-owth 
and  sti-uctural  adjustment  in  developing  coun- 
tries. Thus  it  contributes  to  alleviating  debt 
problems.  Developing  countries  should  wel- 
come and  encourage  such  investment  by  creat- 
ing a  favourable  investment  cHmate. 

Debt  to  the  Poorest 

29.  An  increase  in  concessional  resource  flows 
is  necessary  to  help  the  poorest  developing 
countries  resume  sustained  growth,  especially 
in  cases  where  it  is  extremely  difficult  for  them 
to  service  their  debts.  Since  Venice,  progress 
in  deahng  with  the  debt  burden  of  these 
countries  has  been  encouraging.  Paris  Club 
creditors  are  rescheduling  debt  at  extended 
grace  and  repayment  periods.  In  addition,  the 
recent  enhancement  of  the  IMF's  Structural 
Adjustment  Facility;  the  World  Bank  and 
Official  Developing  Assistance  (ODA)  agen- 
cies' enhanced  program  of  co-financing;  and 
the  fifth  replenishment  of  the  African  Develop- 
ment Fund  will  mobilize  a  total  of  more  than 
US$18  billion  in  favour  of  the  poorest  and  most 
indebted  countries  undertaking  adjustment 
efforts  over  the  period  1988/90.  Out  of  this 
total,  US$15  bilHon  will  be  channelled  to 
sub-Saharan  African  countries. 

30.  We  welcome  proposals  made  by  several 
of  us  to  ease  further  the  debt  service  burdens 
of  the  poorest  countries  that  are  undertaking 
internationally  approved  adjustment  pro- 
grams. We  have  achieved  consensus  on 
rescheduling  official  debt  of  these  countries 
within  a  framework  of  comparability  that 


51 


allows  official  creditors  to  choose  among  con- 
cessional interest  rates  usually  on  shorter 
maturities,  longer  repayment  periods  at  com- 
mercial rates,  partial  write-offs  of  debt  service 
obligations  during  the  consolidation  period,  or 
a  combination  of  these  options.  This  approach 
allows  official  creditors  to  choose  options  con- 
sistent with  their  legal  or  budgetary  con- 
straints. The  Paris  Club  has  been  urged  to 
work  out  necessary  technicalities  to  ensure 
comparability  by  the  end  of  this  year  at  the 
very  latest.  This  approach  will  provide  benefits 
over  and  above  the  impressive  multilateral 
agreements  to  help  the  poorest  countries  over 
the  past  year.  We  also  welcome  the  action 
taken  by  a  number  of  creditor  governments  to 
write-off  or  otherwise  remove  the  burden  of 
ODA  loans,  and  also  urge  countries  to  maintain 
a  high  grant  element  in  their  future  assistance 
to  the  poorest. 


ENVIRONMENT 

31.  We  agree  that  the  protection  and  enhance- 
ment of  the  environment  is  essential.  The 
report  of  the  World  Commission  on  Environ- 
ment and  Development  has  stressed  that 
environmental  considerations  must  be  inte- 
gi-ated  into  all  areas  of  economic  policy-making 
if  the  globe  is  to  continue  to  support  human- 
kind. We  endorse  the  concept  of  sustainable 
development. 

32.  Threats  to  the  environment  recognize  no 
boundaries.  Their  urgent  nature  requires 
strengthened  international  cooperation  among 
all  countries.  Significant  progress  has  been 
achieved  in  a  number  of  environmental  areas. 
The  Montreal  Protocol  on  Substances  that 
Deplete  the  Ozone  Layer  is  a  milestone.  All 
countries  are  encouraged  to  sign  and  ratify  it. 

33.  Further  action  is  needed.  Global  climate 
change;  air,  sea,  and  fresh  water  pollution;  acid 
rain;  hazardous  substances;  deforestation;  and 
endangered  species  require  priority  attention. 
It  is,  therefore,  timely  that  negotiations  on  a 
protocol  on  emissions  of  nitrogen  oxides  within 
the  framework  of  the  Geneva  Convention  on 
Long-range  Transboundary  Air  Pollution  be 
pursued  energetically.  The  efforts  of  the 
United  Nations  Environment  Program 
(UNEP)  for  an  agreement  on  the  transfrontier 
shipment  of  hazardous  wastes  should  also  be 
encouraged  as  well  as  the  establishment  of  an 
inter-governmental  panel  on  global  climate 
change  under  the  auspices  of  UNEP  and  the 
Worid  Meteorological  Organization  (WMO). 
We  also  recognize  the  potential  impact  of 
agriculture  on  the  environment,  whether  nega- 
tive through  over-intensive  use  of  resources  or 
positive  in  preventing  desertification.  We  wel- 
come the  Conference  on  the  Changing  Envi- 
ronment to  be  held  in  Tbronto  next  week. 


52 


FUTURE  SUMMITS 

34.  We,  the  Heads  of  State  or  Government, 
and  the  representatives  of  the  European  Com- 
munity, beheve  that  the  Economic  Summits 
have  strengthened  the  ties  of  sohdarity,  both 
political  and  economic,  that  exist  between  our 
countries  and  that  thereby  they  have  helped  to 
sustain  the  values  of  democracy  that  underlie 
our  economic  and  political  systems.  Our  annual 
meetings  have  provided  the  principal  opportu- 
nity each  year  for  the  governments  of  the 
major  industrialized  countries  to  reflect,  in  an 
informal  and  flexible  manner,  upon  their  com- 
mon responsibility  for  the  progi-ess  of  the 
world  economy  and  to  resolve  how  that 
responsibility  should  have  practical  manifesta- 
tion in  the  years  ahead.  We  believe  that  the 
mutual  understanding  engendered  in  our  meet- 
ings has  benefitted  both  our  own  countries  and 
the  wider  world  community.  We  believe,  too, 
that  the  opportunities  afforded  by  our  meet- 
ings are  becoming  even  more  valuable  in 
today's  world  of  increasing  interdependence 
and  increasing  technological  change.  We  have 
therefore  agreed  to  institute  a  further  cycle  of 
Summits  by  accepting  the  invitation  of  the 
President  of  the  French  Republic  to  meet  in 
France,  July  14-16,  1989. 


OTHER  ISSUES 

Human  Frontier  Science  Program 

1.  We  note  the  successful  conclusion  of  Japan's 
feasibility  study  on  the  Human  Frontier  Sci- 
ence Program  and  are  grateful  for  the  opportu- 
nities our  scientists  were  given  to  contribute  to 
the  study.  We  look  forward  to  the  Japanese 
Government's  proposal  for  the  implementation 
of  the  program  in  the  near  future. 

Bioethics 

2.  We  note  that,  as  part  of  the  continuing 
review  of  the  ethical  implications  of  develop- 
ments in  the  life  sciences,  the  Italian  Govern- 
ment hosted  the  fifth  conference  on  bioethics  in 
April  1988,  and  we  welcome  the  intention  of  the 
European  Communities  to  host  the  sixth  con- 
ference in  the  spring  of  1989. 

ANNEX  ON  STRUCTURAL  REFORMS 

Europe  is  pursuing  structural  reforms  to  com- 
plement macroeconomic  policies  in  order  to 
spur  job  creation,  enhance  growth  potential, 
and  achieve  a  sustainable  pattern  of  extenial 
balances.  Structural  reform  measures  are 


being  put  into  place  in  the  framework  of  thi 
Communities'  program  for  a  unified  interna 
market  by  1992,  including  full  liberalization 
capital  movements;  removal  of  physical,  ad 
ministrative,  and  technical  barriers  to  allov 
the  full  mobility  of  persons,  goods,  and  ser 
ices;  and  an  improvement  of  competition  pc 
icy.  However,  full  achievement  will  depenc 
complete  and  timely  implementation  of  the 
measures  and  on  complementary  policies  in 
eluding  those  in  the  fields  of  regional,  socia 
and  environmental  pohcies  and  of  technoloj 
co-operation. 

The  main  elements  of  Germany's  structu 
reforms  are  tax  reform  and  reduction,  der 
lation.  and  privatization;  reform  of  the  post 
and  telecommunications  system;  increased 
flexibility  in  the  labour  market;  and  refortr. 
the  social  security  system. 

In  France,  the  main  structural  reforms  v 
deal  with  improving  the  level  of  education 
professional  training  and  development  for 
workers,  and  with  major  improvements  in 
functioning  of  financial  markets  in  order  to 
facilitate  the  financing  of  the  economy  at  tl 
lowest  possible  cost. 

Italy  will  seek  to  promote  training  and 
education,  increase  the  flexibility  of  the  la 
market  to  spur  emplo>Tnent,  improve  the 
functioning  of  financial  markets,  revise  th( 
system  to  promote  efficiency  and  eliminate 
distortions,  and  enhance  pubhc  sector  effi- 
ciency. 

In  the  United  Kingdom,  there  has  alrea( 
been  a  substantial  program  of  tax  reform, 
trade  union  law  reform,  deregulation,  oper 
up  of  markets,  and  privatization  of  state 
industries.  This  will  continue.  Further  me; 
ures  are  being  introduced  to  improve  both 
quality  of  education  and  the  flexibility  of  tl 
housing  market. 

Japan  will  pursue  further  structural  ref( 
to  support  and  sustain  the  greater  reliance 
domestic  demand-led  growth  which  has  qi 
ened  remarkably.  Japan  will  promote  refor 
government  regulations  in  key  sectors  incl 
ing  land  use  policies  and  the  distribution 
system,  and  reform  of  the  tax  system. 

For  the  United  States,  where  recent  in' 
tions  that  the  declining  trend  in  private  sa\ 
may  have  bottomed  out  are  encouraging,  ii 
nonetheless  a  priority  to  increase  incentivi 
save.  Also  the  United  States  will  strengthi 
the  international  competitiveness  of  its  ind 
trial  sector. 

The  most  promising  areas  of  structural 
reform  in  Canada  are  implementation  of  th 
second  stage  of  tax  reform,  the  proposed 
liberalization  of  the  financial  services  secto 
and,  most  important,  the  implementation  c 
the  Free  Trade  Agreement  with  the  Unite 
States. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/August  ni 


FEATURE 


^ 


^m^ 


bO\l,\\ET  TORONTO  SL:,\1MIT 


HE   HOUSE 
J  £21,19882 


STATEMENT, 


isunimit  punctuated  the  success  of 
vsiilent's  economic  program  over 
-t  T  years.  The  emphasis  on  tax 
111.  trade  liberalization,  and  individ- 
;  tiative  has  borne  fruit  in  the  United 
t  .  liringing  about  the  longest  sus- 
onomic  gi-owth  in  peacetime, 
ilown  inflation  and  unemploy- 
1  iu'  leaders  expressed  personal 
,;  1  l'(  >r  the  President's  success  and  the 
)  t  It  has  on  other  world  economies, 
f  lilt'  economic  side,  this  summit  once 
highlights  that  increased  coor- 
of  policies  is  one  of  the  reasons 
economies  are  doing  so  well  and 
.--ame  sort  of  coordination  is 
■(  ;arv  in  areas  concerning  the 
t  iituring  of  economies.  On  agricul- 
t  till'  leaders  this  morning  moved  the 
!•  ^^  forward.  The  final  language  was  a 
•a  nijjrovement  over  the  early  morn- 
%  iguage,  and  the  United  States  is 
.p   with  the  final  product. 
0  the  political  side,  increased  coop- 
a1  n  on  fighting  international  drug 
xf  king  is  a  major  step  forward.  This  is 
I./  lerican  initiative,  something  the 
■p  lent  and  Vice  President  worked  on 
1  'lime  Minister  Mulroney.  This  is  the 
line  that  we  have  an  initiative  that 
Idress  the  complex  issue  of  in- 
iniial  production,  trafficking,  and 
inu  of  the  drug  trade. 
.  iwise,  in  the  area  of  teiTorism, 
rt  (if  the  ICAO  action  on  hijacked 
s  another  step  in  the  fight  against 
II.  We  hope  to  build  broader 
111  other  countries  in  the  months 

iimary  the  President  is  quite 
A'ith  the  outcome  of  the  summit, 
itified  by  the  accolades  from  his 
aders.  He  appreciates  their 
ip  and  the  personal  bonds  that 
t-ljeen  established  in  these  summits. 


Secretary  Shultz  with  President  Reagan  before  final  plenary  session. 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT 
JUNE  21,  19883 

Today's  ceremonies,  as  you  know,  mark 
the  end  of  my  eighth  economic  summit, 
and  over  the  years,  I  have  come  to  re- 
gard the  summit  process  as  extremely 
important  in  forging  a  coordinated  eco- 
nomic approach  for  the  United  States 
and  the  other  industrialized  democra- 
cies. It  has  helped  return  the  nations 
represented  here  to  steady  growth  and 
helped  to  estabUsh  a  consensus  among 
us  that  only  free  and  open  markets  and 
only  free  and  open  societies  can  foster 
economic  progress  and  opportunity. 

Maybe  one  of  the  best  ways  to  view 
these  economic  summits  is  to  compare 
discussions  at  them — whether  heralded 
in  our  communiques  or  not — with  later 
results.  For  example,  our  1981  communi- 
que from  Ottawa  said  the  primary  chal- 
lenge we  addressed  at  this  meeting  was 
the  need  to  revitalize  the  economies  of 


the  industrial  democracies.  Revitaliza- 
tion,  of  course,  has  been  achieved  in 
part  because  the  common  commitment 
at  Ottawa  inaugurated  a  search  for  con- 
sensus on  how  to  work  together  to  re- 
lease the  productive  energies  of  our  peo- 
ple. And  today  gross  national  products 
are  growing,  as  are  employment  num- 
bers and  real  personal  incomes.  Our  eco- 
nomic expansion  in  the  United  States 
got  the  ball  rolling  and  helped  crystalize 
the  new  consensus.  And  now  everyone 
is  part  of  the  act. 

To  take  another  example,  in  our 
1986  Tokyo  economic  communique,  we 
said  there  should  be  close  and  continu- 
ous coordination  of  economic  policy 
among  the  seven  summit  countries. 
Today  policy  coordination  is  a  major  pil- 
lar of  the  economic  policies  of  all  our 
countries.  It  is  a  significant  reason  why 
the  world  market  instabilities  of  last  Oc- 
tober had  so  little  impact  on  our  underly- 
ing economies.  The  summit  in  Tokyo 
gave  the  political  push  that  ensured  that 
the  fledging  process  of  coordination 
grew  strong  and  robust. 


yjljlrtment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


53 


Prime  Minister  Mulroney  reading  economic  declaration  on  the  last  day  of  the 
summit;  with  him  are  Prime  Minister  Thatcher,  President  Reagan,  and  President 
Mitterrand. 


So  here  we  are  celebrating  this  sum- 
mit with  a  measure  of  pride.  Some  sig- 
nificant items  are  still  in  need  of  atten- 
tion but,  all  in  all,  how  things  have 
changed  over  the  years.  The  economies 
of  the  summit  countries  have  come  roar- 
ing back,  driven  by  a  common  commit- 
ment to  replace  government  control 
with  market-oriented  policies.  These 
summits  are  building  blocks  for  tomor- 
row. Goals  we  set  in  earlier  years  have 
borne  fruit.  I  believe  that  the  goals  we 
are  setting  now  will  become  the  land- 
marks for  the  future. 

Ijooking  back  at  how  much  has  been 
achieved  since  the  last  time  the  summit 
was  in  Canada,  is  it  any  wonder  that 
our  seven  free  democratic  industrialized 
nations  are  turning  with  confidence  to 
the  future,  to  the  challenges  and  oppor- 
tunities that  new  technology,  more 
closely  knit  global  markets,  and  a  free 
world  will  bring  in  working  together? 


During  our  meetings  here,  we  dis- 
cussed the  international  economic  and 
political  situations.  We  reviewed  the  eco- 
nomic policy  coordination  process,  the 
world  debt  situation — particularly  that 
of  the  poorer  countries — the  state  of  the 
Uruguay  Round  of  trade  negotiations — 
particularly  in  agriculture — and  inter- 
national cooperation  to  stop  the  produc- 
tion and  flow  of  illegal  drugs. 

We  also  had  a  fruitful  exchange  of 
views  on  East- West  relations,  terror- 
ism, and  regional  political  issues.  Yester- 
day afternoon.  Prime  Minister  Mulroney 
organized  an  informal  session  where 
leaders  shared  their  thoughts  on  the  eco- 
nomic future  of  the  summit  countries. 
In  that  session,  I  said  that  I  believe 
that  the  e.xpansion  of  global  markets 
and  the  enormous  technological  ad- 
vances that  are  coming  in  the  years 
ahead  will  demand  even  closer  coordina- 
tion of  economic  policies. 


All  of  our  economies  must  be  flex 
ible  and  open,  not  burdened  by  exces- 
sive regulations,  high  taxes,  and  all  til 
other  rigidities  that  too  many  econom 
have  known  too  well. 

Last  night  my  colleagues  and  I 
spoke  of  the  future,  of  the  education  ( 
our  children,  of  assisting  those  displs 
by  the  rapid  pace  of  economic  change 
most  notably  our  farmers — of  removii 
structural  impediments  in  our  econo- 
mies. We  are  all  flexible  enough  to  n 
the  challenges  of  the  rapid  technologi 
changes  and  economic  integration  thj 
the  hallmark  of  the  future. 

The  summit  nations  can  be  partn 
in  a  great  venture  to  progress.  Yes,  i 
can  seize  our  opportunities  or  we  can 
watch  the  world  go  by.  I  am  confider 
which  path  our  nations  will  choose.  A 
said  before  leaving  Washington,  the  : 
ture  belongs  to  the  flexible.  Eight  ye 
ago,  you  would  have  heai'd  argument 
about  that.  Today  it  defines  the  const 
sus  among  the  seven  nations  that  me 
at  these  economic  summits. 

In  closing,  let  me  say  thank  you 
the  people  of  Toronto  and  to  Prime 
Minister  Mulroney  for  hosting  us  wit 
such  courtesy  and  enthusiasm.  They 
made  all  of  us  in  the  American  delegi 
tion — and  I'm  confident  those  in  the 
other  delegations  as  well — feel  right 
home.  And  in  just  3  days  here,  we  sht 
one  common  sentiment:  We  love 
Canada. 


'  This  statement  was  read  to  news  cor 
spondents  by  Canadian  Secretary  of  State  1 
External  Affairs  Joe  Clai'k. 

-  Tfext  from  White  House  press  release 
'  Opening  statement  at  a  new  conferer 
held  in  the  Royal  York  Hotel  in  Tbronto:  foi 
full  text  of  news  conference,  see  Weekly 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  of 
27,  1988.  ■ 


54 


JS.-Japan  Agreement 

>i  Cooperation  in  Science  and  Technology 


FEATURE 


SOMMET  TORONTO  SllMMIT 


)ilune  20,  198S,  during  the  economic  summit  in  Toronto,  President  Reagan  and 
'i  le  Minister  Takeshita  signed  the  Agreement  on  Cooperation  in  Research  and 
>i.^lopment  in  Science  and  Technology. 


SITE  HOUSE  FACT  SHEET, 
JE  20,  1988' 

I 

new  agreement  incorporates  provi- 
s  and  initiatives  to  establish  a  more 
need  and  reciprocal  partnership  in 
nee  and  technology.  Specifically  the 

agreement: 

•    Sets  forth  broad  principles 
er  which  the  Governments  of  the 


United  States  and  Japan  will  conduct 
their  guture  science  and  technology 
relationship; 

•  Estabhshes  cooperation  in  sci- 
ence and  technology  areas  of  national 
importance  in  which  both  countries 
have  complementary  capabilities  and 
from  which  both  countries  will  obtain 
equitable  benefits  (among  these  areas 
of  research  are  advanced  materials,  in- 
cluding superconductors,  life  sciences, 


information  science,  manufacturing  tech- 
nology, automation  and  process  control, 
global  geoscience  and  environment,  and 
joint  database  development); 

•  Calls  for  both  governments  to 
provide  comparable  access  to  their 
government-sponsored  or  supported  re- 
search facilities  and  activities,  as  well 

as  to  scientific  and  technical  literature; 

•  Creates  a  broad  management 
structure  that  will  oversee  the  overall 
science  and  technology  relationship  and 
generate  initiatives  and  policy  recom- 
mendations to  strengthen  that 
relationship; 

•  Sets  forth  provisions  for  the  ade- 
quate protection  of  intellectual  property 
and  the  distribution  of  intellectual  prop- 
erty rights  arising  from  the  collabora- 
tive activities  under  the  agreement;  and 

•  Details  the  shared  security  obli- 
gations of  the  United  States  and  Japan 
in  the  area  of  collaborative  science  and 
technology  information.  The  agreement 
states  that  both  countries  vrill  support 
the  widest  possible  dissemination  of 
information,  subject  to  export  controls, 
classification  procedures,  and  intellec- 
tual property  rights  protection. 

The  new  agreement  estabhshes  a 
Joint  High-Level  Committee  to  meet 
annually  to  review  matters  of  impor- 
tance in  the  field  of  science  and  technol- 
ogy and  policy  issues  related  to  the 
overall  science  and  technology  relation- 
ship between  the  two  countries. 

The  new  5-year  accord  supersedes 
the  Science  and  Tfechnology  Agreement 
that  was  signed  by  President  Carter 
and  Prime  Minister  Ohira  in  1980. 


'Tfext  from  White  House  press  release. 


f  )artment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


55 


THE  SECRETARY 


Secretary's  Interview  on 
"Meet  the  Press" 


Secretary  Shultz  was  interviewed  on 
NBC-TV's  "Meet  the  Press"  on 
June  19,  1988,  by  Chris  Wallace  and 
John  Cochran,  NBC  Neivs,  and  Robert 
Kaiser,  The  Washington  Post.' 

Q.  I  want  to  ask  you  first  of  all,  if  I 
might,  about  this  apparent  scandal  in 
military  procurement  which  some  Re- 
publican Senators,  who  have  been 
briefed  on  it,  are  calling  the  worst  in  the 
history  of  the  Pentagon.  How  concerned 
are  you  about  the  threat  to  national 
security,  both  in  terms  of  this  slowing 
down  the  military  buildup,  and  also  in 
terms  of  it  further  eroding  public  sup- 
port to  the  Pentagon? 

A.  First  of  all,  I  know  nothing 
about  this  other  than  what  I  read.  It's 
been  uncovered  by  our  chief  law  en- 
forcement agency,  the  FBI,  and  they're 
pursuing  it.  Just  what  its  dimensions 
are  I  don't  have  any  information  on. 

However,  it  is  essential,  I  think, 
for  our  country  to  maintain  our  capabil- 
ity to  defend  our  interests  and  repre- 
sent our  values  around  the  world,  and  a 
strong  defense  estabUshment  is  essen- 
tial to  that. 

Q.  What  is  it  going  to  do  if  a  number 
of  the  major  Defense  contractors  in  this 
country  are  now  going  to  be  involved  in 
investigations  for  weeks  or  months  or 
years? 

A.  Individuals  who  participated  and 
the  corporate  entity,  if  they  are  guilty 
of  something,  will  have  to  pay  a  pen- 
alty. Nevertheless,  those  are  great 
organizations  and  very  productive — full 
of  ability,  both  scientific  and  engineer- 
ing production  possibilities — and  so 
they'U  proceed.  They're  very 
competitive. 

Q.  You  pride  yourself  on  being  a 
good  government  manager.  Some  peo- 
ple say  that  what's  happened  here  is 
exactly  what  you  would  expect  when 
you  throw  $2  trillion  at  the  Pentagon, 
that  there  was  just  too  much  money  and 
too  many  contracts  for  them  to  be 
adequately  overseen. 

A.  As  I  say,  I  don't  know  the  de- 
tails of  this  investigation  at  all.  Obvi- 
ously, when  you're  spending  large  sums 
of  money,  you  have  to  have  procedures 
and  safeguards  to  do  it  properly,  and 
you  have  to  have  people  who  have  high 
standards  of  proper  behavior.  By  and 
large,  I  think  they  have  those  things. 
Whether  there  are  some  people  around 
the  edges  who  have  managed  to  distort 


this  flow  of  ethical  behavior,  I  just 
don't  know. 

Q.  You  talk  about  the  flow  of  ethical 
behavior.  I  want  to  ask  you,  if  I  might, 
about  the  public  reaction  to  all  of  this 
and  public  support  for  the  military 
buildup.  Isn't  this  just  going  to  add  to 
the  general  impression  of  the  sleaze 
factor,  that  there's  a  pattern  of  unethi- 
cal and,  in  this  case,  perhaps  illegal 
behavior  within  the  Reagan  Admini- 
stration? 

A.  There  are  problems  that  come 
out  when  you  have  large  amounts  of 
spending  like  this  periodically.  I  think 
it's  worth  noting  that  this  was  uncov- 
ered by  people  working  in  the  Reagan 
Administration,  so  you  have  to  factor 
that  in.  But  it's  a  problem,  and  I  think 
that  the  way  to  deal  with  it  is  to  hit  it 
hard. 

I  think  it  was  Ike  who  said  he 
wanted  people  who,  his  phrase  was, 
"were  as  clean  as  a  hound's  tooth." 
And  I  also  remember  Senator  Paul 
Douglas,  one  of  my  favorites  from  the 
old  days,  from  Illinois  who  always  said, 
"It  all  starts  with  a  cigar."  So  you 
have  to  watch  the  httle  things  before 
they  become  big  things.  I'm  sure  that's 
true. 

Q.  It  was  announced  yesterday  that 
you're  going  to  go  down  to  Central 
America.  At  the  same  time,  one  of  your 
senior  officials  said  on  background  that 
the  Administration  has  no  hope  of  get- 
ting more  lethal  aid,  military  aid,  for  the 
contras  out  of  Congress.  What  sort  of 
bargaining  cards  have  you  got  if  you 
don't  have  the  possibility  for  military 
aid?  What  can  you  do  down  there? 

A.  I'm  going  to  carry  a  U.S.  mes- 
sage of  what  our  objectives  are  and  our 
program  and  ideas  for  getting  there. 
Those  objectives  have  been  set  out  by 
the  President  way  back  in  a  speech  to  a 
joint  session  of  Congress  in  1983.  They 
are  reaffirmed  and  developed  in  the 
Kissinger  commission  report. 

What  are  we  for?  We're  for  peace; 
we're  for  freedom;  we're  for  the  rule  of 
law;  we're  for  economic  development. 
We  have  major  efforts  and  lots  of  re- 
sources being  put  into  those  things,  and 
we  are  in  the  process  of  succeeding, 
particularly  in  El  Salvador,  Honduras, 
Guatemala,  to  add  to  the  basically  good 
picture  in  Costa  Rica. 

The  odd  man  out  is  Nicaragua.  It's 
the  rotten  apple  in  the  barrel.  Some- 
how or  other  Nicaragua  has  got  to  be 


brought  into  this  fold,  and  that's  a  prcl^ 
lem.  We  want  to  somehow,  through  l» 
some  combination  of  pressure  that's  I 
generated  internally  to  Nicaragua  and  I 
the  obvious  opportunities  they're  miss  i 
ing,  to  get  them  in  the  fold. 

You  know,  the  situation  in  Nicara 
gua  is  really  lousy,  both  from  the  star 
point  of  suppression,  repression,  and 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  absolutely 
terrible  situation  in  their  economy.  So 
they  are  under  intense  pressure,  but 
we  want  to  bring  them  into  this  fold  ( 
peace,  democracy,  freedom,  the  rule  o 
law,  and  economic  development. 

Q.  Some  people  might  think  you 
description  of  the  Central  American 
situation  is  a  little  rosy  in  that  the  I 
right  looks  like  it's  coming  back  in 
Salvador,  President  Duarte's  deathly 
you've  completely  had  a  flop  in  Panak 
it  looks  like  so  far,  the  contras  now  se< 
to  be  a  spent  force.  Aren't  you  a  littl 
concerned  about  the  general  drift  do 
there? 

A.  I  don't  want  to  say  that  there 
are  no  problems.  If  there  were  no  pr 
lems,  we  wouldn't  be  struggling  as  W' 
are.  What  I  am  saying,  though,  is  I 
think  it's  time  to  reinject,  in  as  stron; 
a  way  as  I  can,  our  basic  objectives  ; 
the  many  things  we're  doing,  and  the 
fact  that  with  all  of  the  kinds  of  prob 
lems  you  allude  to,  there  has  been  a 
very  strong  measure  of  success. 

I  might  say,  insofar  as  Panama  is 
concerned,  it's  also  kind  of  an  odd  ma 
out  in  a  different  way  from  Nicaragu; 
and  it's  not  a  good  picture  from  any- 
one's standpoint — not  just  ours;  all  of 
Latin  America.  They  don't  like  the  ii 
that  a  drug-oriented  person  is  as 
strong  in  a  country  as  Noriega  is  in 
Panama.  He's  under  a  lot  of  pressure 
and  he  knows  it. 

Q.  You  and  the  President  are  ab< 
to  leave  for  the  Toronto  summit.  I 
gather  one  of  the  things  you're  worr 
about  is  terrorism  and  particularly 
countries  like  Algeria  which  permit: 
terrorist  planes — that  is  to  say,  hijacl  I 
planes — to  land  and  then  take  off  fc 
another  country.  Is  this  the  kind  of 
thing  you're  going  to  focus  on? 

A.  Tferrorism  is  one  of  the  subjec 
that  has  been  given  a  lot  of  attention 
summits,  and  the  summit  meetings  ai 
their  declarations  and  the  spirit  genei 
ated  from  them  have  helped  a  lot  in 
what  is  a  basically  successful  effort 
against  terrorism. 

One  of  the  things  that  I  think 
would  help  would  be  implementation  < 
what  is  basically,  I  think,  a  British  s 
gestion  that  countries  all  agree  that 
hijacked  plane  lands  in  your  territory 


56 


THE  SECRETARY 


will  lake  steps  to  see  that  it  can't 
(iff.  It's  sort  of  a  way  of  imple- 
tiiiu  the  President's  view  "no  place 

Ilk'." 

Q.  On  another  subject— SDI  [Stra- 
fe Defense  Initiative].  An  official,  an 
^linistration  official,  said  this  week 
Hi  SDI — that  is  to  say,  "star  wars" — 
-  lout  to  get  a  lobotomy,  that  the 
diinistration  decided  to  scale  way 
)n  vour  SDI  hopes.  True? 
A.  The  SDI  hopes  are  very  strong. 
n  F'resident  has  reiterated  them  con- 
-ly,  including  at  the  Moscow  sum- 
!■  problem  with  SDI  is  that  it 
.'  that  have  scaled  it  back:  Con- 
>  has  scaled  back  the  funding.  Nev- 
I'ltss,  the  objectives  of  the  prog^ram 
•  nJact,  they  are  right,  they  are  pow- 
,  and  they'll  be  pursued. 

^^  You  say  that  the  objectives  are 
Lt.  In  fact  what  this  report  said  is 
n;  the  .\dministration  is  headed  away 
Wi  the  space-based  shield  over  a 
01  er  period  of  time  and  headed  toward 
Nter  deployment  of  a  ground-based 
,'ni.  particularly  around  Washing- 
Is  that  true? 

A.  There  haven't  been  any  decisions 

'  kind.  There  has  been  a  lot  of 

1  itten  about.  But  as  you  make 

-s  in  the  program  and  as  your 

.  I  iH'gins  to  turn  beyond  the  strictly 

irch  stage  to  how  you  would  go 
I  t  deploying  a  system,  then  you  see 
clearly  that  you  would  deploy  it  in 
I  -    You  just  don't  suddenly  start 
So  you  ask  yourself  about  these 
and  the  criteria  that  the  phases 
ill  make. 

Q.  And  would  the  first  phase  be 
p:;ind-based  interceptors? 

A.  It's  a  matter  of  debate  about 
■r  what  the  right  way  to  go  about 
process  is,  and  I  think  that  the 
lie  subject  has  kind  of  surfaced  pub- 
,  personally  I  think  in  a  premature 

Q.  I  just  want  to  see  if  we  can  wrap 
me  point  in  the  question  about  the 
ation  in  Nicaragua  which  Bob  [Kai- 
was  talking  with  you  about  earlier. 
You  said  that  you're  going  to  be 
dng  this  diplomatic  effort  in  your 
on  the  29th,  but  there  is  also  this 
stion  about  U.S.  aid.  Has,  as  was 
t  )rted  today  in  The  Washington  Post, 
Administration  basically  decided 
t  you  can't  get  a  lethal  military  aid 
kage  through  this  Congress? 
A.  There  hasn't  been  any  decision, 
re's  been  a  lot  of  discussion  about 
■  to  maintain  support  for  freedom 
ters  in  Nicaragua — humanitarian 
port  and  other  kinds  of  support — 


but  there  hasn't  been  any  decision 
made  about  that. 

Q.  Let  me  turn,  if  I  can,  to  the 
situation  involving  Manuel  Noriega, 
which  is  one  that  you  say  you'll  be 
bringing  up  on  the  political  side  of  this 
economic  summit.  Are  you  going  to  be 
asking  the  other  countries  to  join  the 
United  States  in  imposing  economic 
sanctions  against  Panama? 

A.  The  subject  that  we'll  want  to 
discuss  at  the  summit — or  one  of 
them — has  to  do  with  narcotics  traffick- 
ing and  the  use  and  control  of  this 
whole  drug  problem  which  all  of  the 
countries  are  concerned  about.  It  is 
clear  enough  that  it  is  an  international 
problem.  We  have  it,  so  do  others,  and 
so  you  need  to  have  an  international  ap- 
proach to  it.  So  we'll  be  talking  about 
that.  It  isn't  particularly  about  him. 
It's  about  the  narcotics  problem. 

Q.  But,  in  fact,  you're  trying  to  get 
Noriega  out.  You  say  he  is  one  of  the 
major  international  drug  traffickers  in 
this  hemisphere.  Wouldn't  one  of  the 
best  things  [be]  to  be  getting  these  other 
countries  to  join  the  United  States  in 
imposing  economic  sanctions  instead  of 
helping  to  fund  the  Noriega  regime? 

A.  He's  a  problem,  but  he's  not  the 
main  problem.  He's  under  great  pres- 
sure and  is  very  vulnerable,  and  he 
knows  it.  So  that's  all  I  have  to  say 
about  Noriega.  The  main  problem — 

Q.  You  say  he's  under  great  pres- 
sure. I  mean,  the  sense  that  all  of  us 
have  is  that  he's  faced  this  Administra- 
tion down  and  made  you  look  silly.  It 
doesn't  seem  like  he's  under  any  great 
pressure  at  all. 

A.  You  just  keep  saying  that,  but 
the  facts  are  a  little  bit  different,  and 
we'll  just  let  them  assert  themselves. 

Q.  Do  you  have  a  new  plan,  be- 
cause, in  fact,  you  were  asked  this 
question  at  a  White  House  briefing  this 
week  [and]  you  said  that  the  Adminis- 
tration does  not  have  a  new  plan  to  get 
Noriega  out. 

A.  No.  I  didn't  say  that. 

Q.  Sir,  I  mean,  I  heard  you  from  the 
podium  myself.  You  said  that  the  Ad- 
ministration does  not  have  a  new  plan 
to  get  Noriega  out. 

A.  We  do  not  have  anything  going 
that  I  care  to  talk  to  you  about. 

Q.  How  do  you  respond  to  this 
general  view  that  this  has  been  a  kind 
of  humiliating  fiasco  for  the  United 
States  on  your  watch,  this  whole  busi- 
ness? 

A.  I  don't  particularly  like  the  fact 
that  he's  emerged  in  Panama  as  a  per- 


J  lartment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


son  caught  by  this  Administration  hav- 
ing taken  part  in  drug  peddling  and 
that  he's  still  there.  However,  there's  a 
lot  of  pressure  on  him.  There  is  no  sup- 
port for  him  at  all  other  than  from 
Nicaragua  and  Cuba.  And  in  the  end,  I 
think  his  days  are  numbered. 

Q.  You  are  known,  either  rightly  or 
wrongly  because  you've  never  con- 
firmed it,  as  one  of  the  prime  advocates 
of  using  the  military  option  to  get 
Noriega  out.  You  say  that  you  have 
ideas,  but  nothing  you  want  to  discuss 
with  us. 

There  are  a  number  of  people, 
including  even  Richard  Nixon  on  this 
program,  who  have  said  that  they  felt 
the  military  idea  would  be  a  disaster, 
very  counterproductive,  creating  a 
terrible  backlash  not  only  in  Panama 
but  throughout  Latin  America.  Aren't 
they  right? 

A.  I  won't  confirm  or  deny  any  of 
these  so-called  stories  about  my  views. 
I  give  them  to  the  President. 

Q.  But  do  you  have  anything  to  say 
about  the  wisdom  or  lack  of  wisdom  of 
the  military  option,  without  telling  us 
what  you  say  in  the  Oval  Office? 

A.  It's  an  option,  it's  there,  and  it 
will  stay  there. 

Q.  Let's  talk  about  the  Soviet  Union 
for  a  second.  Is  this  SDI — [Secretary  of 
Defense]  Carlucci  seems  to  favor  a 
limited  system  as  a  first  phase.  Does  that 
sort  of  approach  offer  an  option  for 
solving  the  ABM  [Antiballistic  Missile] 
Treaty,  SDI  issues,  and  making  it  — 
might  make  it  easier  to  actually  have 
that  treaty  signed  before  you  leave 
office?  Do  you  see  much  hope  of  reach- 
ing that  agreement  before  you  leave? 

A.  There  are  a  number  of  things  on 
the  table  in  our  negotiations  with  the 
Soviets  on  the  ABM  Treaty  issue,  and 
we  have  made  a  fair  amount  of  head- 
way. The  principal  thing  that  we 
haven't  been  able  to  get  a  good  handle 
on  with  them  has  to  do  with  the  activi- 
ties you  can  conduct  during  a  period  of 
pledged  nonwithdrawal  from  the  ABM 
Treaty.  The  principle  of  a  nonwithdra- 
wal period  is  agreed,  and  to  a  degree 
people  understand  what  you  would  do, 
but  there  are  some  problems  there  that 
need  to  be  wrestled  with.  I  don't  think 
this  particular,  as  I  said,  premature  dis- 
cussion of  how  you  would  go  about 
what  are  the  right  phasings  for  possible 
deployment  particularly  helps  us  one 
way  or  another  on  that. 

Q.  You've  been  following  Governor 
Dukakis'  foreign  policy  statements  to 
some  degree.  He  gave  a  speech  just  this 
past  week  on  NATO.  What  do  you  think 
about  him? 


57 


AFRICA 


A.  I  didn't  read  that  speech  care- 
fully, so  I  don't  want  to  comment  on  it. 

Q.  He  talks  about  doing  away  with 
some  of  the  bargaining  chips  that  you 
folks  are  using  in  this  Administration. 

A.  He  did  say  that  he  supported 
what  we  were  doing  to  bring  about  a 
START  [strategic  arms  reduction  talks] 
treaty,  but  it  also  seemed  as  though  he 
threw  away  some  of  the  things  that 
were  part  of  the  bargaining.  So  you 
know  when  you're  bargaining  for  some- 
thing, you'll  get  all  the  cards  you  can 
into  your  hands  and  you  play  them 
pretty  carefully;  and  before  you  put  one 
down,  you  want  to  get  one  from  the 
other  side.  That's  what  bargaining  is. 
You  can't  sell  it  if  you  give  it  away, 
and  I  hope  he  will  come  to  realize  that. 

Q.  Speaking  of  bargaining,  you're 
going  to  be  in  Toronto  and  you're  going 
to  be  asking  the  allies  to  come  up  with 
some  money  for  the  Philippines  and  for 
the  Afghan  resistance.  Regarding  the 
Philippines,  you  had  a  very  tough  state- 
ment this  week  about  possibly  pulling 
American  bases  out  of  the  Philippines. 
Do  you  want  to  explain  that? 

A.  The  Philippines  keep  talking 
about  prohibiting,  in  effect,  ship  visits 
as  New  Zealand  has  done;  and,  if  they 
do  take  that  policy,  then  there's  no 
place  for  our  Navy  in  the  Philippines. 

Q.  Doesn't  that  undercut  your  posi- 
tion that  they  should  be  getting  aid  right 
now? 

A.  No.  I  think  the  PhiUppines  is  an 
important  democratic  country,  and  we 
want  to  support  the  emergence  of  de- 
mocracy and  freedom  and  the  rule  of 
law  in  the  Philippines,  as  elsewhere.  At 
the  same  time,  we  do  have  important 
bases  there,  but  they  need  to  be  bases 
in  the  spirit  of  friends  and  allies.  They 
are  there  because  they  want  them 
there  as  well  as  because  we  want  them 
there. 

I  hope,  incidentally,  that  we  will  be 
able  to  work  these  problems  out.  But 
the  United  States  does  have  alternates, 
and  it's  interesting  that  countries  that 
don't  have  bases  or  don't  have  ships 
coming  or  getting  i-epaired  and  so 
forth,  say,  "Look  we're  open  for  busi- 
ness. We  like  to  do  that  business." 
And  it's  important  to  the  Philippines,  I 
might  say. 

Q.  I'm  going  to  go  back  to  Central 
America  just  one  moment.  A  lot  of 
people  say  that's  the  greatest  area  of 
disappointment  to  this  Administration 
— the  greatest  disaster.  Do  you  agree 
with  that,  in  fact?  Is  that  your  greatest 
disappointment? 


A.  I  think  that  the  President's  for- 
eign policy  around  the  world  is  in  excel- 
lent shape.  It's  made  tremendous  head- 
way, and  it's  in  good  shape. 

Q.  What  are  you  most  disappointed 
about? 

A.  The  area  that  is  the  most  trouble- 
some is  Central  America,  in  spite  of 
the  fact  that  we've  made  great  strides 
there,  as  I  said  in  response  to  an  ear- 
lier question.  The  fact  that  we  still 
have  this  bad  rotten  apple  in  the  barrel 
in  the  forai  of  Nicaragua— the  Panama 


problem  is  a  little  different — is  an  an- 
noying problem.  And  I  agree  with  you; 
it's  the  thing  that  troubles  me  the 
most. 

Other  than  with  respect  to  Nicara- 1 
gua,  we're  in  very  good  shape,  and  I  I 
might  say  there  is  broad  bipartisan  sup  I 
port  for  the  general  thrust  of  American  I 
foreign  policy.  People  shouldn't  forget  | 
that.  "  1 


'Press  release  117  of  June  20,  1988. 


The  Potential  Impact  of  Imposing 
Sanctions  Against  South  Africa 


by  John  C.  Whitehead 

Statement  before  the  Senate  Foreign 
Relations  Committee  on  June  22,  1988. 
Mr.  Whitehead  is  Deputy  Secretary  of 
State.' 

Thank  you  for  this  opportunity  to  pre- 
sent the  Administration's  views  on  Sen- 
ate Bill  2378,  the  amendments  to  the 
Comprehensive  Anti-Apartheid  Act  of 
1986.  If  enacted,  this  legislation  could 
have  important  consequences  for  the  fu- 
ture of  American  diplomacy  in  South 
Africa  and  in  the  southern  Africa  re- 
gion. For  reasons  I  hope  to  make  clear 
in  my  testimony,  the  Administration 
strongly  opposes  Senate  Bill  2378. 
American  interests  are  not  served  by 
legislation  which  requires  that  we  ex- 
periment in  the  economic  destabiliza- 
tion  of  South  Africa  without  genuine 
prospects  of  contributing  to  the  solution 
of  that  country's  problems. 

Despite  our  strong  objections  to 
this  bill,  we  are  quick  to  recognize  the 
feelings  which  motivated  it.  South  Af- 
rica's apartheid  system  is  repugnant  to 
all  Americans.  While  many  govern- 
ments tolerate  or  even  surreptitiously 
encourage  discrimination  on  the  basis  of 
ethnicity,  only  in  South  Africa  is  racial 
discrimination  a  civic  duty  and  the 
failure  to  practice  it  a  punishable  of- 
fense. Among  nations  which  profess  to 
identify  with  Western,  democratic  val- 
ues, only  South  Africa  classifies  indi- 
viduals, herds  them  into  groups,  and 
strips  them  of  their  individual  political 
rights  according  to  racial  and  ethnic 
criteria.  This  monstrous  injustice  af- 
fronts us  all  and  cries  out  for  redress. 

Our  aversion  deepens  when  we  are 
confronted  by  the  stubborn  resistance 
of  the  South  African  Government  to  ap- 
peals for  peaceful  change.  Successive 


generations  of  black  activists — during  J 
the  defiance  campaigns  of  the  early 
1950s  and  early  1960s,  during  the 
Soweto  uprising  of  the  1970s,  and  in  th 
latest  wave  of  township  protest  from     ^ 
1984  to  1986— have  been  shattered  by    ^ 
progressively  harsher  and  more  sophis  ^ 
ticated  forms  of  official  repression.  De 
spite  repeated,  worldwide  censure  and 
the  imposition  of  severe  sanctions — 
some  of  them  dating  back  more  than  2 
years — South  Africa's  governing  elite 
remains  steadfast  in  its  determination 
to  retain  its  monopoly  on  political 
power  I 

Injustice  and  inequality  are  en- 
trenched in  South  Africa,  but  not  all 
the  trends  are  negative.  Over  the  past 
10  years,  the  nature  of  apartheid  has    | 
changed  markedly.  Numerous  petty      ^ 
apartheid  provisions  have  fallen  by  the ; 
wayside,  the  Pass  Laws  have  been 
scrapped,  central  business  districts 
have  been  opened  to  blacks,  and  black 
labor  unions  have  been  legalized  and 
have  made  impressive  organizational 
strides.  These  changes  testify  to  a 
growing  awareness  among  many  Soutl 
African  whites  that  apartheid  in  its 
purest  sense  is  impractical  and  un- 
economic, if  not  actually  immoral.  Coi 
sistent  with  this  trend  is  the  finding  c 
the  Dutch  Reformed  Church  2  years 
ago  that  no  scriptural  justification 
exists  for  the  practice  of  apartheid. 
Another  institutional  pillar  of  the 
Afrikaner  establishment,  the  Broeder 
bond,  also  broke  with  apartheid 
orthodoxy  at  that  time.  Regrettably, 
this  willingness  to  dispense  with  somt 
forms  of  racial  discrimination  has  not 
yet  developed  into  a  consensus  in  favo 
of  addressing  the  truly  critical  issue 
confronting  South  Africa,  which  is  th< 
issue  of  permitting  all  South  Africans 


58 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/August  19g 


AFRICA 


;#?articipate  in  deciding  how  and  by 
ilfem  they  are  governed. 

A  clear  and  dispassionate  analysis 

i|he  crisis  gripping  South  Africa  is 

lired  if  the  United  States  hopes  to 

a  constructive  role  there.  Our  in- 

tJsts  demand  that  we  avoid  the  pit- 

tj  of  desperate  activism  on  the  one 

and  resignation  and  disengagement 
ofljhe  other.  We  must  accept  that  the 
tdisition  to  a  nonracial  democracy  in 
iSflth  Africa  will  inevitably  take  longer 
:■!  all  of  us  would  like.  We  must  also 
i^erstand  that  South  Africans  them- 
es, black  and  white,  will  be  the 
its  of  their  own  liberation,  with  out- 
rs,  including  the  United  States, 
ing  only  a  secondary  role  at  best. 
Above  all,  we  need  to  acknowledge 
such  limited  influence  as  we  cur- 
ly possess  derives  from  our  con- 
ing presence  on  the  ground  in 
;h  Africa.  A  progressive  U.S.  busi- 
nd  presence,  an  official  aid  program 
rd'hing  out  to  tens  of  thousands  of 
\mk  South  Africans,  our  persistence 
in'rging  South  Africans  to  confront 
th  imperatives  of  dialogue  and  compro- 
mi'  and  to  consider  what  they  are  for 
AS  -ell  as  what  they  are  against — these 
■  the  most  important  assets  we  have 
■iiallenging  apartheid.  We  can  con- 
.c  u,  censure,  and  sanction — as  this 
leplation  requires — and  hope  against 
■0]  •  and  experience  that  we  can  a- 
\f'  some  beneficial  result.  Or  we  can 
a  longer  view  which  refuses  to  dis- 
-r  ige,  preserves  our  lines  of  commu- 
rriition,  our  contacts,  and  our  limited 
re  urces  within  South  Africa  and  posi- 
".i<s  the  United  States  to  intervene 
Dfltively  at  the  moment  when  our  lim- 
t  leverage  can  accomplish  the  most 


Tl  Fallacy  of  Sanctions 

-'''  years  ago,  at  the  height  of  the 
•nt  unrest  in  black  townships  across 
ill  Africa,  it  was  fashionable  to  ar- 
that  apartheid  had  entered  its  final 
1^.  Activists  in  South  Africa,  e.xiled 
k  leaders,  and  many  observers  in 
iipe  and  the  United  States  pre- 
ed  that  only  a  final  push  was 
liil  to  topple  the  system.  Compre- 
si\e  and  mandatory  international 
t Kills  were  thought  by  some  to  be 
■isely  the  push  required. 
These  prognostications  were  ob- 
isly  wide  of  the  mark.  Few  persons 
'■  iliar  with  existing  power  rela- 
ships  in  South  Africa  seriously  be- 
e  that  a  rapid  resolution  of  the  crisis 
ossible — with  or  without  sanctions 
<siire.  Surely  it  was  unrealistic  to 
ect  the  South  African  Government 


to  respond  to  our  pressure  by  ending 
the  state  of  emergency,  releasing  politi- 
cal detainees,  or  meeting  any  of  the 
other  conditions  for  lifting  sanctions 
outlined  in  the  Comprehensive  Anti- 
Apartheid  Act.  Not  surprisingly,  the 
South  African  Government  refused  cat- 
egorically to  meet  these  demands. 

Presumably  in  recognition  of  these 
factors,  Congress  has  modified  its  ex- 
pectations. In  reporting  out  House  Res- 
olution 1580,  the  House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee  describes  sanctions  as  "part 
of  a  medium-  to  long-term  approach  de- 
signed to  maximize  both  internal  and 
external  pressure  on  the  apartheid  re- 
gime." The  House  report  further  notes 
that  to  ensure  their  effectiveness,  sanc- 
tions must  be  multilateralized;  that 
U.S.  pressure  alone  will  be  insufficient 
to  accelerate  the  pace  of  change  in 
South  Africa. 

It  should  be  clearly  understood 
that  the  Administration  has  consulted 
intensively  with  South  Africa's  main 
trading  partners,  all  of  whom  are  major 
allies  of  the  United  States.  For  the 
most  part,  these  governments  are 
strongly  disinclined  to  either  follow  an 
American  lead  or  act  unilaterally  in 
adopting  further  punitive  sanctions. 
Our  allies  either  reject  or  are  highly 
skeptical  of  the  premise  that  by  de- 
stabilizing the  South  African  economy 
the  West  can  somehow  engineer  a  rela- 
tively peaceful  transition  to  democratic 
rule  in  South  Africa.  Moreover,  these 
governments  judge — as  does  the  Ad- 
ministration— that  international  sanc- 
tions cannot  be  effectively  enforced 
without  recourse  to  military  measures. 

As  some  of  you  may  be  aware,  we 
have  received  in  the  past  2  weeks  sepa- 
rate, official  communications  from  the 
European  Community  and  the  British 
Government  informing  us  of  their  deep 
concerns  over  extraterritorial  provi- 
sions in  this  bill.  Passage  of  S.  2378, 
particularly  the  secondary  boycott  fea- 
tures, could  lead  to  GATT  [General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade]  dis- 
putes with  our  major  trading  partners 
and  undermine  the  U.S.  negotiating 
position  in  the  current  round  of  GATT 
talks. 

We  should  not,  therefore,  delude 
ourselves  into  thinking  that  it  is  possi- 
ble to  internationalize  sanctions  under 
American  leadership.  Our  allies  will  re- 
sist this  approach,  at  least  until  such 
time  as  we  can  demonstrate  convinc- 
ingly that  cutting  trade  links,  selling 
off  assets,  and  relinquishing  contacts 
across  the  board  in  South  Africa  will 
result  in  something  other  than  a  costly, 
symbolic  protest. 


The  central  fallacy  of  the  sanctions 
approach  is  not  simply  that  it  isn't  fea- 
sible. Rather,  the  problem  lies  with  a 
fundamental  misreading  of  South  Af- 
rican political  and  economic  realities 
and  with  the  acceptance  of  a  false  cor- 
relation between  economic  pain  and 
positive  social  change.  Simply  put, 
sanctions  are  the  wrong  tool  brought  to 
the  wrong  job. 

Sanctions  are  the  wrong  tool  be- 
cause South  Africa  has  the  resources  to 
resist  an  economic  siege  and  has  been 
preparing  for  such  a  contingency  for 
many  years.  Although  heavily  depend- 
ent on  international  trade,  South  Africa 
has  domestic  deposits  of  virtually  every 
key  raw  material  input  needed  for  an 
industrial  economy  with  the  major  ex- 
ceptions of  crude  oil  and  bauxite.  The 
South  African  Government  and  private 
sector  have  spent  billions  of  dollars 
stockpiling  strategic  imports,  ranging 
from  crude  oil  and  bauxite  to  computer 
and  aircraft  parts.  These  stockpiles 
would  provide  a  cushion  against  short- 
ages until  alternative  sources  of  supply 
could  be  found  or  import  substitution 
projects  completed. 

Based  on  previous  experiences  with 
international  embargoes  against  South 
Africa,  we  believe  that  direct  controls 
on  shipments  to  South  Africa  would 
probably  not  prevent  South  African 
importers  from  obtaining  the  foreign 
supplies  that  they  need.  One  possible 
exception  would  be  certain  high-tech- 
nology goods,  for  which  adequate  en- 
forcement mechanisms  already  exist. 

With  regard  to  South  African  ex- 
ports, 65%  of  export  earnings  are  made 
up  of  low-bulk,  high-value  items  such  as 
gold,  diamonds,  and  strategic  minerals. 
Most  economists  believe  that  an  effec- 
tive boycott  of  these  commodities  would 
be  difficult  or  impossible  to  enforce. 
The  remaining  35%,  mainly  steel  and 
manufactured  products,  would  be  more 
vulnerable  to  a  general  boycott.  Even 
here,  however,  a  boycott  would  not  be 
airtight.  For  example,  in  the  past  2 
years,  sanctions  have  closed  80%  of 
South  Africa's  traditional  export  mar- 
ket for  steel,  yet  South  African  steel 
exports  were  only  down  by  about  2.9% 
through  October  of  last  year.  Given 
South  Africa's  proven  capacity  for  trade 
realignment  and  diversion  and  its  still 
untested  capacity  for  full-scale  sanc- 
tions-busting, we  estimate  that  even 
reasonably  well-enforced,  comprehen- 
sive UN  sanctions  would  cut  total  ex- 
port receipts  by  something  less 
than  25%. 

The  net  result  of  a  total  trade  em- 
bargo on  South  Africa  would  almost 
certainly  be  far  less  dramatic  than  pro- 


Miartment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


59 


AFRICA 


ponents  of  the  sanctions  approach  be- 
heve.  The  impact  is  likely  to  be  a 
moderate  recession  over  the  medium 
term   comparable  to  the  1982-86  period 
in  South  Africa.  Over  the  longer  term, 
constraints  on  growth  and  a  decline  m 
competitiveness  could  push  South 
Africa  deeper  into  recession. 

But   whatever  their  economic  con- 
sequences, what  counts  is  the  political 
impact  of  sanctions.  As  one  leading 
South  African  Marxist  theoretician  re- 
cently noted  in  a  reversal  of  his  pre- 
vious position,  the  criterion  for 
sanctions  should  be  the  question  of 
whether  they  consolidate  the  position  ot 
the  black  worker  and  black  organiza-    ^ 
tions   He  concludes  that  sanctions  don  t 
meet  that  criterion.  As  I  will  point  out, 
sanctions  are  far  more  likely  to  produce 
perverse  results:  mild  discomfort,  at 
most,  for  white  elites,  but  a  risk  of 
severe  economic  dislocation  for  the 
black  work  force. 

The  Economic  Costs  to 
the  United  States 


Sanctions  are  not  cost  free  for  the 
United  States;  S.  2738  will  require  U.S. 
business  to  find  new  markets,  assuming 
they  are  available,  for  over  $1.2  billion 
in  annual  exports  of  mostly  manufac- 
tured and  high-technology  goods.  The 
forced  liquidation  of  over  $1  billion  in 
direct  U.S.  investment  will  change  ht- 
tle  in  South  Africa  except  to  consoli- 
date the  position  of  local  business 
interests  acquiring  these  assets  at  well 
below  market  value.  It  is  reasonable  to 
expect  that  at  least  some  U.S.  compan- 
ies will  challenge  the  constitutionahty 
of  this  provision  on  the  grounds  that  it 
results  in  the  confiscation  of  assets 
without  fair  compensation. 

While  the  precise  impact  of  sanc- 
tions on  the  U.S.  economy  is  hard  to 
measure,  some  industries  will  be  more 
seriously  affected  than  others.  Studies 
indicate  that  the  U.S.  coal  industry  has 
already  lost  an  estimated  $250  million 
over  the  past  3  years.  A  sizable  portion 
of  the  loss  is  due  to  market  distortions 
caused  by  existing  U.S.  sanctions 
against  South  Africa.  Foreign  custom- 
ers of  U.S.  Government  enriching  serv- 
ices who  use  South  African  uranium 
provide  approximately  $350  million  a 
year  in  revenues.  Some  of  these  cus- 
tomers will  take  their  enrichment  busi- 
ness to  Europe  and  the  Soviet  Union  if 
the  United  States  cannot  process  their 
material. 

These  estimates  do  not  include  the 
potential  cost  of  South  African  counter- 
sanctions.  Even  a  temporary  disruption 
of  strategic  mineral  exports  to  the 


United  States  would  have  serious  reper- 
cussions over  a  broad  range  of  U.S. 
industries. 

According  to  the  U.S.  Bureau  ot 
Mines,  the  direct  economic  costs  to  this 
nation  resulting  from  a  decision  to  em- 
bargo South  African  strategic  and  criti- 
cal minerals  imports  are  estimated  at 
$1.85  billion  per  year  About  94%  of 
these  estimated  costs  are  for  two  plati- 
num-group metals,  platinum  and 
rhodium.  . 

Platinum  is  primarily  used  in  the 
production  of  automotive  catalytic  con- 
verters, and  about  two-thirds  of  1986 
total  domestic  industrial  consumption 
was  used  for  this  purpose.  In  1986,  the 
United  States  imported  86%  of  its  plati 
num  supplies  from  South  Africa. 

Outside  the  Soviet  bloc  there  are 
insufficient  alternative  supply  sources 
to  South  Africa  to  meet  U.S.  platinum 
metal  requirements.  In  1986,  the  total 
production  of  countries  other  than 
South  Africa  and  the  Soviet  Union,  in- 
cluding domestic  primary  and  second- 
ary production,  could  only  satisfy  about 
40%  of  U.S.  demand. 

Rhodium  is  a  very  rare  metal  abso- 
lutely essential  for  compliance  with 
Clear  Air  Act  auto  emissions  standards 
for  nitrous  oxides.  Omitting  the  Soviet 
Union  and  other  centrally  planned 
economies,  U.S.  consumption  of  rho- 
dium was  almost  one-half  of  the 
Western  world  total.  The  primary  ap- 
plication of  rhodium  is  in  the  production 
of  automotive  catalytic  converters.  Over 
70%  of  U.S.  consumption  (93,000 
ounces  in  1986)  was  used  in  this  applica- 
tion in  1986.  Rhodium  demand  is  in- 
creasing worldwide  as  emission-control 
requirements  are  placed  on  nitrous  ox- 
ide emissions  and  as  the  control  re- 
quirements are  applied  to  a  larger  fleet 
of  vehicles.  In  1986,  South  Africa  pro- 
vided about  53%  of  Western  world  sup- 
ply the  Soviet  Union  38%,  and 
secondary  recovery  5%.  There  are  in- 
sufficient non-South  African  rhodium 
supplies  to  meet  U.S.  demand. 

It  should  be  pointed  out  that  while 
the  South  African  Government  has 
never  threatened  the  United  States 
with  a  disruption  or  a  cut-off  of  strate- 
gic minerals  supplies,  it  certainly  has 
this  option.  Pretoria  also  has  the  option 
of  slapping  countersanctions  on  neigh- 
boring black  states,  all  of  whom  are 
critically  dependent  on  South  African 
trade  or  transport  routes,  or  both.  Pas- 
sage of  this  bill  would  put  South  Af- 
rica's intentions  to  the  test  with  regard 
to  both  the  United  States  and  our  in- 
terests in  stable  development  of  the 
region. 


The  Political  Costs  of  Sanctions 


If  sanctions  are  the  wrong  tool,  they  ^ 
are  also  being  used  for  the  wrong  jol|^. 
Ostensibly  aimed  at  infiuencing  Sout  |: 
Africa's  key  decisionmakers,  sanctioi^. 
miss  this  target  altogether  while  hit  jj 
ting  everyone  else,  causing  collateral  |fi 
damage  in  precisely  those  sectors  of  ^,. 
South  African  society  which  are  pus  ■ 
ing  hardest  for  fundamental,  peacefi  ^ 
change.  . 

If  comprehensive,  international  ^ 
sanctions  against  South  Africa  are  e 
tended   we  should  anticipate  that  th 
main  losers  will  be  South  African 
blacks.  They  will  be  the  first  to  suff 
the  effects  of  a  prolonged  recession 
terms  of  lost  opportunities;  lost  jobs 
and  decreased  government  spending 
black  housing,  black  education,  and 
services  provided  to  black  township 
This  is  an  unintended  and  possibly 
tragic  economic  implication  of  the 
sanctions  approach. 

At  the  same  time,  the  forced  w 
drawal  of  U.S.  corporations  from  S 
Africa  will  end  funding  and  logistic 
support  for  a  wide  range  of  progra; 
designed  to  promote  black  economi 
empowerment,  foster  black  self-re- 
liance, and  build  professional  and  li 
ership  skills.  U.S.  and  other  Weste 
corporations  play  an  important  par 
helping  to  sustain  an  estimated  2,0- 
such  programs  which  exist  at  the 
grassroots  level.  In  the  face  of  mou 
ing  restrictions  on  most  forms  of 
opposition  political  activity,  these  i 
grams  provide  a  vital  organizations 
network  and  fall-back  position  for  I 
blacks  working  to  build  the  power 
bases  necessary  for  challenging  th( 
government. 

In  less  direct  fashion  we  stand 

lose  other  opportunities  to  deflect 

pressive  measures  directed  at  blacl 

the  threat  of  a  total  economic  emb; 

on  South  Africa  becomes  reality,  t 

South  African  Government  will  hai 

even  fewer  reasons  to  heed  outsidt 

vice  on  what  it  regards  as  its  intei 

political  affairs.  Although  our  stan 

with  the  South  African  Governmei 

chned  sharply  following  passage  o: 

Comprehensive  Anti-Apartheid  A( 

1986,  we  retained  enough  influence 

argue  persuasively  in  favor  of  a  st 

execution  for  the  Sharpeville  Six. 

black  South  Africans  convicted  fo; 

murder  committed  during  a  prote 

demonstration.  The  United  States 

joined  several  other  governments 

groups  in  appealing  for  clemency 

the  six.]  We  have  also  successfuU; 

bied  to  postpone  and,  hopefully,  s 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Augusi 


AFRICA 


.k  pending  legislation  which  could 
1  all  foreign  funding  to  groups  whose 
i\  ities  the  government  broadly  de- 
•s  as  "political."  These  are  small  but 
sij:iifioant  achievements.  We  cannot  re- 
aJtically  expect  to  repeat  them  if  we 
(tinue  down  the  road  toward  punitive 
1(  embargoes  and  a  severance  of  ties 
h  South  African  officialdom. 

1  cannot  accept  the  argument  that 
iiitlicting  additional  economic  hard- 
nd  political  frustration  on  South 
n  blacks  we  create  the  conditions 
.    -ary  for  a  successful  challenge  to 
apartheid  system.  Nor  is  it  reason- 
in  think  that  sanctions  will  have  a 
Mi-alizing  effect  on  white  elites, 
irliy  rendering  them  more  vulnerable 
'  inssures  for  fundamental  change. 
U  r  any  conceivable  sanctions  scen- 
'    the  South  African  Government 
-sign  top  priority  to  protecting 
jobs  and  to  ensuring  that  the  po- 
aiui  military  are  funded  at  levels 
ficient  to  avoid  any  decline  in  their 
aliilities.  The  suppression  of  new 
'  liivaks  of  black  unrest  is  a  foregone 
ilu.sion.  To  suppose  that  outside 
VIS  can  rearrange  government  pri- 
its  through  economic  quarantines 
I  ri'duced  contact  with  South  Africa 
o  misread  tragically  the  staying 
,j  aT  of  the  Afrikaner  minority  and  its 
d  ermination  to  put  its  security  ahead 
0  ill  other  interests,  including  the  in- 
t'ests  of  South  Africa  as  a  whole. 

South  African  blacks  will  be  the 
p  mary,  but  not  the  only,  victims  of  an 
i)?rnational  sanctions  campaign 
a  linst  South  Africa.  Other  victims 
'I  lie  those  South  African  whites  who 
St  closely  identify  with  American 
iii'cratic  ideals  and  who  support 
1 1;  aspirations  for  a  more  just  soci- 
Leaders  such  as  Frederik  van  Zyl 
liliert,  Wynand  Malan,  Helen  Suz- 
11,  and  Denis  Worrall  staunchly 
Hise  an  economic  and  diplomatic 
iiaiitine  of  South  Africa.  As  they 
ule  to  build  bridges  across  South 
IS  racial  divide,  they  need  the 
rt  that  a  strong  U.S.  presence, 
•Fficial  and  unofficial,  provides. 
have  seen  sanctions  contribute  to 
ii  i^e  mentality  among  whites  which 
ruling  National  Party  has  success- 
l.\  fostered  and  exploited  by  convert- 
to  its  ranks  thousands  of  relatively 
'ilei-ate,  English-speaking  voters  over 
'  past  2  years.  They  have  also  wit- 
>sed  a  steady  erosion  over  the  past 
ii'  of  fundamental  civil  liberties  even 
the  hitherto  protected  sphere  of 
lite  politics.  The  same  noose  which 
•I  s  been  used  to  strangle  black  dissent 


is  now  coiled  expectantly  around  the 
white,  reformist  opposition.  By  dis- 
sociating ourselves  from  South  Africa, 
we  simply  make  it  easier  and  less 
costly  for  authorities  to  pull  that  noose 
tighter. 

By  the  same  token,  ultraconserv- 
ative  factions  in  South  Africa  are  in- 
creasingly drawn  to  the  prospect  of 
cutting  trade  links,  ending  the  U.S. 
business  presence  in  South  Africa,  and 
limiting  contact  with  the  West.  From 
their  standpoint,  a  strong  American 
presence  is  an  unwelcome  restraint  on 
South  Africa's  internal  and  external 
policy  options.  Conservatives  resent 
what  they  regai'd  as  American  med- 
dling in  South  Africa's  internal  affairs, 
including  our  financial  and  moral  sup- 
port to  antiapartheid  groups,  and  our 
persistance  in  seeking  ways  to  disman- 
tle racial  barriers  and  promote  di- 
alogue. They  also  resent  American 
films  and  televisions  programs,  our  mu- 
sic, journalism,  and  popular  culture  be- 
cause of  their  supposedly  subversive  in- 
fluence on  a  younger  generation  of  Af- 
rikaners. South  Africa's  UN  represent- 
ative was  speaking  to  this  constituency 
when,  in  responding  a  few  months  ago 
to  harsh  criticism  of  South  Africa  in  the 
General  Assembly,  he  invited  the  inter- 
national community  to  "do  its  damned- 
est" to  Pretoria.  He  could  have  as  well 
added:  "and  close  the  door  behind  you." 
Neither  hardliners  in  the  National 
Party,  nor  the  growing  conservative  op- 
position, nor  the  more  militant  organi- 
zations even  further  to  the  right  will 
mourn  the  absence  of  Americans  from 
South  Africa. 

Sanctions  and  the  Black  Opposition 

Claims  that  the  overwhelming  majority 
of  South  African  blacks  support  sanc- 
tions cannot  be  substantiated.  Cer- 
tainly, respected  black  leaders  of 
community,  labor,  church,  and  student 
organizations,  as  well  as  the  ANC 
[African  National  Congress]  and  PAC 
[Pan-African  Congress]  in  exile,  con- 
tinue to  call  publicly  for  further 
punitive  measures  against  Pretoria. 
Some,  like  Archbishop  Desmond  Tutu, 
believe  that  sanctions  are  the  only  al- 
ternative to  uncontrollable  violence. 
Leaders  of  the  front-line  states  have 
also,  in  past  years  at  least,  been  out- 
spoken in  calling  for  U.S.  and  Western 
sanctions  against  South  Africa. 

Yet  there  are  signs  that  over  the 
past  2  years  a  serious  rethinking  of  the 
sanctions  strategy  has  taken  place. 
Some  mass  organizations,  such  as  con- 
servative black  churches  and  Chief 
Buthelezi's  Inkatha  movement,  which 


artment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


claims  to  represent  more  than  6  million 
Zulus,  have  always  been  opposed  to  in- 
ternational sanctions.  Other  organiza- 
tions, such  as  the  National  African 
Fedei-ated  Chamber  of  Commerce, 
which  represents  most  major  black 
business  interests,  officially  subscribe 
to  sanctions  while  leaving  individual 
members  ample  room  to  express 
doubts.  Even  within  the  staunchly 
prosanctions  COSATU  [Congress  of 
South  African  Trade  Unions],  debate 
simmers  over  the  wisdom  of  promoting 
international  embargoes. 

While  it  would  be  wrong  to  infer 
that  black  opposition  leaders  are  simply 
out  of  touch  with  their  rank  and  file, 
debate  over  the  effectiveness  of  sanc- 
tions is  unquestionably  livelier  now 
than  ever  before.  This  new  mood  is  cap- 
tured in  Soweto  playwright  Gibson 
Rente's  popular  drama  Sekunjalo, 
which  depicts  comrades  destroying  a 
township  by  intimidating,  burning,  and 
boycotting.  It  ends  with  a  declaration 
of  hatred  for  Afrikaner  rule  and  a 
dance  routine  in  which  the  actors  sing 
"Who's  gonna  plant  that  cane?  Who's 
gonna  drive  that  train?  Who's  gonna  fly 
that  plane?"  Rente's  actors  recount  the 
events  of  the  1850s  when  the  Xhosa  na- 
tion killed  its  cattle  and  burned  its 
grain  in  the  faith  that  the  dead  would 
rise  and  the  Russians  would  come  to 
drive  the  British  into  the  sea.  The  ac- 
tors compare  those  times  with  the  cur- 
rent calls  for  sanctions  and  bemoan  the 
self-destructive  tradition  of  black  South 
African  resistance  to  white  rule. 

The  Marxist  intellectual  and  leader 
of  the  black  consciousness-based  Na- 
tional Forum,  Neville  Alexander 
(hardly  an  apologist  for  apartheid), 
makes  the  same  argument  from  a  dif- 
ferent perspective.  He  wrote  recently 
that  "I  believe  .  .  .  that  the  insistence 
on  total  sanctions  is  senseless — as 
senseless  as  an  unqualified  academic 
boycott  and  unlimited  school  boycotts — 
which  amount  to  suicide  if  you  do  not 
have  real  power,  and  if  the  government 
is  not  yet  so  weak  that  such  pressure 
can  bring  it  to  its  knees." 

Across  South  Africa's  borders,  re- 
assessments of  the  effects  of  sanctions 
and  possible  South  African  counter- 
sanctions  on  the  economies  of  the  front- 
line states  are  also  underway.  As  a  re- 
sult, front-line  leaders  have  modified 
their  rhetoric,  moved  serious  discus- 
sions of  sanctions  to  the  margins  of  in- 
ternational meetings  and  abandoned 
plans  to  apply  sanctions  of  their  own. 
Trade  between  South  Africa  and  most 
neighboring  states  has  actually  in- 
creased over  the  past  year. 


61 


AFRICA 


These  observations  are  not  meant 
to  suggest  that  black  South  Africans 
have  come  to  terms  with  white  domina- 
tion or  that  South  Africa's  black-ruled 
neighbors  have  accepted  the  status  of 
satellites  to  the  region's  economic  su- 
perpower. What  has  occurred,  I  believe, 
is  that  sanctions  have  been  reevaluated, 
and  strong  misgivings  have  developed 
about  both  their  high  costs  and 
effectiveness. 

Keeping  Open  U.S.  Options 

I  alluded  earlier  to  the  combination  of 
outrage  and  impatience  with  which 
many  Americans  react  to  the  situation 
in  South  Africa.  But  neither  we  nor 
South  Africans  can  afford  U.S.  policies 
motivated  primarily  by  passion.  There 
exists  a  broad  American  consensus  on 
what  is  wrong  in  South  Africa  and  on 
the  steps  South  Africa  and  its  citizens 
must  take  to  correct  these  wrongs. 
This  consensus  could  provide  the  basis 
for  a  realistic,  workable,  and  nonpar- 
tisan approach  to  the  South  African 
crisis. 

Any  sound  American  policy  toward 
South  Africa  must  take  into  account  at 
least  two  fundamental  constraints. 
First,  we  must  accept  that  South  Af- 
rica's crisis  is  an  enduring  one.  There 
are  no  quick  solutions.  Resorting  to 
drastic  remedies — such  as  the  misuse  of 
American  power  to  destabilize  the 
South  African  economy — only  increases 
chances  of  a  catastrophic  outcome  for 
all  South  Africans.  Second,  we  must 
also  accept  that  our  leverage  is  limited. 
South  Africa  can  survive — even 
thrive — without  trade  or  contact  with 
Americans.  Our  mission  should  be  one 
of  using  all  available  means  to  maximize 
our  influence  and  leverage.  This  can't 
be  achieved  through  a  policy  of  eco- 
nomic and  diplomatic  dissociation  from 
the  problem. 

Operating  from  these  premises,  the 
Administration  has  constructed  an  ap- 
proach which  emphasizes  both  the  pro- 
tection of  enduring  U.S.  interests  in 
South  Africa  and  the  promotion  of 
rapid,  fundamental  change  in  that  soci- 
ety. This  approach  has  a  number  of  key 
elements. 

•  The  Administration  has  under- 
taken strenuous  efforts  to  keep  open  all 
our  lines  of  communication,  to  expand 
contacts  across  the  racial  and  political 
spectrum,  and  to  open  up  opportunities 
for  the  kinds  of  negotiations  which  are 
South  Africa's  only  alternative  to  a  slow 
descent  into  civil  war.  Over  the  past  8 
years,  all  groups  in  South  Africa,  in- 
cluding the  full  range  of  opposition 


movement  leaders,  have  had  access  to 
the  highest  levels  of  our  government. 
We  continue  to  make  it  clear  to  the 
South  African  Government  that  we  be- 
lieve it  has  a  special  responsibility  to 
create  the  necessary  conditions  in 
which  negotiations  with  credible  oppo- 
nents can  take  place. 

•  Expanding  our  assistance  to 
apartheid's  victims  is  a  top  priority. 
South  Africa's  struggling  black  commu- 
nities need  our  financial  support,  our 
technical  and  professional  training,  and 
our  help  in  developing  organizational 
and  leadership  skills.  These  are  the 
building  blocks  from  which  the  disad- 
vantaged majority  will  construct  a  more 
just  and  more  democratic  future  for 
South  Africa.  To  the  extent  that  num- 
bers of  blacks  already  possess  the 
knowledge  and  the  skills,  and  hence  the 
economic  power,  that  a  modern  indus- 
trial state  requires,  they  have  greatly 
strengthened  their  bargaining  position 
vis-a-vis  South  Africa's  governing  elite. 
We  must  work  to  develop  further  this 
leverage  and  to  help  turn  it  to  political 
advantage.  This  is  the  central  thrust  of 
our  official  aid  program  to  South  Af- 
rica. Obviously,  sanctions-induced  un- 
employment, a  turn  by  South  Africa 
toward  autarky  and  tighter  state  con- 
trol of  the  economy,  and  a  reduced 
American  presence  in  South  Africa 
would  all  work  against  this  effort. 

•  In  dealing  with  South  Africa,  we 
must  continue  to  put  a  strong  emphasis 
on  the  regional  context.  Turmoil  in 
South  Africa  continues  to  spread  out- 
ward in  shock  waves  which  threaten  the 
economic  and  political  stability  of 
neighboring  states.  Our  regional  diplo- 
macy is  committed  to  reducing  these 
states'  economic  vulnerabilities  and  to 
easing  misunderstandings  and  tensions 
in  their  dealings  with  South  Africa. 

•  In  this  regard,  negotiations  cur- 
rently underway  to  secure  Namibian  in- 
dependence and  the  withdrawal  of  all 
foreign  troops  from  both  Namibia  and 
Angola  assume  special  importance.  A 
negotiated  solution  would  be  a  signal 
achievement  for  American  diplomacy 
and  would  win  widespread  approval 
throughout  Africa.  Progress  has  been 
made  which  even  sympathetic  observers 
would  have  said  a  short  time  ago  was 
impossible.  We  have  laid  down  the  con- 
ceptual basis  for  a  settlement  and 
brought  all  parties  to  the  realization 
that  Namibian  independence,  the  re- 
moval of  foreign  armies  from  Angola, 
and  the  resolution  of  Angola's  internal 
conflict  are  interrelated  problems. 
None  of  these  problems  can  be  solved 
in  isolation  from  the  others. 


Our  mediation  continues,  and  it 
important  that  Congress  not  underci 
this  effort  by  ordering  drastic  change 
in  our  bilateral  relationship  with  ont 
the  negotiating  parties.  While  it  ma; 
be  in  South  Africa's  best  interests  tc 
achieve  a  negotiated  settlement  in  A 
gola  and  Namibia,  Pretoria  could  wc 
decide  that  a  harsh,  diplomatic  re- 
joinder to  expressions  of  U.S.  hostil 
is  a  higher  immediate  priority. 

As  a  final  note,  I  would  like  to 
point  out  that  in  a  few  months'  time 
new  U.S.  administration  will  enter  i 
fice  and  will  no  doubt  undertake  a  r 
view  of  U.S.  policy  toward  South  Al 
and  the  region.  It  would  be  wrong  f 
Congress  to  commit  the  United  Stal 
in  the  final  days  of  this  Administrat 
to  the  extreme  measures  contempla 
in  S.  2378.  To  do  so  will  deny  the  m 
administration  the  option  of  continu 
in  U.S.  policy  while  at  the  same  tin 
seriously  restricting  its  choices  befc 
it  has  even  entered  office. 

The  South  African  dilemma  wil 
with  us  for  some  time  to  come.  The 
only  reasonable  course  Americans  c 
adopt  is  one  which  ensures  that  we 
tain  as  many  diplomatic  tools  and  c 
nels  of  influence  as  possible  in  the 
search  for  ways  to  remain  relevant 
involved  in  finding  a  solution.  Regri 
bly,  S.  2378  takes  us  in  precisely  th 
opposite  direction. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearii 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  wi 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Doci 
ments,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Review  of  Events 
in  Ethiopia 


Following  are  statements  by  Cheste 
Crocker,  Assistant  Secretary  for  A) 
rican  Affairs;  Richard  Williamson, 
Assistant  Secretary  for  Internation 
Organization  Affairs;  and  Charles 
Gladson,  Assista7it  Administrator, 
Bureau  for  Africa,  Agency  for 
International  Development. 

APRIL  21,  1988 

Joint  statement  by  Assistant  Secre- 
taries Crocker  and  Williamson  and 
sistant  Administrator  Gladson  befo 
the  Subcommittees  on  Africa  and  o 


62 


AFRICA 


/'.'/'  Rights  a>id  International  Or- 
;    ''ii/(.s  of  the  House  Committee  on 
Affairs.' 

■Arlciime  the  opportunity  to  meet 
:  'lie  subcommittees  today  to  review 
us  of  events  in  Ethiopia  arising 
panded  civil  war  in  the  north 
1-  impact  on  international  relief 
lilies.  Let  us  note  from  the  outset 
this  has  been  a  rapidly  evolving 
e.  We  have  moved  quickly  on  many 
■f,  iliplomatic,  and  political  fronts 
.ii>e  of  the  seriousness  of  the  threat 
ai\ing  people  and  of  the  need  to 
;  quick  solutions.  We  were  pleased 
1   the  mission  to  Ethiopia  by  UN 
I  ei-  Secretary  General  Ahtisaari  and 
!  he  reviewing  matters  with  the 
!  ed  Nations  later  this  week.  I  wish 
ill]  be  optimistic,  but  overall  the 

■  f  .situation  remains  very  trouble- 
■  and  our  prognosis  is  not 
ui'atj'ing. 

.\>  the  committee  is  well  aware, 
rents  of  the  problem  lie  not  so  much 
eat  her  as  in  war  and  poor  agri- 
iral  policies.  The  internal  politics  of 
la  I'll  Ethiopia  have  festered  for 
lies  with  various  groups  spouting  a 
iaii-a  of  largely  Marxist  ideologies. 
ie  past  10  years,  however,  when  the 
:  uistu  regime  opted  for  confronta- 

■  rather  than  accommodation  with 
liern  dissidents,  the  stage  became 

a>ingly  set  for  the  major  warfare 
I  lew  afflicts  the  area.  During  this 
nil,  rebel  armies  in  Eritrea  co- 
ed under  the  leadership  of  the 
...  rean  People's  Liberation  Front 
ELF),  which  seeks  a  separate  and 
Hi  pendent  Eritrea. 

The  government's  military  pre- 
jjc.pation  in  Eritrea  permitted  the 
•"rth  of  another  distinct  political/mili- 
inovement  in  neighboring  Tigray. 
hard-line  Marxist  organization,  the 
■eaii  People's  Liberation  Front 
l-h),  has  also  expanded  its  military 
K  ities  and  wages  classic  guerrilla 
tale  ambushing  and  interdicting 
■riiment  movements  throughout  the 


(  urrent  Military  Situation 

'  I  result  of  rebel  successes  and  the 
lective  performance  of  the  Ethio- 
I  .Army  in  its  last  encounter,  the 
tary  situation  in  northern  Ethiopia 
le  most  precarious  in  years.  Since 
W-February,  climaxing  with  loss  of 
iibet  to  EPLF  surprise  attack  on 
■ch  20,  the  Ethiopian  Army  has  lost 
h  ground,  including  garrison  towns 
ch  it  apparently  intentionally  aban- 


doned. Government  forces  have  with- 
drawn into  a  defensive  perimeter 
centered  on  Massawa/Asmara/Keren  in 
Eritrea  and  Mekele  in  Tigi-ay.  Positions 
there  have  been  reinforced,  and  the 
government  is  actively  rebuilding  the 
manpower  and  material  of  the  northern 
armies. 

This  buildup  portends  a  major 
counteroffensive.  Whenever  that  occurs 
and  irrespective  of  whether  it  is  suc- 
cessful, such  fighting  would  likely  come 
at  high  cost  in  lives,  civilian  as  well  as 
military.  But  even  another  major  battle 
may  not  be  definitive.  This  war  has 
lasted  27  years,  at  times  punctuated  by 
bitter  fighting  and  ebb  and  flow  of  ter- 
ritorial control.  As  in  the  past,  it  is 
possible,  perhaps  even  probable,  that 
no  party  will  be  able  dramatically  to 
alter  the  military  balance  in  the  near 
future.  In  that  case,  and  in  the  absence 
of  political  solutions,  the  existing  stale- 
mate will  likely  continue,  albeit  at  a 
higher  level  of  mobilization  and 
readiness. 

This  impasse  dramatically  under- 
lines the  fact  that  only  political  solu- 
tions really  offer  the  possibility  for 
peace.  In  the  absence  of  peace,  war  will 
continue,  relief  operations  will  be  con- 
strained, and  famine  will  mount.  Thou- 
sands if  not  hundreds  of  thousands  or 
even  millions  of  people  may  die.  Sadly, 
no  party  to  conflict  in  northern  Ethi- 
opia appears  ready  to  negotiate  or  even 
to  consider  settlement  on  other  than  its 
harshest  terms,  i.e.,  total  victory.  How 
many  more  must  die  before  belligerents 
recognize  that  peace  rather  than  con- 
quest is  the  path  to  reconciliation? 

We  note  that  in  addition  to  pur- 
suing internal  military  solutions.  Presi- 
dent Mengistu  has  taken  certain  diplo- 
matic steps  designed  to  reduce  his 
evident  vulnerabilities  and  to  under- 
cut support  for  his  opponents  or  to 
lessen  external  pressures.  In  late 
March,  Ethiopia  accepted  with  alacrity 
2-year-old  Somali  propositions  which 
would  i-educe  border  tensions  between 
these  traditional  foes.  Implementation 
of  such  measures  will  release  Ethiopian 
troops  from  the  frontier  for  service  on 
the  northern  front,  but  the  Somalia- 
Ethiopia  accord  will  also  deal  directly 
with  nagging  issues  such  as  exchange 
of  POWs  [prisoners  of  war]  from  the 
1977  war  and  a  halt  to  insurgent  ac- 
tivities that  have  long  retarded  peace  in 
the  region.  Similarly,  there  are  indica- 
tions that  Ethiopia,  after  several  years 
of  deliberate  destabilization  of  Sudan, 
might  look  for  an  accommodation  with 
Sudan,  in  effect  proposing  a  mutual 
halt  to  support  for  insurgents.  Real- 
ization of  this  idea  is  problematical. 


however,  because  the  issues  are  intrac- 
table and  the  parallels  between  the 
civil  wars  in  these  two  countries  are  far 
from  exact.  The  importance  of  the  two 
developments,  nonetheless,  is  that  they 
represent  Mengistu's  near  admission 
that  Ethiopia  has  been  responsible  for 
mischief  in  the  region. 

This  latest  cycle  of  war  in  the 
north  is  an  impediment  to  consolidation 
of  President  Mengistu's  rule  and  the 
transformation  of  Ethiopia  into  a  So- 
viet-style people's  democratic  republic. 
Although  it  is  now  more  tenuous  than 
before,  Mengistu's  position  is  not  appar- 
ently threatened  by  these  develop- 
ments. His  control  of  the  internal 
security  apparatus  and  the  military 
command  structure  does  not  appear, 
from  available  evidence,  to  be  under 
challenge.  There  is  growing  discontent 
on  the  part  of  the  population  that  must 
forego  economic  progress  and  provide 
sons  for  the  army  as  well  as  taxes  for 
the  war,  but  this  is  unlikely  to  erupt 
into  popular  antigovernment  action. 

U.S.  Policy  Toward  Ethiopia 

American  relations  with  the  Ethiopian 
Government  remain  cool,  as  they  have 
for  more  than  a  decade.  We  have  indi- 
cated to  Ethiopian  leaders  our  willing- 
ness to  meet  and  discuss  the  many 
issues  which  divide  us,  but  they  have 
consistently  turned  away  from  serious 
talk.  We  have  very  little  direct  leverage 
with  the  Ethiopian  Government  and  its 
leaders.  Our  longstanding  policy,  valid 
throughout  Africa,  supports  the  ter- 
ritorial integrity  of  each  nation,  includ- 
ing Ethiopia.  We  have  never  provided 
equipment  or  other  support  to  any  of 
the  separatist  groups  active  in 
Ethiopia. 

Our  chief  involvement  with  Ethi- 
opia at  present,  as  in  1985-86,  centers 
on  providing  humanitarian  relief  so  that 
victims  of  famine  do  not  starve.  We 
have  purposely  pursued  relief  opera- 
tions in  concert  with  other  donors 
through  private  voluntary  organiza- 
tions, the  United  Nations,  and  interna- 
tional organizations  such  as  the  Red 
Cross  in  order  to  keep  the  human- 
itarian agenda  in  Ethiopia  separate 
from  the  political  one. 

Without  hesitation  we  have  done 
our  utmost  to  ensure  that  hungry  chil- 
dren are  fed  and  that  their  parents  re- 
ceive the  sustenance  necessary  to 
remain  in  their  homes  and  on  their 
farms  so  they  can  plant  again  when 
the  rains  return.  The  U.S.  Government 
mobilized  large  amounts  of  its  own 
resources.  We  also  catalyzed  other  gov- 


lartment  of  State  Bulletin/ August  1988 


63 


AFRICA 


ernments  into  prompt  action.  We  re- 
peatedly found  warm  and  widespread 
congressional  and  public  support  for 
food  for  Ethiopia.  American  private 
voluntary  organizations,  which  are 
the  backbone  of  humanitarian  efforts 
around  the  globe,  again  came  through 
with  effective,  efficient,  and  compassion- 
ate operations.  Always  at  sacrifice  of 
personal  comfort  and,  indeed,  in  the 
face  of  some  personal  risk,  relief  work- 
ers on  the  ground  struggle  daily 
against  the  odds  of  nature.  All  Ameri- 
cans can  be  proud  of  our  country's 
response. 

Humanitarian  Operations 

Given  the  solid  early  start  last  summer 
and  cooperation  from  all  concerned,  re- 
lief operations  progressed  satisfactorily 
through  the  fall  and  into  the  new  year. 
Up  until  February  1988,  food  flowed 
into  drought-stricken  areas  through  a 
relatively  efficient  mechanism  consist- 
ing of  donors,  the  government's  Relief 
and  Rehabilitation  Commission  (RRC), 
PVOs,  NGOs  [private  voluntary  organi- 
zations, nongovernmental  organiza- 
tions], and  the  United  Nations.  People 
were  being  fed,  and  we  were  encour- 
aged that,  by  slowly  increasing  food 
deliveries  as  new  transport  became 
available,  we  would  be  able  to  stay 
ahead  of  the  problem,  that  camps  would 
be  avoided,  and  that  hungry  people 
would  hve. 

Two  of  the  three  major  con- 
straints— food  availability  and  trans- 
port— appeared  to  be  solved,  but  the 
third  constraint — insecurity — was  the 
unknown  factor.  Clearly,  it  was  the  im- 
ponderable in  the  north  upon  which 
success  or  failure  turned.  Sporadic  re- 
bel attacks  against  trucks  crippled  the 
fleet  and  were  a  strong  psychological 
deterrent  to  fleet  movements.  Addi- 
tionally, government  forces  began  clos- 
ing roads  more  frequently,  particularly 
in  Tigray  where  donors  met  less  than 
half  of  delivery  goals  in  February. 
Stocks  held  in  provincial  towns  and 
rural  feeding  centers  dwindled  and  re- 
supply  dramatically  diminished.  Rebel 
forays  in  Tigray  hampered  movements, 
but  the  true  turning  point  was  the  mili- 
tary setback  suffered  by  the  army  at 
Afabet,  Eritrea,  on  March  19. 

Following  that,  the  government 
clamped  down  hard  to  ensure  its  con- 
trol, resulting  in  a  virtual  halt  of  relief 
food  movement.  The  military  comman- 
deered government  food  trucks  and 
fuel.  Relief  aircraft  were  barred  from 
the  north  and  port  priorities  assigned 


to  military  shipments.  By  April  6,  re- 
lief operations  were  pretty  well  stalled 
throughout  the  rural  north,  except  for 
sporadic  airlift  into  Mekele  from  the 
south  and  some  residual  distribution 
from  local  stocks.  Nonetheless,  donors 
were  prepared  to  resume  active  opera- 
tions whenever  security  cii-cumstances 
permitted.  The  government's  April  6 
e.xpulsion  order  came  as  a  surprise,  but 
it  was  quickly  enforced;  and  by  April 
13,  all  expatriates  had  left  the  northern 
provinces.  Food  stocks  and  assets  were 
either  left  in  custody  of  local  employees 
or  locked  up. 

Current  Relief  Situation 

Overall  the  donor  community  estimated 
that  some  5-7  million  persons  were  at 
risk  and  that  half  of  those  were  resi- 
dent in  Eritrea  and  Tigray.  The  rough 
relief  plan  was  to  move  100,000  tons  of 
food  a  month  from  the  ports  to  the  peo- 
ple; 50,000  tons  to  the  north  and  50,000 
tons  to  the  south.  Although  we  failed 
to  achieve  this  ambitious  goal,  we  did 
move  a  substantial  amount,  about 
34,000  tons  into  the  north  last  De- 
cember and  another  30,000  tons  in  Jan- 
uary. About  31,000  tons  were  moved  in 
February,  but  only  23,000  tons  in 
March  and  a  projected  10,000  tons  in 
April.  Total  deliveries  in  the  south  are 
more  difficult  to  calculate  given  the 
larger  number  of  organizations  in- 
volved, but  we  estimate  that  approxi- 
mately 30,000-40,000  tons  are  being 
delivered  monthly.  Fortunately,  opera- 
tions in  the  south  have  not  been  af- 
fected by  security  constraints  similar  to 
those  in  the  north  and  operations  there 
continue  to  be  successful. 

Since  April  8,  virtually  all  food  op- 
erations in  Eritrea  and  northern  Tigray 
ceased,  with  the  notable  exception  of 
distributions  by  the  Ethiopian  Catholic 
Church  through  its  joint  distribution 
program  (JRP).  In  Eritrea  about  23 
of  36  centers  remain  open.  Maybe  as 
many  as  500,000  beneficiaries  are  being 
reached  by  JRP  in  Eritrea  including 
some  transfers  from  ICRC  [Interna- 
tional Committee  of  the  Red  Cross] 
centers.  All  centers  in  Tigray  except 
three  or  four  in  Mekele  are  closed.  In 
Mekele  about  140,000  people  are  being 
fed. 

Feeding  centers  along  the  main 
road  west  of  Keren  to  the  Sudanese 
border  in  Eritrea  and  beginning  before 
Adigrat  south  of  Asmara  into  Tigray 
are  closed.  Some  food  continues  to 
reach  Maychew,  Tigray,  by  road  from 
the  south.  Targeted  beneficiaries  in 
that  area  total  117,000. 


Roughly  speaking,  feeding  efforts 
in  the  north  were  divided  into  thirds- 
one-third  to  the  RRC,  another  to  the 
United  Nations,  and  the  final  third  ti 
the  PVOs  and  NGOs.  The  RRC  oper- 
ated mainly  in  the  cities  and  towns.  T 
United  Nations  assured  transport  an' 
provided  some  distribution  in  outlyin 
towns  and  nascent  camps,  but  the  PV 
and  NGOs  distributed  in  rural  areas. 


i 


Actions  to  Date 

Faced  with  this  impasse  and  fearing 
that  2  million  intended  recipients  coi 
not  be  reached  with  food,  the  Unitec 
States  undertook  a  range  of  diploma 
contacts  designed  to  achieve  a  chang 
of  Ethiopia's  decision  and  resumptior 
feeding  efforts. 

Because  we  have  consistently  fo 
lowed  the  UN  lead  on  famine  matter 
in  Ethiopia,  we  looked  foremost  to  t 
UN  representative  in  Addis  Ababa, 
Michael  Priestley,  to  dissuade  the  g( 
ernment.  We  also  urged,  then  gave  ( 
full  support  to,  the  undertaking  of  S 
retary  General  Perez  de  Cuellar  to  i 
his  top  troubleshooter,  Under  Secre  ] 
Martti  Ahtisaari,  to  Ethiopia  to  pur 
solutions  to  the  crisis.  We  plan  to  c( 
suit  with  the  Secretary  General  and 
Mr.  Ahtisaari  later  this  week  to  see 
what  next  steps  might  be  appropria 

We  criticized  the  Ethiopian  Go\ 
ment,  protested  its  recent  decisions 
noted  the  catastrophe  which  will  be 
2  million  people  if  the  situation  is  n' 
changed,  and  encouraged  reconsidei 
tion.  We  approached  other  donor  gc 
ernments  to  seek  common  approach 
to  protest  Ethiopian  actions.  We  foi 
fullest  sympathy  and  support  for  th 
position  that  resumed  international 
lief  efforts  were  essential  to  avoid 
greater  tragedy.  Many  allied  goven 
ments  subsequently  approached  EtI 
opia  bilaterally,  issued  statements, 
worked  multilaterally  through  the  I 
ropean  Economic  Community  to  pn 
these  points.  Essentially,  we  have  a 
called  for  reversal  of  the  decision  to 
elude  international  agencies  from  tl 
north.  The  Department  of  State's 
spokesman  read  a  statement  April 
publicly  expressing  dismay  with  de' 
opments  in  Ethiopia.  That  was  folio 
by  a  briefing  from  AID  [Agency  foi 
International  Development]  Admini 
tor  Woods  on  relief  operation  specil 

As  you  know.  Secretary  Shultz 
raised  Ethiopian  issues  with  Soviet 
Foreign  Minister  Shevardnadze  in  C 
eva  last  week.  We  have  also  intensi 
our  working  and  senior-level  discus.-; 
on  Ethiopia  with  representatives  of 


Deoartment  of  State  Bulletin/ Auaust 


AFRICA 


et  Union.  The  immediate  and  top 
r  rity  focus  of  these  exchanges  is  on 
ijiirgency  of  resolving  immediate  hu- 
niiitarian  relief  problems.  We  wel- 
9ied  the  Soviet  pledge  of  250,000  tons 
f  lod  for  famine  relief  in  Ethiopia. 
h  provision  of  such  assistance  does, 
ited,  for  the  first  time,  make  the 
■oet  Union  an  interested  party  in 
ecing  resumption  of  viable  relief 
p -at ions  in  the  north.  As  Ethiopia's 
0  ical  ally  and  chief  military  supplier, 
mU.S.S.R.  clearly  has  interests 
'.  L^ive  it  unmatched  influence  with 
an  leaders.  We  have  urged  the 
1  'nion  to  use  such  influence  in  a 
I (^  live  fashion  for  the  benefit  of 
ling  people.  At  the  same  time,  we 
;  hi'lieve  that  humanitarian  crisis 
I  If  a  recurrent  phenomenon  as  long 
tliKipia  is  wedded  to  military  op- 
aiul  failed  economic  policies.  The 
-    tnr  political  compromise  and  nego- 
m  to  end  27  years  of  war  has  never 
iiKire  apparent.  We  believe  the  So- 
1    have  a  responsibihty  to  put  their 
MiT  to  the  wheel  on  behalf  of  peace 
V  Horn  just  as  we  have  done. 

'     Moves 

next  few  days,  we  intend  to 

'!■'  opportunities  with  the  United 

:  niis  and  other  donors  regarding  the 

0  ihilities  for  including  PVO  opera- 

;  under  a  wider  UN  umbrella  in  the 
h.  We  still  need  to  learn  exactly 
;  arrangements  have  been  worked 

•  We  remain  convinced  that  full  re- 
ption  of  PVO  activities  is  the  most 
ane  and  practical  course  of  action. 

•  We  intend  to  continue  to  coordi- 
and  share  information  with  like- 
led  allied  governments. 

'•  We  intend  to  keep  the  spotlight 

ablic  opinion  on  the  Government  of 

lopia.  This  hearing  today  is  cer- 

ly  an  important  part  of  that 

ess. 

'•  We  will  be  following  up  with  the 

et  Union  at  senior  levels. 

•  As  practical  matters,  in  coordina- 
with  WFP  [World  Food  Program] 
other  donors,  we  are  also  looking 
^scheduling  port  deliveries  in  order 
void  congestion.  We  are  considering 
■nenting  airlift  into  the  most  seri- 

y  affected  areas  and  are  preposi- 
ing  materials  that  will  be  needed 
n  camps  inevitably  form. 

1  In  summary,  let  me  assure  you  that 
;ii-i  leadership  and  activism  will  not 

0  e.  We  strongly  feel  the  mandate 
cd:  the  American  people  have  conferred 


upon  us  to  see  that  starving  people 
are  fed.  Our  humanitarian  impulse  is 
strong,  and  we  will  persist  until  solu- 
tions are  achieved  that  permit  food  to 
flow  again  to  the  innocent  victims  of 
war  and  famine  in  northern  Ethiopia. 


APRIL  21,  1988 

Statement  by  Assistmit  Secretary 
Williamson  before  the  House  Subcom- 
mittees on  Africa  and  on  Human 
Rights  and  International 
Organizations.' 

Thank  you  for  the  opportunity  to  meet 
with  you  today  on  the  subject  of 
Ethiopia.  The  Congress  is  to  be  con- 
gratulated for  helping  put  a  public 
spotlight  on  the  needless  human  trag- 
edy unfolding  in  eastern  Africa. 

In  the  joint  statement  submitted 
for  the  record  by  the  AID  and  the  Bu- 
reaus of  African  and  International  Or- 
ganization Affairs  at  the  Department  of 
State,  we  have  expressed  our  shared 
concern  about  the  general  situation  in 
Ethiopia.  Given  the  specific  role  of  the 
United  Nations,  I  would  like  to  comple- 
ment that  statement  with  a  brief  sum- 
mary of  the  work  of  the  UN  system — 
emphasizing  three  points: 

First,  international  compassion  for 
the  starving  people  of  Ethiopia; 

Second,  the  status  of  UN  efforts, 
encouraged  by  the  United  States,  to 
help  the  Ethiopian  people;  and 

Third,  the  determination  of  the 
Reagan  Administration  to  assure  that 
the  United  Nations  helps  avert  more 
death  and  devastation  in  Ethiopia. 

Famine  and  human  suffering  have 
been  the  lot  of  mankind  throughout  his- 
tory. The  people  of  Ethiopia  have 
known  more  than  their  share,  suffering 
from  recurring  droughts  and  famines. 
The  callous  and  indifferent  Government 
of  Ethiopia  has  allied  itself  with  nature 
to  jeopardize  the  lives  of  more  than  2 
million  people. 

We  will  not — indeed,  we  cannot — 
sit  silent  during  such  a  time  of  shame. 
Rather,  we  are  more  than  ever  deter- 
mined to  make  every  effort  and  to  pur- 
sue every  channel  to  help  the  people  of 
Ethiopia  through  this  crisis. 

Working  within  the  mandate  of  my 
office,  I  have  impressed  upon  the  offi- 
cials of  the  United  Nations  the  urgency 
of  the  situation  and  our  deep  concern 
and  complete  commitment  to  helping 
the  people  of  Ethiopia  through  all  avail- 
able means. 

I  met  last  week  in  Geneva  with  UN 
Secretary  General  Perez  de  Cuellar  on 


lartment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


the  subject  of  Ethiopia.  He,  like  us,  is 
extremely  concerned.  I  expressed  to 
him  our  great  anxiety  over  the  pos- 
sibility that  the  horrible  prospect  of 
millions  dying  from  starvation  may  re- 
sult from  decisions  by  the  Ethiopian 
Government  to  ban  international  relief 
agencies  from  operating  in  the  most  se- 
riously affected  areas  of  the  country.  I 
stressed  that  the  U.S.  Government  con- 
sidered this  situation  to  be  a  matter  of 
utmost  urgency  and  that  we  supported 
his  efforts  and  that  of  the  UN  system 
to  ensure  that  compassion  prevails  over 
conflict  and  blatant  disregard  for  hu- 
man rights. 

In  this  connection,  I  expressed  our 
full  support  for  the  mission  of  UN  Un- 
der Secretary  Ahtisaari.  This  mission, 
which  concluded  yesterday,  has  resulted 
in  a  decision  by  the  Ethiopian  Govern- 
ment to  permit  UN  representatives  to 
resume  relief  operations  in  Tigray  and 
Eritrea.  We  welcome  this  news.  But  we 
will  be  watching  very  closely  to  assure 
that  the  Ethiopian  Government  adheres 
to  this  reported  agreement.  We  note 
that  the  Ethiopian  Government  is  con- 
tinuing its  ban  on  International  Red 
Cross  and  other  private  voluntary  orga- 
nizations in  northern  Ethiopia.  Thus,  in 
our  view,  Ahtisaari's  mission  has  been 
only  partly  successful. 

We  must  continue  to  insist — 
through  the  United  Nations  and  with 
the  active  involvement  of  the  diplomatic 
community — that  the  Ethiopian  Govern- 
ment respects  its  basic  responsibilities 
to  its  own  people.  I  myself  have  already 
talked  with  a  number  of  representatives 
of  countries  able  and  willing  to  provide 
assistance  and  with  other  senior  offi- 
cials in  the  United  Nations.  I  met  on 
April  19  with  James  Jonah,  Assistant 
Secretary  General  and  Director  of  the 
Office  of  Research  and  Collection  of  In- 
formation for  the  United  Nations,  to 
emphasize  American  concerns  and,  on 
April  20,  I  reiterated  U.S.  determina- 
tion to  help  restore  international  relief 
to  Ethiopia  with  Joseph  Verner  Reed, 
UN  Under  Secretary  for  Political  and 
General  Assembly  Affairs.  My  col- 
leagues and  I  plan  to  follow  up  with 
Under  Secretary  Ahtisaari  upon  his  re- 
turn from  Ethiopia.  I  have  under- 
scored— and  will  continue  to  under- 
score— the  seriousness  with  which  we 
view  the  situation  and  our  belief  that 
firm  resolve  on  the  part  of  the  interna- 
tional community  is  critical  to  getting 
needed  i-elief  supplies  to  the  people  of 
Ethiopia.  Our  U.S.  Mission  to  the 
United  Nations  in  New  York  has  been 
instructed  to  begin  planning,  on  a  con- 
tingency basis,  for  seeking  further 
action  in  UN  fora. 


65 


AFRICA 


I  would  not  want  to  leave  the  im- 
pression that  nothing  has  been  clone 
heretofore.  As  you  know,  the  UN  sys- 
tem took  the  lead  some  time  ago  in 
coordinating  the  international  effort  to 
confront  the  emergency  in  Ethiopia. 
One  of  the  first  steps  taken  by  the  UN 
Secretary  General  was  the  designation 
of  a  Special  Representative  in  Ethiopia, 
Michael  Pi'iestley,  to  deal  with  all  as- 
pects of  this  emergency.  Mr.  Priestley 
heads  the  Emergency  Prevention  and 
Preparedness  Group  (EPPG)  which 
serves  as  a  fulcrum  for  UN  system- 
wide  efforts  in  the  country. 

The  UN  Development  Program 
(UNDP)  has  augmented  the  financing 
and  personnel  of  the  group.  UNDP  has 
also  allocated  UN  volunteers  to  work 
with  the  Relief  and  Rehabihtation  Com- 
mission of  the  Government  of  Ethiopia. 
These  young  and  dedicated  profes- 
sionals, from  a  number  of  countries,  are 
providing  know-how  to  expedite  re- 
ceipt, storage,  transportation,  and 
distribution  of  foodstuffs,  medical 
supplies,  and  other  basic  necessities. 
They  not  only  know  how  to  get  the  job 
done  but  also  are  committed  to  taking 
every  conceivable  step  to  ensure  that 
the  people  of  Ethiopia  get  the  help  they 
so  desperately  need. 

Another  UN  approach  to  the  prob- 
lem has  been  through  the  UN  Disaster 
Relief  Organization  (UNDRO)  and  the 
World  Food  Program  (WFP).  Together 
they  have  led  the  effort  to  move  huge 
volumes  of  food  from  the  ports  to 
the  devastated  areas  in  the  north  of 
the  country.  Also,  in  response  to  a 
UNDRO-launched  appeal,  donors  have 
pledged  almost  $10  million  to  the  Emer- 
gency Transport  Fund  to  pay  for  the 
airlifting  of  food  to  remote  areas  of  Ti- 
gray  and  Eritrea.  The  United  Nations 
has  appealed  for  an  additional  $5  mil- 
lion to  e.xtend  this  operation  until  the 
end  of  June.  In  March,  before  the  latest 
crisis,  EPPG  was  responsible  for  airlift- 
ing some  11,000  tons  of  emergency  sup- 
plies. WFP  has  a  fleet  of  some  200 
trucks,  provided  by  donors,  and  is  pur- 
chasing an  additional  70  vehicles  for  use 
in  the  north.  We  are  using  every  avail- 
able channel  to  reach  the  various 
groups  which  have  attacked  these  relief 
convoys  in  order  to  end  the  loss  of 
transport,  supplies,  and  lives.  We  are 
also  supporting  UN  efforts  to  persuade 
the  government  to  permit  convoys  to 
operate  freely  at  their  own  risk. 

The  UN  Children's  Fund 
(UNICF2F)  has  raised  more  than  $10 
million  in  response  to  its  appeal  of 
November  1987  for  relief  to  drought- 
affected  women  and  children.  The 


UNICEF  aid  will  cover  health,  supple- 
mentary feeding  and  relief  items,  water 
and  sanitation  needs,  and  cash  for  food 
for  drought  victims. 

The  Food  and  Agriculture  Organi- 
zation's (FAO)  Food  Information  and 
Early  Warning  System  project  was  in- 
strumental in  bringing  the  impending 
drought/famine  to  the  attention  of  the 
world  last  June  and  July.  FAO  also 
has  three  crop  protection  projects  in 
Ethiopia  addressing  the  agricultural 
side  of  emergency  needs,  valued  at 
about  $0.5  million.  They  focus  on  con- 
trolling army  worm  infestation,  tse-tse 
fly,  and  desert  locusts. 

We  know  that  these  efforts  and 
those  of  the  rest  of  the  international 
community  cannot  compensate  for  effec- 
tive action  by  the  Ethiopian  Govern- 
ment. Nor  may  they  be  sufficient  to 
meet  the  magnitude  of  the  need. 

We  thus  appreciate  all  the  more 
this  opportunity  to  highlight  the  need 
for  all,  especially  the  Government  of 
Ethiopia,  to  ensure  that  the  people 
whose  lives  are  at  risk  get  life-sustain- 
ing relief  The  Government  of  Ethiopia 
must  adopt  policies  which  are  grounded 
in  the  recognition  that  the  needs  of  its 
people  are  its  foremost  concern.  I  will 
be  working  actively  with  my  colleagues 
from  the  Department's  Bureau  of  Af- 
rican Affairs  and  from  AID  and  else- 
where to  keep  pressure  on  the  UN 
system.  The  Government  of  the  United 
States  believes  that  the  United  Nations 
can  and  must  play  a  critical  facilitative 
role,  so  that  we  may  deflect  what  oth- 
erwise will  be  a  catastrophe  of  monu- 
mental proportions.  The  strong  outcry 
of  the  international  community  in  be- 
half of  the  Ethiopian  people  may  make 
the  difference  between  life  and  death. 


MAY  19,  1988 

Statemeyit  by  Assistant  Secretary 
Williamson  before  the  UN  Economic 
and  Social  Council  in  New  York  City.- 

The  Economic  and  Social  Council 
(ECOSOC)  is  second  only  to  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly  in  the  range  of  issues  it 
must  examine  and  on  which  members 
must  have  views.  Its  oversight  role  has 
made  the  ECOSOC  into  a  major  inter- 
national forum  for  the  discussion  of  the 
principal  themes  of  our  time,  those  of 
violence  and  peace,  death  and  life,  suf- 
fering and  triumph. 

The  nations  represented  in  this 
ECOSOC  chamber  are  all  signatories  of 
the  UN  Charter.  As  such,  we  have  vol- 
untarily assumed  a  solemn  responsibil- 


ity to  advocate  the  values  and  moral 
principles  reflected  in  the  Preamble  ai 
in  Article  I  of  Chapter  I  of  the  Charte 
It  is,  I  firmly  believe,  our  duty  to  stat 
up  for  these  values  and  to  call  for  ac- 
tions which  reflect  the  moral  authorir 
of  this  great  organization.  When  we  si 
a  situation  developing  which  is  contrai 
to  these  values,  we  are  obligated  to 
speak  out.  We  must  never  leave  our- 
selves open  to  the  shame  of  silence. 

Today  we  want  to  discuss  a  topic 
that  only  infrequently  and  very  brief] 
comes  to  life  on  our  televisions  and  in 
our  newspapers  or  in  debates  here  an 
elsewhere.  We  come  before  you  to  dis 
cuss  a  situation  about  which  the  worL 
community  has  only  occasionally  spoli 
out,  a  situation  characterized  by  the 
deliberate  and  entirely  avoidable  suff 
ing  of  millions  of  our  fellow  human  b( 
ings.  The  subject  is  Ethiopia. 

In  1986,  my  country  went  before 
the  Commission  on  Human  Rights  in 
effort  to  get  that  august  body  to  taki 
stand  on  the  situation  in  Ethiopia.  U 
fortunately  for  the  people  of  Ethiopii 
politics  prevailed  and  the  commissior 
refused  to  act.  And  sadly,  subsequer 
events  in  Ethiopia  proved  us  correct. 
We  will  never  know  how  many  could 
have  been  saved  had  the  commission 
acted  at  that  time  or  how  many  wen 
in  fact,  saved  merely  by  our  raising 
issue. 

Once  again,  we  come  before  a  bi 
of  the  United  Nations  to  plead  for  tl 
people  of  Ethiopia.  Once  again,  a  bo 
of  the  United  Nations  and  its  memb' 
must  face  the  issue  of  whether  to  re 
main  mute  and  blind  in  the  presence 
actions  which  starve  an  innocent  po| 
lation.  Put  bluntly,  once  again  a  bod 
the  United  Nations  must  face  the  is 
of  whether  human  lives  are  more  va 
able  than  narrow  political  interests. 
have  no  doubt  about  our  answer;  weF 
have  no  doubt  about  what  the  answe 
the  world  community  should  be.  Aik  "' 
necessary,  we  wdll  come  again  befor 
the  summer  session  of  the  ECOSOC 
and  other  forums  of  the  United  Nat 
to  press  for  that  answer. 

The  United  States  hopes  that  tl 
Secretary  General  and  all  the  govt  r 
ments  represented  here  and  throui: 
the  United  Nations  will  work  tou' 
to  persuade  the  Ethiopian  reginn 
I'ebel  forces  in  the  north  to  permit  ^r, 
international  relief  effort  to  resumelj 
unfettered.  In  the  next  few  days,     L 
the  annual  summit  meeting  of  the 
Organization  of  African  Unity  (OAl 
will  take  place  in  Addis  Ababa.  The 
Secretary  General  is  due  to  attend 
meeting,  as  are  the  leaders  of  manv  i 


,.\ 


Denartmpnt  nf  cstatp  Riillptin/Aiiaust'.l. 


ARMS  CONTROL 


simu'iits  that  share  our  human- 
iicerns.  We  urge  that  all  who 
'■r  in  Addis  Ababa  register  this 

(•  rail  upon  the  United  Nations 

>  nu-mbers,  regardless  of  ideology 
u'ii:ii  policy,  to  recognize  the  trag- 

riirring  in  Ethiopia  and  to  use  all 
.  Iilf  |)eaceful  means  to  end  it. 
I    ;ill,  we  hope  to  use  this  pres- 

■-  ai'ena  to  call  upon  the  Govern- 

ni  Ethiopia  to  respect  the  most 

ihiital  rights  of  its  citizens. 

i'[  me  stress:  my  government  is 
;  It'll  bv  humanitarian  concern  for 

■ople  (if  Ethiopia.  The  United 
it;  has  consistently  demonstrated 
c  icern  for  the  people  of  Ethiopia. 

f  the  largest  donor  of  relief  as- 
;  If  to  the  people  of  Ethiopia  and 
!    (|uietly  condone  obstacles  to  es- 
t  1  aid. 
hile  we  do  not  have  fully  reliable 

lation  about  what  is  actually  hap- 
:  :  111  Ethiopia — and  that  uncer- 
!    is  itself  one  of  our  greatest 
IS .  for  consternation — we  do  believe 

ijdwing. 

The  famine  in  Ethiopia,  espe- 
i  111  the  Provinces  of  Eritrea  and 

.  lias  become  e.xtremely  serious. 

( If  -',.2  million  people  at  risk,  only 
n  ■^•'>il.000  are  now  being  fed.  That 
,t  ,sts  with  almost  2  million  who 
■  K  ing  fed  in  February  of  this  year. 

iiiainder  face  a  very  real  prospect 
s  :-valion. 

War  is  the  principal  culprit  in 
li'  ig  access  to  hungry  people.  Mili- 
V  ctiuns  by  both  sides  and  changed 
t  lines,  compounded  by  misguided 
(  iiiient  decisions,  have  affected  de- 
■1  systems,  the  number  of  people 
1'  Udvernment  control,  and  the  abil- 
(  relief  organizations  to  operate. 

The  decisions  of  the  Ethiopian 

iiiiient  on  April  6  effectively 

il  international  relief  efforts  in 

irth,  thereby  seriously  undermin- 

-■  eding  operations.  Although  sev- 

1  'N  personnel  have  been  allowed 

1  iimch  more  needs  to  be  done. 

'  1  massive  undertaking  can  now 

liiise  at  risk. 

ly  LTovernment  deplores  this  cold- 
il  neglect  of  millions  of  Ethio- 
111  |iursuit  of  military  objectives  in 

•  ractable  and  unwinnable  civil  war. 
similarly,  we  condemn  the  callous 
I'lis,  actions,  and  warfare  of  the 
fnices,  which  have  resulted  in  an- 
aiul  chaos  in  the  north — which,  in 

I  have  impeded  feeding  operations. 
t'  not  addressing  politics  but  hu- 

I  leeency.  It  is  a  profoundly  moral 


issue.  We  must  speak  out  against — and 
try  to  stop — this  horrible  affront  by  all 
parties  to  the  UN  Charter  and  to  civi- 
lization itself 

We  must  bear  in  mind  as  well  that 
the  apparent  willingness  by  the  Ethio- 
pian Government  to  allow  innocent  ci- 
vilians to  starve  has  an  impact  beyond 
Ethiopia's  borders.  It  threatens  the 
lives  of  other  Africans  and  the  stability 
of  the  entire  region.  A  new  bout  of 
starvation  in  northern  Ethiopia  could 
produce  anew  a  mass  exodus  of  refu- 
gees seeking  food  in  neighboring  coun- 
tries, particularly  in  Sudan.  We  should 
not  forget  the  enormous  burdens  placed 
on  the  people  and  Government  of  Sudan 
during  the  famine  of  1984-85.  Without  a 
resumption  of  unhindered  food  deliveries 
in  the  north,  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
Ethiopians  might  have  to  flee  again. 
Many,  many  may  die  in  the  process. 

The  great  irony  is  that,  due  to  the 
bitter  lessons  learned  during  the  last 
famine  in  Ethiopia  and  in  response  to 
the  government's  impassioned  pleas  for 
assistance,  the  international  commu- 
nity, in  particular  the  United  Nations, 
is  ready  this  time,  with  adequate  stocks 
of  food,  supplies,  and  experienced  per- 
sonnel to  avert  mass  starvation  in  Ethi- 
opia. Yet,  that  same  government  which 
came  before  the  world  seeking  as- 
sistance for  its  people  now  refuses  to 


allow  that  assistance  to  reach  its  peo- 
ple. It  cites  concern  for  the  security  of 
expatriate  relief  workers.  These  con- 
cerns are  not  shared  by  most  of  those 
workers;  they  are  willing  to  resume 
their  relief  efforts  regardless  of  per- 
sonal risk. 

I  want  to  make  clear  that  we  take 
the  step  of  raising  this  issue  here  only 
because  other  approaches  have  failed. 
We  have  contacted  Ethiopian  authori- 
ties and  have  been  in  touch  with  the 
regime's  allies.  And,  we  have  supported 
strongly  the  efforts  made  by  the 
United  Nations  to  clarify  and  rectify 
the  situation  in  Ethiopia,  in  particular 
during  Mr.  Ahtisaari's  visit  last  month. 
Important  first  steps  have  been  taken, 
but  much  more  must  be  done.  _ 

This  body  should  not  permit  yet 
another  sad  chapter  to  be  added  to  the 
history  of  our  time.  We  should  regis- 
ter— for  all  to  hear  and  act  upon — that 
we  have  not  forgotten  the  people  of 
Ethiopia.  That  is  the  least,  the  bare 
minimum,  to  which  the  people  of  Ethi- 
opia are  entitled. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  "Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 

-USUN  press  release  50.  ■ 


U.S.,  Soviet  Union  Sign 

Joint  Verification  Experiment  Agreement 


Following  is  the  text  of  the  Joint 
Verification  Experiment  (JVE)  Agree- 
ment signed  in  Moscow  by  Secretary 
Shultz  and  Foreign  Minister  Shevard- 
nadze on  May  31,  1988  J 

Agreement  Between 

the  United  States  of  America 

and  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics 

on  the  Conduct  of 

a  Joint  Verification  Experiment 

The  United  States  of  America  and  the  Union  of 
Soviet  Socialist  Republics,  hereinafter  re- 
ferred to  as  the  Parties, 

Reaffirming  the  statement  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  of  the  United  States  and  the 
Foreign  Minister  of  the  Union  of  Soviet  Social- 
ist Republics  of  December  9,  1987, 

Proceeding  from  the  agi-eement  to  conduct 
a  Joint  Verification  Experiment,  hereinafter 
referred  to  as  JVE,  for  the  purpose  of  the 
elaboration  of  effective  verification  measures 
for  the  Treaty  Between  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Union  of  Soviet  Sociahst 


Republics  on  the  Limitation  of  Underground 
Nuclear  Weapon  Tfests,  hereinafter  referred  to 
as  the  1974  Treaty  on  the  Limitation  of 
Underground  Nuclear  Weapon  Tfests, 

Taking  into  account  the  agreements 
reached  by  the  U.S.  and  Soviet  delegations  at 
the  negotiations  in  Geneva  on  specific  JVE 
technical  procedures  and  organizational  plans 
in  full  conformity  with  the  December  9,  1987, 
ministerial  statement. 

Have  agreed  as  follows: 

1.  For  purposes  of  the  JVE,  there  shall  be 
two  nuclear  explosions,  one  at  the  U.S.  Ne- 
vada Tfest  Site  and  one  at  the  USSR 
Semipalatinsk  Tfest  Site,  each  hereinafter 
being  referred  to  as  a  JVE  explosion. 

2.  The  planned  yield  of  the  JVE  explosion 
at  each  test  site  shall  be  not  less  than 

100  kilotons  and  shall  approach  150  kilotons. 

3.  Each  Party  shall  have  the  opportunity 
to  measure,  on  the  basis  of  reciprocity,  the 
yield  of  the  JVE  explosion  conducted  at  the 
other  Party's  test  site  using  teleseismic  meth- 
ods and,  at  the  other's  test  site,  using  hydro- 
dynamic  yield  measurement  methods. 


It  nf  <itate  RiillMin/Auaust  1988 


M. 


ARMS  CONTROL 


4.  Each  Party  shall  also  perform  teleseis- 
mic  measurements  with  its  national  seismic 
station  network  for  both  JVE  explosions.  To 
assist  in  teleseismic  measurement,  the  Parties 
shall  exchange  data  on  five  nuclear  explosions 
conducted  after  January  1,  1978  but  before 
January  1,  1988  to  include  yield,  date  and  time, 
geographic  coordinates,  depth  of  burial,  and 
associated  geological  and  geophysical  data.  For 
each  of  these  historical  explosions,  the  Parties 
shall  exchange  teleseismic  recordings  taken  at 
five  designated  stations  on  each  side  including 
station  corrections  and  the  best  network  seis- 
mic magnitude. 

5.  Each  Party  shall  perform  hydrodynamic 
yield  measurements  within  the  satellite  hole 
provided  for  that  purpose  of  the  JVE  explo- 
sions at  both  Parties'  test  sites  u.sing  the 
methods  it  has  identified  in  this  Agi-eement. 

6.  As  a  yield  standard,  the  experiment  will 
include  yield  measurement  within  the  emplace- 
ment hole  of  the  JVE  explosions  at  both 
Parties'  test  sites  using  the  hydrodynamic 
methods  each  Party  has  identified  in  this 
Agreement.  Each  Party  shall  report  to  the 
other  Party  the  yield  values  of  each  of  the  JVE 
explosions  that  are  derived  by  each  Party  on 
the  basis  of  hydrodynamic  yield  measurements 
undertaken  within  the  satellite  hole  and  within 
the  emplacement  hole.  Each  Party  shall  under- 
take for  the  pui-pose  of  the  JVE  to  ensure  at  its 
test  site  a  test  configuration  that  will  allow 
each  Party  to  obtain  an  accurate  yield  standard 
of  the  JVE  explosion.  The  use  of  hydrodynamic 
yield  measurement  methods  within  the  em- 
placement hole  by  the  visiting  Party  is  being 
undertaken  only  in  the  JVE,  and  such  meas- 
urement methods  within  the  emplacement  hole 
shall  not  be  proposed  by  either  Party  for 
verification  of  the  1974  Treaty  on  the  Limita- 
tion of  Underground  Nuclear  Weapon  Tfests. 

7.  In  the  course  of  the  JVE,  each  Party 
shall  carry  out  teleseismic  measurements  of 
both  JVE  explosions  at  its  five  seismic  stations 
for  which  historical  data  were  exchanged.  The 
Parties  shall  exchange  the  seismic  data  ob- 
tained in  the  JVE  in  corresponding  detail  to 
that  exchanged  for  the  historical  explosions. 

8.  The  JVE  will  provide  information  on  the 
basis  of  which  each  Party  can  demonstrate  the 
effectiveness  of  its  hydrodynamic  yield  meas- 
urement methods  at  the  test  site  of  the  other 
Party.  Because  the  JVE  is  not  designed  to 
produce  statistically  significant  results,  it  can- 
not by  itself  estabHsh  statistical  proof  of  the 
accuracy  of  any  particular  yield  measurement 
method. 

9.  The  JVE  conducted  at  both  test  sites 
will  provide  sufficient  information  to  resolve  all 
concerns,  except  those  of  a  statistical  nature, 
that  have  been  identified  by  either  Party 
regarding  methods  proposed  by  the  other 
Party  for  verification  of  the  1974  Treaty  on  the 
Limitation  of  Underground  Nuclear  Weapon 


Tfests  by  providing  an  example  of  the  effective- 
ness of  the  verification  methods  used  in  the 
JVE  and  by  demonstrating  their  practicability 
and  non-intiTJsiveness. 

10.  Specific  design  procedures  of  the  JVE 
configuration  within  the  emplacement  hole 
that  may  have  been  necessary  to  accommodate 
technical  objectives  of  the  JVE  shall  not 
provide  a  basis  for  objections  by  either  Party 
regarding  the  use  of  hydrodynamic  yield  meas- 
urements within  the  satellite  hole  for  future 
nuclear  tests.  Such  design  procedures  of  the 
JVE  configuration  shall  not  establish  a  prece- 
dent for  requiring  similar  design  procedures  in 
the  two  Parties'  future  tests  as  a  condition  for 
agreement  on  measures  permitting  effective 
verification  of  the  1974  Treaty  on  the  Limita- 
tion of  L'nderground  Nuclear  Weapon  Tfests. 

11.  The  JVE  will  assist  the  Parties  in: 
finalizing  operational  procedures  for  the  con- 
duct of  hydrodynamic  yield  measurements 
within  the  satellite  hole  and  teleseismic  yield 
measurements  for  verification  of  future  nu- 
clear tests;  establishing  procedures  for  gather- 
ing the  geological  and  geophysical  data  that  is 
to  be  exchanged  in  accordance  with  any  future 
yield  measurement  method  proposed  by  either 
Party;  determining  procedures  for  exchange  of 
data  by  the  Parties  on  shock-wave  properties 
of  rock;  comparing  procedures  to  be  used  by 
the  Parties  for  analyzing  results  of  either 
hydrodynamic  or  teleseismic  yield  measure- 
ment methods  proposed  by  either  Party;  and 
considering  improved  measures  for  reducing 
any  intrusiveness  associated  with  the  verifica- 
tion methods  proposed  by  each  Party. 

12.  The  Parties  will  use  their  best  efforts 
to  conduct  the  JVE  explosions  in  accordance 
with  the  schedule  specified  in  the  Annex. 


13.  The  exchange  of  the  data  obtained  i 
the  preparation  for  and  conduct  of  the  JVE : 
of  the  results  of  the  analysis  by  each  Party 
be  done  in  accordance  with  the  schedule 
specified  in  the  Annex  with  a  view  toward 
agreement  on  measures  providing  for  effec 
verification  of  the  1974  Treaty  on  the  Limit 
tion  of  Undergi-ound  Nuclear  Weapon  Tfests 

14.  Upon  request  by  either  Party,  the 
Parties  shall  meet  promptly  to  discuss  any 
question  or  concern  that  may  arise  concern 
the  provisions  of  this  Agreement. 

15.  Each  Party  shall  treat  with  due  res 
the  personnel  of  the  other  Party  in  its  terri 
in  connection  with  the  preparatory  work  fn 
and  execution  of,  the  JVE  and  shall  take  al 
appropriate  steps  to  prevent  any  attack  or 
person,  freedom  and  dignity  of  such  persoi 

16.  To  ensure  the  effective  implement; 
of  the  foregoing  provisions,  the  Parties  ha' ' 
reached  the  agreements  set  forth  in  the  An  I 
which  form  an  integral  part  of  this  Agreen  I 

This  Agreement,  including  the  Annex  I 
hereto,  shall  enter  into  force  upon  signatu; 

Do.NE  at  Moscow  on  May  31,  1988,  in  two 
copies,  each  in  the  English  and  Russian  la' 
guages,  both  texts  being  equally  authentic 

FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMEI 
George  P.  Shultz 

FOR  THE  UNION  OF  SOVIET  SOCIAI 
REPUBLICS 

E.  Shev.ard.nadze 

'The  Annex  is  not  printed  here.  I 


President  Welcomes  Entry 
Into  Force  of  INF  Treaty 


PRESIDENT'S  LETTER 

TO  THE  SENATE, 
JUNE  10,  1988' 

I  was  gratified  the  U.S.  Senate  gave  its  advice 
and  consent  to  the  ratification  of  the  Treaty 
Between  the  United  States  of  America  and  the 
Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  on  the 
Elimination  of  Their  Intermediate-  and 
Shorter-range  Missiles  (INF  Treaty).  It  was 
my  honor  to  exchange  instruments  of  ratifica- 
tion on  June  1  in  Moscow,  and  the  treaty  has 
now  entered  into  force.  During  the  past  four 
months,  the  Senate  has  performed  its  constitu- 
tional duties  with  respect  to  the  advice  and 


consent  to  this  treaty  in  an  exceptionally 
serious  and  diligent  manner.  On  the  Adn 
stration's  part,  we  spared  no  effort  to  re 
to  the  Senate's  needs,  and  to  do  our  best 
ensure  that  the  Senate  had  all  the  infom 
it  needed  to  carry  out  its  constitutional  r 
sibilities.  Administration  witnesses  appe 
in  more  than  70  formal  hearings  and  mat 
more  informal  briefings;  we  provided  de 
written  answers  to  over  1,300  questions 
record  from  the  committees  and  individi 
senators;  and  we  provided  access  to  the 
tiating  record  of  the  treaty,  comprising ', 
bound  volumes. 


.y 


EAST  ASIA 


[n  short,  I  believe  the  executive  branch 
»a|;he  Senate  took  their  responsibilities  very 
i^usly  and  made  every  effort  to  work 
jiher  to  fulfill  them  in  the  common  interest 
ifSvancing  the  national  security  of  the 
I'lted  States  and  our  allies  and  friends.  The 
irjjy  ^^ill  bear  v\itness  to  the  sincerity  and 
aii|mce  of  those  in  the  executive  branch  and 
tt*l«nate  who  have  taken  part  in  this  effort. 
\s  noted  in  my  statement  issued  on  May 
Hhe  date  of  final  Senate  action,  one  provi- 
g^)f  the  Resolution  to  Ratification  adopted 
oj^e  Senate  causes  me  serious  concern. 
The  Senate  condition  relating  to  the 
;y  Clauses  of  the  Constitution  apparently 
;  to  alter  the  law  of  treaty  interpretation, 
rijiccompanying  report  of  the  Committee  on 
ign  Relations  accords  primacy,  second 
to  the  treaty  text,  to  all  executive  branch 
ments  to  the  Senate  above  all  other 
es  which  international  forums  or  even 
courts  would  consider  in  interpreting 
ies.  It  subordinates  fundamental  and  es- 
il  treaty  interpretative  sources  such  as 
'eaty  parties'  intent,  the  treaty  negotiat- 
>cord,  and  the  parties'  subsequent  prac- 

>eaties  are  agreements  between  sover- 
j  states  and  must  be  interpreted  in  accord- 
[  ftith  accepted  principles  of  international 
11(1  I'.S.  Supreme  Court  jurisprudence. 
iiactical  matter,  the  Senate  condition 
an  work  against  the  interests  of  the 
"I  ,'^tates  by  creating  situations  in  which  a 

>  lia.-i  one  meaning  under  international  law 
>  iiother  under  domestic  law.  Unilateral 

'.  ctions  on  the  United  States  should  be 
(  ed,  especially  in  a  treaty  affecting  vital 
I  lal  security  interests.  With  respect  to 
I  law,  the  President  must  respect  the 
I  al  understandings  reached  with  the  Sen- 
!  aring  the  advice  and  consent  process.  But 
f  itive  statements  should  be  given  binding 
'  It  only  when  they  were  authoritatively 

umicated  to  the  Senate  by  the  e.xecutive 
'  .  iiT  part  of  the  basis  on  which  the  Senate 

111  its  advice  and  consent  to  ratification. 

>  in  accordance  with  the  legal  standards 

n  liy  our  courts  in  determining  legislative 

!  rommend  the  thoughtful  statements 

ring  the  Senate  debate  by  Senators 

' ,  Uoth,  Wilson  and  others  which  am- 

Micse  concerns. 

I  lll^  Administration  does  not  take  the 
Sion  that  the  executive  branch  can  disre- 
I  authoritative  executive  statements  to  the 
te,  and  we  have  no  intention  of  changing 
iterpretation  of  the  INF  Treaty  which 
presented  to  the  Senate.  On  the  contrary, 
\dministration  has  made  it  clear  that  it 
onsider  all  such  authoritative  statements 


as  having  been  made  in  good  faith.  Nonetheless 
the  principles  of  treaty  interpretation  recog- 
nized and  repeatedly  invoked  by  the  courts 
may  not  be  limited  or  changed  by  the  Senate 
alone,  and  those  principles  will  govern  any 
future  disputes  over  interpretation  of  this 
treaty.  As  Senator  Lugar  pointed  out  during 
the  debate,  the  Supreme  Court  may  well  have 
the  final  judgment,  which  would  be  binding  on 
the  President  and  Senate  alike.  Accordingly,  I 
am  compelled  to  state  that  I  cannot  accept  the 
proposition  that  a  condition  in  a  resolution  to 
ratification  can  alter  the  allocation  of  rights  and 
duties  under  the  Constitution;  nor  could  I, 
consistent  with  my  oath  of  office,  accept  any 
diminution  claimed  to  be  effected  by  such  a 
condition  in  the  constitutional  powers  and 
responsibilities  of  the  presidency. 


I  do  not  believe  that  any  difference  of  view 
about  the  Senate  condition  will  have  any 
practical  effect  on  the  implementation  of  the 
treaty.  I  believe  the  executive  branch  and  the 
Senate  have  a  very  good  common  understand- 
ing of  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  and  I  believe 
that  we  will  handle  any  question  of  interpreta- 
tion that  may  arise  in  a  spirit  of  mutual 
accommodation  and  respect.  In  this  spirit  I 
welcome  the  entry  into  force  of  the  treaty  and 
express  my  hope  that  it  will  lead  to  even  more 
important  advances  in  arms  reduction  and  the 
preservation  of  world  peace  and  security. 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Ttext  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  June  13,  1988.  ■ 


China  and  the  U.S.:  Present  and  Future 


by  Michael  H.  Armacost 


Address  before  the  National  Council 
for  United  States-China  Trade  on  June 
1,  1988.  Ambassador  Armacost  is  Under 
Secretary  for  Political  Affairs. 

Nearly  a  decade  ago,  the  United  States 
and  China  completed  the  process  of 
normalization — Initiated  by  President 
Nixon  in  1969 — by  establishing  full  dip- 
lomatic relations  between  our  countries. 

Today  the  U.S. -China  relationship 
has  been  normahzed  in  every  sense  of 
the  word.  We  have  substantial  cultural, 
economic,  and  trade  contacts,  and  these 
are  growing  rapidly.  Our  political  di- 
alogue has  been  broadened  and  deep- 
ened. We  have  the  normal  day-to-day 
problems  and  differences  that  mark  any 
vibrant  relationship.  Perhaps  most  no- 
tably, this  important  relationship — once 
the  subject  of  such  domestic  contro- 
versy— is  no  longer  a  matter  of  partisan 
debate  as  we  head  into  a  presidential 
election. 

I  would  like  to  take  a  few  minutes 
this  evening  to  look  at  the  relationship: 
where  we  are;  where  we  are  going; 
what  we  have  learned. 

The  Development  of  Relations 

First,  a  brief  historical  note.  Strategic 
concerns,  rather  than  sentiment, 
prompted  the  United  States  and  China 
to  make  the  initial  moves  toward  rap- 
prochement in  the  late  1960s.  The 
friendlier  relations  that  emerged  in  the 


early  1970s  eased  U.S.  security  con- 
cerns both  in  Asia  and  on  the  wider 
global  geopolitical  playing  field. 

In  the  late  1970s,  full  normalization 
of  relations  was  facilitated  not  only  by 
a  shared  opposition  to  Soviet  expan- 
sionism but  by  China's  decision  to  accel- 
erate its  modernization  drive.  The  new 
relationship  got  off  to  a  fast  start,  espe- 
cially in  the  areas  of  educational  and 
scientific  exchange,  people-to-people 
contacts,  and  an  upsurge  in  commercial 
transactions.  These  and  other  impor- 
tant substantive  ties  developed  in  a 
honeymoon  atmosphere  in  which  expec- 
tations on  both  sides  were  high.  Inev- 
itably, there  were  disappointments.  But 
there  was  also  rapid  learning  and  real 
progress  on  many  fronts. 

The  Achievements  of  the  Relationship 

Throughout  the  Reagan  Administration, 
the  United  States  and  China  have 
worked  to  diversify  and  to  expand  this 
relationship.  In  so  doing,  we  have  rein- 
forced its  original  foundations.  A  quick 
look  at  the  record  reveals  the  progress 
achieved. 

•  In  diplomacy,  regular  high-level 
consultations  on  key  regional  and 
international  issues  have  been 
institutionalized; 

•  In  commerce,  bilateral  trade  with 
China  has  grown  from  $1.1  billion  in 
1978  to  $10.5  billion  in  1987. 

•  Investment  flows,  nonexistent  in 
1978,  have  grown  to  $3.1  billion  in  com- 
mitted funds  and  $1.7  in  paid-in  funds; 


J)artment  of  State  Bulletin/Auaust  1988 


RQ 


EAST  ASIA 


there  are  now  approximately  350  joint 
ventures,  many  of  them  undoubtedly 
represented  in  this  room; 

•  In  science  and  technology,  we 
have  signed  over  30  protocols,  more 
than  either  the  United  States  or  China 
has  with  any  other  country.  Today  we 
cooperate  across  a  broad  spectrum  of 
scientific  and  technological  research — 
from  agriculture  to  superconductivity; 

•  In  defense,  ship  and  aircraft  vis- 
its, personnel  exchanges,  and  transfers 
of  technology  have  flourished,  and  we 
now  have  a  cash  FMS  [Foreign  Military 
Sales]  progi'am  with  China; 

•  In  education,  we  have  moved  from 
a  closed  to  an  open  door  policy.  Almost 
30,000  Chinese  students  are  in  the 
United  States,  while  Americans  in  in- 
creasing numbers  are  studying  and  con- 
ducting I'esearch  in  China.  In  April 
China  agreed  in  principle  to  accept  a 
Peace  Corps  contingent. 

This  is  a  record  in  which  both  our 
peoples  and  governments  can  take 
pride. 

Changes  in  China 

This  audience  is  well  aware  of  the  strik- 
ing economic  transformation  now  taking 
place  in  China  today.  Yet,  as  busi- 
nessmen, diplomats,  and  observers  of 
China,  we  may  share  a  certain  skep- 
ticism about  developments  that  appear, 
at  first  glance,  to  be  almost  too  good  to 
be  true.  Will  the  reforms  continue?  Will 
they  provoke  a  backlash?  Will  they  be 
reversed?  These  are  questions  that  are 
frequently  asked.  Let  me  give  you  my 
own  views  on  the  subject. 

Recent  developments  encourage  op- 
timism. Over  the  past  6  months,  both 
the  13th  National  Party  Congress  and 
the  7th  National  People's  Congress  have 
affirmed  Chinas  commitment  to  a  broad 
program  of  economic  reform.  The  inter- 
nal debates  are  no  longer  focused  on 
the  question  of  whether  reform  should 
take  place — as  was  the  case  in  the  late 
1970s — but  on  the  scope  and  pace  of 
reform.  The  issue  is  not  whether  but 
how  far  and  how  fast  to  effect  funda- 
mental changes  in  the  economy  and  po- 
litical system.  Leaders  of  all  stripes, 
including  many  who  were  formerly  con- 
sidered "economic  conservatives,"  ap- 
pear to  accept  the  necessity  for  more 
reform.  The  principal  problems  now 
facing  the  leadership  are  those  of  man- 
aging a  complex  process  of  directed  and 
derivative  change — how  best  to  intro- 
duce market  mechanisms  without  fuel- 
ing inflation;  how  to  improve  enterprise 
efficiency  without  causing  massive  un- 
employment; how  to  introduce  greater 


freedom  without  spawning  unaccepta- 
bly  high  levels  of  social  conflict  and  po- 
litical demands. 

There  is  now  a  heightened  political 
will  to  tackle  key  reforms,  as  under- 
scored by  policy  initiatives  in  the  areas 
of  price  reform,  foreign  trade,  constitu- 
tional sanction  of  private  property,  and 
the  further  curtailment  of  central  con- 
trol over  the  daily  economic  life  of 
China.  Movement  toward  a  market- 
oriented  economy  is  an  unabashed  goal 
as  Chinese  leaders  seek  to  invigorate 
the  economy  by  replacing  the  heavy 
hand  of  bureaucracy  with  the  vitality  of 
the  marketplace. 

In  recent  weeks,  the  Chinese  lead- 
ership has  expressed  a  renewed  com- 
mitment to  press  ahead  with  sensitive 
aspects  of  reform,  especially  reform  of 
the  pricing  system.  Price  reform  is  like 
going  to  the  dentist — the  longer  you 
put  it  off,  the  worse  it  is  when  you 
finally  go.  Yet  the  willingness  of  the 
leadership  to  tackle  this  knotty  issue  is 
indicative  not  only  of  the  political 
strength  of  reformers  but  of  the  bold, 
innovative  approach  to  problems  that 
has  proven  so  successful  during  the 
past  10  years.  Just  last  month,  Beijing 
announced  new  guidelines  for  state  food 
prices.  In  order  to  achieve  a  better  bal- 
ance between  supply  and  demand  and 
to  restrain  the  latter,  some  increases  in 
the  price  of  food  apparently  will  be 
passed  directly  to  the  consumer,  and 
price  reform  may  be  accelerated  in 
other  areas.  At  the  same  time,  the  pace 
of  reform  will  be  affected  by  how  well 
the  leadership  handles  several  difficult 
side  effects  of  systemic  reform — for  ex- 
ample, double-digit  inflation  and  grow- 
ing disparities  in  regional  development 
levels. 

The  leadership's  commitment  to 
reform  also  is  highlighted  by  the  fur- 
ther opening  of  coastal  areas  to  the  in- 
fluence of  international  market  forces. 
In  January,  China  announced  a  market- 
oriented  coastal  development  initiative, 
with  increased  emphasis  on  labor-inten- 
sive, export-processing  industries.  De- 
velopments along  the  coast  may,  in 
turn,  spur  greater  decentralization  of 
the  domestic  economy  and  facilitate 
systemic  reforms,  e.g.,  price  reform. 

Throughout  China,  the  leadership 
continues  to  give  factory  managers 
greater  freedom  from  state  and  party 
interference;  to  develop  national  mar- 
kets for  capital  goods,  raw  materials, 
technology,  and  labor;  to  permit  expan- 
sion of  collective  and  individual  enter- 
prises; to  reduce  direct  government 
interference  in  economic  activities;  and 
to  replace  command  planning  with  mac- 


roeconomic  fiscal  and  monetary  con- 
trols. To  my  mind,  these  are  all  clear 
indications  of  the  direction  in  which 
China's  present  leadership  wants  to 
take  the  country. 

Will  the  reform  movement  con- 
tinue? My  judgment  is  that  it  will.  W 
should  it  not?  It  is  delivering  the  goo' 
today  and  offering  the  prospect  of  an 
even  brighter  future  for  the  Chinese 
people  tomorrow. 

•  In  1987,  the  real  GNP  [gross  n; 
tional  product]  growth  rate  was  9.4% 
for  each  of  the  past  7  years,  it  has  in 
creased  approximately  10%; 

•  Over  the  past  7  years,  agricul- 1 
tural  output  has  increased  14%  on  an  I 
annual  basis; 

•  The  gross  value  of  agricultural 
and  industrial  output  for  the  first 
quarter  of  1988  was  up  16% ;  '• 

•  Should  GNP  continue  to  grow  ' 
an  average  rate  of  7% — a  figure  that  •' 
would  appear  well  within  reach — ex- 1 
ports  could  reach  $175  billion  by  the  I 
year  2000,  placing  China  on  a  par  wi 
the  United  Kingdom  and  France  as 
trading  nation.  | 

These  numbers  suggest  that  de  |, 
centralization  and  the  rewards  for  ii  j, 
vidual  enterprise  may  well  be  creati 
a  spontaneous,  self-sustaining  d\na 
for  further  reform.  This  is  not  to  s;i 
that  the  course  of  reform  will  invari  j 
be  smooth,  without  reverses  and  se  ,. 
backs,  but  there  are  solid  reasons  t  |. 
expect  that  the  reform  movement  w  , 
persist  and  that  it  will  prevail.  It  is  |i 
important  to  note,  however,  that  th  . 
same  dynamic  will  test  the  stability  j, 
the  Chinese  political  system.  Fear  ( ^ 
disorder  is  very  strong  in  China,  at  ^. 
leaders  will  be  hard  pressed  to  mai  ^ 
tain  a  balance  between  "order"  and  k. 
"change."  Special  interests  will  pro  I 
ate,  and  growing  pluralism  could  p 
strong  challenges  to  the  Party's  m( 
oly  of  power.  How  it  will  respond  r 
mains  to  be  seen. 

China  in  the  World 

Paralleling  China's  success  at  homt 
its  increasingly  active  role  in  inter 
tional  affairs.  To  discern  where  Ch 
going  in  its  external  relations,  we 
first  to  note  that  Beijing  perceives 
world  as  moving  away  from  superj; 
domination  and  in  the  direction  of 
creasing  multipolarity. 

From  China's  vantage  point,  t 
world  of  the  1990s  will  be  marked 
relative  decline  in  the  position  and 
fluence  of  the  superpowers.  Thus, 
will  be  a  world  of  relatively  greate 


EAST  ASIA 


liMii  of  maneuver  for  other 
r>— a  world,  that  is,  in  which 
,1  .an  move  with  greater  security 
:i.-.-i'rtiveness.  What  will  this  mean 
r'liina's  foreign  policy? 
First,  greater  independence  or  as- 
'  xciu'ss  need  not  prove  synonymous 
:ni  "equidistant"  stance  between 
lilted  States  and  the  Soviet 
,iii,  though  Beijing  is  likely  to  seek 
;;■  balanced  relations  with  both 
v'aiiiigton  and  Moscow. 

Given  the  priority  of  economic  de- 
-I  niipnt  and  reform  in  China  today,  I 
-ihiulent  that  its  relations  with  us 
niitinue  to  grow.  Chinas  moderni- 
i  n  (ibjectives  and  its  market- 
iitt'd  growth  strategy,  if  sustained, 
il  incline  China  strongly  toward 
\'6  ern  markets.  Western  capital,  and 
"f  ern  technologies.  Underlying 
!  as  inclination  toward  the  West  in 
ral,  and  the  United  States  in  partic- 
is  a  recognition  that  we  pose  no 
t'oic  threat  to  China  and  that  we 
e  jme  China's  role  as  a  major  player 
m'  le  world  scene. 

We  do,  as  I  have  said,  expect  China 
ove  toward  more  normal  relations 
;   the  Soviet  Union.  Sino-Soviet  rela- 
10   are  already  improving.  Ti-ade  be- 
w  n  the  two  countries  has  more  than 
0'  led  since  1980 — albeit  from  a  small 
lai  — and  border  trade  in  particular  is 
•0'  ling.  Although  overall  volume  is 
i  niddest,  the  Soviet  Union  has  be- 
1  ■  China's  sixth  largest  trading  part- 
Suhstantive  discussions  are  taking 
■  aliout  the  longstanding  border 
it.'.  Cultural  relations  have  im- 
il.  A  relaxation  of  political  ten- 
aiid  propagandistic  excesses 
a  IS  in  the  interest  of  both  coun- 
,  allowing  them  to  devote  greater 
irces  to  economic  reform  and 
■I  -iR'turing. 
!  'Iiina's  "three  obstacles"  to  full 
1  normalization — which,  after 
ire  of  the  Geneva  accords  on 
lamstan,  could  perhaps  be  reduced 
■  vii — persist.  Even  if  Moscow  were 
move  all  three,  Sino-Soviet  rela- 
rc  unlikely  to  return  to  the  al- 
rclationship  of  the  1950s.  Beijing 
regards  the  Soviet  Union  as  posing 
ig-term  challenge  to  China's  inter- 
,  and  this  strategic  perception  is 
^ely  to  change  in  the  near  future, 
geopolitical  dimensions  of  our  rela- 
j  with  China — though  more  muted 
nuanced  than  in  the  past — remain 
Drtant. 

Naturally,  a  move  away  from  the 
lar  world  system  will  also  compel 
4ia  to  reexamine  and  strengthen  its 
tions  with  other  important  regional 
re* 


powers,  such  as  Japan  and  the  ASEAN 
[Association  of  South  East  Asian  Na- 
tions] nations,  as  well  as  Third  World 
countries  farther  afield.  The  troubled 
history  of  Sino-Japanese  relations  in 
this  century  assures  that  development 
of  the  relationship  between  the  two 
countries  will  be  a  complicated  process. 
It  will  require  statesmanship  on  both 
sides  of  the  Sea  of  Japan  to  prevent  the 
frequent  irritants  from  disrupting  the 
mutual  need  for  friendly  relations. 

China's  relations  with  the  ASEAN 
nations  are  marked  to  a  degree  by  his- 
toric memories  similar  to  those  that 
burden  the  Sino-Japanese  relationship, 
though  in  this  instance  China  is  the  ob- 
ject of  suspicion.  China's  opposition  to 
the  Vietnamese  occupation  of  Cambodia 
and  its  willingness  to  forswear  material 
support  for  communist  parties  in 
Southeast  Asia  have  helped  Beijing  to 
dispel  suspicions  harbored  by  ASEAN 
countries.  As  China's  economy  and  ex- 
port potential  develop,  however,  the 
ASEAN  countries  are  also  likely  to  find 
themselves  increasingly  in  competition 
with  China  for  shares  of  Western  mar- 
kets. The  same  is  true  more  generally 
in  the  Third  World,  where  China  may 
frequently  find  its  competitive  drive  for 
markets  in  conflict  with  its  desire  for 
political  solidarity. 

The  Bilateral  Relationship: 
A  Balance  Sheet 

Let  me  return  briefly  to  the  present 
state  of  Sino-American  bilateral 
relations.  The  very  range  of  issues 
currently  under  discussion — ti-ade, 
technology  transfer,  Tibet,  Afghanistan, 
Cambodia,  the  Korean  Peninsula, 
the  Persian  Gulf— underscores  how  our 
relationship  has  expanded,  matured, 
and  become  thoroughly  normal. 

Some  of  these  challenging  issues 
have  stimulated  frictions  and  disagree- 
ments; others  have  offered  new  oppor- 
tunities for  cooperation.  It  is  a 
testament  to  the  maturity  of  our  rela- 
tionship that  we  have  been  able  to  dis- 
cuss the  most  difficult  issues  without 
major  adverse  consequences,  while  con- 
tinuing to  cooperate  and  advance  our 
relationship  as  a  whole. 

In  the  case  of  Tibet,  the  Dalai 
Lama's  visit  to  the  United  States  last 
fall  and  the  subsequent  clashes  between 
demonstrators  and  security  personnel 
in  Lhasa  aroused  sensitivities  on  both 
sides.  We  have  made  clear  that  we  re- 
gard Tibet  to  be  part  of  China  but 
have,  at  the  same  time,  reaffirmed  our 
strong  commitment  to  respect  for  hu- 
man rights  in  Tibet  as  elsewhere  in  the 


lartment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


world.  Despite  disagreements  and  polit- 
ical sensitivities,  we  have  discussed  this 
problem  at  high  levels,  and  China  has 
facilitated  our  efforts  to  gain  firsthand 
information  on  conditions  in  Tibet. 

Silkworn  missiles  and  COCOM  [Co- 
ordinating Committee  for  Multilateral 
Security  Export  Controls]  liberalization 
evoked  a  controversy  in  which  tactical 
differences  threatened  to  obscure  paral- 
lel strategic  objectives.  China's  arms 
sales  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  especially  the 
supply  of  Silkworm  missiles  to  Iran, 
posed  dangers  to  the  hves  of  American 
naval  personnel  upholding  freedom  of 
navigation  in  the  gulf  We  reacted  by 
putting  a  temporary  hold  on  further 
liberalization  of  COCOM  controls  on 
technology  exports  to  China.  We  have 
also  engaged  the  Chinese  in  a  forth- 
right dialogue  on  the  gulf  region,  the 
Iran-Iraq  war,  and  arms  sales.  More  re- 
cently, we  have  registered  a  general 
concern  about  the  sale  of  ballistic  mis- 
siles— a  very  destabilizing  class  of 
weapons — particularly  to  countries  in 
the  gulf  and  South  Asia — regions  of 
special  volatility.  The  Chinese,  I  be- 
lieve, have  understood  our  concerns, 
though  they  have  not  always  shared 
them.  We  anticipate  continued  frank 
discussions  of  these  issues. 

At  the  same  time,  we  have  cooper- 
ated with  China  to  bring  about  a  reso- 
lution of  the  conflict  in  Afghanistan, 
and,  with  Beijing,  we  are  supporting 
ASEAN  in  pressing  for  an  early  with- 
drawal of  Vietnamese  forces  from  Cam- 
bodia. On  the  Korean  Peninsula,  the 
United  States  and  China  share  a  com- 
mon objective:  to  preserve  deterrence 
and  maintain  stability,  and  to  assure 
the  peaceful  conduct  of  the  Seoul 
Olympics  this  fall. 

Our  economic  relations  have  con- 
tinued to  thrive: 

•  In  February,  we  signed  a  new  4- 
year  bilateral  textiles  agreement;  this 
will  allow  us  to  manage  a  politically 
sensitive  subject  in  a  reasonable  way. 

•  In  March,  the  United  States  re- 
sumed deliberations  on  the  liberaliza- 
tions of  COCOM  restrictions  on  high 
technology  exports  to  China,  poten- 
tially enhancing  U.S.  competitiveness 
in  the  multibillion  dollar  market. 

•  Negotiations  on  China's  accession 
to  the  GATT  [General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade]  continue.  We  support 
Beijing's  accession,  but  believe  that  full 
participation  carries  with  it  an  obliga- 
tion to  eliminate  over  time  its  nontariff 
barriers  and  export  subsidies. 

•  The  Administration  has  resisted  a 
variety  of  protectionist  forces  while  en- 
gaging the  Chinese  in  a  dialogue  aimed 


71 


ECONOMICS 


at  increasing  U.S.  access  to  the  Chi- 
nese market  and  improving  the  attrac- 
tiveness of  China's  market  for  U.S. 
businessmen  by  providing  better  pro- 
tection of  intellectual  property  and  re- 
ducing bureaucratic  obstacles  and  red 
tape. 

Despite  the  ups  and  downs  and 
some  une.xpected  surprises,  we  have,  in 
large  part,  been  successful  in  dealing 
with  these  issues.  That  success  owes 
much  to  a  willingness  to  address  prob- 
lems in  a  spirit  of  friendship  and 
candor. 

If  there  is  a  lesson  to  be  learned 
from  our  recent  e.\perience,  it  is  this: 


since  our  respective  interests  will  con- 
tinue to  expand  and  intersect,  we  will 
need  to  continue  to  cultivate  the  forth- 
right approach  that  has  served  both 
countries  so  well.  We  cannot  afford  to 
overlook  each  other's  sensitivities,  con- 
cerns, or  interests.  We  must  work  to 
ease  frictions  where  we  can,  and  insu- 
late them  from  the  core  of  our  rela- 
tionship where  we  cannot. 

This  is  a  sensible  strategy.  It  has 
already  paid  rich  dividends.  It  provides 
a  basis  for  confidence  that  friendly 
Chinese-American  relations  will  remain 
a  solid  fixture  in  a  rapidly  changing 
world.  ■ 


The  United  States  in  the  World  Economy 


by  W.  Allen  Wallis 

Address  before  the  World  Affairs 
Comi.cil  in  Baltimore  on  May  10,  1988. 
Mr.  Wallis  is  Under  Secretary  for  Eco- 
nomic Affairs  and  Agriculture. 

This  is  a  leap  year,  and  the  U.S.  Con- 
stitution makes  every  leap  year  a  time 
of  great  confusion  in  discussions  of  eco- 
nomic policy.  With  the  political  season 
comes  silliness.  Slogans  and  buzzwords 
masquerade  as  thought.  Claims, 
charges,  and  statistics  fly  about  like  ex- 
cited hornets. 

Nevertheless,  debate  on  economic 
policy  is  a  sign  of  a  healthy,  dynamic 
society.  Static  economies,  with  struc- 
tures fixed  by  tradition  or  authority, 
have  little  debate  over  economic  pol- 
icies. Change  is  not  necessarily  healthy, 
but  healthy  economic  progress  neces- 
sarily brings  change.  Change,  in  turn, 
brings  debate  about  whether  to  resist 
it,  about  what  changes  to  make,  and 
about  adjusting  to  the  changes. 

An  economy  like  the  United 
States,  open  to  international  markets, 
experiences  more  pressures  for  change 
than  does  a  closed  economy.  Thus,  with 
growing  integration  of  the  world  econ- 
omy, economic  issues  in  the  United 
States  increasingly  relate  to  our  place 
in  the  world  economy.  That  is  my  topic 
for  this  evening. 

The  issues  behind  the  rhetoric  are 
real  and  important.  Is  our  economy 
thriving  or  slumping?  Is  our  prosperity 
soundly  based  or  are  we  teetering  on 
the  brink  of  economic  disaster?  Are  we 
competitive  internationally,  or  are  we 
being  overwhelmed  by  more  efficient 


72 


producers  abroad?  Do  we  benefit  from 
foreign  trade  or  are  we  merely  weak 
prey  for  foreigners  who  take  advantage 
of  us?  Do  our  economic  policies  need  a 
change  of  direction?  Should  we  raise 
taxes;  intervene  in  markets;  counterat- 
tack against  foreign  predators?  In  this 
year  of  decision,  the  American  electo- 
rate has  to  sort  out  these  questions.  It 
must  separate  fact  from  myth  and  rea- 
son from  fallacy. 

The  fundamental  question  underly- 
ing these  policy  debates  is  this:  will  our 
economy  benefit  if  we  continue  in  the 
direction  of  the  past  decade  or  so — 
increasing  our  reliance  on  markets, 
rather  than  government  fiat,  to  make 
basic  economic  choices?  Or  would  we  do 
better  to  rely  more  directly  on  the  gov- 
ernment, and  less  on  private 
decisionmaking? 

An  informed  choice  between  these 
alternatives  requires  that  we  look  both 
inward  and  outward.  We  should  exam- 
ine our  own  experience  during  the  past 
several  years.  How  successful  have  we 
been,  particularly  in  relation  to  the  rest 
of  the  world?  But  also  we  should  note 
how  the  world  is  changing  and,  in  par- 
ticular, how  economic  policies  around 
the  world  are  evolving. 

The  Global  Trend  Toward  the  Market 

The  observations  that  follow  are  based 
partly  on  experience  as  the  President's 
personal  representative  for  preparing 
and  attending  six  economic  summits 
(1983  through  1988),  partly  on  engaging 
in  a  large  number  of  negotiations  and 
discussions  with  officials  and  busi- 
nessmen from  many  countries,  and 


partly  on  participating  in  many  intern; 
tional  organizations  and  conferences. 
During  the  nearly  6  years  that  I 
have  been  in  my  present  position,  I 
have  observed  a  remarkable  transfor- 
mation of  attitudes  on  economic  pol- 
icies. Market-oriented  policies  that 
were  once  dismissed  as  old  fashioned, 
naive,  and  impractical  are  now  seen  to 
work  in  practice,  and  there  is  a  major 
trend  toward  such  policies  throughout 
the  world. 

Back  in  1981,  when  President 
Reagan  attended  his  first  economic  I 
summit  with  the  leaders  of  the  other  I 
six  major  industrialized  countries,  he  ) 
was  preaching  the  benefits  of  free  anc  I 
open  markets  to  an  audience  that,  ex- 1 
cept  for  Margaret  Thatcher,  was  skep  i 
tical,  to  put  it  mildly — derisive  might  ' 
be  more  accurate.  Next  month  at  the  ' 
Toronto  summit,  Francois  Mitterrand  ' 
will  be  the  only  remaining  socialist,  b ' 
even  he  has  moved  a  long,  long  way  ' 
since  1983  from  disastrous  policies  he  ' 
introduced  in  1981. 

Many  of  the  poorer  countries  of  t 
world  have  long  been  afflicted  by  sta- 1 
tist,  inward-looking,  authoritarian  ec  t 
nomic  policies,  sometimes  rooted  in    \ 
resentment  of  a  colonial  past;  more  o  > 
ten  in  Marxist  ideology.  Increasingly  * 
however,  many  of  these  countries,  nc  t 
bly  in  Africa,  are  coming  to  realize  t  I 
such  policies  lead  only  to  continued 
stagnation  and  poverty,  and  they  are  i 
embarking  on  fundamental  economic  [ 
form.  Even  in  Latin  America,  where  | 
the  intellectual  climate  has  long  beei 
dominated  by  statism,  opinion  has  bi 
shifted  by  overwhelming  evidence,  a 
policies  are  changing.  We  see  moverr 
toward  the  market  even  in  communi: 
countries,  including  the  Soviet  Unio: 
and  China. 

What  is  the  evidence  that  has  ci 
ated  this  profound  shift  in  attitudes'' 
Let  me  review  some  of  it  for  you  in 
broad  terms. 

The  United  States  and  Europe 

During  most  of  the  postwar  period, 
ropean  economic  growth  outstripped 
that  of  the  United  States.  In  the  tw^ 
decades  1961-80,  for  example,  annu 
growth  in  the  European  Community 
averaged  about  half  a  percentage  pc 
above  that  in  the  L'nited  States.  Ho 
ever,  since  the  1981-82  recession,  th 
relationship  has  been  reversed — U.' 
economic  growth  has  been  consisteii 
more  robust  than  European,  averag 
during  the  last  5  years  about  two-th 
higher  (about  IVa  percentage  points 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/August  '^ 


ECONOMICS 


Similarly,  creation  of  jobs  in  the 
i'  States  has  been  strong — a  net 
of  over  15  million  in  employ- 
ee 1982 — while  in  the  European 
I  liimity  it  has  been  weak  or  nonex- 
t.  and  unemployment  seems  stuck 
(  \(1  more  than  double  our  current 

iM  ii'asingly,  the  reason  for  these 
■  I's  is  becoming  understood  by 
npeans  themselves.  In  the 
li  States  we  have  lowered  impor- 
t:i\  rates  and  deregulated  such 
riant  sectors  of  the  economy  as 
piii-tation  and  communication. 
rt>  for  goods  and  labor  are  rela- 
I    npen  and  flexible.  In  Europe,  in 
1  ast,  governments  have  intervened 
'  y.--  that  impede  adjustments  to 
i;c.  Labor  mai-kets,  in  particular, 
1  licen  made  inflexible  and  stagnant 
( lal  programs  and  regulations  that 
intended  to  improve  economic  se- 
,  Imt  actually  have  done  the  op- 
■  l>y  creating  disincentives  for  both 
ij  ers  and  employers. 
^Vithin  Europe,  the  United  King- 
t  -which  leads  other  European 
rii-s  in  the  adoption  of  free  market 
(  -. — has  had  a  better  growth  re- 
<  iiijhe  1980s  than  its  partners. 
I  •  the  middle  of  last  year  its  unem- 
I  iit'iit  rate  has  been  dropping 
i  ilv. 


a  .\sia  and  Latin  America 

0  rasting  experience  among  develop- 
ig  ountries  provides  similar  lessons. 
■ei  ider  the  leading  "newly  industri- 
ikig  countries" — NICs,  as  we  call 

I.  Four  economies  in  the  Far 
— Hong  Kong,  Korea,  Singapore, 
SHaiwan — have  economic  strategies 
while  differing  considerably  from 
other,  are  generally  speaking  out- 
looking  and  market  oriented.  Dur- 
he  past  20  years,  they  have 
ned  some  of  the  world's  highest 
th  I'ates;  Korea  and  Singapore,  for 
iple,  have  averaged  over  9%  per 
Even  during  the  1980s— when  ex- 
il  conditions  were  less  favorable 
ieveloping  countries  as  a  whole 
red  a  sharp  retardation  in 
th — these  economies  proved  re- 
it  and  continued  to  progress 
irkably. 

Latin  America's  main  NICs  are 
.il,  Mexico,  and  Argentina.  Mexico 
particularly  Brazil,  with  aggressive 
rt  promotion,  did  fairly  well  under 
-able  conditions  in  the  1970s,  but 
■  government-dominated  econo- 
— with  price  and  wage  controls  and 
ly  protected  and  inefficient  state- 
id  enterprises — proved  unable  to 


cope  with  the  changed  conditions  of  the 
1980s.  Their  debts  skyrocketed,  and 
their  growth  rates  collapsed.  Argen- 
tina, with  the  most  protectionist,  in- 
ward-looking policies  of  the  group,  went 
from  sluggish  growth  before  1980  to  ac- 
tual decline  since  then. 

Several  countries  in  both  regions 
have  now  joined  the  trend  toward 
market-oriented  reform  and  are  reaping 
benefits.  In  East  Asia,  for  example, 
Malaysia  and  Thailand  are  regarded  as 
the  most  likely  new  NICs.  Thailand, 
following  recent  stabilization  and  liber- 
alization measures,  has  emerged  from  a 
period  of  sluggishness  and  is  now  grow- 
ing at  a  strong  pace.  In  the  Philippines, 
President  Aquino's  government  has  un- 
dertaken major  economic  reforms,  and 
economic  growth  has  resumed. 

In  Latin  America,  Chile — afflicted 
in  the  early  1980s  by  heavy  debt  and 
falling  export  prices — has  rebounded 
since  1983  with  healthy  growth  sup- 
ported by  strongly  market-oriented  pol- 
icies. Colombia  is  another  country 
where  sound  economic  policies  are  pay- 
ing off  in  improved  growth  and  easing 
of  debt  pressures.  Mexico  is  benefiting 
from  an  ambitious  economic  reform  pro- 
gram, notably  in  trade  liberalization. 
Argentina's  leaders  are  struggling  to 
reverse  the  heritage  of  decades  of  sta- 
tist policies  and  resultant  stagnation. 
There  are  other  examples. 

Africa 

Africa,  the  continent  with  the  most 
profound  economic  problems,  has  seen 
in  recent  years  perhaps  the  most  dra- 
matic reversal  in  policies.  During  the 
1960s  and  1970s,  economic  policies  in 
Africa  were  dominated  by  Marxist  ide- 
ology, with  large  public  sectors,  sub- 
sidies, controls  on  prices  and  exchange 
rates,  and  other  measures  that  pro- 
tected industry  and  eroded  incentives 
to  production. 

Economic  decline  forced  the  au- 
thorities to  recognize  that  their  policies 
were  leading  to  destitution.  A  gradual 
but  widespread  process  of  reform  is 
now  getting  underway,  sometimes  fit- 
fully. Perhaps  two-thirds  of  sub- 
Saharan  African  countries  have 
undertaken  economic  reform  in  the  past 
few  years,  supported  by  the  IMF 
[International  Monetary  Fund],  the 
World  Bank,  and  bilateral  aid  pro- 
grams. The  United  States  is  taking  an 
active  role  in  helping  to  mobilize  such 
support.  Progress  has  been  uneven;  be- 
cause of  extreme  poverty,  heavy  debts, 
and  weak  export  prices,  the  road  ahead 
is  bound  to  be  difficult.  With  outside 
help  there  is  hope  that  these  countries 


♦  irtment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


can  succeed,  but  not  unless  economic 
reforms  are  made. 


The  U.S.  Experience 

Although  the  performance  of  the  U.S. 
economy  has  had  a  profound  effect  on 
the  whole  world,  and  the  economy  is 
performing  about  as  well  as  it  ever  has, 
our  policies  are  coming  under  heavy 
criticism  at  home.  While  much,  if  not 
most,  of  the  criticism  is  politically  moti- 
vated, this  being  leap  year,  some  of  it 
deserves  serious  consideration — even 
some  of  the  politically  motivated  argu- 
ments merit  consideration.  Some  argue 
that  our  strong  performance  in  growth, 
employment,  and  price  stability  is  hid- 
ing fundamental  flaws.  That  is  a  hypo- 
thetical possibility;  for  example, 
recently  Brazil  had  a  great  spurt  under 
the  Cruzeiro  plan,  only  to  collapse  into 
worse  troubles  than  those  that  led  to 
the  Cruzeiro  plan.  But  it  definitely  is 
not  true  in  the  United  States.  The 
Cruzeiro  plan  was  obviously  unsound 
from  the  beginning,  and  no  competent 
economist  had  any  uncertainty  about 
that. 

In  1981,  the  Reagan  Administration 
supported  a  firm  disinflationary  policy 
by  the  Federal  Reserve  and  shifted  the 
focus  of  policy  toward  medium-term 
goals,  away  from  the  short-term  fine- 
tuning  which  experience  had  proved  to 
be  counterproductive.  It  worked  to  gain 
control  over  excessive  Federal  spend- 
ing, to  curtail  the  growth  of  the  govern- 
ment, and  to  encourage  healthy  growth 
in  the  private  sector  The  centerpiece  of 
this  effort  was  strengthening  incentives 
to  the  private  sector  through  lower  in- 
come tax  rates  and  tax  reform,  while 
reducing  structural  rigidities  through 
deregulation  and  keeping  markets  open 
to  competition.  The  program  has  not 
been  successful  in  balancing  Federal  re- 
ceipts and  expenditures — more  on  this 
later — but  its  positive  accomplishments 
have  been  impressive.  What  do  the 
facts  tell  us  about  the  results?  What  is 
it  that  impresses  other  countries  so 
greatly  that  they  are  abandoning  views 
that  they  have  believed  in  deeply  for 
half  a  century  and  are  shifting  in  our 
direction? 

U.S.  Economic  Performance 
in  the  1980s 

To  answer  that,  start  with  standard 
indexes  of  economic  performance: 

•  The  inflation  rate  (consumer  price 
index)  came  down  from  more  than  12% 
during  1979  and  1980  (December- 
December)  to  less  than  4%  by  1982  and 


73 


ECONOMICS 


has  since  been  contained  at  about  that 
level  through  5V2  years  of  economic 
expansion. 

•  Since  the  recession  that  inevita- 
bly follows  disinflation  ended  late  in 
1982,  real  growth  (growth  above  infla- 
tion) has  averaged  a  strong  4.1%  per 
year,  and  we  have  now  surpassed  by 
about  6  months  the  previous  U.S.  re- 
cord for  the  longest  period  of  uninter- 
rupted economic  growth  in  peacetime. 
The  economy  appears  to  have  weath- 
ered well  the  shock  of  the  October 
stock  market  decline  and  looks  stronger 
now  than  it  did  a  few  months  ago. 

•  As  I  noted  earlier,  employment 
has  risen  by  over  15  million  during  the 
e.xpansion,  and  the  unemployment  rate 
is  the  lowest  in  14  years.  The  propor- 
tion of  the  population  employed  has 
been  continually  setting  records  during 
the  last  3  years. 

What  are  the  flaws  in  this 
performance? 

Progress  at  Lower  Income  Levels 

Some  say  that  prosperity  has  been  at 
the  expense  of  the  poor,  who  have  not 
benefited  from  economic  expansion. 
But,  in  fact,  real  cash  income  rose  be- 
tween 1981  and  1986  for  every  income 
group.  The  number  of  persons  below 
the  poverty  level  dropped  by  about  3 
million  between  1983-86,  a  turnaround 
from  a  sharp  upward  trend  which  be- 
gan in  1980.  The  1987  data,  when  avail- 
able, will  probably  show  further 
improvement.  Moreover,  these  data  in- 
clude only  cash  payments  and  do  not 
include  income  support  in  kind  which 
has  been  growing  rapidly  in  relative  im- 
portance. Finally,  the  tax  reform  legis- 
lation of  1986  frees  4.3  million  low- 
income  families  and  individuals  from 
Federal  income  taxes. 


Job  Quality 

Some  have  said  that  the  new  jobs  now 
being  created  are  typically  inferior 
ones,  turning  us  into  "a  nation  of  ham- 
burger flippers."  The  data  contradict 
that.  Job  growth  has  been  most  rapid  in 
higher  paying,  skilled  occupations.  The 
share  of  total  full-time  employment  ac- 
counted for  by  the  lowest  paying  occu- 
pations has  declined. 

Some  of  the  misunderstanding  on 
this  point  arises  from  the  fact  that 
wages  in  manufacturing  are  higher  on 
average  than  in  services.  It  is  thought, 
therefore,  that  the  increase  in  the  pro- 
portion working  in  services  must  result 


74 


in  lower  average  wages.  This  just  does 
not  follow.  There  is  a  lot  of  variation 
within  sectors.  Services  industries — 
communications,  transportation,  law, 
medicine,  engineering,  education,  ac- 
counting, journalism,  acting,  and  oth- 
ers— provide  many  high-quality,  high- 
paying,  technology-intensive  jobs,  and 
that's  where  much  of  the  growth  has 
been. 

Competitiveness  in  Manufacturing 

Some  complain  that  our  manufacturing 
sector  is  languishing,  losing  out  to  for- 
eign competition.  This  certainly  is  true 
of  some  manufacturing  firms  and  even 
of  a  few  industries,  but  certainly  it  is 
not  even  remotely  true  for  manufactur- 
ing as  a  whole.  U.S.  manufacturing 
output  is  up  about  40%  from  a  decade 
ago,  and  the  share  of  manufacturing  in 
total  U.S.  output  is  about  the  same  as 
it  has  been  for  30  years  or  more.  Man- 
ufacturing's share  of  employment  has, 
indeed,  declined,  though  the  actual 
number  of  people  employed  is  now 
climbing  back  toward  the  historical 
high.  The  decline  in  the  proportion  of 
employment  in  manufacturing,  far  from 
reflecting  failure,  is  a  consequence  of 
success  in  raising  productivity.  Man- 
ufacturing contributes  the  same  propor- 
tion of  total  output  but  does  so  with  a 
smaller  proportion  of  total  employment. 

Of  course,  what  is  true  of  the 
whole  may  not  be  true  of  each  individ- 
ual sector.  In  global  markets  the  pro- 
duction of  particular  products  will  shift 
internationally  as  comparative  advan- 
tage shifts.  Thus,  the  textile  industry 
in  the  United  States  suffers  not  so 
much  from  textile  imports  as  from  com- 
petition for  its  labor,  capital,  and  man- 
agement by  other  industries  whose 
products  cannot  be  produced  as  advan- 
tageously abroad  as  can  textiles.  While 
those  who  own  fixed  equipment  or  have 
skills  that  are  not  transferable  may  suf- 
fer from  this  competition,  in  general, 
workers  benefit  and  the  country  bene- 
fits. While  some  industries  are  moving 
abroad  as  the  pattern  of  efficient  inter- 
national specialization  changes,  other 
industries  are  replacing  them.  Indeed, 
in  a  sense,  new  industries  push  old 
ones  abroad  by  bidding  up  the  costs  of 
their  labor,  capital,  management,  and 
raw  materials. 

With  strengthened  incentives  to  in- 
vest, and  under  the  stimulus  provided 
by  foreign  competition,  the  growth  of 
productivity  in  manufacturing  has  been 
particularly  impressive  during  the  pe- 
riod 1981-87.  It  has  risen  nearly  three 


times  as  fast  as  during  the  period 
1973-81.  Manufacturing  has  the  benefi 
now  of  the  lower  value  of  the  dollar, 
which  makes  our  products  cheaper  in 
marks,  pounds,  francs,  or  yen.  The  V( 
ume  of  our  nonagricultural  exports  ro 
12%  last  year,  even  in  the  face  of  slug 
gish  growth  in  some  important  markti 
that  restrained  demand.  We  expect 
more  good  performance  in  1988. 

International  Imbalances:  What  Is  1 
the  Real  Threat?  I 

What  about  the  huge  and  persistent 
trade  and  budget  deficits?  U.S.  trad 
and  current  account  deficits  are  ofte 
portrayed  as  the  Achilles  heel  of  \].i 
policies,  reflecting  either  weak  trade 
policy  or  imprudent  fiscal  policy — th 
Federal  budget  deficit.  Many  believe  j 
that  these  twin  deficits  pose  grave    1 
threats  to  our  future  prosperity.        j 
In  fact,  any  threat  from  the  tra(| 
deficit  is  far  less  serious  than  the  di  i^ 
ger  of  harmful  policies  to  deal  with  ,, 
such  as  the  omnibus  trade  bill  now  i  ,^ 
Congress.  Among  the  many  fallacie:  ■ 
ten  perpetrated  in  discussing  the  di 
cit,  four  are  especially  egregious. 

Fallacy  No.  1:  The  U.S.  econor  1 
has  lost  fundamental  competitivene:  i' 
particularly  in  manufacturing,  so  \\ 
need  a  more  active  government  v^l' 
planning  and  coordinating  research 
velopment,  investment,  finance,  am 
marketing,  buttressed  by  "tempora 
subsidies  or  barriers  to  imports  to    n 
serve  our  manufacturing  sector        ; 

I  have  described  earlier  the  wa  )i 
which  the  manufacturing  industry  1  |f 
responded  to  international  competil )' 
pressures.  Do  we  really  think  that   it 
ernment  officials  would  have  done  1:  t 
ter?  Would  they  have  had  better       | 
foresight?  Wouldn't  the  prospect  of 
kind  of  intervention  simply  invite  p 
cally  determined,  wasteful  decision 
Wouldn't  the  impact  of  inevitable  n 
takes  in  judgment  have  been  magn 
by  being  imposed  on  a  broader  seal 

Such  policies  would  inevitably 
generate  into  attempts  to  preserve 
competitive  industries — or  to  prese 
certain  politicians.  It  makes  no  ser 
and  would  do  much  harm — to  try  t' 
maintain  any  particular  economic  s 
at  a  particular  size.  Temporary  pn 
tion  seldom  leads  to  increased  com 
petitiveness;  more  often  it  leads  to 
pressure  for  continued  protection  i 
to  extend  subsidies  or  protection  ti 
dustries  which  become  noncompeti 
because  of  the  high  prices  of  prote^ 
industries. 


Deoartment  of  State  Bulletin/Augustl 


ECONOMICS 


Fallacy  No.  2:  Foreigners  have 
riici'd  the  trade  deficit  through 

an'  practices  and  trade  barriers, 

I"  h  we  have  naively  acquiesced. 
re,  we  should  protect  our  own 

..    >  in  response. 

There  are  a  great  many  trade  bar- 
;;  and  unfair  trading  practices 
lail.  But  such  barriers  do  not  ac- 
1 1  tnr  our  trade  deficit,  only  the 
I  lesition  of  what  is  traded.  Even 
(■  total  elimination  would  do  little 
lything  to  eliminate  imbalances, 

h  are  due  to  macroeconomic  forces. 

1'  nf  the  most  highly  protectionist 
1  iiies  in  the  world  have  had  trade 

■  it-;  some  of  the  most  open  econo- 
1    have  had  surpluses. 

This  does  not  mean  that  we  should 

■  iditYerent  to  foreign  barriers  to 

■.  Such  barriers  keep  us  from  gain- 
.  ii.-  full  potential  advantage  of 
'.  We  get  only  the  benefit  that 
■s  t(i  us  from  keeping  our  markets 
.  thus  being  able  to  buy  to  our 

■  test  advantage.  We  lose  the  benefit 
:  wiiiild  come  from  being  able  to  sell 

ir  ureatest  advantage.  A  country 
closes  its  markets  impoverishes 
'  if  its  own  people  to  enrich  others 
M'ople,  and  in  the  process  it  im- 
hes  some  foreigners,  too. 
I  can  tell  you  from  personal  experi- 
1    that  the  U.S.  Government  works 
to  reduce  barriers  to  our  exports. 
1  his  in  both  bilateral  and  multi- 
negotiations.  There  has  not  been 
'•cognition  of  our  successes, 
they  have  been  significant.  We 
.1   achieved,  for  example,  significant 
i<  -ases  in  exports  to  Japan;  we  have 
e  'cted  a  number  of  European  protec- 
st  measures;  we  have  negotiated  a 
I  lade  arrangement  with  Canada; 
r  succeeded  in  launching  the 
ly  Round  of  multilateral  trade 
.1  itions  now  underway  in  Geneva. 
'I  success  will  not  be  improved  by 
if-httion  which  puts  us  into  negotiat- 
straitjackets,  reducing  our  discre- 
as  to  when  and  whether  we  must 
liate  to  establish  our  negotiating 
ibility. 

If  we  are  forced  into  retaliatory 
ectionism,  it  will  not  lower  the  defi- 
mt  only  our  own  standard  of  living, 
ecially  now,  when  our  competitive 
ngth  is  making  itself  felt  in  rapid 
vth  of  exports,  we  will  lose  much  if 
et  involved  in  an  escalating  series 
^ade  restrictions  with  our  trading 
ners. 

Fallacy  No.  3:  The  U.S.  deficit 
ms  that  we  have  lost  jobs  or,  at 
'  t,  lost  high-paying  jobs. 


Clearly,  such  a  statement  doesn't 
square  with  the  facts  on  employment 
that  I  cited  earlier.  In  fact,  shifting 
patterns  of  international  trade  are  re- 
fleeted  in  the  industrial  composition, 
not  the  overall  level,  of  employment. 
When  an  economy  is  performing  well — 
as  ours  most  definitely  is — any  jobs  lost 
to  import  competition  will  be  more  than 
offset  by  jobs  in  other  industries.  As  I 
explained  earlier,  in  a  strong  economy 
jobs  lost  to  foreign  countries  are  as 
much  pushed  out  by  other  domestic  in- 
dustries competing  for  their  inputs  as 
they  are  pulled  out  by  foreign  competi- 
tion from  their  own  industry.  Finally, 
we  must  recognize  that  the  purchasing 
power  of  all  American  workers  is  in- 
creased by  the  lower  priced  goods  made 
available  through  trade. 

Fallacy  No.  4:  The  capital  inflows 
that  balance  the  trade  deficit  leave  us 
at  the  mercy  of  foreign  creditors  and 
are  resulting  in  the  buildup  of  net  in- 
debtedness to  foreigners  that  will  im- 
poverish our  children. 

Greater  growth  of  foreign  claims  on 
the  United  States  than  of  U.S.  claims 
on  foreigners  is  a  necessary  conse- 
quence of  net  capital  inflows.  This  is 
often  called — erroneously — an  increase 
in  debt,  and  we  are  said  to  be  the 
world's  greatest  debtor,  to  have  lost  our 
influence  in  the  world  because  of  it,  and 
to  have  mortgaged  our  future  and  our 
children's.  Poppycock! 

Inflows  of  capital  from  abroad 
make  our  labor  and  our  natural  re- 
sources more  productive  instead  of  the 
labor  and  natural  resources  of  the  coun- 
try from  which  the  capital  comes.  That 
is,  in  fact,  how  this  country  was  built. 
Only  part  of  the  capital  that  comes  here 
results  in  debt;  much  is  equity.  When 
the  Germans  build  an  automobile  plant 
in  Pennsylvania,  or  the  Japanese  in 
Ohio,  paying  for  it  is  their  responsibil- 
ity, not  ours. 

Concern  is  sometimes  expressed 
about  the  growing  burden  on  U.S.  in- 
come represented  by  the  returns  of  for- 
eigners on  their  investments.  But  the 
product  of  the  additional  investment 
made  possible  by  the  capital  inflows  is 
greater  than  the  income  it  will  pay  to 
its  foreign  owners.  Moreover,  total  in- 
vestment in  the  United  States  con- 
tinues to  exceed  net  capital  inflows,  so 
our  national  net  worth  continues  to 
grow.  Thus,  we  will  be  able  to  make 
these  payments  while  still  growing  in 
wealth. 

A  final  warning  on  alarms  about 
foreign  debt:  do  not  trust  the  data.  The 
Department  of  Commerce,  which  pub- 
lishes them,  does  not  even  label  them 


tartmant  nf  <:tato  Rllllptin/Auaust  1988 


debt.  This  is  not  the  time  or  place  to 
elucidate  that,  but  I  will  toss  you  two 
tidbits:  (1)  our  gold  holdings  are  valued 
at  $42.22  an  ounce;  (2)  in  1987  we  re- 
ceived $14.5  billion  more  income  on  our 
assets  abroad  than  we  paid  to  for- 
eigners on  their  assets  here — a  para- 
doxical position  for  a  debtor. 

What  Should  We  Do  About  Interna- 
tional Imbalances? 

Imbalances  in  international  current  ac- 
counts are  not  undesirable  when  they 
reflect  temporary  differences  between 
countries'  cyclical  positions  or  when 
they  reflect  basic  differences  between 
countries  in  the  profitability  of  invest- 
ment and  the  propensity  to  save.  Our 
present  imbalances,  however,  are 
largely  the  result  of  distorting  govern- 
ment policies.  Abroad,  government  pol- 
icies in  many  countries  have  created 
poor  climates  for  investment,  so  the 
funds  are  invested  here,  thus  contribut- 
ing to  the  trade  imbalance.  In  the 
United  States  the  government  deficit 
probably  reduces  savings  which,  if  left 
in  private  hands,  would  reduce  the 
imbalances. 

Our  current  account  deficit  also 
would  be  reduced  if  foreign  economies 
were  stronger,  for  then  they  would  im- 
port more.  (Our  deficit  would,  of 
course,  be  reduced  if  our  economy  were 
less  strong,  for  then  we  would  import 
less,  but  I  know  of  no  one  who  favors 
that  remedy.)  While  Japan's  economy  is 
growing  fairly  briskly  now,  it  would 
benefit  from  internal  structural  reform. 
European  countries  need  to  break  down 
the  many  structural  rigidities  that  im- 
pede growth,  employment,  and 
adjustment. 

In  the  meantime,  market  forces  are 
already  vigorously  at  work  reducing  the 
international  imbalances  to  the  extent 
to  which  the  market  judges  they  are 
excessive.  This  is  the  meaning  of  the 
dollar's  decline  in  the  foreign  exchange 
markets.  That  decline  has  brought 
about  major  changes  in  the  growth  of 
exports  and  imports.  As  long  as  we 
maintain  steady  policies,  we  need  not 
fear  a  sudden  loss  of  confidence  and 
flight  of  capital  that  would  cause  the 
dollar  to  plummet  and  interest  rates  to 
rise.  The  United  States  is,  by  far,  the 
best  place  in  the  world  to  invest  and 
getting  even  more  so. 

Conclusion 

Increasingly  around  the  world  the  mar- 
ket is  being  recognized  to  be  the  most 


75 


EUROPE 


successful  organizing  principle  for  pros- 
perity and  growth.  Evidence  is  gradu- 
ally overcoming  ideological  doubts.  The 
United  States,  with  an  economy  that  is 
robust  and  competitive,  has  provided 
the  most  dramatic  evidence.  We  have  a 
considerable  way  to  go  in  putting  mar- 
ket principles  fully  into  practice  our- 


selves, but  now — when  we  see  success 
all  over  the  world — now  is  not  the  time 
to  turn  back.  Our  demonstration  is  do- 
ing more  good  for  the  world  than  could 
any  amount  of  foreign  aid  and  multina- 
tional bank  loans,  useful  as  those  may 
be.  The  world  economy  is  going  our 
way.  ■ 


North  Atlantic  Council  Meets  in  Madrid 


Secretary  Skultz  attended  the  regu- 
lar semiannual  session  of  the  North  At- 
lantic Coioicil  ministerial  meeting  in 
Madrid  June  9-10,  1988.  Following  is 
the  text  of  the  final  communique. 

1.  At  their  meeting  in  Brussels  on  2nd  and  3rd 
March  1988,  the  Heads  of  State  and  Govern- 
ment of  the  Alliance  reaffirmed  its  guiding 
principles  and  stressed  their  determination  to 
continue  working  for  the  advancement  of  our 
common  ideals  and  goals.  It  was  in  this  spirit 
that  at  our  meeting  in  Madrid  we  reviewed  the 
international  situation  and  the  challenges  and 
opportunities  before  us,  taking  into  account 
recent  positive  developments. 

2.  Guided  by  our  desire  for  a  more  peaceful 
and  secure  state  of  international  affairs,  we 
have  continued  since  the  Alliance  Summit  to 
consider  the  broad  spectrum  of  issues  concern- 
ing East- West  relations  and  security,  includ- 
ing ai-ms  control  and  the  e.xisting  military  force 
relationship.  Against  that  background  we  dis- 
cussed: 

•  The  current  situation  in  and  prospects 
for  Eastern  Europe; 

•  The  need  for  a  substantial  and  balanced 
outcome  of  the  CSCE  [Conference  on  Security 
and  Cooperation  in  Europe]  follow-up  meeting 
in  Vienna,  at  an  early  date,  including  signifi- 
cant progress  on  human  rights  and  human 
contacts,  and  mandates  for  negotiations  on 
conventional  stability  and  confidence  and  secu- 
rity building  measures; 

•  Our  continuing  commitment  to  share 
equitably  the  risks,  burdens  and  responsibili- 
ties, as  well  as  the  benefits  of  our  common 
endeavour,  and  the  need  to  renew  our  efforts 
to  maintain,  under  evolving  circumstances,  a 
fair  partnership,  mindful  of  the  structure  of  the 
Alliance. 

3.  We  welcome  the  results  of  the  Summit 
meeting  in  Moscow  between  President  Reagan 
and  General  Secretary  Gorbachev,  both  for 
their  substance  and  as  a  portent  for  the  future 
development  of  East-West  relations.  We  wel- 
come the  unprecedented  prominence  accorded 
to  human  rights  in  the  joint  statement  of  the 
Summit,  and  hope  that  a  more  forthcoming 
Soviet  attitude  will  also  be  reflected  in  the 
CSCE  concluding  document.  We  support  the 
progress  recorded  towards  an  agreement  on  a 
50  per  cent  reduction  in  United  States  and 
Soviet  strategic  nuclear  weapons,  and  stress 
the  importance  we  attach  to  this  objective  in 


seeking  security  at  lower  levels  of  armaments. 
We  welcome  the  entry  into  force  of  the  INF 
[Intermediate-Range  Nuclear  Forces]  Treaty 
as  an  important  step  in  our  search  for  effec- 
tively verifiable  arms  control  agreements  in 
accordance  with  the  declarations  of  our  Heads 
of  State  and  Government. 

4.  The  North  Atlantic  Council  in  Perma- 
nent Session  has  continued  its  consideration  of 
the  further  development  of  the  Alliance's 
comprehensive  concept  of  arms  control  and 
disarmament  as  called  for  in  the  statement 
issued  in  Reykjavik  in  June  1987.  The  Secre- 
tary General  reported  on  the  progress  of  this 
work  and  we  look  forward  to  receiving  a 
comprehensive  concept  of  arms  control  and 
disarmament  as  called  for  in  the  statement 
issued  in  Reykjavik  in  June  1987.  The  Secre- 
tary General  reported  on  the  progress  of  this 
work  and  we  look  forward  to  receiving  a 
written  report  at  our  ne.xt  meeting  in  Decem- 
ber. 

5.  We  welcome  the  beginning  of  Soviet 
troop  withdrawals  from  Afghanistan  after  over 
eight  years  of  occupation.  We  hope  that  the 
Geneva  Accords  mark  the  start  of  a  process 
which  will  enable  the  Afghan  people  to  exercise 
their  right  to  self-determination  and  enable 
their  country  to  recover  its  full  sovereignty  and 
independence. 

6.  The  maintenance  of  calm  and  stability  in 
and  around  Berlin  and  the  improvement  of 
conditions  there,  as  envisaged  in  the  current 
Beriin  initiative,  remain  key  elements  in  East- 
West  relations.  As  the  EC's  [European  Com- 
munities] European  City  of  Culture  for  1988, 
Berlin  is  again  demonstrating  its  vitality  and 
attractiveness. 

7.  We  greatly  appreciate  the  hospitality  of 
the  Spanish  Government  and  people  on  the 
occasion  of  our  first  meeting  in  Madrid.  We 
take  this  opportunity  to  welcome  again  Spain's 
membership  as  yet  another  confirmation  of  the 
vitality  of  the  North  Atlantic  Alliance.  We  also 
strongly  support  the  process  under  way  in 
response  to  proposals  made  by  Spain  for 
defining  a  significant  Spanish  military  contri- 
bution to  the  common  defense. 

8.  On  completion  of  his  term  of  office, 
we  paid  tribute  to  the  departing  Secretary 
General,  Lord  Carrington,  for  his  outstanding 
contribution  to  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty 
Organization.  We  expressed  deep  appreciation 
for  his  services  to  the  strength  and  unity  of 
the  Alliance,  and  therefore  to  peace  and 
freedom.  ■ 


37th  Report  on  Cypn 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
MAY  24,  1988' 

In  accordance  with  Public  Law  95-384,  I  an 
submitting  to  you  a  bimonthly  report  on 
progress  toward  a  negotiated  settlement  of 
Cyprus  question. 

Major  meetings  were  held  by  U.S.  offi( 
with  Cypriot  leaders  during  the  past  two 
months.  Secretary  of  State  Shultz  visited 
Cyprus  on  April  8,  1988,  during  the  course 
travel  to  a  number  of  Middle  Eastern  coun- 
tries. The  Secretary  met  with  Cypriot  For 
Minister  lacovou  and  stressed  to  him  our 
desire  to  be  helpful  in  the  effort  to  achieve 
Cyprus  solution.  The  Secretary  also  underl 
our  continuing  support  for  the  United  Nati 
Secretary  General's  good  offices  mission. 

Special  Cyprus  Coordinator  M.  James 
Wilkinson  visited  Cypi-us,  Greece,  and  Ta 
in  late  March  and  early  April,  meeting  in 
Cyprus  with  President  Vassiliou,  Foreign 
ister  lacovou,  Turkish  Cypriot  community 
leader  Denktash.  and  other  political  and  g( 
ernment  leaders.  Mr.  Wilkinson  strongly « 
phasized  our  belief  that  negotiations  shou 
started  as  soon  as  possible  under  the  aegis 
the  U.N.  Secretary  General  and  his  repre; 
tative  in  Cyprus,  Oscar  Camilion.  Mr.  Wil 
son  also  stated  that  the  United  States  wis 
to  be  helpful  in  the  effort  to  start  negotial 
but  that  the  parties  themselves  must  elect 
begin  the  process. 

The  new  U.S.  Ambassador  to  the  Rej 
of  Cyprus,  Bill  K.  Perrin,  arrived  in  Cypr 
April  28  and  presented  his  credentials  to 
President  Vassiliou  on  May  3,  1988.  Ami 
dor  Perrin  begins  his  tour  of  duty  at  a  tin- 
when  we  enjoy  excellent  bilateral  relation 
with  Cyprus  and  stands  ready  to  lend  all 
possible  support  to  efforts  to  solve  the  Cy 
dispute. 

During  the  period  under  review  both 
Greek  and  Tbrkish  Cypriot  leaders  expres 
their  continued  interest  in  working  with  t 
U.N.  Secretary  General  in  pursuit  of  a  se 
ment.  At  the  same  time,  both  parties  poii 
to  statements  and  actions  by  the  other  sic 
that  they  argue  call  into  question  the  sin^ 
of  such  expressions. 

Also,  during  the  reporting  period,  th 
TYirkish  Cypriot  authorities  began  stampi 
the  |)assports  of  certain  travelers  enterin 
TYirkish  Cypriot  sector  across  the  U.N.- 
controlled"  buffer  zone.  The  Tbrkish  Cypr 
have  asserted  that  the  new  measures  wei 
established  in  response  to  long-standing 
Cypriot  restrictions  on  travel  between  tl 
sectors.  We  and  others  have  questioned  t 
initiative  and  urged  maximum  effort  by  a 
parties  to  restart  serious  negotiations. 

Financial  problems  for  the  United  NJ 
Force  in  Cyprus  [UNFICYP]  remain  sev| 
In  mid-April,  UNFICYP  troop  contribut 
vigorously  renewed  their  appeal  for  a  sw 
UNFICYP's  funding  base  to  assessed  coi 
butions  in  place  of  the  present  voluntary 
contributions.  The  United  Nations  Force 
Cyprus's  cumulative  deficit  is  over  $160  i 
lion,  borne  entirely  by  the  troop-contribi 
countries.  We  continue  to  consult  with  U, 


norvartmont  nf   Qtato   Rill, 


llotin/Aimnet. 


=DREIGN  ASSISTANCE 


i:i!    and  the  troop  contributors  on  this 

arding  congressional  interest  in  Cy- 
.  applaud  House  Concurrent  Resolution 
,  that  commends  the  Prime  Ministers  of 

I  If  and  "Rirkey  "on  their  statesmanship  in 
iatiiiu  their  current  dialogue."  I  agi-ee 

II  the  positive  thoughts  expressed  in  that 

,  liuioii  and,  like  its  authors,  hope  that  the 
.1  meetings  between  Greece  and  Tar- 
\  result  in  the  creation  of  an  atmos- 
■  lat  is  conducive  to  ...  a  resolution  of 
.  \  l>rus  problem." 

Till'  United  States  continues  to  believe 
'     time  is  ripe  for  resuming  negotiations 
preconditions.  An  early  meeting,  fa- 
(•   (i  as  appropriate  by  the  U.N.  Secretary 


General,  between  the  leaders  of  the  two 
communities  also  appears  desirable.  At  the 
same  time,  we  continue  to  favor  e.xpanded 
contacts  at  all  levels  to  reduce  tensions  and  to 
complement,  not  substitute  for,  substantive 
negotiations. 
Sincerely, 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Identical  letters  addressed  to  Jim 
Wright,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives, and  Claiborne  Pell,  chairman  of  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  (text 
from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  May  30,  1988).  ■ 


I 

Himanitarian  Aid  to  Nicaragua 


iji/on  Woods 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
,.  Vislcni  Hciiii^pkere  and  Peace  Corps 
,   IIS  iiflhi'  SriKite  Foreign  Relations 
niiltix  un  May  20,  1988.  Mr.  Woods 
•  htiinistrator  of  the  Agency  for  Inter- 
niial  Development  (AID).' 

I  ireciate  the  invitation  to  discuss  the 
nf  4ID's  efforts  to  fulfill  Con- 
mandate  to  provide  humanitarian 
i  he  Nicaraguan  resistance  and  to 

Id  It  a  process  for  peace  and  reconcili- 

I.  1  will  outline  for  you  today  the 

!  less  of  our  efforts  to  implement  the 

Ills  components  of  this  legislation 
i   l()(>-276). 

'1  Nicaraguan  Resistance 

Ml  Congress  passed  this  legislation,  it 
sumed  that  a  modus  operandi  in 
ise-fire  zones  would  be  negotiated 
It  ly  and  that  the  Nicaraguan  Gov- 

II.  nt  would  allow  food  to  be  delivered 
I.'  resistance  inside  Nicaragua  as 

•I I  lor  in  the  Sapoa  agreement.  But, 
■cks  later,  this  is  not  the  case.  And 
'  ilks  between  the  resistance  and  the 

iiinent  to  resolve  this  issue  have 
■  I  1(1  produce  results. 
Putting  aside  the  ongoing  political 
erences  between  these  parties,  AID 
onfronted  by  three  compelling  facts 
ve  fulfill  our  humanitarian  mandate. 

The  Sapoa  agreement  said  the  re- 
ance  would  get  food. 

The  U.S.  Congi-ess  said  the 
r>^'  [stance  should  get  food. 

•    But,  nearly  2  months  after  Sapoa, 
de  Nicaragua,  resistance  units  have 


irtmant  nf  <%t9t<>  Biilletin/AuQUSt  1988 


not  received  food.  They  are  either  going 
hungry  or  going  to  Honduras. 

Given  these  simple  facts,  and  guided 
by  the  congressional  mandate  to  keep 
the  resistance  together  as  a  viable  organi- 
zation able  to  negotiate  with  the  Nicara- 
guan Government  on  a  firm  footing,  we 
have  taken  the  following  steps. 

On  April  19,  with  the  support  of  the 
Honduran  Government,  the  first  truck- 
load  of  food  was  delivered  to  resistance 
combatants  and  their  families  in  south- 
ern Honduras.  These  shipments  were  in- 
spected by  nuns,  priests,  and  lay  people 
appointed  by  the  Honduran  Cathohc 
Church,  and  the  dehveries  were  made  by 
independent  Honduran  truckers  on  con- 
tract to  AID. 

Routine  ground  operations — supple- 
mented by  air  drops  that  began  on  April 
28 — continue  today,  having  delivered 
over  $1. 15  million  worth  of  food,  cloth- 
ing, and  other  supplies  to  Honduras,  al- 
ways with  the  inspection  by  the  church. 
In  human  terms,  up  to  now,  troops  have 
been  given  enough  food  to  last  through 
May.  Today  we  are  meeting  the  need  for 
food  supplies  in  Honduras. 

There  is  a  different  picture  inside 
Nicaragua.  We  have  been  unable  to  de- 
liver food  or  any  supplies  to  resistance 
units  inside  their  country.  Press  and  in- 
telligence reports  paint  a  desperate  pic- 
ture: The  resistance  is  relying  on  dona- 
tions, bartering,  or  credit  for  the  food 
needed  to  survive.  Many  are  leaving  the 
country  to  reach  the  food  supplies  in  Hon- 
duras. Some  have  gone  without  food  for 
days  during  their  trek  through  the  thick 
jungles  of  Nicaragua. 


Clearly,  this  is  not  what  the  Sapoa 
agreement  or  the  U.S.  legislation  in- 
tended. To  meet  the  needs  of  those  in- 
side Nicaragua,  I  announced  a  week  ago 
that  we  must  begin  providing  measured 
amounts  of  food  and  cash-for-food  to  the 
resistance  for  delivery  to  units  in  the 
country. 

The  cash-for-food  will  be  in  the 
form  of  Nicaraguan  currency — cordobas 
— amounting  to  about  $1.00  per  person, 
per  day.  The  resistance  will  sign  for  the 
currency  and  be  responsible  for  its  deliv- 
ery. We  are  confident  that  the  units  in- 
side will  use  these  small  sums  to  meet 
their  basic  needs.  Anyone  wanting  to 
buy  anything  other  than  food  will  have  a 
difficult  time  spending  even  these  small 
amounts  of  cordobas  outside  of  Nicara- 
gua. 

Let  me  emphasize  that  we  have 
taken  this  particular  step  as  a  last  re- 
sort. Until  the  Nicaraguan  Government 
agrees  to  allow  routine  dehvery  of  food, 
as  called  for  in  the  Sapoa  agreement  and 
expected  by  Congress,  we  must  use 
other  means  of  getting  aid  to  the  resist- 
ance inside  Nicaragua. 

In  the  meantime,  we  are  also  deliver- 
ing clothing  (fatigues)  and  medical  sup- 
plies to  the  resistance  in  Honduras.  This 
week,  we  funded  medical  services  for  the 
resistance  for  April  and  May,  and  family 
assistance  payments  are  being  made.  Re- 
garding authorized  communications 
equipment,  within  a  few  days,  we  hope 
to  be  distributing  batteries  needed  to  op- 
erate communications  equipment. 

On  the  issue  of  aid  to  the  Indian  or- 
ganization known  as  Yatama,  we  have 
found  it  to  be  an  increasingly  complex 
question.  We  have  met  with  Brooklyn 
Rivera  and  his  representatives  several 
times  to  discuss  the  delivery  of  aid  to 
Yatama  units.  We  also  have  met  in  Hon- 
duras with  Orsonio  Coleman,  chief  of 
staff  of  the  Yatama  mihtary.  In  these 
meetings,  we  have  tried  to  identify  the  lo- 
cation and  needs  of  Yatama  forces,  with- 
out getting  embroiled  in  the  political  dif- 
ferences between  the  gi-oups. 

A  third  group  calling  itself  Yatama, 
and  unknown  to  us,  recently  signed  a 
new  accord  with  the  Government  of  Nica- 
ragua. Information  available  to  us  sug- 
gests that  these  people  are  not  the  recog- 
nized leaders  of  Yatama. 

To  date  we  have  been  able  to  reach 
some  Yatama  troops  in  the  Mosquitia  re- 
gion of  eastern  Honduras.  We  hope  to 
have  our  first  air  drops  to  those  units 
very  soon. 

That  concludes  the  summary  of  our 
efforts  on  aid  to  the  Nicaraguan  resist- 
ance. 


77 


FOREIGN  ASSISTANCE 


Children's  Survival  Assistance 

Another  component  of  this  legislation  is 
$17.7  million  for  medical  care  to  Nicara- 
guan  children  affected  by  the  civil  strife 
in  their  country.  To  date,  we  have  signed 
grants  with  nine  private  voluntary  or- 
ganizations that  intend  to  provide  a  wide 
range  of  services  to  Nicaraguan  children 
throughout  that  country  and  in  Hondu- 
ras and  Costa  Rica. 

These  groups  were  selected  for  their 
experience  in  Central  America  and  their 
proven  track  records  in  delivering  those 
services  called  for  in  the  legislation.  The 
over  $5  million  remaining  in  this  fund 
will  be  used  to  "fill  in  the  gaps"  in  sei'v- 
ices  performed  and  people  and  regions 
served;  we  would  e.xpect  this  remaining 
money  to  be  obligated  in  the  ne.xt  couple 
of  months. 

Seven  of  the  eight  groups  wanting  to 
work  in  Nicaragua  already  have  pro- 
grams in  that  country.  Not  only  are  they 
familiar  with  the  territory,  many  of  them 
are  operating  today  under  agreements 
with  the  government.  We  hope  this  will 
enable  them  to  expand  their  services  to 
Nicaraguan  children  with  the  understand- 
ing of  the  Nicaraguan  Government. 

Verification  Commission 

The  third  component  of  the  legislation  is 
support  for  the  verification  commission 
consisting  of  Joao  Baena  Soares,  Secre- 
tary General  of  the  Organization  of 
American  States  (OAS),  and  Cardinal 
Miguel  Obando  y  Bravo,  leader  of  the 
Nicaraguan  Catholic  Church.  In  meet- 
ings with  the  Secretary  General  and  his 
staff  immediately  after  the  legislation 
was  passed,  we  requested  a  plan  of  opera- 
tions and  a  budget  from  the  members  of 
the  commission.  Since  then  we  have  in- 
vested countless  hours  attempting  to 
forge  a  simple,  clear  agreement  to  sup- 
port all  activities  of  the  commission  re- 
lated to  verifying  compliance  with  Sapoa, 
Esquipulas,  and  any  subsequent  agree- 
ments. 

Quite  frankly,  these  talks  were  diffi- 
cult. Our  first  challenge  was  getting  the 
two  commission  members  to  work  to- 
gether so  that  the  activities  of  both  are 
supported  as  Congress  intended.  There 
were  disagi-eements  between  the  OAS 
and  the  Cardinal's  representatives  re- 
garding Obando's  role  in  the  verification 
process.  There  also  was  reluctance  or  in- 
ability on  the  part  of  the  OAS  to  provide 


us  with  an  operational  program  or  an  esti- 
mated budget  for  $10  million  U.S.  tax 
dollars. 

In  drafting  an  agreement,  there 
were  contentions  over  what  seem  to  be 
very  straightforward  matters  regarding 
democratization  and  respect  for  human 
rights.  For  example,  we  have  had  diffi- 
culty convincing  the  OAS  respresenta- 
tives  of  the  need  for  a  simple,  declarative 
statement  that  the  commission  "will" 
verify  compliance  with  Sapoa  and  key 
sections  of  Esquipulas  II.  The  position  of 
the  OAS  is  that  the  commission  "may" 
perform  what  we  consider  fundamental 
functions  of  verification. 

After  extensive  consultation  with 
both  parties,  we  have  signed  an  agree- 
ment that  meets  our  minimum  require- 
ments and  satisfies  the  intent  of  Con- 
gress. The  document  was  signed  on 
Wednesday  [May  18]  under  which  the 


$10  million  will  be  disbursed  in  periodic 
payments. 

Conclusion 

Let  me  close  by  saying  that  there  shouli 
be  no  surprises  in  my  testimony  this 
morning  because  of  our  ongoing  consult 
tions  with  Congress.  The  director  of  thf 
task  force  heading  up  this  effort,  Tfed 
Morse,  has  spent  literally  dozens  of 
hours  on  Capitol  Hill  briefing  interestec 
parties  on  the  details  of  this  effort.  We 
have  made  every  effort  to  keep  you  in- 
formed as  we  strive  to  fulfill  the  assign 
ment  we  have  been  given. 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 

MAY  24,  1988' 

Two  months  have  passed  since  the  Con- 
gress limited  U.S.  assistance  to  the  Nica- 
raguan democratic  resistance  to  food, 
shelter,  clothing,  and  medicine.  The  Con- 
gress stopped  U.S.  miHtary  assistance  to 
the  resistance  while  the  Soviet  bloc  con- 
tinued its  military  assistance  to  the  com- 
munist Sandinista  regime  in  Nicaragua. 
Some  thought  that  U.S.  forbearance 
would  bring  democracy  and  peace  to 
Nicaragua  through  negotiations  between 
the  resistance  and  the  Sandinista  re- 
gime, but  it  has  not. 

Tomorrow,  as  I  leave  on  the  first  leg 
of  my  trip  to  Moscow,  the  resistance  and 
the  Sandinistas  are  scheduled  to  meet 
again.  The  Sandinistas  will  again  have 
the  opportunity  to  carry  out  the  prom- 
ises they  have  made — beginning  a  decade 
ago  with  promises  to  the  Organization  of 
American  States — of  establishment  of 
freedom  and  democracy  in  Nicaragua. 
We  do  not  need  more  pieces  of  paper 
bearing  empty  Sandinista  promises  and 
Sandinista  signatures.  We  need  deeds, 
not  more  words. 

During  the  60-day  truce  established 
under  the  Sapoa  agi-eement  signed 
March  23,  the  Sandinistas  have  contin- 
ued, and,  indeed,  intensified,  their  re- 
pression of  the  Nicaraguan  people.  They 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearing 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  ^ 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu-  ' 
ments,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  | 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Aid  to  the  Nicaraguan 
Democratic  Resistance 


have  not  carried  out  their  commitmen  , 
under  the  Guatemala  accord  of  Augut  „ 
1987,  or  under  the  Sapoa  agreement.  ^ 
Sandinistas  have  gone  so  far  as  to  mal 
it  impossible  to  arrange  through  neuti 
parties  to  deliver  food  and  medicine  h 
sistance  members  inside  Nicaragua. 

The  men  and  women  of  the  Ageni '' 
for  International  Development  (AID) 
who  have  worked  long  and  hard  to  en  ^ 


sure  that  the  members  of  the  resistan 


have  the  basic  necessities  of  life  deser  j; 
the  thanks  of  our  nation.  The  work  of 
AID  keeps  the  chance  for  democracy  i 
alive  in  Nicaragua. 

The  United  States  continues  to  ?- 
port  those  fighting  for  freedom  and  (h 
mocracy  in  Nicaragua.  The  freedom  fi  t- 
ers  of  the  Nicaraguan  democratic  resi 
ance  deserve  the  continued  support  1 1 
the  United  States. 

If  the  current  stalemate  in  thi 
process  persists  and  the  Sandini.'^t: 
tinue  their  policies  of  repression,  ti 
we  will  call  upon  the  Congress  to  r^ 
sider  its  February  3  decision  to  cui-i 
sistance  to  the  Nicaraguan  freedom  f 
ers. 


'Tfext  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Pn 
dential  Documents  of  "May  30,  1988.  ■ 


78 


nonartmant  /\f  Qtof^ 


■ktin/Aiimie* 


-filMAN  RIGHTS 


JS.  Signs  UN  Convention  Against  Torture 


'Following  are  the  President's  mes- 
f/)fn  the  Senate  and  the  text  of  the 
I    !ii))i  Against  Torture  and  Other 
hilniiiian  or  Degrading  Treatment 
•;liineiit  signed  on  behalf  of  the 
ni  States  by  Deputy  Secretary  of 
John  C.  Whitehead  on  April  18. 
-,  .(/  the  United  Nations.  The  United 
.  s  luvame  the  6Sd  nation  to  sign  the 
■   iitxin,  which  was  adopted  by  the  UN 
,  ml  Assembly  in  December  198Jf  and 
t-ril  into  force  on  June  26,  1987,  after 
I,  s  ratified  by  20  nations. 


Hi;SAGE  TO  THE  SENATE, 

•u  20.  19881 

>  a  \  ii'w  to  receiving  the  advice  and  consent 
'.   Senate  to  ratification,  subject  to  certain 

iati(]ns,  understandings,  and  declara- 
1   I  transmit  herewith  the  Convention 
.■ilk  st  Torture  and  Other  Cruel,  Inhuman  or 
)e(  iding  Treatment  or  Punishment.  The 
■IT  'Tition  was  adopted  by  unanimous  agree- 
(if  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly 
criiiber  10,  1984,  and  entered  into  force 
; ,  ae  2(5,  1987.  The  United  States  signed  it 
n ,  iril  18,  1988. 1  also  transmit,  for  the 
nft  nation  of  the  Senate,  the  report  of  the 
Je]  -tment  of  State  on  the  Convention. 

'he  United  States  participated  actively 
JM)  ffectively  in  the  negotiation  of  the  Con- 
er  )n.  It  marks  a  significant  step  in  the 
•^  opment  during  this  century  of  interna- 
1  measures  against  torture  and  other 
laii  treatment  or  punishment.  Ratifica- 
I  i  he  Convention  by  the  United  States 
>  arly  express  United  States  opposition  to 
■e.  an  abhorrent  practice  unfortunately 
re\  alent  in  the  world  today. 
lie  core  provisions  of  the  Convention 
lish  a  regime  for  international  coopera- 
ji  Uhe  criminal  prosecution  of  torturers 
'1;  ig  on  so-called  "universal  jurisdiction." 
i(  State  Party  is  required  either  to  prose- 
iturers  who  are  found  in  its  territory  or 
I niite  them  to  other  countries  for  prose- 


lew  of  the  large  number  of  States 
•  I,  it  was  not  possible  to  negotiate  a 
liat  was  acceptable  to  the  United 
I  all  respects.  Accordingly,  certain 
lens,  understandings,  and  declara- 
li  ive  been  drafted,  which  are  discussed  in 
pert  of  the  Department  of  State.  With 
I'lusion  of  these  reservations,  under- 
iiiirs,  and  declarations,  I  believe  there  are 
iistitutional  or  other  legal  obstacles  to 
•I I  States  ratification.  The  recommended 
at II in  necessary  to  implement  the  Con- 
en  will  be  submitted  to  the  Congress 
■ately. 

^heuld  the  Senate  give  its  advice  and 
lit  to  ratification  of  the  Convention,  I 
(I  at  the  time  of  deposit  of  United  States 
'■at  Kin  to  make  a  declaration  pursuant  to 
I'  2s  that  the  United  States  does  not 


recognize  the  competence  of  the  Committee 
against  Torture  under  Article  20  to  make 
confidential  investigations  of  charges  that  tor- 
ture is  being  systematically  practiced  in  the 
United  States.  In  addition,  I  intend  not  to 
make  declarations,  pursuant  to  Articles  21  and 
22  of  the  Convention,  recognizing  the  compe- 
tence of  the  Committee  against  Torture  to 
receive  and  consider  communications  from 
States  and  individuals  alleging  that  the  United 
States  is  violating  the  Convention.  I  beheve 
that  a  final  United  States  decision  as  to 
whether  to  accept  such  competence  of  the 
Committee  should  be  withheld  until  we  have 
had  an  opportunity  to  assess  the  Committee's 
work.  It  would  be  possible  for  the  United 
States  in  the  future  to  accept  the  competence 
of  the  Committee  pursuant  to  Articles  20,  21, 
and  22,  should  e.xperience  with  the  Committee 
prove  satisfactory  and  should  the  United 
States  consider  this  step  desirable. 

By  giving  its  advice  and  consent  to  ratifi- 
cation of  this  Convention,  the  Senate  of  the 
United  States  will  demonstrate  unequivocally 
our  desire  to  bring  an  end  to  the  abhorrent 
practice  of  torture. 

Ronald  Reagan 


TEXT  OF  CONVENTIONS 

Convention  Against  Torture 

and  Other  Cruel,  Inhuman  or 

Degrading  Treatment 

or  Punishment 

The  States  Parties  to  this  Convention, 

Cunsidering  that,  in  accordance  vnth  the 
principles  proclaimed  in  the  Charter  of  the 
United  Nations,  recognition  of  the  equal  and 
inalienable  rights  of  all  members  of  the  human 
family  in  the  foundation  of  freedom,  justice  and 
peace  in  the  world, 

Recognizing  that  those  rights  derive  from 
the  inherent  dignity  of  the  human  person, 

Considering  the  obligation  of  States 
under  the  Charter,  in  particular  Article  55,  to 
promote  universal  respect  for,  and  observance 
of,  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms, 

Having  regard  to  Article  5  of  the  Univer- 
sal Declaration  of  Human  Rights  and  article  7 
of  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and 
Political  Rights,  both  of  which  provide  that  no 
one  shall  be  subjected  to  torture  or  to  cruel, 
inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  or  punish- 
ment, 

Having  regard  also  to  the  Declaration  on 
the  Protection  of  All  Persons  from  Being 
Subjected  to  Torture  and  Other  Cruel,  Inhu- 
man or  Degrading  Treatment  or  Punishment, 
adopted  by  the  General  Assembly  on  9  Decem- 
ber 1975, 

Desiring  to  make  more  effective  the 
struggle  against  torture  and  other  cruel,  inhu- 
man or  degrading  treatment  or  punishment 
throughout  the  world. 

Have  agreed  as  follows: 


PARTI 

Article  1 

1.  For  the  purposes  of  this  Convention,  the 
term  "torture"  means  any  act  by  which  severe 
pain  or  suffering,  whether  physical  or  mental, 
is  intentionally  inflicted  on  a  person  for  such 
purposes  as  obtaining  from  him  or  a  third 
person  information  or  a  confession,  punishing 
him  for  an  act  he  or  a  third  person  has 
committed  or  is  suspected  of  having  commit- 
ted, or  intimidating  or  coercing  him  or  a  third 
person,  or  for  any  reason  based  on  discrimina- 
tion of  any  kind,  when  such  pain  or  suffering  is 
inflicted  by  or  at  the  instigation  of  or  with  the 
consent  or  acquiescence  of  a  public  official  or 
other  person  acting  in  an  official  capacity.  It 
does  not  include  pain  or  suffering  arising  only 
from,  inherent  in  or  incidental  to  lawful  sanc- 
tions. 

2.  This  article  is  without  prejudice  to  any 
international  instrument  or  national  legislation 
which  does  or  may  contain  provisions  of  wider 
application. 

Article  2 

1.  Each  State  Party  shall  take  effective  legisla- 
tive, administrative,  judicial  or  other  measures 
to  prevent  acts  of  torture  in  any  territory 
under  its  jurisdiction. 

2.  No  exceptional  circumstances  whatso- 
ever, whether  a  state  of  war  or  a  threat  of  war, 
internal  political  instability  or  any  other  public 
emergency,  may  be  invoked  as  a  justification  of 
torture. 

3.  An  order  from  a  superior  officer  or  a 
public  authority  may  not  be  invoked  as  a 
justification  of  torture. 

Article  3 

1.  No  State  Party  shall  expel,  return  ("re- 
fouler")  or  extradite  a  person  to  another  State 
where  there  are  substantial  gi-ounds  for  beUev- 
ing  that  he  would  be  in  danger  of  being 
subjected  to  torture. 

2.  For  the  purpose  of  determing  whether 
there  are  such  grounds,  the  competent 
authorities  shall  take  into  account  all  relevant 
considerations  including,  where  applicable,  the 
existence  in  the  State  concerned  of  a  consistent 
pattern  of  gross,  flagrant  or  mass  violations  of 
human  rights. 

Article  4 

1.  Each  State  Party  shall  ensure  that  all  acts  of 
torture  are  offences  under  its  criminal  law.  The 
same  shall  apply  to  an  attempt  to  commit 
torture  and  to  an  act  by  any  person  which 
constitutes  complicity  or  participation  in  tor- 
ture. 

2.  Each  State  Party  shall  make  these 
offences  punishable  by  appropriate  penalties 
which  take  into  account  their  grave  nature. 

Article  5 

1.  Each  State  Party  shall  take  such  measures 
as  may  be  necessary  to  estabhsh  its  jurisdiction 
over  the  offences  referred  to  in  article  4  in  the 
following  cases: 

(a)  When  the  offences  are  committed  in 
any  territory  under  its  jurisdiction  or  on  board 
a  ship  or  aircraft  registered  in  that  State; 


liartment  of  State  Bulletin/Auaust  1988 


79 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


(b)  When  the  alleged  offender  is  a 
national  of  that  State; 

(c)  When  the  victim  is  a  national  of  that 
State  if  that  State  considers  it  appropriate. 

2.  Each  State  Party  shall  likewise  take 
such  measures  as  may  be  necessary  to  estab- 
lish its  jurisdiction  over  such  offences  in  cases 
where  the  alleged  offender  is  present  in  any 
territory  under  its  jurisdiction  and  it  does  not 
extradite  him  pursuant  to  article  8  to  any  of  the 
States  mentioned  in  paragraph  1  of  this  article. 

3.  This  Convention  does  not  exclude  any 
criminal  jurisdiction  exercised  in  accordance 
with  internal  law. 

Article  6 

1.  Upon  being  satisfied,  after  an  examination  of 
information  available  to  it,  that  the  circum- 
stances so  warrant,  any  State  Party  in  whose 
territory  a  person  alleged  to  have  committed 
any  offence  referred  to  in  article  4  is  present 
shall  take  him  into  custody  or  take  other  legal 
measures  to  ensure  his  presence.  The  custody 
and  other  legal  measures  shall  be  as  provided 
in  the  law  of  that  State  but  may  be  continued 
only  for  such  time  as  is  necessai-y  to  enable  any 
criminal  or  extradition  proceedings  to  be  insti- 
tuted. 

2.  Such  State  shall  immediately  make  a 
preliminary  inquiry  into  the  facts. 

3.  Any  person  in  custody  pursuant  to 
paragraph  1  of  this  article  shall  be  assisted  in 
communicating  immediately  with  the  nearest 
appropriate  representative  of  the  State  of 
which  he  is  a  national,  or,  if  he  is  a  stateless 
person,  with  the  representative  of  the  State 
where  he  usually  resides. 

4.  When  a  State,  pursuant  to  this  article, 
has  taken  a  person  into  custody,  it  shall 
immediately  notify  the  States  referred  to  in 
article  5,  paragi-aph  1,  of  the  fact  that  such 
person  is  in  custody  and  of  the  circumstances 
which  warrant  his  detention.  The  State  which 
makes  the  preliminary  inquiry  contemplated  in 
paragi-aph  2  of  this  article  shall  promptly 
report  its  findings  to  the  said  States  and  shall 
indicate  whether  it  intends  to  exercise  jurisdic- 
tion. 

Article  7 

1.  The  State  Party  in  the  territory  under  whose 
jurisdiction  a  person  alleged  to  have  committed 
any  offence  referred  to  in  article  4  is  found  shall 
in  the  cases  contemplated  in  article  5,  if  it  does 
not  extradite  him,  submit  the  case  to  its 
competent  authorities  for  the  purpose  of 
prosecution. 

2.  The.se  authorities  shall  take  their  deci- 
sion in  the  same  manner  as  in  the  case  of  any 
ordinary  offence  of  a  serious  nature  under  the 
law  of  that  State.  In  the  cases  referred  to  in 
article  5,  paragraph  2,  the  standards  of  evi- 
dence required  for  prosecution  and  conviction 
shall  in  no  way  be  less  stringent  than  those 
which  apply  in  the  cases  referred  to  in  article  5, 
paragraph  1. 

3.  Any  person  regarding  whom  proceed- 
ings are  brought  in  connection  with  any  of  the 
offences  referred  to  in  article  4  shall  be 
guaranteed  fair  treatment  at  all  stages  of  the 
proceedings. 


80 


Article  8 

1.  The  offences  referred  to  in  article  4  shall  be 
deemed  to  be  included  as  extraditable  offences 
in  any  extradition  treaty  existing  between 
States  Parties.  States  Parties  undertake  to 
include  such  offences  as  extraditable  offences 
in  every  extradition  treaty  to  be  concluded 
between  them. 

2.  If  a  State  Party  which  makes  extradi- 
tion conditional  on  the  existence  of  a  treaty 
receives  a  request  for  extradition  from  another 
State  Party  with  which  it  has  no  extradition 
treaty,  it  may  consider  this  Convention  as  the 
legal  basis  for  extradition  in  respect  to  such 
offences.  Extradition  shall  be  subject  to  the 
other  conditions  provided  by  the  law  of  the 
requested  State. 

3.  States  Parties  which  do  not  make 
extradition  conditional  on  the  existence  of  a 
treaty  shall  recognize  such  offences  as  extra- 
ditable offences  between  themselves  subject  to 
the  conditions  provided  by  the  law  of  the 
requested  State. 

4.  Such  offences  shall  be  treated,  for  the 
purpose  of  extradition  between  States  Parties, 
as  if  they  had  been  committed  not  only  in  the 
place  in  which  they  occurred  but  also  in  the 
territories  of  the  States  required  to  establish 
their  jurisdiction  in  accordance  with  article  5, 
paragraph  1. 

Article  9 

1.  States  Parties  shall  afford  one  another  the 
greatest  measure  of  assistance  in  connection 
with  criminal  proceedings  brought  in  respect  of 
any  of  the  offences  referred  to  in  article  4, 
including  the  supply  of  all  evidence  at  their 
disposal  necessary  for  the  proceedings. 

2.  States  Parties  shall  carry  out  their 
obligations  under  paragraph  1  of  this  article  in 
conformity  with  any  treaties  on  mutual  judicial 
assistance  that  may  exist  between  them. 

Article  10 

1.  Each  State  Party  shall  ensure  that  education 
and  information  regarding  the  prohibition 
against  torture  are  fully  included  in  the  train- 
ing of  law  enforcement  personnel,  civil  or 
military,  medical  personnel,  pubhc  officials  and 
other  persons  who  may  be  involved  in  the 
custody,  interrogation  or  treatment  of  any 
individual  subjected  to  any  form  of  arrest, 
detention  or  imprisonment. 

2.  Each  State  Party  shall  include  this 
prohibition  in  the  rules  or  instructions  issued  in 
regard  to  the  duties  and  functions  of  any  such 
persons. 

Article  11 

Each  State  Party  shall  keep  under  systematic 
review  interrogation  rules,  instructions,  meth- 
ods and  practices  as  well  as  arrangements  for 
the  custody  and  treatment  of  persons  sub- 
jected to  any  form  of  arrest,  detention  or 
imprisonment  in  any  territory  under  its  juris- 
diction, with  a  view  to  preventing  any  cases  of 
torture. 

Article  12 

Each  State  Party  shall  ensure  that  its  compe- 
tent authorities  proceed  to  a  prompt  and 
impartial  investigation,  wherever  there  is  rea- 
sonable ground  to  believe  that  an  act  of  torture 
has  been  committed  in  any  territory  under  its 
jurisdiction. 


Article  13 

Each  State  Party  shall  ensure  that  any  indivi. 
ual  who  alleges  he  has  been  subjected  to 
torture  in  any  territory  under  its  jurisdiction 
has  the  right  to  complain  to,  and  to  have  his 
case  promptly  and  impartially  examined  by,  j 
competent  authorities.  Steps  shall  be  taken  t 
ensure  that  the  complainant  and  witnesses  a 
protected  against  all  ill-treatment  or  intimid 
tion  as  a  consequence  of  his  complaint  or  any 
evidence  given.  ' 

Article  14  ! 

1.  Each  State  Party  shall  ensure  in  its  legal 
system  that  the  victim  of  any  act  of  torture 
obtains  redress  and  has  an  enforceable  right ' 
fair  and  adequate  compensation,  including  th ' 
means  for  as  full  rehabilitation  as  possible.  I  ' 
the  event  of  the  death  of  the  victim  as  a  rest  | 
of  an  act  of  torture,  his  dependents  shall  be 
entitled  to  compensation.  ' 

2.  Nothing  in  this  article  shall  affect  anj ' 
right  of  the  victim  or  other  persons  to  comp' ' 
sation  which  may  exist  under  national  law.    ' 

I 

.\rticle  15 

Each  State  Party  shall  ensure  that  any  stat<  ' 
ment  which  is  established  to  have  been  mad( '' 
a  result  of  torture  shall  not  be  invoked  as  ' 
evidence  in  any  proceedings,  except  against  ' 
person  accused  of  torture  as  evidence  that  t 
statement  was  made. 


Article  16  ' 

1.  Each  State  Party  shall  undertake  to  pre\  I' 
in  any  territory  under  its  jurisdiction  other 
acts  of  cruel,  inhuman  or  degrading  treatmi  '"' 
or  punishment  which  do  not  amount  to  tort  ' 
as  defined  in  article  1,  when  such  acts  are 
committed  by  or  at  the  instigation  of  or  wit  ' 
the  consent  or  acquiescence  of  a  public  offic 
or  other  person  acting  in  an  official  capacitj  I 
particular,  the  obligations  contained  in  arti  \ 
10,  11,  12  and  13  shall  apply  with  the  subsl  'i 
tion  for  references  to  torture  of  references  ** 
other  forms  of  cruel,  inhuman  or  degrading  '' 
treatment  or  punishment.  •" 

2.  The  provisions  of  this  Convention  ar ' 
without  prejudice  to  the  provisions  of  any    J 
other  international  instrument  or  national  1 
which  prohibits  cruel,  inhuman  or  degradin 
treatment  or  punishment  or  which  relates  t 
extradition  or  expulsion. 

PART  II 

Article  17 

1.  There  shall  be  established  a  Committee 
against  Torture  (hereinafter  referred  to  asi 
Committee)  which  shall  carry  out  the  funct 
hereinafter  provided.  The  Committee  shall 
consist  of  ten  experts  of  high  moral  standir 
and  recognized  competence  in  the  field  of 
human  rights,  who  shall  serve  in  their  pars 
capacity.  The  experts  shall  be  elected  by  tl 
States  Parties,  consideration  being  given  t 
equitable  geographical  distribution  and  to  1 
usefulness  of  the  participation  of  some  per 
having  legal  experience. 

2.  The  members  of  the  Committee  sha 
elected  by  secret  ballot  from  a  list  of  perso 


Dpnartmfint  nf  Rtatp  Biillptin/Auaust  1l 


i 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


!;i!.m1  by  States  Parties.  Each  State  Party 
mate  one  person  from  among  its  own 
States  Parties  shall  bear  in  mind  the 
~  of  nominating  persons  who  are  also 
I  I  -  (if  the  Human  Rights  Committee 
ii-luMi  under  the  International  Covenant 
\  il  and  Political  Rights  and  who  are 
c  I  <  1  serve  on  the  Committee  against 

}■  Unctions  of  the  members  of  the  Com- 
-hall  be  held  at  biennial  meetings  of 
-  I'arties  convened  by  the  Secretary- 
al  of  the  United  Nations.  At  those 
ni:<.  for  which  two-thirds  of  the  States 

-  -hall  constitute  a  quorum,  the  persons 

the  Committee  shall  be  those  who 
I  largest  number  of  votes  and  an 
It.   majority  of  the  votes  of  the  represen- 
s  (if  States  Parties  present  and  voting. 
.  The  initial  election  shall  be  held  no  later 
i\  months  after  the  date  of  the  entry  into 
1  this  Convention.  At  least  four  months 

■  the  date  of  each  election,  the  Seeretary- 
al  (if  the  United  Nations  shall  address  a 
to  the  States  Parties  inviting  them  to 

i  t  their  nominations  within  three  months. 
!  ecretary-General  shall  prepare  a  list  in 
I  letical  order  of  all  persons  thus  nomi- 
I  IK  heating  the  States  Parties  which  have 

at  I'll  them,  and  shall  submit  it  to  the 

.  I'arties. 

The  members  of  the  Committee  shall  be 
!  d  for  a  term  of  four  years.  They  shall  be 
!  e  for  re-election  if  renominated.  How- 
!  the  term  of  five  of  the  members  elected  at 

■st  election  shall  e.xpire  at  the  end  of  two 
I  immediately  after  the  first  election  the 
I ;  of  these  five  members  shall  be  chosen  by 

I  the  chairman  of  the  meeting  refeiTed  to 
:  agraph  3  of  this  article. 

If  a  member  of  the  Committee  dies  or 

-  Ill'  for  any  other  cause  can  no  longer 

111  his  Committee  duties,  the  State  Party 
:  iKiminated  him  shall  appoint  another 

I I  from  among  its  nationals  to  serve  for 
I  mainder  of  his  term,  subject  to  the 

-  \-al  of  the  majority  of  the  States  Parties. 
[ipnival  shall  be  considered  given  unless 

■  more  of  the  States  Parties  respond 

-  !.  (jy  within  si.\  weeks  after  having  been 
i(d  by  the  Secretary-General  of  the 

I  Nations  of  the  proposed  appointment. 
States  Parties  shall  be  responsible  for 
iH'nses  of  the  members  of  the  Committee 
thi'v  are  in  performance  of  Committee 


■  (  (immittee  shall  elect  its  officers  for  a 
it  two  years.  They  may  be  re-elected. 
The  Committee  shall  establish  its  own 
if  procedure,  but  these  rules  shall  pro- 
nitcralia,  that: 

la)  Six  members  shall  constitute  a  quo- 

ili)  Decisions  of  the  Committee  shall  be 
liy  a  majority  vote  of  the  members 

nt, 

.  The  Secretary-General  of  the  United 
shall  provide  the  necessary  staff  and 
I'lir  the  effective  performance  of  the 
!>  of  the  Committee  under  this  Conven- 


4.  The  Secretary-General  of  the  United 
Nations  shall  convene  the  initial  meeting  of  the 
Committee.  After  its  initial  meeting,  the  Com- 
mittee shall  meet  at  such  times  as  shall  be 
provided  in  the  rules  of  procedure. 

5.  The  States  Parties  shall  be  responsible 
for  e,\penses  incurred  in  connection  with  the 
holding  of  meetings  of  the  States  Parties  and  of 
the  Committee,  including  reimbursement  to 
the  United  Nations  for  any  e.xpenses,  such  as 
the  cost  of  staff  and  facilities,  incurred  by  the 
United  Nations  pursuant  to  paragraph  3  of  this 
article. 

Article  19 

1.  States  Parties  shall  submit  to  the  Commit- 
tee, through  the  Secretary-General  of  the 
United  Nations,  reports  on  the  measures  they 
have  taken  to  give  effect  to  their  undertakings 
under  this  Convention,  within  one  year  after 
the  entry  into  force  of  the  Convention  for  the 
State  Party  concerned.  Thereafter  the  States 
Parties  shall  submit  supplementary  reports 
every  four  years  on  any  new  measures  taken 
and  such  other  reports  as  the  Committee  may 
request. 

2.  The  Secretary-General  of  the  United 
Nations  shall  transmit  the  reports  to  all  States 
Parties. 

3.  Each  report  shall  be  considered  by  the 
Committee  which  may  make  such  general 
comments  on  the  report  as  it  may  consider 
appropriate  and  shall  forward  these  to  the 
State  Party  concerned.  That  State  Party  may 
respond  with  any  observations  it  chooses  to  the 
Committee. 

4.  The  Committee  may,  at  its  discretion, 
decide  to  include  any  comments  made  by  it  in 
accordance  with  paragraph  3  of  this  article, 
together  with  the  observations  thereon  re- 
ceived from  the  State  Party  concerned,  in  its 
annual  report  made  in  accordance  with  article 
24.  If  so  requested  by  the  State  Party  con- 
cerned, the  Committee  may  also  include  a  copy 
of  the  report  submitted  under  paragraph  1  of 
this  article. 

Article  20 

1.  If  the  Committee  receives  reliable  informa- 
tion which  appears  to  it  to  contain  well- 
founded  indications  that  torture  is  being  sys- 
tematically practised  in  the  territory  of  a  State 
Party,  the  Committee  shall  invite  that  State 
Party  to  co-operate  in  the  examination  of  the 
information  and  to  this  end  to  submit  observa- 
tions with  regard  to  the  information  concerned. 

2.  Taking  into  account  any  observations 
which  may  have  been  submitted  by  the  State 
Party  concerned,  as  well  as  any  other  relevant 
information  available  to  it,  the  Committee 
may,  if  it  decides  that  this  is  warranted, 
designate  one  or  more  of  its  members  to  make 
a  confidential  inquiry  and  to  report  to  the 
Committee  urgently. 

3.  If  an  inquiry  is  made  in  accordance  with 
paragraph  2  of  this  article,  the  Committee  shall 
seek  the  co-operation  of  the  State  Party 
concerned.  In  agreement  with  that  State 
Party,  such  an  inquiry  may  include  a  visit  to  its 
territory. 

4.  After  e.xamining  the  findings  of  its 
member  or  members  submitted  in  accordance 
with  paragraph  2  of  this  article,  the  Committee 
shall  transmit  these  findings  to  the  State  Party 


concerned  together  with  any  comments  or 
suggestions  which  seem  appropriate  in  view  of 
the  situation. 

5.  All  the  proceedings  of  the  Committee 
referred  to  in  paragraphs  1  to  4  of  this  article 
shall  be  confidential,  and  at  all  stages  of  the 
proceedings  the  co-operation  of  the  State 
Party  shall  be  sought.  After  such  proceedings 
have  been  completed  with  regard  to  an  inquiry 
made  in  accordance  with  paragraph  2,  the 
Committee  may.  after  consultations  with  the 
State  Party  concerned,  decide  to  include  a 
summary  account  of  the  results  of  the  proceed- 
ings in  its  annual  report  made  in  accordance 
with  article  24. 

Article  21 

1.  A  State  Party  to  this  Convention  may  at  any 
time  declare  under  this  article  that  it  recog- 
nizes the  competence  of  the  Committee  to 
receive  and  consider  communications  to  the 
effect  that  a  State  Party  claims  that  another 
State  Party  is  not  fulfilling  its  obligations 
under  this  Convention.  Such  communications 
may  be  received  and  considered  according  to 
the  procedures  laid  down  in  this  article  only  if 
submitted  by  a  State  Party  which  has  made  a 
declaration  recognizing  in  regard  to  itself  the 
competence  of  the  Committee.  No  communica- 
tion shall  be  dealt  with  by  the  Committee 
under  this  article  if  it  concerns  a  State  Party 
which  has  not  made  such  a  declaration.  Com- 
munications received  under  this  article  shall  be 
dealt  with  in  accordance  with  the  following 
procedure: 

(a)  If  a  State  Party  considers  that 
another  State  Party  is  not  giving  effect  to  the 
provisions  of  this  Convention,  it  may,  by 
written  communication,  bring  the  matter  to 
the  attention  of  that  State  Party.  Within  three 
months  after  the  receipt  of  the  communication 
the  receiving  State  shall  afford  the  State  which 
sent  the  communication  an  explanation  or  any 
other  statement  in  writing  clarifying  the  mat- 
ter, which  should  include,  to  the  extent  possi- 
ble and  pertinent,  reference  to  domestic  proce- 
dures and  remedies  taken,  pending  or  available 
in  the  matter: 

(b)  If  the  matter  is  not  adjusted  to  the 
satisfaction  of  both  States  Parties  concerned 
vdthin  six  months  after  the  receipt  by  the 
receiving  State  of  the  initial  communication, 
either  State  shall  have  the  right  to  refer  the 
matter  to  the  Committee,  by  notice  given  to 
the  Committee  and  to  the  other  State: 

(c)  The  Committee  shall  deal  with  a 
matter  referred  to  it  under  this  article  only 
after  it  has  ascertained  that  all  domestic 
remedies  have  been  invoked  and  exhausted  in 
the  matter,  in  conformity  with  the  generally 
recognized  principles  of  international  law.  This 
shall  not  be  the  rule  where  the  application  of 
the  remedies  is  unreasonably  prolonged  or  is 
unlikely  to  bring  effective  relief  to  the  person 
who  is  the  victim  of  the  violation  of  this 
Convention; 

(d)  The  Committee  shall  hold  closed 
meetings  when  examining  communications 
under  this  article; 

(e)  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  subpara- 
graph (c),  the  Committee  shall  make  available 
its  good  offices  to  the  States  Parties  concerned 
with  a  view  to  a  friendly  solution  of  the  matter 


i|artment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


81 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


on  the  basis  of  respect  for  the  obligations 
provided  for  in  this  Convention.  For  this 
purpose,  the  Committee  may,  when  appropri- 
ate, set  up  an  ad  hoc  conciliation  commission; 

(f)  In  any  matter  referred  to  it  under 
this  article,  the  Committee  may  call  upon  the 
States  Parties  concerned,  referred  to  in  sub- 
paragraph (b),  to  supply  any  relevant  informa- 
tion; 

(g)  The  States  Parties  concerned,  re- 
ferred to  in  subparagi'aph  (b),  shall  have  the 
right  to  be  represented  when  the  matter  is 
being  considered  by  the  Committee  and  to 
make  submissions  orally  and/or  in  writing; 

(h)  The  Committee  shall,  within  twelve 
months  after  the  date  of  receipt  of  notice  under 
subparagraph  (b),  submit  a  report: 

(i)  If  a  solution  within  the  terms  of 
subparagraph  (e)  is  reached,  the  Committee 
shall  confine  its  report  to  a  brief  statement  of 
the  facts  and  of  the  solution  reached; 

(ii)  If  a  solution  within  the  terms  of 
subparagraph  (e)  is  not  reached,  the  Commit- 
tee shall  confine  its  report  to  a  brief  statement 
of  the  facts;  the  wTitten  submissions  and 
record  of  the  oral  submissions  made  by  the 
States  Parties  concerned  shall  be  attached  to 
the  report. 

In  every  matter,  the  report  shall  be 
communicated  to  the  States  Parties  concerned. 

2.  The  provisions  of  this  article  shall  come 
into  force  when  five  States  Parties  to  this 
Convention  have  made  declarations  under 
paragi-aph  1  of  this  article.  Such  declarations 
shall  be  deposited  by  the  States  Parties  with 
the  Secretary-General  of  the  United  Nations, 
who  shall  transmit  copies  thereof  to  the  other 
States  Parties.  A  declaration  may  be  with- 
drawn at  any  time  by  notification  to  the 
Secretary-General.  Such  a  withdrawal  shall 
not  prejudice  the  consideration  of  any  matter 
which  is  the  subject  of  a  communication  already 
transmitted  under  this  article;  no  further 
communication  by  any  State  Party  shall  be 
received  under  this  article  after  the  notifica- 
tion of  withdrawal  of  the  declaration  has  been 
received  by  the  Secretary-General,  unless  the 
State  Party  concerned  has  made  a  new  decla- 
ration. 

Article  22 

1 .  A  State  Party  to  this  Convention  may  at  any 
time  declare  under  this  article  that  it  recog- 
nizes the  competence  of  the  Committee  to 
receive  and  consider  communications  from  or 
on  behalf  of  individuals  subject  to  its  jurisdic- 
tion who  claim  to  be  victims  of  a  violation  by  a 
State  Party  of  the  provisions  of  the  Conven- 
tion. No  communication  shall  bo  received  by 
the  Committee  if  it  concerns  a  State  Party 
which  has  not  made  such  a  declaration. 

2.  The  Committee  shall  consider  inadmis- 
sible any  communication  under  this  article 
which  is  anonymous  or  which  it  considers  to  be 
an  abuse  of  the  right  of  submission  of  such 
communications  or  to  be  incompatible  with  the 
provisions  of  this  Convention. 

3.  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  paragraph 

2,  the  Committee  shall  bring  any  communica- 
tions submitted  to  it  under  this  article  to  the 
attention  of  the  State  Party  to  this  Convention 


which  has  made  a  declaration  under  paragraph 
1  and  is  alleged  to  be  violating  any  provisions  of 
the  Convention.  Within  six  months,  the  receiv- 
ing State  shall  submit  to  the  Committee 
written  explanations  or  statements  clarifying 
the  matter  and  the  remedy,  if  any,  that  may 
have  been  taken  by  that  State. 

4.  The  Committee  shall  consider  communi- 
cations received  under  this  article  in  the  light 
of  all  infoi-mation  made  available  to  it  by  or  on 
behalf  of  the  individual  and  by  the  State  Party 
concerned. 

5.  The  Committee  shall  not  consider  any 
communications  from  an  individual  under  this 
article  unless  it  has  ascertained  that: 

(a)  The  same  matter  has  not  been,  and  is 
not  being,  examined  under  another  procedure 
of  international  investigation  or  settlement; 

(b)  The  individual  has  exhausted  all 
available  domestic  remedies;  this  shall  not  be 
the  rule  where  the  application  of  the  remedies 
is  unreasonably  prolonged  or  is  unlikely  to 
bring  effective  relief  to  the  person  who  is  the 
victim  of  the  violation  of  this  Convention. 

6.  The  Committee  shall  hold  closed  meet- 
ings when  examining  communications  under 
this  article. 

7.  The  Committee  shall  forward  its  views 
to  the  State  Party  concerned  and  to  the 
individual. 

8.  The  provisions  of  this  article  shall  come 
into  force  when  five  States  Parties  to  this 
Convention  have  made  declarations  under 
paragraph  1  of  this  article.  Such  declarations 
shall  be  deposited  by  the  States  Parties  with 
the  Secretary-General  of  the  United  Nations, 
who  shall  transmit  copies  thereof  to  the  other 
States  Parties.  A  declaration  may  be  with- 
drawn at  any  time  by  notification  to  the 
Secretary-General.  Such  a  withdrawal  shall 
not  prejudice  the  consideration  of  any  matter 
which  is  the  subject  of  a  communication  already 
transmitted  under  this  article;  no  further 
communication  by  or  on  behalf  of  an  individual 
shall  be  received  under  this  article  after  the 
notification  of  withdrawal  of  the  declaration 
has  been  received  by  the  Secretary-General, 
unless  the  State  Party  has  made  a  new 
declaration. 

Article  2.3 

The  members  of  the  Committee  and  of  the  ad 
hoc  conciliation  commissions  which  may  be 
appointed  under  article  21,  paragi-aph  1(e), 
shall  be  entitled  to  the  facilities,  privileges  and 
immunities  of  experts  on  mission  for  the 
United  Nations  as  laid  down  in  the  relevant 
sections  of  the  Convention  on  the  Privileges 
and  Immunities  of  the  United  Nations. 

Article  24 

The  Committee  shall  submit  an  annual  report 
on  its  activities  under  this  Convention  to  the 
States  Parties  and  to  the  General  Assembly  of 
the  United  Nations. 

PART  III 

Article  2.5 

1.  This  ('onvention  is  open  for  signature  by  all 
States. 

2.  This  Convention  is  subject  to  ratifica- 
tion. Instruments  of  ratification  shall  be  depos- 


ited with  the  Secretary-General  of  the  Unite 
Nations. 

Article  26 

This  Convention  is  open  to  accession  by  all 
States.  Accession  shall  be  effected  by  the 
deposit  of  an  instniment  of  accession  with  ti 
Secretary-General  of  the  United  Nations.  ^ 

Article  27 

1.  This  Convention  shall  enter  into  force  on  tl 
thirtieth  day  after  the  date  of  the  deposit  wi 
the  Secretary-General  of  the  United  Nation.' 
of  the  twentieth  in.strument  of  ratification  oi 
accession. 

2.  For  each  State  ratifying  this  Convent! 
or  acceding  to  it  after  the  deposit  of  the 
twentieth  instrument  of  ratification  or  acces 
sion,  the  Convention  shall  enter  into  force  o 
the  thirtieth  day  after  the  date  of  the  depos 
of  its  own  insti-ument  of  ratification  or  acce; 


Article  28 

1.  Each  State  may,  at  the  time  of  signature 
ratification  of  this  Convention  or  accession  ' 
thereto,  declare  that  it  does  not  recognize   '' 
competence  of  the  Committee  provided  1^  n- 
article  20. 

2.  Any  State  Party  having  made  a  it;: 
vation  in  accordance  with  paragraph  1  of  tl 
article  may,  at  any  time,  withdraw  this  re:  '' 
vation  by  notification  to  the  Secretary-Gen  II 
of  the  United  Nations.  j! 

Article  29 

1.  Any  State  Party  to  this  Convention  ma; 
propose  an  amendment  and  file  it  with  the 
Secretary-General  of  the  United  Nations.   {' 
Secretary-General  shall  thereupon  commui 
cate  the  propo.sed  amendment  to  the  State  " 
Parties  with  a  request  that  they  notify  hir  ■ 
whether  they  favour  a  conference  of  State  r 


Parties  for  the  purpose  of  considering  and 
voting  upon  the  proposal.  In  the  event  ths 
within  four  months  from  the  date  of  such 
communication  at  least  one-third  of  the  St 
Parties  favours  such  a  conference,  the  Sec 
tary-General  shall  convene  the  conference 
under  the  auspices  of  the  United  Nations, 
amendment  adopted  by  a  majority  of  the  St 
Parties  present  and  voting  at  the  conferer 
shall  be  submitted  by  the  Secretary-Gener 
all  the  States  Parties  for  acceptance. 

2.  An  amendment  adopted  in  accorda; 
with  paragraph  1  of  this  article  shall  enter 
force  when  two-thii-ds  of  the  State  Paities  i 
this  Convention  have  notified  the  Secretai^ 
General  of  the  United  Nations  that  they  ha 
accepted  it  in  accordance  with  their  respect 
constitutional  processes. 

3.  When  amendments  enter  into  forci 
they  shall  be  binding  on  those  States  Part 
which  have  accepted  them,  other  States  I 
ties  still  being  bound  by  the  provisions  ol 
Convention  and  any  earlier  amendments  \ 
they  have  accepted. 

Article  30 

1.  Any  dispute  between  two  or  more  Stati 
Parties  concerning  the  interpretation  or  ; 
cation  of  this  Convention  which  cannot  be 
settled  through  negotiation  shall,  at  the  n 


MIDDLE  EAST 


r  one  of  them,  be  submitted  to  arbitra- 
1 ;  within  six  months  from  the  date  of  the 
ii'>i  fcir  arbitration  the  Parties  are  unable 
i^iv,'  (in  the  organization  of  the  arbitration, 
I  Miir  (if  those  Parties  may  refer  the  dispute 
K   International  Court  of  Justice  by  request 
iMlormity  with  the  Statute  of  the  Court. 
:!   i:ach  State  may.  at  the  time  of  signature 

■  ti  ilR-ation  of  this  Convention  or  accession 
(III,  declare  that  it  does  not  consider  itself 
1(1  liy  paragi-aph  1  of  this  article.  The  other 

_  c-  Parties  shall  not  be  bound  by  paragraph 
( this  article  with  respect  to  any  State  Party 
a  ntj  made  such  a  reservation. 

:',.  Any  State  Party  having  made  a  reser- 
;i  111  in  accordance  with  paragi-aph  2  of  this 

■  li'  may  at  any  time  withdraw  this  reserva- 

iiotification  to  the  Secretary-General  of 
led  Nations. 

i(U-:!l 

State  Party  may  denounce  this  Conven- 

li\  written  notification  to  the  Secretary- 

•  Tal  of  the  United  Nations.  Denunciation 

■;  iiics  effective  one  year  after  the  date  of 

i]ii  (if  the  notification  by  the  Secretary- 

l!   Such  a  denunciation  shall  not  have  the 
t  '  if  releasing  the  State  Party  from  its 
:   at  Kins  under  this  Convention  in  regard  to 
itnission  which  occurs  prior  to  the  date  at 
li  !  he  denunciation  becomes  effective,  nor 
■1   (Ifiiunciation  prejudice  in  any  way  the 
;o  inued  consideration  of  any  matter  which  is 
ih  idy  under  consideration  by  the  Committee 
w  •  to  the  date  at  which  the  denunciation 
je  mes  effective. 
;^.  Following  the  date  at  which  the  denun- 

■  ■'  (if  a  State  Party  becomes  effective,  the 

'  t  ce  shall  not  commence  consideration 
IK  w  matter  regarding  that  State. 

vj  tie  :!2 

\  Secretary-General  of  the  United  Nations 
iiif(irm  all  States  Members  of  the  United 
'iii>  and  all  States  which  have  signed  this 
M  .'ention  or  acceded  to  it  of  the  following: 

(a)  Signatures,  ratifications  and  acces- 
5  under  articles  25  and  26; 

(b)  The  date  of  entry  into  force  of  this 
v'ention  under  article  27  and  the  date  of  the 
y  into  force  of  any  amendments  under 

■le  29; 

(c)  Denunciations  under  article  31. 

ftiicle  33 

his  Convention,  of  which  the  Arabic, 
lese,  English,  French,  Russian  and  Span- 
,exts  are  equally  authentic,  shall  be  depos- 
with  the  Secretary-General  of  the  United 
ions. 

2.  The  Secretary-General  of  the  United 
ions  shall  transmit  certified  copies  of  this 
vention  to  all  States. 


President's  Meeting  With  Israeli 
Foreign  Minister  Peres 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
MAY  17,  19881 

Today  President  Reagan  met  with  Is- 
raeli Foreign  Minister  Shimon  Peres. 
The  President  and  the  Foreign  Minister 
discussed  bilateral  issues,  the  upcoming 
U.S. -Soviet  summit,  and  the  urgent 
need  to  make  progress  toward  peace  in 
the  Middle  East.  The  President  empha- 
sized the  value  of  deepening  U.S. -Israeli 
bilateral  relations  and  the  emergence  of 
meaningful  strategic  cooperation  be- 
tween our  two  countries.  He  remarked 
that  the  progress  we've  made  together, 
embodied  in  the  recently  signed  MOA 
[memorandum  of  agreement,  April  21, 
1988],  owed  much  to  Shimon  Peres"  ef- 
forts, both  as  Foreign  Minister  and  as 
Prime  Minister.  In  discussing  the  sum- 
mit, the  President  spoke  of  our  four-part 
agenda — bilateral  relations,  human 
rights,  arms  reduction,  regional  con- 
flicts— and  emphasized  that  we  will,  as  al- 
ways, press  for  the  unimpeded  right  of 
Soviet  Jewry  to  emigrate.  The  President 
also  spoke  of  our  determination  to  make 
progress  toward  Middle  East  peace.  He 
thanked  Foreign  Minister  Peres  for  his 
efforts  in  behalf  of  peace  and  his  continu- 
ing commitment  to  negotiate  it.  While 
being  steadfast  in  his  commitment  to  Is- 
raeli strength  and  security,  the  Foreign 
Minister  has  a  vision  for  the  future,  rec- 
ognizes the  increasing  danger  of  the 
status  quo,  and  understands  the  negative 
consequences  of  passivity  and  delay  in 
the  search  for  a  settlement.  The  Foreign 
Minister  is  creative  and  has  the  courage 


Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 

sidential  Documents  of  May  23,  1988. 

2  The  Secretary's  letter  of  submittal  to  the 

ident  of  May  10,  1988,  and  the  U.S. 

Stitimary  and  analysis  of  the  convention  are 

«r:  ted  in  Senate  Treaty  Doc.  100-20.  ■ 


lh(i« 


.hartment  of  State  Bulletin/Auaust  1988 


and  wisdom  to  sa.y  yes  when  real  oppor- 
tunities arise.  Such  a  positive  attitude 
toward  peace  is  essential  for  both  Israeli 
and  Arab  leaders  if  there  is  to  be  a 
comprehensive  settlement  in  the  region. 
A  settlement  must  be  grounded  on  the 
realistic  basis  of  UN  Security  Council 
Resolution  242  and  its  call  for  an  ex- 
change of  territory  for  peace.  Those 
leaders  who  are  negative,  consistently 
reject  new  ideas,  and  fail  to  exploit 
realistic  opportunities  to  bring  about 
negotiations  make  progress  impossible. 
In  the  end,  they  will  have  to  answer  to 
their  own  people  for  the  suffering  that 
will  inevitably  result. 

The  President  also  told  the  Foreign 
Minister  that  Secretary  of  State  Shultz 
would  be  going  to  the  Middle  East  after 
the  summit  to  pursue  our  initiative,  an 
initiative  that  we  continue  to  believe 
offers  the  only  realistic  basis  on  which 
to  make  progress  toward  peace.  The 
alternative  is  a  drift  toward  a  much 
graver  future  in  the  region.  Extremist 
forces  will  gain  strength  at  the  expense 
of  moderates  at  the  very  moment  that 
proliferating  ballistic  missiles  and 
chemical  weapons  are  creating  a  far 
more  ominous  military  environment. 

Foreign  Minister  Peres  agreed  that 
regional  trends  should  add  to  our  collec- 
tive sense  of  urgency  in  pursuing  Middle 
East  peace.  He  also  thanked  the  Presi- 
dent for  his  efforts  on  behalf  of  Soviet 
Jewry  and  world  peace. 


'Tbxt  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  May  23,  1988.  ■ 


83 


UNITED  NATIONS 


Third  Special  Session 

on  Disarmament  Convenes 


U.S.  STATEMENT, 
MAY  31,  1988  i 

Tbday,  the  third  UN  General  Assembly 
Special  Session  Devoted  to  Disamaament 
(SSOD-III)  will  convene  for  almost  4 
weeks  of  discussion  on  anns  control  and 
disarmament  issues.  Heads  of  state,  for- 
eign ministers,  and  other  representa- 
tives from  some  140  UN  countries  will  at- 
tend this  session  to  express  their  na- 
tional views  on  disarmament-related  top- 
ics. 

SSOD-III  participants  will  have  an 
opportunity  to  look  back  at  progress 
made  since  the  second  special  session  in 
1982,  review  current  developments  and 
trends,  and  consider  the  challenges  of 
and  possibilities  for  the  future.  As  an  out- 
come of  this  session,  the  United  States 
hopes  to  achieve  a  consensus  document 
that  reflects  our  common  commitment  to 
efforts  aimed  at  enhancing  international 
peace  and  stability. 

The  United  States  is  proud  of  its  ef- 
forts in  this  regard  since  the  second  spe- 
cial session.  The  United  States  has  con- 
tributed to  the  significant  progress 
which  has  been  made  in  both  bilateral 
and  multinational  negotiations.  Equally 
as  important,  we  have  advanced  success- 
fully international  acceptance  of  the  prin- 
ciple that  arms  control  must  be  pursued 
in  the  conte.xt  of  overall  relations  among 
states,  such  as  resolving  regional  con- 
flicts, respect  for  human  rights,  and  gen- 
eral relations  among  states.  Examples  of 
progress  include: 

•  The  historic  INF  [Intermediate- 
Range  Nuclear  Forces]  Treaty,  signed  at 
the  Washington  summit,  will  eliminate 
globally  U.S.  and  Soviet  intermediate- 
range  and  shorter  range  missiles.  This  is 
the  first  treaty  ever  to  eliminate  an  en- 
tire class  of  nuclear  missiles,  and  it  con- 
tains unprecedented  verification  provi- 
sions. 

•  The  United  States  and  U.S.S.R. 
also  agreed  in  1987  to  establish  Nuclear 
Risk  Reduction  Centers  in  their  respec- 
tive capitals  to  help  reduce  the  risk  of 
war  due  to  accident,  miscalculation,  or 
misunderstanding. 

•  U.S.  negotiators  in  Geneva  have 
been  working  diligently  toward  a  strate- 
gic arms  reduction  treaty  which  would 
cut  U.S.  and  Soviet  strategic  offensive 
nuclear  arsenals  in  half.  We  have  made 
extensive  progress  toward  completing 
this  agreement. 


-M. 


•  The  United  States  is  engaged  in 
full-scale,  stage-by-stage  bilateral  nego- 
tiations with  the  Soviet  Union  on  nuclear 
testing  issues.  As  an  initial  step,  we  are 
negotiating  verification  provisions  to 
make  it  possible  to  ratify  existing  related 
treaties,  namely  the  Threshold  Tfest  Ban 
Treaty  and  the  Peaceful  Nuclear  Explo- 
sions Treaty. 

•  In  1984,  the  United  States  pre- 
sented to  the  40-nation  Conference  on 
Disarmament  a  draft  comprehensive  con- 
vention for  banning  chemical  weapons. 
Many  difficult  problems  remain  to  be 
worked  out  to  make  a  convention  truly 
global  and  effectively  verifiable.  How- 
ever, much  progress  has  been  made,  es- 
pecially with  regard  to  basic  principles  of 
verification. 

•  At  the  198.5  Nuclear  Nonprolifera- 
tion  Treaty  (NPT)  review  conference, 
participants  unanimously  concluded  that 
the  treaty  is  essential  to  the  security  of 
all  states  and  is  the  best  barrier  to  nu- 
clear weapons  proliferation.  Since  then, 
other  states  have  joined  the  NPT,  rais- 
ing its  membership  to  more  than  130  par- 
ties. 

•  In  1986,  the  second  Biological 
Weapons  Convention  review  conference 
acknowledged  U.S.  concerns  about  So- 
viet noncompliance  with  the  convention. 
The  conference  stressed  that  all  states 
need  to  deal  seriously  with  compliance  is- 
sues, otherwise  the  convention  and  the 
arms  control  process  in  general  would  be 
undermined. 

•  In  1986,  the  35  states  participat- 
ing in  the  Conference  on  Security  and  Co- 
operation in  Europe  adopted  the  Stock- 
holm document  on  confidence-  and  secu- 
rity-building measures  designed  to  in- 


crease openness  and  reduce  the  risks  of 
war  by  accident  or  miscalculation.  For 
the  first  time,  the  right  to  conduct  onsi 
inspections  to  check  comphance  was  ac- 
cepted. Tfen  inspections  have  been  con- 
cluded thus  far. 


In  reviewing  the  present  interna- 
tional situation,  the  United  States  is 
encouraged  that  a  number  of  long- 
standing U.S.  basic  concepts  undeiiyinj 
a  sound  approach  to  arms  control  seem 
to  be  gaining  increasing  international ; 
ceptance.  The  international  community 
has  endorsed  these  principles  through 
UN  General  Assembly  resolutions  and 
some  extent  in  arms  control  negotia- 
tions. These  concepts  include:  the  re- 
quirement for  effective  verification  and , 
compliance  with  arms  control  agree- 
ments, the  need  for  greater  openness  i . 
military  matters,  the  importance  of  coi  I 
ventional  disarmament,  and  the  need  t , 
curb  proliferation,  both  nuclear  and      , 
chemical.  i 

These  positive  trends  can  serve  af  „ 
point  of  departure  for  the  special  sess'  „ 
Of  course,  international  stability  canm  ,, 
be  achieved  solely  through  disarmame  n 
measures,  as  arms  are  not  the  cause  b  ., 
a  symptom  of  international  tensions.  \  |i 
hope  that  countries  participating  in  th 
special  session  will  examine  the  cause  |j 
tension  in  their  own  regions  of  the  wo  ,j 
and  take  appropriate  steps  to  improvt 
stability. 

In  conclusion,  the  United  State.s 
comes  this  opportunity  for  the  intern:  i; 
tional  community  to  discuss  a  range  o  „• 
important  issues.  The  U.S.  delegatior  |, 
will  work  in  a  cooperative  and  constn 
five  spirit  toward  a  meaningful  and  pi  |; 
ductive  SSOD-III  that  will  contribute  k'; 
to  enhancing  international  peace  and 
securitv. 


'USUN  press  release  54  of  May  31, 


Arms  Control: 

Progress  and  Global  Challenges 


Serretarif  Shtilfz's  address  before  the 
third  U\  General  Assembly  Special  Ses- 
sion on  Disarmament  in  New  York  City 
on  June  IS,  1988.'^ 

Two  weeks  ago  in  Moscow,  President 
Reagan  and  General  Secretary  Gor- 
bachev exchanged  the  instruments  of 
ratification  for  the  first  treaty  in  his- 
tory to  reduce  nuclear  weapons.  That 


treaty  is  a  message  of  hope  for  the 
future. 

One  day  earlier,  the  President 
set  forth  his  vision  of  the  future,  in 
speech  to  the  students  at  Moscow  t 
University.  He  saw  a  world  where  1 
wonders  of  technology,  especially  tl 
technology  of  information,  would  cc 
bine  with  the  plain  practical  benefi 


r 


UNITED  NATIONS 


K  al  and  economic  freedom,  to 
u  iiK-reased  peace  and  prosperity 

ilu'  work  of  this  special  session  is 
iMiti-ating  on  the  weapons  of  war,  as 
ii  should.  But  we  must  never  for- 
I  jHiint  the  President  made  to  the 
.  nts  of  Moscow — a  point  he  has  re- 
('Jl\-  made  around  the  world: 
.  inns  do  not  distrust  each  other  be- 
(■  I  hey  are  armed:  they  are  armed 
iiM'  they  distrust  each  other." 
In  succeed  in  our  endeavor,  we 
!  pursue  our  visions  with  realism. 
■r  is  no  room  for  wishful  thinking — 
)  rially  thinking  that  technology  and 
■  i(>  stand  still.  They  do  not. 
.\ilvanced  weapons  technology  is 
ailing  throughout  the  globe.  It  has 
used  in  conflicts  that  are  under- 
c.  e\  en  as  I  speak  to  you.  Terrorists 
I'l  iiaking  use  of  advanced  e.xplosives 
n  missiles.  The  diffusion  of  nuclear 
1  chemical  weapons  capabilities,  of 
I  siic  missile  technology,  even  of  bio- 
m  nology,  is  a  global  problem.  These 
ari  lot  simply  East-West  issues:  they 
'o  ern  every  state  here  represented. 
]  we  must  all  recognize  that  if  we 
■■  lot  part  of  the  solution,  we  are  part 
i  le  problem. 

The  spread  of  these  technologies 
1  'ides  with  the  resurgence  of  age-old 
a  ,  religious,  and  communal  con- 
~.  These  conflicts  are  tragedies  in 
til.  iselves;  the  misuse  of  new  technolo- 
m  of  destruction  only  adds  to  the 
•u  'ring  and  to  the  risk  that  these 
'o:licts  will  e.xpand,  further  threaten- 
'  a|  he  peace. 

So  the  changes  we  see  present  us 
iivi   both  problems  and  opportunities. 
!8tl  whatever  else  changes,  some  basic 
i'm;  do  not.  We  are  all  in  this  together. 
i^Have  a  common  interest  in  interna- 
ioil  stability  and  security.  That  com- 
TM  interest  is  as  compelling  now  as  it 
«  over  40  years  ago,  when  the 
J!l:ed  States  and  others  joined  to- 
jB:er  to  form  this  great  body,  in  the 
ifirmath  of  the  most  devastating  war 
iiworld  has  ever  known.  Turning  that 
imon  interest  into  practical  reality  is 
i|(iys  the  real  challenge.  Sweeping 
'  ements  of  principle  have  their  place, 
noble  words  can  never  substitute 
;oncrete  deeds, 
ij  Si.x  years  ago,  President  Reagan 
ight  to  the  second  special  session 
profound  wish  for  peace  of  the 
irican  people.  He  also  described  his 
:rete  agenda  for  progress. 
As  we  review  those  6  years,  I  think 
lave  made  remarkable  progress — 
e  than  many  expected.  But  much 
Hains  to  be  done.  There  is  work 
nty  for  all  of  us. 


Let  me  briefly  review  the  progress 
of  the  past  6  years — first,  what  we  have 
achieved  bilaterally  w-ith  the  Soviet 
Union;  next,  what  we  have  done  to- 
gether with  our  NATO  allies  to 
strengthen  stability  in  Europe;  and 
then  our  efforts  to  deal  with  disarma- 
ment challenges  on  a  global  scale. 

Progress  Since  1982 

U.S. -Soviet  Arms  Control.  Progress  in 
U.S. -Soviet  arms  control  has  been  sub- 
stantial. I  have  already  mentioned  the 
INF  [Intermediate-Range  Nuclear 
Forces]  Ti-eaty.  Over  the  next  3  years, 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
will  eliminate,  forever  and  on  a  global 
basis,  all  their  intermediate-  and 
shorter  range  nuclear  missiles.  For  the 
next  13  years,  we  and  the  Soviets  will 
verify  this  disarmament  by  means  of 
the  most  extensive  onsite  inspection  re- 
gime ever.  It  may  be  that  future  histo- 
rians will  come  to  judge  this  treaty's 
breakthroughs  in  verification  and  open- 
ness to  have  been  almost  as  important 
as  the  nuclear  reductions  themselves. 

When  President  Reagan  spoke  to 
the  second  special  session,  negotiations 
on  strategic  weapons  had  just  begun. 
As  with  his  "zero  option"  for  INF,  he 
had  proposed  dramatic  reductions 
which  many  thought  were  out  of  the 
question.  Six  years  later,  we  have  made 
major  progress  toward  a  treaty  to  cut 
U.S.  and  Soviet  strategic  nuclear  arse- 
nals by  50%.  I  do  not  know  whether  we 
will  be  able  to  conclude  such  a  treaty 
this  year,  but  we  will  make  our  best 
effort.  It  is  the  United  States'  top  arms 
control  priority. 

We  and  the  Soviet  Union  have 
agreed  to  pursue  stage-by-stage  nego- 
tiations on  nuclear  testing.  The  first 
step  is  to  agree  on  effective  verifica- 
tion, to  make  it  possible  to  ratify  the 
Threshold  Test  Ban  Treaty  of  1974  and 
the  Peaceful  Nuclear  Explosions  Treaty 
of  1976.  At  the  Moscow  summit,  we 
agreed  on  the  detailed  procedures  nec- 
essary to  design  and  conduct  a  joint 
verification  experiment  at  each  other's 
test  sites.  And  we  have  made  progress 
on  a  new  protocol  to  the  Peaceful  Nu- 
clear Explosions  Treaty. 

Earlier  this  year,  we  opened  the 
nuclear  risk  reduction  centers  in 
Moscow  and  Washington.  They  will 
further  decrease  the  chance  of  war 
through  accident  or  miscalculation,  and 
will  play  a  direct  role  in  implementing 
the  INF  Treaty.  At  the  Moscow  sum- 
mit, we  also  agreed  to  provide  24  hours 
advance  notice  of  strategic  ballistic  mis- 
sile launches. 


These  achievements  are  tangible 
testimony  to  the  success  of  the  policy 
that  President  Reagan  has  steadily  pur- 
sued to  build  a  better  relationship  with 
the  Soviet  Union.  It  is  a  policy  that 
covers  a  broad  agenda — human  rights, 
regional  conflicts,  and  bilateral  issues, 
as  well  as  arms  control.  It  is  a  policy 
built  to  last,  and  it  has  stood  the  test  of 
time.  It  is  a  policy  which  we  have  pur- 
sued with  the  full  support  of  our  NATO 
allies.  Without  the  full  and  active  sup- 
port of  our  allies,  the  INF  Ti-eaty  in 
particular  could  never  have  been 
achieved. 

Multilateral  East-West  Negotia- 
tions. Together  with  our  allies,  we  have 
taken  important  steps  in  multilateral 
negotiations  as  well. 

The  Stockholm  Conference  on  Con- 
fidence- and  Security-Building  Mea- 
sures and  Disarmament  in  Europe 
concluded  successfully  in  September 
1986.  This  was  a  major  breakthrough 
for  onsite  inspection  of  military  forces 
and  activities.  The  35  participating 
states  agreed  to  specific  measures  to 
reduce  the  risk  of  war  as  a  result  of 
misunderstanding,  miscalculation,  or 
surprise  attack. 

These  measures  have  real  military 
meaning.  They  require  advance  notice 
of  military  activities  above  a  certain 
level  of  troops  or  tanks,  observation  of 
military  activities  above  a  specific  level 
of  troops,  and  annual  forecasts  of  cer- 
tain military  activities.  They  also  give 
the  right  to  request  onsite  inspections 
to  verify  compliance.  To  date,  5  of  the 
participating  states  have  conducted  a 
total  of  10  inspections.  The  successful 
implementation  of  the  Stockholm  accord 
has  increased  confidence  and  given  all 
concerned  a  better  understanding  of 
military  activities  by  other  states. 

We  and  our  NATO  allies  have 
pressed  for  progress  in  conventional 
arms  control  in  Europe.  This  is  part 
and  parcel  of  a  balanced  overall  ap- 
proach. Three  days  ago,  my  NATO  col- 
leagues and  I  agreed  on  the  need  for  a 
substantial  and  balanced  outcome  of  the 
CSCE  [Conference  on  Security  and  Co- 
operation in  Europe]  foUowup  meeting 
in  Vienna,  at  an  early  date,  including 
significant  progress  on  human  rights 
and  human  contacts,  and  on  mandates 
for  negotiations  on  conventional  sta- 
bility and  security-building  measures. 

In  conventional  arms  control,  the 
leaders  of  the  alliance  stated  our  aim 
clearly  at  the  March  NATO  summit:  "to 
establish  a  situation  in  Europe  in  which 
force  postures  as  well  as  the  numbers 
and  deployments  of  weapon  systems  no 
longer  make  surprise  attack  and  large- 
scale  offensive  action  a  feasible  option." 


Uiartment  of  State  Bulletin/ August  1988 


85 


UNITED  NATIONS 


Our  leaders  at  the  NATO  summit  were 
very  specific  about  what  steps  must  be 
taken: 

•  Enhance  stability  in  the  whole  of 
Europe,  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Urals, 
in  a  way  which  safeguards  the  security 
of  all  biit  takes  into  account  the  partic- 
ular problems  facing  each  region; 

•  Focus  on  the  key  weapon  systems 
in  seeking  to  eliminate  the  ability  to 
conduct  large-scale  offensive  actions; 

•  Deal  with  stationed  forces,  in- 
cluding forward-deployed  Soviet  units, 
while  taking  into  consideration  rein- 
forcement capabilities; 

•  Concentrate  on  results  which  will 
eliminate  the  disparities  that  threaten 
stability,  not  on  schemes  for  "equal  re- 
ductions" which  would  have  no  such 
effect; 

•  Redress  the  conventional  im- 
balance, which  can  be  achieved  through 
a  set  of  measures  including  reductions, 
limitations,  and  redeployments,  as  well 
as  the  establishment  of  equal  ceilings; 

•  Require  highly  asymmetrical  re- 
ductions by  the  East,  entailing,  for  ex- 
ample, the  elimination  from  Europe  of 
tens  of  thousands  of  Warsaw  Pact  wea- 
pons that  could  be  used  in  a  surprise 
attack,  including  tanks  and  artillery 
pieces; 

•  Propose,  as  a  concurrent  ele- 
ment, measures  to  produce  greater 
openness  of  military  activities,  and  to 
support  a  rigorous  monitoring  and  ver- 
ification regime;  and 

•  Include  in  this  regime  the  ex- 
change of  detailed  data  about  forces 
and  deployments,  and  the  right  to  suffi- 
cient onsite  inspections  to  be  confident 
of  compliance. 

We  are  under  no  illusion  that  we 
have  set  ourselves  an  easy  objective. 
But  we  have  identified  what  we  need  to 
achieve  in  order  to  make  a  real  contri- 
bution to  a  lasting  peace.  And  we  have 
done  so  in  the  explicit  recognition,  as 
our  leaders  put  it,  that  "the  military 
confrontation  in  Europe  is  the  result, 
not  the  cause,  of  the  painful  division 
which  burdens  that  continent." 

Global  Disarmament.  All  these 
achievements  are  important,  and  they 
have  received  their  due  share  of  atten- 
tion. But  that  must  not  be  allowed  to 
obscure  the  fact  that  building  a  safer 
world  is  not  a  U.S. -Soviet  problem 
alone  or  even  an  East-West  problem.  It 
is  every  nation's  responsibility. 

•  Since  June  1982,  21  additional 
states  have  joined  the  most  important 
multilateral  disarmament  agreement  so 
far  achieved — the  Nuclear  Non-Pro- 
liferation  Treaty  (NPT).  The  1985  NPT 


Review  Conference  unanimously  con- 
cluded that  the  treaty  is  essential  to 
international  peace  and  security. 

•  In  April  1984,  at  the  Geneva  Con- 
ference on  Disarmament  (CD),  Vice 
President  Bush  tabled  a  draft  treaty  to 
ban  chemical  weapons.  In  doing  so,  he 
noted  that  if  ever  in  the  history  of  man- 
kind there  was  something  on  which 
people  from  every  single  country  could 
agree — not  just  government  officials 
but  families  in  Vladivostok  and 
Leningrad,  Peoria  and  Paris,  London, 
Caracas,  and  Belgrade — it  is  on  the 
need  to  ban  chemical  weapons. 

Since  then,  negotiations  at  the  CD 
toward  a  comprehensive,  verifiable,  and 
truly  global  ban  have  increasingly  cen- 
tered on  the  real  issues.  These  include 
the  need  for  concrete  solutions  to  the 
problems  of  ensuring  effective  verifica- 
tion and  undiminished  security.  For  the 
treaty  to  have  real  meaning,  all  chem- 
ical-weapons-capable states  must  be 
part  of  it.  Formidable  obstacles  remain. 
It  serves  no  good  purpose  to  minimize 
them.  But  the  United  States  is  fully 
committed  to  pressing  ahead. 

•  In  1986,  the  second  review  con- 
ference of  the  Biological  and  Toxin 
Weapons  Convention  was  held.  It 
acknowledged  concerns  about  past 
Soviet  noncompliance,  stressed  the 
need  for  all  states  to  deal  seriously 
with  compliance  issues,  and  emphasized 
that  failure  to  strengthen  compliance 
measures  undermined  the  convention 
and  the  arms  control  process  in 
general. 

•  In  1987,  the  United  States  and 
six  other  industrialized  democracies 
formed  a  missile  technology  control  re- 
gime to  limit  the  proliferation  of  mis- 
siles capable  of  delivering  nuclear 
weapons.  I  might  add  that  at  the  Mos- 
cow summit,  we  and  the  Soviet  Union 
agreed  to  hold  exploratory  talks  to  ex- 
change ideas  and  information  about  how 
to  cope  with  this  growing  problem. 

•  The  United  Nations  has  contrib- 
uted welcome  support  to  some  essential 
principles  of  arms  control.  For  2  years 
in  a  row,  the  General  Assembly  has 
adopted,  by  consensus,  resolutions  call- 
ing for  compliance  with  existing  trea- 
ties and  resolutions  underlining  the 
importance  of  verification  of  arms  con- 
trol agreements. 

•  I  have  described  how  the  INF 
Treaty  and  the  CSCE  process  have 
brought  greater  openness  to  military 
matters.  The  United  Nations  is  also 
playing  a  role.  Last  year  the  General 
Assembly  adopted  a  resolution  calling 
for  "furthering  openness  and  trans- 
parency" on  military  matters,  including 


objective  information  on  military  cap- 1 
abilities.  The  United  States  warmly 
welcomed  this  resolution  and  calls  on 
all  member  states  to  heed  it.  Every    I 
country  can  help  build  the  confidence  j 
on  which  true  peace  depends,  by  pub 
lishing  honest  figures  about  defense  ( I 
penditures,  for  all  the  world  to  see.  V 
welcome  the  Soviet  commitment  to 
make  such  figures  public.  We  think  n  i 
is  the  time  to  do  so.  i 

So,  as  I  review  the  past  6  years, ! 
see  a  lot  of  forward  movement.  But  . 
even  as  we  celebrate  our  progress,  a  i 
somber  fact  overshadows  this  special  | 
session.  Proliferation  is  winning  the 
race  against  disarmament  in  the  tec! , 
nologies  of  destruction  I  described  at  | 
the  outset.  We  must  all  face  up  to  th , 
threat  and  act  to  counter  it.  | 

Challenges  of  Proliferation 

Chemical  Weapons.  This  threat  is  n 
an  abstract  one.  During  the  same  6 
years  that  we  have  made  the  progre' ' 
have  outlined,  bloody  conflicts  have 
been  fought  throughout  the  world.  I ' 
some,  chemical  weapons  have  been  ( I' 
ployed.  This  is  a  direct  and  flagrant  li 
violation  of  the  1925  Geneva  Protoco  ' 
which  bans  the  use  of  chemical  wea|  ' 
ons.  But  only  a  binding  internationi 
convention  banning  the  weapons  th(  i 
selves  can  ensure  that  they  are  nev(  I 
used  again.  ' 

All  nations  have  a  responsibilitj  li 
combat  the  proliferation  of  these  tei ' 
ble  weapons.  The  General  Assemblj 
has  voted  to  strengthen  the  Secreta ' 
General's  investigations  of  suspectec  * 
use  of  chemical  weapons.  This  is  a  1  ** 
ited  but  positive  step.  Whenever  ev  ' 
dence  emerges  that  chemical  weapo » 
are  being  used,  all  nations  must  ste  | 
to  their  responsibilities,  by  bringinii^ 
political  pressure  and  moral  suasior^ 
bear  on  offending  states.  States  wit 
chemical  manufacturing  capabilities 
have  a  special  responsibility  to  worl 
against  proliferation.  Stringent  exp 
controls  for  the  chemicals  needed  t( 
make  these  weapons  are  a  good  pla 
start. 

I  have  described  how,  at  the  C( 
ference  on  Disarmament,  the  diffic 
outstanding  issues  of  a  chemical  we 
ons  ban  have  been  identified.  All  4( 
participating  nations  must  apply  th 
selves  to  resolving  them.  In  doing  i 
they  are  blazing  a  path  which  must 
followed  by  all  members  of  the  inte 
tional  community. 

Ballistic  Missiles.  Ballistic  mi 
proliferation  is  a  new  and  urgent  c 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/August' 


UNITED  NATIONS 


, .  It  is  a  worldwide  threat.  In  some 
,  It  involves  missiles  of  the  same 
hat  the  INF  Treaty  is  forever 
latmg  from  U.S.  and  Soviet 
..als.  '" 
'hi'  United  States  is  especially 
riK'd  about  the  introduction  of  ad- 
'(]  missiles  into  the  Persian  Gulf 
riiis  has  lead  directly  to  the  indis- 
iiatc  slaughter  of  civilians,  making 
11  more  difficult  to  bring  that 
; '  conflict  to  an  end.  We  are  al- 

st'eing  signs  of  a  dangerous  new 
11  race  which  will  put  at  risk  coun- 
le  far  removed  from  the  gulf  region 
e, 
Purely,  mutual  restraint  is  a  better 
\nr  the  nations  of  that  troubled 
Id  see  to  their  security.  The 
•<1  States  is  prepared  to  do  its 
,.r  both  to  curb  ballistic  missile  pro- 
rejtion,  and  to  help  bring  about 
ea  'ful  resolutions  of  the  conflicts  in 
neiulf  and  nearby  regions. 

Juclear  Weapons.  Bad  as  the  pro- 
fei  tion  of  chemical  weapons  and  bal- 
st  missiles  is,  nuclear  proliferation 
s  an  even  graver  threat  to  interna- 
I ;  stability.  The  United  States  con- 
,ii  j  nuclear  proliferation  the  most 
.Tif  'tant  item  on  this  special  session's 
^ela. 

)oes  anyone  doubt  that  the  spread 
1 1  clear  weapons  threatens  regional 
nc  ;lobal  security?  What  state  be- 
ev;  that,  if  it  now  acquired  nuclear 
.'e;ons,  its  rivals  would  not  seek  to  do 
he  ame? 

?he  vast  majority  of  the  countries 
er  represented  have  undertaken  a 
')!( m  commitment  to  stop  the  spread 
1  clear  weapons.  One  hundred  and 
,-si.\  nations  have  freely  chosen  to 
■(■  to  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty, 
1  celebrates  its  20th  anniversary 
iiiinth.  There  is  no  good  reason 
ivt-ry  nation  should  not  make  such 
imitment.  It  is  a  contribution  each 
■\ try  state  can  make  to  a  safer 
■  1. 

The  Treaty  of  Tlatelolco  also  re- 
-  a  key  part  of  the  nonproliferation 
.  ir.  The  United  States  believes  all 
ill'  states  should  fully  adhere  to  it. 
pining  their  nuclear  activities  to 
■ctiiin  by  the  International  Atomic 
KV  Agency,  the  parties  to  both 
it's  provide  verifiable  assurances 
la these  activities  are  for  peaceful 
iWoses  only. 
Each  state  that  has  not  yet  made  a 
ntr  commitment  to  nuclear  non- 
ftration  must  e.\plain  why  for  it- 
I'.ut  one  pretext  for  not  doing  so  is 
The  image  of  an  endless  nuclear 


buildup  by  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  looks  very  false  in  the 
light  of  the  INF  Treaty. 

At  the  very  moment  when  the 
United  States  and  U.S.S.R.  have 
agreed  to  reduce  their  nuclear  arsenals, 
it  would  be  tragic  for  other  countries  to 
pursue  the  capability  to  cross  the  nu- 
clear threshold.  Nuclear  prohferation  is 
one  of  the  most  direct  and  serious 
threats  to  regional  and  global  stability. 
It  is  a  challenge  which  no  nation  has 
the  right  to  ignore. 

We  must  be  most  concerned  about 
areas  where  regional  tensions  are  high, 
and  where  countries  that  see  each 
other  as  potential  rivals  have  not  made 
a  binding  commitment  to  nonprolifera- 
tion or  opened  all  their  nuclear  ac- 
tivities to  international  inspection. 
Today  it  is  in  South  Asia  that  the  dan- 
ger is  most  acute.  We  encourage  the 
states  of  South  Asia  to  take  concrete 
steps  to  meet  this  urgent  challenge. 
The  United  States  is  prepared  to  work 
with  countries  inside  and  outside  the 
region  to  find  a  lasting  solution  to  the 
danger  of  proliferation  that  satisfies  all 
parties. 

The  Path  to  Peace 

Building  a  constructive  relationship 
with  one's  neighbors  and  other  poten- 
tial adversaries  should  be  an  element  of 
every  national  security  policy. 

Each  individual  country  must  de- 
cide the  proper  balance  between  invest- 
ing in  plowshares  and  investing  in 
swords.  In  making  such  decisions,  it  is 
essential  to  have  a  clear  idea  of  the 
threat.  That  is  one  good  reason  for 
openness  about  military  budgets — and 
about  nuclear  progi'ams.  It  is  also  why 
states  should  talk  to  each  other  about 
their  political  differences,  in  order  to 
reduce  regional  tensions  and  thus  re- 
duce the  perceived  need  to  maintain 
lai'ge  military  forces.  Let  me  cite  a  few 
figures  without  drawing  any 
conclusions. 

In  the  5  years  from  1977  to  1981, 
some  $128  billion  worth  of  arms  were 
delivered  to  developing  countries.  In 
the  following  5  years,  ending  in  1986, 
this  figure  rose  to  $180  billion — an  in- 
crease of  some  40%. 

The  Soviet  Union  was  by  far  the 
most  significant  source  of  arms  deliv- 
eries throughout  that  decade.  In  the 
first  5  years,  Warsaw  Pact  countries  ac- 
counted for  51%  of  the  weapons  ship- 
ments, while  NATO  countries  were 
responsible  for  41%.  In  the  second  5 
years,  these  figures  declined  somewhat, 
to  50%  for  the  Warsaw  Pact  and  37% 
for  NATO. 


During  this  same  period,  the  devel- 
oping countries  themselves  showed  a 
dramatic  growth  as  the  sources  of  their 
own  weapons.  In  percentage  terms, 
their  share  almost  doubled  from  the 
first  period  to  the  second,  rising  from 
6%  to  11%.  In  absolute  terms,  the  fig- 
ure went  up  some  two  and  a  half  times. 
This  is  development  of  a  sort,  but  it  is 
hardly  disarmament. 

I  said  at  the  outset  that  the  United 
States  recognizes  the  need  for  realism. 
The  UN  Charter  specifically  recognizes 
the  right  of  self-defense,  as  well  as  the 
right  to  form  regional  collective  se- 
curity arrangements.  History  has  not 
been  kind  to  states  that  neglected  their 
fundamental  security  responsibilities. 
The  United  States  does  not  believe  in 
peace  through  weakness,  and  does  not 
recommend  it  to  anyone  else. 

So  it  is  necessary  to  be  strong.  But 
it  is  not  sufficient.  As  the  leaders  of 
the  NATO  alliance  put  it,  at  their 
March  summit: 

Security  in  Europe  involves  not  just 
military,  but  also  political,  economic,  and. 
above  all,  humanitarian  factors.  We  look 
forward  to  a  Europe  undivided,  in  which 
people  of  all  states  can  freely  receive  ideas 
and  information,  enjoy  their  fundamental 
human  rights,  and  determine  their  own  fu- 
ture. ...  A  just  and  lasting  peaceful  order 
in  Europe  requires  that  all  states  enjoy 
relations  of  confidence  with  their  own  cit- 
izens, trust  them  to  make  political  or  eco- 
nomic choices  of  their  own,  and  allow  them 
to  receive  information  from  and  exchange 
ideas  with  citizens  of  other  states. 

Allied  leaders  went  on  to  say  that 
military  forces  should  only  exist  to  pre- 
vent war  and  to  ensure  self-defense, 
not  for  purposes  of  aggression  or  for 
political  or  military  intimidation. 

I  think  there  is  much  in  this  vision 
which  applies  beyond  the  North  Atlan- 
tic area.  It  suggests  a  way  for  nations 
to  build  their  security  on  a  solid  foun- 
dation. The  best  basis  on  which  to  build 
a  durable  peace,  wherever  there  are 
areas  of  potential  or  actual  conflict,  is  a 
broad  one.  Ti-ying  to  limit  dialogue  to  a 
narrow  agenda — whether  on  security 
measures  or  something  else — not  only 
misses  important  opportunities,  it  al- 
lows the  whole  relationship  to  be  poi- 
soned if  things  go  wrong. 

Within  the  broad  approach  I  have 
outlined,  confidence-building  measures, 
or  arms  control  and  disarmament, 
should  be  considered  on  their  own 
merits,  as  one  way  to  enhance  security. 
Doing  them  for  any  other  reason  can 
only  lead  to  trouble. 


mment  of  State  Bulletin/ August  1988 


87 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


The  Road  Ahead 

There  are  challenges  enough  for  all  of 
us.  Some  tasks,  such  as  work  to  reduce 
nuclear  arsenals,  must  be  strictly  bilat- 
eral, in  negotiation,  verification,  and 
implementation.  But  others — above  all, 
the  negotiations  to  ban  chemical  weap- 
ons and  the  need  to  control  nuclear  pro- 
liferation— are  global  problems. 

As  we  continue  these  discussions, 
even  as  we  exchange  frank  or  candid 
opinions,  let  us  recall  the  purpose  of 
this  great  organization,  as  set  forth  in 
the  UN  Charter: 

To  save  succeeding  generations  from 
the  scourge  of  war  ...  to  reaffirm  faith  in 
fundamental  human  rights  ...  to  establish 
conditions  under  which  justice  and  respect 
for  the  obligations  arising  from  treaties 
and  other  sources  of  international  law  can 
be  maintained,  and  to  promote  social  prog- 
ress and  better  standards  of  life  in  larger 
freedom. 

In  that  spirit,  let  us  get  on  with 
the  job. 


'Press  release  111  of  June  15,  1988;  USUN 
press  release  59  of  June  13.  ■ 


Situation  in  Panama 


Following  is  the  text  of  a  news  con- 
ference by  Secretary  Shultz,  Under  Sec- 
retary for  Political  Affairs  Michael  H. 
Armacost,  and  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Inter- American  Affairs  Elliott  Abrams 
held  May  25,  1988  A 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  President  has 
authorized  me  to  recall  U.S.  negotiator 
Michael  Kozak  to  the  United  States.  At 
the  final  moment  in  negotiations,  Noriega 
would  not  cairy  through  with  the  ar- 
rangements his  representatives  had  nego- 
tiated. No  further  negotiations  are  con- 
templated. All  proposals  addressed  dur- 
ing these  negotiations  have  been  with- 
drawn. No  offers  remain  on  the  table. 

Noriega  imposes  a  heavy  burden  on 
the  people  of  Panama.  The  burden  is 
political:  repression  of  the  freedom  to 
speak,  to  assemble,  to  choose  leadership 
and  direction.  The  burden  is  economic: 
fewer  jobs,  less  pay,  inability  to  benefit 
from  a  relationship  with  the  economy  of 
the  United  States.  The  burden  is  moral: 
isolation  in  the  hemisphere,  as  the  cor- 
ruption of  the  drug  trade  is  rejected. 

Noriega  had  a  chance  to  lift  these 
burdens  as  a  result  of  reasonable  terms 
worked  out  with  the  United  States.  Hav- 


88 


ing  authorized  others  to  say  he  agreed  to 
resign  and  leave,  he  has  not  been  able  to 
say  so  himself.  He  has  put  his  own  inter- 
ests above  those  of  the  people  of  Panama. 

The  United  States  will  continue  to 
work  for  an  opening  to  democracy  to 
Panama  and  for  the  conditions  that  will 
lead  to  economic  development.  We  will 
continue  our  all-out  war  on  drugs,  and  we 
will  continue  to  work  with  the  people  of 
Panama  and  democratic  forces  through- 
out the  hemisphere  to  get  Noriega  out  of 
power  and  out  of  Panama. 

Q.  What  further  steps  is  the  United 
States  prepared  to  take  in  order  to  en- 
courage him  to  leave  eventually? 

Secretary  Shultz.  We  will  keep  our 
present  posture  in  place,  and  we  will 
continue  to  work  various  options,  espe- 
cially in  coordination  with  other  countries 
of  the  hemisphere,  particularly  those  in 
Latin  America.  As  to  the  details  of  them, 
I  don't  wish  to  discuss  those  details. 

Q.  Are  any  of  the  options  military  in 
nature? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  wouldn't  com- 
ment on  military  options. 

Q.  If  you  truly  intended  to  save 
Panama,  why  have  you  taken  the  offer 
that  was  on  the  table  off  the  table?  Why 
not  try  and  press  forward  on  the  negoti- 
ating front? 

Secretary  Shultz.  Because  the  nego- 
tiations came  to  an  unsatisfactory  con- 
clusion, and  we  don't  intend  to  just  leave 
the  possibility  there  for  somebody  to  pick 
up  or  not  as  the  situation  may  change. 

Q.  Did  domestic  political  pressure 
here  have  something  to  do  with  your 
decision  to  drop  the  proposals? 

Secretary  Shultz.  It  had  nothing  to 
do  with  it  at  all.  We  have  a  very  strong 
proposal,  and  while  many  have  criticized 
it,  I  have  noticed  as  people  have  learned 
about  it  and  come  to  understand  it  a  little 
bit  more,  it  has  been  increasingly  sup- 
ported as  something  sensible.  It  is  clear 
enough  Noriega  and  his  people  in  the 
Panamanian  military  who  are  close  to  him 
saw,  without  a  doubt,  what  our  proposal 
did  do:  It  got  him  out  of  Panama  and  it  got 
him  out  of  power.  That's  the  object  and,  of 
course,  to  create  a  pohtical  opening  so  the 
forces  of  democracy  and  freedom  could 
move  into  that  opening  and  take  over.  We 
will  continue  to  work  for  that  and  con- 
tinue to  work  with  the  people  of  Panama 
for  that  end. 

Q.  There  are  many  who  are  saying 
Gen.  Noriega  has  been  able  to  stand  up 
to  the  full  weight  of  the  United  States 
and,  in  effect,  rub  the  United  States' 


nose  in  this.  How  would  you  respond 
that? 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  United  Stat 
has  performed  with  gi-eat  restraint.  We 
have  done  our  best  to  try  to  work  out 
something  in  a  sensible  way.  We  have  i 
used  our  military  resources  or  bases  or 
presence  in  any  way  at  all.  Of  course,  v  j 
have  recognized  and  will  continue  to  r 
ognize  President  Delvalle  as  the  con-  L 
stitutionally  proper  and  legitimate  Pri  i, 
dent  of  Panama.  It  is  the  case  that  a  gr  j 
deal  of  the  economic  bite  in  Panama  re  ;■ 
suits  from  the  fact  we  are  doing  what  \  L 
have  been  asked  to  do  by  the  legitimat  I 
Government  of  Panama,  and  will  conti: . 
to  do  it.  I 

Q.  Noriega  refused  to  step  down  F 
under  any  circumstances?  *■ 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  don't  know  at  |t 
that.  I'm  sure  there  will  be  circumstar  ■ 
that  will  come  about  when  he  will  step  '■ 
down,  and  we  will  be  working  toward  1 1' 
end.  1 

k'. 

Q.  You  said  that  we  are  going  to  ^ 

working  with  our  Latin  American  al  i 
on  this.  Can  you  cite  examples  of  th  1 
Mexico  has  just  offered  to  provide  ei  (» 
nomic  assistance  to  Panama.  The  SI  P' 
[Latin  American  Economic  System 
tions  are  even  considering  develop! i 
new  currency  for  use  in  Panama.  W  t 
are  the  examples  that  you  claim  the 
are  of  other  Latin  American  countr 
cooperating  on  our  side? 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  democrat 
cally  oriented  countries,  particularly 
those  which  have  recently  tasted  the 
freedom  that  goes  with  democracy — 
as  Argentina,  such  as  Uruguay,  and, 
course,  a  longstanding  democracy  sue  I 
Venezuela  and  others — are  very  con-    « 
cerned  about  what's  going  on  in  Pan;  i^ 
Obviously,  some  countries  have  imm(  [,i 
ately  "cottoned  up"  to  Noriega — Nica  ^, 
gua  has,  Cuba  has.  So  those  are  prob 
countries.  But  in  general,  in  Latin  A 
ica,  there  is  a  surge  of  democracy,  an 
people  want  to  see  freedom,  and  the 
ognize  this  is  very  much  in  their  inte 

They  also  recognize,  as  we  all  do 
seriousness  of  involvement  with  drug 
and  the  higher  it  goes  in  a  country,  tl 
more  serious  it  is.  All  of  these  things 
factor  into  a  set  of  attitudes  through( 
the  hemisphere  that  will  make  them- 
selves felt.  And  I  don't  have  any  dou 
about  it. 

Q.  Are  there  no  conditions  und 
which  negotiations  could  be  resume 
could  Noriega  come  to  you  and  say 
he's  ready  to  talk  on  some  conditio 
that  he  would  set? 

Secretary  Shultz.  As  of  now,  th 
are — our  negotiator  is  withdrawn,  w 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Auaust  1\  h 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


.  iin  plan  for  any  further  negotiations, 
ur  (iffer  is  no  longer  standing  there 

r  I  able. 

I  What  caused  the  breakdown? 
lil  his  refusal  to  leave,  or  did  he 
1  to  impose  conditions?  What  failed 
tu  package  that  apparently  was  so 

^e^•retary  Shultz.  Why  he  decided  to 
Mai  he  decided,  of  course,  you'll  have 
]i  him.  What  he  told  our  negotiator 

■  hat  it  was  obviously  clear  what  we 

iilu'd  out  in  the  end  required  him  to 
■  —end  his  term  of  office  as  Com- 
>{  the  Panamanian  Defense 

-  I  I'DF),  that  is  basically  the  source 

pnuer — and  to  leave  Panama.  Ap- 
•  it  1>  he  was  not  prepared,  at  least  not 

n  cimtemplate  that.  But  as  for  his 
:  ill  .■,,  you'll  have  to  ask  him. 

iiim  our  standpoint,  we  developed 
!  hing  we  feel  is  in  the  interest  of  the 
1 1'  I >r  Panama,  and  we  will  continue  to 

till-  a  political  opening,  for  economic 

iipment,  and  for  stamping  out  con- 

■  Ills  to  the  drug  trade. 

J.  Did  he  agree  at  one  point  to 
em  n  and  leave? 

iecretary  Shultz.  Our  negotiations 
I  )Iace,  to  a  certain  extent,  directly 
;  iim  but  mostly  with  representatives 

,  and  they  were  very  detailed  and 

il.  An  arrangement  was  structured 
V  u-h  the  details  of  what  was  agreed 
ad  ny  formal  papers  connected  with 
16'  would  be  filed  with  the  Papal  Nun- 
\  hn  is  a  very  well-respected  person 
I  lama  and  would  hold  these  in  good 
t  It  was  a  well-structured  ar- 

iiicnt,  and  he  must  have  known  very 
1  \  hat  was  being  arranged. 

l  Do  you  feel  that  Gen.  Noriega 
a  le-crossed  you  or  the  United 

as? 
iecretary  Shultz.  I  only  deal  de- 

"^  ively  here.  We  conducted  a  nego- 

-  n  111  good  faith  that  was  very  de- 
.  with  people  who  I  have  no  doubt 

.  Healing  on  his  behalf.  I've  described 
I  111  broad  terms  the  process.  In  the 
111'  proposition  that  Gen.  Noriega 
III  to  have  agi-eed  to  through  his 
si'iitatives,  he  couldn't  bring  himself 
Iff  to  when  we  said,  "This  has  to  be 
■il  to  face-to-face,  without  nego- 

l  Will  you  renew  your  argument 
the  Administration  to  use  military 
in  an  attempt  to  oust  Noriega?  And 
t,  what  options  are  there  available 
L  I  n  ited  States  to  force  the  ouster  of 
L'sa? 

secretary  Shultz.  I've  seen  lots  of 
.  c  characterizations  of  my  position 


which  are  not  necessarily  accurate.  I  will 
continue  to  give  my  counsel  to  the  Presi- 
dent directly,  and  there  are  many  things 
we  are  doing  and  can  do.  Our  objective 
remains  very  clear:  We  want  to  create  a 
political  opening  for  a  democratic  form  of 
government  in  Panama.  We  want  to  help 
Panamanians  create  the  conditions 
whereby  their  economy  can  flourish.  And 
we  want  to  do  everything  we  can  to  get  at 
the  drug  trade  and  the  drug  problem  in 
our  hemisphere.  Those  are  things  we  will 
continue  to  work  at,  and  relentlessly. 

Under  Secretary  Armacost.  I  think 
the  Secretary  has  outlined  the  objectives 
and  the  state  of  play.  I  thought  you  might 
be  interested  in  a  little  more  detail  on 
what  has  transpired. 

First,  along  with  [U.S.  negotiator] 
Mike  Kozak,  Col.  Gerry  Clark  has  been 
participating  on  our  side  throughout.  On 
the  Panamanian  side,  the  principal  inter- 
locutors were  Romula  Escobar,  a  princi- 
pal political  leader  in  the  Democratic 
Revolutionary  Party  (PRD),  and  Col. 
Ustinus,  the  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Panama- 
nian Defense  Forces. 

The  arrangements  that  were  dis- 
cussed in  great  detail  involved  the  unfold- 
ing of  the  scenario.  And  the  elements  of 
that  scenario  would  have  been  that,  im- 
mediately upon  the  .suspension  of  the  In- 
ternational Emergency  Economic  Powers 
Act  (lEEPA)  sanctions  on  our  part,  it  was 
anticipated  that  Gen.  Noriega  would 
make  a  speech  in  which  he  would  make  a 
number  of  declarations,  among  them  an 
announcement  of  his  intent  to  step  down 
from  the  Panamanian  Defense  Forces  as 
commander  on  August  12  and  a  call  upon 
the  Panamanian  legislature  to  immedi- 
ately pass  legislation  which  would  confine 
the  "term  of  any  commander  of  the  PDF  to 
5  years  retroactive  to  August  12,  1983.  In 
short,  his  tenure  would  have  been  termi- 
nated on  August  12  as  a  result  of  a  change 
in  the  law. 

In  addition,  he  would  call  upon  the 
various  parties  in  Panama  to  create  a 
government  of  national  reconciliation 
and,  in  that  connection,  would  have  called 
upon  the  legislature  to  promptly  pass — 
and  this  would  have  been  intended  to  be 
accomplished  within  30  days — legislation 
to  restore  fully  civil  and  political  rights  for 
all  Panamanians. 

It  was  to  call  for  the  return  of  exiles 
and  to  provide  for  amnesty  and  pardons 
for  all  Panamanians  who  had  been  de- 
tained for  political  reasons  so  they  could 
participate  in  this  quest  for  national  rec- 
onciliation. 

The  PDF  was  to  participate  as  a 
party  in  this  dialogue  for  national  recon- 
ciliation as  a  result  of  opposition  concerns 


Jirtment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


that  if  they  were  left  out,  the  dialogue 
might  not  be  meaningful. 

He  was  to  declare  the  government  of 
national  reconciliation  would  have  the  re- 
sponsibility to  take  those  measures  nec- 
essary to  ensure  elections  were  held  in 
May  of  1989  under  a  fair  and  free  condi- 
tion. 

He  was  to  take  questions  following 
the  completion  of  his  speech  indicating  his 
plans  for  the  future  that  included  travel 
outside  of  Panama,  devoting  himself  to 
personal  affairs,  staying  out  of  politics. 

We  would  have  expected  to  then  see, 
following  this  speech,  a  process — a  politi- 
cal process — commence  in  which  Panama- 
nians of  all  kinds  sought  to  create  a  new 
government.  As  the  Secretary  said,  our 
intention  was  to  continue  recognizing 
President  Delvalle  until  some  other  gov- 
ernment, more  broadly  based,  was 
formed. 

It  was  intended  we  would — in  re- 
sponse to  motions  filed  by  Noriega's  law- 
yers to  dismiss  the  indictment  against 
him — acquiesce  in  a  motion  to  continue 
that  motion  until  August  12  and  acquiesce 
in  the  dismissal  of  the  indictment  for  want 
of  prosecution  in  the  event  he  performed 
on  his  obligation  to  step  down  from  the 
Panamanian  Defense  Force  on  August  12. 

Therefore,  what  was  contemplated 
was  a  process  that  could  have  begun 
unfolding  immediately;  leading  to  the 
restoration  of  freedoms  in  Panama,  the 
opening  of  a  new  political  process  whose 
objective  would  be  to  create  a  broadly 
based  government,  Noriega's  retirement 
fi-om  the  PDF  on  a  date  certain  in  the  not 
distant  future.  And,  under  circumstances 
in  which  he  fulfilled  his  pledge  to  make 
such  a  speech,  then  we  would  have,  in 
addition  to  lifting  the  IE  EPA  sanctions,  a 
step  which  would  have  been  taken — 
would  have  indicated — we  would  not  in- 
terpose objections  to  the  resumption  of 
normal  business  practices  by  American 
companies  or  others. 

That's,  in  essence,  the  outline  of 
what  was  being  discussed. 

Q.  What  was  there  about  his  coming 
back?  You  didn't  mention  anything 
about  how  long  he  would  have  to  stay 
outside  of  Panama. 

Under  Secretary  Armacost.  It  was 
contemplated  he  would  be  traveling.  It 
was  expected  he  would  wind  up  a  little 
personal  business  in  the  period  immedi- 
ately following  his  retirement  but  as  of 
September  would  travel  outside  the  coun- 
try, except  for  a  brief  family  visit  at 
Christmastime,  through  the  period  of 
elections  in  May  of  1989. 


89 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Q.  And  after  that  could  he  come 
back? 

Under  Secretary  Armacost.  After 
that,  that  would  have  been  the  decision  of 
the  Panamanian  authorities,  whoever 
emerged  from  the  election. 

Q.  Would  Soils  Palma,  however, 
stay  in  power  in  Panama  at  least  ini- 
tially? 

Under  Secretary  Armacost.  We  had 

no  ability  to  affect  the  continuing  role  of 
SoHs  Palma  initially  as  the  de  facto  gov- 
ernment. As  I  said,  we  would  have  recog- 
nized Delvalle  as  the  legitimate  authority, 
and  we  would  have  encouraged  the  proc- 
ess of  negotiation  through  which  we  ex- 
pected a  broader-based  government  to 
emerge. 

Q.  Could  you  tell  us  when  and  how 
precisely  you  learned  that  the  deal  had 
fallen  through? 

Under  Secretary  Armacost.  We  got 

a  call  fi'om  Mike  Kozak  this  afternoon  a 
little  after  4:00,  indicating — despite  ex- 
pectations this  would  go  through  based  on 
discussions  with  his  interlocutors — when 
presented  with  the  arrangement.  Gen. 
Noriega  declined  to  agree. 

Q.  And  he  didn't  say  specifically 
what  it  was  about  the  package? 

Under  Secretary  Armacost.  He  inti- 
mated some  an.xiety  [that]  the  majors  and 
captains  within  the  armed  forces  might 
take  strong  action  against  him  had  he 
gone  through  with  this. 

Q.  Many  people  have  commented 
that  this  policy  originated  with  you,  this 
was  your  idea.  Can  you  comment  on 
that?  And,  secondly,  can  you  go  into  a 
little  more  detail  about  the  extent  of 
support  or  lack  thereof  among  other 
countries  south  of  the  border  for  our 
policy  with  respect  to  Panama? 

Assistant  Secretary  Abrams.  As  to 
the  first,  I  think  it  should  be  obvious  by 
now  this  is  the  President's  policy  and  the 
Secretary's  policy. 

With  respect  to  Latin  countries,  as 
one  foreign  minister  told  us  just  last 
week,  Noriega  has  no  support  in  any 
democratic  country  in  Latin  America.  He 
does  have  some,  as  the  Secretary  noted, 
in  Cuba  and  Nicaragua.  That's  it.  There  is 
no  support  for  him  in  the  rest  of  Latin 
America.  The  Latins  have  made  that  very 
clear  to  us  jirivately  and  are  anxious  for 
some  kind  of  solution  that  gets  him  out  of 
Panama. 

We  will  be  discussing  tonight  and 
tomorrow  with  a  number  of  governments 
in  Latin  America  what  efforts  we  can 
undertake;  they  can  undertake;  we  can 
possibly  undertake  jointly  with  them  to 
continue  toward  that  goal. 


90 


Q.  There  was  a  certain  finality  in 
what  Secretary  Shultz  had  to  say  about 
dropping  all  negotiations.  Is  the  Ad- 
ministration prepared  to  declare  this  a 
policy  failure? 

Under  Secretary  Armacost.  The  ne- 
gotiation didn't  produce  the  result  we  had 
hoped  it  would  produce.  As  the  Secretary 
said,  we've  got  our  objectives,  and  we'll 
continue  working  at  it,  and  we'll  review 
all  the  options  available  to  us. 

Q.  And  how  do  you  pursue  those 
objectives  if  you're  not  going  to  deal 
directly  with  Manuel  Noriega? 

Under  Secretary  Armacost.  We 

were  dealing  with  him  through  these  ne- 
gotiations. He  gave  us  a  pretty  definitive 
answer,  and  I  don't  really  have  anything 
to  add  to  what  the  Secretary  said. 

Q.  Was  a  possible  military  option 
ever  discussed  during  these  negotiations 
or  directly  with  Manuel  Noriega? 

Under  Secretary  Armacost.  A  mili- 
tary option?  I'm  not  sure — 

Q.  A  U.S.  military  option  to  remove 
Noriega  from  power. 

Under  Secretary  Armacost.  Dis- 
cussed with  Noriega?  No. 

Q.  You  mentioned  that  you  were 
going  to  be  discussing  with  the  Latins 
possible  next  steps.  What  could  those 
be?  Noriega  thus  far  has  resisted  our 
economic  sanctions.  He  has  resisted  our 
diplomatic  efforts.  The  Latins  haven't 
spoken  out  strongly  publicly.  We 
haven't  seen  splits  in  the  PDF.  What  is 
there  that  makes  you  think  that  there's 
anything  the  United  States  can  do,  with 
the  Latins  or  without  them,  to  get  this 
guy  out  of  power? 

Assistant  Secretary  Abrams.  First, 
there  was  actually  a  coup  attempt.  I 
would  say  that's  a  pretty  good  split  in  the 
PDF,  so  I  would  not  say  that  there  were 
no — 

Q.  After  which  he  cleaned  out  the 
defense  forces,  however. 

Assistant  Secretary  Abrams.  Our  in- 
formation is  there  remain  significant 
splits  in  the  PDF,  and  there  is,  in  fact,  a 
recognition  on  the  part  of  many — in  fact,  I 
would  correct  that  and  say  most  in  the 
PDF — that  Noriega  is  a  burden  now  on 
the  country  and  on  the  PDF  that  really 
has  to  be  lifted. 

With  respect  to  the  Latins,  I  think 
what  we  will  talk  about  with  the  demo- 
cratic countries  is  what  diplomatic  steps 
fir.st  they  contemplate — and  there  has 
been  great  interest  on  the  part,  for  exam- 
ple, of  particularly  Venezuela,  Colombia, 
Costa  Rica,  Guatemala,  and  Argentina,  in 


diplomatic  efforts  aimed  at  his  remova 
from  power. 

So  the  first  question  I  guess  we'll 
to  them  is:  What  ideas  do  you  have?  1: 
do  you  plan  to  proceed?  How  can  we  b 
helpful?  What  can  we  do  together, 
jointly?  Is  there  a  role  here  for  multils 
eral  action?  Is  there  a  role  for  multilat  _ 
consideration — that  is  to  say,  in  a  mul  I 
lateral  forum?  And  we  will  try  to  be  \  ■ 
open-minded  about  it  and  talk  to  their . 
about  it.  r 

They  have  been  engaged  in  this  e  r 
fort.  They  just  didn't  meet  with  any  f 
cess  in  their  diplomatic  efforts  as  we  1 1 
not  in  this  one.  ' 

Q.  If  I  could  follow  up  on  your  L 
about  the  PDF;  are  you  saying  that 
there  is  still  a  threat  of  a  coup  atter . 
against  Mr.  Noriega,  if  there  are  sp  ,, 
within  the  military?  L 

Q.  Could  we  have  a  verbal  respo»f 
[Laughter]  |l 

Q.  Is  that  something  the  Unitei  \ 
States  might  encourage  in  some  wa  111 

Under  Secretary  Armacost.  It';  H' 
something  that  he  obviously  has  tn  >, 
about. 

Q.  You  mentioned  that  Noriegi 
that,  if  he  resigned,  actions  might 
taken  by  majors  and  captains.  Whi 
he  mean,  and  how  seriously  would 
interpret  that? 

Under  Secretary  Armacost.  I'r 
position  where  we've  had  a  brief  con 
sation  with  the  negotiator,  and  we 
haven't  had  a  chance  to  have  a  thoro 
conversation,  so  I  really  can't  elabor 

Q.  I  take  it  from  your  answer 
no  unilateral  action  by  the  United  i 
is  contemplated,  at  least  over  the  s 
term,  and  that  you  are  into  multita 
ism  now?  [Laughter] 

Assistant  Secretary  Abrams.  \ 
have  had  very  close  contact  with  a  r 
ber  of  Latin  American  countries  on 
for  a  year — that  is  to  say,  since  the 
tional  Civic  Crusade  was  formed  las 
year,  since  the  Diaz  Heran'a  revela 
tions — personal  contacts  on  the  part 
number  of  our  ambassadors  and  pec 
here  in  Washington,  including  the  S 
retary,  with  Latin  foreign  ministers 
ambassadors  here  in  Washington,  v 
emissaries.  We've  had  a  lot  of  discu 
about  this,  so  this  is  not  anything  m 

In  a  number  of  cases,  they  wer 
waiting  to  see  how  our  effort  prosp( 
But  in  the  short  term — meaning  toe 
tomorrow — sure,  the  first  step  is  co 
tation. 


■kartiriAnt  ni  QtafA   Di  illAtin/Aii/i 


IIC'I 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


j.  In  the  past,  you've  been  accused 

>ur  critics  of  ignoring  a  Latin 
vi(  an  solution  and  ignoring  the  ef- 

l)>  ("osta  Rica  and  Venezuela  to  try 
dnediate  a  solution  to  this.  Are  you 
I'lg  now  that  you're  returning  to  that 
iti  American  solution? 

Assistant  Secretary  Abrams.  No. 
e'ffdrts  by  the  three  e.x-presidents,  in 
tl':iii('(l  to  get  Gen.  Noriega  out  of 

1-.  Fhey  were  tried.  This  particular 
s^  iating  effort  was  tried  and  also  failed 
g;  him  out  of  power.  And  so  obviously 
•  1  need  to  get  together  and  reflect  on 
i  tln'v  did  and  what  we  did,  and  that's 

i>t  step. 

I.  When  the  negotiations  broke 
'd\i ,  did  Noriega  make  any  type  of 
iii(;eroffer,  or  did  he  just  reject  out- 
?( the  offer  on  the  table? 

Tnder  Secretary  Armaeost.  As  far 
III  aware,  he  simply  rejected  the  offer 
.=  nething.  He  was  not  prepared  to  go 

rd  with  it. 

•.  Early  on  we  heard  almost  every 
ayiiat  Noriega's  time  is  short.  In  your 
ill  st  dreams,  did  you  think  that  he 
>n  hold  on  this  long? 

Inder  Secretary  Armaeost.  Oh,  I 
r  o\-erybody  had  a  different  estimate 
[ .  I  had  a  different  kind  of  e.xperi- 
'  Mth  this  sort  of  thing  in  the  Philip- 
c   It  was  a  kind  of  long-haul  struggle. 
^  f  I  he  differences  has  been  the 
-  fluent  of  the  opposition  forces  in 
.  iia.  It  was  a  rather  courageous  in- 
iii'nt  of  the  National  Civic  Crusade 
'position  groups,  but  they  were 
itilile  to  more  repressive  measures. 
.  Iiilippine  public  middle-class 
•-  :i(l  in  a  very  strong  way  after  the 
.  Illation  of  Aquino,  but  it  was  still  a 
.  truggle.  It  took  months  and  months. 

II.  I  think  if  you'd  ask  10  people, 

!j('t  different  estimates  from  every- 
ihem  how  long. 

I  But  you  obviously  made  this 
nancement,  hoping  on  the  eve  of  the 
rr\it  to  have  some  good  news  to  re- 
1^  Do  you  think  this  is  going  to  have 
V  Tipact  on  the  summit  whatsoever — 

iviets  are  going  to  make  any  kind 

issue  out  of  this? 

nder  Secretary  Armaeost.  I  don't 


Cuban  Independence  Day 


'ress  release  99. 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 

MAY  20,  19881 

Speaking  for  myself,  and  I  think  speak- 
ing for  the  Vice  President  also,  it  gives 
us  gi'eat  pleasure  to  join  with  the  Cuban- 
American  community  in  commemorating 
the  anniversary  of  a  gi-eat  day  in  the 
cause  of  a  free  Cuba:  the  estabUshment 
of  the  Cuban  Republic  86  years  ago.  On 
that  day.  May  20,  1902,  the  bonds  of 
friendship  between  the  peoples  of  Cuba 
and  of  the  United  States  were  reaf- 
firmed. The  birth  of  the  Cuban  RepubUc 
was  the  culmination  of  a  long  and  ardu- 
ous struggle,  of  revolts,  political  impris- 
onment, e.xecutions,  and  exile.  Today 
that  passion  for  a  free  Cuba  remains 
alive  in  the  hearts  of  thousands  of  Cu- 
bans everywhere.  Cuban-Americans 
have  demonstrated  what  a  free  people 
can  accomplish  unencumbered  by  tyr- 
anny, and  I  am  confident  that  the  time 
will  come  when  the  spirit  of  freedom  will 
reign  in  Cuba  itself. 

And  let  me  just  say,  throughout  this 
Administration,  in  good  times  and  bad, 
I've  always  known  that  I  could  look  to 
the  Cuban-American  community  for  sup- 
port. Your  support,  your  friendship  has 
meant  more  to  me  that  I  can  say.  Having 
suffered  personally  the  evils  of  commu- 
nism, you  have  an  acute  understanding 
of  the  danger  that  communist  expansion 
poses  to  this  hemisphere.  You  have 
stood  in  support  of  people  everywhere 
who  seek  freedom,  such  as  the  people  of 
Nicaragua.  And  let  me  assure  you,  as  far 
as  this  Administration  is  concerned,  the 
freedom  of  Cuba  is  a  non-negotiable  de- 
mand. We  will  never,  ever,  negotiate 
away  the  dream  of  every  Cuban- Ameri- 
can— a  dream  that  I,  too,  hold  in  my 
heart — that  Cuba  will  again  join  the  fam- 
ily of  free  and  democratic  nations. 

Only  90  miles  of  ocean  separate  the 
Island  of  Cuba  from  the  United  States, 
but  between  our  governments  is  an  un- 
bridgeable gulf — the  gulf  between  free- 
dom and  tyi-anny,  between  respect  for 
human  rights  and  the  rejection  of  individ- 
ual freedom.  "Within  the  revolution, 
everything,"  Castro  has  proclaimed, 


"against  the  revolution,  nothing."  Well, 
"nothing"  has  meant  no  freedom  of 
speech,  assembly,  religion,  or  economic 
activity.  "Nothing"  has  increasingly 
meant  a  Cuba  dependent  on  subsidies 
from  the  Soviet  Union  to  keep  its  un- 
workable communist  economy  from  com- 
plete ruin.  "Everything"  has  meant 
every  conceivable  cruelty,  abuse,  and  tor- 
ture— to  the  point  that  Cuba,  today,  has 
the  worst  human  rights  record  in  the  en- 
tire Western  Hemisphere.  "Every- 
thing" means  the  Cuban  pohtical  pris- 
ons where,  vvrites  that  brave  freedom 
tighter,  Armando  Valladares,  Castro's 
prisoners  "have  been  held  longer  than 
any  other  political  prisoners  in  Latin 
America,  perhaps  in  the  world.  The  vio- 
lence, repression,  and  beatings  are  facts 
of  life  for  them.  And  today,  at  this  very 
moment,  hundreds  of  political  prisoners 
are  naked,  sleeping  on  the  floors  of  cells 
whose  windows  and  doors  have  seen 
sealed.  They  never  see  the  light  of  day 
or,  for  that  matter,  artificial  light."  De- 
nied medical  care,  even  visits,  their 
spirit  remains  unbroken.  If  they  who  suf- 
fer so  greatly  will  not  negotiate  away 
their  freedom  with  Castro,  neither  will 
the  United  States  of  America. 

Jose  Marti  said:  "One  revolution  is 
still  necessary:  the  one  that  will  not  end 
with  the  rule  of  its  leader.  It  will  be  the 
revolution  against  revolutions,  the  upris- 
ing of  all  peaceable  men  who  will  become 
soldiers  for  once  so  that  neither  they  nor 
anyone  else  will  ever  have  to  be  a  soldier 
again."  Well,  at  a  time  when  young  Cu- 
bans are  shipped  abroad  to  advance  for- 
eign designs,  the  rulers  in  Havana  are 
necessarily  worried  about  the  new  gen- 
eration's interest  in  Marti's  message. 

In  this  anniversary  of  the  Cuban  Re- 
public, I  join  a  million  free  Cuban-Ameri- 
cans in  reaffirming  our  sohdarity  with 
the  long  suffering  Cuban  people.  In  the 
heart  of  the  Americas,  the  long  night  of 
totahtarian  rule  cannot  endure  forever. 
Long  live  the  dawn  of  freedom!  Viva 
Cuba  Libre! 


'Tbxt  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  May  23,  1988.  ■ 


rtment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


91 


TREATIES 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Arms  Limitation 

Agreement  regarding  inspections  relating  to 
the  treaty  of  Dec.  8,  1987,  between  the  U.S. 
and  the  U.S.S.R.  on  the  elimination  of  their 
intermediate-range  and  shorter-range  mis- 
siles, with  anne.x.  Signed  at  Brussels  Dec.  11, 
1987. 
Entered  into  force:  June  1, 1988 

Aviation,  Civil 

Convention  on  international  civil  aviation. 
Done  at  Chicago  Dec.  7,  1944.  Entered  into 
force  Apr.  4,  1947.  TIAS  1591. 

Protocol  on  the  authentic  trilingual  text  of 

the  convention  on  international  civil  aviation 

(TIAS  1591).  Done  at  Buenos  Aires  Sept.  25, 

1968.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  24,  1968. 

TIAS  6605. 

Adherence  deposited:  San  Marino,  May  13, 

1988. 

Convention  on  offenses  and  certain  other 
acts  committed  on  board  aircraft.  Done  at 
Tokyo  Sept.  14,  1963.  Entered  into  force 
Dec.  4,  1969.  TIAS  6768. 
Accessions  deposited  Belorussian  S.S.R., 
U.S.S.R.,  Feb.  3,  1988. '^ 

Commodities — Common  Fund 

Agreement  establishing  the  Common  F\ind  for 
Commodities,  with  schedules.  Done  at  Geneva 
June  27,  1980.  ■' 

Signature:  Maldives,  May  19,  1988. 
Ratification  deposited:  Honduras,  May  26, 


Fisheries 

Pacific  Island  regional  fisheries  treaty,  with  an- 
nexes and  agreed  statement.  Done  at  Port 
Moresby  Apr  2,  1987.  [Senate]  Treaty  Doc. 

ioa-5. 

Ratification  deposited:  U.S.,  June  15,  1988. 
Entered  into  force:  June  15,  1988. 

Maritime  Matters 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  acts 
against  the  safety  of  maritime  navigation, 
with  protocol  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful 
acts  against  the  safety  of  fixed  platforms 
located  on  the  Continental  Shelf.  Done  at 
Rome  Mar  10,  1988.3 

Signatures:  Argentina,  Austria,''  Bahamas, 
Brazil,  Bulgaria,  (Canada,  Chile,  Costa  Rica, 
Ecuador,  France,  Greece,  Hungary,  Israel, 
Italy,  Jordan,  Liberia,  Morocco,  Norway, 
Philippines,  Sweden,  Switzerland,^  Turkey,- 
U.S.,  Mar  10,  1988. 

Narcotic  Drugs 

Single  convention  on  narcotic  drugs.  Done  at 
New  York  Mar.  30,  1961.  Entered  into  force 
Dec.  13, 1964;  for  the  U.S.  June  24, 1%7. 
TIAS  6298. 


92 


Protocol  amending  the  single  convention  on 
narcotic  drugs  (TIAS  6298).  Done  at  Geneva 
Mar.  25,  1972.  Entered  into  force  Aug.  8, 
1975.  TIAS  8118. 

Accession  deposited  Somalia,  June  9,  1988; 
Uganda,  Apr.  15,  1988. 

Pollution 

Convention  for  the  protection  of  the  ozone 
layer,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Vienna  Mar  22, 
1985.  [Senate]  Ti-eaty  Doc.  99-9. 
Accession  deposited:  Uganda,  June  24,  1988. 
Enters  into  force  Sept.  22,  1988. 

Montreal  protocol  on  substances  that  deplete 
the  ozone  layer,  with  annex.  Done  at  Montreal 
Sept.  16,  1987.'  [Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  100-10. 
Signatures:  Australia,  June  8,  1988;  Chile,  June 
14,  1988. 
Ratification  deposited:  Norway,  June  24,  1988. 

Rubber 

International  natural  i-ubber  agreement,  1987, 
with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  Mar  20,  1987. ^ 
[Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  100-9. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Japan,  June  3,  1988. 

Seabeds 

Provisional  understanding  regarding  deep  sea- 
bed matters.  Signed  at  Genea  Aug.  3,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  Sept.  2,  1984. 
Entered  into  force  for  the  Netherlands: 
June  20,  1988.  ^ 

Sugar 

International  sugar  agreement,  1987,  with  an- 
nexes. Done  at  London  Sept.  11,  1987.  Entered 
into  force  provisionally  Mar  24, 1988. 
Accession  deposited:  Malawi,  June  9,  1988. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Cuba,  June  2,  1988; 
Swaziland,  Apr  28,  1988. 

Telecommunication 

International  telecommunication  convention, 
with  annexes  and  protocols.  Done  at  Nairobi 
Nov.  6,  1982.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  1,  1984; 
definitively  for  the  U.S.  Jan.  10,  1986.  [Senate] 
Treaty  Doc.  99-6. 

Accession  deposited:  Vanuatu,  Mar  30,  1988. 
Ratification  deposited  Nicaragua,  Feb.  17, 


Trade 

Agreement  on  the  implementation  of  Art.  VI  of 
the  General  Agi-eement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade 
(anti-dumping  code).  Done  at  Geneva  Apr  12, 
1979;  entered  into  force  Jan.  1,  1980.  TIAS  9650. 
Acceptance  deposited:  New  Zealand,  May  6, 


BILATERAL 

Bangladesh 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales 
of  agricultural  commodities  of  Mar.  8,  1982,  as 
amended  (TIAS  10483,  10642).  Effected  by 
exchange  of  letters  at  Dhaka  May  15,  1988.  En- 
tered into  force  May  15,  1988. 


Brazil  t 

International  express  mail  agreement,  with 
tailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Brasilia  and  Wf 
ington  Apr  7  and  May  11,  1988.  Entered      f 
into  force  May  11,  1988.  , 

Supersedes  agreement  of  Mar  23,  1972  (TI.  I 
8792).  \ 

I 
China  C 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Fet : 
1988,  concerning  trade  in  textiles  and  texti  ( 
products.  Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  i  '<•■ 
Beijing  May  24  and  26,  1988.  Entered  into  I 
force  May  26,  1988.  I 


Denmark 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Mi 
25,  1985,  as  extended,  concerning  a  Danish 
American  FUnd  for  the  exchange  of  techno 
Signed  at  Copenhagen  May  2,  1988.  Enten 
into  force  May  2,  1988;  effective  Apr  1,  m 

Dominican  Republic 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, with  memorandum  of  understani 
Signed  at  Santo  Domingo  June  30,  1987. 
Entered  into  force:  June  1,  1988.  I 

Agreement  relating  to  and  amending  the 
agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commc  , 
ties  of  June  30,  1987.  Signed  at  Santo  Don  ] 
Apr  29,  1988.  Entered  into  force  June  1, 1  ' 

Agreement  amending  the  special  access  ai  ( 
ment  (Caribbean  Basin),  of  Dec.  18,  19sn,   ' 
amended,  relatingto  trade  in  cotton,  wun 
manmade  fiber  te.xtiles  and  textile  pnniui 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Santo 
Domingo  Apr  22  and  May  4,  1988.  Enten 
into  force  May  4,  1988. 

El  Salvador 

Agreement  for  the  sale  of  agricultural  coij 
modities.  Signed  at  San  Salvador  Mar.  101 
Enters  into  force  on  a  date  to  be  determili 
an  exchange  of  notes  indicating  that  the  i 
nal  procedures  of  both  countries  have  bee 


Finland 

Agreement  for  relief  from  double  taxatio 
earnings  from  operation  of  ships  and  aire 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Helsink 
8  and  22,  1988.  Entered  into  force  Apr  2! 

France 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerni; 
exchange  of  energy-related  information  i 
area  of  enhanced  oil  recovery.  Signed  at 
Washington  and  Paris  Jan.  27  and  Feb.  1( 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  16,  1988. 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
1983  (TIAS  10753).  for  cooperation  in  the 
radioactive  waste  management.  Effected 
change  of  letters  at  Washington  and  Pari 
27  and  May  10.  1988.  Entered  into  force  I 
1988. 

German  Democratic  Republic 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  the 
ment  of  Apr  13,  1983,  concerning  fisheri^ 
the  coasts  of  the  U.S.  (TIAS  10687).  Eff( 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Augusil 


TREATIES 


litre  of  notes  at  Washington  Jan.  14  and 
l!tS8.  Enters  into  force  following  writ- 
rniation  of  the  completion  of  the  two 
nits'  internal  procedures. 


Ml  amending  and  extending  the  memo- 
:    .1  understanding  of  Apr.  28,  1986,  and 
liiii;  the  memorandum  of  understanding  of 

HIS"),  concerning  air  services.  Effected 
(i.iiitre  of  notes  at  Athens  Apr.  25  and 
I'tss.  Entered  into  force  May  4,  1988; 
Apr.  25,  1988, 

it  concerning  relief  from  double  taxa- 
1  1  earnings  derived  from  the  operation  of 
.pand  aircraft.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
t€  at  Washington  June  10,  1988.  Entered  into 
:  lune  10,  1988. 


t  amending  agreement  of  Aug.  27, 
.mended,  relating  to  trade  in  textiles 
:  xtile  products.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
t«  at  Washington  Apr  5  and  14,  1988.  En- 
■e  intu  force  Apr  14,  1988. 

iiuiit  amending  the  agreement  of  Nov.  9, 
;  i.'~  amended,  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
.M  es.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
jnj  :on  Apr  29  and  May  2,  1988.  Entered  into 
•T  vlav  2,  1988. 


ni.nt  for  cooperation  concerning  peace- 
's ( if  nuclear  energy,  with  annexes, 
I  miiyites,  implementing  agreement,  and 
!it;i's  of  notes.  Signed  at  Tokyo  Nov.  4, 

eil  into  force:  July  17,  1988. 


Oj  sedes  agreement  of  Feb.  26,  1968,  as 
mi  led  (TIAS  6517,  7306,  7758). 

'  iiii-nt  on  cooperation  in  research  and 
inii'nt  in  science  and  technology,  with 
I-  and  exchanges  of  letters.  Signed  at 
ti>  .lune  20,  1988.  Entered  into  force 
id.  1988. 


gi  'ment  extending  the  agreement  of  Nov. 
-\<  76  (TIAS  84,56),  as  extended,  relating  to 
-i.ific  and  technical  cooperation.  Effected 

«  change  of  notes  at  Seoul  May  6,  1988. 

ni-ed  into  force  May  6,  1988;  effective 

1(7,  1988. 

Hal  logistics  support  agreement,  with 
■  les.  Signed  at  Seoul  June  8,  1988. 
|r|i-ed  into  force  June  8,  1988. 

Sigascar 
national  express  mail  agreement,  with  de- 
I  regulations.  Signed  at  Antananarivo  and 
ington  Apr.  28  and  May  26,  1988.  Entered 
orce  July  15,  1988. 

onesia 

ement  relating  to  investment  guaranties, 
ted  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Kolonia  Feb. 
d  Mar  3,  1988.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  3, 


Morocco 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, with  memorandum  of  understanding. 
Signed  at  Rabat  June  25,  1987.  Entered  into 
force  June  25,  1987. 

International  express  mail  agreement,  with 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Rabat  and 
Washington  Mar.  18  and  May  11,  1988.  En- 
tered into  force  June  1,  1988. 

Panama 

Agreement  amending  the  arrangement  of 
Jan.  15,  Feb.  8,  and  Mar  28,  1941  (EAS  221), 
providing  for  relief  from  double  income  tax 
from  shipping  profits.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  Panama  July  30  and  Dec.  30, 

1987.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  30, 1987;  effec- 
tive with  respect  to  taxable  years  beginning 
on  or  after  Jan.  1,  1987. 

Philippines 

Agi-eement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  Manila  Apr.  19,  1988. 
Entered  into  force  Apr.  19,  1988. 

Agi-eement  amending  the  agreement  of  Apr.  19, 

1988,  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities. 
Signed  at  Manila  May  23,  1988.  Entered  into 
force  May  23,  1988. 

Agreement  regarding  the  consoUdation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to,  guaran- 
teed by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S.  Government 
and  its  agencies,  with  annexes.  Signed  at 
Manila  May  16,  1988.  Entered  into  force 
June  17,  1988. 

Sri  Lanka 

Agi-eement  amending  the  agreement  of  Dec.  3, 
1987,  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Colombo 
May  20, 1988.  Entered  into  force  May  20, 1988. 

Switzerland 

Supplementary  agreement  amending  the  agree- 
ment on  social  security  of  July  18,  1979, 
with  supplementary  administrative  agreement 
(TIAS  9830).  Signed  at  Bern  June  1,  1988. 
Enters  into  force  on  the  first  day  of  the  month 
following  the  date  of  the  last  notification  by  the 
parties  of  completion  of  their  respective  statu- 
tory and  constitutional  procedures. 

Trinidad  and  Tobago 

International  express  mail  agreement,  with  de- 
tailed regulations.  Signed  at  Port  of  Spain  and 
Washington  Nov.  3  and  Dec.  7,  1987.  Entered 
into  force  July  1,  1988. 

Tunisia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Mar.  16, 
1988,  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities. 
Signed  at  Tunis  May  12,  1988.  Entered  into 
force  May  12,  1988. 

U.S.S.R. 

Treaty  on  the  elimination  of  intermediate- 
range  and  shorter-range  missiles,  with  memo- 
randum of  understanding  and  protocols. 
Signed  at  Washington  Dec.  8,  1987. 
Ratifications  exchanged  June  1,  1988. 
Entered  into  force:  June  1,  1988. 


Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  June 
21,  1973,  as  amended  and  extended  (TIAS 
7655,  10757),  on  scientific  and  technical  coop- 
eration in  the  field  of  peaceful  uses  of  atomic 
energy.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Moscow  May  31,  1988.  Entered  into  force 
May  31,  1988. 

Agi'eement  on  notifications  of  launches  of 
intercontinental  ballistic  missiles  and  subma- 
rine-launched ballistic  missiles.  Signed  at 
Moscow  May  31,  1988.  Entered  into  force  May 
31,  1988. 

Agreement  on  mutual  fisheries  relations,  with 
annexes.  Signed  at  Moscow  May  31,  1988. 
Enters  into  force  on  the  date  of  the  exchange  of 
notes  notifying  the  completion  of  internal 
procedures  of  both  parties. 

Agreement  on  maritime  search  and  rescue, 
with  exchange  of  letters.  Signed  at  Moscow 
May  31,  1988.  Enters  into  force  on  the  date  the 
parties  notify  each  other  in  writing  that  neces- 
sary internal  procedures  have  been  completed. 

Agreement  on  the  conduct  of  a  joint  verification 
experiment  relating  to  nuclear  testing,  with  an- 
nex. Signed  at  Moscow  May  31,  1988.  Entered 
into  force  May  31,  1988. 

Agreement  on  the  establishment  of  joint 
Loran-C  and  Chayka  radionavigation  systems, 
with  annex.  Signed  at  Moscow  May  31,  1988. 
Enter  into  force  on  the  date  the  parties  notify 
each  other  in  writing  that  necessary  internal 
procedures  have  been  completed. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Apr  15, 
1987  concerning  cooperation  in  the  explora- 
tion and  use  of  outer  space  for  peaceful 
purposes.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Moscow  May  31,  1988.  Entered  into  force 
May  31,  1988. 

Agreement  on  cooperation  in  transportation 
science  and  technology,  with  annexes.  Signed  at 
Moscow  May  31,  1988.  Entered  into  force  May 
31,  1988. 

United  Kingdom 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  July  26, 
1984,  as  extended,  concerning  the  Cayman 
Islands  and  narcotics  activities.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  May  25,  1988. 
Entered  into  force  May  25,  1988;  effective 
May  29,  1988. 

Venezuela 

Agreement  extending  the  implementing  agree- 
ment of  Oct.  29  and  Nov.  9,  1982,  as  extended, 
regarding  air  transport  services.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  Apr  26  and 
28,  1988.  Entered  into  force  Apr  28,  1988; 
effective  May  1,  1988. 

Zambia 

Agreement  on  civil  aviation  security.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Lusaka  Feb.  16  and 
Mar.  28,  1988.  Entered  into  force 
Mar.  28,  1988. 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  Lusaka  Apr  25,  1988.  En- 
tered into  force  Apr.  25,  1988. 


tment  of  State  Bulletin/August  1988 


93 


PRESS  RELEASES 


PUBLICATIONS 


International  express  mail  agreement,  with 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Ndola  and 
Washington  Apr  25  and  May  16,  1988. 
Entered  into  force  June  15,  1988. 


'  With  statement. 
-'  With  reservations. 
3  Not  in  force. 

*  Not  a  party  to  the  protocol. 
5  For  the  Kingdom  in  Europe. 
s  Not  extended  to  Cook  Islands,  Niue,  or 
Tokelau." 


Department  of  State 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from 
the  Office  of  Press  Relations,  Depart- 
ment of  State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

No.  Date  Subject 

101  6/2       Shultz:  interview  on  PBS- 

TV's  "MacNeil-Lehrer 
Newshour,"  Moscow,  May 
31. 

102  6/3        Shultz:  arrival  statement, 

Cairo. 

*103      6/6       Shultz:  remarks  following 

meeting  with  former  Soviet 
Jewish  refuseniks, 
Jerusalem,  June  5. 

*104      6/7       Shultz:  departure  remarks  and 
question-and-answer  ses- 
sion, Ben-Gurion  Airport, 
Israel,  June  5. 
105      6/13       Shultz:  news  conference, 
Cairo,  June  7. 

*106      6/10       Program  for  the  official  work- 
ing visit  to  Washington, 
D.C,  of  IMme  Minister 
DeMita  of  the  Republic 
of  Italy,  June  13-16. 

*107     6/13       Shultz:  news  conference  fol- 
lovdng  North  Atlantic 
Council  meeting,  Madrid, 
June  10. 

*108      6/10      Shultz:  interview  on  NBC- 
TV's  "Today  Show," 
Madrid. 

*109      6/13       Shultz:  interview  on  ABC  of 
Madrid  and  La  Vanguardia 
of  Barcelona,  Madrid, 
June  10. 

*110      [Not  Issued] 


111      6/15       Shultz:  address  before  UN 
General  Assembly  Third 
Special  Session  on  Disarma- 
ment, New  York,  June  13. 

*112  6/15  Shultz:  address  before  the  At- 
lantic Council  of  the  United 
States,  June  14. 

*113      6/15       Shultz:  interview  on  USIA's 
"Worldnet." 

*114      6/16       Shultz,  Baker:  news  confer- 
ence, June  15. 

♦115      6/17       Shultz:  testimony  before  Sub- 
committee on  Foreign  Op- 
erations, Senate  Appropria- 
tions Committee,  June  16. 

*116      6/17       Shultz:  remarks,  question- 
and-answer  session  before 
USIA  International  Advi- 
sory Council  Conference  II, 
June  16. 
117      6/20       Shultz:  interview  on  NBC- 
TV's  "Meet  the  Press," 
June  19. 

*118      6/20       Shultz:  interview  on  NBC- 
TV's  "Today  Show," 
Toronto. 

*119      6/20       Program  for  the  official  work- 
ing visit  to  Washington, 
D.C,  of  Australian 
Prime  Minister  Hawke, 
June  22-24. 

n20      6/22       Rush  Walker  Taylor,  Jr., 

sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Togo,  May  26  (biogr-aphic 
data). 

*121      6/23       Program  for  the  state  visit  to 
the  United  States  of  Turkish 
President  Kenan  Evren, 
June  26-July  2. 

*122      6/28       Shultz:  remarks  before  the 
National  Foreign  Policy 
Conference  for  Educators, 
June  24. 

*123  6/28  Shultz:  luncheon  toast  in  honor 
of  TXirkish  President  Evren, 
June  27. 

*124  6/28  Schultz:  remarks  on  the  open- 
ing of  the  Australian  bilat- 
eral ministerials,  June  28. 

*125      6/30       Shultz,  Carlucci,  Hayden, 

Beazley:  news  conference, 
June  29. 

*126     Cancelled. 


*Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


Department  of  State 


Free  single  copies  of  the  following  Departm  ' 
of  State  publications  are  available  from  thi 
Public  Information  Division,  Bureau  of  Pu 
Affairs,  Department  of  State,  Washington. ' 
D.C.  20.520.  I 

Secretary  Shultz  i 

Arms  Control:  Progress  and  Global  | 

Challenges,  Third  UN  General  Assembl  ^i 

Special  Session  on  Disannament,  New  'S  t 

City,  June  13,  1988  (Current  Policy  #l(i ' 

Africa 

The  Potential  Impact  of  Imposing  Sanctioi 
Against  Sough  Africa,  Deputy  Secretar  ,: 
Whitehead.  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Ci 
mittee,  June  22,  1988  (Current  Policy  #1 1,' 

Canada 

U.S.  Canada  Free  Ti-ade  Agreement,  Jun 
1988  (Public  Information  Series). 

East  Asia 

The  United  States  in  the  Changing  Asia  i  », 
1990s,  Under  Secretary  Armacost,  Jap; 
America  Society  of  New  York,  New  Yo:  , 
City,  June  6,  1988  (Current  Policy  #107 

China  and  the  U.S.:  present  and  Future,  • 
der  Secretary  Armacost,  National  Cou  a. 
for  United  States-China  Ti-ade,  June  1,  » 
(Current  Policy  #1079).  a. 

Association  of  Southeast  Asian  Nations  ('  T 
June  1988). 

U.S.  Export  Controls  and  China  (GIST. 
1988). 

Economics 

The  United  States  in  the  World  Economx 
Under  Secretary  Wallis,  World  Affairs  fi 
cil,  Baltimore,  May  10,  1988  (Current 
Policy  #1076). 

Middle  East 

U.S.  Policy  in  the  Middle  East,  June  198i 
(Selected  Documents  #27).  i 

Narcotics 

International  Narcotics  Control  (GIST.  •' 

1988). 
The  Drug  Pr-oblem:  Americans  Arresteii 

Abroad  (GIST,  June  1988). 

Western  Hemisphere 

Regional  Brief  Nicaraguan  Compliance  '  I 
the  Central  American  Peace  Plan,  Jun  i 
1988  (Public  Information  Series).  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Augusft 


DEX 


diigust  1988 
^lume  88,  No.  2137 

IS  Control 

IS  Control:  Progress  and  Global 

hallenges  (Shultz)    84 

cow  Summit  (Bush,  Gorbachev,  Rea- 

in,  Shultz,  joint  statement)   1 

sident  Welcomes  Entry  Into  Force  of 
^F  Treaty  (letter  to  the  Senate)  ...    68 
retary's  Interview  on  "Meet  the 

ress"   56 

-d  Special  Session  on  Disarmament 

onvenes  (U.S.  statement) 84 

.,  Soviet  Union  Sign  Joint  Verifica- 
on  Experiment  Agreement  (te.xt  of 

jreement) 67 

na.  China  and  the  U.S.;  Present  and 

ature  (Armacost)    69 

(S  gress 

4  nanitarian  Aid  to  Nicaragua 

V'oods) 77 

1  I'dtential  Impact  of  Imposing  Sanc- 
iiis  Against  South  Africa  (White- 

•ad)   58 

iljiew  of  Events  in  Ethiopia  (Crocker, 

■ladson,  Williamson)   62 

:?|i  Report  on  Cyprus  {message  to  the 

jngress)   76 

IS  .  Signs  UN  Convention  Against  Tor- 
re (message  to  the  Senate,  text  of 

)i  invention) 79 

6l^a.  Cuban  Independence  Day 

teagan)  91 

G;tus.  37th  Report  on  Cyprus  (mes- 

ge  to  the  Congress)    76 

E  nomics 

C  la  and  the  U.S.;  Present  and  Future 

irmacost)   69 

Tl  Potential  Impact  of  Imposing  Sanc- 
Dns  Against  South  Africa  (White- 

;ad)   58 

PIddent  Welcomes  Entry  Into  Force  of 

>IF  Treaty  (letter  to  the  Senate)  ...    68 
Bmto  Economic  Summit  (Reagan,  po- 
;ical  and  economic  declarations, 
■  hairman's  statement,  White  House 

I  .atement)    46 

T\  United  States  in  the  World  Econ- 

ny  (Wallis) 72 

B'iopia.  Review  of  Events  in  Ethiopia 

"rocker,  Gladson,  Williamson)   62 

F  d.  Review  of  Events  in  Ethiopia 

'nii.-ker,  Gladson,  Williamson)   62 

Fieign  Assistance 

A  to  the  Nicaraguan  Democratic  Re- 
stance  (Reagan)   78 

'  nanitarian  Aid  to  Nicaragua 
A.hmIs) 77 


Human  Rights 

Moscow  Summit  (Bush,  Gorbachev,  Rea- 
gan, Shultz,  joint  statement)   1 

U.S.  Signs  UN  Convention  Against  Tor- 
ture (message  to  the  Senate,  text  of 
convention) 79 

Industrialized  Democracies.  Toronto 
Economic  Summit  (Reagan,  political 
and  economic  declarations.  Chair- 
man's statement.  White  House 
statement)    46 

Israel.  President's  Meeting  With  Israeli 
Foreign  Minister  Peres  (White  House 
statement)    83 

Japan.  U.S. -Japan  Agreement  on  Coop- 
eration in  Science  and  Technology 
(White  House  fact  sheet) 5.5 

Nicaragua 

Aid  to  the  Nicaraguan  Democratic  Re- 
sistance (Reagan)    78 

Humanitarian  Aid  to  Nicaragua 
(Woods) 77 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "Meet  the 
Press"" 56 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization. 
North  Atlantic  Council  Meets  in 
Madrid  (final  communique) 76 

Panama 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "Meet  the 
Press"' 56 

Situation  in  Panama  (Abrams,  Arma- 
cost, Shultz) 88 

Philippines.  Secretary's  Interview  on 
"Meet  the  Press" 56 

Presidential  Documents 

Aid  to  the  Nicaraguan  Democratic  Re- 
sistance      78 

Cuban  Independence  Day 91 

President  Welcomes  Entry  Into  Force  of 
INF  Treaty  (letter  to  the  Senate)  ...    68 

37th  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the 
Congress)   76 

Toronto  Economic  Summit  (Reagan,  po- 
litical and  economic  declarations, 
Chairman's  statement.  White  House 
statement)    46 

U.S.  Signs  UN  Convention  Against  Tor- 
ture (message  to  the  Senate,  text  of 
convention) 79 

Publications.  Department  of  State    ...    94 

Science  &  Technology.  U.S. -Japan 
Agreement  on  Cooperation  in  Science 
and  Technology  (White  House  fact 
sheet)    55 

South  Africa.  The  Potential  Impact  of 
Imposing  Sanctions  Against  South  Af- 
rica (Whitehead)   58 


Terrorism.  Secretary's  Interview  on 
"Meet  the  Press" 56 

Trade 

China  and  the  U.S.;  Present  and  Future 
(Armacost)  69 

The  Potential  Impact  of  Imposing  Sanc- 
tions Against  South  Africa  (White- 
head)       58 

The  United  States  in  the  World  Econ- 
omy (Wallis) 72 

Treaties 

Current  Actions    92 

President  Welcomes  Entry  Into  Force  of 
INF  Treaty  (letter  to  the  Senate)  ...    68 

Summary  of  U.S. -Soviet  Agreements 
Signed  in  Moscow  42 

U.S. -Japan  Agreement  on  Cooperation 
in  Science  and  Technology  (White 
House  fact  sheet)    55 

U.S.,  Soviet  Union  Sign  Joint  Verifica- 
tion Experiment  Agreement  (text  of 
agreement) 67 

U.S.S.R. 

Moscow  Summit  (Bush,  Gorbachev,  Rea- 
gan, Shultz,  joint  statement)   1 

Summary  of  U.S. -Soviet  Agreements 
Signed  in  Moscow  42 

U.S.,  Soviet  Union  Sign  Joint  Verifica- 
tion Experiment  Agreement  (te.xt  of 
agreement) 67 

United  Nations 

Arms  Control;  Progress  and  Global 

Challenges  (Shultz)    84 

Review  of  Events  in  Ethiopia  (Crocker, 

Gladson,  Williamson)   62 

Third  Special  Session  on  Disarmament 
Convenes  (U.S.  statement) 84 

Name  Index 

Abrams,  Elliott    88 

Armacost,  Michael  H   69,  88 

Bush,  Vice  President    1 

Crocker,  Chester  A  62 

Gladson,  Charles   62 

Gorbachev,  Mikhail  S    1 

Reagan,  President    1,  46,  68, 

76,  78,  79,  91 

Shevardnadze,  Eduard   67 

Shultz,  Secretary    1,  56,  67, 

84,  88 

Wallis,  W.  Allen 72 

Whitehead,  John  C    58 

Williamson,  Richard  S    62 

Woods,  Alan    77 


Superintendent  of  Documents 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Washington,  D.C.  20402 


Second  Class  Mail 

Postage  and  Fees  Paid 

U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 

ISSN  0041-7610 


OFFICIAL  BUSINESS 
Penalty  for  Private  Use  $300 


Subscription  Renewals:  To  Insure  uninterrupted  service,  please  renew  your 
subscription  promptly  when  you  receive  the  expiration  notice  from  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents.  Due  to  the  time  required  to  process  renewals, 
notices  are  sent  3  months  In  advance  of  the  expiration  date.  Any  questions  in- 
volving your  subscription  should  be  addressed  to  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402 


Depart  mvni 


1.3: 


•     / 


2-1 


buUetBn 


ie  Official  Monffilv  Record  of  United  StateS^ffifeKaS^F^fev  /  Volume  88  /  Number  2138 


^  SEP  22  1988 


EC^^TOi"'  PIJ'TL'C  '.'""Ar^Y 


September  1988 


:f::::x::::::y$^l?^i3!;iSJ!:;:w^^^^ 


iM^KAJ^'ifd^S:*:':*:*!':*:*:*:' 


;'x-?K:^^¥^^^^:^^i^^:%^" 


Visits 

•  Italian  Prime  Minister/29 

•  Turkish  President/31 

•  Australian  Prime  Minister/50 


Secretary's  Trips 


Dppartmvni  of  State 

bulletin 


Volume  88  /  Number  2138  /  September  1' 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and  govern- 
ment agencies  with  information  on  de- 
velopments in  U.S.  foreign  relations 
and  the  work  of  the  Department  of 
State  and  the  Foreign  Service.  The 
Bulletin's  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  se- 
lected press  releases  issued  by  the 
White  House,  the  Department,  and  the 
U.S.  Mission  to  the  United  Nations; 
and  treaties  and  other  agreements  to 
which  the  United  States  is  or  may  be- 
come a  party.  Special  features,  articles, 
and  other  supportive  material  (such  as 
maps,  charts,  photographs,  and  graphs) 
are  published  frequently  to  provide  ad- 
ditional information  on  current  issues 
but  should  not  necessarily  be  inter- 
preted as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 

Secretary  of  State 

CHARLES  REDMAN 

Assistant  Secretary 
for  Public  Affairs 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

COLLEEN  LUTZ 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON  R.  HAYNES 

Assistant  Editor 


The  Secretary  of  State  has  determined  that 
the  publication  of  this  periodical  is  neces- 
sary in  the  transaction  of  the  public  busi- 
ness required  by  law  of  this  Department. 
Use  of  funds  for  printing  this  periodical 
has  been  approved  by  the  Director  of  the 
Office  of  Management  and  Budget  through 
September  30,  1988. 


Dli'artment  of  State  Bulletin  (ISSN 
0041-7610)  is  published  monthly  (plus  an- 
nual inde.x)  by  the  Department  of  State, 
2201  C  Street,  NW,  Washington,  D.C. 
20520.  Second-class  postage  paid  at  Washi 
ington,  D.C,  and  additional  mailing  of- 
fices. Postmaster:  Send  address  change 
to  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S 
Government  Printing  (!)ffice,  Washington, 
D.C.  20402. 


NOTE:  Most  of  the  contents  of  this  pub- 
lication are  in  the  public  domain  and 
not  copyrighted.  Those  items  may  be  re- 
printed; citation  of  the  Department  of 
State  Bulletin  as  the  source  will  be 
appreciated.  Permission  to  reproduce 
all  copyrighted  material  (including  pho- 
tographs) must  be  obtained  from  the  origi- 
nal source.  The  Bulletin  is  indexed  in 
the  Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Literature 
and  in  the  PAIS  (Public  Affairs  Informa- 
tion Service,  Inc.)  Bulletin. 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


CONTENTS 


ie  Secretary 


Interview  on  "Face  the  Nation" 

frica 

Negotiations  on  Angola  and 
Namibia  (Chester  A.  Crocker. 
Department  Announcement, 
Joint  Communique,  Delega- 
tions' Statement,  Text  of 
Agreement) 

rms  Control 

Nuclear  and  Space  Arms  T^lks 

Open  10th  Round  (Max  M. 

Kampelman,  President 

Reagan) 
Nuclear  Testing  T^lks  Conclude 

Round  Two  (White  House 

Statement) 
Nuclear  Nonproliferation  Treaty 

Celebrates  20th  Anniversary 

(White  House  Statement) 

ast  Asia 

The  United  States  in  the 
Changing  Asia  of  the  1990s 
(Michael  H.  Armacost) 
Proposed  Sale  of  Aegis  Weapons 
I  System  to  Japan  (Gaston  J. 

I  Sigur,  Jr.) 

^       Update  on  POW/MIA  Efforts 
(David  F.  Lambertson) 


;onomics 

Japan  to  Phase  Out  Quotas  on 
Beef  and  Citrus  Imports 
(Clayton  Yeutter) 

U.S.  Imposes  Sanctions  on  Cer- 
tain Brazilian  Imports  (White 
House  Statement) 

Trade  With  Hungary  and  China 
(Letter  to  the  Congress,  Text  of 
Report) 

J  rope 

Regional  Issues  and  U.S. -Soviet 

Re!"*.!ons  (Michael  H. 

Armacost) 
Perspectives  on  Change  in  the 

Soviet  Union  (Rozanne  L. 

Ridgway) 
Baltic  Freedom  Day,  1988 

(Proclamation) 


26        Negotiating  With  the  Soviet 
Union:  Then  and  Now 
(Edward  L.  Rownij) 

29  Visit  of  Italian  Prime  Minister 

(Ciriaco  De  Mita,  President 
Reagan) 

30  Italy— A  Profile 

31  Visit  of  Turkish  President 

(Kenan  Evren,  President 
Reagan) 

32  Turkey— A  Profile 

General 

33  Openness:  The  Only  Path  to 

Progress  (John  C.  Whitehead) 
36        Acting  Secretary  Whitehead's 

Interview  on  "This  Week  With 
David  Brinkley" 


Middle  East 

38        Iranian  Airbus  Tragedy  (Vice 
President  Bush,  President 
Reagan,  Richard  S.  William- 
son, Letters  to  the  Congress 
and  UN  Security  Council, 
White  House  Statement) 

44        Middle  East  Peace:  Facing  Real- 
ities and  Challenges 
(Richard  W.  Murphy) 

46  President  Meets  With  Patriarch 

of  Lebanon  (White  House 
Statement) 

47  Secretary  Visits  Middle  East 

(Secretary  Shultz) 
49        President  Meets  With  Israeli  De- 
fense Minister  (White  House 
Statement) 


Pacific 

50  Visit  of  Australian  Prime  Minis- 

ter (Robert  J.L.  Hawke,  Presi- 
dent Reagan) 

51  Australia-U.S.  Ministerial  Held 

in  Washington  (Joint 
Communique) 


Security  Assistance 

53        FY  1989  Request  for  Security 
Assistance  Program  (John  C. 
Whitehead) 


South  Asia 

55        Status  Report  on  Afghanistan 
(Michael  H.  Armacost,  Rich- 
ard S.  Williamson) 


Terrorism 

59  Countering  Terrorism:  Successes 

and  Failures  (L.  Paul 
Bremer,  III) 

60  U.S.  Offers  Reward  for 

Terrorists  (Department 
Announcement) 


United  Nations 

62  Developments  in  the  UN  System 

(Richard  S.  Williamson) 

63  Iran  Accepts  Security  Council 

Resolution  598  (Department 
Statement) 

65        The  United  Nations  and  Dis- 
armament (Richard  S. 
Williamson) 

67        Advancing  U.S.  Objectives  in  the 
United  Nations  (Richard  S. 
Willianison) 


Western  Hemisphere 

69        Reciprocal  E.xpulsion  of  Nic- 

araguan  Diplomats  (Richard  T. 
McCormack,  Department 
Statement.) 

71  Nicaraguan  Peace  Negotiations 

(White  House  Statement) 

72  Cuba:  "Our  Last  Adversary" 

(Kenneth  N.  Skoug.  Jr.) 
76        Secretary  Visits  Central  Amer- 
ica (Secretary  Shultz,  Letter  to 
the  Congress) 
82        Chile  Renews  State  of  Emer- 
gency (Department  Statement) 


Treaties 

83        Current  Actions 

Press  Releases 

85  Department  of  State 

Publications 

86  Department  of  State 
86        Background  Notes 

Index 


(©  Rcni  Newsphotos,  Inc.) 


i 


HE  SECRETARY 


ecretary's  Interview  on  "Face  the  Nation" 


Secretary  Shultz  was  interviewed 
CBS-TV's  "Face  the  Nation"  on 
ly  31,  1988,  by  Lesley  StahlA 

King  Hussein  of  Jordan  has  dis- 
Ived  the  lower  parliament  in  his 
untry,  which  represents  the  inter- 
;s  of  the  Palestinians  of  the  West 
ink.  He  appears  to  be  removing 
Tiself,  eliminating  himself,  as  a 
rtner  in  any  future  peace  talks 
th  Israel.  Is  that  the  way  you  read 
!  move? 

A.  He  has  to  be  a  partner — and 
|;rybody  recognizes  that — because 
•dan  has  the  longest  border  with  Is- 
;1  of  any  Arab  state.  So  if  there  is 
ng  to  be  peace  between  Israel  and 
neighbors,  then  Jordan  is  involved, 
lat  he's  doing,  I  think,  is  registering 
'.  fact  that  the  Palestinians  living  on 
;  West  Bank  and  Gaza  have  asserted 
!mselves  as  wanting  to  speak  for 
'mselves,  and  so  the  King  is  register- 
:  that  fact. 

How,  exactly,  this  will  play  out  in 
'  end  remains  to  be  seen,  but  that's 
at's  happening. 

Q.  Does  it  force  Israel  to  now 
ree  that  it  will  sit  and  talk  with  the 
lestine  Liberation  Organization 
LO)? 

A.  No,  it  doesn't.  That's  there,  and 
hink  that  the  PLO,  if  it  wants  to  be  a 
'tner  in  a  peace  process,  has  to 
inge  its  ways.  The  position  of  the 
lited  States  has  been  stated  repeat- 
ly,  and  that  remains  our  position. 

Q.  It  does?  Because  that  raises 
J  next  question,  which  is  that 
:yptian  President  Mubarak  has 
ited  that  the  United  States  is  now 
lling  to  meet  with  members  of  the 
..0  and  is,  in  fact,  in  the  process,  he 
ys,  of  searching  out  PLO  members 
talk  to. 
A.  No,  that's  not  correct.  That  is, 
correct  that  he  said  something  like 
It,  but  it  isn't  correct  that  we're  do- 
?  that.  We  are  and  always  have  been 
idy  to  meet  with  Palestinians,  and 
e  met  with  some,  and  I've  tried  to 
ganize — 

Q.  But  they're  all  members  of  the 
.0— 

A.  No,  no,  they  aren't  all  members 
the  PLO,  but  there  are — obviously, 
ere  are  credible  people  who  aren't. 


And  it's  also  true  that  we  need  to  keep 
the  pressure  on  the  PLO  to  recognize 
that  Israel  is  there,  Israel  is  going  to 
stay  there — it's  a  fact  of  life — and  they 
might  as  well  accept  that  fact.  And 
they  ought  to  stop  the  terrorism,  and 
recognize  that  [UN  Security  Council 
Resolutions]  242  and  338  are  the  roads 
to  peace. 

Q.  But  isn't  King  Hussein's  move, 
in  effect,  a  recognition  that  the  PLO 
is  always  going  to  be  there,  that  the 
PLO  is  the  legitimate  leader  of  the 
Palestinians?  And  doesn't  it  put  pres- 
sure on  you — and  on  Israel — to  find  a 
way  to  deal  with  the  PLO? 

A.  It  has  been  the  view  of  the 
Arab  states — and  they've  stated  it  re- 
peatedly, going  back  to  the  Rabat  con- 
ference— that  the  PLO  is  the  sole, 
legitimate  representative  of  the  Palestin- 
ian people.  That's  their  statement. 

The  problem  with  the  PLO  is  that 
as  long  as  they  continue  the  way  they 
are,  which  basically  calls  for  the  elim- 
ination of  Israel  as  a  state  and  uses 
terrorist  tactics,  they  are  not  a  suitable 
peace  partner. 

Q.  But  does  what  King  Hussein 
has  done  increase  the  pressure  on  you 
and  Israel  to  find  some  way  to  talk 
directly — to  talk  directly — even  before 
the  PLO  changes  its  charter  or  what- 
ever the  conditions  are  for  these 
talks? 

A.  No. 

Q.  Why  not? 

A.  We  will  stay  right  where  we 
are;  that  we're  ready  to  talk  with  them 
when  they  take  certain  steps,  which 
are  very  clear,  and  as  far  as  I  can  see, 
not  too  onerous.  After  all,  Israel  is 
there.  Israel  is  going  to  stay  there. 
We're  going  to  continue  to  support 
them. 

Q.  Talking  to  governments  that 
disagree  with  us,  or  have  committed 
acts  of  terrorism,  obviously  raises  the 
question  of  Iran.  It's  been  reported 
that  President  Reagan  has  sent  a 
message  to  Iran  that  the  United 
States  would  like  to  have  talks  with 
an  authoritative  member  of  the 
government. 

I  assume  we've  gotten  no  re- 
sponse. But  what  I'm  curious  about  is 
why  you  didn't  try  to  have  a  meeting 
with  your  counterpart  in  the  Iranian 


Government  who  is  in  New  York  for 
the  peace  talks — their  Foreign  Minis- 
ter. Why  didn't  you  try  to  have  a 
meeting  with  him? 

A.  Here  is  our  policy  toward  Iran, 
in  terms  of  this  dimension.  First  of  all, 
we  have  stated  repeatedly  that  we're 
prepared  to  have  direct  talks  with 
them.  Second,  what  are  we  going  to 
talk  about?  We're  going  to  talk  to  them 
about  what  it  takes  for  them  to  become 
more  a  part  of  the  civilized  commu- 
nity— stop  the  war,  stop  being  involved 
in  terrorism,  stop  promoting  the  use  of 
hostages.  And  when  they  do  those 
things,  then  there  is  a  prospect  of  more 
normal  relations  with  us. 

Q.  Yes,  but  why  didn't  you  try  to 
talk  with  this  man?  You  know,  you 
sent  a  message  of  being  willing  to 
talk — he's  in  our  country. 

A.  We  don't  have  to  go  running 
around  after  people.  It's  important  to 
Iran  to  have  a  relationship  with  the 
United  States,  and  that  will  emerge  in 
due  time. 

Q.  I  take  it  they  have  not  re- 
sponded to  the  President's  message.  Is 
that  correct? 

A.  I  don't  know  what  you  call  re- 
sponse, so  I'll  just  leave  it  at  that. 

Q.  Now,  you've  intrigued  us  with 
that. 

A.  I  know. 

Q.  What  does  that  mean?  Have 
we  gotten  so — 

A.  I  said  I'll  just  leave  it  at  that. 

Q.  Give  us  a  hint.  Have  we  gotten 
some  kind  of  a  third-party  or  indirect 
response? 

A.  There  is  constantly  that  sort  of 
thing,  but  it's  important,  we  think,  to 
have  an  authoritative  channel  to  the 
Government  of  Iran  so  you  know  who 
you're  talking  to,  and  that's  what  we 
are  waiting  for. 

Q.  If  their  Foreign  Minister,  who 
is  now  in  New  York,  gave  some  signal 
that  he  would  be  willing  to  talk, 
would  you  sit  down  with  him? 

A.  Sure. 

Q.  Would  you  do  that?  Right 
now? 

A.  Oh,  sure. 


partment  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


THE  SECRETARY 


Q.  Right  now.  The  Iranians  have 
said  that  if  we  unfreeze  their  assets — 

A.  I  don't  know  that  it's  neces- 
sarily the  right  way  to  start,  to  have 
the  foreign  ministers  meet.  It  may  be 
that  there's  some  other  way.  But  at  any 
rate,  we  have  stated  our  policy,  and  if 
the  conditions  emerge,  we'll  do  that. 

Q.  He's  certainly  authoritative. 
You'd  have  to — 

A.  I  think  he  is  an  authoritative 
spokesman. 

Q.  I  hope  he's  listening.  Anyway, 
the  Iranians  have  said  that  if  we  un- 
freeze their  assets  that  we've  been 
holding  for  years,  ever  since  Jimmy 
Carter  froze  their  assets,  that  they 
would  use  their  influence  to  release 
our  hostages. 

There  are  two  different  kinds  of 
assets:  one  is  weapons  and  the  other 
is  money.  What  would  be  so  wrong 
about  us  unfreezing  the  money  aspect 
as  a  signal  of  good  will,  or  whatever, 
and  hope  that  our  hostages  are  set 
free? 

A.  In  the  first  place,  we  have  to 
separate  the  question — the  human- 
itarian question — of  releasing  hostages, 
which  should  be  done,  from  all  of  these 
financial  and  other  considerations. 

Second,  there  is  in  operation  a 
claims  tribunal  in  The  Hague  that  hears 
claims,  that  judges  the  disposition  of 
assets,  and  these  financial  claims  work 
their  way  through  that.  There  has  been 
a  huge  amount  of  claims  settled  and 
money  paid  back  and  forth  through  that 
process. 

Q.  Couldn't  we  speed  that  up? 
Couldn't  we  send  a  little  signal  to 
speed  that  up?  I  mean,  it  wouldn't  be 
the  same  as  ransom  because  it's  their 
money. 

A.  The  tribunal  is  operating  in  a 
satisfactory  way. 

Q.  No  speeding  up? 

A.  It  has  its  own  pace,  and  you 
know  it  takes  awhile  to  put  a  case  for- 
ward and  have — the  justices  are  there, 
they  can  go  as  fast  as  they  want. 

Q.  I  ask  you  this  question  be- 
cause there  has  begun  to  be  some 
criticism  that  the  Reagan  Administra- 
tion has  boxed  itself  into  a  corner  be- 
cause it's  embarrassed  over  the  Iran 
arms-for-hostages  sale,  and  then — 

A.  No,  no,  no,  no. 


Q.  —and  that  you're  getting  too 
inflexible. 

A.  The  Iran  arms  sales  thing  was 
an  aberration,  and  we  have  a  constant 
policy.  We  stay  on  that  course.  We're 
not  bo.xed  into  anything.  As  far  as 
claims  are  concerned,  there  is  a  tri- 
bunal that  hears  the  cases,  that  pays 
the  money  back  and  forth.  That's  an 
ongoing  process.  It's  working,  and 
there's  no  reason  to  disrupt  it. 

Q.  U.S.  News  &  World  Report 
says  this  week  that  negotiations  are 
underway,  and  that  they  are  either 
direct  or  indirect,  and  that  the  deal 
involves  release  of  the  hostages,  un- 
freezing the  assets,  and  normaliza- 
tion of  relations,  and  that  these  talks, 
either  with  a  third  party  or  whatever, 
are  ongoing. 

Can  you  categorically  deny  that 
there  are  any  kind  of  negotiations,  di- 
rect or  indirect,  taking  place  or  being 
pursued? 

A.  There  are  all  sorts  of  things 
that  are  said.  [Speaker  of  Iran's  Parlia- 
ment] Rafsanjani  has  made  public 
statements.  The  President  has  made  his 
statements.  I  don't  know  what  you  call 
that.  And  I  have  stated  our  policy  here. 
And  if  people  want  to  describe  that  as 
addressing  the  issue,  they  can.  But  as 
far  as  any  direct  discussions  with  Iran 
are  concerned,  there  aren't  any. 

Q.  You  have  talked  about  these 
lower-level  feelers — 

A.  We  have.  We  have  represen- 
tative countries,  our  so-called  protect- 
ing power,  which  delivers  messages  on 
our  behalf  from  time  to  time,  and  Iran 
does  the  same. 

Q.  You  talked  earlier  about,  sug- 
gesting that  maybe  there  has  been 
some  kind  of  message  in  response  to 
the  President's  message  to  the  Ira- 
nians. Is  there  some  bubbling,  in  sort 
of  these  lower  levels,  toward  an  agree- 
ment that  would  involve  those  three 
legs  I  mentioned? 

A.  All  over  the  world  right  now, 
there  is  unusual  diplomatic  fluidity  that 
has  emerged  in  Asia,  in  all  parts  of  the 
world — southern  Africa — 

Q.  You're  changing  the  subject. 

A.  No,  I'm  not.  I'm  pointing  up 
the  fact  that  this  break  which  has  taken 
place  in  the  Iran-Iraq  war,  with  all  of 
its  implications  about  a  rearrangement 
of  the  diplomatic  status  of  various  coun- 
tries, is  part  of  a  process,  I  think, 
that's  potentially  very  fruitful.  And  we 
are  on  top  of  it.  We  have  promoted  it. 


Our  policies  are,  in  some  respects,  r 
sponsible  for  it,  and  I  think  the  Pre,- 
dent's  policies,  as  [Deputy  Secretar,\ 
John  Whitehead  said  in  an  article  th 
other  day,  are  "on  a  roll." 

Q.  When  diplomats  talk  like  tit. 
people  like  Lesley  Stahl  look  for  li  le 
tea  leaves  or  little  signals. 

A.  Sure. 

Q.  The  Soviets  were  recently  i 
Tehran.  Have  they  brought  messas 
out  about  some  kind  of  a  deal,  or    j. 
whatever? 

A.  You'll  have  to  ask  them. 

Q.  Is  that  what  you  were  tryin 
to  suggest? 

A.  No,  we  haven't  gotten  any  n 
sages  about  Iran  from  the  Soviets. 

Q.  Okay.  I  wanted  to  ask  you 
about  a  New  York  Times  report. 

A.  We  will  have  talks  with  the 
viets  on  the  Middle  East  and  the  Ir: 
Iraq  war  and  Afghanistan,  in  Genev 
starting  to  take  place  tomorrow.  An 
we'll  have  them  on  southern  Africa  i 
day  and  tomorrow. 

Q.  You're  not  connecting  it — 

A.  There's  a  huge  amount  goinj 
on. 

Q.  The  New  York  Times  has  a 
intriguing  story  this  morning,  say 
that  the  Administration  is  workinj 
out  a  compromise  with  the  Amerit 
Jewish  community  to  sell  arms  to 
Kuwait,  that  the  Kuwaitis  have  m;  | 
a  proposal,  and  that  you  are  negot 
ing  with  the  American  Jewish  con 
munity  in  a  deal  that  would  allow 
most  of  those  weapons  to  be  sold  t 
Kuwait.  Is  that  true? 

A.  There  is,  publicly,  a  propose 
sale  of  F-18  aircraft  and  associated 
weaponry  to  Kuwait.  That  is  on  the 
table  before  the  Congress,  and  it's  i 
the  regular  process  that  those  arms 
sales  go  through.  And  there  has  bet 
lot  of  discussion  between  the  Admin 
istration.  Members  of  the  Congress, 
and  the  Government  of  Kuwait  that 
justs,  potentially,  exactly  what's  in  1 
sale  a  little  bit.  That's  obviously  bee 
discussed  with  interested  parties,  ai 
think  that  it  is  pretty  well  set  now. 

Q.  So,  it's  true? 

A.  It's  not  as  though  you're  dis 
covering  something.  This  is  a  public 
statement  to  the  Congress. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/September  t 


AFRICA 


Q.  This  raises  the  whole  ques- 
n,  doesn't  it,  of  the  proliferation  of 
h-tech  weaponry  in  the  Middle 
5t.  with  Iraq  using  chemical  war- 
e,  and  both  sides — all  sides  now — 
■ing  ballistic  missiles?  What  is  our 
icy?  Do  we  have  a  policy  to  try  to 
ink  the  proliferation  of  ballistic 
ipons,  chemical  weapons  in  the 
idle  East? 

A.  Yes,  we  do,  all  over  the  world. 
i  I  think  there  are  three  categories 
veapons  that  are  particularly  dis- 
bing  and  destabilizing:  one  is  any 
ential  threat  of  proliferating  nuclear 
ipons;  second  is  the  emerging  threat 
iroliferation  in  use  of  chemical  weap- 
;  and  third  is  the  potential  prolifera- 
i  of  ballistic  missiles  used  to  deliver 
m.  Those  three  things  are  very  de- 
DiUzing  potentially.  We  have  a  good 
ilear  nonproliferation  regime  in 
ie. 

Q.  But  get  back  to  the  sale  to 
wait. 

A.  We  have  been  working  on  the 
istic  missile  side,  and  we  are  also 
king  very  hard — and  I  might  say, 
structively — with  the  Soviets  on  the 
stion  of  chemical  weapons. 

Q.  What  about  Iraq?  Do  we  have 
■  influence,  any  ability  to — 

A.  We  have  sounded  off  very 
mgly  about  Iraq's  use  of  chemical 
ipons  right  from  the  first  time. 

Q.  Yes,  but  now  that  this  war  is 
iding  down,  do  we  have  any  ability 
force  the  nations  in  the  Middle 
5t,  to  pressure  them  into  destroy- 
all  their  chemical  weapons  stores? 
A.  What  we  are  doing  is  working 
h  many  other  countries — around 
-in  Geneva  to  negotiate  a  ban  on 
mical  weapons.  And  we've  made  a 
•  amount  of  progress  with  that. 

Q.  The  genie  out  of  the  bottle! 

A.  That's  the  problem;  the  genie  is 
of  the  bottle,  and  it's  very  impor- 
t  to  all  of  us — you,  me,  everybody — 
stuff  that  genie  back  in  the  bottle, 
at's  what  we're  trying  to  do. 

Q.  You  re  leaving  tomorrow  for 
ntral  America.  The  New  York 
nes  again  has  a  story — 

A.  I'm  leaving  for  South  America 
1  Central  America. 

Q.  The  New  York  Times  has  a 
iry  that  two  of  the  four  Central 
lerican  countries  have  rejected  a 
3.  effort  to  strongly  denounce  Nic- 
igua  in  a  communique.  Have  they 
ected  your  effort  to  really  slam  the 
ndinistas  rhetorically? 


A.  No,  they  haven't.  What  has 
happened  is  that  during  the  time  be- 
tween my  last  visit,  about  a  month  ago, 
and  this  one,  there  have  been  a  lot  of 
discussions.  And  a  possible  statement 
that  might  be  made  was  gotten  up — 
mostly,  it  was  written  by  the  Central 
American  Foreign  Ministers,  their  of- 
fices, not  by  us.  So  we're  not  trying  to 
ram  anything  down  anybody's  throat. 

Q.  You're  saying  they're  rejecting 
their  own  statement? 


A.  And  having  drafted  it,  they're 
not  so  sure  that  they  want  to  issue  it. 
Anyway,  when  I  get  there  tomorrow, 
we're  going  to  have  a  discussion  of  it. 
Personally,  I  hate  to  spend  all  my  time 
discussing  communiques,  because 
there's  a  lot  of  work  to  do,  things  that 
people  should  be  taking  action  on,  and 
that's  what  I  hope  we'll  discuss  mostly. 


'Press  release  164  of  Aug.  1,  1988. 


Negotiations  on  Angola  and  Namibia 


DEPARTMENT  ANNOUNCEMENT, 
JUNE  20,  1988' 

The  Government  of  Egypt  has  an- 
nounced that  it  will  host  a  second  round 
of  the  negotiations  on  a  regional  settle- 
ment involving  Namibian  independence 
and  the  departure  of  all  foreign  forces 
from  Angola  and  Namibia.  The  talks 
will  take  place  in  Cairo  June  24-25  and 
will  continue  the  effort  begun  at  the 
May  3^  meeting  in  London.  As  was 
the  case  in  London,  delegations  of  the 
Republic  of  South  Africa,  the  People's 
Republic  of  Angola/Republic  of  Cuba, 
and  the  United  States  will  take  part  in 
the  Cairo  meeting. 

We  greatly  appreciate  the  states- 
manlike initiative  of  the  Government  of 
Egypt  in  hosting  this  round  of  the  ne- 
gotiations. The  acceptance  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Egypt's  invitation  by  all 
parties  attests  to  Egypt's  stature  as  a 
founding  member  of  the  Organization  of 
African  Unity  (OAU)  and  a  consistent 
supporter  of  the  peaceful  resolution  of 
African  problems.  This  process  has  elic- 
ited growing  African  diplomatic  support 
and  occurs  against  the  backdrop  of  in- 
tensified allied  and  U.S. -Soviet  con- 
sultations on  southern  Africa. 


JOINT  COMMUNIQUE, 
JUNE  25,  1988 

On  June  24-25,  1988,  delegations  of  the 
People's  Republic  of  Angola/Republic  of 
Cuba,  the  Republic  of  South  Africa,  and 
the  United  States  of  America  met  in  Cairo 
to  continue  work  begun  at  the  May  3^ 
meeting  in  London  toward  a  regional  set- 
tlement of  the  conflict  in  southwestern 
Africa.  Further  progress  was  made  and  a 
plan  of  work  was  developed  for  continuing 
e,xchanges  at  the  level  of  experts  to  e.xpand 
on  the  progress  made  in  Cairo.  The  par- 


ties agreed  to  meet  at  the  experts'  level 
during  the  week  of  July  11  at  a  venue  in  the 
United  States.  The  delegations  expressed 
their  deep  appreciation  to  the  Government 
of  Egypt  for  its  initiative  in  providing  a 
venue  and  superb  facilitative  support  for 
the  meeting. 


ASSISTANT  SECRETARY 

CROCKER, 
JUNE  25,  19882 

I  believe  you  all  received  a  copy  of  the 
joint  communique  issued  by  the  delega- 
tions here  at  Cairo.  So  I  will  not  repeat 
it,  but  its  basic  points  are  very  clear. 

The  delegations  have  made  certain 
progress  here  which  they  wished  to 
register  in  this  communique,  and  they 
have  decided  that  they  wish  to  continue 
the  e.xchanges  next  time  at  the  expert 
level  to  build  on  the  progress  made 
here.  The  parties  have  agreed  to  meet 
within  the  next  2  weeks,  in  the  week  of 
July  11,  in  the  United  States.  I  will  add 
to  this  a  brief  opening  statement  from 
the  U.S.  perspective. 

These  meetings  have  taken  place 
against  a  backdrop  of  other  develop- 
ments which  is  worth  briefly  noting.  As 
you  know,  there  were  useful  talks  con- 
ducted in  London  in  early  May,  and 
these  have  been  followed  by  a  number 
of  other  events. 

There  has  been  a  continuing  move- 
ment in  a  dangerous  military  direction 
on  the  ground  in  southern  Africa.  On 
the  more  positive  side,  there  have  been 
a  number  of  bilateral  contacts,  most  no- 
tably between  ourselves  and  the  Soviet 
Union  during  the  Moscow  summit. 
Those  contacts  have  continued  both  be- 
fore and  since  that  summit,  and  it  is 
very  clear,  I  think,  from  what  has  been 
said  publicly  that  we  and  the  Soviets 
believe  that  this  very  difficult  regional 


nf  cttatP  Riilletln/SeDtember  1988 


AFRICA 


Internotional   boundory 

if       National    capital 


ATLANTIC 
OCEAN 


Nomes   and   boundary  repr«sontoti 
ore  not  necessarily  authoritat 


7728  8-M  STATE   (INR/GE) 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/September  14 


AFRICA 


e  is  one  that  should  be  worked  out, 
rress  should  be  made,  a  settlement 
jld  be  achieved. 

The  same  points  were  registered 
e  recently  at  the  Toronto  summit  of 
Western  seven  economic  powers  in 
ch  full  support  for  this  negotiating 
;ess  was  registered  by  the  summit 
lers. 

I  would  like  next  to  make  a  few 
its  concerning  the  hospitality  and 
facilities  and  the  strong  diplomatic 
port  provided  by  the  Government  of 
'pt  for  this  process.  As  the  commu- 
le  indicates,  the  facilities  and  sup- 
:  were  quite  simply  superb,  and 
1  represent  yet  another  reflection  of 
efforts  of  the  Government  of  Egypt 
'lay  a  leading  role  in  the  search  for 
3e  in  cooperation  with  us  and  with 
;rs  around  the  world.  Egypt,  as  I 
't  need  to  remind  you,  is  in  the  fore- 
it  of  efforts  to  achieve  peace  in  the 
die  East.  Now  with  this  meeting,  it 
placed  itself  in  the  forefront  of 
rts  to  achieve  something  which  is  of 
highest  priority  to  the  Continent  of 
:ca.  We  value  the  initiative  that  was 
en  by  the  Government  of  Egypt,  as 
he  other  parties  represented  in 
ie  talks. 

The  talks  have  just  concluded  with 
issuance  of  this  joint  communique, 
in  a  final  plenary  meeting  the  par- 
confirmed  that  they  are  looking  for- 
d  with  hope  toward  the  results  of 
next  meeting. 

Let  me  try  and  briefly  describe 
it  was  accomplished  here.  I  think, 
;,  one  can  say  that  the  positive  at- 
phere  achieved  in  London  at  the  be- 
ling  of  May  was  restored  and 
itablished  here  in  Cairo.  Secondly,  I 
ik  the  agreement  to  meet  in  the 
/  near  future  at  a  senior  expert 
■1  is  an  important  sign  and  provides 
basis  to  test  whether  or  not  there 
n  both  sides  a  genuine  desire  to  get 
problem  solved.  During  the  course 
he  meetings,  and  there  were  a 
iber  as  you  know,  proposals  and 
is  were  exchanged  in  both  direc- 
is,  and  those  proposals  and  ideas  re- 
n  on  the  table  as  a  basis  for 
tinuing  work  in  the  near  future  at 
expert  level.  There  has  been  a 
asure  of  agreement  on  how  to 
ceed. 
As  in  any  negotiation,  the  place 
re  you  start  is  by  establishing 
ether  or  not  there  is  an  agreement 
basic  principles,  which  can  then  be 
nslated  into  a  concrete  agreement  or 
jries  of  agreements  mutually  sup- 
ting,  as  may  be  the  case.  So  I  would 
cribe  the  progress  here  as  being 


concentrated  on  this  procedural  issue  of 
how  to  approach  getting  down  to  actual 
agreed  texts  of  language  which  would 
reflect  the  commitments  and  undertak- 
ings of  the  parties. 

It  is  obvious,  having  said  that,  that 
there  remains  a  great  deal  of  substan- 
tive work  to  do,  work  which  was  only 
touched  upon  here  and  which  remains 
to  be  done  in  the  meetings  that  take 
place  in  the  near  future  and  meetings 
after  that. 

Finally,  I  think  it  is  clear  that 
these  discussions  here  in  Cairo  reveal 
that  the  parties  have  decided  to  keep 
their  diplomatic  options  open  and  alive 
and  to  pursue  them  further  at  a  time 
when  the  military  situation  on  the 
ground  can  only  be  described  as  con- 
taining dangerous  risks  of  military  con- 
frontation, involving  significant  forces 
which  are  directly  facing  each  other  on 
a  large  scale. 


DELEGATIONS'  STATEMENT, 
JULY  13,  1988  ■! 

Delegations  of  the  Republic  of  South 
Africa,  the  People's  Republic  of  Angola/ 
Republic  of  Cuba,  and  the  United 
States  of  America  met  on  July  11-13, 
1988,  at  Governors  Island,  New  York, 
to  continue  efforts  to  achieve  a  settle- 
ment of  the  conflict  in  southwestern  Af- 
rica. The  discussions  took  place  in  a 
constructive  spirit  and  were  positive 
and  productive. 

Building  upon  the  foundations 
made  at  London  and  Cairo,  the  delega- 
tions at  New  York  achieved  agreement, 
ad  referendum  to  their  governments, 
on  a  basic  document  entitled  "Principles 
for  a  Peaceful  Settlement  in  South- 
western Africa."  Pending  the  approval 
of  governments,  they  further  agreed 
that  the  next  objective  in  the  negotia- 
tions is  to  translate  these  basic  princi- 
ples into  agreements  on  a  compre- 
hensive settlement.  The  delegations 
also  discussed  ways  to  create  a  climate 
in  the  region  to  achieve  further  prog- 
ress in  the  negotiations.  Recognizing 
the  need  for  a  further  acceleration  of 
the  pace  of  work,  the  delegations 
agreed  to  meet  again  at  the  senior  ex- 
pert level  during  the  first  week  of 
August. 

The  delegations  of  the  Republic  of 
South  Africa,  the  People's  Repubhc  of 
Angola/Republic  of  Cuba  expressed 
their  appreciation  to  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  of  America  for  its 
mediation  and  for  providing  the  venue 
and  facilities  for  these  talks. 


PRINCIPLES  FOR  A  PEACEFUL 

SETTLEMENT  IN 

SOUTHWESTERN  AFRICA, 
JULY  13,  1988^ 

The  Governments  of  the  People's  Re- 
public of  Angola,  the  Republic  of  Cuba, 
and  the  Republic  of  South  Africa  have 
reached  agreement  on  a  set  of  essential 
principles  to  establish  the  basis  for 
peace  in  the  southwestern  region  of  Af- 
rica. They  recognize  that  each  of  these 
principles  is  indispensable  to  a  compre- 
hensive settlement. 

A.  Implementation  of  Resolution  435/78 
of  the  Security  Council  of  the  United 
Nations.  The  parties  shall  agree  upon 
and  recommend  to  the  Secretary-Gen- 
eral of  the  United  Nations  a  date  for 
the  commencement  of  implementation 
of  UNSCR  435/78. 

B.  The  Governments  of  the  People's  Re- 
public of  Angola  and  of  the  Republic  of 
South  Africa  shall,  in  conformity  with 
the  dispositions  of  Resolution  435/78  of 
the  Security  Council  of  the  United  Na- 
tions, cooperate  with  the  Secretary- 
General  with  a  view  towards  ensuring 
the  independence  of  Namibia  through 
free  and  fair  elections,  abstaining  from 
any  action  that  could  prevent  the  ex- 
ecution of  said  Resolution. 

C.  Redeployment  toward  the  North  and 
the  staged  and  total  withdrawal  of 
Cuban  troops  from  the  territory  of  the 
People's  Republic  of  Angola  on  the 
basis  of  an  agreement  between  the  Peo- 
ple's Republic  of  Angola  and  the  Re- 
public of  Cuba  and  the  decision  of  both 
states  to  solicit  the  on-site  verification 
of  that  withdrawal  by  the  Security 
Council  of  the  United  Nations. 

D.  Respect  for  the  sovereignty,  sov- 
ereign equality,  and  independence  of 
states  and  for  territorial  integrity  and 
inviolability  of  borders. 

E.  Non-interference  in  the  internal  af- 
fairs of  states. 

F.  Abstention  from  the  threat  and  utili- 
zation of  force  against  the  territorial 
integrity  and  independence  of  states. 

G.  The  acceptance  of  the  responsibility 
of  states  not  to  allow  their  territory  to 
be  used  for  acts  of  war,  aggression,  or 
violence  against  other  states. 


/contomkior  ianR 


ARMS  CONTROL 


H.  Reaffirmation  of  the  right  of  the 
peoples  of  the  southwestern  region  of 
Africa  to  self-determination,  indepen- 
dence, and  equality  of  rights. 

I.  Verification  and  monitoring  of  com- 
pliance with  the  obligations  resulting 
from  the  agreements  that  may  be 
established. 

J.  Commitment  to  comply  in  good  faith 
with  the  obligations  undertaken  in  the 
agreements  that  may  be  established 
and  to  resolve  the  differences  via 
negotiations. 

K.  Recognition  of  the  role  of  the  Per- 
manent Members  of  the  Security  Coun- 
cil of  the  United  Nations  as  guarantors 
for  the  implementation  of  agreements 
that  may  be  established. 

L.  The  right  of  each  state  to  peace, 
development,  and  social  progress. 

M.  African  and  international  coopera- 
tion for  the  settlement  of  the  problems 
of  the  development  of  the  southwestern 
region  of  Africa. 

N.  Recognition  of  the  mediating  role  of 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America. 


Nuclear  and  Space  Arms  Talks 
Open  10th  Round 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by 
Department  deputy  spokesman  Phyllis 
Oakley. 

-Chester  A.  Crocker  is  Assistant 
Secretary  for  African  Affairs. 

■*USUN  press  release  68. 

^Initialed  in  New  York  City  by 
delegations  from  Angola/Cuba  "and  South 
Africa.  This  statement  was  approved  by 
their  respective  governments  and  released 
publicly  by  mutual  agreement  on  Julv  20, 
1988.  t 


AMBASSADOR  KAMPELMAN, 
JULY  11,  1988> 

The  negotiations  on  nuclear  and  space 
arms  begin  their  10th  round  tomorrow, 
July  12,  1988,  in  accordance  with  the 
agreement  in  Moscow  last  month  be- 
tween President  Reagan  and  General 
Secretary  Gorbachev.  The  U.S.  delega- 
tion looks  forward  in  a  constructive 
spirit  to  the  resumption  of  talks  with 
our  Soviet  colleagues. 

We  have  come  a  long  way  since 
these  negotiations  began  in  March  1985. 
Our  talks  and  the  results  flowing  from 
them  have  proven  to  be  historic  steps 
in  what  we  hope  will  be  a  firm  and 
continuing  process  toward  peace  with 
human  dignity  through  better  under- 
standing and  a  more  stable  relationship 
between  us. 

The  Intermediate- Range  Nuclear 
Forces  (INF)  Treaty,  whose  instru- 
ments of  ratification  were  e.xchanged 
during  the  Moscow  summit,  is  now  in 
force.  It  is  widely  known  but  worth  re- 
peating that  this  is  the  first  treaty  in 
history  actually  to  reduce  nuclear 
weapons — it  eliminates  an  entire  class, 
reducing  to  zero  all  these  nuclear  mis- 
siles that  have  a  range  between  500  and 
5,500  kilometers.  Future  historians  may 
well  judge  the  treaty's  innovations  in 
verification  and  openness  to  have  been 
almost  as  important  as  the  reductions 
themselves. 

Our  talks  will  continue  to  address 
our  desire  to  broaden  our  areas  of 
agreement.  We  want  to  reduce  by  50% 
the  number  of  long-range  ballistic  mis- 
sile warheads,  those  highly  accurate 
and  tremendously  destructive  nuclear 
weapons  that  can  cross  thousands  of 
miles  in  minutes. 

Here,  too,  we  have  come  a  long 
way  and  have  made  significant  progress 
since  we  began  in  March  1985.  It  is 
important  to  note  that  we  now  have  a 
joint  draft  text  of  a  strategic  arms  re- 
duction treaty  (START)  and  its  integral 
protocols.  These  documents  include 
many  key  provisions  that  are  com- 
pletely agreed. 

We  have  agreed  that  neither  we 
nor  the  Soviet  Union  should  have  more 
than  6,000  of  these  strategic  warheads, 
nor  more  than  1,600  of  their  launchers. 
We  have  also  agreed  that  neither  of  us 
should  have  more  than  4,900  warheads 
in  intercontinental  ballistic  missiles 
(ICBMs)  or  submarine  launched  bal- 


listic missiles  (SLBMs)  or  1,540  war- 
heads on  the  most  powerful  "heavy" 
missiles  within  that  6,000  limit.  We 
have  agreed  that  neither  of  us  will  ha> 
more  "throw-weight"  capability  in  the 
remaining  arsenals  than  the  amount  t 
Soviets  will  have  after  a  50%  cut  in 
their  throw-weight.  We  have  also 
agreed  on  many  of  the  vital  details- 
verification  and  others — necessary  ef- 
fectively to  carry  out  our  objectives. 

These  agreements,  reflected  in  tl 
joint  documents,  manifest  the  intensi 
efforts  by  both  sides  that  have  charac 
terized  these  talks.  But  much  that  is 
vital  still  remains  to  be  resolved.  Our 
hope  is  that  this  round  of  talks  will 
resolve  most,  if  not  all,  of  the  remain- 
ing issues  or  at  the  very  least  signifi- 
cantly narrow  the  differences  betwee 
us. 

Essentially  the  main  areas  of  dis- 
agreement are  these: 

•  How  to  deal  with  the  question  < 
limits  on  sea-launched  cruise  missiles 

•  Our  desire  to  place  specific  sub 
limits  on  the  numbers  of  ICBMs; 

•  How  to  count  air-launched  cruis 
missiles  (ACLMs); 

•  How  to  verify  mobile  missiles; 
and 

•  How  to  agree  upon  the  highly 
technical  and  specific  details  indispen 
sable  for  effective  verification. 

The  START  joint  draft  text  repr. 
sents  a  truly  prodigious  amount  of  co 
structive  negotiation.  In  a  process  as 
important  as  this  one,  we  must  care- 
fully consider  each  detail,  since  "the 
devil  is  in  the  details."  Verification  is 
case  in  point.  Ambiguities  must  be  re 
solved  so  that  they  will  not  create  pn 
lems  further  down  the  road.  We  must 
be  very  thorough  to  ensure  that  what 
ever  agreement  we  reach  will  make  tl 
world  a  safer,  more  peaceful  place.  A 
flawed  treaty  would  not  increase  sta- 
bility. With  the  patience  and  care  tha 
we  know  are  necessary,  we  intend  to 
proceed  expeditiously  and  constructiv 

The  United  States  strongly  objec 
to  the  Soviet  insistence  that  the  vital 
50%  START  reductions  we  seek  canm 
be  realized  without  an  agreement  in  t 
defense  and  space  negotiations — a  lin 
age  we  cannot  accept,  just  as  we  ob- 
jected to  linking  a  defense  and  space 
agreement  to  the  vital  INF  benefits  \ 
achieved. 


ARMS  CONTROL 


While  we  oppose  linkage,  we  re- 
in willing  to  conclude  a  sound  de- 
ise  and  space  agreement  which 
inds  on  its  own  merits.  But  we  reject 
>  Soviet  attempts  to  use  these  nego- 
tions  to  have  us  end  our  Strategic 
fense  Initiative  (SDI),  which  is  de- 
;ned  to  find  a  scientific  answer  to  the 
(estion  of  whether  defenses  against 
ategic  ballistic  missiles  can  be  devel- 
jd.  As  you  will  recall,  last  year  Gen- 
ii Secretary  Gorbachev  acknowledged 
at  we  have  long  said;  that  the  Sovi- 

are  doing  strategic  defense  explora- 
n  comparable  to  our  own. 

We  have  a  shared  interest  in  strate- 
defenses.  It  seems  logical  to  us  that 
both  seek  to  negotiate  measures  to 
courage  cooperation  in  the  inevitable 
/elopment  of  high  technology  to  pro- 
e  defenses  against  the  highly  de- 
uctive,  nuclear-armed  strategic 
listic  missiles  we  are  simultaneously 
iking  to  reduce. 

Since  the  beginning  of  our  talks, 
have  proposed  that  both  of  us  pro- 
'd  with  this  work  in  a  stabilizing 
nner,  within  the  limits  of  the  Anti- 
listic  Missile  (ABM)  Treaty  and  sur- 
mded  with  as  many  cooperative 
•angements  as  we  can  agree  upon  de- 
ned  to  build  confidence  between  us. 
cently  we  have  made  notable  prog- 
is  in  drafting  the  joint  text  of  a  pre- 
tability  protocol  designed  to  build 
;h  confidence.  This  protocol  includes 
'  agreement  to  reciprocal  exchange 
information  through  the  Nuclear 
5k  Reduction  Centers,  regular  meet- 
;s  of  experts,  and  mutual  observation 
tests. 

We  have  also  agreed  on  a  formula 
it  includes  a  period  of  nonwithdrawal 
'm  the  ABM  Treaty.  But  we  have  not 
:  agreed  on  the  draft  of  a  joint  text 
a  separate  agreement  embodying 
it  formula. 

Important  unsettled  issues  include 
i  duration  and  legal  meaning  of  the 
nwithdrawal  commitment,  what  hap- 
ns  during  the  nonwithdrawal  period, 
d  what  happens  after  that  period.  It 
0  seems  ludicrous  to  us  to  make  an 
ditional  explicit  commitment  to  the 
5M  Treaty  while  our  current  con- 
'ns  about  Soviet  noncompliance  with 
it  treaty  remain  unsatisfied. 

What  are  the  prospects  for  round 
'  Our  leaders  have  instructed  us  to 
itinue  our  efforts  "energetically  and 
rposefully."  That  is  what  we  will  do. 
;  have  seen  how  much  can  be  accom- 
shed  with  good  will  and  hard  work. 
e  U.S.  delegation  will  leave  no  stone 
turned  in  its  search  for  equitable 


agreements  that  will  make  the  world 
safer  for  the  United  States  and  its  al- 
lies, for  the  Soviet  Union  and  its  allies, 
and  for  mankind. 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
JULY  12,  19882 

The  United  States  and  Soviet  Union 
open  round  10  of  the  nuclear  and  space 
talks  in  Geneva  today. 

In  over  6  years  of  negotiation,  we 
have  made  considerable  progress:  in 
START  we  have  agreement  on  50%  re- 
ductions in  strategic  forces,  to  a  ceiling 
of  6,000  warheads  on  1,600  strategic  nu- 
clear delivery  vehicles,  and  subceilings 
of  4,900  ballistic  missile  warheads,  and 
1,540  warheads  on  154  heavy  missiles. 
Both  sides  have  agreed  that  there  will 
be  a  50%  reduction  in  throw-weight  for 
Soviet  missiles.  There  is  also  agree- 
ment on  a  counting  rule  for  heavy 
bomber  armaments  and  on  elements  of 
a  verification  regime  that  will  include 
several  kinds  of  on-site  inspection,  data 
exchange,  and  measures  to  reduce  the 
possibility  of  cheating.  The  negotiators 
have  worked  out  a  joint  draft  treaty 
text  that  records  extensive  and  signifi- 
cant areas  of  agreement,  as  well  as  re- 
maining areas  of  disagreement. 

In  the  defense  and  space  forum,  we 
seek  agreement  on  how  the  United 
States  and  Soviet  Union  can  jointly 
manage  a  stable  transition  to  increasing 
reliance  on  effective  defenses — should 
they  prove  feasible — which  threaten  no 
one.  Our  negotiators  will  work  on  a 
joint  draft  text  of  a  separate  agreement 
on  defense  and  space  issues,  reflecting 
the  principles  General  Secretary 
Gorbachev  and  I  outlined  at  the  Wash- 
ington summit  in  December  1987.  At 
the  outset  of  the  defense  and  space 
talks,  few  expected  that  we  could  have 
come  as  far  as  we  have.  Our  SDI  pro- 
gram has  provided  an  important  incen- 
tive for  the  Soviets  to  negotiate 
seriously.  It  is  also  our  best  hope  for  a 
safer  world.  We  have  made  clear  to  the 
Soviets  that  we  will  not  bargain  SDI 
away  nor  accept  any  provisions  that 
would  cripple  our  research,  develop- 
ment, and  testing  program,  which  is  in 
full  compliance  with  the  ABM  Treaty. 

Since  the  end  of  the  last  round, 
additional  progress  was  made  on  a  num- 
ber of  issues.  In  the  joint  statement 
issued  at  the  Moscow  summit,  we  and 
the  Soviets  identified  some  common 
ground  with  respect  to  concepts  for 
verification  of  mobile  missiles — should 


they  be  permitted  in  a  START  treaty— 
and  on  dealing  with  air-launched  cruise 
missiles.  It  remains  the  U.S.  position 
to  seek  a  ban  on  mobile  missiles  unless 
effective  verification  provisions  can  be 
found  for  limitations  on  them.  The  dis- 
cussions in  Moscow  were  a  sound  be- 
ginning but  much  remains  to  be  done, 
including  translating  areas  of  common 
ground  into  precise  treaty  language. 

Many  other  tough  issues  remain, 
however,  including  issues  which  affect 
the  fundamental  security  interests  of 
each  side.  A  major  one  for  the  United 
States  is  the  illegal  Soviet  radar  at 
Krasnoyarsk. 

Ambassadors  Kampelman,  Cooper, 
and  Hanmer-'  and  their  negotiating 
teams  are  returning  to  Geneva  pre- 
pared to  engage  in  the  discussion  and 
hard  bargaining  necessary  to  make 
headway  and  to  achieve  an  agreement 
that  meets  the  criteria  we  have  set: 
deep  reductions,  greater  strategic  sta- 
bility, and  effective  verification.  Our 
goal  is  a  good  agreement  in  each  area, 
not  a  quick  one,  and  we  will  not  take 
any  shortcuts.  We  have  already  come  a 
long  way  toward  agreements  that  will 
strengthen  our  security  and  that  of  our 
allies.  If  the  Soviets  return  to  Geneva 
prepared  to  make  further  progress, 
much  more  can  be  achieved. 


'Made  on  arrival  in  Geneva.  Max  M. 
Kampelman  is  head  of  the  U.S.  delegation 
on  nuclear  and  space  arms  talks. 

-Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  18,  1988. 

■*Henry  F.  Cooper  is  chief  defense  and 
space  negotiator,  and  Stephen  R.  Hanmer 
is  chief  START  negotiator.  ■ 


Nuclear  Testing  Talks 
Conclude  Round  Two 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
JUNE  28,  19881 

The  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  concluded  round  2  of  the  nuclear 
testing  talks  on  June  28  in  Geneva.  The 
round,  which  began  on  February  15,  is 
part  of  U.S. -Soviet  step-by-step  nego- 
tiations on  nuclear  testing.  The  first 
priority  of  these  talks  is  agreement  on 
effective  verification  measures  for  two 
existing  but  unratified  treaties — the 
Threshold  Test  Ban  Treaty  and  the 
Peaceful  Nuclear  Explosions  Treaty. 


nartmont  ni  State  Bulletin/SeDtember  1988 


ARMS  CONTROL 


During  the  round,  we  made  consid- 
erable progress  toward  our  goal  of  ef- 
fective verification  of  these  treaties. 
The  two  sides  are  now  close  to  agree- 
ment on  the  verification  protocol  for  the 
Peaceful  Nuclear  Explosions  Treaty. 
Agreement  on  this  protocol  will  facili- 
tate further  progress  on  the  verification 
protocol  for  the  Threshold  Test  Ban 
Treaty.  However,  in  the  case  of  this 
treaty,  the  Soviets  have  insisted  that 
the  joint  verification  e.xperiment  (JVE) 
is  necessary  before  the  protocol  is 
finalized. 

Preparations  for  the  JVE  are  well 
advanced.  Based  on  procedures  detailed 
in  an  agi-eement  signed  in  Moscow  dur- 
ing the  summit,  personnel  from  each 
side  are  now  on  the  other's  test  site, 


making  arrangements  for  the  experi- 
ment. We  expect  the  JVE  to  be  con- 
ducted this  summer.  We  believe  that 
the  experiment  will  provide  the  Soviets 
the  information  they  need  to  accept 
routine  U.S.  use  of  CORRTEX  [contin- 
uous reflectometry  for  radius  vs.  time 
experiment] — the  most  accurate 
method  we  have  identified  for  verifying 
compliance  with  these  treaties — for 
treaty  verification. 

We  hope  that  with  the  continued 
cooperation  of  the  Soviet  Union,  we  will 
be  able  to  reach  early  agreement  on 
effective  verification  measures  so  that 
these  two  treaties  can  be  ratified. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  4,  1988. 


Nuclear  Nonproliferation  Treaty 
Celebrates  20th  Anniversary 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
JULY  1,  19881 

Twenty  years  ago  today,  61  nations,  in- 
cluding the  United  States,  signed  the 
Ti-eaty  on  the  Non-Proliferation  of  Nu- 
clear Weapons.  This  treaty  serves  as  a 
cornerstone  of  international  efforts  to 
prevent  the  further  spread  of  nuclear 
weapons,  which  is  one  of  the  most  di- 
rect and  serious  threats  to  regional  and 
global  stability.  Nations  from  around 
the  globe  have  committed  themselves  to 
the  treaty  and  its  objectives.  Indeed, 
with  136  parties,  the  Nonproliferation 
Treaty  has  the  widest  adherence  of  any 
arms  control  treaty  in  history.  The 
important  role  of  the  treaty  has  been 
repeatedly  reaffirmed.  The  participants 
at  the  third  Nonproliferation  Treaty  re- 
view conference  in  1985  concluded  that 
universal  adherence  to  the  treaty  is  the 
best  way  to  strengthen  the  barriers 
against  proliferation.  They  urged  all 
states  not  party  to  the  treaty  to  accede 
to  it. 

The  nuclear-weapon  states  which 
are  parties  to  the  treaty  have  agreed 
not  to  assist  non-nuclear-weapon  states 
to  acquire  nuclear  explosives.  The  non- 
nuclear-weapon  states  in  turn  pledged 
not  to  acquire  nuclear  explosives.  These 
mutual  pledges  acknowledge  that  the 
technology  of  nuclear  weapons  and  nu- 
clear explosives  cannot  be  distinguished 
and  that  their  further  spread  threatens 
the  security  of  all  nations. 

The  Nonproliferation  Treaty  also 
calls  for  parties  to  cooperate  in  the  de- 
velopment of  the  peaceful  uses  of  nu- 


clear energy,  especially  in  non-nuclear- 
weapon  states  which  are  parties  to  the 
treaty.  The  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  en- 
ergy are  important  to  the  social  and 
economic  well-being  of  many  peoples, 
and  the  United  States  has  long  been  in 
the  forefront  of  countries  providing 
technical  assistance  and  other  coopera- 
tion in  the  nuclear  field.  We  are  com- 
mitted to  continuing  such  cooperation 
under  effective  international  safe- 
guards. The  comprehensive  safeguards 
applied  by  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency  (IAEA)  under  the 
treaty  provide  essential  assurance  of 
the  peaceful  intent  of  the  nuclear  ac- 
tivities of  the  states  involved,  thus  ben- 
efiting all  mankind. 

The  United  States  has  taken  the 
initiative  in  negotiations  to  substan- 
tially reduce  nuclear  arsenals  as  called 
for  in  Article  VI  of  the  Nonprolifera- 
tion Treaty.  The  conclusion  by  the 
United  States  and  the  U.S.S.R.  of  the 
Treaty  on  the  Elimination  of  Their 
Intermediate-Range  and  Shorter-Range 
Missiles  (INF),  which  entered  into 
force  on  June  1,  is  clear  evidence  of  our 
deep  commitment  to  nuclear  arms  re- 
ductions. This  treaty,  which  contains 
the  most  stringent  verification  meas- 
ures of  any  arms  control  agreement, 
will  eliminate  an  entire  class  of  U.S. 
and  Soviet  nuclear  missiles.  The  United 
States  also  continues  its  negotiations 
with  the  U.S.S.R.  to  complete  a  treaty 
to  reduce  U.S.  and  Soviet  strategic  of- 
fensive arms  by  50%.  We  are,  in  addi- 
tion, committed  to  seeking  effective 


and  verifiable  agreements  with  the  Sc  || 
viet  Union  on  nuclear  testing  limita-   ] 
tions  that  could  strengthen  security  ft  i 
all  nations.  When  discussions  of  two  e'' 
isting  treaties  are  completed  and  thej 
are  ratified,  we  are  prepared  to  pursu 
negotiations  on  a  step-by-step  paralle ! " 
program  to  limit  and  ultimately  end  n 
clear  testing,  in  association  with  a  pn 
gram  to  reduce  and  ultimately  elimim 
all  nuclear  weapons. 

In  1981  the  President  outlined  U. 
pohcy  to  prevent  the  proliferation  of  I 
nuclear  explosives  and  declared  that   || 
this  issue  was  critical  to  international  t 
peace  as  well  as  regional  and  global  s  (i: 
bility.  If  we  are  to  succeed  in  halting  ^ 
the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons,  how-    ^ 
ever,  the  nations  of  the  world  must     ■ 
work  together  Each  state  has  a  resp(  I 
sibihty  to  refrain  from  seeking  nuclet  t 
weapons  and  to  take  all  steps  necesss  \ 
to  avoid  contributing  to  the  spread  of  jt 
nuclear  weapons  through  the  export  i  ji 
nuclear  equipment  and  technology.      |j 
As  the  President  has  stated  on  a  K 
number  of  occasions,  he  believes  that  ji 
nuclear  war  can  never  be  won  and  mi  L 
never  be  fought.  In  order  to  eliminat  L 
the  threat  of  nuclear  war,  we  have       I 
sought  to  achieve  deep  reductions  in 
the  level  of  nuclear  weapons  worldwi< 
The  INF  agreement  is  a  concrete  ex- 
ample of  our  success.  However,  in  on 
to  completely  rid  the  world  of  the  ris 
of  nuclear  war,  particularly  at  the  tin 
when  the  United  States  and  the 
U.S.S.R.  have  agreed  to  reduce  theii 
nuclear  arsenals,  it  is  equally  vital  to 
prevent  any  further  spread  of  nucleai 
weapons.  The  Nonproliferation  Treat; 
is  clearly  the  most  important  means  ' 
have  for  accomplishing  this  goal. 

The  United  States  played  a  maio 
role  in  the  negotiation  of  the  Non- 
proliferation  Treaty  and,  over  its  life- 1 
time,  all  U.S.  Presidents  have  strong  t 
supported  it.  On  this,  the  20th  annivt 
sary  of  the  opening  for  signature  of  t 
treaty,  the  President  calls  upon  all 
countries  that  have  not  yet  adhered  t 
it  to  do  so  in  order  to  demonstrate 
their  commitment  to  preventing  the 
spread  of  nuclear  weapons  and  to  re- 
ducing the  risk  of  nuclear  war.  Purth' 
he  urges  all  parties  to  the  treaty  to 
rededicate  themselves  to  achieving  it: 
objectives  and  to  ensuring  its  continu 
vitality.  This  is  both  our  shared  respi 
sibility  and  our  contribution  to  peace 
for  this  and  future  generations. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  4,  1988.  I 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/September  1^ 


ST  ASIA 


ie  United  States 
the  Changing  Asia  of  the  1990s 


'ichael  H.  Armacost 

Address  before  the  Japan-America 
ety  of  New  York  on  June  6,  1988. 
)assador  Armacost  is  Under  Secretary 
Mitkal  Affairs. 

Icome  this  opportunity  to  address 
iistinguished  members  of  the 
n-America  Society  of  New  York 
the  Asia  Society  on  the  subject  of 
ge  in  Northeast  Asia  and  its  conse- 
ices  for  the  United  States.  I  hope 
will  permit  me  to  address  the 
itly  broader  geographic  area  of 
.  Asia  in  my  remarks.  Japan, 
!a,  and  China  are  part  of  a  larger 
fie  Basin  economy.  Their  security 
•ests  are  directly  affected  by  the 
ility  of  Southeast  Asia  and  politi- 
,  as  well  as  economically,  they 
acquired  a  stake  in  the  resilience 
,e  ASEAN  [Association  of  South 
,  Asian  Nations]  countries  and 
,h  Pacific  nations. 
Although  much  of  my  career  has 
I  spent  in  Washington,  I  have  had 
privilege  of  serving  in  Tokyo  and 
ila,  two  capitals  which  illustrate 
diversity  and  dynamism  of  the  re- 
.  In  both  I  have  seen  firsthand  the 
lendous  changes  which  have  taken 
8  in  East  Asia  in  recent  decades. 
No  region  in  the  world  has  demon- 
ted  a  greater  capacity  to  generate 
ccommodate  change.  That  perhaps 
unts  for  the  fact  that  in  recent 
s  the  Asia-Pacific  region  has 
rged  as  a  world  leader  in  manufac- 
ng,  trade,  and  finance.  Japan  ranks 
he  world's  second  largest  economy; 
arrent  exchange  rates,  its  per  cap- 
JNP  [gross  national  product]  ex- 
s  that  of  the  United  States;  and  the 
Lalization  of  the  Tokyo  stock  market 
surpasses  that  of  the  New  York 
k  Exchange. 

We  all  know,  moreover,  that  in  Asia 
imic  economic  growth  is  no  longer  a 
ly  Japanese  phenomenon.  The  "four 
rs"  of  Asia  (Korea,  Taiwan,  Sing- 
■e,  and  Hong  Kong)  as  a  group 
aally  register  among  the  world's 
est  growth  rates;  they  have  become 
3r  players  in  international  trade; 
their  per  capita  GNP  now  equals  or 


exceeds  that  of  some  OECD  [Organiza- 
tion for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development]  members. 

But  the  focus  of  this  conference  is 
on  the  future.  What  are  the  trends  that 
will  shape  East  Asia  through  the  1990s? 

First,  the  center  of  gravity  of  world 
economic  financial  power  will  con- 
tinue to  move  toward  the  Pacific. 

•  East  Asian  nations  as  a  group 
seem  likely  to  have  little  trouble  match- 
ing recent  annual  growth  rates  of 
roughly  5%  through  the  rest  of  this 
century,  permitting  the  region  to  pro- 
duce a  combined  GNP  possibly  exceed- 
ing that  of  the  United  States  and  the 
European  Community  by  the  year  2000. 
This  would  enhance  the  region's  status 
as  the  world's  most  dynamic  economic 
zone  and  provide  it  the  basis  for  grow- 
ing international  political  influence. 

•  Assuming  a  continuation  of  pres- 
ent policies  to  liberalize  financial, 
trade,  and  foreign  investment  rules, 
the  East  Asian  region  could  amass  the 
world's  largest  and  most  modern  stock 
of  industrial  capital.  At  present,  East 
Asian  nations  are  investing  nearly  20% 
more  in  real  terms  than  the  United 
States,  an  annual  gap  of  roughly  $120 
biUion.  If  this  pattern  continues,  it  will 
carry  large  implications  for  our  compet- 
itiveness a  decade  hence. 

•  By  the  end  of  the  century.  East 
Asia  could  become  the  world's  largest 
source  of  credit.  Already,  Japan  is  the 
world's  largest  net  creditor  nation.  In 
the  future,  competing  demands  for  Jap- 
anese funds — and  for  surplus  capital 
from  the  newly  industrialized  countries 
of  East  Asia — will  come  from  Latin 
America,  Africa,  and  the  commodity 
exporters  of  Southeast  Asia.  This  will 
give  Japan  and  the  NICs  [newly  indus- 
triahzed  countries]  a  growing  ability  to 
influence  international  financial  affairs. 

•  East  Asia  could  also  become  the 
world's  technological  leader.  A  recent 
survey  of  trends  in  nine  key  technolo- 
gies suggests  that  Japan  may  soon 
achieve  a  clear  lead  in  four  (semicon- 
ductors, advanced  structural  materials, 
manufacturing  technology,  and  bio- 
technology), rough  parity  in  two  (tele- 
communications and  data  processing), 
while  lagging  somewhat  in  three  (air- 


craft, space,  and  nuclear  power).  Need- 
less to  add,  the  economic  prowess  of 
other  East  Asian  nations  will  be  aug- 
mented as  technology  is  defused 
throughout  the  region  by  U.S.  and  Jap- 
anese direct  investment  and  licensed 
production. 

In  short,  the  United  States  already 
faces  a  formidable  industrial,  financial, 
and  technological  challenge  from  the 
nations  of  East  Asia.  That  challenge 
will  continue  to  grow. 

Second,  internal  structural  adjust- 
ments and  economic  reforms,  if  al- 
lowed by  governments  to  continue, 
will  reshape  the  economies  of  the 
Pacific  Basin  and  effect  changes  in 
their  relative  strengths. 

Japan.  Two  years  ago  Japan  pro- 
duced almost  75%  of  East  Asian  out- 
put. That  share  may  drop  to  around 
60%  of  regional  production  by  the  year 
2000,  as  the  result  of  faster  growth  in 
the  region's  newly  industrialized  coun- 
tries and  LDCs  [less  developed  coun- 
tries]. The  structure  of  the  Japanese 
economy  will  experience  significant 
change  as  it  continues  to  shift  from 
manufacturing  to  service  industries 
and  diminishes  its  reliance  upon 
export-led  growth. 

China.  Over  the  next  decade, 
China  could  well  become  a  major  com- 
mercial power  in  Asia.  Market-oriented 
reform  policies  have  produced  over  10% 
annual  GNP  growth  since  1982.  These 
reforms  have  significantly  raised  agri- 
cultural output  and  spawned  countless 
new  rural  enterprises.  Yet,  the  main 
thrust  of  China's  export  drive  will  con- 
tinue to  be  the  manufacturing  sector 
where  output  has  expanded  13%  an- 
nually over  the  last  6  years.  If  China's 
GNP  continues  to  increase  at  an  aver- 
age rate  of  7% — a  target  that  should  be 
well  within  reach — and  its  economy  con- 
tinues to  open  up  to  imports,  Beijing's 
exports  could  reach  $175  billion  by  the 
year  2000.  This  would  place  the  P.R.C. 
[People's  Republic  of  China]  on  a  par 
with  France  or  the  United  Kingdom  as 
a  trading  nation. 


It  nt  Qtato  Riilletin/Seotenfiber  1988 


EAST  ASIA 


U.S.S.R.  Heretofore,  the  Soviet 
Union  has  been  a  negligible  factor  in 
the  Pacific  Basin  economy.  However, 
[General  Secretary]  Mikhail  Gorbachev 
has  recognized  the  dynamism  of  East 
Asia  and  served  notice  that  the  Soviets 
intend  to  play  more  actively  in  the 
area.  He  has  signaled  an  interest  in 
spurring  economic  development  in  the 
Soviet  Far  East  and  in  making  that  de- 
velopment the  driving  force  in  ex- 
panding Soviet  trade  with  East  Asia. 
Rhetoric  aside,  Moscow  has  yet  to 
allocate  the  resources  necessary  to 
achieve  such  a  goal.  Recent  major  So- 
viet projects  in  the  east  have  been  pri- 
marily in  natural  resource  development, 
not  in  industry;  and  most  have  been 
located  in  Western  Siberia,  not  the  far 
eastern  region.  Given  the  strains  that 
perestroika  will  probably  impose  upon 
the  Soviet  economy,  Moscow's  economic 
ambitions  in  the  Pacific  will  prove  diffi- 
cult to  realize  for  years  to  come. 

The  NICs.  The  newly  industri- 
alized economies  of  Asia  will  continue 
to  progress  up  the  industrial  ladder; 
Korea,  Taiwan,  Singapore,  and  Hong 
Kong  will  become  even  more  important 
regional  players;  other  ASEAN  coun- 
tries will  offer  growing  attractions  to 
labor-intensive  manufacturing  indus- 
tries due  to  labor  cost  differentials.  By 
the  turn  of  the  century,  Thailand  could 
be  a  major  success  story,  and  countries 
like  the  Philippines  and  Indonesia, 
which  must  surmount  more  serious 
economic  or  political  hurdles,  possess 
impressive  potential. 

Thus,  by  the  turn  of  the  century 
Japan  will  remain  the  dominant  re- 
gional economy;  China  is  likely  to  play 
a  dramatically  increased  role;  some  of 
the  NICs  will  have  emerged  as  world- 
class  competitors;  and  the  Soviets  will 
be  in  the  game  but  not  yet  a  major 
player 

Third,  continuing  economic  growth 
should  enhance  prospects  for  political 
stability  in  the  region. 

Economic  development  will  remain 
a  dominant  priority  for  governments  in 
the  region.  Growth  should  reduce  the 
temptation  of  external  adventure  and 
erode  the  force  of  militant  ideologies 
and  virulent  forms  of  nationalism. 
Heretofore,  Vietnam  and  North  Korea 
have  made  themselves  the  pariahs  in 
the  region;  they  have  not  shared  the 
benefits  of  Asian  prosperity.  Perhaps 
that  will  change. 


As  for  the  historic  conflict  points  in 
the  region — Korea,  Indochina,  and  the 
Taiwan  Straits — one  can  hope  for  posi- 
tive change. 

•  It  is  difficult  to  foresee  with  any 
clarity  political  developments  in  North 
Korea.  But  South  Korea's  extraordinary 
economic  performance  has  already 
strengthened  Seoul's  hand,  altered  the 
balance  of  forces  on  the  peninsula,  and 
encouraged  incipient  moves  to  reduce 
North-South  tensions.  There  is  no  ob- 
jective reason  why  these  trends  should 
not  continue. 

•  In  Indochina,  prospects  for  a  po- 
litical resolution  of  the  Cambodian  issue 
appear  to  be  on  the  upswing.  In  Mos- 
cow last  week  the  Soviets  professed  an 
interest  in  a  negotiated  settlement; 
Vietnam  recently  announced  major 
troop  withdrawals  this  summer,  but  it 
remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  with- 
drawals will  be  more  than  the  troop 
rotations  of  the  past  and  whether  Hanoi 
is  ready  to  join  in  the  search  for  a  po- 
litical settlement. 

•  There  are  also  encouraging  devel- 
opments in  the  interaction  between  Tai- 
pei and  Beijing.  The  P.R.C.  has  been 
pursuing  a  peaceful  policy  toward  Tai- 
wan for  a  decade.  This  is  very  impor- 
tant. Last  year  Taiwan  authorized 
family  visits  to  the  mainland,  and  Tai- 
pei is  considering  liberalizing  such  pri- 
vate contacts  further  Indirect  trade 
between  the  two  is  now  substantial, 
and  it  is  increasing.  We  welcome  these 
developments  and  hope  they  continue. 

Fourth,  by  the  turn  of  the  century  a 
new  generation  of  leadership  will 
come  to  power  in  Asia. 

This  will  affect  communist  and  non- 
communist  countries  alike.  This  passing 
of  the  baton  is  already  well  underway 
in  Korea,  China,  Taiwan,  and  several 
Southeast  Asian  countries.  The  new 
generation  of  leaders  is  likely  to  be  bet- 
ter educated,  more  persuaded  of  the 
virtues  of  the  market  economy,  and 
more  critical  of  authoritarian  political 
practices  than  their  predecessors.  I 
would  merely  add  that  figures  like 
[Chairman  of  China's  Central  Military 
Committee]  Deng  Xiaoping,  [former 
President  of  Indonesia]  Suharto,  and 
[Prime  Minister  of  Singapore]  Lee 
Kuan  Yew — not  to  mention,  [President 
of  North  Korea]  Kim  Il-Sung — are  vir- 
tually synonymous  with  the  recent  po- 
litical evolution  of  their  respective 
countries.  One  cannot  be  sure  how 
their  passing  will  affect  the  political 
stability  and  policy  continuity  of  their 
nations. 


Fifth,  the  continuing  economic  trai^ 
formation  of  East  Asia  should  enco  (- 
age  the  trend  toward  pluralistic  ancj 
democratic  political  systems. 

Korea,  l^iwan,  Thailand,  and  the' 
Philippines  provide  grounds  for  hope 
that  the  trend  toward  democratizatio 
is  accelerating.  Even  in  China  pluralii 
is  growing,  as  are  pressures  for  polit' 
cal  liberalization.  We  cannot  assume 
that  progress  will  be  steady,  let  alon^l 
inevitable.  In  many  Asian  countries  ; 
military  continues  to  play  an  import;  i 
political  role,  democratic  traditions  r  ' 
main  weak,  and  religious  or  ethnic  d  '' 
ferences  as  well  as  economic  disparit  i' 
make  prospects  for  democratization   '' 
somewhat  uncertain.  Nonetheless,  tl 
general  trend  appears  to  be  moving  ' 
toward  pluralism. 

Sixth,  regional  consultation  and  co  ' 
operation  should  continue  to  grow  'i 
among  East  Asian  nations.  H 

Organic  economic  forces — trade 
and  investment  flows  and  entrepre-    .; 
neurial  activity — will  continue  to  en- 1 
courage  the  integration  of  the  Pacific  ,, 
Basin  economy.  Over  the  coming  dec 
ade,  we  may  not  see  the  elaborate  n  . 
gional  political  institutions  in  Asia  tl  jf 
have  emerged  in  Europe.  But  the  co 
sion  of  ASEAN  seems  destined  to 
grow,  serving  to  minimize  conflict 
among  its  members;  and  the  ASEA 
dialogue  with  Japan,  the  United  Stal 
the  EC  [European  Community],  and 
other  external  powers  will  expand.  I 
would  also  expect  even  broader  pan- 
Pacific  regional  groupings,  like  the 
PECC  [Pacific  Economic  Cooperatioi 
Conference],  to  strike  deeper  roots. 
How  the  various  parts  of  the  Asian  e 
nomic  jigsaw  puzzle  will  respond  to  i  i 
initiatives  to  integrate  the  Pacific  ec( 
omy  and  to  give  the  Pacific  nations  a 
stronger  regional  political  identity  is  '', 
not  clear.  It  seems  self-evident,  how-, 
ever,  that  the  Soviets  and  the  Chines 
will  take  an  increased  interest  in  par 
ticipating  in  any  regional  forums  tha 
develop. 

Seventh,  the  interplay  among  the 
major  powers  in  Asia  is  likely  to 
become  more  balanced  and  perhaps 
more  fluid. 

With  respect  to  Soviet  policies  ir 
the  area,  much  will  depend  upon  the 
success  of  Mr.  Gorbachev's  reforms.  ' 
reform  effort  should  focus  Moscow's 
efforts  on  a  domestic  agenda  and  giv 
the  Soviets  a  strong  incentive  to  assi 
tranquility  along  their  borders.  We  r 


Deoartment  of  Statp  RiiltPtin/<;pntpmhpr  1<li 


EAST  ASIA 


some  slowing  of  the  Soviet  military 
dup  in  the  Far  East.  We  should  also 
3ct  a  more  adroit  and  sophisticated 
onal  political  and  diplomatic 
tegy. 

China  is  clearly  the  current  focus 
lorbachev's  East  Asian  strategy. 
;e  his  1986  Vladivostok  speech,  he 
moved  to  address  China's  precondi- 
s  for  normalization  of  relations,  and 
Chinese  have  encouraged  Soviet 
rts.  Given  the  importance  attached 
conomic  reform  and  restructuring  in 
1  China  and  the  Soviet  Union,  a  re- 
.tion  of  tensions  between  the  two 
ers  is  politically  attractive  for  both, 
h,  moreover,  seeks  greater  maneu- 
ibility  in  its  dealings  with  Japan  and 
United  States. 

Thus,  over  the  next  decade,  fur- 
■  normalization  of  Sino-Soviet  politi- 
'elations  is  in  the  cards.  I  would  not 
5ct  a  return  to  the  alliance  rela- 
ship  of  the  1950s.  Beijing  still  sees 
Soviet  Union  as  posing  long-term 
.gers  to  Chinese  interests  in  Asia, 
it  will  take  more  than  "smile  di- 
aacy"  to  change  this  strategic 
;eption. 

Even  with  the  advent  of  a  more 
ful  Soviet  diplomacy,  Moscow's  rela- 
s  with  Tokyo  will  remain  uncertain 
result  of  their  territorial  dispute 
•  the  Northern  Islands.  In  the  eco- 
iic  sphere,  the  Soviet  Union  will 
i  to  attract  Japanese  interest  and 
stment  in  the  development  of 
;ria  and  the  maritime  regions, 
to  date  such  efforts  have  produced 
•ger  results. 

Expanded  Japanese  relations  with 
aa  are  likely.  Economic  complemen- 
ty  reinforced  by  political  interests 
ooth  sides  should  assure  that  result, 
if  recent  experience  is  any  guide, 
can  expect  periodic  ups  and  downs 
occasional  misunderstandings  as 
1  adjusts  to  the  growing  power  and 
I  istrial  prowess  of  the  other. 
U.S.  ties  with  Tokyo  and  Beijing 
now  on  track;  with  both  we  have 
t  on  a  broad  foundation  that  should 
nde  stability  and  continuity  over 
coming   lecade. 

Our  own  alliance  relations  with 
an  will  continue  to  be  the  cor- 
stone  of  our  East  Asian  policy.  Over 
past  8  years,  our  security  rela- 
ship  with  Japan  has  matured.  Jap- 
se  efforts  to  assume  responsibility 
the  conventional  defense  of  the 
le  islands,  to  defend  the  sealanes  to 
south,  to  pick  up  a  larger  portion  of 
cost  of  maintaining  U.S.  forces  in 
an,  and  to  develop  a  more  equitable 


pattern  of  exchanges  of  defense  tech- 
nology all  testify  to  the  strength  of  our 
security  ties.  They  will  remain  an 
important  source  of  stability  in  the 
region. 

What  are  the  implications  of  these 
trends  for  Tokyo  and  Seoul?  Our  Jap- 
anese and  Korean  friends  must  speak 
to  this  question,  but  I  might  offer  a  few 
parochial  comments. 

A  major  test  for  Japan  will  come  in 
managing  the  domestic  political  strains 
that  will  inevitably  accompany  the  con- 
tinuing internationalization  of  its  econ- 
omy. The  most  difficult  challenges  will 
presumably  arise  from  necessary  re- 
forms in  the  agricultural  sector  and 
from  dramatically  raising  the  level  of 
manufactured  imports.  Many,  particu- 
larly in  this  country,  have  been  critical 
of  the  pace  of  these  adjustments.  None- 
theless, the  ruling  Liberal  Democratic 
Party,  despite  vigorous  opposition,  has 
begun  to  open  up  agriculture  to  com- 
petition by  cutting  rice  subsidies.  In 
the  industrial  sector,  imports  of  con- 
sumer goods  are  on  the  rise.  A  strong 
yen  is  forcing  many  firms  to  cut  costs 
by  relocating  assembly  operations  over- 
seas. Nearly  half  of  Japan's  manufactur- 
ing companies  already  have  employees 
abroad.  This  trend  will  continue.  It  will 
fuel  growth  in  East  Asia  and  further 
integrate  Japan  more  closely  into  the 
regional  and  global  economy. 

The  flow  of  jobs  and  manufacturing 
facilities  overseas  will  presumably  rein- 
force Tokyo's  determination  to  replace 
lost  jobs  with  new  ones  in  fields  like 
the  information  sciences  and  applied 
technology.  We  can  expect  growing 
competition  in  areas  in  which  we  have 
traditionally  been  the  world  leader. 

Japan  also  faces  major  social  and 
demographic  changes.  By  the  end  of 
the  century  it  will  have  one  of  the  older 
populations  in  the  world — 16%  of  its 
people  will  be  over  65.  The  burden  of 
health  and  retirement  benefits,  cur- 
rently spi'ead  comfortably  over  six 
workers,  may  then  be  shouldered  by 
only  four.  This  change  will  probably  ac- 
celerate the  shift  to  service  industries, 
require  further  emphasis  on  domestic 
spending,  and  diminish  Japan's  current 
account  surplus. 

In  the  defense  area,  significant 
gaps  will  persist  between  Japan's  eco- 
nomic and  military  capabilities.  Al- 
though Japan  is  capable  of  a  dramatic 
mihtary  buildup,  it  is  not  likely  to  un- 
dertake one.  Historic  memories,  con- 
stitutional impediments,  domestic 
political  considerations,  and  the  con- 
cerns of  neighbors  will  continue  to  im- 


pose significant  constraints.  But  these 
notwithstanding,  Japan  will  become  a 
formidable  military  power  even  if  it 
continues  to  allocate  a  very  small  per- 
centage of  its  GNP  to  defense. 

We  should  expect  Japan  to  continue 
assuming  wider  regional  and  global  po- 
litical and  economic  responsibilities 
commensurate  with  its  industrial  and 
financial  strength.  In  particular  we  can 
expect  Japan's  economic  aid  programs 
to  grow  much  faster  than  anyone  else's, 
enabling  Japan  to  play  an  increasingly 
influential  supporting  role  in  the  devel- 
opment and  stability  of  countries  of  ma- 
jor importance — in  East  Asia  and 
elsewhere.  The  major  thrust  of  Japan's 
aid  program  has  traditionally  been 
aimed  at  the  Asia-Pacific  region.  That 
is  natural  and  will  continue.  But  as  its 
aid  expands,  as  Asian  nations  prosper 
and  Japan's  global  responsibilities  in- 
crease, it  is  reasonable  to  expect  more 
of  its  aid  to  be  targeted  on  Africa,  the 
Middle  East,  and  Latin  America;  its 
loan  programs  to  become  even  more 
concessional  and  to  be  supplemented 
by  more  grant  assistance. 

As  for  Korea,  we  have  seen  phe- 
nomenal changes  on  the  peninsula  over 
the  last  decade.  South  Korea  has  car- 
ried out  an  economic  expansion  that  is 
the  envy  of  other  developing  and  indus- 
trializing nations.  In  the  process  it 
has  moved  from  number  12  to  number  7 
among  our  trading  partners.  The 
growth  of  Korea's  industrial  power  will 
require  it  to  open  the  doors  to  its  own 
market  wider. 

Even  more  striking,  Korea  has  led 
a  move  for  democracy  that  has  captured 
the  attention  and  earned  the  admiration 
of  the  world.  Koreans  have  restored 
freedom  to  the  media;  they  provided  for 
full  participation  in  their  recent  elec- 
tions; and  a  truly  multiparty  political 
system  has  emerged.  Such  fundamental 
changes  cannot  come  without  some 
noise,  but  the  process  seems  under  con- 
trol and  appears  to  enjoy  broad  domes- 
tic support. 

During  this  period,  the  Republic  of 
Korea  has  continued  to  concentrate  on 
the  very  real  threat  from  the  North, 
carrying  out  a  modernization  and  train- 
ing program  that  has  enhanced  the  abil- 
ity of  the  republic  to  defend  itself  from 
aggression.  We  shall  continue  to  play 
our  own  part  in  supporting  their  shield. 
We  have  also  seen  a  fundamental  shift 
in  Seoul's  approach  to  Pyongyang.  More 
confident  and  self-assured,  Seoul  now 
seeks  to  draw  the  North  out  of  its  iso- 
lation and  into  an  active  dialogue. 


EAST  ASIA 


The  northern  half  of  the  peninsula 
presents  a  different  picture.  The  econ- 
omy has  stagnated.  Although  the 
D.P.R.K.  [Democratic  People's  Republic 
of  Korea]  continues  its  push  for  military 
superiority,  the  effort  seems  doomed  to 
fail  given  the  precipitous  decline  in  its 
relative  position  on  the  peninsula. 

These  changes  have  brought  Seoul 
an  internal  and  external  strength  that 
is  unprecedented.  The  result  is  a  new 
creativity  and  flexibility  in  coping 
with  domestic  and  external  challenges. 
I  would  expect  equally  important 
changes  over  the  coming  decade — most 
notably  in  the  diversification  of  eco- 
nomic and  political  relationships — not 
least  with  Eastern  and  Western  Eu- 
rope, China,  and  the  Soviet  Union.  The 
big  question,  of  course,  will  be  how  far 
relations  between  North  and  South  can 
be  opened  up.  One  can  hope  for  more 
"natural"  ties  through  the  lifting  of 
North  Korea's  impediments  to  wider 
travel  and  communications  with  the 
South,  family  reunification,  cultural  and 
sports  exchanges,  trade  ties,  and  a 
fuller  political  dialogue.  I  would  hope 
we  will  see  moves  toward  representa- 
tion of  Korea  in  the  United  Nations. 

Finally,  what  are  the  implications 
for  the  United  States? 

With  the  growth  of  Japan's  power, 
the  resurgence  of  China,  and  the  re- 
direction of  Soviet  interest  toward  the 
Far  East,  our  own  focus  on  Asian  af- 
fairs must  grow  correspondingly. 

We  can  expect  some  erosion  of  the 
dominant  position  we  have  exercised  in 
the  Pacific  since  World  War  II.  The 
growth  of  other  power  centers  will  inev- 
itably reduce  our  relative  influence,  and 
in  the  short  term  our  effort  to  over- 
come trade  and  fiscal  deficits  will 
prompt  Asians  to  look  to  other  markets 
and  will  temporarily  diminish  capital 
flows  from  the  United  States. 

This  does  not  foreshadow,  however, 
an  eclipse  of  America's  position  as  the 
major  power  in  the  Pacific.  We  will  con- 
tinue to  offer  the  largest  market  for 
Asian  exports,  and  a  major  source  of 
investment,  high  technology,  and  man- 
ufacturing facilities;  our  service  indus- 


tries are  poised  for  an  expanded  role  in 
the  area;  and  we  will  continue  to  deploy 
the  most  flexible  and  diversified  mili- 
tary power  in  East  Asia,  allowing  us  to 
play  a  pivotal  I'ole  in  regional  security. 

Our  steadfast  support  for  a  free 
trading  system  has  helped  create  the 
environment  in  which  our  Asian  friends 
have  prospered.  In  keeping  with  their 
dramatic  success,  Japan  and  the  four 
"Asian  tigers"  now  must  bear  a  much 
larger  responsibility  for  the  health  of 
the  world  economy  by  making  appi'o- 
priate  structural  adjustments  (ensur- 
ing realistic  exchange  rates,  lowering 
barriers  to  imports,  and  seeking 
growth  from  domestic  demand  as  well 
as  exports).  But  we,  too,  have 
responsibilities. 

We  should  not  look  upon  Asian 
competitiveness  as  a  threat  or  succumb 
to  protectionism.  This  is  the  worst  time 
to  give  in  to  that  temptation,  because  it 
is  increasingly  difficult  to  determine 
what,  in  fact,  is  "national"  and  what  is 
"foreign."  An  example  Secretary  Shultz 
frequently  cites  involves  a  shipping  la- 
bel for  integrated  circuits  fabricated  by 
an  American  firm.  It  read:  "Made  in 
one  or  more  of  the  following  countries: 
Korea,  Hong  Kong,  Malaysia,  Singa- 
pore, Taiwan,  Mauritius,  Thailand,  In- 
donesia, Mexico,  Philippines.  The  exact 
country  of  origin  is  unknown."  You  will 
note  that  8  of  the  10  countries  men- 
tioned happen  to  be  in  East  Asia. 

The  world  as  a  whole — and  that 
certainly  includes  Americans — has 
benefited  from  the  internationalization 
of  production  and  the  emergence  of  a 
global  economy.  Historically,  the  secret 
of  rapid  economic  growth  has  involved 
brisk  international  movements  of  cap- 
ital, technology,  and  goods.  This  is  such 
a  time,  and  we  should  encourage  it. 

As  the  newly  industrializing  coun- 
tries of  East  Asia  continue  to  mature 
economically,  we  must  find  ways  of  ac- 
knowledging their  status  and  drawing 
them  into  those  organizations  that  man- 
age the  global  economy.  Over  the  next 
decade.  South  Korea  and  several  other 
Asian  states  will  show  clear  promise  as 
candidates  for  membership  in  the 
OECD  and  other  such  international  for- 
ums. In  my  view  we  should  champion 
their  cause.  And  we  should  look  for 


other  regional  associations  in  which  t 
take  up  the  economic  and  political  oh 
lenges  of  the  Pacific  with  Asian  natio 

We  should  welcome  and  seize  op- 
portunities to  facilitate  the  resolutior 
regional  conflicts.  The  Cambodian  sit 
ation,  in  particular,  demands  a  politic 
settlement.  All  the  major  powers  ac- 
knowledge that  a  settlement  requires 
the  complete  withdrawal  of  Vietname 
forces,  a  process  of  national  reconcili. 
tion  in  Cambodia,  and  international 
guarantees.  We  should  continue  to  in 
sist  on  a  prompt  and  complete  with- 
drawal of  Vietnam's  forces;  support 
Sihanouk's  [Cambodian  resistance 
leader  Norodom  Sihanouk]  diplomati 
initiative;  coordinate  our  own  efforts 
closely  with  the  ASEAN  countries, 
Japan,  China,  and  others. 

In  Korea,  we  should  continue  to 
encourage  a  reduction  of  North-Sout 
tensions  through  dialogue,  while  helj 
ing  to  assure  a  security  environment 
which  such  tension  reduction  measur 
can  flourish. 

Politically,  we  should  continue  t( 
affirm  our  democratic  convictions  ani 
promote  their  practice  by  others.  Th 
role  we  played  in  the  Philippines  and 
Korea — lending  encouragement  to  in 
digenous  pressures  for  reform  witho- 
attempting  to  provide  our  own  blue- 
print— was  an  appropriate  one.  We 
must  also  be  willing  to  follow  throug 
helping  democratic  regimes  strike 
deeper  roots  by  lending  support  in 
ways  they  consider  appropriate  in  su 
mounting  current  problems. 

I  have  given  an  upbeat  assessme 
of  East  Asia's  future.  I  think  it  is  ful 
warranted.  During  much  more  tryin; 
times,  Winston  Churchill  said:  "I  am 
optimist  because  there's  not  much  po 
in  anything  else."  Today,  there  are 
plenty  of  reasons  to  be  bullish  about 
Asia.  I  am  also  an  optimist  about  oui 
relationships  with  the  Pacific  nations 
As  [former]  Prime  Minister  Nakason 
of  Japan  put  it  just  last  month:  "Two 
vastly  different  civilizations,  which  h 
moved  across  the  globe  over  the  cen- 
turies from  opposite  directions,  east 
and  west, 

are  making  giant  steps  to  meet  in  a 
dramatic  way  over  the  Pacific,  puUinj 
toward  each  other  like  two  magnets. 
So  it  is,  and  we  are  all  beneficiaries. 


Deoartment  of  State  Bulletin/Seotember  Ml. 


EAST  ASIA 


oposed  Sale  of  Aegis  Weapons  System  to  Japan 


Gaston  J.  Sigur,  Jr. 

Stafement  before  the  Suhcommit- 
■  on  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  and 
Arms  Control,  International  Se- 
ity,  and  Science  of  the  House  For- 
i  Affairs  Committee  on  June  16, 
?.  Mr.  Sigur  is  Assistant  Secretary 
lEast  Asia7i  and  Pacific  Affairs.^ 

opreciate  the  opportunity  to  meet 
1  you  to  discuss  the  proposed  sale  of 
Aegis  weapons  system  to  Japan,  a 
which  the  administration  views  as 
he  utmost  importance  in  strengthen- 
the  U.S.  security  position  in  the 
ific  as  well  as  our  critical  military 
tionship  with  Japan. 
Less  than  a  month  ago,  I  had  the 
ortunity  to  speak  before  Congress 
at  the  U.S.  defense  posture  in  the 
ific.  At  that  time,  I  noted  the  great 
:ess  which  U.S.  foreign  policy  has 
eved  in  this  important  part  of  the 
Id.  We  have  seen  impressive  eco- 
lic  growth  and  progress  in  the  poht- 
realm  toward  increasingly 
•esentative  government. 
One  of  the  cornerstones  of  this  suc- 
;  is  the  U.S.  military  presence  in 
t  Asia  and  the  Pacific  and  our  bilat- 
security  arrangements  which  have 
/ided  peace  and  security  in  the  re- 
1.  And  of  all  our  bilateral  security 
mgements  which  we  have  in  this 
i,  and  possibly  in  the  world,  our  re- 
jnship  with  Japan  is  unsurpassed  in 
ortance. 

In  the  course  of  over  40  years,  we 
Japan  have  developed  an  impressive 
1  of  military  cooperation.  This  rela- 
ship  found  its  root  in  a  common  as- 
5ment  of  the  military  threat  to  the 
ion  from  the  Soviet  Union.  However, 
as  grown  due  to  tireless  efforts  on 
part  of  both  our  governments  to 
1  increasingly  productive  methods  of 
izing  our  joint  military  capabilities 
counter  that  Soviet  threat. 

hancing  Pacific  Security 

!  Administration  views  the  proposed 
i  of  Aegis — an  integrated  air  defense 
tern  designed  to  track,  select,  and 
•  on  multiple  incoming  targets — as 
)ortant  in  enhancing  the  joint  mili- 
y  capabilities  of  the  United  States 
1  Japan  in  the  Pacific.  We  view  it  as 
nificant  for  military,  economic,  and 
itical  reasons. 


Militarily  it  directly  benefits  U.S. 
security  interests  in  the  region  and  is  a 
major  part  of  our  efforts  to  achieve 
greater  burdensharing  by  the  Japanese. 
Economically  it  involves  the  Japanese 
purchase  of  over  half  a  billion  dollars  of 
U.S.  equipment.  Politically,  and  most 
importantly,  this  proposed  sale  further 
cements  the  desire  on  the  parts  of  both 
our  governments  to  work  together  to 
achieve  security  in  the  Pacific. 

When  the  Government  of  Japan  an- 
nounced in  1981  that  it  would  defend  its 
territory,  airspace,  and  sealanes  of 
communication  out  to  1,000  nautical 
miles,  that  statement  was  greeted  en- 
thusiastically by  the  Administration 
and  in  Congress.  Since  that  time,  Japan 
has  acquired  substantial  military  equip- 
ment, including  P-3C  antisubmarine 
aircraft  and  F-15s,  needed  to  take  on 
those  missions.  The  proposed  sale  of 
Aegis  to  Japan  is  critical  in  enabling 
Japan  to  fully  assume  those  defensive 
roles,  which  in  turn,  directly  support 
U.S.  secui'ity  interests  in  the  region. 

A  look  at  Japan's  strategic  geo- 
graphic location  in  the  Northwest  Pa- 
cific indicates  why  these  Japanese 
defensive  missions  are  critical  to  the 
United  States.  A  line  drawn  due  west 
from  the  northernmost  tip  of  Japan  on 
the  Island  of  Hokkaido  intersects  the 
east  coast  of  the  Soviet  Union  at  a 
point  300  miles  north  of  the  Soviet 
naval  port  of  Vladivostok.  A  similar  line 
drawn  west  from  the  southernmost 
point  of  Japan  on  the  island  of  Okinawa 
touches  Taiwan. 

Japan's  self-defense  missions  deny 
Soviet  ships  and  aircraft  undetected  ac- 
cess to  the  Pacific  Ocean  and  much  of 
the  Indian  Ocean  since  most  Soviet 
forces  there  come  from  Vladivostok. 
They  also  complicate  Soviet  plans  to  in- 
terfere with  the  free  flow  of  commerce 
in  the  Pacific  and  Indian  Oceans,  which 
is  a  critical  U.S.  national  interest. 

Japan  already  provides  a  formida- 
ble military  force  which  seeks  to  coun- 
ter the  Soviet  military  presence  in  the 
area.  Japan  presently  has  more  than  50 
destroyers  in  its  maritime  Self-Defense 
Force,  more  than  twice  as  many  as  we 
have  in  the  U.S.  7th  Fleet,  which  must 
cover  all  of  the  Western  Pacific  and  In- 
dian Oceans.  While  we  have  some  25 
P-3C  antisubmarine  aircraft  in  the  7th 
Fleet,  the  Japanese  will  deploy  100 
P-3Cs  at  its  bases  located  in  proximity 


to  Vladivostok  by  1990.  The  Japanese 
Air  Self-Defense  Force  now  has  100  F^ 
Phantoms  and  will  have  some  200  F-15s 
by  1990,  roughly  the  number  of  tactical 
aircraft  we  now  have  defending  the  con- 
tinental United  States. 

While  Japan  already  has  a  sizable 
military  force  deployed  in  the  area,  it 
must  be  emphasized  that  the  proposed 
sale  of  Aegis  would  be  a  crucial  addi- 
tion to  U.S.  and  Japanese  efforts  to 
counter  the  military  buildup  by  the  So- 
viet Union  in  the  Pacific.  The  Soviets 
have  more  than  770  ships  in  this  area, 
the  most  critical  portion  of  which  is  a 
force  of  100  submarines,  two-thirds  of 
which  are  nuclear-powered.  More 
important,  the  Soviets  have  some  2,000 
fixed-wing  aircraft  in  the  Far  Eastern 
theater.  This  air  capability  directly 
threatens  U.S.  interests  in  the  Pacific, 
since  Japanese  air  defenses  are,  at 
present,  at  risk  of  being  overwhelmed 
by  the  Soviets. 

To  meet  that  threat,  Japan  is 
studying  the  acquisition  of  a  mix  of 
forces  which  can  deal  with  the  Soviet 
air  threat  in  the  1990s.  A  critical  part 
of  that  increased  capability  involves 
purchase  of  the  Aegis  system.  Aegis 
will  be  the  keystone  in  Japan's  effort  to 
upgrade  its  antiair  warfare  capability  in 
each  of  four  escort  flotillas. 

Without  Aegis,  Japan's  naval  sur- 
face ships  prosecuting  Soviet  sub- 
marines are  vulnerable  to  attack  by 
multiple  numbers  of  Soviet  aircraft. 
With  Aegis,  Japanese  ships  can  protect 
themselves  against  attack  by  Soviet  air- 
craft and  can  link  with  U.S.  ships  for 
combined  operations.  Aegis  also  per- 
mits the  linkage  of  land-  and  sea-based 
air  defenses  and  expands  the  coverage 
of  the  battle  zone.  This  will  create  a 
safe  air  defense  zone  in  which  our  own 
aircraft  carrier  battle  groups  can 
operate. 

The  capability  provided  by  Aegis 
will  greatly  enhance  the  inter- 
operability of  the  U.S.  Navy  with  the 
Japanese  Maritime  Self-Defense  Force. 
Additionally,  Aegis  will  provide  a  force 
multiplier  effect  to  Japan's  naval  forces 
as  it  has  for  the  U.S.  Navy.  The  force 
multiplier  effect  results  from  the  auto- 
matic detection,  engagement,  and  tar- 
geting capability  of  the  system  and 
significantly  improves  the  effectiveness 
of  non-Aegis  ships  when  working  with 
an  Aegis  ship.  In  short.  Aegis  would  be 


»<  ctoto  Riillafin/<;ontomhpr  1QRfl 


13 


EAST  ASIA 


a  key  element  in  improving  a  presently 
vulnerable  air  defense  network  against 
the  Soviets'  Far  Eastern  air  threat. 

As  you  ai'e  aware,  we  have  often 
spoken  to  the  Japanese  Government 
about  the  need  for  increased  defense 
spending  and  capabilities  on  their  part. 
Secretary  of  Defense  Carlucci  and  Dep- 
uty Secretary  of  Defense  Tkft  have  re- 
cently met  with  Japanese  officials  to 
discuss  the  need  for  greater  bur- 
densharing.  The  sale  of  Aegis  would 
represent  greater  burdensharing  by 
Japan,  and  to  deny  this  sale  would  un- 
dercut our  policy  of  encouraging  en- 
hanced Japanese  military  spending. 

In  addition,  if  Congress  acts  to  dis- 
approve the  sale  of  Aegis,  it  would  im- 
pact on  major  large-scale  procurement 
which  the  Japanese  Government  is  now 
contemplating  for  the  1991-95  defense 
program.  Japan  is  now  deciding 
whether  to  include  an  over-the-horizon 
radar,  long-range  early  warning  air- 
craft, and  tanker  aircraft,  all  of  which 
would  increase  Japanese  defense  ca- 
pabilities and  directly  benefit  U.S.  se- 
curity. Japan  could  purchase  each  of 
these  systems  in  the  United  States,  en- 
hancing U.S. -Japanese  interoperability 
and  increasing  our  balance  of  trade  in 
defense  items,  already  in  our  favor  at 
over  $1  billion  per  year  However,  it  will 
be  much  more  difficult  for  Japan  to  plan 
purchases  from  the  United  States  if  it 
is  uncertain  that  the  United  States  will 
allow  a  valued  ally  to  acquire  such 
systems. 

Security  of  the  Aegis  System 

I  would  now  like  to  address  my  com- 
ments to  the  questions  which  have  been 
raised  regarding  the  security  of  the 
Aegis  system  if  it  is  provided  to  the 
Japanese  Government.  We  are  aware 
that  concern  has  been  expressed  that 
Japan  should  not  be  provided  such  sen- 
sitive equipment  and  that  in  the  after- 
math of  the  Toshiba  Machine  Company 
sale  of  milling  machines  to  the  Soviet 
Union,  Japan  cannot  be  entrusted  with 
a  sophisticated  military  system  such  as 
Aegis. 

Let  me  make  several  points  on  this 
question. 

First,  the  terms  of  the  proposed 
sale  of  Aegis  include  provisions  for  the 
security  of  the  system.  Under  the  1954 
U.S. -Japan  Mutual  Defense  Assistance 
Agreement,  each  government  is  obli- 
gated to  prevent  the  disclosure  or  com- 
promise of  classified  articles,  services, 
or  information  furnished  by  the  other 


government.  Japanese  law  gives  effect 
to  this  obligation  and  authorizes  the 
Japanese  Government  to  protect  U.S. 
classified  information  provided  under 
this  agreement. 

Second,  the  United  States  has 
been  monitoring  and  will  continue  to 
monitor  Japanese  security  procedures. 

Third,  under  the  terms  of  the 
agreement,  security  for  the  system  will 
be  provided  to  the  same  extent  as  it  is 
for  Aegis-equipped  U.S.  ships. 

Fourth,  despite  the  absence  of  an 
espionage  law  in  .Japan,  all  Japanese 
Government  employees  are  required  to 
protect  classified  information,  including 
that  of  U.S.  origin.  In  addition,  all  Jap- 
anese citizens  are  legally  bound  to  pro- 
tect information  provided  to  Japan 
under  the  1954  Mutual  Defense  As- 
sistance Agreement. 

Fifth,  it  is  important  to  distinguish 
the  Toshiba  Machine  Company  from  the 
Japanese  Government.  The  sale  of  mill- 
ing machines  to  the  Soviet  Union  by 
Toshiba  Machine  was  illegal.  However, 
that  case  is  vastly  different  from  the 
proposed  sale  we  are  discussing  today. 
The  technology  sold  to  the  Soviets  was 
of  Japanese  origin,  not  U.S.  technology. 
And  it  was  a  private  company  which 
sold  the  machines,  not  the  Japanese 
Government.  If  Congress  does  not  dis- 
approve sale  of  the  Aegis  system  to 
Japan,  it  will  be  sold  to  the  Government 
of  Japan,  not  a  private  company. 

Finally,  I  would  point  out  that  the 
Japanese  Government  has  an  exemplary 
record  of  protecting  sensitive  military 
equipment.  When  weapons  technology 
has  been  furnished  to  Japan  under  our 
Mutual  Defense  Assistance  Agreement, 
both  Japanese  Government  and  indus- 
try have  scrupulously  protected  that  in- 
formation. The  United  States  has 
loaned,  sold,  and  licensed  defense  tech- 
nology to  Japan  for  over  30  years,  and 
Japan  has  not  compromised  a  single 
item  of  technology  provided  under  for- 
eign military  sales  or  under  a  commer- 
cial sale.  And  we  already  allow  Japan  to 
license-produce  sophisticated  military 
equipment  such  as  F-15s,  P-3C  anti- 
submarine aircraft,  and  Patriot  mis- 
siles. They  have  clearly  established 
their  commitment  and  ability  to  protect 
sensitive  defense  technology. 

Financial  Benefits 

In  addition  to  defense  considei-ations, 
Japan's  purchase  of  Aegis  will  have  di- 
rect, significant  financial  benefits  to  the 
United  States.  The  sale  of  one  Aegis 


system  will  result  in  $526  million  in 
revenue  and  5,400  work-years  for  U.S 
workers.  For  each  Aegis  system  we  s( 
to  Japan,  New  Jersey  will  receive  ap- 
proximately $187  million  in  work,  Cal- 
ifornia $120  million,  Virginia  $53 
million,  Massachusetts  $29  million,  Nfit 
York  $17  million,  and  Missouri  $16  mil 
lion.  An  additional  $95  million  per  sys 
tern  will  be  up  for  competitive  bids. 

The  Japanese  Government  has 
budgeted  for  the  purchase  of  one  Aeg  > 
system  this  fiscal  year  and  will  seek  t 
purchase  a  second  system  in  its  curre  lr 
5-year  defense  plan  which  runs  from 
1986  through  1990.  We  believe  Japan    j 
intends  to  purchase  additional  system! 
subject  to  the  availability  of  funds.      I 

Finally,  there  has  been  discussior 
in  Congress  of  mandating  the  purchas 
of  Aegis  in  a  U.S.  hull.  We  believe  th  I 
would  be  a  serious  mistake.  We  have 
discussed  the  purchase  of  Aegis  in  a 
U.S.  hull  with  the  Japanese  Govern-    jj] 
ment.  They  have  informed  us  that  thet| 
will  not  acquire  Aegis  if  the  United 
States  requires  the  purchase  of  a  U.S 
hull.  Instead,  the  Japanese  would  bui 
a  guided  missile  destroyer  in  Japan 
which  is  not  Aegis-capable. 

We  would  ideally  like  Japan  to  pu  j( 
chase  a  hull  equipped  with  Aegis  fror  )| 
the  United  States.  However,  we  cann' 
let  our  wishes  blind  us  to  what  we  ca 
realistically  hope  to  achieve.  With  or 
without  Aegis,  Japanese  domestic  im 
peratives  virtually  dictate  that  any  m 
jor  naval  combatants  will  be  built  in    |,| 
Japan.  The  last  Japanese  naval  comba 
ant  built  in  a  foreign  shipyard  was  co  I, 
missioned  circa  1880.  Requiring  [" 

purchase  of  Aegis  in  a  U.S.  hull  woul  | 
not  only  lead  to  loss  of  a  major  sale  a  | 
the  jobs  it  represents  but  would  en-    | 
danger  potential  future  sales  as  well.  I5, 
Moreover,  such  a  precedent  could  like  |; 
discourage  the  Japanese  Government  ta 
from  pursuing  purchases  of  other  U.'L 
military  systems.  We  would  also  lose  | 
critical  opportunity  for  interoperabilit  |, 
with  Japan,  and,  most  importantly. 
Japan's  capability  to  play  a  greater  de 
terrent  role  in  the  Pacific  would  be 
lessened. 

We  will  continue  to  attempt  to  p€  ^, 
suade  Japan  to  purchase  U.S.  hulls  h\[^ 
not  at  the  expense  of  losing  the  Aegis 
sale.  It  is  too  important  to  our  nation  j| 
interest,  from  a  military,  financial,  ar 
political  perspective,  that  Japan  acqui 
Aegis  and  assume  the  additional  de- 
fense responsibilities  that  Aegis  will 
permit. 


nenartmont  nf  Qtato  Riillotin/QontomKior  1Q)ii.. 


EAST  ASIA 


The  president  has  emphasized 
in's  role  as  America's  most  impor- 
partner  and  ally  in  the  Pacific.  The 
s  for  the  statement  is  clearly  deni- 
grated in  the  close  cooperation  we 
;  achieved  in  a  number  of  fields, 
Ocularly  in  the  security  area.  On 
stions  ranging  from  arms  control  to 
military  threat  in  the  Pacific  posed 
he  Soviet  Union,  the  Japanese  Gov- 
Tient  has  been  a  staunch  ally.  At  a 
J  when  we  are  asking  our  partners 
hare  more  of  the  defense  burden, 
?  is  one  ally  ready,  willing,  and  able 

0  just  that. 

1  can  think  of  no  single  action  on 
part  which  would  do  more  to  call 


into  question  the  basic  aims  of  our  se- 
curity policy  in  the  Pacific  region  at 
this  time  than  to  say  that  we  have  de- 
cided not  to  proceed  with  the  Aegis 
sale  to  Japan.  And  I  can  think  of  no 
better  way  for  us  to  ensure  the  con- 
tinued enhancement  of  the  overall  rela- 
tionship with  our  major  Pacific  ally 
than  to  support  the  sale,  which  so  man- 
ifestly serves  our  own  national  interest. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee 
and  will  be  available  from  the  Superintend- 
ent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Ddate  on  POW/MIA  Efforts 


^aiyid  F.  Lambertson 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  Task 
:e  on  POW/MIA  of  the  House  For- 
Affairs  Committee  on  June  15, 
'.  Mr  Lambertson  is  Deputy  As- 
ant  Secretary  for  East  Asian  and 
Ific  Affairs.^ 

^predate  this  opportunity  to  meet 
n  with  the  task  force  to  discuss  our 
inuing  efforts  to  gain  the  fullest 
iible  accounting  for  our  missing  in 
theast  Asia. 


tnam 

;e  February  1988,  when  we  last  met, 
•e  has  been  some  progress.  General 
in  W.]  Vessey  and  Vietnamese  Vice 
mier  [Nguyen  Co]  Thach  met  again 

week  in  New  York  to  discuss  the 
V/MIA  [prisoner  of  war/missing  in 
on]  question.  As  well  as  the  emigi'a- 

to  the  United  States  of  former  re- 
cation  camp  inmates  and  other 
lanitarian  issues.  The  interagency 
tap  has  continued  to  facilitate  the  im- 
iTientation  of  the  agreements  reached 
iianoi  last  August  between  General 
Isey  and  Vietnamese  Vice  Premier 
Lch. 

During  their  June  8  meeting,  Gen- 
l  Vessey  urged  Vice  Premier  Thach 
expeditiously  resolve  the  questions 
ut  our  missing  men.  Underlining 
je  again  the  deep  concern  felt  by  the 
erican  people  over  this^issue.  Gen- 
1  Vessey  stressed  in  particular  the 
d  for  accelerated  Vietnamese  coop- 


eration in  resolving  discrepancy  cases 
(individuals  about  whom  the  Viet- 
namese should  have  information). 

Vice  Premier  Thach  said  he  agreed 
that  it  was  in  the  best  interest  of  both 
nations  to  resolve  the  POW/MIA  issue. 
He  said  his  government  would  attempt 
to  move  rapidly  to  resolve  the  70  most 
compelling  discrepancy  cases,  and  that 
every  effort  would  be  made  to  achieve 
substantial  accountability  by  the  end  of 
the  year.  Thach  added  that  his  govern- 
ment would  be  prepared  to  conduct 
joint  activities,  such  as  surveys  and 
crash  site  excavations. 

In  addition  to  this  high-level  meet- 
ing, U.S.  and  Vietnamese  experts  have 
continued  their  regularly  scheduled 
POW/MIA  technical  talks.  There  have 
now  been  five  since  General  Vessey's 
visit  to  Hanoi  in  August  of  last  year, 
with  the  most  recent  taking  place  2 
weeks  ago,  June  1-3.  These  meetings 
have  proven  to  be  productive  ex- 
changes, and  we  hope  they  will  pave 
the  way  for  more  concrete  progress  in 
the  near  term  (e.g.,  joint  activities).  A 
Vietnamese  team  will  visit  CILHI/ 
JCRC  [Central  Identification  Labora- 
tory, Hawaii,  and  the  Joint  Casualty 
Resolution  Center]  in  Hawaii  later  this 
month. 

During  this  period  the  Vietnamese 
have  repatriated  44  sets  of  remains  (17 
returned  March  2  and  27  sets  were  re- 
patriated April  (5 — the  largest  repatria- 
tion since  the  end  of  the  war).  Some  of 
these  remains  have  been  identified  as 
those  of  U.S.  servicemen— although 
frankly  far  fewer  than  we  would  have 


hoped — efforts  continue  to  identify  oth- 
ers. During  the  most  recent  round  of 
technical  talks  the  Vietnamese  reported 
to  us  that  they  are  investigating  32  in- 
stances where  they  have  received  infor- 
mation or  remains  which  could  be 
associated  with  missing  Americans.  We 
welcome  this  information  and  look  for- 
ward to  an  early  repatriation  date. 

NGO  Efforts 

The  U.S.  commitment  to  address  cer- 
tain Vietnamese  humanitarian  concerns 
was  reiterated  by  General  Vessey  in  his 
meetings  with  ViOe  Premier  Thach  on 
June  8.  Last  August  we  said  that  we 
would  encourage  and  facilitate  the 
efforts  of  U.S.  nongovernmental  organi- 
zations (NGOs)  in  the  area  of  pros- 
thetics. The  first  team  of  U.S.  experts 
went  to  Vietnam  in  August  1987  to 
meet  with  their  technical  counterparts 
and  returned  to  write  an  analysis  of 
Vietnamese  needs  which  was  dis- 
tributed in  the  NGO  community.  As  a 
result,  a  number  of  U.S.  NGOs  are  now 
engaged  in  direct  discussions  with  the 
Vietnamese,  and  several  are  developing 
with  the  Vietnamese  plans  to  refurbish 
and  reequip  certain  rehabilitation  cen- 
ters in  Vietnam. 

In  addition,  over  $110,000  of  do- 
nated prosthetics  supplies  and  mate- 
rials have  been  transported  to  Vietnam 
and  more  is  in  the  pipeline.  Based  on 
the  constructive  results  of  these 
efforts,  in  terms  of  at  least  marginally 
enhanced  Vietnamese  attention  to  our 
humanitarian  agenda,  we  have  decided 
to  add  a  new  area  of  emphasis — NGO 
assistance  in  the  area  of  child  dis- 
abilities— e.g.,  cleft  palate  surgery  and 
burn  repair.  A  team  composed  of  U.S. 
Government  representatives  and  medi- 
cal experts  has  just  returned  from  Viet- 
nam and  will  write  another  compre- 
hensive report  for  distribution  to 
NGOs.  We  anticipate  a  positive  re- 
sponse from  the  NGO  and  donor  com- 
munities as  a  result  of  these  efforts. 

Despite  progress  in  the  area  of 
prosthetics  and  the  good  faith  effort 
which  it  represents,  the  Vietnamese 
have  continued  indirectly,  but  publicly, 
to  call  for  some  direct  U.S.  Government 
aid.  (During  the  July  8  meetings.  Vice 
Premier  Thach  did  not  specifically  dis- 
cuss the  lack  of  direct  government-to- 
government  aid,  but  expressed  dis- 
pleasure over  what  he  felt  was  the  slow 
pace  of  the  efforts.)  Our  policy,  and  the 
commitment  made  by  General  Vessey  in 
Hanoi,  are  clear  on  th^  point:  the  U.S. 
Government  will  encourage  and  facili- 


/C^w^*Am)r\ar  IQfift 


15 


ECONOMICS 


tate  the  efforts  of  the  NGO  community, 
but  it  will  not  provide  direct  assistance. 
We  said  our  efforts  to  address  Viet- 
namese humanitarian  concerns  would 
be  within  the  bounds  of  "political,  pol- 
icy, and  legal  constraints,"  meaning  no 
U.S.  Government  aid,  no  trade,  no  po- 
litical normalization.  The  Vietnamese 
clearly  understood  this  in  August,  and 
they  understand  it  now. 

Laos  and  Cambodia 

It  should  be  noted  also  that  there  has 
been  some  recent  progress  on  POW/ 
MIA  issues  with  the  Lao.  In  February, 
I  described  the  December  and  January 
unilateral  excavations  carried  out  by 
the  Lao  which  resulted  in  the  recovery 
of  2  sets  of  remains  believed  to  be  those 
of  unaccounted  for  U.S.  servicemen. 
U.S.  and  Lao  technical  teams  carried 
out  a  joint  crash  site  excavation  May 
3-11,  1988,  after  a  joint  survey  of  the 
site  in  Savannakhet  Province  April  26. 
The  downed  U.S.  aircraft  was  an  OV-1 
observation  plane  which  crashed  in 
March  1966.  Two  U.S.  servicemen  were 
believed  to  have  been  aboard. 
Unfortunately,  no  remains  were  re- 
covered and  only  one  piece  of  identifica- 
tion was  found  at  this  site,  despite  the 
combined  efforts  of  the  Lao  and  U.S. 
teams. 

Another  encouraging  sign  was  the 
recent  visit  to  the  United  States  of  Lao 
Vice  Foreign  Minister  Soubanh.  His 
visit  included  stops  in  New  York, 
Washington,  and  Hawaii.  Lengthy  dis- 
cussions concerning  POW/MIA  issues 


took  place.  During  these  meetings  we 
expressed  appreciaion  for  the  unilateral 
and  joint  excavations  carried  out  by  the 
Lao  over  the  past  6  months — noting  the 
professionalism  and  cooperativeness  of 
the  Lao  technical  team.  (Secretary 
Shultz  has  also  expressed  his  apprecia- 
tion to  Lao  Foreign  Minister  Phoun.) 

Vice  Foreign  Minister  Soubanh  in- 
dicated his  continued  awareness  of  the 
importance  of  the  issue  and  his  willing- 
ness to  move  ahead  with  another  joint 
excavation  during  this  calendar  year. 
We  in  turn  will  continue  to  push  for 
more  crash  site  surveys.  During  his 
stop  in  Hawaii,  this  past  weekend.  Vice 
Foreign  Minister  Soubanh  met  with  of- 
ficers of  CILHI  and  the  JCRC  to  gain  a 
better  understanding  of  the  U.S.  effort 
and  commitment. 

Unfortunately,  there  is  no  progress 
to  report  concerning  the  Hun  Sen  gov- 
ernment in  Cambodia  and  its  Sep- 
tember 1987  claim  to  hold  remains  of 
our  unaccounted  for  servicemen.  De- 
spite our  interventions  through  the 
Vietnamese,  the  Lao,  and  the  ICRC 
[International  Committee  of  the  Red 
Cross] — and  direct  communications  by 
the  National  League  of  Families — the 
Vietnamese-installed  regime  in  Phnom 
Penh  has  refused  to  cooperate  in  re- 
turning these  remains  to  the  United 
States. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee 
and  will  be  available  from  the  Superintend- 
ent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Japan  to  Phase  Out  Quotas 
on  Beef  and  Citrus  Imports 


Representatives  of  the  Governments  of 
the  United  States  and  Japan  announced 
June  20,  1988,  an  ad  referendum 
agreement  which  calls  for  the  elimina- 
tion of  Japanese  import  quotas  on  beef 
and  citrus  products.  The  agi-eement 
was  reached  by  U.S.  Trade  Represen- 
tative Clayton  Yeutter  and  Japanese 
Minister  of  Agriculture  T^kashi  Sato  as 
the  culmination  of  several  months  of  in- 
tense negotiations.  The  negotiations 
broke  down  and  had  to  be  restarted 
twice  before  agreement  was  finally 
reached. 

"The  United  States  is  pleased  with 
the  outcome,"  Yeutter  said  from  Tokyo, 
"though  we  would  like  these  markets  to 
open  sooner  than  is  contemplated.  It  is 


16 


regrettable  that  the  process  of  market 
liberalization  was  not  begun  several 
years  ago.  Nevertheless,  we  are  grate- 
ful that  the  Government  of  Japan  is  now 
prepared  to  phase  out  all  import  quotas 
on  these  products." 

"What  Japan  is  now  prepared  to  do 
on  beef  and  citrus  is  a  recognition  of  its 
responsibility  as  a  major  economic 
power  running  a  very  large  trade  sur- 
plus," asserted  Yeutter.  "And  it  is  also 
what  Japan  must  do  in  order  to  comply 
with  the  rules  of  the  General  Agree- 
ment on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT)." 

"This  new  agreement,"  said  Yeut- 
ter, "will  open  up  excellent  export  op- 
portunities for  American  beef  and 
citrus  producers.  U.S.  export  sales  in 


these  products  should  increase  soon,  | 
and  they  could  easily  exceed  $1  billion  '' 
annually  when  the  accord  is  fully  u 
implemented." 

The  agreement  calls  for  a  phase-  j 
out  of  import  quotas  on  beef  products  |f 
and  fresh  oranges  over  a  3-year  period  j;; 
and  quotas  on  orange  juices  over  4 
years.  Japan  will  have  the  privilege  of  |i 
temporarily  raising  duties  on  beef  proi|, 
ucts  to  certain  specified  levels  during  ir 
second  3-year  adjustment  period,  at  tl|i 
end  of  which  the  Japanese  beef  marke' 
will  be  fully  liberalized. 

Ambassador  Yeutter  noted  that 
since  the  quotas  will  be  phased  out, 
rather  than  ehminated  immediately,  a,' 
the  United  States  had  requested,  the 
Government  of  Japan  had  agreed  not 
only  to  significant  increases  in  market 
access  in  the  interim  but  also  to  certa 
other  actions,  including  duty  reductioi 
on  such  products  as  fresh  grapefruit, 
fresh  lemons,  frozen  peaches  and  pear 
walnuts,  pistachios,  macadamias, 
pecans,  pet  food,  beef  jerky,  sausage, 
and  pork  and  beans. 

The  agreement  also  calls  for  a  3- 
year  phase-out  of  the  import  manage- 
ment operations  of  Japan's  Livestock 
Industry  Promotion  Corporation 
(LIPC)  and  for  greater  flexibility  in  tl 
administration  of  the  import  program 
for  both  beef  and  citrus  products  dur- 
ing their  respective  phase-out  periods 

"Both  negotiating  teams  worked 
extremely  hard  on  this  difficult  and 
complex  issue,  over  a  period  of  many 
weeks,"  added  Yeutter.  "This  was  one 
of  the  most  challenging  bilateral  nego 
tiations  we  have  ever  undertaken.  1 
wish  particularly  to  commend  the 
efforts  of  Deputy  U.S.  Ti-ade  Repre-    n 
sentative  Michael  B.  Smith,  who  led     f 
the  U.S.  team  during  most  of  the  neg(  r 
tiations.  I  commend  as  well  the  Jap-     | 
anese  team  for  its  positive  and  [ 

courageous  attitude  throughout  and  tlji 
Japanese  Government  for  its  willingne  it; 
to  take  the  right  course  in  this  politi-  i| 
cally  sensitive  area."  { 

Text  from  press  release  issued  by  the  Of-  t 
fice  of  the  U.S.  Trade  Representative.  11 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/September  198k 


ECONOMICS 


S.  Imposes  Sanctions  on 
^rtain  Brazilian  Imports 


ITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
,Y  22,  1988' 

lident  Reagan  has  found  Brazil's  re- 
1  to  provide  adequate  patent  protec- 
for  U.S.  pharmaceuticals  and  fine 
nicals  to  be  unfair  under  Section 
■a  the  Trade  Act  of  1974.  In  re- 
ise,  the  President  has  decided  to 
)se  sanctions  on  certain  Brazilian 
irts.  The  products  upon  which  sanc- 
?  are  to  be  impo.sed  will  be  drawn 
I  a  list  of  potential  items  that  will 
be  published  in  the  Federal  Regin- 
The  import  value  of  the  list  will  be 
;ast  S2W  million. 

With  %2,m)  million  in  .sales  in  1985, 
ril  ranks  among  the  top  10  phar- 
eutical  markets  in  the  world.  It 
linated  produc-t  patent  protection  for 
inaceuticaLs  in  1945  and  process  pat- 
iprotection  in  L%9.  After  several 
IS  of  unsuccessful  consultations,  the 
Tnaceutical  Manufacturers  Assw. 
a  petition  in  June  1987  under  Sec- 
301  of  the  Trade  Ac-t  of  1974  for  an 
stigation  of  Brazil's  lack  of  process 
product  patent  protection.  The 
Tnaceutical  Manufacturers  As.so.  al- 
d  that  Brazil's  failure  to  protect  in- 
ictual  property  rights  constitutes  an 
easonable  trade  practice  that  bur- 
t  or  restricts  U.S.  commerce.  The 
':e  of  the  U.S.  Trade  Representative 
tpted  the  petition  on  July  23,  1987. 
A/Jequate  patent  protection  is  the 
ler-itone  of  a  healthy  pharmaceutical 
latry.  By  denying  this  basic  com- 
fcial  right,  Brazil  permits  unauthor- 
copjing  of  pharmaceutical  products 
processes  that  were  invented  by 
.  firms.  This  not  only  deprives 
erican  companies  of  sales,  it  di»- 
fages  investment  in  the  research 
de^'elopment  of  new  drugs. 
The  U.S.  pharmaceutical  industry 
the  U.S.  Government  have  at- 
pted  for  .several  years  to  persuade 
ell  to  enact  adequate  patent  protec- 
.  Despite  these  efforts  on  the  part 
he  United  States,  Brazil  has  yet  to 
'nde  adequate  intellectual  property 
action  for  pharmaceutical  products. 
We  regret  that  it  Ls  neces.sary  to 
ose  trade  sanctions  in  this  matter, 
the  United  States  cannot  tolerate 
piracj-  of  its  intellectual  property. 
T  the  past  -3  years,  we  have  chal- 
ked the  infringement  of  U.S.  intel- 
loal  property  rights  and  denial  o€ 


rights  throughout  the  world.  This  pol- 
icy has  resulted  in  strengthened  patent 
laws  in  many  foreign  countries  and  a 
multilateral  commitment  to  address  in- 
tellectual property  issues  at  the  Uru- 
guay Rfjund  of  trade  talks.  This 
progress  stands  in  stark  contrast  to 
Brazil's  lack  of  ac-tion  in  this  area.  The 
President  calls  upon  the  Government  of 
Brazil  to  join  the  United  States  and 
other  nations  in  establishing  compre- 
hensive intellectual  property  proteclion 
for  pharmaceuticals  and  other  products. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 

Presidential  r)wijm<-rit,!(  of  .July  25,  W8S. 


Trade  with  Hungary 
and  China 

LETTER  TO  THE  CONGRESS 
JUNE  3,  1988' 

I  hereby  tran.imit  the  document*  referred 
to  in  .subsection  402'd>f.5>  of  the  Trade  Act 
of  1S74  with  respect  to  a  further  12-month 
extension  of  the  authority  to  waive  .lubsec- 
tion.'i  fa;  and  fb;  of  aection  402  of  the  Act. 
These  documents  constitute  my  deciision  to 
continue  in  effect  thi.i  waiver  authority  for 
a  further  12-month  period. 

I  include  as  part  of  these  documents 
my  determination  that  further  extenision  of 
the  waiver  authority  will  substantially  pro- 
mole  the  objectives  of  section  402.  I  aUo 
include  my  determination  that  continuation 
of  th';  waiver"  applicable  to  the  Hungarian 
P«; ,  '  :>;  and  the  People's  Republic 

of  .ostantially  promote  the 

ob.  ".ion  402.  The  attached 

docuff.er/..-  a..-.o  include  my  reasons  for  ex- 
tension of  the  waiver  authority,  and  for  my 
determination  that  continuation  of  the 
waivers  currently  in  effect  for  the  Hun- 
garian People's  Republic  and  the  People's 
Republic  of  China  will  substantially  pro- 
mote the  objectives  of  section  402. 

Sincerely, 

Ro.SAJ-ti  Eea«a.s' 


REPORT  TO  CONGRESS 
CONCERNING  EXTENSION 
OF  WAIVER  AUTHORITY 

Pursuant  to  subsection  Wlii\)i^>)  of  the 
Trade  Act  of  1974  ("hereinafter  "the  Act"),  I 
have  today  determined  that  further  exten- 
sion of  the  waiver  authority  granted  by 
subsection  402'cj  of  the  Act  for  12  months 
will  substantially  promote  the  objectives  of 
section  402  and  that  continuation  of  the 
waivers  currently  applicable  to  the  Hun- 
garian People's  Republic  and  the  People's 
Republic  of  China  will  also  substantially 
promote  the  objectives  of  section  402  of  the 
Act.  My  determination  is  attached  and  in 
incorporated  herein. 

"The  general  waiver  authority  conferred 
by  section  402  of  the  Act  is  an  important 
means  for  the  strengthening  of  mutually 
beneficial  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  certain  countries  of  F^astem 
Europe  and  the  People's  Republic  f/f  China. 
The  waiver  authority  has  permitted  us  to 
conclude  and  maintain  in  force  bilateral 
trade  agreements  with  Hungary,  Romania, 
and  the  People's  flepublic  of  China.  These 
agreements  continue  to  be  fundamental 
elements  in  our  political  and  economic  re- 
lations with  those  countries,  including 
important  exchanges  on  emigration  and 
human  rights  matters.  Granting  c/f  Most 
Favored  Nation  fMKN;  status  pursuant  to 
these  agreements  gives  U.S.  companies 
the  ability  to  compete  in  those  markets. 
Moreover,  continuation  of  the  waiver  au- 
thority would  permit  future  expansion  of 
our  bilateral  relations  with  other  countries 
now  subject  to  subsections  402''a)  and  'bj 
of  the  Act,  should  circumstances  permit.  I 
believe  that  these  considerations  clearly 
warrant  this  renewal  of  the  general  waiver 
authority. 

I  continue  to  believe  that  extending 
the  current  waivers  applicable  to  Hungary 
and  the  People's  Republic  of  China  will 
sub.stantially  promote  the  objectives  of  sec- 
tion 402  of  the  Act. 

Hungary.  Hungary  hax  continued  to 
take  a  relatively  positive  and  constructive 
approach  to  emigration  matters.  Nearly  all 
Hungarians  who  are  eligible  to  apply  t// 
emigrate  for  purposes  of  family  reunifica- 
tion receive  permission  to  depart.  Inuring 
the  past  year  there  have  been,  in  fact,  no 
instances  of  refusal  of  emigration  permiji- 
sion  in  family  reunification  cases.  The 
American  f.;mba.»,sy  in  Budaf*e?it  issued  Wft 
immigrant  visas  in  U*87,  con.».iderably  more 
than  the  number  i.^ssued  for  !!>>•>;  O02;, 
There  have  been  no  divided  family  cases 
since  the  spring  of  1&87,  when  the  three 
ca>.es  brought  to  the  Fores j"  "  -    — 
attention  in  January  1&^7  ' 
Although  there  are  some  f- 
emigration,  there  are  no  sy.^.te.Tiat.,'.  official 
sanctions  imposed  on  persons  seeking  to 
emigrate. 


kar4r.«ant    r^'f    Ctats    Rlllle-tin    .^4>Otember    1988 


EUROPE 


People's  Republic  of  China.  Although 
China's  population  will  shortly  exceed 
1.1  billion  persons,  only  10  percent  of  the 
country's  land  area  is  suitable  for  farming. 
China's  standard  of  living  is  low — per  cap- 
ita GNP  was  under  $300  in  1987;  urban 
overcrowding  is  endemic;  and  unemploy- 
ment is  a  growing  problem.  In  conse- 
quence, China  faces  exceptional  challenges 
to  adequately  feed  and  house  even  its  pres- 
ent population.  Furthermore,  birth  rates 
have  recently  picked  up  again  and  are 
adding  another  12-13  million  people  each 
year  to  the  population.  If  present  trends 
continue,  China's  population  will  exceed 
1.25  billion  by  the  year  2000.  These  circum- 
stances contribute  to  the  maintenance  of  a 
relatively  open  emigration  policy.  In  addi- 
tion, the  Chinese  Government,  as  part  of 
its  policies  of  economic  reform  and  opening 
to  the  outside  world,  continues  to  encour- 
age students,  scientists,  and  industrial 
managers  to  travel  to  Western  countries 
for  training  and  orientation.  The  principal 
limitation  on  increased  emigration  appears 
not  to  be  Chinese  policy,  but  the  ability 
and  willingness  of  other  nations  to  absorb 
Chinese  immigrants. 

China's  relatively  liberal  policy  on  emi- 
gration is  reflected  in  the  steadily  rising 
number  of  immigrant  visas  issued  by  our 
embassy  and  consulates  in  China  since  the 
normalization  of  relations  in  1979.  In  Fiscal 
Year  1987,  our  China  posts  issued  16,263 
immigrant  visas  (versus  14,051  in  FY  1986) 
and  .50,519  non-immigrant  visas  (versus 
44,2.54  in  FY  1986).  This  represents  a  rise 
of  16  percent  for  immigrants  and  14  percent 
for  non-immigrants.  Non-immigrant  visas 
were  issued  to  Chinese  who  wished  to 
study,  conduct  business,  and  visit  relatives 
in  the  United  States.  Other  Western  coun- 
tries continue  to  experience  increases  in 
Chinese  travel  and  emigration. 

For  the  above  reasons,  I  have  deter- 
mined that  continuation  of  the  waivers  for 
Hungary  and  the  People's  Republic  of 
China  will  substantially  promote  the  objec- 
tives of  the  Act. 

Romania.  Since  Romania  has  re- 
nounced extension  of  Most-Favored-Nation 
tariff  treatment  by  the  United  States  con- 
ditioned on  the  requirements  of  section  402 
of  the  Act,  I  am  permitting  the  waiver  for 
Romania  to  expire  on  July  3,  1988. 


Regional  Issues 

and  U.S.-Soviet  Relations 


'Identical  letters  addressed  to  Jim 
Wright,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Represen- 
tatives, and  George  Bush,  President  of  the 
Senate  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  June  13,  1988).  ■ 


by  Michael  H.  Armacost 

Address  before  the  General  Federa- 
tion of  Women's  Clubs  in  Grand  Rapids 
on  June  22,  1988.  Ambassador  Arma- 
cost is  Under  Secretary  for  Political 
Affairs. 

The  recent  television  image  of  Presi- 
dent Reagan  explaining  to  a  group  of 
students  from  Moscow  State  University 
the  rights  and  protections  afforded  by 
Western  democracy  was  eloquent  testi- 
mony to  the  winds  of  change  currently 
sweeping  the  Soviet  Union.  It  also  pro- 
vided graphic  evidence  of  the  progress 
that  has  been  made  in  U.S.-Soviet  rela- 
tions during  the  past  8  years. 

The  Administration's  policy  toward 
the  Soviets  has  produced  results.  Major 
changes  have  occurred  in  all  "four  pil- 
lars" of  the  U.S.-Soviet  relationship. 

In  arms  control,  we  and  the  Sovi- 
ets have  concluded  a  treaty  that,  for 
the  first  time,  abolishes  a  whole  class 
of  ballistic  missiles.  We  have  also  made 
good  progress  in  reaching  a  START 
[strategic  arms  reduction  talks]  agree- 
ment reducing  strategic  arsenals  by 
50%. 

In  human  rights,  Jewish  emigra- 
tion has  increased;  some  political  pris- 
oners have  been  released,  and  others, 
such  as  Andrei  Sakharov,  allowed  to 
return  to  Moscow  from  e.xile;  and  a 
number  of  refusenik  and  divided  family 
cases  have  been  resolved.  The  Soviet 
policy  oi glasnost,  or  "openness,"  has 
brought  Soviet  performance  closer  into 
line  with  a  number  of  obligations  as- 
sumed under  the  Helsinki  Final  Act. 
More  needs  to  be  done,  but  this  issue 
has  become  an  accepted  feature  of  the 
U.S.-Soviet  dialogue — something  un- 
thinkable just  a  few  years  ago. 

On  bilateral  issues,  we  and  the 
Soviets  have  concluded  a  host  of  work- 
manlike agreements  in  areas  ranging 
from  civilian  nuclear  reactor  safety, 
transportation,  and  maritime  shipping 
to  radio  navigation,  fisheries,  and  the 
exploration  of  outer  space.  We  have 
placed  particular  emphasis  on  the  ex- 
pansion of  people-to-people  contacts 
and  exchanges  between  nongovernmen- 
tal organizations. 


Today  I  would  like  to  say  a  few 
words  about  the  "regional  pillar"  (if  t 
U.S.-Soviet  dialogue.  This  is,  in  sdim 
respects,  the  most  important  part  nf 
the  U.S.-Soviet  agenda  since  it  deals 
directly  with  the  competitive  and  ad- 
versarial aspects  of  the  relationshiii. 

Importance  of  Regional  Issues 

Disputes  over  regional  issues  have  Id 
shaped  U.S.-Soviet  relations.  Sincf 
World  War  II,  competition  or  conflict 
over  regional  issues  have  frequently 
sown  mutual  suspicion,  fueled  an  arn 
race,  caused  deployments  and  alerts 
military  forces,  complicated  bilateral 
dealings,  and  undermined  domestic  p 
litical  support  for  improved  relations. 
Conversely,  the  successful  resolution 
such  issues  has  facilitated  an  imprdvi 
ment  in  U.S.-Soviet  relations. 

The  "cold  war"  began  over  just 
these  kinds  of  issues  as  Stalin  sough 
at  the  end  of  the  last  World  War,  td 
alter  the  world  balance  of  power  by  : 
taching  the  eastern  parts  of  Euroi)e 
the  Soviet  Union  and  gaining  domi- 
nance of  the  Eurasian  land  mass.  Ir; 
in  1946,  Greece  and  Turkey  in  1947, 
Berlin  in  1948,  and  Korea  in  1950  \\i' 
all  crises  fostered  by  Stalin's  quest  f 
hegemony.  These  and  other  moves 
forced  the  West  to  adopt  a  policy  of 
containment. 

The  death  of  Stalin  brought  a 
"thaw"  to  the  cold  war  as  Khrushchi 
and  the  new  Soviet  leadership  moxfi  ( 
conclude  an  armistice  agreement  in 
Korea  and  to  remove  Soviet  forces  fi  r 
occupied  Austria.  At  the  same  tiiiif, 
new  frictions  with  the  West  were  crt 
ated  by  Khrushchev's  efforts  to  ex  pa  I 
Soviet  influence  beyond  the  peripher 
of  the  U.S.S.R.  by  fanning  conflict 
in  newly  formed  nations  beset  by  m- 
stability  and  internal  conflicts.  In  19' , 
we  confronted  one  of  the  most  dan- 
gerous situations  of  the  postwar  wor 
when  Khrushchev  attempted  to  depl 
intermediate-range  missiles  in  Cuba 

The  successful  resolution  of  the 
Cuban  missile  crisis  led  to  a  relaxati  i 
of  tensions  that  was  marked  by  the  i  ■ 
clear  test  ban  and  "Hot  Line"  agree- 
ments. Though  there  were  setbacks- 
the  Soviet  invasion  of  Czechoslovak]:  i 
1968  forced  the  Johnson  Administrat  i 
to  postpone  SALT  I  [strategic  arms 


18 


Deoartment  of  State  Bulletin/September  Kj 


EUROPE 


mitation  talks]  talks,  and  Soviet  sup- 
ort  for  North  Vietnam  cast  a  long 
ladow — the  period  from  1963  to  1974 
■as  marked  by  steadily  improving  rela- 
ons.  The  1972  Quadripartite  Agree- 
lent  on  Berlin  removed  that  city  as  a 
one  of  East-West  contention  and  paved 
16  way  for  conclusion  of  the  SALT  I 
a;reement  and  other  East-West  accords. 

The  Nixon  Administration  recog- 
ized  that,  given  the  intensity  of  the 
eopolitical  competition,  even  those  re- 
ional  conflicts  that  do  not  originate  di- 
ectly  from  superpower  actions  carry 
rie  potential  for  superpower  involve- 
lent.  In  1972,  it  concluded  with  the 
I.S.S.R.  a  "code  of  conduct"  designed 
5  promote  self-restraint  and  mutual  re- 
pect.  In  this  "Basic  Principles  of  Re- 
itions  Between  the  United  States  of 
imerica  and  the  Union  of  Soviet  So- 
ialist  Republics,"  the  sides  recognized 
le  principle  of  "peaceful  coexistence," 
efined  as  "a  special  responsibility... to 

0  everything  in  their  power  so  that 
ituations  of  conflict  will  not  arise 
'hich  serve  to  increase  international 
jnsions." 

They  further  promised  to  negotiate 
ind  settle  differences  by  peaceful 
leans,  to  seek  no  unilateral  advantages 
t  the  expense  of  the  other,  and  to  rec- 
gnize  the  security  interests  of  each 
ther  based  on  the  principle  of  equality 
nd  the  renunciation  of  the  use  or 
hreat  of  force. 

Experience  soon  showed,  how- 
ver,  that  these  pledges  were  not  self- 
nforcing  and  were  no  substitute  for 
laintaining  the  balance  of  power. 
Lgainst  a  backdrop  of  what  Moscow 
erceived  to  be  a  new  "correlation  of 
jrccs"  emerging  from  Hanoi's  victory 

1  Indochina  and  the  apparent  decline 
f  American  power  and  will,  Moscow 

moved  in  the  mid-1970s  to  exploit  tur- 
iioil  in  several  different  regions  of  the 
jrorld.  It  undertook  military  interven- 
ions— either  directly  or  through  prox- 
3S— in  Angola,  Ethiopia,  Cambodia, 
ind  Afghanistan. 

Combined  with  Moscow's  attain- 
nent  of  strategic  nuclear  parity  and 
Rowing  pi.  >vess  in  conventional  arms, 
■hese  interventions  suggested  a  broad 
sffort  by  Moscow  to  shift  the  global 
)alance  of  forces.  They  eliminated  any 
)ractical  prospect  for  ratification  of 
5ALT  II  and  led  both  the  Carter  and 
ileagan  Administrations  to  question  the 
issumptions  which  had  led  earlier  pres- 
dents  to  seek  a  relaxation  in  tensions 
vith  the  Soviet  Union. 


Reagan  Administration's  Approach 

The  management  of  regional  crises  and 
flashpoints  remains  of  fundamental 
importance  for  U.S. -Soviet  relations. 
Many  of  the  interventions  undertaken 
or  supported  by  the  Soviets  in  the  1970s 
continue.  In  addition,  there  are  a 
number  of  regional  conflicts  such  as  the 
Arab-Israeli  dispute,  the  Iran-Iraq  war, 
and  the  military  competition  between 
India  and  Pakistan  which — while  local 
in  origin — could  draw  in  the  super- 
powers if  allowed  to  spread  or  escalate. 
These  disputes  pose  a  particular  threat 
to  international  stability  in  light  of  con- 
cerns over  the  proliferation  of  nuclear, 
CW  [chemical  weapons],  and  missile 
technology. 

Despite  a  number  of  Soviet  at- 
tempts— most  recently,  at  the  Moscow 
summit — to  return  to  the  "rules  of  the 
road"  approach,  this  Administration  has 
eschewed  an  effort  to  draw  general 
guidelines  for  regulating  superpower 
behavior.  We  have  favored  an  approach 
that  seeks  to  resolve  the  specific  re- 
gional disputes  that  feed  superpower 
tensions.  This  "organic"  approach  of 
coming  to  grips  with  the  particulars  of 
individual  conflicts  can  benefit  the  local 
parties  involved  and,  in  time,  lead  to 
greater  cooperation  and  trust  between 
the  superpowers. 

This  approach  has  consisted  of  four 
key  elements. 

First,  we  have  recognized  that  a 
climate  of  mutual  restraint  can  be  fos- 
tered only  when  the  underlying  balance 
of  power  is  maintained.  The  Admin- 
istration's first  priority,  therefore, 
has  been  to  restore  our  national  self- 
confidence  and  military  strength.  In  a 
number  of  regional  conflicts,  this  has 
meant  support  for  indigenous  move- 
ments resisting  Soviet-supported  mili- 
tary occupations.  Increasing  the  po- 
litical and  economic  costs  of  Soviet 
intervention  not  only  provides  a  crucial 
incentive  for  the  Soviets  to  liquidate 
past  involvements  but  is  the  most 
promising  method  of  deterring  Moscow 
from  future  adventures. 

Second,  as  outlined  in  a  speech 
President  Reagan  gave  to  the  UN  Gen- 
eral Assembly  in  1985,  we  have  pro- 
moted dialogue  and  negotiation.  First 
and  foremost,  we  have  sought  to  in- 
volve the  local  or  warring  parties  them- 
selves, since  any  durable  solution  must 
accommodate  the  interests  of  those 
most  directly  concerned.  The  form  of 
these  negotiations  may  and  should  vary. 
Often — as  in  the  UN-sponsored  talks  on 
Afghanistan,  the  talks  on  Cambodia 


sponsored  by  ASEAN  [Association  of 
South  East  Asian  Nations],  the  Con- 
tadora  process  in  Central  America,  or 
the  efforts  of  the  UN  Secretary  Gen- 
eral to  mediate  between  Iran  and 
Iraq — a  multilateral  forum  or  institu- 
tion will  be  involved. 

Whatever  their  form,  these  nego- 
tiations are  essential  to  achieving  an 
end  to  violence,  the  withdrawal  of  for- 
eign troops,  and  the  promotion  of  na- 
tional reconciliation.  Once  these  aims 
have  been  achieved,  we  are  prepared  to 
contribute  to  international  reconstruc- 
tion and  development  efforts  and  to 
welcome  each  country  back  into  the 
world  economy. 

Third,  to  facilitate  direct  negotia- 
tions, the  United  States  has  under- 
taken a  dialogue  with  the  Soviet  Union 
on  the  geopolitical  competition  itself. 
Since  President  Reagan  first  proposed 
this  in  September  1984,  regional  prob- 
lems have  been  discussed  at  both  the 
summit  and  ministerial  levels.  In  addi- 
tion, exchanges  at  the  expert  level  on 
the  Middle  East,  East  Asia,  Central 
America,  and  Afghanistan  have  become 
a  regular  feature  of  the  superpower  di- 
alogue. In  these  talks,  we  have  sought 
to  identify  specific  ways  in  which  we 
and  the  Soviets  can  promote  regional 
settlements  by  the  parties  themselves. 
An  increasingly  open  and  frank  airing 
of  mutual  concerns  has  also  served  to 
correct  misimpressions  and  reduce  the 
chances  for  miscalculations.  Over  time, 
we  will  assess  the  seriousness  of  Soviet 
commitments  to  restraint  in  the  geo- 
political competition  and  to  respect  for 
the  interests  of  others  by  the  concrete 
results  of  this  dialogue. 

Fourth,  we  have  insisted  on  a  bal- 
ance in  U.S. -Soviet  relations  so  that 
the  weight  of  the  relationship  would  not 
rest  on  only  one  or  two  "pillars."  Our 
approach  has  been  to  work  on  all  the 
issues  across  the  board,  make  progress 
wherever  we  can,  and  conclude  agree- 
ments when,  in  their  own  terms,  they 
meet  U.S.  goals  and  interests.  The  re- 
sult has  been  that  progress  in  one  area 
has  reinforced  and  given  further  impe- 
tus to  progress  in  the  other  areas. 

Afghanistan 

This  approach  has  had  its  most  dra- 
matic success  in  Afghanistan. 

The  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan 
in  1979  constituted  the  first  massive  use 
of  Soviet  troops  outside  Eastern  Eu- 
rope since  World  War  II.  This  brazen 
act  destroyed  the  independence  of  a 
nonaligned  country,  threatened  the  se- 


lOenartment  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


19 


EUROPE 


curity  of  our  ally  Pakistan,  and  ex- 
tended forward  by  several  hundred 
miles  the  Soviet  capacity  to  project  mil- 
itary power  toward  the  Persian  Gulf 
For  all  of  these  reasons,  the  complete 
and  total  withdrawal  of  Soviet  troops 
and  the  restoration  of  Afghan  national 
independence  became  an  urgent  goal  of 
U.S.  policy. 

We  are  now  within  reach  of  achiev- 
ing that  objective.  On  April  14,  the 
U.S.S.R.  signed  the  Geneva  accords, 
which  were  negotiated,  under  UN  aus- 
pices, by  Pakistan  and  the  Kabul  re- 
gime. The  United  States  associated 
itself  with  the  settlement  by  agreeing 
to  respect  the  undertakings  of  the  high 
contracting  parties. 

These  accords  provide  for  the  com- 
plete withdrawal  of  Soviet  troops  by 
February  1989,  with  50%  of  those 
troops  to  be  withdrawn  by  August  15. 
In  addition,  the  Soviets  have  stated 
that  they  will  undertake  no  military 
operations  during  the  period  of  troop 
withdrawal  except  in  direct  defense 
against  attacks  on  their  troops. 

This  withdrawal  agi-eement  is 
a  historic  achievement.  It  is  virtually 
unprecedented  for  Soviet  troops  to  de- 
part from  a  country  they  have  invaded, 
but  already  the  troop  withdrawals 
have  begun.  To  date,  an  estimated 
20,000-25,000  Soviet  troops  have  left 
their  garrisons  in  Afghanistan. 

A  number  of  factors  made  agree- 
ment at  Geneva  possible. 

Afghan  Resistance.  First  and  fore- 
most, the  credit  goes  to  the  Afghan 
people  themselves,  who  throughout 
their  history  have  successfully  resisted 
foreign  invasion.  They  paid  a  high  price 
to  repel  the  Soviet  invader.  In  8  years 
of  war,  over  1  million  Afghan  lives  have 
been  lost,  and  over  5  million  Afghans 
have  been  driven  into  exile. 

The  Soviet-controlled  PDPA 
[People's  Democratic  Party  of  Afghan- 
istan] regime,  riddled  with  factionalism 
and  identified  with  a  foreign  invader, 
enjoys  scant  popular  support.  Even 
with  massive  Soviet  backing,  the  Kabul 
regime's  army  has  been  an  ineffective 
fighting  force,  suffering  high  rates  of 
desertion. 

The  allegiance  of  the  Afghan  peo- 
ple appears  clearly  to  belong  to  the  re- 
sistance, a  broad  national  movement 
encompassing  almost  the  entire  popula- 
tion inside  the  country,  Afghan  refu- 
gees in  Iran  and  Pakistan,  and  Afghans 
in  exile  throughout  the  world.  The 
military  side  of  the  resistance — the 
mujahidin  fighters — are  grouped  in 
hundreds  of  fronts  in  every  part  of  the 


country.  Most  are  affiliated  with  one  of 
seven  parties  with  headquarters  in 
Pakistan. 

Before  commencement  of  Soviet 
troop  withdrawals,  the  mujahidin 
controlled  an  estimated  80%  of  the 
country.  As  Soviet  forces  have  pulled 
back  from  eastern  and  southern  Af- 
ghanistan, the  strength  of  the  re- 
sistance has  become  even  more 
apparent. 

•  The  Kabul  regime  has  given  up 
additional  territory — including  a 
number  of  important  towns  and  gar- 
risons— to  the  mujahidin.  As  a  result, 
the  resistance  now  entirely  controls  the 
Panjsher  and  Konar  Valleys — strategic 
areas  bitterly  contested  for  the  last 

8  years. 

•  Major  cities  such  as  Jalalabad, 
Ghazni,  and  Gardeyz  are  cut  off  from 
the  surrounding  countryside  and  can  be 
supplied  only  with  great  difficulty. 

As  the  Soviet  troop  withdrawal 
progresses,  military  initiative  will  con- 
tinue to  pass  to  the  mujahidin.  As  long 
as  the  resistance  remains  united,  we 
see  little  prospect  that  the  current  re- 
gime can  survive. 

Support  of  Pakistan  and  Other 
Countries.  A  second  important  factor 
in  securing  Soviet  troop  withdrawal  has 
been  the  steadfast  support  of  Pakistan 
and  others.  After  the  Afghans  them- 
selves, Pakistan  has  borne  the  primary 
burden  of  the  war.  Pakistan  has  offered 
refuge  to  more  than  3  million  Afghans; 
suffered  air  raids  on  its  territory,  kill- 
ing and  wounding  hundreds;  and  en- 
dured a  Soviet/Afghan  campaign  of 
terrorism  and  subversion,  including 
bombings  of  restaurants,  hotels,  cin- 
emas, shopping  centers,  schools,  and 
other  public  places.  Even  as  their 
troops  withdraw,  the  Soviets  continue 
to  wage  a  campaign  of  pressure  and 
intimidation  against  Pakistan. 

The  Afghan  cause  has  enjoyed 
broad  bipartisan  support  in  this  coun- 
try. We  have  provided  both  human- 
itarian and  military  assistance  to  the 
Diujahidin  and  will  continue  to  do  so. 
Prior  to  signature  of  the  Geneva  ac- 
cords, we  proposed  a  moratorium  on  all 
military  supplies  to  parties  in  Afghani- 
stan, but  the  Soviets  rejected  this  offer. 
We,  therefore,  made  clear — publicly  at 
time  of  signature  in  Geneva  as  well  as 
privately  through  diplomatic  channels — 
that  we  intended  to  exercise  our  right 
to  provide  military  aid  to  the  resistance 
as  long  as  the  Soviet  Union  continued 
to  give  military  assistance  to  the  Kabul 
regime. 


World  Opinion.  A  third  factor 
leading  to  a  successful  outcome  at  (le 
eva  has  been  the  sheer  weight  of  wur 
opinion.  The  international  community 
properly  viewed  the  Soviet  violation  ( 
Afghan  sovereignty  and  independenct 
as  a  threat  to  the  international  systei 
itself 

•  Since  January  1980,  the  UN  Ik' 
eral  Assembly  has  voted  nine  time^, 
overwhelming  and  generally  increasii 
margins,  for  a  resolution  calling  for  tl 
complete  withdrawal  of  foreign  forces 
from  Afghanistan,  the  restoration  (if 
Afghanistan's  independent  and  non- 
aligned  status,  Afghan  self-determin: 
tion,  and  the  creation  of  condition.-^  tl 
would  allow  the  refugees  to  return 
home  with  safety  and  honor. 

•  Afghanistan's  membership  in  tl 
Organization  of  the  Islamic  Confercn 
(OIC)  has  been  suspended,  and  the  (  ' 
has  regularly  issued  a  resolution  c(in 
demning  the  Soviet  invasion  and  sup 
porting  the  cause  of  Pakistan  and  the 
mujahidin.  The  South  Asian  Associ; 
tion  for  Regional  Cooperation  has  -dh 
rebuffed  Kabul's  efforts  to  join  that 
organization. 

•  Last  December,  the  European 
Community  issued  a  statement  caUii 
for  an  immediate  end  to  the  occupati 
of  Afghanistan,  including  a  Soviet  w  - 
drawal  completed  before  the  end  of 
1988. 

•  China  has  consistently  cited  S( 
viet  actions  in  Afghanistan  as  a  thre 
to  regional  security  and  a  major  obst 
cle  to  the  improvement  of  its  relatioi 
with  the  Soviet  Union.  The  Chinese 
Government  has  also  rendered  a  larj^ 
amount  of  aid  to  Afghan  refugees. 

These  factors — the  indigenous 
strength  of  the  Afghan  insurgency ,  t 
generous  support  provided  by  meml'  - 
of  the  international  community,  and    ' 
Soviets'  political  isolation — did  not  iv 
to  the  outright  military  defeat  of  Sox  t 
forces,  but  they  imposed  substantial 
and  growing — military,  political,  and 
economic  costs  on  Moscow.  In  9  yiar  il 
war,  the  Soviets  suffered  about  S'ljii 
casualties,  with  13,000  killed.  With 
no  victory  in  sight,  a  palpable  war- 
weariness  set  in  among  many  elenioi 
of  the  Soviet  population.  Criticism  ol 
the  war  has  grown  and,  in  the  dim  at 
of  glasnost,  become  more  public. 

New  Soviet  Leadership.  It  is  dii- 
cult  to  say  whether  these  costs  woiiN 
have  impelled  earlier  Soviet  leadei- 
ships  to  reassess  the  wisdom  of  pui's 
ing  the  war.  But  General  Secretary 
Gorbachev — free  of  responsibility  Ini 


20 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/September  1£l 


EUROPE 


arlier  decisions  and  intent  upon  creat- 
ng  an  international  environment  con- 
lucive  to  the  concentration  of  Soviet 
esources  and  energies  on  urgent  do- 
nestic  needs — has  clearly  found  them 
inacceptable.  The  emergence  of  a  new 
joviet  leadership  with  the  courage  to 
everse  a  failed  policy  has  been  a  fourth 
;ey  element  in  the  Soviet  decision  to 
vithdraw. 

UN  Negotiating  Framework.  A 
ifth  factor  crucial  to  the  success  at 
Jeneva  was  the  existence  of  a  UN  ne- 
gotiating framework  that  left  the  initia- 
ive  to  local  parties  whose  security  in- 
erests  were  directly  engaged.  Pakistan 
ook  the  lead  in  indirect  proximity  talks 
vith  the  Kabul  regime.  These  negotia- 
ions,  which  began  in  1982,  were  medi- 
ited  by  the  UN  Under  Secretary 
jeneral  for  Special  Political  Affairs, 
)iego  Cordovez. 

We  used  our  discussions  with  the 
Soviets  to  promote  a  speedy  Soviet 
withdrawal  and  restoration  of  Afghan 
ndependence.  We  emphasized  the  need 
or  a  withdrawal  timetable  that  was 
hort  and  frontloaded — i.e.,  one-half  of 
.11  Soviet  troops  out  in  90  days.  We  also 
upported  creation  of  an  interim  gov- 
Tnment  that  could  lay  the  groundwork 
or  genuine  Afghan  self-determination. 

Bipartisan  Support.  Finally,  a 
ixth  factor,  well  worth  pondering,  was 
he  bipartisan  support  for  our  policy, 
"■his  suggests  that,  with  political  con- 
ensus,  the  United  States  can  pursue  its 
nterests  successfully,  all  the  specula- 
ion  about  our  decline  notwithstanding. 

[       Much  has  been  accomplished  in 
kfghanistan;  much  also  remains  to  be 
lone.  The  shape  of  future  Afghan  po- 
litical arrangements  is  still  unclear. 
These ,  of  course,  are  for  the  Afghans 
hem.selves  to  decide.  We  support  the 
efforts  of  Diego  Cordovez,  in  a  private 
capacity,  to  mediate  among  the  parties 
n  the  hope  that  the  Afghans  will  be 
ible  to  exercise  their  right  to  self- 
letermination  without  additional  blood- 
shed and  civil  war. 

There  is  also  the  vast  problem  of 
nroviding  for  the  repatriation  and  re- 
settlement of  Afghan  refugees.  Of  a 
Drewar  population  of  about  14  million, 
\illy  half  are  dead,  in  exile  as  refugees, 
jr  displaced.  Agricultural  production 
las  been  sharply  reduced,  with  mines 
by  the  millions  strewn  throughout  the 
'country's  roads  and  fields. 

The  international  community  is  in 
:he  process  of  responding  to  this  human 
and  national  tragedy.  The  Soviet  Union 
nas  a  major  responsibility  for  assisting 


in  Afghan  reconstruction.  The  Secre- 
tary General  has  appointed  Sadruddin 
Aga  Khan  to  coordinate  a  broad  multi- 
lateral effort  to  assist  the  Afghans  in 
returning  to  their  homes  and  resuming 
their  livelihood.  Both  will  join  in  issu- 
ing an  appeal  for  the  necessary  funds. 
They  will  enjoy  our  strong  support  and 
encouragement.  At  the  economic  sum- 
mit, we  pressed  our  partners  to  do 
much  more. 

Other  Regional  Conflicts 

In  February,  General  Secretary  Gor- 
bachev stated  that  untying  the  Afghan 
knot  would  have  "the  most  profound  im- 
pact on  other  regional  conflicts."  Since 
then,  Soviet  officials  have  held  up  the 
Afghan  settlement  as  a  "model"  for 
handling  other  regional  conflicts. 

It  is  unclear  exactly  what  these 
officials  have  in  mind,  beyond  signaling 
a  desire  for  further  U.S. -Soviet  cooper- 
ation. Each  of  the  regional  conflicts 
must  be  understood  in  its  own  terms. 
Unlike  the  case  of  Afghanistan — where 
the  Soviets  alone  could  make  the  key 
decision  on  troop  withdrawal — Soviet 
involvement  in  the  other  conflicts  is 
more  indirect. 

Nonetheless,  keeping  in  mind  that 
each  conflict  has  its  own  character, 
some  of  the  same  broad  factors  that 
made  for  success  in  Afghanistan  may 
lead  to  settlements  in  regional  disputes 
in  southeast  Asia  and  southern  Africa. 
In  Angola  and  Cambodia,  the  Soviets 
support  a  regime  whose  reliance  on  for- 
eign troops  has  discredited  it  among  a 
significant  segment  of  its  own  people. 

•  Regimes  in  both  conflicts  have 
provoked  significant  resistance  move- 
ments. In  both  cases,  national  recon- 
ciliation requires  the  withdrawal  of 
foreign  forces. 

•  In  both  conflicts,  the  Soviets  and 
the  warring  parties  themselves  have 
shown  increasing  awareness  that  no 
military  solution  is  possible  and  that 
the  attempt  to  achieve  it  entails  grow- 
ing costs. 

•  In  both  cases,  a  multilateral  ne- 
gotiating framework,  involving  the  war- 
ring parties  themselves,  exists  for  ar- 
riving at  a  political  settlement.  The 
Soviets  have  begun  to  play  a  more  ac- 
tive role  in  these  diplomatic  processes. 

•  Finally,  in  both  conflicts,  the  best 
means  of  ensuring  the  removal  of  out- 
side powers  entails  establishment  of  a 
genuinely  neutral,  nonaligned  regime 
reflecting  the  domestic  political  real- 
ities in  the  countries  concerned. 


Cambodia.  Of  all  the  regional  con- 
flicts, the  war  in  Cambodia  perhaps 
most  resembles  that  in  Afghanistan.  On 
Christmas  Day  1978,  Vietnamese  troops 
crossed  the  border  into  Cambodia  to 
crush  the  Pol  Pot  regime.  The  war  has 
now  dragged  on  for  over  8  years,  im- 
posing a  heavy  cost  to  the  Khmer  peo- 
ple and  to  Vietnam.  The  Vietnamese 
continue  to  enjoy  military  superiority, 
but  the  Khmer  resistance  remains 
active. 

The  resistance — comprised  of 
the  communist  Khmer  Rouge,  the  non- 
communist  ANS  [Sihanouk  National 
Army]  led  by  Prince  Sihanouk,  and  the 
Khmer  People's  National  Liberation 
Front  (KPNLF) — has  concentrated 
largely  on  political  and  propaganda 
work  aimed  at  disrupting  P.R.K.  [Peo- 
ple's Republic  of  Kampuchea]  admin- 
istration and  on  launching  small-scale 
harassing  attacks.  The  resistance,  how- 
ever, does  not,  at  this  point,  seriously 
threaten  overall  Vietnamese  control. 

Despite  Vietnam's  announcement  of 
a  planned  withdrawal  of  50,000  troops 
by  the  end  of  1988,  its  decision  to  place 
some  75,000  remaining  troops  under 
P.R.K.  command  reflects  a  P.R.K./Viet- 
namese  recognition  that  the  regime 
cannot  stand  on  its  own.  The  P.  R.K.'s 
lack  of  popular  legitimacy  is  also  shown 
in  the  spotty  performance  of  the  P.R.K. 
mihtary.  Recruitment  is  a  serious  prob- 
lem, and  many  units  suffer  from  low- 
morale,  high  desertion  rates,  and,  in 
some  cases,  collaboration  with  one  or 
more  of  the  resistance  groups. 

At  this  time,  there  are  no  signs  of 
an  early  end  to  the  stalemate.  Vietnam 
has  little  prospect  of  consolidating  the 
P.R.K.  regime,  and  the  Vietnamese 
economy  continues  to  stagnate.  The  in- 
creasing costs  imposed  on  Vietnam  by 
the  international  community  may  ex- 
plain some  of  the  tactical  flexibility 
recently  evidenced  by  Vietnam. 

•  ASEAN  has  taken  the  lead  at  the 
United  Nations  and  elsewhere  in  efforts 
to  secure  Vietnamese  withdrawal  and 
reestablishment  of  a  neutral,  independ- 
ent Cambodia  not  dominated  by  any 
outside  power. 

•  The  Chinese  are  providing  the  re- 
sistance— both  the  Khmer  Rouge  and 
the  noncommunist — most  of  its  weapons 
and  a  great  deal  of  its  nonlethal  sup- 
port. Chinese  pressure  on  Vietnam's 
northern  border  also  ties  down  most  of 
Vietnam's  best  units,  preventing  their 
use  in  Cambodia. 

•  We  are  also  providing  a  modest 
level  of  aid.  We  have  used  our  as- 
sistance to  bolster  the  noncommunist 


>r.»  /^f  Qtato  RiillPtin/SeDtember  1988 


21 


EUROPE 


elements  of  the  resistance  as  a  political 
alternative,  within  the  resistance,  to 
the  Khmer  Rouge. 

The  diplomacy  surrounding  Cam- 
bodia has  recently  become  more  active. 
During  the  past  year.  Prince  Sihanouk's 
talks  with  Hun  Sen,  head  of  the  P.R.K. 
regime,  also  injected  greater  diplomatic 
fluidity,  though  those  discussions  have 
stalled  because  of  Hun  Sen's  lack  of 
flexibility  and  the  refusal  of  Hanoi 
to  participate.  Sihanouk  is  the  only 
Cambodian  leader  to  enjoy  widespread 
popular  Cambodian  support  and  inter- 
national prestige.  We  can  envision  him 
playing  a  central  role  in  a  future  inde- 
pendent Cambodia. 

Indonesian  Foreign  Minister  Alatas 
recently  revived  a  proposal  for  an  infor- 
mal meeting  that  would  bring  the  Khmer 
factions  together  for  talks  to  be  quickly 
joined  by  the  Vietnamese.  Hanoi  has 
indicated  it  will  attend  the  talks. 

The  essential  decisions  for  ending 
the  conflict,  of  course,  remain  with  the 
Vietnamese.  Hanoi's  intention  regard- 
ing a  complete  troop  withdrawal  is  the 
central  question.  Its  proposed  time- 
table for  withdrawing  all  of  its  troops 
by  1990  is  far  too  long  and  is  hedged 
by  a  number  of  conditions.  We  remain 
skeptical  that  the  Vietnamese  are  actu- 
ally willing  to  risk  the  demise  of  their 
surrogate  regime,  either  through  the 
promised  complete  withdrawal  of  their 
troops  or  through  formation  of  a  genu- 
ine coalition  government,  but  the  ap- 
proaching Indonesia-hosted  talks  will 
give  Hanoi  a  chance  to  prove  its  bona 
fides. 

Hanoi's  new  leadership  has  shown 
greater  concern  about  the  dismal  shape 
of  the  Vietnamese  economy.  The  domes- 
tic preoccupations  of  Vietnam's  new 
leaders  are  well  warranted.  Food  pro- 
duction is  falling,  and  industrial  produc- 
tion is  at  only  a  fraction  of  capacity; 
inflation  is  skyrocketing;  and  party  dis- 
content is  reportedly  widespread. 

The  Soviets  can  play  a  construc- 
tive— even  crucial — role  in  facilitating  a 
settlement.  An  end  to  the  war  would 
reduce  the  economic  burden  on  them — 
last  year  they  provided  an  estimated 
$2.5  billion  in  military  assistance  to 
Vietnam  and  Cambodia — and  facilitate 
improvements  in  Soviet  relations  with 
us,  the  ASEAN  states,  and  with  Beij- 
ing, which  has  cited  Vietnamese  occu- 
pation of  Cambodia  as  a  major  obstacle 
to  normalization  of  Sino-Soviet  relations. 

Recently,  the  Soviets  have  begun 
to  acknowledge  the  benefits  to  them 
of  a  Vietnamese  troop  withdrawal.  They 
have  applauded  the  Vietnamese  an- 


nouncement of  a  partial  troop  with- 
drawal, and  they  may  have  played  an 
important  role  in  arranging  Hun  Sen's 
talks  with  Sihanouk.  Nonetheless,  the 
question  is  whether  they  are  willing  to 
jeopardize  use  of  military  assets  at 
Cam  Ranh  Bay  by  using  their  consider- 
able economic  and  political  leverage  to 
press  Hanoi  to  show  genuine  flexibility. 
We  have  used  our  dialogue  with  the 
Soviets  and  others  to  support  ASEAN's 
and  Sihanouk's  efforts  to  achieve  a  ne- 
gotiated settlement.  We  will  continue 
to  do  so.  International  pressure  on  the 
Vietnamese  to  negotiate  seriously  must 
be  maintained.  We  will  continue  to 
maintain  the  economic  and  diplomatic 
isolation  of  Vietnam  and  block  its  ac- 
cess to  Western  technological  and  fi- 
nancial sources.  Hanoi  has  a  strong 
interest  in  normalization  of  relations 
with  the  United  States,  but  this  will 
not  occur  without  a  settlement  in 
Cambodia. 

Southern  Africa.  The  conflict  in 
southern  Africa  involves  two  foreign 
interventions. 

•  With  Soviet  support,  Cuban 
troops  arrived  in  Angola  in  1975  to  help 
the  MPLA  [Popular  Movement  for  the 
Liberation  of  Angola]  guerrilla  army 
beat  its  rivals  in  the  civil  war  that  fol- 
lowed Angolan  independence  from  Por- 
tugal. Thirteen  years  later,  Cuban 
troops  remain  in  Angola  in  augmented 
strength. 

•  To  the  south,  Namibia  continues 
to  be  administered  by  South  Africa  in 
defiance  of  international  law  and  the 
United  Nations,  which,  under  UN  Se- 
curity Council  Resolution  (UNSCR) 
435,  has  called  for  free  internationally 
supervised  elections.  In  support  of  its 
position  in  Namibia,  the  South  African 
Government  has  repeatedly  militarily 
intervened  in  Angola.  It  has  troops 
there  now. 

This  situation  has  denied  Angola  a 
government  enjoying  the  consent  of  the 
governed  and  has  made  it  a  focal  point 
of  East-West  rivalry.  At  the  same  time. 
South  African  rule  has  condemned  a 
million  Namibians  to  apartheid  and  life 
under  an  occupation  force.  For  these 
reasons,  we  have  pursued  a  solution  in- 
volving independence  for  Namibia  un- 
der UNSCR  435  and  total  withdrawal 
of  Cuban  and  South  African  forces  from 
Angola  and  Namibia.  We  have  also 
sought  to  promote  an  equitable  end  to 
the  15-year  civil  war  in  Angola  through 
genuine  national  reconciliation. 

In  this  endeavor.  Assistant  Secre- 
tary [for  African  Affairs]  Chet  Crocker 
has  worked  tirelessly  with  all  the  par- 


ties concerned  to  establish  a  negotiat- 
ing framework.  In  early  May  of  this 
year,  through  Crocker's  mediation,  the 
South  Africans  met — for  the  first  time 
in  over  18  months— with  their  Angolar 
and  Cuban  counterparts  around  the 
same  negotiating  table.  At  this  and 
other  meetings  with  Crocker,  the  par- 
ties made  important  advances  toward 
settlement. 

•  The  Angolan/Cuban  side  has  af- 
firmed a  commitment  to  total  with- 
drawal of  Cuban  forces  from  Angola  ii 
the  context  of  an  overall  settlement.  I 
March,  the  Angolans  tabled,  for  the 
first  time,  a  timetable  for  complete 
Cuban  withdrawal. 

•  The  South  Africans  have  reaf- 
firmed their  commitment  to  implemen 
the  plan  for  Namibian  independence 
contained  in  UNSCR  435  if  an  accept 
able  timetable  for  Cuban  troop  with- 
drawal is  achieved. 

We  have  also  had  an  intense  di- 
alogue with  the  Soviets — including  di: 
cussions  at  the  summit,  ministerial,  a 
expert  levels — aimed  at  seeking  ways 
promote  a  political  settlement.  The 
U.S.S.R.  provided  over  $1  billion  of  a 
to  Angola  in  1986,  and  this  sum  sub- 
stantially increased  in  1987.  These 
subventions  should  give  Moscow  cons: 
erable  leverage  with  both  Havana  anc 
Luanda  in  promoting  a  political 
settlement. 

In  recent  months,  the  Soviets  ha' 
been  willing  to  play  a  more  active  roli 
in  the  diplomatic  process. 

•  We  welcome  recent  Soviet  sup- 
port of  U.S.  mediation  efforts  to  reac 
a  settlement  linking  independence  for 
Namibia  under  UNSCR  435  with  tota 
Cuban  troop  withdrawal. 

•  We  welcome  a  commitment  to 
urge  the  parties  to  resolve  outstandin 
differences  by  September  29,  1988 — 
the  tenth  anniversary  of  approval  of 
UNSCR  435. 

•  Finally,  we  have  noted  Deputy 
Foreign  Minister  Adamishin's  commen 
in  a  June  6  interview  reported  in  The 
Neiv  York  Times,  that  a  settlement 
would  not  hinge  on  an  end  to  U.S.  aid 
to  UNITA  [National  Union  for  the 
Total  Independence  of  Angola]. 

All  of  these  are  positive  develop- 
ments. An  opportunity  exists  for  fur- 
ther U.S. -Soviet  cooperation,  but  the 
extent  of  that  cooperation  will  depend 
upon  Soviet  willingness  to  help  resolv 
a  number  of  key  outstanding  issues  or 
which  the  parties  are  still  far  apart. 


22 


EUROPE 


»  The  4-year  withdrawal  timetable 
"oposed  by  Luanda  is  not  realistic, 
he  recent  increase  in  Cuban  troop 
rength  in  Angola  raises  serious  ques- 
ons  about  Cuban  professions  of  a  will- 
gness  to  withdraw. 

•  Luanda  also  has  yet  to  make  a 
;rious  effort  at  national  reconciliation 
ith  its  long-time  rival,  the  National 
nion  for  the  Total  Independence  of 
ngola.  Led  by  Jonas  Savimbi  and  en- 
vying the  support  of  at  least  40%  of 

le  Angolan  population,  UNITA  is  a 
jjnuine  nationalist  force  with  which 
lie  MPLA  will  have  to  come  to  terms  if 
iiere  is  to  be  peace  and  stability  in 
ngola.  We  will  continue  our  aid  to 
NITA  until  this  problem  is  solved. 

•  Finally,  the  commitment  of  all 
des  to  total  and  complete  implementa- 
on  of  UNSCR  435 — majority  rule  in 
amibia — must  be  fulfilled  without 
aalification  if  an  overall  settlement  is 
ihieved. 

Whether  the  parties  will  make 
le  compromises  required  to  resolve 
lese  issues  is  uncertain.  The  effort  to 
;hieve  a  settlement  is  burdened  by  a 
)-year  legacy  of  conflict  and  deep- 
sated  fears  on  all  sides  that  any 
lange  will  be  for  the  worse. 

Nonetheless,  it  is  increasingly  clear 
lat  neither  side  can  achieve  a  military 
ictory,  and  both  Luanda  and  Pretoria 
re  feeling  the  costs  of  military  stale- 
late.  Angola  is  economically  ex- 
austed;  its  people,  increasingly  war- 
■eary.  South  Africa  gets  only  limited 
sturns  on  its  investment  in  Namibia, 
here  is  increasing  public  discussion 
ithin  South  Africa  of  the  costs  of  the 
'ar  and  fears  of  longer  white  casualty 
sts.  There  is  also  a  growing  preoc- 
upation  with  mounting  internal 
roblems. 

International — especially  African — 
pinion  is  coming  to  play  a  larger  role. 
Jecause  of  South  African  support  for 
JNITA,  African  nations  have  been  re- 
ictant  to  acknowledge  the  realities  of 
he  internal  Angolan  situation.  But  this 
5  changing.  There  is  increasing  criti- 
ism  within  Africa  of  the  Cuban  role  in 
Lngola,  and,  in  recent  months,  a  num- 
ler  of  key  African  leaders  have  moved 
uietly  to  bring  Angolan  adversaries 
ogether.  These  efforts  deserve  our  full 
upport. 

For  our  part,  the  U.S.  commitment 
0  an  early  political  settlement  is  firm. 
Ve  intend  to  remain  active  on  this  front 
0  the  very  end  of  this  Administration. 


Conclusion 

I  do  not  wish  to  exaggerate  the  pro- 
gress we  have  made  in  our  dialogue 
with  the  Soviets  on  regional  issues.  The 
Soviet  troop  withdrawal  from  Afghan- 
istan is  not  yet  complete,  and  the  con- 
flicts in  Cambodia  and  southern  Africa 
are  far  from  resolved.  In  a  number  of 
areas,  forward  movement  has  been 
modest. 

On  the  Middle  East,  while  our  di- 
alogue shows  some  promise,  there  are 
still  significant  differences  regarding 
the  role  of  an  international  conference 
and  the  nature  of  Palestinian  represen- 
tation in  it. 

On  the  Iran-Iraq  war,  we  were  en- 
couraged in  July  1987  by  Soviet  cooper- 
ation in  the  UN  Security  Council  in 
adopting  UNSCR  598.  We  have  been 
disappointed,  however,  with  Moscow's 
subsequent  unwillingness  to  support  an 
enforcement  resolution. 

In  Central  America,  destabilizing 
Soviet  arms  deliveries  to  Nicaragua 
continue,  despite  calls  for  their  curtail- 
ment by  [Costa  Rican]  President  Arias 
and  the  congressional  ban  on  U.S.  mili- 
tary supphes  to  the  I'esistance. 


As  this  agenda  of  unresolved  issues 
shows,  the  competitive  elements  of  the 
U.S. -Soviet  relationship  persist.  Our 
two  countries  remain  vastly  different  in 
the  way  we  view  the  rights  of  the  indi- 
vidual and  in  the  way  we  relate  to  other 
countries.  Nonetheless,  our  policies 
toward  the  Soviet  Union  are  working 
and,  with  patience,  persistence,  and 
bipartisanship,  they  will  continue 
to  work. 

The  Soviet  commitment  to  with- 
draw from  Afghanistan  indicates  that 
there  may  be,  for  the  first  time  ever,  a 
Soviet  willingness  to  reexamine  Soviet 
security  and  other  interests  in  order  to 
bring  them  closer  to  international 
norms.  Some  Soviets  have  even  begun 
to  acknowledge  publicly  that  Brezhnev's 
actions  in  the  Third  World  were  respon- 
sible for  the  demise  of  detente  in  the 
1970s. 

We  can  only  welcome  a  Soviet  reas- 
sessment of  past  policies.  And  I  am 
hopeful  that  we  can  develop  further  op- 
portunities for  U.S. -Soviet  cooperation 
in  helping  local  parties  resolve  even 
some  of  the  most  intractable  regional 
disputes.  ■ 


Perspectives  on  Change 
in  the  Soviet  Union 


by  Rozanne  L.  Ridgway 

Statement  before  the  Subcoinmittee 
on  Europe  and  the  Middle  East  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
June  29,  1988.  Ambassador  Ridgway  is 
Assistant  Secretary  for  European  and 
Canadian  Affairs  A 

I  am  pleased  to  be  here  to  help  con- 
clude the  subcommittee's  series  of  hear- 
ings on  change  in  the  Soviet  Union  and 
its  implications  for  U.S.  policy. 

Yes,  there  is  change  in  today's 
Soviet  Union.  It  is  not  a  test  of  one's 
ideology  to  say  so.  But  it  is  hard  to  go 
beyond  that  statement.  I  hear  all  kinds 
of  descriptions.  Some  focus  on  plans  for 
economic  reform  and  the  effort  to  sell 
that  to  the  party  and  the  country.  Oth- 
ers concentrate  on  the  emerging  inter- 
relationships between  economic  reform 
on  the  one  hand  and  reform  in  the  cul- 
tural and  political  fields  on  the  other. 
It's  true  enough  that  there  is  an  inter- 
relationship, but  we  don't  yet  know 
what  will  happen  with  it. 


I  want,  therefore,  to  give  a  very 
personal  view  of  what  kind  of  change 
I  see.  Let  me  share  with  you  three 
thoughts  on  change. 

First,  there  is  the  promise  of 
change.  A  new  genei-ation  of  Soviet 
leaders  is  running  things.  The  people  in 
many  key  jobs  are  different  and  bring 
different  experiences  and  perceptions  of 
what  the  Soviet  Union  needs.  They  use 
different  language — more  direct  and 
speUing  out  different  priorities.  Venera- 
ble institutions  are  being  reorganized. 

Then  there  is  the  perception 
of  change.  Disasters  are  announced 
promptly.  Public  discussion  is  permitted 
of  many  sensitive  issues.  Our  ambas- 
sador in  Moscow,  Jack  Matlock,  says 
that  for  the  first  time  in  his  lifetime  of 
following  Soviet  affairs,  a  Soviet  news- 
paper reads  like  a  newspaper.  Long- 
banned  literature,  theater,  and  films 
are  being  published  and  produced.  The 
Soviets  are  looking  at  their  past:  criti- 
cizing Stalin,  rehabilitating  Bukharin. 
People  have  been  released  from  prison. 


jeoartment  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


23 


EUROPE 


These  things  happening  in  the  intellec- 
tual and  cultural  areas  are  not  at  the 
heart  of  how  the  Soviet  Union  actually 
maintains  party  and  state  power,  but 
they  are  symbolic  of  it,  they  have  cre- 
ated a  new  atmosphere,  and  they  sug- 
gest new  attitudes. 

Finally,  there  is  the  reality  of 
change.  The  reality  is  what  might  be 
actually  underway  involving  structural 
change,  what  may  make  the  nature  of 
the  Soviet  Union  truly  different  over 
the  long  term.  The  General  Secretary 
Gorbachev  I  see  is  a  committed  Marxist 
trying  to  make  the  Soviet  system  func- 
tion effectively,  particularly  its  econ- 
omy. He  appears  to  be  willing  to  adjust 
certain  international  relationships,  and 
perhaps  also  some  domestic  arrange- 
ments of  interest  to  the  Soviet  Union's 
international  partners,  in  order  to  be 
able  to  concentrate  more  fully  on  that 
complex  and  difficult  domestic  task. 

The  Soviets  are  now  willing  to  sit 
down  across  a  table  with  us  and  dis- 
cuss, and  sometimes  make  progress  on, 
the  full  range  of  our  agenda.  That  is 
not  to  say  that  Soviet  values  and  Soviet 
interests  are  becoming  the  same  as 
ours,  or  even,  in  many  areas,  compati- 
ble with  ours.  Gorbachev  uses  the  word 
"democratization"  in  a  peculiarly  com- 
munist sense,  and  the  West  has  cho- 
sen to  mistranslate  the  Russian  word 
glasnost.  Gorbachev  is  most  certainly 
not  a  Western  liberal  democrat. 

That  Gorbachev  is  committed  to 
moving  his  perestroika  program,  his  no- 
tion of  reform,  is  real.  But  as  Premier 
Ryzhkov  also  said  to  us  in  Moscow:  it  is 
not  so  much  that  there  is  opposition  to 
perestroika,  as  that  there  is  resistance. 

There  are  real  limits  as  yet  to  the 
reality  of  change.  So  far,  the  Soviet  mil- 
itary force  posture  remains  essentially 
unchanged,  and  Soviet  weapons  mod- 
ernization programs  continue  apace. 
While  the  Soviets  have  resolved  some 
individual  human  rights  cases,  and  we 
are  pleased  that  those  individual  human 
lives  are  thereby  relieved,  they  have 
yet  to  address  the  structural  and  insti- 
tutional restrictions  on  human  rights 
that  are  built  into  Soviet  society. 

On  things,  therefore,  that  matter 
to  the  United  States  and  our  allies  and 
how  to  deal  with  the  changing  Soviet 
Union,  it  is  a  confused  picture.  One 
has  to  be  willing  to  negotiate  our  full 
agenda  and  to  back  away  when,  for  the 
moment,  that  isn't  possible. 


Baltic  Freedom  Day,  1988 


PROCLAMATION  5831, 
JUNE  14,  1988' 

In  June  1940,  acting  under  the  color 
of  a  secret  protocol  to  the  infamous 
Ribbentrop-Molotov  Non-Aggression  Pact 
signed  the  previous  year,  Soviet  forces  oc- 
cupied the  independent  Baltic  States  of  Es- 
tonia. Latvia,  and  Lithuania.  These  small, 
democratic  republics  were  crushed  by  the 
armies  of  their  expansionist  neighbor  and 
illegally  incorporated  into  the  Soviet  em- 
pire. In  the  aftermath  of  the  Soviet  take- 
over, tens  of  thousands  of  Baits  were 
imprisoned,  deported,  or  killed.  Their  re- 
ligious and  cultural  heritage  was  deni- 
grated and  repressed.  An  alien  political 
system,  inimical  to  the  ideals  of  individual 
liberty  and  self-determination,  was  im- 
posed upon  them. 

The  end  of  World  War  11  saw  the  de- 
feat of  ambitious  empire-builders  in  Ger- 
many and  Japan,  but  foreign  domination  of 
the  Baltic  States  that  resulted  from  the 
collusion  of  Hitler  and  Stalin  remained  in 
place.  For  nearly  five  decades,  the  Soviet 
Union  has  tried  in  vain  to  convince  the 
Baltic  peoples  to  accept  its  hegemony,  but 
its  efforts  are  doomed  to  failure. 

The  situation  has  improved  for  some 
Soviet  human  rights  activists  in  recent 
months,  but  Baltic  men  and  women  still 
suffer  imprisonment,  banishment,  and  per- 
secution for  daring  to  protest  the  con- 
tinuing suppression  of  their  national 
independence  and  cultures.  Yet,  despite 
the  risks,  they  continue  to  speak  out,  to 


plead,  and  to  claim  their  rights  to  re- 
ligious, cultural,  and  political  freedom. 

Our  government  has  never  recognized 
the  forcible  incorporation  of  the  Baltic 
States  into  the  Soviet  Union,  and  we  neve 
will.  The  American  people,  citizens  of  a 
land  conceived  in  liberty  and  dedicated  to 
equality  under  God  for  all,  support  the  as- 
pirations of  the  Baltic  people  to  regain  the 
freedom  that  was  theirs  and  to  chart  their 
own  course.  To  this  goal  we  pledge  anew 
our  unswerving  commitment. 

By  Senate  Joint  Resolution  249,  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States  has  autho- 
rized and  requested  the  President  to  des- 
ignate June  14,  1988,  as  "Baltic  Freedom 
Day" 

Now,  Therefore,  I,  Ronald 
Reagan,  President  of  the  United  States  o 
America,  do  hereby  designate  June  14,  198! 
as  Baltic  Freedom  Day.  I  call  upon  the 
people  of  the  United  States  to  observe  thi 
day  with  appropriate  remembrances  and 
ceremonies  and  to  reaffirm  their  commit- 
ment to  principles  of  liberty  and  freedom 
for  all  oppressed  people. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  I  have  here- 
unto set  my  hand  this  fourteenth  day  of 
June,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  nineteen  hu: 
dred  and  eighty-eight,  and  of  the  Indepen 
dence  of  the  United  States  of  America  the 
two  hundred  and  twelfth. 

Ronald  Reaga 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  June  20,  1988.  II 


We  have  made  some  progress. 
We  have  signed  and  ratified,  and  are 
now  about  to  implement,  an  INF 
[intermediate-range  nuclear  forces] 
agreement.  We  have  put  in  place  a  proc- 
ess of  ministerials  and  summits  which 
motivates  the  bureaucracies  on  both 
sides  to  stay  serious  about  trying  to 
chip  away  at  the  very  real  differences 
which  divide  us.  We  have  concluded  a 
number  of  modest  bilateral  agreements 
which  are  in  the  two  countries'  mutual 
interest. 

The  Soviets  are  withdrawing  troops 
from  Afghanistan,  because  even  they 
eventually  came  to  see  that  was  in  their 
interest.  But  it  remains  to  be  seen 
whether  they  will  work  constructively 
with  other  parties  for  solutions  to  con- 
flicts in  other  parts  of  the  world  where 


they  perceive  their  interests  engaged. 
In  some  areas,  we  think  we  see  signs 
they  may.  We  hope  so. 

Implications  for  U.S.  Policy 

What  does  all  this  mean  for  the  Unitec 
States  and  its  allies?  Western  govern- 
ments, or  the  outside  world  put  to- 
gether, are  in  a  position  to  affect  some 
of  what  happens  in  the  Soviet  Union — 
it  is,  after  all,  not  a  desert  island — bul 
we  exert  our  influence  very  much  at 
the  margin  of  the  main  issues  with 
which  the  Soviet  Union  is  grappling. 

Let  me  highlight  for  you  the  word 
used  10  days  ago  by  the  seven  economi 
summit  heads  in  Toronto,  in  their  polit 
ical  declaration,  to  describe  change  in 
the  Soviet  Union. 


24 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/September  M 


EUROPE 


In  several  important  respects  changes 
ive  taken  place  in  relations  between 
astern  countries  and  the  Soviet  Union 
nee  we  last  met.  For  our  part  this  evolu- 
on  has  come  about  because  the  industri- 
ized  democracies  have  been  strong  and 
iiited.  In  the  Soviet  Union  greater  free- 
bm  and  openness  will  offer  opportunities 
li  reduce  mistrust  and  build  confidence, 
ach  of  us  will  respond  positively  to  any 
ich  developments. 

On  what  basis  are  we,  here  in  the 
[nited  States,  prepared  to  respond?  On 
lie  basis  of  U.S.  interests;  these  en- 
jre  whatever  happens  in  the  Soviet 
nion.  We  will  wish  and  need  to  pursue 
lem  with  whatever  leadership  history 
!rves  up  in  Moscow.  The  directions 
lat  Gorbachev  has  set  out  seem  to 
5  healthy  ones.  If  the  Soviet  Union 
oves  in  those  directions,  it  will  be  a 
etter  place  for  Soviet  people  to  live 
.  It  may  be  a  more  responsible  part- 
ar  in  world  affairs.  But  we  cannot 
low  whether,  or  how  far,  the  Soviet 
nion  will,  in  fact,  move  in  those  direc- 
ons.  And  we  cannot  make  our  own 
)licy  depend  on  the  answer  to  those 
iestions.  Instead,  we  need  a  policy 
lat  gives  the  Soviets  a  clear,  consis- 
■nt  view  of  the  interests  we  will  be 
irsuing  in  our  dealings  with  them  as 
ley  pursue  theirs  with  us. 

.S.  Interests 

ur  interests  include: 

•  Defending  and  promoting  care- 
lUy  defined  U.S.  and  Western  foreign 
Dhcy  interests  throughout  the  world  in 
lie  face  of  persisting  Soviet  challenge; 

•  Encouraging  humane  values  and 
emocratic  and  pluralistic  institutions 
iroughout  the  world,  including  the 
oviet  Union; 

•  Deterring  Soviet  military  attack 
nd,  in  the  nuclear  age,  ensuring  that 
ie  combined  Western  nuclear  and  con- 
entional  deterrent  is  effective  enough 
nat  its  nuclear  component  never  has  to 
e  used;  and 


•  Encouraging  sustained  growth 
and  health  in  the  international  eco- 
nomic system  through  expanding  oppor- 
tunity for  free  enterprise  and  trade. 

And  the  test  of  success  for  us  is 
whether  or  not  we  are  able  to  deal  with 
the  Soviets  on  a  sustained  basis  in  a 
way  that  produces  results  in  terms  of 
those  interests. 

U.S.  Policy  Framework  and  Process 

We  have  just  seen,  in  the  Moscow  sum- 
mit, an  effort  to  sum  up  and  record 
where  U.S.  policy  toward  the  Soviet 
Union  and  the  U.S. -Soviet  relationship 
have  taken  us  over  the  last  few  years. 
That  policy  approach  is  based  on 
strength,  realism,  and  dialogue  to- 
gether, reinforcing  one  another.  It  is  a 
comprehensive  policy.  It  goes  beyond 
arms  control  to  include  all  significant 
issues  between  the  two  countries.  This 
was  the  conceptual  origin  of  the  four- 
part  agenda,  which  was  in  place  by  late 
1982/early  1983:  human  rights,  arms 
control,  regional  issues  representing 
conflicts  which  caused  tension  in  the 
East-West  relationship,  and  a  range  of 
bilateral  issues. 

The  relationship  has  to  be  seen 
as  a  process  rather  than  a  series  of 
lurches  from  triumph  to  tragedy.  In  a 
competitive  and  crisis-prone  rela- 
tionship, we  need  to  be  able  to  deal 
consistently  with  both  the  hard  and  the 
easy  issues,  with  whatever  Soviet  lead- 
ership history  turns  up.  We  needed  to 
be  well-positioned,  as  Secretary  Shultz 
put  it  in  a  speech  last  February,  "to 
deal  with  the  best  and  worst  of  Soviet 
behavior." 

Where  We  Are;  Where  We  Are  Going 

A  lot  of  hard  work  has  been  required  to 
get  this  far  toward  the  goal  of  a  U.S.- 
Soviet relationship  that  is  stable  and 
constructive  on  a  long-term  basis.  Sys- 
tematic, continuous  negotiations  across 
the  range  of  issues  is  easy  to  talk 
about,  hard  to  do. 

In  a  sense,  the  Moscow  summit 
was  both  a  summation  of  the  very  solid 
progress  we  have  made  over  the  past  3 
years  and  a  recommitment  to  continue 
on  the  same  path  in  the  same  direction. 
When  the  relationship  is  defined  as  a 
comprehensive  process,  no  single  high- 


level  meeting  is  critical,  but  all  are 
useful,  and  this  one  was  no  exception. 

We  have  a  political  dialogue  in 
place  that  is  realistic  and  solid  enough 
to  deal  with  all  the  issues,  the  hard  and 
the  less  hard,  in  the  relationship.  It 
was  clear  in  Moscow  that  the  Soviets 
are  willing  to  join  us  in  the  effort  to 
take  the  dialogue  as  far  as  it  can  go  in 
the  months  ahead.  Again,  for  us,  this  is 
the  element  of  change.  The  more  there 
is,  the  more  we  will  be  able  to  respond. 

As  was  spelled  out  in  the  joint 
statement  issued  at  the  Moscow  sum- 
mit, we  have  a  very  broad  and  detailed 
work  program  that  will  give  substance 
to  the  commitment  to  keep  going.  As 
was  spelled  out  in  the  political  declara- 
tion of  the  economic  summit  of  the  in- 
dustrialized democracies,  the  summit 
seven  are  prepared  to  respond  to  Soviet 
change  across  the  range  of  our  inter- 
ests: in  human  rights,  arms  control,  re- 
gional disputes,  and  contacts  and  trade. 

The  rate  of  progress  on  the  U.S. 
agenda  is  dependent  on  what  the  Sovi- 
ets see  as  in  their  interests,  as  well  as 
what  specific  moves  we  see  as  in  ours. 
But  the  agenda  and  the  policy  which 
underlies  it  are  not  dependent  on  the 
Soviets  or  their  actions,  intentions,  or 
leadership.  The  policy  and  the  agenda 
are  ours  to  define.  We  have  tried  to 
define  them  to  reflect  and  embody  this 
country's  real  and  enduring  interests 
vis-a-vis  the  other  superpower.  We 
think  that  the  policy  and  agenda  have 
been  realistic  and  that  the  results  show 
they  are  realistic.  We  also  think  they 
provide  a  solid  basis  for  the  future. 


■The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee 
and  will  be  available  from  the  Superintend- 
ent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  Washington,  D.C.,  20402.  ■ 


(eoartment  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


25 


EUROPE 


Negotiating  With  the  Soviet  Union: 
Then  and  Now 


by  Edward  L.  Kowny 

Address  before  the  Seminar  on 
Global  Security  and  Arms  Control  at 
the  University  of  California  in  Santa 
Cruz  on  June  30,  1988.  Ambassador 
Rowny  is  special  adviser  to  the  Presi- 
dent and  the  Secretary  of  State  for 
arms  control  matters. 

Several  years  ago,  I  wrote  an  article 
entitled  "Ten  'Commandments'  for  Ne- 
gotiating with  the  Soviet  Union."  I 
tried  to  condense  my  experience  in  ne- 
gotiating with  the  Soviets,  first  as  the 
representative  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of 
Staff  to  the  SALT  II  [strategic  arms 
limitation  talks]  delegation  and  then  as 
chief  START  [strategic  arms  reduction 
talks]  negotiator,  into  some  brief  guide- 
lines for  others  who  would  have  to  sit 
across  the  negotiating  table  from  the 
Soviets  in  the  future.  I  admonished 
future  negotiators: 

•  Above  all,  remember  the 
objective; 

•  Be  patient; 

•  Keep  secrets; 

•  Bear  in  mind  the  differences  be- 
tween the  two  political  systems; 

•  Beware  of  'Greeks'  bearing  gifts; 

•  Remember  that  for  the  Soviets, 
form  IS  substance; 

•  Don't  be  deceived  by  the  Soviet 
"fear  of  being  invaded"; 

•  Beware  of  eleventh  hour 
negotiating; 

•  Don't  be  deceived  by  words;  and 

•  Don't  misinterpret  the  human 
element. 

It  is  an  appropriate  time  to  see 
how  these  'commandments'  apply  today. 

A  New  Juncture 

in  U.S. -Soviet  Relations 

Since  I  wrote  that  piece,  there  have 
been  three  General  Secretaries  of  the 
Communist  Party.  We  have  gone  from 
Brezhnev,  the  consummate  apparatchik , 
car  collector,  and  invader  of  Afghani- 
stan; to  Andropov,  the  former  head  of 
the  KGB  and  the  individual  bearing 
much  of  the  burden  of  responsibility  for 


turning  psychiatry  in  the  Soviet  Union 
into  an  instrument  of  state  terror  and 
repression;  to  Chernenko,  who  is  prob- 
ably most  notable  for  having  the  good 
grace  to  make  timely  way  for  Gorbachev. 

There  can  be  little  question  that 
we  are  now  at  a  new  juncture  in  the  re- 
lationship between  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union.  In  arms  control, 
we  have  signed  and  ratified  the  INF 
[Intermediate-Range  Nuclear  Forces] 
Ti-eaty,  which  will  eliminate  an  en- 
tire class  of  U.S.  and  Soviet  nuclear 
missiles.  We  also  achieved  Soviet 
agreement  on  extensive  verification 
provisions,  including  onsite  inspections 
and  monitoring  that  many  believed  un- 
thinkable just  a  few  years  ago. 

More  importantly  for  the  long-term 
development  of  superpower  relations, 
we  have  made  the  U.S. -Soviet  rela- 
tionship four-dimensional.  No  longer  do 
U.S. -Soviet  summits  focus  exclusively 
on  arms  control.  We  discuss  a  whole 
spectrum  of  issues.  Human  rights  now 
occupy  a  position  of  high  priority  on  the 
agenda  in  a  way  never  realized  before — 
not  only  do  we  bring  up  Soviet  human 
rights  practices  but  the  Soviets  actually 
discuss  them.  We  emphasize  the  impor- 
tance of  regional  conflicts,  where  the 
threat  to  peace  has  already  crossed  the 
threshold  into  violence,  as  we  consis- 
tently have  done  over  Afghanistan, 
Cambodia,  Ethiopia,  Angola,  the  Mid- 
dle East,  and  Central  America.  We 
candidly  and  publicly  force  the  Soviet 
Government  to  face  its  responsibility 
for  aggravating  these  regional  conflicts. 
We  also  foster  our  bilateral  relations 
with  agreements  on  educational  and 
cultural  exchanges.  Over  IV-z  years  and 
four  summits,  the  United  States  has 
made  great  strides  in  advancing  the 
President's  balanced  and  realistic  ap- 
proach to  U.S. -Soviet  relations  through 
his  broad,  four-pillar  agenda. 

Changes  in  the  Soviet  leadership, 
specifically  Gorbachev's  rise  to  power, 
have  aided  this  process.  More  impor- 
tantly, however,  we  have  capitalized  on 
the  arrival  of  the  new  Soviet  leader  by 
following  the  steady  course  of  realism, 
patience,  and  strength  plotted  by  Pres- 


ident Reagan.  The  more  significant 
question,  though,  is  not  whether  or  no 
U.S. -Soviet  relations  have  reached  a 
new  stage.  Clearly,  they  have.  The  rea 
question  is:  Where  will  our  relations  gi 
from  here? 

I  submit  that  people  who  give  a 
definitive  answer  to  the  real  question 
don't  know  what  they  are  talking 
about.  The  only  honest  answer  is,  "I 
don't  know."  We  should  all  hope  that 
Gorbachev's  reforms  are  fundamental 
and  institutional  and  that  they  will 
bring  about  a  true  liberalization  of  life 
in  the  Soviet  Union.  However,  we  mus 
not  assume  this. 

Considerations  for 
Future  Relations 

My  first  commandment  is  to  remembei 
the  objective.  The  U.S.  objectives 
globally  include: 

•  To  strengthen  our  security  and 
the  security  of  our  allies; 

•  To  promote  and  defend  freedom, 
democracy,  and  human  rights  abroad; 

•  To  resolve  peacefully  disputes 
that  affect  U.S.  interests  in  troubled 
regions  of  the  world;  and 

•  To  build  effective  and  friendly  re 
lationships  with  all  states  with  which 
there  is  a  basis  of  shared  concern. 

The  objectives  of  the  Soviet  Union 
however,  remain  basically  antagonistic 
to  the  broad  interests  of  the  United 
States.  Soviet  military  power  and  activ 
Soviet  diplomacy  continue  to  challenge 
the  vital  interests  of  the  United  States 
in  many  parts  of  the  world.  The  Soviet 
Union  places  a  high  priority  on  creatin 
and  exploiting  divisions  within  and 
among  the  Western  allies.  It  continues 
to  support  local  communist  parties  and 
insurgent  movements  that  seek  to 
undermine  governments  allied  with  or 
friendly  to  the  United  States  and  to 
replace  them  with  authoritarian  or 
totalitarian  client  regimes. 

My  fourth  commandment  is  to  bea 
in  mind  the  fundamental  differences  be 
tween  the  political  systems  of  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union — 
constantly.  These  have  not  changed. 


26 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/September  198 


EUROPE 


isnost  is  a  good  example.  Glasiwst  in 
I  Soviet  Union  is  not  analogous  to 
!  First  Amendment  in  the  United 
ites.  Glasnost  is  a  privilege  extended 
the  current  leadership  to  criticize 
ne  aspects  of  Soviet  life  that  they 
nt  to  reform.  The  media,  which  in  a 
e  society  is  one  of  the  chief  conduits 
;he  public  dialogue,  is,  in  the  Soviet 
ion,  still  under  the  ultimate  control 
;he  Communist  Party.  The  Commu- 
t  Party  continues  to  dominate  and 

the  boundaries  of  the  permissible 
ernal  debate  in  the  Soviet  Union. 

Closely  related  to  the  need  to  con- 
er  the  fundamental  differences  be- 
;en  the  two  political  systems  is  my 
th  commandment:  don't  be  deceived 
words.  It  is  impossible  these  days 
hear  a  Soviet  commentator  in  the 
st — and  they  seem  to  be  everywhere, 
m  "Nightline"  to  the  Donahue 
iw — talk  about  what  is  going  on  in 

Soviet  Union  without  using  the 
'd  "democracy"  or  "democratization." 

are  trying  to  democratize  the  Soviet 
ion,  they  say.  Even  dyed-in-the-wool 
ipagandists  like  Georgi  Arbatov 
uld  have  us  believe  that  they  have 
'ays  been  closet  reformers.  The 
ids  of  thinking  Americans  spin  at 

thought  of  the  Soviet  Union  becom- 

democratic. 

But  by  "democracy"  these  Soviet 
)kesmen  mean  nothing  hke  what  the 
m  means  to  us  in  the  West.  They  do 
,  mean  allowing  Soviet  citizens  to  de- 
mine  the  political  composition  of 
lir  government.  Nor  do  they  mean 
■  unfettered  right  to  elect  their  rep- 
entatives  directly  and  replace  them 
en  they  have  not  done  their  job  or 
set  the  guidelines  of  the  domestic 
1  international  policy  their  leaders 
1  follow.  By  "democracy"  and 
imocratization,"  the  Soviets  mean 
it  they  are  trying  to  make  the  Com- 
mist  Party  and  the  state  bureaucracy 
controls  somewhat  more  responsive 
needs  of  the  Soviet  people  that  for  so 
ig  have  been  virtually  ignored.  We  in 
;  West  must  not  be  led  into  thinking 
it  because  Soviet  spokesmen  use  the 
rd  "democracy"  frequently,  we  are 
aling  with  a  group  of  fledgling 
mocrats. 

The  discussion  at  the  summit  about 
eaceful  coexistence"  is  instructive  in 
ming  to  a  judgment  about  the  Soviet 
[lion's  attitudes  toward  international 
[airs.  Gorbachev,  the  leading  propo- 
int  of  "new  thinking"  in  the  Soviet 


Union,  submitted  a  draft  paragraph  for 
the  summit  joint  statement  containing 
an  icon  of  old  thinking — the  phrase 
"peaceful  coexistence" — in  addition  to 
other  objectionable  language.  There 
was  a  good  deal  of  discussion  between 
the  President  and  Gorbachev  on 
whether  or  not  this  phrase  should  be 
included.  Ultimately,  it  was  left  out. 

On  the  face  of  it,  what  could  possi- 
bly be  objectionable  about  conducting 
your  relations  on  the  basis  of  "peaceful 
coexistence"?  But  this  phrase  is  an- 
other example  of  "semantic  infiltra- 
tion"— that  is,  the  use  of  terminology 
as  a  Soviet  code  for  something  quite 
different  from  the  ordinary  meaning  of 
the  words  as  understood  in  the  West. 
"Peaceful  coexistence,"  as  it  has  been 
practiced  by  the  Soviets,  means  to 
them  that  we,  in  effect,  will  condone 
continued  Soviet  attempts  to  expand 
their  regional  influence  through  direct 
intervention,  local  proxy  wars,  or  other 
such  means.  This  is  why  the  President 
would  not  permit  the  reference  to 
"peaceful  coexistence."  The  President 
instead  underscored  the  value  of  di- 
alogue "based  on  realism  and  focused 
on  the  achievement  of  concrete  results." 
He  insisted  on  noting  the  real  differ- 
ences between  the  United  States  and 
Soviet  Union,  not  on  endorsing  vague 
principles  that  mask  them. 

Most  of  my  commandments  fall  into 
two  categories.  The  first  category  in- 
cludes those  that  remind  the  negotiator 
of  the  essential  differences  between  the 
United  States  and  Soviet  Union — differ- 
ences that  are  often  obscured  in  a  nego- 
tiation. The  second  includes  those  that 
warn  the  negotiator  how  the  Soviets 
will  attempt  to  exploit  those  differences 
to  their  advantage. 

Two  commandments  make  a  par- 
ticularly important  pair  from  these 
categories.  My  sixth  commandment 
admonishes:  "remember  that  to  the 
Russians,  form  is  substance."  The  So- 
viet belief  in  form  as  substance  ex- 
plains a  good  deal  of  their  desire  to 
focus  the  attention  of  the  West  on  arms 
control  as  the  central  pillar  of  the  U.S.- 
Soviet relationship.  Grandiose  but  unre- 
alistic and  unverifiable  Soviet  disarma- 
ment proposals  can  yield  them  public 
relations  dividends,  while  they  have 
marginal  effect  on  the  seemingly  inev- 
itable march  of  Soviet  military  modern- 
ization. The  Soviets  believe  it  is 
extremely  important  to  keep  the 
"process"  of  arms  control  with  the 
United  States  going.  This  is  true,  quite 


irrespective  of  whether  or  not  any 
agreement  is  ever  reached.  They  have 
used  this  process  to  concentrate  the  at- 
tention of  Western  publics  on  nuclear 
weapons  and  arms  control  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  the  other  fundamental  aspects  of 
the  U.S. -Soviet  relationship.  They  have 
sought  to  shift  attention  away  from 
areas  such  as  human  rights  and  re- 
gional conflicts  where  Soviet  policy  is 
not  so  fetching.  The  message:  Nuclear 
weapons  are  the  enemy;  we  are  not. 

Even  under  Gorbachev,  Soviet 
spokesmen  have  admitted  that  a  chief 
goal  of  their  diplomacy  now  is  to  "deny 
the  United  States  the  image  of  an  en- 
emy." But  for  U.S. -Soviet  relations  to 
improve  truly,  the  Soviets  must  do 
more  than  merely  put  a  smiling  face  on 
their  diplomacy;  they  must  fundamen- 
tally alter  their  behavior.  One  key  test 
will  be  in  the  application  of  the  so- 
called  defensive  doctrine.  For  this  to  be 
a  real  harbinger  of  improvement  in  the 
U.S. -Soviet  relationship,  it  must  be- 
come more  than  a  slogan.  In  the  past, 
we  have  seen  empty  Soviet  slogans  pro- 
fessing a  belief  in  military  "equality" 
and  "sufficiency"  at  the  same  time  we 
have  seen  massive  buildups  in  Soviet 
forces  across  the  board.  To  become 
more  than  a  slogan,  the  "defensive  doc- 
trine" must  come  to  be  reflected  in  So- 
viet force  structure  and,  though  it  is 
less  visible  to  us  in  the  West,  in  their 
military  doctrine  itself.  This  is  some- 
thing the  Soviets  can  and  should  do  on 
their  own.  We  in  the  West  did  not  force 
an  offensive  doctrine  on  the  Soviet 
Union,  and  we  should  not  be  asked  to 
pay  a  price  in  arms  control  for  the  re- 
structuring of  Soviet  forces  from  an 
overtly  offensive  to  a  defensive  posture. 

Secretary  of  Defense  Carlucci  has 
noted  there  is  no  evidence  that  the 
"defensive  doctrine"  is  being  reflected 
in  Warsaw  Pact  force  posture.  Senior 
NATO  officials  have  made  the  same  ob- 
servation. Indeed,  such  a  change  in  So- 
viet forces  and  doctrine  would  have  to 
be  manifested  over  a  significant  period 
of  years  and  be  attended  by  other 
changes  in  Soviet  international  behavior 
before  the  free  world  should  come  to 
rely  on  it  as  a  real  change  in  the  Soviet 
Union.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  mas- 
sive resources  we  see  being  devoted  to 
the  military  by  Gorbachev  continue  in 
the  face  of  savings  from  possible  reduc- 
tions and  the  drawdown  in  Afghanistan, 
we  will  know  that  the  concept  of  "de- 
fensive doctrine"  is  empty  rhetoric. 


partment  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


27 


EUROPE 


When  the  Soviets  are  serious  about 
concluding  an  arms  control  deal,  as 
they  were  in  INF,  they  will  still  at- 
tempt to  manipulate  the  arms  control 
"process"  to  create  momentum  they  can 
use  to  try  to  force  the  United  States  to 
make  precipitate  decisions  and  unwise 
concessions.  Thus,  my  eighth  command- 
ment warns:  "beware  of  negotiating  at 
the  eleventh  hour."  Eleventh-hour  tac- 
tics are  among  the  most  time-honored 
of  Soviet  negotiating  techniques.  But  to 
use  them,  the  Soviets  must  be  able  to 
put  us  up  against  the  wall  of  an  ar- 
tificial deadline.  One  e.xample  of  this  is 
the  continued  speculation  and  question- 
ing about  whether  a  START  treaty  will 
be  concluded  by  the  end  of  President 
Reagan's  term.  But  the  Soviets  will  be 
disappointed  if  they  believe  they  can 
use  the  date  of  January  1989  to  put 
pressure  on  us.  President  Reagan,  an 
old  negotiator  himself,  knows  the  pit- 
falls of  dealing  under  a  deadline.  He 
made  it  clear  after  the  summit  that 
there  are  no  deadlines  for  START.  Our 
goal,  as  he  often  has  said,  is  a  good 
treaty,  not  a  fast  treaty. 

The  Human  Element 

Finally,  I  would  like  to  reemphasize  the 
one  commandment  that  may  be  most 
important  in  the  age  of  Gorbachev  and 
glasnost — the  tenth:  "don't  misinterpret 
the  human  element."  Even  under  pre- 
vious Soviet  general  secretaries,  there 
was  a  tendency  among  U.S.  negotiators 
to  think  that  if  only  they  could  estab- 
lish the  right  kind  of  personal  rela- 
tionship with  their  Soviet  counterparts, 
they  could  somehow  "melt  the  ice"  or 
"break  the  logjam"  that  they  felt  was 
artificially  preventing  progress.  This  is 
a  misconception,  and  by  no  means  an 
isolated  one. 

In  dealing  with  the  Soviets,  we 
must  resist  the  notion  that  personal  re- 
lationships transcend  superpower  inter- 
ests. While  personal  relationships  can 
facilitate  the  process  of  negotiation, 
they  cannot  fundamentally  alter  its 


basis.  For  example,  Secretary  Shultz 
and  Foreign  Minister  Shevardnadze  en- 
joy a  good  working  relationship  that 
enables  them  to  cut  through  a  lot  of 
superficial  layers  in  their  dealings  with 
one  another  President  Reagan  and 
General  Secretary  Gorbachev  enjoy  a 
mutual  respect  and  even,  on  one  plane, 
a  liking  for  one  another  that  allows 
them  largely  to  dispense  with  polemics 
and  get  right  down  to  business  in  their 
meetings.  My  own  e.\perience  in  deal- 
ing with  Marshal  Sergei  Akhromeyev, 
Chief  of  the  Soviet  General  Staff, 
across  the  table  and  in  personal  conver- 
sation, convinces  me  that  he  is  a  con- 
summate, no-nonsense  professional.  His 
appearance  at  the  negotiating  table 
means  business  is  about  to  be  done. 
Akhromeyev's  combination  of  compe- 
tence and  clout  mean  that  the  oppor- 
tunities presented  by  our  frequent 
senior-level  meetings  often  realize 
tangible  results. 

Certain  types  of  personalities  can 
facilitate  the  process  of  negotiation. 
But,  as  I  indicated,  personalities  don't 
change  geopolitics.  Despite  personal  re- 
lationships, it  still  took  over  6  years 
and  much  difficult  negotiation  to  get 
the  INF  Treaty,  based  on  President 
Reagan's  initial  zero-optional  proposal. 
We  are  still  a  long  way  away  from  a 
completed  START  treaty,  with  its  myr- 
iad, complex  details  and  remaining  dif- 
ferences over  some  fundamental  issues 
of  substance.  Gorbachev's  and  Reagan's 
personalities  aren't  getting  the  Soviet 
Union  out  of  Afghanistan;  the  ynujahi- 
din  resistance  is.  The  Soviets  still 
funnel  millions  of  dollars  in  military 
assistance  to  leftist  guerrillas  and 
the  Sandinistas  in  Central  America. 
And  it  must  not  be  overlooked  that 
Akhromeyev's  job  is  still  to  advance  the 
interests  of  the  Soviet  Union.  His  clout 
stems  from  his  ability  to  promote  a 
strengthened  military  posture.  Whereas 
Marshal  Ogarkov,  his  predecessor,  was 
unable  to  make  the  case  for  increased 
expenditures  and  keep  his  job,  there 
are  indications  that  Akhromeyev  has 
succeeded  in  getting  Gorbachev  to 
maintain  or  up  the  military's  share  of 
the  Soviet  GNP  [gross  national  prod- 
uct] from  the  15%-17%  range. 


We  must  not  be  misled  by  the  fact 
that  the  Soviets  now  have  leaders  and 
spokesmen  who  smile.  Gorbachev  rep- 
resents a  qualitative  difference  in  the 
style  of  the  Soviet  leadership.  But, 
as  Andrei  Gromyko  reminded  us, 
Gorbachev  "has  a  nice  smile,  but  iron 
teeth."  Indeed,  we  still  see  many  of  tl 
same  old  faces  popping  up,  like  Georg 
Arbatov's,  though  they're  now  more 
pleasant  and  don't  use  phrases  like 
"U.S.  imperialism"  as  often  as  they 
used  to.  The  Soviet  Union  is  still,  firs 
and  foremost,  a  communist  state  fund 
mentally  unlike  the  Western  democ- 
racies and  the  greatest  land  power  on 
the  Eurasian  continent. 

Conclusion 

The  Soviets  are  certainly  allowing  soi 
cracks  to  appear  in  their  old  visage. 
They  seem  more  flexible  and  often  ev 
accommodating.  But  because  Soviet  c 
plomacy  has  become  less  predictable 
doesn't  necessarily  mean  that  it  has  ! 
come  less  inimical  to  U.S.  and  allied 
interests.  It  may  mean  only  that  the 
Soviets  have  gotten  smarter — that  th 
still  want  to  achieve  the  same  ends  b 
are  far  more  clever  about  their  mean 
And  we  will  not  know  which  of  these 
conclusions  is  correct  for  years. 

In  the  meantime,  Western  diplo- 
mats and  negotiators  should  continue 
follow  these  10  commandments  for  de 
ing  with  the  Soviets.  We  can  and 
should  look  for  and  encourage  signs  c 
real  change  in  the  Soviet  Union.  We 
should  continue  pressing  them,  as  Pr 
ident  Reagan  did  in  Moscow,  to  move 
from  perestroika — restructuring — to 
metanoia — the  biblical  term  for  a 
"change  of  heart."  We  would  see  the 
signs  of  this  not  in  different  words  oi 
more  pleasant  appearances  but  in  tht 
situation  on  the  ground  in  Eastern  E 
rope  and  in  Soviet  activities  worldwi( 
They  are  not  there  yet.  ■ 


28 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/September  l£l 


EUROPE 


isit  of  Italian  Prime  Minister 


Prime  Minister  Ciriaco  De  Mita  of 
3  Republic  of  Italy  made  an  official 
>rking  visit  to  Washington,  D.C., 
.ne  13-16,  1988,  to  meet  with  Presi- 
nt  Reagan  and  other  government 
"icials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
esident  Reagan  and  Prime  Minister 
'  Mita  after  their  meeting  on  June  U.^ 

esident  Reagan 

s  been  my  great  pleasure  to  meet  to- 
y  with  Prime  Minister  De  Mita  of 
ily,  who  is  no  stranger  to  the  White 
)use.  But  this  is  the  first  time  that 
comes  as  Prime  Minister,  and  I  want 
begin  by  offering  our  warmest 
ngratulations. 

I  regard  this  visit  as  extremely 
portant.  As  members  of  the  Atlantic 
iance  and  as  major  industrial  states, 
2  United  States  and  the  Republic  of 
ily  have  much  to  discuss  and  much  to 
.  Accordingly,  our  discussions  today 
ire  wide  ranging  and  extremely 
eful.  Although  our  agenda  was  far 
)  long  for  me  to  discuss  in  detail,  let 
!  just  give  you  some  of  the  highlights. 


First,  I  gave  the  Prime  Minister 
my  views  on  where  our  relationship 
stands  with  the  Soviet  Union  and 
where  it  is  going.  I  told  him  that  we're 
very  pleased  with  the  progress  that 
we've  made  on  the  broad  agenda  and,  of 
course,  with  the  entry  into  force  of  the 
INF  [Intermediate-Range  Nuclear 
Forces]  Treaty.  I  also  told  him  of  my 
firm  belief  that  without  Italy's  courage, 
determination,  and  support  throughout 
INF  deployment  and  negotiations, 
there  would  have  been  no  treaty.  In 
arms  reductions  and  the  other  areas  on 
our  agenda,  much  work  remains  to  be 
done.  We  will  continue  to  depend,  and 
gratefully  so,  upon  Italy's  support  as  an 
ally  and  advice  as  a  friend. 

One  of  the  important  issues  before 
our  alliance  is  where  we  will  redeploy 
the  401st  Tactical  Fighter  Wing,  the' 
F-16s.  Italy's  willingness,  at  NATO  in- 
vitation, to  consider  accepting  the 
planes  on  its  soil  is  typical  of  Italy's 
serious  approach  toward  its  alliance 
commitments.  Its  willingness  to  do  its 
part,  to  share  the  risks  and  respon- 
sibilities, as  well  as  the  benefits  of 
NATO  membership,  is  exemplary. 


The  Prime  Minister  and  I  will  meet 
again  shortly  in  Toronto,  where  we'll 
participate  in  our  economic  summit.  We 
reviewed  some  of  the  issues  that  we 
expect  to  discuss  there,  including 
Italy's  welcome  initiative  to  strengthen 
international  environmental  protection 
activities. 

Prime  Minister  De  Mita  and  I  also 
talked  about  our  mutual  desire  for  a 
peaceful  end  to  the  conflict  between 
Iran  and  Iraq  and  for  a  comprehensive 
peace  in  the  Middle  East.  I  know 
there's  deep  interest  and  concern 
among  the  Italian  people  on  these  is- 
sues, and  we  appreciate  the  positive 
role  that  the  Government  of  Italy  has 
played  in  that  troubled  region. 

Another  issue  of  great  concern  to 
all  of  us  is  international  terrorism.  In 
the  last  6  months,  Italy  has  been  the 
victim  of  two  shocking  incidents:  the 
death  of  one  of  your  close  friends,  Mr 
Prime  Minister,  in  which  I  want  to  ex- 
tend again  my  deepest  condolences,  and 
an  attack  on  a  USO  club  in  Naples,  in 
which  an  American  servicewoman  was 
killed.  These  incidents,  terrible  as  they 
are,  only  serve  to  strengthen  our  re- 
solve. And  they  remind  us  of  the  impor- 
tance of  our  cooperative  efforts  against 
the  human  scourge  of  terrorism. 

In  closing,  I  must  confess  that 
6  months  ago  I  said  that  U.S. -Italian 
relations  could  hardly  be  better,  but  re- 
markably, they  are.  In  fact,  I  believe 
that  we've  made  significant  progress  in 
a  number  of  areas,  and  I'm  confident 
that  we'll  continue  this  trend  for  the 
foreseeable  future.  We're  indeed 
pleased  and  honored  to  have  had  you  as 
our  guest. 

Prime  Minister  De  Mita^ 

I  should  like  to  thank  President  Reagan 
for  the  welcome  extended  to  me  today, 
which  bears  witness  to  the  longstand- 
ing bonds  of  friendship  that  exist  be- 
tween Italy  and  the  United  States. 

I  have  once  again  expressed  to  the 
President  the  admiration  and  esteem  of 
the  Italian  Government  for  the  courage 
and  determination  with  which  he  has 
pursued  his  farsighted  plan  to  effec- 
tively ease  the  tensions  between  East 
and  West  during  his  recent  discussions 
with  the  General  Secretary  of  the  So- 
viet Communist  Party,  Gorbachev.  Italy 
warmly  welcomes  the  outcome  of  the 
Moscow  summit  and  believes  that  it 
is  a  prelude  to  further  and  more  wide- 
ranging  agreements  along  the  paths  of 
peace. 


spartment  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


29 


EUROPE 


I  reaffirm  the  fact  that  Italy  will 
continue  with  conviction  to  share  in  the 
commitments  and  undertakings  of  the 
alliance  which  binds  us,  safeguards  our 
freedoms,  and  underpins  the  develop- 
ment of  the  West.  The  prospects  for  a 
lasting  peace  which  are  now  emerging 
in  the  world  require  us  to  prevent  any 
weakening  of  Atlantic  solidarity,  to  re- 
frain from  any  actions  of  unilateral 
disarmament,  and  to  ensure  that 
differential  security  zones  are  not  cre- 
ated in  Europe.  I  also  stressed  to  Pres- 
ident Reagan  the  importance  we 
attribute  to  strengthening  the  rela- 
tionship between  the  United  States  and 
Europe — that  Europe  which  represents 
the  other  major  goal  of  the  Italian  Gov- 
ernment and  the  major  contribution 
which  a  strong,  united,  and  prosperous 
Europe,  coupled  with  a  solid  Euro- 
American  partnership,  can  make  to- 
ward the  peace  and  development  of  the 
whole  world. 

With  President  Reagan,  I  reviewed 
the  main  aspects  of  the  international 
situation.  We  expressed  a  shared  con- 
cern at  the  protracted  states  of  crises 
in  the  Middle  East,  Southeast  Asia, 
southern  Africa,  and  Latin  America. 
We  also  expressed  the  hope  that  the 
improved  climate  of  trust  which  now 
characterizes  the  dialogue  between 
East  and  West  may  exercise  a  favorable 
effort  on  these  crises  and  help  lead  to 
peaceful  and  fair  settlements. 

Particular  attention  was  devoted  to 
the  preparations  for  the  summit  of  the 
seven  most  industrialized  nations  in 
Toronto  in  relation  to  economic  growth, 
trade  issues,  and  problems  of  interna- 
tional indebtedness.  In  Toronto,  the 
seven  will  have  to  demonstrate  their 
political  farsightedness  in  order  to 
withstand  any  backward  protectionist 
tendencies  and  any  selfish  inward- 
looking  attitudes.  I  also  reminded  Pres- 
ident Reagan  of  the  particular  impor- 
tance which  Italy  attaches  to  the  risks 
connected  with  the  deterioration  of  the 
environment  and  the  fight  against  the 
worldwide  scourge  of  drugs. 

Lastly,  we  reviewed  bilateral  rela- 
tions between  the  United  States  and 
Italy  and  expressed  our  satisfaction  at 
how  well  they  are  faring,  along  with 
the  hope  that  cooperation  and  ex- 
changes in  every  sector  will  continue  to 
increase  and  intensify.  There  is  a  funda- 
mental bond  which  unites  Italy  and  the 
United  States  in  this  respect,  and  that 
is  represented  by  Americans  of  Italian 
origin.  They  continue  to  make  a  grow- 
ing contribution  to  strengthening  the 
ties  between  our  two  countries. 

Today's  conversations  have  en- 
hanced my  personal  conviction  that 


30 


there  exists  a  special  relationship  be- 
tween Italy  and  the  United  States,  a 
permanent  political  solidarity  from 
which  our  two  countries  will  greatly 
benefit  in  their  commitment  to  the  pur- 
suit of  a  future  characterized  by  peace, 
justice,  and  progress. 


'Made  at  the  South  Portico  of  the 
White  House  (text  from  Weekly  Compila- 
tion of  Presidential  Documents  of  June  20  i 
1988. 

-Prime  Minister  De  Mita  spoke  in  Ital 
ian,  and  his  remarks  were  translated  by  a) 
interpreter.  ■ 


Italy— A  Profile 


Geography 

Area:  301,22.5  sq.  km.  (116,303  sq.  mi.); 
about  the  size  of  Georgia  and  Florida  com- 
bined. Cities:  Capital — Rome  (pop.  2.8 
million).  Other  cities — Milan,  Naples, 
Turin.  Terrain:  Mostly  rugged  and  moun- 
tainous. Climate:  Generally  mild  Mediter- 
ranean; cold  northern  winters. 


People 

Nationality:  Noini  and  adjective — Ital- 
ian(s).  Population  (mid-1986):  57.3  million. 
Annual  growth  rate  (1986):  2.3%.  Eth- 
nic groups:  Primarily  Italian,  but  small 
groups  of  German-,  French-,  Slovene-,  and 
Albanian-Italians.  Religion:  Roman  Catho- 
lic. Language:  Italian.  Education:  Years 
compulsory — 8.  Literacy — 98%.  Health: 
Infant  mortality  rate  (1986)— 14.3/1,000 
live  births  (1986).  Life  expectancy — 73  yrs. 
Workforce  (1986)  23  milhon;  employed" 
20.7  million):  Agriculture — 10%.  Industry 
and  commerce — 30%.  Services — 60%. 

Government 

Type:  Republic  since  June  2,  1946. 
Constitution:  January  1,  1948.  Kingdom  of 
Italy  proclaimed  March  17,  1861. 

Branches:  Executive — president  (chief 
of  state),  Council  of  Ministers  (Cabinet), 


headed  by  the  president  of  the  council 
(prime  minister).  Legislative — bicameral 
Parliament;  630-member  Chamber  of  Dep-' 
ties,  322-member  Senate.  Judicial — inde- 
pendent constitutional  court  and  lower 
magistracy. 

Subdivisions:  94  provinces,  20  region' 

Political  parties:  Christian  Demo- 
cratic, Communist,  Socialist,  Italian  Socij, 
Movement,  Social  Democratic,  Republicai» 
Liberal.  Suffrage:  Universal  over  18. 

Defense  (1986*):  2.5%  of  GNP. 

Flag:  Three  vertical  bands — green, 
white,  and  red. 

Economy 

GDP  (1986*):  $368.7  billion.  Per  capita  ir 

come  (1986*):  $6,447.  Avg.  inflation  rate 

(last  4  yrs.):  10%. 

Natural  resources:  Fish,  natural  gas 

Agriculture:  Products — wheat,  rice, 
grapes,  olives,  citrus  fruits. 

Industry:  Types — automobiles,  ma- 
chinery, chemicals,  textiles,  shoes. 

Trade  (1986*);  Exports  (f.o.b.)— $80.'i 
billion;  machinery  and  transport  equip- 
ment, textiles,  foodstuffs,  chemicals,  foob 
wear.  Imports  (f.o.b.) — $83.0  billion: 
machinery  and  transport  equipment, 
foodstuffs,  ferrous  and  nonferrous  metalS' 
wool,  cotton,  petroleum.  Major  trade  par 
ners  (1986*)— F.R.G.  16%,  France  13%, 
U.K.  6%,  U.S.  9%,  U.S.S.R.  2%,  OPEC 
12%. 

Exchange  rate  (fluctuates):  1,320 
lire  =  US$1  (Jan.  1987). 

Membership  in 
International  Organizations 

UN  and  some  of  its  specialized  and  relate 
agencies,  NATO,  Organization  for  Eco- 
nomic Cooperation  and  Development 
(OECD),  European  Community  (EC), 
Western  European  Union,  Council  of  Eu- 
rope, INTELSAT. 


*1986  figures  are  estimates. 

Taken  from  the  Background  Notes  of 
April  1987,  published  bv  the  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  Department  of  State.  Edi- 
tor: Juanita  Adams.  ■ 


1 


EUROPE 


^isit  of  Turkish  President 


Presideiit  Kenan  Evren  of  the  Re- 
jtblic  ofTurkey  made  a  state  visit  to 
le  United  States  June  26-Jul.y  2,  1988, 
)  meet  with  President  Reagan  and 
'her  government  officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
resident  Reagan  and  President  Evren 
t  the  welcoming  ceremony  on  June  27, 
)8SA 


'resident  Reagan 

he  founder  of  the  Turkish  Republic, 
![ustafa  Kemal  Ataturk,  once  said, 
Happy  is  he  who  can  call  himself  a 
urk."  I  can  say  that  I  understand  that 
intiment.  And  I  can  also  say  that, 
Happy  is  the  American  President  who 
in  welcome  the  Turkish  President." 
et  me  welcome  you  to  the  United 
tates  on  behalf  of  myself  and  the 
merican  people. 

We  are  proud  to  have  the  Turkish 
resident  here.  Turkey  and  the  United 
tates  have  the  strongest  of  bonds: 
•iendship  and  alliance.  Our  relations 
ave  been  characterized  by  success.  To- 
ether  with  their  NATO  allies,  Turkey 
nd  the  United  States  have  been  part- 
ers  in  the  most  successful  alliance  the 
orld  has  ever  known,  an  alliance  that 
as  maintained  the  peace  for  nearly  40 
ears. 

The  modern  Turkish-American 
artnership  began  in  1947.  The  Turkish 
eople  demonstrated  the  will  and  coui'- 
ge  that  were  required  to  meet  the 
ireat  of  aggression.  The  American 
eople,  with  similar  will  and  courage, 
'ere  able  to  support  them.  In  the  40 
ears  that  have  followed,  the  strength 
nd  durability  of  our  partnership,  and 
f  the  NATO  alliance,  have  discouraged 
ggression.  In  Korea,  Turks  and  Amer- 
;ans  shed  blood  together  on  the  bat- 
lefield  in  defense  of  freedom.  Today 
he  solidarity  of  our  mutual  commit- 
lent  to  collective  security  keeps  us 
afe  and  enables  us  to  seek  improved 
elations  with  our  adversaries  from  a 
osition  of  strength. 

The  ties  between  Turkey  and  the 
Inited  States  are  broader  than  our 
ommon  security  interests.  We  are 
rought  together  by  the  strong  bonds 
bat  derive  from  shared  values  as  well. 
i.nd  I  might  say,  Americans  have  ad- 
lired  the  way  that  Turkey  pulled  itself 
ack  to  democracy  when  challenged  by 
he  violent  forces  of  terrorism  and  an- 
rchy  a  decade  ago.  We  are  well  aware 
f  your  own  distinguished  role,  Mr. 
'resident,  in  maintaining  Turkey's  de- 


votion to  the  ideals  of  Ataturk.  Your 
country's  pride  in  that  accomplishment 
is  understandable.  For  our  part,  the 
American  people  are  proud  of  the  dec- 
ades of  support  they  have  given  to  Tur- 
key. Friendships  must  never  be  taken 
for  granted.  We  want  our  ties  with  the 
Turkish  nation  to  grow  and  to  deepen. 
Happily  that  process  is  well  underway. 
As  vigorous  democracies,  our  peoples 
should  get  to  know  each  other  better. 

Last  year  the  "Suleyman  the  Mag- 
nificent" exhibit — magnificent  in  it- 
self— opened  the  eyes  of  Americans  to 
the  i-ichness  of  the  Turkish  heritage. 
Visits  between  American  congressmen 
and  women  and  Turkish  parliamen- 
tarians have  increased  in  recent  years 
and  with  that  increase  has  come  better 
understanding.  Our  trade  relations  are 
growing,  and  Turkey  is  strongly  at- 
tracting American  investors.  And  I 
firmly  believe  that  trade  and  invest- 
ment are  the  surest  ways  that  Turkey 
can  find  to  ensure  the  prosperity  its 
people  seek. 

Turkey  and  the  United  States  are 
allies  and  friends;  as  such,  we  have  a 
record  of  success  together.  In  our  com- 
ing meetings,  I  know  that  we  will  en- 


hance that  friendship  and  add  to  the 
record  of  success.  I  am  confident,  too, 
that  your  full  schedule,  with  its  intense 
program  of  contacts  with  American  po- 
litical, economic,  and  cultural  leaders, 
will  further  strengthen  mutual  under- 
standing and  our  sense  of  common  pur- 
pose. I  look  forward  to  discussing  with 
you  the  ways  in  which  we  can  strengthen 
our  established  ties  and  create  new 
forms  of  cooperation  in  defense  of  these 
purposes  and  values.  As  Turkey  and 
the  United  States  look  ahead  to  the 
next  century,  our  continuing  friendship 
and  alliance  will  continue  to  serve  us 
well.  It  cannot  be  otherwise,  for  at  the 
root  of  our  relationship  are  common 
goals — democracy,  peace,  and  security 
for  our  peoples. 

And  now  I  have  the  honor  of  pre- 
senting to  you  the  Legion  of  Merit, 
Chief  Commander,  one  of  the  highest 
military  honors  our  country  awards,  for 
the  service  of  Turkish  forces  in  the 
Korean  conflict.  I  present  this  not  only 
as  a  tribute  to  the  valor  of  the  Turkish 
military  and  the  people  of  your  nation 
but  as  a  symbol  of  our  alliance  on  so 
many  fronts  over  so  many  years  in  the 
cause  of  peace  and  freedom. 

President  Evren 

I  thank  you  for  the  kind  invitation  to 
visit  the  United  States  of  America  and 
for  your  generous  hospitality.  Your 
warm  words  of  welcome  have  moved  us. 
This  ceremony,  which  marks  the  begin- 
ning of  my  visit,  brings  together  the 
national  flags  of  Turkey  and  the  United 
States,  allies  whose  ties  have  stood  the 
test  of  time. 

Thousands  of  Turks  like  myself  still 
recall  the  memories  of  fighting  shoulder 
to  shoulder  with  American  soldiers  in 
Korea  for  the  defense  of  freedom.  We 
have  been  allies  at  war  and  in  peace. 
This  Legion  of  Merit  award  is  a  reflec- 
tion of  the  fact  that  the  outstanding 
services  of  the  Turkish  brigade  in 
Korea  are  still  fresh  in  the  minds  of  our 
American  friends,  and  I  accept  it  with 
deep  appreciation  on  behalf  of  the  en- 
tire Turkish  nation.  In  so  doing,  I  ex- 
press not  only  my  own  personal  thanks 
but  also  those  of  my  54  million  fellow 
Turks  who  share  with  me  the  pride  of 
their  nation  of  this  occasion.  Recalling 
our  comrades  in  arms  who  made  the 
ultimate  sacrifice  in  Korea,  I  assure 
you  that  the  dedication  of  the  Turkish 
people  to  the  principle  of  freedom  and 
democracy  remains  as  undiminished  to- 
day as  it  did  40  years  ago. 

My  visit  to  your  country  is  also  the 
natural  consequence  of  the  interest  and 
support  which  your  Administration 
from  the  outset  has  extended  to  Turkey 


)epartment  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


31 


EUROPE 


and  to  the  development  of  Turkish- 
American  friendship.  This  interest, 
which  we  much  appreciate,  is  rooted  in 
Turkey's  dedication  to  Western  ideals  of 
democracy,  peace,  and  stability.  As  in 
the  past,  the  core  of  Turkish-American 
relations  continues  to  consist  of  com- 
monly held  political  views  and  values. 
Those  elements  constitute  the  most 
valid  guarantee  of  the  durability  and 
closeness  of  our  friendship,  as  well  as 
the  fruitfulness  of  our  cooperation. 
The  stable  development  of  Turkish- 
American  relations,  based  on  equality 
and  mutual  interests,  is  to  the  benefit 
of  our  countries,  the  free  world,  and 
international  peace  and  security. 

I  am  confident  that  my  visit  will 
provide  the  opportunity  for  a  produc- 
tive dialogue  on  how  we  can  further 
expand  and  deepen  our  bonds.  At  the 
same  time,  I  hope  that  my  visit  will 
also  contribute  to  a  better  recognition 
of  Turkey  and  the  United  States  by  our 
respective  peoples,  and  particularly  of 
Turkey  as  a  reliable  partner 

The  people  of  Turkey  follow  with 
admiration  your  determined  efforts  for 
the  defense  of  freedom,  strengthening 
of  peace,  and  development  and  reduc- 
tion of  international  tensions.  Strength- 
ening of  peace,  freedom,  and  independ- 
ence remain  high  on  the  global  agenda. 
Situated  in  a  region  where  these  issues 
are  paramount,  Turkey  is  determined 
to  continue  its  contribution  to  peace 
and  stability.  Turkey  serves  as  an  an- 
chor of  democracy,  freedom,  and  sta- 
bility in  a  region  in  turmoil.  Your  own 
Thomas  Paine  once  wrote,  "Those  who 
expect  to  reap  the  blessings  of  freedom 
must  .  .  .  undergo  the  fatigue  of  sup- 
porting it."  Let  me  say  that  in  Turkey, 
we  do  not  feel  fatigued  by  our  support 
of  the  Western  allies  because  we  know 
that  by  supporting  the  allies,  we  may 
all  continue  to  reap  the  blessings  of 
freedom. 

I  am  delighted  to  meet  you,  the 
distinguished  members  of  your  Admin- 
istration, and  be  among  the  great  peo- 
ple of  this  country.  As  a  final  word,  let 
me  say  that  I  look  with  hope  and  confi- 
dence to  the  future  of  the  relations  be- 
tween our  two  countries  sharing  the 
ideals  of  peace,  stability,  freedom,  and 
prosperity.  I  thank  you  once  again  for 
your  kind  invitation. 


Turkey — A  Profile 


Geography 

Area:  766,640  sq.  km.  (296,000  sq.  mi.); 
slightly  larger  than  Texas.  Cities:  Capi- 
tal— Ankara  (pop.  3.5  million).  Other  cities 
— Istanbul  (5.86  million),  Izmir  (2.3  mil- 
lion), Adana  (1.76  million).  Terrain: 
Narrow  coastal  plain  surrounds  Anatolia; 
an  inland  plateau  becomes  increasingly 
rugged  as  it  progresses  eastward. 
Climate:  Moderate  in  coastal  areas, 
harsher  temperatures  inland. 


People 

Nationality:  Noun — Turk(s).  Adjective — 
Turkish.  Population  (1986  est.):  51.8  mil- 
lion. Annual  growth  rate:  2.5%.  Ethnic 
groups:  Turkish,  Kurdish,  other. 
Religions:  Muslim  98%,  Christian,  Jewish. 
Languages:  Turkish  (official),  Kurdish, 
Arabic.  Education:  Years  compulsory — 6. 
Atteiidattce— 95%.  Literacy— 10%.  Health: 
Infant  mortality  rate— 12.3/1,000.  Life  ex- 
pectancy— 62.7  yrs.  Workforce  (18.1  mil- 
lion): Agriculture — 58%.  Industry  and 
commerce — 17% .  Services — 25%. 

Government 

Type:  Republic.  Independence:  1923. 

Constitution:  November  7,  1982. 

Branches:  Under  the  1982  constitu- 
tion, a  unicameral  400-member  parliament 
(the  Grand  National  Assembly)  and  a 
strengthened  presidency  were  established. 
The  number  of  seats  in  parliament  was 
raised  to  450  in  1987.  An  advisory  Presi- 
dential Council,  consisting  of  the  members 
of  the  previous  National  Security  Council, 
also  was  established  for  an  interim  6-year 
period.  The  judicial  system  has  been  left 
intact.  Executive — president  (chief  of 
state),  prime  minister.  Council  of  Ministers 
(cabinet).  Legislative — Grand  National  As- 


sembly chosen  by  national  elections  at 
least  every  5  years.  Judicial — Constitu- 
tional Court,  Court  of  Cassation,  Council 
of  State,  High  Council  of  Judges  and 
Prosecutors. 

Political  parties:  Motherland  Party 
(ANAP),  Social  Democrat  Populist  Party 
(SHP).  Correct  Way  Party  (DYP),  Demo- 
cratic Left  Party  (DSP),  several  smaller 
parties.  Suffrage:  Universal  over  21. 

Central  government  budget  (1986 
est.):  $12.1  billion  (8,128  billion  Turkish 
lira). 

Defense:  4.7%  of  1986  GDP  or  20%  O; 
1986  budget. 

National  holiday:  Republic  Day, 
October  29. 

Flag:  White  crescent  and  star  on  a 
red  field. 

Economy 

GNP  (1986  est.):  $59.4  billion.  Annual 
growth  rate  (1980-86):  7%.  Per  capita  ir- 
come:  $1,160.  Avg.  annual  inflation  rat 

(1986  est.):  About  30%.. 

Natural  resources:  Coal,  chromite, 
copper,  boron,  oil. 

Agriculture  (18.5%  of  GNP):  Prod- 
ucts— cotton,  tobacco,  cereals,  sugar 
beets,  fruit,  nuts. 

Industry  (27.8%  of  GNP):  Types— ie 
tiles,  processed  foodstuffs,  iron  and  stee 
cement,  leather  goods. 

Trade  (1987  est.):  Exports— $10.2  bi 
lion:  tobacco,  cotton,  textiles,  cement,  r 
sins,  nuts,  leather,  glass,  ceramics. 
Imports — $14.2  billion:  (by  value)  Pe- 
troleum, pharmaceuticals  and  dyes,  iron 
and  steel,  machinery,  plastics  and  rubbe 
transport  vehicles.  Major  partners — 
F.R.G.,  Iraq,  Iran,  U.S.,  France,  U.K., 
Italy,  Libya,  Eastern  Europe. 

Fiscal  year:  Calendar  year. 

Official  exchange  rate"  (Feb.  1988): 
1182  Turkish  lira  =  US$1. 

U.S.  economic  aid  received  (FY 
1946-87):  $4.2  billion.  U.S.  military  aid 
(FY  1946-87):  $8.8  billion. 

Membership  in 
International  Organizations 

UN,  Organization  for  Economic  Coopera 
tion  and  Development  (OECD),  INTEL- 
SAT, North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organizatioi 
(NATO),  Islamic  Conference  Organizatio 
(OIC),  European  Community  (EC)  assoc; 
ate  member.  Council  of  Europe. 


'Made  at  the  South  Portico  of  the 
White  House  where  President  Evren  was 
accorded  a  formal  welcome  with  full  military 
honors  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  4,  1988).  ■ 


Taken  from  the  Background  Notes  of 
March  1988,  published  by  the  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  Department  of  State.  Edi 
tor:  Juanita  Adams.  ■ 


32 


GENERAL 


)penness:  The  Only  Path  to  Progress 


f  John  C.  Whitehead 

Address  before  the  Conference  on 
ew  Approaches  to  East-West  Security 
'the  Institute  for  East-West  Security 
"vdies  in  Potsdam,  German  Demo- 
•atic  Republic,  on  June  10,  1988.  Mr. 
'hitehead  is  Deputy  Secretary  of  State. 

Iwould  like  to  thank  the  Institute  for 
last- West  Security  Studies  for  afford- 
g  me  the  opportunity  to  speak  to  this 
stinguished  audience.  In  addition,  I 
ould  certainly  like  to  commend  the  in- 
itute  and  its  president,  John  Mroz, 
r  making  this  conference  possible, 
ith  the  cooperation  of  the  Ministry  of 
Dreign  Affairs  of  the  German  Demo- 
•atic  Republic.  I  know  that  I  speak  for 
any  others  when  I  express  my  admi- 
ition  for  the  institute  and  its  accom- 
ishments.  I  wish  it  every  success  in 
s  current  and  future  endeavors  to 
icourage  ever-greater  East-West 
alogue,  respect,  and  mutual 
iderstanding. 

Mistaken  identity  is,  as  you  know, 
Tfiong  the  playwrights'  favorite  de- 
ices.  Similarly,  jokes  and  stories  based 
1  confusion  about  the  meaning  of  words 
'6  among  the  staples  of  comedy.  Yet 
ir  those  concerned  with  diplomacy  and 
le  relations  between  nations,  confu- 
ons  about  the  meanings  of  words  are 
lything  but  amusing,  and  this  is  all 
le  more  true  of  words  that  do  not 
lerely  describe  but  themselves  gener- 
ic expectations. 

Much  has  been  said  recently  in  this 
art  of  the  world  about  glasnost  or 
Dpenness."  The  same  is  true  in  the 
/est,  where  news  reports  and  analyses 
f  the  recent  hopeful  developments  in 
he  Soviet  Union  and  the  individual  na- 
ions  of  Eastern  Europe  utilize  the 
rord  "openness"  with  regularity.  Yet 
irecisely  because  we  hear  the  word 
ised  with  great  frequency,  it  is  impor- 
ant  to  make  clear  its  various  meanings 
md  implications. 

In  the  West,  the  word  "openness" 
:an  refer  both  to  a  condition  and  an 
ittitude.  We  say  that  a  view,  or  street, 
ir  border  is  "open"  when  it  is  free  of 
)arriers  and  restrictions.  From  this 
iefinition  comes  the  related  one  of 
'openness"  as  an  attitude.  When  the 
vord  "openness"  is  used  in  this  way,  it 
■neans  receptivity  to  new  ideas  and 
3eoi)le  and  is  closely  related  to  other 
ittributes,  such  as  tolerance  and 
,'andor 


Yet  perhaps  the  most  interesting 
thing  I  can  tell  you  about  the  word 
"openness"  is  that — aside  from  its  re- 
cent use  in  relation  to  glasnost — it  is 
not  a  word  Americans  find  great  need 
of  in  everyday  speech.  Indeed,  in  many 
of  our  standard  dictionaries,  it  does  not 
even  have  its  own  entry. 

At  first  glance,  this  would  appear 
to  be  very  odd,  indeed,  for  both  its  ad- 
mirers and  its  critics  concede  that  the 
United  States  is  an  "open  society."  In- 
deed, some  critics  even  charge  that  the 
United  States  is  too  open,  that  its  lack 
of  restrictions  encourages  social  confu- 
sion and  personal  license.  Of  course, 
one  solution  to  this  puzzle  is  obvious:  it 
is  unnecessary  to  make  frequent  refer- 
ence to  a  normal  condition,  and  "open- 
ness" is  the  normal  condition  of  life 
in  the  United  States.  But  there  is  a 
deeper  explanation,  one  that  is  also  re- 
flected in  the  everyday  speech  of  ordi- 
nary men  and  women  in  the  United 
States. 

If  an  American  is  injured  or  ag- 
grieved in  any  way,  he  will  immediately 
tell  you  that  you  have  violated  his 
rights.  Furthermore,  he  will  speak 
about  those  rights  in  a  very  direct  and 
personal  way.  He  will  not  speak  of  his 
rights  as  dependent  upon  the  state.  He 
will  not  speak  of  his  rights  as  existing 
on  account  of  his  membership  in  any 
organization  or  party.  He  will  rather 
speak  of  his  rights  as  part  of  his  very 
person — as,  indeed,  unalienable  or  in- 
separable from  his  very  existence  as  a 
human  being. 

Perhaps  to  some  people,  the  princi- 
ple that  each  and  every  human  being 
has  rights  inseparable  from  his  or  her 
existence  will  seem  strange.  Neverthe- 
less, this  principle  is  no  novelty.  The 
founders  of  the  United  States  wrote 
precisely  that  200  years  ago  in  the 
American  Declaration  of  Independence. 

Where  did  these  first  Americans 
get  such  a  notion?  From  Athens  and 
Jerusalem,  from  Wittenberg  and  Edin- 
burgh. For  it  would  also  be  correct  to 
describe  this  belief  as  a  product,  long 
in  the  making,  of  the  noblest  minds  of 
Western  civilization. 

It  owes  much  to  an  old  Greek  who 
drank  hemlock  so  that  the  wrong  done 
him  might  ensure  the  freedom  of  future 
generations  of  philosophers.  It  owes 
even  more  to  centuries  of  saintly  exam- 
ples from  men  and  women  who  taught 


by  word  and  action  that  life  is  a  gift 
from  the  Creator,  and  thus  each  indi- 
vidual person  is  precious.  Its  debts  to 
Martin  Luther  and  to  certain  philoso- 
phers of  the  Enlightenment  are  as  ob- 
vious as  they  are  profound. 

Naturally,  those  of  us  in  the 
West — recognizing  as  we  do  the  lineage 
of  "open  societies" — take  notice  when 
'  "openness"  is  mentioned  in  relation  to 
governments  elsewhere.  We  take  spe- 
cial notice  when  we  find  it  discussed, 
and  even  promoted,  in  a  part  of  the 
world  where  the  principles  of  human 
rights  we  associate  with  open  societies 
have  not  been  widely  accepted  by 
governments. 

We  regard  the  current  discussion  of 
openness  in  the  East  as  a  very  encour- 
aging development.  Thus  far,  the  con- 
cept of  openness  under  consideration 
east  and  south  of  Potsdam  is  not  as 
fundamental  as  our  own.  It  seems  to 
regard  openness  as  a  means  to  other 
ends,  especially  greater  economic  pros- 
perity, rather  than  as  one  of  the  attri- 
butes of  a  well-ordered  society.  Never- 
theless, the  discussion  itself  marks  an 
important  beginning.  In  time,  it  could 
prove  to  be  a  historic  one. 

In  my  remarks  today,  I  would  like 
to  contribute  to  this  discussion  by 
focusing  on  openness  as  it  relates  to  the 
theme  of  our  conference,  "New  Ap- 
proaches to  East-West  Security."  I  do 
so  in  the  spirit  of  the  recent  Moscow 
summit,  where  President  Reagan  and 
General  Secretary  Gorbachev  affirmed 
their  own  conviction  that  an  expanding 
dialogue  "represents  an  increasingly 
effective  means  of  resolving  issues  of 
mutual  interest  and  concern."  Further- 
more, though  I  remain  committed  to 
the  deeper  Western  understanding  I 
have  outlined,  I  will  argue  for  open- 
ness on  instrumental  or  "pragmatic" 
grounds. 

For  I  believe  that — in  the  new 
world  we  are  facing — openness  is  indis- 
pensable to  security.  The  more  open  a 
nation's  policies  and  practices  are,  the 
greater  will  be  its  security.  I  believe 
this  to  be  the  case  both  in  terms  of  its 
national  security,  from  external  military 
threats,  and  also  in  terms  of  securing 
the  material  well-being  of  its  citizens 
through  economic  growth. 

My  main  thesis  is  this:  if  the  Soviet 
Union  and  other  members  of  the  War- 
saw Pact  desire  a  genuinely  secure 
world,  they  must  continue — and,  pref- 


Jepartment  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


33 


GENERAL 


erably,  they  will  accelerate — the  move- 
ment now  underway  toward  greater 
openness.  I  will  illustrate  this  thesis 
with  reference  to  arms  control,  econom- 
ics, and  human  rights — three  categories 
roughly  corresponding  to  the  three  bas- 
kets of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act.  This  is 
particularly  appropriate  since  the 
Helsinki  accords  indicated  the  recogni- 
tion, by  .35  governments  of  Eui'ope  and 
North  America,  that  these  issues  are 
intimately  related  both  to  each  other 
and  to  European  security  itself. 

Security 

The  most  obvious  and  direct  link  be- 
tween openness  and  security  has 
arisen^quite  paradoxically — in  the  con- 
text of  arms  control.  As  we  all  know, 
the  question  of  verification  played  a 
central  role  in  the  successful  negotia- 
tions to  eliminate  intermediate  and 
shorter  range  nuclear  weapons.  Ver- 
ification continues  to  play  a  major  role 
in  the  ongoing  START  [strategic  arms 
reduction  talks]  negotiations.  Indeed, 
it  remains  the  key  to  concluding  a 
START  agreement. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  arms  con- 
trol era,  we  heard  much  talk  about 
what  is  referred  to  as  "national  tech- 
nical means  of  verification."  This  was 
never  a  completely  satisfactory  method 
of  verification.  It  became  less  satisfac- 
tory as  missiles  became  smaller,  more 
varied,  and  more  mobile.  Today  no  one 
believes  that  a  mobile  nuclear  missile 
can  be  tracked  with  certainty  from  fac- 
tory to  staging  site  solely  from  the  air 
And  how  does  one  distinguish — from 
any  distance  at  all — between  nuclear 
and  conventional  cruise  missiles? 

The  solution  to  the  problem  has 
proved  to  be  openness.  During  the  ne- 
gotiations over  the  INF  [Intermediate- 
Range  Nuclear  Forces]  Ti-eaty,  both 
sides  came  to  recognize  that  the  only 
way  to  assure  compliance  with  the 
agreement  was  to  permit  the  other  side 
to  inspect  the  factories  where  the 
weapons  were  made. 

Years  from  now,  this  may  prove  to 
have  been  the  most  seminal  advance  in 
the  history  of  nuclear  disarmament. 
In  the  interests  of  greater  security, 
two  adversaries — wary  of  each  other's 
motives  and  lacking  in  trust — agreed  to 
open  some  of  their  most  secure  and  se- 
cret facilities  to  the  inspection  of  the 
other.  The  exchange  of  the  instruments 
of  ratification  by  President  Reagan  and 
General  Secretary  Gorbachev  at  the 
Moscow  summit  was  a  fitting  climax  to 
this  pioneering  experiment  in  openness. 


34 


Notwithstanding  the  remarkable 
nature  of  the  final  achievement,  how- 
ever, verification  proved  to  be  a  prob- 
lem in  the  INF  Treaty  negotiations  to 
the  very  end.  Although  our  negotiators 
worked  hard  at  the  Moscow  summit  and 
made  some  progress,  the  problems  with 
regard  to  the  START  treaty  are  proving 
to  be  even  greater  START,  after  all, 
deals  with  a  large  variety  of  different 
weapons  systems,  whose  numbers  will 
be  reduced,  not  eliminated.  As  both 
sides  recognized  in  Moscow,  the  solu- 
tions to  the  problems  will  require  even 
greater  openness.  Both  sides  face  the 
uncomfortable  prospect  of  ever-greater 
numbers  of  inspection  teams  searching 
every  corner  of  their  most  highly  clas- 
sified, heavily  guarded  facilities.  The 
paradox  could  not  be  more  striking. 
Because  we  do  not  trust  one  another, 
we  are  opening  up  to  one  another. 

With  respect  to  arms  control,  open- 
ness has  become  indispensable  to  se- 
curity. Furthermore,  in  the  START 
talks — and  in  any  future  negotiations — 
it  will  continue  to  be  so.  Simply  put, 
the  greater  the  openness  to  which  each 
side  will  agree,  the  greater  will  be 
our  progress  in  arms  control  and  the 
greater  will  be  our  mutual  security. 

The  United  States  is  willing  to  play 
its  full  role  in  this  process.  We  favor 
opening  our  facilities  in  whatever  way 
is  necessary  to  ensure  adequate  ver- 
ification on  a  reciprocal  basis.  But  if  we 
are  to  continue  to  make  progi'ess  in 
arms  control  negotiations,  both  sides 
will  have  to  make  the  same  effort.  Reci- 
procity will  be  the  doorway  to  progress. 
Openness  will  be  the  key  to  reciprocity. 

Economics 

Economic  life  suggests  a  more  subtle 
but  no  less  important  link  between 
openness  and  security.  Of  course,  the 
relationship  between  a  country's  eco- 
nomic success  and  its  security  is  ob- 
vious enough.  What  may  not  be  so 
obvious,  however,  is  that  economic 
openness  is  the  only  sure  path  to 
economic  success. 

Not  all  that  long  ago,  many  in  this 
part  of  the  world  looked  forward  to  an 
economic  flowering  under  socialism. 
Heavy  industry  was  springing  up 
throughout  Eastern  Europe.  The 
growth  rates  of  national  economies 
were  rising  sharply — indeed,  were  out- 
stripping those  in  the  West.  Confidence 
was  so  great  that  Soviet  leaders  pre- 
dicted the  day  when  the  Soviet  econ- 
omy would  overtake  that  of  the  United 
States. 


It  did  not  happen.  The  Eastern 
"economic  miracle"  had  depended  on 
large  pool  of  surplus  labor  and  a  plci 
tiful  supply  of  inexpensive  natural 
resources.  Once  these  material  ad\ai 
tages  were  depleted,  beginning  almu 
1970,  growth  rates  began  to  plummet 

Rather  than  overtaking  the  Unit 
States,  the  Soviet  Union  reached  its 
top  production  at  a  level  only  about 
50%  of  the  U.S.  gross  national  produ 
And  since  the  Eastern  economies  coi 
centrated  on  heavy  industry  at  the  e 
pense  of  the  average  citizen-consume 
Soviet  per  capita  consumption  figure 
were  even  more  revealing — a  disap- 
pointing 35%  of  the  U.S.  performanc 
Elsewhere,  in  other  Eastern  countri 
results  were  more  or  less  the  same, 
two  decades,  despite  continuing  abs< 
lute  growth  and  achievement,  the  E; 
ern  record  has  been  one  of  comparat 
decline. 

The  reasons  for  the  decline  are 
fairly  well  understood.  As  President 
Reagan  pointed  out  in  his  address  at 
Moscow  State  University,  socialist 
economies  are  more  heavily  bureau- 
cratized  and,  therefore,  less  flexible 
and  efficient  than  market  economies 
But  that  is  not  the  most  serious  pro 
lem  that  lies  ahead  for  such  economi 
For  the  inefficiencies  of  the  past  are 
dwarfed  by  the  challenges  to  come, 
cause  the  more  complex  an  economy 
comes,  the  more  inefficient  current 
methods  will  prove. 

Why  is  this  necessarily  so?  Bee; 
such  systems — in  substituting  the  bi 
reaucrat  for  the  workings  of  the  mai 
ket — place  upon  him  an  impossible 
task.  In  1909,  the  Italian  economist 
fredo  Pareto  calculated  that  a  societ, 
only  100  persons,  trading  in  only  70( 
items,  would  require  the  solution  of 
70,699  simultaneous  equations  to  rel 
supply  and  demand  in  the  manner  a 
free  market  does  on  its  own.  What  t 
is  the  bureaucrat  to  do,  when  one  fa 
tory  alone  may  employ  100  times  100 
workers  and  contain  7  times  700  kin 
of  machinery,  equipment,  and  work 
process? 

And  so  passed  the  Eastern 
"economic  miracle."  State  direction 
does  permit  effective  mobilization  in 
limited  economic  sectors,  such  as  th' 
military.  But  the  burden  of  managin 
an  entire  economy  was  too  great.  Oi 
the  initial  advantages  in  surplus  labc 
and  plentiful,  inexpensive  resources 
were  depleted,  these  economies  four 
that  the  traditional  mechanisms  of  b 
reaucratic  command  and  control  no 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Septemt: 


GENERAL 


er  promoted  efficiency.  Indeed, 

■  proved  themselves  to  be  obstacles 
fficiency. 

Nor  has  this  fact  gone  unnoticed 
where  in  the  world.  Throughout  the 
d  World,  countries  that  had  earlier 
ed  what  was  thought  of  as  the  so- 
st  model  are  not  advancing  but  de- 
ng.  They  have  learned  through 
;r  experience  that  total  state  eco- 
ic  management  on  the  old  model 
;  not  work.  Those  in  a  position  to 
ise  are  beginning  to  reorient  their 
(omies  toward  the  market.  They 
gnize  that  the  Third  World's  only 
ess  stories  today  are  countries  that 

■  allowed  freedom  and  openness  in 
marketplace. 

Nothing  any  Western  government 
ial  has  to  say  speaks  as  loudly  to 
nations  of  the  Third  World  as  the 
nple  of  economies  such  as  South 
la.  Tkiwan,  Singapore,  and  Hong 
g.  Between  them,  these  four  econo- 
; — which  contain  only  2%  of  the 
ilation  of  the  Third  World — account 
lalf  of  the  manufactured  exports  of 
'hird  World  countries. 
Of  course,  the  comparative  decline 
le  socialist  economies  has  also  re- 
ed considerable  attention  here  in 
East.  That  attention  has  been  re- 
ed, in  country  after  country,  in 
for  restructuring  and  greater 
mess.  We  think  the  diagnosis  is  cor- 
.  The  prescriptions  for  change — de- 
ralized  decisionmaking,  increased 
.  autonomy,  and  increased  material 
ntives — strike  us  as  prudent  and 
due. 

Naturally,  we  in  the  West  have  also 
d  the  varied  reception  this  evidence 
received  within  the  Soviet  Union 
throughout  the  individual  countries 
astern  Europe.  Some  have  em- 
ed  the  reforms;  others  argue  that 

■  do  not  go  far  enough;  still  others 
ain  wedded  to  the  notion  that  heav- 
(entralized  economies  can  be  made 
/ork. 

It  may  be  that  the  East  German 
fbiinit  system  functions  as  effi- 
tly  as  any  heavily  bureaucratized 
lomic  syst'"'^  can.  Compared  to 
'.r  socialist  economies,  it  works  well, 
iparisons  with  the  Federal  Republic 
dth  other  Western  economies,  how- 
',  are  not  nearly  so  favorable. 
We  believe  that  the  competitive- 
i  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  na- 
s  of  Eastern  Europe  in  the  years 
ad  will  depend  increasingly  upon 
r  willingness  to  open  up  their  econ- 
es  and  to  institute  genuine  market 
rms. 


"What  about  the  problems  of  the 
Western  economies?"  you  ask.  "Do  you 
not  have  plenty  of  problems  of  your 
own?"  We  do,  indeed.  Yet  I  would  sug- 
gest that  the  economic  problems  the 
advanced  economies  of  the  West  are 
facing  differ  in  kind  from  those  the  so- 
cialist countries  are  dealing  with. 

We  are  bidding  farewell  to  the  in- 
dustrial age.  In  the  new  age  of  high 
technology  that  is  dawning  in  the  West, 
the  pace  of  economic  change  is  increas- 
ing dramatically.  Products  that  used  to 
have  life  cycles  of  a  decade  or  more  are 
now  replaced  by  improved  technologies 
in  2  or  3  years.  Indeed,  the  life  expec- 
tancy of  the  most  sophisticated  tech- 
nology is  even  shorter. 

As  President  Reagan  noted  in  his 
Moscow  State  University  address,  this 
technological  revolution — perhaps  the 
most  dramatic  in  history — places  a  high 
premium  on  flexibility  and  individual 
initiative.  Its  watchwords  are  speed 
of  communication  and  economic 
interdependence. 

As  for  individual  initiative,  many  of 
the  most  important  technological  inno- 
vations in  the  West  have  resulted  from 
intense  competition  among  relatively 
small  enterprises,  many  of  them  led  by 
their  founders.  And  the  technological 
revolution  is  also  increasingly  interna- 
tional: 88%  of  U.S.  manufacturers  use 
foreign  components  in  their  products. 
The  technological  revolution  points  to  a 
global  market-based  economy  in  which 
prosperity  will  require  openness  within 
and  among  nations. 

The  socialist  economies  are  enter- 
ing the  21st  century  with  antiquated 
equipment  and  outdated  concepts.  The 
same  bureaucratic  rigidities  responsible 
for  their  relative  decline  over  the  past 
20  years  raise  the  prospect  of  even 
greater  difficulties  in  the  years  ahead. 
After  all,  if  an  economic  system  cannot 
effectively  compete  in  an  environment 
in  which  sophisticated  technology  turns 
over  at  the  rate  of  once  a  decade,  how 
can  it  hope  to  compete  in  an  environ- 
ment in  which  the  rate  of  turnover  is  .3 
or  5  or  even  10  times  faster?  Without 
greater  openness  in  economic  manage- 
ment, Eastern  nations — however  great 
their  absolute  advances — face  the  pros- 
pect of  accelerating  relative  decline.  I 
suspect  such  a  situation  would  have  un- 
certain consequences  for  East- West  se- 
curity— consequences  that  would  most 
likely  be  in  the  interest  of  neither  side. 

That  is  why  we  in  the  West  are 
heartened  by  the  economic  reforms  un- 
der discussion  in  a  number  of  Eastern 
countries.  We  encourage  stronger  and 


bolder  steps.  We  want  the  drive  for 
greater  economic  openness  in  the  East 
to  succeed. 

Why?  Because  we  are  willing  to 
bet  that  greater  economic  openness  and 
further  integration  of  Eastern  econo- 
mies into  the  world  market  system  will 
help  to  reduce  tensions  and  advance  the 
prospect  of  a  more  secure  and  more 
prosperous  world  for  us  all. 

Human  Rights 

Another  valuable  insight  is  beginning 
to  emerge  in  several  Eastern  countries. 
There  are  now  those  who  suggest  that, 
though  economic  openness  can  improve 
the  competitive  position  of  Eastern 
countries  temporarily,  only  by  means  of 
a  relaxation  of  political  controls  can 
competitiveness  be  sustained  in  the 
longer  term. 

Certainly,  the  examples  of  other 
nations  suggest  such  a  conclusion.  In 
the  Third  World,  prosperity  has  been 
most  striking  in  countries  which  have 
not  only  adopted  market  policies  but 
also  have  accommodated  their  people's 
desire  for  increased  individual  freedom 
and  political  expression.  And,  as  you 
know,  the  historical  development  of  po- 
litical democracy  in  the  West  followed  a 
similar  course.  We  are  encouraged  that 
the  drive  for  greater  openness  in  the 
Soviet  Union  and  in  Eastern  Europe 
has  a  political  as  well  as  an  economic 
dimension. 

The  progress  on  political  questions 
has  been  undeniable.  In  some  coun- 
tries, a  considerable  number  of  political 
prisoners  have  been  released,  and  fewer 
people  are  being  imprisoned  for  politi- 
cal offenses.  The  practice  of  sentencing 
political  offenders  to  psychiatric  hospi- 
tals is  increasingly  discredited. 

The  bounds  of  permissible  speech, 
in  writing  and  in  film,  have  been  ex- 
panded. The  news  media  are  now  per- 
mitted to  report  on  subjects  previously 
regarded  as  too  sensitive  or  too  embar- 
rassing. More  and  more  people  are  be- 
ing allowed  to  travel  abroad.  Contacts 
and  exchanges  with  Western  countries 
have  increased,  as  have  the  number  of 
persons  permitted  to  emigrate.  Such 
steps  make  life  in  the  East  richer  and 
more  hopeful;  they  mobilize  public  sup- 
port for  the  difficult  process  of  eco- 
nomic reform  and  adjustment. 

We  in  the  West  have  followed  these 
developments  with  interest,  because  we 
consider  them  directly  relevant  to  our 
own  security.  We  believe  that  there 
is  a  close  relationship  between  the 
way  governments  treat  their  people  at 
home  and  the  way  they  behave  abroad. 


•artment  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


35 


GENERAL 


Governments  that  mistreat  their  own 
citizens,  or  deny  them  basic  human 
rights,  seem  more  ready  than  others  to 
treat  their  neighbors  badly.  Conversely, 
it  seems  to  us,  the  greater  the  degree 
of  political  freedom  and  openness  with- 
in a  country,  the  less  likely  that  coun- 
try will  become  a  danger  to  outsidei-s. 

Although  we  are  encouraged  by 
the  greater  openness  now  apparent  in 
the  Soviet  Union  and  in  the  nations 
of  Eastern  Europe,  our  enthusiasm  is 
tempered  by  awareness  that  much  re- 
mains to  be  done  in  order  to  meet  the 
standards  agi-eed  to  at  Helsinki.  Fur- 
thermore, we  note  that  in  the  East 
basic  human  rights — to  speak  and 
write,  to  travel  and  emigrate — are  still 
treated  as  gifts  of  state  power.  And 
what  the  state  can  give,  the  state  can 
take  away.  Until  a  fundamental  change 
in  perspective  is  realized,  therefore, 
neither  neighbors  nor  citizens  can  be 
confident  that  these  improvements  rep- 
resent an  irreversible  feature  of  the 
future  political  landscape. 

It  was  in  a  spirit  of  openness,  and 
in  the  hope  of  expanding  dialogue  on 
this  most  important  of  topics,  that 
President  Reagan  placed  such  stress  on 
human  rights  at  the  Moscow  summit. 
While  expressing  satisfaction  at  the 
changes  that  have  taken  place  in  the 
Soviet  Union,  the  President  stressed  to 
General  Secretary  Gorbachev  the  need 
to  institutionahze  change.  As  has  been 
his  practice  at  these  meetings,  the 
President  called  for  more  changes,  for 
more  openness,  and  for  greater  dia- 
logue. And  in  truth,  our  dialogue  on 
human  rights  is  expanding.  In  Moscow, 
as  always,  President  Reagan  found  the 
General  Secretary  to  be  a  willing  in- 
terlocutor on  this  subject.  And  one 
need  only  compare  the  joint  statement 
agreed  at  Geneva  to  the  one  issued  at 
Moscow  to  see  how  far  our  dialogue 
has  come. 

Recognizing  the 
Benefits  of  Openness 

We  also  believe  and  appreciate  that  the 
East — despite  the  lack  of  fundamental 
change — has,  nonetheless,  begun  to  feel 


the  attraction  and  note  the  utility  of 
openness.  There  is  recognition  of  a 
need  for  change.  These  are  positive 
developments.  They  are  cause  for  opti- 
mism. We  would  like  to  see  them  be- 
come permanent,  irreversible  elements 
of  a  larger  process  of  change  across  a 
broad  spectrum. 

In  the  meantime,  we  in  the  West 
will  do  what  we  can  to  encourage  the 
process  of  reform  in  the  East.  We  will 
respond  positively — in  word  and  in 
deed — to  progress  as  it  occurs.  And  be- 
cause we  are  proud  of  the  openness 
that  characterizes  life  in  our  own  coun- 


tries, and  of  a  way  of  life  that  guard 
our  liberties  while  providing  us  witl 
many  material  blessings,  we  will  als . 
as  I  have  done  today — always  state   i 
views  forthrightly. 

In  the  final  analysis,  however,  t 
role  of  the  West  is  limited.  Ultimate 
it  is  the  Soviet  Union  and  each  of  tb 
nations  of  Eastern  Europe  who  mua 
recognize  for  themselves  the  benefit 
openness.  They  must  come  to  under 
stand  from  their  own  experience— 
we  in  the  West  have  learned  from 
ours — that  it  is  in  greater  openness 
that  true  security  lies.  ■ 


Acting  Secretary  Whitehead's  Interview 
on  "This  Week  With  David  Brinkley" 


Acting  Secretary  John  C.  White- 
head was  interviewed  on  ABC-TV's 
"This  Week  With  David  Brinkley"  on 
July  2i,  1988,  by  David  Brinkley  and 
Sa7n  Donaldson,  ABC  News,  and 
George  F.  Will,  ABC  Neivs  analystA 

Q.  Now  you  have  heard  the  discussion 
just  finished  between  the  Iranian  and 
the  Iraqi.  Does  that  sound  like  two 
countries  ready  to  arrive  at  a  peace- 
ful settlement? 

A.  I  think  it's  not  surprising  after 
8  years  of  such  a  dreadfully  bitter  war 
that  sweetness  and  hght  do  not  imme- 
diately descend  on  the  parties  over- 
night. And  we  saw  certainly  a  residue 
of  that  bitterness  in  the  program  this 
morning.  I  think  the  important  thing  is 
that  both  of  these  countries  now,  fi- 
nally, after  8  years,  after  1  year  of  try- 
ing to  get  Iran  to  support  the  [UN 
Security  Council]  resolution,  both  coun- 
tries have  agreed  to  support  it.  And  we 
have  described  that  as  a  major  break- 
through, and  I  think  it  is  that. 

Q.  Let  me  give  you  a  chance  to 
do  a  little  bragging  if  you're  in  the 
mood.  That  is,  why  now?  Why  have 
they  moved  to  the  settlement?  Why 
has  Iran  done  this?  And  does  the  U.S. 
presence  in  the  gulf  have  something 
to  do  with  this? 


A.  Yes,  I'm  always  prepared  fo 
bragging,  and  this  is  a  time — if  not 
bragging,  at  least  it's  a  time  for,  I 
think,  all  of  us  to  be  proud  that  our 
policy  has  been  a  success. 

Iran's  decision  is  not  solely  at- 
tributable to  U.S.  policy.  But  our 
firmness  of  our  military  presence  ir 
gulf,  our  indication  that  we  plan  to 
there  as  long  as  it  was  necessary,  a 
at  the  same  time  our  diplomatic  tra 
principally  at  the  United  Nations,  h 
finally  achieved  success.  But  Iran,  ( 
course,  was  finding  it  very  difficult 
continue  the  war.  They  were  suffer! 
military  defeats  in  the  last  several 
months,  one  after  another. 

Q.  Why?  They  have  more  peoi 
and  this  has  been  a  ground  war.  T 
should  have  had  the  advantage.  W 
are  they  losing? 

A.  The  popular  support  seems 
have  eroded.  They  seem  to  have  fou 
it  very  difficult  to  recruit  more  youi 
men  into  their  army. 

Q.  Does  popular  support  reall 
mean  much  in  a  country  like  that' 

A.  Yes,  I  think  so.  Ultimately  i 
seems  to  have  paid  a  toll.  If  they  lo; 
popular  support  through  very  adver 
economic  conditions  in  the  country  ; 
through  the  huge  number  of  deaths 
that  were  taking  place  in  the  bat- 
tlefields, eventually,  popular  suppor 
essential,  even  in  the  most  dictator! 
countries. 


36 


GENERAL 


Q.  But  also,  isn't  it  a  fact,  we 
re  siding  with  Iraq — the  United 
ites? 

A.  We  have  tried  not  to  side  with 
her  side  in  this  war.  We  have  tried  to 
',e  moderation,  but  in  the  last  year 
en  Iran  was  the  principal  holdout  in 
•eeing  to  [Resolution]  598,  we  have 
;d  our  best  to  bring  pressure  on  Iran 
accede,  and  now  they  finally  have. 

Q.  Let's  look  ahead.  What  about 
r  hostages  and  the  other  Western 
stages  in  Lebanon?  There  is  a  lot  of 
k  that  if  this  can  be  settled,  they 
II  be  released.  Is  it  talk,  or  do  you 
ve  some  information? 

A.  No,  it's  talk.  I  have  no  informa- 
n.  The  release  of  the  hostages  is,  of 
irse,  an  extremely  high  priority,  and 
?ould  only  say  that  if  this  acceptance 
Resolution  598  by  Iran  indicates  that 
:y  are  prepared  to  come  back  into 

■  world  of  civilized  nations,  then  we 

y  be  beginning  a  pi-ocess  in  which  we 
I  begin  a  dialogue  with  Iran  about 

■  other  subjects  of  grave  concern  to 
of  which  the  hostages  and  terrorism 

■  at  the  very  top  of  our  agenda. 

Q.  Do  you  foresee  a  restoration  of 
ilomatic  relations  with  Iran  while 
!  Ayatollah  lives?  Is  that  possible? 

A.  We  never  can  tell  how  long  the 
atollah  will  live.  He  seems  to  be 

■y— 

Q.  What's  your  latest  intelligence 
that? 

A.  Our  latest  intelligence  is  that  he 
quite  ill,  but  he  has  been  quite  ill  off 
i  on  for  a  number  of  years.  But  the 
itoration  of  relations  with  Iran  is  cer- 
nly  not  imminent;  there  are  a 
mber  of  steps  in  that  process.  We 
re  had  some  indirect  contact  with 
m.  We  have  sent  a  message  to  them 
ice  their  acceptance  of  Resolution 
S,  indicating  to  them  that  we  wel- 
Tie  that  step  of  theirs,  indicating  our 
llingness  to  cooperate  in  the  imple- 
mtation  of  their  decision.  They  know 
at  we  are  prepared  for  more  contacts 
we  can  be  sure  that  we  are  dealing 
th  responsible  spokesmen  of  their 
vernment  who  can  speak  for  them. 


Q.  Have  you  had  a  reply  to  that 
message  you  just  described? 

A.  We  have  not  had  a  reply  to  that 
particular  message,  but  the  Iranians 
know  how  we  feel  about  what's  going 
on.  It's  affect — 

Q.  You'd  have  to  build  a  new  em- 
bassy there,  wouldn't  you? 

A.  Yes,  we  would. 

Q.  Because  the  old  one  was 
destroyed. 

A.  Yes,  we  would.  But  I  would 
stress  that  we're  only  at  the  very  be- 
ginning of  these  stages.  It  is  some  way 
away  toward  anything  like  the  restora- 
tion of  normal  relationships  with  Iran. 

Q.  Is  this  a  good  thing  for  Israel, 
if  there's  a  cease-fire?  Iraq,  one  of 
Israel's  most  implacable  foes,  emerges 
with  a  strong  army,  with  a  military 
force  that  it's  never  had  before,  with  a 
man  at  its  helm  that  clearly  still  is 
one  of  the  most  anti-Israeli  leaders  in 
the  area. 

A.  Israel  has  indicated  some  con- 
cern about  what  might  happen  if  this 
war  is  settled  and  is  fearful  that  Iraq's 
military  power  might  now  be  freed  up 
to  aim  in  a  different  direction.  We  can 
only  hope  that  their  fears  are 
misplaced. 

Certainly,  no  one  can  hope  for  con- 
tinuation of  this  war.  And  we  all  need 
to  be  happy  that  there  has  been  this 
major  breakthrough  that  seems  very 
likely  now  to  lead  toward  a  full 
settlement. 

Q.  If  we  could  change  the  subject 
and  move  just  a  little  bit  east  to 
Afghanistan.  There  are  a  welter  of 
confusing  reports  about  whether  the 
Soviet  Union  is  continuing  its  troop 
withdrawals,  whether  it  sent  10,000 
troops  back  in  to  defend  Kabul, 
whether  it  is  complaining  that 
Pakistan  is  breaking  the  accords  by 
supplying  aid  to  the  rebels.  Can  you 
tell  us  what  the  status  is,  and  are  we 
anxious  about  Soviet  compliance  with 
the  Afghan  accords? 


A.  Yes,  I'd  be  glad  to.  The  reports 
are,  indeed,  confusing  and  of  concern. 
But  the  most  recent  report  was  a  re- 
port from  Marshal  Akhromeyev,  who  is 
the  head  of  the  Soviet  Armed  Forces — 
the  equivalent  of  our  Chairman  of  the 
Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff — and  he  has  said 
that  these  reports  are  inaccurate,  that 
there  is  no  plan  for  the  Soviets  to  rein- 
sert troops  into  Afghanistan.  And  we 
have  subsequently  received  assurance 
from  the  Soviet  Government  that  this 
statement  represents  the  authoritative 
view  of  the  government. 

This  is  a  reassuring  statement. 
And  the  key  date  that's  coming  up  is 
August  15th.  That's  the  only  date  that 
we  should  really  focus  on.  The  Soviets 
have  agreed  in  the  accords  reached  at 
Geneva  that  they  will  withdraw  50%  of 
their  troops  by  August  15th;  the  bal- 
ance by  February  15th. 

Q.  What  you're  saying  essentially 
is  that  the  Government  of  Pakistan  is 
just  wrong  in  what  it's  been  saying? 

A.  It  would  appear  that  the  Sovi- 
ets have  denied,  at  least,  these  reports. 

Q.  But  there  is  precedent  for  the 
Soviets  denying  doing  things  that 
they  are,  in  fact,  doing. 

A.  Yes,  that's  true,  We  must  be 
very  cautious.  But  I  would  aim  our  con- 
cern at  August  15th.  That  is  the  date  to 
which  they  have  agreed,  and  they  have 
assured  us  that  they  continue  to  stick 
to  that  agreement. 

Q.  What  happens  to  the  U.S. 
force  in  the  Persian  Gulf?  If  there  is  a 
cease-fire  which  moves  on  toward 
peace  negotiations,  are  we  able  to 
withdraw  many  of  the  ships  that  we 
have  had  there  for  the  past  year  and  a 
half? 

A.  It's  premature  to  speak  of  with- 
drawal yet.  But  if  there  is  a  cease-fire, 
if  conditions  return  to  normal,  if  it  ap- 
pears that  the  tensions  are  eliminated, 
it  certainly  will  be  possible  to  consider 
the  reduction  of  those  forces  and  to 
bring  them  down  to  a  normal  level. 


'Press  release  159  of  July  25,  1988. 


spartment  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


37 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Iranian  Airbus  Tragedy 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
JULY  3,  19881 

I  am  saddened  to  report  that  it  appears 
that  in  a  proper  defensive  action  by  the 
U.S.S.  Vinceinies  this  morning  in  the 
Persian  Gulf,  an  Iranian  airliner  was 
shot  down  over  the  Strait  of  Hormuz. 
This  is  a  terrible  human  tragedy.  Our 
sympathy  and  condolences  go  out  to  the 
passengers,  crew,  and  their  families. 
The  Defense  Department  will  conduct  a 
full  investigation. 

We  deeply  regret  any  loss  of  life. 
The  course  of  the  Iranian  civilian  air- 
liner was  such  that  it  was  headed  di- 
rectly for  the  U.S.S.  Vincennes,  which 
was  at  the  time  engaged  with  five  Ira- 
nian Boghammar  boats  that  had  at- 
tacked our  forces.  When  the  aircraft 
failed  to  heed  repeated  warnings,  the 
Vincennes  followed  standing  orders  and 
widely  publicized  procedures,  firing  to 
protect  itself  against  possible  attack. 

The  only  U.S.  interest  in  the  Per- 
sian Gulf  is  peace,  and  this  tragedy  re- 
inforces the  need  to  achieve  that  goal 
with  all  possible  speed. 


LETTER  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
JULY  4,  19882 

On  July  3,  1988,  the  USS  VINCENNES 
and  USS  ELMER  MONTGOMERY  were 
operating  in  international  waters  of  the 
Persian  Gulf  near  the  Strait  of  Hormuz. 
(On  July  2,  the  MONTGOMERY  had  re- 
sponded to  a  distress  signal  from  a  Danish 
tanker  that  was  under  attack  by  Iranian 
small  boats  and  had  fired  a  warning  shot, 
which  caused  the  breaking  off  of  the  at- 
tack.) Having  indications  that  appro.xi- 
mately  a  dozen  Iranian  small  boats  were 
congregating  to  attack  merchant  shipping, 
the  VINCENNES  sent  a  Mark  III  LAMPS 
Helicopter  on  investigative  patrol  in  inter- 
national airspace  to  assess  the  situation. 
At  about  1010  local  Gulf  time  (2:10  a.m. 
EDT),  when  the  helicopter  had  approached 
to  within  only  four  nautical  miles,  it  was 
fired  on  by  Iranian  small  boats  (the  VIN- 
CENNES was  ten  nautical  miles  from  the 
scene  at  this  time).  The  LAMPS  helicopter 
was  not  damaged  and  returned  immedi- 
ately to  the  VINCENNES. 


As  the  VINCENNES  and  MONTGOM- 
ERY were  approaching  the  group  of  Ira- 
nian small  boats  at  appro.ximately  1042 
local  time,  at  least  four  of  the  small  boats 
turned  toward  and  began  closing  in  on  the 
American  warships.  At  this  time,  both 
American  ships  opened  fire  on  the  small 
craft,  sinking  two  and  damaging  a  third. 
Regrettably,  in  the  course  of  the  U.S.  re- 
sponse to  the  Iranian  attack,  an  Iranian 
civilian  airliner  was  shot  down  by  the  VIN- 
CENNES, which  was  firing  in  self-defense 
at  what  it  believed  to  be  a  hostile  Iranian 
military  aircraft.  We  deeply  regret  the 
tragic  loss  of  life  that  occurred.  The  De- 
fense Department  will  conduct  a  full 
investigation. 

The  actions  of  U.S.  forces  in  response 
to  being  attacked  by  Iranian  small  boats 
were  taken  in  accordance  with  our  inherent 
right  of  self-defense,  as  recognized  in  Arti- 
cle .51  of  the  United  Nations  Charter,  and 
pursuant  to  my  constitutional  authority 
with  respect  to  the  conduct  of  foreign  rela- 
tions and  as  Commander  in  Chief  There 
has  been  no  further  hostile  action  by  Ira- 
nian forces,  and,  although  U.S.  forces  will 
remain  prepared  to  take  additional  defen- 
sive action  to  protect  our  units  and  mili- 
tary personnel,  we  regard  this  incident  as 
closed.  U.S.  forces  suffered  no  casualties 
or  damage. 

Since  March  1987,  I  and  members  of 
my  Administration  have  provided  to  Con- 
gress letters,  reports,  briefings,  and  testi- 
mony in  connection  with  developments  in 
the  Persian  Gulf  and  the  activities  of  U.S. 
Armed  Forces  in  the  region.  In  accordance 
with  my  desire  that  Congress  continue  to 
be  fully  informed  in  this  matter,  I  am 
providing  this  report  consistent  with  the 
War  Powers  Resolution.  I  look  forward  to 
cooperating  with  Congress  in  pursuit  of 
our  mutual,  overriding  aim  of  peace  and 
stability  in  the  Persian  Gulf  region. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald  Reagan 

U.S.  LETTER  TO 
THE  UN  SECURITY  COUNCIL, 

JULY  6,  19883 

In  accordance  with  Article  51  of  the  Char- 
ter of  the  United  Nations,  I  wish  on  behalf 
of  my  government  to  report  that  U.S. 
forces  have  e.xercised  their  inherent  right 
of  self-defense  under  international  law  by 
taking  defensive  action  in  response  to  an 
attack  by  the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran 
against  U.S.  forces  lawfully  operating  in 
international  waters  of  the  Persian  Gulf 


On  July  3,  1988,  the  USS  VIN- 
CENNES, which  was  operating  in  inter: 
tional  waters  in  the  Persian  Gulf,  sent  a 
helicopter  on  an  investigative  patrol  in  i 
ternational  airspace  in  response  to  indie 
tions  that  approximately  a  dozen  Iraniai 
small  boats  were  congregating  to  attack 
neutral  merchant  shipping. 

At  approximately  2:10  a.m.  (Easter) 
Daylight  Time)  on  July  3,  1988,  a  group 
Iranian  patrol  craft  fired  on  the  U.S.  he 
copter  The  helicopter,  without  returnin 
fire,  returned  immediately  to  the  VIN- 
CENNES, which  was  10  nautical  miles 
from  the  scene  at  the  time  of  the  inciden 

At  approximately  2:42  a.m.  (Easterij 
Daylight  Time),  as  the  VINCENNES  aiJ 
another  U.S.  naval  vessel  were  approac 
ing  the  group  of  Iranian  small  boats,  at 
least  four  of  the  small  boats  turned  tow, 
and  began  closing  in  on  the  U.S.  warshi 
At  that  time,  both  U.S.  ships  opened  fu 
on  the  small  boats,  sinking  two  and  dair 
ing  a  third. 

In  the  course  of  the  U.S.  response  I 
the  Iranian  attack,  the  VINCENNES  f 
in  self-defense  at  what  it  believed  to  be 
hostile  Iranian  military  aircraft,  after 
sending  repeated  warnings  (to  which  th 
aircraft  did  not  respond).  Regrettably,  1 
Iranian  civilian  airliner  was  shot  down  1 
the  VINCENNES.  As  President  Reaga 
said,  "this  is  a  terrible  human  tragedy.' 

The  United  States  deeply  regrets  t; 
tragic  loss  of  life  that  occurred  and  is  C( 
ducting  a  full  investigation.  The  United 
States  will  also  cooperate  in  all  appropr 
respects  with  any  International  Civil  A' 
tion  Organization  (ICAO)  investigation 
this  incident. 

It  remains  the  policy  of  my  govern- 
ment not  to  seek  a  military  confrontatic 
with  Iran  or  a  widening  of  the  conflict  i 
the  area. 

The  actions  of  the  U.S.  forces  in  re- 
sponse to  being  attacked  by  Iranian  sm. 
boats  were  taken  in  accordance  with  oui 
inherent  right  of  self-defense,  as  recog- 
nized in  Article  51  of  the  U.N.  Charter 

The  tragic  loss  of  lives  resulting  fro 
these  actions  underscores  the  dangers 
posed  by  the  continuation  of  the  Gulf  W 
the  root  cause  of  tension  and  violence  in 
the  area,  and  the  urgency  of  bringing  th 
senseless  conflict  to  an  early  end. 

The  United  States  once  again  calls 
upon  the  international  community,  and  ) 
ticularly  the  members  of  the  Security 
Council,  to  join  us  in  redoubling  our  eff( 
to  end  the  war  as  soon  as  possible  and 
restore  peace  and  security  to  the  region 
through  the  full  and  rapid  implementati 
of  Security  Council  Resolution  598. 

Herbert  S.  Ok 


38 


MIDDLE  EAST 


IITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 

LY  11,  1988^ 

i  President  has  reviewed  U.S.  policy 
he  Persian  Gulf  where  our  military 
:es  are  protecting  vital  interests  of 

free  world.  He  has  expressed  his 
iplete  satisfaction  with  the  policy 
I  reiterated  his  belief  that  the  ac- 
is  of  the  U.S.S.  Vincennes  on  July  3 
he  case  of  the  Iranian  airliner  were 
tifiable  defensive  actions.  At  the 
le  time,  he  remains  personally  sad- 
led  at  the  tragic  death  of  the  inno- 
t  victims  of  this  accident  and  has 
eady  expressed  his  deep  regret  to 
ir  families. 

Prompted  by  the  humanitarian  tra- 
ons  of  our  nation,  the  President  has 
ided  that  the  United  States  will  of- 
compensation,  on  an  ex  gratia  basis, 
;he  families  of  the  victims  who  died 
he  Iranian  airliner  incident.  Details 
cerning  amounts,  timing,  and  other 
Dters  remain  to  be  worked  out. 

It  should  be  clearly  understood 
t  payment  will  go  to  the  families, 

governments,  and  will  be  subject  to 

normal  U.S.  legal  requirements,  in- 
jing,  if  necessary,  appropriate  action 
Congress.  In  the  case  of  Iran,  ar- 
gements  will  be  made  through  ap- 
priate  third  parties.  This  offer  of  ex 
tia  compensation  is  consistent  with 
irnational  practice  and  is  a  human- 
nan  effort  to  ease  the  hardship  of 

families.  It  is  offered  on  a  voluntary 
is,  not  on  the  basis  of  any  legal  lia- 
ty  or  obligation. 

The  responsibility  for  this  tragic  in- 
ent,  and  for  the  deaths  of  hundreds 
housands  of  other  innocent  victims 
a  result  of  the  Iran-Iraq  war,  lies 
,h  those  who  refuse  to  end  the  con- 
t.  A  particularly  heavy  burden  of  re- 
msibility  rests  with  the  Government 
[ran  which  has  refused  for  almost  a 
ir  to  accept  and  implement  Security 
uncil  Resolution  598,  while  it  con- 
ues  unprovoked  attacks  on  innocent 
itral  shipping  and  crews  in  the  inter- 
:ional  waters  of  the  gulf.  In  fact,  at 
.'  time  of  the  Iran  Air  incident,  U.S. 
ces  were  militarily  engaged  with  Ira- 
,n  forces  as  a  result  of  the  latter's 
provoked  attacks  upon  neutral  ships 
d  a  U.S.  Navy  helicopter.  The  urgent 


necessity  to  end  this  conflict  is  rein- 
forced by  the  dangers  it  poses  to  neigh- 
boring countries  and  the  deplorable 
precedent  of  the  increasingly  frequent 
use  of  chemical  weapons  by  both  sides, 
causing  still  more  casualties. 

Only  an  end  to  the  war,  an  objec- 
tive we  desire,  can  halt  the  immense 
suffering  in  the  region  and  put  an  end 
to  innocent  loss  of  life.  Our  goal  is 
peace  in  the  gulf  and  on  land.  We  urge 
Iran  and  Iraq  to  work  with  the  Se- 
curity Council  for  an  urgent  compre- 
hensive settlement  of  the  war  pursuant 
to  Resolution  598.  Meanwhile  U.S. 
forces  will  continue  their  mission  in  the 
area,  keenly  aware  of  the  risks  involved 
and  ready  to  face  them. 


ASSISTANT  SECRETARY 

WILLIAMSON, 
ICAO  COUNCIL, 
MONTREAL, 
JULY  13,  19885 

I  appreciate  having  this  opportunity  to 
make  a  statement  on  behalf  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  of  Amer- 
ica regarding  Iran  Air  #655  and  the 
tragic  incident  on  July  3,  1988. 

Immediately  after  the  incident,  the 
President  of  the  United  States  ex- 
pressed our  deep  regret  over  the  loss  of 
life  in  this  tragedy.  President  Reagan's 
spokesman  also  has  announced  that  the 
United  States  is  prepared  to  provide 
compensation  to  the  families  of  the  vic- 
tims, of  all  nationalities,  who  died  in 
this  accident.  These  payments  will  be 
subject  to  normal  U.S.  legal  require- 
ments and  consultations  with  the  Con- 
gress. This  compensation  will  be 
offered  on  an  ex  gratia,  or  voluntary, 
basis  and  not  on  the  basis  of  any  legal 
liability  or  obligation.  We  simply  be- 
lieve it  is  the  right  thing  to  do  in  these 
tragic  circumstances. 

As  members  of  the  council  know, 
the  United  States  initiated  its  own  for- 
mal investigation  immediately  after  the 
incident  on  July  3.  This  investigation 
will  be  thorough.  There  are  many 
important  outstanding  questions.  We 
intend  to  share  with  ICAO  as  much  in- 
formation as  possible,  consistent  with 
the  purposes  of  any  ICAO  investigation 


and  the  need  to  safeguard  information 
relating  to  sensitive  military  matters. 
It  is  essential  that  this  organization  in- 
stitute measures  to  prevent  similar  inci- 
dents in  the  future.  We  want  to  take 
steps  toward  improvements  that  will 
benefit  civil  aviation  in  the  Persian 
Gulf  We  pledge  our  cooperation  to 
the  council  and  to  the  full  ICAO 
membership. 

In  my  statement  today,  I  intend  to 
address  the  following: 

First,  I  will  discuss  the  general 
background  to  the  incident,  including 
comment  on  the  continuing  conflict  in 
the  Persian  Gulf; 

Second,  I  will  describe  the  specific 
situation  confronting  the  captain  of  the 
U.S.S.  Vincennes  on  July  3,  1988,  as 
the  facts  are  known  to  us  at  this  time; 
and 

Third,  I  will  discuss  possible  steps 
that  the  International  Civil  Aviation 
Organization  might  consider  in  order  to 
avoid  future  incidents  such  as  the  one 
we  address  today.  My  government 
wants  to  work  with  ICAO  on  measures 
that  can  be  taken,  as  soon  as  possible, 
to  increase  the  safety  of  international 
civil  aviation  in  the  Persian  Gulf — a 
fundamental  goal  of  this  organization 
and  certainly  of  the  United  States.  We 
hope  this  extraordinary  session  of  the 
council  will  initiate  work  to  that  end. 

General  Background 
on  the  Situation 

Let  me  begin  by  reviewing  the  situa- 
tion that  existed  in  the  Persian  Gulf  on 
July  3  when  the  incident  involving  Iran 
Air  #655  occurred. 

This  tragedy  occurred  in  the  con- 
text of  the  continuing  war  between  Iran 
and  Iraq.  Not  only  has  this  war  caused 
incalculable  damage  to  Iran  and  Iraq 
but  many  neutral  nations  and  innocent 
people  have  suffered  as  well.  The  con- 
flict has  been  a  threat  to  the  stability 
and  territorial  integrity  of  nations  in 
the  gulf  whose  security  long  has  been 
of  concern  to  the  United  States. 

The  accident  cannot  be  considered 
in  isolation.  This  war  has  gone  on  for 
almost  8  years,  despite  the  UN  Se- 
curity Council's  mandatory  call,  in  Res- 
olution 598,  for  an  immediate  cease-fire 


partment  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


39 


MIDDLE  EAST 


and  for  the  withdrawal  of  all  forces  to 
internationally  recognized  boundaries. 
If  Iran  had  heeded  the  decision  of  the 
UN  Security  Council,  the  incident  in- 
volving Iran  Air  #655  would  not  have 
occurred. 

It  has  been  suggested  that  the 
U.S.  naval  presence  in  the  gulf  is  at 
fault  in  this  incident.  My  government 
rejects  that  contention.  We  are  in  the 
gulf  to  preserve  peace.  Our  naval  pres- 
ence in  international  waters  has  been 
augmented  in  order  to  contain  the  ef- 
fect of  the  Iran-Iraq  conflict,  to  assist 
the  countries  of  the  region,  and  to  pro- 
tect U.S. -flag  shipping.  As  tensions  in 
the  gulf  diminish,  our  presence — and, 
no  doubt,  the  presence  of  other  West- 
ern navies — will  be  reduced  to  more 
traditional  levels. 

In  the  meantime,  it  is  clear  that 
the  safety  of  neutral  shipping  and  air 
traffic  is  a  major  victim  of  the  war. 
Innocent  ships  have  been  attacked,  and 
innocent  civil  airliners  have  had  to  alter 
their  courses  in  order  to  avoid  inadvert- 
ent confrontations  in  an  area  of  poten- 
tial hostilities. 

The  incident  on  July  3,  was  in  fact, 
an  accident.  But  it  was  an  accident  that 
was  directly  related  to  the  unresolved 
Iran-Iraq  conflict.  Indeed,  in  Septem- 
ber 1987,  a  general  warning — a  Notice 
to  Airmen,  or  NOTAM — was  issued  by 
the  U.S.  Government  regarding  flights 
within  the  Persian  Gulf  area,  specifi- 
cally emphasizing  the  critical  impor- 
tance and  the  method  of  aircraft 
identification.  In  November  1987,  you, 
Mr.  President  [Assad  Kotaite],  wrote  to 
the  authorities  of  states  in  the  Persian 
Gulf  to  bring  to  their  attention  the 
"hazardous  situation  for  aircraft  operat- 
ing in  that  area." 

In  addition,  U.S.  naval  vessels  have 
issued  warnings  to  civil  aircraft  on  nu- 
merous occasions  to  alter  their  courses 
in  order  to  avoid  inadvertent  confronta- 
tions. My  government  appreciates  that 
there  are  concerns  and  sensitivities  re- 
lating to  military  warnings  to  civil  air- 
craft. But  these  warnings  have  been 
issued  only  because  of  the  concern  of 
the  United  States  about  the  safety  of 
civil  aviation.  I  must  add  that  not  all 
civil  aircraft  have  heeded  these  warn- 
ings. In  particular,  it  is  our  under- 
standing that  some  Iranian  aircraft 
have  continued  to  fly  into  and  over  hos- 
tile zones,  despite  repeated  warnings. 


Specific  Situation 
Confronting  the  Vincennes 

This  was  the  general  atmosphere  per- 
taining in  the  gulf  at  the  time  of  this 
incident  on  July  3.  But  let  us  look  more 
closely  at  the  specific  situation. 

I  invite  each  member  of  the  coun- 
cil to  consider  the  circumstances  facing 
the  captain  of  the  U.S.S.  Vincennes, 
based  on  the  knowledge  that  we  have 
now.  The  ship  was,  at  the  time  of  the 
incident,  in  international  waters  outside 
the  zone  of  exclusion  declared  by  Iran. 
U.S.  forces  were  on  heightened  alert 
because  of  reports  about  the  possibility 
of  Iranian  attack  against  U.S.  ships  on 
the  U.S.  Independence  Day,  the  Fourth 
of  July.  On  the  afternoon  preceding  the 
incident,  Iranian  F-14s  approached  an- 
other U.S.  cruiser  and  were  warned 
away  after  closing  to  within  a  few  miles 
of  this  ship. 

Only  a  few  hours  later  on  July  2,  a 
Danish  ship  was  attacked  by  Iranian 
boats  and  requested  assistance  from 
U.S.  forces.  At  about  7:20  a.m.  on 
July  3,  a  Pakistani  ship  issued  a  dis- 
tress call,  again  due  to  attacks  by  Ira- 
nian boats.  Later,  a  Liberian  ship  also 
was  threatened.  At  about  9:25  a.m.  lo- 
cal time  on  July  3,  the  Vincennes  had 
sent  her  helicopter  on  patrol  to  investi- 
gate reports  that  Iranian  boats  were 
closely  following  a  vessel  of  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany.  That  helicopter 
was  fired  upon,  and  it  returned  to  the 
Vincennes. 

A  threatening  trend  was  clearly  de- 
veloping. Iranian  fighters  had  pressed 
to  within  only  a  few  miles  of  a  Navy 
cruiser,  four  neutral  ships  had  either 
been  attacked  or  threatened,  and 
Vincennes'  own  helicopter  had  been 
shot  at  by  Iranian  gunboats. 

As  the  Vi)icennes  and  another  U.S. 
naval  vessel  then  approached  the  group 
of  Iranian  boats  that  had  fired  upon  the 
U.S.  helicopter,  at  least  four  of  the 
boats  turned  toward  the  U.S.  ships 
with  obvious  hostile  intentions.  Both 
U.S.  ships  began  to  exchange  fire  with 
the  gunboats,  sinking  two  of  the  Ira- 
nian boats  and  damaging  a  third.  This 
fighting  between  U.S.  and  Iranian  ves- 
sels took  place  before,  during,  and 
after  the  incident  involving  Iran  Air 
#655. 


With  the  Vincennes  already  in-     1 1' 
volved  in  this  exchange  of  fire  with  atpi 
tacking  surface  vessels,  the  radar  on  P 
the  Vincennes  suddenly  showed  a  plaiP 
in  the  vicinity  of  the  joint  military-     l< 
civilian  airfield  at  Bandar-e  Abbas  anij(t 
heading  directly  for  the  Vinceimes.  L IH-- 
me  add  that  Iranian  F-14  fighters  areli 
known  to  be  based  at  Bandar-e  Abbas  I' 
which  was  the  site  of  departure  for 
Iran  Air  #655.  Despite  repeated  effoi 
by  the  Vincennes  to  establish  contact; 
with  the  unidentified  aircraft,  the  pla 
did  not  respond  to  the  voice  transmis 
sions  on  international  air  distress  and 
military  air  distress  frequencies.  An 
electronic  IFF  [identification  of  friem 
or  foe]  interrogation  from  the  Vin- 
ceyines  indicated  both  a  mode  II  and  i 
mode  III  IFF  response.  Mode  II  nor- 
mally is  associated  with  military  air- 
craft, and  this  particular  mode  II 
response  historically  has  been  associ- 
ated with  F-14s  flown  by  Iran  in  the 
gulf.  It  must  be  noted  as  well  that  mi 
tary  aircraft  also  are  capable  of  re- 
sponding with  mode  III. 

I  think  council  members  will  agn 
that  it  was  reasonable  in  these  circun 
stances  for  the  captain  of  the  Vincem 
to  believe  that  he  might  soon  come  u 
der  attack  by  an  Iranian  military  air- 
craft sent  to  assist  the  Iranian  boats 
that  were  involved  in  an  exchange  of 
fire  with  the  Vincennes.  The  plane  w 
not  far  away,  given  the  speed  ca- 
pabilities of  modern  aircraft.  Time  w 
short.  Indeed,  the  captain  had  only  i 
few  brief  minutes  from  the  time  the 
aircraft  was  spotted  until  it  could  be 
expected  to  be  directly  over  the 
Vincennes. 

Nevertheless,  the  captain  avoide 
immediate  air  defensive  action  even 
though  the  surface  gun  battle  con- 
tinued. At  some  risk  to  his  ship,  in  tl 
extremely  limited  time  available,  he 
sought  to  confirm  the  identity  of  the 
plane,  which  was  observed  to  alter  a 
normal  climb  and  began  descending 
while  heading  rapidly  toward  him.  R 
peatedly,  he  asked  the  plane  to  ident 
itself  and  turn  away.  Each  time  he  w; 
met  with  silence,  only  to  have  radar 
show  the  plane  moving  closer.  Ulti- 
mately, as  the  risk  of  imminent  dang 
reached  an  extreme  point  and  while 
still  under  attack  by  Iranian  gunboat 
the  captain  felt  compelled  to  take  ac 


40 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/September  19 


MIDDLE  EAST 


to  protect  his  men  and  his  vessel 
!i  what  then  appeared  to  be  an  air 
ick  in  support  of  the  Iranian  surface 
ibatants.  From  the  time  the  captain 
|,  considered  the  approaching  air- 
It  to  be  hostile,  he  had  only  240  sec- 
|j — 4  minutes — to  reconcile  the 
iiacing  trend  the  Iranians  had  exhib- 
over  the  past  24  hours.  He  waited 
1  the  very  last  minute  to  defend  his 
■  from  an  air  attack. 
Given  the  overall  tension  of  the  sit- 
on,  the  history  of  attacks  on  U.S.- 
vessels,  and  the  immediate  situa- 
confronting  the  captain  of  the 
-ennes.  it  is  not  difficult  to  imagine 
this  scenario  developed.  Nor  is  it 
;onable  to  believe  that  there  is  a 
le  focus  of  responsibility. 
Those  in  this  council  who  deal  with 
technology  of  aviation  know  that 
•e  have  been  great  technological  ad- 
}es  in  this  field.  But  we  also  know 
technology  has  its  limitations, 
ar  today  can  perform  services  only 
aely  dreamed  about  a  few  short 
-s  ago.  But  often  it  cannot  identify 
size,  type,  or  mission  of  an  aircraft, 
annot  divine  the  intentions  of  a  pilot 
1  does  not  identify  himself  and  does 
identify  his  purpose  as  he  flies  di- 
ly  into  a  scene  of  hostilities. 
In  the  end,  the  captain  of  a  ship 
it  make  a  judgment  on  the  basis  of 
information  available  to  him.  It  is 
solemn  responsibility  to  protect  the 
1  under  his  command.  That  is  what 
pened  in  the  case  of  Iran  Air  #655. 
5  important  to  understand  the  entire 
te.xt  of  events  during  that  24-hour 
iod  on  July  2  and  3.  Everyone  has 
deepest  regret  for  the  tragic  loss  of 
lives  on  board  Iran  Air  #655.  But 
-minded  people  must  recognize  the 
icult  options  put  before  a  captain 
)  had  to  make  this  critical  decision 
L  very  short  period  and  while  under 
tinuing  attack  by  surface  vessels. 
At  the  same  time,  I  think  we  must 
ognize  that  Iranian  civil  aviation  au- 
rities  must  have  known  there  was 
flict  in  the  waters  of  the  gulf.  If 
y  did  not,  they  should  have  known, 
I  they  should  have  taken  steps  to 
■vent  the  plane  from  flying  into  an 
■a  where  fighting  was  in  progress, 
leed,  Iranian  vessels  were  attacking 
S.  naval  vessels  at  the  very  mo- 
nt  that  Iran  Air  #655  took  off  from 


Bandar-e  Abbas.  The  plane  headed 
straight  for  the  scene  of  the  conflict 
and  failed  to  heed,  or  even  answer,  the 
repeated  warnings  and  requests  for 
identification.  Some  degree  of  responsi- 
bility must  be  taken  by  Iran  for  putting 
its  aircraft  in  this  vulnerable  position. 
The  innocent  victims  on  Iran  Air  #655 
are  just  the  latest  among  the  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  casualties  in  a  needless 
war  which  should  have  ended  long  ago. 

Looking  Ahead 

Nevertheless,  the  important  question  is 
where  we  go  from  here.  We  can  and 
must  agree  to  take  all  appropriate  mea- 
sures to  ensure  that  such  tragedies  do 
not  recur. 

First  of  all,  we  believe  it  would  be 
useful  for  the  council  to  ask  the  ICAO 
Secretary  General  to  conduct  a  fact- 
finding investigation  on  the  incident  of 
July  3,  with  the  objective  of  identifying 
possible  measures  for  the  improvement 
of  civil  aviation  in  the  gulf,  and  to  re- 
port back  to  this  council.  The  United 
States  is  prepared  to  cooperate  in  all 
appropriate  respects  with  an  ICAO  in- 
vestigation and  is  convinced  that,  as  a 
result  of  the  review  by  this  council,  the 
difficulty  of  the  complex  situation  in  the 
Persian  Gulf  will  be  understood  better 
and  appropriate  procedures  to  promote 
civil  aviation  safety  in  that  region  can 
be  implemented.  Only  a  thorough  inves- 
tigation can  help  resolve  the  many 
questions  and  anomalies  surrounding 
the  incident  on  July  3. 

My  government  trusts  that  all  the 
concerned  governments  will  give  this 
investigation  their  full  support.  In  par- 
ticular, we  urge  the  Government  of  Iran 
to  cooperate  fully  by  providing  ICAO 
with  the  flight  data  and  cockpit  voice 
recorders  and  any  other  specific  infor- 
mation which  can  help  determine  the 
actual  facts  of  the  situation  and  resolve 
any  anomalies. 

Let  me  affirm  my  own  govern- 
ment's intention  to  cooperate  with  the 
investigation.  We  are  working  to  com- 
plete our  own  investigation  as  quickly 
as  possible  and  will  make  information 
available,  consistent  with  safeguarding 
the  rights  of  individuals  and  military 
security  matters. 

Second,  my  government  believes 
that  this  council  and  this  organization 
must  consider  soon  whether  new  steps 


can  be  taken  which  would  help  the  situ- 
ation relating  to  international  civil  avia- 
tion safety  in  the  Persian  Gulf  area.  It 
is  apparent  that  further  improvements 
are  needed  in  international  operating 
practices  and  that  other  steps  can  be 
taken  within  the  international  civil  avi- 
ation community  which  clarify  existing 
rules  or  procedures  and  enhance  their 
effectiveness  in  avoiding  tragic  acci- 
dents. My  government  stands  ready  to 
assist  in  this  process.  We  need  not 
await  the  result  of  any  investigation  to 
begin  consideration  of  possible  steps  to 
make  civil  aviation  more  safe  and  more 
secure  in  the  Persian  Gulf  area. 

To  be  more  specific,  let  me  list 
some  examples  of  areas  that  may  have 
some  immediate  practical  application 
regarding  civil  aviation  in  the  Persian 
Gulf  area. 

•  Civil  air  routes  in  the  gulf  might 
be  restructured,  where  possible,  to 
minimize  contact  with  areas  of  military 
activity. 

•  Alternate  routes  might  be 
opened. 

•  New  minimum  altitudes  might  be 
set  for  civil  aircraft  operating  over 
water. 

•  Transponder  equipment  used  by 
civil  aircraft  might  be  controlled  more 
carefully  to  ensure  that  the  identity  of 
an  airliner  is  unambiguous  to  all  mili- 
tary and  civil  air  traffic  service 
facilities. 

•  Radio  communications  might  be 
improved  to  ensure  that  warnings  to 
airline  pilots  are  communicated,  re- 
ceived, and  given  a  prompt  response. 

These  are  just  some  examples  of 
steps  that  might  be  followed.  Other 
ideas  will  undoubtedly  emerge  as  we 
discuss  these  topics,  both  now  and  after 
an  investigation.  Let  us  keep  our  minds 
open  and  focused  on  taking  truly  con- 
structive steps  that  can  serve  to  pre- 
vent similar  actions  in  the  future.  When 
the  council  considers  the  report  from 
the  Secretary  General  about  Iran  Air 
#655,  it  may  wish  to  initiate  a  review 
of  ICAO  documents  to  determine  the 
status  of  their  current  implementation 
and  the  need  for  possible 
improvements. 

Finally,  let  me  make  clear  that  the 
risk  of  future  tragedies  such  as  the 
downing  of  Iran  Air  #655  on  July  3  will 
remain  so  long  as  the  senseless  and 
tragic  war  in  the  Persian  Gulf  con- 


partment  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


41 


MIDDLE  EAST 


tinues.  All  of  us  must  cooperate  in  the 
United  Nations  so  that  this  conflict  can 
be  brought  to  an  end.  The  Government 
of  Iran  is  the  only  party  to  the  conflict 
which  has  refused  to  express  a  willing- 
ness to  comply  with  the  UN  Security 
Council's  mandatory  decision  in  Resolu- 
tion 598.  In  particular,  Iran  must  be 
urged  by  all  responsible  parties  to  sum- 
mon the  political  will  to  end  a  conflict 
which  has  claimed  so  many  innocent 
victims. 

Conclusion 

In  closing,  the  U.S.  Government  re- 
mains committed  to  the  safety  of  inter- 
national civil  aviation.  In  particular,  we 
reaffirm  our  support  for  the  Interna- 
tional Civil  Aviation  Organization  and 
its  fundamental  objectives  of  promoting 
the  safety  of  international  civil  aviation 
and  ensuring  its  orderly  growth 
throughout  the  world.  Our  cooperation 
in  this  investigation  will  be  further  evi- 
dence of  our  support  for  this  body. 

My  government  has  been  in  the 
forefront  of  leading  aviation  nations  in 
proposing  measures  to  ensure  safety 
and  security  in  civil  aviation,  and  that 
commitment  will  continue.  Members  of 
this  council  know  that  the  United 
States  calls  for  and  expects  a  great  deal 
on  the  part  of  other  nations  regarding 
safety  precautions  for  international  civil 
aviation.  We  will  do  no  less  than  we 
request  of  others. 

This  council  has  a  long  history  of 
careful  deliberation  and  of  fairness  and 
wisdom  in  its  judgments.  My  govern- 
ment trusts  that  its  members,  as  in 
past  incidents,  will  reach  its  conclu- 
sions only  after  all  of  the  facts  have 
been  received.  We  look  forward  to  join- 
ing with  the  other  members  of  this 
council  in  a  search  for  solutions  to  avoid 
tragic  incidents  such  as  the  one  involv- 
ing Iran  Air  #655.  In  doing  so,  we  can, 
together,  reaffirm  the  role  of  ICAO  in 
making  air  travel  safe  for  all  our 
citizens. 


VICE  PRESIDENT  BUSH, 
UN  SECURITY  COUNCIL, 
JULY  14,  19886 

I  have  come  here  today  to  represent 
the  United  States,  at  the  request  of 
President  Reagan,  because  of  the  im- 
portance of  the  issues  at  stake— not 
just  the  terrible  human  tragedy  of  Iran 
Air  #655  but  the  continuing  conflict  be- 
tween Iran  and  Iraq  and  its  implica- 
tions for  international  commerce  in  the 
Persian  Gulf 


Having  been  my  country's  perma- 
nent representative  to  this  body,  I 
know  what  a  grave  responsibility  the 
council  bears  and  the  good  it  can  do 
when  it  acts  with  realism  and  wisdom. 
We  are  in  urgent  need  of  realism  and 
wisdom  now. 

The  Persian  Gulf  is  a  region  of  vital 
importance  to  the  United  States  and 
the  economy  of  the  world.  American 
and  European  forces  are  in  the  gulf 
with  the  support  of  the  states  of  the 
area,  to  meet  a  vital  need — to  help  en- 
sure the  unimpeded  flow  of  oil  and  to 
keep  neutral  commerce  moving  in  the 
face  of  a  very  real  threat  to  innocent 
shipping.  This  is  our  legal  right. 

Iranian  mines,  deliberately  sown, 
have  disrupted  innocent  passage  and 
damaged  unarmed  merchant  vessels 
and  a  U.S.  naval  ship  in  international 
waters.  Iranian  small  boat  attacks  on 
nonbelligerent  merchant  ships  continue 
unabated.  These  actions  are  in  blatant 
violation  of  international  law.  They  give 
the  lie  to  Iran's  assertions  that  it  sup- 
ports freedom  of  navigation  in  the  gulf 

We  have  increased  the  size  of  our 
forces  from  traditional  levels  to  protect 
U.S. -flag  shipping  and  to  assist  other 
neutral  vessels  under  unlawful  attack 
when  they  request  assistance.  Five  Eu- 
ropean navies  in  addition  to  our  own — a 
total  of  some  43  ships — are  now  in  the 
gulf  to  counter  Iran's  reckless  behavior 
toward  neutral  ships  engaged  in  lawful 
commerce.  I  am  proud  of  our  leadership 
in  meeting  this  challenge.  Together,  we 
have  made  it  clear  that  we  will  keep 
the  Persian  Gulf  open,  no  matter  what 
the  threat.  I  am  here  to  reaffirm,  to 
those  who  depend  on  us  and  to  those 
who  would  threaten  us,  that  we  will  not 
alter  this  course. 

The  critical  issue  confronting  this 
body  is  not  the  how  and  why  of  Iran 
Air  #655.  It  is  the  continuing  refusal  of 
the  Government  of  the  Islamic  Republic 
of  Iran  to  comply  with  Resolution  598, 
to  negotiate  an  end  to  the  war  with 
Iraq,  and  to  cease  its  acts  of  aggression 
against  neutral  shipping  in  the  Persian 
Gulf  The  victims  of  Iran  Air  #655  are 
only  the  most  recent  casualities  of  a 
brutal  and  senseless  war  that  has 
brought  immense  pain  and  suffering  to 
the  people  of  both  sides. 

Iran  long  ago  could  have  accepted, 
and  can  still  accept,  an  honorable  end 
to  the  war.  As  a  first  step,  it  should 
declare  its  readiness  unequivocally  to 
comply  with  Resolution  598 — today,  for 
the  first  time,  before  this  body.  It  can 
act  now  to  end  the  unspeakable  sacri- 
fices the  people  of  both  Iran  and  Iraq 
are  being  asked  to  make.  What  possible 
objective  could  be  worth  the  human 
suffering  and  pain,  the  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  casualties,  and  the  eco- 


nomic devastation  the  war  has  causec 
on  both  sides? 

A  particularly  horrifying  aspect 
the  Iran-Iraq  war  is  the  increasingly 
routine  use  of  chemical  weapons.  Mi 
can  forget  the  pictures  of  entire  fami 
lies  lying  dead  in  the  streets  of  their 
villages,  innocent  of  anything,  yet 
killed  in  this  savage  way? 

The  United  States  was  the  first  i 
tion  publicly  to  condemn  the  use  of 
chemical  weapons  in  the  war  as  a  blal 
tant  violation  of  the  Geneva  protocol  j 
We  fully  support  Security  Council  Ri| 
olution  612,  which  demands  an  imme  | 
ate  end  to  chemical  warfare  by  both  1, 
parties.  No  country  should  think  it  c  i 
use  chemical  weapons  with  impunity  j, 

We  here  in  the  council  have  a  sp  |i 
cial  responsibility  to  help  bring  this  i 
to  an  end.  Almost  a  year  ago  today,  || 
July  20,  1987,  this  council  responded  o 
the  hopes  of  the  world  with  the  unar  Ii 
imous  adoption  of  Resolution  598.  Tl  n 
United  States  played  a  leading  role  i  |i 
the  adoption  of  that  resolution.  Its  |i 
provisions  are  familiar.  It  provides  a  |i 
comprehensive  framework  for  an  imi  jt 
diate  end  to  the  war.  |j 

Resolution  598  had  a  unique,  m;  {i 
datory  character.  In  adopting  Resoli  |[ 
tion  598,  the  members  of  the  Securil 
Council  knew  exactly  what  they  wer  {{ 
doing  in  ordering  an  immediate  end  i| 
the  conflict  without  the  agreement  c 
either  party. 

Almost  a  year  has  passed,  and  t 
bloodshed  continues  unchecked.  The 
time  has  come  for  action  to  bring  th 
war  to  an  end.  I  call  today  on  both 
sides  to  accept  an  immediate  and  coi( 
prehensive  permanent  cease-fire — 04 
land  and  sea  and  in  the  air.  Let  thati: 
the  first  step  in  the  full  implementa' 
of  Resolution  598,  leading  directly  t( 
prompt  withdrawal  to  international  I 
ders,  return  of  all  prisoners  of  war, 
establishment  of  an  impartial  body  ti 
look  into  responsibility  for  the  conflil 
Let  that  stop  the  bloodshed.  Let  thai 
pave  the  way  for  an  enduring  peaceF 
resolution. 

I  met  this  morning  with  the  Sec 
tary  General  to  commend  his  tirelesi 
efforts  to  end  the  war  and  to  proinis 
our  strong  support  for  his  mediation 
efforts.  I  urge  the  members  of  the  S 
curity  Council — and  particularly  its 
permanent  members — to  do  likewise 
and  to  make  clear  that  they  will  not 
support  efforts  to  delay  the  immedia 
implementation  of  Resolution  598  in 
of  its  provisions. 

We  must  not  lose  sight  of  one  ba 
fact:  Iraq  has  declared  its  readiness 
comply  with  Resolution  598  as  a  basi 
for  a  settlement,  and  Iran  has  not.  I 
stead  of  expressing  willingness  to  co 
ply  with  the  resolution  and  negotiati 
its  implementation  in  good  faith,  Ira 


42 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/September  1i 


MIDDLE  EAST 


5  played  for  time  and  maneuvered  for 
ilomatic  advantage — and  the  Iranian 
)ple  have  paid  a  heavy  price. 

We  respect  Iran's  right  to  air  its 
evances.  But  Iran  cannot  have  it 
,h  ways.  Iran  cannot  simultaneously 
nplain  to  this  body  and  defy  it. 

The  Government  of  the  Islamic  Re- 
alic  of  Iran  has  refused  to  say  plainly 
i  clearly  that  it  will  comply  with  the 
ndatory  decision  of  the  Security 
uncil.  Iran  must  not  be  permitted  to 
)ose  those  provisions  of  Resolution 
]  it  likes  and  ignore  the  others.  Nor 
1  Iraq  be  permitted  to  rest  on  verbal 
lerence  to  Resolution  598,  while 
liding  cooperation  with  the  Secretary 
neral  in  finding  practical  ways  to  im- 
ment  the  resolution. 

As  for  the  immediate  matter  at 
id — the  unfortunate  destruction  of 
.n  Air  #655 — many  of  the  circum- 
nces  remain  unclear.  Our  own  mili- 
y  investigation  is  underway.  We  will 

0  cooperate  with  any  investigation 
it  is  conducted  by  the  International 
'il  Aviation  Organization  (ICAO),  and 

trust  that  the  Government  of  Iran 

1  do  the  same.  We  want  all  the  rele- 
it  facts  to  be  brought  to  light  as 
ckly  as  possible. 

But  one  thing  is  clear:  The  U.S.S. 
icennes  acted  in  self-defense.  This 
gic  accident  occurred  against  a  back- 
)p  of  repeated,  unjustified,  un- 
)voked,  and  unlawful  Iranian  attacks 
unst  U.S.  merchant  shipping  and 
ned  forces,  beginning  with  the  mine 
ack  on  the  U.S.S.  Bridgeton  in  July 
!7.  It  occurred  in  the  midst  of  a  naval 
ack  initiated  by  Iranian  vessels 
linst  a  neutral  vessel  and,  subse- 
ently,  against  the  Vincennes  when 
:ame  to  the  aid  of  the  innocent  ship 
distress. 

Despite  these  hostilities,  Iranian 
thorities  failed  to  divert  Iran  Air 
155  from  the  area.  They  allowed  a  ci- 
ian  aircraft  loaded  with  passengers 
proceed  on  a  path  over  a  warship 
gaged  in  battle.  That  was  irresponsi- 
;  and  a  tragic  error. 

The  information  available  to 
ipt.  Will  Rogers,  the  captain  of  the 
ncennes.  indicated  that  an  Iranian 
litary  aircraft  was  approaching  his 
ip  with  hostile  intentions.  After 
ven  unanswered  warnings,  he  did 
lat  he  had  to  do  to  protect  his  ship 
d  the  lives  of  his  crew.  As  a  military 
mmander,  his  first  duty  and  responsi- 
lity  is  to  protect  his  men  and  his  ship. 

The  United  States  has  never 
Ufully  acted  to  endanger  innocent  ci- 
lians,  nor  will  it  ever.  But  I  can  also 
sure  you  that  the  United  States  will 
■ver  put  its  military  in  a  dangerous 
;uation  and  deny  them  the  right  to 
■fend  themselves. 


We  are  all  accustomed  by  now  to 
hearing  irresponsible  charges  from  the 
Iranian  Government.  There  have  been 
many  particularly  egregious  statements 
concerning  this  tragic  incident. 

I  will  not  dignify  with  a  response 
the  charge  that  we  deliberately  de- 
stroyed Iran  Air  #655.  The  Foreign 
Minister  of  Iran  knows  better.  He 
knows  that  this  tragedy  was  an  acci- 
dent. He  also  knows  that  by  allowing  a 
civilian  airliner  to  fly  into  the  area  of 
an  engagement  between  Iranian  war- 
ships and  U.S.  forces  in  the  gulf,  Iran 
must  bear  a  substantial  measure  of  re- 
sponsibility for  what  has  happened. 

I  call  on  Iran  today  to  reroute  civil- 
ian air  traffic  away  from  areas  of  active 
hostilities.  Yesterday,  the  U.S.  re- 
presentative to  the  International  Civil 
Aviation  Organization  advocated  an 
investigation  by  the  ICAO  into  the  Iran 
Air  incident  and  immediate  considera- 
tion of  appropriate  measures  to  ensure 
the  safety  of  civil  aviation  in  the  gulf 

The  terrible  disaster  of  Iran  Air 
#655  fills  our  hearts  with  sorrow.  Our 
reaction  to  this  tragedy  transcends  po- 
litical differences  and  boundaries.  As 
Americans,  we  share  the  grief  of  the 
families  of  the  victims,  whatever  their 
nationalities. 

It  is  that  strongly  felt  sense  of 
common  humanity  that  has  led  our  gov- 
ernment to  decide  that  the  United 
States  will  provide  voluntary,  ex  gratia 
compensation  to  the  families  of  those 
who  died  in  the  crash  of  Iran  Air  #655. 
We  make  this  offer  as  a  humanitarian 
gesture — not  as  a  matter  of  legal  obli- 
gation but  out  of  a  sense  of  moral  com- 
passion, reflecting  the  value  we  place 
on  human  life.  We  hope  that  compensa- 
tion will  help  ease  the  pain  of  those 
who  have  suffered  a  loss,  even  as  we 
recognize  that  nothing  we  can  do  or  say 
can  ever  bring  back  their  loved  ones. 

In  the  case  of  Iranian  victims,  we 
will  take  appropriate  measures  to  en- 
sure that  the  money  flows  directly  to 
the  families  and  not  to  the  government; 
we  will  provide  none  of  these  funds  to 
the  Government  of  the  Islamic  Republic 
of  Iran.  Indeed,  we  will  provide  no 
compensation  until  mechanisms  are  in 
place  to  ensure  that  the  money  goes 
only  to  the  families  of  the  victims. 

The  time  has  come — indeed,  the 
time  is  long  past — for  us  to  rededicate 
ourselves  to  the  cause  of  peace.  The 
Iran  Air  tragedy  should  reinforce  our 
determination  to  act.  It  should  remind 
those  who  would  prefer  to  ignore  the 
terrible  human  cost  of  the  Iran-Iraq 
war  and  the  threat  it  poses  to  the  se- 
curity of  the  Persian  Gulf — those  who 
find  reasons  to  delay  rather  than  rea- 
sons to  act  for  peace — that  their  com- 
placency carries  a  heavy  price. 


The  United  States  has  one  over- 
arching goal  in  the  Persian  Gulf.  That 
goal  is  peace.  Peace  means  cessation  of 
the  killing.  Peace  means  a  definitive 
end  to  the  war.  Peace  means  total  free- 
dom of  passage  through  the  straits — 
total  freedom  of  ships  to  sail  without 
risk  in  international  waters.  Peace  also 
means  nations  living  without  the  fear  of 
threats  or  intimidation  from  their 
neighbors. 

To  this  end,  we  will  continue  to  de- 
fend our  interests  and  support  our 
friends  while  remaining  steadfastly 
neutral  in  the  war.  As  long  as  this  con- 
flict continues,  we  and  other  Western 
nations  will  work  to  contain  the  threat 
to  freedom  of  navigation  and  peaceful 
commerce  in  a  waterway  that  is  vital  to 
the  economies  of  the  world.  Our  naval 
presence  is  welcomed  by  peaceful  na- 
tions and  is  a  threat  to  no  one.  But 
we  will  respond  firmly  if  we  are 
threatened. 

The  implementation  of  Resolution 
598  would  enable  the  United  States  to 
return  to  the  modest  naval  presence  in 
the  gulf  we  have  maintained  for  more 
than  40  years,  with  the  support  of  the 
gulf  states.  We  look  forward  to  that 
day. 

But  make  no  mistake:  until  that 
day,  we  will  do  whatever  it  takes  to 
maintain  freedom  of  navigation  in  this 
vital  area  of  the  world  and  to  take 
whatever  actions  we  must  to  protect 
our  forces  there.  We  will  not  let  down 
our  friends  and  allies.  We  will  not  be 
intimidated  by  reckless  attacks  or  ter- 
ror. Our  commitment  to  freedom  and 
peace  demands  this,  and  nothing  less, 
from  the  United  States  of  America. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  11,  1988. 

-Identical  letters  addressed  to  Jim 
Wright,  Speaker  of  the  House  of 
Representatives,  and  John  C.  Stennis, 
President  pro  tempore  of  the  Senate  (text 
from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  July  11). 

■'Letter  addressed  to  Security  Council 
President  Paulo  Nogueira-Batista  and 
signed  by  Ambassador  Okun,  Acting  U.S. 
Permanent  Representative  to  the  United 
Nations. 

^Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  18;  also 
issued  as  USUN  press  release  66. 

^Richard  S.  Williamson  is  Assistant 
Secretary  for  International  Organization 
Affairs. 

«USUN  press  release  69  (rev.  1)  of 
July  14.  ■ 


partment  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


43 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Middle  East  Peace: 

Facing  Realities  and  Challenges 


by  Richard  W.  Murphy 

Address  before  the  Council  on  For- 
eign Relations  in  New  York  City  on 
June  U,  1988.  Ambassador  Murphy  is 
Assistant  Secretary  for  Near  Eastern 
and  South  Asian  Affairs. 

Major  transformations  are  underway  in 
global  political  and  economic  relations. 
And  significant  improvements  are  tak- 
ing place  in  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union. 
Against  the  backdrop  of  potentially  far- 
reaching  changes  in  Soviet  thinking — 
indeed,  contributing  significantly  to 
those  changes — new  patterns  of  pohti- 
cal  dialogue  are  taking  shape,  most  sig- 
nificantly represented  by  the  progress 
achieved  at  the  Moscow  summit  in  sta- 
bilizing and  intensifying  superpower 
relations. 

In  the  Middle  East,  however,  old 
attitudes  prevail  and  traditional  illu- 
sions persist.  Outdated  concepts  pro- 
duce outdated  actions  and  result  in 
policies  which  fail  to  meet  the  needs 
of  today. 

During  his  recent  visit  to  the  re- 
gion, Secretary  Shultz  addressed  the 
dichotomy  between  the  dictates  of  real- 
ity and  the  illusions  to  which  Arabs  and 
Israelis  cling.  The  Secretary  argued 
that  emerging  realities — in  superpower 
relations  and,  more  particularly,  in  re- 
gional trends — require  a  serious  re- 
thinking by  all  parties. 

What  are  some  of  these  emerging 
realities  in  the  Middle  East? 

Demographic  Trends 

The  migration  of  people  throughout  the 
Middle  East,  the  ebb  and  flow  of  their 
movement  and  life  cycles,  have  shaped 
the  fabric  of  the  region  for  centuries. 
Today  these  demographic  trends  pose 
enormous  challenges  for  the  modern  na- 
tion state— straining  the  state's  ca- 
pacity to  provide  for  its  citizens  and 
impeding  social  and  economic  develop- 
ment. Moreover,  demographic  changes, 
particularly  when  they  overlap  with 
sectarian  and  political  conflict,  can  ex- 
acerbate or  even  cause  confrontation. 

•  With  a  population  growth  rate  of 
2.5%  a  year,  Egypt  has  1.3  million  new 
mouths  to  feed  each  year.  By  the  turn 
of  the  century,  Egypt's  population  will 
e.xceed  70  million  people;  by  2010,  its 
population  will  reach  100  million.  Cairo, 


44 


a  city  designed  originally  for  some  1.5 
million  people,  now  has  a  population  of 
some  12-15  million  people.  Indeed,  the 
consequences  of  Egypt's  population 
boom  is  systemic  and  has  placed  a 
strain  on  housing,  employment  oppor- 
tunities, social  services,  and  economic 
expectations. 

•  In  Lebanon,  shifting  population 
balances  have  contributed  to  the  break- 
down of  the  confessional  political  sys- 
tem and  created  severe  local  and  eco- 
nomic dislocation.  The  Shia  community, 
now  estimated  at  roughly  40%  of  the 
Lebanese  population,  remains  the 
largest  and  most  disadvantaged  of  all 
Lebanese  communal  groups.  This  im- 
balance in  relation  to  other  religious 
groups  has  made  large  elements  of  the 
Shia  community  vulnerable  to  manip- 
ulation by  Shiite  Iran,  which  seeks  to 
impose  an  Islamic  republic  on  all 
Lebanese. 

•  In  the  West  Bank/Gaza,  changing 
demographic  trends  have  created  new 
realities.  Israel's  continued  occupation 
of  these  territories  means  controlling 
1.5  million  Palestinian  Arabs  against 
their  will — a  fact  which  the  intifada 
[uprising]  confirms — and  poses  much 
more  difficult  challenges  for  Israel  than 
in  the  past.  And  since  the  Arab  popula- 
tion in  territories  controlled  by  Israel 
will  outnumber  the  Jewish  population 
within  a  generation,  the  challenges  can 
only  sharpen.  Indeed,  the  occupation  is 
a  dead-end  street  that  will  guarantee 
continued  violence,  compromise  Israel's 
democracy  and  moral  values,  and  frus- 
trate any  durable  accommodation  be- 
tween Israel  and  its  Arab  neighbors. 

Economic  Issues 

On  the  economic  front,  lower  oil  prices 
and  sluggish  growth  have  affected  all 
countries  in  the  Middle  East.  Major  oil 
producers  have  cut  their  domestic  de- 
velopment plans  and  their  foreign  as- 
sistance. Opportunities  for  exporting 
goods  and  labor  to  these  countries  have 
diminished,  resulting  in  a  foreign 
exchange  squeeze  in  Lebanon,  Egypt, 
Jordan,  Syria,  and  the  West  Bank. 
Skilled  and  unskilled  Arab  workers  in 
the  oil-producing  countries  have  been 
forced  to  return  to  their  own  countries, 
and  remittances  have  dwindled,  along 
with  trade.  Government-to-government 
grants  and  loans  from  richer  to  poorer 
Arab  states  have  also  fallen  off  sharply. 


Israel  has  come  through  a  wrench  i 
ing  period  of  economic  readjustment,  I' 
but  there  are  signs  of  trouble.  The  hy 
perinflation  of  a  few  years  ago,  which 
dropped  to  a  more  manageable  16%,  isli 
now  moving  back  up.  And  profoundly  |1 
affecting  both  Israel  and  the  occupied  li 
territories  are  population  pressures  1: 
on  labor  markets.  In  the  West  Bank  1: 
and  Gaza,  population  growth  rates  an  L- 
2.5%-3%  per  year.  This  exceeds  the  c 
pacity  to  absorb  manpower.  The  resul  li 
has  been  substantial  emigration.  In-  f 
come  from  outside  the  West  Bank  ac-  i 
counts  for  one-third  of  that  area's  GN  ji 
[gross  national  product].  , 

The  Palestinian  uprising  on  the  a 
West  Bank  has  paradoxically  high-  | 
lighted  the  economic  integration  of  Is  'i 
rael  and  the  West  Bank.  Unpublished  '! 
estimates  suggest  that  the  intifada  ii 
will  reduce  the  GDP  [gross  domestic  ii 
product]  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  1  ii 
2%  this  year.  The  economic  effects  on  r 
Israel  are  equally  profound.  Israeli 
exports  to  the  West  Bank  may  have 
dropped  by  35%-50%.  Absenteeism  b  ' 


Arab  workers  has  cut  the  Israeli  labo 
force  by  l%-2%.  The  cost  to  Israel 
could  be  as  much  as  2%  of  GNP  growt 
plus  a  hefty  boost  to  inflation. 

In  the  meantime,  defense  expend 
itures  account  for  19%  of  GNP  in  Isra 
and  Jordan,  11%  in  Egypt.  This  com- 
pares with  an  average  of  under  5%  fo 
other  countries  in  the  world.  The  con 
tinned  diversion  of  extraordinary  mat 
rial  and  human  resources  to  military 
purposes  in  the  Middle  East  will 
severely  retard  the  efforts  of  these 
countries  to  keep  pace  economically 
and  with  technological  and  scientific 
change  in  the  next  century. 

Economic  insecurity  and  austerit; 
reduce  public  confidence  in  the  futurf 
and  create  a  climate  for  political  and 
religious  demagoguery.  This  can,  at  it 
worst,  lead  to  the  sort  of  upheaval 
which  has  splintered  Lebanon.  And 
even  if  the  situation  is  not  immediateS 
explosive,  it  breeds  an  atmosphere  of 
caution,  making  it  difficult  for  politicj 
leaders  to  take  the  bold  decisions  re- 
quired for  peace. 

The  Changing 
Arab-Israeli  Battlefield 

Increasing  sophistication  of  military 
technology  has  revolutionized  modern 
warfare  and  created  scenarios  of  de- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/September  19*'  i; 


MIDDLE  EAST 


iction  that  have  dramatically  raised 
costs  of  conventional  conflict. 

•  In  the  Iran-Iraq  war,  we  have 
nessed  use  of  chemical  weapons  and 
irt-range  ballistic  missiles  (SRBMs) 
:  have  brought  the  war  to  urban 

as  and  underscored  the  limitations 
he  concept  of  secure  borders. 

•  Syrian  acquisition  of  the  SS-21 
other  short-range  ballistic  missiles, 

ibined  with  Israel's  own  SRBM  pro- 
m,  has  set  off  a  potentially  dan- 
ous  cycle  of  conflict,  with  higher 
;s  to  both  military  and  civilian 
rets. 

•  Acquisition  of  chemical  weapons 
introduced  a  new  element  in  bat- 
ield  planning  and  heightened  danger 
■reemption  and  large-scale  civilian 
lalties. 

•  Saudi  acquisition  of  the  CSS-2, 
^'s  success  in  increasing  the  range 
iCUD  to  over  300  miles,  and  top- 
irity  programs  in  other  Middle  East- 
countries  to  develop  or  acquire 

^er  range  missiles  have  aggravated 
dangers  and  heightened  the  risks 
5ed  by  widespread  missile  prolifera- 
;  throughout  the  region. 


■  Middle  East  is  a  region  of  passion- 
beliefs  and  powerful  ideas.  All  too 
■n  these  ideas — both  secular  and  re- 
Dus  alike — are  converted  into  ide- 
jies  of  an  extreme  nature. 

•  Islamic  fundamentalism  of  a  revo- 
onary  and  sometimes  violent  nature 

roots  throughout  the  region.  In 
lisia,  Egypt,  Lebanon,  and  Syria, 
have  witnessed  the  emergence  of 
Ul  extremist  groups  which  have  chal- 
ked the  state  and  spread  their  mili- 
t  message  through  terrorism. 

•  Terrorist  organizations  espousing 
ical  ideologies  or,  in  the  case  of  the 
u  Nidal  organization,  a  nihilist  phi- 
ophy  contrive  to  attack  moderate 
ces  everywhere  in  an  effort  to  pre- 
it  accommodation  and  resolution  of 

conflicts. 

•  In  Israel,  Jewish  extremists  pro- 
im  that  there  can  be  no  compromise 
,h  the  Arabs  and  no  accommodation 
ied  on  any  territorial  compromise. 
me  even  urge  the  transfer  or  expul- 
n  of  Palestinian  Arabs. 


nner-Take-All  Thinking 

)  often,  parties  to  a  conflict  believe 
.t  only  one  side  can  win  and  that  it  is 
Dossible  for  both  sides  to  gain 
ough  negotiation.  This  thinking 
iracterizes  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict, 


particularly  the  Palestinian-Israeli  con- 
frontation. Israelis  and  Palestinians  are 
prisoners  of  the  past,  locked  into  the 
prejudices  of  a  historic  conflict  over 
what  they  perceive  as  absolute  imper- 
atives— territory,  security,  and  political 
legitimacy.  Too  many  persist  in  seeing 
the  problem  as  a  winner-take-all  affair 
without  an  appreciation  of  the  need  for 
flexibility,  let  alone  the  importance  of  a 
practical  negotiation. 

In  each  case,  the  implications  of 
these  economic,  demographic,  and  mili- 
tary trends  are  felt  in  three  independ- 
ent but  interrelated  ways. 

First — and  this  is  new — they  affect 
the  ability  of  countries  and  people  to 
compete  politically  and  economically  in 
the  increasingly  interdependent,  demo- 
cratic, and  free  market  world  of  the 
late  20th  century. 

Second,  they  impose  specific  con- 
straints on  efforts  to  resolve  the  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict  by  encouraging  extrem- 
ists on  both  sides. 

Third,  they  risk  reversing  the 
trend  toward  greater  Arab  acceptance 
of  Israel,  starting  back  down  the  road 
to  major  military  confrontation  some- 
time in  the  future. 

The  trends  I  just  described  are 
complicated  by  what  Secretary  Shultz 
has  termed  the  propensity  of  the  par- 
ties in  the  conflict  to  "cling  to  old  vi- 
sions and  dreams  as  though  they  were 
immutable  laws  of  nature."  The  Secre- 
tary has  just  returned  from  another 
round  of  discussions  in  the  Middle 
East,  and  I  would  like  to  report  to  you 
on  the  state  of  play  in  the  peace 
process. 

The  Peace  Process 

As  you  know,  the  plan  put  forward  by 
the  United  States  says  that  negotia- 
tions between  Israel  and  certain  of  its 
neighbors  who  wish  to  participate  in 
the  peace  process  should  be  based  on 
UN  Security  Council  Resolutions  242 
and  338.  The  plan  also  stipulates  that, 
in  the  case  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza, 
negotiations  should  take  place  initially 
on  transitional  arrangements  but  that 
these  negotiations  would  be  interlocked 
in  time  and  sequence  with  final  status 
talks. 

Since  we  put  this  plan  on  the  table, 
we  have  heard  a  number  of  complaints, 
problems,  and  concerns  about  it.  Two 
examples  of  reactions  we  have  heard 
should  suffice  in  explaining  what  we 
mean  in  asking  all  parties  to  shed  illu- 
sions in  favor  of  reality. 


•  From  the  PLO  [Palestine  Libera- 
tion Organization],  we  have  read  in  the 
media  that  Resolution  242  is  not  suffi- 
cient, for  it  is  deficient  in  regard  to 
Palestinian  national  rights;  and  the  sug- 
gestion has  been  made  that  additional 
UN  resolutions  become  the  basis  of  ne- 
gotiations, including  Resolution  181,  the 
partition  resolution.  From  a  strictly 
legal  standpoint,  I  think  I  understand 
what  Resolution  181  does  for  the  PLO 
case:  it  puts  the  UN  General  Assembly 
on  record  in  support  of  a  Palestinian 
state  west  of  the  Jordan  River.  But  can 
the  PLO  realistically  believe  that  the 
clock  can  be  turned  back  to  1947  and 
that  we  start  negotiations  on  the  basis 
of  Resolution  181?  This  is  an  illusion 
that  simply  will  not  lead  to  negotiations 
and  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict. 

•  On  the  other  hand,  some  Israelis 
have  argued  that  the  timetable  and  in- 
terlock mechanism  are  unacceptable  de- 
viations from  the  Camp  David  accords, 
and  they  have  suggested  that  the  plan 
be  revised  to  conform  entirely  with 
Camp  David.  Here,  too,  I  understand 
the  legal  motivation,  which  is  to  avoid 
undermining  the  validity  of  Camp 
David  or  seeing  U.S.  commitment  to 
Camp  David  flag;  but  can  these  people 
realistically  believe  that  the  clock  can 
be  turned  back  to  1978  and  that  nego- 
tiations can  start  from  a  basis  which 
Jordan,  Syria,  and  others  rejected  cate- 
gorically? This  is  an  illusion  which  can- 
not and  will  not  be  fulfilled. 

So,  as  the  Secretary  said  in  Cairo, 
"the  recognition  that  dreams  and  real- 
ity need  to  be  reconciled  is  a  first  prin- 
ciple for  peace  in  the  Middle  East." 
All  peoples  share  collective,  national 
dreams;  these  are  the  stuff  of  nation- 
building  and  political  acculturation.  But 
all  peoples  must  appreciate  the  effect 
which  local,  regional,  and  international 
realities  have  on  their  ability  to  fulfill 
overblown,  inflated  dreams.  In  the  Mid- 
dle East,  both  Arabs  and  Israelis  must 
shed  the  kinds  of  illusions  which  serve 
as  convenient  excuses  for  denying  real- 
ity. Both  sides  must  seize  what  is  possi- 
ble by  engaging  in  a  process  of  peace 
and  accommodation. 

When  these  sentiments  are  ex- 
pressed, however,  the  reaction  heard 
most  often  is  one  of  disbelief:  the 
United  States  is  naive  in  believing  that 
this  is  a  resolvable  conflict.  Emotions 
run  too  high  and  hatreds  too  deep  for 
Arabs  and  Israelis  to  seek  common 
bases  on  which  to  engage  in  a  peace 
process. 


partment  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


45 


IDDLE  EAST 


This  reaction  is  wrong,  and  it  is  its 
own  form  of  illusion,  one  which  borders 
on  hubris.  Arabs  and  Israelis  own  no 
monopoly  on  conflict,  violence,  and 
hatred.  .Just  recall  the  European  wars 
of  religion  and  nationalism.  The  peoples 
of  the  Middle  East  are  not  the  first  or 
last  protagonists  who  find  it  politically 
e.xpedient  to  stick  to  unrealistic  as- 
sumptions rather  than  contemplate 
compromise  or  concession.  It  behooves 
us,  friends  of  Arabs  and  Israelis,  to  tell 
both  that  there  is  no  longer  an  excuse 
for  extremist  positions  and  demands. 

So,  if  the  emerging  realities  of  de- 
mography, tools  of  war,  and  extremism 
point  up  the  need  for  a  new  approach 
and  if  the  illusions  which  the  parties 
have  hid  behind  for  so  long  are  revealed 
as  weak  excuses  for  realistic  policy, 
then  the  answer  lies  in  a  serious  proc- 
ess of  negotiations  leading  to  a  com- 
])rehensive  settlement.  Such  negotia- 
tions will  require  compromise,  but  they 
can  achieve  the  minimum  required  by 
both  sides — an  outcome  that  will  prove 
conclusively  that  both  can  win  at  peace 
what  neither  can  win  through  war. 

Questions  and  Challenges 

In  the  limited  time  available,  I  will  not 
review  the  American  plan  for  negotia- 
tions— even  though  such  a  review  would 
demonstrate  that  our  plan  meets  the 
criteria  of  realism,  sensibility,  and 
achievability  which  are  required.  I  can 
review  the  plan  later,  if  you  wish. 
Rather,  I  will  start  from  an  assumption 
that  our  plan  is  workable  and  realistic. 
What  it  is  not,  however,  is  a  full  script 
for  negotiations.  It  provides  a  certain 
amount  of  structure  for  necessary  dis- 
cussions among  the  parties  designed  to 
flesh  out  operational  details.  But  it  re- 
quires leadership  and  partners  so  that 
the  parties  can  use  the  plan  as  a 
springboard  to  negotiations. 

Since  January,  the  United  States 
has  been  engaged  intensively  in  the 
effort  to  draw  the  parties  out,  to  evince 
their  willingness  to  address  the  opera- 
tional details  of  our  proposal.  We  shall 
continue  these  efforts  for  as  long  a  time 
as  it  takes.  Our  determination  will  not 
flag. 

But  at  the  same  time,  there  are 
steps  which  the  parties  themselves  can 
take  to  condition  the  environment, 
create  an  atmosphere  conducive  to  ne- 
gotiations, and  send  signals  to  the  other 
side  that  positions  ai-e  negotiable.  One 
key  step  would  be  the  acknowledge- 
ment by  all  parties  of  the  land-for- 
peace  formula  represented  by  Resolu- 


46 


President  Meets 
With  Patriarch  of  Lebanon 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
JUNE  24,  19881 

The  President  was  pleased  to  meet  to- 
day with  Maronite  Catholic  Patriarch 
Nasrallah  Sfeir  of  Lebanon.  The  Vice 
President  also  met  separately  with  Pa- 
triarch Sfeir.  The  President  and  the 
Vice  President  reaffirmed  U.S.  support 
for  the  restoration  of  Lebanon's  unity, 
sovereignty,  and  territorial  integrity 
and  the  withdrawal  of  all  foreign  forces 
from  Lebanon.  Both  emphasized  that 
the  suffering  of  the  Lebanese  people 
must  end  and  that  a  process  of  national 
reconciliation  is  urgently  needed,  in- 
cluding agreement  on  political  and  se- 
curity reforms.  They  also  recongized 
that  durable  peace  and  security  for 
Lebanon  can  best  be  assured  by  a  com- 
prehensive peace  settlement  for  the 
Middle  East  and  pledged  the  continued 
efforts  by  this  Administration  on  the 
peace  process. 

The  United  States  considers  the 
upcoming  Lebanese  presidential  elec- 
tion to  be  very  important  for  Lebanon's 
unity  and  stability.  The  election  should 
proceed  constitutionally,  with  a  new 
President  taking  office  as  scheduled  on 
September  23.  It  should  also  be  orderly 
so  that  a  smooth,  legitimate  transition 
can  occur.  The  election  provides  an  ex- 
cellent opportunity  for  national  recon- 
ciliation and  should  be  seen  in  that 
light.  In  this  context,  the  United  States 
has  responded  to  the  request  of 
Lebanese  leaders  to  help  Lebanese 
Muslims  and  Christians  devise  and 
agree  upon  a  new  arrangement  for 
sharing  political  power.  We  are  con- 
vinced by  our  conversations  with  these 


leaders  that  responsible  Lebanese  wa 
to  find  fair  guidelines  for  a  process  to 
establish  a  central  government  that  e: 
ercises  full  authority  over  a  unified, 
sovereign  state.  In  that  state,  all 
Lebanese  would  enjoy  comparable  op- 
portunities for  advancement.  The 
United  States  believes  an  agreement 
such  guidelines  is  possible  and  ought 
be  achieved  as  soon  as  possible. 

The  United  States  is  particularly 
concerned  about  the  plight  of  innocen 
civilians  in  Lebanon.  The  tragic  casu- 
alties from  the  recent  fighting  betwei 
rival  militias  in  Beirut's  southern  sub 
urbs  and  from  terrorist  bombing  and 
the  continued  taking  and  detention  of 
hostages,  both  Lebanese  and  foreign 
demonstrate  the  urgent  need  to  restc 
the  authority  of  the  central  governmt 
throughout  the  country.  Only  the  cen 
tral  government  has  the  clear,  unen- 
cumbered right  and  responsibility  to 
maintain  law  and  order.  The  continue 
existence  of  armed  militias  and  ter- 
rorist groups  frustrates  the  desire  of 
the  vast  majority  of  the  Lebanese  pe 
pie  to  have  the  legal  order  and  autho 
ity  reestablished. 

The  Lebanese  and  American  pec 
pies  have  had  a  long  and  close  rela- 
tionship. Out  of  that  friendship  emer 
both  our  deep  concern  about  Lebano; 
future  and  our  enduring  commitment 
help  the  Lebanese  ease  their  sufferir 
and  achieve  national  reconciliation.  T 
those  ends,  the  United  States  pledge 
both  continuing  humanitarian  as- 
sistance and  political  support. 


'Te.xt  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  June  27,  1988 


tion  242.  Traditionally,  this  has  been 
seen  as  an  issue  only  for  those  in  Israel 
who  favor  retention  of  the  West  Bank 
and  Gaza.  But  this  is  not  the  case,  for 
Palestinians  and  other  Arabs  will  also 
have  to  respond  to  the  same  land-for- 
peace  issue. 

As  we  measure  illusions  against 
the  test  of  realism,  we  need  to  answer 
some  key  questions. 

•  Would  the  Arabs  be  prepared  to 
accommodate  themselves  to  a  negotia- 
tion premised  on  the  nonreturn  of  ter- 
ritory? The  answer  is  no. 


•  Is  land  essential  to  satisfy  de- 
mands for  justice?  The  answer  is  yes 

•  Would  Israelis  be  expected  to  i 
commodate  themselves  to  something 
less  than  full  peace?  The  answer  is  n 

•  Are  peace  and  normalization  es 
sential  to  satisfy  the  necessity  for  se 
curity?  The  answer  is  yes,  because  g 
ography  and  conventional  military 
strategy  can  no  longer  ensure  securil 

•  Do  Israelis  and  Arabs  require 
period  of  transition  before  they  can  1: 
expected  to  complete  agreement  on 
land  for  peace?  The  answer  is  yes. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/September  19  p 


MIDDLE  EAST 


So,  I  suggest  that  we  move  on  two 
:ks  simultaneously — one  which 
ises  on  substance  and  modalities  of 
jgotiating  process  and  another,  com- 
nentary  track  which  builds  bridges 
ccommodation  and  realism  between 
ties  about  to  negotiate  with  each 
2r. 

For  Israel,  the  challenge  is  to  ac- 
t  and  act  upon  the  understanding 
t  legitimate  political  rights  and  dem- 
itic  self-expression  for  Palestinians 
compatible  with  Israeli  security.  In 
long  run,  they  are  the  key  to  real 
irity  for  an  Israel  at  peace  with  its 
^hbors. 

Surely,  this  will  not  be  easy,  for 
recent  violence  in  the  West  Bank 
Gaza  has  heightened  Israeli  se- 
ity  concerns  and  focused  on  short- 
Ti  solutions.  But  Palestinian  willing- 
s  to  engage  in  a  political  process 
ds  to  be  tested.  And  practical  steps 
ard  this  end  can  be  undertaken  in 
period  ahead  with  an  eye  toward 
iting  conditions  more  beneficial  to 
otiations. 

For  Palestinians,  equally,  the  chai- 
se is  to  turn  away  from  the  dead-end 
n  of  violence  and  rejectionism  and  to 
',e  an  effective,  forward-looking  po- 
al  program.  Israel's  existence  and 
arity  are  non-negotiable.  But  the 
pe  and  content  of  a  future  settle- 
it  are  exactly  what  negotiations  are 
ut. 

For  other  Arabs,  the  challenge  is 
tep  forward  in  support  of  negotia- 
hs.  To  await  ideal  negotiating  condi- 
jiS  is  to  ensure  that  negotiations  will 
take  place.  Arabs  can  instill  confi- 
ce  in  Palestinians  and  Israelis  that 
otiations  can  work.  In  this  respect, 
1;  noteworthy  that  the  Algiers  Arab 
limit  meeting  did  not  reject  the  U.S. 
Ice  process  initiative.  Participants 
e  been  quick  to  signal  us  that  the 
,  dialogue  with  the  parties — Israelis 
Arabs — should  continue  on  our  pro- 
.als,  and  it  will. 

iclusion 

h  Arabs  and  Israelis  have  met  many 
illenges  in  the  past.  None  were  more 
)ortant,  however,  than  those  which 
front  them  now.  Indeed,  the  future 
he  Middle  East  will  be  determined 
their  ability  to  work  together  to 
front  their  common  challenge  of 
cting  a  structure  of  relations  within 
ich  they  and  their  children  can  live 
Deace  and  security.  ■ 


Secretary  Visits  IVIiddle  East 


Folluwing  are  statements  Secretary 
Shultz  made  during  his  trip  to  Egypt, 
Jordan,  Israel,  and  Syria  (June  3-7, 
1988). 


ARRIVAL  STATEMENT, 

CAIRO, 

JUNE  3,  19881 

I  am  here  to  make  it  clear  that  the 
United  States  will  do  all  it  can  to  pro- 
mote peace  in  the  area.  Egypt  is  the 
natural  place  to  start  my  mission.  We 
seek  a  comprehensive  settlement. 
Everyone  will  need  the  vision,  prag- 
matism, and  determination  that  Egypt 
has  brought  to  Arab-Israeli  peacemak- 
ing over  the  years. 

Also  needed  is  the  strength  to  con- 
front reality  and  to  shed  illusions  that 
have  hindered  progress  for  too  long. 
During  this  trip,  I  plan  to  focus  on 
what  is  required  to  move  us  closer  to 
the  negotiating  table.  Too  often,  people 
become  convinced  that  only  their 
dreams  or  their  causes  are  legitimate. 
They  deny  the  rights  of  others.  They 
avoid  the  realities  on  the  ground.  So, 
the  United  States — as  a  veteran  of 
many  years  encounter  with  the  Middle 
East — can  help  our  friends  face  up  to 
the  challenges  which  lie  ahead. 

We  start  with  fundamental  ques- 
tions. What  is  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict? 
It  is  the  competition  between  two  na- 
tional movements  for  sovereignty  on 
one  land.  The  conflict  is  not  the  fault  of 
one  party  or  the  other;  no  party  has 
sole  responsibility  for  resolving  it. 
There  are  no  cheap  or  painless  fixes. 
No  one  can  avoid  taking  difficult  steps. 
The  continuation  of  the  conflict  to- 
day stems  from  the  inability  of  Arabs 
and  Israelis  to  lay  aside  prejudices, 
hatred,  and  overblown  dreams  in  favor 
of  a  negotiated  settlement.  The  fate  of 
Zionism  and  Palestinian  nationalism  are 
interdependent,  although  many  on  both 
sides  refuse  to  recognize  this.  Instead 
of  a  political  dialogue  among  Arabs  and 
Israelis,  there  is  a  growing  tendency 
to  sharpen  differences  and  avoid 
compromise. 

Negotiations  work.  Leaders  who 
seize  opportunities  and  pursue  policies 
of  accommodation  achieve  results. 
Nowhere  has  this  been  proven  more 
dramatically  than  in  Egypt,  which 
recovered  occupied  territory  and  cam- 


paigned actively  to  advance  the  cause  of 
Palestinian  rights  through  negotiations. 
Others  fail — those  who  refuse  to  con- 
front reality,  who  reject  any  opportun- 
ity to  move  ahead,  and  who  cHng  to  old 
visions  and  dreams  as  though  they  were 
immutable  laws  of  nature. 

No  one  can  be  ensured  against  all 
possible  outcomes  in  advance  of  nego- 
tiations. Those  who  seek  such  guaran- 
tees in  advance  rule  out  the  possibility 
of  making  real  headway  today — and 
perhaps  forever.  Only  a  new  realism 
and  sense  of  responsibility  can  break 
Arabs  and  Israelis  out  of  the  self- 
destructive  pattern  they  are  locking 
themselves  into.  The  recognition  that 
dreams  and  reality  need  to  be  recon- 
ciled as  a  first  principle  for  peace  in  the 
Middle  East. 

In  formulating  ideas  for  bringing 
about  negotiations,  the  United  States 
has  been  guided  by  the  need  to  address 
the  needs  and  requirements  of  Arabs 
and  Israelis.  We  have  been  guided  by 
practical  aspects  of  Middle  East  reality. 

First,  there  is  room — physical 
space — for  Israelis  and  Palestinians 
to  live  side  by  side,  as  neighbors,  in 
Israel,  the  West  Bank,  and  Gaza. 
Arabs  and  Israelis  are  not  engaged  in  a 
winner-take-all  competition.  A  fair  set- 
tlement is  possible,  even  though  peo- 
ple have  difficulty  conceiving  how  to 
achieve  it.  It  is  not  too  late  for  a 
settlement. 

Second,  Israelis  and  Palestinians 
are  locked  into  mutually  reinforcing  cy- 
cles of  hatred,  which  sometimes  lead  to 
actions  that  contradict  norms  they  have 
established  to  guide  their  own  behavior. 
Discrimination  and  segregation  are  in- 
compatible with  the  values  of  democ- 
racy, freedom,  and  liberty;  violence  and 
terrorism  are  incompatible  with  po- 
litical rights,  responsibihties,  and 
obligations. 

Third,  both  sides  fear  entering  a 
process  in  which  the  outcome  is  not 
known  in  advance.  But  a  creative  proc- 
ess is  what  is  needed,  and  such  a  proc- 
ess requires  an  interplay  between 
transitional  and  final  status  negotia- 
tions. Just  as  a  transition  can  provide 
confidence  in  possible  ultimate  out- 
comes, so  the  existence  of  negotiations 
on  the  final  status  can  make  transi- 
tional arrangements  work  well.  The 
idea  of  a  transitional  period,  linked  to 
final  status  talks,  was  conceived  for 
just  such  a  purpose. 


jartment  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


47 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Fourth,  both  sides  ignore  emerging 
global  realities  which  require  a  new 
look  at  old  concepts.  Their  definitions 
of  political  rights  and  obligations, 
boundaries,  and  sovereignty  are  out- 
dated. An  appreciation  of  new  global 
realities  can  help  resolve  this  conflict. 
Borders  today  are  permeable  and  por- 
ous, indifferent  to  the  ballistic  missile, 
and  indifferent  to  the  desire  of  any  sov- 
ereign to  shut  out  the  outside  world.  A 
thorough  reassessment  of  security  con- 
cepts is  required.  Some  may  need  to 
change;  others  may  not.  But  one  thing 
is  clear:  the  location  of  borders  is  less 
significant  today  in  ensuring  security 
than  the  political  relations  between 
neighbors.  Peace  is  the  real  answer  to 
the  problems  of  security. 

So,  it  is  illusions  which  need  to  be 
shed  but  not  hopes  and  aspirations.  In 
a  region  where  visionaries  of  millennia 
past  shaped  the  moral  and  intellectual 
course  of  history,  it  is  not  too  much  to 
hope  that  visions  of  today  be  directed 
toward  accommodation,  reconciliation, 
and  peace  of  tomorrow. 

These  are  among  the  issues  I  will 
want  to  discuss  with  our  friends  in  the 
region.  We  need  to  maintain  momentum 
and  commitment  toward  a  comprehen- 
sive peace.  If  we  are  all  prepared  to 
confront  reality  and  face  up  to  the  chal- 
lenges ahead,  I  am  confident  we  can 
succeed. 


ARRIVAL  STATEMENT, 

AMMAN, 
JUNE  4,  1988 

I  return  to  Jordan  to  continue  discus- 
sions on  bringing  about  negotiations  on 
a  comprehensive  peace.  Jordan  has  a 
crucial  role  to  play  in  this  process.  I 
look  forward  to  productive  discussions 
with  King  Hussein. 

We  need  to  keep  the  focus  on  our 
ultimate  objective — an  equitable,  last- 
ing, and  comprehensive  peace  between 
Arabs  and  Israelis.  Too  often  the  de- 
tails of  day-to-day  diplomacy  over- 
shadow the  substance.  Procedure  and 
process  are  important  tools  of  diplo- 
macy, but  they  must  be  anchored  on 
fundamental  principles. 

Any  settlement  of  the  Arab-Israeli 
conflict  must  be  based  on  three  funda- 
mental elements. 

First,  the  basis  of  any  negotiating 
process  is  Resolution  242  and  its  call 
for  the  exchange  of  territory  for  peace. 
The  provisions  of  Resolution  242  apply 
to  all  fronts.  There  can  be  no  genuine 


48 


peace  without  an  equitable  settlement 
of  the  land  issue,  and  there  can  be  no 
settlement  of  the  land  issue  without 
true  peace. 

Second,  there  can  be  no  settlement 
without  addressing  legitimate  Palestin- 
ian political  rights.  The  Arab-Israeli 
conflict  is  more  than  just  a  dispute  over 
boundaries.  It  involves  identity,  aspira- 
tions, legitimacy,  and  history. 

Third,  there  must  be  Palestinian- 
Israeli  accommodation.  This  is  not  a 
matter  of  winner-take-all,  in  which  one 
side  can  win  everything  it  wants.  Pal- 
estinians and  Israelis  must  learn  to 
treat  each  other  decently,  respect  their 
mutual  right  to  live  in  security,  and 
fulfill  their  political  aspirations. 

This  is  not  an  easy  agenda.  The 
obstacles  we  face  are  formidable.  But  if 
we  are  to  succeed — and  I  think  we  can 
succeed — we  must  address  our  efforts 
to  the  things  that  matter.  I  am  sure  our 
talks  today  will  keep  us  on  the  right 
road  to  achieve  the  goal  we  seek:  a  just 
and  comprehensive  peace. 

ARRIVAL  STATEMENT, 
TEL  AVIV, 
JUNE  5,  1988 

What  a  pleasure  it  is,  always,  to  be 
back  in  Israel.  Unfortunately,  however, 
the  problems  which  have  brought  me  to 
the  Middle  East  often  this  year  move 
closer  to  resolution  only  by  inches  at 
best. 

People  ask,  "Why  am  I  traveling 
again?"  The  answer  is  clear.  The  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict  persists;  it  cannot  be 
wished  away.  It  requires  the  strength 
to  face  reality  and  the  vision  to  come 
up  with  practical  solutions  to  problems. 

Today  in  the  region,  demographic 
and  economic  problems  are  becoming 
more  serious.  The  proliferation  of 
longer  range  missiles  and  chemical 
weapons  threatens  to  make  future  con- 
flicts that  much  more  destructive.  In- 
deed, the  next  war — let  us  not  have  a 
next  war;  I  know  that  Israel  wants 
peace  and  will  work  for  peace — will  be 
unlike  any  conflict  we've  seen  before, 
involving  more  casualties  and  proving 
harder  to  contain.  These  realities  in- 
crease the  stakes  dramatically  for  re- 
gional parties  and  lay  to  rest  the 
notion  that  time  works  in  favor  of 
accommodation. 

In  light  of  these  realities,  move- 
ment toward  peace  and  accommodation 
would  seem  logical.  But,  instead,  the 
trend  runs  in  the  opposite  direction. 


•  Extremism  is  spreading.  Extrei 
ists  sow  hatred  and  violence,  close  off 
options  for  political  accommodation, 
and  hamper  the  ability  of  government 
to  pursue  moderate  policies. 

•  Psychological  horizons  are  nar- 
rowing rather  than  expanding.  The  di 
tinction  between  the  desirable  and  thi 
possible  is  being  erased.  Illusions  are  I' 
becoming  substitutes  for  reality.  Prejil' 
dice  and  hatred  are  overwhelming  tol*  l| 
ance  and  dialogue.  v 

•  Palestinians  and  Israelis  are  |' 
viewing  the  conflict  as  threatening  I' 
their  very  existence  as  a  people;  each  |' 
fearing  the  other  side  is  out  to  destro  f 
it  completely.  Who  will  be  the  first  to  j' 
make  gestures  of  coexistence  and 
accommodation? 


A  strong  and  stable  Israel  is  an 
essential  building  block  for  peace.  We 
will  always  work  with  you  for  a  stron  f 
and  stable  Israel.  The  peace  treaty     ll 
with  Egypt  shows  that  negotiations  c 
work.  We  will  always  work  with  you  t 
find  the  way  to  a  constructive  negotiE 
ing  process.  Now  is  the  time  for  fur- 
ther progress  toward  peace. 

This  is  not  idle  talk  or  speculatio 
The  United  States  has  put  forward  a 
plan  to  bring  about  negotiations.  I  ar 
back  in  the  region  to  try  to  make  tha 
plan  work.  No  party  has  the  luxury  t 
turn  aside  a  chance  to  negotiate.  Evt 
party  must  take  up  serious  challenge 
of  peace. 

•  For  all  parties,  the  challenge  is 
rise  above  their  fears  and  prejudices 
and  accept  a  negotiating  process  that 
offers  hope  for  a  more  peaceful  futur 
That  process  must  be  based  on  UN  £ 
curity  Council  Resolutions  242  and  3 
including  the  exchange  of  territory  ft 
peace,  and  on  the  need  to  accept  a  cr 
ative  process  of  negotiations  involvinj 
the  interplay  between  transitional  ar 
rangements  and  final  status.  Transi- 
tional arrangements  can  provide 
confidence  in  final  outcomes,  just  as 
gotiations  on  final  status  can  make 
transitional  arrangements  work  well. 

•  For  Israelis,  the  challenge  is  tc 
see  that  security  based  on  strength 
must  allow  for  a  fair  and  just  accom- 
modation with  Arabs.  The  continued 
occupation  of  the  West  Bank  and  Ga2 
and  frustration  of  Palestinian  rights  i 
dead-end  street.  The  belief  that  this 
can  continue  is  an  illusion. 

•  For  Palestinians,  the  challenge 
to  forge  an  effective  political  prograr 
to  replace  slogans  and  violence.  The 
basis  of  Palestinian  thinking  must  be 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/September  KK 


MIDDLE  EAST 


e  willingness  to  engage  directly  with 
raelis,  to  accept  Israel's  existence  and 
■  c  necessity  of  its  security  require- 
fnts.  The  belief  that  this  can  be 
, i)i(lf(i  or  that  violence  can  end  Israeli 
(cupation  is  an  illusion. 

•  For  the  Arab  states,  the  chal- 
liige  is  to  shape  the  environment  of 
1e  region  in  a  responsible  way  that 
\11  facilitate  rather  than  hinder  a  set- 
|;ment.  This  calls  for  realism,  not 
letoric;  for  practical  steps,  not  slo- 
jins;  for  sensitivity  to  the  constraints 
(lerating  on  all  of  the  parties;  and  for 
(cognition  that  much  has  already  been 
hieved  in  the  way  of  Arab-Israeli  ac- 
mmodation  and  that  these  achieve- 
lents  have  come  only  through  direct 
igotiations.  The  denial  of  these  real- 
lies  is  an  illusion. 

These  are  challenges  that  can  and 
ust  be  met.  And  they  are  challenges 
1  more  or  less  formidable  than  others 
lich  Arabs  and  Israelis  separately 
.ve  confronted  in  the  past.  The  shape 
the  future  of  this  region  will  be  de- 
rmined  by  the  ability  of  Arabs  and 
raelis  to  work  together  to  meet  the 
mmon  challenge  of  forging  a  lasting 
•ace  for  themselves  and  their 
ildren. 


rATEMENT, 
\IRO, 

JNE  7,  19882 

aring  this  trip  to  the  region,  I  have 
nphasized  the  need  to  shed  illusions 
favor  of  realistic  and  practical  ways 
resolve  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict.  Re- 
ism  is  required  to  prevent  serious 
•oblems  from  becoming  worse — prob- 
ms  such  as  extremism,  proliferation  of 
ingerous  weapons,  and  more  intense 
limosity  between  Arabs  and  Israelis. 

This  is  not  a  new  situation.  But  the 
iderlying  problem  won't  go  away.  Nor 
n  it  be  ignored.  The  lives  and  well- 
;ing  of  too  many  people  are  en- 
ingered  by  the  continuation  of  this 
nflict. 

There  are  ways  to  get  at  a  solution 
this  problem.  With  realism  and  com- 
itment,  the  parties  can  construct  a 
igotiating  process  which  meets  mini- 
um needs  and  requirements.  The  ini- 
itive  of  the  United  States  meets  these 
iteria. 

I  have  during  past  trips  heard 
any  suggestions  that  our  initative 
lould  have  in  it  more — or  less — on  dif- 
rent  points,  guarantees,  formulas,  or 
Tiing.  I  expected  this  healthy  discus- 


President  Meets  With 
Israeli  Defense  Minister 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
JUNE  28,  19881 

The  President,  the  Vice  President,  and 
other  top  officials  have  met  with  Israeli 
Defense  Minister  Yitzhak  Rabin  over 
the  past  2  days. 

The  President  noted  that  Israel 
and  the  United  States  will  soon  sign  a 
memorandum  of  understanding  for  the 
joint  development  of  an  antitactical  bal- 
listic missile  which  will  be  able  to  deal 
with  ballistic  missile  threats.  The  U.S. 
contribution  will  be  approximately  80% 
and  that  of  Israel  20%.  This  joint  devel- 
opment is  an  outgrowth  of  research  on 
the  Strategic  Defense  Initiative  (SDI). 

The  President  expressed  his  con- 
cern about  ominous  new  military  devel- 
opments in  the  region.  In  particular,  he 
called  attention  to  the  prohferation  of 
ballistic  missiles  and  chemical  ca- 
pabilities. He  observed  that  such  ca- 
pabilities could  change  the  military 
situation,  making  any  future  war  far 
more  costly,  difficult  to  control,  and 
dangerous.  Both  the  President  and  Vice 
President  emphasized  in  their  meetings 
with  Defense  Minister  Rabin  the  need 
for  international  efforts  to  stop  this 
proliferation.  They  also  stressed  that 
these  trends  put  a  premium  both  on 
continuing  U.S. -Israeli  defense  cooper- 


ation and  energetically  working  for 
peace  in  the  area. 

The  President  paid  tribute  to  what 
Defense  Minister  Rabin  has  done  to 
strengthen  Israeli  capability  for  self- 
defense.  Defense  Minister  Rabin  has 
also  done  much  to  develop  our  strategic 
pai-tnership  and  give  it  substance.  He 
has  recognized  realistically  what  Israel 
can  develop  on  its  own  and  in  part- 
nership with  the  United  States. 

The  President  and  Vice  President 
reaffirmed  America's  commitment  to  Is- 
rael's security,  noting  that  Israel  could 
never  be  fully  secure  without  peace. 
Realism  and  a  willingness  to  nurture 
rather  than  reject  possible  oppor- 
tunities for  peace  are  essential,  as  is  a 
climate  that  makes  negotiations  possi- 
ble. While  Israel  should  not  be  ex- 
pected to  make  concessions  under  the 
threat  of  violence,  the  preservation  of 
order  in  the  territories  must  neither 
provide  a  justification  for  civilian 
lawlessness  nor  act  as  an  excuse  for 
avoiding  political  discourse  with  the 
Palestinians  of  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza.  Neither  should  violence  nor  con- 
trols on  violence  become  ends  in  them- 
selves, making  a  political  solution  more 
difficult. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  4,  1988. 


sion  to  continue  during  this  visit  to  the 
region.  And  it  has.  But  something  has 
changed.  There  seems  to  be  less  in- 
clination to  fight  the  problem.  There 
certainly  is  strong  and  universal  inter- 
est in  finding  a  way  to  move  forward. 
So,  no  one  suggested  to  me — here 
in  the  region  or  elsewhere — that  the 
initiative  should  be  abandoned  or  that 
our  efforts  should  stop;  on  the  contrary, 
everyone  urged  that  efforts  continue  to 
bring  about  negotiations.  Each  recog- 
nized the  dangers  that  would  follow  the 
breakdown  of  the  peace  process.  And 
each  conveyed  the  seriousness  of  pur- 
pose which  can  make  further  activity 
beneficial. 


As  we  advise  others  to  be  realistic 
in  their  approach  to  peace,  the  United 
States  continues  to  be  realistic.  The 
American  initiative  is  an  integral 
whole,  but  it  is  not  a  self-contained  ne- 
gotiating process.  Details  need  to  be 
worked  out;  operational  content  needs 
to  be  added  to  its  structure.  Moreover, 
we  recognize  that  attitudes  must  con- 
tinue to  evolve  if  successful  negotia- 
tions are  to  come  into  being. 

So,  there's  much  work  to  be  done.  I 
have  been  encouraged  again  by  all  par- 
ties to  continue;  in  return,  I  encourage 
them  to  double  their  efforts  to  face  up 
to  the  required  difficult  decisions.  To 
those  who  share  the  vision  and  hope  of 
a  negotiated  settlement  of  the  conflict. 


ipartment  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


49 


PACIFIC 


I  urge  realism,  restraint,  and  commit- 
ment. I  urge  practical  steps  to  foster  a 
better  climate  and  create  conditions 
more  conducive  to  peace-making.  The 
process  needs  encouragement  and  sup- 
port, particularly  for  those  who  must 
make  difficult  choices  in  the  period 
ahead. 

In  the  period  ahead,  the  United 
States  will  remain  heavily  involved.  We 
will  be  in  close  touch  with  the  parties. 
We  have  many  things  to  discuss.  We 
are  willing  to  help  shape  opportunities 
that  exist.  We  are  willing  to  discuss  the 
details  requii'ed  to  launch  a  realistic  ne- 
gotiating process.  We  are  anxious  to 
help  frame  steps  by  the  parties  that 
send  messages  of  accommodation  to 
each  other.  In  short,  there  will  be  no 
diminution  of  the  American  effort.  We 
are  confident  of  our  initiative,  confident 
of  the  desire  of  the  parties  to  proceed, 
and  confident  that  the  peace  process 
can  be  carried  forward. 


Visit  of  Australian  Prime  IVIinister 


'Press  release  102  of  June  6,  1988. 

-Opening  statement  to  a  news 
conference,  the  question-and-answer 
portion  of  which  is  not  printed  here  (text 
from  press  release  105  of  June  13).  ■ 


Prime  Minister  Robert  J.L.  Hawke 
of  Australia  made  an  official  working 
visit  to  Washington,  D.C.,  June  22-2i, 
1988,  to  meet  with  President  Reagan 
and  other  government  officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
President  Reagan  and  Prime  Mi^iister 
Hawke  after  their  meeting  on  June  23 J 

President  Reagan 

I  was  pleased  to  welcome  Prime  Minis- 
ter Bob  Hawke  to  Washington  again, 
especially  because  this  year  Australia  is 
commemorating  its  bicentennial.  The 
United  States  and  Australia  have  been 
steadfast  partners  through  times  of  war 
and  times  of  peace,  and  I'm  sure  the 
Prime  Minister's  visit  to  Washington 
and  other  cities  in  the  United  States 
will  deepen  the  already  close  ties  be- 
tween our  two  countries. 

During  the  Prime  Minister's  last 
visit  in  1986,  I  promised  to  reciprocate 
Australia's  contribution  to  our  own  bi- 
centennial celebration.  Last  year  Con- 
gress appropriated  $5  million  for  a  U.S. 
national  gift  to  Australia  that  will  be 
used  for  a  permanent  U.S.  gallery  in 
the  Australian  National  Maritime  Mu- 
seum, with  an  exhibition  commemorat- 
ing 200  years  of  bilateral  maritime 
relations.  I  expect  this  exhibit,  along 
with  other  public  and  private  efforts 
too  numerous  to  list,  will  serve  as  a 
lasting  testament  of  our  two  peoples' 
enduring  friendship. 


Our  discussions  have  covered  a 
range  of  topics,  including  security  an' 
progress  in  arms  control.  I  shared  wi 
the  Prime  Minister  my  detailed  asses 
ment  of  my  meeting  a  few  weeks  ago 
in  Moscow  with  General  Secretary 
Gorbachev.  Australia  is  an  important 
ally  in  our  efforts  to  reach  meaningfu 
arms  reduction  agreements  with  the 
U.S.S.R.  The  joint  facilities  that  Am 
tralia  hosts  are  essential  to  deterrenc 
and  to  the  West's  ability  to  monitor  S 
viet  compliance  with  arms  accords.  T 
United  States  greatly  appreciates  Au 
tralia's  contributions  to  the  vital  task 
preserving  peace  in  both  the  South  P 
cific  and  throughout  the  world. 

Prime  Minister  Hawke  and  I  alsc 
talked  a  good  deal  about  bilateral  tra 
issues.  The  United  States  and  Austrt 
have  closely  parallel  interests  in  the 
current  round  of  multilateral  trade  m 
gotiations.  We're  in  full  agreement  or 
the  need  to  open  up  international  trai 
in  agricultural  products,  a  keystone  o 
both  our  economies.  We  also  agree  or 
the  need  to  redouble  our  efforts  towa 
the  elimination  of  ti-ade-d'  ,co'  Jng  go' 
ernment  subsidies  of  agricultural  pro- 
ucts.  The  Toronto  summit  resulted  in 
strong,  unified  position  on  the  pressii 
need  to  invigorate  the  multilateral  tr; 
ing  system.  I  noted  that  the  United 
States  will  continue  to  work  closely 
with  Australia  and  other  like-minded 
countries  to  carry  us  through  to  a  poi 
five  conclusion  of  the  ongoing  trade  n 


50 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/September  19> 


PACIFIC 


>tiations.  Until  we  achieve  that  goal, 
3  will  ensure  that  any  measures  that 
e  United  States  may  take  to  counter 
ifair  subsidization  of  agi'iculture  take 
Uy  into  account  the  interests  of  coun- 
ies  like  Australia. 

We  also  exchanged  views  on  refu- 
es  and  regional  issues,  particularly 
1  the  importance  of  cooperation  among 
iicific  states  to  maintain  a  secure, 
'aceful,  and  prosperous  environment 
which  democratic  government  can 
)urish.  The  stabilizing  role  the  U.S.- 
ustralia  alliance  plays  in  supporting 
ir  common  efforts  has  helped  foster 
le  phenomenal  growth  the  Pacific  re- 
on  has  enjoyed. 

In  summing  up,  I  cannot  overstate 
e  importance  we  attach  to  our  rela- 
Dnship  with  Australia.  Australia  has 
ade  major  contributions  to  our  mutual 
•curity  over  the  past  40  years  as  a 
■sponsible  ally,  a  staunch  defender  of 
;mocratic  freedoms,  and  as  a  major 
ading  partner. 

Bob,  you've  been  a  good  friend, 
id  I  value  your  counsel.  This  is  our 
urth  meeting,  and  I'm  delighted  that 
e've  been  able  to  have  regular,  per- 
)nal  e.xchanges  of  views  and  ideas.  I 
low  the  American  people  will  extend 
1  you  a  warm  welcome,  in  the  tradition 
'  hospitality  that  both  Aussies  and 
anks  are  famous  for,  as  you  continue 
)ur  visit  in  the  United  States. 

rime  Minister  Hawke 

confirm  that  the  President  and  I  have 
3en  able  to  engage  in  a  very  useful 
iscussion  covering  the  range  of  topics 
)  which  the  President  has  alluded.  We 
ave  confirmed  the  strengths  and  the 
nduring  nature  of  the  relationship  be- 
A'een  our  two  great  countries,  a  rela- 
onship  which,  as  I  was  able  to  say  in 
ongress  and  confirm  with  the  Presi- 
ent,  is  based  upon  a  shared  commit- 
lent  to  principles  which  we  regard  as 
indamental  to  the  operation  of  a  free 
nd  open  society. 

I  took  the  opportunity  of  thanking 
ne  President  for  the  fact  that  during 
ly  prime  ministership,  as  he  has  said, 
e  has  welcomed  me  here  on  a  number 
f  occasions;  and  I  observed  that  this 
'ould  almost  certainly  be  the  last  occa- 
ion  on  which  I  would  have  the  oppor- 
Linity  of  meeting  with  him  as  President 
f  the  United  States.  And  I  expressed 
a  him  personally  and  on  behalf  of  the 
lovernment  and  people  of  Australia  our 
ratitude  for  the  contribution  of  his 
residency  to  the  improvement  not 
lerely  of  his  own  people  but  globally. 


The  fact  that  today,  as  I  said  to  the 
Congress,  we  have  more  than  at  any 
other  stage  in  the  postwar  period  rea- 
son to  look  with  optimism  to  a  future 
where  the  world  can  live  more  con- 
structively at  peace  is  in  very  large 
measure,  as  I  told  the  President,  due 
to  his  ideas,  to  his  persistence,  to  his 
strength,  to  his  determination  to  shape 
the  agenda  and  the  context  of  the  dis- 
cussions between  the  two  superpowers. 
He  has  ensured  properly  that  when  he 
has  come  to  speak,  he  has  spoken  both 
from  a  position  of  strength  and  from  a 
position  where  he  knows  that  he  has 
consulted  and  has  the  support  of  his 
allies  and  friends.  He  has  insisted  that 
in  those  discussions  that  the  vital  ques- 
tion of  human  rights  shall  be  a  central 
part  of  the  agenda.  And  the  results 
have  shown  not  merely  in  the  negotia- 
tion for  the  first  of  an  agreement  which 
has  eliminated  a  particular  class  of  nu- 
clear weapons  but  also  in  the  area  of 
human  rights,  the  significant  advances 
that  have  been  made  in  the  attitudes 
and  practices  of  the  Soviet  Union,  that 
his  determination  in  the  shaping  of  the 
agenda  has  been  right  and  that  it  has 
borne  fruit.  And  I  repeat  that  we  are 
this  day  able  to  look  with  a  greater 
degree  of  confidence  to  a  world  in 
which  the  resources  of  mankind  may  be 
able,  with  a  greater  degree  of  confi- 
dence, to  be  channeled  in  the  construc- 
tive uses  is  significantly  a  result,  as  I 
told  you,  of  the  time  of  your  presidency. 
And  we  are  indebted  to  you  for  that. 

We  are  also  indebted  to  you  for  the 
fact  that  in  your  own  country,  you  have 
presided  over  a  period  of  record  growth 
and  uninterrupted  prosperity.  Our  rela- 
tionship, as  I've  said  to  you,  is  so  good 
and  so  mature  that  where  we  do  have 
any  differences  we  are  able  to  discuss 
those. 

I  expressed  to  the  President,  in 
particular,  the  appreciation  of  the  Gov- 
ernment and  people  of  Australia  for  the 
way  in  which  he  has  reflected  the  fact 
that  the  correspondence  that  takes 
place  between  us  is  no  mere  formality 
but  that  the  President  reads,  takes  ac- 
count of,  and  carries  with  him  in  his 
presentations  the  consideration  of  the 
Austrahan  position.  And  in  particular, 
of  course,  I  refer  to  the  fact  that  I,  for 
some  time  now  and  particularly  just  be- 
fore the  recent  Toronto  summit,  wrote 
to  the  President,  stressed  the  impor- 
tance that  we  attach  to  the  attainment 
of  a  liberalized  international  trading 
system  in  general,  and  in  particular,  in 
regard  to  agricultural  commodities. 


And  as  you  know,  the  President  took 
those  matters  seriously  into  account 
and  pressed  them  at  the  Toronto  sum- 
mit. I  expressed  our  appreciation  to  the 
President. 

And  so,  I  conclude,  Ron,  as  I  be- 
gan in  our  private  talks,  in  saying  in 
front  of  the  media,  thank  you  for  a  con- 
tribution to  the  relations  between  our 
two  countries,  which  I  believe  has  been 
unique  on  your  part.  And  thank  you  for 
the  contributions  that  you  have  made, 
which  means  that  at  the  end  of  your 
presidency  the  world  is  going  to  be  a 
better  and  safer  place  than  it  was  when 
you  took  office. 


'Made  in  the  East  Room  of  the  White 
House  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  June  27,  1988).  I 


Australia-U.S. 
Ministerial  Held 
in  Washington 


JOINT  COMMUNIQUE, 
JUNE  29,  1988 

The  United  States  Secretary  of  State,  Mr. 
George  Shultz,  and  Secretary  of  Defense, 
Mr.  Frank  Carlucci,  and  the  Australian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  Trade, 
Mr.  Bill  Hayden,  and  Minister  for  Defense, 
Mr.  Kim  Be'azley,  met  June  28-29.  1988,  in 
Washington,  D.C.,  to  discuss  global  and 
regional  issues  affecting  the  interests  of 
both  countries,  as  well  as  issues  in  the  bi- 
lateral relationship. 

The  discussions  reflect  the  pattern  of 
close  and  continuing  contacts  at  the  minis- 
terial level  on  matters  of  mutual  concern 
that  has  marked  the  U.S. -Australian 
alliance. 

Defense  and  Security 

The  Australian  and  U.S.  Governments  re- 
affirmed the  importance  of  continued  ac- 
tive defense  cooperation  under  the  ANZUS 
[Australia,  New  Zealand,  United  States 
security  treaty]  alliance.  The  ANZUS  al- 
liance continues  to  serve  the  vital  interests 
of  both  governments  by  contributing  to  re- 
gional security  and  to  the  maintenance  of  a 
global  balance  essential  to  world  peace. 
The  two  governments  noted  that  the 
ANZUS  treaty  remains  in  place  and  re- 
affirmed that  the  rights  and  obligations  as- 
sumed by  Australia  and  the  U.S.  under  the 
treaty  remain  constant  and  undiminished. 
In  the  view  of  both  the  U.S.  and  Australia, 
unimpeded  access  for  allied  ships  and  air- 
craft is  essential  to  the  full  effectiveness  of 


)epartment  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


51 


PACIFIC 


the  ANZUS  alliance.  The  U.S.  confirmed 
that  its  security  obligations  to  New  Zea- 
land under  the  treaty  remain  suspended 
pending  adequate  corrective  measures  by 
the  New  Zealand  Government  which  would 
permit  a  return  to  normal  patterns  of  al- 
liance cooperation.  In  this  conte.xt,  Aus- 
tralia maintains  its  bilateral  security 
relationship  with  New  Zealand. 

The  U.S.  welcomed  the  progress  that 
Australia  continues  to  make  in  fulfilling 
its  security  goals  as  expressed  in  the 
Australian  Government's  White  Paper 
on  defense.  The  U.S.  reaffirmed  its 
understanding  that  the  Australian  Govern- 
ment's emphasis  on  defense  self-reliance 
and  modernization,  incorporated  into  an  al- 
liance framework  and  based  on  broad  con- 
cepts of  strategic  responsibility  and 
regional  cooperation,  constitute  a  strong 
foundation  for  the  defense  of  Australia  and 
Australia's  fulfillment  of  its  alliance  re- 
sponsibility. Both  sides  reaffirmed  the  im- 
portance of  the  U.S. /Australian  Joint 
Facilities  to  global  security.  The  Joint  Fa- 
cilities, which  Australia  hosts,  are  essen- 
tial to  deterrence  and  to  the  verification  of 
arms  control  agreements  that  seek  to  pre- 
serve Western  security  at  lower  levels  of 
nuclear  armaments. 

Both  sides  recognized  that  this  meet- 
ing was  taking  place  at  a  time  of  important 
changes  in  the  Soviet  Union  and  e.xpressed 
the  hope  that  these  changes  would  follow  a 
course  leading  to  a  more  stable  and  peace- 
ful world.  The  Australian  Government  con- 
gratulated the  U.S.  Government  for  its 
part  in  impi'oving  relations  with  the  Soviet 
Union  and  welcomed  the  ratification  of  the 
INF  [Intermediate-Range  Nuclear  Forces] 
agreement  and  the  progress  made  at  the 
June  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  summit  toward  agree- 
ment to  cut  strategic  nuclear  forces.  The 
sides  agreed  that  a  strategic  arms  reduc- 
tion agreement  must  be  both  verifiable  and 
stabilizing.  The  two  sides  also  welcomed 
progress  made  in  U.S. -Soviet  negotiations 
on  nuclear  testing. 

On  these  and  other  East-West  issues, 
the  two  sides  expressed  their  support  for  a 
policy  of  negotiation  based  on  realism  and 
a  firm  commitment  to  the  military  forces 
needed  for  deterrence  and  defense.  As 
progress  is  made  toward  reducing  nuclear 
weapons,  both  sides  agreed  that  stability 
at  lower  levels  of  conventional  weapons 
becomes  increasingly  essential  to  the  main- 
tenance of  a  strategic  balance.  In  this 
regard,  both  sides  noted  that  despite 
variations  in  Soviet  deployments  outside 
the  North  Asia  area,  the  Soviet  Union  has 
continued  improving  its  military  ca- 
pabilities available  for  use  in  the  Pacific 
region. 

Both  governments  reaffirmed  their 
commitment  to  the  Treaty  on  the  Non- 
Proliferation  of  Nuclear  Weapons  (NPT) 
and  to  the  system  of  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency  safeguards.  They  urged  all 
states  which  still  have  not  done  so  to  ad- 
here to  the  NPT  and  agreed  to  work  to- 
gether to  achieve  a  successful  fourth  NPT 


review  conference  in  1990.  Both  govern- 
ments also  reaffirmed  the  need  for  the  con- 
clusion of  a  comprehensive,  verifiable  and 
truly  global  international  convention  which 
effectively  bans  chemical  weapons.  The 
U.S.  underscored  its  determination  to 
work  toward  this  goal,  recognizing  the 
need  to  overcome  the  considerable  difficul- 
ties involved  in  concluding  an  effective  ver- 
ification regime.  Australia  will  also 
continue  its  efforts  in  cooperation  with  the 
U.S.  and  all  other  countries  involved. 


Regional  Security 

The  two  sides  carefully  reviewed  recent  de- 
velopments affecting  the  complex  political 
and  strategic  situation  facing  states  and 
territories  in  the  South  Pacific.  They  em- 
phasized their  common  commitment  to  fos- 
tering democratic  processes  and  economic 
prosperity  in  that  region.  Both  govern- 
ments reaffirmed  their  intentions  of  work- 
ing closely  with  island  countries  to 
promote  security  and  stability,  and  in  this 
context  the  U.S.  noted  Australia's  recent 
actions  in  support  of  democratic  institu- 
tions in  Vanuatu.  Both  governments  ex- 
pressed their  hope  that  Fiji  will  continue 
efforts  to  restore  democratic  constitutional 
government.  The  two  sides  expressed  sup- 
port for  the  efforts  of  the  Government  of 
France  to  consult  all  the  parties  in  New 
Caledonia  on  arrangements  for  the  future 
political  status  of  that  territory.  Both  sides 
reaffirmed  their  support  for  an  act  of  self- 
determination  which  will  result  in  a  viable, 
long-term,  multi-racial  political  solution 
which  is  acceptable  to  all  parties.  The 
growing  international  recognition  accorded 
to  the  Federated  States  of  Micronesia  and 
the  Republic  of  the  Marshall  Islands  was 
welcomed.  The  two  sides  agreed  on  the 
need  for  a  final  resolution  of  Palau's  status 
consistent  with  the  will  of  the  people  of 
Palau. 

Australia  warmly  welcomed  the  U.S. 
ratification  of  the  South  Pacific  Regional 
Fisheries  Access  Treaty.  The  two  sides  re- 
iterated their  commitment  to  economic  de- 
velopment in  the  region  and  welcomed  the 
increased  efforts  of  other  nations,  such  as 
Japan,  to  assist  in  this  process.  They  noted 
the  importance  of  appropriate  consultation 
among  all  parties  involved  in  development 
assistance  programs  in  the  region  so  as  to 
ensure  that  the  development  objectives  of 
the  island  states  are  being  met. 

The  two  sides  reviewed  Soviet  activity 
in  the  South  Pacific  and  noted  the  impor- 
tance they  both  attach  to  Soviet  policies 
toward  the  region  being  positive  and  con- 
structive. They  agreed  on  the  need  to  con- 
tinue to  be  alert  against  any  destabilizing 
Libyan  activity  in  the  region. 

The  Australian  and  U.S.  Governments 
expressed  their  continuing  support  for  re- 
gional cooperation  in  Southeast  Asia 
through  the  ASEAN  [Association  of  South 
East  Asian  Nations]  organization.  They 
agreed  that  the  continued  occupation  of 
Cambodia  by  Vietnamese  forces  remained 


the  principal  source  of  tension  in  Southeasi 
Asia.  They  expressed  their  hope  that  all     | 
countries,  including  the  Soviet  Union,        | 
would  contribute  constructively  to  a  solu-  | 
tion  which  will  lead  to  the  full  withdrawal  i| 
of  Vietnamese  troops  and  the  reestablish-  j 
ment  of  an  independent,  neutral  and  non-  j 
aligned  Cambodia.  The  U.S.  expressed  itsf 
support  for  Australia's  continued  active 
involvement  in  the  Five  Power  Defense 
Arrangement,  noting  the  important  contri 
bution  made  by  the  Arrangement  to  re- 
gional stability  and  security. 

Both  sides  drew  attention  to  their  sup 
port  for  Philippine  democracy.  They  wel- 
comed the  substantial  accomplishments  th 
government  of  President  Aquino  has 
achieved  in  restoring  democracy,  recogniz- 
ing individual  rights  and  in  generating  eci 
nomic  activity.  They  agreed  on  the 
desirability  of  further  discussions  with  thi 
Government  of  the  Philippines  on  prospec 
for  a  coordinated  international  effort  to 
bring  together  economic  resources  neces- 
sary for  accelerated  economic  and  social 
development.  Australia  stressed  the  impo 
tant  contribution  the  U.S.  military  facili- 
ties in  the  Philippines  make  to  internation 
security  and  particularly  to  security  and 
confidence  in  the  region.  Australia  ex- 
pressed the  hope  that  the  current  review 
the  U.S. -Philippine  Military  Bases  Agree 
ment  can  be  brought  to  a  successful 
conclusion. 


Economic  and  Trade  Issues 

Both  Governments  reaffirmed  their  com- 
mitment to  reducing  protectionism  and 
dismantling  restrictions  on  trade  and 
underlined  the  importance  they  attach  to 
the  common  cause  of  opening  up  and  invii 
orating  the  multilateral  trading  system. 
Australia  welcomed  the  priority  given  to 
agricultural  reform  at  the  Uruguay  Roun 
and  most  recently  at  the  Toronto  summit, 
and  emphasized  the  importance  of  main- 
taining momentum  in  the  current  GATT 
[General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade 
round  of  negotiations. 

Both  sides  emphasized  the  importanc 
of  the  Uruguay  Round  as  a  vital  opportu- 
nity to  overcome  the  root  causes  of  distor 
tion  in  international  trade.  Both  sides 
agreed  that  the  mid-term  review  in 
Montreal  should  register  tangible  results 
in  as  many  areas  of  the  Uruguay  Round  a 
possible,  embracing  in  particular  short-  a 
well  as  long-term  elements  of  agricultura 
reform.  Despite  some  tactical  differences 
Australia  and  the  U.S.  share  many  of  the 
same  objectives  in  these  negotiations,  pai 
ticularly  the  fundamental  goal  of  compre- 
hensive, market-oriented  reform  of 
international  agricultural  trade.  Both  gov 
ernments  stressed  the  need  for  short-ten 
actions  to  be  consistent  with  shared  long- 
term  objectives  in  international  trade  pol- 
icy and  the  importance  of  adherence  by  al 
nations  to  the  standstill  and  rollback  prov 
sions  of  the  Uruguay  Round. 


52 


SECURITY  ASSISTANCE 


I  The  U.S.  expressed  its  appreciation 
[  the  role  taken  by  Australia  and  the 
iirns  Group  in  advancing  multilateral 
^de  reform,  particularly  in  the  area  of 
ricultural  trade  liberalization.  The  U.S. 
ik  special  note  of  the  positive  steps  re- 
itly  announced  by  Australia  to  reduce 
lustry  assistance.  Both  sides  welcomed 
;  decision  of  Japan  to  open  its  market  for 
sf  following  negotiations  with  the  U.S. 
d  Australia. 

The  U.S.  took  careful  note  of  Aus- 
ilia's  concerns  over  the  impact  on  Aus- 
ilia  of  U.S.  agricultural  trade  policies. 
e  U.S.  noted  Australia's  view  that  to  the 
^ree  protectionism  and  agricultural  sub- 
ies  impose  economic  strains  on  Aus- 
jilia,  they  impair  Australia's  ability  to 
irk  effectively  with  its  allies  and  friends, 
e  U.S.  emphasized  that  any  measures  it 
y  take  to  counter  unfair  subsidization  of 
riculture  will  take  fully  into  account  the 
lerests  of  countries  like  Australia  which 
not  subsidize  production. 

The  two  sides  agreed  that  the  yearly 
nisterial  talks  demonstrate  the  wide 
ige  of  interests  which  the  U.S.  and  Aus- 
.lia  share,  and  their  determination  to 
•rk  together  for  peace  and  security  in  the 
ia-Pacific  region  and  the  world.  ■ 


FY  1989  Request  for 
Security  Assistance  Program 


by  John  C.  Whitehead 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Foreign  Operations  of  the  Senate 
Appropriations  Committee  on  May  26, 
1988.  Mr.  Whitehead  is  Deputy  Secre- 
tary of  State. ^ 

It  is  a  pleasure  for  me  to  appear  before 
you  today  to  discuss  the  Administra- 
tion's FY  1989  secui'ity  assistance  re- 
quest. As  you  know,  I  have  been 
directed  by  the  Secretary  to  be  the  De- 
partment's coordinator  for  programs 
within  the  framework  of  Function  150, 
the  international  affairs  component  of 
the  budget.  I  consult  regularly  with  the 
other  Function  150  Departments  and 
agencies  which  are  involved  with  the 
Function  150  budget,  including  Defense, 
Treasury,  Agriculture,  the  Peace 
Corps,  the  U.S.  Information  Agency 
(USIA),  the  Board  for  International 
Broadcasting,  and  the  Export-Import 
Bank.  Accordingly,  I  deal  extensively 
with  the  security  assistance  programs 
as  they  relate  to  the  Function  150  budg- 
et as  a  whole. 

Therefore,  my  testimony  today  will 
focus  both  on  how  foreign  operations  fit 
within  the  overall  international  affairs 
budget  and  also  on  how  security  as- 
sistance fits  within  the  foreign  opera- 
tions aggregate. 

I  would  like  to  summarize  briefly 
what  I  like  to  describe  as  our  "winning 
hand"  and  then  make  the  case  for  why 
we  believe  that  a  winning  hand  still 
needs  adequate  resources  with  which  to 
back  it  up. 

A  Successful  Foreign  Policy 

Our  country  has  achieved  a  lengthy 
record  of  foreign  policy  successes  in  the 
past  several  years.  In  the  last  year 
alone: 

•  We  have  concluded  a  historic 
treaty  with  the  Soviet  Union  to  elimi- 
nate an  entire  class  of  nuclear  weapons, 
and  negotiations  for  a  50%  reduction  of 
all  intercontinental  ballistic  weapons 
are  at  an  advanced  stage; 

•  We  continue  to  challenge  Moscow 
and  the  Eastern  bloc  on  the  fundamen- 
tal issues  of  human  rights  and  freedom 
of  peoples  and  have  seen  considerable 
progress  on  these  issues; 


•  We  have  supported  the  Afghan 
freedom  fighters  for  8  long  years  and 
are  now  finally  witnessing  the  long- 
sought  Soviet  Army  departure  from 
that  embattled  land; 

•  We  are  firmly  engaged  in  the 
search  for  peace  in  the  Middle  East, 
and  the  Secretary  is  committed  to  con- 
tinue his  efforts  to  keep  alive  the  hope 
for  more  progress  toward  a  resolution 
of  the  problems  in  this  region; 

•  We  have  taken  major  strides  to- 
ward stabilizing  the  political  and  eco- 
nomic situation  in  Central  America. 
The  bipartisan  financial  support  for  the 
four  democracies — El  Salvador,  Hon- 
duras, Guatemala,  and  Costa  Rica — has 
been  significant  in  this  regard,  and  we 
continue  to  press  Nicaragua  and  Pan- 
ama to  turn  toward  democracy; 

•  We  undertook  a  successful  pro- 
gram to  protect  neutral  shipping  in  the 
Persian  Gulf; 

•  We  are  at  the  forefront  of  the  in- 
ternational effort  to  end  the  Iran-Iraq 
war;  and 

•  We  have  seen  remarkable  shifts 
to  democratic  forms  of  government  in 
two  key  East  Asian  strategic  allies — 
the  Philippines  and  South  Korea. 

Many  of  these  successes  have  come 
about  because  we  were  able  to  provide 
adequate  levels  of  financial  resources  to 
back  up  our  policy.  Others  can  only  be 
sustained  by  renewing  our  commitment 
to  match  policy  with  resources. 

The  Budget  Summit 

The  Administration's  request  for  Func- 
tion 150  resources  in  FY  1989  is  in  line 
with  the  conclusions  reached  last 
November  in  the  budget  summit  agree- 
ment between  the  White  House  and 
congressional  leaders. 

With  respect  to  last  year's  budget 
summit  process,  I  want  to  take  this  op- 
portunity to  express  our  very  sincere 
thanks  to  you  and  to  the  subcommit- 
tee's ranking  member  Senator  Kasten 
for  your  strong  support  of  Function  150. 
As  a  direct  result  of  your  good  efforts, 
our  international  affairs  budget  came 
out  of  the  summit  much  better  off  than 
otherwise  would  have  been  the  case — 
not  necessarily  where  we  hoped  to  be 
in  terms  of  necessary  resource  levels 
but  certainly  much  better  off  than 
would  have  been  the  case  had  there 
been  no  summit  agreement  at  all. 


epartment  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


53 


SECURITY  ASSISTANCE 


Therefore,  in  accordance  with  the 
summit  agreement,  we  seek  a  2%  in- 
crease in  Function  150  discretionary 
funding  for  FY  1989  over  the  levels  in 
the  FY  1988  continuing  resolution.  This 
$18.1  billion  total  reflects  the  first  in- 
crease for  the  international  affairs 
budget  since  FY  1985. 

In  analyzing  this  figure,  it  is  useful 
to  divide  it  into  two  subcategories.  The 
first,  totaling  $14.4  billion,  is  the  sum 
of  all  our  foreign  assistance  programs. 
With  the  exception  of  PL  480  food  aid, 
which  is  appropriated  by  the  Agri- 
culture Subcommittee,  these  programs 
are  entirely  under  the  appropriations 
jurisdiction  of  this  subcommittee.  The 
balance  of  the  $18.1  billion  (or  $3.8  bil- 
lion) represents  the  institutional  back- 
bone of  our  foreign  policy — the 
operating  budgets  of  the  State  Depart- 
ment, USIA,  and  the  other  foreign  af- 
fairs agencies  which  fall  under  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Commerce,  Justice, 
State  Subcommittee. 

In  putting  together  our  FY  1989 
request,  we  were  guided  in  the  aggre- 
gate by  the  totals  of  the  budget  summit 
agreement.  In  the  mi.\  of  programs 
within  these  totals,  we  tried  as  closely 
as  possible  to  adhere  to  the  spirit  of  the 
summit  itself.  That  is,  we  sought  to 
minimize  the  number  of  issues  which 
have  traditionally  divided  the  Congress 
and  the  Administration  in  determining 
the  mix  of  programs. 

We  have  also  worked  closely  with 
the  Congressional  Budget  Office  to 
minimize  differences  over  the  all- 
important  scoring  of  the  budget.  As  a 
result,  with  only  two  exceptions — Ex- 
port-Import Bank  outlays  and  the 
needs  of  the  guarantee  reserve  fund  (a 
mandatory  program  outside  of  the  pa- 
rameters of  the  budget  summit  agree- 
ment)— we  are  in  accord  with  the 
Congressional  Budget  Office's  reesti- 
mate  of  the  President's  request. 

Security  Assistance  Request 

It  is  important  to  note  that  our  foreign 
military  sales  (FMS)  and  military  as- 
sistance program  (MAP)  request  repre- 
sents a  modest  increase  of  3.7%  over 
the  enacted  FY  1988  continuing  resolu- 
tion level.  While  higher  than  the  overall 
2%  increase  for  the  function  as  a  whole, 
it  is  still  almost  $100  million  below  the 
FY  1987  level  and  over  $800  million  be- 
low the  levels  which  were  appropriated 
in  FY  1985  and  1986.  I  believe,  and  I 
hope  that  you  would  agree,  that  our 
military  assistance  progi-ams  are  a 


54 


critical  element  in  our  overall  efforts  to 
pursue  U.S.  national  security  and  for- 
eign policy  interests.  While  our  FY 
1989  request  does  not  come  close  to  re- 
storing the  cuts  in  military  assistance 
over  the  past  3  years,  we  are  seeking  a 
slightly  higher  rate  of  increase  next 
year  for  those  accounts  than  would  be 
available  under  a  simple  application  of 
the  budget  summit's  2%  formula.  We 
believe  such  an  increase  is  necessary  to 
restore  an  appropriate  amount  of  funds 
for  key  programs  in  Portugal,  South 
America,  the  Caribbean,  and  Africa — 
programs  which  were  either  zeroed  out 
or  scaled  back  drastically  in  FY  1988. 

In  addition  to  the  modest  3.7%  in- 
crease in  appropriations  for  military 
assistance  programs,  we  are  also 
proposing  for  the  first  time  that  such 
programs  be  carried  out  on  an  all-grant 
basis.  This  proposal  is  a  critical  ele- 
ment in  our  ability  to  live  within  the 
limits  imposed  by  the  budget  summit 
agreement  and  still  meet  our  military 
assistance  requirements  around  the 
world.  An  all-grant  program  will  not 
provide  "more  quanity"  for  military 
purchases,  but  it  will  provide  "more 
quality"  assistance  for  military  pro- 
grams, assistance  that  will  not  add  to 
the  serious  debt  servicing  burdens  be- 
ing faced  by  many  of  our  security 
partners. 

We  view  this  all-grant  initiative  as 
a  logical  extension  of  recent  congres- 
sional action  on  military  financing 
activities,  action  in  which  this  subcom- 
mittee has  taken  the  leadership  role.  In 
FY  1985,  the  Administration  proposed 
and  the  Congi'ess  approved  bringing 
the  FMS  program  on-budget,  thus  al- 
lowing us  to  provide  FMS  financing  to 
selected  countries  at  concessional  rates 
of  interest.  As  the  budget  squeeze 
became  tighter  and  tighter,  FMS  ap- 
propriations were  reduced,  but  the  Ad- 
ministration has  been  given  greater 
flexibility  in  choosing  the  terms  under 
which  the  financing  can  be  offered. 

In  the  FY  1987  bill,  for  example, 
this  subcommittee  initiated  action  that 
would  have  allowed  the  Administration 
to  provide  all  military  financing  on  a 
grant  basis  (as  forgiven  FMS  loans)  and 
would  have  also  allowed  fdr  the  selec- 
tive conversion  of  previously  appropri- 
ated, but  undrawn,  FMS  loans  into 
grants.  Although  this  proposal  survived 
in  the  Senate,  it  unfortunately  did  not 
make  it  thi-ough  the  conference  on  that 
year's  continuing  resolution.  However, 
the  FY  1987  continuing  resolution  did 
allow  the  Administration  to  provide  the 
FMS  loans  to  Israel  and  Egypt  on  a 


forgiven  basis  and  all  other  FMS  loans ; 
at  concessional  rates  of  interest.  | 

Last  year's  continuing  resolution    I 
again  saw  the  level  of  military  as-         j 
sistance  appropriations  reduced.  Once  | 
again,  however,  the  Administration  wai 
given  maximum  flexibility  to  offer  FM  | 
loans  at  concessional  rates  of  interest  |, 
and,  for  the  first  time,  two  additional  |, 
countries — Turkey  and  Pakistan — werj 
added  to  the  list  of  those  which  could  j 
receive  forgiven  FMS  loans.  Once         j 
again,  it  was  the  Senate  that  went  int 
conference  recommending  an  all-grant 
mihtary  assistance  program.  These 
were  very  important  improvements  to 
the  military  assistance  program  and 
went  a  long  way  to  easing  the  difficul-  j, 
ties  that  accompanied  the  reduction  ii  n 
funding  levels  for  many  countries.        h 

You  have  been  leaders  in  the  effo)  |j 
to  come  up  with  new  and  creative  waj  Ij 
to  cope  with  a  shrinking  military  as-  || 
sistance  budget.  Your  efforts  have  j, 
been  greatly  appreciated  by  the  | 

Administration.  || 

We  are  now  seeking  a  small  but  h 
much  needed  increase  in  military  aid  I 
levels  for  FY  1989.  Picking  up  on  you 
FY  1987  and  1988  initiatives,  we  have 
proposed  for  FY  1989  that  all  militan 
assistance  be  provided  on  a  grant  bas 
I  sincerely  hope  that  you  will  be  sup- 
portive of  both  the  level  and  the  ternr 
of  our  request. 

Earmarked  Funds 

Before  concluding  my  remarks,  I  mus 
say  a  few  words  about  earmarks.  As 
you  undoubtedly  know,  I  have  been 
critical  of  the  high  degree  of  earmark 
ing  of  the  security  assistance  account 
contained  in  the  FY  1988  continuing 
resolution.  While  the  budget  summit 
agreement  provided  us  with  more  for 
eign  assistance  funds  than  we  other- 
wise would  have  received  and  while  t 
continuing  resolution  provided  more 
forgiven  FMS  and  the  flexibility  to  s( 
concessional  rates  of  interest  on  the 
nonforgiven  FMS,  the  continuing  res 
lution  also  took  away  needed  flexibilii 
by  heavy  earmarking,  especially  in  e( 
nomic  support  funds  (ESF)  where  ov 
90%  of  the  total  funds  provided  were 
earmarked  for  particular  countries. 
The  individual  earmarks  them- 
selves were  not  significantly  out  of  lii 
with  what  the  Administration  had  pn 
posed  in  its  request.  However,  these 
earmarks,  in  conjunction  with  approf 
ations  well  below  the  Administration; 
request,  created  a  rigid  and  potential 
dangerous  situation.  In  FY  1988,  we 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Seotember  UL 


SOUTH  ASIA 


>re  faced  with  a  choice — whether  to 
■minate  ESF  and  military  assistance 
pgrams  in  several  important  coun- 
ies  or  use  special  presidential  au- 
)rities  to  break  the  earmarks, 
lither  prospect  was  appealing.  After 
ig  consideration,  we  chose  not  to 
i;ak  the  earmarks.  We  are  doing  our 
i3t  to  manage  the  bilateral  difficulties 
it  were  created  by  the  steep  reduc- 
:ns  or  outright  eliminations  of  as- 
.tance  to  several  important  aid 
rtners. 

Our  FY  1989  request  is  a  modest 
e.  If  it  is  appropriated,  we  will  be 
le  to  continue  playing  the  "winning 
nd"  I  described  at  the  beginning  of 
'  testimony.  If  we  face  yet  another 
ir  of  reduced  levels  and  heavy  ear- 
irking,  however,  the  damage  may  be 
eparable — basing  and  access  agree- 
•nts  could  be  lost,  and  crucial  inter- 
tional  support  on  a  variety  of  foreign 
licy,  national  security,  and  economic 
ues  will  be  further  eroded.  We  can- 
t  expect  others  to  be  dependable 
ends  if  we  cannot  be  one  ourselves. 


Status  Report  on  Afghanistan 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
;s  will  be  published  by  the  committee 
i  will  be  available  from  the  Superintend- 
;  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
;  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Following  are  statements  by  Under 
Secretary  for  Political  Affairs  Michael 
H.  Armacost  and  Assistant  Secretary 
for  International  Organization  Affairs 
Richard  S.  Williamson  before  the  Sen- 
ate Foreign  Relations  Committee  on 
June  23,  1988  J 


UNDER  SECRETARY  ARMACOST 

I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  discuss 
our  Afghanistan  policy  with  you  this 
afternoon.  I  am  particularly  pleased  to 
do  so  not  only  because  we  have  been 
successful  in  moving  toward  attaining 
the  principal  objectives  of  that  pohcy 
but  because  this  hearing  provides  an 
occasion  for  me  to  express  our  appre- 
ciation for  the  strong,  bipartisan  sup- 
port we  have  received  from  this 
committee  and  many  others  in  the  Con- 
gress in  pursuing  those  objectives.  Our 
policy  toward  Afghanistan  provides  evi- 
dence that  Congress  and  the  Admin- 
istration can  work  effectively  together 
to  bring  about  historic  results  in  the 
cause  of  freedom. 

Our  aims  in  Afghanistan  have  been 
consistent  since  the  Soviets  invaded 
that  small,  traditionally  nonaligned  na- 
tion in  December  1979.  They  were,  and 
remain: 

•  Rapid  and  complete  withdrawal  of 
Soviet  troops; 

•  Restoration  of  Afghanistan's  inde- 
pendent and  nonaligned  status; 

•  Return  of  the  refugees  in  safety 
and  honor;  and 

•  Self-determination  for  the  Afghan 
people. 

These  objectives  have  been  widely 
shared  by  other  nations,  as  demon- 
strated by  the  overwhelming  majorities 
which  have  each  year  supported  the 
Pakistan-sponsored  UN  General  As- 
sembly resolution  calling  for  their  im- 
plementation. Even  more  importantly, 
they  represent  the  goals  of  the  people 
of  Afghanistan  themselves.  The  valiant 
struggle  of  the  Afghans,  with  the  sup- 
port of  their  friends,  is  what  has  made 
our  policy  achievements  possible. 

The  Geneva  Accords  and 
Withdrawal  of  Soviet  Forces 

The  successful  conclusion  of  the  Geneva 
accords  on  April  14  provides  a  frame- 
work for  attaining  our  policy  goals. 


Above  all,  it  calls  for  the  complete 
withdrawal  of  the  Soviet  occupying 
army.  Moscow  is  obliged  to  remove  half 
its  troops  by  August  15  and  the  re- 
mainder by  February  15,  1989,  and,  in 
fact.  Foreign  Minister  Shevardnadze  in- 
dicated to  us  that  the  Soviets  expected 
the  withdrawal  would  be  completed  by 
the  end  of  1988.  This,  in  turn,  will  re-' 
move  the  principal  impediment  to 
achievement  of  other  goals,  particularly 
the  safe  return  of  refugees  and  the 
creation  of  a  broadly  based  government 
representing  the  Afghan  people. 

The  significance  of  this  accompUsh- 
ment  cannot  be  overstated.  The  1979 
invasion  marked  the  first  time  since 
their  occupation  of  Eastern  Europe  in 
the  final  months  of  World  War  II  that 
the  Soviets  had  seized  territory  by  mil- 
itary force.  A  blatant  violation  of 
Afghanistan  national  sovereignty  to  sal- 
vage communist  rule  in  Kabul,  it 
brought  Moscow's  army  and  air  force  to 
the  borders  of  the  Indo-Pakistan  sub- 
continent and  to  within  striking  dis- 
tance of  the  Persian  Gulf.  It  was  an 
affront  to  Afghan  self-determination 
and  a  challenge  to  the  peace,  stability, 
and  security  of  the  region.  The  reaction 
of  the  United  States,  and  of  the  over- 
whelming majority  within  the  commu- 
nity of  nations,  was  strong  opposition 
to  the  Soviet  actions  and  support  for 
the  Afghan  resistance. 

The  withdrawal  of  the  Soviet 
forces — now  well  underway — is,  per- 
haps, an  even  more  historic  milestone. 
Its  implications  go  well  beyond  the  res- 
toration of  the  strategic  balance  of  the 
region  and  the  rebirth  of  an  independ- 
ent Afghanistan,  important  as  these 
are.  It  strengthens  the  cause  of  self- 
determination  everywhere.  It  could  also 
lend  impetus  to  efforts  to  resolve  other 
regional  conflicts. 

You  will  recall  that  when  we 
agreed  in  principle  in  December  1985  to 
Pakistan's  request  that  we  serve  as  a 
coguarantor  with  the  U.S.S.R.,  we  did 
so  on  condition  that  the  accords  be  sat- 
isfactory to  us.  It  was  only  when  we 
were  so  satisfied  that  we  took  on  the 
coguarantor  role  and,  with  the  Soviet 
Union,  undertook  to  respect  the  agree- 
ments arrived  at  by  Pakistan  and 
Afghanistan.  We  insisted,  moreover, 
that  the  obligations  of  the  guarantors 
must  be  balanced  and  symmetrical.  We 
were  prepared  to  accept  a  joint  U.S.- 
Soviet moratorium  on  further  military 


ipartment  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


55 


SOUTH  ASIA 


supplies  to  Afghan  parties  during  the 
period  of  their  withdrawal  and  several 
months  thereafter  The  Soviets  refused 
such  an  arrangement,  insisting  on  their 
right  to  continue  providing  military 
supplies  to  their  client  government  in 
Kabul.  We  consequently  insisted  that 
the  United  States  would  retain  and  ex- 
ercise the  right,  consistent  with  its  own 
obligations  as  a  guarantor,  to  provide 
military  assistance  to  parties  in 
Afghanistan.  Should  the  Soviet  Union 
e.xercise  restraint  in  providing  military 
assistance,  the  United  States  similarly 
will  exercise  restraint. 

The  Soviets  are  withdrawing  their 
troops  as  stipulated  in  the  accords.  We 
estimate  that  around  25,000  troops  have 
left  their  garrisons.  Over  half  of  these 
have  already  crossed  into  the  Soviet 
Union.  The  Soviets  thus  are  proceeding 
on  the  basis  of  the  schedule  agreed  to 
at  Geneva.  Soviet  troops,  thus  far,  have 
left  most  of  eastern  and  southeastern 
Afghanistan,  including  the  major  cities 
of  Jalalabad,  Ghazni,  and  Gardeyz. 
These  areas  are  now  free  of  Soviet 
troops.  In  the  coming  weeks,  we  expect 
troops  in  the  western  portion  of  the 
country,  including  the  cities  of  Qan- 
dahar,  Shindand,  and  Herat,  to  be 
withdrawn.  A  withdrawal  of  Soviet 
forces  in  this  area  would  bring  them  to 
the  50%  mark.  Preparations  for  the 
withdrawal  continue  throughout  the 
country,  however,  and  the  Soviets  could 
move  other  forces  first  if  they  wish  to 
do  so. 

Thus  far,  the  Soviet  withdrawal  has 
been  fairly  uneventful.  The  mujahidin 
have  harassed  some  withdrawing  Soviet 
columns  but  have  not  mounted  major 
attacks.  It  is  possible  that  mujahidin 
commanders  in  some  areas  have  con- 
cluded local  cease-fires  with  the  depart- 
ing Soviet  troops — preferring  to 
preserve  their  supplies  for  the  battle 
against  the  forces  of  the  regime. 

In  their  efforts  to  bolster  the  Ka- 
bul regime,  the  Soviets  are  turning 
over  large  quantities  of  military  sup- 
plies to  the  regime's  armed  forces.  As 
the  Geneva  accords  came  into  effect  on 
May  15,  General  Gromov,  the  Soviet 
commander  in  Afghanistan,  announced 
that  Moscow  would  leave  behind  "facil- 
ities and  equipment"  valued  at  $1  bil- 
lion. In  addition  to  consumable  supplies 
such  as  ammunition,  the  Soviets  are 
also  delivering  heavy  equipment  such 
as  armored  fighting  vehicles  and  trans- 
port aircraft.  Some  of  this  is  being 
brought  in  from  the  Soviet  Union. 


56 


These  Soviet  efforts  have  not 
checked  the  continuing  deterioration  in 
the  position  of  the  Kabul  regime.  Some 
20  garrisons  and  district  towns  have 
fallen  to  the  resistance  in  the  past  few 
weeks.  Much  of  the  area  vacated  by  the 
Soviets  has  been  abandoned  by  or 
taken  from  the  NajibuUah  army.  The 
major  city  of  Qandahar  is  under  serious 
pressure  from  the  mujahidin.  Its  fall 
would  constitute  a  severe  blow  to  a  re- 
gime already  wracked  by  factional  in- 
fighting and  desertions  from  its  armed 
forces. 

The  resistance  is  well  positioned  to 
take  advantage  of  the  new  situation 
created  by  the  Soviet  withdrawal.  Its 
commanders  have  displayed  an  im- 
pressive ability  to  work  together  in  tac- 
tical operations,  despite  differing  party 
allegiances.  It  is  very  well  supplied. 
The  materiel  it  has  received  from  its 
friends  has  been  massively  supple- 
mented by  equipment  captured  from 
surrendering  or  retreating  Afghan 
forces.  In  seizing  the  eastern 
Afghanistan  stronghold  of  Ali  Khel,  for 
example,  the  mujahidin  acquired  ma- 
teriel that  would  provide  them  the 
means  to  fight  the  war  throughout  the 
country  for  more  than  a  month. 

The  rapid  deterioration  of  the  re- 
gime's present  situation  and  its  poor  fu- 
ture prospects  have  prompted  Moscow 
to  launch  a  volley  of  charges  alleging 
that  Pakistan  is  violating  the  Geneva 
accords  by  aiding  the  mujahidin. 
Pakistan  denies  that  it  is  violating  the 
accords  and  has  granted  staff  of  the 
UN  Good  Offices  Mission  for  Afghani- 
stan and  Pakistan  access  to  border 
areas.  Islamabad  has  also  reported 
shelling  and  strafing  of  Pakistan  border 
towns  by  the  forces  of  NajibuUah. 

As  we  told  the  Soviets  at  the  Mos- 
cow summit  when  they  raised  the  issue, 
we  fully  support  the  sovereignty  and 
territorial  integrity  of  our  Pakistani 
ally.  While  we  commended  the  Soviets 
at  the  summit  for  making  the  decision 
to  withdraw,  we  also  underscored  that 
we  and  other  countries  expect  to  see 
them  complete  that  withdrawal  on 
schedule. 

So  far,  we  see  no  evidence  that  the 
Soviets  do  not  intend  to  meet  their 
troop  withdrawal  deadlines  on  Au- 
gust 15,  1988,  and  February  15,  1989. 
They  have  confirmed  to  us  that  there  is 
no  change  in  the  timetable.  We  believe 
that  in  charging  that  Pakistan  is  violat- 
ing the  accords,  Moscow  evidently 
hopes  to  build  up  pressure  on  the 
Pakistanis  to  rein  in  the  mujahidin. 
The  charges  could  also  serve  the 


Soviets  by  identifying  a  convenient 
scapegoat  for  the  serious  setbacks  the 
Kabul  regime  has  suffered.  The  Soviet 
may  also  hope  to  drive  a  wedge  be- 
tween us  and  the  Pakistanis. 

We  have  consistently  maintained 
that  the  prerequisite  for  Afghan  self- 
determination  is  Soviet  withdrawal. 
The  current  regime  in  Kabul  is  only  t? 
most  recent  in  the  line  of  failed  admin- 
istrations installed  by  Soviet  bayonets. 
It  is  illegitimate  and  lacks  any  sem- 
blance of  popular  support.  Only  the  Sc 
viet  military  presence  enables  it  to 
survive.  Its  repeated  efforts  over  the 
past  18  months  to  broaden  its  support 
through  a  variety  of  appeals  for  so- 
called  national  reconciliation  and  offer; 
to  the  opposition  of  a  share  in  power 
are  bogus  and  have  evoked  no  signifi- 
cant response. 

Afghanistan's  Future  Course 

We  believe  that  Afghanistan's  future 
political  course  must  be  left  to  the 
Afghan  people  themselves  to  decide. 
The  United  States  has  no  blueprint  fo 
Afghanistan.  Nor  do  we  favor  any 
group  or  individual.  The  experience  o 
the  British  in  the  19th  century  and  th 
Soviets  in  this  one  suggests  that  the 
Afghans  do  not  take  kindly  to  efforts 
by  outsiders  to  choose  a  government 
for  them. 

We  hope  that  the  Afghans  will  be 
able  to  develop  a  process  for  selecting 
government  representative  of  Afghan 
society.  We  support  the  efforts  of  UN 
Under  Secretary  General  Diego  Cor- 
dovez  to  promote  a  dialogue  among  th 
Afghan  parties.  His  aim  is  to  work  ou 
a  transitional  arrangement  as  a  step  t 
ward  self-determination.  We  do  not 
know  if  his  efforts  will  be  successful 

We  continue  to  urge  the  resistanc 
to  overcome  its  factional  differences. 
We  are  heartened  by  evidence  that  th 
mujahidin  are  making  efforts  to  in- 
crease cooperation  both  among  com- 
manders in  the  field  and  among  the 
resistance  parties.  I  have  noted  the 
better  coordination  of  the  resistance 
military  effort  within  Afghanistan,  ps 
ticularly  since  the  Soviet  withdrawal 
began.  The  resistance  alliance  has  re- 
cently announced  both  a  cabinet  for  it 
proposed  interim  government  and  pla 
to  hold  elections  within  the  next  few 
months.  These  plans  are  tentative  an( 
may  be  modified  over  time,  but  they 
show  that  the  resistance  recognizes  tl 
need  for  greater  cooperation  and  is  at 
tempting  to  bring  this  about. 


SOUTH  ASIA 


We  do  not  know  what  kind  of  gov- 
inment  the  Afghans  will  choose.  But  I 
1  cdiifident  that  a  free  Afghan  gov- 
nmciit  will  eventually  emerge  with 
Mich  the  United  States  will  enjoy  the 
fendly  relations  which  characterized 
IS. -Afghan  ties  before  the  communist 
tup  of  1978  and  the  Soviet  occupatioii 
nich  followed. 

IS.  Efforts 

,;  iiart  of  our  ongoing  effort  to  keep  in 
:)S('  tduch  with  the  resistance  and  the 
fiiuces,  we  have  sent  periodic  special 
ssKiiis  to  supplement  our  regular 
;d'f  in  Islamabad  and  Peshawar  Our 
ri'i'iit  plans  include  the  assignment  of 
>'ei-y  well-qualified,  languages-trained 
[ficer  to  serve  as  Ambassador  [to 
ikistan  Arnold]  Raphel's  special  as- 
itant  for  Afghan  affairs.  He  will  be 
ending  much  of  his  time  in  contact 
th  resistance  figures  in  Peshawar  and 
sewhere. 

In  line  with  our  objective  of  pro- 
ofing a  peaceful  and  stable  Afghani- 
an,  the  United  States  expects  to  play 
role  in  helping  the  Afghan  people  get 
ick  on  their  feet  and  rebuild  their 
ar-devastated  country.  Refugee  reset- 
5ment  and  rehabilitation  will  be  a  ma- 
r  challenge.  Approximately  3  million 
fghans  fled  to  Pakistan  in  the  years 
lldwing  the  Soviet  invasion;  another  2 
illion  are  estimated  to  be  living  in 
an.  In  addition,  several  million  have 
?en  displaced  within  Afghanistan  it- 
'If  In  i^ct,  population  distribution 
ithin  the  country  has  been  dramat- 
ally  altered,  putting  significant  pres- 
ire  on  Afghanistan's  fragile 
frasti'ucture  and  the  slender  food  re- 
mrces  of  many  regions  of  the  country, 
he  widespread  sowing  of  literally  mil- 
Dns  of  landmines  has  added  an 
ninous  new  dimension  to  the  re- 
ibilitation  effort.  The  refusal,  thus 
r,  of  the  U.S.S.R.  or  the  Najibullah 
igime  to  help  locate  and  remove  these 
ines  is  a  moral  outrage  and  inconsis- 
int  with  their  commitment  in  the  Gen- 
ra.  accords  to  facilitate  the  return  of 
le  refugees. 

We  have  been  actively  engaged 
ith  the  United  Nations  and  other 
Dvernments  in  planning  for  the  re- 
itriation  of  the  refugees  and  the  reset- 
ement  of  these  people  and  of  displaced 
srsons  within  Afghanistan.  Assistant 
ecretary  Williamson  has  been  coordi- 
iting  our  efforts  in  this  area  and  will 
Dw  describe  them  for  you. 


ASSISTANT  SECRETARY 
WILLIAMSON 

I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  appear 
before  this  committee  for  the  first  time 
since  Secretary  Shultz  asked  me  to  as- 
sume the  job  of  Coordinator  for  Afghan 
Affairs.  I  look  forward  to  working 
closely  with  this  committee  as  we  move 
forward  with  the  implementation  of  the 
Afghan  accords,  which  were  signed  in 
April  in  Geneva. 

Under  Secretary  Armacost  has 
given  you  a  comprehensive  overview  of 
the  political-military  situation  in 
Afghanistan.  As  he  indicated,  I  will 
focus  on  our  bilateral  and  multilateral 
effort  to  aid  the  refugees  who  fled  from 
Afghanistan  and  the  displaced  persons 
within  that  country. 

The  Objective:  Return 
of  the  Afghan  Refugees 

For  years  the  safe  and  honorable  return 
of  the  Afghan  refugees  has  been  a  ma- 
jor objective  of  the  United  States  and 
the  international  community.  Their  re- 
turn, as  well  as  that  of  the  displaced 
persons,  will  enable  them  to  participate 
in  the  political  and  economic  recon- 
struction of  their  country.  It  will  help 
carry  forward  the  process  by  which  the 
Afghan  people  exercise  their  right  of 
self-determination  and  establish  their 
own  government. 

As  the  Afghan  people  return  home, 
they  hope  to  begin  rebuilding  their 
lives  after  enduring  almost  9  years  of 
Soviet  occupation  and  the  destruction  of 
much  of  their  country.  However,  as 
Prince  Sadruddin  Aga  Khan,  the  newly 
appointed  UN  Coordinator  for  Human- 
itarian and  Economic  Assistance  in 
Afghanistan,  has  pointed  out,  this  ex- 
pectation of  better  things  to  come  can 
turn  into  a  crisis  of  hope.  As  he  notes: 
"Unless  the  essential  needs  of  normal 
Hfe  can  be  quickly  met,  hope  may  be 
just  as  quickly  followed  by  despair  and 
renewed  suffering." 

The  refugee  and  related  issues  pose 
a  daunting  challenge  to  the  interna- 
tional community.  The  demands  for  ex- 
pertise, experience,  and  finance  compel 
an  international  response  to  which  the 
United  Nations  and  its  technical  and 
development  agencies  must  provide 
leadership.  This  is  one  of  the  principal 
functions  for  which  the  United  Nations 
was  created — to  help  put  into  place  the 
building  blocks  of  peace  and  create  the 
conditions  "to  give  peace  a  chance." 

The  Afghan  people  are  hardy  and 
capable.  Their  valor  and  self-reliance 
are  impressive.  But  despite  their  re- 


silience, self-reliance,  and  downright 
toughness,  the  Afghan  refugees  need 
our  help.  The  international  community 
must  rise  to  the  occasion  to  assist  the 
refugees  as  they  return  to  homes  in 
rubble,  fields  laced  with  mines,  and  de- 
stroyed irrigation  systems-so  vital  in 
an  arid  country  such  as  Afghanistan. 

Organizing  To  Achieve 
the  Objective 

In  recent  months,  we  have  put  a  great 
deal  of  energy  and  effort  into  assuring 
the  creation  of  a  UN  relief  and  resettle- 
ment program  for  the  Afghan  people 
that  runs  efficiently,  effectively,  and 
without  duplication.  Beginning  in 
March,  I  spoke  with  the  Secretary  Gen- 
eral on  several  occasions,  urging  him  to 
appoint  a  special  coordinator  who  could 
organize  and  manage  this  type  of  UN 
effort  and  obtain  the  necessary  contri- 
butions from  the  donor  nations.  Secre- 
tary Shultz  raised  the  issue  with  UN 
officials  when  he  signed  the  Afghan 
accords  in  Geneva  on  April  14.  We 
continued  to  campaign  for  such  an  ap- 
pointment right  up  to  the  announce- 
ment on  May  11  that  Prince  Sadruddin 
Aga  Khan  had  been  selected  as  the  spe- 
cial coordinator.  We  strongly  applauded 
his  selection. 

We  have  already  had  extensive  con- 
tact with  Prince  Sadruddin.  I  spoke 
with  him  immediately  following  his  ap- 
pointment and  consulted  with  him  in 
Geneva  at  the  end  of  May  following  his 
visit  to  Afghanistan,  Pakistan,  and 
Iran.  At  that  time,  I  shared  with  him 
our  ideas  on  the  UN  assistance  effort 
and  ascei'tained  how  his  thinking  was 
evolving.  On  June  13,  3  days  after  the 
Secretary  General  announced  the  UN 
appeal,  Prince  Sadruddin  came  to 
Washington  for  meetings  with  Presi- 
dent Reagan,  Vice  President  Bush,  and 
Secretary  Shultz — an  indication  of  the 
importance  which  we  place  on  Prince 
Sadruddin's  role  and  coordinated  UN 
action.  On  June  14,  I  attended  the  first 
donors'  meeting  in  New  York,  which 
was  chaired  by  Prince  Sadruddin. 

Because  Prince  Sadruddin's  office  is 
in  Geneva,  we  have  appointed  Ambas- 
sador Petrone,  U.S.  Permanent  Repre- 
sentative to  the  UN  offices  in  Geneva, 
to  serve  as  his  principal  U.S.  Govern- 
ment interlocutor  with  that  office.  As 
his  work  progresses.  Prince  Sadruddin 
is  committed  to  provide  frequent  brief- 
ings to  us  and  other  donors  on  his  plan- 
ning and  interaction  with  the  various 
UN  agencies. 


epartment  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


57 


SOUTH  ASIA 


Within  the  executive,  we  have  also 
moved  to  organize  ourselves  so  that  we 
can  administer  the  Afghan  relief  pro- 
gram in  a  coherent  and  effective  man- 
ner. As  always,  major  decisions  will  be 
taken  by  the  President  or  Secretary 
Shultz  or  by  Under  Secretary  Arma- 
cost  as  the  Secretary's  designee.  I,  of 
course,  participate  in  the  policymaking 
process.  The  additional  role  the  Secre- 
tary recently  asked  me  to  undertake 
was  to  serve  as  coordinator  of  our 
Afghan  policy,  with  particular  emphasis 
on  the  foUowup  to  the  Geneva  accords. 
I  have  established  an  interagency  work- 
ing group,  which  meets  every  day,  to 
help  me  with  this  complex  task.  In  ad- 
dition. Under  Secretary  Armacost 
chairs  a  weekly  meeting  to  review  all 
aspects  of  our  Afghan  policy.  For  the 
indefinite  future,  we  will  continue  these 
daily  and  weekly  meetings,  monitoring 
the  situation  closely  in  Afghanistan  and 
continuing  close  coordination  and  con- 
sultations within  our  own  government 
and  with  Prince  Sadruddin. 

The  UN  Assistance  Program 

Prince  Sadruddin  has  moved  with  re- 
cord speed  in  developing  a  coordinated 
UN  program.  Less  than  a  month  after 
his  appointment,  the  Secretary  General 
was  able  to  issue  his  appeal  to  donors 
and  supply  them  with  an  outline  (to  be 
refined  later)  for  the  cooperative  work 
of  the  various  UN  agencies.  Other 
meetings  will  be  scheduled  after  donors 
have  had  time  to  study  the  relevant 
documentation. 

I  am  submitting  to  the  committee 
a  copy  of  the  report  [UN  document 
SG/CONF.  3/1]  distributed  at  that 
meeting,  which  you  may  wish  to  include 
in  the  record.  The  report  provides  an 
overview  of  the  proposed  relief  and  re- 
settlement program,  with  details  about 
the  structure  and  phased  sequencing  in 
the  various  sectors  of  food,  agriculture, 
irrigation,  health,  and  in  logistical 
backup.  The  report  emphasizes  that,  as 
the  refugees  return  home,  the  focus 
must  be  on  immediate  and  basic  sup- 
port— e.g.,  providing  food  aid  and  agri- 
cultural supplies  (seed  and  tools), 
repairing  local  irrigation  canals,  and 
delivering  basic  health  care. 

In  its  introduction,  the  report  ac- 
knowledges that  what  is  presented  is 
"no  more  than  the  first  outline  of  a  pic- 
ture"— a  picture  that  will  have  to  be 
refined  in  the  coming  months  as  more 
information  becomes  available  and  cir- 
cumstances evolve.  Even  the  estimated 


total  cost  for  the  first  phase  of  the  pro- 
gram (approximately  $1.1  billion)  is  sub- 
ject to  revision. 

Nonetheless,  the  underlying  philo- 
sophy upon  which  the  program  is 
predicated  will  not  change.  The  Admin- 
istration supports  that  approach.  As 
developed  in  the  report,  the  program  is 
based  on  these  key  principles. 

Humanitarianism.  The  report  ex- 
plicitly states  that  the  relief  effort  must 
be  seen  as  being  a  humanitarian  effort 
and  notes  that  the  Secretary  General 
has  clearly  distinguished  it  from  his  po- 
litical good  offices. 

Decentralization.  The  report 
states  that  it  would  be  unrealistic  to 
attempt  a  nationwide  rehabilitation 
effort  at  the  present  time.  Rather,  pro- 
gram efforts  will  be  focused  at  the  re- 
gion! level  as  conditions  permit. 

People  to  People.  Aid  will  be  chan- 
neled directly  to  the  refugees  as  they 
return. 

In  summary,  the  report  states  that 
"the  fundamental  purpose  of  this  pro- 
gramme is  to  link  people  back  to  their 
homes  and  engender  self-reliance  in 
order  to  avoid  institutionalizing  relief" 
We  could  not  agree  more. 

There  are  basic  principles  that 
must  underlie  the  UN  effort  to  ensure 
the  success  of  its  program.  The  United 
States  opposes  UN  financial  assistance 
flowing  through  the  Kabul  regime.  It 
must  not  be  administered  in  a  way  that 
permits  that  illegitmate  regime  to  en- 
hance its  political  standing  within  the 
country.  This  position  is  firmly  held  by 
the  United  States.  Secretary  Shultz  has 
emphasized  this  point  on  several  occa- 
sions. I  stressed  the  idea  at  the  June  14 
donors'  meeting,  insisting  that  "the  UN 
assistance  should  be  provided  directly 
to  the  refugees  and  displaced  persons 
as  they  return  home,  that  the  agencies 
involved  must  ensure  that  the  aid  in- 
deed gets  to  the  intended  recipients 
and  that  humanitarian  goals  alone  drive 
the  effort."  Other  donors,  such  as 
Great  Britain,  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  and  Japan,  also  voiced  on 
that  occasion  their  opposition  to  the 
Kabul  regime  obtaining  any  control 
over  UN  financial  assistance. 

Prince  Sadruddin  and  other  senior 
UN  officials  have  assured  us  that  they 
understand  the  strength  of  this  shared 
concern  and  that  they  hold  a  similar 
view.  We  have  made  clear — and  will 
continue  to  do  so — that  we  will  be 
watching  this  matter  very  closely. 


Working  with  Prince  Sadruddin,  we  ar 
confident  that  the  UN  effort  will  be 
directed  in  ways  supportive  of  the  in- 
terests of  the  Afghan  people. 

U.S.  Contributions 

Let  me  now  turn  to  our  contribution 
and  role  in  this  relief  effort.  In  fiscal 
year  (FY)  1988,  the  United  States  budg 
eted  $119  million  in  humanitarian  as- 
sistance to  the  Afghan  refugees. 
Approximately  $49  million  of  this  as 
sistance  goes  through  multilateral  chaii 
nels — specifically,  the  UN  High 
Commissioner  for  Refugees  and  the 
World  Food  Program — to  assist  the 
more  than  3  million  refugees  in 
Pakistan.  The  remainder,  consisting  of 
food  and  agricultural  equipment,  medi 
cine  and  medical  supplies,  and  educa 
tional  training  and  materials,  is 
provided  bilatei-ally,  primarily  to  peep 
still  within  Afghanistan. 

Not  only  does  the  bilateral  pro- 
gram assist  needy  Afghans,  it  has  en- 
couraged them  to  remain  in  their 
country  rather  than  fleeing  to  PakistE 
and  placing  an  additional  burden  on  t 
Pakistani  Government  and  people. 
Throughout  the  years  of  conflict  in 
Afghanistan,  Pakistan  has  earned  the 
admiration  of  the  world  for  its  cou- 
rageous stand  against  Soviet  intimida 
tion  and  the  provision  of  refuge  for 
millions  of  homeless  Afghans.  Our  bil 
eral  program,  initiated  with  strong  ai 
bipartisan  congressional  input  and  su 
port,  has  been  generously  funded. 

Despite  budgetary  constraints,  w 
intend  to  maintain  an  overall  level  of 
bilateral  and  multilateral  aid  around 
$119  million  in  FY  1989.  We  are  also 
seeking — within  existing  funding — ad 
tional  resources,  particularly  food  aid 
to  contribute  to  our  Afghan  assistanci 
effort.  We  have  recently  identified  foi 
this  fiscal  year  an  additional  80,000 
metric  tons  (MT)  of  wheat  and  3  milli 
MT  of  dried  skim  milk  for  the  multi- 
lateral effort  and  20,000  MT  of  wheat 
for  our  bilateral  assistance — approxi- 
mately $23  million  in  food  and  transpc 
tation  charges.  Hence,  our  overall 
assistance  for  FY  1988  will  total  abou 
$142  million.  Consistent  with  the  agre 
ment  last  fall  with  the  Congress,  how 
ever,  we  do  not  intend  to  seek  a 
supplemental  for  Afghan  assistance. 
Our  continuing  programs  are  consiste 
with,  supportive  of  and  will  be  closel 
coordinated  with  the  UN  effort.  As  i. 
refugees  return  home,  an  increasing 
proportion  of  our  aid  will  follow  them 
into  Afghanistan. 


58 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/September  19< 


TERRORISM 


j      We  are  encouraging  other  donors 
3  contribute  substantially  to  the 
ifghan  assistance  effort.  In  our  ap- 
eals,  we  point  out  that  we  are  by  far 
le  largest  donor  of  humanitarian  as- 
istance  to  Afghans  and  that  others 
hould  now  assume  a  major  share  of  the 
ew  burden  as  the  refugees  begin  their 
eturn  home. 

We  are  making  clear  to  the  Soviet 
jlnion  that  it  should  make  a  major  fi- 
lancial  contribution  to  the  special  inter- 
lational  assistance  effort.  It  destroyed 
ne  country  of  Afghanistan;  it  is  obli- 
ated  to  pay  a  major  part  of  the  bill  to 
sbuild  it.  But  its  contribution  to  the 
Inited  Nations  must  come  without 
trings  or  any  recjuirement  that  the 
jnds  be  used  to  bolster  the  illegitimate 
labul  regime.  Soviet  and  UN  officials 
nderstand  our  position  clearly. 

The  U.S.S.R.  should  certainly  as- 
ist  in  eliminating  the  danger  to  the 
jfugees  of  the  millions  of  mines  Soviet 
nd  Kabul  forces  have  sown  across  the 
oads  and  fields  throughout  most  of 
Afghanistan.  No  humanitarian  task  is 
lore  important  than  the  removal  or  de- 
truction  of  these  mines.  They  are  a 
lajor  obstacle  to  permitting  the  safe 
eturn  of  the  refugees  and  allowing 
hem  to  begin  cultivating  their  land. 
Ve  and  the  United  Nations  are  pushing 
he  Soviets  to  stop  laying  mines,  re- 
love  the  mines  they  can,  and  provide 
iformation  on  minefield  locations  so 
hat  any  remaining  mines  can  be  re- 
loved  quickly. 

I  mentioned  at  the  onset  my  pro- 
ound  belief  that  the  United  Nations 
nust  lead  the  international  community 
n  meeting  the  challenge  of  the  Afghan 
efugees.  I  am  convinced  it  will  succeed 
md,  in  doing  so,  help  advance  interests 
if  major  importance  to  the  United 
States.  There  are  legitimate  grounds 
or  criticizing  some  of  the  failings  of  the 
Jnited  Nations.  I  have  done  so  when  I 
)elieved  such  criticism  was  warranted, 
IS  have  many  Members  of  Congress. 
But,  even  as  we  seek  to  criticize  con- 
structively, we  must  not  forget  the  in- 
lispensable  work  the  United  Nations 
loe.s — work  essential  to  global  peace, 
stability,  and  development;  work  that 
oenefits  directly  our  national  and  inter- 
national interests. 

More  specifically,  the  UN  system  is 
uniquely  placed  to  lead  the  multina- 
tional effort  to  aid  the  Afghan  refu- 
gees. It  has  the  capacity  to  coordinate 
and  pool  resources.  Contributions  made 
in  isolation  by  small  nations  with  lim- 
ited aid  programs,  for  example,  would 


be  much  less  effective  and  productive 
than  when  channeled  through  the  UN 
system.  The  specialized  agencies  also 
have  had  decades  of  e.xperience  manag- 
ing the  various  issues  associated  with 
major  refugee  programs  (e.g.,  dis- 
tributing food  aid  and  providing  health 
care).  Finally,  the  United  Nations  can 
undertake  refugee  programs  in  coun- 
tries such  as  Iran  where  individual  na- 
tions cannot.  For  all  these  reasons,  the 
UN  effort  on  behalf  of  the  Afghan  refu- 
gees is  important  and  should  be 
supported. 

Conclusion 

In  conclusion,  the  international  commu- 
nity faces  a  major  challenge.  We  will 
not  relax  our  vigilance  until  the  last 


Soviet  troops  are  gone,  until  all  the  ref- 
ugees who  want  to  return  are  able  to 
do  so,  and  until  the  proud  Afghan  peo- 
ple have  established,  through  self- 
determination,  a  representative  govern- 
ment that  serves  their  needs  and  sus- 
tains their  traditions. 

Let  me  assure  you  that  the  Admin- 
istration will  work  closely  with  other 
donors,  the  UN  coordinator  and  UN 
agencies,  and  the  Congress  in  this  criti- 
cally important  endeavoi*.  We  will  do 
our  share  to  transform  this  challenge 
into  an  achievement. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee 
and  will  be  available  from  the  Superintend- 
ent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Countering  Terrorism: 
Successes  and  Failures 


by  L.  Paul  Bremer,  III 

Address  before  the  Institute  of  Inter- 
national Ed%ication  and  the  World  Af- 
fairs Council  in  Denver  on  June  15, 
1988.  Ambassador  Bremer  is  Ambassador 
at  Large  for  Counter-Terrorism. 

Public  opinion  polls  show  that  terrorism 
is  a  major  concern  of  the  American 
people.  In  fact,  many  Americans  rank 
teiTorism  as  a  greater  threat  than  the 
spread  of  nuclear  weapons.  Our  major 
newspapers  give  extensive  coverage  to 
terrorism,  carrying  a  terrorism-related 
story  practically  every  day  of  the  year. 
A  single  terrorist  attack  can  capture  the 
headlines  for  weeks,  as  the  recent  hi- 
jacking of  a  Kuwait  plane  did. 

Our  government,  too,  places  top  pri- 
ority on  fighting  terrorism.  As  we  have 
developed  our  policies,  we  have  looked 
closely  at  our  successes  and  failures  in  the 
battle.  I  would  like  to  discuss  these  with 
you  today. 

In  general,  there  are  four  important 
areas  which  can  be  counted  as  successes: 
the  international  community  has  had  no- 
table— but  not  universal — success  in 
pressuring  terror-supporting  states; 
many  of  Europe's  domestic  terrorist 
groups  have  been  shattered;  airline  hi- 
jackings are  at  the  lowest  levels  in  his- 
tory; and,  perhaps  most  importantly,  in 
country  after  country  the  rule  of  law  is 
being  extended  to  terrorists.  There  are 
also  some  areas  where  we  need  to  do 
better.  I'll  discuss  these,  too. 


Western  Pressure  on  Tferrorist  States 

One  of  the  key  factors  in  recent  terrorism 
is  the  support  some  countries  give  to 
terrorist  groups.  Tferrorists  supported  by 
a  sovereign  state  are  exceptionally  dan- 
gerous. State  support  allows  terrorists  to 
spend  more  time  on  operations  and  less 
on  logisitics.  And  state  support  means 
terrorists  have  easy  access  to  documents, 
money,  weapons,  and  training  facilities. 
That  is  why  our  government  has  devel- 
oped a  strategy  to  pressure  states  which 
support  terrorists.  This  strategy  has  led 
to  some  of  our  important  successes. 

Until  a  few  years  ago,  countries  such 
as  Libya  and  Syria  spread  terrorism 
throughout  Europe,  meeting  little  or  no 
resistance.  Some  Western  nations  re- 
acted defensively  or  simply  allowed 
themselves  to  be  intimidated  by  the 
terrorist  bombings  and  murders.  Others 
responded  by  trying  to  understand  the 
"root  causes"  that  motivated  the  terror- 
ists. Still  others  offered  the  terrorists 
safe  transit  through  their  countries  in 
return  for  promises  by  terrorists  not  to 
conduct  attacks  there.  In  contrast,  for  a 
number  of  years  the  United  States  unilat- 
erally used  economic  and  political  pres- 
sures on  Libya.  But  our  repeated  efforts 
to  enlist  the  support  of  other  countries 
failed.  The  uncoordinated  efforts  by  the 
international  community  were  unsuc- 
cessful. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


59 


TERRORISM 


Attitudes  changed  dramatically  after 
the  U.S.  bombing  of  terrorist  targets  in 
Libya  in  April  1986.  Our  military  strike 
demonstrated  to  Libya  that  the  United 
States  was  serious  about  combatting  ter- 
rorists and  galvanized  the  West  into 
action. 

Europe  responded  by  imposing  eco- 
nomic sanctions  against  Libya  and  expel- 
ling over  100  Libyan  so-called  diplomats 
and  businessmen.  These  actions  dis- 
rupted Libya's  terrorist  network  in 
Europe.  As  a  result  of  our  bombing  and 
these  European  steps,  Libya  reduced  its 
planning  for  terrorist  acts.  In  all  of  1987, 
we  detected  Libyan  involvement  in  only 
five  terrorist  incidents.  Qadhafi  [Col. 
Muammer  Qadhafi]  has  certainly  not 
given  up  terrorism  and  in  fact  has  become 
more  active  recently.  But  he  is  unable  to 
practice  it  at  the  same  levels  as  before. 

Another  success  for  concerted  allied 
pressure  happened  when  the  nations  of 
Europe  and  the  United  States  worked 
together  against  Syrian  support  for 
terrorism.  In  November  of  1986,  after  a 
British  court  proved  that  Syrian  officials 
were  involved  in  an  attempt  to  plant  a 
bomb  aboard  an  El  Al  flight,  Britain 
broke  diplomatic  relations  with  Syria;  the 
United  States  recalled  our  ambassador; 
Germany  expelled  a  number  of  Syrian 
diplomats;  and  the  European  Community 
halted  arms  sales,  suspended  high-level 
visits,  and  tightened  accreditation  for 
Syrian  diplomats. 

Once  again,  decisive  action  by  allies 
resulted  in  less  terrorism.  Direct  Syrian 
involvement  in  terrorism  has  declined 
significantly  during  the  past  18  months. 
And  last  summer  Syria  expelled  the 
notorious  Abu  Nidal  terrorist  group  from 
its  borders. 

The  lesson  is  clear:  when  Western 
nations  act  together  against  terrorism, 
the  results  can  be  significant.  We  can  be 
proud  of  the  cohesion  we  have  achieved 
thus  far. 

Europe's  Domestic  Iferrorist  Groups 

A  second  success  has  been  the  virtual 
elimination  of  several  indigenous  terror- 
ist groups  in  Europe.  The  major  force  for 
these  successes  was  public  outrage  among 
European  citizens  with  the  high  level  of 
indiscriminate  terrorism.  The  political 
effect  of  this  outrage  was  to  force  Euro- 
pean politicians  to  put  more  resources 
into  the  fight.  As  a  result,  law  en- 
forcement capabilities  were  beefed  up  and 
brought  to  bear  on  European  terrorist 
groups.  The  effect  has  been  remarkable. 
For  example,  Italy's  Red  Brigades, 
once  the  largest  and  most  dangerous 
group  in  continental  Europe,  was  the 


60 


U.S.  Offers  Reward  for  Terrorists 


DEPARTMENT  ANNOUNCEMENT, 
JUNE  30,  1988' 

The  U.S.  Government  is  announcing  a 
reward  of  up  to  $500,000  for  informa- 
tion leading  to  the  apprehension,  effec- 
tive prosecution,  and  punishment  of 
those  responsible  for  the  assassination 
of  U.S.  Navy  Capt.  William  Nordeen, 
Defense  Attache  to  the  U.S.  Embassy 
in  Athens.  The  U.S.  Government  has 
condemned  this  act  of  terrorism  in  the 
strongest  possible  terms.  The  murder 
of  Capt.  Nordeen  was  a  senseless,  bru- 
tal act. 

Information  received  will  be  han- 
dled confidentially,  and  the  identities  of 
the  informants  will  be  protected.  Those 


with  information  should  notify  the  near 
est  U.S.  Embassy  or  Consulate. 

The  reward  is  part  of  the  U.S.  Gov 
ernment's  counterterrorism  program, 
which  was  authorized  by  the  1984  Act 
to  Combat  International  Terrorism. 
This  legislation  empowers  the  U.S.  Sec,, 
retary  of  State  to  pay  rewards  for  cer- 
tain information  regarding  acts  of 
international  terrorism.  Such  rewards 
have  been  offered  several  times  in  the 
past.  The  amount  of  the  reward  will  be 
determined  by  the  value  of  the  informs 
tion  received. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by 
Department  deputy  spokesman  Phyllis 
Oakley.  ■ 


target  of  a  massive  police  effort  following 
the  kidnapping  of  General  James  Dozier 
in  1981.  Italian  pohce  arrested  hundreds 
of  Red  Brigade  members  and  supporters, 
including  the  hardcore  leadership.  Over 
400  Red  Brigade  members  remain  in  jail. 
There  has  been  a  precipitous  decline  in 
the  number  of  attacks.  'The  Red  Brigades 
has  not  attacked  a  foreign  target  since 
then.  Although  the  group  remains  capa- 
ble of  carrying  out  terrorist  attacks,  its 
total  current  membership  is  the  lowest 
since  the  group  was  formed  in  the  late 
1960s. 

The  French  have  enjoyed  similar 
success  against  Action  Direct,  France's 
most  dangerous  indigenous  group.  In 
recent  years  Action  Direct  carried  out  a 
number  of  attacks,  including  the  assas- 
sination of  Renault  president  Georges 
Besse  in  1986.  The  French  authorities 
effectively  decapitated  the  organization 
when  they  arrested  the  international 
wing's  four  leaders  in  a  farmhouse  in 
February  1987.  Late  in  1987,  French 
police  dealt  the  group  a  further  blow 
when  they  arrested  Max  Frerot,  the 
group's  bomb  expert  and  the  last  identi- 
fied major  figure  at  large.  With  these  key 
leaders  in  jail,  the  group  has  been  crip- 
pled and  has  not  carried  out  an  attack  in 
over  a  year. 

In  Belgium,  law  enforcement  and 
antiterrorism  procedures  were  restruc- 
tured to  meet  the  threat  posed  by  the 
Fighting  Communist  Cells,  a  Marxist 
terrorist  group  responsible  for  a  wide- 
spread bombing  campaign  in  Belgium. 
The  group's  leader,  Pierre  Carette,  and 
three  associates  were  arrested  in  De- 


cember 1985.  Since  then  the  group  has 
committed  no  act  of  terrorism. 

Increased  international  cooperatior 
has  also  contributed  to  some  European 
successes.  For  more  than  a  decade,  tht< 
Spanish  Government  has  faced  a  viciow 
wave  of  terrorism  conducted  by  the 
Basque  terrorist  group,  ETA  [Basque 
Fatherland  and  Freedom].  The  turning 
point  in  the  battle  came  over  the  past 
year,  when  the  Spanish  put  12  ETA 
commando  units  out  of  action.  Critical 
that  success  was  cooperation  from  the 
French,  who  expelled  over  100  suspectf 
Basque  terrorists,  including  several  re- 
puted top  leaders  in  1987.  The  cooper 
tion  continues.  Last  December,  France 
and  Spain  announced  the  formation  of 
permanent  police  liaison  office  to  furth' 
strengthen  antiterrorist  cooperation. 

These  successes  show  what  gover 
ments  can  do  against  homegrown  terro 
ism  when  they  assert  political  wall  and 
apply  the  necessary  resources  and  men*. 
to  the  task. 

Fewer  Hijackings 

In  the  early  1970s  there  were  as  many ; 
18  terrorist  airline  hijackings  per  year.  '. 
other  words,  we  had  a  hijacking  on 
average  every  3  weeks.  Barely  was  oi 
incident  over  when  another  began.  Bull 
last  year,  there  was  only  one  hijacking 
Three  factors  are  responsible  for  th 
dramatic  success. 

•    About  15  years  ago  the  alarmiii 
increase  in  hijackings  led  to  intemation 
conventions  which  classified  air  piracy 
a  crime  regardless  of  motive.  The 


TERRORISM 


onventions  imposed  an  obligation  on  any 
ation  which  came  to  control  the  hijackers 
0  bring  the  teiTorists  to  justice.  These 
reaties  have  given  countries  an  impor- 
ant  tool  in  the  fight  against  terrorism. 

•  Public  concern  over  hijackings  and 
1SS  (if  tourist  revenue  led  many  political 
?a(lers  to  devote  increased  attention  and 
esources  to  airline  security.  Money  was 
ound  for  metal  detectors,  bomb  sniffing 
logs,  and  x-ray  machines. 

•  With  more  people,  money,  and 
lolitical  backing,  security  officials  began 
0  jtroduce  results.  In  most  airports  the 
asual  hijacking,  where  someone  strolls 
board  with  a  weapon,  is  a  thing  of  the 
last.  The  few  recent  terrorist  hijackings 
lave  been  meticulously  planned  and  car- 
ied  nut,  often  resorting  to  unusual  tactics 
uch  as  bypassing  the  terminal  and  seiz- 
ing the  plane  from  the  tarmac. 

While  hijackings  are  not  ended — we 
lave  already  seen  one  bloody  takeover 
his  year — this  dramatic  improvement 
lemonstrates  what  local  diligence  and 
joncerted  international  cooperation  can 
nccomplish. 

rhe  Rule  of  Law 

\  final  success  in  the  fight  against  terror- 
sm  is  the  fact  that  terrorists  are  going 
-0  jail  in  record  numbers.  More  and  more 
ndividuals  and  governments  are  coming 
,0  realize  that  nothing  justifies  the  delib- 
erate targeting  of  noncombatants.  Al- 
.hough  the  tired  old  cliche  "one  man's 
terrorist  is  another  man's  freedom 
iighter"  still  persists,  many  govem- 
Tients  now  recognize  that  terrorists  are 
irst  and  foremost  criminals.  This  concep- 
;ual  breakthrough  has  complemented  the 
mproved  police  procedures  and  expanded 
ntelligence  efforts,  which  result  in  ar- 
*ests  of  terrorists. 

As  the  change  in  perspective  has 
;aken  hold,  so  has  the  rule  of  law. 
[ferrorists  who  might  have  been  quietly 
ieported  10  years  ago  are  being  tried, 
:onvicted,  and  going  to  jail. 

•  Last  year  in  Paris,  the  notorious 
;errorist  Georges  Ibrahim  Abdallah  re- 
;eived  a  life  sentence  for  his  role  in  the 
nurders  of  a  U.S.  Army  attache  and  an 
[sraeli  diplomat. 

•  In  a  widely  publicized  trial  in 
Iflndon  in  1986,  Nezar  Hindawi  was 
sentenced  to  45  years  for  attempting  to 
imuggle  a  bomb  on  board  an  El  Al  airline. 

•  In  Austria,  two  Abu  Nidal  terror- 
sts  were  given  life  sentences  for  murder 
ind  attempted  murder  during  an  attack 
m  an  El  Al  airline  terminal  in  December 
•985. 


•   A  Canadian  court  sentenced  to  life 
imprisonment  two  Sikh  terrorists  who 
conspired  to  blow  up  a  New  York-to- 
London  Air  India  flight  in  1986. 

In  the  United  States,  domestic  ter- 
rorist groups  have  been  actively  prose- 
cuted for  years,  and  recently  we  have 
been  able  to  prosecute  international  ter- 
rorists as  well.  A  Lebanese  terrorist 
named  Fawaz  Younis  currently  awaits 
trial  in  Washington,  D.C.,  on  hostage- 
taking  charges  arising  from  the  hijacking 
of  a  Royal  Jordanian  Airlines  flight  in 
June  1985.  FBI  [Federal  Bureau  of 
Investigation]  agents  arrested  this  man 
in  international  waters  and  brought  him 
to  this  country  to  face  charges.  This  was 
the  first  time  we  used  a  newly  authorized 
statute  permitting  arrests  by  the  United 
States  of  terrorists  abroad  for  acts  com- 
mitted against  Americans.  The  United 
States  has  also  assisted  in  the  capture  and 
prosecution  of  terrorists  in  many  coun- 
tries through  the  sharing  of  intelligence 
information  and  cooperation  between  law 
enforcement  authorities. 

When  terrorism  burst  on  the  scene 
in  the  late  1960s,  the  West  was  ill- 
prepared  to  oppose  it.  Now,  20  years 
later,  we  have  made  considerable  gains 
and  have  had  significant  success  in  all  of 
these  areas. 

But  the  successes  have  not  been 
constant  and  serious  problems  remain. 

Iran  and  North  Korea 

Earlier  I  mentioned  the  importance  of 
state  support  for  terrorism  and  outlined 
the  successes  that  cooperative  efforts 
against  Libya  and  Syria  had  brought. 
These  successes  were  the  result  of  firm 
international  pressures  on  those  teiTorist 
supporting  nations.  But  when  there  is  no 
concerted  multilateral  effort,  especially 
among  the  Western  allies,  support  for 
terrorism  continues.  Iran  and  North 
Korea  are  cases  in  point. 

The  Government  of  Iran  has  prac- 
ticed terrorism  since  it  came  to  power  9 
years  ago.  It  has  taken  hostages,  assas- 
sinated dissidents,  disrupted  the  pilgrim- 
ages to  Mecca,  bombed  embassies,  sabo- 
taged oil  installations,  and  supported 
hijackings.  Iran  has  used  terrorism  to 
intimidate  gulf  rulers  into  ending  their  aid 
to  Baghdad,  to  drive  U.S.  and  French 
influence  from  the  region,  and  to  kill 
opponents  of  the  regime. 

Some  nations  have  acted  against 
Iran.  The  United  States  broke  diplomatic 
relations  in  1980,  imposed  export  con- 
trols, banned  Iranian  imports,  and  took 
other  measures  to  try  to  contain  Iran's 


support  for  terrorism.  Other  nations  have 
taken  similar  though  weaker  steps.  But 
no  unified  opposition  exists,  and  Iranian 
terrorism  is  growing.  Iranian-sponsored 
terrorism  tripled  from  1986  to  1987. 

North  Korea  also  sponsors  terrorism 
without  any  significant  punishment.  It  is 
responsible  for  the  most  flagrant  terrorist 
attack  last  year,  the  mid-flight  bombing 
of  a  Korean  Air  Lines  flight  that  killed  115 
persons.  In  1983,  North  Korean  comman- 
dos planted  explosives  in  Rangoon, 
Burma,  where  South  Korean  officials 
were  visiting;  17  were  killed.  In  1974 
North  Korean  agents,  attempting  to  as- 
sassinate then-president  Park,  shot  and 
killed  his  wife  in  Seoul. 

In  response  to  these  attacks,  the 
United  States  designated  North  Korea  as 
a  state  sponsor  of  terrorism  and  tightened 
visa  procedures.  But  because  our  rela- 
tions with  North  Korea  are  already  mini- 
mal, our  steps  alone  have  little  practical 
impact.  Unfortunately,  North  Korea's 
savage  behavior  has  not  prompted  world 
condemnation.  The  European  Community 
condemned  the  bombing  of  Korean  Air 
Lines  as  an  act  of  terrorism  but  stopped 
short  of  naming  North  Korea  specifically 
as  the  culprit.  The  Korean  Air  Lines 
attack  was  given  a  thorough  hearing  at 
the  United  Nations  and  the  International 
Civil  Aviation  Organization,  but  North 
Korea  faces  no  significant  punitive  meas- 
ures that  might  persuade  it  to  change  its 
behavior. 

So  our  government  will  continue 
encouraging  the  world  community  to  keep 
a  sharp  focus  on  the  issue  of  state- 
supported  terrorism.  That  way  we  can  be 
sure  that  the  lessons  of  the  past  are 
applied  to  all  state  sponsors. 

Aircraft  Sabotage 

Increased  security  measures  and  greater 
political  will  have  dramatically  reduced 
aircraft  hijackings.  But  the  very  success 
of  anti-hijacking  measures  seems  to  have 
spavmed  a  new  threat:  sabotage  to  air- 
craft. 

Unfortunately,  the  mid-air  destruc- 
tion of  Korean  Air  Lines  #858  is  not  an 
isolated  episode.  In  1986,  Palestinian 
terrorists  planted  a  bomb  aboard  TWA 
#840  which  ruptured  the  fuselage.  The 
resultant  depressurization  sucked  a  fam- 
ily of  four  Greek- Americans  to  their 
death  as  the  plane  descended  into  Athens. 
Had  the  bomb  gone  off  at  greater  altitude 
it  is  likely  that  the  entire  plane  would 
have  been  lost.  In  1985,  Sikh  terrorists 
destroyed  an  Air  India  jumbo  jet,  killing 
all  329  passengers  aboard.  Cooperation 
between  the  FBI  and  the  Royal  Canadian 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


61 


UNITED  NATIONS 


Mounted  Police  narrowly  averted  a  simi- 
lar bombing  in  1986. 

The  United  States  is  working  to 
counter  this  new  threat  with  research  and 
development  of  new  devices  to  screen 
checked  and  carry-on  baggage  and  to 
detect  batteries  and  liquid  explosives 
hidden  in  luggage.  The  International  Civil 
Aviation  Organization  directed  its  avia- 
tion security  panel  to  develop  concrete 
measures  to  prevent  future  acts  of  sabo- 
tage. They  will  be  meeting  ne.xt  week  in 
Montreal  to  discuss  some  proposals.  But 
until  better  security  measures  are  in 
place,  we  vdll  continue  to  face  the  danger 
of  aircraft  sabotage  and  the  resulting  loss 
of  life. 

Hostage  Taking 

Nor  can  we  claim  success  against  hos- 
tage-taking.  Hostage-taking  is  one  ter- 
rorist tactic  that  still  works.  The  allied 
unity  that  is  apparent  in  other  areas 
seems  to  fall  apart  when  an  individual, 
identifiable  citizen  is  at  risk.  Countries 
which  have  been  resolute  elsewhere  have 
too  often  made  deals  to  gain  the  release 
of  their  citizens,  gaining  short-term  relief 
at  the  cost  of  near-certain  recurrence. 


True,  the  Iran-cow  ^ra  affair  hurt  the 
credibility  of  the  United  States  policy  of 
remaining  firm  against  hostage-taking. 
But  we  have  admitted  that  mistakes  were 
made,  and  there  is  no  consideration  now 
of  making  concessions  to  gain  freedom  for 
the  hostages.  Our  policy  is  firm,  resolute, 
and  clear:  we  will  talk  to  any  country,  any 
group,  any  individual  about  the  safety  and 
freedom  of  Americans  held  hostage.  We 
will  not,  however,  make  concessions 
which  would  encourage  future  acts  of 
terrorism. 

Sadly,  there  are  widespread  reports 
that  other  countries,  such  as  South 
Korea,  Japan,  France,  and  Germany, 
have  made  concessions.  In  several  coun- 
tries, corporations  have  paid  ransom  to 
terrorists  who  held  their  employees. 

In  short,  hostage  holding  has  been 
rewarded,  and  behavior  rewarded  is  be- 
havior repeated. 

Conclusion 

Last  year,  there  were  832  international 
terrorist  attacks  worldwide,  the  highest 
number  ever  recorded.  Current  trends 


indicate  that  1988  may  also  be  a  record 
year  for  terrorism.  In  every  region  of  tht 
world,  our  statistics  show  increases. 

The  West  has  made  an  enormous 
effort  to  thwart  terrorism.  We  have 
placed  lots  of  attention  on  the  problem  o: 
state  sponsorship  of  terrorism.  We  have 
successfully  pressured  some  states  into 
reducing  their  support  for  terrorism. 
Domestic  terrorist  groups  that  once 
plagued  Europe  have  been  disbanded  o: 
severely  curtailed.  We  have  made  airlint 
hijackings  a  rare  occurrence.  We  have 
applied  the  rule  of  law  against  terrorist 
and  have  locked  up  some  of  the  most 
ruthless  terrorists  in  the  world. 

But  we  cannot  rest  on  our  past 
successes.  We  must  build  on  them  and 
focus  attention  on  the  remaining  probler 
areas.  These  include  putting  pressure  or 
all  states  that  use  terrorism,  such  as  Irar 
and  North  Korea;  refusing  to  yield  to 
terrorist  demands;  and  i-emaining  alert  ti 
new  terrorist  tactics  such  as  airline 
sabotage. 

The  world  can  be  a  safer  place  in  the 
future  for  the  efforts  we  make  today.  ■ 


Developments  in  the  UN  System 


by  Richard  S.  Williamson 

Statement  before  the  Subcommit- 
tees oil  Human  Rights  and  Inter- 
national Organizations  and  on 
International  Operations  of  the  House 
Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on  May  25, 
1988.  Ambassador  Williamson  is 
Assistant  Secretary  for  International 
Orgayiization  Affairs. • 

I  welcome  the  opportunity  to  report  to 
you  again  on  recent  developments  in 
the  UN  system.  Since  I  last  met  with 
you  in  February,  there  have  been  a 
number  of  interesting  events.  Consider- 
ing the  fact  that  this  used  to  be  the 
quiet  seasion  in  the  United  Nations,  we 
have  had  a  rather  full  plate. 

Human  Rights  in  Cuba 

Not  long  after  our  last  meeting,  the 
Human  Rights  Commission  in  Geneva 
concluded  its  work  with  an  important 
agreement  to  send  an  investigation 
team  to  look  at  the  human  rights  situa- 
tion in  Cuba.  This  is  an  effort  both  the 


Administration  and  the  Congress 
worked  very  hard  on,  and  we  are  ex- 
tremely satisfied  with  the  results. 

The  result  goes  well  beyond  any- 
thing envisioned  in  the  resolution  which 
we  tabled  in  Geneva  in  February.  It 
provides  for  a  six-man  team  to  visit 
Cuba  this  summer  and,  on  the  basis  of 
that  visit  plus  information  obtained 
both  inside  and  outside  Cuba,  to  pro- 
duce a  report  to  be  submitted  to  the 
Human  Rights  Commission  next  Febru- 
ary. I  want  to  emphasize  how  pleased 
we  are  with  this  outcome.  An  investiga- 
tion of  human  rights  in  Cuba  is  long 
overdue. 

The  role  of  the  Congress  in  this 
effort,  including  especially  the  visit  to 
Geneva  during  the  commission  meeting 
by  Chairman  Fascell  [Dante  B.  Fascell, 
chairman  of  the  House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee]  and  Congressman  Broom- 
field  [William  S.  Broomfield,  ranking 
Republican  member  of  the  House  For- 
eign Affairs  Committee],  was  essential. 
It  is  now  up  to  us  to  follow  through  to 
ensure  that  a  fair  and  honest  report  is 
ultimately  submitted. 


Afghanistan 

I  do  not  need  to  go  into  great  detail 
here  about  the  very  useful  role  played 
by  the  United  Nations  in  the  recent 
Geneva  accords  on  Afghanistan.  The 
United  Nations  showed  that  it  can  be 
extremely  helpful  in  facilitating  such  a 
arrangement  when  all  parties  to  a  con- 
flict are  agreed  on  the  need  to  bring  it 
to  an  end.  The  United  Nations  will  pla. 
a  key  role  in  the  months  ahead  monitoi 
ing  Soviet  withdrawal  and  assisting  re- 
turning refugees. 

Iran-Iraq  War 

I  wish  that  I  could  report  as  positively 
on  UN  efforts  to  resolve  the  Iran-Iraq 
war  Unfortunately,  in  that  sad  encoun- 
ter the  will  to  reach  a  settlement  is  sti 
lacking.  UN  efforts  to  go  beyond  Se- 
curity Council  Resolution  598,  which 
was  passed  last  July,  remain  stymied. 
Those  efforts  will,  however,  continue. 


62 


Department  of  State  Bulietin/September  198iE 


UNITED  NATIONS 


ilthiopian  Famine 

i'here  is  another  area  that  I  want  to 
lighlight  for  you  because  it  involves  the 
ives  of  perhaps  hundreds  of  thousands 
if  people. 

Last  week  I  addressed  the  UN 
economic  and  Social  Council  meeting  in 
^ew  York  on  the  problem  of  Ethiopia. 
Ve  are  concerned  that  the  present  re- 
usal  of  the  Ethiopian  Government  to 
illow  adequate  distribution  of  food  aid 
n  the  northern  part  of  the  country 
■ould  lead  to  a  major  catastrophe.  We 
ntend  to  continue  to  speak  out  in  UN 
bra  in  order  to  try  to  bring  about  a 
hange  in  the  intransigent  policy  of  the 
!]thiopian  Government. 

This  is  an  issue  which  still  seems 
lot  to  have  captured  the  headlines,  but 
t  is  one  which  needs  our  most  careful 
crutiny.  Food  supplies  are  available; 
he  problem  is  a  government  more  con- 
erned  with  fighting  an  unwinnable 
ivil  war  than  with  preventing  thou- 
ands  from  dying  of  starvation. 

Security  Council  Activities 

since  last  February,  the  Security  Coun- 
cil has  taken  up  a  number  of  issues, 
ncluding  resolutions  on  the  Falklands, 
Nicaragua,  recent  developments  in  the 
iccupied  territories  of  Gaza  and  the 
iVest  Bank,  and  political  assassination 
n  Tunisia.  The  proliferation  of  resolu- 
;ions  taken  to  the  Security  Council  is 
disturbing.  While  we,  of  course,  retain 
jur  veto,  there  are  times  when  exercis- 
,ng  it  can  work  against  us.  I  think  this 
s  too  often  the  case  in  Middle  East  and 
Central  American  issues,  many  of 
which,  in  our  view,  do  not  deserve  the 
attention  of  the  Security  Council. 

One  recent  accomplishment  of  the 
Security  Council  that  is  worth  mention- 
ing is  the  passage  of  a  resolution  con- 
demning the  use  of  chemical  weapons. 
While  naming  no  country  specifically, 
this  resolution  was,  of  course,  occa- 
sioned by  the  Iran-Iraq  war,  and  its 
consensus  passage  by  the  Security 
Council  is  a  welcome  development. 

Specialized  Agencies'  Activities 

The  period  since  February  has  been 
busy  for  the  technical  specialized  agen- 
cies of  the  UN  system. 

The  World  Health  Organization 
(WHO)  Assembly  has  just  concluded  its 
annual  session.  Dr.  Hiroshi  Nakajima  of 
Japan  was  elected  as  the  new  Director 
General  of  WHO,  effective  on  July  21, 
and  we  look  forward  to  developing  a 
good  working  relationship  with  him. 


Iran  Accepts  Security  Council 
Resolution  598 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
JULY  18,  1988' 

The  United  States  welcomes  Iran's  for- 
mal acceptance  of  UN  Security  Council 
Resolution  598,  as  well  as  President 
Saddam  Hussein's  reaffirmation  yester- 
day of  Iraq's  acceptance  of  the  resolu- 
tion. This  major  breakthrough  is  an 
important  first  step  toward  the  out- 
come that  we  and  all  members  of  the 
Security  Council  have  sought  for  the 
last  year.  It  opens  the  way  for  the  end 
of  an  8-year  tragic  war  and  restoration 
of  stability  in  a  troubled  region  of  the 
world. 

We  call  upon  Iran  and  Iraq  to  coop- 
erate urgently  with  UN  Secretary  Gen- 
eral Perez  de  Cuellar  and  the  Security 
Council  to  ensure  the  earliest  possible 


implementation  of  Resolution  598  in  all 
its  aspects. 

As  Vice  President  Bush  empha- 
sized to  the  Security  Council  last  week, 
the  United  States  has  long  sought  a 
just,  negotiated  settlement  of  the  tragic 
conflict.  Intensive  efforts  have  been  un- 
dertaken by  the  Administration  over 
the  past  year  to  further  this  objective. 
The  United  States  will  continue  to  do 
all  that  it  can,  individually  and  in  coop- 
eration with  like-minded  governments 
and  the  United  Nations,  to  hasten  a 
durable  peace  between  Iran  and  Iraq 
and  to  enhance  the  stability  and  se- 
curity of  the  gulf  region. 


We  were  able  to  announce  at  the 
assembly  that  the  U.S.  Government  has 
completed  payment  of  its  1987  assessed 
contribution,  thanks  to  the  decision  on 
reprogramming  the  FY  1988  appropria- 
tion. As  a  result,  the  assembly  agreed 
to  reduce  the  1988-89  budget  by  $25 
million  which  makes  U.S.  assessments 
$6.25  million  lower  than  they  would  be 
otherwise.  We  still  owe  WHO  about  $17 
million  from  1985  and  1986. 

The  assembly  also  adopted  con- 
structive resolutions  on  AIDS  [acquired 
immune  deficiency  syndrome],  infant 
feeding,  and  pharmaceuticals;  there 
was  no  effort  to  provide  WHO  with  a 
regulatory  role.  Political  issues  were 
minimized. 

The  governing  body  of  the  Interna- 
tional Labor  Organization  (ILO)  began 
meeting  this  week  and  will  be  followed 
by  the  international  labor  conference  in 
June.  Issues  include  ILO  financial  diffi- 
culties resulting  from  U.S.  arrearages, 
the  perennial  Soviet  complaint  about 
ILO's  supervisory  machinery,  and  a 
draft  resolution  by  Arab  states  con- 
demning Israeli  practices  in  the  oc- 
cupied territories.  We  will  be  working 
actively  with  all  concerned  parties  to 
assure  constructive  results  on  these 
issues. 

The  Economic  and  Social  Council 
(ECOSOC)  has  just  completed  action  on 
UN  drug  control  activities.  It  decided 
to  convene  a  plenipotentiary  conference 
in  Vienna,  from  November  25  to  De- 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by 
Department  deputy  spokesman  Phyllis 
Oakley.  ■ 


cember  20,  1988,  to  complete  and  sign  a 
new  international  convention  against 
drug  trafficking.  We  are  very  pleased 
that  this  final  step  will  be  taken  this 
year,  since  it  is  the  culmination  of  3 
years  of  negotiation.  We  strongly  sup- 
port this  convention,  which  we  expect 
will  include  many  important  new  law 
enforcement  measures  to  combat  illicit 
drug  trafficking. 

The  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency  (IAEA)  Board  of  Governors 
met  in  February  and  will  convene  again 
in  June.  A  key  issue  is  the  size  of  the 
1989-90  program  budget  and,  in  partic- 
ular, the  Director  General's  proposal  for 
an  increase  in  the  funding  for  the  safe- 
guards program.  The  board  should 
make  a  decision  on  this  in  June. 

South  Africa  indicated  some  time 
ago  that  it  would  begin  consultations 
regarding  its  adherence  to  the  Nuclear 
Nonproliferation  Ti-eaty.  If  no  signifi- 
cant action  occurs,  there  could  be  seri- 
ous consideration  of  suspension  of 
South  Africa  from  the  IAEA  in 
September. 

We  saw  in  March  the  Senate 
ratification  of  the  Montreal  Protocol  on 
Substances  that  Deplete  the  Ozone 
Layer,  an  agreement  reached  under  the 
auspices  of  the  UN  Environment  Pro- 
gram (UNEP). 

In  March  the  International  Civil 
Aviation  Organization  (ICAO)  passed  a 
resolution  condemning  the  "despicable" 


Deoartment  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


63 


UNITED  NATIONS 


destruction  of  Korean  Air  Lines  #858 
and  "the  loss  of  115  innocent  lives." 
The  resolution  initially  was  opposed 
strongly  by  the  Soviet  Union,  Cuba, 
and,  of  course.  North  Korea,  but  when 
they  saw  that  the  text  clearly  would 
be  approved,  they  dropped  their 
opposition. 

A  special  meeting  held  in  March  in 
Rome,  under  the  auspices  of  the  Inter- 
national Maritime  Organization  (IMO), 
saw  international  agreement  on  a  new 
convention  against  terrorist  acts  involv- 
ing passenger  ships  and  ports. 

All  of  these  actions  make  clear  the 
value  of  the  specialized  agencies  in 
dealing  with  issues  of  great  importance 
to  the  United  States. 

The  UN  Children's  Fund  (UNI- 
CEF)  Executive  Board  held  its  annual 
meeting  in  New  York  for  2  weeks  last 
month.  Ms.  Rita  DiMartino  led  the 
seven-member  U.S.  delegation  to  this 
highly  successful  session.  The  board 
made  a  number  of  important  decisions 
and  passed  resolutions  on  the  survival, 
development,  and  protection  of  children 
and  mothers  in  developing  countries, 
including  a  strategy  for  helping  in  the 
fight  against  AIDS,  laying  the  founda- 
tions for  developing  a  strategy  for  chil- 
dren for  the  1990s,  strengthening 
primary  health  care  in  Africa,  expand- 
ing programs  for  abandoned  and  street 
children  in  Latin  America,  strengthen- 
ing UNICEF's  policy  of  "adjustment 
with  a  human  face"  to  ensure  that 
structural  adjustment  policies  take  into 
account  the  basic  needs  of  the  most 
vulnerable  groups  (i.e.,  mothers  and 
children),  and  further  enhancing 
UNICEF's  management  and  accounting 
procedures. 

The  UN  Development  Program's 
(UNDP)  Governing  Council  will  meet 
from  June  6  to  July  1.  As  usual  most 
donor  governments  will  be  represented 
by  the  leadership  of  development  agen- 
cies. The  Administrator  of  the  U.S. 
Agency  for  International  Development 
(AID)  will  lead  the  U.S.  delegation.  A 
matter  of  special  interest  will  be  pro- 
posals of  the  UNDP  administration  to 
meet  newly  identified  needs  in  Africa 
and  to  support  economic  reforms  and 
structural  adjustment  programs.  The 
council  will  also  consider  steps  the 
UNDP  is  taking  to  improve  the  imple- 
mentation of  UNDP  field  programs,  in- 
cluding the  performance  of  other  UN 
agencies  as  executors  of  UNDP  pro- 
grams, as  well  as  exploring  specific 
means  of  improving  the  coherence  of 
system- wide  UN  operational  activities 
for  development  at  the  field  level. 


64 


The  Food  and  Agriculture  Organi- 
zation (FAO)  has  just  concluded  joint 
meetings  of  the  Program  and  Finance 
Committees  in  Rome  this  week.  Those 
sessions  provided  an  important  occasion 
for  member-state  representatives  to  ad- 
dress needed  reform  of  the  FAO.  The 
United  States  was  represented  on  the 
Finance  Committee. 

We,  like  the  majority  of  the  major 
donors  to  the  FAO  and  other  member 
states,  have  been  concerned  about  the 
need  for  reform  of  this  important  inter- 
national agency.  It  is  an  organization 
whose  work  we  value,  whether  in  terms 
of  its  efforts  to  alleviate  hunger  in  de- 
veloping nations  or  in  terms  of  its  di- 
rect importance  to  the  U.S.  agricultural 
community.  Preliminary  reports  indi- 
cate that  the  joint  session  has  acted 
favorably  on  issues  important  to  the 
United  States.  We  look  forward  to  re- 
ceiving full  reports  from  our  mission 
and  from  other  capitals.  As  members  of 
the  committee  know,  the  FAO  had 
stood  out  over  the  last  year  as  the  one 
specialized  agency  in  the  UN  system 
that  had  not  responded  fully  to  pro- 
posals for  program  budget  reform.  On 
that  basis,  the  executive  branch  had  de- 
cided to  defer  payment  to  the  FAO. 

Future  Problems  and  Difficulties 

We  continue  to  face  important  and  diffi- 
cult problems  in  the  United  Nations. 
We  have  been  subjected  to  a  good  deal 
of  criticism  for  our  effort  to  close  the 
Palestine  Liberation  Organization 
(PLO)  mission  in  New  York,  pursuant 
to  legislation  passed  last  summer.  The 
World  Court  has  called  for  international 
arbitration.  The  General  Assembly 
voted  148  to  2  to  deplore  our  action. 
This  issue  is  in  the  U.S.  courts,  and  we 
will  continue  to  insist  that  that  is 
where  it  should  rightly  be  resolved. 

We  have  come  unsuccessfully  to  the 
end  of  a  year-long  very  extensive  exer- 
cise on  reform  of  the  economic  and  so- 
cial areas  of  the  United  Nations.  The 
exercise  was  undertaken  as  a  result  of 
the  G-18  report  on  UN  reform  and  UN 
General  Assembly  Resolution  41/213  on 
UN  reform.  Western  interest  in  this 
effort  sought  to  make  the  existing  sys- 
tem work  better  by  eliminating  large 
areas  of  duplication  and  waste. 

By  contrast  the  developing  coun- 
tries and  others  viewed  the  exercise  as 
an  opportunity  to  expand  the  mandate 
of  the  United  Nations  in  the  interna- 
tional economic  arena.  We  hope  to  see 
renewed  efforts  on  reform  sometime  in 
the  future.  There  is  real  need  to  im- 


prove upon  the  way  the  United  Nations 
deals  with  economic  and  social  issues. 

Finally  there  is  the  matter  of  U.S. 
funding  of  the  UN  system.  The  Presi- 
dent has  determined  that  five  of  the  six 
major  UN  specialized  agencies  have 
complied  with  budget  reform  require- 
ments, and  we  are  proceeding  to  dis- 
tribute reprogrammed  funding  to  these 
institutions.  As  you  know,  we  have  set 
aside  $44  million  to  pay  the  United  Na- 
tions for  part  of  our  outstanding  1987 
assessment,  pending  a  presidential  de- 
termination that  congressional  require- 
ments on  budget  reform,  personnel 
reductions,  and  secondment  of  UN  per- 
sonnel have  been  met.  Ambassador 
Walters  [U.S.  Permanent  Represen- 
tative to  the  UN]  and  I  continue  to 
work  on  these  issues. 

With  the  budget  summit  compro- 
mise, we  are  no  longer  in  a  position  to 
request  the  full  appropriation  of  our 
assessed  contribution  to  the  United 
Nations  and  many  of  the  specialized 
agencies.  We  face  a  very  complex  and 
difficult  funding  situation  for  FY  1989 
and  the  years  ahead.  Without  the  abil- 
ity to  request  full  funding,  our  efforts 
to  bring  about  real  and  much  needed 
UN  reform  are  seriously  hampered. 
There  is  no  simple  way  of  dealing  with 
this  issue,  but  we  are  looking  at  variou 
possibilities. 

Many  of  the  issues  I  have  men- 
tioned here  remain  on  our  plate — Iran- 
Iraq,  the  PLO  mission,  implementatioi 
of  the  Afghan  accords,  budgetary  ques 
tions.  They  are  often  complicated  mat- 
ters with  no  easy  answers.  As  we 
continue  to  work  on  them,  I  hope  we 
will  have  many  more  opportunities  like 
this  to  exchange  views  and  ideas  with 
the  Congress. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee 
and  will  be  available  from  the  Superintenc 
ent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Prini 
ing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/SeDtember  198 


UNITED  NATIONS 


rhe  United  Nations  and  Disarmament 


ty  Richard  S.  Williamson 

Statement  before  Working  Group  II 
f  the  third  UN  Special  Session  on  Dis- 
irmament  in  New  York  City  om 
une  7,  1988.  Ambassador  Williamson 
s  Assistant  Secretary  for  International 
'Organization  Affairs  and  U.S.  Alter- 
mte  Representative  to  the  special 
ession.^ 

et  me  begin  by  congratulating  you 
Permanent  Representative  Paul  Engo 
rom  the  Republic  of  Cameroon]  on  the 
issumption  of  the  chairmanship  of  this 
mportant  working  group,  which  deals 
vith  a  subject — namely  UN  disarma- 
nent  machinery — which  is  of  particular 
nterest  to  my  delegation  in  the  context 
if  the  ongoing  UN  reform  efforts.  I 
vould  note  that  this  agenda  item  has 
)een  the  subject  of  discussion  in  a 
vorking  group  which  you  yourself  have 
■haired  at  the  UN  Disarmament  Com- 
nission  (UNDC)  in  recent  years.  I  am 
■onfident  that  your  able  stewardship  of 
hat  group  will  serve  you  well  as  you 
niide  the  deliberations  of  the  present 
vorking  group. 

I  wish  to  preface  my  remarks  with 
.he  observation  that  the  work  of  this 
special  session  should  be  viewed  in  the 
)roader  context  of  overall  international 
•elations.  The  primary  objective  of  the 
Jnited  Nations,  as  stated  in  its  Char- 
ter, is  to  maintain  international  security 
ind  peace.  In  pursuing  our  work  here, 
IS  in  other  UN  bodies,  we  must  keep 
;his  objective  firmly  in  mind;  and  in 
considering  proposals  related  to  disar- 
mament, we  must  weigh  them  against 
;his  objective.  We  also  must  work  to 
insure  that  all  of  our  efforts  support 
mother  fundamental  principle  of  the 
[Jnited  Nations — namely,  freedom. 

Security,  freedom,  and  peace  must 
3e  our  watchwords.  That  is  why  the 
[Jnited  States  cannot  subscribe  to  the 
lotion  that  arms  control  and  disarma- 
ment agreements  should  be  pursued 
merely  for  the  sake  of  agreement. 
Rather,  in  our  view,  arms  control  and 
iisarmament  agreements  must  make 
sense  only  to  the  degree  that  they 
make  a  realistic  contribution  to  a  more 
secure,  free,  and  peaceful  world.  Arms 
ire  the  symptom,  not  the  cause,  of  dis- 
trust and  tension.  Agreements  to  limit 
ind  reduce  the  level  of  armaments  are 
aseful  when  they  can  help  to  reduce 


distrust  and  tension,  which  lie  at  the 
root  of  all  conflicts,  but  such  agree- 
ments cannot  do  the  job  alone.  Real 
arms  control,  applying  to  all  nations, 
will  be  feasible  only  when  the  causes  of 
distrust  and  tension  are  addressed  and 
resolved. 

Accomplishments 

For  its  part,  the  United  States  has 
been  engaged  in  a  broad  range  of  ac- 
tivities— bilateral  and  multilateral — 
aimed  at  promoting  enhanced  security, 
freedom,  and  peace  for  all  nations.  We 
are  proud  of  our  record  and  take  satis- 
faction in  the  solid  accomplishments  we 
have  achieved  thus  far,  for  these  should 
serve  as  an  example  for  the  rest  of  the 
world. 

In  the  bilateral  field,  the  INF 
[Intermediate-Range  Nuclear  Forces] 
Treaty  stands  as  the  first  agreement  in 
history  to  provide  for  the  actual  reduc- 
tion of  nuclear  weapons  by  eliminating 
an  entire  class  of  such  weapons,  and 
contains  unprecedented,  stringent  ver- 
ification provisions  which  can  serve  as 
the  model  for  future  agreements.  We 
are  continuing  negotiations  with  the 
Soviet  Union  toward  an  agreement  on 
strategic  nuclear  weapons  which  could 
lead  to  far  more  substantial  reductions, 
and  we  are  pursuing  exchanges  on  nu- 
clear testing  through  a  step-by-step  ap- 
proach to  resolve  verification  concerns 
to  make  possible  the  ratification  of  ex- 
isting treaties. 

But  our  efforts  have  not  been  con- 
fined to  the  bilateral  sphere.  The 
United  States  has  been  an  active  par- 
ticipant in  a  wide  range  of  multilateral 
arms  control  and  disarmament  negotia- 
tions. We  played  a  leading  role,  for  ex- 
ample, at  the  Stockholm  Conference  on 
Confidence-  and  Security-Building  Mea- 
sures and  Disarmament  in  Europe, 
which  reached  agreement  in  September 
1986  on  specific  measures  to  reduce  the 
risk  of  war  in  Europe  as  a  result  of 
miscalculation  or  misunderstanding. 
Similarly,  the  United  States  has  been 
energetic  in  the  talks  in  Vienna,  which 
we  hope  will  lead  to  a  negotiation  be- 
tween the  member  states  of  NATO  and 
the  Warsaw  Pact  on  conventional  arms 
control  in  Europe  from  the  Atlantic  to 
the  Urals. 


Finally,  I  hardly  need  to  remind  the 
delegates  of  the  leading  role  we  have 
exercised  at  the  Geneva  Conference  on 
Disarmament  (CD)  in  the  negotiations 
for  a  comprehensive,  effectively  verifia- 
ble and  truly  global  ban  on  chemical 
weapons.  These  negotiations  are  pro- 
ceeding on  the  basis  of  a  U.S.  draft 
treaty  text  which  was  introduced  by 
Vice  President  Bush  to  the  CD  in  1984. 
In  the  intervening  years,  the  negotia- 
tions have  increasingly  focused  on  the 
tough  issues,  particularly  effective  ver- 
ification. Much  work  remains  to  be 
done  to  overcome  the  substantial  obsta- 
cles which  remain.  We  will  need  to  deal 
realistically  with  these  issues  and 
ensure  that  any  agreement  that  is 
reached  accords  with  our  primary  ob- 
jective of  security,  freedom,  and  peace. 

This  solid  record,  which  speaks  for 
itself,  stands  in  rather  sharp  contrast 
with  the  situation  which  prevails  else- 
where in  the  world.  Most  of  the  initia- 
tives I  have  just  cited  fall  within  the 
East-West  and/or  European  context. 
Yet,  it  is  appropriate  to  note  that,  in 
the  decades  since  the  end  of  World  War 
II,  the  conflicts  which  have  ravaged  the 
world  and  sapped  its  human  and  mate- 
rial resources  have  taken  place  in  re- 
gions outside  this  arena — in  Africa, 
Asia,  and  Latin  America. 

There  have  been  scores  of  such  con- 
flicts, which  have  exacted  a  staggering 
toll  of  casualties.  Probably  the  most  de- 
structive and  protracted  regional  con- 
flict of  recent  times  is  the  ongoing  war 
between  Iran  and  Iraq.  It  has  been  es- 
timated that,  in  the  nearly  8  years 
since  this  war  erupted,  several  hundred 
thousand  people  have  been  killed.  The 
war  between  Iran  and  Iraq  also  high- 
Ughts  several  of  the  most  disturbing  re- 
cent trends  in  regional  conflicts:  the 
increasing  sophistication  and  deadliness 
of  modern  conventional  weapons  and 
the  resort  to  chemical  weapons. 

Thus,  it  is  fair  to  ask:  What  are 
other  countries,  of  other  regions,  doing 
concretely  to  contribute  to  a  more  se- 
cure, free,  and  peaceful  world?  What 
steps  have  regional  groups  and  individ- 
ual states  outside  Europe  taken  to  re- 
duce tensions  and  remove  the  sources 
of  conflict?  Other  regions  of  the  globe 
have  been  subjected  to  the  destabiliza- 
tion  and  human  losses  caused  by  local 
conflict,  but  what  have  the  states  of 
those  regions  done  to  reduce  tensions 
and  the  likelihood  of  conflict? 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


65 


UNITED  NATIONS 


The  answer  is:  in  many  regions,  far 
too  little.  The  United  States  is  doing  its 
part  in  cooperation  with  its  allies  and 
friends,  but  other  countries  need  to  do 
theirs.  All  nations  should  acknowledge 
and  assume  their  share  of  responsibility 
for  maintaining  peace  and  security 
within  their  respective  regions  through 
such  activities  as  confidence-building 
measures  and  reductions  in  their  arse- 
nals of  conventional  weapons.  This  is  a 
challenge  which  deserves  the  full  atten- 
tion of  all  participants  at  this  special 
session. 

The  maintenance  of  international 
peace  and  security  is  the  primary  pur- 
pose of  the  United  Nations,  according 
to  the  Charter.  The  organization  can 
play,  and  does  play,  a  constructive  role 
in  this  vital  endeavor  in  a  variety  of 
ways.  For  example,  the  Security  Coun- 
cil's efforts  over  the  decades  in  peace- 
keeping operations  and  the  resolution 
of  regional  conflicts  have  made  contri- 
butions to  promoting  peace  and  se- 
curity in  many  parts  of  the  world. 

Outside  its  main  organs,  there  are 
components  of  the  UN  system  which 
also  contribute  to  a  more  secure  world. 
Based  on  my  own  e.xperience,  I  would 
particularly  cite  the  work  of  the  Inter- 
national Atomic  Energy  Agency 
(IAEA)  in  safeguarding  the  interna- 
tional nonproliferation  regime  under 
the  Non-Proliferation  Treaty  as  an 
important  example  of  the  multilateral 
cooperation  in  this  regard.  During  my 
years  as  U.S.  Representative  to  the 
IAEA,  I  was  pleased  and  proud  to  con- 
tribute to  that  agency's  efforts  to  pro- 
mote the  safe  and  peaceful  uses  of 
nuclear  energy  and  to  ensure  that  nu- 
clear materials  are  used  for  strictly 
peaceful  purposes. 

Questionable  UN  Activities 

At  the  same  time,  however,  there  are 
instances  of  UN  activities — especially 
in  the  field  of  arms  control  and  disar- 
mament— which  make  only  a  marginal 
or  even  negative  contribution  to  a  more 
secure,  free,  and  peaceful  world.  Over 
the  years,  the  United  Nations  has  accu- 
mulated an  elaborate — some  would  say 
excessive — structure  of  activities  and 
mechanisms  ostensibly  designed  to  pro- 
mote and  encourage  the  arms  control 
and  disarmament  process.  Yet,  by  its 
very  nature,  this  structure  has  become 
unwieldy  and,  at  times,  detrimental  to 
improving  the  climate  for  negotiations. 

For  example,  every  fall  the  First 
Committee  of  the  General  Assembly 
routinely  considers  and  adopts  literally 


scores  of  resolutions  on  subjects  rang- 
ing from  the  so-called  urgent  need  for  a 
comprehensive  nuclear  test-ban  treaty 
to  the  importance  of  multilateral  nego- 
tiations at  the  CD  to  prevent  an  arms 
race  in  outer  space.  Not  only  is  there  a 
surplus  in  the  number  of  such  resolu- 
tions but  there  is  also  a  surfeit  of  un- 
realistic, hyperbolic  formulations  in 
their  texts. 

The  United  States  endorses  and 
supports  the  various  proposals  which 
have  been  made  to  rationalize  the  work 
of  the  First  Committee  by  such  devices 
as  confining  its  consideration  of  indi- 
vidual agenda  items  to  alternate  years. 
We  will  continue  to  promote  such  pro- 
posals, but,  more  to  the  point,  we 
would  hope  that  member  states  would 
exercise  greater  restraint  in  the  lan- 
guage of  the  resolutions  which  they  in- 
troduce. Rhetorical,  polemical  texts  on 
the  so-called  urgent  need  for  a  compre- 
hensive test  ban,  for  example,  are 
hardly  conducive  to  the  climate  affect- 
ing the  serious  negotiations  now  under- 
way between  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  on  nuclear  testing  issues. 

The  plethora  of  resolutions  con- 
sidered annually  by  the  First  Commit- 
tee leads  me  to  my  final  point,  which 
directly  relates  to  the  deliberations 
of  this  working  group:  at  a  time  of  con- 
tinuing financial  crisis  over  the  organi- 
zation, the  UN  machinery  in  the  field 
of  disarmament  needs  to  be  ration- 
alized, streamlined,  and  made  more 
cost  effective.  My  delegation  applauds 
the  welcome  first  steps  toward  this 
end,  such  as  the  proposals  which  have 
been  made  in  the  UNDC  working  group 
over  which  you  have  presided,  Mr. 
Chairman,  and  the  adoption  last  year  of 
Resolution  42/42N  entitled  "Rational- 
ization of  the  work  of  the  First  Com- 
mittee." We  hope  and  expect  that, 
consistent  with  the  J^equest  of  that  res- 
olution, the  committee  will  implement 
the  recommendations  contained  therein 
at  the  43d  General  Assembly. 

Room  for  Further  Improvement 

But  more  needs  to  be  done.  For  exam- 
ple, one  cost-saving  measure  would  be 
for  the  First  Committee  and  the  Disar- 
mament Commission  to  adopt  the  prac- 
tice of  summary  records  rather  than 
verbatim  records.  Consideration  should 
also  be  given  to  adjourning  those  UN 
subsidiary  bodies  which  have  failed  to 
achieve  substantive  progress.  I  note 
that  such  a  step  has  already  been  taken 
in  the  case  of  the  Ad  Hoc  Committee  on 
the  World  Disarmament  Conference. 


During  the  course  of  this  working 
group's  deliberations,  my  delegation 
will  offer  other  ideas. 

Consistent  with  our  views  on  the 
need  to  streamline  the  disarmament 
machinery,  the  United  States  does  not 
perceive  any  need  to  create  new,  du- 
plicative UN  mechanisms  in  this  field 
We  are  aware  of  proposals  from  some 
member  states  for  the  establishment 
new  organs,  such  as  a  UN  verification 
mechanism  and  an  international  outer 
space  inspectorate.  I  wish  to  reiterate 
that  my  delegation  will  continue  to  op 
pose  such  proposals  on  both  financial 
and,  more  importantly,  substantive 
grounds. 

We  also  are  aware  of  proposals  bj 
some  states  that  certain  components  i 
the  UN  system  which  have  heretofore 
not  played  a  role  in  disarmament  shoi 
be  accorded  such  a  role.  The  United 
States  believes  that  we  already  have 
sufficient  UN  bodies  to  consider  the 
broad  agenda  of  arms  control  and  dis£ 
mament,  as  manifested  in  this  special 
session,  for  example.  To  accord  a  role 
in  disarmament  matters  to  other  bodi 
would  diffuse  the  overall  focus  of  dis- 
cussion. This  would  be  a  prescription 
for  failure. 

The  U.S.  delegation  approaches  t 
work  of  this  working  group,  and  of  th 
special  session  overall,  in  a  positive  a 
constructive  spirit.  We  trust  that  all 
other  delegations  will  adopt  a  similar 
approach.  For,  if  our  work  here  is  to 
contribute  to  a  more  constructive  atn 
sphere  for  the  conduct  of  arms  contrc 
and  disarmament  negotiations,  we  mi 
be  realistic  and  avoid  divisive  propost 
and  overly  ambitious  concepts  which 
clearly  are  not  susceptible  to  consen- 
sus. We  must  recognize  that  while  th< 
General  Assembly  provides  the  centr 
forum  for  deliberations,  at  which  all 
member  States  are  able  to  express  th 
particular  concerns  about  arms  contn 
and  disarmament,  the  conduct  of  neg' 
tiations  lies  outside  our  purview  but 
can  be,  and  is,  influenced  by  what  we 
accomplish  here.  Whether  the  outcon: 
of  this  special  session  contributes  to  t 
international  environment  in  which  fti 
ther  agreements  can  be  reached  and 
implemented  will  largely  depend  upoi 
realistic  and  reasonable  approach  by 
of  us  assembled  here.  ■ 


: 


66 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/September  ISl  1 


UNITED  NATIONS 


Ldvancing  U.S.  Objectives 
1  the  United  Nations 


r  Richard  S.  Williamson 

Address  before  the  Council  of 
ashington  Representatives  on  the 
nited  Nations  on  June  21,  1988.  Ani- 
issador  Williamson  is  Assistant  Sec- 
tary for  International  Organization 
ffairs. 

Dr  many  Americans  the  United  Na- 
ons  has  become  a  focal  point  of  our 
-eat  dissatisfaction,  frustration,  and 
tterness  over  what  the  postwar  world 
IS  become.  The  United  Nations  was 
•eated  under  America's  leadership 
ith  the  hope  that  a  future  world  order 
ould  emerge  in  which  the  old  colonial 
npires  would  develop  into  independent 
id  sovereign  nation  states  which 
leated  each  other  as  equals.  Just  as 
imericans  conduct  themselves  in  their 
)litical  affairs  civilly  and  peacefully 
id  according  to  the  rule  of  law,  it  was 
iped  that  the  new  countries  would  re- 
iiect  the  injunction  contained  in  the 
N  Charter  to  refrain  from  aggressive 
t;ts  against  one  another. 

Since  the  United  Nations  was 
unded,  over  20  million  people  have 
jen  killed  in  well  over  100  wars  around 
le  world.  Today  regional  conflicts  rage 
the  Middle  East,  Central  America, 
sia,  Africa — each  a  tinderbox  that 
)uld  blaze  out  of  control. 

Once  seen  as  man's  last,  best  hope 
ir  international  order  and  peace,  the 
nited  Nations  has  fallen  into  severe 
Lsrepute  among  many  Americans, 
ritics  have  pointed  out  many  legiti- 
late  problems.  Far  from  being  just  in- 
ffectual  or  an  expensive  Turkish  bath, 
ley  charge  that  the  UN  General 
ssembly  (UNGA)  exacerbates  the 
'Grid's  problems  by  forcing  nations  to 
ike  positions  on  many  matters  on 
hich  they  otherwise  could  avoid  en- 
inglements.  Critics  charge  that  the 
Inited  Nations  is  rife  with  double 
tandards.  And  many  feel  the  United 
Jations  is  hostile  to  our  values  and 
iterests. 

Or  as  William  F.  Buckley  has  ob- 
erved:  "Obviously,  our  country  at- 


taches importance  to  the  values  and 
ideas  of  the  United  Nations.  The  ques- 
tion is  whether  the  United  Nations  at- 
taches any  importance  to  the  values 
and  ideas  of  the  United  Nations." 

The  fact  is  that  member  states  in 
the  United  Nations  have  greatly  pol- 
iticized this  important  body — politicized 
it  in  ways  that  harm  the  United  Na- 
tions and  certainly  do  no  credit  to  the 
member  states  themselves.  The  1975 
UNGA  resolution  branding  Zionism  as 
racism  is  a  disgrace.  It  is  absurd.  It 
damages  efforts  to  bring  peace  to  the 
Middle  East.  It  properly  brings  dis- 
credit to  the  United  Nations. 

The  double  standards  in  the  United 
Nations,  especially  on  human  rights, 
undermine  the  United  Nation's  moral 
authority  and,  some  would  say,  its  le- 
gitimacy. Name  calling — while  less — 
still  persists  in  the  United  Nations. 
This,  too,  is  unacceptable. 

The  fact  is  that  the  member  states 
in  the  United  Nations  have  supported, 
and  for  too  long  allowed  to  flourish, 
mismanagement  and  inefficiency.  As 
the  United  Nation's  largest  financial 
contributor  by  far— nearly  $900  miUion 
this  year  in  assessed  and  voluntary  con- 
tributions paid  by  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment— this  is  cause  for  profound 
concern. 

Having  pointed  out  some  of  these 
serious  problems  in  the  United  Na- 
tions— problems  the  United  States 
must  diligently  and  forcefully  seek  to 
correct — let  me  now  say  categorically 
that  the  United  Nations  matters.  It  is 
important.  It  is  important  to  the  world 
community,  and  it  is  important  to  the 
United  States. 

The  UN  Charter  reflects  our  fun- 
damental beliefs,  our  basic  values,  and 
our  aspirations  for  mankind.  Further, 
the  United  Nations,  in  many  of  its  ac- 
tivities, indeed  does  advance  U.S. 
interests. 

•  At  the  International  Atomic  En- 
ergy Agency  (IAEA),  invaluable  and 
near  irreplaceable  work  is  done  on  nu- 
clear nonproliferation,  assurance  of  sup- 
ply, and  nuclear  safety.  The  IAEA 
responded  fully  and  constructively  to 
the  Soviet  nuclear  accident  at  Cher- 


nobyl, helping  to  analyze  the  causes  of 
the  accident,  contain  the  fallout,  and 
draft  international  conventions  to  deal 
with  future  nuclear  accidents. 

•  The  World  Health  Organization 
(WHO)  led  the  fight  to  eradicate  small- 
pox. And  today  at  WHO,  international 
research  on  the  AIDS  [acquired  im- 
mune deficiency  syndrome]  crisis  is  co- 
ordinated and  advanced. 

•  At  the  UN  Fund  for  Drug  Abuse 
Control,  programs  to  battle  ilUcit  drugs 
through  crop  eradication  and  substitu- 
tion are  advanced.  New  international 
conventions  to  strengthen  legal  sanc- 
tions and  enhance  cooperation  to  fight 
illegal  drug  traffic  are  moving  rapidly 
toward  ratification  within  the  United 
Nations. 

•  The  International  Civil  Aviation 
Organization  promotes  higher  stand- 
ards for  aviation  safety,  as  well  as  more 
effective  aviation  and  airport  security 
against  international  terrorism. 

•  The  World  Meterological  Organi- 
zation coordinates  global  weather  re- 
porting and  forecasting. 

At  these  and  other  specialized 
agencies  of  the  UN  system,  important 
work  goes  on  every  day.  And  while 
there  are  continuing  efforts  by  some 
member  states  to  politicize  these 
bodies,  generally  such  assaults  have 
failed.  Further,  notwithstanding  its  se- 
rious faults,  the  General  Assembly  and 
the  Security  Council  can — at  times — 
effectively  advance  U.S.  interests. 

We  see  this  today  with  the  situa- 
tion in  Afghanistan.  The  General  As- 
sembly condemned  the  illegal  occupation 
of  Afghanistan— repeatedly.  World  at- 
tention focused  on  the  issue,  and  pres- 
sure built  for  a  remedy.  Simultaneously, 
the  Secretary  General's  personal  repre- 
sentative. Under  Secretary  Diego  Cor- 
dovez,  worked  to  find  a  political  solu- 
tion. Now,  the  United  Nations  is  not 
the  cause  for  the  present  Soviet  troop 
withdrawal.  Events  on  the  ground  in 
Afghanistan  and  events  and  decisions  in 
Moscow  dictated  the  withdrawal.  None- 
theless, the  United  Nations  made  a 
contribution.  The  United  Nations 
helped  facilitate  the  implementation  of 


■it    nt    CtatO 


RiiiiPtin/SeDtember  1988 


67 


UNITED  NATIONS 


the  political  decision.  The  United  Na- 
tions continues  this  role.  And  this  is 
important. 

The  United  Nations  has  a  critically 
important  role  to  play  in  the  return  of 
over  5  million  refugees,  assisting  over  1 
million  displaced  persons  within  Af- 
ghanistan, and  reconstruction  of  a  coun- 
tryside devastated  by  nearly  9  years  of 
brutal  Soviet  occupation.  The  demands 
for  expertise,  e.xperience,  and  finance 
compel  an  international  response  to  this 
problem,  to  which  the  United  Nations 
and  its  technical  and  development  agen- 
cies can  provide  special  leadership.  The 
United  Nations  has  the  capacity  to  co- 
ordinate and  pool  resources.  Its  agen- 
cies have  the  experience  of  managing 
major  refugee  programs.  It  can  operate 
in  areas  where  other  individual  coun- 
tries may  be  unable  to. 

We  are  delighted  the  Secretary 
General  has  appointed  Prince  Sadrud- 
din  Aga  Khan  as  UN  coordinator  for 
this  effort.  As  President  Reagan  told 
the  Prince  last  week  at  an  Oval  Office 
meeting,  the  U.S.  Government  wants 
to  work  closely,  in  full  cooperation  in 
this  effort,  with  him  and  with  the 
United  Nations. 

Prince  Sadruddin  has  moved  with 
record  speed  in  developing  a  coordi- 
nated UN  program.  At  a  meeting  to 
provide  donors  with  information  re- 
cently held  in  New  York,  Sadruddin 
provided  an  overview  of  his  proposed 
program.  It  will  be  focused  primarily 
on  relief  and  resettlement  of  Afghan 
refugees  and  displaced  persons,  provid- 
ing them  with  food,  agricultural  sup- 
plies, irrigation,  and  health  care.  Most 
importantly,  the  program  will  be  de- 
centrahzed  and  geared  to  provide  assis- 
tance directly  to  the  Afghan  people 
rather  than  channeled  through  the  il- 
legitimate Kabul  regime. 

Further,  the  United  States  must 
recognize  that  the  world  has  become 
more  multifaceted,  and  individual  na- 
tional economies,  including  America's, 
have  become  more  interdependent  on 
the  global  economy.  Newer  nation 
states,  developing  countries,  can  have  a 
major  impact  on  our  vital  interests: 
economic  prosperity,  war,  and  peace. 
As  sovereign  nations  they  deserve  our 
respect.  We  must  seek  to  understand 
their  interests  and  aspirations. 

The  Soviet  Union  remains  our  pri- 
mary adversary:  the  East-West  debate 
properly  is  the  dominant  diplomatic 
concern  of  the  United  States.  Yet  the 


East- West  debate  cannot  be  our  only 
concern  or  bilateral  relations  our  sole 
effective  means  of  diplomacy. 

With  increasing  frequency  we 
should  seek  multilateral  solutions.  We 
must  seek  creative  solutions  for  North- 
South  as  well  as  East- West  issues.  And 
to  advance  U.S.  vital  interests,  we 
must  work  with  developing  countries. 
There  are  a  variety  of  multilateral  for- 
ums in  the  world  today  where  such  co- 
operation should  be  sought.  And  it  is 
the  United  Nations  which  remains  the 
primary  multilateral  arena.  The  United 
States  must  show  proper  respect  for 
developing  countries'  highest  concerns 
in  their  preferred  diplomatic  forum:  the 
United  Nations. 

President  Reagan  has  addressed 
the  United  Nations  six  times — more 
than  any  of  his  predecessors.  In  Dr. 
Jeane  Kirkpatrick  and  Gen.  Vernon 
Walters,  President  Reagan  sent  distin- 
guished and  very  able  ambassadors  to 
New  York  to  advance  U.S.  interests  in 
the  United  Nations.  Their  selections  re- 
flected the  importance  Ronald  Reagan 
placed  on  the  United  Nations  and  his 
commitment  to  improve  it. 

Ambassador  Kirkpatrick  took  the 
"Kick  Me"  sign  off  the  U.S.  delegation. 
Her  forceful  eloquence  advanced  the 
U.S.  agenda.  In  the  United  Nations, 
name  calling  has  all  but  stopped. 
Efforts  to  delegitimize  Israel  unfortu- 
nately continue,  but  the  momentum  to 
challenge  Israeli  credentials  within  the 
United  Nations  and  its  specialized 
agencies  has  been  reversed. 

Following  a  2-year  campaign  led  by 
Ambassador  Walters  and  the  United 
States,  this  past  March,  the  UN  Hu- 
man Rights  Commission  took  a  major 
step  to  correct  the  cynicism,  hypocrisy, 
and  double  standards  of  the  United  Na- 
tions in  the  field  of  human  rights.  For 
years,  Cuba  has  been  the  worst  UN 
member  of  all  in  violating  its  citizens' 
human  rights.  Nonetheless,  it  remained 
free  from  careful  scrutiny  by  the 
United  Nations.  This  year,  the  United 
States  succeeded  in  achieving  a  consen- 
sus decision  at  the  UN  Human  Rights 
Commission  to  launch  an  investigation 
into  Cuba's  human  rights  abuses.  Al- 
ready Castro  has  begun  to  free  some 
political  prisoners,  improve  prison  con- 
ditions, and  allow  greater  religious 
freedom. 


In  1986,  under  the  able  leadership 
of  U.S.  Permanent  Representative  to 
the  United  Nations  Vernon  Walters  am 
of  Ambassadors  Keyes  [former  U.S. 
Representative  to  the  Economic  and 
Social  Council]  and  Sorzano  [former 
Deputy  Permanent  Representative  to 
the  United  Nations],  the  UN  reform 
effort  really  took  off. 

The  U.S.  efforts  succeeded  in  the 
establishment  of  a  "Group  of  18  Govern 
mental  Experts"  to  look  at  the  need  fo 
budget  and  program  reform  in  the 
United  Nations.  The  Group  of  18  pro- 
posed some  sweeping  measures  affect- 
ing personnel  reductions,  budgeting  b; 
consensus,  and  the  need  to  establish 
program  priorities.  The  United  States 
worked  tirelessly  with  other  major  do- 
nors to  advance  these  proposals,  both 
in  the  United  Nations  and  in  UN  spe- 
cialized agencies.  Most  of  the  spe- 
cialized agencies  now  have  adopted 
significant  aspects  of  these  reform  pro 
posals.  The  UN  members  are  teeterin 
on  the  brink  of  implementing  these  pr 
posals,  but  whether  the  UN  mem- 
bership has  the  political  will  to  fully 
implement  these  needed  reforms  is  sti 
an  open  question.  U.S.  resolute  lead- 
ership during  the  rest  of  this  Admin- 
istration and  the  next  will  be  necessai 
to  achieve  the  reforms  required  to 
make  the  United  Nations  budgetarily 
responsible  and  programatically 
effective. 

The  Group  of  18  recommendations 
are  extremely  important,  not  only  be- 
cause they  offer  hope  for  improved 
management  and  a  rational  budget 
process  but  just  as  critical,  perhaps 
more  so,  because  the  CPC  [Committe 
on  Program  Coordination]  consensus 
decisionmaking  offers  hope  that  the  ir 
portance  of  consensus  decisionmaking 
can  be  relearned  in  the  UN  General 
Assembly. 

The  force  and  effectiveness  of  the 
United  Nations  lies  in  consensus,  not 
polarization.  The  contentious  balkaniz 
tion  within  the  United  Nations  today, 
driven  in  large  part  by  regional  blocs, 
hurts  the  institution  and  thwarts  its  pi 
tential  effectiveness. 

Some  charge  that  the  Reagan  Ad- 
ministration has  been  too  tough-mindc 
toward  the  United  Nations.  But  the 
facts  speak  for  themselves.  We  are  no 
longer  in  retreat  within  the  United  N 
tions.  Thanks  in  large  part  to  forceful 


nenartmont  nf  ^tato  Riillotin/^Ant(>mhpr  1Qfl 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


irsistent,  clear-headed  U.S.  lead- 
ship,  the  United  Nations  is  a  better 
ace  today  than  it  was  8  years  ago. 

The  United  Nations  is  still  an  in- 
itution  with  serious  flaws — a  forum  of 
•eat  frustration  for  us.  But  it  also  is  a 
rum  of  opportunity  for  us.  The 
nited  Nations  matters.  It  matters  a 
t.  We  must  dedicate  ourselves  to 
orking  constructively  in  the  United 
ations  to  advance  U.S.  interests,  and 
I  help  us  achieve  those  interests,  to 
Ivance  UN  reform.  ■ 


Reciprocal  Expulsion 
of  Nicaraguan  Diplomats 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
JULY  12,  1988' 

This  afternoon  the  Under  Secretary  for 
Political  Affairs,  Mr.  Michael  H.  Arma- 
cost,  advised  Nicaraguan  Ambassador 
Carlos  Tunnermann  that  his  continued 
presence  in  the  United  States,  as  well 
as  that  of  Mr.  Manuel  Cordero,  Mrs. 
Sofia  Clark  D'Escoto,  Mr.  Orlando  Mar- 
tin Vega  Gutierrez,  Mrs.  Zelmira  L. 
Garcia,  Mr.  Angel  R.  Arce,  Maj.  Pedro 
Sampson  Mendoza  (Military  Attache), 
and  Mrs.  Maureen  Sampson,  was  no 
longer  acceptable  to  the  Government  of 
the  United  States.  Both  Ambassador 
Tunnermann  and  Maj.  Sampson  have 
engaged  in  activities  that  constitute  an 
abuse  of  their  privileges  of  residence  in 
the  United  States.  All  eight  have  been 
ordered  to  leave  the  country  within  72 
hours. 

We  are  considering  other  measures 
which  may  be  necessary  in  the  light  of 
Nicaragua's  unwarranted  action  of  ex- 
pelling U.S.  diplomats  for  engaging  in 
normal  diplomatic  activities.  The  false 
charges  made  by  Sandinista  Foreign 
Minister  Miguel  D'Escoto  that  [U.S.] 
Ambassador  Melton  and  the  members 
of  our  Embassy  have  engaged  in  pur- 
ported criminal  acts  and  that  the  Ad- 
ministration is  guilty  of  "crimes  against 
humanity"  are  not  worthy  of  comment. 

This  latest  Sandinista  action  is  not 
only  directed  at  the  United  States;  it  is 
a  calculated  threat  directed  to  the  Nic- 
araguan people.  It  follows  a  virulent 
propaganda  campaign  directed  at  sub- 
duing and  intimidating  the  people  of 
Nicaragua  and  suppressing  any  dissent. 

At  Esquipulas,  San  Jose,  and 
Sapoa,  the  Sandinista  regime  solemnly 
pledged  to  implement  measures  to 
bring  true  democracy  and  authentic  na- 
tional reconciliation  to  Nicaragua.  They 
have  acted  instead  to  imprison  and  to 
intimidate  those  who  would  dissent. 

On  the  same  day  that  our  Ambas- 
sador was  being  expelled.  Radio 
CatoUca  was  again  shut  down  indefi- 
nitely for  unspecified  violations  of  a 
Sandinista  media  law.  The  independent 
newspaper.  La  Prensa,  was  silenced  by 
the  Interior  Ministry  for  15  days.  Only 
a  day  before,  43  members  of  the  civic 
opposition  were  imprisoned,  and  an  un- 
known number  of  peaceful  marchers 


were  attacked,  beaten,  and  injured  by 
Sandinista  police  in  the  small  town  of 
Nandaime.  Since  the  signing  of  the  Es- 
quipulas accord  on  August  7,  1987, 
there  have  been  almost  daily  violations 
by  the  Sandinistas  of  their  commitments. 
It  is  now  time  for  the  signatories  of 
the  Esquipulas  accord  to  carefully  con- 
sider the  purpose  and  value  of  San- 
dinista pledges  in  light  of  the  clear, 
calculated,  and  unequivocal  pattern  of 
Sandinista  actions  which  violate  both 
the  spirit  and  the  letter  of  these 
commitments. 


AMBASSADOR  MC  CORMACK'S 

REMARKS, 
OAS  PERMANENT  COUNCIL, 
JULY  14,  19882 

For  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  this 
organization,  the  United  States,  as  host 
country,  had  reason  to  invoke  its  rights 
under  Article  3  of  the  March  20,  1975, 
Agreement  Related  to  Privileges  and 
Immunities  between  the  United  States 
and  the  Organization  of  American 
States  to  request  the  departure  of  dip- 
lomats accredited  to  the  Organization  of 
American  States  (OAS)  in  light  of  their 
abuse  of  their  privilege  of  residence  in 
the  United  States. 

Article  3  reads  as  follows: 

In  case  of  abuse  of  the  privileges  of  resi- 
dence in  the  United  States  by  any  person 
enjoying  diplomatic  privileges  and  immu- 
nities under  the  foregoing  articles,  the  said 
privileges  and  immunities  shall  not  be  con- 
strued to  grant  exemption  from  the  laws 
and  regulations  of  the  United  States  re- 
garding the  continued  residence  of  aliens. 
However,  no  such  person  shall  be  required 
to  leave  the  country  othervifise  than  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  customary  procedure  ap- 
plicable to  diplomatic  envoys  accredited  to 
the  Government  of  the  United  States. 

The  agreement  was,  of  course, 
signed  by  all  OAS  member 
governments. 

Mindful  of  our  obligations  as  the 
host  country,  the  U.S.  delegation 
wishes  to  present  the  following  infor- 
mation to  the  Permanent  Council. 

On  July  12,  I  was  instructed  to  de- 
liver the  following  note  to  the  chairman 
of  the  Permanent  Council  and  the  As- 
sistant Secretary  General  in  charge  of 
the  General  Secretariat: 


eoartment  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


69 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


No.  52- A 

Excellency: 

On  behalf  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  I  am  instructed  to  refer 
to  the  March  20,  1975,  Agreement  Related 
to  Privileges  and  Immunities  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Organization  of 
American  States  and  the  continued  pres- 
ence in  the  United  States  of  the  Permanent 
Representative  of  the  Republic  of  Nic- 
aragua, Ambassador  Carlos  Tunnermann, 
and  of  Major  Pedro  Sampson,  Military  At- 
tache and  Adviser  to  the  Permanent  Mis- 
sion of  Nicaragua  to  the  Organization  of 
American  States.  Today,  my  Government 
informed  Ambassador  Tunnermann  that,  in 
light  of  their  activities  and  actions  which 
constitute  abuse  of  their  privileges  of  resi- 
dence in  the  United  States,  their  presence 
in  this  country  is  no  longer  acceptable  to 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America.  They  have  been  requested  to  ar- 
range for  their  departure  from  the  United 
States  within  seventy-two  hours  of 
5:30  p.m.,  July  12,  1988. 

Accept,  E.xcellency,  the  renewed  as- 
surances of  my  highest  consideration. 

Sincerely, 

Richard  T.  McCormack 

Ambassador 

Permanent  Representative 

On  the  afternoon  of  July  12,  Under 
Secretary  of  State  Michael  Armacost 
informed  Ambassador  Tunnermann  that 
his  continued  presence  in  the  United 
States,  as  well  as  that  of  Maj.  Pedro 
Sampson  Mendoza,  a  military  attache 
and  adviser  to  the  Permanent  Mission 
of  Nicaragua  to  the  OAS,  were  no 
longer  acceptable  to  the  United  States 
of  America.  Under  Secretary  Armacost 
also  advised  Ambassador  Tunnermann 
that  the  presence  of  six  Nicaraguan 
diplomats  accredited  to  the  United 
States  was  no  longer  acceptable  to  the 
United  States  and  requested  him  to  ar- 
range for  the  departure  of  all  eight  dip- 
lomats within  72  hours.  Ambassador 
Tunnermann  was  given  two  diplomatic 
notes  which  confirmed  the  decision  of 
the  United  States:  one  in  his  capacity 
as  the  Nicaraguan  Permanent  Repre- 
sentative to  the  OAS  and  the  other  in 
his  capacity  as  Ambassador  of  Nic- 
aragua to  the  United  States. 

The  United  States  is  committed  to 
carrying  out  its  obligations  under  the 
Charter  as  host  country  to  the  Organi- 
zation of  American  States,  its  officers 
and  employees,  and  the  accredited  rep- 
resentatives of  its  member  states.  In 
return,  OAS  missions  and  members  of 
the  General  Secretariat  are  obliged  not 
to  abuse  their  privilege  of  residence 
through  their  conduct  in  the  host 
country. 


Certain  activities  and  actions  of 
Ambassador  Tunnermann  and  Maj. 
Sampson  while  serving  in  a  diplomatic 
mission  located  in  the  United  States 
constitute  an  abuse  of  their  privilege  of 
residence  in  the  United  States  under 
the  March  20,  1975,  Agreement  Related 
to  Privileges  and  Immunities  between 
the  United  States  of  America  and  the 
Organization  of  American  States. 

The  Organization  of  American 
States  can  take  pride  in  the  fact  that 
the  United  States  has  never  before  had 
any  reason  to  use  its  legal  authority  to 
take  actions  against  diplomats  ac- 
credited to  the  OAS  for  abuse  of  their 
privilege  of  residence  in  the  United 
States.  Nonetheless,  in  the  rare  cases 
of  those  who  do  abuse  their  privilege  of 
residence,  the  United  States  has  the 
legal  authority  to  protect  its  sov- 
ereignty and  inherent  rights  as  host 
country  by  taking  appropriate  action, 
based  upon  Article  3  of  the  March  20, 
1975,  Agreement  Related  to  Privileges 
and  Immunities  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Organization  of  Ameri- 
can States.  I  should  note  that  in  the 
UN  context,  the  United  States  has 
been  forced  to  invoke  this  principle 
some  two  dozen  times. 

Some  have  asked  why  the  United 
States  waited  until  its  Ambassador  and 
diplomats  in  Managua  were  expelled  by 
the  Nicaraguan  Government  to  order 
the  departure  of  Ambassador  Tunner- 
mann and  Maj.  Sampson  for  abuses  of 
their  privilege  of  residence. 

Prior  to  the  events  of  this  week, 
the  United  States  had  information  on 
which  to  base  its  request  for  their  de- 
parture. Nevertheless,  in  the  spirit  of 
the  Esquipulas  agreement,  we  deferred 
action  in  order  to  avoid  giving  the  Nic- 
araguan Government  a  pretext  for  tak- 
ing the  kinds  of  actions  it  perpetrated 
this  week  in  expelling  our  own 
Ambassador. 

It  was  important  to  have  an  ambas- 
sador and  a  functioning  embassy  in 
Managua.  Obviously,  Nicaragua's  ac- 
tions against  our  diplomats  in  Nic- 
aragua and  against  the  Nicaraguans 
who  dare  to  speak  out  against  repres- 
sion of  democracy  and  human  rights  in 
Nicaragua  have  removed  the  basis  for 
such  restraint  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States. 

On  July  11,  without  provocation, 
the  Nicaraguan  Government  expelled 
the  U.S.  Ambassador  and  seven  other 
embassy  officers  from  Nicaragua  for 
engaging  in  normal  diplomatic  ac- 
tivities. The  embassy  was  in  contact 


with  major  political  groups,  including 
the  opposition,  in  Nicaragua  as  are  for-ii 
eign  embassies  everywhere,  including  || 
in  the  United  States.  The  Sandinista  n 
government's  charges  against  our  Am-  h 
bassador  and  his  staff  are  patently  fals ! 
and  ridiculous. 

These  Sandinista  actions  are  not  d 
rected  only  against  the  United  States; 
they  are  calculated  efforts  to  subdue, 
isolate,  and  intimidate  the  Nicaraguan 
people.  We  are  outraged  that  the  San- 
dinista government  has,  once  again, 
sought  to  turn  its  internal  conflict  witl 
the  Nicaraguan  people  into  a  bilateral 
issue  with  the  United  States. 

The  recent  actions  of  the  San- 
dinista government  demonstrate  its  de 
termination  to  repress  internal  dissent 
at  all  costs,  including  the  violation  of 
both  the  letter  and  the  spirit  of  the 
Esquipulas  accord.  It  is  time  for  the 
member  states  to  consider  the  purpos 
and  value  of  the  Nicaraguan  Govern- 
ment's pledges  in  light  of  its  clear,  cor 
sistent,  and  calculated  pattern  of 
violations  of  its  commitments  to  the  0 
ganization  of  American  States,  to  the 
Central  American  democracies,  and  t( 
its  own  people. 

Allow  me  to  cite  some  of  the  ac- 
tions the  Nicaraguan  Government  has 
taken  against  its  own  people  during  t 
last  few  days. 

On  July  11,  the  day  that  our  Am- 
bassador to  Nicaragua  was  being  ex- 
pelled. Radio  Catolica  was  shut  down 
indefinitely  for  unspecified  violations 
a  Sandinista  media  censorship  law.  A{ 
parently.  Radio  Catolica  was  told  tha 
it  had  been  closed  for  broadcasting 
"tendentious  information  that  was 
false"  on  July  10-11.  We  understand 
that  the  only  news  broadcast  by  Radi 
Catolica  during  that  period  was  a  pre 
conference  given  on  July  10  by  Cardii 
Obando  y  Bravo. 

Is  the  Nicaraguan  Government  at 
tempting  to  censor  the  statements  of 
the  Cardinal  who  is  not  only  the  Pres 
dent  of  the  Episcopal  Conference  of 
Nicaragua  but  who  is  also  chairman  o 
Nicaragua's  National  Reconciliation 
Commission  and  the  cochairman  of  th 
Verification  Commission  of  the  Sapoa 
agreement? 

On  the  same  day,  the  independen 
newspaper.  La  Proisa,  was  silenced  I 
the  Ministry  of  the  Interior  for  15  daj 
This  action  followed  a  vicious  campai^ 
carried  on  by  the  government-control! 
media  to  defame  the  owner  of  La 
Proisa,  Mrs.  Violeta  Chamorro,  as  a 
"war  criminal." 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Does  this  represent  the  Nicaraguan 
ivernment's  compliance  with  its 
;dges  under  the  Esquipulas  accord 
d  the  Sapoa  agreement  to  guarantee 
;edom  of  the  press? 

On  July  10,  thousands  of  Nic- 
aguans  took  part  in  a  peaceful  dem- 
stration  coordinated  by  the  civic 
position  in  the  small  town  of  Nan- 
ime.  Forty-three  demonstrators,  who 
e  members  of  the  democratic  opposi- 
)n,  were  imprisoned,  and  an  unknown 
imber  of  peaceful  marchers  were  bru- 
lly  attacked  and  beaten  by  the  San- 
nista  police.  Four  arrested  leaders 
;re  each  "sentenced"  to  6  months 
jail,  not  by  the  courts  but  by  the 
lice.  Yesterday,  the  Sandinista  gov- 
nment  arrested  Roger  Guevara,  Sec- 
tary General  of  the  Democratic 
jordinator,  the  coalition  of  opposition 
d  independent  unions  that  organized 
e  demonstration. 

Is  this  the  way  the  Sandinista  gov- 
•nment  complies  with  its  commitments 
ider  the  Arias  plan  and  the  American 
)nvention  on  Human  Rights  to  guar- 
tee  freedom  of  association,  freedom 
expression,  and  freedom  of  assembly? 

On  the  night  of  July  3,  having  il- 
^ally  entered  his  home  at  2:00  o'clock 
the  morning,  Sandinista  police  shot 
d  killed  Carlos  Garcia,  a  leader  of 
e  independent  labor  confederation, 
mtral  Unificado  de  Sindicatos. 

Is  this  the  due  process  to  which 
le  Nicaraguan  Government  committed 
self  under  the  American  Convention 

Human  Rights  and  under  its  own 
institution? 

During  the  last  negotiations  under 
e  Sapoa  agreement  in  June,  Defense 
inister  Ortega  threatened  the  lives  of 
e  resistance  delegation  if  they  did  not 
gn  the  Sandinista  government's  pro- 
)sed  agreement.  These  threats  were 
tered  in  the  presence  of  the  two  wit- 
isses,  [OASJ  Secretary  General  Baena 
Dares  and  Cardinal  Obando  y  Bravo. 

Is  this  the  spirit  of  national  recon- 
liation  to  which  the  Nicaraguan  Gov- 
•nment  is  pledged  under  the 
squipulas  accord  and  the  Sapoa 
^reement? 

With  the  nationalization  of  Nic- 
ragua's  largest  private  sugar  mill  yes- 
!rday,  the  Sandinista  government  has 
snt  unequivocal  messages  of  intimida- 
on  to  all  of  the  independent  sectors  of 
licaraguan  society:  the  church,  the  op- 
osition  parties,  the  media,  the  free 
rade  unions,  and  the  private  sector. 

Is  this  the  way  that  the  Nic-  ^ 
raguan  Government  implements  its 
ommitment  to  establish  a  pluralistic 
ociety? 


Nicaraguan  Peace  Negotiations 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
JUNE  10,  19881 

The  President  is  disappointed  at  the 
Sandinista  rejection  of  the  Nicaraguan 
resistance  proposal  to  achieve  democ- 
racy and  an  end  to  the  war  in  Nic- 
aragua. Sandinista  promises  of 
democracy  date  back  to  1979  in  commit- 
ments made  to  the  Organization  of 
American  States  (OAS)  and  repeated  in 
the  Guatemala  accord  of  August  7, 
1987,  the  San  Jose  declaration  of  Janu- 
ary 16,  1988,  and  the  Sapoa  agreement 
of  March  23,  1988.  If  the  dialogue  be- 
tween the  resistance  and  the  San- 
dinistas is  to  resume,  the  Sandinistas 
must  show  a  willingness  to  carry  out 
the  promises  to  establish  democracy 
that  they  have  made,  and  broken  re- 
peatedly, over  the  past  decade. 

In  the  June  7-9  round  of  talks,  the 
resistance  proposed  specific  steps  to 
implement  a  calendar  of  previous  San- 
dinista commitments  for  establishing 
democracy  in  Nicaragua  in  conjunction 


The  grave  violations  of  the  Nic- 
araguan Government's  commitments  to 
the  hemisphere  and  to  its  own  people 
that  I  have  cited  all  occurred  within  the 
past  few  days.  Unfortunately,  they  are 
a  continuation  of  a  consistent  pattern  of 
serious  abuses.  I  have  asked  the  Gen- 
eral Secretariat  to  distribute  to  each 
delegation  around  this  table  a  12-page 
chronology  of  Sandinista  abuses  since 
the  signing  of  the  Esquipulas  accord  on 
August  7,  1987.  This  document,  which 
was  prepared  by  the  Department  of 
State  on  the  basis  of  verifiable  informa- 
tion, illustrates  the  cynicism  with 
which  the  Sandinista  leadership 
pledged  to  implement  the  Esquipulas 
accord  and  the  Sapoa  agi-eement.  The 
number  and  gravity  and  brutality  of 
violations  committed  by  the  Nicaraguan 
Government  are  staggering. 

I  hereby  respectfully  request  you 
to  issue  this  chronology  as  an  informa- 
tion document  of  the  Permanent  Coun- 
cil and  to  an-ange  for  its  translation. 

I  urge  all  of  OAS  members  to 
study  this  document  and  to  consider 
carefully  the  value  of  the  pledges  of  the 
Nicaraguan  Government  against  its 
shameful  record  of  noncompliance. 


with  the  cease-fire  process.  However,  it 
became  clear  that  the  Sandinistas  were 
not  interested  in  democratization  and 
national  reconciliation.  Their  sole  goal 
was  the  disarmament  of  the  resistance. 
Deeds,  not  more  words,  are  needed. 
Those  who  insisted  that  the  best  way  to 
achieve  peace  and  democracy  in  Nic- 
aragua was  to  withdraw  military  pres- 
sure on  the  Sandinistas  now  bear  a 
special  responsibility  to  press  for  de- 
mocracy in  Nicaragua. 

Ambassador  Max  Kampelman,  the 
Counselor  of  the  Department  of  State, 
had  scheduled  visits  to  the  Central 
American  democracies  to  brief  their 
leaders  on  events  at  the  recent  sum- 
mit in  Moscow,  including  the  summit 
discussions  on  regional  issues.  The 
President  now  has  directed  that  the 
Ambassador  seek  the  views  of  the  lead- 
ers of  the  democracies  on  the  current 
situation  in  Nicaragua  as  well. 


■Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  June  13,  1988. 


The  Presidents  of  the  Central 
American  democi-acies  have  said  many 
times:  There  can  be  no  real  peace  with- 
out democracy  in  Nicaragua. 

The  Sandinistas  promised  democ- 
racy in  their  message  to  this  organiza- 
tion in  July  1979.  They  promised 
democracy  in  the  Esquipulas  II  agree- 
ment of  August  1987.  They  said,  "Oh 
yes,  we  will  hurry  to  institute  democ- 
racy" when  they  signed  the  declaration 
of  Central  American  Presidents  of  San 
Jose  last  January.  And  they  promised 
democracy  in  the  Sapoa  agreement 
3  months  ago. 

But  what  have  they  in  fact  done? 
They  have  used  every  tool  available  to 
them — violence,  intimidation,  cajolery, 
pretense,  and  insincere  negotiations — 
to  maintain  their  tight,  exclusive  con- 
trol over  the  helpless  people  of  Nic- 
aragua. While  promising  respect  for 
human  rights,  they  have  kept  thou- 
sands of  political  prisoners  in  jail,  deny- 
ing them  amnesty  or  due  process 
despite  repeated  protests  by  the  Inter- 
American  Commission  on  Human 
Rights. 

The  Sandinista  government  has  of- 
fered excuses  for  its  failure  to  imple- 


/CantamKer  IQAft 


71 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


ment  democracy  and  respect  for  human 
rights.  It  cannot  do  so,  they  claim, 
while  the  U.S.  Embassy  is  watching.  It 
cannot  do  so,  they  claim,  until  it  has 
defeated  the  resistance.  Apparently  it 
cannot  even  do  so  until  the  civic  opposi- 
tion is  crushed.  Are  we  to  understand 
that  the  Nicaraguan  Government  plans 
to  wait  until  all  of  the  independent  in- 
stitutions have  been  suppressed  and 
their  leaders  are  behind  bars  to  estab- 
lish some  sort  of  so-called  democracy? 
Are  the  governments  of  the  hemisphere 
going  to  accept  such  an  outcome,  or  are 
we  going  to  demonstrate  our  solidarity 
with  those  courageous  Nicaraguans 
who  are  strugghng  for  freedom  and  de- 
mocracy for  their  people? 

The  position  of  the  United  States  is 
clear.  Not  only  has  the  Administration 
forcefully  condemned  the  recent  San- 
dinista  violations,  but  the  U.S.  Senate 
yesterday  approved  by  an  overwhelm- 
ing majority  a  bipartisan  resolution 
strongly  condemning  the  actions  taken 
by  the  Nicaraguan  Government  against 
both  the  American  Embassy  and  the 
people  of  Nicaragua. 

The  shameful  record  of  Sandinista 
violations  of  their  commitments  under 
the  Esquipulas  accord  does  not  mean 
that  the  Arias  plan  has  failed.  The  Es- 
quipulas II  accord  has  successfully  es- 
tablished a  standard  by  which  the 
progress  or  lack  thereof  of  the  Central 
American  governments  toward  estab- 
lishing democracy,  pluralism,  and  the 
full  protection  of  human  rights  can  be 
judged.  By  these  standards,  set  by  the 
five  Central  American  Presidents  them- 
selves, including  President  Ortega,  Nic- 
aragua has  demonstrated  to  the  world 
its  utter  failure  to  comply. 

For  a  just  and  lasting  peace  to 
come  to  Central  America,  the  San- 
dinistas must  show — by  actions  and  not 
mere  words — that  they  are  prepared  to 
carry  out  the  promises  to  establish  de- 
mocracy and  respect  human  rights  that 
they  have  made  and  broken  repeatedly 
over  the  past  decade.  Only  then  will 
Nicaragua's  people  and  their  neighbors 
in  Central  America  be  free  from  fear. 


Cuba:  "Our  Last  Adversary" 


'Made  available  to  news  correspond- 
ents by  Department  deputy  spokesman 
Phyllis  Oakley. 

^Richard  T.  McCormack  is  U.S.  Perma- 
nent Representative  to  the  Organization  of 
American  States.  ■ 


by  Kenneth  N.  Skoug,  Jr. 

Address  before  the  Florida  Eco- 
nomics Club  in  Tallahassee  on  May  13, 
1988.  Mr.  Skoug  is  Coordinator  for 
Cuban  Affairs. 

Fortuitously,  Cuba  has  been  very  much 
in  the  headlines  recently,  at  least  in  the 
southern  part  of  Florida.  The  thrust  of 
what  has  been  written  and  said  of  late 
is  that  there  is  a  new  U.S.  policy  with 
respect  to  Cuba,  based  on  secret  diplo- 
macy and  looking  to  the  reestablish- 
ment  of  diplomatic  relations  between 
Washington  and  Havana  at  some  early 
date.  Those  who  report  this  so-called 
warming  trend  in  relations  also  tend  to 
be  unhappy  about  it.  The  reality  is  that 
there  is  much  less  here  than  meets  the 
eye. 

I  would  like  to  try  to  put  U.S.- 
Cuban relations  in  perspective  by  tak- 
ing a  careful  look  at  some  of  the  under- 
lying realities.  Clearly,  there  has  been 
an  improvement  in  the  relationship  if 
one  compares  it  with  the  situation 
prevailing  about  1  year  ago,  when  the 
Government  of  Cuba  was  not  even  per- 
mitting us  to  send  necessary,  and  hith- 
erto routinely  authorized,  charter 
supply  flights  to  the  U.S.  Interests 
Section  in  Havana  and  was  obstructing 
the  orderly  transfer  of  diplomatic 
pouches.  At  that  time  Cuba  was  still 
refusing  to  implement  a  bilateral  migra- 
tion agreement  which  we  had  signed  in 
December  1984  because  Havana  ob- 
jected to  the  broadcasting  of  the  Radio 
Marti  program  of  the  Voice  of  America, 
which  began  on  May  20,  1985.  In  1987, 
Cuban  officials  were  describing  rela- 
tions with  the  United  States  as  the 
worst  ever,  which  is  saying  quite  a  lot. 

Migration  Agreement 

At  present  those  supply  and  pouch 
problems  appear  to  be  behind  us.  Since 
November  20,  1987,  the  mutually  bene- 
ficial migration  agreement  is  again  be- 
ing implemented.  We  achieved  this 
result  without  making  any  concessions 
on  Radio  Marti.  This  is  an  important 
positive  development  which  has  both 
immediate  and  long-term  results, 
providing  for  the  orderly  transfer  of 
Cubans  to  the  United  States  in  accor- 
dance with  U.S.  law.  It  is  particularly 
beneficial  to  Cuban-Americans  and 


their  relatives  in  Cuba.  Unfortunately, 
some  persons  have  criticized  this  agree 
ment  since  its  reimplementation  be- 
cause it  provides  for  the  return  to  Cub 
of  certain  persons  who  came  at  the 
time  of  the  Mariel  boatlift  and  abused 
the  hospitality  of  the  United  States  to 
commit  serious  common  crimes  such  as 
murder,  armed  robbery,  rape,  or  traf- 
ficking in  narcotic  drugs.  The  return  o 
those  persons  to  Cuba  was  a  major  ob- 
jective of  both  the  Carter  and  the  Rea- 
gan Administrations  and  was  staunchly 
opposed  by  the  Govei'nment  of  Cuba.  I 
is,  therefore,  ironical  to  see  the  re- 
implementation  of  this  agreement  liste 
by  some  persons  among  the  catalog 
of  dark  deeds  they  quite  mistakenly 
imagine  are  taking  place  between  the 
United  States  and  Cuba. 

The  reality  is  that  thousands  of 
Cubans — all  with  close  relations  in  the 
United  States  or  else  former  political 
prisoners  and  their  families — are  pres 
ently  being  processed  in  the  U.S.  In- 
terests Section  in  Havana  for  admissic 
to  the  United  States  on  the  basis  of  tl 
1984  migration  agreement.  All  of  then 
will  have  thorough  medical  examina- 
tions and  police  checks.  Those  who 
qualify  are  now  beginning  to  arrive 
gradually  and  lawfully  as  bona  fide  iir 
migrants  or  as  refugees.  This  agree- 
ment also  banishes  the  specter  of  a  so 
called  second  Mariel. 

Radio  Talks 

We  are  discussing  radio  matters,  in- 
cluding interference,  with  the  Cubans 
This  is  the  only  bilateral  conversation 
with  Cuba  which  is  now  in  progress. 
Because  of  Cuba's  proximity  and  the 
problems  it  has  caused  for  U.S.  broac 
casters  and  their  audiences,  this  has  i 
ways  been  an  important  issue.  Cuba 
broke  off  talks  with  us  on  radio  inter- 
ference in  1983  after  Congress  enactei 
the  Radio  Broadcasting  to  Cuba  Act, 
which  provided  for  the  establishment 
the  Radio  Marti  program  of  the  Voice 
of  America.  The  radio  talks,  like  vir- 
tually all  bilateral  negotiations,  are  n( 
conducted  in  public,  but  the  fact  that 
they  would  be  held  was  announced  lai- 
November.  We  stated  publicly  in  Febr 
ary  of  this  year  that  a  very  provisions 
first  round  of  talks  had  taken  place  in 
Mexico  City.  The  positions  of  the  two 
governments  on  radio  matters  have 
sharply  diverged  in  the  past.  All  that 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


'3  have  agreed  is  to  discuss  our  differ- 
nces.  Newspaper  articles  to  the  con- 
'arv  are  based  on  the  wildest  specu- 

idii  and  warrant  no  credence.  We  will 
iiuimie  to  announce  all  further  rounds 
(  talks. 

n^oia 

'le  Cubans  are  participating  in  the 
.rigolan  MPLA  [Popular  Movement  for 
le  Liberation  of  Angola]  delegation  in 
llks  with  U.S.  officials  aimed  at  get- 
fig  Cuban  troops  out  of  their  post- 
(lonial  but  also  neocolonial  civil  war  in 
lagola,  in  which  they  have  been  en- 
uged  during  the  past  13  years.  Ob- 
fously,  such  a  withdrawal  would  be  in 
;e  interest  of  the  United  States. 

Fidel  Castro  sent  Cubans  en  masse 
jto  Angola  in  1975  with  the  objective 
ensuring  the  control  of  the  counti-y 
'  the  MPLA  faction,  which  had  long 
ijoyed  Cuban  support.  Although  over 
'0,000  Cubans  have  served  in  Angola, 
jhting  alongside  the  MPLA  or  guard- 
g  rear  areas,  the  war  has  gone  on. 
ast  year,  Cuban  authorities  made 
lown  to  us  that  they  were  prepared  to 
ave  Angola  and  would  like  to  be  in- 
uded  in  the  talks  on  Cuban  troop 
ithdrawal  being  conducted  by  the 
nited  States  with  the  Angolan  MPLA. 

Thus  senior  Cuban  officials  since 
nuary  1988  have  been  participating  as 
embers  of  the  Angolan  delegation  in 
Iks  which  recently  were  broadened  to 
elude  the  South  Africans.  At  this 
)int  we  do  not  know  if  the  Cubans  are 
•epared  to  leave  Angola  and  allow  it 
I  settle  its  domestic  affairs  without 
itside  interference.  We  do  not  yet 
low  if  they  intend  to  negotiate  in  good 
ith  toward  that  end.  At  the  same  time 
;  they  began  to  participate  in  the 
Iks,  they  also  increased  substantially 
le  number  of  their  armed  forces  in 
ngola,  and  they  expanded  the  sphere 
'  their  operations  in  southwestern 
ngola  to  a  point  much  closer  to  the 
amibian  border  than  they  had  pre- 
ously  been.  Perhaps  this  was  in  re- 
)onse  to  an  escalation  in  the  fighting 
lat  had  also  drawn  in  more  South  Af- 
cans.  But  the  fact  is  that  there  are 
)w  considerably  more  Cuban  troops  in 
ngola  than  there  were  a  few  months 

JO. 

If  Cuba  is  serious  about  pulling  its 
rces  out  of  Angola,  attitudes  of  Af- 
can  countries  and  the  Soviet  Union, 
ong  with  possible  war-weariness  in 
uba  itself,  are  probably  more  impor- 
nt  in  Cuban  considerations  than  is 


the  reaction  of  the  Government  of  the 
United  States.  Nevertheless,  if  they  do 
leave,  it  would  have  a  positive  impact 
on  U.S. -Cuban  relations.  If  they  do  not 
withdraw,  they  will  have  gained  some 
temporary  propaganda  advantage,  per- 
haps, from  having  been  included  in  the 
negotiations,  but  the  fighting  will  go 
on,  claiming  mainly  Angolan  but  also 
Cuban  lives. 


Temporary  Visitors 

Aside  the  from  the  migration  agree- 
ment and  the  two  negotiations  which  I 
have  just  described,  we  have  relaxed 
some  sanctions,  mainly  limitation  on 
official  Cuban  travel  to  the  United 
States,  that  were  in  force  while  the  mi- 
gration agreement  was  being  suspended 
by  Cuba.  More  Cubans  are,  therefore, 
presently  coming  to  the  United  States 
for  temporary  visits.  For  example, 
Cuban  cultural  delegations  are  again 
receiving  visas  even  though  their  polit- 
ical attitudes  may  not  be  welcome. 
Some  Cuban  nuclear  safety  personnel 
will  visit  a  U.S.  facility  in  the  near 
future  because  we  see  an  interest  for 
the  United  States  and  particularly  for 
the  people  of  Florida  in  avoiding  a 
Chernobyl-type  nuclear  accident  in  the 
city  of  Cienfuegos,  where  the  Soviets 
and  the  Cubans  are  constructing  a  nu- 
clear energy  plant. 

A  Consistent  U.S.  Policy 

Does  this  mean  that  our  relations  with 
Cuba  are  "warmer"  than  they  were  1 
year  ago?  They  are  less  tense,  but  one 
is  comparing  them  with  something  like 
the  nadir.  Does  it  mean  that  our  policy 
toward  Cuba  has  changed,  as  some  peo- 
ple appear  to  fear  and  as  others  of  a 
different  political  persuasion  may  hope? 
The  short  answer  is  that  our  policy  to- 
ward Cuba  has  not  changed  at  all.  It 
remains  what  it  has  been  for  years.  We 
have  always  been  prepared  to  resolve 
problems  with  Cuba  if  U.S.  interests 
could  be  served  thereby. 

The  Government  of  the  United 
States  is  not  naive  about  the  difficulty 
of  making  any  progress.  We  recognized 
that  issues  less  connected  with  national 
security  and  ideological  differences 
would  be  easier  to  solve.  We  have  been 
willing  to  look  at  even  the  toughest 
problems,  however,  with  an  open  mind 
and  in  Hght  of  changing  facts  to  see  if 
we  could  bring  about  a  change  in  Cuban 
conduct  that  would  be  advantageous  to 
the  United  States.  We  are  following  our 


agenda,  whether  we  are  broadcasting 
the  truth  to  Cuba  on  Radio  Marti,  rais- 
ing Cuban  human  rights  violations  in 
the  UN  Human  Rights  Commission  in 
Geneva,  or  negotiating  agreements 
which  could  benefit  the  American 
people. 

One  central  fact  remains:  we  still 
do  not  like  what  we  see  of  the  Cuban 
reality.  U.S.  policy  is  strongly  influ- 
enced by  tangible  Cuban  conduct,  not 
merely  assertions  or  ambivalent  ac- 
tions. In  Cuba,  one  man  exercises  de- 
cisive control  over  his  country's  con- 
duct, and  his  attitude  toward  the 
United  States  has  never  been  benign. 

"One  of  the  Few  Adversaries 
of  the  United  States" 

In  his  recent  television  interview  with 
NBC,  Fidel  Castro  contrasted  what  he 
termed  the  "excellent"  relations  which 
the  United  States  enjoys  with  China 
and  the  Soviet  Union  with  the  quite 
different  relationship  which  it  has  with 
Cuba.  "We  are  left  with  the  honor  of 
being  one  of  the  few  adversaries  of  the 
United  States,"  Castro  explained  to 
Maria  Shriver.  Cuba,  he  said,  would  be 
a  "great  adversary... a  firm  adver- 
sary...an  adversary  that  does  not  give 
in... a  very  morally  strong  adversary." 

This  conceptualization  of  an  adver- 
sarial relationship  between  the  United 
States  and  Cuba  hardly  needs  to  be  ar- 
gued. It  comes  from  the  man  who 
should  know  best.  It  is  self-evident  and 
fully  attested  by  the  record  of  the  last 
three  decades.  Nor  is  it  coincidental 
that  Fidel  Castro  privately  confided  to 
Celia  Sanchez  in  June  1958,  prophet- 
ically, that  when  the  civil  war  he  was 
then  waging  against  Batista  ended,  a 
longer,  larger  war  would  begin  for 
him — the  war  he  would  lead  against  the 
United  States.  This  was  his  "true  des- 
tiny," Castro  wrote. 

It  would  be  a  serious  mistake  to 
regard  either  his  recent  statement  or 
the  one  of  30  years  ago  as  mere  rhet- 
oric. The  destined  war  against  the 
United  States,  the  relationship  as  a 
firm  and  principled  adversary  that  does 
not  give  in,  are  not  hyperbole  but 
rather  keys  for  understanding  the  fun- 
damental orientation  of  the  Castro  re- 
gime. Put  simply,  in  order  to  justify 
the  maintenance  in  Cuba  of  the  moral 
fervor  and  the  material  burden  of  a  na- 
tion at  arms,  Castro  requires  the  clear 
and  present  danger  of  an  unrelenting 
outside  threat,  forever  poised  to  chal- 
lenge his  authority  in  Cuba  and  always 


apartment  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


73 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


prepared  to  counter  the  moves  which 
he  intended  from  the  outset  to  make  on 
the  world  stage. 

In  part,  of  course,  this  is  a  self- 
fulfilling  prophecy.  To  underscore  the 
permanent  nature  of  the  alleged  Yankee 
menace,  Castro  has  said  on  at  least  two 
public  occasions  that  Cuba  could  never 
relax  its  state  of  high  military  alert 
even  if  the  United  States  were  to  be- 
come a  communist  country.  He  re- 
minded his  countrymen  of  the  recent 
war  between  China  and  Vietnam.  The 
message  was  clear:  the  immutable  geo- 
graphical proximity  of  the  United 
States  obliges  Cuba  to  maintain  the 
largest  number  of  regular  and  ready  re- 
serve forces  in  Latin  America,  plus  a 
militia  of  over  1  million  men  and 
women,  plus  the  ubiquitous  committees 
for  defense  of  the  revolution  (or  block 
wardens),  plus  an  unending  state  of  mil- 
itary preparedness  on  the  part  of  the 
whole  population  of  Cuba. 

Even  if  Fidel  Castro  only  intended 
the  eternal  Yankee  menace  for  pur- 
poses of  internal  control,  it  would  be  a 
serious  impediment  to  any  fundamental 
improvement  in  bilateral  relations.  But 
there  is  another  reason  why  Castro 
feels  that  he  needs  an  adversarial  rela- 
tionship with  the  United  States.  De- 
spite the  modest  size  and  material 
assets  of  Cuba,  a  country  with  a  popu- 
lation of  only  10  million  persons,  Castro 
has  successfully  carved  out  a  leadership 
I'ole  in  international  affairs  which  would 
almost  certainly  have  eluded  him  had 
he  chosen  in  1959  to  take  the  path  of 
democracy.  He  could  have  been  a  demo- 
crat and  served  Cuba  honorably  and 
well  while  maintaining  a  good  rela- 
tionship with  the  United  States,  as 
Romulo  Betancourt  did  on  the  other 
side  of  the  Caribbean,  in  Venezuela,  at 
the  same  time. 

Cuba  as  a  Linchpin 

But  Castro  rejected  such  a  course  be- 
cause he  had  quite  different  objectives 
in  mind.  He  placed  his  considerable  tal- 
ents as  a  charismatic,  even  messianic, 
leader  at  the  service  of  the  elitist  con- 
cept of  world  revolution.  His  singular 
"contribution"  to  the  much  longer  his- 
tory of  civil  strife  in  this  hemisphere 
was  to  provide  a  linchpin  between  So- 
viet power  and  Latin  American  revolu- 
tionaries, to  turn  each  insurgency  into 
a  chapter  in  the  ideological  and  stra- 
tegic relationship  between  the  super- 
powers. It  was  not  so  much  that 
Moscow  wanted  revolution  in  the  West- 
ern Hemisphere.  It  wanted  the  strat- 


74 


egic  partnership  which  Castro  was  of- 
fering, in  return  for  which  Moscow  gave 
the  necessary  life  support  to  the  willing 
mother  of  revolutions  in  Havana.  Apart 
from  this,  Fidel  Castro  has  also  sought, 
especially  in  recent  years  and  with 
some  success,  the  construction  of  an  in- 
ternational anti-American  coalition. 
Paradoxically,  the  regime  which  began 
by  waging  guerrilla  warfare  against  its 
neighbors  now  affects  to  be  their  leader 
in  a  confrontation  with  the  United 
States. 

If  the  grandiosity  of  his  interna- 
tional designs  has  been  frequently  be- 
trayed by  the  shallowness  of  Cuba's 
material  base,  Castro  has,  nonetheless, 
succeeded  in  holding  center  stage  for 
three  decades.  And  whatever  doubts 
the  new  Soviet  leadership  may  pri- 
vately harbor  for  his  personality,  his 
dogmatism,  and  his  idiosyncracies,  it 
continues  to  pay  him  a  monumental 
subsidy  in  order  to  keep  the  Cuban 
economy  from  collapse.  The  subsidy 
presently  exceeds  $5  billion  per  year 
for  economic  assistance  alone,  or  about 
$100  million  weekly.  Soviet  willingness 
to  support  Cuba's  inefficient  economy  is 
what  permits  Castro  to  play  the  strate- 
gic and  military  role  of  a  great  adver- 
sary of  the  United  States.  That  is  not 
to  say  that  the  Soviet  Union  necessarily 
supports  or  even  welcomes  every  Cas- 
tro action,  for  Moscow  has  broader  in- 
terests than  does  Cuba  and  Gorbachev 
appears  to  have  a  new  recognition  of 
the  extent  of  Moscow's  own  serious  eco- 
nomic problems. 

Cuba's  Brave  New  World 

Fidel  Castro  has  governed  Cuba  for  30 
years.  His  personal  dictatorship  may  go 
on  indefinitely.  He  appears  to  be  in 
good  health.  He  has  never  been  known 
seriously  to  consider  relinquishing  his 
authority,  even  though  he  is  now  facing 
serious  societal  problems  in  Cuba  that 
are  challenging  his  genius  for  manipula- 
tion and  control.  We  have  to  anticipate 
both  that  he  will  be  around  and  that  his 
basic  outlook  will  change  but  little.  It 
is  sometimes  argued  that  Cuba's  seri- 
ous internal  problems  might  make  Fidel 
Castro  a  more  flexible  negotiating  part- 
ner. He  himself  has  referred  to  a 
"growing  crisis"  in  Cuba,  even  though 
more  recently  he  has  been  insisting 
that  his  so-called  rectification  of  errors 
campaign  has  set  Cuba  back  on  the 
"right  road  to  socialism." 


Obviously,  the  United  States  has 
very  little  reason  to  help  Castro.  More 
over,  his  preferred  remedy  seems  to  be|t 
more  of  the  same  recipe  that  got  Cuba  ^ 
where  it  is  today.  While  in  the  Soviet 
Union  Gorbachev  looks  to  revisionist 
Soviet  economists  for  guidance  in  intro|t 
dueing  more  market  mechanisms  and 
material  incentives  into  the  Soviet  sys- 
tem, the  Cubans  stress  zeal  and  recall  b 
with  nostalgia  the  dubious  legacy  of     | 
Che  Guevara.  Castro's  right  road  to  so  i: 
cialism  is  paved  with  discipline,  and  th  |i 
road  signs  are  mainly  moral  stimulatio  k 
or  fear  of  punishment  for  failure.  Cas-  r 
tro  described  Cuba's  problems  in  a        | 
recent  interview  with  a  Uruguayan 
newspaper  as  "the  unavoidable  phenol  {| 
ena  of  a  revolutionary  process,"  addin 
modestly  that  "there  is  no  more  diffi- 
cult task  than  that  of  building  a  new 
world."  The  defection  of  even  veteran 
loyalists  like  General  Rafael  del  Pino 
suggests  that  in  Cuba  the  heroes  are 
tired  of  having  the  only  bandmaster  ir 
town  keep  calling  for  more  martial 
music. 

Building  a  new  world,  for  Castro 
is,  however,  the  real  meaning  of  his  r« 
olution.  It  means  changing  the  men- 
tality of  the  Cuban  people.  Criticism  i 
his  eternal  verities  is  viewed  as  "ener' 
propaganda."  Ricardo  BofiU,  presiden 
of  the  tiny  Cuban  Human  Rights  Con 
mittee,  recently  called  attention  to  th 
fundamental  nature  of  this  issue,  say- 
ing: "The  lack  of  freedom  in  Cuba  anc 
the  violation  of  human  rights  original 
from  the  Constitution  itself.  Everyoni 
knows  that  the  concept  of  liberty  in 
Cuba  does  not  include  the  liberty  to 
criticize  or  oppose." 

His  combative  instincts  have  led 
Castro  to  sympathize  with  other  mill 
tants.  Unlike  the  Soviet  Union  and 
China,  Cuba  is  spurning  the  1988  Olyi 
pic  Games  in  Seoul  because  of  Castro' 
strange  affinity  for  the  North  Korean 
under  Kim  Il-sung,  whose  harsh  rule 
and  inherent  belligerence  go  back  a 
decade  beyond  his  own.  One  wonders 
how  Cuba's  well-trained  and  quasi- 
professional  athletes  feel  about  this 
sacrifice  on  behalf  of  the  terrorist  au- 
thorities in  Pyongyang.  The  Cuban 
press  reports  that  they  are  delighted 
by  Castro's  decision.  In  a  similar  vein 
other  young  Cubans  were,  no  doubt, 
delighted  to  go  to  the  distant  Horn  of 
Africa  to  fight  for  the  Mengistu  regin 
in  Ethiopia  or  to  Yemen  to  see  how 
barren  the  rocks  of  Aden  have  becomi 
under  socialism.  If  a  man  is  known  b> 
his  associates,  Castro  has  some  tough 
customers  to  explain,  beyond  this  hen 
sphere  as  well  as  within  it. 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Cuba  supports  Latin  American  rev- 
jtionaries,  including  by  military 
lining  and  arms  transfers.  This  as- 
;tance  is  calibrated  to  the  specific  sit- 
tion  prevailing  in  a  given  country, 
irlier  this  month,  Cuban  Vice  Presi- 
nt  Carlos  Rafael  Rodriguez,  the  sil- 
r  fox  of  Latin  American  revolu- 
maries,  explaining  in  the  Brazilian 
ws  weekly  Veja  why  Cuba  supports 
errilla  movements  like  the  one  in 
lile,  said:  "When  there  are  situations 
that  character,  we  continue  giving 
r  solidarity  because  principles  do 
t  change,  rather  the  situations."  Ap- 
rently  Cuba's  arms  deUveries  to  Chi- 
m  revolutionaries  are  a  demonstra- 
■n  of  these  principles.  It  is  also 
je  that  Cuba  trained  the  terrorist 
-19  movement  in  Colombia  for  its 
;ht  against  Colombian  democracy. 

Recently,  the  Cubans,  concerned 
out  the  possible  loss  of  a  highly  valu- 
le  friend  in  Panama,  sent  a  witch's 
uldron  of  agitprop  experts  in  order  to 
dicalize  the  situation.  Fearing  that  a 
inted  leadership  might  step  down 
acefully,  an  outcome  they  observed 
thout  joy  when  it  took  place  in  the 
lilippines  and  Haiti,  the  Cubans  seek 
ensure  that  there  can  be  no  bloodless 
ansition  to  democracy  in  Panama, 
leir  skilled  agitators  have  coached 
iterviews"  picturing  the  contest  as 
tween  the  "Colossus  of  the  North" 
d  the  Panamanian  people,  backed  by 
ose  of  Cuba  and  of  all  Latin  America. 

The  Cubans  also  have  supplied 
ms  and  have  encouraged  the  deve- 
oment  of  Panamanian  block  wardens 
ang  the  lines  developed  in  Cuba, 
avana's  objective  is  not  the  introduc- 
)n  of  a  communist  society  in  Panama 
1989,  however,  but  retention  of  in- 
lence  and  encouragement  of  anti- 
merican  tendencies  there  until  the 
iar  2000  when  Panama  is  to  take  over 
e  canal.  Cuba  does  not  want  its  in- 
jence  in  Panama  to  be  reduced  in  the 
tervening  12  years.  After  all,  a  firm, 
■incipled  adversary  can  afford  to  wait, 
.pecially  if  he  presides  over  a  system 
hich  does  not  have  elections  itself  and 
here  there  has  never  been  a  change  in 
Iministration. 

uba's  Unpayable  Debt 

part  fi'om  its  military  commitments 
id  its  support  to  revolutionaries,  the 
uban  regime  has  tried  to  rally  the 
hird  World  behind  the  notion  that  de- 
;loped  countries — and  principally  the 
nited  States — should  assume  the  for- 


eign debt  of  the  developing  countries 
and  pay  it  off  through  savings  from 
disarmament.  In  a  seminar  in  Brazil 
on  the  subject  of  debt,  Carlos  R. 
Rodriguez  said  Latin  America  should 
be  in  the  vanguard  of  the  view  that 
debt  is  "illegal"  and  "immoral"  because 
"peoples  are  not  responsible  for  debts 
incurred  by  authoritarian  govern- 
ments." For  years  Castro  has  told  any- 
one who  would  listen  that  the  foreign 
debt  of  developing  countries  should  be 
renounced.  Few  have  taken  his  advice 
literally  although  some  may  have  found 
an  outlet  for  their  frustrations  in  his 
fierce  rhetoric.  Perhaps  they  have 
looked  at  Cuba's  own  unpayable  debt  to 
Western  countries,  not  to  mention  the 
imaginary  mountain  of  soft  currency 
which  the  island  owes  to  the  Soviet 
Union  and  Eastern  Europe.  Cuban  pol- 
icy stresses  Latin  America  economic  in- 
tegration though  the  buildup  of  such 
organizations  as  SELA  [Latin  Ameri- 
can Economic  System]  and  OLADE 
[Latin  American  Energy  Organization], 
where  Cuba  is  a  member  and  from 
which  the  United  States  is  excluded; 
yet  Cuban  trade  is  over  85%  oriented 
toward  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  Coun- 
cil for  Mutual  Economic  Assistance 
(CMEA),  and  almost  no  trade  takes 
place  with  Latin  America.  The  Cubans 
stress  the  importance  of  "new  mecha- 
nisms," but  these  usually  turn  out  to  be 
financed  by  other  developing  countries 
or  simply  are  barter. 

Fidel  Castro,  although  prepared  to 
stand  alone  as  the  last  adversary  of  the 
United  States,  would  doubtless  wel- 
come company  in  his  protracted  con- 
frontation. He  wants  to  be  recognized 
not  merely  as  the  militant  voice  of 
Cuba  but  also  as  a  primary  spokesman 
for  Latin  America.  If  he  were  to  suc- 
ceed— and  it  is  unwise  to  underestimate 
his  determination  or  his  skill,  despite 
the  unorthodoxy  of  his  form  of  commu- 
nism— the  adversary  relationship  would 
be  continued  at  a  higher  and  more 
damaging  level. 

A  Realistic  Prognosis 

The  prognosis  for  U.S. -Cuban  relations 
is  thus  not  encouraging.  Some  talks  are 
underway,  but  to  speak  of  a  warming 
trend  is  not  only  premature  but  unwar- 
ranted by  the  facts.  As  we  have  fre- 
quently noted,  there  can  be  progress, 
especially  in  the  solution  to  bilateral  is- 
sues such  as  migration,  radio  inter- 
ference, and  safety  of  life  at  sea.  We 
will  continue  to  seek  to  advance  U.S. 


interests — and  that  means  the  interests 
of  all  Americans,  in  every  state — as  op- 
portunities present  themselves.  Some 
in  the  United  States  who  oppose  any 
sort  of  contact  with  Cuba  may  be  un- 
happy about  even  this  prudent  and  real- 
istic approach.  On  the  opposite  side  of 
the  Florida  Straits,  Cuban  officials  like 
Carlos  Rafael  Rodriguez  appear  to  be 
smoking  something  stronger  than  their 
own  cigars  as  they  speak  of  concessions 
which  some  future  U.S.  administration 
will  have  to  make  to  them  for  the  prize 
of  resuming  diplomatic  relations  with 
Havana.  Or  perhaps  Rodriguez  is  only 
trying  to  worry  the  good  people  of 
Miami.  There  could  perhaps  also  be 
progress  in  national  security  issues  but 
only  if  the  Cuban  Government  shows 
itself  prepared  to  temper  its  militancy 
and  accept  a  less  tempestuous  place  in 
a  region  where  democracy  is  struggling 
to  prevail  over  elitist  or  caudillo  re- 
gimes of  one  sort  or  another.  The 
choice,  however,  is  largely  that  of  Cuba, 
and  the  historical  record  is  daunting. 

Fidel  Castro  has  sought  and  covets 
the  role  of  firm  and  unyielding  adver- 
sary. We  cannot  assume  that  this  will 
change  in  his  lifetime.  This  role  is  not 
compatible  with  any  fundamental  im- 
provement in  U.S. -Cuban  relations. 
Under  these  circumstances,  just  as  the 
present  Administration  has  done,  any 
future  U.S.  Govei'nment  will  have  to 
deal  resolutely  and  realistically  with 
the  challenge  of  Castro's  Cuba.  ■ 


tenartmont  nf  Histif^  Bulletin/Seotember  1988 


75 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Secretary  Visits  Central  America 


Secretary  Shultz  departed  Wash- 
ington, D.C.,  June  29,  1988,  to  visit 
Guatemala,  El  Salvador,  Honduras, 
and  Costa  Rica;  he  returned  to  Wash- 
ington on  July  1. 

Following  are  remarks  he  ynade 
during  the  trip  and  the  text  of  an  iden- 
tical letter  he  sent  to  Senate  Majority 
Leader  Robert  J.  Dole  and  Minority 
Leader  Robert  C.  Byrd  and  to  Speaker 
of  the  House  of  Representatives  Jim 
Wright  and  House  Minority  Leader 
Robert  H.  Michel. 


ARRIVAL  STATEMENT, 
GUATEMALA  CITY, 
JUNE  29,  19881 

Central  America  is  torn  by  contradic- 
tory forces. 

•  Much  of  the  groundwork  has  been 
laid  for  the  practice  of  democracy  and 
the  revival  of  economic  development. 
Yet  efforts  to  subvert  democracy  and 
prevent  peaceful  progress  continue,  and 
many  Central  Americans  live  with  nei- 
ther freedom  nor  security. 

•  The  search  for  peace  has  inten- 
sified. Yet  in  recent  months,  fresh 
hopes  have  been  accompanied  by  fresh 
uncertainties. 

I  am  here  as  a  concerned  friend. 
There  are  major  problems  to  overcome. 
Some  look  like  mountains  to  move.  But 
an  enormity  has  already  been  achieved 
since  the  near-disastrous  days  afflicting 
Central  America  at  the  start  of  the 
1980s.  With  the  right  kinds  of  efforts, 
the  job  can  be  finished.  I  believe  that, 
working  together  with  vision  and 
statesmanship,  we  can  overcome  the 
obstacles  and  move  forward  together. 

So  I  have  come  to  Guatemala  and 
its  democratic  neighbors  to  consult  on  a 
common  course  in  the  search  for  free- 
dom and  human  dignity,  for  economic 
progress,  and  for  peace  in  Central 
America. 

These  are  our  objectives — freedom, 
economic  progress,  and  peace.  We  must 
sustain  our  mutual  commitment  in  the 
months  and  years  ahead  to  reach  these 
goals  for  all  people  in  this  important 
area  of  the  world.  Let  me  look  quickly 
at  where  we  stand  on  each  today. 


Freedom  and  Respect 
for  Human  Rights 

First,  the  political  dimension — freedom 
and  respect  for  human  rights:  political 
progress  must  rest  on  the  foundation  of 
democracy.  The  basic  freedoms  that  in- 
dividuals deserve  must  be  relentlessly 
pursued.  Freedom  must  stand  as  the 
guiding  light  for  efforts  to  bring  about 
a  brighter  future  for  the  region. 

In  the  last  decade,  three  coun- 
tries— Guatemala,  El  Salvador,  and 
Honduras — have  each  made  significant 
progress,  more  than  most  believed  pos- 
sible. Ten  years  ago,  Costa  Rica  was 
Central  America's  only  democracy;  to- 
day Nicaragua  is  Central  America's 
only  dictatorship. 

In  joining  Costa  Rica  in  choosing 
democracy,  Guatemala,  Honduras,  and 
El  Salvador  have  made  a  decision  that 
is  not  without  challenges.  Democracy 
is  not  merely  a  mechanical  device  to 
choose  representatives  through  elec- 
tions; elections  are  an  indispensable 
element  of  democracy,  but  its  vitality 
depends  on  an  atmosphere  to  nourish 
it.  Democracy  is  a  way  of  life,  an  en- 
compassing pattern  of  behavior  con- 
ducive to  freedom,  individual  human 
dignity,  and  the  protection  of  rights 
and  liberties. 

Everyone  has  a  stake  in  the  build- 
ing of  democracy.  Democracy  requires 
strong  civilian  leadership  and  effective 
political  parties  to  articulate  the  needs 
of  the  people.  Democracy  requires  the 
participation  of  the  military  as  a  part- 
ner in  the  search  for  stability.  Here  in 
Guatemala,  the  country  will  celebrate 
"Army  Day"  tomorrow.  It  will  be  a 
time  to  show  appreciation  for  the  sacri- 
fices of  the  armed  forces  in  helping  to 
build  and  defend  the  new  democratic 
order.  Democracy  also  requires  the  ac- 
tive support  and  participation  of  busi- 
ness and  labor.  Their  entrepreneurship 
and  productivity,  fairly  rewarded,  are 
key  to  any  solid,  lasting  democracy. 

Economic  Reforms 

This  brings  me  to  my  second  point,  the 
economic  dimension:  to  carry  out  inter- 
nal economic  reforms  that  will  bring 
opportunity  and  development  that  is 
widely  shared.  We  live  in  a  period  of 
profound  change  in  communications, 
production,  and  technology.  This  is  an 
era  in  which  openness  to  new  ideas  and 
to  change  itself  is  critical.  The  lesson  of 
today — and  one  which  we  need  to  learn 


in  order  to  compete  in  the  global  mar- 
ket of  tomorrow — is  that  democratic  so 
cieties  with  market-based  economies 
succeed;  closed  societies  with  central- 
ized economies  fail.  No  matter  how 
small  a  country  may  be,  it  can  be  suc- 
cessful economically  and  lift  the  stand- 
ards of  its  people  if  it  is  open  to  the 
initiatives  required  by  the  rapidly 
changing  world  of  knowledge. 

Even  before  the  economic  crash  of 
the  late  1970s  brought  about  by  falling 
coffee  and  cotton  prices  and  rising  cost 
of  oil  and  capital,  the  UN  Economic 
Commission  for  Latin  America  had 
warned  that  "the  fruits  of  the  long 
period  of  [Central  America's]  economic 
e.xpansion... were  distributed  in  a 
flagrantly  inequitable  manner." 

We  have  all  worked  hard  to  over- 
come these  economic  fluctuations  and 
social  injustices.  The  past  decade  has 
seen  first  a  stabilization,  now  a  slow 
recovery  and  return  to  growth  in  the 
region. 

Since  democratic  government 
was  restored  at  the  beginning  of  1986, 
Guatemala  has  reversed  its  economic 
decline.  The  inflation  rate  fell  from  37 
in  1986  to  less  than  10%  today.  In  198"; 
the  economy  grew  by  over  3%,  the  fir 
year  of  per  capita  growth  since  1980. 
Aided  by  the  Caribbean  Basin  Initia- 
tive, nontraditional  e.xports  to  the 
United  States  totaled  $168  million  in 
1987,  an  increase  of  48%  in  1  year. 

In  1982,  Costa  Rica's  economy  de- 
clined by  over  7%;  last  year  was  Cost 
Rica's  third  consecutive  year  of  eco- 
nomic growth.  Last  year  the  Hondurs 
economy  grew  by  4%  with  the  lowest 
inflation  rate  in  all  of  Latin  America- 
2.5%. 

While  enacting  major  land  reforn" 
to  provide  more  economic  opportunity 
and  recovering  from  a  devastating 
earthquake.  El  Salvador's  inflation  ral 
this  year  is  likely  to  be  little  more  th; 
half  the  1986  rate  of  32%.  I  sometimes 
marvel  at  how  well  the  people  of  El 
Salvador  manage  to  prevail  in  spite  of 
communist  guerrilla  attacks  on  their 
means  of  livelihood  and  progress. 

Peace  and  Security 

Third,  the  dimension  of  peace  and  se- 
curity: Central  America  is  still  torn  b 
conflict,  but  serious  efforts  have  begu 
in  the  search  for  peace  among  its  five 
nations.  Success  for  any  diplomatic 
effoi't  requires  all  parties  to  commit 
themselves  to  negotiate  fairly,  abide  1: 
the  same  rules,  and  share  a  common 
vision  of  what  a  settlement  can  achie\ 


76 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


I  GDP  Growth  Rates  in  Central  America,  1984-87 

lent  W//A  1984  ||||}  1985 


Nicaragua 


Belize 


Costa  Rica 


El  Salvador 


Guatemala 


e  Esquipulas,  San  Jose,  and  Sapoa 
reements  carry  such  promise. 

Guatemala,  Honduras,  El  Salvador, 
d  Costa  Rica  clearly  are  committed 
a  negotiated  settlement.  They  are 
epared  to  abide  by  the  rules  of  the 
gotiating  process.  And  they  have 
;ommon  vision  of  a  region  free  of 
reats  and  committed  to  democracy. 
3  share  their  vision  and  commitment. 

Nicaragua  is  the  odd  man  out.  In- 
3ad  of  a  commitment  to  negotiate 
rly,  the  Sandinistas  have  a  record  of 
asions  and  noncompliance.  They  have 
peatedly  negotiated  agreements — 
st  with  the  OAS  [Organization  of 
nerican  States];  then  with  their  Gen- 
ii American  neighbors;  regularly  with 
eir  own  countrymen.  But  they  have 
t  complied.  They  have  not  democra- 
;ed.  They  continue  to  support  subver- 
)n  in  neighboring  countries.  Theirs  is 
t  a  record  of  honest  negotiations:  it  is 
record  of  negotiations  corrupted  by 


the  Sandinistas'  efforts  to  destroy  those 
who  do  not  agree  with  them. 

Those  of  us  who  seek  peace  vnth 
Nicaragua  must  deal  with  the  bla- 
tant evasive  sarcasms  of  President 
Ortega,  who  blandly  told  the  OAS  on 
November  11,  1987,  that  he  could  not 
respond  to  "the  supposed  violation  of  a 
nonexistent  commitment"  to  the  OAS 
because  the  agreements  negotiated  in 
1979  were  "political"  and  hence  not 
legally  binding. 

Nicaragua's  diplomatic  isolation  re- 
flects its  political  and  economic  back- 
wardness. The  hopes  of  1979  have  given 
way  to  repression  and  stagnation.  The 
economy  is  a  bust:  income  per  person  is 
about  half  its  1977  level  and  has  fallen 
below  all  other  countries  in  the  region; 
inflation  runs  out  of  control;  exports 
are  almost  nonexistent.  Promises  of 
progress  have  been  redeemed  with 
deepening  misery.  Ideology  is  plentiful, 
but  milk  is  rationed.  The  standing  army 


has  grown  from  6,000  to  80,000  men. 
Parades  are  constant,  but  the  Ministry 
of  Justice  has  been  abolished,  and  con- 
stitutional guarantees  are  restricted. 
The  will  of  a  small  minority  is  imposed 
by  force  on  the  majority  of  the  people. 
Apparently  the  leaders  of  Nicaragua 
have  no  compassion  for  the  people  of 
Nicaragua. 

Those  of  us  who  seek  peace  must 
find  the  answer  to  a  fundamental  ques- 
tion: if  we  cannot  trust  the  Sandinistas 
to  keep  promises  made  in  agreement 
after  agreement,  how  can  we  trust 
promises  that  they  will  make  about 
the  future? 

All  of  us  who  value  democracy  and 
human  dignity  seek  a  settlement  that 
will  bring  true  peace  to  Nicaragua  and 
to  the  region.  That  is  what  the  Nic- 
araguan  resistance,  too,  is  fighting 
for — a  peace  based  upon  freedom,  re- 
spect for  human  rights,  and  economic 
progress.  We  will  see  in  the  weeks  and 


ipartment  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


77 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


months  ahead  whether  the  Sandinistas 
finally  learn  that  economic  and  political 
freedom  are  indispensable  to  peace  and 
progress.  We  will  see  whether  the  gap 
continues  between  Soviet  statements  in 
support  of  peace  and  Soviet  war  mate- 
riels  to  the  Sandinista  army. 

No  nation  in  this  hemisphere  can 
live  as  an  island  unto  itself  None  can 
arrogate  to  itself  sole  responsibility  for 
determining  the  future  course  of  the  re- 
gion. None  can  hold  up  a  failed  model 
of  economic  gi-owth  and  expect  others 
to  follow.  None  can  frustrate  for  long 
the  wishes  of  the  majority  of  people  in 
the  region  for  peace,  democracy,  and 
freedom.  And  none  can  stand  alone  as 
the  region  intensifies  its  commitment 
to  democracy  and  development. 

A  Vision  of  the  Future 

During  my  visits  here  in  Guatemala 
and  elsewhere  in  the  region,  I  want  to 
discuss  and  e.xplore  a  common  vision  of 
the  future  that  will  propel  us  into  the 
next  century.  It  is  a  vision  firmly  an- 
chored on  the  foundation  of  democracy. 
It  is  a  vision  aspiring  to  social  progress 
and  justice.  It  is  a  vision  committed  to 
the  peaceful  resolution  of  disputes. 

A  key  judgment  that  I  bring  to 
these  discussions  is  that  the  democ- 
racies of  the  region  will  want  to  inten- 
sify their  dialogue  and  cooperation — 
politically  and  economically — in  the  pe- 
riod ahead.  We  shall  explore  ways  in 
which  the  United  States  and  other 
friendly  states  can  contribute  to  pro- 
moting the  shared  objectives  of  regional 
democracies. 

For  our  part,  the  United  States 
pledges  to  work  actively  in  support  of 
the  objectives  put  forward  by  our  re- 
gional allies. 

•  We  are  for  democracy  and  human 
rights  and  freedom.  We  will  continue  to 
support  those  who  choose  to  govern 
themselves  as  free  people. 

•  We  are  for  economic  development 
and  growth.  We  will  continue  to  assist 
the  region  directly,  promote  investment 
and  trade,  and  marshal  as  much  multi- 
lateral economic  assistance  as  possible. 
We  will  encourage  economic  change  in 
the  region  necessary  for  our  friends  to 
succeed  in  the  global  economic  system. 

•  We  are  for  peace  and  security. 
We  will  support  efforts  to  move  forward 
the  peace  efforts  begun  here  in 
Guatemala  last  summer. 

These  principles  need  to  be  trans- 
lated into  a  concrete  and  sustainable 
plan  of  action  for  the  period  ahead. 


78 


They  need  the  active  involvement  of 
those  who  share  our  vision  of  tomor- 
row. They  need  to  be  seen  as  the  most 
effective  argument  against  those  in  the 
region  who  seek  to  subvert  democracy 
and  subjugate  their  people.  They  will 
illustrate — in  clear  terms — that,  by 
chaining  themselves  to  a  system  being 
discarded  by  its  very  creators,  Nic- 
aragua's rulers  are  destroying  their 
country's  opportunity  to  look  toward 
the  next  century. 

As  our  friends  here  seek  peace  and 
freedom  in  the  period  ahead,  we  in 
Washington  will  work  in  a  bipartisan 
manner  to  help  meet  the  challenges  fac- 
ing this,  our  neighboring  region.  We 
will  honor  our  commitment  to  promote 
economic  growth  and  social  justice  in 
the  region.  We  will  work  to  involve  oth- 
ers in  this  effort.  And  we  will  uphold 
and  strengthen  our  commitment  to  pro- 
tect our  democratic  friends  from  attack 
or  subversion.  We  will  make  this  deter- 
mination clear  in  our  dialogue  with 
those  outside  the  region  who  pour  arms 
into  the  already  full  arsenals  of  Nic- 
aragua. I  make  that  commitment  to  you 
today. 

There  is  much  work  to  be  done. 
But  our  friends  in  the  region  are  up  to 
the  challenge,  and  we  will  be  there  at 
their  side. 

I  am  pleased  to  begin  this  effort  in 
Guatemala,  for  the  promise  of  the  fu- 
ture is  exemplified  here.  After  decades 
of  violence  and  repression,  Guatemala 
chose  democracy.  Yesterday  the  govern- 
ment and  the  military  were  isolated:  to- 
day it  is  the  guerrillas  who  are  without 
popular  support.  Today  President  Vin- 
icio  Cerezo  is  an  elected  civilian  re- 
former who  has  won  the  respect  of  the 
world  community.  Inflation  has  fallen; 
economic  growth  has  begun  again;  ex- 
ports are  up. 

By  choosing  and  protecting  democ- 
racy, Guatemala  has  made  a  political 
and  economic  statement  about  the  fu- 
ture to  its  people  and  its  neighbors. 
Guatemala's  statement  should  echo 
throughout  the  region.  The  time  of  de- 
mocracy and  development  is  now.  It  is 
our  task  to  transform  them  into  real- 
ities that  will  bring  peace  throughout 
the  region. 

I  am  eager  to  begin  the  process 
of  elaborating  these  ideas  during  this 
visit. 


ARRIVAL  STATEMENT, 
SAN  SALVADOR, 

JUNE  30,  19882 

A  year  and  a  half  ago,  I  came  to  El 
Salvador  in  the  wake  of  a  terrible  natu- 


ral disaster.  There  were  few  words  of  t 
hope  that  could  be  said  then  to  comfor|f 
you.  Today  as  I  visit  El  Salvador,  I  anir 
filled  with  admiration  at  your  strengtl  i 
and  determination  in  bouncing  back  at* 
resuming  your  drive  toward  economic  I 
growth.  ; 

This  is  the  same  spirit  that  char-  I 
acterizes  the  personal  struggle  of  Presii 
ident  Duarte.  His  is  a  remarkable        il 
example  of  courage  and  devotion  to  thi 
people  of  his  homeland  whom  he  loves  f 
I  visited  him  a  short  time  ago  and  wa: 
enormously  moved  and  impressed  by 
his  good  spirits  and  the  strength  he 
imparts  to  all  around  him. 

The  people  of  the  United  States 
have  come  to  know  the  people  of  El 
Salvador.  You  have  proven,  at  great 
sacrifice,  that  you  are  ready  for  the 
challenges  which  lie  ahead.  El  Salvadi 
has  overcome  problems  of  nature,  pro 
lems  of  repression  and  subversion,  an  !i 
problems  of  historical  inequities  to 


create  a  vibrant  democracy  moving  tc 
ward  an  open  and  productive  economi 
system. 

After  50  years  of  military  govern 
ments,  five  free  elections  have  been 
held  in  succession,  with  a  new  one  ne 
year  that  will  determine  the  presiden 
tial  succession — freely  and  politically, 
not  by  force. 

Despite  monumental  damage  in- 
flicted on  the  economy  by  communist 
guerrillas.  El  Salvador  continues  to 
produce  and  recover.  Soon,  a  strategi 
of  economic  recovery  will  need  to  giv 
way  to  economic  growth  and  expansi( 
In  the  rapidly  changing  international 
marketplace,  it  is  no  longer  sufficient 
to  try  to  keep  pace;  giant  leaps  must 
taken  over  old  ways  of  doing  things  ii 
order  to  compete  globally. 

The  political  and  diplomatic  effor 
the  region  requires  should,  in  turn, 
build  on  the  benefits  of  democracy  ar 
free  market-based  economic  growth. 
Our  joint  search  for  peace  should  re- 
flect our  common  objectives:  political 
freedom,  social  justice,  and  security. 

This  search — to  which  the  democ 
racies  of  this  region  are  committed — 
will  constitute  a  challenge  to  the  gue 
rillas  and  their  communist  allies.  The 
don't  want  democracy;  they  don't  wai 
freedom.  They  want  to  impose  by  for 
of  arms  a  way  of  life  which  restrains 
society  from  fulfilling  its  potential. 
They  want  to  achieve  with  bullets  th( 
power  that  the  people  of  El  Salvador 
refuse  to  give  them  by  the  ballot. 

But  their  goal  is  an  illusion,  and 
their  methods  will  fail.  To  Nicaragua 
and  its  backers  from  the  outside,  I 
bring  an  unf-(|uivocal  pledge  from  the 
United  States:  we  will  not  tolerate  at 


Deoartment  of  State  Bulletin/September  13 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


lipts  to  subvert  democracy.  The  peo- 
of  El  Salvador  have  chosen  their 
m  of  government.  They  have  chosen 
^ay  of  life  best  suited  to  bring  about 
ial  justice  and  freedom.  They  cannot 
1  will  not  be  subverted. 

So,  I've  come  to  the  region  to 
dge  the  support  of  a  unified  U.S. 
vernment  and  a  determined  Ameri- 
|i  people  to  uphold  democracy  and  hu- 
m  rights,  development  with  equity, 
1  security  with  peace  in  Central 
lerica.  I  have  come  to  work  with  El 
vador  and  its  neighbors  as  they  elab- 
:te  a  diplomatic  strategy  for  the  pe- 
el ahead. 

The  commitment  and  support  of 
■  United  States  are  firm.  Our  friend- 
p  and  respect  are  sincere.  Our  con- 
tion  in  the  course  you  and  we  are  on 
•ooted  in  reality.  Together,  we  can 
ke  it  work. 


RIVAL  STATEMENT, 

GUCIGALPA, 

NE  30,  19883 

3me  to  Honduras  with  a  sense  of 
ired  purpose  and  common  endeavor, 
m  proud  to  be  here — proud  to  salute 
ir  achievements  in  democratization 

1  development  and  proud  to  say,  as  a 
?nd,  that  we  shall  work  together  in 
Iding  a  more  secure  peace. 

Your  political  and  economic 
lievements  of  the  past  decade  here  in 
nduras  are  a  remarkable  part  of  the 
'bal  drive  toward  democracy.  You 
/e  survived  critical  political  chal- 
iges  along  the  way.  You  have  worked 
rd  to  achieve  economic  growth  and 
.'ial  justice. 

Hondurans  understand  that 
irket-based  economic  growth,  distri- 
ted  fairly,  requires  an  open  system  of 
vernance.  This  kind  of  governing  sys- 
n — democracy — requires  internal 
ace  at  home  and  external  security  in 

2  region  in  order  to  prosper.  The 
hievement  of  peace  and  security  re- 
ires  the  correct  mix  of  political  de- 
)cracy  and  military  vigilance  and 
terrence.  And  it  requires  common 
rpose  and  commitment  among  like- 
nded  nations. 

Honduras  has  played  an  important 
le  in  seeking  a  political  and  diplo- 
itic  solution  to  regional  problems, 
esident  Azcona  has  acted  with 
"ength  and  firmness  to  set  the  stage 
"  the  peaceful  resolution  of  regional 
sputes. 

The  drive  to  democracy  here  in 
jnduras  and  the  economic  and  social 


development  that  democracy  is  produc- 
ing stand  in  stark  contrast  to  the  situa- 
tion in  Nicaragua.  The  Sandinistas  seek 
to  build  a  totalitarian  society  on  the 
back  of  a  massive  military  machine. 
They  have  caused  income  per  person  to 
fall  to  roughly  half  its  level  of  a  decade 
ago  and  to  the  lowest  level  in  the  re- 
gion. They  see  the  freedom  of  people  in 
neighboring  countries — and  recoil  from 
it  in  fear.  Nicaragua  is  out  of  step,  a 
country  isolated  by  its  rejection  of  free- 
dom, growth,  and  the  security  of  its 
neighbors. 

Honduras  understands  the  problem 
better  than  most.  A  steadfast  sup- 
porter of  democracy,  Honduras  has 
been  on  the  front  lines  of  the  conflict 
created  by  the  denial  of  democracy  in 
Nicaragua.  The  contributions  of  Hon- 
duras to  the  cause  of  freedom  and  to 
easing  the  human  burdens  of  the  civil 
conflict  next  door  continue  even  today. 
But  we  must  do  more — and  do  it  to- 
gether— if  we  are  to  find  a  future  dedi- 
cated to  democracy,  social  justice  and 
progress,  and  economic  development 
and  prosperity. 

What  is  needed  is  a  joint  economic 
and  diplomatic  effort  built  around  the 
vibrant  democracies  and  growing  econ- 
omies in  the  region.  We  must  demon- 


strate conclusively  that  free  political 
and  economic  systems  are  the  way  of 
the  future  and  that  totalitarianism, 
state-controlled  economies,  and  foreign 
adventurism  are  methods  of  the  past 
and  doomed  to  failure. 

I  have  come  to  the  region  to  work 
with  our  friends  to  strengthen  freedom 
and  to  promote  economic  progress  and 
to  consult  with  them  on  the  search  for 
peace.  We  benefit  from  a  good  start  in 
the  Esquipulas,  San  Jose,  and  Sapoa 
agreements.  We  benefit  from  the  en- 
thusiastic support  of  democratic 
friends.  And  we  benefit  from  the  de- 
termined and  widespread  support  in 
my  country  for  peace  and  democracy  in 
this  region. 

Free  choice — and  cooperation 
among  free  men  and  women — works.  It 
works  in  pohtics,  in  economics,  and  in 
diplomacy.  All  three  are  at  the  heart  of 
the  friendship  and  cooperation  between 
the  United  States  and  Honduras.  All 
three  can  contribute  to  the  security  and 
prosperity  which  the  people  of  Hon- 
duras and  the  region  deserve. 


Proposed  U.S.  Bilateral  Assistance  to  Central  America,  FY  1989* 

TOTAL:  $859  million 


International 
Military  Education 
and  Training 
(0.4%) 


Military 
Assistance 
Program 
(18.9%) 


•Includes  all  U.S.  aid  to  Belize.  Costa  Rica.  El  Salvador,  Guatemala,  and  Honduras. 


nartmont  nf  <%tat(>  Riillfitin/SeDtember  1988 


79 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


LUNCHEON  TOAST 

(EXCERPTS), 
TEGUCIGALPA, 
JUNE  30,  1988* 

First  let  me  express  my  appreciation  to 
you  for  having  at  this  luncheon  such  a 
diverse  representation  of  the  political 
and  business  life — and  journalistic 
life_of  Honduras.  It's  a  statement 
about  Honduras  that  so  many  presiden- 
tial candidates  are  gathered  in  one 
room,  even  at  one  table,  and  have  such 
a  good  time  with  each  other.  But 
deeper  than  that,  it  shows  the  kind  of 
open  and  vigorous  society  that  has 
emerged  here — 

In  the  United  States  there  is  broad 
bipartisan  support  for  the  four  demo- 
cratic Central  American  countries  that 
are  our  friends.  We  appreciate  what 
each  of  you  are  doing  and  what  Hon- 
duras is  doing,  and  when  it  comes  to 
votes  in  our  Congress  on  critical  mat- 
ters, what  we  find  is  big  majorities 
which  means  big  majorities  among  Re- 
publicans and  big  majorities  among 
Democrats.  It's  not  controversial. 
Therefore,  you  can  expect  that  there 
will  be  continuity,  that  we  will  have 
staying  power. . . . 

The  President  believes,  and  told 
me  to  tell  you,  that  he  feels  you  have 
the  right  to  be  proud  of  what  you  have 
achieved  here  in  Honduras.  Just  to  take 
a  couple  of  numbers — I  used  to  be  an 
economist;  I  like  numbers — you  have  a 
very  low  rate  of  inflation — 2V'2%-3% — 
who  in  Latin  America  has  a  better  rec- 
ord? Who  anywhere  in  the  world  has  a 
better  record?  You  have  real  growth  on 
the  order  of  4% — pretty  good  by  any 
standards.  Of  course,  you  have  lots  of 
problems.  Of  course,  you  and  we  would 
like  to  see  it  better,  but  let's  not  mini- 
mize the  achievements 

All  of  the  other  democracies  in 
Central  America,  with  all  the  problems 
we  all  have — nevertheless,  all  have  in- 
flation under  reasonable  control,  all  are 
experiencing  right  now  a  real  rate  of 

growth [W]hat  does  Nicaragua  have 

to  offer?  Does  it  have  an  economic  sys- 
tem that  anybody  envies?  Does  it  have 
a  pohtical  system  that  you'd  like  to  be 
in?  It  doesn't  have  anything  to  offer. 
What  it  has  is  a  Soviet-supplied  mili- 
tary capability  that  threatens  the  re- 
gion. That's  all,  and  it's  a  problem.  But 
from  the  standpoint  of  political  achieve- 
ments, social  justice,  economic  achieve- 
ments, any  sense  of  the  things  that  we 
strive  for...  we,  the  democracies, 
have  the  winning  hand — 

So  that's  the  reason  why  the  Presi- 
dent sent  me  here.  To  consult  here  with 


you  and  the  other  democracies  in  this 
region  and  develop  together  a  strategy 
for  how  to  play  that  hand.  So  we  will 
consult  with  you,  we  will  work  with 
you,  we  will  share  our  common  prob- 
lems with  you.  And,  as  you  said  in  your 
toast,  the  United  States  will  stand  with 
you,  and  we  will  help  us  all  develop  this 
winning  hand... so  that  it  does,  in  the 
end,  turn  out  to  be  truly  the  success 
we  want  it  to  be. 


ARRIVAL  STATEMENT, 
SAN  JOSE, 
JULY  1,  19885 

The  pursuit  of  peace  requires  diligence, 
dedication,  and  perseverance.  It  is 
mankind's  noblest  activity.  This  is  well 
understood  by  the  people  of  Costa 
Rica,  whose  president  is  admired 
throughout  the  world  for  his  noble 
efforts  on  behalf  of  peace. 

Costa  Ricans  know  that  the  re- 
quirements of  peace  are  the  require- 
ments of  democracy.  They  are  an  open 
mind  and  the  willingness  to  change 
positions  and,  ultimately,  behavior 
based  on  information  validated  by  the 
freedom  with  which  it  is  transmitted, 
received,  and  evaluated.  Progress  is  of- 
ten measured  in  small  increments.  But 
progress  is  possible  when  the  parties 
share  a  commitment  to  make  the  proc- 
ess work  and  when  they  share  a  com- 
mon vision  about  the  shape  of  a 
settlement. 

The  search  for  peace  in  Central 
America  can  succeed.  The  parties  can 
engage  in  practical  steps  toward  peace, 
and  there  can  be  a  change  in  the  envi- 
ronment. But  we  need  to  assess  care- 
fully whether  the  parties  to  this 
conflict  can  share  a  common  vision  of 
the  shape  of  a  settlement. 

In  1978,  Costa  Rica  was  Central 
America's  only  democracy.  Today 
Guatemala,  Honduras,  and  El  Salvador 
are  committed  to  similar  democratic 
courses.  They  are  becoming  increas- 
ingly open  societies.  They  have  free 
market  economies,  recognizing  that  the 
global  marketplace  requires  an  open  so- 
ciety and  open  economy.  They  strive 
hard  to  achieve  social  justice  and  equal- 
ity. They  invest  in  people,  not  arms. 

Nicaragua  under  the  Sandinistas 
simply  doesn't  measure  up.  The  San- 
dinistas are  intent  on  snuffing  out  free- 
dom at  home  and  intervening  abroad. 
Theirs  is  a  closed  economy,  increasingly 
reliant  on  handouts  from  the  Soviet 
Union.  They  don't  want  social  justice 
and  equality  for  their  people;  they  pre- 


fer a  communist  government  and  a  to- 
tahtarian  society.  This  is  a  model  that 
has  never  worked.  It  is  a  model  that  i 
being  rejected  around  the  world  todaj 

Costa  Rica  and  its  democratic 
neighbors  have  a  different  vision  for 
Central  America.  You  seek  a  peaceful 
settlement  that  will  bring  freedom  an 
prosperity  to  Nicaragua  and  to  the  re 
gion — a  peace  based  upon  freedom,  ji 
tice,  and  respect  for  human  rights.  Tl 
democratic  opposition  in  Nicaragua 
shares  this  vision.  So  does  the  Nic- 
araguan  resistance. 

Will  the  Sandinistas  reconcile  wit 
their  countrymen,  stop  supporting  su 
version,  and  live  up  to  the  obligations 
they  have  made  to  you,  their  neigh- 
bors? Will  they  place  power  in  the 
hands  of  the  people  through  free,  intt 
nationally  observed  elections,  or  will 
they  cling  to  their  prerogatives  and 
stand  unmasked  before  the  world  as 
dictators?  Will  the  Soviet  Union  stop 
its  adventurism  in  this  region  as  Pres 
dent  Arias  so  eloquently  urged  in  his 
letter  to  General  Secretary  Gorbache 

It  is  not  a  framework  for  peace 
that  is  lacking;  the  Esquipulas,  San 
Jose,  and  Sapoa  agreements  are  good 
bases  on  which  to  proceed.  What  is  r 
quired  is  the  willingness  of  all  partiei 
to  join  and  play  by  the  same  rules.  V 
have  plenty  of  promises  embedded  in 
agreements.  What  we  need  is  perfori 
ance.  We  need  delivery  on  promises. 
When  the  Sandinistas  and  their  sup- 
porters share  a  vision  of  a  settlement 
based  on  democracy  and  freedom, 
peace  can  be  achieved. 

So  I've  come  to  the  region  this 
week  to  consult  on  a  common  course 
the  search  for  freedom,  economic  pre 
ress,  and  peace.  We  share  the  same  ( 
jectives  as  our  friends  in  the  region. 

•  We  are  for  democracy  and  hum 
rights  and  freedom.  We  will  continue 
support  those  who  choose  to  govern 
themselves  as  free  people.  We  will 
work  with  the  prodemocratic  forces 
within  Nicaragua. 

•  We  are  for  economic  developmc 
and  growth.  We  will  continue  to  assit 
the  region  directly,  promote  investmt 
and  trade,  and  marshal  as  much  muh 
lateral  economic  assistance  as  possibl 
We  will  encourage  economic  change  i 
the  region  necessary  for  our  friends  1 
succeed  in  the  global  economic  systei 

•  We  are  for  peace  and  security. 
We  will  support  efforts  to  move  forw 
the  search  for  peace  President  Arias 
did  so  much  to  advance  last  summer. 


nonartmont  r.f  Ctato  Riillotin^gogtomho^ 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


This  is  a  realistic  agenda,  but  the 
ad  ahead  will  not  be  an  easy  one.  We 
ust  spare  no  effort  in  our  quest.  By 
edicating  ourselves  to  the  common  en- 
jrprise  of  a  just  and  peaceful  resolu- 
t)n  of  the  conflict  in  Nicaragua,  we 
(ill  extend  the  benefits  of  democracy 
I  all  the  peoples  of  Central  America 
(id  further  strengthen  the  sense  of  sol- 
arity  among  the  democracies  of  our 
imisphere. 


rATEMENT, 
VN  JOSE, 
JLY  1,  19886 

am  happy  to  report  that  we  have  ac- 
mplished  a  great  deal  in  the  past  3 
lys.  Building  on  our  mutual  efforts 
'er  the  past  7  years  to  restore  demo- 
atic  government  and  revitalize  the 
•onomies  of  Central  America,  I  have 
^sured  each  of  the  presidents  that  the 
nited  States  remains  committed  to 
le  freedom,  the  development,  and  the 
'curity  of  the  region. 

My  consultations  with  President 
erezo,  Acting  President  Castillo  Clar- 
nount  [of  El  Salvador],  President 
zcona,  and  President  Arias,  and  with 
leir  key  advisers,  have  been  stimulat- 
g  and  productive.  In  each  case,  the 
mosphere  of  our  meetings  reflected 
le  close  friendship  and  mutual  inter- 
its  of  our  nations. 

The  discussions  revealed  a  common 
ision  of  human  dignity,  freedom,  and 
:}uitable  economic  progress.  The  dis- 
issions  also  revealed  a  belief  that  Nic- 
-agua  poses  a  threat  to  this  shared 
ision — and  a  concern  that  the  San- 
inistas  seem  ready  once  again  to  scut- 
e  the  prospects  for  lasting  regional 
eace. 

We  strongly  beUeve  in  the  impor- 
ince  of  close  and  continuing  consulta- 
ons  among  the  democracies  of  the 
sgion  and  between  the  democracies 
nd  the  United  States. 

We  want  neighbors  at  peace.  We 
ill  stand  with  Central  America. 

We  and  our  neighbors  agree  that 
trong  democratic  institutions  which 
uarantee  social  and  economic  freedoms 
re  vital  to  a  lasting  peace.  Free  demo- 
ratic  institutions  must  be  encouraged 
nd  supported  in  each  country,  includ- 
ig  Nicaragua  and  Panama.  Respect  for 
uman  rights  must  be  strengthened 
hroughout  the  region. 

All  our  governments  also  agree 
hat  economic  freedom  is  the  key  to  the 
conomic  growth  that  will  fuel  social 
iistice.  In  neighboring  Nicaragua,  the 
landinistas  have  imposed  comprehen- 


U.S.S.R.  Aid  to  Nicaragua  Compared 
to  U.S.  Aid*  to  Central  America, 
1982-86 


'Includes  all  U.S.  aid  to  Belize,  Costa  Rica,  El 
Salvador,  Guatemala,  Honduras,  and  the  Nlc- 
araguan  Resistance. 


sive  state  controls  and  gross  mis- 
management. The  results  have  been  a 
two-thirds  decline  in  the  standard  of 
living  in  the  past  4  months,  inflation 
that  is  sure  to  exceed  2,000%  this  year, 
and  tens  of  thousands  of  workers  who 
are  paid  less  than  the  cost  of  subsis- 
tence. Income  per  person  has  fallen  to 
half  its  level  of  a  decade  ago,  to  the 
lowest  level  in  the  region. 

By  contrast,  I  am  struck  by  the 
economic  progress  achieved  by  the  four 
democracies.  All — even  war-torn  El 
Salvador — have  substantially  recovered 
from  the  disastrous  days  of  the  early 
1980s.  The  challenges  remain  difficult; 
much  hard  work  lies  ahead — but  posi- 
tive economic  growth  has  returned  to 
each  of  these  countries.  The  political 
difficulties  of  implementing  economic 
reforms  must  be  faced — for  all  four 
countries  recognize  the  advantages  of 
pursuing  development  based  on  eco- 
nomic liberalization  and  export-led 
growth.  All  have  made  impressive  prog- 
ress in  bringing  inflation  under  control. 
Infant  mortality  is  declining;  literacy 
rates  are  rising;  health  care  is  improv- 
ing markedly.  Though  rates  of  progress 
vary,  initial  structural  economic  re- 
forms have  been  implemented  in  each 
country;  other  necessary  reforms  are 
underway  or  under  consideration. 


I  am  proud  of  the  major  role  the 
United  States  is  playing  to  help  these 
countries  reverse  their  economic  de- 
cline. From  1983  through  1988,  the 
United  States  will  have  provided  nearly 
$4.4  billion  in  economic  assistance  to 
these  four  Central  American  nations. 
Those  monies  have  helped  our  demo- 
cratic neighbors  stabilize  their  econo- 
mies and  improve  delivery  of  basic 
services.  Working  together,  we  have 
made  great  strides  in  health  care,  edu- 
cation, agricultural  diversification  and 
improvement,  export  promotion,  and  a 
host  of  other  programs  to  improve  the 
lives  of  the  people  of  Central  America. 
But  much  remains  to  be  done. 

We  also  discussed  the  negotiations 
between  the  Nicaraguan  resistance  and 
the  Sandinistas.  We  firmly  agree  that 
mere  promises  will  not  achieve  national 
reconciliation  in  Nicaragua.  A  definitive 
calendar  of  concrete  and  verifiable 
steps  to  implement  true  and  lasting  de- 
mocracy is  fundamental  to  a  successful, 
permanent  cease-fire  agreement.  We 
discussed  the  appalling  negotiating  con- 
ditions in  Managua,  in  which  the  re- 
sistance delegation  was  not  allowed 
to  meet  with  their  fellow  Nicaraguans 
and  was  subjected  to  harassment  and 
threats. 

I  found  unanimous  agreement  that 
the  massive  and  continuing  Soviet  and 
Soviet  client  military  shipments  to  Nic- 
aragua threaten  every  country  in  Cen- 
tral America.  Those  shipments  should 
stop  immediately.  The  Sandinistas  have 
built  a  military  machine  far  in  excess  of 
any  legitimate  security  need.  This,  cou- 
pled with  continuing  Sandinista  support 
for  subversion,  forces  the  democracies 
to  divert  scarce  resources  from  the  so- 
cial and  economic  development  which  is 
critically  important  to  the  future  of  the 
region. 

I  want  to  make  it  absolutely  clear 
that  the  United  States  will  not  tolerate 
the  subversion  or  destabilization  of  the 
democratic  governments  of  Central 
America.  Such  an  act,  direct  or  indi- 
rect, is  a  threat  to  the  security  inter- 
ests of  the  United  States  of  America. 
It  will  be  resisted  by  all  appropriate 
means,  including  military  cooperation 
in  the  collective  self-defense  of  the 
democracies. 

I  described  to  each  president  our 
efforts  to  restore  democracy  and  to 
protect  vital  U.S.  interests  in  Panama 
and  our  determination  to  confront, 
without  tiring,  the  invidious  and 
destructive  influence  of  narcotics 
trafficking. 


It  nf  Qtato  Riillptin/Rpntember  1988 


81 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Finally,  and  perhaps  most  impor- 
tantly, I  categorically  assured  each 
president  that  these  objectives  enjoy 
strong  bipartisan  support;  our  national 
interests  will  not  change  with  a  change 
of  Administration.  The  United  States 
is — and  will  remain — fully  committed  to 
protecting  critical  U.S.  national  inter- 
ests by  achieving  constitutional  democ- 
racy, economic  and  social  development, 
and  an  enduring  peace  in  Central  Amer- 
ica. These  U.S.  interests  and  objectives 
are  fundamental  to  our  national  se- 
curity and  to  our  firm  national  desire  to 
improve  our  world. 


LETTER  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
JULY  7,  1988 

I  have  just  returned  from  a  three  day  trip 
to  Central  America,  during  which  I  met 
with  the  presidents,  foreign  ministers,  mil- 
itary officials,  and  opposition  leaders  of  the 
region's  four  democracies.  I  was  struck  by 
the  strong  indications  I  found  that,  al- 
though there  have  been  and  may  continue 
to  be  some  temporary  setbacks,  our  bipar- 
tisan policy  of  support  for  democracy,  de- 
velopment, peace  and  security  in  the  four 
democracies  is  succeeding.  On  the  whole, 
the  trend  is  positive. 

Respect  for  democratic  institutions  is 
growing  in  the  three  new  democracies  and 
remains  strong  in  traditionally  democratic 
Costa  Rica.  In  the  new  democracies  of  El 
Salvador,  Honduras,  and  Guatemala,  demo- 
cratic practices  are  growing.  In  El  Sal- 
vador, for  e.xample,  I  was  assured  by 
Acting  President  Castillo  Claramount  that 
not  even  the  stresses  associated  with  Pres- 
ident Duarte's  incapacitating  illness  have 
shaken  the  commitment  of  the  Salvadoran 
people  to  democracy. 

I  met  with  the  Salvadoran  military 
high  command  on  the  same  day  they  an- 
nounced the  rotation  of  several  top  of- 
ficers— a  changing  of  the  guard  in  a  new 
democracy.  Similarly  in  Guatemala,  I  met 
with  representatives  of  the  private  sector 
who,  though  clearly  opposed  to  some  of  the 
government's  policies,  nevertheless  ex- 
pressed support  for  Guatemala's  new  demo- 
cratic constitution. 

Economic  news  from  the  region  is  also 
encouraging.  Standards  of  living  are  rising 
and  the  rate  of  inflation  is  falling  in  all  four 
democracies.  The  presidents  assured  me 
that  with  continued  U.S.  assistance  and 
access  to  the  U.S.  market  they  will  be  able 
to  sustain  economic  growth,  thereby  reliev- 
ing the  poverty  that  fuels  so  much  of  the 
region's  distress.  The  political  and  eco- 
nomic advances  of  the  democracies  contrast 
strongly  with  the  sad  story  of  deepening 
misery  and  repression  in  Nicaragua,  whose 
rulers  are  adopting  an  ideological  model 
now  being  abandoned  by  its  creators  in 
Moscow. 


82 


The  diplomatic  process  arising  out  of 
the  San  Jose  Declaration  provides  the  hope 
of  peace  and  security  in  the  region,  based 
on  a  commitment  to  democracy.  The  presi- 
dents told  me  that  U.S.  support  for  pro- 
democratic  forces  in  the  region  is  essential 
to  bring  the  negotiations  to  a  successful 
conclusion.  They  now  see  with  great  clarity 
the  extent  of  the  Ortega  regime's  failure 
and  the  danger  of  its  Soviet-backed  mili- 
tary buildup. 

There  was  universal  concern  and  re- 
sentment about  the  continued  flow  of  So- 
viet arms  supplies.  The  leaders  of  all  four 
democracies  view  this  major  Soviet  mili- 
tary intervention  as  unjustified  and  incom- 
patible with  long-term  stability  in  the 
region. 

The  Sandinistas  increasingly  are  isolat- 
ing themselves  from  the  effort  to  build  a 
sound,  just,  and  open  future  for  the  re- 
gion. We  need  to  heighten  that  sense  of 
pressure  and  isolation  if  the  peace  process 
is  to  succeed.  I  pledged  America's  strong 
support,  and  I  will  return  to  Central 
America  on  August  1  to  meet  with  the  for- 
eign ministers  of  the  four  democracies.  I 
want  to  work  with  them  on  reinvigorating 
the  negotiating  track,  so  that  the  Central 
American  summit  they  plan  in  early  Au- 
gust can  achieve  real  gains  for  peace. 

I  also  met  with  the  Nicaraguan  Re- 
sistance to  review  the  status  of  their 
efforts  to  negotiate  an  end  to  the  Nic- 
araguan conflict.  The  Resistance  stressed 
that  it  sincerely  wants  to  achieve  a  negoti- 
ated settlement,  but  has  been  weakened  by 
deficiencies  in  the  current  U.S.  assistance 
program  to  the  point  where  it  has  little 


leverage  in  the  talks.  The  Resistance  re- 
affirmed that  its  objective  is  not  to  under 
mine  the  negotiations,  but  to  advance 
them,  so  as  to  secure  democracy  in  Nic- 
aragua. A  further  demonstration  of  bi- 
partisan support  by  the  Congress  for 
Nicaragua's  democratic  resistance  betwee 
now  and  my  August  1  meeting  with  the 
foreign  ministers  of  Central  American  de- 
mocracies would  give  a  welcomed  boost  tc 
our  diplomatic  strategy. 

The  main  purpose  of  my  trip  was  to 
assure  the  four  democracies  of  the  strong 
bipartisan  support  in  the  U.S.  for  democ- 
racy, development,  and  peace  in  the  re- 
gion. The  views  I  expressed  are  set  forth 
more  fully  in  the  statements  I  made  in  th 
region,  which  are  enclosed  for  your  conve 
ience.  I  know  you  will  join  me  in  reaffirm 
ing  our  nation's  commitment  to  the  friene 
of  democracy  in  this  crucial  neighboring 
region. 


Sincerely  yours. 


George  P.  Shul 


■Press  release  127  of  July  1,  1988. 

^Press  release  129  of  July  1  (question 
and  answers  not  printed  here). 

^Press  release  131  of  July  6. 

^Press  release  132  of  July  7. 

'Press  release  135  of  July  7. 

•sPress  release  136  of  July  7  (questiot 
and  answers  not  printed  here).  ■ 


Chile  Renews  State  of  Emergency 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
JUNE  7,  1988' 

We  are  concerned  and  deeply  disap- 
pointed with  the  Government  of  Chile's 
decision  on  May  31  to  renew  the  state  of 
emergency  for  another  90-day  period. 
The  establishment  of  a  climate  of  re- 
spect for  human  and  civil  rights  many 
months  before  the  upcoming  plebiscite 
is  necessary  for  democratic  decision- 
making to  take  place.  As  we  noted  in 
our  December  17  statement  of  support 
for  democracy  in  Chile,  states  of  e.xcep- 
tion  which  limit  freedoms  of  assembly, 
association,  and  expression  are  not 
compatible  with  a  legitimate  electoral 
procedure. 

While  we  energetically  condemn 
the  recent  murders  of  Chilean  carabi- 
neros,  we  feel  that  these  and  other  acts 
of  violence  by  small  groups  of  political 


e.xtremists  do  not  justify  the  continu; 
tion  of  states  of  exception  which  den> 
Chileans  their  right  to  participate  ful 
and  openly  in  the  democratic  process 
In  this  regard,  we  are  especially  con- 
cerned by  the  continuing  restrictions 
placed  by  the  Chilean  Government  or 
freedom  of  expression.  Although  ther 
has  been  some  increase  in  airing  diffe 
ing  points  of  view  on  university  telev 
sion,  there  remains  a  lack  of  equitabl 
access  to  the  media,  and  arrests  and 
imprisonment  of  journalists  continue. 
We  urge  that  a  fuller  respect  for 
basic  guarantees  and  freedoms  be  pr< 
vided  to  the  Chilean  people  well  in  at 
vance  of  the  plebiscite  and  not  be 
limited  to  a  brief  period  just  prior  to 
the  vote. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  D( 
partment  deputy  spokesman  Phyllis 
Oaklev.  ■ 


^EATIES 


Jrrent  Actions 


|LTI  LATERAL 

titration 

tvention  on  the  recognition  and  enforce- 
pt  on  foreign  arbitral  awards.  Done  at 
^  Yorl<  June  10,  1958.  Entered  into 
te  June  7,  1959;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  29, 
p.  TIAS  6997. 
iession  deposited:  Peru,  July  7,  1988. 

kimodities — Common  Fund 

reement  establishing  the  Common  Fund 
Commodities,  with  schedules.  Done  at 
iieva  June  27,  1980.' 
lifications  deposited:  Maldives,  July  11, 
8;  Swaziland,  June  29,  1988. 

iisular  Relations 

nna  convention  on  consular  relations, 
te  at  Vienna  Apr.  24,  1963.  Entered  into 
e  Mar.  19,  1967;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  24, 
).  TIAS  6820. 

.ession  deposited:  Guinea,  June  30, 
■i;  Saudi  Arabia,  June  29,  1988. 


porandum  of  understanding  concerning 
■operative  project  for  a  pilot  NATO  in- 
sitive  munitions  information  center, 
h  anne.xes.  Signed  at  Brussels  Apr.  26 
28  and  May  26,  1988.  Entered  into 
•e  May  26,  1988. 

natories:  France,  Netherlands,  Norway, 
C,  U.S. 

icial  Procedure 

3r-American  convention  on  letters 
atory.  Done  at  Panama  City  Jan.  30, 
5.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  16,  1976;  for 
U.S.  Aug.  27,  1988.  [Senate]  Treaty 
-■.  98-27. 

iitional  protocol  to  the  Inter-American 

vention  on  letters  rogatory,  with  an- 

es.  Done  at  Montevideo  May  8,  1979. 

;ered  into  force  June  14,  1980;  for  the 

5.  Aug.  27,  1988.  [Senate]  Treaty  Doc. 

27. 

:ification  deposited:  U.S.,  July  28, 


bor 

ivention  No.  144  relating  to  tripartite 

isultations  to  promote  the  implementa- 

n  of  international  labor  standards. 

opted  by  the  International  Labor  Con- 

ence  at  Geneva  June  21,  1976.  Entered 

0  force  May  16,  1978.-^  [Senate]  Treaty 

c.  No.  99-20. 

gate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 

b.  1,  1988. 

tification  deposited:  U.S.,  June  15,  1988. 

nvention  No.  147  relating  to  minimum 
i.ndards  in  merchant  ships.  Adopted  by 
!  International  Labor  Conference  at 
neva  Oct.  13,  1976.  Entered  into  force 
iv.  28,  1981. »  [Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  No. 
-21. 


Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 

Feb.  1,  1988. 

Ratification  deposited:  U.S.,  June  15,  1988. 

Marine  Pollution 

International  convention  for  the  prevention 
of  pollution  of  the  sea  by  oil,  with  annexes. 
Done  at  London  May  12,  1954.  Entered  into 
force  July  26,  1958;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  8, 
1961.  TIAS  4900. 

Notification  of  denunciation:  Germany, 
Fed.  Rep.  of.  Mar.  30,  1988,  effective 
Mar.  30,  1989. 

International  convention  on  civil  liability 

for  oil  pollution  damage.  Done  at  Brussels 

Nov  29,  1969.  Entered  into  force  June  19, 

1975. •< 

Accession  deposited:  Seychelles,  Apr.  12, 

1988. 

International  convention  on  the  establish- 
ment of  an  international  fund  for  compen- 
sation for  oil  pollution  damage.  Done  at 
Brussels  Dec.  18,  1971.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  16,  1978.'' 

Accession  deposited:  Seychelles,  Apr.  12, 
1988. 

Protocol  of  1978  relating  to  the  interna- 
tional convention  for  the  prevention  of  pol- 
lution from  ships,  1973.  Done  at  London 
Feb.  17,  1978.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  2, 
1983. 

Territorial  application:  E.xtended  by  the 
U.K.  to  the  Cayman  Islands,  effective 
June  23,  1988. 

Maritime  Matters 

Convention  on  the  International  Maritime 
Organization.  Signed  at  Geneva  Mar.  6, 
1948.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  17,  1958. 
TIAS  4044. 

Acceptance  deposited:  Solomon  Islands, 
June  27,  1988. 

Convention  on  the  high  seas.  Done  at  Ge- 
neva Apr.  29,  1958.  Entered  into  force 
Sept.  20,  1962.  TIAS  5200. 
Accession  deposited:  Cyprus,  May  23, 
1988. 

Convention  on  facilitation  of  international 
maritime  traffic,  with  annex.  Done  at  Lon- 
don Apr.  9,  1965.  Entered  into  force  Mar. 
5,  1967;  for  the  U.S.  May  16,  1967.  TIAS 
6251. 

Ratification  deposited:  Ecuador,  May  17, 
1988. 

International  convention  on  tonnage  meas- 
urement of  ships,  1969,  with  annexes.  Done 
at  London  June  23,  1969.  Entered  into 
force  July  18,  1982;  for  the  U.S.  Feb.  10, 
1983.  TIAS  10490. 

Territorial  application:  Extended  by  the 
U.K.  to  the  Cayman  Islands,  effective 
June  23,  1988.  " 

International  convention  for  the  safety  of 
life  at  sea,  1974,  with  annex.  Done  at  Lon- 
don Nov.  1,  1974.  Entered  into  force 
May  25,  1980.  TIAS  9700. 

Protocol  of  1978  relating  to  the  interna- 
tional convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at 
sea,  1974  (TIAS  9700).  Done  at  London 


Feb.  17,  1978.  Entered  into  force  May  1, 
1981.  TIAS  10009. 

Accessions  deposited:  Marshall  Islands, 
Apr.  26,  1988;  Seychelles,  May  10,  1988. 
Territorial  application:  Extended  by  the 
U.K.  to  the  Cayman  Islands,  effective 
June  23,  1988.  " 

International  convention  on  standards  of 
training,  certification,  and  watchkeeping 
for  seafarers,  1978.  Done  at  London  July  7, 
1978.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  28,  1984.-' 
Accessions  deposited:  Bolivia,  Apr.  11, 
1988;  Burma,  May  4,  1988;  Ecuador, 
May  17,  1988;  Singapore,  May  1,  1988. 

International  convention  on  maritime 

search  and  rescue,  1979,  with  annex.  Done 

at  Hamburg  Apr.  27,  1979.  Entered  into 

force  June  22,  1985. 

Accession  deposited:  Ecuador,  May  17, 

1988. 

Narcotic  Drugs 

Convention  on  psychotropic  substances. 
Done  at  Vienna  Feb.  21,  1971.  Entered  into 
force  Aug.  16,  1976;  for  the  U.S.  July  15, 
1980.  TIAS  9725. 
Accession  deposited:  Uganda,  Apr.  15, 


Pollution 

Protocol  to  the  convention  on  long-range 
transboundary  air  pollution  of  Nov.  13. 
1979  (TIAS  10541),  concerning  monitoring 
and  evaluation  of  long-range  transmission 
of  air  pollutants  in  Europe  (EMEP),  with 
annex.  Done  at  Geneva  Sept.  28,  1984.  En- 
tered into  force  Jan.  28,  1988. 
Accession  deposited:  Greece,  June  24, 
1988. 

Montreal  protocol  on  substances  that  de- 
plete the  ozone  layer,  with  annex.  Done  at 
Montreal  Sept.  16,  1987.'  [Senate]  Treaty 
Doc.  100-10. 

Signatures:  Argentina,  June  29,  1988;  Mal- 
dives, July  12,  1988. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Canada,  June  30, 
1988;  Sweden,  June  29,  1988. 

Postal 

Constitution  of  the  Universal  Postal  Union. 
Done  at  Vienna  July  10,  1964.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  1,  1966.  TIAS  5881. 
Ratification  deposited:  Rwanda,  May  18, 
1988. 

Third  additional  protocol  to  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  Universal  Postal  Union  of  July 
10,  1964,  general  regulations  with  annex, 
and  the  universal  postal  convention  with 
final  protocol  and  detailed  regulations. 
Done  at  Hamburg  July  27,  1984.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  1,  1986;  for  the  U.S.  June  6, 
1986. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Bahamas,  Apr.  25, 
1988;2  Cyprus,  June  28,  1988;  Dominica, 
May  3,  1988;  Poland,  Feb.  9,  1988;  Rwanda, 
May  18,  1988;  Saudi  Arabia,  June  28,  1988. 

Postal  parcels  agreement  with  final  pro- 
tocol and  detailed  regulations.  Done  at 
Hamburg  July  27,  1984.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  1,  1986;  for  the  U.S.  June  6,  1986. 


ipartment  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


83 


TREATIES 


Ratifications  deposited:  BaJiamas,  Apr.  25, 
1988;2  Cyprus,  June  28,  1988;  Dominica, 
IWay  3,  1988;  Poland,  Apr.  12,  1988; 
Rwanda,  May  18,  1988;  Saudi  Arabia,  June 
28,  1988. 

Money  orders  and  postal  travelers'  checks 
agreement,  with  detailed  regulations  with 
final  protocol.  Done  at  Hamburg,  July  27, 
1984.  Entered  into  force  June  6,  1986;  for 
the  U.S.  June  6,  1986. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Cyprus,  June  28, 
1988;  Poland,  Apr.  12,  1988;  Rwanda,  May 
18,  1988. 

Racial  Discrimination 

International  convention  on  the  elimination 
of  all  forms  of  racial  discrimination.  Done 
at  New  Yorli  Dec.  21,  1965.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  4,  1969.^  660  UNTS  195. 
Accession  deposited:  Congo,  July  11,  1988. 

Renunciation  of  War 

Treaty  providing  for  the  renunciation  of 
war  as  an  instrument  of  national  policy 
(Kellogg-Briand  pact).  Signed  at  Paris 
Aug.  27,  1928.  Entered  into  force  July  24, 
1929.  46  Stat.  2343,  94  LNTS  57. 
Notification  of  succession  deposited:  Do- 
minica, July  18,  1988. 

Sugar 

International  sugar  agreement,  1987,  with 
annexes.  Done  at  London  Sept.  11,  1987. 
Entered  into  force  provisionally  Mar.  24, 
1988. 

Accessions  deposited  Pakistan,  June  22, 
1988;  Thailand,  May  16,  1988. 
Notifications  of  provisional  application: 
Brazil,  May  13,  1988;  Uruguay,  July  8, 
1988. 

Torture 

Convention  against  torture  and  other 
cruel,  inhuman,  or  degrading  treatment  or 
punishment.  Adopted  at  New  York  Dec.  10, 
1984.  Entered  into  force  June  26,  1987.^ 
[Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  100-20. 
Ratifications  deposited  Czechoslovakia, 
Peru,  July  7,  1988. 

Treaties 

Vienna  convention  on  the  law  of  treaties. 
Done  at  Vienna  May  23,  1969.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  27,  1980.-'  1155  UNTS  331. 
Ratification  deposited:  Mongolia,  May  16, 
1988.2 

United  Nations — Privileges 
and  Immunities 

Convention  on  the  privileges  and  immu- 
nities of  the  United  Nations.  Adopted  by 
the  General  Assembly  of  the  United  Na- 
tions Feb.  13,  1946.  Entered  into  force 
Sept.  17,  1946;  for  the  U.S.  Apr.  29,  1970. 
TIAS  6900. 

Accession  deposited  Vietnam,  Apr  6, 
1988.^ 


BILATERAL 

The  Bahamas 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  the 
implementing  arrangement  of  April  5, 
1984,  to  the  agreement  concerning  U.S.  de- 
fense facilities  in  The  Bahamas.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Nassau  Aug.  20, 

1987,  Jan.  25,  1988,  and  Feb.  3  and  23, 

1988.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  23,  1988;  ef- 
fective Jan.  26,  1988. 

Bolivia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Apr.  9,  1986,  for  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
moditites.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
La  Paz  Apr  22,  1987.' Entered  into  force 
Apr  22,  1987. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Apr.  9,  1986,  as  amended,  for  the  sale  of 
agricultural  commodities.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  La  Paz  June  8  and  10, 
1988.  Entered  into  force  June  10,  1988. 

Canada 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning 
the  personnel  exchange  program  between 
the  U.S.  Navy  and  Canadian  forces,  with 
appendix.  Signed  at  Washington  May  27 
and  June  9,  1988.  Entered  into  force  June 
9,  1988. 

Czechoslovakia 

Agreement  regarding  inspections  on  the 
territory  of  the  Czechoslovak  Socialist  Re- 
public provided  for  by  the  U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
treaty  of  Dec.  8,  1987,  on  the  elimination  of 
their  intermediate-range  and  shorter-range 
missiles.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Prague  Dec.  18,  1987,  and  Jan.  4,  1988. 
Entered  into  force  June  1,  1988. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  on  coopera- 
tion in  the  basic  sciences,  with  annexes. 
Signed  at  Prague  June  27,  1988.  Entered 
into  force  June  27,  1988. 

Egypt 

Fourth  amendment  to  the  grant  agreement 
of  Aug.  19,  1981  (TIAS  10242),  for  basic 
education.  Signed  at  Cairo  June  22,  1988. 
Entered  into  force  June  22,  1988. 

Fifth  amendment  to  the  grant  agreement 
of  Sept.  22,  1981  (TIAS  10278),  for  irriga- 
tion management  systems.  Signed  at  Cairo 
June  23,  1988.  Entered  into  force  June  23, 
1988. 

El  Salvador 

Grant  agreement  for  the  1988  balance-of- 
payments  support  program.  Signed  at  San 
Salvador  June  30,  1988.  Entered  into  force 
June  30,  1988. 

France 

Protocol  to  the  convention  of  July  28,  1967, 
with  respect  to  taxes  on  income  and  prop- 
erty, as  amended  (TIAS  6518,  7270,  9500), 
with  exchange  of  notes.  Signed  at  Paris 
June  16,  1988.  Enters  into  force  on  day  of 
receipt  of  last  notification  of  completion  of 
necessary  constitutional  procedures. 


General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade — Interimn  Commission 

Tax  reimbursement  agreement,  with  ar 
nex.  Signed  at  Geneva  June  27,  1988.  E 
tered  into  force  June  27,  1988. 

German  Democratic  Republic 

Agreement  regarding  inspections  on  th 
territory  of  the  German  Democratic  Re 
public  provided  for  by  the  U.S.-U.S.S. 
treaty  of  Dec.  8,  1987,  on  the  eliminati( 
their  intermediate-range  and  shorter-r: 
missiles.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
Berlin  Dec.  23,  1987.  Entered  into  fore 
June  1,  1988. 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  th 

agreement  of  Apr  13,  1983  (TIAS  10681 

concerning  fisheries  off  the  coasts  of  th 

United  States.  Effected  by  exchange  ol 

notes  at  Washington  Jan.  14  and  Apr  1: 

1988. 

Entered  into  force:  June  29,  1988. 

Germany,  Federal  Republic  of 

Agreement  on  cooperation  in  research 
cerning  the  continental  crust  by  sclent 
drilling,  with  annexes.  Signed  at  Wash 
ington  June  3,  1988.  Entered  into  force 
June  3,  1988. 

Guatemala 

Grant  agreement  for  economic  support 
Signed  at  Guatemala  June  27,  1988.  Er 
tered  into  force  June  27,  1988. 

Hungary 

Agreement  amending  agreement  of  Fe 
and  25,  1983  (TIAS  10666),  as  amended 
relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  r 
made  fiber  textiles  and  textile  product 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Buda 
May  25  and  June  17,  1988.  Entered  intc 
force  June  17,  1988. 

India 

Agreement  amending  agreement  of  Fel 
1987,  as  amended,  relating  to  trade  in 
tiles  and  textile  products.  Effected  by 
change  of  letters  at  New  Delhi  Apr.  21 
May  30,  1988.  Entered  into  force  May 
1988. 

Indonesia 

Agreement  for  the  sale  of  agricultural 
modities.  Signed  at  Jakarta  June  3,  Wl- 
Entered  into  force  June  3,  1988. 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double 
ation  and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasic 
with  respect  to  taxes  on  income,  with  j 
tocol  and  exchange  of  notes.  Signed  at 
karta  July  11,  1988.  Enters  into  force  1 
month  after  the  date  of  exchange  of  ins 
ments  of  ratification. 

Israel 

Mutual  logistic  support  agreement,  wit 
annexes.  Signed  at  Stuttgart- Vaihingei 
and  Tel  Aviv  May  10  and  24,  1988.  Entf 
into  force  May  24,  1988. 


84 


PRESS  RELEASES 


naica 

reement  amending  the  agreement  of 
^.  9,  1987,  as  amended,  for  sale  of  agri- 
tural  commodities.  Effected  by  ex- 
Inge  of  notes  at  Kingston  June  27  and 
1 1988.  Entered  into  force  June  28,  1988. 

fan 

itocol  amending  the  agreement  of  Jan. 

1987,  concerning  special  measures  re- 
:ng  to  article  XXIV  of  the  agreement 
ler  article  VI  of  the  treaty  of  mutual 
iperation  and  security  regarding  facili- 
;  and  areas  and  the  status  of  U.S. 
-ned  Forces  in  Japan  (TIAS  4510). 

ned  at  Tokyo  Mar.  2,  1988. 
tered  into  force:  June  1,  1988. 

reement  implementing  the  agreement  of 
r.  22,  1956  (TIAS  3585),  to  facilitate  in- 
change  of  patent  rights  and  technical  in- 
mation  for  purposes  of  defense,  with 
morandum  of  understanding,  pro- 
ures,  related  notes,  and  letters.  Ef- 
;ed  by  e.xchange  of  notes  at  Tokyo  Apr. 

1988.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  12,  1988. 


morandum  of  understanding  on  defense 
hnological  and  industrial  cooperation, 
ned  at  Seoul  June  8,  1988.  Entered  into 
:e  June  8,  1988. 

■wait 

reement  on  aviation  security.  Effected 
exchange  of  notes  at  Kuwait  Nov.  22, 
7,  and  Jan.  11,  1988. 
tered  into  force:  July  5,  1988. 

lawi 

ernational  express  mail  agreement,  with 
ailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Lilongwe 
I  Washington  Apr.  26  and  June  21,  1988. 
tered  into  force  July  15,  1988. 


5tal  money  order  agreement.  Signed  at 
xico  and  Washington  May  31  and  June 
1988.  Entered  into  force  Aug.  1,  1988. 

iTO  Maintenance  and  Supply  Agency 

reement  regarding  consolidated  pro- 
•ement  of  munitions.  Signed  at  Wash- 
;ton  and  Capellen  Apr.  5  and  12,  1988. 
tered  into  force  Apr.  12,  1988. 

land 

■morandum  of  understanding  on  coopera- 
n  in  the  basic  sciences,  with  annexes. 
?ned  at  Warsaw,  June  13,  1988.  Entered 
0  force  June  13,  1988. 

•mania 

jreement  suspending  mutual  application 
most-favored-nation  tariff  treatment  un- 
r  the  trade  agreement  of  Apr.  2,  1975 
IAS  8159).  Signed  at  Bucharest  June  22, 
iS.  Entered  into  force  June  22,  1988;  ef- 
:tive  July  3,  1988. 


Sierra  Leone 

Agreement  relating  to  and  amending  the 
agreement  of  June  10,  1987,  for  the  sale  of 
agricultural  commodities.  Signed  at  Free- 
town June  16,  1988.  Entered  into  force 
June  16,  1988. 

Sri  Lanka 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  3,  1987,  as  amended,  for  sales  of  agri- 
cultural commodities.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Colombo  June  10,  1988. 
Entered  into  force  June  10,  1988. 

Sweden 

Agreement  regarding  mutual  assistance  in 
customs  matters.  Signed  at  Washington 
July  8,  1987. 
Entered  into  force:  May  8,  1988. 

Uganda 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  Kampala  June  28,  1988. 
Entered  into  force  June  28,  1988. 

U.S.S.R. 

Agreement  modifying  the  memorandum  of 
understanding  of  June  20,  1963  (TIAS 
5362),  regarding  the  establishment  of  a  di- 
rect communications  link.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Washington  June  24, 
1988.  Entered  into  force  June  24,  1988. 


1988. 


'Not  in  force. 

^With  reservation(s). 

^Enters  into  force  for  the  U.S.  July  28, 

■•Not  in  force  for  U.S.  ■ 


Department  of  State 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

No.        Date  Subject 

127      7/1         Shultz:  arrival  remarks, 
Guatemala  City, 
June  29. 
*128      7/1         Shultz:  remarks  at  signing 
of  the  Economic  Sta- 
bilization and  Recovery 
Program  Agreement, 
Guatemala  City, 
June  29. 

129      7/1         Shultz:  statement  and 
question-and-answer 
session,  Casa  Presiden- 
eial,  San  Salvador, 
June  30. 
*130      7/1         Shultz:  remarks  on  the 

signing  of  the  Economic 
Support  Fund  Balance- 
of-Payments  Assistance 
Agreement,  San  Sal- 
vador, June  30. 

131      7/6        Shultz:  arrival  remarks, 
Tegucigalpa,  June  30. 


132      7/7         Shultz:  luncheon  toast, 
Tegucigalpa,  June  30. 

*133  7/7  Shultz:  news  conference, 
Tegucigalpa,  June  30. 

*134      7/7        Shultz:  remarks,  Pal- 

merola  AFB,  June  30. 

135  7/7        Shultz:  arrival  remarks, 

San  Jose,  July  1. 

136  7/7         Shultz:  news  conference, 

San  Jose,  July  1. 

*137      7/7        Shultz,  Madrigal:  depar- 
ture remarks,  San  Jose, 
July  1. 
138      7/8         Shultz:  opening  statement 
for  ASEAN 
postministerial  confer- 
ence, Bangkok,  July  7. 

*139      7/8         Program  for  the  official 
working  visit  to  Wash- 
ington, D.C,  of  Kuwaiti 
Prime  Minister  Shaikh 
Saad,  July  10-16. 
140      7/12       Shultz:  opening  statement 
at  the  ASEAN 
postministerial  confer- 
ence six-plus-one  ses- 
sion, Bangkok,  July  8. 

*141      7/12       Shultz:  remarks  at  signing 
of  the  agreement  on  af- 
fected Thai  villages, 
July  9. 

*142      7/14       Shultz,  ASEAN  delega- 
tion: joint  news  confer- 
ence, Bangkok,  July  9. 

*143  7/14  Shultz:  news  conference, 
Subang  Airport,  Kuala 
Lumpur,  July  9. 

*144  7/14  Shultz:  arrival  remarks, 
Jakarta,  July  9. 

*145      7/14       Shultz:  dinner  toast, 
Jakarta,  July  10. 

*146  7/18  Shultz,  Alatas:  remarks  at 
tax  treaty  signing  cere- 
mony, Jakarta,  July  11. 

*147      7/20       Shultz:  news  conference, 
Jakarta,  July  11. 
148      7/15       Shultz:  address  before  As- 
sociation of  Indonesian 
Economists,  Jakarta, 
July  11. 
148A    7/19       Shultz:  question-and-an- 
swer session  following 
address  before  Associa- 
tion of  Indonesian  Econ- 
omists, Jakarta,  July  11. 

*149      7/18       Shultz:  news  briefing, 
Jakarta,  July  11. 

*150      7/18      Shuitz:  luncheon  toast, 
Malacanang  Palace, 
Manila,  July  12. 

*151      7/19      Whitehead:  interview  on 
"MacNeil-Lehrer  News- 
hour,"  July  13. 

*152      7/19      Whitehead:  interview  on 
CBS-TV's  "Morning 
News." 

153  7/21       Shultz:  news  conference, 

Manila,  July  12. 

154  7/27       Shultz:  address,  question- 

and-answer  session  be- 
fore Korean  Newspaper 
Editor's  Association, 
Seoul,  July  18. 


partment  of  State  Bulletin/September  1988 


85 


PUBLICATIONS 


*155      7/21       First  State  Department 
voluntary  contribution 
to  Center  for 
Telecommunications 
Development. 

*156      7/25      Shultz:  departure  state- 
ment, question-and-an- 
swer  session,  Seoul, 
July  18. 

*157      7/22       Program  for  the  official 
working  visit  to  Wash- 
ington, D.C.,  of  Premier 
Grosz  of  the  Hungarian 
People's  Republic, 
July  26-28. 

*158      7/25       Robert  South  Barrett  IV 
sworn  in  as  Ambassador 
to  Djibouti,  July  22  (bi- 
ographic data). 

*159      7/25      Whitehead:  interview  on 
ABC-TVs  "This  Week 
With  David  Brinkley," 
July  24. 
160      7/27       Shultz:  address,  question- 
and-answer  session  be- 
fore East-West  Center, 
the  Pacific  and  Asian 
Affairs  Council,  and  the 
Pacific  Forum,  Hono- 
lulu, July  21. 

nei  7/28  Shultz:  departure  re- 
marks. Hong  Kong, 
July  14. 

n62      7/29       Shultz:  luncheon  toast  in 
honor  of  Polish  Foi-eign 
Minister  Olechowski, 
July  28. 

*163      7/29       Mary  A.  Ryan  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to 
Swaziland  (biographic 
data). 


*Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


Department  of  State 


Free  single  copies  of  the  following  Depart- 
ment of  State  publications  are  available 
from  the  Public  Information  Division,  Bu- 
reau of  Public  Affairs,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20.520. 

Africa 

Principles  for  a  Peaceful  Settlement  in 
Southwestern  Africa,  July  20,  1988 
(Selected  Documents  #31). 

U.S.  Policy  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa:  Key 
Issues  (GIST,  July  1988) 

Arms  Control 

The  INF  Treaty:  June  1,  1988,  data  update 
on  the  conduct  of  the  joint  verification 
e.xperiment. 

Europe 

Negotiating  With  the  Soviet  Union:  Then 
and  Now,  Ambassador  Rowny,  Seminar 
on  Global  Security  and  Arms  Control, 
University  of  California,  Santa  Cruz, 
June  30,  1988  (Current  Policy  #1088). 

Regional  Issues  and  U.S. -Soviet  Relations, 
Under  Secretary  Armaeost,  General 
Federation  of  Women's  Clubs,  Grand 
Rapids,  June  22,  1988  (Current  Policy 
#1089). 

Perspectives  on  Change  in  the  Soviet 
Union,  Assistant  Secretary  Ridgway, 
Subcommittee  on  Europe  and  the  Middle 
East,  House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee, 
June  29,  1988  (Current  Policy  #1090). 

General 

Openness:  The  Only  Path  to  Progress, 
Deputy  Secretary  Whitehead,  Confer- 
ence on  New  Approaches  to  East-West 
Security  of  the  Institute  for  East-West 
Security  Studies,  Potsdam,  G.D.R.,  June 
10,  1988  (Current  Policy  #1083). 

Middle  East 

Middle  East  Peace:  Facing  Realities  and 
Challenges,  Assistant  Secretary  Murphy, 
Council  on  Foreign  Relations,  New  York 
City,  June  14,  1988  (Current  Policy 
#1082). 

Iran  Air  655:  Steps  to  Avert  Future  Trag- 
edies, Assistant  Secretary  Williamson, 
ICAO  Council,  Montreal,  July  13,  1988 
(Current  Policy  #1092). 

The  Persian  Gulf  Conflict  and  Iran  Air  655, 
Vice  President  Bush,  UN  Security  Coun- 
cil, July  14,  1988  (Current  Policy  #1093). 

South  Asia 

Status  Report  on  Afghanistan,  Under  Sec- 
retary Armaeost  and  Assistant  Secretary 
Williamson,  Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committee,  June  23,  1988  (Current  Pol- 
icy #1087). 


United  Nations 

The  United  Nations  and  Disarmament, 
sistant  Secretary  Williamson,  workin 
group  II  of  the  third  UN  Special  Ses 
on  Disarmament,  June  7,  1988  (Curn 
Policy  #1077). 

Advancing  U.S.  Objectives  in  the  Uniti 
Nations,  Assistant  Secretary  Willian 
son.  Council  of  Washington  Represer 
tatives  on  the  United  Nations,  June 
1988  (Current  Policy  #1086). 

Western  Hemisphere 

Cuba:  "Our  Last  Adversary,"  Coordina^ 
for  Cuban  Affairs  Skoug,  Florida  Ec 
nomics  Club,  Tallahassee,  May  13,  1£ 
(Current  Policy  #1085). 

U.S.  Policy  in  Central  America,  July  1 
(Selected  Documents  #29).  ■ 


Background  Notes 


This  series  provides  brief,  factual  sumi 
ries  of  the  people,  history,  government 
economy,  and  foreign  relations  of  abou 
countries  (excluding  the  United  States 
and  of  selected  international  organizat 
Recent  revisions  are: 

Antigua  and  Barbuda  (June  1988) 

Bermuda  (Apr.  1988) 

Cyprus  (Apr.  1988) 

Ethiopia  (July  1988) 

Finland  (May  1988) 

Jordan  (June  1988) 

Lebanon  (Apr.  1988) 

Malta  (July  1988) 

Monaco  (May  1988) 

Nauru  (June  1988) 

Romania  (June  1988) 

Solomon  Islands  (June  1988) 

Tonga  (June  1988) 

Uruguay  (June  1988) 

A  free  copy  of  the  index  only  may 
obtained  from  the  Public  Information 
sion,  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Depart 
of  State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

For  about  60  Background  Notes  a 
a  subscription  is  available  from  the  Su 
intendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Governi 
Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  204 
for  $14.00  (domestic)  and  $17.50  (foreii 
Check  or  money  order,  made  payable  t 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  must  a( 
pany  order.  ■ 


86 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/September 


vIDEX 


eptember  1988 
olume  88,  No.  2138 


'ghanistan.  Status  Report  on 
Afghanistan  (Armacost, 

Williamson)   55 

igola.  Negotiations  on  Angola  and 
Namibia  (Crocker,  Department 
announcement,  joint  communique, 
delegations'  statement,  text  of 

agreement)     3 

'tns  Control 

uclear  and  Space  Arms  Talks  Open  10th 

Round  (Kampelman,  Reagan)    6 

uclear  Nonproliferation  Treaty 
Celebrates  20th  Anniversary  (White 

House  statement) 8 

uclear  Testing  Talks  Conclude  Round  Two 

(White  House  statement)   7 

jstralia 

justralia-U.S.  Ministerial  Held  in 

Washington  (joint  communique)    51 

sit  of  Australian  Prime  Minister  (Hawke, 

Reagan)    50 

razil.  U.S.  Imposes  Sanctions  on  Certain 
Brazilian  Imports  (White  House 

statement)    17 

liile.  Chile  Renews  State  of  Emergency 

(Department  statement) 82 

hina.  Trade  With  Hungary  and  China 
(letter  to  the  Congress,  te.xt  of 

report)    17 

ongress 

eveloiiments  in  the  UN  System 

(Williamson)    62 

Y  U>x9  Request  for  Security  Assistance 

Program  (Whitehead)    53 

■anian  Airbus  Tragedy  (Bush,  Reagan, 
Williamson,  letters  to  the  Congress  and 
UN  Security  Council,  White  House 

statement)  38 

erspectives  on  Change  in  the  Soviet 

Union  (Ridgway)   23 

roposed  Sale  of  Aegis  Weapons  System  to 

Japan  (Sigur) 13 

ecretary  Visits  Central  America  (Shultz, 

letter  to  the  Congress)   76 

tatus  Report  on  Afghanistan  (Armacost, 

Williamson)   55 

rade  With  Hungary  and  China  (letter  to 

the  Congress,  text  of  report) 17 

uba.  Cuba:  "Our  Last  Adversary" 

(Skoug) 72 

last  Asia.  The  United  States  in  the 
Changing  Asia  of  the  1990s 

(Armacost) 9 

leonomics.  Openness:  The  Only  Path  to 

Progress  (Whitehead)   33 

Istonia.  Baltic  Freedom  Day,  1988 

(proclamation) 24 

lungary.  Trade  With  Hungary  and  China 
(letter  to  the  Congress,  text  of 

report)    17 

ran 

Icting  Secretary  Whitehead's  Interview  on 
"This  Week  With  David  Brinkley"    ...  36 
ran  Accepts  Security  Council  Resolution 

598  (Department  statement)   63 

ranian  Airbus  Tragedy  (Bush,  Reagan, 
Williamson,  letters  to  the  Congress  and 
UN  Security  Council,  White  House 
statement )  38 


Secretary's  Interview  on  "Face  the 

Nation" 1 

Iraq.  Acting  Secretary  Whitehead's 

Interview  on  "This  Week  With  David 

Brinkley"  36 

Israel.  President  Meets  With  Israeli 

Defense  Minister  (White  House 

statement)  49 

Italy 

Italy— A  Profile   30 

Visit  of  Italian  Prime  Minister  (De  Mita, 

Reagan)    29 

Japan 

Japan  to  Phase  Out  Quotas  on  Beef  and 

Citrus  Imports  (Yeutter)    16 

Proposed  Sale  of  Aegis  Weapons  System  to 

Japan  (Sigur) 13 

Laos.  Update  on  POW/MIA  Efforts 

( Lambertson)    15 

Latvia.  Baltic  Freedom  Day,  1988 

(proclamation) 24 

Lebanon.  President  Meets  With  Patriarch 

of  Lebanon  (White  House  statement)    .  46 
Lithuania.  Baltic  Freedom  Day,  1988 

(proclamation) 24 

Middle  East 

Middle  East  Peace:  Facing  Realities  and 

Challenges  (Murphy) 44 

Secretary  Visits  Middle  East    47 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "Face 

the  Nation"    1 

Namibia.  Negotiations  on  Angola  and 

Namibia  (Crocker,  Department 

announcement,  joint  communique, 

delegations'  statement,  text  of 

agreement)    3 

Nicaragua 

Nicaraguan  Peace  Negotiations  (White 

House  statement) 71 

Reciprocal  Expulsion  of  Nicaraguan 

Diplomats  (McCormack,  Department 

statement)  69 

Organization  of  American  States. 

Reciprocal  Expulsion  of  Nicaraguan 

Diplomats  (McCormack,  Department 

statement)  69 

Presidential  Documents 
Baltic  Freedom  Day,  1988 

(proclamation) 24 

Iranian  Airbus  Tragedy  (Bush,  Reagan, 

Williamson,  letters  to  the  Congress  and 

UN  Security  Council,  White  House 

statement)  38 

Nuclear  and  Space  Arms  Talks  Open  10th 

Round  (Kampelman,  Reagan)    6 

Trade  With  Hungary  and  China  (letter  to 

the  Congress,  text  of  report) 17 

Visit  of  Australian  Prime  Minister  (Hawke, 

Reagan)    50 

Visit  of  Italian  Prime  Minister  (De  Mita, 

Reagan)    29 

Visit  of  Turkish  President  (Evren, 

Reagan)    31 

Publications 

Background  Notes 86 

Department  of  State  86 

Refugees.  Status  Report  on  Afghanistan 

(Armacost,  Williamson)    55 

Security  Assistance.  FY  1989  Request  for 

Security  Assistance  Program 

(Whitehead) 53 


Terrorism 

Countering  Terrorism:  Successes  and 

Failures  (Bremer)    59 

U.S.  Offers  Reward  for  Terrorists 

(Department  announcement) 60 

Trade 

.lapan  to  Phase  Out  Quotas  on  Beef  and 

Citrus  Imports  (Yeutter)    16 

Trade  With  Hungary  and  China  (letter  to 

the  Congress,  text  of  report) 17 

Treaties.  Current  Actions 83 

Turkey 

Turkey— A  Profile   32 

Visit  of  Turkish  President  (Evren, 

Reagan)    31 

U.S.S.R. 

Acting  Secretarv  Whitehead's  Interview  on 

"This  Week  w"ith  David  Brinkley"    ...  36 
Negotiating  With  the  Soviet  Union:  Then 

and  Now  (Rowny) 26 

Openness:  The  Only  Path  to  Progress 

(Whitehead) ' 33 

Perspectives  on  Change  in  the  Soviet 

Union  (Ridgway)    23 

Regional  Issues  and  U.S. -Soviet  Relations 

(Armacost) 18 

United  Nations 

Advancing  U.S.  Objectives  in  the  United 

Nations  (Williamson) 67 

Developments  in  the  UN  System 

(Williamson)    62 

Iran  Accepts  Security  Council  Resolution 

598  (Department  statement)   63 

Iranian  Airbus  Tragedy  (Bush,  Reagan, 

Williamson,  letters  to  the  Congress  and 

UN  Security  Council,  White  House 

statement)  38 

The  United  Nations  and  Disarmament 

(Williamson)    65 

Vietnam.  Update  on  POW/MIA  Efforts 

(Lambertson)    15 

Western  Hemisphere 

Secretary  Visits  Central  America  (Shultz, 

letter  to  the  Congress)  76 

Secretary's  Interview  on  "Face 

the  Nation"    1 

Name  Index 

Armacost,  Michael  H    9,18,55 

Bremer,  L.  Paul,  III   59 

Bush,  Vice  President    38 

Crocker,  Chester  A 3 

De  Mita,  Ciriaco    29 

Evren,  Kenan   31 

Hawke,  Robert  J.L   50 

Kampelman,  Max  M    6 

Lambertson,  David  F    15 

McCormack,  Richard  T    69 

Murphy,  Richard  W 44 

Okun,  Herbert  S    38 

Reagan,  President   6,17,24,29,31,38,50 

Ridgway,  Rozanne  L  23 

Rowny,  Edward  L   26 

Shultz,  Secretary    1,47,76 

Sigur,  Gaston  J. ,  Jr   13 

Skoug,  Kenneth  N.,  Jr 72 

Whitehead,  John  C   33,36,53 

Williamson,  Richard  S 38,55,62,65,67 

Yeutter,  Clayton 16 


''°<f^V^ 


'■^?S^a^^'-