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Depart tn0»n t
of State

I 3',

) Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 89 / Number 2148

July 1989

-^^^^imDmo?

M0f»parinn»ni of Siaie

bulletin

Volume 89 / Number 2148 July 1989

The Dki'artment ok State Buij.etin.
published by the Office of PubUc Com-
munication in the Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and govern-
ment agencies with information on de-
velopments in U.S. foreign relations
and the work of the Department of
State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin's contents include major ad-
dresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State:
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials; se-
lected press releases issued by the
White House, the Department, and the
U.S. Mission to the United Nations;
and treaties and other agreements to
which the United States is or may be-
come a party. Special features, articles,
and other supportive material (such as
maps, charts, photographs, and graphs)
are jniblished frequently to provide ad-
ditional information on current issues
but should not necessarily be inter-
preted as official U.S. policy
statements.

JAMES A. BAKER, III

Secretary nf State

MARGARET DeB. TUTWILER

Assistant Secretary
for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD

Director,

Office of Public Communication

COLLEEN LUTZ

Chiel', Editdrial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

Editor

The Secretary of State has determined that
the publication of this periodical is neces-
sary in the transaction of the public busi-
ness requii-ed by law of this Department.
Use of funds for printing this periodical
has been approved by the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget through
September :l(), 19S9.

Dkpartment of State Bulletin (ISS^'
0041-7610) is published monthly (plus an-
nual indexl by the Department of State,
2201 C Street, NW, Washington, D.C.
20520. Second-class postage paid at Wasl
ington, D.C, and additional mailing of-
fices. POSTMASTER: Send address
changes to Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20402.

NtJTE: Most of the contents of this publi-
cation are in the public domain and not
copyrighted. Those items may be re-
printed; citation of the Department of
State Bulletin as the source will be ap-
preciated. Permission to reproduce all
copyrighted material (including pho-
tographs) must be obtained from the origi-
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online by Magazine Index (Dialog file 47;
BRS file MAGS), in the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature and the online ver-
sion of Reader.s' Guide (WILSONLINE file
RDG), and in the PAIS (Public Affairs In-
formation Service, Inc.) Bulletin. .'Articles

are abstracted bv Readers' Guide Ab-
stracts (WILSONLINE file RGA). The
Bulletin also participates in Mead Dat
Central's full-text online services, LEXI
and NEXIS.

For sale by the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402.

CONTENTS

FEATURE

1 50th Anniversary of the Bulletin

ie President

Change in the Soviet Union
The Future of Europe
Security Strategy for the 1990s

ie Secretary

News Conference
Principles and Pragmatism:

American Policy Toward the

Arab-Israeli Conflict
Interview on "Face the Nation"
Trip to Moscow and NATO

{Secretary Baker. Joint

Statement)
The Challenge of Change in

U.S. -Soviet Relations

ifrica

FY 1990 Assistance Request for
Sub-Saharan Africa {Alison
Rosenberg)

Cease-Fire in Sudan
{Department Statement)

ifms Control

'' Biological Weapons Prolifera-
tion {H. Allen Holmes)
CFE and CSBM Talks Resume
in Vienna {White House
Statement)

lanada

President Meets With Prime
Minister Mulroney {President
Bush, Brian Mulroney)

ast Asia

1 Student Demonstations in China
{Richard L. Williams)

48 U.S., Japan Agree to Codevelop
FSX Aircraft {President
Bush, Lawrence S.
Eagleburger)

Economics

Competitiveness in the Global
Marketplace {Richard T.
McCormack)

World Trade Week, 1989
{Proclamation)

Europe

52 Deconfrontation on Cyprus
{Department Stafeynent)

Middle East

54
55

Visit of King Hussein I

{President Bush,

King Hussein)
Jordan — A Profile
Relief Aid to Lebanon

{Department Statement)
Situation in Lebanon

{Department Statements)

Oceans

56 U.S. Responsibilities in

International Fisheries Mat-
ters {Edward E. Wolfe)

Refugees

59 Update on Immigration and

Refugee Issues {Jonathan
Moore)

Science & Technology

62 U.S. Contributions to Communi-
cations Development

United Nations

65 U.S. Opposes PLO Admission to

UN Agencies {Secretary
Baker, Sandra L.
Vogelgesang, Department
Statement)

Western Hemisphere

66 Panama Elections {President

Bush, Lawrence S. Eagle-
burger, Department and
White House Statements, Text
of OAS Resolution)

68 Elections in Argentina {Depart-
ment Statements)

71 Elections in Bolivia {Depart-
ment Statement)

73 U.S. -Mexico Relations

76 Mexico — A Profile

Treaties

76 Current Actions

Press Releases

78 Department of State

Publications

79 Department of State

80 Foreign Relations Volumes

Released

81 Background Notes

Index

epartment of State Bulletin/July 1989

To Our Readers:

With this issue, we celebrate the gold-
en anniversary of the Department of
State Bulletin.

When this periodical was first
published, no one could have forseen
the crucial role the United States
would play in world events during the
next half-century. In order to illus-
trate the extent of these changes, we
are pleased to reproduce here the full
text of the first Bulletin issued on
July 1, 1939. Through the Administra-
tions of 10 Presidents and 15 Secre-
taries of State, America has assumed
global responsibilities in political,
economic, military, scientific, envi-
ronmental, and humanitarian affairs
to an extent unimaginable in those
twilight days just prior to World
War II.

The words and phrases that have
become part of our vocabulary and
lore in the past 50 years — cold war,
Uruguay Round, narcotics interdic-
tion, American hostages, Cuban mis-
sile crisis, perestroika, intifada. Camp
David agreements, INF Treaty, Tien-
anmen Square, acid rain, to cite but a
few — illustrate the growth in com-
plexity and scope of U.S. foreign rela-
tions. Our language of acronyms —
UN, OECD, NATO, GATT, UNCTAD,
OAS, OAU, EEC, UNEP, etc.— dem-
onstrate the growing interdependence
of nations and the crucial importance
of diplomacy.

Throughout this time, the
Bulletin has attempted to provide as
accurate and as complete a record as
possible of U.S. public policy on inter-
national issues, for contemporary
readers and for the researchers of
future generations.

Just as the issues have become
far more complex and varied, so has
our publication — in the range of its
subject matter, in the volume of its
material, and in its format and style.
We have gone from a weekly to a
monthly in order to keep subscription
rates low. New technology has al-
lowed us to speed up the printing
process and increase our use of
graphics and photos, and this revolu-
tion is only just beginning.

But whatever changes have been
made, we have sought, above all, to
maintain the integrity and utility of
the only official monthly record of
national foreign policy published by
any country in the world. As we ap-
proach the 21st century, our goal is to
continue to provide the same level of
quality and coverage and to be as
adaptable to the enormous changes
looming ahead as we have been to
those of the past. That promises to be
an exciting challenge!

July 1, 1989

Department of State Bulletin/July

FEATURE
50th Anniversary of the Bulletin

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

■^ f

riN

JULY I, 1939
Vol. I: No. 1— Publication 1349

Qontents

Announcement 3

Peace and neutrality legislation: Statement by the

Secretary of State 4

Department of State appropriations for the fiscal year

1940 4

Visit to Washington of the Crown Prince and Crown

Princess of Norway 9

Mexico: Perfecting of land titles in the State of Veracruz . 10

Use of the original records of the Department of State . . 10

Training of Chilean students in the United States ... 12
International conferences, commissions, etc.:

Biennial Congress of the International Chamber of

Commerce 13

International Commission of Inquiry, United States

and Bolivia 13

Fifteenth International Conference on Documentation . 14

Treaty information 14

Foreign Service 16

Aimiversaries:

Anniversary of inauguration of postal service between

the United States and France 16

Legislation 16

Publications 16

epartment of State Bulletin/July 1989

Announcement

'T^HE present issue inaugurates The Department of State Bulletin. This periodical will

be published weekly and will contain the texts of press releases, information regard-
ing treaties, and other material on current developments in American foreign relations
and the work of the Department of State. It will take the place of the Department's
weekly pamphlet Press Releases and monthly Treaty Information bulletin, which are being
discontinued with the issues for June 1939. Indexes to The Department of State Bulletin
will be prepared and published semiannually.

The decision to discontinue the Treaty Information bulletin and the Press Releases
pamphlet was arrived at after careful consideration by the Department of State and con-
sultation with a nimiber of organizations and persons outside the Government who use one
or both of those publications. A large majority of the organizations and persons consulted
were of the opinion that the publication in a single bulletin of the material which was
being issued in the weekly and monthly periodicals mentioned would be most desirable.
This opinion coincided with the belief of the Department that a single bulletin containing
both treaty information and information on other closely related aspects of the conduct of
American foreign relations would constitute a more useful and convenient source for
current reference and for filing than two separate publications.

The material to be published in The Department of State Bulletin wiU be so organized
as to enable persons who are interested in certain special subjects to follow developments
in their particular fields by reference each week to the appropriate section of the Bulletiti.
Data, for instance, of the character of that previously contained in the Treaty Information
bulletin will henceforth be printed each week in a separate section of the Bulletin.

The Department of State Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents,
Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C, for 10 cents a copy, or for $2.75 a year by
subscription.

lEililor's Note; Dii UlliH ."ilition. page i; was blank.]

Department of State Bulletin/July 1!|

FEATURE
50th Anniversary of the Bulletin

PEACE AND NEUTRALITY LEGISLATION

Statement by the Secretary of State

[Released July 1]

I am still thoroughly convinced that the six-
point peace and neutrality program set forth in
my letters to Senator Pittman and Representa-
tive Bloom on May 27, 1939,^ would be far
more effective in the interests of peace and in
keeping the country out of war than the pres-
ent embargo law or any equivalent.

This legislative proposal was submitted to the
appropriate committees of the two Houses of
Congress after lengthy conferences with mem-
bers of these committees and with other lead-
ing Members of Congress of all political per-
suasions. It was my hope and belief that, while
this proposal might not contain all that every
individual Member of Congress or every oflS-
cial of the executive branch of the Govern-
ment wished, it would in the present interna-
tional exigencies be regarded as desirable by

a majority of Congress. Its failure to pass the
House by a narrow margin is a matter of re-
gret and disappointment from the standpoint
of peace and the best interests of this country
in its international relations.

This six-point peace and neutrality proposal
is not only best calculated to keep this Nation
out of war in the event war comes, but also,
what is all-important at this time, best cal-
culated to make a far greater contribution than
could the present law or its equivalent toward
the discouragement of the outbreak of war. At
the same time, while doing this, it would like-
wise keep this Government and Nation lUO
percent within the limits of universally recog-
nized international law.

In these circumstances, I must continue to
urge the adoption of this proposal.

-f + 4- ^ -f -f -♦■

DEPARTMENT OF STATE APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE FISCAL

YEAR 1940

The first of the following tables shows the
increases and decreases in the State Depart-
ment's appropriations for the 1940 fiscal year
as compared with the 1939 fiscal year. The sec-
ond table shows increases and decreases in the

" See Press Releases, Vol. XX, No. 505, Jiine 3, 1939,
pp. 475-477.

estimates as submitted to the Congress by the
Bureau of the Budget and as approved by the
President compared with the 1940 appropria-
tions approved by the Congress.

The Department's appropriation bill for
1940 was approved by the President on June
29, 1939.

Ipartment of State Bulletin/July 1989

JULY 1, 1939

TABLE I

Department op State Appbopeiations fob Fiscal Ybab 1940 Compabed With Fiscal Yeab 1939

(Note. — For purposes of comparison it should be carefully noted that the 1939 column Includes all deficiency
appropriations in addition to those in the regular annual appropriation bill, whereas for 1940 only the latter are
shown since no deficiencies for that year have yet been passed.)

Appropriation title

Appropriations
for 1940

Appropriations
for 1939

Increases (+)

Decreases (— )

for 1940

Reasons for increases or decreases

Department Proper

Salaries, Department of State -

Salaries, Reciprocal Trade Agree-
ments.

Contingent Expenses, Depart-
ment of State.

Printing and Binding, Depart-
ment of State.

$2, 192, 000

225, 000
138, 000

225, 000

$2, 072, 600

250, 000
95, 810

+ $119,400

-25,000

+ 42, 190

172, 750

Printing and Binding, Depart-
ment of State (Supplemental
for special items for 1939).

Passport Agencies, Department
of State.

Collecting and Editing Terri-
torial Papers.

Promotion of Foreign Trade

Total Department Proper.

60, 000
19, 800
43, 000

2, 902, 800

15, 000

63, 500
20, 000
40,000

2, 729, 660

+ 52,250

-15,000

-3,500

-200

+ 3,000

+ 173,140

Increases of $92,640 for 47 addi-
tional permanent positions; and
$26,760 to reduce the deficit
which is now required to be
covered by lapses.

General reduction which will re-
quire readjustments in present
set-up.

Increases of $7,875 for general sup-
plies and services; $2,000 for
replacement of trucks and pur-
chase of one additional car;
$11,065 for equipment for addi-
tional personnel and replace-
ments, particularly of machines.
Decrease of $4,500 in travel.
The sum of $25,750 was continued
available for 1939 from 1938 and,
therefore, was in addition to the
appropriation of $95,810. In-
crease for 1940 over funds actu-
ally available for 1939 is, there-
fore, $25,750 less than the
$42,190, which is on the basis of
appropriations.

Increases of $13,600 for consolida-
tion of consular regulations and
instructions to diplomatic offi-
cers; $18,000 for Foreign Rela-
tions; $4,500 for press releases;
$4,110 for passports and passport
forms; $9,000 for Foreign Service
requirements; and $3,040 for mis-
cellaneous items.

Non-recurring for 1940.

Decrease based on trend of expend-
itures for past year.
General decrease.

Funds available for 1939 were
$4,500 more than the appropria-
tion of $40,000 due to the avail-
ability of the unexpended balance
for 1938. For 1940 no balance
is brought forward.

FEATURE
50th Anniversary of the Bulletin

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Appropriation title

Foreign Service

Salaries of Ambassadors and
Ministers.

Salaries of Foreign Service
Officers.

Transportation, Foreign Service..

Office and Living Quarters, For-
eign Service.

Cost of Living Allowances,

Representation Allowances-

Appropriations

for 1940

$650, 000

3, 580, 000
600, 000

Retirement Fund

Salaries of Foreign Service Clerks.

Salaries of Foreign Service Clerks
(Supplemental for urgent needs
in 1939).

Miscellaneous Salaries and Allow-
ances, Foreign Service.

Contingent Expenses, Foreign
Service.

Contingent Expenses, Foreign
Service (Supplemental for tele-
graph expenses in 1939).

Emergencies Arising in the Diplo-
matic and Consular Service.

Total Foreign Service

FoEEiGN Service Buildings.

2, 020, 000

300, 000

140, 000

199, 400
2, 550, 000

700, 000

1, 135, 000

Appropriations
(or 1939

$640, 000

3, 505, 100
556, 700

1, 962, 000

280, 000

125, 000

187, 600
2, 359, 020

41, 700

680, 180

1, 158, 500

Increases (+)

Decreases (— )

tor 1940

+ $10,000

+ 74,900
+ 43, 300

175, 000

12, 049, 400

750, 000

140, 000
175, 000

11,810,800

+ 58,000

+ 20, 000
+ 15,000

+ 11,800
+ 190, 980

-41,700
+ 19,820

-23,500

Reasons for increases or decreases

- 140, 000

+ 238, 600

+ 750,000

Increase of $22,500 required for
raising ranks of Ministers to
Colombia, Panama, and Vene-
zuela to Ambassadors. De-
creases of $10,000 for Minister to
Czechoslovakia; and $2,500 addi-
tional to be saved on lapses.

Increases of $49,900 for automatic
promotions and $25,000 for 10
additional officers.

Increases of $12,500 for transfers
of Ambassadors and Ministers;
$10,600 for new officers; $4,200
for new clerks; $8,500 for tem-
porary details; and $7,500 trans-
ferred to this appropriation from
Contingent Expenses for trade
conference travel.

Increa.ses of $12,000 for 10 addi-
tional officers; $11,970 for addi-
tional clerks; and $34,030 to
reduce deficit which it is neces-
sary to cover by lapses on allow-
ances for living quarters.

Increases of $2,400 for additional
officers: $3,150 for additional
clerks; and $14,450 for increased
living costs.

To make readjustments in the in-
terest of uniform treatment in the
allotment of these funds, and to
make more adequate provision
for official entertainment le-
quired by heads of mission.

Increases of $100,000 for some 700
promotions; $66,020 for 58 addi-
tional permanent clerks; $15,920
for transfers to this appropria-
tion of personnel previously paid
from other appropriations; and
$9,040 for temporary clerks.

Non-recuiring for 1940.

Increases of approximately $18,000
for some 600 promotions at an

' average of $30; $1,820 for addi-

"' tional personnel.

Reductions of $15,000 in program
for purchase of household furni-
ture; $10,000 for trade conference
travel transferred to "Trans-
portation, Foreign Service"
$2,500 in item for special train-
ing of Foreign Service officers
$650 in automotive equipment.
Increase of $4,650 for supplies
postage, and miscellaneous items

Non-recurring' for 1940.

New appropriation under act of
May 25, 1938.

partment of State Bulletin/July 1989

JULY 1, 1939

Appropriation title

Appropriations
for 1940

Appropriations
for 1939

Increases (+)

Decreases (-)

for 1940

Reasons for increases or decreases

International Obltgations

Contributions, Quotas, etc. to In-

$870, 000

$835, 590

+ $34,410

Increases of $1,319.67 for Pan

ternational Bureaus.

American Union; $27,303.44 for
Pan American Sanitary Bureau;
and $10,786.89 for International
Labor Organization. Decrease of
$5,000 for Meeting of Interna-
tional Road Congress which is a
non-recurring item.

(Convention for the Promotion of

75, 000

+ 75,000

New item growing out of conven-

Inter-American Cultural Re-

tion signed at Buenos Aires, De-

lations.

cember 23, 1936.

Mexican Boundary Commission

193, 000

143, 300

+ 49, 700

Increase is entirely for operation

(Regular).

and maintenance of the Rio

Grande Rectification Project

which is to be assumed by the

regular Commission upon com-
pletion.
Anticipated completion of this

Rio Crrande Rectification Proiect

229, 500

-229, 500

j_l^H_/ y^ X c* 1-1 v.* \^ ^ V w ^-' VI *-* x^n' V* v^ *"* .■■ iv-'j^^^-'v —

project.

Lower Rio Grande Flood Control

800, 000

311,500

+ 488,500

Although there is an increase in the

Project.

actual amount appropriated for
1940, there was a considerable
balance brought forward to 1939
from 1938 which made funds
available for 1939 somewhat in
excess of the appropriation for
1940.

Rio Grande Canalization Pro-

500, 000

646, 500

-146,500

Reduction in construction work.

ject.

Fence Construction on the

Boundary, Arizona.
International Boundary Commis-

25, 000

42, 000

41, 500

+ 500

Increase is for additional field work.

sion, United States and Can-

ada, and Alaska and Canada.

Salaries and Expenses, Interna-

37, 500

36, 600

+ 900

Increase for travel, supplies, com-

tional Joint Commission,

munication service, and miscel-

United States and Great Brit-

laneous items.

ain.
Special and Technical Investiga-

47, 000

49, 000

-2,000

General reduction.

tions, United States and Great

Britain.

International Fisheries Commis-
sion.
International Pacific Salmon Fish-

25 000

25, 000

40, 000

25, 000

+ 15,000

For more extensive field work in

eries Commission.

cooperation with Canada.

Eighth American Scientific Con-
gress.

85, 000

+ 85,000

Special appropriation for participa-

tion by the United States in this
conference.

Seventh General Assembly of the
International Union of Geodesy
and Geophysics.

Ninth International Seed Testing
Congress.

4,500

+ 4,500

Special appropriation for organiz-

500

+ 500

ing this Congress to be held in
the United States.
Special appropriation in connection

with holding this Congress in the

United States.

Payment to Government of Nica-
ragua.

72, 000

+ 72,000

Special appropriation' under agree-

ment with Nicaragua.

Fifteenth International Congress
of Architects.

15, 000

-15,000

Non-recurring.

Tenth Pan American Sanitary

Conference.
International Committee OD Po-

3,500

-3, 500

Non-recurring.

50, 000

-50,000

Appropriation for 1940 undeter-

litical Refugees.

mined at present.

Department of &tate Bulletin/July 19|

FEATURE
50th Anniversary of the Bulletin

DEPABTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Appropriation title

Appropriations
for 1940

Appropriations
for 1939

Increases (+)

Decreases (-)

for 1940

Reasons for increases or decreases

International Obligations — Con.
Fourth International Conference

$15, 500

50,000
15,000

3,600

50,000

10, 000

-$15,500

-50,000
-15,000

-3,600

-50.000

-10,000

Non-recurring.

Non-recurring.
Non-recurring.

Non-recurring.

on Private Air Law.
Pan American Highway.

Third Pan American Highway

Conference.
Commission of Experts on Codifi-

cation of International Law.
Tenth International Congress of

Military Medicine and Phar-
macy.
Arbitration of Smelter Fumes

Controversy.

Total Intbknational Obli-
gations.

$2, 816, 500

2, 581, 090

-1-235, 410

Gband ToTAi

18 518 700

17, 121, 550

+ 1,397, 150

TABLE II

Dbpartment of State Estimates as Submitted to Congress by the Bureau op the Budget Compared With

Appropriations Approved by Congress, 1940

Title of appropriation

Department op State

Salaries, Department of State

Salaries, Reciprocal Trade Treaties

Salaries, Inter- American Program

Contingent Expenses, Department of State

Contingent Expenses, Inter- American Program .

Printing and Binding, Department

Printing and Binding, Inter- American Program,

Passport Agencies

Territorial Papers

Promotion of Foreign Trade

Total, Department of State

Foreign Service

Salaries of Ambassadors and Ministers

Salaries of Foreign Service Officers

Transportation, Foreign Service Officers

Office and Living Quarters

Cost of Living Allowance

Representation Allowance

Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund

Salaries, Foreign Service Clerks

Miscellaneous Salaries and Allowances

Contingent Expenses, Foreign Service

Emergency Fund

Total, Foreign Service

Foreign Service Buildings Fund

Estimate submitted
to Congress

$2, 205, 000. 00

250, 000. 00

39, 360. 00

143, 000. 00

5, 430. 00

214, 500. 00

45, 500. 00

63, 500. 00

20, 000. 00

44, 500. 00

3, 030, 790. 00

655, 000. 00
580, 000. 00
610, 000. 00
030, 000. 00
308, 500. 00
145, 000. 00
199, 400. 00
570, 000. 00
710, 500. 00
154, 500. 00
175, 000. 00

12, 137, 900. 00

1, 000, 000. 00

Appropriation

approved by

Congress

$2, 192, 000. 00
225, 000. 00

138, 000. 00
'225,' 000.' 00

60, 000. 00
19, 800. 00
43, 000. 00

2, 902, 800. 00

650,
3, 580,

600,
2, 020,

300,

140,

199,
2, 550,

700,
1, 135,

175,

000. 00
000. 00
000. 00
000. 00
000. 00
000. 00
400. 00
000. 00
000. 00
000. 00
000. 00

12, 049, 400. 00

750, 000. 00

Increase (-1-)
Decrease (-)

-$13,000.00
-25,000.00
-39,360.00

- 5, 000. 00

-5,430.00
+ 10, 500. 00
-45,500.00

-3, 500. 00
-200. 00

- 1, 500. 00

-127,990. 00

-5,

000.

-10,

000.

-10,

000.

-8,

500.

-5,

000.

-20,

000.

-10,

500

-19,

500.

-88, 500. 00

-250,000.00

Apartment of State Bulletin/July 1989

JULY 1, 1939

Title of appropriation

Estimate submitted
to Congress

Appropriation

approved by

Congress

Increase (+)
Decrease (— )

International Obligations

Contributions, Quotas, etc

Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural

Relations.
Mexican Boundary Commission:

Regular Commission

Lower Rio Grande Flood Control

Rio Grande Canalization

Fence Construction

International Boundary Commission:

United States and Canada and Alaska and Canada

International Joint Commission:

Salaries and Expenses

Special and Technical Investigations

International Fisheries Commission

International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission

Eighth American Scientific Congress

Seventh Assembly of International Union of Geodesy and
Geophysics.

Ninth International Seed Testing Congress

Payment to Nicaragua

$870, 133. 00
75, 000. 00

198, 300. 00
1, 000, 000. 00
1, 000, 000. 00

43, 000. 00

38, 500. 00
49, 000. 00
31, 500. 00
40, 000. 00
90, 000. 00
5, 000. 00

500. 00
72, 000. 00

$870, 000. 00
75, 000. 00

193, 000. 00

800, 000. 00

500, 000. 00

25, 000. 00

42, 000. 00

37, 500. 00
47, 000. 00
25, 000. 00
40, 000. 00
85, 000. 00
4, 500. 00

500. 00
72, 000. 00

Total, International Obligations-
Grand Total

3, 512, 933. 00

2, 816, 500. 00

-$13a 00

-5,300.00

-200,000.00

-500,000.00

+ 25, 000. 00

- 1, 000. 00

- 1, 000. 00
-2,000.00
-6,500.00

-5,000. 00
-500. 00

-696,433.00

19, 681, 623. 00

18, 518, 700. 00

1, 162, 923. 00

VISIT TO WASHINGTON OF THE CROWN PRINCE AND CROWN

PRINCESS OF NORWAY

[Released June 26]

Their Royal Highnesses the Crown Prince
and Crown Princess of Norway will arrive in
Washington, for an unofficial visit, at 9 : 15
p. m., the evening of Tuesday, June 27. They
will be accompanied by the Minist«r of Norway
and will be met at the Union Station by the
following committee:

The Honorable Cordell Hull, Secretary of
State, and Mrs. Hull

Madame Munthe de Morgenstierne, wife of the
Minister of Norway

Mr. Jorgen Galbe, Counselor of the Norwegian
Legation, and Madame Galbe

Mr. George T. Summerlin, Chief of Protocol

Mr. James C. Dunn, Adviser on Political Rela-
tions, Department of State, and Mrs. Dunn

Mr. John Hickerson, Acting Chief of the Divi-
sion of European Affairs, Department of State,
and Mrs. Hickerson

Mr. Aage Bryn, First Secretary of the Nor-
wegian Legation, and Madame Bryn

Mr. Ditlef Knudsen, Attache of the Norwegian
Legation, and Madame Knudsen

Mr. Torfinn Oftedal, Attache of the Norwegian
Legation

Lt. Col. H. M. Rayner, United States Army,
Military Aide to the Crown Princ«

Comdr. R. B. Carney, United States Navy,
Naval Aide to the Crown Prince

On Wednesday, June 28, the Secretary of
State and Mrs. Hull will give a luncheon for
Their Royal Highnesses, who will remain in
Washington until Friday afternoon, June 30.

Department of State Bulletin/July 1!

FEATURE
50th Anniversary of the Bulletin

[Released June 28]

Following is the list of guests attending the lunch-
eon given by the Secretary of State and Mrs. Hull in
honor of Their Royal Highnesses the Crown Prince
and Crown Princess of Norway, June 28, 1939, at the
Carlton Hotel:

Their Royal Highnesses the Crown Prince and Crown
Princess of Norway; the Honorable the Minister of
Norway and Madame Munthe de Morgenstierne ; Maj.
N. R. 0stgaard and Madame 0stgaard ; Capt. N. A.
Ramm ; Mr. Jens Schive ; Mrs. Woodrow Wilson ; the
Honorable the Attorney General; the Honorable the
Secretary of Commerce ; Mrs. Charles L. McNary ; the
Honorable Walter F. George and Mrs. George; the
Honorable Robert L. Doughton and Mrs. Doughton ;
Mrs. Sol Bloom ; the Honorable Edith Nourse Rogers ;
the Honorable Jere Cooper ; the Honorable the Under
Secretary of State and Mrs. Welles ; the Honorable
Lucille F. McMillan ; Mr. and Mrs. Nicholas Roose-
velt ; the Honorable Jesse Jones and Mrs. Jones ; Mr.
George T. Summerlin ; Mr. David Lawrence ; Mr.
Ulric Bell; Miss Ramona Lefevre; Miss Beth Camp-
bell ; Lt. Col. Harold M. Rayner, United States Army,
American military aide to His Royal Highness the
Crown Prince of Norway ; Comdr. Robert B. Carney,
United States Navy, American naval aide to His Royal
Highness the Crown Prince of Norway.

+ -f -♦•

MEXICO: PERFECTING OF LAND
TITLES IN THE STATE OF VERA-
CRUZ

[Released June 26]

The Department of State has been informed
that the State of Veracruz, Mexico, has ex-
tended until July 22, 1939, the period within
which proprietors of immovable property (in-
cluding those who have inherited immovable
property) may legalize their property rights
by instituting the necessary proceedings to
"perfect" the said rights in cases where titles
of ownership are not properly inscribed in the
Public Registry of Property. As stated in the
Department's press release of March 21, 1939,-
provision for such perfection of title was made

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

in Veracruz State law promulgated September
22, 1938.

The American consul at Veracruz, in report-
ing this extension, states that in order to com-
ply with the law it may be necessary for Amer-
ican property owners affected by the law to
engage an attorney. The consul will be glad,
upon request, to furnish any interested Amer-
ican citizen with a list of attorneys. He can-
not, of course, assume any responsibility for
the integrity or ability of any attorneys ap-
pearing on the list who may be employed by
such property owner.

-f -♦■ -f

USE OF THE ORIGINAL RECORDS OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Released July 1]

In view of the contemporary international
situation, the Department has found it neces-
sary to revise in certain respects the regula-
tions set forth in Departmental Order No. 751,
of April 5, 1938, relating to the use of the
original records of the Department of State.'
The revised regulations as contained in De-
partmental Order No. 796, dated June 19, 1939.
are as follows:

"Section 91, Title 20, of the United States
Code reads in part as follows: 'The facilities
for study research and illustration in the Gov-
ernment departments . . . shall be accessible,
under such rules and restrictions as the officers
in charge of each department or collection may
prescribe, subject to such authority as is now
or may hereafter be permitted by law, to the
scientific investigators and to duly qualified
individuals, students and graduates of any in-
stitution of learning in the several States and
Territories and the District of Columbia . . .'
Pursuant to the provisions quoted and in order

'Press Releases, Vol. XX, No. 495, March 25, 1939,
pp. 222-223.

" See Press Releases, Vol. XIX, No. 479, December 3,
1938, p. 401.

JULY 1, 1939

to clarify the present procedure in the Depart-
ment, the following regulations, superseding
those contained in Departmental Order No. 751,
dated April 5, 1938, and all previous depart-
mental orders on the subject, are hereby pre-
scribed to govern the use of the original records
of the Department of State.

"In view of the contemporary international
situation it will not be possible to make the
confidential or unpublished files and records of
the Department of a date later than December
31, 1918, available to persons who are not offi-
cials of the United States Government. In
order that the Department's records may be
made available as liberally as circumstances
permit, the Department each year will give con-
sideration to the situation then existing with a
view to advancing the date fixed whenever such
action is deemed possible. The use of these
records by Government officials will be subject
to such conditions as the chiefs of the appro-
priate policy divisions in the Department of
State may deem it advisable to prescribe.

"The confidential or unpublished records of
the Department of a date prior to December 31,
1918, or such subsequent date as may be fixed
by the Department, may be made available to
persons who are not officials of the United
States Government, subject to the following
conditions :

"Files which are in current use in the De-
partment or which cannot be made public with-
out the disclosure of confidences reposed in the
Department or without adversely affecting the
public interest should not be made available
to inquirers. Papers received by the Depart-
ment from a foreign government which have
not been released for publication by that gov-
ernment should not be made available to in-
quirers without the consent of the government
concerned. If there is reason to believe a for-
eign government may be willing to permit the
use of the papers in question under certain
conditions the permission may, in the discre-
tion of the appropriate officials of the Depart-
ment, be requested. If such permission is re-
quested, the expenses of communicating with

the foreign government (cost of telegrams,
postage, etc.) will be met by the person desir-
ing to consult the papers.

"Permission to consult the records of the
Department through the date fixed by the De-
partment may be granted, subject to the limi-
tations set forth in this order, to such persons
as lawyers, publicists, historians, instructors,
and professors in accredited colleges and uni-
versities, and holders of the doctor's degree (or
its equivalent) in foreign relations or allied
subjects from such colleges and universities,
provided that they are authorities of recog-
nized standing in the field to which the records
relate and that they have an important and
definite use for the information desired. Due
to lack of personnel the Department is not in
a position to assemble large quantities of
papers or extensive files for consultation by
persons not officials of the Government, and
requests for permission to consult material
should therefore be definitely limited in scope
and confined to specific subjects or particular
papers.

"An application from an alien to consult the
Department's records under this order shall be
considered only if accompanied by a letter
from the head of the embassy or legation at
Washington of the country of which the alien
is a citizen, subject or national. Such a letter
must show that the applicant is favorably
known to the appropriate embassy or legation
and that the mission is familiar with the pur-
pose of the applicant's work.

"All applications to consult the original
records of the Department of date prior to
the one fixed by the Department shall be re-
ferred to the Chief of the Division of Kesearch
and Publication. If the Chief of the Divi-
sion of Research and Publication is of the
opinion that the applicant possesses the requi-
site qualifications as set forth in this order, he
shall have assembled and shall submit to the
chief of the policy division charged with the
consideration of questions in the field which is
the object of the research or inquiry all of the
relevant papers and files which the applicant

FEATURE
50th Anniversary of the Bulletin

desires to consult with the exceptions herein-
after noted. If the applicant is permitted to
use all or part of the papers desired, the chief
of the policy division concerned will inform
the Chief of the Division of Research and
Publication under what conditions the papers
may be examined, that is, whether copies may
be made of the relevant documents or whether
only notes may be taken and whether the copies
or notes may be published in whole or in part
or used only for background information, or
any other conditions which the chief of the
policy division mentioned may deem it advis-
able to prescribe. This decision will be final
except in cases of unusual importance where
the question may be referred to an Assistant
Secretary of State or higher officer. Docu-
ments or papers previously released or pub-
lished, and unpublished papers clearly involv-
ing no question of policy, may be made avail-
able to qualified applicants by the Chief of the
Division of Research and Publication without
reference to other officials.

"Upon receiving the decision of the chief of
the policy division mentioned, with the condi-
tions therein deemed advisable and necessary
to prescribe, the Chief of the Division of Re-
search and Publication will thereupon arrange
for the applicant to consult the files subject to
the conditions mentioned. After the papers
have been consulted the applicant will submit
all notes, copies of documents, etc., which he
has made to the Chief of the Division of
Research and Publication. The latter, when
necessary, will refer these notes, copies, etc., to
the chief of the policy division concerned for
examination if desired by the chief of the latter
division. The chief of this policy division
may, after such examination, return the papers
to the Chief of the Division of Research and
Publication for transmittal to the applicant or
he may, in his discretion, retain the notes and
refuse the applicant permission to use them.

"The provisions of this order are to be inter-
preted as liberally as possible. In this regard
it is to be borne in mind that the further it is
possible to go in the way of promoting legiti-

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

mate historical research and the study of the
foreign policy of the United States without
violating the confidences necessary for the
transaction of diplomatic affairs, the more
likely the Department will be to receive the
support and trust of the intelligent public."

■f > *

TRAINING OF CHILEAN STUDENTS IN
THE UNITED STATES

[Released July 1]

A group of graduate students of Chilean
engineering schools today called on Assistant
Secretary of State Berle to pay their respects.
They were presented by the Chilean Ambassa-
dor. These students have come to the United
States to spend several months in some of the
important industrial plants of the country in
order to obtain advanced instruction and prac-
tical experience in certain branches of tech-
nology. They are here under the sponsorship
of the University of Chile and of a number of
Chilean and American banks, transportation
lines, and industrial concerns.

One group is under the sponsorship of:

The University of Chile (Engineering
School)

Mining Credit Bank of Chile

Chilean State Railways

Consulate General of Chile in New York

Chile-American Association, Inc.

Wessel-Duval & Co.

General Motors Corp.

Baldwin Locomotive Works & Associated
Companies

Bethlehem Steel Corp. & Associated Com-
panies

Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey & Asso-
ciated Companies

Westinghouse Electric International Co.

Thomas A. Edison Co.

Carrier Corporation

Members of this group are located as follows :

Luis Rojas, Westinghouse Electric Inter-
national Co.

Carlos A. Echazii, Westinghouse Electric
International Co.

spartment of State Bulletin/July 1989

JULY 1, 19 39

Fernando Suarez, Baldwin Locomotive

Works
Kamon Suarez, Bethlehem Steel Corp.
Jorge Hevia, Bethlehem Steel Corp.
Arturo Aranda, General Motors Corp.
Isaac Faiguenbaum, General Motors Corp.
Albert Arce, Carrier Corporation
Alfonso Castro, Baldwin Locomotive

Works
Carlos Alvarez, Standard Oil Co. of New

Jersey

A second group is under the sponsorship of

W. R. Grace & Co., the General Electric Co.,
and Ingersoll-Rand Co.

These students and their locations are as fol-
lows:

Ramon Cabezon B., General Electric Co.
Julio Melnick A., Ingersoll-Rand Co.
Luis Marti, Grace Industrial Department

The students presented also included Alberto
Cabero, Jr., son of the Chilean Ambassador to
the United States, and Mario Barranza, who is
under the sponsorship of the Panagra airlines.

International Conferences, Commissions, etc.

BIENNIAL CONGRESS OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

[Released June 26]

Following is the text of a message from tlie
President of the United States to Mr. Thomas
J. Watson, in connection with the Congress of
the International Chamber of Commerce being
held at Copenhagen, Denmark, convening June
26, 1939:

"In these times of international uncertainty
the existence of the International Chamber of
Conmierce and its efforts to promote interna-
tional economic activity are extremely hearten-
ing to those of us who believe that only with
the existence of stable and progressively im-
proving world trade and finance will it be pos-
sible to establish satisfactory international
political relations.

"I am glad to take this opportunity of ex-
pressing again my appreciation of the work
done in the promotion of world trade and un-
derstanding by the International Chamber of
Commerce, which has been under your leader-
ship for the past two years. To the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce and to your suc-
cessor I extend my best wishes for continued
successful activities in this direction.

"Frankun D. Roosevelt"

In transmitting the foregoing message to Mr.
Watson, Secretary of State Hull wrote:

"I have been requested by the President to
transmit to you his message to the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce at the June 26,
1939 Opening Session of its Biennial Congress.
I should like to have you know that I echo the
words of the President and that I wish for the
International Chamber of Commerce a success-
ful congress.

"CoRDELL Hull"

■f -f -f

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF
INQUIRY, UNITED STATES AND
BOLIVIA

[Released June 26]

By the joint action of the Governments of
the United States and Bolivia, Mr. Johannes
Irgens, Norwegian diplomatist, has been ap-
pointed to tlie position of Joint Commissioner
for the International Commission provided for
under the terms of the Treaty for the Advance-
ment of Peace between the United States and
Bolivia, signed January 22, 1914.

Department of State Bulletin/July 19

FEATURE
50th Anniversary of the Bulletin

The present composition of the Commission
is as follows:

American Commissioners :

National : A. R. Talbot, of Nebraska
Nonnational : Ludvigs Seja, of Latvia

Bolivian Commissioners:
National: Vacant
Nonnational: Vacant

Joint C onvmissioner :
Johannes Irgens, of Norway.

FIFTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CON-
FERENCE ON DOCUMENTATION

[Released July 1]

This Government has accepted the invitation
of the Swiss Goverimient to participate in the
Fifteenth International Conference on Docu-
mentation, which will be held at Zurich, Swit-

DEPARTMENT OF STATE HTTT.T.TCTTTJ

zerland, from August 10 to 13, 1939, and the
President has approved the appointment of the
following persons as delegates on the part of
the United States:

Vernon D. Tate, Ph. D., Chief, Division of
Photographic Archives and Research, The Na-
tional Archives

Miss Jose Meyer, European representative. Li-
brary of Congress, Paris, France.

This Government was represented at the
Fourteenth International Conference on Docu-
mentation which was held at Oxford, England,
in September 1938. At that meeting the dis-
cussions concerned the best methods of obtain-
ing authoritative information on bibliographic
work in such fields of learning as archeology,
archive work, economics, history, and linguistic
studies.

Treaty Information

All material for the month of June 1939 con-
cerning treaties to which the United States is a
party or may become a party or treaties of gen-
eral international interest will appear in the
Treaty Information bulletin for June 30, 1939 ;

treaty data available after that date will be
compiled in the Treaty Division and wiU ap-
pear in this section of subsequent issues of The
Department of State Bulletin.

ipartment of State Bulletin/July 1989

JULY 1, 1939

Foreign Service

The July 1, 1939, issue of the Foreign Serv-
ice List will contain the following changes in
heads of American diplomatic missions :

Norman Armour, of New Jersey, formerly
Ambassador to Chile, appointed Ambassador
to Argentina May 18, 1939.

Claude G. Bowers, of New York, formerly
Ambassador to Spain, appointed Ambassador
to Chile June 22, 1939.

Robert Granville Caldwell, of Texas, re-
signed as Minister to Bolivia effective upon
expiration of leave of absence.

Frank P. Corrigan, of Ohio, formerly Min-
ister to Panama, appointed Ambassador to
Venezuela January 20, 1939.

William Dawson, of Minnesota, formerly
Minister to Uruguay, appointed Ambassador
to Panama March 23, 1939.

Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., of California, for-
merly counselor of embassy at Lima, Peru, ap-
pointed Minister to Iran July 7, 1939.

Antonio C. Gonzalez, of New York, resigned
as Minister to Venezuela effective June 8, 1939.

Douglas Jenkins, of South Carolina, for-
merly consul general at London, appointed
Minister to Bolivia June 22, 1939.

Daniel C. Roper, of South Carolina, ap-
pointed Minister to Canada May 9, 1939.

Laurence A. Steinhardt, of New York, for-
merly Ambassador to Peru, appointed Ambas-
sador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics March 23, 1939.

Alexander W. Weddell, of Virginia, formerly
Ambassador to Argentina, appointed Ambas-
sador to Spain May 3, 1939.

Edwin C. Wilson, of Florida, formerly coun-
selor of embassy at Paris, appointed Minister
to Uruguay June 22, 1939.

The following changes have occurred in the
American Foreign Service since June 24, 1939 :

John G. Erhardt, of Brooklyn, N. Y., For-
eign Service officer detailed as inspector, has
been designated first secretary of. embassy and
consul general at London, England.

William M. Cramp, of Philadelphia, Pa., sec-
ond secretary of legation at Tegucigalpa, Hon-
duras, has been assigned as consul at Warsaw,
Poland.

William C. Trimble, of Baltimore, Md., now
assigned to the Department of State, has been
designated third secretary of embassy and vice
consul at Paris, France.

Douglas Flood, of Kenilworth, 111., vice con-
sul at Barcelona, Spain, has been assigned as
vice consul at Naples, Italy.

Robert C. Strong, of Beloit, Wis., vice consul
at Frankfort on the Main, Germany, has been
assigned as vice consul at Prague, Bohemia.

The following Executive orders concerning
the Foreign Service have recently been issued :

Executive Order Amending the Foreign Service Reg-
ulations of the United States (Retirement of Foreign
Service OflBcers). (E. O. 8176.) Federal Register,
Vol. 4, No. 121, June 23, 1939, p. 2467 (The National
Archives of the United States).

Executive Order Amending the Foreign Service Reg-
ulations of the United States (Chapter III — Immu-
nities, Powers, and Privileges). (E. O. 8181.) Fed-
eral Register, Vol. 4, No. 123, June 27, 1939, p. 2491
(The National Archives of the United States).

[The above orders effect no material altera-
tions in the Foreign Service Regulations but
merely consolidate into one chapter the miscel-
laneous sections throughout the Regulations
pertaining to the diplomatic and consular
branches of the Foreign Service as separate
entities.]

Executive Order: Effective Date of Election by Re-
tired Foreign Service OflBcers to Receive Reduced An-
nuities. (E. O. 8180.) Federal Register, Vol. 4, No.
122, June 24, 1939, p. 2475 (The National Archives of
the United States).

Department of State Bulletin/July 19

FEATURE
50th Anniversary of the Bulletin

Anniversaries

ANNIVERSARY OF INAUGURATION OF
POSTAL SERVICE BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND FRANCE

[Released July 1]

Translation of a telegram from the Minister for For-
eign, Affairs of France (Oeorges Bonnet) to the Secre-
tary of State

Pabis, June 28, 19S9.
Seventy-flve years ago a steamer to which France
had been pleased to give the name of the American
hero Washington insured for the first time, in thirteen
and one-half days, the regular service of the French
mall line between Le Havre and New York. On the
occasion of this anniversary I desire to express to
Tour Excellency, recalling myself to your recollection,
the deep satisfaction which I feel In noting the prog-
ress made with respect to the rapidity of communica-
tions between France and the United States, a tangi-
ble testimony of the unfailing friendship which unites
our two countries.

Geoboes Bonnet

Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Minister
for Foreign Affairs of France

June 30, 1939.
I hasten to thank Your Excellency for your cordial
telegram on the Seventy-fifth Anniversary of the in-
auguration of a postal service between France and
the United States by the French steamer Washington.
The phenomenal expansion in transportation facilities
between the United States and Europe since the
maiden voyage of the French steamer Washington

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

has had a profound influence on cultural and com-
mercial relations between our two countries.

CoBDEEX Hull

Legislation

Comanunlcation from the President of the United
States transmitting supplemental estimate of appro-
priation for the War Department, for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1939, to remain available until ex-
pended, amounting to $200,000, for investigation and
survey of a canal and highway across the Republic
of Nicaragua. (H. Doc. 351, 76th Ck)ng., 1st sess.)
2 pp. 5^.

Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives on present neutrality
law (Public Res. 27, 75th Cong.), proposed amend-
ments thereto, and related legislation affecting the
foreign policy of the United States, April 11, 12, 13,
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and May 2, 1939.
(76th Cong., 1st sess.) 639 pp. 600.

An Act Making appropriations for the Departments of
State and Justice and for the Judiciary, and for the
Department of Commerce, for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1940, and for other purposes. (Public, No.
156, 76th Cong., 1st sess.) 39 pp. 100.

Publications

Depabtment of State

Treaty Information, Bulletin No. 116, May 31, 1939.
Publication 1342. iv, 20 pp. Subscription, $1 a year ;
single copy, 1(>0.

Other Government Agencies

Foreign Commerce Yearbook, 1938. (Department of
Commerce : Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Com-
merce.) 1939. 435 pp. $1 (cloth).

U. 5. COVERNHENT PRrNTlNG OFFICE: I9SB

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. — Price 10 cents Subscription price, $2.75 a year

PUBLISHED WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE DIBECTOB OF THE BUBE^D OF THE BUDGET

>epartment of State Bulletin/July 1989

THE PRESIDENT

Change in the Soviet Union

President Bush's address at Texas
A&M U7iiversity's conunencement ex-
ercises at College Station on May 12,
1989.^

My sincerest congratulations go to
every graduate and to your parents.
In this ceremony, we celebrate noth-
ing less than the commencement of
the rest, and the best, of your life.

When you look back to your days at
Texas A&M, you will have a lot to be
proud of — a university that is first in
baseball and first in service to our na-
tion. Many are the heroes whose names
are called at muster. Many are those
you remember in silver taps.

We are reminded that no genera-
tion can escape history. Parents — we
share a fervent desire for our children,
and their children, to know a better
world, a safer world. Students — your
parents and grandparents have lived
through a world war and helped Ameri-
ca to rebuild the world. They witnessed
the drama of postwar nations divided
by Soviet subversion and force but
sustained by an allied response most
vividly seen in the Berlin airlift.

Containing Soviet Expansionism

Wise men — Truman and Eisenhower,
Vandenberg and Rayburn, Marshall,
Acheson, and Kennan — crafted the
strategy of containment. They believed
that the Soviet Union, denied the easy
course of expansion, would turn inward
and address the contradictions of its
inefficient, repressive, and inhumane
system. And they were right. The So-
viet Union is now publicly facing this
hard reality.

Containment worked. Containment
worked because our democratic princi-
ples, institutions, and values are sound
and always have been. It worked be-
cause our alliances were and are
strong; and because the superiority of
free societies and free markets over
stagnant socialism is undeniable.

We are approaching the conclusion
of a historic postwar struggle be-
tween two visions — one of tyranny
and conflict and one of democracy and
freedom. The review of U.S. -Soviet re-
lations that my Administration has just
completed outlines a new path toward
resolving this struggle.

Our goal is bold — more ambitious
than any of my predecessors might

have thought possible. Our review indi-
cates that 40 years of perseverance
have brought us a precious opportunity.
Now it is time to move beyond contain-
ment, to a new policy for the 1990s —
one that recognizes the full scope of
change taking place around the world
and in the Soviet Union itself.

In sum, the United States now has
as its goal much more than simply con-
taining Soviet expansionism — we seek
the integration of the Soviet Union into
the community of nations. As the So-
viet Union moves toward greater open-
ness and democratization — as they
meet the challenge of responsible inter-
national behavior — we will match their
steps with steps of our own. Ulti-
mately, our objective is to welcome the
Soviet Union tjack into the world order.

Looking for Signs of Soviet Change

The Soviet Union says it seeks to make
peace with the world and criticizes its
own postwar policies. These are words
we can only applaud. But a new rela-
tionship cannot be simply declared by
Moscow or bestowed by others. It must
be earned. It must be earned because
promises are never enough. The Soviet
Union has promised a more cooperative
relationship before — only to reverse
course and return to militarism. So-
viet foreign policy has been almost
seasonal — warmth before cold, thaw
before freeze. We seek a friendship
that knows no season of suspicion, no
chill of distrust.

We seek a friendship
[with the Soviet Union J
that knows no season of
suspicion, no chill of
distrust.

We hope perestroika is pointing the
Soviet Union to a break with the cycles
of the past — a definitive break. Who
would have thought we would see the
deliberations of the Central Committee
on the front page of Pravda, or dissi-
dent Andrey Sakharov seated near the
councils of power? Who would have

imagined a Soviet leader who can-
vasses the sidewalks of Moscow and
Washington, D.C.? These are hopeful-
indeed, remarkable — signs. Let no ont
doubt our sincere desire to see peres-
troika continue and succeed. But the
national security of America and our
allies is not predicated on hope. It mu!
be based on deeds. We look for endur-
ing, ingrained economic and political
changes.

While we hope to move beyond coi
tainment, we are only at the beginninj
of our new path. Many dangers and un
certainties are ahead. We must not for
get that the Soviet Union has acquirei
awesome military capabilities. That
was a fact of life for my predecessors.
That has always been a fact of life
for our allies. And that is a fact of life
for me.

As we seek peace, we must also re
main strong. The purpose of our mili-
tary might is not to pressure a weak
Soviet economy or to seek military su
periority. It is to deter war. It is to dt
fend ourselves and our allies and to d(
something more — to convince the So-
viet Union that there can be no rewar
in pursuing expansionism, to convince
the Soviet Union that reward lies in tl
pursuit of peace.

Positive Steps Toward an
Open Society

Western policies must encourage the
evolution of the Soviet Union toward i
open society. This task will test our
strength. It will tax our patience. Am
it will require a sweeping vision — let
me share with you ray vision. I see a
Western Hemisphere of democratic,
prosperous nations, no longer threat-
ened by a Cuba or a Nicaragua armed
by Moscow. I see a Soviet Union that
pulls away from ties to terrorist
nations — like Libya — that threaten thi
legitimate security of their neighbors.
I see a Soviet Union which respects
China's integrity and returns the
Northern Territories of Japan — a pre-
lude to the day when all the great
nations of Asia will live in harmony.

But the fulfillment of this vision
requires the Soviet Union to take posi
tive steps, including:

First, reduce Soviet forces. Al-
though some small steps have already,
been taken, the Warsaw Pact still pos-
sesses more than 30,000 tanks, more
than twice as much artillery, and hun-
dreds of thousands more troops in Eu-
rope than NATO. They should cut thei
forces to less threatening levels in pro

Department of State Bulletin/July 19(

THE PRESIDENT

I I'tiiiii to their legitimate security

Socond, adhere to the Soviet
cliuation — promised in the final days
[. Wnrld War II — to support self-
Htermination for all the nations of
istern and central Europe. This re-
ires specific abandonment of the
ezhnev doctrine. One day it should
possible to drive from Moscow to
mich without seeing a single guard
iver or a strand of barbed wire. In
ort, tear down the Iron Curtain.

Third, work with the West in posi-
'8, practical — not merely rhetorical —
;ps toward diplomatic solutions to
gional disputes around the world. I
!lcome the Soviet withdrawal from
'ghanistan and the Angola agree-
>nt. But there is much more to be
ne around the world. We're ready.
;t's roll up our sleeves and get
work.

Fourth, achieve a lasting political
aralism and respect for human
!;hts. Dramatic events have already
curred in Moscow. We are impressed
limited, but freely contested, elec-
ms. We are impressed by a greater
leration of dissent. We are impressed
a new frankness about the Stalin
a. Mr. Gorbachev, don't stop now.

Fifth, join with us in addressing
essing global problems, including the
ternational drug menace and dangers
the environment. We can build a
tter world for our children.

penness and Arms Control

3 the Soviet Union moves toward
ms reduction and reform, it will find
illing partners in the West. We seek
rifiable, stabilizing arms control and
ms reduction agreements with the
)viet Union and its allies. However,
ms control is not an end in itself but
means of contributing to the security
America and the peace of the world,
directed Secretary Baker to propose
the Soviets that we resume negotia-
ans on strategic forces in June. And,
I you know, the Soviets have agreed.
Our basic approach is clear. In the
rategic arms reduction talks, we
ish to reduce the risk of nuclear war.
1 the companion defense and space
ilks, our objective will be to preserve
ir options to deploy advanced de-
nses when they are ready. In nuclear
!sting, we will continue to seek the
jcessary verification improvements in
dsting treaties to permit them to be
rought into force. We will continue to
;ek a verifiable global ban on chemical
eapons. We support NATO efforts

to reduce the Soviet offensive threat
in the negotiation on conventional
[armed] forces in Europe. And, as I've
said, fundamental to all of these objec-
tives is simple openness.

Make no mistake, a new breeze is
blowing across the steppes and cities of
the Soviet Union. Why not, then, let
this spirit of openness grow, let more
barriers come down. Open emigration,
open debate, open airwaves — let open-
ness come to mean the publication and
sale of banned books and newspapers in
the Soviet Union. Let the 19,000 Soviet
Jews who emigrated last year be fol-

One day it should be
possible to drive from
Moscow to Munich with-
out seeing a single guard
tower or a strand of
barbed wire.

lowed by any number who wish to emi-
grate this year. Let openness come to
mean nothing less than the free ex-
change of people, books, and ideas be-
tween East and West. And let it come
to mean one thing more.

Thirty-four years ago. President
Eisenhower met in Geneva with Soviet
leaders who, after the death of Stalin,
promised a new approach toward the
West. He proposed a plan called "Open
Skies," which would allow unarmed air-
craft from the United States and the
Soviet Union to fly over the territory
of the other country. This would open
up military activities to regular scruti-
ny and, as President Eisenhower put it,
"convince the world that we are . . .
lessening danger and relaxing tension."

President Eisenhower's suggestion
tested Soviet readiness to open their
society. The Kremlin failed that test.
Let us again explore that proposal, but
on a broader, more intrusive and radi-
cal basis — one which I hope would in-
clude allies on both sides. We suggest
that those countries that wish to exa-
mine this proposal meet soon to work
out the necessary operational details,
separately from other arms control ne-
gotiations. Such surveillance flights,
complementing satellites, would pro-
vide regular scrutiny for both sides.
Such unprecedented territorial access
would show the world the meaning of

the concept of openness. The very So-
viet willingness to embrace such a
concept would reveal their commit-
ment to change.

Economic Relations

Where there is cooperation, there can
be a broader economic relationship. But
economic relations have been stifled
by Soviet internal policies. They have
been injured by Moscow's practice of
using the cloak of commerce to steal
technology from the West. Ending dis-
criminatory treatment of U.S. firms
would be a helpful step. Trade and
financial transactions should take
place on a normal commercial basis.

And should the Soviet Union cod-
ify its emigration laws in accord with
international standards and implement
its new laws faithfully, I am prepared
to work with Congress for a temporary
waiver of the Jackson-Vanik amend-
ment, opening the way to extending
most-favored-nation trade status to the
Soviet Union. The policy I have just de-
scribed has everything to do with you.

World Order of the Future

Today you graduate. You will start
careers and families. And you will be-
come the leaders of America in the next
century. What kind of world will you
know? Perhaps the world order of the
future will truly be a family of nations.

It is a sad truth that nothing forces
us to recognize our common humanity
more swiftly than a natural disaster. I
am thinking of Soviet Armenia, just a
few months ago — a tragedy without
blame, warlike devastation without
war.

My son took our 12-year-old grand-
son to Yerevan. At the end of a day of
comforting the injured and consoling
the bereaved, father and son sat down
together amid the ruins and wept. How
can our two countries magnify this
simple expression of caring? How can
we each convey the good will of our
people?

Forty-three years ago, a young
lieutenant by the name of Albert Kot-
zebue, classof 1945 at Te.xas A&M,
was the first American soldier to shake
hands with the Soviets at the banks of
the Elbe River. Once again, we are
ready to extend our hand. Once again,
we are ready for a hand in return.
Once again, it is a time for peace.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of May 22, 1989. ■

epartment of State Bulletin/July 1989

THE PRESIDENT

The Future of Europe

President Bicah'n addresii at Bos-
ton Universitifs commencement exer-
cises on May 21, 19S9.^

As Boston University graduates, you
take with you a degree from a great in-
stitution, and something more —
knowledge of the past and respon-
sibility for the future. And take a look
at our world today. Nations are under-
going changes so radical that the inter-
national system you know — and will
know in the future — will be as differ-
ent from today's as today's world is
from the time of Woodrow Wilson. How
will America prepare, then, for the
challenges ahead?

It's with your future in mind that,
after deliberation and a review, we are
adapting our foreign policies to meet
this challenge. I've outlined how we're
going to try to promote reform in East-
ern Europe, and how we're going to
work with our friends in Latin Ameri-
ca. In Texas, I spoke to another group
of graduates of our new approach to the
Soviet Union — one of moving beyond
containment to seek to integrate the
Soviets into the community of nations,
to help them share the rewards of inter-
national cooperation.

Change in Western Europe

But today, I want to discuss the future
of Europe — that mother of nations and
ideas that is so much a part of America.
And it is fitting that I share this forum
with a very special friend of the United
States — [French] President Mitter-
rand, you have the warm affection and
high regard of the American people.
And I remember well, about 8 years
ago, when you joined us in Yorktown, in
1981, to celebrate the bicentennial of
that first Franco-American fight for
freedom. And soon, I will join you in
Paris, to observe the 200th anniversary
of the French struggle for liberty and
equality.

And this is just one e.xample of the
special bond between two continents.
But consider this city. From the Old
North Church to Paul Revere's home
nestled in the warm heart of the Italian
North End, to your famous song-filled
Irish pubs — the Old and New Worlds
are inseparable in this city. But as we
look back to Old World tradition, we
must look ahead to a new Europe. His-
toric changes will shape your careers
and your very lives.

The changes that are occurring in
Western Europe are less dramatic than
those taking place in the East, but they
are no less fundamental. The postwar
order that began in 1945 is transform-
ing into something very different. And
yet certain essentials remain, because
our alliance with Western Europe is
utterly unlike the cynical power alli-
ances of the past. It is based on far more
than a perception of a common enemy.
It is a tie of culture and kinshi]) and
shared values. And as we look toward
the 21st century, Americans and Euro-
peans alike should remember the words
of Raymond Aron, who called the alli-
ance a "moral and spiritual commu-
nity." Our ideals are those of the
American Bill of Rights and the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man. And
it is precisely because the ideals of this
community are universal that the world
is in ferment today.

Now a new century holds the prom-
ise of a united Europe. And as you
know, the nations of Western Europe
are already moving toward greater
economic integration, with the ambi-
tious goal of a single European market
in 1992. The United States has often
declared it seeks a healing of old enmi-
ties, an integration of Europe. And at
the same time, there has been a histor-
ical ambivalence on the part of some
Americans toward a more united
Europe. To this ambivalence has been
added apprehension at the prospect of
1992. But whatever others may think,
this Administration is of one mind. We
believe a strong, united Europe means
a strong America.

Western Europe has a gross do-
mestic product that is roughly equal to
our own and a population that e.xceeds
ours. European science leads the world
in many fields, and European workers
are highly educated and highly skilled.
We are ready to develop, with the Eu-
ropean Community and its member
states, new mechanisms of consultation
and cooperation on political and global
issues from strengthening the forces of
democracy in the Third World to man-
aging regional tensions to putting an
end to the division of Europe. A re-
surgent Western Europe is an econom-
ic magnet, drawing Eastern Europe
closer toward the commonwealth of free
nations.

A more mature partnership with
Western Europe will pose new chal-
lenges. There are certain to be clashes
and controversies over economic issues
America will, of course, defend its in-
terests. But it is important to distin-
guish adversaries from allies and allie
from adversaries. What a tragedy;
what an absurdity it would be if futurf^
historians attribute the demise of the
Western alliance to disputes over beef
hormones and wars over pasta. We
must all work hard to ensure that the
Europe of 1992 will adopt the lower
barriers of the modern international
economy, not the high walls and the
moats of medieval commerce.

NATO: Maintaining Peace in Europe

But our hopes for the future rest ulti-
mately on keeping the peace in Europi
Forty-two years ago, just across the
Charles River, Secretary of State
George Marshall gave a commence-
ment address that outlined a plan to
help Europe recover. Western Europe
responded heroically and later joined
with us in a partnership for the com-
mon defense — a shield we call NATO.
And this alliance has always been dri\
en by a spirited debate over the best
way to achieve peaceful change. But
the deeper truth is that the alliance h;
achieved a historic peace because it is
united by a fundamental purpose. Be-
hind the NATO shield, Europe has no^
enjoyed 40 years free of conflict — the
longest period of peace the continent
has ever known. Behind this shield, th(
nations of Western Europe have risen
from privation to prosperity — all be-
cause of the strength and resolve of
free peoples.

With a Western Europe that is noi
coming together, we recognize that ne*
forms of cooperation must be devel-
oped. We applaud the defense co-
operation developing in the revitalized
West European Union, whose member
worked with us to keep open the sea-
lanes of the Persian Gulf. And we ap-
plaud the growing military cooperatio
between West Germany and France.
And we welcome British and French
programs to modernize their deterren
capability and their moves toward coo]
eration in this area. It is perfectly
right and proper that Europeans in-
creasingly see their defense coopera-
tion as an investment in a secure fu-
ture. But we do have a major concern i
a different order — a growing compla-
cency throughout the West.

Department of State Bulletin/July 198

THE PRESIDENT

And, of course, your generation
1 hardly be expected to share the
ip of past anxieties. With such a long
ace, it is hard to imagine how it
lid be otherwise. But our expecta-
ns in this rapidly changing world
inot race so far ahead that we forget
at is at stake. There's a great irony
•e. While an ideological earthquake
shaking asunder the very communist
mdation, the West is being tested by
nplacency.

We must never forget that twice in
s century, American blood has been
;d over conflicts that began in Eu-
je. And we share the fervent desire
Europeans to relegate war forever
the province of distant memory. But
it is why the Atlantic alliance is so
itral to our foreign policy. And that's
ly America remains committed to the
iance and the strategy which has
sserved freedom in Europe. We must
ver forget that to keep the peace in
irope is to keep the peace for
nerica.

NATO's policy of flexible response
eps the United States linked to Eu-
pe and lets any would-be aggressors
ow that they will be met with any
'el of force needed to repel their at-
;k and frustrate their designs. And
r short-range deterrent forces based
Europe, and kept up-to-date, demon-
■ate that America's vital interests
e bound inextricably to Western Eu-
pe and that an attacker can never
mble on a test of strength with just
r conventional forces. Though hope is
w running high for a more peaceful
ntinent, the history of this century
iches Americans and Europeans to
main prepared.

viet Change

; we search for a peace that is endur-
5, I'm grateful for the steps that
r. Gorbachev is taking. If the Soviets
vance solid and constructive plans
' peace, then we should give credit
lere credit is due. And we're seeing
seeping changes in the Soviet Union
at show promise of enduring, of be-
ming ingrained. At the same time,
an era of extraordinary change,
? have an obligation to temper
timism — and I am optimistic — with
udence.

For example, the Soviet Foreign
inister [Eduard Shevardnadze] in-
rmed the world last week that his na-
m's commitment to destroy SS-23
issiles under the recently enacted

INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces] Treaty may be reversible. And
the Soviets must surely know the re-
sults of failure to comply with this sol-
emn agreement. Perhaps their purpose
was to divide the West on other issues
that you're reading about in the papers
today. But regardless, it is clear that
Soviet "new thinking" has not yet to-
tally overcome the old.

I believe in a deliberate, step-by-
step approach to East-West relations,
because recurring signs show that
while change in the Soviet Union is
dramatic, it is not yet complete. The
Warsaw Pact retains a nearly 12-to-l
advantage over the Atlantic alliance in
short-range missiles and rocket launch-
ers capable of delivering nuclear weap-
ons and more than a 2-to-l advantage
in battle tanks. And for that reason, we
will also maintain, in cooperation with
our allies, ground and air forces in Eu-
rope as long as they are wanted and
needed to preserve the peace in Eu-
rope. At the same time, my Adminis-
tration will place a high and continuing
priority on negotiating a less mili-
tarized Europe, one with a secure con-
ventional force balance at lower levels
offerees. Our aspiration is a real

peace — a peace of shared optimism, not
a peace of armed camps.

Celebrating a Moral and
Spiritual Community

Nineteen-ninety-two is the 500th anni-
versary of the discovery of the New-
World. So we have five centuries to
celebrate, nothing less than our very
civilization — the American Bill of
Rights and the French Rights of Man,
the ancient and unwritten constitution
of Great Britain, and the democratic vi-
sions of Konrad Adenauer and Alcide de
Gasperi.

And in all our celebrations, we ob-
serve one fact: this truly is a moral and
spiritual community. It is our inheri-
tance, and so let us protect it. Let us
promote it. Let us treasure it for our
children, for Americans and Europeans
yet unborn. We stand with France as
part of a solid alliance. And once again,
let me say how proud I am to have
received this degree from this noble
institution and to have shared this plat-
form with the President of the French
Republic, Francois Mitterrand.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of May 29, 1989. ■

Security Strategy for the 1990s

President Bush's address at the
Coast Guard Academy commencement
exercises in New London, Conn., on
May2J,, 1989.^

Today, our world — your world — is
changing. East and West. And today, I
want to speak to you about the world
we want to see, and what we can do to
bring that new world into clear focus.

We live in a time when we are wit-
nessing the end of an idea — the final
chapter of the communist experiment.
Communism is now recognized — even
by many within the communist world
itself — as a failed system, one that
promised economic prosperity but failed
to deliver the goods, a system that built
a wall between the people and their po-
litical aspirations.

But the eclipse of communism is
only one-half of the story of our time.
The other is the ascendancy of the dem-
ocratic idea. Never before has the idea
of freedom so captured the imagina-
tions of men and women the world over.

And never before has the hope of free-
dom beckoned so many — trade union-
ists in Warsaw, the people of Panama,
rulers consulting the ruled in the Sov-
iet Union. And even as we speak today,
the world is transfixed by the dramatic
events in Tiananmen Square [Beijing,
China]. Everywhere those voices are
speaking the language of democracy
and freedom, and we hear them and the
world hears them, and America will do
all it can do to encourage them.

So today I want to speak about our
security strategy for the 1990s — one
that advances American ideals and up-
holds American aims.

Risks and Opportunities
of New Challenges

Amidst the many challenges we'll face,
there will be risks. But let me assure
you, we'll find more than our share of
opportunities. We and our allies are
strong — stronger really than at any
point in the postwar period, and more
capable than ever of supporting the

iepartment of State Bulletin/July 1989

THE PRESIDENT

cause of freedom. There's an oppor-
tunity before us to shape a new world.

What is it that we want to see? It
is a growing community of democracies
anchoring international peace and
stability, and a dynamic free-market
system generating prosperity and
progress on a global scale. The eco-
nomic foundation of this new era is the
])roven success of the free market — and
nurturing that foundation are the val-
ues rooted in freedom and democracy.

Our country, America, was found-
ed on these values, and they gave
us the confidence that flow's from
strength. So let's be clear about one
thing: America looks forward to the
challenge of an emerging global mar-
ket. But these values are not ours
alone; they are now shared by our
friends and allies around the globe.

The economic rise of Europe and
the nations of the Pacific rim is the
growing success of our postwar policy.
This time is a time of tremendous op-
portunity, and destiny is in our own
hands. To reach the world we want to
see, we've got to work and work hard.
There's a lot of work ahead of us.

We must resolve international
trade problems that threaten to pit
friends and allies against one another.
We must combat misguided notions of
economic nationalism that will tell us
to close off our economies to foreign
competition — ^just when the global mar-
ketplace has become a fact of life. We
must open the door to the nations of
Eastern Europe and other socialist
countries that embrace free-market
reforms.

And finally, for developing nations
heavily burdened with debt, we must
provide assistance and encourage the
market reforms that will set those na-
tions on a path toward growth. If we
succeed, the ne.xt decade and the centu-
ry beyond will be an era of unparalleled
growth — an era which sees the flour-
ishing of freedom, peace, and pros-
perity around the world.

But this new era cannot unfold in a
climate where conflict and turmoil ex-
ist. And, therefore, our goals must also
include security and stability: security
for ourselves and our allies and our
friends; stability in the international
arena and an end to regional conflicts.

Such goals are constant, but the
strategy we employ to reach them can,
and must, change as the world changes.
Today, the need for a dynamic and
adaptable strategy is imperative. We
must be strong — economically, dip-
lomatically, and, as you know,

militarily — to take advantage of the
opportunities open to us in a world of
rapid change. And nowhere will the
ultimate consequences of change have
more significance for world security
than within the Soviet Union itself.

Soviet Union

What we're seeing now in the Soviet
Union is, indeed, dramatic. The proc-
ess is still ongoing, unfinished. But
make no mistake, our policy is to seize
every, and I mean every, opportunity to
build a better, more stable relationship
with the Soviet Union — just as it is our
policy to defend American interests in
light of the enduring reality of Soviet
military power.

We want to see perestroika suc-
ceed. And we want to see the policies
of glasnost and perestroika — so far, a
revolution imposed from top down —
institutionalized within the Soviet
Union. And we want to see perestroika
extended as well. We want to see a So-
viet Union that restructures its rela-
tionship toward the rest of the world —
a Soviet Union that is a force for con-
structive solutions to the world's
problems.

The grand strategy of the West
during the postwar period has been
based on the concept of containment:
checking the Soviet Union's expansion-
ist aims, in the hope that the Soviet
system itself would one day be forced to
confront its internal contradictions.
The ferment in the Soviet Union today
affirms the wisdom of this strategy.
And now we have a precious oppor-
tunity to move beyond containment.
You're graduating into an exciting
world, where the opportunity for
peace — world peace, lasting peace —
has never been better.

Our goal — integrating the Soviet
Union into the community of nations —
is every bit as ambitious as contain-
ment was at its time. And it holds tre-
mendous promise for international
stability.

Other Regional Powers

Coping with a changing Soviet Union
will be a challenge of the highest order.
But the security challenges we face to-
day do not come from the East alone.
The emergence of regional powers
is rapidly changing the strategic
landscape.

In the Middle East, in South Asia,
in our own hemisphere, a growing num-
ber of nations are acquiring advanced

and highly destructive capabilities — in
some cases, weapons of mass destruc-
tion and the means to deliver them.
And it is an unfortunate fact that the
world faces increasing threat from
armed insurgencies, terrorists, and, a
you in the Coast Guard are well aware
narcotics traffickers — and, in some re-
gions, an unholy alliance of all three.

Our task is clear: we must curb thi
proliferation of advanced weaponry;
we must check the aggressive ambitions
of renegade regimes; and we must en-
hance the ability of our friends to de-
fend themselves. We have not yet mas-
tered the complex challenge. We and
our allies must construct a common
strategy for stability in the developing
world.

Defense Strategy

How we and our allies deal with thesei
diverse challenges depends on how we'
we understand the key elements of de-
fense strategy. And so let me just men
tion today two points in particular.

First, the need for an effective de>
terrent, one that demonstrates to our
allies and adversaries alike American
strength, American resolve; and

Second, the need to maintain an
approach to arms reduction that pro-
motes stability at the lowest feasible
level of armaments.

Deterrence is central to our de-
fense strategy. The key to keeping the
peace is convincing our adversaries
that the cost of aggression against us
or our allies is simply unacceptable.

In today's world, nuclear forces ar
essential to deterrence. Our challenge
is to protect those deterrent systems
from attack. And that's why we'll mov'
Peacekeeper ICBMs [intercontinental i
ballistic missiles] out of fixed and vu
nerable silos — making them mobile an(
thus harder to target. Looking to the
longer term, we will also develop and
deploy a new highly mobile single-
warhead missile, the Midgetman. Witl
only minutes of warning, these new
missiles can relocate out of harm's wa}
Any attack against systems like this
will fail.

We are also researching — and we
are committed to deploy when read,\ —
more comprehensive defensive systoni.
known as SDI [Strategic Defense Ini-
tiative]. Our premise is straight-
forward: defense against incoming
missiles endangers no person, endan-
gers no country.

Department of State Bulletin/July 198

THE SECRETARY

We're also working to reduce the
reat we face, both nuclear and con-
ntional. The INF [Intermediate-
inge Nuclear Forces] Treaty demon-
rates that willingness. In addition, in
e past decade, NATO has unilaterally
moved 2,400 shorter range theater
irheads. But theater nuclear forces
ntribute to stability, no less than
rategic forces, and thus, it would be
responsible to depend solely on stra-
gic nuclear forces to deter conflict
Europe.

jnventional Balance in Europe

le conventional balance in Europe
just as important and is linked to
e nuclear balance. For more than 40
lars — and look at your history books
see how pronounced this accomplish-
ent is — the Warsaw Pact's massive ad-
intage in conventional forces has cast
shadow over Europe.

The unilateral reductions that
resident Gorbachev has promised give
hope that we can now redress that
ibalance. We welcome those steps be-
,use, if implemented, they will help
duce the threat of surprise attack,
nd they confirm what we've said all
ong: that Soviet military power far
iceeds the levels needed to defend the
gitimate security interests of the
.S.S.R. And we must keep in mind
at these reductions alone — even if
iiplemented — are not enough to elimi-
!ite the significant numerical si'f ^ri-
I'ity that the Soviet Union enjo-"-
jght now.

Through negotiations, we can now
ansform the military landscape of
[urope. The issues are complex, stakes
•e very high. But the Soviets are now
jing forthcoming, and we hope to
;hieve the reductions we seek.

Let me emphasize — our aim is
Dthing less than removing war as an
ption in Europe.

The U. S.S.R. has said that it is
illing to abandon its age-old reliance
\\ offensive strategy. It's time to
pgin. This should mean a smaller
tree — one less reliant on tanks and
"tillery and personnel carriers that
rovide the Soviets' offensive striking
3wer. A restructured Warsaw Pact —
le that mirrors the defensive posture
' NATO — would make Europe and the
orld more secure.

Peace can also be enhanced by
lovement toward more openness in
lilitary activities. And 2 weeks ago, I
roposed an "open skies" initiative, to
xtend the concept of openness. That
Ian for territorial overflights would

increase our mutual security against
sudden and threatening military activ-
ities. In the same spirit, let us extend
this openness to military expenditures
as well. I call on the Soviets to do as
we have always done. Let's open the
ledgers, publish an accurate defense
budget.

But as we move forward we must
be realistic. Transformations of this
magnitude will not happen overnight.
If we are to reach our goals, a great
deal is required of us, our allies, and of
the Soviet Union. But we can succeed.

Preserving Democracy

I began today by speaking about the
triumph of a particular, peculiar, very
special American ideal — freedom. And
I know there are those who may think
there's something presumptuous about
that claim — those who will think it's
boastful. But it is not, for one simple

reason: Democracy isn't our creation,
it is our inheritance.

And we can't take credit for democ-
racy, but we can take that precious gift
of freedom, preserve it, and pass it on —
as my generation does to you, and you,
too, will do one day. And perhaps —
provided we seize the opportunities
open to us — we can help others attain
the freedom that we cherish.

As I said on the Capitol steps the
day I took this office, as President of
the United States, "There is but one
just use of power, and it is to serve
people." As your Commander in Chief,
let me call on this Coast Guard class to
reaffirm with me that American power
will continue in its service to the
enduring ideals of democracy and
freedom.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of May 29, 1989. ■

Secretary's News Conference

Secretary Baker held a news
conference at the White House on
Maij2S. 1989.''

Before our briefing on the summit trip,
I'd like to make an announcement.

The United States and the Soviet
Union have now agreed on the date
of June 19th to restart the START
[strategic arms reduction talks]
negotiations.

Turning now to the NATO trip, let
me begin by touching on two topics
that I hope will give you a context for
the President's trip to NATO. First, I'll
say a few words about the theme the
President hopes to project on this trip;
and second, I'll list the five-point work
plan that the President would hope to
emphasize in his meetings with col-
leagues and in public statements.

The central theme of this trip will
be that the alliance rests on the cor-
nerstone of shared Western values.
These common values — belief in democ-
racy, human rights, the rule of law,
free markets and free enterprise, re-
spect for the individual — give the na-
tions of the West both an anchor and a
course to navigate for the future.

As to the past, 40 years ago these
shared values brought our nations to-
gether in search of a common defense.
NATO became the shield to protect
those values. As to the present, today

those values have positioned the West
in the strongest posture ever. They are
inspiring the hopes of many people in
many parts of the globe, including in
central and Eastern Europe, even in
the Soviet Union itself.

As to the future, in the future
these same values will provide a princi-
pal basis for ending the division of Eu-
rope, for drawing Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union into the community of
nations. Some have suggested that the
future of Europe depends on a more
narrow territorial vision — that is, an
idea bounded by geographic borders
and without a particular substantive
content, and I'm referring there, of
course, to the calls for a common Euro-
pean house.

In contrast, it's our vision that the
future of Europe depends on these
common Western values. We see this as
a substantive core established over cen-
turies of striving to apply enlightened
principles and not limited by any geo-
graphic borders.

Now while the trends may be
promising, it's our view that the alli-
ance cannot rest on its laurels nor can
it expect to reach its full potential
without further effort. So the Presi-
dent will be emphasizing five points for
future work.

•epartment of State Bulletin/July 1989

THE SECRETARY

First, we must continue to ensure
a strong common defense, so the Presi-
dent will discuss how we can maintain
this defense at possibly lower levels as
we make progress in the CFE [con-
ventional armed forces in Europe]
negotiations.

Part of this defense, of course, in-
corporates short-range nuclear forces
(SNF), so we will also be working to
reach a common ground on this issue —
one that demonstrates, if I may put it
this way, a flexibility to negotiate given
the changing circumstances while it
preserves the elements necessary to
support our longstanding and very
successful deterrent strategy.

Second, we look to the further de-
velopment of European institutions
that will strengthen the European pil-
lar of our alliance. For example, Euro-
pean Communities (EC) economic
integration should provide economic
growth and European unity of action.
It might well be characterized also as a
magnet to those in the East who are
trying to liberalize their own economic
systems.

Third, we need to look East to see
how the nations of the West can further
the peaceful decentralization of eco-
nomic, political, and social authority in
Eastern Europe. In part, this could in-
volve lowering tensions on borders, fol-
lowing the example we've seen recently
as far as Hungary is concerned. It
could also involve offering the experi-
ence of our governments and private
groups in building diverse and open so-
cieties in East European countries.

Fourth, we need to turn our
attention — our collective attention — to
new and difficult problems that could
endanger all of us; for example, envi-
ronmental risks and missile and chemi-
cal proliferation. Obviously we need not
rely only on one structure — that is, the
NATO alliance — to address these prob-
lems. For example, the Group of Seven
countries has established the missile
technology control regime.

Over time, the alliance or members
of the alliance might also see the bene-
fit of collective action in out-of-area is-
sues, particularly in areas of regional
conflict. For example, we worked
together — not all members of the
alliance but many members of the
alliance — in the Persian Gulf.

And finally, we must also maintain
our resolve in the pursuit of freedom in
locales where cold war vestiges remain.
I'm thinking in particular of Berlin,
and we will continue to pursue the Ber-
lin initiative which was launched by

President Reagan in 1987. We will con-
tinue, for example, to call for the wall
to come down.

Q. How about the missile issue?
Will it be resolved before the NATO
meeting? Are you closer, or are you
farther apart, or do you care whether
it's resolved?

A. What we've said all along here
is that we are very hopeful that it will
be resolved before the summit, and we
remain hopeful. I can't tell you that we
know that it will be. It is not resolved,
there is still a gap to bridge, and we
continue to work to try and bridge that
gap.

Q. What's the stumbling block?

A. The stumbling block is how you
go about adapting to the changes that
are taking place, as I mentioned, and,
at the same time, preserve the essen-
tial ingredients of your deterrent
strategy.

Q. Has the United States now
been put into a position on this mis-
sile issue where we are, in effect,
negotiating between England and
Germany?

A. No, not at all. No.

Q. What is the situation with
Mrs. Thatcher? She doesn't seem too
pleased with what she sees as a giv-
ing in on our side.

A. I think that we will see the spe-
cific position of the United Kingdom,
just as we will see the specific position
of the other alliance countries, as we
move into the summit. She has a differ-
ent view of the issue than [West Ger-
man] Chancellor Kohl. It's important,
we think, to try and bridge these gaps
that exist before we get to the summit,
and we will continue to try and to do
that.

Q. When you say resolved — you
hope it's resolved, do you mean with
both sides, or are you saying that
you're going to get there and we'll be
with the Germans and then there will
be—

A. No, no, I'm not saying that at
all. We're going to continue to try and
reach agreement on language before
we get there, but I'm not going to pre-
dict that that's going to happen. And
let me say that we have made it very
clear throughout the process that while
we would prefer to resolve it before we
get to the summit, it's an extraordi-
narily important matter that deals
with the security of the West, and,
therefore, it should not be resolved at
all costs. So if we have to take it on at

the summit, we will take it on at the
summit.

Q. How close are you? Do you
find the West German counter-
proposal acceptable? Or how far awayi
from being acceptable is it?

A. As I put it to you a minute ago,,
there is still a gap between their posi-
tion and ours, and we're not there yet.

Q. Do you find this closer to Koh
or Thatcher on this in that way?

A. I'm not going to get into that
kind of speculation because that's all it
would be, is speculation.

Q. What made you decide to
change from a position that you stoon
firm on for a long time, which was
never zero, to negotiations, willing-
ness to negotiate?

A. I really didn't. What I said was
that I thought negotiations would be a
mistake — negotiations, that is, in the
form of early, immediate, unconditiona.
negotiations. I still feel that way, very
strongly. And that is not something
that we are willing to agree to. What
we have proposed is a formula that coni
tains, as I put it, I think, to you last
Saturday up in IVIaine, significant
conditions.

Q. If the SNF issue is not re-
solved by the summit, are you con-
cerned that the whole issue could
dwarf or dominate or overwhelm this
meeting?

A. I think that the issue will hv
important, but I think the alliance w il
really take a broader look at the whole
question of the alliance — the more gen
era] political and economic questions.
And I just don't think that it will total
ly dominate the summit. Yes, it will lit
a very, very important issue.

Q. President Gorbachev has
claimed that the Soviets are in the
process of changing their military
strategy toward one of defensive suf-
ficiency. There have been a lot of
comments coming from the White
House that many of Gorbachev's ini-
tiatives are merely words and not
deeds. Do you see any signs in terms
of factual evidence that he has shift-
ed his military policy to this point,
and will this be discussed at the
NATO summit?

A. We think it is important to Idol
for deeds rather than just words. I
think that the conventional arms piM-
posals that he proposed during the
course of my trip to Moscow are signif
cant and deserve serious consideration
I think that's the view of most
everyone.

Department of State Bulletin/July 198

THE SECRETARY

On the other hand, I think that the
NF proposal that he made was ba-
ically purely a PR ploy, when you con-
ider that he did not suggest removing
lose missiles even from Europe, just
•oni those countries which the Soviet
'nion has had a client-state relation-
hip with, and he did not propose dis-
lantling or destroying those.

And when you look at it in the con-
3xt of what the alliance has done over
le i)ast 10 years, we have unilaterally
educed some 2,400, and we have dis-
lantled practically all of those.

Q. On Sunday the President,
chen asked about the SNF dispute,
kid he felt this could well be resolved
lefore the summit. You seem to be
^ggesting in a little bit more decisive
ferms or definitive terms today that
dat may not be the case. Is that —

A. I think the President himself
1st made the same suggestion, did he
ot, in an interview he gave to some
luropean correspondents. I am antici-
ating your question, though — so go
head and ask the question.

Q. My question was, what
merged from the apparent conversa-
ion with Chancellor Kohl that he al-
jjded to, and what has happened over
jhe last few days?

' A. I think what probably happened
I'as that they had led themselves to be-
jeve that our position was perhaps
pmewhat different than it was when
|iey actually looked at the piece of pa-
er. That's the only thing I can think it
light be.

Q. What do you mean by that,
^nd has, in fact, the President talked
Dday with Chancellor Kohl? What
as the upshot of that conversation,
F there was one?

A. I don't believe he's talked to
im today, no — has not talked to him
Dday. We've received their response to
ur proposal; we got it in here —

Q. Written response?

A. Yes, we got it in here late yes-
?r(hiy evening, and there has been no
iiiitact since that time. We do, of
ourse, e.xpect to get back to him.

Q. The basic issue seems to be —
t least the experts tell us and you in-
icated Saturday — was, rather, the
lUture of nuclear deterrence on the
"round in Europe. Do you see a time
.'hen we will no longer depend upon
hat? That has been our policy for a
ong time. You indicated that it's
oing to continue to be our policy for

a long time. Do you foresee an end to
that, that the end of that could ever
be negotiated?

A. We think it's very important
that we have some sort of an indication
in the comprehensive concept language
that if there were ever to be negotia-
tions in this area, we would not be talk-
ing in any event about a third zero.

Your question goes even beyond
that; it's very hypothetical and specula-
tive, and I can't answer it, because it's
so hypothetical. The deterrence — the
nuclear deterrence — has been the very
cornerstone of our flexible response
strategy. The flexible response strate-
gy has kept the peace for 40 years. We
should be very, very reluctant to take
any steps that would be seen to be mov-
ing away from that. And that's why we
are reluctant to take those steps.

Q. You mentioned the Gorbachev
PR proposal — what you call the PR
proposal — in his SNF offer. He seems
to be doing pretty well with his PR
proposals, and I wondered if the Ad-
ministration now recognizes that
there is a need, or recognizes a need,
to counter them, and if there is any
coherent strategy for doing that?

A. I think, as I indicated in my
opening remarks, I don't think the
West has ever been stronger. We are
winning across the broad range of
political — we're winning economically,
we're winning politically. We have the
other philosophy acknowledging that it
is a failure — frankly acknowledging
that.

So whatever we're doing is work-
ing, and for the time being I don't think
we ought to say that we're going to
change that just for PR purposes.

At the same time, I think it is im-
portant that we be seen to be creative,
that we be seen to be forward-thinking
and forward-looking. I think we are.
But that doesn't mean that we, as I've
said before — that we can necessarily
win by going into an arms control grab
bag and competing with him on that
score.

There may be times and circum-
stances under which we might think it's
appropriate to do something like that,
but we ought not to be, I don't think —
we should not feel constrained to try
and do that every time.

Q. Could I carry that to China?
Are you somewhat disappointed at the
students in the streets of Beijing?
They have a name on their lips — it's
Gorbachev's, not George Bush's.

And beyond that, can you explain
the difference between the President
and his position on China as opposed
to Panama, where the President actu-
ally urged the people to take action in
Panama, but both of you are urging
great restraint in China?

A. Gorbachev has been to China,
and so there was a lot of coverage of
this trip, so maybe that's one reason.

But let me tell you, they may have
that name on their lips, but they have
the policies of the West in mind. And
it's the policies of the West, indeed, it's
these common values that I've just talk-
ed about as the theme for the 40th sum-
mit, as far as we're concerned, that are
motivating those students to do what
they are doing.

And it is the philosophy of the West
that they are advancing, and it is the
values of the West that they are seek-
ing. They are asking for democracy.
They're asking for freedom of assem-
bly. They're asking for freedom of ex-
pression. So I don't feel badly about
that, in the slightest.

In terms of difference between
Panama and the People's Republic of
China, without admitting the hypothe-
sis of your question that the President
was somehow — without admitting that,
let me just say that there is a signifi-
cant difference between China and
Panama.

Q. He did say no caution.

A. Let me just suggest to you that
China is moving after many, many
years of embracing a different philoso-
phy, both economically and politically.
They are moving.

Panama is moving too, but it's mov-
ing in the other direction. Panama used
to have some semblance of freedom for
its people. It used to have some sem-
blance of democratic values. But Man-
uel Noriega is taking it in the other
direction and, in fact, stealing elec-
tions and thereby thwarting the will of
the people.

So China is going in the right di-
rection; Panama is going in the wrong
direction.

Q. If I could ask you about
Nicaragua and the Russians. When
Mr. Gorbachev promised to reduce or
said he had actually cut out arms to
Nicaragua, were there any conditions
on it?

Secondly, in the U.S. Govern-
ment, is it that you have found no evi-
dence that there has been any slow-
down or that there is a disagreement
within the American Government as

department of State Bulletin/July 1989

THE SECRETARY

to whether there is a slowdown? What
is your judgment today as to what he
has promised — has actually come
into the pipeline?

A. He hasn't promised anything.
He notified us that there had been no
weapons shipments to Nicaragua since
the end of 1988. We do Itnow that there
have, in fact, been shipments of mili-
tary supplies and equipment. We also
have not been informed that there are
no longer weapons shipments going into
Nicaragua from Cuba. So there was no
promise; it was simply a matter of a no-
tification in a letter.

Q. You've said that the SNF nego-
tiations had threatened a major por-
tion of NATO's deterrence. Unity
you've also described as a major part
of NATO's deterrence. Does not the
dispute in itself have the potential to
weaken NATO? And how do you rank
the weapons versus unity in terms of
deterrent capability?

A. You've got to have the unity of
the alliance, and then you must have
the arms control policies to support
that, and you must have adequate
deterrence.

Let me just say we have a wide
range of common interests in the alli-
ance on political, economic, and securi-
ty issues. We're going to be dealing
with all of these, not just with SNF.
The alliance has survived many great-
er threats to its existence than this;
and we remain, as I said before, quite
hopeful that we'll get this resolved and
that we'll get it resolved before the
summit. We may not get it resolved
before the summit.

Q. A statement was read here
yesterday expressing concern about
the strength of the dollar, and report-
ers were referred to Treasury. Is that
in any way tied to the meeting be-
cause the allies are concerned? And
what's the current policy on the
strength or weakness vis-a-vis the
dollar?

A. I have better sense than to an-
swer that question, I think. [Laughter]

I will say one thing. I do think it's
important that the coordination proc-
ess which was put in place at the Tokyo
summit move forward effectively and
as efficiently as possible. I think it's
important that the major industrial de-
mocracies of the world continue to work
to coordinate their economic policies,
and it's really the coordination of those
underlying economic policies that's
going to make a difference in terms of
exchange rate stability.

Q. Would it be correct to say that
the U.S. position on a third zero and
on modernization are non-negotiable
positions?

A. We're in the midst of discus-
sions right now, so I'm not sure I under-
stand really — there are many ways to
express different positions, and what
we're talking about here now are vary-
ing ways to express different view-
points and different positions.

Q. In talking about Gorbachev
winning the PR war and so on, you
said, "We can't be reaching into the
arms control grab bag to try to com-
pete," but then you said, "Though
there may be times when we'll do
that." Is the NATO summit one of
those times? Is the President going to
have some arms control —

A. Let me point out that one of
those times was at the opening of the
conventional arms talks in Vienna when

we suggested that we would see if we
couldn't remove our chemical weapons
stocks from Germany at an earlier date
than they were planned to be removed.
That's the kind of thing I'm talking
about.

Q. Mr. Shamir [Israeli Prime
Minister] responded to your speech
yesterday, calling it useless. What's
your response to him?

A. I think it was a very balanced
speech. If you look at the speech in its
entirety, you see that it was very bal-
anced with respect to what we think, a>
least, is required of all of the parties if
we're going to move forward to make,
progress toward peace in the Middle
East. It calls on the Palestinians, it
calls on the Israelis, it calls on the So-
viets, and it says what we really think
needs to be done.

'Press release 97.

Principles and Pragmatism:
American Policy Toward
the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Secretary Baker's address before
the American-Israel Public Affairs
Committee on May 22, 1989.'^

You know, it's been said that AIPAC
manages to bring together the execu-
tive and the Congress in a way that
they might not normally associate. I'd
agree with that, and I would add only
that we have a name for such coming
together. We call it bipartisanship. And
American bipartisan support for Israel
is a great and an enduring achieve-
ment, not only for AIPAC, not only for
Israel's supporters but also, above all,
for America's national interest.

There have been many, many an-
alyses of the U.S. -Israeli relationship
over the years, and most of them begin
with the fact that we share common
values of freedom and of democracy.
That is the golden thread in the tapes-
try of U.S. -Israeli ties, and there are,
if I might suggest it, other strands as
well.

Ed [AIPAC President Ed Levy] has
mentioned some of what I did in the
Reagan Administration, but let me tell
you that I was proud to work in that
Administration — an Administration
that recognized the importance of U.S.-
Israeli strategic cooperation and an

Administration that, I think, gave
fiber and sinew to our strategic
partnership.

I'm also proud to have had a small
part to play in the historic free trade
agreement which may well become a
model for other nations. I really think
we probably would not have gotten
home on the Canadian-U.S. free trade
agreement had we not had a U.S.-
Israel free trade agreement. The
President believes — President Bush
believes — and I believe that on these isi
sues, there can only be one policy and
that is a policy of continuity. American
support for Israel is the foundation of
our approach to the problems — the
very, very difficult problems — of the
Middle East.

This support has become all tht'
more important as we approach what,
think, is a critical juncture in the Mid-
dle East. For many years, we have as-
sociated that region with either the
vanished glories of ancient history t.r
the terrible costs of modern conflict.
But now, I think, the world is chang-
ing. We have seen longstanding prob-
lems in other regions begin to abate.
The President spoke last week of prom:
ising and hopeful, even though incom-
plete, developments in the Soviet

Department of State Bulletin/July 198

THE SECRETARY

nion. Everywhere there is a quicken-
g consciousness that the globe is be-
g transformed through the search for
jmocracy, the spread of free enter-
•ise, and technological progress. And,

course, nowhere is that more true,
, we meet here today, than in the

ople's Republic of China.

The Middle East should be able to
irticipate fully in these new develop-
ents. Oftentimes we think of the
igion as a place full of precious
(sources, such as oil and minerals,
ut the area's most precious resource,
we really stop and think about it, is
le lives of its peoples.

And that is the stake. Are the peo-
es of the Middle East going to safe-
aard their most precious resource?
re they going to join the rest of the
langing world in the works of peace?
r is this region going to pioneer in
inflict once more through the prolif-
■ation of chemical weapons and ballis-
c missiles?

The people of Israel are vitally
incerned with these questions. Israel,

course, is a vigorous democracy. The
raelis are among the world leaders

communications, electronics, and
'ionics — the new technological revolu-
ans. And Israel understood long ago
lat the most important of its natural

sources is the skill and the intel-
jence of its people.

eace Process:

rinciples and Pragmatism

his is the wider context in which we
id Israel must consider the peace
•ocess. The outcome is of vital con-
'rn both to Israel's future and for our
sion of a free and peaceful world.

Not so long ago, we marked a de-
ide of the Camp David peace accords,
hat occasion reminded us not only of
3w far we have come but of how much
irther we have to go. I would like to
;port to you that we and Israel have
iken some important steps forward.

Before Prime Minister Shamir
jsited Washington, we had called for
j)me Israeli ideas on how to restart the
eace process. We did so based on our
i)nviction that a key condition for
rogress was a productive U.S. -Israeli
artnership. And I believe that the
?st way to be productive is through
)nsultation rather than confrontation.

Let me assure you that we were
jt disappointed. The Prime Minister
ill, I'm sure, forgive me if I divulge
) you a conversation at our very first
leeting. The Prime Minister said, in

preparing for his visit, he had studied
President Bush and me, just as he sus-
pected that perhaps we had studied
him. I had been described by the media
as an ever-flexible pragmatist. The
Prime Minister, he said, had been de-
scribed as an inflexible man of ideologi-
cal principle. Then the Prime Minister
volunteered, that in his view, the jour-
nalists were wrong, and they were
wrong in both cases. "Yes," he said, "I
am a man of principle, but I am also a
pragmatist who knows what political
compromise means." And he said that
it was clear that I, although a pragma-
tist, was also a man of principle, and
that principle would guide my foreign
policy approach. Needless to say, I
didn't disagree with the Prime
Minister.

If ever an opening statement
achieved its goal of establishing a
strong working relationship, this was
it. I think it's fair to say that we under-
stood each other to be pragmatists,
but pragmatists guided by principle.

As we approach the peace process,
together, we understand Israel's cau-
tion especially when assessing Arab
attitudes about peace. I don't blame
Israel for exercising this caution. Its
history and, indeed, its geopolitical
situation require it.

At the same time, I think that cau-
tion must never become paralysis. Ten
years after Camp David, Egypt re-
mains firmly committed to peace, and
Arab attitudes are changing. Egypt's
readmission into the Arab League on
its own terms and with the peace trea-
ty intact, I think, is one sign of change.
Evolving Palestinian attitudes are an-
other. Much more needs to be done — to
be demonstrated — that such change is
real. But I don't think that change can
be ignored even now. This is surely a
time when, as the Prime Minister said,
the right mix of principles and prag-
matism is required.

U.S. Views

As we assess these changes, U.S. poli-
cies benefit from a longstanding com-
mitment to sound principles, principles
which have worked in practice to ad-
vance the peace process. Let me men-
tion some of those principles for you.

First, the United States believes
that the objective of the peace process
is a comprehensive settlement achieved
through negotiations based on UN Se-
curity Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
In our view, these negotiations must in-
volve territory for peace, security and

...negotiations must involve
territory for peace, security
and recognition for Israel
and all of the states of the re-
gion, and Palestinian politi-
cal rights.

...for negotiations to succeed,
they must allow the parties
to deal directly with each
other, face to face.

. . . some transitional period is
needed, associated in time
and sequence with negotia-
tions on final status.

...in advance of direct nego-
tiations, neither the United
States nor any other party,
inside or outside, can or will
dictate an outcome.

recognition for Israel and all of the
states of the region, and Palestinian
political rights.

Second, for negotiations to suc-
ceed, they must allow the parties to
deal directly with each other, face to
face. A properly structured interna-
tional conference could be useful at an
appropriate time, but only if it did not
interfere with or in any way replace or
be a substitute for direct talks between
the parties.

Third, the issues involved in the
negotiations are far too complex, and
the emotions are far too deep, to move
directly to a final settlement. Accord-
ingly, some transitional period is
needed, associated in time and se-
quence with negotiations on final sta-
tus. Such a transition will allow the
parties to take the measure of each oth-
er's performance, to encourage atti-
tudes to change, and to demonstrate
that peace and coexistence is desired.

'epartment of State Bulletin/July 1989

THE SECRETARY

[To the Arab world], we
would say: end the economic
boycott; stop the challenges
to Israel's standing in inter-
national organizations; repu-
diate the odious line that
Zionism is racism.

For Israel, now is the time to
lay aside, once and for all,
the unrealistic vision of a

greater Israel Foreswear

annexation. Stop settlement
activity. Allow schools to re-
open. Reach out to the Pal-
estinians as neighbors who
deserve political rights.

For Palestinians, now is the
time to speak with one voice
for peace Practice con-
structive diplomacy —
Amend the covenant —
Reach out to Israelis and
convince them of your peace-
ful intentions. You have the
most to gain from doing so —

For outside parties — in par-
ticular, the Soviet Union —
now is the time to make "new
thinking" a reality as it ap-
plies to the Middle East. . . .
restore diplomatic ties with

Israel stop the supply of

sophisticated weapons to
countries like Libya.

Fourth, in afivance of direct nego-
tiations, neither the United States nor
any other party, inside or outside, can
or will dictate an outcome. That is why
the United States does not support an-
nexation or permanent Israeli control
of the West Bank and Gaza, nor do we
support the creation of an independent
Palestinian state.

I would add here, that we do have
an idea about the reasonable middle
ground to which a settlement should be
directed; that is, self-government for
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza
in a manner acceptable to Palestinians,
Israel, and Jordan. Such a formula pro-
vides ample scope for Palestinians to
achieve their full political rights. It
also provides ample protection for
Israel's security as well.

Prenegotiations

Following these principles, we face a
pragmatic issue, the issue of how do
we get negotiations underway. Unfor-
tunately, the gap between the parties
on key issues such as Palestinian rep-
resentation and the shape of a final
settlement remains very, very wide.
Violence has soured the atmosphere,
and so a quick move to negotiations is
quite unlikely. And in the absence of
either a minimum of good will or any
movement to close the gap, a high-
visibility American initiative, we
think, has little basis on which to
stand.

If we were to stop here, the situa-
tion would, I think, be gloomy, indeed.
But we are not going to stop with the
status quo. We are engaged, as I men-
tioned a moment ago; we will remain
engaged; and we will work to help cre-
ate an environment to launch and sus-
tain negotiations. This will require
tough but necessary decisions for peace
by all of the parties. It will also require
a commitment to a process of negotia-
tions clearly tied to the search for a
permanent settlement of the conflict.

When Prime Minister Shamir vis-
ited Washington, he indicated that he
shared our view that the status quo
was unacceptable. He brought an idea
for elections to, in his words, "launch
a political negotiating process" which
would involve transitional arrange-
ments and final status. The Prime Min-
ister made clear that all sides would be
free to bring their preferred positions
to the table and that the negotiated
outcome must be acceptable to all. The
United States welcomed these Israeli
ideas and undertook to see whether it
could help in creating an atmosphere
which could sustain such a process.

Just last week, the Israeli cabinet
approved a more detailed version of the
Prime Minister's proposal, indicating
Israeli Government positions on some,
but not all, of the issues which are in-
volved. The Israeli proposal is an im-
portant and very positive start down
the road toward constructing workable
negotiations.

The Israeli Government has of-
fered an initiative, and it has given ust
something to work with. It has taken t
stand on some important issues, and
this deserves a constructive Palestin-
ian and broader Arab response.

Much work needs to be done — to
elicit Palestinian and Arab thinking
on the key elements in the process, to
flesh out some of the details of the
Israeli proposals, and to bridge areas
where viewpoints differ. Both sides, ol
course, are going to have to build polii
ical constituencies for peace. Each ide;
proposal, or detail should be developei
if I may say so, as a deal-maker not as
deal-breaker.

It may be possible to reach agree-
ment, for example, on the standards
a workable elections process. Such el(
tions should be free and fair, of cour;
and they should be free of interferem
from any quarter.

Through open access to media anfl
outside observers, the integrity of the)
electoral process can be affirmed. An|
participation in the elections should bl
as open as possible.

It is, therefore, high time for seri|
ous political dialogue between Israelii
officials and Palestinians in the terri-<
tories to bring about a common undert
standing on these and other issues.
Peace, and the peace process, must b(
built from the "ground up." Palesti-
nians have it within their power to he'
define the shape of this initiative and
to help define its essential elements.
They shouldn't shy from a dialogue
with Israel that can transform the cui
rent environment and determine the
ground rules for getting to, for con-
ducting, and, indeed, for moving be-
yond elections.

We should not hide from ourselve?
the difficulties that face even these
steps here at the very beginning. For'
many Israelis, it will not be easy to ei
ter a negotiating process whose suc-
cessful outcome will, in all probabilit;
involve territorial withdrawal and thf
emergence of a new political realit\'.
For Palestinians such an outcome w ill
mean an end to the illusion of conti'ol
over all of Palestine, and it will mean
full recognition of Israel as a neighboi
and partner in trade and in human
contact.

Challenges Ahead

We do not think there is a real con-
structive alternative to the process
which I have outlined. Continuation o
the status quo will lead to increasing

Department of State Bulletin/July 19

THE SECRETARY

olence and worsening pi-ospects for
lace. We think now is the time to
ove toward a serious negotiating proc-
s, to create the atmosphere for a re-
wed peace process.

Let the Arab world take concrete
eps toward accommodation with
rael — not in place of the peace proc-
s, but as a catalyst for it. And so we
3uld say: end the economic boycott;
op the challenges to Israel's standing
international organizations; repudi-
e the odious line that Zionism is
,cism.

For Israel, now is the time to lay
iide, once and for all, the unrealistic
sion of a greater Israel. Israeli in-
rests in the West Bank and Gaza —
curity and otherwise — can be accom-
odated in a settlement based on Reso-
tion 242. Forswear annexation. Stop
ittlement activity. Allow schools to re-
)en. Reach out to the Palestinians as
jighbors who deserve political rights.

For Palestinians, now is the time
I speak with one voice for peace. Re-
)unce the policy of phases in all lan-
aages, not just those addressed to the
fest. Practice constructive diplomacy,
)t attempts to distort international
•ganizations, such as the World Health
rganization. Amend the covenant,
ranslate the dialogue of violence in
le intifada into a dialogue of politics
id diplomacy. Violence will not work,
each out to Israelis and convince
lem of your peaceful intentions. You
ive the most to gain from doing so,
id no one else can or will do it for you.
inally, understand that no one is
jing to "deliver" Israel for you.

For outside parties — in particular,
le Soviet Union — now is the time to
.ake "new thinking" a reality as it ap-
lies to the Middle East. I must say
lat Chairman Gorbachev and Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze told me in Mos-
)w 10 days ago that Soviet policy is
Tianging. New laws regarding emigra-
on will soon be discussed by the Su-
i-eme Soviet. Jewish life in the Soviet
Inion is also looking better, with stu-
ents beginning to study their heritage
■t'l'ly. Finally, the Soviet Union
tiiced with us last week that Prime
linister Shamir's election proposal
as worthy of consideration.

These, of course, are all positive
ii;ns. But the Soviets must go further
I demonstrate convincingly that they
ii' ,-erious about new thinking in the
irali-Israeli conflict. Let Moscow re-
tdie diplomatic ties with Israel, for
xample.

The Soviets should also help pro-
mote a serious peace process, not just
empty slogans. And it is time for the
Soviet Union, we think, to behave re-
sponsibly when it comes to arms and
stop the supply of sophisticated weap-
ons to countries like Libya.

I said at the beginning of these
remarks that the Middle East had ap-
proached a turning point. I believe that
this region, which is so full of poten-
tial, will not remain immune from the
changes which are sweeping the rest of
the world. These changes begin with
the quest for democracy, for individual
freedom, and for choice. Long ago, of
course, Israel chose this path. And long
ago, the American people decided to

Secretary's Interview
on "Face the Nation"

Secretary Baker' was interviewed
in Houston on CBS-TV's "Face the
Nation" on Mail U. 19S9. by Terence
Smith and Bill Plante. CBS News.''

Q. You just heard the two Senators
[Nancy Kassebaum and Bob Graham]
talking in very serious terms about
the situation in Panama. Is there a
point there where the Administration
has to take another step, and what
might it be?

A. I think that the steps that the
Administration has taken so far need to
be given — if I might put it this way —
some time to work. I don't think that
we ought to assume that they're not
going to work. They are measured
responses.

I heard your question and the re-
sponses of the Senators about the OAS
[Organization of American States]
meeting on Wednesday. Let's see how
that meeting goes. I think that we've
got good diplomatic support in the re-
gion. I think it's important to note
that this should not be a U.S.-versus-
Panama problem. This is really a prob-
lem for Latin American countries in
the region as well as for the United
States.

Q. Do you agree with Senator
Graham that it's important to get rid
of Gen. Noriega at almost any cost?
In other words, how far does this
country go to get Noriega out?

A. I think it's very important that
the will of the Panamanian people be

walk with Israel in its quest for peace
and in its quest for security.

The policy I have described today
reaffirms and renews that course. For
our part, the United States will move
ahead steadily and carefully, in a step-
by-step approach designed to help the
parties make the necessary decisions
for peace. Perhaps Judge Learned
Hand expressed it best when he said,
". . . we shall have to be content with
short steps; ...but we shall have gone
forward, if we bring to our task. . . pa-
tience, understanding, sympathy, for-
bearance, generosity, fortitude and
above all an inflexible determination."

'Press release 96.

given effect. We had an election here
that has been stolen. We have the will
of the people being subverted and per-
verted, so we ought to do everything
within reason that we can to encourage
this man to leave; to bring pressure, if
you will, on him to leave. It's important
in terms of the entire hemisphere.

Q. Are there any hints that you
can share with us this morning that
Noriega might be considering step-
ping down or leaving? Are there any
discussions that you can share with
us, going on between this country and
his government, that might lead to
that end?

A. As you know, there have been
some discussions in the past. I'm not at
liberty to comment beyond saying that.
I think that, again, the Senators were
right in terms of what the proper posi-
tion of the United States should be
with regard to suggestions that some-
how the indictment should be dis-
missed. I don't think you should antici-
pate seeing President Bush entertain
ideas such as that.

I think it's important that we con-
tinue to do everything we can to bring
public opinion to bear in order to en-
courage this man to leave. It's very
important in terms of the overall rela-
tionship in the hemisphere.

Q. Are there any circumstances
at all under which the United States
should consider abrogating the Pan-
ama Canal Treaties?

Oepartment of State Bulletin/July 1989

THE SECRETARY

A. I don't think that that's the ap-
propriate response. Again I think both
Senator Graham and Senator Kasse-
baum made it very clear [that] what you
do when you start talking about that is
turn this into a U.S.-versus-Panama
and, in effect, versus-some-of-the-rest-
of-Latin-America contest. That would
be a mistake. I think it would be
counterproductive.

Q. There's another headline this
morning that we're all looking at,
which is your Soviet counterpart,
Eduard Shevardnadze, saying that if
the United States goes ahead and
modernizes the Lance missile in Eu-
rope as it plans to do, the Soviets may
have to develop a new missile of their
own or even abrogate certain parts of
the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces] Treaty. It sounds like a pretty
serious threat. I wonder what you
respond to it?

A. My response would be that this
is a matter that was specifically negoti-
ated when the INF Treaty was nego-
tiated— the elimination of the SS-23s
on the part of the Soviet Union. This
was debated back and forth for quite
some time.

The Soviets responded, in effect,
that they would agree to eliminate
these missiles, and now they're doing
so. And there was never any suggestion
at all that the United States or the
NATO alliance should not keep its
short-range missiles up-to-date. That
was never entertained during the
course of that debate. All we're really
talking about here is maintaining those
missiles up-to-date that have a range of
less than 300 miles.

Q. Do you take this as a serious
threat on the part of Soviet Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze, or is he just
trying to drive the wedge deeper
between the United States and
Germany?

A. I think it perhaps could be a lit-
tle bit of a combination of both. This
was discussed in our meetings there,
during the course of the ministerial in
Moscow. I think that the Soviets are
concerned, of course, that what they'd
much prefer to see is the entire de-
nuclearization of Europe. They would
like to see the alliance lose its resolve,
lose its will.

The fact of the matter is the reason
we've had peace for 40 years is because
we have been strong, and we have kept
our deterrent up-to-date, and we've
maintained our strength. We really
need to continue to do that.

Q. Let me be the devil's advocate
for a moment and ask you, why not
begin discussions as the Soviets pro-
pose on the elimination or reduction
of short-range missiles and tie it, as
others have proposed, to a reduction
in conventional forces and to other
goals that we, in fact, have in Eu-
rope? Why not get the talks going?

A. There are a lot of suggestions
out there. I got that question during
the course of my press conference in
Brussels, and I think it's probably a
mistake for the United States to react
to each and every one of these so-called
compromise proposals that come
forward.

I should say this: It is important
that there be a resolution of the imbal-
ance in conventional forces before we
start getting into negotiations on
short-range nuclear weapons. It's the
short-range nuclear weapon that gives
us support for our flexible response
strategy w^hich has kept the peace all
these years. The minute you lose that
in the face of major imbalances in the
favor of the Soviet Union on conven-
tional forces, major imbalances in the
favor of the Soviet Union on short-
range nuclear weapons, I think you lose
something very, very fundamental.

Q. What's wrong with tying the
two together — tying the negotiations
to the idea that you negotiate not
down to zero but only down to a cer-
tain level, as Ambassador Nitze [Paul
H. Nitze, formerly special adviser to
the President and the Secretary of
State on arms control matters] has
suggested? Why not start that?

A. Again let me say there are a lot
of proposals out there that might make
sense, but I think it's a mistake for us
to pass judgment on each and every one
of these as we move forward toward the
summit.

We are engaged with the Germans,
as you know; we are having ongoing
discussions with them about the appro-
priate way to bridge this gap. I think I
said a couple of days ago that we're
very hopeful that we'll find a way to
bridge the gap. The alliance has always
been able to resolve these problems in
the past, and I'm very hopeful that
we'll be able to resolve them in the
future.

Q. But why not take a more ag-
gressive posture? Why let the Soviets
get all the public relations advan-
tage? Why not float some new ideas
of your own? Isn't there a sense that
public opinion is beginning to turn?

There are editorials today — there
have been editorials recently — saying)
it's time for the United States to maki
some moves — dramatic moves — of its
own.

A. The United States is making
some moves, not all of which are laid
out there in the public domain. Again
let me say that we have been having
discussions with the Germans —
extensive discussions. The important
thing is not who wins a public relations
victory but whether or not we make
sure that we keep the alliance stron^u,
we make sure that we bridge this gap
ultimately, and we need to work towan
that end. We don't need to be concern-
ing ourselves with short-range public
opinion victories.

I've got to say one more time what
I said again in Brussels: It would be a
terrible mistake if we fall into the trap
of playing polities with Western secu-
rity, and the Russians would dearly
love to see that happen. They'd love Ili
see us do that and start trying to play
that game.

Q. It costs you, though, doesn't
it? I have to say that you looked sur-
prised and perhaps a little annoyed
when Gorbachev gave you his pro-
posals that cut 500 nuclear warheads
from the European stockpile. These
things come one after the other.
They've almost become predictable.
Didn't you expect —

A. You're quite right when you sa;
they're predictable. And as far as we
were concerned, that was predictable;
and it was something, quite frankly,
that we had specifically talked about
here in Washington before the trip. So
I would guide you off any suggestion
that we were surprised. On the other
hand the Soviets are coming our way.
They are moving in our direction. The;
are doing what we've been calling on
them to do. For a long time, we've beer
calling on them to unilaterally reduce
some of their short-range nuclear weap
ons the way the NATO alliance has.
Two thousand four hundred weapons
over the last 10 years we've not only
eliminated, we have destroyed.

And they've now come with this
very, very modest little step- — about
500 weapons that they're going to move
from some of their client states in East
ern Europe, not even out of Europe,
not even back behind the Urals — and
they're not suggesting that they're
going to destroy them. So we say it's a
good step, but it's a very small one and
a very modest one.

Department of State Bulletin/July 198

THE SECRETARY

Q. Give us a sense of this Admin-
stration's view now of Gorbachev, his
iiospects on perestroika, his efforts
t roform. You've just been there. We
uid Defense Secretary Cheney saying
few days ago that the prognosis for
ircstroika was very poor, that Gor-
liuhev was likely to fail and be re-
ilaied by someone more militant.
N'liat did you think? You've just come
Kitne.

A. I've just come back from there,
11(1. as a matter of fact, I spent
' _ hours with the General Secretary.
t's my view that they've got some ma-
(ir problems. They're quite candid
bciut talking about those and acknowl-
duiiig that they've got these problems
hat they've got to deal with.

It's our further view, as you proba-
cy know — the view of everyone in our
Ldministration, including Secretary
]heney — that we very much want per-
stroika to succeed, because if they are
uccessful, it will mean that there will
16 a more open and stable and secure
ioviet Union. That will be in the best
nterests of the United States. It would
Iso be in the best interests of the
ioviet Union and the world.

So we'd like to see that happen.
Vhether or not he succeeds, though, is
ping to depend really not on what we
n the West do; it's going to depend
ipon what happens in the Soviet
Jnion, and it's going to depend upon
he Soviet people.

Q. Let's move on to another area
hat's really in the news today. Gen-
ral Secretary Gorbachev is about to
irrive in China on a history-making
ummit there. What, from the U.S.
loint of view, is there to worry about
ir look for in this summit?

A. I don't think that there's a lot
hat we should be worried about. In
act, when we were in Beijing, Presi-
lent Bush told Chairman Deng Xiao-
ling that we welcomed the fact that the
'eople's Republic and the Soviet Union
rere getting together. He has sent the
chairman a message in the last several
lays with regard to this subject, and
t's not something that the United
States ought to be worried about. It's
lomething that we really ought to wel-
:ome, and we do welcome.

Q. Does the United States have
iny response specifically to the news
;his morning, which are the continu-
ng student protests? There are a
;housand students camped as we
speak in Tiananmen Square, and Gor-
jachev is on his way. What's the U.S.

comment or observation on that stu-
dent demonstration?

A. The comment of the United
States is that we support freedom of
e.xpression around the world. We sup-
port self-determination, freedom of ex-
pression, democratization. We take
note of the fact that the authorities in
Beijing have really not, as they quite
frequently have in the past, cracked
down on these demonstrations. These
students have been permitted to ex-
press their views rather freely if you
look at what has been traditional in the
past.

Q. And you applaud that re-
straint, I take it?

A. Yes, we do.

Q. The chairman and some mem-
bers of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee have called on you and the
President to withdraw the nomina-
tion of Donald Gregg to be the Am-
bassador to Korea. What do you say
to that?

A. What I say is that the President
stands behind this nomination, as do I.
He has faith and confidence in his nom-

inee. He's served the President, as you
know, as his national security adviser
for the full 8 years that the President
was Vice President of the United
States.

It's quite true that we had some
discussions with several Senators on
the Foreign Relations Committee about
this — talked to them about whether or
not the nomination should be given a
second look. It was, and the President
is quite satisfied that the nomination
should go forward and that the con-
firmation process should go forward.
And, quite frankly, we had hoped that
that some of the Senators who are op-
posing this nomination would have seen
fit to sit down with the nominee before
the hearing and discuss what they saw
as some of the problems.

Q. Did you believe his testimony?
Did you believe Gregg's testimony?

A. I haven't seen his testimony, so
I'm not in a position to answer that
question. As you know, I've been in the
Soviet Union for the past week.

1 Press release 88 of May 1.5, 1989.

Secretary's Trip to Moscow and NATO

Secretary Baker visited Helsinki
(May 9-10, 1989), Moscow (May 10-11),
and Brussels (May 11-12). Following
are remarks he made on various
occasions during the trip.

REMARKS AT RECEPTION
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS
AND REFUSENIKS,

U.S. EMBASSY,

MOSCOW,

MAY 10, 1989'

Thank you very much Ambassador
Matlock [U.S. Ambassador to the
Soviet Union Jack Matlock]. Let me
start by apologizing to all of you for be-
ing late. Our meetings ran late, and we
have been running late ever since. I
really apologize, but I am delighted to
have the opportunity to come by and
visit with you and, I want to thank you
all for being here.

As you undoubtedly know, when-
ever we sit down, government-to-
government, with the Soviet Union,
human rights is always at the top of our
agenda because human rights occupies
such an important place in our whole

system of government, politics, and
society in the United States. I specifi-
cally raised today the issue of re-
fuseniks with Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze. I want you all to know
that we are going to keep up the pres-
sure to resolve individual cases, but be-
yond that, we are going to push to see
that changes are institutionalized and
human rights guaranteed. Despite the
progress that has been made — and I
think we should all candidly admit
that — there has been progress, partic-
ularly with respect to emigration.
There are, nevertheless, substantial
problems that remain. There are still
hundreds of refuseniks who are denied
exit permission, both new cases and
old. We intend to continue to press for
a resolution of these cases.

Other human rights goals that we
have include family reunification, ex-
panding the scope of civil and political
liberties, and, of course, the legal and
institutional reforms to secure the
progress that's already been made, as I
mentioned.

I want you all to know that the
United States remains committed to
the right of Soviet Jews to practice

THE SECRETARY

their religion and to participate fully in
Soviet society. I should say that we wel-
come the recent progress in the [inaud-
ible] isolation of Soviet Jews, such as
the opening of the Jewish Cultural Cen-
ter and Judaic Studies Center in
Moscow.

Let me close by saying that we look
forward to the day when all believers
may worship, study, and participate
fully in Soviet society without
discrimination.

JOINT STATEMENT

ON LEBANON,
MOSCOW.
MAY n, 1989^

In the face of the escalating level of
bloodshed in Lebanon, the United
States and the Soviet Union call on all
parties to adopt and observe a cease-
fire which would be an important first
step toward ending the civil war in this
country.

Tlie United States and U.S.S.R.
favor the Arab League proposal first to
consolidate the cease-fire and then to
build the framework for a national dia-
logue and reconciliation in Lebanon.
They are prepared to use their good of-
fices to join with others and promote a
political solution to Lebanon, taking
into account the interests of all sides.

The Soviet Union and the United
States support the sovereignty, inde-
pendence, and territorial integrity of
Lebanon.

NEWS CONFERENCE,

MOSCOW,

MAY 11, 1989'

I have what is a longer opening state-
ment than I might normally make, but

1 want to give you — the reason I'm
going to do this is to give you, as best I
can, a feel for the discussions that
we've had during the course of the past

2 days.

Let me start by simply saying I
think this visit was very useful, and it
was productive. I think we had con-
structive talks. I'm very satisfied with
the way in which the meetings went.

President Bush asked that I make
clear to the leadership of the Soviet
Union that the United States is ready
and anxious to reengage across the full
range of our relations. Over the past
2 days, [Foreign] Minister Shevardnadze
and I established a foundation for both
continuity and change across our five-

part agenda. We've begun to add to the
list of topics we will periodically ad-
dress together and to deepen our en-
gagement on matters we've discussed
in the past.

I e.xplained that the President and
I welcome perestroika, glasnost, and
the "new thinking" in Soviet foreign
policy. We believe they have contrib-
uted to a changing political environ-
ment, one which offers an opportunity
for both of our countries to expand the
arena of our constructive interaction.

During these meetings, the United
States and the Soviet Union sought
both to adapt old policy frameworks as
well as develop new ones to fit the
changing times.

Let me add some specifics by
touching, as briefly as I can, on each
topic in our five-part agenda.

In the area of human rights, we

both sought further progress on indi-
vidual cases and opened the way for co-
operation on the institutionalization of
rights in Soviet society.

First, the Soviets gave us the
names of individuals who will now be
free to emigrate, and we urged early
positive action on the remaining re-
fusenik cases which involve some
400-500 families.

Second, we moved close to agree-
ment on a mechanism for the exchange
of information on criminal cases aris-
ing in one country which the other be-
lieves to be political in character. Such
a mechanism could help us free individ-
uals who are political victims of an ear-
lier era.

Third, the Soviets reported their
progress in drafting new laws regard-
ing freedom of conscience and emigra-
tion. We understand it's their present
intention that the Supreme Soviet
would act on these laws after it
convenes.

And finally, we agreed to future
projects. We will engage in ongoing di-
alogues or exchange programs in three
areas: the rule of law, human rights
and humanitarian issues arising on the
international scene, and our respective
experiences in dealing with social
issues.

In the arms control area, we've
agreed to I'eengage on the full range of
our existing negotiations. This re-
flects, I think, our country's interest in
an active, constructive, and expanding
relationship.

The NST [nuclear and space talks]
negotiations will resume in Geneva be-
tween June 12 and June 19, with the
precise date to be set through diplo-

matic channels. The Standing Consult-
ative Commission (SCO, which is
charged with Antiballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty verification and compli-
ance, will resume meeting in mid-June.
The nuclear testing talks will resume
in Geneva on June 26. We will hold bi-
lateral discussions on chemical weapons
on the margins of next month's meetiim
of the UN Conference on Disarmament
in Geneva. We discussed and agreed on
the importance of the ongoing conven-
tional armed forces in Europe (CFEi
and confidence-building measures
talks.

Second, we also agreed — impor-
tantly in my view — to broaden the
arms control agenda to include a new
emphasis on the problem of chemical
weapons and missile proliferation.

In the regional area, we placed, a.'^
some of you know, new emphasis on re-
gional talks and made headway in
crafting a common basis for U.S.-
Soviet cooperation to try and resolve a
number of conflicts around the globe.
In particular, we described in detail
our approaches in Central America ami
the Middle East.

With respect to Central America,
we agreed to work toward a political
and diplomatic solution to the problem
of Nicaragua and to support the goals
of Esquipulas and Tesoro.

We related our objectives and uui'
general strategies on a number of re-
gional issues. We discussed specific
possible roles which the Soviet Union
could play, as well as roles which the
United States could play.

On the new topic of transnational
relations, we agreed to establish an
ongoing working group. We also de-
rived a work program for this new
group which covers a range of issues,
including protection of the environ-
ment, coping with the effects of natural
disasters, and combatting international
terrorism and illicit drug trafficking.

In the bilateral area, [Foreign]
Minister Shevardnadze and I accepted
the work plan developed by the working
group which provides for intensified
action in numerous areas, including the
completion of negotiations on new or
amended cooperative agreements and
the opening of new cultural and infoi--
mation centers in our two nations. We
have a 23-point agreed work program
covering topics as diverse as research
on world oceans, civil aviation, atomic
energy, maritime boundaries, and so
forth.

In conclusion, I also took the op-
portunity of this brief visit to have

Department of State Bulletin/July 1989

THE SECRETARY

ur sessions outside the formal
3vernment-to-government agenda.

First, my wife and I had an inter-
ting private dinner with [Foreign]
Minister Shevardnadze and his wife,
'e very much appreciated their warm
jspitality.

Second, I inspected our uncom-
eted office building to see the extent
'possible security penetrations
yself.

Third, I met with three newly
ected members of the Congress of
teople's Deputies. I congratulated
lem on their accomplishment and ex-
ressed the President's and my strong
iterests in the process of perestroika
nd glasnost.

Finally, I met with a group of
oviet refuseniks. I told them that the
eople of the United States were moved
y their sacrifice and that we would
)ntinue to work for their freedom.

Q. You did not refer at all in this
ammary to the Middle East. I won-
ered if you could tell us what you
light have accomplished with Shev-
rdnadze and Gorbachev on the Mid-
le East?

A. If I didn't mention the Middle
last in the discussion of regional is-
pes, I intended to, because we think
lat there may be a fair amount of com-
lon ground with respect to our ap-
roach to the Middle East.

We talked about it at quite some
ingth during the first day. We talked
Dout the importance of giving the idea
'elections a chance, working with Is-
ielis and Arabs to see if we can con-
ert elections into a process — a broader
rocess — that will ultimately bring
Oout political negotiations. The [For-
ign] Minister made the point that he
links it is important to keep the possi-
ility of an international conference on
le table, and I told him that it was the
osition of the United States that an in-
^rnational conference at an appropri-
te time, properly structured, might
'ell be useful.

Q. Was there any discussion in
our meetings with President Gor-
.achev about the possibility of uni-
iteral Soviet cuts in their tactical
uclear short-range force, and did
hat subject come up in general?

A. Which subject?

Q. The subject of short-range
luclear forces.

A. The subject of short-range nu-
lear weapons did come up in general.
t came up primarily during the course
f my meeting with the General Secre-
arv, and we had a rather extensive and

in-depth discussion on the issue, during
the course of which I set forth our posi-
tion and he set forth his.

Q. Was there any common
ground reached at all in that area?

A. I hope the fact we were able to
discuss the issue for as long as we did
and to the extent we did might produce
some better understanding on his part
of our position. And we agreed we
would continue to disagree agreeably
for the time being with respect to this
matter.

Q. After this first trip of yours to
the Soviet Union and these extensive
discussions you've described, could
you give us an assessment of where
you think the cold war stands? Is it
getting over? Have you got a start on
getting it over? Could you tell me how
you feel about that?

A. I answered that question in the
United States not long ago, I think.
What I said was, it seems to me, at
least, that it is certainly moving in that
direction. We may not quite be there
yet. We think it's important. We think
there are perhaps some object indica-
tors out there that one might look to,
but we are certainly moving in that
direction.

We would, of course, as we've said
before, be delighted to see an ex-
pressed renunciation of the Brezhnev
doctrine. We would be very pleased to
see the [Berlin] Wall come down. We
applaud the fact they're rolling up
the barbed wire on the Hungarian-
Austrian border. So I think you have to
say we are clearly moving in that
direction.

Q. Can you return to the ques-
tion of whether unilateral cuts in tac-
tical short-range nuclear forces were
discussed? And can you tell us wheth-
er the General Secretary wanted to
reduce or eliminate short-range nu-
clear weapons?

A. Unilateral reductions were dis-
cussed because, as you know, we have
argued for some time, there is a signifi-
cant imbalance in favor of the Warsaw
Pact with respect to these weapons.
Before we start talking about sitting
down and negotiating them, it would be
advisable, certainly from our stand-
point and from the standpoint of main-
taining a deterrence which we believe
has maintained the peace for all these
years, if that imbalance was reduced
voluntarily and unilaterally. That's
been an argument we've made for quite
some time.

There was no in-depth discussion of
a total elimination. There was a discus-
sion of reduction.

Q. Do you believe it is realistic
for the U.S. Administration to re-
nounce negotiations as the way to
solve the issue of tactical nuclear
weapons?

A. We don't renounce it as a way to
solve the issue. What we say is that it
is very good politics to talk about this,
and we acknowledge and recognize
that; but that security is extraordi-
narily important. It is our view that a
minimal number of these weapons has
contributed substantially to the main-
tenance of security between East and
West for many, many years. It's our
view that an adequate mix of conven-
tional and nuclear forces is required if
we are going to maintain that security.
It is a defensive posture; the NATO
strategy of flexible response is a defen-
sive strategy, not an offensive strategy.
It has to do with deterring war and
keeping the peace. That's what has
happened for 40 years, and we ought to
be very careful before we depart from
these strategic concepts that have been
successful.

Q. From the moment of the for-
mation of the new U.S. Administra-
tion, you have repeated [Israeli Prime
Minister] Shamir's proposal for elec-
tions in the occupied lands in the
Middle East. Do you have your own
concrete proposal which would speed
up the process of peace in the Middle
East?

A. The answer is, yes, we do have
a proposal of our own which we have
discussed at quite some length in the
United States and which is very com-
patible with the proposal that has been
advanced by Prime Minister Shamir. It
is our view that big, high-visibility ini-
tiatives with respect to this very in-
tractable problem are not likely to
succeed unless and until there has been
an improvement in the atmosphere and
unless there has been a "tilling of the
ground," if you will, in the area. So we
have called for some reciprocal steps
toward improving the atmosphere —
steps that could be taken by Israelis
and steps that could be taken by
Palestinians.

For the first time ever, the United
States now has a dialogue with the Pal-
estine Liberation Organization (PLO),
and we talk to them about these steps.
We have always, of course, had a dia-
logue with the Israelis, and we talk to
them about taking steps.

department of State Bulletin/July 1989

THE SECRETARY

This is very compatible with the
idea that Prime Minister Shamir ad-
vanced which, by the way, we do not
view, as someone suggested not long
ago, as "warmed-over Camp David."
There are some significant differences
in what the Prime Minister of Israel is
now proposing from the Camp David
peace process. I won't run through all
of them here now for you, but one is the
Israeli recognition that this could and
should lead to a broader political dia-
logue, a broader political negotiation, a
recognition on their part that at some
point negotiations have to be held on
the question of permanent status, a rec-
ognition on their part that in those ne-
gotiations on permanent status all
options are open, and other items such
as that. So the two ideas are very
compatible.

Q. Are you indicating to us, when
you say that it would be helpful to
reduce the numbers of those short-
range launchers and missiles uni-
laterally first, that you would negoti-
ate? And tell us, if you will, did the
Secretary General ask you to negoti-
ate specifically on that question?

A. No, I'm not suggesting that.
What I'm saying is, before you get to
the issue of whether or not there should
be negotiations, there has to be a little
less of an imbalance. There needs to be
a greater congruence, if you will, in
force structures. The alliance is at a
significant disadvantage with respect
to the numbers of tactical short-range
nuclear weapons that are currently de-
ployed today, and we are at a signifi-
cant disadvantage as well with respect
to conventional forces.

Q. But did the General Secretary
ask you negotiate — sorry to persist —
but did he ask you to negotiate these
down?

A. Did he suggest the idea of nego-
tiation? Yes, he did.

Q. The TASS news agency today
charged the United States with in-
stigating a fraudulent election in
Panama. And, as you may or may not
know, the Panamanian regime of
Gen. Noriega declared the elections
last Sunday to be nullified — their
word. What is your reaction to events
in Panama over the last 2 or 3 days?

A. Our reaction to those events
has been pretty well stated, I think, by
the President. Gen. Noriega has been
very reluctant to accept the will of the
Panamanian people. He has done every-
thing he could to steal that election.
And when it became e.xtraordinarilv

difficult to accomplish that, I suppose
he's giving consideration to simply de-
claring it null and void and starting
over. But either way — either way you
look at it, it is a perversion and a sub-
version of the freely expressed will of
the Panamanian people.

Q. You delivered a letter from
President Bush to Mr. Gorbachev.
Could you tell us a little bit about
that letter? And also, did you get into
any discussion about a summit be-
tween Mr. Gorbachev and the
President?

A. The question of a summit came
up and was discussed, and we agreed
we would further discuss that issue at
the next ministerial which [Foreign]
Minister Shevardnadze and I have,
which we suspect will be sometime in
the month of September.

With respect to the question about
the President's letter, the letter from
the President to the General Secretary
outlined broadly our views on the
evolving relationship with the Soviet
Union. It made some of the points that
I made initially in my opening state-
ment here this afternoon. The Presi-
dent called attention to the reform
effort in the Soviet Union. He empha-
sized in the strongest terms our desire
to see perestmika succeed. He pointed
out that we believe these changes are
significant, even revolutionary; that
they create a basis for progress; and
that we seek that progress.

It pointed out as well that our in-
tention is to work seriously and care-
fully step-by-step to prepare the
ground to make our cooperation
enduring.

Q. You started your negotiations
here by discussing regional conflicts.
You discussed Afghanistan and Cen-
tral America. Do you think a compro-
mise is possible on that? And you
discussed the Middle East. Did you
discuss Lebanon within that context?

A. Let me say that it was our view
coming into these meetings that re-
gional issues should have a greater em-
phasis in the dialogue between the
United States and the Soviet Union.
I'm very pleased to see that our inter-
locutors here accepted that view, and
regional issues were accorded a higher
emphasis in these meetings. That does
not in any way diminish the impor-
tance of any of the other aspects on the
agenda, such as arms control, human
rights, and the others.

We did, indeed, discuss Lebanon,
and we agreed upon a joint statement
on Lebanon which is in the process of

being released and which will be avail-
able to you.

Q. In view of what the Soviets
told you about emigration, and par-
ticularly embodying the liberal rules
into their legislation, could you give
us your assessment now of the possi-
bilities of waiving the Jackson-Vanik
restrictions?

A. We told the Soviets that once
that more liberal emigration policy hadi
been institutionalized, enacted into
law, and once those laws were seen to
be in the process of being implemented,
we thought it would be appropriate to
then address the question of whether ort
not there ought to be a relaxation or re-
peal of Jackson-Vanik and the Steven-
son amendments in the United States.

Q. Regarding Central America,
could you give us your assessment for
the possibility now that the Soviets
may decrease or stop their military
assistance to Nicaragua?

A. We are very hopeful that will
be the case. I'm an optimist, so I'd eveiT
be optimistic. I would point you to
what I said in my opening statement,
though, when I said that we agreed tn
work toward a diplomatic and political
solution to the problem of Nicaragua
and to support the goals of Esquipulas
and Tesoro. I would argue that those
goals clearly move in the direction of
reducing, if not eliminating, that
support.

Q. Just to return to the short-
range nuclear forces (SNF) issue one
more time — one. did General Secre-
tary Gorbachev indicate to you that
he is anticipating unilateral cuts?
And, two, are you saying that we
would welcome those cuts rather thar
regarding them as simply a device to
try to split NATO?

A. We would welcome the cuts in
any event. In fact, we have been calling
upon the Soviet Union to reduce their
short-range nuclear weapons to bring
the imbalance more into line; and we
have said that's something that ought
to be done before we even get to the
question of negotiations.

Q. The first part of my question:
Did he indicate to you that he is
thinking about it?

A. 'You noticed I've dodged that
about three times, haven't you?

Q. Did the discussions in NATO
on the modernization of the Lance
program come up, and did you offer
the Russians your interpretation of
the apparent split in NATO on this
issue?

Department of State Bulletin/July 198{

THE SECRETARY

A. The answer to the last part of
>rour question is no, I didn't offer them
iny interpretation on where NATO
nay or may not be on that. The ques-
tion of modernization did, indeed, come
jp, just as the question of negotiations
ame up.

Q. Did General Secretary Gor-
bachev bring up the Afghanistan
tjuestion at any length, and could you
tell us what his concerns were and
now you responded to them?
j A. The answer is no, he did not
pring it up at any length. We did dis-
cuss it in the ministerial, but he didn't
bring it up in the meeting.

I Q. Could you describe how
phevardnadze —

j A. We had a full discussion of the
(ssue. Concern, I think, was expressed
bn the part of the Soviet side about
What they perceived as some inap-
l^ropriate activities, perhaps, by
Pakistan. We don't see it that way. We
Bade the point during the course of
,hese discussions, as we have before,
:hat it is not our desire to see a govern-
Tient in Afghanistan that is hostile to
;he Soviet Union. At the same time, we
ire very interested, as we think
^'akistan and other countries are, in
seeing self-determination for the Af-
ghan people.

Q. Just to clarify your last state-
ment, you say that Mr. Gorbachev did
lot bring it up at all?

A. He didn't bring it up at all.

INTERVIEW BY TASS

AND IZVESTIYA,
VIOSCOW,
VI .\Y 11. 1989^

3. What are the results of your 2-day
;alks in Moscow, and what are your
mpressions of your meetings with the
jeneral Secretary, Mr. Gorbachev?

A. I'm very satisfied with the
I days of talks we've had here — my
alks with [Foreign] Minister Shev-
trdnadze and his associates, and my
•ather e.xtensive meeting with the Gen-
?ral Secretary. 1 think our talks were
constructive. 1 think they were helpful
and useful. 1 believe that my interlocu-
:ors shared that view.

Q. The fact itself that you are in
Moscow means that the new Adminis-
tration has finished and concluded,
ar finishing and concluding, their ex-
amination on vour national and secu-

rity policy. Can you elaborate in a few
words what are the main outlines of
the new policy of your Adminis-
tration?

A. Let me answer your question by
saying that we have, indeed, completed
our foreign policy and national security
review. We still have some work to do
on some of the specific positions that, of
necessity, will come up in the arms con-
trol negotiations. But as I told the Gen-
eral Secretary, and I told the Foreign
Ministei", we expect to be ready by the
time those negotiations resume. And,
of course, one of the products of our
talks here was the setting of dates for
the resumption of all the arms control
negotiations.

Q. What do you think is the chief
element in the policy of continuity to-
ward the Soviet Union proclaimed by
President Bush?

A. As I told [Foreign] Minister
Shevardnadze, there will be a consider-
able degree of continuity, not just in
the overall policies that had been pur-
sued by the prior Administration but in
our negotiating positions in the arms
control negotiations as well.

We hope that we can put new em-
phasis on working cooperatively — the
United States and the Soviet Union —
to help solve some of the regional con-
flicts around the world that have real
potential for erupting into war, partic-
ularly in these days when we have the
added dangers of missile and chemical
weapons proliferation. It's our view
that if we can find a way to work to-
gether on some of these issues in a
cooperative way, rather than in a
confrontational and competitive way, as
we have too often in the past, it would
be very, very good.

Q. The previous achievements in
Soviet-American relations were con-
nected with such a tool as a summit.
What do you think about this mecha-
nism of summits in the Soviet-
American relations in the future?

A. We agreed today in our discus-
sions with the General Secretary — he
and I agreed — that summits are impor-
tant. I told him that that was the view
of President Bush, that President Bush
wanted me to talk to him to ascertain,
solicit his views about a possible sum-
mit, the appropriate timing for such a
summit. We had a full discussion of
this issue, and we concluded that we
should address the question further in
my next ministerial meeting with [For-
eign] Minister Shevardnadze.

Q. This is your first visit to this
country, and, of course, it generated
a lot of interest among the Soviet peo-
ple. We would certainly like to know
more about you as a person, about
what ideas you want to bring into
Soviet-American relations. Could you
satisfy, at least a little, their curi-
osity on the subject?

A. I just mentioned one of the
ideas, and that is cooperation rather
than competition and confrontation. I
have also alluded to the fact that we
think it would be useful to put a bit
more emphasis on this problem of re-
gional conflicts.

I have suggested that we add a
fifth category of issues to the usual
basket of issues normally discussed in
these meetings; that is, transnational
or global issues, matters such as the
environment, terrorism, drug traffick-
ing, the reduction of natural disasters.
Together I think we could work on
some of these problems.

I'm struck by the fact that we have
cooperated very well where disaster
strikes. Your earthquakes in Armenia,
we were helpful. Our oil spill in Valdez,
Alaska, you were very helpful. In fact,
I think you still have a Soviet ship up
there assisting us. These are examples,
I think, of the way our two countries
might better cooperate.

Q. As you know, the American
space ship Apollo and the Soviet
space ship Soyiiz have quite different
strategies. But in one detail, they
were almost 100% similar; it's the
mechanism of docking. What was
your docking with [Foreign] Minister
Shevardnadze? You know that your
predecessor. Mr. Shultz, met 31 times
with our Foreign Minister. How did
this docking go?

A. At the conclusion of our meet-
ing today, the [Foreign] Minister char-
acterized our discussions as very
friendly and as having laid a good foun-
dation for the establishment of a fine
personal relationship between the two
of us. I must say to you that I strongly
share that view.

The [Foreign] Minister and his
wife were kind enough to entertain my
wife and me last night at a private din-
ner in their home. I thought that was
very gracious. I thank him for his hos-
pitality and look forward to reciprocat-
ing when he next comes to the United
States. I found that during my
3V2 years as Secretary of the Treasury,
personal relationships are very impor-
tant in getting things accomplished,

Department of State Bulletin/July 1989

THE SECRETARY

and the [Foreign] Minister and I talked
about that last night, and I know he
shares that view.

Q. Which specific steps should be
taken, vou think, to raise trust be-
tween the U.S.S.R. and the United
States? As a part of the increasing
U.S. -Soviet exchange, would you
agree to send a member of your
family to permanently work in
Moscow? If that's a good idea, who
would that be?

A. I don't have any members of my
family that I can dictate to that way.
We have something called freedom of
choice in the United States. But I
would certainly encourage — I do have
an 11-year-old daughter, and when she
gets a little bit older, if that was in any
way a desire of hers, I would certainly
be supportive of it, and I would encour-
age It.

Q. With every turn around in or-
bit, our planet is shrinking and the
whole of mankind, including the
Soviet Union and the United States,
are in the same boat. So helping each
other, we are helping all of mankind.
You have several points of view in
Washington, and even inside the Ad-
ministration, about our perestroika. I
think that some people say that per-
estroika will fail. Some people say
let's wait and see. Wouldn't it be more
productive to say not wait and see,
but help and see, because helping us
you are helping yourself, because of
this new development in the world,
because we're in the same boat?

A. I've already said to you that we
in the new Administration — and this
goes for all of us, even someone who
might think that perestroika is not
going to succeed — we all, nevertheless,
want it to succeed. We do not want to
do anything that in any way obstructs
that success or makes it more difficult,
provided that it was in our national in-
terest. We, after all, as you, have to
continue to look after our own national
interest.

We have not only a strongly held
view that we want perestroika to suc-
ceed, we have a strongly held view that
whether or not it succeeds, it really is
up to what happens here in the Soviet
Union. It's up to your leadership and
it's up to the Soviet people. It's not
going to be determined by what we in
the West do or don't do, as long as we
are not obstructionists. As long as we
cooperate, where cooperation is in our
national interest. And I've just men-
tioned to you that that's one of the

things that I would hope we would be
able to achieve more of — that's more co-
operation and less confrontation.

Q. This fifth basket is also, I
think, a result of your new thinking.

A. It was an idea that I had during
the course of my confirmation hearings
by the U.S. Senate. And I told the [For-
eign] Minister today I was very pleased
that he agreed to include this fifth
basket and that he and the General Sec-
retary both agreed to put added em-
phasis on the resolution of regional
conflicts.

NEWS CONFERENCE,

NATO,

MAY 12, 19895

Let me start by simply saying that I've
had an opportunity this morning to
brief the NATO foreign ministers on
my trip to the Soviet Union. I want to
say a word or two about that briefing.

I commented that I thought we had
constructive, useful, and productive
talks there; we laid a good foundation, I
think, for future meetings. It's quite
clear the United States and the Soviet
Union are reengaged across the full
range of our relations. We were pleased
with the acceptance by the Soviet
Union of added emphasis on regional is-
sues in connection with the full range
of issues between us. We were pleased
they were willing to engage with us on
transnational, or global, issues — that
is, issues affecting the environment,
terrorism, drugs. And we were pleased
they were interested in talking to us
about the problems presented by mis-
sile and chemical proliferation around
the world.

Q. On the short-range nuclear
missile problem that the United
States has been having with West
Germany, is it closer to resolution?
Will it be a divisive issue at the sum-
mit at the end of the month, do you
think?

A. You know, it has been our hope
all along it would be resolved before the
summit. But it's a very, very important
issue, involving as it does questions of
alliance security, and we remain hope-
ful it might be resolved before the sum-
mit. It has not as yet been resolved.

Q. In your meeting this morning
with [West German Foreign] Minister
Genscher, did you and he come any
closer to a meeting of the minds on
how to deal with the issue of the
SNF?

A. I think that we, of course, had
the opportunity for another full e.\-
change on the issue and I think — I
hope — he better understands our posi-
tion. I can say I think we have under-
stood his position for quite some time.
There remain differences between us,
but we will continue to try and work to
resolve those differences with [Foreign]
Minister Genscher and with other ele-
ments of the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany.

Q. Do you see yet the outline of a
way to resolve this before the NATO
summit meeting here in a few weeks?

A. As I've said before, I'm hopeful
we will be able to do that. We are en-
gaged in the process of trying. I think I
said a moment ago I remain hopeful. If
we had bridged the gap, I would tell
you, but we haven't as yet bridged that
gap.

Q. Could you say whether you
were surprised by Mr. Gorbachev's
proposal yesterday for a unilateral re-
duction, and if you feel that the tim-
ing of that proposal, in particular,
was in any way designed to try to ex-
acerbate the split between the United
States and the Germans?

A. I don't think it was necessarily
designed for that purpose. I think it
was designed with a view to public
opinion in mind. We have felt for some
time we might see such a proposal.
Frankly, as most of you know, we have
been calling upon the Soviets for a longv
time to do just this. We have pointed
out that the NATO alliance has, over
the past 10 years, reduced — unilaterally
reduced — its tactical nuclear weapons
by some 2,400. This is a reduction of
500 the Soviet Union has announced.
That is a very modest step by them
when you consider the rather substan-
tial imbalance in favor of the Warsaw
Pact.

I think there are some other points
that ought to be noted with respect to
this proposal. This was a proposal to
remove 500 weapons from the territory
of allies of the Soviet Union, not a pro-
posal to remove these weapons from
Europe. So it's quite limited in that
regard.

Further, there is no commitment to
destroy these weapons. Let me say one
more time: The NATO alliance over the
past 10 years has unilaterally reduced —
through destruction — 2,400 of its weap-
ons of this nature.

Q. Has this proposal divided the
alliance to any extent? Did you hear
any difference of opinion?

Department of State Bulletin/July 198£

THE SECRETARY

A. As we went around the table
lis morning, the alliance is absolutely,
otally, completely unified with respect
Jd this proposal. And each and every
ne of the representatives there would
tiaracterize it for you in the same way
have characterized it for you. What's
appening here is the Soviet Union is
asically following the lead of the alli-
nce. Finally, they are responding to
'hat had been repeated calls on our
(art that they unilaterally reduce some
'f the very substantial imbalances that
xist in their favor. So while it's a very
lodest step, it's a step we should wel-
ame, because it is in compliance, if you
'ill, or in furtherance of calls the
[ATO alliance has been making for
uite some time.

Q. Would you comment on the de-

i'lgn of the Soviet proposal that in-
ludes bombs on aircraft, an issue
hich I think— where NATO has not
.nilaterally reduced in the last few
jears?

A. That's correct. The design of it
[lould give us, I suppose, some pause
ecause it doesn't just refer to land-
ased nuclear weapons. It refers to the
ill range of nuclear weapons — land-
ased nuclear weapons, bombs on air-
lanes, and artillery pieces as well.
Ind some might well argue that is con-
stant with a Soviet goal that there be
complete denuclearization of Europe.
Q. Could the United States at the
ummit accept the establishment of
ome kind of high-level NATO panel
3 consider the issue of possibly enter-
ig SNF negotiations in the future
ithout making an explicit commit-
lent one way or the other on when
ctually to enter such talks?

.\. Look, there are any number of
)rmulations out there that are being
^oposed from time to time by various
arties that are interested in this de-
^te. I think the last thing in the world
should do is answer hypothetical
juestions about different types of for-
jiulations if we really expect to have
ny chance of making progress before
le summit actually begins.

Q. The two proposals together —
he proposals in the nuclear field and
he proposals in the conventional
ield being presented today in
'ienna — are considered at least by
■ne country to make it easier to pre-
are negotiations with the aim of ob-
aining mutually lower numbers

hen it comes to SNF. Do you agree

ith this?

A. Do I agree that's the purpose of
their making these proposals?

Q. No, does it make it easier?

A. Does it make it easier to do
what now?

Q. To prepare negotiations for
the reduction.

A. Does it make it easier to enter
negotiations? Let me say that when you
consider the point I made a moment
ago, this unilateral reduction they've
announced is quite apparently designed
for public opinion. I think the answer
to that would have to be no. We are
glad to see this move. We would sug-
gest to you that both this move and the
announcement they made with respect
to conventional forces was in answer to
calls that have emanated from the alli-
ance from time to time for unilateral
reductions on the one hand, such as we
have accomplished, and for specifics
with respect to their conventional
weapons proposals. We put specifics
on the table when we announced the
NATO position in Vienna.

Q. Were there any voices in the
meeting this morning suggesting that
the United States should now enter
negotiations?

A. There were none. But we really
didn't debate this issue this morning.
This morning's session was devoted al-
most entirely to a read out on my meet-
ings in the Soviet Union, both the
ministerial meetings and the meetings
with the General Secretary.

Q. In your comments yesterday
in Moscow in the press conference,
where you said before you start to
talk about negotiations you have to
bring this imbalance in short-range
systems down. You seem to be making
a connection between the size of the
imbalance and the prospects for nego-
tiations. Could you explain, if you do
feel that is a proper connection, how
these two things are connected?

A. I think it's proper to suggest,
before we start talking about negotiat-
ing with respect to these weapons,
somehow there ought to be a resolution
of the very significant imbalance that
exists in favor of the Soviet Union.

I think we have to take due note of
the rather major imbalance that exists
with respect to conventional forces, be-
cause the reason we think we need a
land-based nuclear deterrent has a lot
to do with the fact of those imbalances.
And I should say we're talking here,
of course, about a defensive military

strategy, the strategy of deterrence
and flexible response. We're talking
about a strategy that's been successful
in maintaining the peace for 40 years
so we have to be very careful as we
move forward in this area.

Q. If Mr. Gorbachev's proposals
in the conventional field were indeed
implemented, it would clearly create
equal levels on both sides. Now let's
say that happens, would you negotiate
then?

A. That's very hypothetical. I'm
reminded of the old saying back home,
"If the dog hadn't stopped, he would've
caught the rabbit." I mean let's see it
happen and then address that question.

Q. This is your first visit to the
Soviet Union. I wonder if you could
talk for a second, what was your reac-
tion to what you saw and what you
heard.

A. I should say I thought — as I
have indicated here — we had some very
meaningful meetings. I detected a de-
sire on the part of the Soviet leader-
ship to engage, and to engage across all
areas, not just arms control, without
diminishing in any way the importance
of arms control.

I found them very interested in
talking about ways in which we might
move jointly to resolve some regional
conflicts. I think this is important. We
talked about whether or not there
would be a way for the United States
and the Soviet Union to move from a
posture of addressing regional conflicts
from the standpoint of confrontation
and competition to one of cooperation.
Maybe we can't, but we think it's impor-
tant to explore that. I got the very dis-
tinct feeling they think it's important
to explore that.

'There were candid discussions dur-
ing our meetings about some of the
problems, quite frankly, that the Soviet
Union faces today in the area of eco-
nomic matters. We discussed some of
the problems they are facing in trying
to implement these rather dramatic and
revolutionary changes that are taking
place, both political and economic
changes.

I think I've said before we think
these changes are real. We think they
present opportunities that we in the
West should be alert to and we should
respond to. It was the purpose of the
President in sending me at this time to
make clear to the Soviet leadership
that we are not only ready but anxious
to reengage across the full range of our
relations.

department of State Bulletin/July 1989

THE SECRETARY

We have completed our foreign pol-
icy and national security reviews. I
should have mentioned in my brief
opening comments that we have estab-
lished dates now for the resumption of
all of the arms control negotiations that
are ongoing between us, the latest of
which is June 26. The bottom line from
all of this is that we have a new Admin-
istration in the United States, but we
are back, totally reengaged in our dia-
logue with the Soviet Union.

Q. But doesn't it annoy you that
Mr. Gorbachev used this first encoun-
ter to, in effect, upstage the Adminis-
tration? I mean it would be human
nature, I think, to react other than
that.

A. I don't know whether you would
call it upstaging. Our view is that be-
cause of the big imbalances that exist in
weaponry across the full range, there's
no way we're going to win by trying to
play a public relations game of outbid-
ding the Soviet Union with respect to
arms control issues like this.

We must focus — and keep our at-
tention focused — on what's really im-
portant and that is the security of the
West. We should approach this with
prudence and with realism. Where we
see deeds — as opposed to just words —
we must be prepared to react. But we
are entitled to look for deeds, and we
are entitled to probe and look for real
evidence of the so-called new thinking.

Q. Can you envision NATO's jubi-
lee summit without prior bridging of
the gap between Washington and
Bonn? Would it really be a disaster?

A. A worse disaster would be if we
let politics somehow endanger the secu-
rity of the alliance. We simply cannot
afford to do that.

The Challenge of Change
in U.S.-Soviet Relations

'Press release 83 of May 12,
-Press release 85 of May 13.
^Press release 84 of May 16.
■•Press release 86 of May 17.
"Press release 87 of May 15.

1989.

Secretary Baker's address before
the Center for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies (CSIS) on May i,
1989.'^

I am honored to once again be here at
the CSIS. Ever since its founding, I
think this center has combined an un-
derstanding of international problems
with a vigorous debate over how Amer-
ica should conduct its foreign policy.
Those of us who have been privileged
to serve this nation in one capacity or
another — to serve this nation abroad or
to participate in the formation of policy
here at home — know full well the ar-
dors of this task. We know, too, that
assessments of reality are not enough.
Judgments and words ultimately have
to be turned into action if we are going
to serve the public interest.

A Time of Change

The assessment of reality has become
more difficult in today's world because
the pace of international change has ac-
celerated considerably. Some years ago,
I happened across a scholarly study of
the late 18th century entitled The Age
of Revolutions, and perhaps one day
historians might describe our times
the same way.

Just consider for a moment, if
you will, some of the trends which are
transforming our world. Democracy, an
idea and political system challenged for
much of the postwar era, really is on
the offensive. Millions of people in our
own hemisphere and in countries such
as the Philippines and Korea have
achieved, now, democratic govern-
ments. Millions elsewhere — in Eastern
Europe, in the Soviet Union, and in the
People's Republic of China — are de-
manding free institutions in a way that
we've never seen before. So I think it is
fair to say that the quest for democracy
is the most vibrant political fact of
these times.

Another great transformation that
we are seeing is economic. Free mar-
kets, private initiative have become the
new watchwords of economic develop-
ment because those concepts work —
and we know this very well now —
actually work in practice. And closely
allied to economic change is technologi-
cal progress. The new technologies of
information and communication have

helped to create a global economy, an
economy which transcends the tradi-
tional boundaries of the nation state.

There have been other transformat
tions as well. Emerging technologies
open new horizons, I think, for greatei-
military stability. Other trends,
though, such as the proliferation of
chemical weapons and missiles — as
David [Ambassador David Abshire,
CSIS president] mentioned to you —
the proliferation of those weapons to
volatile regions and to irresponsible
states present us with greater dangers

And while we struggle to deal wit)
traditional political and military prob-
lems, I think we all must become in-
creasingly aware of new transnational
threats — threats such as environment;
hazards, terrorism, the drug trade-
that demand greater and greater intei
national cooperation if they are going 1
be properly addressed.

Every nation has been affected in
one way or another by these transfor-
mations. And, as a consequence, realh:
no international relationship has re-
mained the same. This, of course, is
especially true of U.S. -Soviet rela-
tions. The result, I think, is a rare
opportunity — a chance to transform
our attitudes, our words, and, above
all, our actions toward each other for
the better. But this opportunity is
also — and I think David touched
on this as well — at the same time, a
challenge — a challenge to understand
first what is happening, and secondly,
why and how to seize the opportunity
for progress toward a freer and more
peaceful international community.

The Promise of Perestroika
in the Soviet Union

The challenge of change in U.S.-
Soviet relations begins, I think, with
change — fundamental change — in the
Soviet Union. For nearly half a centun
now, we and our allies have confrontec
a Soviet superpower along the great
fault lines of the postwar period. This;
struggle has been rooted in two pro-
foundly different visions — the demo-
cratic vision and the communist visior
We differ over the rights of the indivic
ual; we differ over the power of the
state; we differ over the rule of law, th
use of force, the role of religion. In

Department of State Sulletin/July 19{

THE SECRETARY

;hort, we differ over what we consider
0 be the basic values of society.

While we may have erred from
ime to time, on the whole, I think it's
fair to say that we in the West have
[)een very, very faithful to our vision.
iJreat sacrifices have been made. The
)urdens were — and, indeed, the bur-
lens still are sometimes — very diffi-
cult to bear. There were, and there
dways will be, risks. But we upheld
)ur values. And we prevented for 40
fears war in Europe.

Surely, some of the change we see
low in the Soviet Union is a conse-
[uence of our success. There would be
10 quest for democratic institutions
f democratic institutions had failed.
Phere would be less soul-searching of
he communist vision if the democratic
'ision had somehow faded or disap-
)eared. And an alliance of free nations,
vorking together, sharing risks and re-
;ponsibilities while pursuing freedom
ind extending economic progress, has
ilways, I think, offered a rather con-
'incing alternative.

I think it can also be said, however,
hat the dramatic changes which are
weeping the Soviet Union are not due
.imply to Western fortitude. It is also
he failure of the communist vision to
iroduce results, judged by its own
itandards, that inspires calls fov per-
stivika. It is the fear that outdated
logma and unworkable institutions will
eave Soviet society behind — isolated
rem technological progress and the
flobal economy — that really accelerates
eform in the Soviet Union. And just as
lurely, change is motivated also by the
)elief of some in the Soviet Union that
•evolutions have a tough time living by
logans alone.

The President has said and I have
laid that we have absolutely no wish to
lee perestroika fail. To the contrary,
ve would very much like it to succeed.
^nd that achievement could have great
nternational effect.

As Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
old the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Af-
airs, and I quote, ". . . we must labor
;olidly to convince the people that we
ire thinking first and foremost about
heir interests. . . . We are aware of
ind declare the truth that foreign poli-
cy cannot be divorced from domestic
•ealities." A process that promises to
ncrease the freedom and improve the
veil-being of the Soviet peoples really
s in everyone's interest. A process that
)romises to change Soviet internation-
il behavior toward diplomatic solutions

and problemsolving, rather than the
use of force or intimidation, I think,
offers hope for a radically improved
international order.

...we have absolutely no
wish to see perestroika
fail.

That's why we've been so encour-
aged by the words and the concepts of
what General Secretary Gorbachev re-
fers to as the "new thinking." And in a
number of places, I think it's fair to say
that words have turned into realities.
The General Secretary pledged that
Soviet troops would leave Afghanistan
on February 15, and they did. He
signed the INF [Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces] Treaty, and SS-20s are
being destroyed. Last December, he
announced unilateral troop cuts in Eu-
rope, and now we've seen Soviet tanks
leaving Hungary. Soon we hope to see
them destroyed.

The Soviets have begun releasing
political prisoners. And, as we all
know, great strides have been made in
permitting freer emigration. Most im-
portantly, the Soviets now talk of en-
forcing the rule of law and other
guarantees of individual rights which
are very, very familiar and very basic
to us in the West. Limited elections
have taken place. The growing dissat-
isfaction with the Soviet system and
pressure for change is unmistakable,
and it is widespread.

Words of hope are, indeed, not lim-
ited just to the Soviet Union. In Po-
land, the free labor union Solidarity
has been legalized following unprece-
dented roundtable agreements. And
in Hungary, the mechanics of a multi-
party system are actively being
considered.

In the economic sphere as well, the
spread of private ownership, coopera-
tives, and decentralization of power
creates some promising opportunities.
Soon we may see the Soviets move
forward to join the global economy. I
think we would welcome, and welcome
strongly, a Soviet economy open to
world markets with a freely convertible
ruble.

We also recognize, however, that
in this critical area, as in many others,
there are many hard choices to be
made. It is far too early for us to know,
of course, whether perestroika will or
will not succeed. But it begins and it
ends with the people of the Soviet
Union, and they will determine wheth-
er it succeeds or whether it fails.

New Thinking and Old Habits

These great changes, however, are not
the only realities of the Soviet Union
today. There is an uneasy and, I might
add, a not always peaceful coe.xistence
between the slogans of the new think-
ing and the reality of both Soviet capa-
bilities and Soviet actions. We must all,
I think, face the fact that the Soviets
continue to pose a significant military
threat to Western interests. Even after
the unilateral Soviet reductions in Eu-
rope take place, the Warsaw Pact would
retain a two-to-one edge in tanks and
artillery. At a time when we hear talk
of unilateral reductions, of the need to
cut defense spending, and of the neces-
sity to transfer precious resources
from the military economy to the civil-
ian sector, 3,500— that's right, 3,500—
new Soviet tanks continue to roll off
the production lines each year That
happens to be a production rate five
times greater than our own.

For all the talk of "defensive de-
fense," Soviet military exercises still
continue to show a marked inclination
for taking the offensive. For all the talk
of openness, the Soviets have yet to
publish a real defense budget — a bud-
get that would reveal what the Soviets
really are spending on defense; a bud-
get that would provide a guide to So-
viet defense production; a budget, in
effect, that would show the direction
of future Soviet defense plans. If they
were to publish such a budget, I think
we could then evaluate the Soviet
pledge to cut their defense budget by
14%, and we could measure its impact.
Indeed, we challenge them to present
such a budget and to publish openly, as
we do, the details of their worldwide
forces and deployments.

For all of the talk of a common Eu-
ropean home — and we hear a lot of that
now — the European house remains
divided by Soviet force. If there is
ever to be a true "common European
house," the Soviets must no longer pre-
vent the residents from moving from
room to room. But, today, the [Berlin]
Wall still stands, and the Brezhnev doc-
trine remains unrenounced.

Pepartment of State Bulletin/July 1989

THE SECRETARY

Unfortunately, there are still many
regions where the new thinking has yet
to take root. We still see — and we've
mentioned this from time to time —
many signs of the old thoughts and the
old actions in Central America where
the Soviets sent over $500 million in
military aid to the Sandinistas just
last year. In the Middle East, long-
range bombers have just been sent to
Qadhafi. In Korea, the heavily fortified
North — supported by Soviet arms and
aid — still threatens the South. And in
the Far East, of course, the Soviets
continue their occupation of Japan's
Northern Territories.

exchange and negotiations already ex-
ists. Our purpose here, I think, should
be to institutionalize these changes to
make them, if we can, more difficult to
reverse. And we want both Soviet in-
tentions and capabilities to become
more transparent.

Building Upon Past Successes:
Human Rights and Arms Control

Human rights will always head the list.
As a democracy, of course, we could
not do otherwise and still be true to
our own values. We wall always be con-
cerned about how the Soviet Union and

Our foreign policy has to be based on an understand-
ing of change in the Soviet Union, but it cannot
wholly rely on that change to produce the results that
we want.

An Active Agenda

So the reality of Soviet change, as I
have described it from both sides, I
think, is both promising and problem-
atic. How do w^e address the very
serious difficulties remaining on the
agenda, while giving due credit to the
remarkable progress that has been
made in the past few years?

There are some who say that we
don't need to do much of anything be-
cause trends are so favorable to us.
Their counsel is to sit tight and simply
await further Soviet concessions.

1 don't happen to be of this school.
I don't think we can be passive in the
face of these great strategic changes,
nor can we simply yield the initiative to
a Soviet agenda that may not reflect
the best interests of the West. Our for-
eign policy has to be based on an under-
standing of change in the Soviet Union,
but it cannot wholly rely on that change
to produce the results that we want.

Our actions, of course, will play an
important role in shaping the future of
U.S. -Soviet relations. Our policy has
got to be to press forward with our
agenda, to test the application of Soviet
new thinking again and again.

In areas such as human rights and
arms control, much progress has been
made, and a framework for diplomatic

the governments in Eastern Europe
treat their own citizens. That is impor-
tant not only for humanitarian rea-
sons but also because we believe that
a government's treatment of its own
people is a good measure of how it
will treat other states.

We are encouraged by recent Sovi-
et performance with respect to human
rights and democratization, and we
hope to see these changes become a
permanent part of the Soviets' legal
system and political code. By expres-
sing these hopes, we seek not to inter-
fere in Soviet affairs but only to see the
fulfillment of the promises once made
by the Soviet Union when it signed the
Helsinki accords. These promises were,
after all, reiterated by General Secre-
tary Gorbachev at the United Nations
as recently as December.

We shall also continue with the ex-
isting arms control framework because
it serves our objectives of stable deter-
rence at lower levels of arms and risk.
We intend to preserve and to strength-
en this framework. Indeed, the United
States will soon suggest a date for the
resumption of the strategic arms talks.
The talks on conventional forces in Eu-
rope and confidence-building measures
that began in Vienna last month, I
think, can contribute substantially to
our objectives of deterrence at lower
levels of force. These give us a forum to

challenge the Soviets and their allies ti
come clean on the true level and nature
of their forces and to engage in careful
reductions that diminish the threat to
the West. As I said in Vienna, current
force levels and structure in Europe
are not engraved in stone.

Broadening the Foundation
for the Future

But the challenge of change cannot sto)
there. Indeed, new thinking in Soviet
foreign policy gives us a unique oppor-
tunity to take Moscow- at its word —
take it at its word — across all areas of
U.S. -Soviet relations. Are the Soviets
willing to live up to the promise of
their rhetoric? Are the Soviets really
prepared to recognize the constraints
of an interdependent world? Is Moscow
really ready to abandon the quest for
unilateral gain? Can military confron-
tation really be replaced by political
dialogue and even by cooperation?
Will the slogans of new thinking be
translated into enduring action?

The only way to answer these que*
tions is to test the new thinking on is-
sues that go beyond the recent intense
focus on human rights and arms con-
trol. We face new threats and new
challenges in regional conflicts, in the
proliferation of advanced weapons,
and in pressing transnational issues.

By testing Moscow across the
board, we have the opportunity to turr
many of the opportunities presented b;
the new thinking into reality. We can
establish frameworks and baselines fo:
common dialogue in areas where no
real dialogue or basis for cooperation
exists today. We can see whether tht-
new thinking is real once we probe be-
yond the slogans. We can help fill tlu'
new thinking with content, and we can
take advantage of change in the Soviet
Union to achieve a new level of coopera
tion and international stability. And wi
can also, while we're at it, determine
where the old thinking still holds force
Let me, if I might, be just a bit morr
specific.

First, we will focus on regional
conflicts, a significant source of East-
West and international tension in the
postwar period. While the Soviet
Union has not necessarily been the
cause of these conflicts, too often Son i- 1
et military aid and diplomacy have im-
peded the search for solutions and have

Department of State Bulletin/July 198!

AFRICA

even sometimes encouraged the vio-
lence. Now is the time to engage the
Soviet Union in a serious dialogue to
determine whether such policies really
have changed. And the slogans of new
thinking must be given content for this
dialogue to work.

The Soviets have got to understand
that their inclusion in the important
process of resolving regional disputes
irequires them to act responsibly and
Inot just to make high-profile assertions
jabout a peace-loving intent. Establish-
|ing a basis for cooperation depends not
jon a Soviet commitment to vague gen-
eralities of peace but to the responsible
behavior that will, in fact, make peace
possible.

There can be little doubt that the
proliferation of advanced weapons
around the globe creates a strong need,
|and it creates a greater urgency, to de-
velop a common framework for resolv-
ing regional disputes. Regional wars
are unlikely to remain limited for very
long. Rather, they are likely to escalate
quickly, drawing us into conflicts that
we should have helped to resolve in the
first place.

Second, in the areas of ballistic
missile and chemical weapons prolifera-
tion, we have only begun to establish
new international rules addressing
these problems — rules to which the So-
viets have not, as yet, agreed. It will
be an objective of mine in Moscow next
iweek to determine whether we might
idevelop a framework for working to-
gether to control a phenomenon which
threatens us all.

Third, we will approach the Sovi-
ets on transnational issues, partic-
ularly the problems of the environment,
which do not respect national bound-
aries. Pollution, drugs, and terrorism
are all issues that should join, not sepa-
rate, the Soviet Union and the United
States. These are new testing grounds
for our ability to work together. I be-
lieve that we can discover whether the
Soviet Union seriously understands
the need to deal with such issues, or
whether it is prepared to pretend that
old thinking will somehow isolate
Moscow from the consequences.

The Soviets have got to understand that their in-
clusion in the important process of resolving regional
disputes requires them to act responsibly and not just
to make high-profile assertions about a peace-loving
intent.

Meeting the Challenge of Change

I'd like to conclude on a note of histori-
cal perspective. Students of American-
Soviet relations are familiar with De
Tocqueville's famous prophecy that the
world would eventually be dominated
by the United States and the Russian
Empire — the one based on freedom, the
other based on a denial of freedom.
That prophecy very nearly came to
pass. But in my view, a wise American
diplomacy prevented it. An important
part of our vision was the rejection of a
condominium, of a division of the world
according to spheres of influence. In-
stead, we sought to build up our allies,
to assemble a coalition of free nations —
free to seek their own destiny however
they wished, just as our citizens are
free to develop their own individual
talents.

Now we are living in a time when
these Western values are in the ascen-
dancy, when our allies have become
strong and, for the most part, prosper-
ous. This changing world has chal-
lenged the Soviet Union. It is a chal-
lenge that the Soviet Union, acting in
its own interests, has tried to meet
through perestroika. Yes, we have
heard claims of new thinking, and we
have seen some of it translated into ac-
tion. And we are saying to the Soviet
Union; Let us continue. Free people
can work together peacefully, linked by
a common destiny. Let us deal, there-
fore, with the new problems of a differ-
ent era guided by a vision of a free and
peaceful world.

'Press release 78 of May 5, 1989.

FY 1990 Assistance Request
for Sub-Saharan Africa

by Alison Rosenberg

Statement prepared for the Sub-
coynmittee on Foreign Operations of the
House Appropriations Committee on
April H, 1989. Mrs. Rosenberg is
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Afri-
can Affairs.^

It is a pleasure to be here as the Bush
Administration begins to address the
challenges and opportunities that we
have before us in our policies toward
sub-Saharan Africa. There is a sense
throughout the Administration — and, I
believe, here in the Congress as well —
that a new era of cooperation between
the Administration and Capitol Hill is
possible in the making and implementa-
tion of our foreign policy and in the pro-
vision of foreign assistance to meet our
policy objectives.

In the very recent past. Congress
and the e.xecutive branch have worked
together to provide desperately needed
relief to areas stricken by natural dis-
asters and those torn by civil war. We
are working closely with the Congress,
and specifically this committee, to
meet our obligations in terms of sup-
port for the UN Transition Assistance
Group (UNTAG) for Namibia. Last
year the Congress and the Administra-
tion agreed that more economic assist-
ance was required for Africa, and you
provided that assistance. We look for-
ward to working with you and your
staff on matters of mutual interest and
concern.

For FY 1990, the Administration is
requesting $820 million in economic as-
sistance for sub-Saharan Africa and
$85 million for military assistance.
As in previous years, the emphasis on

Department of State Bulletin/July 1989

AFRICA

our assistance is where it belongs for
Africa, and that is on the economic
side. We are i-equesting approximately
$10.00 in economic assistance for every
$1.00 of military assistance.

The request for assistance for
Africa for the coming fiscal year re-
mains consistent with previous years.
Our request last year (FY 1989) was for
$819 million; the increase this year
over last is entirely on the economic
side of the ledger. Over the past 5
years, the request for foreign assis-
tance for Africa has been just at, or
just under, $1 billion. It has always
heavily emphasized the economic needs
in Africa.

We do, however, also have serious,
legitimate military assistance require-
ments in Africa, and the recent deep
cuts in appropriations and the ear-
marking of 94% of the military assist-
ance funds have left little for African
programs. This year, as in 1988, we
were able to allocate just over $25 mil-
lion for military assistance for our
countries.

This funding trend is jeopardizing
our ability to maintain any credibility
with our African friends. We consider
our funding request to be the minimum
necessary for U.S. security interests.
These include promoting regional sta-
bility, forging key liaison channels with
African militaries, fostering the mili-
tary sense of professionalism as well as
nationbuilding values, and maintaining
access to African facilities.

I should point out that the FY 1990
request contains no funding for any
Namibia programs. We are well aware
that a newly independent Namibia will
have significant requirements for as-
sistance. The donor community is al-
ready beginning to look at those re-
quirements, but we are not yet in a
position to predict what will be needed
and what the United States should be
providing. We will be working with the
United Nations, with the donor com-
munity, and with Namibia once it is
independent to determine Namibian
requirements. According to the timeta-
ble, Namibia will become independent
during FY 1990. As Namibia's econom-
ic requirements become clear, we will
begin to work with the Congress to try
to meet those requirements.

As we begin a new Administration,
I thought it would be best to review
where we have been over the past
8 years and set a context for the next
4 years. My review will relate our poli-
cies to the resources needed to meet
our policy objectives.

Current Situation

By and large, U.S. policy — and policy
objectives — for Africa have been very
consistent over the last 10 years or so.
As we work with the Congress, we
hope that our overall objectives will
continue to enjoy a healthy degree of
support during the Bush years. Unfor-
tunately the resources appropriated
over the years have fallen short of al-
lowing us to meet our earlier stated ob-
jectives. Foreign assistance resources,
both economic and military, plum-
meted from a high in 1985 "of $1,256 bil-
lion to a low of $882 million in 1987 and
have risen only slightly in 1989 to about
$905 million. This swing of $400 million
in a 2-year period came at a time when
economic and military assistance re-
sources were needed most to assist our
African friends and accomplish some of
our most important objectives — eco-
nomic reform, access to military facili-
ties, and gaining influence with left-
leaning and nonaligned states. The in-
ability to infuse resources at critical
times has kept us from achieving key
objectives.

Objectives and Policy

Objectives which will continue to have
legitimacy for at least the near term —
with some fine tuning as necessary for
unfolding events — can be stated as
follows:

• Promote a more pro-Western po-
litical and economic orientation in Afri-
can countries, strengthening their
impetus toward market-oriented eco-
nomic reform and self-reliant develop-
ment strategies;

• Deny strategic advantage and in-
fluence to those countries or groups
with objectives inimical to our own and
continue to follow through on Cuban
withdrawal from Angola and build on
Soviet cooperation in southern and
eastern Africa;

• Continue to work toward a resolu-
tion of the southern Africa conflict by
pressing for racial justice and repre-
sentative government in South Africa,
while supporting a successful transi-
tion to independence for Namibia and
working for a settlement of the Angolan
civil war and national reconciliation as
well as for peaceful solutions to all in-
ternal conflicts in Africa;

• Retain military access in East
Africa and U.S. Government facilities
in Liberia and our cooperative relation-
ships with Zaire and Chad;

• Work to strengthen respect for
human rights in all African countries —

develop comjjrehensive programs for
use of "human rights fund" resources;

• Sustain our partnership with key
African states and cooperate with the
French and other allies in the common
effort to contain and, where oppor-
tunities occur, roll back Libyan inroads
and influence; and

• Support refugee programs and
work to alleviate suffering and prevent
death from famine, disease — including
acquired immune deficiency syndrome
(AIDS) — and natural disasters.

Economic Assistance Required

As I mentioned earlier, this year the
Administration is seeking approx-
imately $820 million in economic assist-
ance for sub-Saharan Africa. Of that
request, we propose $565 million for
the Development Fund for Africa, a
total of $171 million in PL 480 food as-
sistance, and $83.3 million for economic
support funds (ESF).

An increasing flow of U.S. assist-
ance will be necessary to sustain the
trend toward continent-wide abandon-
ment of statist and antimarket econom-
ic strategies and to promote African
accommodation to and respect for the
existing international economic order.
In addition to government and interna-
tional institution-provided assistance,
we need to attract greater U.S. private
sector resources to support Africa's
economic growth. Consolidation of the
existing movement toward a reduction
of statist economic strategies and al-
lowing greater freedom to the private
sector is a major American success.
The economic bind in which most Afri-
can states find themselves, and the
prevalence of one-party and military
regimes, have tended to promote a
search for radical solutions in, for ex-
ample, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and
LTganda. Severe economic problems
have created low cost opportunities for
Libya, Cuba, North Korea, and, in
some cases, the Soviet Union. By con-
trast an African disavowal of statism
has the potential, over time, to trans-
form and stabilize the international
politico-economic landscape to U.S. ad-
vantage. We need to do everything we
can to promote continuation of this
trend.

Market economics is now on trial
in Africa, as government after govern-
ment moves at our urging toward polit-
ically risky structural adjustment and
economic reform policies. The LInited
States has a high stake in making this
approach work. Our goal must be to
demonstrate convincingly that it is the

Department of State Bulletin/July 1989

AFRICA

Vest which is the natural and effective
:artner of African countries seeking to
evelop and modernize, just as it is the
/est which steps forward to mitigate
nd offset the effects of natural
isasters.

Economic Action Program. We

annot afford to back away from Africa
t a time when we believe it is walking
3ward us. Critical to the success of our
fforts to assist Africa is an under-
tanding that sub-Saharan Africa pre-
ents unique problems which merit
pecial solutions. As African govern-
lents adopt e.xtraordinary measures,
he goal of donors and creditors will be
5 provide enough resources to permit
fie new economic policies to bear fruit,
'he international agenda will focus on
'orking with other donors to help re-
uce Africa's debt burden and increas-
ig the effectiveness of assistance,
ither major activities will include:

• Marshaling public and private
eetor resources for growth;

• Assuring the International Mone-
iry Fund's (IMF) and multilateral de-
elopment banks' continued active and
ffective roles in sub-Saharan Africa;

• Enhancing donor coordination;

• E.xploring ways to improve the
uality of our bilateral activities; and

• Sustaining progress on the part
f the more than two dozen sub-
aharan African governments which
ave courageously adopted fundamen-
il economic reform and adjustinent
rograms.

The international atmosphere is
nusually receptive to innovative ap-
roaches to sub-Saharan African eco-
omlc problems. The Venice economic
ummit in 1987 endorsed the concept of
more generous Paris Club treatment
f the poorest debtors and an e.xpanded
MF Structural Adjustment Facility,
he IMF and World Bank are spear-
eading efforts to increase conces-
ional flows to African reformers, to
|aise levels of fast-disbursing assist-
ance, and to develop a strategy to alle-
iate sub-Saharan Africa's
idebtedness.

We face the diplomatic challenge of
nsuring that African hopes are not
aised to unrealistic heights in these
ight budget times. But we must also
ontinue to assess ways to muster re-
sources commensurate with African re-
irmers' needs. In our contacts with
ub-Saharan African leaders, we must
onsistently stress the importance of
ound economic performance, while un-

Cease-Fire in Sudan

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT.
MAY 5, 1989>

The cease-fire in southern Sudan, now
approved by both sides, is a most wel-
come, [Hisitive development on the path
to ending the human tragedy. Both
sides deserve credit for taking this im-
portant step which sets an encouraging
benchmark and, we hope, signals their
determination to negotiate a peaceful,
lasting end to this conflict. A political

solution requires will, vision, and
statesmanship by both sides. We re-
main poised to help support this proc-
ess in any appropriate way.

As the cease-fire begins, we urge
all Sudanese to use it effectively to
continue prepositioning critically
needed relief supplies for the welfare
of victims of the war.

'Read til news correspondents by De-
partment spokesman Margaret DeB. Tut-
wiler. ■

derstanding the political and social lim-
its to and consequences of change.

U.S. aid is essential to enable Afri-
can governments to make and sustain
the tough policy measures necessary
for policy reform and to create condi-
tions which will eventually attract the
foreign and domestic private invest-
ment necessary for a sustained eco-
nomic growth. Should we be unable to
sustain necessary assistance levels, we
risk the collapse or delay of economic
reforms, injury to friendly govern-
ments, and acrimonious charges of a
breach of faith.

Development ind for Africa
(DFA)/Economic Support Funds

(ESF). In 1988 the Congress created
the Development F\md for Africa via
specific line items in the FY 1988 ap-
propriations legislation. In the process
of creating the DFA, most ESF pro-
grams were folded into the develop-
ment account, and the ESF account was
decreased by more than one-third from
$165 million in FY 1987 to $90 million
in FY 1988.

Military Assistance Required

We view selective arms transfers as a
valid instrument among the various in-
struments or levers of influence that
we possess. We have acknowledged that
African governments and militaries
have legitimate military requirements.
Bilateral military assistance programs
have a variety of justifications:

• To gain access to military and ci-
vilian facilities for our own military
forces;

• To gain access to senior African
officials, many of whom are military;
and

• To respond to the legitimate re-
quests by a number of governments for
technical and equipment assistance to
organize and professionalize their
militaries.

The FY 1990 military assistance
request continues to be focused on
countries where we have important
military interests — the Horn coun-
tries, Kenya, Chad, and Zaire. We seek
to expand our civic action and coastal
security programs from $2 million this
year to".$6 million in FY 1990. We be-
lieve that through these programs, we
can help turn the military toward na-
tionbuilding activities.

U.S. military assistance will con-
tinue to go primarily for spares and
support of previously furnished equip-
ment and will emphasize basic training
and infrastructure requirements —
transportation, engineering, communi-
cations, and personal equipment such
as boots and uniforms. Of the $85 mil-
lion requested for FY 1990, I would
stress that $73 million addresses only
necessary support, not additional
equipment for attrition or new pro-
grams that are badly needed in some
countries. Another $12 million would
fund training under the international
military education and training
(IMET) program.

Overview. As I mentioned earlier,
military assistance to Africa — e.xcept
for IMET funding — has been reduced
to a fraction of the 1985 level of
$158 million. FY 1989 military assis-
tance for all of sub-Saharan Africa has
fallen to just $25 million — $25 million
to support 18 individual programs in
Africa.

In relative terms, we have put very
little military assistance into Africa.
As stated above, the vast majority of

)epartment of State Bulletin/July 1989

AFRICA

U.S. assistance has gone for basic de-
velopment and military infrastructure
requirements.

We have, however, been able to
ma.ximize our effectiveness through
careful use of scarce resources by es-
tablishing meaningful, small programs
in countries that require only limited
funding to meet their needs. Two of
these programs are the civic action and
coastal security programs mentioned
above. These two regional programs
have enjoyed the interest of the Con-
gress and been very successful with
the Africans.

Civic Action Program. The civic
action program is designed to demon-
strate that there are excellent peace-
time uses of the African military. Too
often, particularly in Africa, the mili-
tary is seen by the civilian population
as a liability and drain on the society
when, in many cases, the military is a
competent, trained work force that can
be an asset to the nation. Civic action
projects are primarily engineering
projects, such as road and airfield im-
provement, construction of health clin-
ics and schools for the military and
their dependents, and water projects.

Coastal Security Program. The

coastal security program is even more
successful. It provides assistance to
West African navies to allow them to
better patrol their coasts and exclusive
economic zones. Although only 4 years
old, the program has made an enor-
mous difference in the abilities of these
small navies to enforce fishing agree-
ments and apprehend poachers and
smugglers. The coastal security pro-
gram has gained us direct access to top
leadership in half a dozen countries in
West Africa.

Due to the decline in overall fund-
ing levels, we were able to fund these
two valuable programs at only $5 mil-
lion total in FY 1988 and 1989, com-
pared to an initial level of $5 million in
1985 — a level we had hoped to maintain
to meet our objectives. This year's re-
quest is for $6 million.

The decline in military assistance
for African countries has put U.S. re-
liability and credibility in jeopardy.
One of the key tenets of U.S. military
assistance is that we support what we
provide. In Africa we have not done
that. This year we are unable to pro-
vide sufficient funding even to support
Niger's two C-130 aircraft. By our cal-
culations, approximately $73 million
(the FY 1990 request) is required annu-
ally to provide support, spares, and

maintenance for the equipment we have
provided.

The reduction in military assist-
ance for Africa, which has meant a cut-
off of assistance for FY 1988 and FY
1989 in many countries, has put U.S.
access to facilities and leadership in
grave danger this year. Our negotiated
access agreements with Kenya and
Somalia are subject to renegotiation in
1990. These agreements, originated
under the Carter Administration and
sustained by succeeding Administra-
tions, are in support of U.S. strategic
interests in the Middle East and Per-
sian Gulf, Southwest Asia, and Indian
Ocean. Continued access may not be
possible if we are unable to provide
higher amounts of military
assistance — assistance which we have
agreed is a legitimate requirement.

The combination of lower funding
levels and high earmarks in FY 1989
left only $25 million in military assist-
ance for all of Africa. Because Con-
gress earmarked $15 million for
Kenya, this left us with only $10 mil-
lion in grant funds to spread across the
continent for all of our other key
programs — Somalia, Zaire, Chad, civic
action, and coastal security, to name a
few. This is an excellent example of
why the Administration opposes ear-
marks even when, as in the case of Ken-
ya, an important friend benefits.

One of our most difficult accounts
in the Horn is Somalia. Concerns about
human rights and the insurgency in the
north led to congressional holds on
ESF (balance-of-payments) support for
the government. We fully share these
concerns. National reconciliation and
human rights improvements are in the
U.S. interest as well as Somalia's. The
progress that has been achieved since
last summer demonstrates that our pol-
icy on this issue is taking hold. Somalia
remains important to us, both in politi-
cal terms and as a location for U.S.
forces to exercise, fly training mis-
sions, stage surveillance missions in
the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean,
and, most importantly, as it has the
only facilities available to our ships and
planes near the Bab el Mandeb Strait,
through which an increasing amount of
oil flows. In assisting this friendly gov-
ernment to resolve its internal prob-
lems, we should remember that it is in
our interest to do so not only for bilat-
eral and regional objectives but to
maintain our negotiated access to
Somali facilities.

We understand fully the foreign as-
sistance constraints due to the serious
U.S. domestic budget situation. We also
know Africa and African countries

have the lowest worldwide priority for
military assistance funding. But the
United States does have a military in-
terest in Africa, and we have well-
defined policy objectives that necessi-
tate a reasonable funding level for our
military assistance programs.

Foreign Assistance Strategy

Africa's most pressing needs are eco-
nomic and humanitarian, but many
countries which have dire economic
needs also have serious security
threats due to aggression or internal
instability requiring military assist-
ance to deal with the situation. We can
not address one need without
addressing the other. We must recog-
nize that in many African countries,
the military is often the most powerfu
political and social institution and
clearly benefits from material assist-
ance provided with professional
guidance.

Although real growth in the for-
eign assistance account is unlikely in
the near term, we still seek the where-
withal to respond to both urgent
requirements and windows of oppor-
tunity, particularly on the economic
front. Both economic and military re-
sources need be increased only mod-
estly to meet our current policy
objectives if those resources can be
flexibly and effectively applied.

The consequences of further redui
tions in our assistance in terms of in-
stability on the economic and security
fronts are not in our interest. The cos
to the United States in dollar terms ti
prevent this is minimal. We believe
that dollar for dollar, we get an excel-
lent return on investment of foreign a:
sistance funds in Africa. We have a
tremendous opportunity at relatively
low cost, and we should not pass it up.

In conclusion I want to reempha-
size our desire and willingness to worl
with the Congress to make our assist-
ance as effective as possible. I believe
that the recent examples of the creatic
of the Development Fund for Africa an
the instituting of the civic action and
coastal security programs under the
military assistance account are evi-
dence that we can work together to
maximize the effectiveness of our re-
sources to achieve U.S. national objec-
tives in Africa. I look forward to a
continuing partnership.

'The complete transcript of the hear-
ings will be published by the committee an
will be available from the Superintendent i
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Department of State Bulletin/July 198

ARMS CONTROL

Biological Weapons Proliferation

by H. Allen Holmes

Statement pefore the Senate Gov-
ernmental Affairs Committee and its
Permanent Sii,bcommittee on Investi-
jatiuns on May 17, 1989. Ambassador
Holmes is Assistant Secretary for
Politico-Military Affairs. '■

I am pleased to appear before you to-
iay to discuss the foreign policy impli-
cations of the problem of biological
weapons proliferation. These hearings
ire coming at an opportune time. We
ire presently witnessing a disturbing
md dangerous trend in the increasing
efforts by states to acquire biological
Afeapons. The technology to produce
:hem is improving, and the agents
;hemselves are becoming ever more
ihreatening.

I should like to state from the out-
set that the United States is adamantly
jpposed to the development, produc-
tion, or use of biological weapons, and
f/e are committed to doing all we can
;o eliminate them from the world's
irsenals.

I would like first to give you some
background on the development of U.S.
policy on biological weapons and on the
oresent state of play in this area. I will
';hen describe how we are working to
ichieve our goal of eliminating these
veapons.

Background

There are, in fact, two relevant inter-
lational agreements, both of which
lave proven inadequate to prevent the
jroliferation of biological and toxin
.veapons.

The 1925 Geneva protocol prohibits
;he first use in war of chemical and
piological weapons but not their devel-
apment, production, possession, or
transfer. The 1972 Biological and Toxin
^Veapons Convention prohibits the de-
velopment, production, stockpiling, ac-
quisition, retention, and transfer of
Diological and toxin weapons.

The United States itself uncondi-
ionally renounced all aspects of biolog-
cal warfare in 1969. President Nixon
ordered the Department of Defense to
draw up a plan for the disposal of exist-
ing stocks of biological agents and
Weapons. In 1970 this unilateral ban
vvas extended also to cover toxins; that
s, poisonous chemicals produced by liv-
ng organisms. All research in the area

of biological warfare has since been
confined to the development of strictly
defined defensive measures; for exam-
ple, development of vaccines.

Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention

The United States followed up these
unilateral actions by leading the fight
for an international ban — the 1972 Bio-
logical and Toxin Weapons Convention.
Article I of the convention and the trea-
ty's negotiating record make clear, how-
ever, that protective and prophylactic
activities are permitted.

The Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention was approved by the U.S.
Senate on December 16, 1974, and en-
tered into force on March 26, 1975. All
U.S. military stocks of biological and
toxin agents, weapons, equipment, or
means of delivery prohibited by the
convention had already been destroyed
unilaterally. Facilities in the United
States which had been built and used
for biological or toxin weapons pur-
poses were converted to other use. For
example, military facilities at Ft. De-
trick, Maryland, and Pine Bluff, Ar-
kansas, previously used for biological
weapons activities, are now the prop-
erty of the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services and are used by
the National Cancer Institute and the
National Center for Toxicological
Research.

After the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention was completed,
many thought that the security prob-
lem posed by biological and to.xin weap-
ons had been solved. However, this
clearly is not the case. Despite the lim-
itations of the convention, which has no
verification provisions, we have identi-
fied a number of compliance problems.
In previous years and again in 1988,
President Reagan reported to the Con-
gress that the Soviet Union had contin-
ued to maintain an offensive biological
warfare program and accompanying ca-
pability and that the Soviet Union has
been involved in the production, trans-
fer, and use of mycotoxins for hostile
purposes in Laos, Cambodia, and Af-
ghanistan in violation of the 1972 Bio-
logical and Toxin Weapons Convention.
Furthermore we have yet to receive a
satisfactory official explanation of the
unprecedented outbreak of anthrax at
Sverdlovsk in the Soviet Union in 1979.

Two review conferences for the Bi-
ological and Toxin Weapons Convention
have been held— in 1980 and 1986— with
the next scheduled for 1991. At the two
review conferences, the United States
confirmed that it is in full compliance
with the convention.

At the second review conference,
the United States expressed its con-
cern that the Soviet Union, Laos, and
Vietnam had violated the convention.
Several other states party to the con-
vention also expressed concern about
compliance. These concerns are re-
flected in the final declaration of the
1986 review conference, which notes
statements that compliance with Arti-
cles I, II, and III of the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention was "sub-
ject to grave doubt" and that efforts
to resolve the concerns expressed had
not been successful. Since then our
concerns have intensified as evidence
mounts of biological weapons prolifera-
tion, especially in areas of particular
concern to us.

Technological Advances

In addition the rapid advance of tech-
nology in the biological field has led to
another set of problems for the conven-
tion. In many ways, recent progress in
biological technology increases the
ease of concealment of illicit manufac-
turing plants, particularly for biolog-
ically derived chemicals such as toxins.
Verification of the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention, always a difficult
task, has been significantly compli-
cated by the new technology. The ease
and rapidity of genetic manipulation,
the ready availability of a variety of
production equipment, and the prolif-
eration of safety and environmental
equipment and health procedures to
numerous laboratories and production
facilities throughout the world are
signs of the growing role of biotechnol-
ogy in the world's economy. They also
make it easier for nations to produce
the lethal agents banned by the
convention.

As advances are made in the field
of biotechnology, the potential for using
this technology for biological and toxin
weapons increases commensurately.
Not only has the time from basic re-
search to mass production of lethal
weapons decreased but the ability to
create agents and toxins with more op-
timal weapons potential has increased.
Simply put the potential for undetected
breakout from treaty constraints has
increased significantly.

Department of State Bulletin/July 1989

ARMS CONTROL

Growth of Biological
Weapons Capability

When the Biological and Toxin Weap-
ons Convention was negotiated, only
the United States acknowledged having
biological weapons. In contrast to the
openness we have practiced regarding
our military programs, the Soviets, to
date, have never officially acknowl-
edged having a biological weapons pro-
gram and, in fact, admitted only in
1987 to having a chemical weapons
program.

Today a number of countries are
estimated to be working to achieve a bi-
ological weapons capability. Our infor-
mation on which states are involved in
biological weapons programs is based
on e.xtremely sensitive intelligence
sources and methods, and I would defer
to the intelligence community to pro-
vide you a fuller description of these
programs in closed session.

We are especially concerned about
the spread of biological weapons in un-
stable areas and about the prospects of
biological and toxin weapons falling
into the hands of terrorists or into the
arsenals of those states which actively
support terrorist organizations. To
date w'e have no evidence that any
known terrorist organization has the
capability to employ such weapons nor
that states supporting terrorism have
supplied such weapons. However, we
cannot dismiss these possibilities. If
the proliferation of biological weapons
continues, it may be only a matter of
time before terrorists do acquire and
use these weapons.

U.S. Research Program

The unilateral U.S. renunciation of
biological weapons in 1969 was accom-
panied by the recognition that main-
taining a strong program to provide for
defense against biological weapons is
essential for national security. That re-
quirement is reflected in Article I of
the convention which permits produc-
tion of biological agents and toxins in
quantities required to develop protec-
tive measures. In today's circum-
stances, with the concerns about
compliance, proliferation, and rapid ad-
vances in biotechnology, the require-
ment for defensive measures is even
greater than in 1969.

The Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention clearly permits research
and development for protection against
biological and toxin weapons. The U.S.
biological defense research program is

CFE and CSBM Talks
Resume in Vienna

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,

MAY 5, 1989'

Today marks the resumption in Vienna,
Austria, of both the negotiation on
conventional armed forces in Europe
(CFE), which involves all 23 nations of
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the
talks on confidence- and security-
building measures (CSBMs) among the
35 participants in the Conference on
Securitv and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCEl

In the CFE negotiations, the Unit-
ed States and its allies are seeking a
stable and secure balance of conven-
tional forces in Europe at reduced lev-
els, the elimination of destabilizing
disparities of forces, and the elimina-
tion of capabilities for surprise at-
tack and large-scale offensive action.
NATO's approach reflects a continuing
commitment to realizing these goals
through a realistic, militarily signifi-
cant, and verifiable agreement. The
work ahead is complex. The United
States and its allies are, however, en-
couraged by the seriousness with w'hich
the Soviet Union and its allies have en-

tered into this negotiation. What is
needed now is for them to join NATO in
exchanges that are frank and construc-
tive and enhance the chances for
success.

In the CSBM talks, NATO has ta-
bled a set of proposals which build upon
and expand the Stockholm document.
The centerpiece of the NATO proposal
is an annual exchange of information on
military organization, manpower, and
equipment in Europe and a correspond-
ing system to evaluate the information
that is exchanged. These and other
NATO proposals apply equally to all
participating states, in contrast to the
Eastern proposals that clearly seek to i
constrain NATO's ability to train and
reinforce its troops.

During this second round, NATO
wall be elaborating the practical details
of its proposals to demonstrate their ef-
fectiveness, feasibility, and the contri-
bution they can make to furthering
openness, trans])arency, and predict-
ability about military organization and
activities in Europe.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of I'
dential Documents of May 8, 1989, ■

in full compliance with the provisions
of the convention. It is also open to pub-
lic scrutiny. No other country even
comes close in its openness.

Eliminating Biological Weapons

Vigorous action is needed to deal with
the problems that I have just outlined.
These problems are tough ones that
will not be resolved easily or quickly.
But we are determined to deal with
them.

What do we need to do? We need to
persuade states that are not parties to
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Con-
vention, particularly states in the Mid-
dle East, to renounce the option of
possessing biological and toxin weap-
ons. We have expressed our desire to
have consultations with the Soviets un-
der Article V of the convention, and
this continues to be our position. We
also need to explore possible means for
strengthening the international norms
against biological weapons.

With respect to the Soviet Union,
we have repeatedly raised our concerns

about noncompliance both through dip-
lomatic channels and at the 1980 and
1986 review conferences. Fortunatel\
the use of "yellow rain" appears to have
stopped several years ago. However,
the Soviet response to our compliance
concerns has not been satisfactory. 1
might add that it is not primarily a
matter of explaining the anthrax out-
break at Sverdlovsk in 1979. After 10
years, w'e can probably never know
with certainty what happened. At this ■
stage, it is more important to resolve
our concerns about the very unusual
military biological facility in Sverd-
lovsk that was reportedly the source of>
the outbreak. That facility still exists
and raises serious apprehensions.

We continue to believe that the So->
viet Union must deal seriously with oui
concerns and resolve them. We urge
the new Soviet leadership to demon-
strate some "new thinking" in this im-
portant arms control area.

In addition to ensuring that states
fulfill their commitments not to pos-
sess biological or toxin weapons, we
must persuade additional states to

Department of State Bulletin/July 198!

CANADA

make that important commitment.
Currently more than 110 states have
renounced the option of possession of
Diological and toxin weapons by becom-
ng parties to the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention. Unfortunately,
(vhile most states in the Middle East
lave signed or acceded to the conven-
tion, only about half have ratified it and
ieposited their instruments of ratifica-
;ion, the legal steps necessary to be-
come full parties to the convention. A
lumber of these states have said that
they will not take these actions until
;heir neighbors do so. We need to break
this vicious circle.

We believe that it would be in the
interests of all states in the Middle
East to eliminate the spectre of biolog-
ical warfare from this already very vol-
atile region. For that reason, we have
recently renewed our effort to bring all
states in the Middle East into the con-
rention. We will persist in this attempt
;o break the vicious circle.

We are also carefully considering
whether export controls could help re-
inforce our efforts to prevent the acqui-
sition of biological and toxin weapons
py other countries. Our preliminary
'impression is that such controls can
(ilay only a minor role. From a techni-
■al standpoint, unfortunately, the prob-
fin we face is much more difficult even
hail cui'bing the spread of chemical
i\ fapons. The equipment needed is all
lual-use, common, and not very expen-
>i\i'. There are many suppliers around
hi' world. In contrast to chemical
ivi'apons agents, there are no real pre-
cursor materials for biological agents.
While states seeking a chemical weap-
iiiis capability may need hundreds of
tons of precursor chemicals, a state
with a biological weapons program
needs only a tiny quantity of a disease-
producing organism as a seed stock.
For these reasons, an export control
iregime analogous to that coordinated
|by the 19 countries belonging to the
Australian group for chemical precur-
sors seems to offer little benefit.

In addition to resolving compliance
issues and promoting broader adher-
ence to the Biological and Toxin Weap-
ons Convention, we should consider new
and innovative approaches to making
the international arms control regime
for biological weapons more effective.

One way to strengthen the regime
is lo strengthen international reaction
]to deal effectively with proven viola-
;tions of the ban on use embodied in the
192.5 Geneva protocol. The Paris Con-
ference on Chemical Weapons Use
could be a good example of an initial
•step to build an international con-

sensus. But there must be concrete
actions, including international sanc-
tions, to put some teeth into the
reaction.

Another way to strengthen the re-
gime is through additional confidence-
building measures to create greater
openness about biological activities.
The United States has taken the lead
here. I doubt that any other state any-
where can match the openness we al-
ready practice with regard to our
defensive research. We need to push
others, especially the Soviet Union, to
match this openness.

We have joined with other states
party to the Biological and Toxin Weap-
ons Convention in agreeing that more
information should be made available
concerning legitimate biological re-
search activities. By creating greater
openness in these areas, we hope that
the norm against biological weapons
created by the convention can be
strengthened. The United States
joined with others at the second review
conference in calling for an annual ex-
change of information on each party's
research activities using the U.S. poli-
cies on program openness as the
standard.

Flirthermore we should continue
programs where researchers from dif-
ferent countries work for extended pe-
riods in each other's laboratories. It
would be more difficult to conceal sig-
nificant research programs of inten-
tions from qualified exchange scientists
than it would be to fool inspectors mak-
ing a brief, one-time visit.

We must continue to strive to pre-
vent biological weapons proliferation
by reinforcing the moral, legal, and po-
litical constraints against biological
weapons and, where feasible, seek to
prevent states from obtaining sensitive
materials and technology for biological
weapons purposes. This will be a par-
ticularly difficult task and, quite
frankly, we do not have the answers yet
on how to achieve this. We do know that
we cannot do it alone. Our efforts to
constrain biological weapons prolifera-
tion will require a sustained multi-
lateral approach, involving both U.S.
leadership and cooperation with
friends and allies.

'The complete transcript of the hear-
ings will be published by the committee and
will be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

President Meets With
Prime IVIinister Mulroney

Following are excerpts from the
questioii-and-ausiver session President
Bush and Canadian Prime Minister
Brian Mulroney held with news corre-
spondents after their luncheon on May
i, 1989.^

President Bush. May I just, at the out-
set of this scrum in which we each an-
swer questions, say what a joy it's been
to have Prime Minister Mulroney back
here with his very special Mila. Bar-
bara and I froze them to death on the
balcony. It's warm now, but 20 minutes
ago, it was cold — temperature; warm in
terms of the feeling that existed at that
little lunch and, indeed, over in the
Oval Office.

And I cite that because the rela-
tionship between the United States and
Canada remains strong. Our respect
for the Prime Minister and his objec-
tives remains strong. The fact that he
fought hard for this breakthrough Free
Trade Agreement has the respect for
him at an altogether high level. And so,

I can report that the conversations that
we had that touched on a wide array of
subjects — on the environment and on
the importance of the NATO meeting
and on the bilateral relations — were
good. We found that we can look each
other in the eye and talk out any differ-
ences with no rancor. We salute him
and welcome him as a good friend.

Prime Minister Mulroney. We had
a very delightful and effective meet-
ing, I thought, with President Bush
and his colleagues. And Mila and I had
an especially delightful lunch with Bar-
bara and the President.

Our discussions today on the agen-
da dealt with the environment, which is
very important, and I applaud the lead-
ership the President is giving to the
environment, particularly on the ques-
tion of acid rain.

We discussed as well something
that [British Prime Minister] Marga-
ret Thatcher has described as a model
for the rest of the world, and that's the

Department of State Bulletin/July 1989

CANADA

Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,
which is in its infancy, is growing and
growing strongly, and I think to the
benefit of both of our nations.

We discussed the role of NATO and
the importance of the Western alliance
in the world — the role of the United
States in that alliance. The position of
Canada is unequivocal in that regard.

Q. Are you willing to compro-
mise your position now on short-
range missiles in terms of starting
negotiations with the Soviet Union on
that area?

President Bush. I want the NATO
summit to be a success. And we will be
working with the Germans and with
others to see that there is a common
NATO position. This is no time for one
to compromise or somebody not to com-
promise. We've made proposals to the
Germans. I e.xpect we'll be hearing
from them soon. I'd prefer to do what-
ever negotiation among allies that is re-
quired in private, recognizing that we
all want the NATO summit to be suc-
cessful. There's a lot of public discus-
sion of this issue, and that's fine. I
don't plan in detail to join in on that
public discussion. The U.S. position is
well known. NATO's last stated public
position is well known. We're prepared
to go from there.

Q. It sounds like you're ready to
negotiate.

President Bush. I'm always will-
ing to negotiate. But we're not going to
go for any third zero or getting SNF
[short-range nuclear forces] out of
whack in terms of negotiations; let's be
clear on that. But certainly, I'll be will-
ing to discuss these issues, as we did in
a very constructive way with the Prime
Minister.

Q. What did you say to the Presi-
dent about the SNF issue?

Prime Minister Mulroney. What I
said to the President was that NATO
was founded on, in my judgment, two
concepts: first, solidarity; and second,
the American leadership of the West-
ern alliance. And it's the solidarity that
has brought about the success that the
West has engendered thus far. We have
to stick together on all of these funda-
mental questions, and we will.

NATO is a grouping of sovereign
independent nations. There is going to
be vigorous debate, unlike the Warsaw
Pact. In NATO there are independent
nations which get together and which

come together willingly under a com-
mon shield to achieve common objec-
tives. While there has to be this kind
of debate, in the end, there must be
solidarity — total solidarity. There must
be a common view of leadership, which
has served the world so well for
40 years. We're going to Brussels to
celebrate the achievements of NATO.
That's e.xactly what we are going to be
doing, and that is why we look forward
to President Bush's presence there — to
celebrate that particular achievement
in which the United States has played
such a pivotal role.

Q. Did you urge the President to
begin negotiations — to at least back
negotiations — on SNF reductions?

Prime Minister Mulroney. I've
just said what the position of Canada is
in regard to — there's one NATO posi-
tion. This is not an association where
everybody freelances.

Q. — different views on this,
though.

Prime Minister Mulroney. We

have a common NATO position, and
while there are divergence of views
that emerge from time to time, the ob-
ject of our getting together is to har-
monize those views into one position.
And that's what we're going to be able
to do.

Q. You were very careful, I
thought, to say you didn't want the
third zero. That still allows for the
possibility of reducing the number of
short-range nuclear weapons.

President Bush. My emphasis will
be on conventional force reductions. We
will be talking very soon with the Ger-
mans on a proposal we made to them.
We've listened very carefully to the
constructive suggestions that Prime
Minister Mulroney has raised, and
that's really all I care to say about it. I
want the NATO meeting to be a suc-
cess. One way you guarantee success
is not to go out and fine tune nuance
differences that may e.xist between
various staunch allies. The German
position was made public last week. I
will continue to work with the leaders
of the NATO countries to see that we
have a successful summit.

Q. — any new commitments on
acid rain?

Prime Minister Mulroney. Acid
rain, we had an excellent discussion on
that. The President has made a very
strong statement in regard to his inten-
tions in acid rain, which will involve
legislation and cooperation with the
Congress. We look forward to that, and
once that is achieved, we look forward
to the conclusion of a mutual accord
which will allow our countries to bring
an end, hopefully, a problem that has
been a major challenge to both of our
governments and one that has blighted
the environments of the United States
and Canada. We're moving along on
that. I'm pleased with what the Presi-
dent had to say today. I met with con-
gressional leaders, including Senator
Mitchell [Senate Majority Leader
George J. Mitchell], earlier this morn-
ing. As the Prime Minister of Canada,
I'm pleased with the manner in which
this very important matter is going.

Q. Mr. Gingrich [Congressman
Newt Gingrich] this morning sug-
gested if the Panama election is as
fraudulent as many think it will be
that perhaps you shouldn't give back
the canal. What's your view on that?
What's your response to him?

President Bush. My view on that
is to warn Panama that the world will
be looking at them, not just the Unitedll
States. In terms of these elections and
deciding what to do if the elections are
fraudulent — calling on them for free
and fair elections — there will be inter-
national observers there — and then we
will cross whatever hypothetical bridgg
we have to cross later on. But it's too
hypothetical at this point to go beyond
that.

But this does give me an oppor-
tunity to say that I have been very dis-
turbed by the reports that the election
will be less than free and less than fair
and less than open. I simply want to en-i
courage the people in Panama to do ev- 1
erything they can to guarantee free |
and fair elections. What pressures they
can bring to bear on the PDF [Panama-
nian Defense Forces] leader, Mr. No-
riega, I don't know. But I would hope,
with the world watching, they would in-
sist on free and fair elections.

CANADA

Q. Senator Mitchell mentioned
lis morning that Canada should be
ushing for a bilateral accord on acid
iin consecutively, while the Admin-
tration introduces its legislation on
cid rain. Was there any talk about
■at, and will you be pushing for
jiat?

Prime Minister Mulroney. I think
16 President knows my position full-
ell. We know that there have to be
gislative changes here in the United
:ates to kind of equate the initiatives
iken in Canada. Once that is done, or
:hile in the process of that being done,
leii there has to be an international
■ciii-(l that is an enforceable document
\- w hich we can measure our progress
1(1 enforce delinquency in that event.
ri'^ident Bush is known as a strong
iviriinmentalist. He's made some very
giiificant statements in regard to not
il\- acid rain but its impact on our bi-
tei-al relationship and his resolve to
ean it up. I'm very encouraged.

(i. Did you make any undertak-
iss in your lunch in terms of what's
oing to be in your clean air legisla-
on that's going to help this acid rain
robiem?

President Bush. We didn't go into
le specific amounts. As the Prime
inister said, he knows of my commit-
!ent. He knows now that we are in the
'nal stages of formulating our recom-
endations to the Congress — the Clean
ir Act. And, indeed, we'll be pre-
ired, after those recommendations go
rward, to discuss in more detail the
ibject that you're asking about. We
lid have a chance to do what you asked
jout. If there's anything that the
rime Minister of Canada has been
ear with me about — and he's been
ear with me on everything — it is this
ibject. He forcefully brings it up, and
tell him where we stand.

Q. The President said you made
jncrete suggestions on the issue of
lort-range missiles. Can you give us
n idea what some of those sugges-
ons entailed?

Prime Minister Mulroney. Mr.
lark [Canadian Secretary of State for
xternal Affairs] has been in touch
'ith Secretary Baker and others in
^gard to how this matter might be
roached. We discuss it privately with
jr allies, and that's what we have
•ied to do.

But the position of Canada is the
one I've set out — it deals with the effec-
tiveness of NATO being predicated on
our solidarity and the leadership, a
very particular role of leadership by
the United States in that equation. We
think that within those parameters, w^e
can resolve differences of degree and
emphasis that will come up from sover-
eign states from time to time. We think
that this is what the President and I
and Secretary Baker and Minister
Clark have been working on and will
continue to work on.

Q. Your good friend, Michael Du-
kakis [Governor of Massachusetts
and Democratic Party candidate for
President in 1988], said the other day
to the Prime Minister that he thought
that it was possible for an acid rain
treaty between Canada and the Unit-
ed States to be signed within a year. I
don't know what your feelings are on
this, but could you give us kind of a
timeframe? Do you think it's possible
that there might be a treaty signed at
least before you leave or the next
election?

President Bush. There will be
great progress made. Whether the
treaty proves to be the vehicle for dem-
onstrating that progress, I don't know,
and I can't say.

Q. Was there any discussion of a
global warming convention, and if so,
what direction did it take?

Prime Minister Mulroney. The

President and I had an excellent dis-
cussion of the entire environmental for-
mula. I expressed the view as well that
there can be little progress in terms of
the environment unless there's a very
strong leadership role played by the
United States. I've already indicated
to you President Bush's very strong
commitment to the environment in all
of its related and ancillary and princi-
pal dimensions. This is a very, very
important one. You can hold all the
conferences you want, but if the princi-
pal players are not there, then progress
can be fairly modest. President Bush
indicated to me, as he did in Ottawa,
his intention to play a very significant
leadership role in all aspects of the en-
vironment, and I think we're all very
encouraged by that.

Q. Your Administration has been
very outspoken in promoting demo-
cratic efforts in places like Poland
and Nicaragua and around the world.
But you haven't really said anything
about China. Do you have some words
of encouragement for the students
who are defying a government ban in
order to protest in favor of freedom
and democracy?

President Bush. I have words of
encouragement for freedom and democ-
racy wherever, and I would like to see
progress in China, in the Soviet Union,
and in other systems that have here-
tofore not been in the forefront, to put
it mildly, of human rights or of demo-
cratic rights. I wouldn't suggest to any
leadership of any country that they ac-
cept every demand by every group. But
I will say that as I reviewed what the
demands are today, we can certainly, as
the United States, identify with them.
When they talk about more free press,
we would encourage that, wherever it
might be. When they talk about — I for-
get what the list w-as of every demand,
but a lot of them had my enthusiastic
backing, in a broad, generic sense. I
would like to encourage China or the
Soviet Union or other totalitarian
countries — countries that have not en-
joyed democratic practices — to move as
quickly as they ean down democracy's
path.

I've been pleased with some of the
changes in China. It's changed dramati-
cally since I was living there. But
they've got a way to go and other coun-
tries in this hemisphere have a long
way to go and countries over in Europe
have a long way to go. I would encour-
age them all. Democracy is on the
move. This is one thing that the Prime
Minister and I talked about. When we
go to that NATO meeting, we're going
to be on the side that is winning and
the side that is right, fundamentally
right. Freedom, democracy, human
rights — these are the things we stand
for. I would encourage every govern-
ment to move as quickly as it can to
achieve human rights.

•Held at the South Portico of the White
House (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Doeuments'of May 8, 1989). ■

department of State Bulletin/July 1989

EAST ASIA

Student Demonstrations in China

by Richard L. Williams

Statement before the Subcomniittee
on Asian and Pacific Affaira of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee on
May 4, 1989. Ambassador Williams is
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs.^

Thank you for the opportunity to ap-
pear today to discuss current develop-
ments in China.

As you know, since the death of
former party leader Hu Yaobang on
April 15, there have been demonstra-
tions involving students and others in
several cities in China, most promi-
nently in Beijing. Students have also
boycotted classes in the capital and
elsewhere. Although there have been
reports of scattered incidents of vio-
lence, the demonstrators — particularly
the students who make up the great
majority — on the whole, have been
quite peaceful in their conduct. And for
their part, the authorities to date have
shown restraint and caution in dealing
with the demonstrators.

Before attempting to explore the
causes and possible outcome of these
demonstrations, it may be useful to say
a few words about the role of students
and universities in China.

Role of Students

Briefly China's history for most of this
century has been a turbulent one, in
which students and others associated
with universities, particularly Beijing
University, have played leading roles.
Sun Yatsen, the' father of the 1911
revolution which overthrew the last dy-
nasty, was a returned student from Ja-
pan. The May 4th Movement, in which
Chinese expressed outrage that the
Treaty of Versailles allowed Japan to
gain control of a part of China, was led
by students from Beijing University.
One of the two founders of the Chinese
Communist Party was a professor at
Beijing University, and an assistant
librarian there later became better
known as the leading figure in the
party, Mao Zedong. Many years later,
it was a wall poster by another Beijing
University professor that helped trig-
ger the turbulent period known as the
Cultural Revolution. And to bring
things down to the present, Deng
Xiaoping, still China's paramount
leader, is himself a returned student
from France.

This brief history helps explain
why the authorities have paid consider-
able attention to the student demon-
strations, particularly those in Beijing,
and will likely continue to do so.

Student Concerns

What do the demonstrators want? They
seem to have a variety of related con-
cerns. Judging by the posters they have
carried and the slogans they have
shouted, some are concerned about al-
legations of official corruption; some
want to move faster in instituting dem-
ocratic reforms, while others have eco-
nomic grievances. In general they are
interested in reform of a system which
they see as insufficiently responsive to
their needs. Their demands and slogans
have been carefully cast in a fashion
which seeks to avoid a direct challenge
to the system, asking that the party
and the government live up to ideals in
China's Constitution, such as freedom
of the press, anticorruption measures,
and freedom of association.

As noted the authorities have re-
acted with caution so far and have not
attempted to forcibly restrain the
demonstrations or arrest large num-
bers of participants. At the same time,
a People's Daily editorial has threat-
ened those seen as challenging the au-
thority of the Communist Party, and
the authorities have declared illegal
newly formed independent student or-
ganizations at Beijing University. Ac-
cording to a report broadcast in both
the Chinese and Western media, the
authorities have discussed grievances
with some student leaders but have
not met with those in the "illegal"
organizations.

In Shanghai, authorities closed
down the outspoken World Economic
Herald and dismissed its editor.

U.S. Reaction

With regard to the U.S. reaction to the
events in China, we have made several
points in our noon press briefings.

• We believe in and support the
right of peaceful assembly, including
peaceful protest and the freedom of
expression.

• We regret measures taken con-
trary to those principles, such as the
closing of the World Economic Herald.

• We hope that demonstrations in
China, if they continue, will remain
peaceful and that the authorities will
act with restraint.

The future course of the student
movement, of course, is hard to pre-
dict, as is its possible impact on China'i
future. China has made much progress
in the past decade. Economic reforms
have resulted in significant growth,
particularly in the countryside. There
has also been progress in human right
matters, including greater toleration (
religion, relaxed emigration controls,
and the beginnings of an effective lei;:i
system.

At the same time, China has con-
tinued to place restrictions on basic pi_
litical and civil rights, such as freedon
of the press and freedom of speech. W(
hope that the trend toward more open-
ness and more respect for basic humai
rights will continue.

'The complete transcript of the hear-
ings will be published by the committee ans
will be available from the Superintendent c
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

U.S., Japan Agree
to Codevelop
FSX Aircraft

Following are statements by
President Bush on April 28, 1989. anq
Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence i
Eagleburger before the House Foreigi
Affairs Committee on May S.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
APR. 28, 1989'

I am pleased to announce that the Gov-
ernments of the United States and Ja-
pan have reached understandings that
will allow us to proceed with joint de-
velopment of the FSX fighter aircraft.
I am ready to submit the FSX agree-
ment to Congress for its review.

We have been conducting talks
with the Japanese to clarify both sides
understandings of this agreement. I
am convinced that the codevelopment ('
this aircraft is in the strategic and
commercial interests of the United
States. And we weighed this matter
from the standpoint of trade, of our in-
dustrial growth, and technology tran.<
fer, as well as strategic and foreign
policy considerations.

Department of State Bulletin/July 198

ECONOMICS

This aircraft will improve the basic
'-16 design and will contribute to the
ecurity of the United States and our
lajiii' ally, Japan. There will be no cost
1 ilu' American taxpayer, and, at the
inii' time, the Japanese will improve
:ii'ii' ability to carry their share of the
efeiise burden. The United States will
ave a 40% work share in the initial de-
elopment stage of this aircraft, and
■e will have a similar share when the
ircraft goes into production.

We did have several initial con-
srns about the agreement, but I want
) assure you that sensitive source
Ddes for the aircraft's computer will
e strictly controlled; access will be
ranted to only those codes that are es-
eiitial to complete the project.

In conclusion the United States is
It' world's leader in aircraft manufac-
ii-iiig. I believe this aircraft will im-
in\f the defense of the United States
11(1 .lapan, and this agreement also
elps preserve our commitment that
'.S. aerospace products of the future
ill continue to dominate the world
larkets.

>EPUTY SECRETARY
i EAGLEBURGER,
I AY 3, 1989^

ast F'riday the President announced
is support for the FSX codevelopment
jreement recently reached between
le United States and Japan. Accord-
igly the State Department, on May 1,
!)rmally notified Congress of the FSX
rogram, in accordance with Section
o(d) of the Arms Export and Control
ct. Beyond the requirements of the
c-t, we have transmitted copies of the
leiiiorandum of understanding and re-
tted documents to the Congress.

The final agreement represents a
act not only between the United
tates and Japan but between the Ad-
linistration and the Congress. When
le President entered office, he or-
ered, in response to congressional
oncerns, an interagency review of the
|SX agreement, with particular atten-
on to its economic and technological
nplications for the United States,
hat review was undertaken with
reat care; there was no rush to judg-
aent. The review underscored a need
;)r certain clarifications from the Japa-
ese side — clarifications which we ob-
|iined as a consequence of protracted
egotiations. Secretary Baker, who, as
ou know, takes congressional concerns
sriously, was instrumental in securing
lose clarifications.

The Secretary of State was partic-
ularly concerned about U.S. jobs. Even
before the interagency review was con-
cluded, he stressed to the Japanese in
Tokyo the need for assurance that the
U.S. share in the production phase
would be similar to that for the devel-
opment phase. We now have that assur-
ance, as well as assurances with regard
to U.S. technology flows to Japan and
the flow of Japanese technology to the
United States. U.S. industry will get
40% of the work in the development
phase and approximately a 40% share
during production. The consequent
benefits to the American worker and
American industry have already been
described by Secretaries Cheney [of
Defense] and Mosbacher [of Commerce].

In considering FSX, we must keep
in mind the larger dimensions of our
security ties and our overall relation-
ship with Japan. The U.S. -Japan Trea-
ty of Mutual Cooperation and Security,
under which Japan furnishes bases in
exchange for our commitment to defend
Japan, is the foundation for our political
and strategic relations throughout the
Pacific. Our deployment of forces in Ja-

pan is key to our forward defense strat-
egy and our ability to meet global de-
fense commitments.

The FSX will bolster Japan's de-
fense capability with an upgraded ver-
sion of an already front-line fighter,
strengthen our overall alliance, and al-
low Japan to assume a larger share of
the common defense burden. In addi-
tion as the first military codevelop-
ment project between the world's two
most technologically advanced coun-
tries, FSX sets an important precedent
for future U.S. -Japan cooperative de-
fense efforts.

We made suggestions to Tokyo on
ways to clarify the FSX agreement.
The Japanese in turn gave us the assur-
ances we sought. We now have an
agreement that clearly serves the na-
tional interests of the United States.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of May 1, 1989.

-The complete transcript of the hear-
ings will be published by the committee and
will be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Competitiveness in the Global Marketplace

by Richard T. McCormack

Address before the President's Ex-
ecutive Exchange Alumni Association
on May 11, 1989. Ambassador McCor-
mack is Under Secretary for Economic
Affairs.

I'd like to talk to you today about the
future of America's competitiveness.
We now live in a world in which far-
reaching changes in international eco-
nomic and financial relationships, ac-
celerated by advances in technology,
transportation, and communications,
have stimulated increasing global com-
petition. As we approach the economic
summit in Paris this summer, now is a
good time to take stock of our position
and prospects in this emerging global
marketplace.

My basic theme is that the key to
our international competitiveness is
also the key to our trade policy and to
our leadership role in the world econ-
omy: that is, to maintain responsive-
ness to market forces domestically and
internationally. The key to competitive-
ness, in other words, is competition.
We must be ready, willing, and able

to move resources around — to struc-
turally adjust our economy — in order
to meet global standards of excellence.

There has been a lot of talk in re-
cent years about America's declining
competitiveness in world markets. Yet,
for all the pronouncements of doom and
gloom, the facts suggest a different,
more nuanced story.

In fact, we are currently in the
seventh year of sustained economic
growth, an unprecedented accomplish-
ment in peacetime. Nearly 20 million
jobs have been created since November
1982, and the civilian unemployment
rate in recent months has reached the
lowest figure since 1973. The U.S.
economy is not only alive and well,
it is booming.

If this is the case, then what is
the controversy over competitiveness?
Much of the problem, as I see it, lies in
how we define the word. In some quar-
ters, for example, the trade balance is
often mistakenly seen as a yardstick of
competitiveness. One is then led to the
conclusion that the large U.S. trade
deficits of recent years are indication of
competitive decline. Yet the trade bal-

'epartment of State Bulletin/July 1989

ECONOMICS

ance is not an accurate measure of com-
petitiveness. Using this criterion, we
would conclude, for example, that the
Cote d'lvoire, which had a trade sur-
plus in 1988, is more competitive than
the United States.

The Budget Deficit

But let's take a closer look at our
trade imbalance. There are three basic
factors that can explain our trade
performance — one explaining the over-
all balance, the other two explaining
the performance of specific industries.

Domestic Economic Environ-
ment. The first and by far the most im-
portant one is the domestic economic
environment that provides the setting
for trade. The essential truth is that
the trade deficit is a macroeconomic
phenomenon. A deficit means that our
spending for consumption, investment,
and government programs together are
greater than production, with the dif-
ference coming from abroad. Increases
in the government's budget deficit, in
consumption, or in domestic investment
in the United States can create an off-
setting trade deficit. Since we do not
want to discourage investment, in or-
der to reduce the trade deficit, we must
produce more, consume less, and save
more or reduce the Federal budget def-
icit. Since the trade deficit is the result
of imbalances in these broad aggre-
gates, economic policies bearing on
consumption, savings, investment, and
the Federal budget are the appropriate
tools for correcting our trade deficit.

Sectoral Competitiveness. When
we observe the trade performance of
specific sectors of the economy, a sec-
ond factor — sectoral competitiveness —
emerges. While we continue to be lead-
ers in many sectors of the economy, in
some U.S. industries the quality of
goods, marketing, and distribution
efforts have been inferior to that of
foreign competitors. When inferior
quality develops, it is immediately re-
flected in consumers' choices in the
marketplace. If a product made in the
United States is not as desirable as the
item produced by the the foreigner, or
as efficiently marketed, then the U.S.
producer will lose market share to the
foreign rival.

Protectionist Policies. Finally,
protectionist policies play a role in the
trade of specific goods. Everyone in-
volved in international business knows
of foreign government policies or

business practices which effectively
closed market access. The "level play-
ing field" is an important issue in our
trade negotiations, and for specific in-
dustries, trade policy measures can be
geared to open markets abroad. None-
theless, foreign tariffs, quotas, and
other barriers to trade are not the
principal cause of the overall trade defi-
cit. The U.S. trade deficit widened sig-
nificantly in the 1980s, yet there was
no massive increase in trade barriers
during this period. The principal rea-
son for the trade deficit lies not in for-
eign barriers nor in the stars, it lies
within ourselves.

Policies of massive retaliation and
"managed trade" will, therefore, not
solve the trade deficit issue or the com-
petitiveness issue for that matter. They
will only succeed in wrecking the inter-
national trading system. We must never
forget that the massive increase in
trade barriers in the 1930s made the
depression even deeper. We must also
remember that trade liberalization is a
key reason for widespread economic
progress in the last 40 years.

Without minimizing our trade defi-
cit problems, let me offer an alternative
definition of national competiveness:
the ability of a country's economy to
sustain a high and growing standard of
living compared with other countries,
based on the quantity and quality of the
goods and services it produces. This,
it seems to me, is what we're really
after — a measure of overall economic
performance.

With this in mind, we can ask the
really important questions: Is the U.S.
economy performing at its maximum
potential? And how do we stack up
against the rest of the world?

Using this new definition, the
United States remains very competi-
tive, indeed. In terms of real standards
of living, the United States ranks high-
est among OECD [Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment] countries. In 1987, we were ap-
proximately 20% ahead of both Japan
and West Germany.

Many of our trading partners have
begun, to be sure, to "catch up" with
the United States in recent years by
closing the gap in productivity and liv-
ing standards; but that should not be
viewed as a failure on our part. On the
contrary, the economic recovery of Eu-
rope and Japan in the postwar period,
as well as the emergence of the newly
industrialized economies, should be
viewed as major successes to which

U.S. foreign and economic policies have
made a significant contribution. Eco-
nomic growth is the best friend of de-
mocracy, and stable democracies in
these countries serve U.S. interests.

More to the point, competition
among these countries and the United
States is the lifeblood of a healthy
world economy, and every country
which joins the challenge gains from it.
Too often, the trend toward increas-
ingly competitive world markets is
viewed with apprehension as a zero-
sum game. The remarkable record of
trade liberalization, increasing compe-
tition, and economic growth in the
postwar period belies this fear.

These remarks are not to suggest,
of course, that American companies
should look with equanimity on their
performance or on foreign trade bar-
riers. Although U.S. labor productivitj
still ranks highest in the world in abso^
lute terms, a recent MIT [Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology] study
cites lagging U.S. productivity in-
creases in recent years as a major
problem, for example. In specific
companies, there are other problems,
too, such as poor product quality and
marketing efforts mentioned earlier,
inadequate worker training, and an
inordinate emphasis on short-term
profits. These difficulties can be
summarized as lack of responsiveness
to the marketplace — now increasingly
global.

Adjustment to Changing Markets

The successful economic performance
of the United States over the years ha!
been the result of our flexibility in de-
ploying our labor force, our capital, ouii
know-how, and our other economic re-
sources to their most productive use.
Our future economic success will sim-
ilarly depend on our ability to provide ;
responsive economic environment and
adequate incentives to maintain this
dynamism.

Economic growth, in other words,
requires continuous adjustment. Our
economic welfare is improved when oui
workforce and capital readily shift to
more highly valued activities in re-
sponse to changes in demand, tech-
nology, and the costs of production.

In sum, the key to international
competitiveness is maintaining a high
degree of openness to change in the do-
mestic economy. Ossification — through
policies and practices that block this

Department of State Bulletin/July 198!

ECONOMICS

Ijustment process — kills our ability to
mpete, just as it nearly paralyzed the
onomies of certain European coun-
ies in the 1970s.

Promoting domestic competition
30 requires a free and open policy
ward the international flow of goods,
rvices, capital, and technology. In-
rnational competition will shift our
(sources to areas where we have a
imparative advantage. This means, of
urse, that we cannot be number one
every endeavor, but an open trading
stem based on specialization means
at we do not have to be number one
every industry. The performance of
dividual sectors is not the key issue
determining who is number one any
are than in sports; the statistics of
ly individual player measure the per-
rmance of the team.

Secondly, competitiveness depends
the quality of our labor force. Edu-
tion and training embodied in Ameri-
n workers are estimated to account
r about three-quarters of the United
ates' total stock of productive capital,
jring the postwar era, improvements
this human capital — which we con-
lue to strive for — contributed 10%-

i% of real output growth. Similarly,
vestments in research and develop-
;nt have led to technological ad-
ncenients which have improved
oductivity. With this framework in
nd, we can now put the policy issues
to clearer perspective.

)vernment's Role in
ronomic Competitiveness

(erall, there is a certain, but limited,
ilf for government; the best way to en-
1 nci' competitiveness is basically to
1: it happen on its own. While govern-
U'nt's role is essential in some areas to
lott'ct the common good, American
(itrejjreneurs as a rule don't need gov-
fnment officials making decisions for
teni. We might be better off, for e.\-
nple, reducing legal restrictions on
jint high-tech production ventures for
te sake of stimulating technological
Jivancement. The role of active gov-
tnment policies should be to create an
(on(jmic environment conducive to
(mjjetition, innovation, and growth.
First, we must all work to reduce
k' Ffderal budget deficit. As I sug-
; >u-(l earlier, this is one key to reduc-
o; iiur current account deficit. But

Vdiul that, reducing the need for
'e Federal Government to borrow

Lipases the capital available for

i\"ate-sector investment.

World Trade Week, 1989

PROCLAMATION 5971,
M.AY 5, 1989'

At no other time in U.S. history has in-
ternational commerce been so important
to tlomestic eeonomif growth. Increased
e.xiiorts mean prosperity for America.
World Trade Week provides an excellent
opportunity for American business men
and women to reaffirm their commit-
ment to the pursuit of export markets.

Trade i'igu)-es for the past year indi-
cate that American businesses are mov-
ing in the right direction, U.S. export
performance durint; lil^8 was respon-
sibk- for the highest giowth rate this
decade and the lar,i;est I'eduction in the
trade ."leficit in history. During 1088,
l!.S. merchandise exports grew 28 per-
cent, reaching record levels ($.320 bil-
lion). These exiiorts generated 40 percent
uf real CJXP growth during the year and
contributed to the t-reation of a near
record number of jobs. An improved
global economic climate and measurable
improvements in the i)uality of American
goods and services contributed to this
promising expert performance.

The I'avorable market conditions that
niaiie eiir goods and services competitive
in IDH.'S continue to exist in 1989, and
U.S. businesses must take full advantage
of this .situation. American industry can
lieiietii .^ii'istantially from trade oppor-
tunities ri-eated by reci'nt events in the
w'orhl tnarketj.ilaci'. Fer iwample, when
the historic United Stales-Canada Free
Trade .Agreement entered into force on
January 1. 1989, it heralded the begin-
ning of a new era in Americas economic
relations with our largest trading part-
ner. It also created abundant oppor-
timiiies for U.S. firms to reach the
market offered by our 2ti million neigh-
bors to the north.

The European Community's form.a-
tion of a single market by the year 1992
has the potential to provide even more
trading opportunities for American busi-
ness. However. U.S. firms need to pre-
pare for 1992 now if they are to realize
greater export sales.

Tins Administration is committed to
forging a partnershij) with our Nation's

business community to help ensure con-
tinued economic prosperity and growth
into the 1990s. Trade and U.S. compet-
itiveness are top priorities. I am firmly
committed to oiiening world markets to
U.S. exports and promoting our free
trade agenda on both nuiltilateral and bi-
lateral levels.

The United States led in initiating
the current round of tieneral Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotia-
tions, and we shall remain vigilant in our
efforts to ensure that the GATT negotia-
tions result in a strengthened interna-
tional trading system that creates new
opportunities to expand trade and
achieve economic growth.

We shall pursue our quest to elimi-
nate unfair trade practices, and we shall
also use the tools provided by the Con-
gress in the Omnibus Ti'ade and Compet-
itiveness Act of 1988 to ensure an open
world marketplace.

In short, this Administration will
continue to do its part to ensure a strong
economy into the 1990s. .-American busi-
ness, however, must take the lead in
meeting the important challenge of in-
creasing our competitiveness in world
markets.

Now, Thkrei-'oki,, 1. t;i;<)ia.;K Bi:sH,
President of the United States of Ameri-
ca, by virtue of the authoi'ity vested in
me by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, do hereby proclaim the
week beginning May 21. 19.~-!9, as World
Trade Week. I invite the businesses and
workers of America to join together with
the F'ederai Government in observance of
W(prld Trade Week. Together, we can en-
sure continued prosjjerity for our coun-
try thr(aigh global trade.

Ix WiTNKss Whi:i;i:of, I have here-
unto set my hand this fifth day of May, in
the year of our Lord nineteen hundred
and eighty-nine, and of the Independence
of the United States of America the two
hundred and thirteenth.

George Bush

'Text from Weekly Com])ilation
of Presidential Documents of May 8,
1989. ■

l^partment of State Bulletin/July 1989

EUROPE

A related policy objective is to
maintain a stable macroeconomic envi-
ronment. Hard experience has taught
us how inflation can damage our eco-
nomic system by distorting relative
prices and investment decisions. The
Federal Government owes it to all
Americans to erase the specter of
inflation.

The ne.\t, and equally important,
role of government is to maintain open
markets, both here and abroad. For in
a rapidly changing high-tech environ-
ment, the free flow of goods, services,
information, and capital is essential if
we are to maintain flexibility in world
markets.

To this end, the Administration is
pursuing policies of open trade. These
efforts are taking place, I need not re-
mind you, in the face of strong protec-
tionist pressures. But we should all
clearly understand that openness to in-
ternational markets in maintaining our
competitiveness makes the Bush Ad-
ministration's commitment to an open
trading system not only a matter of
principle but also one of national
self-interest.

Furthermore, barriers to imports
are a tax on our export industries.
They deprive our exporters of access to
the range of intermediate goods avail-
able to their foreign competitors. More-
over, they push resources into less
efficient industries, decreasing our
economic welfare, and raising costs
for exporters.

At the same time, we are attempt-
ing to reduce foreign trade barriers.
The centerpiece of this strategy is the
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations, which holds the potential
of achieving significant agreements on
trade in agriculture and services, pro-
tection of intellectual property rights,
and strenghtening the GATT [General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] sys-
tem. These negotiations are, therefore,
of great importance in providing fair
access to the growing foreign markets
in which U.S. exporters can flourish.

Finally, this Administration sup-
ports free international investment
flows. Barriers to foreign direct in-
vestment deprive us of foreign capital
and restrict our access to foreign
technology.

We are also pursuing policies to
promote domestic investment which
creates new jobs, new markets, and
new technologies. Let me mention two
ways to promote investment. Earlier I
mentioned the benefits of deficit reduc-
tion for investment. In addition, the
President favors reducing the capital

Deconfrontation on Cyprus

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
MAY 18, 1989'

On May 17, the United Nations an-
nounced in Cyprus that a deconfronta-
tion plan had gone into effect that
morning in Nicosia. Under the plan,
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
forces evacuated a number of positions
on the cease-fire line in the old walled
city of Nicosia.

Thi.s represents an important prac-
tical step toward alleviating tensions
and averting incidents. It is a measure
which we strongly supported. We con-

gratulate the parties concerned and
the United Nations which worked wit
them to bring about this success.

This deconfrontation agreement
the product of leadership and vision.
As the parties continue their discus-
sions under the auspices of the UN Se
retary General, we hope that this
significant achievement will be a pre-
lude to further progress on immediat
problems and on the larger issues
bound up in the Cyprus dispute.

' Read to news correspondents bv De-
partment deputy spokesman Richard A.
Boucher. ■

gains tax to 15% on long-held assets,
which would further encourage private
investment.

Increased investment should great-
ly benefit research and development,
with decisions made primarily by the
private firms which receive the bene-
fits of such investments. Acknowledging
the key role of patent protection in
stimulating innovation in publicly sup-
ported research, we now encourage the
patenting of technologies resulting
from research performed in Federal
laboratories.

The government has taken other
steps to promote research and
development.

• The President has proposed a
permanent extension of the research
and experimentation tax credit.

• The Administration is funding a
number of new university-based inter-
disciplinary science centers to per-
form long-term research in emerging
technologies.

• The Administration has also
called for increased funding for NASA
[National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration] and the superconducting-
supercollider.

• Finally, the President has pro-
posed doubling the budget of the Na-
tional Science Foundation by 1993.

Education Innovation and Reform

President Bush has stated his desirt- !
be known as the "education President
The government is, therefore, stre.<>-
ing improvements in the quality of ou
system of education. Without impmve
education, we cannot remain flexible,
and without flexibility we cannot be
competitive.

In this regard, we must improve
the knowledge and skills of the work-
force needed to create new technol-
ogies and convert them into new
products and services. Just as we re-
oriented our educational system afteH
Sputnik, perhaps the time has come.t<
see we are adequately equipping the
next generation to compete in the
world marketplace.

We are already working with the
National Science Foundation on a widf
range of programs to improve the sci-
ence and engineering workforce. The
proposed education excellence act of
1989 will further improve elementary
and secondary education by building
on earlier initiatives which have stim-
ulated educational innovation and
reform. j

Education has even broader and '
more far-reaching importance for the
future of America's competitiveness. ■
For in a flexible, dynamic economy, ec

Department of State Bulletin/July 191

MIDDLE EAST

cati(jn must never stop. We must be
illiiig to assimilate new ideas and ap-
ly iiur skills and ingenuity to ever-
handing markets, just as the great
jiu-rican inventors have done in the

HSt.

In the global marketplace, this
ii-aiis that we must maintain an in-
_-r national outlook on new ideas and
?chnologies. American engineers,
I'ientists, and business executives
nist be encouraged to gain interna-
diial experience, to recognize emerg-
lu market opportunities abroad, and
k'en to learn the foreign languages
ecessary to remain at the forefront of
e\v developments in their respective
elds.

onfidence in America's Future

et me sum up by returning to the
riginal question: Where does America
pand in the world economy? My answer
s that we have a very sound economy
•ith continuing high potential.

We can best understand the basic
Dundness of the U.S. economy by
Dserving two very significant facts.
irst, in testimony to economic per-
urmance, the rest of the world has cho-
'n to invest heavily in the United
tates in recent years. That, in itself,
a vote of confidence in America's
iture.

An even more direct sign that we
ill respond positively in the years
lead, finally, is the fact that so many
sghly motivated immigrants still seek
II make the United States their home.
js did our parents, grandparents, and
'lose before them, the new immigrants
)nstantly renew the American spirit
' enterprise and hope. Their contribu-
ons, in themselves, immeasurably add
) our strength to forge ahead.

Thus, while government lays the
roundwork, the ingenuity and drive
'the American people and American
aterprises will be called upon to re-
3ond to the major challenges we face —
Ijustment to changing markets, the
Jdget deficit, and the need for a well-
iucated labor force. Our reply to
lese challenges will determine the fu-
ire of American competitiveness. I,
ir one, am confident of the outcome. ■

Visit of King Hussein I

His Majesty King Hussein I of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan visited
Washington, D.C., April 17-21, 1989,
to meet with President Bush and other
government officials.

Following are remarks made by
the President and His Majesty after
their meeting on April 19.^

President Bush

I have had the pleasure and honor of an
intimate discussion with an old friend.
His Majesty King Hussein of Jordan.
The relationship between Jordan and
the United States has deep roots; it's
founded on a commonality of interests
and mutual respect. And it is in this
spirit that His Majesty and I reviewed
the situation in the Middle East and, in
particular, the search for Arab-Israeli
peace. We talked also of the concerns
that we both have about Lebanon.

Few individuals can match the ded-
ication of His Majesty King Hussein to
the cause of peace, for his is a commit-
ment to explore opportunities, examine
options, pursue possibilities. I ex-
plained to him our thinking on the need
to diffuse tensions, to promote dia-
logue, to foster the process of negotia-
tions that could lead to a comprehensive
settlement. I reiterated my belief that
properly designed and mutually accept-
able elections could, as an initial step,
contribute to a political process leading
to negotiations on the final status of the
West Bank and Gaza.

I also reaffirmed to His Majesty
our longstanding commitment to bring
about a comprehensive settlement
through negotiations based on UN [Se-
curity Council] Resolutions 242 and 338
and the principle of territory for peace.
Through these negotiations, peace and
security for Israel and all states, and
legitimate Palestinian political rights,

department of State Bulletin/July 1989

MIDDLE EAST

Jordan — A Profile

EGYPT

*Fro»i 19!t9 to 1967, Jordan administered
that part of former mandate Palestine west
(if the Jordan Hirer known as the West
Hank. Since the 1967 war. when Israel took
control of this territory, the United States
has considered the West Bank to be terri-
tory occ}ipied by Israel. The United States
believes that the final status of the West
Hank can be determined only through ne-
gotiations among the parties concerned on
the basis of Security Council Resolutions
,'-iJ and J.iS. The US view is that self-
government for the Palestinians of the
West Bank in association with Jordan of-
fers the best chance for a durable, just,
and lasting peace.

CJeography

Area: 91,000 sq. km. (85,000 .sq. mi.).
(Mties: Capital — Amman (pop. 648,000).
Other cities— Irbid (112,000), Az-Zarqa
(215,000).

People

Nationality: Noun and adjective — Jor-
(ianian(s). I'opulation (19H0 cen.sus): 2.8
million. ,\nnual growth rate (1986 est.):
:-i.659'f. KeliKions: Sunni Mu.slim 95%,
Christian r>'/i . Langua);es: Arabic (official),
English. Education: Literacy (1984)— 71%.
Health: Infant mortality rate (1984) —
50/1,000. Life expectancy (1984)— 64 yrs.
Ethnic groups: Mostly Arab, but small
communities of Circassians, Armenians,
and Kurds. Work force (1981): Agricul-
ture— 80%. Manufacturing and min-
ing—20%.

Government

Type: Constitutional monarchy.
Independence: May 25, 1946. Con-
stitution: January 8, 1952.

Branches: Executive — king (chief of
state), prime minister (head of govern-
ment). Council of Ministers (cabinet).
Legislative — bicameral National Assembly
(appointed Senate, elected Chamber of
Deputies). Judicial — civil, religious, spe-
cial courts.

Political party: Only the/government-
sponsored Arab National Union is officially
recognized. Suffrage: Universal.

Defense: About 12% of GNP.

Economy

GDP (1986): $4.3 billion. Annual growth
rate (1986): 2.6%. Per capita GDP (1986):
$1,530.

Natural resources: Phosphate, potash.

Agriculture: Products — fruits, vegeta-
bles, wheat, olive oil. Land — ll%i arable.

Industry (20% of GDP); Ti/pe— phos-
phate mining, manufacturing, cement, and
petroleum production.

Trade (1986): Exports— Vi2 million:
fruits, vegetables, phosphates. Major mar-
kets— Iraq, Saudi Arabia, India, Romania,
Kuwait, Pakistan. Imports — $2.4 billion:
machinery, transportation equipment,
cereals, petroleum products. Major sup-
pliers—US, UK, FRG, Iraq, Japan, Saudi
Arabia, Syria.

Fiscal year: Calendar year.

Official exchange rate (1986): .35
Jordanian dinar = US$1.

US economic aid received: $1.7 billion
(1952-87)— loans, grants, PL-480 (Food for
Peace) programs.

Membership in International
Organizations

UN and several of its specialized and re-
lated agencies, including the Food and Ag-
riculture Organization (FAO), International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), World
Health Organization (\VhU), World Bank,
International Monetary Fund (IMF); Orga-
nization of the Islamic Conference (OIC);
INTELSAT; Nonaligned Movement; Arab
League.

Taken from the Background Notes of June
1988, published by the' Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, De|5artment of State. Editor: Juanita
Adams ■

can be realized. In addition, a proprrly
structured international conference
could serve, at the appropriate time, a
a means to facilitate direct negotiatn-i;
between the parties.

The time has come to encourage
fresh thinking, to avoid sterile debate, |
and to focus on the difficult but critical i
work of structuring a serious negotiat- |
ing process. His Majesty committed
Jordan to this task.

An important part of this effort,
and of the stability of the Middle Ea>t
as a whole, will be the continued ecu-
nomic and military strength of Joi'dan.
Jordan's security remains of fundaiiiiii
tal concern to the United States, and 1
have reassured His Majesty that the
United States will do its utmost to \k-\
meet Jordan's economic and militar.\
requirements.

His Majesty King Hussein and 1
delved deeply into the broader regioim
and internal problems, and as alwa,\>,
benefited greatly from the wisdom nf
my friend. Together we pledge to con- i
tinue the close cooperation and coor- '
dination that mark the relations
between Jordan and the United State.-;

In closing, I would like to express
my best wishes to King Hussein and t^
the people of Jordan for an auspicious
month of Ramadan and a blessed 'Id
holiday.

His Majesty King Hussein I

It is a great pleasure, as always, to r&
turn to the United States, a country
with which Jordan has enjoyed a sped!
relationship for so many years. It is
even a greater pleasure on this occa-
sion to be meeting with you, a treas-
ured friend of longstanding. Your
dedication to the service of your great!
country has been a source of inspira-
tion, respect, and admiration to me, ai
it is to all who know you.

I know how devoted you are to the'
cause of peace. I share this devotion. 1
sincerely hope that through our com-
mon devotion to peace, we can, with
those who are equally devoted, finally
bring peace to the Middle East.

You are the sixth President with
whom I have joined to pursue that
peace. I first visited this historic
house in 1959 to meet with President
Eisenhower. It marked the beginning
of a warm and productive relationship
between our two countries, a relation-
ship which has flourished because of
our shared values, shared interest.-^,
and shared goals. It is a relationshi])

Department of State Bulletin/July 19(

MIDDLE EAST

;hich my country and I cherish. I am
eartened that the talks we are en-
at;v(l in will contribute to a deepening
f this relationship.

One of our goals, which despite

2 years of efforts we have yet to
chieve, is a comprehensive settlement
f the Arab-Israeli conflict. The princi-
les for that settlement were estab-
shed many years ago: UN Security
!ouncil Resolutions 242 and 338. These
esolutions provide for the withdrawal

f Israeli forces from the territories oc-
upied in 1967 in return for the estab-
shment of peace, arrangements for
ecure and recognized boi'ders, and
egotiations under appropriate auspices

3 implement these provisions.

Your recent e.xpressed reaffirma-
ion of American support for the end of
sraeli occupation and return for peace
nd for the political rights of the Pal-
stinian people are integral parts of
ny comprehensive settlement is both
onstructive and commendable. As a
iesult of a recent decision by the Pal-
estine Liberation Organization (FLO)
D accept the right of Israel to exist, to
egotiate a settlement with Israel
ased on Security Council Resolutions
42 and 338, and to renounce terror-
-ni, a significant contribution to peace
as been made.

This historic decision has the over-
helming support of the Arab world.
he decision by the United States to
ndertake substantive discussions with
ne PLO has further improved the
irospects for peace. I hope this will
Irompt Israel to respond similarly to
he requirements of peace and recog-
iize the legitimate representative of
he Palestinian people. Peace can nei-
her be negotiated nor achieved without
'LO participation.

I believe the bases for peace are al-
eady established. What is required is
D implement them. The forum for a ne-
otiated comprehensive settlement is a
jeace conference under the auspices of
|he United Nations. In my opinion, any
jteps taken should lead to such a con-
erence, if our efforts to arrive at a
comprehensive settlement are not to be
iverted. All the people in the Middle
]ast need peace and an end to this
ragic and interminable conflict. The
awards of peace are limitless and far
jutweigh any advantage which might
•e gained by any party from continued
lontroversy and conflict. The condi-
|ions for peace exist. We all must dis-
play the vision and determination to
a])italize on them.

Allow me to say, as one of your
many friends and as one who knows
well your qualities, abilities, devotion,
and dedication to the cause of peace,
that you are the right leader in the
right office at the right time. I know
the high esteem with which you are
held throughout the Middle East. You
are in a unique position to help the pro-
tagonists in our area to engender the
needed trust and hope and to assist us
in bringing the conflict to a just and
durable conclusion. I can assure you
that I fully support you and all your ef-
forts in this regard.

'Made in the Rose Garden of the White
House (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Apr. 24, 1989). ■

Relief Aid to Lebanon

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
MAY 19, 1989'

The United States is pleased to an-
nounce that $200,000 has been allocated
for disaster relief efforts in Lebanon.
The assistance will be used to provide
medical supplies and to meet other ur-
gent relief needs to the Lebanese af-
fected by the recent fighting. These
supplies are intended for all segments
of the affected population through the
several private voluntary organizations
active in Lebanon.

We are also happy to announce that
a shipment of 7,302 metric tons of U.S.
food for the Lebanese people has ar-
rived in Lebanon. This food — rice, len-
tils, and vegetable oil — is part of a
Food for Peace program through which
the U.S. Government will provide the
Lebanese people nearly 30,000 metric
tons of foodstuffs worth $18 million
from October 1988 to October 1989.

Through this humanitarian relief
program, we provide about half the
food for nearly 700,000 Lebanese.

'Read to news correspondents by De-
partment deputy spokesman Richard A.
Boucher ■

Situation in Lebanon

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
APR. 28, 1989'

The United States welcomes the call by
Arab League Foreign Ministers for a
cease-fire and the lifting of all block-
ades. We fully support the decision to
send Arab League observers to moni-
tor the cease-fire.

We note that Gen. Awn [Christian-
backed leader] and Dr. Huss [Muslim-
backed leader] have accepted the cease-
fire, and we urge all other parties to
the fighting to abide by the Arab
League's call. Outside parties involved
in Lebanon must exercise the utmost
restraint. The United States applauds
the determined efforts of the Arab
League to restore security and stabil-
ity to Lebanon.

We encourage the Arab League to
continue its initiative to help the
Lebanese resolve their political im-
passe. The United States remains com-
mitted to the restoration of Lebanon's
sovereignty, unity, and territorial in-
tegrity with the withdrawal of all for-
eign forces and the disbandment of
militias.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,

MAY 4, 1989'

The United States welcomes the an-
nouncement by Gen. Awn that he will
suspend temporarily his blockade of
the ports. Gen. Awn's decision can
strengthen the political process under-
way to restore Lebanon's security and
stability and to end the suffering of the
Lebanese.

We call on all parties to cooperate
fully with the Arab League effort to
send observers to Lebanon as soon as
possible to monitor the cease-fire. We
congratulate the Arab League and its
Committee on Lebanon for the success
it has achieved so far in arranging a
cease-fire, and we encourage the
league to renew its initiative to pro-
mote a political dialogue among
Lebanese leaders on the issue of nation-
al unity and constitutional reform.

The United States remains fully
committed to the restoration of
Lebanon's unity, sovereignty, and terri-
torial integrity with the withdrawal of
all foreign forces and the disbandment
of militias.

'Read to news correspondents by
Department spokesman Margaret DeB.
Tutwiler. ■

department of State Bulletin/July 1989

OCEANS

U.S. Responsibilities

in International Fisheries Matters

by Edward E. Wolfe

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Fisheries and Wildlife Conserva-
tion and the Environment of the House
Merchant Marine Committee on May
2, 1989. Mr. Wolfe is Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Oceans and Interna-
tional Environmental and Scientific
Affairs.^

I am pleased to be here today to discuss
the reauthorization of the Magnuson
Fisheries Conservation and Manage-
ment Act. I would like to say at the out-
set that, from the perspective of the
Department of State, the act and its
implementation have been a note-
worthy success. The Department has
no changes to recommend to the act.

As the subcommittee is aware,
among the fundamental purposes of the
Magnuson act are to conserve and man-
age U.S. fisheries resources, to pro-
mote domestic commercial and
recreational fishing under sound con-
servation and management principles,
and to encourage the development by
the U.S. fishing industry of fisheries
off the coasts of the United States. The
principal role of the Department of
State, in the process established by the
act to achieve these purposes, has been
to negotiate governing international
fisheries agreements with foreign na-
tions desiring to operate off the U.S.
coasts and to allocate surplus Ameri-
can fisheries resources to fishermen
from countries with which the United
States has governing international
fisheries agreements in force.

"Americanization" of Fisheries

The principal fisheries policy which the

United States has pursued since 1980
has been called the "Americanization"
of fisheries in the U.S. exclusive eco-
nomic zone (EEZ). Consistent with this
policy, the Department of State and
the Department of Commerce have fol-
lowed the allocation criteria specified
in Section 201 of the Magnuson act.
During the decade of the 1980s, direct
allocations to foreign countries have
fallen from a high in 1980 of 2,176,789
metric tons (MT) on both coasts, to
51,577 MT (Atlantic mackerel and by-
catch species) thus far in 1989. The pol-
icy has been responsible for and, at the

same time, has been driven by dramat-
ic changes in our fisheries. The growth
in the U.S. catch of Alaska pollock and
the development of the squid fisheries
on the east coast are two e.xamples
which come to mind. As the foreign
fisheries declined, joint ventures ex-
panded during the early part of the
same period. Joint ventures, usually in-
volving U.S. fishermen selling their
catch to foreign vessels in our zone,
reached a peak in 1986, when 1.5 mil-
lion MT were caught. Americanization
is rapidly reducing joint venture fish-
ing operations each year, which is the
intent of the law.

To send the diplomatic signal to for-
eign countries fishing in the U.S. EEZ
that the United States was changing
its approach with regard to bilateral
fisheries agreements, we began several
years ago to extend certain agree-
ments for only a 2-year period. We have
not renegotiated a governing interna-
tional fisheries agreement for several
years. Our approach has been to offer
each governing international fisheries
agreement nation the choice of accept-
ing a 2-year extension of their existing
agreement (with changes to make it
conform with current U.S. law and pol-
icy) or to allow their agreements to ex-
pire. During the 1980s, the number of
governing international fisheries
agreements in force has been reduced
from 17 to 9, counting the comprehen-
sive bilateral fisheries agreement with
the Soviet Union. I might note at this
point that we do not have a goal of
elminating all governing international
fisheries agreements, since in some
cases they are a useful vehicle for ar-
rangements, such as joint ventures,
which may benefit U.S. fishermen dur-
ing this stage of development of the
U.S. fishing industry.

From an international perspective,
the problems which the Magnuson act
intended to address when it was writ-
ten over a decade ago, for the most part
have been resolved. That is, the United
States is now fully controlling the fish-
eries resources off our coasts. In fact,
for all practical purposes, foreign fish-
ing in the U.S. zone has been elimi-
nated. One might say that, in a sense, a
chapter in U.S. fisheries relations with
countries which traditionally fished off
the U.S. coast has been closed.

We are now pursuing new and in-
novative methods of doing business

with our foreign fishing partners. For
example, we have been promoting the
establishment of equity joint ventures
between U.S. and foreign companies.
Japan has participated in the develop-
ment of several surimi [a processed
fish product] processing plants in Alaa
ka, and other countries are currently
involved in other equity investment
projects.

As we have gone about the process
of reducing and, in fact, practically
eliminating the foreign fishing off the
U.S. coast, we have inevitably encoun-
tered a reaction from the foreign
governments involved. While U.S.
fisheries policy and corresponding ac-
tions have not been popular with our
foreign colleagues, all of the foreign ni
tions involved have accepted the realitj
of coastal state control over the man-
agement of coastal fisheries resources
inside 200 miles and its inevitable con-
sequence. I might add for the record
that we have not experienced any seri-
ous foreign policy problems as a result!
of the phase out of foreign fishing in
our zone. [

As one chapter of our international
fisheries relations has come to a close,
other international areas are requirinji
more of our attention. In some cases,
these areas have long been the focus o:
considerable attention by the Depart
ment of State. We have important re-
sponsibilities in international fisheriei
matters other than the allocation of
surplus resources to governing inter-
national fisheries agreement countries-
Three broad areas of U.S. internationji
fisheries interests come to mind.

Cooperation in
Multiple Fisheries Zones

The first area involves the question of
how to deal with fishery stocks which
are partly in the U.S. zone and partly
in either the zones of neighboring coun
tries or in the high seas areas beyond
the 200-mile jurisdiction of any nation.
For example, one of the main issues w(
face in the North Pacific is the dramat
ically increased level of fishing by thir
countries in the Bering Sea beyond 20(
miles, the so-called donut area. In this
region, fishing vessels from Japan, i
Korea, Poland, and China have con- i
centrated their efforts and increased |
harvests of pollock from some 100,000 '
MT in 1984 to about 1.3 million MT in
1988. This is totally unacceptable. Ac-
cording to our scientists, this dramatic
increase in fishing is adversely affect-
ing economically vital U.S. pollock
stocks as well as other stocks in the

Department of State Bulletin/July 198

OCEANS

'ring Sea. We are currently working
,th the Soviet Union, the other Ber-
g Sea coastal state, to develop meas-
es; for addressing the unregulated

• hii'ies in the donut area. In these
Iks, the United States has proposed
(lliiig for a temporary moratorium on
Ishing in the donut by all countries,
deluding the United States, until an
aequate multilateral conservation re-
ime for the region can be established.

Talks with the Soviet Union on mu-
tal fisheries concerns will resume in
JDSCOW in late May or early June. In
idition to the Bering Sea donut issue,
le two sides will discuss measures to
tnserve salmon on the high seas. Un-
(r a memorandum of understanding
S^ned on February 9, both countries
Ive agreed to the principle that high
fas salmon fishing is a wasteful prac-
\e and should be eliminated. We also
I, reed to increase bilateral coopera-
lin on high seas salmon enforcement
hues. During the ne.xt meeting in
ipscow, we will be discussing possible
hg-term regimes for the conservation
(salmon throughout the North Pacific.

We also face a major conservation
|oblem in the form of the large squid
id tuna driftnet fleets from Japan,
Ijrea, and Taiwan operating through-
('t the North Pacific. These fleets uti-
le daily some 30,000-40,000 miles of
fiating driftnet, which entangle those
I'lrine resources migrating through
te fishing grounds. This type of
Msteful and indiscriminate fishery
tkes large quantities of marine mam-
tils. seabirds, and other nontarget liv-
ie marine resources. In addition, if
te fisheries operate in certain north-
en areas, they will intercept valuable
IS. -origin salmon. There is, in fact,
eidence that squid driftnet vessels
fom Taiwan, and possibly other coun-
ties, are involved in illegal directed
slmon fishing. For instance, the U.S.
(bast Guard recently sighted several
■^.liwan squid driftnet vessels operat-
ig in an area that is closed to them.
"iiiis incident has added to our concern
\th the activities of the driftnet fleets
ithe North Pacific.

Pursuant to the 1987 Driftnet Act,
!:■ have been involved in talks with Ja-
1 n, Korea, and Taiwan with the aim of
laching adequate agreements for the
lonitoring and enforcement of these
•('iftnet fleets. Although we continue

* actively press for such agreements,
I'ogress has been slow in some in-
ances and practically nonexistent in
.'ihers. We have faced resistance on the
'■ounds that fisheries on the high seas

should be controlled only by the flag
state. If adequate agreements are not
reached by June 29, the Driftnet Act
requires that the Secretary of Com-
merce certify such fact to the President
under the Pelly amendment. The Presi-
dent then has the discretion to place
sanctions on imports of fisheries and
aquatic products from the countries
involved.

U.S. Bilateral
Fisheries Relationships

Soviet Union. On a more positive note,
turning to the matter of neighboring
countries, one approach to bilateral
fisheries relations is the recently con-
cluded comprehensive bilateral fish-
eries agreement with the Soviet Union,
which covers all aspects of our bilateral
fisheries relationship. The agreement
provides for access to each other's wa-
ters on a reciprocal basis and for coop-
eration on fisheries issues of mutual
interest. The agreement also lays the
groundwork for increased cooperation
on bilateral fisheries science and re-
search issues.

This landmark agreement, which
was the product of 8 years of talks, pro-
vides U.S. fishermen, for the first time,
access to the Soviet 200-mile zone.
Because of ongoing economic restruc-
turing efforts in the U.S.S.R., our
Embassy in Moscow informs us that
there is strong Soviet interest in estab-
lishing joint enterprises with foreign
companies, especially in the field of
fisheries. Several U.S. companies are
now in the process of finalizing joint
enterprises with their Soviet counter-
parts which will provide for joint har-
vesting, processing, and marketing of
fish from Soviet waters.

The Soviet agreement also pro-
vides for increased bilateral coopera-
tion on fisheries issues of mutual
concern. As noted previously, one of the
major issues both countries have been
considering is the effect of the vastly
increasing fishing levels in the Bering
Sea donut on adjacent fish stocks in the
U.S. and Soviet EEZs. We have also
been working jointly to address the
conservation of salmon in the high seas
areas of the North Pacific. I believe we
are making progress in this area.

Canada. The idea of reciprocal
fishing arrangements may not be ap-
propriate in other cases involving U.S.
fisheries relations with neighboring
countries. In the case of the U.S.-
Canada fisheries relationship, for ex-
ample, such an approach would likely

be very controversial. On the U.S. side,
there is no domestic consensus that the
United States and Canada should have
a more formal fisheries relationship in-
volving reciprocal fishing rights or
joint management efforts. As we know
from past experience, unless such a do-
mestic consensus exists, it is futile for
the government to proceed. At the
same time, we recognize the need for
close cooperation with Canada on fish-
eries matters, since in some instances
both countries are managing the same
stocks offish, and historically our
overall fisheries trade and industry re-
lationship has been a very close one.

Our approach has been to enhance
U.S. -Canada communications on fish-
eries matters and to find as much com-
mon ground as possible on fisheries
issues of mutual interest. At a mini-
mum, we need to ensure that the
different approaches to fisheries
management used in the Canadian and
U.S. systems do not conflict and thus
counteract each other.

There are examples of cooperation
between U.S. and Canadian fishing
interests in some sectors. Canadian
authorities in Nova Scotia have put in
place minimum size restrictions which
parallel our own. In the area of enforce-
ment, U.S. and Canadian authorities
have taken steps to increase coopera-
tion and reduce conflicts along the
U.S. -Canadian maritime boundary.
Also, we are in the process of attempt-
ing to arrange with Canada a jointly
sponsored conference on the scientific
basis for fisheries management, which
we believe could be an important step
in fostering better mutual understand-
ing of each nation's management
system. The U.S. approach to our
fisheries relationship with Canada has
been to proceed cautiously and to pur-
sue, on a step-by-step basis, somewhat
limited and hopefully achievable goals,
consulting with Congress and U.S.
fishing interests as we proceed. In rec-
ognition of the long-term fisheries rela-
tionship which we will inevitably have
with Canada, it is our view that we
should keep the door open for closer
cooperation on fisheries management
issues in the future. In an effort to en-
hance such cooperation, we have pro-
posed that the two governments meet
in the near future to exchange views on
a variety of fisheries matters.

Mexico. The United States also
has an important fisheries relationship
with Mexico which will require more of

bpartment of State Bulletin/July 1989

OCEANS

our attention in the years ahead. Leav-
ing aside for the moment the question
of tuna, which is probably the most im-
portant aspect of our fisheries relation-
ship with Mexico, we do have important
fisheries interests in both the Gulf of
Mexico and off the Pacific coast which
require cooperative efforts on the part
of both countries. For example, in the
gulf there are stocks offish such as
mackerel which, in effect, are shared
stocks migrating throughout the 200-
mile zones of both Mexico and the
United States. On the Pacific side, the
same situation pertains to such fish
stocks as northern anchovy and coastal
migratory species which move along
the coasts of both California and Baja,
California. In the long run, the United
States and Mexico need to work closely
together in order to most effectively
manage these shared stocks of fish. I
recently had a very productive meeting
with the new Mexican Secretary of
Fisheries and other Mexican officials,
and we plan to have a second meeting
later this month.

Conservation and
Management of Resources

A second broad international fisheries
area which is the responsibility of
the Department of State involves the
conservation and management of
anadromous U.S. fisheries resources
beyond the U.S. 200-mile zone. Such
conservation and management is, in my
opinion, one of the more important pur-
poses of the Magnuson act. Our conser-
vation efforts are complicated by the
fact that foreign fleets may take U.S.-
origin salmon beyond the U.S. exclu-
sive economic zone. It seems clear that
a cooperative international effort is
mandatory if we are to do effectively
the job required of us under the act. As
I noted earlier, the driftnet negotia-
tions with Japan, Korea, and Taiwan
represent one of our major efforts to
address salmon management issues.
However, I would be less than candid
if I reported to the committee that all
of the involved countries have been
cooperative.

In recent years we have also been
involved in other international action
to conserve U.S. -origin salmon on the
high seas. In the early 1980s, the De-
partment, through the International
North Pacific Fisheries Commission,
raised the issue of excessive salmon
harvesting by the Japanese salmon
fleet. As a result, the .Japanese im-
posed new area restrictions on their

fleet in 1982 in order to reduce the in-
terception of North America salmon. In
1986, the Department negotiated an
amendment to the commission whereby
.Japan would cease fishing for salmon
in the high seas area of the Bering Sea
by 1994.

As noted earlier, the Department
is also currently seeking new ways to
cooperate with the Soviet Union to-
ward better conservation of salmon in
the North Pacific. Toward this end, we
signed a memorandum of understand-
ing in February of this year at the So-
viet Embassy which provides for in-
creased sharing of information and
cooperative enforcement against high
seas salmon poaching. This was the
first U.S. -Soviet agreement signed
during the Bush Administration. The
Department is continuing to explore
every avenue, consistent with interna-
tional law, to conserve U.S. salmon on
the high seas.

I might make the observation at
this point: that it was considerably eas-
ier to deal with these management is-
sues beyond our zone when there were
U.S. fisheries resources to allocate to
the foreign nations with which we have
to negotiate. A few years ago, when
there were surplus U.S. fisheries avail-
able for allocation to foreign nations,
we had considerable leverage with
which to help us achieve our goals. Now
that we do not have — and are not likely
to have — any surplus U.S. fish to use
as a negotiating carrot, it is more diffi-
cult for us to persuade foreign gov-
ernments to reduce their fishing or
undertake other economically disad-
vantageous actions with regard to their
fisheries beyond 200 miles. As I am
sure the chairman [Gerry Studds] re-
calls, the U.S. "fish and chips" policy
was an important tool in achieving our
goal of full utilization and development
of U.S. resources by U.S. fishermen in
our EEZ. It is unclear whether under
these circumstances the United States
will be able to achieve all that it wants,
but we are determined to do our best
with the situation facing us.

Distant Water Fisheries

A third broad area of international
fisheries which is the responsibility of
the Department of State involves the
so-called distant water fisheries which
are conducted by U.S. flag vessels. To
a considerable extent, these activities
are not really a part of the Magnuson
act process, although one of the act's

purposes is to support and encourage
international fisheries agreements for
the conservation and management of
highly migratory species. While the
United States has other distant water
fisheries interests, tuna is the most in
portant distant water fishery which w
have. The U.S. tuna industry continu*
to be one of the major U.S. fisheries,
and, indeed, it is one of the world's ma
jor tuna industries. The Department
has expended considerable effort
around the world in attempting to n^:
gotiate both conservation and access
arrangements involving U.S. tuna
vessels. One of our more notable receit
successes was the negotiation and en-
try into force of the South Pacific Re-
gional Fisheries Agreement, which
provides access for the U.S. tuna flee
for 5 years, to a 10 million-square-niil
area of the western Pacific Ocean. Si>
teen Pacific island countries are par-
ties to this treaty.

In the eastern Pacific, we have
been encouraged by recent develop-
ments which offer new hope for the
negotiation of a comprehensive tuna
management organization for the
eastern tropical Pacific. The Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commis-
sion continues to do an outstanding
job in monitoring the status of the tui
and porpoise stocks of the eastern trc
ical Pacific Ocean. In the Atlantic, we
believe that the International CommiiJ
sion for the Conservation of Atlantic
Tunas has been very effective in pr
viding a mechanism for effective con-
servation and management of Atlantid
tuna and billfish species.

Conclusion

In closing, let me reiterate that the Dl
partment of State believes — in terms-
international fisheries matters as the
relate to the Magnuson act — that we
have successfully achieved the intent '
the act and the "Americanization" of
the U.S. zone. A chapter has been
closed. The new chapter is evolving
which will require international coop-
eration, albeit differently, to continue
to advance U.S. fisheries interests.

0- I

'The complete transcript of the hear-
ings will be published by the committee ai
will be available from the Superintendent
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Department of State Bulletin/July 19:

EFUGEES

ipdate on Immigration and Refugee Issues

Jonathan Moore

Sfntement before the Subcommittee
I iinnigration. Refugees, and Inter-
< liiiiial Law of the House Judiciari/
iiriiiittee on April 6, 1989. Ambas-
•iliir Moore is U.S. Coordinator for
' Jiii/ce Affairs.'^

he occasion for this important hearing-
It he surge in emigration from the So-
I't I'nion. The Administration views
;is phenomenon as a signal success for
. • sustained, bipartisan policy of the
liitiMl States toward the Soviet Union
the postwar era, a policy which em-
asizes human rights for Soviet citi-
Mis and specifically calls for freedom
emigration. I am pleased to have the
portunity today to review the policy
itiatives the Administration is taking
icsponse to the current unprece-
iitfd rate of application by Soviet em-
raiits for resettlement in the United
•ates. In particular, as U.S. Coordina-
;:' for Refugee Affairs, I wish to pre-
?,it fnrmally the President's proposal
; raise the refugee admissions ceiling
f- FY [fiscal year] 1989. Finally, in re-
- iiise to the subcommittee's invita-
; 11, we will offer some preliminary
i w s on the bill introduced by Mi\ Ber-
rin and on your own draft bill,
P-. Chairman [Bruce A. Morrison].
Before moving to these specific
citters, I would like to report briefly
3 the major refugee situations in the
firld with which we are now engaged.
ifr policies for dealing with Soviet
Eiigration cannot be developed in iso-
I. inn from other refugee needs, both
['■ ({(imestic resettlement here and for
i ernational assistance abroad. Our
i ernational refugee policies and re-
sonsibilites are linked intimately with
ksic bilateral and multilateral foreign
flicy objectives. And, with limited re-
sjrces to meet multiple refugee prob-
lais, the United States cannot respond
L individual demands without main-
t ning equity in our humanitarian
rsponses worldwide.

Jajor Refugee Issues

■^lere are some 13 million people in the
Virld who have fled persecution and
i-med conflict, often combined with
rtural disasters, and less than 1% of
t?m in a given year will be resettled
anv third country.

In Africa, there is the all-too-
familiar catalogue of intractable, long-
term populations of refugees and dis-
placed persons, but also a few hopeful
signs. In the past 5 years, over
1 million Mozambicans have fled the
RENAMO [Mozambique National Re-
sistance Movement] insurgency and its
attendant terrors for neighboring na-
tions; tiny Malawi alone gives shelter to
some 650,000 of them. Ethiopia — which
itself produces refugees and displaced
persons from the long-term, civil con-
flict there — shelters an estimated
350,000 Sudanese and as many as
400,000 Somalis fleeing civil conflict
within their countries. On the hopeful
side, most of those who fled last sum-
mer's ethnic violence in Burundi have
now returned home, and there are
hopes that — under terms of recent
peace agreements — thousands of Nami-
bians will begin to return home from
their long-term exile.

In East Asia, in spite of years of
international assistance, the fate of the
320,000 Khmer in camps along the
Thai-Cambodian border remains pre-
carious, and those in camps controlled
by the Khmer Rouge are particularly
vulnerable to the cross-border conflict
between Khmer Rouge combatants and
Vietnamese troops. The upcoming in-
ternational conference on Indochinese
refugees will try to put in place a new
international policy consensus among
the refugee-producing, first-asylum,
and resettlement and donor nations. We
seek a resolution which preserves first
asylum and offers open access to safe
and orderly emigration as a true alter-
native to the dangerous boat trips of
Vietnamese asylum seekers that con-
tinue today at the highest level in many
years.

The situation in Central America

is as troublesome as ever. The enemies
are repression and armed conflict, but
they are also desperate poverty and
the desire for a better life. All four —
usually in some combination — have pro-
duced large-scale displacement within
the region and a particularly difficult
situation along our southern border
as thousands flee toward the United
States. Here in particular the recog-
nized refugee and displaced person
population — that is, those in camps and
given assistance by the international
community — is only part of a much big-
ger migration picture.

In the Near East and South Asia.

there are two refugee populations con-
stantly in the news whose long-term
fate remains unclear. After a decade in
temporary asylum, and even after the
withdrawal of Soviet troops, it remains
to this moment unclear when the long-
awaited return to Afghanistan of the
3 million refugees in Pakistan will
begin. And the deprivation of the
Palestinian refugees in the occupied
territories is now compounded by the
urgent need for medical and social
services resulting from the response
to the intifada [uprising].

Finally, there is a rather different
challenge in Europe. The loosening of
exit controls in the Soviet Union and
some of the countries of Eastern Eu-
rope is first of all a victory for their na-
tionals. It is also a tribute to the long-
term, patient insistence of the United
States and others that those countries
are beginning to recognize one of the
most fundamental human rights: the
right to leave and enter one's country at
will. In the short term, however, this
very success has led to enormous pres-
sures both on our own refugee admis-
sions system and on the asylum policies
of the nations of Western Europe.

Our challenge in dealing with new
refugee crises around the world, as
well as with the continuing tragedy of
longstayers in refugee camps — a trag-
edy especially for the children whose
future lives are formed there — is that,
despite our far-flung energies and
strong leadership in humanitarian as-
sistance to refugees, we face both
inadequate international resources to
meet all of the needs and the moral
dilemma of deciding who needs help
the most.

U.S. Response to Soviet Emigration

In the past year, we have witnessed the
effects of a major change in the emigra-
tion policy of the Soviet Union. Per-
sons, or categories of persons, who had
never before been allowed that oppor-
tunity became eligible to apply for exit
permits to the United States, to Israel,
to Germany, and elsewhere. Applica-
tions at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow
have soared from a rate of about 1,500
per month in FY 1988 to a current rate
of upward of 4,000 a month. Simul-
taneously, the number of Soviets enter-

bpartment of State Bulletin/July 1989

REFUGEES

ing Austria with permission to go to
Israel, almost all of whom opt to apply
to the United States, has more than
tripled in the past 6 months, from less
than 1,000 per month in FY 1988 to be-
tween 3,000 and 4,000 per month since
December. These are far and away the
highest rates in this decade, and Con-
gress and the Administration can
share credit for the role the United
States has played in bringing about
this new Soviet emigi'ation policy.

Our national, bipartisan policy ris-
a-vis the Soviet Union places the high-
est emphasis on human rights, includ-
ing the right of a citizen to travel freely
and to emigrate from his country. The
success of this leadership, however,
does not equate immediately or easily
with the more complex reality which
the Congress and the executive branch
share — and which cuts across their var-
ious jurisdictions — of U.S. immigration
and refugee policies defined in specific
statutes that set eligibility standards,
prescribe a process to establish annual
numerical ceilings, and appropriate
funds for federally supported services.

Let me briefly recount the steps
the Administration has taken to date.

First, in December, we advised
Congress of a decision to reallocate
7,000 refugee admissions numbers
from other regions to the Soviet Union,
as an interim measure, in order to en-
sure that all regional programs could
continue without interruption. Along
with the frontloading of admissions
numbers earlier into the fiscal year,
this enabled us to maximize the use of
numbers available under the worldwide
ceiling and to continue processing all
groups, including Soviet applicants, at
rates which minimized the backlog
problem. We also instituted human-
itarian parole and encouraged private
funding as further efforts to manage
the increased pressures in the short-
term.

Second, we have been addressing
the processing capacity in Rome and
Moscow to meet the increased work-
load. INS [Immigration and Natural-
ization Service] officer strength is ob-
viously a critical variable in determin-
ing how many applicants can be
processed per month, but it is not the
only one. Consular staff, other embassy
support personnel, practices of host na-
tions, and the ability of the voluntary
agencies are also important factors in

our efforts to keep up with an increas-
ing flow of applicants. In Moscow, as
the subcommittee knows, we face also
the particular impediment of the bilat-
eral personnel ceiling, within which we
have to find space not only for INS and
consular officers, but also for American
citizen clerical and support personnel.

Third, we have been working hard
on an initiative to create a new provi-
sion in U.S. immigration law to give
the United States the flexibility to ad-
mit for permanent resettlement per-
sons of humanitarian and foreign policy
concern who do not qualify under cur-
rent immigrant or refugee provisions.
Secretary Shultz and [INS] Commis-
sioner Nelson testified to the need for
such a provision in the consultations
hearings last September, and this Ad-
ministration sent its proposed legisla-
tion to Congress yesterday. Under our
proposal, the beneficiary groups would
be identified through an annual consult-
ative process between the executive
branch and Congress.

The Administration has been con-
cerned, as have you, that the use of the
Attorney General's parole authority as
an avenue of admission to the United
States for applicants who are not found
eligible for refugee status, although a
valuable interim resource and the only
statutory available, is inadequate. The
new legislation seeks to correct that
deficiency and most importantly will
accord the beneficiaries the full rights
of other permanent residents of the
United States — including the right to
qualify for citizenship, which parolees
do not have. With specific regard for
the problems faced by Soviets who
enter as parolees this fiscal year, our
legislation proposes a retroactive
adjustment of status to come under this
new special immigrant category. We
hope and request that Congress will
give this legislation prompt and serious
attention.

Fourth, on March 24 the President
submitted a request for FY 1989 sup-
plemental appropriations which in-
cludes $85 million for the refugee
admissions program and $15 million for
critical refugee assistance needs in
Africa and Southeast Asia that I spoke
of earlier. The $85 million for refugee
admissions is expected to provide fund-
ing for the State Department costs for
28,500 persons. Added to the 84,000
refugee admissions which were funded
in our FY 1989 appropriations, this
could provide State Department fund-
ing for a new total of 112,500 refugee
admissions.

Fifth, I would like to advise the
subcommittee that the Department of
State has commenced a comprehensive
interagency policy review of the whole
subject of Soviet emigration. When
this has been completed, we will want!
to come to Congress to discuss our
conclusions.

The sixth step is to engage in
emergency consultations with Congres
prior to a determination by the Presi-
dent to raise the FY 1989 admissions
ceilings, and I am here today in fulfill,
ment of the statutory requirement to
present formally the President's pro-
posal to raise the refugee admissions
ceiling for FY 1989.

The President's Proposal

Pursuant to the procedures for emer-
gency consultations which are set fort
in Section 207 of the Immigration andli
Nationality Act, as amended, the Coni
gress has been advised by letter of th(
President's proposal. Because this is
truly urgent matter, we appreciate th(
opportunity to discuss this proposal a|
today's hearing, in full recognition th.fl:
the subcommittee has not had time to
study the proposal in detail. We inten ; ,
that the requirement of the statute fo il
in-person discussions by a cabinet off
cer representing the President will be
met by a meeting to be arranged in tl
near future.

The President proposes that the i
refugee admissions ceiling for FY 198!
be raised from 94,000 to 116,500 and
that the regional refugee admissions
ceilings authorized under Presidentia 1'
Determination No. 89-2 of October 5,
1988, would be modified to be as
follows. I,

Africa

East Asia, First Asylum
East Asia, Orderly

Departure Program
Eastern Europe/Soviet Union
Near East/South Asia
Latin America/Caribbean

Total

2,0i|
28,0- 1

22,0'

50,0'

7,0'

3,5'

112,51

There would be a total of up to
112,500 admissions for which federal
funding could be used, and the 4,000
numbers reserved for private-sector
initiatives would be retained for a to-
tal of 116,500. This is an increase of
22,500 over the currently authorized
94,000 figure.

I would like to mention two specil
effects of this proposal.

Department of State Bulletin/July 19i<

REFUGEES

First, we are now proposing in our
ipplemental appropriations request
1 provide State Department funding
:r all refugee admissions within the
-2,500 total. In other words, from the
lint of view of the State Department
■ogram, the 6,000 so-called semi-
inded numbers with which we began
le fiscal year will now be fully
Inded.

Second, under the President's pro-
psed new ceilings and the supplemen-

il appropriations request we propose
restore 4,000 numbers from the De-
mber reallocation. The East Asia
•st-asylum regional ceiling will be re-
|ored to the original presidential de-
rmination levels — 28,000. The Near
st/South Asia regional ceiling will
0 be restored to the original level —
'00. For the Vietnam orderly depar-
re program, we propose to restore
00 numbers to a new level of 22,000
Amissions compared to the original
^,000 ceiling. At this point in the fis-
ijl year — taking into account actual
id anticipated rates of departure from
' etnam as well as the numbers of
IS. -approved persons now in our
teining programs — it is most unlikely
tat more than 22,000 persons funded
lultT this ceiling — which includes fund-
ig for Amerasian immigrants as well
E refugees — could enter the United
fates this fiscal year. I regret to re-
[rt that despite our continuing ef-
I'ts, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
Is not yet agreed to resume discus-
P)ns on a program to permit resettle-
r?nt of former reeducation center
(tainees through the orderly depar-
tre program.

()nsultations With Public
sid Private Agencies

^; r.S. Coordinator, on March 30 I
cnvened a meeting to obtain the views
Cjthe voluntary agencies, which have
iisponsibility for overseas processing
trefugees and for the early stages of
teir resettlement in the United
Sates. The agencies were generally
ipportive of both the need for using
te emergency provision to raise the
emissions ceiling and the range of
rmbers presented to them (an in-
cease of 20,000-25,000). They did, how-
eer, raise several particular issues:
l!e need for additional numbers for
'ist Europeans, for Pentecostal appli-
i]nts from the Soviet Union, and for
."menians in the Near East region;
Ve higher rate of rejection in the latest

round of processing of Vietnamese or-
derly departure program applicants;
and the fear that any supplemental
funding for Soviet admissions might
result in diminished funds for other
parts of the refugee program. I and
representatives of the Department of
State e.xpressed concerns about the
agencies' capacity to maintain quality
and timeliness in processing higher
numbers, especially in Europe, and
again encouraged them to organize pri-
vately funded projects to support the
6,000 semifunded numbers, pending
enactment of supplemental appropria-
tions, and the use of humanitarian
parole.

I also consulted with 25 represent-
atives of state and local governments at
a March 31 meeting. While generally
recognizing the need for some increase
in admissions, they pressed for a com-
mensurate increase in domestic
funding for the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) and asked
for detailed answers on what shape
it might take, timeframes, the pro-
portion of offsets to new funding that
might be involved, and the conse-
quences for the FY 1990 budget. They
also asserted that it seemed the federal
government was relying too much on
the success of the matching grant pro-
gram in its calculations of domestic
need for both welfare and social serv-
ices funding, pointing out recent sur-
veys which showed that almost half of
the refugees who had been in the match-
ing grant programs in New York State
were found to be using public welfare.
The state and local representatives also
voiced concerns about the effect of in-
creased parole and regular immigra-
tion admissions — for which no domestic
benefits are provided — on their finan-
cial ability to provide adequate re-
settlement support.

Representative Berman's Bill

We believe that the revised refugee ad-
missions ceilings proposed by the Pres-
ident, if supported by the supplemental
appropriations we have requested, will
enable the United States to sustain our
generous admissions programs for ref-
ugees from the Soviet Union and the
rest of the world for the remainder of
this fiscal year.

In presenting this proposal, we
wish to give full credit to all of the
Members of Congress and representa-
tives from the private sector who have
called for prompt action to address the

rising tide of Soviet emigration and
the shortage of refugee numbers and
funding, including the chairmen and
ranking members of the House Judici-
ary Committee and this subcommittee.

Mr. Herman has also been one of
the leaders in this effort, and he has
recently introduced legislation which
would authorize an increase in the ref-
ugee admissions ceiling for FY 1989 by
28,000 numbers and which would trans-
fer funds to pay for such admissions to
the HHS Office of Refugee Resettle-
ment and to the State Department's
Emergency Refugee and Migration As-
sistance Fund. We note that the revised
ceilings proposed in Mr. Berman's bill
are very close to those being proposed
by the President. Where Mr. Berman's
bill would add an aggregate of 21,000
numbers for Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union — which I believe would
result in a new* total of 52,500 for that
region — the President's proposal
would bring the regional ceiling to
50,000. For the Vietnam orderly depar-
ture program, Mr. Berman's bill adds
5,500 numbers, for a total of 25,000,
where the President's proposal sets the
revised orderly departure program
ceiling at 22,000, for reasons I have e.x-
plained earlier. For East Asia first-
asylum and for the Near East/South
Asia region, the two proposals are
identical.

With respect to the funding re-
quirements for the State Department's
programs, we believe that the amount
requested in supplemental appropria-
tions for refugee admissions, $85 mil-
lion, is needed to fully fund the State
Department costs for the proposed lev-
el of 112,500 funded admissions, rather
than the $50 million proposed in this
bill. We urge congressional approval
of the Administration's request.

Representative Morrison's Bill

I would also like to comment briefly on
the chairman's draft legislation, which
addresses both admissions ceilings and
the question of eligibility of certain So-
viet applicants. First, with respect to
the numbers, this bill would set a sub-
ceiling for Soviet applicants for FY
1989 at 60,000—50,000 Soviet Jews and
Pentecostals and 10,000 other Soviets —
which compares with the President's
proposal of approximately 43,500. (The
President's proposal sets a regional
ceiling for East European and Soviet
refugees at 50,000.) Although we know

lepartment of State Bulletin/July 1989

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

that estimates of the rate of emigration
from the Soviet Union vary, we believe
that the President's proposal contains
sufficient numbers to carry us through
the current fiscal year Moreover, we
wish to adhere to the principle of align-
ment between the admissions ceilings
and the availability of funding, as we
failed to do last year, but as we have
done in our supplemental a|)propria-
tions request.

For FY 1990, we believe that the
consultations process prescribed in the
statute is the proper way to set the re-
gional ceiling. In September, we will
have more current information about
Soviet emigration rates, and we will
also be able to benefit from discussions
between the Congress and the execu-
tive branch on the results of our policy
review.

Your draft bill would also amend
our immigration laws by exempting So-
viet Jews and Pentecostals from the
refugee definition. We share your ob-
jective of ensuring our nation's ability
to continue generous resettlement of
emigrants from the Soviet Union, and
we share your special concern for Sovi-
et Jews and Pentecostals. We believe
that your draft legislation reflects a
judgment that current law does not
provide the United States with suffi-
cient authorities to admit for perma-
nent resettlement certain types of
aliens who are of special humanitarian
concern to the United States.

We have recognized that current
law does not enable the United States
to admit certain applicants of special
humanitarian concern to the United
States who do not meet the specific
statutory criteria for immigrant visas
or for refugee status. It is precisely to
address that gap in current statutory
authority that the Administration has
proposed that new special immigrant
category.

We believe the Administration's
proposal has two advantages over your
draft bill. First, by providing for con-
sultations between the Congress and
the executive branch, our bill gives the
United States the flexibility to respond
in future years to applicants of priority
concern of different nationalities, in-
cluding persons affected by events we
cannot now foresee. Second, as a gener-
al principle, we believe our laws should
accord benefits on the basis of needs in
as equitable, nonpreferential a fashion
as possible and should avoid the desig-
nation of specific groups.

We believe that the resettlement
needs of the Soviet Jews and Pentecos-
tals in FY 1990 and future years can be
met by the combination of authorities
which would exist under our proposed
new legislation and the current refugee
and immigrant visa categories. Al-
though we cannot at this time project
a number of Soviet admissions in FY
1990 under these combined authorities,
under our proposal this number would
be determined through two consulta-
tive processes — one on refugees and
one on special immigrants — prior to
the start of the new fiscal year. Prior to
these consultations we will also be able
to report on the results of our compre-
hensive review of Soviet emigration
policy.

Furthermore, we do not favor leg-
islation that would establish a pre-
sumption or confer automatic refugee
eligibility on a particular group or
groups of Soviet applicants. We sup-
port neutral decisionmaking under a
uniform worldwide standard as contem-
plated by the Refugee Act of 1980.

Last August the Department of
Justice and INS, who have the legal
responsibility for implementing the
Refugee Act and adjudicating refugee
applications, reaffirmed that the stat-
ute requires refugee applications to be

judged on a case-by-case basis, throug
individual interviews, and based on
uniform, worldwide standards. The De
partment of State supports the policy
of the Attorney General and believes
that INS should apply the definition
contained in the Refugee Act properly
and consistently to all refugee appli-
cants, including Soviets.

Nonetheless, we are deeply con-
cerned about the plight of the many
Soviets who undoubtedly have been
persecuted or have a well-founded fear,
of persecution and who qualify as refu
gees. We are concerned at the current
high level of denial rates in Rome, as
well as in the Vietnam orderly depar-
ture program. We will assist INS in e
ery way possible to ensure that INS
interviewers have available all neces-
sary information concerning condition
in the Soviet Union, including the
treatment of the various religious and
ethnic groups in the applicant pool. W*
hope that, through these efforts and
proper application of the law, we can
ensure that those who are refugees w»
be recognized as such for admission
into the United States.

'The complete transcript of the hear-
ings will be published by the committee ar
will be available from the Superintendent
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

U.S. Contributions to
Communications Development

Following is the suuiinarij of a May
1989 report entitled "U.S. Government
and Private Sector Contributions to
Communications Development." It is a
study of bilateral contributions to
communications development prepared
by the Bureau of International
Communications and Information
Policy.'

From September 1988 to March 1989,
the State Department's Bureau of In-
ternational Communications and In-
formation Policy undertook a study to
identify U.S. Government and private
sector bilateral contributions to com-
munications development. This work
complements a 1985 survey, funded by
the Department of State's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, on U.S.

Government contributions to commun
cations development. The current stUd
not only updates that earlier work buti
also demonstrates the scope and impw
tance of nongovernment telecommuni-
cations assistance.

This study is intended to help U.5
Government policymakers coordinate
more effectively scarce communicatioi
development resources, to aid the U.S
private sector in reassessing its role |
in communications development activ-j
ities, and to offer developing countries
a better global picture of U.S. efforts
so as to identify possible unexplored
sources of assistance.

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

he ITU Looks at

elecommunications

cM'lopment

lie r.S. commitment to communica-
)iis development has as its backdrop
ic pivotal report by the International
•Iciommunication Union (ITU) Inde-
■111 lent Commission for World-Wide
'elecommunications Development,
'he Missing Link." The report fol-
ded the 1982 amendment to the ITU
nvention that lists communications
ivelopment as one of the priority con-
rns of the ITU. Issued in January
'85, "The Missing Link" identified the
arp disparity between the telecom-
Linications capabilities of the devel-
led and developing worlds. The
nited States fully agrees with the
ed, outlined in "The Missing Link,"
promote joint efforts in which "gov-
nments and development assistance
encies must give a higher priority
I'an hitherto to investment in telecom-
unieations." The United States has
ikcn seriously the challenges defined
1 the independent commission and, as
lis study reveals, has been working
jstfmatically to meet them.

Kven before the "The Missing Link"
MS issued, the United States had re-
Miniled to the calls at the 1982 ITU
I 'nipotentiary conference for in-
C'used technical cooperation and as-
■ taiice. Shortly after that conference,
I;- r.S. Telecommunications Training
Istitute (USTTI), a nonprofit organiza-
t'n, began operations. Since 1983,
loTTI has provided training for near-
11,500 trainees from 108 developing
amtries. More than 60 American com-
pnies and foundations, as well as the
rS. Government, have provided $13.3
I" lUoii in cash and in-kind support to
I ike this program a shining example
Cone successful government-private
i:tor approach to communications
Dvelopment.

IS. Multilateral Assistance

Vhile the focus of this study is on bilat-
: il |ii-ograms, it should be noted that
- niticant levels of U.S. public and pri-
\\.r funding promotes communications
Lveiopment activities in several multi-
Leral organizations. Between 1986
ad 1988, for instance. World Bank
liding for telecommunications pro-
i ts was nearly $769 million. The
'lited States, with a 209^ subscription
sare in the World Bank, provided
out $154 million of these funds.

In 1988, the International Telecom-
munications Satellite Organization
devoted about $650,000 to communica-
tions development. The U.S. signatory
to INTELSAT— the Communications"
Satellite Corporation (COMSAT)— pro-
vided $165,000 of this amount through
its 25% holding of INTELSAT'S shares.
COMSAT also holds 27% of the shares
of the International Maritime Satellite
Corporation (INMARSAT), making it
responsible for about $54,000 of the
$200,000 that INMARSAT devoted to
communications development last year.
The United States contributes approx-
imately two-thirds of the total budget
of the Organization of American States
(OAS) and its agencies, such as the
Inter-American Commission on Tele-
communications (CITEL). In addition
to its regular budgetary contributions,
the United States has made special
contributions for OAS communications
development activities. The U.S. Trade
and Development Program (TDP), for
example, completed in early 1989 fund-
ing of a $1.5-million OAS feasibility
study on digitalization in five Latin
American countries. TDP has also
begun funding through the OAS addi-
tional digitalization and fiber optics
projects in five Latin American coun-
tries totaling $2.75 million.

In the International Telecom-
munication Union, the United States
contributes approximately 7% of total
voluntary funds for technical coopera-
tion and assistance. Of the nearly $13.5
million that the ITU has expended on
technical cooperation of regular budget
funds between 1984-87, the United
States provided around $945,000. The
ITU also executes projects for the UN
Development Program (UNDP). The
U.S. share of the $170 million in ITU-
executed UNDP projects between
1982-88 was about 19%, or $32 million.
From 1986 to March 1989, the U.S.
public and private sectors have also
contributed $405,000 to the ITU's Cen-
ter for Telecommunications Develop-
ment. While the United States strongly
supports the multilateral communica-
tions development programs, which
have grown in recent years in the ITU
and in other international forums, the
lion's share of U.S. activities have been
bilateral and will continue on that basis
in the foreseeable future.

Official Aid

The U.S. commitment to the economic
development of the Third World is

rooted in a basic premise: a vibrant
world economy in which all nations
fully participate tends to produce
wider trade and investment oppor-
tunities for all players. To foster this
goal, the U.S. Government will commit
some $7.8 billion in international eco-
nomic assistance in fiscal year (FY)
1989— more than $6.3 billi'on bilaterally
and more than $1.5 billion through mul-
tilateral economic assistance.

U.S. Government assistance for
communications development has al-
ready increased significantly over the
past 3 years — from about $422 million
in 1985 (the date of the last survev) to
about $504 million in 1988. These'fig-
ures include grants, loans, loan guar-
antees, loan insurance, investment
guarantees, training, technical assis-
tance, and training and feasibility
studies. Other activities, such as ex-
changes of technical information, can-
not be quantified and are not reflected
in the figures. The following table sum-
marizes the results by sector based on
the survey responses from 10 U.S. Gov-
ernment agencies:

U.S. Government Communications

Development Assistance,

FY 1984 and 1988

(SMillions)

1984

1988

Grants

45.0

Loans, loan guaranties,
investment guaranties,
and insurance

316.5

390.3

Technical assistance

45.0

49.4

Training

15.0

15.8

Feasibility studies

0.7

3.8

TOTAL

422.2

504.3

Of the many U.S. Government agencies
involved in this effort, five have been
most active over the last 4 years. These
are the Agency for International Devel-
opment (AID), the Department of Com-
merce, the Export-Import Bank, the
Overseas Private Investment Corpora-
tion (OPIC), and the United States In-
formation Agency. Five other agencies
had major programs: the Department
of Defense, Department of Agriculture,
Trade and Development Program,
Peace Corps, and U.S. Postal Service.
Their programs are examined in detail
elsewhere in this study.

tspartment of State Bulletin/July 1989

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

The principal U.S. development as-
sistance organ, the Agency for Interna-
tional Development, has concen-
trated on integrating communications
into the basic development sectors of
health, education, and agriculture.
While the total amounts devoted to
such programs are relatively small —
.$1G8 million from 1985 to 1988— the
multiplier effect they have produced
is significant. The U.S. Congress is
also becoming more directly involved
in communications development. In
a significant first step. Congress
earmarked a total of $500,000 for
communications development activities
in the State Department's FY 1988 and
1989 budgets. At the time of writing,
the State Department had disbursed
$200,000 of this sum to the ITU's Cen-
ter for Telecommunications Devel-
opment and $50,000 to the U.S.
Telecommunications Training Insti-
tute. Other U.S. Government agencies
are also reexamining their development
programs in light of growing evidence
that telecommunications is one of the
most effective vehicles for generating
revenue for development purposes.

Private Sector Assistance

The U.S. private sector, with resources
infinitely greater than those of the
U.S. Government, has provided a far
greater level of communications devel-
opment assistance. The U.S. private
sector contribution to communications
development is broad and significant
but defies easy characterization due to
the diversity of goods and services pro-
vided and the decentralized conte.xt in
which such activity takes place.

U.S. Corporations. Although only
a limited number of companies partici-
pated in the survey, among them are
some of the most active participants in
communications development activities:
AT&T, COMSAT, IBM, NYNEX, and
Southwestern Bell.

Most U.S. telecommunications as-
sistance to developing countries takes
place in a commercial context.

Although American companies have
been slow to recognize the vast growth
potential in the developing world, the
tide has started to turn. With new
business opportunities and a more pro-
pitious investment climate in many de-
veloping countries, U.S. companies
have increased their commercially
related communications development
activities. These include equipment
donations and loans, feasibility studies,
seminar participation, fellowships,
training, consulting, exchanges of tech-
nical information, and other technical
assistance. It is virtually impossible to
calculate an accurate global figure for
these activities, which run into hun-
dreds of millions of dollars. However,
the study gives several examples of
illustrative programs in each sector.

Universities, Foundations, Coop-
eratives, and Associations. U.S. edu-
cational and nonprofit groups carry out
a multitude of programs to assist devel-
loping countries improve their commu-
nications and information capabilities.
Scholarships and fellowships for deve-
loping country journalists and broad-
casters represent a major effort of
these organizations. The 25 most active
U.S. foundations and associations
awarded more than 550 grants in 1988
varying between $200 and $35,000
each. Among these foundations are the
World Press Institute, Alfred Friendly
Foundation, Council for International
Exchange of Scholars, East-West
Center, Gannett Foundation, Inter-
American Press Association, and
Rotary International. Over 400 U.S.
colleges and universities also offer a
wide range of scholarship opportunities
for developing country journalists and
broadcasters.

U.S. voluntary and cooperative
organizations — such as the U.S. Tele-
communications Training Institute
mentioned earlier — have made very
significant efforts to help develop
Third World telecommunications. The
Volunteers in Technical Assistance
(VITA) is another exemplary nonprofit
program. Established almost 30 years
ago by scientists and engineers eager
to share their skills and experience,
VITA has built a cadre of 5,000 volun-
teers who answer more than 1,000 re-
quests for information per month from

developing countries — many of them i
lated to communications. VITA is dev
loping a low-orbiting satellite networj
called PACSAT, to support developing
countries in health, education, disast
relief, agriculture, and other activ-
ities. The work of three other U.S. no
profit organizations — the National
Telephone Cooperative Association, t
Global Technology Foundation, and tl
Public Service Satellite Consortium-
is listed in the survey narrative.

Cooperative Approaches

The U.S. Government established in
1985 the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on
Communications Development to sys-
tematically gain private sector input
communications development matter;
The group, chaired by a private sect(
representative, reports to the U.S. C
ganization for the ITU International
Telegraph and Telephone Consultativ
Committee (CCITT). The major U.S.
Government agencies and the princip
U.S. private sector organizations in-
volved in communications developmei
activities are represented on the ad 1
group. The State Department Bureav
of International Communications and'
Information Policy serves as secre-
tariat for the group.

The U.S.-China Protocol in Tele-
communications Sciences represents
an outstanding model of government-
to-government cooperation in commui
cations development. The protocol —
signed on May 16, 1986, for a 5-year
period — is an agreement to "conducti
scientific and technological exchange
and cooperation in the field of civil
commercial telecommunications on
basis of equality, mutual benefit, and'
reciprocity." Since then, four major \
its between the two countries by U.S
and Chinese officials and technical e;
perts have resulted in useful studies
and ample exchange of information.
The United States hopes to reach sin
lar agreements with other developinj
countries in the future.

Department of State Bulletin/July 1!

UNITED NATIONS

inclusion

rmei- Secretary of State George
ultz in December 1988, eloquently
ited why communications devel-
ment is receiving increased atten-
n by senior U.S. Government
licymakers:

Modern telecommunications are no
ger a luxury for developing countries.
ther, in a world increasingly dependent
the latest information, telecommunica-
is have become a powerful engine of
nomic growth. A growing number of
es shows that modern telecommunica-
is create new jobs, attract foreign invest-
nt, and provide the revenue to meet basic
nan needs.

The key for U.S. and developing
intry policymakers will be to effec-
ely catalyze market-oriented activ-
is in a way that will foster basic
'elopment goals. Numerous e.xamples
;ed herein demonstrate that signifi-
it progress is currently being made
rard this end. However, the nascent
)lic-private partnership needs to be
lewed and strengthened if the pace is
be accelerated. Similarly, coopera-
1 between the United States and de-
oping countries requires creative
V approaches. This report should
p identify some areas where fur-
:r government-to-government and
'ernment-private sector coopera-
1 is possible and some new possi-
ties for spreading more widely
unprecedented benefits of the
Drmationage.

U.S. Opposes PLO Admission
to UN Agencies

'To receive a copy of the full report, call
i.vrite: Bureau of International Communi-
iiuns and Information Policy, Rm. 6317,
Jv Hepartment of State, Washington,
):. :ili520 (Tel: 202-647-834.5). ■

by Sandra L. Vogelgesang

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Foreign Operations of the Senate
Appropriations Committee on May i,
1989. Dr. Vogelgesang is Deputy Assist-
ant Secretary for International Orga-
nization Affairs.^

I will address the issue of Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) admis-
sion to membership in the Woidd Health
Organization (WHO) and other UN
agencies. This pressing matter has
been highest on the agenda of the Bu-
reau of International Organization Af-
fairs for the last few weeks.

As you know, we are currently fac-
ing a serious challenge in the WHO,
where the PLO, which has observer
status, has submitted an application
for membership for the "state of Pal-
estine." This application is expected to
be considered at the upcoming annual
meeting of the World Health Assembly,
which begins May 8. The PLO has also
expressed interest in making similar
applications in other UN agencies; suc-
cess in WHO could encourage the PLO
to do so.

The Administration fully appreci-
ates congressional concerns over these
developments. I can assure you we
share those concerns. We are engaged
in a major effort to head off these at-
tempts, which, if successful, would po-
liticize the specialized agencies, thus
complicating their essential technical
work and would also be seriously detri-
mental to the search for Middle East
peace.

U.S. policy in this regard is clear.

• The self-declared Palestinian
"state," which the United States does
not recognize, does not satisfy the gen-
erally accepted criteria under interna-
tional law for statehood and thus does
not qualify for membership in UN
agencies.

• The United States is opposed to
the introduction of such a divisive polit-
ical issue into the technical work of the
specialized agencies.

• Moreover we are convinced that
any effort to bestow legitimacy on the
self-proclaimed Palestinian "state"
would harm efforts underway in the
region to promote peace. The Arab-
Israeli problem can be resolved only
through a process of negotiations be-

tween the parties, not through uni-
lateral acts by either side — such as the
declaration of Palestinian statehood —
that seek to prejudge the outcome of
such negotiations.

To emphasize the depth of our con-
cern, the Secretary announced May 1
that he will recommend to the Presi-
dent that the United States make no
further contributions — voluntary or
assessed — to any international organi-
zation which makes any change in the
PLO s present status as an observer or-
ganization. This would be a major step,
and the Secretary's statement should
leave no doubt in others' minds as to
how seriously the United States views
this issue.

To ensure that our concerns over
this issue are clearly understood by
others, we have undertaken a series of
worldwide demarches in capitals, rein-
forced by high-level meetings with em-
bassy representatives in Washington.
With the support of like-minded allies,
we have urged that, at a minimum,
some mechanism be found to defer

Secretary's Statement

MAY 1, 19892

The United States virorously opposes
the admission of the PLO to member-
ship in the World Health Oi-ganization
or any other UN agencies. We have
worked, and will continue to work, to
convince others of the harm that the
PLO's admission would cause to the
Middle East peace process and to the
UN system.

Political questions such as this
should not be raised in specialized
agencies because such politicization de-
tracts from the important technical
work of these organizations.

To emphasize the depth of our con-
cern, I will recommend to the Presi-
dent that the United States make no
further contributions — voluntary or
assessed — to any international organi-
zation which makes any change in the
PLO's present status as an observer
organization.

^Press release 75.

Ipartment of State Bulletin/July 1989

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Department Statement

MAY 12, 1989'

The United States welcomes the deci-
sion today by the World Health Organi-
zation to defer consideration of the
membership application of the Pal-
estine Liberation Oi'ganization.

In deciding not to admit the self-
declared "state of Palestine," the WHO
rejected the PLO's efforts to politicize
who's important work.

We believe today's vote demon-
strates that other nations are deter-
mined, as we are, that such maneuvers
should not detract from the central ef-
fort of bringing peace to the Middle
East.

Although we objected to parts of
the WHO resolution, we believe its de-
cision to defer the PLO application will
help ensure that the WHO can proceed
with its vital health agenda. The Ad-
ministration reaffirms U.S. support
for the World Health Organization and
its important programs for helping to
ensure better health for people around
the world.

The United States will continue to
oppose any change in the observer sta-
tus of the PLO in the World Health Or-
ganization or other UN bodies.

■'Made available to news correspondents
by Department deputy spokesman Rich-
ard A. Boucher. ■

consideration of the membership appli-
cation. We just completed useful meet-
ings here in Washington with WHO
Director General Nakajima, who clear-
ly appreciates the potential danger to
his organization posed by the PLO's ef-
forts and supports efforts to avoid a
vote on this explosive issue. We hope
that other states will conclude that it
would be in the best interests of all if
the WHO deferred action on the
application.

I can assure you that we will con-
tinue our vigorous efforts to oppose the
admission of the self-proclaimed "state
of Palestine" as a member in WHO or
any other organization in the UN sys-
tem. We appreciate the e.xpressions of
congressional support we have received
for this policy.

'The complete transcript of the hear-
ings will be published by the committee and
will be available from the Superintendent of
Document.s, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington. D.C. 20402. ■

Panama Elections

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
APR. 27, 1989'

The people of Panama clearly yearn for
a free and fair election on May 7th so
that their country can again take its
rightful place in this hemisphere's com-
munity of democratic nations. Only the
threat of violence and massive fraud by
the Noriega regime will keep the Pan-
amanian people from realizing that as-
piration for democracy.

Free and fair elections on May 7th,
and respect for the results, can pro-
duce a legitimate government in Pan-
ama, which will end that nation's
political and economic crises and inter-
national isolation. That is clearly what
the people of Panama deserve and
desire.

The Noriega regime promised that
free and fair elections would, in fact,
take place May 7th and that interna-
tional observers would be permitted to
observe them. In recent weeks, the
Noriega regime has taken steps to com-
mit systematic fraud. Through violence
and coercion, it threatens and intimi-
dates Panamanian citizens who believe
in democracy. It is attempting to limit
and obstruct the presence of observers
from around the world and the ability
of journalists to report freely on the
election.

Nevertheless many observers in-
tend to travel to Panama to shine the
spotlight of world opinion on the Pan-
amanian elections just as they did pre-
viously in nations like the Philippines
and El Salvador. We admire their com-
mitment to democracy and their cour-
age and will fully support their efforts.

The days of rule by dictatorship in
Latin America are over. They must end
in Panama as well. There is still time
for Panama to resolve its current crisis
through free and fair elections. The
people and Government of the United
States will not recognize fraudulent
election results engineered by Noriega.
The aspirations of the people of Panama
for democracy must not be denied.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT.

MAY 2, 1989-

The Noriega regime continues its cal-
culated campaign to harass and intimi-
date opposition parties, journalists,
and foreign visitors in an effort to
carry out its plans for election fraud.

In the last 10 days, incidents have in-
creased dramatically. The following i
incidents representative of Noriega
regime actions.

• Opposition legislative eandidati
Felipe Escobar was beaten unconscio
by proregime thugs on April 27 and Y
to be hospitalized.

• The regime has reserved large
blocks of rooms in all hotels, and all
new reservations must be cleared
through Panamanian military intel-
ligence, G-2. The G-2 will inspect
passports and luggage. No "political'
meetings can be held in any hotel.

• On April 21, two Costa Rican
newsmen reporting on the elections
were arrested and held incommunica
for 1.5 hours because their report al-
legedly contained "seditious materia

• On April 27, 10 days before the
election, the regime COLIN A [Coali
tion for National Liberation] ticket h
a "victory" dinner for its candidate,
Carlos Duque. On April 24, the re-
gime announced in a full-page ad ths
COLINA would win by more than
6.5,000 votes.

• The opposition TV program, '"'.
ward Victory," was temporarily sus-
pended on April 24, allegedly becaua
the anchorwoman's license had expin

• Two opposition radio program |
("Voice of the Christian Democratic I
Party" and "Heightening Awarene.^.-
have been suspended by the regime.

• The Panamanian Supreme Cnu
has agreed to hear a suit filed by "ir
pendent" PPA [Authentic Panameni;
Party] candidate Hildebrando Nicos
claiming that Guillermo Endara can
run for president under another pait
label because he never "resigned" fr(
the PPA.

• The Catholic Church is so con-
cerned about regime-instigated vio-
lence that it is urging family and
neighborhood groups to vote togethe

• There has been a 29% increase
the number of registered voters; the
should have been no more than a
12% increase in registered voters.

• The regime said it would an-
nounce the election results within

24 hours. Challenges to the vote will
dealt with after the official results a
announced.

• A Chilean pollster, commissior
by the opposition, was arrested by >
riega's police on April 29, his inform
tion confiscated, and he was deporte

• The regime has denied visas t
Chilean and Venezuelan nationals plj
ning to observe Panama's elections

Department of State Bulletin/July 1 )*'

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

IPARTMENT STATEMENT,
LY 3, 1989^

the final days of the election cam-
gn in Panama, regime propaganda
; taken on an increasingly threaten-
tone. The campaign of intimidation
lertaken by the regime press and
Panama Defense Forces is aimed at
ucing voter turnout and discourag-
any popular protest following the
louncement of a "victory" for regime
sidential candidate Carlos Duque.
jime efforts to control the outcome
he election include the following.

• The government and the Justice
lister said yesterday that any media
adcasting election results other

n those released by the govern-
nt's election media center will be
lished by warnings, fines, and possi-
closure.

• The government and Justice Min-
•y's national media directorate has
lounced that local and foreign corre-
ndents covering the May 7 election

prohibited from carrying press cre-
iitials issued by any office not author-
;1 by the Noriega regime; penalties
■lude arrest and deportation.

• Two opposition radio programs
ie been suspended by regime

horities.

) • Government-owned media have
n devoting significant coverage to
readiness of the so-called civilian
nity Battalions to defend the gov-
ment coalition's victory on May 7.
j>y have reported Dignity Battalion
pbers gathered at installations of
Panamanian Air Force to receive
es and other weapons. In contrast,
government issued a decree requir-
1 all civilians, including private secu-
1' guards, to turn in their weapons
iir to the elections.

IPARTMENT STATEMENT.

I,Y 4, 19892

l;i)ite Noriega regime efforts at har-
Miii'iit, such as suspending public
rispdrtation services, an opposition
;n|)aign closing rally drew an enthusi-
.-,(.■ crowd estimated by reliable
crces at over 200,000, which is rough-
Mi' r of Panama's entire population.

Despite the obstacles that continue
: le placed in the way of an honest
.■•tural process, the people of Panama
qtinue to demonstrate their deter-
Tiation to manifest their will at the
' tiun polls.

We continue to believe that a free
and fair election provides the oppor-
tunity for Panamanians to find a solu-
tion to the political and economic crises
that have gripped Panama for more
than 20 months. Subverting the elec-
tion results will do nothing more than
perpetuate Panama's crises.

At the opening of the election press
center, operated by the regime's Elec-
toral Tribunal, a decision was an-
nounced to allow the international news
media free access to the May 7 election.
This decision reverses an earlier de-
cree that would have barred entry to
Panama to all but officially invited
journalists.

However, the restrictions that af-
fect housing, transportation, communi-
cation, and that forbid reporting of
unofficial election results remain in ef-
fect. Spanish newsmen have reported
that another journalist — a Barcelona-
based reporter — was prevented from
entering Panama yesterday.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
MAY 5, 1989^

The Noriega regime continues its sys-
tematic campaign to discourage obser-
vation of the elections and independent
reporting of the results, even while it
publicly welcomes observers to the
elections on May 7.

On May 1, Noriega's presidential
candidate, Duque, said, "We want pure,
honest elections, and we wish thou-
sands of observers would come. Hope-
fully all observers who want to come to
observe these elections could come and
will come." He added that Presidents
Ford and Carter are welcome.

However, some Latin American
representatives in the Ford-Carter del-
egation have not received visas, and
the regime continues to place hurdles
in the way of meaningful election cover-
age by journalists.

The Costa Rican Newsmen's Asso-
ciation has reported that two reporters
for Costa Rican television were de-
tained in Panama last week for video-
taping and recording reports on
Panama and comments by Panama-
nians. The regime has also threatened
to arrest and jail any journalist cover-
ing the elections who carry credentials
from U.S. SOUTHCOM [Southern
Command]. SOUTHCOM routinely is-
sues press credentials to journalists
covering SOUTHCOM.

The regime's Electoral Tribunal
has released figures on voter regis-
tration. According to this source,

1,184,324 Panamanians are registered
to vote in Sunday's election. This repre-
sents an unbelievable increase of over
160% of the total number of votes cast
in the 1984 election.

The Panama Defense Forces con-
tinue to arm Panama's Dignity Battal-
ions in public ceremonies as part of an
ongoing campaign to further intimidate
the domestic opposition and discourage
any thoughts of organized protests af-
ter the May 7 election results are an-
nounced. Members of the Dignity
Battalions are primarily young, unem-
ployed Panamanians. The combat slo-
gan of the so-called Dignity Battalions
is, "For Panama, our lives. Panama
first. The fighting will be bitter,
bloody, and without quarter in rich
neighborhoods."

The regime's political parties held
their final rally yesterday. Only 70,000
people turned out. This stands in sharp
contrast to the rally of 200,000 people
held 2 days ago by the opposition
parties.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,

MAY 8, 19893

In Panama, voters faced extraordinary
efforts by the regime of the past weeks
to frustrate the free e.xpression of their
will. Voter turnout in yesterday's elec-
tion was extremely heavy. Reliable
sources estimate it at 80%. Our Em-
bassy reports that independent exit
polls project the opposition coalition
with 68% of the vote and the regime
coalition with 23%.

President Carter this morning said
it appeared, based on observations at
polling stations in Panama City last
night, that the vote was running be-
tween 2- and 3-to-l against the re-
gime. We look forward to hearing the
views of our presidential observer dele-
gation which is holding a press confer-
ence at 4:00 p.m. Washington time.

At this juncture, it appears clear
that the people of Panama have voted
for democracy. It is now up to Gen.
Noriega to respect the wishes of the
Panamanian people.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,

MAY 8, 1989^

We are deeply concerned by evidence
pouring in of electoral fraud on the
part of the pro-Noriega forces.

The leader of the presidential ob-
server delegation. Representative John
Murtha, stated at his press conference

•partment of State Bulletin/July 1989

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Elections in Argentina

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
MAY 10, 1989>

On May 14, 1989, the Argentine people
will have the opportunity to vote for
their new president and members of
congress. Since the last presidential
elections in 1983, the Argentines have
voted in two national elections i'oi- mem-
bers of congress and local officials.

The people of Argentina have dem-
onstrated throughout the last 6 years
their commitment to democracy and
theii- support for the rule of law.
Against this backdrop of shai-ed demo-
cratic values, the Government of the
United States looks forward to con-
tinuing cooperative relations based on
mutual respect and a constructive dia-
logue with whatever government the
Argentine people freely choose through
constitutional processes.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,

MAY 15, 1989'

We congratulate the people of Argen-
tina and their leaders for the demon-
stration of democracy at work which
just took place in their elections. We
also congratulate Dr. Carlos Menem for
his apparent victory.

Argentina's election for president
and members of congress yesterday
was an example of civic responsibility
and democratic values. These elections
took place in an atmosphere of free and
open debate and under procedures in
accord with the Argentine Constitu-
tion. The United States looks forward
to continuing good relations, based on
mutual respect and constructive dia-
logue, with the Government of Argen-
tina in the transition period and with
the new government when it is
inaugurated.

'Read to iie\v.< correspondents by De-
partment deputy spokesman Richard A.
Boucher. ■

that he saw "fraud and manipulation"
by COLINA, the pro-Noriega political
coalition, and that he cannot "justify
saying that there was a just and fair
election." He also said that he was "im-
pressed by the Panamanian peoples' de-
sire for democracy."

European parliamentarians have
been reported as stating that
127,000 ballots have been destroyed.

The opposition held a demonstra-
tion, led by unity candidate Guillermo
Endara, in which 4,000-5,000 people
participated. They were met by a re-
gime show of force which included wa-
ter cannons, "doberman" special riot
police, and armed regime civilian sup-
porters. After a face-off of approx-
imately half an hour, the opposition
marchers dispersed. In the aftermath
of this event, sporadic gunfire has oc-
curred in the areas in which U.S. Em-
bassy personnel live. No injuries have
been reported.

The official vote tabulation has
been interrupted and remains largely
incomplete. The regime has promised
numerous times to publish results but
still has not complied.

PRESIDENT'S REMARKS,
MAY 9, 19895

I would like to comment on the Pan-
amanian elections. I met with the Mur-
tha delegation to hear their report, and
I have now received a preliminary re-
port from President Ford and Presi-
dent Carter. President Carter and his
whole delegation will be here shortly to
give me a full report.

In addition, we have the report of
other observer groups, including that
of the Archbishop of Panama, which
demonstrates clearly that despite mas-
sive irregularities at the polls, the
opposition has won a clearcut, over-
whelming victory. The Panamanian
people have spoken. I call on Gen. Nor-
iega to respect the voice of the people. I
call on all foreign leaders to urge Gen.
Noriega to honor the clear results of
the election.

I might add that I applaud the
statement by Peru's Alan Garcia who
has spoken out against the fraud. I
noted with interest that the Arch-
bishop of Panama felt that 14% of the
vote went to the opposition. I under-
stand that Carlos Andres Perez of
Venezuela is talking to some of the
neighboring countries there to encour-
age a joint statement against the fraud

that has taken place and calling on
Noriega to honor the results of this
election.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,

MAY 9, 1989 =

Scattered and sporadic incidents of
shooting and violence were reported
throughout Panama last night, but thi
morning the streets are quiet. Our
Embassy reports no visible troop pre
ence this morning.

We have no indications that the oi
ficial vote count has ever begun. A
range of international observers has
concluded that the Noriega regime ei'
gaged in massive fraud in an attempt*
steal the election, notwithstanding tl
fact that the Panamanian people hav«
voted overwhelmingly for democracy?
and for a change of regime. We share
these conclusions.

The bishops have called on autho)
ties to respect the will of the people.
The church's statistical sampling of
115 polling places showed the opposi-
tion coalition winning 74*7? of the vot<
with 25% for the regime.

We believe the situation is clear
cut. The Panamanian people have voM
by margins of 2- or 3-to-l to replace*
the Noriega regime with the oppositt
candidate.

Once again we call upon Noriega
respect the will of the people and to '.
the winner win.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
MAY 10, 1989'

ill

The U.S. Embassy reports Panama
City is quiet. Stores and banks are
open, but there is little activity.
Schools remain closed. Panamanian
combat troops have been deployed in
Panama City. m

The regime's Electoral Tribunal
has released partial results from twc
provinces purporting to show the re-l
gime leading the opposition by 2-to-i
At the same time, with about 50% of I
the vote tallied, the opposition's parsl
lei vote count shows the opposition c(
alition with 68.4% of the vote and th(
regime coalition with 23.4%.

The reports of the U.S. and fore
observers, as well as reports from r<
able independent sources within Par[ '
ama concerning the handling of the
ballots and the vote tally sheets afti
the polls closed on May 7 indicate th.
the fraud perpetrated by the regime
has continued after the voting stopp'

111

Department of State Bulletin/July 1''

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Having failed in his attempt to rig
I election in advance, Noriega is now
ng everything he can to steal it af-

the fact despite the clear message
m the people of Panama.

ilTE HOUSE STATEMENT,
^Y 10. 1989«

jsident Bush condemns the violence
V underway in Panama. Gen. No-
ga has thwarted the desire of the
lamanian people for democracy by
iducting a fraudulent election. He

now escalated this to include vio-
ce against opposition leaders, in-
ding Mr. Endara. This action
lerscores that Gen. Noriega does not
^e the interests of the Panamanian
)ple at heart.

At about 4:40 this afternoon, Presi-
it Bush called U.S. Ambassador [to
lama Arthur H.] Davis to receive a

t-hand description of the situation
Panama. They discussed the condi-
h of Mr. Endara, the status of the vi-
nce, and the reported harassment of
5. servicemen. The President tried
call Mr. Endara but could not imme-
tely get through. He asked Ambas-
or Davis to contact Mr. Endara to
[;r his encouragement to the opposi-
1 leader, to commend him for his
sngth in standing up to the Noriega
:es, and to praise him for his convic-
iis in striving to represent the demo-
itic interests of the Panamanian
i«>ple.

The President today also contacted
Slers of other countries with inter-
ss in the region. Those conversations
eated to Latin American unity in
aing the blatant attempts at intimida-
h now being conducted by the No-
i?a regime. The President continues
cnonitor the situation closely and will
(tinue to consult with the states in
1" region.

XPUTY SECRETARY
CAGLEBURGERS INTERVIEW,
OOD MORNING, AMERICA,"

«iY 11, 1989^

iHow does the government read the
(ding of the [Panama] election?

A. It was one of the possibilities
1 1 we have been e.xpecting for some
i e. It's clear that Noriega is half
ilit, that it was a fraudulent election.
"-' trouble is it was his fraud, and he
^ 1 lust the election heavily. But where
\ go from here remains yet to be

seen. Clearly we e.xpected this was a
possibility.

Q. Bob Zelnick has been report-
ing from the Pentagon that today
there may well be an announcement
of more U.S. troops to go into Pan-
ama. Do you anticipate that today?

A. The President hasn't made up
his mind on that subject, as far as I
know, and it is one of those things he is
looking at. He'll be looking at a series
of options, and he'll make his announce-
ments when he's ready.

Q. In light of the violence that
took place against the opposition can-
didate, can the U.S. Administration
stay as passive as it has been?

A. I'm not at all sure you can say
the Administration has been passive.
We've been waiting to see how the elec-
tion results came out. It's clear the peo-
ple of Panama want Noriega out. We
now have to make our choices on the ba-
sis of this robbery that Noriega has
perpetrated against his own people.

Q. And practically, what can we
do?

A. I think there is a series of
things we can do. However, I'd rather
wait and let the President make those
announcements than I do it myself.

Q. What would you have other
Latin American nations do?

A. Some of the other Latin Ameri-
can nations have already taken some
steps. There has been a call for an e.x-
traordinary meeting of the Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS).
President Carlos Andres Perez in Ven-
ezuela has been active. A number of the
Latin Americans have been active. And
there have been some condemnations al-
ready of the thievery in Panama City.

I think we'll get, at least, fairly
substantial diplomatic support and a
fairly substantial open attack on No-
riega's robbery.

Q. Aren't those other nations in
Latin America, though, edgy about
the U.S. response in that it may be
too strong, that there may be signs of
the U.S. stepping in militarily, etc.?

A. The Latins are always going to
be edgy about our response in the sense
that they are always worried about in-
tervention in the internal affairs of
states in Latin America. That's histori-
cally the case.

In this particular case, however, I
think it's fairly clear that there is going
to be almost universal condemnation of
Noriega's robbery this week; and I think
we will find very substantial Latin

American support for our response,
whatever it may be, to Noriega.

Q. Including if we send troops in?

A. I'm not going to make any
guesses about whether we do or do not
send troops in and how the Latin Amer-
icans will react. I will simply say it is
clear, as of this moment, that the Lat-
ins are at least as upset as we are.

Q. There is some talk among
Members of Congress about a mili-
tary reaction, not just sending troops
in to protect Americans who are there
but an actual military action against
Panama. There are some in Congress
talking about their desire to abrogate
the Panama Canal Treaties. Is that
talk helpful or harmful at this point?

A. Helpful, harmful — they get a
chance to express themselves. The
President is having a leadership meet-
ing this morning. They will also get a
chance to e.xpress themselves to the
President. I don't think it makes much
difference in terms of the effect itself
in the area. They have the right to tell
the President and the American people
what they think.

Q. Are either one of those possi-
ble options?

A. I think it's very unlikely, very
unlikely, that we will do anything with
regard to the treaty itself. Again, I
leave that decision obviously to the
President, but I don't think he's going
to move away from the treaty.

With regard to the use of armed
force or what we do with the military, I
just don't want to make any guesses at
this point.

Q. Is there a feeling that Ameri-
cans now in Panama are in danger?

A. No, I don't think there's a feel-
ing that they're in danger. Obviously
we are concerned about them, and
there have been some steps taken, as I
think you already know. We're moving
the dependents from the embassy into
safer areas, and the dependents of the
military are, in fact, under — not house
arrest obviously — but they don't travel
as much. I don't think we're terribly
nervous at this point about it, but it is
something that we have to keep an eye
on.

Q. How do you read Gen. No-
riega's position now? That he is so
firmly in control he doesn't concern
himself with the backlash or that he
is very worried now about his own
situation?

A. One of the two. I'm not at all
sure you can read Noriega at this

}3artment of State Bulletin/July 1989

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

point. But what is clear is he made a
terrible misjudgment with regard to
the election. He tried to steal it and
even then, he lost heavily. I think at
this point, there is no question that his
position in Panama, and certainly in-
ternationally, is much weaker than it
was before the election.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
MAY 11, 1989'

The situation in Panama remains ex-
tremely tense in the aftermath of yes-
terday's unprovoked and outrageous
violence by Noriega's thugs against op-
position leaders.

A massive police presence in the
streets of Panama City has been re-
ported. As of now, there are no
marchers out. Numerous people were
injured yesterday when a peaceful
march was attacked. We understand
that President-elect Endara is still hos-
pitalized after being hit in the head
with a metal bar. The latest reports are
that he looks forward shortly to re-
turning to full activity.

Second Vice President-elect Ford
was also beaten by regime thugs. You
have all seen the pictures of him being
attacked. He is also hospitalized but do-
ing well. We understand that First
Vice President-elect Arias Calderon,
who was also assaulted, is now safe.

Despite all of his attempts to rig
the elections, even Noriega found it im-
possible to declare his man the victor
in the face of overwhelming rejection
by the Panamanian people. As a result,
last night the regime officially an-
nounced that it was declaring the an-
nulment of the election results. As the
attacks on the winners have shown,
Noriega will stop at nothing to main-
tain his strong hold on the country.

We condemn in the strongest possi-
ble terms this attempt to hijack the
democratic process which, as Secretary
Baker noted, is a subversion and per-
version of the will of the Panamanian
people. We again call upon Noriega and
the Panamanian Defense Forces to re-
spect the results of the election.

Finally, let me note the rising tide
of foreign condemnation. We are con-
sulting widely with other nations. So
far to our knowledge at least, Argen-
tina, Guatemala, El Salvador, Peru,
Costa Rica, Spain, the United King-
dom, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Canada, and Venezuela have spoken out
against Noriega. We understand that
Colombia has released a statement on
behalf of the so-called Group of Eight

countries e.xpressing dismay at what
has happened.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
MAY 11, 1989'

The people of Latin America and the
Caribbean have sacrificed, fought, and
died to establish democracy. Today
elected constitutional government is
the clear choice of the vast majority of
the people in the Americas, and the
days of the dictator are over. Still, in
many parts of our hemisphere, the ene-
mies of democracy lie in wait to over-
turn elected governments through
force or to steal elections through
fraud.

All nations in the democratic com-
munity have a responsibility to make it
clear, through our actions and our
words, that efforts to overturn consti-
tutional regimes or steal elections are
unacceptable. If we fail to send a clear
signal when democracy is imperiled,
the enemies of constitutional govern-
ment will become more dangerous. And
that is why events in Panama place an
enormous responsibility on all nations
in the democratic community.

This past week, the people of Pan-
ama, in record numbers, voted to elect
a new democratic leadership of their
country. And they voted to replace the
dictatorship of Gen. Manuel Noriega.
The whole world was watching. Every
credible observer — the Catholic
Church, Latin and European ob-
servers, leaders of our Congress, and
two former Presidents of the United
States — tell us the same story. The op-
position won. It was not even a close
election. The opposition won by a mar-
gin of nearly 3-to-l.

The Noriega regime first tried to
steal this election through massive
fraud and intimidation and now has
nullified the election and resorted to
violence and bloodshed. In recent days,
a host of Latin American leaders has
condemned this election fraud. They
have called on Gen. Noriega to heed the
will of the people of Panama. We sup-
port and second those demands. The
United States will not recognize nor ac-
commodate a regime that holds power
through force and violence at the ex-
pense of the Panamanian people's right
to be free.

I have exchanged these views over
the last several days with democratic
leaders in Latin America and in Eu-
rope. These consultations will
continue.

The crisis in Panama is a conflict
between Noriega and the people of Pa*
ama. The United States stands with
the Panamanian people. We share the
hope that the Panamanian Defense
Forces will stand with them and fulfi!
their constitutional obligation to defer
democracy. A professional Panamaniai
Defense Force can have an important
role to play in Panama's democratic
future.

The United States is committed I
democracy in Panama. We respect th*
sovereignty of Panama, and, of course
we have great affection for the Pan-
amanian people.

We are also committed to protect
the lives of our citizens. And we are
committed to the integrity of the Pan
ama Canal Treaties, which guarantei
safe passage for all nations through tl
canal. The Panama Canal Treaties art
a proud symbol of respect and partne |
ship between the people of the Unite'
States and the people of Panama.

In support of these objectives an
after consulting this morning with t?
bipartisan leadership of the Congres
I am taking the following steps.

First, the United States stroniil
supports and will cooperate with inil
fives taken by governments in this
hemisphere to address this crisis
through regional diplomacy and actic
in the Organization of American Stat
and through other means.

Second, our Ambassador in Pan
ama, Arthur Davis, has been recalle
and our Embassy staff will be reduct
to essential personnel only.

Third, U.S. Government empluy(
and their dependents living outside c
U.S. military bases or Panama Cana
Commission housing areas will be ri
cated out of Panama or to secure l'.>
housing areas within Panama. This :
tion will begin immediately. It will b
completed as quickly and in as orderl
a manner as possible.

Fourth, the State Department,
through its travel advisory, will en-
courage U.S. business representativ
residing in Panama to arrange for th
extended absences of their dependen
wherever possible.

Fifth, economic sanctions will ci
tinue in force.

Sixth, the United States will cai
out its obligations and will assert am
enforce its treaty rights in Panama i
der the Panama Canal Treaties.

And finally, we are sending a
brigade-size force to Panama to aug-
ment our military forces already as-
signed there.

Department of State Bulletin/July 1!

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Elections in Bolivia

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,

MAY 8, 1989'

Yesterday, while efforts were being
made in Panama to rig an election, Bo-
livia held an open, honest vote for a
new president and a new congress. Bo-
livia's three major political parties are
Committed to democracy and carried
out hard-fought, well-organized, seri-
ous cami)aigiis.

With over half the vote counted,
the results are very close. Former
President Hugo Banzer of the National-
ist Democratic Action (ADN) Party
took the lead in early returns which
were primarily from urban areas. But
as the vote has come in from rural
areas, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada of
the Nationalist Revolutionary

Movement (MNR) has been catching
up. Jaime Paz of the Movement of the
Revolutionary Left (MIR) is a strong
third. The popular vote is still too close
to call.

If none of the candidates receive a
majority of the popular vote, in accord-
ance with Bolivia's Constitution, the
ne.\t president will be chosen from the
three top candidates by the newly
elected congress when it meets in
August.

The Bolivian election is a victoi'y
for democracy. The candidates and
the people of Bolivia are to be
congratulated.

'Read tij new> c-firrespondents by De-
partment deputy .spokesman Richard A.
Boucher. ■

If reipiired, I do not rule out fur-
ther steps in the future.

The United States and all demo-
cratic nations in this hemisphere hope
that a peaceful resolution can be found
Lii tlie crisis in Panama. And we urge
:ill those in Panama — every individual,
'.'Very institution — to put the well-being
jf their country first and seek an hon-
orable solution to this crisis. The way is
^till open.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
M.\Y 12, 1989'

Panama City was cjuiet overnight. The
regime continues to put police and mil-
itary on the streets in a show of force
in order to intimidate the opposition
^nd to suppress popular reaction to the
jannulment of the election. Businesses
are open, but there is little activity.
Schools remain closed.

The Department of State travel
warning, issued May 11, warns U.S.
citizens that the e.xtremely unsettled
conditions and the reduction of
embassy personnel in Panama compli-
cate embassy efforts to provide full
!|3rotective and consular services to
Americans. U.S. citizens are advised
not to travel to Panama until further
notice.

U.S. citizens aboard ships transit-
ing the Panama Canal are well advised
to remain aboard the vessel while in
Panamanian territory. Private sector
•and other U.S. citizens are advised to

arrange for their dependents in Pan-
ama to depart until conditions return
to normal. The U.S. Embassy will re-
main open to assist U.S. citizens. They
should contact the embassy's Consular
Section for information and assistance.

Foreign reaction continues to
strongly condemn developments in Pan-
ama. Peru has issued a second state-
ment, condemning the annulment of the
election and has stressed its support of
democracy in Panama.

President Oscar Arias of Costa
Rica has said the Panamanian people
were betrayed and quotes the Costa Ri-
can Supreme Electoral Tribunal as re-
jecting the legitimacy of the results.

Salvadoran Foreign Minister
Ricardo Acevedo notes that it is clear
that the opposition was victorious in
the May 7 election and says El Salvador
intends to reject all forms of manipula-
tion and fraud in the Panama election.

Ecuadoran Foreign Minister Cor-
dovez has condemned the imposition of
press restrictions in Panama.

The European Community has con-
demned election fraud and violence in
Panama.

By latest count, I note 11 individu-
al countries, in addition to the United
States, that have issued individual
statements. In addition, Colombia
made a statement on behalf of the
Group of Eight, and the European
Community's 12 nations have issued a
statement.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
MAY 1.5, 1989'

The flood of international condemna-
tion of Noriega continues to flow in.
The Governments of Argentina, Belize,
Canada, Costa Rica, Dominica, El Sal-
vador, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Guatemala, Japan, Me.xico,
Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Spain,
Trinidad and Tobago, the United King-
dom, Uruguay, and Venezuela have all
spoken out, as has the Group of Eight
through Colombia and the 12 nations of
the European Community. The OAS, of
course, will meet on Wednesday.

In addition, condemnation contin-
ues inside Panama. We salute the cour-
age of the leaders of the Catholic
Church in speaking out against No-
riega's dictatorship, especially in light
of the contempt for life which the regi-
me showed in the killing of Father Van
Cleef, the Dutch priest working in
Panama.

We second the words of the bishop's
letter, which states, in part, "What
moral justification is thei-e to disperse
with blows and bullets men and women
whose only crime has been to demand
peacefully their rights?" The letter
calls upon the regime to honor the will
of the people, expressed freely in the
ballot boxes. We, too, believe that this
is the only way to end the crisis which
Panama now^ faces.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
MAY 16, 1989'

The struggle in Panama continues. The
democratic opposition has called for a
24-hour general strike tomorrow. May
17, the same day the consultation of the
OAS foreign ministers is to take place
here.

The Noriega regime's response
thus far has been to declare business
strikes illegal and to threaten to apply
sanctions against violators. In a bla-
tant attempt to thwart public employee
participation in the general strike, the
regime has announced it will pay em-
ployees overdue salaries tomorrow.
Those who do not report for work may
risk being fired or losing their pay.

Other regime efforts to frustrate
public demand to honor the elections in-
clude ongoing censorship of independ-
ent radio and TV stations in Panama
and jamming and interference with
U.S. Southern Command broadcasts of
network news.

Department of State Bulletin/July 1989

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

At the Organization of American
States meeting tomorrow, supporters
of democracy can take an important
step to help the people of Panama. We
welcome the fact that a large number of
foreign ministers will attend this meet-
ing. We hope the meeting will result in
a clear examination of the situation in
Panama, and we look forward to work-
ing with governments from throughout
the hemisphere to develop action in
support of democracy. This is a meet-
ing called by Latins, led by Latins, and
we expect the result to reflect Latin in-
terest in democracy.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
MAY 17, 1989^

Today in Panama, the general strike
was called by the democratic forces. In
Washington the foreign ministers of
the OAS member nations will be ur-
gently considering the struggle in
Panama.

It is still too early to tell what the
level of participation in the strike will
be. Certainly Noriega is making every
effort to try to frustrate it. The regime
is forcing buses and taxis to operate. It
is making today payday for government
employees. It has made threats against
businesses that may join in the strike
and threatened to use its Dignity Bat-
talion goon squads.

We are now seeing press reports of
beatings and torture of regime oppo-
nents who were tortured while de-
tained. If true, these violations of
fundamental human rights are
intolerable.

The President has talked to
Guillermo Endara and congratulated
him on his victory. The President also
stressed the American people's support
for the Panamanian people's desire for
democracy.

International condemnation of No-
riega continues. President Cerezo of
Guatemala has stated that "the Pan-
amanian regime no longer has any jus-
tification for what it is doing."

Finally, I would note that Luis An-
derson, a Panamanian member of the
Canal Commission Board of Directors
since 1983, has resigned his position in
protest of Noriega's policies. Mr. An-
derson is Secretary General of ORIT,
the Inter-American Regional Workers
Organization, Latin America's regional
labor grouping.

OAS RESOLUTION 1,

MAY 17, 1989**

Reaffirming: That the true significance of
American sioHdarity and good neighborli-
ness can only mean the consolidation on thi.s
continent, within the framework of demo-
cratic institutions, of a system of individual
liberty and social justice based on respect
for the essential rights of man: and

That no State or group of States has the
right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for
any reason whatever, in the internal or ex-
ternal affairs of any other State; and

Considering: That the grave events and
the abuses by Genera! Manuel Antonio No-
riega in the crisis and the electoral process
in Panama could unleash an escalation of vi-
olence with its attendant risks to the life
and safety of persons;

That these events have abridged the
right of the Panamanian people to freely
elect their legitimate authorities;

That the outrageous abuses perpetrated
against the opposition candidates and citi-
zenry violate human, civil and political
rights;

That the crisis, which involves internal
and external factors, is escalating rapidly,
and could seriously endanger international
peace and security;

That the solidarity of the American
States and the high aims which are sought
through it require the political organization
of those States on the basis of the effective
exercise of representative democracy;

That every State has the right to
choose, without external interference, its
own political, economic and social system
and to organize itself in the way best suited
to it;

That the Organization of American
States must offer its collaboration in pro-
moting the measures required for an effec-
tive and urgent solution to the Panamanian
crisis that will preserve the standards of
inter-American comity;

That an essential purpose of the Organi-
zation of American States is to promote and
consolidate representative democracy with
due respect for the principle of noninter-
vention— a purpose that is being seriously
jeopardized by the current political situation
in Panama; and

That the continuation in force of the
1977 Panama Canal Treaties and compliance
with them constitute a fundamental commit-
ment of all of the Governments of the Ameri-
cas that has received universal approval,

Resolves: 1. To entrust to the Ministers
of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador, Guatemala
and Trinidad and Tobago the urgent mission
of promoting, with the assistance of the
Secretary General of the Organization of
American States, conciliation formulas for
arriving at a national accord that can bring
about, through democratic mechanisms, a
transfer of power in the shortest possible
time, and with full respect for the sovereign
will of the Panamanian people.

2. To exhort the Government of Panan
to cooperate fully in the implementation ol
this resolution.

'.J. To urge the authorities and all polit
cal forces in Panama to refrain from any
measure or act that could aggravate the
crisis.

4. To urge all States to cooperate in tl
implementation of this resolution.

.5. To instruct the Mission to present tl
this Meeting of Consultation a report on t
fulfillment of its mandate, to be consider©
at its session of June 6, 1989, the date on
which the Meeting is convened so that
further appropriate measures may be
determined.

6. To exhort all States to refrain from
any action that may infringe the principle
nonintervention in the internal affairs of
States.

7. To keep the Meeting of Consultatio'
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in session
long as the current situation persists.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,

MAY 18, 19893

We are very pleased with the OAS re<
olution. It constitutes a condemnatiot
of Noriega by name for his abuses. Iti
calls for a transfer of power to those
who enjoy the support of the Panama
nian people, and it calls for sending a
mission to Panama to report back byi
June 6 at the reconvening of the grou
The vote had the support of all the OJ
states.

Two specific anti-U.S. amend-
ments concerning U.S. troops in
Panama that were introduced by
Nicaragua were voted down over-
whelmingly. Some countries which
voted against these amendments wou
normally vote against measures invo«
ing troops, but in the event, only
Nicaragua and Panama supported th!
negative amendments.

The language to condemn Noriej
by name was introduced by the Latin
We support them and the process wh
has emerged. Noriega should listen t'
the clear message from his people an
from his neighbors. It is time for hin
to leave.

'Text from Weeklv Compilation of Pr
dential Documents of May 1, 1989.

-Read to news correspondents by De
partment spokesman Margaret DeB.
Tutwiler.

■*Read to news correspondents by De
partment deputy spokesman Richard A.
Boucher.

JMade available by Department depu
spokesman Richard A. Boucher.

■"■Text from Weekly Compilation of Pr
dential Documents of May 15.

•^Text from White House press relea.^

"Press release 82.

"Adopted by consensus. ■

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

.S.-Mexico Relations

e importance of U.S. -Mexico ties
s underscored on November 22,
18, when President-elect George
3h met with Mexican President-elect
rlos Salinas in his first postelection
eting with a foreign leader. Mexico
mportant to the United States not
y as a neighbor sharing a 1,952-mile
der, and one of our largest, secure
deign oil suppliers, but as our third
agest trading partner It is a country
h which we have longstanding cul-
al ties and a shared history. The
jited States is important to Mexico

its major market and trading part-
a close neighbor and world power,
nvestor in the Mexican economy,
the home of many emigres who
tintain family ties in Mexico. For
Ise reasons, Mexico and the United
[,tes desire closer relations and are
irking together more closely than
Jr on economic, border, tourism, and
r enforcement issues.

Recent U.S. -Mexican agreements
nude: a bilateral trade and invest-
iit framework understanding; a mu-
1 1 k'gal assistance treaty; and
j-eements on textiles, steel, civil avi-
tin. telecommunications, and the bor-
1 environment. Ongoing dialogue has
'rted potential friction over U.S. im-
i;i':ition reform. And Mexican acces-
ii to the General Agreement on
'•iffs and Trade (GATT) has marked
rim]3ortant step in relating Mexico to
I World economy and enhancing the
isiliility of further strengthening
'v -.Mexico trade relations.

idc

' ■ trade relationship with our south-
1 neighbor is extremely important.
\:h a 1988 total of $44 billion in two-
V trade, Mexico was our third larg-
^ trading partner — after Canada and
ian. with which U.S. total trade
lounted to $150 billion and $131 bil-
1. respectively. Mexico was the third
i^f.'it U.S. export market and fifth
iLifst supplier of 1988 U.S. imports,
ttlie same time, the United States is
«n more important to Mexico's trad-
1 picture — some two-thirds of its to-
ijtrade was with the United States.
1 Since 1986 Mexico has liberalized
Hariff levels and cut its use of import
insing and official reference prices,
^part of this reform package, Mexico
liversifying its exports to reduce its
^nerability to fluctuations in the

Mexico, with some 82 million inhabi-
tants, 18 tlie 11th must populous country
in the world. Its capitiril is the world's
laiM.''-st city. But while Mexico has one
!■'■■• '■ ihi- developed world, much of Mex-
'1 a Third World country. Also
'" 'he throes of massive social
ch: ! a rural nation of 2G million

peuj.., 1,. itais ago, Mexico has become a
largely urban industrializing nation,
whose population will exceed 100 million
by the year 2000. Each year, 1 million
younjr i.ieople enter the job market — most
of whom seek work in metroiJolitan cen-
ters or the United States.

Mexico is goin,i)- tlirou,i>-h perhaps its
worst economic )-ecessiciii of this century
and massive systemic changes largely
driven by economic and demographic
forces. Per capita income is down ly-r
since 19S2, and there is w idespread un-
employment, but this has given rise to
modernization efforts that have already
begun to bring major and beneficial
changes to the economy and also may
have accelerated the evolution of Mexico's
political system.

price of oil. Though affected somewhat
by low petroleum prices, exports of
manufactured goods produced more
revenue in 1986, 1987, and 1988 than
did oil exports, testimony to the impact
of Mexican economic reforms and their
emphasis on developing exports.

Under an umbrella Framework
Understanding on Trade and Invest-
ment in 1987, the United States and
Mexico have concluded separate ac-
cords on trade in textiles, steel, beer
and wine, and — outside the frame-
work— on civil aviation. Following the
signing of the Free Trade Agreement
with Canada in 1988, some discussion
has centered on the possibilities for de-
veloping a similar accord with Mexico.
The gap in development levels between
the United States and Mexico makes
that unlikely at this time, but there is
interest on both sides in expanding
trade relations.

Investment

The United States accounts for more
than 60% of some $20 billion in foreign
direct investment in Mexico. More for-
eign and domestic investment is needed
to promote Mexican economic growth.
Though the investment climate is im-
proving, domestic ownership restric-
tions, local content and performance
requirements, poor intellectual proper-
ty protection, and unclear rules still
discourage foreign investment. How-
ever, an extensive liberalization of
these rules reportedly is underway.

The 1987 trade and investment
framework established a consultative
mechanism for resolution of these is-
sues. It can serve as a vehicle for work-
ing toward future trade and investment
agreements and marks a significant
advance in the bilateral negotiating
climate.

The growth of the Mexican in-bond
assembly plant industry (maqui-
ladora) — where imported components
are transformed and reexported as fin-
ished goods — and its use by major U.S.
manufacturers have led to a substantial
degree of U. S.-Mexico industrial inte-
gration. This has spurred economic
growth on both sides of the border.

Debt

About 25<7f of Mexico's $107-billion debt
and $13-billion annual debt service is
owed to U.S. banks. A large portion of
this debt was acquired in the late 1970s
when the discovery of vast additional
oil reserves in Mexico removed con-
straints on foreign borrowing.

However, by 1982 Mexico was beset
by falling oil prices and rising real in-
terest rates, coupled with poorly man-
aged fiscal and monetary policy. This
resulted in a substantial decline in real
wages and per capita output over the
subsequent 6 years. Mexico has under-
taken and persisted in difficult eco-
nomic reform measures which have
curbed inflation sharply and trimmed,
somewhat, the government's inflation-
adjusted fiscal deficit. These essential

Ipartment of State Bulletin/July 1989

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

U.S. Trade With Mexico, 1988

Chemicals, 8.9%

Beverages,

Tobacco 0.1%

Crude

Materials,

7.1%

Other. 4.1%

Agricultural
Goods, 8%

Mineral
Fuels, 2.2%

Chemicals, 3.2%

Crude
Materials,

1.7%

Other, 4.3%

Agricultural
Goods, 8.3%

Beverages,
Tobacco 1.1%

Mineral
Fuels, 14.6%

Department of State Bulletin/July 1i'

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

sures, on the heels of already de-
iiit; real wages, have been seen as
iisintj a heavy social cost. Mexico
remained current in paying its in-
latiunal debt obligations, despite
,fai-t that interest alone, at $9 bil-
|in 1988, represented over 5% of to-

iutput.

An economically healthy Mexico is
:e U.S. interest, both for the sake
)cial stability and to maintain its
)icity to function as a major market
iJ.S. goods and services.
Mexico may need help in order to
ijre that it resume growth. It is try-
|,o negotiate a reduction in its re-
.ments to international lenders over
(next 5 years in order to devote
(e funds to resuming growth. In
,y March 1989, U.S. Secretary of
(Treasury Nicholas Brady an-
ificed a proposal for debt and debt
-ice reduction which would apply to
■■(1 World debtors. Mexico presented
5iwn plan for debt management to
Wiifld Bank and International Mon-
: y I'und meetings in April.

rfiigration

jfiigration, legal and illegal, has a
in- impact on U.S. -Mexican rela-
5-. The United States issues more
1 iui'ant visas to Mexican nationals
;' t(i those of any other nation —
'HI in fiscal year 1987. Visitor visas
tied nearly one-half million in the
)e period. Yet immigration issues
IT been contentious for some time.
)the United States, the problem is
Hof controlling entry across borders
lassuring that immigrants do not
.'lace American workers. Mexico
:Us to protect the human and labor
ets of its workers in the United
:es, whether legal or otherwise. Mi-

■ ion to the United States is often

(1 as a social "safety valve," as an al-
rative to unemployment or undei'-
qloyment at home. The U.S. and
eican Governments share a deep
iiern over violent acts against Mexi-
;i. committed by smugglers of illegal
liiigrants or other criminals.
Substantial portions of the Immi-

■ ion Reform and Control Act of 1986
iiern the twin issues of illegal immi-
-ion and the need for agricultural
brers in the United States. The
:\-which seeks to reduce illegal im-
tration by providing enforcement of
I'tions against those employing ille-

i mmigrants — has moved into high
^■. The law also has amnesty provi-
■s which will allow many undocu-

U.S. Trade With Mexico, 1988

■ Exports
O Imports

1982 1983 1984

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce

mented aliens who have lived in the
United States to obtain legal resident
alien status and eventually citizenship.
Legalization provisions have allowed
1,235,600 Mexicans who were residing
illegally in the United States to remain
legally.

In 1987 the Mexican and U.S. Gov-
ernments established two joint working
groups to discuss ways to reduce vio-
lence against undocumented aliens as
they enter the United States, handle
mistreatment of Mexicans, and resolve
other problems.

Narcotics

Mexico has expanded the scope of
opium and marijuana eradication pro-
grams, while taking steps to improve
operational efficiency. However, Mexico
is still a major drug producer and a ma-
jor transshipment point for South
American cocaine. It is our largest sin-
gle foreign source of heroin and the sec-
ond largest source for marijuana.

The demand for illicit narcotics in
the United States and the foreign pro-
duction and trafficking of drugs are
two sides of the same coin. The United
States seeks to resolve the problem of
illegal narcotics traffic from Mexico to
the United States by working together
with Mexican authorities to curb sup-
ply. At the same time, the United
States works with officials at state and
local levels to reduce the demand for
drugs in the United States.

The narcotics problem is the most
controversial in our bilateral relation-
ship. U.S. law requires that countries
be certified as cooperating with the
United States before they can benefit
from certain assistance programs and
tariff benefits. In the case of Mexico,
the loss of tariff benefits under the
generalized system of preferences — and
a sharp cut in concessional lending —
would be the most significant
sanctions.

Mexican officials point out that
60% of their attorney general's budget
and 25% of their army personnel are
deployed in the war against drugs. The
attorney general's budget for 1989 ex-
ceeds $26 million, up from $19.5 mil-
lion in 1987. For our part, President
Bush has announced a $5.5 billion na-
tionwide program to curb drug con-
sumption in the United States through
education and increased law enforce-
ment. Mexico is prosecuting top drug
traffickers, including those charged
with the highly publicized kidnaping
and murder of an American drug enfor-
cement agent.

Since 1976 the United States has
supported a Mexican aerial eradication
program, primarily through funding of
maintenance support. Mexican authori-
ties have seized record amounts of co-
caine this year, and U.S. and Mexican
officials cooperate on drug interdiction
along the border.

eartment of State Bulletin/July 1989

TREATIES

Bilateral Relations

The sheer breadth of U.S.-Mexico rela-
tions, the 1,952-mile land border, and
involvement by federal, state, and local
and private-sector entities give us a
unique position with our neighbor to
the south. While the range of our rela-
tionship will always deal with the man-
agement of problems that derive from
our many ties, the fabric of the rela-
tionship has been marked by increasing
cooperation and understanding and the
creation of institutions to manage the
resolution of differences.

U.S. foreign policy objectives to-
ward Mexico include:

• A stronger U.S. -Mexican trade
partnership, based upon the further re-
laxation of trade barriers on both sides;

• Increased access for foreign in-
vestment in Mexico;

• Responsible and prudent action
toward the payment of Mexico's inter-
national debt, some $30 billion of which
is owed to U.S. financial institutions;

• The control of illegal emigration
from Mexico to the United States,
while facilitating the flow of docu-
mented workers and preventing the
abuse of Mexican workers who do cross
the border; and

• A reduction in the flow of illegal
narcotics from Mexico to the United
States by engaging in bilateral efforts
to curb both supply and demand. ■

Mexico — A Profile

Geography

Area: 1.978 million sq. km. (764,000 sq.
mi.); about three times the size of Texas.
Cities: Capital — Mexico City (pop. 18 mil-
lion, est. 1985). Other f)7(>s— Guadalajara
a million), Monterrey (2.7 million), Ciudad
Juarez (1.12 million), Puebla de Zaragoza
(1.1 million), Leon (1 million). Terrain:
Varies from coastal lowlands to high moun-
tains. Climate: Varies from tropical to
desert.

People

Nationality: Noun and adjective — Mex-
ican(s). Population (July 1987): 81.9 mil-
lion. Annual growth rate (1987 est.):
2.09%. Ethnic groups: Indian-Spanish
(mestizo) 60%, American Indian 30%., Cau-
casian 9%, other 1%. Religion: Roman
Catholic 97%, Protestant 3%. Language:
Spanish. Education: Years compulsory —
10. Literacy— 8S%. Health: Infant mor-
tality rate (1984)— 51.0/1,000. Life expect-
ancy (1984) — 65.4 yrs. Work force
(26,320,000, 1985): Agriculture, forestry,
hunting, fishing — 26%. Manufacturing —
12.8%. Commerce— 13.9%. Services-
Si. 4%. Mining and quarrying — 1.3%.
Construction— 9.^%. Electricity— 0.3%.
Transportation and communication —
4.8%.

Government

Type: Federal Republic. Independence:

First proclaimed September 16, 1810; Re-
public established 1822. Constitution:
February 5, 1917.

Branches: Executive — president (chief
of state and head of government).
Legislative — bicameral. Judicial — Supreme
Court, local and federal systems.

Political parties: Institutional Revolu-
tionary Party (PRI), National Action Party
(PAN), Mexican Socialist Party (PMS),
Mexican Democratic Party (PDM), Popular
Socialist Party (PPS), the Authentic Party
of the Mexican Revolution (PARM), Mex-
ican Workers Party (PMT), Revolutionary
Workers Party (PRT), Party of the Car-
denist Front of National Reconstruction
(PFCRN). Suffrage: Universal over 18.

Administrative subdivisions: 31 states
and the federal district.

Flag: Green, white, and red vertical
bands. An eagle holding a snake in its beak
and perching on a cactus is centered.

Membership in International
Organizations

UN and some of its specialized and related
agencies, including the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF); the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT); International Civil Aviation Orga-
nization (ICAO); Seabeds Committee;
Inter-American Defense Board (lADB);
Organization of American States (OAS);
Latin American Integration Association
(ALADI); INTELSAT; and many others.

Taken from the Background Notes of Febru-
ary 1988, published by the Bureau of Public
Affairs, Department of State. Editor:
Juanita Adams. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

Convention on the regulation of Antarctic
mineral resource activities. Done at Well-i
ington June2, 1988.'
Signatures: Argentina, Mar. 17, 1989;--'
Chile, Mar. 17, 1989;^-' U.K. Man 22, 19891

Aviation, Civil

Convention on international civil aviation
Done at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered int
force Apr. 4, 1947. TIAS 1.591.
Adherence deposited: Bhutan, May 17, 19!*

Protocol for the suppression of unlawful at
of violence at airports serving internatioi'
civil aviation, supplementary to the conve
tion of Sept. 23, 1971 (TIAS"7570). Done a.
Montreal Feb. 24, 1988.' [Senate] Treaty
Doc. 100-19.

Signature: Luxembourg, May 18, 1989.
Ratification deposited: Kuwait, Mar. 8,
1989.

Coffee

International coffee agreement 1983, wit
annexes. Done at London Sept. 16, 1982.
tered into force provisionally Oct. 1, 198rv
definitively Sept. 11, 1985. [Senate] Treai
Doc. 98-2.

Territorial application: Extended by the
U.K. to St. Helena, effective Jan. 6,' 1989«

Collisions

Convention on the international regulatia
for preventing collisions at sea, 1972, witi
regulations, as amended (TIAS 8587, 109
Done at London Oct. 20, 1972. Entered in
force July 15, 1977. TIAS 8587.
Accession deposited: Malta, Mar. 20, 1989

Conservation

Convention on the conservation of AntarC
marine living resources, with annex. Do!
at Canberra Mav 20, 1980. Entered into
force Apr. 7, 1982. TIAS 10240.
Accession deposited: Italy, Mar. 29, 1989.

Judicial Procedure

Convention on the civil aspects of intern;
tional child abduction. Done at The Hagu
Oct. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1,
1983; for the U.S. July 1, 1988. [Senate]
Treaty Doc. 99-11.
Signature: Sweden, Mar. 22, 1989.
Ratification deposited: Sweden, Mar. 22,
1989.-'

Load Lines

International convention on load lines, IS
Done at London Apr. 5, 1966. Entered inii
force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331, 6629, 672
Accessions deposited: Haiti, Apr 6, 1989
Tanzania, Feb. 28, 1989.

TREATIES

itime Matters

rnational convention on standards of
ling, certification, and watchkeeping
eafarers, 1978. Done at London July 7.
. Entered into force Apr. 28, 1984.=
ission deposited: Haiti, Apr. 6, 1989.

rention for the suppression of unlawful
against the safety of maritime naviga-
with protocol for the suppression of un-
ul acts against the safety of fixed

!-ms located on the Continental Shelf.
lb at Rome Mar. lU, 1988.' [Senate] Trea-
oc. 101-1.
fatures: Belgium, Mar. 9. 1989; Byelorus-

iS.S.R., Mar. 2, 1989; Czechoslovakia,
f 9, 1989; Egypt, Aug. 16, 1988; Nigeria,
. 9, 1988; Saudi Arabia, Mar 6, 1989;
inian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., Mar. 2, 1989.

) ear Material — Physical Protection

I'ention on the physical protection of nu-

'• material, with anne.xes. Done at Vien-

1 1. i!ii, 1979. Entered into force Feb. 8,

liration deposited: Argentina, May 2,

nts — Microorganisms

pest treaty on the international recog-
|n of the deposit of microorganisms for
lUrposes of patent procedure, with reg-
ions. Done at Budapest Apr. 28, 1977.
■red into force Aug. 19, 1980. TIAS

sion deposited: German Dem. Rep.,
rl7. 1989.

I jtion

-.iidments to the convention of Dec. 29,
u nil the prevention of marine pollution
jiiiping of wastes and other matter

1 S M(i.5). Done at London Oct. 12, 1978.'

-' Ptaiice deposited: Portugal, Mar. 10,

u ii'al protocol on substances that de-
e- thf ozone layer, with annex. Done at
areal Sept. 16, 1987. Entered into force
dl. 1989. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-10.
:'ssinn deposited; Hungary, Apr 20,

ill'ication deposited: Austria, May 3,

'^-

elgees

•«ocol relating to the status of refugees.

D» at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered

t.force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1,

«. TIAS 6.577.

■ ssion deposited: Mozambique, May 1,

t'national natural rubber agreement,
'". \\ ith annexes. Done at Geneva Mar. 20.
I', filtered into force provisionally
f 29, 1988. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-9.
aification deposited: Finland, Apr. 18,

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of

life at sea, 1974, with annex, as amended.

Done at London Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into

force May 25, 1980. TIAS 9700, 10009,

10626.

Accessions deposited: Haiti, Apr. 6, 1989;

Suriname, Nov. 4, 1988.

Sugar

International sugar agreement, 1987, with
annexes. Done at London Sept. 11, 1987. En-
tered into force provisionally Mar 24, 1988.
Accession deposited: El Salvador, Mar. 17,
1989.

Tonnage

International convention on tonnage meas-
urement of ships, 1969. with annexes. Done
at London June 23, 1969. Entered into force
July 18, 1982; for the U.S. Feb. 10, 1983.
TIAS 10490.

Acceptance deposited: Indonesia, Mar. 14,
1989.

Accessions deposited: Haiti, Apr. 6, 1989;
Malta, Mar 20, 1989.

BILATERAL

Australia

Agreement amending the agreement of Dec.
3, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1574, 3880), con-
cerning air transport. Effected by exchange
of notes at Washington Mar 23, 1989. Enter-
ed into force Mar. 23, 1989; effective
Aug. 20, 1988.

Supersedes the agreement of Aug. 12, 1957
(TIAS 3880).

Agreement relating to the air transport
agreement of Dec. 3, 1946, as amended
(TIAS 1574, 3880), concerning capacity for
the North Pacific, South Pacific, and Guam
routes, with annexes. Effected by exchange
of notes at Washington Mar. 23, 1989. Enter-
ed into force Mar 23, 1989; effective Aug.
20, 1988.

Austria

Air services agreement, with annexes.
Signed at Vienna Mar. 16, 1989. Entered
into force June 2, 1989.

Botswana

Agreement concerning interpretation of the
agreement of June 15, 1984, relating to the
employment of dependents of official govern-
ment employees. Effected by exchange of
notes at New York Mar 14 and Apr. 27,
1989. Entered into force Apr. 27, 1989.

Chile

Memorandum of understanding regarding
cooperation in ensuring the safety and
wholesomeness of fresh and frozen oysters,
clams, and mussels exported to the U.S.
from Chile. Signed at Rockville May 18,
1989. Entered into force May 18, 1989.

China

Memorandum of agreement on liability for
satellite launches. Signed at Washington
Dec. 17, 1988.

Memorandum of agreement on satellite
technology safeguards. Signed at Washing-
ton Dec. 17, 1988.

Memorandum of agreement regarding inter-
national trade in commercial launch serv-
ices, with annex. Signed at Washington
Jan. 26, 1989.
Entered into force: Mar. 16, 1989.

Denmark

Agreement amending and extending the
agreement of June 11, 1984, concerning
Faroese fishing in fisheries off the coasts of
the U.S. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington Man 28, 1989. Enters into force
on a date to be agreed upon by exchange of
notes following completion of internal pro-
cedures of both parties.

European Economic Community

Agreement amending and extending the
agreement of Oct. 1, 1984, concerning fish-
eries off the coasts of the U.S. Effected by
exchange of notes at Brussels Sept. 15, 1988,
and Feb. 27, 1989. Enters into force on a
date to be agreed upon by exchange of notes
following the completion of internal pro-
cedures of both parties.

Germany, Federal Republic of

Memorandum of understanding concerning a
cooperative program for harmonization, de-
velopment, production, and support of a
maritime patrol aircraft, with annexes.
Signed at Bonn and Washington Feb. 17 and
Apr. 5, 1989. Entered into force Apr. 5,
1989.

Memorandum of understanding for coopera-
tive projects of research and development in
the field of high energy laser technology,
with annex. Signed at Bonn Apr. 14, 1989.
Entered into force Apr 14, 1989.

Agreement amending the air transport
agreement of July 7, 1955, as amended
(TIAS 3536. 6434, 9591). Signed at Bonn
Apr 25, 1989. Enters into force on the date
on which the U.S. is informed that neces-
sary F. R.G. national requirements have
been completed.

Honduras

Agreement to establish a Caribbean Basin
Radar Network (CBRN) in Honduras.
Signed at Tegucigalpa Apr 7, 1989. Enters
into force on the date on which parties ex-
change notes indicating that their respec-
tive constitutional requirements have been
fulfilled.

Iceland

Agreement amending and extending the
agreement of Sept. 21, 1984, concerning
fisheries off the coasts of the U.S. Effected
by exchange of notes at Reykjavik Nov. 23.
1988, and Jan. 17, 1989. Enters into force on
a date to be agreed upon by exchange of
notes following the completion of internal
procedures of both governments.

Qartment of State Bulletin/July 1989

PRESS RELEASES

India

Agreement concerning the reciprocal ex-
emption from income tax of income derived
from tlie international operation of ships and
aircraft. Effected bv an exchange of notes
at New Delhi Apr. 12. 1989. Entered into
force Apr. 12, 1989; effective with respect to
taxable years on or after Jan. 1, 1987.

international .\tomic Energy Agency
(IAEA)

Tax reimbursement agreement, with annex.
Signed at Vienna Apr. 5, 1989. Entered into
force Apr. 5. 1989, applicable with regard to
tax reimbursements for institutional income
earned on or after Jan. 1, 1988.

Israel

Agreement modifying the land lease and
purchase agreement for construction of dip-
lomatic facilities of .Jan. 18, 1989. Effected
bv exchange of notes at Tel Aviv and Jerusa-
lem Mar. 21 and Apr. 10, 1989. Entered into
force Apr. 10, 1989.

■ Jamaica

Agreement amending the agreement of Nov.
12, 1987, regarding the consolidation and re-
scheduling of certain debts owed to, guaran-
teed by, or insured by the U.S. Government
and its agencies. Effected by exchange of
notes at Kingston Feb. 2 and Mar. 1.5, 1989.
Entered into force Mar. 1.5, 1989.

Korea

Agreement extending the agreement of
July 26, 1982 (TIAS 10571), as amended and
extended, concerning fisheries off the
coasts of the U.S. Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington Feb. 17 and Mar 27,
1989. Enters into force following written
confirmation of the completion of U.S. inter-
nal procedures.

Malaysia

Memorandum of understanding for reducing
demand, preventing illicit use, and combat-
ting illicit pi'oduction and traffic of drugs,
including precursor chemicals. Signed at
Kuala Lumpur Apr. 20, 1989. Entered into
force Apr 20, 1989.

Mexico

Memorandum uf understanding on coopera-
tion in geothermal and related volcanic in-
vestigations, with annex. Signed at Mexico
Mar. 31, 1989. Entered into force Mar. 31,
1989.

New Zealand

Memorandum of understanding concerning
the operation of the INTELPOST service,
with details of implementation. Signed at
Bern Apr. 28, 1989. Entered into force
May 1. 1989.

Philippines

Agreement amending the agreement uf
Sept. 16, 1982 (TIAS 10443), as amended,
concerning air transport services. Effected
by exchange of notes at Washington Apr. 24,
1989. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1989.

Supersedes agreements of Nov. 23, 1983,
and Jan. 23, 1984 (TIAS 10931), and Sept. 5
and Oct. 31. 1985.

Spain

Agreement on defense cooperation, with an-
nexes and related letters. Signed at Madrid
Dec. 1, 1988.

Entered into force: May 4, 1989.
Supersedes agreement of July 2, 1982 (TIAS
10589).

U.S.S.R.

Agreement concerning cooperation in com-
batting pollution in the Bering and Chukchi
Seas in emergency situations. Signed at Mos-
cow May 11, 1989. Enters into force on the
date the parties notify each other in writing
that necessary internal procedures have
been completed.

United Kingdom

Agreement extending the agreement of
July 26, 1984, as extended, concerning the
Cayman Islands and narcotics activities. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Washington
May 25, 1989. Entered into force May 25,
1989.

Agreement extending the agreement of
Mar. 1, 1985, in the field of decommissioning
nuclear facilities. Effected by exchange of
letters at Washington and Risley Feb. 17
and Mar. 6, 1989. Entered into force Mar. 6,
1989; effective Mar. 1, 1989.

Agreement extending the agreement of
Apr. 14, 1987, as extended, concerning the
British Virgin Islands and narcotics activ-
ities. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington May 10, 1989. Entered into for-
ce May 10, 1989'.

Zambia

Agreement relating to the agreement of
Apr. 25, 1988, for sales of agricultural com-
modities. Signed at Lusaka Mar. 10, 1989.
Entered into force Mar. 10, 1989.

'Not in force.
-With statement(s).
■'With understanding(s).
■•With reservation.
■^Not in foiK-'e for the U.S.
'•With declaration. ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the (
fice of Press Relations, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20.520.

No. Dale Subject

*74 5/1 Henry E. Catto sworn in ai
Ambassador to the Coun
of Saint James's, Apr. 211
(biographic data).

75 .5/1 Baker: statement on the P'

application to UN
agencies.

76 .5/1 Baker: address and questit

and-answer session befa
the Council of the Amer»
cas conference.

77 5/4 Foreign Relations of the

United States, 1955-19S
Vol. XVIII, Africa,
released.

78 5/5 Baker: address before the*

Center for Strategic am

International Studies,

May 4.
*79 5/5 Baker: address at Foreigw

Service Day luncheon.
*80 5/5 Baker: remarks at Foreigi

Service Day memorial

plaque dedication

ceremony.
*81 5/10 Terence A.' Todman sworp

as Ambassador to Argei

tina. May 1 (biographic)

data).

82 5/10 Eagleburger: interview 01

ABC-TV's "Good Morni
America."

83 5/12 Baker: remarks at recepti

for human rights activil
and refuseniks, Moscofl
May 10.

84 5/16 Baker: news conference,

Moscow, May 11.

85 5/13 Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. state

ment on Lebanon, MoscI
May 11.

86 5/17 Baker: interview by TAS>^

and Izvestii/a, Moscow,
May 11. ' J

87 5/15 Baker: news conference a I

North Atlantic Council
meeting, Brussels,
May 12.

88 5/15 Baker: interview on CBS-

TV's "Face the Nation,''
Houston, May 14.
*89 5/15 Richard T. McCormack

sworn in as Under Seer
tary for Economic Affa
Apr. 14 (biographic dat;

Department of State Bulletin/July 1 8

PUBLICATIONS

5/16

5'16

5/17
5'19

5/23

5/22

5/23
5/25

5/30

5/31
(i/1

5/31
5/31

Baker: remarks and
question-and-answer ses-
sion, Dodd Washington
Seminar. May 15.

Eugene J. McAllister reap-
pointed Assistant Secre-
tary for Economic and
Business Affairs. Apr. 11.

Baker: interview on World-
net's "Dialogue."

Forciijn Relations of the
United States. 1955-57.
Vol. XXIV, Soviet Union;
Eastern Mediterranean,
released.

Baker. Dumas: news brief-
ing. Kennebunkport,
May 20.

.John R. Bolton sworn in as
Assistant Secretary for
International Organization
Affairs (biographic data).

Baker: address before the
American-Israel Public
Affairs Committee.

Baker: news conference.
White House.

John C. Monjo sworn in as
Ambassador to Indonesia,
May 24 (biographic data).

Baker: interview on ABC-
TV special "Beyond the
Cold War." May 25.

Baker: interview on NBC-
TV's "Meet the Press,"
Rome, May 28.

Baker: interview on ABC-
TV's "Good Morning,
America," Brussels.

Baker: news briefing, Bonn,
May 30.

Foreign Relations of the
United States. 1955-1957.
Vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli
Dispute, 1955, released.

Ivan Selin sworn in as Under
Secretary for Manage-
ment. May 23.

Baker: interview on NBC-
TVs "The Today Show,"
Bonn.

■Not printed in the Bulletin.

Department of State

Free single copies of the following Depart-
ment of State publications are available from
the Public Information Division. Bureau of
Public Affairs, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20520.

President Bush

Commitment to Democracy and Economic
Progress in Latin America, Council of the
Americas, May 2, 1989 (Current Policy
#1168).

Change in the Soviet Union, Te.xas A&M
University commencement, College Sta-
tion, May 12, 1989 (Current Policy #1175).

The Future of Europe, Boston University
commencement, Boston, May 21, 1989
(Current Policy #1177).

Security Strategy for the 1990s, Coast
Guard Academy commencement, New
London, Conn., Mav 24, 1989 (Current
Policy #1178).

Vice President Quayle

American Leadership in the Pacific, Ameri-
can Business Council, Singapore. May 3,
1989 (Current Policy #1173).

Secretary Baker

LI.S. and Latin America: A Shared Destiny,
Council of the Americas, May 1, 1989
(Current Policv #1167).

The Challenge of Change in U.S.-Soviet Re-
lations, Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies (CSIS), May 4, 1989
(Current Policy #1170).

Principles and Pragmatism: American Poli-
cy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict,
America-Israel Public Affairs Committee
(AIPAC), Mav 22, 1989 (Current Policy
#1176).

Arms Control

Military Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures in Europe: Strengthening Sta-
bility Through Openness, May 1989 (Pub-
lic Information Series).

Economics

Competitiveness in the Global Marketplace,
Under Secretary McCormack, President's
E.xecutive E.xchange Alumni Asso.,
May 11, 1989 (Current Policy #1174).

Agriculture in LI.S. Foreign Economic Poli-
cy (GIST, May 1989).

International Monetary Fund (GIST, May
1989).

Third World Debt (GIST, May 1989).

U.S. Exports: Strategic Technology Con-
trols (GIST, May 1989).

Europe

Northern Ireland (GIST. May 1989).
U.S.-Soviet Relations (GIST. May 1989).

Human Rights

Global Human Rights Violations. Ambas-
sador Walters. 45th session of the UN
Commission on Human Rights. Geneva,
Mar. 6. 1989 (Current Policy #1164).

Middle East

FY 1990 Assistance Programs for the Mid-
dle East and North Africa. Deputy Assis-
tant Secretaries Walker and Burleigh.
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations,
House Appropriations Committee, Apr.
19. 1989 (Current Policy #1169).

Oceans

U.S. Responsibilities in International Fish-
eries Matters. Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary Wolfe. Subcommittee on Fisheries
and Wildlife Conservation and the Envi-
ronment. House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, May 2, 1989 (Cur-
rent Policy #1172).

Refugees

Update on Immigration and Refugee Issues.
Refugee Coordinator Moore. Subcommit-
tee on Immigration, Refugees, and Inter-
national Law, House Judiciary
Committee, Apr. 6, 1989 (Current Policy
#1163).

Science & Technology

Telecommunications as an Engine of Eco-
nomic Growth. May 1989 (Public Informa-
tion Series).

U.S. Contribution to Communications De-
velopment. May 1989 (Public Information
Series).

United Nations

U.S. -UN Relations: Program Funding and
PLO Status, Secretary Baker. May 1,
1989; Ambassador Pickering and Deputy
Assistant Secretary Vogelgesang. Sub-
committee on Foreign Operations, Senate
Appropriations Committee, May 4, 1989
(Current Policy #1171).

Western Hemisphere

El Salvador: U.S. Policy (GIST, May 1989).

Panama Presidential and Legislative Elec-
tions, May 1989 (Public Information
Series).

Latin America: U.S. -Mexico Relations, Mav
1989 (Regional Brief). ■

)oartment of State Bulletin/July 1989

PUBLICATIONS

Foreign Relations Volumes Released

AFRICA'

The Department of State on May 4,
1989, released Foreign Relatione of the
United States, 1955-1957, Volume
XVIII, Africa, a volume of more than
800 pages of previously classified rec-
ords of the White House, Department
of State, and other government
agencies.

The documents in this volume show
that as rising African nationalism in
both North and sub-Saharan Africa
challenged the European colonial pow-
ers in the 1950s, traditional American
support for nationalism and self-
determination clashed with U.S. ties
with its European allies. In general,
the Eisenhower Administration encour-
aged the colonial powers to yield
gracefully to the inevitable but did not
press them to grant, as Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles phrased it,
"premature" independence. Also actu-
ating U.S. policymaking in Africa was
fear that growing Soviet influence
would spread via Egypt into the rest of
Africa. The Eisenhower doctrine of
January 1957, which was designed to
aid North African as well as Near
Eastern countries, was a significant
U.S. response to this threat, as was
Vice President Richard M. Nixon's fact-
finding tour of Ethiopia, Ghana,
Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and
Tunisia.

In Algeria, where the United
States saw French policy as self-
defeating, the intensity of French feel-
ing and the importance of France in
NATO constrained the Administration
from putting pressure on Paris. In Mo-
rocco and Tunisia, the United States
promptly recognized the new independ-
ent governments. It entered into base
negotiations with Morocco and, despite
friction with France, which resented
Tunisian support of Algerian independ-
ence, worked with Great Britain to as-
sure Tunisia of a Western rather than a
Soviet arms source. In Libya, where
President Eisenhower believed that the
United States would be "in an awful
fix" if it lost influence, the United
States began to increase financial and
military aid as British resources
dwindled.

While the United States promptly
recognized Ghana, it was noncommittal
regarding aid because of Ghana's warm
attitude toward the Soviet Union. Rela-
tions with Ethiopia deteriorated some-
what due to Ethiopian dissatisfaction
with the amount of U.S. assistance.
The United States tried to avoid giving
the appearance of endorsing South Af-
rican apartheid and encouraged the
South African Government to moderate
its policies, while maintaining friendly
relations with South Africa because of
its strategic importance and mineral
production. In the United Nations, the
United States abstained on apartheid
resolutions until 1958.

This volume is the first to be de-
voted entirely to Africa. In addition to
the regional and bilateral materials de-
scribed above, it includes documents on
U.S. bilateral relations with or interest
in British East Africa, the Central Af-
rican Federation, the Belgian Congo,
Liberia, Nigeria, Somalia, and Sudan.

Copies of Volume XVIII (Depart-
ment of State Publication No. 9665;
GPO Stock No. 044-000-02223-1) may
be purchased for $32.00 (domestic post-
paid) from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
Checks or money orders should be
made payable to the Superintendent of
Documents.

SOVIET UNION;

EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN^

The Department of State on May 19,
1989, released Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1955-1957, Volume
XXIV, Soviet Union; Eastern Mediter-
ranean. This volume documents the
U.S. understanding of and reaction to
the consolidation of power in the Soviet
Union by Communist Party First Sec-
retary Nikita S. Khrushchev in the
period following the death of Gener-
alissimo Joseph Stalin. U.S. acquisition
of a text of Khrushchev's secret speech
to the Communist Party 20th Congress
in February 1956 and the removal from
power of Foreign Minister Vyacheslav
Molotov later in the year were high-
lights in the campaign of de-
Stalinization. Following the summit
conference of July 1955, bilateral rela-
tions between the two superpowers ex-
perienced a thaw which lasted until the

suppression of the Hungarian uprisir
in November 1956. U.S. attitudes we
severely impacted by the launching c
the first Soviet intercontinental balll
tic missile and Sputnik I.

Difficulties arose within the U.&
Government in arriving at a consiste
policy on East -West exchanges. On tj|'
one hand, the United States wanted \\
encourage and promote exchanges w
the Soviet Union and bloc countries,
while on the other hand, there was c
siderable concern about the threat t(
national security of allowing possiblii
spies to enter the United States dis-|
guised as members of an exchange I
program.

Other portions of this volume d(
tail U.S. policies toward Greece and
Turkey. The issue of independence f
Cyprus came to a head when the Bri
ish decided to abandon their positior
the island in 1955. The struggle be-
tween the Greek and Turkish Cypri
to determine the fate of the island
gradually drew a reluctant United
States into the dispute. Concern thj
the issue might disrupt NATO made
the United States proceed very cau^
tiously in its attempts to resolve tht
problem, and while some progress \
made, no solution had been reached
the end of 1957.

Relations with Greece and Turl
when not dominated by the Cyprus
question, dealt primarily with effor
of the United States to maintain th(
stability of Greece while achieving
nomic and financial reform in Turks
At the end of 1957, relations with
Greece had cooled, while those with
Turkey were steadily improving. i

Foreign Relations of the Uniteoi
States, 1955-1957, Volume XXIV, cct
prises 750 pages of government rec-
ords, most of which were previously
classified. This authoritative recorc
based on files of the White House, t
Department of State, and other gov
ment agencies.

Copies of Volume XXIV (Depari i
ment of State Publication No. 9699,
GPO Stock No. 044-000-02228-1) m;
be purchased for $30.00 (domestic p
paid) from the Superintendent of Dn-
ments, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
Checks or money orders should be
made payable to the Superintenden
Documents.

'Press release 77.
-Press release 93.

Department of State Bulletin/July ^

PUBLICATIONS

ackground Notes

s series provides brief, factual sunima-
of the people, history, government,

nomy, and foreign relations of about

countries (excluding the United States)
of selected international organizations.

ent revisions are:

eria (Nov. 1988)
;entina (Oct. 1988)
SAN (Mar. 1989)
itralia (Apr. 1989)
in (Apr. 1989)
swana (Dec, 1988)
■ma (Feb. 1989)
neroonlNov. 1988)
loros (Oct. 1988)
ta Rica (Apr. 1989)
imark(Nov. 1988)
latorial Guinea (Mar. 1989)
nch Antilles and Guiana
an. 1989)

eral Republic of Germany (May 1989)
nea-Bissau (Feb. 1989)
y See (Apr. 1989)
ig Kong (Nov. 1988)
;ia(Mar. 1989)
[3nesia(Apr. 1989)
y (Mav 1989)
im(Feb. 1989)
:htenstein (Jan. 1989)
awi (Feb. 1989)
herlands Antilles and Aruba
an. 1989)
;nnda (Feb. 1989)
\tzerland (Mar. 1989)
Midad & Tobago (Apr. 1989)
Iteii Kingdom (May 1989)

I ted Nations (Nov. 1988)
■inslavia(Apr 1989)

II x I Mar 1989)

A free copy of the inde.x only may be ob-
led from the Public Information Division,
iieau of Public Affairs, Department of
tte, Washington, D.C. 20520.

For about 60 Background Notes a year,
:bscription is available from the Superin-
elent of Documents. U.S. Government
'iiting Office, Washington, D.C. 20402,
>$14.00 (domestic) and .$17.50 (foreign).
'Ick or money order, made payable to the
lerintendent of Documents, must aecom-
av order. ■

Soartment of State Bulletin/July 1989 81

DEX

y 1989

ume89, No. 2148

ca. FY 1990 Assistance Request for

ib-Saharan Africa (Rosenberg) 39

•rican Principles. Security Strategy for

e 1990s (Bush) 19

?ntina. Elections in Ai-gentina

l^epartment statements) 68

IS Control

jgical Weapons Proliferation

olnies) 43

; and CSBM Talks Resume in Vienna

/hite House statement) 44

iige in the Soviet Union (Bush) 16

etary's Interview on "Face the

ition" 27

etary's News Conference 21

etary's Trip to Moscow and NATO

aker. joint statement) 29

irity Strategy for the 1990s (Bush) ... 19
via. Elections in Bolivia (Department

jtement) 71

ada. President Meets With Prime

inister Mulroney (Bush. Mulroney) . . 45

etary's Interview on "Face the

ition" 27

etary's News Conference 21

lent Demonstrations in China

l|/illiams) 48

limunications. U.S. Contributions to

fiinmunications Development 62

jtfross

I lu ual Weapons Proliferation

( i^hiu's) 43

V',i!in .Assistance Request for Sub-

: li;ir:in Africa (Rosenberg) 39

I III Demonstrations in China

('illiams) 48

|ate on Immigration and Refugee Issues

iloore) 59

.\ , .Japan Agree to Codevelop FSX

. rci-aft (Bush, Eagleburger) 48

. Opposes PLC) Admission to UN
-icncies (Baker, Vogelgesang,

-■liai'tment statement) 65

. Ri'sponsibilities in International

shcries Matters (Wolfe) 56

Vitus. Deconfrontation on Cyprus

(department statement ) 52

c^artment & Foreign Service. 50th

.miversai'y of the Bulletin 1

enemies. Competitiveness in the Global

.arketplace (McCormack) 49

rironment. President Meets With Prime
.inister .Mulroney (Bush, Mulroney) . . 45
tope. The F"uture of Europe (Bush) ... 18
iiieries. U.S. Responsibilities in
jternational Fisheries Matters

Volfe) 56

B'ign .Assistance

M99(l .Assistance Request for Sub-

'.ihai-an Africa ( Rosenberg) 39

U'f .Aid to Lebanon (Department
att-nient) 55

Human Rights

Change in the Soviet Union (Bush) 16

Secretary's Trip to Moscow and NATO

(Baker, joint statement) 29

.lapan. U.S., -Japan Agree to Codevelop FSX

Aircraft (Bush. Eagleburger) 48

Jordan

Jordan — A Profile 54

Visit of King Hussein I (Bush, King

Hussein) .53

Lebanon

Relief Aid to Lebanon (Department

statement) 55

Secretary's Trip to Moscow and NATO

(Baker, joint statement) 29

Situation in Lebanon (Department

statements) 55

Mexico

Me.xico — A Profile 76

U.S. -Mexico Relations 73

Middle East

Principles and Pragmatism: .American

Policv Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict

(Baker) 24

U.S. Opposes PLO Admission to UN

Agencies (Baker, Vogelgesang,

Department statement) 65

Military .Affairs. LI.S., .Japan Agree to

Codevelop FSX Aircraft (Bush,

Eagleburger) 48

Nicaragua

Secretary's News Conference 21

Secretary's Trip to Moscow and NATO

(Baker, joint statement) 29

North .Atlantic Treaty Organization
CFE and CSBM Talk.s Resume in Vienna

(White House statement) 44

President Meets With Prime Minister

Mulroney (Bush. Mulroney) 45

Secretary's News Conference 21

Secretary's Trip to Moscow and NATO

(Baker, joint statement) 29

Panama

Panama Elections (Bush. Eagleburger,

Department and White House statements,

text of OAS resolution) 66

President Meets With Prime Minister

Mulroney (Bush, Mulroney) 45

Secretary's Interview on "Face the

Nation" 27

Secretary's Trip to Moscow and NATO

(Baker, joint statement) 29

Presidential Documents

Change in the Soviet Union 16

The Future of Europe 18

Panama Elections (I5ush, Eagleburger,

Department and White House statements,

text of OAS resolution) 66

President Meets With Prime Minister

Mulroney (Bush, Mulroney) 45

Security Strategy for the 1990s 19

U.S., .Japan Agree to Codevelop FSX

Aircraft (Bush, Eagleburger) 48

Visit of King Hussein I (Bush, King

Hussein) 53

World Trade Week, 1989 (proclamation) . . 51
Publications

Btukgruinid Nutes 81

Department of State 79

F(ir(i(/)i Relatiuiis Volumes Released .... 80
Refugees. L'pdate on Immigration and

Refugee Issues (Moore) 59

Security Assistance. FY 1990 Assistance

Request for Sub-Saharan Africa

(Rosenberg) 39

Sudan. Cease-Fire in Sudan (Department

statement) 41

Trade

Competitiveness in the Global Marketplace

( McCoi-mack I 49

World Trade Week. 1989 (proclamation) . . 51

Treaties. Current .Actions 76

U.S.S.R.

The Challenge of Change in LI.S. -Soviet

Relations i^Baker) .36

Change in the Soviet Union (Bush) 16

Secretary's Interview on "Face the

Nation" 27

Secretary's News Conference 21

Secretary's Trip to Moscow and NAT(")

(Baker, joint statement) 29

Security Strategy for the 1990s (Bush) ... 19
Update on Immigration and Refugee Issues

(Moore) 59

United Nations

Deconfrontation on Cyprus (Department

statement ) .52

U.S. Opposes PLO Admission to ITN

Agencies (Baker, Vogelgesang,

Dei)artment statement) 65

Warsaw Pact. CFE and CSBM Talks

Resume in Vienna (White House

statement) 44

Na me Index

Baker, Secretary 21,24,27,29,36,65

Bush, President .... 16,18,19,45,48,51,53,66

Eagleburger, Lawrence S 48,66

Holmes, H. Allen 43

King Hussein I 53

McCormack, Richard T 49

Moore, .Jonathan 59

Mulroney, Brian 45

Rosenberg, Alison 39

Vogelgesang, Sandra L 65

Williams, Richard L 48

Wolfe, Edward E 56

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U.S. Government Printing Office
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Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402

Depurttn^nt

jm of state -m^ J ^

bulletin

he Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 89 / Number 2149

August 1989

Dppartmpnt of Staip

bulletin

Volume 89 / Number 2149 / August 1989

('resident Bush held a news conference a(
the conclusion of the 2-day NATO summit.

(While House photo by Michael Sargent)

The Department (if State Bulletin,
published by the Office of Public Com-
munication in the Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and govern-
ment agencies with information on de-
velopments in U.S. foreign relations
and the work of the Dejiartment of
State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin's contents include major ad-
dresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
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JAMES A. BAKER, III

Secretary nf State

MARGARET DeB. TUTWILER

Assistant Secretary
for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD

Director,

Office of Public Communication

COLLEEN LUTZ

Chief. Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

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CONTENTS

FEATURE

1 A Short History of NATO (James E. Miller)

6 Western Security: The U.S. and Its NATO Allies

rhe President

Visits Europe; Attends North
Atlantic Council Meeting
(Secretary Baker. President
Bush, Helmut Kohl, Marga-
ret Thatcher. NATO Decla-
ration and Comprehensive
Concept)

News Conferences of June 5
and 8 (Excerpts)

rhe Vice President

i2 American Leadership in the
Pacific

rhe Secretary

4
7

After the NATO Summit:
Challenges for the West in a
Changing World

Challenges Ahead for NATO
and Developments in East-
West Relations

A New Pacific Partnership:
Framework for the Future

Interview on "Newsmaker
Saturday"

Vfrica

The Seedlings of Hope: U.S.
Policy in Africa (Edward J.
Perlyins)

Arms Control

73 Nuclear and Space Talks Open

Round 11 (Richard R. Burt, ■
President Bush)

74 Military Openness Proposals

Tabled at CSBM Talks
(Department Statement)
74 Anniversary of INF Treaty
(White House Statement)

East Asia

75 Demonstrations in China
(President Bush, White
House and Department
Statements)

Europe

77 NATO Defense Planning Com-

mittee Meets in Brussels
(Final Communique)

78 Elections in Poland (President

Bush)

78 Hungarian Political Reforms

(White House Statemoit)

79 President Meets With French

President (President Bush.
Francois Mitterrand)

80 Baltic Freedom Day (Procla-

mation)
83 President's Meeting With EC
Commission President
(White House Statement)

Middle East

84 President Meets With Israeli

Defense Minister (White

House Statement)
84 President Meets With Saudi

Foreign Minister (White

House Statement)

Refugees

Confronting Realities on
Refugee Assistance
(Jonathan Moore)

Developing Solutions for Cen-
tral American Refugee
Problems (Jonathan Moore)

Treaties

88 Current Actions

Press Releases

90 Department of State

91 USUN

Publications

92 Department of State

92 Foreign Relations Volumes
Released

Index

!l9%^

FEATURE
NATO

A Short History of NATO

The following article was prepared
}y James E. Miller of the Office of the
'iistorian. Bureau of Public Affairs.

Nummary

rill- North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
ii)ii (NATO) was born in an era of ris-
nu Kast-West tensions. Its member
Uatt's joined together to safeguard
hrii' national security and political de-
iiiK racy from the challenge posed by
>ii\ iet expansionism. In spite of fre-
iuciit, well-publicized disagreements,
he alliance has been durable, respond-
\\\i to changing international condi-
iiiiis and expanding from its original
12 member states to 16. NATO's
strengths remain the military security
hat membership provides individual
;tates, its ability to facilitate c.onsulta-
iniis among its member states, and the
nulcrlying U.S. commitment to come
11 1 lie defense of Europe.

The Origins of NATO, 1947-49

The decision of the United States, Can-
ida, and 10 European states to enter
nto a peacetime defensive alliance was
me (if the most significant develop-
neiits of the post-World War II era. For
hi' United States in particular, mem-
)ersliip in NATO represented a funda-
neiital change in its more than
■entury-old foreign policy of refraining
Viim involvement with "entangling alli-
mces." The emerging East-West con-
'liet provided the context for the
levelopment of NATO. By 1947 the
''lilted States and the Soviet Union
lail clashed over nuclear disarmament,
he nature of the postwar economic and
iiilltical settlement in Central and
Eastern Europe, Iran, and the shape of
beace treaties with the defeated Axis
lat Inns.

The pace of West European eco-
nomic recovery was agonizingly slow.
Severe shortages in food, fuel, and the
basic necessities of life stimulated pop-
ular discontent. Concern grew over the
establishment of communist regimes in
Eastern Europe. The U.S. Government
responded with a series of highly cre-
ative economic and political initiatives
that stabilized both European democra-
cy and a free trading system.

The European Recovery Program
(Marshall Plan) of 1948-52 was a key el-
ement in the U.S. program of Euro-
pean stabilization. It rebuilt the sinews
of Europe's economy, committed the
United States to a long-term role in
Europe, and created mechanisms for
political consultation between the two
sides of the Atlantic. Simultaneously,
the European states, with the encour-
agement of the United States, took the
first steps toward economic and politi-
cal integration by creating in 1947 the
Organization for European Economic
Cooperation and in 1948 a security ar-
rangement, the Brussels pact (known
after 1955 as the Western European
Union). Economic weakness, however,
limited Europe's ability to provide for
its defense.

After considerable debate within
the United States, the leaders of the
executive and legislative branches
agreed on two immediate U.S. re-
sponses to Europe's crisis: participa-
tion in a defensive peacetime alliance
and provision of military equipment
and technical assistance. Negotiations
for the alliance began quietly in March
1948 among the United States, Canada,
and Great Britain. On June 11, 1948,
the U.S. Senate adopted the Vanden-
berg resolution, encouraging U.S. par-
ticipation in a collective defense
arrangement. The Benelux states and
France joined the talks in July. Initial
discussions focused on the text of a
treaty and the definition of the alli-
ance's geographical extension and
membership.

Creating an Alliance
Structure, 1949-55

On April 4, 1949, the Foreign Ministers
of the United States, the United King-
dom, France, Italy, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal
signed the North Atlantic Treaty in a
ceremony held in Washington, D.C.
The NATO treaty came into force on
August 24, 1949, when the 12 partici-
pating nations formally deposited their
instruments of ratification.

The state of East-West relations
did not permit a leisurely approach to
building the military and political
structures of alliance. During the sum-
mer of 1949, the Soviet Union exploded
its first atomic weapon. China fell to a
communist revolution during the au-
tumn of 1949. Then, in June 1950,
North Korean forces invaded South Ko-
rea. U.S. and West European leaders
concluded that the attack on Korea
might be the prelude to a military
move against Europe.

These external stimuli quickened
the pace of NATO's transformation into
an active defense structure. Imme-
diately after the Senate approved the
NATO treaty in July 1949, the Truman
Administration presented Congress
with legislation authorizing a Military
Defense Assistance Program (MDAP)
to provide equipment and training for
the armies of the NATO allies. In Octo-
ber 1949, Congress approved a $1.3 bil-
lion MDAP appropriation. After the
outbreak of the Korean war in June
1950, the size of U.S. military assist-
ance grants rose rapidly, and the Tru-
man Administration increased its
original military commitment from one
division to four divisions. The offshore
procurement program, which encour-
aged the creation of defense industries
in Europe, supplemented MDAP.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

The North Atlantic Council, com-
posed of the Foreign Ministers of the
NATO states, met in Washington on
July 17, 1949. The Foreign Ministers
created committees to handle military
planning, established regional planning
groups to look at specific local issues,
and took the first steps toward build-
ing standing mechanisms for economic
and political cooperation. A December
1949 agi'eement provided for an initial
division of responsibility among the al-
lies: the United States would provide
the alliance's strategic bombing capa-
bility, while the European states would
contribute the bulk of its ground troops
and tactical air defense. The United
States and Great Britain would defend
NATO's Atlantic lines of communica-
tion, while the United States would in-
crease its military presence in Europe.

The allies agreed to speedily build
a permanent military command struc-
ture. President Truman, at the request
of the NATO Foi-eign Ministers, ap-
pointed Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower as
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe
in December 1950. Gen. Eisenhower
quickly built a military chain of com-
mand and in 1952 i)ut the NATO armies
through their first major combined ex-
ercises. The North Atlantic Council's
February 1952 Lisbon meeting estab-
lished force goals for each NATO mem-
ber state. Although these goals were
not completely met, the allied states
increased their military preparedness
and allocated more of their resources
to the common defense. In September
1951, the NATO member states agreed
to invite Greece and Turkey to join the
alliance.

By 1954, the NATO states had cre-
ated a permanent defense mechanism.
The North Atlantic Council became the
executive, and its standing council of
representatives, made up of ambas-
sadors from the member states, pro-
vided i)olicy coordination. NATO's
[jermanent planning groups and secre-
tariat were located in Paris. The Su-
preme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe (SHAPE) coordinated defense
preparations.

NATO then focused on the role
West Germany would play in the de-
fense of the West. Meetings of NATO
Foreign Ministers in September and
October 1950 produced general agree-
ment that West Germany must be part

of NATO. The allied strategy of for-
ward defense along the borders of com-
munist states required West German
jiarticij^ation. France and other conti-
nental European allies were deeply
concerned about the effects of rearm-
ing the Germans so soon after the de-
feat of Nazism. On October 24, 1950,
French Premier Rene Pleven unveiled a
plan for a European Defense Commu-
nity (EDO, consisting of a standing
European army under the control of a
European defense minister. The plan
would commit German manpower to
the common defense but without
forming a separate German army or
general staff. Although the United
States actively supported the plan, the
United Kingdom declined to join, cit-
ing its imperial commitments. The ab-
sence of a postwar German peace
settlement and the creation of East and
West Germany made European states
wary of the coiicejjt of an integrated
defense force. The French and Italian
Governments delayed parliamentary
action on the European Defense Com-
munity in the face of combined commu-
nist and nationalist opposition. Finally,
in August 1954, the F'rench Govern-
ment presented the EDC measure to
the National Assembly, which rejected
it.

The defeat of the EDC was fol-
lowed by West German rearmament. A
September-October 19.54 meeting of the
Foreign Ministers of nine NATO pow-
ers agreed to terminate the military
occupation of the Federal Republic of
Germany and invite the West German
Government to join NATO. Italy and
the Federal Republic at this time ac-
ceded to the Western European Union.
The Government of the Federal Repub-
lic voluntarily agreed to limit its arms
buildup and undertook not to construct
nuclear weapons and certain other
types of armaments. In May 1955, the
Federal Republic joined NATO.

The Nuclear Control Issue,
1958-64 _ H

In 1958, France's President Charles de
Gaulle brought to the surface two of
the underlying tensions within the alli-
ance: concern over nuclear strategy and
France's claim to a special leadership
role within NATO. Although Great Bri-

tain also maintained a nuclear capa-
bility within the Western alliance, the
United States possessed an overwhelm
ing predominance in nuclear weapons
stockpile and delivery systems. At
their December 1954 meeting, the
NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers
adopted a policy of nuclear response to
a Soviet attack on Europe, commonly
referred to as "massive retaliation."
The policy reflected a U.S. desire to
maintain a credible deterrent at the
lowest possible cost. By 1958, however,
the Soviet Union had made major
strides in both long-range bomber and
missile technology, and it was capable
of striking the United States. Increas-
ingly, Europeans asked if the United
States would risk a nuclear attack on
its territory to defend Europe.

De Gaulle was among the doubtert
He was determined to reduce U.S. cor
trol over alliance nuclear policy by
building an independent nuclear force,
the force dc frappe, a goal that he
achieved in the early 1960s. The Frene
President wanted France to act as the
principal spokesman for Europe in an
inner group of three with the United
States and Great Britain.

The NATO nations rejected De
Gaulle's 1958 bid to create a two-tiered
alliance structure, insisting instead on
the equality of all NATO members. In
an effort to accommodate the French
leader on nuclear policy, the West Ger-
mans urged the alliance to create a
multilateral nuclear force (MNF) with-
in NATO. The United States initially
hesitated to endorse the MNF because
of its concern with preventing nuclear
proliferation.

In 1963, however, the Kennedy Ad-
ministration came forward with a pro-
posal to create an MNF surface fleet
equipped with Polaris missiles under
NATO command. The MNF would fit
into the overall U.S. nuclear defense
strategy. De Gaulle rejected the plan
because the United States insisted on
retaining final say on the launching of
these weapons. The United States qui-
etly dropped the MNF concept in 1964.1
In 1966, De Gaulle took France out of
the alliance military command struc-
ture, while maintaining French partici
pation in the political consultative
mechanism. Consequently. NATO head
quarters moved from Paris to Ri'ussels
and U.S. forces withdrew from France

FEATURE
NATO

flexible Response and
)etente, 1966-74

)n(' factor in De Gaulle's decision to
■nil French forces out of NATO was his
elief that the climate of East-West re-
itions was impi'oving and that the dan-
er of war had lessened. By the
lid-lSGOs. two separate but related
roeesses of normalization of relations
rere underway between East and
Vest. The United States and the Soviet
Jnion were attempting to lessen ten-
ions between themselves. At the same
ime, a number of West European
tates, including France and the Feder-
1 Republic of Germany, were seeking
ew relationships with the Soviet
Jnion and East European states.

Within the conte.xt of this chang-
ng political climate, the NATO nations
n December 1966 commissioned a
tudy on the "Future Tasks of the Alli-
nce" by a working group headed by
Selgian Foreign Minister Pierre Har-
lel. The allies also agreed to establish
wo permanent bodies for nuclear
ilanning — the Nuclear Defense Affairs
ommittee, open to all members, and a
mailer Nuclear Planning Group, with
ermanent and rotating members — to
andle the details.

The Harmel report, issued at the
linisterial meeting of the North At-
intic Council in Brussels in December
967, concluded that "military security
nd a policy of detente are not contra-
ictory but complementary" and that
■lATO had an important role to play in
preparing for bilateral and multilateral
egotiations between Eastern and
Vestern nations over key issues, such
s the future of Germany and arms
ontrol. Public perception of the alli-
nce would be significantly improved,
he report noted, if the allied consulta-
ive process was strengthened and if
he alliance took an active role in ad-
ancing the rapprochement between
ast and West by coordinating Euro-
jean and U.S. political approaches to
he Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

At the December 1967 meeting, the
ouncil also adopted the strategic doc-
rine of "fle.xible response," endorsing
ii balanced range of appropriate conven-
ional and nuclear reactions to all levels
)f aggression or threats of aggression,
rhe responses were designed first to
leter aggression but, failing that, to

maintain the security and integrity of
the North Atlantic Treaty area. The
long-held concept of forward defense
underlined NATO's commitment to
counter an attack as close as possible to
the frontiers of its member states.
Fle.xible response, when combined with
the pursuit of negotiations with the
Warsaw Pact, enabled NATO to move
beyond the strategy of massive retalia-
tion and present a more credible de-
fense posture that won wider public
acceptance.

The move toward East-West accom-
modation met a significant setback in
August 1968 when the Soviet Union in-
vaded Czechoslovakia. The Soviet inva-
sion gave impetus to the buildup of
NATO conventional forces and
strengthened support for the alliance.
A number of European countries in-
creased their NATO contributions,
while the United States cancelled
planned troop reductions in Europe.

Detente was further limited by
disagreement over the U.S. role in Eu-
rope, as well as by Soviet support for
"national liberation movements" in the
underdeveloped nations. While at-
tempting to extend its influence in the
Third World, the Soviet Union insisted
that detente required the exclusion of
the United States from Europe and an
end to defensive alliances. It called
NATO a U.S.-imposed straitjacket
whose continued existence precluded
successful settlement of Europe's diffi-
culties. The United States and its
NATO allies rejected this claim and in-
sisted that any improvement in rela-
tions between East and West would
have to be negotiated within the exist-
ing alliance framework.

The Western view prevailed. Dur-
ing the Nixon Administration (1969-74),
the West succeeded in creating ar-
rangements which fostered both an im-
proved climate of East-West relations
and a NATO role in the process. The
conclusion in September 1971 of a Quad-
ripartite Agreement on Berlin (which
had been occupied since 1945 by the
United States, the United Kingdom,
France, and the Soviet Union) reduced
tensions between the blocs. The West-
ern allies extracted Soviet concessions
over Berlin in exchange for an agree-
ment to convene a Conference on Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE). The caucus of NATO states
has been the primary forum for coor-

dinating Western strategy at succes-
sive CSCE meetings. NATO coordina-
tion has played an important role in
defining the West's CSCE objectives.

Mutual and balanced force reduc-
tion (MFBR) talks also began as a re-
sult of a NATO initiative. These talks,
intended to reduce in a stabilizing way
the conventional forces of both NATO
and the Warsaw Pact in central Eu-
rope, continued until early 1989 with-
out a significant breakthrough.

The appropriate level of U.S. par-
ticipation in NATO was debated vigor-
ously during the Nixon Administration.
The Mansfield amendment of 1971,
which would have cut significantly the
number of U.S. troops stationed in Ger-
many, reflected a widely held view that
Europeans must do more for their own
defense and that the United States
must improve its balance of payments.
The Nixon Administration, with the
support of the foreign policy establish-
ment, headed off a reduction of one-half
of the ground troops committed to Eu-
rope. West European leaders recog-
nized the seriousness of public
sentiment in the United States, and the
West German Government arranged to
pay a higher share of the costs of main-
taining U.S. forces on its soil.

During the mid-1970s, conflicting
political and economic interests among
NATO's member states created an ele-
ment of tension within the alliance.
Disagreements over Middle East policy
between the United States and its Eu-
ropean partners surfaced at the time of
the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the sub-
sequent Arab oil embargo.

Tensions within the alliance grew
more acute in 1974 as a result of a ma-
jor crisis on Cyprus. In the eastern
Mediterranean, a coup by right-wing
Greek Cypriots triggered Turkish mili-
tary occupation of almost 40'/f of the is-
land of Cyprus in July-August 1974.
Greece's newly installed democratic
government pulled its forces out of
NATO's integrated military command
structure to protest the alliance's in-
ability to prevent or reverse the Turk-
ish military action.

Meanwhile, the allies welcomed the
end of the dictatorship in Portugal but
watched the growing radicalization of
its military leadership and the increas-
ing strength of the Portuguese Commu-

nist Party with mounting concern until
democratic forces gained control of the
situation in late 1975.

The Decline of Detente,
1975-80

Detente became increasingly difficult
to maintain after 1974. The United
States and the Soviet Union clashed
over the expansion of Soviet influence
in Africa, and negotiations stalled on a
second strategic arms limitation
(SALT) agreement. The Soviet Union
undertook a major modernization of its
intermediate-range nuclear forces
(INF), substantially increasing the
threat to NATO by replacing older SS-
4 and SS-5 missiles with the mobile,
longer-range, more accurate SS-20s,
which were equipped with multiple in-
dependently targetable reentry vehi-
cles (MIRVs). The concept of detente
came under attack within the United
States from both sides of the political
spectrum.

NATO continued to carry out its
basic defense functions and regained its
unity through a series of political ac-
commodations and military reforms.
The Portuguese situation began to sta-
bilize in 1976-77. Although Greek-
Turkish relations remained tense, the
Greek Government recognized the val-
ue of NATO participation and rejoined
the alliance's military wing in October
1980. The Western nations also
achieved greater coordination on ener-
gy policy. Newly democratic Spain join-
ed the NATO alliance in December
1981.

The growing Soviet military
threat was a key to improved allied co-
operation. In May 1977, the NATO
states agreed to increase their defense
e.xpenditures by 3% per annum (after
adjustment for inflation) in order to
meet the growth in Soviet military
power. West Germany took the lead in
calling for a NATO response to the So-
viet SS-20 intermediate-range missile
deployments. Discussions within the al-
liance led to the adoption in December
1979 of a "two-track" approach. The
Western alliance would proceed with
the installation of 572 U.S. Pershing II

and ground-launched cruise inter-
mediate-range missiles beginning in
1983, while the United States would of-
fer to negotiate with the Soviet Union
on an INF balance at the lowest possi-
ble level.

A Renewed Cold War, 1980-84

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
December 1979 severely chilled East-
West relations. The Carter Adminis-
tration requested a delay in Senate con-
sideration of the June 1979 SALT II
Treaty, which was already under heavy
criticism. The United States imposed a
grain embargo on the Soviet Union and
sought to organize a Western boycott of
the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games to
protest the invasion.

Soviet actions continued to feed
the crisis. The U.S.S.R. encouraged
and supported the Polish Government's
imposition of martial law and its
repression of popular democratic move-
ments. It propped up a puppet govern-
ment in Afghanistan and provided it
with military support against a popu-
lar resistance movement. It intensified
the repression of domestic human
rights activists. The quick succession
of three aging Soviet leaders increased
the West's difficulties in dealing with
the Soviet Union. The September 1,
1983, destruction of Korean Air Lines
#007, an unarmed civilian airliner that
strayed into Soviet airspace, further
impeded East-West dialogue.

NATO continued to pursue its
"two-track" approach on missile deploy-
ment. In 1981, the Reagan Administra-
tion, in close consultation wdth the
allies, offered a "zero/zero" INF
outcome — no Pershing Il/cruise missile
deployments in exchange for the dis-
mantlement of comparable Soviet weap-
ons systems — and in 1983, an interim
INF approach to establish equal low
ceilings on these weapons for the Unit-
ed States and the Soviet Union on a
global basis.

The Soviet Union rejected Western
proposals and intensified its propagan-
da campaign, seeking to exploit a grow-
ing pacifist movement in Europe and
the United States to "freeze" a status
quo that established a Soviet predomi-
nance by preventing a U.S. INF de-

ployment. The Soviet Union broke off
INF talks in the fall of 1983, as the
first U.S. missiles became operational.

Upon taking office in January
1981, President Reagan began a long-
term nuclear and conventional rearma-
ment program. The Administration
urged the NATO allies to take a great-
er share in the defense of Europe
through a buildup of their conventional
forces. The Administration maintained
that the alliance must solidify the
Western defense posture as the first
step toward realistic and productive
negotiations with the Soviet Union.
U.S. proposals for strategic arms re-
duction talks (START) forsaw an over-
all reduction in the number of offensive
nuclear weapons each side deployed, as
well as a restructuring of these forces
to enhance stability. The Reagan Ad-
ministration also sought to reduce the
size of the ground forces that both side;
had in Europe in the MBFR talks and
to improve European security through
adopting concrete and mutually verifiai
ble confidence-building measures. The
Madrid meeting of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe
(1980-83) adopted a NATO-backed pro-
posal for the creation of a Conference
on Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament in Europe
(CDE) with a mandate to formulate
confidence-building measures. The
CDE concluded its meeting in Stock-
holm in September 1986 with an agree-
ment on a set of mutually comple-
mentary measures for monitoring sig-
nificant military activities in Europe,
including mandatory on-site inspection
as a means of verification.

NATO also sought to improve in-
tergovernmental cooperation in other
areas of deep mutual concern. A May
1981 NATO declaration deplored the
recent resurgence of violent terrorist
attacks, agreed on the necessity for bi-
lateral and multilateral cooperation to
prevent and combat terrorism, and ex-
pressed determination to take all nec-
essary measures to ensure the security
of diplomatic and other official
personnel.

FEATURE
NATO

An Era of Intensified Dialogue,
1985-89

triu' successful conclusion of the Madrid
rsCE meeting in 1983 mai'ked the first
linak in the cycle of East-West confron-
tatiun that had characterized the rela-
tiiiiiship since the invasion of
Afuhanistan. The 1984 reelection of
President Reagan and the emergence of
Mikhail Gorbachev as Soviet leader in
the spring of 1985 provided both great
pdwers with stable political leadership.
Xt'Udtiations on INF and strategic
arms reductions, as well as on limita-
tidii of space systems, began in Geneva
111 March 1985.

The November 1985 Reagan-
(liiihachev summit in Geneva produced
an agreement to give priority to 50%
START reductions and to an interim
1 X F agreement. A subsequent meeting
I if the two leaders at Reykjavik, Ice-
lanil, in October 1986 led to wide-
ranging discussion of major disarma-
ment initiatives but no agreement.

In February 1987, General Secre-
tai y Gorbachev removed his previous
it'(|uirement that U.S. concessions on
:h(' Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
[irecede INF progress. The June 1987
meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers at
Re,\kjavik supported the global and ef-
fectively verifiable elimination of both
long- and short-range U.S. and Soviet
land-based INF missiles, urging the
Soviet Union to drop its demand to re-
tain a portion of its SS-20 missiles. In
July, the Soviet Union agreed in princi-
ple to a zero level for all long-range
INF missiles.

President Reagan and General Sec-
retary Gorbachev signed an INF Trea-
ty (in December 8, 1987, during their
\\'ashington summit meeting. Under
terms of the agreement, the first arms
reduction accord in East-West discus-
siiins, all missiles in the 500-5,000 km
range will be dismantled or destroyed
'under strict supervision that permits
reliable verification. On December 11,
U)S7, the NATO states that provided
bases for the U.S. INF missiles signed
a separate accord to facilitate the pro-
cesses of dismantling and verification.

With the signature of the INF ac-
ciinl, the United States and the Soviet
Union had taken a significant step to-
ward the reduction of tensions in Eu-

rope. During their March 2-3, 1988,
meeting at Brussels, the NATO heads
of government sketched out the next
steps in the disarmament process. A
North Atlantic Council statement un-
derlined the need for a reduction in the
size of conventional forces in Europe
and called upon the Soviet Union and
its Warsaw Pact allies to accept the
principle of an asymmetrical reduction
that would bring their troop and equip-
ment levels down to those of NATO
forces. The NATO leaders also called
for talks that would eliminate each
side's capacity for a surprise attack.
NATO set as its goal the creation of
European stability from the Atlantic to
the Urals.

The Soviet response, delivered by
Gorbachev in his new role as President
in a December 7, 1988, address to the
United Nations, was to announce a uni-
lateral overall Soviet force reduction of
500,000 men and 10,000 tanks by 1991.
In addition, the Soviet Union agreed to
a NATO proposal for convening talks
on conventional armed forces in Europe
(CFE) as part of the CSCE process.
These talks began in Vienna in March
1989. They replace the MBFR talks
that concluded in February 1989 and
extend the parameters of the talks to
cover Europe from the Atlantic to the
Urals. Nuclear issues will remain out-
side the scope of these discussions.

U.S. leaders' concern about
preserving NATO's basic strategies of
flexible response and forward defense
led them to insist that agreement on
reducing conventional forces to parity
must precede further talks on scaling
down nuclear arsenals in Europe. In
view of the Soviet Union's large superi-
ority in the number of short-range mis-
siles, U.S. and British officials urged
the modernization of NATO's Lance
missiles, a critical element in flexible
response and forward defense. The
Fecleral Republic and several other
NATO allies favored direct negotia-
tions with the Soviet Union prior to un-
dertaking a modernization program.
Gorbachev also called for talks intend-
ed to eliminate short-range nuclear-
equipped missiles from Europe.

At the May 1989 NATO summit
meeting. President Bush offered to re-
duce U.S. troop strength in Europe by
30,000 men in return for a Soviet

agreement to bring its troop levels
down to parity with those of the United
States. Under the Bush proposal, which
won NATO endorsement, the Soviet
Union would reduce its forces in East-
ern Europe by about 325,000 men, and
both states would reach a level of
275,000 troops by 1992 or 1993.

In addition, the President proposed
setting limits on the number of tanks,
armored personnel carriers, and artil-
lery pieces in NATO and Warsaw Pact
arsenals and suggested a 15% reduction
below current NATO levels of land-
based combat aircraft and helicopters
by both sides. The troops involved in
these reductions would be demobilized;
the weapons would be destroyed.

The NATO allies also announced an
accord on a short-range missiles nego-
tiating strategy. NATO would enter
into talks with the Soviet Union at the
point at which the agreements result-
ing from the CFE talks were being im-
plemented. Talks on short-range
missiles would aim at partial reduction
of these weapons. Bush simultaneously
reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to
Europe.

While the arms reduction process
goes forward, other areas of progress
in East-West relations that are outside
the purview of NATO have contributed
to a lessening of international tensions.
The conclusion of accords that provided
for a Soviet withdrawal of its occupying
forces from Afghanistan and an agree-
ment among the parties directly in-
volved in the civil war in Angola that
provided for the withdrawal of Cuban
and South African forces have helped
to diffuse conflict between the major
powers and may contribute to long-
range regional stability.

NATO's role in an era of renewed
negotiations remains central. It pro-
vides the military deterrent essential
for success in negotiations. Moreover,
as the process of Europe's economic
and political integration continues and
as Europe's role in its own defense in-
creases, NATO serves as a unique fo-
rum in which allied policy can be
forged and differences between the
American and European pillars of the
Atlantic alliance resolved. ■

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

Western Security:
The U.S. and Its NATO Allies

After World War II, the people of
Europe, free from the menace of Nazi
Germany, were confronted with two
distinctly different and opposing views
of what the future should hold. The
United States and its West European
allies looked to an era of democracy un-
derscored by individual freedoms and
economic prosperity built on a founda-
tion of free markets. With our allies,
we stood fast against a contrary view
championed by the Soviet Union — a
view that forcibly divided Europe
against the will of its peoples and
which transformed it into the world's
most heavily armed continent.

Indications that the Soviet Union —
through glasnost, perestroika,
democratization, and "new thinking" —
is changing its vision of the future do
not mean that the need for allied soli-
darity is over. We are viewing with in-
terest and caution the changes in the
Soviet Union. The United States wel-
comes glasnost, perestroika, new politi-
cal thinking, and the first tentative
steps toward democracy. However, the
United States awaits tangible signs
that the Soviets have changed their be-
havior on issues such as Soviet mili-
tary e.xpansion, forces acquisition and
disposition, military doctrine,
human rights, regional conflicts, and
military support to totalitarian states
before we can make fundamental
changes in the allied approach to
relations with the East.

Moreover, the former Soviet-
inspired view of a Europe divided into
ideological camps is not the only reason
for Western alliances and friendships.
Over the past four decades, the United
States and its NATO allies have con-
structed strong political, military, and
economic relationships bound together
by shared values and fundamental com-
mon interests. Enormous changes have
taken place among the Western allies
themselves, and America's role is far
less predominant today than it was after
Woi'ld War II. Far from being a negative

indication of diminished U.S. influence,
these changes are the best possible evi-
dence that our policies have worked.
While the United States is not the major
source of resources for European jjoliti-
cal, economic, and military strength,
America plays a unique role as a catalyst
for cooperation.

The most significant development
in the allied response to postwar chal-
lenges was the signing of the North
Atlantic Treaty in April 1949. ' That
document created the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), which
many view as the most effective and en-
during defensive alliance in modern his-
tory. NATO is a purely defensive
alliance: it makes no territorial claims
against any other nation, and its mem-
bers have pledged to use their armed
forces only to defend NATO territory.
As NATO celebrates its 40th year in
1989, continued U.S. -allied consulta-
tions will lead to a comprehensive ap-
proach, not only to East-West issues but
also to making the Western alliance
stronger than ever as it meets the new
challenges before it.

This document e.xamines funda-
mental U.S. goals and objectives as
NATO reevaluates and responds to a
changing security climate.

Political Relations

In a speech to European foreign minis-
ters meeting in Vienna, Austria, on
March 6, 1989, Secretary Baker out-
lined "four freedoms" which are em-
braced by the West as foundation
stones for democracy and jjeaceful
relations:

• The freedom of all Europeans to
have a say in decisions which affect
their lives, including freedom of the
workplace: If the East were to accept
this freedom, the legality of Poland's
"Solidarity" trade union would have
been the norm and not the subject of bit-
ter negotiations.

• The freedom of all Europeans to
express their political differences,
when all ideas are welcome and human
rights are truly inviolable: If the East
were to accept this freedom, monitors
of the Helsinki accords on human rights
would not be persecuted by their
governments.

• The freedom of all Europeans to
exchange ideas and information and to
exercise their right to freedom of move-
ment: If the East were to accept these
freedoms, academic researchers would
never be denied access to scholarly
documents — and the Berlin Wall would
be reduced to rubble.

• The freedom of all Europeans to
be safe, not only from military attack
but from military intimidation as well:
If the East were to accept this freedom,
West Europeans would not face an over-
whelming conventional military force to
the East, and East Europeans would be
able to make their own political deci-
sions without fear of being "over-ruled"
by Soviet tanks, as happened in Hun-
gary and East Germany in 19-56 as well
as Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Steadfast dedication to these four
principles, fueled by the vigor of free
market economies and close cooperation
with the United States, allowed West-
ern Europe to rebuild via the Marshall
Plan from the rubble of World War II
faster than the most optimistic planners
imagined. As a result, some power and
influence has shifted from the United
States to the West European allies.
This development is both positive and
desirable. Yet it poses new challenges as
the United States and its allies explore
ways to share both the benefits and bur-
dens of collective defense.

West Europeans have become used
to seeing the United States contribute a
large share of the cost of collective de-
fense. However, as West European econ-
omies now challenge U.S. business
interests here and around the world,
Americans argue that Western Europe

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

FEATURE
NATO

is capable of paying a greater share of
the common defense. The fact that the
Western alliance continues to grow
stronger even while debating such fun-
damental issues is the best proof that
the democratic sharing of ideas is the
only guarantee of durable peace and
friendship.

Indeed, because NATO is made up
of flourishing democracies, public opin-
ion in many nations must be taken into
account before critical political, eco-
nomic, and military decisions are made.
For example, the December 1987 U.S.-
Roviet treaty to eliminate inter-
iiii'diate-range nuclear forces (INF) was
made possible because, despite Soviet
maneuvering, the people of several West
Eui-opean democracies made decisions
1(1 deploy INF forces in the first place.
This concerted action by the allies, in
effect, forced Moscow's hand, since pri-
or to the deployment of Western INF
forces, the Soviets held a monopoly on
such weaponry and saw no reason to ne-
gotiate seriously. Key decisions on allied
security as well as political and econom-
ic relations must stand up to public scru-
tiny in all 16 NATO democracies.

The Western allies have long under-
stood that their own freedom and well-
being is best protected only if they
maintain an effective deterrent and if
they can secure certain understandings
with the East. The Conference on Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE), which first met in Helsinki in
1972, has been seeking to address the
matri.\ of political and military issues
that contribute to instability in Eu-
rope. Followup meetings in what has
come to be known as the "CSCE proc-
ess" have been scheduled on subjects as
varied as human rights, the peaceful
settlement of disputes, and environ-
mental issues (see p. 9).

Nuclear Arms Control

In the immediate postwar period, Eu-
rope's military balance was fluid and
marked by Soviet attempts to impose
Moscow's will on other governments.
U.S. strategic, or long-range, nuclear
weapons served as a counterweight to
:he Soviet Union's superiority in con-
ventional forces. After 1948, the Soviet
Union's development of nuclear weap-
ons posed an additional threat to Eu-
rojje and the United States.

Short-range nuclear weaponry ap-
peared on both sides, and the Soviet-
led Warsaw Pact troops and armor con-
tinued to numerically overwhelm those
of the West. This was a critical factor
in allied defense strategy because
NATO's largest military power, the
United States (thousands of miles away
from the East-West frontier), was un-
able to quickly deploy conventional
forces to Europe.

In response to the Soviet bloc's mas-
sive military buildup, NATO in 1967
adopted and continues to follow a strat-
egy known as "fle.xible response."
NATO is prepared to use any of the
weapons at its disposal to appropriately
counter any act of aggression. The
Warsaw Pact must weigh the possibility
that NATO could use any of its
resources — including nuclear
weapons — if Warsaw Pact forces invade
Western Europe. This flexibility is
aimed at deterring war by sending the
other side an unmistakable message
that the West will take appropriate ac-
tion to deal with any form of aggression.

The Soviet Union, for its own prop-
aganda advantage, often attempts to

misrepresent NATO's "flexible re-
sponse" strategy and our efforts to de-
ter war. For example, Moscow would
like us to renounce first-use of nuclear
weapons and even to turn Europe into
a "nuclear free zone." In the past, Mos-
cow also has suggested a "freeze" on
nuclear forces at current levels. The
true nature of these Soviet arguments
becomes clear when one considers that,
in the absence of a credible nuclear de-
terrent, Warsaw Pact conventional
forces would dominate the European
security environment. Moreover, even
should equal conventional force levels
be achieved, history has shown that
conventional forces alone do not prevent
war. It is NATO's strategy of deter-
rence, made credible by a mix of up-to-
date nuclear and conventional weapons,
which has guaranteed the peace in Eu-
rope for the last 40 years.

For this reason, the United States
and its allies have approached the question
of nuclear arms control from an overall
perspective of Western secMr/f^. Reduc-
ing nuclear arms is not an end in itself;
rather, enhancing Western securi-

NATO'S 40 Years: A Chronology

May 1945: Germany surrenders; U.S.,
British, French, and Soviet troops occupy
Germany.

June 1947: United States announces
Marshall Plan for European economic re-
covery, starts pulling troops out of Europe
but leaves 40,000 in Germany.

June 1948: Soviets start Berlin block-
ade by blocking roads to West Berlin.

April 4, 1949: The United States and
11 other countries sign the North Atlantic
Treaty, creating NATO (Greece and Tur-
key joined in 1952, West Germany in 1955,
and Spain in 1982).

May 1949: Soviets end Berlin block-
ade. West Germany (and later East Ger-
many) are created from occupation zones.

October 1950: NATO is formally es-
tablished after the Korean war begins.
Paris is its first headquarters.

May 1955: The Warsaw Pact is
created.

August 1961: The Berlin Wall is built.

October 1962: Cuban missile crisis
puts NATO and the Warsaw Pact on full
military alert.

July 1966: France withdraws from the
NATO military command; NATO begins
moving headquarters to Brussels.

October 1967: NATO adopts its "flex-
ible response" strategy.

October 1977: West Germany asks
NATO to take action in response to Soviet
deployment of SS-20 INF missiles.

December 1979: NATO adopts its
"dual-track" policy of deploying its own
INF missiles while negotiating with the
Soviets for removal of their SS-20s.

1983-88: NATO unilaterally with-
draws 2,400 nuclear warheads deployed
with SNF weaponry in Europe.

November 1983: Pershing II INF mis-
siles are sent to West Germany; Soviets
walkoutof INF talks.

March 1985: U.S. -Soviet INF talks
resume.

December 1987: United States and
U.S.S.R. sign INF Treaty abolishing this
entire class of nuclear weapons from their
respective arsenals.

March 1989: NATO and Warsaw Pact
begin talks on conventional forces in Eu-
rope and confidence- and security-building
measures.

May 1989: NATO summit and new
CFE/SNF proposal.

June 1989: START talks resume.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

Th« Unilsd Sut*a Govefnin«nt haa not r»coflf>ii«d
the incofporalion of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union Other boundary rapreaentahon
\ 18 not necesaarily authoritative )

ty and regional stability is our goal.
Western conventional arms control
proposals are aimed at eliminating
the conventional forces imbalance
and enhancing stability.

There are three basic categories
of land-based nuclear missiles: short-
range nuclear forces (SNF) with a
range of less than 500 kilometers
(300 miles), intermediate-range (INF)
with a range of .500-5,500 kilometers
(300-3,400 miles), and long-range or
strategic — intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy
bombers — with a range of more than
5,500 kilometers (3,400 miles).

The only category of nuclear mis-
siles that has been banned completely

by the United States and the U.S.S.R.
is INF. The Soviet Union began deploy-
ing ground-launched missiles capable of
reaching West European targets dur-
ing the 1950s. The most dangerous of
these INF weapons were the modern
SS-20 missiles which the Soviets began
deploying in 1977. The allies then join-
ed in a "dual-track" approach on INF —
deploying new INF weapons to counter
the Soviet threat while at the same
time pursuing negotiations with the So-
viets for elimination of the SS-20s and
other Soviet INF missiles. Faced with
U.S. deployments of INF missiles, the
U.S.S.R. agreed to a U.S. proposal for a
fully verifiable ban on intermediate-
range weapons.

Strategic nuclear forces are the
subject of the strategic arms reduction

talks (START) aimed at reducing the
risk of nuclear war. The U.S. objective
in START is to achieve an equitable andi
effectively verifiable agreement that
creates a more stable nuclear balance,
thereby reducing the incentive for ei-
ther side to launch a first strike. The
United States believes that a START
treaty is possible in the future but not
before several difficult issues are re-
solved. These include: mobile ICBMs,
sea-launched and air-launched cruise
missiles, and sublimits on ICBM
warheads. In many of these cases, veri-
fication presents the most difficult
challenge.

NATO continues to face the direct
threat posed to Europe by large num-
bers of Warsaw Pact short-range nucle-

Department of State Bulletin/August 198S

FEATURE
NATO

ar missiles, which recently have been
substantially upgraded. As agreed to
in the May 1989 NATO report, "A Com-
prehensive Concept of Arms Control
and Disarmament [see p. 22]," NATO
reaffirms its position that for the fore-
seeable future, there is no alternative
to the alliances strategy of deterrence
based upon an appropriate mix of ade-
quate and effective nuclear and conven-
tional forces. Land-, sea-, and air-based
nuclear systems in Western Europe, in-
cluding ground-based missiles, will be
needed and continue to be updated
where necessary. In line with NATO's
commitment to maintain only the mini-
mum number of nuclear weapons neces-
sary to support this strategy, NATO
already has made unilateral cuts in
short-range nuclear forces. The num-
ber of land-based warheads in Western
Europe has been reduced by more than
one-third since 1979 to its lowest level
in more than 20 years. Updating such
systems would result in further
reductions.

Conventional Arms Control

President Bush and Secretary Baker
consider conventional forces to be a
high priority area in arms control. Sec-
retary Baker has defined the issue
quite simply: "A vast force, spear-
headed by heavily armored units and
supported by massive firepower, has
been fielded by the Soviet Union and
its allies. That force points West." War-
saw Pact tank and artillery forces out-
number NATO 3:1 and the Warsaw Pact
holds a 2:1 advantage in armored per-
sonnel carriers. Even if all the uni-
lateral force reductions announced by
General Secretary Gorbachev and the
Warsaw Pact were implemented, the
pact would still hold more than a 2:1
edge in tanks and artillery.

On March 9, 1989, two new autono-
mous negotiations within the framework
of the CSCE process opened in Vienna.
The negotiation on conventional armed
forces in Europe (CFE) covers the
European territory of all Warsaw Pact
and NATO countries from the Atlantic
Ocean to the Ural Mountains. Separate
Negotiations on confidence- and
security-building measures (CSBMs)
involving all 35 CSCE nations aim to
build "openness" between East and
West.

CFE. During the NATO summit
meeting on May 29, 1989, President
Bush asked the allies to join in tabling
the most far-reaching Western conven-
tional arms control proposal ever of-
fered in the postwar era. The President
has proposed and NATO has endorsed
the following enhancements to NATO's
CFE proposal now on the table in
Vienna:

• First, that the members of the al-
liance lock in Eastern acceptance of the
proposed Western limits on key portions
of their ground forces. This includes
ceilings on numbers of tanks (20,000

for each side), armored troop carriers
(28,000 for each side), and artillery
pieces (16,500-24,000 for each side, de-
pending on the resolution of definitional
questions). Equipment reduced would
be destroyed. This provision would
oblige the East to destroy tens of thou-
sands of weapons systems and eliminate
its preponderance in these important
components of military strength.

• Second, that the West expand its
proposal to extend, for the first time,
the concept of conventional arms control
to all land-based combat aircraft and he-
licopters in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals
area. Each side would be obliged to re-
duce its holdings to a level 15% below the
current NATO total. All reduced equip-
ment would be destroyed. Again, al-
though both sides would take significant
cuts, the East would lose its current
preponderance in these forces.

• Third, that the United States and
Soviet Union agree to a common level of

approximately 275,000 ground and air
forces stationed outside national terri-
tory in the Atlantic-to-the Urals zone.
The United States is willing to reduce
its combat forces by 20% to arrive at
this level. The reduction to parity would
require the Soviets to reduce their
600,000-member force in Eastern Eu-
rope by 325,000. Withdrawn forces on
both sides would be demobilized.

• Fourth, that both sides accelerate
their timetable for reaching a CFE
agreement along the above lines and for
implementing the required reductions.
The Soviet Union has referred to a tar-
get date of 1997 as its goal; the United
States would like to reach an agreement
within 6 months to 1 year and accom-
plish the reductions by 1992 or 1993.

NATO has set a goal of tabling
these enhancements along with verifica-
tion provisions at the opening of round 3
of CFE on September 7, 1989. As the So-
viet Union and its allies indicate their
readiness to change their national prior-
ities and reduce their enormous mili-
tary establishments, the United States
and its allies are prepared to help real-
ize the longstanding hope of a secure and
less militarized Europe.

The Western allies have four major
objectives in CFE:

• The establishment of a secure and
stable balance of conventional forces at
lower levels. The present concentration of
conventional forces between the Atlantic
and the Urals represents the greatest
destructive potential of conventional

CSCE

: Followup Meetings, March 1989-91

1989

CSBMs
Information
Human Rights
Environment

Date

March 9-
April 18-May 12
May 30^une 2:5
October 16-November 3

Location

Vienna, Austria
London, England
Paris, France
Sofia, Bulgaria

1990

Economics
Human Rights
Mediterranean

March 19-April 6

June 5-29

September 24-October 19

Bonn, West Germany
Copenhagen, Denmark
Palma, Spain

1991

Peaceful Settlemer

of Disputes
Cultural Heritage
Human Rights

It January 15-February 8

May 28^une 7
September 10-October 4

Valletta, Malta

Krakow, Poland
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

forces ever assembled. The mere pres-
ence of such massive firepower threat-
ens European security.

• The elimination of disparities
prejudicial to stability and security. It is
the substantial disparity of tanks, artil-
lery, and troop carriers that most
threatens European stability and secu-
rity. In particular, no single country
should be allowed to possess more than a
fixed proportion of all weapons systems
held by all parties. Additional limits
should be placed on the stationing of
troops on another country's territory
(such as Soviet forces in East Germany).
These two elements would combine to
ensure that no one country could domi-
nate Europe by force of arms.

• The elimination of capabilities to
launch surprise attacks and large-scale
offensive operations. The types of weap-
ons systems in which the Soviet bloc en-
joys the greatest advantage — tanks,
artillery, and armored personnel
carriers — are systems that are most vi-
tal to seizing and holding territory, the
prime aim of any aggressor.

• The United States insists that any
arms control treaty be effectively veri-
fiable and that inspections be expanded.

CSBMs. CSBMs are designed to re-
duce the risk for armed conflict that
arises through misunderstanding or
miscalculation of military capabilities
and intentions in Europe. After suc-
cessful conclusion of the 1986 Stockholm
agreement and the 2V2-year implemen-
tation experience, the 35 CSCE partici-
pating states are meeting again in
Vienna to develop additional measures.
The focus of the Western proposal is for
measures which increase openness and
transparency of military structure,
equipment, and activities, thus reduc-
ing the likelihood that weapons will ever
be used.

A Look Toward the Future

Economic, social, and political changes
in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
are occurring at the same time that al-
lied economies and democracies are
flourishing. New horizons are now evi-
dent for a continent that was divided 40
years ago by a conflict between two op-
posing visions. As that conflict abates,
it may be possible to remove old obsta-
cles from Europe's path to the future.

The United States and its NATO al-
lies are working in concert to remove
the largest of those obstacles — espe-
cially the conventional force imbalances
and curtains of secrecy that have long
imperiled European security and world
peace. This process will not be easy, but
it will help clear the path toward a free,
open, secure, and prosperous Europe.

'The original members of NATO were:
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ice-
land, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nor-
way, Portugal, United kingdom, and United
States. The Federal Republic of Germany,
Greece, Spain, and Turkey joined later,
bringing total NATO membership to 16.
France withdrew from NATO'S integrated
military structure in 1966 but remains a
member of the alliance. ■

THE PRESIDENT

President Visits Europe;
Attends Nortli Atlantic Council Meeting

President Bush was in

Italy and the Holy See (May 26-28, 1989),

Belgium (May 28-30),

West Germany (May 30-31),

and the United Kingdom (May 31^une 2).

Departure Remarks,
May 26, 1989^

i depart for Europe this morning to
ntH't with all our North Atlantic allies
mil also to pay visits to Italy, Ger-
naiiy, and the United Kingdom for dis-
mssions with leaders of those alliance
lations on issues of common interest,
['m especially pleased that my first
/isit to Europe as President is to cele-
brate the 40th anniversary of NATO.
A.merica is a proud partner in the At-
antic alliance, and American interests
lave been well served by the alliance.
Twice in the first half of this cen-
;ury, Europe was the scene of world
ivar, and twice Americans fought in
Europe for the sake of peace and free-
iom. Today Europe is enjoying a period
af unparalleled prosperity and uninter-
rupted peace, longer than it has known
in the modern age, and NATO has
made the difference. And the alliance
will prove every bit as important to
American and European security in
tht' decade ahead. The importance of
the alliance and its democratic under-
pinnings is the message I now take to
Europe. NATO has been a success by
an\- measure, but success breeds its
iiw n challenges. Today dramatic
changes are taking place in Europe,
both East and West. For us, those
changes bring new challenges and un-
paralleled opportunities.

For too long, unnatural and inhu-
man barriers have divided the East
from the West. And we hope to over-
come that division, to see a Europe
that is truly free, united, and at peace.
We are ready to work with a united Eu-
rope, to extend the peace and prosper-
ity we enjoy to other parts of the world.
And we hope to move beyond contain-
ment: to integrate the Soviet Union
into the community of nations. We wel-
come the political and economic liberal-
ization that has taken place so far in
the Soviet Union and in some countries
of Eastern Europe. We will encourage
more changes to follow.

Many common concerns confront
us. Beyond the traditional economic
and security spheres, we and our part-
ners in the alliance are working hard
on a growing international agenda,
from a common approach to environ-
mental protection to cooperation
against drug trafficking and against
terrorism. We also welcome Europe's
progress toward a truly common mar-
ket and a growing European coopera-
tion on security issues as the basis of
an even more clynafnic transatlantic
partnership. As we approach 1992, it is
essential that we work with our Euro-
pean partners to ensure an open and
expanding world trading system and
that we take strong steps to prevent
trade disputes from obscuring our com-
mon political and security concerns.
NATO is based on the many bonds be-
tween us: our shared heritage, history,
and culture; our shared commitment to
freedom, democracy, and the rights of
the individual. Barbara and I are look-
ing forward to visiting Europe.

Arrival Remarks,

Rome,

May 26, 19892

Let me begin by thanking all of you
and my personal friend, my good
friend, Prime Minister De Mita, for
welcoming us to Italy at this late hour.

Since ancient times, the saying
goes, "All roads lead to Rome." And
that's still true. It is very fitting that
here I begin my first step on this first
trip to Europe as President of the
United States. Italy has long been a
wellspring of Western culture and
Western values, fostering the alliance
and a more unified Europe. I hope that
our visit to Rome will demonstrate just
how strongly the United States re-
spects and appreciates Italy's role as a
staunch ally and as a constant friend.

When our common security has
been threatened, you have been ready
to strengthen the alliance. When Eu-
rope appeared ready to loosen the ties
that sustained it, you kept these impor-
tant transatlantic ties alive and strong.
When conflict has threatened, you have
been in the front ranks of those
searching for solution. The bond be-
tween the United States and Italy runs
deep. It's a bond of family, of culture, of
shared interests, and common vision.
The world around us is changing, but
we can be sure that our friendship will
endure.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

Mr. Prime Minister, when we last
met, we talked of new developments
around the world: of change in the
East, of new opportunities for arms re-
duction, of the growing unity of Eu-
rope. And in recent weeks, I've spoken
of America's vision for world peace. I
have said that we are prepared to move
beyond containment, toward policy that
works to bring the Soviet Union into
the community of nations. We will be
actively engaged in Eastern Europe,
promoting measures to encourage po-
litical and economic liberalization in
Poland. The United States welcomes a
stronger and more united Europe. We
believe, as I know you do, that Euro-
pean unity and the transatlantic part-
nership reinforce each other.

Over the next 2 days, we'll have the
opportunity to engage in renewed dia-
logue, as partners, certainly as
friends. And I hope that our conversa-
tions are shaped by our shared expec-
tations for the future and by our
determination to see our future
succeed.

Dinner Toast,

Rome,

May 27, 19893

Mr. Prime Minister and leaders of the
legislative branch, distinguished
guests, it's a very great honor for me to
be welcomed in such a warm and gener-
ous way by the Italian people and their
government. You know, Barbara and I
have been to this marvelous country,
this beautiful country, many times; and
as always, we've been received with
kindness and generosity. This trip is
my first visit to Europe as President of
the United States. And I think of no
place that is better to begin than right
here in Italy and to be right here in
Rome.

It is traditional when visiting Italy
for American leaders to note the mil-
lions of our citizens who claim an Ital-
ian background, so I will brag — now 12
million and rising. Among the many
Italian-Americans, there are Fiorello
La Guardia — some old enough to
remember — Joe DiMaggio in sports;
Tony Fauci, now at the National Insti-
tutes of Health; and, of course, our Su-
preme Court Justice Antonin Scalia.

And Italian-Americans are one
link that binds the United States and
Italy — but only one. For we are united
by our belief in individual liberty, hu-
man dignity, and the rule of law and by
the shared values of family, faith, and
work.

We also admire your country's rec-
ord of success in combating terrorism
and organized crime. I'm especially
grateful for your help in stopping the
scourge of narcotics, which torments
both our nations. We're going to contin-
ue our intense cooperative efforts to
fight terrorism and narcotics and to
protect air travelers. Just as this coop-
erative effort brings our peoples even
closer together and helps to strengthen
our already excellent bilateral rela-
tions, so, too, will the action that I'm
pleased to announce tonight.

After studying ways to relax U.S.
visa requirements, we will soon begin
a pilot program to end these require-
ments for your citizens. In the future,
Italians who wish to visit our country,
whether as tourists or on business, will
no longer need to apply for visas; and
we look forward to that day.

But along with our domestic initia-
tives, I think, too, of the strong mili-
tary ties between our two countries
and within the Atlantic alliance, the
most enduring alliance in the history of
man. To protect that alliance and the
shared commitment to freedom which
underlies it is our continuing mission
not merely as Americans or Italians
but as believers in democracy. Of this,
I am certain: We will do our part, and I
know Italy will do its part.

For when our common security has
been in danger, you have stood ready to
defend the alliance. And when the need
arose for NATO to relocate that 401st
Tactical Fighter Wing within southern
Europe, Italy welcomed it. When stra-
tegic interests were at risk in the Per-
sian Gulf and in Lebanon, Italy sent
ships and peacekeeping forces. When
NATO confronted widespread Soviet
deployment of these multiple-warhead
SS-20 missiles, Italy stood tall in re-
sponse. At times when Europe seemed
ready to turn inward, you have rein-
forced our transatlantic ties. For that,
Mr. Prime Minister, Italy has our grat-
itude and our profound respect. So, to-
gether, let us reaffirm the ties that
bind us. And let's continue to build
peace and the commonwealth of free
nations not for ourselves but also for
our children, the kind of peace and
freedom which lasts.

In that spirit, I ask all of our
guests tonight to rise and raise their
glasses. To Italian-American friend-
ship, our transatlantic heritage, and to
the Western alliance and the shared
values of freedom and democracy that
have made that alliance strong, and to
your health, Mr. Prime Minister, and
the peace and prosperity of your great
country.

Secretary Baker's

Interview on

'Meet the Press,"
Rome,
May 28, 1989^

Q. There have been some indications
that the President at this NATO sum-
mit is going to offer a proposal to re-
duce American military forces in
Western Europe, perhaps by 10%. Cam
we expect that?

A. What you should not expect is a
proposal to unilaterally withdraw any
of America's conventional forces. What-
ever the President proposes at this
summit — and I would, of course, not
deny that he will have something sub-
stantial to say at this summit — will be
done in the context of submitting sug-
gestions for alliance consideration. So
put aside any thoughts of unilateral re-
ductions of American forces.

Q. What you're saying here is
rather tantalizing. You're sending the
signal that he is going to make some
specific, concrete reductions or pro-
posals. You're not denying the fact
that it may involve reducing Ameri-
can forces. So you're saying, in effect,
that this may, indeed, be put on the
table within the context of the
alliance — a reduction of forces —
perhaps 10%.

A. What I don't want to do is pre-
judge what the President is going to
say. It's important the President him-
self make that proposal to the alliance,
and so you really ought not to read any-
thing into silence, if you will, on my
part. We're almost at the first day of
the summit. I'd rather just let it stand
at that.

Q. You seem to have a German
problem. President Von Weizaecker in
Germany made an interesting speech
last week. He said, 'Germans don't
want our ball for other people to play

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

with." There's obviously an assertive
new mood in Germany about assert-
injf German rights, telling the West-
ern allies, you can't use us as your
nuclear battlefield anymore and so
on. How are you going to handle this
now German mood?

A. I think the President is very
sensitive to the particular problems
that Germany faces. As you know, the
Pi'esident is already on the issue, for
instance, of short-range nuclear force
niddernization. The President has al-
ready indicated a willingness to see
(|iiestions involving production and de-
|ili)yment delayed until the end of 1991
or the beginning of 1992. The President
lias already acknowledged, at least, the
jii inciple of negotiations, although he
li'i-ls very, very strongly that before
you can talk about that or get into that,
you need to see a conventional forces
agreement.

I think it will be the position of the
United States at the summit that Ger-
many is an e.xtremely valuable and val-
ued member of the alliance. They will
continue to be such. Just witness the
remarks of their own leading officials.

I think that the SNF [short-range
nuclear forces] problem, if you will, is
not going to be something that will be
the main focus of this 40th anniversary
summit.

The Federal Republic of Germany
embraces, to the full extent, the West-
ern value system that has permitted
the West to win politically and econom-
ically over a competing philosophy over
the past 40 years and has permitted
the alliance, in effect, to keep the
peace.

Q. Let me switch to the Soviet
Union. There was a report leaked by
your Administration this week that
you all were about to lift economic
sanctions against the Soviets — those
that were first imposed after the Af-
ghanistan invasion. This would en- |
able the Soviets to buy computers and |
other high-technology items from the =
West. I

Now critics, including some in s
the Defense Department, say that |

would give the Soviets a big military =■
edge. Does that concern you? |

A. It would concern me if I ^

thought that whatever was done would 1
give the Soviets a big military edge. I -
don't think that the President is going
to be foolhardy. If anything is done —
and I'm not confirming here that any-
thing will be done, I do think it's an ap-

propriate subject for discussion with
our allies — but if anything is done,
you've got to remember that we have
"COCOM [Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Export Controls] still in
effect. So whatever transfers are con-
templated will be subject to the normal
COCOM review test with respect to
their strategic importance.

Q. Would lifting sanctions be a
reward for the Soviets for getting out
of Afghanistan? Would it be a reward
for perestroikal What would be your
rationale, would you think, if you
were to go ahead and do that?

A. I think if the President were to
go ahead and do that, he would be
thinking more about the sensitivities,
frankly, of our strong allies in the
NATO alliance. It's my view, as I've
said before, that I think the lifting of
the "no-exceptions" policy is more im-
portant to our allies than it is to the
Soviet Union. I'm not sure the Soviet
Union would see that as a particular
reward.

When the policy was put into effect
in 1979, it was done so because of the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It's
been implied, if not expressly stated in
the interim, that were they to leave Af-
ghanistan, certainly that policy would
be subject to review.

Q. Let's come back to a point you
raised just a minute ago. We were
talking about the dispute in the alli-
ance over short-range nuclear weap-
ons. You said it will not be a major
issue at this NATO summit confer-
ence. But we all know that it is a ma-
jor problem today within the alliance.
If this dispute is not to be settled now,
when will it be settled, and how will
it be settled?

A. I hope what I said was, I don't
think it will be the major issue. I think
this being the 40th anniversary summit
of NATO, there will be many other
things that will be considered. Clearly
this is an important issue, and I do not
mean to be interpreted as suggesting
otherwise.

We're still hopeful that it will be
settled on terms that are acceptable to
all of the members of the alliance. I
think there is still a fair chance that
that can take place. Obviously it won't
happen now before we get to Brussels
since we leave this evening. It would
be, I think, settled on some formula
such as I suggested in my answer a mo-
ment ago. And that is, delaying the de-
cision on modernization, recognizing
the principle of negotiations but making
it very, very clear that any negotiations

On Memorial Day (May 28), President and Mrs. Bush visited the Sicily-Rome .\merican
Cemetery and Memorial outside Nettuno, a town south of Rome. The 77-acre site is the
final resting place for 7,862 U.S. military personnel, most of whom died in operations
preceding the liberation of Rome in 1944.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

would not involve going to a third zero,
if you will, and that any negotiations
must await, at the very least, tangible
implementation or successful conclusion
of a conventional forces agreement.
Remember these weapons are
there for the purpose of deterrring sur-
prise attack by the overwhelming supe-
riority of Soviet forces, or Warsaw Pact
forces — conventional forces. So we
really ought to concentrate on reduc-
tions in conventional forces as our top
priority. Once we get to a balance
there, then perhaps it would be appro-
priate to talk about negotiating lower
levels, but not zero, in short-range nu-
clear weapons.

Q. What you're saying sounds
very persuasive and is persuasive to
many people in the alliance. The fact
is, though, that the President goes on
to Bonn after Brussels. A recent poll
in West Germany shows that 89% of
the West Germans do not want to see
new, more modern nuclear weapons
on their territory. So when you face
that strong public opinion, what does
the President do in Bonn?

A. He does what I have just men-
tioned. He is in the process of doing —
he's taken some steps that are very
forthcoming. But one thing he doesn't
do, if I might suggest it, is sacrifice
Western security because of political
considerations anywhere. This is an ex-
traordinarily important issue from
that standpoint.

The nuclear deterrent has kept the
peace for 40 years. You know, we've
just come from a really very poignant
and stirring Memorial Day ceremony at
the American Cemetery at the Anzio
beachhead where the President and the
Prime Minister of Italy spoke. When
you see the 8,000 American graves
there, I think you really focus in on
how very important it is to maintain
this deterrent, which has been the rea-
son we've had peace for 40 years.

Q. Let me ask you about your
competitor in this game we're play-
ing. Do you agree with the President's
press secretary that Mr. Gorbachev is
a "drugstore cowboy?"

A. No, I don't agree with that. I'm
not sure that Marlin himself agrees
with that characterization. I think he
has even said as much subsequently.

Q. But what are you dealing
with? What does Mr. Gorbachev rep-
resent?

A. I think he represents a leader
who is bringing real change to the So-
viet Union. The changes that we see
there are dramatic. They are real.
They are, indeed, revolutionary.

We don't know yet whether or not
he, individually, will succeed. We want
him to. There is no one in this Admin-
istration who doesn't want the General
Secretary to succeed, because what
he's doing is embracing the political and
economic agenda of the West. The West
has won. We've won the struggle of the
past 40 years; we've kept the peace for
40 years; the Soviet Union is moving in
our direction, and we ought to continue
to encourage their moving in our
direction.

What we really should be doing is
focusing on ending the division of Eu-
rope and bringing Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union into the community of
nations on the basis of Western values,
and they are now beginning to sub-
scribe to those Western values.

Q. Let's turn now to China. We
know the developments there. The
student demonstrations seem to be
winding down. The orthodox
leaders — Li Peng and others — are re-
asserting their control. Zhao Ziyang
and the moderates may be out in the
cold.

The President endorsed the goals
of the student demonstrators in Chi-
na. Aren't you disappointed by what's
happening there now?

A. I don't think you should say
that you're disappointed when there is
an absence of bloodshed, an absence of
violence; when there is restraint on
both sides involving major demonstra-
tions like this, the most significant
demonstrations perhaps in the history
of China.

You don't have to walk away one bit
from your subscription to the goals of
the students — and we do support those
goals wholeheartedly; that is, freedom
of speech, freedom of assembly, democ-
ratization, and that sort of thing — to be
pleased that there has been no blood-
shed and no violence. In other words,
we are pleased that there is a peaceful
solution to this problem.

We still subscribe to and support
the goals of the students: freedom of
speech, freedom of assembly, democra-
tization. We would like and hope to see
that process continue to unfold in the
People's Republic of China.

Q. We may not be walking away
from those goals, but over the years
the United States has been very force-
ful in embracing the cause of freedom
and democracy in places as diverse as
the Soviet Union and Panama. We
have been far more tepid in the China
case, particularly we've been reluc-
tant to criticize those Chinese leaders
who are opposing those forces. Why
the double standard?

A. Because China has been open-
ing up on its own. When we were criti-
cal of the Soviet Union, it was a totally
closed society. It was very, very repres-
sive. Demonstrations such as this would
never have been permitted.

You can't use Panama as an analo-
gy. Panama, after all, at one time had a
reasonable degree of democracy, and
they're moving in the other direction.
They're not opening up; they're closing
up. So I don't think those situations are
analogous to this one.

Q. We've got reports in the press
here that there's a blacklist in China;
that they're going to now come
around and pick up leaders of this
demonstration and take harsh action
against them. If something like that
happens, what will be the U.S.
reaction?

A. That would be something that
the United States would clearly not fa-
vor. That would be regrettable. But
let's not assume that something like
that is going to happen until it does.
After all, we've had these major dem-
onstrations going on for many weeks
now. Throughout those demonstrations,
we were assuming, almost everyday,
that force would be used to quell the
demonstrations, that there would be
bloodshed, that there would be vio-
lence. In fact, there was not. So let's
not jump the gun.

If something like that happened,
that's not something that the United
States would view with any sort of
favor.

Q. Would we do something about
it? Would we retaliate in some way?

A. Let's wait and see. Let's don't
answer hypothetical questions or cross
bridges before we get there. It would
be something that we would seriously
regret.

Q. The Middle East: You made a
speech recently which caused quite a
bit of controversy in some circles. You i
called on Israelis to reach out to Pal-
estinians and Palestinians to reach
out to Israelis. Nothing controversial

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 '

THE PRESIDENT

about that, but you call on Israel to
give up any dreams of annexing for-
mally the occupied territories — the
Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Prime
Minister Shamir of Israel called it
"useless," I believe. How do you react
to that?

A. What I say to that is that the
speech, if you look at it in its entirety,
was very, very balanced. Many, many
people have said they felt that it was,
including quite a few public commenta-
tors, and it was balanced.

I would refer you back to Prime
Minister Shamir's words of yesterday
where he said, "The policy differences,
which Secretary Baker cited, have ex-
isted for quite a while, policy differ-
ences between the United States and
Israel and yet the United States and
Israel enjoy very, very good relations."
And we do, and we will continue to.

Q. A lot of people say it was a
good speech, but they say the whole
history of the Middle East, as far as
U.S. policy is concerned, is good
speeches and then no follow-through
on policy. I'd like to know how you
think it's going to be different this
time? And, specifically, are you going
to appoint a Middle East envoy who
can devote the kind of attention to
that troubled area that's necessary?

A. No, because we're devoting a
lot of attention to it ourselves. Frankly
we don't think progress is made in the
Middle East with high visibility initia-
tives. We think, unless you till the
ground carefully, sometimes those
things can pre-empt more promising
possibilities.

One of the things I said in that
speech, for instance, is that we think
Prime Minister Shamir's proposal for
elections, as part of a broader political
negotiation, was a very good proposal.
We have some differences with some
aspects of it. But as a vehicle for mov-
ing toward peace in the Middle East,
we think it was a very, very good ef-
fort, and we're very pleased with it. We
want to try and follow up on that and,
indeed, we are following up on it.

Q. Are you going to press the Pal-
estinians and Mr. Arafat [of the Pal-
estine Liberation Organization
(PLO)] now through your channel in
Tunis to take up free and fair elec-
tions?

A. We are pressing the Palestin-
ians in every way that we know how,
through our dialogue in Tunis, through
our Ambassador there with the PLO.
We have suggested to the PLO that
they permit Palestinians in the occu-
pied territories to engage with Israel
on this question of elections. So I'm
glad you give me the opportunity here
to make that plea publicly this
morning.

It's important that this elections
proposal be followed up on. One thing
that will be required, of course, is that
the PLO in Tunis give the green light
to Palestinians in the territories to en-
gage with Israel so we can develop this
proposal and move it into a broader po-
litical dialogue.

Q. Finally, Panama. We know
what the situation is there. Despite
the President's actions and his words
calling for Noriega's ouster, Noriega
is still very much in power. Nothing
seems to be changing. What happens
now? What do you do?

A. I think it was fairly significant
that the Organization of American
States (OAS), for the first time in 10 or
12 years, got a consensus resolution
condemning, and it did: it specifically
condemned the abuses that Gen. Nor-
iega has engaged in down there by
stealing an election from his own peo-
ple and thwarting the will of the
people.

We've said there can be no normal-
ization of relations between the United
States and Panama until he steps down.
We're going to continue to maintain
that policy. Now, at least, we have the
support of all of the other countries in
this hemisphere, save Nicaragua. I
think that's some progress in the right
direction.

Arrival Remarks,
Brussels,
May 28, 19895

It is really a pleasure to be back once
again in Brussels. I'm especially
pleased that my first visit as President
of the United States comes as the na-
tions of NATO celebrate 40 years of al-
liance and the longest period of peace
and freedom that Europe has known in
the modern age.

Americans and Belgians share the
memories of war and hard-won peace in
this century. Flanders, the battle of
Ardennes, Bastogne — those names are
part of our history as well as your own,
part of our shared heritage of freedom
and the sacrifices it requires. Belgium,
no stranger to conquest and division,
recognized from the first the impor-
tance of alliance in the postwar world.
Today, as permanent home to NATO
and the European Community,
Brussels stands at the center of a Eu-
rope free, at peace, and prosperous as
never before, a Europe that is steadily
moving toward the single market and
unprecedented political and economic
opportunities. In Brussels the signs of
this European renaissance are
everywhere.

Belgium has been a good friend
and a valued ally, one that has always
acted with alliance interests in mind.
Early in this decade, Belgium was
one of five NATO nations that made
the difficult decision to base INF
[intermediate-range nuclear forces]
systems on its own soil. And those de-
ployments gave us the leverage that we
needed to negotiate the first-ever nu-
clear arms reduction treaty, indeed,
one that banned an entire generation of
nuclear weapons. That's the kind of
courageous and realistic approach that
explains NATO's success. NATO is at
once ready to ensure the common de-
fense and to reduce arms and seek to
diminish tensions with the East.

As I've said a number of times, we
seek to move to a policy beyond con-
tainment. We want to see an end to the
division of Europe, and we want to see
it ended on the basis of Western values.
We will join West European nations in
encouraging the process of change in
the Soviet Union, pointing to the day

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

President Bush and Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens.

when the Soviet Union will be wel-
comed as a constructive participant in
the community of free nations.

I'm looking forward to important
discussions with the King of the Bel-
gians, King Baudouin, and the NATO
heads of government. I look forward, as
well, to my meeting with Prime Minis-
ter Martens, my friend, my discussions
also with Mr. Delors of the European
Community, and Secretary General
Woerner at NATO.

The future of NATO depends on
the alliance's ability to deal with our
enduring security concerns and our
evolving economic relationship. We look
to Belgium to continue to play its im-
portant role in our close and coopera-
tive transatlantic partnership. I am
delighted to be back.

Statement and

Question-and-Answer

Session,
Brussels,
May 29, 1989^

This morning I met with the other
NATO leaders and shared with them
my views on the role of the North At-
lantic alliance in a changing Europe.
NATO, we all agree, is one of the great
success stories, and it's guaranteed the
peace in Europe, provided a shield for
40 years for freedom and prosperity.
Now our alliance faces new challenges
at a time of historic transition as we

seek to overcome the division of Eu-
rope. I call it beyond containment.

Today I'm proposing a major initia-
tive to help move us toward that mo-
mentous objective. If it were accepted,
it would be a revolutionary convention-
al arms control agreement. I believe
the alliance should act decisively now
to take advantage of this extraordinary
opportunity, and I urge that NATO
adopt a 4-point proposal to bring the
Vienna negotiations to a speedy
conclusion.

First, lock in Eastern acceptance
of the proposed Western ceilings on
each side's holding of tanks and ar-
mored troop carriers. Additionally, we
would seek agreement on a similar ceil-
ing for artillery, provided there's some
definitional questions that have to be
resolved there. But all of the equipment
reduced would be destroyed.

We would then, number two, ex-
pand our current NATO proposal so
that each side would reduce to 15% be-
low current NATO levels in two addi-
tional categories: attack and assault, or
transport helicopters and all land-
based combat aircraft. All of the equip-
ment reduced would be destroyed.

Third, propose a 20% cut in combat
manpower in U.S. stationed forces and
a resulting ceiling in U.S. and Soviet
ground and air forces stationed outside
of national territory in the Atlantic-to-
the-Urals zone at approximately
275,000 each. This manpower ceiling
will require the Soviets to reduce their
forces in Eastern Europe by about
325,000 people. Withdrawn soldiers and
airmen on both sides would be
demobilized.

And then, fourth, accelerate the
timetable for reaching a CFE [con-
ventional arms forces in Europe]
agreement along these lines and imple-
menting the required reductions. I be-
lieve that it should be possible to reach
such agreement in 6 months or maybe a
year and to accomplish the reductions
by 1992 or 1993.

If the Soviet Union accepts this
-.fair offer, the results would dramati-
cally increase stability on the continent
Land transform the military map of Eu-
; rope. We can and must begin now to set
; out a new vision for Europe at the end
\ of this century. This is a noble mission
; that I believe the alliance should be
ready to undertake. I have no doubt
that we are up to the task.

Incidentally, in addition to these
arms control proposals I mentioned in
there, that we are prepared to change
our no-exceptions policy on trade. I
called again for a ban on chemical
weapons. I would reiterate my support
for our open skies proposal, and in the
meeting it was discussed by the Prime
Minister of Canada.

Q. Does this revolutionary plan
signal the end of the cold war?

A. I don't know what it signals, ex-
cept it signals a willingness on our part
to really put Mr. Gorbachev to the test
now. I don't like to dwell in antiquated
history. But I do like to get the idea
that we are out front as an alliance, be-
cause this has broad alliance support,
in challenging Mr. Gorbachev to move
forward now more quickly on the most
destabilizing part of the military bal-
ance, and that is on conventional
forces.

Q. Were you pressured by him
and the allies?

A. No, I think I said when I first
came in we were going to take our time
and we were going to study and we're
going to think it out. And we did exact-
ly that. You know and I know that some
voices were raised in Congress that we
were going too slow. But we knew ex
actly what we were doing all along, and
we've now said: "This is what we sug
gest, and this is the way we plan to
lead — lead the alliance and lead the
free world."

Q. Why is it possible to make
such drastic cuts in conventional
weapons and not move on nuclear
aircraft — nuclear ground-based
short-range missiles, which seems to
disturb the Germans and really a ma
jority of the alliance?

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

A. Because the conventional
forces — the existing imbalance is so
ureat that that is the most urgent prob-
lem and the most destabilizing.

Q. If the Soviets accept this pro-
posal, would that enable us to talk
about reducing or eliminating short-
range forces?

A. After agreement was reached
and after there was some implementa-
tion, yes. We are not unwilling to nego-
tiate on SNF.

Q. What was the reaction of the
NATO leaders this morning when you
told them? Did you consult with all
the allies before you put it on the
table?

A. We had widespread — and I
would think everyone was consulted. I
know we had widespread consultation
and — the answer is yes to all NATO
members. And it's been done over the |
last few days. >

Q. What did they tell you about J

it? Why did they find it appealing? z

A. I'll leave it to them to wa.x eu- i

phoric. But I'll tell you, I was very, ^

very pleased with the response in the |
meeting just concluded.

Q. Can you ever see a time when
you might not have nuclear forces in
Europe?

A. No. We need the concept of
flexible response, and I can't, in the
foreseeable future, see us getting away
from that.

Q. Is there any indication that
this disagreement with the West Ger-
mans over the SNF issue will be re-
solved here at the NATO summit?

A. I'm not really at liberty to go
into too much on that, because right
now we put together a working group
to try to work out some resolution. But
you see, this bold proposal, in terms of
conventional forces, should give those
who have had difficulty with our posi-
tion on SNF a chance to regroup and
rethink and give them a little leeway
that they haven't had heretofore.

Q. Do you expect early negotia-
tion by the Secretary of State [Soviet
Foreign Minister] Mr. Shevardnadze
or Mr. Gorbachev on this proposal?

A. The sooner the better.

Q. There's been some criticism in
Congress, as you mentioned, about
that you have been too cautious in ap-
proaching the Soviet Union. Was that
sentiment expressed today by anyone,

President Bush announced his Conventional Parity
NATO summit in Brussels on May 29.

Initiative on the opening day of the

and was there any mention of how the
West should respond to Gorbachev?

A. No, it wasn't mentioned by any-
one in there. And generally, when it
was — your question about how to re-
spond to Gorbachev — without putting
woixls into the mouths of various par-
ticipants, there was enthusiastic en-
dorsement. I can't speak for everybody,
but for those who have intervened so
far.

Q. Have you costed out this pro-
posal? And did the budgetary con-
straints play any part in your
decision to try to —

A. No, the budgetary constraints
didn't, and I haven't seen a full cost
analysis. Some of this would be quite
expensive for us, short-run — the pull-
ing people out. But we did check mil-
itarily. I did not want to propose
something that was militarily unsound.
And our top military people are for
this. Our SACEUR Commander [Su-
preme Allied Commander, Europe —
General John Galvin], who wears many
hats, who represents many countries,
obviously, is for this. And so, we
checked it in that sense.

Q. In some of your early policy
speeches, you expressed deep skepti-
cism about what was going on in the
Soviet Union. You said this new rela-
tionship cannot be bestowed; it must
be earned. Your Secretary of Defense
said he felt Gorbachev would fail.
What prompted change in your think-
ing to make a proposal like this?

A. This is to put it to the test.
This is to say: Here we go. We're out
there now with a proposal that the
United States puts forward and that
has widespread alliance support. Now
test it. How serious are you? Are you —
really want to reduce the imbalances
that exist in all these categories, or do
we want rhetoric? And so, what we're
saying — we're not changing; I'm not
changing my mind. I've said I want to
see pei-estroika succeed. I said I want
to see us move forward in arms reduc-
tions. Indeed, we've set a date for the
resumption of the START [strategic
arms reduction talks] talks — but eyes
wide open. And here we go now, on the
offense with a proposal that is bold and
tests w'hether the Soviet Union will
move toward balance, or whether they
insist on retaining an unacceptable con-
ventional force imbalance.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

Q. On the subject of Mr. Cor-
bachev, do you believe he will fail?

A. I want to see him succeed. And
I've said that, and I'll repeat it here.
I'm not making predictions as to what's
going to happen in.side the Soviet
Union. Those are hard tea leaves to
read. But I would like to see him suc-
ceed. He seems stronger now than he
has been earlier on. But he faces enor-
mous problems. I hope he looks at this
proposal as a way to help solve some of
those enormous problems. It gets to the
question of finance to maintain this
number of troops outside of his country.

Q. Does this four-point proposal
represent your conditions that the So-
viets must accept before you will open
talks on the short-range missiles?

A. As I said earlier, we've got to
have a reduction in conventional forces
and then some implementaton of that
proposal.

Q. You described this as a pro-
posal to the other allies. Do you ex-
pect it's going to be adopted as a
formal alliance position at the end of
this meeting, and then will you put it
on the table at CFE very soon?

A. I can't answer procedurally. I'd
like to see it adopted. But I don't know-
that the people have had enough time to
really — do you know what's planned on
that," Al? [Alton G. Keel, Jr., Ambas-
sador to NATO]

Ambassador Keel. I think, clearly,
the alliance will adoi)t it, in terms of
the concept but then will assign it to
the proper mechanism here at NATO to
finish the details on it.

Q. Why actually destroy the
equipment and demobilize the troops?

A. Because then we get verified —
we hope — verified reductions that last.
You can't just juggle around the players
on the chessboard.

Q. There's been a lot of talk at
the White House recently about pub-
lic relations gambits. Do you believe
that this initiative by the United
States puts Mr. Gorbachev on the de-
fensive, and does it in any way put the
United States back on the top of any
public relations war that might be
going on?

A. One, we've eschewed getting in-
volved in a public relations battle. This
is too serious a business. Alliance secu-
rity is too serious. The safety and secu-
rity of American forces, for which I
have direct responsibility as command-
er in chief, is too serious to be jeopard-
ized by feeling we always have to be

out front on some public relations gam-
bit. I think we all know that in certain
quarters in the United States, my Ad-
ministration has taken a little bit of a
hammering for not engaging in the
public relations battle.

But what we've been doing is for-
mulating what I think is a very prudent
plan, and now that plan is out there on
the table. So, I really can't comment on
the public relations aspect. What I'm
interested in is the security aspect and
the strength of the alliance and then
the future — the ability of the alliance
to move beyond containment.

Q. A long-term benefit of this
proposal would obviously be a de-
crease in defense spending. Now, how
much of this proposal was driven by
budget considerations?

A. I thought I answered that, but
let me try again to be clearer. None.
What drove the proposal was the mili-
tary and alliance considerations. I
would agree that if this proposal is
fully implemented — longer-run, as you
put it — it would result in less spending,
particularly if these troops and weap-
ons are demobilized, as we say.

Q. Just to be clear on one point,
what you're proposing is an agree-
ment with the Warsaw Pact, not any-
thing that you will do unilaterally,
that you won't take any of these steps
yourselves outside an overall agree-
ment with the —

A. This is a NATO proposal, and it
would be negotiated with the pact. But
it means that — obviously, when you're
dealing with the pact — that the Soviet
Union is going to have to be the key
player. This part of the proposal, as it
relates to U.S. troops, clearly is one
where both the Soviet General Secre-
tary and I have to have agreement. But
I want to keep the negotiations and the
initiatives inside of the alliance. We
came over here to say the alliance has
worked. It's kept the peace for 40
years, and we want to continue to keep
it strong. That's one reason I am very
pleased with the alliance response to
our proposal. They don't see it as solo-
ing off there, taking care of U.S. inter-
est. They see it as in the interest of the
alliance.

Again, I believe I speak — I
believe — I know most of the people
there feel that way, and I hope all of
them do.

Q. When did you make the final
decision to accept this idea? How did
it evolve?

A. Twelve days ago.

Q. Do you have any interest in
discussing this with Mr. Gorbachev at
a summit meeting? Do you have any
interest or intention of discussing
this proposal or other arms proposals
with Mr. Gorbachev at a summit
meeting?

A. When I have a summit meeting
with Mr. Gorbachev, I expect we'll dis-
cuss a wide array of subjects.

Q. Do you anticipate that this
year?

A. When that happens, I will have
wide, farflung discussions and no date
has been set for that.

Q. Is it likely to be speeded up,
though because of this proposal?

A. Hadn't thought if it in this con-
nection, but I would not rule that out.
But we'll see how it's digested there in
Moscow. I hope favorably.

Q. Isn't it time for a summit now
that you've laid this out?

A. Baker's got some more work to
do.

Declaration of
the Heads of State
and Government,

North Atlantic Council,

May 30, 19896

NATO's 40 Years of Success

1. As our Alliance celebrates its 40th
Anniversary, we measure its achieve-
ments with pride. Founded in troubled
times to safeguard our security, it has
withstood the test of four decades, and
has allowed our countries to enjoy in
freedom one of the longest periods of
peace and prosperity in their history.
The Alliance has been a fundamental
element of stability and co-operation.
These are the fruits of a partnership
based on enduring common values and
interests, and on unity of purpose.
2. Our meeting takes place at a
juncture of unprecedented change and
opportunities. This is a time to look
ahead, to chart the course of our Alli-
ance and to set our agenda for the
future.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

A Time of Change

3. In our rapidly changing world, where
ideas transcend borders ever more eas-
ily, the strength and accomplishments
of democracy and freedom are increas-
ingly apparent. The inherent inability
of oppressive systems to fulfil the aspi-
rations of their citizens has become
equally evident.

4. In the Soviet Union, important
changes are underway. We welcome the
current reforms that have already led
to greater openness, improved respect
for human rights, active participation
of the individual, and new attitudes in
foreign policy. But much remains to be
done. We still look forward to the full
implementation of the announced
change in priorities in the allocation of
economic resources from the military
to the civilian sector. If sustained, the
reforms will strengthen prospects for
fundamental improvements in East-
West relations.

5. We also welcome the marked
progress in some countries of Eastern
Europe towards establishing more
democratic institutions, freer elections
and greater political pluralism and eco-
nomic choice. However, we deploi-e the
fact that certain Eastern European
governments have chosen to ignore this
reforming trend and continue all too
frequently to violate human rights and
basic freedoms.

Shaping the Future

6. Our vision of a just, humane and
democratic world has always under-
pinned the policies of this Alliance. The
changes that are now taking place are
bringing us closer to the realisation of
this vision.

7. We want to overcome the painful
division of Europe, which we have nev-
er accepted. We want to move beyond
the post-war period. Based on today's
momentum of increased co-operation
and tomorrow's common challenges, we
seek to shape a new political order of
peace in Europe. We will work as Al-
lies to seize all opportunities to achieve
this goal. But ultimate success does not
depend on us alone.

Our guiding principles in the pur-
suit of this course will be the policies of
the Harmel Report in their two comple-
mentary and mutually reinforcing ap-
proaches: adequate military strength
and political solidarity and, on that ba-
sis, the search for constructive dia-
logue and co-operation, including arms

control, as a means of bringing about a
just and lasting peaceful order in
Europe.

8. The Alliance's long-term objec-
tives are:

• To ensure that wars and intim-
idation of any kind in Europe and
North America are prevented, and that
military aggression is an option which
no government could rationally contem-
plate or hope successfully to under-
take, and by doing so to lay the
foundations for a world where military
forces e.xist solely to preserve the inde-
pendence and territorial integrity of
their countries, as has always been the
case for the Allies;

• To establish a new pattern of re-
lations between the countries of East
and West, in which ideological and mili-
tary antagonism will be replaced with
co-operation, trust and peaceful compe-
tition; and in which human rights and
political freedoms will be fully guaran-
teed and enjoyed by all individuals.

9. Within our larger respon-
sibilities as Heads of State or Govern-
ment, we are also committed to strive
for an international community founded
on the rule of law, where all nations join
together to reduce world tensions, set-
tle disputes peacefully, and search for
solutions to those issues of universal
concern, including poverty, social
injustice and the environment, on
which our common fate depends.

Maintaining our Defence

10. Peace must be worked for; it can
never be taken for granted. The great-
ly improved East-West political climate
offers prospects for a stable and lasting
peace, but e.xperience teaches us that
we must remain prepared. We can over-
look neither the capabilities of the War-
saw Treaty countries for offensive
military action, nor the potential haz-
ards resulting from severe political
strain and crisis.

11. A strong and united Alliance
will remain fundamental not only for
the security of our countries but also
for our policy of supporting political
change. It is the basis for further suc-
cessful negotiations on arms control
and on measures to strengthen mutual
confidence through improved transpar-
ency and predictability. Military secu-
rity and policies aimed at reducing
tensions as well as resolving underly-
ing political differences are not contra-
dictory but complementary. Credible

defence based on the principle of the in-
divisibility of security for all member
countries will thus continue to be es-
sential to our common endeavour.

12. For the foreseeable future,
there is no alternative to the Alliance
strategy for the prevention of war. This
is a strategy of deterrence based upon
a appropriate mi.x of adequate and ef-
fective nuclear and conventional forces
which will continue to be kept up-to-
date where necessary. We shall ensure
the viability and credibility of these
forces, while maintaining them at the
lowest possible level consistent with
our security requirements.

13. The presence of North Ameri-
can conventional and nuclear forces in
Europe remains vital to the security of
Europe just as Europe's security is vi-
tal to that of North America. Mainte-
nance of this relationship requires that
the Allies fulfil their essential commit-
ments in support of the common de-
fence. Each of our countries will
accordingly assume its fair share of the
risks, roles and responsibilities of the
Atlantic partnership. Growing Euro-
pean political unity can lead to a rein-
forced European component of our
common security effort and its efficien-
cy. It will be essential to the success of
these efforts to make the most effective
use of resources made available for our
security. To this end, we will seek to
maximise the efficiency of our defence
programmes and pursue solutions to is-
sues in the area of economic and trade
policies as they affect our defence. We
will also continue to protect our tech-
nological capabilities by effective ex-
port controls on essential strategic
goods.

Initiatives on Arms Control

14. Arms control has always been an
integral part of the Alliance's security
policy and of its overall approach to
East-West relations, firmly embedded
in the broader political context in
which we seek the improvement of
those relations.

15. The Allies have consistently
taken the lead in developing the concep-
tual foundations for arms control, iden-
tifying areas in which the negotiating
partners share an interest in achieving
a mutually satisfactory result while
safeguarding the legitimate security
interests of all.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

16. Historic progress has been
made in recent years, and we now see
prospects for further substantial ad-
vances. In our determined effort to re-
duce the excessive weight of the
military factor in the East -West rela-
tionship and increasingly to replace
confrontation by co-operation, we can
now exploit fully the potential of arms
control as an agent of change.

17. We challenge the members of
the Warsaw Treaty Organization to join
us in accelerating efforts to sign and
implement an agreement which will en-
hance security and stability in Europe
by reducing conventional armed forces.
To seize the unique opportunity at
hand, we intend to present a proposal
that will amplify and expand on the po-
sition we tabled at the opening of the
CFE [conventional armed forces in Eu-
rope] negotiations on 9th March.'' We
will

• Register agreement, based on
the ceilings already proposed in Vien-
na, on tanks, armoured troop carriers
and artillery pieces held by members of
the two Alliances in Europe, with all of
the withdrawn equipment to be de-
stroyed. Ceilings on tanks and ar-
moured troop carriers will be based on
proposals already tabled in Vienna; def-
initional questions on artillery pieces
remain to be resolved;

• Expand our current proposal to
include reductions by each side to equal
ceilings at the level 15 per cent below
current Alliance holdings of helicopters
and of all land-based combat aircraft in
the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone, with all
the withdrawn equipment to be
destroyed;

• Propose a 20 per cent cut in com-
bat manpower in US stationed forces,
and a resulting ceiling on US and Sovi-
et ground and air force personnel sta-
tioned outside of national territory in
the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone at ap-
proximately 275,000. This ceiling
would require the Soviet Union to re-
duce its forces in Eastern Europe by
some 325,000. United States and Soviet
forces withdrawn w-ill be demobilized;

• Seek such an agreement within
six months to a year and accomplish the
reductions by 1992 or 1993. Accor-
dingly, we have directed the Alliance's
High Level Task Force on conventional
arms control to complete the further
elaboration of this proposal, including
its verification elements, so that it may
be tabled at the beginning of the third
round of the CFE negotiations, which
opens on 7th September 1989.

18. We consider as an important
initiative President Bush's call for an
"open skies" regime intended to im-
prove confidence among States through
reconnaissance flights, and to contrib-
ute to the transparency of military ac-
tivity, to arms control and to public
awareness. It will be the subject of
careful study and wide-ranging
consultations.

19. Consistent with the principles
and objectives set out in our Compre-
hensive Concepts of Arms Control and
Disarmament which we have adopted at
this meeting, we will continue to use
arms control as a means to enhance se-
curity and stability at the lowest possi-
ble level of armed forces, and to
strengthen confidence by further ap-
propriate measures. We have already
demonstrated our commitment to these
objectives: both by negotiations and by
unilateral action, resulting since 1979
in reductions of over one-third of the
nuclear holdings assigned to SACEUR
[Supreme Allied Commander Europe]
in Europe.

Towards an Enhanced Partnership

20. As the Alliance enters its fifth de-
cade we will meet the challenge of
shaping our relationship in a way which
corresponds to the new political and
economic realities of the 1990s. As we
do so, we recognize that the basis of
our security and prosperity — and of
our hopes for better East-West
relations — is and will continue to be the
close cohesion between the countries of
Europe and of North America, bound
together by their common values and
democratic institutions as much as by
their shared security interests.

21. Ours is a living and developing
partnership. The strength and stability
derived from our transatlantic bond
provide a firm foundation for the
achievement of our long-term vision, as
well as of our goals for the immediate
future. We recognize that our common
tasks transcend the resources of either
Europe or North America alone.

22. We welcome in this regard the
evolution of an increasingly strong and
coherent European identity, including
in the security area. The process we
are witnessing today provides an exam-
ple of progressive integration, leaving
centuries-old conflicts far behind. It
opens the way to a more mature and
balanced transatlantic partnership and
constitutes one of the foundations of
Europe's future structure.

23. To ensure the continuing suc-
cess of our efforts we have agreed to

• Strengthen our process of politi-
cal consultation and, where appropri-
ate, co-ordination, and have instructed
the Council in Permanent Session to
consider methods for its further
improvement;

• Expand the scope and intensity of
our effort to ensure that our respective
approaches to problems affecting our
common security are complementary
and mutually supportive;

• Renew our support for our eco-
nomically less-favoured partners and to
reaffirm our goal of improving the
present level of co-operation and
assistance;

• Continue to work in the appropri-
ate fora for more commercial, mone-
tary and technological co-operation,
and to see to it that no obstacles im-
pede such co-operation.

Overcoming the Division of Europe

24. Now, more than ever, our efforts to
overcome the division of Europe must
address its underlying political causes.
Therefore all of us will continue to pur-
sue a comprehensive approach encom-
passing the many dimensions of the
East-West agenda. In keeping with our
values, we place primary emphasis on
basic freedoms for the people in East-
ern Europe. These are also key ele-
ments for strengthening the stability
and security of all states and for guar-
anteeing lasting peace on the
continent.

25. The CSCE [Conference on Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe]
process encompasses our vision of a
peaceful and more constructive rela-
tionship among all participating states.
We intend to develop it further, in all
its dimensions, and to make the fullest
use of it.

We recognize progress in the im-
plementation of CSCE commitments by
some Eastern countries. But we call
upon all of them to recognise and im-
plement fully the commitments which
all CSCE states have accepted. We will
invoke the CSCE mechanisms — as most
recently adopted in the Vienna Con-
cluding Document — and the provisions
of other international agreements, to
bring all Eastern countries to;

• Enshrine in law and practice the
human rights and freedoms agreed in
international covenants and in the
CSCE documents, thus fostering prog-
ress towards the rule of law;

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

(\\ hite House photo by David Valdez)

The heads of government of the 16 NATO members met in Brussels May 29-30. From left
to right: Prime Minister Jacques Santer (Luxembourg), Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers
(Netherlands), Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway), Prime Minister An-
ibal Cavaco Silva (Portugal), Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez Marquez (Spain), Prime
Minister Turgut Ozal (Turkey), Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (United Kingdom),
President Francois Mitterrand (France), NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner,
President Bush, Prime Minister Wilfried Martens (Belgium), Prime Minister Brian
Mulroney (Canada), Prime Minister Poul Schlueter (Denmark), Chancellor Helmut Kohl
(West Germany), Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou (Greece), Prime Minister Stein-
grimur Hermannsson (Iceland), and Prime Minister Ciriaco De Mita (Italy).

• Tear down the walls that separate
us physically and politically, simplify
the crossing of borders, increase the
number of crossing points and allow the
free exchange of persons, information
and ideas;

• Ensure that people are not pre-
vented by armed force from crossing
the frontiers and boundaries which we
share with Eastern countries, in exer-
cise of their right to leave any country,
including their own;

• Respect in law and practice the
right of all the people in each country
to determine freely and periodically
the nature of the government they wish
to have;

• See to it that their peoples can
decide through their elected authorities
what form of relations they wish to
have with other countries;

• Grant the genuine economic free-
doms that are linked inherently to the
rights of the individual;

• Develop transparency, especially
in military matters, in pursuit of
greater mutual understanding and
reassurance.

26. The situation in and around
Berlin is an essential element in East-
West relations. The Alliance declares
its commitment to a free and prosper-
ous Berlin and to achieving improve-
ments for the city especially through
the Allied Berlin Initiative! The Wall

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

dividing the city is an unacceptable
symbol of the division of Europe. We
seek a state of peace in Europe in
which the German people regains its
unity through free self-determination.

Our Design for Co-operation

27. We, for our part, have today reaf-
firmed that the Alliance must and will
reintensify its own efforts to overcome
the division of Europe and to explore
all available avenues of co-operation
and dialogue. We support the opening
of Eastern societies and encourage re-
forms that aim at positive political,
economic and human rights develop-
ments. Tangible steps towards genuine
political and economic reform improve
possibilities for broad co-operation,
while a continuing denial of basic free-
doms cannot but have a negative effect.
Our approach recognizes that each
country is unique and must be treated
on its own merits. We also recognize
that it is essentially incumbent upon
the countries of the East to solve their
problems by reforms from within. But
we can also play a constructive role
within the framework of our Alliance
as well as in our respective bilateral
relations and in international organiza-
tions, as appropriate.

28. To that end, we have agreed the
following joint agenda for the future:

• As opportunities develop, we will
expand the scope of our contacts and
co-operation to cover a broad range of
issues which are important to both
East and West. Our goal is a sustained
effort geared to specific tasks which
will help deepen openness and promote
democracy within Eastern countries
and thus contribute to the establish-
ment of a more stable peace in Europe;

• We will pursue in particular ex-
panded contacts beyond the realm of
government among individuals in East
and West. These contacts should in-
clude all segments of our societies, but
in particular young people, who will
carry the responsibility for continuing
our common endeavour;

• We will seek expanded economic
and trade relations with the Eastern
countries on the basis of commercially
sound terms, mutual interest and reci-
procity. Such relations should also
serve as incentives for real economic
reform and thus ease the way for in-
creased integration of Eastern coun-
tries into the international trading
system;

• We intend to demonstrate through
increased co-operation that democratic
institutions and economic choice create
the best possible conditions for econom-
ic and social progress. The development
of such open systems will facilitate co-
operation and, consequently, make its
benefits more available;

THE PRESIDENT

• An important task of our co-
operation will be to explore means to
extend Western experience and know-
how to Eastern countries in a manner
which responds to and promotes posi-
tive change. Exchanges in technical
and managerial fields, establishment
of co-operative training programmes,
expansion of educational, scientific
and cultural exchanges all offer pos-
sibilities which have not yet been
exhausted;

• Equally important will be to inte-
grate Eastern European countries
more fully into efforts to meet the so-
cial, environmental and technological
challenges of the modern world, where
common interests should prevail. In ac-
coi'dance with our concern for global
challenges, we will seek to engage
Eastern countries in co-operative
strategies in areas such as the environ-
ment, terrorism, and drugs. Eastern
willingness to participate construc-
tively in dealing with such challenges
will help further co-operation in other
areas as well;

• East-West understanding can be
expanded only if our respective soci-
eties gain increased knowledge about
one another and communicate effec-
tively. To encourage an increase of So-
viet and Eastern studies in universities
of our countries and of corresponding
studies in Eastern countries, we are
prepared to establish a Fellowship/
Scholarship programme to promote the
study of our democratic institutions,
with candidates being invited from
Eastern as well as Western Europe
and North America.

Global Challenges

29. Worldwide developments which af-
fect our security interests are legiti-
mate matters for consultation and,
where appropriate, co-ordination
among us. Our security is to be seen in
a context broader than the protection
from war alone.

30. Regional conflicts continue to
be of major concern. The co-ordinated
approach of Alliance members recently
has helped toward settling some of the
world's most dangerous and long-
standing disputes. We hope that the
Soviet Union will increasingly work
with us in positive and practical steps
towards diplomatic solutions to those
conflicts that continue to preoccupy the
international community.

31. We will seek to contain the new-
ly emerging security threats and de-
stabilizing consequences resulting from

the uncontrolled spread and application
of modern military technologies.

32. In the spirit of Article 2 of the
Washington Treaty, we will increas-
ingly need to address worldwide prob-
lems which have a bearing on our
security, particularly environmental
degradation, resource conflicts and
grave economic disparities. We will
seek to do so in the appropriate multi-
lateral fora, in the widest possible co-
operation with other states.

33. We will each further develop
our close co-operation with the other
industrial democracies akin to us in
their objectives and policies.

34. We will redouble our efforts in
a reinvigorated United Nations,
strengthening its role in conflict settle-
ment and peacekeeping, and in its larg-
er endeavours for world peace.

Our 'Third Dimension'

35. Convinced of the vital need for in-
ternational co-operation in science and
technology, and of its beneficial effect
on global security, we have for several
decades maintained Alliance pro-
grammes of scientific co-operation.
Recognizing the importance of safe-
guarding the environment we have also
co-operated, in the Committee on the
Challenges of Modern Society, on envi-
ronmental matters. These activities
have demonstrated the broad range of
our common pursuits. We intend to
give more impact to our programmes
with new initiatives in these areas.

The Future of the Alliance

36. We, the leaders of 16 free and demo-
cratic countries, have dedicated our-
selves to the goals of the Alliance and
are committed to work in unison for
their continued fulfilment.

37. At this time of unprecedented
promise in international affairs, we
will respond to the hopes that it offers.
The Alliance will continue to serve as
the cornerstone of our security, peace
and freedom. Secure on this founda-
tion, we will reach out to those who are
willing to join us in shaping a more sta-
ble and peaceful international environ-
ment in the service of our societies.

Comprehensive Concept,
May 30, 1989

1. At Reykjavik in June 1987, Ministers
stated that arms control problems fac-
ing the Alliance raised complex and in-
terrelated issues that needed to be
evaluated together, bearing in mind
overall progress in arms control nego-
tiations as well as the requirements of
Alliance security and of its stretegy of
deterrence. They therefore directed
the Council in Permanent Session,
working in conjunction with the appro-
priate military authorities, to 'consider
the further development of a compre-
hensive concept of arms control and
disarmament."

2. The attached report, prepared
by the Council in response to that man-
date, was adopted by Heads of State
and Government at the meeting of the
North Atlantic Council in Brussels on
29th and 30th May 1989.

A. Comprehensive Concept of Arms
Control and Disarmament

I. Introduction

1. The overriding objective of the Alli-
ance is to preserve peace in freedom,
to prevent war, and to establish a just
and lasting peaceful order in Europe.
The Allies' policy to this end was set
forth in the Harmel Report of 1967. It
remains valid. According to the Re-
port, the North Atlantic Alliance's
'first function is to maintain adequate
military strength and political soli-
darity, to deter aggression and other
forms of pressure and to defend the ter-
ritory of member countries if aggres-
sion should occur.' On that basis, the
Alliance can carry out 'its second func-
tion, to pursue the search for progress
towards a more stable relationship in
which the underlying political issues
can be solved.' As the Report observed,
military security and a policy aimed at
reducing tensions are 'not contradic-
tory, but complementary.'
Consistent with these principles. Allied
Heads of State and Government have
agreed that arms control is an integral
part of the Alliance's security policy.

2. The possibilities for fruitful
East-West dialogue have significantly
improved in recent years. More favour-
able conditions now exist for progress
towards the achievement of the Alli-

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

ance's objectives. The Allies are re-
solved to grasp this opportunity. They
will continue to address both the symp-
toms and the causes of political tension
in a manner that respects the legiti-
mate security interests of all states
concerned.

3. The achievement of the lasting
peaceful order which the Allies seek
will require that the unnatural division
of Europe, and particularly of Ger-
many, be overcome, and that, as stated
in the Helsinki Final Act, the sover-
eignty and territorial integrity of all
states and the right of peoples to self-
determination be respected and that
the rights of all individuals, including
right of political choice, be protected.
The members of the Alliance accord-
ingly attach central importance to fur-
ther progress in the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) process, which serves as a
framework for the promotion of peace-
ful evolution in Europe.

4. The CSCE process provides a
means to encourage stable and con-
structive East-West relations by in-
creasing contacts between people, by
seeking to ensure that basic rights and
freedoms are respected in law and
practice, by furthering political ex-
changes and mutually beneficial cooper-
ation across a broad range of
endeavours, and by enhancing security
and openness in the military sphere.
The Allies will continue to demand full
implementation of all the principles and
provisions of the Helsinki Final Act,
the Madrid Concluding Document, the
Stockholm Document, and the Conclud-
ing Document of the Vienna Meeting.
The latter document marks a major ad-
vance in the CSCE process and should
stimulate further beneficial changes in
Europe.

5. The basic goal of the Alliance's
arms control policy is to enhance secu-
rity and stability at the lowest balanced
level of forces and armaments consist-
ent with the requirements of the strat-
egy of deterrence. The Allies are
committed to achieving continuing
progress towards all their arms control
objectives. The further development of
the Comprehensive Concept is designed
to assist this by ensuring an integrated
approach covering both defence policy
and arms control policy: these are com-
plementary and interactive. This work
also requires full consideration of the
interrelationship between arms control
objectives and defence requirements
and how various arms control meas-
ures, separately and in conjunction
with each other, can strengthen Alli-

ance security. The guiding principles
and basic objectives which have so far
governed the arms control policy of the
Alliance remain valid. Progress in
achieving these objectives is, of course,
affected by a number of factors. These
include the overall state of East-West
relations, the military requirements of
the Allies, the progress of existing and
future arms control negotiations, and
developments in the CSCE process.
The further development and imple-
mentation of a comprehensive concept
of arms control and disarmament will
take place against this background.

II. East-West Relations
and Arms Control

6. The Alliance continues to seek a just
and stable peace in Europe in which all
states can enjoy undiminished security
at the minimum necessary levels of
forces and armaments and all individu-
als can exercise their basic rights and
freedoms. Arms control alone cannot
resolve longstanding political differ-
ences between East and West nor guar-
antee a stable peace. Nonetheless,
achievement of the Alliance's goal will
require substantial advances in arms
control, as well as more fundamental
changes in political relations. Success
in arms control, in addition to enhanc-
ing military security, can encourage
improvements in the East-West politi-
cal dialogue and thereby contribute to
the achievement of broader Alliance
objectives.

7. To increase security and stabil-
ity in Europe, the Alliance has consist-
ently pursued every opportunity for
effective arms control. The Allies are
committed to this policy, independent
of any changes that may occur in the
climate of East-West relations. Success
in arms control, however, continues to
depend not on our own efforts alone,
but also on Eastern and particularly
Soviet readiness to work constructively
towards mutually beneficial results.

8. The immediate past has wit-
nessed unprecedented progress in the
field of arms control. In 1986 the Stock-
holm Conference on Disarmament in
Europe (CDE) agreement created an
innovative system of confidence and
security-building measures, designed
to promote military transparency and
predictability. To date, these have been
satisfactorily implemented. The 1987
INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces] Treaty marked another major
step forward because it eliminated a
whole class of weapons, it established

the principle of asymmetrical reduc-
tions, and provided for a stringent veri-
fication regime. Other achievements
include the establishment in the United
States and the Soviet Union of nuclear
risk reduction centres, the US/Soviet
agreement on prior notification of bal-
listic missile launches, and the conduct
of the Joint Verification Experiment in
connection with continued US/Soviet
negotiations on nuclear testing.

9. In addition to agreements al-
ready reached, there has been substan-
tial progress in the START [strategic
arms reductions talks] negotiations
which are intended to reduce radically
strategic nuclear arsenals and elimi-
nate destabilizing offensive capa-
bilities. The Paris Conference on the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has
reaffirmed the authority of the 1925
Geneva Protocol and given powerful po-
litical impetus to the negotiations in
Geneva for a global, comprehensive and
effectively verifiable ban on chemical
weapons. New distinct negotiations
within the framework of the CSCE
process have now begun in Vienna: one
on conventional armed forces in Europe
between the 23 members of NATO and
the Warsaw Treaty Organization
(WTO) and one on confidence- and
security-building measures (CSBMs)
among all 35 signatories of the Helsinki
Final Act.

10. There has also been substantial
progress on other matters important to
the West. Soviet troops have left Af-
ghanistan. There has been movement
toward the resolution of some, although
not all, of the remaining regional con-
flicts in which the Soviet Union is in-
volved. The observance of human
rights in the Soviet Union and in some
of the other WTO countries has signifi-
cantly improved, even if serious defi-
ciencies remain. The recent Vienna
CSCE Follow-up meeting succeeded in
setting new, higher standards of con-
duct for participating states and should
stimulate further progress in the
CSCE process. A new intensity of dia-
logue, particularly at high-level, be-
tween East and West opens new
opportunities and testifies to the Al-
lies' commitment to resolve the funda-
mental problems that remain.

11. The Alliance does not claim ex-
clusive responsibility for this favour-
able evolution in East-West relations.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

111 recent years, the East has become
more responsive and flexible. Nonethe-
less, the Alliance's contribution has
clearly been fundamental. Most of the
achievements to date, which have been
described above, were inspired by ini-
tiatives by the Alliance or its members.
The Allies' political solidarity, commit-
ment to defence, patience and cre-
ativity in negotiations overcame initial
obstacles and brought its efforts to
fruition. It was the Alliance that drew
up the basic blueprints for East-West
progress and has since pushed them
forward towards realisation. In partic-
ular the concepts of stability, reason-
able sufficiency, asymmetrical
reductions, concentration on the most
offensive equipment, rigorous verifica-
tion, transparency, a single zone from
the Atlantic to the Urals, and the bal-
anced and comprehensive nature of the
CSCE process, are Western-inspired.

12. Prospects are now brighter
than ever before for lasting, qualitative
improvements in the East-West rela-
tionship. There continue to be clear
signs of change in the internal and e.x-
ternal policies of the Soviet Union and
of some of its Allies. The Soviet leader-
ship has stated that ideological compe-
tition should play no part in interstate
relations. Soviet acknowledgement of
serious shortcomings in its past ap-
proaches to international as well as do-
mestic issues creates opportunities for
progress on fundamental political
problems.

13. At the same time, serious con-
cerns remain. The ambitious Soviet re-
form programme, which the Allies
welcome, will take many years to com-
plete. Its success cannot be taken for
granted given the magnitude of the
problems it faces and the resistance
generated. In Eastern Europe, prog-
ress in constructive reform is still un-
even and the extent of these reforms
remains to be determined. Basic hu-
man rights still need to be firmly an-
chored in law and practice, though in
some Warsaw Pact countries improve-
ments are underway. Although the
WTO has recently announced and be-
gun unilateral reductions in some of its
forces, the Soviet Union continues to
deploy military forces and to maintain
a pace of military production in excess
of legitimate defensive requirements.
Moreover, the geo-strategic realities fa-
vour the geographically contiguous
Soviet-dominated WTO as against the
geographically separated democracies
of the North Atlantic Alliance. It has
long been an objective of the Soviet
Union to weaken the links between the

European and North American mem-
bers of the Alliance.

14. We face an immediate future
that is promising but still uncertain.
The Allies and the East face both a
challenge and an opportunity to cap-
italise on present conditions in order to
increase mutual security. The progress
recently made in East-West relations
has given new impetus to the arms con-
trol process and has enhanced the pos-
sibilities of achieving the Alliance's
arms control objectives, which comple-
ment the other elements of the Alli-
ance's security policy.

III. Principles of Alliance Security

15. Alliance security policy aims to
preserve peace in freedom by both po-
litical means and the maintenance of a
military capability sufficient to prevent
war and to provide for effective de-
fence. The fact that the Alliance has for
forty years safeguarded peace in Eu-
rope bears witness to the success of
this policy.

16. Improved political relations and
the progressive development of cooper-
ative structures between Eastern and
Western countries are important com-
ponents of Alliance policy. They can en-
hance mutual confidence, reduce the
risk of misunderstanding, ensure that
there are in place reliable arrange-
ments for crisis management so that
tensions can be defused, render the sit-
uation in Europe more open and pre-
dictable, and encourage the develop-
ment of wider cooperation in all fields.

17. In underlining the importance
of these facts for the formulation of Al-
liance policy, the Allies reaffirm that,
as stated in the Harmel Report, the
search for constructive dialogue and co-
operation with the countries of the
East, including arms control and disar-
mament, is based on political solidarity
and adequate military strength.

18. Solidarity among the Alliance
countries is a fundamental principle of
their security policy. It reflects the in-
divisible nature of their security. It is
expressed by the willingness of each
country to share fairly the risks, bur-
dens and responsibilities of the common
effort as well as its benefits. In partic-
ular, the presence in Europe of the
United States' conventional and nuclear
forces and of Canadian forces demon-
strates that North American and Euro-
pean security interests are inseparably
bound together.

19. From its inception the Alliance
of Western democracies has been defen-
sive in purpose. This will remain so.
None of our weapons will ever be used
except in self-defence. The Alliance
does not seek military superiority nor
will it ever do so. Its aim has always
been to prevent war and any form of co-
ercion and intimidation.

20. Consistent with the Alliance's
defensive character, its strategy is one
of deterrence. Its objective is to con-
vince a potential aggressor before he
acts that he is confronted with a risk
that outweighs any gain — however
great — he might hope to secure from
his aggression. The purpose of this
strategy defines the means needed for
its implementation.

21. In order to fulfil its strategy,
the Alliance must be capable of
responding appropriately to any ag-
gression and of meeting its commit-
ment to the defence of the frontiers of
its members' territory. For the foresee-
able future, deterrence requires an ap-
propriate mix of adequate and effective
nuclear and conventional forces which
will continue to be kept up to date
where necessary; for it is only by their
evident and perceived capability for ef-
fective use that such forces and weap-
ons deter.

22. Conventional forces make an es-
sential contribution to deterrence. The
elimination of asymmetries between
the conventional forces of East and
West in Europe would be a major
breakthrough, bringing significant
benefits for stability and security. Con--
ventional defence alone cannot, how-
ever, ensure deterrence. Only the
nuclear element can confront an ag-
gressor with an unacceptable risk and
thus plays an indispensable role in our
current strategy of war prevention.

23. The fundamental purpose of nu-'
clear forces — both strategic and sub-
strategic — is political; to preserve the
peace and to prevent any kind of war.
Such forces contribute to deterrence by
demonstrating that the Allies have the
military capability and the political
will to use them, if necessary, in re-
sponse to aggression. Should aggres-
sion occur, the aim would be to restore
deterrence by inducing the aggressor
to reconsider his decision, to terminate
his attack and to withdraw and thereby;
to restore the territorial integrity of
the Alliance.

24. Conventional and nuclear
forces, therefore, perform different but
complementary and mutually reinforc-
ing roles. Any perceived inadequacy in

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

either of these two elements, oi* the im-
pression that conventional forces could
be separated from nuclear, or sub-
strategic from strategic nuclear forces,
might lead a potential adversary to
conclude that the risks of launching ag-
gression might be calculable and ac-
ceptable. No single element can, there-
fore, be regarded as a substitute
compensating for deficiencies in any
other.

25. For the foreseeable future,
there is no alternative strategy for the
prevention of war. The implementation
of this strategy will continue to ensure
that the security interests of all Alli-
ance members are fully safeguarded.
The principles underlying the strategy
of deterrence are of enduring validity.
Their practical expression in terms of
the size, structure and deployment of
forces is bound to change. As in the
past, these elements will continue to
evolve in response to changing interna-
tional circumstances, technological
progress and developments in the scale
of the threat — in particular, in the pos-
ture and capabilities of the forces of the
Warsaw Pact.

26. Within this overall framework,
strategic nuclear forces provide the ul-
timate guarantees of deterrence for
the Allies. They must be capable of in-
flicting unacceptable damage on an ag-
gressor state even after it has carried
out a first strike. Their number, range,
survivability and penetration capa-
bility need to ensure that a potential
aggressor cannot count on limiting the
conflict or regarding his own territory
as a sanctuary. The strategic nuclear
forces of the United States provide the
cornerstone of deterrence for the Alli-
ance as a whole. The independent nu-
clear forces of the United Kingdom and
France fulfil a deterrent role of their
own and contribute to the overall deter-
rence strategy of the Alliance by com-
plicating the planning and risk
assessment of a potential aggressor.

27. Nuclear forces below the stra-
tegic level provide an essential political
and military linkage between conven-
tional and strategic forces and, togeth-
er with the presence of Canadian and
the United States forces in Europe, be-
tween the European and North Ameri-
can members of the Alliances. The
Allies' sub-strategic nuclear forces are
not designed to compensate for conven-
tional imbalances. The levels of such
forces in the integrated military struc-
ture nevertheless must take into ac-
count the threat — both conventional

and nucleai- — with which the Alliance is
faced. Their role is to ensure that there
are no circumstances in which a poten-
tial aggressor might discount the pros-
pect of nuclear retaliation in response
to military action. Nuclear forces be-
low the strategic level thus make an es-
sential contribution to deterrence.

28. The wide deployment of such
forces among countries participating in
the integrated military structure of
the Alliance, as well as the arrange-
ments for consultation in the nuclear
area among the Allies concerned, dem-
onstrates solidarity and willingness to
share nuclear roles and respon-
sibilities. It thereby helps to reinforce
deterrence.

29. Conventional forces contribute
to deterrence by demonstrating the Al-
lies' will to defend themselves and by
minimising the risk that a potential ag-
gressor could anticipate a quick and
easy victory or limited territorial gain
achieved solely by conventional means.

30. They must thus be able to re-
spond appropriately and to confront the
aggressor immediately and as far for-
ward as possible with the necessary re-
sistance to compel him to end the
conflict and to withdraw or face possi-
ble recourse to the use of nuclear weap-
ons by the Allies. The forces of the
Allies must be deployed and equipped
so as to enable them to fulfil this role
at all times. Moreover, since the Alli-
ance depends on reinforcements from
the North American continent, it must
be able to keep open sea and air lines of
communication between North Ameri-
ca and Europe.

31. All member countries of the Al-
liance strongly favour a comprehensive,
effectively verifiable, global ban on the
development, production, stockpiling
and use of chemical weapons. Chemical
weapons represent a particular case,
since the Alliance's overall strategy of
war prevention, as noted earlier, de-
pends on an appropriate mix of nuclear
and conventional weapons. Pending the
achievement of a global ban on chemical
weapons, the Alliance recognises the
need to implement passive defence
measures. A retaliatory capability on a
limited scale is retained in view of the
Soviet Union's overwhelming chemical
weapons capability.

32. The Allies are committed to
maintaining only the minimum level of
forces necessary for their strategy of
deterrence, taking into account the
threat. There is, however, a level of
forces, both nuclear and conventional,
below which the credibility of deter-

rence cannot be maintained. In particu-
lar, the Allies have always recognised
that the removal of all nuclear weapons
from Europe would critically under-
mine deterrence strategy and impair
the security of the Alliance.

33. The Alliance's defence policy
and its policy of arms control and disar-
mament are complementary and have
the same goal: to maintain security at
the lowest possible level of forces.
There is no contradiction between de-
fence policy and arms control policy. It
is on the basis of this fundamental con-
sistency of principles and objectives
that the comprehensive concept of arms
control and disarmament should be fur-
ther developed and the appropriate con-
clusions drawn in each of the areas of
arms control.

IV. Arms Control and Disarmament:
Principles and Objectives

34. Our vision for Europe is that of an
undivided continent where military
forces only exist to prevent war and to
ensure self-defence, as has always been
the case for the Allies, not for the pur-
pose of initiating aggression or for po-
litical or military intimidation. Arms
control can contribute to the realisa-
tion of that vision as an integral part of
the Alliance's security policy and of our
overall approach to East-West
relations.

35. The goal of Alliance arms con-
trol policy is to enhance security and
stability. To this end, the Allies' arms
control initiatives seek a balance at a
lower level of forces and armaments
through negotiated agreements and, as
appropriate, unilateral actions, recog-
nising that arms control agreements
are only possible where the negotiation
partners share an interest in achieving
a mutually satisfactory result. The Al-
lies' arms control policy seeks to re-
move destabilising asymmetries in
forces or equipment. It also pursues
measures designed to build mutual con-
fidence and to reduce the risk of con-
flict by promoting greater trans-
parency and predictability in military
matters.

36. In enhancing security and sta-
bility, arms control can also bring im-
portant additional benefits for the
Alliance. Given the dynamic aspects of
the arms control process, the principles
and results embodied in one agreement
may facilitate other arms control steps.
In this way arms control can also make

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

possible further reductions in the level
of Alliance forces and armaments, con-
sistent with the Alliance's strategy of
war i)revention. Furthermore, as noted
in ('hapter II, arms control can make a
significant contribution to the develop-
ment of more constructive East-West
relations and of a framework for fur-
ther cooperation within a more stable
and predictable international environ-
ment. Progress in arms control can
also enhance public confidence in and
promote support for our overall securi-
ty policy.

Guiding Principles for Arms Control

37. The members of the Alliance will be
guided by the following principles:

Security: Arms control should en-
hance the security of all Allies. Both
during the implementation period and
following implementation, the Allies'
strategy of deterrence and their ability
to defend themselves, must remain
credible and effective. Arms control
measures should maintain the strategic
unity and political cohesion of the Alli-
ance, and should safeguard the princi-
ple of the indivisibility of Alliance
security by avoiding the creation of ar-
eas of unequal security. Arms control
measures should respect the legitimate
security interests of all states and
should not facilitate the transfer or in-
tensification of threats to third party
states or regions.

Stability: Arms control measures
should yield militarily significant re-
sults that enhance stability. To promote
stability, arms control measures should
reduce or eliminate those capabilities
which are most threatening to the Alli-
ance. Stability can also be enhanced by
steps that promote greater transparen-
cy and predictability in military mat-
ters. Military stability requires the
elimination of options for surprise at-
tack and for large-scale offensive ac-
tion. Crisis stability requires that no
state have forces of a size and configu-
ration which, when compared with
those of others, could enable it to calcu-
late that it might gain a decisive advan-
tage by being the first to resort to
arms. Stability also requires measures
which discourage destabilising at-
tempts to re-establish military advan-
tage through the transfer of resources
to other types of armament. Agree-
ments must lead to final results that
are both balanced and ensure equality
of rights with respect to security.

Verifiability: Effective and reli-
able verification is a fundamental re-
quirement for arms control
agreements. If arms control is to be ef-
fective and to build confidence, the ver-
ifiability of proposed arms control
measures must, therefore, be of central
concern for the Alliance. Progress in
arms control should be measured
against the record of compliance with
existing agreements. Agreed arms
control measures should e.xclude oppor-
tunities for circumvention.

Alliance Arms Control Objectives

38. In accordance with the above princi-
ples, the Allies are pursuing an ambi-
tious arms control agenda for the com-
ing years in the nuclear, conventional
and chemical fields.

Nuclear Forces

39. The INF Agreement represents a

milestone in the Allies' efforts to
achieve a more secure peace at lower
levels of arms. By 1991, it will lead to
the total elimination of all United
States and Soviet intermediate range
land-based missiles, thereby removing
the threat which such Soviet systems
presented to the Alliance. Implementa-
tion of the agreement, however, will af-
fect only a small proportion of the
Soviet nuclear armoury, and the Alli-
ance continues to face a substantial ar-
ray of modern and effective Soviet
systems of all ranges. The full realisa-
tion of the Alliance agenda thus re-
quires that further steps be taken.

Strategic Nuclear Forces

40. Soviet strategic systems continue
to pose a major threat to the whole of
the Alliance. Deep cuts in such systems
are in the direct interests of the entire
Western Alliance, and therefore their
achievement constitutes a priority for
the Alliance in the nuclear field.

41. The Allies thus fully support
the US objectives of achieving, within
the context of the Strategic Arms Re-
duction Talks, fifty percent reductions
in US and Soviet strategic nuclear
arms. US proposals seek to enhance
stability by placing specific restrictions
on the most destabilising elements of
the threat — fast flying ballistic mis-
siles, throw-weight and, in particular,
Soviet heavy ICBMs [intercontinental
ballistic missiles]. The proposals are
based on the need to maintain the de-

terrent credibility of the remaining US
strategic forces which would continue
to provide the ultimate guarantee of
security for the Alliance as a whole;
and therefore on the necessity to keep
such forces effective. Furthermore, the
United States is holding talks with the
Soviet Union on defence and space mat-
ters in order to ensure that strategic
stability is enhanced.

Sub-Strategic Nuclear Forces

42. The Allies are committed to main-
taining only the minimum number of
nuclear weapons necessary to support
their strategy of deterrence. In line
with this commitment, the members of
the integrated military structure have
already made major unilateral cuts in
their sub-strategic nuclear armoury.
The number of land-based warheads in
Western Europe has been reduced by
over one-third since 1979 to its lowest
level in over 20 years. Updating where
necessary of their sub-strategic
systems would result in further
reductions.

43. The Allies continue to face the
direct threat posed to Europe by the
large numbers of shorter-range nuclear
missiles deployed on Warsaw Pact ter-
ritory and which have been substan-
tially upgraded in recent years. Major
reductions in Warsaw Pact systems
would be of overall value to Alliance se-
curity. One of the ways to achieve this
aim would be by tangible and verifiable
reductions of American and Soviet
land-based nuclear missile systems of
shorter range leading to equal ceilings
at lower levels.

44. But the sub-strategic nuclear
forces deployed by member countries of':
the Alliance are not principally a coun-
ter to similar systems operated by
members of the WTO. As is explained
in Chapter III, sub-strategic nuclear
forces fulfil an essential role in overall
Alliance deterrence strategy by ensur-
ing that there are no circumstances in
which a potential aggressor might dis-
count nuclear retaliation in reponse to
his military action.

45. The Alliance reaffirms its posi-
tion that for the foreseeable future
there is no alternative to the Alliance's
strategy for the prevention of war,
which is a strategy of deterrence based
upon an appropriate mix of adequate
and effective nuclear and conventional
forces which will continue to be kept up
to date where necessary. Where nucle-
ar forces are concerned, land-, sea-,
and air-based systems, including

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

ground-based missiles, in the present
circumstances and as far as can be
foreseen will be needed in Europe.

46. In view of the huge superiority
of the Warsaw Pact in terms of short-
range nuclear missiles, the Alliance
calls u])on the Soviet Union to reduce
unilaterally its short-range missile sys-
tems to the current levels within the
integrated military structure.

47. The Alliance reaffirms that at
the negotiations on conventional stabil-
ity it pursues the objectives of:

• The establishment of a secure
and stable balance of conventional
forces at lower levels;

• The elimination of disparities
prejudicial to stability and security;
and

• The elimination as a matter of
high priority of the capability for
launching surprise attack and for ini-
tiating large-scale offensive action.

48. In keeping with its arms con-
trol objectives formulated in Reykjavik
in 1987 and reaffirmed in Brussels in
1988, the Alliance states that one of its
highest priorities in negotiations with
the East is reaching an agreement on
conventional force reductions which
would achieve the objectives above. In
this spirit, the Allies will make every
effort, as evidenced by the outcome of
the May 1989 Summit, to bring these
conventional negotiations to an early
and satisfactory conclusion. The United
States has e.xpressed the hope that this
could be achieved within si.x to twelve
months. Once implementation of such
an agreement is underway, the United
States, in consultation with the Allies
concerned, is prepared to enter into ne-
gotiations to achieve a partial reduc-
tion of American and Soviet land-based
nuclear missile forces of shorter range
to equal and verifiable levels. With spe-
cial reference to the Western proposals
on CFE tabled in Vienna, enhanced by
the proposals by the United States at
the May 1989 Summit, the Allies con-
cerned proceed on the understanding
that negotiated reductions leading to a
level below the existing level of their
SNF [short-range nuclear forces] mis-
siles will not be carried out until the
results of these negotiations have been
implemented. Reductions of Warsaw
Pact SNF systems should be carried
out before that date.

49. As regard the sub-strategic nu-
clear forces of the members of the inte-
grated military structure, their level
and characteristics must be such that

they can perform their deterrent role
in a credible way across the required
spectrum of ranges, taking into ac-
count the threat — both conventional
and nuclear — with which the Alliance is
faced. The question concerning the in-
troduction and deployment of a follow-
on system for the Lance will be dealt
with in 1992 in the light of overall secu-
rity developments. While a decision for
national authorities, the Allies con-
cerned recognise the value of the con-
tinued funding by the United States of
research and development of a follow-on
for the existing Lance short-range mis-
sile, in order to preserve their options
in this respect.

Conventional Forces

50. As set out in the March 1988 Sum-
mit statement and in the Alliance's No-
vember 1988 data initiative, the Soviet
Union's military presence in Europe,
at a level far in excess of its needs for
self-defence, directly challenges our se-
curity as well as our aspirations for a
peaceful order in Europe. Such exces-
sive force levels create the risk of polit-
ical intimidation or threatened aggres-
sion. As long as they exist, they present
an obstacle to better political relations
between all states of Europe. The chal-
lenge to security is, moreover, not only
a matter of the numerical superiority of
WTO forces. WTO tanks, artillery and
armoured troop carriers are concen-
trated in large formations and deployed

in such a way as to give the WTO a ca-
pability for surprise attack and large-
scale offensive action. Despite the re-
cent welcome publication by the WTO
of its assessment of the military bal-
ance in Europe, there is still consider-
able secrecy and uncertainty about its
actual capabilities and intentions.

51. In addressing these concerns,
the Allies' primary objectives are to es-
tablish a secure and stable balance of
conventional forces in Europe at lower
levels, while at the same time creating
greater openness about military organ-
isation and activities in Europe.

52. In the Conventional Forces in
Europe talks between the 23 members
of the two alliances, the Allies are
proposing;

• Reductions to an overall limit on
the total holdings of armaments in Eu-
rope, concentrating on the most threat-
ening systems, i.e., those capable of
seizing and holding territory;

• A limit on the proportion of these
total holdings belonging to any one
country in Europe (since the security
and stability of Europe require that no
state exceed its legitimate needs for
self-defence);

• A limit of stationed forces (thus
restricting the forward deployment and
concentration of Soviet forces in East-
ern Europe); and,

• Appropriate numerical sub-limits
on forces which will apply simul-
taneously throughout the Atlantic to
the Urals area.

Secretary Baker and the President during a session of the North Atlantic Council.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

These measures, taken together,
will necessitate deep cuts in the WTO
conventional forces which most threat-
en the Alliance. The resulting reduc-
tions will have to take place in such a
way as to prevent circumvention, e.g.,
by ensuring that the armaments re-
duced are destroyed or otherwise dis-
posed of. Verification measures will be
required to ensure that all states have
confidence that entitlements are not
exceeded.

53. These measures alone, however,
will not guarantee stability. The re-
gime of reductions will have to be back-
ed up by additional measures which
should include measures of transparen-
cy, notification and constraint applied
to the deployment, storage, movement
and levels of readiness and availability
of conventional forces.

.54. In the CSBM negotiations, the
Allies aim to maintain the momentum
created by the successful implementa-
tion of the Stockholm Document by
proposing a comprehensive package of
measures to improve: transparency
about military organisation, transpar-
ency and predictability of military ac-
tivities, contacts and communication,
and have also proposed an exchange of
views on military doctrine in a seminar
setting.

55. The implementation of the Al-
lies' proposals in the CFE negotiations
and of their proposals for further confi-
dence and security-building measures
would achieve a quantum improvement
in European security. This would have
important and positive consequences
for Alliance policy both in the field of
defence and arms control. The outcome
of the CFE negotiations would provide
a framework for determining the fu-
ture Alliance force structure required
to perform its fundamental task of pre-
serving peace in freedom. In addition,
the Allies would be willing to contem-
plate further steps to enhance stability
and security if the immediate CFE ob-
jectives are achieved — for example,
further reductions or limitations of
conventional armaments and equip-
ment, or the restructuring of armed
forces to enhance defensive capabilities
and further reduce offensive
capabilities.

56. The Allies welcome the declar-
ed readiness of the Soviet Union and
other WTO members to reduce their
forces and adjust them towards a defen-
sive posture and await implementation
of these measures. This would be a step
in the direction of redressing the im-

balance in force levels existing in Eu-
rope and towards reducing the Warsaw
Pact capability for surprise attack. The
announced reductions demonstrate the
recognition by the Soviet Union and
other WTO members of the convention-
al imbalance, long highlighted by the
Allies as a key problem of European
security.

Chemical Weapons

57. The Soviet Union's chemical weap-
ons stockpile poses a massive threat.
The Allies are committed to conclude,
at the earliest date, a worldwide, com-
prehensive and effectively verifiable
ban on all chemical weapons.

58. All Alliance states subscribe to
the prohibitions contained in the Ge-
neva Protocol for the Use in War of As-
phyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of War-
fare. The Paris Conference on the Pro-
hibition of Chemical Weapons reaf-
firmed the importance of the commit-
ments made under the Geneva Protocol
and expressed the unanimous will of
the international community to elimi-
nate chemical weapons completely at an
early date and thereby to prevent any
recourse to their use.

59. The Allies wish to prohibit not
only the use of these abhorrent weap-
ons, but also their development, pro-
duction, stockpiling and transfer, and
to achieve the destruction of existing
chemical weapons and production facili-
ties in such a way as to ensure the un-
diminished security for all participants
at each stage in the process. Those ob-
jectives are being pursued in the Ge-
neva Conference on Disarmament.
Pending agreement on a global ban, the
Allies will enforce stringent controls
on the export of commodities related to
chemical weapons production. They will
also attempt to stimulate more open-
ness among states about chemical
weapons capabilities in order to pro-
mote greater confidence in the effec-
tiveness of a global ban.

V. Conclusions:

Arms Control and Defence
Interrelationships

60. The Alliance is committed to pur-
suing a comprehensive approach to se-
curity, embracing both arms control
and disarmament, and defence. It is
important, therefore, to ensure that in-
terrelationships between arms control
issues and defence requirements and

amongst the various arms control areas
are fully considered. Proposals in any
one area of arms control must take ac-
count of the implications for Alliance
interests in general and for other nego-
tiations. This is a continuing process.

61. It is essential that defence and
arms control objectives remain in har-
mony in order to ensure their comple-
mentary contribution to the goal of
maintaining security at the lowest bal-
anced level of forces consistent with the
requirements of the Alliance strategy
of war prevention, acknowledging that
changes in the threat, new technolo-
gies, and new political opportunities af-
fect options in both fields. Decisions on
arms control matters must fully reflect
the requirements of the Allies' strategy
of deterrence. Equally, progress in
arms control is relevant to military
plans, which will have to be developed
in the full knowledge of the objectives
pursued in arms control negotiations
and to reflect, as necessary, the results
achieved therein.

62. In each area of arms control,
the Alliance seeks to enhance stability
and security. The current negotiations
concerning strategic nuclear systems,
conventional forces and chemical weap-
ons are, however, independent of one
another: the outcome of any one of
these negotiations is not contingent on
progress in others. However, they can
influence one another: criteria estab-
lished and agreements achieved in one
area of arms control may be relevant in
other areas and hence facilitate overall
progress. These could affect both arms
control possibilities and the forces
needed to fulfil Alliance strategy, as
well as help to contribute generally to a
more predictable military environment.

63. The Allies seek to manage the
interaction among different arms con-
trol elements by ensuring that the de-
velopment, pursuit and realisation of
their arms control objectives in indi-
vidual areas are fully consistent both
with each other and with the Alliance's
guiding principles for effective arms
control. For example, the way in which
START limits and sub-limits are ap-
plied in detail could affect the future
flexibility of the sub-strategic nuclear
forces of members of the integrated
military structure. A CFE agreement
would by itself make a major contribu-
tion to stability. This would be signifi-
cantly further enhanced by the
achievement of a global chemical weap-
ons ban. The development of Confi-
dence- and Security-Building Measures
could influence the stabilising meas-

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

ures being considered in connection
with the Conventional Forces in Eu-
rope negotiations and vice versa. The
removal of the imbalance in convention-
al forces would provide scope for fur-
ther reductions in the sub-strategic
nuclear forces of members of the inte-
grated military structure, though it
would not obviate the need for such
forces. Similarly, this might make pos-
sible further arms control steps in the
conventional field.

64. This report establishes the
overall conceptual framework within
which the Allies will be seeking prog-
ress in each area of arms control. In so
doing, their fundamental aim will be
enhanced security at lower levels of
forces and armaments. Taken as a
whole, the Allies' arms control agenda
constitutes a coherent and comprehen-
sive approach to the enhancement of se-
curity and stability. It is ambitious, but
we are confident that — with a construc-
tive response from the WTO states — it
can be fully achieved in the coming
years. In pursuing this goal, the Alli-
ance recognises that it cannot afford to
build its security upon arms control re-
sults expected in the future. The Allies
will be prepared, however, to draw ap-
propriate consequences for their own
military posture as they make concrete
progress through arms control towards
a significant reduction in the scale and
quality of the military threat they face.
Accomplishment of the Allies' arms
control agenda would not only bring
great benefits in itself but could also
lead to the expansion of cooperation
with the East in other areas. The arms
control process itself is, moreover, dy-
namic; as and when the Alliance
reaches agreement in each of the areas
set out above, so further prospects for
arms control may be opened up and fur-
ther progress made possible.

65. As noted earlier, the Allies' vi-
sion for Europe is that of an undivided
continent where military forces only
exist to prevent war and to ensure self-
defense; a continent which no longer
lives in the shadow of overwhelming
military forces and from which the
;threat of war has been removed; a con-
'tinent where the sovereignty and terri-
torial integrity of all states are
respected and the rights of all individu-
als, including their rights of political
choice, are protected. This goal can
only be reached by stages: it will re-

quire patient and creative endeavour.
"The Allies are resolved to continue
working towards its attainment. The
achievement of the Alliance's arms con-
trol objectives would be a major contri-
bution toward the realisation of its

Secretary Baker's
Interview on "Good
Morning, America,"

Brussels,

May 30, 19898

Q. The NATO summit reached an
agreement early this morning con-
cerning the future on short-range
nuclear missiles in Europe. The
agreement ties negotiations on the re-
duction of such missiles to negotia-
tion and implementation of an
agreement by both the United States
and the Soviet Union to reduce con-
ventional forces in Europe.

Earlier this morning, before
President Bush held his news confer-
ence, I tallied with Secretary of State
James Baker in Brussels, and I began
by asking him just what today's
agreement means.

A. There has been an agreement.
It's an agreement, frankly, that we wel-
come, that is basically on the terms
that we had indicated before we came
to the summit we would be willing to
agree.

I think the bigger the story here,
though, if I might suggest it, is that
this is a significant victory for the alli-
ance, because the alliance begins its
second 40 years unified and moving for-
ward, having regained the initiative, if
you will, in the area of arms control. So
I think it almost could be characterized
as a double victory for the alliance.

Q. Let me talk about how these
pieces tie together. Specifically, how
would the agreement on short-range
missiles work, and how would it be
tied to the timing of the discussions
over the reductions of conventional
forces — of tanks and troops and
artillery?

A. It is specifically related in this
sense: It's been the position of the
United States, and other countries in
the alliance, that we really should not

negotiate the reduction of short-range
nuclear forces, which might weaken our
nuclear deterrent, until we had re-
solved the very substantial imbalance
in conventional forces that existed in
favor of the Warsaw Pact. This short-
range nuclear agreement provides that
negotiations on short-range forces can
begin after we have undertaken imple-
mentation of the conventional forces
arms control agreement, after we've
reached an agreement, and after we
have begun to implement it.

Q. We're talking about months,
years here. What would happen to the
short-range nuclear missiles in the
meantime? Could they be modernized
in the meantime?

A. In the meantime they will be
kept up-to-date. The specific decision —

Q. What does that mean?

A. It means what it has meant
throughout the history of the alliance;
as long as we've had those missiles.
And that is, we replace and we repair
and we keep them up-to-date. The deci-
sion with respect to whether we come
with an entirely new system or follow-
on system to the missiles we now have,
the decision on deployment of those will
be reserved for 1992. NATO will take
that decision in 1992.

Q. The Germans obviously have
said they want all of the short-range
nuclear missiles eliminated, the Brit-
ish have said they they don't want
elimination of the missiles, and we
have said the same thing. What does
the agreement overnight say, because
both sides seem to be interpreting
this a little differently?

A. The agreement is, I think,
quite clear. For one thing, it says that
ground-based nuclear missiles are an
important part of the NATO arsenal; it
recognizes that specifically.

Secondly, it says that there can be
negotiations that deal with partial re-
ductions of these — not complete, not to-
tal, but only partial reductions. It's
quite clear that discussions that would
lead to a third zero, or total elimination
of these missiles, are not contemplated
or permitted by this language.

Q. Now that NATO has agree-
ment on what to do about short-range
nuclear missiles, now that there are
new Bush proposals on the table in-
volving conventional force reduc-
tions, does all this, do you think,
hasten the possibility of a Bush-
Gorbachev summit?

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

A. Oh. it doesn't slow it down any.
I don't know that you can say that it
hastens it. As the President said yes-
terday in his press conference, we've
still got some work to do before we set
the date for a summit, and we'll set
about the task of doing that work.

I suppose the real answer to your
question depends on what the Soviet
reaction to the President's conventional
proposal is. Let's see whether they
really mean what they've been saying.
Let's see whether they mean business.
Let's see the extent to which they ac-
cept what the President has proposed.

Q. Let me address the same ques-
tion another way. The President at
the Coast Guard Academy [May 24,
1989] gave a speech which was proba-
bly more conciliatory toward the So-
viets and accepting of their role in
the world situation than he has been
in the past, talking about them now
entering the family of nations, etc.
There are now new proposals of con-
ventional force reductions. How much
does all of this — the U.S. position —
depend on the presence of that one
man, Mikhail Gorbachev, at the head
of the Soviet Government?

A. I don't think that it depends en-
tirely on that, although he has been, of
course, the driving force behind many
of the changes that are taking place
over there. That's why we say
continually — and everyone in this Ad-
ministration says — we want him to suc-
ceed, we want perestroika to succeed,
we want these changes to succeed, be-
cause these are changes that are based
on Western values. He's, in effect,
opening or trying to open up a closed
system over there, a system that's been
closed for almost 70 years. We really
hope that he succeeds. To a large de-
gree, I guess you would have to ac-
knowledge that the changes do depend
upon him. That's not to say that a suc-
cessor couldn't continue to carry them
forwai'd, because he could.

News Conference,

Brussels,

May 30, 19896

First, I want to pay my respects to
[NATO Secretary General] Manfred
Woerner and thank him for the way in
which this meeting has been con-
ducted, for his thorough staff work,
and for his able leadership in the hall. I
think that the successful results at this
summit have given us a double hit —
both conventional forces and short-
range nuclear forces. Taken in tandem,
it demonstrates the alliance's ability to
manage change to our advantage, to
move beyond the era of containment.

Our overall aim is to overcome the
division of Europe and to forge a unity
based on Western values. The starting
point, of course, is to maintain our se-
curity while seeking to lessen tensions
and adapt to changing circumstances.
Our Conventional Parity Initiative
seeks to capitalize on the opportunity
we have and to do so without delay. We
want to finally free Europe from the
constant threat of surprise attack. We
want to free Europe from the political
shadow of Soviet military power. And
we want to free Europe to become the
center of cooperation, not confronta-
tion. We want to open up opportunities
for greater U.S. -European cooperation
on the other great issues of our day, for
example, on environment and regional
conflicts. A reduced military presence
when combined with a less threatening
Soviet presence in Europe can create a
stronger basis for engagement in Eu-
rope over the long haul.

America is and will remain a Euro-
pean power. Similarly, our SNF agree-
ment demonstrates our ability to adapt
to change while remaining true to our
core security principles. We've agreed
to future negotiations after the imple-
mentation of a conventional forces
agreement — after the implementation
of the agreement is underway for the
conventional force agreement. Any ne-
gotiated SNF reductions will not be
carried out until the CFE agreement is
implemented. We've underscored that
our objective in negotiations is to
achieve partial reductions, clearly leav-
ing an SNF deterrent at lower, equal,
and verifiable levels. Partial means
partial.

We also stress that our strategy of
deterrence requires land-, sea-, and
air-based nuclear systems, including
ground-based missiles, for as far as we
can foresee. While we will not take the
modernization decision until 1992, the
allies recognize the value of continued
U.S. funding for the research and de-
velopment of the follow-on to the Lance
system.

Last, we are placing great empha-
sis on a rapid negotiated reduction of
the conventional asymmetries that
threaten Europe. Based on results in
that area, we can negotiate SNF reduc-
tions, as well, while ensuring the con-
tinued presence of the nuclear
deterrent.

Q. The communique says that
chemical weapons are abhorrent, and
you called for total elimination. Most
people think nuclear weapons are to-
tally abhorrent. Why not totally elim-
inate them, as your predecessor had
called for?

A. The communique addresses it-
self to where nuclear forces are
concerned — blah, blah, land-sea-air-
based systems, including ground-based
missiles. In the present circumstances,
as far as can be foreseen, they'll be
needed in Europe. And I would just
stand by that. This is a decision that
has been thoroughly consulted with the
military, and that's the way it is.

Q. Your spokesman said today
that the formula for negotiations on
short-range nuclear missiles was a
very strong victory for the United
States and the NATO alliance. How
can it be a victory for the United
States without being a defeat for
Chancellor Kohl and Mr. Genseher
[West German Foreign Minister], giv-
en that the United States and Ger-
many were on such opposing sides of
this issue?

A. They strongly supported it, it's
my understanding. And I don't view it
as a victory for the United States. I
view it as a victory for the alliance. So,
they can speak for themselves, but I'm
very pleased that it worked out and
that there was alliance harmony on
this very important question.

Q. Did both sides make conces-
sions, sir?

A. I can only speak for the United
States, and we had certain broad pa-
rameters that — I've addressed part one
of them, and that was this question of
partial reduction, no third zero ques-
tion. The other one was to agree to be-

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 '

THE PRESIDENT

gin the negotiations on SNF following
tangible implementation. That was one
of our strong conditions, or strong ne-
gotiating points, if you will. And then
no implementation of agreed reduction
on SNF forces before completion of
these reductions. So, I'm very happy.

Put it this way, we're here as part
of an alliance, and I don't think we
ought to have winners and losers out of
a summit that everybody concedes has
been very, very unified. It's an alliance
victory or an alliance decision. I'm
proud to have had a part in that.

Q. All politics may be local, but
hasn't the continued insistence of the
Germans been damaging to the
alliance'/

A. Talk to the people that have
been around here for a long time, and
they'll tell you that they've never seen
more unity and more upbeat feeling af-
ter a meeting.

Q. Do you think the Foreign Min-
isters who missed dinner last night
would agree with you on that?
[Laughter]

A. No, they probably would dis-
sent, but they went along today, kept
their eyes open.

Q. Is it possible that you could
start negotiations on SNF missiles
before the modernization decision
has been made'? And do you think
that's a good way to go into negotia-
tions without a commitment to up-
grade these — the Soviets say, Okay, if
we don't have a commitment, we'll get
rid of all of them — and where 's your
position'.'

A. The modernization decision
doesn't need to be taken until 1992. We
have spelled out the procedures for ne-
gotiating on SNF, and that will come
after the agreement on the convention-
al forces.

That is the important point. I don't
believe the layman — I know we've got a
lot of e.xperts on this side, and I don't
want to restrict my questions to those
of us like myself who are not long-time
arms control experts — but I can tell
you that most people in our country
don't realize the imbalance that exists
on these conventional forces. It is de-
stabilizing. And the question is SNF,
short-range nuclear forces, where
they've got, in terms of launchers,
what, 1,200 or something of that nature
to our 88. Why don't they just
negotiate — ^just unilaterally reduce to
equal numbers? Now there would be a
good challenge.

We've got this order set up as to
how we're going to go about it. The alli-
ance has taken a firm position, and so
I'm not going to go into a hypothetical
question of that nature.

Q. On this question of partial,
the word is underlined for emphasis
in the document. Was that done at
our behest, or Mrs. Thatcher's behest,
or whose behest?

A. If we can wake up Jim Baker,
you'll have to ask him. But I would sim-
ply say there was total agreement on it,
and it speaks for itself. Partial is par-
tial, and to try to interpret it some oth-
er way misses the boat.

Q. In light of the fact that you
have added several new weapons cate-
gories to the NATO bargaining posi-
tion and to the conventional arms
talks, is it realistic to suppose that
these talks can be carried out suc-
cessfully in the brief period of time
that you have now asked for?

A. Yes, we can meet that timeta-
ble. We've challenged the Soviets to
meet us, you might say — the alliance.
NATO is tasked to be back on Septem-
ber 7th with our internals to be farther
along. I would certainly say yes, let's do
that. We all remember September 7th,
don't we? [Laughter]

Q. You've said that the moderni-
zation decision has been put off until
1992, but you have a commitment to
keep the weapons systems up-to-date.
When are changes to be made?

A. Not before 1992.

Q. You've said that your efforts
here are not a public relations battle
with Soviet Leader Mikhail Gor-
bachev, but if this were a battle, who's
winning, yourself or Mr. Gorbachev?

A. Too hypothetical, too hypo-
thetical. I've read who some think is
winning, but that was yesterday.

Q. Do you expect the hammering
about your alleged lack of leadership
in the United States to quiet down
now as a result of your performance
here?

A. I haven't felt under siege in the
United States because I've known ex-
actly what we wanted to do. I made
statements to that effect earlier on:
that we were going to have a review
and then have proposals. And we did
exactly that. So, I will concede I've
read such reports, but they haven't
troubled me any.

Q. Mr. Gorbachev has apparently
for the first time revealed specific de-
fense budget figures in Moscow today.
And he also says he is proposing to
cut defense spending by 14% over 1990
and 1991. That's equal to about $17.3
billion. Is that a lot? Is that meaning-
ful? What do you think about it?

A. This will help him — this pro-
posal. If he hits our bid, that should
save him a lot of money in the long run
because he has a disproportionate num-
ber of conventional forces. And therein,
as you know, that's where a lot of the
expense for defense comes from. So, I
don't know, but it sounds like a substan-
tial number to me. But again, I hadn't
seen that. I will say this for those who
may wonder what the Soviet reaction
has been — and it's very preliminary —
but the initial contact with our Embas-
sy in Moscow was — I would put fairly
positive — cautious, but we're leading on
the side of saying it's positive. In other
words, they clidn't really slam the door
and come in on a negative vein.

Q. On that point, wouldn't it
seem that if you want to strike this
agreement even as early as 6 months,
that there would be a summit meet-
ing with Mr. Gorbachev before the
end of the year?

A. Again, if there was something
constructive to come out of such a
meeting, I would certainly be prepared
to meet, and I believe that Secretary
Baker has conveyed that to [Foreign]
Minister Shevardnadze.

Q. Has Mr. Gorbachev responded
to your letter of Sunday?

A. No, sir.

Q. You used some strong lan-
guage yesterday about leading the al-
liance and leading the free world —
that wasn't your term, but did you
feel it was important, if not for your-
self then for the alliance, for the
United Sates, to assert yourself in a
strong way at this particular
summit — this time?

A. Yes. I think it is highly impor-
tant that the United States — to be seen
as fully engaged, trying to come up
with creative proposals, and fulfilling
its historic leadership responsibilities.
I would like to put it in terms of alli-
ance unity, though, and what — all these
decisions. There's plenty of room for
credit out there, and I would insist that
it's an alliance — to the degree we got
unanimity — an alliance victory.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

Q. The stress you put on the
speed of negotiations — 6 months to a
year — and the decision to wait until
1992, modernization, are there some
progress points if there are no nego-
tiations or progress in the negotia-
tions within a year to reexamine the
1992 deadline?

A. To be honest with you, I don't
know the answer to that question. But
my own personal view would be that if
there were some dramatic change
somewhere that changed the theses
that underlined this agreement that
we'd want to review things. But I'm not
predicting that. I want to see it go
forward.

Q. Following tangible implemen-
tation— that's being read as obviously
not complete implementation. Can
you tell us how far tangible is?

A. No, I can't tell you how far it is,
but it has to be so that you and I would
look at it and we'd both agree that
there had been sincere implementation.

Q. In the comprehensive concept
[communique], it states that ground-
based missiles will be needed as far
as can be foreseen. Even though the
modernization decision has been put
off is there any alternative to mod-
ernizing those missiles?

A. Is there any alternative to mod-
ernizing it? We will cross that bridge in
1992.

Q. As you know, Mr. Gorbachev is
coming to Bonn soon, and his opera-
tive style has been to try to up the
ante when the United States makes a
proposal. On your conventional arms
proposal, do you think you've gone
down as far as the West can safely go
in reducing conventional forces, and
can you go no further than what
you've proposed yesterday?

A. I see no reason talking about
further cuts and further reductions
when we have just tabled a sound pro-
posal that addresses ourselves to this
enormous imbalance, so I just would
defer on that.

Q. You were criticized early on
for a slow start. Now this proposal is
being described as bold; you yourself
said revolutionary. I wonder if there
is any element of I-told-you-so in your
attitude now to reaction to these
proposals?

A. Not really. [Laughter] Not
really. No, listen, I'm not going to get
into that game with Congress or any-
one else [Laughter]

Q. Looking ahead, what impact
do you think your proposals will have
on U.S. -Soviet relations, and specifi-
cally on strategic arms talks?

A. I hope that these proposals have
an ameliorating effect, that things will
get only better. I think it's a serious
proposal. I think they see a solid, unit-
ed alliance, and that is important in
this. I would hope that it would have a
good effect on whatever follows on. And
strategic arms reduction talks follow
on. I have never questioned whether
Gorbachev knew that we were serious
and wanted to move forward with him.
I've read speculation on this, but I have
reason to believe that he knows that we
have been serious, taking our time to
formulate proposals. I do think that
this one will be tangible evidence of
this. I hope it would lead to — if conven-
tional forces talks can be catalytic for
strategic talks, so be it. But I hope that
the seriousness of all of this and the
unity of the alliance will be persuasive
to him to make him know that we do
want to go forward.

Q. As you know, the United
States has strongly opposed, and so
has NATO, including aircraft in these
negotiations up to now. Could you tell
us what your thinking was in decid-
ing to reverse that position and to
propose the 15% cut?

A. Trying to correct disparity.
And it was really that simple. I realize
there have been some concerns of — we
are very understanding of the French
reservation in this regard — I might say
very diplomatically and beautifully ex-
pressed by President Mitterrand. But
it is simply that: disparity.

Q. Secretary General Woerner
spoke about the future being as im-
portant or more important than the
past for the alliance. He spoke about
NATO vision. Does NATO's vision in-
clude East-West alliance?

A. I don't see an East-West alli-
ance, but I see a Europe much more
free, and one whose innate desire to
have more democracy comes to the sur-
face. But I don't see it as an East and
West joining in some formal alliance, if
that was what the question was.

Q. NATO exists because of the
perceived threat that the Soviet
Union provided. Now the Soviet
Union isn't perceived as a threat any-
more. Surely, an East-West alliance
would then exist for a perceived
threat from elsewhere —

A. I've answered my question on —
you asked me whether I felt there
would be some formal alliance between
pact countries. I guess you meant be-
tween Warsaw Pact and NATO. I don't
think it would require a formal alliance
in order to have much, much better re-
lationships that include security consid-
erations. But we're a long way from
there. We're just beginning to see the
differentiation in Europe, and our
whole policy for the United States — let
me set aside NATO for a minute — will
be to watch for those changes and try __
to facilitate them and work with those
who are willing to move toward free-
dom and democracy.

Indeed, we've made some proposals
on Poland. I will be going to both Po-
land and Hungary, and I will make
clear that if they move toward these
Western values that have served the al-
liance so well for a long time that,
speaking for the United States, we will
be ready to have much better relations.

Q. Can you say this morning that
there will be no third zero? And if you
can say it, why cannot the compre-
hensive concept say it?

A. I thought I already did say it.

Q. I didn't think so.

A. There will be no third zero.
There wall be third no zero. [Laughter]
Partial means partial.

Q. Vice President Quayle, in an
interview with a reporter the other
day, said that if some of these East
European countries move too far to-
ward Western values that the Soviets
might intervene militarily and that
we have not planned how we might re-
spond to that. He said we ought to do
that. Do you agree that that's a — he
called it a big risk. Do you agree it's a
big risk, and do you think that we
ought to be deciding what to do if the
Soviets should —

A. I'm old enough to remember
Hungary in 1956, and I would want to
do nothing in terms of statement or ex-
hortation that would encourage a re-
peat of that. And so, I would leave it
right there. I'd like to think that the
situation will move in the opposite di-
rection. But who would have predictpcl
the kind of public, up until now, peace
ful demonstration in Tiananmen Square^
[in Beijing]? Who would have predicted
the kind of move inside the Soviet
Union on perentruika and, indeed,
glasHosf! When you're dealing with
things as complex as relations between
countries, I think prudence is the order

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

of the day, and I've said that all along.
But back to your questions, I don't
think anyone knows the answer to that.
I mean, we're not certainly predicting

that.

Q. Well, then, do you disagree
with the Vice President?

A. I don't even know what he said.
I learned long ago not to comment on
things that I haven't read personally
when we're trying to get one member
of an Administration to be juxtaposed
against another. It's bad business, and
I'm not going to that. But I have great
confidence in the Vice President, I
might add, and I think his pronounce-
ments on foreign policy have been very
sound.

Q. Notwithstanding the obvious
fact that they all work for you any-
way, how much of a problem, if any,
did you have getting the Pentagon on
board on these proposals?

A. The Pentagon did what it
should have done. They looked at vari-
ous options from the military stand-
point, and they analyzed it. The Joint
Chiefs were fully engaged in the proc-
ess. My contacts were principally, but
not e.xclusively, with Bill Crowe [Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]. One of
the things I wanted to do in talking to
our alliance partners was assure them
that our military was behind the final
proposal. Indeed, I was very pleased in
talking to Gen. Galvin before his pro-
posal was tabled to have his assurances
that what we have proposed here is
sound militarily. That made it a much
better position to present to the
alliance.

Q. Do you expect any foot-
dragging or grumbling or maybe even
a little leaking along the way as you
go forward?

A. In our own leak-proof bureau-
cracy? No, I don't expect that. [Laugh-
ter] And I would discourage it. But is it
apt to happen? I would hope not.

Q. Were you, at any point, un-
happy with the pace and the projec-
tions of that slow and lengthy policy
review to the extent — as you de-
scribed you had a 12-day sort of crash
course in some of these new pro-
posals. Can you give us some of your
personal sense of how you got to this
point?

A. First we undertook these re-
views. I'm not sure everyone here un-
derstands that. I said that I needed
some time when I became President —
new President, January 20th — to re-

view not only this subject, the NATO-
related subjects, but a wide array of
subjects. We're almost through all of
the reviews. During this time, I came
under some fire for being recalcitrant,
reluctant to move forward. Indeed,
when Mr. Gorbachev would make one of
his many proposals, they would be com-
ing to me and saying 'Well, don't you
think you have to do something?" And I
would say, 'No, we want to take our
time and act in a prudent mannei'."

I had in my mind that what we
wanted to do was to be sure that the al-
liance would come together on any pro-
posal we made to the alliance. But I
think there was some feeling in Con-
gress, some criticism of my speed or
lack of it in the U.S. Congress. But I'm
so immune to political criticism that I
just kind of write it off. I was elected
to do what I think is right. And I think
we've come up with a good proposal
here.

I will end, this being the last ques-
tion, not with a filibuster but simply to
say I have been told by others here that
the alliance really has never had a
meeting that's more upbeat and where
we've taken rather significant steps in
unity. Whatever the wait, whatever po-
litical arrows might have been fired my
way, it's all been worth it because I
think we have something sound and sol-
id to build on now.

I end by thanking my colleagues,
the other heads of government, chiefs
of state who were here, for the total co-
operation and the spirit in which these
proposals were received and discussed
and the way in which NATO adopted its
final position. I think it's a good thing.
It's good for NATO. I really happen to
believe that it's good for the entire free
world.

Remarks and

Question-and-Answer

Session,
Bonn,
May 30, 19899

Chancellor Kohl

Allow me to welcome you, Mr. Presi-
dent, very cordially here to the Federal
Republic of Germany. This is a good
day for us. A few days ago, we cele-
brated the 40th anniversary of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, and these 40
years were also 40 years of friendship
and partnership with the United
States. Over these four decades, Amer-
ican soldiers defended, together with
our troops, freedom and peace in our
country. A lot of what was decisive for
the early history of our country was
initiated by the United States, and we
always received support by the United
States.

I would like to welcome you very
cordially as a proven friend of our coun-
try, as a personal friend who has al-
ways stood ready to help me in difficult
times. Yesterday and today we met in
order to celebrate the 40th anniversary
of NATO. We jointly discussed, in the
spirit of friendship, difficult questions
which are now important for our fu-
ture. Your initiative, your new pro-
posal for disarmament, is an enormous
step into the future, and it shows the
inspiration emanating from the leader-
ship role of the United States. That
was a wise, a right decision at a very
important point in time. Now it's up to
the other side to actually take that
hand which has been extended to it,
and then that will be a great work of
peace. We have taken up already our
talks.

I would just like to mention two
points on our agenda. First of all, we
talked about the foundation of the Eu-
ropean Community and then about the
completion of the internal market of
the European Community by the 31st
of December 1992. This will lend a new
quality to European policy, and you
know the Federal Republic of Germany
has been a motor, an engine, behind
this development.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

But we are also a motor for open
world trade. If from time to time I hear
reports and read reports from the
United States that people are afraid
that we would isolate ourselves against
the rest of the world, drawing up bar-
riers to trade, I say to people: This will
not happen in any case and certainly
not receive the support of the Federal
Republic of Germany. On the contrary,
I firmly believe that in the next years
to come, the European Community and
the United States of American will en-
joy deepened relations — political rela-
tions and economic relations.

For us, the relationship with the
United States is of existential impor-
tance. Therefore, we also discussed an-
other very important point which goes
beyond day-to-day politics, that is to
say, the fact that we want to intensify
the exchange of pupils and students. We
want as many young Americans as pos-
sible to come over here to our country.
To use an image that's out of this plant-
ing of young trees: A forest may grow
which stands as a symbol of the solid
friendship between our two countries.
To put it quite simply, Mr. President,
we're glad you're here. You are a friend
among friends.

President Bush

Let me just be very brief and first
thank Chancellor Kohl for this warm
reception. I told him that I don't be-
lieve German-American relations have
ever been better. Secondly, I am very
pleased with the reaction to the NA'TO
decision that was taken. I think it
shows NATO to be together; it shows
NATO to be strong. Indeed, I think in
challenging Mr. Gorbachev to come for-
ward now, we have moved in the right
direction in unity. It is in the interest
of NATO; it is clearly in the interest of
the United States and all the members
of NATO— the Federal Republic. I hap-
pen to believe that what we've pro-
posed is in the interest of the Soviet
Union. So, we will see what the reac-
tion is, but this was a wonderful cele-
bration of the 40th anniversary of
NATO. Chancellor Kohl, once again my
sincere thanks to you for your hospi-
tality and for the total cooperation be-
tween the United States and the
Federal Republic.

(J. Do you consider yourself a
winner"/ Do you consider yourself a
winner or a loser on the short-range
missiles? Did you get what you want-
ed or is it a real compromise?

Chancellor Kohl. I think we were
all just winners in Brussels. I think
that the alliance has given itself the
best kind of birthday present it could
have given. After difficult discussions,
we came to a joint decision, and this de-
cision is what applies. I think we've —
all of us — had the personal experience
of having to make compromises, and I
think that this is a good thing. We also
came to a compromise here. Just as one
concrete answer to your question,
there are only winners, and actually
that's a very rare experience for a poli-
tician and I relish that.

Q. Is this compromise enough for
you to win the election next year?
[Laughter]

Chancellor Kohl. I am completely

certain as to the result of the elections
in 1990. And as a very concrete answer
to your question, I think it is very help-
ful with regard to the majority of the
German people that we have here a gov-
ernment and a head of government who
has proved his friendship with the
United States over the course of the
years. So, insofar, yesterday and today
will indeed be helpful.

Q. When will you go to Berlin?
President Bush. The answer is, I
don't know.

Q. Would you expand the Berlin
initiative of your predecessor?

President Bush. We might well.
We might well. We might have some-
thing to say about that tomorrow in
Mainz.

Secretary Baker's
News Briefing,
Bonn,
May 30, 19891°

We have just emerged from a very pro-
ductive summit, the first of this presi-
dency. As you know, the President has
spoken of moving beyond containment
in our relations with the Soviet Union
in this time of very fundamental
change in the East, and now I think we
have a basis for managing that change.
We have seen a summit that proves we
have unity in the NATO alliance. We
have seen an initiative in the field of
arms control. We have been, as we have

mentioned before, winning across the
board politically and economically for
quite some time. The values of the West
are the values that are persevering.
And we now have an initiative on secu-
rity as well.

Q. From an American point of
view, what did the United States give
up in order to get this agreement
today?

A. You mean the SNF agreement?

Q. Right, the SNF agreement.

A. I wouldn't characterize it that
way, although any agreement is a com-
promise. As you know, we have been
having discussions for some 2 months
prior to the time that we got to
Brussels on this issue, hoping to re-
solve it before we got to Brussels. Dur-
ing the course of those discussions, the
United States indicated a willingness
to delay taking the decision on produc-
tion and deployment of the follow-on to
Lance until late 1991, early 1992; and
indicated a willingness to accept the
principle of negotiations on SNF.

We already indicated that before
we got to Brussels. We had to find a
way to put that into language that
didn't do violence to some of the princi-
ples we wanted to preserve. Let me
mention those to you, because they
might be of interest as well.

We wanted to preserve the posi-
tion, even though we might be willing
to negotiate after a period of time and
subject to certain preconditions, we did
not want those negotiations to involve
going all the way to zero, or total or
complete elimination of those missiles.
We preserve that position.

We also did not want to be put in
the position of having to negotiate be-
fore we were able to begin implementa-
tion of a conventional forces agreement,
and the language is essentially that.

And third, we did not want thei'e
to be any doubt but that a conventional
force agreement would have to be im-
plemented before we would begin im-
plementing reductions under a short-
range nuclear agreement.

Q. Has that not been the U.S. po-
sition from the beginning, though,
that you would not negotiate SNF un-
til you had a conventional arms
agreement in play?

A. That's correct. Our position
going in was we wanted the phrase "un-
til there was tangible implementation"
of the conventional forces agreement.
What we come out of here with is a
statement that says we won't have

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

short-range nuclear negotiations begin
"until implementation of the conven-
tional forces agreement is underway." I
don't see that as much of a change
myself.

Q. That sounds like everything
was set a long time ago. but there's at
least one report that suggests the
President was displeased with the
strategic review, the results of it; that
in the last few days, he ordered a new
review, some Pentagon, some civilian
people — something was put together
rather quickly, and what he presented
at the NATO summit is the product of
that reconsideration. In fact, he
wasn't really happy with his New
London —

A. That's simply not correct.
That's totally inaccurate. That's not
what happened.

Q. What did happen?

A. What happened on what? The
original question was short-range nu-
clear. What do you want to talk about?
Conventional —

Q. Let me get more specific. Did
the President make some major last
minute revisions in his assessment of
what the United States could do with
regard to these missiles and with re-
gard to troop reduction? In fact, [Ca-
nadian Prime Minister] Mulroney
and others apparently were taken
somewhat by surprise.

A. No, there was no last minute —

Q. I mean, the night before.

A. While there is some relation-
ship and will be some relationship in
implementation, the two things are
separate. The conventional forces ini-
tiative is something that was discussed
among a very small group in the Ad-
ministration going way, way back to the
very beginnings of this Administra-
tion. The short-range nuclear agree-
ment is something that — having the
short-range agreement, having to do
with the questions of modernization
and negotiation — we began to discuss
with our allies, frankly, during the
course of my early trip in February to
NATO Capitols. So the two things were
proceeding on separate tracks, and
they were not linked in any way.

Q. Is it true that after you came
back from your visit to talk to Mr.
Gorbachev and laid out the new num-
bers, that it was at that time you and
the President —

A. No, that is inaccurate. I read
those reports. That's not correct.

The President and Chancellor Kohl on a cruise down the Rhine River from Oberwesel
to Koblenz.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

Q. That was not a turning point
as far as you are concerned?

A. No, there had been significant
discussions with respect to the conven-
tional forces proposal — as I mentioned
before — going way, way back to the be-
ginnings of this Administration among
a small group of people in the
Administration.

Q. Isn't it a case of interpreta-
tion as to whether you can ever nego-
tiate to zero on SNF, subject to
interpretation by different parties?

A. No, I don't think it is subject to
interpretation. In my view, "partial"
means partial. It doesn't permit you to
completely eliminate, nor does it per-
mit you to totally eliminate. But you
don't have to rest right there. That's in
paragraph 48 of the agreement. If you
look in paragraph 45 as well, you will
see a reference in there to the fact
that — last sentence of 45 — "Where nu-
clear forces are concerned, land-, sea-,
and air-based systems, including," it
says, "ground-based missiles, in the
present circumstances and as far as can
be foreseen will be needed in Europe."
You might also take a look at paragraph
63. We think it's pretty clear that you
can't go to zero.

Q. Yes, but the future is the fu-
ture. As far as can be foreseen may be
only a couple of years.

A. If you want me to say there is
no expressed statement in here saying
this is in perpetuity, I'll be glad to say
that. But the fact of the matter is the
negotiation that is going to be kicked
off would not permit a result that takes
you all the way to zero or that com-
pletely or totally eliminates these
missiles.

Q. Could you tell us a little more
about the negotiations last night that
came up with that partial language?
And instead of saying flatly "no third
zero," was it designed to give the Ger-
man Government a little wiggle
room? Could you just tell us a little
about that?

A. Yes, yes, it was designed to
avoid saying it in those stark terms.
Because those are very stark terms as
far as they are concerned, and that's
the reason we went to that formulation.

Q. Back to the question of the re-
view. Many of us who have observed
the President's speeches in the last
few weeks have noticed how he has
discussed the words "caution;" he's

talked about being "prudent." Now we
have what I can only call a very bold
proposal which does seem to be quite
different from the speeches which he
gave. Isn't there obviously, from any
observer's viewpoint, a change in
course?

A. No, there is no change in
course. Prudence and realism will still
be standards which will guide this rela-
tionship. But the fact that the Presi-
dent has put a bold proposal on the
table doesn't mean that he has aban-
doned prudence and realism when you
look at the proposal in detail. This pro-
posal brings us to parity across the full
range of conventional weapons, save na-
val forces, which are not included in
any way. It brings us to parity in the
face of tremendous imbalances favoring
the East.

So when we talk about reducing
29,000 troops, or when we talk about
reducing 750 or 800 combat aircraft — if
you look at what the East has to re-
duce, it's way, way bigger; I mean,
300,000 troops and in the thousands of
aircraft. This is not an imprudent
proposal.

Q. So you're saying this is a re-
sult of the review; there was, in fact,
no change in course? The President
was perfectly happy with the review
and there was no sense, as he
himself —

A. No, I didn't say that^I mean,
the President was perfectly happy, as
we all were, with the review. This par-
ticular initiative was proceeding in a
different way — on a separate track, if
you will; it was not put into the
bureaucracy — I guess that's the best
way I can explain it. The various bu-
reaucracies in the Federal Government
that have to consider these things ulti-
mately considered this proposal, but it
wasn't put into the general review. It
was dealt with at a higher level in the
government.

Q. I believe that you have ac-
knowledged that basically the Ger-
mans accepted the counterproposal
that you and the President came up
with at Kennebunkport. The Presi-
dent even used that phrase "tangible"
this morning in his press conference,
and yet when the West Germans first
received it, they rejected it. Some
were saying this would mean you
couldn't have SNF talks possibly even
into the next century. Yet now they
have accepted the same proposal.

What happened? Was it the Presi-
dent's conventional arms proposal, or
was it the fact that the West Germans
found themselves in a very small mi-
nority at the NATO Council, or both?

A. I think that maybe it was part
of both. I believe there was a feeling
there at the summit that the United
States had been forthcoming even be-
fore we got here, as I told you this had
been the subject of a 2-month-long exer-
cise, and there was a feeling on the
part of many allies that we had, in-
deed, been forthcoming in an effort to
recognize the changing circumstances
and, therefore, be flexible and at the
same time protect our deterrence. I
think many allies felt that was, in fact,
the way we had approached this.

Now that wasn't the only reason, I
think the conventional forces initiative
did enter into the German thinking, al-
though you really ought to ask them
that. But the fact that we have an arms
control proposal on conventional forces
that has some possibilities at least of
being concluded in a year probably en-
tered into their thinking.

Q. You say there was no change
in course, but hasn't there been an
evolution, at least, in the President's
thinking? In his May 12th speech at
Texas A&M, he seemed to put the em-
phasis on a list of unilateral steps he
wanted the Soviets to take, including
unilateral troop reductions, before we
responded, and in his proposal of yes-
terday he was talking about mutual
cuts.

A. I think there's still some steps
that he would like to see the Soviets
take. We would like again to see the
"new thinking" represented in deeds as
opposed to words in a number of differ-
ent areas around the world. You should
not interpret the fact that the Presi-
dent has put a bold conventional arms
proposal on the table as somehow
changing course or changing direction,
because this proposal is very good for —

Q. I said evolution in thinking.

A. Wait a minute, though. This
proposal is very, very good for the
United States. That's why he suggested
it, because it's not something we are
doing for the Soviet Union. This is
very, very positive from our stand-
point, and we will be much better off
and much more secure in the West if
they will accept it. By the way, we have
just seen a report that [Soviet Foreign
Minister] Shevardnadze says is a very
serious, positive, and substantial

Department of State Bulletin/August 19891

THE PRESIDENT

proposal, and they're going to give it
serious consideration, and that's very
good.

Q. Yesterday, when we were being
briefed. Administration officials
were pointing to the Soviet proposal
as one reason that we now thought
they were serious and that was one
reason the President responded as he
did.

A. You mean the Soviet proposal
responding to the original NATO
conventional — yes —

Q. Responding to the original
NATO proposal. And it just seemed
there was some evolution there.

A. Correct.

Q. I mean, you're denying there's
no change or evolution in thinking or
attitude?

A. Oh, no, but I'm saying it's not —
there hasn't been a sea change. I mean,
the Soviet — that was important. Yes,
that entered into the thinking. The
President's original deliberations with
respect to this go way, way back, and
they antedate the Soviet response to
the original NATO conventional arms
proposal.

Q. You say that we can get this
conventional agreement done in a
year. Is it conceivable that negotia-
tions on SNF will start before the
modernization decision in 1992? Is
that even a remote possibility? And is
that the kind of way you want to go
into negotiations with the Soviet
Union?

A. It is a possibility. I think the
1-year date is optimistic but not unre-
alistic. I think it's not an unrealistic
date, so —

Q. Is that the way you want to
have a negotiation with the Soviet
Union, with the modernization ques-
tion left unanswered, and there's no
pressure, therefore, on them to think
they're going to get these missiles —
they can continue to play the political
game with Germany?

A. It doesn't. Just because you
have started a negotiation doesn't mean
that you cave. And the decision will be
made on modernization in 1992. So
you're only looking at a period of about
14-17 months there, and there are pro-
visions in here calling for keeping our
current forces up-to-date, which we
will continue to do. So we will continue
to have these weapons deployed.

Q. But that requires modern-
ization.

A. No, keeping —

Q. They become obsolete by the
mid-1990s. At least that's—

A. By the mid-1990s, yes; by 1996
or so, that is correct. But we're not
talking about that timeframe. We're
going to have another look at the ques-
tion of modernization in 1992.

Q. Yes, but in order to have some,
they have to be modernized. Isn't that
correct?

A. No, they do not have to be mod-
ernized in order to have some. We have
88 out there right now, and we're under
an obligation — agreement at each and
every one of these summits to keep
these systems up-to-date. We do repair
them, and we keep them up-to-date,
and we will continue to. There's noth-
ing in the communique that would pre-
vent that.

Q. Just explain how, if there is no
modernization decision, how — isn't
there a conflict there?

A. Modernization refers to a new
system, okay — development of a follow-
on to Lance. Until we take that deci-
sion, we will continue to keep our
Lance missile systems up-to-date.

Q. The President said that you
would be able to tell us who was re-
sponsible for underlining the word
"partial" in the communique.

A. We were.

Q. We, the United States?

A. We, the United States.

Q. Why did you do that?

A. We, the United States, because
we wanted to give it a little added em-
phasis for the reason that was sug-
gested in the first question.

Q. What must happen before the
modernization decision? Must there
be progress in the talks. Must there
be actual cuts in conventional weap-
ons? What must take place before the
modernization decision goes —

A. There must be a political con-
stituency sufficient for that decision to
be taken for NATO in 1992.

Q. And what will create that
decision?

A. Let's see what happens in terms
of security developments around the
world; let's see whether or not the "new
thinking" is real; let's see whether or
not the Soviet Union continues to come
toward the West; let's see whether or
not the East continues to move toward

Western values. All of those things will
enter into the political calculus as to
whether or not that constituency will
be there in 1992.

Q. You would not have to have a
completed treaty on conventional
reductions?

A. No, there's no such requirement
or restriction at all.

Q. Are you going to meet with
Mr. Shevardnadze before the Septem-
ber, third round?

A. I have no plans now to meet
with him before September. Remember
these are alliance decisions. Yes, the
manpower proposal is U.S. -Soviet man-
power and that would, of course, per-
mit direct dialogue, but we would want
to do that, I think, within the context
of very close consultation with the
alliance.

Q. But direct dialogue wouldn't
give them any sort of impetus, so
once you have the formal language in
September, you could really move for-
ward more quickly.

A. We would like to be able to put
this on the table at the September 7 — I
think it is — resumption of the discus-
sions. This is a package deal. This is
not something we put on the table with
the idea the East can come in and pick
what they like and leave what they
don't like. Yes, there are some ques-
tions that will have to be resolved.
There are accounting rules, partic-
ularly with respect to aircraft; there
are some counting rules with respect to
artillery; there are questions about de-
mobilization and deactivation of troops
that are reduced. This has to be devel-
oped in that sense, but hopefully, we
can put it on the table at the September
7 reconvening of the CFE discussions
in Vienna.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

President's Address,

Mainz,

May 31, 198911

Today I come to speak, not just of our
mutual defense but of our shared val-
ues. I come to speak, not just of the
matters of the mind but of the deeper
aspirations of the heart.

Just this morning, Barbara and I
were charmed with the e.xperiences we
had. I met with a small group of Ger-
man students, bright young men and
women who studied in the United
States. Their knowledge of our country
and the world was impressive to say the
least. But sadly, too many in the West,
Americans and Europeans alike, seem
to have forgotten the lessons of our
common heritage and how the world we
know came to be. And that should not
be, and that cannot be. We must recall
that the generation coming into its own
in America and Western Europe i.s heir
to gifts greater than those bestowed to
any generation in history — peace, free-
dom, and prosperity.

NATO: Europe's Second Renaissance

This inheritance is possible because 40
years ago the nations of the West joined
in that noble, common cause called
NATO. First, there was the vision, the
concept of free peoples in North Amer-
ica and Europe working to protect
their values. Second, there was the
practical sharing of risks and burdens
and a realistic recognition of Soviet ex-
pansionism. And finally, there was the
determination to look beyond old ani-
mosities. The NATO alliance did noth-
ing less than provide a way for Western
Europe to heal centuries-old rivalries,
to begin an era of reconciliation and
restoration. It has been, in fact, a sec-
ond renaissance of Europe.

As you know best, this is not just
the 40th birthday of the alliance. It's
also the 40th birthday of the Federal
Republic — a republic born in hope,
tempered by challenge. And at the
height of the Berlin crisis in 1948,
Ernst Reuter called on Germans to
stand firm and confident, and you did —
courageously, magnificently.

The historic genius of the German
people has flourished in this age of
peace. Your nation has become a leader
in technology and the fourth largest
economy on earth. But more impor-
tant, you have inspired the world by
• forcefully promoting the principles of
human rights, democracy, and free-
- dom. The United States and the Feder-
al Republic have always been firm
friends and allies. But today we share
an added role — partners in leadership.

Of course, leadership has a con-
stant companion — responsibility. And
our responsibility is to look ahead and
grasp the promise of the future. I said
recently that we're at the end of one era
and at the beginning of another. And I
noted that in regard to the Soviet
Union, our policy is to move beyond
containment. For 40 years, the
seeds of democracy in Eastern Europe
lay dormant, buried under the frozen
tundra of the cold war. And for 40
years, the world has waited for the cold
war to end. Decade after decade, time
after time, the flowering human spirit
withered from the chill of conflict and
oppression. And again, the world
waited. But the passion for freedom
cannot be denied forever. The world has
waited long enough. The time is right.
Let Europe be whole and free.

To the founders of the alliance, this
aspiration was a distant dream, and
now it's the new mission of NATO. If

ancient rivals like Britain and France,
or France and Germany, can reconcile,
then why not the nations of the East
and West?

Growing Political
Freedoms in the East

In the East, brave men and women are
show-ing us the way. Look at Poland,
where Solidarity — Solidarnosc — and
the Catholic Church have W'on legal sta-
tus. The forces of freedom are putting
the Soviet status quo on the defensive.

In the West, we have succeeded be-
cause we've been faithful to our values
and our vision. And the other side of
the rusting Iron Curtain, their vision
failed.

The cold war began with the divi-
sion of Europe. It can only end when
Europe is whole. Today, it is this very
concept of a divided Europe that is un-
der siege. And that's why our hopes run
especially high, because the division of
Europe is under siege not by armies,
but by the spread of ideas that began
here, right here. It was a son of Mainz,
Johannes Gutenberg, who liberated the
mind of man through the power of the
printed word.

And that same liberating power is
unleashed today in a hundred new
forms. The Voice of America, Deutsche
Welle allows us to enlighten millions
deep within Eastern Europe and
throughout the world. Television satel-
lites allow us to bear witness from the
shipyards of Gdansk [Poland] to Tian-
anmen Square [Beijing, China]. But
the momentum for freedom does not
just come from the printed word or the
transistor or the television screen. It
comes from a single powerful idea —
democracy.

This one idea is sweeping across
Eurasia. This one idea is why the
communist world, from Budapest to
Beijing, is in ferment. Of course, for
the leaders of the East, it's not just
freedom for freedom's sake. But what-
ever their motivation, they are unleash-
ing a force they will find difficult to
channel or control — the hunger for lib-
erty of oppressed peoples who have
tasted freedom.

Nowhere is this more apparent
than in Eastern Europe, the birthplace
of the cold war. In Poland, at the end of
World War II, the Soviet Army pre-
vented the free elections promised by
Stalin at Yalta. Today, Poles are taking
the first steps toward real elections, so
long promised — so long deferred. And

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

in Hungai'y, at last, we see a chance for
multiparty competition at the ballot
box.

As President, I will continue to
do all I can to help open the closed
societies of the East. We seek self-
determination for all of Germany and
all of Eastern Europe. We will not re-
lax, and we must not waiver. Again, the
world has waited long enough.

But democracy's journey East is
not easy. Intellectuals like the great
Czech playwright Vaclav Havel still
work under the shadow of coercion. Re-
pression still menaces too many peo-
ples of Eastern Europe. Barriers and
barbed wire still fence in nations. So
when I visit Poland and Hungary this
summer, I will deliver this message:
There cannot be a common European
home until all within it are free to
move from room to room. And I'll take
another message: The path of freedom
leads to a larger home — a home where
West meets East, a democratic home —
the commonwealth of
free nations.

I said that positive steps by the So-
viets would be met by steps of our own.
This is why I announced on May 12th a
readiness to consider granting to the
Soviets a temporary waiver of the
Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions, if
they liberalize emigration. This is also
why I announced, on Monday, that the
United States is prepared to drop the
"no-exceptions" standard that has
guided our approach to controlling the
export of technology to the Soviet
Union — lifting a sanction enacted in
response to their invasion of
Afghanistan.

Proposals for a Whole
and Free Europe

In this same spirit, I set forth four pro-
posals to heal Europe's tragic division,
to help Europe become whole and free.

First. I propose we strengthen and
broaden the Helsinki process to pro-
mote free elections and political plural-
ism in Eastern Europe. As the foi'ces
of freedom and democracy rise in the
East, so should our expectations.

And weaving together the slender
threads of freedom in the East will
require much from the Western de-
mocracies. In particular, the great po-
litical parties of the West must assume
a historic responsibility — to lend coun-
sel and support to those brave men and
women who are trying to form the first

truly representative political parties in
the East, to advance freedom and de-
mocracy, to part the Iron Curtain.

In fact, it's already begun to part.
The frontier of barbed wire and mine-
fields between Hungary and Austria is
being removed, foot by foot, mile by
mile. Just as the barriers are coming
down in Hungary, so must they fall
throughout all of Eastern Europe.
Let Berlin be next.

Second. Nowhere is the division
between East and West seen more
clearly than in Berlin. There this bru-
tal wall cuts neighbor from neighbor,
brother from brother. That wall stands
as a monument to the failure of commu-
nism. It must come down.

Now, glasnost may be a Russian
word, but openness is a Western con-
cept. West Berlin has always enjoyed
the openness of a free city. Our pro-
posal would make all Berlin a center of
commerce between East and West — a
place of cooperation, not a point of con-
frontation. And we rededicate our-
selves to the 1987 allied initiative to
strengthen freedom and security in
that divided city. This, then is my
second proposal — bring glasnost to
East Berlin.

Third. My generation remembers a

Europe ravaged by war. And, of
course, Europe has long since rebuilt
its proud cities and restored its majes-
tic cathedrals. But what a tragedy it
would be if your continent was again
spoiled, this time by a more subtle and
insidious danger — the Chancellor [Hel-
mut Kohl] referred to it — that of poi-
soned rivers and acid rain.

America has faced an environmen-
tal tragedy in Alaska. Countries from
France to Finland suffered after Cher-
nobyl. West Germany is struggling to
save the Black Forest today. And
throughout, we have all learned a terri-
ble lesson — environmental destruction
respects no borders. So my third pro-
posal is to work together on these envi-
ronmental problems, with the United
States and Western Europe extending
a hand to the East. Since much remains
to be done in both East and West, we
ask Eastern Europe to join us in this
common struggle. We can offer techni-
cal training, assistance in drafting
laws and regulations, and new technol-
ogies for tackling these awesome prob-
lems. And I invite the environmental-
ists and engineers of the East to visit
the West, to share knowledge so we can
succeed in this great cause.

Fourth. My fourth proposal —
actually, a set of proposals — concerns a
less militarized Europe, the most
heavily armed continent in the world.
Nowhere is this more important than
in the two Germanys. And that's why
our quest to safely reduce armaments
has a special significance for the Ger-
man people.

To those who are impatient with
our measured pace in arms reductions,
I respectfully suggest that history
teaches us a lesson — that unity and
strength are the catalyst and prerequi-
site to arms control. We've always be-
lieved that a strong Western defense is
the best road to peace. Forty years of
experience have proven us right.

But we've done more than just keep
the peace. By standing together, we
have convinced the Soviets that their
arms buildup has been costly and
pointless. Let us not give them incen-
tives to return to the policies of the
past. Let us give them every reason to
abandon the arms race for the sake of
the human race.

In this era of both negotiation and
armed camps, America understands
that West Germany bears a special bur-
den. Of course, in this nuclear age, ev-
ery nation is on the front line. But not
all free nations are called to endure the
tension of regular military activity, or
the constant presence of foreign mili-
tary forces. We are sensitive to these
special conditions that this needed
presence imposes.

To significantly ease the burden of
armed camps in Europe, we must be
aggressive in our pursuit of solid, veri-
fiable agreements between NATO and
the Warsaw Pact. On Monday, with my
NATO colleagues in Brussels, I shared
my great hope for the future of conven-
tional arms negotiations in Europe. I
shared with them a proposal for achiev-
ing significant reductions in the near
future.

As you know, the Warsaw Pact has
now accepted major elements of our
Western approach to the new conven-
tional arms negotiations in Vienna. The
Eastern bloc acknowledges that a sub-
stantial imbalance exists between the
conventional forces of the two alliances.
And they've moved closer to NATO's
position by accepting most elements of
our initial conventional arms proposal.
These encouraging steps have pro-
duced the opportunity for creative and
decisive action, and we shall not let
that opportunity pass.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

Our proposal has several key initia-
tives. I propose that we "lock in" the
Eastern agreement to Western-
proposed ceilings on tanks and ar-
mored troop carriers. We should also
seek an agreement on a common nu-
merical ceiling for artillery in the
range between NATO's and that of the
Warsaw Pact, provided these defini-
tional problems can be solved. And the
weapons we remove must be destroyed.

We should expand our current offer
to include all land-based combat air-
craft and helicopters, by proposing
that both sides reduce in these catego-
ries to a level 15% below the current
NATO totals. Given the Warsaw Pact's
advantage in numbers, the pact would
have to make far deeper reductions
than NATO to establish parity at those
lower levels. Again, the weapons we re-
move must be destroyed.

I propose a 20% cut in combat man-
power in U.S. -stationed forces, and a
resulting ceiling on U.S. and Soviet
ground and air forces stationed outside
national territory in the Atlantic-to-
the-Urals zone, at approximately
275,000 each. This reduction to parity,
a fair and balanced level of
strength, would compel the Soviets to
reduce their 600,000-strong Red army
in Eastern Europe by 325,000. And
these withdrawn forces must be
demobilized.

And finally, I call on President
Gorbachev to accelerate the timetable
for reaching these agreements. There
is no reason why the 5-6 year timetable
as suggested by Moscow is necessary. I
propose a much more ambitious sched-
ule. We should aim to reach an agree-
ment within 6 months to 1 year and
accomplish reductions by 1992 or 1993
at the latest.

In addition to my conventional
arms proposals, I believe that we ought
to strive to improve the openness with
which we and the Soviets conduct our
military activities. Therefore, I want
to reiterate my support for greater
transparency. I renew my proposal that
the Soviet Union and its allies open
their skies to reciprocal, unarmed aeri-
al surveillance flights, conducted on
short notice, to watch military activ-
ities. Satellites are a very important
way to verify arms control agreements.
But they do not provide constant cover-
age of the Soviet Union. An "open-
skies" policy would move both sides
closer to a total continuity of coverage,
while symbolizing greater openness be-
tween East and West.

These are my proposals to achieve
a less militarized Europe. A short time
ago, they would have been too revolu-
tionary to consider. And yet today, we
may well be on the verge of a more am-
bitious agreement in Europe than any-
one considered possible.

But we are also challenged by de-
velopments outside NATO's traditional
areas of concern. Every Western nation
still faces the global proliferation of le-
thal technologies, including ballistic
missiles and chemical weapons. We
must collectively control the spread of
these growing threats. So we should
begin as soon as possible with a world-
wide ban on chemical weapons.

Conclusion

Growing political freedom in the East,
a Berlin without barriers, a cleaner en-
vironment, a less militarized Europe —
each is a noble goal, and taken together
they are the foundation of our larger
vision — a Europe that is free and at
peace with itself. Let the Soviets know
that our goal is not to undermine their
legitimate security interests; our goal
is to convince them, step by step, that
their definition of security is obsolete,
that their deepest fears are unfounded.

When Western Europe takes its gi-
ant step in 1992, it will institutionalize
what's been true for years — borders
open to people, commerce, and ideas.
No shadow of suspicion, no sinister fear
is cast between you. The very prospect
of war within the West is unthinkable
to our citizens. But such a peaceful in-
tegration of nations into a world com-
munity does not mean that any nation
must relinquish its culture much less
its sovereignty.

This process of integration, a sub-
tle weaving of shared interests, which
is so nearly complete in Western Eu-
rope, has now finally begun in the
East. We want to help the nations of
Eastern Europe realize what we, the
nations of Western Europe, learned
long ago. The foundation of lasting se-
curity comes, not from tanks, troops,
or barbed wire; it is built on shared
values and agreements that link free
peoples.

The nations of Eastern Europe are
rediscovering the glories of their na-
tional heritage. So let the colors and
hues of national culture return to these
gray societies of the East. Let Europe
forego a peace of tension for a peace of
trust, one in which the peoples of the
East and West can rejoice; a continent
that is diverse, yet whole.

Forty years of cold war have tested
Western resolve and the strength of our
values. NATO's first mission is now
nearly complete. But if we are to fulfill
our vision — our European vision — the
challenges of the next 40 years will ask
no less of us. Together, we shall answer
the call. The world has waited long
enough.

Thank you for inviting me to
Mainz. May God bless you all. Long live
the friendship between Germany and
the United States.

Remarks and

Question-and-Answer

Session,
London,
June 1,198912

President Bush

Let me just thank the Prime Minister
on behalf of our entire traveling squad.
She and I talked in detail about a wide
array of issues. I want to thank her,
and I want to assert here that the spe-
cial relationship that has existed be-
tween the United Kingdom and the
United States is continuing and will
continue. Once again. Madam Prime
Minister, iny sincere thanks to you for
a very encouraging and frank exchange
that we had. It's only with friends that
you can take off the gloves and talk
from the heart. I felt that I was with a
friend today, and I can assure the peo-
ple in the United Kingdom that, from
our side of the Atlantic, this relation-
ship is strong and will continue to be.

Prime IVIinister Thatcher

The President comes here after a very,
very successful NATO summit due to
the leadership of the United States un-
der the Presidency of George Bush. We
talked about the followup to these mat-
ters. We talked also about the very dif-
ficult situation in the Middle East. We
talked about the situation in China. We
talked about matters in South Africa.
And we have talked about matters in
the Argentine and in Central America.

I think you'll agree we have cov-
ered an extremely wide range of sub-
jects, and yet the morning has been too
short. We spoke together for about an
hour and three-quarters and then
joined our foreign ministers and Mr.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

Scowcroft [Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs]. They,
too, had considered some of these mat-
ters and others. We then also talked
about the problems in Cambodia and
the problems with the Vietnamese boat
people still going to Hong Kong.

So, you can see that we have com-
pressed a great deal into the time. We
think very much the same way, which
isn't surprising. We're absolutely de-
lighted that we have in President Bush
a President of the United States who is
staunch and steadfast on everything
which is of fundamental value to democ-
racy, freedom, and justice — necessary
to keep our country secure and yet for-
ever stretching out the hand of friend-
ship with other nations across the
European divide, trying to e.xtend to
the world some of the benefits which we
enjoy but take for granted.

We are in a period when, as the
President has said in some of his most
e.xcellent speeches, it's the end of con-
tainment. It's freedom on the
offensive — a peaceful offensive —
throughout the world. I think they
have been some of the most valuable
and happy talks I've had for a very long
time, and we thank and congratulate
the President.

Q. Is Britain America's most im-
portant ally in Europe?

Prime Minister Thatcher. I think
you might put it more tactfully.
[Laughter] America has allies through-
out Europe and throughout the free
world. I would like to think that we
pride ourselves being among the fore-
most of U.S. friends, and we will al-
ways be. I think it's quite wrong, that
because you have one friend, you should
e.xclude the possibility of other friend-
ships as well. And I'm sure the Presi-
dent doesn't, and I don't. We both have
many friends in Europe.

President Bush. Very good
answer.

Q. Do you think that West Ger-
many and France will increasingly
share the spotlight in the so-called
special relationship you have with
Mrs. Thatcher?

President Bush. I think that the
special relationship that I referred to
in my opening remarks speaks for it-
self. And I think the remarks that the
Prime Minister just made about U.K.'s
propensity for friendship with other na-
tions and the U.S. friendship with oth-
er nations — those remarks speak for
themselves. I would simply say, I ex-
pect this relationship to continue on
the steady keel because it is so funda-
mentally based on common values. The

Prime Minister Thatcher and the President.

NATO alliance, for example, is not
going to divide up into inside cliques of
who is the closest friend to whom.

But the point I want to make here
is that I value the judgment, the con-
viction, the principled stance of Prime
Minister Thatcher I've been privileged
to know her and work with her in a — for
me, a lesser capacity, for 8 years. This
visit alone, as we crossed many, many
borders and discussed the problems,
reassures me and just reaffirms what
I've always felt: that we have a very,
very special relationship. But it needn't
be at the expense of our friendship
with other countries.

Q. What exactly can Britain do
to bring about this further freedom in
Eastern Europe that you said you
want to see?

President Bush. They've already
done one step, and that is to help NATO
come out with a very sound proposal. I
can tell you that the Prime Minister
and her able Foreign Minister [Sir
Geoffrey Howe] helped shape this
whole NATO proposal, which both of us
think is a very forward-looking docu-
ment, adhering to principles. It's not a
question of the future; they've already
performed since I've been here in the
last few days a very useful role. There
are many other areas where, just on a
bilateral basis, that I'm sure the Unit-

ed Kingdom can influence and encour-
age this trend to democracy that the
Prime Minister referred to — many oth-
er areas. The United Kingdom is wide-
ly respected in Eastern Europe.

Secretary Baker's
News Briefing,
London,
June 1,198913

Let me just briefly say that the Presi-
dent's meetings with Prime Minister
Thatcher marked the end of a success-
ful week of consultation with all allies.
The President thanked the Prime Min-
ister for her steadfast support of our
Central American policies, for her work
to move the Angola-Namibia accords
along successfully to keep the agree-
ment in Namibia from unraveling, the
excellent work that she did when she
was in southern Africa, and the con-
cern that she and her government have
shown for the United States with re-
spect to the tragedy of PanAm #103.

THE PRESIDENT

In addition, the President and the
Prime Minister discussed matters in-
volving fbllowup on the conventional
forces initiative that the President pre-
sented at the NATO summit. They dis-
cussed Eastern Europe with reference
particularly to the President's speech
in Mainz. They discussed the situation
in China. They discussed the Middle
East, particularly the situation in the
occupied territories, and they dis-
cussed the problem.s presented by the
influx of Vietnamese boat people to
Hong Kong.

Q. I wonder if you could give us
an idea of the problems, or at least
the difficulties, that are ahead in the
troop reduction arrangement. There
have been suggestions — storing — the
West prestores a lot of equipment.
There are other problems about
whether the FVench and British
troops — but I'd like your version of
what are the difficult things ahead.

A. There are questions involving
verification. There are questions, in-
deed, involving stored equipment.
There are questions, obviously, involv-
ing the extent to which troops must be
demobilized and deactivated. All of
these things have first got to be sorted
out within the NATO alliance so that
the alliance is able to table a specific
proposal at the resumption of the dis-
cussions in Vienna on September 7th.
Both the Prime Minister and the Presi-
dent focused on the importance of con-
tinuing to move the debate within
NATO along so that the alliance will be
ready to table a position on
September —

Q. Is the President's timetable
still feasible, or is it very optimistic —
about () months —

A. It hasn't changed from the way
I characterized it yesterday, which, it
was optimistic but not unrealistic. I
think that's a fair statement. The first
thing, as I indicated before, that we
have to do is formalize the alliance po-
sition on this initiative. We have to
work that out within the context of the
NATO alliance and within the organi-
zation at Brussels.

Q. You spoke about this being the
end of a week of successful consulta-
tions. Does this have any impact on
(ieorge Hush's presidency in view of
all the criticism that he had had be-
fore he came here about being too
cautious and too timid in terms of
dealing with the Soviet Union?

A. I would hope that it might put
to rest some of that speculation. It is
important, I think, that an American
President be seen to be leading the alli-
ance. I would respectfully submit that
the President was seen actively and ag-
gressively and effectively leading the
NATO alliance during the course of
this week.

Q. I gather that Mrs. Thatcher
was rather unhappy with the fact
that we still have some military aid
going to the Argentinians. Was that
the only area that you had contention
at your meetings today? And if so, do
you see any way that can be resolved?

A. There really was not contention
with respect to that. The matter of Ar-
gentina remains important to the
Prime Minister. She expressed her ap-
preciation for our willingness to work
closely with the United Kingdom and to
consult with them with respect to the
modest amounts of military aid that
have been suggested for Argentina. I
would not characterize that as a matter
of contention.

Q. The United States and Great
Britain have always had a special re-
lationship. Do you expect that to
change at all in 1992 when they join
Europe more fully in the open
market?

A. No, I don't expect it to change.
I think that the special relationship be-
tween the United States and the Unit-
ed Kingdom is strong, it is enduring, it
is based on a number of things. But we
have been close friends and allies for
many, many years, and I don't think
that's going to be diminished as a con-
sequence of EC 1992. It has not been
diminished as a consequence of NATO
and other multilateral organizations in
which both countries are parties.

Q. The President spoke a lot
about Eastern Europe yesterday, in
both the communique and the com-
prehensive concept also did. Is this
signaling a new intention to step up
the U.S. role in Eastern Europe, or
an attempt to shape events there?

A. I think it's important that we
recognize — and this is w'hat the Presi-
dent's speech did, in my view — that
there is fundamental change taking-
place in some countries in Eastern Eu-
rope. We must be able to properly man-
age our response to that change. What
the President called for, of course, was
to end the division of Europe on the ba-
sis of Western values. That means that

we must be responsive to those coun-
tries that are trying to open up both
economically and politically. It does not
mean that we should abandon our poli-
cy of differentiation.

Q. [Former Defense] Secretary
Carlucci, before he left office, recom-
mended a follow-on to the Lance sys-
tem called the MLRS [multiple-
launch rocket system]. Will this Ad-
ministration carry through with that
decision by Secretary Carlucci, or are
you going to go back and rethink the
MLRS system as a follow-on to
Lance?

A. That's a decision that has not,
as yet, been formally taken by the
President. He will have to consider that
as one possibility, as one option. He
may decide that he wants to consider
some other options as well. But now we
have a situation where the questions on
production and deployment are deci-
sions that will be made in calendar vear
1992.

Q. You said the other day in an-
swer to a question that the Presi-
dent's proposal at NATO did not
amount to an abandonment of his
policy review. It was not a signal of
dis-appointment with it, indeed, that
the discussions about this sort of pro-
posal dated way back to the early
days of the Administration. I wonder
if you could elaborate on that further
and give us some further description
of the steps that were taken that pro-
duced this.

A. I can't elaborate much beyond
what I said. I perhaps could clear up
something that I think might have been
misinterpreted. What I said was that
this proposal was not initially devel-
oped within the bureaucracies — and
that is true.

It was ultimately, however, run by
the bureaucracies before the President
finally signed off on it. The President
himself suggested the idea that we ex-
plore this as a possibility early on in
the Administration —

Q. You say "this." What do you
mean by "this?"

A. The conventional forces initia-
tive or something like it — something
like this conventional forces initiative
that he has put forward — his CPI, if
you want to call it that — his Conven-
tional Paritv Initiative.

Department of State Bulletin/August 198S

THE PRESIDENT

Q. Did the Prime Minister ex-
press objections or reservations to
even the modest sale of arms to Ar-
gentina by the United States?

A. I think that the Prime
Minister — as I tried to put it a moment
ago — is very a])preciative of the fact
that we consult very, very closely with
the United Kindgom with respect to
any proposed sales of arms to
Argentina. -

Q. But did she specifically object |
to any sales? p

A. Not that I am aware of, no. ^

Q. Can you tell us when, exactly, s
it was decided to table this proposal — -|
I mean, not to table it. but when it I

was decided that this was the pro- i

posal you were going to make? Be- |
cause when you said the other day
that this is something you've been
talking about for months — the gener-
al concept — I was given to believe
that that's exactly what you meant —
the general concept. When did this —

A. Yes, I did mean the general
concept.

Q. When did this come into play
as a real-life proposal that you could
actually make here? Was it in the last
3 weeks? Can you just tell us —

A. Probably the final shape of it
would have been in the last 3 weeks,
yes.

Q. .•Xnd whose idea was it
initially?

A. It was the President's idea.

Q. He said he'd like to cut forces
in Europe and 1.5% of the aircraft?

A. He said, "I would like to look at
something in this area." There were a
whole host of things that were initially
looked at. But then, it was important to
the President, as he has said before,
that this have a complete and thorough
scrub by the military to make certain
that it was militarily appropriate and
sound and made good sense from a mili-
tary standpoint. And that's what
happened.

Q. Was this after your trip to
Moscow when you got the inklings of
what kind of response they were
going to have to the NATO proposal?

A. The President's final sign-off
came after my trip to Moscow.

The President and Mrs. Bush were guests lor lunch with Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth
II and His Royal Highness Prince Philip at Buckingham Palace.

Q. Was the major part of the de-
velopment of the initiative after the
trip to Moscow?

A. It's hard to say, but if I had to
say, the major part probably. Although
I have to tell you that this is something
that the President had an interest in
going way, way back. And it was dis-
cussed among his top advisers — all of
his top advisers.

Q. Soviet Foreign Minister Shev-
ardnadze has said in Paris that the
Soviets would demand a withdrawal
of French and British troops from
West Germany, as well as a condition
for acceptance of the 275,000 troop
level. What is your reaction to that,
and what was Mrs. Thatcher's reac-
tion to that?

A. I'm not sure that that was spe-
cifically discussed with the Prime Min-
ister. I didn't hear that as an item of
specific discussion. But my reaction to
that is there are a lot of Warsaw Pact
troops in there, too, that are not in-
cluded in this poposal. This is a U.S.-
Soviet proposal to the extent that it in-
volves manpower.

With respect to the other
elements — aircraft, helicopters, tanks,
artillery, and armored personnel
carriers — it's Warsaw Pact to Warsaw
Pact.

Q. Can we fine tune that? You re-
member the problem with intermedi-
ate range. The U.S. argument was,
look, this is U.S. -Soviet. We're not re-
sponsible for German missiles, and

you had to work out kind of a special
deal. Are you saying now that there
will be sort of two-level negotiations?
Troops will not be a NATO—

A. No, no, I'm not saying it will be
negotiated that way, but I'm answering
the question about — that the minister
has said we want to see what happens
to French and British troops. I suppose
we will have an interest in knowing
what happens to other Warsaw Pact
troops other than Soviet troops. But
the negotiation will take place within
the alliance.

Q. I note some insecurity on the
part of Britain; this major concentra-
tion on the special relationship. Are
the British afraid that we are — it's a
"mirror, mirror on the wall, who do
you love the most?" Are they afraid —

A. I didn't notice a special concen-
tration. I noticed one question at a
press conference.

Q. The President emphasized it,
and the British reporters seem to
think there is something —

A. The President emphasized it in
response to a question about it, and
what he said was there is a special rela-
tionship. He told the Prime Minister
this, by the way, during the course of
their discussions. It is something that
we talk about all the time in bilateral
discussions with respresentatives of the
United Kingdom, because it is there.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

Q. But is it a worry?

A. It's not a worry as far as we're
concerned, and I don't think it's a wor-
ry as far as the United Kingdom is
concerned.

Q. You spoke earlier about the
need to have further discussions with-
in NATO before a full conventional
forces proposal can be tabled. Is there
a timetable now about how long that's
likelv to take, and what the process
will be?

A. As I think I may have said ear-
lier, we would like to see that process
completed by the 7th of September so
that when the conventional forces talks
reconvene in Vienna on that date, we
will be able to table a specific
proposal — a proposal that will have
been fleshed out to the extent that the
questions^some of which have come up
here today — will have been resolved.
There are questions that have to be re-
solved. We're shooting at September
7th.

Q. Was there any discussion with
the Prime Minister about the possible
withdrawal of some U.S. troops from
Britain and also any discussion about
British dual-capable aircraft being —

A. There w-as no discussion about
the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Bri-
tain, but there was a discussion with
respect to the question of dual-capable
aircraft. The President indicated to the
Prime Minister that it is not his inten-
tion in advancing this initiative that it
involve the dual-capable aircraft of the
United Kingdom or France.

I might say that the reservations of
each of those countries in this regard
had been expressed to us during the
course of our prior consultations with
those countries about this initiative.
We think that the aircraft element in
the proposal can be accomplished with-
out getting into the dual-capable air-
craft of the United Kingdom or France.

Q. The British Government
wants the principle accepted by the
international community that the
boat people could, if necessary, be
sent back against their will to Viet-
nam. They want this principle to be
accepted at the international confer-
ence in Geneva next month. The Unit-
ed States has been against this
principle until now. I gather it was
discussed today. Can you tell us if
that is still your position?

A. Yes, it is still the position of the
United States; that is, that we support
the right of first asylum, and we also
support freedom of choice where refu-
gees are concerned. We are talking, of
course, about political refugees. There
will be a discussion in Vienna on the
13th and 14th of June, and this matter
will come up and be discussed further.
But the position of the United States is
as you have stated it and as I have just
repeated it.

Q. [Foreign Minister] Shev-
ardnadze is saying that your timeta-
ble is too fast, that they can't move
that fast. Do you think that the Presi-
dent has managed to put the shoe on
the other foot, so to speak? Do you
think that the Soviets are on the de-
fensive here and that you have put the
President on the offensive?

A. I don't know about that. I'm not
going to get into that. I do think this —

Q. What's your reaction to what
he said?

A. I do think this, that the dynam-
ics now are that the ball is in their
court and a response by them is now
clearly called for, and it will be inter-
esting to see exactly what that re-
sponse is.

Q. This is his response, and he's
saying you're trying to go too fast.
What's your answer to that?

A. No, no, this is not his response.
This may be a preliminary part of his
response, but my answer to that is
that, yes, this is an optimistic timeta-
ble, but it is not an unrealistic timeta-
ble, particularly if we have cooperation
from the Soviet Union.

Q. We were told you discussed the
Middle East with Mrs. Thatcher to-
day. What in your opinion, if any-
thing, is there that Britain can do
about the Middle East? When Mr.
Shamir was here recently, he was
very upset about the speech you made
in America. But what, in your opin-
ion, can Britain do that the Soviet
Union and the United States can't do
together.

A. I think that the United King-
dom, and other countries in Europe for
that matter, can join the United
States — and maybe there can be a Sovi-
et component in this — in supporting
Prime Minister Shamir's proposal for
elections in the West Bank as a means
to get into a broader political negotia-
tion. And it's in that context that the
Prime Minister advanced his elections
proposals.

I frankly believe, following these
discussions here today, that there is
some chance that we will see — well, I
know there's more than some chance —
we will have the active support of the
United Kingdom in trying to use the
concept of elections to move the peace
process forward in the Middle East.

Q. You are totally for that elec-
tion proposal? You are for it,
absolutely?

A. Oh, yes, as I have said, we are
totally for it. We think it offers the best
chance to move the peace process
forward.

Arrival Remarks,
New Hampshire,
June 2, 1989i'»

In the last week, Barbara and I have
been to Rome and the Vatican,
Brussels, Bonn, and London, and work-
ing with our allies in Europe, we set a
course for the future. We must move to
fulfill that promise — move beyond con-
tainment, move beyond the era of con-
flict and cold war that the world has
known for more than 40 years — because
keeping the peace in Europe means
keeping the peace for America. Our al-
liance seeks a less militarized
Europe — a safer world for all of us.

I'm now returning from Europe
with a message for the American
people — a message of hope. We have a
great and historic opportunity to shape
the changes that are transforming Eu-
rope. This chance has been delivered
not just because of our strength and re-
solve but also because of our power of
ideas, especially one idea which is
sweeping the communist world —
democracy.

For the last 6 weeks, I've pre-
sented, in a series of speeches, ways to
deal with these changes to make the
most of this opportunity. Let me
summarize.

In Michigan [April 17], I stressed
that the United States will actively en-
courage peaceful reform led by the
forces of freedom in Eastern Europe.
The Texas speech [May 12] explains
America's commitment to a balanced
approach to our relationship with the
Soviet Union — that we must remain

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

strong and realistic, judge their
performance, not their rhetoric, all the
while seeking a friendship with the So-
viets that knows no season of suspicion.
At Boston University [May 21], the fo-
cus was our partnership with a more
united Western Europe — of how a
strong Europe means a strong Ameri-
ca. Then at the Coast Guard Academy
[May 24], I said that America is ready
to seize every — and I do mean every —
opportunity to bring the Soviet Union
into the community of nations.

Then with my colleagues in
Brussels, on the 40th anniversary of
the founding of the North Atlantic alli-
ance, we celebrated NATO's 40 years of
success in preserving the peace in
Europe — the longest period without
war in all the recorded history of that
continent.

We were reminded that once again,
the future of so many nations depends
on NATO's unity and resolve. We were
reminded that NATO must remain
strong and together, and we were chal-
lenged to seize this new opportunity for
progress while staying true to the
principles that got us here.

We met that challenge. We agreed
to strive — to hope for a Europe that is
whole and free. At the Rheingoldhalle
in Mainz in the heart of Germany, I
said that the cold war began with the
division of Europe, and it must end
with a reconciliation based on shared
values where East joins West in a com-
monwealth of free nations.

That is my vision for the future,
and here is how we got there. The War-
saw Pact has a lot more planes, a lot
more arms, a lot more troops in Europe
than the NATO alliance, and we chal-
lenge the Soviets, if they are serious,
to reduce to equal numbers. Our pro-
posal is bold but fundamentally fair,
and every single one of our allies
agreed with our proposal.

We proposed a new initiative for
more comprehensive and faster negoti-
ated cuts in conventional arms to lift
the West at last from the shadow cast
over Europe since 1945 by massive So-
viet ground and air forces, and our al-
lies agreed. We proposed that Berlin,
East and West, become a center of co-
operation, not confrontation, and our
allies agreed. We proposed that we
strengthen the Helsinki process to sup-

port free elections in Eastern Europe,
and our allies agreed.

Because the threat of environmen-
tal destruction knows no borders, we
proposed that the West enlist the coun-
tries of Eastern Europe in one of the
great causes of our time — the common
struggle to save our natural heritage.

With our agreement in NATO on
our short-range nuclear forces in Eu-
rope, we demonstrated as an alliance
that we can manage change while re-
maining true to the strategy of deter-
rence which has kept the peace.

In short, this week's NATO sum-
mit in Brussels showed that we are
ready to help shape a new world. In
this period of historic change, NATO
has never been more united, never been
stronger, and we issued a summit dec-
laration detailing our vision for the fu-
ture and plan of action. Ours is not an
arrogant challenge to Mr. Gorbachev;
it's an appeal in good fath. The summit
was a triumph for the alliance, a tri-
umph of ideas, and, most of all, it was a
triumph of hope.

Let me say it is truly gratifying
that all of this was understood so well
at home and abroad. While keeping our
defenses up and our eyes wide open, we
must go forward. We must stay on the
offensive. We must get to work now to
end the cold war. The world has waited
long enough, and if we succeed, the
world your children will know — the
world of the 21st century — will be all
the better.

We are delighted to be here. I sa-
lute the men and women of Pease Air
Force Base, who help keep the peace. I
thank my friends and neighbors from
New Hampshire, and 1 even spot a few
from Kennebunkport, Maine, here. I
thank the two governors and the mem-
bers of the U.S. Congress who came
out to greet us, and I particularly
thank a former governor of the State of
New Hampshire standing over here,
my able chief of staff, John Sununu; our
Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney; our
Secretary of State, Jim Baker; and my
very able friend and adviser, the head
of the National Security Council, Gen.
Brent Scowcroft.

Barbara and I are overwhelmed by
this welcome home. Thank you all. God
bless you, and God bless the United
States of America.

'Made at Andrews Air Force Base (text
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of May 29, 1989).

-Made at Ciampino Airport (text from
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu-
ments of June 5).

^Made at the Villa Madama (text from
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu-
ments of June 5).

■•Interview by Garrick Utley, NBC
News; Robert Kaiser, The Washington Post;
and Albert Hunt, The Wall Street Journal
(press release 100 of May 30).

^Made at Brussels International Airport
(text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents of June 5).

i^Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of June .5.

"France takes this opportunity to recall
that, since the mandate for the Vienna nego-
tiations excludes nuclear weapons, it retains
complete freedom of judgment and decision
regarding the resources contributing to the
implementation of its independent nuclear
deterrent strategy.

spress release 101.

^Held in the Chancellery. Chancellor
Kohl spoke in German, and his remarks
were translated by an interpreter (text
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of June 5).

•"Held in the Meritin Hotel (press re-
lease 102 of May ;31).

"Made before citizens of Mainz at Rhe-
ingoldhalle (text from Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents of June 5).

i^Held at 10 Downing Street after their
meeting (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of June 5).

'^Held at the Royal Lancaster Hotel
(press release 107 of June 6).

"Made at Pease Air Force Base (text
from Weekly Compilaton of Presidential
Documents of June 12). ■

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

News Conferences of June 5 and 8
(Excerpts)

President Bush held news confer-
ences at the White House on June 5
andS, 1989.''

JUNE 5, 1989

During the past few days, elements of
the Chinese Army have been brutally
suppressing popular and peaceful dem-
onstrations in China. There has been
widespread and continuing violence,
many casualties, and many deaths. We
deplore the decision to use force, and I
now call on the Chinese leadership pub-
licly, as I have in private channels, to
avoid violence and to return to their
previous policy of restraint.

The demonstrators in Tiananmen
Square were advocating basic human
rights, including the freedom of ex-
pression, freedom of the press, free-
dom of association. These are goals we
support around the world. These are
freedoms that are enshrined in both
the U.S. Constitution and the Chinese
Constitution. Throughout the world, we
stand with those who seek greater
freedom and democracy. This is the
strongly felt view of my Administra-
tion, of our Congress, and, most impor-
tant, of the American people.

In recent weeks we've urged mutu-
al restraint, nonviolence, and dialogue.
Instead, there has been a violent and
bloody attack on the demonstrators.
The United States cannot condone the
violent attacks and cannot ignore the
consequences for our relationship with
China, which has been built on a foun-
dation of broad support by the Ameri-
can people. This is not the time for an
emotional response but for a reasoned,
careful action that takes into account
both our long-term interests and recog-
nition of a comple.x internal situation in
China.

There clearly is turmoil within the
ranks of the political leadership, as
well as the Peoples Liberation Army.
Now is the time to look beyond the mo-
ment to important and enduring as-
pects of this vital relationship for the
United States. Indeed, the budding of
democracy which we have seen in re-
cent weeks owes much to the relation-
ship we have developed since 1972. It's
im])ortant at this time to act in a way
that will encourage the further devel-
opment and deepening of the positive
elements of that relationship and the

process of democratization. It would be
a tragedy for all if China were to pull
back to its pre-1972 era of isolation and
repression.

Mindful of these complexities, and
yet of the necessity to strongly and
clearly express our condemnation of the
events of recent days, I am ordering
the following actions: Suspension of all
government-to-government sales and
commercial exports of weapons, sus-
pension of visits between U.S. and Chi-
nese military leaders, sympathetic
review of requests by Chinese students
in the United States to extend their
stay, and the offer of humanitarian and
medical assistance through the Red
Cross to those injured during the as-
sault, and review of other aspects of
our bilateral relationship as events in
China continue to unfold.

The process of democratization of
communist societies will not be a
smooth one, and we must react to set-
backs in a way which stimulates rather
than stifles progress toward open and
representative systems.

Q. You have said the genie of de-
mocracy cannot be put back in the
bottle in China. You said that, how-
ever, before the actions of the past
weekend. Do you still believe that?
And are there further steps that the
United States could take, such as eco-
nomic sanctions, to further democra-
cy in China?

A. Yes, I still believe that. I be-
lieve the forces of democracy are so
powerful, and when you see them as re-
cently as this morning — a single stu-
dent standing in front of a tank, and
then, I might add, seeing the tank driv-
er exercise restraint — I am convinced
that the forces of democracy are going
to overcome these unfortunate events
in Tiananmen Square.

On the commercial side, I don't
want to hurt the Chinese people. I haji-
pen to believe that the commercial con-
tacts have led, in essence, to this quest
for more freedom. I think as people
have commercial incentive, whether it's
in China or in other totalitarian sys-
tems, the move to democracy becomes
more inexorable. So what we've done is
suspended certain things on the mili-
tary side, and my concern is with those
in the military who are using force.
And yet when 1 see some exercising re-
straint and see the big divisions that

exist inside the PLA [People's Libera-
tion Army], I think we need to move
along the lines I've outlined here. I
think that it's important to keep saying
to those elements in the Chinese mili-
tary, "Restraint: Continue to show the
restraint that many of you have
shown." I understand there are deep
divisions inside the army. So this is,
we're putting the emphasis on that side
of it.

Q. Have you had any personal
contact with the Chinese leadership?
Why do you think they moved in the
way they did? And why did you wait so
long?

A. I don't think we've waited so
long. I made very clear, in a personal
communication to Deng Xiaoping
[Chairman of China's Central Military
Commission], my views on this. I
talked to the [U.S.] Ambassador last
night, .Jim Lilley. He's been in touch
constantly with the Chinese officials,
and so, I don't feel that we've waited
long, when you have a force of this na-
ture and you have events of this nature
unfolding. We are the United States
and they are China, and what I want to
do is continue to urge freedom, democ-
racy, respect, nonviolence, and with
great admiration in my heart for the
students. So, I don't think we've waited
long.

Q. What impelled the Chinese
Government? They did wait a long
time, more than we expected, really,
and —

A. Yes, they did.

Q. — then they finally moved in.
What do you think is the impetus?

A. I'm glad you raised that point.
We were, and have been, and will con-
tinue to urge restraint, and they did.
The army did show restraint. When
Wan Li [Chairman, Standing Commit-
tee, National People's Congress] was
here [May 23], he told me — and this is
very Chinese, the way he expressed
it — the army loves the Chinese
people. They showed restraint for a
long time, and I can't begin to fathom
for you exactly what led to the order to
use force, because even as recently as a
couple of days ago, there was evidence
that the military were under orders not
to use force. So I think we have to wait
now until that unfolds.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

Q. Could you give us your cur-
rent, best assessment of the political
situation there; which leaders are up,
which are down, who apparently has
prevailed here, and who apparently
das lost?

A. It's too obscure, it's too be-

louded to say. And I would remind you
Df the history. In the Cultural Revolu-
tion days, Deng Xiaoping at Mao
Zedong's right hand, was put out. He

ame back in 1976. He was put out
igain in the last days of Mao Zedong
ind the days of the Gang of Four. Then
16 came back in, and, to his credit, he
noved China toward openness, toward
iemocracy, toward reform. Suddenly
ve see a reversal. I don't think there's
inybody in this country that can an-
swer your question with authority at

his point. It doesn't work that way in
lealing with China.

Q. But there have been reports
hat Deng was behind the move to or-
ler the troops, and other reports that
le's ailing and in a hospital. What do
'ou know about that?

A. Don't know for sure on either,
ind I've talked to our Ambassador on
hat, as I say, last night, and we just
an't confirm one way or another on the
ither.

Q. You spoke of the need for the
Jnited States to maintain relations
vith China. But given the brutality
»f the attacks over the last couple of
lays, can the United States ever re-
urn to business as usual with the
urrent regime?

A. I don't want to see a total break
n this relationship, and I will not en-
ourage a total break in the relation-
hip. This relationship is, when you see
hese kids struggling for democracy
nd freedom, this would be a bad time
or the United States to withdraw and
lull back and leave them to the devices
fa leadership that might decide to
rack down further. Some have sug-
ested I take the Ambassador out. In
ly view, that would be 180 degrees
iTong. Our Ambassador provides one
f the best listening posts we have in
Jhina. He is thoroughly experienced,
tnd so let others make proposals that
n my view don't make much sense. I
rant to see us stay involved and contin-
e to work for restraint and for human
ights and for democracy. And then
own the road, we have enormous com-
monality of interests with China, but it
ifill not be the same under a brutal and
epressive regime.

So I stop short of suggesting that
what we ought to do is break relations
with China, and I would like to encour-
age them to continue their change.

Q. You're sending a message to
the military and to the government. A
couple of weeks ago, you told the stu-
dents to continue to stand by their be-
liefs. What message do you want the
students to hear from what you're
saying right now?

A. That we support their quest for
democracy, for reform, and for free-
dom. There should be no doubt about
that. Then, in sending this message to
the military, I would encourage them
to go back to the posture of a few days
ago that did show restraint, and that
did recognize the rights of the people,
and that did epitomize what that Chi-
nese leader told me, that the army
loves the people. There are still vivid
e.xamples of that.

Q. Should the students go home?
Should the students stop trying to
fight the army?

A. I can't dictate to the students
what they should do from halfway
around the world. But we support the
quest for democracy and reform, and
I'd just have to repeat that.

Q. I'd like to ask you about the
other development in Iran. What is
your assessment of who is in charge,
and what opportunities the changes
in Iran create for the United States?

A. We're not sure yet. Khamenei
[President Hojatolislam Ali] appears to
be the annointed successor, the will
having been read by Khomeini's son.
But, again, in a society of that nature,
it's hard to predict. I would simply re-
peat what I said on January 20th, that
there is a way for a relationship with
the United States to improve, and that
is for a release of the American hos-
tages. But I can't give you an answer
on that one. No experts here can yet,
either.

Q. Do you plan any overture?

A. I just made it.

Q. Do you plan any overtures or
any other kind of opening toward
Iran, toward the new government?

A. No, absolutely not. They know
what they need to do. They have been a
terrorist state. And as soon as we see
some move away from oppression and
extremism of that nature, we will re-
view our relationship.

Q. Would you elaborate on the
question of economic sanctions — back
to China. Did you consider economic
sanctions for this morning's an-
nouncement, and what will you do if
the violence escalates?

A. I reserve the right to take a
whole new look at things if the violence
escalates, but I've indicated to you why
I think the suspension of certain mili-
tary relationships is better than
moving — on the economic side.

Q. Do you feel that the Chinese
leadership cares what the United
States does or thinks right now?

A. I think they are in the sense of
contradiction themselves right now.
China has historically been less than
totally interested in what other coun-
tries think of their performance. You
have to just look back to the Middle
Kingdom syndrome. And you look back
in history when outsiders, including
the United States, were viewed as
"barbarians." So historically China,
with its immense pride and its cultural
background and its enormous history of
conflict, internal and external, has
been fairly independent in setting its
course.

I have had the feeling that China
wants to be a more acceptable —
acceptable in the family of nations. I
think any observer would agree that,
indeed, until very recent events,
they've moved in that direction. What I
would like to do is encourage them to
move further in that direction by rec-
ognizing the rights of these young peo-
ple and by rebuking any use of force.

Q. More than most Americans,
you understand the Chinese. How do
you account for the excessive violence
of this response? Once the army de-
cided to act, that they would drive ar-
mored personnel carriers into walls
of people, how can you explain that?

A. I really can't. It is very hard to
explain, because there was that re-
straint that was properly being showed
for awhile on the part of the military,
challenged to come in and restore —
what I'm sure they'd been told — order
to a situation, which I expect they had
been told was anarchic. I can't explain
it. I can't explain it, unless they were
under orders, and then you get into the
argument about, well, what orders do
you follow? I condemn it. I don't try to
explain it.

>epartment of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

Q. Will you be able to accommo-
date the calls from Congress for
tougher sanctions? Many lawmakers
felt you were slow to condemn or crit-
icize the violence in China before
now, and many are pushing for much
tougher action on the part of this
country.

A. I've told you what I'm going to
do. I'm the President. I set the foreign
policy objectives and actions taken by
the executive branch. I think they
know, most of them in Congress, that I
have not only a keen personal interest
in China but that I understand it rea-
sonably well. I will just reiterate to the
leaders this afternoon my conviction
that this is not a time for anything oth-
er than a prudent, reasoned response.
It is a time to assert over and over
again our commitment to democracy,
emphasize the strength that we give to
democracy in situations of this nature.
I come back to the frontline question
here: I do think this change is inexor-
able. It may go a couple of steps for-
ward and then take a step back, but it
is on the move. The genie will not be
put back in the bottle. I am trying to
take steps that will encourage a peace-
ful change and yet recognize the fact
that China does have great pride in its
own history. My recommendations are
based on my knowledge of Chinese
history.

I would argue with those who want
to do something more flamboyant, be-
cause I happen to feel that this rela-
tionship is vital to the United States of
America, and so is our adherence to de-
mocracy and our encouragement for
those who are willing to hold high the
banner of democracy. We found, I
think, a prudent path here.

Q. Do you think that the events
in China can have a chilling effect on
democratic reforms occurring in other
communist countries, particularly in
the Soviet Union and Eastern Eu-
rope, when they look at the kind of
uprising that was sparked in China?

A. No. I think the moves that
we're seeing in Eastern Europe today,
and indeed, in the Soviet Union are
going to go forward. I think people are
watching more with horror, and saying:
How, given this movement toward de-
mocracy, can the Chinese leadership
react in the way they have? I think this
may be a sign to others around the
world that people are heroic when it
comes to their commitment to demo-
cratic change. I would just urge the
Chinese leaders to recognize that.

Q. There are reports that the
Chinese military is badly divided and
that, with this crackdown, the au-
thorities brought in some troops from
the Tibet conflict. If that's the case,
how does suspending these military
relationships encourage any kind of
change? I mean, could you explain
what the point of doing that is —

A. I already did. You missed it. I
explained it because I want to keep it
on the military side. I've expressed
here rhetorically the indignation we
feel. I've recognized the history of Chi-
na moving onto its own Middle King-
dom syndrome, as it's done in various
times in its past, and I want to encour-
age the things that have helped the
Chinese people. I think now the sus-
pension is going to send a strong signal.
I'm not saying it's going to cure the
short-range problem in China. I'm not
sure any outside country can cure the
short-range, the today in Tiananmen
Square, problem. But I think it is very
important the Chinese leaders know it's
not going to be business as usual, and I
think it's important that the army know
that we want to see restraint. And this
is the best way to signal that.

Q. Would you fear conflict? You
talked about the divisions within the
Chinese Army. Do you or your ad-
visers fear that there could actually
be a civil conflict between army
commanders?

A. I don't want to speculate on
that, but there are differences, clearly,
within the army in terms of use of
force. Otherwise, they wouldn't be do-
ing what [was] properly pointed out is
happening: units coming in from
outside.

And it is not, incidentally, just in
Tiananmen Square that this problem
exists. It is in Shanghai, it's in Cheng-
du today, it's in Guangzhou, I'm told, in
a much smaller scale. But they brought
the troops in from outside because the
Beijing troops apparently demon-
strated a great sensitivity to the cause
of the young people and were —
disciplined though they were, they
opted for the side of democracy and
change in the young people. So those
others came in. But I certainly don't
want to speculate on something that I
don't have — I can't reach that conclu-
sion, put it that way.

Q. There were some news reports
that some of the soldiers' units had
burned their own trucks in — have you
received the same type of intelligence
reports?

A. I just saw speculation. I haven't
got it on any — I don't believe the intel-
ligence said that. But there are reports
that it is very difficult for some of the
military, who are much more sympa-
thetic to the openness, to the demon-
strators. And I, again, go back to the
original question here that [was] asked.
I think, with the change that's taken
place so far, we're beyond kind of a Cul-
tural Revolution response. I think the
depth of the feeling toward democracy
is so great that you can't put the genie
back in the bottle and return to total
repression. I think what we're seeing is
a manifestation of that in the divisions
within the PLA. But I certainly want
to stop short of predicting a civil war
between units of the People's Libera-
tion Army.

Q. What about Poland? What do
you think of the elections?

A. To make a profound statement,
I think they were very interesting. We
haven't seen the final results, but com-
munist bureaucrats beware in Poland.
It looks to me like there's quite a move,
moving toward the freedom and
democracy.

JUNE 8, 1989

Q. Cutting off military sales to
China does not seem to have made an
impression on the rulers there, and
they've become more repressive. What
else are you going to do to express
this nation's outrage? And do you
have any other plans?

A. I think that the position we
took, aiming not at the Chinese people
but at the military arrangements, was
well-received around the world and was
followed by many countries. Right af-
ter we did that, many of the European
countries followed suit. The events in
China are such that we, obviously, de-
plore the violence and the loss of life,
urge restoration of order with recogni-
tion of the rights of the people. I'm still
hopeful that China will come together,
respecting the urge for democracy on
the part of the people. What we will do
in the future, I will announce at appro-
priate times. But right now, we are en-
gaged in diplomatic efforts, and other
countries are doing the same thing.
Let's hope that it does have an amelio-
rating effect on this situation.

Q. Does your support of human
rights and democracy extend to other
places in the world, like South Africa,

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989'

THE PRESIDENT

the West Bank, where they've been
fighting a lot longer than in China
against repression?

A. Yes, it does. It certainly does.
Concern is universal. And that's what I
want the Chinese leaders to under-
stand. You see, we've taken this action.
I am one who lived in China; I under-
stand the importance of the relation-
ship with the Chinese people and with
the government. It is in the interest of
the United States to have good rela-
tions, but because of the question that
you properly raised, we have to speak
out in favor of human rights. We aren't
going to remake the world, but we
should stand for something. And
there's no question in the minds of
these students that the United States
is standing in their corners.

I'll tell you a little anecdote: When
our cars went out to the university to
pick up some of the students and bring
them out, they were met by universal
applause. Then the students in this
country have been quite supportive of
the steps that I have taken. We had a
few into the Oval Office the other day,
and I must say my heart goes out to
them. They cannot talk to their fami-
lies, and it's very difficult.

But, yes, the United States must
stand wherever, in whatever country,
universally for human rights. And let
me say, you mentioned South Africa?
Absolutely, appalling. Apartheid must
end.

Q. Can the United States ever
have normal relations with China as
long as the hardliners believed re-
sponsible for the massacre, such as
Deng Xiaoping and Premier Li Peng,
remain in power? In other words,
what will it take to get U.S. -Chinese
relations back to normal?

A. It will take a recognition of the
rights of individuals and respect for the
rights of those who disagree. You have
cited two leaders, one of whom I might
tell you is — you mentioned Deng Xiao-
ping. I'm not sure the American people
know this. He was thrown out by the
Cultural Revolution crowd back in the
[ate 1960s; came back in 1976; was put
Dut again because he was seen as too
forward-looking. All I'm saying from
;hat experience is: Let's not jump at
conclusions as to how individual leaders
.n China feel when we aren't sure of
:hat.

But the broad question that you
isk — we can't have totally normal rela-
tions unless there's a recognition of the

validity of the students' aspirations. I
think that that will happen. We had a
visit right here, upstairs in the White
House, with Mr. Wan Li. I don't know
whether he's in or out, but he said
something to me that I think the Amer-
ican people would be interested in. He
said, "The army loves the people." And
then you've seen soldiers from the 27th
Army coming in from outside of Beijing
and clearly shooting people. But having
said that, I don't think we ought to
judge the whole People's Liberation
Army of China by that terrible
incident.

What I want to do is preserve this
relationship as best I can, and I hope
the conditions that lie ahead will per-
mit me to preserve this relationship. I
don't want to pass judgment on individ-
ual leaders, but I want to make very
clear to those leaders and to the rest of
the world that the United States de-
nounces the kind of brutality that all of
us have seen on our television.

Q. I'd like to return to China for
a moment. You mentioned that your
goal is to preserve our relationship
with the Chinese Government. But
what do you say to the American peo-
ple who might wonder why we are not
more forceful in being the world's
leading advocate of democracy? And
are we not living up to that respon-
sibility in this situation?

A. Some have suggested, for exam-
ple, to show our forcefulness, that I
bring the American Ambassador back.
I disagree with that 180 degrees.
We've seen, in the last few days, a very
good reason to have him there. In fact,
one of your colleagues, Richard Roth of
CBS, was released partially because of
the work of our Embassy, of Jim Lilley,
our very able Ambassador.

Some have suggested you've got to
go full sanctions on [the] economic side.
I don't want to cut off grain, and we've
just sold grain to the People's Republic
of China. I think that would be counter-
productive and would hurt the people.

What I do want to do is take what-
ever steps are most likely to demon-
strate the concern that America feels. I
think I've done that, and I'll be looking
for other ways to do it if we possibly
can.

Q. Chinese dissident Fang Lizhi
has taken refuge in the U.S. Embassy,
apparently fearing for his own safety.
The Chinese Government has called
that a wanton interference in inter-

nal affairs and a violation of interna-
tional law. What is your reaction to
that? And will the United States
grant Fang political asylum in the
United States?

A. First, let me remind the audi-
ence here that we do not discuss asy-
lum. It's almost like a public discussion
of intelligence matters. But in terms of
your question, we have acted in compli-
ance with the international law as an
extraordinary measure for human-
itarian reasons. His personal safety
was involved here, he felt. Then we try,
historically, to work these things out in
consultation with the sovereign state.
So we are not violating international
law, in the opinion of our attorneys. It
is awful hard for the United States,
when a man presents himself — a person
who is a dissident — and says that his
life is threatened, to turn him back.
That isn't one of the premises upon
which the United States was founded.
We have a difference with them on that,
you're right, but I hope it can be
resolved.

Q. The Iranian Government, of
course, has changed. And the ques-
tion to you is: Is there hope that there
might be restored some kind of rela-
tions with that country? As you know,
today the Iranians set forth, infor-
mally, an offer for some kind of a
deal: that if the Americans would
help free some Iranians held by the
Phalangists that they might help us
free some of our prisoners as well, or
our hostages. Is there any hope for
any change in the near future?

A. For a change in relationship? I
stated the other day what it would take
to have improved relationships, and
that would be a renunciation of terror.
We can't have normalized relations
with a state that's branded a terrorist
state. Secondly, they must facilitate the
release of American hostages. And so,
that is what it would take. There was a
case a while back where Iran asked for
information regarding their hostages —
never accused us, properly so, of hold-
ing people hostage or in any way con-
doning that. We condemn it. And we've
supplied them information. But it's
going to take a change in behavior. We
don't mind name-calling. They keep
calling us the "Great Satan." That
doesn't bother us. Sticks and stones —
remember the old adage — will hurt
your bones. The names don't hurt you,
but performance is what we're looking
for. I don't see so far any sign of
change.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

I held out the olive branch at my
inauguration speech, and I said, Look,
we want better relations with Iran. I
remember when we had good relations.
We like the Iranian people. We have a
lot of Iranians living in this country. I
said, Look, you want better relations,
do what's right, do what's right by peo-
ple that are held against their will;
we've seen no movement. I would re-
peat that offer tonight.

Q. The other day you picked up
the phone and talked to Richard Nix-
on about China. I'm wondering, since
you know some of the Chinese leaders
personally, why you don't pick up the
phone and talk to them.

A. I tried today. Isn't that a coinci-
dence that you'd ask that question?
[Laughter]

Q. And what did you learn?

A. The line was busy. [Laughter] I
couldn't get through.

Q. I'm wondering if you learned
anything from those phone calls
about who's really running China?

A. I said I couldn't get through.
And I talked to our Ambassador, know-
ing that we'd understandably get ques-
tions on China tonight, and the
situation is still very, very murky. And
that's the way it's been.

I remember being in China when
the way we'd tell who was winning and
who was losing, who was up and who
was down — we'd send people out around
town to count the red flag limousines.
And then they'd say. Oh, there's 30 of
them gathered here; there must be an
important meeting. Everybody'd hover
around trying to see who emerged or
who stood next to somebody on a pa-
rade on festival day. It's opened up
much more than that. There have been
dramatic changes since then.

But in terms of our trying to fig-
ure out their internal order, it is ex-
traordinarily difficult. I did try to
contact a Chinese leader today, and it
didn't work. But I'm going to keep on
trying. I want them to know that I
view this relationship as important,
and yet I view the life of every single
student as important.

Q. Earlier you made reference to
Deng Xiaoping, suggesting that he
may, if I read you right, not neces-
sarily have been responsible for the
actions. You said that he was a re-
former, twice out, back in. What were
you trying to say? Do you have infor-
mation that he is not —

A. I was trying to say that I don't
know. And I'm trying to say you don't
know. And he doesn't know, and she
doesn't know. And nobody knows —
outside. That's the way the Chinese
system works. So for us to read every
day some new name out there — it just
isn't right. I don't want to misrepre-
sent this to the American people. But
what I do know is that there are events
over there that — it doens't matter who's
in charge — we condemn. There's a rela-
tionship over there that is fundamen-
tally important to the United States
that I want to see preserved. I'm try-
ing to find a proper, prudent balance,
not listening to the extremes that say,
take your Ambassador out; cut off all
food to the Chinese people so you show
your concern. I think we found a proper
avenue there, but I cannot — and you
ask a good question — I simply cannot
tell you with authority who is calling
the shots there today.

Q. When you were in China ear-
lier in the year, you met with Li Peng,
and I believe you told him that China
was exempted from your policy review
because you knew China, you under-
stood China. Have you been let down
personally? Have you been misled in
any way?

A. I feel a certain sense of person-
al disappointment. But they weren't ex-
empt from the norms of behavior that
are accepted internationally in terms of
armed people don't shoot down un-
armed students. Nobody suggested
that.

There was an interesting point in
there — and I don't want to delve into
the detail of private conversations — but
one of the Chinese leaders, a very
prominent name, told me, "We want
change, but people have to understand
it's very complicated here, how fast we
move on these reforms. We've come a
long way." And, indeed, they did move
dramatically faster on economic re-
forms that I think any of us in this
room would have thought possible.

But what hasn't caught up are the
political reforms and reforms in terms
of freedom of expression. The freedom
of press caught up a little bit; but it
hadn't gone, obviously, nearly far
enough. Now there's martial law and
censorship. But we were cautioned on
that visit about how fast China could
move. Some of it was economic, and
clearly, some of the message had to do
with how fast they could move
politically.

Q. Back to China. There are re-
ports tonight that the government
there has begun rounding up the stu-
dent leaders, who face at the very
least, persecution, at the most, possi-
bly charges of treason and whatever
punishment that will bring. You have
talked tonight about your strong de-
sire to keep this relationship going
and to keep the dialogue and all our
business as usual moving forward. If
the—

A. Not all of them. Excuse the
interruption —

Q. Except for the military —
A. Yes.

Q. Except for the military. If we
find out that the people who perpe-
trated the killings in Tiananmen
Square and who were rounding up
these students are running the gov-
ernment, can the United States main-
tain fairly normal relationships with
them, given our aim to foster human
rights and promote democracy?

A. It would make it extraordi-
narily difficult. But the question is so
hypothetical that I'm going to avoid an-
swering it directly. Anything that cod-
ifies the acceptance of brutality or lack
of respect for human rights will make
things much more difficult. There's no
question about that.

Q. There are 20.000 Chinese stu-
dents in the United States.
A. Yes.

Q. Many of them have spoken
out. Are you prepared to grant them
political asylum in this country,
should these —

A. They're not seeking asylum. I'll
tell you why I answer the question that
way. They're not seeking asylum. We
had four of them in the other day. And
the first thing that one of them — Jia
Hao — said, "I love my country." And he
wants to go back to his country. What I
have done is extend the visas so that
people are not compelled to go back to
their country. He's not seeking asylum.
This man is not going to turn his back
on his own country. He wants to change
things. But he also wants to know that
he is going to be safe, and I don't blame
him for that. So, it's not a question of
all these people — asylum is a legal sta-
tus, and that's not what they're looking
for.

Q. — in light of the student
roundups. I mean, if they face —

A. I think it's ap])alling, and so I
would simply say that what we've al-

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE PRESIDENT

ready done — would say to these people,
You don't have to go back. But I'm not
going to ask them to turn down the flag
that they love and turn their back on
China. These are patriotic young peo-
ple who fear because of seeing their
own brothers and sisters gunned down.
But they're not seeking asylum. They
don't want to flee China; they want to
help change China.

Q. We can discuss another com-
munist country for a while. Your atti-
tude toward the Soviet Union seems
to have shifted a bit since you became
president, from deep skepticism to
seeming acceptance of their inten-
tions. Do you now accept Mr. Gor-
bachev's sincerity in regard to his
pledge of new thinking'? And can you
tell us a little bit about why you've
changed —

A. I don't think it's shifted as
much as you think. I don't think it's
shifted as much. What I did was to say.
We need a time to make some prudent
investigation and discovery and then to
go forward with a proposal. And we've
done exactly that. The proposal we
made at NATO has unified the alliance,
and some of the leaders told me that it's
more unified than it's been in history.
We've made a good proposal now, and I
hope the Soviets will take it on good
faith, and I am encouraged by the re-
sponse to far.

Having said that, in dealing with
the Soviet Union, I am going to contin-
ue to keep my eyes wide open. I will
also say I want to see perestroika suc-
ceed. I want to see it succeed, not fail.
And I told Mr. Gorbachev that one-on-
one last fall at Governor's Island. I
don't think he believes that I view this
as some kind of a cold war relationship
or that I want to see perestroika fail.
He did say that he felt there were some
elements in this country that did. But I
hope that now he knows that I don't
look at it that way.

Q. Do you accept that he is sin-
cere in terms of — are you operating
on the assumption that he is sincere
when he says he's interested in new
thinking in international affairs?

A. He's already demonstrated that
he's interested in new thinking. Who
would have thought that we would sit
here and, on televison, see a relatively
lively debate? It's nothing like our Con-
gress, but it had some similar aspects
to it. I think he has already demon-
strated his commitment to change and
to reform.

But there ways now to solidify
these changes. They have 600,000
troops, and we have 305,000. I made an
offer to him. I said the best way to
guarantee stability and less warlike at-
titude is to go to equal numbers. They
are being asked to take out many,
many more troops than we are. But
I've said. What's wrong with being
equal? The United States will have
275,000 troops deployed, and you, sir,
will have 275,000. So, here's a test now.
Nobody can argue the inequity of that,
particularly since we've put aircraft
and helicopters and these other catego-
ries on the table.

I am inclined to think that if I do
my work properly and we keep NATO
moving forward on this quick timeta-
ble, that we can succeed. And if we do,
he will once again have demonstrated
his desire for change.

Q. Some of the critics say that,
despite your rhetoric, General Nor-
iega can sit in Panama for as long as
he wishes, in effect laughing at you,
laughing at the United States. Can
you do anything about it? Should you?

A. You know, as you look around
the world and you see change, respect
for the election process, I would simply
say Panama is not immune. We're all
traumatized, and properly by the terri-
ble excesses in Tiananmen Square. But
I haven't forgotten the brutal beating
of Guillermo Ford in Panama [opposi-
tion Vice Presidential candidate], and
the world hasn't forgotten it. European
public opinion has changed dramati-
cally as they look at Mr. Noriega now.
It is my fervent hope that the Organiza-
tion of American States will stay with
their mission and will keep working on
their mandate until Mr. Noriega leaves.

Let me repeat an important point
here. I think there is some feeling in
Panama that we are against the PDF,
the Panama Defense Forces. We have
no argument with the PDF. Many of
their people have trained in the United
States. We respect the Panamanian
people. The problem is Noriega. If he
gets out and they recognize the results
of a freely held election — and certifia-
bly freely held, I will say — they would
have instant improved relations with
the United States.

I am not going to give up on this. I
think we're proper to use multilateral
diplomacy in this instance, as well as
doing what we can bilaterally; and I in-
tend to protect our treaty rights, for

example, and certainly the best I can to
guarantee the safety of Americans.

Q. The agreement between Bonn
and Washington on the nuclear issue
only temporarily bridges the differ-
ences. At what point do you visualize
the Lance missile going into Ger-
many, and can any German Govern-
ment accept it?

A. That matter has been properly
deferred under the agreement at
NATO. Research can go forward, but
the deployment matter has been prop-
erly deferred, and let us just go for-
ward on the NATO arrangements that
were announced in Brussels. Yes, there
are differences. You're absolutely
right. There are differences in Ger-
many on this whole question, not just of
the Lance follow-on but a whole differ-
ence there on the question of SNF,
short-range nuclear forces. It is in our
interest to quickly move forward, be-
cause if we can get [it] implemented
within our timeframe, the agreement
on conventional forces, that will take a
tremendous amount of pressure off the
Germans on short-range forces.

Q. Poland — there was no ques-
tion about Poland. I'm a Polish re-
porter. Maybe you would answer a
question about — what are you expect-
ing from your visit to Poland?

A. She's got a followup. You've mis-
understood. She got a followup
question.

Q. NATO was regarded as your
success because of your initiatives
there and — but isn't the West German
challenge just the first of many, now
that the Soviet threat is diminishing
in Western Europe?

A. But let me use this question to
reply to the question about Poland, too.
There will be new challenges for
NATO, as the level of concern about
armed conflict reduces. I will keep re-
minding our friends, and they will
keep reminding me, that we must keep
whatever force is required to deter
war. But part of what's happening — and
I'm glad the gentleman raised Poland —
is this quest for democracy in Poland.
If that goes forward, I can see a much
better relationship for the United
States with Poland, in one that will, in
Poland itself, convince the people that
they have less of a stake in military
confrontation or in a East bloc confron-
tation with the West.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE VICE PRESIDENT

So it is fascinating — tlie change
that is going on there. It is absolutely
fascinating. And we should be posi-
tioned. I'm going there to tell this to
the leaders: We want to work with you.
You've got to reform your economy. We
don't feel that you have any bad inten-
tions toward the United States, but we

want to see this policy of differentia-
tion continue. When a country moves
like Poland did, down democracy's path,
the United States should respond as
best it could.

'Texts from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of June 12, 1989.

American Leadership in the Pacific

Vice President Quayle's address
before the American Business Council
in Singapore on May S, 1989.

As everyone knows, we are only 11 short
years away from the end of the century
and the beginning, not only of a new cen-
tury but a new millennium. At a time
like this when the shape of the
future is on everyone's mind, it's
especially appropriate for the new
American Administration to consult
with its Asian friends and to lay out its
perspective on the developments in this
critical region of the world. It is also
important to solicit the views of our
friends.

I can tell you the discussions with
Prime Minister Lee [Kuan Yew] and
others were very revealing. Complete
understanding of the geopolitical con-
cepts that are involved, the discus-
sions, and challenges — not only today,
but what our challenges are going to be
in the future — were very much on both
of our minds. President Bush made a
trip to Asia last February, and now I
am back — two trips within the first 100
days of this Administration to Asia
show the importance of this region of
the world to the United States. My trip
here will provide me with first-hand
experience of an area where amazing
advances in economic growth and tech-
nological development guarantee it an
important role in the years to come.

But it is also an opportunity to
make some fundamental points about
America's view of itself, and its role in
Asia and the Pacific in the years ahead.
Perhaps the most spectacularly accu-
rate political prediction of all time was
made by the great French social critic
and student of democracy, Alexis de
Tocqueville. Writing back in 1835,
De Tocqueville declared:

. . . there are at the present time two
great nations in the world which seem to
tend toward the same end, although they
started from different points: I allude to the

Russians and to the Americans. Both of
them have grown up unnoticed, and while
the attention of mankind was directed else-
where, they have suddenly assumed a most
prominent place among nations. And the
world learned of their existence and their
greatness at almost the same time. The
American relies upon personal interest to
accomplish his ends, and gives free scope to
the unguided exertions and common sense of
the citizens; the Russian centers all the au-
thority of society in a single arm. The prin-
cipal instrument of the former is freedom; of
the latter, servitude. Their starting point
is different, and their courses are not the
same, yet each of them seems to be marked
out by the will of heaven to sway the des-
tinies of half the globe.

These words were written at a
time when the notion of a global destiny
could not have been more remote from
the minds of most Americans. Yet in
the 1.50 years since De Tocqueville de-
livered his prophecy, America and the
Soviet Union have, indeed, come to
sway the destiny of the globe. The
question is, will they continue to do
the same thing in the 21st century?

As everyone now recognizes, an ex-
traordinary ferment is currently un-
derway inside the Soviet Union on
almost every issue. Wide-ranging and
potentially explosive debates are in
progress. The failure and abuses of the
Soviet system are not only admitted
but exposed in astonishing detail in the
official Soviet press. The need for a
fundamental restructuring of the So-
viet economy and policy appears to be
accepted by virtually all currents of
political opinion in the Soviet Union.

What does all this mean for the fu-
ture of the Soviet empire and Soviet
global ambitions? I think it is fair to
say that the new Soviet policies —
glasnost, perestroika — derive from the
recognition by the Soviet leadership
that their system has failed and that
their country has fallen behind — not
only America and Europe but also
many nations in the Pacific. Their pro-

pensity to center all authority of soci-
ety in a single arm, as De Tocqueville
put it, is poorly adapted to the emerg-
ing realities of the next century — a
century where political, economic, and
social openness will increasingly be
seen as keys to national success.

Whether the Soviet system can
successfully adapt to the 21st century
is, of course, an open question. We cer-
tainly wish the long-suffering Soviet
people good will. We applaud recent
measures to increase openness in the
press, to ease restrictions on religion,
to take the first faltering steps toward
democracy, and to contribute construc-
tively to settling certain international
disputes.

Nevertheless, barring some really
radical and fundamental shift in the
very basis of Soviet power, it's hard to
see how the Soviets can continue to
play the global role to which they so
clearly aspire. At present, the basis of
Soviet power is the Soviet military
establishment — that goes without say-
ing. Yet it is becoming increasingly
clear that the economic performance of
the Soviet Union is inadequate to sup-
port such massive military forces or
military efforts of client states whose
own economies are also declining or in
collapse.

America's Unchanging
Fundamental Principles

Let me turn now to my own country,
the United States. I think of the most
striking facts about my country is that
today, as in the days when De Tocque-
ville first issued his famous prophecy,
"America continues to give free scope
to the unguided exertions and common
sense of its citizens." Although a great
deal has happened in the world be-
tween Andrew Jackson's Administra-
tion and George Bush's Administration,
America's fundamental principles have
remained unchanged. People who ac-
cuse the Americans of being inconsis-
tent and fickle would do well, I think,
to bear fundamental fact in mind.

Of course, we Americans have of-
ten been taken to task for adhering so
tenaciously to our convictions. Our
critics argue that perhaps the demo-
cratic form of government woi'ked well
enough in the United States, but it was
hopelessly unsuited to other parts of
the world. It was particularly inap-
propriate to the Third World, we were
told, because most Third World peoples
lack a democratic tradition and because

Department of State Bulletin/August 198f

THE VICE PRESIDENT

economic development requires cen-
tralized control and planning.

Yet today, it is clear that
democracy — personal freedom within
a framework of representative
government — is, indeed, the wave of
the future. In Latin America for e.xam-
ple, most nations have either recently
accepted democracy or are moving
clearly in that direction. While in Asia,
old traditions of authoritarian govern-
ment are fading fast from the scene. At
the same time, free markets and pri-
vate initiative are the new guideposts
to economic development, for the sim-
ple reason that their principles of eco-
nomic organization clearly work. The
nations of the Pacific rim, in particular,
[lave shown the world that free enter-
prise economies are at least as effec-
tive in the developing world as they are
in the more industrialized nations.

Is it a mere coincidence that demo-
cratic governments and free-market
economies are developing side by side
throughout the world? It is not a coinci-
dence. I think it is not. Rather it seems
to me that economic development and
political freedom are two sides of the
same coin. Both are necessary to
achieve genuine modernization.

Continuing U.S. Global
Commitments

Let me return to the rather special
}ase of the United States. While most
ire willing to acknowledge the remark-
ible dynamism of American society,
some question whether America will
;ontinue to fulfill the promise that De
Focqueville predicted for it. Certain
3ritics question whether America has
:he discipline or the determination to
"emain competitive in the global envi-
ronment or to manage its fiscal prob-
ems in a responsible manner. Others
joint specifically to America's security
;ommitments and wonder whether it
;an continue to shoulder the burdens of
i far-flung alliance system.

The United States, critics say, is a
lation in decline, our budget and trade
ieficits are symptoms of a deeper
nalaise. The burden of international
eadership has grown too heavy for
\merica to bear. If we are to avoid dis-
ister, we must pull back from our glob-
il commitments. That way, at least, we
:an decline gracefully.

Books predicting America's immi-
lent fall from world leadership have
nade the best seller list in my country.
Prophets of American decline have be-
come virtual academic celebrities. That

being the case, what are our friends in
Asia, and the rest of the world, to con-
clude? Will the United States remain a
key player in the Pacific region? Can it
still be relied upon to sustain the secu-
rity commitments which have helped
preserve peace and stability in an area
of geopolitical and ideological conflict?

As you and other members of the
international community address these
questions, there are four important
factors that you should bear in mind.
Perhaps the most important thing to
remember about the current wave of
"declinist" thought in the United
States is that it is hardly a new phe-
nomenon. On the contrary, since the
end of World War II, Americans have
been periodically scaring themselves
with visions of imminent collapse.

The first such scare occurred back
in 1957 and 1958, in the wake of the So-
viet missile launches of Sputnik. The
fashionable fear that swept the United
States then was that Soviet technologi-
cal superiority had relegated us to a
position of permanent inferiority. Of
course, these fears proved to be
groundless. The United States quickly
regained the lead in military high tech-
nology. Today, as a result of revolution-
ary advances in strategic defense
systems, low observable or "stealth"
aircraft, and other advanced aerospace
technologies, this lead, in all proba-
bility, will become wider.

The second great scare occurred at
the end of the 1960s, when it became
fashionable to argue that the United
States and Soviet Union were both los-
ing their primacy. The bipolar world of
the immediate postwar period was said
to be giving way to a five-cornered
world in which Japan, China, and Eu-
rope would enjoy superpower status.
Twenty years later, however, this devel-
opment has yet to occur.

This was quickly followed by a
third wave of pessimism, triggered by
the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries] oil embargo of
1975, which envisioned the United
States as a helpless giant unable to se-
cure the energy resources necessary to
support our growing economy. Then, in
the late 1970s, the Soviet Union once
again became the focus of the fourth
declinist wave of thought, as the Amer-
ican withdrawal from Southeast Asia,
together with a series of Soviet foreign
policy successes, led many to conclude
that the global "correlation of forces,"
as they called it, had shifted decisively

in the favor of the Soviet bloc. All these
fears enjoyed a considerable intellec-
tual vogue for a time; yet again, all
were proven to be false.

The Condition of America Today

What is the truth about the condition of
America today? The truth is that there
are fundamental sources of strength in
the American economy that are ignored
by the prophets of decline. The United
States is entering its 78th consecutive
month of economic growth, the longest
period of peacetime economic expan-
sion in American history. During this
period, real per capita income for
Americans has risen more than 15%.
Employment has grown faster in the
United States than in other leading in-
dustrial nations, more than 2V2 times
faster than Japan, for example. We
have produced more than 17.5 million
jobs over the last 6 years, more than
Western Europe, Canada, and Japan
combined, and average U.S. produc-
tivity is greater than that of any other
major industrialized country. Strong
productivity growth, combined with
wage restraint and adjustment in the
foreign exchange value of the American
dollar, has restored the international
competitiveness of U.S. manufactur-
ing. In fact, recent labor costs in the
United States relative to other major
industrial nations fell 41% between
1985 and 1987, and we are now lower
than they were in 1980.

The result has been a dramatic im-
provement in our trade balance. The
trade deficit has fallen from a peak of
about $170 billion to an annual rate of
about $120 billion, according to the
most recent statistics. Perhaps an even
more telling sign of our competitive
strength is that exports have risen dra-
matically over the last few years, grow-
ing by an impressive 27% in 1988 alone.
I think that it is safe to conclude that
the United States remains healthy and
vigorous despite, or perhaps because
of, a certain brooding and self-critical
disposition. The United States will
continue to be engaged with and open
to the world. We recognize that some
nations are advancing rapidly in eco-
nomic power and that others rival us in
military power. No nation, however, ei-
ther now or in the foreseeable future,
ranks as high as the United States in
virtually all the major sources of na-
tional power: population size and edu-
cation, natural resources, economic
development, political stability, social
cohesion, military strength, ideological

ruepartment of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE VICE PRESIDENT

appeal, diplomatic appliances, and
technological achievement.

U.S. Leadership and Security Roles

Because it is such a multidimensional
power. America has a unique leadership
role to play in the Pacific. Let me be
very clear, we intend to play it. We
will, therefore, continue to work closely
with our Asian friends and allies to
keep our markets open, to support free
trade, and to oppose what President
Bush has aptly called, "the fool's gold of
protectionism." We believe that an
open trading system is good for all
countries — importers as well as export-
ers. Our goal is to open markets, not
close them, to create an ever-e.xpanding
international trading system based
upon fair and enforceable rules. We
prefer to use multilateral negotiations
to achieve our objectives, but we will
also engage in bilateral efforts and take
selective unilateral actions where these
can be effective and where they are
necessary for opening foreign markets
to U.S. goods and .services. While pur-
suing this active agenda with our tra-
ding partners, we will work equally
hard to ensure the openness of the U.S.
economy to fairly traded goods and
services.

What, then, of the American secu-
rity role? Here, too, our fundamental
objectives remain constant. Globally,
the containment of Soviet power re-
mains the cornerstone of American
foreign policy. The doctrine of
containment, as originally formulated,
called on the United States to confront
the Soviets with an "unalterable coun-
ter force at every point where they
show signs of encroaching upon the in-
terests of a peaceful and stable world."
Were we to do that, it was predicted,
we would "promote tendencies which
must eventually find their outlet in
either the break-up or the gradual
mellowing of Soviet power."

For the past 40 years, America has
pretty much followed this course; with
some notable exceptions, we have suc-
ceeded in containing the power of the
Soviet Union and its clients. The result
has been, more or less, what the archi-
tects of containment predicted it would
be: deprived of the aura of historical in-
evitability, the Soviet system is being
forced to confront its own "internal
contradictions." Meanwhile, sheltered
behind America's broad shield, the na-
tions of the free world, both here and in
Europe, have made brilliant use of the
time Ameri-

ca's containment policy won for them
and have succeeded in overcoming the
legacy of war and devastation to be-
come vibrant and robust societies in
their own right. The recovery of our
European and Asian allies under
America's security umbrella must sure-
ly be reckoned as one of the greatest
foreign policy successes of our time and
irrefutable demonstration of the fact
that America advances its own inter-
ests best when we foster the growth
and security of our friends and allies.

The very success of containment
poses new and difficult challenges. The
new political dynamics of reform in the
Soviet Union and some of its client
states afford important opportunities
for advancing Western interests. At
the same time, a new instability and
unpredictability has been introduced
into the East-West equation. There are
promising signs of change in Soviet se-
curity policies. But these have not yet
been translated into substantial reduc-
tions in the overall Soviet military
threat, while their political impact in
the West has been quite enormous.
With declining levels in East-West ten-
sion, it is all too easy to neglect the re-
quirements of national security and the
maintenance of strong alliances. De-
clining concern for security issues is
also bound to raise substantially the
political importance of interallied
frictions over trade and other
economic issues.

In light of the current develop-
ments, it is all the more vital for the
United States to maintain an active
role and presence in the Pacific. Now,
more than ever, it is necessary to af-
firm and cultivate our alliance relation-
ships. These relationships are not
intended solely to address urgent needs
or immediate threats. They are a re-
flection of abiding geopolitical real-
ities. The United States and its Asian
friends and allies must take the longer
view of our collective security require-
ments. We must be more mindful than
ever of the fact that the strength of the
alliance relationships rests not on mili-
tary power alone but on shared politi-
cal purposes. U.S. policy in Asia will
also continue to insist that democratic
political institutions, with a commit-
ment to openness and criticism, are the
surest means of building a national po-
litical consensus — the foundation of
true security. We will continue to su])-
port democratic reforms as they devel-
op naturally, even while recognizing
that there is no set pattern for democ-
racy and no standard or assured out-

come to processes of political change.
We will continue to monitor human
rights practices and to register our
concern when we think fundamental
freedoms, including the open press,
are violated.

Future Peace Through Strength

When Americans and Singaporeans
look to the future, we both share simi-
lar evaluations of the evolving interna-
tional situation. We both agree on the
necessity of peace through strength.
We both agree that we must comple-
ment military deterrence with an ac-
tive diplomacy that seeks political
solutions to regional tensions. We both
condemn Vietnam's illegal occupation o
Cambodia and are united in calling on
Hanoi to withdraw completely its re-
maining forces in Cambodia. We agree
that once Cambodia has achieved a
genuine end to Vietnam's occupation,
free elections should be held under, a
transitional government led by Prince
Sihanouk. We agree that the dis-
credited Khmer Rouge must never be
allowed to seize power again.

As far as the Soviet role in the Pa-
cific is concerned, the United States
and our Asian friends agree that the
Soviet Union must be judged by its ac-
tions, not by its rhetoric. The Soviet
Union has placed the improvement of
its relations with China on the top of it
agenda; General Secretary Gorbachev
will be visiting China shortly. We be-
lieve that lessening Sino-Soviet ten-
sions is a logical course for both nationi
to pursue, and we have no objections to
it, provided that any new relationship
harms neither our own interests nor
those of our friends and that it directly
addresses our common security
concerns.

More generally, we recognize the
Soviet interest in sharing in Asia's eco<
nomic boom and in increasing its accesi
to the region. But Moscow has a long
way to go to achieve this goal. Besides
reforming itself, the greatest contribu-
tion it can make to reducing tension
and building confidence in Asia would
be to end its military presence in Viet-
nam and its support for Vietnam's oc-
cupation in Cambodia. In pursuing
our common destiny in the Pacific,
the United States looks forward to
strengthening and deepening our
friendship with Singapore. Your role ir
Asia and, indeed, the world testifies to
the fact that a nation's influence is a
function not of its size but of the char-
acter of its people and the quality of its
leadership.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE SECRETARY

Singapore's commitment to mar-
ket principles has made an inspiration
to developing countries around the
world. Singapore's unwavering commit-
ment to free trade has made it a model
for economic development. We welcome
Singapore's interest in pursuing a
"U.S.-ASEAN [Association of South
East Asian Nations] initiative" and look
forward to a dialogue with ASEAN in
the coming months to discuss this ini-
tiative and others like it. Singapore's
role in ASEAN has made it a force for
patience, unity, and steadfastness in
Southeast Asia. And Singapore's role in
the United Nations in the nonaligned
movement has served to encourage
moderation, reasonableness, and peace-
ful resolution of disputes. These are
qualities that Americans deeply admire
and that we ourselves seek to emulate,
as we both face the challenges of the
21st century.

Our two nations have much in com-
mon. We have common objectives and
concerns. I came to Singapore impres-
sed by its people and its capacity for
economic growth, and I leave with
strong favorable impressions of Prime
Minister Lee, his younger generation of
leadership, and the Singaporean people
who have created this economic
miracle. ■

After the NATO Summit:

Challenges for the West in a Changing World

Secretary Baker's address and ex-
cerpts from the question-and-ansiver
session at the National Press Club on
June 8, 1989.'

I know that most of you know that
on NATO's 40th anniversary, we, the
United States, and our allies renewed
our commitment to collective defense,
and we renewed our commitment to
democratic values. But we did more
than that. We also committed ourselves
to an ambitious mission for the years
ahead, and that mission is to make
from a divided Europe, a new Europe,
a Europe that is whole, a Europe that
is free, and a Europe that is secure.
This mission, of course, has far-
reaching security, political, and
economic implications for NATO
but also for the West as a whole.

NATO's Security Proposals

So let me begin with the security pro-
posals which we discussed at the 40th
anniversary of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. From its incep-
tion, NATO has sought to protect the
West's democratic values by preventing
war. It's been very, very sucessful. The
Soviet threat has imposed on the mem-
bers of the alliance a significant burden
of defense, but, through four some-
times tense decades, we have been
able to avoid armed conflict.

Now a combination of Western
strength and pressing economic prob-
lems within the Soviet Union appears
to have convinced Moscow that the
arms buildup really leads us nowhere.
All NATO leaders acknowledge that a
ray of hope has dawned — hope that Eu-
rope, the most heavily armed continent
in the world, can really begin to dis-
arm; hope that through negotiation and
responsible action by governments,
ways can be found to make all of us
safer at lower levels of risk. But, I
think we should all recognize that the
dawn is not the day. That's why the
President advanced proposals at the
summit to bring us closer to that day
when the shadow of still-threatening
Soviet conventional advantages will
be lifted.

The President's Conventional Par-
ity Initiative promises to accelerate
and lock in a potentially historic change
in the balance of militarv forces in Eu-

rope. If accepted by the East, this ini-
tiative would reduce the size of NATO,
and it would reduce the Warsaw Pact's
conventional forces to equal and stable
levels. These levels would substantially
reduce the threat of surprise military
attack and substantially reduce the
danger of large-scale offensive opera-
tions against Western Europe.

I want to add here an observation
about the summit process and about
NATO itself. This summit, I think,
showed beyond a shadow of a doubt that
the alliance does have the flexibility to
change while at the same time preserv-
ing and even enhancing its core princi-
ples and values. NATO's agreement
on a comprehensive concept, including
an agreement on short-range nuclear
forces (SNF), demonstrates that we
can maintain deterrence under new and
changing political conditions.

In light of the conventional imbal-
ances, the alliance agreed that the
short-range nuclear forces negotiations
leading to partial nuclear reductions
would begin but only — and this is very
important — only after the implementa-
tion of a conventional forces agreement
is underway. We and our NATO part-
ners further agreed that any short-
range nuclear forces reductions will not
be implemented — they'll not be carried
out — until the results of the conven-
tional forces agreement have been
implemented.

The economic and the political con-
sequences of the President's security
initiatives are far reaching and pro-
found. If the Soviet Union truly wishes
to channel needed resources from the
military to the civilian sector, then
these new proposals surely offer the op-
portunity. If the Soviet Union truly
wishes the process of political reform
in Eastern Europe to proceed freely,
then the removal of 325,000 troops will
surely reduce fears of Soviet military
intervention.

These proposals point clearly to a
long-term, dramatic transformation in
Europe's strategic and political land-
scape. The time is ripe for General Sec-
retary Gorbachev to respond positively
to the opportunities presented by these
initiatives. Indeed, we look for him to
do so when he travels to the Federal
Republic of Germany ne.xt week.

As the alliance came to agreement
on the SNF issue last week, we added

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE SECRETARY

an important call to the Soviet Union:
We urged the Soviets to reduce uni-
laterally their short-range nuclear sys-
tems to NATO levels. Next week, the
General Secretary can sustain this new
spirit by answering this call and by an-
nouncing a real cut in Soviet short-
range nuclear forces. But whatever
Mr. Gorbachev's response, I think we
should remember that the West's ef-
forts are aimed at removing more than
just Soviet divisions; they are aimed,
in fact, at removing the division of
Europe itself.

Beyond Containment
to a New Europe

The Brussels summit also affirmed
that NATO's mission goes beyond the
military dimension of East-West rela-
tions. We want, as the President has
said, to move beyond containment to a
new Europe — a Europe that is whole,
and a Europe that is free. That Europe
is defined by a community of free na-
tions from which no one is excluded. Its
borders are set not by geography or
barbed wire but by the reach of demo-
cratic freedoms. Its pursuits are the
ways of peace, and it grows through the
force of ideas. Today, it stretches from
Montreal, San Francisco, and Rome to
Tokyo, Helsinki, and Melbourne.

It is the community for which Chi-
nese students have sacrificed their
lives on the hard pavement of Tianan-
men Square. It is the community of
thought to which Sakharov belongs.
It is the model in the minds of Hun-
garians and Poles as they strive to
hammer out social compacts between
government and the governed.

NATO has signaled its intention to
engage in political and economic out-
reach to the East. We and our alliance
partners realize that the cold war
which began with the Iron Curtain and
continued with the Berlin Wall can
really only be ended there. It can only
be ended when imposed barriers no
longer separate East and West — East
and West Europeans, East and West
Germans, East and West Berliners.

Therefore, we've called upon the
East to bring down the wall that makes
our common European home a house
which is really divided against its will.
And, as an expression of our deter-
mination to increase contact and
cooperation, NATO reiterated its
commitment to improve the quality
of life for Berlin's inhabitants through
the allied Berlin initiative. This effort

seeks to make all of Berlin a free and
prosperous city — a symbol of a Europe
that is itself free and whole.

The President has offered five new
proposals that would help overcome the
division of Europe by fostering the
spread of democratic ideas and the de-
centralization of political and economic
authority in the East.

First, in the economic sphere, the
President seeks to encourage private
initiative and private institutions in the
East. We want to make sure, of course,
that we avoid the costly mistakes of the
1970s, when we allowed unproductive
public sector debt to accumulate. The
European Community is becoming a
magnet for the East; in effect, an agent
for change. We urge the European
Community to reach out toward East-
ern Europe, particularly after 1992,
when Western Europe becomes a single
unified market.

Second, in the political sphere, the
President seeks to encourage greater
political freedom. That can best be
done through contacts with free press
associations, universities, trade unions,
and other organizations that have
sprung up in the East. He has asked
Western counterparts to establish ties
with these new groups. We have experi-
ence; they have the need; and we can
both benefit from the new relationship.

Third, the President has urged the
free political parties of Western Eu-
rope and the United States to establish
relations and help foster new parties in
the East.

Fourth, the President has called
for self-determination for all of Ger-
many and for all of Eastern Europe.
He has urged that the question of free
elections be placed prominently on the
agenda for meetings of the Helsinki sig-
natory states. The world cannot fully
enter a new age of normalized relations
between East and West until the peo-
ples of all nations can freely choose
their own destinies.

And fifth, the President has pro-
posed that East and West work to-
gether on environmental problems.
Can there be any greater symbol of the
promise and the problems that East
and West face together than the Cher-
nobyl nuclear disaster? A supreme
technological achievement, when you
think about it, the unlocking of nuclear
energy, was mocked by the failure of
those who designed and ran the plant to
control it. Instead of pointing the fin-
ger of blame for this and other pollu-
tions of our environment, we extend,
instead, the hand of cooperation. We

can offer training, assistance in draft-
ing laws and regulations — in short, our
whole experience in dealing with these
issues. And we can look to develop joint
projects to control the pollution that
knows no walls or borders and that
threatens the health and beauty of
Europe.

Forty years ago, we and our NATO
partners pledged to "safeguard the
common heritage and civilization" of
Europe against our common enemies.
As the President pointed out, Europe's
environment is the common heritage of
all Europeans, and we must all work to
protect it. Defending Europe's environ-
ment from the threat of pollution is just
another way for the West to fulfill
NATO's mission of making Europe
safe and making Europe whole.

President Bush's July trip to Po-
land and Hungary prior to the Paris
economic summit demonstrates his se-
riousness about reaching out to East-
ern nations. The President is convinced
that the East can progress only through
both political and economic changes. To
stand in the way of such necessary, his-
toric change — as we are seeing to our
outrage and sorrow in China — is to
turn one's back on the future.

Beyond Europe to the
Global Community

That future promises to be a demand-
ing one for all nations — even ours in
the West with proven political and
economic track records. From the be-
ginning, we and our Western allies
recognized that our efforts to prevent
war and to advance democratic values
on the European Continent were really
fundamental to world peace.

Today, as tensions ease in the So-
viet Union and Eastern Europe, the
President and other NATO leaders ac-
knowledge that the West must begin
to turn more attention to other areas
of concern to the world community.
Together, we and our allies met the
daunting challenges of a postwar world.
So today, as that postwar era is suc-
ceeded by new times, we really must
tackle a new and a different set of
challenges, and I want to cite three
of those in particular.

First, we face a series of regional
problems that, if untended, can affect
nations near and far with grim conse-
quences. Perhaps it's time for our
friends and alliance partners to con-
sider mechanisms to deal collectively
with these regional conflicts. For ex-
ample, working bilaterally and in par-

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE SECRETARY

allel with several of our European al-
lies, we and other nations responded
very effectively when Iran's actions
threatened vital shipping lanes in the
Persian Gulf.

Second, the spread of ballistic mis-
siles, chemical weapons, and possibly
even nuclear weapons to countries en-
gaged in regional conflicts is very, very
dangerous. The trends are very alarm-
ing. At least 15 developing nations
could be producing their own ballistic
missiles by the year 2000. The spread
of these missiles will put states in vol-
atile regions on hair triggers and will
increase their incentives to acquire or
deploy chemical or nuclear weapons.
Can there be any doubt that such de-
velopments constitute an increasing
danger to world peace? The time is
growing short for effective approaches
to deal with these problems. F\irther
steps — both individual and collective —
are necessary to strengthen interna-
tional barriers to proliferation. We
must continue to support the nuclear
imnproliferation regime, and we must
.strengthen the missile technology con-
tiol regime. Building on the work of
the recently concluded Paris conference
(111 chemical weapons, we must continue
our joint efforts toward banning these
weapons of terror.

And, finally, like the problems of
proliferation, transnational dangers
such as environmental hazards, terror-
ism, and the drug trade ultimately re-
spect no political boundaries. They
pose new threats. But they also create
opportunities for creative responsibi-
lity sharing and cooperation where
none existed before.

The President discussed all of
these points at the summit in Brussels,
and we have been gratified by the re-
sponse. The NATO leaders agreed to
consult and to coordinate among them-
selves with respect to these issues, and
we will continue to lead the allies in
working toward solving these very,
very pressing problems.

Creative Responsibility-Sharing

Finally, I want to discuss a very im-
portant concept that the President
broached at the summit. The best way,
we think, to proceed with our alliance
partners — indeed, with all nations — in
this changing world is to engage in
what the President has called "creative
responsibility-sharing."

In the past, we heard a lot about
"burdensharing," which was a concept
that at first, at least, was narrowly ap-

plied to defense cooperation within our
alliance system. And, in the defense
area, many of our European partners
are working toward a more efficient
European defense industry. We en-
dorse these efforts, particularly those
of the independent European program
group and the West European Union to
develop wider armaments cooperation.
And, by continuing our own efforts to
stimulate codevelopment projects, the
United States will promote joint arma-
ments development and production and
over time will improve efficiencies and
reduce the costs of defense.

But, "creative responsibility-
sharing" is really a broader concept
than burdensharing. It embraces is-
sues such as how we define threats to
our security, how we divide up respon-
sibilities, and who we engage in respon-
sibility sharing. It applies to a broad
range of issues on the international
agenda.

Today, for instance, we must think
more broadly about how we define "se-
curity" in the long term. Environmen-
tal concerns violate the integrity of
Europe. Conflicts around the world —
regional conflicts — threaten the supply
of vital resources to our Atlantic and
Pacific allies. Chemical and ballistic
missile proliferation pose dangers to
the entire world community — to our
allies, friends, and adversaries alike.

So the West must consider how best
to divide responsibility for our wider
security needs among our friends and
among our alliance partners. We must
learn to pool our various strengths.
Countries having differing capabilities,
experiences, and know-how can lend
each of these capabilities, experiences,
and know-how toward meeting the se-
curity challenges which we together
face. I think, for example, that some
countries, given their historical in-
volvement in particular regions, can
play key diplomatic roles to resolve
conflicts. Still others, I believe, are
well-placed to help with problems of
economic development and problems
of debt.

An expanding global economy, de-
velopment in the Third World, and the
resolution of Third World conflicts are
all critical to global progress. Already,
our Pacific ally Japan is using its great
wealth to foster economic development
in the Third World. I would note, of
course, that everyone bears a respon-
sibility to contribute to global growth.

Clearly, I think we must also think
creatively about the private sector's
role in efforts that can contribute to

our security. For example, as I men-
tioned earlier, we can facilitate private
efforts by Western trade unions, busi-
nesses, industry, and the scientific
community that would foster political
and economic reform in Eastern
Europe.

Conclusion

So let me sum up where I think NATO
and the West stand today in relation to
the challenges of a changing world.

NATO has always — not always
been perceived to be — but has always
been more than simply a military ar-
rangement. It began as a community of
nations sharing a common vision of Eu-
rope, a vision of free peoples working
peacefully together to advance de-
mocracy. Now we have very nearly
achieved that vision. Western Europe,
today, is a model of democratic values.
It's an economic giant, and it is a pillar
of Western security.

In Brussels, the leaders of NATO
committed themselves to the next
mission — to bring about a whole Eu-
rope and a free Europe, as I said at the
beginning of my remarks. Even as we
protect the West's security, we must
marshal our combined military, diplo-
matic, and economic strengths in order
to reach out to the East. That is be-
cause the Soviets and many of their
allies are engaged in new thinking —
really, I guess we should say rethink-
ing— of their failed policies. The walls
of ideological dogma are collapsing and
with them the old order of a rigidly di-
vided Europe. Opportunities are now
opening for the East to rejoin the main-
stream of European and international
life.

At the anniversary summit, there-
fore, we and our allies made the next
40 years, not the last 40 years, our
point of reference. We forged, I think
it's fair to say, a new basis for unity. We
advanced toward our objectives of mak-
ing war both unthinkable and impos-
sible. And, we have set a new course so
that the alliance and the nations of the
West can bridge at last the East-West
divide.

As we in the West look into the
future, we rekindle our hope for a
Europe that is free and a Europe that
is whole. And, as we approach a new
century, we renew our commitment
to work with all nations to make the
world a far, far better place.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE SECRETARY

Q. Do you think that Gorbachev's
efforts to open up Russian society
will succeed?

A. We hope they will. We very
much want perestroika to succeed. At
the same time, we have to recognize, I
think, that there are some significant
problems that have to be overcome.
There is, of course, the resistance of a
rather significantly entrenched bureau-
cracy to change — a bureaucracy that
has built up over the past 70 years.
There are major economic problems
that have to be overcome, and there are
the problems, of course, in the Soviet
Union — the problems of nationalities.
These are the three biggest problems
that I think the General Secretary
faces in his efforts to open up the Sovi-
et Union.

We have said on a number of occa-
sions that we think it is in the best in-
terests of the United States for
perestroika to succeed, because we
think that will produce a more stable, a
more secure, and a more open Soviet
Union.

Q. What is our view of ethnic dis-
turbances in the Soviet Union?

A. I think those are rather signifi-
cant problems for the leadership. They
have suggested as much, recognized
them as such. Our view, of course, is
that we stand for freedom, democracy,
the right of free speech, the right of as-
sembly. I think that pretty well an-
swers your question.

We'd like to see reform go forward
in the Soviet Union. We take note of
the fact that, to some extent, the politi-
cal reform process in the Soviet Union
may be a bit ahead of the economic re-
form process. They have got some ma-
jor, major steps to take to find their
way to a market economy.

I think that perhaps we've seen
somewhat the reverse in the People's
Republic of China, where the economic
reforms got out in front of the political
reforms. It is our view that democratic
reforms — political and economic —
should proceed apace.

Q. Since NATO's prime mission
for 40 years has been to deter the So-
viet military threat, does the Presi-
dent's conventional proposal indicate
we believe that threat has signifi-
cantly diminished? Or is it based on a
hope that the threat will diminish
enough to justify fewer U.S. troops?

A. No. It's based on a rather, we
think, realistic assumption that if we

could get to parity, we would see the
Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact al-
lies having to reduce by significantly
greater numbers in all categories of
weapons and manpower — I mean, the
proposal the President has presented
calls for a reduction in U.S. troop
strength in Europe of 29,200 and a cor-
responding reduction in Soviet troop
strength of 325,000. So it's based on a
realistic assessment by the political
and military leadership in the United
States that it's in the very best inter-
ests of the peace and security of the
Western alliance that we see these
reductions.

Q. You and the President have en-
couraged the Soviets to tear down the
Berlin Wall. Do you seriously believe
that that decision can be made with-
out the consent of the East German
Government?

A. We're really not suggesting
that it necessarily can be made without
the consent of the East German Gov-
ernment. But what we're saying is that
this is — we hear the Soviet Union talk-
ing a lot about a common European
home, and that is their competing vi-
sion, if you will, to our suggestion that
we should see a Europe that is un-
divided and free. We argue that you
can't talk about a common European
home unless the people living in that
home are free to move from room to
room. The Berlin Wall is the greatest
symbol that we see of the fact that un-
der the current system people are, in
fact, not free to move from room to
room.

""We also know, of course, that the
Soviet Union has a significant degree
of influence as far as the German Dem-
ocratic Republic is concerned.

Q. Who's in charge in China?

A. Let me suggest to you that we
have seen various reports about who's
in charge. I think it's too soon, and the
situation is too clouded now for us to
answer that definitively by suggesting
names — throwing names out there for
you.

The Chinese themselves, at this
point in time, are not shedding a lot of
light on this, which I think is another
indication of the fact that there is a
power struggle going on in China.

Q. Are economic sanctions being
considered as a way to bring pressure
on China, and can you rule out specif-
ically the use of a grain embargo?

A. The President, in announcing
the action that he took several days ago
with respect to military sales and the
exchange of visits between military ad-
visers, said that he reserved the right
to review all options as the situation
warrants. For the time being, he has
determined that it is important that
we maintain the economic relationships
that exist now.

In large part, I said a moment ago
that I thought the reform process in
China — the economic part — got out a
little ahead of the political part. But in
large part, those economic reforms are
what have led to the opening up that we
saw before this recent tragic and unfor-
tunate and deplorable crackdown.

We think it's important that we
maintain, if we can — depending upon
what happens and depending upon the
future course of events there — that we
maintain these economic ties, because
those are the things that for the most
part have led to a move toward open-
ness in the People's Republic of China.
But the President does reserve his op-
tions with respect to all these matters.

Q. If, as it now appears, the
hardliners are taking charge in Bei-
jing, will you hand back Mr. Fang, the
dissident now in the U.S. Embassy, if
asked to do so?

A. Mr. Fang is in the embassy
where he took refuge for personal safe-
ty reasons. We never discuss questions
involving the issue of asylum, and I
will not discuss that now. Let me sim-
ply say that he asked for refuge in our
embassy, and we granted that refuge.
We will be motivated primarily by his
wishes in this regard.

Q. In retrospect, was the U.S.
Embassy in Beijing slow in beginning
the process of evacuating Americans
from Beijing and other parts of
China?

A. No, I really don't think so. I
think, frankly, that we were right on
the mark, if I might suggest so. I've
seen some comment to the contrary. We
have had a working group monitoring
this situation since the 19th of May on a
24-hour basis. We have been following-
it very, very closely. I have been follow-
ing it personally very closely for the
past week, or since last Saturday morn-
ing, in any event, when the circum-
stances began to go in the direction
they were moving in.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE SECRETARY

I have been in very frequent con-
tact with the President by telephone
and in person on each day since then.
When the violence began to erupt on
Saturday, our embassy sent some of our
officers at some personal risk to these
diplomats, if I might say so, into the
square to advise Americans to leave.
We sent them to the campuses and into
town to suggest that they give consid-
eration to leaving.

We have provided for air transpor-
tation through contact that we made
with some of the private air carriers in
the United States. I might say that
those companies — United, Continental,
and Northwest — have been very, very
quick to respond to our pleas for assist-
ance. We now have more air charter ca-
pacity than we have people willing to
leave. The last airplane that took off an
hiiur or two ago, I think, left with only
(is Americans on board. There are no
mure Americans at the airport await-
inu evacuation from Beijing. There are
.■^till some Americans in Beijing, but we
have ordered our U.S. Government de-
pt'ndents home. We have strongly sug-
gested that all Americans leave China.
I Now obviously, we are not in a po-
sition to, nor would we want to be in a
pnsition to, force them to do so against
tht'ir will. But I particularly want to
say that I believe that our embassy
there and our Ambassador, Jim Lilley,
have been e.xtraordinarily responsive
tn the needs and concerns of Americans
tlii'oughout this crisis. Not one Ameri-
can has been killed. Only one has been
hurt. We were in touch with him imme-
diately after he was injured and taken
til a hospital. He has since been re-
leased and is ambulatory. So all in all,
we are keeping our fingers crossed,
maintaining our 24-hour vigilance.

While our dependents are coming
I lilt of Beijing, we are maintaining the
full staff of other embassy people there
sii that we can continue to assist
people — Americans — to get to the air-
port and to move about in this very,
\ery chaotic and unfortunate situation.

Q. Are the events in China hav-
ing any effect on the situation in the
Korean Peninsula?

A. There's been no significant fall-
iiiit as we stand here at this time.

Q. The Iranian leader Rafsanjani
J, today made an offer to help with the
nine U.S. hostages in Lebanon. What
is your reply to him on this request
for U.S. help?

A. He said that if w^e would help
with respect to certain Iranian hos-
tages, I think, who are alleged to be
held in the Christian enclave sector of
Lebanon — let me simply say that we
have provided Iran, on several occa-
sions, with all of the information that
we have with regard to the disap-
pearance of these four Iranians in Bei-
rut in 1982. It's our position and
remains our position that Iran should
move to bring about the immediate and
unconditional release of U.S. citizens
held by Iranian-supported groups in
Lebanon.

Q. Ali Khamenei is the new lead-
er in Iran. Is he a caretaker, and do
you expect that relations with Iran
will improve?

A. I've just given you our condi-
tions for improvement in those rela-
tions. And in addition to seeing Iran
move unconditionally and with dispatch
to obtain the release of our hostages,
w^e, of course, would like to see them
renounce state-sponsored terrorism,
which they have been unwilling to do in
the past.

I have to say to you I think we're
going through a period of great change
around the world. One of our chal-
lenges, of course, is to relate to that
change in an effective and appropriate
way.

Before I finish answering your
question on Iran, I should throw one
other thing in here about China. While
the President does reserve options, I
think it's important to note he has
spent and we in the United States have
spent many years in improving the re-
lationship between the United States
and the People's Republic of China and
encouraging China to move toward de-
mocratization. Now we've had a very
tragic step backward. But it is impor-
tant, I think, that we all recognize the
importance of this relationship.

Back to Iran. Change is taking
place in many areas of the world.
Change is clearly going to take place
now in Iran. It is my own view, in all
probability, there will be a significant
struggle for power there, and it re-
mains to be seen whether there will be,
in the future, any basis for our improv-
ing our relationship with that country.

Q. Could you tell us about the
questions Ambassador Pelletreau
[Robert H. Pelletreau. Jr., U.S. Am-
bassador to Tunisia and official U.S.
contact with the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO)] is bringing up
in his dialogue with the PLO today in
Tunisia?

A. Let me start answering by say-
ing to you that the dialogue we are
maintaining with the PLO, we have
said on many occasions, should not be
and cannot be, as far as we're con-
cerned, an end in and of itself. It can
only be productive if it can move us for-
ward toward the goal of peace in the
Middle East.

This was the third formal session
which we've had with the PLO. Our dia-
logue has progressed from initial con-
tacts to now the discussion of
substantive issues and today to a con-
sideration of serious and practical ways
we might progress in a step-by-step
fashion toward the goal of a comprehen-
sive settlement through negotiations
based, of course, on UN Security Coun-
cil Resolutions 242 and 338. And we got
into a fair amount of substance today in
that dialogue.

We, of course, support the proposal
that [Israeli] Prime Minister Shamir
has advanced for elections in the occu-
pied territories, particularly when you
consider that he advanced that proposal
in the context of a way to launch a polit-
ical negotiation. We think this is
meaningful. We think this gives us
something to work with, to try and
move things forward toward peace in
this very, very difficult part of the
world and with respect to this very,
very intractable problem.

Q. Several former U.S. ambas-
sadors have admitted last Sunday
that over the past several years, they
had over 30 secret meetings with the
PLO in violation of U.S. State De-
partment policy and a promise made
to Israel by former Secretary of State
Kissinger.

The first question: How does this
breach of trust with Israel affect pos-
sibilities for progress with the prob-
lems in the West Bank and Gaza?

And, second, what do you know
about the involvement of U.S. citizens
and former State Department offi-
cials in masterminding the intifada'!

A. I don't know anything about it,
and I take note of the fact you made
mention in the question these were for-
mer U.S. Ambassadors. [Laughter]

Let me simply say we now have a
dialogue with the PLO, because the
PLO has acceded to the three condi-
tions the United States laid out there
as preconditions for such a dialogue 13
years ago. So we don't have secret
meetings. These meetings are — I
mean, they're private meetings, but
they're not being held behind anybody's
back.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE SECRETARY

Frankly, this is the first time that
I've even heard of this. I hadn't seen
The Washington Posf article, so I can't
comment further.

Q. What sort of reaction has
your recent recommendations to the
Israelis in the Mideast peace gotten
from Congress? Many protests?

A. No. I've gotten — you mean
the — I guess you're referring to the
speech I gave which has received a fair
amount of publicity.

But I think it's interesting to note
I have received three congressional let-
ters with respect to that speech; two
very positive and approving, and one
that I would characterize as slightly
negative.

But there doesn't seem to be
much — if you measure it by the volume,
by the number of letters, there
wouldn't seem to be that much — as
much interest as the question might
suggest up in the Congress.

Q. If the mission of the Organi-
zation of American States (OAS) to
Panama fails, what would be Wash-
ington's next step?

A. We're very hopeful, now that all
countries in Latin America, save
Cuba — which is not a member of the Or-
ganization of American States — and
save Nicaragua, agree with us there
should be a transfer of power in Pan-
ama. We're very hopeful, when the mis-
sion goes back down there, they will be
able to move the process forward.

You're asking me to look into a
crystal ball here and suggest what we
might do next, and I, of course, am un-
willing to do that, because that would
probably not be good policy even if I
were able to tell you, which I'm not.
[Laughter]

Q. How does the Bush Adminis-
tration's policy on South Africa differ
from the Reagan Administration's
unsuccessful policy of constructive
engagement?

A. I'm not sure that the question is
phrased in the right way. If I might re-
phrase it just a little bit.

Some of us believe that sanctions
sometimes are counterproductive.
Sometimes they can be quite effective.
It's important, if you're going to make a
difference with respect to the affairs of
any country, that you have an
ability to engage that country and you
have an ability to move public opinion
in other countries in support of your
policy vis-a-vis that country, that you

have an ability to reward or not rewai'd
that country.

That was the idea behind construc-
tive engagement. I recognize that the
term has been discredited in the sense
that was the term that was used to sup-
port the policy of the executive branch
of the U.S. Government. But the legis-
lative branch had a different policy, and
that policy prevailed, and it was a poli-
cy of sanctions.

What we would like to do is con-
vince the legislative branch, as I think
we were able to do with respect to Cen-
tral American policy, where we were
going off in different directions, and,
therefore, the United States could not
act in a unified way and could not be
successful. We would like to convince
the Congress we have the same ends in
mind. We seek the abolition of apart-
heid, which we think is deplorable, and
we seek the institution of a nonracial,
representative government in South
Africa.

I think that is the same goal of
those people who supported past sanc-
tion legislation and who support addi-
tional sanction legislation. Our
difference of opinion is with respect to
the best way to get there, and we are
now engaged in dialogue with the legis-
lative branch to see if we can come for-
ward with an agreed course, so the
United States can speak with one voice
and might be able to have some impact
on what happens in South Africa, be-
cause we're having scant impact now.

Q. Were your meetings in Rome
with the man likely to be the next
head of state in South Africa, Wil-
liam de Klerk, productive, and do you
see any sort of a breakthrough
coming?

A. I didn't meet with De Klerk in
Rome. I met with the Foreign Minister
of South Africa [Roelof F. "Pik" Botha].
I thought the meeting was productive.
I'll tell you what he told me, which I
understand he said before, but which I
found very significant. He said, "The
days of white domination are over." He
said, "We are going to abolish apart-
heid in South Africa," and he said, "My
party and I are going to run on that
platform."

Now, the question, of course, is
when. The key is implementation. But I
thought it was fairly significant that
the first time there was a high-level
meeting between representatives of
that government — and that's the party
that's going to succeed, going to proba-
bly win the election in South Africa — I

thought it was significant that the first
time there was a meeting between rep-
resentatives of that party and the Bush
Administration, they would be so de-
finitive in their comments to us and in
stating their goals in that way.

Q. Is the U.S. Government pre-
pared to support negotiations be-
tween the Najibullah regime and the
mujahidin in Afghanistan?

A. We will continue our support
for the right of the Afghan people to
self-determination. We have said before
we think it's a question of transfer of
power in Kabul, not sharing of power.
We don't think there can be self-
determination for the Afghan people if
Najibullah remains in powei'.

So our goals in that regard have
not changed. Our policy has not
changed, contrary to some suggestions
I saw a day or so ago in the press. We
have spent a fair amount of time yester-
day in discussions of this matter with
[Pakistani] Prime Minister Bhutto
when she was here, and we and our al-
lies in Pakistan will be moving forward
together in respect to this question of
Afghanistan.

Q. Back to the loop that you are
in, should civil war erupt in China,
what position will the United States
take? Would the I'nited States sup-
port one side or the other?

A. That's too speculative and hypo-
thetical for me to answer. It's a good
way to get in trouble; therefore, I won't
answer it.

Q. Would you want to flesh out
your proposal that the United States
and its allies should join in a creative
responsibility-sharing to help resolve
regional problems? Which regional is-
sues do you have in mind, and which
allies could be helpful? Are you sug-
gesting something like the assistance
Sweden played last year in influenc-
ing the PLO to shift its ground?

A. That's an example, but, of
course, Sweden is a neutral country
and not an ally. So that would not be a
good example from that standpoint.
But the NATO alliance includes, for in-
stance, a number of countries that were
very helpful when we had to go into the
Persian Gulf and assure freedom of
navigation.

The British and the Dutch, among
others, sent ships in to help with our
ships. The Japanese — although they're

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE SECRETARY

not members of NATO, they are an ally
of the United States — helped foot the
bill for that operation.

The Spanish are members of
NATO, and they can be very influential
with respect to regional conflicts in
Latin America by virtue of the cultural
relationship that exists there.

It's these kinds of things that I'm
talking about. The United Kingdom
was helpful in connection with Angola-
Namibia — a regional problem — and the
resolution of that problem. And [Brit-
ish Prime Minister] Margaret Thatcher
happened to be in southern Africa
when the Namibian settlement gave ev-

ery indication of coming off the tracks
because SWAPO [South West Africa
People's Organization] moved into
Namibia against the agreement. And
she was very helpful in getting that
back on track.

So it's that kind of thing that I'm
talking about. There's no reason why,
with this very vital and vibrant and ef-
fective alliance, we shouldn't coordi-
nate our efforts with respect to solving
some of these regional conflicts which
represent the real threat, I think, to
world peace today.

'Press release 112.

Challenges Ahead for NATO

and Developments in East-West Relations

Secvetanj Baker's statement pre-
pared for the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on June 20, 1989.^

It is a pleasure to appear before you
this afternoon to report on East-West
relations and the progress we have
made in our European security policy.

NATO's commitment to protect our
security and promote democratic val-
ues has been largely responsible for the
positive developments we see in the in-
ternational environment. At the NATO
summit, all Western leaders agreed
that we are in a remarkable period of
transition in East-West relations. A
combination of Western resolve and
economic problems within the Soviet
Union seem to have convinced the Sov-
iet leadership that it must rethink
a wide range of domestic and foreign
policies.

Now, it is the West's task to seize
the opportunities that have been
created by the new "correlation of
forces" — to borrow a phrase from Mos-
cow. At this time of transition, we must
work together to promote the West's
democratic principles enshrined in
the North Atlantic Treaty and in the
Helsinki Final Act.

The President has called for the
United States and the West to move
"beyond containment" toward a new ob-
jective: overcoming the division of Eu-
rope by making Europe whole and free.
We are seeking to bring a new unity to
Europe — a unity based on Western
values.

The President has also outlined his
strategy for moving toward this objec-
tive. He has explained how America
must lead in "managing change" by es-
tablishing new missions for the alliance
and the West.

U.S. -Soviet Dynamics

We are living in an era of transition.
The postwar system is being trans-
formed, and a new environment is
emerging. To establish the context of
these changing times, it's helpful to
begin with an assessment of how the
Soviet Union is changing.

The movement we're seeing in
Soviet politics presents a potential
revolution — a revolution we hope will
succeed. "New thinking" is really
a rethinking of their failed ideol-
ogy. But nobody knows — not even Mr.
Gorbachev — what kind of Soviet Union
ultimately will result from the changes
underway.

At this time of transition, our val-
ues and our interests have led us to en-
gage the East actively. We should not
sit idly by. We've moved decisively to
broaden our dialogue with the Soviet
Union, seeking to contribute content to
the slogans of Soviet "new thinking."

The Soviets have taken concrete
and encouraging strides in a number of
key areas. Emigration has increased
dramatically. They have come forward
with serious responses to our arms
control proposals — for example, on
intermediate nuclear forces and
conventional reductions. The Soviets
pulled out of Afghanistan as promised.

They have agreed to work actively with
us on transborder issues of global con-
cern. But there is a long way to go
before the promise of perestroika
becomes reality, before the progress
becomes institutionalized.

We'll have to be realistic and pa-
tient while we probe the Soviets to see
how far cooperation can go. We're going
to work hard to get results in every
area. Some of the individual steps may
be small, but their cumulative weight
could result in a markedly more con-
structive U.S. -Soviet relationship.

Results won't come easily; many of
the critically important issues between
us are not amenable to simple, facile
solutions. But the President and I are
optimistic that progress will come if
we have bipartisan support from Con-
gress; if we and our allies stand by our
convictions; if we remain engaged; and,
above all, if we stay united.

For our part, the Bush Adminis-
tration has been engaging the Soviets
across the full range of our concerns.
As always, we begin with human rights.
During my ministerial talks in Moscow
in May, I took up individual human
rights cases with Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze, telling him that we
won't be satisfied until the several hun-
dred remaining cases are resolved.

I also indicated to him that we
want the Soviets to go beyond the "era
of lists." We want to see them guaran-
tee human rights by institutionalizing
the changes they're making. We want
to see an open Soviet political system
and legal codes that will make the re-
cent gains difficult to reverse.

On arms control, we are also mov-
ing forward. We have promising move-
ment on conventional arms reductions.
(I'll say more about the President's am-
bitious conventional proposal and the
status of the CFE [conventional armed
forces in Europe] talks later.) The
President has put forward an "open
skies" proposal designed to build con-
fidence through greater transparency.
We are proceeding on a multilateral
basis with the CSCE [Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe]
talks on confidence- and security-
building measures in Vienna. We have
just signed a bilateral agreement with
the Soviets on avoiding military activ-
ities that could lead to inadvertent con-
flict. Yesterday, strategic arms control
negotiations resumed in Geneva.

And, we have also been stressing
with the Soviets our interest in extend-
ing the arms control agenda to cover
ballistic missile, chemical, and nuclear

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE SECRETARY

weapons proliferation. These weapons
are being acquired by irresponsible
regimes in unstable regions and in-
crease the danger of escalation.

While working to control the tech-
nological side of superpower competi-
tion through arms reductions and
control, we have made it clear to Mos-
cow that regional conflicts must be-
come a central focus of superpower
cooperation because of the dangerous
threats of escalation they represent.

In Moscow, General Secretary Gor-
bachev and Foreign Minister Shev-
ardnadze listened carefully to my
presentations on Nicaragua and the
Middle East peace process. They un-
derstand that we are giving diplomacy
a chance in Central America and that
our policy has bipartisan support. They
know the importance we attach to the
Sandinistas living up to their pledges
in Esquipulas II. In the Middle East,
they understand our support for elec-
tions in the territories, and they
understand, too, why a premature
international conference will only di-
vert us from the changes we need to
see taking place on the ground. We are
now engaging in a series of experts
talks with the Soviets on all the areas
of regional concern.

By taking positive action to resolve
regional conflicts, the Soviets can show
us that their new thinking applies the
world over. In Central America and the
Middle East, especially — but also in
southern Africa, the Horn of Africa,
and Asia — it is time for the Soviets
to prod their clients into doing some
new thinking of their own.

At the ministerial, we also had
fruitful discussions on transnational
and bilateral issues. The transnational
problems were added to the agenda at
our suggestion. We have pointed out
that the Alaskan oil spill, the Arme-
nian earthquake, Chernobyl, global
warming — all these are problems that
go beyond traditional geopolitical con-
cerns of sovereignty and security to af-
fect global well-being. Foreign Ministei-
Shevardnadze and I also signed an
agreement combating pollution in the
Bering and Chukchi Seas — a small step
on what I hope will be a long road to-
ward solving the international environ-
mental problems which threaten all
mankind.

On terrorism, we seek to establish
points of contact within our govern-
ments and vehicles for information
sharing about terrorist groups.

On bilateral subjects, we have es-
tablished a full workplan of 23 items as
diverse as ocean research, civil avia-
tion, atomic energy, and maritime
boundaries.

I would sum up this brief overview
of U.S. -Soviet relations this way:
No one can know the outcome of the
changes taking place in Moscow and
elsewhere in the communist world. In
the end, we do know that the success of
reform will depend primarily upon
choices made in Moscow, Beijing, or
East Berlin, not Washington, Brussels,
or Bonn. What we do know is that the
East can progress only through both
political and economic reform. To stand
in the way of such necessary, historic
change — as we are seeing to our out-
rage and sorrow in China — is to turn
one's back to the future. And that is
why General Secretary Gorbachev's
temporizing comments on those tragic
events are disappointing.

For our part, we strongly believe
that reform in the communist world —
whether in Asia or in Europe — is very
much in our interests. That is why
we're building on past efforts and mov-
ing forward on our broad agenda with
the Soviets. We are e.xploring and es-
tablishing new vehicles that will foster
systematic cooperation. And we'll be
continuing our wide-ranging discus-
sions during the ministerial meeting in
September.

We're actively engaging Moscow
with our eyes open and fixed on our
longstanding goals and interests: pro-
tecting Western security and pro-
moting the democratic values, goals,
and interests that we reaffirmed at the
NATO summit.

Moving Ahead: The NATO Summit

At NATO's 40th anniversary summit,
we made the next 40 years, not the last
40, our point of reference. And as we
took bold steps toward making war in
Europe both unthinkable and imposs-
ible, we set our eyes on the objective of
making Europe whole and free and the
world a much better place for everyone
to live in.

In Brussels, the President took
three significant actions to lead the al-
liance in managing the changing world
we face. First, this Administration
seized the opportunity to lock in and
accelerate a possible historical change
in the balance of military forces in Eu-
rope. Second, we reached agreement on
NATO's comprehensive concept. Third,
we identified new missions for NATO.

The President's Conventional |

Forces Proposal. Let me discuss the
President's conventional forces proposal
by giving the members a brief review
of the negotiations to date.

In March of this year, members of
the North Atlantic alliance and the
Warsaw Pact began negotiations in
Vienna on conventional armed forces in
Europe that are designed to reduce the
threats posed by Warsaw Pact superi-
ority in key conventional military capa-
bilities. At the opening of the CFE
negotiations, we and our Western part-
ners tabled detailed and comprehensive^
proposals designed to achieve security
and stability in Europe at greatly re-
duced levels of conventional forces.

The Western proposal, which has
become the basis for negotiations,
calls for establishment of equal NATO-
Warsaw Pact ceilings on key types of
equipment that can be used to seize and
hold territory. Beyond eliminating key
Warsaw Pact military advantages, the
Western approach to CFE seeks to re-
duce the pact's capability to initiate
surprise attacks and large-scale offen-
sive actions or to use military forces
for political intimidation. We also want
to reduce and constrain the overall size
of Soviet forces, the extent of their de-
ployment in Eastern Europe, and the
relative speed with which they can be
brought to bear in any conflict.

Finally, our approach includes four
subzonal ceilings which would limit the
concentration of forces in any part of
Europe. Thus, we seek to enhance de-
terrence by establishing East-West
parity in the capability to employ and
sustain military action.

A major opportunity to advance
the Vienna negotiations developed out
of my meeting with General Secretary
Gorbachev in Moscow on May 11. Mr.
Gorbachev presented me with specific
numerical ceilings and a more detailed
timetable for the proposal the East had
introduced earlier in Vienna. These fig-
ures were formally tabled just before
the NATO summit.

The President concluded that the
specific Warsaw Pact proposals re-
flected tacit Eastern acceptance of the
Western concept and framework for
CFE and that the time was ripe to give
the negotiations a major push. The
President decided to advance a four-
part augmentation of our original pro-
posal. At the summit, the plan was
universally lauded by our allies. Our
proposal calls for:

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE SECRETARY

One, locking in Eastern acceptance
of the proposed Western limits on key
elements of ground forces. That would
mean fixing common ceilings on the
numbers of tanks at 20,000, on armored
troop carriers at 28,000, and on artil-
lery pieces between 16,500 and 24,000,
depending on the resolution of defini-
tional questions. Equipment reduced
would be destroyed.

Two, expanding the West's original
proposal to include limitations on all
! aircraft permanently based on land and
on helicopters throughout the Atlantic-
to-the-Urals area at 15% below the cur-
jrent NATO total. All reduced equip-
ment would be destroyed.

Three, an agreement between the
United States and the U.S.S.R. to each
reduce their combat manpower sta-
tioned in Europe outside national terri-
tory to parity at 20*^ below current
U.S. levels, with the resulting ceiling
(ill U.S. and Soviet ground forces sta-
tioned in Europe at approximately
27.'), 000 troops. Withdrawn soldiers and
airmen on both sides would be demo-
bilized. This personnel ceiling would
re(|uire the Soviets to withdraw ap-
pi'oximately 325,000 military personnel
from Eastern Europe, thereby rein-
iforcing the objectives of the stationed
Ifni-ces ceiling in the original Western
proposal.

Four, an agreement on acceleration
of both the Eastern and Western time-
tables for reaching a CFE agreement
along the lines I have just outlined and
for implementing the required reduc-
tions. The Soviet proposal called for
full implementation of an accord by
1997. The President set a goal of com-
pleting an agreement in 6 months to
1 year with completion of required
reductions by 1992 or 1993.

These provisions would oblige both
sides to destroy significant amounts of
equipment. Most importantly, the Wai*-
saw Pact's preponderance in critical
components of military strength would
be eliminated. These efforts will not
undercut NATO's defense moderniza-
tion plans. They should be understood
as part of a comprehensive approach to
imi)roving our security through both
force modernization and arms reduc-
tion and control.

The Western governments are now
in the process of preparing these aug-
mentations of our original proposal
with the goal of presenting them at the
opening of the third round of negotia-
tions in Vienna on September 7. In
addition, the West is continuing to

develop the specific elements of its ver-
ification regime and a package of "sta-
bilizing measures," which are designed
to amplify the benefits of the equip-
ment ceilings. Work is also continuing
apace in the negotiations with the East
on the development of agreed defini-
tions and counting rules.

Both sides now agree, in principle,
that there should be subceilings on
forces on foreign soil in Europe, limits
on any one nation's forces, and sub-
zones. However, there are some impor-
tant differences in the way East and
West apply these principles. The East
has yet to advance its verification re-
gime, but we expect them to be fairly
forthcoming.

The Broader Implications of the
President's Proposal. I don't want to
get lost in numbers here. Arms reduc-
tion and control is much more than a
matter of simple subtraction. And the
President's initiative is more than a
military concept.

Our proposal has far reaching po-
litical implications for bringing about
the whole and free Europe that we
seek. We are seizing this opportunity
to diminish the shadow Soviet military
power casts throughout Europe. We
seek to free Western Europe from the
threat of aggression or political intim-
idation by superior Warsaw Pact forces.
Finally, we want to help free the politi-
cal reform process in Eastern Europe
from the heavy weight of an excessive
Soviet military presence. While we
tend to see the Soviet forces as a poten-
tial invasion force, to millions in the
East the Soviets remain an occupation
force.

In sum, we want to free all of Eu-
rope to become a center of cooperation,
not confrontation.

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in
NATO's Strategy. At the summit, the
President also led the alliance in taking
a second important step toward the
future: Western agreement on the com-
ponents of "A Comprehensive Concept
of Arms Control and Disarmament"
[see p. 22].

This achievement demonstrates
NATO's ability to adapt to change
while maintaining our fundamental
conviction that nuclear weapons play a
critical role in ensuring the effective-
ness of our deterrent strategy. In light
of the existing imbalances in conven-
tional forces, the alliance agreed that
any negotiations on short-range nuclear
forces (SNF) could begin only after the
implementation of a CFE agreement is
underway. Moreover, any negotiated

SNF reductions will not be carried out
until the CFE agreement is, in fact,
implemented.

The summit communique under-
scores— literally, in fact — that our ob-
jective in SNF negotiations would be
to achieve partial reductions in these
forces. The alliance is committed, for
as long into the future as can be fore-
seen, to maintain an appropriate level
of land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear
systems, including ground-based SNF
missiles.

Thus, the alliance reaffirmed our
long-shared conviction that nuclear
weapons make an irreplaceable con-
tribution to the credibility of NATO's
deterrent posture. We hope the cata-
strophic potential of nuclear escalation
in any conflict will continue to over-
whelm the calculations of any potential
aggressor. Even at conventional parity,
nuclear weapons will play a unique role
in our strategy.

New Missions for NATO. The

third step forward by the President at
the summit was his call for the alliance
to address new problems. He invited
our alliance partners to consider new
missions for the alliance. As we suc-
ceed in easing down the military con-
frontation in Europe, we must direct
the alliance toward new challenges.
NATO will always have as its central
purpose the maintenance of collective
Western security. However, the focus of
alliance activities in a more benign Eu-
ropean security environment will, ob-
viously, be different than it has been
during the past 40 years.

First, the President spoke of our
interest in furthering the decentraliza-
tion of political, economic, and social
authority in Eastern Europe. Even as
we protect the West, we must reach out
to the East to give substance to our
commitment to overcome the division of
Europe. In this regard, NATO's role as
a political consultative forum and our
commitment to the Helsinki process
could be more effectively used to syn-
chronize Western approaches to the
East. Together with activity in the Eu-
ropean Community and other Western
institutions, the United States and its
allies should develop a coherent strate-
gy for dealing with change in Eastern
Europe.

Second, the President also noted
the newly recognized dangers to our se-
curity and well-being posed by threats
to the environment. He proposed new
efforts that the West might undertake

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE SECRETARY

to help the East rectify its massive pollu-
tion problems. In addition, the allies are
committed to allocating more resources
to certain nonmilitary endeavors that
complement the functions of the Euro-
pean Community and other
European cooperative institutions — for
example, on environmental matters and
scientific cooperation.

Third, the President focused atten-
tion on the need for cooperation in deal-
ing with the array of security threats,
particularly those posed by regional
conflicts and the proliferation of chemi-
cal and nuclear weapons and their deliv-
ery systems.

It is not necessary for NATO to de-
velop highly visible unified responses to
all these new security threats, nor
should our efforts be limited to coopera-
tion among Western countries. These
new threats menace allies, friends, and
adversaries alike. We have signaled our
readiness to work with all concerned na-
tions to counter them.

Conclusion

The success of the summit, and indeed
of the alliance itself, is testament to
the enduring strength of the political,
cultural, and economic ties that have
united America with our European al-
lies for 40 years. As the President has
stressed, America is and will remain a
European power.

In Brussels, we and our alliance
partners set forth ambitious plans for
the future. We made important head-
way on the security agenda, having
successfully set guidelines for the de-
velopment of our nuclear and conven-
tional force postures and arms control
policies. In addition, we focused atten-
tion on the need for the members of the
alliance and other Western states to
address a much broader agenda that
confronts us in Europe and the world
during the 1990s.

But, most importantly, during this
40th anniversary of the signing of the
North Atlantic Treaty, and at a time of
great change in East-West relations,
we and our alliance partners have
forged a new basis for unity.

A New Pacific Partnership:
Framework for the Future

'Press release 118. The complete tran-
script of the hearings will be published by
the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
20402. ■

Secretary Baker's address pre-
pared for delivery before the Asia Soci-
ety ill Neiv York City on June 26, 1989.^

Thank you for that introduction, and I
am honored to be here. I am especially
happy to appear before the Asia Society
in the company of Japan's Foreign Min-
ister, Hiroshi Mitsuzuka. As the repre-
sentative of a great democracy, the
Foreign Minister understands, as we
all do, that a free government depends
upon well-informed citizens who are ac-
tive in public affairs. The Asia Society
can, therefore, reflect with pride upon
its contribution to America's under-
standing of East Asia and the Pacific
rim. Each one of you, by participating
in the [Asia] Society, makes a unique
contribution to our national interests.

Our understanding of events in
Asia and the Pacific has become all the
more important because the postwar
era is over. In Asia, as in Europe, a
new order is taking shape. While the
rites of passage will be painful — China
proves that — it is an order full of prom-
ise and hope. I believe strongly that
the United States, with its regional
friends, must play a crucial role in
designing its architecture.

There are major challenges to be
met as the new order emerges. In Asia
and the Pacific, as elsewhere in the
world, the demand for democracy is the
most vital political fact of our time.
The Philippines and South Korea have
made the transition to free govern-
ment. But, as we have seen to our
sorrow last year in Burma, and more
recently in China, there are no guaran-
tees of progress.

Another challenge stems from the
very fact of the Pacific rim's economic
success. Economic achievements carry
new responsibilities. Explosive growth
has been accompanied by imbalances
that threaten the integrity of the open
trading system.

Finally, we continue to face securi-
ty challenges. Conflict continues in In-
dochina. And on the Korean Peninsula,
there remains a heavily armed stand-
off. Elsewhere in Asia, the postwar
security arrangements are being
strained by economic constraints,
changing threats, and rising national-
ism. Yet without a regional consensus
on defense, all other achievements will
be put in doubt.

The Pacific region is clearly of
great and grow'ing importance to the
United States. That is why President
Bush and Vice President Quayle visited
Asia within the first 100 days of the
new Administration. In a few days, I
will be traveling to Tokyo to meet with
other donors to the Philippines Multi-
lateral Assistance Initiative. Then, I'll
go on to Brunei to meet my colleagues
in ASEAN [Association of South East
Asian Nations], one of the Pacific's most
constructive regional organizations.

The purpose of my trip is to estab-
lish the framework for a new Pacific
partnership. To build that new part-
nership, we need continued American
engagement in the region's politics,
commerce, and security. We need a
more creative sharing of global respon-
sibilities with Japan. And we also need
a new mechanism to increase economic
cooperation throughout the Pacific rim.

Elements of the New Partnership:
American Engagement

The foundation of the new Pacific part-
nership must be the engagement of the
United States. President Bush has
declared rightfully that America is a
European power and will remain one.
America is also a Pacific power, and
we will remain one.

The stakes are great. In 1988, for
example, our transpacific trade totaled
$271 billion, far exceeding our trans-
atlantic commerce of $186 billion. U.S.
trade with East Asia has more than
doubled since 1982.

Eight of our top 20 export markets
are now in the Pacific. U.S. investment
there, exceeding $33 billion, accounts
for 23% of all overseas profits earned
by U.S. corporations.

The prosperity of the Pacific, how-
ever, depends upon the peace of the
Pacific. For four decades, the United
States has provided a framework of
security that has permitted the region
to prosper. America's forward-deployed
deterrent remains more essential than
ever to the security of the Pacific. And,
as we demonstrated through the treaty
abolishing intermediate-range nuclear
forces, we will not seek to improve the
security of another region at Asia's
expense.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE SECRETARY

Today, our allies are stronger and
more prosperous than ever. And there
may be new opportunities to reduce
'both political tensions and threatening
military capabilities.

Surely we will be able to find cre-
ative, new ways to assure our mutual
defense. Just as surely, we must avoid
false complacency. We have fought
three major wars in East Asia in the
past 45 years. Neither we nor our allies
want to fight another.

I think that the facts are clear and
the conclusions inescapable. America's
unique political, economic, and mili-
itary capabilities provide the foundation
■ for a prosperous and secure Pacific. And
that foundation can be strengthened
further through improved regional
partnerships that reflect the achieve-
ments of our friends and allies.

iThe U.S.-Japan Global Partnership

Among those relationships in the Pacif-
ic, none is more important to the region
or the world than our alliance with
Japan.

Over the past decade, that alliance
has experienced a fundamental change.
Japan has become a world power. We
applaud this achievement which holds
so much promise for the future. But to
make the most of that promise, the
United States and Japan must build a
new and truly global partnership. The
foundations for that global partnership
are now being laid.

• Japan is shouldering more of the
mutual defense burden and provides
40% of the cost of stationing U.S.
forces in-country.

• The recently concluded FSX
fighter codevelopment project is an im-
portant advance as we strengthen our
cooperation in defense and technology.

• Japan will soon be the largest do-
nor of overseas development assistance.
Its role in the Philippines' assistance
initiative offers a prime example of

the good Japan can do in bolstering
emerging democracies and sharing
responsibilities.

• Finally, Japan has offered to help
in alleviating the international debt
problem.

There are, of course, other issues
I that will find their way onto the agenda
of a global partnership, including envi-
I ronmental protection and international
j peacekeeping. But the message is clear.
The time has arrived for Japan to trans-
late its domestic and regional successes

more fully into a broader international
role with increased responsibility. And
I am glad to say here today to my Japa-
nese colleague. Foreign Minister Mit-
suzuka, that I look forward to a new
closeness of coordination with Japan.

This expanding relationship will
require a transformation of outlook
and policy in both our countries. That
is already evident in the area of trade,
where our bilateral relationship contin-
ues to be troubled. Prime Minister Uno
himself put it best when, in his first
major speech to the Diet, he urged Ja-
pan to "embark upon rectifying those
institutions and practices that are ob-
jectively viewed as unfair." Though we
have seen some progress in the trade
area, the full opening of Japanese mar-
kets must still be achieved. And at the
same time, we look forward to the full
implementation of the structural re-
forms advocated by the Maekawa report.

We and Japan must recognize how
interconnected we really are. That is
why we are looking to begin a struc-
tural economic initiative. Its purpose is
to identify, on both sides, impediments
to the reduction of economic imbal-
ances— and to develop action plans
to remove them.

Change will be required of the
United States, not just of the Japanese.
That is why President Bush is deter-
mined to put our American house in
better order — to improve our educa-
tion, to sharpen our competitiveness,
to reduce the trade and budget deficits
that weigh so heavily on our economy.
And we will continue to oppose the pro-
tectionist pressures that menace the
world trading systems. The challenge
of structural change is not Japan's
alone.

Pacific Economic Cooperation

Let me turn now to the next part of
the framework — a new mechanism to
increase economic cooperation through-
out the Pacific. Last year intra-Asian
trade approached $200 billion, reflect-
ing the rapid pace of Pacific rim eco-
nomic integration. Yet unlike Europe,
there are inadequate regional mecha-
nisms to deal with the effects of in-
terdependence. Many distinguished
statesmen and influential organizations
have suggested ways to fill the gap —
among them Australian Prime Minister
Hawke and MITI [Japan's Ministry of
International Trade and Industry] dur-
ing the time Hiroshi Mitsuzuka headed
it. All their suggestions share the ob-
jective of improving economic coopera-

tion and offering a regional forum to
discuss a range of common problems.

Clearly, the need for a new me-
chanism for multilateral cooperation
among the nations of the Pacific rim is
an idea whose time has come. Our in-
volvement in the creation of this new
institution will signal our full and on-
going engagement in the region. And
by furthering the development and in-
tegration of market economies within
the international system, we strength-
en the collective force of those that
share our principles.

I want to explore the possibilities
for such a mechanism in detail during
my trip. The United States will not of-
fer a definitive blueprint. We will be
looking, instead, for a consensus, draw-
ing on the best elements from various
plans. This new mechanism should be
based on the following key principles.

First, any mechanism should en-
compass a wide array of issues, extend-
ing from trade and economic affairs to
issues such as cultural exchange and
the protection of the Pacific region's
natural resources. As such, it would
embody what the President has called
"creative responsibility-sharing,"
meaning that each government should
act commensurate with its resources
and capabilities. All our economies
have benefited from the world trading
system and all should act commensu-
rate with their resources and capa-
bilities to help strengthen it.

Second, any Pacific-wide institu-
tion must be an inclusive entity that ex-
pands trade and investment. It must
help, not hinder, already existing ef-
forts, such as the Uruguay Round of
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade], the OECD [Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment], or a regional group, such as
ASEAN. It should be based on a com-
mitment by market economies to facili-
tate the free flow of goods, services,
capital, technology, and ideas.

Third, a pan-Pacific entity should
recognize the diversity of social and
economic systems and differing levels
of development in the region. At the
same time, we should recognize that
private initiative and free-market
policies offer the best route for indi-
vidual opportunity and higher living
standards.

Today, Minister Mitsuzuka and I
talked about the possibility of such a
new entity. And I will be discussing
how we can create this new mechanism
when I see Prime Minister Hawke this

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE SECRETARY

week and our ASEAN friends next
week. If a consensus can be reached,
we would support the Prime Minister's
call for a ministerial meeting this fall
as a first step toward developing such
a new Pacific institution.

Constructive Relations With China

Full American engagement, a global
partnership with Japan, and a new po-
litical mechanism for Pacific economic
cooperation are critical pieces in the
puzzle of Asia's future. But that future
will be incomplete without China. And
today, more than ever, China casts a
long shadow over the Pacific.

China had made great economic
strides. Per capita income doubled in a
decade. An open window to Western
trade, technology, and investment was
an essential part of reform. To sum it
up, if I can, China had decided to join
in regional progress rather than re-
main isolated from it.

History shows, however, that eco-
nomic and political reforms are but two
sides of the same coin. Now it has be-
come all too evident that the pace of po-
litical change in China did not match
the aspirations of the Chinese people.

The President has condemned in
the strongest terms the brutal events of
this past month. We and other nations
have suspended business as usual. But
we and the rest of the world must not
let our revulsion at this repression
blind us to the pressures for reform.

China has suffered a tragic set-
back, but the story is not ovei". As the
President said, "the process of democ-
ratization in communist countries will
not be a smooth one, and we must react
to setbacks in a way that stimulates
rather than stifles progress."

That is why we have acted in a
measured way. The hasty dismantling
of a constructive U.S. -Chinese rela-
tionship, built up so carefully over two
decades, would serve neither our inter-
ests nor those of the Chinese people.
Above all, it would not help those aspi-
rations for democracy that were so ob-
vious in the millions who marched to
support the students in Tiananmen
Square.

Having said that, let me be clear:
The U.S. Government and its people
will stand for the democratic values we
hold dear. China's current leadership
may have cleared the square; they
cannot clear the conscience. China's
rendezvous with freedom, like its
rendezvous with the advancing nations

of the Pacific, cannot be long delayed.
We will be there to help when the day
follows the night.

Conflict in the Pacific

Finally, we and the entire region must
deal with the remaining major conflicts
that threaten peace: the Korean Penin-
sula and Indochina.

I must note with regret that the
North Korean regime has yet to aban-
don its self-imposed isolation or its
pressure tactics intended to destabilize
the Republic of Korea. We will continue
to probe for hints of progress in reduc-
ing tensions between North and South,
looking for signs of a willingness to en-
gage in greater (jr/a.s»(os? and military
transparency. Our policy is to facilitate
reconciliation through dialogue with all
concerned parties, above all through
direct talks between South and North.
We will maintain fully our security
commitment to Korea to facilitate such
progress and prevent armed conflict.

In Cambodia the shooting contin-
ues and the danger of renewed civil war
is real. Hanoi's announced intention to
withdraw its troops by the end of Sep-
tember has accelerated efforts toward
a negotiated settlement. Our principal
objectives are to bring about a verified
Vietnamese withdrawal, to prevent a
return to power of the Khmer Rouge,
and to provide the Cambodian peo-
ple a genuine opportunity for self-
determination. We believe a compre-
hensive agreement, backed by a cred-
ible international presence under UN
auspices, is the best way to achieve
these goals.

We believe that Prince Sihanouk's
leadership is essential to the process of
creating an independent Cambodia at
peace with itself. That is why we have
asked Congress to authorize additional
aid to the noncommunist resistance.
Such aid will strengthen the Prince's
position in the political process now un-
derway and increase the prospects for
a settlement which can ensure that the
Khmer Rouge never again take power.

As we examine the possibilities of
resolving the remaining Pacific con-
flicts, I want to note here some new de-
velopments in Soviet policy. For much
of the postwar era, Soviet actions in
Asia could only be described as omi-
nous. Moscow has deployed a formida-
ble military presence able to project
naval and air power well into the Pacific.

Three years ago, at Vladivostok,
General Secretary Gorbachev an-
nounced a new approach to Soviet in-

terests in Asia. After easing Sino-
Soviet border tensions, withdrawing
Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and
influencing Vietnamese restraint, Mr.
Gorbachev was able recently to visit
Beijing. President Bush welcomed this
development. It confirms that a con-
structive Soviet approach is possible if
Moscow changes its policy of military
intimidation and support for
aggression.

Now, it is time for new Soviet
deeds to match new Soviet thinking.
Let Moscow end its occupation of
Japan's Northern Territories. Let
Vladivostok become an open port, as
Mr. Gorbachev proposed 3 years ago.
Let special economic zones bloom in the
Soviet Far East, as Mr. Gorbachev sug-
gested 1 year ago. Let the Soviet
Union cooperate in resolving the ten-
sions and hostilities in Korea and
Cambodia.

Conclusion

A political philosopher once wrote
that "there is nothing more difficult to
take in hand, more perilous to conduct,
more uncertain in its success, than to
take the lead in the introduction of a
new order of things." Yet today in the
Pacific and East Asia, as in Europe,
we face the inescapable challenge of
building a new order.

Thei-e are perils. There will be dif-
ficulties. Yet I believe that despite
these uncertainties, the rewards of a
free, prosperous, and secure Pacific
are within our reach.

That calls for a new Pacific part-
nership, based on a global sharing of
responsibilities with Japan. We also
need a new political mechanism to
enhance economic cooperation in the
Pacific rim. And we need to address
the points of conflict that still threaten
the peace of the Pacific.

Let me close on this note. I believe
that, ultimately, what beckons us to
our Pacific destiny goes beyond the
reckoning of material interests. It is
the idea of a creative harmony, the
product of many different nations, each
with its own approach but drawn to-
gether around certain principles. It is
the faith that we can create a Pacific
community reaching out to the rest of
the world. It is, in short, the belief
that free peoples, working together,
can emancipate our region at last
from historic burdens of poverty and
conflict. That is our vision, to which
we this day dedicate our new Pacific
partnership.

'Press release 123 I

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE SECRETARY

Secretary's Interview

on "Newsmaker Saturday"

Secretary Baker was interviewed
(III CNN's "Newsmaker Saturday" by
Charles Bierbaxer and Ralph Begleiter
(III June 3, 1989.^

Q. The pictures from Beijing today
are vivid and alarming. Chinese secu-
rity forces have opened fire on the
student demonstrators, and the stu-
dents have resisted. Amid the flames,
there are also the first victims on
both sides. It is very much a contest
of the flames of suppression, which
we now see, versus the flames of de-
mocracy, which we have witnessed
kindling the past weeks in Tianan-
men Square.

Is there any influence that the
Inited States has exerted, sought to
exert, can exert, to try and bring
what we are seeing now to a peaceful
rather than a violent conclusion?

A. Unfortunately, it would appear
that the situation in China is turning
uu'ly and chaotic. The U.S. Government
has heretofore expressed its concern to
the Chinese Government that the ut-
most restraint be used. I think it's im-
portant to note that there has been a
sinnificant amount of restraint used
ii\er the past number of weeks, because
this has been going on for quite some
time.

I think the Chinese Government
knows of the position of the U.S. Gov-
ernment. The army of China calls itself
the army of the people, and we think it
would be unfortunate, indeed, if the
army of the people were used to sup-
press the people. This would disturb
the United States, and it w^ould, of
course, disturb the people of the Unit-
ed States.

Q. Have you been told, though,
that this is really none of your busi-
ness, that it's going to be handled the
w ay the Chinese seek to?

A. The Chinese are, like others I
suppose, of a mind from time to time
that things that involve the internal af-
fairs of that country are just that —
matters involving their internal af-
fairs. I think that the messages which
we have sent have, however, been re-
ceived in the spirit in which they have
been sent. We've not, in effect, been
told in so many words, "You mind your
own business," because the commit-

ment of the United States of America
to democracy, to freedom of speech, to
freedom of expression, and freedom of
assembly is w^ell known throughout the
world.

Q. You said that the situation
had turned ugly and chaotic. Chaos
was one of the things many people
around the world — businessmen,
diplomats — are very worried about in
China. How chaotic is it, according to
your latest reports?

A. We've been in touch very
recently — within the last hour — with
our Embassy there. I have spoken, as a
matter of fact, to the President within
the last hour, and the reports that
we're receiving and that are being com-
municated to me and that I am commu-
nicating to him are that it's quite
chaotic now. There is shooting going
on. To some extent, that shooting ap-
pears to be aimed up in the air, al-
though we do have some preliminary
reports of casualties. We're not able to
confirm any specific casualty reports.

Q. Should Americans who are in
Beijing leave, and what about busi-
nesses who have investments in
China?

A. We have, as you know, a travel
advisory against travel to China now.
We have, in fact, ordered our Embassy
people out of Tiananmen Square. We
have suggested that other Americans
avoid Tiananmen Square, but we have
actually ordered our Embassy person-
nel out of the square. It's a situation
that is not a happy one; it's not pleas-
ant. It is, indeed, turning quite ugly.

Q. Just recently, one of the Chi-
nese leaders, Wan Li, was in this
country. President Bush has often
made reference to his conversations
and relationship with Zhao Ziyang.
These appear to be people who now
are out of power. Do you have any as-
sessment as to what may have hap-
pened to them, or who is in charge
now, and is it a solid control?

A. There has been a power strug-
gle in conjunction with this very pas-
sionate statement that these hundreds
of thousands of students are making for
democracy. This has triggered a power
struggle within China. I'd really rather
not go into the details of who's up and

who's down, and where we think the
various parties are. That's really some-
thing I think —

Q. Is that because of uncer-
tainty?

A. No, not so much because of un-
certainty; because we have some opin-
ions on it. But I really do believe that
would be seen to be interfering in the
internal affairs of China, and that
would probably not be appropriate for
us to do.

Q. Is there any response the U.S.
Government can take or should take
overtly in response to the ugliness
that you see now in Beijing?

A. We have sent the signals that I
have mentioned to you, the messages
that I've just mentioned to you here on
the program. This is a matter of great
concern to the United States. I suppose
saying that is a signal. I have said that
it is something that disturbs the Amer-
ican people. Beyond that, we will have
to see how the situation develops.

I said earlier — and I think we
should keep this in mind — that both
sides in this exercised a significant de-
gree of restraint for quite a period of
time, and it is our hope that they will
return to restraint. We have some re-
ports, as you probably do, that there
are some Molotov cocktails being
thrown, so it would appear that there
may be some violence being used here
on both sides.

Q. It almost sounds as though
you're suggesting the demonstrators
also ought to back off a bit here.

A. No, I think the demonstration,
for the most part, has been very peace-
ful. It's been very orderly. It has, as
I've indicated to you, been what I think
we would characterize as a very
passionate statement for democracy.
It's only recently that we've received
reports — as a matter of fact, during
the course of this recent escalation on
the part of the government — of some
Molotov cocktails being thrown by the
students.

Q. Beyond the Molotov cocktails,
there are arms that the United States
sends to the Chinese Government.
There is some rumbling on Capitol
Hill that perhaps you ought to stop
doing that, or at least curtail it.
What action will you take?

A. Oh, I don't think we should sit
here today, if I might suggest, within
hours of the first really significant use
of force, and that's what I think we see

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

THE SECRETARY

here now. But this is, after all, the first
time we've seen that against a peaceful
demonstration that has lasted for
many, many weeks. I don't think we
should sit here this morning and try
hypothesize about what that will mean
with respect to —

Q. But you know that Congress
will. Is this a question that you feel
you're going to have to address?

A. I think we'll have to see what
happens. Let's see what happens now
as we move forward. We're not sure
what course this will take even now, al-
though I have characterized it for you
in the words, actually of our people
there in China, as ugly and chaotic.
We're afraid it's moving in that
direction.

Q. There are reports of more
troops moving into Tiananmen
Square. We go now to CNN's Mike
Chinoy in Beijing.

Mike Chinoy. Thousands of
troops are now sweeping through Ti-
ananmen Square. They have been fir-
ing as they go. They appear to have
cleared the top end of the square.
Thousands of people broke and ran in
panic as the troops opened fire at
them, just in front of the Gate of
Heavenly Peace. I can now see thou-
sands of people streaming down
Changang Boulevard, away from the
square, moving toward the east. The
troops are systematically sweeping
the square, trying to clear the re-
maining protesters from it. You can
hear the sirens of ambulances racing
through these crowds. There are
many people wounded. I fear there
are many people dead. We have no
precise casualty figures. The guns
have been blasting almost continu-
ously. It's just in the last moment or
two that it has stopped. Now it's pick-
ed up again down toward the square.

Thousands of troops poured out
of the entrance to the Forbidden City
on the north side of the square and
moved into the square. We also have
reports the troops were firing from
the roof of the Great Hall of the Peo-
ple, and the roof of Chairman Mao's
mausoleum, although we cannot con-
firm that.

There are reports from eyewit-
nesses that in the southern corner of
the square that troops bayonetted
protesters. This, ironically, right
near Mao's mausoleum and the Colo-
nel Sanders Kentucky Fried Chicken
joint venture restaurant.

As the crowds stream back now,
some of them are regrouping and
chanting, waving flags, but from my
vantage point — the top part of the
square — which has been a sea of peo-
ple for 3 weeks, is now clear. The
troops are slowly trying to establish
their control over the square.

Q. In light of this stronger ac-
tion, does the U.S. Government now
take a stronger demarche against the
Chinese Government? Do you do
something more?

A. I think what I have said here
earlier today is, in effect, considerably
stronger than what we've said here-
tofore. It's important that the Chinese
people not lose the social and economic
progress, the developments they've
made socially and economically over the
past decade. As I've indicated earlier
on the program, it is very important,
however, that excessive force not be
used. That would, unfortunately, ap-
pear to be the case, and this will dis-
turb the U.S. Government, and it will
disturb the American people
considerably.

Q. Can the U.S. Government con-
tinue to share science and technology
achievements with the Chinese Gov-
ernment, which has apparently open-
ed fire from the roof of the Great
Hall of the People upon its own
citizens?

A. Before we get into hypothetical
situations, let's see how this most re-
cent and extremely deplorable develop-
ment unfolds. Let's see what happens
over the course of the next few days be-
fore we start hypothesizing about what
we might or might not do in the future.

Q. Let me ask you about arms
control, then. Have you had a direct
Soviet response to the President's pro-
posals delivered at NATO earlier this
week?

A. We haven't had what I would
call a comprehensive response. We've
had responses that you've seen report-
ed in the news and that we've seen
reported.

Q. Does the Soviet Government
have to respond, in the U.S. view, to a
package — a complete package — deal
that the President proposed? Is it all
or nothing? Or is there room for
negotiation?

A. Yes. As I indicated in Bonn — or
London, I can't remember which of
those press conferences — this is a pack-
age deal. This is not something that
NATO will put on the table and invite

the Warsaw Pact to pick and choose
those elements it likes, or reject those
elements it doesn't.

Q. When you said that, you've
really upped the ante on this. You
went to Brussels feeling that the So-
viets had now come very close to your
position on tanks and armored per-
sonnel carriers.

Now you're saying, in effect, it's
not good enough; let's go farther. Or
you're saying, it's good; let's see if we
can go farther. What if he comes
back — and it's not hypothetical — and
says, okay, we're in agreement on
phase one; let's do that, and then
we'll talk about phase two?

A. I'm inclined to think that we
would want to reject that, because the
proposal that the President put on the
table is a coordinated proposal. It is a
whole. It's not something that he lays
out there, or that NATO lays out there,
inviting them to pick what they like
and reject what they don't. It's impor-
tant that we not have control or reduc-
tion in one area, because everything is
related.

I think the military would tell us
that it's something we should continue
to look at as a package.

Q. The proposal includes a nego-
tiation on aircraft, combat aircraft.
Toward the end of the trip, it became
clear that the United States has told
perhaps France, but certainly Bri-
tain, don't worry, your aircraft are
not going to be included in this deal.
It sounds a little like a lot of side
deals being made that is not really am
alliance-wide commitment on the
question of combat aircraft.

A. No. When the proposal was de-
veloped, we faced up to the problem
that is presented by the possibility of
including the dual-capable aircraft of
France and Great Britain. And the pro-
posal was designed with that in mind;
that is, with the fact in mind that we
should not include their dual-capable
aircraft.

There are counting rules now, and
there are definitional problems on air-
craft that I'm sure you're aware of that
we're going to have to overcome. The
definition of the Warsaw Pact, or the
Soviets, about combat aircraft is quite
different than ours.

Q. That's going to make it hard
for the Soviets to accept an all-or-
nothing deal.

AFRICA

A. What that's going to mean is it's
going to mean we're going to have to
negotiate diligently, and it's going to
take us a while to reach a final
agreement.

Q. As we traveled through Eu-
rope this past week, we went from
dissension in the ranks to some ap-
prehension to an agreement, to a sigh
of relief, to almost euphoria, to gee
whiz, it was swell. Is that perhaps
going too far? Is there too much eu-
phoria at this stage? Is there a cau-
tion that you should have for
yourselves as well as everyone else?

A. I hope there's not too much eu-
phoria. We have an agreement here
that is not going to be easy to negoti-
ate. As a matter of fact, we do not yet
have an agreement; we have a proposal.
But it is a bold proposal, and it's far-
reaching. Clearly you want to not get
overly enthusiastic or optimistic, but I
think that there is clearly reason for
some optimism.

Q. Speaking of arms control, but
in another area of the world, the Indi-
an Government recently tested a bal-
listic missile which now gives India
the capability not only to produce a
nuclear weapon but also to deliver it,
almost anywhere in the region that
it's in.

That could be a threat to
Pakistan. What's your view of the es-
calation of the nuclear and missile is-
sue in that region of the world?

A. The escalation of both the nucle-
ar and missile issue problems is of ma-
jor concern to us, as is the escalation, if
I may say so, of chemical weapons
around the world, not just in that re-
gion but around the world. That's why
we, as you well know, wanted to begin
a dialogue with the Soviet Union about
proliferation of missiles, of nuclear and
of chemical weapons technology.

Q. Has India crossed a line of
some sort as far as the United States
is concerned and gone too far in its
development of a weapons program?

A. As far as missile technology,
perhaps not. We continue to suggest to
both India and Pakistan that they exer-
cise restraint in connection with their
nuclear programs, and, in fact, there
are legal considerations, as you know,
again, with respect to the development,
the possibility of development, by
Pakistan of a nuclear capability.

Q. While we're jumping around
the world, while we were traveling,
did anything happen in Panama that

we should know about, or is Noriega
as entrenched as ever?

A. The commission that went down
from the OAS [Organization of Ameri-
can States] will be coming back up here
next week. I'll be meeting with the
three foreign ministers who made up
that commission the early part of this
week. There will be another session of
the Organization of American States to
continue to work the issue, work the
problem. I think it's important to note
that with the sole exception of
Nicaragua, all Latin governments now
subscribe to the idea that Gen. Noriega
has abused power.

Q. Yes, but do you have any indi-
cation from the foreign ministers
that anything is really going to
happen?

A. We have an indication that the
message they carried down there was
received, that the fact that there is
wide disapproval of what he's doing — on
the part, not just of the United States,
not just of European countries and oth-
er countries around the world but all
Latin countries — could move us in the
right direction. Is he going to leave of-
fice tomorrow? We have no indication of
that whatsoever, but we will continue
to work the problem. Let me simply say
to you that there will be no normaliza-
tion of relations as far as the United
States is concerned with Panama until
Gen. Noriega does leave power.

Q. You and the Foreign Minister
of Great Britain [Sir Geoffrey Howe]

discussed the hostages in Lebanon
this past week in Europe. Did you
come up with any ideas about how to
get them out?

A. No new ideas.

Q. Is anything new on the subject
of the hostages; have we heard any-
thing more of or from them?

A. Not that I am at liberty to talk
about here.

Q. Does that mean something is
happening, but —

A. No, it doesn't.

Q. Polish elections this weekend;
the President is headed for Poland
next month. How much do you expect
to achieve there? Is this a weaning
away of the Poles from the Soviet
bloc?

A. I don't think it's a weaning
away from the Soviet bloc as much as it
is an expression of the fact that we see
they're opening up with a great deal of
pleasure. We're very happy to see the
Poles begin to open up politically, at-
tempt to open up economically. The
President thought it was important to
go both to Poland and to Hungary, be-
cause, as he indicated on this recent
trip to Europe, ending the division of
Europe on the basis of Western values
is one of the things that is very, very
important to the United States, and it's
a policy that we should embrace and
continue to pursue.

1 Press release 109 of June 6, 1989. I

The Seedlings of Hope:
U.S. Policy in Africa

by Edward J. Perkins

Address before Africare on June
11, 19S9. Avibassador Perkins was U.S.
Ambassador to South Africa (1986-89)
and is nominee to be Director General
of the Foreign Service.

I am pleased and honored to appear be-
fore you today, this 11th Africare Day.
When C. Payne Lucas [Africare Execu-
tive Director] asked me to speak on the
subject of hope for Africa, it was an
invitation I was only too pleased to
accept, despite the common view that
the continent is now without hope.

Much of my life has been entwined
with Africa; I am no stranger to its
pain and tragedy. The same is true of
all of those who work in this great or-
ganization. I know about the poverty,
which is among the worst in the world,
and the crushing debt burden which
keeps it locked in place. I know about
the civil wars, the bloodshed, and the
corruption. And, I also know about
the grisly specter of AIDS [acquired
immune deficiency syndrome], which
in the next 10 years threatens to
wipe out numbers too frightening to
contemplate.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

AFRICA

But I also know there is a hope and
promise for Africa and its people. I
base this hope on other aspects of Afri-
ca I have come to know: its aspects of
warmth and generous hospitality, of
hard work and commitment, of vast
natural wealth, and of that special
African concept of ubuntu — the
doctrine of humanity, love, and
forgiveness that guides human rela-
tions throughout the continent.

The Gathering Breezes

There is no doubt that Africa is on the
brink of some dramatic and fundamen-
tal shifts. Nearly 30 years after British
Prime Minister Harold MacMillin her-
alded the "winds of change" which top-
pled colonialism in Africa, new breezes
are gathering force. And the changes
which they signify are no less revolu-
tionary than those which altered the
face of the continent in the 1950s and
1960s.

At this crucial juncture in Africa's
development, we in the United States
must intensify our commitment to Af-
rica's future with a thoughtful policy
that will contribute to the realization of
the hopes that we all share. Even the
unsparingly realistic British weekly
The Economist recently noted "for the
first time in decades, there is a little
cheer coming from that huge conti-
nent." Across Africa, more and more
governments are taking closer looks at
liberalized pricing policies, incentives
to farmers and business representa-
tives, more realistic exchange rates,
reduced government deficits, privatiza-
tion, and increased investment in basic
education.

This shift in thinking has already
produced dramatic results: the boom-
ing produce markets in Maputo and
Dar es Salaam and the stunning in-
crease in maize production in Zim-
babwe. Furthermore, a new World
Bank/UN Development Program study
shows encouraging indications that the
economic performance of countries
which have adopted key policy reforms
has been consistently better than those
which have not.

Politically speaking, Africa's track
recoi'd on democracy and political par-
ticipation is better than is usually
recognized, and it's improving. Many
African countries lack the institutional
structure we would normally identify
with democratic institutions, yet there
is a real recognition among most polit-
ical leaders that government must
accommodate dissent and allow decen-
tralized decisionmaking. And there are

governments across the continent
which are courageously taking on and
succeeding in the task of building
democracy.

• In Nigeria, Gen. Babangida is
working to rebuild a functioning de-
mocracy. Nigeria is scheduled to elect
local government officials this year,
state governors next year, and return
to a complete, elected, civilian democ-
racy in 1992. If successful, Nigeria will
become Africa's largest democracy.

• In Zimbabwe, a courageous and
relatively free press protects the right
of open dissent, and a responsible and
highly professional judiciary ensure
government accountability — despite a
one party structure and socialist
rhetoric.

It is in the area of diplomacy where
Africa has made its most dramatic
progress, just in the past year. After
decades of South African occupation,
Namibia is on the brink of independ-
ence. After years of war, one-
upmanship, and ideological hostility.
South Africa, Angola, Cuba, and the
Soviet Union came to realize that there
is a joint interest in peace and prosper-
ity. What an example that sets for the
entire continent, if not the world! In
Angola there are signs that the MPLA
[Popular Movement for the Liberation
of Angola] has decided to begin a proc-
ess of national reconciliation with
UNITA [National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola]. And, in
Mozambique, the church has begun a
dialogue which holds the promise of
eventual talks between RENAMO
[Mozambique National Resistance
Movement] and the government. The
countries of southern Africa are acting
constructively on the realization that
their economies are inextricably
linked — leading to the creation of the
Southern African Development Coor-
dination Conference.

A New Africa

Admittedly, many of these successes
may not seem like much compared to
the obstacles which remain before all
Africans can enjoy lives free of war and
hunger; before they can expect better
futures for their children; and before
they can be free to say what they wish
and elect their own leaders. But I take
hope from these successes, because
they are not isolated events. Taken to-
gether, they mark a change of direction
for all of Africa, away from the mis-
takes of the past and toward a new Af-

rica that will realize the potential with
which it is so richly endowed.

The new Africa is moving away
from the view that the state can solve
all ills — toward recognition of the im-
portant role of the individual and the
community in generating and sustain-
ing growth. Rulers of the new Africa
are coming to realize that political sta-
bility is won by establishing participa-
tory governments which respect the
rights of individuals. The new Africa
features a shift away from the thinking
that governments are not accountable
for their actions and toward the convic-
tion that Africans have a right to good
and decent government. Most impor-
tantly, the new Africa is coming to the
realization that the solutions to its
problems do not lie in foreign board-
rooms and governments. In the words
of the African delegates to the UN spe-
cial session on Africa in 1986, "Africa
has taken the responsibility for its own
development."

Slowly, and one by one, African
leaders are taking these courageous
steps toward greater openness in their
economies and political systems, taking
the risks of trying new paths, and ac-
knowledging the mistakes of the past
and learning from them. And that is
why I have hope for Africa.

South Africa-Southern Africa

Even in South Africa, from where I've
just returned, I have hope. There is re-
markable absence of bitterness by
black South Africans in spite of the ag-
onies which apartheid has inflicted and
a recognition that cooperation between
black and white is indispensable to
South Africa's survival.

There is an extraordinary under-
standing of and commitment to the
democratic process in township politics
among ordinary people. South Africa's
enormous natural wealth in its miner-
als, agriculture, infrastructure, and its
people can make it one of the world's
strongest economies in the aftermath
of apartheid. South Africa, when it
does become free, will also have the im-
portant benefit of having the history of
newly independent countries behind it.
This will endow South Africa's future
leaders with a mine of lessons learned
in managing the transition to
independence with prosperity for all.

There has been a change in big
power attention to southern Africa.
The successul negotiation on Angola/
Namiba introduced a new direction in
U.S. -Soviet attention to southern Afri-
ca. Both powers see the possibility of

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

AFRICA

ooperation in other spheres. The con-
licts in Mozambique and Angola come
0 mind. The overall encouragement of
rowth economies in the region will
ertainly be the focus of attention.

There is dynamic tension in the
/hite power structure. Clearly, the
oming change in presidential leader-
hip signals new government ap-
iroaches within the nationalist party
,nd government structures. The modns
permidi is still to be worked out, but
he South African Government must
■ain the trust of the black leadership
lefore anything concrete will happen.

The measures of repression by the
lOuth African Government have not sti-
led the desire of blacks to make a dif-
erence in their situation. The black
ipposition is widening its range of op-
ions in strategic planning — education
ind nationbuilding skills are among the
onsiderations. A greater awareness of
he importance of direct negotiations is
in stream. The recent discussions be-
ween the Minister of Law and Order
ind religious leaders on the hunger
itrikes was a good example.

Younger South Africans of all col-
ors are much more aware of the need
or change. Some want it now; others
ook at it as an evolutionary thing.
Black South African youth on the other
land are searching for more alterna-
ives. They want the right to partici-
)ate in the political process decisively,
low. The government would do well to
■emember that the black leaders of
oday represent a much more coopera-
.ive element with which to negotiate
.han the emerging younger leadership.

The American public needs to
enow more about South Africa — beyond
;he surface. One of the more important
;ontributions that can be made by the
American people is the provision of
noney for education of South Africans
lisadvantaged by apartheid. This
iioiluces effective change agents.
African-Americans have a lot to con-
iiiliute: role models in business, in edu-
jation, in reaching for psychological
^'mancipation.

My assignment in South Africa was
challenging, rewarding, and tension-
til h-d. I arrived in 1986 thinking that
the United States should be repre-
sented. I left even more convinced. The
solution to South Africa must be found
by the South Africans themselves, but
the United States can be facilitative.

The Terror of AIDS

The road to the new Africa will not be
an easy one. One of the most immediate
problems, as well as the most frighten-
ing, is the terrifying specter of AIDS.

We are only now discovering the
scope of the threat this disease poses to
Africa, and its awful magnitude ex-
ceeds our power to comprehend. Some
countries in central and southern Afri-
ca face the loss of as much as half their
populations in the next 20 years. AIDS
is the most critical emergency Africa
has faced in its modern existence. We
must all work together to combat it,
now.

Nationbuilding

Beyond the threat of AIDS lie the
daunting challenges of nationbuilding.
Many of the political entities which oc-
cupy the African Continent are not the
product of rational political evolution.
Rather, they are the legacy of colonial-
ism, a patchwork quilt sewn and sun-
dered by European wars and economic
competition.

The rulers of Africa must cope
with complex societies; with amalgama-
tions of multiple tribes, languages, and
cultures; and few common bonds for
forging a nation. The rulers of the
new Africa face an arduous task of
nationbuilding.

Economically, Africa faces the bur-
dens of starting largely from scratch to
build the infrastructure that is a neces-
sity for any successful economy. Not
only the nuts and bolts infrastructure
of bridges, roads, and power plants but
also the social infrastructure of a sound
educational system.

Nations in the new Africa must op-
erate in a world that is infinitely more
competitive, faster paced, and more
challenging than the world in which
our nation matured. The new Africa
must compete on first-world terms
with Third-World assets— both interna-
tionally in terms of trade and domes-
tically in meeting the expectations and
demands of its own people.

A U.S. Policy for Africa

To assist this newly emerging Africa,
we need a new dynamism in our foreign
policy toward the continent. Like any
foreign policy, our policy toward Africa
must be the product of an evaluation of
our interests, our goals in defense of
those interests, our resources to pur-
sue those goals, and, finally, specific
actions toward those goals.

• Our interest in Africa, though
not always apparent to the public at
large, should be abundantly clear to us
here.

• Africa's economic potential and
the American market make us an ideal
match for pursuing a mutually benefi-
cial economic relationship.

• A significant number of Ameri-
cans are of African heritage, and our
links to the mother continent are be-
coming stronger.

• More broadly, the issues which
Africa is beginning to address hit at
the core of what we stand for in the
world: the democratic ideal, the value of
a pluralistic society, and the positive
dynamism of the free market. In the
process of testing, expanding, and ex-
perimenting with these ideals, Afri-
cans will document for the world at
large the potential — and limits — of
these ideas.

It is vitally important that these
initial experiments in greater political
and economic openness in Africa suc-
ceed. Each success encourages other
experiments and contributions to fur-
ther successes. Each small success is a
buildingblock in the construction of the
new Africa I envision. Failure, on the
other hand, will breed discouragement
and despair, a retrenchment of the
openness we seek to promote. And
there can be no retrenchment of this
openness without more poverty and
conflict. We can't bow away from Afri-
ca because it's too tough. The failure of
the ongoing experiments there will cost
us all too much.

We have seen how famine and revo-
lution in Africa can affect the world. A
decision to limit our involvement in Af-
rica is really a decision to limit our in-
volvement in the world because the
problems of Africa have such a global
dimension.

On the strength of the positive
changes I've pointed out, we should re-
affirm our commitment and our efforts
to support Africans in their pursuit of
prosperity and nationhood. And we do
so with intelligence and respect for Af-
rican aspirations and with the wisdom
and humility born of past mistakes.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

AFRICA

Strategic Areas

There are some strategic areas which
I believe must receive our attention.
First and foremost, we must focus on
education. A well-educated public is
fundamental to a free society and eco-
nomic growth. We must first define it.
I think our definition should have three
ingredients.

First, education must fill the needs
of nationbuilding.

Second, there must be some link
between educators and society.

Finally, we should support educa-
tion in its broadest sense — not just for-
mal school learning, as measured in
enrollments or degrees, but the ability
to think critically and independently.

We can help greatly by financing
training in nationbuilding skills; by
sharing with African educators U.S.
research and e.xperience in building re-
sponsive educational systems; by sup-
porting efforts to improve the place of
women in African society, since they
are the primary educators of African
children; and by facilitating regional
and international exchanges for Afri-
cans of all backgrounds through schol-
arships for study abroad.

Another strategic component of
our African policy must be to stop
thinking that economic development is
somehow separate from political
development and build into our assis-
tance programs in Africa support for
institutions which promote decentral-
ized decisionmaking, pluralistic struc-
tures, and the exercise of democratic
process. Support for independent trade
unions, private business associations,
and grassroots community organiza-
tions should be viewed as integral ele-
ments in our assistance programs in
Africa.

We must also realize that a key to
Africa's development as a prosperous
continent will be contingent on its re-
ceiving a share of the technology which
has powered our own economic develop-
ment. Our trade with Africa must be
more than just purchases of raw mate-
rials and agricultural commodities.
As consumers of those products, the
West — and the United States in
particular — has an obligation to plow
back into Africa the technology which
can provide the framework for indus-
trial and agricultural development.

And this technology transfer
should not only come from the West.
Africans themselves have a wealth of
knowledge and experience and should

be encouraged and assisted to share
with other African nations. Strategi-
cally there needs to be a freer ex-
change of ideas, a greater depth of
understanding of how Africans see the
world, how their systems of influence
and decisionmaking work, and what
their aspirations are.

We need to continue our impor-
tant effort in South Africa to lay the
groundwork for an early and peaceful
transition to a nonracial democratic
future. How South Africa makes this
transition — and there is no longer any
doubt that it will — will be felt far and
wide throughout Africa. The better
managed the transition, and the better
prepared South Africans are to govern,
the better off the rest of Africa will be.
So whatever modest impact our diplo-
macy and our AID [Agency for Interna-
tional Development] and USIS [United
States Information Service] programs
can make toward preparing black and
white South Africans for change is an
investment for the whole of Africa.

For these reasons, we are looking
at a long-term bipartisan commitment
to educate the future leadership of
South Africa. The collaborative effort
among AID, HE [Institute for Interna-
tional Education], corporate donors,
and the university community has re-
sulted in first-class university educa-
tion in the United States for over 600
black South Africans in the past 10
years. But it is not enough. We hope
that a bursaries foundation can be es-
tablished to guarantee that adequate
funding, from both the private and
public sectors, is made available for
this purpose for many more black
South Africans in the years ahead.

As for sanctions, the Comprehen-
sive Anti-Apartheid Act [of 1986] sent a
strong signal to all South Africans of
fundamental U.S. opposition to apart-
heid. More sanctions in this period of
transition in South Africa would proba-
bly be dysfunctional at this time. But
we should not let South Africa forget
that added ones are always a possi-
bility. We need both incentives and dis-
incentives and existing sanctions give

us plenty of the latter and a path to
push vigorously toward a post-
apartheid South Africa.

Our existing AID programs in Af-
rica are reaping huge dividends in rela-
tion to investment. But we need to be
doing more, and that will require an in-
crease in our AID budget for Africa.
However, in light of the opportunities
for positive change in Africa, I believe
it is important that we expand this as-
sistance. It is also important we coordi-
nate with our key allies to the greatest
possible extent in order to avoid dupli-
cation and to maximize the impact of
our respective aid programs.

The Seedlings of Hope

Against this background, it is clear
how very important it is that such
organizations as Africare exist and
thrive. Your reforestation program in
West Africa is perhaps one of the best
metaphors around for the hope that ex-
ists for Africa. Through the resources
you provide, the communities of West
Africa are nurturing the seedlings that
will one day grow into trees that stop
the desert creeping across the face of
Africa.

Africare, together with such orga-
nizations as the African Development
Foundation, the African-American In-
stitute, the Peace Corps, the Institute
for International Education, private
foundations such as Ford and Rock-
efeller, and many others have done a
great service in stepping forward to
argue on behalf of the most neglected
part of the world. Your efforts have
contributed, I believe, to a more atten-
tive foreign policy and a more conscien-
tious assistance program in Africa and
certainly to a better informed Ameri-
can public.

I have every reason to believe Afri-
care and its sister organizations will
continue to play an important role in
nurturing Africa's seedlings of hope
and in promoting our relations with Af-
rica. I urge you to continue; you have
our extended support and encourage-
ment not to abandon our high hopes for
Africa. And we will continue to work
actively with you to see those high
hopes realized. ■

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

ARMS CONTROL

Nuclear and Space Talks
Open Round 11

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
JUNE 19, 1989'

Today marks the opening of round 11 of
the nuclear and space talks (NST) in
Geneva. Ambassador Richard Burt, the
chief negotiator to the strategic arms
reduction talks (START), heads the
U.S. delegation. Ambassador Henry
Cooper is our chief negotiator to the de-
fense and space talks.

My objective for these negotiations
is to achieve verifiable agreements that
improve our security while enhancing
stability and reducing the risk of war.
In the strategic arms reduction talks,
our emphasis will be on creating a
more stable nuclear balance and
strengthening deterrence by reducing
and constraining those strategic nucle-
ar forces which pose the greatest
threat to security and stability. We will
pursue complementary goals in the de-
fense and space talks, seeking an
agreement on a cooperative transition
to a more stable nuclear balance that
relies increasingly on defenses.

After extensive deliberations with
my advisers, I have approved instruc-
tions for the U.S. START delegation.
These instructions reaffirm much of
the treaty text negotiated with the So-
viets by the previous Administration.
Modifications will be proposed in some
cases. The United States will be pre-
pared to address all the issues on which
the two sides have not reached agree-
ment as the negotiations proceed. In
addition, I have reserved the right to
introduce new initiatives aimed at fur-
ther enhancing security and strategic
stability.

Of all the outstanding START is-
sues, verification may be the most com-
plex. It will be especially critical in
determing whether START enhances
U.S. security and strategic stability.
As part of our overall negotiating ef-
fort as the talks resume in Geneva, the
United States will also propose that
the two sides make a special effort to
agree on, and to begin implementing as
soon as possible, certain verification
and stability measures drawn from pro-
posals that both sides have already ad-
vanced in START or other contexts.
These measures will enhance verifica-
tion of a START treaty and contribute
to strategic stability. Early agreement

and implementation of them will speed
resolution of outstanding issues and
give added momentum to the efforts of
our two countries to conclude expe-
ditiously a START agreement.

Our approach to these arms nego-
tiations and to our force modernization
programs are complementary and mu-
tually reinforcing. Maintaining cred-
ible and effective nuclear deterrent
forces is essential both to our security
and to our ability to negotiate sound
and stabilizing agreements. A success-
ful START treaty will reduce the risk
of war but will not diminish our need
to rely on modernized, effective strate-
gic forces for continued deterrence. In-
deed, our security would be reduced
rather than enhanced if we do not mod-
ernize our forces while the Soviets con-
tinue to modernize theirs. We must
continue to pursue both our force mod-
ernization and arms control and not
make the mistake of treating one as a
substitute for the other.

Our negotiators return to the bar-
gaining table with my firm pledge that
we will work vigorously to achieve fair
and far-reaching agreements that
strengthen peace. Nothing has higher
priority. I am heartened by the grow-
ing evidence that the Soviet Union is
prepared to negotiate seriously about
agreements that promise to reduce the
risk of war. Much has already been ac-
complished in the negotiations; much
remains to be done. Our commitment is
unwavering. We must build on our
achievements thus far to reach agree-
ments that fulfill our objectives of re-
ducing the risk of war and enhancing
security and stability.

AMBASSADOR BURT'S

STATEMENT,
JUNE 20, 1989

We have now begun the 11th round of
the negotiations on nuclear and space
arms. The United States sees this
round as an opportunity to reestablish
the working relationships of our nego-
tiating groups, to reaffirm previous
positions, and to present some new
ideas. We will be prepared to address
all the issues on which the two sides
have not yet reached agreement. After
seeing the lay of the land over the
course of the next 6 weeks or so, we
will have a recess sufficient to

allow us time to analyze in our capitals
the results of our dialogue during this
round.

This round is also the first since
President Bush assumed his respon-
sibilities as President. As you know,
the Bush Administration has conducted
a comprehensive review of American
security and arms control policies. As a
result of this review, the President has
concluded that the primary objective of
strategic arms control is to achieve ver-
ifiable agreements that reduce the risk
of nuclear war. In particular, we seek
agreements that will contribute to nu-
clear risk reduction in three ways.

First, we seek to strengthen the
stability of the nuclear balance by curb-
ing incentives to use nuclear weapons
in a crisis.

Second, we seek to improve predic-
tability in the evolution of the forces of
the two sides over the longer term.

Third, we seek to create greater
transparency in the strategic posture
and activities of both sides.

Based on the results of his review,
the President has decided to build on
the progress that has been achieved to
date here in Geneva. At the same time,
as I mentioned, we are coming to these
talks with new ideas. We returned to
the bargaining table with President
Bush's firm pledge that "we will work
vigorously to achieve fair and far-
reaching agreememts that strengthen
peace. Nothing has higher priority."

In START, we seek to ensure a sta-
ble nuclear balance by reducing the na-
ture and scope of the threat posed to
each side, by decreasing the vul-
nerability of our retaliatory forces to
the threat that remains, and by lower-
ing uncertainties in the evolution of
forces between the two sides. Critical
to determining whether START en-
hances our security and strategic sta-
bility is the issue of verification. As
part of our overall negotiating effort,
the United States will propose that the
two sides make a special effort to agree
on, and to begin implementing as soon
as possible, certain verification and
stability measures that we believe will
enhance verification of a START treaty
and contribute to strategic stability.
Early agreement and implementation
of these measures will give both sides
early practical experience in verifica-
tion, which will speed resolution of out-
standing issues and give added
momentum to the efforts of our two
countries to conclude a START treaty.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

ARMS CONTROL

Similarly President Rush has de-
cided that our goals for the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) and our ap-
proach in the defense and space talks
are sound and remain unchanged. The
SDI program will continue to research,
develop, and test concepts for effective
defenses in full compliance with the
Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. In
defense and s])ace, we will preserve our
options to deploy advanced defenses
when they are ready.

Several U.S. initiatives introduced
late last round remain on the table in
the defense and space area and provide
a good basis for continued discussions
with the Soviets. We look forward to a
constructive Soviet response to help
complete a separate defense and space
agreement, with the same legal status
as the ABM and START treaties, as
was agreed by President Reagan and
General Secretary Gorbachev during

their Washington summit. We have
made some progress toward such a
treaty, including an associated protocol
on predictability measures, which
builds on the understanding reached at
the December 1987 Washington
summit.

We have accomplished much al-
ready in Geneva, yet a great deal of
work lies ahead. Based on the growing
evidence that the Soviet Union is pre-
pared to negotiate seriously, I believe
that through a constructive dialogue,
we will be able to make significant
progress. The United States is com-
mitted to building on our achievements
thus far to reach agreements that ful-
fill our objectives of reducing the risk
of war and enhancing security and
stability.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of .June 25, 1989. ■

Military Openness Proposals
Tabled at CSBM Talks

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
JUNE 9, 1989'

Maintaining the momentum of U.S. and
NATO leadei'ship on arms control
launched by the President at the NATO
summit, the allies today tabled far-
reaching proposals for military open-
ness throughout Europe.

The Western package of 12 specific
measures was put on the table at the
negotiations on confidence- and
security-building measures (CSBMs) in
Vienna. These measures cover every-
thing from a comprehensive e.xchange
of information about ground forces,
combat aircraft, and majoi' weapons
systems in combat units in Europe to a
measure for improving access for the
press to military exercises. They are
the result of a cooperative effort among
the members of the NATO alliance to
design a comprehensive package of
CSBMs that would go far beyond the
Stockholm regime to advance openness
and predictability about military
forces in Europe and their activities.

The Western package represents
another step in the broader U.S. effort
to build confidence and openness in
East-West relations, most recently set
out in the President's speech in Mainz
this week [May 31J. European security
can only be built upon a foundation of
respect for human rights and the rule

of law. In the military area, openness
and confidence-building serve to chip
away at the secrecy which too often
shrouds the capabilities and intentions
of some states toward their neighbors.

The Western measures are written
in language suitable for a final agree-
ment. NATO's tabling of such detailed
proposals so early in the negotiation is
indicative of our eagerness to propel
the process forward with all possible
speed.

In addition to the information pro-
posal, the Western package has a num-
ber of ground-breaking features. These
include a requirement to notify new de-
ployments of weapons systems in the
zone, a new evaluation measure which
entitles states to visit units to check
the validity of the information pro-
vided, notification of mobilizations of
reservists, and a proposal to conduct a
35-nation seminar on military doctrine.
Also included are many improvements
to the highly successful Stockholm re-
gime (completed in 1986), including ex-
tension of the duration of observation of
military exercises, a tightening of the
inspection regime, including the right
to conduct an aerial overflight of the
area to be inspected before the actual
inspection begins, and an increase in
the inspection quota.

'Made available to news correspondents
by Department spokesman Margaret DeB.
Tutwiler. ■

Anniversary of
INF Treaty

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
JUNE 1, 1989'

One year ago today, on .June 1, 1988, the'
President of the United States and the
President of the Soviet Union ex-
changed the instruments of ratification
bringing into force the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty,
the first in history to bring about actu-
al reductions in nuclear arsenals.

The goal of the INF Treaty— the
complete elimination of INF missile
systems under conditions of strict
verification — is being accomplished.
Since the summer of 1988, when elim-
inations began with the destruction of a>
Soviet SS-20 at Kapustin Yar and an
American Pershing II at Longhorn,
Texas, both sides have continued to
eliminate INF missiles, launchers, and
support equipment in the presence of
inspectors from the other side.

The achievement of the INF Treaty^
was a signal victory for NATO soli-
darity and political resolve and a con-
tribution to greater security for our
allies. It established the long-held alli-
ance principles of asymmetrical reduc-
tions to reach equality of forces and
effective verification as essential com-
ponents of arms control agreements.
These principles remain keystones of
our approach to arms control.

The agenda ahead is even more
challenging as we move forward with
NATO's conventional force proposals
and the President's initiative this week
for added reductions. Further we seek
stabilizing reductions in strategic arse-
nals and increased reliance on strategic*
defenses and a truly global and effec-
tive verifiable ban on chemical weap-
ons. We will spare no effort to achieve
agreements that will reduce the risk of
war and strengthen the foundations for
peace.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of .June .5, 1989. ■

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

EAST ASIA

Demonstrations in China

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT.
MAY 18, 1989'

The Department of State advises
Americans traveling to China to use
caution and avoid areas where demon-
strations are occurring. There is no in-
dication of any antiforeign feeling
among the demonstrators. Nonetheless
caution, good sense, and discretion are
called for to ensure Americans are not
caught up in a demonstration. This
alert does not advise against traveling
to China; only that caution should be
e.xercised.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,

MAY 20, 19892

President Bush this morning received
his daily intelligence briefing, includ-
ing an update on the status of events in
China. The situation remains uncer-
tain. Both sides have exercised re-
straint, and we urge that restraint to
continue. The United States stands for
freedom of speech and freedom of as-
sembly, and President Bush commented
yesterday on the inexorable march of
democracy in China. The demonstra-
tions of the last few days indicate that
the hunger for change remains strong.
We remain hopeful that a dialogue be-
tween the government and the students
is possible.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
MAY 23, 19892

The President today met with Wan Li,
Chairman of the Standing Committee
of the National People's Congress, from
2:30 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. Following the
plenary meeting. Wan Li visited the
residence to greet Mrs. Bush.

The Chinese leader briefed the
President on the outcome of the recent
Sino-Soviet summit and on the student
demonstrations in China. "We are
strongly committed to democracy
around the world," the President said.
"It is the underpinning of our being as
a nation. I urge nonviolence and re-
straint in your present situation. I urge
that Voice of America not be jammed
and that reporters be given open
access."

The President told Chairman Wan
that he remains personally committed
to expanding the normal and construc-
tive relations the United States enjoys
with China. The world has a stake in
China's economic progress, national se-
curity, and political vitality. The Unit-
ed States hopes to see the continuing
implementation of economic and politi-
cal reforms, which undoubtedly will
also help advance these goals.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
JUNE 3, 1989-^

It is clear that the Chinese Government
has chosen to use force against Chinese
citizens who were making a peaceful
statement in favor of democracy. I
deeply deplore the decision to use force
against peaceful demonstrators and the
consequent loss of life. We have been
urging, and continue to urge, non-
violence, restraint, and dialogue. Trag-
ically another course has been chosen.
Again I urge a return to nonviolent
means for dealing with the current
situation.

The United States and People's Re-
public of China, over the past two dec-
ades, have built up, through great
efforts by both sides, a constructive re-
lationship beneficial to both countries.
I hope that China will rapidly return to
the path of political and economic re-
forms and conditions of stability so that
this relationship, so important to both
our peoples, can continue its growth.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
JUNE 5, 1989^

The situation in Beijing and other cities
remains chaotic. There are reports of
indiscriminate firing on civilians and
burning of military vehicles in several
sectors. The situation in Shanghai is
tense, with many roads blocked and
large groups of students and workers
gathered in the business district.

To ensure the safety of American
students in Beijing, the embassy is re-
questing they leave their campuses and
go to hotels in central Beijing. The em-
bassy is attempting to facilitate the
movement of students with embassy
vehicles.

Today we are issuing another trav-
el advisory urging Americans not to
travel to China in view of the extremely
volatile and dangerous situation. The
embassy in Beijing has advised Ameri-
cans in the city not to venture outdoors
unless absolutely necessary.

We have had an open line for the
last 72 hours from our Embassy in Bei-
jing to the State Department's 24-hour
task force that is set up here in the Op-
erations Center. In addition our Em-
bassy in Beijing has activated its
warden system whereby it keeps in
touch with all Americans to make sure
they are safe and to help if necessary.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
JUNE 6, 1989J

The situation in China remains tense
and unsettled. The Secretary of State,
after consulting with our Ambassador
in Beijing, last night decided to encour-
age American citizens in the Beijing
area to depart China. The embassy is
making an effort to contact American
citizens in Beijing to give them this ad-
vice and assist in their departure.

In addition the Secretary of State
has authorized the ambassador to per-
mit voluntary departure by those U.S.
Government dependents who wish to
leave China. There is no drawdown of
embassy officers. The embassy and our
four consulate offices continue to oper-
ate fully.

The embassy's figures as of Janu-
ary of this year show 270 American stu-
dents in Beijing, 360 in all of China;
1,400 American non-U. S. Government
residents in Beijing, 8,800 in all China.
There are 424 embassy and consulate
personnel and dependents in China.
Normally — and we don't have a better
figure for you — there are roughly about
4,000 tourists in China at any given
time.

Persons in other parts of China
may also wish to leave China, depend-
ing on the local situation. Citizens who
choose to leave should, if possible, avoid
routes out of the country that would re-
quire them to travel through Beijing.
The Beijing airport is open, and flights
are operating as scheduled. Roads to
the airport are also open.

The U.S. Government is in touch
with commercial airlines to arrange for
charter flights, should they become
necessary, to accommodate Americans
departing China. As many of you know,
Northwest Airlines flies out of Shang-
hai, and United flies out of Beijing.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

EAST ASIA

The Secretary is recommending
today to the Attorney General that all
nationals of the People's Republic of
China in the United States be permit-
ted to remain in this country after
their visas expire, without a change in
their status. There are approximately
45,000 P.R.C. nationals in the United
States at this time.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
JUNE 7, 1989J

The situation in Beijing and in China is
volatile, uncertain, and increasingly
dangerous. As you all know, this morn-
ing in China our Ambassador issued an
order that all U.S. dependents — there
are 258 of them — depart China.

Let me make something very clear.
Our government can only order U.S.
personnel and dependents to leave the
country. The U.S. Government has no
legal authority to order Americans to
leave a foreign country. In light of that,
the Secretary of State and our Ambas-
sador are strongly urging all American
citizens to leave China, and our Embas-
sy and consular officers are assisting
all Americans in leaving China to the
best of our personnel's ability.

The State Department today is is-
suing a new travel advisory which reit-
erates the above.

In order to help facilitate the de-
parture of American citizens and de-
pendents, we have done the following.
The U.S. Government is arranging
charters that will supplement U.S. air-
lines to facilitate the departure of all
those who want to leave and all those
who have been ordered to leave. There
are two charter flights scheduled for
Thursday [June 8]. Thei-e is a possi-
bility of a third. One of these is a Unit-
ed Airlines 747. Another is a Con-
tinental DC-10. There are 684 seats on
those two flights. I do not have for you
at this time what the additional charter
may be.

On Friday [June 9], there is a regu-
larly scheduled United Airlines flight.
In addition Continental Airlines will
bring back its DC-10 twice. All flights
will include a mix of American citizens
and dependents. It will depend on who
is ready and waiting at the airport to
go. There is a U.S. Embassy officer
available at the Beijing airport to as-
sist American citizens.

Concerning transportation to the
airport: The road remains open. Yes,
there are some roadblocks and some

difficulties and delays. Embassy vans
and cars are transporting American
citizens to the airport. Hotel buses and
taxis are also available.

In addition a convoy of six embassy
vans and one car departed our Embas-
sy in Beijing this morning at approx-
imately 9:30 a.m. for the university
area. The convoy picked up 55 Ameri-
can teachers, students, and depend-
ents. All of those people are now at the
airport and were taken directly from
their pickup points to the airport.

Our embassy and four consulates
remain open.

Secretary Baker spoke this morn-
ing with our Ambassador in Beijing for
a report on the situation at the diplo-
matic compound and the embassy. Am-
bassador Lilley reported that he was
able to see the Vice Minister for For-
eign Affairs and registered a strong
protest against the shooting incident.
In addition here in Washington the
State Department, around 2:00 a.m.
this morning, registered a similarly
strong protest to the Chinese Embassy.

The Chinese Embassy has in-
formed the State Department late last
night — that was June 6 — that Foreign
Minister Qian's visit to Washington has
been postponed. As I said on Monday,
the visit would have given us the oppor-
tunity to convey to the Chinese leaders
our view of the tragic and brutal ac-
tions that have taken place and to urge
that a policy of restraint and dialogue
be reinstated. However, under current
circumstances, we agree that such a
visit should not take place.

The State Department task force
has 35 individuals here answering
phones 24 hours a day. We are averag-
ing approximately 8,000 calls in a 24-
hour period.

I would like to give you a VOA
[Voice of America] update. We have
stepped up the hours of frequency. We
have increased the hours from nine to
eleven in Mandarin. We will continue
increasing the hours. We have increas-
ed the frequency as of today to 12 in
Mandarin; that is breaking out into
seven in the evening — broadcasts — and
five in the morning. There is sporadic
jamming, but we know that some of
this is getting through.

We have seven English frequen-
cies, which is an increase of two; and
these are not being jammed. In addi-
tion VOA has satellite television being
beamed into China. I would like to
point out that the only way it can be
picked up is on a TV receiving dish,

and our estimates are that there are
approximately 2,000 of these dishes in
China. There are 43 people working at
VOA on these radio and TV broadcasts
both here and in China.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
JUNE 9, 1989^

Basically we would describe the situa-
tion today as relatively calm; however,
we would note that Beijing is still an
armed camp.

On Americans left in China — our
estimates are there are a little under
1,500 Americans in China. I will breaH
some of this out for you. There are
approximately — and all our numbers
are approximate and estimates — 500
Americans in Beijing. Of that number,
approximately 150-200 are media, 116t
are our own Embassy personnel, and
the remaining number is made up of
businessmen and tourists.

There are approximately 200
Americans in Shanghai. There are ap-
proximately 135 Americans in Guan-
zhou. There are approximately 100-25J
Americans in Wuhan, and we are worB
ing on getting transportation to get
those individuals out.

There are 50-100 Americans in Ti
anjin, and the embassy has organized
bus caravan to pick them up and bringi
them to Beijing.

The embassy is still making daily
visits to the universities and to the ho
tels. We have found at Beijing Univer-
sity there are no Americans there. Thf
approximate number we have of Amer
cans choosing to stay in Beijing is 400
[including press], because the total
number we have out there is about 500*

Of the dependents order that was
issued earlier this week, there are 10
dependents left in China, and they are
coming out.

On charters; you know that we ha*
a United charter that left on June 8.
There were 65 Americans on board.
Our Continental charter left on June 9
with 77 people, which includes Ameri-
cans and third country nationals. Thei
are no more scheduled chartered
flights.

The embassy has told us that ther
are many seats now available on the
regularly scheduled flights, and I will
be glad to post for you the details on a:
commercial flights out of China. The
number that we have is approximately
43 in the next 3 days, and their destim
tions are 10 different cities around the
world.

EUROPE

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,

Jl'NE 12, 1989^

Beijing and other cities remain rela-
tively quiet. There is little troop activ-
ity that has been reported. Tiananmen
."^ijuare is still surrounded by tanks, ar-
mored personnel carriers, armed sol-
diers, and barbed wire.

As you all know, there is an in-
crease in the security presence sur-
rounding the foreign diplomatic
residence compound and also at our
Embassy.

We estimate there are roughly
1,100 Americans still in China. In Bei-
jing, private, 185; official, 118 as of
Monday morning. [Figures for Ameri-
cans in other cities were posted for
news correspondents.]

Over the weekend, we did complete
our bus convoy to Tianjin where 89
Americans were convoyed out. We com-
pleted a chartered airplane to Wuhan
with 3.5 Americans on it. In Dalian, we
took out a charter flight with 35 Amer-
icans and 70 third country nationals.
That plane went to Hong Kong. Our
best information is that all U.S. citi-
zens who wish to leave have left or are
on their way out, according to our Em-
bassy in Beijing.

On VOA: Beijing is being heavily
jammed and not much is getting
through. In fact, for 100 square miles,
there is very heavy jamming and not
much is getting through. They are
broadcasting 1 hour a day from the
Philippines using medium waves, which
is AM and is broadcast in Mandarin.
This broadcast covers Guangzhou and
the whole countryside in the southeast

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
JUNE 20, 1989-^

The President today directed that the
I'.S. Government suspend participation
in all high-level e.xchan^'es of govern-
ment officials with the People's Repub-
lic of China, in addition to the
suspension of military exchanges previ-
ously announced [by the President at
his news conference on June 5]. This ac-
tion is being taken in response to the
\\ ave of violence and reprisals by the
Chinese authorities against those who
lia\ e called for democracy. The United
Slates has supported the legitimate
democratic aspirations for freedom of
peoples throughout the world. The

United States will continue to voice its
concern and its support for these
aspirations.

The United States hopes that the
current tragedy in China will be
brought to a peaceful end and that dia-
logue will replace the atmosphere of
suspicion and reprisal. China is an im-
portant state with which we hope to
continue productive relations.

In addition to the ban on ex-
changes, the United States will seek to
postpone consideration of new interna-
tional financial institutions' loans to
China. The situation in China is of in-

ternational concern as witnessed by the
variety of voices that have spoken up on
the issue. We urge continued interna-
tional expressions of concern.

'Made to news correspondents by De-
partment deputy spokesman Richard A.
Boucher.

-Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of May 29, 1989.

^Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of June 12.

■"Made to news correspondents by De-
partment spokesman Margaret DeB.
Tutwiler.

»Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of June 26. ■

NATO Defense Planning Committee
l\/leets in Brussels

The Defense Ministers of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
met in Brussels June 8-9, 1989. The
United States ivas represented by Sec-
retary of Defense Richard B. Cheney.
Following is the text of the final com-
munique issued June 9.

1. The Defense Planning Committee of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in
Ministerial session in Brussels on 8th and
9th June 1989.

2. At their meeting in Brussels on 29th
and 30th May, marking the advent of the
fifth decade of the North Atlantic Alliance,
our Heads of State and Government re-
viewed the successful results that Alliance
policies have brought about. In their Sum-
mit Declaration and the Comprehensive
Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament,
they set out a positive and ambitious
forward-looking programmme which estab-
lishes an agenda for the future designed to
achieve the realization of our long-term ob-
jectives. They reaffirmed that the Alliance,
founded on the strength and cohesion of the
trans-Atlantic partnership, will continue to
serve as the cornerstone of our security,
peace and freedom. They also underlined
that, for the foreseeable future there is no
alternative to the Alliance's strategy for the
prevention of war. which is a strategy of de-
terrence based upon an appropriate mix of
adequate and effective nuclear and conven-
tional forces which will continue to be kept
up-to-date where necessary.

3. In aiming to build on the success of
the Summit and recalling the principles of
the Harmel Report, we reaffirmed that the
maintenance of a strong and coherent de-
fense posture is a prerequisite for the secu-
rity of our countries and for constructive
dialogue and co-operation with the countries
of the East, including arms control and dis-
armament. To this end, we considered at

this meeting a number of issues which are of
particular significance for defense planning
and policy within the Alliance. Most impor-
tant amongst these were the implications for
defense planning of the Western proposals,
as expanded by the Summit initiative, for
the reduction of conventional forces in Eu-
rope; the new Ministerial Guidance; and the
equitable sharing of roles, risks and respon-
sibilities within the Alliance.

4. We agreed that in order to safeguard
and enhance our collective security the
yardstick against which NATO require-
ments for defense and deterrence must be
measured continues to be present and fore-
cast Warsaw Pact capabilities. In this re-
spect we noted that, even after the
announced and recently begun unilateral re-
ductions in some of the Warsaw Pact forces
have been carried out, a substantial imbal-
ance will remain between the forces of the
Warsaw Pact and NATO, and that the Soviet
Union continues to maintain the pace of its
military production.

5. The Comprehensive Concept has
made clear that within the Alliance's far-
reaching arms control agenda one of the
highest priorities in negotiations with the
East is reaching agreement on conventional
force reductions, and it reaffirms our key
objectives for these negotiations. The Sum-
mit agreed on further proposals to be tabled
in the CFE [conventional armed forces in
Europe] negotiations and set out an ambi-
tious timetable for achieving an agreement
and then accomplishing the reductions. To
meet this timetable work is already in hand
in the High Level Task Force to elaborate
further these proposals. The CFE negotia-
tions have important implications for
NATO's collective defense planning activ-
ities. It is essential that the Alliance's de-
fense and arms control objectives remain in
harmony in order to ensure their comple-
mentary contribution to achieving the goal
of enhanced security at the lowest possible

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

EUROPE

level offerees. We have accordingly tasked
the Defense Planning Committee in Perma-
nent Session to consider how Alliance de-
fense planning can most effectively
contribute to this end.

6. The fundamental considerations set
out in the Summit documents are duly re-
flected in the 1989 Ministerial Cuidance
which we have approved as the basic politi-
cal directive for a broad range of defense
planning activities, both national and inter-
national, in NATO. Specifically, it provides
guidance for the development of the next set
of force goals and their implementation, and
maintains an emphasis on the need to re-
dress identified deficiencies in our conven-
tional defense, reaffirming the focus of the
Conventional Defense Improvements (CDI)
programme and the need to maintain its mo-
mentum. The Guidance also seeks increased
military assistance for Greece, Portugal and
Turkey, building on recent efforts to im-
prove and focus more clearly such assis-
tance. While recognizing that considerable
efforts will be needed to meet all these chal-
lenges, we are resolved to continue to aim to
provide increased resources in order to
maintain and improve the effectiveness of
our individual contributions to collective de-
fense, as set out in the attached e.xtract
from the 1989 Ministerial Guidance.

7. In the light of current resource con-
straints we also expressed our determina-
tion to obtain greater value for the money
we devote to defense in order to improve our
defense capabilities. We shall seek to broad-
en the scope of our national and collabora-
tive efforts to achieve this. We therefore
renewed our support for further develop-
ment of NATO planning processes which can
play an important role in expanding co-
operation and in setting priorities.

8. The longstanding Alliance principle
of the equitable sharing of roles, risks and
responsibilities, reaffirmed at the Summit,
is one of the major themes of our Guidance.
The Guidance recognizes and incorporates
key recommendations contained in the Re-
port that we issued in December 1988. We
intend to ensure that national defense plans
and Alliance defense planning activities
take full account of the assessments and rec-
ommendations contained in this Report. To
this end we have endorsed a work pro-
gramme which sets out specific respon-
sibilities for the necessary follow-on action.
Some countries have already taken initial
steps to improve their contributions to our
collective security and further initiatives
are being pursued by the Alliance collec-
tively and by individual countries. A full re-
l)ort on progress in this important field will
be presented to us in November this year.

9. In our consideration of other defense
matters we discussed the need to ensure
that Alliance ammunition stocks are suffi-
cient and are supported by an adequate pro-
duction capability. We also noted that the
current status of an examination by NATO's
Military Authorities of the necessary level
and ajjpropriate mix of military training

Elections in Poland

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
JUNE 6. 1989"

Sunday's elections [June 4] in Poland
marked an important step toward free-
dom and democracy. I am encouraged
by the responses of both the Polish Gov-
ernment and members of the opposition
to the election results. I hope the move-
ment toward political pluralism will
continue to follow the responsible, con-
structive path it has taken since the
historic roundtable agreements in
April.

As I said in my speech in Ham-
tramck, Michigan, April 17, the Polish
people are now taking steps that de-
serve our active support. We will work,
in concert with our allies to help Polish
democracy take root anew and sustain
itself. The Polish people face a difficull
task ahead; but their first steps have
been firmly in the right direction.

'Text fi-om Weekly Compilation of Pres
dential Documents of .June 12, 1989. ■

Hungarian Political Reforms

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
JUNE 16, 1989"

The United States welcomes the an-
nouncement of the Hungarian Govern-
ment's intention to begin discussions
with the opposition as a first step to
multiparty elections. On April 17, in
Hamtramck, Michigan, the President
pledged support to East European
countries which embarked upon the

path of fundamental political and eco-
nomic reforms. In view of Hungary's
progress, the President will seek legis
lation to accord Hungary GSP [gener-
alized system of preferences] and to
permit the Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation (OPIC) to operate ir
Hungary.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of PreS"
dential Documents of June 19, 1989. ■

and exercises in Europe to ensure that our
forces maintain their operational standards
while minimizing the impact on our publics.
In addition, we welcomed progress being
made in the trial of a conventional arma-
ments planning system and in the pursuit of
armaments co-operation initiatives for Al-
lies with lesser developed defense
industries.

10. We recognize that at this time of un-
precedented promise in international affairs
hopes for the future are high, and that many
in our publics look forward to the time when
the burdens of defense can be reduced. We
share the hope that this will indeed become
possible as a consequence of the current
arms control negotiations. But our defense
requirements are determined by realities,
and the realities of the Warsaw Pact's mili-
tary capabilities are such that we must
maintain an adequate defense and deterrent
posture as a prerequisite not only for peace
and stability but also for the further prog-
ress in East-West relations that we seek.
The defense efforts which we make — which
must be shared equitably — must provide
forces which are sufficient to meet our secu-
rity requirements but are also at the lowest
possible level consistent with these require-
ments. The policies we have endorsed at our
meeting aim at achieving just this.

ANNEX

Resource Guidance

Since 1977 Alliance defense planning has
been based on resource guidance involving
commitment by countries to aim at annual
real increases in defense expenditure in the
region of 3^, although with certain quali-
fications, notably relating to the quality ano
quantity of the past and present defense ef-
forts of invididual countries. The original
basis for the '3% guideline was the need to
maintain planned force levels and allow for
essential equipment modernization and re-
placement, bearing in mind not only the
substantial gap between NATO and Warsaw
Pact forces but also that the continuing en-
hancement of Warsaw Pact force capabilities
was tending to widen the gap, particularly
in terms of the quantity of equipment de-
ployed. Account was also taken, however, of
affordability, based on forecasts of likely
economic growth rates and pressure on Al-
lied Governments to exercise budgetary re-
straint for domestic economic reasons.

Practical experience over the past dec-
ade has generally confirmed the apjiro-
priateness of the guidance. Most annual
reviews during the period concluded that

EUROPE

ual increases in that order were necessary
n maintain the credibility of NATO's de-
jnsf posture. While no country has suc-
eeded in consistently meeting or exceeding
he target over the whole period, and the
erformance of a few countries has fallen
.ell short of doing so, some eight countries
enerally achieved the goal and the average
att' (if growth across the Alliance (e.xclud-
le the United States whose large defense
•iuii;et tends to distort the figures) was
bout 2%.

Notwithstanding the announced uni-
Utral reductions in Warsaw Pact forces and
he possibility of future arms control agree-
leiits. a very considerable imbalance re-
lains between the forces of the Warsaw
'act and NATO, and there is as yet no evi-
ence of a significant diminution of the
cope and momentum of Warsaw Pact force
Kidernization programmes. Therefore, in
rdtr to sustain a credible deterrent there
fmains, at least for the time being, a con-
inuing need to increase the resources de-
(itrii to defense both in order to maintain
hi' fffectiveess of current capabilities and
I) ndress existing deficiencies in conven-
Kiiial defense. It will also be necessary to
1111 to achieve the most efficient use of re-
ouices devoted to defense, on both a nation-

I and an Alliance basis.

The DPC [Defense Planning Commit-
|ee] report on Enhancing Alliance Collec-
jive Security endorsed by Ministers in
)ecember 1988, whilst acknowledging the
eeil to avoid setting unrealistic or unrea-
iiiialile standards, concluded that real in-
rea.-^es in resource inputs will continue to
e necessary if the defense output is to be
laiiitained and improved. It stressed that

II countries should provide a level of re-
ource allocations to defense adequate to en-
hle them to maintain or assume a fair share
f the roles, risks and responsibilities in the
Llliance, noting that for some countries par-
icular efforts will be necessary.

While there may be significant varia-
ions among individual countries, it should
le noted that projected GDP growth rates
or NATO as a whole over the planning peri-
od are in the region of 3%. Moreover, most
ountries have, in the recent past, allocated
larger share of their GDP to defense than
t present and should, therefore, be in a po-
ition to reverse the current downward
rends or at least to arrest them. Thus, for
he present, continuing real increases in de-
iense expenditure of the order of 3% appear
loth necessary and affordable.

The ultimate yardstick against which
he need for Alliance and national efforts
nu.st be measured is the overall ability to
u]ipnrt NATO's deterrent and defensive ob-
ectives. In this context, it is recognized
hat reductions in the threat resulting from
uither positive developments in East-West
elationships and arms control agreements
na,\ in the future justify some revision both
n iiur force posture and in the resource
ruiilance. However, in the near term at
east, the need to overcome significant defi-

ciencies in our conventional defense in order
to maintain our strategy remains beyond
dispute.

Taking into account the above considera-
tions and recognizing that guidance on the
level of financial input is only one of several
instruments to guide the defense effort in
the Alliance and to bring about a fair shar-
ing of roles, risks and responsibilities, coun-
tries should:

(a) continue to aim to achieve significant
real annual increases in defense expenditure
in order to redress identified deficiencies,
maintain the momentum of the GDI pro-
gramme and enhance collective security as
agreed in the DPC report on the sharing of
roles, risks and responsibilities. In this re-
spect, the target of a real increase in de-
fense expenditure of the order of 3% should,
in the absence of tangible improvement in
the balance offerees, serve as a general
guide, recognizing that a special effort will
be required from those countries identified

of the DPC report whose past level of expen-
ditures had led to key deficiencies in their
defense capabilities. Regarding the share of
GDP devoted to defense, countries should
make every effort to provide a level of re-
sources adequate to enable them to maintain
or assume an equitable share of the roles,
risks and responsibilities of the common de-
fense burden; in particular those countries
that spend a smaller percentage of their
GDP on defense than the current NATO me-
dian should over time assume a more equita-
ble share of the defense burden by showing
real progress in increasing that percentage;

(b) make every effort to improve the
output obtained from the resources avail-
able. Continuing attention should be paid to
obtaining better value for money through
improved cooperation and rationalization,
with particular attention to those areas
identified in the Roles, Risks and Respon-
sibilities Report. ■

President Meets With French President

President Francois Mitterranc
visited the United States May 20-21,
1989, and met with President Bush at
Keiinebunkport, Maine, and at Boston.
Following is the text of a news confer-
ence the two Presidents held at Dicker-
son Field at Boston University on May
21^

President Mitterrand. We're coming
to the end of our stay in the United
States, and this meeting with the press
is, more or less, the last event. And the
journalists who have been good enough
to follow us during the last 24 hours
will have appreciated, I think, that
we've had a very full day. But you will,
of course, be able, in a moment, to ask
the questions which you feel most suit-
ed to the requirements of the day. And
President Bush and myself will be at
your disposal to reply to them.

But personally — and also on behalf
of my country — I would like to say how
very deeply sensitive we are to the way
in which Mrs. Bush and President Bush
have received us — my wife and myself.
They received us in a very warm,
homely family and restful atmosphere;
but at the same time, we were able to
have some intensive, political, serious
conversations which were given, as it
were, more life thanks to the forest air
and the sea breeze that we were ble to
breathe.

Now President Bush will be saying
a few words, and then we'll be open to
questions. But I'd like to personally
thank all those who have Ijeen good
enough to accompany us during our
stay and comment on what we have
done.

President Bush. Let me just say
what a pleasure it was having Presi-
dent Mitterrand and Madame Mitter-
rand as our guests in Maine. We've just
come from the commencement of Bos-
ton University. And nothing better
symbolizes the strength of the friend-
ship and common values which we
share — which our two nations share —
and which really the President cele-
brated with us 8 years ago, when he
came to Yorktown, celebrating the
200th anniversary of that battle.

The weekend was not all work and
no play; it provided a good opportunity
for us to discuss many of the main is-
sues on the international agenda. By
the end of this week, both of us will be
traveling to Brussels for the NATO
summit. We agreed on the central role
the Atlantic alliance has played in
keeping the peace for the past four dec-
ades, the enduring value of this part-
nership in the common defense in the
years ahead. We also agreed on the
critical contribution the nuclear deter-
rent has made in keeping us free and
secure and at peace.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

EUROPE

We also talked about the oppor-
tunities that lie before us in the light of
the changes now taking place in the So-
viet Union and in Eastern Europe.
Both of us will watch developments in
the Soviet Union, seeking signs of last-
ing change. Of course, we discussed the
dramatic events now taking place in
Beijing, in China. The President, I be-
lieve, shares my view — I'll let him
speak for himself — that our goal should
be a bold one, to move beyond contain-
ment, toward the integration of the So-
viet Union into the community of
nations. Of course, we discussed how
the United States will relate to France
and the rest of Western Europe in the
years ahead.

I sensed an excitement on his part
about the future. We exchanged views
about the themes that I touched on in
my earlier remarks here at BU [Boston
University] — America's readiness for a
more mature transatlantic partnership,
the vision of a commonwealth of free
nations as a bridge to overcome the di-
visions of Europe. We also discussed
the potential for improved cooperation
with the EC [European Community] as
we approach 1992 and the single Euro-
pean market, as well as the prospects
for greater Western European coopera-
tion in addressing the political and
global issues around the world. I heard
his clarion's call for cooperative action
on the environment, and I salute him
for that.

Beyond the NATO summit and
East-West relations, we exchanged
views on so may subjects, many of
which will be on the agenda at the
Paris economic summit. We agreed
that more needs to be done in practical,
realistic ways to deal with the environ-
ment and to deal with the problems of
global warming. We also reviewed ways
of advancing the peace process in the
Middle East, the urgent need to try to
find, or be helpful in finding, a solution
to the situation in Lebanon.

On the question of peace and de-
mocracy in this hemisphere, in Central
America, we share the view that de-
mocracy must be restored in Panama
and that the commitments undertaken
at Esquipulas are the key to peace and
democracy in the region.

Q. The students in China have
been told to leave Tiananmen Square
or face military attack. What's your
reaction to that, and do you have any
message for the students, other than
that the United States supports free-
dom of speech and freedom of
assembly?

Baltic Freedom Day

PROCLAMATION 5990,
JUNE 14, 1989"

Fifty years ago on August 23, 1939, the for-
eign ministers of the Soviet Union and Nazi
Germany signed the infamous Molotov-
Ribbentrop pact. The secret protocols to
this treaty condemned the independent Bal-
tic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
to the foi'eign domination they still endure
today.

Less than 1 year after the signing of the
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Soviet Union
invaded the three Baltic Republics and im-
posed a regime antithetical to the ideas of
national sovereignty and individual liberty.
The suffering of the Baltic people was e.\ac-
erbated when Nazi forces drove through
these states during the beginning of the
Nazi-Soviet War and established a brutal
administration. When the Red Army recap-
tured the Baltic States during World War II,
it reinstituted a reign of terror under the
Soviet secret police. Hundreds of thousands
of innocent men, women, and children were
deported to Siberia; thousands of others per-
ished in armed resistance to the attack upon
their national independence and individual
rights. By the end of World War II, the Bal-
tic States had lost 20 percent of their
populations.

Since their forcible annexation by the
Soviet Union in 1940, the people of
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have suf-
fered political oppression, religious persecu-
tion, and repression of their national
consciousness. Their cultural heritage has
been denigrated and suppressed, and
russification has threatened their survival
as distinct ethnic groups. An aggressive
program of industrialization has posed haz-
ards to their health as well as the environ-
ment. Members of the clergy and lay
religious leaders have been systematically
harassed and imprisoned for activities
deemed unacceptable by the authorities.

However, half a century of repression
has not broken the spirit of the Baltic peo-
ples. Today, their longing and hopes for lib-
erty remain strong. Hundreds of thousands
of Estonian, Lativian, and Lithuanian men
and women have publicly demonstrated their
desire for freedom and democracy, calling
for national autonomy and control over their
own affairs.

The future looks brighter today than at
any other time in the Baltic States' post-war
experience. The undeniable voice of Baltic
people is being heard. Some religious
shrines — desecrated by the Communist gov-
ernment and used to house concerts, art-
work, and even a museum of atheism — have
been returned to the churches. Members of
the clergy have been allowed to take up theiii
pastoral duties. The unique languages, na-
tional flags, and patriotic songs of the three
countries have been restored. Some politicali
prisoners have been released.

These are important steps, but justice
demands that more be taken. Recent im-
provements in human rights practices by tha
ruling Communist officials are not com-
plete, nor have they been institutionalized.
The people of Lithuania, Latvia, and Es-
tonia both demand and deserve lasting guan
antees of their fundamental rights.

The Government of the United States
does not and will not recognize the uni-
lateral incorporation by force of arms of the
Baltic States into the Soviet Union. On this
observance of Baltic Freedom Day, we ex-
press our solidarity with them and call upon
the Soviet Union to listen to their calls for
freedom and self-determination.

By Senate Joint Resolution 63, the Con-
gress has designated June 14, 1989, as "Bal-
tic Freedom Day" and has requested the
President to issue a proclamation in observ-
ance of this event.

Now, Therefore, I George Bush, Pres*
ident of the United States of America, do
hereby proclaim June 14, 1989, as Baltic
Freedom Day. I call upon the people of the
United States to observe this day with ap-
propriate remembrances and ceremonies
and to reaffirm their commitment to princi-
ples of liberty and freedom for all oppressed
people.

In Wit.\ess Whereof, I have hereunto
set my hand this fourteenth day of June, in
the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and
eighty-nine, and of the Independence of the
United States of America the tw'o hundred
and thirteenth.

George Bush

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of June 19, 1989. ■

President Bush. We do support
freedom of speech, freedom of assem-
bly, freedom of the press; and clearly,
we support democracy. I don't want to
be gratuitous in giving advice, but I
would encourage restraint. I do not
want to see bloodshed. We revere the
model of Martin Luther King in this

country for his peaceful protests. And
so I might suggest a familiarization
with that for the people in China. I
would urge the government to be as
forthcoming as possible in order to see
more democratization and to see a
peaceful resolution of this matter.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

EUROPE

Q. Do you think that progress
ias been made in hoping to bring
ierman and American views closer
ogether on the question of moderni-
sation of nuclear short-term weapons
;n Europe? And do you think that you
ire there to act as an intermediary, a
onciliator?

President Mitterrand. The only
ole I play is the role that is my natural
ole as a member of the alliance. But I
m not particularly there to act as a
fiediator. Obviously I'm happy if views
an be reconciled and believe, I think,
hat they can be reconciled. I think
hat we have now the elements of ideas
hat could form a decision that will be
aken just in a week's time. And I think
hat the decision that will be taken will
18 found positive from the point of view
if all members of the alliance. You
:now what my suggestions on the sub-
ects are because I made them clear in
'aris.

Q. On that point, the indication
•ut of Bonn today was that the West
xermans have not accepted the ex-
(licit conditions that were handed to
flr. Stoltenberg [West German Minis-
er of Finance] on Friday for talks on
>NF [short-range nuclear forces]. A
Vest German spokesman said that
hose conditions were merely — I
hink he said — a basis for further dia-
ogue. Is the U.S. position negotiable
it this point, and how do you sum up
he likelihood of resolving this before
he NATO summit?

President Bush. I think great
irogress has been made. One way to
guarantee there will not be progress is
0 lock each other in, in public state-
neiits, so I do not intend to comment
)n the specifics. The report I saw from
Bonn was somewhat more encouraging
-han the way you phrased this one, in
,erms of being very, very close togeth-
>r with the Germans. This is an alli-
uue that contains many countries, and
A'e are in active consultation with the
jermans and others. And, of course, I
lad the benefit over this weekend of
learing directly from President Mit-
errand on his views. But I think that
,ve could well have this resolved before
.he summit.

Q. You spoke about the common
jond between the United States and
France and the economic changes
hat will be coming about in 1992 and,
)f course, the obvious benefit to the
L nited States. Yet we have an immi-
gration law at the present that dis-

favors Europeans. Do you see this
matter being resolved so that Euro-
peans can continue to contribute to
the United States?

President Bush. I want to see the
immigration matter resolved, and, yes,
1 do foresee it being resolved.

Q. You have a personal interest
in China and the Chinese people, yet
your statements have seemed to be
very cautious and diplomatic. Have
you made any private representation
to the Chinese leadership or given
any suggestions to them on how to
resolve — or what you might help with
in the democracy movement in China?

President Bush. We have been in
touch with our ambassador on this very
key question. I think this perhaps is a
time for caution because we aspire to
see the Chinese people have democracy,
but we do not exhort in a way that is
going to stir up a military confronta-
tion. We do not want to have a situation
like happened in Burma or some other
place. And so as we counsel restraint
and as we counsel peaceful means of ef-
fecting change, that is sound advice. To
go beyond that and encourage steps
that could lead to bloodshed would be
inappropriate.

Q. You said we could well have
agreement on SNF before the sum-
mit. I gather you're talking about the
West Germans, because we're getting
reports out of London that Mrs.
Thatcher is not, as the English say,
best pleased about this. And this is
confusing because we also understand
that you took Mrs. Thatcher's wishes
into account when you were formulat-
ing your counterproposal and that, in
fact, you were in rather close touch
with the British. Do you think we
could go to Brussels with the British
not having signed on to this and yet
you would have agreement with the
West Germans?

President Mitterrand. I can ap-
preciate exactly what kind of a dialogue
you were hoping to achieve [with Presi-
dent Bush], but the rules of the game
are that it's my turn to answer. You
may be asking for an opinion, but I
would say this; that within the Atlantic
alliance, there is full equality among
all partners. And on this problem, like
on other problems, at the outset, people
have diverging views, different opin-
ions. But the important thing is to
come to a meeting of the minds and to
achieve a common answer. This has al-
ways been the case in the alliance. A

particular view will only carry more
weight if it carries more wisdom and
more common sense. I'm not going to
sit here and award prizes to this view
or that view. There's no particular view
which would prevail. The important
thing is that the general interest of the
alliance should prevail, and it will.

Q. You called for restraint in
China, and you said that the lessons
of Martin Luther King could well be
heeded here. Do you believe the pro-
testers should go home? Do you think
there is a revolution underway in Chi-
na now?

President Bush. I don't think that
it would be appropriate for the Presi-
dent of the United States to say to the
demonstrators and the students in Bei-
jing exactly what their course of action
should be; that is for them to deter-
mine. They know the U.S. commitment
to democracy, to the commitment to
freedom, to the aspiration we have that
all people will live in democratic soci-
eties. But I'm not about to suggest
what I think they ought to do, except to
spell out peaceful and continue to fight
for what you believe in, stand up for
what you believe in, but beyond that, I
cannot go.

Q. How unstable is the situation?

President Bush. I don't know. I
think we have to wait and see. There's
certainly an enormous expression on
the part of many people — students and
others — for change toward movement
toward democracy. I lived there. I saw
a society totally different than the one
that exists in China today. China has
moved, in some areas, toward democra-
cy. Now the quest is, and the appeal
from these kids is, to move further. I
am one who feels that the quest for de-
mocracy is very powerful. But I am not
going to dictate or try to say from the
United States how this matter should
be resolved by these students. I'm not
going to do it.

As for [an earlier] question, we
have been in very close touch with Mrs.
Thatcher. And I listened attentively
and with great interest to what Presi-
dent Mitterrand said, and I agree with
him; that we can get together on this
vexing question. There are strong-
willed people from strong countries,
and they each have an opinion. But my
role has been to try, behind the scenes,
to be helpful for working this problem
out. And I should salute the President
of France as he has tried to be extraor-
dinarily helpful in working this prob-

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

EUROPE

lem out. Your job is to know every step
of the way the nuances of difference
that exist between the parties, and
mine is to see if we can't iron out those
differences. And that's exactly what
I'm (hMng, what Secretary Baker is do-
ing-, and what others are doing.

Q. You were talkiriK about the at-
titude we should have toward the So-
viet Union, particularly on the part
of the allies. Do you think that the
cold war has come to an end, and, if
so, has it come to an end once and for
all?

President Mitterrand. People
seem to want us to play the role of
crystal-gazers, which we are not. It's
like a revolution. You only know after-
ward if a thing turned out to be a revo-
lution. As far as the cold war is
concerned, one thing is clear, and that
is that we are moving out of the cold
war. And the chances are that this will
be true for a very long time. There will
be moments when things will be more

difficult, doubtless, but I don't see us
slipping right back into the cold war. Of
course, anything is possible. A lot will
depend on the trend of developments
within the Soviet Union.

Q. You said in your speech today
that you're grateful for some of these
proposals with General Secretary
Gorbachev, yet some in your Adminis-
tration have made no secret of their
disdain for some of these proposals.
In talking about "beyond contain-
ment," did the recent proposals of
General Secretary Gorbachev on con-
ventional and nuclear weapons meet
any of your tests for going beyond
containment?

President Bush. Yes. I not only en-
courage him to continue to make pro-
posals but I'd encourage him to
unilaterally implement the proposals.
Many of them address themselves to
conventional forces where they have an
extraordinary preponderant imbal-
ance, where they have the weight on
their side. And so, I'd like to see that.
But I don't think anybody is criticizing
the specific proposals. All we want to
see is real progress. And when you
have the historic imbalance that exists
on conventional forces, yes, I welcome
the proposals and like to see them im-
plemented. And it's in that area that
we're looking for reality versus rheto-
ric. I know that some are quite restless
about the pace that I have set in deal-
ing with the Soviet Union, but I think
it's the proper pace. I will be prepared
when Jim Baker gets back to talk some
more. I'm most anxious to be sure that
the alliance is together on these ques-
tions. And so, we have time.

In the meantime, I welcome not
only the change of openness and the
change of reform but I want to see it
continue. I welcome the proposals, but
I would like to see them implemented.
That would still leave a large imbalance
in favor of the Soviets on many of these
proposals — not all of them. Some of
them talk to get where we need to be
engaged, because they talked to get-
ting down to equal numbers. But no, I
salute the man, as I said, for certain
kinds of steps that he has taken. But I
hope I'll be forgiven for being cautious
and for being prudent and not for being
stampeded into something that might
prove to be no good for the alliance and
not good for the United States.

Q. Mr. Gorbachev has been de-
scribed by the President's spokesman
as a "drugstore cowboy." Do you
agree with this description?

President Mitterrand. I think that
one must be wary of caricatures. Mr.
Gorbachev is worth very much more
than that.

Q. Do you believe that the Ameri
can public is aware of the limits of
American power and of your ability ta
really influence political events like
those in China, Panama, and Europe?

President Mitterrand. I think on
these questions of influence — influence
can be of a material kind and military
or peaceful. But it can also be of a mor-
al kind and psychological. There's a
whole rainbow, a whole range, of possl
bilities. Of course, the first problem
that you're always up against is the
problem of noninterference in other
people's affairs. That being said — but
it's a question of human rights. One
must not stop at that. And I think one
must give priority to the public asser-
tion of the basic principles of human
rights and that is what must be
prevailed.

With reference to the countries yoi
are mentioning, these principles shoul(
be recalled to the countries concerned,
But recourse of arms is probably not
the kind of method that is fully in tune
with the requirements of our day. And
to think that you can win whole popula-
tions over to your way of thinking by
threatening them with guns or tanks is
obviously wrong.

What is also very important, and
more important, is to win over interna-*
tional public opinion, to mobilize public
opinion, both within and without the
country, so that those governments
which fail in the respect of human
rights will be, both within and without,
with their backs to the wall on the sub-
ject. That being said, I know of no mir-
acle cure in these matters, no unfailing
method that always works. And if I
were able to come here to Boston and
someone could give me the golden key
that would open all these doors, I'd be
very happy and perhaps somewhat
surprised.

Q. In your discussions this week-
end concerning Lebanon, did you dis-
cuss the situation concerning the
hostages, and have you any news con-
cerning avenues that could be pur-
sued toward their eventual release?

President Bush and President Mitterrand
at the President's home in Kennebunkport,
Maine.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

EUROPE

President Bush. It was just
;ouched on because — but we discussed
Lebanon in depth. The hostage situa-
;ion obviously continues to be on our
mind, and President Mitterrand was
most sympathetic — the French people
leld various times against their will.
That underlies the concerns that I feel.
But Lebanon transcends just our own
<een interest in the hostage question —
;o see a once peaceful country, where
various factions could live together,
low ripped asunder by war and by out-
ride pressures, demands world action.
.A.nd yet again, when you look at the al-
A'l'natives, they aren't that clear. We
ia\i' called for the cease-fire, support-
n,u the Arab League posture: getting
'ori'ign troops out of Lebanon and try-
ne to have the election process go for-
ward so you can have an elected
)i-fsident that fulfills the will of the
ifiiple.

President Mitterrand was very
lelpFul because he has a unique view of
Lflianon, with France's history there.
\iiil yet I don't think either of us came
ip with a simple answer. I saluted what
le tried to do when he encouraged the
Secretary General of the United Na-
ioiis to go there. But for various rea-
sons, that did not work out. We did talk
ibout a couple of other specific ap-
iroaches that we might take, which I
hiiik should remain confidential. But it
vas discussed in detail. It is a matter
)f enormous urgency. In the United
States, of course, you heard Cardinal
.aw I Archbishop of Boston] today ap-
irdpriately singling out Lebanon be-
■ause of the religious divisions there. I
vish there was an easy answer to it,
md the United States stands ready to
lelp if we can.

President's Meeting With
EC Commission President

'President Mitterrand spoke in French.
ind his remarks were translated by an in-
erpreter (te.xt from Weekly Compilation of
"residential Documents of Mav 29, 1989). ■

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
JUNE 14, 1989>

The President held a working lunch to-
day with Jacques Delors, President of
the Commission of the European Com-
munities (EC). The President had in-
vited President Delors for the luncheon
when they met in Brussels on May 30.

The two, who were accompanied by
senior advisers, discussed ongoing co-
operation between the United States
and the EC Commission on issues of
mutual interest, including the implica-
tions of the EC's 1992 integration pro-
gram, international trade and the
Uruguay Round, the efforts toward po-
litical and economic reforms in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union, and
transnational problems such as the ur-
gent need to protect the environment.

The President reiterated his sup-
port for European integration and the
EC's single-market program. He reaf-
firmed that a stronger Europe means a
stronger America. He also noted that
there will be new challenges as the EC
carries out its single-market program.
He stressed the importance of open
markets in a more closely integrated

Europe and said that the United States
would work with the EC Commission
and the member states to ensure that
U.S. interests are taken fully into ac-
count in the 1992 process. The Presi-
dent underlined the need for both the
United States and the EC to continue
to combat protectionism and to con-
clude the current round of trade nego-
tiations successfully by the end of 1990.

The President reiterated a key
point in his Boston University speech:
that the United States and the EC
must strengthen their dialogue and co-
operation. He stressed the importance
of the annual U.S-EC ministerial
meeting in December as an oppor-
tunity for a high-level review of all as-
pects of the relationship. He also said
that other channels, such as the sub-
cabinet consultations held in November
1988, can help to broaden U.S.-EC
understanding.

The President said that he looked
forward to seeing President Delors
again next month at the Paris economic
summit.

'Te.xt from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of June 19, 1989. ■

uepartment of State Bulletin/August 1989

MIDDLE EAST

President Meets
With Israeli Defense Minister

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
MAY 24, 1989'

The President just completed a produc-
tive half-hour meeting with Israeli De-
fense Minister Yitzhak Rabin.
President Bush reaffirmed the U.S.
commitment to a close relationship
with our long-term friend and strategic
partner Israel. Toward this end, the
President made clear his determination
to provide Israel with the resources
necessary for its security.

The two leaders also discussed the
situation in the West Bank and Gaza.
The President told Defense Minister
Rabin that the recent elections pro-
posal put forward by the Government of

Israel constitutes an important contri-
bution to a process that has the poten-
tial to bring about negotiations leading
to a comprehensive settlement consist-
ent with Israeli security and Palestin-
ian political rights. The President
noted that the Israeli elections pro-
posal gives us something to work with,
and we are now looking for a construc-
tive Arab response to it.

The President also voiced his deep
concern over the escalating violence in
the occupied territories and expressed
the strong hope that all parties would
e.xercise maximum restraint.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- .=
dential Documents of May 29, 1989. ■ £

President Meets
With Saudi Foreign Minister

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
JUNE 14, 19891

The President met today with Prince
Sa'ud al-Faisal, Foreign Minister of
Saudi Arabia, to discuss the efforts of
the Arab League to resolve the
Lebanon crisis. The President wel-
comed the collective efforts of Saudi
Arabia, Morocco, and Algeria and ex-
pressed U.S. support for their mandate
to pursue urgently a political process
in Lebanon leading to elections, re-
forms, and a new national consensus.
The President pledged the commitment
of the United States to do all it can to
promote a political solution that would
bring Lebanon's turmoil to an end.

The United States encourages the
Arab League's efforts to foster a politi-
cal dialogue among the Lebanese. Such

a dialogue, in the context of a cease-
fire, is the necessary first step toward
a solution of Lebanon's suffering, which
has gone on too long. The President re-
affirmed the commitment of the United
States to Lebanon's unity, sovereignty,
and territorial integrity, with the with-
drawal of all foreign forces and the dis-
bandment of the militias.

The President said that the United
States believes that all parties to the
conflict in Lebanon must show re-
straint and flexibility at this crucial
point. All concerned must do their part
to promote a genuine political process,
devoid of threats and coercion. Outside
interests must not add to Lebanon's
misery.

(White Hou.te photo by David Valdez)

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents of June 19, 1989. ■

Department of State Bulletin/August 198

REFUGEES

Confronting Realities
of Refugee Assistance

by Jonathan Moore

Address before the Episcopal Mi-
grafion Ministries Network meeting
on May 26, 1989. Ambassador Moore is
U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs.

The United States, for a long time and
at present, has a record of service to
refugees around the world which we
can be proud of. We are the world's
leader in resettlement, assistance, and
political advocacy on behalf of refugees
and their humanitarian treatment
wherever they may be, and we influ-
ence the behavior of other nation states
continuously in major ways to increase
their support.

We do this because it is a projec-
tion, an engagement of our ideals, our
values within the world in which we
live, a manifestation of our sense of the
family of man, of sisterhood across
oceans and cultures, of the global vil-
lage, and our faith to love our neighbor
as ourselves. We do it also because per-
secution, violence, and poverty — and
the instability they engender which
perpetuate refugees — are not in the
U.S. interest. And because freedom
and justice should be for all.

The idealism inherent in refugee
policy not only is essential to its own
success but also can strengthen the
character and conduct of overall U.S.
foreign policy. The injection of idealism
into a whole body of policy can have an
enlightening, empowering effect. We
must include our own most precious val-
ues to produce progressive internation-
al leadership which otherwise might be
too susceptible to chauvinism and real-
politik. To separate refugees from poli-
tics or vice versa would be folly; to
divorce foreign policy from the voyage
of the human spirit would be failure. A
dynamic commitment to humanitarian
assistance to refugees is one way of
avoiding this.

Inadequate Resource Problems

Yet the proud record and commitment
of the U.S. worldwide program for ref-
ugees is in jeopardy. Increases in refu-
gee flows and in refugee plights are not
covered by adequate funding. Inconsis-
tencies in our policies between regions
and refugee groups threaten the even-

handed character of our program. Ad-
missions requirements for thousands
of refugees eat up funding needed to
assist millions of refugees in life-
threatening situations.

Larger numbers of people through-
out the world are migrating across
international boundaries, sometimes
covering great distances, than previ-
ously, and within these flows there is a
much higher proportion of those who
are economically rather than politically
motivated, seekers rather than fleers.
Some countries are being drained, oth-
ers mobbed, and neither is good. Here
is one of the many paradoxes in our be-
loved and anguished refugee work: peo-
ple must be able to escape what plagues
them, yet too much movement can both
cause more chaos and frustrate the ne-
cessity of building wholesome, viable
societies everywhere. Americans want
to give asylum-seekers sanctuary and
permanent homes amidst us, yet almost
everyone who leaves their own coun-
tries or regions wants to come to the
United States. We cannot take them
all, and we must not act so as to pull
them away from the chance of building
viable homes and nations with which we
can interact in an interdependent and
mutually reinforcing world.

Increasingly, refugee receiving
countries will be tightening up, re-
stricting their welcome of large num-
bers of exoduses and inflows in order
to be able to sustain their capacity
to provide special aid and generosity
to those who are most deserving and
needy. This requires more serious and
intense attention being given to dis-
tinctions, definitions, who is and who
isn't a refugee, what do we have to pro-
vide, who gets it and who doesn't. In
turn, this calls for the most exacting
resource allocation and the most excru-
ciating soul-searching.

We have an enormous resource
problem, both with regard to admis-
sions and resettlement and to emergen-
cy and relief assistance. The United
States — as well as what we call "the in-
ternational community" — does not cur-
rently have funds available to fulfill the
policies we proclaim given current and
growing levels of need. More funds are
required, in competition with deficit-
fighting and with other legitimate
claimants — a lot of money over a pro-
tracted period of time.

Our assistance program must deal
with two problems: the tendency of the
admissions program to eat up a larger
portion of the overall State Department
refugee account — in FY [fiscal year]
1984, roughly 70% of this budget went
to assistance and in FY 1990, roughly
57% will — and the pressure to keep ex-
penditures down in the face of severe
increases in humanitarian needs — the
U.S. percentage of support to multi-
lateral organizations has slipped over
the last 2 years significantly below
traditional levels.

This crisis in emergency relief,
care, and protection for refugees in
first asylum threatens both human-
itarian standards and U.S. policy
achievements and long-range interests.
At the start of this calendar year, we
informally estimated a shortfall of $85
million in funds required to sustain
traditional levels of U.S. contributions
to international assistance activity. We
have, over recent years, halved the
U.S. contribution to the International
Committee of the Red Cross as a per-
centage of their budget. Our funding
for the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees — which is currently appeal-
ing for $50 million to avoid a disruption
of programs, on which some refugees
are dependent for their very lives,
within the next 6 weeks — has declined
from one-third to one-fifth. Although
U.S. budgets for this purpose have held
fairly level, the emergency survival and
protection needs of the world refugee
population — which increased by 1 mil-
lion in the Horn and southern Africa
during the past year — have escalated.
We are also coming to realize that
real peacemaking — when fighting has
ceased and repatriation and recon-
struction can begin — tends for a per-
iod to cost more rather than less,
whether in Mozambique, Namibia, Af-
ghanistan, Cambodia, or the occupied
territories.

At the same time, the deteriora-
tion of first asylum and the threat to
the protection of fragile and vulnerable
refugee populations in Southeast Asia
and elsewhere is fearsome. We are hard
at work to link prospects for normaliza-
tion and stability in Southeast Asia
to the perpetuation of first-asylum
treatment and have helped to forge
a balanced multilateral strategy for
endorsement at the upcoming Inter-

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

REFUGEES

national Conference on Indochinese Re-
fugees at Geneva which emphasizes
protection, disincentives to flows,
resettlement, and repatriation. But the
outcome is not assured.

A Call For Solidarity and Agreement

In dealing with these sad and dan-
gerous circumstances I have merely
suggested, we have got to have less
fragmentation and recrimination and
find more solidarity and agreement.
We have a frustration consensus but not
a political consensus. We face an enor-
mous problem, which no one perversely
created and cannot be solved overnight,
which requires respect for and accom-
modation of contending forces, and the
courage and discipline to deal with a
comple.x reality. In our pluralism, bu-
reaucracies, and vast responsibilities,
we have not in this country yet mar-
shaled the needed priorities, re-
sources, compromise, and will. This is
largely because everyone would like to
avoid having to address the enormously
difficult and controversial de-
cisions which must be addressed.

Too often we are evasive about this
complexity in our reflexes and our
rhetoric, in parochial posturing and
simplistic criticism. At times we act
appalled if money is mentioned as a
constraint to humanitarian policy,
when in truth, the two are not exclu-
sively, but integrally, tied together. It
is ironic not only that certain of the ide-
als we hold require money to be ful-
filled, but more that we feel we lack the
money when we essentially have more
of it than any other country of the
world. How much can we share? Has
our affluence got us by the scruff of the
neck?

Moral and Ethical Challenges Ahead

I believe that we can find it within
ourselves — as individuals, as organi-
zations, as a government, and as a
society — to meet these challenges. I
believe that we all have done wonder-
fully in the past and can continue our
proud performance, but that it will
not be easy. Almost all of the tough
decisions — the tradeoffs — we have to
make will require a powerful element
of moral choice, and I would like to give
a few examples of what I mean by this,

both to underscore the gravity of the
task and to encourage us to get on
with it.

First, there is the fundamental
question of adequate priority being
given to humanitarian assistance to
refugees in an integral, rather than
peripheral, role in policy formulation —
given other competing needs in terms
of resources, political energy, and poli-
cy interests.

Second, we must meet the need for
long-term attack on the root causes of
persecution, violence, and poverty
which produce refugees and for advanc-
ing peacemaking and stability-winning
strategies — in the face of emergency
short-term demands and of the need to
counter firmly the violent and inhu-
manitarian acts of others.

Third. How can we apply the im-
perative for even-handedness, equity,
and fairness when confronted by claims
for special treatment on ideological,
ethnic, or political grounds with which
we have sympathy? And how do we un-
dertake the ferociously ethical dilemma
of distinguishing between those in
greatest need and pain and those who
are merely seriously deprived?

Fourth, we must accept our re-
sponsibilities to influence the ad-
herence of others to our principles
particularly in the case of our own
allies — such as the human rights behav-
ior of the contras and the niujahidin,
the Israeli response to the intifada in
the occupied territories, and the exploi-
tation of refugees along the Thai-
Cambodia border.

Fifth, should we cut off or continue
relief for exploited refugees when the
delivering agencies are denied access
to the camps by those who control
them? And should we cut off or contin-
ue to provide food to hungry refugees
caught in civil conflict when it is being
used as a weapon of war by either or
both combatants?

Sixth. Even more exactingly, we
must deal courageously with the moral
tension inherent in measures to deter
flows of asylum seekers; in the failure
to discourage people from flight which
could expose them to further suffering;
in the procreation of "humane" holding
centers of rejected asylum seekers who
will be cooped up until they can be
repatriated; and in the ambivalence
of repatriation itself — the absolutely
essential component of any viable hu-
manitarian strategy — back to countries

of origin like Vietnam and Mozam-
bique, where the dangers from which
the people first fled still lurk.

Seventh, how do we resolve the
schizophrenia of needing to rely less m
the government for resources and au-
thority and more on our own independi
ent, volunteer, charitable identities
when government funds and authority
are so important? And how do we re-
frain from self-righteousness when
there appears to be insufficient spiri-
tual energy around us?

These are some of the moral
choices which we must truly engage,
which we can neither treat superficial
nor shrink back from making.

Conclusion

So, I've unburdened myself, not on, bti
with you. In closing, I have one hint to
share. It is that individuals like your-
selves, who are in the trenches, direct
ly, immediately, intimately working
with those special voyagers whether at
home or abroad — not quitting — are tht
key to the transcendent power of faith :
and love in this mission and lead and
inspire the rest of us — the macropolic;
makers, the bureaucrats, officialdom-
to seize the opportunities and resolve
the choices ahead. You can help more
than you know in sustaining hope whij
confronting reality. ■

Department of State Bulletin/August 198

Developing Solutions for

Central American Refugee Problems

REFUGEES

If Jonathan Moore

Address before the International
onference on Central American Refu-
ses in Guatemala City on May SO.
W9. Ambassador Moore is U.S. Coor-
inator for Refugee Affairs.

he U.S. delegation wishes to congrat-
ate the countries of Central America
3 well as the UN High Commissioner
>r Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN
■evelopment Program (UNDP) for or-
anizing this humanitarian undertak-
ig on behalf of the uprooted of the
gion. My government comes to this
mference sharing the concerns of the
rganizers — having studied the plan
'action — and prepared to work with
le other participants in addressing
xr shared concerns about both the
rotection of and assistance to refu-
ses, displaced persons, and repatri-
;es in Central America.

The United States believes that it
; important to move beyond legalistic
ebates and focus on defining a con-
*ete plan of action appropriate to the
tuation in the region and desirable
•om a humanitarian point of view,
r'hile my government does not consid-

the Cartagena declaration and the
Irinciple documents prepared for this
onference as statements of interna-
onal law, we appreciate the human-
arian and generous spirit underlying
lem.

defining Refugee Status

.8 a party to the UN protocol relating
0 the status of refugees, my govern-
lent considers it essential that the
rincipie oi noiirefoulement^ set forth
ii Article 33 of the refugee convention
e api)lied to refugees as defined in the
invention. In addition, we appreciate
le willingness of the Central Ameri-
an countries, as a matter of policy, to
xtend the same treatment to persons
ho are fleeing civil strife in their
onielands. In fact, we know they have
ft en been even more generous, ai-
ming persons from other Central
diicrican countries to remain at least
jiiiporarily, regardless of their precise
lotivations for leaving or for not wish-
it; til return to their homelands.

Whether a country chooses to ap-
ply the convention definition or the
"expanded" Cartagena definition of
refugee in its domestic asylum prac-
tice, asylum seekers must be given a
fair opportunity to make their case for
refugee status. There must be pro-
cedures for status determination that
ensure that persons with valid claims
are not repatriated involuntarily.

Voluntary repatriation, when
feasible, is the preferred solution
for refugees. Refugees should be given
information about conditions in their
home countries to assist them in decid-
ing whether they wish to return, and it
is desirable and, indeed, indispensable
for neutral parties to monitor the well-
being of repatriates.

U.S. Assistance to the Region

Under our national laws, the United
States generally offers permanent re-
settlement and the protection of non-
refoule)ueni only to people who meet
the convention definition of refugees.
In the assistance area, however, the
United States can and does assist not
only convention refugees but persons
externally and internally displaced by
civil strife and natural disasters. In
1989, we will contribute $10.5 million
for aid to refugees, repatriates, and
displaced persons in this region
through UNHCR and ICRC [Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross]; in
the decade of the 1980s, the cumulative
total for these programs has reached
$105 million. Clearly, the longer term
needs of refugees and repatriates will
require an even larger response from
these organizations. The United States
and other donors must increase their
efforts to support them.

The disadvantaged groups, who
are the subject of this conference, also
benefit substantially from the broader
program of U.S. assistance to the re-
gion. The U.S. Government, through
the Agency for International Develop-
ment (AID) and multilateral financial
and development institutions, provides
significant amounts of assistance to
Central America in support of the
countries' efforts to achieve peace and
development. While the United States
has been working with Central Ameri-

can programs for several decades, our
bilateral assistance has increased
sharply in this decade. We have pro-
vided over $5 billion in direct assis-
tance since 1984 alone. These resources
flow through our bilateral programs in
Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guate-
mala, and Honduras and through a
regional program involving institutions
such as the Central American Bank for
Economic Integration and the Nutri-
tion-Institute for Central America and
Panama.

The principal goals of U.S. econom-
ic assistance are to support the return
of economic stability to the region, to
establish the foundation for broad-
based, sustained growth, and to en-
courage the growth of democracy and
democratic institutions. All U.S.
assistance — balance-of-payments sup-
port, sector programs, project assis-
tance, and food aid — support these
goals.

U.S. aid programs in the five coun-
tries mentioned earlier are now con-
tributing over $700 million annually
toward these goals. Their focus in each
country is both national and in areas
with significant refugee returnee and
displaced populations. Projects include
water supply, rehabilitation of rural
roads and bridges, microenterprise
credit, primary health care, employ-
ment generation, housing, agricultural
assistance, family planning services,
municipal development, sanitation,
feeding programs, forestry, irriga-
tion, soil conservation, and primary
education.

In addition to these projects, AID
supports a number of specially tar-
geted programs totaling over $100 mil-
lion in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and
Honduras that focus directly on refu-
gees and displaced persons. These pro-
grams, of course, vary in the level of
resources and sectors of activity de-
pending on the characteristics, prob-
lems, and priorities of each country.

In this regard, the United States
finds the diagnostic studies prepared
for this conference to be a valuable
source for highlighting the priorities
of each of the affected countries with
respect to programs affecting the up-
rooted. We are distributing, along with
the text of these remarks, an outline of
how our aid programs relate to the pri-
orities identified by the affected coun-
tries in these studies.- As we seek to

)epartment of State Bulletin/August 1989

TREATIES

maintain our economic assistance to
the region at roughly the $700 million
level over the next few years, we will
give close consideration to these
priorities.

Steps Toward Agreement

In each of the countries, there are bi-
lateral AID missions to work with the
countries and nongovernmental organi-
zations to follow up on this conference.
Our delegation includes a contingent of
AID representatives from the region
prepared to engage in this process
starting today.

As we move on to the next steps,
we think it is important to recognize
that donors will be most responsive to
the real problems of the refugees and
displaced persons if the final proposals
which emerge are sound analytically,
realistic in estimates of those genu-
inely in need, and feasible in the spe-
cific responses to those needs and in
the capacity of truly representative
host country institutions to implement
them.

The United States believes that
funding of individual projects should be
achieved through direct contacts be-
tween individual donor countries, re-
cipient countries, UNHCR, and UNDP.
FoUowup mechanisms will most cer-
tainly be an important part of the on-
going process, but there is no need to
create new ones. Conversion of the pre-
paratory committee as is called for in
the plan of action, or any of a number of
regional bodies already in place includ-
ing those associated with Esquipulas
II, could serve the purpose. The U.S.
Government would react positively to a
call for a postconference review later in
the year to assess developments and
activities stemming from our deliber-
ations here.

It is clear that progress addressing
the root causes affecting the peace and
well-being of the people of the region in
general, and the uprooted in particular,
is essential to the success of our mutual
endeavor. My government heartily en-
dorses the draft declaration's commit-
ment to the establishment of firm and
lasting peace in the region and views it
as a fundamental prerequisite for long-
term refugee solutions.

We fully endorse and support the
goals contained in the Esquipulas and
Tesoro accords to which all five Central
American countries are signatories.
Their goals of democratization of all the
nations in the region and an end to sub-
version and destabilization from re-

gional or extraregional sources in the
isthmus must be pursued as an in-
tegrated whole. The United States
stresses that these accords must be
based on credible standards of compli-
ance, strict timetables for enforce-
ment, and effective ongoing means to
verify both the democratic and security
requirements embodied in the two
agreements. Lasting peace and an
end to violence in the region can only
be achieved by democratization and
economic development.

Conclusion

We all share a common interest in
continued efforts to foster a stable,
developing, and prosperous Central
American region which will stimulate
long-lasting refugee solutions that in
turn can lead to the healing of old
wounds and consolidate the sense of

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Arbitration

Convention on the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign arbitral awards. Done at
New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force
June 7, 1959; for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970.
TIAS 6997.

Ratification deposited: Mar. 14, 1989.'
Accession deposited: Lesotho, June 13, 1989.

Atomic Energy

Amendment of Article VLA.l of the Statute

of the Atomic Energy Agency of Oct. 26,

1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284, 7668).

Done at Vienna Sept. 27, 1984.2 [Senate]

Treaty Doc. 99-7.

Acceptance deposited: Uganda, June 6,

1989.

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful
seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague Dec.
16, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 14, 1971.
TIAS 7192.

Accession deposited: Marshall Islands, May
31, 1989.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful
acts against the safety of civil aviation.
Done at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered
into force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
Accession deposited: Marshall Islands, May
31, 1989.

Protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts
of violence at airports serving international
civil aviation, supplementary to the conven-
tion of Sept. 23, 1971 (TIAS7570). Done at
Montreal Feb. 24, 1988.^ [Senate] Treaty
Doc. 100-19.

well-being so eagerly sought after by
the people of the five Central Americai
countries. The United States applauds'
the humanitarian spirit with which the
Central American nations have ap-
proached the plight of refugees, dis-
placed persons, and returnees and
joins in the spirit of solidarity they ex-
emplify. Their determination at this
crucial juncture cannot help but be ap-
plauded by all who associate with the:
in their most worthwhile endeavor. A
as true commitment to find solutions
takes a stronger hold, the prospect of
success cannot help but become much
brighter.

'No expulsion or return of refugees toi
the frontiers of territories where their life|
or freedom would be threatened for reason
of race, religion, nationality, political opin-J
ion, or membership in a particular social
group. ■

Signatures: Congo. Apr. 13, 1989; Finland, j
Nov. 16, 1988; Korea, Dem. People's Rep. o|
Apr 2, 1989; Mauritius, June 28, 1989.
Ratifications deposited: German Dem. Re^
Jan. 31, 1989; Hungary, Sept. 7, 1988.

Commodities — Common Fund

Agreement establishing the Common Fund
for Commodities, with schedules. Done at |
Geneva June 27, 1980.''
Entered into force: June 19, 1989.

Conservation

Convention on international trade in endaii
gered species of wild fauna and flora, withl
appendices, as amended. Done at Washing-;
ton Mar 3, 1973. Entered into force July L
1975. TIAS 8249.
Accessions deposited: Ethiopia, Apr. 5, 198
Gabon, Feb. 13, 1989; Malta, Apr. 17, 1989;.
New Zeaknd, May 10, 1989.

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations.
Done at Vienna Apr 24, 1963. Entered into
force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24,
1969. TIAS 6820.
Accessions deposited: Byelorussian S.S.R.,
Mar. 21, 1989; Mongolia Mar 14, 1989; j

Ukrainian S.S.R., Apr 27, 1989; U.S.S.R.
Mar 15, 1989.

Containers

International convention for safe container!

with annexes, as amended. Done at Geneva

Dec. 2, 1972. Entered into force Sept. 6,

1977; for the U.S. Jan. 3, 1979. TIAS 9037,

10220.

Accession deposited: Mexico, Apr 4, 1989.

Department of State Bulletin/August 19(

TREATIES

enipcide

(iii\ention on the prevention and punish-
i-iu (if the crime of genocide. Done at Paris
i-r, ;i. 1948. Entered into force Jan. 12,
i.-.l: for the U.S. Feb. 23, 1989.
ceession deposited: Libya, May 16, 1989.

ui lear Material — Physical Protection

iiiiM'ntion on the physical protection of nu-
L'iir material, with annexes. Done at Vien-
a I let. 26, 1979. Entered into force Feb. 8,
IS 7
crission deposited: China, Jan. 10, 1989.^

luilear Weapons — Nonproliferation

jreaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear
reapons. Done at Washington, London, and
Joscow Julv 1, 1968. Entered into force
Ur. 5, 1970. TIAS6839.
et I'ssion deposited: Qatar, June 13, 1989.

'atents — Microorganisms

iudapest treaty on the international reeog-

jition of the deposit of microorganisms for

he jiurposes of patent procedure, with reg-

latiuns. Done at Budapest Apr. 28, 1977.

Intcred into force Aug. 19, 1980. HAS

"lis.

.cn-.-sion deposited: Czechoslovakia, May 5,

'Dilution

'ninention for the protection of the ozone

i.Mi-, with anne.xes. Done at Vienna Mar. 22,

!i>:). Entered into force Sept. 22, 1988.

>fnate] Treaty Doc. 99-9.

latifications deposited: Burkina Faso, Mar.

0, 1989; Peru, Apr. 7, 1989.

kccession deposited: Jordan, May 31, 1989.

■lontreal protocol on substances that de-
lete the ozone layer, with annex. Done at
llontreal Sept. 16, 1987. Entered into force
an. 1, 1989. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-10.
Ratifications deposited: Australia, May 19,
989; Maldives. May 16, 1989.
accession deposited: Jordan, May 31, 1989.

'rotocol to the 1979 convention on long-
lange transboundary air pollution (TIAS
0541) concerning the control of emissions of
litrogen oxides or their transboundary
lukes, with annex. Done at Sofia Oct. 31,
988. Enters into force on the 90th day fol-
awing the date on which the 16th instru-
nent of ratification, acceptance, approval,
>r accession has been deposited,
'signatures: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Jyelorussian S.S.R., Canada,
Czechoslovakia. Denmark, Finland, France,
German Dem. Rep., Germany, Fed. Rep. of,
:}reece, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,
;>Ietherlands, Norway. Poland, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Ukrainian S.S.R.,
;,S.S.R., U.K., and U.S.,-5 Nov. 1, 1988;
Hungary, May 3, 1989; Ireland, May 1, 1989.
Ratification deposited: Bulgaria, Mar. 30,
i989.

Red Cross

Protocol additional to the Geneva conven-
tions of Aug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363,
3364, 3365), and relating to the protection of
victims of international armed conflicts
(protocol I), with annexes. Done at Geneva
June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7,
1978.-'

Ratifications deposited: Greece, Mar. 31,
1989; Hungary, Apr. 12, 1989; Spain, Apr.
21, 1989.'
Accession deposited: Malta, Apr 17, 1989. '■■'

Protocol additional to the Geneva conven-
tions of Aug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363,
3364, 3365), and relating to the protection of
victims of noninternational armed conflicts
(protocol II). Done at Geneva June 8, 1977.
Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.^'
Ratifications deposited: Hungary, Apr. 12,
1989; Spain, Apr 21, 1989.
Accession deposited: Malta, Apr. 17, 1989. ■•

Refugees

Protocol relating to the status of refugees.

Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered

into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1,

1968. TIAS 6577.

Accession deposited: Hungary, Mar. 14,

1989.

Rubber

International natural rubber agreement,
1987, with annexes. Done at Geneva Mar. 20,
1987. Entered into force provisionally Dee.
29, 1988. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-9.'
Entered into force definitively: Apr. 3, 1989.

Satellite Communications Systems

Amendments to the convention and operat-
ing agreement on the International Mar-
itime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT)
of Sept. 3, 1976 (TIAS 9605). Adopted at
London Oct. 16, 1985.-
Acceptance deposited: New Zealand, Apr.
28, 1989.

Seabed Disarmament

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplace-
ment of nuclear weapons and other weapons
of mass destruction on the seabed and the
ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. Done
at Washington, London, and Moscow Feb.
11, 1971. Entered into force May 18, 1972.
TIAS 7337.
Accession deposited: Bahamas, June 7, 1989.

Taxation— OECD

Convention on mutual administrative assist-
ance in tax matters. Done at Strasbourg
Jan. 25, 1988.^

Signatures: Norway, May 5, 1989; Sweden,
Apr 20, 1989; U.S.'june'28, 1989.

Torture

Convention against torture and other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punish-
ment. Done at New York Dec. 10, 1984. En-
tered into force June 26, 1987.^ [Senate]
Treaty Doc. 100-20.
Accession deposited: Libya, May 16, 1989.

Trade— Textiles

Protocol extending the arrangement regard-
ing international trade in textiles of Dec. 20, '
1973, as extended (TIAS 7840). Done at Ge-
neva July 31, 1986. Entered into force Aug.
1, 1986; for the U.S. Aug. 5, 1986.
Ratification deposited: Brazil, Apr. 4, 1989.

Weapons

Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on
the use of certain conventional weapons
which may be deemed to be excessively inju-
rious or to have indiscriminate effects, with
protocols. Done at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. En-
tered into force Dec. 2, 1983. ^
Accession deposited: Benin, Mar. 27, 1989.^

Women

Convention on the political rights of women.
Done at New York Mar. 31, 1953. Entered
into force July 7, 1954; for the U.S. July 7,
1976. TIAS 8289.
Accession deposited: Libya, May 16, 1989.

Convention on the elimination of all forms of

discrimination against women. Done at New

York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force Sept.

3, 1981.3

Ratification deposited; Madagascar, Mar. 17,

1989.

Accession deposited: Libya, May 16, 1989.

BILATERAL

Argentina

Cooperation agreement for reducing de-
mand, preventing abuse, and combating il-
licit production and traffic of drugs and
psychotropic substances. Signed at Buenos
Aires May 24, 1989. Entered into force pro-
visionally. May 24, 1989; definitively, upon
notification that each party has met the re-
spective requirements imposed by its
Constitution.

Bahamas

Memorandum of agreement concerning as-
sistance in developing and modernizing the
Bahamas' civil aviation system, with letter
of understanding and annex. Signed at
Washington and Nassau Dec. 20, 1988, and
May 17, 1989. Entered into force May 17,
1989.

Bangladesh

Memorandum of understanding concerning
operation of the INTELPOST service, with
details of implementation. Signed at Dhaka
and Washington May 16 and 24, 1989. Enter-
ed into force June 15, 1989.

Bolivia

Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guar-
anteed by, or insured by the U.S. Govern-
ment and its agencies, with annexes. Signed
at La Paz May 15, 1989. Entered into force
June 23, 1989.

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989

PRESS RELEASES

Finland

Atcreement regarding mutual assistance in
customs matters. Signed at Washington Jan.
5. 1988. Entered into force July 13, 1989.

Gabon

Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guar-
anteed by. or insured by the U.S. Govern-
ment and its agencies, with annexes. Signed
at Libreville Feb. 16, 1989. Entered into
force Mar. 30, 1989.

Germany, Fed. Rep. of

Memorandum of agreement concerning a co-
operative program for extended air defense,
with attachment and annex. Signed at Wash-
ington and Bonn Apr. 28 and May 17, 1989.
Entered into force May 17, 1989.

Greece

Agreement extending the interim agree-
ment on air services, with memorandum of
understanding, of Apr 9, 1985, as amended
and extended. Effected by exchange of notes
at Athens May 11 and 2.5, 1989. Entered into
force May 25,' 1989; effective Apr 25, 1989.

India

Agreement amending the air transport
agreement of Feb. 3, 1956, as amended
(TIAS 3504, 5682). Effected by exchange of
notes at New Delhi May 4, 1989. Entered
into force May 4, 1989.

Peru

Agreement relating to the agreement of
June 28, 1988, as amended, for sales of agri-
cultural commodities, with memorandum uf
understanding. Signed at Lima May 3, 19S9.
Entered into force May 3, 1989.

Portugal

Agreement on social security, with adminis-
trative arrangement. Signed at Lisbon Mar
30, 1988. Entered into force Aug. 1, 1989.

Spain

Protocol amending the air transport agree-
ment of Feb. 20, 1973 (TIAS 7725). Signed at
Washington May 31, 1989. Enters into force
on the date on which the parties notify one
another that their respective constitutional
requirements have been fulfilled.

Sri Lanka

Agreement amending the agreement of
Sept. 30, 1988, for sales of agricultural com-
modities. Effected by exchange of notes at
Colombo Mav 16, 1989. Entered into force
May 16, 1989.

Tanzania

Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guar-
anteed by, or insured by the U.S. Govern-
ment and its agencies, with annexes. Signed
at Dar es Salaam May 4, 1989. Entered into
force June 15, 1989.

United Kingdom

Memorandum of understanding concerning
cooperative research project in imaging of
the ocean using radar, with annexes. Signec
at Arlington and London Apr 26 and Mav 5
1989. Entered into force May 5, 1989.

Agreement amending the agreement of Jul"
23, 1977, as amended (TIAS 8641, 8965,
9722, 10059), concerning air services.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washing-
ton Mav 25, 1989. Entered into force May 28
1989.

Agreement concerning reciprocal recogni-
tion of airline fitness and citizenship deter-
minations. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington May 25, 1989. Entered into for-
ce May 25, 1989'.

Agreement extending the agreement of
Mar. 11, 1987, as extended, concerning An-
guilla and narcotics activities. Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington June 23,
1989. Entered into force June 23, 1989; ef-
fective June 27, 1989.

'With declaration(s).

-Not in force.

^Not in force for the U.S.

••With reservation(s).

=With statement(s).

"To the convention and protocols I and

III.

Iraq

International express mail agreement, with
detailed regulations. Signed at Baghdad and
Washington Apr 6 and May 5, 1989. Entered
into force June 15, 1989.

Department of State

Japan

Agreement extending the agreement of May
2, 1979 (TIAS 94(53), on cooperation in re-
search and development in energy and re-
lated fields. Effected by exchange of notes
at Washington Apr 28, 1989. Entered into
force Apr 28, 1989.

Malaysia

Agreement concerning reciprocal exemption
with respect to taxes on income of shipping
and air transport enterprises. Signed at
Kuala Lumpur Apr 18, 1989. Enters into
force upon the exchange of any necessary in-
struments of ratification.

Niger

Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guar-
anteed by, or insured by the U.S. Govern-
ment and its agencies, with annexes. Signed
at Niamey Feb. 21, 1989. Entered into force
Mar 30, i989.

Norway

Agreement regarding mutual assistance be-
tween customs authorities. Signed at Oslo
Mav 17, 1989. Entered into force Aug. 30,
1989.

Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of Press Relations, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No. Date Subject

*106 6/1 Morris B. Abram sworn in
as LI.S. Representative to
the European Office of the
UN, May 24.
107 6/6 Baker: news briefing, Lon-
don, June 1.

*108 6/2 Program for the official visit
of Pakistani Prime Minis-
ter Bhutto, June 5-10.
109 6/6 Baker: interview on CNN's
"Newsmaker Saturday,"
June 3.

*110 6/6 Baker: luncheon toast for

Pakistani Prime Minister
Bhutto.

111 6/7 Foreign Relations of the

[rnited States. 1955-1957,
Vol. XV, Arab-Israeli Dis-
pute, Jan. 1-July 26, 1956,
released.

112 6/8 Baker: address and question-

and-answer session. Na-
tional Press Club.

*113 6/0 OP-1 immigrant visa
program.

*114 6/12 Herman J. Cohen sworn in
as Assistant Secretary fo
African Affairs, May 12
(biographic data).

*115 6/12 E. Michael Ussery sworn in
as Ambassador to Moroc-
co, Jan. 6 (biographic
data).

*116 6/14 Vernon A. Walters sworn in
as Ambassador to the Fee
eral Republic of Germany,
Apr. 17 (biographic data).

117 6/15 Foreic/n Relations of the

United States. 1952-1954,
Vol. X, Iran (1951-54),
released.

118 6/20 Baker: statement before the

Senate Foreign Relations

Committee.
*119 6/22 Program for the official visi

of Australian Prime Mini;

ter R.J.L. Hawke, June

24-27.
*120 6/22 Baker: statement before the

House Foreign Affairs

Committee.

Department of State Bulletin/August 198

PRESS RELEASES

121 6/26

122 6/26

123 6/26

124 6/27

125 6/29

John H. Kelly sworn in as
Assistant Secretary for
Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs, June 16
(biographic data).

Program for the official visit
of Zairian President
Mobutu Sese Seko, June
28-30.

Baker: address before the
Asia Society, New York
City.

Douglas P. Mulholland sworn
in as Assistant Secretary
for Intelligence and Re-
search (biographic data).

Baker: news conference.
White House.

*Not printed in the Bulletin.

JSUN

ress releases may be obtained from the
ublie Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the
Jnited Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza,
Jew York, N.Y. 10017.

No. Date Subject

1 1/5 Okun: downing of Libyan air-
craft, Security Council.
* 2 1/6 Walters: Libyan complaint.
Security Council.

*3 1/6 Walters: Libyan complaint.
Security Council.

*4 1/11 Okun: Libyan complaint, Se-
curity Council.

*5 1/11 Okun: PLO participation in
Security (Council delibera-
tions, Security Council.

*6 1/25 Joint statement by the Joint
Commission of the People's
Republic of Angola, the Re-
putjlic of Cuba, and the Re-
public of South Africa, New
York, Jan. 24.

*7 2/10 Okun: PLO participation in
Security Council delibera-
tions. Security Council.

*8 2/14 Okun: condolences to the peo-
ple and Government of Ja-
pan, plenary.

*9 2/17 Okun: situation in the occu-
pied territories. Security
Council.

'"10 2/21 Barabba: priorities, Popula-
tion Commission of
ECOSOC.

*11 2/21 Smith: outer space. Scientific
and Technical Subcommit-
tee, Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space.

*12 2/23 Smith: allocating funds. Sci-
entific and Technical Sub-
committee, Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space.

*13 2/23 Pickering: statement at con-
firmation hearings. Senate
Foreign Relations
Committee.

*14 2/24 Smith: geostationary orbit.
Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee, Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space.

*15 2/24 Smith: space transportation,
Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee, Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space.

*16 2/27 Maclure: remote sensing. Sci-
entific and Technical Sub-
committee, Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space.

*17 2/28 Smith: planetary exploration.
Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee, Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space.

*18 3/3 Cahill: special session on in-
ternational economic is-
sues. Committee IL

*19 3/1 Nicogossian: biospheric mon-
itoring and disease predic-
tion. Subcommittee on
Scientific and Technical Af-
fairs, Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, Feb. 28.

*20 3/1 Smith: international geo-

sphere biosphere program.
Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee, Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space.

*21 3/1 Nygard: UNTAG financing.
Committee V, Feb. 28.

*22 3/1 Smith; astronomy. Scientific
and Technical Subcommit-
tee, Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space.

*23 3/7 Byrne: host country respon-
sibilities. Committee on
Relations With the Host
Country.

*24 3/8 Walters: human rights. Com-
mission on Human Rights,
Geneva, Mar. 6.

*25 3/9 Byrne: UNBRO donors'
meeting.

*26 [Not issued]

*27 3/16 Pickering: authorization of

funds for FY 1990 and 1991,
House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee, Mar. 14.

*28 3/16 Byrne: TTPL Trusteeship
Council.

*29 3/16 Byrne: pledging conference
on the Repatriation of
Namibian Refugees.

*30 3/22 Rashkow: outer space. Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space, Mar. 21.

*31 4/5 Rashkow: outer space. Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space, Apr. 3.

*32 4/7

*33 4/14

34
35
36

[Not
[Not
4/20

4/26

4/24

[Not
4/28

•41

4/28

'42

5/4

<43

5/4

'44

5/4

*45 5/4

5/9

5/12

5/15

5/16

5/18

5/22

*53 5/23

*54

*55

*56

5/24
5/23

5/24

*57 5/24

5/24

5/30

5/31

6/6

Rashkow: outer space. Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space. Apr. 4.

Byrne: assistance to Mozam-
bique, special meeting,
issued]
issued]

Pickering: e.xplanation of vote
on violence on the West
Bank.

Okun: Afghanistan, Security
Council.

Exchange visitors to meet at
UN before going on work
projects across the U.S.
issued]

Pickering: Panama, Security
Council.

Byrne: narcotic drugs. Com-
mittee IL

Waldrop: drug trafficking.
Committee II.

Bailey; NPT, preparatory
committee for review con-
ference. May 4.

Pickering: FY 1990 assistance
request. Senate Appropria-
tions Committee, Subcom-
mittee on Foreign
Operations.

Bvrne: social development,
ECOSOC.

McLennan: women, Commit-
tee II.

Byrne: opening statement.
Trusteeship Council.

Noe; American Samoa, spe-
cial committee.

Pickering: human rights,
ECOSOC Committee II.

Tvson: transnational corpora-
"tions, ECOSOC, May 17.

Waldrop; human rights,
ECOSOC Committee II,
May 18.

Russel: U.S. Virgin Islands,
Subcommittee on Small
Territories.

Tyson: transnational corpora-
tions in South Africa and
Namibia, ECOSOC.

Byrne: response to peti-
tioners, Trusteeship
Council.

Tyson: transnational banks in
developing countries,
ECOSOC.

Tyson: transnational corpora-
tions and environmental
protection in developing
countries, ECOSOC.

Byrne: women, ECOSOC.

Bunton: Guam. Subcommittee
on Small Territories.

Byrne: Palau, Trusteeship
Council.

Brady: UNFPA, UNDP Gov-
erning Council, June 5.

Pickering: PLO participation
in Security Council deliber-
ations. Security Council.

>epartment of State Bulletin/August 1989

PUBLICATIONS

*63

*64

6/7 Lowell; outer space, Commit-
tee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, June 6.
6/9 Clapp: outer space. Commit-
tee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space.

*65 6/9 Cahill: Fourth UN Develop-
ment Decade, ad hoc Com-
mittee of the Whole.

*66 [Not issued)

*67 [Not issued]

*68 6/13 Stevenson: outer space. Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space.

*69 6/13 Okun: outer space. Commit-
tee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space.

*70 6/13 Ault: outer space. Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space.

*71 6/19 Pickering: drug control, U.S.
Senate Caucus on Interna-
tional Narcotics Control,
New York City.

*Not printed in the Bulletin. I

Department of State

Free single copies of the following
Department of State publications are
available from the Public Information
Division, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.

President Bush

Proposals for a Free and Peaceful Europe,
Rheingoldhalle, Mainz, West Germany,
May 31, 1989 (Current Policy #1179).

Secretary Baker

After the NATO Summit: Challenges for the
West in a Changing World, National Press
Club, June 8, 1989 (Current Policy #1181).

A New Pacific Partnership: Framework for
the Future, Asia Society, New York City,
June 26, 1989 (Current Policy #1185).

Challenges Ahead for NATO and
Developments in East-West Relations,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
June 20, 1989 (Current Policy #1186).

Biography of Secretary Baker, June 1989
(Public Information Series)

Africa

The Seedlings of Hope: U.S. Policy in
Africa, Ambassador Perkins, Africare,
June 11, 1989 (Current Policy #1182).

Canada

U.S. -Canada Relations (GIST, June 1989).

East Asia

U.S. -Japan Relations (GIST, June 1989).
U.S. Relations With Korea, June 1989
(Regional Brief).

Economics

GATT and Multilateral Trade Negotiations

(GIST, June 1989).
Generalized System of Preferences (GIST,

June 1989).
International Investment Policy (GIST, June

1989).
Structural Adjustment and Economic

Performance (GIST, June 1989).
Trade Protection (GIST, June 1989).
U.S. Trade Policy (GIST, June 1989).

Refugees

Confronting Realities of Refugee Assist-
ance, U.S. Coordinator Moore, Episcopal
Migration Ministries Network meeting.
May 26, 1989 (Current Policy #1180).

Developing Solutions for Central American
Refugee Problems, U.S. Coordinator
Moore, International Conference on
Central American Refugees, Guatemala
City, May 30. 1989 (Current Policy #1182).

Indochina Refugee Situation: Toward a
Comprehensive Plan of Action, Deputy
Secretary Eagleburger, International
Conference on Indochinese Refugees,
Geneva, June 13, 1989 (Current Policy
#1184).B

Foreign Relations
Volumes Released

ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE, 1955'

The Department of State on June 1,
1989, released Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1955-1957, Volume XIV,
Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955. This 929-
page volume consists of previously clas-
sified records of the White House, De-
partment of State, and other govern-
ment agencies. It is the first of four
volumes of the authoritative documen-
tation on U.S. policy concerning the
Arab-Israeli conflict and the events
surrounding the Suez crisis of 1956.

The newly released documents re-
veal the details of the dramatic onset of
the Suez crisis. The United States saw
the Arab-Israeli dispute as the main
source of instability in the region that
could threaten vital Western interests.
In a diplomatic initiative code-named
"Alpha," the United States and the
United Kingdom formulated a compre-
hensive plan intended to serve as a ba-
sis for negotiation between Israel and
its Arab neighbors. The plan provided
for territorial adjustments leading to a
political settlement and an end to bel-
ligerency. The hoped-for results were
to include a resolution of the refugee is-
sue and of related problems, such as the
Arab economic boycott of Israel. Incen-
tives included a guarantee of the

agreed boundaries by the United
States and Britain and a variety of ecc
nomic measures, including aid to
Egypt for the Aswan Dam project and
assistance for development of the wa-
ters of the Jordan River valley. Al-
though Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles found the projected cost of a ses
tlement to the United States of $1 bil-
lion "depressingly large," he secured
President Eisenhower's approval in
principle in February.

Dulles and British Foreign Secre-
tary Anthony Eden tried to secure th
early cooperation of Egypt and Israel.,
Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasi
ser, the single most powerful Arab
leader, was reported to be "sore and
suspicious" and preoccupied with ten-
sions with Israel in the Gaza Strip. Is-
rael, for its part, was attempting to
secure a U.S. -Israel defense treaty.
Dulles and Eisenhower, after securing
the reluctant consent of the British,
went public with an August speech by
Dulles which outlined the principles
but not the details of Alpha. Israel re-
sponded by emphasizing it could make
no territorial concessions, while Egyp
stated it would need concessions fromi
Israel in the Negev area.

Egypt's conclusion in September (
a deal with Czechoslovakia to procure
Soviet arms further complicated mat- '
ters. It aroused U.S. apprehensions of '
an expansion of Soviet influence in tht
region, prompting a reassessment of
U.S. policy. It also stimulated an Isra
eli request for compensatory arms fro
the United States, a request the Ad-
ministration supported, but to a lim-
ited extent even though it feared a
regional arms race. Despite concern
over Egypt's arms purchase, the
Eisenhower Administration, after pro '
longed internal debate, decided to con
tinue to support the Aswan Dam
proposal and to pursue Alpha further.

The year ended on a mildly hopefii
note when Israeli Prime Minister
David Ben Gurion stated that Israel
was prepared to talk about boundaries!
on a "give-and-take basis," and the '
United States prepared to send formei
Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert B.,
Anderson to the Near East to promottj
the Alpha plan. His plan will be docu
mented in Volume XV. '

Department of State Publication No.

9688
GPO Stock No. 044-000-02224-9
Price: $34.00 (domestic postpaid)

Department of State Bulletin/August 1981

PUBLICATIONS

^AB-ISRAELI DISPUTE,
JNUARY 1-JULY 26, 19562

le Department of State on June 7,
89. released Foreign Relations of the
.■ntrri States, 1955-1957, Volume XV,
. alt-Israeli Dispute, January 1-July
;, UI56. This 943-page volume of pre-
Musly classified records of the White
buse, Department of State, and other
^vernment agencies is the second of
hr volumes of the authoritative, offi-
cii documentation on the history of
IS. policy concerning the Arab-
Iraeli conflict and the Suez crisis of
]j56.

' The newly released documents de-
til the events from the beginning of
T5(i to the nationalization of the Suez
dual Company by Egypt. They reveal
resident Eisenhower's attempt to rec-
(cile rising Arab nationalism with the
I S. commitment to Israel in the face
( a campaign by the Soviet Union to
ijicase its influence in the Arab
',)rl(l. In 1955 Egyptian Prime Minis-
ir (lamal Abdul Nasser began receiv-
iir arms from the Soviet bloc, and the
Uyptian-Israeli military equation
I )V('(1 toward rough parity. The trend
\is reinforced by the U.S. decision, af-
tr the Israeli attack on Syrian terri-
t|ry in December 1955, to suspend
^tion on a proposed sale of arms to Is-
itel. The Eisenhower Administration
sught to make the Israeli Government
nl vulnerable enough to consider
face with the Arabs but not so threat-
fed as to launch a preemptive strike
( its enemies.

Special presidential envoy Rob-
(t II. Anderson shuttled between
(liro and Jerusalem in an effort to
iiii agreement on a comprehensive
].iii for a negotiated settlement be-
t ten Israel and its Arab neighbors,
(dt'-named "Alpha." Anderson hoped
t use Nasser's opposition to the
hghdad pact, his desire to build the
ijwan Dam, and Egypt's need for de-
;lopment assistance as levers for ne-
flitiations with Israel. Nasser, however,
ijected direct contacts with Israeli of-
I'ials. Ben Gurion, meanwhile, re-
Ised to offer any major territorial
iiuessions, such as a link with Jordan
i the Negev which Nasser wanted, and
isisted on direct talks.

When the Anderson mission failed,
the United States adopted a policy of
political and economic pressures on
Nasser to move him toward more con-
ciliatory stances and to limit his influ-
ence in the Arab world. This new
policy, code-named "Omega," was based
on the assumption that Nasser was now
working against Western interests in
the Middle East and in tandem with the
Soviet Union. The United States dras-
tically cut its programs of assistance in
Egypt, stalled on the negotiations for
funding the Aswan Dam, and sought
with the United Kingdom to counter
Egyptian influence in moderate Arab
states. Secretary of State Dulles got
Eisenhower's approval to refuse to fund
the Aswan Dam. Before the Egyptians
were informed of the U.S. decision, the
Soviet Union countered in mid-June
1956 with an offer to finance the dam
on very attractive terms, but Nasser
apparently wanted Western financing.
Only a week after the United States in-
formed Egypt that the United States
would not fund the dam, Nasser sur-
prised the West by nationalizing the
Suez Canal Company — with compensa-
tion promised for its shareholders — and
stated that Egypt would use further
revenues from the canal to fund the
dam itself. The stage was set for the
Suez crisis.

Department of State Publication 9689
GPO Stock No. 044-000-02231-1
Price $34.00 (domestic postpaid)

IRAN, 1951-19543

The Department of State on June 15,
1989, released Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1952-1954, Volume X,
Iran (1951-1954), a 1,100-page volume
consisting of previously classified rec-
ords of the Department of State, the
White House, and other governmental
agencies.

This volume documents the end of
the British political-economic role in
Iran and the assumption of a greater
role in the area by the United States.
In April 1951, Iran nationalized the oil
industry; in effect eliminating the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) as
the major source of British influence in
the country. The United States became
involved when it agreed to mediate the

dispute over the form and amount of
compensation to the AIOC. Many plans
and proposals were drafted by the par-
ties, all to no avail until 1954 when the
political climate in Iran had changed
sufficiently to allow resolution.

U.S. interest in the Middle East
was based on a strong, stable Iranian
Government resistant to communist
penetration. The intractability of the
Anglo-Iranian oil dispute posed a fun-
damental challenge to this policy. The
United States became increasingly
frustrated both with apparent British
underestimation of the Soviet threat to
Iran and the virulence of Iranian na-
tionalism. The United States eventu-
ally found itself obliged to adopt a more
independent policy toward Iran and for-
mulate a policy that would take into ac-
count Iranian nationalism without the
loss of Western influence.

The crisis came to a head in 1953
when Prime Minister Mosadeq at-
tempted to force the Shah into exile
and turn away from a Western orienta-
tion. Pro-Shah demonstrations foiled
this gambit, and Mosadeq's subsequent
departure removed the major obstacle
to a settlement, which was achieved in
1954. A package of U.S. military and
economic assistance quickly followed,
and beginning in 1954 the United
States became heavily involved in
maintaining Iranian security.

This is the most recent volume in
the Department of State's official diplo-
matic documentary series begun in
1861 and the last of 16 covering the
1952-54 triennium.

Department of State Publication No.

9690
GPO Stock No. 044-000-02248-6
Price: $38.00 (domestic postpaid)

The Foreign Relations series is
prepared in the Office of the Historian,
Bureau of Public Affairs, Department
of State.

Copies of these volumes may be
purchased from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
Checks or money orders should be
made payable to the Superintendent of
Documents.

'Press release 103.
^Press release 111.
^Press release 117.

rfepartment of State Bulletin/August 1989

INDEX

August 1989
Volume 89, No. 2149

jAfRhanistan. After the NATO Summit:
Challenges for the West in a Changing

World (Baker) 55

\frica. The Seedlings of Hope: U.S. Policy

1 in Africa (Perkins) 69

iArms Control

Anniversary of INF Treaty (White House

I statement) 74

jMilitary Openness Proposals Tabled at
CSBM Talks (Department statement) . . 74

Nuclear and Space Talks Open Round 11
(Burt, Bush) 73

jPresident Meets with French President
(Bush, Mitterrand) 79

Secretary's Interview on "Newsmaker

■ Saturday" 67

JBelKium. President Visits Europe; Attends

North Atlantic Council Meeting (Baker,
Bush, Kohl, Thatcher, NATO declaration

■ and comprehensive concept) 11

China

After the NATO Summit: Challenges for the
West in a Changing World (Baker) 55

Demonstrations in China (Bush, White
House and Department statements) ... 75

I'lfsident Meets with French President
I Bush, Mitterrand) 79

President Visits Europe; Attends North At-
lantic Council Meeting (Baker, Bush,
Kohl, Thatcher, NATO declaration and
comprehensive concept) 11

Presidents News Conferences of June 5 and
.S (excerpts) 46

Secretary's Interview on "Newsmaker
Saturday" 67

Congress. Challenges Ahead for NATO and
Developments in East-West Relations
(Baker) 61

iEast Asia

American Leadership in the Pacific
(Quayle) 52

A New Pacific Partnership: Framework for
the Future (Baker) 64

Estonia. Baltic Freedom Day
(proclamation) 80

Europe

'After the NATO Summit: Challenges for the
West in a Changing World (Baker) 55

Challenges Ahead for NATO and Develop-
ments in East-West Relations (Baker) . . 61

{European Communities. President's Meet-
ing With EC Commission President
(White Hou.se statement) 83

France. President Meets with French Pres-
ident (Bush, Mitterrand) 79

Germany. President Visits Europe; Attends
North Atlantic Council Meeting (Baker.
Bush, Kohl, Thatcher, NATO declaration
and comprehensive concept) 11

Hungary. Hungarian Political Reforms
(White House statement) 78

Iran

After the NATO Summit: Challenges for the
West in a Changing World (Baker) 55

President's News Conferences of -June 5 and
8 (e.xcerpts) 46

Israel. President Meets With
Israeli Defense Minister (White House
statement) 84

Italy. President Visits Europe; Attends
North Atlantic Council Meeting (Baker,
Bush, Kohl, Thatcher, NATO declaration
and comprehensive concept) 11

Latvia. Baltic Freedom Day
(proclamation) 80

Lebanon

Pi-esident Meets with French President
(Bush. Mitterrand) 79

President Meets with Saudi Foreign Minis-
ter (White House statement) 84

Lithuania. Baltic Freedom Day
(proclamation) 80

Middle East

After the NATO Summit: Challenges for the
West in a Changing World (Baker) 55

President Visits Europe; Attends North At-
lantic Council Meeting (Baker, Bush.
Kohl, Thatcher, NATO declaration and
comprehensive concept) 11

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

After the NATO Summit: Challenges for the
West in a Changing World (Baker) 55

Challenges Ahead for NATO and Develop-
ments in East-West Relations (Baker) . . 61

Military Openness Proposals Tabled at
CSBM Talks (Department statement) . . 74

NATO Defense Planning Committee Meets
in Brussels (final communique) 77

President Meets with French President
(Bush, Mitterrand) 79

President Visits Europe; Attends North
Atlantic Council Meeting (Baker, Bush,
Kohl, Thatcher, NATO declaration and
comprehensive concept) 11

A Short History of NATO (Miller) 1

Western Securitv: The U.S. and Its NATO
Allies 6

Panama

After the NATO Summit: Challenges for the
West in a Changing World (Baker) 55

President Visits Europe; Attends North
Atlantic Council Meeting (Baker, Bush,
Kohl, Thatcher, NATO declaration and
comprehensive concept) 11

President's News Conferences of June 5 and
8 (excerpts) 46

Poland

Elections in Poland (Bush) 78

President's News Conferences of June 5 and
8 (excerpts) 46

Presidential Documents

Baltic Freedom Day (proclamation) 80

Demonstrations in China (Bush. White
House and Department statements) ... 75

Elections in Poland 78

Nuclear and Space Talks Open Round 11
(Burt, Bush) 73

President Visits Europe; Attends North
Atlantic Council Meeting (Baker, Bush,
Kohl. Thatcher, NATO declaration and
comprehensive concept) 11

News Conferences of June 5 and 8
(excerjjts) 46

Publications

Department of State 92

Foreign Relations Volumes Released .... 92

Refugees

Confronting Realities on Refugee Assis-
tance (Moore) 85

Developing Solutions for Central American
Refugee Problems (Moore) 87

Saudi Arabia. President Meets With Saudi
Foreign Minister (White House state-
ment) 84

South Africa. After the NATO Summit:
Challenges for the West in a Changing
World (Baker) 55

Treaties. Current Actions 88

U.S.S.R.

After the NATO Summit: Challenges for the
West in a Changing World (Baker) 55

Challenges Ahead for NATO and Develop-
ments in East-West Relations (Baker) . . 61

Nuclear and Space Talks Open Round 11
(Burt, Bush) 73

President Visits Europe; Attends North At-
lantic Council Meeting (Baker, Bush,
Kohl, Thatcher, NATO declaration and
comprehensive concept) 11

President's News Conferences of June 5 and
8 (excerpts) 46

United Kingdom. President Visits Europe;
Attends North Atlantic Council Meeting
(Baker, Bush, Kohl, Thatcher, NATO dec-
laration and comprehensive concept) ... 11

Warsaw Pact. Military Openness Proposals
Tabled at CSBM Talks (Department state-
ment) 74

Western Hemisphere. Developing Solutions
for Central American Refugee Problems
(Moore) 87

Ncune Index

Baker, Secretary 11,55,61,64,67

Burt, Richard R 73

Bush, President 11,46,73,75,78,79,80

Kohl, Helmut 11

Miller, .James E 1

Mitterrand, Francois 79

Moore, Jonathan 85,87

Perkins, Edward J 69

Quayle, Vice President 52

Thatcher, Margaret 11

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buUetBn

fhe Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 89 / Number 2150

September 1989

SUMMIT OF THE ARCH

soP£RENTr«oaffgrtoa....,,rj

.-^li:.

Df*partnt€*ni of Statp

bulletin

Volume 89 / Number 2150 / September 1989

The Department of State Bulletin,
published by the Office of Riblic Com-
munication in the Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and govern-
ment agencies with information on de-
velopments in U.S. foreign relations
and the work of the Department of
State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin's contents include major ad-
dresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials; se-
lected press releases issued by the
White House, the Department, and the
U.S. Mission to the United Nations;
and treaties and other agreements to
which the United States is or may be-
come a party. Special features, articles,
and other supportive material (such as
maps, charts, photographs, and graphs)
are published frequently to provide ad-
ditional information on current issues
but should not necessarily be inter-
preted as official U.S. policy
statements.

JAMES A. BAKER, III

Secretary of State

MARGARET DeB. TUTWILER

Assistant Secretary
for Public Affairs

Director,

Office of Public Communication

COLLEEN LUTZ

Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

Editor

Department of State Bulletin (ISSN
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For sale by the Superintendent of Docu-
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Washington, D.C. 20402,

CONTENTS

SUMMIT OF THE ARCH

FEATURE

1 Summit of the Arch (Secretary Baker, President Bush,
Political and Economic Declarations)

rhe President

12 Visit to Europe (Secretary
I Baker, President Bush, Hans

I Van den Broek, Action Plans

for Poland and Hungary)
News Conference of June 27
(Excerpts)

rhe Secretary

Visit to Japan, Brunei, and

Oman
News Conference of June 29
Interview on the "MacNeil/

Lehrer Newshour"

\frica

Review of U.S. -South Africa
Relations (Edward J. Perkins)

President Meets With South
African Antiapartheid
Activist (President Bush)

Arms Control

74 U.S. Efforts Against the Spread

of Chemical Weapons
(Reginald Bartholomew)

75 CFE Talks End Round Two

(Stephen J. Ledogar)

76 NATO's Conventional Force

Reduction Proposal
(White House Fact Sheet)

77 Nuclear Testing Talks Open

Round Four (White House
Statement)

East Asia

78 U.S. , Japan Launch Structural

Impediments Initiative (Joint
Statement)

Economics

78 OECD Council Ministerial Held
in Paris (Nicholas F. Brady,
Communique)

Energy

83 International Energy Agency
Ministers Meet in Paris
(Communique)

Human Rights

Bulgaria's Persecution of Its

Turkish Minority

(White House Statement)
Captive Nations Week, 1989

(Proclamation)

Middle East

91 Compensation Offered for

Victims of Iran Airbus
Tragedy (Department

Statement)

Western Hemisphere

92 Upcoming Elections in

Nicaragua (President Bush)

Treaties

93 Current Actions

Press Releases

94 Department of State

Index

Europe

86 CSCE Information Forum
(Leonard Marks)

88 CSCE Conference on the

HumanDimension
(Morris Abram)

89 Second Report on Cyprus

(Message to the Congress)

FEATURE

SUMMIT OF THE ARCH

The eight economic summit participants at the giant glass pyramid, the new entrance to (White House photo by David Valdez)
the Louvre Museum. Some of the summit sessions were held at the Arche de la Defense,
a new structure in Paris that will house offices, exhibitions, and cultural facilities;
hence Summit of the Arch.

Department of State Bulletin/September 191

FEATURE

SUMMIT OF THE ARCH

Summit of the Arch

President Bush attended the 15th econx)mic summit

of the industrialized nations in Paris

July U-16, 1989, which was hosted by

French President Francois Mitterrand. The other participants were

Prime Minister Brian Midroney (Cajiada),

Chancellor Helmut Kohl (West Germany),

Prime Minister Ciriaco De Mita (Italy),

Prime Minister Sosuke Uno (Japan),

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (United Kingdom),

and Jacques Delors, President

of the Commission of the European Cormnunities.

Declaration on
Human Rights,
July 15, 19891

n 1789, the rights of man and of the citizen
'ere solemnly proclaimed. Just over 40
ears ago, the General Assembly of the
Inited Nations adopted the Universal Dec-
iration of Human Rights, which have been
Jrther developed and codified and are now
mbodied in the Covenants on Civil and Po-
tical Rights and on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights.

We reaffirm in our commitment to
reedom, democratic principles and human
ights. We reaffirm our belief in the rule of
iw which respects and protects without
?ar or favor the rights and liberties of every
itizen and provides the setting in which the
uman spirit can develop in freedom and
iversity.

Human rights are a matter of legitimate
nternatiunal concern. We commit ourselves
gain to encouraging and promoting univer-
al respect for human rights and fundamen-
al freedoms.

Looking towards the future, we see op-
portunities as well as threats; this impels us
to pledge our firm commitment to uphold in-
ternational standards of human rights and
to confirm our willingness to reaffirm them
and to develop them further.

We stress the protection of freedom of
thought, conscience and religion, and of
freedom of opinion and e.xpression; for with-
out these freedoms, other rights cannot be
fully realized.

We stress also respect for the rule of
law and the plurality of opinion, for without
them there can be neither representative
government nor democracy

We believe equally in freedom of asso-
ciation in a pluralist society.

We hold that the right of each individual
to physical integrity and dignity must be
guaranteed. We abhor and condemn torture
in all its forms.

We believe that all human beings must
act towards each other in a spirit of
fraternity.

We believe that everyone has a right to
equality of opportunity as well as to own
property, alone or in association with oth-
ers. Extreme poverty and exclusion from

society violate the dignity of everyone en-
during them. Those who suffer or are in
need should be supported.

We stress that the rights of the child,
the disabled and the elderly require special
protection.

We consider that developments in the
human sciences, for instance the progress
achieved in genetics and organ transplanta-
tion, must be applied in accordance with all
human rights if the dignity of human beings
is to be preserved.

We, the present generation, have an
obligation to ensure that future generations
will inherit a healthy environment.

We reaffirm our belief that these rights
and freedoms cannot be properly safe-
guarded without the rule of law, impartial
justice and genuine democratic institutions.

FEATURE

SUMMIT OF THE ARCH

Declaration on
East-West Relations,
July 15, 1989

1. We. the leaders of our seven countries and
the representatives of the European Com-
munity, reaffirm the universal and supreme
importance which we attach to freedom, de-
mocracy and the promotion of human rights.

2. We see signs of this same desire for
greater freedom and democracy in the East.
The people there, including the young peo-
ple, are reasserting these values and calling
for a pluralist democratic society. Some of
their leaders are aware of the positive con-
tribution that greater freedom and democ-
racy can make to the modernization of their
countries and are starting to make changes
to their laws, practices and institutions.
Others are still endeavoring to resist this
movement by taking repressive measures
which we strongly condemn.

3. We hope that freedom will be broad-
ened and democracy strengthened and that
they will form the basis, after decades of
military confrontation, ideological antago-
nism and mistrust, for increased dialogue
and cooperation. We welcome the reforms
underway and the prospects of lessening the
division of Europe.

4. We call upon the Soviet Government
to translate its new policies and pronounce-
ments into further concrete action at home
and abroad. Military imbalances favouring
the Soviet Union, both in Europe and in
Asia, remain an objective threat to each of
us. Our governments must therefore contin-
ue to be vigilant and maintain the strength
of our countries. For the foreseeable future,
there is no alternative for each of us, within
e.xisting alliances, to maintaining a strategy
of deterrence based upon an appropriate
mi.x of adequate and effective nuclear and
conventional forces. In order to hasten the
advent of a world in which the weight of
arms and military strength is reduced, we
recommit ourselves to the urgent pursuit of
a global ban on chemical weapons, a conven-
tional forces balance in Europe at the lowest
possible level consistent with our security
requirements and a substantial reduction in
Soviet and American strategic nuclear
arms.

5. We offer the countries of the East the
opportunity to develop balanced economic
cooperation on a sound commercial basis
consistent with the security interests of
each of our countries and with the general
principles of international trade. We have
noted developments of relations between the
EEC and countries of the East, in particular
in conclusion of an agreement with Hungary,
the progress already achieved during the
current discussions with Poland and the
opening of negotiations with the Soviet
Union.

6. We welcome the process of reform un-
derway in Poland and Hungary. We recog-
nize that the political changes taking place
in these countries will be difficult to sustain
without economic progress. Each of us is
prepared to support this process and to con-
sider, as appropriate and in a coordinated
fashion, economic assistance aimed at trans-
forming and opening their economies in a
durable manner. We believe that each of us
should direct our assistance to these coun-
tries so as to sustain the momentum of re-
form through inward investment, joint
ventures, transfer of managerial skills, pro-
fessional training and other ventures which
would help develop a more competitive
economy.

Each of us is developing concrete initia-
tives designed to encourage economic re-
forms, to promote more competitive
economies and to provide new opportunities
for trade.

We agreed to work along with other in-
terested countries and multilateral institu-
tions to concert support for the process of
reform underway in Hungary and Poland, in
order to make our measures of support more
effective and mutually reinforcing. We will
encourage further creative efforts by inter-
ested governments and the public and pri-
vate sectors in support of the reform
process.

Concerning concerted support for re-
form in Poland and Hungary, we call for a
meeting with all interested countries which
will take place in the next few weeks. We
underline, for Poland, the urgent need for
food in present circumstances.

To these ends, we ask the Commission
of the European Communities to take the
necessary initiatives in agreement with the
other Member States of the Community, and
to associate, besides the Summit Partici-
pants, all interested countries.

7. We are in favor of an early conclusion
of the negotiations between the IMF and
Poland. The strengthened debt strategy is
applicable to Poland, provided it meets the
conditions. We are ready to support in the
Paris Club the rescheduling of Polish debt
expeditiously and in a flexible and forthcom-
ing manner.

8. We see good opportunities for the
countries of West and East to work togethc
to find just solutions to conflicts around th
world, to fight against underdevelopment, '
safeguard the resources and the environ-
ment and to build a freer and more open
world.

Declaration on China,
July 15, 1989

We have already condemned the violent re-
pression in China in defiance of human
rights. We urge the Chinese authorities to
cease action against those who have done n
more than claim their legitimate rights to
democracy and liberty.

This repression has led each of us to
take appropriate measures to express our
deep sense of condemnation to suspend bih
eral ministerial and high-level contacts, ar
also to suspend arms trade with China,
where it exists. Furthermore, each of us h;
agreed that, in view of current economic u
certainties, the examination of new loans l
the World Bank be postponed. We have alsi
decided to extend the stays of those Chines
students who so desire.

We look to the Chinese authorities to
create conditions which will avoid their iso
lation and provide for a return to coopera-
tion based upon the resumption of movenie
towards political and economic reform and
openness. We understand and share the
grave concern felt by the people of Hong
Kong following these events. We call on the
Government of the People's Republic of Chi
na to do what is necessary to restore confi-
dence in Hong Kong. We recognize that the
continuing support of the international con
munity will be an important element in the
maintenance of confidence in Hong Kong.

Declaration on Terrorism,
July 15, 1989

1, We remain resolutely opposed to terror-
ism in all its forms. We confirm the commi'
ment each of us has undertaken to the
principle of making no concessions to terroi
ists or their sponsors and to cooperating, b
laterally and in all relevant international
fora, in combatting terrorism. We reiteratf
our commitment to the policies agreed at
previous summits; in particular we condem
state-sponsored terrorism. We are deter-
mined not to let terrorists remain un-

Department of State Bulletin/September 198

FEATURE

unished, and to have them brought to jus-
ce within the framework of international
iw and in conformity with the rule of law.
le call upon those states which have sup-
orted or encouraged terrorist acts to dem-
tistrate by their actions that they have
jnounced such policies. We reaffirm in par-
cular our absolute condemnation of the tak-
ig of hostages. We call on those holding
ostages to release them immediately and
nconditionally and on those with influence
ver hostage-takers to use it to this end.

2. Deeply concerned for the safety of all
■avellers and outraged by the murderous
ttacks perpetrated against international
vil aviation and the frequent threat to air
•ansport safety from terrorist groups, we
Baffirm our commitment to the fight
gainst all forms of terrorism affecting civil
I'iation. We reiterate our determination to
jntribute to reinforcing internationally
greed measures for protection against air-
"aft hijackings and sabotage.

'A. We particularly condemn the recent
ttack on an aircraft over Scotland, which
illed 270 people. We have agreed to give
riority to preventing such attacks by fur-
ler strengthening security measures. We
;tach importance to the implementation of
16 work plan recently adopted by the ICAO
nternational Civil Aviation Organization]
ouncil for this purpose.

4. We have also agreed on the need for
nproved methods of detecting e.xplosives.
'e endorse efforts currently underway in
TAO to develop, as a matter of high priori-
an appropriate international regime for
le marking of plastic and sheet explosives
ir detection.

Secretary Baker's

News Conference,
Paris,
July 15, 19892

efore I get to the political declaration,
it me simply cover for you the fact that
t the morning plenary session, we
aent, I suppose, most of the time on
16 political declaration, but we also
jvered economic policy coordination,
;ructural reform, and trade. We then
roke for lunch. In the afternoon ple-
ary, we covered debt and narcotics in
jme detail.

With respect to the political decla-
ition, I think it's a fitting occasion on
16 200th anniversary of the Declara-
on of the Rights of Man and the Citi-

zen that we recall the common heritage
of Western values that unite those
seven summit countries. As I said sev-
eral days ago when I briefed, the Presi-
dent's NATO summit trip first
highlighted this theme, and that's been
carried forward at this summit. He
then carried that message, as you
know, to Poland and Hungary, where
homegrown reform efforts are turning
their societies toward the Western her-
itage. So it's fitting, I think, that our
first declaration — or the first topic cov-
ered in the political declaration — was
human rights.

Our common purpose, of course, is
to promote these rights, to secure the
rule of law, to create opportunity, and
to e.xtend the reach of the fundamental
freedoms of man. The declaration
makes those points.

The East-West declaration, of the
four, we probably spent most of our
time on. That expresses our joint com-
mitment to help advance the cause of
freedom and economic liberty to others
in Europe who have lived for far too
long under the shadow of repression.
Our seven nations will reach out to
these countries and, in this declara-
tion, we condemn those who resist the
movement with further repression.

The declaration points out again,
as did the President's presummit trip,
that Poland and Hungary are in the
vanguard of change. Recognizing that
political reform has got to be supported
by economic reform, the seven summit
countries agreed to act in concert to
support the opening in Poland and
Hungary for both political and econom-
ic transformation.

Specifically, the East-West decla-
ration commits each of us to developing
concrete initiatives to promote the de-
velopment of competitive market-
oriented economics.

Secondly, the enterprise funds that
the President announced in Poland and
Hungary, we think, provide an example
of our effort to build viable private sec-
tors in each of these two nations.

We agreed to tackle the problem of
Poland's debt without delay, in the
Paris Club without waiting for an IMF
program. There's participation in the
strengthened debt strategy.

SUMMIT OF THE ARCH

We agreed to work together, along
with other countries and multilateral
institutions, to make our efforts mutu-
ally reinforcing and more effective in
every way that we possibly can.

And fifth, and very, very impor-
tantly, I think, to move the process
along without delay, we agreed to
speedily convene a meeting, I think,
within a matter of weeks to concert our
support for Poland and Hungary,
working — the summit countries that
are members of the EC — alongside
those members of the European
Community.

The East-West declaration also ac-
knowledges the new policies and the
new pronouncements in the Soviet
Union. We call for the Soviets to trans-
late those announcements into concrete
action. But because the military imbal-
ances in Europe and Asia continue to
favor the Soviets, we state the need to
remain vigilant and to maintain our
strategy of deterrence based upon a
mix of adequate conventional and nucle-
ar forces.

The third topic in the political dec-
laration was China. The declaration on
China endorses the program which the
President led the way in establishing.
If you take a look at that, you see that
the seven explain their common re-
sponse to the repression, that each of
the seven countries has condemned,
and we hold out our common interest in
the creation by China of conditions that
will avoid its isolation.

We also recognize the concern of
the people of Hong Kong, and we look
to the People's Republic for steps that
could restore the confidence of the
Hong Kong people.

The final subject in the political
declaration has to do with terrorism.
In this, we confirm our commitment to
combat terrorism in all of its forms, in-
cluding, of course, state-sponsored
terrorism.

We take special note this year of
the murderous attacks on air travelers
and commit to prevent, to the extent

department of State Bulletin/September 1989

FEATURE

SUMMIT OF THE ARCH

that we can, a repetition of last year's
tragedy over Lockerbie. Specifically,
we refer to seeking international regu-
lations forcing the marking of plastic
explosives so as to make them more
easily detectable.

Let me say that, in summary,
we're very pleased with these four dec-
larations that, together, constitute the
political declaration. They reflect our
core values and those of our allies and
friends. The democratic e.xperiment
was conceived in these values. We've
sought to preserve, protect, and pro-
mote them, and we welcome the sup-
port of others who share them.

We had extensive discussions as
well in foreign ministers' meetings of
other foreign policy subjects and top-
ics, which were covered in an oral pre-
sentation by [Foreign] Minister Dumas
as the host Foreign Minister. We have
not seen a transcript of that yet, so I
may be able to answer some questions
that you have about other areas, but
I'm not exactly sure of specifically
what he said. This was the manner in
which this was handled last year, and
we agreed early on that this is the way
we would handle regional conflicts this
year.

I'd like to say simply that this is
my ninth summit, and this has been, as
far as I am concerned, the most harmo-
nious and one of the most productive
summits that I have attended. So much
so, that I think we might be able to
wrap it up a little early. But the French
are the host country and, if we do that,
they'll have the announcement to make.

Q. I'd like to start on this meet-
ing you're talking about on the sub-
ject of Hungary and Poland. At what
level will this meeting take place?
How will the United States be repre-
sented? What are the goals? How spe-
cific are the goals for that meeting?

A. The level hasn't been deter-
mined, and frankly, where the meeting
is going to be held has not been deter-

mined, because this decision came dur-
ing the course of the plenary meeting to-
day. It was, in effect, negotiated in the
plenary session itself. It was not worked
out by the sherpas. It wasn't something
that was preplanned, and you can see in
the political declaration what is said
about it. What is said about it there is all
that has, as yet, been agreed to.

But the idea is we don't want to just
let this drop. We want to follow up on it
and we want to follow up on it as expe-
ditiously as we can. The President was
very anxious to get a commitment from
the other countries to do this and, in
fact, had written the heads of state prior
to coming to the summit, requesting
that this action be taken. We feel very
fortunate that we were able to get a com-
mitment to this effect.

Q. Are you at all disappointed
that the minimum language, mini-
mum level that Gov. Sununu talked
about earlier — language he cited was
action in concert — is not in the state-
ment? There is no discussion of con-
certed action — talk about support,
but no action.

A. No, that's not correct. If you'll
look at paragraph six, I will read it to
you.

Concerning concerted support for re-
form in Poland and Hungary, we call for a
meeting with all interested countries which
will take place within the next few weeks.

It's clearly in there. Not only is
that in there, but there's a followup
meeting called for.

Q. Some of us had the impression
that the idea of having this confer-
ence on Hungary and Poland was pro-
moted by [West German] Chancellor
Kohl. Now I guess it's still possible he
got it in the communique. Was this an
initiative of the President? And,
apart from China, what in this com-
munique bears really the strong mark
of the United States? Where did the
United States take the lead?

A. The United States took the lead
I think, with respect, as you point out,
to China but also with respect to the
East-West portion of the declaration; foil
that matter, with respect to human
rights and terrorism as well, because
we've been pushing those two subjects
for the political declarations of prior
summits for a number of summits now.

But particularly, with reference to
the East-West, because, after all, it wai
the President's trip to Poland and Hun-
gary that emphasized the importance oJi
the homegrown reform efforts that are
taking place there and the importance c
our supporting those.

To answer specifically your questii
about who proposed this, I've already
said that the President requested this ii
letters to the heads before he came. Th
specific suggestion in the plenary wa:
made by Chancellor Kohl but, of course
strongly supported by the United
States.

Q. What progress, if any, have
you made on the question of Third
World debt? And specifically, how
much support was there for Presiden
Mitterrand's position on reschedulin
ofThird World debt?

A. There was quite an extensive
discussion on debt this afternoon. No
particular controversy, I know you'll be
disappointed to hear Everybody was
pretty much in agreement that the
strengthened debt strategy that the
United States has proposed is the cours
that should be followed.

There was a general recognition on
the part of most countries that we are
making very good progress with what
we determined to do at Toronto about
forgiving the debt of some of the poores
of the poor. The United States, as you
know, is empowered now to and will be
soon forgiving the hundreds of millions
of dollars of debt to some of the poorest
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Other
countries took note of the fact that
they're doing the .same thing and every-
one generally subscribed to the strength
ened debt strategy approach to the debt
of middle income debtor countries.

Q. But there was no support for i
North-South conference or dialogue
among the participants?

Department of State Bulletin/September 198

FEATURE

A. President Mitterrand briefly re-
irred to the fact that he had been re-
uested to raise with the summit seven
le idea of a North-South conference. He
kid, however, that he had told his inter-
Dcuters that it was the view of most
lummit countries that current organiza-
i(ins were sufficient; that some of the
hese issues are being addressed in
uite some detail in other fora — for in-
tance, development. There will be a
pecial session on development next year.
Ve ought not to divert the focus from
hat.

Trade, we're working very hard to
ccomplish a new Uruguay Round. We
ught not to complicate that with a
Joi'th-South dialogue, and so forth.

Now he mentioned this because he
ad told some of these other countries
hat he would do so, but it wasn't a mat-
er of debate or controversy or consid-
ration with respect to a decision being
aken here at this summit about whether
|r not we'd have such a conference.

Q. So he didn't argue for it — he
ist raised it?

.\. No, no, it was not — it was only
lised.

Q. How long did this discussion
1st, by the way?

\. Very brief discussion. I would
n no more than — I hate to
naracterize — I don't remember that
peoifically, but I'd say no more than 10
linutes.

Q. When was that?

A. I think that was this afternoon,
think it was this afternoon, as opposed
0 this morning.

Q. Both in Poland and in Hun-
ary, when the President announced
hese enterprise funds, he said that
le would seek parallel contributions
rom his summit partners. He doesn't
ppear to have gotten those and I
yonder if that's a setback for him.

A. I think he has gotten parallel
ontributions in the form of a commit-
lent for concerted support, rapid move-
lent on rescheduling Poland's debt,
participation of Poland in the strength-
iied debt strategy. Some countries are
oing to be making specific economic in-
entives available.

I would argue that he did receive
what he was seeking in this connection,
and particularly with respect to this
follow-on meeting. All the details cannot
be wrapped up in a summit like this, but
now there will be a follow-on meeting
that will deal in detail with the reform
efforts in both of these countries and
ways in which the summit countries can
help.

Q. Did any of them, however,
commit to contributing funds similar
to the enterprise funds?

A. We never asked anybody to com-
mit for funds. We made it very clear be-
fore we got to Paris that this would not
be a pledging session. But we believe
we've gotten parallel efforts in the form
of commitments to support the reform
efforts that are being undertaken in Po-
land and Hungary.

Q. The line in the declaration on
China about postponing examination
of new World Bank loans — does that
significantly hurt China, and if so, by
how much? And secondly, what do you
think the significance is of saying
that in the declaration?

A. I think the significance of saying
it is that it's action that has been taken
by these countries. They've all agreed
with the taking of this action. Pm trying
to find my copy of the political
declaration — the China portion.

Q. It says the examination of new
loans by the World Bank will be
postponed.

A. Yes, I'm aware of that, but I
can't — I wanted to see the exact
language.

Q. That is the exact language.

A. Yes, wait a minute, though. Now
I've got it. Yes, you know what it says —
each of us has agreed. All of these reci-
tations of actions are actions that have
been taken already. I'm not in a position
to judge for you the extent to which that
action may or may not hurt China. I
don't want to make that judgment. I'm
not in a position to make that judgment.
This is a recitation of the actions that
have been taken by the summit seven; all
agreed.

Q. Officials in Washington said
before we came here that the United
States would like a terrorism state-
ment in the section that talked about

SUMMIT OF THE ARCH

the Lockerbie bombing to specifically
cite Iran as responsible for that inci-
dent. But that language is not in this
declaration. Did the United States,
indeed, seek that?

A. As far as I know, we never
sought that. I'm not aware that we
sought that.

Q. At any point? Even during the
sherpa process?

A. I am not aware that we sought
that during the sherpa process. I think
we were pretty well pleased with the
way the terrorism statement came out in
light of some of the battles we fought a
year or two ago on this issue. But I'm
not personally aware that we asked that
Iran be cited.

Q. So you think we did not?
That's your understanding?

A. I think we did not, but I don't
know everything that was raised in the
entire sherpa process. I'm not suggest-
ing that.

Q. On the question of food for
Poland; is that supposed to be part of
the agenda of the follow-on confer-
ence? It's in the same paragraph, but
it's not explicitly stated here.

A. It's going to be dealt with in the
followup meeting, but it was important
to us to make it clear that the followup
meeting was not restricted just to the
food issue. We did have a little debate
about that. We think we have it in such
shape that the followup meeting will
deal with the general topic of concerted
support for Poland and Hungary, includ-
ing food.

Q. If I could just understand the
genesis of that, did Chancellor Kohl
bring up the idea of having this fol-
lowup meeting to discuss food for Po-
land and then the President said,
"Well, let's broaden that to be all"—
some sort of —

A. I really can't answer that, not
because I'm unwilling to. When we final-
ly got a text back typed, it looked like
the followup meeting was going to deal

l)epartment of State Bulletin/September 1989

FEATURE

SUMMIT OF THE ARCH

only with food, and we wanted it to deal
with concerted support. We made that
case and it carried the day and we were
very happy about that. I think the
Chancellor was very much with us on
that.

Q. But did he mention the food,
specifically, when he brought that up?

A. In his proposal, yes.

Q. Among the countries that you
would think would attend this follow-
on meeting, is it contemplated that
Poland and Hungary would be among
the participants?

A. That was not discussed. It would
be my sense of the discussion that that
would not be contemplated, that the
meeting would be of EC countries, sum-
mit participants that are not members of
the EC, and all interested countries, as
you see there — interested in concerting
their support efforts for these two
countries.

Q. But not the recipients
themselves?

A. Probably — well, I don't — there
was never any discussion of it. I don't
know that there would be a reason to e.x-
clude them, but I don't think it contem-
plated that they would be coming.

Q. Since the President left Po-
land, Lech Walesa has said that a
communist president, meaning Gen.
Jaruzelski in particular, would be ac-
ceptable to him. Is that something
that was urged on either Mr. Walesa
or other Solidarity leaders by the
President or yourself, other U.S.
officials?

A. Not to my knowledge. We did not
involve ourselves in the internal political
situation there in terms of the presiden-
tial election.

Q. Do you think it's a good idea,
given the realities of today, that Po-
land continues to have a communist
president for the time being — at least
in this next election?

A. The way they're moving toward
political reform there, they have re-
served a certain number of seats in the

same for communist party members. So
having a communist president is not in-
consistent with that, but I'm not going to
e.xpress a judgment on whether we think
that's good or bad.

Q. While we're talking about in-
ternal politics, could you clarify what
is still a rather ambiguous outcome
on sending somebody to Israel to find
out what their intentions were? It
struck me that you thought it needed
some clarification, and now, evi-
dently, it doesn't. What happened?

A. I think we've seen a lot happen
in the course of a week; you're right. My
view, and the view of all of us, was that
we had some genuine concern, frankly,
that perhaps as a result of the action by
the Likud Party, they were, in a sense,
devaluing their own initiative. We still
think it might be useful to send
someone — not right now — never have had
in mind the idea of a presidential emis-
sary, as some had misinterpreted
things, I think. I mean, we're not
talking — and I think we made it very
clear — about shuttle diplomacy or Phil
Habib getting on an airplane and that
sort of thing — and never have been.

We still think it might be useful at
some point, but not right now, because
Prime Minister Shamir, himself, has
made a number of statements that the
initiative has not been changed. I think
in one of them he said it has not been
changed one iota. The national unity gov-
ernment there appears to be working
very hard to reconfirm their commit-
ment to the elections proposal. Israeli
Government officials have confirmed to
us and to others that they are very much
committed to the proposal.

The last thing, I guess, I'd say on it
is that we've been working very hard
here in Paris to support the election pro-
posal with the summit countries and in
meetings with other countries, such as
my meeting of yesterday with Foreign
Minister Megid of Egypt. I hope that
clarifies it for you.

Q. On that last point, may I pick
you up, how have you done so far as
conversions? It seemed the United
States has been pretty much alone in
supporting the Israeli initiative. Do
you have friends now?

A. No, we had friends before. It's
wrong to say how are we doing on con-
verting because we were able, I think, i
bring a number of countries — to gain
support from a number of countries in
Europe of the Israeli elections proposal
which previously had not been support-
ive. We think we still have that support
provided that they know that the Israel
Government itself is every bit as com-
mitted to that proposal as it was when
advanced it. We believe, based on what
we've seen during the course of this
week and the contacts we've had with I:
raeli Government officials, that they ari
every bit as committed as they were
when they advanced it.

Q. Could you tell us what steps
you are looking for from China that
they could do to restore the confi-
dence of the Hong Kong people? Andli
secondly, could you tell us whether
there are any discussions of the intei
national government, especially Bri
ish Government, commitments to thr
Hong Kong Chinese during the
summit?

A. There were discussions of — but
not that I can recall in the plenary ses-
sion. I've had a bilateral meeting with
[British Foreign Secretary] Sir Geoffre
Howe in which we discussed the U.K.'s
firm commitment to Hong Kong. I thin
the steps that are referred to in the cor
munique are the steps that many of the
summit countries expressed in speakin
about the tragic events of Tiananmen
Square — the need to reassure the inter
national community that the process of
economic reform is going to continue ar
that political repression is going to
cease, as it says here in the declaration.

Q. Was Lebanon discussed at alii
today, and is there harmony betweer
the U.S. position and the French pos
tion concerning Lebanon's special —

A. The answer to the last part of
that question is, there is harmony be-
tween the U.S. position and the French
position on Lebanon. And the answer tc
the first part of the question — was
Lebanon discussed today — is no, but it
was discussed at quite some length last
night at the dinner of foreign ministers.

Q. Are these summits still wort
all this trouble?
A. Yes.

Department of State Bulletin/September 19f'

FEATURE

Secretary Baker's
Interview on
"Evans and Novak,"

July 15, 19893

The President began his tour in
'oland and Hungary, setting the
age for what he wanted to do in
aris. He declared his intentions at
arl Marx University in Budapest,
ilm clip from President Bush's
peech: "I will propose at the Paris
conomic summit concerted Western
ction for Poland and Hungary to
ack your reforms with economic and
echnical assistance from the summit
artners."]

En route to Paris, Bush was
skfd whether he would tell his col-
■asues at the summit that commu-
ism is dead. [Film clip of President
;ush: "No. I'll tell them that there's
ynamic change taking place in East-
rn Europe."]

Hut other summit leaders, espe-
lally France's President Mitterrand,
re looking south rather than east,
bout 2.5 Third World leaders were in-
ted here to help celebrate the
rench Revolution bicentennial, and
ley immediately put pressure on the
th summit seven to convene a global
orth-South conference to help the
npoverished Third World countries.

Would it be fair to say that the
ithusiasm for helping Eastern Eu-
)pe of President Bush is not quite
latched by his summit colleagues
'ere in Paris?

A. No, I really don't think that
ould be fair to say. There is genuine en-
nusiasm on the part of, I think, every-
le here to assist Hungary and Poland
irticularly, which are moving toward
ic West — to assist the process of home-
■iiw II reform that we see in these East
uiiipean countries. They are moving on
le basis of Western values, and I don't
Kiw any country at this summit that is
)t \i'ry genuinely supportive of them.

Q. Does assisting the East —
astern Europe and the Soviet
nion — mean the United States is
)w prepared to allow the East to
ive some of that technology that

they so desperately need to move
ahead in their economies, or is that
not part of the deal?

A. Nonstrategic technology could
be a part of the deal, but there will still
be normal COCOM [Coordinating Com-
mittee for Multilateral E.xport Controls]
restraints on strategic technology, as
there should be.

Q. But there are always changes
in the definition of what strategic
technology is. Some nations in the
Western alliance want to ease those
restrictions.

A. That's true, and, of course, our
whole approach to the countries of East-
ern Europe has been one of differentia-
tion. The technology that might be
approved by COCOM for transfer to a
country like Hungary, for instance,
might well be different than what
COCOM might approve for transfer to a
country like Romania. So you can't gen-
eralize with respect to it. It is still im-
portant to the United States and to our
COCOM partners that we protect our
strategic technology.

Q. Are there milestones you are
setting up on issues like human
rights and so on within the Adminis-
tration to see how Poland and Hun-
gary come along — and are the other
allies in agreement on those — for fu-
ture steps?

A. They are not milestones in the
specific sense that I think your question
refers to. But clearly we look at progress
in both of those countries — political
progress and economic progress — and
should there be a reversal of that prog-
ress, then it would change the way in
which we would recommend approaching
those two countries. But not in the spe-
cific sense I think you had in mind.

With respect to most-favored-nation
treatment for Hungary, for instance, it's
only a case of their codifying some laws
that they are already debating. Once
they do "that, they'll "get MEN. So there's
a good example, though, of a specific
guideline or guidepost.

Q. I just want to go back to the
original point I made. I just don't
hear other people talking with the en-
thusiasm of President Bush about
this whole East European revolution.

SUMMIT OF THE ARCH

A. Then you haven't been attending
the meetings that I've spent several
hours in yesterday. There is genuine en-
thusiasm on the part of everyone because
this is a great victory for the West. It's a
great victory for free markets — they're
not there yet, but they are admitting
they want to go there; they are acknowl-
edging that the old system has failed.
It's a great victory for democracy. They
are talking about and holding free elec-
tions. There is genuine enthusiasm on
the part of all these summit countries.

You may be comparing this to the
position of the United States as recently
as a year ago, when we were the country
that was holding back on movement to-
ward East European countries that were
expressing a desire to move toward the
West. We were doing that because we
were not satisfied then that the move-
ment had gone as far as it should have,
but there has been dramatic progress in
the last 12 months.

Q. Have you endorsed Lech Wa-
lesa's program, the Solidarity leader
in Poland, who wants to put parlia-
mentary control over the power of the
purse, remove the communist control
over the monopolization of the Polish
economy? I didn't hear much talk by
the President in Poland about that
program.

A. There has not been an endorse-
ment of a specific Solidarity program as
such. There has been strong general en-
dorsement of the idea that the Poles
should move to free-market economics
to the extent that they can and that
we ought to help in that process — not
through funnel ing a lot of concessionary
assistance in there that might or might
not be properly used. We did that in the
1970s; it didn't work. What we are talk-
ing about is technical assistance and
helping them make the reforms that are
necessary to get to the Adam Smith-
type policies that you and I believe in.

Q. Didn't it give Gen. Jaruzelski
quite a boost, following along on that

jepartment of State Bulletin/September 1989

FEATURE

SUMMIT OF THE ARCH

question? The President almost
gushed about what a great man Ja-
ruzelski is, only a few years after he
imposed martial law in Poland.

A. It is important that there be sta-
bility in the political leadership in Po-
land. They are making efforts to move
toward democracy. It is not yet democra-
cy in the sense that we know it and be-
lieve it must ultimately be as far as our
Western values are concerned. But the
progress they've made in the last 12
months by holding a free election, elect-
ing democratically a senate without re-
serving seats for the party — yes, they
reserved some seats for the party in the
lower house, but they are making dra-
matic progress.

Q. Do you want to see Jaruzelski
take that official position of
president?

A. We don't want to interfere in the
internal politics of Poland any more than
we are interfering in the internal poli-
tics of any other country. But Gen. Ja-
ruzelski has been, recently at least,
taking action that permits movement to-
ward the West and toward Western val-
ues in Poland. He has been, to some
extent maybe, a late comer, but he has,
to some extent, been a reformer.

Q. President Mitterrand of
France proposed, along with some of
his Third World guests, a global
North-South conference, and U.S.
leaders have just rejected it out of
hand. Are you afraid that if you got
together with these people from the
poor Southern countries, they'd beat
up on you, make you feel guilty, ask
for money, share the wealth? Is that
what you're worried about?

A. No. I think our view is that we
are working very hard on these problems
that involve North and South. We've got
major undertakings going on with re-
spect to debt, for instance. We happen to
believe that you can't globalize the debt
problem, that the debt problem has to be
solved on a case-by-case basis — and you
know all the reasons for that.

On trade, we've got the Uruguay
Round discussions going. We shouldn't
dilute those or change the focus by mov-
ing into some other forum. It is very
important that we have a successful
Uruguay Round. The United Nations it-
self is going to have a conference just
next year on development. We shouldn't
have a competing conference on develop-
ment with that.

The environment is a topic that
doesn't lend itself quite as well to politi-
cal dialogue. It is scientific primarily,
and we ought not to just throw that into
the political arena without having scien-
tific discussions about what ought to be
done.

Q. You didn't quite answer my
question, because 8 years ago, at your
first economic summit in Ottawa,
President Mitterrand was trying to
have some kind of a distribution of
wealth, from the North to the South,
from the rich to the poor. Is that
what he's still up to, in your opinion?

A. I don't know that. I'm not sure
that he was trying to do that at the 1981
summit in Ottawa. You may recall that
there was a North-South summit in the
first year of President Reagan's presi-
dency in Cancun, but people could argue
with respect to whether or not it was
successful.

Q. What do you think? Was it
successful?

A. I think that whatever success
was achieved was quite limited because
what happens is, expectations get built
up to unrealistic levels, and it is very dif-
ficult to satisfy those expectation at a
big North-South conference.

Q. So there will not be a big
North-South conference?

A. I don't know that you can say
that there will not be. There may very
well be one, and it's something that defi-
nitely should be considered and debated.
I was simply giving you what I think are
some very logical reasons why it might
not be the best thing to do.

Q. Changing topics for a moment
to the Middle East. Don't you feel a
little jerked around by what Israeli
Prime Minister Shamir has been do-
ing? First, he comes to the United
States and says, "We want to have
elections," then he goes back to Isra-
el and announces he's got this list of
four or five conditions he wants to

put on them. You come out and say,
"We have to send an envoy to figure i
out," and then the Israelis come bad
and say, "Don't worry. Everything's
okay. "

A. We were concerned; we were
thinking about sending someone because
we were genuinely concerned that the
Israeli Government was, to some extent
devaluing its own elections proposal,
something that we had worked very
hard to implement. We are continuing t'
work very hard to implement it, because
we believe that it has great promise. In
fact, we are working hard to implement
it right here at this summit, talking to
our summit partners about the impor-
tance of pursuing the elections proposal j
talking to the Egyptians about the im-
portance of pursuing it. That's the rea-
son we considered sending a repre-
sentative.

In the interim, the Government of
Israel has made it quite clear that they
are totally committed to their elections
proposal. They intend to continue to ac-
tively and vigorously work it. The na-
tional unity Government of Israel is
sorting out whatever differences they
had with respect to it. So we are quite
satisfied that they are as committed to
that proposal as they have been, and we'
intend to continue to work with them tc
try and advance it.

Q. With all respect, this is new,
saying the Israeli Government is coir
mitted to it. The last word we had
from the Israeli Government is one
from Yitzak Shamir himself, and it
has got four conditions attached to ill

A. No, no, no. The last word we've-
heard, if I may say so, is from Yitzak
Shamir himself saying that his proposal
has not changed one iota and that it is
still very, very much the proposal that
they intend to push and to advance.

We believe that. If we didn't believe
that, we would have to then say, "Well,
let's sit down and talk about it." That
was the original reason we were think-
ing about sending someone. We are quit
satisfied now that they are prepared,
ready, willing, and able to continue to
push this proposal.

Q. In briefing the press in War
saw on Monday evening, I believe, yoi
said that we would send an emissary,

Department of State Bulletin/September 1981

FEATURE

'resident Bush and French President Mitterrand, who hosted the 15th economic summit
f industrialized nations.

>id the President pull the rug out
jrom under you after pressure was
ut on him?

A. No, and we still may send an em-
;sary. The question is whether or not an
missary is necessary. That was a week
go. Since that time, as I've just ex-
lained to you, the Government of Israel
as taken a number of steps. Prime Min-
uter Shamir has spoken out. The nation-
I unity government is woi-king together
J reaffirm their proposal. Those are all
.gnificant steps.

We talk to our Israeli allies fre-
uently about many things, and I foresee
iiearly that we will be talking to them in
luite some detail about this elections
jroposal. Whether that's done in the
liddle East or whether it's done in
Washington or whether it's done through
mbassadors, it will be done.

Q. If you send an emissary, when
ould it be?

A. If we send an emissary, it would
e when we think it is necessary in or-
er to address this question about
hfther there is any real doubt about
aeir commitment to their own elections
'roposal. Right now we are satisfied.

Q. Is the United States conduct-
ig "proximity negotiations" between
lie PLO and Israel, essentially nego-
iating between Israel and the PLO
lirough the United States?

A. No, that's not what we are doing.
We do have a dialogue with the PLO, as
you know, but we are not conducting ne-
gotiations between Israel and the PLO.

Q. You are not carrying positions
stated by the Israelis for the PLO and
vice versa?

A. No. No, we don't. We don't carry
messages from one to the other. We take
positions with both that are consistent
with U.S. policy. In some cases those po-
sitions are not agreed to by either, but
they represent U.S. policy. But we are
not conducting negotiations by proxy.

Q. You've talked to the Egyptian
Foreign Minister. He often talks with
PLO officials. What are you hearing
from the PLO about the Likud re-
strictions and the Israeli position on
the elections?

A. We haven't heard anything that
is different than what you've read in the
press, to the effect generally —

Q. We watch television.
[Laughter]

A. All right. Let's include television
in that. [Laughter] — to the effect gener-
ally that they felt that the four condi-
tions that came out of the Likud Party
convention, in effect, made it definitely
more difficult to get to closure. Now we
haven't heard anything different from
that, and that's all out there in the public
press.

SUMMIT OF THE ARCH

It's not dead in the water. We are
taking the position — we took the position
yesterday with the Egyptians — that in
our view, based on the developments in
Israel over the course of the past week,
we think the proposal is very much alive,
and we intend to continue to work to ad-
vance it. I think that the Egyptians will
continue to work to advance it.

Q. There has been a debate be-
tween the two members of the coali-
tion in Israel whether, in fact, there
have been de facto negotiations be-
tween the PLO and Israel. Have there
been, in your opinion?

A. I'm not prepared to answer that,
because I frankly don't know and I
frankly have no intention of inserting
myself into an internal political debate
in Israel.

Q. Could it be possible that you
have an opinion but you'd rather not
express it?

A. It would be possible that I was
telling you the truth when I said I really
don't know, number one; and number
two, I don't intend to insert myself into
the political debate in Israel.

Q. Okay. I just want to get back
to the summit for one thought, and
that is that this has been a very un-
usual economic summit, with the pa-
rades and all the Third World
leaders — Mexico, the Philippines,
African countries. This was supposed
to be a get-together session originally
for the seven industrialized de-
mocracies. Hasn't the purpose really
been subverted by President Mitter-
rand's celebration?

A. No, I don't think it has been sub-
verted by the celebration. I think it has
been complemented by the celebration
or — let's put it this way — the celebration
has been, to a large extent, comple-
mented by the presence and fact that the
summit was taking place here in Paris at
the same time. I don't see that there is
any problem with that.

fepartment of State Bulletin/September 1989

FEATURE

SUMMIT OF THE ARCH

Q. Do you have any suggestions
to make these things a little more
substantive and perhaps get down to
some of the more serious questions?

A. I think we deal with serious
questions at these summits. I do believe
that summits have grown in terms of the
number of press that cover them, in
terms of the presence of the number of
people involved from what the original
idea was at Rambouillet in 1974 or 1975.
People say all the time it would be nice if
we could get back to that concept, but I
don't know of a host country that's will-
ing to take the heat and move us back to
that time.

Q. Why is the United States pay-
ing so little attention to what seems
to be a major revolution going on in
Cuba? Castro is throwing out all
these generals, throwing out all these
important people, executing them.
Why are we saying nothing about it?

A. We are taking note of that, but
there are a lot of things that Castro
is not doing to change behavior that
doesn't meet internationally accepted
norms. And that's the reason we're not
jumping up and down and clapping our
hands when he prosecutes some people
dealing in narcotics. He is still shipping
weapons — he's still exporting subversion
in Central America. We know that —

Q. Yes, but is he crumbling from
within? Is his regime crumbling from
within here? Are we seeing the de-
mise of the Castro regime?

A. I don't think you could conclude
that when you take note of the way in
which he handled this recent matter in-
volving some people in his government.

Q. Has the time arrived this year,
finally, for a summit meeting be-
tween President Gorbachev and Presi-
dent Bush?

A. You know the time will arrive for
a summit meeting between General Sec-
retary Gorbachev and President Bush
when the two of them decide they are

ready to have a summit meeting. We are
going to talk some more about that, as
President Bush indicated, in my meeting
with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in
September when he comes to the United
States for the UN- meetings. That deci-
sion hasn't been made.

Q. Could an arms control agree-
ment on reducing conventional forces
in Europe be finished up by the end of
this year, perhaps paving the way for
a summit?

A. The original timeframe, as you
know, that the President expressed when
he made his conventional arms proposal
at the 40th anniversary summit of
NATO was 6-12 months. People said,
"That's ridiculous; it's too short; you can't
meet it." And here we are, 60 days ahead
of the date that we thought we would be
tabling, specifically tabling, that pro-
posal in Vienna for the Soviets to consid-
er. And their preliminary reaction to it
has been sufficiently positive that I
think people are now beginning to say,
"Wait a minute. Maybe we could get a
conventional arms proposal in 6-12
months."

Q. But do we need a conven-
tional arms agreement to have a
summit?

A. You don't need to have any spe-
cific agreement to have a summit, no. It
doesn't have to rest upon the completion
of an arms control agreement or any oth-
er specific agreement.

Secretary Baker's
Interview on
"This Week With
David Brinkley,"

July 16, 19894

Q. It has been a busy week, and for
some time now everybody in the world
will be assessing it and trying to de-
cide what it accomplished and wheth-
er it was good, bad, or indifferent.
Give us your assessment first, before
we go into anything else.

A. I, of course, think it has been
a good week. For one thing, this is the
first of these summits — I think there's
been 15 of them — someone said this is the

first one that has not had to deal primar
ily with the threat of communism but
with the consequences of its failure, andi
I believe that's true.

I think the President had an excel-
lent visit to both Poland and Hungary,
two Eastern-bloc countries that are mov
ing in the direction of the West, that are
subscribing to Western values, that are
embracing some homegrown reform thai
we want to support. So we think it has
been a good trip to Eastern Europe, anc
we think we've had a good economic
summit here.

Q. I'm interested in your charac
terization of the agenda — that is, cop
ing with the failures, not the threat,
of communism. While you've been doi
ing that, the Secretary of Defense,
Mr. Cheney, has been trying to sell
an expensive Defense budget to
Congress.

Having seen Eastern Europe nov
and having looked over the Iron Cur-
tain or what's left of it, how would
you characterize the Soviet military
threat and what's required of us in
responding to it?

A. I think that what is required of
us in responding to it is continued re-
solve. We must maintain our will and
we must maintain our strength, and the-
communique from the economic summit
just issued here reflects that fact.

There is still a significant imbalanci
in favor of the Soviet Union in conven-
tional forces in Europe, so it's importani
that we maintain our strength and re-
solve. That's what got us to this point, il
our view. That's the reason that the Sovi
et Union and their East European alliei
are moving in the direction of the West,
because we have been strong. The NATi
alliance has been, in the past 40 years, !
think it's fair to say, the most successful
alliance that we've seen.

I think the threat is there, I think
we have to maintain our strength, and
all seven summit countries recognize
that in this communique here.

Q. You've been in the two East
European countries where change
has accelerated most dramatically —
Hungary and Poland. Both of them
have in place bureaucracies reluctan
to give up their perquisites. How doe
the United States plan to condition

FEATURE

ts aid to use it as a lever to get these
ountries to move toward free-market
nslitutions?

A. We made the mistake — not just
he United States but other Western
latiims — in the 1970s of giving conces-
iidiialist and subsidized assistance to
;(inie of these countries without properly
■iinditioning it, and it was not used to
;()(iil effect. So I think thei'e's a feeling
in the part of all the countries here that
\v must properly condition any assist-
nue that's offered.

At the same time, these countries
u'c reaching out to us, and we've got to
end them a helping hand. We've got to
;h(i\v them, assist them, if you will, in
n(i\ ing toward a free-market economic
;ystfm. This is something they very
niR-h want to do.

Hungary is considerably farther out
n front of Poland, we think, economi-
ally. Poland has just recently seen some
at her dramatic political movement. But
ve'\t' got to properly condition aid or the
fffft that we all want and that they
>aiit, quite frankly, won't happen.

Q. The summit leaders roundly
'ondemned China's repression of the
tudents and other elements there,
nd yet are we correctly informed
hat the Bush Administration now in-
ends to allow American grain farm-
rs to continue to sell grain and
I heat to the Chinese?

A. The President has made it very
leal- that he does not intend, has not in-
ended, to disrupt commercial relations,
le doesn't want to; he said from the
vvy beginning, I think, he doesn't want
0 take action that would hurt the Chi-
n's. • people. A refusal to sell grain to
'hina would not only hurt the Chinese
teople, it would hurt a lot of American '
armers probably, although that's not the
eason he would go ahead and permit
.rain sales. But he has no plans to pro-
libit grain sales.

We believe, frankly, that the re-
ponse of the U.S. Government to these
nfiii-tunate circumstances in China has
leeii the right response. It has been a
leasured response. We have expressed
ur outrage and sorrow, and we've taken
ertain specific actions having to do with
lilitary-to-military transactions and
igh-level exchanges politically.

Q. As you know, not as many
actions as Congress would have you
take, and Congress is moving forward
to requiring stronger measures. Will
you go along with the congressional
intent?

A. We will observe the law as we all
take oaths to do. But I should point out
to you that in both the House and Senate
bills, there are provisions that give the
President a considerable degree of flex-
ibility in carrying out those laws. If he
finds it not in the national interests to
take certain actions, then he doesn't
have to take them.

Q. I guess I'm asking about the
level of hypocrisy here. You say that
you've condemned China in strong
terms and words, and yet here just
this weekend you confirm now that
we'll continue to sell wheat to them
because, as you point out rather can-
didly, it's in the interests of American
farmers.

A. No. I really said it would hurt
the Chinese people as the primary rea-
son we will continue — if we cut it off, it
would hurt the Chinese people, and
that's one of the things that the Presi-
dent said right off the bat he didn't want
to do. That's not the kind of action we
ought to be taking.

Q. There are things we could do
that would not hurt the Chinese peo-
ple or be, as sanctions usually are, fu-
tile, particularly with a commodity
like grain. That is, we could say we're
reexamining, in conjunction with the
British reexamining, our policies
about the fundamental relationships
between our country, their country,
and Taiwan and Hong Kong. Have you
given any thought to that?

A. What the United States has
done here is really lead the way. The
President was the first to take action
against China in connection with what's
happened. He's the one who set the
standard of ceasing military exchanges.
He's the one who called for postponement
of World Bank loans. He's the first leader
who basically said, I think, that we're
going to cut off high-level political
exchanges.

SUMMIT OF THE ARCH

All of these other six Western indus-
trial democracies here at this summit
are following that lead. They all believe
this is the proper course. They also don't
think that we ought to isolate China,
that it would not be in the best interests
of the West. All seven of these countries
feel this way. We think the response is
appropriate.

Q. You and the President have
been to two Iron Curtain countries
which are now emerging to some de-
gree into some level of freedom —
Poland and Hungary. Now an inter-
esting development. Lech Walesa said
the other day to some visiting Ameri-
cans that he's very happy about what
has happened, of course, but he, as a
leader of a labor union, needs for his
people — needs employers, and they
don't have any. They haven't had any
in 40-odd years. The government has
been the only employer. It is a diffi-
culty for the emerging central Euro-
pean countries, and I wondered if you
have any thoughts on this, how to
deal with it.

A. One of the proposals that the
President made during the course of his
trip to Poland was to set up a $100 mil-
lion fund to assist in the creation of pri-
vate sector entities and operations in
Poland — an enterprise foundation, if you
will. And he's quite right. They do need
employers. It's one of the problems that
has faced all of these centrally planned,
statist economies of the East.

It's their view — it's been their view
for a long time — that governments solve
all the problems. Governments don't
solve economic problems. Many times
governments contribute to economic
problems. They now realize this. They
want to move to free-market economics,
and they want our help in getting there.

Q. I want to move you to the Mid-
dle East and the increasingly conten-
tious relationship between Israel and
the United States. This morning the

department of State Bulletin/September 1989

FEATURE

SUMMIT OF THE ARCH

Director General of the Prime Minis-
ter's office said the following: "We
are reaching a moment of truth be-
cause there has to be a decision by
the parties concerned — primarily by
the United States — whether to contin-
ue the dialogue with the PLO or proc-
eed with moving the Israeli initiative
to fruition. The two are mutually ex-
clusive." Do you think the two are
mutually exclusive?

A. No. I don't think the two are mu-
tually exclusive. The policy of the United
States is that the two are not mutually
exclusive. We are working very hard and
have been for quite some time — ever
since the Shamir elections proposal was
first advanced — to implement that pro-
posal. And we are working with Euro-
pean governments, and we're working
with Arab governments, and we're work-
ing with the Israeli Government.

We were concerned last week when
it appeared to us that perhaps they were
in the process somehow of devaluing
their own initiative by putting certain
conditions on there that were very, very
difficult conditions and that were the
kinds of issues that needed to be ad-
dressed at the very end of a discussion
and negotiation, not at the beginning.

We are now convinced, by having
talked to them — talked to represen-
tatives of the Israeli Government — that
they are fully supportive of their origi-
nal elections proposal and initiative as
they originally announced it, and we are
going to continue to work very hard to
make it happen.

Q. That's the point. I was also
going to say — and, obviously, you
know more than I do — there's a report
this morning that Prime Minister
Shamir is prepared to reintroduce to
the cabinet his original proposal and
drop the Ariel Sharon and company
hard-line portions of it. Did you get
the same report?

A. I haven't gotten that report over
here in Paris. But let me say that we
have been reassured, as have other

governments, by the Government of Is-
rael that it stands four-square behind its
original election proposal. I think Prime
Minister Shamir himself said it hasn't
changed one iota. And, of course, we
deal with governments and not with
parties.

Q. When the United States gets
irritated with Israel, it periodically
resurfaces the idea of invoking, as a
kind of club to drive Israel in this di-
rection or that, an international con-
ference. You yourself did it not too
long ago. What is the status of your
thinking now on an international
conference? Can you reassure the Is-
raelis that that's not part of our
program?

A. There has been absolutely no
change in the policy of the United States
with respect to an international confer-
ence from what the policy was during
the Reagan Administration. And the pol-
icy is this: The United States believes
that an international conference, proper-
ly structured, at the appropriate time,
might be useful. But we've spent a num-
ber of months in the Bush Administra-
tion arguing against an international
conference. When the idea has been sur-
faced to us by foreign ministers and
heads of state of other governments, we
say that going to an international confer-
ence now might well preempt other,
more promising possibilities. And we
think the Shamir elections proposal is
just such a more promising possibility.
We're glad to know and glad to hear that
that proposal stands as originally sub-
mitted and that we and our ally Israel
are going to work to implement that
proposal.

Q. We're hearing once again for
the first time since, I guess, the Car-
ter years that it may be time now to
consider the withdrawal — 36 years af-
ter the end of the Korean war — of
some or perhaps all of American
forces in Korea. Is there more "give"
in American policy now with regard
to Korea?

A. You know the President pro-
posed at the NATO summit that there be
a reduction in U.S. manpower in Eu-
rope, provided that there was a move to
parity by the Soviets which would re-
quire them to reduce even more.

To the extent that we can see some
correlative moves with respect to the
status of forces in the Pacific, maybe
those kinds of things can be considered
in the future. But right now, the U.S.
policy remains what it has been.

Q. One of the most expensive —
and hence one of the most vulnerable
to political pressure — weapons sys-
tems in the American inventory is th*
Stealth bomber which was under re-
view in Congress this week. Is it youn
view that it is important both for the
U.S. deterrent and for, I suppose, our
arms control negotiations that that
program proceed at full speed?

A. We think that is a very impor-
tant program. It is in the President's
budget. The Secretary of Defense is
working very hard to obtain the funding
for it, and we think it ought to proceed.
It's an important element of our deter-
rent arsenal.

Q. Even given the fact that the
Soviet threat now seems to be very,
very hard to define?

A. I don't know that the Soviet
threat is hard to define. I'm not sure I
would agree with that. The Soviet
threat is still very much there in terms
of the imbalance of forces that they have
both nuclear and conventional.

Now, they are saying the right
things, and if we see them taking action
to reduce those forces and to get to par-
ity so that the threat is reduced, then we
can take a look at the kind of thing
you're suggesting. But not until then.

Department of State Bulletin/September 198S

FEATURE

Economic Declaration,
July 16, 19891

) We. the Heads of State or Government of
even major industrial nations and the Presi-
ent of the Commission of the European
'ommunities, have met in Paris for the fif-
eenth annual Economic Summit. The Sum-
ait of the Arch initiates a new round of
Summits to succeed those begun at Ram-
louillet in 1975 and at Versailles in 1982.
'he round beginning in 1982 has seen one of
he longest periods of sustained growth
ince the Second World War. These Summits
ave permitted effective consultations and
ffered the opportunity to launch initiatives
nd to strengthen international cooperation.

2) This year's world economic situation
resents three main challenges:

I The choice and the implementation of
leasures needed to maintain balanced and
jstained growth, counter inflation, create
)bs and promote social justice. These meas-
res should also facilitate the adjustment of
xternal imbalances, promote international
■ade and investment and improve the eco-
omic situation of developing countries.

» The development and the further inte-
ration of developing countries into the
orld economy. Whilst there has been sub-
.antial progress in many developing coun-
ies, particularly those implementing sound
lonomic policies, the debt burden and the
;rsistence of poverty, often made worse by
itural disasters affecting hundreds of mil-
ons of people, are problems of deep concern
hich we must continue to face in a spirit of
)lidarity.

• The urgent need to safeguard the en-
lironment for future generations. Scientific
' udies have revealed the e.xistence of seri-
js threats to our environment such as the
spletion of the stratospheric ozone layer
nd e.xcessive emissions of carbon dioxide
nd other greenhouse gases which could lead
) future climate changes. Protecting the
ivironnient calls for a determined and con-
;'rted international response and for the
irly adoption, worldwide, of policies based
1 sustainable development

iternational Economic Situation

I Growth has been sustained by focusing
ilicies on improving the efficiency and
exiliility of our economies and by strength-
ling our cooperative efforts and the coor-
ination process. In the medium term, the
irrent buoyant investment seen during
ii.< period should pave the way for an in-
■ea.sed supply of goods and services and
'Iji reduce the dangers of inflation. The
.itlook is not, however, without risks.

4) Until now, the threat of inflation in
many countries has been contained, thanks
to the concerted efforts of governments and
monetary authorities. But continued vig-
ilance is required and inflation, where it has
increased, will continue to receive a firm
policy response so that it will be put on a
downward path.

.5) While some progress has been made
in reducing external imbalances, the mo-
mentum of adjustment has recently weak-
ened markedly. There needs to be further
progress in adjusting external imbalances
through cooperation.

6) In countries with fiscal and current
account deficits, including the United States
of America, Canada and Italy, further re-
ductions in budget deficits are needed. Ac-
tion will be taken to bring them down. This
may help reduce the saving-investment gap
and external imbalances, contribute to coun-
tering inflation and encourage greater
exchange rate stability in a context of de-
creasing interest rates.

7) Countries with external surpluses,
including Japan and Germany, should con-
tinue to pursue appropriate macroeconomic
policies and structural reforms that will en-
courage non-inflationary growth of domestic
demand and facilitate external adjustment.

8) All our countries share the respon-
sibility for the sound development of the
world economy. Over the medium term, defi-
cit countries have to play a key role in global
adjustment through their external adjust-
ment and increased exports; surplus coun-
tries have to contribute to sustaining global
expansion through policies providing favour-
able conditions for growth of domestic de-
mand and imports.

9) The emergence of the newly indus-
trializing economies and the initiation of a
dialogue with them are welcome. We call on
those with substantial surpluses to contrib-
ute to the adjustment of external imbalances
and the open trade and payments system. To
that end, they should permit exchange rates
to reflect their competitive position, imple-
ment GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade] commitments and reduce trade
barriers.

International Monetary Developments
and Coordination

10) Under the Plaza and Louvre agreements,
our countries agreed to pursue, in a mutu-
ally reinforcing way, policies of surveillance
and coordination aimed at improving their
economic fundamentals and at fostering sta-
bility of exchange rates consistent with
those economic fundamentals.

There has been progress in the multi-
lateral surveillance and coordination of eco-
nomic policies with a view to ensuring
internal consistency of domestic policies and

SUMMIT OF THE ARCH

their international compatibility. The pro-
cedures to be used have been more clearly
defined and improved in cooperation with
the International Monetary Fund.

11) The coordination process has made a
positive contribution to world economic de-
velopment and it has also contributed great-
ly to improving the functioning of the
International Monetary System. There has
also been continued cooperation in exchange
markets.

It is important to continue and, where
appropriate, to develop this cooperative and
flexible approach to improve the functioning
and the stability of the International Mone-
tary System in a manner consistent with
economic fundamentals. We therefore ask
the Finance Ministers to continue to keep
under review possible steps that could be
taken to improve the coordination process,
exchange market cooperation and the func-
tioning of the International Monetary
System.

12) We welcome the decision to complete
the work on the ninth review of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund quotas with a view to
a decision on this matter before the end of
the year.

We note that the question of a resump-
tion of SDR [special drawing rights] alloca-
tion remains under consideration in the
Executive Board of the International Mone-
tary Fund.

13) Within the European Community,
the European Monetary System has con-
tributed to a significant degree of economic
policy convergence and monetary stability.

Improving Economic Efficiency

14) We will continue to promote measures in
order to remove inefficiencies in our econ-
omies. These inefficiencies affect many as-
pects of economic activity, reduce potential
growth rates and the prospects for job cre-
ation, diminish the effectiveness of macro-
economic policies and impede the external
adjustment process. In this context, tax re-
forms, modernization of financial markets,
strengthening of competition policies and
reducing rigidities in all sectors including
energy, industry and agriculture are neces-
sary. So are the improvement of education
and vocational training, transportation and
distribution systems and further policies
aimed at giving more flexibility and mo-
bility to the labour market and reducing

epartment of State Bulletin/September 1989

FEATURE

SUMMIT OF THE ARCH

unemployment. Within the European Com-
munity, the steady progress towards the
completion by the end of 1992 of the program
contained in the Single Act has already
given a strong momentum to economic
efficiency.

15) The decline of saving in some of our
countries in this decade is a cause for con-
cern. This lower level of saving can contrib-
ute to high real interest rates and therefore
hamper growth. Inadequate saving and
large fiscal deficits are associated with
large e.xternal deficits. We recommend,
within the framework of policy coordination,
policies to encourage saving and remove
hindrances where they exist.

16) Financial activities are being in-
creasingly carried out with new techniques
on a worldwide basis. As regards insider
trading, which could hamper the credibility
of financial markets, regulations vary
greatly among our countries. These regula-
tions have been recently, or are in the proc-
ess of being, strengthened. International
cooperation should be pursued and
enhanced.

Trade Issues

17) World trade developed rapidly last year.
Yet protectionism remains a real threat. We
strongly reaffirm our determination to
fight it in all its forms. We shall fulfill the
Punta del Este standstill and rollback com-
mitments which, inter alia, require the
avoidance of any trade restrictive or distort-
ing measure inconsistent with the provi-
sions of the General Agreement and its
instruments. We agree to make effective use
of the improved GATT dispute settlement
mechanism and to make progress in negotia-
tions for further improvements. We will
avoid any discriminatory or autonomous ac-
tions, which undermine the principles of the
GATT and the integrity of the multilateral
trading system. We also are pledged to op-
pose the tendency towards unilateralism, bi-
lateralism, sectoralism and managed trade
which threatens to undermine the multi-
lateral system and the Uruguay Round
negotiations.

18) The successful negotiation of the
Trade Negotiations Committee of the
Uruguay Round in Geneva last April, there-
by completing the mid-term review, is a
very important achievement. It gives a clear
framework for future work in all sectors in-
cluding the pursuit of agricultural reform in

the short term as well as in the long term. It
also gives the necessary framework for sub-
stantive negotiations in important sectors
not yet fully included in GATT disciplines,
such as services, trade-related investment
measures and intellectual property.

Developing countries participated ac-
tively in these negotiations and contributed
to this success. All countries should make
their most constructive contribution
possible.

We express our full commitment to
making further substantive progress in the
Uruguay Round in order to complete it by
the end of 1990.

19) We note with satisfaction the entry
into force of the Free Trade Agreement be-
tween Canada and the United States, as
well as more recent initiatives to intensify
the close economic relations between the
European Community and EFTA [European
Free Trade Association] countries. It re-
mains our policy that these and other devel-
opments in regional cooperation, should be
trade-creating and complementary to the
multilateral liberalization process.

20) It is the firm intention of the Euro-
pean Community that the trade aspects of
the single market program should also be
trade-creating and complementary to the
multilateral liberalization process.

21) We note with satisfaction the prog-
ress that has been made in strengthening
the multilateral disciplines on trade and aid
distorting export credit subsidies. This ef-
fort must be pursued actively and completed
in the competent bodies of the OECD [Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment] with a view to improving
present guidelines at the earliest possible
date.

General Problems of Development

22) Development is a shared global chal-
lenge. We shall help developing countries by
opening the world trading system and by
supporting their structural adjustment. We
shall encourage too economic diversification
in commodity dependent countries and the
creation of a favourable environment for
transfers of technology and capital flows.

We underline the continuing importance
of official development assistance and wel-
come the increased efforts of Summit par-
ticipants in this respect. We note the
targets already established by international
organizations for the future level of official
development assistance and stress the im-
portance of overall financial flows to
development.

We underline simultaneously the impor-
tance attached to the quality of the aid and
to the evaluation of the projects and the pro-
grams financed.

23) We urge developing countries to im-
plement sound economic policies. A vital fac
tor will be the adoption of financial and
fiscal policies which attract inward invest-
ment and encourage growth and the return
of flight capital.

24) We note with satisfaction that there*
has been substantial progress in the multi-
lateral aid initiative for the Philippines thati
was given special attention in the Toronto
economic declaration.

25) Faced with the worrying economic
situation of Yugoslavia, we encourage its
government to implement a strong economic
reform program that can command bilatera
and multilateral support.

The Situation in the Poorest Countries

26) The enhancement of the International
Monetary Fund Structural Adjustment Fa-
cility, the World Bank special program of a.^
sistance for the poorest and most indebted
countries and the fifth replenishment of tht
African Development Fund are all importai
measures benefiting those countries having
embarked upon an adjustment process. We
stress the importance attached to a substan'
tial replenishment of International Develop-
ment Association resources.

27) As we urged last year in Toronto,
the Paris Club reached a consensus in Sep-
tember 1988 on the conditions of implemen-
tation of significant reduction of debt
service payments for the poorest countries.
Thirteen countries have already benefitted
by this decision.

28) We welcome the increasing grant el
ement in the development assistance as wel'
as the steps taken to convert loans into
grants and we urge further steps to this
end. Flexibility in development aid as mucM
as in debt rescheduling is required.

29) We attach great importance to the
efficient and successful preparation of the
next general conference of the United Na-
tions on the least developed countries, whic
will take place in Paris in 1990.

Strengthened Debt Strategy for
the Heavily Indebted Countries

30) Our approach to the debt problems has
produced significant results, but serious
challenges remain: in many countries the r;
tio of debt service to exports remains high, jj
financing for growth promoting investment
is scarce and capital flight is a key problem
An improvement in the investment climate
must be a critical part of efforts to achieve (
sustainable level of growth without exces-
sive levels of debt. These improvements of
the current situation depend above all on
standard and effective adjustment policies
in the debtor countries.

Department of State Bulletin/September 1981

FEATURE

31) To address these challenges, we are
trongly committed to the strengthened
lebt strategy. This will rely, on a case-by-
ase basis, on the following actions:

• Borrowing countries should imple-
nent, with the assistance of the Fund and
he Bank, sound economic policies, partic-
ilarly designed to mobilize savings, stimu-
ate investment and reverse capital flight;

• Banks should increasingly focus on
oluntary, market-based debt and debt serv-
ee reduction operations, as a complement to
lew lending;

• The International Monetary Fund and
Vorld Bank will support significant debt re-
luction by setting aside a portion of policy-
lased loans;

• Limited interest support will be pro-
ided, through additional financing by the
nternational Monetary Fund and the World
iank, for transactions involving significant
lebt and debt service reduction. For that
lurpose the use of escrow accounts is
greed;

• Continued Paris Club rescheduling
nd flexibility of export-credit agencies;

• Strengthening of the international fi-
.ancial institutions capability for supporting
ledium-term maeroeconomic and structural
djustment programs and for compensating
he negative effects of export shortfalls and
.\tt-rnal shocks.

:^2) In the framew'ork of this strategy:

• We welcome the recent decisions taken
y the two institutions to encourage debt

nd debt service reduction which provide
dequate resources for these purposes;

• We urge debtor countries to move
head promptly to develop strong economic
eform programs that may lead to debt and
ebt service reductions in accordance with
he guidelines defined by the two Bretton
Voods institutions;

• We urge banks to take realistic and
onstructive approaches in their negotia-
tions with the debtor countries and to move
jromptly to conclude agreements on finan-
ial packages including debt reduction, debt
ervice reduction and new money. We stress
hat official creditors should not substitute
or private lenders. Our governments are
prepared to consider as appropriate tax,
■egulatory and accounting practices with a

I lew to eliminating unnecessary obstacles
0 debt and debt service reductions.

(Environment

?)) There is growing awareness throughout
he world of the necessity to preserve better
he uiobal ecological balance. This includes
erious threats to the atmosphere, which
ould lead to future climate changes. We
otc with great concern the growing pollu-

tion of air, lakes, rivers, oceans and seas;
acid rain; dangerous substances; and the
rapid desertification and deforestation. Such
environmental degradation endangers spe-
cies and undermines the well-being of indi-
viduals and societies.

Decisive action is urgently needed to
understand and protect the earth's ecologi-
cal balance. We will work together to
achieve the common goals of preserving a
healthy and balanced global environment in
order to meet shared economic and social
objectives and to carry out obligations to fu-
ture generations.

34) We urge all countries to give fur-
ther impetus to scientific research on envi-
ronmental issues, to develop necessary
technologies and to make clear evaluations
of the economic costs and benefits of envi-
ronmental policies.

The persisting uncertainty on some of
these issues should not unduly delay our
action.

In this connection, we ask all countries
to combine their efforts in order to improve
observation and monitoring on a global
scale.

35) We believe that international cooper-
ation also needs to be enhanced in the field
of technology and technology transfer in or-
der to reduce pollution or provide alterna-
tive solutions.

36) We believe that industry has a cru-
cial role in preventing pollution at source, in
waste minimization, in energy conservation
and in the design and marketing of cost-
effective clean technologies. The agri-
cultural sector must also contribute to tackl-
ing problems such as water pollution, soil
erosion and desertification.

37) Environmental protection is inte-
gral to issues such as trade, development,
energy, transport, agriculture and economic
planning. Therefore, environmental consid-
erations must be taken into account in eco-
nomic decision-making. In fact good
economic policies and good environmental
policies are mutually reinforcing.

In order to achieve sustainable develop-
ment, we shall ensure the compatibility of
economic growth and development with the
protection of the environment. Environmen-
tal protection and related investment should
contribute to economic growth. In this re-
spect, intensified efforts for technological
breakthrough are important to reconcile
economic growth and environmental
policies.

Clear assessments of the costs, benefits
and resource implications of environmental
protection should help governments to take
the necessary decisions on the mix of price
signals (e.g., taxes or expenditures) and
regulatory actions, reflecting where possi-
ble the full value of natural resources.

SUMMIT OF THE ARCH

We encourage the World Bank and re-
gional development banks to integrate envi-
ronmental considerations into their
activities. International organizations, such
as the OECD and the United Nations and its
affiliated organizations, will be asked to de-
velop further techniques of analysis which
would help governments assess appropriate
economic measures to promote the quality of
the environment. We ask the OECD, within
the context of its work on integrating envi-
ronment and economic decision-making, to
examine how selected environmental indica-
tors could be developed. We expect the 1992
U.N. Conference on Environment and De-
velopment to give additional momentum to
the protection of the global environment.

38) To help developing countries deal
with past damage and to encourage them to
take environmentally desirable action, eco-
nomic incentives may include the use of aid
mechanisms and specific transfer of technol-
ogy. In special cases, ODA [official develop-
ment assistance] debt forgiveness and debt
for nature swaps can play a useful role in en-
vironmental protection.

We also emphasize the necessity to take
into account the interests and needs of de-
veloping countries in sustaining the growth
of their economies and the financial and
technological requirements to meet environ-
mental challenges.

39) The depletion of the stratospheric
ozone layer is alarming and calls for prompt
action.

We welcome the Helsinki conclusions re-
lated, among other issues, to the complete
abandonment of the production and con-
sumption of chlorof luorocarbons covered by
the Montreal protocol as soon as possible
and not later than the end of the century.
Specific attention must also be given to
those ozone-depleting substances not cov-
ered by the Montreal protocol. We shall pro-
mote the development and use of suitable
substitute substances and technologies.
More emphasis should be placed on
projects that provide alternatives to
chlorof luorocarbons.

40) We strongly advocate common ef-
forts to limit emissions of carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases, which threaten
to induce climate change, endangering the
environment and ultimately the economy.
We strongly support the work undertaken by
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change on this issue.

department of State Bulletin/September 1989

FEATURE

SUMMIT OF THE ARCH

We need to strengthen the worldwide
network of observatories for greenhouse
gases and support the World Meteorological
Organization initiative to establish a global
climatological reference network to detect
climate changes.

41) We agree that increasing energy ef-
ficiency could make a substantial contribu-
tion to these goals. We urge international
organizations concerned to encourage meas-
ures, including economic measures, to im-
prove energy conservation and, more
broadly, efficiency in the use of energy of all
kinds and to promote relevant techniques
and technologies.

We are committed to maintaining the
highest safety standards for nuclear power
plants and to strengthening international
cooperation in safe operation of power plants
and waste management, and we recognize
that nuclear power also plays an important
role in limiting output of greenhouse gases.

42) Deforestation also damages the at-
mosphere and must be reversed. We call for
the adoption of sustainable forest manage-
ment practices, with a view of preserving
the scale of world forests. The relevant in-
ternational organizations will be asked to
complete reports on the state of the world's
forests by 1990.

43) Preserving the tropical forests is an
urgent need for the world as a whole. While
recognizing the sovereign rights of develop-
ing countries to make use of their natural
resources, we encourage, through a sustain-
able use of tropical forests, the protection of
all the species therein and the traditional
rights to land and other resources of local
communities. We welcome the German ini-
tiative in this field as a basis for progress.

To this end, we give strong support to
rapid implementation of the Tropical Forest
Action Plan which was adopted in 1986 in
the framework of the Food and Agriculture
Organization. We appeal to both consumer
and producer countries, which are united in
the International Tropical Timber Organiza-
tion, to join their efforts to ensure better
conservation of the forests. We express our
readiness to assist the efforts of nations
with tropical forests through financial and
technical cooperation, and in international
organizations.

44) Temperate forests, lakes and rivers
must be protected against the effects of acid
])ollutants such as sulphur dioxide and nitro-
gen oxides. It is necessary to pursue ac-
tively the bilateral and multilateral efforts
to this end.

45) The increasing complexity of the is-
sues related to the protection of the atmos-
phere calls for innovative solutions. New
instruments may be contemplated. We be-
lieve that the conclusion of a framework of
umbrella convention on climate change to
set out general principles or guidelines is
urgently required to mobilize and rational-
ize the efforts made by the international
community. We welcome the work under way
by the U.N. Environmental Program, in co-
operation with the World Meteorological Or-
ganization, drawing on the work of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
and the results of other international meet-
ings. Specific protocols containing concrete
commitments could be fitted into the frame-
work as scientific evidence requires and
permits.

46) We condemn indiscriminate use of
oceans as dumping grounds for polluting
waste. There is a particular problem with
the deterioration of coastal waters. To en-
sure the sustainable management of the ma-
rine environment, we recognize the
importance of international cooperation in
preserving it and conserving the living re-
sources of the sea. We call for relevant bod-
ies of the United Nations to prepare a
report on the state of the world's oceans.

We express our concern that national,
regional and global capabilities to contain
and alleviate the consequences of maritime
oil spills be improved. We urge all countries
to make better use of the latest monitoring
and clean-up technologies. We ask all coun-
tries to adhere to and implement fully the
international conventions for the prevention
of oil pollution of the oceans. We also ask the
International Maritime Organization to put
forward proposals for further preventive
action.

47) We are committed to ensuring full
implementation of existing rules for the
environment. In this respect, we note
with interest the initiative of the Italian
Government to host in 1990 a forum on inter-
national law for the environment with schol-
ars, scientific experts and officials, to
consider the need for a digest of existing
rules and to give in-depth consideration to
the legal aspects of environment at the in-
ternational level.

48) We advocate that existing environ-
ment institutions be strengthened within
the U.N. system. In particular, the U.N.
Environmental Program urgently requires
strengthening and increased financial sup-
port. Some of us have agreed that the estab-
lishment within the United Nations of a new
institution may also be worth considering.

49) We have taken note of the report of
the sixth conference on bioethics held in
Brussels which examined the elaboration of

a universal code of environmental ethics
based upon the concept of the "human stew-
ardship of nature."

.50) It is a matter of international con-
cern that Bangladesh, one of the poorest and
most densely populated countries in the
world, is periodically devastated by cata-
strophic floods.

We stress the urgent need for effective,
coordinated action by the international com-
munity, in support of the Government of
Bangladesh, in order to find solutions to this
major problem which are technically, finan-
cially, economically and environmentally
sound. In that spirit, and taking account of
help already given, we take note of the dif-
ferent studies concerning flood alleviation,
initiated by France, Japan, the United
States and the U.N. Development Program,
which have been reviewed by experts from
all our countries. We welcome the World
Bank's agreement, following those studies,
to coordinate the efforts of the international
community so that a sound basis for achiev-
ing a real improvement in alleviating the ef-
fects of flood can be established. We also
welcome the agreement of the World Bank t(
chair, by the end of the year, a meeting to be
held in the United Kingdom by invitation of
the Bangladesh Government, of the coun-
tries willing to take an active part in such a-
program.

51) We give political support to projects
such as the joint project to set up an observ-
atory of the Saharan areas, which answers
the need to monitor the development of that
rapidly deteriorating, fragile, arid region,
in order to protect it more effectively.

Drug Issues

52) The drug problem has reached devastat-
ing proportions. We stress the urgent need
for decisive action, both on a national and am
international basis. We urge all countries,
especially those where drug production,
trading and consumption are large, to join
our efforts to counter drug production, to
reduce demand and to carry forward the
fight against drug trafficking itself and the
laundering of its proce.eds.

53) Accordingly, we resolve the fol-
lowing measures within relevant fora;

• Give greater emphasis on bilateral and
U.N. programs for the conversion of illicit
cultivation in the producer countries. The
U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UN-
FADC), and other United Nations and multi-
lateral organizations, should be supported,
strengthened and made more effective.
These efforts could include particular sup-
port for the implementation of effective pro-
grams to stop drug cultivation and trading
as well as developmental and technical
assistance.

FEATURE

• Support the efforts of producing coun-
;ries who ask for assistance to counter ille-
gal production or trafficking.

• Strengthen the role of the United Na-
;ions in the war against drugs through

in increase in its resources and through re-
nforced effectiveness of its operations.

• Intensify the e.xchange of information
m the prevention of addiction, and reha-
nlitation of drug addicts.

• Support the international conference
jlanned for 1990 on cocaine and drug de-
nand reduction.

• Strengthen the efficiency of the coop-
irative and mutual assistance on these is-
ues, the first steps being a prompt
idhesion to, ratification and implementation
)f the Vienna Convention on Illicit Traffic in
!^arcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances.

• Conclude further bilateral or multi-
ateral agreements and support initiatives
ind cooperation, where appropriate, which
nclude measures to facilitate the identifica-
ion, tracing, freezing, seizure and forfei-
ure of drug crime proceeds.

• Convene a financial action task force
'rom Summit Participants and other coun-
•ries interested in these problems. Its man-
late is to assess the results of cooperation
ilready undertaken in order to prevent the

utilization of the banking system and finan-
cial institutions for the purpose of money
laundering, and to consider additional pre-
ventive efforts in this field, including the
adaptation of the legal and regulatory sys-
tems so as to enhance multilateral judicial
assistance. The first meeting of this task
force will be called by France and its report
will be completed by April 1990.

54) International cooperation against
AIDS [acquired immune deficiency
syndrome];

We take note of the creation of an Inter-
national Ethics Committee on AIDS which
met in Paris in May 1989, as decided at the
Summit of Venice (June 1987). It assembled
the Summit Participants and the other mem-
bers of the EC, together with the active par-
ticipation of the World Health Organization.

55) We take note of the representations
that we received from various Heads of
State or Government and organizations and
we will study them with interest.

56) Next Economic Summit: We have ac-
cepted the invitation of the President of the
United States to meet next year in the
United States of America.

SUMMIT OF THE ARCH

President Bush's
News Conference,

Pgrje

July 16, 19891

We've just concluded 2'/2 days of inten-
sive and productive meetings with the
summit counterparts on economic and
political issues. Let me take this oppor-
tunity, first of all, to thank President
Mitterrand for his most gracious
hospitality.

The summit, in my view, was a
clear success. We met in a time of sus-
tained economic growth and agreed
that the prospects are good for the con-
tinued expansion without inflation of
that growth. It was against this back-
drop that we conducted a wide-ranging

^\ lute House photo by Susan Biddle)

The "Summit of the Arch" participants (left to right): President Delors (EC Commis-
sion), Prime Minister De Mita (Italy), Chancellor Kohl (West Germany), President
Bush, President Mitterrand, Prime Minister Thatcher (United Kingdom), Prime
Minister Mulroney (Canada), and Prime Minister Uno (Japan).

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

FEATURE

SUMMIT OF THE ARCH

discussion on critical global issues,
from East-West relations to the grow-
ing environmental challenges that we
face.

We came to Paris at a truly re-
markable moment. The winds of change
are bringing hope to people all around
the world. Who would have thought just
a few short years ago that we would be
witness to a freely elected Senate in
Poland or political pluralism in Hun-
gary? I was really touched by what I
saw and heard in those two countries —
people determined to keep their
dreams alive, people determined to see
a Europe whole and free. That's why
America brought to this summit our
determination to support the reform
movement in Hungary and Poland. Peo-
ple yearning for freedom and democra-
cy deserve our support, and it's because
of the community of values shared by
these summit countries that we were
able to agree to meet soon to discuss
concerted action that will help Poland
and Hungary.

Democracy and economic growth
go hand in hand, whether in Eastern
Europe, the summit seven, or the devel-
oping world. And therefore, much of
our discussion here in Paris centered
on economics. We reaffirmed our inter-
national economic cooperation and our
whole policy coordination process. Our
strengthened debt strategy was firmly
supported. We reaffirmed our deter-
mination to maintain and improve the
multilateral trading system, calling for
the completion of the Uruguay Round
by the end of 1990 and extending the
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade] to new areas, including
agriculture.

This summit marked a watershed
in the environment. And we agreed
that decisive action is urgently needed
to preserve the Earth. We committed
to work together, as well as with the
developing world, to meet our respon-
sibility of global stewardship. The
measures we've agreed to in Paris are
timely, and they lay the groundwork for

further specific steps when we meet
again next year in the United States.

Finally, I was especially pleased to
find that my colleagues share our
sense of urgency and sense of the im-
portance of the worldwide fight against
drugs. Among other steps, we agreed
to establish a financial task force to
find new ways to track and prevent the
laundering of drug money. I look for-
ward to meeting my summit colleagues
in the United States next year as we
continue working on these and other
priority issues, build on the genuine
progress that I think was made here in
Paris.

And I might say that I was very
pleased that this meeting coincided
with the bicentennial here. It was a
very moving experience for all of us.

Q. Mr. Gorbachev wants to play a
part in the world economic discus-
sions. Would he be welcome at the
next economic summit table?

A. I think that's a little premature,
but it was very interesting, I found, that
a leader of the Soviet Union would ad-
dress a letter to the French President as
head of this year's summit. We talked
about that letter a great deal. There's an
awful lot that has to transpire in the
Soviet Union, it seems to me, before
anything of that nature would be consid-
ered. We're talking about free-market
economies here. But I found fascinating
the very fact of the letter. But there
was no — there certainly — I don't think
any indication that he will be attending
the next summit. He'll get a very cour-
teous and very thoughtful reply from
Mr. Mitterand.

Q. How about the poor

countries Bangladesh? Would they

ever be welcome?

A. This is an economic summit of
countries whose economies — drawn to-
gether by the free economies of the
West, and so, I don't think there's a
question at this point of expanding the
summit. There is concern about the
economies in the world that aren't doing
so well. Bangladesh is a country that
does need aid, and, indeed, the commu-
nique addressed itself to trying to help
Bangladesh.

Q. You consulted with the
NATO allies on military matters in
Brussels, and then you had an eco-
nomic summit here in Paris. What's
left before you sit down with Mr. Gor-
bachev for a superpower summit?

A. A little more time, I think.

Q. I mean is there any more —
don't you have anything to discuss
with him now that you've planted this
groundwork?

A. Yes. Let me explain, to those
who aren't familiar with the policy, that
Secretary Baker has met a couple of
times with Mr. Shevardnadze [Soviet
Foreign Minister]. There will be another
such meeting of that nature, and at an
appropriate time, I will have a meeting
with Mr. Gorbachev. But I don't think
anything at the summit influenced that
bilateral meeting.

Q. The summit called for decisive
action on the environment, but vari-
ous environmental groups are saying
that you did not take decisive action.
Could you respond to that?

A. I did see one or two groups.
They didn't think I took proper action
when I sent a very far-reaching clean air
proposal up to the Congress. And so,
some have been critical.

Many have been supportive on the
broad — the very fact — I'll tell you where
we got a lot of support is the very fact
that the communique addressed itself
with some specificity to various environ-
mental goals: the whole concept of coop-
eration on research, technology, and
transfer to the LDCs [less developed
countries]; the prevention of pollution;
the idea of setting up monitoring sta-
tions so we can better predict and, thus,
avoid environmental disaster.

Thei'e was a lot of common ground.
In fact, I would say that on that and per-
haps antinarcotics there was the most
fervor. And so, I think many environ-
mental groups see the very fact that this
matter was on the front burner as being
very positive. The summit did make
strong enough statements to commit all
of our members, and hopefully others
around the world, to sound environmen-
tal practice. So you get criticized; but I
think, generally speaking, it's been very,
very forward-looking.

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

FEATURE

Q. You promised in Poland and
Hungary that you would seek con-
certed action on the part of the coun-
tries meeting here to help those
countries. There seems to have been a
pledge that there would be concerted
consideration of action — no dollar
figure attached and no specified ac-
tion promised — and a meeting appar-
ently planned. And do you feel you got
what you wanted?

A. I think so. And you'll notice that
in both Poland and Hungary I stopped
well short of setting dollar figures or of
challenging others to meet dollar fig-
ures. But on this one, let there be no
doubt there was unanimity that we
should adress ourselves to the problems
of Poland and Hungary. And so, I was
not disappointed. I didn't go in there
with a specific package with dollar fig-
ures on it, and I think that an early
meeting to do just that is good. It called
for food aid to Poland. That's specific.
Doesn't have a figure on it, but — no, I
think we got what we sought. There was
no rancor on that question and no divi-
sion on the question. But there was
unanimity that we have to move on it.

Q. Since you've said that you
spent a lot of time last night talking
about Mr. Gobrachev's letter, can you
tell us a little bit about those discus-
sions, and can you tell us what your
view is? What is an appropriate re-
sponse from the West to such an ex-
traordinary request by Mr. Gorbachev
to become part of the economy of the
Western democracies?

A. We would welcome any move-
ment by the Soviet Union toward
market-oriented, or Western, econ-
omies. There's no question about that.
And there's nothing begrudging about
our saying that I don't expect Mr. Gor-
bachev to sit as a member at next year's
summit. But the discussion was — it start-
ed off by: What do you think he means
by this? And a lot of discussion — we'll
get the experts to analyze it. All of that
took place. People concluded that it was
just one more manifestation of the
changing world we're living in. That,
I think, was the main message.

Then, where we go from here — some
of that has been addressed in the com-
munique, because we talked in there
about help for the Third World. Some of

his letter, as you know, was on that very
subject. When it came in, Mr. Mitter-
rand read it off to the group there and
then said, "Well, what will we do?" And
my suggestion was — which he had in-
tended to adopt anyway — that he, as the
man to whom the letter was addressed,
would reply to it.

That's the way it was. And the fact
that it's happening, is taking place — the
President of the United States can go to
Eastern Europe and witness the very
kind of change we're talking about.

I'll tell you that almost the most dra-
matic for me was when Mr. Nemeth, the
Prime Minister of Hungary, handed me
that piece of barbed wire — tearing down
the Iron Curtain between Hungary and
Austria. Now who would have thought
that possible? And this letter — just one
more manifestation of the e.xciting times
we're in of change. They're moving to-
ward our open system, our free system,
our system of free elections. And that's
the way I would look at the letter in that
conte.xt.

Q. In connection with next year's
summit, there's been some talk
among some of your people about pos-
sibly having it in your home State of
Texas, possibly in San Antonio. And I
wondered whether you'd like to see
that.

A. I'd have to run that by the Dal-
las Morning News and see how they felt
about it. But that's a distinct possibility.
However, it's too early; no decision has
been made. The fact that Jim Baker is
from Houston and I'm from Houston and
[Secretary of Commerce] Bob Mos-
bacher's from Texas should have nothing
to do — [laughter] — with where the next
summit's going to be, and there had been
no decision.

Q. That wouldn't mean some dis-
crimination against Dallas because
of your roots?

A. No, none whatsoever. Get that
down. The fall elections are up in 19 —

Q. Let me follow on the question
about summits. These things have
gotten a lot bigger than they were
originally planned to be — hundreds of
your people, thousands of us. It's your
first summit, but you've got to host
the next one. Have you given any
thought to how you want to do it in
terms of style?

SUMMIT OF THE ARCH

A. No, but I'll tell you, the part —
and I'm the new boy, the new kid in
school — but the part I found most inter-
esting was the unstructured part, the
part where you sit with these other lead-
ers, tell them what you think, listen
carefully to what they think. And that
happens sometimes in the corridors or
sometimes at a meal. I would like to
think that the more emphasis we've
placed on that kind of interaction, the
better it would be.

But there was no discussion by the
summit interlocutors on how to restruc-
ture it. Indeed, it went smoothly. I will
again say that Mr. Mitterrand handled
the formal part very well. But for me,
I'd like to see more just plain unstruc-
tured interaction between the leaders,
where you don't just have to talk on the
agenda items.

Q. How much change would the
Soviet Union have to make before
they could earn an invitation to next
year's economic summit? If you can't
answer that specifically, at least
could you give us some sense of scale?

A. One, as you know, I have wel-
comed the reforms that are taking place
in the Soviet Union. This concept of the
Soviets coming to a G-7 summit has nev-
er been, to my knowlege, thought much
about until this letter appeared, so
there's no standards for entrance into
the G-7.

The Soviet economy needs a lot of
work. And I say that not to be critical,
but certainly that's an objective judg-
ment. The economy is in bad, bad
shape — far worse shape than the West-
ern economies. I think what we ought to
do is to encourage the kinds of economic
changes in Eastern Europe and — to the
degree the Soviets would not consider
that an intervention into their internal
affairs — in the Soviet Union. Those
should be the next steps.

Welcome the interest that was
shown by this letter. This wasn't an ap-
plication for admission to the G-7. It was
saying. Let's do something in a common

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

FEATURE

SUMMIT OF THE ARCH

way about solving problems around the
world. And so, I wouldn't set a stand-
ard right now. I'd simply say: Let each
of us try to get our economies in order.
As soon as that happens and as soon as
we see the manifestations of freedom
break out there, in terms of demonstra-
bly free elections all over, then we start
talking about democratic change, and
then the day approached. I think it's
very premature to start laying down
guidelines from here as to what we
need to do on that.

Q. You've talked about a whole
and united Europe, and Mr. Gor-
bachev has talked about a common
European home. Are they the same
concept, or what is the difference? Is
there a difference between the role of
the United States in those two
statements?

A. Europe whole and free is our
concept. His common European home is
fine, so long as — as I said earlier — you
can move from room to room. That
means coming along further on human
rights. That means much more openness.
It means support them when you see
them move toward perestroika and
glasnosi. But it means an evolution in
Eastern Europe. And we've begun to
see it.

A Europe whole and free does not
visualize a Europe where you still have
barbed wire separating people, where
you still have human rights abuses in one
or two of the countries that are
egregious. It is whole and free, and the
common home theme is a good one. I
mean, that's a very good theme, and we
should encourage it. But we want to see
these countries continue to move toward
what works, and what works is freedom,
democracy, market economies — things of
that nature.

Q. In the meeting of the G-7, did
you sense the countries want U.S.
leadership or they want the United
States to be a coequal partner?

A. You mean with the Soviets? No,
I sense that those colleagues feel that we

have disproportionate responsibility. I
think there's a keen interest in how I
will work with the Soviets. There's no
question about that. I felt that very
clearly.

Q. At the risk of seeming fixated
by Mr. Gorbachev, when you discussed
his letter, was there a suggestion
from anybody that it might have been
a bit of mischief or an attempt to get
some publicity out of a Western
summit?

A. I can't say that never occurred.
[Laughter] But I don't think that, after
people thought about it rationally, that
anyone was prepared to say that and
that alone was what motivated this
letter.

There is change taking place. I
think for some time people really won-
dered whether I was a little begrudging
in recognizing that change and encour-
aging that change. But I think now that
has been laid to rest. So when you see
something of this nature, you take a look
at it, and you assess it, and then you —
but you don't discount it in a cynical
fashion.

But I think there was the timing.
The summit has been planned for a long
time, and this letter might have come in
earlier on far more serious sherpa con-
sideration, as every other issue was sub-
jected to marvelous work by the
sherpas — who incidentally did a superb
job — and this one didn't. So, I think peo-
ple would excuse a reasonable degree of
cynicism, but don't think the conclusion
was cynical.

Q. Going back to the other day in
Poland, an elderly man said that
when people talk to you folks about
change, just remember that the com-
munists still have the bayonets. Do
you believe that countries like Poland
and Hungary are really going to have
serious and permanent change, or is
there a line that their leaders and
that Moscow just won't go past?

A. No, I think that you've already
seen serious change. I think you see the
political situation in Hungary, for exam-
ple, is absolutely amazing compared to
the way we used to view Hungary. If the
Soviet Union, instead of taking their
troops out of Hungary, had tried to
tighten down, I don't expect we'd see the'
kind of change in Hungary that we're
seeing today.

I'd say that we're a long way from
what Gorbachev has spelled out as a
common European home, but it's mov-
ing. Let's encourage the progress.

Maybe I missed the nuance of your
question.

Q. That there is a course that's
going to lead to a permanent change,
or. again, the question is: Are the So-
viets going to step in and pull the rug
out from under at some point?

A. I would quote Mr. Gorbachev's
words back to him on that, what he told
me in New York, and what Jim Baker
has heard from Shevardnadze, and what
everybody who interacts with the Sovi-
ets hear, and that is that perestroika is
for real. You cannot set the clock back. Il
is going to go forward. And so, I would
see that as what guides now.

However, I have said as long as
there are enormous imbalances in con-
ventional forces and in certain catego-
ries of strategic forces, the West should
keep its eyes wide open. Indeed, there
was some reference to that in this com-
munique. There was unanimity on the
part of the NATO allies that we ought to.
be cautious and that we — and so to an-
swer your question, it's not a done deal;
and that's, I think, what was being re-
flected there in Poland.

Q. I wonder, as you put all of this
together, what you said about Poland
and Hungary and Gorbachev asking
to join the world economy. As a mat-
ter of policy, do you see the cold war
over, and do you think the West has
won it?

A. I don't like to use "cold war."
That has a connotation of worse days in
terms of East-West relationship. I think
things have moved forward so that the
connotation that those two words conjure

FEATURE

u)! is entirely different now. And yet I
<l(in't want to stand here and seem
euphoric — that everything is hunky-
dory between the East and the West on
arms or on differences in the economy
or on how we look at regional problems.
We have some big differences, still. But
let's encourage the change. And then I
can answer your question in maybe a
few more years more definitively.

Q. The summit seven leaders are
^celebrating a gathering that was so
successful it went 2V2 days instead of
3. Could you not find another half
day's worth of problems to discuss
and maybe resolve? [Laughter]

A. We're kind of running out of gas.
I'll tell you, it's been a vigorous e.xperi-
fiice in physical fitness for me, and I try
t(i stay in pretty good shape. But this
(iiie — when you couple the summit with
the bicentennial and then tack on Poland
and Hungary, I wasn't about to argue we
needed more time, and nor was anyone
else. I think the fact that this rather
jcomple.x agenda was completed in hai'-
!mony is the fact that ought to really car-
ry the spotlight, not the fact that we
finished in advance.

There's going to be plenty of oppor-
tunity to discuss a lot more problems
that e.xist around the world. But we had
an agenda. We addressed it. We finished
it on time. And it was done harmo-
niously. I think that's why it worked out.
And that is e.xactly what happened. We
idid complete it. And we had a lot more
op])ortunity because of the bicentennial
to have interaction with the other lead-
ers, more so than at any other summit.

Q. Do you feel you accomplished
all you could?

A. We accomplished what we set
out to accomplish.

Q. — in Eastern Europe you
italked about two themes constantly:
one, encouraging democracy and
moves to a market economy, and two,
that you weren't there to try to raise
tensions with the Soviet Union or
challenge them in any way. But my
Iquestion is: If what you want is car-
Iried out — moves to democracy and a
market economy — aren't you really
'talking about the dissolution of the

Soviet empire? And is that what you
mean when you call for a Europe
that's whole and free?

A. Soviet empire? If you mean the
imposition of a Marxist system or a so-
cialism in their definition — system on
others — yes, I'd like to see Europe whole
and free. But with the Soviet moving to-
ward market — and they're not there —
toward more freedom, toward more
openness, they themselves have recog-
nized that their system doesn't work. So,
you don't run the risks or have the same
tensions that we might have 10 years ago
talking about the very same themes I
talked about in Poland and Hungary.

I went to — some of you were on this
trip — Vienna several years ago and gave
a speech, and a man in — the speech was
on differentiation. And I will spare him
identification. But a Hungarian official
told me that he personally — he be-
friended us, and we talked carefully —
had gotten a lot of grief over the fact
that we had singled out Hungary as a
country that was moving. Even then,
even those short year ago, moving in a
way that their changes could be accom-
modated by closer relationships with the
West. And that conversation I had on
this trip showed me how dynamic the
change.

So, I don't think there's a risk of — if
we're right in our assessment that
change is going forward — I don't think
there is this risk.

Q. Is Mr. Mitterrand free to reply
to the Gorbachev letter himself, or
will it be circulated, or would you like
to see the letter? How would you like
that to go?

A. No, I think that he should reply
to it himself. He has a good relationship
with Mr. Gorbachev. Gorbachev was
here. They've had some followup, I be-
lieve, and the letter was addressed to
him, albeit as the president of the sum-
mit. I think it's fitting that he simply use
his good judgment and reply to it in any
way he wants. That's e.xactly what he's
going to do, incidentally. That was
discussed.

Q. And if next year's summit is in
Texas, can it be very early?
[Laughter].

A. Parting — walking shot.

SUMMIT OF THE ARCH

Q. In this summit, you achieved
all your goals. Do you have the feel-
ing of being the winner number one
of this summit?

A. I pointed out before we came
over here that something of this nature
ought not to be judged in terms of win-
ners and losers. Your question sounds
very much like some that we engage in
at home of who's up, who's down, who's
ahead, who's winning, who's more popu-
lar, who's ahead in the poll — Bush or
Gorbachev — in Eastern Europe or Con-
necticut. [Laughter] And it doesn't
I'eally have much to do with that.

Q. Are you satisfied —

A. I am very satisfied. I am very
satisfied that the summit achieved its
goals. Every other summit leader tells
me that it was the best summit they
have attended, and I again would salute
the President of the French Republic for
the way in which he conducted the meet-
ings. But, yes, I am very, very satisfied,
and there aren't any winners or losers or
who is up or who is down. We're together
is how we approached the environmental
questions. I didn't take a question here
on Third World debt, but there was a
strong endorsement for the Brady plan.
And there was not dissension on that ap-
proach. So, it came together very, very
well.

And if the Brady — and I shouldn't
say this. I know this is going to get me
in real trouble. But if the Brady plan
looks like it's going to be successful, we
may call it the Bush plan. [Laughter]

' Text from Weekly Compilation of Pres-
idential Documents of July 24, 1989.
- Press release 137 of July 17.
■* Press release 138 of July 17.
"^ Press release 139 of July 17. ■

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

President Bush Visits Europe

President Bush departed Washington, D.C.,

July 9, 1989, to visit Poland (July 9-11),
Hungary (July 11-13), France (July 13-17),

arid the Netherlands (July 17-18).
He returned to the United States on July 18.

President's Departure

Remarks,
Andrews Air Force Base,
July 9, 19891

This morning, I depart for Europe, my
second visit in 2 months to a continent
in the midst of change, a time of un-
precedented opportunity for peace,
prosperity, and freedom. I'm especially
pleased to make my trip at this time.
Just 5 days ago, we celebrated the birth
of our nation. Just 5 days from now,
France will celebrate its rebirth as a
modern nation, the 14th of July. This
year, it's a special celebration: the bi-
centennial of Bastille Day.

Two hundred years ago, the demo-
cratic revolution that began here in
America crossed the Atlantic. The
gates of the Bastille opened onto a new
era, the era of the rights of man. In Eu-
rope, as in America, an idea was un-
leashed that would change the face of
history, an idea that is still shaping our
world today. That idea is democracy.

Then and now, freedom finds its
allies everywhere. Lafayette and
Rochambeau, Kosciuszko and Pulaski —
these names are engraved in American
history, patriots not only in their own
countries but in America as well. And
the Revolution of 1789 had its roots in
the Spirit of 1776. Remember what

James Monroe said about the French
who fought at our side for America's in-
dependence: "They caught the spirit of
liberty here and carried it home with
them." Today that spirit of liberty re-
mains strong, and the United States
remains the friend of any nation, any
people, who love freedom and cherish
the rights of man.

This morning I begin a journey
that will take me to Europe — East and
West — a journey that underscores the
tremendous changes, challenges, and
opportunities ahead of us. I travel first
to Poland and Hungary, nations on the
threshold of a new era, nations where
the spirit of freedom is strong. In both
countries, we're witnessing remarkable
changes, welcome developments no one
would have thought possible even a year
ago. New voices are shaping the course
of national affairs, and both countries
are on the path toward economic re-
birth and political pluralism. My visit
underscores the growing importance
our nation sees in the changing face of
central Europe.

I will travel from Poland and Hun-
gary to France, to join leaders from
the si.x major industrial democracies in
my first economic summit as Presi-
dent. Together we are working to
spread the benefits of political freedom
and economic prosperity around the
world. The summit is a unique oppor-
tunity to assess our progress. It's also
an opportunity to show that we can
forge a common response to new chal-
lenges, such as the need to protect the
global environment.

Our agenda at the economic sum-
mit will include both political and eco-
nomic issues of global impact. We will
review the international economic
scene, and we'll identify where we can
improve coordination. We'll focus on
the problem of debt in the developing
world. I expect summit leaders to maki
a firm commitment to complete the
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations
by December 1990.

And we will discuss ways of deal-
ing with a number of critical environ-
mental issues that affect us all —
problems including global warming, d6«
forestation, and the pollution of the
world's oceans. We know there are no
easy solutions. Provided we work to-
gether, I'm confident we can find com-
mon solutions to problems none of us
can solve alone.

Finally, before returning home, I
will visit an old and honored ally: the
Netherlands. Our friendship with the
Dutch is older than our own Constitu-
tion, with a nation whose long traditior
of union and liberty shaped and in-
spired our own. Today our two nations
are partners in commerce and common^
defense, and the common values that
bind us have never been stronger.

Europe is at a turning point. A
continent cruelly divided for more
than four decades now dreams of being
whole and free. Our task is clear: to se
that we mend old divisions, that we ful
fill the decades-old dream, and that th'
new Europe emerges secure, prosper-
ous, peaceful, and free.

Department of State Bulletin/September 198>

THE PRESIDENT

President's Arrival Remarks,

Warsaw,

July 9, 19892

jThank you, Mr. Chairman [Wojciech
Jaruzelski, Chairman of Poland's Coun-
cil of State], for your hospitable and
gracious words of welcome. To you and
to the people of Poland, friends and
cousins of so many in my homeland, we
extend the heartfelt best wishes of the
American people. Here in the heart of
Europe, the American people have a
fervent wish: that Europe be whole and
free.

In my first moments as President,
1 told my countrymen that a new
oreeze was blowing across the world.
And the winds of change have surely
touched the land here, where so much
las happened since my last visit. It is
wonderful to be back at such an e.xcit-
ng time. History, which has so often
1,'onspired with geography to deny the
-•olish people their freedom, now offers
i|i a new and brighter future for
^uland.

I listened carefully to your words
i)f welcome, and yes, Poland has
started along an ascending path of
change — democratic change. This climb
s e.xhilarating, but not always easy,
ind will require further sacrifices.
But, if followed, it will lead to a renais-
;ance for this remarkable nation.

These are great days for Poland,
solidarity is legal. The beginnings of a
'ree press now exist. A new Parliament
s in place. The Polish Senate has been
■estored through free and fair elec-
,,ions. And Poland is making its own
li.story. America, and the whole world,
s watching. The Government of Poland
mil you, Mr. Chairman, have shown
visdom and courage in taking the path
)f those roundtable accords. The world
s inspired by what is happening here.

We do look forward to our talks
vith you and other representatives of
he Polish Government, with the demo-

President Bush and Chairman Jaruzelski exchanged dinner toasts at Radziwill Palace.

cratic opposition as well. While in your
country, I want to hear the many voices
of the people of Poland.

As we begin these discussions, I
carry with me many happy memories
of my first visit to Poland. And my
thoughts turn on this Sunday to the
memory of another Sunday outside
Warsaw, when we attended morning
mass at St. Margaret's Church in Lo-
mianki. The cracks of its historic walls
were filled with flowers, and the
church itself was filled to overflowing
with your countrymen, their devoted
faces touched by tears of joy. It re-
minds me of other churches that I've
visited since that morning at St. Mar-
garet's, churches like St. Adalbert's in
Philadelphia, St. Hyacinth's in Chi-
cago, churches built by Polish hands
and nurtured by Polish dreams. In
America and in Poland, those dreams
are as ancient and as fundamental as
the courageous spirit of the Polish peo-
ple. As we meet this evening in War-
saw, the sun still shines on those
churches across the sea. It's still Sun-
day afternoon there, and America's

churches are filled with people in pray-
er. As we begin these discussions — and
as your country continues its hard jour-
ney up the path it has chosen — my pray-
ers and the prayers of the American
people remain with Poland, as they
have throughout its long struggle.

Yes, there is a good deal of work to
be done, and we will work together to
gain new ground, to expand our com-
mon ground and U.S. -Polish ties.

White House Statement,

Warsaw,

July 10, 19893

President Bush and Gen. Jaruzelski
talked for more than 2 hours this morn-
ing, from 9:45 to 12:05, and discussed a
full range of bilateral and international
issues. President Bush outlined the
economic program that he will make to
the Polish Parliament this afternoon.

department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

The President also discussed his con-
ventional arms proposal made at the
NATO summit. Gen. Jaruzelski said the
Warsaw Pact applauded the President's
proposal and felt the timetable was
achievable. General Jaruzelski spent a
good deal of the time discussing the in-
ternal political situation in Poland.
President Bush reiterated the United
States desire to be helpful in Poland's
reform efforts without being intrusive.

In the plenary session, Secretary
of State Baker and Poland's Foreign
Minister Olechowski amplified these
same themes. Secretary Baker re-
ferred to the close and historic bonds
between the two peoples. The Secre-
tary outlined in some detail the Presi-
dent's economic incentives. The two
ministers discussed the full range of
bilateral issues, including increased
dialogue between U.S. and Polish
officials, technical and scientific ex-
changes, trade increases, environmen-
tal improvements, international fishing
clarifications, and various
economic prospects.

President Bush felt the meeting
was quite productive and friendly.

President's Address
Before Polish
Parliament,

Warsaw,

July 10, 19891

On behalf of the people of the United
States, I am honored to greet the new-
ly elected representatives of the Polish
Parliament. To be here with you on this
occasion is proof that we live in ex-
traordinary, indeed, thrilling, times.

The power and potential of this mo-
ment was first made clear to me when
I saw a photo — a worldwide photo —
flashed all around the world, a photo of
Gen. Jaruzelski, Solidarity leader Lech
Walesa — shoulder-to-shoulder at the
opening session of this Parliament,

committed to new progress in Poland.
Believe me, that sent a wonderful sig-
nal all around the world.

Poland and the United States are
bound, it is often said, by ties of kin-
ship and culture. But our peoples are
linked by more than sentiment.

The May 3rd Constitution of 1791
set Poland ahead of its peers — ahead
of its time — in the pursuit of freedom
and democratic ideas, just as our
Constitution — the American Constitu-
tion of 1787 — set new standards for pro-
tection of the rights of the individual.

For decades, beginning with the
Versailles peace conference, the Unitec
States has stood for Polish independ-
ence, freedom, prosperity. And we are
proud of our early and long-
standing commitment to Polish self-
determination. As America's Presi-
dent, I am here today to reaffirm that
proud commitment.

I understand something of the
work you are commencing, for I began
my own public service in the American
Congress. Democratically chosen legiS'
latures are among mankind's greatest
forums for debate and dialogue. While
I've been to Poland before, I did not ex-
pect to return so soon — nor to such
altered circumstances. And so, too,
perhaps many of you didn't expect to be
here, serving in this, or any, Polish
Parliament. Your achievement has sur-
passed all expectations and has earned;
all our admiration. Our meeting today
bears witness to the character of our
age.

Some 450 years ago, when the Po-
lish astronomer Copernicus came to un-
derstand the natural order of the
planets and — had the courage to ques-
tion accepted wisdom — the world was
changed forever. From this year for-
ward, as Poland works to reaffirm the
natural order of man and government,
so too will Poland be changed forever.

For today the scope of political and
economic change in Poland is, indeed,
Copernican: A fundamental change in
perspective that places the people at
the center; a new understanding that
the governed are the true source of
lasting social peace and economic pros-
perity, around which government re-
volves and exists to serve.

(White House photo by Susan Biddle)

Department of State Bulletin/September 198S

THE PRESIDENT

Poland has a rich democratic heri-
tage. The May 3rd Constitution was a
stroke of genius. Today, at the dawn of
the document's third century, you're
called upon to match its genius with
contemporary action — to make a peace-
ful transition toward political and eco-
nomic renewal — through representative
government that expresses the will of
the people.

I said a few weeks ago here in Eu-
rope that East and West have arrived
at the end of one era and at the begin-
ning of anothei'. Chairman Jaruzelski
recently said of Poland that "the light of
the nation has undergone deep changes,
society has the full right to ask when a
ray of sun will shine over Poland." In
truth, this applies not just to Poland
but to the entirety of relations between
East and West.

A profound cycle of turmoil and
great change is sweeping the world
from Poland to the Pacific. It is some-
times inspiring, as here, in Warsaw.
And sometimes it's agonizing, as in
China today. But the magnitude of
change we sense around the world com-
pels us to look within ourselves and to
God to forge a rare alloy of courage and
restraint.

The future beckons with both hope
and uncertainty. Poland and Hungary
find themselves at a crossroads: each
has started down its own road to re-
form, without guarantee of easy suc-
cess. The people of these nations — and
the courage of their leaders — command
our admiration. The way is hard. But
ithe moment is right, both internally
and internationally, for Poland to walk
its own path.

On the day Solidarity was re-
stored, I spoke of my support and ad-
imiration for the political e.xperiment
:just getting underway in Poland. You
ihave since proceeded further along
that road, including holding the re-
markable elections that produced this
Parliament. And let us consider what
your e.xperiment may mean, not just for
Poland but for Europe and for the en-
tire world.

A Europe Divided; A Europe United

The divided world of the modern age
began right here — right here in
Poland — 50 years ago this summer.
Your country, and then nearly all of
Europe, was first besieged and then
occupied by totalitarian despotic
forces. A courageous Poland was our
ally. In that fearful time, Franklin
Roosevelt and Winston Churchill de-
vised the Atlantic Charter which out-
lined principles on which we hoped to
build a better world, including freedom
from want and fear and the right of
peoples to choose the form of govern-
ment under which they will live.

But as you know better than any-
one, the world that we sought then was
not to be. Stalinist systems were im-
posed over a third of a continent. The
cold war began. The countries of the
West organized themselves in defense
of democratic principles. And we pro-
posed that the Marshall Plan include
Eastern Europe. But again, that was
not to be.

The Western strategy — our strat-
egy of containment — was a means but
was never an end in itself. And we did
not forget the frustrated and lost hopes
of 1945 nor the promise of a better
world. Neither did the Polish people.
You've been a crucible of conflict.
You're now becoming a vessel for
change.

Poland is where the cold war be-
gan, and now the people of Poland can
help bring the division of Europe to an
end. The time has come to move beyond
containment to a world too long de-
ferred— a better world. And now, at
long last, two developments have al-
lowed us to redeem the principles of the
Atlantic Charter for which the United
States and Poland fought as allies. One
is the manifest failure of the classic
Stalinist system. And the other is the
indomitable will of the people — through
leaders in Poland and Hungary, who
are working to overcome the mistakes
of the past with honesty, creativity,
and, yes, courage. The world watches
in admiration.

And now, in part because of what
you're doing here, the genuine oppor-
tunity exists for all of us to build a
Europe which many thought was de-
stroyed forever in the 1940s. That
Europe — the Europe of our children —
will be open, whole, and free. We can
make it so in two ways.

First, a new East-West relation-
ship must rest on greatly reduced
levels of arms. I notice what Gen. Ja-
ruzelski said on that point, and I
support him. We in the West have pro-
posed dramatic reductions in con-
ventional armed forces in Europe,
reductions that promise to transform
the military map of Europe and dimin-
ish the very threat of war. The new
willingness in Moscow to accept this
Western framework for reductions in
troops and tanks and aircraft and other
categories of weapons gives us hope
that the negotiations in Vienna will suc-
ceed. A good beginning has been made.
Constructive proposals are being of-
fered on both sides. We are determined
to push hard for an early and successful
conclusion to these talks.

Second, reductions in military
forces will go further and be more sus-
tainable if they take place in parallel
with political change. Excessive levels
of arms, we believe, are the symptom
and not the source of political tensions.
In Europe, those tensions spring from
an unnatural and cruel division.

Poland's decision to embrace politi-
cal reform — and Hungary's movement
in the same direction — thus have great
importance beyond their borders: by
creating political structures legit-
imized by popular will — by that, your
reforms can be the foundation of stabil-
ity, security, and prosperity, not just
here but in all of Europe, now and into
the next century.

Mikhail Gorbachev has written,
"Universal security rests on the recog-
nition of the right of every nation to
choose its own path of social develop-
ment and on the renunciation of inter-
ference in the domestic affairs of other
states. A nation may choose either cap-
italism or socialism. This is its sover-
eign right." In principle, I agree. But I
might well have said that the people of

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

a nation may freely choose either a
fi'ee-market economy or socialism.
That is their right.

And so the West works not to dis-
rupt, not to interfere, not to threaten
any nation's security but to help forge
closer and enduring ties between Po-
land and the rest of Europe. As a result
of the roundtable accords, Poland's fate
lies more than ever in Polish hands.
And there it must ever remain.

Your responsibility for your coun-
try's future is immense. Poland's
friends, including the American peo-
ple, want Poland to be free, prosper-
ous, democratic, independent — true to
the best tradition of your nation's past.
And this regime is moving forward
with a sense of realism and courage, in
a time of great difficulty and challenge.
Lech Walesa's Solidarity is deeply com-
mitted to institutions in Poland that
will serve all its people. This Parlia-
ment, by its very existence, is advanc-
ing pluralism. And the church has
served as a source of spiritual guidance
and unity of Poland — people who are
steadfastly working toward productive
change.

Yet, even under the best circum-
stances, representative government
has its own challenges. It requires pa-
tience, tolerance, and give-and-take be-
tween political opponents. But its
virtue is that it grants legitimacy to
leaders and their policies. It gives gov-
ernments and societies the mandate to
make hard choices. And through their
involvement, it gives the people a stake
in the choices that are made.

For over 200 years, Americans
have wrestled over political and eco-
nomic interests, over individual and
civil rights, and the role of a loyal oppo-
sition. Democracy is not a conclusion,
it's a process, and perfecting it never
ends. But history has taught Ameri-
cans one very clear lesson: Democracy
works.

We understand in my country the
enormous economic problems you face.
Economic privation is a danger that can
threaten any great democratic experi-
ment. And I must speak honestly. Eco-
nomic reform and recovery cannot
occur without sacrifices. Even in an

economy as productive as ours, we
still debate the roles and limits of
government — how to regulate the pri-
vate sector without discouraging
innovation, how to reduce our own
enormous budget deficit, how to bal-
ance workers' needs and industrial
efficiency, how to handle the painful
disruptions of change — for the sake of
prosperity.

The reform of the Polish economy
presents a historic challenge. There
can be no substitute for Poland's own ef-
forts. But I want to stress to you today
that Poland is not alone. Given the
enormity of this moment, the United
States stands ready to help as you help
yourselves.

U.S. Support for Polish Reforms

In Hamtramck, Michigan, 3 months
ago, I outlined a policy of support for
the reforms then just beginning in Po-
land. I proposed specific steps, care-
fully chosen, to recognize the reforms
underway here and to encourage re-
forms yet to come. It is a policy built
on dynamic interplay of progress in
Poland and Western engagement, and
not on unsound credits made without
regard to necessary reforms. That was
the record of the 1970s. Poland and the
United States need not repeat that.

We've made progress on the steps
announced at Hamtramck, and this is
where we stand.

Legislation is well underway that
will help Polish exporters compete
more effectively in the U.S. market
through the generalized system of pref-
erences, and that will authorize our
Overseas Private Investment Corpora-
tion to operate in Poland, providing in-
vestment insurance and setting up
missions to stimulate U.S. investment
in joint ventures here.

The United States is proposing a
private business agreement that will
promote contacts between Poland's
growing private sector and its Ameri-
can counterparts. We hope to conclude
an agreement soon, to build on what
promises to be an unprecedented
opportunity.

There is great interest and excite-
ment in the United States about what
you're doing in Poland and a clear-cut
desire to help the reform process. I
hosted a White House symposium on
July 6 to bring together citizens of my
country interested in promoting invest-
ment, trade, and academic exchange
with Poland and Hungary. I can assure
you that, more than ever before, the
American people will be involved in
your democratic experiment.

I've said that as Poland reforms it-
self, the United States will respond.
Much has happened even in the short
time since Hamtramck. Today I'm
pleased to announce that we plan to do
more and go farther for the sake of a
stable and prosperous Poland.

First, I will propose at the upcom-
ing economic summit in Paris that the
nations of the summit — the summit
seven — intensify their coordination and
concerted action to promote democratic
reform in Poland and Hungary and to
help manage compassionately the proc-
ess of change. We will work with our
partners at the summit, moving quick-
ly with increased Western aid and tech-
nical assistance. This concerted action
will complement existing institutions
like the World Bank, the Paris Club,
and IMF and address needed economic
reforms, credits, management and
training initiatives, social safety nets,
housing, and other issues important to
Poland.

Second, I will ask the U.S. Con-
gress to provide a $100 million fund to
capitalize and invigorate the Polish pri-
vate sector, and we will encourage par-
allel contributions from other nations of
the economic summit.

Third, I will encourage the World
Bank to move ahead with $325 million
in economically viable loans to help Po-
lish agriculture and industry reach the
production levels they are so clearly ca-
pable of.

Fourth, I will ask my counterparts
in the West to support an early and
generous rescheduling of Polish debt.
This could provide deferral of debt pay-
ments amounting to about $5,000 mil-
lion this year, if our allies and friends

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

in the Paris Club agree to join us in of-
fering liberalized terms. I plan to dis-
cuss this issue with my colleagues at
the Paris summit.

Fifth, economic progress should
not come at the expense of our common
heritage — our common inheritance —
the environment. In fact, sound ecology
and a strong economy can and must co-
jexist. Air and water pollution know no
iboundaries. And this concern is world-
wide. Almost 2 years ago, I visited
Krakow, and your formal royal capital,
a city recognized by UNESCO as an in-
ternational treasure. Today, Krakow is
under siege by pollution; its precise
monuments are being destroyed.
Krakow must be reclaimed. And the
'United States will help. I'll ask the
Congress for $15 million for a coopera-
tive venture with Poland to help fight
air and water pollution there.

Sixth, and finally, when I began
my remarks, I mentioned the shared
cultural heritage of our two nations.
Today I'm proud to announce that the
United States will establish a cultural
,and information center in Warsaw and
iwill ask Poland to establish a similar
center in the United States. This will
be the first time that either of our two
countries will be able to conduct educa-
tional and cultural programs outside of
our embassies and consulates.

The elections which brought us —
all of us — together here today mean
that the path the Polish people have
chosen is that of political pluralism and
economic rebirth. The road ahead is a
long one, but it is the only road which
leads to prosperity and social peace.
Poland's progress along this road
iwill show the way toward a new era
Ithroughout Europe, an era based on
icommon values and not just geographic
:proximity. The Western democracies
will stand with the Polish people, and
other peoples of this region.

Democracy has captured the spirit
of our time. Like all forms of govern-
ment, though it may be defended, de-
mocracy can never be imposed. We
believe in democracy. For without
doubt, though democracy may be a
dream for many, it remains in my view,
the destiny of man.

Two hundred years ago, demo-
cratic constitutions were adopted by
three nations, embodying the powerful
influence of the Enlightenment, as a
testament to ideas that endure.

The American Constitution was
first, and has stood the test of history
for the over 200 years of our existence
as a republic. Constitutional democracy
in France began two centuries ago this
summer. And in a few days, leaders
from all over the world will be in Paris
to celebrate the anniversary of its
birth.

On May 3rd, 1991, the Polish Con-
stitution will also be 200 years old.
Your Constitution of 1791 was crushed
but never forgotten. And now, this gen-
eration's calling is to redeem the prom-
ise of a free Polish republic. Poland has
not been lost so long as the Polish spirit
lives.

America wishes you well as you
face the tough problems today. I salute
Gen. Jaruzelski for his leadership and
his extraordinary hospitality to me. I
salute the leaders and members of
these two great legislative bodies. God,
in His infinite wisdom and love, is with
us in this chamber. May God bless you
and your efforts. Long live Poland.
Long live Poland.

Action Plan for Poland

WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET,
JULY 10, 1989'

In his speech today to the Polish Parlia-
ment, the President presented a com-
prehensive package of six measures to
help Poland meet the historic chal-
lenges of the 1990s. The measures take
into account the ongoing hopeful demo-
cratic change in Poland.

The measures recognize that suc-
cessful market economic reform and
democratization in Poland, and else-
where in East central Europe, can lay
the basis for European stability and
security.

Concerted International Efforts.

The President is proposing that nations
of the summit seven intensify their con-
certed action to support economic re-
forms based on political pluralism in
Poland and Hungary. Complementary
efforts by leading industrial democra-
cies will provide a powerful impetus to
economic recovery and progress in
these nations as they face a turning
point. Other interested countries could
contribute to this process as well.

Efforts will involve work with the
Polish and Hungarian Governments,
and with other official and independent
organizations in those countries, to
gather information and provide feed-
back on issues of mutual concern. In-
volved governments will also work as
appropriate with representatives of the
IMF, World Bank, EC Commission, and
other multilateral and private-sector
institutions.

Specific issues addressed could in-
clude needed economic reforms; timing
and conditions for new credits; and con-
crete support for privatization and pri-
vate business, environmental projects,
management and training initiatives,
social safety nets to accompany re-
structuring, housing, etc. These ef-
forts would not undercut or replace
existing institutions such as the World
Bank, Paris Club, or IMF.

The President will discuss this
proposal in Paris with the leaders of
the other summit seven nations — the
United Kingdom, West Germany,
France, Japan, Italy, and Canada.

Polish-American Enterprise
Fund. Poland's economic recovery will
require a strong entrepreneurial sec-
tor, growing fast and generating
wealth to benefit the whole nation. To
support this process, the President has
proposed that the United States and
Poland establish a "Polish-American
Enterprise Fund." The President is
asking Congress to provide $100 mil-
lion for this initiative. The fund will be
managed by a board of distinguished
U.S. and Polish representatives.

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

The fund will promote development
of the private sector in Poland. It will
be empowered to disburse hard curren-
cy loans or venture capital grants for
approved projects, including private-
sector development (business loans/
grants, possible establishment of a
private-sector development bank); pri-
vatization of state firms (e.g., provide
funding for entrepreneurs to buy into
state firms); technical assistance or
training programs in support of or run
by Poland's private sector; funding of
export projects partly or wholly pri-
vate; and joint ventures between pri-
vate Polish and American investors
(e.g., encourage participation of pri-
vate Polish firms in joint ventures).

World Bank Loans. The President
will encourage the World Bank to ap-
prove two economically viable project
loans for Poland totaling $325 million.
The loans for industrial restructuring
and agricultural industrial develop-
ment are intended to improve the com-
petitiveness of Poland's exports.

The industrial restructuring loan
($250 million) is to be used for the im-
port of technology and equipment used
in restructuring projects in plants pro-
ducing chemical fibers, petrochemicals,
polypropylene for packaging, particle
board and nitrogen and the foreign cur-
rency costs associated with outside
technical assistance for these projects.
The agricultural industrial develop-
ment loan ($75 million) would be used
for the purchase of equipment and tech-
nology licensing abroad and foreign ex-
change costs for technical assistance
for plants engaged in frozen fruit and
vegetable processing, meat, and other
food processing. The loans are for 17
years, with a 6-year period of grace be-
fore repayment begins.

A Polish bank will relend the mon-
ey to individual firms. These loans to
and repayment by sub-borrowers will
be in dollars, facilitating repayment of
the overall loan to the World Bank.

Debt Rescheduling. The President
will ask his counterparts in the Paris
Club to support an early and generous
rescheduling of the Polish debt.

The President and this Polish Little
Leaguer share a love of baseball.

Poland's foreign debt of nearly $40
billion is owed mainly to Western gov-
ernment creditors. The U.S. share of
this debt is about $2.2 billion, mostly in
the form of credit guarantees extended
by the Commodity Credit Corporation
and the Export-Import Bank.

The Paris Club agreed to re-
schedule Poland's debt service to offi-
cial creditors four times in the past 8
years. However, until March 1989, Po-
land has not proceeded to negotiate and
sign the bilateral agreements from the
last two reschedulings, in late 1985 and
1987. Negotiations on the two outstand-

ing bilaterals were revived earlier this
year when the Government of Poland
sought to resolve this issue with its
creditors.

On July 10 the United States and
Poland signed the two pending bilateral
agreements covering the 1985 and 1987
reschedulings. This paves the way for
further agreements between Poland
and its creditors on rescheduling the
country's official debt.

A Paris Club rescheduling on debt
service obligations falling due in 1989
would allow Poland to defer payments
of about $5 billion. A new Paris Club
rescheduling agreement would normal-
ize Poland's financial relations and
would provide export credit agencies a
legal basis for resumption of credit if
governments decide such credits are
warranted.

Environmental Initiative. The

President has stressed the need for
fresh international efforts to preserve
and improve the environment, human-
ity's common heritage. Following up on
his Mainz speech [May 31, 1989], which
singled out East-West cooperation on
the environment, the President has
proposed three environmental initia-
tives for Poland totaling $15 million
concentrated in the magnificent
medieval city of Krakow. This splendid
city, designated by UNESCO as a world
monument, is suffering from severe
pollution.

One proposal is for a $10 million
initiative to retrofit an existing coal-
firing plant in the Krakow- area with
advanced clean coal technology. This
retrofit will reduce sulphur dioxide
emissions from a 100 MW plant by
60-65%. Nitrogen oxide emissions will
also be reduced.

The initial phase of the project will
include an assessment of the major
coal-fired plants in the Krakow region
to determine the best control strate-
gies for these facilities. A specific plant
would then be selected and the optimal
technology(s) for installation at this fa-
cility would be chosen.

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

Following selection, the project
will proceed into the design phase.
iThis would involve the fabrication and
iinstallation of the equipment. The final
phase of the project would include oper-
ation and analysis of the data. It is as-
sumed that Poland will take over
responsibility for the operation of the
project and that the data would be
'made available to the United States.
The United States will provide techni-
cal support to Poland as needed.

The second project is for a $1 mil-
lion air quality monitoring network in
the Krakow metropolitan area as part
of Poland's national air monitoring net-
work to include monitors and related
equipment for measuring sulphur diox-
ide, nitrogen dio.xide, particulate, car-
bon monoxide, ozone, and lead and for
data storage/processing equipment.

The third project is a $4 million
initiative to improve water quality and
-availability in Krakow. Using the city's
1986-2010 program of environmental
protection and water economy as a
guide. Environmental Protection
Agency and Polish experts will per-
form a comprehensive assessment of
Krakow's current and future drinking
water and wastewater needs to select
and test treatment methods best suited
to local conditions. To determine the
optimal, least-cost engineering solu-
tions, the program will examine
streamflow records and data on the
health of a variety of aquatic species,
test for stream and drinking water pu-
rity, and identify water quality stand-
ards according to use. The program
will emphasize recycling, pollution pre-
vention, and low-cost approaches such
as land treatment of effluents.

Cultural Center. The United
States will expand its exchange pro-
grams to reach out to the increasingly
open society in Poland. An agreement
signed on July 10 will allow the United
States to establish a Cultural and In-
formation Center in Warsaw and allow
Poland the right to establish a similar
center in the United States.

This will be the first time either
country will be able to conduct public
information and cultural programs at a

site physically removed from the em-
bassies or consulates. The centers still
will be considered an integral part of
the diplomatic services of the two
countries.

The American center in Poland
will be under the direction of the U.S.
Information Agency, which operates
similar centers in many countries
around the world. A site in Warsaw
still must be identified and renovated
for the new American center, but we
would hope to open it sometime in early
1990. First-year construction and oper-
ational costs are expected to be $1.1
million.

The centers will serve as focal
points for a wide range of cultural and
information activities, including oper-
ating a full-service library including
reference use and lending of books, pe-
riodicals, films, videocassettes, and
other materials; sponsoring of concerts,
recitals, exhibits, film, television, and
video showings; seminars featuring
professionals, scientists, and cultural
personalities from various fields; and
courses of English and Polish
languages.

Secretary Baker's News

Conference,
Warsaw,
July 10, 1989"

The general theme of this trip is ba-
sically a continuation of the message
from the President's NATO visit; that
is, overcoming the division of Europe
on the basis of Western values, seeking
a Europe that is whole and a Europe
that is free. I think it's fair to say that
we want to convey our support for the
process of building democracy in Po-
land and freeing the private sector to
grow.

The President has expressed at
each of the stops his thanks to the Po-
lish people — to the representatives he's

met with — for the warmth of the greet-
ing, the crowds from last night and to-
day, the American flags, the Statue of
Liberty that we saw at the Tomb of the
Unknown Soldier — the symbol, for in-
stance, of what the United States
stands for.

During the course of this visit, it's
our feeling that we are supporting a
homegrown reform process. The Presi-
dent has made it very clear — just fin-
ished making it clear in his meeting
with Prime Minister Rakowski — that
there is no effort here to divide or to
disrupt, no hot rhetoric or exhorta-
tions. As to the fact that this is a home-
grown reform process. Prime Minister
Rakowski said in his meeting w'ith the
President, "In your speech, Mr. Presi-
dent, you said we're ready to help you if
you're ready to help yourself." And he
said, "We agree to that, and I'd like to
put that slogan on the walls with your
name on it and mine, too, if you would
agree."

I think it's fair to say that the
President recognizes that there will be
some trying times ahead, but as was
symbolized by a number of the stops
that the President made today — the
Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, the
UmscMagplatz — the Polish people have
faced trying times before and, with
their courage and resolve, the Polish
nation has triumphed. For the future, a
democratically and economically free
Poland will be a stable Poland.

Q. In the six-point package,
there's a reference to a $100-million
capitalization fund, let's call it, and
he says we will encourage parallel
contributions at the economic sum-
mit. Literally, do you mean the same
amount or all six nations propor-
tionally? Could you spell that out a
little bit?

A. We'd be pleased to see other na-
tions contribute more if they felt so in-
clined in order to assist Poland, but we'd
like to see other nations make the same
kind of an effort toward stimulating free
enterprise in Poland, as we're making
with that initiative.

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

Q. I know the spirit behind it,
but would you like each of the coun-
tries to provide $100 million or is it a
little looser than that?

A. We would be very pleased if each
would provide $100 million. We'd be
pleased, in fact, if some of the surplus
countries wanted to contribute more
than $100 million. There's no specific set
amount.

Q. I don't think that there was
any reference to conditionality in the
President's mention of the six-point
program. Does that remain the prin-
ciple guiding the U.S. economic rela-
tions with Poland?

A. It does, indeed, and in several of
the meetings, the comments were made
by representatives from Poland that they
full-well recognized the need to help
themselves if they're going to receive
help from the West. The point was made
by the President as well that we don't
want to repeat the mistatces of the 1970s
where we funneled a lot of concessionary
and subsidized lending when there
wasn't the necessary reform effort
undertaken.

Q. Could you tell us a little about
the meeting with Gen. Jaruzelski
and, in particular, were there any as-
surances given the President about
specific further economic reforms —
steps in the works — any specifics?

A. There was a discussion of the
need for economic reform, a recognition,
I think, on the part of Gen. Jaruzelski
that Poland needed, as Pve just men-
tioned, to help itself if it was going to be
effectively helped by others. There was a
discussion generally by the General of
the challenges facing Poland at this very
delicate time.

The President talked about his over-
all approach to the trip, making many of
the points that I've just outlined to you
in my opening statement — making the
point that he doesn't come with hot rhet-
oric or an effort to divide or disrupt in
mind. The President outlined the vari-
ous elements of the economic assistance
package with respect to which you've re-
ceived fact sheets.

Q. Do you have any feedback
from the Poles, either from the gov-
ernment or from the Solidarity people
you met today, such as Mr. Geremek,
about the size of the package you pro-
posed? Are they disappointed in the
scope of it or pleased?

A. I think they're pleased. I out-
lined in my meeting with the Foreign
Minister the package in some detail. The
President mentioned it perhaps more
generally in his meeting with Gen. Ja-
ruzelski, and I thought that the reaction
from Prime Minister Rakowski, in the
meeting just concluded an hour or so
ago, was positive.

Much of this, of course, will come
from reschedulings in the Paris Club,
but it will be relief that will be of value
to the Polish economy.

Q. Are your definitions of reform
the same as theirs, and what might
those be? I don't have any specifics
here as to what reforms mean.

A. The reforms would be basically
those things that they have been talking
about with the International Monetary
F\ind and some of their official creditors
as well. It will mean taking action with
respect to an inflation rate that is en-
tirely too high. It will mean dealing, or
certainly trying to deal, with subsidies.
It will be moving to the extent that they
can move judiciously toward a free mar-
ket economy from an economy that has
been a statist model and centrally con-
trolled. They'll have to make a lot of re-
forms. But I think that they are very
well aware of this.

Q. Can you tell us why [Deputy
Secretary] Larry Eagleburger is be-
ing dispatched to the Middle East?

A. That's a rumor that I won't con-
firm here because it may very well be
that he is not being dispatched to the
Middle East. Don't believe everything
you read in the paper. But somebody will
go to the Middle East in order to deter-
mine the extent to which the Israeli Gov-
ernment is still committed to their
elections proposal in the aftermath of
the Likud Party convention.

Q. Why is that necessary? Why is
there a question raised in your mind
after the Likud Party meeting?

A. The four elements that were out-
lined in the party meeting give rise, at
least in our minds, to a question about
the seriousness of purpose. We've al-
ready characterized those, I believe, as
unhelpful, so we really want to make cer-
tain that they are as committed to this
pi'oposal as we have been if we're going
to continue to strongly support it, as we
do.

Q. Before this trip, a number of
American officials briefing us about
the trip and a number of American of-
ficials in Europe have said that they
expected an emotional outpouring
when President Bush arrived in East-
ern Europe and several people spoke
of tens of thousands of people. Are
you disappointed with the rather
small crowds today— .3,000 or 4,000
people? Do you have any explanation
of what I think many people would
describe as a rather muted reaction?

A. I'm not sure I would agree with
your characterization of it. As I said in
my opening remarks, I think the recep-
tion has, indeed, been warm. I don't
think that we've been disappointed at all
by the size of the crowds. It's not some
election campaign where we've gone out
here and tried to turn out crowds. We're
not making efforts to do that, and we're
pleased by what we see as a rather spon-
taneous outpouring of support for a visit
by a U.S. President. I thought the
crowds coming in last night at whatever
it was — 11:00 p. m. at night — there were
quite a few people out spontaneously. So
we're not at all disappointed with the
size of the crowd or the enthusiasm of the .
crowd.

Q. As you know, the general pat-
tern of visits here has been to meet
with the official Poles and the leaders
of the opposition when Western lead-
ers have visited Poland. President
Bush seems to have broken that pat-
tern by having what could be charac-
terized as a unity lunch. How much
weight would you put on the effort
that you've made to bring the two
sides together as part of American di-
plomacy here?

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989|

THE PRESIDENT

A. I think the two sides pretty well
came together during the roundtable
process. They didn't come together be-
cause of our efforts; they came together
before we got here. And I think it's rath-
er remarkable, quite frankly, when you
look at the situation as recently as 3
months ago that there could be that uni-
ty lunch today.

Q. Whoever you send to the Mid-
dle East, are they going to see the
PLO [Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion], and are they going to see [PLO
leader Yasir] Arafat?

A. No, they will not see any Arab
countries or representatives. They would
be going solely to determine the extent
now of the Israeli Government's commit-
ment to the election proposal.

Q. Can you tell me who is going

to—

A. We haven't decided who's going
yet. We'll make that decision during the
course of the ne.xt week, because the trip
wouldn't be made, in any event, until
sometime around the middle of July.

Q. The President has spoken
more than once of the need for the
Polish people to be prepared to accept
additional sacrifice in their national
life as this restructuring gets under-
way. Lech Walesa has warned that the
society is in clear and present danger
of chaos and upheaval. How much
time do you estimate that the Polish
system, in its transition, has before
something serious does break out?

A. I'm not going to concede that
something serious will break out. I do
think that in accomplishing the
reforms — particularly the economic
reforms — the political situation has to be
kept in mind. One of the things that the
President's package contemplates, quite
frankly, is assistance, to the e.xtent that
we can render it, with the IMF and with
the World Bank in formulating the ele-
ments of conditionality that will be em-
braced in the package.

Q. Lech Walesa tomorrow appar-
iently is going to hand to the Presi-
dent the Solidarity request for
Western aid, which, as you know,

Escorted by Poland's Chief of Protocol, Ambassador Janusz Switkowski, and two mili-
tary officers. President Bush placed a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.

amounts to $10 billion. People from
Solidarity have said that they have
communicated some details of that
and that roughly .$6 billion of it is
multilateral debt relief, but $4 billion
is their estimate of the kind of private
capital that might come in. And they
don't quite understand why it's been
dismissed in the capitals of the West.
What kind of reaction do you think
you can have tomorrow to the Soli-
darity plan?

A. I think you're quite right that
over half of it would be money that would
come from additional World Bank lend-
ing or a standby agreement with the
IMF and some $400 million of it is proba-
bly already in the pipeline as far as the
World Bank is concerned.

The additionality would be — we
hope there would be some additionality
generated through our enterprise foun-
dation. The point here is that it is impor-
tant for Poland to deal with its debt
management problem and its macro-
economic policy problem on the one
hand, but it also has to build a private
sector. And in the medium and long

term, that is what is important. That is
why we have directed our attention and
our energies toward the types of things
that we have directed them toward.

No one that we've met with so far
has intimated that they expected the
President of the United States to show
up here with a big wheelbarrel full of
dollars.

Q. Gov. Sununu [Chief of Staff to
the President], in a television inter-
view this morning, said that it was
important not to give the Poles too
much aid because, he said, "it would
be like putting a child in a candy
store." I was wondering if this was
also your view and whether you fear
that this characterization might be
insulting to Poles.

A. I haven't seen the interview, and
so let me not react to something I
haven't even seen, or I haven't seen quot-
ed. But let me remind you that we made
a mistake in the 1970s — all of us — the in-
ternational financial community and the
Polish Government and the Polish
people — when we shoveled a lot of money
into this country without any condi-

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

tionality whatsoever and with no re-
quirement for reform. I rather
suspect — and now, I might say that the
international financial community and
the Government of Poland and the peo-
ple of Poland, I think, I understand
that it's those reforms that are going to
make the difference in the long run.
And I'll bet you that's what John was
talking about.

Q. In this package, only about
$150 million is direct U.S. aid to Po-
land. The rest is a lot of multilateral
actions and encouragement. Has the
United States basically decided that
the bulk of this action should be
taken by the Europeans, that the bur-
den of funding reform in the Polish
economy should fall on West Euro-
pean nations and not the United
States?

A. No, not at all. The United States
will be very active in that multilateral
effort, and we will share — I don't know
what the exact percentages of the overall
Paris Club debt we hold, but it's not
insignificant — and the United States
will be sharing substantially in the mul-
tilateral effort.

Beyond that, I might say that in the
past it has been the United States that
has been the biggest obstacle or bar to
getting reschedulings in the Paris Club
for Poland in advance of an IMF pro-
gram. One of the things the President is
saying that is very significant in this
package is, we're going to be pushing
for — we're going to be in the lead —
trying to get this rescheduling accom-
plished even before you have a standby
agreement with the IMF.

Q. One more on the Middle East,
if I may. Do you still feel as strongly
about not moving toward an interna-
tional conference now after the Li-
kud decision last week?

A. The policy of the United States
toward an international conference has
not changed. Our policy is, as it has
been, that an international conference
might be appropriate at the right time;

the right time is not now. We think we
should continue to pursue the Israeli
Government's elections proposal. We
think it's important to determine what
changes, if any, have been accomplished
in the official Israeli Government posi-
tion by virtue of the Likud Party
conference.

Q. When is the first test of the
rescheduling that you signed today?
When does the first payment toward
that need to be made and what hap-
pens if they don't? How do you test
whether they meet the commitment?

A. That rescheduling, in effect, ex-
tends maturities out into the future. I
don't have in the top of my head here ex-
actly what those maturity dates are. I
think we rescheduled interest and prin-
cipal in those, but I'd have to check on
that to be certain.

Q. But to be sure that we don't
make a mistake like the 1970s, when
is the first test of whether they make
their payments?

A. I'll get you the maturity date. I
don't know what the rescheduled maturi-
ty date is. I'll have to find that out for
you.

Q. What kind of message is the
President sending to those countries
that are not accepting reforms, espe-
cially in the case of Cuba? Cuba has
been sending messages to get the em-
bargo lifted from the United States
and is flatly refusing any kind of
reforms.

A. Cuba is refusing any kind of
reform?

Q. What kind of message is the
President trying to send to those
countries in the communist world
that are not accepting reforms?

A. Who are not? The message is the
embargo stays in force.

Q. In connection with this eco-
nomic fund that the President pro-
posed today, is this a form of this
consortium proposal that Mr.
Brzezinski has been talking about?

A. It could be compared to that. It's
basically a concerted effort that we hope
to be able to put together with the Group
of Seven with the major industrialized —

Q. Some kind of a structure be-
hind it, presumably, to —

A. Yes, but not as formal as a con-
sortium would be.

Q. Can you tell us at this point
how soon you expect a Paris Club
agreement on rescheduling? And how
soon did the Poles indicate they could
be moving and eligible for an IMF
standby program?

A. I can't answer the last part of
that. I don't know when they think they
might be eligible for a standby program.
I think they are already in discussions
with the IMF.

As far as Paris Club rescheduling is
concerned, we're going to try and push
for that at the economic summit in termsn
of getting our colleagues interested in
moving forward expeditiously with a re-
scheduling on very liberal terms, but we
will have to make sure that they're on
board.

Q. So when do you think they'd
have an agreement? September?

A. Oh, I'd just be guessing, and I
don't want to do that. We want to do it as
soon as we can. I can't tell you when that"
would be — whether it would be Septem-
ber, October, November

Q. What do you expect $15 mil-
lion to accomplish in terms of clean-
ing up problems in the environment?
And can we expect the President to
come up with a similar set of pro-
posals when he goes to Hungary?

A. Let me refer you to the fact
sheet that has been distributed that will
give you the exact detail and here it is
right here on what could be accom-
plished with that $15 million. Ten million
of it is to retro-fit an existing coal-fired '
plant in the Krakow area with advanced
clean coal technology; $1 million would
be for an air quality monitoring network
in the Ki-akow metropolitan area; and $4 '
million would be spent on water quality
and availability.

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

President's Remarks

at Solidarity

Workers' Monument,
Gdansk,
July 11, 19891

Poland has a special place in the Ameri-
can heart and in my heart, and when
you hurt we feel pain, and when you
dream we feel hope, and when you suc-
ceed we feel joy. It goes far beyond dip-
lomatic relations; it's more like family
relations. And coming to Poland is like
coming home.

This special kinship is the kinship
of an ancient dream, a recurring
dream, the dream of freedom. "They
are accustomed to liberty," wrote a

Byzantine historian about the Slavic
people more than 1,000 years ago, and
the spirit of the Poles has been convey-
ed across the centuries and across the
ocean, a dream that would not die.

That dream was severely tested
here in Gdansk 50 years ago this sum-
mer. The predawn quiet of this peace-
ful Baltic harbor was shattered by the
thunder from the 15-inch guns of Nazi
warship Schlesivig-Holstein. Within
the hour, iron panzers rolled across
the Polish frontier, and Europe was
plunged into darkenss that would en-
gulf the world.

For Poland the choices were few —
surrender to tyranny or resist against
impossible odds. In the brutal fighting
that followed, you set a standard for
courage that will never be forgotten. In
World War II, Poland lost everything
except its honor, except its dreams.

Before Poland fell, you gave the Al-
lies Enigma, the Nazi's secret coding

(White House photo by David Valdez)

machine. Breaking the unbreakable
Axis code saved tens of thousands of Al-
lied lives, of American lives, and for
this you have the enduring gratitude of
the American people. Ultimately, Enig-
ma and freedom fighters played a ma-
jor role in winning the Second World
War.

But for you, the war's end did not
end the darkness. The cold war brought
a long and chilly night of sorrow and
hardship and the dream was again
denied.

And yet, there were glimmers of
the long-awaited dawn. In the summer
of 1980, you occupied the shipyards
where we stand, and a patriotic electri-
cian clamored over these iron gates and
emerged as one of the heroes of our
time. Lech Walesa. Above your streets
a graceful monument rose in the tradi-
tion of our own Statue of Liberty to be-
come a symbol recognized around the
world as a beacon of hope.

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

Solidarity trade union leader Lech Walesa and President and Mrs. Bush at the shipyard
workers' monument outside the main gate to the Lenin Shipyard. The monument
commemorates fellow workers killed by government security forces during strikes in
Gdansk, Gdynia, and Szczecin in December 1970.

But the hope, like the dawn, proved
fleeting, for under cover of darkness,
the electrician was arrested and your
movement outlawed. In the icy cold of a
savage winter, a modern nation was
sealed off from the outside world.

But still, the dream would not die.
In the wintry darkness, candles ap-
peared in silent protest, lighting the
windows of your villages, of your cities.
As the years unfolded and as the world
watched in wonder, you, the Polish peo-
ple and your leaders, turned despair
into hope, turned darkness into
dreams.

Hope and hard work were the foun-
dations of Poland's resurrection as a
state in 1918. Against enormous odds,
confidence and determination made
that dream a reality. And these same
qualities have brought you to this new

crossroads in history. Your time has
come. It is Poland's time of possi-
bilities, its time of responsibilities. It
is Poland's time of destiny.

A time when dreams can live
again — Solidarity reborn; productive
negotiations between the Government
of Poland and the Polish people; and the
first fruits of democracy, elections. At
another time, in another city, where the
human spirit was being tested, a great
American President spoke eloquently
about the struggle for liberty. Today
the world watches the inevitable out-
come of that struggle.

Today, to those who think that hope
can be forever suppressed, I say let
them look at Poland. To those who
think that freedom can be forever de-
nied, I say let them look at Poland. To
those who think that dreams can be
forever

repressed, I say let them look at Po-
land. For here in Poland, the dream is
alive.

Today the brave workers of Gdansk
stand beside this monument as a bea-
con of hope, a symbol of that dream.
And the brave workers of Gdansk know
Poland is not alone. America stands
with you.

Because Americans are so free to
dream, we feel a special kinship with
those who dream of a better future.
Here in Poland, the United States sup-
ports the roundtable accords and ap-
plauds the wisdom, tenacity, and
patience of one of Poland's great lead-
; ers, Lech Walesa. We share a move-
I ment that has touched the imagination
; of the world. That movement is Soiidar-
; nose. We applaud those who have made
..this progress possible, the Polish peo-
i pie. We recognize, too, that the Polish
L Government has shown wisdom and
: creativity and courage in proceeding
: with these historic steps.
; Poles and Americans share a com-
; mitment to overcome the division of
Europe and to redeem the promise that
is the birthright of men and women
throughout the world. Poles and Ameri-
cans want Europe to be whole and free.
A more democratic Poland can be a
more prosperous Poland. The round-
table provisions, as they continue to be
carried out, can liberate the energy of
a dynamic people to work together to
build a better life.

We understand the legacy of dis-
trust and shattered dreams as Poles of
all political complexions travel together
down the path of negotiation and com-
promise. Your challenge is to rise
above distrust and bring the Polish
people together toward a common pur-
pose. Speaking before the new Parlia-
ment and the Senate — your freely
elected Senate — I outlined steps that
America is prepared to take to assist
Poland as you move forward on the path
of reform.

It will not be easy. Sacrifice and
economic hardship have already been
the lot of the Polish people, and hard
times are not yet at an end. Economic
reform requires hard work and re-
straint before the benefits are realized,

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

and it requires patience and deter-
mination. But the Polish people are no
strangers to hard work and have taught
the world about determination.

Follow your dream of a better life
for you and your children. You can see a
new and prosperous Poland — not over-
night, not in a year, but, yes, a new and
prosperous Poland in your lifetime.

It's been done by Polish people be-
fore. Hopeful immigrants came to that
magical place called America and built
a new life for themselves in a single
generation, and it can be done by Polish
people again, but this time it will be
done in Poland.

A few days ago, I was asked in my
office in the White House by one of
your journalists if I would leave Poland
and go to America were I a young Pole.
I answered that in this time of bright
pi'omise, of historic transition, of
unic|ue opportunity, I would want to
stay in Poland and be a part of it — to
help make the dream come true.

The magic of America is not found
in the majesty of its land — and, yes,
our country has been blessed — but Po-
land too is a land of natural beauty, am-
ple timber, and ore and water and coal,
abundant agriculture potential and tal-
ented, creative people who are deter-
mined to succeed.

No, the magic of America is in an
idea. I described it in my first mo-
ments as President: "We know what
works: Freedom works. We know
what's right. Freedom is right. We
know how to secure a more just and
prosperous land for man on earth."

Today you can rediscover a new
land, a land of your dreams, a land of
your own making, a Poland strong and
proud.

Poland is where World War II be-
gan, and Poland is where and why the
cold war got started, and it is here, in
Poland, where we can work to end the
division of Europe.

It is in your power to help end the
division of Europe. I can think of no
finer or more capable people with
w hom to entrust this mission. Just as
the son of Poland has shown the world

The President and Mrs. Bush with Bishop Tadeusz Goclowcki at Oliwa Cathedral, a
fiOO-year-old Gothic cathedral located in a suburb of Gdansk.

Danuta and Lech Walesa hosted a lunch in their home for Barbara and George Bush.
Standing is U.S. interpreter Wiktor Litwinski.

r^'JtSS&OiL

^iiJK-"**!^ - ^' ' ■m.^-T: '

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

the heights of spiritual leadership in
the Vatican, so the people of Poland can
show the world what a free people with
commitment and energy can
accomplish.

A new century is almost upon us.
It is alive with possibilities. In your
quest for a better future for yourselves
and for those wonderful children that
I saw coming in from the airport, in
that quest America stands shoulder-to-
shoulder with the Polish people in
Solidarity.

Americans and Poles both know
that nothing can stop an idea whose
time has come. The dream is a Poland
reborn, and the dream is alive.

White House Statement,

Gdansk,

July 11, 19891

The President today announced a deci-
sion to provide technical assistance to
Polish independent trade unionists,
government officials, and employers to
ease the burden of adjustment during
the period of economic transition and
reform. The workers of Poland will ulti-
mately benefit from their country's
reform efforts, but the difficult transi-
tion period could jeopardize the reform
process, with unemployment possibly
being a particularly acute problem.

The Department of Labor, working
with the AFL-CIO and American busi-
ness, will assist Poland in eight areas:
training and retraining; job search and
employment services; unemployment
insurance; entrepreneurial develop-
ment, self-employment, and employee
ownership; labor-management rela-
tions; labor statistics; worker safety
and health, including mine safety; and
women in the workforce.

The Department of labor will pro-
vide a mix of in-country technical assist-
ance and U.S. domestic activities and,
along with other U.S. Government

agencies, will help develop policies and
programs to set up an effective labor
safety net in each of the eight priority
areas. The cost of the initiative is ap-
proximately $4 million.

President's Departure

Remarks,
Gdansk,
July 11, 19895

This has been the first visit of an
American President to Poland in al-
most 12 years. That, in itself, is some-
thing of a milestone. And it has been a
great honor to be here. But what has
made this visit most noteworthy, in my
mind, are the extraordinary oppor-
tunities and challenges now faced by
Poland and its people. In my 2 days
here, I met with leaders of a govern-
ment that is both responsive and re-
sponsible and determined that Poland
shall find its own road to recovery.

I met with the chairman of the
Free Solidarity Trade Union, Lech
Walesa, whose courage and moral guid-
ance have carried Poland's people from
the dark of night to the threshold of a
brilliant future. I met with senators
and parliamentary leaders of a demo-
cratic opposition, now legalized. We
discussed their new and weighty re-
sponsibilities as Poland enters a new
era. And I met with Polish citizens,
from all walks of life, including the citi-
zens of the great city of Gdansk, at a
monument to courage and freedom.

Poland is blazing its own path to a
better life for all of its people. With ev-
ery meeting, with every conversation,
we have had meaningful discussions
about the possibilities and challenges of
Poland's unique experiment in reform. I
have explained that the United States
will respond with specific, appropriate
measures designed to encourage future
economic and political reform, reform

that is crucial to Poland's long-term
economic health. But the real work be-
gins now, as Poland joins the commu-
nity of nations committed to open
elections and open markets and the
open exchange of ideas.

I add my voice to those of so many
around the world who are impressed
with Poland's courage and committed
to help a great nation fulfill its destiny.
Poland's wisdom and strength will be
tested. But such a nation, fully en-
gaged in such an enterprise, need only
summon the will of its people to suc-
ceed. The world watches, confident that
they will triumph.

President's Dinner Toast,

Budapest,

July 11, 19896

I'm delighted to have this opportunity
to visit Hungary once again, to see
firsthand the remarkable changes tak-
ing place hei'e.

We live at a great moment in hu-
man affairs, an era when change is
shaking the existing order. From Bei-
jing to Budapest, from Tiananmen
Square to the long-delayed day of heal-
ing in Heroes Square less than a month
ago, we're witnessing the expression of
democratic idea whose appeal is univer-
sal, whose impact is worldwide. Here in
the heart of central Europe, Hungary
is at the heart of central Europe, Hun-
gary is at the center of change. Your
nation is involved in an unprecedented
experiment: a communist system seek-
ing to evolve toward a more open
economy, toward a more open and plu-
ralistic political system.

No one now denies that reform is
the path of the future. In nation after
nation, decades of experience have
proven beyond any doubt the poverty of
an idea: the idea that progress is the
product of the state. On the contrary,
progress is the product of the people.

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

And state control simply cannot pro-
vide sustained economic growth, nor
can it provide a regime the political le-
gitimacy it needs to govern. Most of
all, the state is in constant conflict
with human liberty.

In Hungary today, there is a deep-
ening consensus on the direction that
reform must take — on a new model for
state and society — in economics, the
competitive market; in politics, plural-
ism and human rights.

The key to economic success is let-
ting the market do its work, and that
means an end to inefficient government
intervention in the marketplace, an end
to the dead weight that drags down
overall economic growth. It means fac-
tories and enterprises of all kinds play-
ing by the rules of the marketplace,
according to the laws of supply and de-
mand: in other words, rules that work
for the individual and the common
good.

Economic competition has a paral-
lel in the political sphere. Pluralism is
nothing more than an open and honest
competition between parties, a compe-
tition between points of view. Plural-
ism is what we in the West call the
marketplace of ideas. The open elec-
tions that Hungary has promised will
mark a great advance and allow your
great nation to enjoy the benefits of
pluralism.

The hopeful process of Helsinki
points the way to the enhancement of
freedom in central Europe, to a new
basis for security and cooperation in all
of Europe.

All Hungarians should look to the
future with confidence in what Hun-
gary can be. This is only the begin-
ning. I see in Hungary's future a
country of hundreds of thousands of
small enterprises — sources of innova-
tion, productivity, and prosperity. I see
in Hungary's future new voices speak-
ing out, shaping the course of national
affairs. I see a Hungary at peace with

Across the table from President Bush and Secretary Baker (foreground) are Karoly
Grosz, General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (left), and Rezso
Nyers, Chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party.

itself, a Hungary assuming its rightful
place as a vital part of an emerging
Europe — a Europe whole and free.

The road ahead will be difficult;
there's no denying that. But I believe in
Hungary. I believe in its ability to
meet and master the challenge: to
make reform succeed. The key is Hun-
gary's most precious resource: its peo-
ple. Each individual is an infinity of
possibilities, and in the capacity of
those individual talents lies the future
of your nation.

Now let us raise our glasses: to the
future of Hungarian reform; to friend-
ship, the genuine friendship, between
the American and the Hungarian peo-
ple. Thank you for this warm welcome.

President's Address
at Karl Marx University
of Economics,

Budapest,

July 12, 19891

It is a great pleasure for Barbara and
me to be back in Budapest. I am very
proud to be the first American Presi-
dent to visit Hungary. Some might find
it ironic that I am speaking at a univer-
sity named after Karl Marx. If you
don't find it ironic in Hungary, try it on
for size in the United States. But the
fact that I am here today is less a cause
for surprise than proof that America
welcomes the unfettered competition of
ideas. I understand that 50 or so of the
faculty from this great university have

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

The President addressed the students and faculty of Karl Marx University of Economics,
Hungary's premier economics school with an enrollment of about 2,400 full-time and
1,300 evening and correspondent students.

(White House photo by David Valdez)

been either students or teachers in the
United States of America. That is a
very good thing for my country, and
I'm glad you came our way.

The university's principal task is to
promote a competition — an unfettered
competition — of ideas. That is the spir-
it that brings us together — a spirit that
guided a great teacher at Karl Marx
University whose name was Imre
Nagy.

As his funeral proceeded in Heroes
Square a few weeks ago, the rising
voice of Hungary was heard reciting
the szozat. In this simple, somber cere-
mony, the world saw something more
than a dignified act, an act of recon-

ciliation; we witnessed an act of truth.
It is on this foundation of truth, more
solid than stone, that Hungarians have
begun to build a new future — a genera-
tion waited to honor Imre Nagy's
courage; may a hundred generations re-
member it.

While Hungary rediscovers its nat-
ural role in the affairs of Europe, the
world again looks to you for inspiration.
A popular nonfiction book in my coun-
try today is entitled Budapest 1900. Dr.
John Lukacs lovingly describes the
Budapest of memory, with its proud
stock exchange and great opera; a time
when Europe's first electric subway
ran underneath the handsome shops of
Andrassy Avenue. A city that rivaled

Paris in its splendor, Vienna in its mu-
sic, London in its literature. A center
of learning that enlightened the world
and gave America one kind genius in
Joseph Pulitzer, another in Bela Bar-
tok. But for four decades, this great-
city, this great nation, so central to the
continent in every respect, has been
separated from Europe and the West.

Today Hungary is opening again to
the West — becoming a beacon of light
in European culture, and I see people
in motion — color, creativity, experi-
mentation. I see a new beginning for
Hungary. The very atmosphere of this
city, the very atmosphere of Budapest,
is electric and alive with optimism.

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

Your people and your leaders —
government and opposition alike — are
not afraid to break with the past, to act
in the spirit of truth. And what better
example of this could there be than one
simple fact: Karl Marx University has
dropped Das Kapital from its required
reading list.

Some historians argue that Marx-
ism arose out of human impulse. But
Karl Marx traced only one thread of hu-
man existence and missed the rest of
the tapestry — the colorful and varied
tapestry of humanity. He regarded
I man as hapless — unable to shape his
(environment or destiny. But man is not
I driven by impersonal economic forces.
He's not simply an object acted upon by
mechanical "laws" of history. Rather,
man is imaginative and inventive. He is
artistic, with an innate need to create
land enjoy beauty. He is a loving mem-
iber of a family, and a loyal patriot to
his people. Man is dynamic, deter-
mined to shape his own future.

The creative genius of the Hun-
garian people, long suppressed, is
again flourishing in your schools, your
businesses, your churches. This is
more than a fleeting season of free-
dom. It is Hungary returning to its
normal, traditional values. It is Hun-
gary returning home.

Voices long stilled are being heard
again. An independent daily newspaper
is now sold on the streets. Commercial
radio and television stations will broad-
cast everything from the news to the
music of Stevie Wonder. And Radio
Free Europe is opening its first East
European bureau right here in
Budapest.

Along your border with Austria,
the ugly symbol of Europe's division
and Hungary's isolation is coming
down, as the barbed wire fences are
rolled and stacked into bales. For the
first time, the Iron Curtain has begun
to part, and Hungary, your great coun-
ti'v, is leading the way.

The Soviet Union has withdrawn
troops, which I also take as a step in
overcoming Europe's division. As those
forces leave, let the Soviet leaders
know they have everything to gain, and
nothing to lose or fear, from peaceful
change. We can — and I am determined

that we will — work together to move
beyond containment, beyond the cold
war.

One of the key steps in moving be-
yond containment is easing the mili-
tary confrontation in Europe. To this
end, the NATO allies joined, at the
May summit meeting, in my proposal of
a comprehensive conventional arms con-
trol initiative — an initiative that would
cut the number of tanks, armored troop
carriers, artillery, combat aircraft, at-
tack helicopters, as well as U.S. and
Soviet troops stationed on foreign soil
in Europe, all to lower, equal levels.

The issues may be complex, but
we're working, day and night, to get a
solid, historic agreement to strengthen
stability in Europe and reduce the risk
of war. And we are determined to get
it soon.

No, there is no mistaking the fact
that we are on the threshold of a new
era. There's also no mistaking the fact
that Hungary is at the threshold of
great and historic change. You're writ-
ing a real constitution, and you're mov-
ing toward democratic, multiparty
elections.

This is partly possible because
brave men and women have formed op-
position parties. This is possible be-
cause Hungarian leaders are going to
show the ultimate political courage —
the courage to submit to the choice of
the people in free elections.

But to succeed in reform, you'll
need partners — partners to help pro-
mote lasting change in Hungary. And I
am here today to offer Hungary the
partnership of the United States of
America. Three vital spheres stand out
in our partnership — economics, the en-
vironment, and democratic and cultural
exchanges.

The United States believes in the
acceleration of productive change, not
in its delay. So this is our guiding
principle — the United States will offer
assistance not to prop up the status quo
but to propel reform.

Of course, the weight of the past
still burdens Hungarian enterprise.
There are remnants of the Stalinist
economy — huge inefficient industrial

plants and a bewildering price system
that is hard for anyone to understand —
and the massive subsidies that cloud
economic decisions — all of this slows
what you could otherwise achieve. It's
an economic Rubik's cone that defies
solution.

To make the transition to a produc-
tive economy will test your mettle as a
people. The prices of some commodities
may rise. Some inefficient businesses
and factories will close. But the Hun-
garian Government is increasingly
leaving the business of running the
shops to the shopkeepers, the farms to
the farmers. The creative drive of the
people, once unleashed, will create mo-
mentum of its own. This will bring you
a greater treasure than simply the
riches you create. It will give each of
you control over your own destiny — a
Hungarian destiny. As I said, the
United States will be your partner in
this transformation to a successful
economy.

Last Thursday [July 6] at the
White House, I invited leaders from
business, education, labor, and other
fields to come to the White House and
discuss the new private-sector oppor-
tunities opening up in Hungary. Their
response was enthusiastic. This was es-
pecially true of Hungarian-Americans,
so proud to be building a bridge be-
tween their new country and their
motherland. As long as our two govern-
ments ease the way, the people of
America and Hungary can do the
rest — the people can do the rest. It is
in this spirit that I want to announce
the following measures.

First, as I said in Warsaw, I will
propose at the Paris economic summit
concerted Western action for Poland
and Hungary, to back your reforms
with economic and technical assistance
from the summit partners. Of course,
our efforts for Hungary will be tar-
geted to your needs.

Second, I will ask the U.S. Con-
gress to authorize a $25 million fund as
a source of new capital to invigorate
the Hungarian private sector. I'll also
encourage parallel efforts from the
other nations of the economic summit.

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

Third, once your Parliament pass-
es the new emigration legislation pro-
posed by your Council of Ministers, I
will inform our Congress that Hungary
is in full compliance with the Jackson-
Vanik amendment to our 1974 trade
law. No country has yet been released
from the restrictions of this amend-
ment. So I am pleased to tell you that
Hungary will be the first. This action
will give Hungary the most liberal ac-
cess to the American market for the
longest terms possible under our laws.

Fourth, America is prepared to
provide your country with access to
our generalized system of preferences,
which offers selective tariff relief. Sim-
ply put, these last two measures will
allow you to take advantage of the larg-
est single market in the entire world.

Fifth, we've concluded a draft
agreement to authorize the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation to op-
erate in Hungary. Once our Senate
passes the enabling legislation, OPIC
will be able to provide insurance to en-
courage American investment in pri-
vate enterprises in Hungary. Through
OPIC, American business e.xecutives
will see first hand the great oppor-
tunity of Hungary.

Private investment is critical for
Hungary. It means jobs, innovation,
progress. But most of all, private in-
vestment means a brighter future for
your children; a brighter future for
Hungary.

Yet economic progress cannot be at
the e.xpense of the air we breathe and
the water we drink. Six weeks ago, in
Mainz, I proposed cooperation between
East and West on environmental is-
sues. That is why I will ask the U.S.
Congress to appropriate $5 million to
establish an international environmen-
tal center for central and Eastern Eu-
rope, to be based right here in
Budapest, which will bring together
private and government e.xperts and or-
ganizations to address the ecological
crisis. After all, our shared heritage is
the Earth, and the fate of the Earth
transcends borders; it isn't just an
East-West issue.

Hungary has led Eastern and cen-
tral Europe in addressing the concerns
of your citizens for cleaner air and wa-
ter. Now you can do even more, work-
ing with the West to build a bridge of
technical and scientific cooperation.

Along these lines, I'm also pleased
to announce that the United States has
proposed an agreement between our
two countries to establish scientific and
technical cooperation in the basic sci-
ences and in specific areas, including
the environment, medicine, and nuclear
safety.

It is my hope that this visit will
also lead to a wider exchange between
East and West, so our scientists, our
artists, and our environmentalists can
learn from one another, so that our sol-
diers and statesmen can discuss peace,
and our students — God bless them — can
discuss the future.

But to discuss anything requires a
common language. The teaching of the
English language is one of the most
popular American exports. As stu-
dents, you know that English is the lin-
gua franca of world business, the key
to clinching deals from Hong Kong to
Toronto. To open the global market to
more Hungarians, I am pleased to an-
nounce that the Peace Corps will, for
the first time, operate in a European
country. Our Peace Corps instructors
will come to Budapest and all 19 coun-
ties to teach English.

In such exchanges, we want to help
you in your quest for a new beginning
as a democratic Hungary. The United
States is also committing more than $(5
million to cultural and educational op-
portunities in Eastern Europe. We will
make available funds for a series of ma-
jor new U.S. -Hungarian exchange
programs — among congressmen and
legislative experts; among labor and
business leaders; among legal experts;
among community leaders, educators,
and young people. We are creating doz-
ens of fellowships to enable Hungarians
to study at American universities. And
we will fund endowed chairs in Ameri-
can Studies at your universities, and
books — many thousands of them — to

fill the shelves of your new Interna-
tional Management Center and the li-
braries of schools and universities
across Hungary.

The United States will also open,
within the next several years, an
American House in the center of Bu-
dapest. Today the celebrated American
architect, Robert Stern, is releasing
his design for this center, which will be
an open house of books, magazines, and
video cassettes — an open house of
ideas.

In conclusion, in economic reform
and democratic change, in cultural and
environmental cooperation, there are
great opportunities and great chal-
lenges. Hungary has a lot of work
ahead; and so do the United States and
Hungary, working together to build
this better future, a dynamic future.

Your challenge is enormous and
historic: to build a structure of political
change and decentralized economic en-
terprises on the ruins of a failed Stalin-
ist system.

Given the opportunity to show your
characteristic initiative, creativity, and
resourcefulness, I believe that the
Hungarian people will meet the chal-
lenge. You stand on the threshold of a
new era of economic development and,
yes, political change.

I believe with all my heart that you
are ready to meet the future. I see a
country well on the way. I see a country
rich in human resources — rich in the
moral courage of its people. I see a na-
tion transcending its past and reaching
out to its destiny. I congratulate you
for having come so far. Let us be equal
to the opportunity that lies before us.
Let us have history write of us that we
were the generation that made Europe
whole and free.

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

U.S. Program in Support
of Hungarian Reform

WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET,
JULY 12, 19891

Hungary has entered a period of dy-
namic political and economic change. 15
President Bush announced several 2

measures to support Hungary's already %
considerable efforts to develop private «
enterprise and a freer political system. ^■

Concerted Western Action. The |

President is proposing that nations of j
the summit seven intensify their con- |
certed action to support economic re- i
forms based on political pluralism in g
Hungary and Poland. Complementary
efforts by leading industrial de-
mocracies will provide a powerful im-
petus to economic recovery and
progress in these nations as they face a
turning point. Other interested coun-
tries could contribute to this process as
well.

Efforts will involve work with the
Hungarian and Polish Governments,
and with other official and independent
organizations in those countries, to
gather information and provide feed-
back on issues of mutual concern. In-
volved governments will also work as
appropriate with representatives of the
IMF, World Bank, EC Commission, and
other multilateral and private-sector
institutions.

Specific issues addressed could in-
clude needed economic reforms; timing
and conditions for new credits; and con-
crete support for privatization and pri-
\ate business, environmental projects,
management and training initiatives,
social safety nets to accompany re-
structuring, housing, etc. These ef-
forts would not undercut or replace
existing institutions such as the World
Bank, Paris Club, or IMF.

President Bush purchased fresh fruit from a private vendor at a Budapest market.

The President will discuss this
proposal in Paris with the leaders of
the other summit seven nations — the
United Kingdom, West Germany,
France, Japan, Italy, and Canada.

Hungarian-American Enterprise
Fund. Hungary has taken a number of
steps to enlarge its private sector,
which can produce wealth that will ben-
efit the entire nation. At the Presi-
dent's initiative, the United States and
Hungary will jointly establish a
"Hungarian-American Enterprise
Fund." The President is asking Con-
gress to provide $25 million for this
initiative.

The fund will support the develop-
ment of the growing private sector in
Hungary. It will be empowered to dis-
burse hard currency loans or venture
capital grants for approved projects,
including private-sector development
(business loans/grants, possible estab-
lishment of a private-sector develop-
ment bank); privatization of state firms
(e.g., provide funding for entrepre-
neurs to buy into state firms); techni-
cal assistance or training programs in

support of or run by Hungary's private
sector; funding of e.xport projects part-
ly or wholly private; and joint ventures
between private Hungarian and Ameri-
can investors (e.g., encourage partici-
pation of private Hungarian firms in
joint ventures).

Most-Favored-Nation Status. The

President has announced that upon en-
actment of the new law on emigration
by the Hungarian Parliament, he will
inform the Congress that Hungary is in
full compliance with the Jackson-Vanik
amendment to the 1974 Trade Act.
Hungary will be eligible to receive
most-favored-nation (MFN) status for
the ma.ximum period allowable under
our legislation without any need of an-
nual waivers.

On June 26, 1989, Hungary's Coun-
cil of Ministers approved the final draft
of a new law on emigration to be sub-
mitted to the Hungarian Parliament for
adoption. The approved draft incorpo-
rates the provisions considered neces-
sary to satisfy the free emigration
requirements of Section 402 of the
Jackson-Vanik amendment.

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

Under the Jackson-Vanik amend-
ment to the Trade Act of 1974, the
President is empowered to waive the
prohibition on the granting of MFN
tariff treatment to a country which
substantially restricts emigration, if
such a waiver would further the goals
of the amendment. The President has
taken this step annually with respect
to Hungary since 1978. Hungary is now
approaching total compliance with the
provisions of the Jackson-Vanik amend-
ment and will be the first Warsaw
Pact country to have legalized and
implemented free emigration, thus
satisfying the requirements of the
amendment.

Regional Environmental Center.

The President has proposed the estab-
lishment of a $5 million regional envi-
ronmental center, located in Budapest.
This is a substantive foUowup to the
President's initiative in Mainz [May 31,
1989] to help Eastern and central
Europe overcome its environmental
problems.

The center will provide a facility
for cooperative research and activities
between governmental and nongovern-
mental experts and public interest
groups from the United States, West-
ern Europe, and Eastern Europe con-
cerned with the environment, including
energy and nuclear safety.

The center would be an independ-
ent organization supported by both pri-
vate and government funds. It would
focus on developing the broadest human
resource base for comprehensive envi-
ronmental improvement and protection
activities in the region. It would facili-
tate loans of lab equipment and orga-
nize workshops and other exchanges.
Specific emphasis would be placed on
transboundary pollution problems; tox-
ic waste disposal; alternative sources of
nonpolluting energy; and promotion of
nuclear safety technology and prac-
tices. Although located in or near Bu-
dapest, the center's objectives would be
to attract funding and direct participa-
tion by both governmental and private
entities and groups from East and
West.

Exchanges With East-Central
Europe. The President has called for
expanded and imaginative exchange
initiatives. The U.S. Information Agen-
cy (USIA) will allocate up to $6.1 mil-
lion from 1990 resources in order to
implement this new initiative to
strengthen the trends toward demo-
cratic values and institutions through
significantly expanded academic, cul-
tural, and people-to-people contacts.

The principal emphasis of this ini-
tiative will be in Hungary and Poland,
but other countries in the region will
also be involved. Hundreds will partici-
pate in the new government-sponsored
exchanges in both directions over the
next year. The initiative has the follow-
ing elements:

• Visits to the United States by
more than 50 legal scholars, judicial,
and parliamentary officials to examine
the U.S. jurisprudence and legislative
system (John Marshall Study Program
in the Rule of Law);

• Visits by congressional experts
to consult with new democratic legisla-
tures in Hungary and Poland;

• Consultations for representatives
of East-central European political par-
ties with U.S. party organizations to
learn the mechanics of democratic elec-
toral politics;

• Travel and study programs for
trade unionists in the United States
(Samuel Gompers Labor Leader
Exchanges);

• Translation and distribution of up
to 100,000 books, magazines, and vid-
eocassettes in local languages on the
U.S. political and economic systems;

• Placement of U.S. specialists in
law and public administration at East-
central European academic
institutions;

• Visits to the United States by
East-central European "future lead-
ers" under the age of 30. Approximately
100 participants are projected for this
program;

• Internships and educational and
training programs for at least 50 entre-
preneurs and enterprise managers (Al-
exander Hamilton Fellowships in
Management);

• Consulting visits by U.S. execu-
tives and management specialists to ad-
vise private and cooperative
enterprises;

• Support of management training
programs and institutes through U.S.
instructors, curriculum materials, and
short-term seminars. Hundreds of
East-central European management
specialists would benefit from this ex-
panded effort;

• Establishment of Noah Webster
Chairs in American Language and Lit-
erature at central and East European
universities;

• Assistance to the U.S. private
sector in developing youth and other
people-to-people exchange activities in
Eastern and Central Europe. Several
hundred American and European citi-
zens would be involved in this inten-
sified two-way exchange initiative; and

• Two-way exchanges with special-
ists in the fields of environmental pro-
tection and cultural preservation.

Science and Technology Agree-
ment. The President has announced the
U.S. intention to conclude an umbrella
science and technology agreement with
Hungary. We envision a broad program
of scientific and technological coopera-
tion in such areas of joint interest and
expertise as basic sciences, the envi-
ronment, agriculture, medicine, ener-
gy, geology, and nuclear safety.

The agreement would develop and
implement high-quality cooperative re-
search programs. Science and technolo-
gy cooperation recognizes Hungary's
first-rate scientific establishment. The
agreement also complements the Presi-
dent's East European environmental
initiative by coordinating research ac-
tivities, providing core funds, and en-
couraging contacts in the environ-
mental area.

We expect to send a technical dele-
gation to Hungary shortly to negotiate
the final terms of the agreement and
work out detailed arrangements for
funding.

Annual contributions of approx-
imately $1 million or the equivalent of
Hungarian currency from each side

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

would implement the agreement. The
United States can expect reasonable
and tangible returns that far exceed
U.S. costs because such core money of-
ten returns much larger dividends in
terms of scientific innovations and by
stimulating additional funding by par-
ticipating technical agencies. This pro-
gram will complement other existing
and valuable U.S. science and technolo-
gy programs with Poland and
Yugoslavia.

Peace Corps Program. The Unit-
ed States and the Government of Hun-
gary have agreed in principle to estab-
lish a Peace Corps program, centered
on assisting Hungarian efforts to devel-
op and expand English-language teach-
ing. The Peace Corps entry into
Hungary represents a new era for
American volunteers serving overseas.
The Hungarian program, which could
begin as early as the fall of 1989 with
training for assignment in early 1990,
eventually will involve teaching Eng-
lish in Budapest and all 19 of the coun-
try's counties.

There are now nearly 6,000 volun-
teers and trainees in 65 nations in the
Americas, Africa, Asia, and the Pacif-
ic. Hungary will be the first European
country where U.S. volunteers are as-
signed. Around the world, these Peace
Corps volunteers offer skills in a wide
variety of programs (e.g., maternal
and child health, family nutrition,
fresh water fisheries, agriculture ex-
tension, teacher training, small busi-
ness consulting, public administration,
natural resource development, energy,
engineering, and industrial arts). A
volunteer must be a U.S. citizen at
least 18 years old. There is no upper
age limit, and currently nearly 500 vol-
unteers are over 50.

All volunteers will receive lan-
guage and cultural training within
Hungary before being assigned to
schools. Strong emphasis will be placed
on learning Hungarian. Cultural stud-
ies include Hungary's history, customs,
and social and political systems.

Premier Miklos Nemeth (center) presented President Bush and Secretary Baker with
plaques bearing an inscription and a piece of barbed wire that had been removed from
the Hungarian-Austrian border.

Secretary Baker's

News Conference,
Budapest,
July 12, 19897

I've two brief opening statements.
First, I would like to read you the in-
scription which was on the gift that
Premier Nemeth gave to me and to
President Bush. The inscription reads
as follows:

This piece of barbed wire is a part of
the Iron Curtain alongside the Hungarian-
Austrian border that palpably represented
the division of the European Continent into
two halves. Its dismantling was made possi-
ble by the will of the Hungarian people and
the recognition of peaceful coexistence and
mutual independence. We believe that the
artificial, physical, and spiritual walls still
existing in the world some day shall collapse
everywhere.

The second statement has to do
with the President's conventional arms
proposal. At the NATO summit in late
May, the allies committed themselves
to tabling a detailed conventional force
proposal by the opening of round 3 of
the CFE [conventional armed forces in
Europe] discussions in Vienna in Sep-
tember. Tomorrow in Vienna, almost 2
months ahead of schedule, the NATO
alliance will table specifies of that pro-
posal. This proposal will implement
President Bush's initiatives to extend
limits to include aircraft and helicop-
ters and to seek lower, equal levels of
stationed U.S. and Soviet forces.

As the President said earlier today,
one of the key steps in moving beyond
containment is easing the military con-
frontation in Europe. By tabling this
new proposal, we are taking a step to-
ward ending the military division of
Europe. Our presence here in Hung-
ary, and in Poland earlier this week, is
part of an effort to end the political and

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

economic divisions of Europe. These ef-
forts complement each other, and we
think, together, advance the cause of a
Europe which is whole and a Europe
which is free.

Q. The Soviet chief disarmament
spokesman said today that the Soviets
do not think they can meet President
Bush's timetable for conventional
forces reductions by 1993. Do you have
a comment?

A. Let me see if I have the question
right. You said the Soviets have said to-
day that they don't think they can reach
the timetable on conventional.

Let me say to you that the Foreign
Minister of Hungary told us today that
at the recent Warsaw Pact meeting,
there was general agreement that they
should not let conventional arms control
get bogged down in the details. So, I
suppose, maybe there's a difference of
opinion between the political side and
the military side — maybe. I don't know;
I'm just surmising that perhaps that is
the case.

The Soviets did say, however, that
the Administration was slow in getting
its arms control act together. I think
we've proven that was wrong. They
said — or some people said — that NATO
would not be able to meet the deadline
that it set for itself. As I've just indi-
cated to you, we've not only met that
deadline, we're going to be 2 months
ahead of it.

I would discount statements or ar-
guments to the effect that the timetable
called for in our conventional forces pro-
posal was unreachable or unrealistic.

Q. Could you tell us, how did the
alliance resolve the question of whose
aircraft would be reduced? Will the
British aircraft be reduced under this
initial proposal and will the French?

A. There was a commitment early
on not to involve the dual-capable air-
craft of France and the United King-
dom. And I assume, without having the
e.xact numbers right here before me,
that that commitment was kept. Let me
give you the numbers of aircraft,
though, because I didn't announce that.

If you recall, the President's pro-
posal was that combat aircraft and heli-
copters in the Atlantic-to-the-Ural-zone

area be at a level 15% below the current
NATO total. Those numbers come out to
a total of 5,700 combat aircraft and 1,900
combat helicopters for each side.

There will, of course, be definitional
problems as between the alliance and
the Warsaw Pact when we start talking
about aircraft and helicopters.

Q. Do you think that the Presi-
dent's objective of an agreement in 6
months to a year is still viable, hav-
ing looked at the details of it?

A. I think it's more viable if we ex-
ceed by 60 days almost our own original
timetable for when we might have a spe-
cific proposal tabled in Vienna. And that
is what we have done. So I think it would
argue forcefully that the President's
6-months-to-a-year timetable was not
unreasonable.

Q. I think you said "specifics,"
but you didn't say "all specifics." Is
there something that hasn't been re-
solved yet, or is everything going on
the table?

A. Everything is going on the table,
as far as I know, in terms of our pro-
posal. I just could not answer the ques-
tion about whether there would be any
French or British aircraft involved. I'm
quite confident there will be no dual-
capable French or British aircraft.

Q. The Soviets seem taken with
the idea of some advance work on ver-
ification for START [strategic arms
reduction talks] and I wondered if
that pleased you and surprised you,
and what does it say to critics who
thought perhaps you were finding a
ploy to put off START?

A. As we've tried to explain at the
time that we came with our verification
proposal, it was in no way designed to
slow down arms control negotiations. It
was not foot-dragging. We felt then and
we feel now that to confront some of the
serious questions of verification in ad-
vance might well move arms control for-
ward rather than retarding it — because
some of the knottiest problems we've fac-
ed in the past when we had treaties that
we've sought to be ratified have been
verification problems. We think it is

very good that the Soviets have re-
sponded positively to those proposals we
made about advance verification.

Q. Gen. Scowcroft [Assistant to
the President for National Security
Affairs] referred today in an inter-
view to a small exchange between the
President and Gorbachev last week.
Was there some message that went on
or —

A. The President is in communica-
tion with other heads of state fairly fre-
quently, and we frequently don't
comment on those communications.

Q. This isn't another head of
state; this is the leader of the Soviet
Union. And it obviously must have
been in reference to this trip. Was
it — don't worry, we won't rock the
boat —

A. We don't comment on communi-
cations between heads of state —

Q. He commented.

A. He didn't comment on the sub-
stance of it or the specifics of it. He may
have commented on the fact that it took
place, but I'm not going to take it any
further than that.

Q. What kind of preliminary re-
action do you have from the summit
countries about the proposals that the
President has got for Poland and
Hungary, and do you know of any spe-
cific commitments that other coun-
tries are going to make to these two
countries?

A. I think that there's a general
view on the part of the summit seven
that there are, indeed, dramatic changes
taking place in Poland and Hungary,
changes that move these countries in the
direction of the values that the West has
always embraced and holds dear. And, I
think, there will be support on the part
of summit countries for supporting the
political and economic reforms that are
taking place in these two countries.

In terms of specific commitments —
how many dollars country X is going to
commit and that sort of thing — no, we do i
not have that yet. But we will have some
substantial discussions about this when
we get to the summit.

THE PRESIDENT

Q. Do you expect more from some
countries, such as Japan, West Ger-
many? Do you expect them to put up
more —

A. Some countries are in a better
position to contribute than other coun-
tries are.

Q. I would like to go back to your
answer to [a previous] question. I'm
not quite sure if you were referring to
the Soviet statement when you said,
"I discount statements that timeta-
bles are unreachable." What I'd like
to ask is, do you have some basis on
the private rather than the public
side to give you reason to think that ;
the Soviets can meet the timetable? ^
Have they given you any indication?

A. No, I'm not referring to any pri- -
vate indication. I was answering a ques- "
tion that I think referred to an article J
that appeared today in The Washington
Post, the headline of which says, "Soviet :
Says Bush's Goal Unreachable; More
Time Sought For Military Cuts." ■.

What I'm saying is that a somewhat
similar criticism was leveled at our abili-
ty to get NATO, in fact, to agree to ta-
ble this proposal within the timeframe
that we had suggested. The same criti-
cism was leveled at the 6-month-to-l-year
time proposal that we put out there.
What this is referring to, I think, is that
they do not think — even if we got an
agreement within 1 year — that they
could implement it by 1992 or 1993. As
you know, their proposal is to implement
their reductions by 1996 or 1997. But it's
based on the article; it's not based on any
private communications.

Q. During your talks here, have
the Hungarian officials indicated to
you that they feel that the success of
their reform process is closely linked
with what Mr. Gorbachev is doing in
the Soviet Union?

A. There have been discussions
about the reform process in those coun-
ti'ies in which it is taking place. Some of
the Hungarian leaders that we have met
with have indicated that, in their view,
reform is taking place in the Soviet
Union, in Poland, in Hungary, and in
Yugoslavia. They have not tied — and I do

As a token of his esteen for George Washington, the Marquis de Lafayette sent him the
key to the bastille in 1790; it has been on permanent display at Mount Vernon since 1797.
To help commemorate the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution, the key was
loaned to France for public view by the Mount Vernon Ladies' Association. Shown here
are Mrs. Robert Channing Seamans, Jr., Regent of the association; President Bush;
Eliza Burnham. (he interpreter; and President Mitterrand.

not believe they do tie — the success of
their reform efforts to success in the
Soviet Union. I think it's their view
that the reform efforts that they're
making stand a reasonably good chance
of success, both political reform and
economic reform.

Q. Before this trip, there was a
lot of talk about how the President's
trip to Eastern Europe would com-
pare with Gorbachev's trips to West-
ern Europe. I realize that this isn't
the reason you're taking this trip, but
now that you are about to leave East-
ern Europe, could you tell us how you
think they compare?

A. As the President has indicated,
we're really not in the business of gain-
ing this thing or competition or compar-
ing these trips or counting the crowds.

I must say that the warmth of the
reception here in Hungary, though, I
think is very, very clear and quite sub-

stantial. I, for one, thought the crowds
were pretty good, pretty terrific, as a
matter of fact in Poland and particularly
in Gdansk.

But the point is, it's important if you
believe that your objectives should be to
do what you can to see Europe become
whole and free, that we become
engaged — more actively engaged — with
these countries in Eastern Europe that
are making these very, very fundamen-
tal and dramatic reform efforts. And
that's why we're here; not out of any idea
that we need to compete with General
Secretary Gorbachev.

Q. Since the President talked to
Gorbachev before he took this trip,
should we assume that he will also
have some kind of exchange with him
once this trip is over?

A. He talks frequently to heads of
state and corresponds with them
frequently.

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

Let me say one other thing. The
President has been very careful to say
here, I think, and to point out to you
that he is not here to disrupt or create
division or to in any sense create prob-
lems with respect to the relationship
between the United States and the So-
viet Union, or the Soviet Union's rela-
tionship with these two countries.
That's not the purpose of our trip. It is
to encourage continued home-grown re-
form and continued movement on their
part to those values that we hold dear.

Q. With establishing a $25 mil-
lion investment fund here and $100
million in Poland for this year, is
there any mechanism or intention to
continue incentives in following
years?

A. We are doing more than that, of
course. I mean, I suppose you've been
briefed on the legislation that's moving
on OPIC [Overseas Private Investment
Corporation] and GSP [generalized sys-
tem of preferences] and what we can do
for Hungary by way of MFN [most-
favored-nation] the minute they codify
these proposed legislative changes
they've got in mind for immigration. So,
there's a lot more there than just saying,
"Well, if things go well next year, we'll
add another few million to that fund."
It's the reforms in their economies that
will make them eligible for assistance
from the United States. It's those re-
forms that are really important. If you
are asking me if there are any specific
plans here, right now, today, to add to
those next year, there are no such plans,
but there are no plans not to.

Q. Apparently in the meeting to-
day with the government leaders, the
President repeated, or said for the
first time, what you just said now,
which is that. "We're not here to chal-
lenge Gorbachev — we don't want to be
destabilizing." You repeated it here.
Did you get messages from these gov-
ernments, both in Poland and here,
that they were concerned that the
President was going to do that, and
did they ask him not to, and are you
restating this to be assuring on that
point?

A. No, we got no such messages
from these governments. No one asked
the President to make those statements.
It simply lays out the way we feel about
the trip. That is not the purpose of the
trip.

Q. He did say some things before
the trip — for instance, pulling troops
out of Poland — that may have left
that impression, though. Why the
need, do you think, to keep repeating
that you are not here to do that?

A. I don't know that it's being done
out of any sense of need. The point is,
that's not the reason we're here and
that's one of the things that the Presi-
dent told the officials that he met with. I
said it — I didn't raise it voluntarily — in
response to a question that suggested
otherwise.

Q. If we could look ahead to the
economic summit. The Japanese are
supposedly prepared to pledge $43 bil-
lion in new money to the less devel-
oped nations. It seems to almost
dwarf what the United States is ap-
parently prepared to do in that con-
text. Can you give us a little bit of a
look ahead as to the kinds of things,
maybe in general numbers, that the
United States is going to be doing at
the economic summit? And can
you comment on what Japan is
apparently —

A. Let me say that I'm not totally
familiar — I saw that article, but I
haven't really analyzed it in detail, and
I'm not sure that all the details have
been fleshed out by the Japanese Gov-
ernment. But this is a good example, I
think, of what we have been referring to
as "creative responsibility-sharing."

The United States is carrying a
very large share of the cost of defending
freedom in the Pacific. There are limita-
tions on what Japan can do — constitu-
tional limitations on what they can do
militarily. This is one way — that is,
through assistance with the third world,
cooperation in the international financial
institutions, overseas development
assistance — that they can share respon-
sibility with us and with other Western
industrialized democracies.

Q. Do you think that since both
President Bush and General Secre-
tary Gorbachev favor quick agree-
ment on conventional arms and
believe it can be done in 6 months to a
year, that it would be useful for them
to meet within 6 months to help prod
along this process?

A. There will be some further talk-
ing about that at the ministerial that I'll
be having with Foreign Minister Shev-
ardnadze in September, close to the time
that the United Nations has the General
Assembly. I don't want to speculate out
here with you now about when that
meeting might or might not take place.

Q. That meeting being a summit
meeting?

A. I thought that was the thrust of
your question. That was certainly the
thrust of my answer. [Laughter]

President's Departure

Remarks,
Budapest,
July 13, 19898

I was the first Vice President of the
United States to visit your country 6
years ago, but now I'm especially hon-
ored to be the first American President'
to come to this beautiful land. During
the past 2 days, we've met with Hun-
garians from every walk of life. I saw
many thousand wet Hungarians turn-
ing out there at Kossuth Square, that
square a reminder of the sacrifices of
Hungary's past. At Parliament, I
met with the political leaders of the
present — leaders who have the courage
to call for a historic election. And at
Karl Marx University, I saw the hope-
ful face of Hungary's future and an-
nounced a series of American actions to
engage my country more deeply in the
future. But throughout, at every single
event, I felt a deepening of the friend-
ship between the American and Hun-
garian people.

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

In just a moment, we're going to
leave for Paris for an economic summit
with Western leaders. This will be a
historic moment for Europe, for the na-
tions of the economic community are
moving steadily toward economic inte-
gration in 1992. This should mean more
than just a vast trade opportunity for
Hungary. As your economy modern-
izes, you will play an even greater role
in the evolution of a new Europe, a
Europe that is whole and free.

While in Paris, we shall also cele-
brate the independence of that nation
and the declaration of the rights of
man. But these rights are not French,
nor are they American. You are prov-
ing here in the heartland of Europe
that the rights of man are the proper
birthright of us all.

Thank you for a wonderful visit,
for an unforgettably warm welcome.
God bless you, and God bless Hungary.

President's Remarks

to Residents,
Leiden,
July 17, 19891

The Netherlands is an old friend, an
honored ally of the United States. The
friendship between our nations is older
than the American Constitution — and
the United Provinces were one of the
models that our founders looked to in
creating a nation from 13 sovereign
states.

It's a pleasure to visit Leiden, a
city whose very name has symbolized
for centuries Dutch determination and
the struggle for freedom against the
forces of occupation. For Americans
too, Leiden is a special city, a place
where we trace our origins. So many of
the individuals who shaped the modern
world walked the cobbled streets of
Leiden.

It was here that Hugo de Groot,
known to the world as Grotius, the fa-

The President addressed the residents of
Leiden at Pieterskerk (St. Peter's Church).
Dating back to the 12th century, it is the
oldest parish church in the city and the
site of the annual Thanksgiving service
for the American community in the
Netherlands.

ther of modern international law, stud-
ied in the nation that is today the home
of the International Court of Justice. It
was here that Rembrandt lived and
worked and created a world of beauty
that moves us still today. It was here to
Leiden that the Pilgrims came to es-
cape persecution; to live, work, and
worship in peace. In the shadow of Pie-
terskerk, they found the freedom to
witness God openly and without fear.
Here, under the ancient stones of the
Pieterskerk, the body of John Robin-
son, the Pilgrims' spiritual leader, was
laid to rest.

And it was from this place the Pil-
grims set their course for a new world.
In their search for liberty, they took
with them lessons learned here of free-
dom and tolerance. The Pilgrims faced
the dangerous passage, but, carried on
the winds of hope, they arrived. On the
rocky coast of New England, at the
edge of a wild and unsettled continent,
they planted the seeds of a new world, a
world that became America.

Today, as when the Pilgrims left
this city, a new world lies within our
reach. Our time is a time of great hope
and a time of enormous challenges. The
new world we seek is shaped by an
idea, an idea of universal appeal and
undeniable force — that idea is democra-
cy. The power of the democratic idea is
evident everywhere — in the halls of
government, in the hearts of people
around the world. In the words of Vic-
tor Hugo, "No army can withstand the
strength of an idea whose time has
come." Freedom's time has come.

We, the people of the United States
and the people of the Netherlands, are
fortunate. The freedoms that others
are struggling for are freedoms that we
enjoy. But freedom never comes with-
out struggle, and no struggle is with-
out sacrifice. The Americans and the
Dutch both know that the cost of free-
dom is high, and that's why both of our
nations are partners in an alliance of
free nations that spans the ocean that
the Pilgrims crossed. Our alliance — the
NATO alliance — connects two conti-
nents, unites a hemisphere. But what
connects us isn't merely a fact of geog-
raphy. Ours is an alliance forged on
common values, rooted in a shared his-
tory and heritage; it's a common kin-
ship and culture, as well.

We are part of the commonwealth
of free nations. Almost 2 months ago, I
came to Europe to celebrate the fruits
of our alliance; four decades of peace
and prosperity and freedom. At the
time of NATO's founding, amid the air-
lift to a besieged Berlin, few would
have predicted a peace so strong and
lasting. Here in the Netherlands and
elsewhere, some people expected war
to come again within their lifetime. In-
stead, the NATO era has brought the
longest period of peace that Europe has
known in the modern age. Let me as-
sure you, Americans know that to keep
the peace in Europe is to keep the
peace for America.

Today the Atlantic alliance, formed
to contain the threat of Soviet expan-
sionism, is creating new opportunities
to ease tensions, to build a new world,
to build an enduring peace. Thanks to
NATO's strength and unity, we now

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

have the opportunity to move beyond
containment, to integrate the Soviet
Union into the community of nations.

Thanks to NATO's steadiness of
purpose and its commitment to main-
tain strong deterrent forces, the way is
now open to real reductions in the level
of arms that has long cast a shadow
over this continent, the most heavily
militarized on Earth.

In seizing these opportunities,
reaching that new world depends on the
unity and strength of the entire alli-
ance, not on the actions of one nation
alone. The revival of the Western Euro-
pean Union, in which the Netherlands
played a vital role, the growing cooper-
ation on security issues between West
Germany and France: British and
French resolve to modernize their own
nuclear forces — each of these develop-
ments is a sign that Europe sees the
wisdom of sustaining the collective
strength that has kept the peace.

The lesson of our postwar e.xperi-
ence is this: Strength has kept us safe
and has created opportunities for
change, and from these opportunities,
we can create a new era of enduring
peace.

Let me say clearly a stronger Eu-
rope, a more united Europe, is good for
my country. It's good for the United
States of America. It's a development
we welcome, a natural evolution within
our alliance, the product of true part-
nership 40 years in the making.

This trend toward closer coopera-
tion isn't limited to collective security
alone. Around the world, countries are
now recognizing that no nation, no na-
tion can prosper in economic isolation,
and that's why we look forward to the
single European market and a more in-
tegrated European Community. The
world's major industrial democracies
must work to maintain an open trading
system to preserve sustained economic
growth. Our progress at this recently
concluded economic summit in Paris
brought us closer to a more coordinated
and common approach across a wide
spectrum of critical global issues.

The key is concerted action, bring-
ing the collective strength of the West
to bear on our common concerns. Con-
cerns like the environment, global
warming, acid rain, and pollution of the
world's oceans — these are problems
that know no borders, that no line on a
map has the power to stop. Pollution
crosses continents and oceans. And it's
time for nations to join forces in com-
mon defense of our environment.

The United States of America will
do its part. A little over a month ago,
in the United States, I announced a se-
ries of sweeping changes to our Clean
Air Act, changes meant to ensure that
every American, in the space of one
generation, will breathe clean air.
Shortly after I get back to the United
States, after I return home, we will
send our clean air legislation to Con-
gress. Last week in Poland and Hun-
gary, I announced initiatives to work
with those two countries to combat
their pollution problems. The next step
is clear: we must work together — take
concerted action to combat this com-
mon problem — to clean up our environ-
ment for ourselves and for our children.

The summit underscored the fact
that it's time we take the next step in
solving the debt problem, to encourage
conditions for global growth that will
benefit the industrialized nations and
the developing world alike. We must
make progress on this because it's more
than a matter of economic development:
democracy is at stake. Freedom can
nourish the barren soil of poverty, just
as the Pilgrims landed upon a desolate
rock and laid the foundations of the
freedom and prosperity that we know
today.

Economic and democratic develop-
ment go hand-in-hand. The steps we've
taken toward a common strategy on
debt will sustain a favorable climate for
growth and for the flourishing of de-
mocracy in the developing world.

And there's Eastern Europe. Let
me explain the approach that I take to-

ward reform in Eastern Europe. We
will never compromise our principles.
We will always speak out for freedom.
But we understand, as well, how vital a
carefully calibrated approach is in this
time of dynamic change.

The Soviet Union has nothing,
nothing to fear from the reforms that
are now unfolding in some of the na-
tions of Eastern Europe. We support
reform in Eastern Europe and in the
Soviet Union. And we're seeing dra-
matic changes. General Secretary
Gorbachev's letter 2 days ago to the
economic summit is only the latest ex-
ample of the Soviets' moving in our di-
rection, coming our way. I've said it
many times, that I want to see per-
estroika succeed. I want to see the So-
viet Union chart a course that brings
itself into the community of nations.

My visits these last 2 months dem-
onstrate how closely the United States
is linked to Europe. For half a century,
America has been deeply involved in
the future of this continent, and U.S.
involvement will be a strategic fact in
the next century as it has been for this
one.

We will play a constructive role
in Eastern Europe's economic develop-
ment— in the development of political
pluralism and in creating an interna-
tional climate in which reform can suc-
ceed, and that is why America's
relations with the Soviet Union are so
important.

Improved relations with the
U.S.S.R. reduce pressure on the na-
tions of Eastern Europe, especially
those on the cutting edge of reform.
The new world we seek is a common-
wealth of free nations working in
concert — a world where more and more
nations enter a widening circle of
freedom.

In the pulpit here at Pieterskerk,
1 year after peace was restored in Eu-
rope, Winston Churchill spoke to the
people of Leiden. The Allies had tri-
umphed over tyranny. The occupation
was over. After 6 years of war and dev-
astation, Churchill said, "The great

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

wheel has swung full circle." Europe
then stood at the threshold of a new
era — an era whose hope Churchill ex-
pressed in a single, simple phrase, "let
freedom reign." We all know what fol-
lowed. Half of Europe entered that new
era and half of Europe found its path
blocked, walled off by barriers of brick
and barbed wire.

The half of Europe that was free
dug out from the rubble, recovered
from the war, and laid the foundations
of free government and free enterprise
that brought unparalleled prosperity
and a life in peace and freedom.

The "other Europe" — the Europe
behind the wall — endured four decades •
of privation and hardship and persecu- ,
tion and fear.

Today that "other Europe" is
changing. The great wheel is moving
once more. Our time, the exciting time
in which we live, is a time of new hope, '
the hope that all of Europe can now
know the freedom that the Netherlands '
has known, that America has known,
and that the West has known. Our hope
is that the unnatural division of Europe
will now come to an end; that the Eu-
rope behind the wall will join its neigh-
bors to the West, prosperous and free.

Poland and Hungary are on the
cutting edge; they're on the forefront of
this reform. They've traveled far these
past 12 months, farther than any of us
once would have thought possible. In
Warsaw I spoke to the new Polish Par-
liament that includes 100 new, freely
elected senators, elected to office in
Eastern Europe's first truly free elec-
tion in the postwar era. In Hungary, I
addressed the students and faculty of
Karl Marx University, a university
where the lessons of the free market
are replacing the old teachings of Das
Kapital.

At the shipyards of Gdansk and at
the statue of the great Hungarian hero,
Kossuth, tens of thousands of people —
literally tens of thousands — filled the
streets, new voices full of new hope.
And theirs were the faces of pilgrims
on a journey — fixed on the horizon, on
the new world coming into view. They

Her Majesty Queen Beatrix and President Bush reviewed the honor guard at Schiphol
Airport in .Amsterdam.

know, as we do, that ultimately, what-
ever the odds, freedom will succeed.

It's a lesson the world has learned
several times this century, a lesson
that you know so well, that the Dutch
know so well. The Netherlands will
never forget the nightmare of occupa-
tion. Some of you here today suffered
through those long years. Even then,
freedom endured.

Pieterskerk — behind these walls
above the rafters, resistance fighters,
university students, took refuge from
the forces of occupation and found safe
haven in this church. Daily acts of hero-
ism: the church sextant who brought
them food; the neighborhood grocer
who collected extra ration stamps —
kept them alive, kept the spirit of dig-
nity and human decency alive through-
out the Netherlands' dark night.

And why? Why would people en-
danger themselves to save others? They
did it for the simplest, most human of
reasons. In the words of Jan Campert,

poet of the Dutch resistance, they
acted because "the heart could not do
otherwise."

Freedom can never be extin-
guished— not then, not now. Even in
Europe behind the wall, the dream of
freedom for all of Europe has never
died. It's alive today — in Warsaw, in
Gdansk, in Budapest, and, yes, across
the Soviet Union.

So the challenge that we face is a
very clear one: We must work together
toward the day when all of Europe,
East and West, is free of discord, free
of division; a day when people in every
city and every town across this conti-
nent knows the freedoms that we enjoy.

Here in Leiden, where the Pil-
grims dreamed their new world, let us
pledge our effort to create a new world
in Europe, whole and free, a new world
now within our reach.

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

Secretary Baker's
and Foreign Minister
Van den Broek's
News Conference,

The Hague,

July 17, 19899

Foreign Minister Van den Broek. Let

me say, on behalf of the Dutch Govern-
ment, how extremely pleased and grati-
fied we are with the President's visit
and with his party, and for me, of
course, in particular also for Secretary
Baker being here these days.

Needless to say, how welcome the
President and his American delegation
are here, given the fact that the
friendly relations between our two
countries have endured, one can say,
uninterruptedly for over 200 years.

I know that many journalists in the
past days have put the question to me
how to explain that it is now the very
first time that an American President
in office visits this country. I must say
I've never asked myself that question.
But what I do know is that this visit
certainly sets another marker on the
longstanding friendship between these
two countries. And it's not necessary to
say how welcome it was; how fortunate
also it was, at exactly this point in time
where, apart from discussing bilateral
relations where we don't have any
really significant problems.

The world is changing so much.
And it is a great privilege to have a
world leader among us giving his im-
pressions on a very important meeting
that took place in the past days in Paris
between the seven industrialized — top
industrialized — countries, having vis-
ited Poland on a historical visit, being
so committed to further working, im-
proving East-West relations, and mak-
ing the world, in fact, a safer place.

I don't know whether you all had
the opportunity this afternoon to hear
the President's speech in Leiden and
how strong he signaled the fact to us
over here the commitment of the Unit-

ed States for the security of Europe;
and needless to say, how badly we need
this ally. But there's more than that.
There's more than containment. There
is shaping the peace constructively in
the coming era. And again, it's ex-
tremely gratifying to hear directly
from the American President his views
in this respect.

We spoke this morning in the dele-
gations meeting about the very impor-
tant subject of environment. We very
much welcome the U.S. commitment to
such a vigorous approach of the envi-
ronmental problems that threaten our
planet. We are talking about problems
on a planet wide scale that need a global
approach, and American leadership
certainly also is extremely welcome.
We hope to receive a high-level Ameri-
can representative at the November
conference on atmospheric pollution
and climate change, a conference that
is being organized in the Netherlands
in November next.

We talked, of course, about the oth-
er problems that were also under con-
sideration at the G-7, like the
important debt problem. I don't think
that the views of the United States and
the Netherlands run very much apart
in this field — not very much, in fact,
not at all.

We discussed, of course the inter-
national trade situation, prospectives
for the GATT negotiations, where I
think, again, that our minds run to a
great extent parallel where we both
want the counterprotectionist
tendencies.

We further spoke, of course, about
the further integration process in Eu-
rope and, we found it extremely worth-
while over lunch to have this very open
and informal discussion and where the
Prime Minister and myself and the
colleagues — De Korte [Minister of Eco-
nomic Affairs] and Ruding [Minister of
Finance] and Nijpels [Minister of Hous-
ing, Physical Planning, and
Environment] — had the opportunity of
explaining somewhat more of the back-
ground that motivates us to continue
with this European integration — what
it means to us, but also what it means
to the broader construction of Europe,
between East and West. I found that
myself a very interesting exchange.

Some political issues were, of
course, on the agenda — not only East-
West relations. We had a few words
about China; we had some words about
what was discussed in Paris on the
common endeavor to combat terrorism.

Secretary Baker. Let me just say
that I think that was a very good sum-
mary of the discussions that we had in
the meetings just before lunch and at
lunch with the Prime Minister and his
party.

I should say as well, though, on be-
half of the President, that we are very
pleased and gratified with the recep-
tion that the President has received
here in the Netherlands, the warmth of
the greeting. The President took par-
ticular note of the fact that the Queen
returned and personally greeted him
at the airport.

I should expand a little bit on what
Hans has said about the close coopera-
tion between our two countries, partic-
ularly in the area of trade where the
Netherlands and the United States
more often than not find themselves on
the same side of most all issues — trade
issues. There are no bilateral irritants
of any substance between our two
countries.

The Netherlands and the United
States are actively pushing for a suc-
cessful Uruguay Round, actively push-
ing, in fact, for the inclusion and
coverage of agriculture, which is a very
difficult trade topic — [the] most impor
tant, and I think, significant trade
problem the world knows today.

The close cooperation that I'm talk'
ing about was evidenced particularly at
the NATO summit, where the gentle-
man sitting to my left chaired what
turned out to be an all-night meeting O)
foreign ministers to resolve the very
difficult question of short-range nucle-
ar weapons and resolve it in a manner
that was satisfactory, I think, to all of
the NATO countries and which recog-
nized the reality of changing conditions
in Europe at the same time that it pre-
served the deterrent structure and
strategy of the NATO alliance.

I think that the summary which
has been given is quite complete and
accurate, and I would have nothing fur-
ther to add.

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

Q. Things are going so well here,
perhaps I could ask you about a part
of the world where things aren't going
so well — Afghanistan. Has the Bush
Administration decided to increase
weapons and other aid to the rebels?
And what is the response to the
Afghan Government's request to the
United States to put pressure on
Pakistan to back off?

Secretary Baker. Let me answer
the last part of that first by saying that
the policy of the United States in
Afghanistan has not changed. Our poli-
cy is to seek and support self-
determination for the Afghan people.
We support that quest for self-
determination in a number of ways.
The nature and character of that sup-
port has not changed.

Q. May I ask about the other
part — about Afghanistan's request
that the United States try to influ-
ence Pakistan to ease off.

Secretary Baker. To ease off what?

Q. We both know they're the con-
duit to keep the war going, to keep
the rebels armed to try to bring down
the Afghan Government.

Secretary Baker. 1 think I an-
swered your question by saying that we
support the Afghan people in their
quest for self-determination in a num-
oer of different ways, and the nature
md character of that support has not
changed.

Q. Did the American side raise
:he problem of burdensharing in the
alliance?

Foreign Minister Van den Broek.

No, that was not discussed today,
.vhich doesn't mean that we don't real-
ze that this is still an issue which will
De on the agenda for the time to come.
You know full well what the Dutch
)pinion is — the opinion of the Dutch
jovernment in this respect — that it
iieeds careful consideration, and cer-
tainly, also in view of the very gratify-
ng progress we are experiencing in
■onventional arms control, and also the
;'ontribution that results there may
iive to also the problem of
jurdensharing.

Secretary Baker. I didn't under-
stand the last part of the question. I

think the first part of the question was,
could I say what was discussed, if any-
thing, about the longstanding Dutch
grievance that they are excluded from
the seven?

Q. Yes.

Secretary Baker. I don't recall
that being specifically discussed or
raised, to be very honest with you, al-
though there were perhaps some indi-
rect references to the fact that the
Netherlands would appreciate it if the
summit seven — if they're going to par-
ticipate in followup actions flowing
from the summit, it would be a lot eas-
ier for the Netherlands to do that in ev-
ery case if they were in on the take-off
as well as the landing.

We understand that. At the same
time, I am quite certain that the Gov-
ernment of the Netherlands under-
stands the function of the Group of
Seven, why it exists and what it does
and what it does beneficially.

There are no plans, as the Presi-
dent told you yesterday, to expand the
Group of Seven at this time.

Q. In fact, it was the same ques-
tion. I wanted to have the reaction of
Mr. Baker to know — if you think that
the role of the Netherlands, and its
economic role in particular, justifies
the Netherlands being admitted into
the Group of Seven —

Secretary Baker. If you did that,
you would have about 15 or 20 other ap-
plications immediately. It would pre-
sent you with very difficult problems
and decisions. And as I just said, quot-
ing the President from yesterday with
respect to another nation, specifically
the Soviet Union, there are no plans to
expand the Group of Seven. I would
hasten to add here that we clear-
ly recognize the commitment of the
Netherlands to democracy and free
market economic policies in contrast to
the Soviet Union.

Q. Do you foresee a time when
the Soviet Union will be integrated
into the European Community?

Foreign Minister Van den Broek.

I think that time is still well off. But
what we do welcome very much is in-
creasing openness from the Soviet
Union, the willingness which was clear-

ly stated, I think, also by the letter to
the seven of yesterday, not dwelling on
whether that means wanting to be in-
vited as a member. But what it does
show is that things are changing there
very fast too, and that there is a very
great need in the Soviet Union to in-
tensify the international economic co-
operation and to become more and
more, but gradually, a member of the
free-market system. And we all know
that that's not for tomorrow.

Q. Why is the United States in-
vited for the next — The Hague
conference — conference about envi-
ronmental questions, as the United
States wasn't invited for the last
Hague conference? And, especially,
this question because the United
States didn't subscribe to the results
of the last conference.

Foreign Minister Van den Broek.
If you ask Secretary Baker why he was
not invited, you'd better ask us why we
didn't invite the United States. But
that question, in fact, has been ad-
dressed many times so you know full
well what the setup was of the confer-
ence in The Hague at the time of the
24 countries then. Neither of the super-
powers was invited then. It was repre-
sentatives from all the continents. We
said we are not institutionalizing a
group dealing with atmospheric pollu-
tion or what have you. No, we are try-
ing to establish a group which can
catalyze developments in order to re-
take this problem in the international
fora.

That is why now, in fact, the Unit-
ed States is being invited to the No-
vember conference that will deal with
atmospheric pollution and climate
change in order to bring the whole is-
sue further into the institutionalized
international fora like UNEP [UN En-
vironment Program]. And I think that
both the United States and the Nether-
lands share the feeling that we should
try to reinforce those organizations to
deal with these global problems as
such.

Q. In the Dutch presentation of
the President's speech today, the com-
mentator mentioned that there had
been longstanding irritation on the

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

part of the Dutch about trade bar-
riers to their products that the Unit-
ed States imposes. Since Mr. Baker
said that you all are in sync on trade,
I wondered, did I get bad translation
or is there some irritation along these
lines?

Foreign Minister Van den Broek.
I don't feel any irritation, to be quite
frank. I think that in trade, and think-
ing about the importance of the GATT
negotiations and making headway and
advancing the liberalization of trade in
general, which is to the benefit of all,
that there the United States and Hol-
land are very much like-minded. We
are free trade countries. That doesn't
mean that on certain specific subjects,
we may not have a difference of opinion
from time to time.

We know what the preoccupations
of the United States are as far as Eu-
rope 1992 is concerned, at least what
could derive from 1992 of more protec-
tionism, etc., which we say we don't
want. The United States knows full
well that there are preoccupations in
Europe about the bill 301, in fact,
which we consider to imply certain
risks of more protectionism, etc. What
I think is very positive is that these
types of disputes or imminent disputes
can de discussed open and freely and in
a very friendly and constructive
atmosphere.

Secretary Baker. And if I might
add to that, the point is, I think, that
our two countries are in the forefront
of efforts to see a successful Uruguay
Round and to see a Uruguay Round
that is as comprehensive and broad as
it can be in terms of subject matter.
That's the point I think.

Q. The Netherlands is often in-
volved in Middle Eastern affairs in
many, many ways, and we don't even
review them. I'd appreciate your as-
sessment of Israel's current position
on the elections proposal and specifi-
cally to ask your reaction to a speech
delivered today by Ariel Sharon in
which he calls for the eliminating of
the leadership of the PLO.

Foreign Minister Van den Broek.
As far as the speech is concerned, you
are referring to, I'm sorry, I haven't

had an opportunity to read that, so
that's somewhat difficult to comment.

In general, the Netherlands Gov-
ernment, like the 12 of the EEC, want
to support a peace process where both
the safe and secure existence of Israel,
within recognized borders, is guaran-
teed and by the same token, the legiti-
mate rights which we translate into the
right of self-determination of the Pal-
estinian people are being respected.

As far as the latest proposals from
Mr. Shamir are concerned, notably
where he has proposed elections as
such, that was welcomed by the 12. Al-
though we said it depends, of course,
under what conditions those elections
can be held. And we spelled out a num-
ber of, let's say, elements which we
thought would have to be complied with
to make those elections acceptable and
also for the Palestinians and to make
these elections successful.

As far as the statement of Mr.
Shamir is concerned, or rather the Li-
kud Party specifying, more or less, a
number of other conditions which could
not be met in the case of the elections,
quite frankly, we felt they were not ex-
actly helpful. On the other hand, I
think we must also recognize that Mr.
Shamir until now, and publicly, takes
the stand that the government state-
ment on the elections in Israel still
stands and that the other thing is a
party issue.

Don't ask me how this would work
out in practice. Our line is a clear one.
We feel as the United States does — we
know that — very much committed to
trying to be conducive to further prog-
ress in these peace negotiations be-
cause the people in the area — and that
goes for the Israelis, but that also goes
for the Palestinians — really by now de-
serve peace over there.

Secretary Baker. Let me answer it
by saying, I think that the minister
gave you an answer with which we
would agree with respect to the ques-
tion of elections. There may be one or
two nuances of difference. It would
take me a while to go back through ex-
actly what he said and — but you are
very familiar with the position — view
of the United States with respect to

the Shamir elections proposal. We sup-
port it, we have supported it, we are
continuing to support it.

We were concerned when the Likud
Party adopted its four priniciples that
perhaps they were, in a sense, deval-
uing their own initiative. We have since
been satisfied that they remain com-
mitted to it as a government, and we
will continue to support it. And we sup-
port it in our discussions with our
counterparts. In fact we have discussed
it today, as you could tell from the min-
ister's answer.

Q. Looking back on the Presi-
dent's whole trip in the last week —
the kind of changes he's talked about,
especially Eastern Europe, have
come relatively quickly compared to
40-years' time since the war. What
kind of timeframe does the President
see in the coming, say, 2-4 years?
Does he think that kind of pace of re-
form will be sustained, and can you
do anything to keep the pace of re-
form moving?

Secretary Baker. I think he has
spoken very clearly to what we would
like to do to maintain the momentum of
reform, so I won't go into all that
again. With respect to whether or not
the pace of reform will equal what it
has in the last 12 months, I don't know
that anybody could give you a defini-
tive answer on that. It has been, in the
words of some — the minister on my
left, as a matter of fact, when we were
discussing it on the way in from town-
breathtaking.

It really has been, over the course
of the past 12 months. Will that contin-
ue? We don't know. Will it slow down?
It could. We hope it will continue, be-
cause significant progress has been
made. And we will be encouraging a
continuation of both the political re-
form and the economic reform in every
way that we can in both of those coun-
tries, and in, if I may say so, in the So-
viet Union as well. As the President
said very clearly today in his speech,
yesterday in his press conference — we
really want perestroika to succeed. We
think that will result in a more stable,
a more secure, and a more open Soviet
Union.

Department of State Bulletin/September 198!

THE PRESIDENT

Q. The United States has been
trying to broker an agreement be-
tween Mexico and its creditors. Has
that agreement come any closer in re-
cent days?

Secretary Baker. They're still
talking; we're still hopeful. I don't have
a report over the course of the last
3 hours myself. I think the bank ad-
visory committee and representatives
of the Mexican Government are still
meeting perhaps as we spread here.
And we're very hopeful that they will
arrive at a satisfactory conclusion.

President's Arrival Remarks,
Washington, D.C.,
July 18, 198910

irhank you for this warm welcome
lome. Barbara and I are delighted to
)e back, and we thank you for this
varm welcome back. I know you've
;een some of what we e.xperienced dur-
ng this trip, but let me just share with
.'ou some of the memorable moments of
he last 10 days that will certainly stay
n my mind: the open arms of the peo-
)le in Poland; American flags waving
n the square at the Lenin Shipyard in
jdansk; the faces of the people who
ined the streets, greeting us with
;uch joy; the thousands who endured a
Iriving downpour in Budapest to wel-
•ome us to Hungary; the students I
;poke to there, the hope of Hungary's
'uture; and images we won't foget. The
varmth Barbara and I felt is a reflec-
ion of the warmth the people of Poland
ind Hungary feel for America and for
mr ideals.

Then there was Paris, celebrating
■he bicentennial of the revolution that
irought forth the Rights of Man. And
low satisfying it was to witness the
mity of purpose that emerged from the
-;ummit, ranging from East-West rela-
ions to the environment.

Finally, the Netherlands and that
hurch at Leiden, spiritual home of the
'ilgrim Fathers and American ideals.

But of all these special moments, I
want to share one with you that is truly
special in its message It's a story told
by a Polish woman at a luncheon meet-
ing that I hosted in Warsaw. Around
the table sat members of Poland's Com-
munist Party and members of
Solidarity — in some cases, men and wo-
men who had been imprisoned on the
party's orders not so long ago and who
were now elected members of the Po-
lish Parliament. It was remarkable
proof of how far Poland had come. But
in Poland and in Hungary as well,
progress hasn't come without heroic
efforts — a heroism that comes from
deep within the heart. And this wo-
man, who'd worked at personal risk
for the release of many who had been
jailed, was asked: How is it possible,
after such a short time, to break bread
with the men who ordered those im-
prisonments? Why the absence of the
bitterness? And she said, "Our joy at
what is now happening is more power-
ful than memory." Those are the words
of someone who means to build a better
future — the desire to move forward to-
ward a better life, a life of freedom. It's
a source of tremendous strength.

It's the strength that enabled the
government and Solidarity to sit down
at the roundtable to negotiate new po-
litical progress for Poland, the strength
that enabled Lech Walesa and Gen. Ja-
ruzelski to sit side-by-side at the open-
ing of the new Polish Parliament. It's a
strength that in Hungary is enabling
the government and an emerging oppo-
sition to find a common ground in re-
form, to sit together in writing a new
constitution and in planning truly free
elections. We must not forget that it
was the strength and cohesion of our
Western alliance that has helped make
these dramatic changes possible.

Everywhere in Warsaw, Gdansk,
and Budapest, among the leaders of the
summit nations in Paris and then in the
Netherlands — I found an enormous
amount of excitement, excitement at
the times in which we are living and

the possibilities they offer: the chance
we have in our lifetimes to move be-
yond containment to end the division of
Europe, to make that continent truly
whole and free. Everywhere people
seem to sense that we live at a moment
when positive change is possible.

As I said yesterday in the Dutch
city of Leiden, history's great wheel is
turning once again. Just as the wind of
hope carried the Pilgrims to a new
world, we, too, now find a new world
within our reach, a world where the
yearnings for freedom overcomes dis-
cord and confrontation, where freedom
and democracy flourish for others, as
they have for this great country of
ours.

Thank you for this welcome home.
It is good to be back. And God bless the
United States of America. Thank you
very much.

' Text from Weekly Compilation of Pres-
idential Documents of July 24, 1989.

- Made at Okecie Airport (text from
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu-
ments of -luly 24).

■' At their meeting. President Bush and
Chairman Jaruzelski signed agreements re-
scheduling Poland's debt (text from Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents of
July 24).

■• Press release 133 of July 11.

•' Made at Gdansk Airport (text from
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu-
ments of July 24).

'■ Made in Hunters' Hall at the National
Parliament building (text from Weekly Com-
pilation of Presidential Documents of July
24).

' Press release 135.

>* Made at Budapest Airport (text from
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu-
ments of July 24).

" Press release 140 of July IS.

"' Made on the South Lawn of the White
House (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of July 24).H

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

News Conference of June 27 (Excerpts)

President Bush held a neu's
conference in the Briefing Room at the
White House on June 27, 1989.^

Q. When you were last with us, you
said that you had tried to contact the
leaders of China, and the line was
busy; you were unable to get through.
In light of the fact that there's now a
new party secretary, have you renew-
ed that try? And also in light of what
you just said, do you plan to ask
Prime Minister Li Peng to return the
Texas cowboy boots with the Ameri-
can flag on them that you gave him in
China?

A. I have no such plans, and I hope
he doesn't ask for his bicycles back ei-
ther. In terms of contacts, we are trying,
through our Embassy, to have contacts.
We have contact. Their Ambassador has
access to, and contact with, our officials
here; and so there has been some ex-
change of views. But I have not renewed
a phone call request, if that was your
question.

Q. Do you intend to go ahead and
send a Peace Corps team to China in
the fall to teach English, or will you
go along with the Chinese request
that that be delayed?

A. You have no choice; if the Chi-
nese say they're not welcome, they can't
come in. And it's too bad, because one of
the things that moved forward the re-
forms was contact with Americans. I
don't want to see those contacts cut off,
and I'm sorry that the Chinese have
made that decision.

I would like to have seen those
young volunteers go to China and help
teach English to the Chinese, and I like
these student exchanges. I don't want to
hurt the Chinese people. I have ex-
pressed my concern about what went on
in China. I reiterate my concern here to-
day. But I reiterate also my desire not to
do damage to the people themselves, be-
cause I believe that it was contact with
the United States and others in the West
that has moved the process of economic
reform forward and, hopefully someday,
will move the process of political reform
forward.

Q. You're going to Poland in a
few weeks, and I wonder — a lot's hap-
pened since your Hamtramck [Michi-

gan, April 17] speech. We've had the
free elections. Solidarity now may
have a much bigger role in what hap-
pens in Poland. When you go, are you
interested in bringing some expanded
debt relief, financial aid? Walesa
[chairman, Independent Free Trade
Union of Solidarity] has been saying
to the world that he really needs help
now. Do you think you are in a posi-
tion to bring it?

A. Yes, I'm in a position to discuss
it; inasmuch as some of what I want to
do will require legislation, that will not
have been completed. But I called [Sena-
tor] Lloyd Bentsen, the chairman of the
Finance Committee, to thank him over
the weekend for his stance in the Fi-
nance Committee in terms of support for
Poland. We will have a package that I'm
not prepared to discuss now in detail
that I hope will help.

I know this will be a subject of great
concern after the visit to Poland in our
economic summit meeting. But the prob-
lem is, we would like very much to help
Poland. I am very encouraged with
what's happened in Poland. But I want to
be sure that when we do offer the spe-
cifics and the specific plan to help Po-
land, that Poland itself will have taken
the steps necessary to have the money
well-spent. I don't want to just push
money down the drain. I think along
with what we can offer will have to come
from their side some reforms. And that I
want to talk to Gen. Jarulzelski [Chair-
man, Council of State] about and, obvi-
ously, Lech Walesa, and we'll see where
we go.

Q. Both there and in Hungary,
you're entering countries that are in
a transition and in a very delicate sit-
uation politically and vis-a-vis their
own allies. What cautions do you take
and do you exercise going in there so
as not to be a negative catalyst?

A. I think being there is the signifi-
cant thing. It is important that the Unit-
ed States shows its interest in these
countries that are undergoing change.
You don't want to overexhort. You don't
want to overpromise. You don't want to
rally people to levels of political activity
that might cause repression. What I
want to do is make clear where the Unit-
ed States stands in terms of our respect
for freedom; encourage reform as much
as possible; and then, back to [an earlier]
question, offer some specifics where we
can help on the economy.

My views on differentiation have not
changed over the last few years. We will
differentiate. We will support those that
move toward us — economically, politi-
cally, and in terms of human rights. It's
more on those general themes that I will
be talking to the Hungarian leaders and
the Polish leaders.

Q. Do you send any signal at the
same time to the Soviet Union, or
have you had any communication to
them about the purposes of your visit?

A. No, but I would not expect them
to be uptight about it. Mr. Gorbachev
goes to Western Europe and is well re-
ceived; and I will go to Eastern Europe,
and I will be well received. I think it
was a good thing, his trip to Germany.
I've talked to Chancellor Kohl about it
personally, and I don't get into some
state of competition when I see Mr. Gor-
bachev get a good, warm response in
Germany.

The NATO alliance is together. One
of the things that came out of the
Brussels NATO summit meeting was the
fact that there is strong unity there.
And so it's a good thing for him to go to
Western Europe, and it's a good thing
for the President of the United States to ■
go to Eastern Europe. I want to see us
move beyond containment. I want to see
a much more open Europe. The impor-
tance of this visit is along that line, and
it's not going to be we're going to solve
the problem of the Hungarian economy
or the Polish economy.

Q. You and Mr. Gorbachev are
touring each other's backyards in Eu-
rope. Now that you've finished your
foreign policy reviews with regard to
the Soviet Union, have you moved any
closer to perhaps meeting with the
General Secretary?

A. I wouldn't say closer. That mat-
ter will be discussed again — its having
been discussed once by the Secretary
[of State] and Foreign Minister Shev-
ardnadze. I guess I'd leave it right there.
There will, obviously at some point, be a
meeting, but I still feel I'd like the meet-
ing to be seen as productive rather than
just the meeting itself.

But let me say this: I feel comfort-
able about the wave length we're on with
the Soviet Union now, and I think they
feel comfortable in the sense that I think
they know we want to move forward with
START [strategic arms reduction talks].
They know that we're prepared to move
swiftly forward with rectifying the con-

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE PRESIDENT

\entional force imbalance. And, indeed,
I yot the feeling from talking to Chan-
cellor Kohl that Mr. Goi'bachev was not
hung up on the timetable that we set.

We're coming closer on some of
these broad-scale objectives. And then
there are some very nice, smaller
things: that Soviet ship helping with
the cleanup, and our kids from Brooke
[Institute of Surgical Research, Brooke
Army Medical Center] going over to
help with the burn — our specialized
burn unit, really qualified people, the
best in helping with burns — going to
the Soviet Union. And then the out-
reach at the time of Yerevan.

There are some atmospherics that
I think are very, very important and
harmonious that will help when we sit
down to hammer out the details on the
strategic arms talks or on these other
matters.

Q. Could I ask you to perhaps de-
fine a little bit more what useful or
progrress would be, in terms of a meet-
ing? .4re you setting a precondition,
as President Reagan did, that you
need something to sign, or is there —

A. No, I don't think it should be
something to sign, but I would like to
think that the governing criterion would
be so that the world would see the meet-
ing as having been successful, some-
thing good happening out of it. It doesn't
have to be signing, necessarily, although
I've been around this track long enough
to know that you can always whip out
something to sign — a fishing agreement
or something of this nature. [Laughter]

We could have that, but I'm not say-
ing that it should be hung up on a major
treaty of some sort before I would sit
down with Mi'. Gorbachev. Maybe we'll
do it like this: say, "Hey, let's get togeth-
er." And I'm interested in what he
thinks about it. We've had some commu-
nication back and forth, but all I want to
say is, I think the relationship is going in
the right general direction, albeit we
have tremendous differences with the
Soviet Union still. I still have — guided
by a certain sense of caution.

Q. You made much during the
campaign and after your election of
your relationship with China's lead-
ers, and yet for the past several weeks
you've been unable to contact them.
China appears to have ignored our
calls for clemency and for dialogue.
Do you not think the relationship was
oversold?

A. No, I don't think it was oversold.

Q. Then tell us what benefit
we've gained from it.

A. What we've gained is China has
a much more open economic system than
when the Shanghai communique was
signed quite a few years ago. What
we've gained is 30,000 students right
this minute, I think the figure is, study-
ing in the United States — Chinese kids
who are going back there with a sense of
what freedom and democracy are all
about. What we have gained is helping
China move out of a period of cultural
revolution isolation. This relationship is
important. I can continue to e.xpress my
outrage about what happened in Tianan-
men Square, and I will. But I am deter-
mined to do my level best to keep from
injuring the very people that we're try-
ing to help, and I'm talking about the
Chinese people generally.

We've gained a lot from this rela-
tionship, and so have they. I still think
that it is in the strategic interest of the
United States. I'm not talking about the
old adage of playing the "China card" or
something of that nature — playing the
"Soviet card." But if you look at the
world and you understand the dynamics
of the Pacific area, good relationships
with China are in the national interest of
the United States. It's hard to have
them. It's impossible at this moment to
have what I would say normalized rela-
tions, for very obvious reasons. But I am
going to do my level best to find a way to
see improvement there that will help the
Chinese people.

Q. It's the personal relationship
with China's leaders that I'm speak-
ing of. I'm looking for the benefit
when you cannot even complete a
phone call to Deng Xiaoping. I'm
wondering if the personal —

A. The benefit is I understand the
situation; that's the benefit. Leaders are
changing all the time over there — I
mean recently. We've got to deal with
who is there. We don't dictate to China
about their leaders. We express our con-
cerns as other leaders have.

But let me be very clear: In my
view, the United States has been out
front. We've been out front on the steps
we've taken, and I am very pleased that
there has been broad support for the po-
sition I've taken.

I heard it just today from the Prime
Minister of Australia [Robert Hawke],
one of the most knowledgeable men about

China. The Australians have always had
a — they've been a little out front.
They've had relations before we did, and
they have almost a unique standing in
China. They've done a lot of business
with China. They've had a lot of ex-
changes with China. Bob Hawke feels
that he knows most of the Chinese lead-
ers, the ones that we had been dealing
with. And to be as supportive as he was
today was very reassuring to me.

Q. How concerned are you that
the political retreat that we've seen
in China in recent weeks could be
duplicated in the Soviet Union?

A. I did not predict what would
happen in Tiananmen Square, and I
don't know of any China expert, scholar
or otherwise, who predicted that. I
guess the lesson is: Go forward as best
you can. Keep your eyes open. Hold high
the banner of values that we believe in —
the United States. We have a special re-
sponsibility around the world in terms of
human rights and democracy, freedom.
But keep your eyes open. That's what
I've learned from this.

Q. Have you had any communica-
tions with Secretary Gorbachev on
the situation in China?

A. Not on China. Maybe others in
the Administration — not Gorbachev per-
sonally. But I followed carefully the
statements out of there and obviously
the Soviet Union has tried to — with Gor-
bachev's visit to China — improve rela-
tions. But I think that's on a little bit of a
hold, although maybe they're more ac-
commodating than we are right now.

Q. Are you concerned that a dete-
rioration in the U.S. relations with
China would disrupt the strategic bal-
ance between the United States and
the Soviet Union? And is that of over-
riding importance in your reaction to
events there?

A. As you look at the whole Pacific
area, you have to consider that. I have
never been one who thinks that the rela-
tionship with China ought to be based on
playing the "Soviet card" or placing the
"China card." I will not overlook funda-
mental abuse of the human rights be-
cause of a strategic concern. But, of
course, when you look at all your rela-
tionships, a President must be concerned
about the strategic importance of the re-
lationships. Not only is our relationship

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE SECRETARY

with China of strategic importance, it
has this whole cultural and educational
and art and, hopefully someday, human
rights side of it.

You look at it in what is right be-
tween China and the United States,
but, of course, I'm concerned about the
strategic implications. It's not just the
strategic implications vis-a-vis the So-
viet Union. Take a look at what Deng
Xiaoping used to call encirclement and
look at what he means. Just take a look
at China on the map, and you'll under-
stand why the Chinese leaders still, as
recently as 3 months ago, talked about
encirclement. That gets you into the
questions of the ASEAN [Association of
South East Asian Nations] countries. It
gets you into the question of what's
happening in Cambodia today. It gets
you into the question of, obviously
then, Vietnam, the Korean Peninsula.
There's a lot of strategic interests in-
volved here.

Secretary Visits Japan, Brunei,
and Oman

' Te.xt from Weekly Compilation of Pres-
idential Documents of July 3, 1989. ■

Secretary Baker visited Japan
(July i-5, 1989), Bnmei (July 5-7) to
participate in the Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) post-
ministerial conference, and Oman
(July 8-9).

Following are his address before a
special public session of the Multi-
lateral Assistayice Initiative (MAI)
pledging conference for the Philippines
iyi Tokyo and statements made at the
ASEAN postministerial conference
and a news conference in Bandar Seri
Begawan.

MAI PLEDGING CONFERENCE,

TOKYO,

JULY 4, 19891

It gives me great pleasure to partici-
pate in the inauguration of the Multi-
lateral Assistance Initiative for the
Philippines. I particularly wish to
thank the World Bank and the Govern-
ment of Japan for organizing and host-
ing this special occasion. Japan's
e.xtraordinary contributions to the
MAI exemplify the kind of leadership
befitting a global economic power.

MAI is a concrete expression of
the kind of partnership and "creative
responsibility-sharing" we see as the
basis of a new era in East Asia and
the Pacific — as I indicated in a speech
to our Asia Society a week ago.

President Bush and I believe that
the MAI is essential if the Philippine
economy is to grow and develop in a
sustained, broad-based fashion over the
next critical years. As an important ef-
fort based on international cooperation,
the MAI will set a worldwide example
of the use of multilateral assistance re-
sources, from both public and private
sector sources, in support of economic
restructuring and sound environmental
management.

MAI's Role in Fortifying
Democracy's Economic Base

Our purpose here today, however, is
much more than strengthening econom-
ic reform in one country. It is to ex-
press in tangible ways our commitment
to the success of democracy and
freedom.

In country after country in the
world today, from Eastern Europe to
East Asia, we see the dramatic rela-
tionship between economic success and
democratic values. Development height-
ens demands for democracy; and with-
out democracy, economic progress
cannot be sustained. Thus, from its be-
ginning, the MAI has had implications
and objectives well beyond the purely
economic. MAI is also critical to the
future of Philippine democracy.

Few can forget the dramatic days
of February 1986 when Filipinos bravely
risked their lives for democracy.
Just as dramatic as the success of "peo-
ple power" in the Philippines has been
President Aquino's persistence in re-
viving democratic institutions. Today,
more than 300,000 Philippine public of-
ficials have been freely chosen in three
elections under a new, democratic con-
stitution. An unfettered, free-wheeling
press aptly symbolizes this new spirit
of freedom.

President Aquino and her govern-
ment have undertaken farsighted and
far-reaching economic reforms to revi-
talize the Philippine economy. Acceler-
ating growth rates since 1986 reached
6.8% last year. This growth has come
while the Philippine Government has
responsibly and effectively managed a
$28 billion foreign debt burden.

Nonetheless, enormous problems of
poverty and development persist —
problems that challenge us all to this
very special effort. As a result of the
12% economic decline in the last diffi-
cult years before 1986, average incomes
are still well below their 1981 high.
During the early 1980s, unemployment
mushroomed, and poverty gripped
more than 60% of the people. The result
was rapid growth of a communist-led
insurgency.

Thus, democracy in the Philippines
remains fragile and under attack. The
communist movement, while probably
no longer growing, continues to commit
violence and exploit the vulnerabilities
in Philippine society for political gain.
This violence directly touched the
United States in the recent tragic
murder of our own Col. Nick Rowe in
Manila.

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE SECRETARY

The Role of the Philippine
Government in MAI's Success

The MAI concept demonstrates a de-
termination to fortify democracy's eco-

' nomic base at this critical time. MAI
represents an extraordinary commit-

, ment by donors that is matched by an

I extraordinary commitment by the Fili-

I pinos themselves.

The Philippine Government has
presented here its "Agenda for Growth
and Development" — an impressive pro-
gram of economic restructuring fo-
cused on sustainable growth, more
equitable distribution of economic ben-
efits, reduction of poverty, and restora-

I tion of commercial creditworthiness.
This Philippine reform agenda pro-

I vides the broad framework for the MAI

i upon which an intensified Philippine
reform effort can build. MAI resources
will complement and support further

■; development and implementation of the

' economic restructuring and develop-
ment programs set out in the agenda.
This, in turn, will reinforce the prog-
ress already made in structuring a dy-
namic, private sector-led Philippine
economy — an economy free to expand
to the full potential of the richly tal-
ented and industrious Philippine people.

In the reform agenda paper, the
Filipinos show their commitment to
continue removing bureaucratic and
administrative roadblocks to rapid and
effective development. They are also
committed to speeding the delivery of
services that improve the daily lives of

I the average Filipino.

The Philippine authorities will con-
tinue the process of opening their econ-
omy to trade, investment, competition,
and entrepreneurial ingenuity. And,
they promise a dedication to environ-
mental protection — including rational
use, protection, and restoration of vital
natural resources. They recognize that
without such a commitment to conser-
vation, economic progress in the Phil-
ippines will be built on an eroding
foundation.

The Role of the Private Sector

Thus, to succeed, the MAI must be a
true partnership among concerned na-
tions, the Philippine people, and their
government — a common commitment to
the future.

Special efforts must be made by
all. The private sector is, ultimately,
far more important than the increased
official assistance we provide here.

MAI is designed to produce a strong
positive response from the private sec-
tor. The Philippine Government can es-
tablish a foundation for private sector-
led growth by strengthening policies
that stimulate economic dynamism and
investment and by carefully choosing
and implementing infrastructure pro-
jects. We are particularly pleased that
Korea and Singapore, two countries
with enormously successful experience
in this regard, have joined us here to
participate in the MAI effort.

The MAI serves as a challenge to
international business to broaden its
own commitment to the Philippines.
Strong support for Philippine
democracy — exemplified by the MAI
commitments that the United States
and other donors will make here —
shows faith in the Philippine economic
potential as well. The international
business community must join with the
Filipino business community in a con-
certed effort to realize that potential.

The U.S. Contribution

The United States is prepared to back
its investment in the future of Philip-
pine democracy. President Bush has
asked the U.S. Congress for a multi-
year commitment of $1 billion for the
MAI. For the first year of the pro-
gram, the United States is seeking to
provide $200 million in special grant
assistance, above and beyond our
already large economic assistance
program.

Members of Congress from both
parties and both Houses have played a
pivotal role in launching the MAI.
Senators Lugar and Cranston, Repre-
sentative Solarz and former Repre-
sentative— now Secretary [of the
Department of Housing and Urban
Development] — Kemp originally pro-
moted this special program for Phil-
ippine democracy. They and other
interested Members of Congress of
both parties have joined with us in
laying its foundation. With the strong
bipartisan support the Philippines
enjoys, we will work hard with the Con-
gress for approval of this $200 million
as the initial U.S. contribution to the
success of the MAI.

Key Objectives

The United States expects to support
directly a number of key Philippine ob-
jectives with its MAI assistance.

Expanding the Private Sector

Role. Our first priority is to expand
the scope and role of the private sector
in the Philippine economy by strength-
ening macroeconomic and structural
reform. Such reform, coupled with bad-
ly needed infrastructure projects will
contribute to developing an appropriate
environment for attracting private in-
vestment from home and abroad.

Debt Reduction. Another impor-
tant MAI objective is the reduction of
the Philippines debt and debt service
burden. Such a reduction will be a key
factor in the Philippines' efforts to in-
crease its reliance on investment and
other private capital inflows, in place
of official sources of financing, over the
5-year period of the MAI. The Philip-
pines has expressed its intention to
pursue the options for debt and debt
service reduction embodied in Treas-
ury Secretary Brady's proposals to
strengthen the international debt strat-
egy. Thus, we expect that U.S. assist-
ance under the MAI will add to funds
available from the IMF [International
Monetary Fund], World Bank, and oth-
er sources to support market-oriented
operations to reduce the Philippines'
debt and debt service.

Conservation. Another key objec-
tive of U.S. participation in MAI is the
rational management of natural re-
sources to ensure that today's growth
builds — and does not destroy — the re-
source base needed for the Philippines'
future prosperity. We would like to see
protection of the environment and nat-
ural resource conservation become the
focus of a special, follow-on meeting in
the near future. Innovative programs
with the private sector, such as debt-
for-nature swaps, should also be consid-
ered as a means of expanding the re-
sources available for environmental
research and protection.

Effective Donor Cooperation. Fi-
nally, we see the MAI as an exciting
opportunity to broaden and institu-
tionalize donor cooperation. As the two
largest bilateral donors to the Philip-
pines, the United States and Japan
have worked together closely to shape
the MAI as an experiment in enhanced
coordination. Just as the intergovern-
mental group on Indonesia has played a
formative role for two decades in Indo-
nesia's dramatic economic revival, we
anticipate that the MAI will attract
substantial support from an increasing
number of nations. And in MAI we see
a means by which the international
community can give regular support
to the Philippine Government's efforts

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE SECRETARY

to advance economic reform — thus
strengthening the foundation of Philip-
pine democracy.

Conclusion

In closing, let me just note that today is
a very special day in U.S. -Philippine
relations — the Fourth of July. For many
years, Filipinos and Americans have
remembered July 4th as Philippine-
American Friendship Day, to reinforce
our traditionally close relationship. It
is in this spirit that the United States
has helped to pioneer the MAI. And it
is in this spirit that the United States
is proud to join in partnership with the
remarkable range of allies and friends
represented here, today, in this impor-
tant joint effort to promote democracy
and prosperity in the Philippines.

ASEAN POSTMINISTERIAL

CONFERENCE,
BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN

JULY 6, 19892

I am very pleased to be here. This is
my first opportunity to participate in
this important forum. Close consulta-
tion with ASEAN has become a tradi-
tion with American Secretaries of State
for a key reason: Our respect for and
collective efforts with ASEAN serve as
a pillar of U.S. policy in the Pacific.

As the importance of the Pacific
grows, the vitality of the ASEAN post-
ministerial conference dialogue grows
with it. In that spirit, I am an.xious to
share with you our views on the situa-
tion in Asia and the Pacific and the
challenges we see in this historic time
of transition.

Asia — like Europe — is in the midst
of transformations propelling the world
toward a promising new era. In many
ways, East Asia has gotten a jump on
the new order taking shape. We see sev-
eral unmistakable trends: the world-
wide renaissance of democracy; the
failure of communism as an economic
and political system; the renewed force
of free enterprise and private initiative
in an increasingly integrated global
economy; and rapid technological ad-
vance propelled by the open e.xchange
of information within a worldwide sci-
entific community.

This new order is full of challenges
and opportunities for all nations. And
the going will not always be smooth —
as events in China have proven. There
will be setbacks, disappointments, and

risks. But to stand in the way of neces-
sary, historic change — as we have seen
to our revulsion and sorrow in China —
is to turn one's back to the future.

The United States seeks in this pe-
riod of great global change to adjust old
international structures and build new
ones in order to foster our fundamental
principles: democracy, freedom, eco-
nomic liberty, reliance on open mar-
kets, and respect for the efforts and
contributions of the individual.

ASEAN as a Pioneer

in "Creative Responsibility Sharing"

If the United States is to meet the
challenges and realize the oppor-
tunities, we must engage actively in a
new partnership with ASEAN and our
other friends elsewhere throughout the
world.

The United States hopes to serve
as a catalyst for cooperation. President
Bush calls this process "creative re-
sponsibility sharing." It's a concept al-
ready familiar to ASEAN. You have
been the key orchestrator of interna-
tional efforts to end the Cambodian
conflict. You are actively engaged in
e.xploring new possibilities for econom-
ic cooperation in the Pacific. ASEAN
nations have collectively provided first
asylum to millions of refugees from In-
dochina. And ASEAN has been helpful
in initiating the Uruguay Round of
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade] negotiations — to name only
a few key areas where ASEAN has long
practiced creative responsibility
sharing.

Together, the United States, our
allies in Asia, and our friends in
ASEAN have much work to do, for the
sake of each of our nations, for the sake
of the region, and for global well-being.

Together, we must work to ensure
the vitality of the world's trading sys-
tem. Fast-maturing economies and the
rush of new technologies are putting
new strains on global commerce. Now,
all who have benefited from the open
system of trade must share respon-
sibility for keeping it open. We must
counter all forms of protectionism —
whether overt, subtle, or structural —
in all the nations that rim the Pacific.

Together, we must ensure the secu-
rity and stability of the Pacific. U.S.
security commitments in the region
have fostered an environment in which
the ASEAN economies have flour-
ished. Changing threats and resource
constraints notwithstanding, the
United States intends to maintain
its presence in East Asia.

The conflict in Indochina under-
scores the importance of our security
consensus and our political association
with ASEAN. Vietnam's announced in-
tention to withdraw from Cambodia by
the end of September has given a new
urgency to the search for peace. While
the prospects for a resolution of the
Cambodian conflict are encouraging,
the danger of a new cycle of civil war is
very real. As always, we view close co-
operation with ASEAN as essential to
bringing about a just and durable
peace based on the self-determination
and renewal of the Cambodian people.

As free nations, we must do all that
we can to foster democratic and human-
itarian efforts in the region. The
comprehensive plan of action for
Indochinese refugees agreed to in
Geneva last month is one such oppor-
tunity. Another is ASEAN's support
for democracy in the Philippines, in-
cluding the Multilateral Assistance
Initiative.

So, together we face these and
many other challenges. I'm here to
say — and I cannot stress this too
strongly — that the United States will
stay engaged with you to see them
through. We see East Asia as integral
to America's future — and to the world's
future. We see continuing U.S. engage-
ment as crucial to the stability, growth,
and influence of this dynamic region.

In my consultations here in Brunei,
I would like to outline U.S. views for
meeting these challenges. Today, in
particular, I want to discuss two areas
of major concern to us and to you in
ASEAN: enhancing Pacific Basin coop-
eration and security in Southeast Asia.

Pacific Basin Cooperation

In recent years, we have witnessed a
remarkable degree of economic and fi-
nancial integration in the Pacific.
Transpacific trade totaled $271 billion
last year, and intra-Asian trade was in
the range of $200 billion. U.S. invest-
ment in ASEAN has more than doubled
since 1982 to over $10 billion. Together
with Japan, we account for 70% of for-
eign investment in ASEAN.

The growing interdependence of
the region has raced ahead of the orga-
nizational means to contend with its ef-
fects and to ensure a smooth transition
to the ne.xt stage. Over the past year,
we have seen a number of proposals to
create a mechanism to address econom-
ic opportunities and problems of com-
mon concern. They all seek to enhance
region-wide cooperation so as to

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE SECRETARY

strengthen sustainable economic
yrowth. They all recognize our mutual
(.ninmitment to one another and to the

, larger international economic order.

Pacific rim economic cooperation is
an idea whose time has come. Building
a consensus to turn these ideas into
reality is a top item on our agenda. We
do not bring a definitive blueprint.
Rather, through dialogue with ASEAN
and other market-oriented countries,
we seek accord on the guiding princi-
ples and structure of such a mecha-
nism. As a starting point, let me offer

, a few suggestions for your

I consideration.

1 First, we believe it would be useful
i if a possible mechanism encompassed a
' significant array of issues — for exam-
ple, trade, investment, and regional

■ economic infrastructures, such as
transportation and communications. It
could possibly extend to other topics
such as the protection of the natural re-
sources of the Pacific Basin. Effective
management of our interdependence
necessitates a full understanding of
one another's perspectives.

Second, a pan-Pacific entity should
recognize the diversity of social and
economic systems and differing levels
I of development in the region.

Third, while acknowledging our
distinctive national differences, we
should also recognize together that pri-
, vate initiative and free-market policies
offer the best route for promoting op-
portunity and higher living standards
for all our citizens.

Fourth, we should forge a common
commitment by market economies to
facilitate the free flow of goods, serv-
ices, capital, technology, and ideas.

Fifth, any Pacific-wide institution
must be an inclusive entity that ex-
pands trade and investment. It should
help, not hinder, already existing ef-
forts such as the Uruguay Round or the
OECD [Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development].

Sixth, any such effort must re-
spect, preserve, and perhaps even en-
hance the uniquely beneficial ASEAN
contribution to the region and to the
world at large.

Finally, any ongoing governmental
support for a new arrangement should
be flexible so it can adapt as the group
and its functions evolve. Perhaps a
, small secretariat staffed by govern-

■ ment officials would be suitable. Alter-
natively, a less formal Sherpa group
drawing from each of our governments
might be preferred.

These are some of our thoughts. I
hope they contribute to advancing a re-
sult that is to our mutual benefit. But
I am here this week to learn what you
think — for we need a consensus, if we
are to proceed successfully.

Ensuring Regional Security

Another key item on our agenda is rein-
forcing regional security. We view our
forward-deployed deterrent as a
central element in maintaining
equilibrium in the region.

Our military bases in the Philip-
pines are an important part of this bal-
ance. We hope and expect to find ways
to sustain our military presence in the
Philippines after 1991. Such an outcome
would best serve the interests of the
United States, the Philippines, and
stability in Southeast Asia. But what-
ever the outcome of the negotiations
with the Philippine Government — that
we expect to begin this fall — we are
committed to maintaining a credible
deterrent in the region to honor our
treaty obligations.

I must add that our friendship with
the Philippines far transcends the fate
of Clark and Subic Bay Our Multi-
lateral Assistance Initiative testifies to
that. It is a symbol of our commitment
to support democracy in the region and
a model of donor cooperation.

Our most immediate security chal-
lenge lies in Indochina. The conflict in
Cambodia remains the chief source of
tension in the region. Efforts to build
comprehensive and stable political set-
tlement are now reaching a critical
stage. The United States and ASEAN
share three main objectives: a verified
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, ef-
fective measures to prevent the return
to dominance of the Khmer Rouge, and
self-determination for the Cambodian
people.

We believe that support for the
noncommunist resistance led by Prince
Sihanouk is central to reaching our
goals. As the negotiating process quick-
ens, we should increase, not decrease,
the influence of those who are best po-
sitioned to counter the beneficiaries of
aggression and the agents of brutality.
Prince Sihanouk's efforts to work out
a powersharing agreement with the
Hanoi-sponsored Hun Sen regime are
crucial to the achievement of a viable
political accord, and we urge our
ASEAN friends to use their unity to do
all they can to strengthen the Prince's
position, as he seeks to advance the
process of national reconciliation.

Such an accord, we believe, should
include: a cease-fire: cessation of for-
eign military aid to all factions; an
interim coalition government led by
Prince Sihanouk; and an adequate and
credible international presence to veri-
fy the Vietnamese withdrawal, monitor
and supervise free elections, and sta-
bilize the peace. We see the United
Nations as the best means of accom-
plishing these objectives.

Like others in this region, and be-
yond, we too hope the day is near when
Indochina can be transformed from a
battlefield to a marketplace. Yet to
achieve this end — to remake the terri-
ble swords of the killing fields into
plowshares for a peaceful community —
we must maintain our resolve and our
unity of purpose, now more than ever.

In conclusion, President Bush and I
have great respect for the cooperative
and rewarding relationship we have al-
ready developed with ASEAN. But we
believe the future holds even greater
promise. We seek to go beyond our past
successes to forge a creative, growing,
and mutually beneficial partnership for
the challenging era ahead.

July 7, 19893

... I reviewed our views on the new
currents in Asia and our approach to-
ward subjects of particular concern to
ASEAN. In light of our indepth and
candid exchanges over the past 2 days,
I would like to share with you my view
of where we stand with regard to three
critical issues: the conflict in Cam-
bodia, the Pacific rim economic cooper-
ation, and refugees.

The Cambodian Conflict

On the Cambodian question, I am im-
pressed with the substantial consen-
sus that exists. Both ASEAN and the
United States are united on the need
for a truly comprehensive settlement.

Over the past 10 years, the United
States has strongly supported ASEAN's
unwavering efforts to mobilize the in-
ternational community in opposition to
the Vietnamese occupation. As a result
of that firm resolve, we have reason
to expect that Vietnam will soon
withdraw its forces completely from
Cambodia.

We are of one mind on what must
happen after Vietnam's withdrawal:
There is a critical need for ASEAN
and Western unity to ensure the emer-

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE SECRETARY

gence and survival of a new, independ-
ent Cambodia. This new Cambodia
must be free to determine its own fu-
ture, and it must not be dominated by
thie murderous Khmer Rouge. There-
fore, ASEAN, the United States, and
others must work together in the days
and weelis ahead on behalf of a settle-
ment incorporating three essential
principles.

First, there should be a compre-
hensive solution encompassing a cease-
fire, measures to control the Khmer
Rouge effectively, transitional power-
sharing arrangements, and then free
elections to enable the Cambodians to
determine their own future. A confer-
ence which addresses only "external"
issues — leaving key political questions
unresolved — cannot succeed.

Second, there should be an interim
coalition government in which Prince
Sihanouk plays the leading role, re-
flecting a real sharing of power with
the noncommunist resistance.

Third, these arrangements should
be supervised by an international con-
trol mechanism organized by the United
Nations. This UN mechanism should
verify the Vietnamese withdrawal,
monitor and protect the transitional ar-
rangements, oversee free elections,
and stabilize the peace.

These principles have formed the
basis of Indonesia's commendable spon-
sorship of the Jakarta informal meet-
ing. They have been affirmed in your
recent ASEAN ministerial declaration.
Now they must be the basis of our com-
mon position as we enter the interna-
tional conference in Paris next month.

All of us agree, I believe, that our
responsibilities to regional security,
as well as to the Cambodian people, do
not end with a Vietnamese withdrawal.
They must extend to the creation of
an independent and stable Cambodia.
It would be a tragedy if this triumph
of ASEAN cohesion — the Vietnamese
withdrawal — were undone through fail-
ure to follow through with a similar
unity of purpose. This lapse could well
lead to a new period of civil war. It
could endanger people who have al-
ready suffered too much. And it could
ultimately lead to more foreign inter-
vention. The Cambodian people deserve
much better than this.

Pacific Rim Economic Cooperation

The second issue that merits our spe-
cial attention is Pacific rim economic
cooperation. Yesterday, I noted some

suggestions for consideration. I believe
our subsequent discussions revealed
the general opinion that we should pro-
ceed on the basis of consensus — with
full respect for the special interests
of ASEAN.

There are, of course, a number of
questions we need to answer, working
together. Over the coming months, per-
haps our subministeral officials could
help us address matters of agenda,
structure, and timing. A ministerial
meeting toward the end of this year
could possibly assist in developing or
securing a consensus. Through one
means or another, we need to maintain
forward movement on this important
initiative.

Let me close on this issue by touch-
ing again on an aspect that should be
significant for all who want to resist
protectionism and to assure the oppor-
tunity for continued strong growth in
Asia based on exports. I believe an as-
sociation of the type we have discussed
can help us inform the American people
of the importance of the region and of
the need to maintain a strong commit-
ment to Asia. We want to broaden and
deepen the network of our public and
private ties with Asia — and this coop-
eration mechanism could assist to that
end. I hope, therefore, your govern-
ments give it thorough consideration.

Refugees

The third and final issue on which I be-
lieve we can register progress is refu-
gees. The comprehensive plan of action
that emerged from the Geneva confer-
ence last month was a major accom-
plishment for multilateral diplomacy
and one in which ASEAN can take con-
siderable pride for its leadership role.
We need to adhere to the comprehen-
sive plan of action and implement it
faithfully. The United States welcomes
the affirmation of the practice of first
asylum and urges all countries to abide
by this principle. For our part, we have
pledged to admit up to 22,000 individu-
als from the precutoff date caseload
and to accept up to 50% of all screened-
in cases. We remain strongly opposed
to the forcible repatriation of those
screened out.

The comprehensive plan of action
can only deal with the symptoms of the
refugee problem, however; its root
causes lie in Vietnam, with its failed
economic, political, and social policies.
Over the long run, we must see that
Vietnam fulfills its comprehensive plan

of action commitments, and we should
keep up the pressure on it to reform its
political and economic system.

Trade and Investment Program

I would like to conclude by citing
one more concrete example of U.S.-
ASEAN cooperation. I am pleased to-
day to announce that the U.S. Govern-
ment, in partnership with ASEAN and
the private sector, is launching a new
$13 million trade and investment pro-
gram through our Agency for Interna-
tional Development. This program will,
promote policy reforms that will en-
hance market opportunities for U.S.
and ASEAN companies. It will also en-
courage trade and investment through
trade missions and greater market in-
formation. Finally, this program will
help create a new ASEAN growth fund.

This effort is but one example of
the innovative new ventures we can
launch together. Its promotion of libera
trade and investment regimes, among
and between ASEAN countries, is a
practical symbol of the importance my
government attaches to the economic
and strategic interdependence betweei
the United States and Pacific rim
countries. ■

In closing, let me say once again
how delighted I am to have been able t
represent the United States here with
you today. I believe that this oppor-
tunity for a personal and candid ex-
change of views with ASEAN is critica
to maintaining a vital, prosperous, and
stable Pacific community. I look for- ■'
ward to many more such exchanges in
the future.

NEWS CONFERENCE,

BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN,

JULY 7, 1989^ I

First of all, let me say that I'm very
pleased with this trip. The group ses-
sions that we've had have been, I think,
very productive. The bilaterals have
been an excellent complement to those
and have permitted me to develop, I
hope, some very beneficial personal re-
lationships. I welcome the fact that our
notion of "creative responsibility-
sharing" seems to be evident in many
quarters. I'd refer you to the Multi-
lateral Assistance Initiative for the
Philippines, the notion of an entity for
Pacific rim cooperation, the unity of
ASEAN and the dialogue partners on
Cambodia. I think that these common

Department of State Bulletin/September 1988

THE SECRETARY

^efforts represent some very good first
steps in laying the foundation for in-
creased cooperation in the Pacific.

Those of you in the U.S. press
know that on the way over here, I listed
seven objectives before we left. I'd like
to touch briefly on each one of those.

First of all, I think we've made
very clear our full engagement and
commitment to Asia during this time of
rapid change and, indeed, some tur-
moil. And, of course, that was one of
our objectives. I want to note in that
regard that the ASEAN as well as most
others present — I think it's fair to say
!that all of the dialogue partners —
;stressed the importance of maintaining
jopen lines with the People's Republic of
China. This is perhaps even more im-
portant in a time of upheaval. I think
one of the ASEAN members put it this
way: "Take it easy with China." This
.seems to me to reaffirm the measured
response approach that we have been
taking in the United States. It reaf-
firms President Bush's judgment with
respect to the manner in which we
ought to handle this matter. Of course,
none of us will ever — can ever or will
lever — accept the horrible actions that
took place there. But our foreign policy
must really keep open the possibility of
and, indeed, encourage China's full re-
turn to the international community.

The second objective or second
point that I mentioned on the way over
was the possibility of a global partner-
ship between the United States and Ja-
pan, and I think the brief stop in Japan
was a stepping stone toward the build-
ing of that global partnership. I would
refer you there to the close interaction
between our two governments on the
Multilateral Assistance Initiative and
on the Pacific rim cooperation idea.

Third, I spoke about our commit-
ment to democracy and growth in the
Philippines. Of course the Multilateral
Assistance Initiative and our bilateral
discussions, I think, are evidence of
this. In addition to that. President
Bush has invited President Aquino to
visit the United States, and she will be
coming as his guest on November the
9th.

Fourth, we conveyed our respect
for and interest in working with the
ASEAN countries on a diverse number
of problems. I think examples of that
are the firm U.S. support for the
■ASEAN position on Cambodia, our on-
going commitment to play a major role
with topics such as refugees. And I

hope and believe that maybe we
touched a new chord with respect to
our intervention on the issue of
terrorism.

Fifth, I hope that I have been able
to establish some good personal rela-
tionships, as I said I wanted to do on
the way over here.

Sixth, I believe that we have begun
to move the idea of a Pacific rim eco-
nomic cooperation entity a step ahead.
There will be further discussion with
respect to this. I hope that we will be
in a position — and I think there's a rea-
sonably good chance that we will — to
all attend a ministerial conference in
Australia sometime in November or
perhaps at the latest in December.

And the last objective, of course,
that I mentioned on the way over here
was the idea that I wanted to do what I
could to communicate to the United
States — the people of the United States
and the public of the United States —
the importance of this region to the
United States. Perhaps I need to leave
that to those of you in the press in
terms of whether we're able to do that
for the short term. In the longer term,
however, I hope that some of the part-
nerships we're developing with Japan,
the Philippines, and with ASEAN gen-
erally will carry forward to create a
greater recognition at home of the im-
portance of Asia to our future.

Q. Have you received an assur-
ance yet from the Soviet Union that
they could agree with the idea of the
United Nations sponsoring a Cambo-
dian peacekeeping force? And if you
haven't, would you now challenge the
Soviets to accept the idea?

A. I don't have to challenge the So-
viets to accept the idea, because in our
discussions with them, they've indicated
that that idea would be acceptable to
them; they have interposed no objection
to the idea of a UN control mechanism or
peacekeeping force.

Q. What role would the United
States play in [inaudible]?

A. The United States will be a par-
ticipant in the forthcoming conference in
Paris. We have some strongly held views
about the nature and makeup of the in-
ternational control mechanism. We feel
very strongly that it should be a UN en-
tity or body and that it should be suffi-
cient in terms of resources and numbers
of people to get the job done. With re-
spect to the second part of your ques-
tion, the United States has been
committed to the security of

this region for quite awhile. I reiterated
our continuing commitment to the secu-
rity of this region, both in the group ses-
sions and in the bilaterals I had with
Thailand and, for that matter, other AS-
EAN countries.

Q. Vietnam has said it would
withdraw in September 1989. Now,
should that happen it [inaudible] re-
sult in something of a civil war.
Would the United States continue to
aid and support the noncommunists if
that were to happen?

A. That's a very hypothetical and
speculative question and so I probably
should decline to answer it. I'm not at all
sure that civil war would necessarily re-
sult. That's one thing, of course, that we
think a comprehensive settlement of the
problems of Cambodia would avoid. It's
one of the things that we will be seeking
to avoid; one of the things that ASEAN
will be seeking to avoid. Once again, let
me reiterate that there is an almost com-
plete degree of unity in the position of
ASEAN and the dialogue partners here
with respect to the way in which we
should approach the question of a settle-
ment in Cambodia.

Q. It is essentially your view that
the Khmer Rouge be included in an
interim administration?

A. No, it is not essential in our
view. It happens to be essential, I think,
in the view of some other major players
in this equation. I'm sure that the Peo-
ple's Republic of China has some very
definite view with respect to this. I
would refer you to the comments of
Prince Sihanouk himself of not long ago
when he said he would prefer to see them
represented in the government than out
in the jungle — not in a position of domi-
nance or power. And of course, we defi-
nitely do not want to see them in a
position of dominance in a government.

Q. How seriously do the actions
of the Likud party in Israel damage
the Shamir plan for elections in the
West Bank?

A. Let me say that the actions of
which you speak were the actions of a po-
litical party. They were not the actions of
a government. The United States contin-
ues to support the Israeli Government's
proposal for elections leading the nego-
tiations, a proposal that was adopted by
the Israeli Cabinet on May 14. We think
that the elections proposal by the Israeli
Government gives us a possible way to
get to direct negotiations between the
parties. And it's only by direct negotia-
tions between the parties that we will, I
think, find our way to peace.

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE SECRETARY

Having said that, I would have to
add that, in our judgment, the Likud
resokitions are not helpful in this re-
gard. Imposing restrictive conditions
are, I think, obviously going to make it
more difficult to get to negotiations.
We have urged all the parties to avoid
this.

Q. On your first trip as Secre-
tary of State through Europe, in
meeting with European ministers, we
heard frequently about the fascina-
tion with Gorbachev in Western Eu-
rope. I'm curious, in your discussion
here in East Asia, do you find a simi-
lar fascination with Gorbachev?

A. To be very honest with you, I did
not find a similar fascination with re-
spect to the personality of the General
Secretary. We did have a discussion of
East-West issues; it was on the agenda
yesterday. We had what I thought was an
in-depth discussion of East-West issues
and of the rather dramatic changes that
are taking place, not just in the Soviet
Union but in many of the countries of
Eastern Europe as well.

Q. Could you specifically name
the countries which the United States
thinks should take part in a
conference?

A. I'd rather not get into fingering
countries. I might name some that, for
one reason or another, didn't think they
ought to participate or didn't want to
participate. So I really would prefer not
to do that.

Q. Back to Cambodia. Is it the
U.S. preference that the Khmer
Rouge play no role in a new
government?

A. That would be, I think, our pref-
erence. But I think that we are realistic.
I think we understand the facts on the
ground. I think we understand also that
a settlement must be comprehensive. We
understand that Prince Sihanouk, in our
view, at least, should have the major role
to play. It is Prince Sihanouk who has
said that he would prefer to see some
representation of that group within the
government rather than having them
outside in the jungle engaged in civil
war

Q. As you look ahead, it seems
that the Vietnamese are withdrawing
from Cambodia. What do you see as
the future of U.S. -Vietnam relations?
Do you see further conditions needed
before the United States would recog-
nize Vietnam?

A. I certainly don't see the United
States recognizing Vietnam in the near
term. We have always said one condition

was that they must withdraw from Cam-
bodia. We are also interested, as you
know, in resolving the POW/MIA [pris-
oners of war/missing in action] problem
that confronts us, as far as Vietnam is
concerned.

Q. On Pacific cooperation, what
are the chances of there actually be-
ing a conference in November or De-
cember judging by the response
you've had at ASEAN? Do you think it
would be harmful if the conference
would not be organized by that time?

A. Let me take those questions in
the reverse order in which you asked
them. One, I don't think it would be
harmful. I think it would be very benefi-
cial if a conference could be held within
that timeframe, and I think that there is
a reasonably good chance that that is
possible. We had some rather in-depth
discussions of this concept. Many of us
made it abundantly clear, I hope, that
ASEAN would have to form the basis
and the foundation for such an undertak-
ing but that such an undertaking, we
think, would benefit not just dialogue
partners but ASEAN and dialogue part-
ners as well. There have been entities
for economic cooperation and develop-
ment in Europe for quite some time.
Asia is growing dramatically. The econ-
omies of Asia are developing dramati-
cally. There are very good reasons, we
think, from the standpoint of those econ-
omies in Asia, for there to be such an or-
ganization or entity.

Q. Is it the U.S. position that
China would be welcome at that Pa-
cific rim conference, number one?
And what about Taiwan?

A. That presents us, as you well
know, with a political problem of long
standing. It is our sense that such an or-
ganization would best first be started by
the group that is represented here. You
might want to include a South Korean.
The creation of that kind of an organiza-
tion does not present you with some very
thorny political problems.

It is our further view that an orga-
nization such as this would best be uti-
lized and composed of market-oriented
economies. There has been, in recent
years, some movement toward market
principles in the People's Republic of
China. But I don't think you could say as
yet that they have a free market-
oriented economy. So I would think that
it might be preferable, in order to get
such an organization or entity launched,
that you would start it with a bit smaller
grouping.

Q. So you do not expect China to
be in that first —

A. The United States doesn't come
here with a definitive, specific idea.
Many i^eople have had the idea for a Pa-
cific rim cooperation entity. We would
like to serve, to the extent that we can,
as a catalyst for getting this accom-
plished. Clearly China is or will be a ma-
jor economic force in this region; but to
get this organization launched, I think
the best way to do it is for ASEAN, its
dialogue partners, and maybe South Ko-
rea, which does not present a problem
and is to be an observer shortly here
anyway, to be the original parties.

Q. What areas of cooperation
can Brunei and the United States
have? And my second question is, in
your audience with His Majesty yes-
terday, what issues did you discuss?

A. We discussed a number of issues
but I really would prefer for His Majesty
to give you a readout of that since I was
there as a minister and he is a head of
state and government. I would leave it to
him to characterize our meeting.

You asked me about bilateral issues.
The bilateral relationship between the
United States and Brunei is very good.
We would like to see them improve in
any way possible, and I think Brunei
feels the same way. We did talk about th(
importance to both countries of our peri-
odic military visits and the visits of our
security components.

Q. Can you confirm your itiner-
ary? Will you go to Oman tonight,
then visit other European countries,
and then attend the Paris summit?

A. Yes. We leave as soon as we'i-e
finished here. We will fly to Diego Gar-
cia to refuel. We will refuel and fly to
Oman where we will spend a little over
one day, 24 hours. We will fly to Warsaw,
Poland, to join the President of the Unit-
ed States in his visit to Poland; we will
go to another city in Poland. We will go
to Hungary, then we go to the Nether-
lands, and then we will go home, after 16
davs.

1 Press release 126 of July 10, 1989.

2 Press release 129 of July 10.
^ Press release 130.

■* Press release 131 of July 10. ■

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989li|

THE SECRETARY

News Conference of June 29

Secretary Baker held a news con-
%rence at the White House on June 29,
1989.^

iLast month at NATO's 40th anniversa-
ry, the President proposed an ambi-
tious mission for the future — that is, to
make from a divided Europe a new Eu-
rope, a Europe which is whole, free,
and secure. His upcoming trip to Po-
land and Hungary demonstrates his
personal interest in and support for
democratic change and for economic re-
form in this region.

At the NATO summit, we focused
on how best to divide responsibility
for our wider security needs among
friends and partners. At the economic
summit, just 6 weeks later, we will
be considering how best to pool our
various strengths to deal with the chal-
lenges of Eastern Europe, transnation-
al issues such as the environment, and,
of course, maintaining an e.xpanding
and prospering global economy.

The President's trip comes at a
,ime of great change. It comes at a
Ame of opportunity and hope in Eu-
rope, both in East and West. His ap-
pearances and speeches in Poland,
'riungary, Paris, and the Netherlands
vill underscore that our mutual re-
■.pect for Western values forms the
•ommon thread which binds together
he peoples of Europe and America, as
veil as many others around the globe.

The President will affirm that a
Vee enterprise system and a demo-
;ratic society, which have been so suc-
-'essful in Western Europe, provide the
inly answer to the aspirations of the
)eople of Eastern Europe. Along with
ts friends and allies, the United States
tvill encourage those countries in the
East trying to make the transition to
free, democratic, and market-oriented
societies.

To the extent possible, we will help
;hose countries make the necessary po-
itical reforms and help them to make
:he necessary economic reforms. In
oarticular, the President will empha-
size the importance of developing a
spirited private sector, a pluralistic po-
litical system, and an open society.

The economic summit July 15 and
16 in Paris will be concentrating on
Four broad areas:

First, the protection and expansion
of the community of Western values,
especially in Eastern Europe:

Second, the international economy:
Third, the global environment; and
Fourth, the fight against the
transnational challenges of drug traf-
ficking, international terrorism, and
weapons proliferation.

The formal sessions of the summit
will be devoted, as they usually are, to
economic topics, but there will be other
opportunities for the leaders to discuss
important political issues. There will
be great interest, I think, in the Presi-
dent's evaluation of the prospects for
political and economic reforms in Po-
land and Hungary, and, of course, the
developments in Eastern Europe do
draw together both the political and the
economic sides of the summit.

The summit will present an oppor-
tunity for Western leaders to consider
measures that they might undertake
together to support the change that is
taking place in Eastern Europe. They
will also, of course, want to, as they al-
ways do, consider various regional
issues — for example, the recent trag-
edy in China, the prospects for peace
in the Middle East, democracy in Cen-
tral America, among other issues.

With respect to the international
economy, the issues will, in all likeli-
hood, be what they have been in past
summits. They will tend to focus, I
think, on Third World debt, trade, and
economic policy coordination.

On the environment, we expect
that the leaders will spend time dis-
cussing possibilities for dealing with is-
sues such as global climate change,
deforestation, conservation of the
oceans, hazardous waste, and ozone de-
pletion. As I mentioned earlier, the
transnational issues are likely to be
narcotics, terrorism, and weapons
proliferation.

Since the first economic summit at
Rambouillet in 1974, the leaders of the
seven major economic powers in the
West have used these sessions to grap-
ple with the challenges of an increas-
ingly interdependent world. They have
also frequently proven a useful forum
for common engagement on pressing
political issues, and I think that this
year we have a chance to lay the

groundwork for our joint response to
the changing times in which we are op-
erating, particularly with respect to
Europe.

In summary, the economic summit,
I think, represents an opportunity to
reaffirm the basic Western values of
political freedom and market-based
economies and to demonstrate that, as
the postwar era is succeeded by new
times, together we can tackle a new
and a different set of challenges.

Q. I would have liked to ask you
about the economic summit, but spot
news keeps getting in the way. House
leaders apparently have agreed on
some limited sanctions against Chi-
na. And I wondered — I assume you
know about the package — does that
package have the Administration's
endorsement?

A. No, it does not, and let me speak
to that for a moment. As I have said in
public testimony during the course of
the past week, I think the President has
been right on track with respect to his
measured response to the tragic events
in China, and he's been right on track
from the very start.

He has forcefully expressed his out-
rage and his sorrow. In addition to that,
he has taken a number of what we think
at least are significant actions by way of
sanctions, relating primarily to military
matters but relating as well to high-level
visits and exchanges. And I won't go
through the long list of sanctions.

I believe, and I think many Ameri-
cans believe and understand, that no
elected official in the United States of
America understands China better than
the President of the United States, who
served this country in China for a num-
ber of years. He has been and, in my
view, continues to be at the forefront
among world leaders in his actions and
in his words with respect to this
tragedy.

Having said that, I think we do rec-
ognize the desire of elected officials to
speak to this issue and to vote on this is-
sue; but we really firmly believe that the
leadership in this instance should come
from the executive branch, and it should
come from the President of the United
States as Commander in Chief and as
one who is thoroughly and completely
versed in the affairs of China.

Q. Would the President veto that
legislation if it came out?

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE SECRETARY

A. We have not said that as yet be-
cause we have been, frankly, seeking to
try and work with the Congress to craft
a message which would recognize their
desire to speak on this issue and to vote
on this issue but which would still, at the
same time, retain what we consider to
be the necessary flexibility in the Presi-
dent to respond to the situation as it de-
velops and as it unfolds.

Q. Do you expect the summit to
go smoothly on the economic matters
side? I mean, "Super 301" really gen-
erated a lot of anger — that's the trade
front. The Third World debt proposal
by Secretary [of the Treasury] Brady
hasn't exactly been embraced by
banks, commercial banks. And,
thirdly, it appeared at the OECD [Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation
and Development] that the G-7 had
different concerns about inflation. Is
this all going to jell at this summit,
or will we see more of that?

A. I think it will jell at the summit,
although we'll have to wait and see what
develops. I think that there will be a
spirited discussion, as there frequently
is, at these summits. They are not al-
ways "precooked," as some have sug-
gested. There will be, I think,
considerable discussion respecting Third
World debt and respecting macro-
economic policy issues.

Maintenance of the fight against in-
flation is very, very important, but that
always has to be balanced against the
maintenance of an expanding and pro-
ductive global economy. So I'm sure
there will be discussion about that. I'm
sure thei'e will also be discussion about
reinvigoration of the economic policy co-
ordination process.

So I can't give you an iron-clad
guarantee here that there won't be some
differences that will emerge, both on the
political side and on the economic side;
but I think those differences will be re-
solved as they have been in the past.

Q. You said that the President
understands China, but he was very
surprised at the developments and the
harshness of the reaction toward
democratic protest.

What does he understand today? I
mean, does he understand that at any
price, the leadership will take total
control of China and that we should
not — and it's very clear that we've
made no impact so far. Can we make a
difference at all, and is it so impor-
tant to maintain top diplomatic rela-
tions with them as they continue this
oppression?

A. The principle of human rights,
as I have testified to recently, has to be
a major foundation principle for our for-
eign policy. It has been, it continues to
be, and in my view it will continue to be
well into the future. That is a very, very
important principle.

But it is not the only principle which
determines our foreign policy, and it is
not and cannot be the sole and only prin-
ciple which determines the extent and
scope and degree of the response of the
United States in a situation such as this.
When we say the relationship is impor-
tant and that we ought to try and pre-
serve the relationship, we do not suggest
that we do so at all costs, and we are not
suggesting that it is important solely on
an economic basis. It is important eco-
nomically, yes, but it is important as
well from a geopolitical and geostrategic
standpoint.

Q. That's the key, then, isn't it?
A. What?

Q. The listening posts.

A. I didn't say anything about lis-
tening posts.

Q. You said that the President
has spoken out forcefully, expressing
his outrage. I don't believe I've heard
him speak out specifically on the
executions.

A. I think that he has condemned
what happened in the square. I know we
have, certainly, from the podium at the
Department of State. I have personally
on a number of occasions. I think,
frankly — I can't go back and give you the
exact date — but I think that the Presi-
dent has spoken out forcefully with re-
spect to this outrage.

Let me simply say on behalf of the
Administration that we do and have con-
demned the events that took place in the
square. We would like to see restraint
exercised with respect to punishment,
and we condemn the punishment of peo-
ple who are doing nothing more than ex-
ercising their basic human rights and
freedoms.

Q. You know, Mr. Hawke [Prime
Minister of Australia] was here the
other day, and he spoke of the barbar-
ity, and he used, you know, emotional
rhetoric. And neither you nor the
President seem to want to do that.

A. We will not use inflammatory
rhetoric. If people want us to use inflam-
matory rhetoric, that's fine; they're enti-
tled to have that desire. But we do not
intend to do that.

Q. Why?

A. Because we think that a meas-
ured response is just that. It calls for a
response which clearly expresses our
outrage but does not resort to an overly
emotional response which involves in-
flammatory rhetoric. It involves proper-
ly structured sanctions, and that's what
we think we have.

Q. Doesn't that give you, really,
the political problem you have now
where you've got the members in Com
gress who want to whoop for some
resolution with the strongest possible
language?

A. Yes, that's clear.

Q. And doesn't it put you in a po-
sition where you might lose control o
the issue in the sense that you've got
both Houses potentially in the Con-
gress voting for some resolution you
might have to veto?

A. Sometimes the proper course to
follow is not always the politically popu-
lar course. We are following the proper ,
course. This is the right action; we |

think, feel very strongly, this is the righ
action from a foreign policy standpoint.
Quite frankly I think that there are a loi
of people in this country and a lot of peo
pie who think frequently about this situ-
ation there that agree with us.

Q. What is the state of play in
your discussions with the leaders on
the Hill about this issue?

A. I was asked — the first question
was, "Can we support the en bloc amend ^
ment that has been proposed?" My an-
swer was, "We cannot support it in its
current form." I was then asked, "Have
you said you would veto it?" And I said,
"We haven't gone that far yet." But I've
said we can't support it.

Q. Are there talks? I mean, are
you optimistic that you're going to
work something out?

A. There have been. There are
some things in this amendment, quite
frankly, that we like. There's a clear rec-
ognition in the amendment that the
United States should speak with one
voice on matters such as this — major for-
eign policy issues; that the President
should have the lead and that the Presi-
dent should have the flexibility to act in
the manner that he sees as appropriate.
That is a statement in the current
amendment that they are considering,
but there are other things in there that
we simply cannot go along with.

Q. In avoiding inflammatory
rhetoric, is one of the long-range
things you're looking at the possi-

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE SECRETARY

lility that Gorbachev may not sur-
ive, that different people may come
nto control in the Kremlin — the old
■onservatives — and, therefore, the old
riangular relationship with China —
he Nixon-Kissinger triangular
-elationship — is important?

A. I don't think it's a matter of ba-
ng concerned about China playing the
soviet card or something like that,
^hat's really not what it is. It's consid-
rably broader than that.

Q. An economic summit ques-
iion. Solidarity has circulated an ap-
leal to the West for $10 billion in aid
iver the next few years. From all ap-
learances, that seems to be wildly
lut of the ballpark from what some of
he allied leaders are considering. Do
ve have a potential collision here be-
ween what the Poles would like us to
!o and what the West is capable of do-
ng to help Poland?

A. I don't know whether I would
all it a collision. I think obviously Po-
and would like us to do every bit as
puch as is possible, and we would like to
Id what's possible. Doing something of
he magnitude that you suggest is proba-
ly not feasible or possible at this time.

Let me say that whatever is done,
hough, we want to do in a way that
/ould not repeat the mistakes of the
970s where we tended to make available
lot of credits and concessionary lend-
ig and subsidized lending that did not
arry with it the appropriate reforms of
hose economies. They are now saddled
/ith a lot of debt as a consequence of
hat, and it really didn't help move them
oward a free-market economic system.

Q. Then what does the President
lave in mind when he goes over there?

A. The President has some things
n mind, but those are for the President
0 announce, and it's not for me to an-
[Qunce here this far in advance of the
rip.

Q. Would you, in your discussions
vith your counterparts, support some
iind of debt forgiveness or, on the
luestion of their debt, is about as far
IS we're willing to go the ideas in the
lamtramck speech [President's ad-
Iress on April 17] — that is, sort of a
estructuring tied to reforms? I know
he German banks hold most of the
lebt. It's not really a U.S. debt.

A. I don't know the exact percent-
-ge that U.S. banks hold. There is offi-
ial debt. At the Toronto summit, we
ame together — the seven nations — and

provided some fairly liberal terms and
pretty effective debt relief for the poorer
countries of sub-Saharan Africa. I don't
know whether there will be a similar
type of proposal at this summit. And by
mentioning that, I don't mean to suggest
that there will be. We do have some leg-
islation that passed recently — Section
572 of some bill; I just remember the
number — that permits the United States
to grant debt relief in appropriate cir-
cumstances. It doesn't extend Export-
Import Bank type debt, and so forth.
But clearly debt relief will be a major
subject that will be discussed at the
summit. And since the summit will be
interested in Eastern Europe, as I've in-
dicated, I don't know why we wouldn't be
talking as well about what can be done
there.

More liberal terms in the Paris Club
is a form of relief. Certainly it's cash
flow relief.

Q. But aren't you and the other
members of the Paris Club in dis-
agreement? Don't you have difficulty
on restructuring first, that they are
more liberally inclined than you are?

A. No, I'm not sure that's correct
when you speak about the Paris Club.
There may be some little difference with
respect to whether or not World Bank
loans should await the completion of an
International Monetary Fund (IMF) pro-
gram. But as far as Paris Club re-
scheduling, on some of the technicalities
of a particular rescheduling proposal,
there may be differences; there usually
are.

Q. Could you give us some state-
ment as to where you and the other
economic partners are?

A. Why don't you ask Secretary
Brady tomorrow because he's a lot closer
to that. He deals with it everyday. Let
me simply say that we support — the
President has announced it, and I think
he mentioned in his Hamtramck
speech — that we would support liberal
rescheduling in the Paris Club and that
we would not insist upon the completion
of an IMF program in advance, which is
our normal standard. It's the standard
that all members of the Paris Club usu-
ally adopt.

Q. Do you see the possibility of
summit countries agreeing on a
broad plan for aiding Eastern Europe
or do you think that each country
will adopt its own set of policies for
providing —

A. I would hope and believe that
there could be some general principles
that would be adopted, not unlike, frank-
ly, what we did at the Toronto summit
with respect to terms of lending to East-
ern Europe.

Clearly the situation has changed in
the course of the year since that summit.
There may well be some countries that
want to go further on a bilateral basis,
and they might well go further. That
would not be inconsistent with having a
generalized approach on some issues.

For instance, the Federal Republic
of Germany is owed a particular debt by
Poland. It was, I think, a loan that was
made on condition that Poland let cer-
tain Germans leave Poland. There is
some thought to forgiving all or part of
that loan. That would probably not be
matched by other countries. Other coun-
tries would probably not be in a position
to match that.

Q. Solidarity's request for about
.$10 billion in aid is based on their as-
sessment that without that level of as-
sistance in Poland, the lid is going to
blow off the situation there. Are you
concerned that the West, in general,
may not be able to provide the neces-
sary level of assistance to really pre-
vent a political crisis from deepening
at home?

A. I think the key is that the politi-
cal reform and the economic reform
move apace. I think that's true in Poland;
I think that's true in the Soviet Union; I
think that's true in China. So that, I be-
lieve, is a general principle that has been
established, and that is accurate.

In Poland the key is that the Poles
adopt the necessary reforms so that they
can move to a free-market system. We
ought to encourage that in every way
that we can. But to simply grant relief
or make highly concessionary loans with-
out reform in the final analysis will not
get them where they want to go. That's
the route we took in the 1970s, and it, I
think, had adverse effects. It certainly
didn't have beneficial effects.

The important thing to remember,
in trying to help countries move to a
free-market economic policy, is that they
themselves be willing to adopt the re-
forms necessary to get there.

'Press release 125.1

)epartment of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE SECRETARY

Secretary's Interview on

the "MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour'

Secretary Baker ivas interviewed
on PBS's "MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour"
on Jul u 19, 1989.'^

Q. The Secretary has just returned
with President Bush from 10 days in
Europe that included the Paris eco-
nomic summit and visits to Poland
and Hungary. He has returned to a
congressional fight over talking with
the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion (PLO), among many, many other
things.

First, on some of today's news
about selling computers to the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe, do you
support the decision?

A. I think this decision demon-
strates how tough it is sometimes to
determine what's strategic trade and
what's not strategic trade. There's a
clear difference of opinion here between
the Defense Department, on the one
hand, and the Commerce Department on
the other. That means, of course, that
the President will make the ultimate
decision.

I'll be guided, in terms of where the
State Department comes down on it, by
what the technicians say because it's a
very technical issue. It depends on
whether or not technical people think
there can be military uses of the mate-
rial being sold.

Q. But the Commerce Depart-
ment has pretty much made the deci-
sion, has it not?

A. The Commerce Department has
the authority to make the decision. The
right to make this decision is given by
statute to the Secretary of Commerce.
The President, of course, has the ulti-
mate authority, though; and he could
modify it, he could amend it, he could re-
voke it if he wanted to. I don't think he's
going to do that, though.

Q. What do you think about the
Secretary of Defense speaking out
publicly on this, as he did today, in
opposition to this decision by the
Commerce Department?

A. I think that, again, this is an is-
sue that the President has the ultimate
authority to speak on and speak with re-
spect to, so what you have here is an
honest difference of opinion on a ques-
tion that is sometimes extremely diffi-

cult to resolve: What is and is not capa-
ble of being used strategically? It really
boils down to the opinion of very, very
technical experts.

We saw a number of instances dur-
ing the two terms of the Reagan Ad-
ministration where there were clear
differences of opinion between Com-
merce and Defense. Many times we'd
just get hung up and wouldn't be able to
make a decision because of that. So the
decisions here are always tough.

Q. Is the decision to do this
linked at all to the trip to Poland and
Hungary? In other words —

A. No.

Q. — does Eastern Europe need
these computers badly? Did they ask
for them?

A. No. The Commerce Department
would argue to you that this is not state-
of-the-art stuff. This is stuff that they
can get in any number of other coun-
tries. It's easily available. It does not
have any strategic value.

The Defense Department, on the
other hand, will argue that it has signifi-
cant strategic value, and we ought to
continue to ban it. But it was not a deci-
sion that was taken as a political matter
because of what's happening in Eastern
Europe. That was not what drove this
decision.

Q. But from the State Depart-
ment's point of view, is it a good thing
to sell these computers?

A. It's a good thing to sell as much
nonstrategic material and equipment as
we can. You are asking me to make a de-
termination that only really some very
technically oriented type people can
make. We are in favor, of course, of see-
ing an expanding relationship with East-
ern Europe, and I'd be glad to talk to
you further about the President's rather
remarkable trip there and what's going
on in Poland and Hungary.

On the other hand, we don't want to
see strategic technology go out the door
either, so we've got to try and walk that
very difficult line.

Q. I don't want to make a too
heavy weather over this, but the Sec-
retary of Defense — the man the Presi-
dent chose and the Congress
confirmed as the guy who is supposed
to know this — says "Hey, don't do
this. This would be giving away
things that have military capability."

A. On the other hand, the man to ,
whom the law gives the authority to
make this decision said, "Wait a minute.
We've got to be rational in the way we
take a look at this, and we should not
ban material that a country in the
Eastern bloc could get from any other
country in the world — or many other
countries in the world — that is not of an;
strategic value." So it's a question of bal-
ancing these interests. That's what's hap
peninghere.

Q. When is it going to be
resolved?

A. I don't know. I can't give you the
answer. That depends on when the Pres;
dent considers it.

Q. Speaking again of Poland,
Gen. Jaruzelski was elected President
today by one vote. Is this a good thinj
for the United States of America?

A. I think stability in Poland is a
good thing for the United States of
America, and I think it's probably a gooi
thing that he was elected, yes, because
there was a very difficult situation
there. The political reform is going for-
ward so rapidly in Poland that you had a
situation where they didn't have a chair-
man or a president. So I think it's proba
bly a good thing.

Q. It has been suggested, as I'm
sure you're aware, that President |

Bush's visit to Poland gave Jaruzelsk '
a boost that helped him get this job,
because before President Bush went
there, Jaruzelski said, "No, I'm not
going to run." And Solidarity said
"Naw, we don't want to have anything
to do with him." Mr. Bush comes and
embraces him, and now Jaruzelski de
cides to run. Solidarity backs off, and
now he's the President.

A. I know that's been said. It's my
understanding, based on what I've hearc
today, that Solidarity did not support
him. So he wasn't supported by
Solidarity.

Q. They just backed off and
didn't participate.

A. They backed off, and he, there-
fore, garnered enough votes to be elect-
ed. But, listen, the reforms there are
dramatic. No one would have dreamed ai
year ago that they would have gone to
elections, that they would be seeing the
types of political change that's taking
place there; and it is important that that
not be aborted early in the process. It's ;
difficult enough process, so it's probably
a good thing for them to have a Presi-
dent, to have one who is experienced,
who's been there before, who can oversee

THE SECRETARY

;he transition, if you will, to political
jluralism. And that's what's going on in
Poland.

Q. In American political terms,
though, the fact that President Bush
?ame and the fact that Jaruzelski got
elected President, does that give the
United States a leg-up, in other
words, with Jaruzelski that he might
iay. "Hey, I couldn't have done it
without you."? Does a better relation-
ship exist because of it?

A. I think the approach President
Bush took when he went to Poland was
Exactly the right approach. One, we're
lot over here to disturb or disrupt or to
ptick a finger in the eye of the Soviet
Union. We are pleased with the political
ind economic reforms that are taking
olace. We'd like to find a way to support
:hose.

He saw Solidarity leaders and elect-
?d members of the Sejm — their parlia-
ment, the Sejm. He saw Jaruzelski him-
self He saw all the various elements and
,va.-i seen with them, so his approach was
t very balanced one. This is a good
hing, I think, for stability in Poland,
md, therefore, it's a good thing for the
Jnited States.

Q. Did you or the President or
inyone else representing the United
states give any private signals to Sol-
darity about Jaruzelski?

A. No, I don't think you could ac-
cuse us of that. We're not going to in-
'olve ourselves in the internal politics of
'oland.

Q. Walesa — he was very outspo-
cen in his disappointment about the
imount of money. He wanted $10 bil-
ion, and the United States said $125
nillion. Then there was the economic
;ummit in Paris. The message that
•ame out of there — now, correct me if
I'm wrong — the message that came
)ut of there was that the United
>tates said, "Hey, look, it's Western
Europe's responsibility to help East-
ern Europe more than it is the United
states." Is that a correct statement?

A. No, no, that's not the message
hat came out. The message that came
)ut was the United States went in there
md took the lead — first time ever — in
Iriving for concerted effort to support
Eastern European countries — Poland
tnd Hungary — and was able to generate
hat support.

In fact, there was a pretty good de-
i)ate in the summit about whether there
vould be a prompt follow-on meeting.
The President himself spoke out in the

plenary session; and the decision was
made right there, in the meeting of the
heads of state. I mean, the lower levels
had not been able to reach agreement on
that, and the President was able to get
an agreement from all the countries that
they would join with us and that we
would all concert our support for Poland
and Hungary.

So I really don't believe that the im-
pression you give is a right one.

Q. Then what do you say to Wa-
lesa's disappointment? Has he got a
legitimate complaint?

A. What you say is, "We want to
help you, but you've got to help yourself.
You've got to adjust, and you've got to
reform your economy. You've got to move
to a free market. You've got to have the
trade unions over there — and Solidarity
is one of them — be perhaps a little more
understanding and reasonable in their
demands with respect to benefits and '5-
years-of-paid-maternity-and-paternity-
leave' kinds of demands." That's what
you say. And you say, though, "If you'll
reform and if you'll adjust, we'll be there
to help you."

But what they really do need to do
is move to encourage private enterprise
and private-sector involvement. That's
what this $125 million that the United
States is putting up will go toward.

Q. But I'm sure you're aware,
though, what they say in response to
that is, "That's all well and good, Mr.
Secretary. But in the meantime we've
got serious economic problems. We
could have riots; we could have anar-
chy here if you do not help us get
through this immediate economic
period."

A. We are. We are helping in that
way. We are helping by calling for a
rescheduling of their fairly significant
debt on the most liberal and expeditious
terms. That will give them a fair amount
of cash flow relief. We're calling for im-
mediate food aid, because they've got
some food shortages in Poland.

This is the first time the United
States has been in the forefront of ef-
forts to help these Eastern European
countries. 'The reason we're in the fore-
front is because they are making dra-
matic progress in opening up their
societies to political pluralism and in
trying to move toward free-market eco-
nomic systems. That latter undertaking
they are finding quite difficult. It's hard
to move from a central-planned, statist
economy to a free-market economy when
you've been in a central-planned econ-
omy for 40 or 50 years.

Q. Mr. Gorbachev is having the
same problem in the Soviet Union.
A. Yes, indeed.

Q. Today he spoke to his parlia-
ment, and he said that perestroika re-
forms are in serious jeopardy because
of these strikes. Is that just talk, or is
that a serious problem?

A. I don't think it's talk. I think
that if it were not true, he would not be
saying it. I believe that.

We want perestroika to succeed. We
think that perestroika — the success of
perestroika — will mean a more stable, a
more open, and a more secure Soviet
Union; and that's good for the United
States. Because they will be more open
and more secure, they'll be more stable.
That's what we need. So we want to see
perestroika succeed. We don't want to
see it aborted by —

Q. Strikes?

A. — by violent unrest.

Q. So the ethnic unrest —

A. — the strikes, or anything.

Q. Because the ethnic unrest has
also been blamed on the economy,
sure.

A. That's right.

Q. Gorbachev wrote a letter to
President Mitterrand during the sum-
mit and said, "I'd like a place at that
table, fellows."

A. He didn't really say it quite that
way.

Q. I'm paraphrasing it.

A. He wasn't asking to be a member
oftheG-7.

Q. But he wanted to be involved
in —

A. He said he wanted to cooperate
and he wanted to help address the eco-
nomic needs of the world and partic-
ularly the developing nations of the
world. It's another example, I think, of
the Soviet Union moving in our direc-
tion. The Stalinist model has failed. It's
discredited. They admit it themselves.
This is yet just another example of that,
I think.

Q. You say the United States and
the West have a terrific stake in per-
estroika being successful. How do we
help Gorbachev succeed without un-
derwriting the transformation of an
old enemy or whatever? You've heard
that argument. What is the proper
role here?

A. The proper role is to assist them
in trying to move to a free-market econ-
omy. And they need technical assistance.

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

THE SECRETARY

It's not a case of funneling money in
there. Nobody is suggesting that. It's
not a ease of rela.xing our strategic —
you were taltting about strategic ex-
jjorts. It's not a case of relaxing our
guard with respect to strategic ex-
joorts. It's not a case, frankly, of
letting our guard down on military
preparedness.

Until we see actual reductions in
Soviet forces — the one thing they've
been able to do very, very effectively
and efficiently is to build a massive
military machine. So until we see that
actually pulled down, we ought not to
pull our own down. But as they begin
to reduce, then we should reduce. That,
of course, was the suggestion of the
President's conventional forces initia-
tive at the NATO summit.

But we assist them in every way
that we can because it is important
that they — having admitted the failure
of their system and seeking to embrace
the type of system that we have and
that we know succeeds — it's important
we try to assist in that if we can.

Q. You've been Secretary of State
now — what? — 8 months, right?
A. Six.

Q. Six? I don't know where I got
the extra two. I take it you're im-
pressed with Gorbachev? I read be-
tween the lines, in everything we've
been taking about.

A. I'm impressed, frankly, with the
changes that are taking place in Eastern
Europe, in Poland and Hungary. I said
before, this trip really impresses upon
you how far-reaching — breathtaking, in
effect — those changes are and I think
how real they are.

I think there are similar changes
underway in the Soviet Union. Of
cour.se, the General Secretary is the rea-
son that those changes have been taking
place in the Soviet Union.

Q. Do you believe him? Do you
trust him?

A. I think President Reagan was
right when he said "trust but verify." I
think that's the standard. I think we
ought to be prudent in our approach to
the Soviet Union. We ought to be realis-
tic, but we ought to extend the hand. If
they truly reach out to us, whether it's in
arms reductions or requests for technical
assistance on economic issues and things
like that, we ought to be willing to
engage.

Q. But 1 meant him personally.
When he says to you, "Jim Baker,
boom, boom, boom," whatever, do you
believe him?

A. Of course, I've only had one
meeting with him but it lasted
3V2 hours, and I have no reason to disbe-
lieve him as a result of that one meeting.

Q. While you were overseas, the
Senate was on the verge of passing
some legislation that would have set
some restrictions on the kinds of peo-
ple the United States could talk to —
representatives of the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization (FLO). The
word is that you got on the phone
with Senator Jesse Helms and you got
the legislation delayed. What's this
all about?

A. It is a provision that would be at-
tached to our authorization bill that
would basically, at least in its original
form, in my view terminate the dialogue
that has been established between the
United States and the PLO.

Q. How would it terminate it?

A. It would terminate it by saying
in effect that no appropriated funds
could be used to engage in a dialogue
with anybody who had been a conspira-
tor in or an accessory to or participated
directly or indirectly in a terrorist ac-
tivity and so forth. That would be very
difficult. It would be very difficult to
maintain the dialogue in the face of that
kind of language when you consider that
the Palestine Liberation Organization
was, in fact, a terrorist organization.

Of course they met the U.S. 13-year-
old conditions for discussions between
the United States and the PLO when
they renounced terrorism and accepted
UN Resolution 242 and so forth back in
December of 1988.

Q. But the U.S. representative in
Tunis has talked to — the problem
here, as you know, is over Abu lyad,
who is the number two man in the
Palestine Liberation Organization, a
man who was involved in terrorist ac-
tivities, including the Munich massa-
cre of the Israeli athletes in 1972.
When was it decided that the United
States would talk to him? And explain
what the position was that led to
those talks, and why now —

A. The position, as I mentioned ear-
lier, is that in December of 1988, the Pal-
estine Liberation Organization met the
three conditions that the United States
had put forward as conditions for a dia-
logue that had existed for some 13 years.

So we began a dialogue with the
PLO through our Ambassador in Tunis,
and we said this is the only channel that
we will use for this dialogue. And it is
the only channel that we do use.

He has talked to a number of indi-
viduals in the — we didn't say that we
wouldn't talk to anybody or that we
wouldn't talk to members of the PLO. W _
said we would begin a dialogue; and we
have, and we did, and we've talked to a
number of different people.

Q. And you want to continue to
talk to lyad and anybody else, right?

A. Their having met our conditions
of 13 years, it's important that we main-
tain this dialogue if we're going to maki
progress toward peace in the Middle
East.

If the legislation that you referred
to were to pass in the form that Senatoi
Helms submitted it, in our view it woulj
mean we would have to terminate the
dialogue. We think that would be,
frankly — we believe — I'm not sure that,
there's agreement on this over there —
but we think that would be adverse, as 1
matter of fact, to the interests of the
State of Israel.

One thing we know is, it would end)
the dialogue, and we think it would
mean there would be less chance of our 1
making progress toward peace in the
Middle East.

Q. Have you worked out a deal
with Senator Helms on it?
A. No.

Q. You mean the bill is still hot?.

A. They're still working the bill uj
there on the Hill.

Q. How serious a matter is this?
Are you going to pull out all the stop
you can command to stop this?

A. We're doing what we can.

Q. But no deal yet?

A. We're working on the basis of
quiet diplomacy.

Q. Quiet diplomacy. Okay. In otl
er words, you're not going to say any
more about it. I got that message.

The Shamir election proposals —
are they dead?

A. No, I hope not. We've been worl
ing very hard to implement the Shamir
election proposal. We've been talking to
a number of leaders in the European
Community. The President talked to the
summit seven. I talked to my counter-
part Foreign Ministers and have been ,
for 5 or 6 months. I think we've moved
them, many of them, toward support of
the election proposal. We have been tall
ing to Arab governments because we
think it offers a real prospect of moving
the peace process forward.

Department of State Bulletin/September 198

AFRICA

When Prime Minister Shamir
came to the United States, he said, "I
think we ought to look at the possibility
of elections in the territories; we ought
to look at the possibility of discussions
between Israelis and Palestinians in
.'he territories, leading to elections in
order to launch," he said, "a political
iK'Hotiation." We think that deserves to
be worked very hard, and we're work-
ing it very hard.

Q. Then you disagree with the
FLO's position that the situation is
dead as a result of Shamir embracing
some new rules that the party put on
these negotiations?

A. Yes, we do disagree with that. I
will say that we were concerned, when
the party rules came out, that Israel
might in a sense be devaluing its own
initiative. We have since satisfied our-
selves that the initiative is very much
alive and well, that they're pushing it,
that the Israeli Government subscribes
to it. The Prime Minister himself has
said it has not changed one iota. They
are in the process, I think, of working
nut arrangements to reaffirm it.

So we continue to support it. We
think it offers great promise and hope.
We hope it does. It's the best thing we
know of that's going in favor of making
progress toward peace in the Middle
East.

Review of U.S.-South Africa Relations

' Press release 143.1

by Edward J. Perkins

Address at the Foreign Policy As-
sociation's "Think Internatioyial" essay
contest in New York City on June 6,
1989. Ambassador Perkins was U.S.
Ambassador to South Africa (1986-89)
and is nominee to be Director General
of the Foreign Service.
President Kiermaier and members of
the Foreign Policy Association, and
winners of the Think International
contest, I am delighted to have this op-
portunity to interact with you on this
eighth annual Think International Es-
say Contest. The subject of the essays
upon which you have been judged sug-
gests that I should be discussing for-
eign affairs as a career rather than a
single substantive subject such as
South Africa. Howevei', recognizing the
interest occasioned by my recent as-
signment in that country, I will try to
do a bit of both.

I have just completed my tour in
South Africa. As I said some weeks
ago, it has been exciting and reward-
ing. When I first arrived, I was con-
vinced that the United States needed
to be in South Africa. I left even more
convinced. Representing the United
States was a challenge every day; man-
ifesting in an overt and psychological
way what our country is, and what
we stand for as a nation, represented
important policy objectives.

The South Africa of 1989 cannot
be explained away by a few well-chosen
cliches. The land, the society, and the
peoples represent a far too complex
module to do that. But the people and
the land have promise. I said so when
I left. South Africa is still a twice-
promised land, seen from the view of
both blacks and whites. But it does
manifest the hope of better things to
come. Several recent changes in the re-
gion will help. The implementation of
UN Security Council Resolution 435,
and eventual independence of Namibia,
is an excellent example.

My hopes for South Africa are but-
tressed by several truths: The courage
of United Democratic Front (UDF)
President Albertina Sisulu, who never
stops fighting for change in her country
even though she is restricted. The
warmth and good will of black South
Africans is still evident in spite of bit-

ter experiences under apartheid. And
the growing numbers of white South
Africans who are attempting to make a
difference in many ways, such as talks
about talks, providing legal defense,
and the manifestation of a resultant de-
sire to rise above petty racism and look
to a greater nonapartheid South
Africa. The government has been suc-
cessful in reducing overt manifestation
of discontent in the townships, but it
has succeeded in reinforcing the deter-
mination of blacks to change that
system.

Being in South Africa has been an
extraordinary educational experience.
Let's review the job of representing the
United States in South Africa. It's not
an easy job; there my staff and I w'ere
reminded every day of the assault on
the values we as a nation cherish.
There were constant efforts to get us
to take sides. Some whites accused us
of selling them out for political expe-
diency; some blacks accused us of not
doing enough to hasten the end of
apartheid. Some South Africans called
on us to assist them with financial as-
sistance. Some wanted more sanctions,
while some wanted fewer. One thing re-
mains clear; South Africans of every
persuasion, whether they agree with us
or not, find the United States attrac-
tive. They place a great deal of impor-
tance on what the United States says
and does. Thus, we carefully and pur-
posefully try at all times to manifest
the values which make our country
unique: individual rights, human rights,
equality under the law, and due proc-
ess. This rather than taking sides,
dents and their teachers are honored.

As I've said often in this country,
South Africa is an issue which consist-
ently excites greater and more emo-
tional interest than almost any other
foreign policy issue. That is rightly so.
In my judgment, our history of race re-
lations and civil rights endows us with
a unique sensitivity to the evil of rac-
ism anywhere. And it fills us with a
special commitment to its eradication
everywhere. That is not to say that we
all agree on how best to proceed. The
problems of South Africa and its neigh-
bors pose special challenges and obliga-
tions for the United States and for the
making of foreign policy.

The Foreign Policy Association and
the students who analyze Great Deci-
sions play an especially valuable role in

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

AFRICA

raising America's consciousness about
the importance of looking critically at
our national interests in the pursuit
of foreign policy. Foreign policy is the
product of a logical policymaking proc-
ess which recognizes our national inter-
ests, the reality of the world situation,
our objectives, and our resources to
pursue and achieve those objectives.
Our foreign policy toward any country
or region is not about choosing sides; it
is about choosing principles on which
we as a nation will stand and which rest
firmly on the national interests. This is
especially true in the emotional climate
of South and southern Africa.

U.S. Interests in Southern Africa

The foundation of an effective foreign
policy is a realistic appraisal of what
our interests are. In southern Africa,
it seems to me that our most important
interests are: the promotion of political
and economic freedom and democracy
as well as respect for individual liberty
and basic human rights.

This means, as a starter, the elim-
ination of apartheid in South Africa
and its replacement with a democratic
government which provides for full and
equal participation by all South African
citizens. It means the maintenance of
supplies of key strategic minerals,
which South Africa alone supplies the
United States. It means the mainte-
nance of American influence through
good and mutually productive diplo-
matic, economic, and cultural relations
with nations in the region.

It means the elimination of region-
al tensions which could escalate into
superpower confrontations. This must
feature the promotion of regional se-
curity and stability which has, as its
foundation, the respect for established
borders, noninterference in the inter-
nal affairs of other countries, and the
pursuit of a mutually beneficial inter-
dependence in the aftermath of a de-
mocratized South Africa, the promotion
of the full implementation of the re-
cently signed tripartite agreement and
of UN Security Council Resolution 435,
l)lus the resolution of remaining region-
al conflicts.

Situation on the Ground

How well are we doing? Not as well as
we'd like. True, we continue to have an
uninterrupted supply of the strategic
minerals we buy from South Africa,
despite its internal tensions. We also

maintain varying degrees of influence
with each nation in the region, through
a combination of economic and diplo-
matic relations. But on the other hand,
apartheid continues to be a major cause
of regional instability.

The South African Government's
systematic denial of the human rights
of a majority of its citizens has alien-
ated blacks to such an extent that the
government's credibility with any legit-
imate black South African leader has
been seriously eroded.

The twin spirals of violence and re-
pression within the country seem inex-
tricably linked. This is going to remain
that way until the South African Gov-
ernment takes major steps toward the
total elimination of apartheid and sits
down to talk with credible black lead-
ers, without a prearranged agenda,
instead of jailing them.

The front-line states, particularly
Botswana, still remain fearful of get-
ting caught in the crossfire of the shad-
owy battles between the South African
Government and its enemies. This has
contributed significantly to a tense at-
mosphere throughout the region.

Civil wars still rage in Mozam-
bique and Angola, causing untold hu-
man suffering and economic losses. A
serious process of national reconcilia-
tion is necessary in both countries if
regional stability is to be achieved.

The disease AIDS [acquired im-
mune deficiency syndrome] threatens
the already fragile economies of the re-
gion by killing off the most productive
and talented members of those soci-
eties. It has dire implications for the
leadership of every country in the
region, implications on which some
governments have yet to focus their
attention. Government officials, includ-
ing those in the United States, West-
ern Europe, and Africa, ignore the
implications of this disease at their
own peril.

Positive Factors

There are a number of factors, though,
which may provide a good starting
point for the continued pursuit of our
interests.

The Angola/Namibia arrangement
could herald a new age of pragmatism,
"enlightened self-interest" within re-
gional relationships, and a new respect
for the word "negotiation." The recent
sessions of the joint commission in
Havana, Luanda, Cape Town, and in
Namibia among representatives of An-
gola, South Africa, and Cuba, with ob-

servers from the United States and th(
Soviet Union, is a positive spinoff from
the Angola/Namibia settlement. The
commission, established under the re-
cently concluded tripartite agreement,
acts as ombudsman for players in the
region and provides an important mod-
el for future regional cooperation. The
participation of the United States and
Soviet Union in the commission is an
important step toward regional cooper-
ation between the superpowers.

The seeming new Soviet willing-
ness to approach regional conflicts
as a stage for cooperation rather than
competition has opened up new possi-
bilities for regional stability in South-
ern Africa.

There is growing realization amon
all African governments that political
and economic power centralized in the
hands of the state is not necessarily th
most efficient way to manage a country
Governments in the region are looking
at market economies as a more useful
approach.

Inside South Africa, there is still i
boundless determination among blacks
and whites who oppose apartheid to
forge ahead in search of new models, ir
spite of the repression and the violence
arrayed against them. They are, in ef-
fect, pulling the government along wit
them. The examples are numerous.

• The women of the Black Sash wh
stand with placards on street corners
in solitary protest against the deten-
tion of children, in spite of the abuse
of passing motorists.

• The Vrye Weekblad newspaper,
whose editors risk financial ruin, os-
tracism, and prison to convince their
fellow Afrikaners that there is a life af
ter apartheid, that there is a brighter
future than the frustrated present.

• The black ta.xi drivers who have
organized themselves to take on the
full power of state bureaucracy to get
a piece of South Africa's wealth for
themselves.

• The determination of newspaper '
editors like Aggrey Klaaste of The
Sowetan newspaper, who devised the
"nationbuilding" concept to prepare
blacks for political and economic power
in South Africa.

• The South Africans of all races
and vocations who, tired of their gov-
ernment's intransigence, seek their ow
talks with the African National Con-
gress (ANC) on the future of South
Africa.

• The detainees who put their lives
on the line with hunger strikes in de-
fense of the fundamental human right

Department of State Bulletin/September 198J

AFRICA

hat no person shall be detained with-
ut charge or trial.

• The Lawyers for Human Rights
v'ho defend countless persons who have
leen charged with treason but in real-
ty have engaged in nonviolent protests.

• The South African Government's
jecent release of detainees in a system-

ttic manner.
.'he South African
Government's Response

^he courageous actions of these men
ind women have not resulted in a dem-
icratic South Africa, but there is some
.ttention being paid to them. However,
ipartheid remains very much a part of
louth African Government policy. It is
)uttressed by three pillars:

• The Population Registration

k't, which decrees that each person be
las.sified at birth according to his or
ler race;

• The Separate Amenities Act,
vhich allows for the segregation of pub-
dc facilities according to those racial
•lassifications; and

• The Group Areas Act, which
lictates where people may live on the
lasis of their racial classification; and,
inost importantly, the deliberate exclu-

ion of black people from political and

conomic power.

Apartheid has resulted in the poor
ducation of South African blacks,
ampant unemployment, forced remov-
.Is of entire communities, crushing
)Overty, wages below the subsistence
;evel, the perpetuation of racism, and
I host of other evils. It is to blame for
he recent developments in towns con-
rolled by the Conservative Party in
vhich blacks are banned from enjoying
he parks and other recreational facil-
ties that their tax dollars help to
mpport.

Perhaps even more disturbing are
he barriers which the South African
jovernment has erected to defend this
)dious system. Under the state of emer-
gency, which has been in force since
(une 1986, South Africans have experi-
mced an unprecendented erosion of
-heir civil liberties. We estimate that
Tiore than 30,000 South Africans, in-
cluding children, have been detained
i^'ithout charge or trial for at least some
oeriod since the state of emergency be-
?an. Some of the detainees were in de-
.ention for almost 3 years, without ever
being told why or when they'd be re-
eased or charged. However, the South
f^frican Government has begun a sys-

President Meets With South African
Antiapartheid Activist

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
JUNE 30, 19891

I have been pleased today to welcome
to the White House Mrs. Albertina Si-
sulu of Soweto, South Africa. "Mama
Sisulu," as she is known by her legion
of admirers, is copresident of the Unit-
ed Democratic Front, a coalition of
multiracial South African organizations
opposed to apartheid. The UDF is
among the organizations banned by the
South African Government, and Mrs.
Sisulu has been subjected to imprison-
ment, house arrest, and to government
restrictions on her activities. However,
she remains a strong advocate of non-
violence and of a nonracial South Africa.

Mrs. Sisulu has lived a life of sacri-
fice for the betterment of all South
Africans. At age 70, she continues to
be active in the service of others. Each
day she travels more than an hour to
reach her job as a nurse in a clinic
which cares for the neediest residents
of Soweto. She personifies the struggle
for human rights and human dignity,
and her presence here is an inspiration
to us all.

As I told Mrs. Sisulu in our meet-
ing, the United States also believes
fundamentally in human rights and hu-
man dignity. We believe strongly that
apartheid is wrong and that it must
end. We want to see the creation of a
nonracial and democratic South Africa
as a result of negotiations among legiti-
mate representatives of all of South
Africa's people. We support the begin-
ning of a process leading to a peaceful
transition to democracy.

To achieve our goal, we intend to
expand our assistance to black South
Africans to help them both economi-
cally and politically so they can play
their rightful role in determining the
future of their country. We will work
with the Congress to increase present
programs and develop new ones to as-
sist black South Africans in the critical
areas of human rights, education, em-

ployment, housing, and community de-
velopment. Such programs should not
be misunderstood as our acquiescing in
apartheid but, rather, viewed as a de-
termined effort to bring it to an end.

We will work closely with our
allies — particularly the British, Japa-
nese, West Germans, and Portuguese —
to develop mutually supporting policies
and cooperative programs to resolve
the political impasse created by apart-
heid and to assist in the advancement of
black South Africans. These nations
have important historical, cultural, and
economic ties with South Africa, and
their wisdom and influence need to be
brought to bear on the problems of
South Africa and the region.

Again it has been an honor to be
with Mrs. Sisulu here today. Her strug-
gle and that of her husbancl, Walter,
who remains in prison, and her chil-
dren remind us of the price of freedom
and the hope which her example in-
spires in all of us.

• Te.xt from Weekly Compilation of Pres-
idential Documents of July 3, 1989. ■

tematic review of all detainees, and re-
leases are occurring. We hope and urge
that the practice ceases entirely.

Antiapartheid activists have dis-
appeared and been attacked and mur-
dered under mysterious circumstance

without anyone ever being prosecuted.
Freedom of the press in South Africa
has been seriously eroded. The govern-
ment enjoys sweeping powers of censor-
ship. The Minister for Home Affairs
may temporarily close any newspaper if

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

AFRICA

he believes that its reporting threatens
the government's security, and he may
do so without judicial review. Members
of the security forces enjoy full indem-
nity for any actions they take undei' the
state of emergency, again, without judi-
cial review.

The South African Government has
brought treason charges against some
of South Africa's most talented citizens
because they participated in nonviolent
civil disobedience campaigns against
apartheid policies. The most notable of
these was the recently concluded "Del-
mas treason trial," which resulted in
treason convictions of UDF leaders
Moss Chikane, Patrick Lekota, and
PopoMolefe.

These violations of human rights
are riot a problem only for today. Gov-
ernments seldom divest themselves of
the powers they accrue. Throughout all
of this, the South African Government
continues to refuse to talk to many of
the people and organizations who rep-
resent the feelings and aspirations of a
large majority of South African blacks.
The restricted United Democratic
Front, the Azanian People's Organiza-
tion, and a host of civic, youth, and
religious organizations, which are
committed to nonviolent opposition
to apartheid, are examples.

Afrikaners are the governors of
South Africa. They must overcome
their reluctance to recognize that it is
they who hold the key to peace and de-
mocracy in South Africa. That must in-
clude opening the laager [camp], with
all the benefits it provides, to all South
Africans. The new leader of the nation-
alist party, Minister of National Educa-
tion, F. W. de Klerk, has indicated that
change must come. We will wait and
see where he is coming from.

What Can We Do?

I have described what our interests in
South Africa and southern Africa are.
I've surveyed how reality measures up
against those interests. Now comes the
hard part of policymaking: What can
we do to make reality more in accord
with our interests? Some assumptions
about the "policy environment" which
must be considered when devising a
policy.

First, the self-destructive politics
of this region over the past few years
have prevented it from realizing its
vast economic potential.

Second, the policies of the South
African Government are largely re-

sponsible for the endemic instability
within South Africa. Our efforts must
consequently focus on influencing and
changing those policies thi'ough our
relationship with the South African
Government.

Third, experiences at the commu-
nity level of townships and on the shop
floors of unionized workplaces demon-
strate that South Africans have an
enormous capacity for, and love of, de-
mocracy. There is a general consensus
on the need for individual rights, for
an independent judiciary, and for free
trade unions among all who believe in
and are planning a postapartheid South
Africa.

The South African Government's
opponents bear some responsibility for
creating a climate conducive to the re-
moval of apartheid. This means that
antiapartheid activists and organiza-
tions must spell out their ideals of how
South Africa would look after apart-
heid and challenge the political leaders
of the government.

To make our views known, we will
continue pressure on the South African
Government for fundamental political
change: a new constitutional order with
equal political, economic, and social
rights for all South Africans; a demo-
cratic electoral system with multiparty
participation and universal franchise
for all adult South Africans; effective
constitutional guarantees of basic hu-
man rights for all South Africans as
provided for in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights and the canons of
democracy everywhere; the rule of law
safeguarded by an independent judi-
ciary with the power to enforce the
rights guaranteed by a constitution to
all South Africans; and an economic
system guaranteeing economic free-
dom for all South Africans.

Sanctions will remain in effect, in
one form or another, until apartheid
has been eliminated in South Africa.
U.S. sanctions, some dating back to
1963, are the most severe of any of
South Africa's main trading partners.
Yet it has been difficult to assess the
economic impact of sanctions on South
Africa or to demonstrate that they are
helping to move South Africa in a posi-
tive direction.

The South African Government has
contained the black rebellion of 1984-86
and has laid the foundation for many
more years in power. The ANC, PAC
[Pan-African Congress], and other
organizations which conduct "armed
struggle" strategies are no closer to

overthrowing the South African Gov-
ernment through military force than
they ever were.

South Africa is in the throes of lu:
moil and change. This is perhaps best
symbolized by the apparently imminei
departure of State President P.W.
Botha from the stage of South African
politics. It is also reflected in the
continuing and so far unsuccessful ef-
forts of the South African Government
to include blacks in some central gov-
ernment body and steps toward the re
ognition of black rights or residence
and citizenship outside the "homelands
Consequently, we must be careful
to avoid damaging this process of
change by taking a wrong step. We
must also remain flexible in our policy
so that we may react quickly to chang-
ing events on the ground. Contrary
to popular perceptions, especially in
South Africa, the United States and
other Western nations have only lim-
ited leverage in effecting change in
South Africa. The model and change
must be developed by South Africans;
we can't do it, but we can be facilitative

Finally, it will take generations t(
repair fully the damage that aparthei
has inflicted on South Africans, blacli
and white. The failure to begin work (
this repair job immediately will impei
il a smooth transition to a democratic
postapartheid South Africa. This meat*
we must dedicate our resources to hel
ing blacks achieve the power of which
they have been systematically deprive
by supporting their education and ecO'
nomic and political empowerment.

We will vigorously continue to su).
port black political and economic em-
powerment in a number of ways. Thi
includes scholarships for black studeii
to pursue university study in the
United States and South Africa, to-
gether with financial help to human
rights organizations and legal assis-
tance to organizations and individuali
who are struggling against apartheid.
It includes support for community
based organizations and for the train-
ing of their leaders, as well as assis-
tance to black business and other
democratic change agents. This year
the U.S. Government will spend ap-
proximately $34 million in these areaa

We will maintain regular contact
with the ANC, PAC, and other exiled
organizations and with the South Afri'
can Government and continue pressur
to get them talking with each other
instead of shooting at each other.

We will promote contacts among
South Africans of all races and encour

Department of State Bulletin/September 19f'

AFRICA

(ge them to overcome the barriers
,hieh apartheid has erected. One of
he most remarkable experiences for
iie, as an outsider in South Africa, is
p witness the huge gap between blacks
!nd whites. We work hardest in our
Embassy at bringing whites and blacks
ogether, under our roofs, so they can
sk each other questions of mutual in-
erest and get to know the other.

The United States has tradition-
]lly been a strong voice in defense of
uman rights. We will continue to
ighlight and condemn the systematic
iolations in which the South African
lovernment engages. We will offer
hatever support and assistance we
an to the victims of these violations in
heir struggle for justice. This will usu-
ally take the form, but not be limited
jo, legal assistance.
I We will continue pressure on the
louth African Government for funda-
lental political change which will fea-
ure the full political enfranchisement
if all its citizens. We recognize that
f\e South African Government faces a
hreat from conservative whites who
re demanding more apartheid, not
;ss. With this in mind, we welcome re-
ent remarks by South African officials
hat they will speed up the pace of po-
tical reform despite the right-wing
hreat.

We will note significant progress
lade toward the dismantling of apart-
eid. We will continue to let the South
ifrican Government know that we
/ant to help, not destroy. Neverthe-
iiss, it is the actions of the South Af-
ican Government we will respond to
nd not conciliatory words uttered in
arliament.

P'inally, in large measure, the
'iiiU'd States shares its interests in
louth Africa with most of its Western
Hies. Consequently, in light of the
lather limited leverage we all have sep-
arately, we must coordinate and unify
ur policies on South Africa for ma.x-
mum impact.

ilegional Policy

^he confluence of our interest, assump-
ions. and reality also produces a clear
lath for our policy for the entire south-
rn African region. We will continue
upport for the Southern African De-
jelopment Coordination Conference
inembers' efforts for most productive,
ielf-reliant economies.
I We view the Angola/Namibia peace
process and the Nkomati accord before
t as prime examples of how govern-

ments within the region can pursue
mutually beneficial relations in spite
of their differences. We recognize An-
gola's leading position in the front-line
states and as an important American
trading partner.

We will continue our support for
the Botswanan Government's efforts
to maintain its sovereignty and terri-
torial integrity in the face of outside
pressures.

In Zimbabwe, we are pleased with
the progress President Mugabe has
made in resolving the differences be-
tween rival political factions. Zimbab-
we is a valuable, if imperfect, example
for South Africans who are working for
a new South Africa based on interracial
cooperation.

Mozambique's continuing and bru-
tal civil war pains us, and we wish to
be of whatever assistance we can in
bringing it to an end. After the war
ends, there will be a lot of cleaning up
to do. We stand ready to help President
Chissano and the Mozambican people in
this effort.

We anticipate the coming independ-
ence of Namibia with great enthusi-
asm and promise to work with all gov-
ernments to help assure the success of
this new member of the world of free
nations. We also note South Africa's
willingness to work toward this end.

The Soviet Angle

I might mention the Soviet role. As a
superpower, the Soviet Union can natu-
rally play a major role in the politics of
southern Africa. The Warsaw Pact is
the ANC's chief source of funding. The
MPLA [Popular Movement for the Lib-
eration of Angola] has received much of
its assistance from the U.S.S.R. and
its allies.

The Soviet Government's new sense
of pragmatism and realism in its rela-
tions not only in Africa but throughout
the world is a promising development in
world politics. The Soviets played a
valuable role in the Angola/Namibia
peace process, and we look to them to
continue to act responsibly in the
region.

A Letter From a Pretoria Jail

Something I will always treasure from
my time in South Africa is a letter I re-
ceived from United Democratic Front
leaders Popo Molefe, Moss Chikane,
and Patrick Lekota on the eve of their
sentencing for treason last December.
I feel privileged to know these men. I

sometimes visited them during their
lengthy trial to share a few words of
support and encouragement during the
breaks in the court proceedings. Today,
Moss and Popo are serving 10-year sen-
tences and Patrick, whose nickname is
"Terror" for his prowess on the soccer
field, is serving a 12-year sentence.
Those three men are among South Af-
rica's best and brightest, yet they lan-
guish in prison, incarcerated by the
government which does not want to
hear what people think. I'd like to
close by quoting from their letter to
me, for it is a telling example of the
importance of the United States in
South Africa.

We can no longer delay the writing of
this note to you. As you are aware, when we
next return to court, it will only be to hear
evidence in mitigation of sentences. Soon
thereafter, sentences will be passed. Then
there will no longer be proper opportunity
to communicate with all those who stood by
us throughout the duration of the trial.

We are writing to convey our final
gratitude to you and your staff for all the
warmth, deep concern, and general sympa-
thy you showed us and our families during
these past three and half years of trial. The
presence of all of you. ..providing us with a
measure of reassurance. We always felt then
that your presence would somewhat force
our captors to observe the necessary deco-
rum. We felt assured that both your govern-
ment and the people of your country would
be properly briefed on the nature and pro-
ceedings of our trial.

But above all, your company during the
brief and boisterous adjournments gave us a
sense of belonging and of community. Your
kind words immensely fortified us, for we
realized from them that the world beyond
the borders of our country is filled with
millions of people who understand the
agony of our lives under apartheid. Our faith
in humankind was, therefore, greatly
strengthened.

For the sake of these brave men
and for all South Africans, the eradica-
tion of apartheid through an effective
and unified policy that reflects our val-
ues as a people is essential. Congrat-
ulations to those who have been judged
winners tonight; you are the future.
The Foreign Policy Association is due a
hugh commendation for its community
sensitivity.H

i}epartment of State Bulletin/September 1989

ARMS CONTROL

U.S. Efforts Against the
Spread of Chemical Weapons

by Reginald Bartholomew

Statement before the Subcommittee
on International Finance and Mone-
tary Policy of the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
on June 22, 1989. Ambassador Bar-
tholomew is Under Secretary for Secu-
rity Assistance, Science, and
Technology.^

I am pleased to have the opportunity
to appear before you today to discuss
with you the principal elements of our
policy on chemical and biological weap-
ons. These hearings come at a time of
dynamic movement in the field of arms
control. We have witnessed, and we
have been the catalyst, for significant
events which could affect world peace
and the security of the United States
for many years.

Chemical and Biological Weapons
Sanctions Legislation

Let me first discuss the Administra-
tion's approach to a number of bills
presently before the House and Senate
which would impose sanctions on for-
eign countries which use chemical and
biological weapons materials and tech-
nology. I want to emphasize that we
welcome the interest and concern dem-
onstrated by both Houses of Congress
on this issue. To the extent that we can
coordinate our respective efforts, the
greater will be our prospects for suc-
cess in achieving President Bush's ulti-
mate goal of a world without chemical
weapons.

I should note that there already e.x-
ists legislation, including the E.xport
Administration Act, the Arms Export
Control Act, and the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act,
which give the President many of the
authorities proposed in the pending
bills.

We, nonetheless, welcome the op-
portunity to work with Congress to
strengthen our tools for combating
chemical weapons proliferation. In do-
ing so, we agree that some forms of
sanctions, if appropriately formulated,
would give the Administration an addi-
tional instrument against countries
that use chemical weapons and compan-
ies that aid proliferation. The key

question is how sanctions would be
implemented. Application of such sanc-
tions must be subject to executive
discretion, and there must be no
automatic, retroactive, or extrater-
ritorial application. Legislation should
also encourage multilateral cooperation
and action and avoid excessive empha-
sis on unilateral actions, both to maxi-
mize the deterrent effect of our efforts
and to avoid discriminatory impacts on
U.S. firms. We look forward to working
with the committee to develop legisla-
tion in this area.

Status of the Chemical Weapons
Negotiations in Geneva

The United States has been negotiat-
ing at the Conference on Disarmament
(CD) in Geneva on a comprehensive
treaty to ban chemical weapons from
the world's arsenals. The draft treaty,
tabled by then-Vice President Bush in
1984, remains the basis for negotia-
tions. There are a number of key issues
remaining to be resolved before we can
conclude a comprehensive chemical
weapons ban. These include, first and
foremost, effective verification —
including provisions for monitoring the
chemical industry and for security dur-
ing the destruction phase — and the pro-
tection of confidential business
information and sensitive national secu-
rity information and facilities. These
are difficult issues, and they will take
time and concerted effort by all CD
members to resolve.

The United States has repeatedly
affirmed its commitment to the CD ne-
gotiations. President Bush, during his
address to Congress in February, stat-
ed his personal commitment to "ban-
ning chemicals from the face of the
Earth." He reaffirmed that commit-
ment at the NATO summit on May 29
when he said "the alliance should sup-
port efforts to move ahead toward an
effectively verifiable global chemical
weapons ban. We must achieve a global
chemical weapons ban as quickly as
possible."

U.S. initiatives such as those that
led to the Paris Conference on Chemi-
cal Weapons Use in January 1989 and
the Australian Government and indus-
try conference later this year, in Sep-
tember, demonstrate our commitment
to the President's goal. In addition.

while we are consulting closely with a
lies on our approach to the entire rang
of arms control issues, we also contim
a regular series of bilateral discussior
with the Soviet Union on chemical
weapons treaty issues and on the dan-
gerous proliferation of chemical weap-
ons capabilities to problem countries.

U.S. Export Controls

In the interim — until a comprehensive
effectively verifiable, and truly global
ban can be achieved — the United
States has undertaken a number of ur
lateral measures to address the prob-
lem of chemical weapons proliferation
Proliferation of chemical weapons
makes it more difficult to attain a glol
al and effectively verifiable ban and
greatly increases the risk of use.
Through the Department of State Of-
fice of Munitions Control, the Interna
tional Traffic in Arms Regulations
govern the export of munitions items,
including chemical agents and related
equipment. The United States cur-
rently exercises foreign policy export
controls on 40 designated chemical
weapons precursors, 11 of which re-
quire a validated export license for e.>
port to all destinations, except to
members of the Australia group, whic
I will describe more fully in a momen
The remainder require a validated ex
port license for COCOM [Coordinatin
Committee for Multilateral Security
Export Controls] proscribed destina-
tions and/or Iran, Iraq, Syria, and
Libya as well as Cuba, Vietnam,
Cambodia, and North Korea. The li-
censing policy is to deny applications '
for Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya, whil<
applications for Cuba, Vietnam, Cam-
bodia, and North Korea are denied in
conjunction with the general trade em
bargo for these countries. Exports to
other destinations may be approved,
unless we believe they will be used foi
chemical weapons purposes. \

The controls are effective in pre-
venting direct U.S. exports of the
designated chemicals to targeted
countries. However, controls set by th
United States and other members of
the Australia group have not prevents
acquisition of chemicals by countries (
concern. Suppliers and producers are
becoming more adept at circumventin
the controls, few countries practice

Department of State Bulletin/September 19)

ARMS CONTROL

'■export control over the chemicals,
id chemicals may be purchased from
luntries that do not belong to the
ustralia group.

In addition, in order to coordinate
ir intragovernmental efforts to con-
rain chemical weapons proliferation,
February of this year, we formed an
teragency interdiction committee to
iisure timely and appropriate action
d information on the flow of chemical
■eapons materials and technology to
•}oblem countries. The group monitors
telligence, coordinates proposed de-
arches, and provides a centralized
mechanism for obtaining clearance to
owngrade or release intelligence in-
rmation and ensure necessary fol-
wup. We expect that this committee
ill contribute to the effort to slow
■oliferation and make it more difficult
r countries of concern to maintain or
•quii'e a chemical weapons capability.

he Australia Group

1 the multilateral arena, the Australia
j'oup, to which I referred earlier, is a
irticularly important element of our
'ifort to curb chemical weapons prolif-
lation. Under the chairmanship of
ustralia, the group has been consult-
g informally since 1984 to improve
e effectiveness of export controls on
'lal-use chemicals and to find ways to
• rb illegal use and proliferation of
' emcial weapons.

Chemical weapons use in the Iran-
aq war spawned formation of the Aus-
alia group in 1984. The United States
:ipported Australian efforts to lead
",e group of 19 industrialized nations,
hose goal is to discourage and impede
•lemical weapons proliferation by har-
:onizing national export controls on
lemical weapons precursor chemicals
id by exchanging information on
lemical weapons proliferation and
■eking other ways to curb the use of
lemlcal weapons.

The group meets informally twice
year in Paris. Group members are:
C [European Community]-12, United
;ates, Australia, New Zealand, Japan,
anada, Norway, and Switzerland,
ustria will likely join in November,
he group has no charter or constitu-
on and operates by consensus. Agree-
ents are not binding under inter-
fitional law.

The group has an informal "warn-
ig list" of 50 chemical weapons precur-
irs. Most members share the list with
leir chemical industry and ask chemi-
il firms to report and turn down

CFE Talks End Round Two

Folloiving is a statement by Am-
bassado?- Stephen J. Ledogar, head of
the U.S. delegation to the negotiation
on conventional armed forces in Eu-
rope (CFE), made in Vienna on July
13, 1989.

In the short time since the CFE nego-
tiation began, West and East have
made significant progress toward
achieving an agreement. Advances
have been registered at a time when, in
other arms control negotiations, we
were still getting organized and estab-
lishing basic guidelines.

When this negotiation began in
March, Western representatives came
armed with a fully developed proposal
which was designed to eliminate dis-
parities in those caregories which we
believe represent the core of the capa-
bility to launch a surprise attack and
initiate large-scale offensive opera-
tions; tanks, artillery, and armored
troop carriers — those forces most rele-
vant to the ability to seize and hold
territory.

Despite our conviction that those
forces warranted priority handling in
this negotiation and that including air-
craft, helicopters, and personnel would
pose significant challenges, NATO
leaders pledged on the 30th of May in
Brussels to extend our initial proposal
also to cover land-based combat air-
craft and helicopters and stationed
U.S. and Soviet ground and air force
personnel. The West thus made a major
move in the East's direction.

In order not to lose the momentum
generated by that decisive step, West-
ern representatives have worked inten-
sively these last several weeks to flesh
out the Brussels initiative. NATO lead-
ers had made a pledge that the West
would table its fully fleshed out new
proposal by September 7. In presenting
an expanded outline today, however, we
have overfulfilled the plan — to steal a
phrase from our Eastern colleagues.

We in the West wanted our East-
ern partners to be in a position to re-
turn to their respective capitals with
our expanded outline, including new
specifics of our proposal. We trust the
Eastern side will examine our ideas
with care. In this connection, we were
encouraged by the statement made by
the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative
Committee, which met recently in
Bucharest, confirming the resolve of
members to "do everything possible to
achieve positive results at the Vienna
talks as soon as possible." We noted
that Eastern experts were to be "given
instructions to work out the appropri-
ate proposals as a matter of urgency"
and that an accord would be possible in
1990.

In sum the West is pleased that
the East has accepted our challenge to
work together to reach an agreement
in 6 months to a year. The presentation
today of the expanded outline of
NATO's proposal has demonstrated
our commitment to that goal. ■

transactions which might be associated
with the chemical weapons programs of
Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. The Unit-
ed States itself controls 40 of these 50
chemical weapons precursors and is
looking at bringing the other 10 under
control with regard to those four coun-
tries. A subset of the warning list is a
group of nine "core list" chemicals for
which Australia group members have
commited themselves to impose domes-
tic export controls to ensure peaceful
and legitimate end use.

At the last meeting, in May 1989,
the group continued to make progress
on adding new chemicals to the warn-
ing list and responded favorably to a
U.S. proposal on information exchange.
The next meeting is scheduled for mid-
December 1989.

The Australia group has enjoyed a
measure of success. Its efforts have
made it more difficult for would-be pro-
liferators and others to obtain chemical
weapons precursors. But, it, unfor-
tunately, remains true that countries
intent on acquiring such chemicals can
still do so.

Australia Government and Industry
Conference on Chemical Weapons

Another element of our approach to ad-
dressing chemical weapons prolifera-
tion has been to call attention to the
problem on a global scale. At U.S. ini-
tiative, the Paris Conference on Chem-
cial Weapons Use was held in January.
As a further step, at the Vienna meet-
ing of foreign ministers on March 6,

lepartment of State Bulletin/September 1989

ARMS CONTROL

Secretary Baker called for an interna-
tional conference of governments and
the chemical industry, which Australia
has agreed to host, September 18-22,
1989, in Canberra. We believe that this
will be an excellent opportunity to in-
volve industry and governments world-
wide in the common effort to control
the trade in chemical weapons precur-
sors, as well as to gain industry sup-
port for the Geneva negotiations on a
chemical weapons ban. We hope that
the conference will focus particularly
on government and industry coopera-
tive efforts to control the movement of
precursors in international commerce.

U.S. Diplomatic Efforts Against
Chemical Weapons Proliferation

In addition, the United States is en-
gaged in a major diplomatic effort spe-
cifically to prevent the acquisition by
problem countries of a chemical weap-
ons capability. We have publicly called
on all governments to halt whatever
assistance they, or their firms or citi-
zens, might be providing to Libyan and
other would-be proliferators. Privately
and confidentially, we have also raised
specific concerns with several govern-
ments concerning reported involve-
ment by firms in their country in these
chemical weapons programs. Several
governments have subsequently taken
significant steps to help prevent fur-
ther foreign assistance to problem
countries. The United States will con-
tinue its vigorous diplomatic efforts to
encourage others to take action which
will help ensure that Libya and other
would-be proliferators do not succeed
in achieving full-scale chemical weap-
ons production. For example, we have
consulted closely with the Government
of Japan concerning the involvement of
Japanese firms at a metal fabrication
plant adjacent to the Libyan chemical
weapons plant at Rabta. The Govern-
ment of Japan informed us that, as of
July 1988, Japanese firms had ceased
all involvement with the metal fabrica-
tion plant. In addition, the Japanese
Government has taken a number of
measures on its own initiative to
strengthen export controls on precur-
sor chemicals.

We also have consulted closely with
the Federal Republic of Germany and
are gratified by the legislation intro-
duced in Bonn which would greatly
tighten laws against the export of
chemical weapons precursors and tech-
nology. We understand that legislation
would make it a crime for a citizen of

NATO's Conventional Force
Reduction Proposal

WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET,
JULY 12, 1989"

On July 13, at the conventional armed
forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations in
Vienna, the NATO allies will table the
specifics of their conventional force re-
duction proposal, based on the initia-
tive President Bush put forward at the
NATO summit. In formally tabling the
President's proposal in Vienna, NATO
is advancing the CFE process by pro-
viding the Warsaw Pact with details
2 months before the original Western
target of September 7. This will allow
the East to begin immediate examina-
tion of these details and hopefully allow
the East to respond formally when the
negotiations resume in Vienna in
September.

At the May 29-30 NATO summit
meeting, the alliance agreed on a far-
reaching conventional arms control
proposal which has now been incorpo-
rated into the NATO CFE proposal. It
has the following elements:

• To lock in Eastern acceptance of
the proposed Western limits on tanks
(20,000 for each side) and armored
troop carriers (28,000 for each side)
and artillery pieces (from 16,500 to
24,000 for each side, depending on the
resolution of questions about defini-
tions). Equipment reduced would be de-
stroyed. This provision would oblige
the East to destroy tens of thousands of
weapons systems and eliminate its pre-
ponderance in these important compo-
nents of military strength;

• That the West expand its current
proposal to extend, for the first time,
the concept of conventional arms con-

trol to all land-based combat aircraft
and helicopters in the Atlantic-to-the-
Urals (ATTU) area to a level 15% belo^
the current NATO total;

• To establish a manpower ceiling
of 275,000 each on U.S. and Soviet
ground and air forces stationed outsid
of their respective national territory i
the ATTU zone. The United States '
would take a 20% cut in combat man-
power in U.S. stationed forces, with a
resulting ceiling in U.S. and Soviet
ground and air forces stationed outsid
of national territory of the Atlantic-to
the-Urals zone of approximately
275,000 each. This manpower ceiling
will require the Soviets to reduce the
forces in Eastern Europe by about
325,000. The soldiers and air personni
withdrawn on both sides would be
demobilized.

The updated NATO proposal to bi
tabled on July 13 will, in addition, sta'
that in the case of combat aircraft,
each side would have no more than
5,700 aircraft. In the case of combat h(
icopters, each side would have no niori
than 1,900 helicopters.

NATO is proposing an accelerate!
timetable for reaching and implement
ing a CFE agreement along the above
lines. The allies would like to reach ai
agreement with 6-12 months and ac-
complish the reductions by 1992 or 199
By tabling details of the Western pro-
posal now, the allies demonstrate thei;
commitment to giving greater momer
tum to the CFE negotiations.

• Text from Weekly Compilation of Pre
idential Documents of July 24, 1989.B

the Federal Republic to participate in
the construction of chemical weapons
facilities like the one at Rabta. In addi-
tion, the European Community — at
West German initiative — has taken up
the chemical weapons issue on an ur-
gent basis, has called for EC-wide ex-
port controls on eight chemicals, and is
considering ways to coordinate export
controls on other chemical weapons-
related commodities, including
equipment.

We believe that the full range of
our nonproliferation efforts, through
participation in the Australia group,
diplomatic overtures to allies and oth-
ers, and consultations with the chemi-
cal industry, have helped to impede th
spread of chemical weapons capa-
bilities. While we cannot claim to havt
stopped the traffic in chemical weapor
materials and technology, we have sue
ceeded in enlightening responsible go'
ernment and industry leaders to the

Department of State Bulletin/September 19{

ARMS CONTROL

(ilik'Hi and in enlisting their coopera-
on and have made it that much more
it'ficult for states to acquire or expand
leniical weapons capabilities.

■'ithdrawal of U.S. Chemical
capons Stocks From West Germany

he President has also pledged to seek
ays to accelerate the withdrawal of
le unitary chemical weapons stocks
•om the Federal Republic of Germany.
s the committee is aware, there was
11 existing political commitment to
ithdraw those stocks by the end of
992. This was in response to the con-
ferns of our German ally.

Accordingly, the President
fetermined — after consultation with
Hies and, in particular, with the Ger-
jan Government — to announce our in-
'ntion to e.xplore ways and means of
•1.1'lrrating chemical weapons with-
law al. In announcing the President's
i-L-ision in his speech at the Vienna
leeting of foreign ministers on
tarch 6, Secretary Baker also chal-
•nged the Soviet Union to respond to
.ir announcement by beginning the re-
>oval of their vast chemical w^eapons
' ockpile facing Western Europe.

In this respect. President Bush has
(1 the way in the movement for great-
• progress in chemical weapons arms
)ntrol, and we are calling on the So-
lets to match us with positive actions,
he positive effect of our chemical
eapons arms control efforts serves
ir foreign policy and national security
iterests in other areas of arms control
olity as well. Progress in one area
romotes progress across the board.

biological Weapons Proliferation

Infortunately, today, a number of coun-
'•ies are also estimated to be working
0 achieve a biological weapons capa-
lility. The United States, itself, uncon-
litionally renounced all aspects of
ffensive biological warfare in 1969. We
len followed up this unilateral action
:y leading the fight for an international
!an, the 1972 Biological and Toxin

Weapons Convention. After the conven-
tion was completed, many hoped that
the security problem posed by biolog-
ical and toxin weapons had been solved,
although the absence of verification and
enforcement provisions in the conven-
tion were recognized as significant lim-
itations on its effectiveness.

We are especially concerned about
the spread of biological weapons in un-
stable areas and about the prospects of
biological and toxin weapons falling
into the hands of terrorists or into the
arsenals of those states which actively
support terrorist organizations. To
date, we have no evidence that any
known terrorist organization has the
capability to employ such weapons nor
that states supporting terrorism have
supplied such weapons. However, we
cannot dismiss these possibilities. If
the proliferation of biological weapons
continues, it may be only a matter of
time before terrorists do acquire and
use these weapons.

We must continue to strive to pre-
vent biological weapons proliferation by
reinforcing the moral, legal, and politi-
cal constraints against biological weap-
ons and, where feasible, seek to
prevent states from obtaining sensitive
materials for biological weapons pur-
poses. This will be a particularly diffi-
cult task, and, quite frankly, we do not
have the answers yet on how to achieve
this. We do know that we cannot do it
alone. Our efforts to constrain biolog-
ical weapons proliferation will also
require a sustained multilateral
approach, involving both U.S. leader-
ship and cooperation with friends and
allies.

' The complete transcript of the hear-
ings will be published by the committee and
vi'ill be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402.B

Nuclear Testing Talks
Open Round 4

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
JUNE 26, 1989'

Today marks the beginning of round
4 of the nuclear testing talks (NTT) in
Geneva between the United States and
the Soviet Union. Ambassador C. Paul
Robinson heads the U.S. delegation to
the talks.

The U.S. approach to these nego-
tiations complements our efforts to
reach agreements that will strengthen
our security and enhance stability. A
priority for these step-by-step talks is
to complete protocols to provide for ef-
fective verification of the Threshold
Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of 1974 and the
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
(PNET) of 1976, neither of which has
been ratified because they were not
verifiable in their original form.

Much has been accomplished in the
negotiations, and we will build on the
progress that has been made. We have
substantially completed the protocol to
the PNET, and we will be working to
complete the TTBT protocol, which
governs nuclear weapons testing. Since
the TTBT and PNET are complemen-
tary treaties, they and their protocols
will be submitted to the Senate as a
package for advice and consent to
ratification.

Our approach to these negotiations
is based on a realistic approach to our
security. For the past four decades, a
strong nuclear deterrent has been the
foundation of our security and freedom.
As long as we must rely on nuclear
weapons, we must continue to test to
ensure their safety, security, re-
liability, effectiveness, and surviv-
ability. We resume these negotiations
determined to complete the task of
concluding the verification provisions,
which are essential to sound and stabi-
lizing agreements.

' Text from Weekly Compilation of Pres-
idential Documents of July 3, 1989. ■

department of State Bulletin/September 1989

EAST ASIA

ECONOMICS

U.S., Japan Launch
Structural Impediments Initiative

OECD Council
Ministerial Held
in Paris

Before the opening of the economic
summit in Paris, President Bush and
Japanese Pritne Minister Sosuke Uno
held a bilateral meeting on July U,
1989, at the conclusion of which the fol-
lowing joint statement was issued.^

President Bush and Prime Minister
Uno reviewed a range of bilateral and
multilateral economic issues of mutual
interest. They reaffirmed their com-
mitment to work closely together to
promote continued economic growth
with low inflation, expansion of inter-
national trade, and further reductions
in current account imbalances. In this
connection, they reaffirmed their com-
mitment to economic policy coordina-
tion and noted the progress that had
been achieved within this framework
toward the above objectives.

In addition President Bush and
Prime Minister Uno agreed to comple-
ment the ongoing efforts by launching a

new initiative. They agreed on a U.S.-
Japan Structural Impediments Initia-
tive (SI I) to identify and solve struc-
tural problems in both countries that
stand as impediments to trade and
balance-of-payments adjustment with
the goal of contributing to the reduc-
tion of payments imbalances. They
agreed to establish a joint interagency
working group to undertake these
talks. The President and the Prime
Minister have appointed trichairmen
who will chair these meetings, which
will be held at the subcabinet level.
These talks will take place outside Sec-
tion 301 of the U.S. Trade Act. The bi-
lateral working group will present a
joint final report to the heads of gov-
ernment within a year, with an interim
assessment to be made in the spring of
1990.

' Te.xt from Weekly Compilation of Pres-
idential Documents of July 24, 1989. ■

The annual Council of the
Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECl
met in Paris May Sl-Jime 1, 1989. The
U.S. delegation was headed by
Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas F^_^
Brady.

Following are a statement by
Secretary Brady and the text of the
final communique.

I SECRETARY BRADY'S
■^ STATEMENT,
% MAY 31. 1989

e The key issue for this morning's
I discussion — strengthening the condi-
S tions for sustained growth — is an issu
I many of us wrestle with every day. Bv
i while we can't claim to have found an
g ideal recipe for success, developments
' since the last ministerial surely sug-
gest that we have been correct about
some of the ingredients.

While our 6-year economic expan-
sion has not been totally problem-free
in 1988 the OECD economies turned ii
an impressive performance. Real
growth exceeded expectations, and its
international composition improved;
key current and trade account imbal-
ances were reduced; trade flows ex-
panded dramatically; and inflation,
while somewhat higher on average, re-
mained modest and under control.

Our basic challenge is to sustain
and build on our successes, while effec
tively dealing with the global imbal-
ances that confront us. Certainly this
will require efforts on many fronts,
both individually and collectively. But
the indispensable component — the bot-
tom line if you will — is maintaining
the solid, balanced growth that is es-
sential to achieve our shared objec-
tives: reducing unsustainably large
external imbalances; improving living
standards by creating new jobs and
business opportunities; providing ade-
quate support for developing nations tc
strengthen their economies; and re-
maining vigilant against inflation.
On this last point, we need to
maintain a healthy balance. We should
not endorse restrictive policies in thosi
countries where inflation is not a real
problem, thereby risking a premature

Department of State Bulletin/September 191

ECONOMICS

nd to an expansion that has served us
11 so well.

The industrial countries have
greed that reducing the large existing
rade and current account imbalances
; a matter of priority. There is a con-
ensus that allowing these imbalances
J persist too long increases protec-
iionist threats to the global trading
'ystem and raises the risk of sharp and
amaging financial market swings.

Through cooperative efforts, sub-
tantial progress was made last year in
educing some key trade and current
ccount imbalances. The U.S. trade
eficit, for example, was cut by $34 bil-
lion. But recent trends in the largest
'urplus countries raise important ques-
ions about the continuation of the ad-
jstment process.

•Japan's trade surplus declined mod-
stly last year but has increased for
hree consecutive quarters. Germany's
'rade surplus continues to grow and
ontributes importantly to the major
Tibalances that have developed within
Europe. Progress has been made in re-
ucing the large surpluses of some of
he newly industrialized economies of
isia, but there is room for considerably
lore adjustment in all surplus
ountries.

Countries with large fiscal and ex-
^rnal deficits must reduce budget defi-
^;ts substantially. For our part, the
'i.S. Administration and Congress are
illy committed to implementing the
{partisan agreement designed to meet
he target of a $100 billion budget defi-
it in FY 1990. But let us not lose sight
f the fact that substantial deficit re-
uction progress has already been
lade in the United States. This year's
eductions will bring the Federal defi-
it to 2.7% of GNP, and the overall gov-
rnment deficit to only 1.5% of GNP —
loth near or below the OECD average.

But many in the United States feel
re are being urged to act in a vacuum.
J.S. policy alone does not drive inter-
lational economic developments, and
nternational policy prescriptions for
urrent problems cannot end with U.S.
• iscal action.

Sustaining growth and reducing
'xternal imbalances also requires that
teps be taken by the surplus coun-
ries. Action by Germany and Japan is
)articularly important, and the smaller
;)ECD countries can also make a useful
'ontribution. The newly industrialized
.economies of Asia, too, have an essen-
'ial part to play as part of their larger
ibligation to assume a more construc-
ive role in the global economy.

Surplus countries should ensure
that growth is led by domestic demand.
With their strong fiscal positions, large
external surpluses, and low underlying
rates of inflation, Japan and Germany,
in particular, are well placed to make
substantial contributions to the adjust-
ment process.

A cooperative approach to these is-
sues is at the heart of th G-7 policy co-
ordination process to which we remain
fully committed. Exchange rates have
played an important role in this proc-
ess and must play a continuing role in
promoting adjustment. In this context,
the dollar's recent rise against other
major currencies is a matter of con-
cern. If the dollar's recent rise is sus-
tained for a prolonged period, or
extended, it could undermine our ad-
justment efforts.

As we meet here today, there is
broad agreement on our basic objec-
tives for the coming year: ensure
smooth, balanced, and non-inflationary
growth; to make further progress in
reducing external imbalances; and to
promote a healthy and growing inter-
national trade system. These objectives
are within our grasp and can be
achieved if, together, we share a sense
of common policy priorities.

COMMUNIQUE
JUNE 1, 1989

1. The Council of the OECD met on 31st May
and 1st June at Ministerial level. The meet-
ing was chaired by Mr. Jon Sigurdsson, Min-
ister of Commerce and Industry of Iceland.
The Vice Chairmen were Mr. Robert Ur-
bain. Minister of International Trade of
Belgium, and the Rt. Hon. Joe Clai-k, Secre-
tary of State for External Affairs, the Hon.
John Crosbie, Minister for International
Trade, and the Hon. Michael Wilson, Minis-
ter of Finance of Canada. Ministers re-
viewed the general economic situation. They
discussed the policy orientations necessary
for economic and social progress in the
OECD area and the developing countries.

2. The Council renewed the mandate of
the Secretary-General of the OECD, Mr.
Jean-Claude Paye, for a second period of five
years with effect from 30th September 1989.
On this occasion Ministers expressed their
warmest thanks to Mr Paye for the compe-
tence with which he has directed the Orga-
nization during his first mandate.

Moving Ahead From

the Achievements of the 1980s

3. The current economic situation in the
OECD area is generally good: activity is ro-
bust; inflation has been contained at rela-

tively moderate levels; substantial progress
has been made in job creation; and invest-
ment is buoyant, reflecting business confi-
dence bolstered by actions taken over the
full range of economic policies and the
steady strengthening of international eco-
nomic cooperation.

4. Despite the achievements of recent
years, much remains to be done. To ensure
sustained, job-creating, non-inflationary
growth OECD governments will:

i) resist inflationary pressures, which
have recently reemerged as a problem in
many countries;

ii) strengthen the process of reducing
lai'ge current-account deficits and sur-
pluses, a process which recently has weak-
ened markedly;

iii) reduce unemployment, which re-
mains high in many countries, paying par-
ticular attention to the problems of youth
and the long-term unemployed;

iv) accelerate the reduction of struc-
tural rigidities and distortions within econ-
omies and internationally;

v) establish sound public budgetary
positions and promote efficient public
management;

vi) improve the structure and level of
national saving in manycountries and there-
by contribute to a sustained buoyance of
productive investment;

vii) reinforce the open multilateral trad-
ing system by vigorously pursuing the suc-
cessful conclusion of the Uruguay Round
negotiations in 1990, expanding market ac-
cess, resisting protectionist pressures in all
their manifestations, and refraining from
any measure which could damage the multi-
lateral trading system;

viii) improve the protection and man-
agement of the environment, particularly
through the better integration of economic
and environmental decision-making, to en-
sure sustainable development for current
and future generations;

ix) pursue the establishment of
strengthened and more operationally effec-
tive GATT IGeneral Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade] rules and disciplines as well as
substantial progressive reductions in agri-
cultural support and protection resulting in
correcting and preventing restrictions and
distortions in world agricultural markets,
as affirmed in the Uruguay Round frame-
work approach, over an agreed period of
time;

x) strengthen policies supportive of the
efforts of developing countries to find viable
solutions to the debt and development prob-
lems that confront them.

POLICY DIRECTIONS

5. To meet these challenges and ensure im-
proved economic performance over the next
decade, governments will make full use of
the policy instruments at their disposal and
the synergy among them. The experience of
the 1980s shows that implementing measures

}epartment of State Bulletin/September 1989

ECONOMICS

across the whole range of economic policies
and across countries enhances the effective-
ness of each specific measure.
(). Therefore:

i) monetary policy will be directed to
its primary objective, price stability in a
growing economy. This will help create the
conditions for stable and sustained growth.
In some countries exchange rate stability is
regarded as important in order to maintain
domestic price and cost stability;

ii) fiscal policy will aim, where appro-
priate, to reduce public-sector demand on
private saving by continuing the process of
consolidation. Governments will also aim to
improve the quality and efficiency of both
sides of the public-sector accounts by reduc-
ing distortions associated with the structure
of taxation and by subjecting the level and
composition of expenditure to closer scruti-
ny and better overall control;

iii) governments will step up their ac-
tions in critical areas of structural reform to
improve steadily the potential of economies,
to create additional jobs without an acceler-
ation of inflation, and to enhance the effec-
tiveness of macroeconomic policies;

iv) international economic cooperation
will be intensified in respect of both macro-
economic and structural policies in support,
inter alia, of the external adjustment
process;

v) when Member countries enter into or
strengthen regional arrangements, they will
act in conformity with international obliga-
tions and with the objective of strengthen-
ing the open multilateral trading system
and seek to ensure that the benefits from
regional liberalization and dynamism will
accrue not only to the participating coun-
tries but also the world economy at large.

7. Ministers welcome the report on sur-
veillance of structural policies by the Eco-
nomic Policy Committee.' They endorse its
main conclusion that the case is even more
compelling than ever before for pressing for-
ward with reform on a broad front. Econom-
ic conditions for reform are favorable. In all
Member countries and in Yugoslavlia reform
will foster more flexible and efficient mar-
kets for labor, capital and products, improve
the efficiency of the public sector, and en-
hance the effectiveness of macroeconomic
policies. Ministers take note of the report by
the Secretary-General on the implementa-
tion of multilateral surveillance. This con-
tributes to sustaining the momentum of
reform. Ministers invite the Secretary-
General to continue to develop and strength-
en the OECD's surveillance of structural re-
forms and policies.

8. Specific economic policy orientations
required in individual countries were re-
viewed and agreed.

9. To ensure sustained, balanced
growth, priorities in the Unied States re-
main to contain inflationary pressures and
to reduce further the current-account defi-
cit. Continued moderation of domestic de-
mand and further decrease of public deficits
are of critical importance to achieving these

ends. U.S. authorities w-ill continue to moni-
tor wage, price, and demand developments
closely with a view to taking appropriate ac-
tion should inflationary pressures not abate
in response to policy measures already
taken. The U.S. Administration will ensure
that the recent measures to reduce the Fed-
eral budget deficit to $100 billion in FY 1990
agreed between the President and Congres-
sional leaders are fully enacted. Further
measures will be taken as necessary to
achieve the objective of eliminating it en-
tirely by 1993 as a contribution to the reduc-
tion of the savings-investment gap. Moreover,
priority attention will be given to dealing
with the situation of troubled financial con-
stitutions and improving the system of pru-
dential supervison. Furthermore, the U.S.
will implement its trade policies in line with
the objective of strengthening the open,
multilateral trading system.

10. In both Japan and Germany, the au-
thorities will continue to pursue prudent
but flexible medium-term macroeconomic
policies and accelerate structural reforms,
in order to sustain strong, non-inflationary
growth of domestic demand at a level that
would promote significantly external adjust-
ment, which recently has weakened.

a) In Japan while major reform has re-
cently been achieved to improve the tax sys-
tems, further progress will be made in
adjusting public revenue and expenditure
structures taking into account, i^iter alia,
the prospective aging of population. Struc-
tural reforms contributing to both price sta-
bility and external adjustment will be
expedited. These include the removal of le-
gal and other impediments to, as well as the
review of taxation of, land for the more effi-
cient use of land. Price competition will be
strengthened and market access further fa-
cilitated for domestic and foreign partici-
pants through reforms in regulatory
structures in the distribution and other
service sectors. While substantial progress
has already been made in the financial sec-
tor, financial liberalization and interna-
tionalization will be continued further. In
pursuing these and other measures, Japan
will undertake to further improve market
access both in goods and services, thereby
contributing to a strong expansion of
imports.

b) Germany will continue with the
medium-term programme of fiscal consol-
idation and has embarked upon a policy of
major structural reforms, including, inter
alia, an overhaul of social security systems,
a multi-year tax-reform, and the reform of
the telecommunications sector. Efforts will
be encouraged to introduce more flexible ar-
rangements for working time, wage struc-
tures, and job assignment. Particular
attention will be given to improving the con-
ditions for reemployment of those who are
suffering from long-term unemployment.
There is a need for structural reforms espe-
cially in the services sector where regu-
lations and barriers to entry remain
significant, such as the transport sector.

The flexibility of the economy will be im-
proved by reducing remaining structural
impediments in domestic financial markets
and through more liberal closing hours in
the retail trade. Structural reforms will
increase the dynamism of the economy,
strengthen economic growth, and, by sup-
porting a shift of resources into more do-
mestically oriented sectors, will contribute
to the external adjustment process.

11. Other OECD countries will follow as
appropriate similar broad policy orienta-
tions, with specific actions reflecting indi-
vidual country situations. Among the other
large OECD economies, immediate priori-
ties are:

a) In France, the reforms already un-
dertaken to make the economy more com-
petitive will be reinforced by the priority
given to an anti-inflation strategy involv-
ing, particularly, continued reduction of the
budget deficit, competition policy, and ac-
tion to improve the underlying competitive-
ness of firms. The remaining foreign-
exchange controls will be removed and the
process of opening up to foreign investment
continued. Control of public expenditure
will be intensified, in the light of the conse-
quences for the tax system of the liberaliza-
tion of capital movements and the process ol
fiscal harmoniation in the EC [European
Community], and the need to ensure that
funds are available for current spending pr:
orities, notably research and training.

b) In Italy, efforts w'ill be stepped up to
reduce budget deficits which exert upward
pressure on interest rates, contributing to
the increase of public debt and adding to in-
flationary pressures. Italy will also contin-
ue efforts to improve the efficiency of its
public sector. Coordination between the
public and private sectors will be improved
to contribute to a more efficient allocation o
resources. Tax reform will be intensified
and thereby will increase resources avail-
able to support a sustained growth of investi
ment. Through a variety of measures
relating particularly to training and labor
markets, Italy will continue to reduce struct
tural disparities between the Center-North,
where overheating exists, and the South,
where unemployment remains high.

c) In the United Kingdom, monetary
policy will continue to be directed at reduc-
ing inflation. Fiscal policy provides for fur-
ther repayment of public sector debt, while
moving to a balanced budget over the
medium term. Competition will be further
encouraged in the provision of various pro-
fessional services, and through the reform oi
restrictive trade practices law. Tax reform
will continue to promote the improved per-
formance of the economy, notably through
further reductions, when practicable, in
marginal tax rates. Employment training
and educational standards will be further
improved. There will be continued review
and reform of regulations which are a bur-
den on businesses.

d) In Canada, priority will be given to
following through on the commitments set

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

ECONOMICS

out in the recent budget; reducing inflation;
f-educing the budget deficit and controlling
i,he growth of public debt; implementing a
proadly-based sales tax — the Goods and
Services Tax; and reforming the unemploy-

tient insurance system to place greater em-
. basis on human resources development as
listinct from income maintenance. The Gov-
;rnment will intensify efforts towards the
•emoval of restrictions on inter-provincial
,rade.

e) The European Communities pro-
gramme to complete the internal market in
.992 and improve its economic and social
;ohesion, is progressing steadily and has
ilready given a strong momentum to struc-
;ural policy reform, investment, and
jrowth. These moves are complemented by
oint efforts by the European Communities
knd EFTA [European Free Trade Associa-
tion] countries to deepen and extend their
Cooperation beyond the current free trade
arrangements to create a European Eco-
jiomic Space, and will be in line with the
pbjective of strengthening the open, multi-
ateral trading system.

Financial Markets

ind Foreign Direct Investment

12. The continuing liberalization of financial
Tiarkets and foreign direct investment is
•onti'ibuting to a more dynamic world econ-
imv. Ministers welcome the new impetus
liven to the liberalization process by the re-
cent strengthening of the OECD Codes of
liberalization in the area of capital move-
nents and financial services. The principles
hat underlie the OECD Codes and other
OECD instruments will guide Governments
IS they seek to prevent or reduce interna-
ional difficulties arising from the existence
,)f different financial systems and different
legrees of openness to international
■ompetition.

13. Increasingly integrated securities
Tiarkets have altered the challenges faced
jy prudential supervisors. The OECD has
jeen examining the linkages across mar-
kets, system risks, and the scope for im-
proving the capacity of the system to
nanage those risks. The goal for the coming
/ears will be to extend significantly inter-
lational cooperation among supervisory and
regulatory bodies in order to ensure the
i^mooth, efficient, and flexible working of the
Financial system.

14. While progress has been made in
reducing the restrictions on inward foreign
:Jirect investment and flows have risen
sharply, protectionist sentiment, sometimes
IS a spill-over from tensions in trade,
threatens investment flows. In connection
with the 1990 Review of the OECD Declara-
tion and Decisions on International Invest-
ment and Multinational Enterprises,
Ministers reaffirm their determination to
le.-ist such protectionism, to maintain an
.open investment climate, and, inter alia, to
■strengthen the OECD National Treatment
instrument. The balance that has charac-
terized the Organization's approach to inter-
national investment questions, including

that between the different elements of the
1976 Declaration on International Invest-
ment and Multinational Enterprises, should
continue to prevail.

Labor Markets, Education,
and Social Policies

15. The climate for entrepreneurship and job
creation has improved, especially in small
and new businesses, and moderate wage out-
comes have made an important contribution
to employment growth in many countries
during the past years. Nevertheless, unem-
ployment levels in certain OECD countries
remain unacceptably high. Labor-market
policies will be strengthened, in particular
to fight youth and long-term unemployment,
to seek further reduction of labor-market ri-
gidities, and to ensure that employment op-
portunities are fully exploited. Ministers
welcome the efforts undertaken in the Orga-
nization to develop a new framework for
long-term policies aimed at more job-
creating growth, increased functional and
geographical mobility, and smoother adjust-
ment of the labor force.

16. A solid basic education, combined
with post-compulsory education and train-
ing opportunities throughout working life, is
essential for each individual to exploit fully
employment opportunities. In close coopera-
tion, Governments and the private sector
must step up efforts to meet these funda-
mental requirements.

17. Social protection systems are an es-
sential expression of solidarity and contrib-
ute importantly to personal security and
dignity, facilitating the acceptance of struc-
tural change. To remain viable, these sys-
tems must adjust to evolving circumstances
and needs. In particular, full use must be
made of the contribution they can provide
for effectively underpinning labor-market
and human resource enhancement policies.

18. More generally, social and labor-
market policies should aim at the active par-
ticipation of all groups, particularly the dis-
advantaged, in the economy and society at
large. This will become all the more impor-
tant as dependency rates rise with aging
populations and will require better integra-
tion of policies, programmes, entitlements,
and administrative structures, taking ad-
vantage of the signals and incentives pro-
vided by the market.

Agriculture

19. Ministers take note of the joint report by
the Agriculture and Trade Committees- and
endorse its conclusion. Reduced production
resulting mainly from the North American
drought but also, to some extent from policy
measures, has contributed to the reduction
in assistance in 1988 (as provisionally meas-
ured by PSE/CSE). In some instances, sup-
ply control systems have been effective in
reducing production, but they may entail se-
rious economic distortions. The cost of agri-
cultural support for the OECD as a whole
imposed on taxpayers and consumers

amounted in 1988, according to Secretariat
estimates, to approximately .$270 billion.
This figure is lower than those of 1986 and
1987 but is still above the level of 1985 and
previous years. The role of market signals in
orienting agricultural production remains
insufficient almost everywhere. Trade ten-
sions continue to be acute; market access
has improved only in a few cases, and the
use of measures affecting export competi-
tion, directly and indirectly, remains
widespread.

20. It is therefore more than ever neces-
sary that the process of agricultural reform
be pursued vigorously, in conformity with
the principles defined by Ministers in 1987
and 1988, and taking advantage of the pres-
ent strength of markets. The successful
completion of the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions will be of decisive importance in this
respect. Therefore, in accordance with the
framework approach endorsed at the Mid-
Term Review, Member countries will, in the
months ahead, actively engage in substan-
tive negotiations in Geneva (including the
tabling of negotiating proposals) and meet
their undertakings and stated intentions on
short-term measures. Reform should be
achieved through mutually reinforcing ac-
tions at domestic and international levels
leading to a fair and market-oriented trad-
ing system through substantial, progressive
reductions in agricultural support and
protection and strengthened and more
operationally effective GATT rules and
disciplines.

21. The Organization will continue its
work on the monitoring of agricultural re-
form. This will include improving quantita-
tive indicators (e.g., PSE/CSE) and
analysis; analyzing medium-term market
trends and the medium-term impact of spe-
cific policies; assessing the scope and limita-
tions of all relevant policy measures, such as
supply control and direct income support;
and examining the interrelationship be-
tween agriculture and the en-
vironment. Work undertaken on rural devel-
opment policies will be actively pursued
with a view to contributing to the identifica-
tion and assessment of the range of actions
available to stimulate, in rural areas, eco-
nomically viable activities which would en-
hance development and growth in an
environmentally sound way.

Industrial Subsidies

22. Industrial subsidies often present imped-
iments to structural adjustment, distort
resource allocation, and engender interna-
tional frictions. Reducing such subsidies is
crucial for improving the flexibility of econ-
omies and for increasing international trade
on a competitive basis. Ministers note the
progress on the work in this area, following
the mandates given in 1986 and 1987 and
agreed to strengthen that work. Priority
will now be given to completing the
information-gathering and reaching early
agreement on concepts and methodology for
the second phase of the work which will be
directed at transparency and assessment of
the economic impact of industrial subsidies.

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

ECONOMICS

Export Credit Subsidies

23. Ministers note with satisfaction thie
progress ttiat has been made in strengthen-
ing the multilateral disciplines on trade- and
aid-distorting export credit subsidies. This
effort must be pursued actively. Ministers
invite the competent bodies in the OECD to
monitor closely the implementation of the
i-ecently updated Export Credit Arrange-
ments and to assess whether their objec-
tives are being met.

Energy

24. The growth of energy consumption, es-
pecially that of oil, risks exerting pressure
on oil and energy supplies, with possible
consequences for prices, inflation, and the
potential for economic growth. Therefore
strong and continued action, as underlined
by Energy Ministers of lEA [In-
ternational Energy Agency] countries, is
necessary to achieve greater energy conser-
vation and efficiency, diversification of sup-
ply, improved energy technology and
emergency preparedness.

GLOBAL ISSUES

2.5. Global interdependence is an increas-
ingly well recognised reality and is leading
to intensified efforts to find solutions to
problems related to the trade system, the
protection of the environment, and develop-
ing countries.

The Open Multilateral Trading System

26. The robust economic activity accom-
panied by strong growth in the volume of
world trade over the past year has had only
limited effect on the existing large number
of trade-restrictive measures and practices.
Persisting large external imbalances, as
well as delays in structural adjustment, are
a source of protectionist pressures and in-
ternational fictions. Recourse to govern-
ment intervention and grey area measures
continues to erode the multilateral system.
New interpretations of certain trade con-
cepts such as "reciprocity" and "unfair trade
practices" as well as new approaches imply-
ing a degree of balanced bilateral trade are
being increasingly advocated in some quar-
ters. Ministers firmly reject the tendency
towards unilateralism, bilateralism, sec-
toralism, and managed trade which threat-
ens the multilateral system and undermines
the Uruguay Round negotiations.

27. Therefore Ministers express their
determination to halt and reverse all such
protectionist tendencies and to strengthen
the open multilateral trading system. They
will fulfill their Punta del Este standstill'
and rollback commitments, which, inter
alia, require the avoidance of any trade-
restrictive or distorting measure inconsis-
tent with the provisions of the General
Agreement and its instruments. They agree
to make effective use of the improved GATT

dispute settlement mechanism and to make
progress in negotiations for further im-
provements, and they will avoid any dis-
criminatory or autonomous actions which
undermine the principles of the GATT and
the integrity of the multilateral trading sys-
tem, in conformity with the standstill com-
mitment mentioned above. They invite the
OECD to pursue its monitoring of trade pol-
icy developments in Member countries in-
cluding in the fields of dumping and other
related measures. In this respect full com-
pliance with the commmitment for early no-
tification of all new measures is essential.
28. These developments underline the
need for a successful outcome to the
Uruguay Round in order to strengthen mul-
tilateralism in international trade in goods
and services, and to open markets. The pos-
itive results of the Mid-Term Review provide
a sound basis for the next phase of the nego-
tiations, for which the work of the OECD
will continue to provide analytical and con-
ceptual support. Ministers agree on the ne-
cessity to table more specific proposals as
soon as possible and to proceed without de-
lay to substantive negotiations on all issues,
including the new areas, so as to meet the
deadline set for the end of the Round. Minis-
ters reaffirm their determination to press
forward and complete the Uruguay Round
negotiations in 1990. They call upon all par-
ticipants, both developed and developing, to
make the most constructive contribution
possible to a successful outcome.

Environment

29. Continuing environmental deterioration
will threaten the achievement of sustainable
economic development and an improved
quality of life for all. It is therefore essential
that all countries actively participate in con-
fronting the range of environmental prob-
lems, including those of a global nature. The
OECD countries bear a special respon-
sibility in this respect. The recent series of
high-level conferences and meetings make
an important contribution to the process of
international cooperation.

30. Given the magnitude, urgency, and
potential economic, social, and ecological im-
plications of environmental problems, all
relevant national, regional, and internation-
al organizations will have to be mobilized in
the most effective and efficient way. The
OECD will cooperate fully in this process
and, building upon the work on environmen-
tal problems it has carried out over twenty
years, will focus on those aspects where, by
nature of its membership and structure, it
can make a particular contribution.

31. Ministers reaffirmed the critical im-
portance of integrating more systematically
and effectively environment and economic
decision-making, as a means of contributing
to sustainable economic development. Tak-
ing advantage of its capacity in the field of
economic analysis, the OECD will work to
place environmental decision-making on
firm analytical ground with respect to
costs, benefits, and resource implications of

environmental proposals and initiatives, se
lection among policy options, and, where a]
propriate, to develop methods to ensure thi
environmental considerations become an in
tegral part of economic policy-making. Par
ticular attention will be paid to breaking
new ground in such areas as: integrating e:
vironmental considerations into economic
growth models; analyzing environment-
trade relationships; determining how price
and other mechanisms can be used to
achieve environmental objectives; assessin
the economic costs and benefits of possible'
responses, including technologies, to cope
with atmospheric, climatic, marine, and ot
er global environmental problems (in coor-
dination with the work carried out in othei
competent bodies); and elaborating in eco-
nomic terms the "sustainable development""
concept.

32. In this respect intensified efforts
for technological breakthrough are impor-
tant to reconcile economic growth and env
ronmental protection. The OECD will
examine incentives and barriers to the inn
vation and diffusion of environmental tecb
nologies. It will also promote expanded
information exchange on technological
options.

33. Industry also has a central role in
confronting the environmental challenges (
the 1990s, especially in incorporating envi-
ronmental concerns into their economic dec
sions. The OECD will continue to stimulati
and support closer cooperation between Gc
ernments and industry to meet these chal-
lenges. Progress is beginning to be made i
fields such as waste minimization, industri
processes that conserve energy and raw mt
terials, the design and marketing of cost-
effective "clean technologies," and the deve
opment of an economically viable pollution
control and environmental management in-
dustry. There will be an expanded effort to
analyze the economic dimensions of these a>
tivities and trends and promote informatio
exchange on technological innovation and
options. The OECD-BIAC Conference on
"Environmental Problems and Industrial
Policies in the 1990s" planned for October is
an example of this. The agricultural sector
also has a central role to play in correcting,
environmental problems, such as soil erosio
and water pollution.

34. Close co-operation, involving the
lEA and the NEA [Nuclear Energy Agen-
da], on the crucial relationship between
environment and energy will continue. Intc
grated policies which further energy secur
ty, environmental protection, and economic
growth are required. In view of increasing!
evidence of the risk of global warming and
climate change and the necessity to respom
to this issue, Ministers call for vigilant, se-
rious, and realistic assessment on a global
basis of what energy policies can contribute
to meeting these challenges, and of their
economic and social impacts. Member gov-
ernments should contribute in their energy
policies to the solution of international and
domestic environmental problems. As ident:
fied by TEA Ministers, they pledge to pur-
sue in their respective energy policies

ENERGY

reatly improved energy efficiency and con-
lervation, new technologies, and, where na-
'ional decisions so contemplate, the use of
jiiclear power with maintained and im-
inived safety in construction, operation,
11(1 waste disposal. The transport sector
Isd has a particular significance for the en-
irunment. The OECD is actively partieipat-
ng in the preparations for an ECMT
linisterial meeting on transport and the
nvironment, which will be held in Novem-
ber 1989.

3.5. Ministers agree that cooperation
vith developing countries is essential for the
.olution of global environmental problems.
The OECD will evaluate relevant policy e.\-
ierience in Member countries. On the basis
if this information the Organization will
leek to coordinate policies among Member
lountries with a view to promoting mecha-
lisms for technology transfer to developing
:ountries; the balancing of long-term envi-
■onmental costs and benefits against near-
erm economic growth objectives; the design
if innovative approaches by development as-
sistance institutions to environmental pro-
eetion and natural resources management;
mil the integration of environmental consid-
■rations into development programmes, tak-
ng into account the legitimate interests and
ii.mmIs of developing countries in sustaining
he urowth of their economies and the finan-
•lal and technological requirements to meet
in irnnmental challenges. Ministers encour-
isr the development of appropriate environ-
iKMital appraisal procedures for specific
levelopmental projects and programmes fi-
.anced directly or indirectly by Member
iivii-nments. They recognize that public
wareness of the environmental impact of
Hit.ntial projects is essential.

)eveloping Countries

16. The diversity of developing country ex-
)erienee in the 1980s has underlined the im-
lortance of individual developing country
jolicies for progress. Sustainable broad-
last'd growth and effective development rely
ipun policy reforms, carefully related to
.'ountry situations, aimed at stabilising and
iberalizing developing economies; strength-
ening the effectiveness of public administra-
ion, the private sector, and the role of
narkets; tackling poverty; and enhancing
luman resources. The members of the DAC
Development Assistance Committee] and
■-he multilateral development and financing
Agencies have been adjusting and differen-
;iating their assistance efforts and modal-
tie.s to support developing country efforts
n these areas. Ministers welcome the re-
view launched by the DAC on major develop-
ment and aid issues in the 1990s. The results
if this work will be submitted to the Minis-
tiiitil meeting in 1990.

37. Adequate, appropriate, and timely
financial support is crucial to the success of
.major economic and social reforms in deve-
loping countries. Despite efforts by some
!DAC countries, the rate of growth in overall

concessional aid has slowed down. Ministers
express their determination to reverse this
trend and to continue to work for improved
aid quality. Ministers welcome steps to
write offer otherwise remove the burden of
ODA loans to the poorest developing coun-
tries and urge all donor countries who are
able to do so to consider further action along
these lines. In addition to their development
assistance efforts, the OECD countries have
a clear responsibility for promoting an open
vigorous international economic environ-
ment as an essential contribution to the de-
velopment process. In this respect an
increase in total net resource flows, includ-
ing foreign private investment, is also im-
portant for developing countries.

38. Persisting debt problems affect a
wide range of developing countries. The key
principles of the collaborative debt strategy
as it has evolved over the past few years re-
main valid, with emphasis on the case-by-
case approach and support to countries im-
plementing effective growth-oriented re-
forms. In this context Ministers welcome
the recent decisions of the IMF [Internation-
al Monetary Fund] and World Bank Boards,
which followed up the agreement in the In-
terim Committee, to strengthen the debt
strategy. Ministers urge all parties to move
quickly to build upon these steps. The Paris
Club is following up the orientations agreed
upon at the Toronto Summit in favor of the
poorest and most indebted countries. Coop-
erative efforts in favor of these debt-ridden
countries should be strongly pur,sued and
supported.

39. Financial modalities are important
but they must be buttressed by a wide-
ranging set of economic policies in both the
OECD and the debtor countries. Sound mon-
etary, fiscal, and structural policies in the
OECD countries will help the financial situ-
ation of the debtors by sustaining growth
and creating conditions favorable to lower

interest rates and stronger savings. OECD
countries must also use every opportunity to
strengthen the open multilateral trade and
financial system, press for expanded and
free trade with full participation of develop-
ing countries, resist protectionism, and en-
sure that their markets are open to the
exports of the developing countries.

Cooperation Witli Non-Members

40. Ministers welcome the successful launch
in the past year of the dialogue with a num-
ber of dynamic Asian economies, whose role
in the world economy is of growing signifi-
cance. The initial exchange of views on
changing patterns in the global economy and
on key areas of common interest in policy-
making was constructive. The experience
thus far suggests considerable scope for fur-
ther valuable contacts to identify and dis-
cuss issues of emerging importance.
Ministers warmly welcome these develop-
ments, and endorse efforts to carry the dia-
logue forward through informal discussions
on more specific issues. They call for a re-
port at their meeting in 1990.

41. Given growing economic and envi-
ronmental interdependence, Ministers con-
sider it important that the OECD remain
attentive to developments in countries in
other regions of the world. Possibilities for
mutually informative contact will be care-
fully examined.

'This report identifies nine areas for ac-
tion; trade policies and the international
trading system; agricultural; industrial sup-
port policies; international direct invest-
ment; financial markets; taxation;
competition policy; labor markets; and the
public sector.

-Agricultural Policies, Markets and
Trade: Monitoring and Outlook, 1989.B

International Energy Agency
Ministers Meet in Paris

The International Energy Agency
{IE A) met in ministerial session in
Paris on May 30, 1989. The U.S. dele-
gation was headed by Secretary of En-
ergy James D. Watkrns.

Following is the text of the com-
munique issued at the conclusion of
the meeting.

1. The Governing Board of the International
Energy Agency (lEA) met at Ministerial
level on 30th May 1989 in Paris under the
Chairmanship of His Excellency, Mr. Jose
Claudio Aranzadi, Minister for Industry and
Energy of Spain.

2. Previous Gains and Current Situation

Ministers agreed that developments in the
main energy markets, including efficiency
gains, sufficient supplies, more competitive
markets and lower prices than earlier in the
decade, are contributing positively to over-
all economic activity in lEA countries and
in the world economy. Energy security, both
for lEA countries and for the world at large,
has improved considerably as a result of pol-
icies and programmes implemented in the
1970s and 1980s in such areas as efficiency
and conservation, fuel diversification, indig-
enous resource development, emergency
preparedness, natural gas security and en-
hanced R&D [research and development]
collaboration, as well as market pricing, de-

Department of state Bulletin/September 1989

ENERGY

regulation and privatization, greater compe-
tition and reduction of trade barriers.

3. Looking Ahead to the 1990s and Beyond

Ministers called sharp attention, however,
to two aspects of the current energy situa-
tion to which they attach particular impor-
tance and view with deep concern:

• growing world-wide oil consumption,
particularly for transportation, with its
eventual medium-term consequences of a
tighter supply/demand balance and renewed
vulnerability to supply disruptions; and

• the environmental aspects of energy
supply and consumption, including both the
more conventional and better-known pollu-
tants and the growing atmospheric concen-
tration of CO2 and other "greenhouse" gases
and its long-term consequences for global
warming and climate change.

They therefore confirmed again their
long-standing commitment to ensuring that
energy security and policy objectives are
achieved while also achieving a clean and
healthy environment, and agreed that the
lEA and its Member countries will take vig-
orous energy policy action, in particular
greater efficiency and technology improve-
ments, to address these challenges of the
1990s in order to prevent them from acting
as a constraint on economic growth in indus-
trialized countries or on development in oth-
er countries.

They also noted certain other aspects of
future market developments which also re-
quire further attention, and in some cases
action by governments as previously agreed
in the lEA:

• growing energy consumption, partic-
ularly in oil and electricity, is eroding gains
achieved earlier on both the supply and the
demand side;

• maintaining sufficient oil supply, par-
ticularly in view of production declines in
some OECD [Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development] countries, will
require investment climate and conditions
conducive to sustaining reserve additions,
especially outside the Middle East, and close
attention to how the oil industry adjusts to
fluctuating prices and to the effect which
changes in ownership and other structural
developments may have on competition with-
in the industry;

• barriers and other distortions to ener-
gy trade in coal and other forms of energy,
where they remain, must continue to be re-
duced with a view to their elimination, and
no new barriers or other distortions must be
allowed to arise;

• rising demand for natural gas must be
met in accordance with previous decisions
by Ministers regarding security and diver-
sity of supply, and taking into account the
long-term reserve situation and environ-
mental characteristics of gas;

• possible difficulties in meeting rising
demand for electricity (despite greater effi-
ciency in generation and end use) if there

are constraints on further diversification of
energy sources through greater use of coal,
natural gas, nuclear, hydro and other
renewables;

• rising demand for energy in develop-
ing countries and in centrally planned
economies.

4. Policies to Deal With Future Challenges

Ministers agreed that energy security in
both the short and long term, in order to
sustain economic well-being, can and must
be maintained despite the risks inherent in
the above aspects of future energy develop-
ments. They agreed upon the need for
strongly reinforced policies as regards oil
demand within a conte.xt of competitive en-
ergy markets, open energy trade and in-
vestment and sound price policies. They also
agreed upon vigorous new action as regards
energy and the environment. In general,
they called for keeping open a broad range
of energy policy options which consolidate
previous gains but are adjusted to meet the
changing circumstances which can now be
foreseen.

(a) Emergency Prepardness. Ministers
recognised that a large portion of the oil
supply of lEA countries is and will be im-
ported from areas where supply disruptions
cannot be excluded. They also noted that
growing consumption is already absorbing
surplus capacity in various parts of the oil
supply chain (including production, trans-
portation and refining) with a correspond-
ing reduction of flexibility and growth of
vulnerability. They agreed that prepared-
ness to meet oil supply disruptions through
the lEA's systems for responding to supply
disruptions, which include co-ordinated ear-
ly stock-draw and other measures, as well as
emergency oil sharing, remains a principal
concern of international co-operation within
the lEA for the purpose of maintaining its
Member countries' economic well-being.
Those systems will therefore be maintained
in readiness by periodic testing, review of
Member countries' response capacities and
any improvements which may be necessary
to reflect changing market and industry
structures. Recalling their decision in 1987
that lEA countries will maintain stock lev-
els that would be readily available at the in-
stance of governments, under clear and
definite authority so as to assure their abili-
ty to implement these systems in an oil sup-
ply disruption, they applauded the efforts of
those lEA countries which have increased
their government, public entity and private
stock levels as protection against the risk of
supply disruptions. They encouraged them
and others to continue those efforts and to
improve their stock-draw authority and pro-
cedures and demand restraint measures and
procedures, in line with the commitments
undertaken in the 1987 decision.

(b) Diversity of Energy Supply. Minis-
ters agreed that diversification of energy
supply must be further pursued, in order to
avoid greater dependence on oil and to make

economic use of available resources. They
therefore agreed to pursue further diver-
sification by means of;

• appropriate investment conditions for
oil exploration and development and compe'
itive industry and market structures;

• more environmentally acceptable use
of solid fuels;

• greater use of natural gas from diver-
sified sources;

• greater use of renewables where avai.
able technology and local conditions make
them economic, and greater efforts to mak(
them more competitive;

• provision of adequate and diversified!
electricity generation capacity.

Ministers recalled their decision in
1987, in view of the different positions whio
exist in lEA countries regarding nuclear
power, that each lEA country will have to
decide on the mix of fuels used for electrici^
ty generation best suited to its particular
circumstances, taking account of energy se
curity, environment, safety and the possibi
effects of their decisions on other countries
Some countries have adopted the nuclear 0}
tion, and they intend to continue their nucl
ar power generation programmes in order ■
secure the economic and environmental ad-
vantages which they consider flow from
them. All lEA countries agree upon the nei
cessity for continuing to apply the highest
available standards of nuclear safety in all
its aspects, particularly operation and
waste management.

(c) Greater Energy Efficiency and
Conservation. Ministers agreed that greav
er energy efficiency and conservation is bol
possible and necessary in the use of all
forms of energy in order to continue the
gains already achieved and to increase the
rate of improvement above present levels. II
will be pursued vigorously by the govern-
ments of all Member countries for both enei
gy security and environmental reasons,
concentrating on:

• achieving long-term results in large
and fast-growing sectors of energy use sucl
as transportation; electricity generation am
end use; heating; and energy process re-
quirements; and

• using market-based pricing and such
of the following measures in each sector as
are appropriate and effective under nationa
circumstances: provision and dissemination
of information, such as labelling; removal oi
institutional and other market barriers; suj
port for the development and application of
technologies for more efficient energy trans
formation and end use; financial or fiscal in
centives taxation; voluntary and mandatory
standards;

in each case taking account of the economic:
and other costs involved.

(d) Energy and the Environment.

Ministers have previously stressed the im-
portant links between energy and the

Department of State Bulletin/September 198!

ENERGY

nvironment, and consequently the need for
ntegrated policies which further energy se-
urity, environmental protection and eco-
lOmic growth. Now in 19S9, particularly in
iew of increasing evidence of the risk of
;lobal warming and climate change and the
lecessity to respond to this issue, Ministers

iterated their previous position and more-
iver called for vigilant, serious and realistic
,ssessment on a global basis of what energy
iolicies can contribute to meeting these
Challenges, and of their economic and social
nipacts. They noted that CO2 and other
;i\-fnhouse gas emissions originate from
JECD countries, but also, in a large and
growing proportion, from non-Member
Countries; and that all countries are affected
iy the result. They therefore stressed that a
ligh degree of international co-operation, as
ulviicated by the World Commission on En-

ironment and Development, will be re-
quired. They also stressed the need to
)ui'sue greater scientific understanding, to
issi'ss the kinds of policy responses which
jnay be necessary, and to implement them on
,i global scale. They agreed that this will be
'1 Idiit; and on-going process in which the
K.\ and its Member countries can show
tailiTship within the overall international
iriiii'ss which is developing for addressing
■liiiiate change issues, with a view to inte-
;rating energy security and environmental
jolicies in both the short and long term.
They agreed that for this purpose the lEA
vill continue its co-operation with the
,)ECD and will participate in the activities
if the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change as a focal point and other interna-
ional activities, in the manner and to the
■■.\tent determined by the Governing Board
't official level in each case.

Ministers noted the range of RD&D [re-
earch, development, and dissemination]
imd other activities which the lEA and its
viember countries have already taken to ad-
Iress the clean use of coal (especially in
•lectricity generation) and motor vehicle
jollutants, and welcomed the significant
M-ogress which has been made in many
■ountries toward reducing emissions of sul-
)hur and nitrogen o.xides, lead in petrol, air
^articulates, water pollution and hazardous
wastes from these sources. They agreed,
■lowever, that further action is necessary to
iichieve more widespread application of exist-
ng pollution control technologies as well as
'urther technological advances, and that
:hese efforts must be continued vigorously
:n all Member countries and especially in
';hose countries which encounter difficulties
and where less progress has so far been
'lichieved, taking due account of the impor-

ant cost implications involved. Industry
ilso has a central role in confronting envi-
■oiimental challenges. The lEA will contin-
ue to stimulate and support close co-
iperation between governments and indus-
;ry in order to meet these challenges.

Ministers requested the Governing
Piiiai'd at official level to e.xamine possi-
uilities for international collaboration with-
in the lEA to improve the technologies and
procedures available for preventing and

treating oil spills and other accidents in the
petroleum production, transportation and
processing system.

Ministers also considered emissions of
carbon dioxide and other gases from fossil
fuel combustion and other sources which
contribute to the greenhouse effect. They
noted especially the complexity and uncer-
tainties of the relationships between green-
house gas emissions from fossil fuels and
atmospheric concentrations, and consequent
climate change, as well as the worldwide di-
mensions and implications of these issues.

Ministers, recognising the respon-
sibility of lEA countries to contribute to the
solution of environmental problems, pledged
that they will not wait for all uncertainties
to be resolved, but will act now by taking
energy policy measures promptly to address
these problems, focusing on prudent steps
that take account of the various costs in-
volved and are consistent with agreed lEA
policies for enei'gy security. Ministers rec-
ognised that even though such measures by
themselves cannot quickly resolve all the
problems on a global scale, they can none-
theless begin to make a contribution in the
medium and longer term.

Ministers therefore pledged to pursue
in their respective energy policies:

(i) increased conservation and energy
efficiency along the lines set out in Section
4(c) above;

(ii) when fossil fuels are used, setting
strict standards for SO2 and NOo emissions
and encouraging introduction of advanced
cleaning and combustion technologies;

(ill) evaluation, on the basis of their en-
tire fuel cycle and their other environmental
consequences, of the possibilities for making
greater use of available energy sources with
lower levels of COo and other greenhouse gas
emissions, such as natural gas and, where
economic or where they can be made more
competitive, renewable and other energy
forms, to meet growing energy needs;

(iv) where national decisions so contem-
plate, the use of nuclear power; this will be
facilitated by demonstrating that safety
both in operation and in waste disposal has
already been, and will in the future, be
maintained and further improved through
such means as more efficient and reliable
regulatory controls, accompanied by RD&D
and other actions further to improve reactor
design, construction, operation and decom-
missioning as well as the front and back
ends of the nuclear fuel cycle;

(v) RD&D to develop new and improved
technologies for greater energy efficiency;
for nuclear fusion and hydrogen fuel proc-
esses; and for renewables such as solai',
wind, hydro power, biomass and geothermal;

(vi) continued and intensified RD&D to
identify and assess technological methods
for containment and removal of greenhouse
gas emissions in the longer term;

(vii) re-examination of priorities within
their existing bilateral and multilateral
energy assistance and R&D collaboration
programmes with a view to determining

whether reorientations or new programmes
are needed to strengthen the contribution
which developing countries can make to the
global response to climate change issues;

and agreed that progress achieved in these
areas w-ill be closely monitored and assessed
within the lEA's Country Review process.

Ministers discussed the new element
which these concerns about global climate
change have introduced into energy policy
formulation. They agreed that this new ele-
ment will have to be taken into account by
all lEA countries in developing the energy
policy options which they will choose by na-
tional decision for their contributions to the
climate change issue. These options would
include greatly improved efficiency, new
technologies and nuclear power.

In agreeing to take these actions. Min-
isters cautioned that severe short-term
measures designed to produce quick results
(such as sharp tax increases or other abrupt
changes in the economics of providing and
using energy, or phasing out individual fos-
sil fuels) could also produce very high ener-
gy and general economic costs. In this
regard, they noted that economic growth is
necessary not only in itself but also to pro-
vide for environmental protection on an eco-
nomically sound basis through financing
new and less polluting infrastructure, fund-
ing RD&D and adapting technologies to the
needs of non-Member countries. They there-
fore stressed the need for a balanced, inte-
grated bundle of realistically implementable
and cost-effective energy-related and other
responses, without losing sight of the need
for energy security.

Ministers also noted that in addition to
the strong contribution they contemplate
from the energy sector, action will also be
required in other important sectors of eco-
nomic activity such as agriculture, trans-
portation and industry, and called for
reliable analysis of the micro- and macro-
economic impacts from all sectors.

(e) Energy Technology and RD&D.

Ministers agreed upon the continued and in-
creasing importance of energy technology
and RD&D not only in all the areas where it
is specifically referred to above but also in
general, as an essential basis for maintain-
ing energy security in the long term. They
agreed that it should be intensified in all
Member countries across the full spectrum
of laboratory development, testing, pilot
plant and prototype demonstration, and dis-
semination and commercialization and with-
in a context of strong international
collaboration; government and private sec-
tor participation within competitive energy
markets; and cost effectiveness. Ministers
noted the results of the lEA/OECD e.xpert
seminar on technologies for reducing green-
house gas emissions, and agreed that the
main priorities for future lEA RD&D ac-
tivities should include technologies for bet-
ter energy efficiency; for more
environmentally acceptable use of coal; for
enhancing the availability of low cost indige

Department of State Bulletin/September 1989

EUROPE

nous oil and natural gas resources; for in-
creasing the accessibility of remote natural
gas reserves; for renewable sources of ener-
gy and their effective integration into ener-
gy systems; for upgrading the reliability,
flexibility and efficiency of the electricity
sector; and for improving nuclear fission
technologies and demonstrating the fea-
sibility of nuclear power fusion systems.
They therefore invited the Governing Board
at official level to define goals and directions
for orientation of future lEA RD&D ac-
tivities on this basis.

5. Energy in Non-Member Countries

Ministers noted that energy supply and de-
mand in non-Member countries will increas-
ingly have a stronger impact upon the world
energy situation and upon the ability of lEA
countries to pursue effectively the kinds of
energy policies referred to above, especially
those relating to greater energy efficiency
and to energy and the environment. They
welcomed the significant progress which the

lEA has made in providing more informa-
tion and better understanding about energy
developments in non-Member countries (in-
cluding a more comprehensive statistical
data base), and the contacts and activities
which have been undertaken to share infor-
mation and to participate in other efforts
with a number of non-Member countries and
other international organisations. Ministers
therefore agreed that available information
should continue to be improved and analysed
in greater depth in order to identify and as-
sess what practical steps might be under-
taken, and that appropriate contacts with
non-Member countries on such subjects as
energy data, energy demand and efficiency
and energy and the environment, should
continue to be established and maintained,
as Ministers have agreed previously, for
those purposes and to help keep non-
Member countries informed as to the con-
tent and purposes of the lEA and its
policies. ■

CSCE Information Forum

The hiformation Forum, manda-
ted by the concluding docimient of the
1989 Vienna meeting of the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Eu-
rope (CSCE), met in London April 18-
May 12, 1989.

Following is the statement made
by Ambassador Leonard Marks, head
of the U.S. delegation, at the opening
plenary on April 21.

I would like to join previous speakers
in thanking the people and Government
of the United Kingdom for their gra-
cious hospitality as hosts of this forum.

At the outset, I support the posi-
tion of other delegations who want to
avoid confrontation. We can disagree —
and we shall on many issues — but there
is no reason to be disagreeable. We
have come to this forum to exchange
views on how to implement the commit-
ments made in the Helsinki F'inal Act
and the Madrid and Vienna documents.
We are prepared to discuss, formally
and informally, issues in a frank and
candid manner. The stage is now set for
all delegations to engage in an open and
spirited discussion on some of the most
vital components of the CSCE process.

To illustrate the importance that
we attach to this meeting, I now turn
to a statement by President George
Bush on the opening of the Information
Forum which we have distributed to all
delegations and from which I would like
to quote in part:

Two hundred years ago, our founding
fathers considered freedom of speech so crit-
ical to America's new democracy that they
made it the subject of our Constitution's
first amendment. They could not have antici-
pated a world of videocassettes or instan-
taneous satellite communications. But they
did know something about the force of demo-
cratic ideas and the citizen's inalienable
rights. When the Helsinki Final Act was
signed in 1975, we already had entered the
information age. Yet the wisdom of Ameri-
ca's first statesmen has stood the test of
time. Open societies, where ideas, people,
and information flow freely, are societies
best equipped to meet the challenges of any
age — and particularly one of rapid techno-
logical change, like ours.

Our objective at the forum is to
further the free flow of information.
But isn't it anachronistic that our dis-
cussions outside of the plenary are
"closed to the press'"? I'm aware that
the CSCE process governs the pro-
cedure here, but I strongly urge that
future meetings be open to the public
and to the press. If the public has a
"right to know," why should our delib-
erations not be accessible to those who
have the greatest stake in them?

Our deliberations will be viewed
with great interest by our publics. The
forum provides a timely opportunity to
assess the gains made in Vienna. The
Vienna concluding document represents
the fullest expression to date of the

original pledges our governments ma(
in Helsinki to each other and to our
citizens. The nature of that docu-
ment mirrors the importance all our
governments and peoples attach to im
proving East-West relations. Its
extensive new provisions regarding ir
formation were possible in large part
because there is growing recognition
on the part of some Eastern govern-
ments that closing off one's society to
world of information means closing it;
own doors to the future.

The public gains its information t
sentially, though not exclusively, from
the printed press, radio, and televi-
sion. In democratic societies, all point
of view are presented by independent
journalists. Under our system, a jour
nalist is free to criticize official autho
ities or public activities. Under the
authoritarian government, a journali:
is a servant of the state charged with
the duty of presenting governmental
views, not to challenge them.

Under our system, the governmei
does not speak for the press, and the
press does not speak for the govern-
ment. Our media report the facts but
do not act as an instrument of govern
mental policy. In his statement, Depu
Minister Petrovski of the U.S.S.R. il-
lustrates this difference by stating:
"The mass media

are a most important instrument of
glasnost." If, indeed, the mass media
is an instrument of glasnost, and
glasnost, I understand, is Soviet polic
then I can only conclude that the mass
media are an instrument of Soviet
policy.

In free societies, a free press is n
an instrument of any government nor
any policy nor of any political move-
ment. It is not, and must not be, an in
strument of any institution.

While our principles, therefore,
are profoundly different, we must, ne\
ertheless, work together to carry out
CSCE commitments by removing bar-
riers to the free flow of information ui
der either system. It has long been
recognized by democratic government
that freedom of speech and of the pres
are the lifeblood of free and independ-
ent states. Without a well-informed ci
izenry, democracy cannot survive. Am
that is why my government views the
individual and his rights as central to
the entire Helsinki process. True secu
rity and cooperation among our coun-
tries cannot exist, let alone flourish,
without respect for the rights of the ir
dividual. At the heart of the Helsinki

Department of State Bulletin/September 196

EUROPE

"ocess is the individual's "right to
low" as well as "to act upon" funda-
ental freedoms.

What does the "right to know"
ean? It means that a citizen has the
isic right to make informed decisions
»out his or her personal life and soci-
;y. State-imposed obstacles to the free
ow of ideas, information, and people
istrict the citizen's ability to make
ich decisions. That is why in the Unit-
i States, we believe in placing as few
mitations as possible on freedom of
jeech and the press. And that is why
16 information and communications
jelds in our country are chiefly a
i'ivate-sector enterprise.

The composition of our delegation
'fleets this. Our delegates to the for-
111 will include distinguished private-
?ct()r participants from film, broad-
istiiig, publishing, journalism, educa-
on, and other professions deeply
mcerned with freedom of expression.
hey will express their views — not
lose of the U.S. Government — and
ley do so without censorship or fear of
?prisal.

In evaluating compliance, I hope
Kit we will criticize where there has
■en no effort to comply but also ac-
lowledge positive steps to meet the
ear responsibilities set out almost 14
'ars ago in Helsinki.

For example, we welcome the ces-
itiiin of jamming of the Voice of Amer-
a and Radio Free Europe/Radio
iberty broadcasts. That's a step
rward — but let me stress that jam-
ing is not only contrary to basket III;
is a clear violation of the regulations
the International Telecommunication
iiiiin and of Article 19 of the Universal
echu-ation of Human Rights. Jam-
inn is reprehensible and not appropri-
e conduct for a civilized nation. I
jpe that jamming is a phenomenon
lat will not recur. I trust that we rec-
jnize that this practice is inconsistent
ith Helsinki commitments and a viola-
on of the public's "right to know."

We urge that radio jamming de-
ices will be dismantled, just as we are
)w dismantling categories of nuclear
eapons, to demonstrate that they will
ever be used to intimidate again.

Other steps taken in Poland and
Aiiigary — and to some degree in the
oviet Union — toward greater toler-
nce of freedom of expression and in-
iriiiation are encouraging and positive
evelopments. We hope they will con-
mie and become irreversible. But we
Isn see with deep concern the rigid

controls on information still prevailing
in Romania, Czechoslovakia, the Ger-
man Democratic Republic, and
Bulgaria.

In the Soviet Union, exercise of the
citizen's "right to know" takes the form
of new efforts to fill in the so-called
blank spots of history. Freedom of ex-
pression appears to have been given
wide scope during the recent elections.
At the same time, however, a new de-
cree increasing the criminal penalties
for operating a copying machine with-
out official sanction is a step very much
in the wrong direction.

In Poland, we see some very en-
couraging developments. Solidarity
and the government have reached
groundbreaking agreements which
should permit Polish citizens to make
informed choices on the pressing issues
facing their country. Likewise in Hun-
gary, the Central Committee recently
announced that it has called for legisla-
tion "to give scope to all views that do
not contravene the Constitution and
laws of the country." Presumably this
would allow individuals or parties to
establish independent newspapers and
radio and television stations. We look
forward at this forum to learning more
about the reform programs underway
in these countries.

In Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, on
the other hand, the light of reform has
yet to shine. Jiri Wolf, a Charter '77
signatory, has been imprisoned since
May 1983 for writing an expose of Po-
lish conditions and attempting to send
the material abroad. The world-
renowned playwright Vaclav Havel has
been imprisoned, in part, on charges
that he sought to incite disturbances
through foreign radio broadcasts.

In Bulgaria the independent dis-
cussion club for the support of glasnost
and perestroika has met with repres-
sion from authorities since its founding
last November. And in the German
Democratic Republic, authorities con-
tinue to practice strict censorship in an
effort to ensure that dissenting views
appear only rarely in the media.

Finally, in Romania, in direct vio-
lation of Vienna commitments, foreign
journalists have been ill-treated, while
three Romanian journalists remain un-
der arrest for allegedly producing a
leaflet critical of the government. Our
repeated requests for information
about these journalists have been
denied.

This brief survey indicates that
much remains to be done to fulfill the
promise of the Vienna commitments.

And there is much that all countries
can do in a cooperative spirit to im-
prove the East-West flow of ideas and
people in the information age.

The information revolution is ex-
panding globally and inevitably em-
braces East and West alike. European
television viewers are on the threshold
of an era in which they could choose
from numerous channels which do not
need national boundaries. As in other
areas in international life, technologi-
cal advances in the information and
communications fields penetrate the
traditional borders of the nation-state,
affecting political relationships, poli-
cies, and diplomatic methods, as the
participants and the structure of this
multilateral forum so aptly attest.

The forum can provide an oppor-
tunity for exploring cooperative efforts
to enhance the flow of East-West infor-
mation in this exciting new age.

But as we hail the technological ad-
vances, we must remember that the
tools of science are only helpful when
they are applied to serve mankind and
not when they are used to perfect the
instruments of popular control. During
our London forum, we will be hearing a
lot about the new technology. But man-
kind has yet to perfect an instrument
to equal the power of a human voice
speaking the truth.

That's where freedom and democ-
racy start and end. What happens to
that voice tells more about how govern-
ments live up to their international
commitments than a lengthy conclud-
ing document ever can. And it is the
record of this that we should focus on in
our deliberations. ■

department of State Bulletin/September 1989

EUROPE

CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension

The Conference on the Human Di-
mension, mandated by the concluding
document of the 1989 Vienna meeting of
the Conference on the Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE), met in
Paris May SO-June 23, 1989.

Following is the statement by Am-
bassador Morris Abram, head of the
U.S. delegation, at the opening session
on May SI.

On behalf of the American delegation, I
wish to thank the Government of
France and the city of Paris for their
excellent organizational work and
warm hospitality.

The United States comes to this
conference with a commitment to hu-
man rights that is central to the iden-
tity of the American people. The
protection and promotion of fundamen-
tal human rights at home and abroad
remains a primary American objective.

From the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man and America's own Bill
of Rights, we can trace an unbroken
thread through history to the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights and to
the Helsinki Final Act.

The Helsinki Final Act was not de-
signed to enshrine a status quo. It is an
action program, designed both to meet
the test of challenging times and to
further the aspirations of our peoples.
Therefore, the principal goal of the
U.S. delegation to the Paris meeting
will be to engage in a thorough and
open review of how human rights com-
mitments are being implemented by
the signatory states, including my own.

The Helsinki, Madrid, and Vienna
documents are based on eternal demo-
cratic principles. The American Statue
of Liberty, a gift of the people of
France, inspires the entire world. This
week "Miss Liberty" appeared in Bei-
jing's central square. As Thomas Jeffer-
son, who loved this country France,
said, "The desire for freedom is
universal."

But it is true that democracies are
not built in a day. And compliance with
Helsinki's human dimension commit-
ments cannot be achieved overnight.
That is why we see the CSCE as a proc-
ess. But we've been at it a long time —
long enough to expect to see consider-
able improvements. Only recently have
we begun to see them in some states.
The dawn of respect for human rights

in all the signatory countries is not yet
day, although CSCE has drawn day
nearer.

Progress Since Vienna

We have witnessed some remarkable
progress even since the Vienna meet-
ing. The Soviet Union has released
hundreds of prisoners of conscience and
given greater scope to the practice of
religion and the cultural rights of mi-
norities. Emigration has increased dra-
matically. Soviet leaders now speak of
enforcing the rule of law and have be-
gun to experiment with popular ballots
and limited competitive elections. Sig-
nificantly the Soviet Union has been
willing to engage in a broadening dia-
logue on human rights and human-
itarian concerns with official and
private citizens and groups both within
the Soviet Union and with other
countries — in our case, parliamen-
tarians, lawyers, psychiatrists, and
other interested private citizens.

Elsewhere in the East, we see in-
ternal reforms initiated in Poland and
Hungary — reforms begun even prior to
Mr. Gorbachev's efforts in the Soviet
Union and driven by popular and eco-
nomic imperatives. Solidarity and the
Catholic Church have been given legal
recognition. Throughout Eastern Eu-
rope, citizens are pressing harder for
personal freedoms and democracy.

But there are no grounds for com-
placency. We cannot afford the luxury
of self-congratulation. In many parts of
Europe, governments still fall far short
of compliance with the pledges they
made 14 years ago, let alone the new
promises of Vienna. We have had
pledges and promises and documents
enough. As President Mitterand said
yesterday at this platform, now the
time is to "call rhetoric to account."

Noncompliance in Eastern Europe

In Eastern Europe, independent voices
are challenging their governments to
live up to all their CSCE obligations.
The time has come for these rights to
be enshrined in law and respected in
fact, in all the CSCE signatory states.
While we see positive changes in
some areas, we cannot honestly ignore
disturbing signs. On the very last day
of the London Information Forum, So-
viet authorities raided an "independent

public library" at the home of Yuri
Kushkov and confiscated 700 copies o:
books, journals, and newspapers.

Visitation between the German
Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) and
West Germany has increased. Last
year 7 million East Germans and Eas
Berliners visited the West, and over ;
million West Germans visited East
Berlin and the G.D.R. Yet the ugly
Berlin Wall still stands disfiguring ai
important section of Europe. Hungar
is unilaterally dismantling the barbei
wire on its border with Austria. But
elsewhere kilometers of barbed wire
and watchtowers are still in place. TI
time has come to get rid of these relic
of old thinking.

Although greater numbers of So%
et citizens are being permitted to
emigrate, the new law codifying the
fundamental right to emigration has
not yet been promulgated. We welcon
the news that there are some 50 laws
waiting to be enacted by the Supremt
Soviet. We hope they will be good law
not just new laws.

In that connection, a member of i
delegation — a public member — Ludm
la Alexeeva, of the U.S. Helsinki
Watch, has been turned down five
times for Soviet entry visas. She is tl
author of Soviet descent, and she has
applied to travel to the U.S.S.R. on p
vate family visits, as well as to parti-
pate in international human rights
conferences. She sits as my colleague
on the front row.

After months of promises that th
political articles of the Russian Repul
lie (Articles 70 and 190.1) would be
stricken from the Soviet criminal cod
the April 8 Supreme Soviet decree dii
not actually nullify these offensive
articles but merely reworded them,
making it now a crime to "discredit"-
whatever that means — Soviet official
or organizations.

In Soviet Georgia, peaceful demt
strators are dead and others remain
hospitalized from the inexplicable use
of toxic gas and blows from shovel-
wielding troops. However, we have
noted with interest the statements of
some Soviet authorities that this bru'
action was contrary to orders, and wt
welcome the fact that a commission h.
been established to look into the mattt

Despite an increase in religious i
tivity, the Ukrainian Catholic Church
remains banned.

Bulgaria recently announced legi
lation relaxing passport requirement
We welcome that, but we must deplor
the recent use of force against ethnic
Turkish demonstrators as a sign that

Department of State Bulletin/September 19)

EUROPE

Bulgaria has not changed its policy of
ippression of the rights of its Turkish
linority. We see this as a serious vio-
:tion of the Helsinki, Madrid, and
ienna documents. We also remain
mcerned about the continued harass-
ent of members of independent hu-
lan rights groups.

Virtually on the eve of this meet-
ig, Czechoslovakia released prisoners
I" conscience Vaclav Havel and Jiri
'olf, yet Havel, as we recall, was ar-
'ste(l for participating in a peaceful
pnionstration the very week the Vien-
a meeting ended. Others arrested at
If same time sadly remain in prison.

Now what do we make of Romania,
here conditions continue to deterio-
ite across the board? Over 20,000 have
eil the country in the past 18 months
) escape harsh repression and eco-
amic desperation. Intellectuals and
purnalists — and for the first time for-
ler party leaders — have raised their
jices to protest these conditions and
)nst'(iuently suffer harassment, house
ri'est, imprisonment, and, reportedly,
reii internal exile. In the meantime,
le Romanian Government — one of the
lOving forces behind the CSCE proe-
ms years ago — turns its back on the
'r\' commitments it had made.

niversal Principles and U.S. Goals

jviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
lid us yesterday that no state has the
ght to impose its notions of democra-
: on others. We agree that democracy
eed not be based on the system of any
le state. But there are two universal
;'i)ieiples of real democracy,
ici.ntestable.

First, the rights of the state are
erived from the consent of the
overned.

Second, free competitive elections,
it bin and among multiple contending
ai-ties, are the only reliable means of
?sting that consent. For by right, peo-
le give power to the state; the state is
lot the source of the basic rights of
laii.

As President Bush suggested at
lATO this week, one useful task for
'SCE might be to develop standards
ir truly free elections, to ensure that
11 uiivernments enjoy the consent of
If i;overned. Together with free elec-
:ons, Principle VIII of the Helsinki Fi-
al .Act provides a way to heal Europe's
piritual and historical scars, includ-
ig, 1 might add, the illegal incorpora-
ion of the Baltic states 50 years ago.

tepartment of State Bulletin/September 1989

Second Report on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
JUNE 5, 1989'

In accordance with Public Law 95-384, I am
submitting to you this bimonthly report on
progress toward a negotiated settlement of
the Cyprus question.

During the past 2 months the two Cy-
priot parties have continued their efforts,
under the auspices of the United Nations
Secretary General, to assemble the basic el-
ements of a settlement in Cyprus. Following
numerous meetings between the two leaders
in Nicosia, they met with the Secretary
General in New York, April 5-7, to review
progress. On April 6, the United Nations is-
sued a communique that noted that the Sec-
retary General and the two leaders
"reviewed the second round of talks whose
objective was to develop a common under-
standing of the issues and to explore a range
of possible options. They shared the Secre-
tary General's view that the efforts made so
far have been useful. They agreed to contin-
ue the talks with the objective of achieving
results by June 1989."

The communique also noted that the
objective in the coming weeks would be to
prepare "a draft outline of an overall agree-
ment in which the goals to be achieved for
each of the elements of the outline would be
described. ...The two leaders accepted the
Secretary General's invitation to meet with
him again in June, if necessary, to complete
the draft outline, to consider its status, and
to decide how to proceed."

The United States Permanent Repre-
sentative to the United Nations, Ambas-
sador Thomas Pickering, met with both
leaders during their visit to New York.
They reiterated to Ambassador Pickering
their confidence in the Secretary General,
their appreciation of his commitment to solv-
ing the Cyprus problem, and their intention
to continue working with the Secretary
General and his representatives toward a
negotiated solution.

We continue vigorous efforts to consult
with and offer advice and assistance to key
interested parties to the Cyprus dispute. I
met with Prime Minister Ozal in Tokyo in
February, as did Secretary of State Baker.
Secretary Baker also has held meetings

with the Prime Ministers and Foreign Min-
isters of Greece and Turkey and with the
Foreign Minister of the Republic of Cyprus.
The Department of State Special Cyprus Co-
ordinator, M. James Wilkinson, traveled to
Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey March 23-
April 4 and is consulting regularly with con-
cerned European allies.

In my previous report to the Congress,
I noted that the United Nations was work-
ing with the two parties to adjust the mili-
tary positions in Nicosia of Greek and
Turkish Cypriot soldiers. I am pleased to
report that the U.N.'s deconfrontation plan
went into effect on May 17, greatly alleviat-
ing the probability of incidents posed by the
dangerously close proximity of the two sides'
military units in the Nicosia area. The Unit-
ed States w'orked hard in support of this
U.N. effort. Congratulations are due to the
Secretary General's political and military
representatives on the island and to the par-
ties themselves. We are hopeful that this
achievement will prove the prelude to fur-
ther progress, in terms both of immediate
steps and the difficult questions underlying
the Cyprus problem.

Finally, I would like to note that Major
General Clive Milner of Canada became the
new commander of the U.N. Peacekeeping
Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) on April 10,
1989, replacing Major General Guenther
Greindl of Austria, UNFICYP's commander
since 1981. I welcome the choice of General
Milner for this important position and com-
mend General Greindl whose performance
under difficult and frustrating conditions
was exemplary. He deserves the gratitude
and appreciation of all those countries,
groups, and individuals who benefited from
his outstanding leadership.

Sincerely,

George Bush

' Identical letters addressed to Jim
Wright, Speaker of the House of Represen-
tatives, and Claiborne Pell, chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (text
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of June 12, 1989).H

HUMAN RIGHTS

At this conference, my delegation
will be pursuing three main goals.

First and foremost, we seek im-
proved human rights performance. We
want a thorough review of the imple-
mentation of all CSCE human com-
mitments, by all parties, including our-
selves. In this conte.xt, we recall the
Vienna commitment to take steps
"within six months" to solve all out-
standing applications based on the hu-
man contacts provisions of Helsinki and
the Madrid documents. Our self-
imposed deadline is mid-July.

Second, we seek to evaluate our
experience to date with the Vienna hu-
man rights mechanism, a constructive
new tool for the conduct of human
rights diplomacy by governments. As
we see it, the Helsinki process can only
profit from measures like this mecha-
nism that increase openness and trans-
parency. Effective confidence-building
measures are just as important in the
human dimension as they are in the
military security sphere.

Third, we seek to ensure that this
Paris meeting and all other meetings of
the CSCE are open and accessible to
interested citizens, journalists, and
nongovernmental organizations. As we
convene the Conference on the Human
Dimension, it is particularly important
that we reaffirm the contributions that
individuals and nongovernmental orga-
nizations make to the CSCE process.
After all, we are here on the people's
business.

In my country, the nongovernmen-
tal organizations are engines of change
that pull and tug our democracy for-
ward. Our Constitution protects free-
dom of association and guarantees
access to the halls of government. In
matters of the environment, education,
human rights — indeed, all aspects of
our national life — citizen groups have
contributed mightily to America's
progress.

We find it disturbing that inter-
ested citizens from some of the Eastern
countries appear not to have received
permission to attend this Paris meet-
ing. All meetings on the human dimen-
sion must take place in conditions of
maximum openness and public access.

In closing, I would like to give you
my thoughts as a longtime observer of
the Helsinki process — most recently as
a public member at the Vienna meet-
ing. I was born the year the First
World War ended, of Jewish parents in
the then-segregated southern State of
Georgia. My first experience of Europe

came as a young man after the Second
World War. In its chaotic aftermath, I
served as a member of the American
prosecution staff at the Nuremberg
trials and later on the committee for
the Marshall Plan. I have had the privi-
lege of serving as the general counsel
to the Peace Corps at its founding and
in several human rights organizations
of the United Nations and the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights.

In my lifetime, then, I have seen
the worst and the best our century has
had to offer: unspeakable human suffer-
ing and man's capacity for evil on the
one hand and on the other, human no-
bility and man's capacity for tremen-
dous change for the good. I have seen
the development of the civil rights
movement in the United States to rec-
tify ancient wrongs that existed in my
country and are still not perfect. I have
seen the worldwide human rights move-
ment gain a place on the international
agenda.

As so well stated by my Soviet col-
league, Mr. Kashlev, in an interview
post-Vienna that I have just had the

privilege of reading this afternoon ini
the Moscow news: "Human rights, the
protection of the individual and civic
dignity, will now be the subject for le-
gitimate discussion in international
relations."

Today no responsible state would
in the name of sovereignty, claim the
right to torture its own citizens. Yet i
state, including my own, would claimi
have completely fulfilled its human
rights commitments. But they are
commitments, and we are making
progress.

We cherish all the goals of the Un
versal Declaration of Human Rights,
but civil and political freedoms are al
solutely essential to the fulfillment ov
the human personality. Otherwise
man's intelligence is stifled, his voice'
throttled, his conscience stilled, and
his essential humanity denied.

In the exercise of civil and politic
freedoms of expression and initiative
man can best obtain his other needs.

This, as history is again so clear'
demonstrating, is the route to libertj
prosperity, happiness, and peace. I

Bulgaria's Persecution of Its Turkish Minorit

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
JUNE 26, 19891

In the last month, over 60,000 people
have either fled or been forcibly ex-
pelled from Bulgaria to Turkey — many
with nothing more than the clothes on
their backs — and more are arriving in
Turkey every day.

This mass migration is the result
of the Bulgarian Government's system-
atic denial of basic human rights to its
Turkish minority. Since 1984 the Bul-
garian authorities have been carrying
out a campaign of forced assimilation of
Bulgaria's ethnic Turkish minority,
forcing its members to slavicize their
names and denying them the right to
speak their language and practice their
religion. Members of the minority, who
have objected have been imprisoned

without trial and treated with great
brutality.

Over the past month, this cam-
paign against ethnic Turks has taker
on a new dimension, as Bulgarian
forces have fired on peaceful demon-
strators, killing some and wounding
others. There are reports that the vi(
lence continues.

We deplore Bulgaria's blatant vie
lations of the human rights of its
citizens, rights which Bulgaria has
committed itself to protect as a signa
tory of the Helsinki accords and othei
international agreements. We urge tl
Government of Bulgaria to cease thes
violations and to allow for the orderly
emigration of those ethnic Turks who
desire to leave. i

' Te.xt from Weekly Compilation of Pni
idential Documents of Julv 3, 1989.B

Department of State Bulletin/September 19

MIDDLE EAST

taptive Nations Week, 1989

ROCLAMATION 5996.
LILY 6, 1989'

ai li luly. we Americans celebrate our Na-
m's independence and the blessings of self-
ivtinment. As we give thanks for the
tehts and freedoms that citizens of this Na-
Dn have enjoyed for more than 200 years,
r lilsd recall our obligation to speak out for
ipi .ssed peoples around the w'orld. We
lus pause during Captive Nations Week to
member in a special way those peoples
ho suffer from foreign domination and
om ideologies that are inimical to the ide-
'; III' national sovereignty and individual

irlly.

Today, the leaders of the Soviet Union
111 iither Communist governments are dis-
ncring that the voices of those who long
1- I'li'edom and self-determination cannot
• silenced. Around the world, men and wo-
fii in captive nations are calling for recog-
tiim of their basic human rights. Their
ills — the undeniable expression of just
•pirations — are beginning to be heard.

Ill Afghanistan, the nightmarish years
Siiviet occupation are over, and the
fylian people's demand for self-
■tt rmination is drawing closer to realiza-
m. Unfortunately, a decisive end to the
il'ylians' long ordeal remains elusive while a
i|i|n't regime in Kabul continues the proxy
'\asiation of their war-ravaged homeland.

In Africa, the people of Angola have a
al iliance to find peace after years of vio-
nt struggle against the ruling Marxist-
■ninist regime. Our hopes for national rec-
leiliation in Angola will remain tempered,
iwi'ver, as long as armed Cuban mercen-
ies continue to stalk the forests and veldt
that land and other countries on the
Iruan continent.

Communist expansionism has been frus-
ati'il in Southeast Asia, and today there is
■\v hope that the people of Cambodia, Laos,
id Vietnam will regain some day their
ng-denied political and religious freedom,
.ich hope has also returned for many of our
'iuiibors to the south. In Nicaragua and
111 r Latin American nations, popular
■sistance to attempts at repression by local
ctatiirs — as well as resistance to political
1(1 military interference from Cuba and
le Soviet Union — has proved to be
■rmiilable.

In Eastern Europe, even as we see rays
of light in some countries, we must recog-
nize that brutal repression continues in oth-
er parts of the region, including the
persecution of ethnic and religious
minorities.

This week, we recall with deep sadness
the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop pact be-
tween Nazi Germany and the U.S.S.R. that
doomed Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania to dismemberment and foreign
domination. The United States refuses to
accept the subsequent incorporation by the
Soviet Union of the Baltic States during
World War II. Since their forcible annexa-
tion in 1940, the people of Lithuania, Latvia,
and Estonia have faced political oppression,
religious persecution, and repression of
their national consciousness. But decades of
oppression have not broken the great spirit
of the Baltic people and other victims of So-
viet domination.

Hundreds of thousands of men and wo-
men around the world continue to demon-
strate publicly their desire for liberty and
democratic government, demanding freedom
of speech, assembly, and movement, as w'ell
as the freedom to practice their religious
beliefs without fear of persecution.

Their voices are being heard; there have
been improvements in human rights prac-
tices by the ruling regimes in many of these
countries. But justice demands that more
positive steps be taken. The fundamental
rights and dignity of individuals must be

recognized in law and respected in practice:
the peoples living in captive nations not only
ask for but are entitled to lasting protection
of their God-given rights.

The United States shall continue to call
upon all governments and states to uphold
the letter and the spirit of the United Na-
tions Charter and the Helsinki Final Act un-
til freedom and independence have been
achieved for all captive nations.

Affirming all Americans' determination
to keep faith with those who are denied
their fundamental rights, the Congress, by
Joint Resolution approved July 17, 1959 (73
Stat. 212), has authorized and requested the
President to issue a proclamation designat-
ing the third week in July of each year as
"Captive Nations Week."

Now, Therefore, I George Bush,
President of the United States of America,
do hereby proclaim the week beginning July
16, 1989, as Captive Nations Week. I call
upon the people of the United States to ob-
serve this week with appropriate programs,
ceremonies, and activities, and I urge them
to reaffirm their devotion to the aspirations
of all peoples for justice, self-determination,
and liberty.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto
set my hand this sixth day of July, in the
year of our Lord nineteen hundred and
eighty-nine, and of the Independence of the
United States of America the two hundred
and fourteenth.

George Bush

' Text from Weekly Compilation of Pres-
idential Documents of July 10, 1989. ■

Compensation Offered for Victims
of Iran Airbus Tragedy

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
JULY 17, 1989»

On July 3, 1988, the U.S.S. Vincennes,
during a surface engagement with Ira-
nian gunboats in the Persian Gulf, shot
down Iran Air #655. The flight carried
290 passengers and crew from six na-
tions: India, Iran, Italy, Pakistan, the
United Arab Emirates, and Yugo-
slavia. Although the United States is
not liable under international law to
pay compensation to the families of the
#655 victims, on July 11, 1988, Presi-
dent Reagan announced that, in accord-
ance with the humanitarian traditions
of our nation, the United States would
do so on an ex gratia basis.

During the past year, the United
States has developed an appropriate
plan for paying ex gratia compensation.
On July 10, 1989, the United States in-
structed its Embassies in India, Italy,
Pakistan, Yugoslavia, and the United
Arab Emirates to approach the govern-
ments in those countries proposing that
specific payments be accepted on be-
half of their nationals. In general the
United States has offered to pay
$250,000 per full-time, wage-earning
victim and $100,000 each for all other
victims.

The same offer has been communi-
cated to the Government of Iran. Un-
fortunately during the past year, the

•epartment of State Bulletin/September 1989

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Government of Iran has ignored repeat- termediary to distribute the funds to

ed efforts by the United States to ob-
tain information on the families of the
Iranian victims. The United States
stands ready to mal^e payments to
these families so long as the Govern-
ment of Iran permits an appropriate in-

the families.

' Read to news correspondents by Rich-
ard A. Boucher, Department deputy
spokesman. ■

Upcoming Elections in Nicaragua

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
JULY 19, 1989'

Ten years ago, there was widespread
satisfaction here and in Latin America
that the anti-Somoza revolution in
Nicaragua had triumphed and at long
last democracy would be given a
chance. The Sandinistas committed to
the Organization of American States
(OAS) in 1979 to establish a democracy
and renewed that commitment when
the Central America peace accord was
signed nearly 2 years ago. Despite
these promises, that commitment re-
mains unfulfilled today.

The United States wanted to do its
part for the success of the turn toward
democracy. We had contributed to the
overthrow of Somoza by cutting off mil-
itary assistance. Encouraged by the
Sandinistas' promise to the OAS, we
provided $118 million in economic and
humanitarian assistance to the new
Nicaraguan Government. This was sub-
stantially more than any other country
gave the new regime and represented
more aid than we had provided the
Somoza government in the previous 4
years.

Despite our efforts to be support-
ive, as well as those of other democratic
governments, the Sandinistas quickly
embarked on a course which central-
ized power in their hands, brought eco-
nomic ruin to their country, and forced
hundreds of thousands to flee. They
built up the largest army in Central
America, with aid from Cuba, the Sovi-
et Union, and other communist states.
The security forces and Sandinista
thugs harassed and imprisoned the op-
position, including from the political
parties, labor unions and businessmen,
the Catholic Church, and the Miskito
Indian community. Elections were post-
poned for 5 years, and, when they were
held, the Sandinistas' ground rules did
not allow the opposition to compete
freely and fairly.

Today, with the eyes of the world
upon them, the Sandinistas have anoth-
er opportunity to give peace and de-

mocracy a chance. But as the second
anniversary of the commitments at Es-
quipulas approaches, what is evident is
a renewed attempt to prevent a free
and fair election. In strong contrast to
its neighbors, who have chosen the
democratic path, the Sandinista gov-
ernment continues to show that it fears
free political competition.

'The Sandinista electoral reform
law, for example, was imposed upon the
opposition over its objections and pro-
vides for an Electoral Council which is
stacked in the Sandinistas' favor. Provi-
sions for government campaign financ-
ing penalize parties that did not
participate in the last election. To snuff
out any chance that foreign contribu-
tions to the opposition could somehow
offset official favoritism toward the
Sandinista party, the law provides that
50% of foreign contributions be distrib-
uted to the Electoral Council. The
Sandinista party is under no such
constraints.

On paper the electoral law permits
foreign observers, but Sandinista prac-
tice to date indicates a desire to re-
strict them. The Sandinistas, for
e.xample, have branded National En-
dowment for Democracy represen-
tatives as "CIA agents," expelled a
Freedom House observer, and imposed
visa restrictions on Americans so as to
control who may report on the election.
Two American diplomats were expelled
for observing an opposition rally, and
Sandinista restrictions on other mem-
bers of the diplomatic corps provoked a
protest by the European Community
representatives. These moves stand in
sharp contrast to the Salvadoran expe-
rience, where observers from all sides
were welcomed, even those critical of
the government.

The new media law also fails to
meet democratic standards, as it con-
tains vague provisions that permit
prosecution for defaming the govern-
ment and enforcement is left to the
Ministry of Interior. Unlike the other
Central American countries, the gov-
ernment by law owns all television

broadcasting. Moreover only
government-sanctioned polling is per
mitted, allowing the Sandinistas to
hide from the people the true extent
their unpopularity.

The Sandinistas have also shown
their fear of electoral freedoms in otl
ways. Several opposition marches hai
been cancelled because the governme
denied permits. Labor unions havt'
been threatened lest their display of
economic power threatens the San-
dinistas. Recently several private- '
sector leaders were stripped of their '
property — not for violations of law bi
in a transparent attempt to silence vi
cal critics of Sandinista policies.

Permeating all of these Sandini,-;
measures is a government propaganc
that equates opposition with disloyal
and criticism with allegiance to a for
eign power. At every point, the San-
dinistas have shown that they feel th
can ignore opposition demands for di
logue. Last week in San Jose, Presid I
Ortega indicated he might be willing o
change. We look for him to do so, for
there will be dim prospects for natio 1
reconciliation unless the internal opj:
sition and the Nicaraguan Resistanc-
are made full partners in this proees

We also look to the Sandinistas t
make other changes to comply with
their Esquipulas commitments. Re-
cently discovered arms caches in El
Salvador show that the Sandinistas
continue to subvert their neighbors.
Despite our having halted lethal aid
the Resistance, the Sandinista milit;;
buildup continues with new deliverie
from Cuba and other communist stat i^
And now the Sandinistas are making'
common cause with the Noriega regi i
in Panama — a dictatorship in the sty
of Somoza.

The bipartisan accord with Con-
gress offers an opportunity for bette
relations between our two countries.
We want to see democracy and natior
reconciliation work in Nicaragua. We'
remain willing to respond positively
the Sandinistas fulfill their promise;-
made to the OAS over 10 years ago, a
Esquipulas, and again last February !
El Salvador — to allow Nicaraguans ti
exercise their democratic rights.

Despite the somber prospects, w,
remain committed to support free el(^l
tions and democracy in Nicaragua, ai
our sincerest hope is that next year, t
Nicaraguan people will truly have
something to celebrate.

' Te.Nt from Weekly Compilation of Pr
idential Documents of July 24, 1989.1'

Department of State Bulletin/September 191

REATIES

vurrent Actions

ULTILATERAL

ntarctica

invention on the regulation of Antarctica
iiu'i'al resource activities, with annex.
,iu. at Wellington June 2, 1988.i
^nature: China, June 28, 1989

tomic Energy

mendment of Article VI. A. 1 of the Statute
the International Atomic Energy Agency
Oct. 26, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3873,

(84, 7668). Done at Vienna Sept. 27, 1984.'

fcceptance deposited: Bangladesh, June 29,

'89.

i-iation

ptocol for the suppression of unlawful acts
violence at airports serving international
vil aviation, supplementary to the conven-
pn of Sept. 23, 1971 (TIAS 7570). Done at
lontreal Feb. 24, 1988.^ [Senate] Treaty
'oc. 100-19.

Ignatures: Austria, July 4, 1989; Belgium,
'ar. 15, 1989; Gabon, Sept. 20, 1988; Ireland,
ilv 29, 1988; Jordan, Sept. 30, 1988; Moroc-
.,'hily 8, 1988; New Zealand, Api-. 11, 1989;
. \'incent and the Grenadines, Dec. 1,
iN^. Spain, Mar. 2, 1989; Sri Lanka, Oct. 28,
',s,^: Togo, Oct. 24, 1988.
,atifications deposited; Byelorussian
!S.R., Mav 1, 1989; Peru,' June 7, 1989; Sau-
Ai-abia, Feb. 21, 1989; Turkey, July 7,
s;i; U.S.S.R., Mar. 31, 1989; Marshall Is-
n(l>,May30, 1989.
iit<'i-ed into force: Aug. 6, 1989.

efense

greement amending the memorandum of
iderstanding of Apr 26 and 28 and May 26,
i.^^N, concerning a cooperative project for
u- .-.-tablishment and operation of a pilot
.ATO insensitive munitions information
ntiT. Signed at Brussels and Paris Apr 18
1(1 .lune 6, 1989. Entered into force June 6,
KS9.

ignatories: Canada, Netherlands, Norway,
.K., U.S., Apr 18, 1989; France, June 6,
)S9.

isheries

acit'ic Island regional fisheries treaty.

'iiur at Port Moresby Apr 2, 1987. Entered

iti. force June 15, 1988 [Senate] Treaty Doc.

JU-5.

ignature and ratification deposited; Tonga,

\mr 13, 1989.

udicial Procedure

ijiivcntion on the civil aspects of interna-
niial child abduction. Done at The Hague
let. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1,
;i.v;;i'ortheU.S. July 1,1988.
.cci-ssion deposited: Belize, June 22, 1989. ^

laritime Matters

iiiii-ndments to the convention on the inter-
atiunal regulations for preventing collisions

at sea (TIAS 8587). Adopted at London Nov.
19, 1987.

Enters into force: Nov. 19, 1989.
Proclaimed bv the President: June 29, 1989.

Pollution

Protocol to the 1979 convention on long-
range transboundary air pollution (TIAS
10541) concerning the control of emissions of
nitrogen oxides or their transboundary
flukes, with annex. Done at Sofia Oct. 31,
1988.'
Acceptance deposited: U.S., July 13, 1989.

Prisoner Transfer

Convention on the transfer of sentenced per-
sons. Done at Strasbourg Mar. 21, 1983. En-
tered into force July 1, 1985. TIAS 10824.
Ratification deposited; Italy, June 30, 1989.

Rubber

International natural rubber agreement,

1987, with annexes. Done at Geneva Mar 20,

1987. Entered into force provisionally Dec.

29, 1988; definitively Apr 3, 1989. [Senate]

Treaty Doc. 100-9.

Accession deposited: Switzerland, June 28.

1989.

Space

Treaty on principles governing the ac-
tivities of states in the exploration and use
of outer space, including the Moon and other
celestial bodies. Done at Washington, Lon-
don, and Moscow Jan. 27, 1967. Entered into
force Oct. 10, 1967. TIAS 6347.
Ratification deposited: Togo, June 26, 1989.

Agreement on cooperation in the detailed
design, development, operation, and utiliza-
tion of the permanently manned civil space
station, with annex. Done at Washington
Sept. 29, 1988.1

Ratifications deposited: Denmark, July 5,
1989; Norway, Feb. 9, 1989.

Wheat

Wheat trade convention, 1986. Done at Lon-
don Mar 14, 1986. Entered into force July 1,
1986; definitively for the U.S. Jan. 27, 1988.
[Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-1.

Food aid convention, 1986. Done at London
Mar 13, 1986. Entered into force July 1,
1986; definitvely for the U.S. Jan. 27, 1988.
[Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-1.
Ratifications deposited: Luxembourg, June
28, 1989; U.K., June 26, 1989.

BILATERAL

Bangladesh

Treaty concerning the reciprocal encourage-
ment and protection of investment, with
protocol and exchange of letters. Signed at
Washington Mar 12, 1986. [Senate] Treaty
Doc. 99-23.
Entered into force: July 25, 1989.

Belgium

Supplementary protocol modifying and sup-
plementing the convention of July 9, 1970
(TIAS 7463), for the avoidance of double tax-

ation and the prevention of fiscal evasion
with respect to taxes on income, with ex-
change of notes signed at Washington Dec.
31, 1987. Entered into force Aug. 3, 1989.
[Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-15.

Cameroon

Treaty concerning the reciprocal encourage-
ment and protection of investment. Signed
at Washington Feb. 26, 1986. [Senate] Trea-
ty Doc. 99-22.
Entered into force: Apr 6, 1989.

Canada

Memorandum of understanding concerning
mutual logistical support, with annexes.
Signed at Ottawa June 6, 1989. Entered into
force June 6, 1989.

China

Agreement amending the agreement of Feb.
2, 1988, as amended, concerning trade in
textiles and textile products. Effected by
exchange of letters at Washington Apr. 28
and May 1, 1989. Entered into force May 1,
1989.

Egypt

Grant agreement for commodity imports.
Signed at Cairo June 21, 1989. Entered into
force June 21, 1989.

El Salvador

Agreement amending the agreement of Mar
2 and Apr 30, 1987, relating to trade in cot-
ton textiles. Effected bv exchange of notes
at San Salvador Nov. 23, 1988, and Apr 26,
1989. Entered into force Apr 26, effective
Jan. 1, 1989.

Grenada

Treaty concerning the reciprocal encourage-
ment and protection of investment. Signed
at Washington May 2, 1986. [Senate] Treaty
Doc. 99-25.
Entered into force: Mar 3, 1989.

Indonesia

Agreement on copyright protection. Signed
at Washington Mar. 22, 1989. Entered into
force Aug. 1, 1989.

Israel

Memorandum of understanding covering
marine and freshwater scientific and techni-
cal cooperation, with annexes. Signed at Je-
rusalem June 5, 1989. Entered into force
June 5, 1989.

Korea

Agreement extending the agreement of July
26, 1982 (TIAS 10571), as amended and e.x-
tended, concerning fisheries off the coasts
of the United States. Effected by exchange
of notes at Washington Feb. 17 and Mar. 27,
1989.

Entered into force: July 21, 1989, effective
July 1, 1989.

Luxembourg

Agreement concerning the reciprocal ex-
emption from income tax of income derived
from the international operation of ships and

}epartment of State Bulletin/September 1989

PRESS RELEASE

aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at
Luxembourg Apr. 11 and June 22, 1989. En-
ters into force upon confirmation by the
U.S. of notification by Luxembourg that all
necessary internal procedures have been
completed.

Mali

Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guar-
anteed by, or insured by the U.S. Govern-
ment and its agency, with annexes. Signed
at Bamako June 3, 1989. Entered into force
July 21, 1989.

Marshall Islands

Memorandum of agreement concerning as-
sistance in developing and modernizing the
Marshall Islands' civil aviation system.
Signed at Washington and Majuro May 23
and June 15, 1989. Entered into force June
15, 1989.

Papua New Guinea

Memorandum of understanding concerning
an exchange of officers. Signed at Port Mor-
esby and Honolulu May 17 and June 13, 1989.
Entered into force June 13, 1989.

Poland

Agreement concerning the reciprocal estab-
lishment of cultural and information cen-
ters. Signed at Warsaw July 10, 1989.
Entered into force July 10, 1989.

Romania

Agreement amending the agreement of Nov.
7 and 16, 1984, as amended, relating to trade
in wool and manmade fiber textiles and tex-
tile products. Effected by exchange of notes
at Bucharest Mar. 18, 1988, and May 29,
1989. Entered into force May 29, 1989; effec-
tive Jan. 1, 1989.

Sudan

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities. Signed at Khartoum June 8, 1989.
Entered into force June 8, 1989.

Switzerland

Agreement of cooperation in nuclear plant
life extension research. Signed at Bern and
Washington May 24 and June 13, 1989. En-
tered into force June 13, 1989.

U.S.S.R.

Agreement on the prevention of dangerous
military activities, with annexes and
agreed statements. Signed at Moscow June
12, 1989. Enters into force Jan. 1, 1990.

Uruguay

Agreement amending the administrative ar-
rangement of Aug. 24 and Sept. 13, 1984, as
amended, for a visa system relating to trade
in certain textile products. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Montevideo Oct. 5, 1988,
and Apr. 25, 1989. Entered into force Apr.
25, 1989.

Agreement amending the agreement of Dec.
30, 1983, and .Jan. 23, 1984, as amended, con-
cerning exports of certain textile products

manufactured in Uruguay to the United
States. Effected by exchange of notes at
Montevideo Nov. 14, 1988, and June 20, 1989.
Entered into force June 20, 1989; effective
.Jan. 1, 1989.

Vanuatu

International express mail agreement, with
detailed regulations. Signed at Port Vila
and Washington May 23 and June 30, 1989.
Entered into force July 3, 1989.

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No. Date Subject

126 7/10 Baker: statement on the Mul-
tilateral Assistance Initia-
tive for the Philippines,
Tokyo, July 4.

*127 7/5 Joseph Verner Reed sworn
in as Chief of Protocol,
Mar. 21 (biographic data).

*128 7/6 Eagleburger: interview on
USIA's-Worldnet."

129 7/10 Baker; opening statement

before the ASEAN post-
ministerial conference.
Bandar Seri Begawan,
Brunei, July 6.

130 7/7 Baker: statement at the

ASEAN postministerial
conference, Bandar Seri
Begawan, Brunei, July 7.

131 7/10 Baker: news conference. Ban-

dar Seri Begawan, Brunei,
July 7.

*132 7/10 Baker: interview on CBS

"This Morning," Warsaw.
133 7/11 Baker: news conference,
Warsaw, July 10.

*134 7/11 Bernard William Aronson

sworn in as Assistant Sec-
retary for Inter-American
Affairs, June 28 (biographic
data).

Zaire

Treaty concerning the reciprocal encoura
ment and protection of investment, with
protocol. Signed at Washington Aug. 3, 19
[Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-17.
Entered into force: July 28, 1989.

' Not in force.

- Not in force for the U.S.

■* With reservation(s).H

135 7/12 Baker; news conference,
Budapest.
*136 7/14 Baker: interview on "The
Today Show," Paris.

137 7/17 Baker: news conference,

Paris, July 15.

138 7/17 Baker: interview on CNN's

"Evans and Novak," Paris
July 15.

139 7/17 Baker; interview on ABC-T"

"This Week With David
Brinkley," Paris, July 16.

140 7/18 Baker, Van den Broek; news

conference, The Hague,
July 17.

*141 7/18 Peter F. Secchia sworn in a:
Ambassador to Italy, Jum ^
28 (biographic data).

*142 7/21 Jewel S. Lafontant sworn in
as Ambassador at Large
and U.S. Coordinator for
Refugee Affairs, July 20
(biographic date).
143 7/19 Baker: interview on BBS's
"MacNeil/Lehrer
Newshour."

*144 7/28 Melvyn Levitsky sworn in a
Assistant Secretary for Ii
ternational Narcotics Mat
ters, June 23 (biographic
data).
145 7/31 Baker, Shevardnadze; re-
marks, Paris, July 29.

*Not printed in the Bulletin. ■

Department of State Bulletin/September 19t|

INDEX

September 1989
\/olume 89, No. 2150

\rms Control

:FE Talks End Round Two (Ledogar) ... 75

MATO's Conventional Force Reduction
Proposal (White House fact sheet) .... 76

;"Juelear Testing Talks Open Round Four
(White House statement) 77

U.S. Efforts Against the Spread of Chemi-
cal Weapons (Bartholomew) 74

Association of South East Asian Nations.
Secretary Visits Japan, Brunei, and
Oman 56

Brunei. Secretary Visits Japan, Brunei, and
Oman 56

Bulgaria. Bulgaria's Persecution of Its
Turkish Minority (White House state-
ment) ' 90

Cambodia. Secretary Visits Japan, Brunei,
and Oman 56

China

Pre.'iident's News Conference of June 27
( f.xcerpts) 54

Secretary's News Conference of June 29 . . 63

Summit of the Arch (Baker, Bush, political
and economic declarations) 1

Congress

Second Report on Cyprus (message to the
(.'ongress) 89

[I.S. Efforts Against the Spread of Chemi-
cal Weapons (Bartholomew) 74

Cyprus. Second Report on Cyprus (message

{ to the Congress) 89

Economics

5ECD Council Ministerial Held in Paris
(Brady, communique) 78

secretary's Interview on the "MacNeil/
Lehrer Newshour" 66

secretary's News Conference of June 29 . . 63

■iummit of the Arch (Baker, Bush, political
and economic declarations) 1

J.S., Japan Launch Structural Impediments
Initiative (joint statement) 78

Energy. International Energy Agency Min-
isters Meet in Paris (communique) .... 83

Europe

CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension
(Abram) 88

CSCE Information Forum (Marks) 86

Secretary's Interview on the "MacNeil/
Lehrer Newshour" 66

Summit of the Arch (Baker, Bush, political
and economic declarations) 1

France. President Bush Visits Europe
(Baker, Bush, Van den Broek, action plans
for Poland and Hungary) 22

Human Rights

Bulgaria's Persecution of Its Turkish Minor-
ity (White House statement) 90

Captive Nations Week, 1989
(proclamation) 91

CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension
(Abram) 88

CSCE Information Forum (Marks) 86

Summit of the Arch (Baker, Bush, political
and economic declarations) 1

Hungary

President Bush Visits Europe (Baker, Bush,
Van den Broek, action plans for Poland
and Hungary) 22

President's News Conference of June 27
(excerpts) 54

Industrialized Democracies

Secretary's News Conference of June 29 . . 63

Summit of the Arch (Baker, Bush, political
and economic declarations) 1

Japan

Secretary Visits Japan, Brunei, and
Oman 56

U.S., Japan Launch Structural Impediments
Initiative (joint statement) 78

Middle East

Compensation Offered for Victims of Iran
Airbus Tragedy (Department
statement) 91

Secretary Visits Japan, Brunei, and
Oman 56

Secretary's Interview on the "MacNeil/
Lehrer Newshour" 66

Nicaragua. Upcoming Elections in
Nicaragua (Bush) 92

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

CFE Talks End Round Two (Ledogar) ... 75

NATO's Conventional Force Reduction Pro-
posal (White House fact sheet) 76

Netherlands. President Bush Visits Europe
(Baker, Bush, Van den Broek, action plans
for Poland and Hungary) 22

Philippines. Secretary Visits Japan,

Brunei, and Oman 56

Poland

President Bush Visits Europe (Baker, Bush,
Van den Broek, action plans for Poland
and Hungary) 22

President's News Conference of June 27
(excerpts) 54

Secretary's Interview on the "MacNeil/
Lehrer Newshour" 66

Secretary's News Conference of
June 29 63

Presidential Documents

Captive Nations Week, 1989
(proclamation) 91

President Bush Visits Europe (Baker, Bush,
Van den Broek, action plans for Poland
and Hungary) 22

President Meets With South African Anti-
apartheid Activist (Bush) 71

Second Report on Cyprus (message to the
Congress) '. 89

Summit of the Arch (Baker, Bush, political
and economic declarations) 1

L'pcoming Elections in Nicaragua 92

South Africa

President Meets With South African Anti-
apartheid Activist (Bush) 71

Review of LI. S. -South Africa Relations
(Perkins) 69

Terrorism. Summit of the Arch (Baker,
Bush, political and economic
declarations) 1

Treaties. Current Actions 93

U.S.S.R.

President's News Conference of June 27
(excerpts) 54

Secretary's Interview on the "MacNeil/
Lehrer Newshour" 66

Warsaw Pact

CFE Talks End Round Two (Ledogar) ... 75

NATO's Conventional Force Reduction
Proposal (White House fact sheet) 76

Name Index

Abram, Morris 88

Baker, Secretary 1,22,56,63,66

Bartholomew, Reginald 74

Brady, Nicholas F 78

Bush, President 1,22,54,71,89,91,92

Ledogar, Stephen J 75

Marks, Leonard 86

Perkins, Edward J 69

Van den Broek, Hans 22

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

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