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Depart tn0»n t 
of State 

I 3', 

) Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 89 / Number 2148 

July 1989 


M0f»parinn»ni of Siaie 


Volume 89 / Number 2148 July 1989 

The Dki'artment ok State Buij.etin. 
published by the Office of PubUc Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on de- 
velopments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. The 
Bulletin's contents include major ad- 
dresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State: 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; se- 
lected press releases issued by the 
White House, the Department, and the 
U.S. Mission to the United Nations; 
and treaties and other agreements to 
which the United States is or may be- 
come a party. Special features, articles, 
and other supportive material (such as 
maps, charts, photographs, and graphs) 
are jniblished frequently to provide ad- 
ditional information on current issues 
but should not necessarily be inter- 
preted as official U.S. policy 


Secretary nf State 


Assistant Secretary 
for Public Affairs 



Office of Public Communication 


Chiel', Editdrial Division 



The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is neces- 
sary in the transaction of the public busi- 
ness requii-ed by law of this Department. 
Use of funds for printing this periodical 
has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through 
September :l(), 19S9. 

Dkpartment of State Bulletin (ISS^' 
0041-7610) is published monthly (plus an- 
nual indexl by the Department of State, 
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NtJTE: Most of the contents of this publi- 
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For sale by the Superintendent of Docu- 
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Washington, D.C. 20402. 



1 50th Anniversary of the Bulletin 

ie President 

Change in the Soviet Union 
The Future of Europe 
Security Strategy for the 1990s 

ie Secretary 

News Conference 
Principles and Pragmatism: 

American Policy Toward the 

Arab-Israeli Conflict 
Interview on "Face the Nation" 
Trip to Moscow and NATO 

{Secretary Baker. Joint 

The Challenge of Change in 

U.S. -Soviet Relations 


FY 1990 Assistance Request for 
Sub-Saharan Africa {Alison 

Cease-Fire in Sudan 
{Department Statement) 

ifms Control 

'' Biological Weapons Prolifera- 
tion {H. Allen Holmes) 
CFE and CSBM Talks Resume 
in Vienna {White House 


President Meets With Prime 
Minister Mulroney {President 
Bush, Brian Mulroney) 

ast Asia 

1 Student Demonstations in China 
{Richard L. Williams) 

48 U.S., Japan Agree to Codevelop 
FSX Aircraft {President 
Bush, Lawrence S. 


Competitiveness in the Global 
Marketplace {Richard T. 

World Trade Week, 1989 




52 Deconfrontation on Cyprus 
{Department Stafeynent) 

Middle East 




Visit of King Hussein I 

{President Bush, 

King Hussein) 
Jordan — A Profile 
Relief Aid to Lebanon 

{Department Statement) 
Situation in Lebanon 

{Department Statements) 


56 U.S. Responsibilities in 

International Fisheries Mat- 
ters {Edward E. Wolfe) 


59 Update on Immigration and 

Refugee Issues {Jonathan 

Science & Technology 

62 U.S. Contributions to Communi- 
cations Development 

United Nations 

65 U.S. Opposes PLO Admission to 

UN Agencies {Secretary 
Baker, Sandra L. 
Vogelgesang, Department 

Western Hemisphere 

66 Panama Elections {President 

Bush, Lawrence S. Eagle- 
burger, Department and 
White House Statements, Text 
of OAS Resolution) 

68 Elections in Argentina {Depart- 
ment Statements) 

71 Elections in Bolivia {Depart- 
ment Statement) 

73 U.S. -Mexico Relations 

76 Mexico — A Profile 


76 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

78 Department of State 


79 Department of State 

80 Foreign Relations Volumes 


81 Background Notes 


epartment of State Bulletin/July 1989 

To Our Readers: 

With this issue, we celebrate the gold- 
en anniversary of the Department of 
State Bulletin. 

When this periodical was first 
published, no one could have forseen 
the crucial role the United States 
would play in world events during the 
next half-century. In order to illus- 
trate the extent of these changes, we 
are pleased to reproduce here the full 
text of the first Bulletin issued on 
July 1, 1939. Through the Administra- 
tions of 10 Presidents and 15 Secre- 
taries of State, America has assumed 
global responsibilities in political, 
economic, military, scientific, envi- 
ronmental, and humanitarian affairs 
to an extent unimaginable in those 
twilight days just prior to World 
War II. 

The words and phrases that have 
become part of our vocabulary and 
lore in the past 50 years — cold war, 
Uruguay Round, narcotics interdic- 
tion, American hostages, Cuban mis- 
sile crisis, perestroika, intifada. Camp 
David agreements, INF Treaty, Tien- 
anmen Square, acid rain, to cite but a 
few — illustrate the growth in com- 
plexity and scope of U.S. foreign rela- 
tions. Our language of acronyms — 
OAS, OAU, EEC, UNEP, etc.— dem- 
onstrate the growing interdependence 
of nations and the crucial importance 
of diplomacy. 

Throughout this time, the 
Bulletin has attempted to provide as 
accurate and as complete a record as 
possible of U.S. public policy on inter- 
national issues, for contemporary 
readers and for the researchers of 
future generations. 

Just as the issues have become 
far more complex and varied, so has 
our publication — in the range of its 
subject matter, in the volume of its 
material, and in its format and style. 
We have gone from a weekly to a 
monthly in order to keep subscription 
rates low. New technology has al- 
lowed us to speed up the printing 
process and increase our use of 
graphics and photos, and this revolu- 
tion is only just beginning. 

But whatever changes have been 
made, we have sought, above all, to 
maintain the integrity and utility of 
the only official monthly record of 
national foreign policy published by 
any country in the world. As we ap- 
proach the 21st century, our goal is to 
continue to provide the same level of 
quality and coverage and to be as 
adaptable to the enormous changes 
looming ahead as we have been to 
those of the past. That promises to be 
an exciting challenge! 

July 1, 1989 

Department of State Bulletin/July 

50th Anniversary of the Bulletin 


■^ f 


JULY I, 1939 
Vol. I: No. 1— Publication 1349 


Announcement 3 

Peace and neutrality legislation: Statement by the 

Secretary of State 4 

Department of State appropriations for the fiscal year 

1940 4 

Visit to Washington of the Crown Prince and Crown 

Princess of Norway 9 

Mexico: Perfecting of land titles in the State of Veracruz . 10 

Use of the original records of the Department of State . . 10 

Training of Chilean students in the United States ... 12 
International conferences, commissions, etc.: 

Biennial Congress of the International Chamber of 

Commerce 13 

International Commission of Inquiry, United States 

and Bolivia 13 

Fifteenth International Conference on Documentation . 14 

Treaty information 14 

Foreign Service 16 


Anniversary of inauguration of postal service between 

the United States and France 16 

Legislation 16 

Publications 16 

epartment of State Bulletin/July 1989 


'T^HE present issue inaugurates The Department of State Bulletin. This periodical will 

be published weekly and will contain the texts of press releases, information regard- 
ing treaties, and other material on current developments in American foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of State. It will take the place of the Department's 
weekly pamphlet Press Releases and monthly Treaty Information bulletin, which are being 
discontinued with the issues for June 1939. Indexes to The Department of State Bulletin 
will be prepared and published semiannually. 

The decision to discontinue the Treaty Information bulletin and the Press Releases 
pamphlet was arrived at after careful consideration by the Department of State and con- 
sultation with a nimiber of organizations and persons outside the Government who use one 
or both of those publications. A large majority of the organizations and persons consulted 
were of the opinion that the publication in a single bulletin of the material which was 
being issued in the weekly and monthly periodicals mentioned would be most desirable. 
This opinion coincided with the belief of the Department that a single bulletin containing 
both treaty information and information on other closely related aspects of the conduct of 
American foreign relations would constitute a more useful and convenient source for 
current reference and for filing than two separate publications. 

The material to be published in The Department of State Bulletin wiU be so organized 
as to enable persons who are interested in certain special subjects to follow developments 
in their particular fields by reference each week to the appropriate section of the Bulletiti. 
Data, for instance, of the character of that previously contained in the Treaty Information 
bulletin will henceforth be printed each week in a separate section of the Bulletin. 

The Department of State Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C, for 10 cents a copy, or for $2.75 a year by 

lEililor's Note; Dii UlliH ."ilition. page i; was blank.] 

Department of State Bulletin/July 1!| 

50th Anniversary of the Bulletin 


Statement by the Secretary of State 

[Released July 1] 

I am still thoroughly convinced that the six- 
point peace and neutrality program set forth in 
my letters to Senator Pittman and Representa- 
tive Bloom on May 27, 1939,^ would be far 
more effective in the interests of peace and in 
keeping the country out of war than the pres- 
ent embargo law or any equivalent. 

This legislative proposal was submitted to the 
appropriate committees of the two Houses of 
Congress after lengthy conferences with mem- 
bers of these committees and with other lead- 
ing Members of Congress of all political per- 
suasions. It was my hope and belief that, while 
this proposal might not contain all that every 
individual Member of Congress or every oflS- 
cial of the executive branch of the Govern- 
ment wished, it would in the present interna- 
tional exigencies be regarded as desirable by 

a majority of Congress. Its failure to pass the 
House by a narrow margin is a matter of re- 
gret and disappointment from the standpoint 
of peace and the best interests of this country 
in its international relations. 

This six-point peace and neutrality proposal 
is not only best calculated to keep this Nation 
out of war in the event war comes, but also, 
what is all-important at this time, best cal- 
culated to make a far greater contribution than 
could the present law or its equivalent toward 
the discouragement of the outbreak of war. At 
the same time, while doing this, it would like- 
wise keep this Government and Nation lUO 
percent within the limits of universally recog- 
nized international law. 

In these circumstances, I must continue to 
urge the adoption of this proposal. 

-f + 4- ^ -f -f -♦■ 


YEAR 1940 

The first of the following tables shows the 
increases and decreases in the State Depart- 
ment's appropriations for the 1940 fiscal year 
as compared with the 1939 fiscal year. The sec- 
ond table shows increases and decreases in the 

" See Press Releases, Vol. XX, No. 505, Jiine 3, 1939, 
pp. 475-477. 

estimates as submitted to the Congress by the 
Bureau of the Budget and as approved by the 
President compared with the 1940 appropria- 
tions approved by the Congress. 

The Department's appropriation bill for 
1940 was approved by the President on June 
29, 1939. 

Ipartment of State Bulletin/July 1989 

JULY 1, 1939 


Department op State Appbopeiations fob Fiscal Ybab 1940 Compabed With Fiscal Yeab 1939 

(Note. — For purposes of comparison it should be carefully noted that the 1939 column Includes all deficiency 
appropriations in addition to those in the regular annual appropriation bill, whereas for 1940 only the latter are 
shown since no deficiencies for that year have yet been passed.) 

Appropriation title 

for 1940 

for 1939 

Increases (+) 

Decreases (— ) 

for 1940 

Reasons for increases or decreases 

Department Proper 

Salaries, Department of State - 

Salaries, Reciprocal Trade Agree- 

Contingent Expenses, Depart- 
ment of State. 

Printing and Binding, Depart- 
ment of State. 

$2, 192, 000 

225, 000 
138, 000 

225, 000 

$2, 072, 600 

250, 000 
95, 810 

+ $119,400 


+ 42, 190 

172, 750 

Printing and Binding, Depart- 
ment of State (Supplemental 
for special items for 1939). 

Passport Agencies, Department 
of State. 

Collecting and Editing Terri- 
torial Papers. 

Promotion of Foreign Trade 

Total Department Proper. 

60, 000 
19, 800 
43, 000 

2, 902, 800 

15, 000 

63, 500 
20, 000 

2, 729, 660 

+ 52,250 




+ 3,000 

+ 173,140 

Increases of $92,640 for 47 addi- 
tional permanent positions; and 
$26,760 to reduce the deficit 
which is now required to be 
covered by lapses. 

General reduction which will re- 
quire readjustments in present 

Increases of $7,875 for general sup- 
plies and services; $2,000 for 
replacement of trucks and pur- 
chase of one additional car; 
$11,065 for equipment for addi- 
tional personnel and replace- 
ments, particularly of machines. 
Decrease of $4,500 in travel. 
The sum of $25,750 was continued 
available for 1939 from 1938 and, 
therefore, was in addition to the 
appropriation of $95,810. In- 
crease for 1940 over funds actu- 
ally available for 1939 is, there- 
fore, $25,750 less than the 
$42,190, which is on the basis of 

Increases of $13,600 for consolida- 
tion of consular regulations and 
instructions to diplomatic offi- 
cers; $18,000 for Foreign Rela- 
tions; $4,500 for press releases; 
$4,110 for passports and passport 
forms; $9,000 for Foreign Service 
requirements; and $3,040 for mis- 
cellaneous items. 

Non-recurring for 1940. 

Decrease based on trend of expend- 
itures for past year. 
General decrease. 

Funds available for 1939 were 
$4,500 more than the appropria- 
tion of $40,000 due to the avail- 
ability of the unexpended balance 
for 1938. For 1940 no balance 
is brought forward. 

50th Anniversary of the Bulletin 


Appropriation title 

Foreign Service 

Salaries of Ambassadors and 

Salaries of Foreign Service 

Transportation, Foreign Service.. 

Office and Living Quarters, For- 
eign Service. 

Cost of Living Allowances, 

Representation Allowances- 


for 1940 

$650, 000 

3, 580, 000 
600, 000 

Retirement Fund 

Salaries of Foreign Service Clerks. 

Salaries of Foreign Service Clerks 
(Supplemental for urgent needs 
in 1939). 

Miscellaneous Salaries and Allow- 
ances, Foreign Service. 

Contingent Expenses, Foreign 

Contingent Expenses, Foreign 
Service (Supplemental for tele- 
graph expenses in 1939). 

Emergencies Arising in the Diplo- 
matic and Consular Service. 

Total Foreign Service 

FoEEiGN Service Buildings. 

2, 020, 000 

300, 000 

140, 000 

199, 400 
2, 550, 000 

700, 000 

1, 135, 000 

(or 1939 

$640, 000 

3, 505, 100 
556, 700 

1, 962, 000 

280, 000 

125, 000 

187, 600 
2, 359, 020 

41, 700 

680, 180 

1, 158, 500 

Increases (+) 

Decreases (— ) 

tor 1940 

+ $10,000 

+ 74,900 
+ 43, 300 

175, 000 

12, 049, 400 

750, 000 

140, 000 
175, 000 


+ 58,000 

+ 20, 000 
+ 15,000 

+ 11,800 
+ 190, 980 

+ 19,820 


Reasons for increases or decreases 

- 140, 000 

+ 238, 600 

+ 750,000 

Increase of $22,500 required for 
raising ranks of Ministers to 
Colombia, Panama, and Vene- 
zuela to Ambassadors. De- 
creases of $10,000 for Minister to 
Czechoslovakia; and $2,500 addi- 
tional to be saved on lapses. 

Increases of $49,900 for automatic 
promotions and $25,000 for 10 
additional officers. 

Increases of $12,500 for transfers 
of Ambassadors and Ministers; 
$10,600 for new officers; $4,200 
for new clerks; $8,500 for tem- 
porary details; and $7,500 trans- 
ferred to this appropriation from 
Contingent Expenses for trade 
conference travel. of $12,000 for 10 addi- 
tional officers; $11,970 for addi- 
tional clerks; and $34,030 to 
reduce deficit which it is neces- 
sary to cover by lapses on allow- 
ances for living quarters. 

Increases of $2,400 for additional 
officers: $3,150 for additional 
clerks; and $14,450 for increased 
living costs. 

To make readjustments in the in- 
terest of uniform treatment in the 
allotment of these funds, and to 
make more adequate provision 
for official entertainment le- 
quired by heads of mission. 

Increases of $100,000 for some 700 
promotions; $66,020 for 58 addi- 
tional permanent clerks; $15,920 
for transfers to this appropria- 
tion of personnel previously paid 
from other appropriations; and 
$9,040 for temporary clerks. 

Non-recuiring for 1940. 

Increases of approximately $18,000 
for some 600 promotions at an 

' average of $30; $1,820 for addi- 

"' tional personnel. 

Reductions of $15,000 in program 
for purchase of household furni- 
ture; $10,000 for trade conference 
travel transferred to "Trans- 
portation, Foreign Service" 
$2,500 in item for special train- 
ing of Foreign Service officers 
$650 in automotive equipment. 
Increase of $4,650 for supplies 
postage, and miscellaneous items 

Non-recurring' for 1940. 

New appropriation under act of 
May 25, 1938. 

partment of State Bulletin/July 1989 

JULY 1, 1939 

Appropriation title 

for 1940 

for 1939 

Increases (+) 

Decreases (-) 

for 1940 

Reasons for increases or decreases 

International Obltgations 

Contributions, Quotas, etc. to In- 

$870, 000 

$835, 590 

+ $34,410 

Increases of $1,319.67 for Pan 

ternational Bureaus. 

American Union; $27,303.44 for 
Pan American Sanitary Bureau; 
and $10,786.89 for International 
Labor Organization. Decrease of 
$5,000 for Meeting of Interna- 
tional Road Congress which is a 
non-recurring item. 

(Convention for the Promotion of 

75, 000 

+ 75,000 

New item growing out of conven- 

Inter-American Cultural Re- 

tion signed at Buenos Aires, De- 


cember 23, 1936. 

Mexican Boundary Commission 

193, 000 

143, 300 

+ 49, 700 

Increase is entirely for operation 


and maintenance of the Rio 

Grande Rectification Project 

which is to be assumed by the 

regular Commission upon com- 
Anticipated completion of this 

Rio Crrande Rectification Proiect 

229, 500 

-229, 500 

j_l^H_/ y^ X c* 1-1 v.* \^ ^ V w ^-' VI *-* x^n' V* v^ *"* .■■ iv-'j^^^-'v — 


Lower Rio Grande Flood Control 

800, 000 


+ 488,500 

Although there is an increase in the 


actual amount appropriated for 
1940, there was a considerable 
balance brought forward to 1939 
from 1938 which made funds 
available for 1939 somewhat in 
excess of the appropriation for 

Rio Grande Canalization Pro- 

500, 000 

646, 500 


Reduction in construction work. 


Fence Construction on the 

Boundary, Arizona. 
International Boundary Commis- 

25, 000 

25, 000 

42, 000 

41, 500 

+ 500 

Increase is for additional field work. 

sion, United States and Can- 

ada, and Alaska and Canada. 

Salaries and Expenses, Interna- 

37, 500 

36, 600 

+ 900 

Increase for travel, supplies, com- 

tional Joint Commission, 

munication service, and miscel- 

United States and Great Brit- 

laneous items. 

Special and Technical Investiga- 

47, 000 

49, 000 


General reduction. 

tions, United States and Great 


International Fisheries Commis- 
International Pacific Salmon Fish- 

25 000 

25, 000 

40, 000 

25, 000 

+ 15,000 

For more extensive field work in 

eries Commission. 

cooperation with Canada. 

Eighth American Scientific Con- 

85, 000 

+ 85,000 

Special appropriation for participa- 

tion by the United States in this 

Seventh General Assembly of the 
International Union of Geodesy 
and Geophysics. 

Ninth International Seed Testing 


+ 4,500 

Special appropriation for organiz- 


+ 500 

ing this Congress to be held in 
the United States. 
Special appropriation in connection 

with holding this Congress in the 

United States. 

Payment to Government of Nica- 

72, 000 

+ 72,000 

Special appropriation' under agree- 

ment with Nicaragua. 

Fifteenth International Congress 
of Architects. 

15, 000 



Tenth Pan American Sanitary 

International Committee OD Po- 


-3, 500 


50, 000 


Appropriation for 1940 undeter- 

litical Refugees. 

mined at present. 

Department of &tate Bulletin/July 19| 

50th Anniversary of the Bulletin 



Appropriation title 

for 1940 

for 1939 

Increases (+) 

Decreases (-) 

for 1940 

Reasons for increases or decreases 

International Obligations — Con. 
Fourth International Conference 

$15, 500 




10, 000 











on Private Air Law. 
Pan American Highway. 

Third Pan American Highway 

Commission of Experts on Codifi- 

cation of International Law. 
Tenth International Congress of 

Military Medicine and Phar- 
Arbitration of Smelter Fumes 


Total Intbknational Obli- 

$2, 816, 500 

2, 581, 090 

-1-235, 410 

Gband ToTAi 

18 518 700 

17, 121, 550 

+ 1,397, 150 


Dbpartment of State Estimates as Submitted to Congress by the Bureau op the Budget Compared With 

Appropriations Approved by Congress, 1940 

Title of appropriation 

Department op State 

Salaries, Department of State 

Salaries, Reciprocal Trade Treaties 

Salaries, Inter- American Program 

Contingent Expenses, Department of State 

Contingent Expenses, Inter- American Program . 

Printing and Binding, Department 

Printing and Binding, Inter- American Program, 

Passport Agencies 

Territorial Papers 

Promotion of Foreign Trade 

Total, Department of State 

Foreign Service 

Salaries of Ambassadors and Ministers 

Salaries of Foreign Service Officers 

Transportation, Foreign Service Officers 

Office and Living Quarters 

Cost of Living Allowance 

Representation Allowance 

Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund 

Salaries, Foreign Service Clerks 

Miscellaneous Salaries and Allowances 

Contingent Expenses, Foreign Service 

Emergency Fund 

Total, Foreign Service 

Foreign Service Buildings Fund 

Estimate submitted 
to Congress 

$2, 205, 000. 00 

250, 000. 00 

39, 360. 00 

143, 000. 00 

5, 430. 00 

214, 500. 00 

45, 500. 00 

63, 500. 00 

20, 000. 00 

44, 500. 00 

3, 030, 790. 00 

655, 000. 00 
580, 000. 00 
610, 000. 00 
030, 000. 00 
308, 500. 00 
145, 000. 00 
199, 400. 00 
570, 000. 00 
710, 500. 00 
154, 500. 00 
175, 000. 00 

12, 137, 900. 00 

1, 000, 000. 00 


approved by 


$2, 192, 000. 00 
225, 000. 00 

138, 000. 00 
'225,' 000.' 00 

60, 000. 00 
19, 800. 00 
43, 000. 00 

2, 902, 800. 00 

3, 580, 

2, 020, 



2, 550, 

1, 135, 


000. 00 
000. 00 
000. 00 
000. 00 
000. 00 
000. 00 
400. 00 
000. 00 
000. 00 
000. 00 
000. 00 

12, 049, 400. 00 

750, 000. 00 

Increase (-1-) 
Decrease (-) 


- 5, 000. 00 

+ 10, 500. 00 

-3, 500. 00 
-200. 00 

- 1, 500. 00 

-127,990. 00 

























-88, 500. 00 


Apartment of State Bulletin/July 1989 

JULY 1, 1939 

Title of appropriation 

Estimate submitted 
to Congress 


approved by 


Increase (+) 
Decrease (— ) 

International Obligations 

Contributions, Quotas, etc 

Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural 

Mexican Boundary Commission: 

Regular Commission 

Lower Rio Grande Flood Control 

Rio Grande Canalization 

Fence Construction 

International Boundary Commission: 

United States and Canada and Alaska and Canada 

International Joint Commission: 

Salaries and Expenses 

Special and Technical Investigations 

International Fisheries Commission 

International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission 

Eighth American Scientific Congress 

Seventh Assembly of International Union of Geodesy and 

Ninth International Seed Testing Congress 

Payment to Nicaragua 

$870, 133. 00 
75, 000. 00 

198, 300. 00 
1, 000, 000. 00 
1, 000, 000. 00 

43, 000. 00 

38, 500. 00 
49, 000. 00 
31, 500. 00 
40, 000. 00 
90, 000. 00 
5, 000. 00 

500. 00 
72, 000. 00 

$870, 000. 00 
75, 000. 00 

193, 000. 00 

800, 000. 00 

500, 000. 00 

25, 000. 00 

42, 000. 00 

37, 500. 00 
47, 000. 00 
25, 000. 00 
40, 000. 00 
85, 000. 00 
4, 500. 00 

500. 00 
72, 000. 00 

Total, International Obligations- 
Grand Total 

3, 512, 933. 00 

2, 816, 500. 00 

-$13a 00 




+ 25, 000. 00 

- 1, 000. 00 

- 1, 000. 00 

-5,000. 00 
-500. 00 


19, 681, 623. 00 

18, 518, 700. 00 

1, 162, 923. 00 



[Released June 26] 

Their Royal Highnesses the Crown Prince 
and Crown Princess of Norway will arrive in 
Washington, for an unofficial visit, at 9 : 15 
p. m., the evening of Tuesday, June 27. They 
will be accompanied by the Minist«r of Norway 
and will be met at the Union Station by the 
following committee: 

The Honorable Cordell Hull, Secretary of 
State, and Mrs. Hull 

Madame Munthe de Morgenstierne, wife of the 
Minister of Norway 

Mr. Jorgen Galbe, Counselor of the Norwegian 
Legation, and Madame Galbe 

Mr. George T. Summerlin, Chief of Protocol 

Mr. James C. Dunn, Adviser on Political Rela- 
tions, Department of State, and Mrs. Dunn 

Mr. John Hickerson, Acting Chief of the Divi- 
sion of European Affairs, Department of State, 
and Mrs. Hickerson 

Mr. Aage Bryn, First Secretary of the Nor- 
wegian Legation, and Madame Bryn 

Mr. Ditlef Knudsen, Attache of the Norwegian 
Legation, and Madame Knudsen 

Mr. Torfinn Oftedal, Attache of the Norwegian 

Lt. Col. H. M. Rayner, United States Army, 
Military Aide to the Crown Princ« 

Comdr. R. B. Carney, United States Navy, 
Naval Aide to the Crown Prince 

On Wednesday, June 28, the Secretary of 
State and Mrs. Hull will give a luncheon for 
Their Royal Highnesses, who will remain in 
Washington until Friday afternoon, June 30. 

Department of State Bulletin/July 1! 

50th Anniversary of the Bulletin 


[Released June 28] 

Following is the list of guests attending the lunch- 
eon given by the Secretary of State and Mrs. Hull in 
honor of Their Royal Highnesses the Crown Prince 
and Crown Princess of Norway, June 28, 1939, at the 
Carlton Hotel: 

Their Royal Highnesses the Crown Prince and Crown 
Princess of Norway; the Honorable the Minister of 
Norway and Madame Munthe de Morgenstierne ; Maj. 
N. R. 0stgaard and Madame 0stgaard ; Capt. N. A. 
Ramm ; Mr. Jens Schive ; Mrs. Woodrow Wilson ; the 
Honorable the Attorney General; the Honorable the 
Secretary of Commerce ; Mrs. Charles L. McNary ; the 
Honorable Walter F. George and Mrs. George; the 
Honorable Robert L. Doughton and Mrs. Doughton ; 
Mrs. Sol Bloom ; the Honorable Edith Nourse Rogers ; 
the Honorable Jere Cooper ; the Honorable the Under 
Secretary of State and Mrs. Welles ; the Honorable 
Lucille F. McMillan ; Mr. and Mrs. Nicholas Roose- 
velt ; the Honorable Jesse Jones and Mrs. Jones ; Mr. 
George T. Summerlin ; Mr. David Lawrence ; Mr. 
Ulric Bell; Miss Ramona Lefevre; Miss Beth Camp- 
bell ; Lt. Col. Harold M. Rayner, United States Army, 
American military aide to His Royal Highness the 
Crown Prince of Norway ; Comdr. Robert B. Carney, 
United States Navy, American naval aide to His Royal 
Highness the Crown Prince of Norway. 

+ -f -♦• 


[Released June 26] 

The Department of State has been informed 
that the State of Veracruz, Mexico, has ex- 
tended until July 22, 1939, the period within 
which proprietors of immovable property (in- 
cluding those who have inherited immovable 
property) may legalize their property rights 
by instituting the necessary proceedings to 
"perfect" the said rights in cases where titles 
of ownership are not properly inscribed in the 
Public Registry of Property. As stated in the 
Department's press release of March 21, 1939,- 
provision for such perfection of title was made 


in Veracruz State law promulgated September 
22, 1938. 

The American consul at Veracruz, in report- 
ing this extension, states that in order to com- 
ply with the law it may be necessary for Amer- 
ican property owners affected by the law to 
engage an attorney. The consul will be glad, 
upon request, to furnish any interested Amer- 
ican citizen with a list of attorneys. He can- 
not, of course, assume any responsibility for 
the integrity or ability of any attorneys ap- 
pearing on the list who may be employed by 
such property owner. 

-f -♦■ -f 


[Released July 1] 

In view of the contemporary international 
situation, the Department has found it neces- 
sary to revise in certain respects the regula- 
tions set forth in Departmental Order No. 751, 
of April 5, 1938, relating to the use of the 
original records of the Department of State.' 
The revised regulations as contained in De- 
partmental Order No. 796, dated June 19, 1939. 
are as follows: 

"Section 91, Title 20, of the United States 
Code reads in part as follows: 'The facilities 
for study research and illustration in the Gov- 
ernment departments . . . shall be accessible, 
under such rules and restrictions as the officers 
in charge of each department or collection may 
prescribe, subject to such authority as is now 
or may hereafter be permitted by law, to the 
scientific investigators and to duly qualified 
individuals, students and graduates of any in- 
stitution of learning in the several States and 
Territories and the District of Columbia . . .' 
Pursuant to the provisions quoted and in order 

'Press Releases, Vol. XX, No. 495, March 25, 1939, 
pp. 222-223. 

" See Press Releases, Vol. XIX, No. 479, December 3, 
1938, p. 401. 

JULY 1, 1939 


to clarify the present procedure in the Depart- 
ment, the following regulations, superseding 
those contained in Departmental Order No. 751, 
dated April 5, 1938, and all previous depart- 
mental orders on the subject, are hereby pre- 
scribed to govern the use of the original records 
of the Department of State. 

"In view of the contemporary international 
situation it will not be possible to make the 
confidential or unpublished files and records of 
the Department of a date later than December 
31, 1918, available to persons who are not offi- 
cials of the United States Government. In 
order that the Department's records may be 
made available as liberally as circumstances 
permit, the Department each year will give con- 
sideration to the situation then existing with a 
view to advancing the date fixed whenever such 
action is deemed possible. The use of these 
records by Government officials will be subject 
to such conditions as the chiefs of the appro- 
priate policy divisions in the Department of 
State may deem it advisable to prescribe. 

"The confidential or unpublished records of 
the Department of a date prior to December 31, 
1918, or such subsequent date as may be fixed 
by the Department, may be made available to 
persons who are not officials of the United 
States Government, subject to the following 
conditions : 

"Files which are in current use in the De- 
partment or which cannot be made public with- 
out the disclosure of confidences reposed in the 
Department or without adversely affecting the 
public interest should not be made available 
to inquirers. Papers received by the Depart- 
ment from a foreign government which have 
not been released for publication by that gov- 
ernment should not be made available to in- 
quirers without the consent of the government 
concerned. If there is reason to believe a for- 
eign government may be willing to permit the 
use of the papers in question under certain 
conditions the permission may, in the discre- 
tion of the appropriate officials of the Depart- 
ment, be requested. If such permission is re- 
quested, the expenses of communicating with 

the foreign government (cost of telegrams, 
postage, etc.) will be met by the person desir- 
ing to consult the papers. 

"Permission to consult the records of the 
Department through the date fixed by the De- 
partment may be granted, subject to the limi- 
tations set forth in this order, to such persons 
as lawyers, publicists, historians, instructors, 
and professors in accredited colleges and uni- 
versities, and holders of the doctor's degree (or 
its equivalent) in foreign relations or allied 
subjects from such colleges and universities, 
provided that they are authorities of recog- 
nized standing in the field to which the records 
relate and that they have an important and 
definite use for the information desired. Due 
to lack of personnel the Department is not in 
a position to assemble large quantities of 
papers or extensive files for consultation by 
persons not officials of the Government, and 
requests for permission to consult material 
should therefore be definitely limited in scope 
and confined to specific subjects or particular 

"An application from an alien to consult the 
Department's records under this order shall be 
considered only if accompanied by a letter 
from the head of the embassy or legation at 
Washington of the country of which the alien 
is a citizen, subject or national. Such a letter 
must show that the applicant is favorably 
known to the appropriate embassy or legation 
and that the mission is familiar with the pur- 
pose of the applicant's work. 

"All applications to consult the original 
records of the Department of date prior to 
the one fixed by the Department shall be re- 
ferred to the Chief of the Division of Kesearch 
and Publication. If the Chief of the Divi- 
sion of Research and Publication is of the 
opinion that the applicant possesses the requi- 
site qualifications as set forth in this order, he 
shall have assembled and shall submit to the 
chief of the policy division charged with the 
consideration of questions in the field which is 
the object of the research or inquiry all of the 
relevant papers and files which the applicant 

50th Anniversary of the Bulletin 


desires to consult with the exceptions herein- 
after noted. If the applicant is permitted to 
use all or part of the papers desired, the chief 
of the policy division concerned will inform 
the Chief of the Division of Research and 
Publication under what conditions the papers 
may be examined, that is, whether copies may 
be made of the relevant documents or whether 
only notes may be taken and whether the copies 
or notes may be published in whole or in part 
or used only for background information, or 
any other conditions which the chief of the 
policy division mentioned may deem it advis- 
able to prescribe. This decision will be final 
except in cases of unusual importance where 
the question may be referred to an Assistant 
Secretary of State or higher officer. Docu- 
ments or papers previously released or pub- 
lished, and unpublished papers clearly involv- 
ing no question of policy, may be made avail- 
able to qualified applicants by the Chief of the 
Division of Research and Publication without 
reference to other officials. 

"Upon receiving the decision of the chief of 
the policy division mentioned, with the condi- 
tions therein deemed advisable and necessary 
to prescribe, the Chief of the Division of Re- 
search and Publication will thereupon arrange 
for the applicant to consult the files subject to 
the conditions mentioned. After the papers 
have been consulted the applicant will submit 
all notes, copies of documents, etc., which he 
has made to the Chief of the Division of 
Research and Publication. The latter, when 
necessary, will refer these notes, copies, etc., to 
the chief of the policy division concerned for 
examination if desired by the chief of the latter 
division. The chief of this policy division 
may, after such examination, return the papers 
to the Chief of the Division of Research and 
Publication for transmittal to the applicant or 
he may, in his discretion, retain the notes and 
refuse the applicant permission to use them. 

"The provisions of this order are to be inter- 
preted as liberally as possible. In this regard 
it is to be borne in mind that the further it is 
possible to go in the way of promoting legiti- 


mate historical research and the study of the 
foreign policy of the United States without 
violating the confidences necessary for the 
transaction of diplomatic affairs, the more 
likely the Department will be to receive the 
support and trust of the intelligent public." 

■f > * 


[Released July 1] 

A group of graduate students of Chilean 
engineering schools today called on Assistant 
Secretary of State Berle to pay their respects. 
They were presented by the Chilean Ambassa- 
dor. These students have come to the United 
States to spend several months in some of the 
important industrial plants of the country in 
order to obtain advanced instruction and prac- 
tical experience in certain branches of tech- 
nology. They are here under the sponsorship 
of the University of Chile and of a number of 
Chilean and American banks, transportation 
lines, and industrial concerns. 

One group is under the sponsorship of: 

The University of Chile (Engineering 

Mining Credit Bank of Chile 

Chilean State Railways 

Consulate General of Chile in New York 

Chile-American Association, Inc. 

Wessel-Duval & Co. 

General Motors Corp. 

Baldwin Locomotive Works & Associated 

Bethlehem Steel Corp. & Associated Com- 

Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey & Asso- 
ciated Companies 

Westinghouse Electric International Co. 

Thomas A. Edison Co. 

Carrier Corporation 

Members of this group are located as follows : 

Luis Rojas, Westinghouse Electric Inter- 
national Co. 

Carlos A. Echazii, Westinghouse Electric 
International Co. 

spartment of State Bulletin/July 1989 

JULY 1, 19 39 

Fernando Suarez, Baldwin Locomotive 

Kamon Suarez, Bethlehem Steel Corp. 
Jorge Hevia, Bethlehem Steel Corp. 
Arturo Aranda, General Motors Corp. 
Isaac Faiguenbaum, General Motors Corp. 
Albert Arce, Carrier Corporation 
Alfonso Castro, Baldwin Locomotive 

Carlos Alvarez, Standard Oil Co. of New 


A second group is under the sponsorship of 


W. R. Grace & Co., the General Electric Co., 
and Ingersoll-Rand Co. 

These students and their locations are as fol- 

Ramon Cabezon B., General Electric Co. 
Julio Melnick A., Ingersoll-Rand Co. 
Luis Marti, Grace Industrial Department 

The students presented also included Alberto 
Cabero, Jr., son of the Chilean Ambassador to 
the United States, and Mario Barranza, who is 
under the sponsorship of the Panagra airlines. 

International Conferences, Commissions, etc. 


[Released June 26] 

Following is the text of a message from tlie 
President of the United States to Mr. Thomas 
J. Watson, in connection with the Congress of 
the International Chamber of Commerce being 
held at Copenhagen, Denmark, convening June 
26, 1939: 

"In these times of international uncertainty 
the existence of the International Chamber of 
Conmierce and its efforts to promote interna- 
tional economic activity are extremely hearten- 
ing to those of us who believe that only with 
the existence of stable and progressively im- 
proving world trade and finance will it be pos- 
sible to establish satisfactory international 
political relations. 

"I am glad to take this opportunity of ex- 
pressing again my appreciation of the work 
done in the promotion of world trade and un- 
derstanding by the International Chamber of 
Commerce, which has been under your leader- 
ship for the past two years. To the Interna- 
tional Chamber of Commerce and to your suc- 
cessor I extend my best wishes for continued 
successful activities in this direction. 

"Frankun D. Roosevelt" 

In transmitting the foregoing message to Mr. 
Watson, Secretary of State Hull wrote: 

"I have been requested by the President to 
transmit to you his message to the Interna- 
tional Chamber of Commerce at the June 26, 
1939 Opening Session of its Biennial Congress. 
I should like to have you know that I echo the 
words of the President and that I wish for the 
International Chamber of Commerce a success- 
ful congress. 

"CoRDELL Hull" 

■f -f -f 


[Released June 26] 

By the joint action of the Governments of 
the United States and Bolivia, Mr. Johannes 
Irgens, Norwegian diplomatist, has been ap- 
pointed to tlie position of Joint Commissioner 
for the International Commission provided for 
under the terms of the Treaty for the Advance- 
ment of Peace between the United States and 
Bolivia, signed January 22, 1914. 

Department of State Bulletin/July 19 

50th Anniversary of the Bulletin 


The present composition of the Commission 
is as follows: 

American Commissioners : 

National : A. R. Talbot, of Nebraska 
Nonnational : Ludvigs Seja, of Latvia 

Bolivian Commissioners: 
National: Vacant 
Nonnational: Vacant 

Joint C onvmissioner : 
Johannes Irgens, of Norway. 


[Released July 1] 

This Government has accepted the invitation 
of the Swiss Goverimient to participate in the 
Fifteenth International Conference on Docu- 
mentation, which will be held at Zurich, Swit- 


zerland, from August 10 to 13, 1939, and the 
President has approved the appointment of the 
following persons as delegates on the part of 
the United States: 

Vernon D. Tate, Ph. D., Chief, Division of 
Photographic Archives and Research, The Na- 
tional Archives 

Miss Jose Meyer, European representative. Li- 
brary of Congress, Paris, France. 

This Government was represented at the 
Fourteenth International Conference on Docu- 
mentation which was held at Oxford, England, 
in September 1938. At that meeting the dis- 
cussions concerned the best methods of obtain- 
ing authoritative information on bibliographic 
work in such fields of learning as archeology, 
archive work, economics, history, and linguistic 

Treaty Information 

All material for the month of June 1939 con- 
cerning treaties to which the United States is a 
party or may become a party or treaties of gen- 
eral international interest will appear in the 
Treaty Information bulletin for June 30, 1939 ; 

treaty data available after that date will be 
compiled in the Treaty Division and wiU ap- 
pear in this section of subsequent issues of The 
Department of State Bulletin. 

ipartment of State Bulletin/July 1989 


JULY 1, 1939 

Foreign Service 

The July 1, 1939, issue of the Foreign Serv- 
ice List will contain the following changes in 
heads of American diplomatic missions : 

Norman Armour, of New Jersey, formerly 
Ambassador to Chile, appointed Ambassador 
to Argentina May 18, 1939. 

Claude G. Bowers, of New York, formerly 
Ambassador to Spain, appointed Ambassador 
to Chile June 22, 1939. 

Robert Granville Caldwell, of Texas, re- 
signed as Minister to Bolivia effective upon 
expiration of leave of absence. 

Frank P. Corrigan, of Ohio, formerly Min- 
ister to Panama, appointed Ambassador to 
Venezuela January 20, 1939. 

William Dawson, of Minnesota, formerly 
Minister to Uruguay, appointed Ambassador 
to Panama March 23, 1939. 

Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., of California, for- 
merly counselor of embassy at Lima, Peru, ap- 
pointed Minister to Iran July 7, 1939. 

Antonio C. Gonzalez, of New York, resigned 
as Minister to Venezuela effective June 8, 1939. 

Douglas Jenkins, of South Carolina, for- 
merly consul general at London, appointed 
Minister to Bolivia June 22, 1939. 

Daniel C. Roper, of South Carolina, ap- 
pointed Minister to Canada May 9, 1939. 

Laurence A. Steinhardt, of New York, for- 
merly Ambassador to Peru, appointed Ambas- 
sador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- 
lics March 23, 1939. 

Alexander W. Weddell, of Virginia, formerly 
Ambassador to Argentina, appointed Ambas- 
sador to Spain May 3, 1939. 


Edwin C. Wilson, of Florida, formerly coun- 
selor of embassy at Paris, appointed Minister 
to Uruguay June 22, 1939. 

The following changes have occurred in the 
American Foreign Service since June 24, 1939 : 

John G. Erhardt, of Brooklyn, N. Y., For- 
eign Service officer detailed as inspector, has 
been designated first secretary of. embassy and 
consul general at London, England. 

William M. Cramp, of Philadelphia, Pa., sec- 
ond secretary of legation at Tegucigalpa, Hon- 
duras, has been assigned as consul at Warsaw, 

William C. Trimble, of Baltimore, Md., now 
assigned to the Department of State, has been 
designated third secretary of embassy and vice 
consul at Paris, France. 

Douglas Flood, of Kenilworth, 111., vice con- 
sul at Barcelona, Spain, has been assigned as 
vice consul at Naples, Italy. 

Robert C. Strong, of Beloit, Wis., vice consul 
at Frankfort on the Main, Germany, has been 
assigned as vice consul at Prague, Bohemia. 

The following Executive orders concerning 
the Foreign Service have recently been issued : 

Executive Order Amending the Foreign Service Reg- 
ulations of the United States (Retirement of Foreign 
Service OflBcers). (E. O. 8176.) Federal Register, 
Vol. 4, No. 121, June 23, 1939, p. 2467 (The National 
Archives of the United States). 

Executive Order Amending the Foreign Service Reg- 
ulations of the United States (Chapter III — Immu- 
nities, Powers, and Privileges). (E. O. 8181.) Fed- 
eral Register, Vol. 4, No. 123, June 27, 1939, p. 2491 
(The National Archives of the United States). 

[The above orders effect no material altera- 
tions in the Foreign Service Regulations but 
merely consolidate into one chapter the miscel- 
laneous sections throughout the Regulations 
pertaining to the diplomatic and consular 
branches of the Foreign Service as separate 

Executive Order: Effective Date of Election by Re- 
tired Foreign Service OflBcers to Receive Reduced An- 
nuities. (E. O. 8180.) Federal Register, Vol. 4, No. 
122, June 24, 1939, p. 2475 (The National Archives of 
the United States). 

Department of State Bulletin/July 19 

50th Anniversary of the Bulletin 




[Released July 1] 

Translation of a telegram from the Minister for For- 
eign, Affairs of France (Oeorges Bonnet) to the Secre- 
tary of State 

Pabis, June 28, 19S9. 
Seventy-flve years ago a steamer to which France 
had been pleased to give the name of the American 
hero Washington insured for the first time, in thirteen 
and one-half days, the regular service of the French 
mall line between Le Havre and New York. On the 
occasion of this anniversary I desire to express to 
Tour Excellency, recalling myself to your recollection, 
the deep satisfaction which I feel In noting the prog- 
ress made with respect to the rapidity of communica- 
tions between France and the United States, a tangi- 
ble testimony of the unfailing friendship which unites 
our two countries. 

Geoboes Bonnet 

Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs of France 

June 30, 1939. 
I hasten to thank Your Excellency for your cordial 
telegram on the Seventy-fifth Anniversary of the in- 
auguration of a postal service between France and 
the United States by the French steamer Washington. 
The phenomenal expansion in transportation facilities 
between the United States and Europe since the 
maiden voyage of the French steamer Washington 


has had a profound influence on cultural and com- 
mercial relations between our two countries. 



Comanunlcation from the President of the United 
States transmitting supplemental estimate of appro- 
priation for the War Department, for the fiscal year 
ending June 30, 1939, to remain available until ex- 
pended, amounting to $200,000, for investigation and 
survey of a canal and highway across the Republic 
of Nicaragua. (H. Doc. 351, 76th Ck)ng., 1st sess.) 
2 pp. 5^. 

Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
of the House of Representatives on present neutrality 
law (Public Res. 27, 75th Cong.), proposed amend- 
ments thereto, and related legislation affecting the 
foreign policy of the United States, April 11, 12, 13, 
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and May 2, 1939. 
(76th Cong., 1st sess.) 639 pp. 600. 

An Act Making appropriations for the Departments of 
State and Justice and for the Judiciary, and for the 
Department of Commerce, for the fiscal year ending 
June 30, 1940, and for other purposes. (Public, No. 
156, 76th Cong., 1st sess.) 39 pp. 100. 


Depabtment of State 

Treaty Information, Bulletin No. 116, May 31, 1939. 
Publication 1342. iv, 20 pp. Subscription, $1 a year ; 
single copy, 1(>0. 

Other Government Agencies 

Foreign Commerce Yearbook, 1938. (Department of 
Commerce : Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Com- 
merce.) 1939. 435 pp. $1 (cloth). 


For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. — Price 10 cents Subscription price, $2.75 a year 


>epartment of State Bulletin/July 1989 


Change in the Soviet Union 

President Bush's address at Texas 
A&M U7iiversity's conunencement ex- 
ercises at College Station on May 12, 

My sincerest congratulations go to 
every graduate and to your parents. 
In this ceremony, we celebrate noth- 
ing less than the commencement of 
the rest, and the best, of your life. 

When you look back to your days at 
Texas A&M, you will have a lot to be 
proud of — a university that is first in 
baseball and first in service to our na- 
tion. Many are the heroes whose names 
are called at muster. Many are those 
you remember in silver taps. 

We are reminded that no genera- 
tion can escape history. Parents — we 
share a fervent desire for our children, 
and their children, to know a better 
world, a safer world. Students — your 
parents and grandparents have lived 
through a world war and helped Ameri- 
ca to rebuild the world. They witnessed 
the drama of postwar nations divided 
by Soviet subversion and force but 
sustained by an allied response most 
vividly seen in the Berlin airlift. 

Containing Soviet Expansionism 

Wise men — Truman and Eisenhower, 
Vandenberg and Rayburn, Marshall, 
Acheson, and Kennan — crafted the 
strategy of containment. They believed 
that the Soviet Union, denied the easy 
course of expansion, would turn inward 
and address the contradictions of its 
inefficient, repressive, and inhumane 
system. And they were right. The So- 
viet Union is now publicly facing this 
hard reality. 

Containment worked. Containment 
worked because our democratic princi- 
ples, institutions, and values are sound 
and always have been. It worked be- 
cause our alliances were and are 
strong; and because the superiority of 
free societies and free markets over 
stagnant socialism is undeniable. 

We are approaching the conclusion 
of a historic postwar struggle be- 
tween two visions — one of tyranny 
and conflict and one of democracy and 
freedom. The review of U.S. -Soviet re- 
lations that my Administration has just 
completed outlines a new path toward 
resolving this struggle. 

Our goal is bold — more ambitious 
than any of my predecessors might 

have thought possible. Our review indi- 
cates that 40 years of perseverance 
have brought us a precious opportunity. 
Now it is time to move beyond contain- 
ment, to a new policy for the 1990s — 
one that recognizes the full scope of 
change taking place around the world 
and in the Soviet Union itself. 

In sum, the United States now has 
as its goal much more than simply con- 
taining Soviet expansionism — we seek 
the integration of the Soviet Union into 
the community of nations. As the So- 
viet Union moves toward greater open- 
ness and democratization — as they 
meet the challenge of responsible inter- 
national behavior — we will match their 
steps with steps of our own. Ulti- 
mately, our objective is to welcome the 
Soviet Union tjack into the world order. 

Looking for Signs of Soviet Change 

The Soviet Union says it seeks to make 
peace with the world and criticizes its 
own postwar policies. These are words 
we can only applaud. But a new rela- 
tionship cannot be simply declared by 
Moscow or bestowed by others. It must 
be earned. It must be earned because 
promises are never enough. The Soviet 
Union has promised a more cooperative 
relationship before — only to reverse 
course and return to militarism. So- 
viet foreign policy has been almost 
seasonal — warmth before cold, thaw 
before freeze. We seek a friendship 
that knows no season of suspicion, no 
chill of distrust. 

We seek a friendship 
[with the Soviet Union J 
that knows no season of 
suspicion, no chill of 

We hope perestroika is pointing the 
Soviet Union to a break with the cycles 
of the past — a definitive break. Who 
would have thought we would see the 
deliberations of the Central Committee 
on the front page of Pravda, or dissi- 
dent Andrey Sakharov seated near the 
councils of power? Who would have 

imagined a Soviet leader who can- 
vasses the sidewalks of Moscow and 
Washington, D.C.? These are hopeful- 
indeed, remarkable — signs. Let no ont 
doubt our sincere desire to see peres- 
troika continue and succeed. But the 
national security of America and our 
allies is not predicated on hope. It mu! 
be based on deeds. We look for endur- 
ing, ingrained economic and political 

While we hope to move beyond coi 
tainment, we are only at the beginninj 
of our new path. Many dangers and un 
certainties are ahead. We must not for 
get that the Soviet Union has acquirei 
awesome military capabilities. That 
was a fact of life for my predecessors. 
That has always been a fact of life 
for our allies. And that is a fact of life 
for me. 

As we seek peace, we must also re 
main strong. The purpose of our mili- 
tary might is not to pressure a weak 
Soviet economy or to seek military su 
periority. It is to deter war. It is to dt 
fend ourselves and our allies and to d( 
something more — to convince the So- 
viet Union that there can be no rewar 
in pursuing expansionism, to convince 
the Soviet Union that reward lies in tl 
pursuit of peace. 

Positive Steps Toward an 
Open Society 

Western policies must encourage the 
evolution of the Soviet Union toward i 
open society. This task will test our 
strength. It will tax our patience. Am 
it will require a sweeping vision — let 
me share with you ray vision. I see a 
Western Hemisphere of democratic, 
prosperous nations, no longer threat- 
ened by a Cuba or a Nicaragua armed 
by Moscow. I see a Soviet Union that 
pulls away from ties to terrorist 
nations — like Libya — that threaten thi 
legitimate security of their neighbors. 
I see a Soviet Union which respects 
China's integrity and returns the 
Northern Territories of Japan — a pre- 
lude to the day when all the great 
nations of Asia will live in harmony. 

But the fulfillment of this vision 
requires the Soviet Union to take posi 
tive steps, including: 

First, reduce Soviet forces. Al- 
though some small steps have already, 
been taken, the Warsaw Pact still pos- 
sesses more than 30,000 tanks, more 
than twice as much artillery, and hun- 
dreds of thousands more troops in Eu- 
rope than NATO. They should cut thei 
forces to less threatening levels in pro 


Department of State Bulletin/July 19( 


I I'tiiiii to their legitimate security 

Socond, adhere to the Soviet 
cliuation — promised in the final days 
[. Wnrld War II — to support self- 
Htermination for all the nations of 
istern and central Europe. This re- 
ires specific abandonment of the 
ezhnev doctrine. One day it should 
possible to drive from Moscow to 
mich without seeing a single guard 
iver or a strand of barbed wire. In 
ort, tear down the Iron Curtain. 

Third, work with the West in posi- 
'8, practical — not merely rhetorical — 
;ps toward diplomatic solutions to 
gional disputes around the world. I 
!lcome the Soviet withdrawal from 
'ghanistan and the Angola agree- 
>nt. But there is much more to be 
ne around the world. We're ready. 
;t's roll up our sleeves and get 

Fourth, achieve a lasting political 
aralism and respect for human 
!;hts. Dramatic events have already 
curred in Moscow. We are impressed 
limited, but freely contested, elec- 
ms. We are impressed by a greater 
leration of dissent. We are impressed 
a new frankness about the Stalin 
a. Mr. Gorbachev, don't stop now. 

Fifth, join with us in addressing 
essing global problems, including the 
ternational drug menace and dangers 
the environment. We can build a 
tter world for our children. 

penness and Arms Control 

3 the Soviet Union moves toward 
ms reduction and reform, it will find 
illing partners in the West. We seek 
rifiable, stabilizing arms control and 
ms reduction agreements with the 
)viet Union and its allies. However, 
ms control is not an end in itself but 
means of contributing to the security 
America and the peace of the world, 
directed Secretary Baker to propose 
the Soviets that we resume negotia- 
ans on strategic forces in June. And, 
I you know, the Soviets have agreed. 
Our basic approach is clear. In the 
rategic arms reduction talks, we 
ish to reduce the risk of nuclear war. 
1 the companion defense and space 
ilks, our objective will be to preserve 
ir options to deploy advanced de- 
nses when they are ready. In nuclear 
!sting, we will continue to seek the 
jcessary verification improvements in 
dsting treaties to permit them to be 
rought into force. We will continue to 
;ek a verifiable global ban on chemical 
eapons. We support NATO efforts 

to reduce the Soviet offensive threat 
in the negotiation on conventional 
[armed] forces in Europe. And, as I've 
said, fundamental to all of these objec- 
tives is simple openness. 

Make no mistake, a new breeze is 
blowing across the steppes and cities of 
the Soviet Union. Why not, then, let 
this spirit of openness grow, let more 
barriers come down. Open emigration, 
open debate, open airwaves — let open- 
ness come to mean the publication and 
sale of banned books and newspapers in 
the Soviet Union. Let the 19,000 Soviet 
Jews who emigrated last year be fol- 

One day it should be 
possible to drive from 
Moscow to Munich with- 
out seeing a single guard 
tower or a strand of 
barbed wire. 

lowed by any number who wish to emi- 
grate this year. Let openness come to 
mean nothing less than the free ex- 
change of people, books, and ideas be- 
tween East and West. And let it come 
to mean one thing more. 

Thirty-four years ago. President 
Eisenhower met in Geneva with Soviet 
leaders who, after the death of Stalin, 
promised a new approach toward the 
West. He proposed a plan called "Open 
Skies," which would allow unarmed air- 
craft from the United States and the 
Soviet Union to fly over the territory 
of the other country. This would open 
up military activities to regular scruti- 
ny and, as President Eisenhower put it, 
"convince the world that we are . . . 
lessening danger and relaxing tension." 

President Eisenhower's suggestion 
tested Soviet readiness to open their 
society. The Kremlin failed that test. 
Let us again explore that proposal, but 
on a broader, more intrusive and radi- 
cal basis — one which I hope would in- 
clude allies on both sides. We suggest 
that those countries that wish to exa- 
mine this proposal meet soon to work 
out the necessary operational details, 
separately from other arms control ne- 
gotiations. Such surveillance flights, 
complementing satellites, would pro- 
vide regular scrutiny for both sides. 
Such unprecedented territorial access 
would show the world the meaning of 

the concept of openness. The very So- 
viet willingness to embrace such a 
concept would reveal their commit- 
ment to change. 

Economic Relations 

Where there is cooperation, there can 
be a broader economic relationship. But 
economic relations have been stifled 
by Soviet internal policies. They have 
been injured by Moscow's practice of 
using the cloak of commerce to steal 
technology from the West. Ending dis- 
criminatory treatment of U.S. firms 
would be a helpful step. Trade and 
financial transactions should take 
place on a normal commercial basis. 

And should the Soviet Union cod- 
ify its emigration laws in accord with 
international standards and implement 
its new laws faithfully, I am prepared 
to work with Congress for a temporary 
waiver of the Jackson-Vanik amend- 
ment, opening the way to extending 
most-favored-nation trade status to the 
Soviet Union. The policy I have just de- 
scribed has everything to do with you. 

World Order of the Future 

Today you graduate. You will start 
careers and families. And you will be- 
come the leaders of America in the next 
century. What kind of world will you 
know? Perhaps the world order of the 
future will truly be a family of nations. 

It is a sad truth that nothing forces 
us to recognize our common humanity 
more swiftly than a natural disaster. I 
am thinking of Soviet Armenia, just a 
few months ago — a tragedy without 
blame, warlike devastation without 

My son took our 12-year-old grand- 
son to Yerevan. At the end of a day of 
comforting the injured and consoling 
the bereaved, father and son sat down 
together amid the ruins and wept. How 
can our two countries magnify this 
simple expression of caring? How can 
we each convey the good will of our 

Forty-three years ago, a young 
lieutenant by the name of Albert Kot- 
zebue, classof 1945 at Te.xas A&M, 
was the first American soldier to shake 
hands with the Soviets at the banks of 
the Elbe River. Once again, we are 
ready to extend our hand. Once again, 
we are ready for a hand in return. 
Once again, it is a time for peace. 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of May 22, 1989. ■ 

epartment of State Bulletin/July 1989 



The Future of Europe 

President Bicah'n addresii at Bos- 
ton Universitifs commencement exer- 
cises on May 21, 19S9.^ 

As Boston University graduates, you 
take with you a degree from a great in- 
stitution, and something more — 
knowledge of the past and respon- 
sibility for the future. And take a look 
at our world today. Nations are under- 
going changes so radical that the inter- 
national system you know — and will 
know in the future — will be as differ- 
ent from today's as today's world is 
from the time of Woodrow Wilson. How 
will America prepare, then, for the 
challenges ahead? 

It's with your future in mind that, 
after deliberation and a review, we are 
adapting our foreign policies to meet 
this challenge. I've outlined how we're 
going to try to promote reform in East- 
ern Europe, and how we're going to 
work with our friends in Latin Ameri- 
ca. In Texas, I spoke to another group 
of graduates of our new approach to the 
Soviet Union — one of moving beyond 
containment to seek to integrate the 
Soviets into the community of nations, 
to help them share the rewards of inter- 
national cooperation. 

Change in Western Europe 

But today, I want to discuss the future 
of Europe — that mother of nations and 
ideas that is so much a part of America. 
And it is fitting that I share this forum 
with a very special friend of the United 
States — [French] President Mitter- 
rand, you have the warm affection and 
high regard of the American people. 
And I remember well, about 8 years 
ago, when you joined us in Yorktown, in 
1981, to celebrate the bicentennial of 
that first Franco-American fight for 
freedom. And soon, I will join you in 
Paris, to observe the 200th anniversary 
of the French struggle for liberty and 

And this is just one e.xample of the 
special bond between two continents. 
But consider this city. From the Old 
North Church to Paul Revere's home 
nestled in the warm heart of the Italian 
North End, to your famous song-filled 
Irish pubs — the Old and New Worlds 
are inseparable in this city. But as we 
look back to Old World tradition, we 
must look ahead to a new Europe. His- 
toric changes will shape your careers 
and your very lives. 

The changes that are occurring in 
Western Europe are less dramatic than 
those taking place in the East, but they 
are no less fundamental. The postwar 
order that began in 1945 is transform- 
ing into something very different. And 
yet certain essentials remain, because 
our alliance with Western Europe is 
utterly unlike the cynical power alli- 
ances of the past. It is based on far more 
than a perception of a common enemy. 
It is a tie of culture and kinshi]) and 
shared values. And as we look toward 
the 21st century, Americans and Euro- 
peans alike should remember the words 
of Raymond Aron, who called the alli- 
ance a "moral and spiritual commu- 
nity." Our ideals are those of the 
American Bill of Rights and the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man. And 
it is precisely because the ideals of this 
community are universal that the world 
is in ferment today. 

Now a new century holds the prom- 
ise of a united Europe. And as you 
know, the nations of Western Europe 
are already moving toward greater 
economic integration, with the ambi- 
tious goal of a single European market 
in 1992. The United States has often 
declared it seeks a healing of old enmi- 
ties, an integration of Europe. And at 
the same time, there has been a histor- 
ical ambivalence on the part of some 
Americans toward a more united 
Europe. To this ambivalence has been 
added apprehension at the prospect of 
1992. But whatever others may think, 
this Administration is of one mind. We 
believe a strong, united Europe means 
a strong America. 

Western Europe has a gross do- 
mestic product that is roughly equal to 
our own and a population that e.xceeds 
ours. European science leads the world 
in many fields, and European workers 
are highly educated and highly skilled. 
We are ready to develop, with the Eu- 
ropean Community and its member 
states, new mechanisms of consultation 
and cooperation on political and global 
issues from strengthening the forces of 
democracy in the Third World to man- 
aging regional tensions to putting an 
end to the division of Europe. A re- 
surgent Western Europe is an econom- 
ic magnet, drawing Eastern Europe 
closer toward the commonwealth of free 

A more mature partnership with 
Western Europe will pose new chal- 
lenges. There are certain to be clashes 
and controversies over economic issues 
America will, of course, defend its in- 
terests. But it is important to distin- 
guish adversaries from allies and allie 
from adversaries. What a tragedy; 
what an absurdity it would be if futurf^ 
historians attribute the demise of the 
Western alliance to disputes over beef 
hormones and wars over pasta. We 
must all work hard to ensure that the 
Europe of 1992 will adopt the lower 
barriers of the modern international 
economy, not the high walls and the 
moats of medieval commerce. 

NATO: Maintaining Peace in Europe 

But our hopes for the future rest ulti- 
mately on keeping the peace in Europi 
Forty-two years ago, just across the 
Charles River, Secretary of State 
George Marshall gave a commence- 
ment address that outlined a plan to 
help Europe recover. Western Europe 
responded heroically and later joined 
with us in a partnership for the com- 
mon defense — a shield we call NATO. 
And this alliance has always been dri\ 
en by a spirited debate over the best 
way to achieve peaceful change. But 
the deeper truth is that the alliance h; 
achieved a historic peace because it is 
united by a fundamental purpose. Be- 
hind the NATO shield, Europe has no^ 
enjoyed 40 years free of conflict — the 
longest period of peace the continent 
has ever known. Behind this shield, th( 
nations of Western Europe have risen 
from privation to prosperity — all be- 
cause of the strength and resolve of 
free peoples. 

With a Western Europe that is noi 
coming together, we recognize that ne* 
forms of cooperation must be devel- 
oped. We applaud the defense co- 
operation developing in the revitalized 
West European Union, whose member 
worked with us to keep open the sea- 
lanes of the Persian Gulf. And we ap- 
plaud the growing military cooperatio 
between West Germany and France. 
And we welcome British and French 
programs to modernize their deterren 
capability and their moves toward coo] 
eration in this area. It is perfectly 
right and proper that Europeans in- 
creasingly see their defense coopera- 
tion as an investment in a secure fu- 
ture. But we do have a major concern i 
a different order — a growing compla- 
cency throughout the West. 


Department of State Bulletin/July 198 


And, of course, your generation 
1 hardly be expected to share the 
ip of past anxieties. With such a long 
ace, it is hard to imagine how it 
lid be otherwise. But our expecta- 
ns in this rapidly changing world 
inot race so far ahead that we forget 
at is at stake. There's a great irony 
•e. While an ideological earthquake 
shaking asunder the very communist 
mdation, the West is being tested by 

We must never forget that twice in 
s century, American blood has been 
;d over conflicts that began in Eu- 
je. And we share the fervent desire 
Europeans to relegate war forever 
the province of distant memory. But 
it is why the Atlantic alliance is so 
itral to our foreign policy. And that's 
ly America remains committed to the 
iance and the strategy which has 
sserved freedom in Europe. We must 
ver forget that to keep the peace in 
irope is to keep the peace for 

NATO's policy of flexible response 
eps the United States linked to Eu- 
pe and lets any would-be aggressors 
ow that they will be met with any 
'el of force needed to repel their at- 
;k and frustrate their designs. And 
r short-range deterrent forces based 
Europe, and kept up-to-date, demon- 
■ate that America's vital interests 
e bound inextricably to Western Eu- 
pe and that an attacker can never 
mble on a test of strength with just 
r conventional forces. Though hope is 
w running high for a more peaceful 
ntinent, the history of this century 
iches Americans and Europeans to 
main prepared. 

viet Change 

; we search for a peace that is endur- 
5, I'm grateful for the steps that 
r. Gorbachev is taking. If the Soviets 
vance solid and constructive plans 
' peace, then we should give credit 
lere credit is due. And we're seeing 
seeping changes in the Soviet Union 
at show promise of enduring, of be- 
ming ingrained. At the same time, 
an era of extraordinary change, 
? have an obligation to temper 
timism — and I am optimistic — with 

For example, the Soviet Foreign 
inister [Eduard Shevardnadze] in- 
rmed the world last week that his na- 
m's commitment to destroy SS-23 
issiles under the recently enacted 

INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces] Treaty may be reversible. And 
the Soviets must surely know the re- 
sults of failure to comply with this sol- 
emn agreement. Perhaps their purpose 
was to divide the West on other issues 
that you're reading about in the papers 
today. But regardless, it is clear that 
Soviet "new thinking" has not yet to- 
tally overcome the old. 

I believe in a deliberate, step-by- 
step approach to East-West relations, 
because recurring signs show that 
while change in the Soviet Union is 
dramatic, it is not yet complete. The 
Warsaw Pact retains a nearly 12-to-l 
advantage over the Atlantic alliance in 
short-range missiles and rocket launch- 
ers capable of delivering nuclear weap- 
ons and more than a 2-to-l advantage 
in battle tanks. And for that reason, we 
will also maintain, in cooperation with 
our allies, ground and air forces in Eu- 
rope as long as they are wanted and 
needed to preserve the peace in Eu- 
rope. At the same time, my Adminis- 
tration will place a high and continuing 
priority on negotiating a less mili- 
tarized Europe, one with a secure con- 
ventional force balance at lower levels 
offerees. Our aspiration is a real 

peace — a peace of shared optimism, not 
a peace of armed camps. 

Celebrating a Moral and 
Spiritual Community 

Nineteen-ninety-two is the 500th anni- 
versary of the discovery of the New- 
World. So we have five centuries to 
celebrate, nothing less than our very 
civilization — the American Bill of 
Rights and the French Rights of Man, 
the ancient and unwritten constitution 
of Great Britain, and the democratic vi- 
sions of Konrad Adenauer and Alcide de 

And in all our celebrations, we ob- 
serve one fact: this truly is a moral and 
spiritual community. It is our inheri- 
tance, and so let us protect it. Let us 
promote it. Let us treasure it for our 
children, for Americans and Europeans 
yet unborn. We stand with France as 
part of a solid alliance. And once again, 
let me say how proud I am to have 
received this degree from this noble 
institution and to have shared this plat- 
form with the President of the French 
Republic, Francois Mitterrand. 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of May 29, 1989. ■ 

Security Strategy for the 1990s 

President Bush's address at the 
Coast Guard Academy commencement 
exercises in New London, Conn., on 
May2J,, 1989.^ 

Today, our world — your world — is 
changing. East and West. And today, I 
want to speak to you about the world 
we want to see, and what we can do to 
bring that new world into clear focus. 

We live in a time when we are wit- 
nessing the end of an idea — the final 
chapter of the communist experiment. 
Communism is now recognized — even 
by many within the communist world 
itself — as a failed system, one that 
promised economic prosperity but failed 
to deliver the goods, a system that built 
a wall between the people and their po- 
litical aspirations. 

But the eclipse of communism is 
only one-half of the story of our time. 
The other is the ascendancy of the dem- 
ocratic idea. Never before has the idea 
of freedom so captured the imagina- 
tions of men and women the world over. 

And never before has the hope of free- 
dom beckoned so many — trade union- 
ists in Warsaw, the people of Panama, 
rulers consulting the ruled in the Sov- 
iet Union. And even as we speak today, 
the world is transfixed by the dramatic 
events in Tiananmen Square [Beijing, 
China]. Everywhere those voices are 
speaking the language of democracy 
and freedom, and we hear them and the 
world hears them, and America will do 
all it can do to encourage them. 

So today I want to speak about our 
security strategy for the 1990s — one 
that advances American ideals and up- 
holds American aims. 

Risks and Opportunities 
of New Challenges 

Amidst the many challenges we'll face, 
there will be risks. But let me assure 
you, we'll find more than our share of 
opportunities. We and our allies are 
strong — stronger really than at any 
point in the postwar period, and more 
capable than ever of supporting the 

iepartment of State Bulletin/July 1989 



cause of freedom. There's an oppor- 
tunity before us to shape a new world. 

What is it that we want to see? It 
is a growing community of democracies 
anchoring international peace and 
stability, and a dynamic free-market 
system generating prosperity and 
progress on a global scale. The eco- 
nomic foundation of this new era is the 
])roven success of the free market — and 
nurturing that foundation are the val- 
ues rooted in freedom and democracy. 

Our country, America, was found- 
ed on these values, and they gave 
us the confidence that flow's from 
strength. So let's be clear about one 
thing: America looks forward to the 
challenge of an emerging global mar- 
ket. But these values are not ours 
alone; they are now shared by our 
friends and allies around the globe. 

The economic rise of Europe and 
the nations of the Pacific rim is the 
growing success of our postwar policy. 
This time is a time of tremendous op- 
portunity, and destiny is in our own 
hands. To reach the world we want to 
see, we've got to work and work hard. 
There's a lot of work ahead of us. 

We must resolve international 
trade problems that threaten to pit 
friends and allies against one another. 
We must combat misguided notions of 
economic nationalism that will tell us 
to close off our economies to foreign 
competition — ^just when the global mar- 
ketplace has become a fact of life. We 
must open the door to the nations of 
Eastern Europe and other socialist 
countries that embrace free-market 

And finally, for developing nations 
heavily burdened with debt, we must 
provide assistance and encourage the 
market reforms that will set those na- 
tions on a path toward growth. If we 
succeed, the ne.xt decade and the centu- 
ry beyond will be an era of unparalleled 
growth — an era which sees the flour- 
ishing of freedom, peace, and pros- 
perity around the world. 

But this new era cannot unfold in a 
climate where conflict and turmoil ex- 
ist. And, therefore, our goals must also 
include security and stability: security 
for ourselves and our allies and our 
friends; stability in the international 
arena and an end to regional conflicts. 

Such goals are constant, but the 
strategy we employ to reach them can, 
and must, change as the world changes. 
Today, the need for a dynamic and 
adaptable strategy is imperative. We 
must be strong — economically, dip- 
lomatically, and, as you know, 


militarily — to take advantage of the 
opportunities open to us in a world of 
rapid change. And nowhere will the 
ultimate consequences of change have 
more significance for world security 
than within the Soviet Union itself. 

Soviet Union 

What we're seeing now in the Soviet 
Union is, indeed, dramatic. The proc- 
ess is still ongoing, unfinished. But 
make no mistake, our policy is to seize 
every, and I mean every, opportunity to 
build a better, more stable relationship 
with the Soviet Union — just as it is our 
policy to defend American interests in 
light of the enduring reality of Soviet 
military power. 

We want to see perestroika suc- 
ceed. And we want to see the policies 
of glasnost and perestroika — so far, a 
revolution imposed from top down — 
institutionalized within the Soviet 
Union. And we want to see perestroika 
extended as well. We want to see a So- 
viet Union that restructures its rela- 
tionship toward the rest of the world — 
a Soviet Union that is a force for con- 
structive solutions to the world's 

The grand strategy of the West 
during the postwar period has been 
based on the concept of containment: 
checking the Soviet Union's expansion- 
ist aims, in the hope that the Soviet 
system itself would one day be forced to 
confront its internal contradictions. 
The ferment in the Soviet Union today 
affirms the wisdom of this strategy. 
And now we have a precious oppor- 
tunity to move beyond containment. 
You're graduating into an exciting 
world, where the opportunity for 
peace — world peace, lasting peace — 
has never been better. 

Our goal — integrating the Soviet 
Union into the community of nations — 
is every bit as ambitious as contain- 
ment was at its time. And it holds tre- 
mendous promise for international 

Other Regional Powers 

Coping with a changing Soviet Union 
will be a challenge of the highest order. 
But the security challenges we face to- 
day do not come from the East alone. 
The emergence of regional powers 
is rapidly changing the strategic 

In the Middle East, in South Asia, 
in our own hemisphere, a growing num- 
ber of nations are acquiring advanced 

and highly destructive capabilities — in 
some cases, weapons of mass destruc- 
tion and the means to deliver them. 
And it is an unfortunate fact that the 
world faces increasing threat from 
armed insurgencies, terrorists, and, a 
you in the Coast Guard are well aware 
narcotics traffickers — and, in some re- 
gions, an unholy alliance of all three. 

Our task is clear: we must curb thi 
proliferation of advanced weaponry; 
we must check the aggressive ambitions 
of renegade regimes; and we must en- 
hance the ability of our friends to de- 
fend themselves. We have not yet mas- 
tered the complex challenge. We and 
our allies must construct a common 
strategy for stability in the developing 

Defense Strategy 

How we and our allies deal with thesei 
diverse challenges depends on how we' 
we understand the key elements of de- 
fense strategy. And so let me just men 
tion today two points in particular. 

First, the need for an effective de> 
terrent, one that demonstrates to our 
allies and adversaries alike American 
strength, American resolve; and 

Second, the need to maintain an 
approach to arms reduction that pro- 
motes stability at the lowest feasible 
level of armaments. 

Deterrence is central to our de- 
fense strategy. The key to keeping the 
peace is convincing our adversaries 
that the cost of aggression against us 
or our allies is simply unacceptable. 

In today's world, nuclear forces ar 
essential to deterrence. Our challenge 
is to protect those deterrent systems 
from attack. And that's why we'll mov' 
Peacekeeper ICBMs [intercontinental i 
ballistic missiles] out of fixed and vu 
nerable silos — making them mobile an( 
thus harder to target. Looking to the 
longer term, we will also develop and 
deploy a new highly mobile single- 
warhead missile, the Midgetman. Witl 
only minutes of warning, these new 
missiles can relocate out of harm's wa} 
Any attack against systems like this 
will fail. 

We are also researching — and we 
are committed to deploy when read,\ — 
more comprehensive defensive systoni. 
known as SDI [Strategic Defense Ini- 
tiative]. Our premise is straight- 
forward: defense against incoming 
missiles endangers no person, endan- 
gers no country. 

Department of State Bulletin/July 198 


We're also working to reduce the 
reat we face, both nuclear and con- 
ntional. The INF [Intermediate- 
inge Nuclear Forces] Treaty demon- 
rates that willingness. In addition, in 
e past decade, NATO has unilaterally 
moved 2,400 shorter range theater 
irheads. But theater nuclear forces 
ntribute to stability, no less than 
rategic forces, and thus, it would be 
responsible to depend solely on stra- 
gic nuclear forces to deter conflict 

jnventional Balance in Europe 

le conventional balance in Europe 
just as important and is linked to 
e nuclear balance. For more than 40 
lars — and look at your history books 
see how pronounced this accomplish- 
ent is — the Warsaw Pact's massive ad- 
intage in conventional forces has cast 
shadow over Europe. 

The unilateral reductions that 
resident Gorbachev has promised give 
hope that we can now redress that 
ibalance. We welcome those steps be- 
,use, if implemented, they will help 
duce the threat of surprise attack, 
nd they confirm what we've said all 
ong: that Soviet military power far 
iceeds the levels needed to defend the 
gitimate security interests of the 
.S.S.R. And we must keep in mind 
at these reductions alone — even if 
iiplemented — are not enough to elimi- 
!ite the significant numerical si'f ^ri- 
I'ity that the Soviet Union enjo-"- 
jght now. 

Through negotiations, we can now 
ansform the military landscape of 
[urope. The issues are complex, stakes 
•e very high. But the Soviets are now 
jing forthcoming, and we hope to 
;hieve the reductions we seek. 

Let me emphasize — our aim is 
Dthing less than removing war as an 
ption in Europe. 

The U. S.S.R. has said that it is 
illing to abandon its age-old reliance 
\\ offensive strategy. It's time to 
pgin. This should mean a smaller 
tree — one less reliant on tanks and 
"tillery and personnel carriers that 
rovide the Soviets' offensive striking 
3wer. A restructured Warsaw Pact — 
le that mirrors the defensive posture 
' NATO — would make Europe and the 
orld more secure. 

Peace can also be enhanced by 
lovement toward more openness in 
lilitary activities. And 2 weeks ago, I 
roposed an "open skies" initiative, to 
xtend the concept of openness. That 
Ian for territorial overflights would 

increase our mutual security against 
sudden and threatening military activ- 
ities. In the same spirit, let us extend 
this openness to military expenditures 
as well. I call on the Soviets to do as 
we have always done. Let's open the 
ledgers, publish an accurate defense 

But as we move forward we must 
be realistic. Transformations of this 
magnitude will not happen overnight. 
If we are to reach our goals, a great 
deal is required of us, our allies, and of 
the Soviet Union. But we can succeed. 

Preserving Democracy 

I began today by speaking about the 
triumph of a particular, peculiar, very 
special American ideal — freedom. And 
I know there are those who may think 
there's something presumptuous about 
that claim — those who will think it's 
boastful. But it is not, for one simple 

reason: Democracy isn't our creation, 
it is our inheritance. 

And we can't take credit for democ- 
racy, but we can take that precious gift 
of freedom, preserve it, and pass it on — 
as my generation does to you, and you, 
too, will do one day. And perhaps — 
provided we seize the opportunities 
open to us — we can help others attain 
the freedom that we cherish. 

As I said on the Capitol steps the 
day I took this office, as President of 
the United States, "There is but one 
just use of power, and it is to serve 
people." As your Commander in Chief, 
let me call on this Coast Guard class to 
reaffirm with me that American power 
will continue in its service to the 
enduring ideals of democracy and 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of May 29, 1989. ■ 

Secretary's News Conference 

Secretary Baker held a news 
conference at the White House on 
Maij2S. 1989.'' 

Before our briefing on the summit trip, 
I'd like to make an announcement. 

The United States and the Soviet 
Union have now agreed on the date 
of June 19th to restart the START 
[strategic arms reduction talks] 

Turning now to the NATO trip, let 
me begin by touching on two topics 
that I hope will give you a context for 
the President's trip to NATO. First, I'll 
say a few words about the theme the 
President hopes to project on this trip; 
and second, I'll list the five-point work 
plan that the President would hope to 
emphasize in his meetings with col- 
leagues and in public statements. 

The central theme of this trip will 
be that the alliance rests on the cor- 
nerstone of shared Western values. 
These common values — belief in democ- 
racy, human rights, the rule of law, 
free markets and free enterprise, re- 
spect for the individual — give the na- 
tions of the West both an anchor and a 
course to navigate for the future. 

As to the past, 40 years ago these 
shared values brought our nations to- 
gether in search of a common defense. 
NATO became the shield to protect 
those values. As to the present, today 

those values have positioned the West 
in the strongest posture ever. They are 
inspiring the hopes of many people in 
many parts of the globe, including in 
central and Eastern Europe, even in 
the Soviet Union itself. 

As to the future, in the future 
these same values will provide a princi- 
pal basis for ending the division of Eu- 
rope, for drawing Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union into the community of 
nations. Some have suggested that the 
future of Europe depends on a more 
narrow territorial vision — that is, an 
idea bounded by geographic borders 
and without a particular substantive 
content, and I'm referring there, of 
course, to the calls for a common Euro- 
pean house. 

In contrast, it's our vision that the 
future of Europe depends on these 
common Western values. We see this as 
a substantive core established over cen- 
turies of striving to apply enlightened 
principles and not limited by any geo- 
graphic borders. 

Now while the trends may be 
promising, it's our view that the alli- 
ance cannot rest on its laurels nor can 
it expect to reach its full potential 
without further effort. So the Presi- 
dent will be emphasizing five points for 
future work. 

•epartment of State Bulletin/July 1989 



First, we must continue to ensure 
a strong common defense, so the Presi- 
dent will discuss how we can maintain 
this defense at possibly lower levels as 
we make progress in the CFE [con- 
ventional armed forces in Europe] 

Part of this defense, of course, in- 
corporates short-range nuclear forces 
(SNF), so we will also be working to 
reach a common ground on this issue — 
one that demonstrates, if I may put it 
this way, a flexibility to negotiate given 
the changing circumstances while it 
preserves the elements necessary to 
support our longstanding and very 
successful deterrent strategy. 

Second, we look to the further de- 
velopment of European institutions 
that will strengthen the European pil- 
lar of our alliance. For example, Euro- 
pean Communities (EC) economic 
integration should provide economic 
growth and European unity of action. 
It might well be characterized also as a 
magnet to those in the East who are 
trying to liberalize their own economic 

Third, we need to look East to see 
how the nations of the West can further 
the peaceful decentralization of eco- 
nomic, political, and social authority in 
Eastern Europe. In part, this could in- 
volve lowering tensions on borders, fol- 
lowing the example we've seen recently 
as far as Hungary is concerned. It 
could also involve offering the experi- 
ence of our governments and private 
groups in building diverse and open so- 
cieties in East European countries. 

Fourth, we need to turn our 
attention — our collective attention — to 
new and difficult problems that could 
endanger all of us; for example, envi- 
ronmental risks and missile and chemi- 
cal proliferation. Obviously we need not 
rely only on one structure — that is, the 
NATO alliance — to address these prob- 
lems. For example, the Group of Seven 
countries has established the missile 
technology control regime. 

Over time, the alliance or members 
of the alliance might also see the bene- 
fit of collective action in out-of-area is- 
sues, particularly in areas of regional 
conflict. For example, we worked 
together — not all members of the 
alliance but many members of the 
alliance — in the Persian Gulf. 

And finally, we must also maintain 
our resolve in the pursuit of freedom in 
locales where cold war vestiges remain. 
I'm thinking in particular of Berlin, 
and we will continue to pursue the Ber- 
lin initiative which was launched by 


President Reagan in 1987. We will con- 
tinue, for example, to call for the wall 
to come down. 

Q. How about the missile issue? 
Will it be resolved before the NATO 
meeting? Are you closer, or are you 
farther apart, or do you care whether 
it's resolved? 

A. What we've said all along here 
is that we are very hopeful that it will 
be resolved before the summit, and we 
remain hopeful. I can't tell you that we 
know that it will be. It is not resolved, 
there is still a gap to bridge, and we 
continue to work to try and bridge that 

Q. What's the stumbling block? 

A. The stumbling block is how you 
go about adapting to the changes that 
are taking place, as I mentioned, and, 
at the same time, preserve the essen- 
tial ingredients of your deterrent 

Q. Has the United States now 
been put into a position on this mis- 
sile issue where we are, in effect, 
negotiating between England and 

A. No, not at all. No. 

Q. What is the situation with 
Mrs. Thatcher? She doesn't seem too 
pleased with what she sees as a giv- 
ing in on our side. 

A. I think that we will see the spe- 
cific position of the United Kingdom, 
just as we will see the specific position 
of the other alliance countries, as we 
move into the summit. She has a differ- 
ent view of the issue than [West Ger- 
man] Chancellor Kohl. It's important, 
we think, to try and bridge these gaps 
that exist before we get to the summit, 
and we will continue to try and to do 

Q. When you say resolved — you 
hope it's resolved, do you mean with 
both sides, or are you saying that 
you're going to get there and we'll be 
with the Germans and then there will 

A. No, no, I'm not saying that at 
all. We're going to continue to try and 
reach agreement on language before 
we get there, but I'm not going to pre- 
dict that that's going to happen. And 
let me say that we have made it very 
clear throughout the process that while 
we would prefer to resolve it before we 
get to the summit, it's an extraordi- 
narily important matter that deals 
with the security of the West, and, 
therefore, it should not be resolved at 
all costs. So if we have to take it on at 

the summit, we will take it on at the 

Q. How close are you? Do you 
find the West German counter- 
proposal acceptable? Or how far awayi 
from being acceptable is it? 

A. As I put it to you a minute ago,, 
there is still a gap between their posi- 
tion and ours, and we're not there yet. 

Q. Do you find this closer to Koh 
or Thatcher on this in that way? 

A. I'm not going to get into that 
kind of speculation because that's all it 
would be, is speculation. 

Q. What made you decide to 
change from a position that you stoon 
firm on for a long time, which was 
never zero, to negotiations, willing- 
ness to negotiate? 

A. I really didn't. What I said was 
that I thought negotiations would be a 
mistake — negotiations, that is, in the 
form of early, immediate, unconditiona. 
negotiations. I still feel that way, very 
strongly. And that is not something 
that we are willing to agree to. What 
we have proposed is a formula that coni 
tains, as I put it, I think, to you last 
Saturday up in IVIaine, significant 

Q. If the SNF issue is not re- 
solved by the summit, are you con- 
cerned that the whole issue could 
dwarf or dominate or overwhelm this 

A. I think that the issue will hv 
important, but I think the alliance w il 
really take a broader look at the whole 
question of the alliance — the more gen 
era] political and economic questions. 
And I just don't think that it will total 
ly dominate the summit. Yes, it will lit 
a very, very important issue. 

Q. President Gorbachev has 
claimed that the Soviets are in the 
process of changing their military 
strategy toward one of defensive suf- 
ficiency. There have been a lot of 
comments coming from the White 
House that many of Gorbachev's ini- 
tiatives are merely words and not 
deeds. Do you see any signs in terms 
of factual evidence that he has shift- 
ed his military policy to this point, 
and will this be discussed at the 
NATO summit? 

A. We think it is important to Idol 
for deeds rather than just words. I 
think that the conventional arms piM- 
posals that he proposed during the 
course of my trip to Moscow are signif 
cant and deserve serious consideration 
I think that's the view of most 

Department of State Bulletin/July 198 


On the other hand, I think that the 
NF proposal that he made was ba- 
ically purely a PR ploy, when you con- 
ider that he did not suggest removing 
lose missiles even from Europe, just 
•oni those countries which the Soviet 
'nion has had a client-state relation- 
hip with, and he did not propose dis- 
lantling or destroying those. 

And when you look at it in the con- 
3xt of what the alliance has done over 
le i)ast 10 years, we have unilaterally 
educed some 2,400, and we have dis- 
lantled practically all of those. 

Q. On Sunday the President, 
chen asked about the SNF dispute, 
kid he felt this could well be resolved 
lefore the summit. You seem to be 
^ggesting in a little bit more decisive 
ferms or definitive terms today that 
dat may not be the case. Is that — 

A. I think the President himself 
1st made the same suggestion, did he 
ot, in an interview he gave to some 
luropean correspondents. I am antici- 
ating your question, though — so go 
head and ask the question. 

Q. My question was, what 
merged from the apparent conversa- 
ion with Chancellor Kohl that he al- 
jjded to, and what has happened over 
jhe last few days? 

' A. I think what probably happened 
I'as that they had led themselves to be- 
jeve that our position was perhaps 
pmewhat different than it was when 
|iey actually looked at the piece of pa- 
er. That's the only thing I can think it 
light be. 

Q. What do you mean by that, 
^nd has, in fact, the President talked 
Dday with Chancellor Kohl? What 
as the upshot of that conversation, 
F there was one? 

A. I don't believe he's talked to 
im today, no — has not talked to him 
Dday. We've received their response to 
ur proposal; we got it in here — 

Q. Written response? 

A. Yes, we got it in here late yes- 
?r(hiy evening, and there has been no 
iiiitact since that time. We do, of 
ourse, e.xpect to get back to him. 

Q. The basic issue seems to be — 
t least the experts tell us and you in- 
icated Saturday — was, rather, the 
lUture of nuclear deterrence on the 
"round in Europe. Do you see a time 
.'hen we will no longer depend upon 
hat? That has been our policy for a 
ong time. You indicated that it's 
oing to continue to be our policy for 

a long time. Do you foresee an end to 
that, that the end of that could ever 
be negotiated? 

A. We think it's very important 
that we have some sort of an indication 
in the comprehensive concept language 
that if there were ever to be negotia- 
tions in this area, we would not be talk- 
ing in any event about a third zero. 

Your question goes even beyond 
that; it's very hypothetical and specula- 
tive, and I can't answer it, because it's 
so hypothetical. The deterrence — the 
nuclear deterrence — has been the very 
cornerstone of our flexible response 
strategy. The flexible response strate- 
gy has kept the peace for 40 years. We 
should be very, very reluctant to take 
any steps that would be seen to be mov- 
ing away from that. And that's why we 
are reluctant to take those steps. 

Q. You mentioned the Gorbachev 
PR proposal — what you call the PR 
proposal — in his SNF offer. He seems 
to be doing pretty well with his PR 
proposals, and I wondered if the Ad- 
ministration now recognizes that 
there is a need, or recognizes a need, 
to counter them, and if there is any 
coherent strategy for doing that? 

A. I think, as I indicated in my 
opening remarks, I don't think the 
West has ever been stronger. We are 
winning across the broad range of 
political — we're winning economically, 
we're winning politically. We have the 
other philosophy acknowledging that it 
is a failure — frankly acknowledging 

So whatever we're doing is work- 
ing, and for the time being I don't think 
we ought to say that we're going to 
change that just for PR purposes. 

At the same time, I think it is im- 
portant that we be seen to be creative, 
that we be seen to be forward-thinking 
and forward-looking. I think we are. 
But that doesn't mean that we, as I've 
said before — that we can necessarily 
win by going into an arms control grab 
bag and competing with him on that 

There may be times and circum- 
stances under which we might think it's 
appropriate to do something like that, 
but we ought not to be, I don't think — 
we should not feel constrained to try 
and do that every time. 

Q. Could I carry that to China? 
Are you somewhat disappointed at the 
students in the streets of Beijing? 
They have a name on their lips — it's 
Gorbachev's, not George Bush's. 

And beyond that, can you explain 
the difference between the President 
and his position on China as opposed 
to Panama, where the President actu- 
ally urged the people to take action in 
Panama, but both of you are urging 
great restraint in China? 

A. Gorbachev has been to China, 
and so there was a lot of coverage of 
this trip, so maybe that's one reason. 

But let me tell you, they may have 
that name on their lips, but they have 
the policies of the West in mind. And 
it's the policies of the West, indeed, it's 
these common values that I've just talk- 
ed about as the theme for the 40th sum- 
mit, as far as we're concerned, that are 
motivating those students to do what 
they are doing. 

And it is the philosophy of the West 
that they are advancing, and it is the 
values of the West that they are seek- 
ing. They are asking for democracy. 
They're asking for freedom of assem- 
bly. They're asking for freedom of ex- 
pression. So I don't feel badly about 
that, in the slightest. 

In terms of difference between 
Panama and the People's Republic of 
China, without admitting the hypothe- 
sis of your question that the President 
was somehow — without admitting that, 
let me just say that there is a signifi- 
cant difference between China and 

Q. He did say no caution. 

A. Let me just suggest to you that 
China is moving after many, many 
years of embracing a different philoso- 
phy, both economically and politically. 
They are moving. 

Panama is moving too, but it's mov- 
ing in the other direction. Panama used 
to have some semblance of freedom for 
its people. It used to have some sem- 
blance of democratic values. But Man- 
uel Noriega is taking it in the other 
direction and, in fact, stealing elec- 
tions and thereby thwarting the will of 
the people. 

So China is going in the right di- 
rection; Panama is going in the wrong 

Q. If I could ask you about 
Nicaragua and the Russians. When 
Mr. Gorbachev promised to reduce or 
said he had actually cut out arms to 
Nicaragua, were there any conditions 
on it? 

Secondly, in the U.S. Govern- 
ment, is it that you have found no evi- 
dence that there has been any slow- 
down or that there is a disagreement 
within the American Government as 

department of State Bulletin/July 1989 



to whether there is a slowdown? What 
is your judgment today as to what he 
has promised — has actually come 
into the pipeline? 

A. He hasn't promised anything. 
He notified us that there had been no 
weapons shipments to Nicaragua since 
the end of 1988. We do Itnow that there 
have, in fact, been shipments of mili- 
tary supplies and equipment. We also 
have not been informed that there are 
no longer weapons shipments going into 
Nicaragua from Cuba. So there was no 
promise; it was simply a matter of a no- 
tification in a letter. 

Q. You've said that the SNF nego- 
tiations had threatened a major por- 
tion of NATO's deterrence. Unity 
you've also described as a major part 
of NATO's deterrence. Does not the 
dispute in itself have the potential to 
weaken NATO? And how do you rank 
the weapons versus unity in terms of 
deterrent capability? 

A. You've got to have the unity of 
the alliance, and then you must have 
the arms control policies to support 
that, and you must have adequate 

Let me just say we have a wide 
range of common interests in the alli- 
ance on political, economic, and securi- 
ty issues. We're going to be dealing 
with all of these, not just with SNF. 
The alliance has survived many great- 
er threats to its existence than this; 
and we remain, as I said before, quite 
hopeful that we'll get this resolved and 
that we'll get it resolved before the 
summit. We may not get it resolved 
before the summit. 

Q. A statement was read here 
yesterday expressing concern about 
the strength of the dollar, and report- 
ers were referred to Treasury. Is that 
in any way tied to the meeting be- 
cause the allies are concerned? And 
what's the current policy on the 
strength or weakness vis-a-vis the 

A. I have better sense than to an- 
swer that question, I think. [Laughter] 

I will say one thing. I do think it's 
important that the coordination proc- 
ess which was put in place at the Tokyo 
summit move forward effectively and 
as efficiently as possible. I think it's 
important that the major industrial de- 
mocracies of the world continue to work 
to coordinate their economic policies, 
and it's really the coordination of those 
underlying economic policies that's 
going to make a difference in terms of 
exchange rate stability. 


Q. Would it be correct to say that 
the U.S. position on a third zero and 
on modernization are non-negotiable 

A. We're in the midst of discus- 
sions right now, so I'm not sure I under- 
stand really — there are many ways to 
express different positions, and what 
we're talking about here now are vary- 
ing ways to express different view- 
points and different positions. 

Q. In talking about Gorbachev 
winning the PR war and so on, you 
said, "We can't be reaching into the 
arms control grab bag to try to com- 
pete," but then you said, "Though 
there may be times when we'll do 
that." Is the NATO summit one of 
those times? Is the President going to 
have some arms control — 

A. Let me point out that one of 
those times was at the opening of the 
conventional arms talks in Vienna when 

we suggested that we would see if we 
couldn't remove our chemical weapons 
stocks from Germany at an earlier date 
than they were planned to be removed. 
That's the kind of thing I'm talking 

Q. Mr. Shamir [Israeli Prime 
Minister] responded to your speech 
yesterday, calling it useless. What's 
your response to him? 

A. I think it was a very balanced 
speech. If you look at the speech in its 
entirety, you see that it was very bal- 
anced with respect to what we think, a> 
least, is required of all of the parties if 
we're going to move forward to make, 
progress toward peace in the Middle 
East. It calls on the Palestinians, it 
calls on the Israelis, it calls on the So- 
viets, and it says what we really think 
needs to be done. 

'Press release 97. 

Principles and Pragmatism: 
American Policy Toward 
the Arab-Israeli Conflict 

Secretary Baker's address before 
the American-Israel Public Affairs 
Committee on May 22, 1989.'^ 

You know, it's been said that AIPAC 
manages to bring together the execu- 
tive and the Congress in a way that 
they might not normally associate. I'd 
agree with that, and I would add only 
that we have a name for such coming 
together. We call it bipartisanship. And 
American bipartisan support for Israel 
is a great and an enduring achieve- 
ment, not only for AIPAC, not only for 
Israel's supporters but also, above all, 
for America's national interest. 

There have been many, many an- 
alyses of the U.S. -Israeli relationship 
over the years, and most of them begin 
with the fact that we share common 
values of freedom and of democracy. 
That is the golden thread in the tapes- 
try of U.S. -Israeli ties, and there are, 
if I might suggest it, other strands as 

Ed [AIPAC President Ed Levy] has 
mentioned some of what I did in the 
Reagan Administration, but let me tell 
you that I was proud to work in that 
Administration — an Administration 
that recognized the importance of U.S.- 
Israeli strategic cooperation and an 

Administration that, I think, gave 
fiber and sinew to our strategic 

I'm also proud to have had a small 
part to play in the historic free trade 
agreement which may well become a 
model for other nations. I really think 
we probably would not have gotten 
home on the Canadian-U.S. free trade 
agreement had we not had a U.S.- 
Israel free trade agreement. The 
President believes — President Bush 
believes — and I believe that on these isi 
sues, there can only be one policy and 
that is a policy of continuity. American 
support for Israel is the foundation of 
our approach to the problems — the 
very, very difficult problems — of the 
Middle East. 

This support has become all tht' 
more important as we approach what, 
think, is a critical juncture in the Mid- 
dle East. For many years, we have as- 
sociated that region with either the 
vanished glories of ancient history t.r 
the terrible costs of modern conflict. 
But now, I think, the world is chang- 
ing. We have seen longstanding prob- 
lems in other regions begin to abate. 
The President spoke last week of prom: 
ising and hopeful, even though incom- 
plete, developments in the Soviet 

Department of State Bulletin/July 198 


nion. Everywhere there is a quicken- 
g consciousness that the globe is be- 
g transformed through the search for 
jmocracy, the spread of free enter- 
•ise, and technological progress. And, 

course, nowhere is that more true, 
, we meet here today, than in the 

ople's Republic of China. 

The Middle East should be able to 
irticipate fully in these new develop- 
ents. Oftentimes we think of the 
igion as a place full of precious 
(sources, such as oil and minerals, 
ut the area's most precious resource, 
we really stop and think about it, is 
le lives of its peoples. 

And that is the stake. Are the peo- 
es of the Middle East going to safe- 
aard their most precious resource? 
re they going to join the rest of the 
langing world in the works of peace? 
r is this region going to pioneer in 
inflict once more through the prolif- 
■ation of chemical weapons and ballis- 
c missiles? 

The people of Israel are vitally 
incerned with these questions. Israel, 

course, is a vigorous democracy. The 
raelis are among the world leaders 

communications, electronics, and 
'ionics — the new technological revolu- 
ans. And Israel understood long ago 
lat the most important of its natural 

sources is the skill and the intel- 
jence of its people. 

eace Process: 

rinciples and Pragmatism 

his is the wider context in which we 
id Israel must consider the peace 
•ocess. The outcome is of vital con- 
'rn both to Israel's future and for our 
sion of a free and peaceful world. 

Not so long ago, we marked a de- 
ide of the Camp David peace accords, 
hat occasion reminded us not only of 
3w far we have come but of how much 
irther we have to go. I would like to 
;port to you that we and Israel have 
iken some important steps forward. 

Before Prime Minister Shamir 
jsited Washington, we had called for 
j)me Israeli ideas on how to restart the 
eace process. We did so based on our 
i)nviction that a key condition for 
rogress was a productive U.S. -Israeli 
artnership. And I believe that the 
?st way to be productive is through 
)nsultation rather than confrontation. 

Let me assure you that we were 
jt disappointed. The Prime Minister 
ill, I'm sure, forgive me if I divulge 
) you a conversation at our very first 
leeting. The Prime Minister said, in 

preparing for his visit, he had studied 
President Bush and me, just as he sus- 
pected that perhaps we had studied 
him. I had been described by the media 
as an ever-flexible pragmatist. The 
Prime Minister, he said, had been de- 
scribed as an inflexible man of ideologi- 
cal principle. Then the Prime Minister 
volunteered, that in his view, the jour- 
nalists were wrong, and they were 
wrong in both cases. "Yes," he said, "I 
am a man of principle, but I am also a 
pragmatist who knows what political 
compromise means." And he said that 
it was clear that I, although a pragma- 
tist, was also a man of principle, and 
that principle would guide my foreign 
policy approach. Needless to say, I 
didn't disagree with the Prime 

If ever an opening statement 
achieved its goal of establishing a 
strong working relationship, this was 
it. I think it's fair to say that we under- 
stood each other to be pragmatists, 
but pragmatists guided by principle. 

As we approach the peace process, 
together, we understand Israel's cau- 
tion especially when assessing Arab 
attitudes about peace. I don't blame 
Israel for exercising this caution. Its 
history and, indeed, its geopolitical 
situation require it. 

At the same time, I think that cau- 
tion must never become paralysis. Ten 
years after Camp David, Egypt re- 
mains firmly committed to peace, and 
Arab attitudes are changing. Egypt's 
readmission into the Arab League on 
its own terms and with the peace trea- 
ty intact, I think, is one sign of change. 
Evolving Palestinian attitudes are an- 
other. Much more needs to be done — to 
be demonstrated — that such change is 
real. But I don't think that change can 
be ignored even now. This is surely a 
time when, as the Prime Minister said, 
the right mix of principles and prag- 
matism is required. 

U.S. Views 

As we assess these changes, U.S. poli- 
cies benefit from a longstanding com- 
mitment to sound principles, principles 
which have worked in practice to ad- 
vance the peace process. Let me men- 
tion some of those principles for you. 

First, the United States believes 
that the objective of the peace process 
is a comprehensive settlement achieved 
through negotiations based on UN Se- 
curity Council Resolutions 242 and 338. 
In our view, these negotiations must in- 
volve territory for peace, security and 

...negotiations must involve 
territory for peace, security 
and recognition for Israel 
and all of the states of the re- 
gion, and Palestinian politi- 
cal rights. 

...for negotiations to succeed, 
they must allow the parties 
to deal directly with each 
other, face to face. 

. . . some transitional period is 
needed, associated in time 
and sequence with negotia- 
tions on final status. advance of direct nego- 
tiations, neither the United 
States nor any other party, 
inside or outside, can or will 
dictate an outcome. 

recognition for Israel and all of the 
states of the region, and Palestinian 
political rights. 

Second, for negotiations to suc- 
ceed, they must allow the parties to 
deal directly with each other, face to 
face. A properly structured interna- 
tional conference could be useful at an 
appropriate time, but only if it did not 
interfere with or in any way replace or 
be a substitute for direct talks between 
the parties. 

Third, the issues involved in the 
negotiations are far too complex, and 
the emotions are far too deep, to move 
directly to a final settlement. Accord- 
ingly, some transitional period is 
needed, associated in time and se- 
quence with negotiations on final sta- 
tus. Such a transition will allow the 
parties to take the measure of each oth- 
er's performance, to encourage atti- 
tudes to change, and to demonstrate 
that peace and coexistence is desired. 

'epartment of State Bulletin/July 1989 



[To the Arab world], we 
would say: end the economic 
boycott; stop the challenges 
to Israel's standing in inter- 
national organizations; repu- 
diate the odious line that 
Zionism is racism. 

For Israel, now is the time to 
lay aside, once and for all, 
the unrealistic vision of a 

greater Israel Foreswear 

annexation. Stop settlement 
activity. Allow schools to re- 
open. Reach out to the Pal- 
estinians as neighbors who 
deserve political rights. 

For Palestinians, now is the 
time to speak with one voice 
for peace Practice con- 
structive diplomacy — 
Amend the covenant — 
Reach out to Israelis and 
convince them of your peace- 
ful intentions. You have the 
most to gain from doing so — 

For outside parties — in par- 
ticular, the Soviet Union — 
now is the time to make "new 
thinking" a reality as it ap- 
plies to the Middle East. . . . 
restore diplomatic ties with 

Israel stop the supply of 

sophisticated weapons to 
countries like Libya. 

Fourth, in afivance of direct nego- 
tiations, neither the United States nor 
any other party, inside or outside, can 
or will dictate an outcome. That is why 
the United States does not support an- 
nexation or permanent Israeli control 
of the West Bank and Gaza, nor do we 
support the creation of an independent 
Palestinian state. 


I would add here, that we do have 
an idea about the reasonable middle 
ground to which a settlement should be 
directed; that is, self-government for 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza 
in a manner acceptable to Palestinians, 
Israel, and Jordan. Such a formula pro- 
vides ample scope for Palestinians to 
achieve their full political rights. It 
also provides ample protection for 
Israel's security as well. 


Following these principles, we face a 
pragmatic issue, the issue of how do 
we get negotiations underway. Unfor- 
tunately, the gap between the parties 
on key issues such as Palestinian rep- 
resentation and the shape of a final 
settlement remains very, very wide. 
Violence has soured the atmosphere, 
and so a quick move to negotiations is 
quite unlikely. And in the absence of 
either a minimum of good will or any 
movement to close the gap, a high- 
visibility American initiative, we 
think, has little basis on which to 

If we were to stop here, the situa- 
tion would, I think, be gloomy, indeed. 
But we are not going to stop with the 
status quo. We are engaged, as I men- 
tioned a moment ago; we will remain 
engaged; and we will work to help cre- 
ate an environment to launch and sus- 
tain negotiations. This will require 
tough but necessary decisions for peace 
by all of the parties. It will also require 
a commitment to a process of negotia- 
tions clearly tied to the search for a 
permanent settlement of the conflict. 

When Prime Minister Shamir vis- 
ited Washington, he indicated that he 
shared our view that the status quo 
was unacceptable. He brought an idea 
for elections to, in his words, "launch 
a political negotiating process" which 
would involve transitional arrange- 
ments and final status. The Prime Min- 
ister made clear that all sides would be 
free to bring their preferred positions 
to the table and that the negotiated 
outcome must be acceptable to all. The 
United States welcomed these Israeli 
ideas and undertook to see whether it 
could help in creating an atmosphere 
which could sustain such a process. 

Just last week, the Israeli cabinet 
approved a more detailed version of the 
Prime Minister's proposal, indicating 
Israeli Government positions on some, 
but not all, of the issues which are in- 
volved. The Israeli proposal is an im- 
portant and very positive start down 
the road toward constructing workable 

The Israeli Government has of- 
fered an initiative, and it has given ust 
something to work with. It has taken t 
stand on some important issues, and 
this deserves a constructive Palestin- 
ian and broader Arab response. 

Much work needs to be done — to 
elicit Palestinian and Arab thinking 
on the key elements in the process, to 
flesh out some of the details of the 
Israeli proposals, and to bridge areas 
where viewpoints differ. Both sides, ol 
course, are going to have to build polii 
ical constituencies for peace. Each ide; 
proposal, or detail should be developei 
if I may say so, as a deal-maker not as 

It may be possible to reach agree- 
ment, for example, on the standards 
a workable elections process. Such el( 
tions should be free and fair, of cour; 
and they should be free of interferem 
from any quarter. 

Through open access to media anfl 
outside observers, the integrity of the) 
electoral process can be affirmed. An| 
participation in the elections should bl 
as open as possible. 

It is, therefore, high time for seri| 
ous political dialogue between Israelii 
officials and Palestinians in the terri-< 
tories to bring about a common undert 
standing on these and other issues. 
Peace, and the peace process, must b( 
built from the "ground up." Palesti- 
nians have it within their power to he' 
define the shape of this initiative and 
to help define its essential elements. 
They shouldn't shy from a dialogue 
with Israel that can transform the cui 
rent environment and determine the 
ground rules for getting to, for con- 
ducting, and, indeed, for moving be- 
yond elections. 

We should not hide from ourselve? 
the difficulties that face even these 
steps here at the very beginning. For' 
many Israelis, it will not be easy to ei 
ter a negotiating process whose suc- 
cessful outcome will, in all probabilit; 
involve territorial withdrawal and thf 
emergence of a new political realit\'. 
For Palestinians such an outcome w ill 
mean an end to the illusion of conti'ol 
over all of Palestine, and it will mean 
full recognition of Israel as a neighboi 
and partner in trade and in human 

Challenges Ahead 

We do not think there is a real con- 
structive alternative to the process 
which I have outlined. Continuation o 
the status quo will lead to increasing 

Department of State Bulletin/July 19 


olence and worsening pi-ospects for 
lace. We think now is the time to 
ove toward a serious negotiating proc- 
s, to create the atmosphere for a re- 
wed peace process. 

Let the Arab world take concrete 
eps toward accommodation with 
rael — not in place of the peace proc- 
s, but as a catalyst for it. And so we 
3uld say: end the economic boycott; 
op the challenges to Israel's standing 
international organizations; repudi- 
e the odious line that Zionism is 

For Israel, now is the time to lay 
iide, once and for all, the unrealistic 
sion of a greater Israel. Israeli in- 
rests in the West Bank and Gaza — 
curity and otherwise — can be accom- 
odated in a settlement based on Reso- 
tion 242. Forswear annexation. Stop 
ittlement activity. Allow schools to re- 
)en. Reach out to the Palestinians as 
jighbors who deserve political rights. 

For Palestinians, now is the time 
I speak with one voice for peace. Re- 
)unce the policy of phases in all lan- 
aages, not just those addressed to the 
fest. Practice constructive diplomacy, 
)t attempts to distort international 
•ganizations, such as the World Health 
rganization. Amend the covenant, 
ranslate the dialogue of violence in 
le intifada into a dialogue of politics 
id diplomacy. Violence will not work, 
each out to Israelis and convince 
lem of your peaceful intentions. You 
ive the most to gain from doing so, 
id no one else can or will do it for you. 
inally, understand that no one is 
jing to "deliver" Israel for you. 

For outside parties — in particular, 
le Soviet Union — now is the time to 
.ake "new thinking" a reality as it ap- 
lies to the Middle East. I must say 
lat Chairman Gorbachev and Foreign 
Minister Shevardnadze told me in Mos- 
)w 10 days ago that Soviet policy is 
Tianging. New laws regarding emigra- 
on will soon be discussed by the Su- 
i-eme Soviet. Jewish life in the Soviet 
Inion is also looking better, with stu- 
ents beginning to study their heritage 
■t'l'ly. Finally, the Soviet Union 
tiiced with us last week that Prime 
linister Shamir's election proposal 
as worthy of consideration. 

These, of course, are all positive 
ii;ns. But the Soviets must go further 
I demonstrate convincingly that they 
ii' ,-erious about new thinking in the 
irali-Israeli conflict. Let Moscow re- 
tdie diplomatic ties with Israel, for 

The Soviets should also help pro- 
mote a serious peace process, not just 
empty slogans. And it is time for the 
Soviet Union, we think, to behave re- 
sponsibly when it comes to arms and 
stop the supply of sophisticated weap- 
ons to countries like Libya. 

I said at the beginning of these 
remarks that the Middle East had ap- 
proached a turning point. I believe that 
this region, which is so full of poten- 
tial, will not remain immune from the 
changes which are sweeping the rest of 
the world. These changes begin with 
the quest for democracy, for individual 
freedom, and for choice. Long ago, of 
course, Israel chose this path. And long 
ago, the American people decided to 

Secretary's Interview 
on "Face the Nation" 

Secretary Baker' was interviewed 
in Houston on CBS-TV's "Face the 
Nation" on Mail U. 19S9. by Terence 
Smith and Bill Plante. CBS News.'' 

Q. You just heard the two Senators 
[Nancy Kassebaum and Bob Graham] 
talking in very serious terms about 
the situation in Panama. Is there a 
point there where the Administration 
has to take another step, and what 
might it be? 

A. I think that the steps that the 
Administration has taken so far need to 
be given — if I might put it this way — 
some time to work. I don't think that 
we ought to assume that they're not 
going to work. They are measured 

I heard your question and the re- 
sponses of the Senators about the OAS 
[Organization of American States] 
meeting on Wednesday. Let's see how 
that meeting goes. I think that we've 
got good diplomatic support in the re- 
gion. I think it's important to note 
that this should not be a U.S.-versus- 
Panama problem. This is really a prob- 
lem for Latin American countries in 
the region as well as for the United 

Q. Do you agree with Senator 
Graham that it's important to get rid 
of Gen. Noriega at almost any cost? 
In other words, how far does this 
country go to get Noriega out? 

A. I think it's very important that 
the will of the Panamanian people be 

walk with Israel in its quest for peace 
and in its quest for security. 

The policy I have described today 
reaffirms and renews that course. For 
our part, the United States will move 
ahead steadily and carefully, in a step- 
by-step approach designed to help the 
parties make the necessary decisions 
for peace. Perhaps Judge Learned 
Hand expressed it best when he said, 
". . . we shall have to be content with 
short steps; ...but we shall have gone 
forward, if we bring to our task. . . pa- 
tience, understanding, sympathy, for- 
bearance, generosity, fortitude and 
above all an inflexible determination." 

'Press release 96. 

given effect. We had an election here 
that has been stolen. We have the will 
of the people being subverted and per- 
verted, so we ought to do everything 
within reason that we can to encourage 
this man to leave; to bring pressure, if 
you will, on him to leave. It's important 
in terms of the entire hemisphere. 

Q. Are there any hints that you 
can share with us this morning that 
Noriega might be considering step- 
ping down or leaving? Are there any 
discussions that you can share with 
us, going on between this country and 
his government, that might lead to 
that end? 

A. As you know, there have been 
some discussions in the past. I'm not at 
liberty to comment beyond saying that. 
I think that, again, the Senators were 
right in terms of what the proper posi- 
tion of the United States should be 
with regard to suggestions that some- 
how the indictment should be dis- 
missed. I don't think you should antici- 
pate seeing President Bush entertain 
ideas such as that. 

I think it's important that we con- 
tinue to do everything we can to bring 
public opinion to bear in order to en- 
courage this man to leave. It's very 
important in terms of the overall rela- 
tionship in the hemisphere. 

Q. Are there any circumstances 
at all under which the United States 
should consider abrogating the Pan- 
ama Canal Treaties? 

Oepartment of State Bulletin/July 1989 



A. I don't think that that's the ap- 
propriate response. Again I think both 
Senator Graham and Senator Kasse- 
baum made it very clear [that] what you 
do when you start talking about that is 
turn this into a U.S.-versus-Panama 
and, in effect, versus-some-of-the-rest- 
of-Latin-America contest. That would 
be a mistake. I think it would be 

Q. There's another headline this 
morning that we're all looking at, 
which is your Soviet counterpart, 
Eduard Shevardnadze, saying that if 
the United States goes ahead and 
modernizes the Lance missile in Eu- 
rope as it plans to do, the Soviets may 
have to develop a new missile of their 
own or even abrogate certain parts of 
the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces] Treaty. It sounds like a pretty 
serious threat. I wonder what you 
respond to it? 

A. My response would be that this 
is a matter that was specifically negoti- 
ated when the INF Treaty was nego- 
tiated — the elimination of the SS-23s 
on the part of the Soviet Union. This 
was debated back and forth for quite 
some time. 

The Soviets responded, in effect, 
that they would agree to eliminate 
these missiles, and now they're doing 
so. And there was never any suggestion 
at all that the United States or the 
NATO alliance should not keep its 
short-range missiles up-to-date. That 
was never entertained during the 
course of that debate. All we're really 
talking about here is maintaining those 
missiles up-to-date that have a range of 
less than 300 miles. 

Q. Do you take this as a serious 
threat on the part of Soviet Foreign 
Minister Shevardnadze, or is he just 
trying to drive the wedge deeper 
between the United States and 

A. I think it perhaps could be a lit- 
tle bit of a combination of both. This 
was discussed in our meetings there, 
during the course of the ministerial in 
Moscow. I think that the Soviets are 
concerned, of course, that what they'd 
much prefer to see is the entire de- 
nuclearization of Europe. They would 
like to see the alliance lose its resolve, 
lose its will. 

The fact of the matter is the reason 
we've had peace for 40 years is because 
we have been strong, and we have kept 
our deterrent up-to-date, and we've 
maintained our strength. We really 
need to continue to do that. 

Q. Let me be the devil's advocate 
for a moment and ask you, why not 
begin discussions as the Soviets pro- 
pose on the elimination or reduction 
of short-range missiles and tie it, as 
others have proposed, to a reduction 
in conventional forces and to other 
goals that we, in fact, have in Eu- 
rope? Why not get the talks going? 

A. There are a lot of suggestions 
out there. I got that question during 
the course of my press conference in 
Brussels, and I think it's probably a 
mistake for the United States to react 
to each and every one of these so-called 
compromise proposals that come 

I should say this: It is important 
that there be a resolution of the imbal- 
ance in conventional forces before we 
start getting into negotiations on 
short-range nuclear weapons. It's the 
short-range nuclear weapon that gives 
us support for our flexible response 
strategy w^hich has kept the peace all 
these years. The minute you lose that 
in the face of major imbalances in the 
favor of the Soviet Union on conven- 
tional forces, major imbalances in the 
favor of the Soviet Union on short- 
range nuclear weapons, I think you lose 
something very, very fundamental. 

Q. What's wrong with tying the 
two together — tying the negotiations 
to the idea that you negotiate not 
down to zero but only down to a cer- 
tain level, as Ambassador Nitze [Paul 
H. Nitze, formerly special adviser to 
the President and the Secretary of 
State on arms control matters] has 
suggested? Why not start that? 

A. Again let me say there are a lot 
of proposals out there that might make 
sense, but I think it's a mistake for us 
to pass judgment on each and every one 
of these as we move forward toward the 

We are engaged with the Germans, 
as you know; we are having ongoing 
discussions with them about the appro- 
priate way to bridge this gap. I think I 
said a couple of days ago that we're 
very hopeful that we'll find a way to 
bridge the gap. The alliance has always 
been able to resolve these problems in 
the past, and I'm very hopeful that 
we'll be able to resolve them in the 

Q. But why not take a more ag- 
gressive posture? Why let the Soviets 
get all the public relations advan- 
tage? Why not float some new ideas 
of your own? Isn't there a sense that 
public opinion is beginning to turn? 

There are editorials today — there 
have been editorials recently — saying) 
it's time for the United States to maki 
some moves — dramatic moves — of its 

A. The United States is making 
some moves, not all of which are laid 
out there in the public domain. Again 
let me say that we have been having 
discussions with the Germans — 
extensive discussions. The important 
thing is not who wins a public relations 
victory but whether or not we make 
sure that we keep the alliance stron^u, 
we make sure that we bridge this gap 
ultimately, and we need to work towan 
that end. We don't need to be concern- 
ing ourselves with short-range public 
opinion victories. 

I've got to say one more time what 
I said again in Brussels: It would be a 
terrible mistake if we fall into the trap 
of playing polities with Western secu- 
rity, and the Russians would dearly 
love to see that happen. They'd love Ili 
see us do that and start trying to play 
that game. 

Q. It costs you, though, doesn't 
it? I have to say that you looked sur- 
prised and perhaps a little annoyed 
when Gorbachev gave you his pro- 
posals that cut 500 nuclear warheads 
from the European stockpile. These 
things come one after the other. 
They've almost become predictable. 
Didn't you expect — 

A. You're quite right when you sa; 
they're predictable. And as far as we 
were concerned, that was predictable; 
and it was something, quite frankly, 
that we had specifically talked about 
here in Washington before the trip. So 
I would guide you off any suggestion 
that we were surprised. On the other 
hand the Soviets are coming our way. 
They are moving in our direction. The; 
are doing what we've been calling on 
them to do. For a long time, we've beer 
calling on them to unilaterally reduce 
some of their short-range nuclear weap 
ons the way the NATO alliance has. 
Two thousand four hundred weapons 
over the last 10 years we've not only 
eliminated, we have destroyed. 

And they've now come with this 
very, very modest little step- — about 
500 weapons that they're going to move 
from some of their client states in East 
ern Europe, not even out of Europe, 
not even back behind the Urals — and 
they're not suggesting that they're 
going to destroy them. So we say it's a 
good step, but it's a very small one and 
a very modest one. 


Department of State Bulletin/July 198 


Q. Give us a sense of this Admin- 
stration's view now of Gorbachev, his 
iiospects on perestroika, his efforts 
t roform. You've just been there. We 
uid Defense Secretary Cheney saying 
few days ago that the prognosis for 
ircstroika was very poor, that Gor- 
liuhev was likely to fail and be re- 
ilaied by someone more militant. 
N'liat did you think? You've just come 

A. I've just come back from there, 
11(1. as a matter of fact, I spent 
' _ hours with the General Secretary. 
t's my view that they've got some ma- 
(ir problems. They're quite candid 
bciut talking about those and acknowl- 
duiiig that they've got these problems 
hat they've got to deal with. 

It's our further view, as you proba- 
cy know — the view of everyone in our 
Ldministration, including Secretary 
]heney — that we very much want per- 
stroika to succeed, because if they are 
uccessful, it will mean that there will 
16 a more open and stable and secure 
ioviet Union. That will be in the best 
nterests of the United States. It would 
Iso be in the best interests of the 
ioviet Union and the world. 

So we'd like to see that happen. 
Vhether or not he succeeds, though, is 
ping to depend really not on what we 
n the West do; it's going to depend 
ipon what happens in the Soviet 
Jnion, and it's going to depend upon 
he Soviet people. 

Q. Let's move on to another area 
hat's really in the news today. Gen- 
ral Secretary Gorbachev is about to 
irrive in China on a history-making 
ummit there. What, from the U.S. 
loint of view, is there to worry about 
ir look for in this summit? 

A. I don't think that there's a lot 
hat we should be worried about. In 
act, when we were in Beijing, Presi- 
lent Bush told Chairman Deng Xiao- 
ling that we welcomed the fact that the 
'eople's Republic and the Soviet Union 
rere getting together. He has sent the 
chairman a message in the last several 
lays with regard to this subject, and 
t's not something that the United 
States ought to be worried about. It's 
lomething that we really ought to wel- 
:ome, and we do welcome. 

Q. Does the United States have 
iny response specifically to the news 
;his morning, which are the continu- 
ng student protests? There are a 
;housand students camped as we 
speak in Tiananmen Square, and Gor- 
jachev is on his way. What's the U.S. 

comment or observation on that stu- 
dent demonstration? 

A. The comment of the United 
States is that we support freedom of 
e.xpression around the world. We sup- 
port self-determination, freedom of ex- 
pression, democratization. We take 
note of the fact that the authorities in 
Beijing have really not, as they quite 
frequently have in the past, cracked 
down on these demonstrations. These 
students have been permitted to ex- 
press their views rather freely if you 
look at what has been traditional in the 

Q. And you applaud that re- 
straint, I take it? 

A. Yes, we do. 

Q. The chairman and some mem- 
bers of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee have called on you and the 
President to withdraw the nomina- 
tion of Donald Gregg to be the Am- 
bassador to Korea. What do you say 
to that? 

A. What I say is that the President 
stands behind this nomination, as do I. 
He has faith and confidence in his nom- 

inee. He's served the President, as you 
know, as his national security adviser 
for the full 8 years that the President 
was Vice President of the United 

It's quite true that we had some 
discussions with several Senators on 
the Foreign Relations Committee about 
this — talked to them about whether or 
not the nomination should be given a 
second look. It was, and the President 
is quite satisfied that the nomination 
should go forward and that the con- 
firmation process should go forward. 
And, quite frankly, we had hoped that 
that some of the Senators who are op- 
posing this nomination would have seen 
fit to sit down with the nominee before 
the hearing and discuss what they saw 
as some of the problems. 

Q. Did you believe his testimony? 
Did you believe Gregg's testimony? 

A. I haven't seen his testimony, so 
I'm not in a position to answer that 
question. As you know, I've been in the 
Soviet Union for the past week. 

1 Press release 88 of May 1.5, 1989. 

Secretary's Trip to Moscow and NATO 

Secretary Baker visited Helsinki 
(May 9-10, 1989), Moscow (May 10-11), 
and Brussels (May 11-12). Following 
are remarks he made on various 
occasions during the trip. 




MAY 10, 1989' 

Thank you very much Ambassador 
Matlock [U.S. Ambassador to the 
Soviet Union Jack Matlock]. Let me 
start by apologizing to all of you for be- 
ing late. Our meetings ran late, and we 
have been running late ever since. I 
really apologize, but I am delighted to 
have the opportunity to come by and 
visit with you and, I want to thank you 
all for being here. 

As you undoubtedly know, when- 
ever we sit down, government-to- 
government, with the Soviet Union, 
human rights is always at the top of our 
agenda because human rights occupies 
such an important place in our whole 

system of government, politics, and 
society in the United States. I specifi- 
cally raised today the issue of re- 
fuseniks with Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze. I want you all to know 
that we are going to keep up the pres- 
sure to resolve individual cases, but be- 
yond that, we are going to push to see 
that changes are institutionalized and 
human rights guaranteed. Despite the 
progress that has been made — and I 
think we should all candidly admit 
that — there has been progress, partic- 
ularly with respect to emigration. 
There are, nevertheless, substantial 
problems that remain. There are still 
hundreds of refuseniks who are denied 
exit permission, both new cases and 
old. We intend to continue to press for 
a resolution of these cases. 

Other human rights goals that we 
have include family reunification, ex- 
panding the scope of civil and political 
liberties, and, of course, the legal and 
institutional reforms to secure the 
progress that's already been made, as I 

I want you all to know that the 
United States remains committed to 
the right of Soviet Jews to practice 



their religion and to participate fully in 
Soviet society. I should say that we wel- 
come the recent progress in the [inaud- 
ible] isolation of Soviet Jews, such as 
the opening of the Jewish Cultural Cen- 
ter and Judaic Studies Center in 

Let me close by saying that we look 
forward to the day when all believers 
may worship, study, and participate 
fully in Soviet society without 


MAY n, 1989^ 

In the face of the escalating level of 
bloodshed in Lebanon, the United 
States and the Soviet Union call on all 
parties to adopt and observe a cease- 
fire which would be an important first 
step toward ending the civil war in this 

Tlie United States and U.S.S.R. 
favor the Arab League proposal first to 
consolidate the cease-fire and then to 
build the framework for a national dia- 
logue and reconciliation in Lebanon. 
They are prepared to use their good of- 
fices to join with others and promote a 
political solution to Lebanon, taking 
into account the interests of all sides. 

The Soviet Union and the United 
States support the sovereignty, inde- 
pendence, and territorial integrity of 



MAY 11, 1989' 

I have what is a longer opening state- 
ment than I might normally make, but 

1 want to give you — the reason I'm 
going to do this is to give you, as best I 
can, a feel for the discussions that 
we've had during the course of the past 

2 days. 

Let me start by simply saying I 
think this visit was very useful, and it 
was productive. I think we had con- 
structive talks. I'm very satisfied with 
the way in which the meetings went. 

President Bush asked that I make 
clear to the leadership of the Soviet 
Union that the United States is ready 
and anxious to reengage across the full 
range of our relations. Over the past 
2 days, [Foreign] Minister Shevardnadze 
and I established a foundation for both 
continuity and change across our five- 

part agenda. We've begun to add to the 
list of topics we will periodically ad- 
dress together and to deepen our en- 
gagement on matters we've discussed 
in the past. 

I e.xplained that the President and 
I welcome perestroika, glasnost, and 
the "new thinking" in Soviet foreign 
policy. We believe they have contrib- 
uted to a changing political environ- 
ment, one which offers an opportunity 
for both of our countries to expand the 
arena of our constructive interaction. 

During these meetings, the United 
States and the Soviet Union sought 
both to adapt old policy frameworks as 
well as develop new ones to fit the 
changing times. 

Let me add some specifics by 
touching, as briefly as I can, on each 
topic in our five-part agenda. 

In the area of human rights, we 

both sought further progress on indi- 
vidual cases and opened the way for co- 
operation on the institutionalization of 
rights in Soviet society. 

First, the Soviets gave us the 
names of individuals who will now be 
free to emigrate, and we urged early 
positive action on the remaining re- 
fusenik cases which involve some 
400-500 families. 

Second, we moved close to agree- 
ment on a mechanism for the exchange 
of information on criminal cases aris- 
ing in one country which the other be- 
lieves to be political in character. Such 
a mechanism could help us free individ- 
uals who are political victims of an ear- 
lier era. 

Third, the Soviets reported their 
progress in drafting new laws regard- 
ing freedom of conscience and emigra- 
tion. We understand it's their present 
intention that the Supreme Soviet 
would act on these laws after it 

And finally, we agreed to future 
projects. We will engage in ongoing di- 
alogues or exchange programs in three 
areas: the rule of law, human rights 
and humanitarian issues arising on the 
international scene, and our respective 
experiences in dealing with social 

In the arms control area, we've 
agreed to I'eengage on the full range of 
our existing negotiations. This re- 
flects, I think, our country's interest in 
an active, constructive, and expanding 

The NST [nuclear and space talks] 
negotiations will resume in Geneva be- 
tween June 12 and June 19, with the 
precise date to be set through diplo- 

matic channels. The Standing Consult- 
ative Commission (SCO, which is 
charged with Antiballistic Missile 
(ABM) Treaty verification and compli- 
ance, will resume meeting in mid-June. 
The nuclear testing talks will resume 
in Geneva on June 26. We will hold bi- 
lateral discussions on chemical weapons 
on the margins of next month's meetiim 
of the UN Conference on Disarmament 
in Geneva. We discussed and agreed on 
the importance of the ongoing conven- 
tional armed forces in Europe (CFEi 
and confidence-building measures 

Second, we also agreed — impor- 
tantly in my view — to broaden the 
arms control agenda to include a new 
emphasis on the problem of chemical 
weapons and missile proliferation. 

In the regional area, we placed, a.'^ 
some of you know, new emphasis on re- 
gional talks and made headway in 
crafting a common basis for U.S.- 
Soviet cooperation to try and resolve a 
number of conflicts around the globe. 
In particular, we described in detail 
our approaches in Central America ami 
the Middle East. 

With respect to Central America, 
we agreed to work toward a political 
and diplomatic solution to the problem 
of Nicaragua and to support the goals 
of Esquipulas and Tesoro. 

We related our objectives and uui' 
general strategies on a number of re- 
gional issues. We discussed specific 
possible roles which the Soviet Union 
could play, as well as roles which the 
United States could play. 

On the new topic of transnational 
relations, we agreed to establish an 
ongoing working group. We also de- 
rived a work program for this new 
group which covers a range of issues, 
including protection of the environ- 
ment, coping with the effects of natural 
disasters, and combatting international 
terrorism and illicit drug trafficking. 

In the bilateral area, [Foreign] 
Minister Shevardnadze and I accepted 
the work plan developed by the working 
group which provides for intensified 
action in numerous areas, including the 
completion of negotiations on new or 
amended cooperative agreements and 
the opening of new cultural and infoi-- 
mation centers in our two nations. We 
have a 23-point agreed work program 
covering topics as diverse as research 
on world oceans, civil aviation, atomic 
energy, maritime boundaries, and so 

In conclusion, I also took the op- 
portunity of this brief visit to have 


Department of State Bulletin/July 1989 


ur sessions outside the formal 
3vernment-to-government agenda. 

First, my wife and I had an inter- 
ting private dinner with [Foreign] 
Minister Shevardnadze and his wife, 
'e very much appreciated their warm 

Second, I inspected our uncom- 
eted office building to see the extent 
'possible security penetrations 

Third, I met with three newly 
ected members of the Congress of 
teople's Deputies. I congratulated 
lem on their accomplishment and ex- 
ressed the President's and my strong 
iterests in the process of perestroika 
nd glasnost. 

Finally, I met with a group of 
oviet refuseniks. I told them that the 
eople of the United States were moved 
y their sacrifice and that we would 
)ntinue to work for their freedom. 

Q. You did not refer at all in this 
ammary to the Middle East. I won- 
ered if you could tell us what you 
light have accomplished with Shev- 
rdnadze and Gorbachev on the Mid- 
le East? 

A. If I didn't mention the Middle 
last in the discussion of regional is- 
pes, I intended to, because we think 
lat there may be a fair amount of com- 
lon ground with respect to our ap- 
roach to the Middle East. 

We talked about it at quite some 
ingth during the first day. We talked 
Dout the importance of giving the idea 
'elections a chance, working with Is- 
ielis and Arabs to see if we can con- 
ert elections into a process — a broader 
rocess — that will ultimately bring 
Oout political negotiations. The [For- 
ign] Minister made the point that he 
links it is important to keep the possi- 
ility of an international conference on 
le table, and I told him that it was the 
osition of the United States that an in- 
^rnational conference at an appropri- 
te time, properly structured, might 
'ell be useful. 

Q. Was there any discussion in 
our meetings with President Gor- 
.achev about the possibility of uni- 
iteral Soviet cuts in their tactical 
uclear short-range force, and did 
hat subject come up in general? 

A. Which subject? 

Q. The subject of short-range 
luclear forces. 

A. The subject of short-range nu- 
lear weapons did come up in general. 
t came up primarily during the course 
f my meeting with the General Secre- 
arv, and we had a rather extensive and 

in-depth discussion on the issue, during 
the course of which I set forth our posi- 
tion and he set forth his. 

Q. Was there any common 
ground reached at all in that area? 

A. I hope the fact we were able to 
discuss the issue for as long as we did 
and to the extent we did might produce 
some better understanding on his part 
of our position. And we agreed we 
would continue to disagree agreeably 
for the time being with respect to this 

Q. After this first trip of yours to 
the Soviet Union and these extensive 
discussions you've described, could 
you give us an assessment of where 
you think the cold war stands? Is it 
getting over? Have you got a start on 
getting it over? Could you tell me how 
you feel about that? 

A. I answered that question in the 
United States not long ago, I think. 
What I said was, it seems to me, at 
least, that it is certainly moving in that 
direction. We may not quite be there 
yet. We think it's important. We think 
there are perhaps some object indica- 
tors out there that one might look to, 
but we are certainly moving in that 

We would, of course, as we've said 
before, be delighted to see an ex- 
pressed renunciation of the Brezhnev 
doctrine. We would be very pleased to 
see the [Berlin] Wall come down. We 
applaud the fact they're rolling up 
the barbed wire on the Hungarian- 
Austrian border. So I think you have to 
say we are clearly moving in that 

Q. Can you return to the ques- 
tion of whether unilateral cuts in tac- 
tical short-range nuclear forces were 
discussed? And can you tell us wheth- 
er the General Secretary wanted to 
reduce or eliminate short-range nu- 
clear weapons? 

A. Unilateral reductions were dis- 
cussed because, as you know, we have 
argued for some time, there is a signifi- 
cant imbalance in favor of the Warsaw 
Pact with respect to these weapons. 
Before we start talking about sitting 
down and negotiating them, it would be 
advisable, certainly from our stand- 
point and from the standpoint of main- 
taining a deterrence which we believe 
has maintained the peace for all these 
years, if that imbalance was reduced 
voluntarily and unilaterally. That's 
been an argument we've made for quite 
some time. 

There was no in-depth discussion of 
a total elimination. There was a discus- 
sion of reduction. 

Q. Do you believe it is realistic 
for the U.S. Administration to re- 
nounce negotiations as the way to 
solve the issue of tactical nuclear 

A. We don't renounce it as a way to 
solve the issue. What we say is that it 
is very good politics to talk about this, 
and we acknowledge and recognize 
that; but that security is extraordi- 
narily important. It is our view that a 
minimal number of these weapons has 
contributed substantially to the main- 
tenance of security between East and 
West for many, many years. It's our 
view that an adequate mix of conven- 
tional and nuclear forces is required if 
we are going to maintain that security. 
It is a defensive posture; the NATO 
strategy of flexible response is a defen- 
sive strategy, not an offensive strategy. 
It has to do with deterring war and 
keeping the peace. That's what has 
happened for 40 years, and we ought to 
be very careful before we depart from 
these strategic concepts that have been 

Q. From the moment of the for- 
mation of the new U.S. Administra- 
tion, you have repeated [Israeli Prime 
Minister] Shamir's proposal for elec- 
tions in the occupied lands in the 
Middle East. Do you have your own 
concrete proposal which would speed 
up the process of peace in the Middle 

A. The answer is, yes, we do have 
a proposal of our own which we have 
discussed at quite some length in the 
United States and which is very com- 
patible with the proposal that has been 
advanced by Prime Minister Shamir. It 
is our view that big, high-visibility ini- 
tiatives with respect to this very in- 
tractable problem are not likely to 
succeed unless and until there has been 
an improvement in the atmosphere and 
unless there has been a "tilling of the 
ground," if you will, in the area. So we 
have called for some reciprocal steps 
toward improving the atmosphere — 
steps that could be taken by Israelis 
and steps that could be taken by 

For the first time ever, the United 
States now has a dialogue with the Pal- 
estine Liberation Organization (PLO), 
and we talk to them about these steps. 
We have always, of course, had a dia- 
logue with the Israelis, and we talk to 
them about taking steps. 

department of State Bulletin/July 1989 



This is very compatible with the 
idea that Prime Minister Shamir ad- 
vanced which, by the way, we do not 
view, as someone suggested not long 
ago, as "warmed-over Camp David." 
There are some significant differences 
in what the Prime Minister of Israel is 
now proposing from the Camp David 
peace process. I won't run through all 
of them here now for you, but one is the 
Israeli recognition that this could and 
should lead to a broader political dia- 
logue, a broader political negotiation, a 
recognition on their part that at some 
point negotiations have to be held on 
the question of permanent status, a rec- 
ognition on their part that in those ne- 
gotiations on permanent status all 
options are open, and other items such 
as that. So the two ideas are very 

Q. Are you indicating to us, when 
you say that it would be helpful to 
reduce the numbers of those short- 
range launchers and missiles uni- 
laterally first, that you would negoti- 
ate? And tell us, if you will, did the 
Secretary General ask you to negoti- 
ate specifically on that question? 

A. No, I'm not suggesting that. 
What I'm saying is, before you get to 
the issue of whether or not there should 
be negotiations, there has to be a little 
less of an imbalance. There needs to be 
a greater congruence, if you will, in 
force structures. The alliance is at a 
significant disadvantage with respect 
to the numbers of tactical short-range 
nuclear weapons that are currently de- 
ployed today, and we are at a signifi- 
cant disadvantage as well with respect 
to conventional forces. 

Q. But did the General Secretary 
ask you negotiate — sorry to persist — 
but did he ask you to negotiate these 

A. Did he suggest the idea of nego- 
tiation? Yes, he did. 

Q. The TASS news agency today 
charged the United States with in- 
stigating a fraudulent election in 
Panama. And, as you may or may not 
know, the Panamanian regime of 
Gen. Noriega declared the elections 
last Sunday to be nullified — their 
word. What is your reaction to events 
in Panama over the last 2 or 3 days? 

A. Our reaction to those events 
has been pretty well stated, I think, by 
the President. Gen. Noriega has been 
very reluctant to accept the will of the 
Panamanian people. He has done every- 
thing he could to steal that election. 
And when it became e.xtraordinarilv 


difficult to accomplish that, I suppose 
he's giving consideration to simply de- 
claring it null and void and starting 
over. But either way — either way you 
look at it, it is a perversion and a sub- 
version of the freely expressed will of 
the Panamanian people. 

Q. You delivered a letter from 
President Bush to Mr. Gorbachev. 
Could you tell us a little bit about 
that letter? And also, did you get into 
any discussion about a summit be- 
tween Mr. Gorbachev and the 

A. The question of a summit came 
up and was discussed, and we agreed 
we would further discuss that issue at 
the next ministerial which [Foreign] 
Minister Shevardnadze and I have, 
which we suspect will be sometime in 
the month of September. 

With respect to the question about 
the President's letter, the letter from 
the President to the General Secretary 
outlined broadly our views on the 
evolving relationship with the Soviet 
Union. It made some of the points that 
I made initially in my opening state- 
ment here this afternoon. The Presi- 
dent called attention to the reform 
effort in the Soviet Union. He empha- 
sized in the strongest terms our desire 
to see perestmika succeed. He pointed 
out that we believe these changes are 
significant, even revolutionary; that 
they create a basis for progress; and 
that we seek that progress. 

It pointed out as well that our in- 
tention is to work seriously and care- 
fully step-by-step to prepare the 
ground to make our cooperation 

Q. You started your negotiations 
here by discussing regional conflicts. 
You discussed Afghanistan and Cen- 
tral America. Do you think a compro- 
mise is possible on that? And you 
discussed the Middle East. Did you 
discuss Lebanon within that context? 

A. Let me say that it was our view 
coming into these meetings that re- 
gional issues should have a greater em- 
phasis in the dialogue between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. 
I'm very pleased to see that our inter- 
locutors here accepted that view, and 
regional issues were accorded a higher 
emphasis in these meetings. That does 
not in any way diminish the impor- 
tance of any of the other aspects on the 
agenda, such as arms control, human 
rights, and the others. 

We did, indeed, discuss Lebanon, 
and we agreed upon a joint statement 
on Lebanon which is in the process of 

being released and which will be avail- 
able to you. 

Q. In view of what the Soviets 
told you about emigration, and par- 
ticularly embodying the liberal rules 
into their legislation, could you give 
us your assessment now of the possi- 
bilities of waiving the Jackson-Vanik 

A. We told the Soviets that once 
that more liberal emigration policy hadi 
been institutionalized, enacted into 
law, and once those laws were seen to 
be in the process of being implemented, 
we thought it would be appropriate to 
then address the question of whether ort 
not there ought to be a relaxation or re- 
peal of Jackson-Vanik and the Steven- 
son amendments in the United States. 

Q. Regarding Central America, 
could you give us your assessment for 
the possibility now that the Soviets 
may decrease or stop their military 
assistance to Nicaragua? 

A. We are very hopeful that will 
be the case. I'm an optimist, so I'd eveiT 
be optimistic. I would point you to 
what I said in my opening statement, 
though, when I said that we agreed tn 
work toward a diplomatic and political 
solution to the problem of Nicaragua 
and to support the goals of Esquipulas 
and Tesoro. I would argue that those 
goals clearly move in the direction of 
reducing, if not eliminating, that 

Q. Just to return to the short- 
range nuclear forces (SNF) issue one 
more time — one. did General Secre- 
tary Gorbachev indicate to you that 
he is anticipating unilateral cuts? 
And, two, are you saying that we 
would welcome those cuts rather thar 
regarding them as simply a device to 
try to split NATO? 

A. We would welcome the cuts in 
any event. In fact, we have been calling 
upon the Soviet Union to reduce their 
short-range nuclear weapons to bring 
the imbalance more into line; and we 
have said that's something that ought 
to be done before we even get to the 
question of negotiations. 

Q. The first part of my question: 
Did he indicate to you that he is 
thinking about it? 

A. 'You noticed I've dodged that 
about three times, haven't you? 

Q. Did the discussions in NATO 
on the modernization of the Lance 
program come up, and did you offer 
the Russians your interpretation of 
the apparent split in NATO on this 

Department of State Bulletin/July 198{ 


A. The answer to the last part of 
>rour question is no, I didn't offer them 
iny interpretation on where NATO 
nay or may not be on that. The ques- 
tion of modernization did, indeed, come 
jp, just as the question of negotiations 
ame up. 

Q. Did General Secretary Gor- 
bachev bring up the Afghanistan 
tjuestion at any length, and could you 
tell us what his concerns were and 
now you responded to them? 
j A. The answer is no, he did not 
pring it up at any length. We did dis- 
cuss it in the ministerial, but he didn't 
bring it up in the meeting. 

I Q. Could you describe how 
phevardnadze — 

j A. We had a full discussion of the 
(ssue. Concern, I think, was expressed 
bn the part of the Soviet side about 
What they perceived as some inap- 
l^ropriate activities, perhaps, by 
Pakistan. We don't see it that way. We 
Bade the point during the course of 
,hese discussions, as we have before, 
:hat it is not our desire to see a govern- 
Tient in Afghanistan that is hostile to 
;he Soviet Union. At the same time, we 
ire very interested, as we think 
^'akistan and other countries are, in 
seeing self-determination for the Af- 
ghan people. 

Q. Just to clarify your last state- 
ment, you say that Mr. Gorbachev did 
lot bring it up at all? 

A. He didn't bring it up at all. 


VI .\Y 11. 1989^ 

3. What are the results of your 2-day 
;alks in Moscow, and what are your 
mpressions of your meetings with the 
jeneral Secretary, Mr. Gorbachev? 

A. I'm very satisfied with the 
I days of talks we've had here — my 
alks with [Foreign] Minister Shev- 
trdnadze and his associates, and my 
•ather e.xtensive meeting with the Gen- 
?ral Secretary. 1 think our talks were 
constructive. 1 think they were helpful 
and useful. 1 believe that my interlocu- 
:ors shared that view. 

Q. The fact itself that you are in 
Moscow means that the new Adminis- 
tration has finished and concluded, 
ar finishing and concluding, their ex- 
amination on vour national and secu- 

rity policy. Can you elaborate in a few 
words what are the main outlines of 
the new policy of your Adminis- 

A. Let me answer your question by 
saying that we have, indeed, completed 
our foreign policy and national security 
review. We still have some work to do 
on some of the specific positions that, of 
necessity, will come up in the arms con- 
trol negotiations. But as I told the Gen- 
eral Secretary, and I told the Foreign 
Ministei", we expect to be ready by the 
time those negotiations resume. And, 
of course, one of the products of our 
talks here was the setting of dates for 
the resumption of all the arms control 

Q. What do you think is the chief 
element in the policy of continuity to- 
ward the Soviet Union proclaimed by 
President Bush? 

A. As I told [Foreign] Minister 
Shevardnadze, there will be a consider- 
able degree of continuity, not just in 
the overall policies that had been pur- 
sued by the prior Administration but in 
our negotiating positions in the arms 
control negotiations as well. 

We hope that we can put new em- 
phasis on working cooperatively — the 
United States and the Soviet Union — 
to help solve some of the regional con- 
flicts around the world that have real 
potential for erupting into war, partic- 
ularly in these days when we have the 
added dangers of missile and chemical 
weapons proliferation. It's our view 
that if we can find a way to work to- 
gether on some of these issues in a 
cooperative way, rather than in a 
confrontational and competitive way, as 
we have too often in the past, it would 
be very, very good. 

Q. The previous achievements in 
Soviet-American relations were con- 
nected with such a tool as a summit. 
What do you think about this mecha- 
nism of summits in the Soviet- 
American relations in the future? 

A. We agreed today in our discus- 
sions with the General Secretary — he 
and I agreed — that summits are impor- 
tant. I told him that that was the view 
of President Bush, that President Bush 
wanted me to talk to him to ascertain, 
solicit his views about a possible sum- 
mit, the appropriate timing for such a 
summit. We had a full discussion of 
this issue, and we concluded that we 
should address the question further in 
my next ministerial meeting with [For- 
eign] Minister Shevardnadze. 

Q. This is your first visit to this 
country, and, of course, it generated 
a lot of interest among the Soviet peo- 
ple. We would certainly like to know 
more about you as a person, about 
what ideas you want to bring into 
Soviet-American relations. Could you 
satisfy, at least a little, their curi- 
osity on the subject? 

A. I just mentioned one of the 
ideas, and that is cooperation rather 
than competition and confrontation. I 
have also alluded to the fact that we 
think it would be useful to put a bit 
more emphasis on this problem of re- 
gional conflicts. 

I have suggested that we add a 
fifth category of issues to the usual 
basket of issues normally discussed in 
these meetings; that is, transnational 
or global issues, matters such as the 
environment, terrorism, drug traffick- 
ing, the reduction of natural disasters. 
Together I think we could work on 
some of these problems. 

I'm struck by the fact that we have 
cooperated very well where disaster 
strikes. Your earthquakes in Armenia, 
we were helpful. Our oil spill in Valdez, 
Alaska, you were very helpful. In fact, 
I think you still have a Soviet ship up 
there assisting us. These are examples, 
I think, of the way our two countries 
might better cooperate. 

Q. As you know, the American 
space ship Apollo and the Soviet 
space ship Soyiiz have quite different 
strategies. But in one detail, they 
were almost 100% similar; it's the 
mechanism of docking. What was 
your docking with [Foreign] Minister 
Shevardnadze? You know that your 
predecessor. Mr. Shultz, met 31 times 
with our Foreign Minister. How did 
this docking go? 

A. At the conclusion of our meet- 
ing today, the [Foreign] Minister char- 
acterized our discussions as very 
friendly and as having laid a good foun- 
dation for the establishment of a fine 
personal relationship between the two 
of us. I must say to you that I strongly 
share that view. 

The [Foreign] Minister and his 
wife were kind enough to entertain my 
wife and me last night at a private din- 
ner in their home. I thought that was 
very gracious. I thank him for his hos- 
pitality and look forward to reciprocat- 
ing when he next comes to the United 
States. I found that during my 
3V2 years as Secretary of the Treasury, 
personal relationships are very impor- 
tant in getting things accomplished, 

Department of State Bulletin/July 1989 



and the [Foreign] Minister and I talked 
about that last night, and I know he 
shares that view. 

Q. Which specific steps should be 
taken, vou think, to raise trust be- 
tween the U.S.S.R. and the United 
States? As a part of the increasing 
U.S. -Soviet exchange, would you 
agree to send a member of your 
family to permanently work in 
Moscow? If that's a good idea, who 
would that be? 

A. I don't have any members of my 
family that I can dictate to that way. 
We have something called freedom of 
choice in the United States. But I 
would certainly encourage — I do have 
an 11-year-old daughter, and when she 
gets a little bit older, if that was in any 
way a desire of hers, I would certainly 
be supportive of it, and I would encour- 
age It. 

Q. With every turn around in or- 
bit, our planet is shrinking and the 
whole of mankind, including the 
Soviet Union and the United States, 
are in the same boat. So helping each 
other, we are helping all of mankind. 
You have several points of view in 
Washington, and even inside the Ad- 
ministration, about our perestroika. I 
think that some people say that per- 
estroika will fail. Some people say 
let's wait and see. Wouldn't it be more 
productive to say not wait and see, 
but help and see, because helping us 
you are helping yourself, because of 
this new development in the world, 
because we're in the same boat? 

A. I've already said to you that we 
in the new Administration — and this 
goes for all of us, even someone who 
might think that perestroika is not 
going to succeed — we all, nevertheless, 
want it to succeed. We do not want to 
do anything that in any way obstructs 
that success or makes it more difficult, 
provided that it was in our national in- 
terest. We, after all, as you, have to 
continue to look after our own national 

We have not only a strongly held 
view that we want perestroika to suc- 
ceed, we have a strongly held view that 
whether or not it succeeds, it really is 
up to what happens here in the Soviet 
Union. It's up to your leadership and 
it's up to the Soviet people. It's not 
going to be determined by what we in 
the West do or don't do, as long as we 
are not obstructionists. As long as we 
cooperate, where cooperation is in our 
national interest. And I've just men- 
tioned to you that that's one of the 


things that I would hope we would be 
able to achieve more of — that's more co- 
operation and less confrontation. 

Q. This fifth basket is also, I 
think, a result of your new thinking. 

A. It was an idea that I had during 
the course of my confirmation hearings 
by the U.S. Senate. And I told the [For- 
eign] Minister today I was very pleased 
that he agreed to include this fifth 
basket and that he and the General Sec- 
retary both agreed to put added em- 
phasis on the resolution of regional 



MAY 12, 19895 

Let me start by simply saying that I've 
had an opportunity this morning to 
brief the NATO foreign ministers on 
my trip to the Soviet Union. I want to 
say a word or two about that briefing. 

I commented that I thought we had 
constructive, useful, and productive 
talks there; we laid a good foundation, I 
think, for future meetings. It's quite 
clear the United States and the Soviet 
Union are reengaged across the full 
range of our relations. We were pleased 
with the acceptance by the Soviet 
Union of added emphasis on regional is- 
sues in connection with the full range 
of issues between us. We were pleased 
they were willing to engage with us on 
transnational, or global, issues — that 
is, issues affecting the environment, 
terrorism, drugs. And we were pleased 
they were interested in talking to us 
about the problems presented by mis- 
sile and chemical proliferation around 
the world. 

Q. On the short-range nuclear 
missile problem that the United 
States has been having with West 
Germany, is it closer to resolution? 
Will it be a divisive issue at the sum- 
mit at the end of the month, do you 

A. You know, it has been our hope 
all along it would be resolved before the 
summit. But it's a very, very important 
issue, involving as it does questions of 
alliance security, and we remain hope- 
ful it might be resolved before the sum- 
mit. It has not as yet been resolved. 

Q. In your meeting this morning 
with [West German Foreign] Minister 
Genscher, did you and he come any 
closer to a meeting of the minds on 
how to deal with the issue of the 

A. I think that we, of course, had 
the opportunity for another full e.\- 
change on the issue and I think — I 
hope — he better understands our posi- 
tion. I can say I think we have under- 
stood his position for quite some time. 
There remain differences between us, 
but we will continue to try and work to 
resolve those differences with [Foreign] 
Minister Genscher and with other ele- 
ments of the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 

Q. Do you see yet the outline of a 
way to resolve this before the NATO 
summit meeting here in a few weeks? 

A. As I've said before, I'm hopeful 
we will be able to do that. We are en- 
gaged in the process of trying. I think I 
said a moment ago I remain hopeful. If 
we had bridged the gap, I would tell 
you, but we haven't as yet bridged that 

Q. Could you say whether you 
were surprised by Mr. Gorbachev's 
proposal yesterday for a unilateral re- 
duction, and if you feel that the tim- 
ing of that proposal, in particular, 
was in any way designed to try to ex- 
acerbate the split between the United 
States and the Germans? 

A. I don't think it was necessarily 
designed for that purpose. I think it 
was designed with a view to public 
opinion in mind. We have felt for some 
time we might see such a proposal. 
Frankly, as most of you know, we have 
been calling upon the Soviets for a longv 
time to do just this. We have pointed 
out that the NATO alliance has, over 
the past 10 years, reduced — unilaterally 
reduced — its tactical nuclear weapons 
by some 2,400. This is a reduction of 
500 the Soviet Union has announced. 
That is a very modest step by them 
when you consider the rather substan- 
tial imbalance in favor of the Warsaw 

I think there are some other points 
that ought to be noted with respect to 
this proposal. This was a proposal to 
remove 500 weapons from the territory 
of allies of the Soviet Union, not a pro- 
posal to remove these weapons from 
Europe. So it's quite limited in that 

Further, there is no commitment to 
destroy these weapons. Let me say one 
more time: The NATO alliance over the 
past 10 years has unilaterally reduced — 
through destruction — 2,400 of its weap- 
ons of this nature. 

Q. Has this proposal divided the 
alliance to any extent? Did you hear 
any difference of opinion? 

Department of State Bulletin/July 198£ 


A. As we went around the table 
lis morning, the alliance is absolutely, 
otally, completely unified with respect 
Jd this proposal. And each and every 
ne of the representatives there would 
tiaracterize it for you in the same way 
have characterized it for you. What's 
appening here is the Soviet Union is 
asically following the lead of the alli- 
nce. Finally, they are responding to 
'hat had been repeated calls on our 
(art that they unilaterally reduce some 
'f the very substantial imbalances that 
xist in their favor. So while it's a very 
lodest step, it's a step we should wel- 
ame, because it is in compliance, if you 
'ill, or in furtherance of calls the 
[ATO alliance has been making for 
uite some time. 

Q. Would you comment on the de- 

i'lgn of the Soviet proposal that in- 
ludes bombs on aircraft, an issue 
hich I think— where NATO has not 
.nilaterally reduced in the last few 

A. That's correct. The design of it 
[lould give us, I suppose, some pause 
ecause it doesn't just refer to land- 
ased nuclear weapons. It refers to the 
ill range of nuclear weapons — land- 
ased nuclear weapons, bombs on air- 
lanes, and artillery pieces as well. 
Ind some might well argue that is con- 
stant with a Soviet goal that there be 
complete denuclearization of Europe. 
Q. Could the United States at the 
ummit accept the establishment of 
ome kind of high-level NATO panel 
3 consider the issue of possibly enter- 
ig SNF negotiations in the future 
ithout making an explicit commit- 
lent one way or the other on when 
ctually to enter such talks? 

.\. Look, there are any number of 
)rmulations out there that are being 
^oposed from time to time by various 
arties that are interested in this de- 
^te. I think the last thing in the world 
should do is answer hypothetical 
juestions about different types of for- 
jiulations if we really expect to have 
ny chance of making progress before 
le summit actually begins. 

Q. The two proposals together — 
he proposals in the nuclear field and 
he proposals in the conventional 
ield being presented today in 
'ienna — are considered at least by 
■ne country to make it easier to pre- 
are negotiations with the aim of ob- 
aining mutually lower numbers 

hen it comes to SNF. Do you agree 

ith this? 

A. Do I agree that's the purpose of 
their making these proposals? 

Q. No, does it make it easier? 

A. Does it make it easier to do 
what now? 

Q. To prepare negotiations for 
the reduction. 

A. Does it make it easier to enter 
negotiations? Let me say that when you 
consider the point I made a moment 
ago, this unilateral reduction they've 
announced is quite apparently designed 
for public opinion. I think the answer 
to that would have to be no. We are 
glad to see this move. We would sug- 
gest to you that both this move and the 
announcement they made with respect 
to conventional forces was in answer to 
calls that have emanated from the alli- 
ance from time to time for unilateral 
reductions on the one hand, such as we 
have accomplished, and for specifics 
with respect to their conventional 
weapons proposals. We put specifics 
on the table when we announced the 
NATO position in Vienna. 

Q. Were there any voices in the 
meeting this morning suggesting that 
the United States should now enter 

A. There were none. But we really 
didn't debate this issue this morning. 
This morning's session was devoted al- 
most entirely to a read out on my meet- 
ings in the Soviet Union, both the 
ministerial meetings and the meetings 
with the General Secretary. 

Q. In your comments yesterday 
in Moscow in the press conference, 
where you said before you start to 
talk about negotiations you have to 
bring this imbalance in short-range 
systems down. You seem to be making 
a connection between the size of the 
imbalance and the prospects for nego- 
tiations. Could you explain, if you do 
feel that is a proper connection, how 
these two things are connected? 

A. I think it's proper to suggest, 
before we start talking about negotiat- 
ing with respect to these weapons, 
somehow there ought to be a resolution 
of the very significant imbalance that 
exists in favor of the Soviet Union. 

I think we have to take due note of 
the rather major imbalance that exists 
with respect to conventional forces, be- 
cause the reason we think we need a 
land-based nuclear deterrent has a lot 
to do with the fact of those imbalances. 
And I should say we're talking here, 
of course, about a defensive military 

strategy, the strategy of deterrence 
and flexible response. We're talking 
about a strategy that's been successful 
in maintaining the peace for 40 years 
so we have to be very careful as we 
move forward in this area. 

Q. If Mr. Gorbachev's proposals 
in the conventional field were indeed 
implemented, it would clearly create 
equal levels on both sides. Now let's 
say that happens, would you negotiate 

A. That's very hypothetical. I'm 
reminded of the old saying back home, 
"If the dog hadn't stopped, he would've 
caught the rabbit." I mean let's see it 
happen and then address that question. 

Q. This is your first visit to the 
Soviet Union. I wonder if you could 
talk for a second, what was your reac- 
tion to what you saw and what you 

A. I should say I thought — as I 
have indicated here — we had some very 
meaningful meetings. I detected a de- 
sire on the part of the Soviet leader- 
ship to engage, and to engage across all 
areas, not just arms control, without 
diminishing in any way the importance 
of arms control. 

I found them very interested in 
talking about ways in which we might 
move jointly to resolve some regional 
conflicts. I think this is important. We 
talked about whether or not there 
would be a way for the United States 
and the Soviet Union to move from a 
posture of addressing regional conflicts 
from the standpoint of confrontation 
and competition to one of cooperation. 
Maybe we can't, but we think it's impor- 
tant to explore that. I got the very dis- 
tinct feeling they think it's important 
to explore that. 

'There were candid discussions dur- 
ing our meetings about some of the 
problems, quite frankly, that the Soviet 
Union faces today in the area of eco- 
nomic matters. We discussed some of 
the problems they are facing in trying 
to implement these rather dramatic and 
revolutionary changes that are taking 
place, both political and economic 

I think I've said before we think 
these changes are real. We think they 
present opportunities that we in the 
West should be alert to and we should 
respond to. It was the purpose of the 
President in sending me at this time to 
make clear to the Soviet leadership 
that we are not only ready but anxious 
to reengage across the full range of our 

department of State Bulletin/July 1989 



We have completed our foreign pol- 
icy and national security reviews. I 
should have mentioned in my brief 
opening comments that we have estab- 
lished dates now for the resumption of 
all of the arms control negotiations that 
are ongoing between us, the latest of 
which is June 26. The bottom line from 
all of this is that we have a new Admin- 
istration in the United States, but we 
are back, totally reengaged in our dia- 
logue with the Soviet Union. 

Q. But doesn't it annoy you that 
Mr. Gorbachev used this first encoun- 
ter to, in effect, upstage the Adminis- 
tration? I mean it would be human 
nature, I think, to react other than 

A. I don't know whether you would 
call it upstaging. Our view is that be- 
cause of the big imbalances that exist in 
weaponry across the full range, there's 
no way we're going to win by trying to 
play a public relations game of outbid- 
ding the Soviet Union with respect to 
arms control issues like this. 

We must focus — and keep our at- 
tention focused — on what's really im- 
portant and that is the security of the 
West. We should approach this with 
prudence and with realism. Where we 
see deeds — as opposed to just words — 
we must be prepared to react. But we 
are entitled to look for deeds, and we 
are entitled to probe and look for real 
evidence of the so-called new thinking. 

Q. Can you envision NATO's jubi- 
lee summit without prior bridging of 
the gap between Washington and 
Bonn? Would it really be a disaster? 

A. A worse disaster would be if we 
let politics somehow endanger the secu- 
rity of the alliance. We simply cannot 
afford to do that. 

The Challenge of Change 
in U.S.-Soviet Relations 

'Press release 83 of May 12, 
-Press release 85 of May 13. 
^Press release 84 of May 16. 
■•Press release 86 of May 17. 
"Press release 87 of May 15. 


Secretary Baker's address before 
the Center for Strategic and Inter- 
national Studies (CSIS) on May i, 

I am honored to once again be here at 
the CSIS. Ever since its founding, I 
think this center has combined an un- 
derstanding of international problems 
with a vigorous debate over how Amer- 
ica should conduct its foreign policy. 
Those of us who have been privileged 
to serve this nation in one capacity or 
another — to serve this nation abroad or 
to participate in the formation of policy 
here at home — know full well the ar- 
dors of this task. We know, too, that 
assessments of reality are not enough. 
Judgments and words ultimately have 
to be turned into action if we are going 
to serve the public interest. 

A Time of Change 

The assessment of reality has become 
more difficult in today's world because 
the pace of international change has ac- 
celerated considerably. Some years ago, 
I happened across a scholarly study of 
the late 18th century entitled The Age 
of Revolutions, and perhaps one day 
historians might describe our times 
the same way. 

Just consider for a moment, if 
you will, some of the trends which are 
transforming our world. Democracy, an 
idea and political system challenged for 
much of the postwar era, really is on 
the offensive. Millions of people in our 
own hemisphere and in countries such 
as the Philippines and Korea have 
achieved, now, democratic govern- 
ments. Millions elsewhere — in Eastern 
Europe, in the Soviet Union, and in the 
People's Republic of China — are de- 
manding free institutions in a way that 
we've never seen before. So I think it is 
fair to say that the quest for democracy 
is the most vibrant political fact of 
these times. 

Another great transformation that 
we are seeing is economic. Free mar- 
kets, private initiative have become the 
new watchwords of economic develop- 
ment because those concepts work — 
and we know this very well now — 
actually work in practice. And closely 
allied to economic change is technologi- 
cal progress. The new technologies of 
information and communication have 

helped to create a global economy, an 
economy which transcends the tradi- 
tional boundaries of the nation state. 

There have been other transformat 
tions as well. Emerging technologies 
open new horizons, I think, for greatei- 
military stability. Other trends, 
though, such as the proliferation of 
chemical weapons and missiles — as 
David [Ambassador David Abshire, 
CSIS president] mentioned to you — 
the proliferation of those weapons to 
volatile regions and to irresponsible 
states present us with greater dangers 

And while we struggle to deal wit) 
traditional political and military prob- 
lems, I think we all must become in- 
creasingly aware of new transnational 
threats — threats such as environment; 
hazards, terrorism, the drug trade- 
that demand greater and greater intei 
national cooperation if they are going 1 
be properly addressed. 

Every nation has been affected in 
one way or another by these transfor- 
mations. And, as a consequence, realh: 
no international relationship has re- 
mained the same. This, of course, is 
especially true of U.S. -Soviet rela- 
tions. The result, I think, is a rare 
opportunity — a chance to transform 
our attitudes, our words, and, above 
all, our actions toward each other for 
the better. But this opportunity is 
also — and I think David touched 
on this as well — at the same time, a 
challenge — a challenge to understand 
first what is happening, and secondly, 
why and how to seize the opportunity 
for progress toward a freer and more 
peaceful international community. 

The Promise of Perestroika 
in the Soviet Union 

The challenge of change in U.S.- 
Soviet relations begins, I think, with 
change — fundamental change — in the 
Soviet Union. For nearly half a centun 
now, we and our allies have confrontec 
a Soviet superpower along the great 
fault lines of the postwar period. This; 
struggle has been rooted in two pro- 
foundly different visions — the demo- 
cratic vision and the communist visior 
We differ over the rights of the indivic 
ual; we differ over the power of the 
state; we differ over the rule of law, th 
use of force, the role of religion. In 


Department of State Sulletin/July 19{ 


;hort, we differ over what we consider 
be the basic values of society. 

While we may have erred from 
ime to time, on the whole, I think it's 
fair to say that we in the West have 
[)een very, very faithful to our vision. 
iJreat sacrifices have been made. The 
)urdens were — and, indeed, the bur- 
lens still are sometimes — very diffi- 
cult to bear. There were, and there 
dways will be, risks. But we upheld 
)ur values. And we prevented for 40 
fears war in Europe. 

Surely, some of the change we see 
low in the Soviet Union is a conse- 
[uence of our success. There would be 
10 quest for democratic institutions 
f democratic institutions had failed. 
Phere would be less soul-searching of 
he communist vision if the democratic 
'ision had somehow faded or disap- 
)eared. And an alliance of free nations, 
vorking together, sharing risks and re- 
;ponsibilities while pursuing freedom 
ind extending economic progress, has 
ilways, I think, offered a rather con- 
'incing alternative. 

I think it can also be said, however, 
hat the dramatic changes which are 
weeping the Soviet Union are not due 
.imply to Western fortitude. It is also 
he failure of the communist vision to 
iroduce results, judged by its own 
itandards, that inspires calls fov per- 
stivika. It is the fear that outdated 
logma and unworkable institutions will 
eave Soviet society behind — isolated 
rem technological progress and the 
flobal economy — that really accelerates 
eform in the Soviet Union. And just as 
lurely, change is motivated also by the 
)elief of some in the Soviet Union that 
•evolutions have a tough time living by 
logans alone. 

The President has said and I have 
laid that we have absolutely no wish to 
lee perestroika fail. To the contrary, 
ve would very much like it to succeed. 
^nd that achievement could have great 
nternational effect. 

As Foreign Minister Shevardnadze 
old the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Af- 
airs, and I quote, ". . . we must labor 
;olidly to convince the people that we 
ire thinking first and foremost about 
heir interests. . . . We are aware of 
ind declare the truth that foreign poli- 
cy cannot be divorced from domestic 
•ealities." A process that promises to 
ncrease the freedom and improve the 
veil-being of the Soviet peoples really 
s in everyone's interest. A process that 
)romises to change Soviet internation- 
il behavior toward diplomatic solutions 

and problemsolving, rather than the 
use of force or intimidation, I think, 
offers hope for a radically improved 
international order. 

...we have absolutely no 
wish to see perestroika 

That's why we've been so encour- 
aged by the words and the concepts of 
what General Secretary Gorbachev re- 
fers to as the "new thinking." And in a 
number of places, I think it's fair to say 
that words have turned into realities. 
The General Secretary pledged that 
Soviet troops would leave Afghanistan 
on February 15, and they did. He 
signed the INF [Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces] Treaty, and SS-20s are 
being destroyed. Last December, he 
announced unilateral troop cuts in Eu- 
rope, and now we've seen Soviet tanks 
leaving Hungary. Soon we hope to see 
them destroyed. 

The Soviets have begun releasing 
political prisoners. And, as we all 
know, great strides have been made in 
permitting freer emigration. Most im- 
portantly, the Soviets now talk of en- 
forcing the rule of law and other 
guarantees of individual rights which 
are very, very familiar and very basic 
to us in the West. Limited elections 
have taken place. The growing dissat- 
isfaction with the Soviet system and 
pressure for change is unmistakable, 
and it is widespread. 

Words of hope are, indeed, not lim- 
ited just to the Soviet Union. In Po- 
land, the free labor union Solidarity 
has been legalized following unprece- 
dented roundtable agreements. And 
in Hungary, the mechanics of a multi- 
party system are actively being 

In the economic sphere as well, the 
spread of private ownership, coopera- 
tives, and decentralization of power 
creates some promising opportunities. 
Soon we may see the Soviets move 
forward to join the global economy. I 
think we would welcome, and welcome 
strongly, a Soviet economy open to 
world markets with a freely convertible 

We also recognize, however, that 
in this critical area, as in many others, 
there are many hard choices to be 
made. It is far too early for us to know, 
of course, whether perestroika will or 
will not succeed. But it begins and it 
ends with the people of the Soviet 
Union, and they will determine wheth- 
er it succeeds or whether it fails. 

New Thinking and Old Habits 

These great changes, however, are not 
the only realities of the Soviet Union 
today. There is an uneasy and, I might 
add, a not always peaceful coe.xistence 
between the slogans of the new think- 
ing and the reality of both Soviet capa- 
bilities and Soviet actions. We must all, 
I think, face the fact that the Soviets 
continue to pose a significant military 
threat to Western interests. Even after 
the unilateral Soviet reductions in Eu- 
rope take place, the Warsaw Pact would 
retain a two-to-one edge in tanks and 
artillery. At a time when we hear talk 
of unilateral reductions, of the need to 
cut defense spending, and of the neces- 
sity to transfer precious resources 
from the military economy to the civil- 
ian sector, 3,500— that's right, 3,500— 
new Soviet tanks continue to roll off 
the production lines each year That 
happens to be a production rate five 
times greater than our own. 

For all the talk of "defensive de- 
fense," Soviet military exercises still 
continue to show a marked inclination 
for taking the offensive. For all the talk 
of openness, the Soviets have yet to 
publish a real defense budget — a bud- 
get that would reveal what the Soviets 
really are spending on defense; a bud- 
get that would provide a guide to So- 
viet defense production; a budget, in 
effect, that would show the direction 
of future Soviet defense plans. If they 
were to publish such a budget, I think 
we could then evaluate the Soviet 
pledge to cut their defense budget by 
14%, and we could measure its impact. 
Indeed, we challenge them to present 
such a budget and to publish openly, as 
we do, the details of their worldwide 
forces and deployments. 

For all of the talk of a common Eu- 
ropean home — and we hear a lot of that 
now — the European house remains 
divided by Soviet force. If there is 
ever to be a true "common European 
house," the Soviets must no longer pre- 
vent the residents from moving from 
room to room. But, today, the [Berlin] 
Wall still stands, and the Brezhnev doc- 
trine remains unrenounced. 

Pepartment of State Bulletin/July 1989 



Unfortunately, there are still many 
regions where the new thinking has yet 
to take root. We still see — and we've 
mentioned this from time to time — 
many signs of the old thoughts and the 
old actions in Central America where 
the Soviets sent over $500 million in 
military aid to the Sandinistas just 
last year. In the Middle East, long- 
range bombers have just been sent to 
Qadhafi. In Korea, the heavily fortified 
North — supported by Soviet arms and 
aid — still threatens the South. And in 
the Far East, of course, the Soviets 
continue their occupation of Japan's 
Northern Territories. 

exchange and negotiations already ex- 
ists. Our purpose here, I think, should 
be to institutionalize these changes to 
make them, if we can, more difficult to 
reverse. And we want both Soviet in- 
tentions and capabilities to become 
more transparent. 

Building Upon Past Successes: 
Human Rights and Arms Control 

Human rights will always head the list. 
As a democracy, of course, we could 
not do otherwise and still be true to 
our own values. We wall always be con- 
cerned about how the Soviet Union and 

Our foreign policy has to be based on an understand- 
ing of change in the Soviet Union, but it cannot 
wholly rely on that change to produce the results that 
we want. 

An Active Agenda 

So the reality of Soviet change, as I 
have described it from both sides, I 
think, is both promising and problem- 
atic. How do w^e address the very 
serious difficulties remaining on the 
agenda, while giving due credit to the 
remarkable progress that has been 
made in the past few years? 

There are some who say that we 
don't need to do much of anything be- 
cause trends are so favorable to us. 
Their counsel is to sit tight and simply 
await further Soviet concessions. 

1 don't happen to be of this school. 
I don't think we can be passive in the 
face of these great strategic changes, 
nor can we simply yield the initiative to 
a Soviet agenda that may not reflect 
the best interests of the West. Our for- 
eign policy has to be based on an under- 
standing of change in the Soviet Union, 
but it cannot wholly rely on that change 
to produce the results that we want. 

Our actions, of course, will play an 
important role in shaping the future of 
U.S. -Soviet relations. Our policy has 
got to be to press forward with our 
agenda, to test the application of Soviet 
new thinking again and again. 

In areas such as human rights and 
arms control, much progress has been 
made, and a framework for diplomatic 


the governments in Eastern Europe 
treat their own citizens. That is impor- 
tant not only for humanitarian rea- 
sons but also because we believe that 
a government's treatment of its own 
people is a good measure of how it 
will treat other states. 

We are encouraged by recent Sovi- 
et performance with respect to human 
rights and democratization, and we 
hope to see these changes become a 
permanent part of the Soviets' legal 
system and political code. By expres- 
sing these hopes, we seek not to inter- 
fere in Soviet affairs but only to see the 
fulfillment of the promises once made 
by the Soviet Union when it signed the 
Helsinki accords. These promises were, 
after all, reiterated by General Secre- 
tary Gorbachev at the United Nations 
as recently as December. 

We shall also continue with the ex- 
isting arms control framework because 
it serves our objectives of stable deter- 
rence at lower levels of arms and risk. 
We intend to preserve and to strength- 
en this framework. Indeed, the United 
States will soon suggest a date for the 
resumption of the strategic arms talks. 
The talks on conventional forces in Eu- 
rope and confidence-building measures 
that began in Vienna last month, I 
think, can contribute substantially to 
our objectives of deterrence at lower 
levels of force. These give us a forum to 

challenge the Soviets and their allies ti 
come clean on the true level and nature 
of their forces and to engage in careful 
reductions that diminish the threat to 
the West. As I said in Vienna, current 
force levels and structure in Europe 
are not engraved in stone. 

Broadening the Foundation 
for the Future 

But the challenge of change cannot sto) 
there. Indeed, new thinking in Soviet 
foreign policy gives us a unique oppor- 
tunity to take Moscow- at its word — 
take it at its word — across all areas of 
U.S. -Soviet relations. Are the Soviets 
willing to live up to the promise of 
their rhetoric? Are the Soviets really 
prepared to recognize the constraints 
of an interdependent world? Is Moscow 
really ready to abandon the quest for 
unilateral gain? Can military confron- 
tation really be replaced by political 
dialogue and even by cooperation? 
Will the slogans of new thinking be 
translated into enduring action? 

The only way to answer these que* 
tions is to test the new thinking on is- 
sues that go beyond the recent intense 
focus on human rights and arms con- 
trol. We face new threats and new 
challenges in regional conflicts, in the 
proliferation of advanced weapons, 
and in pressing transnational issues. 

By testing Moscow across the 
board, we have the opportunity to turr 
many of the opportunities presented b; 
the new thinking into reality. We can 
establish frameworks and baselines fo: 
common dialogue in areas where no 
real dialogue or basis for cooperation 
exists today. We can see whether tht- 
new thinking is real once we probe be- 
yond the slogans. We can help fill tlu' 
new thinking with content, and we can 
take advantage of change in the Soviet 
Union to achieve a new level of coopera 
tion and international stability. And wi 
can also, while we're at it, determine 
where the old thinking still holds force 
Let me, if I might, be just a bit morr 

First, we will focus on regional 
conflicts, a significant source of East- 
West and international tension in the 
postwar period. While the Soviet 
Union has not necessarily been the 
cause of these conflicts, too often Son i- 1 
et military aid and diplomacy have im- 
peded the search for solutions and have 

Department of State Bulletin/July 198! 


even sometimes encouraged the vio- 
lence. Now is the time to engage the 
Soviet Union in a serious dialogue to 
determine whether such policies really 
have changed. And the slogans of new 
thinking must be given content for this 
dialogue to work. 

The Soviets have got to understand 
that their inclusion in the important 
process of resolving regional disputes 
irequires them to act responsibly and 
Inot just to make high-profile assertions 
jabout a peace-loving intent. Establish- 
|ing a basis for cooperation depends not 
jon a Soviet commitment to vague gen- 
eralities of peace but to the responsible 
behavior that will, in fact, make peace 

There can be little doubt that the 
proliferation of advanced weapons 
around the globe creates a strong need, 
|and it creates a greater urgency, to de- 
velop a common framework for resolv- 
ing regional disputes. Regional wars 
are unlikely to remain limited for very 
long. Rather, they are likely to escalate 
quickly, drawing us into conflicts that 
we should have helped to resolve in the 
first place. 

Second, in the areas of ballistic 
missile and chemical weapons prolifera- 
tion, we have only begun to establish 
new international rules addressing 
these problems — rules to which the So- 
viets have not, as yet, agreed. It will 
be an objective of mine in Moscow next 
iweek to determine whether we might 
idevelop a framework for working to- 
gether to control a phenomenon which 
threatens us all. 

Third, we will approach the Sovi- 
ets on transnational issues, partic- 
ularly the problems of the environment, 
which do not respect national bound- 
aries. Pollution, drugs, and terrorism 
are all issues that should join, not sepa- 
rate, the Soviet Union and the United 
States. These are new testing grounds 
for our ability to work together. I be- 
lieve that we can discover whether the 
Soviet Union seriously understands 
the need to deal with such issues, or 
whether it is prepared to pretend that 
old thinking will somehow isolate 
Moscow from the consequences. 

The Soviets have got to understand that their in- 
clusion in the important process of resolving regional 
disputes requires them to act responsibly and not just 
to make high-profile assertions about a peace-loving 

Meeting the Challenge of Change 

I'd like to conclude on a note of histori- 
cal perspective. Students of American- 
Soviet relations are familiar with De 
Tocqueville's famous prophecy that the 
world would eventually be dominated 
by the United States and the Russian 
Empire — the one based on freedom, the 
other based on a denial of freedom. 
That prophecy very nearly came to 
pass. But in my view, a wise American 
diplomacy prevented it. An important 
part of our vision was the rejection of a 
condominium, of a division of the world 
according to spheres of influence. In- 
stead, we sought to build up our allies, 
to assemble a coalition of free nations — 
free to seek their own destiny however 
they wished, just as our citizens are 
free to develop their own individual 

Now we are living in a time when 
these Western values are in the ascen- 
dancy, when our allies have become 
strong and, for the most part, prosper- 
ous. This changing world has chal- 
lenged the Soviet Union. It is a chal- 
lenge that the Soviet Union, acting in 
its own interests, has tried to meet 
through perestroika. Yes, we have 
heard claims of new thinking, and we 
have seen some of it translated into ac- 
tion. And we are saying to the Soviet 
Union; Let us continue. Free people 
can work together peacefully, linked by 
a common destiny. Let us deal, there- 
fore, with the new problems of a differ- 
ent era guided by a vision of a free and 
peaceful world. 

'Press release 78 of May 5, 1989. 

FY 1990 Assistance Request 
for Sub-Saharan Africa 

by Alison Rosenberg 

Statement prepared for the Sub- 
coynmittee on Foreign Operations of the 
House Appropriations Committee on 
April H, 1989. Mrs. Rosenberg is 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Afri- 
can Affairs.^ 

It is a pleasure to be here as the Bush 
Administration begins to address the 
challenges and opportunities that we 
have before us in our policies toward 
sub-Saharan Africa. There is a sense 
throughout the Administration — and, I 
believe, here in the Congress as well — 
that a new era of cooperation between 
the Administration and Capitol Hill is 
possible in the making and implementa- 
tion of our foreign policy and in the pro- 
vision of foreign assistance to meet our 
policy objectives. 

In the very recent past. Congress 
and the e.xecutive branch have worked 
together to provide desperately needed 
relief to areas stricken by natural dis- 
asters and those torn by civil war. We 
are working closely with the Congress, 
and specifically this committee, to 
meet our obligations in terms of sup- 
port for the UN Transition Assistance 
Group (UNTAG) for Namibia. Last 
year the Congress and the Administra- 
tion agreed that more economic assist- 
ance was required for Africa, and you 
provided that assistance. We look for- 
ward to working with you and your 
staff on matters of mutual interest and 

For FY 1990, the Administration is 
requesting $820 million in economic as- 
sistance for sub-Saharan Africa and 
$85 million for military assistance. 
As in previous years, the emphasis on 

Department of State Bulletin/July 1989 



our assistance is where it belongs for 
Africa, and that is on the economic 
side. We are i-equesting approximately 
$10.00 in economic assistance for every 
$1.00 of military assistance. 

The request for assistance for 
Africa for the coming fiscal year re- 
mains consistent with previous years. 
Our request last year (FY 1989) was for 
$819 million; the increase this year 
over last is entirely on the economic 
side of the ledger. Over the past 5 
years, the request for foreign assis- 
tance for Africa has been just at, or 
just under, $1 billion. It has always 
heavily emphasized the economic needs 
in Africa. 

We do, however, also have serious, 
legitimate military assistance require- 
ments in Africa, and the recent deep 
cuts in appropriations and the ear- 
marking of 94% of the military assist- 
ance funds have left little for African 
programs. This year, as in 1988, we 
were able to allocate just over $25 mil- 
lion for military assistance for our 

This funding trend is jeopardizing 
our ability to maintain any credibility 
with our African friends. We consider 
our funding request to be the minimum 
necessary for U.S. security interests. 
These include promoting regional sta- 
bility, forging key liaison channels with 
African militaries, fostering the mili- 
tary sense of professionalism as well as 
nationbuilding values, and maintaining 
access to African facilities. 

I should point out that the FY 1990 
request contains no funding for any 
Namibia programs. We are well aware 
that a newly independent Namibia will 
have significant requirements for as- 
sistance. The donor community is al- 
ready beginning to look at those re- 
quirements, but we are not yet in a 
position to predict what will be needed 
and what the United States should be 
providing. We will be working with the 
United Nations, with the donor com- 
munity, and with Namibia once it is 
independent to determine Namibian 
requirements. According to the timeta- 
ble, Namibia will become independent 
during FY 1990. As Namibia's econom- 
ic requirements become clear, we will 
begin to work with the Congress to try 
to meet those requirements. 

As we begin a new Administration, 
I thought it would be best to review 
where we have been over the past 
8 years and set a context for the next 
4 years. My review will relate our poli- 
cies to the resources needed to meet 
our policy objectives. 


Current Situation 

By and large, U.S. policy — and policy 
objectives — for Africa have been very 
consistent over the last 10 years or so. 
As we work with the Congress, we 
hope that our overall objectives will 
continue to enjoy a healthy degree of 
support during the Bush years. Unfor- 
tunately the resources appropriated 
over the years have fallen short of al- 
lowing us to meet our earlier stated ob- 
jectives. Foreign assistance resources, 
both economic and military, plum- 
meted from a high in 1985 "of $1,256 bil- 
lion to a low of $882 million in 1987 and 
have risen only slightly in 1989 to about 
$905 million. This swing of $400 million 
in a 2-year period came at a time when 
economic and military assistance re- 
sources were needed most to assist our 
African friends and accomplish some of 
our most important objectives — eco- 
nomic reform, access to military facili- 
ties, and gaining influence with left- 
leaning and nonaligned states. The in- 
ability to infuse resources at critical 
times has kept us from achieving key 

Objectives and Policy 

Objectives which will continue to have 
legitimacy for at least the near term — 
with some fine tuning as necessary for 
unfolding events — can be stated as 

• Promote a more pro-Western po- 
litical and economic orientation in Afri- 
can countries, strengthening their 
impetus toward market-oriented eco- 
nomic reform and self-reliant develop- 
ment strategies; 

• Deny strategic advantage and in- 
fluence to those countries or groups 
with objectives inimical to our own and 
continue to follow through on Cuban 
withdrawal from Angola and build on 
Soviet cooperation in southern and 
eastern Africa; 

• Continue to work toward a resolu- 
tion of the southern Africa conflict by 
pressing for racial justice and repre- 
sentative government in South Africa, 
while supporting a successful transi- 
tion to independence for Namibia and 
working for a settlement of the Angolan 
civil war and national reconciliation as 
well as for peaceful solutions to all in- 
ternal conflicts in Africa; 

• Retain military access in East 
Africa and U.S. Government facilities 
in Liberia and our cooperative relation- 
ships with Zaire and Chad; 

• Work to strengthen respect for 
human rights in all African countries — 

develop comjjrehensive programs for 
use of "human rights fund" resources; 

• Sustain our partnership with key 
African states and cooperate with the 
French and other allies in the common 
effort to contain and, where oppor- 
tunities occur, roll back Libyan inroads 
and influence; and 

• Support refugee programs and 
work to alleviate suffering and prevent 
death from famine, disease — including 
acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS) — and natural disasters. 

Economic Assistance Required 

As I mentioned earlier, this year the 
Administration is seeking approx- 
imately $820 million in economic assist- 
ance for sub-Saharan Africa. Of that 
request, we propose $565 million for 
the Development Fund for Africa, a 
total of $171 million in PL 480 food as- 
sistance, and $83.3 million for economic 
support funds (ESF). 

An increasing flow of U.S. assist- 
ance will be necessary to sustain the 
trend toward continent-wide abandon- 
ment of statist and antimarket econom- 
ic strategies and to promote African 
accommodation to and respect for the 
existing international economic order. 
In addition to government and interna- 
tional institution-provided assistance, 
we need to attract greater U.S. private 
sector resources to support Africa's 
economic growth. Consolidation of the 
existing movement toward a reduction 
of statist economic strategies and al- 
lowing greater freedom to the private 
sector is a major American success. 
The economic bind in which most Afri- 
can states find themselves, and the 
prevalence of one-party and military 
regimes, have tended to promote a 
search for radical solutions in, for ex- 
ample, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and 
LTganda. Severe economic problems 
have created low cost opportunities for 
Libya, Cuba, North Korea, and, in 
some cases, the Soviet Union. By con- 
trast an African disavowal of statism 
has the potential, over time, to trans- 
form and stabilize the international 
politico-economic landscape to U.S. ad- 
vantage. We need to do everything we 
can to promote continuation of this 

Market economics is now on trial 
in Africa, as government after govern- 
ment moves at our urging toward polit- 
ically risky structural adjustment and 
economic reform policies. The LInited 
States has a high stake in making this 
approach work. Our goal must be to 
demonstrate convincingly that it is the 

Department of State Bulletin/July 1989 


Vest which is the natural and effective 
:artner of African countries seeking to 
evelop and modernize, just as it is the 
/est which steps forward to mitigate 
nd offset the effects of natural 

Economic Action Program. We 

annot afford to back away from Africa 
t a time when we believe it is walking 
3ward us. Critical to the success of our 
fforts to assist Africa is an under- 
tanding that sub-Saharan Africa pre- 
ents unique problems which merit 
pecial solutions. As African govern- 
lents adopt e.xtraordinary measures, 
he goal of donors and creditors will be 
5 provide enough resources to permit 
fie new economic policies to bear fruit, 
'he international agenda will focus on 
'orking with other donors to help re- 
uce Africa's debt burden and increas- 
ig the effectiveness of assistance, 
ither major activities will include: 

• Marshaling public and private 
eetor resources for growth; 

• Assuring the International Mone- 
iry Fund's (IMF) and multilateral de- 
elopment banks' continued active and 
ffective roles in sub-Saharan Africa; 

• Enhancing donor coordination; 

• E.xploring ways to improve the 
uality of our bilateral activities; and 

• Sustaining progress on the part 
f the more than two dozen sub- 
aharan African governments which 
ave courageously adopted fundamen- 
il economic reform and adjustinent 

The international atmosphere is 
nusually receptive to innovative ap- 
roaches to sub-Saharan African eco- 
omlc problems. The Venice economic 
ummit in 1987 endorsed the concept of 
more generous Paris Club treatment 
f the poorest debtors and an e.xpanded 
MF Structural Adjustment Facility, 
he IMF and World Bank are spear- 
eading efforts to increase conces- 
ional flows to African reformers, to 
|aise levels of fast-disbursing assist- 
ance, and to develop a strategy to alle- 
iate sub-Saharan Africa's 

We face the diplomatic challenge of 
nsuring that African hopes are not 
aised to unrealistic heights in these 
ight budget times. But we must also 
ontinue to assess ways to muster re- 
sources commensurate with African re- 
irmers' needs. In our contacts with 
ub-Saharan African leaders, we must 
onsistently stress the importance of 
ound economic performance, while un- 

Cease-Fire in Sudan 

MAY 5, 1989> 

The cease-fire in southern Sudan, now 
approved by both sides, is a most wel- 
come, [Hisitive development on the path 
to ending the human tragedy. Both 
sides deserve credit for taking this im- 
portant step which sets an encouraging 
benchmark and, we hope, signals their 
determination to negotiate a peaceful, 
lasting end to this conflict. A political 

solution requires will, vision, and 
statesmanship by both sides. We re- 
main poised to help support this proc- 
ess in any appropriate way. 

As the cease-fire begins, we urge 
all Sudanese to use it effectively to 
continue prepositioning critically 
needed relief supplies for the welfare 
of victims of the war. 

'Read til news correspondents by De- 
partment spokesman Margaret DeB. Tut- 
wiler. ■ 

derstanding the political and social lim- 
its to and consequences of change. 

U.S. aid is essential to enable Afri- 
can governments to make and sustain 
the tough policy measures necessary 
for policy reform and to create condi- 
tions which will eventually attract the 
foreign and domestic private invest- 
ment necessary for a sustained eco- 
nomic growth. Should we be unable to 
sustain necessary assistance levels, we 
risk the collapse or delay of economic 
reforms, injury to friendly govern- 
ments, and acrimonious charges of a 
breach of faith. 

Development ind for Africa 
(DFA)/Economic Support Funds 

(ESF). In 1988 the Congress created 
the Development F\md for Africa via 
specific line items in the FY 1988 ap- 
propriations legislation. In the process 
of creating the DFA, most ESF pro- 
grams were folded into the develop- 
ment account, and the ESF account was 
decreased by more than one-third from 
$165 million in FY 1987 to $90 million 
in FY 1988. 

Military Assistance Required 

We view selective arms transfers as a 
valid instrument among the various in- 
struments or levers of influence that 
we possess. We have acknowledged that 
African governments and militaries 
have legitimate military requirements. 
Bilateral military assistance programs 
have a variety of justifications: 

• To gain access to military and ci- 
vilian facilities for our own military 

• To gain access to senior African 
officials, many of whom are military; 

• To respond to the legitimate re- 
quests by a number of governments for 
technical and equipment assistance to 
organize and professionalize their 

The FY 1990 military assistance 
request continues to be focused on 
countries where we have important 
military interests — the Horn coun- 
tries, Kenya, Chad, and Zaire. We seek 
to expand our civic action and coastal 
security programs from $2 million this 
year to".$6 million in FY 1990. We be- 
lieve that through these programs, we 
can help turn the military toward na- 
tionbuilding activities. 

U.S. military assistance will con- 
tinue to go primarily for spares and 
support of previously furnished equip- 
ment and will emphasize basic training 
and infrastructure requirements — 
transportation, engineering, communi- 
cations, and personal equipment such 
as boots and uniforms. Of the $85 mil- 
lion requested for FY 1990, I would 
stress that $73 million addresses only 
necessary support, not additional 
equipment for attrition or new pro- 
grams that are badly needed in some 
countries. Another $12 million would 
fund training under the international 
military education and training 
(IMET) program. 

Overview. As I mentioned earlier, 
military assistance to Africa — e.xcept 
for IMET funding — has been reduced 
to a fraction of the 1985 level of 
$158 million. FY 1989 military assis- 
tance for all of sub-Saharan Africa has 
fallen to just $25 million — $25 million 
to support 18 individual programs in 

In relative terms, we have put very 
little military assistance into Africa. 
As stated above, the vast majority of 

)epartment of State Bulletin/July 1989 



U.S. assistance has gone for basic de- 
velopment and military infrastructure 

We have, however, been able to 
ma.ximize our effectiveness through 
careful use of scarce resources by es- 
tablishing meaningful, small programs 
in countries that require only limited 
funding to meet their needs. Two of 
these programs are the civic action and 
coastal security programs mentioned 
above. These two regional programs 
have enjoyed the interest of the Con- 
gress and been very successful with 
the Africans. 

Civic Action Program. The civic 
action program is designed to demon- 
strate that there are excellent peace- 
time uses of the African military. Too 
often, particularly in Africa, the mili- 
tary is seen by the civilian population 
as a liability and drain on the society 
when, in many cases, the military is a 
competent, trained work force that can 
be an asset to the nation. Civic action 
projects are primarily engineering 
projects, such as road and airfield im- 
provement, construction of health clin- 
ics and schools for the military and 
their dependents, and water projects. 

Coastal Security Program. The 

coastal security program is even more 
successful. It provides assistance to 
West African navies to allow them to 
better patrol their coasts and exclusive 
economic zones. Although only 4 years 
old, the program has made an enor- 
mous difference in the abilities of these 
small navies to enforce fishing agree- 
ments and apprehend poachers and 
smugglers. The coastal security pro- 
gram has gained us direct access to top 
leadership in half a dozen countries in 
West Africa. 

Due to the decline in overall fund- 
ing levels, we were able to fund these 
two valuable programs at only $5 mil- 
lion total in FY 1988 and 1989, com- 
pared to an initial level of $5 million in 
1985 — a level we had hoped to maintain 
to meet our objectives. This year's re- 
quest is for $6 million. 

The decline in military assistance 
for African countries has put U.S. re- 
liability and credibility in jeopardy. 
One of the key tenets of U.S. military 
assistance is that we support what we 
provide. In Africa we have not done 
that. This year we are unable to pro- 
vide sufficient funding even to support 
Niger's two C-130 aircraft. By our cal- 
culations, approximately $73 million 
(the FY 1990 request) is required annu- 
ally to provide support, spares, and 

maintenance for the equipment we have 

The reduction in military assist- 
ance for Africa, which has meant a cut- 
off of assistance for FY 1988 and FY 
1989 in many countries, has put U.S. 
access to facilities and leadership in 
grave danger this year. Our negotiated 
access agreements with Kenya and 
Somalia are subject to renegotiation in 
1990. These agreements, originated 
under the Carter Administration and 
sustained by succeeding Administra- 
tions, are in support of U.S. strategic 
interests in the Middle East and Per- 
sian Gulf, Southwest Asia, and Indian 
Ocean. Continued access may not be 
possible if we are unable to provide 
higher amounts of military 
assistance — assistance which we have 
agreed is a legitimate requirement. 

The combination of lower funding 
levels and high earmarks in FY 1989 
left only $25 million in military assist- 
ance for all of Africa. Because Con- 
gress earmarked $15 million for 
Kenya, this left us with only $10 mil- 
lion in grant funds to spread across the 
continent for all of our other key 
programs — Somalia, Zaire, Chad, civic 
action, and coastal security, to name a 
few. This is an excellent example of 
why the Administration opposes ear- 
marks even when, as in the case of Ken- 
ya, an important friend benefits. 

One of our most difficult accounts 
in the Horn is Somalia. Concerns about 
human rights and the insurgency in the 
north led to congressional holds on 
ESF (balance-of-payments) support for 
the government. We fully share these 
concerns. National reconciliation and 
human rights improvements are in the 
U.S. interest as well as Somalia's. The 
progress that has been achieved since 
last summer demonstrates that our pol- 
icy on this issue is taking hold. Somalia 
remains important to us, both in politi- 
cal terms and as a location for U.S. 
forces to exercise, fly training mis- 
sions, stage surveillance missions in 
the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, 
and, most importantly, as it has the 
only facilities available to our ships and 
planes near the Bab el Mandeb Strait, 
through which an increasing amount of 
oil flows. In assisting this friendly gov- 
ernment to resolve its internal prob- 
lems, we should remember that it is in 
our interest to do so not only for bilat- 
eral and regional objectives but to 
maintain our negotiated access to 
Somali facilities. 

We understand fully the foreign as- 
sistance constraints due to the serious 
U.S. domestic budget situation. We also 
know Africa and African countries 

have the lowest worldwide priority for 
military assistance funding. But the 
United States does have a military in- 
terest in Africa, and we have well- 
defined policy objectives that necessi- 
tate a reasonable funding level for our 
military assistance programs. 

Foreign Assistance Strategy 

Africa's most pressing needs are eco- 
nomic and humanitarian, but many 
countries which have dire economic 
needs also have serious security 
threats due to aggression or internal 
instability requiring military assist- 
ance to deal with the situation. We can 
not address one need without 
addressing the other. We must recog- 
nize that in many African countries, 
the military is often the most powerfu 
political and social institution and 
clearly benefits from material assist- 
ance provided with professional 

Although real growth in the for- 
eign assistance account is unlikely in 
the near term, we still seek the where- 
withal to respond to both urgent 
requirements and windows of oppor- 
tunity, particularly on the economic 
front. Both economic and military re- 
sources need be increased only mod- 
estly to meet our current policy 
objectives if those resources can be 
flexibly and effectively applied. 

The consequences of further redui 
tions in our assistance in terms of in- 
stability on the economic and security 
fronts are not in our interest. The cos 
to the United States in dollar terms ti 
prevent this is minimal. We believe 
that dollar for dollar, we get an excel- 
lent return on investment of foreign a: 
sistance funds in Africa. We have a 
tremendous opportunity at relatively 
low cost, and we should not pass it up. 

In conclusion I want to reempha- 
size our desire and willingness to worl 
with the Congress to make our assist- 
ance as effective as possible. I believe 
that the recent examples of the creatic 
of the Development Fund for Africa an 
the instituting of the civic action and 
coastal security programs under the 
military assistance account are evi- 
dence that we can work together to 
maximize the effectiveness of our re- 
sources to achieve U.S. national objec- 
tives in Africa. I look forward to a 
continuing partnership. 

'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee an 
will be available from the Superintendent i 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 


Department of State Bulletin/July 198 



Biological Weapons Proliferation 


by H. Allen Holmes 

Statement pefore the Senate Gov- 
ernmental Affairs Committee and its 
Permanent Sii,bcommittee on Investi- 
jatiuns on May 17, 1989. Ambassador 
Holmes is Assistant Secretary for 
Politico-Military Affairs. '■ 

I am pleased to appear before you to- 
iay to discuss the foreign policy impli- 
cations of the problem of biological 
weapons proliferation. These hearings 
ire coming at an opportune time. We 
ire presently witnessing a disturbing 
md dangerous trend in the increasing 
efforts by states to acquire biological 
Afeapons. The technology to produce 
:hem is improving, and the agents 
;hemselves are becoming ever more 

I should like to state from the out- 
set that the United States is adamantly 
jpposed to the development, produc- 
tion, or use of biological weapons, and 
f/e are committed to doing all we can 
;o eliminate them from the world's 

I would like first to give you some 
background on the development of U.S. 
policy on biological weapons and on the 
oresent state of play in this area. I will 
';hen describe how we are working to 
ichieve our goal of eliminating these 


There are, in fact, two relevant inter- 
lational agreements, both of which 
lave proven inadequate to prevent the 
jroliferation of biological and toxin 

The 1925 Geneva protocol prohibits 
;he first use in war of chemical and 
piological weapons but not their devel- 
apment, production, possession, or 
transfer. The 1972 Biological and Toxin 
^Veapons Convention prohibits the de- 
velopment, production, stockpiling, ac- 
quisition, retention, and transfer of 
Diological and toxin weapons. 

The United States itself uncondi- 
ionally renounced all aspects of biolog- 
cal warfare in 1969. President Nixon 
ordered the Department of Defense to 
draw up a plan for the disposal of exist- 
ing stocks of biological agents and 
Weapons. In 1970 this unilateral ban 
vvas extended also to cover toxins; that 
s, poisonous chemicals produced by liv- 
ng organisms. All research in the area 

of biological warfare has since been 
confined to the development of strictly 
defined defensive measures; for exam- 
ple, development of vaccines. 

Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention 

The United States followed up these 
unilateral actions by leading the fight 
for an international ban — the 1972 Bio- 
logical and Toxin Weapons Convention. 
Article I of the convention and the trea- 
ty's negotiating record make clear, how- 
ever, that protective and prophylactic 
activities are permitted. 

The Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention was approved by the U.S. 
Senate on December 16, 1974, and en- 
tered into force on March 26, 1975. All 
U.S. military stocks of biological and 
toxin agents, weapons, equipment, or 
means of delivery prohibited by the 
convention had already been destroyed 
unilaterally. Facilities in the United 
States which had been built and used 
for biological or toxin weapons pur- 
poses were converted to other use. For 
example, military facilities at Ft. De- 
trick, Maryland, and Pine Bluff, Ar- 
kansas, previously used for biological 
weapons activities, are now the prop- 
erty of the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services and are used by 
the National Cancer Institute and the 
National Center for Toxicological 

After the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention was completed, 
many thought that the security prob- 
lem posed by biological and weap- 
ons had been solved. However, this 
clearly is not the case. Despite the lim- 
itations of the convention, which has no 
verification provisions, we have identi- 
fied a number of compliance problems. 
In previous years and again in 1988, 
President Reagan reported to the Con- 
gress that the Soviet Union had contin- 
ued to maintain an offensive biological 
warfare program and accompanying ca- 
pability and that the Soviet Union has 
been involved in the production, trans- 
fer, and use of mycotoxins for hostile 
purposes in Laos, Cambodia, and Af- 
ghanistan in violation of the 1972 Bio- 
logical and Toxin Weapons Convention. 
Furthermore we have yet to receive a 
satisfactory official explanation of the 
unprecedented outbreak of anthrax at 
Sverdlovsk in the Soviet Union in 1979. 

Two review conferences for the Bi- 
ological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
have been held— in 1980 and 1986— with 
the next scheduled for 1991. At the two 
review conferences, the United States 
confirmed that it is in full compliance 
with the convention. 

At the second review conference, 
the United States expressed its con- 
cern that the Soviet Union, Laos, and 
Vietnam had violated the convention. 
Several other states party to the con- 
vention also expressed concern about 
compliance. These concerns are re- 
flected in the final declaration of the 
1986 review conference, which notes 
statements that compliance with Arti- 
cles I, II, and III of the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention was "sub- 
ject to grave doubt" and that efforts 
to resolve the concerns expressed had 
not been successful. Since then our 
concerns have intensified as evidence 
mounts of biological weapons prolifera- 
tion, especially in areas of particular 
concern to us. 

Technological Advances 

In addition the rapid advance of tech- 
nology in the biological field has led to 
another set of problems for the conven- 
tion. In many ways, recent progress in 
biological technology increases the 
ease of concealment of illicit manufac- 
turing plants, particularly for biolog- 
ically derived chemicals such as toxins. 
Verification of the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention, always a difficult 
task, has been significantly compli- 
cated by the new technology. The ease 
and rapidity of genetic manipulation, 
the ready availability of a variety of 
production equipment, and the prolif- 
eration of safety and environmental 
equipment and health procedures to 
numerous laboratories and production 
facilities throughout the world are 
signs of the growing role of biotechnol- 
ogy in the world's economy. They also 
make it easier for nations to produce 
the lethal agents banned by the 

As advances are made in the field 
of biotechnology, the potential for using 
this technology for biological and toxin 
weapons increases commensurately. 
Not only has the time from basic re- 
search to mass production of lethal 
weapons decreased but the ability to 
create agents and toxins with more op- 
timal weapons potential has increased. 
Simply put the potential for undetected 
breakout from treaty constraints has 
increased significantly. 

Department of State Bulletin/July 1989 



Growth of Biological 
Weapons Capability 

When the Biological and Toxin Weap- 
ons Convention was negotiated, only 
the United States acknowledged having 
biological weapons. In contrast to the 
openness we have practiced regarding 
our military programs, the Soviets, to 
date, have never officially acknowl- 
edged having a biological weapons pro- 
gram and, in fact, admitted only in 
1987 to having a chemical weapons 

Today a number of countries are 
estimated to be working to achieve a bi- 
ological weapons capability. Our infor- 
mation on which states are involved in 
biological weapons programs is based 
on e.xtremely sensitive intelligence 
sources and methods, and I would defer 
to the intelligence community to pro- 
vide you a fuller description of these 
programs in closed session. 

We are especially concerned about 
the spread of biological weapons in un- 
stable areas and about the prospects of 
biological and toxin weapons falling 
into the hands of terrorists or into the 
arsenals of those states which actively 
support terrorist organizations. To 
date w'e have no evidence that any 
known terrorist organization has the 
capability to employ such weapons nor 
that states supporting terrorism have 
supplied such weapons. However, we 
cannot dismiss these possibilities. If 
the proliferation of biological weapons 
continues, it may be only a matter of 
time before terrorists do acquire and 
use these weapons. 

U.S. Research Program 

The unilateral U.S. renunciation of 
biological weapons in 1969 was accom- 
panied by the recognition that main- 
taining a strong program to provide for 
defense against biological weapons is 
essential for national security. That re- 
quirement is reflected in Article I of 
the convention which permits produc- 
tion of biological agents and toxins in 
quantities required to develop protec- 
tive measures. In today's circum- 
stances, with the concerns about 
compliance, proliferation, and rapid ad- 
vances in biotechnology, the require- 
ment for defensive measures is even 
greater than in 1969. 

The Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention clearly permits research 
and development for protection against 
biological and toxin weapons. The U.S. 
biological defense research program is 

CFE and CSBM Talks 
Resume in Vienna 


MAY 5, 1989' 

Today marks the resumption in Vienna, 
Austria, of both the negotiation on 
conventional armed forces in Europe 
(CFE), which involves all 23 nations of 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the 
talks on confidence- and security- 
building measures (CSBMs) among the 
35 participants in the Conference on 
Securitv and Cooperation in Europe 

In the CFE negotiations, the Unit- 
ed States and its allies are seeking a 
stable and secure balance of conven- 
tional forces in Europe at reduced lev- 
els, the elimination of destabilizing 
disparities of forces, and the elimina- 
tion of capabilities for surprise at- 
tack and large-scale offensive action. 
NATO's approach reflects a continuing 
commitment to realizing these goals 
through a realistic, militarily signifi- 
cant, and verifiable agreement. The 
work ahead is complex. The United 
States and its allies are, however, en- 
couraged by the seriousness with w'hich 
the Soviet Union and its allies have en- 

tered into this negotiation. What is 
needed now is for them to join NATO in 
exchanges that are frank and construc- 
tive and enhance the chances for 

In the CSBM talks, NATO has ta- 
bled a set of proposals which build upon 
and expand the Stockholm document. 
The centerpiece of the NATO proposal 
is an annual exchange of information on 
military organization, manpower, and 
equipment in Europe and a correspond- 
ing system to evaluate the information 
that is exchanged. These and other 
NATO proposals apply equally to all 
participating states, in contrast to the 
Eastern proposals that clearly seek to i 
constrain NATO's ability to train and 
reinforce its troops. 

During this second round, NATO 
wall be elaborating the practical details 
of its proposals to demonstrate their ef- 
fectiveness, feasibility, and the contri- 
bution they can make to furthering 
openness, trans])arency, and predict- 
ability about military organization and 
activities in Europe. 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of I' 
dential Documents of May 8, 1989, ■ 

in full compliance with the provisions 
of the convention. It is also open to pub- 
lic scrutiny. No other country even 
comes close in its openness. 

Eliminating Biological Weapons 

Vigorous action is needed to deal with 
the problems that I have just outlined. 
These problems are tough ones that 
will not be resolved easily or quickly. 
But we are determined to deal with 

What do we need to do? We need to 
persuade states that are not parties to 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Con- 
vention, particularly states in the Mid- 
dle East, to renounce the option of 
possessing biological and toxin weap- 
ons. We have expressed our desire to 
have consultations with the Soviets un- 
der Article V of the convention, and 
this continues to be our position. We 
also need to explore possible means for 
strengthening the international norms 
against biological weapons. 

With respect to the Soviet Union, 
we have repeatedly raised our concerns 

about noncompliance both through dip- 
lomatic channels and at the 1980 and 
1986 review conferences. Fortunatel\ 
the use of "yellow rain" appears to have 
stopped several years ago. However, 
the Soviet response to our compliance 
concerns has not been satisfactory. 1 
might add that it is not primarily a 
matter of explaining the anthrax out- 
break at Sverdlovsk in 1979. After 10 
years, w'e can probably never know 
with certainty what happened. At this ■ 
stage, it is more important to resolve 
our concerns about the very unusual 
military biological facility in Sverd- 
lovsk that was reportedly the source of> 
the outbreak. That facility still exists 
and raises serious apprehensions. 

We continue to believe that the So-> 
viet Union must deal seriously with oui 
concerns and resolve them. We urge 
the new Soviet leadership to demon- 
strate some "new thinking" in this im- 
portant arms control area. 

In addition to ensuring that states 
fulfill their commitments not to pos- 
sess biological or toxin weapons, we 
must persuade additional states to 


Department of State Bulletin/July 198! 


make that important commitment. 
Currently more than 110 states have 
renounced the option of possession of 
Diological and toxin weapons by becom- 
ng parties to the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention. Unfortunately, 
(vhile most states in the Middle East 
lave signed or acceded to the conven- 
tion, only about half have ratified it and 
ieposited their instruments of ratifica- 
;ion, the legal steps necessary to be- 
come full parties to the convention. A 
lumber of these states have said that 
they will not take these actions until 
;heir neighbors do so. We need to break 
this vicious circle. 

We believe that it would be in the 
interests of all states in the Middle 
East to eliminate the spectre of biolog- 
ical warfare from this already very vol- 
atile region. For that reason, we have 
recently renewed our effort to bring all 
states in the Middle East into the con- 
rention. We will persist in this attempt 
;o break the vicious circle. 

We are also carefully considering 
whether export controls could help re- 
inforce our efforts to prevent the acqui- 
sition of biological and toxin weapons 
py other countries. Our preliminary 
'impression is that such controls can 
(ilay only a minor role. From a techni- 
■al standpoint, unfortunately, the prob- 
fin we face is much more difficult even 
hail cui'bing the spread of chemical 
i\ fapons. The equipment needed is all 
lual-use, common, and not very expen- 
>i\i'. There are many suppliers around 
hi' world. In contrast to chemical 
ivi'apons agents, there are no real pre- 
cursor materials for biological agents. 
While states seeking a chemical weap- 
iiiis capability may need hundreds of 
tons of precursor chemicals, a state 
with a biological weapons program 
needs only a tiny quantity of a disease- 
producing organism as a seed stock. 
For these reasons, an export control 
iregime analogous to that coordinated 
|by the 19 countries belonging to the 
Australian group for chemical precur- 
sors seems to offer little benefit. 

In addition to resolving compliance 
issues and promoting broader adher- 
ence to the Biological and Toxin Weap- 
ons Convention, we should consider new 
and innovative approaches to making 
the international arms control regime 
for biological weapons more effective. 

One way to strengthen the regime 
is lo strengthen international reaction 
]to deal effectively with proven viola- 
;tions of the ban on use embodied in the 
192.5 Geneva protocol. The Paris Con- 
ference on Chemical Weapons Use 
could be a good example of an initial 
•step to build an international con- 

sensus. But there must be concrete 
actions, including international sanc- 
tions, to put some teeth into the 

Another way to strengthen the re- 
gime is through additional confidence- 
building measures to create greater 
openness about biological activities. 
The United States has taken the lead 
here. I doubt that any other state any- 
where can match the openness we al- 
ready practice with regard to our 
defensive research. We need to push 
others, especially the Soviet Union, to 
match this openness. 

We have joined with other states 
party to the Biological and Toxin Weap- 
ons Convention in agreeing that more 
information should be made available 
concerning legitimate biological re- 
search activities. By creating greater 
openness in these areas, we hope that 
the norm against biological weapons 
created by the convention can be 
strengthened. The United States 
joined with others at the second review 
conference in calling for an annual ex- 
change of information on each party's 
research activities using the U.S. poli- 
cies on program openness as the 

Flirthermore we should continue 
programs where researchers from dif- 
ferent countries work for extended pe- 
riods in each other's laboratories. It 
would be more difficult to conceal sig- 
nificant research programs of inten- 
tions from qualified exchange scientists 
than it would be to fool inspectors mak- 
ing a brief, one-time visit. 

We must continue to strive to pre- 
vent biological weapons proliferation 
by reinforcing the moral, legal, and po- 
litical constraints against biological 
weapons and, where feasible, seek to 
prevent states from obtaining sensitive 
materials and technology for biological 
weapons purposes. This will be a par- 
ticularly difficult task and, quite 
frankly, we do not have the answers yet 
on how to achieve this. We do know that 
we cannot do it alone. Our efforts to 
constrain biological weapons prolifera- 
tion will require a sustained multi- 
lateral approach, involving both U.S. 
leadership and cooperation with 
friends and allies. 

'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 

President Meets With 
Prime IVIinister Mulroney 

Following are excerpts from the 
questioii-and-ausiver session President 
Bush and Canadian Prime Minister 
Brian Mulroney held with news corre- 
spondents after their luncheon on May 
i, 1989.^ 

President Bush. May I just, at the out- 
set of this scrum in which we each an- 
swer questions, say what a joy it's been 
to have Prime Minister Mulroney back 
here with his very special Mila. Bar- 
bara and I froze them to death on the 
balcony. It's warm now, but 20 minutes 
ago, it was cold — temperature; warm in 
terms of the feeling that existed at that 
little lunch and, indeed, over in the 
Oval Office. 

And I cite that because the rela- 
tionship between the United States and 
Canada remains strong. Our respect 
for the Prime Minister and his objec- 
tives remains strong. The fact that he 
fought hard for this breakthrough Free 
Trade Agreement has the respect for 
him at an altogether high level. And so, 

I can report that the conversations that 
we had that touched on a wide array of 
subjects — on the environment and on 
the importance of the NATO meeting 
and on the bilateral relations — were 
good. We found that we can look each 
other in the eye and talk out any differ- 
ences with no rancor. We salute him 
and welcome him as a good friend. 

Prime Minister Mulroney. We had 
a very delightful and effective meet- 
ing, I thought, with President Bush 
and his colleagues. And Mila and I had 
an especially delightful lunch with Bar- 
bara and the President. 

Our discussions today on the agen- 
da dealt with the environment, which is 
very important, and I applaud the lead- 
ership the President is giving to the 
environment, particularly on the ques- 
tion of acid rain. 

We discussed as well something 
that [British Prime Minister] Marga- 
ret Thatcher has described as a model 
for the rest of the world, and that's the 

Department of State Bulletin/July 1989 



Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 
which is in its infancy, is growing and 
growing strongly, and I think to the 
benefit of both of our nations. 

We discussed the role of NATO and 
the importance of the Western alliance 
in the world — the role of the United 
States in that alliance. The position of 
Canada is unequivocal in that regard. 

Q. Are you willing to compro- 
mise your position now on short- 
range missiles in terms of starting 
negotiations with the Soviet Union on 
that area? 

President Bush. I want the NATO 
summit to be a success. And we will be 
working with the Germans and with 
others to see that there is a common 
NATO position. This is no time for one 
to compromise or somebody not to com- 
promise. We've made proposals to the 
Germans. I e.xpect we'll be hearing 
from them soon. I'd prefer to do what- 
ever negotiation among allies that is re- 
quired in private, recognizing that we 
all want the NATO summit to be suc- 
cessful. There's a lot of public discus- 
sion of this issue, and that's fine. I 
don't plan in detail to join in on that 
public discussion. The U.S. position is 
well known. NATO's last stated public 
position is well known. We're prepared 
to go from there. 

Q. It sounds like you're ready to 

President Bush. I'm always will- 
ing to negotiate. But we're not going to 
go for any third zero or getting SNF 
[short-range nuclear forces] out of 
whack in terms of negotiations; let's be 
clear on that. But certainly, I'll be will- 
ing to discuss these issues, as we did in 
a very constructive way with the Prime 

Q. What did you say to the Presi- 
dent about the SNF issue? 

Prime Minister Mulroney. What I 
said to the President was that NATO 
was founded on, in my judgment, two 
concepts: first, solidarity; and second, 
the American leadership of the West- 
ern alliance. And it's the solidarity that 
has brought about the success that the 
West has engendered thus far. We have 
to stick together on all of these funda- 
mental questions, and we will. 

NATO is a grouping of sovereign 
independent nations. There is going to 
be vigorous debate, unlike the Warsaw 
Pact. In NATO there are independent 
nations which get together and which 

come together willingly under a com- 
mon shield to achieve common objec- 
tives. While there has to be this kind 
of debate, in the end, there must be 
solidarity — total solidarity. There must 
be a common view of leadership, which 
has served the world so well for 
40 years. We're going to Brussels to 
celebrate the achievements of NATO. 
That's e.xactly what we are going to be 
doing, and that is why we look forward 
to President Bush's presence there — to 
celebrate that particular achievement 
in which the United States has played 
such a pivotal role. 

Q. Did you urge the President to 
begin negotiations — to at least back 
negotiations — on SNF reductions? 

Prime Minister Mulroney. I've 
just said what the position of Canada is 
in regard to — there's one NATO posi- 
tion. This is not an association where 
everybody freelances. 

Q. — different views on this, 

Prime Minister Mulroney. We 

have a common NATO position, and 
while there are divergence of views 
that emerge from time to time, the ob- 
ject of our getting together is to har- 
monize those views into one position. 
And that's what we're going to be able 
to do. 

Q. You were very careful, I 
thought, to say you didn't want the 
third zero. That still allows for the 
possibility of reducing the number of 
short-range nuclear weapons. 

President Bush. My emphasis will 
be on conventional force reductions. We 
will be talking very soon with the Ger- 
mans on a proposal we made to them. 
We've listened very carefully to the 
constructive suggestions that Prime 
Minister Mulroney has raised, and 
that's really all I care to say about it. I 
want the NATO meeting to be a suc- 
cess. One way you guarantee success 
is not to go out and fine tune nuance 
differences that may e.xist between 
various staunch allies. The German 
position was made public last week. I 
will continue to work with the leaders 
of the NATO countries to see that we 
have a successful summit. 

Q. — any new commitments on 
acid rain? 

Prime Minister Mulroney. Acid 
rain, we had an excellent discussion on 
that. The President has made a very 
strong statement in regard to his inten- 
tions in acid rain, which will involve 
legislation and cooperation with the 
Congress. We look forward to that, and 
once that is achieved, we look forward 
to the conclusion of a mutual accord 
which will allow our countries to bring 
an end, hopefully, a problem that has 
been a major challenge to both of our 
governments and one that has blighted 
the environments of the United States 
and Canada. We're moving along on 
that. I'm pleased with what the Presi- 
dent had to say today. I met with con- 
gressional leaders, including Senator 
Mitchell [Senate Majority Leader 
George J. Mitchell], earlier this morn- 
ing. As the Prime Minister of Canada, 
I'm pleased with the manner in which 
this very important matter is going. 

Q. Mr. Gingrich [Congressman 
Newt Gingrich] this morning sug- 
gested if the Panama election is as 
fraudulent as many think it will be 
that perhaps you shouldn't give back 
the canal. What's your view on that? 
What's your response to him? 

President Bush. My view on that 
is to warn Panama that the world will 
be looking at them, not just the Unitedll 
States. In terms of these elections and 
deciding what to do if the elections are 
fraudulent — calling on them for free 
and fair elections — there will be inter- 
national observers there — and then we 
will cross whatever hypothetical bridgg 
we have to cross later on. But it's too 
hypothetical at this point to go beyond 

But this does give me an oppor- 
tunity to say that I have been very dis- 
turbed by the reports that the election 
will be less than free and less than fair 
and less than open. I simply want to en-i 
courage the people in Panama to do ev- 1 
erything they can to guarantee free | 
and fair elections. What pressures they 
can bring to bear on the PDF [Panama- 
nian Defense Forces] leader, Mr. No- 
riega, I don't know. But I would hope, 
with the world watching, they would in- 
sist on free and fair elections. 



Q. Senator Mitchell mentioned 
lis morning that Canada should be 
ushing for a bilateral accord on acid 
iin consecutively, while the Admin- 
tration introduces its legislation on 
cid rain. Was there any talk about 
■at, and will you be pushing for 

Prime Minister Mulroney. I think 
16 President knows my position full- 
ell. We know that there have to be 
gislative changes here in the United 
:ates to kind of equate the initiatives 
iken in Canada. Once that is done, or 
:hile in the process of that being done, 
leii there has to be an international 
■ciii-(l that is an enforceable document 
\- w hich we can measure our progress 
1(1 enforce delinquency in that event. 
ri'^ident Bush is known as a strong 
iviriinmentalist. He's made some very 
giiificant statements in regard to not 
il\- acid rain but its impact on our bi- 
tei-al relationship and his resolve to 
ean it up. I'm very encouraged. 

(i. Did you make any undertak- 
iss in your lunch in terms of what's 
oing to be in your clean air legisla- 
on that's going to help this acid rain 

President Bush. We didn't go into 
le specific amounts. As the Prime 
inister said, he knows of my commit- 
!ent. He knows now that we are in the 
'nal stages of formulating our recom- 
endations to the Congress — the Clean 
ir Act. And, indeed, we'll be pre- 
ired, after those recommendations go 
rward, to discuss in more detail the 
ibject that you're asking about. We 
lid have a chance to do what you asked 
jout. If there's anything that the 
rime Minister of Canada has been 
ear with me about — and he's been 
ear with me on everything — it is this 
ibject. He forcefully brings it up, and 
tell him where we stand. 

Q. The President said you made 
jncrete suggestions on the issue of 
lort-range missiles. Can you give us 
n idea what some of those sugges- 
ons entailed? 

Prime Minister Mulroney. Mr. 
lark [Canadian Secretary of State for 
xternal Affairs] has been in touch 
'ith Secretary Baker and others in 
^gard to how this matter might be 
roached. We discuss it privately with 
jr allies, and that's what we have 
•ied to do. 

But the position of Canada is the 
one I've set out — it deals with the effec- 
tiveness of NATO being predicated on 
our solidarity and the leadership, a 
very particular role of leadership by 
the United States in that equation. We 
think that within those parameters, w^e 
can resolve differences of degree and 
emphasis that will come up from sover- 
eign states from time to time. We think 
that this is what the President and I 
and Secretary Baker and Minister 
Clark have been working on and will 
continue to work on. 

Q. Your good friend, Michael Du- 
kakis [Governor of Massachusetts 
and Democratic Party candidate for 
President in 1988], said the other day 
to the Prime Minister that he thought 
that it was possible for an acid rain 
treaty between Canada and the Unit- 
ed States to be signed within a year. I 
don't know what your feelings are on 
this, but could you give us kind of a 
timeframe? Do you think it's possible 
that there might be a treaty signed at 
least before you leave or the next 

President Bush. There will be 
great progress made. Whether the 
treaty proves to be the vehicle for dem- 
onstrating that progress, I don't know, 
and I can't say. 

Q. Was there any discussion of a 
global warming convention, and if so, 
what direction did it take? 

Prime Minister Mulroney. The 

President and I had an excellent dis- 
cussion of the entire environmental for- 
mula. I expressed the view as well that 
there can be little progress in terms of 
the environment unless there's a very 
strong leadership role played by the 
United States. I've already indicated 
to you President Bush's very strong 
commitment to the environment in all 
of its related and ancillary and princi- 
pal dimensions. This is a very, very 
important one. You can hold all the 
conferences you want, but if the princi- 
pal players are not there, then progress 
can be fairly modest. President Bush 
indicated to me, as he did in Ottawa, 
his intention to play a very significant 
leadership role in all aspects of the en- 
vironment, and I think we're all very 
encouraged by that. 

Q. Your Administration has been 
very outspoken in promoting demo- 
cratic efforts in places like Poland 
and Nicaragua and around the world. 
But you haven't really said anything 
about China. Do you have some words 
of encouragement for the students 
who are defying a government ban in 
order to protest in favor of freedom 
and democracy? 

President Bush. I have words of 
encouragement for freedom and democ- 
racy wherever, and I would like to see 
progress in China, in the Soviet Union, 
and in other systems that have here- 
tofore not been in the forefront, to put 
it mildly, of human rights or of demo- 
cratic rights. I wouldn't suggest to any 
leadership of any country that they ac- 
cept every demand by every group. But 
I will say that as I reviewed what the 
demands are today, we can certainly, as 
the United States, identify with them. 
When they talk about more free press, 
we would encourage that, wherever it 
might be. When they talk about — I for- 
get what the list w-as of every demand, 
but a lot of them had my enthusiastic 
backing, in a broad, generic sense. I 
would like to encourage China or the 
Soviet Union or other totalitarian 
countries — countries that have not en- 
joyed democratic practices — to move as 
quickly as they ean down democracy's 

I've been pleased with some of the 
changes in China. It's changed dramati- 
cally since I was living there. But 
they've got a way to go and other coun- 
tries in this hemisphere have a long 
way to go and countries over in Europe 
have a long way to go. I would encour- 
age them all. Democracy is on the 
move. This is one thing that the Prime 
Minister and I talked about. When we 
go to that NATO meeting, we're going 
to be on the side that is winning and 
the side that is right, fundamentally 
right. Freedom, democracy, human 
rights — these are the things we stand 
for. I would encourage every govern- 
ment to move as quickly as it can to 
achieve human rights. 

•Held at the South Portico of the White 
House (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Doeuments'of May 8, 1989). ■ 

department of State Bulletin/July 1989 



Student Demonstrations in China 

by Richard L. Williams 

Statement before the Subcomniittee 
on Asian and Pacific Affaira of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
May 4, 1989. Ambassador Williams is 
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs.^ 

Thank you for the opportunity to ap- 
pear today to discuss current develop- 
ments in China. 

As you know, since the death of 
former party leader Hu Yaobang on 
April 15, there have been demonstra- 
tions involving students and others in 
several cities in China, most promi- 
nently in Beijing. Students have also 
boycotted classes in the capital and 
elsewhere. Although there have been 
reports of scattered incidents of vio- 
lence, the demonstrators — particularly 
the students who make up the great 
majority — on the whole, have been 
quite peaceful in their conduct. And for 
their part, the authorities to date have 
shown restraint and caution in dealing 
with the demonstrators. 

Before attempting to explore the 
causes and possible outcome of these 
demonstrations, it may be useful to say 
a few words about the role of students 
and universities in China. 

Role of Students 

Briefly China's history for most of this 
century has been a turbulent one, in 
which students and others associated 
with universities, particularly Beijing 
University, have played leading roles. 
Sun Yatsen, the' father of the 1911 
revolution which overthrew the last dy- 
nasty, was a returned student from Ja- 
pan. The May 4th Movement, in which 
Chinese expressed outrage that the 
Treaty of Versailles allowed Japan to 
gain control of a part of China, was led 
by students from Beijing University. 
One of the two founders of the Chinese 
Communist Party was a professor at 
Beijing University, and an assistant 
librarian there later became better 
known as the leading figure in the 
party, Mao Zedong. Many years later, 
it was a wall poster by another Beijing 
University professor that helped trig- 
ger the turbulent period known as the 
Cultural Revolution. And to bring 
things down to the present, Deng 
Xiaoping, still China's paramount 
leader, is himself a returned student 
from France. 


This brief history helps explain 
why the authorities have paid consider- 
able attention to the student demon- 
strations, particularly those in Beijing, 
and will likely continue to do so. 

Student Concerns 

What do the demonstrators want? They 
seem to have a variety of related con- 
cerns. Judging by the posters they have 
carried and the slogans they have 
shouted, some are concerned about al- 
legations of official corruption; some 
want to move faster in instituting dem- 
ocratic reforms, while others have eco- 
nomic grievances. In general they are 
interested in reform of a system which 
they see as insufficiently responsive to 
their needs. Their demands and slogans 
have been carefully cast in a fashion 
which seeks to avoid a direct challenge 
to the system, asking that the party 
and the government live up to ideals in 
China's Constitution, such as freedom 
of the press, anticorruption measures, 
and freedom of association. 

As noted the authorities have re- 
acted with caution so far and have not 
attempted to forcibly restrain the 
demonstrations or arrest large num- 
bers of participants. At the same time, 
a People's Daily editorial has threat- 
ened those seen as challenging the au- 
thority of the Communist Party, and 
the authorities have declared illegal 
newly formed independent student or- 
ganizations at Beijing University. Ac- 
cording to a report broadcast in both 
the Chinese and Western media, the 
authorities have discussed grievances 
with some student leaders but have 
not met with those in the "illegal" 

In Shanghai, authorities closed 
down the outspoken World Economic 
Herald and dismissed its editor. 

U.S. Reaction 

With regard to the U.S. reaction to the 
events in China, we have made several 
points in our noon press briefings. 

• We believe in and support the 
right of peaceful assembly, including 
peaceful protest and the freedom of 

• We regret measures taken con- 
trary to those principles, such as the 
closing of the World Economic Herald. 

• We hope that demonstrations in 
China, if they continue, will remain 
peaceful and that the authorities will 
act with restraint. 

The future course of the student 
movement, of course, is hard to pre- 
dict, as is its possible impact on China'i 
future. China has made much progress 
in the past decade. Economic reforms 
have resulted in significant growth, 
particularly in the countryside. There 
has also been progress in human right 
matters, including greater toleration ( 
religion, relaxed emigration controls, 
and the beginnings of an effective lei;:i 

At the same time, China has con- 
tinued to place restrictions on basic pi_ 
litical and civil rights, such as freedon 
of the press and freedom of speech. W( 
hope that the trend toward more open- 
ness and more respect for basic humai 
rights will continue. 

'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee ans 
will be available from the Superintendent c 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 

U.S., Japan Agree 
to Codevelop 
FSX Aircraft 

Following are statements by 
President Bush on April 28, 1989. anq 
Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence i 
Eagleburger before the House Foreigi 
Affairs Committee on May S. 

APR. 28, 1989' 

I am pleased to announce that the Gov- 
ernments of the United States and Ja- 
pan have reached understandings that 
will allow us to proceed with joint de- 
velopment of the FSX fighter aircraft. 
I am ready to submit the FSX agree- 
ment to Congress for its review. 

We have been conducting talks 
with the Japanese to clarify both sides 
understandings of this agreement. I 
am convinced that the codevelopment (' 
this aircraft is in the strategic and 
commercial interests of the United 
States. And we weighed this matter 
from the standpoint of trade, of our in- 
dustrial growth, and technology tran.< 
fer, as well as strategic and foreign 
policy considerations. 

Department of State Bulletin/July 198 


This aircraft will improve the basic 
'-16 design and will contribute to the 
ecurity of the United States and our 
lajiii' ally, Japan. There will be no cost 
1 ilu' American taxpayer, and, at the 
inii' time, the Japanese will improve 
:ii'ii' ability to carry their share of the 
efeiise burden. The United States will 
ave a 40% work share in the initial de- 
elopment stage of this aircraft, and 
■e will have a similar share when the 
ircraft goes into production. 

We did have several initial con- 
srns about the agreement, but I want 
) assure you that sensitive source 
Ddes for the aircraft's computer will 
e strictly controlled; access will be 
ranted to only those codes that are es- 
eiitial to complete the project. 

In conclusion the United States is 
It' world's leader in aircraft manufac- 
ii-iiig. I believe this aircraft will im- 
in\f the defense of the United States 
11(1 .lapan, and this agreement also 
elps preserve our commitment that 
'.S. aerospace products of the future 
ill continue to dominate the world 

I AY 3, 1989^ 

ast F'riday the President announced 
is support for the FSX codevelopment 
jreement recently reached between 
le United States and Japan. Accord- 
igly the State Department, on May 1, 
!)rmally notified Congress of the FSX 
rogram, in accordance with Section 
o(d) of the Arms Export and Control 
ct. Beyond the requirements of the 
c-t, we have transmitted copies of the 
leiiiorandum of understanding and re- 
tted documents to the Congress. 

The final agreement represents a 
act not only between the United 
tates and Japan but between the Ad- 
linistration and the Congress. When 
le President entered office, he or- 
ered, in response to congressional 
oncerns, an interagency review of the 
|SX agreement, with particular atten- 
on to its economic and technological 
nplications for the United States, 
hat review was undertaken with 
reat care; there was no rush to judg- 
aent. The review underscored a need 
;)r certain clarifications from the Japa- 
ese side — clarifications which we ob- 
|iined as a consequence of protracted 
egotiations. Secretary Baker, who, as 
ou know, takes congressional concerns 
sriously, was instrumental in securing 
lose clarifications. 

The Secretary of State was partic- 
ularly concerned about U.S. jobs. Even 
before the interagency review was con- 
cluded, he stressed to the Japanese in 
Tokyo the need for assurance that the 
U.S. share in the production phase 
would be similar to that for the devel- 
opment phase. We now have that assur- 
ance, as well as assurances with regard 
to U.S. technology flows to Japan and 
the flow of Japanese technology to the 
United States. U.S. industry will get 
40% of the work in the development 
phase and approximately a 40% share 
during production. The consequent 
benefits to the American worker and 
American industry have already been 
described by Secretaries Cheney [of 
Defense] and Mosbacher [of Commerce]. 

In considering FSX, we must keep 
in mind the larger dimensions of our 
security ties and our overall relation- 
ship with Japan. The U.S. -Japan Trea- 
ty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, 
under which Japan furnishes bases in 
exchange for our commitment to defend 
Japan, is the foundation for our political 
and strategic relations throughout the 
Pacific. Our deployment of forces in Ja- 

pan is key to our forward defense strat- 
egy and our ability to meet global de- 
fense commitments. 

The FSX will bolster Japan's de- 
fense capability with an upgraded ver- 
sion of an already front-line fighter, 
strengthen our overall alliance, and al- 
low Japan to assume a larger share of 
the common defense burden. In addi- 
tion as the first military codevelop- 
ment project between the world's two 
most technologically advanced coun- 
tries, FSX sets an important precedent 
for future U.S. -Japan cooperative de- 
fense efforts. 

We made suggestions to Tokyo on 
ways to clarify the FSX agreement. 
The Japanese in turn gave us the assur- 
ances we sought. We now have an 
agreement that clearly serves the na- 
tional interests of the United States. 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of May 1, 1989. 

-The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 

Competitiveness in the Global Marketplace 

by Richard T. McCormack 

Address before the President's Ex- 
ecutive Exchange Alumni Association 
on May 11, 1989. Ambassador McCor- 
mack is Under Secretary for Economic 

I'd like to talk to you today about the 
future of America's competitiveness. 
We now live in a world in which far- 
reaching changes in international eco- 
nomic and financial relationships, ac- 
celerated by advances in technology, 
transportation, and communications, 
have stimulated increasing global com- 
petition. As we approach the economic 
summit in Paris this summer, now is a 
good time to take stock of our position 
and prospects in this emerging global 

My basic theme is that the key to 
our international competitiveness is 
also the key to our trade policy and to 
our leadership role in the world econ- 
omy: that is, to maintain responsive- 
ness to market forces domestically and 
internationally. The key to competitive- 
ness, in other words, is competition. 
We must be ready, willing, and able 

to move resources around — to struc- 
turally adjust our economy — in order 
to meet global standards of excellence. 

There has been a lot of talk in re- 
cent years about America's declining 
competitiveness in world markets. Yet, 
for all the pronouncements of doom and 
gloom, the facts suggest a different, 
more nuanced story. 

In fact, we are currently in the 
seventh year of sustained economic 
growth, an unprecedented accomplish- 
ment in peacetime. Nearly 20 million 
jobs have been created since November 
1982, and the civilian unemployment 
rate in recent months has reached the 
lowest figure since 1973. The U.S. 
economy is not only alive and well, 
it is booming. 

If this is the case, then what is 
the controversy over competitiveness? 
Much of the problem, as I see it, lies in 
how we define the word. In some quar- 
ters, for example, the trade balance is 
often mistakenly seen as a yardstick of 
competitiveness. One is then led to the 
conclusion that the large U.S. trade 
deficits of recent years are indication of 
competitive decline. Yet the trade bal- 

'epartment of State Bulletin/July 1989 



ance is not an accurate measure of com- 
petitiveness. Using this criterion, we 
would conclude, for example, that the 
Cote d'lvoire, which had a trade sur- 
plus in 1988, is more competitive than 
the United States. 

The Budget Deficit 

But let's take a closer look at our 
trade imbalance. There are three basic 
factors that can explain our trade 
performance — one explaining the over- 
all balance, the other two explaining 
the performance of specific industries. 

Domestic Economic Environ- 
ment. The first and by far the most im- 
portant one is the domestic economic 
environment that provides the setting 
for trade. The essential truth is that 
the trade deficit is a macroeconomic 
phenomenon. A deficit means that our 
spending for consumption, investment, 
and government programs together are 
greater than production, with the dif- 
ference coming from abroad. Increases 
in the government's budget deficit, in 
consumption, or in domestic investment 
in the United States can create an off- 
setting trade deficit. Since we do not 
want to discourage investment, in or- 
der to reduce the trade deficit, we must 
produce more, consume less, and save 
more or reduce the Federal budget def- 
icit. Since the trade deficit is the result 
of imbalances in these broad aggre- 
gates, economic policies bearing on 
consumption, savings, investment, and 
the Federal budget are the appropriate 
tools for correcting our trade deficit. 

Sectoral Competitiveness. When 
we observe the trade performance of 
specific sectors of the economy, a sec- 
ond factor — sectoral competitiveness — 
emerges. While we continue to be lead- 
ers in many sectors of the economy, in 
some U.S. industries the quality of 
goods, marketing, and distribution 
efforts have been inferior to that of 
foreign competitors. When inferior 
quality develops, it is immediately re- 
flected in consumers' choices in the 
marketplace. If a product made in the 
United States is not as desirable as the 
item produced by the the foreigner, or 
as efficiently marketed, then the U.S. 
producer will lose market share to the 
foreign rival. 

Protectionist Policies. Finally, 
protectionist policies play a role in the 
trade of specific goods. Everyone in- 
volved in international business knows 
of foreign government policies or 


business practices which effectively 
closed market access. The "level play- 
ing field" is an important issue in our 
trade negotiations, and for specific in- 
dustries, trade policy measures can be 
geared to open markets abroad. None- 
theless, foreign tariffs, quotas, and 
other barriers to trade are not the 
principal cause of the overall trade defi- 
cit. The U.S. trade deficit widened sig- 
nificantly in the 1980s, yet there was 
no massive increase in trade barriers 
during this period. The principal rea- 
son for the trade deficit lies not in for- 
eign barriers nor in the stars, it lies 
within ourselves. 

Policies of massive retaliation and 
"managed trade" will, therefore, not 
solve the trade deficit issue or the com- 
petitiveness issue for that matter. They 
will only succeed in wrecking the inter- 
national trading system. We must never 
forget that the massive increase in 
trade barriers in the 1930s made the 
depression even deeper. We must also 
remember that trade liberalization is a 
key reason for widespread economic 
progress in the last 40 years. 

Without minimizing our trade defi- 
cit problems, let me offer an alternative 
definition of national competiveness: 
the ability of a country's economy to 
sustain a high and growing standard of 
living compared with other countries, 
based on the quantity and quality of the 
goods and services it produces. This, 
it seems to me, is what we're really 
after — a measure of overall economic 

With this in mind, we can ask the 
really important questions: Is the U.S. 
economy performing at its maximum 
potential? And how do we stack up 
against the rest of the world? 

Using this new definition, the 
United States remains very competi- 
tive, indeed. In terms of real standards 
of living, the United States ranks high- 
est among OECD [Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment] countries. In 1987, we were ap- 
proximately 20% ahead of both Japan 
and West Germany. 

Many of our trading partners have 
begun, to be sure, to "catch up" with 
the United States in recent years by 
closing the gap in productivity and liv- 
ing standards; but that should not be 
viewed as a failure on our part. On the 
contrary, the economic recovery of Eu- 
rope and Japan in the postwar period, 
as well as the emergence of the newly 
industrialized economies, should be 
viewed as major successes to which 

U.S. foreign and economic policies have 
made a significant contribution. Eco- 
nomic growth is the best friend of de- 
mocracy, and stable democracies in 
these countries serve U.S. interests. 

More to the point, competition 
among these countries and the United 
States is the lifeblood of a healthy 
world economy, and every country 
which joins the challenge gains from it. 
Too often, the trend toward increas- 
ingly competitive world markets is 
viewed with apprehension as a zero- 
sum game. The remarkable record of 
trade liberalization, increasing compe- 
tition, and economic growth in the 
postwar period belies this fear. 

These remarks are not to suggest, 
of course, that American companies 
should look with equanimity on their 
performance or on foreign trade bar- 
riers. Although U.S. labor productivitj 
still ranks highest in the world in abso^ 
lute terms, a recent MIT [Massa- 
chusetts Institute of Technology] study 
cites lagging U.S. productivity in- 
creases in recent years as a major 
problem, for example. In specific 
companies, there are other problems, 
too, such as poor product quality and 
marketing efforts mentioned earlier, 
inadequate worker training, and an 
inordinate emphasis on short-term 
profits. These difficulties can be 
summarized as lack of responsiveness 
to the marketplace — now increasingly 

Adjustment to Changing Markets 

The successful economic performance 
of the United States over the years ha! 
been the result of our flexibility in de- 
ploying our labor force, our capital, ouii 
know-how, and our other economic re- 
sources to their most productive use. 
Our future economic success will sim- 
ilarly depend on our ability to provide ; 
responsive economic environment and 
adequate incentives to maintain this 

Economic growth, in other words, 
requires continuous adjustment. Our 
economic welfare is improved when oui 
workforce and capital readily shift to 
more highly valued activities in re- 
sponse to changes in demand, tech- 
nology, and the costs of production. 

In sum, the key to international 
competitiveness is maintaining a high 
degree of openness to change in the do- 
mestic economy. Ossification — through 
policies and practices that block this 

Department of State Bulletin/July 198! 


Ijustment process — kills our ability to 
mpete, just as it nearly paralyzed the 
onomies of certain European coun- 
ies in the 1970s. 

Promoting domestic competition 
30 requires a free and open policy 
ward the international flow of goods, 
rvices, capital, and technology. In- 
rnational competition will shift our 
(sources to areas where we have a 
imparative advantage. This means, of 
urse, that we cannot be number one 
every endeavor, but an open trading 
stem based on specialization means 
at we do not have to be number one 
every industry. The performance of 
dividual sectors is not the key issue 
determining who is number one any 
are than in sports; the statistics of 
ly individual player measure the per- 
rmance of the team. 

Secondly, competitiveness depends 
the quality of our labor force. Edu- 
tion and training embodied in Ameri- 
n workers are estimated to account 
r about three-quarters of the United 
ates' total stock of productive capital, 
jring the postwar era, improvements 
this human capital — which we con- 
lue to strive for — contributed 10%- 

i% of real output growth. Similarly, 
vestments in research and develop- 
;nt have led to technological ad- 
ncenients which have improved 
oductivity. With this framework in 
nd, we can now put the policy issues 
to clearer perspective. 

)vernment's Role in 
ronomic Competitiveness 

(erall, there is a certain, but limited, 
ilf for government; the best way to en- 
1 nci' competitiveness is basically to 
1: it happen on its own. While govern- 
U'nt's role is essential in some areas to 
lott'ct the common good, American 
(itrejjreneurs as a rule don't need gov- 
fnment officials making decisions for 
teni. We might be better off, for e.\- 
nple, reducing legal restrictions on 
jint high-tech production ventures for 
te sake of stimulating technological 
Jivancement. The role of active gov- 
tnment policies should be to create an 
(on(jmic environment conducive to 
(mjjetition, innovation, and growth. 
First, we must all work to reduce 
k' Ffderal budget deficit. As I sug- 
; >u-(l earlier, this is one key to reduc- 
o; iiur current account deficit. But 

Vdiul that, reducing the need for 
'e Federal Government to borrow 

Lipases the capital available for 

i\"ate-sector investment. 

World Trade Week, 1989 

M.AY 5, 1989' 

At no other time in U.S. history has in- 
ternational commerce been so important 
to tlomestic eeonomif growth. Increased 
e.xiiorts mean prosperity for America. 
World Trade Week provides an excellent 
opportunity for American business men 
and women to reaffirm their commit- 
ment to the pursuit of export markets. 

Trade i'igu)-es for the past year indi- 
cate that American businesses are mov- 
ing in the right direction, U.S. export 
performance durint; lil^8 was respon- 
sibk- for the highest giowth rate this 
decade and the lar,i;est I'eduction in the 
trade ."leficit in history. During 1088, 
l!.S. merchandise exports grew 28 per- 
cent, reaching record levels ($.320 bil- 
lion). These exiiorts generated 40 percent 
uf real CJXP growth during the year and 
contributed to the t-reation of a near 
record number of jobs. An improved 
global economic climate and measurable 
improvements in the i)uality of American 
goods and services contributed to this 
promising expert performance. 

The I'avorable market conditions that 
niaiie eiir goods and services competitive 
in IDH.'S continue to exist in 1989, and 
U.S. businesses must take full advantage 
of this .situation. American industry can 
lieiietii .^ii'istantially from trade oppor- 
tunities ri-eated by reci'nt events in the 
w'orhl tnarketj.ilaci'. Fer iwample, when 
the historic United Stales-Canada Free 
Trade .Agreement entered into force on 
January 1. 1989, it heralded the begin- 
ning of a new era in Americas economic 
relations with our largest trading part- 
ner. It also created abundant oppor- 
timiiies for U.S. firms to reach the 
market offered by our 2ti million neigh- 
bors to the north. 

The European Community's form.a- 
tion of a single market by the year 1992 
has the potential to provide even more 
trading opportunities for American busi- 
ness. However. U.S. firms need to pre- 
pare for 1992 now if they are to realize 
greater export sales. 

Tins Administration is committed to 
forging a partnershij) with our Nation's 

business community to help ensure con- 
tinued economic prosperity and growth 
into the 1990s. Trade and U.S. compet- 
itiveness are top priorities. I am firmly 
committed to oiiening world markets to 
U.S. exports and promoting our free 
trade agenda on both nuiltilateral and bi- 
lateral levels. 

The United States led in initiating 
the current round of tieneral Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotia- 
tions, and we shall remain vigilant in our 
efforts to ensure that the GATT negotia- 
tions result in a strengthened interna- 
tional trading system that creates new 
opportunities to expand trade and 
achieve economic growth. 

We shall pursue our quest to elimi- 
nate unfair trade practices, and we shall 
also use the tools provided by the Con- 
gress in the Omnibus Ti'ade and Compet- 
itiveness Act of 1988 to ensure an open 
world marketplace. 

In short, this Administration will 
continue to do its part to ensure a strong 
economy into the 1990s. .-American busi- 
ness, however, must take the lead in 
meeting the important challenge of in- 
creasing our competitiveness in world 

Now, Thkrei-'oki,, 1. t;i;<)ia.;K Bi:sH, 
President of the United States of Ameri- 
ca, by virtue of the authoi'ity vested in 
me by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States, do hereby proclaim the 
week beginning May 21. 19.~-!9, as World 
Trade Week. I invite the businesses and 
workers of America to join together with 
the F'ederai Government in observance of 
W(prld Trade Week. Together, we can en- 
sure continued prosjjerity for our coun- 
try thr(aigh global trade. 

Ix WiTNKss Whi:i;i:of, I have here- 
unto set my hand this fifth day of May, in 
the year of our Lord nineteen hundred 
and eighty-nine, and of the Independence 
of the United States of America the two 
hundred and thirteenth. 

George Bush 

'Text from Weekly Com])ilation 
of Presidential Documents of May 8, 
1989. ■ 

l^partment of State Bulletin/July 1989 



A related policy objective is to 
maintain a stable macroeconomic envi- 
ronment. Hard experience has taught 
us how inflation can damage our eco- 
nomic system by distorting relative 
prices and investment decisions. The 
Federal Government owes it to all 
Americans to erase the specter of 

The ne.\t, and equally important, 
role of government is to maintain open 
markets, both here and abroad. For in 
a rapidly changing high-tech environ- 
ment, the free flow of goods, services, 
information, and capital is essential if 
we are to maintain flexibility in world 

To this end, the Administration is 
pursuing policies of open trade. These 
efforts are taking place, I need not re- 
mind you, in the face of strong protec- 
tionist pressures. But we should all 
clearly understand that openness to in- 
ternational markets in maintaining our 
competitiveness makes the Bush Ad- 
ministration's commitment to an open 
trading system not only a matter of 
principle but also one of national 

Furthermore, barriers to imports 
are a tax on our export industries. 
They deprive our exporters of access to 
the range of intermediate goods avail- 
able to their foreign competitors. More- 
over, they push resources into less 
efficient industries, decreasing our 
economic welfare, and raising costs 
for exporters. 

At the same time, we are attempt- 
ing to reduce foreign trade barriers. 
The centerpiece of this strategy is the 
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations, which holds the potential 
of achieving significant agreements on 
trade in agriculture and services, pro- 
tection of intellectual property rights, 
and strenghtening the GATT [General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] sys- 
tem. These negotiations are, therefore, 
of great importance in providing fair 
access to the growing foreign markets 
in which U.S. exporters can flourish. 

Finally, this Administration sup- 
ports free international investment 
flows. Barriers to foreign direct in- 
vestment deprive us of foreign capital 
and restrict our access to foreign 

We are also pursuing policies to 
promote domestic investment which 
creates new jobs, new markets, and 
new technologies. Let me mention two 
ways to promote investment. Earlier I 
mentioned the benefits of deficit reduc- 
tion for investment. In addition, the 
President favors reducing the capital 


Deconfrontation on Cyprus 

MAY 18, 1989' 

On May 17, the United Nations an- 
nounced in Cyprus that a deconfronta- 
tion plan had gone into effect that 
morning in Nicosia. Under the plan, 
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
forces evacuated a number of positions 
on the cease-fire line in the old walled 
city of Nicosia. 

Thi.s represents an important prac- 
tical step toward alleviating tensions 
and averting incidents. It is a measure 
which we strongly supported. We con- 

gratulate the parties concerned and 
the United Nations which worked wit 
them to bring about this success. 

This deconfrontation agreement 
the product of leadership and vision. 
As the parties continue their discus- 
sions under the auspices of the UN Se 
retary General, we hope that this 
significant achievement will be a pre- 
lude to further progress on immediat 
problems and on the larger issues 
bound up in the Cyprus dispute. 

' Read to news correspondents bv De- 
partment deputy spokesman Richard A. 
Boucher. ■ 

gains tax to 15% on long-held assets, 
which would further encourage private 

Increased investment should great- 
ly benefit research and development, 
with decisions made primarily by the 
private firms which receive the bene- 
fits of such investments. Acknowledging 
the key role of patent protection in 
stimulating innovation in publicly sup- 
ported research, we now encourage the 
patenting of technologies resulting 
from research performed in Federal 

The government has taken other 
steps to promote research and 

• The President has proposed a 
permanent extension of the research 
and experimentation tax credit. 

• The Administration is funding a 
number of new university-based inter- 
disciplinary science centers to per- 
form long-term research in emerging 

• The Administration has also 
called for increased funding for NASA 
[National Aeronautics and Space Ad- 
ministration] and the superconducting- 

• Finally, the President has pro- 
posed doubling the budget of the Na- 
tional Science Foundation by 1993. 

Education Innovation and Reform 

President Bush has stated his desirt- ! 
be known as the "education President 
The government is, therefore, stre.<>- 
ing improvements in the quality of ou 
system of education. Without impmve 
education, we cannot remain flexible, 
and without flexibility we cannot be 

In this regard, we must improve 
the knowledge and skills of the work- 
force needed to create new technol- 
ogies and convert them into new 
products and services. Just as we re- 
oriented our educational system afteH 
Sputnik, perhaps the time has come.t< 
see we are adequately equipping the 
next generation to compete in the 
world marketplace. 

We are already working with the 
National Science Foundation on a widf 
range of programs to improve the sci- 
ence and engineering workforce. The 
proposed education excellence act of 
1989 will further improve elementary 
and secondary education by building 
on earlier initiatives which have stim- 
ulated educational innovation and 
reform. j 

Education has even broader and ' 
more far-reaching importance for the 
future of America's competitiveness. ■ 
For in a flexible, dynamic economy, ec 

Department of State Bulletin/July 191 


cati(jn must never stop. We must be 
illiiig to assimilate new ideas and ap- 
ly iiur skills and ingenuity to ever- 
handing markets, just as the great 
jiu-rican inventors have done in the 


In the global marketplace, this 
ii-aiis that we must maintain an in- 
_-r national outlook on new ideas and 
?chnologies. American engineers, 
I'ientists, and business executives 
nist be encouraged to gain interna- 
diial experience, to recognize emerg- 
lu market opportunities abroad, and 
k'en to learn the foreign languages 
ecessary to remain at the forefront of 
e\v developments in their respective 

onfidence in America's Future 

et me sum up by returning to the 
riginal question: Where does America 
pand in the world economy? My answer 
s that we have a very sound economy 
•ith continuing high potential. 

We can best understand the basic 
Dundness of the U.S. economy by 
Dserving two very significant facts. 
irst, in testimony to economic per- 
urmance, the rest of the world has cho- 
'n to invest heavily in the United 
tates in recent years. That, in itself, 
a vote of confidence in America's 

An even more direct sign that we 
ill respond positively in the years 
lead, finally, is the fact that so many 
sghly motivated immigrants still seek 
II make the United States their home. 
js did our parents, grandparents, and 
'lose before them, the new immigrants 
)nstantly renew the American spirit 
' enterprise and hope. Their contribu- 
ons, in themselves, immeasurably add 
) our strength to forge ahead. 

Thus, while government lays the 
roundwork, the ingenuity and drive 
'the American people and American 
aterprises will be called upon to re- 
3ond to the major challenges we face — 
Ijustment to changing markets, the 
Jdget deficit, and the need for a well- 
iucated labor force. Our reply to 
lese challenges will determine the fu- 
ire of American competitiveness. I, 
ir one, am confident of the outcome. ■ 

Visit of King Hussein I 

His Majesty King Hussein I of the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan visited 
Washington, D.C., April 17-21, 1989, 
to meet with President Bush and other 
government officials. 

Following are remarks made by 
the President and His Majesty after 
their meeting on April 19.^ 

President Bush 

I have had the pleasure and honor of an 
intimate discussion with an old friend. 
His Majesty King Hussein of Jordan. 
The relationship between Jordan and 
the United States has deep roots; it's 
founded on a commonality of interests 
and mutual respect. And it is in this 
spirit that His Majesty and I reviewed 
the situation in the Middle East and, in 
particular, the search for Arab-Israeli 
peace. We talked also of the concerns 
that we both have about Lebanon. 

Few individuals can match the ded- 
ication of His Majesty King Hussein to 
the cause of peace, for his is a commit- 
ment to explore opportunities, examine 
options, pursue possibilities. I ex- 
plained to him our thinking on the need 
to diffuse tensions, to promote dia- 
logue, to foster the process of negotia- 
tions that could lead to a comprehensive 
settlement. I reiterated my belief that 
properly designed and mutually accept- 
able elections could, as an initial step, 
contribute to a political process leading 
to negotiations on the final status of the 
West Bank and Gaza. 

I also reaffirmed to His Majesty 
our longstanding commitment to bring 
about a comprehensive settlement 
through negotiations based on UN [Se- 
curity Council] Resolutions 242 and 338 
and the principle of territory for peace. 
Through these negotiations, peace and 
security for Israel and all states, and 
legitimate Palestinian political rights, 

department of State Bulletin/July 1989 



Jordan — A Profile 


*Fro»i 19!t9 to 1967, Jordan administered 
that part of former mandate Palestine west 
(if the Jordan Hirer known as the West 
Hank. Since the 1967 war. when Israel took 
control of this territory, the United States 
has considered the West Bank to be terri- 
tory occ}ipied by Israel. The United States 
believes that the final status of the West 
Hank can be determined only through ne- 
gotiations among the parties concerned on 
the basis of Security Council Resolutions 
,'-iJ and J.iS. The US view is that self- 
government for the Palestinians of the 
West Bank in association with Jordan of- 
fers the best chance for a durable, just, 
and lasting peace. 


Area: 91,000 sq. km. (85,000 .sq. mi.). 
(Mties: Capital — Amman (pop. 648,000). 
Other cities— Irbid (112,000), Az-Zarqa 


Nationality: Noun and adjective — Jor- 
(ianian(s). I'opulation (19H0 cen.sus): 2.8 
million. ,\nnual growth rate (1986 est.): 
:-i.659'f. KeliKions: Sunni Mu.slim 95%, 
Christian r>'/i . Langua);es: Arabic (official), 
English. Education: Literacy (1984)— 71%. 
Health: Infant mortality rate (1984) — 
50/1,000. Life expectancy (1984)— 64 yrs. 
Ethnic groups: Mostly Arab, but small 
communities of Circassians, Armenians, 
and Kurds. Work force (1981): Agricul- 
ture — 80%. Manufacturing and min- 
ing— 20%. 


Type: Constitutional monarchy. 
Independence: May 25, 1946. Con- 
stitution: January 8, 1952. 

Branches: Executive — king (chief of 
state), prime minister (head of govern- 
ment). Council of Ministers (cabinet). 
Legislative — bicameral National Assembly 
(appointed Senate, elected Chamber of 
Deputies). Judicial — civil, religious, spe- 
cial courts. 

Political party: Only the/government- 
sponsored Arab National Union is officially 
recognized. Suffrage: Universal. 

Defense: About 12% of GNP. 


GDP (1986): $4.3 billion. Annual growth 
rate (1986): 2.6%. Per capita GDP (1986): 

Natural resources: Phosphate, potash. 

Agriculture: Products — fruits, vegeta- 
bles, wheat, olive oil. Land — ll%i arable. 

Industry (20% of GDP); Ti/pe— phos- 
phate mining, manufacturing, cement, and 
petroleum production. 

Trade (1986): Exports— Vi2 million: 
fruits, vegetables, phosphates. Major mar- 
kets — Iraq, Saudi Arabia, India, Romania, 
Kuwait, Pakistan. Imports — $2.4 billion: 
machinery, transportation equipment, 
cereals, petroleum products. Major sup- 
pliers—US, UK, FRG, Iraq, Japan, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria. 

Fiscal year: Calendar year. 

Official exchange rate (1986): .35 
Jordanian dinar = US$1. 

US economic aid received: $1.7 billion 
(1952-87)— loans, grants, PL-480 (Food for 
Peace) programs. 

Membership in International 

UN and several of its specialized and re- 
lated agencies, including the Food and Ag- 
riculture Organization (FAO), International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), World 
Health Organization (\VhU), World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF); Orga- 
nization of the Islamic Conference (OIC); 
INTELSAT; Nonaligned Movement; Arab 

Taken from the Background Notes of June 
1988, published by the' Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, De|5artment of State. Editor: Juanita 
Adams ■ 


can be realized. In addition, a proprrly 
structured international conference 
could serve, at the appropriate time, a 
a means to facilitate direct negotiatn-i; 
between the parties. 

The time has come to encourage 
fresh thinking, to avoid sterile debate, | 
and to focus on the difficult but critical i 
work of structuring a serious negotiat- | 
ing process. His Majesty committed 
Jordan to this task. 

An important part of this effort, 
and of the stability of the Middle Ea>t 
as a whole, will be the continued ecu- 
nomic and military strength of Joi'dan. 
Jordan's security remains of fundaiiiiii 
tal concern to the United States, and 1 
have reassured His Majesty that the 
United States will do its utmost to \k-\ 
meet Jordan's economic and militar.\ 

His Majesty King Hussein and 1 
delved deeply into the broader regioim 
and internal problems, and as alwa,\>, 
benefited greatly from the wisdom nf 
my friend. Together we pledge to con- i 
tinue the close cooperation and coor- ' 
dination that mark the relations 
between Jordan and the United State.-; 

In closing, I would like to express 
my best wishes to King Hussein and t^ 
the people of Jordan for an auspicious 
month of Ramadan and a blessed 'Id 

His Majesty King Hussein I 

It is a great pleasure, as always, to r& 
turn to the United States, a country 
with which Jordan has enjoyed a sped! 
relationship for so many years. It is 
even a greater pleasure on this occa- 
sion to be meeting with you, a treas- 
ured friend of longstanding. Your 
dedication to the service of your great! 
country has been a source of inspira- 
tion, respect, and admiration to me, ai 
it is to all who know you. 

I know how devoted you are to the' 
cause of peace. I share this devotion. 1 
sincerely hope that through our com- 
mon devotion to peace, we can, with 
those who are equally devoted, finally 
bring peace to the Middle East. 

You are the sixth President with 
whom I have joined to pursue that 
peace. I first visited this historic 
house in 1959 to meet with President 
Eisenhower. It marked the beginning 
of a warm and productive relationship 
between our two countries, a relation- 
ship which has flourished because of 
our shared values, shared interest.-^, 
and shared goals. It is a relationshi]) 

Department of State Bulletin/July 19( 


;hich my country and I cherish. I am 
eartened that the talks we are en- 
at;v(l in will contribute to a deepening 
f this relationship. 

One of our goals, which despite 

2 years of efforts we have yet to 
chieve, is a comprehensive settlement 
f the Arab-Israeli conflict. The princi- 
les for that settlement were estab- 
shed many years ago: UN Security 
!ouncil Resolutions 242 and 338. These 
esolutions provide for the withdrawal 

f Israeli forces from the territories oc- 
upied in 1967 in return for the estab- 
shment of peace, arrangements for 
ecure and recognized boi'ders, and 
egotiations under appropriate auspices 

3 implement these provisions. 

Your recent e.xpressed reaffirma- 
ion of American support for the end of 
sraeli occupation and return for peace 
nd for the political rights of the Pal- 
stinian people are integral parts of 
ny comprehensive settlement is both 
onstructive and commendable. As a 
iesult of a recent decision by the Pal- 
estine Liberation Organization (FLO) 
D accept the right of Israel to exist, to 
egotiate a settlement with Israel 
ased on Security Council Resolutions 
42 and 338, and to renounce terror- 
-ni, a significant contribution to peace 
as been made. 

This historic decision has the over- 
helming support of the Arab world. 
he decision by the United States to 
ndertake substantive discussions with 
ne PLO has further improved the 
irospects for peace. I hope this will 
Irompt Israel to respond similarly to 
he requirements of peace and recog- 
iize the legitimate representative of 
he Palestinian people. Peace can nei- 
her be negotiated nor achieved without 
'LO participation. 

I believe the bases for peace are al- 
eady established. What is required is 
D implement them. The forum for a ne- 
otiated comprehensive settlement is a 
jeace conference under the auspices of 
|he United Nations. In my opinion, any 
jteps taken should lead to such a con- 
erence, if our efforts to arrive at a 
comprehensive settlement are not to be 
iverted. All the people in the Middle 
]ast need peace and an end to this 
ragic and interminable conflict. The 
awards of peace are limitless and far 
jutweigh any advantage which might 
•e gained by any party from continued 
lontroversy and conflict. The condi- 
|ions for peace exist. We all must dis- 
play the vision and determination to 
a])italize on them. 

Allow me to say, as one of your 
many friends and as one who knows 
well your qualities, abilities, devotion, 
and dedication to the cause of peace, 
that you are the right leader in the 
right office at the right time. I know 
the high esteem with which you are 
held throughout the Middle East. You 
are in a unique position to help the pro- 
tagonists in our area to engender the 
needed trust and hope and to assist us 
in bringing the conflict to a just and 
durable conclusion. I can assure you 
that I fully support you and all your ef- 
forts in this regard. 

'Made in the Rose Garden of the White 
House (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Apr. 24, 1989). ■ 

Relief Aid to Lebanon 

MAY 19, 1989' 

The United States is pleased to an- 
nounce that $200,000 has been allocated 
for disaster relief efforts in Lebanon. 
The assistance will be used to provide 
medical supplies and to meet other ur- 
gent relief needs to the Lebanese af- 
fected by the recent fighting. These 
supplies are intended for all segments 
of the affected population through the 
several private voluntary organizations 
active in Lebanon. 

We are also happy to announce that 
a shipment of 7,302 metric tons of U.S. 
food for the Lebanese people has ar- 
rived in Lebanon. This food — rice, len- 
tils, and vegetable oil — is part of a 
Food for Peace program through which 
the U.S. Government will provide the 
Lebanese people nearly 30,000 metric 
tons of foodstuffs worth $18 million 
from October 1988 to October 1989. 

Through this humanitarian relief 
program, we provide about half the 
food for nearly 700,000 Lebanese. 

'Read to news correspondents by De- 
partment deputy spokesman Richard A. 
Boucher ■ 

Situation in Lebanon 

APR. 28, 1989' 

The United States welcomes the call by 
Arab League Foreign Ministers for a 
cease-fire and the lifting of all block- 
ades. We fully support the decision to 
send Arab League observers to moni- 
tor the cease-fire. 

We note that Gen. Awn [Christian- 
backed leader] and Dr. Huss [Muslim- 
backed leader] have accepted the cease- 
fire, and we urge all other parties to 
the fighting to abide by the Arab 
League's call. Outside parties involved 
in Lebanon must exercise the utmost 
restraint. The United States applauds 
the determined efforts of the Arab 
League to restore security and stabil- 
ity to Lebanon. 

We encourage the Arab League to 
continue its initiative to help the 
Lebanese resolve their political im- 
passe. The United States remains com- 
mitted to the restoration of Lebanon's 
sovereignty, unity, and territorial in- 
tegrity with the withdrawal of all for- 
eign forces and the disbandment of 


MAY 4, 1989' 

The United States welcomes the an- 
nouncement by Gen. Awn that he will 
suspend temporarily his blockade of 
the ports. Gen. Awn's decision can 
strengthen the political process under- 
way to restore Lebanon's security and 
stability and to end the suffering of the 

We call on all parties to cooperate 
fully with the Arab League effort to 
send observers to Lebanon as soon as 
possible to monitor the cease-fire. We 
congratulate the Arab League and its 
Committee on Lebanon for the success 
it has achieved so far in arranging a 
cease-fire, and we encourage the 
league to renew its initiative to pro- 
mote a political dialogue among 
Lebanese leaders on the issue of nation- 
al unity and constitutional reform. 

The United States remains fully 
committed to the restoration of 
Lebanon's unity, sovereignty, and terri- 
torial integrity with the withdrawal of 
all foreign forces and the disbandment 
of militias. 

'Read to news correspondents by 
Department spokesman Margaret DeB. 
Tutwiler. ■ 

department of State Bulletin/July 1989 



U.S. Responsibilities 

in International Fisheries Matters 

by Edward E. Wolfe 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Fisheries and Wildlife Conserva- 
tion and the Environment of the House 
Merchant Marine Committee on May 
2, 1989. Mr. Wolfe is Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Oceans and Interna- 
tional Environmental and Scientific 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss 
the reauthorization of the Magnuson 
Fisheries Conservation and Manage- 
ment Act. I would like to say at the out- 
set that, from the perspective of the 
Department of State, the act and its 
implementation have been a note- 
worthy success. The Department has 
no changes to recommend to the act. 

As the subcommittee is aware, 
among the fundamental purposes of the 
Magnuson act are to conserve and man- 
age U.S. fisheries resources, to pro- 
mote domestic commercial and 
recreational fishing under sound con- 
servation and management principles, 
and to encourage the development by 
the U.S. fishing industry of fisheries 
off the coasts of the United States. The 
principal role of the Department of 
State, in the process established by the 
act to achieve these purposes, has been 
to negotiate governing international 
fisheries agreements with foreign na- 
tions desiring to operate off the U.S. 
coasts and to allocate surplus Ameri- 
can fisheries resources to fishermen 
from countries with which the United 
States has governing international 
fisheries agreements in force. 

"Americanization" of Fisheries 

The principal fisheries policy which the 

United States has pursued since 1980 
has been called the "Americanization" 
of fisheries in the U.S. exclusive eco- 
nomic zone (EEZ). Consistent with this 
policy, the Department of State and 
the Department of Commerce have fol- 
lowed the allocation criteria specified 
in Section 201 of the Magnuson act. 
During the decade of the 1980s, direct 
allocations to foreign countries have 
fallen from a high in 1980 of 2,176,789 
metric tons (MT) on both coasts, to 
51,577 MT (Atlantic mackerel and by- 
catch species) thus far in 1989. The pol- 
icy has been responsible for and, at the 


same time, has been driven by dramat- 
ic changes in our fisheries. The growth 
in the U.S. catch of Alaska pollock and 
the development of the squid fisheries 
on the east coast are two e.xamples 
which come to mind. As the foreign 
fisheries declined, joint ventures ex- 
panded during the early part of the 
same period. Joint ventures, usually in- 
volving U.S. fishermen selling their 
catch to foreign vessels in our zone, 
reached a peak in 1986, when 1.5 mil- 
lion MT were caught. Americanization 
is rapidly reducing joint venture fish- 
ing operations each year, which is the 
intent of the law. 

To send the diplomatic signal to for- 
eign countries fishing in the U.S. EEZ 
that the United States was changing 
its approach with regard to bilateral 
fisheries agreements, we began several 
years ago to extend certain agree- 
ments for only a 2-year period. We have 
not renegotiated a governing interna- 
tional fisheries agreement for several 
years. Our approach has been to offer 
each governing international fisheries 
agreement nation the choice of accept- 
ing a 2-year extension of their existing 
agreement (with changes to make it 
conform with current U.S. law and pol- 
icy) or to allow their agreements to ex- 
pire. During the 1980s, the number of 
governing international fisheries 
agreements in force has been reduced 
from 17 to 9, counting the comprehen- 
sive bilateral fisheries agreement with 
the Soviet Union. I might note at this 
point that we do not have a goal of 
elminating all governing international 
fisheries agreements, since in some 
cases they are a useful vehicle for ar- 
rangements, such as joint ventures, 
which may benefit U.S. fishermen dur- 
ing this stage of development of the 
U.S. fishing industry. 

From an international perspective, 
the problems which the Magnuson act 
intended to address when it was writ- 
ten over a decade ago, for the most part 
have been resolved. That is, the United 
States is now fully controlling the fish- 
eries resources off our coasts. In fact, 
for all practical purposes, foreign fish- 
ing in the U.S. zone has been elimi- 
nated. One might say that, in a sense, a 
chapter in U.S. fisheries relations with 
countries which traditionally fished off 
the U.S. coast has been closed. 

We are now pursuing new and in- 
novative methods of doing business 

with our foreign fishing partners. For 
example, we have been promoting the 
establishment of equity joint ventures 
between U.S. and foreign companies. 
Japan has participated in the develop- 
ment of several surimi [a processed 
fish product] processing plants in Alaa 
ka, and other countries are currently 
involved in other equity investment 

As we have gone about the process 
of reducing and, in fact, practically 
eliminating the foreign fishing off the 
U.S. coast, we have inevitably encoun- 
tered a reaction from the foreign 
governments involved. While U.S. 
fisheries policy and corresponding ac- 
tions have not been popular with our 
foreign colleagues, all of the foreign ni 
tions involved have accepted the realitj 
of coastal state control over the man- 
agement of coastal fisheries resources 
inside 200 miles and its inevitable con- 
sequence. I might add for the record 
that we have not experienced any seri- 
ous foreign policy problems as a result! 
of the phase out of foreign fishing in 
our zone. [ 

As one chapter of our international 
fisheries relations has come to a close, 
other international areas are requirinji 
more of our attention. In some cases, 
these areas have long been the focus o: 
considerable attention by the Depart 
ment of State. We have important re- 
sponsibilities in international fisheriei 
matters other than the allocation of 
surplus resources to governing inter- 
national fisheries agreement countries- 
Three broad areas of U.S. internationji 
fisheries interests come to mind. 

Cooperation in 
Multiple Fisheries Zones 

The first area involves the question of 
how to deal with fishery stocks which 
are partly in the U.S. zone and partly 
in either the zones of neighboring coun 
tries or in the high seas areas beyond 
the 200-mile jurisdiction of any nation. 
For example, one of the main issues w( 
face in the North Pacific is the dramat 
ically increased level of fishing by thir 
countries in the Bering Sea beyond 20( 
miles, the so-called donut area. In this 
region, fishing vessels from Japan, i 
Korea, Poland, and China have con- i 
centrated their efforts and increased | 
harvests of pollock from some 100,000 ' 
MT in 1984 to about 1.3 million MT in 
1988. This is totally unacceptable. Ac- 
cording to our scientists, this dramatic 
increase in fishing is adversely affect- 
ing economically vital U.S. pollock 
stocks as well as other stocks in the 

Department of State Bulletin/July 198 


'ring Sea. We are currently working 
,th the Soviet Union, the other Ber- 
g Sea coastal state, to develop meas- 
es; for addressing the unregulated 

• hii'ies in the donut area. In these 
Iks, the United States has proposed 
(lliiig for a temporary moratorium on 
Ishing in the donut by all countries, 
deluding the United States, until an 
aequate multilateral conservation re- 
ime for the region can be established. 

Talks with the Soviet Union on mu- 
tal fisheries concerns will resume in 
JDSCOW in late May or early June. In 
idition to the Bering Sea donut issue, 
le two sides will discuss measures to 
tnserve salmon on the high seas. Un- 
(r a memorandum of understanding 
S^ned on February 9, both countries 
Ive agreed to the principle that high 
fas salmon fishing is a wasteful prac- 
\e and should be eliminated. We also 
I, reed to increase bilateral coopera- 
lin on high seas salmon enforcement 
hues. During the ne.xt meeting in 
ipscow, we will be discussing possible 
hg-term regimes for the conservation 
(salmon throughout the North Pacific. 

We also face a major conservation 
|oblem in the form of the large squid 
id tuna driftnet fleets from Japan, 
Ijrea, and Taiwan operating through- 
('t the North Pacific. These fleets uti- 
le daily some 30,000-40,000 miles of 
fiating driftnet, which entangle those 
I'lrine resources migrating through 
te fishing grounds. This type of 
Msteful and indiscriminate fishery 
tkes large quantities of marine mam- 
tils. seabirds, and other nontarget liv- 
ie marine resources. In addition, if 
te fisheries operate in certain north- 
en areas, they will intercept valuable 
IS. -origin salmon. There is, in fact, 
eidence that squid driftnet vessels 
fom Taiwan, and possibly other coun- 
ties, are involved in illegal directed 
slmon fishing. For instance, the U.S. 
(bast Guard recently sighted several 
■^.liwan squid driftnet vessels operat- 
ig in an area that is closed to them. 
"iiiis incident has added to our concern 
\th the activities of the driftnet fleets 
ithe North Pacific. 

Pursuant to the 1987 Driftnet Act, 
!:■ have been involved in talks with Ja- 
1 n, Korea, and Taiwan with the aim of 
laching adequate agreements for the 
lonitoring and enforcement of these 
•('iftnet fleets. Although we continue 

* actively press for such agreements, 
I'ogress has been slow in some in- 
ances and practically nonexistent in 
.'ihers. We have faced resistance on the 
'■ounds that fisheries on the high seas 

should be controlled only by the flag 
state. If adequate agreements are not 
reached by June 29, the Driftnet Act 
requires that the Secretary of Com- 
merce certify such fact to the President 
under the Pelly amendment. The Presi- 
dent then has the discretion to place 
sanctions on imports of fisheries and 
aquatic products from the countries 

U.S. Bilateral 
Fisheries Relationships 

Soviet Union. On a more positive note, 
turning to the matter of neighboring 
countries, one approach to bilateral 
fisheries relations is the recently con- 
cluded comprehensive bilateral fish- 
eries agreement with the Soviet Union, 
which covers all aspects of our bilateral 
fisheries relationship. The agreement 
provides for access to each other's wa- 
ters on a reciprocal basis and for coop- 
eration on fisheries issues of mutual 
interest. The agreement also lays the 
groundwork for increased cooperation 
on bilateral fisheries science and re- 
search issues. 

This landmark agreement, which 
was the product of 8 years of talks, pro- 
vides U.S. fishermen, for the first time, 
access to the Soviet 200-mile zone. 
Because of ongoing economic restruc- 
turing efforts in the U.S.S.R., our 
Embassy in Moscow informs us that 
there is strong Soviet interest in estab- 
lishing joint enterprises with foreign 
companies, especially in the field of 
fisheries. Several U.S. companies are 
now in the process of finalizing joint 
enterprises with their Soviet counter- 
parts which will provide for joint har- 
vesting, processing, and marketing of 
fish from Soviet waters. 

The Soviet agreement also pro- 
vides for increased bilateral coopera- 
tion on fisheries issues of mutual 
concern. As noted previously, one of the 
major issues both countries have been 
considering is the effect of the vastly 
increasing fishing levels in the Bering 
Sea donut on adjacent fish stocks in the 
U.S. and Soviet EEZs. We have also 
been working jointly to address the 
conservation of salmon in the high seas 
areas of the North Pacific. I believe we 
are making progress in this area. 

Canada. The idea of reciprocal 
fishing arrangements may not be ap- 
propriate in other cases involving U.S. 
fisheries relations with neighboring 
countries. In the case of the U.S.- 
Canada fisheries relationship, for ex- 
ample, such an approach would likely 

be very controversial. On the U.S. side, 
there is no domestic consensus that the 
United States and Canada should have 
a more formal fisheries relationship in- 
volving reciprocal fishing rights or 
joint management efforts. As we know 
from past experience, unless such a do- 
mestic consensus exists, it is futile for 
the government to proceed. At the 
same time, we recognize the need for 
close cooperation with Canada on fish- 
eries matters, since in some instances 
both countries are managing the same 
stocks offish, and historically our 
overall fisheries trade and industry re- 
lationship has been a very close one. 

Our approach has been to enhance 
U.S. -Canada communications on fish- 
eries matters and to find as much com- 
mon ground as possible on fisheries 
issues of mutual interest. At a mini- 
mum, we need to ensure that the 
different approaches to fisheries 
management used in the Canadian and 
U.S. systems do not conflict and thus 
counteract each other. 

There are examples of cooperation 
between U.S. and Canadian fishing 
interests in some sectors. Canadian 
authorities in Nova Scotia have put in 
place minimum size restrictions which 
parallel our own. In the area of enforce- 
ment, U.S. and Canadian authorities 
have taken steps to increase coopera- 
tion and reduce conflicts along the 
U.S. -Canadian maritime boundary. 
Also, we are in the process of attempt- 
ing to arrange with Canada a jointly 
sponsored conference on the scientific 
basis for fisheries management, which 
we believe could be an important step 
in fostering better mutual understand- 
ing of each nation's management 
system. The U.S. approach to our 
fisheries relationship with Canada has 
been to proceed cautiously and to pur- 
sue, on a step-by-step basis, somewhat 
limited and hopefully achievable goals, 
consulting with Congress and U.S. 
fishing interests as we proceed. In rec- 
ognition of the long-term fisheries rela- 
tionship which we will inevitably have 
with Canada, it is our view that we 
should keep the door open for closer 
cooperation on fisheries management 
issues in the future. In an effort to en- 
hance such cooperation, we have pro- 
posed that the two governments meet 
in the near future to exchange views on 
a variety of fisheries matters. 

Mexico. The United States also 
has an important fisheries relationship 
with Mexico which will require more of 

bpartment of State Bulletin/July 1989 



our attention in the years ahead. Leav- 
ing aside for the moment the question 
of tuna, which is probably the most im- 
portant aspect of our fisheries relation- 
ship with Mexico, we do have important 
fisheries interests in both the Gulf of 
Mexico and off the Pacific coast which 
require cooperative efforts on the part 
of both countries. For example, in the 
gulf there are stocks offish such as 
mackerel which, in effect, are shared 
stocks migrating throughout the 200- 
mile zones of both Mexico and the 
United States. On the Pacific side, the 
same situation pertains to such fish 
stocks as northern anchovy and coastal 
migratory species which move along 
the coasts of both California and Baja, 
California. In the long run, the United 
States and Mexico need to work closely 
together in order to most effectively 
manage these shared stocks of fish. I 
recently had a very productive meeting 
with the new Mexican Secretary of 
Fisheries and other Mexican officials, 
and we plan to have a second meeting 
later this month. 

Conservation and 
Management of Resources 

A second broad international fisheries 
area which is the responsibility of 
the Department of State involves the 
conservation and management of 
anadromous U.S. fisheries resources 
beyond the U.S. 200-mile zone. Such 
conservation and management is, in my 
opinion, one of the more important pur- 
poses of the Magnuson act. Our conser- 
vation efforts are complicated by the 
fact that foreign fleets may take U.S.- 
origin salmon beyond the U.S. exclu- 
sive economic zone. It seems clear that 
a cooperative international effort is 
mandatory if we are to do effectively 
the job required of us under the act. As 
I noted earlier, the driftnet negotia- 
tions with Japan, Korea, and Taiwan 
represent one of our major efforts to 
address salmon management issues. 
However, I would be less than candid 
if I reported to the committee that all 
of the involved countries have been 

In recent years we have also been 
involved in other international action 
to conserve U.S. -origin salmon on the 
high seas. In the early 1980s, the De- 
partment, through the International 
North Pacific Fisheries Commission, 
raised the issue of excessive salmon 
harvesting by the Japanese salmon 
fleet. As a result, the .Japanese im- 
posed new area restrictions on their 


fleet in 1982 in order to reduce the in- 
terception of North America salmon. In 
1986, the Department negotiated an 
amendment to the commission whereby 
.Japan would cease fishing for salmon 
in the high seas area of the Bering Sea 
by 1994. 

As noted earlier, the Department 
is also currently seeking new ways to 
cooperate with the Soviet Union to- 
ward better conservation of salmon in 
the North Pacific. Toward this end, we 
signed a memorandum of understand- 
ing in February of this year at the So- 
viet Embassy which provides for in- 
creased sharing of information and 
cooperative enforcement against high 
seas salmon poaching. This was the 
first U.S. -Soviet agreement signed 
during the Bush Administration. The 
Department is continuing to explore 
every avenue, consistent with interna- 
tional law, to conserve U.S. salmon on 
the high seas. 

I might make the observation at 
this point: that it was considerably eas- 
ier to deal with these management is- 
sues beyond our zone when there were 
U.S. fisheries resources to allocate to 
the foreign nations with which we have 
to negotiate. A few years ago, when 
there were surplus U.S. fisheries avail- 
able for allocation to foreign nations, 
we had considerable leverage with 
which to help us achieve our goals. Now 
that we do not have — and are not likely 
to have — any surplus U.S. fish to use 
as a negotiating carrot, it is more diffi- 
cult for us to persuade foreign gov- 
ernments to reduce their fishing or 
undertake other economically disad- 
vantageous actions with regard to their 
fisheries beyond 200 miles. As I am 
sure the chairman [Gerry Studds] re- 
calls, the U.S. "fish and chips" policy 
was an important tool in achieving our 
goal of full utilization and development 
of U.S. resources by U.S. fishermen in 
our EEZ. It is unclear whether under 
these circumstances the United States 
will be able to achieve all that it wants, 
but we are determined to do our best 
with the situation facing us. 

Distant Water Fisheries 

A third broad area of international 
fisheries which is the responsibility of 
the Department of State involves the 
so-called distant water fisheries which 
are conducted by U.S. flag vessels. To 
a considerable extent, these activities 
are not really a part of the Magnuson 
act process, although one of the act's 

purposes is to support and encourage 
international fisheries agreements for 
the conservation and management of 
highly migratory species. While the 
United States has other distant water 
fisheries interests, tuna is the most in 
portant distant water fishery which w 
have. The U.S. tuna industry continu* 
to be one of the major U.S. fisheries, 
and, indeed, it is one of the world's ma 
jor tuna industries. The Department 
has expended considerable effort 
around the world in attempting to n^: 
gotiate both conservation and access 
arrangements involving U.S. tuna 
vessels. One of our more notable receit 
successes was the negotiation and en- 
try into force of the South Pacific Re- 
gional Fisheries Agreement, which 
provides access for the U.S. tuna flee 
for 5 years, to a 10 million-square-niil 
area of the western Pacific Ocean. Si> 
teen Pacific island countries are par- 
ties to this treaty. 

In the eastern Pacific, we have 
been encouraged by recent develop- 
ments which offer new hope for the 
negotiation of a comprehensive tuna 
management organization for the 
eastern tropical Pacific. The Inter- 
American Tropical Tuna Commis- 
sion continues to do an outstanding 
job in monitoring the status of the tui 
and porpoise stocks of the eastern trc 
ical Pacific Ocean. In the Atlantic, we 
believe that the International CommiiJ 
sion for the Conservation of Atlantic 
Tunas has been very effective in pr 
viding a mechanism for effective con- 
servation and management of Atlantid 
tuna and billfish species. 


In closing, let me reiterate that the Dl 
partment of State believes — in terms- 
international fisheries matters as the 
relate to the Magnuson act — that we 
have successfully achieved the intent ' 
the act and the "Americanization" of 
the U.S. zone. A chapter has been 
closed. The new chapter is evolving 
which will require international coop- 
eration, albeit differently, to continue 
to advance U.S. fisheries interests. 

0- I 

'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee ai 
will be available from the Superintendent 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 

Department of State Bulletin/July 19: 


ipdate on Immigration and Refugee Issues 

Jonathan Moore 

Sfntement before the Subcommittee 
I iinnigration. Refugees, and Inter- 
< liiiiial Law of the House Judiciari/ 
iiriiiittee on April 6, 1989. Ambas- 
•iliir Moore is U.S. Coordinator for 
' Jiii/ce Affairs.'^ 

he occasion for this important hearing- 
It he surge in emigration from the So- 
I't I'nion. The Administration views 
;is phenomenon as a signal success for 
. • sustained, bipartisan policy of the 
liitiMl States toward the Soviet Union 
the postwar era, a policy which em- 
asizes human rights for Soviet citi- 
Mis and specifically calls for freedom 
emigration. I am pleased to have the 
portunity today to review the policy 
itiatives the Administration is taking 
icsponse to the current unprece- 
iitfd rate of application by Soviet em- 
raiits for resettlement in the United 
•ates. In particular, as U.S. Coordina- 
;:' for Refugee Affairs, I wish to pre- 
?,it fnrmally the President's proposal 
; raise the refugee admissions ceiling 
f- FY [fiscal year] 1989. Finally, in re- 
- iiise to the subcommittee's invita- 
; 11, we will offer some preliminary 
i w s on the bill introduced by Mi\ Ber- 
rin and on your own draft bill, 
P-. Chairman [Bruce A. Morrison]. 
Before moving to these specific 
citters, I would like to report briefly 
3 the major refugee situations in the 
firld with which we are now engaged. 
ifr policies for dealing with Soviet 
Eiigration cannot be developed in iso- 
I. inn from other refugee needs, both 
['■ ({(imestic resettlement here and for 
i ernational assistance abroad. Our 
i ernational refugee policies and re- 
sonsibilites are linked intimately with 
ksic bilateral and multilateral foreign 
flicy objectives. And, with limited re- 
sjrces to meet multiple refugee prob- 
lais, the United States cannot respond 
L individual demands without main- 
t ning equity in our humanitarian 
rsponses worldwide. 

Jajor Refugee Issues 

■^lere are some 13 million people in the 
Virld who have fled persecution and 
i-med conflict, often combined with 
rtural disasters, and less than 1% of 
t?m in a given year will be resettled 
anv third country. 

In Africa, there is the all-too- 
familiar catalogue of intractable, long- 
term populations of refugees and dis- 
placed persons, but also a few hopeful 
signs. In the past 5 years, over 
1 million Mozambicans have fled the 
RENAMO [Mozambique National Re- 
sistance Movement] insurgency and its 
attendant terrors for neighboring na- 
tions; tiny Malawi alone gives shelter to 
some 650,000 of them. Ethiopia — which 
itself produces refugees and displaced 
persons from the long-term, civil con- 
flict there — shelters an estimated 
350,000 Sudanese and as many as 
400,000 Somalis fleeing civil conflict 
within their countries. On the hopeful 
side, most of those who fled last sum- 
mer's ethnic violence in Burundi have 
now returned home, and there are 
hopes that — under terms of recent 
peace agreements — thousands of Nami- 
bians will begin to return home from 
their long-term exile. 

In East Asia, in spite of years of 
international assistance, the fate of the 
320,000 Khmer in camps along the 
Thai-Cambodian border remains pre- 
carious, and those in camps controlled 
by the Khmer Rouge are particularly 
vulnerable to the cross-border conflict 
between Khmer Rouge combatants and 
Vietnamese troops. The upcoming in- 
ternational conference on Indochinese 
refugees will try to put in place a new 
international policy consensus among 
the refugee-producing, first-asylum, 
and resettlement and donor nations. We 
seek a resolution which preserves first 
asylum and offers open access to safe 
and orderly emigration as a true alter- 
native to the dangerous boat trips of 
Vietnamese asylum seekers that con- 
tinue today at the highest level in many 

The situation in Central America 

is as troublesome as ever. The enemies 
are repression and armed conflict, but 
they are also desperate poverty and 
the desire for a better life. All four — 
usually in some combination — have pro- 
duced large-scale displacement within 
the region and a particularly difficult 
situation along our southern border 
as thousands flee toward the United 
States. Here in particular the recog- 
nized refugee and displaced person 
population — that is, those in camps and 
given assistance by the international 
community — is only part of a much big- 
ger migration picture. 

In the Near East and South Asia. 

there are two refugee populations con- 
stantly in the news whose long-term 
fate remains unclear. After a decade in 
temporary asylum, and even after the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops, it remains 
to this moment unclear when the long- 
awaited return to Afghanistan of the 
3 million refugees in Pakistan will 
begin. And the deprivation of the 
Palestinian refugees in the occupied 
territories is now compounded by the 
urgent need for medical and social 
services resulting from the response 
to the intifada [uprising]. 

Finally, there is a rather different 
challenge in Europe. The loosening of 
exit controls in the Soviet Union and 
some of the countries of Eastern Eu- 
rope is first of all a victory for their na- 
tionals. It is also a tribute to the long- 
term, patient insistence of the United 
States and others that those countries 
are beginning to recognize one of the 
most fundamental human rights: the 
right to leave and enter one's country at 
will. In the short term, however, this 
very success has led to enormous pres- 
sures both on our own refugee admis- 
sions system and on the asylum policies 
of the nations of Western Europe. 

Our challenge in dealing with new 
refugee crises around the world, as 
well as with the continuing tragedy of 
longstayers in refugee camps — a trag- 
edy especially for the children whose 
future lives are formed there — is that, 
despite our far-flung energies and 
strong leadership in humanitarian as- 
sistance to refugees, we face both 
inadequate international resources to 
meet all of the needs and the moral 
dilemma of deciding who needs help 
the most. 

U.S. Response to Soviet Emigration 

In the past year, we have witnessed the 
effects of a major change in the emigra- 
tion policy of the Soviet Union. Per- 
sons, or categories of persons, who had 
never before been allowed that oppor- 
tunity became eligible to apply for exit 
permits to the United States, to Israel, 
to Germany, and elsewhere. Applica- 
tions at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow 
have soared from a rate of about 1,500 
per month in FY 1988 to a current rate 
of upward of 4,000 a month. Simul- 
taneously, the number of Soviets enter- 

bpartment of State Bulletin/July 1989 



ing Austria with permission to go to 
Israel, almost all of whom opt to apply 
to the United States, has more than 
tripled in the past 6 months, from less 
than 1,000 per month in FY 1988 to be- 
tween 3,000 and 4,000 per month since 
December. These are far and away the 
highest rates in this decade, and Con- 
gress and the Administration can 
share credit for the role the United 
States has played in bringing about 
this new Soviet emigi'ation policy. 

Our national, bipartisan policy ris- 
a-vis the Soviet Union places the high- 
est emphasis on human rights, includ- 
ing the right of a citizen to travel freely 
and to emigrate from his country. The 
success of this leadership, however, 
does not equate immediately or easily 
with the more complex reality which 
the Congress and the executive branch 
share — and which cuts across their var- 
ious jurisdictions — of U.S. immigration 
and refugee policies defined in specific 
statutes that set eligibility standards, 
prescribe a process to establish annual 
numerical ceilings, and appropriate 
funds for federally supported services. 

Let me briefly recount the steps 
the Administration has taken to date. 

First, in December, we advised 
Congress of a decision to reallocate 
7,000 refugee admissions numbers 
from other regions to the Soviet Union, 
as an interim measure, in order to en- 
sure that all regional programs could 
continue without interruption. Along 
with the frontloading of admissions 
numbers earlier into the fiscal year, 
this enabled us to maximize the use of 
numbers available under the worldwide 
ceiling and to continue processing all 
groups, including Soviet applicants, at 
rates which minimized the backlog 
problem. We also instituted human- 
itarian parole and encouraged private 
funding as further efforts to manage 
the increased pressures in the short- 

Second, we have been addressing 
the processing capacity in Rome and 
Moscow to meet the increased work- 
load. INS [Immigration and Natural- 
ization Service] officer strength is ob- 
viously a critical variable in determin- 
ing how many applicants can be 
processed per month, but it is not the 
only one. Consular staff, other embassy 
support personnel, practices of host na- 
tions, and the ability of the voluntary 
agencies are also important factors in 

our efforts to keep up with an increas- 
ing flow of applicants. In Moscow, as 
the subcommittee knows, we face also 
the particular impediment of the bilat- 
eral personnel ceiling, within which we 
have to find space not only for INS and 
consular officers, but also for American 
citizen clerical and support personnel. 

Third, we have been working hard 
on an initiative to create a new provi- 
sion in U.S. immigration law to give 
the United States the flexibility to ad- 
mit for permanent resettlement per- 
sons of humanitarian and foreign policy 
concern who do not qualify under cur- 
rent immigrant or refugee provisions. 
Secretary Shultz and [INS] Commis- 
sioner Nelson testified to the need for 
such a provision in the consultations 
hearings last September, and this Ad- 
ministration sent its proposed legisla- 
tion to Congress yesterday. Under our 
proposal, the beneficiary groups would 
be identified through an annual consult- 
ative process between the executive 
branch and Congress. 

The Administration has been con- 
cerned, as have you, that the use of the 
Attorney General's parole authority as 
an avenue of admission to the United 
States for applicants who are not found 
eligible for refugee status, although a 
valuable interim resource and the only 
statutory available, is inadequate. The 
new legislation seeks to correct that 
deficiency and most importantly will 
accord the beneficiaries the full rights 
of other permanent residents of the 
United States — including the right to 
qualify for citizenship, which parolees 
do not have. With specific regard for 
the problems faced by Soviets who 
enter as parolees this fiscal year, our 
legislation proposes a retroactive 
adjustment of status to come under this 
new special immigrant category. We 
hope and request that Congress will 
give this legislation prompt and serious 

Fourth, on March 24 the President 
submitted a request for FY 1989 sup- 
plemental appropriations which in- 
cludes $85 million for the refugee 
admissions program and $15 million for 
critical refugee assistance needs in 
Africa and Southeast Asia that I spoke 
of earlier. The $85 million for refugee 
admissions is expected to provide fund- 
ing for the State Department costs for 
28,500 persons. Added to the 84,000 
refugee admissions which were funded 
in our FY 1989 appropriations, this 
could provide State Department fund- 
ing for a new total of 112,500 refugee 

Fifth, I would like to advise the 
subcommittee that the Department of 
State has commenced a comprehensive 
interagency policy review of the whole 
subject of Soviet emigration. When 
this has been completed, we will want! 
to come to Congress to discuss our 

The sixth step is to engage in 
emergency consultations with Congres 
prior to a determination by the Presi- 
dent to raise the FY 1989 admissions 
ceilings, and I am here today in fulfill, 
ment of the statutory requirement to 
present formally the President's pro- 
posal to raise the refugee admissions 
ceiling for FY 1989. 

The President's Proposal 

Pursuant to the procedures for emer- 
gency consultations which are set fort 
in Section 207 of the Immigration andli 
Nationality Act, as amended, the Coni 
gress has been advised by letter of th( 
President's proposal. Because this is 
truly urgent matter, we appreciate th( 
opportunity to discuss this proposal a| 
today's hearing, in full recognition th.fl: 
the subcommittee has not had time to 
study the proposal in detail. We inten ; , 
that the requirement of the statute fo il 
in-person discussions by a cabinet off 
cer representing the President will be 
met by a meeting to be arranged in tl 
near future. 

The President proposes that the i 
refugee admissions ceiling for FY 198! 
be raised from 94,000 to 116,500 and 
that the regional refugee admissions 
ceilings authorized under Presidentia 1' 
Determination No. 89-2 of October 5, 
1988, would be modified to be as 
follows. I, 


East Asia, First Asylum 
East Asia, Orderly 

Departure Program 
Eastern Europe/Soviet Union 
Near East/South Asia 
Latin America/Caribbean 


28,0- 1 






There would be a total of up to 
112,500 admissions for which federal 
funding could be used, and the 4,000 
numbers reserved for private-sector 
initiatives would be retained for a to- 
tal of 116,500. This is an increase of 
22,500 over the currently authorized 
94,000 figure. 

I would like to mention two specil 
effects of this proposal. 


Department of State Bulletin/July 19i< 


First, we are now proposing in our 
ipplemental appropriations request 
1 provide State Department funding 
:r all refugee admissions within the 
-2,500 total. In other words, from the 
lint of view of the State Department 
■ogram, the 6,000 so-called semi- 
inded numbers with which we began 
le fiscal year will now be fully 

Second, under the President's pro- 
psed new ceilings and the supplemen- 

il appropriations request we propose 
restore 4,000 numbers from the De- 
mber reallocation. The East Asia 
•st-asylum regional ceiling will be re- 
|ored to the original presidential de- 
rmination levels — 28,000. The Near 
st/South Asia regional ceiling will 
be restored to the original level — 
'00. For the Vietnam orderly depar- 
re program, we propose to restore 
00 numbers to a new level of 22,000 
Amissions compared to the original 
^,000 ceiling. At this point in the fis- 
ijl year — taking into account actual 
id anticipated rates of departure from 
' etnam as well as the numbers of 
IS. -approved persons now in our 
teining programs — it is most unlikely 
tat more than 22,000 persons funded 
lultT this ceiling — which includes fund- 
ig for Amerasian immigrants as well 
E refugees — could enter the United 
fates this fiscal year. I regret to re- 
[rt that despite our continuing ef- 
I'ts, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
Is not yet agreed to resume discus- 
P)ns on a program to permit resettle- 
r?nt of former reeducation center 
(tainees through the orderly depar- 
tre program. 

()nsultations With Public 
sid Private Agencies 

^; r.S. Coordinator, on March 30 I 
cnvened a meeting to obtain the views 
Cjthe voluntary agencies, which have 
iisponsibility for overseas processing 
trefugees and for the early stages of 
teir resettlement in the United 
Sates. The agencies were generally 
ipportive of both the need for using 
te emergency provision to raise the 
emissions ceiling and the range of 
rmbers presented to them (an in- 
cease of 20,000-25,000). They did, how- 
eer, raise several particular issues: 
l!e need for additional numbers for 
'ist Europeans, for Pentecostal appli- 
i]nts from the Soviet Union, and for 
."menians in the Near East region; 
Ve higher rate of rejection in the latest 

round of processing of Vietnamese or- 
derly departure program applicants; 
and the fear that any supplemental 
funding for Soviet admissions might 
result in diminished funds for other 
parts of the refugee program. I and 
representatives of the Department of 
State e.xpressed concerns about the 
agencies' capacity to maintain quality 
and timeliness in processing higher 
numbers, especially in Europe, and 
again encouraged them to organize pri- 
vately funded projects to support the 
6,000 semifunded numbers, pending 
enactment of supplemental appropria- 
tions, and the use of humanitarian 

I also consulted with 25 represent- 
atives of state and local governments at 
a March 31 meeting. While generally 
recognizing the need for some increase 
in admissions, they pressed for a com- 
mensurate increase in domestic 
funding for the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) and asked 
for detailed answers on what shape 
it might take, timeframes, the pro- 
portion of offsets to new funding that 
might be involved, and the conse- 
quences for the FY 1990 budget. They 
also asserted that it seemed the federal 
government was relying too much on 
the success of the matching grant pro- 
gram in its calculations of domestic 
need for both welfare and social serv- 
ices funding, pointing out recent sur- 
veys which showed that almost half of 
the refugees who had been in the match- 
ing grant programs in New York State 
were found to be using public welfare. 
The state and local representatives also 
voiced concerns about the effect of in- 
creased parole and regular immigra- 
tion admissions — for which no domestic 
benefits are provided — on their finan- 
cial ability to provide adequate re- 
settlement support. 

Representative Berman's Bill 

We believe that the revised refugee ad- 
missions ceilings proposed by the Pres- 
ident, if supported by the supplemental 
appropriations we have requested, will 
enable the United States to sustain our 
generous admissions programs for ref- 
ugees from the Soviet Union and the 
rest of the world for the remainder of 
this fiscal year. 

In presenting this proposal, we 
wish to give full credit to all of the 
Members of Congress and representa- 
tives from the private sector who have 
called for prompt action to address the 

rising tide of Soviet emigration and 
the shortage of refugee numbers and 
funding, including the chairmen and 
ranking members of the House Judici- 
ary Committee and this subcommittee. 

Mr. Herman has also been one of 
the leaders in this effort, and he has 
recently introduced legislation which 
would authorize an increase in the ref- 
ugee admissions ceiling for FY 1989 by 
28,000 numbers and which would trans- 
fer funds to pay for such admissions to 
the HHS Office of Refugee Resettle- 
ment and to the State Department's 
Emergency Refugee and Migration As- 
sistance Fund. We note that the revised 
ceilings proposed in Mr. Berman's bill 
are very close to those being proposed 
by the President. Where Mr. Berman's 
bill would add an aggregate of 21,000 
numbers for Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union — which I believe would 
result in a new* total of 52,500 for that 
region — the President's proposal 
would bring the regional ceiling to 
50,000. For the Vietnam orderly depar- 
ture program, Mr. Berman's bill adds 
5,500 numbers, for a total of 25,000, 
where the President's proposal sets the 
revised orderly departure program 
ceiling at 22,000, for reasons I have e.x- 
plained earlier. For East Asia first- 
asylum and for the Near East/South 
Asia region, the two proposals are 

With respect to the funding re- 
quirements for the State Department's 
programs, we believe that the amount 
requested in supplemental appropria- 
tions for refugee admissions, $85 mil- 
lion, is needed to fully fund the State 
Department costs for the proposed lev- 
el of 112,500 funded admissions, rather 
than the $50 million proposed in this 
bill. We urge congressional approval 
of the Administration's request. 

Representative Morrison's Bill 

I would also like to comment briefly on 
the chairman's draft legislation, which 
addresses both admissions ceilings and 
the question of eligibility of certain So- 
viet applicants. First, with respect to 
the numbers, this bill would set a sub- 
ceiling for Soviet applicants for FY 
1989 at 60,000—50,000 Soviet Jews and 
Pentecostals and 10,000 other Soviets — 
which compares with the President's 
proposal of approximately 43,500. (The 
President's proposal sets a regional 
ceiling for East European and Soviet 
refugees at 50,000.) Although we know 

lepartment of State Bulletin/July 1989 



that estimates of the rate of emigration 
from the Soviet Union vary, we believe 
that the President's proposal contains 
sufficient numbers to carry us through 
the current fiscal year Moreover, we 
wish to adhere to the principle of align- 
ment between the admissions ceilings 
and the availability of funding, as we 
failed to do last year, but as we have 
done in our supplemental a|)propria- 
tions request. 

For FY 1990, we believe that the 
consultations process prescribed in the 
statute is the proper way to set the re- 
gional ceiling. In September, we will 
have more current information about 
Soviet emigration rates, and we will 
also be able to benefit from discussions 
between the Congress and the execu- 
tive branch on the results of our policy 

Your draft bill would also amend 
our immigration laws by exempting So- 
viet Jews and Pentecostals from the 
refugee definition. We share your ob- 
jective of ensuring our nation's ability 
to continue generous resettlement of 
emigrants from the Soviet Union, and 
we share your special concern for Sovi- 
et Jews and Pentecostals. We believe 
that your draft legislation reflects a 
judgment that current law does not 
provide the United States with suffi- 
cient authorities to admit for perma- 
nent resettlement certain types of 
aliens who are of special humanitarian 
concern to the United States. 

We have recognized that current 
law does not enable the United States 
to admit certain applicants of special 
humanitarian concern to the United 
States who do not meet the specific 
statutory criteria for immigrant visas 
or for refugee status. It is precisely to 
address that gap in current statutory 
authority that the Administration has 
proposed that new special immigrant 

We believe the Administration's 
proposal has two advantages over your 
draft bill. First, by providing for con- 
sultations between the Congress and 
the executive branch, our bill gives the 
United States the flexibility to respond 
in future years to applicants of priority 
concern of different nationalities, in- 
cluding persons affected by events we 
cannot now foresee. Second, as a gener- 
al principle, we believe our laws should 
accord benefits on the basis of needs in 
as equitable, nonpreferential a fashion 
as possible and should avoid the desig- 
nation of specific groups. 

We believe that the resettlement 
needs of the Soviet Jews and Pentecos- 
tals in FY 1990 and future years can be 
met by the combination of authorities 
which would exist under our proposed 
new legislation and the current refugee 
and immigrant visa categories. Al- 
though we cannot at this time project 
a number of Soviet admissions in FY 
1990 under these combined authorities, 
under our proposal this number would 
be determined through two consulta- 
tive processes — one on refugees and 
one on special immigrants — prior to 
the start of the new fiscal year. Prior to 
these consultations we will also be able 
to report on the results of our compre- 
hensive review of Soviet emigration 

Furthermore, we do not favor leg- 
islation that would establish a pre- 
sumption or confer automatic refugee 
eligibility on a particular group or 
groups of Soviet applicants. We sup- 
port neutral decisionmaking under a 
uniform worldwide standard as contem- 
plated by the Refugee Act of 1980. 

Last August the Department of 
Justice and INS, who have the legal 
responsibility for implementing the 
Refugee Act and adjudicating refugee 
applications, reaffirmed that the stat- 
ute requires refugee applications to be 

judged on a case-by-case basis, throug 
individual interviews, and based on 
uniform, worldwide standards. The De 
partment of State supports the policy 
of the Attorney General and believes 
that INS should apply the definition 
contained in the Refugee Act properly 
and consistently to all refugee appli- 
cants, including Soviets. 

Nonetheless, we are deeply con- 
cerned about the plight of the many 
Soviets who undoubtedly have been 
persecuted or have a well-founded fear, 
of persecution and who qualify as refu 
gees. We are concerned at the current 
high level of denial rates in Rome, as 
well as in the Vietnam orderly depar- 
ture program. We will assist INS in e 
ery way possible to ensure that INS 
interviewers have available all neces- 
sary information concerning condition 
in the Soviet Union, including the 
treatment of the various religious and 
ethnic groups in the applicant pool. W* 
hope that, through these efforts and 
proper application of the law, we can 
ensure that those who are refugees w» 
be recognized as such for admission 
into the United States. 

'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee ar 
will be available from the Superintendent 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 

U.S. Contributions to 
Communications Development 

Following is the suuiinarij of a May 
1989 report entitled "U.S. Government 
and Private Sector Contributions to 
Communications Development." It is a 
study of bilateral contributions to 
communications development prepared 
by the Bureau of International 
Communications and Information 

From September 1988 to March 1989, 
the State Department's Bureau of In- 
ternational Communications and In- 
formation Policy undertook a study to 
identify U.S. Government and private 
sector bilateral contributions to com- 
munications development. This work 
complements a 1985 survey, funded by 
the Department of State's Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research, on U.S. 

Government contributions to commun 
cations development. The current stUd 
not only updates that earlier work buti 
also demonstrates the scope and impw 
tance of nongovernment telecommuni- 
cations assistance. 

This study is intended to help U.5 
Government policymakers coordinate 
more effectively scarce communicatioi 
development resources, to aid the U.S 
private sector in reassessing its role | 
in communications development activ-j 
ities, and to offer developing countries 
a better global picture of U.S. efforts 
so as to identify possible unexplored 
sources of assistance. 



he ITU Looks at 



lie r.S. commitment to communica- 
)iis development has as its backdrop 
ic pivotal report by the International 
•Iciommunication Union (ITU) Inde- 
■111 lent Commission for World-Wide 
'elecommunications Development, 
'he Missing Link." The report fol- 
ded the 1982 amendment to the ITU 
nvention that lists communications 
ivelopment as one of the priority con- 
rns of the ITU. Issued in January 
'85, "The Missing Link" identified the 
arp disparity between the telecom- 
Linications capabilities of the devel- 
led and developing worlds. The 
nited States fully agrees with the 
ed, outlined in "The Missing Link," 
promote joint efforts in which "gov- 
nments and development assistance 
encies must give a higher priority 
I'an hitherto to investment in telecom- 
unieations." The United States has 
ikcn seriously the challenges defined 
1 the independent commission and, as 
lis study reveals, has been working 
jstfmatically to meet them. 

Kven before the "The Missing Link" 
MS issued, the United States had re- 
Miniled to the calls at the 1982 ITU 
I 'nipotentiary conference for in- 
C'used technical cooperation and as- 
■ taiice. Shortly after that conference, 
I;- r.S. Telecommunications Training 
Istitute (USTTI), a nonprofit organiza- 
t'n, began operations. Since 1983, 
loTTI has provided training for near- 
11,500 trainees from 108 developing 
amtries. More than 60 American com- 
pnies and foundations, as well as the 
rS. Government, have provided $13.3 
I" lUoii in cash and in-kind support to 
I ike this program a shining example 
Cone successful government-private 
i:tor approach to communications 

IS. Multilateral Assistance 

Vhile the focus of this study is on bilat- 
: il |ii-ograms, it should be noted that 
- niticant levels of U.S. public and pri- 
\\.r funding promotes communications 
Lveiopment activities in several multi- 
Leral organizations. Between 1986 
ad 1988, for instance. World Bank 
liding for telecommunications pro- 
i ts was nearly $769 million. The 
'lited States, with a 209^ subscription 
sare in the World Bank, provided 
out $154 million of these funds. 

In 1988, the International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Organization 
devoted about $650,000 to communica- 
tions development. The U.S. signatory 
to INTELSAT— the Communications" 
Satellite Corporation (COMSAT)— pro- 
vided $165,000 of this amount through 
its 25% holding of INTELSAT'S shares. 
COMSAT also holds 27% of the shares 
of the International Maritime Satellite 
Corporation (INMARSAT), making it 
responsible for about $54,000 of the 
$200,000 that INMARSAT devoted to 
communications development last year. 
The United States contributes approx- 
imately two-thirds of the total budget 
of the Organization of American States 
(OAS) and its agencies, such as the 
Inter-American Commission on Tele- 
communications (CITEL). In addition 
to its regular budgetary contributions, 
the United States has made special 
contributions for OAS communications 
development activities. The U.S. Trade 
and Development Program (TDP), for 
example, completed in early 1989 fund- 
ing of a $1.5-million OAS feasibility 
study on digitalization in five Latin 
American countries. TDP has also 
begun funding through the OAS addi- 
tional digitalization and fiber optics 
projects in five Latin American coun- 
tries totaling $2.75 million. 

In the International Telecom- 
munication Union, the United States 
contributes approximately 7% of total 
voluntary funds for technical coopera- 
tion and assistance. Of the nearly $13.5 
million that the ITU has expended on 
technical cooperation of regular budget 
funds between 1984-87, the United 
States provided around $945,000. The 
ITU also executes projects for the UN 
Development Program (UNDP). The 
U.S. share of the $170 million in ITU- 
executed UNDP projects between 
1982-88 was about 19%, or $32 million. 
From 1986 to March 1989, the U.S. 
public and private sectors have also 
contributed $405,000 to the ITU's Cen- 
ter for Telecommunications Develop- 
ment. While the United States strongly 
supports the multilateral communica- 
tions development programs, which 
have grown in recent years in the ITU 
and in other international forums, the 
lion's share of U.S. activities have been 
bilateral and will continue on that basis 
in the foreseeable future. 

Official Aid 

The U.S. commitment to the economic 
development of the Third World is 

rooted in a basic premise: a vibrant 
world economy in which all nations 
fully participate tends to produce 
wider trade and investment oppor- 
tunities for all players. To foster this 
goal, the U.S. Government will commit 
some $7.8 billion in international eco- 
nomic assistance in fiscal year (FY) 
1989— more than $6.3 billi'on bilaterally 
and more than $1.5 billion through mul- 
tilateral economic assistance. 

U.S. Government assistance for 
communications development has al- 
ready increased significantly over the 
past 3 years — from about $422 million 
in 1985 (the date of the last survev) to 
about $504 million in 1988. These'fig- 
ures include grants, loans, loan guar- 
antees, loan insurance, investment 
guarantees, training, technical assis- 
tance, and training and feasibility 
studies. Other activities, such as ex- 
changes of technical information, can- 
not be quantified and are not reflected 
in the figures. The following table sum- 
marizes the results by sector based on 
the survey responses from 10 U.S. Gov- 
ernment agencies: 

U.S. Government Communications 

Development Assistance, 

FY 1984 and 1988 







Loans, loan guaranties, 
investment guaranties, 
and insurance 



Technical assistance 






Feasibility studies 






Of the many U.S. Government agencies 
involved in this effort, five have been 
most active over the last 4 years. These 
are the Agency for International Devel- 
opment (AID), the Department of Com- 
merce, the Export-Import Bank, the 
Overseas Private Investment Corpora- 
tion (OPIC), and the United States In- 
formation Agency. Five other agencies 
had major programs: the Department 
of Defense, Department of Agriculture, 
Trade and Development Program, 
Peace Corps, and U.S. Postal Service. 
Their programs are examined in detail 
elsewhere in this study. 

tspartment of State Bulletin/July 1989 



The principal U.S. development as- 
sistance organ, the Agency for Interna- 
tional Development, has concen- 
trated on integrating communications 
into the basic development sectors of 
health, education, and agriculture. 
While the total amounts devoted to 
such programs are relatively small — 
.$1G8 million from 1985 to 1988— the 
multiplier effect they have produced 
is significant. The U.S. Congress is 
also becoming more directly involved 
in communications development. In 
a significant first step. Congress 
earmarked a total of $500,000 for 
communications development activities 
in the State Department's FY 1988 and 
1989 budgets. At the time of writing, 
the State Department had disbursed 
$200,000 of this sum to the ITU's Cen- 
ter for Telecommunications Devel- 
opment and $50,000 to the U.S. 
Telecommunications Training Insti- 
tute. Other U.S. Government agencies 
are also reexamining their development 
programs in light of growing evidence 
that telecommunications is one of the 
most effective vehicles for generating 
revenue for development purposes. 

Private Sector Assistance 

The U.S. private sector, with resources 
infinitely greater than those of the 
U.S. Government, has provided a far 
greater level of communications devel- 
opment assistance. The U.S. private 
sector contribution to communications 
development is broad and significant 
but defies easy characterization due to 
the diversity of goods and services pro- 
vided and the decentralized conte.xt in 
which such activity takes place. 

U.S. Corporations. Although only 
a limited number of companies partici- 
pated in the survey, among them are 
some of the most active participants in 
communications development activities: 
Southwestern Bell. 

Most U.S. telecommunications as- 
sistance to developing countries takes 
place in a commercial context. 

Although American companies have 
been slow to recognize the vast growth 
potential in the developing world, the 
tide has started to turn. With new 
business opportunities and a more pro- 
pitious investment climate in many de- 
veloping countries, U.S. companies 
have increased their commercially 
related communications development 
activities. These include equipment 
donations and loans, feasibility studies, 
seminar participation, fellowships, 
training, consulting, exchanges of tech- 
nical information, and other technical 
assistance. It is virtually impossible to 
calculate an accurate global figure for 
these activities, which run into hun- 
dreds of millions of dollars. However, 
the study gives several examples of 
illustrative programs in each sector. 

Universities, Foundations, Coop- 
eratives, and Associations. U.S. edu- 
cational and nonprofit groups carry out 
a multitude of programs to assist devel- 
loping countries improve their commu- 
nications and information capabilities. 
Scholarships and fellowships for deve- 
loping country journalists and broad- 
casters represent a major effort of 
these organizations. The 25 most active 
U.S. foundations and associations 
awarded more than 550 grants in 1988 
varying between $200 and $35,000 
each. Among these foundations are the 
World Press Institute, Alfred Friendly 
Foundation, Council for International 
Exchange of Scholars, East-West 
Center, Gannett Foundation, Inter- 
American Press Association, and 
Rotary International. Over 400 U.S. 
colleges and universities also offer a 
wide range of scholarship opportunities 
for developing country journalists and 

U.S. voluntary and cooperative 
organizations — such as the U.S. Tele- 
communications Training Institute 
mentioned earlier — have made very 
significant efforts to help develop 
Third World telecommunications. The 
Volunteers in Technical Assistance 
(VITA) is another exemplary nonprofit 
program. Established almost 30 years 
ago by scientists and engineers eager 
to share their skills and experience, 
VITA has built a cadre of 5,000 volun- 
teers who answer more than 1,000 re- 
quests for information per month from 

developing countries — many of them i 
lated to communications. VITA is dev 
loping a low-orbiting satellite networj 
called PACSAT, to support developing 
countries in health, education, disast 
relief, agriculture, and other activ- 
ities. The work of three other U.S. no 
profit organizations — the National 
Telephone Cooperative Association, t 
Global Technology Foundation, and tl 
Public Service Satellite Consortium- 
is listed in the survey narrative. 

Cooperative Approaches 

The U.S. Government established in 
1985 the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on 
Communications Development to sys- 
tematically gain private sector input 
communications development matter; 
The group, chaired by a private sect( 
representative, reports to the U.S. C 
ganization for the ITU International 
Telegraph and Telephone Consultativ 
Committee (CCITT). The major U.S. 
Government agencies and the princip 
U.S. private sector organizations in- 
volved in communications developmei 
activities are represented on the ad 1 
group. The State Department Bureav 
of International Communications and' 
Information Policy serves as secre- 
tariat for the group. 

The U.S.-China Protocol in Tele- 
communications Sciences represents 
an outstanding model of government- 
to-government cooperation in commui 
cations development. The protocol — 
signed on May 16, 1986, for a 5-year 
period — is an agreement to "conducti 
scientific and technological exchange 
and cooperation in the field of civil 
commercial telecommunications on 
basis of equality, mutual benefit, and' 
reciprocity." Since then, four major \ 
its between the two countries by U.S 
and Chinese officials and technical e; 
perts have resulted in useful studies 
and ample exchange of information. 
The United States hopes to reach sin 
lar agreements with other developinj 
countries in the future. 


Department of State Bulletin/July 1! 



rmei- Secretary of State George 
ultz in December 1988, eloquently 
ited why communications devel- 
ment is receiving increased atten- 
n by senior U.S. Government 

Modern telecommunications are no 
ger a luxury for developing countries. 
ther, in a world increasingly dependent 
the latest information, telecommunica- 
is have become a powerful engine of 
nomic growth. A growing number of 
es shows that modern telecommunica- 
is create new jobs, attract foreign invest- 
nt, and provide the revenue to meet basic 
nan needs. 

The key for U.S. and developing 
intry policymakers will be to effec- 
ely catalyze market-oriented activ- 
is in a way that will foster basic 
'elopment goals. Numerous e.xamples 
;ed herein demonstrate that signifi- 
it progress is currently being made 
rard this end. However, the nascent 
)lic-private partnership needs to be 
lewed and strengthened if the pace is 
be accelerated. Similarly, coopera- 
1 between the United States and de- 
oping countries requires creative 
V approaches. This report should 
p identify some areas where fur- 
:r government-to-government and 
'ernment-private sector coopera- 
1 is possible and some new possi- 
ties for spreading more widely 
unprecedented benefits of the 

U.S. Opposes PLO Admission 
to UN Agencies 

'To receive a copy of the full report, call 
i.vrite: Bureau of International Communi- 
iiuns and Information Policy, Rm. 6317, 
Jv Hepartment of State, Washington, 
):. :ili520 (Tel: 202-647-834.5). ■ 

by Sandra L. Vogelgesang 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Foreign Operations of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee on May i, 
1989. Dr. Vogelgesang is Deputy Assist- 
ant Secretary for International Orga- 
nization Affairs.^ 

I will address the issue of Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) admis- 
sion to membership in the Woidd Health 
Organization (WHO) and other UN 
agencies. This pressing matter has 
been highest on the agenda of the Bu- 
reau of International Organization Af- 
fairs for the last few weeks. 

As you know, we are currently fac- 
ing a serious challenge in the WHO, 
where the PLO, which has observer 
status, has submitted an application 
for membership for the "state of Pal- 
estine." This application is expected to 
be considered at the upcoming annual 
meeting of the World Health Assembly, 
which begins May 8. The PLO has also 
expressed interest in making similar 
applications in other UN agencies; suc- 
cess in WHO could encourage the PLO 
to do so. 

The Administration fully appreci- 
ates congressional concerns over these 
developments. I can assure you we 
share those concerns. We are engaged 
in a major effort to head off these at- 
tempts, which, if successful, would po- 
liticize the specialized agencies, thus 
complicating their essential technical 
work and would also be seriously detri- 
mental to the search for Middle East 

U.S. policy in this regard is clear. 

• The self-declared Palestinian 
"state," which the United States does 
not recognize, does not satisfy the gen- 
erally accepted criteria under interna- 
tional law for statehood and thus does 
not qualify for membership in UN 

• The United States is opposed to 
the introduction of such a divisive polit- 
ical issue into the technical work of the 
specialized agencies. 

• Moreover we are convinced that 
any effort to bestow legitimacy on the 
self-proclaimed Palestinian "state" 
would harm efforts underway in the 
region to promote peace. The Arab- 
Israeli problem can be resolved only 
through a process of negotiations be- 

tween the parties, not through uni- 
lateral acts by either side — such as the 
declaration of Palestinian statehood — 
that seek to prejudge the outcome of 
such negotiations. 

To emphasize the depth of our con- 
cern, the Secretary announced May 1 
that he will recommend to the Presi- 
dent that the United States make no 
further contributions — voluntary or 
assessed — to any international organi- 
zation which makes any change in the 
PLO s present status as an observer or- 
ganization. This would be a major step, 
and the Secretary's statement should 
leave no doubt in others' minds as to 
how seriously the United States views 
this issue. 

To ensure that our concerns over 
this issue are clearly understood by 
others, we have undertaken a series of 
worldwide demarches in capitals, rein- 
forced by high-level meetings with em- 
bassy representatives in Washington. 
With the support of like-minded allies, 
we have urged that, at a minimum, 
some mechanism be found to defer 

Secretary's Statement 

MAY 1, 19892 

The United States virorously opposes 
the admission of the PLO to member- 
ship in the World Health Oi-ganization 
or any other UN agencies. We have 
worked, and will continue to work, to 
convince others of the harm that the 
PLO's admission would cause to the 
Middle East peace process and to the 
UN system. 

Political questions such as this 
should not be raised in specialized 
agencies because such politicization de- 
tracts from the important technical 
work of these organizations. 

To emphasize the depth of our con- 
cern, I will recommend to the Presi- 
dent that the United States make no 
further contributions — voluntary or 
assessed — to any international organi- 
zation which makes any change in the 
PLO's present status as an observer 

^Press release 75. 

Ipartment of State Bulletin/July 1989 



Department Statement 

MAY 12, 1989' 

The United States welcomes the deci- 
sion today by the World Health Organi- 
zation to defer consideration of the 
membership application of the Pal- 
estine Liberation Oi'ganization. 

In deciding not to admit the self- 
declared "state of Palestine," the WHO 
rejected the PLO's efforts to politicize 
who's important work. 

We believe today's vote demon- 
strates that other nations are deter- 
mined, as we are, that such maneuvers 
should not detract from the central ef- 
fort of bringing peace to the Middle 

Although we objected to parts of 
the WHO resolution, we believe its de- 
cision to defer the PLO application will 
help ensure that the WHO can proceed 
with its vital health agenda. The Ad- 
ministration reaffirms U.S. support 
for the World Health Organization and 
its important programs for helping to 
ensure better health for people around 
the world. 

The United States will continue to 
oppose any change in the observer sta- 
tus of the PLO in the World Health Or- 
ganization or other UN bodies. 

■'Made available to news correspondents 
by Department deputy spokesman Rich- 
ard A. Boucher. ■ 

consideration of the membership appli- 
cation. We just completed useful meet- 
ings here in Washington with WHO 
Director General Nakajima, who clear- 
ly appreciates the potential danger to 
his organization posed by the PLO's ef- 
forts and supports efforts to avoid a 
vote on this explosive issue. We hope 
that other states will conclude that it 
would be in the best interests of all if 
the WHO deferred action on the 

I can assure you that we will con- 
tinue our vigorous efforts to oppose the 
admission of the self-proclaimed "state 
of Palestine" as a member in WHO or 
any other organization in the UN sys- 
tem. We appreciate the e.xpressions of 
congressional support we have received 
for this policy. 

'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent of 
Document.s, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington. D.C. 20402. ■ 


Panama Elections 

APR. 27, 1989' 

The people of Panama clearly yearn for 
a free and fair election on May 7th so 
that their country can again take its 
rightful place in this hemisphere's com- 
munity of democratic nations. Only the 
threat of violence and massive fraud by 
the Noriega regime will keep the Pan- 
amanian people from realizing that as- 
piration for democracy. 

Free and fair elections on May 7th, 
and respect for the results, can pro- 
duce a legitimate government in Pan- 
ama, which will end that nation's 
political and economic crises and inter- 
national isolation. That is clearly what 
the people of Panama deserve and 

The Noriega regime promised that 
free and fair elections would, in fact, 
take place May 7th and that interna- 
tional observers would be permitted to 
observe them. In recent weeks, the 
Noriega regime has taken steps to com- 
mit systematic fraud. Through violence 
and coercion, it threatens and intimi- 
dates Panamanian citizens who believe 
in democracy. It is attempting to limit 
and obstruct the presence of observers 
from around the world and the ability 
of journalists to report freely on the 

Nevertheless many observers in- 
tend to travel to Panama to shine the 
spotlight of world opinion on the Pan- 
amanian elections just as they did pre- 
viously in nations like the Philippines 
and El Salvador. We admire their com- 
mitment to democracy and their cour- 
age and will fully support their efforts. 

The days of rule by dictatorship in 
Latin America are over. They must end 
in Panama as well. There is still time 
for Panama to resolve its current crisis 
through free and fair elections. The 
people and Government of the United 
States will not recognize fraudulent 
election results engineered by Noriega. 
The aspirations of the people of Panama 
for democracy must not be denied. 


MAY 2, 1989- 

The Noriega regime continues its cal- 
culated campaign to harass and intimi- 
date opposition parties, journalists, 
and foreign visitors in an effort to 
carry out its plans for election fraud. 

In the last 10 days, incidents have in- 
creased dramatically. The following i 
incidents representative of Noriega 
regime actions. 

• Opposition legislative eandidati 
Felipe Escobar was beaten unconscio 
by proregime thugs on April 27 and Y 
to be hospitalized. 

• The regime has reserved large 
blocks of rooms in all hotels, and all 
new reservations must be cleared 
through Panamanian military intel- 
ligence, G-2. The G-2 will inspect 
passports and luggage. No "political' 
meetings can be held in any hotel. 

• On April 21, two Costa Rican 
newsmen reporting on the elections 
were arrested and held incommunica 
for 1.5 hours because their report al- 
legedly contained "seditious materia 

• On April 27, 10 days before the 
election, the regime COLIN A [Coali 
tion for National Liberation] ticket h 
a "victory" dinner for its candidate, 
Carlos Duque. On April 24, the re- 
gime announced in a full-page ad ths 
COLINA would win by more than 
6.5,000 votes. 

• The opposition TV program, '"'. 
ward Victory," was temporarily sus- 
pended on April 24, allegedly becaua 
the anchorwoman's license had expin 

• Two opposition radio program | 
("Voice of the Christian Democratic I 
Party" and "Heightening Awarene.^.- 
have been suspended by the regime. 

• The Panamanian Supreme Cnu 
has agreed to hear a suit filed by "ir 
pendent" PPA [Authentic Panameni; 
Party] candidate Hildebrando Nicos 
claiming that Guillermo Endara can 
run for president under another pait 
label because he never "resigned" fr( 
the PPA. 

• The Catholic Church is so con- 
cerned about regime-instigated vio- 
lence that it is urging family and 
neighborhood groups to vote togethe 

• There has been a 29% increase 
the number of registered voters; the 
should have been no more than a 
12% increase in registered voters. 

• The regime said it would an- 
nounce the election results within 

24 hours. Challenges to the vote will 
dealt with after the official results a 

• A Chilean pollster, commissior 
by the opposition, was arrested by > 
riega's police on April 29, his inform 
tion confiscated, and he was deporte 

• The regime has denied visas t 
Chilean and Venezuelan nationals plj 
ning to observe Panama's elections 

Department of State Bulletin/July 1 )*' 




LY 3, 1989^ 

the final days of the election cam- 
gn in Panama, regime propaganda 
; taken on an increasingly threaten- 
tone. The campaign of intimidation 
lertaken by the regime press and 
Panama Defense Forces is aimed at 
ucing voter turnout and discourag- 
any popular protest following the 
louncement of a "victory" for regime 
sidential candidate Carlos Duque. 
jime efforts to control the outcome 
he election include the following. 

• The government and the Justice 
lister said yesterday that any media 
adcasting election results other 

n those released by the govern- 
nt's election media center will be 
lished by warnings, fines, and possi- 

• The government and Justice Min- 
•y's national media directorate has 
lounced that local and foreign corre- 
ndents covering the May 7 election 

prohibited from carrying press cre- 
iitials issued by any office not author- 
;1 by the Noriega regime; penalties 
■lude arrest and deportation. 

• Two opposition radio programs 
ie been suspended by regime 


) • Government-owned media have 
n devoting significant coverage to 
readiness of the so-called civilian 
nity Battalions to defend the gov- 
ment coalition's victory on May 7. 
j>y have reported Dignity Battalion 
pbers gathered at installations of 
Panamanian Air Force to receive 
es and other weapons. In contrast, 
government issued a decree requir- 
1 all civilians, including private secu- 
1' guards, to turn in their weapons 
iir to the elections. 


I,Y 4, 19892 

l;i)ite Noriega regime efforts at har- 
Miii'iit, such as suspending public 
rispdrtation services, an opposition 
;n|)aign closing rally drew an enthusi- 
.-,(.■ crowd estimated by reliable 
crces at over 200,000, which is rough- 
Mi' r of Panama's entire population. 

Despite the obstacles that continue 
: le placed in the way of an honest 
.■•tural process, the people of Panama 
qtinue to demonstrate their deter- 
Tiation to manifest their will at the 
' tiun polls. 

We continue to believe that a free 
and fair election provides the oppor- 
tunity for Panamanians to find a solu- 
tion to the political and economic crises 
that have gripped Panama for more 
than 20 months. Subverting the elec- 
tion results will do nothing more than 
perpetuate Panama's crises. 

At the opening of the election press 
center, operated by the regime's Elec- 
toral Tribunal, a decision was an- 
nounced to allow the international news 
media free access to the May 7 election. 
This decision reverses an earlier de- 
cree that would have barred entry to 
Panama to all but officially invited 

However, the restrictions that af- 
fect housing, transportation, communi- 
cation, and that forbid reporting of 
unofficial election results remain in ef- 
fect. Spanish newsmen have reported 
that another journalist — a Barcelona- 
based reporter — was prevented from 
entering Panama yesterday. 

MAY 5, 1989^ 

The Noriega regime continues its sys- 
tematic campaign to discourage obser- 
vation of the elections and independent 
reporting of the results, even while it 
publicly welcomes observers to the 
elections on May 7. 

On May 1, Noriega's presidential 
candidate, Duque, said, "We want pure, 
honest elections, and we wish thou- 
sands of observers would come. Hope- 
fully all observers who want to come to 
observe these elections could come and 
will come." He added that Presidents 
Ford and Carter are welcome. 

However, some Latin American 
representatives in the Ford-Carter del- 
egation have not received visas, and 
the regime continues to place hurdles 
in the way of meaningful election cover- 
age by journalists. 

The Costa Rican Newsmen's Asso- 
ciation has reported that two reporters 
for Costa Rican television were de- 
tained in Panama last week for video- 
taping and recording reports on 
Panama and comments by Panama- 
nians. The regime has also threatened 
to arrest and jail any journalist cover- 
ing the elections who carry credentials 
from U.S. SOUTHCOM [Southern 
Command]. SOUTHCOM routinely is- 
sues press credentials to journalists 
covering SOUTHCOM. 

The regime's Electoral Tribunal 
has released figures on voter regis- 
tration. According to this source, 

1,184,324 Panamanians are registered 
to vote in Sunday's election. This repre- 
sents an unbelievable increase of over 
160% of the total number of votes cast 
in the 1984 election. 

The Panama Defense Forces con- 
tinue to arm Panama's Dignity Battal- 
ions in public ceremonies as part of an 
ongoing campaign to further intimidate 
the domestic opposition and discourage 
any thoughts of organized protests af- 
ter the May 7 election results are an- 
nounced. Members of the Dignity 
Battalions are primarily young, unem- 
ployed Panamanians. The combat slo- 
gan of the so-called Dignity Battalions 
is, "For Panama, our lives. Panama 
first. The fighting will be bitter, 
bloody, and without quarter in rich 

The regime's political parties held 
their final rally yesterday. Only 70,000 
people turned out. This stands in sharp 
contrast to the rally of 200,000 people 
held 2 days ago by the opposition 


MAY 8, 19893 

In Panama, voters faced extraordinary 
efforts by the regime of the past weeks 
to frustrate the free e.xpression of their 
will. Voter turnout in yesterday's elec- 
tion was extremely heavy. Reliable 
sources estimate it at 80%. Our Em- 
bassy reports that independent exit 
polls project the opposition coalition 
with 68% of the vote and the regime 
coalition with 23%. 

President Carter this morning said 
it appeared, based on observations at 
polling stations in Panama City last 
night, that the vote was running be- 
tween 2- and 3-to-l against the re- 
gime. We look forward to hearing the 
views of our presidential observer dele- 
gation which is holding a press confer- 
ence at 4:00 p.m. Washington time. 

At this juncture, it appears clear 
that the people of Panama have voted 
for democracy. It is now up to Gen. 
Noriega to respect the wishes of the 
Panamanian people. 


MAY 8, 1989^ 

We are deeply concerned by evidence 
pouring in of electoral fraud on the 
part of the pro-Noriega forces. 

The leader of the presidential ob- 
server delegation. Representative John 
Murtha, stated at his press conference 

•partment of State Bulletin/July 1989 



Elections in Argentina 

MAY 10, 1989> 

On May 14, 1989, the Argentine people 
will have the opportunity to vote for 
their new president and members of 
congress. Since the last presidential 
elections in 1983, the Argentines have 
voted in two national elections i'oi- mem- 
bers of congress and local officials. 

The people of Argentina have dem- 
onstrated throughout the last 6 years 
their commitment to democracy and 
theii- support for the rule of law. 
Against this backdrop of shai-ed demo- 
cratic values, the Government of the 
United States looks forward to con- 
tinuing cooperative relations based on 
mutual respect and a constructive dia- 
logue with whatever government the 
Argentine people freely choose through 
constitutional processes. 


MAY 15, 1989' 

We congratulate the people of Argen- 
tina and their leaders for the demon- 
stration of democracy at work which 
just took place in their elections. We 
also congratulate Dr. Carlos Menem for 
his apparent victory. 

Argentina's election for president 
and members of congress yesterday 
was an example of civic responsibility 
and democratic values. These elections 
took place in an atmosphere of free and 
open debate and under procedures in 
accord with the Argentine Constitu- 
tion. The United States looks forward 
to continuing good relations, based on 
mutual respect and constructive dia- 
logue, with the Government of Argen- 
tina in the transition period and with 
the new government when it is 

'Read to iie\v.< correspondents by De- 
partment deputy spokesman Richard A. 
Boucher. ■ 

that he saw "fraud and manipulation" 
by COLINA, the pro-Noriega political 
coalition, and that he cannot "justify 
saying that there was a just and fair 
election." He also said that he was "im- 
pressed by the Panamanian peoples' de- 
sire for democracy." 

European parliamentarians have 
been reported as stating that 
127,000 ballots have been destroyed. 

The opposition held a demonstra- 
tion, led by unity candidate Guillermo 
Endara, in which 4,000-5,000 people 
participated. They were met by a re- 
gime show of force which included wa- 
ter cannons, "doberman" special riot 
police, and armed regime civilian sup- 
porters. After a face-off of approx- 
imately half an hour, the opposition 
marchers dispersed. In the aftermath 
of this event, sporadic gunfire has oc- 
curred in the areas in which U.S. Em- 
bassy personnel live. No injuries have 
been reported. 

The official vote tabulation has 
been interrupted and remains largely 
incomplete. The regime has promised 
numerous times to publish results but 
still has not complied. 

MAY 9, 19895 

I would like to comment on the Pan- 
amanian elections. I met with the Mur- 
tha delegation to hear their report, and 
I have now received a preliminary re- 
port from President Ford and Presi- 
dent Carter. President Carter and his 
whole delegation will be here shortly to 
give me a full report. 

In addition, we have the report of 
other observer groups, including that 
of the Archbishop of Panama, which 
demonstrates clearly that despite mas- 
sive irregularities at the polls, the 
opposition has won a clearcut, over- 
whelming victory. The Panamanian 
people have spoken. I call on Gen. Nor- 
iega to respect the voice of the people. I 
call on all foreign leaders to urge Gen. 
Noriega to honor the clear results of 
the election. 

I might add that I applaud the 
statement by Peru's Alan Garcia who 
has spoken out against the fraud. I 
noted with interest that the Arch- 
bishop of Panama felt that 14% of the 
vote went to the opposition. I under- 
stand that Carlos Andres Perez of 
Venezuela is talking to some of the 
neighboring countries there to encour- 
age a joint statement against the fraud 

that has taken place and calling on 
Noriega to honor the results of this 


MAY 9, 1989 = 

Scattered and sporadic incidents of 
shooting and violence were reported 
throughout Panama last night, but thi 
morning the streets are quiet. Our 
Embassy reports no visible troop pre 
ence this morning. 

We have no indications that the oi 
ficial vote count has ever begun. A 
range of international observers has 
concluded that the Noriega regime ei' 
gaged in massive fraud in an attempt* 
steal the election, notwithstanding tl 
fact that the Panamanian people hav« 
voted overwhelmingly for democracy? 
and for a change of regime. We share 
these conclusions. 

The bishops have called on autho) 
ties to respect the will of the people. 
The church's statistical sampling of 
115 polling places showed the opposi- 
tion coalition winning 74*7? of the vot< 
with 25% for the regime. 

We believe the situation is clear 
cut. The Panamanian people have voM 
by margins of 2- or 3-to-l to replace* 
the Noriega regime with the oppositt 

Once again we call upon Noriega 
respect the will of the people and to '. 
the winner win. 

MAY 10, 1989' 


The U.S. Embassy reports Panama 
City is quiet. Stores and banks are 
open, but there is little activity. 
Schools remain closed. Panamanian 
combat troops have been deployed in 
Panama City. m 

The regime's Electoral Tribunal 
has released partial results from twc 
provinces purporting to show the re-l 
gime leading the opposition by 2-to-i 
At the same time, with about 50% of I 
the vote tallied, the opposition's parsl 
lei vote count shows the opposition c( 
alition with 68.4% of the vote and th( 
regime coalition with 23.4%. 

The reports of the U.S. and fore 
observers, as well as reports from r< 
able independent sources within Par[ ' 
ama concerning the handling of the 
ballots and the vote tally sheets afti 
the polls closed on May 7 indicate th. 
the fraud perpetrated by the regime 
has continued after the voting stopp' 




Department of State Bulletin/July 1'' 


Having failed in his attempt to rig 
I election in advance, Noriega is now 
ng everything he can to steal it af- 

the fact despite the clear message 
m the people of Panama. 

^Y 10. 1989« 

jsident Bush condemns the violence 
V underway in Panama. Gen. No- 
ga has thwarted the desire of the 
lamanian people for democracy by 
iducting a fraudulent election. He 

now escalated this to include vio- 
ce against opposition leaders, in- 
ding Mr. Endara. This action 
lerscores that Gen. Noriega does not 
^e the interests of the Panamanian 
)ple at heart. 

At about 4:40 this afternoon, Presi- 
it Bush called U.S. Ambassador [to 
lama Arthur H.] Davis to receive a 

t-hand description of the situation 
Panama. They discussed the condi- 
h of Mr. Endara, the status of the vi- 
nce, and the reported harassment of 
5. servicemen. The President tried 
call Mr. Endara but could not imme- 
tely get through. He asked Ambas- 
or Davis to contact Mr. Endara to 
[;r his encouragement to the opposi- 
1 leader, to commend him for his 
sngth in standing up to the Noriega 
:es, and to praise him for his convic- 
iis in striving to represent the demo- 
itic interests of the Panamanian 

The President today also contacted 
Slers of other countries with inter- 
ss in the region. Those conversations 
eated to Latin American unity in 
aing the blatant attempts at intimida- 
h now being conducted by the No- 
i?a regime. The President continues 
cnonitor the situation closely and will 
(tinue to consult with the states in 
1" region. 


«iY 11, 1989^ 

iHow does the government read the 
(ding of the [Panama] election? 

A. It was one of the possibilities 
1 1 we have been e.xpecting for some 
i e. It's clear that Noriega is half 
ilit, that it was a fraudulent election. 
"-' trouble is it was his fraud, and he 
^ 1 lust the election heavily. But where 
\ go from here remains yet to be 

seen. Clearly we e.xpected this was a 

Q. Bob Zelnick has been report- 
ing from the Pentagon that today 
there may well be an announcement 
of more U.S. troops to go into Pan- 
ama. Do you anticipate that today? 

A. The President hasn't made up 
his mind on that subject, as far as I 
know, and it is one of those things he is 
looking at. He'll be looking at a series 
of options, and he'll make his announce- 
ments when he's ready. 

Q. In light of the violence that 
took place against the opposition can- 
didate, can the U.S. Administration 
stay as passive as it has been? 

A. I'm not at all sure you can say 
the Administration has been passive. 
We've been waiting to see how the elec- 
tion results came out. It's clear the peo- 
ple of Panama want Noriega out. We 
now have to make our choices on the ba- 
sis of this robbery that Noriega has 
perpetrated against his own people. 

Q. And practically, what can we 

A. I think there is a series of 
things we can do. However, I'd rather 
wait and let the President make those 
announcements than I do it myself. 

Q. What would you have other 
Latin American nations do? 

A. Some of the other Latin Ameri- 
can nations have already taken some 
steps. There has been a call for an e.x- 
traordinary meeting of the Organiza- 
tion of American States (OAS). 
President Carlos Andres Perez in Ven- 
ezuela has been active. A number of the 
Latin Americans have been active. And 
there have been some condemnations al- 
ready of the thievery in Panama City. 

I think we'll get, at least, fairly 
substantial diplomatic support and a 
fairly substantial open attack on No- 
riega's robbery. 

Q. Aren't those other nations in 
Latin America, though, edgy about 
the U.S. response in that it may be 
too strong, that there may be signs of 
the U.S. stepping in militarily, etc.? 

A. The Latins are always going to 
be edgy about our response in the sense 
that they are always worried about in- 
tervention in the internal affairs of 
states in Latin America. That's histori- 
cally the case. 

In this particular case, however, I 
think it's fairly clear that there is going 
to be almost universal condemnation of 
Noriega's robbery this week; and I think 
we will find very substantial Latin 

American support for our response, 
whatever it may be, to Noriega. 

Q. Including if we send troops in? 

A. I'm not going to make any 
guesses about whether we do or do not 
send troops in and how the Latin Amer- 
icans will react. I will simply say it is 
clear, as of this moment, that the Lat- 
ins are at least as upset as we are. 

Q. There is some talk among 
Members of Congress about a mili- 
tary reaction, not just sending troops 
in to protect Americans who are there 
but an actual military action against 
Panama. There are some in Congress 
talking about their desire to abrogate 
the Panama Canal Treaties. Is that 
talk helpful or harmful at this point? 

A. Helpful, harmful — they get a 
chance to express themselves. The 
President is having a leadership meet- 
ing this morning. They will also get a 
chance to e.xpress themselves to the 
President. I don't think it makes much 
difference in terms of the effect itself 
in the area. They have the right to tell 
the President and the American people 
what they think. 

Q. Are either one of those possi- 
ble options? 

A. I think it's very unlikely, very 
unlikely, that we will do anything with 
regard to the treaty itself. Again, I 
leave that decision obviously to the 
President, but I don't think he's going 
to move away from the treaty. 

With regard to the use of armed 
force or what we do with the military, I 
just don't want to make any guesses at 
this point. 

Q. Is there a feeling that Ameri- 
cans now in Panama are in danger? 

A. No, I don't think there's a feel- 
ing that they're in danger. Obviously 
we are concerned about them, and 
there have been some steps taken, as I 
think you already know. We're moving 
the dependents from the embassy into 
safer areas, and the dependents of the 
military are, in fact, under — not house 
arrest obviously — but they don't travel 
as much. I don't think we're terribly 
nervous at this point about it, but it is 
something that we have to keep an eye 

Q. How do you read Gen. No- 
riega's position now? That he is so 
firmly in control he doesn't concern 
himself with the backlash or that he 
is very worried now about his own 

A. One of the two. I'm not at all 
sure you can read Noriega at this 

}3artment of State Bulletin/July 1989 



point. But what is clear is he made a 
terrible misjudgment with regard to 
the election. He tried to steal it and 
even then, he lost heavily. I think at 
this point, there is no question that his 
position in Panama, and certainly in- 
ternationally, is much weaker than it 
was before the election. 

MAY 11, 1989' 

The situation in Panama remains ex- 
tremely tense in the aftermath of yes- 
terday's unprovoked and outrageous 
violence by Noriega's thugs against op- 
position leaders. 

A massive police presence in the 
streets of Panama City has been re- 
ported. As of now, there are no 
marchers out. Numerous people were 
injured yesterday when a peaceful 
march was attacked. We understand 
that President-elect Endara is still hos- 
pitalized after being hit in the head 
with a metal bar. The latest reports are 
that he looks forward shortly to re- 
turning to full activity. 

Second Vice President-elect Ford 
was also beaten by regime thugs. You 
have all seen the pictures of him being 
attacked. He is also hospitalized but do- 
ing well. We understand that First 
Vice President-elect Arias Calderon, 
who was also assaulted, is now safe. 

Despite all of his attempts to rig 
the elections, even Noriega found it im- 
possible to declare his man the victor 
in the face of overwhelming rejection 
by the Panamanian people. As a result, 
last night the regime officially an- 
nounced that it was declaring the an- 
nulment of the election results. As the 
attacks on the winners have shown, 
Noriega will stop at nothing to main- 
tain his strong hold on the country. 

We condemn in the strongest possi- 
ble terms this attempt to hijack the 
democratic process which, as Secretary 
Baker noted, is a subversion and per- 
version of the will of the Panamanian 
people. We again call upon Noriega and 
the Panamanian Defense Forces to re- 
spect the results of the election. 

Finally, let me note the rising tide 
of foreign condemnation. We are con- 
sulting widely with other nations. So 
far to our knowledge at least, Argen- 
tina, Guatemala, El Salvador, Peru, 
Costa Rica, Spain, the United King- 
dom, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Canada, and Venezuela have spoken out 
against Noriega. We understand that 
Colombia has released a statement on 
behalf of the so-called Group of Eight 


countries e.xpressing dismay at what 
has happened. 

MAY 11, 1989' 

The people of Latin America and the 
Caribbean have sacrificed, fought, and 
died to establish democracy. Today 
elected constitutional government is 
the clear choice of the vast majority of 
the people in the Americas, and the 
days of the dictator are over. Still, in 
many parts of our hemisphere, the ene- 
mies of democracy lie in wait to over- 
turn elected governments through 
force or to steal elections through 

All nations in the democratic com- 
munity have a responsibility to make it 
clear, through our actions and our 
words, that efforts to overturn consti- 
tutional regimes or steal elections are 
unacceptable. If we fail to send a clear 
signal when democracy is imperiled, 
the enemies of constitutional govern- 
ment will become more dangerous. And 
that is why events in Panama place an 
enormous responsibility on all nations 
in the democratic community. 

This past week, the people of Pan- 
ama, in record numbers, voted to elect 
a new democratic leadership of their 
country. And they voted to replace the 
dictatorship of Gen. Manuel Noriega. 
The whole world was watching. Every 
credible observer — the Catholic 
Church, Latin and European ob- 
servers, leaders of our Congress, and 
two former Presidents of the United 
States — tell us the same story. The op- 
position won. It was not even a close 
election. The opposition won by a mar- 
gin of nearly 3-to-l. 

The Noriega regime first tried to 
steal this election through massive 
fraud and intimidation and now has 
nullified the election and resorted to 
violence and bloodshed. In recent days, 
a host of Latin American leaders has 
condemned this election fraud. They 
have called on Gen. Noriega to heed the 
will of the people of Panama. We sup- 
port and second those demands. The 
United States will not recognize nor ac- 
commodate a regime that holds power 
through force and violence at the ex- 
pense of the Panamanian people's right 
to be free. 

I have exchanged these views over 
the last several days with democratic 
leaders in Latin America and in Eu- 
rope. These consultations will 

The crisis in Panama is a conflict 
between Noriega and the people of Pa* 
ama. The United States stands with 
the Panamanian people. We share the 
hope that the Panamanian Defense 
Forces will stand with them and fulfi! 
their constitutional obligation to defer 
democracy. A professional Panamaniai 
Defense Force can have an important 
role to play in Panama's democratic 

The United States is committed I 
democracy in Panama. We respect th* 
sovereignty of Panama, and, of course 
we have great affection for the Pan- 
amanian people. 

We are also committed to protect 
the lives of our citizens. And we are 
committed to the integrity of the Pan 
ama Canal Treaties, which guarantei 
safe passage for all nations through tl 
canal. The Panama Canal Treaties art 
a proud symbol of respect and partne | 
ship between the people of the Unite' 
States and the people of Panama. 

In support of these objectives an 
after consulting this morning with t? 
bipartisan leadership of the Congres 
I am taking the following steps. 

First, the United States stroniil 
supports and will cooperate with inil 
fives taken by governments in this 
hemisphere to address this crisis 
through regional diplomacy and actic 
in the Organization of American Stat 
and through other means. 

Second, our Ambassador in Pan 
ama, Arthur Davis, has been recalle 
and our Embassy staff will be reduct 
to essential personnel only. 

Third, U.S. Government empluy( 
and their dependents living outside c 
U.S. military bases or Panama Cana 
Commission housing areas will be ri 
cated out of Panama or to secure l'.> 
housing areas within Panama. This : 
tion will begin immediately. It will b 
completed as quickly and in as orderl 
a manner as possible. 

Fourth, the State Department, 
through its travel advisory, will en- 
courage U.S. business representativ 
residing in Panama to arrange for th 
extended absences of their dependen 
wherever possible. 

Fifth, economic sanctions will ci 
tinue in force. 

Sixth, the United States will cai 
out its obligations and will assert am 
enforce its treaty rights in Panama i 
der the Panama Canal Treaties. 

And finally, we are sending a 
brigade-size force to Panama to aug- 
ment our military forces already as- 
signed there. 

Department of State Bulletin/July 1! 


Elections in Bolivia 


MAY 8, 1989' 

Yesterday, while efforts were being 
made in Panama to rig an election, Bo- 
livia held an open, honest vote for a 
new president and a new congress. Bo- 
livia's three major political parties are 
Committed to democracy and carried 
out hard-fought, well-organized, seri- 
ous cami)aigiis. 

With over half the vote counted, 
the results are very close. Former 
President Hugo Banzer of the National- 
ist Democratic Action (ADN) Party 
took the lead in early returns which 
were primarily from urban areas. But 
as the vote has come in from rural 
areas, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada of 
the Nationalist Revolutionary 

Movement (MNR) has been catching 
up. Jaime Paz of the Movement of the 
Revolutionary Left (MIR) is a strong 
third. The popular vote is still too close 
to call. 

If none of the candidates receive a 
majority of the popular vote, in accord- 
ance with Bolivia's Constitution, the 
ne.\t president will be chosen from the 
three top candidates by the newly 
elected congress when it meets in 

The Bolivian election is a victoi'y 
for democracy. The candidates and 
the people of Bolivia are to be 

'Read tij new> c-firrespondents by De- 
partment deputy .spokesman Richard A. 
Boucher. ■ 

If reipiired, I do not rule out fur- 
ther steps in the future. 

The United States and all demo- 
cratic nations in this hemisphere hope 
that a peaceful resolution can be found 
Lii tlie crisis in Panama. And we urge 
:ill those in Panama — every individual, 
'.'Very institution — to put the well-being 
jf their country first and seek an hon- 
orable solution to this crisis. The way is 
^till open. 

M.\Y 12, 1989' 

Panama City was cjuiet overnight. The 
regime continues to put police and mil- 
itary on the streets in a show of force 
in order to intimidate the opposition 
^nd to suppress popular reaction to the 
jannulment of the election. Businesses 
are open, but there is little activity. 
Schools remain closed. 

The Department of State travel 
warning, issued May 11, warns U.S. 
citizens that the e.xtremely unsettled 
conditions and the reduction of 
embassy personnel in Panama compli- 
cate embassy efforts to provide full 
!|3rotective and consular services to 
Americans. U.S. citizens are advised 
not to travel to Panama until further 

U.S. citizens aboard ships transit- 
ing the Panama Canal are well advised 
to remain aboard the vessel while in 
Panamanian territory. Private sector 
•and other U.S. citizens are advised to 

arrange for their dependents in Pan- 
ama to depart until conditions return 
to normal. The U.S. Embassy will re- 
main open to assist U.S. citizens. They 
should contact the embassy's Consular 
Section for information and assistance. 

Foreign reaction continues to 
strongly condemn developments in Pan- 
ama. Peru has issued a second state- 
ment, condemning the annulment of the 
election and has stressed its support of 
democracy in Panama. 

President Oscar Arias of Costa 
Rica has said the Panamanian people 
were betrayed and quotes the Costa Ri- 
can Supreme Electoral Tribunal as re- 
jecting the legitimacy of the results. 

Salvadoran Foreign Minister 
Ricardo Acevedo notes that it is clear 
that the opposition was victorious in 
the May 7 election and says El Salvador 
intends to reject all forms of manipula- 
tion and fraud in the Panama election. 

Ecuadoran Foreign Minister Cor- 
dovez has condemned the imposition of 
press restrictions in Panama. 

The European Community has con- 
demned election fraud and violence in 

By latest count, I note 11 individu- 
al countries, in addition to the United 
States, that have issued individual 
statements. In addition, Colombia 
made a statement on behalf of the 
Group of Eight, and the European 
Community's 12 nations have issued a 

MAY 1.5, 1989' 

The flood of international condemna- 
tion of Noriega continues to flow in. 
The Governments of Argentina, Belize, 
Canada, Costa Rica, Dominica, El Sal- 
vador, the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, Guatemala, Japan, Me.xico, 
Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Spain, 
Trinidad and Tobago, the United King- 
dom, Uruguay, and Venezuela have all 
spoken out, as has the Group of Eight 
through Colombia and the 12 nations of 
the European Community. The OAS, of 
course, will meet on Wednesday. 

In addition, condemnation contin- 
ues inside Panama. We salute the cour- 
age of the leaders of the Catholic 
Church in speaking out against No- 
riega's dictatorship, especially in light 
of the contempt for life which the regi- 
me showed in the killing of Father Van 
Cleef, the Dutch priest working in 

We second the words of the bishop's 
letter, which states, in part, "What 
moral justification is thei-e to disperse 
with blows and bullets men and women 
whose only crime has been to demand 
peacefully their rights?" The letter 
calls upon the regime to honor the will 
of the people, expressed freely in the 
ballot boxes. We, too, believe that this 
is the only way to end the crisis which 
Panama now^ faces. 

MAY 16, 1989' 

The struggle in Panama continues. The 
democratic opposition has called for a 
24-hour general strike tomorrow. May 
17, the same day the consultation of the 
OAS foreign ministers is to take place 

The Noriega regime's response 
thus far has been to declare business 
strikes illegal and to threaten to apply 
sanctions against violators. In a bla- 
tant attempt to thwart public employee 
participation in the general strike, the 
regime has announced it will pay em- 
ployees overdue salaries tomorrow. 
Those who do not report for work may 
risk being fired or losing their pay. 

Other regime efforts to frustrate 
public demand to honor the elections in- 
clude ongoing censorship of independ- 
ent radio and TV stations in Panama 
and jamming and interference with 
U.S. Southern Command broadcasts of 
network news. 

Department of State Bulletin/July 1989 



At the Organization of American 
States meeting tomorrow, supporters 
of democracy can take an important 
step to help the people of Panama. We 
welcome the fact that a large number of 
foreign ministers will attend this meet- 
ing. We hope the meeting will result in 
a clear examination of the situation in 
Panama, and we look forward to work- 
ing with governments from throughout 
the hemisphere to develop action in 
support of democracy. This is a meet- 
ing called by Latins, led by Latins, and 
we expect the result to reflect Latin in- 
terest in democracy. 

MAY 17, 1989^ 

Today in Panama, the general strike 
was called by the democratic forces. In 
Washington the foreign ministers of 
the OAS member nations will be ur- 
gently considering the struggle in 

It is still too early to tell what the 
level of participation in the strike will 
be. Certainly Noriega is making every 
effort to try to frustrate it. The regime 
is forcing buses and taxis to operate. It 
is making today payday for government 
employees. It has made threats against 
businesses that may join in the strike 
and threatened to use its Dignity Bat- 
talion goon squads. 

We are now seeing press reports of 
beatings and torture of regime oppo- 
nents who were tortured while de- 
tained. If true, these violations of 
fundamental human rights are 

The President has talked to 
Guillermo Endara and congratulated 
him on his victory. The President also 
stressed the American people's support 
for the Panamanian people's desire for 

International condemnation of No- 
riega continues. President Cerezo of 
Guatemala has stated that "the Pan- 
amanian regime no longer has any jus- 
tification for what it is doing." 

Finally, I would note that Luis An- 
derson, a Panamanian member of the 
Canal Commission Board of Directors 
since 1983, has resigned his position in 
protest of Noriega's policies. Mr. An- 
derson is Secretary General of ORIT, 
the Inter-American Regional Workers 
Organization, Latin America's regional 
labor grouping. 


MAY 17, 1989** 

Reaffirming: That the true significance of 
American sioHdarity and good neighborli- 
ness can only mean the consolidation on thi.s 
continent, within the framework of demo- 
cratic institutions, of a system of individual 
liberty and social justice based on respect 
for the essential rights of man: and 

That no State or group of States has the 
right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for 
any reason whatever, in the internal or ex- 
ternal affairs of any other State; and 

Considering: That the grave events and 
the abuses by Genera! Manuel Antonio No- 
riega in the crisis and the electoral process 
in Panama could unleash an escalation of vi- 
olence with its attendant risks to the life 
and safety of persons; 

That these events have abridged the 
right of the Panamanian people to freely 
elect their legitimate authorities; 

That the outrageous abuses perpetrated 
against the opposition candidates and citi- 
zenry violate human, civil and political 

That the crisis, which involves internal 
and external factors, is escalating rapidly, 
and could seriously endanger international 
peace and security; 

That the solidarity of the American 
States and the high aims which are sought 
through it require the political organization 
of those States on the basis of the effective 
exercise of representative democracy; 

That every State has the right to 
choose, without external interference, its 
own political, economic and social system 
and to organize itself in the way best suited 
to it; 

That the Organization of American 
States must offer its collaboration in pro- 
moting the measures required for an effec- 
tive and urgent solution to the Panamanian 
crisis that will preserve the standards of 
inter-American comity; 

That an essential purpose of the Organi- 
zation of American States is to promote and 
consolidate representative democracy with 
due respect for the principle of noninter- 
vention — a purpose that is being seriously 
jeopardized by the current political situation 
in Panama; and 

That the continuation in force of the 
1977 Panama Canal Treaties and compliance 
with them constitute a fundamental commit- 
ment of all of the Governments of the Ameri- 
cas that has received universal approval, 

Resolves: 1. To entrust to the Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador, Guatemala 
and Trinidad and Tobago the urgent mission 
of promoting, with the assistance of the 
Secretary General of the Organization of 
American States, conciliation formulas for 
arriving at a national accord that can bring 
about, through democratic mechanisms, a 
transfer of power in the shortest possible 
time, and with full respect for the sovereign 
will of the Panamanian people. 

2. To exhort the Government of Panan 
to cooperate fully in the implementation ol 
this resolution. 

'.J. To urge the authorities and all polit 
cal forces in Panama to refrain from any 
measure or act that could aggravate the 

4. To urge all States to cooperate in tl 
implementation of this resolution. 

.5. To instruct the Mission to present tl 
this Meeting of Consultation a report on t 
fulfillment of its mandate, to be consider© 
at its session of June 6, 1989, the date on 
which the Meeting is convened so that 
further appropriate measures may be 

6. To exhort all States to refrain from 
any action that may infringe the principle 
nonintervention in the internal affairs of 

7. To keep the Meeting of Consultatio' 
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in session 
long as the current situation persists. 


MAY 18, 19893 

We are very pleased with the OAS re< 
olution. It constitutes a condemnatiot 
of Noriega by name for his abuses. Iti 
calls for a transfer of power to those 
who enjoy the support of the Panama 
nian people, and it calls for sending a 
mission to Panama to report back byi 
June 6 at the reconvening of the grou 
The vote had the support of all the OJ 

Two specific anti-U.S. amend- 
ments concerning U.S. troops in 
Panama that were introduced by 
Nicaragua were voted down over- 
whelmingly. Some countries which 
voted against these amendments wou 
normally vote against measures invo« 
ing troops, but in the event, only 
Nicaragua and Panama supported th! 
negative amendments. 

The language to condemn Noriej 
by name was introduced by the Latin 
We support them and the process wh 
has emerged. Noriega should listen t' 
the clear message from his people an 
from his neighbors. It is time for hin 
to leave. 

'Text from Weeklv Compilation of Pr 
dential Documents of May 1, 1989. 

-Read to news correspondents by De 
partment spokesman Margaret DeB. 

■*Read to news correspondents by De 
partment deputy spokesman Richard A. 

JMade available by Department depu 
spokesman Richard A. Boucher. 

■"■Text from Weekly Compilation of Pr 
dential Documents of May 15. 

•^Text from White House press relea.^ 

"Press release 82. 

"Adopted by consensus. ■ 



.S.-Mexico Relations 

e importance of U.S. -Mexico ties 
s underscored on November 22, 
18, when President-elect George 
3h met with Mexican President-elect 
rlos Salinas in his first postelection 
eting with a foreign leader. Mexico 
mportant to the United States not 
y as a neighbor sharing a 1,952-mile 
der, and one of our largest, secure 
deign oil suppliers, but as our third 
agest trading partner It is a country 
h which we have longstanding cul- 
al ties and a shared history. The 
jited States is important to Mexico 

its major market and trading part- 
a close neighbor and world power, 
nvestor in the Mexican economy, 
the home of many emigres who 
tintain family ties in Mexico. For 
Ise reasons, Mexico and the United 
[,tes desire closer relations and are 
irking together more closely than 
Jr on economic, border, tourism, and 
r enforcement issues. 

Recent U.S. -Mexican agreements 
nude: a bilateral trade and invest- 
iit framework understanding; a mu- 
1 1 k'gal assistance treaty; and 
j-eements on textiles, steel, civil avi- 
tin. telecommunications, and the bor- 
1 environment. Ongoing dialogue has 
'rted potential friction over U.S. im- 
i;i':ition reform. And Mexican acces- 
ii to the General Agreement on 
'•iffs and Trade (GATT) has marked 
rim]3ortant step in relating Mexico to 
I World economy and enhancing the 
isiliility of further strengthening 
'v -.Mexico trade relations. 


' ■ trade relationship with our south- 
1 neighbor is extremely important. 
\:h a 1988 total of $44 billion in two- 
V trade, Mexico was our third larg- 
^ trading partner — after Canada and 
ian. with which U.S. total trade 
lounted to $150 billion and $131 bil- 
1. respectively. Mexico was the third 
i^f.'it U.S. export market and fifth 
iLifst supplier of 1988 U.S. imports, 
ttlie same time, the United States is 
«n more important to Mexico's trad- 
1 picture — some two-thirds of its to- 
ijtrade was with the United States. 
1 Since 1986 Mexico has liberalized 
Hariff levels and cut its use of import 
insing and official reference prices, 
^part of this reform package, Mexico 
liversifying its exports to reduce its 
^nerability to fluctuations in the 

Mexico, with some 82 million inhabi- 
tants, 18 tlie 11th must populous country 
in the world. Its capitiril is the world's 
laiM.''-st city. But while Mexico has one 
!■'■■• '■ ihi- developed world, much of Mex- 
'1 a Third World country. Also 
'" 'he throes of massive social 
ch: ! a rural nation of 2G million 

peuj.., 1,. itais ago, Mexico has become a 
largely urban industrializing nation, 
whose population will exceed 100 million 
by the year 2000. Each year, 1 million 
younjr i.ieople enter the job market — most 
of whom seek work in metroiJolitan cen- 
ters or the United States. 

Mexico is goin,i)- tlirou,i>-h perhaps its 
worst economic )-ecessiciii of this century 
and massive systemic changes largely 
driven by economic and demographic 
forces. Per capita income is down ly-r 
since 19S2, and there is w idespread un- 
employment, but this has given rise to 
modernization efforts that have already 
begun to bring major and beneficial 
changes to the economy and also may 
have accelerated the evolution of Mexico's 
political system. 

price of oil. Though affected somewhat 
by low petroleum prices, exports of 
manufactured goods produced more 
revenue in 1986, 1987, and 1988 than 
did oil exports, testimony to the impact 
of Mexican economic reforms and their 
emphasis on developing exports. 

Under an umbrella Framework 
Understanding on Trade and Invest- 
ment in 1987, the United States and 
Mexico have concluded separate ac- 
cords on trade in textiles, steel, beer 
and wine, and — outside the frame- 
work — on civil aviation. Following the 
signing of the Free Trade Agreement 
with Canada in 1988, some discussion 
has centered on the possibilities for de- 
veloping a similar accord with Mexico. 
The gap in development levels between 
the United States and Mexico makes 
that unlikely at this time, but there is 
interest on both sides in expanding 
trade relations. 


The United States accounts for more 
than 60% of some $20 billion in foreign 
direct investment in Mexico. More for- 
eign and domestic investment is needed 
to promote Mexican economic growth. 
Though the investment climate is im- 
proving, domestic ownership restric- 
tions, local content and performance 
requirements, poor intellectual proper- 
ty protection, and unclear rules still 
discourage foreign investment. How- 
ever, an extensive liberalization of 
these rules reportedly is underway. 

The 1987 trade and investment 
framework established a consultative 
mechanism for resolution of these is- 
sues. It can serve as a vehicle for work- 
ing toward future trade and investment 
agreements and marks a significant 
advance in the bilateral negotiating 

The growth of the Mexican in-bond 
assembly plant industry (maqui- 
ladora) — where imported components 
are transformed and reexported as fin- 
ished goods — and its use by major U.S. 
manufacturers have led to a substantial 
degree of U. S.-Mexico industrial inte- 
gration. This has spurred economic 
growth on both sides of the border. 


About 25<7f of Mexico's $107-billion debt 
and $13-billion annual debt service is 
owed to U.S. banks. A large portion of 
this debt was acquired in the late 1970s 
when the discovery of vast additional 
oil reserves in Mexico removed con- 
straints on foreign borrowing. 

However, by 1982 Mexico was beset 
by falling oil prices and rising real in- 
terest rates, coupled with poorly man- 
aged fiscal and monetary policy. This 
resulted in a substantial decline in real 
wages and per capita output over the 
subsequent 6 years. Mexico has under- 
taken and persisted in difficult eco- 
nomic reform measures which have 
curbed inflation sharply and trimmed, 
somewhat, the government's inflation- 
adjusted fiscal deficit. These essential 

Ipartment of State Bulletin/July 1989 



U.S. Trade With Mexico, 1988 

Chemicals, 8.9% 


Tobacco 0.1% 




Other. 4.1% 

Goods, 8% 

Fuels, 2.2% 

Chemicals, 3.2% 



Other, 4.3% 

Goods, 8.3% 

Tobacco 1.1% 

Fuels, 14.6% 



Department of State Bulletin/July 1i' 


sures, on the heels of already de- 
iiit; real wages, have been seen as 
iisintj a heavy social cost. Mexico 
remained current in paying its in- 
latiunal debt obligations, despite 
,fai-t that interest alone, at $9 bil- 
|in 1988, represented over 5% of to- 


An economically healthy Mexico is 
:e U.S. interest, both for the sake 
)cial stability and to maintain its 
)icity to function as a major market 
iJ.S. goods and services. 
Mexico may need help in order to 
ijre that it resume growth. It is try- 
|,o negotiate a reduction in its re- 
.ments to international lenders over 
(next 5 years in order to devote 
(e funds to resuming growth. In 
,y March 1989, U.S. Secretary of 
(Treasury Nicholas Brady an- 
ificed a proposal for debt and debt 
-ice reduction which would apply to 
■■(1 World debtors. Mexico presented 
5iwn plan for debt management to 
Wiifld Bank and International Mon- 
: y I'und meetings in April. 


jfiigration, legal and illegal, has a 
in- impact on U.S. -Mexican rela- 
5-. The United States issues more 
1 iui'ant visas to Mexican nationals 
;' t(i those of any other nation — 
'HI in fiscal year 1987. Visitor visas 
tied nearly one-half million in the 
)e period. Yet immigration issues 
IT been contentious for some time. 
)the United States, the problem is 
Hof controlling entry across borders 
lassuring that immigrants do not 
.'lace American workers. Mexico 
:Us to protect the human and labor 
ets of its workers in the United 
:es, whether legal or otherwise. Mi- 

■ ion to the United States is often 

(1 as a social "safety valve," as an al- 
rative to unemployment or undei'- 
qloyment at home. The U.S. and 
eican Governments share a deep 
iiern over violent acts against Mexi- 
;i. committed by smugglers of illegal 
liiigrants or other criminals. 
Substantial portions of the Immi- 

■ ion Reform and Control Act of 1986 
iiern the twin issues of illegal immi- 
-ion and the need for agricultural 
brers in the United States. The 
:\-which seeks to reduce illegal im- 
tration by providing enforcement of 
I'tions against those employing ille- 

i mmigrants — has moved into high 
^■. The law also has amnesty provi- 
■s which will allow many undocu- 

U.S. Trade With Mexico, 1988 

■ Exports 
O Imports 

1982 1983 1984 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 

mented aliens who have lived in the 
United States to obtain legal resident 
alien status and eventually citizenship. 
Legalization provisions have allowed 
1,235,600 Mexicans who were residing 
illegally in the United States to remain 

In 1987 the Mexican and U.S. Gov- 
ernments established two joint working 
groups to discuss ways to reduce vio- 
lence against undocumented aliens as 
they enter the United States, handle 
mistreatment of Mexicans, and resolve 
other problems. 


Mexico has expanded the scope of 
opium and marijuana eradication pro- 
grams, while taking steps to improve 
operational efficiency. However, Mexico 
is still a major drug producer and a ma- 
jor transshipment point for South 
American cocaine. It is our largest sin- 
gle foreign source of heroin and the sec- 
ond largest source for marijuana. 

The demand for illicit narcotics in 
the United States and the foreign pro- 
duction and trafficking of drugs are 
two sides of the same coin. The United 
States seeks to resolve the problem of 
illegal narcotics traffic from Mexico to 
the United States by working together 
with Mexican authorities to curb sup- 
ply. At the same time, the United 
States works with officials at state and 
local levels to reduce the demand for 
drugs in the United States. 

The narcotics problem is the most 
controversial in our bilateral relation- 
ship. U.S. law requires that countries 
be certified as cooperating with the 
United States before they can benefit 
from certain assistance programs and 
tariff benefits. In the case of Mexico, 
the loss of tariff benefits under the 
generalized system of preferences — and 
a sharp cut in concessional lending — 
would be the most significant 

Mexican officials point out that 
60% of their attorney general's budget 
and 25% of their army personnel are 
deployed in the war against drugs. The 
attorney general's budget for 1989 ex- 
ceeds $26 million, up from $19.5 mil- 
lion in 1987. For our part, President 
Bush has announced a $5.5 billion na- 
tionwide program to curb drug con- 
sumption in the United States through 
education and increased law enforce- 
ment. Mexico is prosecuting top drug 
traffickers, including those charged 
with the highly publicized kidnaping 
and murder of an American drug enfor- 
cement agent. 

Since 1976 the United States has 
supported a Mexican aerial eradication 
program, primarily through funding of 
maintenance support. Mexican authori- 
ties have seized record amounts of co- 
caine this year, and U.S. and Mexican 
officials cooperate on drug interdiction 
along the border. 

eartment of State Bulletin/July 1989 



Bilateral Relations 

The sheer breadth of U.S.-Mexico rela- 
tions, the 1,952-mile land border, and 
involvement by federal, state, and local 
and private-sector entities give us a 
unique position with our neighbor to 
the south. While the range of our rela- 
tionship will always deal with the man- 
agement of problems that derive from 
our many ties, the fabric of the rela- 
tionship has been marked by increasing 
cooperation and understanding and the 
creation of institutions to manage the 
resolution of differences. 

U.S. foreign policy objectives to- 
ward Mexico include: 

• A stronger U.S. -Mexican trade 
partnership, based upon the further re- 
laxation of trade barriers on both sides; 

• Increased access for foreign in- 
vestment in Mexico; 

• Responsible and prudent action 
toward the payment of Mexico's inter- 
national debt, some $30 billion of which 
is owed to U.S. financial institutions; 

• The control of illegal emigration 
from Mexico to the United States, 
while facilitating the flow of docu- 
mented workers and preventing the 
abuse of Mexican workers who do cross 
the border; and 

• A reduction in the flow of illegal 
narcotics from Mexico to the United 
States by engaging in bilateral efforts 
to curb both supply and demand. ■ 

Mexico — A Profile 


Area: 1.978 million sq. km. (764,000 sq. 
mi.); about three times the size of Texas. 
Cities: Capital — Mexico City (pop. 18 mil- 
lion, est. 1985). Other f)7(>s— Guadalajara 
a million), Monterrey (2.7 million), Ciudad 
Juarez (1.12 million), Puebla de Zaragoza 
(1.1 million), Leon (1 million). Terrain: 
Varies from coastal lowlands to high moun- 
tains. Climate: Varies from tropical to 


Nationality: Noun and adjective — Mex- 
ican(s). Population (July 1987): 81.9 mil- 
lion. Annual growth rate (1987 est.): 
2.09%. Ethnic groups: Indian-Spanish 
(mestizo) 60%, American Indian 30%., Cau- 
casian 9%, other 1%. Religion: Roman 
Catholic 97%, Protestant 3%. Language: 
Spanish. Education: Years compulsory — 
10. Literacy— 8S%. Health: Infant mor- 
tality rate (1984)— 51.0/1,000. Life expect- 
ancy (1984) — 65.4 yrs. Work force 
(26,320,000, 1985): Agriculture, forestry, 
hunting, fishing — 26%. Manufacturing — 
12.8%. Commerce— 13.9%. Services- 
Si. 4%. Mining and quarrying — 1.3%. 
Construction— 9.^%. Electricity— 0.3%. 
Transportation and communication — 


Type: Federal Republic. Independence: 

First proclaimed September 16, 1810; Re- 
public established 1822. Constitution: 
February 5, 1917. 


Branches: Executive — president (chief 
of state and head of government). 
Legislative — bicameral. Judicial — Supreme 
Court, local and federal systems. 

Political parties: Institutional Revolu- 
tionary Party (PRI), National Action Party 
(PAN), Mexican Socialist Party (PMS), 
Mexican Democratic Party (PDM), Popular 
Socialist Party (PPS), the Authentic Party 
of the Mexican Revolution (PARM), Mex- 
ican Workers Party (PMT), Revolutionary 
Workers Party (PRT), Party of the Car- 
denist Front of National Reconstruction 
(PFCRN). Suffrage: Universal over 18. 

Administrative subdivisions: 31 states 
and the federal district. 

Flag: Green, white, and red vertical 
bands. An eagle holding a snake in its beak 
and perching on a cactus is centered. 

Membership in International 

UN and some of its specialized and related 
agencies, including the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF); the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT); International Civil Aviation Orga- 
nization (ICAO); Seabeds Committee; 
Inter-American Defense Board (lADB); 
Organization of American States (OAS); 
Latin American Integration Association 
(ALADI); INTELSAT; and many others. 

Taken from the Background Notes of Febru- 
ary 1988, published by the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, Department of State. Editor: 
Juanita Adams. ■ 

Current Actions 



Convention on the regulation of Antarctic 
mineral resource activities. Done at Well-i 
ington June2, 1988.' 
Signatures : Argentina, Mar. 17, 1989;--' 
Chile, Mar. 17, 1989;^-' U.K. Man 22, 19891 

Aviation, Civil 

Convention on international civil aviation 
Done at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered int 
force Apr. 4, 1947. TIAS 1.591. 
Adherence deposited : Bhutan, May 17, 19!* 

Protocol for the suppression of unlawful at 
of violence at airports serving internatioi' 
civil aviation, supplementary to the conve 
tion of Sept. 23, 1971 (TIAS"7570). Done a. 
Montreal Feb. 24, 1988.' [Senate] Treaty 
Doc. 100-19. 

Signature : Luxembourg, May 18, 1989. 
Ratification deposited : Kuwait, Mar. 8, 


International coffee agreement 1983, wit 
annexes. Done at London Sept. 16, 1982. 
tered into force provisionally Oct. 1, 198rv 
definitively Sept. 11, 1985. [Senate] Treai 
Doc. 98-2. 

Territorial application : Extended by the 
U.K. to St. Helena, effective Jan. 6,' 1989« 


Convention on the international regulatia 
for preventing collisions at sea, 1972, witi 
regulations, as amended (TIAS 8587, 109 
Done at London Oct. 20, 1972. Entered in 
force July 15, 1977. TIAS 8587. 
Accession deposited : Malta, Mar. 20, 1989 


Convention on the conservation of AntarC 
marine living resources, with annex. Do! 
at Canberra Mav 20, 1980. Entered into 
force Apr. 7, 1982. TIAS 10240. 
Accession deposited : Italy, Mar. 29, 1989. 

Judicial Procedure 

Convention on the civil aspects of intern; 
tional child abduction. Done at The Hagu 
Oct. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1, 
1983; for the U.S. July 1, 1988. [Senate] 
Treaty Doc. 99-11. 
Signature: Sweden, Mar. 22, 1989. 
Ratification deposited : Sweden, Mar. 22, 

Load Lines 

International convention on load lines, IS 
Done at London Apr. 5, 1966. Entered inii 
force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331, 6629, 672 
Accessions deposited : Haiti, Apr 6, 1989 
Tanzania, Feb. 28, 1989. 


itime Matters 

rnational convention on standards of 
ling, certification, and watchkeeping 
eafarers, 1978. Done at London July 7. 
. Entered into force Apr. 28, 1984.= 
ission deposited : Haiti, Apr. 6, 1989. 

rention for the suppression of unlawful 
against the safety of maritime naviga- 
with protocol for the suppression of un- 
ul acts against the safety of fixed 

!-ms located on the Continental Shelf. 
lb at Rome Mar. lU, 1988.' [Senate] Trea- 
oc. 101-1. 
f atures : Belgium, Mar. 9. 1989; Byelorus- 

iS.S.R., Mar. 2, 1989; Czechoslovakia, 
f 9, 1989; Egypt, Aug. 16, 1988; Nigeria, 
. 9, 1988; Saudi Arabia, Mar 6, 1989; 
inian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., Mar. 2, 1989. 

) ear Material — Physical Protection 

I'ention on the physical protection of nu- 

'• material, with anne.xes. Done at Vien- 

1 1. i!ii, 1979. Entered into force Feb. 8, 

liration deposited : Argentina, May 2, 

nts — Microorganisms 

pest treaty on the international recog- 
|n of the deposit of microorganisms for 
lUrposes of patent procedure, with reg- 
ions. Done at Budapest Apr. 28, 1977. 
■red into force Aug. 19, 1980. TIAS 

sion deposited : German Dem. Rep., 
rl7. 1989. 

I jtion 

-.iidments to the convention of Dec. 29, 
u nil the prevention of marine pollution 
jiiiping of wastes and other matter 

1 S M(i.5). Done at London Oct. 12, 1978.' 

-' Ptaiice deposited : Portugal, Mar. 10, 

u ii'al protocol on substances that de- 
e- thf ozone layer, with annex. Done at 
areal Sept. 16, 1987. Entered into force 
dl. 1989. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-10. 
:' ssinn deposited ; Hungary, Apr 20, 

il l'ication deposited : Austria, May 3, 



•«ocol relating to the status of refugees. 

D» at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered 

t.force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1, 

«. TIAS 6.577. 

■ ssion deposited : Mozambique, May 1, 


t'national natural rubber agreement, 
'". \\ ith annexes. Done at Geneva Mar. 20. 
I', filtered into force provisionally 
f 29, 1988. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-9. 
ai fication deposited : Finland, Apr. 18, 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of 

life at sea, 1974, with annex, as amended. 

Done at London Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into 

force May 25, 1980. TIAS 9700, 10009, 


Accessions deposited : Haiti, Apr. 6, 1989; 

Suriname, Nov. 4, 1988. 


International sugar agreement, 1987, with 
annexes. Done at London Sept. 11, 1987. En- 
tered into force provisionally Mar 24, 1988. 
Accession deposited : El Salvador, Mar. 17, 


International convention on tonnage meas- 
urement of ships, 1969. with annexes. Done 
at London June 23, 1969. Entered into force 
July 18, 1982; for the U.S. Feb. 10, 1983. 
TIAS 10490. 

Acceptance deposited : Indonesia, Mar. 14, 

Accessions deposited : Haiti, Apr. 6, 1989; 
Malta, Mar 20, 1989. 



Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 
3, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1574, 3880), con- 
cerning air transport. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Washington Mar 23, 1989. Enter- 
ed into force Mar. 23, 1989; effective 
Aug. 20, 1988. 

Supersedes the agreement of Aug. 12, 1957 
(TIAS 3880). 

Agreement relating to the air transport 
agreement of Dec. 3, 1946, as amended 
(TIAS 1574, 3880), concerning capacity for 
the North Pacific, South Pacific, and Guam 
routes, with annexes. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Washington Mar. 23, 1989. Enter- 
ed into force Mar 23, 1989; effective Aug. 
20, 1988. 


Air services agreement, with annexes. 
Signed at Vienna Mar. 16, 1989. Entered 
into force June 2, 1989. 


Agreement concerning interpretation of the 
agreement of June 15, 1984, relating to the 
employment of dependents of official govern- 
ment employees. Effected by exchange of 
notes at New York Mar 14 and Apr. 27, 
1989. Entered into force Apr. 27, 1989. 


Memorandum of understanding regarding 
cooperation in ensuring the safety and 
wholesomeness of fresh and frozen oysters, 
clams, and mussels exported to the U.S. 
from Chile. Signed at Rockville May 18, 
1989. Entered into force May 18, 1989. 


Memorandum of agreement on liability for 
satellite launches. Signed at Washington 
Dec. 17, 1988. 

Memorandum of agreement on satellite 
technology safeguards. Signed at Washing- 
ton Dec. 17, 1988. 

Memorandum of agreement regarding inter- 
national trade in commercial launch serv- 
ices, with annex. Signed at Washington 
Jan. 26, 1989. 
Entered into force : Mar. 16, 1989. 


Agreement amending and extending the 
agreement of June 11, 1984, concerning 
Faroese fishing in fisheries off the coasts of 
the U.S. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Man 28, 1989. Enters into force 
on a date to be agreed upon by exchange of 
notes following completion of internal pro- 
cedures of both parties. 

European Economic Community 

Agreement amending and extending the 
agreement of Oct. 1, 1984, concerning fish- 
eries off the coasts of the U.S. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Brussels Sept. 15, 1988, 
and Feb. 27, 1989. Enters into force on a 
date to be agreed upon by exchange of notes 
following the completion of internal pro- 
cedures of both parties. 

Germany, Federal Republic of 

Memorandum of understanding concerning a 
cooperative program for harmonization, de- 
velopment, production, and support of a 
maritime patrol aircraft, with annexes. 
Signed at Bonn and Washington Feb. 17 and 
Apr. 5, 1989. Entered into force Apr. 5, 

Memorandum of understanding for coopera- 
tive projects of research and development in 
the field of high energy laser technology, 
with annex. Signed at Bonn Apr. 14, 1989. 
Entered into force Apr 14, 1989. 

Agreement amending the air transport 
agreement of July 7, 1955, as amended 
(TIAS 3536. 6434, 9591). Signed at Bonn 
Apr 25, 1989. Enters into force on the date 
on which the U.S. is informed that neces- 
sary F. R.G. national requirements have 
been completed. 


Agreement to establish a Caribbean Basin 
Radar Network (CBRN) in Honduras. 
Signed at Tegucigalpa Apr 7, 1989. Enters 
into force on the date on which parties ex- 
change notes indicating that their respec- 
tive constitutional requirements have been 


Agreement amending and extending the 
agreement of Sept. 21, 1984, concerning 
fisheries off the coasts of the U.S. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Reykjavik Nov. 23. 
1988, and Jan. 17, 1989. Enters into force on 
a date to be agreed upon by exchange of 
notes following the completion of internal 
procedures of both governments. 

Qartment of State Bulletin/July 1989 




Agreement concerning the reciprocal ex- 
emption from income tax of income derived 
from tlie international operation of ships and 
aircraft. Effected bv an exchange of notes 
at New Delhi Apr. 12. 1989. Entered into 
force Apr. 12, 1989; effective with respect to 
taxable years on or after Jan. 1, 1987. 

international .\tomic Energy Agency 

Tax reimbursement agreement, with annex. 
Signed at Vienna Apr. 5, 1989. Entered into 
force Apr. 5. 1989, applicable with regard to 
tax reimbursements for institutional income 
earned on or after Jan. 1, 1988. 


Agreement modifying the land lease and 
purchase agreement for construction of dip- 
lomatic facilities of .Jan. 18, 1989. Effected 
bv exchange of notes at Tel Aviv and Jerusa- 
lem Mar. 21 and Apr. 10, 1989. Entered into 
force Apr. 10, 1989. 

■ Jamaica 

Agreement amending the agreement of Nov. 
12, 1987, regarding the consolidation and re- 
scheduling of certain debts owed to, guaran- 
teed by, or insured by the U.S. Government 
and its agencies. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Kingston Feb. 2 and Mar. 1.5, 1989. 
Entered into force Mar. 1.5, 1989. 


Agreement extending the agreement of 
July 26, 1982 (TIAS 10571), as amended and 
extended, concerning fisheries off the 
coasts of the U.S. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington Feb. 17 and Mar 27, 
1989. Enters into force following written 
confirmation of the completion of U.S. inter- 
nal procedures. 


Memorandum of understanding for reducing 
demand, preventing illicit use, and combat- 
ting illicit pi'oduction and traffic of drugs, 
including precursor chemicals. Signed at 
Kuala Lumpur Apr. 20, 1989. Entered into 
force Apr 20, 1989. 


Memorandum uf understanding on coopera- 
tion in geothermal and related volcanic in- 
vestigations, with annex. Signed at Mexico 
Mar. 31, 1989. Entered into force Mar. 31, 

New Zealand 

Memorandum of understanding concerning 
the operation of the INTELPOST service, 
with details of implementation. Signed at 
Bern Apr. 28, 1989. Entered into force 
May 1. 1989. 


Agreement amending the agreement uf 
Sept. 16, 1982 (TIAS 10443), as amended, 
concerning air transport services. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington Apr. 24, 
1989. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1989. 


Supersedes agreements of Nov. 23, 1983, 
and Jan. 23, 1984 (TIAS 10931), and Sept. 5 
and Oct. 31. 1985. 


Agreement on defense cooperation, with an- 
nexes and related letters. Signed at Madrid 
Dec. 1, 1988. 

Entered into force : May 4, 1989. 
Supersedes agreement of July 2, 1982 (TIAS 


Agreement concerning cooperation in com- 
batting pollution in the Bering and Chukchi 
Seas in emergency situations. Signed at Mos- 
cow May 11, 1989. Enters into force on the 
date the parties notify each other in writing 
that necessary internal procedures have 
been completed. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
July 26, 1984, as extended, concerning the 
Cayman Islands and narcotics activities. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Washington 
May 25, 1989. Entered into force May 25, 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
Mar. 1, 1985, in the field of decommissioning 
nuclear facilities. Effected by exchange of 
letters at Washington and Risley Feb. 17 
and Mar. 6, 1989. Entered into force Mar. 6, 
1989; effective Mar. 1, 1989. 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
Apr. 14, 1987, as extended, concerning the 
British Virgin Islands and narcotics activ- 
ities. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington May 10, 1989. Entered into for- 
ce May 10, 1989'. 


Agreement relating to the agreement of 
Apr. 25, 1988, for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Lusaka Mar. 10, 1989. 
Entered into force Mar. 10, 1989. 

'Not in force. 
-With statement(s). 
■'With understanding(s). 
■•With reservation. 
■^Not in foiK-'e for the U.S. 
'•With declaration. ■ 

Department of State 

Press releases may be obtained from the ( 
fice of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20.520. 

No. Dale Subject 

*74 5/1 Henry E. Catto sworn in ai 
Ambassador to the Coun 
of Saint James's, Apr. 211 
(biographic data). 

75 .5/1 Baker: statement on the P' 

application to UN 

76 .5/1 Baker: address and questit 

and-answer session befa 
the Council of the Amer» 
cas conference. 

77 5/4 Foreign Relations of the 

United States, 1955-19S 
Vol. XVIII, Africa, 

78 5/5 Baker: address before the* 

Center for Strategic am 

International Studies, 

May 4. 
*79 5/5 Baker: address at Foreigw 

Service Day luncheon. 
*80 5/5 Baker: remarks at Foreigi 

Service Day memorial 

plaque dedication 

*81 5/10 Terence A.' Todman sworp 

as Ambassador to Argei 

tina. May 1 (biographic) 


82 5/10 Eagleburger: interview 01 

ABC-TV's "Good Morni 

83 5/12 Baker: remarks at recepti 

for human rights activil 
and refuseniks, Moscofl 
May 10. 

84 5/16 Baker: news conference, 

Moscow, May 11. 

85 5/13 Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. state 

ment on Lebanon, MoscI 
May 11. 

86 5/17 Baker: interview by TAS>^ 

and Izvestii/a, Moscow, 
May 11. ' J 

87 5/15 Baker: news conference a I 

North Atlantic Council 
meeting, Brussels, 
May 12. 

88 5/15 Baker: interview on CBS- 

TV's "Face the Nation,'' 
Houston, May 14. 
*89 5/15 Richard T. McCormack 

sworn in as Under Seer 
tary for Economic Affa 
Apr. 14 (biographic dat; 

Department of State Bulletin/July 1 8 













Baker: remarks and 
question-and-answer ses- 
sion, Dodd Washington 
Seminar. May 15. 

Eugene J. McAllister reap- 
pointed Assistant Secre- 
tary for Economic and 
Business Affairs. Apr. 11. 

Baker: interview on World- 
net's "Dialogue." 

Forciijn Relations of the 
United States. 1955-57. 
Vol. XXIV, Soviet Union; 
Eastern Mediterranean, 

Baker. Dumas: news brief- 
ing. Kennebunkport, 
May 20. 

.John R. Bolton sworn in as 
Assistant Secretary for 
International Organization 
Affairs (biographic data). 

Baker: address before the 
American-Israel Public 
Affairs Committee. 

Baker: news conference. 
White House. 

John C. Monjo sworn in as 
Ambassador to Indonesia, 
May 24 (biographic data). 

Baker: interview on ABC- 
TV special "Beyond the 
Cold War." May 25. 

Baker: interview on NBC- 
TV's "Meet the Press," 
Rome, May 28. 

Baker: interview on ABC- 
TV's "Good Morning, 
America," Brussels. 

Baker: news briefing, Bonn, 
May 30. 

Foreign Relations of the 
United States. 1955-1957. 
Vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli 
Dispute, 1955, released. 

Ivan Selin sworn in as Under 
Secretary for Manage- 
ment. May 23. 

Baker: interview on NBC- 
TVs "The Today Show," 

■Not printed in the Bulletin. 

Department of State 

Free single copies of the following Depart- 
ment of State publications are available from 
the Public Information Division. Bureau of 
Public Affairs, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 

President Bush 

Commitment to Democracy and Economic 
Progress in Latin America, Council of the 
Americas, May 2, 1989 (Current Policy 

Change in the Soviet Union, Te.xas A&M 
University commencement, College Sta- 
tion, May 12, 1989 (Current Policy #1175). 

The Future of Europe, Boston University 
commencement, Boston, May 21, 1989 
(Current Policy #1177). 

Security Strategy for the 1990s, Coast 
Guard Academy commencement, New 
London, Conn., Mav 24, 1989 (Current 
Policy #1178). 

Vice President Quayle 

American Leadership in the Pacific, Ameri- 
can Business Council, Singapore. May 3, 
1989 (Current Policy #1173). 

Secretary Baker 

LI.S. and Latin America: A Shared Destiny, 
Council of the Americas, May 1, 1989 
(Current Policv #1167). 

The Challenge of Change in U.S.-Soviet Re- 
lations, Center for Strategic and Interna- 
tional Studies (CSIS), May 4, 1989 
(Current Policy #1170). 

Principles and Pragmatism: American Poli- 
cy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 
America-Israel Public Affairs Committee 
(AIPAC), Mav 22, 1989 (Current Policy 

Arms Control 

Military Confidence- and Security-Building 
Measures in Europe: Strengthening Sta- 
bility Through Openness, May 1989 (Pub- 
lic Information Series). 


Competitiveness in the Global Marketplace, 
Under Secretary McCormack, President's 
E.xecutive E.xchange Alumni Asso., 
May 11, 1989 (Current Policy #1174). 

Agriculture in LI.S. Foreign Economic Poli- 
cy (GIST, May 1989). 

International Monetary Fund (GIST, May 

Third World Debt (GIST, May 1989). 

U.S. Exports: Strategic Technology Con- 
trols (GIST, May 1989). 


Northern Ireland (GIST. May 1989). 
U.S.-Soviet Relations (GIST. May 1989). 

Human Rights 

Global Human Rights Violations. Ambas- 
sador Walters. 45th session of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights. Geneva, 
Mar. 6. 1989 (Current Policy #1164). 

Middle East 

FY 1990 Assistance Programs for the Mid- 
dle East and North Africa. Deputy Assis- 
tant Secretaries Walker and Burleigh. 
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, 
House Appropriations Committee, Apr. 
19. 1989 (Current Policy #1169). 


U.S. Responsibilities in International Fish- 
eries Matters. Deputy Assistant Secre- 
tary Wolfe. Subcommittee on Fisheries 
and Wildlife Conservation and the Envi- 
ronment. House Committee on Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries, May 2, 1989 (Cur- 
rent Policy #1172). 


Update on Immigration and Refugee Issues. 
Refugee Coordinator Moore. Subcommit- 
tee on Immigration, Refugees, and Inter- 
national Law, House Judiciary 
Committee, Apr. 6, 1989 (Current Policy 

Science & Technology 

Telecommunications as an Engine of Eco- 
nomic Growth. May 1989 (Public Informa- 
tion Series). 

U.S. Contribution to Communications De- 
velopment. May 1989 (Public Information 

United Nations 

U.S. -UN Relations: Program Funding and 
PLO Status, Secretary Baker. May 1, 
1989; Ambassador Pickering and Deputy 
Assistant Secretary Vogelgesang. Sub- 
committee on Foreign Operations, Senate 
Appropriations Committee, May 4, 1989 
(Current Policy #1171). 

Western Hemisphere 

El Salvador: U.S. Policy (GIST, May 1989). 

Panama Presidential and Legislative Elec- 
tions, May 1989 (Public Information 

Latin America: U.S. -Mexico Relations, Mav 
1989 (Regional Brief). ■ 

)oartment of State Bulletin/July 1989 



Foreign Relations Volumes Released 


The Department of State on May 4, 
1989, released Foreign Relatione of the 
United States, 1955-1957, Volume 
XVIII, Africa, a volume of more than 
800 pages of previously classified rec- 
ords of the White House, Department 
of State, and other government 

The documents in this volume show 
that as rising African nationalism in 
both North and sub-Saharan Africa 
challenged the European colonial pow- 
ers in the 1950s, traditional American 
support for nationalism and self- 
determination clashed with U.S. ties 
with its European allies. In general, 
the Eisenhower Administration encour- 
aged the colonial powers to yield 
gracefully to the inevitable but did not 
press them to grant, as Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles phrased it, 
"premature" independence. Also actu- 
ating U.S. policymaking in Africa was 
fear that growing Soviet influence 
would spread via Egypt into the rest of 
Africa. The Eisenhower doctrine of 
January 1957, which was designed to 
aid North African as well as Near 
Eastern countries, was a significant 
U.S. response to this threat, as was 
Vice President Richard M. Nixon's fact- 
finding tour of Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and 

In Algeria, where the United 
States saw French policy as self- 
defeating, the intensity of French feel- 
ing and the importance of France in 
NATO constrained the Administration 
from putting pressure on Paris. In Mo- 
rocco and Tunisia, the United States 
promptly recognized the new independ- 
ent governments. It entered into base 
negotiations with Morocco and, despite 
friction with France, which resented 
Tunisian support of Algerian independ- 
ence, worked with Great Britain to as- 
sure Tunisia of a Western rather than a 
Soviet arms source. In Libya, where 
President Eisenhower believed that the 
United States would be "in an awful 
fix" if it lost influence, the United 
States began to increase financial and 
military aid as British resources 

While the United States promptly 
recognized Ghana, it was noncommittal 
regarding aid because of Ghana's warm 
attitude toward the Soviet Union. Rela- 
tions with Ethiopia deteriorated some- 
what due to Ethiopian dissatisfaction 
with the amount of U.S. assistance. 
The United States tried to avoid giving 
the appearance of endorsing South Af- 
rican apartheid and encouraged the 
South African Government to moderate 
its policies, while maintaining friendly 
relations with South Africa because of 
its strategic importance and mineral 
production. In the United Nations, the 
United States abstained on apartheid 
resolutions until 1958. 

This volume is the first to be de- 
voted entirely to Africa. In addition to 
the regional and bilateral materials de- 
scribed above, it includes documents on 
U.S. bilateral relations with or interest 
in British East Africa, the Central Af- 
rican Federation, the Belgian Congo, 
Liberia, Nigeria, Somalia, and Sudan. 

Copies of Volume XVIII (Depart- 
ment of State Publication No. 9665; 
GPO Stock No. 044-000-02223-1) may 
be purchased for $32.00 (domestic post- 
paid) from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 
Checks or money orders should be 
made payable to the Superintendent of 



The Department of State on May 19, 
1989, released Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1955-1957, Volume 
XXIV, Soviet Union; Eastern Mediter- 
ranean. This volume documents the 
U.S. understanding of and reaction to 
the consolidation of power in the Soviet 
Union by Communist Party First Sec- 
retary Nikita S. Khrushchev in the 
period following the death of Gener- 
alissimo Joseph Stalin. U.S. acquisition 
of a text of Khrushchev's secret speech 
to the Communist Party 20th Congress 
in February 1956 and the removal from 
power of Foreign Minister Vyacheslav 
Molotov later in the year were high- 
lights in the campaign of de- 
Stalinization. Following the summit 
conference of July 1955, bilateral rela- 
tions between the two superpowers ex- 
perienced a thaw which lasted until the 

suppression of the Hungarian uprisir 
in November 1956. U.S. attitudes we 
severely impacted by the launching c 
the first Soviet intercontinental balll 
tic missile and Sputnik I. 

Difficulties arose within the U.& 
Government in arriving at a consiste 
policy on East -West exchanges. On tj|' 
one hand, the United States wanted \\ 
encourage and promote exchanges w 
the Soviet Union and bloc countries, 
while on the other hand, there was c 
siderable concern about the threat t( 
national security of allowing possiblii 
spies to enter the United States dis-| 
guised as members of an exchange I 

Other portions of this volume d( 
tail U.S. policies toward Greece and 
Turkey. The issue of independence f 
Cyprus came to a head when the Bri 
ish decided to abandon their positior 
the island in 1955. The struggle be- 
tween the Greek and Turkish Cypri 
to determine the fate of the island 
gradually drew a reluctant United 
States into the dispute. Concern thj 
the issue might disrupt NATO made 
the United States proceed very cau^ 
tiously in its attempts to resolve tht 
problem, and while some progress \ 
made, no solution had been reached 
the end of 1957. 

Relations with Greece and Turl 
when not dominated by the Cyprus 
question, dealt primarily with effor 
of the United States to maintain th( 
stability of Greece while achieving 
nomic and financial reform in Turks 
At the end of 1957, relations with 
Greece had cooled, while those with 
Turkey were steadily improving. i 

Foreign Relations of the Uniteoi 
States, 1955-1957, Volume XXIV, cct 
prises 750 pages of government rec- 
ords, most of which were previously 
classified. This authoritative recorc 
based on files of the White House, t 
Department of State, and other gov 
ment agencies. 

Copies of Volume XXIV (Depari i 
ment of State Publication No. 9699, 
GPO Stock No. 044-000-02228-1) m; 
be purchased for $30.00 (domestic p 
paid) from the Superintendent of Dn- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 
Checks or money orders should be 
made payable to the Superintenden 

'Press release 77. 
-Press release 93. 


Department of State Bulletin/July ^ 


ackground Notes 

s series provides brief, factual sunima- 
of the people, history, government, 

nomy, and foreign relations of about 

countries (excluding the United States) 
of selected international organizations. 

ent revisions are: 

eria (Nov. 1988) 
;entina (Oct. 1988) 
SAN (Mar. 1989) 
itralia (Apr. 1989) 
in (Apr. 1989) 
swana (Dec, 1988) 
■ma (Feb. 1989) 
neroonlNov. 1988) 
loros (Oct. 1988) 
ta Rica (Apr. 1989) 
imark(Nov. 1988) 
latorial Guinea (Mar. 1989) 
nch Antilles and Guiana 
an. 1989) 

eral Republic of Germany (May 1989) 
nea-Bissau (Feb. 1989) 
y See (Apr. 1989) 
ig Kong (Nov. 1988) 
;ia(Mar. 1989) 
[3nesia(Apr. 1989) 
y (Mav 1989) 
im(Feb. 1989) 
:htenstein (Jan. 1989) 
awi (Feb. 1989) 
herlands Antilles and Aruba 
an. 1989) 
;nnda (Feb. 1989) 
\tzerland (Mar. 1989) 
Midad & Tobago (Apr. 1989) 
Iteii Kingdom (May 1989) 

I ted Nations (Nov. 1988) 
■inslavia(Apr 1989) 

II x I Mar 1989) 

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iieau of Public Affairs, Department of 
tte, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

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Soartment of State Bulletin/July 1989 81 


y 1989 

ume89, No. 2148 

ca. FY 1990 Assistance Request for 

ib-Saharan Africa (Rosenberg) 39 

•rican Principles. Security Strategy for 

e 1990s (Bush) 19 

?ntina. Elections in Ai-gentina 

l^epartment statements) 68 

IS Control 

jgical Weapons Proliferation 

olnies) 43 

; and CSBM Talks Resume in Vienna 

/hite House statement) 44 

iige in the Soviet Union (Bush) 16 

etary's Interview on "Face the 

ition" 27 

etary's News Conference 21 

etary's Trip to Moscow and NATO 

aker. joint statement) 29 

irity Strategy for the 1990s (Bush) ... 19 
via. Elections in Bolivia (Department 

jtement) 71 

ada. President Meets With Prime 

inister Mulroney (Bush. Mulroney) . . 45 


etary's Interview on "Face the 

ition" 27 

etary's News Conference 21 

lent Demonstrations in China 

l|/illiams) 48 

limunications. U.S. Contributions to 

fiinmunications Development 62 


I lu ual Weapons Proliferation 

( i^hiu's) 43 

V',i!in .Assistance Request for Sub- 

: li;ir:in Africa (Rosenberg) 39 

I III Demonstrations in China 

('illiams) 48 

|ate on Immigration and Refugee Issues 

iloore) 59 

.\ , .Japan Agree to Codevelop FSX 

. rci-aft (Bush, Eagleburger) 48 

. Opposes PLC) Admission to UN 
-icncies (Baker, Vogelgesang, 

-■liai'tment statement) 65 

. Ri'sponsibilities in International 

shcries Matters (Wolfe) 56 

Vitus. Deconfrontation on Cyprus 

(department statement ) 52 

c^artment & Foreign Service. 50th 

.miversai'y of the Bulletin 1 

enemies. Competitiveness in the Global 

.arketplace (McCormack) 49 

rironment. President Meets With Prime 
.inister .Mulroney (Bush, Mulroney) . . 45 
tope. The F"uture of Europe (Bush) ... 18 
iiieries. U.S. Responsibilities in 
jternational Fisheries Matters 

Volfe) 56 

B'ign .Assistance 

M99(l .Assistance Request for Sub- 

'.ihai-an Africa ( Rosenberg) 39 

U'f .Aid to Lebanon (Department 
att-nient) 55 

Human Rights 

Change in the Soviet Union (Bush) 16 

Secretary's Trip to Moscow and NATO 

(Baker, joint statement) 29 

.lapan. U.S., -Japan Agree to Codevelop FSX 

Aircraft (Bush. Eagleburger) 48 


Jordan — A Profile 54 

Visit of King Hussein I (Bush, King 

Hussein) .53 


Relief Aid to Lebanon (Department 

statement) 55 

Secretary's Trip to Moscow and NATO 

(Baker, joint statement) 29 

Situation in Lebanon (Department 

statements) 55 


Me.xico — A Profile 76 

U.S. -Mexico Relations 73 

Middle East 

Principles and Pragmatism: .American 

Policv Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict 

(Baker) 24 

U.S. Opposes PLO Admission to UN 

Agencies (Baker, Vogelgesang, 

Department statement) 65 

Military .Affairs. LI.S., .Japan Agree to 

Codevelop FSX Aircraft (Bush, 

Eagleburger) 48 


Secretary's News Conference 21 

Secretary's Trip to Moscow and NATO 

(Baker, joint statement) 29 

North .Atlantic Treaty Organization 
CFE and CSBM Talk.s Resume in Vienna 

(White House statement) 44 

President Meets With Prime Minister 

Mulroney (Bush. Mulroney) 45 

Secretary's News Conference 21 

Secretary's Trip to Moscow and NATO 

(Baker, joint statement) 29 


Panama Elections (Bush. Eagleburger, 

Department and White House statements, 

text of OAS resolution) 66 

President Meets With Prime Minister 

Mulroney (Bush, Mulroney) 45 

Secretary's Interview on "Face the 

Nation" 27 

Secretary's Trip to Moscow and NATO 

(Baker, joint statement) 29 

Presidential Documents 

Change in the Soviet Union 16 

The Future of Europe 18 

Panama Elections (I5ush, Eagleburger, 

Department and White House statements, 

text of OAS resolution) 66 

President Meets With Prime Minister 

Mulroney (Bush, Mulroney) 45 

Security Strategy for the 1990s 19 

U.S., .Japan Agree to Codevelop FSX 

Aircraft (Bush, Eagleburger) 48 

Visit of King Hussein I (Bush, King 

Hussein) 53 

World Trade Week, 1989 (proclamation) . . 51 

Btukgruinid Nutes 81 

Department of State 79 

F(ir(i(/)i Relatiuiis Volumes Released .... 80 
Refugees. L'pdate on Immigration and 

Refugee Issues (Moore) 59 

Security Assistance. FY 1990 Assistance 

Request for Sub-Saharan Africa 

(Rosenberg) 39 

Sudan. Cease-Fire in Sudan (Department 

statement) 41 


Competitiveness in the Global Marketplace 

( McCoi-mack I 49 

World Trade Week. 1989 (proclamation) . . 51 

Treaties. Current .Actions 76 


The Challenge of Change in LI.S. -Soviet 

Relations i^Baker) .36 

Change in the Soviet Union (Bush) 16 

Secretary's Interview on "Face the 

Nation" 27 

Secretary's News Conference 21 

Secretary's Trip to Moscow and NAT(") 

(Baker, joint statement) 29 

Security Strategy for the 1990s (Bush) ... 19 
Update on Immigration and Refugee Issues 

(Moore) 59 

United Nations 

Deconfrontation on Cyprus (Department 

statement ) .52 

U.S. Opposes PLO Admission to ITN 

Agencies (Baker, Vogelgesang, 

Dei)artment statement) 65 

Warsaw Pact. CFE and CSBM Talks 

Resume in Vienna (White House 

statement) 44 

Na me Index 

Baker, Secretary 21,24,27,29,36,65 

Bush, President .... 16,18,19,45,48,51,53,66 

Eagleburger, Lawrence S 48,66 

Holmes, H. Allen 43 

King Hussein I 53 

McCormack, Richard T 49 

Moore, .Jonathan 59 

Mulroney, Brian 45 

Rosenberg, Alison 39 

Vogelgesang, Sandra L 65 

Williams, Richard L 48 

Wolfe, Edward E 56 

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he Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 89 / Number 2149 

August 1989 

Dppartmpnt of Staip 


Volume 89 / Number 2149 / August 1989 

('resident Bush held a news conference a( 
the conclusion of the 2-day NATO summit. 

(While House photo by Michael Sargent) 

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1 A Short History of NATO (James E. Miller) 

6 Western Security: The U.S. and Its NATO Allies 

rhe President 



Visits Europe; Attends North 
Atlantic Council Meeting 
(Secretary Baker. President 
Bush, Helmut Kohl, Marga- 
ret Thatcher. NATO Decla- 
ration and Comprehensive 

News Conferences of June 5 
and 8 (Excerpts) 

rhe Vice President 

i2 American Leadership in the 

rhe Secretary 




After the NATO Summit: 
Challenges for the West in a 
Changing World 

Challenges Ahead for NATO 
and Developments in East- 
West Relations 

A New Pacific Partnership: 
Framework for the Future 

Interview on "Newsmaker 


The Seedlings of Hope: U.S. 
Policy in Africa (Edward J. 

Arms Control 

73 Nuclear and Space Talks Open 

Round 11 (Richard R. Burt, ■ 
President Bush) 

74 Military Openness Proposals 

Tabled at CSBM Talks 
(Department Statement) 
74 Anniversary of INF Treaty 
(White House Statement) 

East Asia 

75 Demonstrations in China 
(President Bush, White 
House and Department 


77 NATO Defense Planning Com- 

mittee Meets in Brussels 
(Final Communique) 

78 Elections in Poland (President 


78 Hungarian Political Reforms 

(White House Statemoit) 

79 President Meets With French 

President (President Bush. 
Francois Mitterrand) 

80 Baltic Freedom Day (Procla- 

83 President's Meeting With EC 
Commission President 
(White House Statement) 

Middle East 

84 President Meets With Israeli 

Defense Minister (White 

House Statement) 
84 President Meets With Saudi 

Foreign Minister (White 

House Statement) 




Confronting Realities on 
Refugee Assistance 
(Jonathan Moore) 

Developing Solutions for Cen- 
tral American Refugee 
Problems (Jonathan Moore) 


88 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

90 Department of State 

91 USUN 


92 Department of State 

92 Foreign Relations Volumes 







A Short History of NATO 

The following article was prepared 
}y James E. Miller of the Office of the 
'iistorian. Bureau of Public Affairs. 


rill- North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- 
ii)ii (NATO) was born in an era of ris- 
nu Kast-West tensions. Its member 
Uatt's joined together to safeguard 
hrii' national security and political de- 
iiiK racy from the challenge posed by 
>ii\ iet expansionism. In spite of fre- 
iuciit, well-publicized disagreements, 
he alliance has been durable, respond- 
\\\i to changing international condi- 
iiiiis and expanding from its original 
12 member states to 16. NATO's 
strengths remain the military security 
hat membership provides individual 
;tates, its ability to facilitate c.onsulta- 
iniis among its member states, and the 
nulcrlying U.S. commitment to come 
11 1 lie defense of Europe. 

The Origins of NATO, 1947-49 

The decision of the United States, Can- 
ida, and 10 European states to enter 
nto a peacetime defensive alliance was 
me (if the most significant develop- 
neiits of the post-World War II era. For 
hi' United States in particular, mem- 
)ersliip in NATO represented a funda- 
neiital change in its more than 
■entury-old foreign policy of refraining 
Viim involvement with "entangling alli- 
mces." The emerging East-West con- 
'liet provided the context for the 
levelopment of NATO. By 1947 the 
''lilted States and the Soviet Union 
lail clashed over nuclear disarmament, 
he nature of the postwar economic and 
iiilltical settlement in Central and 
Eastern Europe, Iran, and the shape of 
beace treaties with the defeated Axis 
lat Inns. 

The pace of West European eco- 
nomic recovery was agonizingly slow. 
Severe shortages in food, fuel, and the 
basic necessities of life stimulated pop- 
ular discontent. Concern grew over the 
establishment of communist regimes in 
Eastern Europe. The U.S. Government 
responded with a series of highly cre- 
ative economic and political initiatives 
that stabilized both European democra- 
cy and a free trading system. 

The European Recovery Program 
(Marshall Plan) of 1948-52 was a key el- 
ement in the U.S. program of Euro- 
pean stabilization. It rebuilt the sinews 
of Europe's economy, committed the 
United States to a long-term role in 
Europe, and created mechanisms for 
political consultation between the two 
sides of the Atlantic. Simultaneously, 
the European states, with the encour- 
agement of the United States, took the 
first steps toward economic and politi- 
cal integration by creating in 1947 the 
Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation and in 1948 a security ar- 
rangement, the Brussels pact (known 
after 1955 as the Western European 
Union). Economic weakness, however, 
limited Europe's ability to provide for 
its defense. 

After considerable debate within 
the United States, the leaders of the 
executive and legislative branches 
agreed on two immediate U.S. re- 
sponses to Europe's crisis: participa- 
tion in a defensive peacetime alliance 
and provision of military equipment 
and technical assistance. Negotiations 
for the alliance began quietly in March 
1948 among the United States, Canada, 
and Great Britain. On June 11, 1948, 
the U.S. Senate adopted the Vanden- 
berg resolution, encouraging U.S. par- 
ticipation in a collective defense 
arrangement. The Benelux states and 
France joined the talks in July. Initial 
discussions focused on the text of a 
treaty and the definition of the alli- 
ance's geographical extension and 

Creating an Alliance 
Structure, 1949-55 

On April 4, 1949, the Foreign Ministers 
of the United States, the United King- 
dom, France, Italy, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal 
signed the North Atlantic Treaty in a 
ceremony held in Washington, D.C. 
The NATO treaty came into force on 
August 24, 1949, when the 12 partici- 
pating nations formally deposited their 
instruments of ratification. 

The state of East-West relations 
did not permit a leisurely approach to 
building the military and political 
structures of alliance. During the sum- 
mer of 1949, the Soviet Union exploded 
its first atomic weapon. China fell to a 
communist revolution during the au- 
tumn of 1949. Then, in June 1950, 
North Korean forces invaded South Ko- 
rea. U.S. and West European leaders 
concluded that the attack on Korea 
might be the prelude to a military 
move against Europe. 

These external stimuli quickened 
the pace of NATO's transformation into 
an active defense structure. Imme- 
diately after the Senate approved the 
NATO treaty in July 1949, the Truman 
Administration presented Congress 
with legislation authorizing a Military 
Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) 
to provide equipment and training for 
the armies of the NATO allies. In Octo- 
ber 1949, Congress approved a $1.3 bil- 
lion MDAP appropriation. After the 
outbreak of the Korean war in June 
1950, the size of U.S. military assist- 
ance grants rose rapidly, and the Tru- 
man Administration increased its 
original military commitment from one 
division to four divisions. The offshore 
procurement program, which encour- 
aged the creation of defense industries 
in Europe, supplemented MDAP. 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 

The North Atlantic Council, com- 
posed of the Foreign Ministers of the 
NATO states, met in Washington on 
July 17, 1949. The Foreign Ministers 
created committees to handle military 
planning, established regional planning 
groups to look at specific local issues, 
and took the first steps toward build- 
ing standing mechanisms for economic 
and political cooperation. A December 
1949 agi'eement provided for an initial 
division of responsibility among the al- 
lies: the United States would provide 
the alliance's strategic bombing capa- 
bility, while the European states would 
contribute the bulk of its ground troops 
and tactical air defense. The United 
States and Great Britain would defend 
NATO's Atlantic lines of communica- 
tion, while the United States would in- 
crease its military presence in Europe. 

The allies agreed to speedily build 
a permanent military command struc- 
ture. President Truman, at the request 
of the NATO Foi-eign Ministers, ap- 
pointed Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower as 
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe 
in December 1950. Gen. Eisenhower 
quickly built a military chain of com- 
mand and in 1952 i)ut the NATO armies 
through their first major combined ex- 
ercises. The North Atlantic Council's 
February 1952 Lisbon meeting estab- 
lished force goals for each NATO mem- 
ber state. Although these goals were 
not completely met, the allied states 
increased their military preparedness 
and allocated more of their resources 
to the common defense. In September 
1951, the NATO member states agreed 
to invite Greece and Turkey to join the 

By 1954, the NATO states had cre- 
ated a permanent defense mechanism. 
The North Atlantic Council became the 
executive, and its standing council of 
representatives, made up of ambas- 
sadors from the member states, pro- 
vided i)olicy coordination. NATO's 
[jermanent planning groups and secre- 
tariat were located in Paris. The Su- 
preme Headquarters Allied Powers 
Europe (SHAPE) coordinated defense 

NATO then focused on the role 
West Germany would play in the de- 
fense of the West. Meetings of NATO 
Foreign Ministers in September and 
October 1950 produced general agree- 
ment that West Germany must be part 

of NATO. The allied strategy of for- 
ward defense along the borders of com- 
munist states required West German 
jiarticij^ation. France and other conti- 
nental European allies were deeply 
concerned about the effects of rearm- 
ing the Germans so soon after the de- 
feat of Nazism. On October 24, 1950, 
French Premier Rene Pleven unveiled a 
plan for a European Defense Commu- 
nity (EDO, consisting of a standing 
European army under the control of a 
European defense minister. The plan 
would commit German manpower to 
the common defense but without 
forming a separate German army or 
general staff. Although the United 
States actively supported the plan, the 
United Kingdom declined to join, cit- 
ing its imperial commitments. The ab- 
sence of a postwar German peace 
settlement and the creation of East and 
West Germany made European states 
wary of the coiicejjt of an integrated 
defense force. The French and Italian 
Governments delayed parliamentary 
action on the European Defense Com- 
munity in the face of combined commu- 
nist and nationalist opposition. Finally, 
in August 1954, the F'rench Govern- 
ment presented the EDC measure to 
the National Assembly, which rejected 

The defeat of the EDC was fol- 
lowed by West German rearmament. A 
September-October 19.54 meeting of the 
Foreign Ministers of nine NATO pow- 
ers agreed to terminate the military 
occupation of the Federal Republic of 
Germany and invite the West German 
Government to join NATO. Italy and 
the Federal Republic at this time ac- 
ceded to the Western European Union. 
The Government of the Federal Repub- 
lic voluntarily agreed to limit its arms 
buildup and undertook not to construct 
nuclear weapons and certain other 
types of armaments. In May 1955, the 
Federal Republic joined NATO. 

The Nuclear Control Issue, 
1958-64 _ H 

In 1958, France's President Charles de 
Gaulle brought to the surface two of 
the underlying tensions within the alli- 
ance: concern over nuclear strategy and 
France's claim to a special leadership 
role within NATO. Although Great Bri- 

tain also maintained a nuclear capa- 
bility within the Western alliance, the 
United States possessed an overwhelm 
ing predominance in nuclear weapons 
stockpile and delivery systems. At 
their December 1954 meeting, the 
NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers 
adopted a policy of nuclear response to 
a Soviet attack on Europe, commonly 
referred to as "massive retaliation." 
The policy reflected a U.S. desire to 
maintain a credible deterrent at the 
lowest possible cost. By 1958, however, 
the Soviet Union had made major 
strides in both long-range bomber and 
missile technology, and it was capable 
of striking the United States. Increas- 
ingly, Europeans asked if the United 
States would risk a nuclear attack on 
its territory to defend Europe. 

De Gaulle was among the doubtert 
He was determined to reduce U.S. cor 
trol over alliance nuclear policy by 
building an independent nuclear force, 
the force dc frappe, a goal that he 
achieved in the early 1960s. The Frene 
President wanted France to act as the 
principal spokesman for Europe in an 
inner group of three with the United 
States and Great Britain. 

The NATO nations rejected De 
Gaulle's 1958 bid to create a two-tiered 
alliance structure, insisting instead on 
the equality of all NATO members. In 
an effort to accommodate the French 
leader on nuclear policy, the West Ger- 
mans urged the alliance to create a 
multilateral nuclear force (MNF) with- 
in NATO. The United States initially 
hesitated to endorse the MNF because 
of its concern with preventing nuclear 

In 1963, however, the Kennedy Ad- 
ministration came forward with a pro- 
posal to create an MNF surface fleet 
equipped with Polaris missiles under 
NATO command. The MNF would fit 
into the overall U.S. nuclear defense 
strategy. De Gaulle rejected the plan 
because the United States insisted on 
retaining final say on the launching of 
these weapons. The United States qui- 
etly dropped the MNF concept in 1964.1 
In 1966, De Gaulle took France out of 
the alliance military command struc- 
ture, while maintaining French partici 
pation in the political consultative 
mechanism. Consequently. NATO head 
quarters moved from Paris to Ri'ussels 
and U.S. forces withdrew from France 



flexible Response and 
)etente, 1966-74 

)n(' factor in De Gaulle's decision to 
■nil French forces out of NATO was his 
elief that the climate of East-West re- 
itions was impi'oving and that the dan- 
er of war had lessened. By the 
lid-lSGOs. two separate but related 
roeesses of normalization of relations 
rere underway between East and 
Vest. The United States and the Soviet 
Jnion were attempting to lessen ten- 
ions between themselves. At the same 
ime, a number of West European 
tates, including France and the Feder- 
1 Republic of Germany, were seeking 
ew relationships with the Soviet 
Jnion and East European states. 

Within the conte.xt of this chang- 
ng political climate, the NATO nations 
n December 1966 commissioned a 
tudy on the "Future Tasks of the Alli- 
nce" by a working group headed by 
Selgian Foreign Minister Pierre Har- 
lel. The allies also agreed to establish 
wo permanent bodies for nuclear 
ilanning — the Nuclear Defense Affairs 
ommittee, open to all members, and a 
mailer Nuclear Planning Group, with 
ermanent and rotating members — to 
andle the details. 

The Harmel report, issued at the 
linisterial meeting of the North At- 
intic Council in Brussels in December 
967, concluded that "military security 
nd a policy of detente are not contra- 
ictory but complementary" and that 
■lATO had an important role to play in 
preparing for bilateral and multilateral 
egotiations between Eastern and 
Vestern nations over key issues, such 
s the future of Germany and arms 
ontrol. Public perception of the alli- 
nce would be significantly improved, 
he report noted, if the allied consulta- 
ive process was strengthened and if 
he alliance took an active role in ad- 
ancing the rapprochement between 
ast and West by coordinating Euro- 
jean and U.S. political approaches to 
he Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 

At the December 1967 meeting, the 
ouncil also adopted the strategic doc- 
rine of "fle.xible response," endorsing 
ii balanced range of appropriate conven- 
ional and nuclear reactions to all levels 
)f aggression or threats of aggression, 
rhe responses were designed first to 
leter aggression but, failing that, to 

maintain the security and integrity of 
the North Atlantic Treaty area. The 
long-held concept of forward defense 
underlined NATO's commitment to 
counter an attack as close as possible to 
the frontiers of its member states. 
Fle.xible response, when combined with 
the pursuit of negotiations with the 
Warsaw Pact, enabled NATO to move 
beyond the strategy of massive retalia- 
tion and present a more credible de- 
fense posture that won wider public 

The move toward East-West accom- 
modation met a significant setback in 
August 1968 when the Soviet Union in- 
vaded Czechoslovakia. The Soviet inva- 
sion gave impetus to the buildup of 
NATO conventional forces and 
strengthened support for the alliance. 
A number of European countries in- 
creased their NATO contributions, 
while the United States cancelled 
planned troop reductions in Europe. 

Detente was further limited by 
disagreement over the U.S. role in Eu- 
rope, as well as by Soviet support for 
"national liberation movements" in the 
underdeveloped nations. While at- 
tempting to extend its influence in the 
Third World, the Soviet Union insisted 
that detente required the exclusion of 
the United States from Europe and an 
end to defensive alliances. It called 
NATO a U.S.-imposed straitjacket 
whose continued existence precluded 
successful settlement of Europe's diffi- 
culties. The United States and its 
NATO allies rejected this claim and in- 
sisted that any improvement in rela- 
tions between East and West would 
have to be negotiated within the exist- 
ing alliance framework. 

The Western view prevailed. Dur- 
ing the Nixon Administration (1969-74), 
the West succeeded in creating ar- 
rangements which fostered both an im- 
proved climate of East-West relations 
and a NATO role in the process. The 
conclusion in September 1971 of a Quad- 
ripartite Agreement on Berlin (which 
had been occupied since 1945 by the 
United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, and the Soviet Union) reduced 
tensions between the blocs. The West- 
ern allies extracted Soviet concessions 
over Berlin in exchange for an agree- 
ment to convene a Conference on Secu- 
rity and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE). The caucus of NATO states 
has been the primary forum for coor- 

dinating Western strategy at succes- 
sive CSCE meetings. NATO coordina- 
tion has played an important role in 
defining the West's CSCE objectives. 

Mutual and balanced force reduc- 
tion (MFBR) talks also began as a re- 
sult of a NATO initiative. These talks, 
intended to reduce in a stabilizing way 
the conventional forces of both NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact in central Eu- 
rope, continued until early 1989 with- 
out a significant breakthrough. 

The appropriate level of U.S. par- 
ticipation in NATO was debated vigor- 
ously during the Nixon Administration. 
The Mansfield amendment of 1971, 
which would have cut significantly the 
number of U.S. troops stationed in Ger- 
many, reflected a widely held view that 
Europeans must do more for their own 
defense and that the United States 
must improve its balance of payments. 
The Nixon Administration, with the 
support of the foreign policy establish- 
ment, headed off a reduction of one-half 
of the ground troops committed to Eu- 
rope. West European leaders recog- 
nized the seriousness of public 
sentiment in the United States, and the 
West German Government arranged to 
pay a higher share of the costs of main- 
taining U.S. forces on its soil. 

During the mid-1970s, conflicting 
political and economic interests among 
NATO's member states created an ele- 
ment of tension within the alliance. 
Disagreements over Middle East policy 
between the United States and its Eu- 
ropean partners surfaced at the time of 
the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the sub- 
sequent Arab oil embargo. 

Tensions within the alliance grew 
more acute in 1974 as a result of a ma- 
jor crisis on Cyprus. In the eastern 
Mediterranean, a coup by right-wing 
Greek Cypriots triggered Turkish mili- 
tary occupation of almost 40'/f of the is- 
land of Cyprus in July-August 1974. 
Greece's newly installed democratic 
government pulled its forces out of 
NATO's integrated military command 
structure to protest the alliance's in- 
ability to prevent or reverse the Turk- 
ish military action. 

Meanwhile, the allies welcomed the 
end of the dictatorship in Portugal but 
watched the growing radicalization of 
its military leadership and the increas- 
ing strength of the Portuguese Commu- 

nist Party with mounting concern until 
democratic forces gained control of the 
situation in late 1975. 

The Decline of Detente, 

Detente became increasingly difficult 
to maintain after 1974. The United 
States and the Soviet Union clashed 
over the expansion of Soviet influence 
in Africa, and negotiations stalled on a 
second strategic arms limitation 
(SALT) agreement. The Soviet Union 
undertook a major modernization of its 
intermediate-range nuclear forces 
(INF), substantially increasing the 
threat to NATO by replacing older SS- 
4 and SS-5 missiles with the mobile, 
longer-range, more accurate SS-20s, 
which were equipped with multiple in- 
dependently targetable reentry vehi- 
cles (MIRVs). The concept of detente 
came under attack within the United 
States from both sides of the political 

NATO continued to carry out its 
basic defense functions and regained its 
unity through a series of political ac- 
commodations and military reforms. 
The Portuguese situation began to sta- 
bilize in 1976-77. Although Greek- 
Turkish relations remained tense, the 
Greek Government recognized the val- 
ue of NATO participation and rejoined 
the alliance's military wing in October 
1980. The Western nations also 
achieved greater coordination on ener- 
gy policy. Newly democratic Spain join- 
ed the NATO alliance in December 

The growing Soviet military 
threat was a key to improved allied co- 
operation. In May 1977, the NATO 
states agreed to increase their defense 
e.xpenditures by 3% per annum (after 
adjustment for inflation) in order to 
meet the growth in Soviet military 
power. West Germany took the lead in 
calling for a NATO response to the So- 
viet SS-20 intermediate-range missile 
deployments. Discussions within the al- 
liance led to the adoption in December 
1979 of a "two-track" approach. The 
Western alliance would proceed with 
the installation of 572 U.S. Pershing II 

and ground-launched cruise inter- 
mediate-range missiles beginning in 
1983, while the United States would of- 
fer to negotiate with the Soviet Union 
on an INF balance at the lowest possi- 
ble level. 

A Renewed Cold War, 1980-84 

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
December 1979 severely chilled East- 
West relations. The Carter Adminis- 
tration requested a delay in Senate con- 
sideration of the June 1979 SALT II 
Treaty, which was already under heavy 
criticism. The United States imposed a 
grain embargo on the Soviet Union and 
sought to organize a Western boycott of 
the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games to 
protest the invasion. 

Soviet actions continued to feed 
the crisis. The U.S.S.R. encouraged 
and supported the Polish Government's 
imposition of martial law and its 
repression of popular democratic move- 
ments. It propped up a puppet govern- 
ment in Afghanistan and provided it 
with military support against a popu- 
lar resistance movement. It intensified 
the repression of domestic human 
rights activists. The quick succession 
of three aging Soviet leaders increased 
the West's difficulties in dealing with 
the Soviet Union. The September 1, 
1983, destruction of Korean Air Lines 
#007, an unarmed civilian airliner that 
strayed into Soviet airspace, further 
impeded East-West dialogue. 

NATO continued to pursue its 
"two-track" approach on missile deploy- 
ment. In 1981, the Reagan Administra- 
tion, in close consultation wdth the 
allies, offered a "zero/zero" INF 
outcome — no Pershing Il/cruise missile 
deployments in exchange for the dis- 
mantlement of comparable Soviet weap- 
ons systems — and in 1983, an interim 
INF approach to establish equal low 
ceilings on these weapons for the Unit- 
ed States and the Soviet Union on a 
global basis. 

The Soviet Union rejected Western 
proposals and intensified its propagan- 
da campaign, seeking to exploit a grow- 
ing pacifist movement in Europe and 
the United States to "freeze" a status 
quo that established a Soviet predomi- 
nance by preventing a U.S. INF de- 

ployment. The Soviet Union broke off 
INF talks in the fall of 1983, as the 
first U.S. missiles became operational. 

Upon taking office in January 
1981, President Reagan began a long- 
term nuclear and conventional rearma- 
ment program. The Administration 
urged the NATO allies to take a great- 
er share in the defense of Europe 
through a buildup of their conventional 
forces. The Administration maintained 
that the alliance must solidify the 
Western defense posture as the first 
step toward realistic and productive 
negotiations with the Soviet Union. 
U.S. proposals for strategic arms re- 
duction talks (START) forsaw an over- 
all reduction in the number of offensive 
nuclear weapons each side deployed, as 
well as a restructuring of these forces 
to enhance stability. The Reagan Ad- 
ministration also sought to reduce the 
size of the ground forces that both side; 
had in Europe in the MBFR talks and 
to improve European security through 
adopting concrete and mutually verifiai 
ble confidence-building measures. The 
Madrid meeting of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(1980-83) adopted a NATO-backed pro- 
posal for the creation of a Conference 
on Confidence- and Security-Building 
Measures and Disarmament in Europe 
(CDE) with a mandate to formulate 
confidence-building measures. The 
CDE concluded its meeting in Stock- 
holm in September 1986 with an agree- 
ment on a set of mutually comple- 
mentary measures for monitoring sig- 
nificant military activities in Europe, 
including mandatory on-site inspection 
as a means of verification. 

NATO also sought to improve in- 
tergovernmental cooperation in other 
areas of deep mutual concern. A May 
1981 NATO declaration deplored the 
recent resurgence of violent terrorist 
attacks, agreed on the necessity for bi- 
lateral and multilateral cooperation to 
prevent and combat terrorism, and ex- 
pressed determination to take all nec- 
essary measures to ensure the security 
of diplomatic and other official 


An Era of Intensified Dialogue, 

triu' successful conclusion of the Madrid 
rsCE meeting in 1983 mai'ked the first 
linak in the cycle of East-West confron- 
tatiun that had characterized the rela- 
tiiiiiship since the invasion of 
Afuhanistan. The 1984 reelection of 
President Reagan and the emergence of 
Mikhail Gorbachev as Soviet leader in 
the spring of 1985 provided both great 
pdwers with stable political leadership. 
Xt'Udtiations on INF and strategic 
arms reductions, as well as on limita- 
tidii of space systems, began in Geneva 
111 March 1985. 

The November 1985 Reagan- 
(liiihachev summit in Geneva produced 
an agreement to give priority to 50% 
START reductions and to an interim 
1 X F agreement. A subsequent meeting 
I if the two leaders at Reykjavik, Ice- 
lanil, in October 1986 led to wide- 
ranging discussion of major disarma- 
ment initiatives but no agreement. 

In February 1987, General Secre- 
tai y Gorbachev removed his previous 
it'(|uirement that U.S. concessions on 
:h(' Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 
[irecede INF progress. The June 1987 
meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers at 
Re,\kjavik supported the global and ef- 
fectively verifiable elimination of both 
long- and short-range U.S. and Soviet 
land-based INF missiles, urging the 
Soviet Union to drop its demand to re- 
tain a portion of its SS-20 missiles. In 
July, the Soviet Union agreed in princi- 
ple to a zero level for all long-range 
INF missiles. 

President Reagan and General Sec- 
retary Gorbachev signed an INF Trea- 
ty (in December 8, 1987, during their 
\\'ashington summit meeting. Under 
terms of the agreement, the first arms 
reduction accord in East-West discus- 
siiins, all missiles in the 500-5,000 km 
range will be dismantled or destroyed 
'under strict supervision that permits 
reliable verification. On December 11, 
U)S7, the NATO states that provided 
bases for the U.S. INF missiles signed 
a separate accord to facilitate the pro- 
cesses of dismantling and verification. 

With the signature of the INF ac- 
ciinl, the United States and the Soviet 
Union had taken a significant step to- 
ward the reduction of tensions in Eu- 

rope. During their March 2-3, 1988, 
meeting at Brussels, the NATO heads 
of government sketched out the next 
steps in the disarmament process. A 
North Atlantic Council statement un- 
derlined the need for a reduction in the 
size of conventional forces in Europe 
and called upon the Soviet Union and 
its Warsaw Pact allies to accept the 
principle of an asymmetrical reduction 
that would bring their troop and equip- 
ment levels down to those of NATO 
forces. The NATO leaders also called 
for talks that would eliminate each 
side's capacity for a surprise attack. 
NATO set as its goal the creation of 
European stability from the Atlantic to 
the Urals. 

The Soviet response, delivered by 
Gorbachev in his new role as President 
in a December 7, 1988, address to the 
United Nations, was to announce a uni- 
lateral overall Soviet force reduction of 
500,000 men and 10,000 tanks by 1991. 
In addition, the Soviet Union agreed to 
a NATO proposal for convening talks 
on conventional armed forces in Europe 
(CFE) as part of the CSCE process. 
These talks began in Vienna in March 
1989. They replace the MBFR talks 
that concluded in February 1989 and 
extend the parameters of the talks to 
cover Europe from the Atlantic to the 
Urals. Nuclear issues will remain out- 
side the scope of these discussions. 

U.S. leaders' concern about 
preserving NATO's basic strategies of 
flexible response and forward defense 
led them to insist that agreement on 
reducing conventional forces to parity 
must precede further talks on scaling 
down nuclear arsenals in Europe. In 
view of the Soviet Union's large superi- 
ority in the number of short-range mis- 
siles, U.S. and British officials urged 
the modernization of NATO's Lance 
missiles, a critical element in flexible 
response and forward defense. The 
Fecleral Republic and several other 
NATO allies favored direct negotia- 
tions with the Soviet Union prior to un- 
dertaking a modernization program. 
Gorbachev also called for talks intend- 
ed to eliminate short-range nuclear- 
equipped missiles from Europe. 

At the May 1989 NATO summit 
meeting. President Bush offered to re- 
duce U.S. troop strength in Europe by 
30,000 men in return for a Soviet 

agreement to bring its troop levels 
down to parity with those of the United 
States. Under the Bush proposal, which 
won NATO endorsement, the Soviet 
Union would reduce its forces in East- 
ern Europe by about 325,000 men, and 
both states would reach a level of 
275,000 troops by 1992 or 1993. 

In addition, the President proposed 
setting limits on the number of tanks, 
armored personnel carriers, and artil- 
lery pieces in NATO and Warsaw Pact 
arsenals and suggested a 15% reduction 
below current NATO levels of land- 
based combat aircraft and helicopters 
by both sides. The troops involved in 
these reductions would be demobilized; 
the weapons would be destroyed. 

The NATO allies also announced an 
accord on a short-range missiles nego- 
tiating strategy. NATO would enter 
into talks with the Soviet Union at the 
point at which the agreements result- 
ing from the CFE talks were being im- 
plemented. Talks on short-range 
missiles would aim at partial reduction 
of these weapons. Bush simultaneously 
reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to 

While the arms reduction process 
goes forward, other areas of progress 
in East-West relations that are outside 
the purview of NATO have contributed 
to a lessening of international tensions. 
The conclusion of accords that provided 
for a Soviet withdrawal of its occupying 
forces from Afghanistan and an agree- 
ment among the parties directly in- 
volved in the civil war in Angola that 
provided for the withdrawal of Cuban 
and South African forces have helped 
to diffuse conflict between the major 
powers and may contribute to long- 
range regional stability. 

NATO's role in an era of renewed 
negotiations remains central. It pro- 
vides the military deterrent essential 
for success in negotiations. Moreover, 
as the process of Europe's economic 
and political integration continues and 
as Europe's role in its own defense in- 
creases, NATO serves as a unique fo- 
rum in which allied policy can be 
forged and differences between the 
American and European pillars of the 
Atlantic alliance resolved. ■ 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 

Western Security: 
The U.S. and Its NATO Allies 

After World War II, the people of 
Europe, free from the menace of Nazi 
Germany, were confronted with two 
distinctly different and opposing views 
of what the future should hold. The 
United States and its West European 
allies looked to an era of democracy un- 
derscored by individual freedoms and 
economic prosperity built on a founda- 
tion of free markets. With our allies, 
we stood fast against a contrary view 
championed by the Soviet Union — a 
view that forcibly divided Europe 
against the will of its peoples and 
which transformed it into the world's 
most heavily armed continent. 

Indications that the Soviet Union — 
through glasnost, perestroika, 
democratization, and "new thinking" — 
is changing its vision of the future do 
not mean that the need for allied soli- 
darity is over. We are viewing with in- 
terest and caution the changes in the 
Soviet Union. The United States wel- 
comes glasnost, perestroika, new politi- 
cal thinking, and the first tentative 
steps toward democracy. However, the 
United States awaits tangible signs 
that the Soviets have changed their be- 
havior on issues such as Soviet mili- 
tary e.xpansion, forces acquisition and 
disposition, military doctrine, 
human rights, regional conflicts, and 
military support to totalitarian states 
before we can make fundamental 
changes in the allied approach to 
relations with the East. 

Moreover, the former Soviet- 
inspired view of a Europe divided into 
ideological camps is not the only reason 
for Western alliances and friendships. 
Over the past four decades, the United 
States and its NATO allies have con- 
structed strong political, military, and 
economic relationships bound together 
by shared values and fundamental com- 
mon interests. Enormous changes have 
taken place among the Western allies 
themselves, and America's role is far 
less predominant today than it was after 
Woi'ld War II. Far from being a negative 

indication of diminished U.S. influence, 
these changes are the best possible evi- 
dence that our policies have worked. 
While the United States is not the major 
source of resources for European jjoliti- 
cal, economic, and military strength, 
America plays a unique role as a catalyst 
for cooperation. 

The most significant development 
in the allied response to postwar chal- 
lenges was the signing of the North 
Atlantic Treaty in April 1949. ' That 
document created the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), which 
many view as the most effective and en- 
during defensive alliance in modern his- 
tory. NATO is a purely defensive 
alliance: it makes no territorial claims 
against any other nation, and its mem- 
bers have pledged to use their armed 
forces only to defend NATO territory. 
As NATO celebrates its 40th year in 
1989, continued U.S. -allied consulta- 
tions will lead to a comprehensive ap- 
proach, not only to East-West issues but 
also to making the Western alliance 
stronger than ever as it meets the new 
challenges before it. 

This document e.xamines funda- 
mental U.S. goals and objectives as 
NATO reevaluates and responds to a 
changing security climate. 

Political Relations 

In a speech to European foreign minis- 
ters meeting in Vienna, Austria, on 
March 6, 1989, Secretary Baker out- 
lined "four freedoms" which are em- 
braced by the West as foundation 
stones for democracy and jjeaceful 

• The freedom of all Europeans to 
have a say in decisions which affect 
their lives, including freedom of the 
workplace: If the East were to accept 
this freedom, the legality of Poland's 
"Solidarity" trade union would have 
been the norm and not the subject of bit- 
ter negotiations. 

• The freedom of all Europeans to 
express their political differences, 
when all ideas are welcome and human 
rights are truly inviolable: If the East 
were to accept this freedom, monitors 
of the Helsinki accords on human rights 
would not be persecuted by their 

• The freedom of all Europeans to 
exchange ideas and information and to 
exercise their right to freedom of move- 
ment: If the East were to accept these 
freedoms, academic researchers would 
never be denied access to scholarly 
documents — and the Berlin Wall would 
be reduced to rubble. 

• The freedom of all Europeans to 
be safe, not only from military attack 
but from military intimidation as well: 
If the East were to accept this freedom, 
West Europeans would not face an over- 
whelming conventional military force to 
the East, and East Europeans would be 
able to make their own political deci- 
sions without fear of being "over-ruled" 
by Soviet tanks, as happened in Hun- 
gary and East Germany in 19-56 as well 
as Czechoslovakia in 1968. 

Steadfast dedication to these four 
principles, fueled by the vigor of free 
market economies and close cooperation 
with the United States, allowed West- 
ern Europe to rebuild via the Marshall 
Plan from the rubble of World War II 
faster than the most optimistic planners 
imagined. As a result, some power and 
influence has shifted from the United 
States to the West European allies. 
This development is both positive and 
desirable. Yet it poses new challenges as 
the United States and its allies explore 
ways to share both the benefits and bur- 
dens of collective defense. 

West Europeans have become used 
to seeing the United States contribute a 
large share of the cost of collective de- 
fense. However, as West European econ- 
omies now challenge U.S. business 
interests here and around the world, 
Americans argue that Western Europe 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


is capable of paying a greater share of 
the common defense. The fact that the 
Western alliance continues to grow 
stronger even while debating such fun- 
damental issues is the best proof that 
the democratic sharing of ideas is the 
only guarantee of durable peace and 

Indeed, because NATO is made up 
of flourishing democracies, public opin- 
ion in many nations must be taken into 
account before critical political, eco- 
nomic, and military decisions are made. 
For example, the December 1987 U.S.- 
Roviet treaty to eliminate inter- 
iiii'diate-range nuclear forces (INF) was 
made possible because, despite Soviet 
maneuvering, the people of several West 
Eui-opean democracies made decisions 
1(1 deploy INF forces in the first place. 
This concerted action by the allies, in 
effect, forced Moscow's hand, since pri- 
or to the deployment of Western INF 
forces, the Soviets held a monopoly on 
such weaponry and saw no reason to ne- 
gotiate seriously. Key decisions on allied 
security as well as political and econom- 
ic relations must stand up to public scru- 
tiny in all 16 NATO democracies. 

The Western allies have long under- 
stood that their own freedom and well- 
being is best protected only if they 
maintain an effective deterrent and if 
they can secure certain understandings 
with the East. The Conference on Secu- 
rity and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE), which first met in Helsinki in 
1972, has been seeking to address the 
matri.\ of political and military issues 
that contribute to instability in Eu- 
rope. Followup meetings in what has 
come to be known as the "CSCE proc- 
ess" have been scheduled on subjects as 
varied as human rights, the peaceful 
settlement of disputes, and environ- 
mental issues (see p. 9). 


Nuclear Arms Control 

In the immediate postwar period, Eu- 
rope's military balance was fluid and 
marked by Soviet attempts to impose 
Moscow's will on other governments. 
U.S. strategic, or long-range, nuclear 
weapons served as a counterweight to 
:he Soviet Union's superiority in con- 
ventional forces. After 1948, the Soviet 
Union's development of nuclear weap- 
ons posed an additional threat to Eu- 
rojje and the United States. 

Short-range nuclear weaponry ap- 
peared on both sides, and the Soviet- 
led Warsaw Pact troops and armor con- 
tinued to numerically overwhelm those 
of the West. This was a critical factor 
in allied defense strategy because 
NATO's largest military power, the 
United States (thousands of miles away 
from the East-West frontier), was un- 
able to quickly deploy conventional 
forces to Europe. 

In response to the Soviet bloc's mas- 
sive military buildup, NATO in 1967 
adopted and continues to follow a strat- 
egy known as "fle.xible response." 
NATO is prepared to use any of the 
weapons at its disposal to appropriately 
counter any act of aggression. The 
Warsaw Pact must weigh the possibility 
that NATO could use any of its 
resources — including nuclear 
weapons — if Warsaw Pact forces invade 
Western Europe. This flexibility is 
aimed at deterring war by sending the 
other side an unmistakable message 
that the West will take appropriate ac- 
tion to deal with any form of aggression. 

The Soviet Union, for its own prop- 
aganda advantage, often attempts to 

misrepresent NATO's "flexible re- 
sponse" strategy and our efforts to de- 
ter war. For example, Moscow would 
like us to renounce first-use of nuclear 
weapons and even to turn Europe into 
a "nuclear free zone." In the past, Mos- 
cow also has suggested a "freeze" on 
nuclear forces at current levels. The 
true nature of these Soviet arguments 
becomes clear when one considers that, 
in the absence of a credible nuclear de- 
terrent, Warsaw Pact conventional 
forces would dominate the European 
security environment. Moreover, even 
should equal conventional force levels 
be achieved, history has shown that 
conventional forces alone do not prevent 
war. It is NATO's strategy of deter- 
rence, made credible by a mix of up-to- 
date nuclear and conventional weapons, 
which has guaranteed the peace in Eu- 
rope for the last 40 years. 

For this reason, the United States 
and its allies have approached the question 
of nuclear arms control from an overall 
perspective of Western secMr/f^. Reduc- 
ing nuclear arms is not an end in itself; 
rather, enhancing Western securi- 

NATO'S 40 Years: A Chronology 

May 1945: Germany surrenders; U.S., 
British, French, and Soviet troops occupy 

June 1947: United States announces 
Marshall Plan for European economic re- 
covery, starts pulling troops out of Europe 
but leaves 40,000 in Germany. 

June 1948: Soviets start Berlin block- 
ade by blocking roads to West Berlin. 

April 4, 1949: The United States and 
11 other countries sign the North Atlantic 
Treaty, creating NATO (Greece and Tur- 
key joined in 1952, West Germany in 1955, 
and Spain in 1982). 

May 1949: Soviets end Berlin block- 
ade. West Germany (and later East Ger- 
many) are created from occupation zones. 

October 1950: NATO is formally es- 
tablished after the Korean war begins. 
Paris is its first headquarters. 

May 1955: The Warsaw Pact is 

August 1961: The Berlin Wall is built. 

October 1962: Cuban missile crisis 
puts NATO and the Warsaw Pact on full 
military alert. 

July 1966: France withdraws from the 
NATO military command; NATO begins 
moving headquarters to Brussels. 

October 1967: NATO adopts its "flex- 
ible response" strategy. 

October 1977: West Germany asks 
NATO to take action in response to Soviet 
deployment of SS-20 INF missiles. 

December 1979: NATO adopts its 
"dual-track" policy of deploying its own 
INF missiles while negotiating with the 
Soviets for removal of their SS-20s. 

1983-88: NATO unilaterally with- 
draws 2,400 nuclear warheads deployed 
with SNF weaponry in Europe. 

November 1983: Pershing II INF mis- 
siles are sent to West Germany; Soviets 
walkoutof INF talks. 

March 1985: U.S. -Soviet INF talks 

December 1987: United States and 
U.S.S.R. sign INF Treaty abolishing this 
entire class of nuclear weapons from their 
respective arsenals. 

March 1989: NATO and Warsaw Pact 
begin talks on conventional forces in Eu- 
rope and confidence- and security-building 

May 1989: NATO summit and new 
CFE/SNF proposal. 

June 1989: START talks resume. 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 

Th« Unilsd Sut*a Govefnin«nt haa not r»coflf>ii«d 
the incofporalion of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
into the Soviet Union Other boundary rapreaentahon 
\ 18 not necesaarily authoritative ) 

ty and regional stability is our goal. 
Western conventional arms control 
proposals are aimed at eliminating 
the conventional forces imbalance 
and enhancing stability. 

There are three basic categories 
of land-based nuclear missiles: short- 
range nuclear forces (SNF) with a 
range of less than 500 kilometers 
(300 miles), intermediate-range (INF) 
with a range of .500-5,500 kilometers 
(300-3,400 miles), and long-range or 
strategic — intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy 
bombers — with a range of more than 
5,500 kilometers (3,400 miles). 

The only category of nuclear mis- 
siles that has been banned completely 

by the United States and the U.S.S.R. 
is INF. The Soviet Union began deploy- 
ing ground-launched missiles capable of 
reaching West European targets dur- 
ing the 1950s. The most dangerous of 
these INF weapons were the modern 
SS-20 missiles which the Soviets began 
deploying in 1977. The allies then join- 
ed in a "dual-track" approach on INF — 
deploying new INF weapons to counter 
the Soviet threat while at the same 
time pursuing negotiations with the So- 
viets for elimination of the SS-20s and 
other Soviet INF missiles. Faced with 
U.S. deployments of INF missiles, the 
U.S.S.R. agreed to a U.S. proposal for a 
fully verifiable ban on intermediate- 
range weapons. 

Strategic nuclear forces are the 
subject of the strategic arms reduction 

talks (START) aimed at reducing the 
risk of nuclear war. The U.S. objective 
in START is to achieve an equitable andi 
effectively verifiable agreement that 
creates a more stable nuclear balance, 
thereby reducing the incentive for ei- 
ther side to launch a first strike. The 
United States believes that a START 
treaty is possible in the future but not 
before several difficult issues are re- 
solved. These include: mobile ICBMs, 
sea-launched and air-launched cruise 
missiles, and sublimits on ICBM 
warheads. In many of these cases, veri- 
fication presents the most difficult 

NATO continues to face the direct 
threat posed to Europe by large num- 
bers of Warsaw Pact short-range nucle- 

Department of State Bulletin/August 198S 


ar missiles, which recently have been 
substantially upgraded. As agreed to 
in the May 1989 NATO report, "A Com- 
prehensive Concept of Arms Control 
and Disarmament [see p. 22]," NATO 
reaffirms its position that for the fore- 
seeable future, there is no alternative 
to the alliances strategy of deterrence 
based upon an appropriate mix of ade- 
quate and effective nuclear and conven- 
tional forces. Land-, sea-, and air-based 
nuclear systems in Western Europe, in- 
cluding ground-based missiles, will be 
needed and continue to be updated 
where necessary. In line with NATO's 
commitment to maintain only the mini- 
mum number of nuclear weapons neces- 
sary to support this strategy, NATO 
already has made unilateral cuts in 
short-range nuclear forces. The num- 
ber of land-based warheads in Western 
Europe has been reduced by more than 
one-third since 1979 to its lowest level 
in more than 20 years. Updating such 
systems would result in further 

Conventional Arms Control 

President Bush and Secretary Baker 
consider conventional forces to be a 
high priority area in arms control. Sec- 
retary Baker has defined the issue 
quite simply: "A vast force, spear- 
headed by heavily armored units and 
supported by massive firepower, has 
been fielded by the Soviet Union and 
its allies. That force points West." War- 
saw Pact tank and artillery forces out- 
number NATO 3:1 and the Warsaw Pact 
holds a 2:1 advantage in armored per- 
sonnel carriers. Even if all the uni- 
lateral force reductions announced by 
General Secretary Gorbachev and the 
Warsaw Pact were implemented, the 
pact would still hold more than a 2:1 
edge in tanks and artillery. 

On March 9, 1989, two new autono- 
mous negotiations within the framework 
of the CSCE process opened in Vienna. 
The negotiation on conventional armed 
forces in Europe (CFE) covers the 
European territory of all Warsaw Pact 
and NATO countries from the Atlantic 
Ocean to the Ural Mountains. Separate 
Negotiations on confidence- and 
security-building measures (CSBMs) 
involving all 35 CSCE nations aim to 
build "openness" between East and 

CFE. During the NATO summit 
meeting on May 29, 1989, President 
Bush asked the allies to join in tabling 
the most far-reaching Western conven- 
tional arms control proposal ever of- 
fered in the postwar era. The President 
has proposed and NATO has endorsed 
the following enhancements to NATO's 
CFE proposal now on the table in 

• First, that the members of the al- 
liance lock in Eastern acceptance of the 
proposed Western limits on key portions 
of their ground forces. This includes 
ceilings on numbers of tanks (20,000 

for each side), armored troop carriers 
(28,000 for each side), and artillery 
pieces (16,500-24,000 for each side, de- 
pending on the resolution of definitional 
questions). Equipment reduced would 
be destroyed. This provision would 
oblige the East to destroy tens of thou- 
sands of weapons systems and eliminate 
its preponderance in these important 
components of military strength. 

• Second, that the West expand its 
proposal to extend, for the first time, 
the concept of conventional arms control 
to all land-based combat aircraft and he- 
licopters in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals 
area. Each side would be obliged to re- 
duce its holdings to a level 15% below the 
current NATO total. All reduced equip- 
ment would be destroyed. Again, al- 
though both sides would take significant 
cuts, the East would lose its current 
preponderance in these forces. 

• Third, that the United States and 
Soviet Union agree to a common level of 

approximately 275,000 ground and air 
forces stationed outside national terri- 
tory in the Atlantic-to-the Urals zone. 
The United States is willing to reduce 
its combat forces by 20% to arrive at 
this level. The reduction to parity would 
require the Soviets to reduce their 
600,000-member force in Eastern Eu- 
rope by 325,000. Withdrawn forces on 
both sides would be demobilized. 

• Fourth, that both sides accelerate 
their timetable for reaching a CFE 
agreement along the above lines and for 
implementing the required reductions. 
The Soviet Union has referred to a tar- 
get date of 1997 as its goal; the United 
States would like to reach an agreement 
within 6 months to 1 year and accom- 
plish the reductions by 1992 or 1993. 

NATO has set a goal of tabling 
these enhancements along with verifica- 
tion provisions at the opening of round 3 
of CFE on September 7, 1989. As the So- 
viet Union and its allies indicate their 
readiness to change their national prior- 
ities and reduce their enormous mili- 
tary establishments, the United States 
and its allies are prepared to help real- 
ize the longstanding hope of a secure and 
less militarized Europe. 

The Western allies have four major 
objectives in CFE: 

• The establishment of a secure and 
stable balance of conventional forces at 
lower levels. The present concentration of 
conventional forces between the Atlantic 
and the Urals represents the greatest 
destructive potential of conventional 


: Followup Meetings, March 1989-91 


Human Rights 


March 9- 
April 18-May 12 
May 30^une 2:5 
October 16-November 3 


Vienna, Austria 
London, England 
Paris, France 
Sofia, Bulgaria 


Human Rights 

March 19-April 6 

June 5-29 

September 24-October 19 

Bonn, West Germany 
Copenhagen, Denmark 
Palma, Spain 


Peaceful Settlemer 

of Disputes 
Cultural Heritage 
Human Rights 

It January 15-February 8 

May 28^une 7 
September 10-October 4 

Valletta, Malta 

Krakow, Poland 
Moscow, U.S.S.R. 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 

forces ever assembled. The mere pres- 
ence of such massive firepower threat- 
ens European security. 

• The elimination of disparities 
prejudicial to stability and security. It is 
the substantial disparity of tanks, artil- 
lery, and troop carriers that most 
threatens European stability and secu- 
rity. In particular, no single country 
should be allowed to possess more than a 
fixed proportion of all weapons systems 
held by all parties. Additional limits 
should be placed on the stationing of 
troops on another country's territory 
(such as Soviet forces in East Germany). 
These two elements would combine to 
ensure that no one country could domi- 
nate Europe by force of arms. 

• The elimination of capabilities to 
launch surprise attacks and large-scale 
offensive operations. The types of weap- 
ons systems in which the Soviet bloc en- 
joys the greatest advantage — tanks, 
artillery, and armored personnel 
carriers — are systems that are most vi- 
tal to seizing and holding territory, the 
prime aim of any aggressor. 

• The United States insists that any 
arms control treaty be effectively veri- 
fiable and that inspections be expanded. 

CSBMs. CSBMs are designed to re- 
duce the risk for armed conflict that 
arises through misunderstanding or 
miscalculation of military capabilities 
and intentions in Europe. After suc- 
cessful conclusion of the 1986 Stockholm 
agreement and the 2V2-year implemen- 
tation experience, the 35 CSCE partici- 
pating states are meeting again in 
Vienna to develop additional measures. 
The focus of the Western proposal is for 
measures which increase openness and 
transparency of military structure, 
equipment, and activities, thus reduc- 
ing the likelihood that weapons will ever 
be used. 

A Look Toward the Future 

Economic, social, and political changes 
in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
are occurring at the same time that al- 
lied economies and democracies are 
flourishing. New horizons are now evi- 
dent for a continent that was divided 40 
years ago by a conflict between two op- 
posing visions. As that conflict abates, 
it may be possible to remove old obsta- 
cles from Europe's path to the future. 

The United States and its NATO al- 
lies are working in concert to remove 
the largest of those obstacles — espe- 
cially the conventional force imbalances 
and curtains of secrecy that have long 
imperiled European security and world 
peace. This process will not be easy, but 
it will help clear the path toward a free, 
open, secure, and prosperous Europe. 

'The original members of NATO were: 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ice- 
land, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nor- 
way, Portugal, United kingdom, and United 
States. The Federal Republic of Germany, 
Greece, Spain, and Turkey joined later, 
bringing total NATO membership to 16. 
France withdrew from NATO'S integrated 
military structure in 1966 but remains a 
member of the alliance. ■ 



President Visits Europe; 
Attends Nortli Atlantic Council Meeting 

President Bush was in 

Italy and the Holy See (May 26-28, 1989), 

Belgium (May 28-30), 

West Germany (May 30-31), 

and the United Kingdom (May 31^une 2). 

Departure Remarks, 
May 26, 1989^ 

i depart for Europe this morning to 
ntH't with all our North Atlantic allies 
mil also to pay visits to Italy, Ger- 
naiiy, and the United Kingdom for dis- 
mssions with leaders of those alliance 
lations on issues of common interest, 
['m especially pleased that my first 
/isit to Europe as President is to cele- 
brate the 40th anniversary of NATO. 
A.merica is a proud partner in the At- 
antic alliance, and American interests 
lave been well served by the alliance. 
Twice in the first half of this cen- 
;ury, Europe was the scene of world 
ivar, and twice Americans fought in 
Europe for the sake of peace and free- 
iom. Today Europe is enjoying a period 
af unparalleled prosperity and uninter- 
rupted peace, longer than it has known 
in the modern age, and NATO has 
made the difference. And the alliance 
will prove every bit as important to 
American and European security in 
tht' decade ahead. The importance of 
the alliance and its democratic under- 
pinnings is the message I now take to 
Europe. NATO has been a success by 
an\- measure, but success breeds its 
iiw n challenges. Today dramatic 
changes are taking place in Europe, 
both East and West. For us, those 
changes bring new challenges and un- 
paralleled opportunities. 

For too long, unnatural and inhu- 
man barriers have divided the East 
from the West. And we hope to over- 
come that division, to see a Europe 
that is truly free, united, and at peace. 
We are ready to work with a united Eu- 
rope, to extend the peace and prosper- 
ity we enjoy to other parts of the world. 
And we hope to move beyond contain- 
ment: to integrate the Soviet Union 
into the community of nations. We wel- 
come the political and economic liberal- 
ization that has taken place so far in 
the Soviet Union and in some countries 
of Eastern Europe. We will encourage 
more changes to follow. 

Many common concerns confront 
us. Beyond the traditional economic 
and security spheres, we and our part- 
ners in the alliance are working hard 
on a growing international agenda, 
from a common approach to environ- 
mental protection to cooperation 
against drug trafficking and against 
terrorism. We also welcome Europe's 
progress toward a truly common mar- 
ket and a growing European coopera- 
tion on security issues as the basis of 
an even more clynafnic transatlantic 
partnership. As we approach 1992, it is 
essential that we work with our Euro- 
pean partners to ensure an open and 
expanding world trading system and 
that we take strong steps to prevent 
trade disputes from obscuring our com- 
mon political and security concerns. 
NATO is based on the many bonds be- 
tween us: our shared heritage, history, 
and culture; our shared commitment to 
freedom, democracy, and the rights of 
the individual. Barbara and I are look- 
ing forward to visiting Europe. 

Arrival Remarks, 


May 26, 19892 

Let me begin by thanking all of you 
and my personal friend, my good 
friend, Prime Minister De Mita, for 
welcoming us to Italy at this late hour. 

Since ancient times, the saying 
goes, "All roads lead to Rome." And 
that's still true. It is very fitting that 
here I begin my first step on this first 
trip to Europe as President of the 
United States. Italy has long been a 
wellspring of Western culture and 
Western values, fostering the alliance 
and a more unified Europe. I hope that 
our visit to Rome will demonstrate just 
how strongly the United States re- 
spects and appreciates Italy's role as a 
staunch ally and as a constant friend. 

When our common security has 
been threatened, you have been ready 
to strengthen the alliance. When Eu- 
rope appeared ready to loosen the ties 
that sustained it, you kept these impor- 
tant transatlantic ties alive and strong. 
When conflict has threatened, you have 
been in the front ranks of those 
searching for solution. The bond be- 
tween the United States and Italy runs 
deep. It's a bond of family, of culture, of 
shared interests, and common vision. 
The world around us is changing, but 
we can be sure that our friendship will 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



Mr. Prime Minister, when we last 
met, we talked of new developments 
around the world: of change in the 
East, of new opportunities for arms re- 
duction, of the growing unity of Eu- 
rope. And in recent weeks, I've spoken 
of America's vision for world peace. I 
have said that we are prepared to move 
beyond containment, toward policy that 
works to bring the Soviet Union into 
the community of nations. We will be 
actively engaged in Eastern Europe, 
promoting measures to encourage po- 
litical and economic liberalization in 
Poland. The United States welcomes a 
stronger and more united Europe. We 
believe, as I know you do, that Euro- 
pean unity and the transatlantic part- 
nership reinforce each other. 

Over the next 2 days, we'll have the 
opportunity to engage in renewed dia- 
logue, as partners, certainly as 
friends. And I hope that our conversa- 
tions are shaped by our shared expec- 
tations for the future and by our 
determination to see our future 

Dinner Toast, 


May 27, 19893 

Mr. Prime Minister and leaders of the 
legislative branch, distinguished 
guests, it's a very great honor for me to 
be welcomed in such a warm and gener- 
ous way by the Italian people and their 
government. You know, Barbara and I 
have been to this marvelous country, 
this beautiful country, many times; and 
as always, we've been received with 
kindness and generosity. This trip is 
my first visit to Europe as President of 
the United States. And I think of no 
place that is better to begin than right 
here in Italy and to be right here in 

It is traditional when visiting Italy 
for American leaders to note the mil- 
lions of our citizens who claim an Ital- 
ian background, so I will brag — now 12 
million and rising. Among the many 
Italian-Americans, there are Fiorello 
La Guardia — some old enough to 
remember — Joe DiMaggio in sports; 
Tony Fauci, now at the National Insti- 
tutes of Health; and, of course, our Su- 
preme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. 

And Italian-Americans are one 
link that binds the United States and 
Italy — but only one. For we are united 
by our belief in individual liberty, hu- 
man dignity, and the rule of law and by 
the shared values of family, faith, and 

We also admire your country's rec- 
ord of success in combating terrorism 
and organized crime. I'm especially 
grateful for your help in stopping the 
scourge of narcotics, which torments 
both our nations. We're going to contin- 
ue our intense cooperative efforts to 
fight terrorism and narcotics and to 
protect air travelers. Just as this coop- 
erative effort brings our peoples even 
closer together and helps to strengthen 
our already excellent bilateral rela- 
tions, so, too, will the action that I'm 
pleased to announce tonight. 

After studying ways to relax U.S. 
visa requirements, we will soon begin 
a pilot program to end these require- 
ments for your citizens. In the future, 
Italians who wish to visit our country, 
whether as tourists or on business, will 
no longer need to apply for visas; and 
we look forward to that day. 

But along with our domestic initia- 
tives, I think, too, of the strong mili- 
tary ties between our two countries 
and within the Atlantic alliance, the 
most enduring alliance in the history of 
man. To protect that alliance and the 
shared commitment to freedom which 
underlies it is our continuing mission 
not merely as Americans or Italians 
but as believers in democracy. Of this, 
I am certain: We will do our part, and I 
know Italy will do its part. 

For when our common security has 
been in danger, you have stood ready to 
defend the alliance. And when the need 
arose for NATO to relocate that 401st 
Tactical Fighter Wing within southern 
Europe, Italy welcomed it. When stra- 
tegic interests were at risk in the Per- 
sian Gulf and in Lebanon, Italy sent 
ships and peacekeeping forces. When 
NATO confronted widespread Soviet 
deployment of these multiple-warhead 
SS-20 missiles, Italy stood tall in re- 
sponse. At times when Europe seemed 
ready to turn inward, you have rein- 
forced our transatlantic ties. For that, 
Mr. Prime Minister, Italy has our grat- 
itude and our profound respect. So, to- 
gether, let us reaffirm the ties that 
bind us. And let's continue to build 
peace and the commonwealth of free 
nations not for ourselves but also for 
our children, the kind of peace and 
freedom which lasts. 

In that spirit, I ask all of our 
guests tonight to rise and raise their 
glasses. To Italian-American friend- 
ship, our transatlantic heritage, and to 
the Western alliance and the shared 
values of freedom and democracy that 
have made that alliance strong, and to 
your health, Mr. Prime Minister, and 
the peace and prosperity of your great 

Secretary Baker's 

Interview on 

'Meet the Press," 
May 28, 1989^ 

Q. There have been some indications 
that the President at this NATO sum- 
mit is going to offer a proposal to re- 
duce American military forces in 
Western Europe, perhaps by 10%. Cam 
we expect that? 

A. What you should not expect is a 
proposal to unilaterally withdraw any 
of America's conventional forces. What- 
ever the President proposes at this 
summit — and I would, of course, not 
deny that he will have something sub- 
stantial to say at this summit — will be 
done in the context of submitting sug- 
gestions for alliance consideration. So 
put aside any thoughts of unilateral re- 
ductions of American forces. 

Q. What you're saying here is 
rather tantalizing. You're sending the 
signal that he is going to make some 
specific, concrete reductions or pro- 
posals. You're not denying the fact 
that it may involve reducing Ameri- 
can forces. So you're saying, in effect, 
that this may, indeed, be put on the 
table within the context of the 
alliance — a reduction of forces — 
perhaps 10%. 

A. What I don't want to do is pre- 
judge what the President is going to 
say. It's important the President him- 
self make that proposal to the alliance, 
and so you really ought not to read any- 
thing into silence, if you will, on my 
part. We're almost at the first day of 
the summit. I'd rather just let it stand 
at that. 

Q. You seem to have a German 
problem. President Von Weizaecker in 
Germany made an interesting speech 
last week. He said, 'Germans don't 
want our ball for other people to play 


Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


with." There's obviously an assertive 
new mood in Germany about assert- 
injf German rights, telling the West- 
ern allies, you can't use us as your 
nuclear battlefield anymore and so 
on. How are you going to handle this 
now German mood? 

A. I think the President is very 
sensitive to the particular problems 
that Germany faces. As you know, the 
Pi'esident is already on the issue, for 
instance, of short-range nuclear force 
niddernization. The President has al- 
ready indicated a willingness to see 
(|iiestions involving production and de- 
|ili)yment delayed until the end of 1991 
or the beginning of 1992. The President 
lias already acknowledged, at least, the 
jii inciple of negotiations, although he 
li'i-ls very, very strongly that before 
you can talk about that or get into that, 
you need to see a conventional forces 

I think it will be the position of the 
United States at the summit that Ger- 
many is an e.xtremely valuable and val- 
ued member of the alliance. They will 
continue to be such. Just witness the 
remarks of their own leading officials. 

I think that the SNF [short-range 
nuclear forces] problem, if you will, is 
not going to be something that will be 
the main focus of this 40th anniversary 

The Federal Republic of Germany 
embraces, to the full extent, the West- 
ern value system that has permitted 
the West to win politically and econom- 
ically over a competing philosophy over 
the past 40 years and has permitted 
the alliance, in effect, to keep the 

Q. Let me switch to the Soviet 
Union. There was a report leaked by 
your Administration this week that 
you all were about to lift economic 
sanctions against the Soviets — those 
that were first imposed after the Af- 
ghanistan invasion. This would en- | 
able the Soviets to buy computers and | 
other high-technology items from the = 
West. I 

Now critics, including some in s 
the Defense Department, say that | 

would give the Soviets a big military =■ 
edge. Does that concern you? | 

A. It would concern me if I ^ 

thought that whatever was done would 1 
give the Soviets a big military edge. I - 
don't think that the President is going 
to be foolhardy. If anything is done — 
and I'm not confirming here that any- 
thing will be done, I do think it's an ap- 

propriate subject for discussion with 
our allies — but if anything is done, 
you've got to remember that we have 
"COCOM [Coordinating Committee for 
Multilateral Export Controls] still in 
effect. So whatever transfers are con- 
templated will be subject to the normal 
COCOM review test with respect to 
their strategic importance. 

Q. Would lifting sanctions be a 
reward for the Soviets for getting out 
of Afghanistan? Would it be a reward 
for perestroikal What would be your 
rationale, would you think, if you 
were to go ahead and do that? 

A. I think if the President were to 
go ahead and do that, he would be 
thinking more about the sensitivities, 
frankly, of our strong allies in the 
NATO alliance. It's my view, as I've 
said before, that I think the lifting of 
the "no-exceptions" policy is more im- 
portant to our allies than it is to the 
Soviet Union. I'm not sure the Soviet 
Union would see that as a particular 

When the policy was put into effect 
in 1979, it was done so because of the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It's 
been implied, if not expressly stated in 
the interim, that were they to leave Af- 
ghanistan, certainly that policy would 
be subject to review. 

Q. Let's come back to a point you 
raised just a minute ago. We were 
talking about the dispute in the alli- 
ance over short-range nuclear weap- 
ons. You said it will not be a major 
issue at this NATO summit confer- 
ence. But we all know that it is a ma- 
jor problem today within the alliance. 
If this dispute is not to be settled now, 
when will it be settled, and how will 
it be settled? 

A. I hope what I said was, I don't 
think it will be the major issue. I think 
this being the 40th anniversary summit 
of NATO, there will be many other 
things that will be considered. Clearly 
this is an important issue, and I do not 
mean to be interpreted as suggesting 

We're still hopeful that it will be 
settled on terms that are acceptable to 
all of the members of the alliance. I 
think there is still a fair chance that 
that can take place. Obviously it won't 
happen now before we get to Brussels 
since we leave this evening. It would 
be, I think, settled on some formula 
such as I suggested in my answer a mo- 
ment ago. And that is, delaying the de- 
cision on modernization, recognizing 
the principle of negotiations but making 
it very, very clear that any negotiations 

On Memorial Day (May 28), President and Mrs. Bush visited the Sicily-Rome .\merican 
Cemetery and Memorial outside Nettuno, a town south of Rome. The 77-acre site is the 
final resting place for 7,862 U.S. military personnel, most of whom died in operations 
preceding the liberation of Rome in 1944. 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



would not involve going to a third zero, 
if you will, and that any negotiations 
must await, at the very least, tangible 
implementation or successful conclusion 
of a conventional forces agreement. 
Remember these weapons are 
there for the purpose of deterrring sur- 
prise attack by the overwhelming supe- 
riority of Soviet forces, or Warsaw Pact 
forces — conventional forces. So we 
really ought to concentrate on reduc- 
tions in conventional forces as our top 
priority. Once we get to a balance 
there, then perhaps it would be appro- 
priate to talk about negotiating lower 
levels, but not zero, in short-range nu- 
clear weapons. 

Q. What you're saying sounds 
very persuasive and is persuasive to 
many people in the alliance. The fact 
is, though, that the President goes on 
to Bonn after Brussels. A recent poll 
in West Germany shows that 89% of 
the West Germans do not want to see 
new, more modern nuclear weapons 
on their territory. So when you face 
that strong public opinion, what does 
the President do in Bonn? 

A. He does what I have just men- 
tioned. He is in the process of doing — 
he's taken some steps that are very 
forthcoming. But one thing he doesn't 
do, if I might suggest it, is sacrifice 
Western security because of political 
considerations anywhere. This is an ex- 
traordinarily important issue from 
that standpoint. 

The nuclear deterrent has kept the 
peace for 40 years. You know, we've 
just come from a really very poignant 
and stirring Memorial Day ceremony at 
the American Cemetery at the Anzio 
beachhead where the President and the 
Prime Minister of Italy spoke. When 
you see the 8,000 American graves 
there, I think you really focus in on 
how very important it is to maintain 
this deterrent, which has been the rea- 
son we've had peace for 40 years. 

Q. Let me ask you about your 
competitor in this game we're play- 
ing. Do you agree with the President's 
press secretary that Mr. Gorbachev is 
a "drugstore cowboy?" 

A. No, I don't agree with that. I'm 
not sure that Marlin himself agrees 
with that characterization. I think he 
has even said as much subsequently. 

Q. But what are you dealing 
with? What does Mr. Gorbachev rep- 

A. I think he represents a leader 
who is bringing real change to the So- 
viet Union. The changes that we see 
there are dramatic. They are real. 
They are, indeed, revolutionary. 

We don't know yet whether or not 
he, individually, will succeed. We want 
him to. There is no one in this Admin- 
istration who doesn't want the General 
Secretary to succeed, because what 
he's doing is embracing the political and 
economic agenda of the West. The West 
has won. We've won the struggle of the 
past 40 years; we've kept the peace for 
40 years; the Soviet Union is moving in 
our direction, and we ought to continue 
to encourage their moving in our 

What we really should be doing is 
focusing on ending the division of Eu- 
rope and bringing Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union into the community of 
nations on the basis of Western values, 
and they are now beginning to sub- 
scribe to those Western values. 

Q. Let's turn now to China. We 
know the developments there. The 
student demonstrations seem to be 
winding down. The orthodox 
leaders — Li Peng and others — are re- 
asserting their control. Zhao Ziyang 
and the moderates may be out in the 

The President endorsed the goals 
of the student demonstrators in Chi- 
na. Aren't you disappointed by what's 
happening there now? 

A. I don't think you should say 
that you're disappointed when there is 
an absence of bloodshed, an absence of 
violence; when there is restraint on 
both sides involving major demonstra- 
tions like this, the most significant 
demonstrations perhaps in the history 
of China. 

You don't have to walk away one bit 
from your subscription to the goals of 
the students — and we do support those 
goals wholeheartedly; that is, freedom 
of speech, freedom of assembly, democ- 
ratization, and that sort of thing — to be 
pleased that there has been no blood- 
shed and no violence. In other words, 
we are pleased that there is a peaceful 
solution to this problem. 

We still subscribe to and support 
the goals of the students: freedom of 
speech, freedom of assembly, democra- 
tization. We would like and hope to see 
that process continue to unfold in the 
People's Republic of China. 

Q. We may not be walking away 
from those goals, but over the years 
the United States has been very force- 
ful in embracing the cause of freedom 
and democracy in places as diverse as 
the Soviet Union and Panama. We 
have been far more tepid in the China 
case, particularly we've been reluc- 
tant to criticize those Chinese leaders 
who are opposing those forces. Why 
the double standard? 

A. Because China has been open- 
ing up on its own. When we were criti- 
cal of the Soviet Union, it was a totally 
closed society. It was very, very repres- 
sive. Demonstrations such as this would 
never have been permitted. 

You can't use Panama as an analo- 
gy. Panama, after all, at one time had a 
reasonable degree of democracy, and 
they're moving in the other direction. 
They're not opening up; they're closing 
up. So I don't think those situations are 
analogous to this one. 

Q. We've got reports in the press 
here that there's a blacklist in China; 
that they're going to now come 
around and pick up leaders of this 
demonstration and take harsh action 
against them. If something like that 
happens, what will be the U.S. 

A. That would be something that 
the United States would clearly not fa- 
vor. That would be regrettable. But 
let's not assume that something like 
that is going to happen until it does. 
After all, we've had these major dem- 
onstrations going on for many weeks 
now. Throughout those demonstrations, 
we were assuming, almost everyday, 
that force would be used to quell the 
demonstrations, that there would be 
bloodshed, that there would be vio- 
lence. In fact, there was not. So let's 
not jump the gun. 

If something like that happened, 
that's not something that the United 
States would view with any sort of 

Q. Would we do something about 
it? Would we retaliate in some way? 

A. Let's wait and see. Let's don't 
answer hypothetical questions or cross 
bridges before we get there. It would 
be something that we would seriously 

Q. The Middle East: You made a 
speech recently which caused quite a 
bit of controversy in some circles. You i 
called on Israelis to reach out to Pal- 
estinians and Palestinians to reach 
out to Israelis. Nothing controversial 


Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 ' 


about that, but you call on Israel to 
give up any dreams of annexing for- 
mally the occupied territories — the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Prime 
Minister Shamir of Israel called it 
"useless," I believe. How do you react 
to that? 

A. What I say to that is that the 
speech, if you look at it in its entirety, 
was very, very balanced. Many, many 
people have said they felt that it was, 
including quite a few public commenta- 
tors, and it was balanced. 

I would refer you back to Prime 
Minister Shamir's words of yesterday 
where he said, "The policy differences, 
which Secretary Baker cited, have ex- 
isted for quite a while, policy differ- 
ences between the United States and 
Israel and yet the United States and 
Israel enjoy very, very good relations." 
And we do, and we will continue to. 

Q. A lot of people say it was a 
good speech, but they say the whole 
history of the Middle East, as far as 
U.S. policy is concerned, is good 
speeches and then no follow-through 
on policy. I'd like to know how you 
think it's going to be different this 
time? And, specifically, are you going 
to appoint a Middle East envoy who 
can devote the kind of attention to 
that troubled area that's necessary? 

A. No, because we're devoting a 
lot of attention to it ourselves. Frankly 
we don't think progress is made in the 
Middle East with high visibility initia- 
tives. We think, unless you till the 
ground carefully, sometimes those 
things can pre-empt more promising 

One of the things I said in that 
speech, for instance, is that we think 
Prime Minister Shamir's proposal for 
elections, as part of a broader political 
negotiation, was a very good proposal. 
We have some differences with some 
aspects of it. But as a vehicle for mov- 
ing toward peace in the Middle East, 
we think it was a very, very good ef- 
fort, and we're very pleased with it. We 
want to try and follow up on that and, 
indeed, we are following up on it. 

Q. Are you going to press the Pal- 
estinians and Mr. Arafat [of the Pal- 
estine Liberation Organization 
(PLO)] now through your channel in 
Tunis to take up free and fair elec- 

A. We are pressing the Palestin- 
ians in every way that we know how, 
through our dialogue in Tunis, through 
our Ambassador there with the PLO. 
We have suggested to the PLO that 
they permit Palestinians in the occu- 
pied territories to engage with Israel 
on this question of elections. So I'm 
glad you give me the opportunity here 
to make that plea publicly this 

It's important that this elections 
proposal be followed up on. One thing 
that will be required, of course, is that 
the PLO in Tunis give the green light 
to Palestinians in the territories to en- 
gage with Israel so we can develop this 
proposal and move it into a broader po- 
litical dialogue. 

Q. Finally, Panama. We know 
what the situation is there. Despite 
the President's actions and his words 
calling for Noriega's ouster, Noriega 
is still very much in power. Nothing 
seems to be changing. What happens 
now? What do you do? 

A. I think it was fairly significant 
that the Organization of American 
States (OAS), for the first time in 10 or 
12 years, got a consensus resolution 
condemning, and it did: it specifically 
condemned the abuses that Gen. Nor- 
iega has engaged in down there by 
stealing an election from his own peo- 
ple and thwarting the will of the 

We've said there can be no normal- 
ization of relations between the United 
States and Panama until he steps down. 
We're going to continue to maintain 
that policy. Now, at least, we have the 
support of all of the other countries in 
this hemisphere, save Nicaragua. I 
think that's some progress in the right 

Arrival Remarks, 
May 28, 19895 

It is really a pleasure to be back once 
again in Brussels. I'm especially 
pleased that my first visit as President 
of the United States comes as the na- 
tions of NATO celebrate 40 years of al- 
liance and the longest period of peace 
and freedom that Europe has known in 
the modern age. 

Americans and Belgians share the 
memories of war and hard-won peace in 
this century. Flanders, the battle of 
Ardennes, Bastogne — those names are 
part of our history as well as your own, 
part of our shared heritage of freedom 
and the sacrifices it requires. Belgium, 
no stranger to conquest and division, 
recognized from the first the impor- 
tance of alliance in the postwar world. 
Today, as permanent home to NATO 
and the European Community, 
Brussels stands at the center of a Eu- 
rope free, at peace, and prosperous as 
never before, a Europe that is steadily 
moving toward the single market and 
unprecedented political and economic 
opportunities. In Brussels the signs of 
this European renaissance are 

Belgium has been a good friend 
and a valued ally, one that has always 
acted with alliance interests in mind. 
Early in this decade, Belgium was 
one of five NATO nations that made 
the difficult decision to base INF 
[intermediate-range nuclear forces] 
systems on its own soil. And those de- 
ployments gave us the leverage that we 
needed to negotiate the first-ever nu- 
clear arms reduction treaty, indeed, 
one that banned an entire generation of 
nuclear weapons. That's the kind of 
courageous and realistic approach that 
explains NATO's success. NATO is at 
once ready to ensure the common de- 
fense and to reduce arms and seek to 
diminish tensions with the East. 

As I've said a number of times, we 
seek to move to a policy beyond con- 
tainment. We want to see an end to the 
division of Europe, and we want to see 
it ended on the basis of Western values. 
We will join West European nations in 
encouraging the process of change in 
the Soviet Union, pointing to the day 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



President Bush and Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens. 

when the Soviet Union will be wel- 
comed as a constructive participant in 
the community of free nations. 

I'm looking forward to important 
discussions with the King of the Bel- 
gians, King Baudouin, and the NATO 
heads of government. I look forward, as 
well, to my meeting with Prime Minis- 
ter Martens, my friend, my discussions 
also with Mr. Delors of the European 
Community, and Secretary General 
Woerner at NATO. 

The future of NATO depends on 
the alliance's ability to deal with our 
enduring security concerns and our 
evolving economic relationship. We look 
to Belgium to continue to play its im- 
portant role in our close and coopera- 
tive transatlantic partnership. I am 
delighted to be back. 

Statement and 


May 29, 1989^ 

This morning I met with the other 
NATO leaders and shared with them 
my views on the role of the North At- 
lantic alliance in a changing Europe. 
NATO, we all agree, is one of the great 
success stories, and it's guaranteed the 
peace in Europe, provided a shield for 
40 years for freedom and prosperity. 
Now our alliance faces new challenges 
at a time of historic transition as we 

seek to overcome the division of Eu- 
rope. I call it beyond containment. 

Today I'm proposing a major initia- 
tive to help move us toward that mo- 
mentous objective. If it were accepted, 
it would be a revolutionary convention- 
al arms control agreement. I believe 
the alliance should act decisively now 
to take advantage of this extraordinary 
opportunity, and I urge that NATO 
adopt a 4-point proposal to bring the 
Vienna negotiations to a speedy 

First, lock in Eastern acceptance 
of the proposed Western ceilings on 
each side's holding of tanks and ar- 
mored troop carriers. Additionally, we 
would seek agreement on a similar ceil- 
ing for artillery, provided there's some 
definitional questions that have to be 
resolved there. But all of the equipment 
reduced would be destroyed. 

We would then, number two, ex- 
pand our current NATO proposal so 
that each side would reduce to 15% be- 
low current NATO levels in two addi- 
tional categories: attack and assault, or 
transport helicopters and all land- 
based combat aircraft. All of the equip- 
ment reduced would be destroyed. 

Third, propose a 20% cut in combat 
manpower in U.S. stationed forces and 
a resulting ceiling in U.S. and Soviet 
ground and air forces stationed outside 
of national territory in the Atlantic-to- 
the-Urals zone at approximately 
275,000 each. This manpower ceiling 
will require the Soviets to reduce their 
forces in Eastern Europe by about 
325,000 people. Withdrawn soldiers and 
airmen on both sides would be 

And then, fourth, accelerate the 
timetable for reaching a CFE [con- 
ventional arms forces in Europe] 
agreement along these lines and imple- 
menting the required reductions. I be- 
lieve that it should be possible to reach 
such agreement in 6 months or maybe a 
year and to accomplish the reductions 
by 1992 or 1993. 

If the Soviet Union accepts this 
-.fair offer, the results would dramati- 
cally increase stability on the continent 
Land transform the military map of Eu- 
; rope. We can and must begin now to set 
; out a new vision for Europe at the end 
\ of this century. This is a noble mission 
; that I believe the alliance should be 
ready to undertake. I have no doubt 
that we are up to the task. 

Incidentally, in addition to these 
arms control proposals I mentioned in 
there, that we are prepared to change 
our no-exceptions policy on trade. I 
called again for a ban on chemical 
weapons. I would reiterate my support 
for our open skies proposal, and in the 
meeting it was discussed by the Prime 
Minister of Canada. 

Q. Does this revolutionary plan 
signal the end of the cold war? 

A. I don't know what it signals, ex- 
cept it signals a willingness on our part 
to really put Mr. Gorbachev to the test 
now. I don't like to dwell in antiquated 
history. But I do like to get the idea 
that we are out front as an alliance, be- 
cause this has broad alliance support, 
in challenging Mr. Gorbachev to move 
forward now more quickly on the most 
destabilizing part of the military bal- 
ance, and that is on conventional 

Q. Were you pressured by him 
and the allies? 

A. No, I think I said when I first 
came in we were going to take our time 
and we were going to study and we're 
going to think it out. And we did exact- 
ly that. You know and I know that some 
voices were raised in Congress that we 
were going too slow. But we knew ex 
actly what we were doing all along, and 
we've now said: "This is what we sug 
gest, and this is the way we plan to 
lead — lead the alliance and lead the 
free world." 

Q. Why is it possible to make 
such drastic cuts in conventional 
weapons and not move on nuclear 
aircraft — nuclear ground-based 
short-range missiles, which seems to 
disturb the Germans and really a ma 
jority of the alliance? 



Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


A. Because the conventional 
forces — the existing imbalance is so 
ureat that that is the most urgent prob- 
lem and the most destabilizing. 

Q. If the Soviets accept this pro- 
posal, would that enable us to talk 
about reducing or eliminating short- 
range forces? 

A. After agreement was reached 
and after there was some implementa- 
tion, yes. We are not unwilling to nego- 
tiate on SNF. 

Q. What was the reaction of the 
NATO leaders this morning when you 
told them? Did you consult with all 
the allies before you put it on the 

A. We had widespread — and I 
would think everyone was consulted. I 
know we had widespread consultation 
and — the answer is yes to all NATO 
members. And it's been done over the | 
last few days. > 

Q. What did they tell you about J 

it? Why did they find it appealing? z 

A. I'll leave it to them to wa.x eu- i 

phoric. But I'll tell you, I was very, ^ 

very pleased with the response in the | 
meeting just concluded. 

Q. Can you ever see a time when 
you might not have nuclear forces in 

A. No. We need the concept of 
flexible response, and I can't, in the 
foreseeable future, see us getting away 
from that. 

Q. Is there any indication that 
this disagreement with the West Ger- 
mans over the SNF issue will be re- 
solved here at the NATO summit? 

A. I'm not really at liberty to go 
into too much on that, because right 
now we put together a working group 
to try to work out some resolution. But 
you see, this bold proposal, in terms of 
conventional forces, should give those 
who have had difficulty with our posi- 
tion on SNF a chance to regroup and 
rethink and give them a little leeway 
that they haven't had heretofore. 

Q. Do you expect early negotia- 
tion by the Secretary of State [Soviet 
Foreign Minister] Mr. Shevardnadze 
or Mr. Gorbachev on this proposal? 

A. The sooner the better. 

Q. There's been some criticism in 
Congress, as you mentioned, about 
that you have been too cautious in ap- 
proaching the Soviet Union. Was that 
sentiment expressed today by anyone, 

President Bush announced his Conventional Parity 
NATO summit in Brussels on May 29. 

Initiative on the opening day of the 

and was there any mention of how the 
West should respond to Gorbachev? 

A. No, it wasn't mentioned by any- 
one in there. And generally, when it 
was — your question about how to re- 
spond to Gorbachev — without putting 
woixls into the mouths of various par- 
ticipants, there was enthusiastic en- 
dorsement. I can't speak for everybody, 
but for those who have intervened so 

Q. Have you costed out this pro- 
posal? And did the budgetary con- 
straints play any part in your 
decision to try to — 

A. No, the budgetary constraints 
didn't, and I haven't seen a full cost 
analysis. Some of this would be quite 
expensive for us, short-run — the pull- 
ing people out. But we did check mil- 
itarily. I did not want to propose 
something that was militarily unsound. 
And our top military people are for 
this. Our SACEUR Commander [Su- 
preme Allied Commander, Europe — 
General John Galvin], who wears many 
hats, who represents many countries, 
obviously, is for this. And so, we 
checked it in that sense. 

Q. In some of your early policy 
speeches, you expressed deep skepti- 
cism about what was going on in the 
Soviet Union. You said this new rela- 
tionship cannot be bestowed; it must 
be earned. Your Secretary of Defense 
said he felt Gorbachev would fail. 
What prompted change in your think- 
ing to make a proposal like this? 

A. This is to put it to the test. 
This is to say: Here we go. We're out 
there now with a proposal that the 
United States puts forward and that 
has widespread alliance support. Now 
test it. How serious are you? Are you — 
really want to reduce the imbalances 
that exist in all these categories, or do 
we want rhetoric? And so, what we're 
saying — we're not changing; I'm not 
changing my mind. I've said I want to 
see pei-estroika succeed. I said I want 
to see us move forward in arms reduc- 
tions. Indeed, we've set a date for the 
resumption of the START [strategic 
arms reduction talks] talks — but eyes 
wide open. And here we go now, on the 
offense with a proposal that is bold and 
tests w'hether the Soviet Union will 
move toward balance, or whether they 
insist on retaining an unacceptable con- 
ventional force imbalance. 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



Q. On the subject of Mr. Cor- 
bachev, do you believe he will fail? 

A. I want to see him succeed. And 
I've said that, and I'll repeat it here. 
I'm not making predictions as to what's 
going to happen in.side the Soviet 
Union. Those are hard tea leaves to 
read. But I would like to see him suc- 
ceed. He seems stronger now than he 
has been earlier on. But he faces enor- 
mous problems. I hope he looks at this 
proposal as a way to help solve some of 
those enormous problems. It gets to the 
question of finance to maintain this 
number of troops outside of his country. 

Q. Does this four-point proposal 
represent your conditions that the So- 
viets must accept before you will open 
talks on the short-range missiles? 

A. As I said earlier, we've got to 
have a reduction in conventional forces 
and then some implementaton of that 

Q. You described this as a pro- 
posal to the other allies. Do you ex- 
pect it's going to be adopted as a 
formal alliance position at the end of 
this meeting, and then will you put it 
on the table at CFE very soon? 

A. I can't answer procedurally. I'd 
like to see it adopted. But I don't know- 
that the people have had enough time to 
really — do you know what's planned on 
that," Al? [Alton G. Keel, Jr., Ambas- 
sador to NATO] 

Ambassador Keel. I think, clearly, 
the alliance will adoi)t it, in terms of 
the concept but then will assign it to 
the proper mechanism here at NATO to 
finish the details on it. 

Q. Why actually destroy the 
equipment and demobilize the troops? 

A. Because then we get verified — 
we hope — verified reductions that last. 
You can't just juggle around the players 
on the chessboard. 

Q. There's been a lot of talk at 
the White House recently about pub- 
lic relations gambits. Do you believe 
that this initiative by the United 
States puts Mr. Gorbachev on the de- 
fensive, and does it in any way put the 
United States back on the top of any 
public relations war that might be 
going on? 

A. One, we've eschewed getting in- 
volved in a public relations battle. This 
is too serious a business. Alliance secu- 
rity is too serious. The safety and secu- 
rity of American forces, for which I 
have direct responsibility as command- 
er in chief, is too serious to be jeopard- 
ized by feeling we always have to be 

out front on some public relations gam- 
bit. I think we all know that in certain 
quarters in the United States, my Ad- 
ministration has taken a little bit of a 
hammering for not engaging in the 
public relations battle. 

But what we've been doing is for- 
mulating what I think is a very prudent 
plan, and now that plan is out there on 
the table. So, I really can't comment on 
the public relations aspect. What I'm 
interested in is the security aspect and 
the strength of the alliance and then 
the future — the ability of the alliance 
to move beyond containment. 

Q. A long-term benefit of this 
proposal would obviously be a de- 
crease in defense spending. Now, how 
much of this proposal was driven by 
budget considerations? 

A. I thought I answered that, but 
let me try again to be clearer. None. 
What drove the proposal was the mili- 
tary and alliance considerations. I 
would agree that if this proposal is 
fully implemented — longer-run, as you 
put it — it would result in less spending, 
particularly if these troops and weap- 
ons are demobilized, as we say. 

Q. Just to be clear on one point, 
what you're proposing is an agree- 
ment with the Warsaw Pact, not any- 
thing that you will do unilaterally, 
that you won't take any of these steps 
yourselves outside an overall agree- 
ment with the — 

A. This is a NATO proposal, and it 
would be negotiated with the pact. But 
it means that — obviously, when you're 
dealing with the pact — that the Soviet 
Union is going to have to be the key 
player. This part of the proposal, as it 
relates to U.S. troops, clearly is one 
where both the Soviet General Secre- 
tary and I have to have agreement. But 
I want to keep the negotiations and the 
initiatives inside of the alliance. We 
came over here to say the alliance has 
worked. It's kept the peace for 40 
years, and we want to continue to keep 
it strong. That's one reason I am very 
pleased with the alliance response to 
our proposal. They don't see it as solo- 
ing off there, taking care of U.S. inter- 
est. They see it as in the interest of the 

Again, I believe I speak — I 
believe — I know most of the people 
there feel that way, and I hope all of 
them do. 

Q. When did you make the final 
decision to accept this idea? How did 
it evolve? 

A. Twelve days ago. 

Q. Do you have any interest in 
discussing this with Mr. Gorbachev at 
a summit meeting? Do you have any 
interest or intention of discussing 
this proposal or other arms proposals 
with Mr. Gorbachev at a summit 

A. When I have a summit meeting 
with Mr. Gorbachev, I expect we'll dis- 
cuss a wide array of subjects. 

Q. Do you anticipate that this 

A. When that happens, I will have 
wide, farflung discussions and no date 
has been set for that. 

Q. Is it likely to be speeded up, 
though because of this proposal? 

A. Hadn't thought if it in this con- 
nection, but I would not rule that out. 
But we'll see how it's digested there in 
Moscow. I hope favorably. 

Q. Isn't it time for a summit now 
that you've laid this out? 

A. Baker's got some more work to 

Declaration of 
the Heads of State 
and Government, 

North Atlantic Council, 

May 30, 19896 

NATO's 40 Years of Success 

1. As our Alliance celebrates its 40th 
Anniversary, we measure its achieve- 
ments with pride. Founded in troubled 
times to safeguard our security, it has 
withstood the test of four decades, and 
has allowed our countries to enjoy in 
freedom one of the longest periods of 
peace and prosperity in their history. 
The Alliance has been a fundamental 
element of stability and co-operation. 
These are the fruits of a partnership 
based on enduring common values and 
interests, and on unity of purpose. 
2. Our meeting takes place at a 
juncture of unprecedented change and 
opportunities. This is a time to look 
ahead, to chart the course of our Alli- 
ance and to set our agenda for the 


Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


A Time of Change 

3. In our rapidly changing world, where 
ideas transcend borders ever more eas- 
ily, the strength and accomplishments 
of democracy and freedom are increas- 
ingly apparent. The inherent inability 
of oppressive systems to fulfil the aspi- 
rations of their citizens has become 
equally evident. 

4. In the Soviet Union, important 
changes are underway. We welcome the 
current reforms that have already led 
to greater openness, improved respect 
for human rights, active participation 
of the individual, and new attitudes in 
foreign policy. But much remains to be 
done. We still look forward to the full 
implementation of the announced 
change in priorities in the allocation of 
economic resources from the military 
to the civilian sector. If sustained, the 
reforms will strengthen prospects for 
fundamental improvements in East- 
West relations. 

5. We also welcome the marked 
progress in some countries of Eastern 
Europe towards establishing more 
democratic institutions, freer elections 
and greater political pluralism and eco- 
nomic choice. However, we deploi-e the 
fact that certain Eastern European 
governments have chosen to ignore this 
reforming trend and continue all too 
frequently to violate human rights and 
basic freedoms. 

Shaping the Future 

6. Our vision of a just, humane and 
democratic world has always under- 
pinned the policies of this Alliance. The 
changes that are now taking place are 
bringing us closer to the realisation of 
this vision. 

7. We want to overcome the painful 
division of Europe, which we have nev- 
er accepted. We want to move beyond 
the post-war period. Based on today's 
momentum of increased co-operation 
and tomorrow's common challenges, we 
seek to shape a new political order of 
peace in Europe. We will work as Al- 
lies to seize all opportunities to achieve 
this goal. But ultimate success does not 
depend on us alone. 

Our guiding principles in the pur- 
suit of this course will be the policies of 
the Harmel Report in their two comple- 
mentary and mutually reinforcing ap- 
proaches: adequate military strength 
and political solidarity and, on that ba- 
sis, the search for constructive dia- 
logue and co-operation, including arms 

control, as a means of bringing about a 
just and lasting peaceful order in 

8. The Alliance's long-term objec- 
tives are: 

• To ensure that wars and intim- 
idation of any kind in Europe and 
North America are prevented, and that 
military aggression is an option which 
no government could rationally contem- 
plate or hope successfully to under- 
take, and by doing so to lay the 
foundations for a world where military 
forces e.xist solely to preserve the inde- 
pendence and territorial integrity of 
their countries, as has always been the 
case for the Allies; 

• To establish a new pattern of re- 
lations between the countries of East 
and West, in which ideological and mili- 
tary antagonism will be replaced with 
co-operation, trust and peaceful compe- 
tition; and in which human rights and 
political freedoms will be fully guaran- 
teed and enjoyed by all individuals. 

9. Within our larger respon- 
sibilities as Heads of State or Govern- 
ment, we are also committed to strive 
for an international community founded 
on the rule of law, where all nations join 
together to reduce world tensions, set- 
tle disputes peacefully, and search for 
solutions to those issues of universal 
concern, including poverty, social 
injustice and the environment, on 
which our common fate depends. 

Maintaining our Defence 

10. Peace must be worked for; it can 
never be taken for granted. The great- 
ly improved East-West political climate 
offers prospects for a stable and lasting 
peace, but e.xperience teaches us that 
we must remain prepared. We can over- 
look neither the capabilities of the War- 
saw Treaty countries for offensive 
military action, nor the potential haz- 
ards resulting from severe political 
strain and crisis. 

11. A strong and united Alliance 
will remain fundamental not only for 
the security of our countries but also 
for our policy of supporting political 
change. It is the basis for further suc- 
cessful negotiations on arms control 
and on measures to strengthen mutual 
confidence through improved transpar- 
ency and predictability. Military secu- 
rity and policies aimed at reducing 
tensions as well as resolving underly- 
ing political differences are not contra- 
dictory but complementary. Credible 

defence based on the principle of the in- 
divisibility of security for all member 
countries will thus continue to be es- 
sential to our common endeavour. 

12. For the foreseeable future, 
there is no alternative to the Alliance 
strategy for the prevention of war. This 
is a strategy of deterrence based upon 
a appropriate mi.x of adequate and ef- 
fective nuclear and conventional forces 
which will continue to be kept up-to- 
date where necessary. We shall ensure 
the viability and credibility of these 
forces, while maintaining them at the 
lowest possible level consistent with 
our security requirements. 

13. The presence of North Ameri- 
can conventional and nuclear forces in 
Europe remains vital to the security of 
Europe just as Europe's security is vi- 
tal to that of North America. Mainte- 
nance of this relationship requires that 
the Allies fulfil their essential commit- 
ments in support of the common de- 
fence. Each of our countries will 
accordingly assume its fair share of the 
risks, roles and responsibilities of the 
Atlantic partnership. Growing Euro- 
pean political unity can lead to a rein- 
forced European component of our 
common security effort and its efficien- 
cy. It will be essential to the success of 
these efforts to make the most effective 
use of resources made available for our 
security. To this end, we will seek to 
maximise the efficiency of our defence 
programmes and pursue solutions to is- 
sues in the area of economic and trade 
policies as they affect our defence. We 
will also continue to protect our tech- 
nological capabilities by effective ex- 
port controls on essential strategic 

Initiatives on Arms Control 

14. Arms control has always been an 
integral part of the Alliance's security 
policy and of its overall approach to 
East-West relations, firmly embedded 
in the broader political context in 
which we seek the improvement of 
those relations. 

15. The Allies have consistently 
taken the lead in developing the concep- 
tual foundations for arms control, iden- 
tifying areas in which the negotiating 
partners share an interest in achieving 
a mutually satisfactory result while 
safeguarding the legitimate security 
interests of all. 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



16. Historic progress has been 
made in recent years, and we now see 
prospects for further substantial ad- 
vances. In our determined effort to re- 
duce the excessive weight of the 
military factor in the East -West rela- 
tionship and increasingly to replace 
confrontation by co-operation, we can 
now exploit fully the potential of arms 
control as an agent of change. 

17. We challenge the members of 
the Warsaw Treaty Organization to join 
us in accelerating efforts to sign and 
implement an agreement which will en- 
hance security and stability in Europe 
by reducing conventional armed forces. 
To seize the unique opportunity at 
hand, we intend to present a proposal 
that will amplify and expand on the po- 
sition we tabled at the opening of the 
CFE [conventional armed forces in Eu- 
rope] negotiations on 9th March.'' We 

• Register agreement, based on 
the ceilings already proposed in Vien- 
na, on tanks, armoured troop carriers 
and artillery pieces held by members of 
the two Alliances in Europe, with all of 
the withdrawn equipment to be de- 
stroyed. Ceilings on tanks and ar- 
moured troop carriers will be based on 
proposals already tabled in Vienna; def- 
initional questions on artillery pieces 
remain to be resolved; 

• Expand our current proposal to 
include reductions by each side to equal 
ceilings at the level 15 per cent below 
current Alliance holdings of helicopters 
and of all land-based combat aircraft in 
the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone, with all 
the withdrawn equipment to be 

• Propose a 20 per cent cut in com- 
bat manpower in US stationed forces, 
and a resulting ceiling on US and Sovi- 
et ground and air force personnel sta- 
tioned outside of national territory in 
the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone at ap- 
proximately 275,000. This ceiling 
would require the Soviet Union to re- 
duce its forces in Eastern Europe by 
some 325,000. United States and Soviet 
forces withdrawn w-ill be demobilized; 

• Seek such an agreement within 
six months to a year and accomplish the 
reductions by 1992 or 1993. Accor- 
dingly, we have directed the Alliance's 
High Level Task Force on conventional 
arms control to complete the further 
elaboration of this proposal, including 
its verification elements, so that it may 
be tabled at the beginning of the third 
round of the CFE negotiations, which 
opens on 7th September 1989. 

18. We consider as an important 
initiative President Bush's call for an 
"open skies" regime intended to im- 
prove confidence among States through 
reconnaissance flights, and to contrib- 
ute to the transparency of military ac- 
tivity, to arms control and to public 
awareness. It will be the subject of 
careful study and wide-ranging 

19. Consistent with the principles 
and objectives set out in our Compre- 
hensive Concepts of Arms Control and 
Disarmament which we have adopted at 
this meeting, we will continue to use 
arms control as a means to enhance se- 
curity and stability at the lowest possi- 
ble level of armed forces, and to 
strengthen confidence by further ap- 
propriate measures. We have already 
demonstrated our commitment to these 
objectives: both by negotiations and by 
unilateral action, resulting since 1979 
in reductions of over one-third of the 
nuclear holdings assigned to SACEUR 
[Supreme Allied Commander Europe] 
in Europe. 

Towards an Enhanced Partnership 

20. As the Alliance enters its fifth de- 
cade we will meet the challenge of 
shaping our relationship in a way which 
corresponds to the new political and 
economic realities of the 1990s. As we 
do so, we recognize that the basis of 
our security and prosperity — and of 
our hopes for better East-West 
relations — is and will continue to be the 
close cohesion between the countries of 
Europe and of North America, bound 
together by their common values and 
democratic institutions as much as by 
their shared security interests. 

21. Ours is a living and developing 
partnership. The strength and stability 
derived from our transatlantic bond 
provide a firm foundation for the 
achievement of our long-term vision, as 
well as of our goals for the immediate 
future. We recognize that our common 
tasks transcend the resources of either 
Europe or North America alone. 

22. We welcome in this regard the 
evolution of an increasingly strong and 
coherent European identity, including 
in the security area. The process we 
are witnessing today provides an exam- 
ple of progressive integration, leaving 
centuries-old conflicts far behind. It 
opens the way to a more mature and 
balanced transatlantic partnership and 
constitutes one of the foundations of 
Europe's future structure. 

23. To ensure the continuing suc- 
cess of our efforts we have agreed to 

• Strengthen our process of politi- 
cal consultation and, where appropri- 
ate, co-ordination, and have instructed 
the Council in Permanent Session to 
consider methods for its further 

• Expand the scope and intensity of 
our effort to ensure that our respective 
approaches to problems affecting our 
common security are complementary 
and mutually supportive; 

• Renew our support for our eco- 
nomically less-favoured partners and to 
reaffirm our goal of improving the 
present level of co-operation and 

• Continue to work in the appropri- 
ate fora for more commercial, mone- 
tary and technological co-operation, 
and to see to it that no obstacles im- 
pede such co-operation. 

Overcoming the Division of Europe 

24. Now, more than ever, our efforts to 
overcome the division of Europe must 
address its underlying political causes. 
Therefore all of us will continue to pur- 
sue a comprehensive approach encom- 
passing the many dimensions of the 
East-West agenda. In keeping with our 
values, we place primary emphasis on 
basic freedoms for the people in East- 
ern Europe. These are also key ele- 
ments for strengthening the stability 
and security of all states and for guar- 
anteeing lasting peace on the 

25. The CSCE [Conference on Se- 
curity and Cooperation in Europe] 
process encompasses our vision of a 
peaceful and more constructive rela- 
tionship among all participating states. 
We intend to develop it further, in all 
its dimensions, and to make the fullest 
use of it. 

We recognize progress in the im- 
plementation of CSCE commitments by 
some Eastern countries. But we call 
upon all of them to recognise and im- 
plement fully the commitments which 
all CSCE states have accepted. We will 
invoke the CSCE mechanisms — as most 
recently adopted in the Vienna Con- 
cluding Document — and the provisions 
of other international agreements, to 
bring all Eastern countries to; 

• Enshrine in law and practice the 
human rights and freedoms agreed in 
international covenants and in the 
CSCE documents, thus fostering prog- 
ress towards the rule of law; 


Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


(\\ hite House photo by David Valdez) 

The heads of government of the 16 NATO members met in Brussels May 29-30. From left 
to right: Prime Minister Jacques Santer (Luxembourg), Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers 
(Netherlands), Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway), Prime Minister An- 
ibal Cavaco Silva (Portugal), Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez Marquez (Spain), Prime 
Minister Turgut Ozal (Turkey), Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (United Kingdom), 
President Francois Mitterrand (France), NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner, 
President Bush, Prime Minister Wilfried Martens (Belgium), Prime Minister Brian 
Mulroney (Canada), Prime Minister Poul Schlueter (Denmark), Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
(West Germany), Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou (Greece), Prime Minister Stein- 
grimur Hermannsson (Iceland), and Prime Minister Ciriaco De Mita (Italy). 

• Tear down the walls that separate 
us physically and politically, simplify 
the crossing of borders, increase the 
number of crossing points and allow the 
free exchange of persons, information 
and ideas; 

• Ensure that people are not pre- 
vented by armed force from crossing 
the frontiers and boundaries which we 
share with Eastern countries, in exer- 
cise of their right to leave any country, 
including their own; 

• Respect in law and practice the 
right of all the people in each country 
to determine freely and periodically 
the nature of the government they wish 
to have; 

• See to it that their peoples can 
decide through their elected authorities 
what form of relations they wish to 
have with other countries; 

• Grant the genuine economic free- 
doms that are linked inherently to the 
rights of the individual; 

• Develop transparency, especially 
in military matters, in pursuit of 
greater mutual understanding and 

26. The situation in and around 
Berlin is an essential element in East- 
West relations. The Alliance declares 
its commitment to a free and prosper- 
ous Berlin and to achieving improve- 
ments for the city especially through 
the Allied Berlin Initiative! The Wall 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 

dividing the city is an unacceptable 
symbol of the division of Europe. We 
seek a state of peace in Europe in 
which the German people regains its 
unity through free self-determination. 

Our Design for Co-operation 

27. We, for our part, have today reaf- 
firmed that the Alliance must and will 
reintensify its own efforts to overcome 
the division of Europe and to explore 
all available avenues of co-operation 
and dialogue. We support the opening 
of Eastern societies and encourage re- 
forms that aim at positive political, 
economic and human rights develop- 
ments. Tangible steps towards genuine 
political and economic reform improve 
possibilities for broad co-operation, 
while a continuing denial of basic free- 
doms cannot but have a negative effect. 
Our approach recognizes that each 
country is unique and must be treated 
on its own merits. We also recognize 
that it is essentially incumbent upon 
the countries of the East to solve their 
problems by reforms from within. But 
we can also play a constructive role 
within the framework of our Alliance 
as well as in our respective bilateral 
relations and in international organiza- 
tions, as appropriate. 

28. To that end, we have agreed the 
following joint agenda for the future: 

• As opportunities develop, we will 
expand the scope of our contacts and 
co-operation to cover a broad range of 
issues which are important to both 
East and West. Our goal is a sustained 
effort geared to specific tasks which 
will help deepen openness and promote 
democracy within Eastern countries 
and thus contribute to the establish- 
ment of a more stable peace in Europe; 

• We will pursue in particular ex- 
panded contacts beyond the realm of 
government among individuals in East 
and West. These contacts should in- 
clude all segments of our societies, but 
in particular young people, who will 
carry the responsibility for continuing 
our common endeavour; 

• We will seek expanded economic 
and trade relations with the Eastern 
countries on the basis of commercially 
sound terms, mutual interest and reci- 
procity. Such relations should also 
serve as incentives for real economic 
reform and thus ease the way for in- 
creased integration of Eastern coun- 
tries into the international trading 

• We intend to demonstrate through 
increased co-operation that democratic 
institutions and economic choice create 
the best possible conditions for econom- 
ic and social progress. The development 
of such open systems will facilitate co- 
operation and, consequently, make its 
benefits more available; 



• An important task of our co- 
operation will be to explore means to 
extend Western experience and know- 
how to Eastern countries in a manner 
which responds to and promotes posi- 
tive change. Exchanges in technical 
and managerial fields, establishment 
of co-operative training programmes, 
expansion of educational, scientific 
and cultural exchanges all offer pos- 
sibilities which have not yet been 

• Equally important will be to inte- 
grate Eastern European countries 
more fully into efforts to meet the so- 
cial, environmental and technological 
challenges of the modern world, where 
common interests should prevail. In ac- 
coi'dance with our concern for global 
challenges, we will seek to engage 
Eastern countries in co-operative 
strategies in areas such as the environ- 
ment, terrorism, and drugs. Eastern 
willingness to participate construc- 
tively in dealing with such challenges 
will help further co-operation in other 
areas as well; 

• East-West understanding can be 
expanded only if our respective soci- 
eties gain increased knowledge about 
one another and communicate effec- 
tively. To encourage an increase of So- 
viet and Eastern studies in universities 
of our countries and of corresponding 
studies in Eastern countries, we are 
prepared to establish a Fellowship/ 
Scholarship programme to promote the 
study of our democratic institutions, 
with candidates being invited from 
Eastern as well as Western Europe 
and North America. 

Global Challenges 

29. Worldwide developments which af- 
fect our security interests are legiti- 
mate matters for consultation and, 
where appropriate, co-ordination 
among us. Our security is to be seen in 
a context broader than the protection 
from war alone. 

30. Regional conflicts continue to 
be of major concern. The co-ordinated 
approach of Alliance members recently 
has helped toward settling some of the 
world's most dangerous and long- 
standing disputes. We hope that the 
Soviet Union will increasingly work 
with us in positive and practical steps 
towards diplomatic solutions to those 
conflicts that continue to preoccupy the 
international community. 

31. We will seek to contain the new- 
ly emerging security threats and de- 
stabilizing consequences resulting from 

the uncontrolled spread and application 
of modern military technologies. 

32. In the spirit of Article 2 of the 
Washington Treaty, we will increas- 
ingly need to address worldwide prob- 
lems which have a bearing on our 
security, particularly environmental 
degradation, resource conflicts and 
grave economic disparities. We will 
seek to do so in the appropriate multi- 
lateral fora, in the widest possible co- 
operation with other states. 

33. We will each further develop 
our close co-operation with the other 
industrial democracies akin to us in 
their objectives and policies. 

34. We will redouble our efforts in 
a reinvigorated United Nations, 
strengthening its role in conflict settle- 
ment and peacekeeping, and in its larg- 
er endeavours for world peace. 

Our 'Third Dimension' 

35. Convinced of the vital need for in- 
ternational co-operation in science and 
technology, and of its beneficial effect 
on global security, we have for several 
decades maintained Alliance pro- 
grammes of scientific co-operation. 
Recognizing the importance of safe- 
guarding the environment we have also 
co-operated, in the Committee on the 
Challenges of Modern Society, on envi- 
ronmental matters. These activities 
have demonstrated the broad range of 
our common pursuits. We intend to 
give more impact to our programmes 
with new initiatives in these areas. 

The Future of the Alliance 

36. We, the leaders of 16 free and demo- 
cratic countries, have dedicated our- 
selves to the goals of the Alliance and 
are committed to work in unison for 
their continued fulfilment. 

37. At this time of unprecedented 
promise in international affairs, we 
will respond to the hopes that it offers. 
The Alliance will continue to serve as 
the cornerstone of our security, peace 
and freedom. Secure on this founda- 
tion, we will reach out to those who are 
willing to join us in shaping a more sta- 
ble and peaceful international environ- 
ment in the service of our societies. 

Comprehensive Concept, 
May 30, 1989 

1. At Reykjavik in June 1987, Ministers 
stated that arms control problems fac- 
ing the Alliance raised complex and in- 
terrelated issues that needed to be 
evaluated together, bearing in mind 
overall progress in arms control nego- 
tiations as well as the requirements of 
Alliance security and of its stretegy of 
deterrence. They therefore directed 
the Council in Permanent Session, 
working in conjunction with the appro- 
priate military authorities, to 'consider 
the further development of a compre- 
hensive concept of arms control and 

2. The attached report, prepared 
by the Council in response to that man- 
date, was adopted by Heads of State 
and Government at the meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 
29th and 30th May 1989. 

A. Comprehensive Concept of Arms 
Control and Disarmament 

I. Introduction 

1. The overriding objective of the Alli- 
ance is to preserve peace in freedom, 
to prevent war, and to establish a just 
and lasting peaceful order in Europe. 
The Allies' policy to this end was set 
forth in the Harmel Report of 1967. It 
remains valid. According to the Re- 
port, the North Atlantic Alliance's 
'first function is to maintain adequate 
military strength and political soli- 
darity, to deter aggression and other 
forms of pressure and to defend the ter- 
ritory of member countries if aggres- 
sion should occur.' On that basis, the 
Alliance can carry out 'its second func- 
tion, to pursue the search for progress 
towards a more stable relationship in 
which the underlying political issues 
can be solved.' As the Report observed, 
military security and a policy aimed at 
reducing tensions are 'not contradic- 
tory, but complementary.' 
Consistent with these principles. Allied 
Heads of State and Government have 
agreed that arms control is an integral 
part of the Alliance's security policy. 

2. The possibilities for fruitful 
East-West dialogue have significantly 
improved in recent years. More favour- 
able conditions now exist for progress 
towards the achievement of the Alli- 


Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


ance's objectives. The Allies are re- 
solved to grasp this opportunity. They 
will continue to address both the symp- 
toms and the causes of political tension 
in a manner that respects the legiti- 
mate security interests of all states 

3. The achievement of the lasting 
peaceful order which the Allies seek 
will require that the unnatural division 
of Europe, and particularly of Ger- 
many, be overcome, and that, as stated 
in the Helsinki Final Act, the sover- 
eignty and territorial integrity of all 
states and the right of peoples to self- 
determination be respected and that 
the rights of all individuals, including 
right of political choice, be protected. 
The members of the Alliance accord- 
ingly attach central importance to fur- 
ther progress in the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) process, which serves as a 
framework for the promotion of peace- 
ful evolution in Europe. 

4. The CSCE process provides a 
means to encourage stable and con- 
structive East-West relations by in- 
creasing contacts between people, by 
seeking to ensure that basic rights and 
freedoms are respected in law and 
practice, by furthering political ex- 
changes and mutually beneficial cooper- 
ation across a broad range of 
endeavours, and by enhancing security 
and openness in the military sphere. 
The Allies will continue to demand full 
implementation of all the principles and 
provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, 
the Madrid Concluding Document, the 
Stockholm Document, and the Conclud- 
ing Document of the Vienna Meeting. 
The latter document marks a major ad- 
vance in the CSCE process and should 
stimulate further beneficial changes in 

5. The basic goal of the Alliance's 
arms control policy is to enhance secu- 
rity and stability at the lowest balanced 
level of forces and armaments consist- 
ent with the requirements of the strat- 
egy of deterrence. The Allies are 
committed to achieving continuing 
progress towards all their arms control 
objectives. The further development of 
the Comprehensive Concept is designed 
to assist this by ensuring an integrated 
approach covering both defence policy 
and arms control policy: these are com- 
plementary and interactive. This work 
also requires full consideration of the 
interrelationship between arms control 
objectives and defence requirements 
and how various arms control meas- 
ures, separately and in conjunction 
with each other, can strengthen Alli- 

ance security. The guiding principles 
and basic objectives which have so far 
governed the arms control policy of the 
Alliance remain valid. Progress in 
achieving these objectives is, of course, 
affected by a number of factors. These 
include the overall state of East-West 
relations, the military requirements of 
the Allies, the progress of existing and 
future arms control negotiations, and 
developments in the CSCE process. 
The further development and imple- 
mentation of a comprehensive concept 
of arms control and disarmament will 
take place against this background. 

II. East-West Relations 
and Arms Control 

6. The Alliance continues to seek a just 
and stable peace in Europe in which all 
states can enjoy undiminished security 
at the minimum necessary levels of 
forces and armaments and all individu- 
als can exercise their basic rights and 
freedoms. Arms control alone cannot 
resolve longstanding political differ- 
ences between East and West nor guar- 
antee a stable peace. Nonetheless, 
achievement of the Alliance's goal will 
require substantial advances in arms 
control, as well as more fundamental 
changes in political relations. Success 
in arms control, in addition to enhanc- 
ing military security, can encourage 
improvements in the East-West politi- 
cal dialogue and thereby contribute to 
the achievement of broader Alliance 

7. To increase security and stabil- 
ity in Europe, the Alliance has consist- 
ently pursued every opportunity for 
effective arms control. The Allies are 
committed to this policy, independent 
of any changes that may occur in the 
climate of East-West relations. Success 
in arms control, however, continues to 
depend not on our own efforts alone, 
but also on Eastern and particularly 
Soviet readiness to work constructively 
towards mutually beneficial results. 

8. The immediate past has wit- 
nessed unprecedented progress in the 
field of arms control. In 1986 the Stock- 
holm Conference on Disarmament in 
Europe (CDE) agreement created an 
innovative system of confidence and 
security-building measures, designed 
to promote military transparency and 
predictability. To date, these have been 
satisfactorily implemented. The 1987 
INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces] Treaty marked another major 
step forward because it eliminated a 
whole class of weapons, it established 

the principle of asymmetrical reduc- 
tions, and provided for a stringent veri- 
fication regime. Other achievements 
include the establishment in the United 
States and the Soviet Union of nuclear 
risk reduction centres, the US/Soviet 
agreement on prior notification of bal- 
listic missile launches, and the conduct 
of the Joint Verification Experiment in 
connection with continued US/Soviet 
negotiations on nuclear testing. 

9. In addition to agreements al- 
ready reached, there has been substan- 
tial progress in the START [strategic 
arms reductions talks] negotiations 
which are intended to reduce radically 
strategic nuclear arsenals and elimi- 
nate destabilizing offensive capa- 
bilities. The Paris Conference on the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has 
reaffirmed the authority of the 1925 
Geneva Protocol and given powerful po- 
litical impetus to the negotiations in 
Geneva for a global, comprehensive and 
effectively verifiable ban on chemical 
weapons. New distinct negotiations 
within the framework of the CSCE 
process have now begun in Vienna: one 
on conventional armed forces in Europe 
between the 23 members of NATO and 
the Warsaw Treaty Organization 
(WTO) and one on confidence- and 
security-building measures (CSBMs) 
among all 35 signatories of the Helsinki 
Final Act. 

10. There has also been substantial 
progress on other matters important to 
the West. Soviet troops have left Af- 
ghanistan. There has been movement 
toward the resolution of some, although 
not all, of the remaining regional con- 
flicts in which the Soviet Union is in- 
volved. The observance of human 
rights in the Soviet Union and in some 
of the other WTO countries has signifi- 
cantly improved, even if serious defi- 
ciencies remain. The recent Vienna 
CSCE Follow-up meeting succeeded in 
setting new, higher standards of con- 
duct for participating states and should 
stimulate further progress in the 
CSCE process. A new intensity of dia- 
logue, particularly at high-level, be- 
tween East and West opens new 
opportunities and testifies to the Al- 
lies' commitment to resolve the funda- 
mental problems that remain. 

11. The Alliance does not claim ex- 
clusive responsibility for this favour- 
able evolution in East-West relations. 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



111 recent years, the East has become 
more responsive and flexible. Nonethe- 
less, the Alliance's contribution has 
clearly been fundamental. Most of the 
achievements to date, which have been 
described above, were inspired by ini- 
tiatives by the Alliance or its members. 
The Allies' political solidarity, commit- 
ment to defence, patience and cre- 
ativity in negotiations overcame initial 
obstacles and brought its efforts to 
fruition. It was the Alliance that drew 
up the basic blueprints for East-West 
progress and has since pushed them 
forward towards realisation. In partic- 
ular the concepts of stability, reason- 
able sufficiency, asymmetrical 
reductions, concentration on the most 
offensive equipment, rigorous verifica- 
tion, transparency, a single zone from 
the Atlantic to the Urals, and the bal- 
anced and comprehensive nature of the 
CSCE process, are Western-inspired. 

12. Prospects are now brighter 
than ever before for lasting, qualitative 
improvements in the East-West rela- 
tionship. There continue to be clear 
signs of change in the internal and e.x- 
ternal policies of the Soviet Union and 
of some of its Allies. The Soviet leader- 
ship has stated that ideological compe- 
tition should play no part in interstate 
relations. Soviet acknowledgement of 
serious shortcomings in its past ap- 
proaches to international as well as do- 
mestic issues creates opportunities for 
progress on fundamental political 

13. At the same time, serious con- 
cerns remain. The ambitious Soviet re- 
form programme, which the Allies 
welcome, will take many years to com- 
plete. Its success cannot be taken for 
granted given the magnitude of the 
problems it faces and the resistance 
generated. In Eastern Europe, prog- 
ress in constructive reform is still un- 
even and the extent of these reforms 
remains to be determined. Basic hu- 
man rights still need to be firmly an- 
chored in law and practice, though in 
some Warsaw Pact countries improve- 
ments are underway. Although the 
WTO has recently announced and be- 
gun unilateral reductions in some of its 
forces, the Soviet Union continues to 
deploy military forces and to maintain 
a pace of military production in excess 
of legitimate defensive requirements. 
Moreover, the geo-strategic realities fa- 
vour the geographically contiguous 
Soviet-dominated WTO as against the 
geographically separated democracies 
of the North Atlantic Alliance. It has 
long been an objective of the Soviet 
Union to weaken the links between the 


European and North American mem- 
bers of the Alliance. 

14. We face an immediate future 
that is promising but still uncertain. 
The Allies and the East face both a 
challenge and an opportunity to cap- 
italise on present conditions in order to 
increase mutual security. The progress 
recently made in East-West relations 
has given new impetus to the arms con- 
trol process and has enhanced the pos- 
sibilities of achieving the Alliance's 
arms control objectives, which comple- 
ment the other elements of the Alli- 
ance's security policy. 

III. Principles of Alliance Security 

15. Alliance security policy aims to 
preserve peace in freedom by both po- 
litical means and the maintenance of a 
military capability sufficient to prevent 
war and to provide for effective de- 
fence. The fact that the Alliance has for 
forty years safeguarded peace in Eu- 
rope bears witness to the success of 
this policy. 

16. Improved political relations and 
the progressive development of cooper- 
ative structures between Eastern and 
Western countries are important com- 
ponents of Alliance policy. They can en- 
hance mutual confidence, reduce the 
risk of misunderstanding, ensure that 
there are in place reliable arrange- 
ments for crisis management so that 
tensions can be defused, render the sit- 
uation in Europe more open and pre- 
dictable, and encourage the develop- 
ment of wider cooperation in all fields. 

17. In underlining the importance 
of these facts for the formulation of Al- 
liance policy, the Allies reaffirm that, 
as stated in the Harmel Report, the 
search for constructive dialogue and co- 
operation with the countries of the 
East, including arms control and disar- 
mament, is based on political solidarity 
and adequate military strength. 

18. Solidarity among the Alliance 
countries is a fundamental principle of 
their security policy. It reflects the in- 
divisible nature of their security. It is 
expressed by the willingness of each 
country to share fairly the risks, bur- 
dens and responsibilities of the common 
effort as well as its benefits. In partic- 
ular, the presence in Europe of the 
United States' conventional and nuclear 
forces and of Canadian forces demon- 
strates that North American and Euro- 
pean security interests are inseparably 
bound together. 

19. From its inception the Alliance 
of Western democracies has been defen- 
sive in purpose. This will remain so. 
None of our weapons will ever be used 
except in self-defence. The Alliance 
does not seek military superiority nor 
will it ever do so. Its aim has always 
been to prevent war and any form of co- 
ercion and intimidation. 

20. Consistent with the Alliance's 
defensive character, its strategy is one 
of deterrence. Its objective is to con- 
vince a potential aggressor before he 
acts that he is confronted with a risk 
that outweighs any gain — however 
great — he might hope to secure from 
his aggression. The purpose of this 
strategy defines the means needed for 
its implementation. 

21. In order to fulfil its strategy, 
the Alliance must be capable of 
responding appropriately to any ag- 
gression and of meeting its commit- 
ment to the defence of the frontiers of 
its members' territory. For the foresee- 
able future, deterrence requires an ap- 
propriate mix of adequate and effective 
nuclear and conventional forces which 
will continue to be kept up to date 
where necessary; for it is only by their 
evident and perceived capability for ef- 
fective use that such forces and weap- 
ons deter. 

22. Conventional forces make an es- 
sential contribution to deterrence. The 
elimination of asymmetries between 
the conventional forces of East and 
West in Europe would be a major 
breakthrough, bringing significant 
benefits for stability and security. Con-- 
ventional defence alone cannot, how- 
ever, ensure deterrence. Only the 
nuclear element can confront an ag- 
gressor with an unacceptable risk and 
thus plays an indispensable role in our 
current strategy of war prevention. 

23. The fundamental purpose of nu-' 
clear forces — both strategic and sub- 
strategic — is political; to preserve the 
peace and to prevent any kind of war. 
Such forces contribute to deterrence by 
demonstrating that the Allies have the 
military capability and the political 
will to use them, if necessary, in re- 
sponse to aggression. Should aggres- 
sion occur, the aim would be to restore 
deterrence by inducing the aggressor 
to reconsider his decision, to terminate 
his attack and to withdraw and thereby; 
to restore the territorial integrity of 
the Alliance. 

24. Conventional and nuclear 
forces, therefore, perform different but 
complementary and mutually reinforc- 
ing roles. Any perceived inadequacy in 


Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


either of these two elements, oi* the im- 
pression that conventional forces could 
be separated from nuclear, or sub- 
strategic from strategic nuclear forces, 
might lead a potential adversary to 
conclude that the risks of launching ag- 
gression might be calculable and ac- 
ceptable. No single element can, there- 
fore, be regarded as a substitute 
compensating for deficiencies in any 

25. For the foreseeable future, 
there is no alternative strategy for the 
prevention of war. The implementation 
of this strategy will continue to ensure 
that the security interests of all Alli- 
ance members are fully safeguarded. 
The principles underlying the strategy 
of deterrence are of enduring validity. 
Their practical expression in terms of 
the size, structure and deployment of 
forces is bound to change. As in the 
past, these elements will continue to 
evolve in response to changing interna- 
tional circumstances, technological 
progress and developments in the scale 
of the threat — in particular, in the pos- 
ture and capabilities of the forces of the 
Warsaw Pact. 

26. Within this overall framework, 
strategic nuclear forces provide the ul- 
timate guarantees of deterrence for 
the Allies. They must be capable of in- 
flicting unacceptable damage on an ag- 
gressor state even after it has carried 
out a first strike. Their number, range, 
survivability and penetration capa- 
bility need to ensure that a potential 
aggressor cannot count on limiting the 
conflict or regarding his own territory 
as a sanctuary. The strategic nuclear 
forces of the United States provide the 
cornerstone of deterrence for the Alli- 
ance as a whole. The independent nu- 
clear forces of the United Kingdom and 
France fulfil a deterrent role of their 
own and contribute to the overall deter- 
rence strategy of the Alliance by com- 
plicating the planning and risk 
assessment of a potential aggressor. 

27. Nuclear forces below the stra- 
tegic level provide an essential political 
and military linkage between conven- 
tional and strategic forces and, togeth- 
er with the presence of Canadian and 
the United States forces in Europe, be- 
tween the European and North Ameri- 
can members of the Alliances. The 
Allies' sub-strategic nuclear forces are 
not designed to compensate for conven- 
tional imbalances. The levels of such 
forces in the integrated military struc- 
ture nevertheless must take into ac- 
count the threat — both conventional 

and nucleai- — with which the Alliance is 
faced. Their role is to ensure that there 
are no circumstances in which a poten- 
tial aggressor might discount the pros- 
pect of nuclear retaliation in response 
to military action. Nuclear forces be- 
low the strategic level thus make an es- 
sential contribution to deterrence. 

28. The wide deployment of such 
forces among countries participating in 
the integrated military structure of 
the Alliance, as well as the arrange- 
ments for consultation in the nuclear 
area among the Allies concerned, dem- 
onstrates solidarity and willingness to 
share nuclear roles and respon- 
sibilities. It thereby helps to reinforce 

29. Conventional forces contribute 
to deterrence by demonstrating the Al- 
lies' will to defend themselves and by 
minimising the risk that a potential ag- 
gressor could anticipate a quick and 
easy victory or limited territorial gain 
achieved solely by conventional means. 

30. They must thus be able to re- 
spond appropriately and to confront the 
aggressor immediately and as far for- 
ward as possible with the necessary re- 
sistance to compel him to end the 
conflict and to withdraw or face possi- 
ble recourse to the use of nuclear weap- 
ons by the Allies. The forces of the 
Allies must be deployed and equipped 
so as to enable them to fulfil this role 
at all times. Moreover, since the Alli- 
ance depends on reinforcements from 
the North American continent, it must 
be able to keep open sea and air lines of 
communication between North Ameri- 
ca and Europe. 

31. All member countries of the Al- 
liance strongly favour a comprehensive, 
effectively verifiable, global ban on the 
development, production, stockpiling 
and use of chemical weapons. Chemical 
weapons represent a particular case, 
since the Alliance's overall strategy of 
war prevention, as noted earlier, de- 
pends on an appropriate mix of nuclear 
and conventional weapons. Pending the 
achievement of a global ban on chemical 
weapons, the Alliance recognises the 
need to implement passive defence 
measures. A retaliatory capability on a 
limited scale is retained in view of the 
Soviet Union's overwhelming chemical 
weapons capability. 

32. The Allies are committed to 
maintaining only the minimum level of 
forces necessary for their strategy of 
deterrence, taking into account the 
threat. There is, however, a level of 
forces, both nuclear and conventional, 
below which the credibility of deter- 

rence cannot be maintained. In particu- 
lar, the Allies have always recognised 
that the removal of all nuclear weapons 
from Europe would critically under- 
mine deterrence strategy and impair 
the security of the Alliance. 

33. The Alliance's defence policy 
and its policy of arms control and disar- 
mament are complementary and have 
the same goal: to maintain security at 
the lowest possible level of forces. 
There is no contradiction between de- 
fence policy and arms control policy. It 
is on the basis of this fundamental con- 
sistency of principles and objectives 
that the comprehensive concept of arms 
control and disarmament should be fur- 
ther developed and the appropriate con- 
clusions drawn in each of the areas of 
arms control. 

IV. Arms Control and Disarmament: 
Principles and Objectives 

34. Our vision for Europe is that of an 
undivided continent where military 
forces only exist to prevent war and to 
ensure self-defence, as has always been 
the case for the Allies, not for the pur- 
pose of initiating aggression or for po- 
litical or military intimidation. Arms 
control can contribute to the realisa- 
tion of that vision as an integral part of 
the Alliance's security policy and of our 
overall approach to East-West 

35. The goal of Alliance arms con- 
trol policy is to enhance security and 
stability. To this end, the Allies' arms 
control initiatives seek a balance at a 
lower level of forces and armaments 
through negotiated agreements and, as 
appropriate, unilateral actions, recog- 
nising that arms control agreements 
are only possible where the negotiation 
partners share an interest in achieving 
a mutually satisfactory result. The Al- 
lies' arms control policy seeks to re- 
move destabilising asymmetries in 
forces or equipment. It also pursues 
measures designed to build mutual con- 
fidence and to reduce the risk of con- 
flict by promoting greater trans- 
parency and predictability in military 

36. In enhancing security and sta- 
bility, arms control can also bring im- 
portant additional benefits for the 
Alliance. Given the dynamic aspects of 
the arms control process, the principles 
and results embodied in one agreement 
may facilitate other arms control steps. 
In this way arms control can also make 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



possible further reductions in the level 
of Alliance forces and armaments, con- 
sistent with the Alliance's strategy of 
war i)revention. Furthermore, as noted 
in ('hapter II, arms control can make a 
significant contribution to the develop- 
ment of more constructive East-West 
relations and of a framework for fur- 
ther cooperation within a more stable 
and predictable international environ- 
ment. Progress in arms control can 
also enhance public confidence in and 
promote support for our overall securi- 
ty policy. 

Guiding Principles for Arms Control 

37. The members of the Alliance will be 
guided by the following principles: 

Security: Arms control should en- 
hance the security of all Allies. Both 
during the implementation period and 
following implementation, the Allies' 
strategy of deterrence and their ability 
to defend themselves, must remain 
credible and effective. Arms control 
measures should maintain the strategic 
unity and political cohesion of the Alli- 
ance, and should safeguard the princi- 
ple of the indivisibility of Alliance 
security by avoiding the creation of ar- 
eas of unequal security. Arms control 
measures should respect the legitimate 
security interests of all states and 
should not facilitate the transfer or in- 
tensification of threats to third party 
states or regions. 

Stability: Arms control measures 
should yield militarily significant re- 
sults that enhance stability. To promote 
stability, arms control measures should 
reduce or eliminate those capabilities 
which are most threatening to the Alli- 
ance. Stability can also be enhanced by 
steps that promote greater transparen- 
cy and predictability in military mat- 
ters. Military stability requires the 
elimination of options for surprise at- 
tack and for large-scale offensive ac- 
tion. Crisis stability requires that no 
state have forces of a size and configu- 
ration which, when compared with 
those of others, could enable it to calcu- 
late that it might gain a decisive advan- 
tage by being the first to resort to 
arms. Stability also requires measures 
which discourage destabilising at- 
tempts to re-establish military advan- 
tage through the transfer of resources 
to other types of armament. Agree- 
ments must lead to final results that 
are both balanced and ensure equality 
of rights with respect to security. 

Verifiability: Effective and reli- 
able verification is a fundamental re- 
quirement for arms control 
agreements. If arms control is to be ef- 
fective and to build confidence, the ver- 
ifiability of proposed arms control 
measures must, therefore, be of central 
concern for the Alliance. Progress in 
arms control should be measured 
against the record of compliance with 
existing agreements. Agreed arms 
control measures should e.xclude oppor- 
tunities for circumvention. 

Alliance Arms Control Objectives 

38. In accordance with the above princi- 
ples, the Allies are pursuing an ambi- 
tious arms control agenda for the com- 
ing years in the nuclear, conventional 
and chemical fields. 

Nuclear Forces 

39. The INF Agreement represents a 

milestone in the Allies' efforts to 
achieve a more secure peace at lower 
levels of arms. By 1991, it will lead to 
the total elimination of all United 
States and Soviet intermediate range 
land-based missiles, thereby removing 
the threat which such Soviet systems 
presented to the Alliance. Implementa- 
tion of the agreement, however, will af- 
fect only a small proportion of the 
Soviet nuclear armoury, and the Alli- 
ance continues to face a substantial ar- 
ray of modern and effective Soviet 
systems of all ranges. The full realisa- 
tion of the Alliance agenda thus re- 
quires that further steps be taken. 

Strategic Nuclear Forces 

40. Soviet strategic systems continue 
to pose a major threat to the whole of 
the Alliance. Deep cuts in such systems 
are in the direct interests of the entire 
Western Alliance, and therefore their 
achievement constitutes a priority for 
the Alliance in the nuclear field. 

41. The Allies thus fully support 
the US objectives of achieving, within 
the context of the Strategic Arms Re- 
duction Talks, fifty percent reductions 
in US and Soviet strategic nuclear 
arms. US proposals seek to enhance 
stability by placing specific restrictions 
on the most destabilising elements of 
the threat — fast flying ballistic mis- 
siles, throw-weight and, in particular, 
Soviet heavy ICBMs [intercontinental 
ballistic missiles]. The proposals are 
based on the need to maintain the de- 

terrent credibility of the remaining US 
strategic forces which would continue 
to provide the ultimate guarantee of 
security for the Alliance as a whole; 
and therefore on the necessity to keep 
such forces effective. Furthermore, the 
United States is holding talks with the 
Soviet Union on defence and space mat- 
ters in order to ensure that strategic 
stability is enhanced. 

Sub-Strategic Nuclear Forces 

42. The Allies are committed to main- 
taining only the minimum number of 
nuclear weapons necessary to support 
their strategy of deterrence. In line 
with this commitment, the members of 
the integrated military structure have 
already made major unilateral cuts in 
their sub-strategic nuclear armoury. 
The number of land-based warheads in 
Western Europe has been reduced by 
over one-third since 1979 to its lowest 
level in over 20 years. Updating where 
necessary of their sub-strategic 
systems would result in further 

43. The Allies continue to face the 
direct threat posed to Europe by the 
large numbers of shorter-range nuclear 
missiles deployed on Warsaw Pact ter- 
ritory and which have been substan- 
tially upgraded in recent years. Major 
reductions in Warsaw Pact systems 
would be of overall value to Alliance se- 
curity. One of the ways to achieve this 
aim would be by tangible and verifiable 
reductions of American and Soviet 
land-based nuclear missile systems of 
shorter range leading to equal ceilings 
at lower levels. 

44. But the sub-strategic nuclear 
forces deployed by member countries of': 
the Alliance are not principally a coun- 
ter to similar systems operated by 
members of the WTO. As is explained 
in Chapter III, sub-strategic nuclear 
forces fulfil an essential role in overall 
Alliance deterrence strategy by ensur- 
ing that there are no circumstances in 
which a potential aggressor might dis- 
count nuclear retaliation in reponse to 
his military action. 

45. The Alliance reaffirms its posi- 
tion that for the foreseeable future 
there is no alternative to the Alliance's 
strategy for the prevention of war, 
which is a strategy of deterrence based 
upon an appropriate mix of adequate 
and effective nuclear and conventional 
forces which will continue to be kept up 
to date where necessary. Where nucle- 
ar forces are concerned, land-, sea-, 
and air-based systems, including 


Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


ground-based missiles, in the present 
circumstances and as far as can be 
foreseen will be needed in Europe. 

46. In view of the huge superiority 
of the Warsaw Pact in terms of short- 
range nuclear missiles, the Alliance 
calls u])on the Soviet Union to reduce 
unilaterally its short-range missile sys- 
tems to the current levels within the 
integrated military structure. 

47. The Alliance reaffirms that at 
the negotiations on conventional stabil- 
ity it pursues the objectives of: 

• The establishment of a secure 
and stable balance of conventional 
forces at lower levels; 

• The elimination of disparities 
prejudicial to stability and security; 

• The elimination as a matter of 
high priority of the capability for 
launching surprise attack and for ini- 
tiating large-scale offensive action. 

48. In keeping with its arms con- 
trol objectives formulated in Reykjavik 
in 1987 and reaffirmed in Brussels in 
1988, the Alliance states that one of its 
highest priorities in negotiations with 
the East is reaching an agreement on 
conventional force reductions which 
would achieve the objectives above. In 
this spirit, the Allies will make every 
effort, as evidenced by the outcome of 
the May 1989 Summit, to bring these 
conventional negotiations to an early 
and satisfactory conclusion. The United 
States has e.xpressed the hope that this 
could be achieved within si.x to twelve 
months. Once implementation of such 
an agreement is underway, the United 
States, in consultation with the Allies 
concerned, is prepared to enter into ne- 
gotiations to achieve a partial reduc- 
tion of American and Soviet land-based 
nuclear missile forces of shorter range 
to equal and verifiable levels. With spe- 
cial reference to the Western proposals 
on CFE tabled in Vienna, enhanced by 
the proposals by the United States at 
the May 1989 Summit, the Allies con- 
cerned proceed on the understanding 
that negotiated reductions leading to a 
level below the existing level of their 
SNF [short-range nuclear forces] mis- 
siles will not be carried out until the 
results of these negotiations have been 
implemented. Reductions of Warsaw 
Pact SNF systems should be carried 
out before that date. 

49. As regard the sub-strategic nu- 
clear forces of the members of the inte- 
grated military structure, their level 
and characteristics must be such that 

they can perform their deterrent role 
in a credible way across the required 
spectrum of ranges, taking into ac- 
count the threat — both conventional 
and nuclear — with which the Alliance is 
faced. The question concerning the in- 
troduction and deployment of a follow- 
on system for the Lance will be dealt 
with in 1992 in the light of overall secu- 
rity developments. While a decision for 
national authorities, the Allies con- 
cerned recognise the value of the con- 
tinued funding by the United States of 
research and development of a follow-on 
for the existing Lance short-range mis- 
sile, in order to preserve their options 
in this respect. 

Conventional Forces 

50. As set out in the March 1988 Sum- 
mit statement and in the Alliance's No- 
vember 1988 data initiative, the Soviet 
Union's military presence in Europe, 
at a level far in excess of its needs for 
self-defence, directly challenges our se- 
curity as well as our aspirations for a 
peaceful order in Europe. Such exces- 
sive force levels create the risk of polit- 
ical intimidation or threatened aggres- 
sion. As long as they exist, they present 
an obstacle to better political relations 
between all states of Europe. The chal- 
lenge to security is, moreover, not only 
a matter of the numerical superiority of 
WTO forces. WTO tanks, artillery and 
armoured troop carriers are concen- 
trated in large formations and deployed 

in such a way as to give the WTO a ca- 
pability for surprise attack and large- 
scale offensive action. Despite the re- 
cent welcome publication by the WTO 
of its assessment of the military bal- 
ance in Europe, there is still consider- 
able secrecy and uncertainty about its 
actual capabilities and intentions. 

51. In addressing these concerns, 
the Allies' primary objectives are to es- 
tablish a secure and stable balance of 
conventional forces in Europe at lower 
levels, while at the same time creating 
greater openness about military organ- 
isation and activities in Europe. 

52. In the Conventional Forces in 
Europe talks between the 23 members 
of the two alliances, the Allies are 

• Reductions to an overall limit on 
the total holdings of armaments in Eu- 
rope, concentrating on the most threat- 
ening systems, i.e., those capable of 
seizing and holding territory; 

• A limit on the proportion of these 
total holdings belonging to any one 
country in Europe (since the security 
and stability of Europe require that no 
state exceed its legitimate needs for 

• A limit of stationed forces (thus 
restricting the forward deployment and 
concentration of Soviet forces in East- 
ern Europe); and, 

• Appropriate numerical sub-limits 
on forces which will apply simul- 
taneously throughout the Atlantic to 
the Urals area. 

Secretary Baker and the President during a session of the North Atlantic Council. 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



These measures, taken together, 
will necessitate deep cuts in the WTO 
conventional forces which most threat- 
en the Alliance. The resulting reduc- 
tions will have to take place in such a 
way as to prevent circumvention, e.g., 
by ensuring that the armaments re- 
duced are destroyed or otherwise dis- 
posed of. Verification measures will be 
required to ensure that all states have 
confidence that entitlements are not 

53. These measures alone, however, 
will not guarantee stability. The re- 
gime of reductions will have to be back- 
ed up by additional measures which 
should include measures of transparen- 
cy, notification and constraint applied 
to the deployment, storage, movement 
and levels of readiness and availability 
of conventional forces. 

.54. In the CSBM negotiations, the 
Allies aim to maintain the momentum 
created by the successful implementa- 
tion of the Stockholm Document by 
proposing a comprehensive package of 
measures to improve: transparency 
about military organisation, transpar- 
ency and predictability of military ac- 
tivities, contacts and communication, 
and have also proposed an exchange of 
views on military doctrine in a seminar 

55. The implementation of the Al- 
lies' proposals in the CFE negotiations 
and of their proposals for further confi- 
dence and security-building measures 
would achieve a quantum improvement 
in European security. This would have 
important and positive consequences 
for Alliance policy both in the field of 
defence and arms control. The outcome 
of the CFE negotiations would provide 
a framework for determining the fu- 
ture Alliance force structure required 
to perform its fundamental task of pre- 
serving peace in freedom. In addition, 
the Allies would be willing to contem- 
plate further steps to enhance stability 
and security if the immediate CFE ob- 
jectives are achieved — for example, 
further reductions or limitations of 
conventional armaments and equip- 
ment, or the restructuring of armed 
forces to enhance defensive capabilities 
and further reduce offensive 

56. The Allies welcome the declar- 
ed readiness of the Soviet Union and 
other WTO members to reduce their 
forces and adjust them towards a defen- 
sive posture and await implementation 
of these measures. This would be a step 
in the direction of redressing the im- 


balance in force levels existing in Eu- 
rope and towards reducing the Warsaw 
Pact capability for surprise attack. The 
announced reductions demonstrate the 
recognition by the Soviet Union and 
other WTO members of the convention- 
al imbalance, long highlighted by the 
Allies as a key problem of European 

Chemical Weapons 

57. The Soviet Union's chemical weap- 
ons stockpile poses a massive threat. 
The Allies are committed to conclude, 
at the earliest date, a worldwide, com- 
prehensive and effectively verifiable 
ban on all chemical weapons. 

58. All Alliance states subscribe to 
the prohibitions contained in the Ge- 
neva Protocol for the Use in War of As- 
phyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, 
and of Bacteriological Methods of War- 
fare. The Paris Conference on the Pro- 
hibition of Chemical Weapons reaf- 
firmed the importance of the commit- 
ments made under the Geneva Protocol 
and expressed the unanimous will of 
the international community to elimi- 
nate chemical weapons completely at an 
early date and thereby to prevent any 
recourse to their use. 

59. The Allies wish to prohibit not 
only the use of these abhorrent weap- 
ons, but also their development, pro- 
duction, stockpiling and transfer, and 
to achieve the destruction of existing 
chemical weapons and production facili- 
ties in such a way as to ensure the un- 
diminished security for all participants 
at each stage in the process. Those ob- 
jectives are being pursued in the Ge- 
neva Conference on Disarmament. 
Pending agreement on a global ban, the 
Allies will enforce stringent controls 
on the export of commodities related to 
chemical weapons production. They will 
also attempt to stimulate more open- 
ness among states about chemical 
weapons capabilities in order to pro- 
mote greater confidence in the effec- 
tiveness of a global ban. 

V. Conclusions: 

Arms Control and Defence 

60. The Alliance is committed to pur- 
suing a comprehensive approach to se- 
curity, embracing both arms control 
and disarmament, and defence. It is 
important, therefore, to ensure that in- 
terrelationships between arms control 
issues and defence requirements and 

amongst the various arms control areas 
are fully considered. Proposals in any 
one area of arms control must take ac- 
count of the implications for Alliance 
interests in general and for other nego- 
tiations. This is a continuing process. 

61. It is essential that defence and 
arms control objectives remain in har- 
mony in order to ensure their comple- 
mentary contribution to the goal of 
maintaining security at the lowest bal- 
anced level of forces consistent with the 
requirements of the Alliance strategy 
of war prevention, acknowledging that 
changes in the threat, new technolo- 
gies, and new political opportunities af- 
fect options in both fields. Decisions on 
arms control matters must fully reflect 
the requirements of the Allies' strategy 
of deterrence. Equally, progress in 
arms control is relevant to military 
plans, which will have to be developed 
in the full knowledge of the objectives 
pursued in arms control negotiations 
and to reflect, as necessary, the results 
achieved therein. 

62. In each area of arms control, 
the Alliance seeks to enhance stability 
and security. The current negotiations 
concerning strategic nuclear systems, 
conventional forces and chemical weap- 
ons are, however, independent of one 
another: the outcome of any one of 
these negotiations is not contingent on 
progress in others. However, they can 
influence one another: criteria estab- 
lished and agreements achieved in one 
area of arms control may be relevant in 
other areas and hence facilitate overall 
progress. These could affect both arms 
control possibilities and the forces 
needed to fulfil Alliance strategy, as 
well as help to contribute generally to a 
more predictable military environment. 

63. The Allies seek to manage the 
interaction among different arms con- 
trol elements by ensuring that the de- 
velopment, pursuit and realisation of 
their arms control objectives in indi- 
vidual areas are fully consistent both 
with each other and with the Alliance's 
guiding principles for effective arms 
control. For example, the way in which 
START limits and sub-limits are ap- 
plied in detail could affect the future 
flexibility of the sub-strategic nuclear 
forces of members of the integrated 
military structure. A CFE agreement 
would by itself make a major contribu- 
tion to stability. This would be signifi- 
cantly further enhanced by the 
achievement of a global chemical weap- 
ons ban. The development of Confi- 
dence- and Security-Building Measures 
could influence the stabilising meas- 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


ures being considered in connection 
with the Conventional Forces in Eu- 
rope negotiations and vice versa. The 
removal of the imbalance in convention- 
al forces would provide scope for fur- 
ther reductions in the sub-strategic 
nuclear forces of members of the inte- 
grated military structure, though it 
would not obviate the need for such 
forces. Similarly, this might make pos- 
sible further arms control steps in the 
conventional field. 

64. This report establishes the 
overall conceptual framework within 
which the Allies will be seeking prog- 
ress in each area of arms control. In so 
doing, their fundamental aim will be 
enhanced security at lower levels of 
forces and armaments. Taken as a 
whole, the Allies' arms control agenda 
constitutes a coherent and comprehen- 
sive approach to the enhancement of se- 
curity and stability. It is ambitious, but 
we are confident that — with a construc- 
tive response from the WTO states — it 
can be fully achieved in the coming 
years. In pursuing this goal, the Alli- 
ance recognises that it cannot afford to 
build its security upon arms control re- 
sults expected in the future. The Allies 
will be prepared, however, to draw ap- 
propriate consequences for their own 
military posture as they make concrete 
progress through arms control towards 
a significant reduction in the scale and 
quality of the military threat they face. 
Accomplishment of the Allies' arms 
control agenda would not only bring 
great benefits in itself but could also 
lead to the expansion of cooperation 
with the East in other areas. The arms 
control process itself is, moreover, dy- 
namic; as and when the Alliance 
reaches agreement in each of the areas 
set out above, so further prospects for 
arms control may be opened up and fur- 
ther progress made possible. 

65. As noted earlier, the Allies' vi- 
sion for Europe is that of an undivided 
continent where military forces only 
exist to prevent war and to ensure self- 
defense; a continent which no longer 
lives in the shadow of overwhelming 
military forces and from which the 
;threat of war has been removed; a con- 
'tinent where the sovereignty and terri- 
torial integrity of all states are 
respected and the rights of all individu- 
als, including their rights of political 
choice, are protected. This goal can 
only be reached by stages: it will re- 

quire patient and creative endeavour. 
"The Allies are resolved to continue 
working towards its attainment. The 
achievement of the Alliance's arms con- 
trol objectives would be a major contri- 
bution toward the realisation of its 

Secretary Baker's 
Interview on "Good 
Morning, America," 


May 30, 19898 

Q. The NATO summit reached an 
agreement early this morning con- 
cerning the future on short-range 
nuclear missiles in Europe. The 
agreement ties negotiations on the re- 
duction of such missiles to negotia- 
tion and implementation of an 
agreement by both the United States 
and the Soviet Union to reduce con- 
ventional forces in Europe. 

Earlier this morning, before 
President Bush held his news confer- 
ence, I tallied with Secretary of State 
James Baker in Brussels, and I began 
by asking him just what today's 
agreement means. 

A. There has been an agreement. 
It's an agreement, frankly, that we wel- 
come, that is basically on the terms 
that we had indicated before we came 
to the summit we would be willing to 

I think the bigger the story here, 
though, if I might suggest it, is that 
this is a significant victory for the alli- 
ance, because the alliance begins its 
second 40 years unified and moving for- 
ward, having regained the initiative, if 
you will, in the area of arms control. So 
I think it almost could be characterized 
as a double victory for the alliance. 

Q. Let me talk about how these 
pieces tie together. Specifically, how 
would the agreement on short-range 
missiles work, and how would it be 
tied to the timing of the discussions 
over the reductions of conventional 
forces — of tanks and troops and 

A. It is specifically related in this 
sense: It's been the position of the 
United States, and other countries in 
the alliance, that we really should not 

negotiate the reduction of short-range 
nuclear forces, which might weaken our 
nuclear deterrent, until we had re- 
solved the very substantial imbalance 
in conventional forces that existed in 
favor of the Warsaw Pact. This short- 
range nuclear agreement provides that 
negotiations on short-range forces can 
begin after we have undertaken imple- 
mentation of the conventional forces 
arms control agreement, after we've 
reached an agreement, and after we 
have begun to implement it. 

Q. We're talking about months, 
years here. What would happen to the 
short-range nuclear missiles in the 
meantime? Could they be modernized 
in the meantime? 

A. In the meantime they will be 
kept up-to-date. The specific decision — 

Q. What does that mean? 

A. It means what it has meant 
throughout the history of the alliance; 
as long as we've had those missiles. 
And that is, we replace and we repair 
and we keep them up-to-date. The deci- 
sion with respect to whether we come 
with an entirely new system or follow- 
on system to the missiles we now have, 
the decision on deployment of those will 
be reserved for 1992. NATO will take 
that decision in 1992. 

Q. The Germans obviously have 
said they want all of the short-range 
nuclear missiles eliminated, the Brit- 
ish have said they they don't want 
elimination of the missiles, and we 
have said the same thing. What does 
the agreement overnight say, because 
both sides seem to be interpreting 
this a little differently? 

A. The agreement is, I think, 
quite clear. For one thing, it says that 
ground-based nuclear missiles are an 
important part of the NATO arsenal; it 
recognizes that specifically. 

Secondly, it says that there can be 
negotiations that deal with partial re- 
ductions of these — not complete, not to- 
tal, but only partial reductions. It's 
quite clear that discussions that would 
lead to a third zero, or total elimination 
of these missiles, are not contemplated 
or permitted by this language. 

Q. Now that NATO has agree- 
ment on what to do about short-range 
nuclear missiles, now that there are 
new Bush proposals on the table in- 
volving conventional force reduc- 
tions, does all this, do you think, 
hasten the possibility of a Bush- 
Gorbachev summit? 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



A. Oh. it doesn't slow it down any. 
I don't know that you can say that it 
hastens it. As the President said yes- 
terday in his press conference, we've 
still got some work to do before we set 
the date for a summit, and we'll set 
about the task of doing that work. 

I suppose the real answer to your 
question depends on what the Soviet 
reaction to the President's conventional 
proposal is. Let's see whether they 
really mean what they've been saying. 
Let's see whether they mean business. 
Let's see the extent to which they ac- 
cept what the President has proposed. 

Q. Let me address the same ques- 
tion another way. The President at 
the Coast Guard Academy [May 24, 
1989] gave a speech which was proba- 
bly more conciliatory toward the So- 
viets and accepting of their role in 
the world situation than he has been 
in the past, talking about them now 
entering the family of nations, etc. 
There are now new proposals of con- 
ventional force reductions. How much 
does all of this — the U.S. position — 
depend on the presence of that one 
man, Mikhail Gorbachev, at the head 
of the Soviet Government? 

A. I don't think that it depends en- 
tirely on that, although he has been, of 
course, the driving force behind many 
of the changes that are taking place 
over there. That's why we say 
continually — and everyone in this Ad- 
ministration says — we want him to suc- 
ceed, we want perestroika to succeed, 
we want these changes to succeed, be- 
cause these are changes that are based 
on Western values. He's, in effect, 
opening or trying to open up a closed 
system over there, a system that's been 
closed for almost 70 years. We really 
hope that he succeeds. To a large de- 
gree, I guess you would have to ac- 
knowledge that the changes do depend 
upon him. That's not to say that a suc- 
cessor couldn't continue to carry them 
forwai'd, because he could. 

News Conference, 


May 30, 19896 

First, I want to pay my respects to 
[NATO Secretary General] Manfred 
Woerner and thank him for the way in 
which this meeting has been con- 
ducted, for his thorough staff work, 
and for his able leadership in the hall. I 
think that the successful results at this 
summit have given us a double hit — 
both conventional forces and short- 
range nuclear forces. Taken in tandem, 
it demonstrates the alliance's ability to 
manage change to our advantage, to 
move beyond the era of containment. 

Our overall aim is to overcome the 
division of Europe and to forge a unity 
based on Western values. The starting 
point, of course, is to maintain our se- 
curity while seeking to lessen tensions 
and adapt to changing circumstances. 
Our Conventional Parity Initiative 
seeks to capitalize on the opportunity 
we have and to do so without delay. We 
want to finally free Europe from the 
constant threat of surprise attack. We 
want to free Europe from the political 
shadow of Soviet military power. And 
we want to free Europe to become the 
center of cooperation, not confronta- 
tion. We want to open up opportunities 
for greater U.S. -European cooperation 
on the other great issues of our day, for 
example, on environment and regional 
conflicts. A reduced military presence 
when combined with a less threatening 
Soviet presence in Europe can create a 
stronger basis for engagement in Eu- 
rope over the long haul. 

America is and will remain a Euro- 
pean power. Similarly, our SNF agree- 
ment demonstrates our ability to adapt 
to change while remaining true to our 
core security principles. We've agreed 
to future negotiations after the imple- 
mentation of a conventional forces 
agreement — after the implementation 
of the agreement is underway for the 
conventional force agreement. Any ne- 
gotiated SNF reductions will not be 
carried out until the CFE agreement is 
implemented. We've underscored that 
our objective in negotiations is to 
achieve partial reductions, clearly leav- 
ing an SNF deterrent at lower, equal, 
and verifiable levels. Partial means 

We also stress that our strategy of 
deterrence requires land-, sea-, and 
air-based nuclear systems, including 
ground-based missiles, for as far as we 
can foresee. While we will not take the 
modernization decision until 1992, the 
allies recognize the value of continued 
U.S. funding for the research and de- 
velopment of the follow-on to the Lance 

Last, we are placing great empha- 
sis on a rapid negotiated reduction of 
the conventional asymmetries that 
threaten Europe. Based on results in 
that area, we can negotiate SNF reduc- 
tions, as well, while ensuring the con- 
tinued presence of the nuclear 

Q. The communique says that 
chemical weapons are abhorrent, and 
you called for total elimination. Most 
people think nuclear weapons are to- 
tally abhorrent. Why not totally elim- 
inate them, as your predecessor had 
called for? 

A. The communique addresses it- 
self to where nuclear forces are 
concerned — blah, blah, land-sea-air- 
based systems, including ground-based 
missiles. In the present circumstances, 
as far as can be foreseen, they'll be 
needed in Europe. And I would just 
stand by that. This is a decision that 
has been thoroughly consulted with the 
military, and that's the way it is. 

Q. Your spokesman said today 
that the formula for negotiations on 
short-range nuclear missiles was a 
very strong victory for the United 
States and the NATO alliance. How 
can it be a victory for the United 
States without being a defeat for 
Chancellor Kohl and Mr. Genseher 
[West German Foreign Minister], giv- 
en that the United States and Ger- 
many were on such opposing sides of 
this issue? 

A. They strongly supported it, it's 
my understanding. And I don't view it 
as a victory for the United States. I 
view it as a victory for the alliance. So, 
they can speak for themselves, but I'm 
very pleased that it worked out and 
that there was alliance harmony on 
this very important question. 

Q. Did both sides make conces- 
sions, sir? 

A. I can only speak for the United 
States, and we had certain broad pa- 
rameters that — I've addressed part one 
of them, and that was this question of 
partial reduction, no third zero ques- 
tion. The other one was to agree to be- 


Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 ' 


gin the negotiations on SNF following 
tangible implementation. That was one 
of our strong conditions, or strong ne- 
gotiating points, if you will. And then 
no implementation of agreed reduction 
on SNF forces before completion of 
these reductions. So, I'm very happy. 

Put it this way, we're here as part 
of an alliance, and I don't think we 
ought to have winners and losers out of 
a summit that everybody concedes has 
been very, very unified. It's an alliance 
victory or an alliance decision. I'm 
proud to have had a part in that. 

Q. All politics may be local, but 
hasn't the continued insistence of the 
Germans been damaging to the 

A. Talk to the people that have 
been around here for a long time, and 
they'll tell you that they've never seen 
more unity and more upbeat feeling af- 
ter a meeting. 

Q. Do you think the Foreign Min- 
isters who missed dinner last night 
would agree with you on that? 

A. No, they probably would dis- 
sent, but they went along today, kept 
their eyes open. 

Q. Is it possible that you could 
start negotiations on SNF missiles 
before the modernization decision 
has been made'? And do you think 
that's a good way to go into negotia- 
tions without a commitment to up- 
grade these — the Soviets say, Okay, if 
we don't have a commitment, we'll get 
rid of all of them — and where 's your 

A. The modernization decision 
doesn't need to be taken until 1992. We 
have spelled out the procedures for ne- 
gotiating on SNF, and that will come 
after the agreement on the convention- 
al forces. 

That is the important point. I don't 
believe the layman — I know we've got a 
lot of e.xperts on this side, and I don't 
want to restrict my questions to those 
of us like myself who are not long-time 
arms control experts — but I can tell 
you that most people in our country 
don't realize the imbalance that exists 
on these conventional forces. It is de- 
stabilizing. And the question is SNF, 
short-range nuclear forces, where 
they've got, in terms of launchers, 
what, 1,200 or something of that nature 
to our 88. Why don't they just 
negotiate — ^just unilaterally reduce to 
equal numbers? Now there would be a 
good challenge. 

We've got this order set up as to 
how we're going to go about it. The alli- 
ance has taken a firm position, and so 
I'm not going to go into a hypothetical 
question of that nature. 

Q. On this question of partial, 
the word is underlined for emphasis 
in the document. Was that done at 
our behest, or Mrs. Thatcher's behest, 
or whose behest? 

A. If we can wake up Jim Baker, 
you'll have to ask him. But I would sim- 
ply say there was total agreement on it, 
and it speaks for itself. Partial is par- 
tial, and to try to interpret it some oth- 
er way misses the boat. 

Q. In light of the fact that you 
have added several new weapons cate- 
gories to the NATO bargaining posi- 
tion and to the conventional arms 
talks, is it realistic to suppose that 
these talks can be carried out suc- 
cessfully in the brief period of time 
that you have now asked for? 

A. Yes, we can meet that timeta- 
ble. We've challenged the Soviets to 
meet us, you might say — the alliance. 
NATO is tasked to be back on Septem- 
ber 7th with our internals to be farther 
along. I would certainly say yes, let's do 
that. We all remember September 7th, 
don't we? [Laughter] 

Q. You've said that the moderni- 
zation decision has been put off until 
1992, but you have a commitment to 
keep the weapons systems up-to-date. 
When are changes to be made? 

A. Not before 1992. 

Q. You've said that your efforts 
here are not a public relations battle 
with Soviet Leader Mikhail Gor- 
bachev, but if this were a battle, who's 
winning, yourself or Mr. Gorbachev? 

A. Too hypothetical, too hypo- 
thetical. I've read who some think is 
winning, but that was yesterday. 

Q. Do you expect the hammering 
about your alleged lack of leadership 
in the United States to quiet down 
now as a result of your performance 

A. I haven't felt under siege in the 
United States because I've known ex- 
actly what we wanted to do. I made 
statements to that effect earlier on: 
that we were going to have a review 
and then have proposals. And we did 
exactly that. So, I will concede I've 
read such reports, but they haven't 
troubled me any. 

Q. Mr. Gorbachev has apparently 
for the first time revealed specific de- 
fense budget figures in Moscow today. 
And he also says he is proposing to 
cut defense spending by 14% over 1990 
and 1991. That's equal to about $17.3 
billion. Is that a lot? Is that meaning- 
ful? What do you think about it? 

A. This will help him — this pro- 
posal. If he hits our bid, that should 
save him a lot of money in the long run 
because he has a disproportionate num- 
ber of conventional forces. And therein, 
as you know, that's where a lot of the 
expense for defense comes from. So, I 
don't know, but it sounds like a substan- 
tial number to me. But again, I hadn't 
seen that. I will say this for those who 
may wonder what the Soviet reaction 
has been — and it's very preliminary — 
but the initial contact with our Embas- 
sy in Moscow was — I would put fairly 
positive — cautious, but we're leading on 
the side of saying it's positive. In other 
words, they clidn't really slam the door 
and come in on a negative vein. 

Q. On that point, wouldn't it 
seem that if you want to strike this 
agreement even as early as 6 months, 
that there would be a summit meet- 
ing with Mr. Gorbachev before the 
end of the year? 

A. Again, if there was something 
constructive to come out of such a 
meeting, I would certainly be prepared 
to meet, and I believe that Secretary 
Baker has conveyed that to [Foreign] 
Minister Shevardnadze. 

Q. Has Mr. Gorbachev responded 
to your letter of Sunday? 

A. No, sir. 

Q. You used some strong lan- 
guage yesterday about leading the al- 
liance and leading the free world — 
that wasn't your term, but did you 
feel it was important, if not for your- 
self then for the alliance, for the 
United Sates, to assert yourself in a 
strong way at this particular 
summit — this time? 

A. Yes. I think it is highly impor- 
tant that the United States — to be seen 
as fully engaged, trying to come up 
with creative proposals, and fulfilling 
its historic leadership responsibilities. 
I would like to put it in terms of alli- 
ance unity, though, and what — all these 
decisions. There's plenty of room for 
credit out there, and I would insist that 
it's an alliance — to the degree we got 
unanimity — an alliance victory. 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



Q. The stress you put on the 
speed of negotiations — 6 months to a 
year — and the decision to wait until 
1992, modernization, are there some 
progress points if there are no nego- 
tiations or progress in the negotia- 
tions within a year to reexamine the 
1992 deadline? 

A. To be honest with you, I don't 
know the answer to that question. But 
my own personal view would be that if 
there were some dramatic change 
somewhere that changed the theses 
that underlined this agreement that 
we'd want to review things. But I'm not 
predicting that. I want to see it go 

Q. Following tangible implemen- 
tation — that's being read as obviously 
not complete implementation. Can 
you tell us how far tangible is? 

A. No, I can't tell you how far it is, 
but it has to be so that you and I would 
look at it and we'd both agree that 
there had been sincere implementation. 

Q. In the comprehensive concept 
[communique], it states that ground- 
based missiles will be needed as far 
as can be foreseen. Even though the 
modernization decision has been put 
off is there any alternative to mod- 
ernizing those missiles? 

A. Is there any alternative to mod- 
ernizing it? We will cross that bridge in 

Q. As you know, Mr. Gorbachev is 
coming to Bonn soon, and his opera- 
tive style has been to try to up the 
ante when the United States makes a 
proposal. On your conventional arms 
proposal, do you think you've gone 
down as far as the West can safely go 
in reducing conventional forces, and 
can you go no further than what 
you've proposed yesterday? 

A. I see no reason talking about 
further cuts and further reductions 
when we have just tabled a sound pro- 
posal that addresses ourselves to this 
enormous imbalance, so I just would 
defer on that. 

Q. You were criticized early on 
for a slow start. Now this proposal is 
being described as bold; you yourself 
said revolutionary. I wonder if there 
is any element of I-told-you-so in your 
attitude now to reaction to these 

A. Not really. [Laughter] Not 
really. No, listen, I'm not going to get 
into that game with Congress or any- 
one else [Laughter] 


Q. Looking ahead, what impact 
do you think your proposals will have 
on U.S. -Soviet relations, and specifi- 
cally on strategic arms talks? 

A. I hope that these proposals have 
an ameliorating effect, that things will 
get only better. I think it's a serious 
proposal. I think they see a solid, unit- 
ed alliance, and that is important in 
this. I would hope that it would have a 
good effect on whatever follows on. And 
strategic arms reduction talks follow 
on. I have never questioned whether 
Gorbachev knew that we were serious 
and wanted to move forward with him. 
I've read speculation on this, but I have 
reason to believe that he knows that we 
have been serious, taking our time to 
formulate proposals. I do think that 
this one will be tangible evidence of 
this. I hope it would lead to — if conven- 
tional forces talks can be catalytic for 
strategic talks, so be it. But I hope that 
the seriousness of all of this and the 
unity of the alliance will be persuasive 
to him to make him know that we do 
want to go forward. 

Q. As you know, the United 
States has strongly opposed, and so 
has NATO, including aircraft in these 
negotiations up to now. Could you tell 
us what your thinking was in decid- 
ing to reverse that position and to 
propose the 15% cut? 

A. Trying to correct disparity. 
And it was really that simple. I realize 
there have been some concerns of — we 
are very understanding of the French 
reservation in this regard — I might say 
very diplomatically and beautifully ex- 
pressed by President Mitterrand. But 
it is simply that: disparity. 

Q. Secretary General Woerner 
spoke about the future being as im- 
portant or more important than the 
past for the alliance. He spoke about 
NATO vision. Does NATO's vision in- 
clude East-West alliance? 

A. I don't see an East-West alli- 
ance, but I see a Europe much more 
free, and one whose innate desire to 
have more democracy comes to the sur- 
face. But I don't see it as an East and 
West joining in some formal alliance, if 
that was what the question was. 

Q. NATO exists because of the 
perceived threat that the Soviet 
Union provided. Now the Soviet 
Union isn't perceived as a threat any- 
more. Surely, an East-West alliance 
would then exist for a perceived 
threat from elsewhere — 

A. I've answered my question on — 
you asked me whether I felt there 
would be some formal alliance between 
pact countries. I guess you meant be- 
tween Warsaw Pact and NATO. I don't 
think it would require a formal alliance 
in order to have much, much better re- 
lationships that include security consid- 
erations. But we're a long way from 
there. We're just beginning to see the 
differentiation in Europe, and our 
whole policy for the United States — let 
me set aside NATO for a minute — will 
be to watch for those changes and try __ 
to facilitate them and work with those 
who are willing to move toward free- 
dom and democracy. 

Indeed, we've made some proposals 
on Poland. I will be going to both Po- 
land and Hungary, and I will make 
clear that if they move toward these 
Western values that have served the al- 
liance so well for a long time that, 
speaking for the United States, we will 
be ready to have much better relations. 

Q. Can you say this morning that 
there will be no third zero? And if you 
can say it, why cannot the compre- 
hensive concept say it? 

A. I thought I already did say it. 

Q. I didn't think so. 

A. There will be no third zero. 
There wall be third no zero. [Laughter] 
Partial means partial. 

Q. Vice President Quayle, in an 
interview with a reporter the other 
day, said that if some of these East 
European countries move too far to- 
ward Western values that the Soviets 
might intervene militarily and that 
we have not planned how we might re- 
spond to that. He said we ought to do 
that. Do you agree that that's a — he 
called it a big risk. Do you agree it's a 
big risk, and do you think that we 
ought to be deciding what to do if the 
Soviets should — 

A. I'm old enough to remember 
Hungary in 1956, and I would want to 
do nothing in terms of statement or ex- 
hortation that would encourage a re- 
peat of that. And so, I would leave it 
right there. I'd like to think that the 
situation will move in the opposite di- 
rection. But who would have predictpcl 
the kind of public, up until now, peace 
ful demonstration in Tiananmen Square^ 
[in Beijing]? Who would have predicted 
the kind of move inside the Soviet 
Union on perentruika and, indeed, 
glasHosf! When you're dealing with 
things as complex as relations between 
countries, I think prudence is the order 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


of the day, and I've said that all along. 
But back to your questions, I don't 
think anyone knows the answer to that. 
I mean, we're not certainly predicting 


Q. Well, then, do you disagree 
with the Vice President? 

A. I don't even know what he said. 
I learned long ago not to comment on 
things that I haven't read personally 
when we're trying to get one member 
of an Administration to be juxtaposed 
against another. It's bad business, and 
I'm not going to that. But I have great 
confidence in the Vice President, I 
might add, and I think his pronounce- 
ments on foreign policy have been very 

Q. Notwithstanding the obvious 
fact that they all work for you any- 
way, how much of a problem, if any, 
did you have getting the Pentagon on 
board on these proposals? 

A. The Pentagon did what it 
should have done. They looked at vari- 
ous options from the military stand- 
point, and they analyzed it. The Joint 
Chiefs were fully engaged in the proc- 
ess. My contacts were principally, but 
not e.xclusively, with Bill Crowe [Chair- 
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]. One of 
the things I wanted to do in talking to 
our alliance partners was assure them 
that our military was behind the final 
proposal. Indeed, I was very pleased in 
talking to Gen. Galvin before his pro- 
posal was tabled to have his assurances 
that what we have proposed here is 
sound militarily. That made it a much 
better position to present to the 

Q. Do you expect any foot- 
dragging or grumbling or maybe even 
a little leaking along the way as you 
go forward? 

A. In our own leak-proof bureau- 
cracy? No, I don't expect that. [Laugh- 
ter] And I would discourage it. But is it 
apt to happen? I would hope not. 

Q. Were you, at any point, un- 
happy with the pace and the projec- 
tions of that slow and lengthy policy 
review to the extent — as you de- 
scribed you had a 12-day sort of crash 
course in some of these new pro- 
posals. Can you give us some of your 
personal sense of how you got to this 

A. First we undertook these re- 
views. I'm not sure everyone here un- 
derstands that. I said that I needed 
some time when I became President — 
new President, January 20th — to re- 

view not only this subject, the NATO- 
related subjects, but a wide array of 
subjects. We're almost through all of 
the reviews. During this time, I came 
under some fire for being recalcitrant, 
reluctant to move forward. Indeed, 
when Mr. Gorbachev would make one of 
his many proposals, they would be com- 
ing to me and saying 'Well, don't you 
think you have to do something?" And I 
would say, 'No, we want to take our 
time and act in a prudent mannei'." 

I had in my mind that what we 
wanted to do was to be sure that the al- 
liance would come together on any pro- 
posal we made to the alliance. But I 
think there was some feeling in Con- 
gress, some criticism of my speed or 
lack of it in the U.S. Congress. But I'm 
so immune to political criticism that I 
just kind of write it off. I was elected 
to do what I think is right. And I think 
we've come up with a good proposal 

I will end, this being the last ques- 
tion, not with a filibuster but simply to 
say I have been told by others here that 
the alliance really has never had a 
meeting that's more upbeat and where 
we've taken rather significant steps in 
unity. Whatever the wait, whatever po- 
litical arrows might have been fired my 
way, it's all been worth it because I 
think we have something sound and sol- 
id to build on now. 

I end by thanking my colleagues, 
the other heads of government, chiefs 
of state who were here, for the total co- 
operation and the spirit in which these 
proposals were received and discussed 
and the way in which NATO adopted its 
final position. I think it's a good thing. 
It's good for NATO. I really happen to 
believe that it's good for the entire free 

Remarks and 


May 30, 19899 

Chancellor Kohl 

Allow me to welcome you, Mr. Presi- 
dent, very cordially here to the Federal 
Republic of Germany. This is a good 
day for us. A few days ago, we cele- 
brated the 40th anniversary of the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany, and these 40 
years were also 40 years of friendship 
and partnership with the United 
States. Over these four decades, Amer- 
ican soldiers defended, together with 
our troops, freedom and peace in our 
country. A lot of what was decisive for 
the early history of our country was 
initiated by the United States, and we 
always received support by the United 

I would like to welcome you very 
cordially as a proven friend of our coun- 
try, as a personal friend who has al- 
ways stood ready to help me in difficult 
times. Yesterday and today we met in 
order to celebrate the 40th anniversary 
of NATO. We jointly discussed, in the 
spirit of friendship, difficult questions 
which are now important for our fu- 
ture. Your initiative, your new pro- 
posal for disarmament, is an enormous 
step into the future, and it shows the 
inspiration emanating from the leader- 
ship role of the United States. That 
was a wise, a right decision at a very 
important point in time. Now it's up to 
the other side to actually take that 
hand which has been extended to it, 
and then that will be a great work of 
peace. We have taken up already our 

I would just like to mention two 
points on our agenda. First of all, we 
talked about the foundation of the Eu- 
ropean Community and then about the 
completion of the internal market of 
the European Community by the 31st 
of December 1992. This will lend a new 
quality to European policy, and you 
know the Federal Republic of Germany 
has been a motor, an engine, behind 
this development. 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



But we are also a motor for open 
world trade. If from time to time I hear 
reports and read reports from the 
United States that people are afraid 
that we would isolate ourselves against 
the rest of the world, drawing up bar- 
riers to trade, I say to people: This will 
not happen in any case and certainly 
not receive the support of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. On the contrary, 
I firmly believe that in the next years 
to come, the European Community and 
the United States of American will en- 
joy deepened relations — political rela- 
tions and economic relations. 

For us, the relationship with the 
United States is of existential impor- 
tance. Therefore, we also discussed an- 
other very important point which goes 
beyond day-to-day politics, that is to 
say, the fact that we want to intensify 
the exchange of pupils and students. We 
want as many young Americans as pos- 
sible to come over here to our country. 
To use an image that's out of this plant- 
ing of young trees: A forest may grow 
which stands as a symbol of the solid 
friendship between our two countries. 
To put it quite simply, Mr. President, 
we're glad you're here. You are a friend 
among friends. 

President Bush 

Let me just be very brief and first 
thank Chancellor Kohl for this warm 
reception. I told him that I don't be- 
lieve German-American relations have 
ever been better. Secondly, I am very 
pleased with the reaction to the NA'TO 
decision that was taken. I think it 
shows NATO to be together; it shows 
NATO to be strong. Indeed, I think in 
challenging Mr. Gorbachev to come for- 
ward now, we have moved in the right 
direction in unity. It is in the interest 
of NATO; it is clearly in the interest of 
the United States and all the members 
of NATO— the Federal Republic. I hap- 
pen to believe that what we've pro- 
posed is in the interest of the Soviet 
Union. So, we will see what the reac- 
tion is, but this was a wonderful cele- 
bration of the 40th anniversary of 
NATO. Chancellor Kohl, once again my 
sincere thanks to you for your hospi- 
tality and for the total cooperation be- 
tween the United States and the 
Federal Republic. 

(J. Do you consider yourself a 
winner"/ Do you consider yourself a 
winner or a loser on the short-range 
missiles? Did you get what you want- 
ed or is it a real compromise? 

Chancellor Kohl. I think we were 
all just winners in Brussels. I think 
that the alliance has given itself the 
best kind of birthday present it could 
have given. After difficult discussions, 
we came to a joint decision, and this de- 
cision is what applies. I think we've — 
all of us — had the personal experience 
of having to make compromises, and I 
think that this is a good thing. We also 
came to a compromise here. Just as one 
concrete answer to your question, 
there are only winners, and actually 
that's a very rare experience for a poli- 
tician and I relish that. 

Q. Is this compromise enough for 
you to win the election next year? 

Chancellor Kohl. I am completely 

certain as to the result of the elections 
in 1990. And as a very concrete answer 
to your question, I think it is very help- 
ful with regard to the majority of the 
German people that we have here a gov- 
ernment and a head of government who 
has proved his friendship with the 
United States over the course of the 
years. So, insofar, yesterday and today 
will indeed be helpful. 

Q. When will you go to Berlin? 
President Bush. The answer is, I 
don't know. 

Q. Would you expand the Berlin 
initiative of your predecessor? 

President Bush. We might well. 
We might well. We might have some- 
thing to say about that tomorrow in 

Secretary Baker's 
News Briefing, 
May 30, 19891° 

We have just emerged from a very pro- 
ductive summit, the first of this presi- 
dency. As you know, the President has 
spoken of moving beyond containment 
in our relations with the Soviet Union 
in this time of very fundamental 
change in the East, and now I think we 
have a basis for managing that change. 
We have seen a summit that proves we 
have unity in the NATO alliance. We 
have seen an initiative in the field of 
arms control. We have been, as we have 

mentioned before, winning across the 
board politically and economically for 
quite some time. The values of the West 
are the values that are persevering. 
And we now have an initiative on secu- 
rity as well. 

Q. From an American point of 
view, what did the United States give 
up in order to get this agreement 

A. You mean the SNF agreement? 

Q. Right, the SNF agreement. 

A. I wouldn't characterize it that 
way, although any agreement is a com- 
promise. As you know, we have been 
having discussions for some 2 months 
prior to the time that we got to 
Brussels on this issue, hoping to re- 
solve it before we got to Brussels. Dur- 
ing the course of those discussions, the 
United States indicated a willingness 
to delay taking the decision on produc- 
tion and deployment of the follow-on to 
Lance until late 1991, early 1992; and 
indicated a willingness to accept the 
principle of negotiations on SNF. 

We already indicated that before 
we got to Brussels. We had to find a 
way to put that into language that 
didn't do violence to some of the princi- 
ples we wanted to preserve. Let me 
mention those to you, because they 
might be of interest as well. 

We wanted to preserve the posi- 
tion, even though we might be willing 
to negotiate after a period of time and 
subject to certain preconditions, we did 
not want those negotiations to involve 
going all the way to zero, or total or 
complete elimination of those missiles. 
We preserve that position. 

We also did not want to be put in 
the position of having to negotiate be- 
fore we were able to begin implementa- 
tion of a conventional forces agreement, 
and the language is essentially that. 

And third, we did not want thei'e 
to be any doubt but that a conventional 
force agreement would have to be im- 
plemented before we would begin im- 
plementing reductions under a short- 
range nuclear agreement. 

Q. Has that not been the U.S. po- 
sition from the beginning, though, 
that you would not negotiate SNF un- 
til you had a conventional arms 
agreement in play? 

A. That's correct. Our position 
going in was we wanted the phrase "un- 
til there was tangible implementation" 
of the conventional forces agreement. 
What we come out of here with is a 
statement that says we won't have 


Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


short-range nuclear negotiations begin 
"until implementation of the conven- 
tional forces agreement is underway." I 
don't see that as much of a change 

Q. That sounds like everything 
was set a long time ago. but there's at 
least one report that suggests the 
President was displeased with the 
strategic review, the results of it; that 
in the last few days, he ordered a new 
review, some Pentagon, some civilian 
people — something was put together 
rather quickly, and what he presented 
at the NATO summit is the product of 
that reconsideration. In fact, he 
wasn't really happy with his New 
London — 

A. That's simply not correct. 
That's totally inaccurate. That's not 
what happened. 

Q. What did happen? 

A. What happened on what? The 
original question was short-range nu- 
clear. What do you want to talk about? 
Conventional — 

Q. Let me get more specific. Did 
the President make some major last 
minute revisions in his assessment of 
what the United States could do with 
regard to these missiles and with re- 
gard to troop reduction? In fact, [Ca- 
nadian Prime Minister] Mulroney 
and others apparently were taken 
somewhat by surprise. 

A. No, there was no last minute — 

Q. I mean, the night before. 

A. While there is some relation- 
ship and will be some relationship in 
implementation, the two things are 
separate. The conventional forces ini- 
tiative is something that was discussed 
among a very small group in the Ad- 
ministration going way, way back to the 
very beginnings of this Administra- 
tion. The short-range nuclear agree- 
ment is something that — having the 
short-range agreement, having to do 
with the questions of modernization 
and negotiation — we began to discuss 
with our allies, frankly, during the 
course of my early trip in February to 
NATO Capitols. So the two things were 
proceeding on separate tracks, and 
they were not linked in any way. 

Q. Is it true that after you came 
back from your visit to talk to Mr. 
Gorbachev and laid out the new num- 
bers, that it was at that time you and 
the President — 

A. No, that is inaccurate. I read 
those reports. That's not correct. 

The President and Chancellor Kohl on a cruise down the Rhine River from Oberwesel 
to Koblenz. 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



Q. That was not a turning point 
as far as you are concerned? 

A. No, there had been significant 
discussions with respect to the conven- 
tional forces proposal — as I mentioned 
before — going way, way back to the be- 
ginnings of this Administration among 
a small group of people in the 

Q. Isn't it a case of interpreta- 
tion as to whether you can ever nego- 
tiate to zero on SNF, subject to 
interpretation by different parties? 

A. No, I don't think it is subject to 
interpretation. In my view, "partial" 
means partial. It doesn't permit you to 
completely eliminate, nor does it per- 
mit you to totally eliminate. But you 
don't have to rest right there. That's in 
paragraph 48 of the agreement. If you 
look in paragraph 45 as well, you will 
see a reference in there to the fact 
that — last sentence of 45 — "Where nu- 
clear forces are concerned, land-, sea-, 
and air-based systems, including," it 
says, "ground-based missiles, in the 
present circumstances and as far as can 
be foreseen will be needed in Europe." 
You might also take a look at paragraph 
63. We think it's pretty clear that you 
can't go to zero. 

Q. Yes, but the future is the fu- 
ture. As far as can be foreseen may be 
only a couple of years. 

A. If you want me to say there is 
no expressed statement in here saying 
this is in perpetuity, I'll be glad to say 
that. But the fact of the matter is the 
negotiation that is going to be kicked 
off would not permit a result that takes 
you all the way to zero or that com- 
pletely or totally eliminates these 

Q. Could you tell us a little more 
about the negotiations last night that 
came up with that partial language? 
And instead of saying flatly "no third 
zero," was it designed to give the Ger- 
man Government a little wiggle 
room? Could you just tell us a little 
about that? 

A. Yes, yes, it was designed to 
avoid saying it in those stark terms. 
Because those are very stark terms as 
far as they are concerned, and that's 
the reason we went to that formulation. 

Q. Back to the question of the re- 
view. Many of us who have observed 
the President's speeches in the last 
few weeks have noticed how he has 
discussed the words "caution;" he's 

talked about being "prudent." Now we 
have what I can only call a very bold 
proposal which does seem to be quite 
different from the speeches which he 
gave. Isn't there obviously, from any 
observer's viewpoint, a change in 

A. No, there is no change in 
course. Prudence and realism will still 
be standards which will guide this rela- 
tionship. But the fact that the Presi- 
dent has put a bold proposal on the 
table doesn't mean that he has aban- 
doned prudence and realism when you 
look at the proposal in detail. This pro- 
posal brings us to parity across the full 
range of conventional weapons, save na- 
val forces, which are not included in 
any way. It brings us to parity in the 
face of tremendous imbalances favoring 
the East. 

So when we talk about reducing 
29,000 troops, or when we talk about 
reducing 750 or 800 combat aircraft — if 
you look at what the East has to re- 
duce, it's way, way bigger; I mean, 
300,000 troops and in the thousands of 
aircraft. This is not an imprudent 

Q. So you're saying this is a re- 
sult of the review; there was, in fact, 
no change in course? The President 
was perfectly happy with the review 
and there was no sense, as he 
himself — 

A. No, I didn't say that^I mean, 
the President was perfectly happy, as 
we all were, with the review. This par- 
ticular initiative was proceeding in a 
different way — on a separate track, if 
you will; it was not put into the 
bureaucracy — I guess that's the best 
way I can explain it. The various bu- 
reaucracies in the Federal Government 
that have to consider these things ulti- 
mately considered this proposal, but it 
wasn't put into the general review. It 
was dealt with at a higher level in the 

Q. I believe that you have ac- 
knowledged that basically the Ger- 
mans accepted the counterproposal 
that you and the President came up 
with at Kennebunkport. The Presi- 
dent even used that phrase "tangible" 
this morning in his press conference, 
and yet when the West Germans first 
received it, they rejected it. Some 
were saying this would mean you 
couldn't have SNF talks possibly even 
into the next century. Yet now they 
have accepted the same proposal. 

What happened? Was it the Presi- 
dent's conventional arms proposal, or 
was it the fact that the West Germans 
found themselves in a very small mi- 
nority at the NATO Council, or both? 

A. I think that maybe it was part 
of both. I believe there was a feeling 
there at the summit that the United 
States had been forthcoming even be- 
fore we got here, as I told you this had 
been the subject of a 2-month-long exer- 
cise, and there was a feeling on the 
part of many allies that we had, in- 
deed, been forthcoming in an effort to 
recognize the changing circumstances 
and, therefore, be flexible and at the 
same time protect our deterrence. I 
think many allies felt that was, in fact, 
the way we had approached this. 

Now that wasn't the only reason, I 
think the conventional forces initiative 
did enter into the German thinking, al- 
though you really ought to ask them 
that. But the fact that we have an arms 
control proposal on conventional forces 
that has some possibilities at least of 
being concluded in a year probably en- 
tered into their thinking. 

Q. You say there was no change 
in course, but hasn't there been an 
evolution, at least, in the President's 
thinking? In his May 12th speech at 
Texas A&M, he seemed to put the em- 
phasis on a list of unilateral steps he 
wanted the Soviets to take, including 
unilateral troop reductions, before we 
responded, and in his proposal of yes- 
terday he was talking about mutual 

A. I think there's still some steps 
that he would like to see the Soviets 
take. We would like again to see the 
"new thinking" represented in deeds as 
opposed to words in a number of differ- 
ent areas around the world. You should 
not interpret the fact that the Presi- 
dent has put a bold conventional arms 
proposal on the table as somehow 
changing course or changing direction, 
because this proposal is very good for — 

Q. I said evolution in thinking. 

A. Wait a minute, though. This 
proposal is very, very good for the 
United States. That's why he suggested 
it, because it's not something we are 
doing for the Soviet Union. This is 
very, very positive from our stand- 
point, and we will be much better off 
and much more secure in the West if 
they will accept it. By the way, we have 
just seen a report that [Soviet Foreign 
Minister] Shevardnadze says is a very 
serious, positive, and substantial 


Department of State Bulletin/August 19891 


proposal, and they're going to give it 
serious consideration, and that's very 

Q. Yesterday, when we were being 
briefed. Administration officials 
were pointing to the Soviet proposal 
as one reason that we now thought 
they were serious and that was one 
reason the President responded as he 

A. You mean the Soviet proposal 
responding to the original NATO 
conventional — yes — 

Q. Responding to the original 
NATO proposal. And it just seemed 
there was some evolution there. 

A. Correct. 

Q. I mean, you're denying there's 
no change or evolution in thinking or 

A. Oh, no, but I'm saying it's not — 
there hasn't been a sea change. I mean, 
the Soviet — that was important. Yes, 
that entered into the thinking. The 
President's original deliberations with 
respect to this go way, way back, and 
they antedate the Soviet response to 
the original NATO conventional arms 

Q. You say that we can get this 
conventional agreement done in a 
year. Is it conceivable that negotia- 
tions on SNF will start before the 
modernization decision in 1992? Is 
that even a remote possibility? And is 
that the kind of way you want to go 
into negotiations with the Soviet 

A. It is a possibility. I think the 
1-year date is optimistic but not unre- 
alistic. I think it's not an unrealistic 
date, so — 

Q. Is that the way you want to 
have a negotiation with the Soviet 
Union, with the modernization ques- 
tion left unanswered, and there's no 
pressure, therefore, on them to think 
they're going to get these missiles — 
they can continue to play the political 
game with Germany? 

A. It doesn't. Just because you 
have started a negotiation doesn't mean 
that you cave. And the decision will be 
made on modernization in 1992. So 
you're only looking at a period of about 
14-17 months there, and there are pro- 
visions in here calling for keeping our 
current forces up-to-date, which we 
will continue to do. So we will continue 
to have these weapons deployed. 

Q. But that requires modern- 

A. No, keeping — 

Q. They become obsolete by the 
mid-1990s. At least that's— 

A. By the mid-1990s, yes; by 1996 
or so, that is correct. But we're not 
talking about that timeframe. We're 
going to have another look at the ques- 
tion of modernization in 1992. 

Q. Yes, but in order to have some, 
they have to be modernized. Isn't that 

A. No, they do not have to be mod- 
ernized in order to have some. We have 
88 out there right now, and we're under 
an obligation — agreement at each and 
every one of these summits to keep 
these systems up-to-date. We do repair 
them, and we keep them up-to-date, 
and we will continue to. There's noth- 
ing in the communique that would pre- 
vent that. 

Q. Just explain how, if there is no 
modernization decision, how — isn't 
there a conflict there? 

A. Modernization refers to a new 
system, okay — development of a follow- 
on to Lance. Until we take that deci- 
sion, we will continue to keep our 
Lance missile systems up-to-date. 

Q. The President said that you 
would be able to tell us who was re- 
sponsible for underlining the word 
"partial" in the communique. 

A. We were. 

Q. We, the United States? 

A. We, the United States. 

Q. Why did you do that? 

A. We, the United States, because 
we wanted to give it a little added em- 
phasis for the reason that was sug- 
gested in the first question. 

Q. What must happen before the 
modernization decision? Must there 
be progress in the talks. Must there 
be actual cuts in conventional weap- 
ons? What must take place before the 
modernization decision goes — 

A. There must be a political con- 
stituency sufficient for that decision to 
be taken for NATO in 1992. 

Q. And what will create that 

A. Let's see what happens in terms 
of security developments around the 
world; let's see whether or not the "new 
thinking" is real; let's see whether or 
not the Soviet Union continues to come 
toward the West; let's see whether or 
not the East continues to move toward 

Western values. All of those things will 
enter into the political calculus as to 
whether or not that constituency will 
be there in 1992. 

Q. You would not have to have a 
completed treaty on conventional 

A. No, there's no such requirement 
or restriction at all. 

Q. Are you going to meet with 
Mr. Shevardnadze before the Septem- 
ber, third round? 

A. I have no plans now to meet 
with him before September. Remember 
these are alliance decisions. Yes, the 
manpower proposal is U.S. -Soviet man- 
power and that would, of course, per- 
mit direct dialogue, but we would want 
to do that, I think, within the context 
of very close consultation with the 

Q. But direct dialogue wouldn't 
give them any sort of impetus, so 
once you have the formal language in 
September, you could really move for- 
ward more quickly. 

A. We would like to be able to put 
this on the table at the September 7 — I 
think it is — resumption of the discus- 
sions. This is a package deal. This is 
not something we put on the table with 
the idea the East can come in and pick 
what they like and leave what they 
don't like. Yes, there are some ques- 
tions that will have to be resolved. 
There are accounting rules, partic- 
ularly with respect to aircraft; there 
are some counting rules with respect to 
artillery; there are questions about de- 
mobilization and deactivation of troops 
that are reduced. This has to be devel- 
oped in that sense, but hopefully, we 
can put it on the table at the September 
7 reconvening of the CFE discussions 
in Vienna. 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



President's Address, 


May 31, 198911 

Today I come to speak, not just of our 
mutual defense but of our shared val- 
ues. I come to speak, not just of the 
matters of the mind but of the deeper 
aspirations of the heart. 

Just this morning, Barbara and I 
were charmed with the e.xperiences we 
had. I met with a small group of Ger- 
man students, bright young men and 
women who studied in the United 
States. Their knowledge of our country 
and the world was impressive to say the 
least. But sadly, too many in the West, 
Americans and Europeans alike, seem 
to have forgotten the lessons of our 
common heritage and how the world we 
know came to be. And that should not 
be, and that cannot be. We must recall 
that the generation coming into its own 
in America and Western Europe i.s heir 
to gifts greater than those bestowed to 
any generation in history — peace, free- 
dom, and prosperity. 


NATO: Europe's Second Renaissance 

This inheritance is possible because 40 
years ago the nations of the West joined 
in that noble, common cause called 
NATO. First, there was the vision, the 
concept of free peoples in North Amer- 
ica and Europe working to protect 
their values. Second, there was the 
practical sharing of risks and burdens 
and a realistic recognition of Soviet ex- 
pansionism. And finally, there was the 
determination to look beyond old ani- 
mosities. The NATO alliance did noth- 
ing less than provide a way for Western 
Europe to heal centuries-old rivalries, 
to begin an era of reconciliation and 
restoration. It has been, in fact, a sec- 
ond renaissance of Europe. 

As you know best, this is not just 
the 40th birthday of the alliance. It's 
also the 40th birthday of the Federal 
Republic — a republic born in hope, 
tempered by challenge. And at the 
height of the Berlin crisis in 1948, 
Ernst Reuter called on Germans to 
stand firm and confident, and you did — 
courageously, magnificently. 

The historic genius of the German 
people has flourished in this age of 
peace. Your nation has become a leader 
in technology and the fourth largest 
economy on earth. But more impor- 
tant, you have inspired the world by 
• forcefully promoting the principles of 
human rights, democracy, and free- 
- dom. The United States and the Feder- 
al Republic have always been firm 
friends and allies. But today we share 
an added role — partners in leadership. 

Of course, leadership has a con- 
stant companion — responsibility. And 
our responsibility is to look ahead and 
grasp the promise of the future. I said 
recently that we're at the end of one era 
and at the beginning of another. And I 
noted that in regard to the Soviet 
Union, our policy is to move beyond 
containment. For 40 years, the 
seeds of democracy in Eastern Europe 
lay dormant, buried under the frozen 
tundra of the cold war. And for 40 
years, the world has waited for the cold 
war to end. Decade after decade, time 
after time, the flowering human spirit 
withered from the chill of conflict and 
oppression. And again, the world 
waited. But the passion for freedom 
cannot be denied forever. The world has 
waited long enough. The time is right. 
Let Europe be whole and free. 

To the founders of the alliance, this 
aspiration was a distant dream, and 
now it's the new mission of NATO. If 

ancient rivals like Britain and France, 
or France and Germany, can reconcile, 
then why not the nations of the East 
and West? 

Growing Political 
Freedoms in the East 

In the East, brave men and women are 
show-ing us the way. Look at Poland, 
where Solidarity — Solidarnosc — and 
the Catholic Church have W'on legal sta- 
tus. The forces of freedom are putting 
the Soviet status quo on the defensive. 

In the West, we have succeeded be- 
cause we've been faithful to our values 
and our vision. And the other side of 
the rusting Iron Curtain, their vision 

The cold war began with the divi- 
sion of Europe. It can only end when 
Europe is whole. Today, it is this very 
concept of a divided Europe that is un- 
der siege. And that's why our hopes run 
especially high, because the division of 
Europe is under siege not by armies, 
but by the spread of ideas that began 
here, right here. It was a son of Mainz, 
Johannes Gutenberg, who liberated the 
mind of man through the power of the 
printed word. 

And that same liberating power is 
unleashed today in a hundred new 
forms. The Voice of America, Deutsche 
Welle allows us to enlighten millions 
deep within Eastern Europe and 
throughout the world. Television satel- 
lites allow us to bear witness from the 
shipyards of Gdansk [Poland] to Tian- 
anmen Square [Beijing, China]. But 
the momentum for freedom does not 
just come from the printed word or the 
transistor or the television screen. It 
comes from a single powerful idea — 

This one idea is sweeping across 
Eurasia. This one idea is why the 
communist world, from Budapest to 
Beijing, is in ferment. Of course, for 
the leaders of the East, it's not just 
freedom for freedom's sake. But what- 
ever their motivation, they are unleash- 
ing a force they will find difficult to 
channel or control — the hunger for lib- 
erty of oppressed peoples who have 
tasted freedom. 

Nowhere is this more apparent 
than in Eastern Europe, the birthplace 
of the cold war. In Poland, at the end of 
World War II, the Soviet Army pre- 
vented the free elections promised by 
Stalin at Yalta. Today, Poles are taking 
the first steps toward real elections, so 
long promised — so long deferred. And 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


in Hungai'y, at last, we see a chance for 
multiparty competition at the ballot 

As President, I will continue to 
do all I can to help open the closed 
societies of the East. We seek self- 
determination for all of Germany and 
all of Eastern Europe. We will not re- 
lax, and we must not waiver. Again, the 
world has waited long enough. 

But democracy's journey East is 
not easy. Intellectuals like the great 
Czech playwright Vaclav Havel still 
work under the shadow of coercion. Re- 
pression still menaces too many peo- 
ples of Eastern Europe. Barriers and 
barbed wire still fence in nations. So 
when I visit Poland and Hungary this 
summer, I will deliver this message: 
There cannot be a common European 
home until all within it are free to 
move from room to room. And I'll take 
another message: The path of freedom 
leads to a larger home — a home where 
West meets East, a democratic home — 
the commonwealth of 
free nations. 

I said that positive steps by the So- 
viets would be met by steps of our own. 
This is why I announced on May 12th a 
readiness to consider granting to the 
Soviets a temporary waiver of the 
Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions, if 
they liberalize emigration. This is also 
why I announced, on Monday, that the 
United States is prepared to drop the 
"no-exceptions" standard that has 
guided our approach to controlling the 
export of technology to the Soviet 
Union — lifting a sanction enacted in 
response to their invasion of 

Proposals for a Whole 
and Free Europe 

In this same spirit, I set forth four pro- 
posals to heal Europe's tragic division, 
to help Europe become whole and free. 

First. I propose we strengthen and 
broaden the Helsinki process to pro- 
mote free elections and political plural- 
ism in Eastern Europe. As the foi'ces 
of freedom and democracy rise in the 
East, so should our expectations. 

And weaving together the slender 
threads of freedom in the East will 
require much from the Western de- 
mocracies. In particular, the great po- 
litical parties of the West must assume 
a historic responsibility — to lend coun- 
sel and support to those brave men and 
women who are trying to form the first 

truly representative political parties in 
the East, to advance freedom and de- 
mocracy, to part the Iron Curtain. 

In fact, it's already begun to part. 
The frontier of barbed wire and mine- 
fields between Hungary and Austria is 
being removed, foot by foot, mile by 
mile. Just as the barriers are coming 
down in Hungary, so must they fall 
throughout all of Eastern Europe. 
Let Berlin be next. 

Second. Nowhere is the division 
between East and West seen more 
clearly than in Berlin. There this bru- 
tal wall cuts neighbor from neighbor, 
brother from brother. That wall stands 
as a monument to the failure of commu- 
nism. It must come down. 

Now, glasnost may be a Russian 
word, but openness is a Western con- 
cept. West Berlin has always enjoyed 
the openness of a free city. Our pro- 
posal would make all Berlin a center of 
commerce between East and West — a 
place of cooperation, not a point of con- 
frontation. And we rededicate our- 
selves to the 1987 allied initiative to 
strengthen freedom and security in 
that divided city. This, then is my 
second proposal — bring glasnost to 
East Berlin. 

Third. My generation remembers a 

Europe ravaged by war. And, of 
course, Europe has long since rebuilt 
its proud cities and restored its majes- 
tic cathedrals. But what a tragedy it 
would be if your continent was again 
spoiled, this time by a more subtle and 
insidious danger — the Chancellor [Hel- 
mut Kohl] referred to it — that of poi- 
soned rivers and acid rain. 

America has faced an environmen- 
tal tragedy in Alaska. Countries from 
France to Finland suffered after Cher- 
nobyl. West Germany is struggling to 
save the Black Forest today. And 
throughout, we have all learned a terri- 
ble lesson — environmental destruction 
respects no borders. So my third pro- 
posal is to work together on these envi- 
ronmental problems, with the United 
States and Western Europe extending 
a hand to the East. Since much remains 
to be done in both East and West, we 
ask Eastern Europe to join us in this 
common struggle. We can offer techni- 
cal training, assistance in drafting 
laws and regulations, and new technol- 
ogies for tackling these awesome prob- 
lems. And I invite the environmental- 
ists and engineers of the East to visit 
the West, to share knowledge so we can 
succeed in this great cause. 

Fourth. My fourth proposal — 
actually, a set of proposals — concerns a 
less militarized Europe, the most 
heavily armed continent in the world. 
Nowhere is this more important than 
in the two Germanys. And that's why 
our quest to safely reduce armaments 
has a special significance for the Ger- 
man people. 

To those who are impatient with 
our measured pace in arms reductions, 
I respectfully suggest that history 
teaches us a lesson — that unity and 
strength are the catalyst and prerequi- 
site to arms control. We've always be- 
lieved that a strong Western defense is 
the best road to peace. Forty years of 
experience have proven us right. 

But we've done more than just keep 
the peace. By standing together, we 
have convinced the Soviets that their 
arms buildup has been costly and 
pointless. Let us not give them incen- 
tives to return to the policies of the 
past. Let us give them every reason to 
abandon the arms race for the sake of 
the human race. 

In this era of both negotiation and 
armed camps, America understands 
that West Germany bears a special bur- 
den. Of course, in this nuclear age, ev- 
ery nation is on the front line. But not 
all free nations are called to endure the 
tension of regular military activity, or 
the constant presence of foreign mili- 
tary forces. We are sensitive to these 
special conditions that this needed 
presence imposes. 

To significantly ease the burden of 
armed camps in Europe, we must be 
aggressive in our pursuit of solid, veri- 
fiable agreements between NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact. On Monday, with my 
NATO colleagues in Brussels, I shared 
my great hope for the future of conven- 
tional arms negotiations in Europe. I 
shared with them a proposal for achiev- 
ing significant reductions in the near 

As you know, the Warsaw Pact has 
now accepted major elements of our 
Western approach to the new conven- 
tional arms negotiations in Vienna. The 
Eastern bloc acknowledges that a sub- 
stantial imbalance exists between the 
conventional forces of the two alliances. 
And they've moved closer to NATO's 
position by accepting most elements of 
our initial conventional arms proposal. 
These encouraging steps have pro- 
duced the opportunity for creative and 
decisive action, and we shall not let 
that opportunity pass. 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



Our proposal has several key initia- 
tives. I propose that we "lock in" the 
Eastern agreement to Western- 
proposed ceilings on tanks and ar- 
mored troop carriers. We should also 
seek an agreement on a common nu- 
merical ceiling for artillery in the 
range between NATO's and that of the 
Warsaw Pact, provided these defini- 
tional problems can be solved. And the 
weapons we remove must be destroyed. 

We should expand our current offer 
to include all land-based combat air- 
craft and helicopters, by proposing 
that both sides reduce in these catego- 
ries to a level 15% below the current 
NATO totals. Given the Warsaw Pact's 
advantage in numbers, the pact would 
have to make far deeper reductions 
than NATO to establish parity at those 
lower levels. Again, the weapons we re- 
move must be destroyed. 

I propose a 20% cut in combat man- 
power in U.S. -stationed forces, and a 
resulting ceiling on U.S. and Soviet 
ground and air forces stationed outside 
national territory in the Atlantic-to- 
the-Urals zone, at approximately 
275,000 each. This reduction to parity, 
a fair and balanced level of 
strength, would compel the Soviets to 
reduce their 600,000-strong Red army 
in Eastern Europe by 325,000. And 
these withdrawn forces must be 

And finally, I call on President 
Gorbachev to accelerate the timetable 
for reaching these agreements. There 
is no reason why the 5-6 year timetable 
as suggested by Moscow is necessary. I 
propose a much more ambitious sched- 
ule. We should aim to reach an agree- 
ment within 6 months to 1 year and 
accomplish reductions by 1992 or 1993 
at the latest. 

In addition to my conventional 
arms proposals, I believe that we ought 
to strive to improve the openness with 
which we and the Soviets conduct our 
military activities. Therefore, I want 
to reiterate my support for greater 
transparency. I renew my proposal that 
the Soviet Union and its allies open 
their skies to reciprocal, unarmed aeri- 
al surveillance flights, conducted on 
short notice, to watch military activ- 
ities. Satellites are a very important 
way to verify arms control agreements. 
But they do not provide constant cover- 
age of the Soviet Union. An "open- 
skies" policy would move both sides 
closer to a total continuity of coverage, 
while symbolizing greater openness be- 
tween East and West. 

These are my proposals to achieve 
a less militarized Europe. A short time 
ago, they would have been too revolu- 
tionary to consider. And yet today, we 
may well be on the verge of a more am- 
bitious agreement in Europe than any- 
one considered possible. 

But we are also challenged by de- 
velopments outside NATO's traditional 
areas of concern. Every Western nation 
still faces the global proliferation of le- 
thal technologies, including ballistic 
missiles and chemical weapons. We 
must collectively control the spread of 
these growing threats. So we should 
begin as soon as possible with a world- 
wide ban on chemical weapons. 


Growing political freedom in the East, 
a Berlin without barriers, a cleaner en- 
vironment, a less militarized Europe — 
each is a noble goal, and taken together 
they are the foundation of our larger 
vision — a Europe that is free and at 
peace with itself. Let the Soviets know 
that our goal is not to undermine their 
legitimate security interests; our goal 
is to convince them, step by step, that 
their definition of security is obsolete, 
that their deepest fears are unfounded. 

When Western Europe takes its gi- 
ant step in 1992, it will institutionalize 
what's been true for years — borders 
open to people, commerce, and ideas. 
No shadow of suspicion, no sinister fear 
is cast between you. The very prospect 
of war within the West is unthinkable 
to our citizens. But such a peaceful in- 
tegration of nations into a world com- 
munity does not mean that any nation 
must relinquish its culture much less 
its sovereignty. 

This process of integration, a sub- 
tle weaving of shared interests, which 
is so nearly complete in Western Eu- 
rope, has now finally begun in the 
East. We want to help the nations of 
Eastern Europe realize what we, the 
nations of Western Europe, learned 
long ago. The foundation of lasting se- 
curity comes, not from tanks, troops, 
or barbed wire; it is built on shared 
values and agreements that link free 

The nations of Eastern Europe are 
rediscovering the glories of their na- 
tional heritage. So let the colors and 
hues of national culture return to these 
gray societies of the East. Let Europe 
forego a peace of tension for a peace of 
trust, one in which the peoples of the 
East and West can rejoice; a continent 
that is diverse, yet whole. 

Forty years of cold war have tested 
Western resolve and the strength of our 
values. NATO's first mission is now 
nearly complete. But if we are to fulfill 
our vision — our European vision — the 
challenges of the next 40 years will ask 
no less of us. Together, we shall answer 
the call. The world has waited long 

Thank you for inviting me to 
Mainz. May God bless you all. Long live 
the friendship between Germany and 
the United States. 

Remarks and 


June 1,198912 

President Bush 

Let me just thank the Prime Minister 
on behalf of our entire traveling squad. 
She and I talked in detail about a wide 
array of issues. I want to thank her, 
and I want to assert here that the spe- 
cial relationship that has existed be- 
tween the United Kingdom and the 
United States is continuing and will 
continue. Once again. Madam Prime 
Minister, iny sincere thanks to you for 
a very encouraging and frank exchange 
that we had. It's only with friends that 
you can take off the gloves and talk 
from the heart. I felt that I was with a 
friend today, and I can assure the peo- 
ple in the United Kingdom that, from 
our side of the Atlantic, this relation- 
ship is strong and will continue to be. 

Prime IVIinister Thatcher 

The President comes here after a very, 
very successful NATO summit due to 
the leadership of the United States un- 
der the Presidency of George Bush. We 
talked about the followup to these mat- 
ters. We talked also about the very dif- 
ficult situation in the Middle East. We 
talked about the situation in China. We 
talked about matters in South Africa. 
And we have talked about matters in 
the Argentine and in Central America. 

I think you'll agree we have cov- 
ered an extremely wide range of sub- 
jects, and yet the morning has been too 
short. We spoke together for about an 
hour and three-quarters and then 
joined our foreign ministers and Mr. 


Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


Scowcroft [Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs]. They, 
too, had considered some of these mat- 
ters and others. We then also talked 
about the problems in Cambodia and 
the problems with the Vietnamese boat 
people still going to Hong Kong. 

So, you can see that we have com- 
pressed a great deal into the time. We 
think very much the same way, which 
isn't surprising. We're absolutely de- 
lighted that we have in President Bush 
a President of the United States who is 
staunch and steadfast on everything 
which is of fundamental value to democ- 
racy, freedom, and justice — necessary 
to keep our country secure and yet for- 
ever stretching out the hand of friend- 
ship with other nations across the 
European divide, trying to e.xtend to 
the world some of the benefits which we 
enjoy but take for granted. 

We are in a period when, as the 
President has said in some of his most 
e.xcellent speeches, it's the end of con- 
tainment. It's freedom on the 
offensive — a peaceful offensive — 
throughout the world. I think they 
have been some of the most valuable 
and happy talks I've had for a very long 
time, and we thank and congratulate 
the President. 

Q. Is Britain America's most im- 
portant ally in Europe? 

Prime Minister Thatcher. I think 
you might put it more tactfully. 
[Laughter] America has allies through- 
out Europe and throughout the free 
world. I would like to think that we 
pride ourselves being among the fore- 
most of U.S. friends, and we will al- 
ways be. I think it's quite wrong, that 
because you have one friend, you should 
e.xclude the possibility of other friend- 
ships as well. And I'm sure the Presi- 
dent doesn't, and I don't. We both have 
many friends in Europe. 

President Bush. Very good 

Q. Do you think that West Ger- 
many and France will increasingly 
share the spotlight in the so-called 
special relationship you have with 
Mrs. Thatcher? 

President Bush. I think that the 
special relationship that I referred to 
in my opening remarks speaks for it- 
self. And I think the remarks that the 
Prime Minister just made about U.K.'s 
propensity for friendship with other na- 
tions and the U.S. friendship with oth- 
er nations — those remarks speak for 
themselves. I would simply say, I ex- 
pect this relationship to continue on 
the steady keel because it is so funda- 
mentally based on common values. The 

Prime Minister Thatcher and the President. 

NATO alliance, for example, is not 
going to divide up into inside cliques of 
who is the closest friend to whom. 

But the point I want to make here 
is that I value the judgment, the con- 
viction, the principled stance of Prime 
Minister Thatcher I've been privileged 
to know her and work with her in a — for 
me, a lesser capacity, for 8 years. This 
visit alone, as we crossed many, many 
borders and discussed the problems, 
reassures me and just reaffirms what 
I've always felt: that we have a very, 
very special relationship. But it needn't 
be at the expense of our friendship 
with other countries. 

Q. What exactly can Britain do 
to bring about this further freedom in 
Eastern Europe that you said you 
want to see? 

President Bush. They've already 
done one step, and that is to help NATO 
come out with a very sound proposal. I 
can tell you that the Prime Minister 
and her able Foreign Minister [Sir 
Geoffrey Howe] helped shape this 
whole NATO proposal, which both of us 
think is a very forward-looking docu- 
ment, adhering to principles. It's not a 
question of the future; they've already 
performed since I've been here in the 
last few days a very useful role. There 
are many other areas where, just on a 
bilateral basis, that I'm sure the Unit- 

ed Kingdom can influence and encour- 
age this trend to democracy that the 
Prime Minister referred to — many oth- 
er areas. The United Kingdom is wide- 
ly respected in Eastern Europe. 

Secretary Baker's 
News Briefing, 
June 1,198913 

Let me just briefly say that the Presi- 
dent's meetings with Prime Minister 
Thatcher marked the end of a success- 
ful week of consultation with all allies. 
The President thanked the Prime Min- 
ister for her steadfast support of our 
Central American policies, for her work 
to move the Angola-Namibia accords 
along successfully to keep the agree- 
ment in Namibia from unraveling, the 
excellent work that she did when she 
was in southern Africa, and the con- 
cern that she and her government have 
shown for the United States with re- 
spect to the tragedy of PanAm #103. 



In addition, the President and the 
Prime Minister discussed matters in- 
volving fbllowup on the conventional 
forces initiative that the President pre- 
sented at the NATO summit. They dis- 
cussed Eastern Europe with reference 
particularly to the President's speech 
in Mainz. They discussed the situation 
in China. They discussed the Middle 
East, particularly the situation in the 
occupied territories, and they dis- 
cussed the problem.s presented by the 
influx of Vietnamese boat people to 
Hong Kong. 

Q. I wonder if you could give us 
an idea of the problems, or at least 
the difficulties, that are ahead in the 
troop reduction arrangement. There 
have been suggestions — storing — the 
West prestores a lot of equipment. 
There are other problems about 
whether the FVench and British 
troops — but I'd like your version of 
what are the difficult things ahead. 

A. There are questions involving 
verification. There are questions, in- 
deed, involving stored equipment. 
There are questions, obviously, involv- 
ing the extent to which troops must be 
demobilized and deactivated. All of 
these things have first got to be sorted 
out within the NATO alliance so that 
the alliance is able to table a specific 
proposal at the resumption of the dis- 
cussions in Vienna on September 7th. 
Both the Prime Minister and the Presi- 
dent focused on the importance of con- 
tinuing to move the debate within 
NATO along so that the alliance will be 
ready to table a position on 
September — 

Q. Is the President's timetable 
still feasible, or is it very optimistic — 
about () months — 

A. It hasn't changed from the way 
I characterized it yesterday, which, it 
was optimistic but not unrealistic. I 
think that's a fair statement. The first 
thing, as I indicated before, that we 
have to do is formalize the alliance po- 
sition on this initiative. We have to 
work that out within the context of the 
NATO alliance and within the organi- 
zation at Brussels. 

Q. You spoke about this being the 
end of a week of successful consulta- 
tions. Does this have any impact on 
(ieorge Hush's presidency in view of 
all the criticism that he had had be- 
fore he came here about being too 
cautious and too timid in terms of 
dealing with the Soviet Union? 

A. I would hope that it might put 
to rest some of that speculation. It is 
important, I think, that an American 
President be seen to be leading the alli- 
ance. I would respectfully submit that 
the President was seen actively and ag- 
gressively and effectively leading the 
NATO alliance during the course of 
this week. 

Q. I gather that Mrs. Thatcher 
was rather unhappy with the fact 
that we still have some military aid 
going to the Argentinians. Was that 
the only area that you had contention 
at your meetings today? And if so, do 
you see any way that can be resolved? 

A. There really was not contention 
with respect to that. The matter of Ar- 
gentina remains important to the 
Prime Minister. She expressed her ap- 
preciation for our willingness to work 
closely with the United Kingdom and to 
consult with them with respect to the 
modest amounts of military aid that 
have been suggested for Argentina. I 
would not characterize that as a matter 
of contention. 

Q. The United States and Great 
Britain have always had a special re- 
lationship. Do you expect that to 
change at all in 1992 when they join 
Europe more fully in the open 

A. No, I don't expect it to change. 
I think that the special relationship be- 
tween the United States and the Unit- 
ed Kingdom is strong, it is enduring, it 
is based on a number of things. But we 
have been close friends and allies for 
many, many years, and I don't think 
that's going to be diminished as a con- 
sequence of EC 1992. It has not been 
diminished as a consequence of NATO 
and other multilateral organizations in 
which both countries are parties. 

Q. The President spoke a lot 
about Eastern Europe yesterday, in 
both the communique and the com- 
prehensive concept also did. Is this 
signaling a new intention to step up 
the U.S. role in Eastern Europe, or 
an attempt to shape events there? 

A. I think it's important that we 
recognize — and this is w'hat the Presi- 
dent's speech did, in my view — that 
there is fundamental change taking- 
place in some countries in Eastern Eu- 
rope. We must be able to properly man- 
age our response to that change. What 
the President called for, of course, was 
to end the division of Europe on the ba- 
sis of Western values. That means that 

we must be responsive to those coun- 
tries that are trying to open up both 
economically and politically. It does not 
mean that we should abandon our poli- 
cy of differentiation. 

Q. [Former Defense] Secretary 
Carlucci, before he left office, recom- 
mended a follow-on to the Lance sys- 
tem called the MLRS [multiple- 
launch rocket system]. Will this Ad- 
ministration carry through with that 
decision by Secretary Carlucci, or are 
you going to go back and rethink the 
MLRS system as a follow-on to 

A. That's a decision that has not, 
as yet, been formally taken by the 
President. He will have to consider that 
as one possibility, as one option. He 
may decide that he wants to consider 
some other options as well. But now we 
have a situation where the questions on 
production and deployment are deci- 
sions that will be made in calendar vear 

Q. You said the other day in an- 
swer to a question that the Presi- 
dent's proposal at NATO did not 
amount to an abandonment of his 
policy review. It was not a signal of 
dis-appointment with it, indeed, that 
the discussions about this sort of pro- 
posal dated way back to the early 
days of the Administration. I wonder 
if you could elaborate on that further 
and give us some further description 
of the steps that were taken that pro- 
duced this. 

A. I can't elaborate much beyond 
what I said. I perhaps could clear up 
something that I think might have been 
misinterpreted. What I said was that 
this proposal was not initially devel- 
oped within the bureaucracies — and 
that is true. 

It was ultimately, however, run by 
the bureaucracies before the President 
finally signed off on it. The President 
himself suggested the idea that we ex- 
plore this as a possibility early on in 
the Administration — 

Q. You say "this." What do you 
mean by "this?" 

A. The conventional forces initia- 
tive or something like it — something 
like this conventional forces initiative 
that he has put forward — his CPI, if 
you want to call it that — his Conven- 
tional Paritv Initiative. 


Department of State Bulletin/August 198S 


Q. Did the Prime Minister ex- 
press objections or reservations to 
even the modest sale of arms to Ar- 
gentina by the United States? 

A. I think that the Prime 
Minister — as I tried to put it a moment 
ago — is very a])preciative of the fact 
that we consult very, very closely with 
the United Kindgom with respect to 
any proposed sales of arms to 
Argentina. - 

Q. But did she specifically object | 
to any sales? p 

A. Not that I am aware of, no. ^ 

Q. Can you tell us when, exactly, s 
it was decided to table this proposal — -| 
I mean, not to table it. but when it I 

was decided that this was the pro- i 

posal you were going to make? Be- | 
cause when you said the other day 
that this is something you've been 
talking about for months — the gener- 
al concept — I was given to believe 
that that's exactly what you meant — 
the general concept. When did this — 

A. Yes, I did mean the general 

Q. When did this come into play 
as a real-life proposal that you could 
actually make here? Was it in the last 
3 weeks? Can you just tell us — 

A. Probably the final shape of it 
would have been in the last 3 weeks, 

Q. .•Xnd whose idea was it 

A. It was the President's idea. 

Q. He said he'd like to cut forces 
in Europe and 1.5% of the aircraft? 

A. He said, "I would like to look at 
something in this area." There were a 
whole host of things that were initially 
looked at. But then, it was important to 
the President, as he has said before, 
that this have a complete and thorough 
scrub by the military to make certain 
that it was militarily appropriate and 
sound and made good sense from a mili- 
tary standpoint. And that's what 

Q. Was this after your trip to 
Moscow when you got the inklings of 
what kind of response they were 
going to have to the NATO proposal? 

A. The President's final sign-off 
came after my trip to Moscow. 

The President and Mrs. Bush were guests lor lunch with Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth 
II and His Royal Highness Prince Philip at Buckingham Palace. 

Q. Was the major part of the de- 
velopment of the initiative after the 
trip to Moscow? 

A. It's hard to say, but if I had to 
say, the major part probably. Although 
I have to tell you that this is something 
that the President had an interest in 
going way, way back. And it was dis- 
cussed among his top advisers — all of 
his top advisers. 

Q. Soviet Foreign Minister Shev- 
ardnadze has said in Paris that the 
Soviets would demand a withdrawal 
of French and British troops from 
West Germany, as well as a condition 
for acceptance of the 275,000 troop 
level. What is your reaction to that, 
and what was Mrs. Thatcher's reac- 
tion to that? 

A. I'm not sure that that was spe- 
cifically discussed with the Prime Min- 
ister. I didn't hear that as an item of 
specific discussion. But my reaction to 
that is there are a lot of Warsaw Pact 
troops in there, too, that are not in- 
cluded in this poposal. This is a U.S.- 
Soviet proposal to the extent that it in- 
volves manpower. 

With respect to the other 
elements — aircraft, helicopters, tanks, 
artillery, and armored personnel 
carriers — it's Warsaw Pact to Warsaw 

Q. Can we fine tune that? You re- 
member the problem with intermedi- 
ate range. The U.S. argument was, 
look, this is U.S. -Soviet. We're not re- 
sponsible for German missiles, and 

you had to work out kind of a special 
deal. Are you saying now that there 
will be sort of two-level negotiations? 
Troops will not be a NATO— 

A. No, no, I'm not saying it will be 
negotiated that way, but I'm answering 
the question about — that the minister 
has said we want to see what happens 
to French and British troops. I suppose 
we will have an interest in knowing 
what happens to other Warsaw Pact 
troops other than Soviet troops. But 
the negotiation will take place within 
the alliance. 

Q. I note some insecurity on the 
part of Britain; this major concentra- 
tion on the special relationship. Are 
the British afraid that we are — it's a 
"mirror, mirror on the wall, who do 
you love the most?" Are they afraid — 

A. I didn't notice a special concen- 
tration. I noticed one question at a 
press conference. 

Q. The President emphasized it, 
and the British reporters seem to 
think there is something — 

A. The President emphasized it in 
response to a question about it, and 
what he said was there is a special rela- 
tionship. He told the Prime Minister 
this, by the way, during the course of 
their discussions. It is something that 
we talk about all the time in bilateral 
discussions with respresentatives of the 
United Kingdom, because it is there. 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



Q. But is it a worry? 

A. It's not a worry as far as we're 
concerned, and I don't think it's a wor- 
ry as far as the United Kingdom is 

Q. You spoke earlier about the 
need to have further discussions with- 
in NATO before a full conventional 
forces proposal can be tabled. Is there 
a timetable now about how long that's 
likelv to take, and what the process 
will be? 

A. As I think I may have said ear- 
lier, we would like to see that process 
completed by the 7th of September so 
that when the conventional forces talks 
reconvene in Vienna on that date, we 
will be able to table a specific 
proposal — a proposal that will have 
been fleshed out to the extent that the 
questions^some of which have come up 
here today — will have been resolved. 
There are questions that have to be re- 
solved. We're shooting at September 

Q. Was there any discussion with 
the Prime Minister about the possible 
withdrawal of some U.S. troops from 
Britain and also any discussion about 
British dual-capable aircraft being — 

A. There w-as no discussion about 
the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Bri- 
tain, but there was a discussion with 
respect to the question of dual-capable 
aircraft. The President indicated to the 
Prime Minister that it is not his inten- 
tion in advancing this initiative that it 
involve the dual-capable aircraft of the 
United Kingdom or France. 

I might say that the reservations of 
each of those countries in this regard 
had been expressed to us during the 
course of our prior consultations with 
those countries about this initiative. 
We think that the aircraft element in 
the proposal can be accomplished with- 
out getting into the dual-capable air- 
craft of the United Kingdom or France. 

Q. The British Government 
wants the principle accepted by the 
international community that the 
boat people could, if necessary, be 
sent back against their will to Viet- 
nam. They want this principle to be 
accepted at the international confer- 
ence in Geneva next month. The Unit- 
ed States has been against this 
principle until now. I gather it was 
discussed today. Can you tell us if 
that is still your position? 

A. Yes, it is still the position of the 
United States; that is, that we support 
the right of first asylum, and we also 
support freedom of choice where refu- 
gees are concerned. We are talking, of 
course, about political refugees. There 
will be a discussion in Vienna on the 
13th and 14th of June, and this matter 
will come up and be discussed further. 
But the position of the United States is 
as you have stated it and as I have just 
repeated it. 

Q. [Foreign Minister] Shev- 
ardnadze is saying that your timeta- 
ble is too fast, that they can't move 
that fast. Do you think that the Presi- 
dent has managed to put the shoe on 
the other foot, so to speak? Do you 
think that the Soviets are on the de- 
fensive here and that you have put the 
President on the offensive? 

A. I don't know about that. I'm not 
going to get into that. I do think this — 

Q. What's your reaction to what 
he said? 

A. I do think this, that the dynam- 
ics now are that the ball is in their 
court and a response by them is now 
clearly called for, and it will be inter- 
esting to see exactly what that re- 
sponse is. 

Q. This is his response, and he's 
saying you're trying to go too fast. 
What's your answer to that? 

A. No, no, this is not his response. 
This may be a preliminary part of his 
response, but my answer to that is 
that, yes, this is an optimistic timeta- 
ble, but it is not an unrealistic timeta- 
ble, particularly if we have cooperation 
from the Soviet Union. 

Q. We were told you discussed the 
Middle East with Mrs. Thatcher to- 
day. What in your opinion, if any- 
thing, is there that Britain can do 
about the Middle East? When Mr. 
Shamir was here recently, he was 
very upset about the speech you made 
in America. But what, in your opin- 
ion, can Britain do that the Soviet 
Union and the United States can't do 

A. I think that the United King- 
dom, and other countries in Europe for 
that matter, can join the United 
States — and maybe there can be a Sovi- 
et component in this — in supporting 
Prime Minister Shamir's proposal for 
elections in the West Bank as a means 
to get into a broader political negotia- 
tion. And it's in that context that the 
Prime Minister advanced his elections 

I frankly believe, following these 
discussions here today, that there is 
some chance that we will see — well, I 
know there's more than some chance — 
we will have the active support of the 
United Kingdom in trying to use the 
concept of elections to move the peace 
process forward in the Middle East. 

Q. You are totally for that elec- 
tion proposal? You are for it, 

A. Oh, yes, as I have said, we are 
totally for it. We think it offers the best 
chance to move the peace process 

Arrival Remarks, 
New Hampshire, 
June 2, 1989i'» 

In the last week, Barbara and I have 
been to Rome and the Vatican, 
Brussels, Bonn, and London, and work- 
ing with our allies in Europe, we set a 
course for the future. We must move to 
fulfill that promise — move beyond con- 
tainment, move beyond the era of con- 
flict and cold war that the world has 
known for more than 40 years — because 
keeping the peace in Europe means 
keeping the peace for America. Our al- 
liance seeks a less militarized 
Europe — a safer world for all of us. 

I'm now returning from Europe 
with a message for the American 
people — a message of hope. We have a 
great and historic opportunity to shape 
the changes that are transforming Eu- 
rope. This chance has been delivered 
not just because of our strength and re- 
solve but also because of our power of 
ideas, especially one idea which is 
sweeping the communist world — 

For the last 6 weeks, I've pre- 
sented, in a series of speeches, ways to 
deal with these changes to make the 
most of this opportunity. Let me 

In Michigan [April 17], I stressed 
that the United States will actively en- 
courage peaceful reform led by the 
forces of freedom in Eastern Europe. 
The Texas speech [May 12] explains 
America's commitment to a balanced 
approach to our relationship with the 
Soviet Union — that we must remain 


Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


strong and realistic, judge their 
performance, not their rhetoric, all the 
while seeking a friendship with the So- 
viets that knows no season of suspicion. 
At Boston University [May 21], the fo- 
cus was our partnership with a more 
united Western Europe — of how a 
strong Europe means a strong Ameri- 
ca. Then at the Coast Guard Academy 
[May 24], I said that America is ready 
to seize every — and I do mean every — 
opportunity to bring the Soviet Union 
into the community of nations. 

Then with my colleagues in 
Brussels, on the 40th anniversary of 
the founding of the North Atlantic alli- 
ance, we celebrated NATO's 40 years of 
success in preserving the peace in 
Europe — the longest period without 
war in all the recorded history of that 

We were reminded that once again, 
the future of so many nations depends 
on NATO's unity and resolve. We were 
reminded that NATO must remain 
strong and together, and we were chal- 
lenged to seize this new opportunity for 
progress while staying true to the 
principles that got us here. 

We met that challenge. We agreed 
to strive — to hope for a Europe that is 
whole and free. At the Rheingoldhalle 
in Mainz in the heart of Germany, I 
said that the cold war began with the 
division of Europe, and it must end 
with a reconciliation based on shared 
values where East joins West in a com- 
monwealth of free nations. 

That is my vision for the future, 
and here is how we got there. The War- 
saw Pact has a lot more planes, a lot 
more arms, a lot more troops in Europe 
than the NATO alliance, and we chal- 
lenge the Soviets, if they are serious, 
to reduce to equal numbers. Our pro- 
posal is bold but fundamentally fair, 
and every single one of our allies 
agreed with our proposal. 

We proposed a new initiative for 
more comprehensive and faster negoti- 
ated cuts in conventional arms to lift 
the West at last from the shadow cast 
over Europe since 1945 by massive So- 
viet ground and air forces, and our al- 
lies agreed. We proposed that Berlin, 
East and West, become a center of co- 
operation, not confrontation, and our 
allies agreed. We proposed that we 
strengthen the Helsinki process to sup- 

port free elections in Eastern Europe, 
and our allies agreed. 

Because the threat of environmen- 
tal destruction knows no borders, we 
proposed that the West enlist the coun- 
tries of Eastern Europe in one of the 
great causes of our time — the common 
struggle to save our natural heritage. 

With our agreement in NATO on 
our short-range nuclear forces in Eu- 
rope, we demonstrated as an alliance 
that we can manage change while re- 
maining true to the strategy of deter- 
rence which has kept the peace. 

In short, this week's NATO sum- 
mit in Brussels showed that we are 
ready to help shape a new world. In 
this period of historic change, NATO 
has never been more united, never been 
stronger, and we issued a summit dec- 
laration detailing our vision for the fu- 
ture and plan of action. Ours is not an 
arrogant challenge to Mr. Gorbachev; 
it's an appeal in good fath. The summit 
was a triumph for the alliance, a tri- 
umph of ideas, and, most of all, it was a 
triumph of hope. 

Let me say it is truly gratifying 
that all of this was understood so well 
at home and abroad. While keeping our 
defenses up and our eyes wide open, we 
must go forward. We must stay on the 
offensive. We must get to work now to 
end the cold war. The world has waited 
long enough, and if we succeed, the 
world your children will know — the 
world of the 21st century — will be all 
the better. 

We are delighted to be here. I sa- 
lute the men and women of Pease Air 
Force Base, who help keep the peace. I 
thank my friends and neighbors from 
New Hampshire, and 1 even spot a few 
from Kennebunkport, Maine, here. I 
thank the two governors and the mem- 
bers of the U.S. Congress who came 
out to greet us, and I particularly 
thank a former governor of the State of 
New Hampshire standing over here, 
my able chief of staff, John Sununu; our 
Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney; our 
Secretary of State, Jim Baker; and my 
very able friend and adviser, the head 
of the National Security Council, Gen. 
Brent Scowcroft. 

Barbara and I are overwhelmed by 
this welcome home. Thank you all. God 
bless you, and God bless the United 
States of America. 

'Made at Andrews Air Force Base (text 
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of May 29, 1989). 

-Made at Ciampino Airport (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments of June 5). 

^Made at the Villa Madama (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments of June 5). 

■•Interview by Garrick Utley, NBC 
News; Robert Kaiser, The Washington Post; 
and Albert Hunt, The Wall Street Journal 
(press release 100 of May 30). 

^Made at Brussels International Airport 
(text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of June 5). 

i^Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of June .5. 

"France takes this opportunity to recall 
that, since the mandate for the Vienna nego- 
tiations excludes nuclear weapons, it retains 
complete freedom of judgment and decision 
regarding the resources contributing to the 
implementation of its independent nuclear 
deterrent strategy. 

spress release 101. 

^Held in the Chancellery. Chancellor 
Kohl spoke in German, and his remarks 
were translated by an interpreter (text 
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of June 5). 

•"Held in the Meritin Hotel (press re- 
lease 102 of May ;31). 

"Made before citizens of Mainz at Rhe- 
ingoldhalle (text from Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents of June 5). 

i^Held at 10 Downing Street after their 
meeting (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of June 5). 

'^Held at the Royal Lancaster Hotel 
(press release 107 of June 6). 

"Made at Pease Air Force Base (text 
from Weekly Compilaton of Presidential 
Documents of June 12). ■ 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



News Conferences of June 5 and 8 

President Bush held news confer- 
ences at the White House on June 5 
andS, 1989.'' 

JUNE 5, 1989 

During the past few days, elements of 
the Chinese Army have been brutally 
suppressing popular and peaceful dem- 
onstrations in China. There has been 
widespread and continuing violence, 
many casualties, and many deaths. We 
deplore the decision to use force, and I 
now call on the Chinese leadership pub- 
licly, as I have in private channels, to 
avoid violence and to return to their 
previous policy of restraint. 

The demonstrators in Tiananmen 
Square were advocating basic human 
rights, including the freedom of ex- 
pression, freedom of the press, free- 
dom of association. These are goals we 
support around the world. These are 
freedoms that are enshrined in both 
the U.S. Constitution and the Chinese 
Constitution. Throughout the world, we 
stand with those who seek greater 
freedom and democracy. This is the 
strongly felt view of my Administra- 
tion, of our Congress, and, most impor- 
tant, of the American people. 

In recent weeks we've urged mutu- 
al restraint, nonviolence, and dialogue. 
Instead, there has been a violent and 
bloody attack on the demonstrators. 
The United States cannot condone the 
violent attacks and cannot ignore the 
consequences for our relationship with 
China, which has been built on a foun- 
dation of broad support by the Ameri- 
can people. This is not the time for an 
emotional response but for a reasoned, 
careful action that takes into account 
both our long-term interests and recog- 
nition of a comple.x internal situation in 

There clearly is turmoil within the 
ranks of the political leadership, as 
well as the Peoples Liberation Army. 
Now is the time to look beyond the mo- 
ment to important and enduring as- 
pects of this vital relationship for the 
United States. Indeed, the budding of 
democracy which we have seen in re- 
cent weeks owes much to the relation- 
ship we have developed since 1972. It's 
im])ortant at this time to act in a way 
that will encourage the further devel- 
opment and deepening of the positive 
elements of that relationship and the 

process of democratization. It would be 
a tragedy for all if China were to pull 
back to its pre-1972 era of isolation and 

Mindful of these complexities, and 
yet of the necessity to strongly and 
clearly express our condemnation of the 
events of recent days, I am ordering 
the following actions: Suspension of all 
government-to-government sales and 
commercial exports of weapons, sus- 
pension of visits between U.S. and Chi- 
nese military leaders, sympathetic 
review of requests by Chinese students 
in the United States to extend their 
stay, and the offer of humanitarian and 
medical assistance through the Red 
Cross to those injured during the as- 
sault, and review of other aspects of 
our bilateral relationship as events in 
China continue to unfold. 

The process of democratization of 
communist societies will not be a 
smooth one, and we must react to set- 
backs in a way which stimulates rather 
than stifles progress toward open and 
representative systems. 

Q. You have said the genie of de- 
mocracy cannot be put back in the 
bottle in China. You said that, how- 
ever, before the actions of the past 
weekend. Do you still believe that? 
And are there further steps that the 
United States could take, such as eco- 
nomic sanctions, to further democra- 
cy in China? 

A. Yes, I still believe that. I be- 
lieve the forces of democracy are so 
powerful, and when you see them as re- 
cently as this morning — a single stu- 
dent standing in front of a tank, and 
then, I might add, seeing the tank driv- 
er exercise restraint — I am convinced 
that the forces of democracy are going 
to overcome these unfortunate events 
in Tiananmen Square. 

On the commercial side, I don't 
want to hurt the Chinese people. I haji- 
pen to believe that the commercial con- 
tacts have led, in essence, to this quest 
for more freedom. I think as people 
have commercial incentive, whether it's 
in China or in other totalitarian sys- 
tems, the move to democracy becomes 
more inexorable. So what we've done is 
suspended certain things on the mili- 
tary side, and my concern is with those 
in the military who are using force. 
And yet when 1 see some exercising re- 
straint and see the big divisions that 

exist inside the PLA [People's Libera- 
tion Army], I think we need to move 
along the lines I've outlined here. I 
think that it's important to keep saying 
to those elements in the Chinese mili- 
tary, "Restraint: Continue to show the 
restraint that many of you have 
shown." I understand there are deep 
divisions inside the army. So this is, 
we're putting the emphasis on that side 
of it. 

Q. Have you had any personal 
contact with the Chinese leadership? 
Why do you think they moved in the 
way they did? And why did you wait so 

A. I don't think we've waited so 
long. I made very clear, in a personal 
communication to Deng Xiaoping 
[Chairman of China's Central Military 
Commission], my views on this. I 
talked to the [U.S.] Ambassador last 
night, .Jim Lilley. He's been in touch 
constantly with the Chinese officials, 
and so, I don't feel that we've waited 
long, when you have a force of this na- 
ture and you have events of this nature 
unfolding. We are the United States 
and they are China, and what I want to 
do is continue to urge freedom, democ- 
racy, respect, nonviolence, and with 
great admiration in my heart for the 
students. So, I don't think we've waited 

Q. What impelled the Chinese 
Government? They did wait a long 
time, more than we expected, really, 
and — 

A. Yes, they did. 

Q. — then they finally moved in. 
What do you think is the impetus? 

A. I'm glad you raised that point. 
We were, and have been, and will con- 
tinue to urge restraint, and they did. 
The army did show restraint. When 
Wan Li [Chairman, Standing Commit- 
tee, National People's Congress] was 
here [May 23], he told me — and this is 
very Chinese, the way he expressed 
it — the army loves the Chinese 
people. They showed restraint for a 
long time, and I can't begin to fathom 
for you exactly what led to the order to 
use force, because even as recently as a 
couple of days ago, there was evidence 
that the military were under orders not 
to use force. So I think we have to wait 
now until that unfolds. 


Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


Q. Could you give us your cur- 
rent, best assessment of the political 
situation there; which leaders are up, 
which are down, who apparently has 
prevailed here, and who apparently 
das lost? 

A. It's too obscure, it's too be- 

louded to say. And I would remind you 
Df the history. In the Cultural Revolu- 
tion days, Deng Xiaoping at Mao 
Zedong's right hand, was put out. He 

ame back in 1976. He was put out 
igain in the last days of Mao Zedong 
ind the days of the Gang of Four. Then 
16 came back in, and, to his credit, he 
noved China toward openness, toward 
iemocracy, toward reform. Suddenly 
ve see a reversal. I don't think there's 
inybody in this country that can an- 
swer your question with authority at 

his point. It doesn't work that way in 
lealing with China. 

Q. But there have been reports 
hat Deng was behind the move to or- 
ler the troops, and other reports that 
le's ailing and in a hospital. What do 
'ou know about that? 

A. Don't know for sure on either, 
ind I've talked to our Ambassador on 
hat, as I say, last night, and we just 
an't confirm one way or another on the 

Q. You spoke of the need for the 
Jnited States to maintain relations 
vith China. But given the brutality 
»f the attacks over the last couple of 
lays, can the United States ever re- 
urn to business as usual with the 
urrent regime? 

A. I don't want to see a total break 
n this relationship, and I will not en- 
ourage a total break in the relation- 
hip. This relationship is, when you see 
hese kids struggling for democracy 
nd freedom, this would be a bad time 
or the United States to withdraw and 
lull back and leave them to the devices 
fa leadership that might decide to 
rack down further. Some have sug- 
ested I take the Ambassador out. In 
ly view, that would be 180 degrees 
iTong. Our Ambassador provides one 
f the best listening posts we have in 
Jhina. He is thoroughly experienced, 
tnd so let others make proposals that 
n my view don't make much sense. I 
rant to see us stay involved and contin- 
e to work for restraint and for human 
ights and for democracy. And then 
own the road, we have enormous com- 
monality of interests with China, but it 
ifill not be the same under a brutal and 
epressive regime. 

So I stop short of suggesting that 
what we ought to do is break relations 
with China, and I would like to encour- 
age them to continue their change. 

Q. You're sending a message to 
the military and to the government. A 
couple of weeks ago, you told the stu- 
dents to continue to stand by their be- 
liefs. What message do you want the 
students to hear from what you're 
saying right now? 

A. That we support their quest for 
democracy, for reform, and for free- 
dom. There should be no doubt about 
that. Then, in sending this message to 
the military, I would encourage them 
to go back to the posture of a few days 
ago that did show restraint, and that 
did recognize the rights of the people, 
and that did epitomize what that Chi- 
nese leader told me, that the army 
loves the people. There are still vivid 
e.xamples of that. 

Q. Should the students go home? 
Should the students stop trying to 
fight the army? 

A. I can't dictate to the students 
what they should do from halfway 
around the world. But we support the 
quest for democracy and reform, and 
I'd just have to repeat that. 

Q. I'd like to ask you about the 
other development in Iran. What is 
your assessment of who is in charge, 
and what opportunities the changes 
in Iran create for the United States? 

A. We're not sure yet. Khamenei 
[President Hojatolislam Ali] appears to 
be the annointed successor, the will 
having been read by Khomeini's son. 
But, again, in a society of that nature, 
it's hard to predict. I would simply re- 
peat what I said on January 20th, that 
there is a way for a relationship with 
the United States to improve, and that 
is for a release of the American hos- 
tages. But I can't give you an answer 
on that one. No experts here can yet, 

Q. Do you plan any overture? 

A. I just made it. 

Q. Do you plan any overtures or 
any other kind of opening toward 
Iran, toward the new government? 

A. No, absolutely not. They know 
what they need to do. They have been a 
terrorist state. And as soon as we see 
some move away from oppression and 
extremism of that nature, we will re- 
view our relationship. 

Q. Would you elaborate on the 
question of economic sanctions — back 
to China. Did you consider economic 
sanctions for this morning's an- 
nouncement, and what will you do if 
the violence escalates? 

A. I reserve the right to take a 
whole new look at things if the violence 
escalates, but I've indicated to you why 
I think the suspension of certain mili- 
tary relationships is better than 
moving — on the economic side. 

Q. Do you feel that the Chinese 
leadership cares what the United 
States does or thinks right now? 

A. I think they are in the sense of 
contradiction themselves right now. 
China has historically been less than 
totally interested in what other coun- 
tries think of their performance. You 
have to just look back to the Middle 
Kingdom syndrome. And you look back 
in history when outsiders, including 
the United States, were viewed as 
"barbarians." So historically China, 
with its immense pride and its cultural 
background and its enormous history of 
conflict, internal and external, has 
been fairly independent in setting its 

I have had the feeling that China 
wants to be a more acceptable — 
acceptable in the family of nations. I 
think any observer would agree that, 
indeed, until very recent events, 
they've moved in that direction. What I 
would like to do is encourage them to 
move further in that direction by rec- 
ognizing the rights of these young peo- 
ple and by rebuking any use of force. 

Q. More than most Americans, 
you understand the Chinese. How do 
you account for the excessive violence 
of this response? Once the army de- 
cided to act, that they would drive ar- 
mored personnel carriers into walls 
of people, how can you explain that? 

A. I really can't. It is very hard to 
explain, because there was that re- 
straint that was properly being showed 
for awhile on the part of the military, 
challenged to come in and restore — 
what I'm sure they'd been told — order 
to a situation, which I expect they had 
been told was anarchic. I can't explain 
it. I can't explain it, unless they were 
under orders, and then you get into the 
argument about, well, what orders do 
you follow? I condemn it. I don't try to 
explain it. 

>epartment of State Bulletin/August 1989 



Q. Will you be able to accommo- 
date the calls from Congress for 
tougher sanctions? Many lawmakers 
felt you were slow to condemn or crit- 
icize the violence in China before 
now, and many are pushing for much 
tougher action on the part of this 

A. I've told you what I'm going to 
do. I'm the President. I set the foreign 
policy objectives and actions taken by 
the executive branch. I think they 
know, most of them in Congress, that I 
have not only a keen personal interest 
in China but that I understand it rea- 
sonably well. I will just reiterate to the 
leaders this afternoon my conviction 
that this is not a time for anything oth- 
er than a prudent, reasoned response. 
It is a time to assert over and over 
again our commitment to democracy, 
emphasize the strength that we give to 
democracy in situations of this nature. 
I come back to the frontline question 
here: I do think this change is inexor- 
able. It may go a couple of steps for- 
ward and then take a step back, but it 
is on the move. The genie will not be 
put back in the bottle. I am trying to 
take steps that will encourage a peace- 
ful change and yet recognize the fact 
that China does have great pride in its 
own history. My recommendations are 
based on my knowledge of Chinese 

I would argue with those who want 
to do something more flamboyant, be- 
cause I happen to feel that this rela- 
tionship is vital to the United States of 
America, and so is our adherence to de- 
mocracy and our encouragement for 
those who are willing to hold high the 
banner of democracy. We found, I 
think, a prudent path here. 

Q. Do you think that the events 
in China can have a chilling effect on 
democratic reforms occurring in other 
communist countries, particularly in 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Eu- 
rope, when they look at the kind of 
uprising that was sparked in China? 

A. No. I think the moves that 
we're seeing in Eastern Europe today, 
and indeed, in the Soviet Union are 
going to go forward. I think people are 
watching more with horror, and saying: 
How, given this movement toward de- 
mocracy, can the Chinese leadership 
react in the way they have? I think this 
may be a sign to others around the 
world that people are heroic when it 
comes to their commitment to demo- 
cratic change. I would just urge the 
Chinese leaders to recognize that. 

Q. There are reports that the 
Chinese military is badly divided and 
that, with this crackdown, the au- 
thorities brought in some troops from 
the Tibet conflict. If that's the case, 
how does suspending these military 
relationships encourage any kind of 
change? I mean, could you explain 
what the point of doing that is — 

A. I already did. You missed it. I 
explained it because I want to keep it 
on the military side. I've expressed 
here rhetorically the indignation we 
feel. I've recognized the history of Chi- 
na moving onto its own Middle King- 
dom syndrome, as it's done in various 
times in its past, and I want to encour- 
age the things that have helped the 
Chinese people. I think now the sus- 
pension is going to send a strong signal. 
I'm not saying it's going to cure the 
short-range problem in China. I'm not 
sure any outside country can cure the 
short-range, the today in Tiananmen 
Square, problem. But I think it is very 
important the Chinese leaders know it's 
not going to be business as usual, and I 
think it's important that the army know 
that we want to see restraint. And this 
is the best way to signal that. 

Q. Would you fear conflict? You 
talked about the divisions within the 
Chinese Army. Do you or your ad- 
visers fear that there could actually 
be a civil conflict between army 

A. I don't want to speculate on 
that, but there are differences, clearly, 
within the army in terms of use of 
force. Otherwise, they wouldn't be do- 
ing what [was] properly pointed out is 
happening: units coming in from 

And it is not, incidentally, just in 
Tiananmen Square that this problem 
exists. It is in Shanghai, it's in Cheng- 
du today, it's in Guangzhou, I'm told, in 
a much smaller scale. But they brought 
the troops in from outside because the 
Beijing troops apparently demon- 
strated a great sensitivity to the cause 
of the young people and were — 
disciplined though they were, they 
opted for the side of democracy and 
change in the young people. So those 
others came in. But I certainly don't 
want to speculate on something that I 
don't have — I can't reach that conclu- 
sion, put it that way. 

Q. There were some news reports 
that some of the soldiers' units had 
burned their own trucks in — have you 
received the same type of intelligence 

A. I just saw speculation. I haven't 
got it on any — I don't believe the intel- 
ligence said that. But there are reports 
that it is very difficult for some of the 
military, who are much more sympa- 
thetic to the openness, to the demon- 
strators. And I, again, go back to the 
original question here that [was] asked. 
I think, with the change that's taken 
place so far, we're beyond kind of a Cul- 
tural Revolution response. I think the 
depth of the feeling toward democracy 
is so great that you can't put the genie 
back in the bottle and return to total 
repression. I think what we're seeing is 
a manifestation of that in the divisions 
within the PLA. But I certainly want 
to stop short of predicting a civil war 
between units of the People's Libera- 
tion Army. 

Q. What about Poland? What do 
you think of the elections? 

A. To make a profound statement, 
I think they were very interesting. We 
haven't seen the final results, but com- 
munist bureaucrats beware in Poland. 
It looks to me like there's quite a move, 
moving toward the freedom and 

JUNE 8, 1989 

Q. Cutting off military sales to 
China does not seem to have made an 
impression on the rulers there, and 
they've become more repressive. What 
else are you going to do to express 
this nation's outrage? And do you 
have any other plans? 

A. I think that the position we 
took, aiming not at the Chinese people 
but at the military arrangements, was 
well-received around the world and was 
followed by many countries. Right af- 
ter we did that, many of the European 
countries followed suit. The events in 
China are such that we, obviously, de- 
plore the violence and the loss of life, 
urge restoration of order with recogni- 
tion of the rights of the people. I'm still 
hopeful that China will come together, 
respecting the urge for democracy on 
the part of the people. What we will do 
in the future, I will announce at appro- 
priate times. But right now, we are en- 
gaged in diplomatic efforts, and other 
countries are doing the same thing. 
Let's hope that it does have an amelio- 
rating effect on this situation. 

Q. Does your support of human 
rights and democracy extend to other 
places in the world, like South Africa, 


Department of State Bulletin/August 1989' 


the West Bank, where they've been 
fighting a lot longer than in China 
against repression? 

A. Yes, it does. It certainly does. 
Concern is universal. And that's what I 
want the Chinese leaders to under- 
stand. You see, we've taken this action. 
I am one who lived in China; I under- 
stand the importance of the relation- 
ship with the Chinese people and with 
the government. It is in the interest of 
the United States to have good rela- 
tions, but because of the question that 
you properly raised, we have to speak 
out in favor of human rights. We aren't 
going to remake the world, but we 
should stand for something. And 
there's no question in the minds of 
these students that the United States 
is standing in their corners. 

I'll tell you a little anecdote: When 
our cars went out to the university to 
pick up some of the students and bring 
them out, they were met by universal 
applause. Then the students in this 
country have been quite supportive of 
the steps that I have taken. We had a 
few into the Oval Office the other day, 
and I must say my heart goes out to 
them. They cannot talk to their fami- 
lies, and it's very difficult. 

But, yes, the United States must 
stand wherever, in whatever country, 
universally for human rights. And let 
me say, you mentioned South Africa? 
Absolutely, appalling. Apartheid must 

Q. Can the United States ever 
have normal relations with China as 
long as the hardliners believed re- 
sponsible for the massacre, such as 
Deng Xiaoping and Premier Li Peng, 
remain in power? In other words, 
what will it take to get U.S. -Chinese 
relations back to normal? 

A. It will take a recognition of the 
rights of individuals and respect for the 
rights of those who disagree. You have 
cited two leaders, one of whom I might 
tell you is — you mentioned Deng Xiao- 
ping. I'm not sure the American people 
know this. He was thrown out by the 
Cultural Revolution crowd back in the 
[ate 1960s; came back in 1976; was put 
Dut again because he was seen as too 
forward-looking. All I'm saying from 
;hat experience is: Let's not jump at 
conclusions as to how individual leaders 
.n China feel when we aren't sure of 

But the broad question that you 
isk — we can't have totally normal rela- 
tions unless there's a recognition of the 

validity of the students' aspirations. I 
think that that will happen. We had a 
visit right here, upstairs in the White 
House, with Mr. Wan Li. I don't know 
whether he's in or out, but he said 
something to me that I think the Amer- 
ican people would be interested in. He 
said, "The army loves the people." And 
then you've seen soldiers from the 27th 
Army coming in from outside of Beijing 
and clearly shooting people. But having 
said that, I don't think we ought to 
judge the whole People's Liberation 
Army of China by that terrible 

What I want to do is preserve this 
relationship as best I can, and I hope 
the conditions that lie ahead will per- 
mit me to preserve this relationship. I 
don't want to pass judgment on individ- 
ual leaders, but I want to make very 
clear to those leaders and to the rest of 
the world that the United States de- 
nounces the kind of brutality that all of 
us have seen on our television. 

Q. I'd like to return to China for 
a moment. You mentioned that your 
goal is to preserve our relationship 
with the Chinese Government. But 
what do you say to the American peo- 
ple who might wonder why we are not 
more forceful in being the world's 
leading advocate of democracy? And 
are we not living up to that respon- 
sibility in this situation? 

A. Some have suggested, for exam- 
ple, to show our forcefulness, that I 
bring the American Ambassador back. 
I disagree with that 180 degrees. 
We've seen, in the last few days, a very 
good reason to have him there. In fact, 
one of your colleagues, Richard Roth of 
CBS, was released partially because of 
the work of our Embassy, of Jim Lilley, 
our very able Ambassador. 

Some have suggested you've got to 
go full sanctions on [the] economic side. 
I don't want to cut off grain, and we've 
just sold grain to the People's Republic 
of China. I think that would be counter- 
productive and would hurt the people. 

What I do want to do is take what- 
ever steps are most likely to demon- 
strate the concern that America feels. I 
think I've done that, and I'll be looking 
for other ways to do it if we possibly 

Q. Chinese dissident Fang Lizhi 
has taken refuge in the U.S. Embassy, 
apparently fearing for his own safety. 
The Chinese Government has called 
that a wanton interference in inter- 

nal affairs and a violation of interna- 
tional law. What is your reaction to 
that? And will the United States 
grant Fang political asylum in the 
United States? 

A. First, let me remind the audi- 
ence here that we do not discuss asy- 
lum. It's almost like a public discussion 
of intelligence matters. But in terms of 
your question, we have acted in compli- 
ance with the international law as an 
extraordinary measure for human- 
itarian reasons. His personal safety 
was involved here, he felt. Then we try, 
historically, to work these things out in 
consultation with the sovereign state. 
So we are not violating international 
law, in the opinion of our attorneys. It 
is awful hard for the United States, 
when a man presents himself — a person 
who is a dissident — and says that his 
life is threatened, to turn him back. 
That isn't one of the premises upon 
which the United States was founded. 
We have a difference with them on that, 
you're right, but I hope it can be 

Q. The Iranian Government, of 
course, has changed. And the ques- 
tion to you is: Is there hope that there 
might be restored some kind of rela- 
tions with that country? As you know, 
today the Iranians set forth, infor- 
mally, an offer for some kind of a 
deal: that if the Americans would 
help free some Iranians held by the 
Phalangists that they might help us 
free some of our prisoners as well, or 
our hostages. Is there any hope for 
any change in the near future? 

A. For a change in relationship? I 
stated the other day what it would take 
to have improved relationships, and 
that would be a renunciation of terror. 
We can't have normalized relations 
with a state that's branded a terrorist 
state. Secondly, they must facilitate the 
release of American hostages. And so, 
that is what it would take. There was a 
case a while back where Iran asked for 
information regarding their hostages — 
never accused us, properly so, of hold- 
ing people hostage or in any way con- 
doning that. We condemn it. And we've 
supplied them information. But it's 
going to take a change in behavior. We 
don't mind name-calling. They keep 
calling us the "Great Satan." That 
doesn't bother us. Sticks and stones — 
remember the old adage — will hurt 
your bones. The names don't hurt you, 
but performance is what we're looking 
for. I don't see so far any sign of 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



I held out the olive branch at my 
inauguration speech, and I said, Look, 
we want better relations with Iran. I 
remember when we had good relations. 
We like the Iranian people. We have a 
lot of Iranians living in this country. I 
said, Look, you want better relations, 
do what's right, do what's right by peo- 
ple that are held against their will; 
we've seen no movement. I would re- 
peat that offer tonight. 

Q. The other day you picked up 
the phone and talked to Richard Nix- 
on about China. I'm wondering, since 
you know some of the Chinese leaders 
personally, why you don't pick up the 
phone and talk to them. 

A. I tried today. Isn't that a coinci- 
dence that you'd ask that question? 

Q. And what did you learn? 

A. The line was busy. [Laughter] I 
couldn't get through. 

Q. I'm wondering if you learned 
anything from those phone calls 
about who's really running China? 

A. I said I couldn't get through. 
And I talked to our Ambassador, know- 
ing that we'd understandably get ques- 
tions on China tonight, and the 
situation is still very, very murky. And 
that's the way it's been. 

I remember being in China when 
the way we'd tell who was winning and 
who was losing, who was up and who 
was down — we'd send people out around 
town to count the red flag limousines. 
And then they'd say. Oh, there's 30 of 
them gathered here; there must be an 
important meeting. Everybody'd hover 
around trying to see who emerged or 
who stood next to somebody on a pa- 
rade on festival day. It's opened up 
much more than that. There have been 
dramatic changes since then. 

But in terms of our trying to fig- 
ure out their internal order, it is ex- 
traordinarily difficult. I did try to 
contact a Chinese leader today, and it 
didn't work. But I'm going to keep on 
trying. I want them to know that I 
view this relationship as important, 
and yet I view the life of every single 
student as important. 

Q. Earlier you made reference to 
Deng Xiaoping, suggesting that he 
may, if I read you right, not neces- 
sarily have been responsible for the 
actions. You said that he was a re- 
former, twice out, back in. What were 
you trying to say? Do you have infor- 
mation that he is not — 

A. I was trying to say that I don't 
know. And I'm trying to say you don't 
know. And he doesn't know, and she 
doesn't know. And nobody knows — 
outside. That's the way the Chinese 
system works. So for us to read every 
day some new name out there — it just 
isn't right. I don't want to misrepre- 
sent this to the American people. But 
what I do know is that there are events 
over there that — it doens't matter who's 
in charge — we condemn. There's a rela- 
tionship over there that is fundamen- 
tally important to the United States 
that I want to see preserved. I'm try- 
ing to find a proper, prudent balance, 
not listening to the extremes that say, 
take your Ambassador out; cut off all 
food to the Chinese people so you show 
your concern. I think we found a proper 
avenue there, but I cannot — and you 
ask a good question — I simply cannot 
tell you with authority who is calling 
the shots there today. 

Q. When you were in China ear- 
lier in the year, you met with Li Peng, 
and I believe you told him that China 
was exempted from your policy review 
because you knew China, you under- 
stood China. Have you been let down 
personally? Have you been misled in 
any way? 

A. I feel a certain sense of person- 
al disappointment. But they weren't ex- 
empt from the norms of behavior that 
are accepted internationally in terms of 
armed people don't shoot down un- 
armed students. Nobody suggested 

There was an interesting point in 
there — and I don't want to delve into 
the detail of private conversations — but 
one of the Chinese leaders, a very 
prominent name, told me, "We want 
change, but people have to understand 
it's very complicated here, how fast we 
move on these reforms. We've come a 
long way." And, indeed, they did move 
dramatically faster on economic re- 
forms that I think any of us in this 
room would have thought possible. 

But what hasn't caught up are the 
political reforms and reforms in terms 
of freedom of expression. The freedom 
of press caught up a little bit; but it 
hadn't gone, obviously, nearly far 
enough. Now there's martial law and 
censorship. But we were cautioned on 
that visit about how fast China could 
move. Some of it was economic, and 
clearly, some of the message had to do 
with how fast they could move 

Q. Back to China. There are re- 
ports tonight that the government 
there has begun rounding up the stu- 
dent leaders, who face at the very 
least, persecution, at the most, possi- 
bly charges of treason and whatever 
punishment that will bring. You have 
talked tonight about your strong de- 
sire to keep this relationship going 
and to keep the dialogue and all our 
business as usual moving forward. If 

A. Not all of them. Excuse the 
interruption — 

Q. Except for the military — 
A. Yes. 

Q. Except for the military. If we 
find out that the people who perpe- 
trated the killings in Tiananmen 
Square and who were rounding up 
these students are running the gov- 
ernment, can the United States main- 
tain fairly normal relationships with 
them, given our aim to foster human 
rights and promote democracy? 

A. It would make it extraordi- 
narily difficult. But the question is so 
hypothetical that I'm going to avoid an- 
swering it directly. Anything that cod- 
ifies the acceptance of brutality or lack 
of respect for human rights will make 
things much more difficult. There's no 
question about that. 

Q. There are 20.000 Chinese stu- 
dents in the United States. 
A. Yes. 

Q. Many of them have spoken 
out. Are you prepared to grant them 
political asylum in this country, 
should these — 

A. They're not seeking asylum. I'll 
tell you why I answer the question that 
way. They're not seeking asylum. We 
had four of them in the other day. And 
the first thing that one of them — Jia 
Hao — said, "I love my country." And he 
wants to go back to his country. What I 
have done is extend the visas so that 
people are not compelled to go back to 
their country. He's not seeking asylum. 
This man is not going to turn his back 
on his own country. He wants to change 
things. But he also wants to know that 
he is going to be safe, and I don't blame 
him for that. So, it's not a question of 
all these people — asylum is a legal sta- 
tus, and that's not what they're looking 

Q. — in light of the student 
roundups. I mean, if they face — 

A. I think it's ap])alling, and so I 
would simply say that what we've al- 


Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


ready done — would say to these people, 
You don't have to go back. But I'm not 
going to ask them to turn down the flag 
that they love and turn their back on 
China. These are patriotic young peo- 
ple who fear because of seeing their 
own brothers and sisters gunned down. 
But they're not seeking asylum. They 
don't want to flee China; they want to 
help change China. 

Q. We can discuss another com- 
munist country for a while. Your atti- 
tude toward the Soviet Union seems 
to have shifted a bit since you became 
president, from deep skepticism to 
seeming acceptance of their inten- 
tions. Do you now accept Mr. Gor- 
bachev's sincerity in regard to his 
pledge of new thinking'? And can you 
tell us a little bit about why you've 
changed — 

A. I don't think it's shifted as 
much as you think. I don't think it's 
shifted as much. What I did was to say. 
We need a time to make some prudent 
investigation and discovery and then to 
go forward with a proposal. And we've 
done exactly that. The proposal we 
made at NATO has unified the alliance, 
and some of the leaders told me that it's 
more unified than it's been in history. 
We've made a good proposal now, and I 
hope the Soviets will take it on good 
faith, and I am encouraged by the re- 
sponse to far. 

Having said that, in dealing with 
the Soviet Union, I am going to contin- 
ue to keep my eyes wide open. I will 
also say I want to see perestroika suc- 
ceed. I want to see it succeed, not fail. 
And I told Mr. Gorbachev that one-on- 
one last fall at Governor's Island. I 
don't think he believes that I view this 
as some kind of a cold war relationship 
or that I want to see perestroika fail. 
He did say that he felt there were some 
elements in this country that did. But I 
hope that now he knows that I don't 
look at it that way. 

Q. Do you accept that he is sin- 
cere in terms of — are you operating 
on the assumption that he is sincere 
when he says he's interested in new 
thinking in international affairs? 

A. He's already demonstrated that 
he's interested in new thinking. Who 
would have thought that we would sit 
here and, on televison, see a relatively 
lively debate? It's nothing like our Con- 
gress, but it had some similar aspects 
to it. I think he has already demon- 
strated his commitment to change and 
to reform. 

But there ways now to solidify 
these changes. They have 600,000 
troops, and we have 305,000. I made an 
offer to him. I said the best way to 
guarantee stability and less warlike at- 
titude is to go to equal numbers. They 
are being asked to take out many, 
many more troops than we are. But 
I've said. What's wrong with being 
equal? The United States will have 
275,000 troops deployed, and you, sir, 
will have 275,000. So, here's a test now. 
Nobody can argue the inequity of that, 
particularly since we've put aircraft 
and helicopters and these other catego- 
ries on the table. 

I am inclined to think that if I do 
my work properly and we keep NATO 
moving forward on this quick timeta- 
ble, that we can succeed. And if we do, 
he will once again have demonstrated 
his desire for change. 

Q. Some of the critics say that, 
despite your rhetoric, General Nor- 
iega can sit in Panama for as long as 
he wishes, in effect laughing at you, 
laughing at the United States. Can 
you do anything about it? Should you? 

A. You know, as you look around 
the world and you see change, respect 
for the election process, I would simply 
say Panama is not immune. We're all 
traumatized, and properly by the terri- 
ble excesses in Tiananmen Square. But 
I haven't forgotten the brutal beating 
of Guillermo Ford in Panama [opposi- 
tion Vice Presidential candidate], and 
the world hasn't forgotten it. European 
public opinion has changed dramati- 
cally as they look at Mr. Noriega now. 
It is my fervent hope that the Organiza- 
tion of American States will stay with 
their mission and will keep working on 
their mandate until Mr. Noriega leaves. 

Let me repeat an important point 
here. I think there is some feeling in 
Panama that we are against the PDF, 
the Panama Defense Forces. We have 
no argument with the PDF. Many of 
their people have trained in the United 
States. We respect the Panamanian 
people. The problem is Noriega. If he 
gets out and they recognize the results 
of a freely held election — and certifia- 
bly freely held, I will say — they would 
have instant improved relations with 
the United States. 

I am not going to give up on this. I 
think we're proper to use multilateral 
diplomacy in this instance, as well as 
doing what we can bilaterally; and I in- 
tend to protect our treaty rights, for 

example, and certainly the best I can to 
guarantee the safety of Americans. 

Q. The agreement between Bonn 
and Washington on the nuclear issue 
only temporarily bridges the differ- 
ences. At what point do you visualize 
the Lance missile going into Ger- 
many, and can any German Govern- 
ment accept it? 

A. That matter has been properly 
deferred under the agreement at 
NATO. Research can go forward, but 
the deployment matter has been prop- 
erly deferred, and let us just go for- 
ward on the NATO arrangements that 
were announced in Brussels. Yes, there 
are differences. You're absolutely 
right. There are differences in Ger- 
many on this whole question, not just of 
the Lance follow-on but a whole differ- 
ence there on the question of SNF, 
short-range nuclear forces. It is in our 
interest to quickly move forward, be- 
cause if we can get [it] implemented 
within our timeframe, the agreement 
on conventional forces, that will take a 
tremendous amount of pressure off the 
Germans on short-range forces. 

Q. Poland — there was no ques- 
tion about Poland. I'm a Polish re- 
porter. Maybe you would answer a 
question about — what are you expect- 
ing from your visit to Poland? 

A. She's got a followup. You've mis- 
understood. She got a followup 

Q. NATO was regarded as your 
success because of your initiatives 
there and — but isn't the West German 
challenge just the first of many, now 
that the Soviet threat is diminishing 
in Western Europe? 

A. But let me use this question to 
reply to the question about Poland, too. 
There will be new challenges for 
NATO, as the level of concern about 
armed conflict reduces. I will keep re- 
minding our friends, and they will 
keep reminding me, that we must keep 
whatever force is required to deter 
war. But part of what's happening — and 
I'm glad the gentleman raised Poland — 
is this quest for democracy in Poland. 
If that goes forward, I can see a much 
better relationship for the United 
States with Poland, in one that will, in 
Poland itself, convince the people that 
they have less of a stake in military 
confrontation or in a East bloc confron- 
tation with the West. 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



So it is fascinating — tlie change 
that is going on there. It is absolutely 
fascinating. And we should be posi- 
tioned. I'm going there to tell this to 
the leaders: We want to work with you. 
You've got to reform your economy. We 
don't feel that you have any bad inten- 
tions toward the United States, but we 

want to see this policy of differentia- 
tion continue. When a country moves 
like Poland did, down democracy's path, 
the United States should respond as 
best it could. 

'Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of June 12, 1989. 

American Leadership in the Pacific 

Vice President Quayle's address 
before the American Business Council 
in Singapore on May S, 1989. 

As everyone knows, we are only 11 short 
years away from the end of the century 
and the beginning, not only of a new cen- 
tury but a new millennium. At a time 
like this when the shape of the 
future is on everyone's mind, it's 
especially appropriate for the new 
American Administration to consult 
with its Asian friends and to lay out its 
perspective on the developments in this 
critical region of the world. It is also 
important to solicit the views of our 

I can tell you the discussions with 
Prime Minister Lee [Kuan Yew] and 
others were very revealing. Complete 
understanding of the geopolitical con- 
cepts that are involved, the discus- 
sions, and challenges — not only today, 
but what our challenges are going to be 
in the future — were very much on both 
of our minds. President Bush made a 
trip to Asia last February, and now I 
am back — two trips within the first 100 
days of this Administration to Asia 
show the importance of this region of 
the world to the United States. My trip 
here will provide me with first-hand 
experience of an area where amazing 
advances in economic growth and tech- 
nological development guarantee it an 
important role in the years to come. 

But it is also an opportunity to 
make some fundamental points about 
America's view of itself, and its role in 
Asia and the Pacific in the years ahead. 
Perhaps the most spectacularly accu- 
rate political prediction of all time was 
made by the great French social critic 
and student of democracy, Alexis de 
Tocqueville. Writing back in 1835, 
De Tocqueville declared: 

. . . there are at the present time two 
great nations in the world which seem to 
tend toward the same end, although they 
started from different points: I allude to the 


Russians and to the Americans. Both of 
them have grown up unnoticed, and while 
the attention of mankind was directed else- 
where, they have suddenly assumed a most 
prominent place among nations. And the 
world learned of their existence and their 
greatness at almost the same time. The 
American relies upon personal interest to 
accomplish his ends, and gives free scope to 
the unguided exertions and common sense of 
the citizens; the Russian centers all the au- 
thority of society in a single arm. The prin- 
cipal instrument of the former is freedom; of 
the latter, servitude. Their starting point 
is different, and their courses are not the 
same, yet each of them seems to be marked 
out by the will of heaven to sway the des- 
tinies of half the globe. 

These words were written at a 
time when the notion of a global destiny 
could not have been more remote from 
the minds of most Americans. Yet in 
the 1.50 years since De Tocqueville de- 
livered his prophecy, America and the 
Soviet Union have, indeed, come to 
sway the destiny of the globe. The 
question is, will they continue to do 
the same thing in the 21st century? 

As everyone now recognizes, an ex- 
traordinary ferment is currently un- 
derway inside the Soviet Union on 
almost every issue. Wide-ranging and 
potentially explosive debates are in 
progress. The failure and abuses of the 
Soviet system are not only admitted 
but exposed in astonishing detail in the 
official Soviet press. The need for a 
fundamental restructuring of the So- 
viet economy and policy appears to be 
accepted by virtually all currents of 
political opinion in the Soviet Union. 

What does all this mean for the fu- 
ture of the Soviet empire and Soviet 
global ambitions? I think it is fair to 
say that the new Soviet policies — 
glasnost, perestroika — derive from the 
recognition by the Soviet leadership 
that their system has failed and that 
their country has fallen behind — not 
only America and Europe but also 
many nations in the Pacific. Their pro- 

pensity to center all authority of soci- 
ety in a single arm, as De Tocqueville 
put it, is poorly adapted to the emerg- 
ing realities of the next century — a 
century where political, economic, and 
social openness will increasingly be 
seen as keys to national success. 

Whether the Soviet system can 
successfully adapt to the 21st century 
is, of course, an open question. We cer- 
tainly wish the long-suffering Soviet 
people good will. We applaud recent 
measures to increase openness in the 
press, to ease restrictions on religion, 
to take the first faltering steps toward 
democracy, and to contribute construc- 
tively to settling certain international 

Nevertheless, barring some really 
radical and fundamental shift in the 
very basis of Soviet power, it's hard to 
see how the Soviets can continue to 
play the global role to which they so 
clearly aspire. At present, the basis of 
Soviet power is the Soviet military 
establishment — that goes without say- 
ing. Yet it is becoming increasingly 
clear that the economic performance of 
the Soviet Union is inadequate to sup- 
port such massive military forces or 
military efforts of client states whose 
own economies are also declining or in 

America's Unchanging 
Fundamental Principles 

Let me turn now to my own country, 
the United States. I think of the most 
striking facts about my country is that 
today, as in the days when De Tocque- 
ville first issued his famous prophecy, 
"America continues to give free scope 
to the unguided exertions and common 
sense of its citizens." Although a great 
deal has happened in the world be- 
tween Andrew Jackson's Administra- 
tion and George Bush's Administration, 
America's fundamental principles have 
remained unchanged. People who ac- 
cuse the Americans of being inconsis- 
tent and fickle would do well, I think, 
to bear fundamental fact in mind. 

Of course, we Americans have of- 
ten been taken to task for adhering so 
tenaciously to our convictions. Our 
critics argue that perhaps the demo- 
cratic form of government woi'ked well 
enough in the United States, but it was 
hopelessly unsuited to other parts of 
the world. It was particularly inap- 
propriate to the Third World, we were 
told, because most Third World peoples 
lack a democratic tradition and because 

Department of State Bulletin/August 198f 


economic development requires cen- 
tralized control and planning. 

Yet today, it is clear that 
democracy — personal freedom within 
a framework of representative 
government — is, indeed, the wave of 
the future. In Latin America for e.xam- 
ple, most nations have either recently 
accepted democracy or are moving 
clearly in that direction. While in Asia, 
old traditions of authoritarian govern- 
ment are fading fast from the scene. At 
the same time, free markets and pri- 
vate initiative are the new guideposts 
to economic development, for the sim- 
ple reason that their principles of eco- 
nomic organization clearly work. The 
nations of the Pacific rim, in particular, 
[lave shown the world that free enter- 
prise economies are at least as effec- 
tive in the developing world as they are 
in the more industrialized nations. 

Is it a mere coincidence that demo- 
cratic governments and free-market 
economies are developing side by side 
throughout the world? It is not a coinci- 
dence. I think it is not. Rather it seems 
to me that economic development and 
political freedom are two sides of the 
same coin. Both are necessary to 
achieve genuine modernization. 

Continuing U.S. Global 

Let me return to the rather special 
}ase of the United States. While most 
ire willing to acknowledge the remark- 
ible dynamism of American society, 
some question whether America will 
;ontinue to fulfill the promise that De 
Focqueville predicted for it. Certain 
3ritics question whether America has 
:he discipline or the determination to 
"emain competitive in the global envi- 
ronment or to manage its fiscal prob- 
ems in a responsible manner. Others 
joint specifically to America's security 
;ommitments and wonder whether it 
;an continue to shoulder the burdens of 
i far-flung alliance system. 

The United States, critics say, is a 
lation in decline, our budget and trade 
ieficits are symptoms of a deeper 
nalaise. The burden of international 
eadership has grown too heavy for 
\merica to bear. If we are to avoid dis- 
ister, we must pull back from our glob- 
il commitments. That way, at least, we 
:an decline gracefully. 

Books predicting America's immi- 
lent fall from world leadership have 
nade the best seller list in my country. 
Prophets of American decline have be- 
come virtual academic celebrities. That 

being the case, what are our friends in 
Asia, and the rest of the world, to con- 
clude? Will the United States remain a 
key player in the Pacific region? Can it 
still be relied upon to sustain the secu- 
rity commitments which have helped 
preserve peace and stability in an area 
of geopolitical and ideological conflict? 

As you and other members of the 
international community address these 
questions, there are four important 
factors that you should bear in mind. 
Perhaps the most important thing to 
remember about the current wave of 
"declinist" thought in the United 
States is that it is hardly a new phe- 
nomenon. On the contrary, since the 
end of World War II, Americans have 
been periodically scaring themselves 
with visions of imminent collapse. 

The first such scare occurred back 
in 1957 and 1958, in the wake of the So- 
viet missile launches of Sputnik. The 
fashionable fear that swept the United 
States then was that Soviet technologi- 
cal superiority had relegated us to a 
position of permanent inferiority. Of 
course, these fears proved to be 
groundless. The United States quickly 
regained the lead in military high tech- 
nology. Today, as a result of revolution- 
ary advances in strategic defense 
systems, low observable or "stealth" 
aircraft, and other advanced aerospace 
technologies, this lead, in all proba- 
bility, will become wider. 

The second great scare occurred at 
the end of the 1960s, when it became 
fashionable to argue that the United 
States and Soviet Union were both los- 
ing their primacy. The bipolar world of 
the immediate postwar period was said 
to be giving way to a five-cornered 
world in which Japan, China, and Eu- 
rope would enjoy superpower status. 
Twenty years later, however, this devel- 
opment has yet to occur. 

This was quickly followed by a 
third wave of pessimism, triggered by 
the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries] oil embargo of 
1975, which envisioned the United 
States as a helpless giant unable to se- 
cure the energy resources necessary to 
support our growing economy. Then, in 
the late 1970s, the Soviet Union once 
again became the focus of the fourth 
declinist wave of thought, as the Amer- 
ican withdrawal from Southeast Asia, 
together with a series of Soviet foreign 
policy successes, led many to conclude 
that the global "correlation of forces," 
as they called it, had shifted decisively 

in the favor of the Soviet bloc. All these 
fears enjoyed a considerable intellec- 
tual vogue for a time; yet again, all 
were proven to be false. 

The Condition of America Today 

What is the truth about the condition of 
America today? The truth is that there 
are fundamental sources of strength in 
the American economy that are ignored 
by the prophets of decline. The United 
States is entering its 78th consecutive 
month of economic growth, the longest 
period of peacetime economic expan- 
sion in American history. During this 
period, real per capita income for 
Americans has risen more than 15%. 
Employment has grown faster in the 
United States than in other leading in- 
dustrial nations, more than 2V2 times 
faster than Japan, for example. We 
have produced more than 17.5 million 
jobs over the last 6 years, more than 
Western Europe, Canada, and Japan 
combined, and average U.S. produc- 
tivity is greater than that of any other 
major industrialized country. Strong 
productivity growth, combined with 
wage restraint and adjustment in the 
foreign exchange value of the American 
dollar, has restored the international 
competitiveness of U.S. manufactur- 
ing. In fact, recent labor costs in the 
United States relative to other major 
industrial nations fell 41% between 
1985 and 1987, and we are now lower 
than they were in 1980. 

The result has been a dramatic im- 
provement in our trade balance. The 
trade deficit has fallen from a peak of 
about $170 billion to an annual rate of 
about $120 billion, according to the 
most recent statistics. Perhaps an even 
more telling sign of our competitive 
strength is that exports have risen dra- 
matically over the last few years, grow- 
ing by an impressive 27% in 1988 alone. 
I think that it is safe to conclude that 
the United States remains healthy and 
vigorous despite, or perhaps because 
of, a certain brooding and self-critical 
disposition. The United States will 
continue to be engaged with and open 
to the world. We recognize that some 
nations are advancing rapidly in eco- 
nomic power and that others rival us in 
military power. No nation, however, ei- 
ther now or in the foreseeable future, 
ranks as high as the United States in 
virtually all the major sources of na- 
tional power: population size and edu- 
cation, natural resources, economic 
development, political stability, social 
cohesion, military strength, ideological 

ruepartment of State Bulletin/August 1989 



appeal, diplomatic appliances, and 
technological achievement. 

U.S. Leadership and Security Roles 

Because it is such a multidimensional 
power. America has a unique leadership 
role to play in the Pacific. Let me be 
very clear, we intend to play it. We 
will, therefore, continue to work closely 
with our Asian friends and allies to 
keep our markets open, to support free 
trade, and to oppose what President 
Bush has aptly called, "the fool's gold of 
protectionism." We believe that an 
open trading system is good for all 
countries — importers as well as export- 
ers. Our goal is to open markets, not 
close them, to create an ever-e.xpanding 
international trading system based 
upon fair and enforceable rules. We 
prefer to use multilateral negotiations 
to achieve our objectives, but we will 
also engage in bilateral efforts and take 
selective unilateral actions where these 
can be effective and where they are 
necessary for opening foreign markets 
to U.S. goods and .services. While pur- 
suing this active agenda with our tra- 
ding partners, we will work equally 
hard to ensure the openness of the U.S. 
economy to fairly traded goods and 

What, then, of the American secu- 
rity role? Here, too, our fundamental 
objectives remain constant. Globally, 
the containment of Soviet power re- 
mains the cornerstone of American 
foreign policy. The doctrine of 
containment, as originally formulated, 
called on the United States to confront 
the Soviets with an "unalterable coun- 
ter force at every point where they 
show signs of encroaching upon the in- 
terests of a peaceful and stable world." 
Were we to do that, it was predicted, 
we would "promote tendencies which 
must eventually find their outlet in 
either the break-up or the gradual 
mellowing of Soviet power." 

For the past 40 years, America has 
pretty much followed this course; with 
some notable exceptions, we have suc- 
ceeded in containing the power of the 
Soviet Union and its clients. The result 
has been, more or less, what the archi- 
tects of containment predicted it would 
be: deprived of the aura of historical in- 
evitability, the Soviet system is being 
forced to confront its own "internal 
contradictions." Meanwhile, sheltered 
behind America's broad shield, the na- 
tions of the free world, both here and in 
Europe, have made brilliant use of the 
time Ameri- 


ca's containment policy won for them 
and have succeeded in overcoming the 
legacy of war and devastation to be- 
come vibrant and robust societies in 
their own right. The recovery of our 
European and Asian allies under 
America's security umbrella must sure- 
ly be reckoned as one of the greatest 
foreign policy successes of our time and 
irrefutable demonstration of the fact 
that America advances its own inter- 
ests best when we foster the growth 
and security of our friends and allies. 

The very success of containment 
poses new and difficult challenges. The 
new political dynamics of reform in the 
Soviet Union and some of its client 
states afford important opportunities 
for advancing Western interests. At 
the same time, a new instability and 
unpredictability has been introduced 
into the East-West equation. There are 
promising signs of change in Soviet se- 
curity policies. But these have not yet 
been translated into substantial reduc- 
tions in the overall Soviet military 
threat, while their political impact in 
the West has been quite enormous. 
With declining levels in East-West ten- 
sion, it is all too easy to neglect the re- 
quirements of national security and the 
maintenance of strong alliances. De- 
clining concern for security issues is 
also bound to raise substantially the 
political importance of interallied 
frictions over trade and other 
economic issues. 

In light of the current develop- 
ments, it is all the more vital for the 
United States to maintain an active 
role and presence in the Pacific. Now, 
more than ever, it is necessary to af- 
firm and cultivate our alliance relation- 
ships. These relationships are not 
intended solely to address urgent needs 
or immediate threats. They are a re- 
flection of abiding geopolitical real- 
ities. The United States and its Asian 
friends and allies must take the longer 
view of our collective security require- 
ments. We must be more mindful than 
ever of the fact that the strength of the 
alliance relationships rests not on mili- 
tary power alone but on shared politi- 
cal purposes. U.S. policy in Asia will 
also continue to insist that democratic 
political institutions, with a commit- 
ment to openness and criticism, are the 
surest means of building a national po- 
litical consensus — the foundation of 
true security. We will continue to su])- 
port democratic reforms as they devel- 
op naturally, even while recognizing 
that there is no set pattern for democ- 
racy and no standard or assured out- 

come to processes of political change. 
We will continue to monitor human 
rights practices and to register our 
concern when we think fundamental 
freedoms, including the open press, 
are violated. 

Future Peace Through Strength 

When Americans and Singaporeans 
look to the future, we both share simi- 
lar evaluations of the evolving interna- 
tional situation. We both agree on the 
necessity of peace through strength. 
We both agree that we must comple- 
ment military deterrence with an ac- 
tive diplomacy that seeks political 
solutions to regional tensions. We both 
condemn Vietnam's illegal occupation o 
Cambodia and are united in calling on 
Hanoi to withdraw completely its re- 
maining forces in Cambodia. We agree 
that once Cambodia has achieved a 
genuine end to Vietnam's occupation, 
free elections should be held under, a 
transitional government led by Prince 
Sihanouk. We agree that the dis- 
credited Khmer Rouge must never be 
allowed to seize power again. 

As far as the Soviet role in the Pa- 
cific is concerned, the United States 
and our Asian friends agree that the 
Soviet Union must be judged by its ac- 
tions, not by its rhetoric. The Soviet 
Union has placed the improvement of 
its relations with China on the top of it 
agenda; General Secretary Gorbachev 
will be visiting China shortly. We be- 
lieve that lessening Sino-Soviet ten- 
sions is a logical course for both nationi 
to pursue, and we have no objections to 
it, provided that any new relationship 
harms neither our own interests nor 
those of our friends and that it directly 
addresses our common security 

More generally, we recognize the 
Soviet interest in sharing in Asia's eco< 
nomic boom and in increasing its accesi 
to the region. But Moscow has a long 
way to go to achieve this goal. Besides 
reforming itself, the greatest contribu- 
tion it can make to reducing tension 
and building confidence in Asia would 
be to end its military presence in Viet- 
nam and its support for Vietnam's oc- 
cupation in Cambodia. In pursuing 
our common destiny in the Pacific, 
the United States looks forward to 
strengthening and deepening our 
friendship with Singapore. Your role ir 
Asia and, indeed, the world testifies to 
the fact that a nation's influence is a 
function not of its size but of the char- 
acter of its people and the quality of its 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


Singapore's commitment to mar- 
ket principles has made an inspiration 
to developing countries around the 
world. Singapore's unwavering commit- 
ment to free trade has made it a model 
for economic development. We welcome 
Singapore's interest in pursuing a 
"U.S.-ASEAN [Association of South 
East Asian Nations] initiative" and look 
forward to a dialogue with ASEAN in 
the coming months to discuss this ini- 
tiative and others like it. Singapore's 
role in ASEAN has made it a force for 
patience, unity, and steadfastness in 
Southeast Asia. And Singapore's role in 
the United Nations in the nonaligned 
movement has served to encourage 
moderation, reasonableness, and peace- 
ful resolution of disputes. These are 
qualities that Americans deeply admire 
and that we ourselves seek to emulate, 
as we both face the challenges of the 
21st century. 

Our two nations have much in com- 
mon. We have common objectives and 
concerns. I came to Singapore impres- 
sed by its people and its capacity for 
economic growth, and I leave with 
strong favorable impressions of Prime 
Minister Lee, his younger generation of 
leadership, and the Singaporean people 
who have created this economic 
miracle. ■ 

After the NATO Summit: 

Challenges for the West in a Changing World 

Secretary Baker's address and ex- 
cerpts from the question-and-ansiver 
session at the National Press Club on 
June 8, 1989.' 

I know that most of you know that 
on NATO's 40th anniversary, we, the 
United States, and our allies renewed 
our commitment to collective defense, 
and we renewed our commitment to 
democratic values. But we did more 
than that. We also committed ourselves 
to an ambitious mission for the years 
ahead, and that mission is to make 
from a divided Europe, a new Europe, 
a Europe that is whole, a Europe that 
is free, and a Europe that is secure. 
This mission, of course, has far- 
reaching security, political, and 
economic implications for NATO 
but also for the West as a whole. 

NATO's Security Proposals 

So let me begin with the security pro- 
posals which we discussed at the 40th 
anniversary of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. From its incep- 
tion, NATO has sought to protect the 
West's democratic values by preventing 
war. It's been very, very sucessful. The 
Soviet threat has imposed on the mem- 
bers of the alliance a significant burden 
of defense, but, through four some- 
times tense decades, we have been 
able to avoid armed conflict. 

Now a combination of Western 
strength and pressing economic prob- 
lems within the Soviet Union appears 
to have convinced Moscow that the 
arms buildup really leads us nowhere. 
All NATO leaders acknowledge that a 
ray of hope has dawned — hope that Eu- 
rope, the most heavily armed continent 
in the world, can really begin to dis- 
arm; hope that through negotiation and 
responsible action by governments, 
ways can be found to make all of us 
safer at lower levels of risk. But, I 
think we should all recognize that the 
dawn is not the day. That's why the 
President advanced proposals at the 
summit to bring us closer to that day 
when the shadow of still-threatening 
Soviet conventional advantages will 
be lifted. 

The President's Conventional Par- 
ity Initiative promises to accelerate 
and lock in a potentially historic change 
in the balance of militarv forces in Eu- 

rope. If accepted by the East, this ini- 
tiative would reduce the size of NATO, 
and it would reduce the Warsaw Pact's 
conventional forces to equal and stable 
levels. These levels would substantially 
reduce the threat of surprise military 
attack and substantially reduce the 
danger of large-scale offensive opera- 
tions against Western Europe. 

I want to add here an observation 
about the summit process and about 
NATO itself. This summit, I think, 
showed beyond a shadow of a doubt that 
the alliance does have the flexibility to 
change while at the same time preserv- 
ing and even enhancing its core princi- 
ples and values. NATO's agreement 
on a comprehensive concept, including 
an agreement on short-range nuclear 
forces (SNF), demonstrates that we 
can maintain deterrence under new and 
changing political conditions. 

In light of the conventional imbal- 
ances, the alliance agreed that the 
short-range nuclear forces negotiations 
leading to partial nuclear reductions 
would begin but only — and this is very 
important — only after the implementa- 
tion of a conventional forces agreement 
is underway. We and our NATO part- 
ners further agreed that any short- 
range nuclear forces reductions will not 
be implemented — they'll not be carried 
out — until the results of the conven- 
tional forces agreement have been 

The economic and the political con- 
sequences of the President's security 
initiatives are far reaching and pro- 
found. If the Soviet Union truly wishes 
to channel needed resources from the 
military to the civilian sector, then 
these new proposals surely offer the op- 
portunity. If the Soviet Union truly 
wishes the process of political reform 
in Eastern Europe to proceed freely, 
then the removal of 325,000 troops will 
surely reduce fears of Soviet military 

These proposals point clearly to a 
long-term, dramatic transformation in 
Europe's strategic and political land- 
scape. The time is ripe for General Sec- 
retary Gorbachev to respond positively 
to the opportunities presented by these 
initiatives. Indeed, we look for him to 
do so when he travels to the Federal 
Republic of Germany ne.xt week. 

As the alliance came to agreement 
on the SNF issue last week, we added 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



an important call to the Soviet Union: 
We urged the Soviets to reduce uni- 
laterally their short-range nuclear sys- 
tems to NATO levels. Next week, the 
General Secretary can sustain this new 
spirit by answering this call and by an- 
nouncing a real cut in Soviet short- 
range nuclear forces. But whatever 
Mr. Gorbachev's response, I think we 
should remember that the West's ef- 
forts are aimed at removing more than 
just Soviet divisions; they are aimed, 
in fact, at removing the division of 
Europe itself. 

Beyond Containment 
to a New Europe 

The Brussels summit also affirmed 
that NATO's mission goes beyond the 
military dimension of East-West rela- 
tions. We want, as the President has 
said, to move beyond containment to a 
new Europe — a Europe that is whole, 
and a Europe that is free. That Europe 
is defined by a community of free na- 
tions from which no one is excluded. Its 
borders are set not by geography or 
barbed wire but by the reach of demo- 
cratic freedoms. Its pursuits are the 
ways of peace, and it grows through the 
force of ideas. Today, it stretches from 
Montreal, San Francisco, and Rome to 
Tokyo, Helsinki, and Melbourne. 

It is the community for which Chi- 
nese students have sacrificed their 
lives on the hard pavement of Tianan- 
men Square. It is the community of 
thought to which Sakharov belongs. 
It is the model in the minds of Hun- 
garians and Poles as they strive to 
hammer out social compacts between 
government and the governed. 

NATO has signaled its intention to 
engage in political and economic out- 
reach to the East. We and our alliance 
partners realize that the cold war 
which began with the Iron Curtain and 
continued with the Berlin Wall can 
really only be ended there. It can only 
be ended when imposed barriers no 
longer separate East and West — East 
and West Europeans, East and West 
Germans, East and West Berliners. 

Therefore, we've called upon the 
East to bring down the wall that makes 
our common European home a house 
which is really divided against its will. 
And, as an expression of our deter- 
mination to increase contact and 
cooperation, NATO reiterated its 
commitment to improve the quality 
of life for Berlin's inhabitants through 
the allied Berlin initiative. This effort 

seeks to make all of Berlin a free and 
prosperous city — a symbol of a Europe 
that is itself free and whole. 

The President has offered five new 
proposals that would help overcome the 
division of Europe by fostering the 
spread of democratic ideas and the de- 
centralization of political and economic 
authority in the East. 

First, in the economic sphere, the 
President seeks to encourage private 
initiative and private institutions in the 
East. We want to make sure, of course, 
that we avoid the costly mistakes of the 
1970s, when we allowed unproductive 
public sector debt to accumulate. The 
European Community is becoming a 
magnet for the East; in effect, an agent 
for change. We urge the European 
Community to reach out toward East- 
ern Europe, particularly after 1992, 
when Western Europe becomes a single 
unified market. 

Second, in the political sphere, the 
President seeks to encourage greater 
political freedom. That can best be 
done through contacts with free press 
associations, universities, trade unions, 
and other organizations that have 
sprung up in the East. He has asked 
Western counterparts to establish ties 
with these new groups. We have experi- 
ence; they have the need; and we can 
both benefit from the new relationship. 

Third, the President has urged the 
free political parties of Western Eu- 
rope and the United States to establish 
relations and help foster new parties in 
the East. 

Fourth, the President has called 
for self-determination for all of Ger- 
many and for all of Eastern Europe. 
He has urged that the question of free 
elections be placed prominently on the 
agenda for meetings of the Helsinki sig- 
natory states. The world cannot fully 
enter a new age of normalized relations 
between East and West until the peo- 
ples of all nations can freely choose 
their own destinies. 

And fifth, the President has pro- 
posed that East and West work to- 
gether on environmental problems. 
Can there be any greater symbol of the 
promise and the problems that East 
and West face together than the Cher- 
nobyl nuclear disaster? A supreme 
technological achievement, when you 
think about it, the unlocking of nuclear 
energy, was mocked by the failure of 
those who designed and ran the plant to 
control it. Instead of pointing the fin- 
ger of blame for this and other pollu- 
tions of our environment, we extend, 
instead, the hand of cooperation. We 

can offer training, assistance in draft- 
ing laws and regulations — in short, our 
whole experience in dealing with these 
issues. And we can look to develop joint 
projects to control the pollution that 
knows no walls or borders and that 
threatens the health and beauty of 

Forty years ago, we and our NATO 
partners pledged to "safeguard the 
common heritage and civilization" of 
Europe against our common enemies. 
As the President pointed out, Europe's 
environment is the common heritage of 
all Europeans, and we must all work to 
protect it. Defending Europe's environ- 
ment from the threat of pollution is just 
another way for the West to fulfill 
NATO's mission of making Europe 
safe and making Europe whole. 

President Bush's July trip to Po- 
land and Hungary prior to the Paris 
economic summit demonstrates his se- 
riousness about reaching out to East- 
ern nations. The President is convinced 
that the East can progress only through 
both political and economic changes. To 
stand in the way of such necessary, his- 
toric change — as we are seeing to our 
outrage and sorrow in China — is to 
turn one's back on the future. 

Beyond Europe to the 
Global Community 

That future promises to be a demand- 
ing one for all nations — even ours in 
the West with proven political and 
economic track records. From the be- 
ginning, we and our Western allies 
recognized that our efforts to prevent 
war and to advance democratic values 
on the European Continent were really 
fundamental to world peace. 

Today, as tensions ease in the So- 
viet Union and Eastern Europe, the 
President and other NATO leaders ac- 
knowledge that the West must begin 
to turn more attention to other areas 
of concern to the world community. 
Together, we and our allies met the 
daunting challenges of a postwar world. 
So today, as that postwar era is suc- 
ceeded by new times, we really must 
tackle a new and a different set of 
challenges, and I want to cite three 
of those in particular. 

First, we face a series of regional 
problems that, if untended, can affect 
nations near and far with grim conse- 
quences. Perhaps it's time for our 
friends and alliance partners to con- 
sider mechanisms to deal collectively 
with these regional conflicts. For ex- 
ample, working bilaterally and in par- 


Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


allel with several of our European al- 
lies, we and other nations responded 
very effectively when Iran's actions 
threatened vital shipping lanes in the 
Persian Gulf. 

Second, the spread of ballistic mis- 
siles, chemical weapons, and possibly 
even nuclear weapons to countries en- 
gaged in regional conflicts is very, very 
dangerous. The trends are very alarm- 
ing. At least 15 developing nations 
could be producing their own ballistic 
missiles by the year 2000. The spread 
of these missiles will put states in vol- 
atile regions on hair triggers and will 
increase their incentives to acquire or 
deploy chemical or nuclear weapons. 
Can there be any doubt that such de- 
velopments constitute an increasing 
danger to world peace? The time is 
growing short for effective approaches 
to deal with these problems. F\irther 
steps — both individual and collective — 
are necessary to strengthen interna- 
tional barriers to proliferation. We 
must continue to support the nuclear 
imnproliferation regime, and we must 
.strengthen the missile technology con- 
tiol regime. Building on the work of 
the recently concluded Paris conference 
(111 chemical weapons, we must continue 
our joint efforts toward banning these 
weapons of terror. 

And, finally, like the problems of 
proliferation, transnational dangers 
such as environmental hazards, terror- 
ism, and the drug trade ultimately re- 
spect no political boundaries. They 
pose new threats. But they also create 
opportunities for creative responsibi- 
lity sharing and cooperation where 
none existed before. 

The President discussed all of 
these points at the summit in Brussels, 
and we have been gratified by the re- 
sponse. The NATO leaders agreed to 
consult and to coordinate among them- 
selves with respect to these issues, and 
we will continue to lead the allies in 
working toward solving these very, 
very pressing problems. 

Creative Responsibility-Sharing 

Finally, I want to discuss a very im- 
portant concept that the President 
broached at the summit. The best way, 
we think, to proceed with our alliance 
partners — indeed, with all nations — in 
this changing world is to engage in 
what the President has called "creative 

In the past, we heard a lot about 
"burdensharing," which was a concept 
that at first, at least, was narrowly ap- 

plied to defense cooperation within our 
alliance system. And, in the defense 
area, many of our European partners 
are working toward a more efficient 
European defense industry. We en- 
dorse these efforts, particularly those 
of the independent European program 
group and the West European Union to 
develop wider armaments cooperation. 
And, by continuing our own efforts to 
stimulate codevelopment projects, the 
United States will promote joint arma- 
ments development and production and 
over time will improve efficiencies and 
reduce the costs of defense. 

But, "creative responsibility- 
sharing" is really a broader concept 
than burdensharing. It embraces is- 
sues such as how we define threats to 
our security, how we divide up respon- 
sibilities, and who we engage in respon- 
sibility sharing. It applies to a broad 
range of issues on the international 

Today, for instance, we must think 
more broadly about how we define "se- 
curity" in the long term. Environmen- 
tal concerns violate the integrity of 
Europe. Conflicts around the world — 
regional conflicts — threaten the supply 
of vital resources to our Atlantic and 
Pacific allies. Chemical and ballistic 
missile proliferation pose dangers to 
the entire world community — to our 
allies, friends, and adversaries alike. 

So the West must consider how best 
to divide responsibility for our wider 
security needs among our friends and 
among our alliance partners. We must 
learn to pool our various strengths. 
Countries having differing capabilities, 
experiences, and know-how can lend 
each of these capabilities, experiences, 
and know-how toward meeting the se- 
curity challenges which we together 
face. I think, for example, that some 
countries, given their historical in- 
volvement in particular regions, can 
play key diplomatic roles to resolve 
conflicts. Still others, I believe, are 
well-placed to help with problems of 
economic development and problems 
of debt. 

An expanding global economy, de- 
velopment in the Third World, and the 
resolution of Third World conflicts are 
all critical to global progress. Already, 
our Pacific ally Japan is using its great 
wealth to foster economic development 
in the Third World. I would note, of 
course, that everyone bears a respon- 
sibility to contribute to global growth. 

Clearly, I think we must also think 
creatively about the private sector's 
role in efforts that can contribute to 

our security. For example, as I men- 
tioned earlier, we can facilitate private 
efforts by Western trade unions, busi- 
nesses, industry, and the scientific 
community that would foster political 
and economic reform in Eastern 


So let me sum up where I think NATO 
and the West stand today in relation to 
the challenges of a changing world. 

NATO has always — not always 
been perceived to be — but has always 
been more than simply a military ar- 
rangement. It began as a community of 
nations sharing a common vision of Eu- 
rope, a vision of free peoples working 
peacefully together to advance de- 
mocracy. Now we have very nearly 
achieved that vision. Western Europe, 
today, is a model of democratic values. 
It's an economic giant, and it is a pillar 
of Western security. 

In Brussels, the leaders of NATO 
committed themselves to the next 
mission — to bring about a whole Eu- 
rope and a free Europe, as I said at the 
beginning of my remarks. Even as we 
protect the West's security, we must 
marshal our combined military, diplo- 
matic, and economic strengths in order 
to reach out to the East. That is be- 
cause the Soviets and many of their 
allies are engaged in new thinking — 
really, I guess we should say rethink- 
ing — of their failed policies. The walls 
of ideological dogma are collapsing and 
with them the old order of a rigidly di- 
vided Europe. Opportunities are now 
opening for the East to rejoin the main- 
stream of European and international 

At the anniversary summit, there- 
fore, we and our allies made the next 
40 years, not the last 40 years, our 
point of reference. We forged, I think 
it's fair to say, a new basis for unity. We 
advanced toward our objectives of mak- 
ing war both unthinkable and impos- 
sible. And, we have set a new course so 
that the alliance and the nations of the 
West can bridge at last the East-West 

As we in the West look into the 
future, we rekindle our hope for a 
Europe that is free and a Europe that 
is whole. And, as we approach a new 
century, we renew our commitment 
to work with all nations to make the 
world a far, far better place. 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



Q. Do you think that Gorbachev's 
efforts to open up Russian society 
will succeed? 

A. We hope they will. We very 
much want perestroika to succeed. At 
the same time, we have to recognize, I 
think, that there are some significant 
problems that have to be overcome. 
There is, of course, the resistance of a 
rather significantly entrenched bureau- 
cracy to change — a bureaucracy that 
has built up over the past 70 years. 
There are major economic problems 
that have to be overcome, and there are 
the problems, of course, in the Soviet 
Union — the problems of nationalities. 
These are the three biggest problems 
that I think the General Secretary 
faces in his efforts to open up the Sovi- 
et Union. 

We have said on a number of occa- 
sions that we think it is in the best in- 
terests of the United States for 
perestroika to succeed, because we 
think that will produce a more stable, a 
more secure, and a more open Soviet 

Q. What is our view of ethnic dis- 
turbances in the Soviet Union? 

A. I think those are rather signifi- 
cant problems for the leadership. They 
have suggested as much, recognized 
them as such. Our view, of course, is 
that we stand for freedom, democracy, 
the right of free speech, the right of as- 
sembly. I think that pretty well an- 
swers your question. 

We'd like to see reform go forward 
in the Soviet Union. We take note of 
the fact that, to some extent, the politi- 
cal reform process in the Soviet Union 
may be a bit ahead of the economic re- 
form process. They have got some ma- 
jor, major steps to take to find their 
way to a market economy. 

I think that perhaps we've seen 
somewhat the reverse in the People's 
Republic of China, where the economic 
reforms got out in front of the political 
reforms. It is our view that democratic 
reforms — political and economic — 
should proceed apace. 

Q. Since NATO's prime mission 
for 40 years has been to deter the So- 
viet military threat, does the Presi- 
dent's conventional proposal indicate 
we believe that threat has signifi- 
cantly diminished? Or is it based on a 
hope that the threat will diminish 
enough to justify fewer U.S. troops? 

A. No. It's based on a rather, we 
think, realistic assumption that if we 

could get to parity, we would see the 
Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact al- 
lies having to reduce by significantly 
greater numbers in all categories of 
weapons and manpower — I mean, the 
proposal the President has presented 
calls for a reduction in U.S. troop 
strength in Europe of 29,200 and a cor- 
responding reduction in Soviet troop 
strength of 325,000. So it's based on a 
realistic assessment by the political 
and military leadership in the United 
States that it's in the very best inter- 
ests of the peace and security of the 
Western alliance that we see these 

Q. You and the President have en- 
couraged the Soviets to tear down the 
Berlin Wall. Do you seriously believe 
that that decision can be made with- 
out the consent of the East German 

A. We're really not suggesting 
that it necessarily can be made without 
the consent of the East German Gov- 
ernment. But what we're saying is that 
this is — we hear the Soviet Union talk- 
ing a lot about a common European 
home, and that is their competing vi- 
sion, if you will, to our suggestion that 
we should see a Europe that is un- 
divided and free. We argue that you 
can't talk about a common European 
home unless the people living in that 
home are free to move from room to 
room. The Berlin Wall is the greatest 
symbol that we see of the fact that un- 
der the current system people are, in 
fact, not free to move from room to 

""We also know, of course, that the 
Soviet Union has a significant degree 
of influence as far as the German Dem- 
ocratic Republic is concerned. 

Q. Who's in charge in China? 

A. Let me suggest to you that we 
have seen various reports about who's 
in charge. I think it's too soon, and the 
situation is too clouded now for us to 
answer that definitively by suggesting 
names — throwing names out there for 

The Chinese themselves, at this 
point in time, are not shedding a lot of 
light on this, which I think is another 
indication of the fact that there is a 
power struggle going on in China. 

Q. Are economic sanctions being 
considered as a way to bring pressure 
on China, and can you rule out specif- 
ically the use of a grain embargo? 

A. The President, in announcing 
the action that he took several days ago 
with respect to military sales and the 
exchange of visits between military ad- 
visers, said that he reserved the right 
to review all options as the situation 
warrants. For the time being, he has 
determined that it is important that 
we maintain the economic relationships 
that exist now. 

In large part, I said a moment ago 
that I thought the reform process in 
China — the economic part — got out a 
little ahead of the political part. But in 
large part, those economic reforms are 
what have led to the opening up that we 
saw before this recent tragic and unfor- 
tunate and deplorable crackdown. 

We think it's important that we 
maintain, if we can — depending upon 
what happens and depending upon the 
future course of events there — that we 
maintain these economic ties, because 
those are the things that for the most 
part have led to a move toward open- 
ness in the People's Republic of China. 
But the President does reserve his op- 
tions with respect to all these matters. 

Q. If, as it now appears, the 
hardliners are taking charge in Bei- 
jing, will you hand back Mr. Fang, the 
dissident now in the U.S. Embassy, if 
asked to do so? 

A. Mr. Fang is in the embassy 
where he took refuge for personal safe- 
ty reasons. We never discuss questions 
involving the issue of asylum, and I 
will not discuss that now. Let me sim- 
ply say that he asked for refuge in our 
embassy, and we granted that refuge. 
We will be motivated primarily by his 
wishes in this regard. 

Q. In retrospect, was the U.S. 
Embassy in Beijing slow in beginning 
the process of evacuating Americans 
from Beijing and other parts of 

A. No, I really don't think so. I 
think, frankly, that we were right on 
the mark, if I might suggest so. I've 
seen some comment to the contrary. We 
have had a working group monitoring 
this situation since the 19th of May on a 
24-hour basis. We have been following- 
it very, very closely. I have been follow- 
ing it personally very closely for the 
past week, or since last Saturday morn- 
ing, in any event, when the circum- 
stances began to go in the direction 
they were moving in. 


Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


I have been in very frequent con- 
tact with the President by telephone 
and in person on each day since then. 
When the violence began to erupt on 
Saturday, our embassy sent some of our 
officers at some personal risk to these 
diplomats, if I might say so, into the 
square to advise Americans to leave. 
We sent them to the campuses and into 
town to suggest that they give consid- 
eration to leaving. 

We have provided for air transpor- 
tation through contact that we made 
with some of the private air carriers in 
the United States. I might say that 
those companies — United, Continental, 
and Northwest — have been very, very 
quick to respond to our pleas for assist- 
ance. We now have more air charter ca- 
pacity than we have people willing to 
leave. The last airplane that took off an 
hiiur or two ago, I think, left with only 
(is Americans on board. There are no 
mure Americans at the airport await- 
inu evacuation from Beijing. There are 
.■^till some Americans in Beijing, but we 
have ordered our U.S. Government de- 
pt'ndents home. We have strongly sug- 
gested that all Americans leave China. 
I Now obviously, we are not in a po- 
sition to, nor would we want to be in a 
pnsition to, force them to do so against 
tht'ir will. But I particularly want to 
say that I believe that our embassy 
there and our Ambassador, Jim Lilley, 
have been e.xtraordinarily responsive 
tn the needs and concerns of Americans 
tlii'oughout this crisis. Not one Ameri- 
can has been killed. Only one has been 
hurt. We were in touch with him imme- 
diately after he was injured and taken 
til a hospital. He has since been re- 
leased and is ambulatory. So all in all, 
we are keeping our fingers crossed, 
maintaining our 24-hour vigilance. 

While our dependents are coming 
I lilt of Beijing, we are maintaining the 
full staff of other embassy people there 
sii that we can continue to assist 
people — Americans — to get to the air- 
port and to move about in this very, 
\ery chaotic and unfortunate situation. 

Q. Are the events in China hav- 
ing any effect on the situation in the 
Korean Peninsula? 

A. There's been no significant fall- 
iiiit as we stand here at this time. 

Q. The Iranian leader Rafsanjani 
J, today made an offer to help with the 
nine U.S. hostages in Lebanon. What 
is your reply to him on this request 
for U.S. help? 

A. He said that if w^e would help 
with respect to certain Iranian hos- 
tages, I think, who are alleged to be 
held in the Christian enclave sector of 
Lebanon — let me simply say that we 
have provided Iran, on several occa- 
sions, with all of the information that 
we have with regard to the disap- 
pearance of these four Iranians in Bei- 
rut in 1982. It's our position and 
remains our position that Iran should 
move to bring about the immediate and 
unconditional release of U.S. citizens 
held by Iranian-supported groups in 

Q. Ali Khamenei is the new lead- 
er in Iran. Is he a caretaker, and do 
you expect that relations with Iran 
will improve? 

A. I've just given you our condi- 
tions for improvement in those rela- 
tions. And in addition to seeing Iran 
move unconditionally and with dispatch 
to obtain the release of our hostages, 
w^e, of course, would like to see them 
renounce state-sponsored terrorism, 
which they have been unwilling to do in 
the past. 

I have to say to you I think we're 
going through a period of great change 
around the world. One of our chal- 
lenges, of course, is to relate to that 
change in an effective and appropriate 

Before I finish answering your 
question on Iran, I should throw one 
other thing in here about China. While 
the President does reserve options, I 
think it's important to note he has 
spent and we in the United States have 
spent many years in improving the re- 
lationship between the United States 
and the People's Republic of China and 
encouraging China to move toward de- 
mocratization. Now we've had a very 
tragic step backward. But it is impor- 
tant, I think, that we all recognize the 
importance of this relationship. 

Back to Iran. Change is taking 
place in many areas of the world. 
Change is clearly going to take place 
now in Iran. It is my own view, in all 
probability, there will be a significant 
struggle for power there, and it re- 
mains to be seen whether there will be, 
in the future, any basis for our improv- 
ing our relationship with that country. 

Q. Could you tell us about the 
questions Ambassador Pelletreau 
[Robert H. Pelletreau. Jr., U.S. Am- 
bassador to Tunisia and official U.S. 
contact with the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO)] is bringing up 
in his dialogue with the PLO today in 

A. Let me start answering by say- 
ing to you that the dialogue we are 
maintaining with the PLO, we have 
said on many occasions, should not be 
and cannot be, as far as we're con- 
cerned, an end in and of itself. It can 
only be productive if it can move us for- 
ward toward the goal of peace in the 
Middle East. 

This was the third formal session 
which we've had with the PLO. Our dia- 
logue has progressed from initial con- 
tacts to now the discussion of 
substantive issues and today to a con- 
sideration of serious and practical ways 
we might progress in a step-by-step 
fashion toward the goal of a comprehen- 
sive settlement through negotiations 
based, of course, on UN Security Coun- 
cil Resolutions 242 and 338. And we got 
into a fair amount of substance today in 
that dialogue. 

We, of course, support the proposal 
that [Israeli] Prime Minister Shamir 
has advanced for elections in the occu- 
pied territories, particularly when you 
consider that he advanced that proposal 
in the context of a way to launch a polit- 
ical negotiation. We think this is 
meaningful. We think this gives us 
something to work with, to try and 
move things forward toward peace in 
this very, very difficult part of the 
world and with respect to this very, 
very intractable problem. 

Q. Several former U.S. ambas- 
sadors have admitted last Sunday 
that over the past several years, they 
had over 30 secret meetings with the 
PLO in violation of U.S. State De- 
partment policy and a promise made 
to Israel by former Secretary of State 

The first question: How does this 
breach of trust with Israel affect pos- 
sibilities for progress with the prob- 
lems in the West Bank and Gaza? 

And, second, what do you know 
about the involvement of U.S. citizens 
and former State Department offi- 
cials in masterminding the intifada'! 

A. I don't know anything about it, 
and I take note of the fact you made 
mention in the question these were for- 
mer U.S. Ambassadors. [Laughter] 

Let me simply say we now have a 
dialogue with the PLO, because the 
PLO has acceded to the three condi- 
tions the United States laid out there 
as preconditions for such a dialogue 13 
years ago. So we don't have secret 
meetings. These meetings are — I 
mean, they're private meetings, but 
they're not being held behind anybody's 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



Frankly, this is the first time that 
I've even heard of this. I hadn't seen 
The Washington Posf article, so I can't 
comment further. 

Q. What sort of reaction has 
your recent recommendations to the 
Israelis in the Mideast peace gotten 
from Congress? Many protests? 

A. No. I've gotten — you mean 
the — I guess you're referring to the 
speech I gave which has received a fair 
amount of publicity. 

But I think it's interesting to note 
I have received three congressional let- 
ters with respect to that speech; two 
very positive and approving, and one 
that I would characterize as slightly 

But there doesn't seem to be 
much — if you measure it by the volume, 
by the number of letters, there 
wouldn't seem to be that much — as 
much interest as the question might 
suggest up in the Congress. 

Q. If the mission of the Organi- 
zation of American States (OAS) to 
Panama fails, what would be Wash- 
ington's next step? 

A. We're very hopeful, now that all 
countries in Latin America, save 
Cuba — which is not a member of the Or- 
ganization of American States — and 
save Nicaragua, agree with us there 
should be a transfer of power in Pan- 
ama. We're very hopeful, when the mis- 
sion goes back down there, they will be 
able to move the process forward. 

You're asking me to look into a 
crystal ball here and suggest what we 
might do next, and I, of course, am un- 
willing to do that, because that would 
probably not be good policy even if I 
were able to tell you, which I'm not. 

Q. How does the Bush Adminis- 
tration's policy on South Africa differ 
from the Reagan Administration's 
unsuccessful policy of constructive 

A. I'm not sure that the question is 
phrased in the right way. If I might re- 
phrase it just a little bit. 

Some of us believe that sanctions 
sometimes are counterproductive. 
Sometimes they can be quite effective. 
It's important, if you're going to make a 
difference with respect to the affairs of 
any country, that you have an 
ability to engage that country and you 
have an ability to move public opinion 
in other countries in support of your 
policy vis-a-vis that country, that you 

have an ability to reward or not rewai'd 
that country. 

That was the idea behind construc- 
tive engagement. I recognize that the 
term has been discredited in the sense 
that was the term that was used to sup- 
port the policy of the executive branch 
of the U.S. Government. But the legis- 
lative branch had a different policy, and 
that policy prevailed, and it was a poli- 
cy of sanctions. 

What we would like to do is con- 
vince the legislative branch, as I think 
we were able to do with respect to Cen- 
tral American policy, where we were 
going off in different directions, and, 
therefore, the United States could not 
act in a unified way and could not be 
successful. We would like to convince 
the Congress we have the same ends in 
mind. We seek the abolition of apart- 
heid, which we think is deplorable, and 
we seek the institution of a nonracial, 
representative government in South 

I think that is the same goal of 
those people who supported past sanc- 
tion legislation and who support addi- 
tional sanction legislation. Our 
difference of opinion is with respect to 
the best way to get there, and we are 
now engaged in dialogue with the legis- 
lative branch to see if we can come for- 
ward with an agreed course, so the 
United States can speak with one voice 
and might be able to have some impact 
on what happens in South Africa, be- 
cause we're having scant impact now. 

Q. Were your meetings in Rome 
with the man likely to be the next 
head of state in South Africa, Wil- 
liam de Klerk, productive, and do you 
see any sort of a breakthrough 

A. I didn't meet with De Klerk in 
Rome. I met with the Foreign Minister 
of South Africa [Roelof F. "Pik" Botha]. 
I thought the meeting was productive. 
I'll tell you what he told me, which I 
understand he said before, but which I 
found very significant. He said, "The 
days of white domination are over." He 
said, "We are going to abolish apart- 
heid in South Africa," and he said, "My 
party and I are going to run on that 

Now, the question, of course, is 
when. The key is implementation. But I 
thought it was fairly significant that 
the first time there was a high-level 
meeting between representatives of 
that government — and that's the party 
that's going to succeed, going to proba- 
bly win the election in South Africa — I 

thought it was significant that the first 
time there was a meeting between rep- 
resentatives of that party and the Bush 
Administration, they would be so de- 
finitive in their comments to us and in 
stating their goals in that way. 

Q. Is the U.S. Government pre- 
pared to support negotiations be- 
tween the Najibullah regime and the 
mujahidin in Afghanistan? 

A. We will continue our support 
for the right of the Afghan people to 
self-determination. We have said before 
we think it's a question of transfer of 
power in Kabul, not sharing of power. 
We don't think there can be self- 
determination for the Afghan people if 
Najibullah remains in powei'. 

So our goals in that regard have 
not changed. Our policy has not 
changed, contrary to some suggestions 
I saw a day or so ago in the press. We 
have spent a fair amount of time yester- 
day in discussions of this matter with 
[Pakistani] Prime Minister Bhutto 
when she was here, and we and our al- 
lies in Pakistan will be moving forward 
together in respect to this question of 

Q. Back to the loop that you are 
in, should civil war erupt in China, 
what position will the United States 
take? Would the I'nited States sup- 
port one side or the other? 

A. That's too speculative and hypo- 
thetical for me to answer. It's a good 
way to get in trouble; therefore, I won't 
answer it. 

Q. Would you want to flesh out 
your proposal that the United States 
and its allies should join in a creative 
responsibility-sharing to help resolve 
regional problems? Which regional is- 
sues do you have in mind, and which 
allies could be helpful? Are you sug- 
gesting something like the assistance 
Sweden played last year in influenc- 
ing the PLO to shift its ground? 

A. That's an example, but, of 
course, Sweden is a neutral country 
and not an ally. So that would not be a 
good example from that standpoint. 
But the NATO alliance includes, for in- 
stance, a number of countries that were 
very helpful when we had to go into the 
Persian Gulf and assure freedom of 

The British and the Dutch, among 
others, sent ships in to help with our 
ships. The Japanese — although they're 


Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


not members of NATO, they are an ally 
of the United States — helped foot the 
bill for that operation. 

The Spanish are members of 
NATO, and they can be very influential 
with respect to regional conflicts in 
Latin America by virtue of the cultural 
relationship that exists there. 

It's these kinds of things that I'm 
talking about. The United Kingdom 
was helpful in connection with Angola- 
Namibia — a regional problem — and the 
resolution of that problem. And [Brit- 
ish Prime Minister] Margaret Thatcher 
happened to be in southern Africa 
when the Namibian settlement gave ev- 

ery indication of coming off the tracks 
because SWAPO [South West Africa 
People's Organization] moved into 
Namibia against the agreement. And 
she was very helpful in getting that 
back on track. 

So it's that kind of thing that I'm 
talking about. There's no reason why, 
with this very vital and vibrant and ef- 
fective alliance, we shouldn't coordi- 
nate our efforts with respect to solving 
some of these regional conflicts which 
represent the real threat, I think, to 
world peace today. 

'Press release 112. 

Challenges Ahead for NATO 

and Developments in East-West Relations 

Secvetanj Baker's statement pre- 
pared for the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on June 20, 1989.^ 

It is a pleasure to appear before you 
this afternoon to report on East-West 
relations and the progress we have 
made in our European security policy. 

NATO's commitment to protect our 
security and promote democratic val- 
ues has been largely responsible for the 
positive developments we see in the in- 
ternational environment. At the NATO 
summit, all Western leaders agreed 
that we are in a remarkable period of 
transition in East-West relations. A 
combination of Western resolve and 
economic problems within the Soviet 
Union seem to have convinced the Sov- 
iet leadership that it must rethink 
a wide range of domestic and foreign 

Now, it is the West's task to seize 
the opportunities that have been 
created by the new "correlation of 
forces" — to borrow a phrase from Mos- 
cow. At this time of transition, we must 
work together to promote the West's 
democratic principles enshrined in 
the North Atlantic Treaty and in the 
Helsinki Final Act. 

The President has called for the 
United States and the West to move 
"beyond containment" toward a new ob- 
jective: overcoming the division of Eu- 
rope by making Europe whole and free. 
We are seeking to bring a new unity to 
Europe — a unity based on Western 

The President has also outlined his 
strategy for moving toward this objec- 
tive. He has explained how America 
must lead in "managing change" by es- 
tablishing new missions for the alliance 
and the West. 

U.S. -Soviet Dynamics 

We are living in an era of transition. 
The postwar system is being trans- 
formed, and a new environment is 
emerging. To establish the context of 
these changing times, it's helpful to 
begin with an assessment of how the 
Soviet Union is changing. 

The movement we're seeing in 
Soviet politics presents a potential 
revolution — a revolution we hope will 
succeed. "New thinking" is really 
a rethinking of their failed ideol- 
ogy. But nobody knows — not even Mr. 
Gorbachev — what kind of Soviet Union 
ultimately will result from the changes 

At this time of transition, our val- 
ues and our interests have led us to en- 
gage the East actively. We should not 
sit idly by. We've moved decisively to 
broaden our dialogue with the Soviet 
Union, seeking to contribute content to 
the slogans of Soviet "new thinking." 

The Soviets have taken concrete 
and encouraging strides in a number of 
key areas. Emigration has increased 
dramatically. They have come forward 
with serious responses to our arms 
control proposals — for example, on 
intermediate nuclear forces and 
conventional reductions. The Soviets 
pulled out of Afghanistan as promised. 

They have agreed to work actively with 
us on transborder issues of global con- 
cern. But there is a long way to go 
before the promise of perestroika 
becomes reality, before the progress 
becomes institutionalized. 

We'll have to be realistic and pa- 
tient while we probe the Soviets to see 
how far cooperation can go. We're going 
to work hard to get results in every 
area. Some of the individual steps may 
be small, but their cumulative weight 
could result in a markedly more con- 
structive U.S. -Soviet relationship. 

Results won't come easily; many of 
the critically important issues between 
us are not amenable to simple, facile 
solutions. But the President and I are 
optimistic that progress will come if 
we have bipartisan support from Con- 
gress; if we and our allies stand by our 
convictions; if we remain engaged; and, 
above all, if we stay united. 

For our part, the Bush Adminis- 
tration has been engaging the Soviets 
across the full range of our concerns. 
As always, we begin with human rights. 
During my ministerial talks in Moscow 
in May, I took up individual human 
rights cases with Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze, telling him that we 
won't be satisfied until the several hun- 
dred remaining cases are resolved. 

I also indicated to him that we 
want the Soviets to go beyond the "era 
of lists." We want to see them guaran- 
tee human rights by institutionalizing 
the changes they're making. We want 
to see an open Soviet political system 
and legal codes that will make the re- 
cent gains difficult to reverse. 

On arms control, we are also mov- 
ing forward. We have promising move- 
ment on conventional arms reductions. 
(I'll say more about the President's am- 
bitious conventional proposal and the 
status of the CFE [conventional armed 
forces in Europe] talks later.) The 
President has put forward an "open 
skies" proposal designed to build con- 
fidence through greater transparency. 
We are proceeding on a multilateral 
basis with the CSCE [Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe] 
talks on confidence- and security- 
building measures in Vienna. We have 
just signed a bilateral agreement with 
the Soviets on avoiding military activ- 
ities that could lead to inadvertent con- 
flict. Yesterday, strategic arms control 
negotiations resumed in Geneva. 

And, we have also been stressing 
with the Soviets our interest in extend- 
ing the arms control agenda to cover 
ballistic missile, chemical, and nuclear 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



weapons proliferation. These weapons 
are being acquired by irresponsible 
regimes in unstable regions and in- 
crease the danger of escalation. 

While working to control the tech- 
nological side of superpower competi- 
tion through arms reductions and 
control, we have made it clear to Mos- 
cow that regional conflicts must be- 
come a central focus of superpower 
cooperation because of the dangerous 
threats of escalation they represent. 

In Moscow, General Secretary Gor- 
bachev and Foreign Minister Shev- 
ardnadze listened carefully to my 
presentations on Nicaragua and the 
Middle East peace process. They un- 
derstand that we are giving diplomacy 
a chance in Central America and that 
our policy has bipartisan support. They 
know the importance we attach to the 
Sandinistas living up to their pledges 
in Esquipulas II. In the Middle East, 
they understand our support for elec- 
tions in the territories, and they 
understand, too, why a premature 
international conference will only di- 
vert us from the changes we need to 
see taking place on the ground. We are 
now engaging in a series of experts 
talks with the Soviets on all the areas 
of regional concern. 

By taking positive action to resolve 
regional conflicts, the Soviets can show 
us that their new thinking applies the 
world over. In Central America and the 
Middle East, especially — but also in 
southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, 
and Asia — it is time for the Soviets 
to prod their clients into doing some 
new thinking of their own. 

At the ministerial, we also had 
fruitful discussions on transnational 
and bilateral issues. The transnational 
problems were added to the agenda at 
our suggestion. We have pointed out 
that the Alaskan oil spill, the Arme- 
nian earthquake, Chernobyl, global 
warming — all these are problems that 
go beyond traditional geopolitical con- 
cerns of sovereignty and security to af- 
fect global well-being. Foreign Ministei- 
Shevardnadze and I also signed an 
agreement combating pollution in the 
Bering and Chukchi Seas — a small step 
on what I hope will be a long road to- 
ward solving the international environ- 
mental problems which threaten all 

On terrorism, we seek to establish 
points of contact within our govern- 
ments and vehicles for information 
sharing about terrorist groups. 

On bilateral subjects, we have es- 
tablished a full workplan of 23 items as 
diverse as ocean research, civil avia- 
tion, atomic energy, and maritime 

I would sum up this brief overview 
of U.S. -Soviet relations this way: 
No one can know the outcome of the 
changes taking place in Moscow and 
elsewhere in the communist world. In 
the end, we do know that the success of 
reform will depend primarily upon 
choices made in Moscow, Beijing, or 
East Berlin, not Washington, Brussels, 
or Bonn. What we do know is that the 
East can progress only through both 
political and economic reform. To stand 
in the way of such necessary, historic 
change — as we are seeing to our out- 
rage and sorrow in China — is to turn 
one's back to the future. And that is 
why General Secretary Gorbachev's 
temporizing comments on those tragic 
events are disappointing. 

For our part, we strongly believe 
that reform in the communist world — 
whether in Asia or in Europe — is very 
much in our interests. That is why 
we're building on past efforts and mov- 
ing forward on our broad agenda with 
the Soviets. We are e.xploring and es- 
tablishing new vehicles that will foster 
systematic cooperation. And we'll be 
continuing our wide-ranging discus- 
sions during the ministerial meeting in 

We're actively engaging Moscow 
with our eyes open and fixed on our 
longstanding goals and interests: pro- 
tecting Western security and pro- 
moting the democratic values, goals, 
and interests that we reaffirmed at the 
NATO summit. 

Moving Ahead: The NATO Summit 

At NATO's 40th anniversary summit, 
we made the next 40 years, not the last 
40, our point of reference. And as we 
took bold steps toward making war in 
Europe both unthinkable and imposs- 
ible, we set our eyes on the objective of 
making Europe whole and free and the 
world a much better place for everyone 
to live in. 

In Brussels, the President took 
three significant actions to lead the al- 
liance in managing the changing world 
we face. First, this Administration 
seized the opportunity to lock in and 
accelerate a possible historical change 
in the balance of military forces in Eu- 
rope. Second, we reached agreement on 
NATO's comprehensive concept. Third, 
we identified new missions for NATO. 

The President's Conventional | 

Forces Proposal. Let me discuss the 
President's conventional forces proposal 
by giving the members a brief review 
of the negotiations to date. 

In March of this year, members of 
the North Atlantic alliance and the 
Warsaw Pact began negotiations in 
Vienna on conventional armed forces in 
Europe that are designed to reduce the 
threats posed by Warsaw Pact superi- 
ority in key conventional military capa- 
bilities. At the opening of the CFE 
negotiations, we and our Western part- 
ners tabled detailed and comprehensive^ 
proposals designed to achieve security 
and stability in Europe at greatly re- 
duced levels of conventional forces. 

The Western proposal, which has 
become the basis for negotiations, 
calls for establishment of equal NATO- 
Warsaw Pact ceilings on key types of 
equipment that can be used to seize and 
hold territory. Beyond eliminating key 
Warsaw Pact military advantages, the 
Western approach to CFE seeks to re- 
duce the pact's capability to initiate 
surprise attacks and large-scale offen- 
sive actions or to use military forces 
for political intimidation. We also want 
to reduce and constrain the overall size 
of Soviet forces, the extent of their de- 
ployment in Eastern Europe, and the 
relative speed with which they can be 
brought to bear in any conflict. 

Finally, our approach includes four 
subzonal ceilings which would limit the 
concentration of forces in any part of 
Europe. Thus, we seek to enhance de- 
terrence by establishing East-West 
parity in the capability to employ and 
sustain military action. 

A major opportunity to advance 
the Vienna negotiations developed out 
of my meeting with General Secretary 
Gorbachev in Moscow on May 11. Mr. 
Gorbachev presented me with specific 
numerical ceilings and a more detailed 
timetable for the proposal the East had 
introduced earlier in Vienna. These fig- 
ures were formally tabled just before 
the NATO summit. 

The President concluded that the 
specific Warsaw Pact proposals re- 
flected tacit Eastern acceptance of the 
Western concept and framework for 
CFE and that the time was ripe to give 
the negotiations a major push. The 
President decided to advance a four- 
part augmentation of our original pro- 
posal. At the summit, the plan was 
universally lauded by our allies. Our 
proposal calls for: 


Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


One, locking in Eastern acceptance 
of the proposed Western limits on key 
elements of ground forces. That would 
mean fixing common ceilings on the 
numbers of tanks at 20,000, on armored 
troop carriers at 28,000, and on artil- 
lery pieces between 16,500 and 24,000, 
depending on the resolution of defini- 
tional questions. Equipment reduced 
would be destroyed. 

Two, expanding the West's original 
proposal to include limitations on all 
! aircraft permanently based on land and 
on helicopters throughout the Atlantic- 
to-the-Urals area at 15% below the cur- 
jrent NATO total. All reduced equip- 
ment would be destroyed. 

Three, an agreement between the 
United States and the U.S.S.R. to each 
reduce their combat manpower sta- 
tioned in Europe outside national terri- 
tory to parity at 20*^ below current 
U.S. levels, with the resulting ceiling 
(ill U.S. and Soviet ground forces sta- 
tioned in Europe at approximately 
27.'), 000 troops. Withdrawn soldiers and 
airmen on both sides would be demo- 
bilized. This personnel ceiling would 
re(|uire the Soviets to withdraw ap- 
pi'oximately 325,000 military personnel 
from Eastern Europe, thereby rein- 
iforcing the objectives of the stationed 
Ifni-ces ceiling in the original Western 

Four, an agreement on acceleration 
of both the Eastern and Western time- 
tables for reaching a CFE agreement 
along the lines I have just outlined and 
for implementing the required reduc- 
tions. The Soviet proposal called for 
full implementation of an accord by 
1997. The President set a goal of com- 
pleting an agreement in 6 months to 
1 year with completion of required 
reductions by 1992 or 1993. 

These provisions would oblige both 
sides to destroy significant amounts of 
equipment. Most importantly, the Wai*- 
saw Pact's preponderance in critical 
components of military strength would 
be eliminated. These efforts will not 
undercut NATO's defense moderniza- 
tion plans. They should be understood 
as part of a comprehensive approach to 
imi)roving our security through both 
force modernization and arms reduc- 
tion and control. 

The Western governments are now 
in the process of preparing these aug- 
mentations of our original proposal 
with the goal of presenting them at the 
opening of the third round of negotia- 
tions in Vienna on September 7. In 
addition, the West is continuing to 

develop the specific elements of its ver- 
ification regime and a package of "sta- 
bilizing measures," which are designed 
to amplify the benefits of the equip- 
ment ceilings. Work is also continuing 
apace in the negotiations with the East 
on the development of agreed defini- 
tions and counting rules. 

Both sides now agree, in principle, 
that there should be subceilings on 
forces on foreign soil in Europe, limits 
on any one nation's forces, and sub- 
zones. However, there are some impor- 
tant differences in the way East and 
West apply these principles. The East 
has yet to advance its verification re- 
gime, but we expect them to be fairly 

The Broader Implications of the 
President's Proposal. I don't want to 
get lost in numbers here. Arms reduc- 
tion and control is much more than a 
matter of simple subtraction. And the 
President's initiative is more than a 
military concept. 

Our proposal has far reaching po- 
litical implications for bringing about 
the whole and free Europe that we 
seek. We are seizing this opportunity 
to diminish the shadow Soviet military 
power casts throughout Europe. We 
seek to free Western Europe from the 
threat of aggression or political intim- 
idation by superior Warsaw Pact forces. 
Finally, we want to help free the politi- 
cal reform process in Eastern Europe 
from the heavy weight of an excessive 
Soviet military presence. While we 
tend to see the Soviet forces as a poten- 
tial invasion force, to millions in the 
East the Soviets remain an occupation 

In sum, we want to free all of Eu- 
rope to become a center of cooperation, 
not confrontation. 

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in 
NATO's Strategy. At the summit, the 
President also led the alliance in taking 
a second important step toward the 
future: Western agreement on the com- 
ponents of "A Comprehensive Concept 
of Arms Control and Disarmament" 
[see p. 22]. 

This achievement demonstrates 
NATO's ability to adapt to change 
while maintaining our fundamental 
conviction that nuclear weapons play a 
critical role in ensuring the effective- 
ness of our deterrent strategy. In light 
of the existing imbalances in conven- 
tional forces, the alliance agreed that 
any negotiations on short-range nuclear 
forces (SNF) could begin only after the 
implementation of a CFE agreement is 
underway. Moreover, any negotiated 

SNF reductions will not be carried out 
until the CFE agreement is, in fact, 

The summit communique under- 
scores — literally, in fact — that our ob- 
jective in SNF negotiations would be 
to achieve partial reductions in these 
forces. The alliance is committed, for 
as long into the future as can be fore- 
seen, to maintain an appropriate level 
of land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear 
systems, including ground-based SNF 

Thus, the alliance reaffirmed our 
long-shared conviction that nuclear 
weapons make an irreplaceable con- 
tribution to the credibility of NATO's 
deterrent posture. We hope the cata- 
strophic potential of nuclear escalation 
in any conflict will continue to over- 
whelm the calculations of any potential 
aggressor. Even at conventional parity, 
nuclear weapons will play a unique role 
in our strategy. 

New Missions for NATO. The 

third step forward by the President at 
the summit was his call for the alliance 
to address new problems. He invited 
our alliance partners to consider new 
missions for the alliance. As we suc- 
ceed in easing down the military con- 
frontation in Europe, we must direct 
the alliance toward new challenges. 
NATO will always have as its central 
purpose the maintenance of collective 
Western security. However, the focus of 
alliance activities in a more benign Eu- 
ropean security environment will, ob- 
viously, be different than it has been 
during the past 40 years. 

First, the President spoke of our 
interest in furthering the decentraliza- 
tion of political, economic, and social 
authority in Eastern Europe. Even as 
we protect the West, we must reach out 
to the East to give substance to our 
commitment to overcome the division of 
Europe. In this regard, NATO's role as 
a political consultative forum and our 
commitment to the Helsinki process 
could be more effectively used to syn- 
chronize Western approaches to the 
East. Together with activity in the Eu- 
ropean Community and other Western 
institutions, the United States and its 
allies should develop a coherent strate- 
gy for dealing with change in Eastern 

Second, the President also noted 
the newly recognized dangers to our se- 
curity and well-being posed by threats 
to the environment. He proposed new 
efforts that the West might undertake 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



to help the East rectify its massive pollu- 
tion problems. In addition, the allies are 
committed to allocating more resources 
to certain nonmilitary endeavors that 
complement the functions of the Euro- 
pean Community and other 
European cooperative institutions — for 
example, on environmental matters and 
scientific cooperation. 

Third, the President focused atten- 
tion on the need for cooperation in deal- 
ing with the array of security threats, 
particularly those posed by regional 
conflicts and the proliferation of chemi- 
cal and nuclear weapons and their deliv- 
ery systems. 

It is not necessary for NATO to de- 
velop highly visible unified responses to 
all these new security threats, nor 
should our efforts be limited to coopera- 
tion among Western countries. These 
new threats menace allies, friends, and 
adversaries alike. We have signaled our 
readiness to work with all concerned na- 
tions to counter them. 


The success of the summit, and indeed 
of the alliance itself, is testament to 
the enduring strength of the political, 
cultural, and economic ties that have 
united America with our European al- 
lies for 40 years. As the President has 
stressed, America is and will remain a 
European power. 

In Brussels, we and our alliance 
partners set forth ambitious plans for 
the future. We made important head- 
way on the security agenda, having 
successfully set guidelines for the de- 
velopment of our nuclear and conven- 
tional force postures and arms control 
policies. In addition, we focused atten- 
tion on the need for the members of the 
alliance and other Western states to 
address a much broader agenda that 
confronts us in Europe and the world 
during the 1990s. 

But, most importantly, during this 
40th anniversary of the signing of the 
North Atlantic Treaty, and at a time of 
great change in East-West relations, 
we and our alliance partners have 
forged a new basis for unity. 

A New Pacific Partnership: 
Framework for the Future 

'Press release 118. The complete tran- 
script of the hearings will be published by 
the committee and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20402. ■ 

Secretary Baker's address pre- 
pared for delivery before the Asia Soci- 
ety ill Neiv York City on June 26, 1989.^ 

Thank you for that introduction, and I 
am honored to be here. I am especially 
happy to appear before the Asia Society 
in the company of Japan's Foreign Min- 
ister, Hiroshi Mitsuzuka. As the repre- 
sentative of a great democracy, the 
Foreign Minister understands, as we 
all do, that a free government depends 
upon well-informed citizens who are ac- 
tive in public affairs. The Asia Society 
can, therefore, reflect with pride upon 
its contribution to America's under- 
standing of East Asia and the Pacific 
rim. Each one of you, by participating 
in the [Asia] Society, makes a unique 
contribution to our national interests. 

Our understanding of events in 
Asia and the Pacific has become all the 
more important because the postwar 
era is over. In Asia, as in Europe, a 
new order is taking shape. While the 
rites of passage will be painful — China 
proves that — it is an order full of prom- 
ise and hope. I believe strongly that 
the United States, with its regional 
friends, must play a crucial role in 
designing its architecture. 

There are major challenges to be 
met as the new order emerges. In Asia 
and the Pacific, as elsewhere in the 
world, the demand for democracy is the 
most vital political fact of our time. 
The Philippines and South Korea have 
made the transition to free govern- 
ment. But, as we have seen to our 
sorrow last year in Burma, and more 
recently in China, there are no guaran- 
tees of progress. 

Another challenge stems from the 
very fact of the Pacific rim's economic 
success. Economic achievements carry 
new responsibilities. Explosive growth 
has been accompanied by imbalances 
that threaten the integrity of the open 
trading system. 

Finally, we continue to face securi- 
ty challenges. Conflict continues in In- 
dochina. And on the Korean Peninsula, 
there remains a heavily armed stand- 
off. Elsewhere in Asia, the postwar 
security arrangements are being 
strained by economic constraints, 
changing threats, and rising national- 
ism. Yet without a regional consensus 
on defense, all other achievements will 
be put in doubt. 

The Pacific region is clearly of 
great and grow'ing importance to the 
United States. That is why President 
Bush and Vice President Quayle visited 
Asia within the first 100 days of the 
new Administration. In a few days, I 
will be traveling to Tokyo to meet with 
other donors to the Philippines Multi- 
lateral Assistance Initiative. Then, I'll 
go on to Brunei to meet my colleagues 
in ASEAN [Association of South East 
Asian Nations], one of the Pacific's most 
constructive regional organizations. 

The purpose of my trip is to estab- 
lish the framework for a new Pacific 
partnership. To build that new part- 
nership, we need continued American 
engagement in the region's politics, 
commerce, and security. We need a 
more creative sharing of global respon- 
sibilities with Japan. And we also need 
a new mechanism to increase economic 
cooperation throughout the Pacific rim. 

Elements of the New Partnership: 
American Engagement 

The foundation of the new Pacific part- 
nership must be the engagement of the 
United States. President Bush has 
declared rightfully that America is a 
European power and will remain one. 
America is also a Pacific power, and 
we will remain one. 

The stakes are great. In 1988, for 
example, our transpacific trade totaled 
$271 billion, far exceeding our trans- 
atlantic commerce of $186 billion. U.S. 
trade with East Asia has more than 
doubled since 1982. 

Eight of our top 20 export markets 
are now in the Pacific. U.S. investment 
there, exceeding $33 billion, accounts 
for 23% of all overseas profits earned 
by U.S. corporations. 

The prosperity of the Pacific, how- 
ever, depends upon the peace of the 
Pacific. For four decades, the United 
States has provided a framework of 
security that has permitted the region 
to prosper. America's forward-deployed 
deterrent remains more essential than 
ever to the security of the Pacific. And, 
as we demonstrated through the treaty 
abolishing intermediate-range nuclear 
forces, we will not seek to improve the 
security of another region at Asia's 


Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


Today, our allies are stronger and 
more prosperous than ever. And there 
may be new opportunities to reduce 
'both political tensions and threatening 
military capabilities. 

Surely we will be able to find cre- 
ative, new ways to assure our mutual 
defense. Just as surely, we must avoid 
false complacency. We have fought 
three major wars in East Asia in the 
past 45 years. Neither we nor our allies 
want to fight another. 

I think that the facts are clear and 
the conclusions inescapable. America's 
unique political, economic, and mili- 
itary capabilities provide the foundation 
■ for a prosperous and secure Pacific. And 
that foundation can be strengthened 
further through improved regional 
partnerships that reflect the achieve- 
ments of our friends and allies. 

iThe U.S.-Japan Global Partnership 

Among those relationships in the Pacif- 
ic, none is more important to the region 
or the world than our alliance with 

Over the past decade, that alliance 
has experienced a fundamental change. 
Japan has become a world power. We 
applaud this achievement which holds 
so much promise for the future. But to 
make the most of that promise, the 
United States and Japan must build a 
new and truly global partnership. The 
foundations for that global partnership 
are now being laid. 

• Japan is shouldering more of the 
mutual defense burden and provides 
40% of the cost of stationing U.S. 
forces in-country. 

• The recently concluded FSX 
fighter codevelopment project is an im- 
portant advance as we strengthen our 
cooperation in defense and technology. 

• Japan will soon be the largest do- 
nor of overseas development assistance. 
Its role in the Philippines' assistance 
initiative offers a prime example of 

the good Japan can do in bolstering 
emerging democracies and sharing 

• Finally, Japan has offered to help 
in alleviating the international debt 

There are, of course, other issues 
I that will find their way onto the agenda 
of a global partnership, including envi- 
I ronmental protection and international 
j peacekeeping. But the message is clear. 
The time has arrived for Japan to trans- 
late its domestic and regional successes 

more fully into a broader international 
role with increased responsibility. And 
I am glad to say here today to my Japa- 
nese colleague. Foreign Minister Mit- 
suzuka, that I look forward to a new 
closeness of coordination with Japan. 

This expanding relationship will 
require a transformation of outlook 
and policy in both our countries. That 
is already evident in the area of trade, 
where our bilateral relationship contin- 
ues to be troubled. Prime Minister Uno 
himself put it best when, in his first 
major speech to the Diet, he urged Ja- 
pan to "embark upon rectifying those 
institutions and practices that are ob- 
jectively viewed as unfair." Though we 
have seen some progress in the trade 
area, the full opening of Japanese mar- 
kets must still be achieved. And at the 
same time, we look forward to the full 
implementation of the structural re- 
forms advocated by the Maekawa report. 

We and Japan must recognize how 
interconnected we really are. That is 
why we are looking to begin a struc- 
tural economic initiative. Its purpose is 
to identify, on both sides, impediments 
to the reduction of economic imbal- 
ances — and to develop action plans 
to remove them. 

Change will be required of the 
United States, not just of the Japanese. 
That is why President Bush is deter- 
mined to put our American house in 
better order — to improve our educa- 
tion, to sharpen our competitiveness, 
to reduce the trade and budget deficits 
that weigh so heavily on our economy. 
And we will continue to oppose the pro- 
tectionist pressures that menace the 
world trading systems. The challenge 
of structural change is not Japan's 

Pacific Economic Cooperation 

Let me turn now to the next part of 
the framework — a new mechanism to 
increase economic cooperation through- 
out the Pacific. Last year intra-Asian 
trade approached $200 billion, reflect- 
ing the rapid pace of Pacific rim eco- 
nomic integration. Yet unlike Europe, 
there are inadequate regional mecha- 
nisms to deal with the effects of in- 
terdependence. Many distinguished 
statesmen and influential organizations 
have suggested ways to fill the gap — 
among them Australian Prime Minister 
Hawke and MITI [Japan's Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry] dur- 
ing the time Hiroshi Mitsuzuka headed 
it. All their suggestions share the ob- 
jective of improving economic coopera- 

tion and offering a regional forum to 
discuss a range of common problems. 

Clearly, the need for a new me- 
chanism for multilateral cooperation 
among the nations of the Pacific rim is 
an idea whose time has come. Our in- 
volvement in the creation of this new 
institution will signal our full and on- 
going engagement in the region. And 
by furthering the development and in- 
tegration of market economies within 
the international system, we strength- 
en the collective force of those that 
share our principles. 

I want to explore the possibilities 
for such a mechanism in detail during 
my trip. The United States will not of- 
fer a definitive blueprint. We will be 
looking, instead, for a consensus, draw- 
ing on the best elements from various 
plans. This new mechanism should be 
based on the following key principles. 

First, any mechanism should en- 
compass a wide array of issues, extend- 
ing from trade and economic affairs to 
issues such as cultural exchange and 
the protection of the Pacific region's 
natural resources. As such, it would 
embody what the President has called 
"creative responsibility-sharing," 
meaning that each government should 
act commensurate with its resources 
and capabilities. All our economies 
have benefited from the world trading 
system and all should act commensu- 
rate with their resources and capa- 
bilities to help strengthen it. 

Second, any Pacific-wide institu- 
tion must be an inclusive entity that ex- 
pands trade and investment. It must 
help, not hinder, already existing ef- 
forts, such as the Uruguay Round of 
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade], the OECD [Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment], or a regional group, such as 
ASEAN. It should be based on a com- 
mitment by market economies to facili- 
tate the free flow of goods, services, 
capital, technology, and ideas. 

Third, a pan-Pacific entity should 
recognize the diversity of social and 
economic systems and differing levels 
of development in the region. At the 
same time, we should recognize that 
private initiative and free-market 
policies offer the best route for indi- 
vidual opportunity and higher living 

Today, Minister Mitsuzuka and I 
talked about the possibility of such a 
new entity. And I will be discussing 
how we can create this new mechanism 
when I see Prime Minister Hawke this 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



week and our ASEAN friends next 
week. If a consensus can be reached, 
we would support the Prime Minister's 
call for a ministerial meeting this fall 
as a first step toward developing such 
a new Pacific institution. 

Constructive Relations With China 

Full American engagement, a global 
partnership with Japan, and a new po- 
litical mechanism for Pacific economic 
cooperation are critical pieces in the 
puzzle of Asia's future. But that future 
will be incomplete without China. And 
today, more than ever, China casts a 
long shadow over the Pacific. 

China had made great economic 
strides. Per capita income doubled in a 
decade. An open window to Western 
trade, technology, and investment was 
an essential part of reform. To sum it 
up, if I can, China had decided to join 
in regional progress rather than re- 
main isolated from it. 

History shows, however, that eco- 
nomic and political reforms are but two 
sides of the same coin. Now it has be- 
come all too evident that the pace of po- 
litical change in China did not match 
the aspirations of the Chinese people. 

The President has condemned in 
the strongest terms the brutal events of 
this past month. We and other nations 
have suspended business as usual. But 
we and the rest of the world must not 
let our revulsion at this repression 
blind us to the pressures for reform. 

China has suffered a tragic set- 
back, but the story is not ovei". As the 
President said, "the process of democ- 
ratization in communist countries will 
not be a smooth one, and we must react 
to setbacks in a way that stimulates 
rather than stifles progress." 

That is why we have acted in a 
measured way. The hasty dismantling 
of a constructive U.S. -Chinese rela- 
tionship, built up so carefully over two 
decades, would serve neither our inter- 
ests nor those of the Chinese people. 
Above all, it would not help those aspi- 
rations for democracy that were so ob- 
vious in the millions who marched to 
support the students in Tiananmen 

Having said that, let me be clear: 
The U.S. Government and its people 
will stand for the democratic values we 
hold dear. China's current leadership 
may have cleared the square; they 
cannot clear the conscience. China's 
rendezvous with freedom, like its 
rendezvous with the advancing nations 

of the Pacific, cannot be long delayed. 
We will be there to help when the day 
follows the night. 

Conflict in the Pacific 

Finally, we and the entire region must 
deal with the remaining major conflicts 
that threaten peace: the Korean Penin- 
sula and Indochina. 

I must note with regret that the 
North Korean regime has yet to aban- 
don its self-imposed isolation or its 
pressure tactics intended to destabilize 
the Republic of Korea. We will continue 
to probe for hints of progress in reduc- 
ing tensions between North and South, 
looking for signs of a willingness to en- 
gage in greater (jr/a.s»(os? and military 
transparency. Our policy is to facilitate 
reconciliation through dialogue with all 
concerned parties, above all through 
direct talks between South and North. 
We will maintain fully our security 
commitment to Korea to facilitate such 
progress and prevent armed conflict. 

In Cambodia the shooting contin- 
ues and the danger of renewed civil war 
is real. Hanoi's announced intention to 
withdraw its troops by the end of Sep- 
tember has accelerated efforts toward 
a negotiated settlement. Our principal 
objectives are to bring about a verified 
Vietnamese withdrawal, to prevent a 
return to power of the Khmer Rouge, 
and to provide the Cambodian peo- 
ple a genuine opportunity for self- 
determination. We believe a compre- 
hensive agreement, backed by a cred- 
ible international presence under UN 
auspices, is the best way to achieve 
these goals. 

We believe that Prince Sihanouk's 
leadership is essential to the process of 
creating an independent Cambodia at 
peace with itself. That is why we have 
asked Congress to authorize additional 
aid to the noncommunist resistance. 
Such aid will strengthen the Prince's 
position in the political process now un- 
derway and increase the prospects for 
a settlement which can ensure that the 
Khmer Rouge never again take power. 

As we examine the possibilities of 
resolving the remaining Pacific con- 
flicts, I want to note here some new de- 
velopments in Soviet policy. For much 
of the postwar era, Soviet actions in 
Asia could only be described as omi- 
nous. Moscow has deployed a formida- 
ble military presence able to project 
naval and air power well into the Pacific. 

Three years ago, at Vladivostok, 
General Secretary Gorbachev an- 
nounced a new approach to Soviet in- 

terests in Asia. After easing Sino- 
Soviet border tensions, withdrawing 
Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and 
influencing Vietnamese restraint, Mr. 
Gorbachev was able recently to visit 
Beijing. President Bush welcomed this 
development. It confirms that a con- 
structive Soviet approach is possible if 
Moscow changes its policy of military 
intimidation and support for 

Now, it is time for new Soviet 
deeds to match new Soviet thinking. 
Let Moscow end its occupation of 
Japan's Northern Territories. Let 
Vladivostok become an open port, as 
Mr. Gorbachev proposed 3 years ago. 
Let special economic zones bloom in the 
Soviet Far East, as Mr. Gorbachev sug- 
gested 1 year ago. Let the Soviet 
Union cooperate in resolving the ten- 
sions and hostilities in Korea and 


A political philosopher once wrote 
that "there is nothing more difficult to 
take in hand, more perilous to conduct, 
more uncertain in its success, than to 
take the lead in the introduction of a 
new order of things." Yet today in the 
Pacific and East Asia, as in Europe, 
we face the inescapable challenge of 
building a new order. 

Thei-e are perils. There will be dif- 
ficulties. Yet I believe that despite 
these uncertainties, the rewards of a 
free, prosperous, and secure Pacific 
are within our reach. 

That calls for a new Pacific part- 
nership, based on a global sharing of 
responsibilities with Japan. We also 
need a new political mechanism to 
enhance economic cooperation in the 
Pacific rim. And we need to address 
the points of conflict that still threaten 
the peace of the Pacific. 

Let me close on this note. I believe 
that, ultimately, what beckons us to 
our Pacific destiny goes beyond the 
reckoning of material interests. It is 
the idea of a creative harmony, the 
product of many different nations, each 
with its own approach but drawn to- 
gether around certain principles. It is 
the faith that we can create a Pacific 
community reaching out to the rest of 
the world. It is, in short, the belief 
that free peoples, working together, 
can emancipate our region at last 
from historic burdens of poverty and 
conflict. That is our vision, to which 
we this day dedicate our new Pacific 

'Press release 123 I 


Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


Secretary's Interview 

on "Newsmaker Saturday" 

Secretary Baker was interviewed 
(III CNN's "Newsmaker Saturday" by 
Charles Bierbaxer and Ralph Begleiter 
(III June 3, 1989.^ 

Q. The pictures from Beijing today 
are vivid and alarming. Chinese secu- 
rity forces have opened fire on the 
student demonstrators, and the stu- 
dents have resisted. Amid the flames, 
there are also the first victims on 
both sides. It is very much a contest 
of the flames of suppression, which 
we now see, versus the flames of de- 
mocracy, which we have witnessed 
kindling the past weeks in Tianan- 
men Square. 

Is there any influence that the 
Inited States has exerted, sought to 
exert, can exert, to try and bring 
what we are seeing now to a peaceful 
rather than a violent conclusion? 

A. Unfortunately, it would appear 
that the situation in China is turning 
uu'ly and chaotic. The U.S. Government 
has heretofore expressed its concern to 
the Chinese Government that the ut- 
most restraint be used. I think it's im- 
portant to note that there has been a 
sinnificant amount of restraint used 
ii\er the past number of weeks, because 
this has been going on for quite some 

I think the Chinese Government 
knows of the position of the U.S. Gov- 
ernment. The army of China calls itself 
the army of the people, and we think it 
would be unfortunate, indeed, if the 
army of the people were used to sup- 
press the people. This would disturb 
the United States, and it w^ould, of 
course, disturb the people of the Unit- 
ed States. 

Q. Have you been told, though, 
that this is really none of your busi- 
ness, that it's going to be handled the 
w ay the Chinese seek to? 

A. The Chinese are, like others I 
suppose, of a mind from time to time 
that things that involve the internal af- 
fairs of that country are just that — 
matters involving their internal af- 
fairs. I think that the messages which 
we have sent have, however, been re- 
ceived in the spirit in which they have 
been sent. We've not, in effect, been 
told in so many words, "You mind your 
own business," because the commit- 

ment of the United States of America 
to democracy, to freedom of speech, to 
freedom of expression, and freedom of 
assembly is w^ell known throughout the 

Q. You said that the situation 
had turned ugly and chaotic. Chaos 
was one of the things many people 
around the world — businessmen, 
diplomats — are very worried about in 
China. How chaotic is it, according to 
your latest reports? 

A. We've been in touch very 
recently — within the last hour — with 
our Embassy there. I have spoken, as a 
matter of fact, to the President within 
the last hour, and the reports that 
we're receiving and that are being com- 
municated to me and that I am commu- 
nicating to him are that it's quite 
chaotic now. There is shooting going 
on. To some extent, that shooting ap- 
pears to be aimed up in the air, al- 
though we do have some preliminary 
reports of casualties. We're not able to 
confirm any specific casualty reports. 

Q. Should Americans who are in 
Beijing leave, and what about busi- 
nesses who have investments in 

A. We have, as you know, a travel 
advisory against travel to China now. 
We have, in fact, ordered our Embassy 
people out of Tiananmen Square. We 
have suggested that other Americans 
avoid Tiananmen Square, but we have 
actually ordered our Embassy person- 
nel out of the square. It's a situation 
that is not a happy one; it's not pleas- 
ant. It is, indeed, turning quite ugly. 

Q. Just recently, one of the Chi- 
nese leaders, Wan Li, was in this 
country. President Bush has often 
made reference to his conversations 
and relationship with Zhao Ziyang. 
These appear to be people who now 
are out of power. Do you have any as- 
sessment as to what may have hap- 
pened to them, or who is in charge 
now, and is it a solid control? 

A. There has been a power strug- 
gle in conjunction with this very pas- 
sionate statement that these hundreds 
of thousands of students are making for 
democracy. This has triggered a power 
struggle within China. I'd really rather 
not go into the details of who's up and 

who's down, and where we think the 
various parties are. That's really some- 
thing I think — 

Q. Is that because of uncer- 

A. No, not so much because of un- 
certainty; because we have some opin- 
ions on it. But I really do believe that 
would be seen to be interfering in the 
internal affairs of China, and that 
would probably not be appropriate for 
us to do. 

Q. Is there any response the U.S. 
Government can take or should take 
overtly in response to the ugliness 
that you see now in Beijing? 

A. We have sent the signals that I 
have mentioned to you, the messages 
that I've just mentioned to you here on 
the program. This is a matter of great 
concern to the United States. I suppose 
saying that is a signal. I have said that 
it is something that disturbs the Amer- 
ican people. Beyond that, we will have 
to see how the situation develops. 

I said earlier — and I think we 
should keep this in mind — that both 
sides in this exercised a significant de- 
gree of restraint for quite a period of 
time, and it is our hope that they will 
return to restraint. We have some re- 
ports, as you probably do, that there 
are some Molotov cocktails being 
thrown, so it would appear that there 
may be some violence being used here 
on both sides. 

Q. It almost sounds as though 
you're suggesting the demonstrators 
also ought to back off a bit here. 

A. No, I think the demonstration, 
for the most part, has been very peace- 
ful. It's been very orderly. It has, as 
I've indicated to you, been what I think 
we would characterize as a very 
passionate statement for democracy. 
It's only recently that we've received 
reports — as a matter of fact, during 
the course of this recent escalation on 
the part of the government — of some 
Molotov cocktails being thrown by the 

Q. Beyond the Molotov cocktails, 
there are arms that the United States 
sends to the Chinese Government. 
There is some rumbling on Capitol 
Hill that perhaps you ought to stop 
doing that, or at least curtail it. 
What action will you take? 

A. Oh, I don't think we should sit 
here today, if I might suggest, within 
hours of the first really significant use 
of force, and that's what I think we see 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



here now. But this is, after all, the first 
time we've seen that against a peaceful 
demonstration that has lasted for 
many, many weeks. I don't think we 
should sit here this morning and try 
hypothesize about what that will mean 
with respect to — 

Q. But you know that Congress 
will. Is this a question that you feel 
you're going to have to address? 

A. I think we'll have to see what 
happens. Let's see what happens now 
as we move forward. We're not sure 
what course this will take even now, al- 
though I have characterized it for you 
in the words, actually of our people 
there in China, as ugly and chaotic. 
We're afraid it's moving in that 

Q. There are reports of more 
troops moving into Tiananmen 
Square. We go now to CNN's Mike 
Chinoy in Beijing. 

Mike Chinoy. Thousands of 
troops are now sweeping through Ti- 
ananmen Square. They have been fir- 
ing as they go. They appear to have 
cleared the top end of the square. 
Thousands of people broke and ran in 
panic as the troops opened fire at 
them, just in front of the Gate of 
Heavenly Peace. I can now see thou- 
sands of people streaming down 
Changang Boulevard, away from the 
square, moving toward the east. The 
troops are systematically sweeping 
the square, trying to clear the re- 
maining protesters from it. You can 
hear the sirens of ambulances racing 
through these crowds. There are 
many people wounded. I fear there 
are many people dead. We have no 
precise casualty figures. The guns 
have been blasting almost continu- 
ously. It's just in the last moment or 
two that it has stopped. Now it's pick- 
ed up again down toward the square. 

Thousands of troops poured out 
of the entrance to the Forbidden City 
on the north side of the square and 
moved into the square. We also have 
reports the troops were firing from 
the roof of the Great Hall of the Peo- 
ple, and the roof of Chairman Mao's 
mausoleum, although we cannot con- 
firm that. 

There are reports from eyewit- 
nesses that in the southern corner of 
the square that troops bayonetted 
protesters. This, ironically, right 
near Mao's mausoleum and the Colo- 
nel Sanders Kentucky Fried Chicken 
joint venture restaurant. 

As the crowds stream back now, 
some of them are regrouping and 
chanting, waving flags, but from my 
vantage point — the top part of the 
square — which has been a sea of peo- 
ple for 3 weeks, is now clear. The 
troops are slowly trying to establish 
their control over the square. 

Q. In light of this stronger ac- 
tion, does the U.S. Government now 
take a stronger demarche against the 
Chinese Government? Do you do 
something more? 

A. I think what I have said here 
earlier today is, in effect, considerably 
stronger than what we've said here- 
tofore. It's important that the Chinese 
people not lose the social and economic 
progress, the developments they've 
made socially and economically over the 
past decade. As I've indicated earlier 
on the program, it is very important, 
however, that excessive force not be 
used. That would, unfortunately, ap- 
pear to be the case, and this will dis- 
turb the U.S. Government, and it will 
disturb the American people 

Q. Can the U.S. Government con- 
tinue to share science and technology 
achievements with the Chinese Gov- 
ernment, which has apparently open- 
ed fire from the roof of the Great 
Hall of the People upon its own 

A. Before we get into hypothetical 
situations, let's see how this most re- 
cent and extremely deplorable develop- 
ment unfolds. Let's see what happens 
over the course of the next few days be- 
fore we start hypothesizing about what 
we might or might not do in the future. 

Q. Let me ask you about arms 
control, then. Have you had a direct 
Soviet response to the President's pro- 
posals delivered at NATO earlier this 

A. We haven't had what I would 
call a comprehensive response. We've 
had responses that you've seen report- 
ed in the news and that we've seen 

Q. Does the Soviet Government 
have to respond, in the U.S. view, to a 
package — a complete package — deal 
that the President proposed? Is it all 
or nothing? Or is there room for 

A. Yes. As I indicated in Bonn — or 
London, I can't remember which of 
those press conferences — this is a pack- 
age deal. This is not something that 
NATO will put on the table and invite 

the Warsaw Pact to pick and choose 
those elements it likes, or reject those 
elements it doesn't. 

Q. When you said that, you've 
really upped the ante on this. You 
went to Brussels feeling that the So- 
viets had now come very close to your 
position on tanks and armored per- 
sonnel carriers. 

Now you're saying, in effect, it's 
not good enough; let's go farther. Or 
you're saying, it's good; let's see if we 
can go farther. What if he comes 
back — and it's not hypothetical — and 
says, okay, we're in agreement on 
phase one; let's do that, and then 
we'll talk about phase two? 

A. I'm inclined to think that we 
would want to reject that, because the 
proposal that the President put on the 
table is a coordinated proposal. It is a 
whole. It's not something that he lays 
out there, or that NATO lays out there, 
inviting them to pick what they like 
and reject what they don't. It's impor- 
tant that we not have control or reduc- 
tion in one area, because everything is 

I think the military would tell us 
that it's something we should continue 
to look at as a package. 

Q. The proposal includes a nego- 
tiation on aircraft, combat aircraft. 
Toward the end of the trip, it became 
clear that the United States has told 
perhaps France, but certainly Bri- 
tain, don't worry, your aircraft are 
not going to be included in this deal. 
It sounds a little like a lot of side 
deals being made that is not really am 
alliance-wide commitment on the 
question of combat aircraft. 

A. No. When the proposal was de- 
veloped, we faced up to the problem 
that is presented by the possibility of 
including the dual-capable aircraft of 
France and Great Britain. And the pro- 
posal was designed with that in mind; 
that is, with the fact in mind that we 
should not include their dual-capable 

There are counting rules now, and 
there are definitional problems on air- 
craft that I'm sure you're aware of that 
we're going to have to overcome. The 
definition of the Warsaw Pact, or the 
Soviets, about combat aircraft is quite 
different than ours. 

Q. That's going to make it hard 
for the Soviets to accept an all-or- 
nothing deal. 



A. What that's going to mean is it's 
going to mean we're going to have to 
negotiate diligently, and it's going to 
take us a while to reach a final 

Q. As we traveled through Eu- 
rope this past week, we went from 
dissension in the ranks to some ap- 
prehension to an agreement, to a sigh 
of relief, to almost euphoria, to gee 
whiz, it was swell. Is that perhaps 
going too far? Is there too much eu- 
phoria at this stage? Is there a cau- 
tion that you should have for 
yourselves as well as everyone else? 

A. I hope there's not too much eu- 
phoria. We have an agreement here 
that is not going to be easy to negoti- 
ate. As a matter of fact, we do not yet 
have an agreement; we have a proposal. 
But it is a bold proposal, and it's far- 
reaching. Clearly you want to not get 
overly enthusiastic or optimistic, but I 
think that there is clearly reason for 
some optimism. 

Q. Speaking of arms control, but 
in another area of the world, the Indi- 
an Government recently tested a bal- 
listic missile which now gives India 
the capability not only to produce a 
nuclear weapon but also to deliver it, 
almost anywhere in the region that 
it's in. 

That could be a threat to 
Pakistan. What's your view of the es- 
calation of the nuclear and missile is- 
sue in that region of the world? 

A. The escalation of both the nucle- 
ar and missile issue problems is of ma- 
jor concern to us, as is the escalation, if 
I may say so, of chemical weapons 
around the world, not just in that re- 
gion but around the world. That's why 
we, as you well know, wanted to begin 
a dialogue with the Soviet Union about 
proliferation of missiles, of nuclear and 
of chemical weapons technology. 

Q. Has India crossed a line of 
some sort as far as the United States 
is concerned and gone too far in its 
development of a weapons program? 

A. As far as missile technology, 
perhaps not. We continue to suggest to 
both India and Pakistan that they exer- 
cise restraint in connection with their 
nuclear programs, and, in fact, there 
are legal considerations, as you know, 
again, with respect to the development, 
the possibility of development, by 
Pakistan of a nuclear capability. 

Q. While we're jumping around 
the world, while we were traveling, 
did anything happen in Panama that 

we should know about, or is Noriega 
as entrenched as ever? 

A. The commission that went down 
from the OAS [Organization of Ameri- 
can States] will be coming back up here 
next week. I'll be meeting with the 
three foreign ministers who made up 
that commission the early part of this 
week. There will be another session of 
the Organization of American States to 
continue to work the issue, work the 
problem. I think it's important to note 
that with the sole exception of 
Nicaragua, all Latin governments now 
subscribe to the idea that Gen. Noriega 
has abused power. 

Q. Yes, but do you have any indi- 
cation from the foreign ministers 
that anything is really going to 

A. We have an indication that the 
message they carried down there was 
received, that the fact that there is 
wide disapproval of what he's doing — on 
the part, not just of the United States, 
not just of European countries and oth- 
er countries around the world but all 
Latin countries — could move us in the 
right direction. Is he going to leave of- 
fice tomorrow? We have no indication of 
that whatsoever, but we will continue 
to work the problem. Let me simply say 
to you that there will be no normaliza- 
tion of relations as far as the United 
States is concerned with Panama until 
Gen. Noriega does leave power. 

Q. You and the Foreign Minister 
of Great Britain [Sir Geoffrey Howe] 

discussed the hostages in Lebanon 
this past week in Europe. Did you 
come up with any ideas about how to 
get them out? 

A. No new ideas. 

Q. Is anything new on the subject 
of the hostages; have we heard any- 
thing more of or from them? 

A. Not that I am at liberty to talk 
about here. 

Q. Does that mean something is 
happening, but — 

A. No, it doesn't. 

Q. Polish elections this weekend; 
the President is headed for Poland 
next month. How much do you expect 
to achieve there? Is this a weaning 
away of the Poles from the Soviet 

A. I don't think it's a weaning 
away from the Soviet bloc as much as it 
is an expression of the fact that we see 
they're opening up with a great deal of 
pleasure. We're very happy to see the 
Poles begin to open up politically, at- 
tempt to open up economically. The 
President thought it was important to 
go both to Poland and to Hungary, be- 
cause, as he indicated on this recent 
trip to Europe, ending the division of 
Europe on the basis of Western values 
is one of the things that is very, very 
important to the United States, and it's 
a policy that we should embrace and 
continue to pursue. 

1 Press release 109 of June 6, 1989. I 

The Seedlings of Hope: 
U.S. Policy in Africa 

by Edward J. Perkins 

Address before Africare on June 
11, 19S9. Avibassador Perkins was U.S. 
Ambassador to South Africa (1986-89) 
and is nominee to be Director General 
of the Foreign Service. 

I am pleased and honored to appear be- 
fore you today, this 11th Africare Day. 
When C. Payne Lucas [Africare Execu- 
tive Director] asked me to speak on the 
subject of hope for Africa, it was an 
invitation I was only too pleased to 
accept, despite the common view that 
the continent is now without hope. 

Much of my life has been entwined 
with Africa; I am no stranger to its 
pain and tragedy. The same is true of 
all of those who work in this great or- 
ganization. I know about the poverty, 
which is among the worst in the world, 
and the crushing debt burden which 
keeps it locked in place. I know about 
the civil wars, the bloodshed, and the 
corruption. And, I also know about 
the grisly specter of AIDS [acquired 
immune deficiency syndrome], which 
in the next 10 years threatens to 
wipe out numbers too frightening to 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



But I also know there is a hope and 
promise for Africa and its people. I 
base this hope on other aspects of Afri- 
ca I have come to know: its aspects of 
warmth and generous hospitality, of 
hard work and commitment, of vast 
natural wealth, and of that special 
African concept of ubuntu — the 
doctrine of humanity, love, and 
forgiveness that guides human rela- 
tions throughout the continent. 

The Gathering Breezes 

There is no doubt that Africa is on the 
brink of some dramatic and fundamen- 
tal shifts. Nearly 30 years after British 
Prime Minister Harold MacMillin her- 
alded the "winds of change" which top- 
pled colonialism in Africa, new breezes 
are gathering force. And the changes 
which they signify are no less revolu- 
tionary than those which altered the 
face of the continent in the 1950s and 

At this crucial juncture in Africa's 
development, we in the United States 
must intensify our commitment to Af- 
rica's future with a thoughtful policy 
that will contribute to the realization of 
the hopes that we all share. Even the 
unsparingly realistic British weekly 
The Economist recently noted "for the 
first time in decades, there is a little 
cheer coming from that huge conti- 
nent." Across Africa, more and more 
governments are taking closer looks at 
liberalized pricing policies, incentives 
to farmers and business representa- 
tives, more realistic exchange rates, 
reduced government deficits, privatiza- 
tion, and increased investment in basic 

This shift in thinking has already 
produced dramatic results: the boom- 
ing produce markets in Maputo and 
Dar es Salaam and the stunning in- 
crease in maize production in Zim- 
babwe. Furthermore, a new World 
Bank/UN Development Program study 
shows encouraging indications that the 
economic performance of countries 
which have adopted key policy reforms 
has been consistently better than those 
which have not. 

Politically speaking, Africa's track 
recoi'd on democracy and political par- 
ticipation is better than is usually 
recognized, and it's improving. Many 
African countries lack the institutional 
structure we would normally identify 
with democratic institutions, yet there 
is a real recognition among most polit- 
ical leaders that government must 
accommodate dissent and allow decen- 
tralized decisionmaking. And there are 

governments across the continent 
which are courageously taking on and 
succeeding in the task of building 

• In Nigeria, Gen. Babangida is 
working to rebuild a functioning de- 
mocracy. Nigeria is scheduled to elect 
local government officials this year, 
state governors next year, and return 
to a complete, elected, civilian democ- 
racy in 1992. If successful, Nigeria will 
become Africa's largest democracy. 

• In Zimbabwe, a courageous and 
relatively free press protects the right 
of open dissent, and a responsible and 
highly professional judiciary ensure 
government accountability — despite a 
one party structure and socialist 

It is in the area of diplomacy where 
Africa has made its most dramatic 
progress, just in the past year. After 
decades of South African occupation, 
Namibia is on the brink of independ- 
ence. After years of war, one- 
upmanship, and ideological hostility. 
South Africa, Angola, Cuba, and the 
Soviet Union came to realize that there 
is a joint interest in peace and prosper- 
ity. What an example that sets for the 
entire continent, if not the world! In 
Angola there are signs that the MPLA 
[Popular Movement for the Liberation 
of Angola] has decided to begin a proc- 
ess of national reconciliation with 
UNITA [National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola]. And, in 
Mozambique, the church has begun a 
dialogue which holds the promise of 
eventual talks between RENAMO 
[Mozambique National Resistance 
Movement] and the government. The 
countries of southern Africa are acting 
constructively on the realization that 
their economies are inextricably 
linked — leading to the creation of the 
Southern African Development Coor- 
dination Conference. 

A New Africa 

Admittedly, many of these successes 
may not seem like much compared to 
the obstacles which remain before all 
Africans can enjoy lives free of war and 
hunger; before they can expect better 
futures for their children; and before 
they can be free to say what they wish 
and elect their own leaders. But I take 
hope from these successes, because 
they are not isolated events. Taken to- 
gether, they mark a change of direction 
for all of Africa, away from the mis- 
takes of the past and toward a new Af- 

rica that will realize the potential with 
which it is so richly endowed. 

The new Africa is moving away 
from the view that the state can solve 
all ills — toward recognition of the im- 
portant role of the individual and the 
community in generating and sustain- 
ing growth. Rulers of the new Africa 
are coming to realize that political sta- 
bility is won by establishing participa- 
tory governments which respect the 
rights of individuals. The new Africa 
features a shift away from the thinking 
that governments are not accountable 
for their actions and toward the convic- 
tion that Africans have a right to good 
and decent government. Most impor- 
tantly, the new Africa is coming to the 
realization that the solutions to its 
problems do not lie in foreign board- 
rooms and governments. In the words 
of the African delegates to the UN spe- 
cial session on Africa in 1986, "Africa 
has taken the responsibility for its own 

Slowly, and one by one, African 
leaders are taking these courageous 
steps toward greater openness in their 
economies and political systems, taking 
the risks of trying new paths, and ac- 
knowledging the mistakes of the past 
and learning from them. And that is 
why I have hope for Africa. 

South Africa-Southern Africa 

Even in South Africa, from where I've 
just returned, I have hope. There is re- 
markable absence of bitterness by 
black South Africans in spite of the ag- 
onies which apartheid has inflicted and 
a recognition that cooperation between 
black and white is indispensable to 
South Africa's survival. 

There is an extraordinary under- 
standing of and commitment to the 
democratic process in township politics 
among ordinary people. South Africa's 
enormous natural wealth in its miner- 
als, agriculture, infrastructure, and its 
people can make it one of the world's 
strongest economies in the aftermath 
of apartheid. South Africa, when it 
does become free, will also have the im- 
portant benefit of having the history of 
newly independent countries behind it. 
This will endow South Africa's future 
leaders with a mine of lessons learned 
in managing the transition to 
independence with prosperity for all. 

There has been a change in big 
power attention to southern Africa. 
The successul negotiation on Angola/ 
Namiba introduced a new direction in 
U.S. -Soviet attention to southern Afri- 
ca. Both powers see the possibility of 


Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


ooperation in other spheres. The con- 
licts in Mozambique and Angola come 
mind. The overall encouragement of 
rowth economies in the region will 
ertainly be the focus of attention. 

There is dynamic tension in the 
/hite power structure. Clearly, the 
oming change in presidential leader- 
hip signals new government ap- 
iroaches within the nationalist party 
,nd government structures. The modns 
permidi is still to be worked out, but 
he South African Government must 
■ain the trust of the black leadership 
lefore anything concrete will happen. 

The measures of repression by the 
lOuth African Government have not sti- 
led the desire of blacks to make a dif- 
erence in their situation. The black 
ipposition is widening its range of op- 
ions in strategic planning — education 
ind nationbuilding skills are among the 
onsiderations. A greater awareness of 
he importance of direct negotiations is 
in stream. The recent discussions be- 
ween the Minister of Law and Order 
ind religious leaders on the hunger 
itrikes was a good example. 

Younger South Africans of all col- 
ors are much more aware of the need 
or change. Some want it now; others 
ook at it as an evolutionary thing. 
Black South African youth on the other 
land are searching for more alterna- 
ives. They want the right to partici- 
)ate in the political process decisively, 
low. The government would do well to 
■emember that the black leaders of 
oday represent a much more coopera- 
.ive element with which to negotiate 
.han the emerging younger leadership. 

The American public needs to 
enow more about South Africa — beyond 
;he surface. One of the more important 
;ontributions that can be made by the 
American people is the provision of 
noney for education of South Africans 
lisadvantaged by apartheid. This 
iioiluces effective change agents. 
African-Americans have a lot to con- 
iiiliute: role models in business, in edu- 
jation, in reaching for psychological 

My assignment in South Africa was 
challenging, rewarding, and tension- 
til h-d. I arrived in 1986 thinking that 
the United States should be repre- 
sented. I left even more convinced. The 
solution to South Africa must be found 
by the South Africans themselves, but 
the United States can be facilitative. 

The Terror of AIDS 

The road to the new Africa will not be 
an easy one. One of the most immediate 
problems, as well as the most frighten- 
ing, is the terrifying specter of AIDS. 

We are only now discovering the 
scope of the threat this disease poses to 
Africa, and its awful magnitude ex- 
ceeds our power to comprehend. Some 
countries in central and southern Afri- 
ca face the loss of as much as half their 
populations in the next 20 years. AIDS 
is the most critical emergency Africa 
has faced in its modern existence. We 
must all work together to combat it, 


Beyond the threat of AIDS lie the 
daunting challenges of nationbuilding. 
Many of the political entities which oc- 
cupy the African Continent are not the 
product of rational political evolution. 
Rather, they are the legacy of colonial- 
ism, a patchwork quilt sewn and sun- 
dered by European wars and economic 

The rulers of Africa must cope 
with complex societies; with amalgama- 
tions of multiple tribes, languages, and 
cultures; and few common bonds for 
forging a nation. The rulers of the 
new Africa face an arduous task of 

Economically, Africa faces the bur- 
dens of starting largely from scratch to 
build the infrastructure that is a neces- 
sity for any successful economy. Not 
only the nuts and bolts infrastructure 
of bridges, roads, and power plants but 
also the social infrastructure of a sound 
educational system. 

Nations in the new Africa must op- 
erate in a world that is infinitely more 
competitive, faster paced, and more 
challenging than the world in which 
our nation matured. The new Africa 
must compete on first-world terms 
with Third-World assets— both interna- 
tionally in terms of trade and domes- 
tically in meeting the expectations and 
demands of its own people. 

A U.S. Policy for Africa 

To assist this newly emerging Africa, 
we need a new dynamism in our foreign 
policy toward the continent. Like any 
foreign policy, our policy toward Africa 
must be the product of an evaluation of 
our interests, our goals in defense of 
those interests, our resources to pur- 
sue those goals, and, finally, specific 
actions toward those goals. 

• Our interest in Africa, though 
not always apparent to the public at 
large, should be abundantly clear to us 

• Africa's economic potential and 
the American market make us an ideal 
match for pursuing a mutually benefi- 
cial economic relationship. 

• A significant number of Ameri- 
cans are of African heritage, and our 
links to the mother continent are be- 
coming stronger. 

• More broadly, the issues which 
Africa is beginning to address hit at 
the core of what we stand for in the 
world: the democratic ideal, the value of 
a pluralistic society, and the positive 
dynamism of the free market. In the 
process of testing, expanding, and ex- 
perimenting with these ideals, Afri- 
cans will document for the world at 
large the potential — and limits — of 
these ideas. 

It is vitally important that these 
initial experiments in greater political 
and economic openness in Africa suc- 
ceed. Each success encourages other 
experiments and contributions to fur- 
ther successes. Each small success is a 
buildingblock in the construction of the 
new Africa I envision. Failure, on the 
other hand, will breed discouragement 
and despair, a retrenchment of the 
openness we seek to promote. And 
there can be no retrenchment of this 
openness without more poverty and 
conflict. We can't bow away from Afri- 
ca because it's too tough. The failure of 
the ongoing experiments there will cost 
us all too much. 

We have seen how famine and revo- 
lution in Africa can affect the world. A 
decision to limit our involvement in Af- 
rica is really a decision to limit our in- 
volvement in the world because the 
problems of Africa have such a global 

On the strength of the positive 
changes I've pointed out, we should re- 
affirm our commitment and our efforts 
to support Africans in their pursuit of 
prosperity and nationhood. And we do 
so with intelligence and respect for Af- 
rican aspirations and with the wisdom 
and humility born of past mistakes. 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



Strategic Areas 

There are some strategic areas which 
I believe must receive our attention. 
First and foremost, we must focus on 
education. A well-educated public is 
fundamental to a free society and eco- 
nomic growth. We must first define it. 
I think our definition should have three 

First, education must fill the needs 
of nationbuilding. 

Second, there must be some link 
between educators and society. 

Finally, we should support educa- 
tion in its broadest sense — not just for- 
mal school learning, as measured in 
enrollments or degrees, but the ability 
to think critically and independently. 

We can help greatly by financing 
training in nationbuilding skills; by 
sharing with African educators U.S. 
research and e.xperience in building re- 
sponsive educational systems; by sup- 
porting efforts to improve the place of 
women in African society, since they 
are the primary educators of African 
children; and by facilitating regional 
and international exchanges for Afri- 
cans of all backgrounds through schol- 
arships for study abroad. 

Another strategic component of 
our African policy must be to stop 
thinking that economic development is 
somehow separate from political 
development and build into our assis- 
tance programs in Africa support for 
institutions which promote decentral- 
ized decisionmaking, pluralistic struc- 
tures, and the exercise of democratic 
process. Support for independent trade 
unions, private business associations, 
and grassroots community organiza- 
tions should be viewed as integral ele- 
ments in our assistance programs in 

We must also realize that a key to 
Africa's development as a prosperous 
continent will be contingent on its re- 
ceiving a share of the technology which 
has powered our own economic develop- 
ment. Our trade with Africa must be 
more than just purchases of raw mate- 
rials and agricultural commodities. 
As consumers of those products, the 
West — and the United States in 
particular — has an obligation to plow 
back into Africa the technology which 
can provide the framework for indus- 
trial and agricultural development. 

And this technology transfer 
should not only come from the West. 
Africans themselves have a wealth of 
knowledge and experience and should 

be encouraged and assisted to share 
with other African nations. Strategi- 
cally there needs to be a freer ex- 
change of ideas, a greater depth of 
understanding of how Africans see the 
world, how their systems of influence 
and decisionmaking work, and what 
their aspirations are. 

We need to continue our impor- 
tant effort in South Africa to lay the 
groundwork for an early and peaceful 
transition to a nonracial democratic 
future. How South Africa makes this 
transition — and there is no longer any 
doubt that it will — will be felt far and 
wide throughout Africa. The better 
managed the transition, and the better 
prepared South Africans are to govern, 
the better off the rest of Africa will be. 
So whatever modest impact our diplo- 
macy and our AID [Agency for Interna- 
tional Development] and USIS [United 
States Information Service] programs 
can make toward preparing black and 
white South Africans for change is an 
investment for the whole of Africa. 

For these reasons, we are looking 
at a long-term bipartisan commitment 
to educate the future leadership of 
South Africa. The collaborative effort 
among AID, HE [Institute for Interna- 
tional Education], corporate donors, 
and the university community has re- 
sulted in first-class university educa- 
tion in the United States for over 600 
black South Africans in the past 10 
years. But it is not enough. We hope 
that a bursaries foundation can be es- 
tablished to guarantee that adequate 
funding, from both the private and 
public sectors, is made available for 
this purpose for many more black 
South Africans in the years ahead. 

As for sanctions, the Comprehen- 
sive Anti-Apartheid Act [of 1986] sent a 
strong signal to all South Africans of 
fundamental U.S. opposition to apart- 
heid. More sanctions in this period of 
transition in South Africa would proba- 
bly be dysfunctional at this time. But 
we should not let South Africa forget 
that added ones are always a possi- 
bility. We need both incentives and dis- 
incentives and existing sanctions give 

us plenty of the latter and a path to 
push vigorously toward a post- 
apartheid South Africa. 

Our existing AID programs in Af- 
rica are reaping huge dividends in rela- 
tion to investment. But we need to be 
doing more, and that will require an in- 
crease in our AID budget for Africa. 
However, in light of the opportunities 
for positive change in Africa, I believe 
it is important that we expand this as- 
sistance. It is also important we coordi- 
nate with our key allies to the greatest 
possible extent in order to avoid dupli- 
cation and to maximize the impact of 
our respective aid programs. 

The Seedlings of Hope 

Against this background, it is clear 
how very important it is that such 
organizations as Africare exist and 
thrive. Your reforestation program in 
West Africa is perhaps one of the best 
metaphors around for the hope that ex- 
ists for Africa. Through the resources 
you provide, the communities of West 
Africa are nurturing the seedlings that 
will one day grow into trees that stop 
the desert creeping across the face of 

Africare, together with such orga- 
nizations as the African Development 
Foundation, the African-American In- 
stitute, the Peace Corps, the Institute 
for International Education, private 
foundations such as Ford and Rock- 
efeller, and many others have done a 
great service in stepping forward to 
argue on behalf of the most neglected 
part of the world. Your efforts have 
contributed, I believe, to a more atten- 
tive foreign policy and a more conscien- 
tious assistance program in Africa and 
certainly to a better informed Ameri- 
can public. 

I have every reason to believe Afri- 
care and its sister organizations will 
continue to play an important role in 
nurturing Africa's seedlings of hope 
and in promoting our relations with Af- 
rica. I urge you to continue; you have 
our extended support and encourage- 
ment not to abandon our high hopes for 
Africa. And we will continue to work 
actively with you to see those high 
hopes realized. ■ 


Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


Nuclear and Space Talks 
Open Round 11 

JUNE 19, 1989' 

Today marks the opening of round 11 of 
the nuclear and space talks (NST) in 
Geneva. Ambassador Richard Burt, the 
chief negotiator to the strategic arms 
reduction talks (START), heads the 
U.S. delegation. Ambassador Henry 
Cooper is our chief negotiator to the de- 
fense and space talks. 

My objective for these negotiations 
is to achieve verifiable agreements that 
improve our security while enhancing 
stability and reducing the risk of war. 
In the strategic arms reduction talks, 
our emphasis will be on creating a 
more stable nuclear balance and 
strengthening deterrence by reducing 
and constraining those strategic nucle- 
ar forces which pose the greatest 
threat to security and stability. We will 
pursue complementary goals in the de- 
fense and space talks, seeking an 
agreement on a cooperative transition 
to a more stable nuclear balance that 
relies increasingly on defenses. 

After extensive deliberations with 
my advisers, I have approved instruc- 
tions for the U.S. START delegation. 
These instructions reaffirm much of 
the treaty text negotiated with the So- 
viets by the previous Administration. 
Modifications will be proposed in some 
cases. The United States will be pre- 
pared to address all the issues on which 
the two sides have not reached agree- 
ment as the negotiations proceed. In 
addition, I have reserved the right to 
introduce new initiatives aimed at fur- 
ther enhancing security and strategic 

Of all the outstanding START is- 
sues, verification may be the most com- 
plex. It will be especially critical in 
determing whether START enhances 
U.S. security and strategic stability. 
As part of our overall negotiating ef- 
fort as the talks resume in Geneva, the 
United States will also propose that 
the two sides make a special effort to 
agree on, and to begin implementing as 
soon as possible, certain verification 
and stability measures drawn from pro- 
posals that both sides have already ad- 
vanced in START or other contexts. 
These measures will enhance verifica- 
tion of a START treaty and contribute 
to strategic stability. Early agreement 

and implementation of them will speed 
resolution of outstanding issues and 
give added momentum to the efforts of 
our two countries to conclude expe- 
ditiously a START agreement. 

Our approach to these arms nego- 
tiations and to our force modernization 
programs are complementary and mu- 
tually reinforcing. Maintaining cred- 
ible and effective nuclear deterrent 
forces is essential both to our security 
and to our ability to negotiate sound 
and stabilizing agreements. A success- 
ful START treaty will reduce the risk 
of war but will not diminish our need 
to rely on modernized, effective strate- 
gic forces for continued deterrence. In- 
deed, our security would be reduced 
rather than enhanced if we do not mod- 
ernize our forces while the Soviets con- 
tinue to modernize theirs. We must 
continue to pursue both our force mod- 
ernization and arms control and not 
make the mistake of treating one as a 
substitute for the other. 

Our negotiators return to the bar- 
gaining table with my firm pledge that 
we will work vigorously to achieve fair 
and far-reaching agreements that 
strengthen peace. Nothing has higher 
priority. I am heartened by the grow- 
ing evidence that the Soviet Union is 
prepared to negotiate seriously about 
agreements that promise to reduce the 
risk of war. Much has already been ac- 
complished in the negotiations; much 
remains to be done. Our commitment is 
unwavering. We must build on our 
achievements thus far to reach agree- 
ments that fulfill our objectives of re- 
ducing the risk of war and enhancing 
security and stability. 


JUNE 20, 1989 

We have now begun the 11th round of 
the negotiations on nuclear and space 
arms. The United States sees this 
round as an opportunity to reestablish 
the working relationships of our nego- 
tiating groups, to reaffirm previous 
positions, and to present some new 
ideas. We will be prepared to address 
all the issues on which the two sides 
have not yet reached agreement. After 
seeing the lay of the land over the 
course of the next 6 weeks or so, we 
will have a recess sufficient to 

allow us time to analyze in our capitals 
the results of our dialogue during this 

This round is also the first since 
President Bush assumed his respon- 
sibilities as President. As you know, 
the Bush Administration has conducted 
a comprehensive review of American 
security and arms control policies. As a 
result of this review, the President has 
concluded that the primary objective of 
strategic arms control is to achieve ver- 
ifiable agreements that reduce the risk 
of nuclear war. In particular, we seek 
agreements that will contribute to nu- 
clear risk reduction in three ways. 

First, we seek to strengthen the 
stability of the nuclear balance by curb- 
ing incentives to use nuclear weapons 
in a crisis. 

Second, we seek to improve predic- 
tability in the evolution of the forces of 
the two sides over the longer term. 

Third, we seek to create greater 
transparency in the strategic posture 
and activities of both sides. 

Based on the results of his review, 
the President has decided to build on 
the progress that has been achieved to 
date here in Geneva. At the same time, 
as I mentioned, we are coming to these 
talks with new ideas. We returned to 
the bargaining table with President 
Bush's firm pledge that "we will work 
vigorously to achieve fair and far- 
reaching agreememts that strengthen 
peace. Nothing has higher priority." 

In START, we seek to ensure a sta- 
ble nuclear balance by reducing the na- 
ture and scope of the threat posed to 
each side, by decreasing the vul- 
nerability of our retaliatory forces to 
the threat that remains, and by lower- 
ing uncertainties in the evolution of 
forces between the two sides. Critical 
to determining whether START en- 
hances our security and strategic sta- 
bility is the issue of verification. As 
part of our overall negotiating effort, 
the United States will propose that the 
two sides make a special effort to agree 
on, and to begin implementing as soon 
as possible, certain verification and 
stability measures that we believe will 
enhance verification of a START treaty 
and contribute to strategic stability. 
Early agreement and implementation 
of these measures will give both sides 
early practical experience in verifica- 
tion, which will speed resolution of out- 
standing issues and give added 
momentum to the efforts of our two 
countries to conclude a START treaty. 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



Similarly President Rush has de- 
cided that our goals for the Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI) and our ap- 
proach in the defense and space talks 
are sound and remain unchanged. The 
SDI program will continue to research, 
develop, and test concepts for effective 
defenses in full compliance with the 
Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. In 
defense and s])ace, we will preserve our 
options to deploy advanced defenses 
when they are ready. 

Several U.S. initiatives introduced 
late last round remain on the table in 
the defense and space area and provide 
a good basis for continued discussions 
with the Soviets. We look forward to a 
constructive Soviet response to help 
complete a separate defense and space 
agreement, with the same legal status 
as the ABM and START treaties, as 
was agreed by President Reagan and 
General Secretary Gorbachev during 

their Washington summit. We have 
made some progress toward such a 
treaty, including an associated protocol 
on predictability measures, which 
builds on the understanding reached at 
the December 1987 Washington 

We have accomplished much al- 
ready in Geneva, yet a great deal of 
work lies ahead. Based on the growing 
evidence that the Soviet Union is pre- 
pared to negotiate seriously, I believe 
that through a constructive dialogue, 
we will be able to make significant 
progress. The United States is com- 
mitted to building on our achievements 
thus far to reach agreements that ful- 
fill our objectives of reducing the risk 
of war and enhancing security and 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of .June 25, 1989. ■ 

Military Openness Proposals 
Tabled at CSBM Talks 

JUNE 9, 1989' 

Maintaining the momentum of U.S. and 
NATO leadei'ship on arms control 
launched by the President at the NATO 
summit, the allies today tabled far- 
reaching proposals for military open- 
ness throughout Europe. 

The Western package of 12 specific 
measures was put on the table at the 
negotiations on confidence- and 
security-building measures (CSBMs) in 
Vienna. These measures cover every- 
thing from a comprehensive e.xchange 
of information about ground forces, 
combat aircraft, and majoi' weapons 
systems in combat units in Europe to a 
measure for improving access for the 
press to military exercises. They are 
the result of a cooperative effort among 
the members of the NATO alliance to 
design a comprehensive package of 
CSBMs that would go far beyond the 
Stockholm regime to advance openness 
and predictability about military 
forces in Europe and their activities. 

The Western package represents 
another step in the broader U.S. effort 
to build confidence and openness in 
East-West relations, most recently set 
out in the President's speech in Mainz 
this week [May 31J. European security 
can only be built upon a foundation of 
respect for human rights and the rule 


of law. In the military area, openness 
and confidence-building serve to chip 
away at the secrecy which too often 
shrouds the capabilities and intentions 
of some states toward their neighbors. 

The Western measures are written 
in language suitable for a final agree- 
ment. NATO's tabling of such detailed 
proposals so early in the negotiation is 
indicative of our eagerness to propel 
the process forward with all possible 

In addition to the information pro- 
posal, the Western package has a num- 
ber of ground-breaking features. These 
include a requirement to notify new de- 
ployments of weapons systems in the 
zone, a new evaluation measure which 
entitles states to visit units to check 
the validity of the information pro- 
vided, notification of mobilizations of 
reservists, and a proposal to conduct a 
35-nation seminar on military doctrine. 
Also included are many improvements 
to the highly successful Stockholm re- 
gime (completed in 1986), including ex- 
tension of the duration of observation of 
military exercises, a tightening of the 
inspection regime, including the right 
to conduct an aerial overflight of the 
area to be inspected before the actual 
inspection begins, and an increase in 
the inspection quota. 

'Made available to news correspondents 
by Department spokesman Margaret DeB. 
Tutwiler. ■ 

Anniversary of 
INF Treaty 

JUNE 1, 1989' 

One year ago today, on .June 1, 1988, the' 
President of the United States and the 
President of the Soviet Union ex- 
changed the instruments of ratification 
bringing into force the Intermediate- 
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, 
the first in history to bring about actu- 
al reductions in nuclear arsenals. 

The goal of the INF Treaty— the 
complete elimination of INF missile 
systems under conditions of strict 
verification — is being accomplished. 
Since the summer of 1988, when elim- 
inations began with the destruction of a> 
Soviet SS-20 at Kapustin Yar and an 
American Pershing II at Longhorn, 
Texas, both sides have continued to 
eliminate INF missiles, launchers, and 
support equipment in the presence of 
inspectors from the other side. 

The achievement of the INF Treaty^ 
was a signal victory for NATO soli- 
darity and political resolve and a con- 
tribution to greater security for our 
allies. It established the long-held alli- 
ance principles of asymmetrical reduc- 
tions to reach equality of forces and 
effective verification as essential com- 
ponents of arms control agreements. 
These principles remain keystones of 
our approach to arms control. 

The agenda ahead is even more 
challenging as we move forward with 
NATO's conventional force proposals 
and the President's initiative this week 
for added reductions. Further we seek 
stabilizing reductions in strategic arse- 
nals and increased reliance on strategic* 
defenses and a truly global and effec- 
tive verifiable ban on chemical weap- 
ons. We will spare no effort to achieve 
agreements that will reduce the risk of 
war and strengthen the foundations for 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of .June .5, 1989. ■ 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


Demonstrations in China 

MAY 18, 1989' 

The Department of State advises 
Americans traveling to China to use 
caution and avoid areas where demon- 
strations are occurring. There is no in- 
dication of any antiforeign feeling 
among the demonstrators. Nonetheless 
caution, good sense, and discretion are 
called for to ensure Americans are not 
caught up in a demonstration. This 
alert does not advise against traveling 
to China; only that caution should be 


MAY 20, 19892 

President Bush this morning received 
his daily intelligence briefing, includ- 
ing an update on the status of events in 
China. The situation remains uncer- 
tain. Both sides have exercised re- 
straint, and we urge that restraint to 
continue. The United States stands for 
freedom of speech and freedom of as- 
sembly, and President Bush commented 
yesterday on the inexorable march of 
democracy in China. The demonstra- 
tions of the last few days indicate that 
the hunger for change remains strong. 
We remain hopeful that a dialogue be- 
tween the government and the students 
is possible. 

MAY 23, 19892 

The President today met with Wan Li, 
Chairman of the Standing Committee 
of the National People's Congress, from 
2:30 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. Following the 
plenary meeting. Wan Li visited the 
residence to greet Mrs. Bush. 

The Chinese leader briefed the 
President on the outcome of the recent 
Sino-Soviet summit and on the student 
demonstrations in China. "We are 
strongly committed to democracy 
around the world," the President said. 
"It is the underpinning of our being as 
a nation. I urge nonviolence and re- 
straint in your present situation. I urge 
that Voice of America not be jammed 
and that reporters be given open 

The President told Chairman Wan 
that he remains personally committed 
to expanding the normal and construc- 
tive relations the United States enjoys 
with China. The world has a stake in 
China's economic progress, national se- 
curity, and political vitality. The Unit- 
ed States hopes to see the continuing 
implementation of economic and politi- 
cal reforms, which undoubtedly will 
also help advance these goals. 

JUNE 3, 1989-^ 

It is clear that the Chinese Government 
has chosen to use force against Chinese 
citizens who were making a peaceful 
statement in favor of democracy. I 
deeply deplore the decision to use force 
against peaceful demonstrators and the 
consequent loss of life. We have been 
urging, and continue to urge, non- 
violence, restraint, and dialogue. Trag- 
ically another course has been chosen. 
Again I urge a return to nonviolent 
means for dealing with the current 

The United States and People's Re- 
public of China, over the past two dec- 
ades, have built up, through great 
efforts by both sides, a constructive re- 
lationship beneficial to both countries. 
I hope that China will rapidly return to 
the path of political and economic re- 
forms and conditions of stability so that 
this relationship, so important to both 
our peoples, can continue its growth. 

JUNE 5, 1989^ 

The situation in Beijing and other cities 
remains chaotic. There are reports of 
indiscriminate firing on civilians and 
burning of military vehicles in several 
sectors. The situation in Shanghai is 
tense, with many roads blocked and 
large groups of students and workers 
gathered in the business district. 

To ensure the safety of American 
students in Beijing, the embassy is re- 
questing they leave their campuses and 
go to hotels in central Beijing. The em- 
bassy is attempting to facilitate the 
movement of students with embassy 

Today we are issuing another trav- 
el advisory urging Americans not to 
travel to China in view of the extremely 
volatile and dangerous situation. The 
embassy in Beijing has advised Ameri- 
cans in the city not to venture outdoors 
unless absolutely necessary. 

We have had an open line for the 
last 72 hours from our Embassy in Bei- 
jing to the State Department's 24-hour 
task force that is set up here in the Op- 
erations Center. In addition our Em- 
bassy in Beijing has activated its 
warden system whereby it keeps in 
touch with all Americans to make sure 
they are safe and to help if necessary. 

JUNE 6, 1989J 

The situation in China remains tense 
and unsettled. The Secretary of State, 
after consulting with our Ambassador 
in Beijing, last night decided to encour- 
age American citizens in the Beijing 
area to depart China. The embassy is 
making an effort to contact American 
citizens in Beijing to give them this ad- 
vice and assist in their departure. 

In addition the Secretary of State 
has authorized the ambassador to per- 
mit voluntary departure by those U.S. 
Government dependents who wish to 
leave China. There is no drawdown of 
embassy officers. The embassy and our 
four consulate offices continue to oper- 
ate fully. 

The embassy's figures as of Janu- 
ary of this year show 270 American stu- 
dents in Beijing, 360 in all of China; 
1,400 American non-U. S. Government 
residents in Beijing, 8,800 in all China. 
There are 424 embassy and consulate 
personnel and dependents in China. 
Normally — and we don't have a better 
figure for you — there are roughly about 
4,000 tourists in China at any given 

Persons in other parts of China 
may also wish to leave China, depend- 
ing on the local situation. Citizens who 
choose to leave should, if possible, avoid 
routes out of the country that would re- 
quire them to travel through Beijing. 
The Beijing airport is open, and flights 
are operating as scheduled. Roads to 
the airport are also open. 

The U.S. Government is in touch 
with commercial airlines to arrange for 
charter flights, should they become 
necessary, to accommodate Americans 
departing China. As many of you know, 
Northwest Airlines flies out of Shang- 
hai, and United flies out of Beijing. 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



The Secretary is recommending 
today to the Attorney General that all 
nationals of the People's Republic of 
China in the United States be permit- 
ted to remain in this country after 
their visas expire, without a change in 
their status. There are approximately 
45,000 P.R.C. nationals in the United 
States at this time. 

JUNE 7, 1989J 

The situation in Beijing and in China is 
volatile, uncertain, and increasingly 
dangerous. As you all know, this morn- 
ing in China our Ambassador issued an 
order that all U.S. dependents — there 
are 258 of them — depart China. 

Let me make something very clear. 
Our government can only order U.S. 
personnel and dependents to leave the 
country. The U.S. Government has no 
legal authority to order Americans to 
leave a foreign country. In light of that, 
the Secretary of State and our Ambas- 
sador are strongly urging all American 
citizens to leave China, and our Embas- 
sy and consular officers are assisting 
all Americans in leaving China to the 
best of our personnel's ability. 

The State Department today is is- 
suing a new travel advisory which reit- 
erates the above. 

In order to help facilitate the de- 
parture of American citizens and de- 
pendents, we have done the following. 
The U.S. Government is arranging 
charters that will supplement U.S. air- 
lines to facilitate the departure of all 
those who want to leave and all those 
who have been ordered to leave. There 
are two charter flights scheduled for 
Thursday [June 8]. Thei-e is a possi- 
bility of a third. One of these is a Unit- 
ed Airlines 747. Another is a Con- 
tinental DC-10. There are 684 seats on 
those two flights. I do not have for you 
at this time what the additional charter 
may be. 

On Friday [June 9], there is a regu- 
larly scheduled United Airlines flight. 
In addition Continental Airlines will 
bring back its DC-10 twice. All flights 
will include a mix of American citizens 
and dependents. It will depend on who 
is ready and waiting at the airport to 
go. There is a U.S. Embassy officer 
available at the Beijing airport to as- 
sist American citizens. 

Concerning transportation to the 
airport: The road remains open. Yes, 
there are some roadblocks and some 

difficulties and delays. Embassy vans 
and cars are transporting American 
citizens to the airport. Hotel buses and 
taxis are also available. 

In addition a convoy of six embassy 
vans and one car departed our Embas- 
sy in Beijing this morning at approx- 
imately 9:30 a.m. for the university 
area. The convoy picked up 55 Ameri- 
can teachers, students, and depend- 
ents. All of those people are now at the 
airport and were taken directly from 
their pickup points to the airport. 

Our embassy and four consulates 
remain open. 

Secretary Baker spoke this morn- 
ing with our Ambassador in Beijing for 
a report on the situation at the diplo- 
matic compound and the embassy. Am- 
bassador Lilley reported that he was 
able to see the Vice Minister for For- 
eign Affairs and registered a strong 
protest against the shooting incident. 
In addition here in Washington the 
State Department, around 2:00 a.m. 
this morning, registered a similarly 
strong protest to the Chinese Embassy. 

The Chinese Embassy has in- 
formed the State Department late last 
night — that was June 6 — that Foreign 
Minister Qian's visit to Washington has 
been postponed. As I said on Monday, 
the visit would have given us the oppor- 
tunity to convey to the Chinese leaders 
our view of the tragic and brutal ac- 
tions that have taken place and to urge 
that a policy of restraint and dialogue 
be reinstated. However, under current 
circumstances, we agree that such a 
visit should not take place. 

The State Department task force 
has 35 individuals here answering 
phones 24 hours a day. We are averag- 
ing approximately 8,000 calls in a 24- 
hour period. 

I would like to give you a VOA 
[Voice of America] update. We have 
stepped up the hours of frequency. We 
have increased the hours from nine to 
eleven in Mandarin. We will continue 
increasing the hours. We have increas- 
ed the frequency as of today to 12 in 
Mandarin; that is breaking out into 
seven in the evening — broadcasts — and 
five in the morning. There is sporadic 
jamming, but we know that some of 
this is getting through. 

We have seven English frequen- 
cies, which is an increase of two; and 
these are not being jammed. In addi- 
tion VOA has satellite television being 
beamed into China. I would like to 
point out that the only way it can be 
picked up is on a TV receiving dish, 

and our estimates are that there are 
approximately 2,000 of these dishes in 
China. There are 43 people working at 
VOA on these radio and TV broadcasts 
both here and in China. 

JUNE 9, 1989^ 

Basically we would describe the situa- 
tion today as relatively calm; however, 
we would note that Beijing is still an 
armed camp. 

On Americans left in China — our 
estimates are there are a little under 
1,500 Americans in China. I will breaH 
some of this out for you. There are 
approximately — and all our numbers 
are approximate and estimates — 500 
Americans in Beijing. Of that number, 
approximately 150-200 are media, 116t 
are our own Embassy personnel, and 
the remaining number is made up of 
businessmen and tourists. 

There are approximately 200 
Americans in Shanghai. There are ap- 
proximately 135 Americans in Guan- 
zhou. There are approximately 100-25J 
Americans in Wuhan, and we are worB 
ing on getting transportation to get 
those individuals out. 

There are 50-100 Americans in Ti 
anjin, and the embassy has organized 
bus caravan to pick them up and bringi 
them to Beijing. 

The embassy is still making daily 
visits to the universities and to the ho 
tels. We have found at Beijing Univer- 
sity there are no Americans there. Thf 
approximate number we have of Amer 
cans choosing to stay in Beijing is 400 
[including press], because the total 
number we have out there is about 500* 

Of the dependents order that was 
issued earlier this week, there are 10 
dependents left in China, and they are 
coming out. 

On charters; you know that we ha* 
a United charter that left on June 8. 
There were 65 Americans on board. 
Our Continental charter left on June 9 
with 77 people, which includes Ameri- 
cans and third country nationals. Thei 
are no more scheduled chartered 

The embassy has told us that ther 
are many seats now available on the 
regularly scheduled flights, and I will 
be glad to post for you the details on a: 
commercial flights out of China. The 
number that we have is approximately 
43 in the next 3 days, and their destim 
tions are 10 different cities around the 




Jl'NE 12, 1989^ 

Beijing and other cities remain rela- 
tively quiet. There is little troop activ- 
ity that has been reported. Tiananmen 
."^ijuare is still surrounded by tanks, ar- 
mored personnel carriers, armed sol- 
diers, and barbed wire. 

As you all know, there is an in- 
crease in the security presence sur- 
rounding the foreign diplomatic 
residence compound and also at our 

We estimate there are roughly 
1,100 Americans still in China. In Bei- 
jing, private, 185; official, 118 as of 
Monday morning. [Figures for Ameri- 
cans in other cities were posted for 
news correspondents.] 

Over the weekend, we did complete 
our bus convoy to Tianjin where 89 
Americans were convoyed out. We com- 
pleted a chartered airplane to Wuhan 
with 3.5 Americans on it. In Dalian, we 
took out a charter flight with 35 Amer- 
icans and 70 third country nationals. 
That plane went to Hong Kong. Our 
best information is that all U.S. citi- 
zens who wish to leave have left or are 
on their way out, according to our Em- 
bassy in Beijing. 

On VOA: Beijing is being heavily 
jammed and not much is getting 
through. In fact, for 100 square miles, 
there is very heavy jamming and not 
much is getting through. They are 
broadcasting 1 hour a day from the 
Philippines using medium waves, which 
is AM and is broadcast in Mandarin. 
This broadcast covers Guangzhou and 
the whole countryside in the southeast 

JUNE 20, 1989-^ 

The President today directed that the 
I'.S. Government suspend participation 
in all high-level e.xchan^'es of govern- 
ment officials with the People's Repub- 
lic of China, in addition to the 
suspension of military exchanges previ- 
ously announced [by the President at 
his news conference on June 5]. This ac- 
tion is being taken in response to the 
\\ ave of violence and reprisals by the 
Chinese authorities against those who 
lia\ e called for democracy. The United 
Slates has supported the legitimate 
democratic aspirations for freedom of 
peoples throughout the world. The 

United States will continue to voice its 
concern and its support for these 

The United States hopes that the 
current tragedy in China will be 
brought to a peaceful end and that dia- 
logue will replace the atmosphere of 
suspicion and reprisal. China is an im- 
portant state with which we hope to 
continue productive relations. 

In addition to the ban on ex- 
changes, the United States will seek to 
postpone consideration of new interna- 
tional financial institutions' loans to 
China. The situation in China is of in- 

ternational concern as witnessed by the 
variety of voices that have spoken up on 
the issue. We urge continued interna- 
tional expressions of concern. 

'Made to news correspondents by De- 
partment deputy spokesman Richard A. 

-Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of May 29, 1989. 

^Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of June 12. 

■"Made to news correspondents by De- 
partment spokesman Margaret DeB. 

»Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of June 26. ■ 

NATO Defense Planning Committee 
l\/leets in Brussels 

The Defense Ministers of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
met in Brussels June 8-9, 1989. The 
United States ivas represented by Sec- 
retary of Defense Richard B. Cheney. 
Following is the text of the final com- 
munique issued June 9. 

1. The Defense Planning Committee of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in 
Ministerial session in Brussels on 8th and 
9th June 1989. 

2. At their meeting in Brussels on 29th 
and 30th May, marking the advent of the 
fifth decade of the North Atlantic Alliance, 
our Heads of State and Government re- 
viewed the successful results that Alliance 
policies have brought about. In their Sum- 
mit Declaration and the Comprehensive 
Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament, 
they set out a positive and ambitious 
forward-looking programmme which estab- 
lishes an agenda for the future designed to 
achieve the realization of our long-term ob- 
jectives. They reaffirmed that the Alliance, 
founded on the strength and cohesion of the 
trans-Atlantic partnership, will continue to 
serve as the cornerstone of our security, 
peace and freedom. They also underlined 
that, for the foreseeable future there is no 
alternative to the Alliance's strategy for the 
prevention of war. which is a strategy of de- 
terrence based upon an appropriate mix of 
adequate and effective nuclear and conven- 
tional forces which will continue to be kept 
up-to-date where necessary. 

3. In aiming to build on the success of 
the Summit and recalling the principles of 
the Harmel Report, we reaffirmed that the 
maintenance of a strong and coherent de- 
fense posture is a prerequisite for the secu- 
rity of our countries and for constructive 
dialogue and co-operation with the countries 
of the East, including arms control and dis- 
armament. To this end, we considered at 

this meeting a number of issues which are of 
particular significance for defense planning 
and policy within the Alliance. Most impor- 
tant amongst these were the implications for 
defense planning of the Western proposals, 
as expanded by the Summit initiative, for 
the reduction of conventional forces in Eu- 
rope; the new Ministerial Guidance; and the 
equitable sharing of roles, risks and respon- 
sibilities within the Alliance. 

4. We agreed that in order to safeguard 
and enhance our collective security the 
yardstick against which NATO require- 
ments for defense and deterrence must be 
measured continues to be present and fore- 
cast Warsaw Pact capabilities. In this re- 
spect we noted that, even after the 
announced and recently begun unilateral re- 
ductions in some of the Warsaw Pact forces 
have been carried out, a substantial imbal- 
ance will remain between the forces of the 
Warsaw Pact and NATO, and that the Soviet 
Union continues to maintain the pace of its 
military production. 

5. The Comprehensive Concept has 
made clear that within the Alliance's far- 
reaching arms control agenda one of the 
highest priorities in negotiations with the 
East is reaching agreement on conventional 
force reductions, and it reaffirms our key 
objectives for these negotiations. The Sum- 
mit agreed on further proposals to be tabled 
in the CFE [conventional armed forces in 
Europe] negotiations and set out an ambi- 
tious timetable for achieving an agreement 
and then accomplishing the reductions. To 
meet this timetable work is already in hand 
in the High Level Task Force to elaborate 
further these proposals. The CFE negotia- 
tions have important implications for 
NATO's collective defense planning activ- 
ities. It is essential that the Alliance's de- 
fense and arms control objectives remain in 
harmony in order to ensure their comple- 
mentary contribution to achieving the goal 
of enhanced security at the lowest possible 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



level offerees. We have accordingly tasked 
the Defense Planning Committee in Perma- 
nent Session to consider how Alliance de- 
fense planning can most effectively 
contribute to this end. 

6. The fundamental considerations set 
out in the Summit documents are duly re- 
flected in the 1989 Ministerial Cuidance 
which we have approved as the basic politi- 
cal directive for a broad range of defense 
planning activities, both national and inter- 
national, in NATO. Specifically, it provides 
guidance for the development of the next set 
of force goals and their implementation, and 
maintains an emphasis on the need to re- 
dress identified deficiencies in our conven- 
tional defense, reaffirming the focus of the 
Conventional Defense Improvements (CDI) 
programme and the need to maintain its mo- 
mentum. The Guidance also seeks increased 
military assistance for Greece, Portugal and 
Turkey, building on recent efforts to im- 
prove and focus more clearly such assis- 
tance. While recognizing that considerable 
efforts will be needed to meet all these chal- 
lenges, we are resolved to continue to aim to 
provide increased resources in order to 
maintain and improve the effectiveness of 
our individual contributions to collective de- 
fense, as set out in the attached e.xtract 
from the 1989 Ministerial Guidance. 

7. In the light of current resource con- 
straints we also expressed our determina- 
tion to obtain greater value for the money 
we devote to defense in order to improve our 
defense capabilities. We shall seek to broad- 
en the scope of our national and collabora- 
tive efforts to achieve this. We therefore 
renewed our support for further develop- 
ment of NATO planning processes which can 
play an important role in expanding co- 
operation and in setting priorities. 

8. The longstanding Alliance principle 
of the equitable sharing of roles, risks and 
responsibilities, reaffirmed at the Summit, 
is one of the major themes of our Guidance. 
The Guidance recognizes and incorporates 
key recommendations contained in the Re- 
port that we issued in December 1988. We 
intend to ensure that national defense plans 
and Alliance defense planning activities 
take full account of the assessments and rec- 
ommendations contained in this Report. To 
this end we have endorsed a work pro- 
gramme which sets out specific respon- 
sibilities for the necessary follow-on action. 
Some countries have already taken initial 
steps to improve their contributions to our 
collective security and further initiatives 
are being pursued by the Alliance collec- 
tively and by individual countries. A full re- 
l)ort on progress in this important field will 
be presented to us in November this year. 

9. In our consideration of other defense 
matters we discussed the need to ensure 
that Alliance ammunition stocks are suffi- 
cient and are supported by an adequate pro- 
duction capability. We also noted that the 
current status of an examination by NATO's 
Military Authorities of the necessary level 
and ajjpropriate mix of military training 

Elections in Poland 

JUNE 6. 1989" 

Sunday's elections [June 4] in Poland 
marked an important step toward free- 
dom and democracy. I am encouraged 
by the responses of both the Polish Gov- 
ernment and members of the opposition 
to the election results. I hope the move- 
ment toward political pluralism will 
continue to follow the responsible, con- 
structive path it has taken since the 
historic roundtable agreements in 

As I said in my speech in Ham- 
tramck, Michigan, April 17, the Polish 
people are now taking steps that de- 
serve our active support. We will work, 
in concert with our allies to help Polish 
democracy take root anew and sustain 
itself. The Polish people face a difficull 
task ahead; but their first steps have 
been firmly in the right direction. 

'Text fi-om Weekly Compilation of Pres 
dential Documents of .June 12, 1989. ■ 

Hungarian Political Reforms 

JUNE 16, 1989" 

The United States welcomes the an- 
nouncement of the Hungarian Govern- 
ment's intention to begin discussions 
with the opposition as a first step to 
multiparty elections. On April 17, in 
Hamtramck, Michigan, the President 
pledged support to East European 
countries which embarked upon the 

path of fundamental political and eco- 
nomic reforms. In view of Hungary's 
progress, the President will seek legis 
lation to accord Hungary GSP [gener- 
alized system of preferences] and to 
permit the Overseas Private Invest- 
ment Corporation (OPIC) to operate ir 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of PreS" 
dential Documents of June 19, 1989. ■ 

and exercises in Europe to ensure that our 
forces maintain their operational standards 
while minimizing the impact on our publics. 
In addition, we welcomed progress being 
made in the trial of a conventional arma- 
ments planning system and in the pursuit of 
armaments co-operation initiatives for Al- 
lies with lesser developed defense 

10. We recognize that at this time of un- 
precedented promise in international affairs 
hopes for the future are high, and that many 
in our publics look forward to the time when 
the burdens of defense can be reduced. We 
share the hope that this will indeed become 
possible as a consequence of the current 
arms control negotiations. But our defense 
requirements are determined by realities, 
and the realities of the Warsaw Pact's mili- 
tary capabilities are such that we must 
maintain an adequate defense and deterrent 
posture as a prerequisite not only for peace 
and stability but also for the further prog- 
ress in East-West relations that we seek. 
The defense efforts which we make — which 
must be shared equitably — must provide 
forces which are sufficient to meet our secu- 
rity requirements but are also at the lowest 
possible level consistent with these require- 
ments. The policies we have endorsed at our 
meeting aim at achieving just this. 


Resource Guidance 

Since 1977 Alliance defense planning has 
been based on resource guidance involving 
commitment by countries to aim at annual 
real increases in defense expenditure in the 
region of 3^, although with certain quali- 
fications, notably relating to the quality ano 
quantity of the past and present defense ef- 
forts of invididual countries. The original 
basis for the '3% guideline was the need to 
maintain planned force levels and allow for 
essential equipment modernization and re- 
placement, bearing in mind not only the 
substantial gap between NATO and Warsaw 
Pact forces but also that the continuing en- 
hancement of Warsaw Pact force capabilities 
was tending to widen the gap, particularly 
in terms of the quantity of equipment de- 
ployed. Account was also taken, however, of 
affordability, based on forecasts of likely 
economic growth rates and pressure on Al- 
lied Governments to exercise budgetary re- 
straint for domestic economic reasons. 

Practical experience over the past dec- 
ade has generally confirmed the apjiro- 
priateness of the guidance. Most annual 
reviews during the period concluded that 



ual increases in that order were necessary 
n maintain the credibility of NATO's de- 
jnsf posture. While no country has suc- 
eeded in consistently meeting or exceeding 
he target over the whole period, and the 
erformance of a few countries has fallen 
.ell short of doing so, some eight countries 
enerally achieved the goal and the average 
att' (if growth across the Alliance (e.xclud- 
le the United States whose large defense 
•iuii;et tends to distort the figures) was 
bout 2%. 

Notwithstanding the announced uni- 
Utral reductions in Warsaw Pact forces and 
he possibility of future arms control agree- 
leiits. a very considerable imbalance re- 
lains between the forces of the Warsaw 
'act and NATO, and there is as yet no evi- 
ence of a significant diminution of the 
cope and momentum of Warsaw Pact force 
Kidernization programmes. Therefore, in 
rdtr to sustain a credible deterrent there 
fmains, at least for the time being, a con- 
inuing need to increase the resources de- 
(itrii to defense both in order to maintain 
hi' fffectiveess of current capabilities and 
I) ndress existing deficiencies in conven- 
Kiiial defense. It will also be necessary to 
1111 to achieve the most efficient use of re- 
ouices devoted to defense, on both a nation- 

I and an Alliance basis. 

The DPC [Defense Planning Commit- 
|ee] report on Enhancing Alliance Collec- 
jive Security endorsed by Ministers in 
)ecember 1988, whilst acknowledging the 
eeil to avoid setting unrealistic or unrea- 
iiiialile standards, concluded that real in- 
rea.-^es in resource inputs will continue to 
e necessary if the defense output is to be 
laiiitained and improved. It stressed that 

II countries should provide a level of re- 
ource allocations to defense adequate to en- 
hle them to maintain or assume a fair share 
f the roles, risks and responsibilities in the 
Llliance, noting that for some countries par- 
icular efforts will be necessary. 

While there may be significant varia- 
ions among individual countries, it should 
le noted that projected GDP growth rates 
or NATO as a whole over the planning peri- 
od are in the region of 3%. Moreover, most 
ountries have, in the recent past, allocated 
larger share of their GDP to defense than 
t present and should, therefore, be in a po- 
ition to reverse the current downward 
rends or at least to arrest them. Thus, for 
he present, continuing real increases in de- 
iense expenditure of the order of 3% appear 
loth necessary and affordable. 

The ultimate yardstick against which 
he need for Alliance and national efforts be measured is the overall ability to 
u]ipnrt NATO's deterrent and defensive ob- 
ectives. In this context, it is recognized 
hat reductions in the threat resulting from 
uither positive developments in East-West 
elationships and arms control agreements 
na,\ in the future justify some revision both 
n iiur force posture and in the resource 
ruiilance. However, in the near term at 
east, the need to overcome significant defi- 

ciencies in our conventional defense in order 
to maintain our strategy remains beyond 

Taking into account the above considera- 
tions and recognizing that guidance on the 
level of financial input is only one of several 
instruments to guide the defense effort in 
the Alliance and to bring about a fair shar- 
ing of roles, risks and responsibilities, coun- 
tries should: 

(a) continue to aim to achieve significant 
real annual increases in defense expenditure 
in order to redress identified deficiencies, 
maintain the momentum of the GDI pro- 
gramme and enhance collective security as 
agreed in the DPC report on the sharing of 
roles, risks and responsibilities. In this re- 
spect, the target of a real increase in de- 
fense expenditure of the order of 3% should, 
in the absence of tangible improvement in 
the balance offerees, serve as a general 
guide, recognizing that a special effort will 
be required from those countries identified 

of the DPC report whose past level of expen- 
ditures had led to key deficiencies in their 
defense capabilities. Regarding the share of 
GDP devoted to defense, countries should 
make every effort to provide a level of re- 
sources adequate to enable them to maintain 
or assume an equitable share of the roles, 
risks and responsibilities of the common de- 
fense burden; in particular those countries 
that spend a smaller percentage of their 
GDP on defense than the current NATO me- 
dian should over time assume a more equita- 
ble share of the defense burden by showing 
real progress in increasing that percentage; 

(b) make every effort to improve the 
output obtained from the resources avail- 
able. Continuing attention should be paid to 
obtaining better value for money through 
improved cooperation and rationalization, 
with particular attention to those areas 
identified in the Roles, Risks and Respon- 
sibilities Report. ■ 

President Meets With French President 

President Francois Mitterranc 
visited the United States May 20-21, 
1989, and met with President Bush at 
Keiinebunkport, Maine, and at Boston. 
Following is the text of a news confer- 
ence the two Presidents held at Dicker- 
son Field at Boston University on May 

President Mitterrand. We're coming 
to the end of our stay in the United 
States, and this meeting with the press 
is, more or less, the last event. And the 
journalists who have been good enough 
to follow us during the last 24 hours 
will have appreciated, I think, that 
we've had a very full day. But you will, 
of course, be able, in a moment, to ask 
the questions which you feel most suit- 
ed to the requirements of the day. And 
President Bush and myself will be at 
your disposal to reply to them. 

But personally — and also on behalf 
of my country — I would like to say how 
very deeply sensitive we are to the way 
in which Mrs. Bush and President Bush 
have received us — my wife and myself. 
They received us in a very warm, 
homely family and restful atmosphere; 
but at the same time, we were able to 
have some intensive, political, serious 
conversations which were given, as it 
were, more life thanks to the forest air 
and the sea breeze that we were ble to 

Now President Bush will be saying 
a few words, and then we'll be open to 
questions. But I'd like to personally 
thank all those who have Ijeen good 
enough to accompany us during our 
stay and comment on what we have 

President Bush. Let me just say 
what a pleasure it was having Presi- 
dent Mitterrand and Madame Mitter- 
rand as our guests in Maine. We've just 
come from the commencement of Bos- 
ton University. And nothing better 
symbolizes the strength of the friend- 
ship and common values which we 
share — which our two nations share — 
and which really the President cele- 
brated with us 8 years ago, when he 
came to Yorktown, celebrating the 
200th anniversary of that battle. 

The weekend was not all work and 
no play; it provided a good opportunity 
for us to discuss many of the main is- 
sues on the international agenda. By 
the end of this week, both of us will be 
traveling to Brussels for the NATO 
summit. We agreed on the central role 
the Atlantic alliance has played in 
keeping the peace for the past four dec- 
ades, the enduring value of this part- 
nership in the common defense in the 
years ahead. We also agreed on the 
critical contribution the nuclear deter- 
rent has made in keeping us free and 
secure and at peace. 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



We also talked about the oppor- 
tunities that lie before us in the light of 
the changes now taking place in the So- 
viet Union and in Eastern Europe. 
Both of us will watch developments in 
the Soviet Union, seeking signs of last- 
ing change. Of course, we discussed the 
dramatic events now taking place in 
Beijing, in China. The President, I be- 
lieve, shares my view — I'll let him 
speak for himself — that our goal should 
be a bold one, to move beyond contain- 
ment, toward the integration of the So- 
viet Union into the community of 
nations. Of course, we discussed how 
the United States will relate to France 
and the rest of Western Europe in the 
years ahead. 

I sensed an excitement on his part 
about the future. We exchanged views 
about the themes that I touched on in 
my earlier remarks here at BU [Boston 
University] — America's readiness for a 
more mature transatlantic partnership, 
the vision of a commonwealth of free 
nations as a bridge to overcome the di- 
visions of Europe. We also discussed 
the potential for improved cooperation 
with the EC [European Community] as 
we approach 1992 and the single Euro- 
pean market, as well as the prospects 
for greater Western European coopera- 
tion in addressing the political and 
global issues around the world. I heard 
his clarion's call for cooperative action 
on the environment, and I salute him 
for that. 

Beyond the NATO summit and 
East-West relations, we exchanged 
views on so may subjects, many of 
which will be on the agenda at the 
Paris economic summit. We agreed 
that more needs to be done in practical, 
realistic ways to deal with the environ- 
ment and to deal with the problems of 
global warming. We also reviewed ways 
of advancing the peace process in the 
Middle East, the urgent need to try to 
find, or be helpful in finding, a solution 
to the situation in Lebanon. 

On the question of peace and de- 
mocracy in this hemisphere, in Central 
America, we share the view that de- 
mocracy must be restored in Panama 
and that the commitments undertaken 
at Esquipulas are the key to peace and 
democracy in the region. 

Q. The students in China have 
been told to leave Tiananmen Square 
or face military attack. What's your 
reaction to that, and do you have any 
message for the students, other than 
that the United States supports free- 
dom of speech and freedom of 

Baltic Freedom Day 

JUNE 14, 1989" 

Fifty years ago on August 23, 1939, the for- 
eign ministers of the Soviet Union and Nazi 
Germany signed the infamous Molotov- 
Ribbentrop pact. The secret protocols to 
this treaty condemned the independent Bal- 
tic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
to the foi'eign domination they still endure 

Less than 1 year after the signing of the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Soviet Union 
invaded the three Baltic Republics and im- 
posed a regime antithetical to the ideas of 
national sovereignty and individual liberty. 
The suffering of the Baltic people was e.\ac- 
erbated when Nazi forces drove through 
these states during the beginning of the 
Nazi-Soviet War and established a brutal 
administration. When the Red Army recap- 
tured the Baltic States during World War II, 
it reinstituted a reign of terror under the 
Soviet secret police. Hundreds of thousands 
of innocent men, women, and children were 
deported to Siberia; thousands of others per- 
ished in armed resistance to the attack upon 
their national independence and individual 
rights. By the end of World War II, the Bal- 
tic States had lost 20 percent of their 

Since their forcible annexation by the 
Soviet Union in 1940, the people of 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have suf- 
fered political oppression, religious persecu- 
tion, and repression of their national 
consciousness. Their cultural heritage has 
been denigrated and suppressed, and 
russification has threatened their survival 
as distinct ethnic groups. An aggressive 
program of industrialization has posed haz- 
ards to their health as well as the environ- 
ment. Members of the clergy and lay 
religious leaders have been systematically 
harassed and imprisoned for activities 
deemed unacceptable by the authorities. 

However, half a century of repression 
has not broken the spirit of the Baltic peo- 
ples. Today, their longing and hopes for lib- 
erty remain strong. Hundreds of thousands 
of Estonian, Lativian, and Lithuanian men 
and women have publicly demonstrated their 
desire for freedom and democracy, calling 
for national autonomy and control over their 
own affairs. 

The future looks brighter today than at 
any other time in the Baltic States' post-war 
experience. The undeniable voice of Baltic 
people is being heard. Some religious 
shrines — desecrated by the Communist gov- 
ernment and used to house concerts, art- 
work, and even a museum of atheism — have 
been returned to the churches. Members of 
the clergy have been allowed to take up theiii 
pastoral duties. The unique languages, na- 
tional flags, and patriotic songs of the three 
countries have been restored. Some politicali 
prisoners have been released. 

These are important steps, but justice 
demands that more be taken. Recent im- 
provements in human rights practices by tha 
ruling Communist officials are not com- 
plete, nor have they been institutionalized. 
The people of Lithuania, Latvia, and Es- 
tonia both demand and deserve lasting guan 
antees of their fundamental rights. 

The Government of the United States 
does not and will not recognize the uni- 
lateral incorporation by force of arms of the 
Baltic States into the Soviet Union. On this 
observance of Baltic Freedom Day, we ex- 
press our solidarity with them and call upon 
the Soviet Union to listen to their calls for 
freedom and self-determination. 

By Senate Joint Resolution 63, the Con- 
gress has designated June 14, 1989, as "Bal- 
tic Freedom Day" and has requested the 
President to issue a proclamation in observ- 
ance of this event. 

Now, Therefore, I George Bush, Pres* 
ident of the United States of America, do 
hereby proclaim June 14, 1989, as Baltic 
Freedom Day. I call upon the people of the 
United States to observe this day with ap- 
propriate remembrances and ceremonies 
and to reaffirm their commitment to princi- 
ples of liberty and freedom for all oppressed 

In Wit.\ess Whereof, I have hereunto 
set my hand this fourteenth day of June, in 
the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and 
eighty-nine, and of the Independence of the 
United States of America the tw'o hundred 
and thirteenth. 

George Bush 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of June 19, 1989. ■ 

President Bush. We do support 
freedom of speech, freedom of assem- 
bly, freedom of the press; and clearly, 
we support democracy. I don't want to 
be gratuitous in giving advice, but I 
would encourage restraint. I do not 
want to see bloodshed. We revere the 
model of Martin Luther King in this 

country for his peaceful protests. And 
so I might suggest a familiarization 
with that for the people in China. I 
would urge the government to be as 
forthcoming as possible in order to see 
more democratization and to see a 
peaceful resolution of this matter. 


Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


Q. Do you think that progress 
ias been made in hoping to bring 
ierman and American views closer 
ogether on the question of moderni- 
sation of nuclear short-term weapons 
;n Europe? And do you think that you 
ire there to act as an intermediary, a 

President Mitterrand. The only 
ole I play is the role that is my natural 
ole as a member of the alliance. But I 
m not particularly there to act as a 
fiediator. Obviously I'm happy if views 
an be reconciled and believe, I think, 
hat they can be reconciled. I think 
hat we have now the elements of ideas 
hat could form a decision that will be 
aken just in a week's time. And I think 
hat the decision that will be taken will 
18 found positive from the point of view 
if all members of the alliance. You 
:now what my suggestions on the sub- 
ects are because I made them clear in 

Q. On that point, the indication 
•ut of Bonn today was that the West 
xermans have not accepted the ex- 
(licit conditions that were handed to 
flr. Stoltenberg [West German Minis- 
er of Finance] on Friday for talks on 
>NF [short-range nuclear forces]. A 
Vest German spokesman said that 
hose conditions were merely — I 
hink he said — a basis for further dia- 
ogue. Is the U.S. position negotiable 
it this point, and how do you sum up 
he likelihood of resolving this before 
he NATO summit? 

President Bush. I think great 
irogress has been made. One way to 
guarantee there will not be progress is 
lock each other in, in public state- 
neiits, so I do not intend to comment 
)n the specifics. The report I saw from 
Bonn was somewhat more encouraging 
-han the way you phrased this one, in 
,erms of being very, very close togeth- 
>r with the Germans. This is an alli- 
uue that contains many countries, and 
A'e are in active consultation with the 
jermans and others. And, of course, I 
lad the benefit over this weekend of 
learing directly from President Mit- 
errand on his views. But I think that 
,ve could well have this resolved before 
.he summit. 

Q. You spoke about the common 
jond between the United States and 
France and the economic changes 
hat will be coming about in 1992 and, 
)f course, the obvious benefit to the 
L nited States. Yet we have an immi- 
gration law at the present that dis- 

favors Europeans. Do you see this 
matter being resolved so that Euro- 
peans can continue to contribute to 
the United States? 

President Bush. I want to see the 
immigration matter resolved, and, yes, 
1 do foresee it being resolved. 

Q. You have a personal interest 
in China and the Chinese people, yet 
your statements have seemed to be 
very cautious and diplomatic. Have 
you made any private representation 
to the Chinese leadership or given 
any suggestions to them on how to 
resolve — or what you might help with 
in the democracy movement in China? 

President Bush. We have been in 
touch with our ambassador on this very 
key question. I think this perhaps is a 
time for caution because we aspire to 
see the Chinese people have democracy, 
but we do not exhort in a way that is 
going to stir up a military confronta- 
tion. We do not want to have a situation 
like happened in Burma or some other 
place. And so as we counsel restraint 
and as we counsel peaceful means of ef- 
fecting change, that is sound advice. To 
go beyond that and encourage steps 
that could lead to bloodshed would be 

Q. You said we could well have 
agreement on SNF before the sum- 
mit. I gather you're talking about the 
West Germans, because we're getting 
reports out of London that Mrs. 
Thatcher is not, as the English say, 
best pleased about this. And this is 
confusing because we also understand 
that you took Mrs. Thatcher's wishes 
into account when you were formulat- 
ing your counterproposal and that, in 
fact, you were in rather close touch 
with the British. Do you think we 
could go to Brussels with the British 
not having signed on to this and yet 
you would have agreement with the 
West Germans? 

President Mitterrand. I can ap- 
preciate exactly what kind of a dialogue 
you were hoping to achieve [with Presi- 
dent Bush], but the rules of the game 
are that it's my turn to answer. You 
may be asking for an opinion, but I 
would say this; that within the Atlantic 
alliance, there is full equality among 
all partners. And on this problem, like 
on other problems, at the outset, people 
have diverging views, different opin- 
ions. But the important thing is to 
come to a meeting of the minds and to 
achieve a common answer. This has al- 
ways been the case in the alliance. A 

particular view will only carry more 
weight if it carries more wisdom and 
more common sense. I'm not going to 
sit here and award prizes to this view 
or that view. There's no particular view 
which would prevail. The important 
thing is that the general interest of the 
alliance should prevail, and it will. 

Q. You called for restraint in 
China, and you said that the lessons 
of Martin Luther King could well be 
heeded here. Do you believe the pro- 
testers should go home? Do you think 
there is a revolution underway in Chi- 
na now? 

President Bush. I don't think that 
it would be appropriate for the Presi- 
dent of the United States to say to the 
demonstrators and the students in Bei- 
jing exactly what their course of action 
should be; that is for them to deter- 
mine. They know the U.S. commitment 
to democracy, to the commitment to 
freedom, to the aspiration we have that 
all people will live in democratic soci- 
eties. But I'm not about to suggest 
what I think they ought to do, except to 
spell out peaceful and continue to fight 
for what you believe in, stand up for 
what you believe in, but beyond that, I 
cannot go. 

Q. How unstable is the situation? 

President Bush. I don't know. I 
think we have to wait and see. There's 
certainly an enormous expression on 
the part of many people — students and 
others — for change toward movement 
toward democracy. I lived there. I saw 
a society totally different than the one 
that exists in China today. China has 
moved, in some areas, toward democra- 
cy. Now the quest is, and the appeal 
from these kids is, to move further. I 
am one who feels that the quest for de- 
mocracy is very powerful. But I am not 
going to dictate or try to say from the 
United States how this matter should 
be resolved by these students. I'm not 
going to do it. 

As for [an earlier] question, we 
have been in very close touch with Mrs. 
Thatcher. And I listened attentively 
and with great interest to what Presi- 
dent Mitterrand said, and I agree with 
him; that we can get together on this 
vexing question. There are strong- 
willed people from strong countries, 
and they each have an opinion. But my 
role has been to try, behind the scenes, 
to be helpful for working this problem 
out. And I should salute the President 
of France as he has tried to be extraor- 
dinarily helpful in working this prob- 

Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 



lem out. Your job is to know every step 
of the way the nuances of difference 
that exist between the parties, and 
mine is to see if we can't iron out those 
differences. And that's exactly what 
I'm (hMng, what Secretary Baker is do- 
ing-, and what others are doing. 

Q. You were talkiriK about the at- 
titude we should have toward the So- 
viet Union, particularly on the part 
of the allies. Do you think that the 
cold war has come to an end, and, if 
so, has it come to an end once and for 

President Mitterrand. People 
seem to want us to play the role of 
crystal-gazers, which we are not. It's 
like a revolution. You only know after- 
ward if a thing turned out to be a revo- 
lution. As far as the cold war is 
concerned, one thing is clear, and that 
is that we are moving out of the cold 
war. And the chances are that this will 
be true for a very long time. There will 
be moments when things will be more 

difficult, doubtless, but I don't see us 
slipping right back into the cold war. Of 
course, anything is possible. A lot will 
depend on the trend of developments 
within the Soviet Union. 

Q. You said in your speech today 
that you're grateful for some of these 
proposals with General Secretary 
Gorbachev, yet some in your Adminis- 
tration have made no secret of their 
disdain for some of these proposals. 
In talking about "beyond contain- 
ment," did the recent proposals of 
General Secretary Gorbachev on con- 
ventional and nuclear weapons meet 
any of your tests for going beyond 

President Bush. Yes. I not only en- 
courage him to continue to make pro- 
posals but I'd encourage him to 
unilaterally implement the proposals. 
Many of them address themselves to 
conventional forces where they have an 
extraordinary preponderant imbal- 
ance, where they have the weight on 
their side. And so, I'd like to see that. 
But I don't think anybody is criticizing 
the specific proposals. All we want to 
see is real progress. And when you 
have the historic imbalance that exists 
on conventional forces, yes, I welcome 
the proposals and like to see them im- 
plemented. And it's in that area that 
we're looking for reality versus rheto- 
ric. I know that some are quite restless 
about the pace that I have set in deal- 
ing with the Soviet Union, but I think 
it's the proper pace. I will be prepared 
when Jim Baker gets back to talk some 
more. I'm most anxious to be sure that 
the alliance is together on these ques- 
tions. And so, we have time. 

In the meantime, I welcome not 
only the change of openness and the 
change of reform but I want to see it 
continue. I welcome the proposals, but 
I would like to see them implemented. 
That would still leave a large imbalance 
in favor of the Soviets on many of these 
proposals — not all of them. Some of 
them talk to get where we need to be 
engaged, because they talked to get- 
ting down to equal numbers. But no, I 
salute the man, as I said, for certain 
kinds of steps that he has taken. But I 
hope I'll be forgiven for being cautious 
and for being prudent and not for being 
stampeded into something that might 
prove to be no good for the alliance and 
not good for the United States. 

Q. Mr. Gorbachev has been de- 
scribed by the President's spokesman 
as a "drugstore cowboy." Do you 
agree with this description? 

President Mitterrand. I think that 
one must be wary of caricatures. Mr. 
Gorbachev is worth very much more 
than that. 

Q. Do you believe that the Ameri 
can public is aware of the limits of 
American power and of your ability ta 
really influence political events like 
those in China, Panama, and Europe? 

President Mitterrand. I think on 
these questions of influence — influence 
can be of a material kind and military 
or peaceful. But it can also be of a mor- 
al kind and psychological. There's a 
whole rainbow, a whole range, of possl 
bilities. Of course, the first problem 
that you're always up against is the 
problem of noninterference in other 
people's affairs. That being said — but 
it's a question of human rights. One 
must not stop at that. And I think one 
must give priority to the public asser- 
tion of the basic principles of human 
rights and that is what must be 

With reference to the countries yoi 
are mentioning, these principles shoul( 
be recalled to the countries concerned, 
But recourse of arms is probably not 
the kind of method that is fully in tune 
with the requirements of our day. And 
to think that you can win whole popula- 
tions over to your way of thinking by 
threatening them with guns or tanks is 
obviously wrong. 

What is also very important, and 
more important, is to win over interna-* 
tional public opinion, to mobilize public 
opinion, both within and without the 
country, so that those governments 
which fail in the respect of human 
rights will be, both within and without, 
with their backs to the wall on the sub- 
ject. That being said, I know of no mir- 
acle cure in these matters, no unfailing 
method that always works. And if I 
were able to come here to Boston and 
someone could give me the golden key 
that would open all these doors, I'd be 
very happy and perhaps somewhat 

Q. In your discussions this week- 
end concerning Lebanon, did you dis- 
cuss the situation concerning the 
hostages, and have you any news con- 
cerning avenues that could be pur- 
sued toward their eventual release? 

President Bush and President Mitterrand 
at the President's home in Kennebunkport, 


Department of State Bulletin/August 1989 


President Bush. It was just 
;ouched on because — but we discussed 
Lebanon in depth. The hostage situa- 
;ion obviously continues to be on our 
mind, and President Mitterrand was 
most sympathetic — the French people 
leld various times against their will. 
That underlies the concerns that I feel. 
But Lebanon transcends just our own 
<een interest in the hostage question — 
;o see a once peaceful country, where 
various factions could live together, 
low ripped asunder by war and by out- 
ride pressures, demands world action. 
.A.nd yet again, when you look at the al- 
A'l'natives, they aren't that clear. We 
ia\i' called for the cease-fire, support- 
n,u the Arab League posture: getting 
'ori'ign troops out of Lebanon and try- 
ne to have the election process go for- 
ward so you can have an elected 
)i-fsident that fulfills the will of the 

President Mitterrand was very 
lelpFul because he has a unique view of 
Lflianon, with France's history there. 
\iiil yet I don't think either of us came 
ip with a simple answer. I saluted what 
le tried to do when he encouraged the 
Secretary General of the United Na- 
ioiis to go there. But for various rea- 
sons, that did not work out. We did talk 
ibout a couple of other specific ap- 
iroaches that we might take, which I 
hiiik should remain confidential. But it 
vas discussed in detail. It is a matter 
)f enormous urgency. In the United 
States, of course, you heard Cardinal 
.aw I Archbishop of Boston] today ap- 
irdpriately singling out Lebanon be- 
■ause of the religious divisions there. I 
vish there was an easy answer to it, 
md the United States stands ready to 
lelp if we can. 

President's Meeting With 
EC Commission President 

'President Mitterrand spoke in French. 
ind his remarks were translated by an in- 
erpreter (te.xt fro