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Departmpnt
of State

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'he Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 82 / Number 2067

October 1982

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bulletin

Volume 82 ' Number 2067 October 1982

The Department OF State Bulletin,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreipi policy. Its purpose is to provide the
public, the Congress, and government
agencies with information on developments
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of
the Department of State and the Foreign
Service.

The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials; selected
press releases issued by the White House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to
the United Nations; and treaties and other
agreements to which the United States is
or may become a party. Special features,
articles, and other supportive material
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and
graphs) are published frequently to
provide additional information on current
issues but should not necessarily be
interpreted as official U.S. policy
statements.

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

Secretary of State

JOHN HUGHES

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD

Director,

Office of Public Communication

NORMAN HOWARD

Actin^r Chiff, F'llitorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

Kditor

JUANITA ADAMS

Assistant Editor

The Secretary of State ha.s determined that the
publication of thi.s periodical is nece.ssary in the
transaction of the public business required by law of
this Department. Use of funds for printing this
periodical has been approved by the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget through March .31,
19H7.

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted
and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation
of the DkI'AKtmknt of Statk Bii.i.f.tin as the .source
will be appreciated. The Bm.r.F.TiN is indexed in the
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, '
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2O402 Price: 12 issues plus annual inde.\ — $21.0
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CONTENTS

The Secretary

Military Affairs

1 The Quest for Peace

5 Middle East Peace Initiative

7 Interview on "Meet the Press"

10 Interview on "Face the Nation"

Africa

14 Visit of Cameroon President

Ahidjo (Presidents Reagan
and Ahidjo)

Department

15 Role of the U.S. Ambassador

(Richard T. Kennedy)

East Asia

22
27

U.S. -China Joint Communique
(John H. Holdridge. President
Reagan, Text of Communiqtie)

U.S.-China Relations, 1981

U.S. Consultations With ASEAN
(Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.)

U.S. Dialogue With ASEAN and
ANZUS (John H. Holdridge)

U.S. Economic Relations With
ASEAN (Anthony C. Albrecht)

Economics

Economic Regulation and Inter-
national Jurisdictional Conflict
(Davis R. Robinson)

Trade in the 1980s (Denis Lamb)

Europe

U.S. -Soviet Grain Sales Agree-
ment (President Reagan, Fact
Sheet)

Soviet Active Measures: An
Update

Middle East

45 Secretary's Letter to Jordan's
King

Chemical Weapons: Arms Control
and Deterrence (Jonathan T.
Howe)

Production of the MX Missile
(President's Statement and Let-
ter to the Speaker of the House)

Oceans

48 Law of the Sea and Oceans Policy
(James L. Malone)

Security Assistance

50 Conventional Arms Transfers in
the Third World, 1972-81
(James L. Buckley)

Western Hemisphere

Building Peace in Central Amer-
ica (Thomas 0. Enders)

Visit of Costa Rican President
Monge (Presidents Reagan
and Monge)

Visit of Honduran President
Suazo (Presidents Reagan
and Suazo)

U.S. Relations With Brazil
(Thomas 0. Enders)

Grenada (Stephen W. Bosworth)

The South Atlantic Crisis: Back-
ground, Consequences,
Documentation (Thomas 0.
Enders, Proposals, Notes,
Letters, Annexes)

Treaties

90 Current Actions

Chronology

92 August 1982

Press Releases

93 Department of State

75
78

Publications

94 Foreign Relations Volume

Released
94 Department of State
94 GPO Sales

If Israel's adversaries want peace
and justice, they must recognize, clear-
ly and explicitly, the right of the State
of Israel to exist. . . .

For the moderate Arabs, there is
the opportunity to demonstrate that the
course of negotiations can produce
results and serve their vital interests.

The Palestinians now confront a
great decision: whether to continue
down the self-destructive road of armed
struggle . . . or to seize the opportunity
to affect their destiny by way of the
peace process.

THE SECRETARY

The Quest
for Peace

by Secretary Shultz

Address before the

United Jewish Appeal,

New York City, September 12, 1982^

No theme is more appropriate for my
first speech as Secretary of State than
the theme of peace. No objective we
share is more worthy or more elusive: to
attain it requires realism, strength, the
capacity to run risks, and the ability to
gather trust. It takes sustained goodwill
to build up that trust. And it takes
serious, fair, and direct bargaining at
the negotiating table to hammer out
workable and durable agreements.

If we needed any reminder, events
of this year make it clear that we do not
live in a world of peace. Scarcely a
region of the developing world— where
peace is crucial for social and economic
growth— has been spared. From Indo-
china to the Horn of Africa, from the
Persian Gulf and Afghanistan to the tip
of South America, wars raged with
frightening intensity and tragic results.
Some cases, such as the Soviets' im-
perialistic war in Afghanistan, are new
conflicts where one nation is seeking to
extend its power and control. But much
of the violence we witnessed this year,
including the war over the Falklands,
represented only the latest outbreak of
long-smouldering disputes. Mankind has
advanced his capacity to wage war. But
his ability to settle disputes peacefully
and to prevent violence remains
primitive.

We have clear codes of international
morality and law. From the words of the
prophets to the rhetoric of 20th century
statesmen, mankind has set out stand-
ards for individual and international
behavior. Over the last two centuries,
nations have formed international bodies
to adjudicate disputes, resolve conflicts.

and promote peace. But the ideal of a
world at peace has remained, and will
remain, a mirage until nations pursue,
as a matter of course, policies rooted in
mutual respect and aimed at forging and
fostering a just international order.

The formula for peace often requires
that we convince our adversaries of the
strength of our forces and of our will to
defend liberty and security. That same
formula demands that we stand pre-
pared to meet with our adversaries and
work with them to bridge differences.
Despite the catalogue of troubles around
the world, there are great opportunities
and practical possibilities before us to-
day.

The pursuit of peace with freedom,
security, and justice is the essence of
America's foreign policy. Our country's
commitment to peace is beyond doubt,
based on our creative, unrelenting
efforts in that cause.

The past year has been a year rich
in American efforts for peace. At the
President's direction, and with the com-
mitment of American peacekeeping
forces. Secretary Haig took the lead in
creating the multinational force that
helped make good on the historic Israeli
move for peace: withdrawal from the
Sinai. Deputy Secretary of State Walter
Stoessel worked intensively in the
crucial final weeks to assure that
achievement. Ours was the nation that
made a major effort to head off the
tragic war in the South Atlantic. We
have continued the effort to find peace-
ful and just settlements to the fighting
in Indochina and Afghanistan. With all
America behind him— including once

THE SECRETARY

again our dedicated men in uniform-
Phil Habib [President's special emissary
to the Middle East] used every ounce of
his legendary skill and stamina to pre-
vent a tragic denouement of the war in
Lebanon. We are currently engaged in a
major diplomatic effort to achieve Nami-
bian independence and lasting security
in southern Africa. We have provided
vigorous backing for the international
efforts that secured Libya's withdrawal
from Chad. And to ease the dangers of
nuclear war, the President has proposed
major reductions of U.S. and Soviet
nuclear weapons and has offered new
proposals to advance the talks on the
reduction of conventional forces.

International institutions and resolu-
tions for peace need practical efforts to
give them life. Mankind has made aston-
ishing technological and material leaps
in the last 40 years. But we must make
equally dramatic gains in the political

The challenge that
the President has of-
fered to Israel is to ex-
tend its hand to welcome
wider participation in
the peace process.

realm if we are to bequeath a safe and
secure world of peace to our children.
I believe we can make those gains.
Strength of arms and of will are essen-
tial, but no more so than the ability to
find that winning mixture of courage
and realism. No matter what the
obstacles, we must persevere — for there
are no more noble nor important goals
than peace, freedom, and security.

The President's Peace Initiative
in the Middle East

These principles apply fully to that set
of goals foremost in our thoughts
today— peace in the Middle East and
security and success for Israel and its
Arab neighbors. No one who has walked
the streets of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv
and who has talked at length with as
many Israeli people as I have can doubt
that they want peace and security, and I
am dedicated to helping them achieve
both.

Against the backdrop of confronta-
tion, despair, and fear that have char-
acterized the search for peace in the
Middle East, three key documents spell
out how peace might be made a reality.

• The first is U.N. Security Council
Resolution 242, which established the
basis for a negotiating process founded
on the idea of an exchange of territory
for real peace.

• The second is the Camp David ac-
cords, which— in the Egypt-Israel Peace
Treaty— led directly to the realization of
such an exchange of territory for peace.
Camp David calls for a "just, compre-
hensive, and durable" Middle East peace

T 'lesolution 242, but builds on it
a_ well by calling for a solution that
recognizes "the legitimate rights of the
Palestinian people and their just require-
ments" and a "resolution of the Pales-
tinian problem in all its aspects."

• And third, there is the President's
speech of September 1 . This historic ad-
dress builds on the earlier documents by
stating categorically that our approach
to peace will continue to be based on
Resolution 242, with its concept of an
exchange of territory for peace, and the
Camp David accords, which provide for
Palestinian self-government with full
guarantees for Israel's security.

While I cannot summarize for you
the totality of a rich and complex
speech, I would like to review four im-
portant points made by the President.

First, there should be full safe-
guards for Israeli security, both internal
and external, throughout the transitional
period and beyond. The President has
made this forcefully clear.

Second, as stated in Camp David,
there should be a transitional period of 5
years during which the Palestinians of
the West Bank and Gaza should be per-
mitted to exercise full autonomy.

Third, the United States believes
that peace cannot be achieved on the
basis of Israeli sovereignty over the
West Bank and Gaza but must be based
on Resolution 242's formula of an ex-
change of territory for peace. Our pref-
erence is for self-government by the
Palestinians in association with Jordan,
with the extent of withdrawal deter-
mined by the quality of peace offered in
return.

Fourth, the United States also be-
lieves that peace cannot be achieved by
the creation of an independent Pales-
tinian state on the West Bank and Gaza.
The President has stated clearly and
unequivocally that we will not support
an independent Palestinian state in the
territories.

One section of the President's spee« U
especially deserves reading tonight woi
for word, because it did not appear in
the text printed in the New York Timeikii
But don't blame the Times. The passag i
was inserted by the President at the
very last minute— after the press had
received their copies. It was put in be-
cause the President wanted to speak
from his heart to the people of Israel.
The President said this:

I have personally followed and supporte
Israel's heroic struggle for survival ever sin ,
the founding of the State of Israel 34 yeara ™
ago. In the pre-1967 borders, Israel was baj **
ly 10 miles wide at its narrowest point. The '*
bulk of Israel's population lived within ar
tillery range of hostile Arab armies. I am n
about to ask Israel to live that way again.

Those words represent the Presi-
dent's, and America's, fundamental coi
mitment to Israeli security and to gem
ine peace. Our commitment grows out
a sense of moral obligation but also ou
of strategic interest. A strong, secure
Israel is in our interests and the inter-
ests of peace. There will be no peace
without Israeli security, but Israel will
never be secure without peace. Our vi-
sion of the future on the West Bank is
one guided by a vision of a secure Isr&
living with defensible borders and by (
abiding belief that it is not in Israel's
long-term interests to try to rule over
the more than 1 million Palestinians lii
ing in the West Bank and Gaza.

Approval for the President's initia'
tive is gathering force and momentun
both here at home and abroad. I belie
it will gather more and more support
people read and study that speech car
fully. The same is true of the Camp
David accords on which the President
speech is based. Those who do take tl
time to read those historic documents
soon recognize the genius of Camp
David. It is an accomplishment that is p'
tribute to the statesmanship of the
leaders of three great nations — Prime
Minister Begin, the late President
Sadat, and our own President Carter,

The Opportunity of the Present

Despite the many dark periods of staj. ing
nation, setback, and delay since 1967
look at the long-term trend in the Mic
die East is encouraging. After a quar
century of sterile conflict and confron
tion, the past decade has seen a build
momentum toward peace. Three negc
tiated disengagement agreements hav
been signed. President Sadat paid his
historic and stirring visit to Jerusalen ton
There was the great achievement of t ^

ilest

THE SECRETARY

3amp David framework and the signing
n 1979 and fulfillment this past April of
he first treaty of peace between Israel
ind an Arab neighbor— a treaty that is
tribute to the willingness of the people
if Israel and of Prime Minister Begin to
ake risks for peace. I say the first trea-
y because there must be — and there
vill be — more to come. For only in the
iontext of true peace, freely negotiated,
an there be true security for Israel and
ts neighbors.

Nothing is more crucial than
milding on this momentum. But, as has
•een obvious to all, the stalemate in the
.utonomy talks over the past 2 or more
ears, and the outbreak of major mili-
ary conflict this past summer, pose a
frave threat to further progress.

In these circumstances, President
Heagan decided that the time had come
lor renewed American leadership. He
tcted, as well, because the Middle East
oday is at a moment of unprecedented
ipportunity: Israel, the moderate Arab
itates, the Palestinians, and the United
States are all affected, and all now face
he choice between hope and frustration,
letween peace and conflict.

Israel has demonstrated once again,
-t trag^ic cost, that it will not be de-
eated militarily. If Israel's adversaries
'/ant peace and justice, they must recog-
lize, clearly and explicitly, the right of
he State of Israel to exist, and they
nust enter, as President Reagan said,
direct, hard, and fair" negotiations with
erael. When they do, Israel then has
Ihe chance to translate military strength
nto peace, the only long-term security.

For the moderate Arabs, there is
(le opportunity to demonstrate that the
Durse of negotiations can produce
asults and serve their vital interests,
or Lebanon, there is now a second
nance; the chance once again to be free,
rosperous, and democratic, posing no
ireat to its neighbors and serving as a
table bridge between the West and the
.rab world.

The Palestinians now confront a
reat decision: whether to continue
own the self-destructive road of armed
truggle, which has only produced
agedy for the Palestinian people, or to
eize the opportunity to affect their
estiny by way of the peace process,
'he Camp David framework upholds the
nportance of self-government for the
'alestinians of the West Bank and Gaza,
ind it provides Palestinian representa-
ives the right to participate in the
etermination of their future at every
tep in that process.

For the United States, the brilliant,
dogged diplomatic achievement of Presi-
dential emissary Phil Habib has shown
America's determination and ability to
promote just and peaceful solutions to
the problems of the area. His work is
but the latest evidence of how crucial is
the help of the United States if the
peoples and nations of the region are to
stop the fighting, construct solid agree-

The President has
offered a fundamental
challenge to the Arabs
as well. It is time for the
Arab world to recognize
the opportunity provided
by Camp David. The
path of rejection has
achieved nothing but
tragedy. . . .

ments, and prevent wars between Arabs
and Israelis from again threatening to
become the focal point of global conflict.

In his historic address to the Israeli
Knesset, Anwar Sadat spoke of
"moments in the lives of nations and
peoples when it is incumbent upon those
known for their wisdom and clarity of
vision, to penetrate beyond the past,
with all its complexities and vain
memories, in a bold drive toward new
horizons." The present is such a moment
for us all.

The President has offered a chal-
lenge— the challenge of peace — to
Israelis and Arabs alike. Everyone talks
so much about peace that it requires
some effort to stop and comprehend
what it really can mean. Relief from the
horrible burden of war can unleash the
full development of human potential,
promising even greater creativity in the
arts and sciences. Peace offers new eco-
nomic possibilities — when the defense
burden is lightened — to build a better
life at home and contribute to the pros-
perity of the region and the world.

Peace can mean fruitful economic co-
operation between Israel and its neigh-
bors. Imagine how the genius of the
Israeli nation could flourish if it were
freed from the physical and psycho-
logical burdens imposed by the continu-
ing state of conflict. Imagine the enorm-
ous contribution that the peoples of this
region — so rich in spiritual strength —
could make to all mankind.

The Challenge to Israel

The challenge that the President has
offered to Israel is to extend its hand to
welcome wider participation in the peace
process. Israel has demonstrated once
more its military strength and bravery.
But we all recognize that while true
peace requires military strength,
strength alone is not enough; true peace
can only be achieved through lasting
negotiated agreements leading ultimate-
ly to friendly cooperation between Israel
and its neighbors.

In the 1948 war of independence
Israel lost 6,000 dead, out of a popula-
tion that was much smaller than it is to-
day; it lost nearly 200 dead in 1956,
nearly 700 in 1967, and hundreds more
in the war of attrition that lasted until
1970; 2,800 young Israelis were killed in
the 1973 war and more than 300 in
1982.

That terrible cycle of death and
suflFering must end. The evacuation of
the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) from Beirut and the forceful
demonstration of Israeli capability make
this an altogether unique moment, a mo-
ment of opportunity to end this cycle.
Triumphs of statecraft are decisions
which join opportunity with action. If
this opportunity is allowed to pass, it
may never conie again.

The challenge Israel faces now is to
combine diplomacy with power to build
an enduring political settlement. There
is nothing that says that Palestinian self-
government in association with Jordan
must lead inevitably to a Palestinian
state. The President has said that we
will not support such an outcome. It is
not beyond the reach of diplomacy to
create, nor Israeli military power to in-
sure, that agreed arrangements for the
West Bank will not erode over time.
U.S. determination that concrete, iron-
clad arrangements for the security of
Israel accompany the ultimate resolution
of the Palestinian question is height-
ened, not diminished, by the fact that
we have views on a desirable direction
for the negotiations.

THE SECRETARY

The crucial point is that when it
comes to safeguarding the long-term
security of Israel, the friendship and
resolve of the United States are second
in importance only to Israel's own reso-
lution and strength. And, in the final
analysis, that friendship and resolve
deserve, in return, to be reciprocated by
a willingness to listen with an open mind
to the views of others. But let me be
clear: We have a right to be heard but
we have no intention of using our sup-
port for Israel's security as a way of im-
posing our views.

We must not underestimate the
dilemmas and risks that Israel faces in
opting for negotiations, but they are
dwarfed by those created by a continua-
tion of the status quo. The United States
recognizes its obligations, as the prin-
cipal supporter of Israel's security, to be
understanding of Israel's specific circum-
stances in the negotiating process. The
President has urged consideration of his
proposals in the context of negotiations,
to be undertaken without preconditions
and with no thought of imposed solu-
tions.

That is why the United States par-
ticularly asked that the parties them-
selves not preclude possible outcomes by
concrete and perhaps irreversible actions
undertaken before the process of negoti-
ation is completed. While we support the
right of Jews to live in peace on the
West Bank and Gaza under the duly con-
stituted governmental authority there —
just as Arabs live in Israel— we regard
the continuation of settlement activity
prior to the conclusion of negotiations as
detrimental to the peace process.

The Challenge to the Arabs

The President has offered a fundamental
challenge to the Arabs as well. It is time
for the Arab world to recognize the op-
portunity provided by Camp David. The
path of rejection has achieved nothing
but tragedy, particularly for the Pales-
tinians. Surely, the pattern of agonies of
this capable and courageous people must
not be repeated. Alternatively, the
Camp David process and the President's
fresh start offers a promise of resolution
with honor and justice to those with the
wisdom to join the peace process. But it
also implies a corollary: Those who fail
to join will miss a precious oppor-
tunity— an opportunity for peace that
may not come again soon.

The absence of Jordan and repre-
sentatives of the Palestinian inhabitants
of the occupied territories from the ne-
gotiations has been the crucial missing
link in the Camp David process. Success
in the peace process depends on Arab
support for these vital missing partners
to join the negotiations and become
partners for peace. We trust that sup-
port will be forthcoming soon. Our con-
sultations with the Arab world will be
designed to encourage such support. We
recognize the risks to all parties, but the
risks of failure are even greater. The
Arab nations missed one chance for
peace when they rejected the 1947 U.N.
partition plan. Then, for nearly two
decades, they rejected the legitimacy of
the boundaries within which the Israelis
lived so insecurely prior to 1967. In 1978
they refused to support Egypt when the
Camp David accords were signed. To-
day, the Arabs again have great oppor-
tunities: to move from belligerency to
negotiation to peace; and to work
realistically and practically for the rights
of the Palestinians. But these oppor-
tunities, like the previous ones, will not
last forever.

A "New Realism" for Us All

Thus for the Palestinians and other
Arabs, and for Israel, this is, indeed, the
moment, as the President said, for a
"new realism." An element in that
realism is that the United States has
decided to state publicly where it stands
on critical questions. There will be, as I
have said, no imposed solutions: Any
point agreed by Israel and its Arab
neighbors will not be opposed by us. But
at the same time, the United States is
now obligated, by reality and morality
alike, to make known its views on what
we believe is needed to reach a fair,
workable, and lasting solution. This the
President did on the first of September.
The President's initiative contains firm
American principles; we will not depart
from them. As we move ahead the
United States, as a full partner, will
reserve the right to support positions on
either side when we feel this is likely to
promote fair agreement. And we will
put forward our own proposals when ap-
propriate, to the same end. I reiterate,
however, that no specific negotiated re-
sult is ruled out: That is the essence of
the process.

lesl

We must also recognize another
reality: The positions now held by the
potential partners in negotiations are
widely at variance. The point however it J
this: Any participant in this process— in
eluding the United States as a full part-
ner—is free to have and to enunciate ib
positions. Once views are expressed, th« |^
place, indeed the only place, to thrash
out differences is at the bargaining
table. If there were no differences of
opinion, there would be no need for
negotiations.

The issues are complex, the emo-
tions deep, the forces in the Middle EaaL',
contentious, and the stakes so great.
The wisdom of the peace process must
spring from recognition of these facts.
Bitterness dies hard, while trust grows >
slowly. President Reagan has now set
out the lines of a fair and realistic solu-
tion; together with the other parties we [(
should all come together to discuss and-
negotiate these matters.

There is no need now to agree on
any principle but one: That is the need
to come together at the bargaining tabC"
to talk— to talk about differences; to ta ^
about aspirations; to talk about peace;
but in all events to talk. We ask for
nothing more of any of the participant!!^'
at the beginning of the process. And wi ^
have the deepest duty and obligation t« ^|
ask for no less.

If it takes more time, we are pre-
pared for that. But there are
limits— this opportunity must not be
lost. One hundred and twenty years agAj
Abraham Lincoln, speaking to the Cod ^j
gress of the United States, said that
"The dogmas of the . . . past are inade
quate to the . . . present. The occasion
piled high with difficulty, and we must
rise with the occasion. As our case is
new, so we must think anew and act
anew."

In this spirit, and with the vision,
self-confidence, and mutual trust that
has marked our relationship at its besi
moments, Israel and America— and oi
Arab friends, now and in the future-
can shape a life of dignity, justice, anc
true peace.

'Press release 278 of Sept. 13, 1982. I

Depart nnent of State Buiiel

THE SECRETARY

liddle East Peace Initiative

Sirretary Shultz's statement before
1^' Senate Foreign Relations Committee
hSeptember 10. 1982.^

|im very pleased to have this oppor-
Knity to discuss with you the Admini-
rat ion's recent poHcy steps in the Mid-
:■ (-"ast. We have begun actions of a
\(ii' range and of immense importance.
le pdsitive bipartisan support for
iesident Reagan's peace initiative has
ten evident to us and is deeply appreci-
£»d. That support is essential to the
cnduct of a vigorous and creative
i-eign policy and, accordingly, I deeply
s predate your willingness to meet with
r' on short notice.

A little over 2 months ago, I came
tfore you as a nominee for Secretary of
Site. In those hearings, we were all
( arly concerned about the problems
{ jsented by the Middle East and the
I lestinian issues in particular. I empha-
sed then our efforts to secure a cease-
i i in Lebanon, as the first step toward
( r goal of a united, sovereign Lebanon,
1 'ed from foreign forces. I also empha-
E ed the importance of Israeli security
i d overall peace, while recognizing the
1 itimate rights of the Palestinians and
1 ?ir just requirements.

Since then, not just your attention
\ t the world's attention was focused on
t ' Middle East and particularly on our
'( ilomatic efforts there to end the blood-
s id and to bring a deeper and lasting
1 ice to the area. With the successful
< icuation of the Palestine Liberation
( ganization (PLO) from Beirut, we
i ve turned to the next steps necessary
1 • peace: the withdrawal of all foreign
i -ces from Lebanon and the restoration
« central authority in that country and,
( prime importance, the reinvigoration
the Camp David peace process in an
ort to resolve fairly the underlying
ab-Israeli dispute.

Lebanon, of course, has suffered
ievously over the last several months,
alone the last several years. Phil
ibib's [President's special emissary to
3 Middle East] and Morris Draper's
)ecial negotiator for Lebanon] success-
' negotiation of the withdrawal of the
^0 from Beirut established the first
ase of our approach to the problem of
tenon. The U.S. Marine contingent in
e multinational force completed its

withdrawal from Beirut at 2:00 this
morning, well within the 30-day period
the President specified in his notification
to you. The French and Italian contin-
gents will begin their withdrawal soon.
■The Government of Lebanon, mean-
while, is working carefully but surely to
reestablish authority over all parts of
Beirut, with the Lebanese Army and
police increasingly assuming security re-
sponsibilities in the city.

The Next Step

A second phase in our Lebanon
diplomacy is now before us. As all of
you know, the Presdent is sending Am-
bassador Draper to Lebanon to begin
negotiations on withdrawal of foreign
forces from that country. The President
has made it clear that he personally in-
tends to stay fully engaged in efforts to
bring about a strong, free, united, and
healthy Lebanon, sovereign throughout
all its territories within internationally
recognized borders. The withdrawal of
all foreign military forces from Lebanon
must be accompanied by the creation of
conditions in southern Lebanon to pre-
serve Israeli security. In the immediate
future, we will seek a further stabiliza-
tion in the situation in Beirut. We must
create an environment in Lebanon that
will allow the newly elected Lebanese
Government — free of outside pressure
or imposed solutions — to carry on with
its task of national reconciliation. The
desperate need for economic reconstruc-
tion can be well served through such re-
conciliation and the withdrawal of
foreign forces.

The United States is a staunch
friend of the Lebanese people and will
be a good partner in Lebanon's courage-
ous effort to rebuild its economy and to
strengthen its national institutions. We
will exercise our responsibility and duty
to give every opportunity to the
Lebanese themselves to recreate a
united but pluralistic society behind
strong leadership from their newly
elected president. We also look forward
to cooperating with appropriate interna-
tional institutions in the effort to ameli-
orate the destruction caused by the long
and most unfortunate fighting.

These efforts to rebuild Lebanon and
strengthen its institutions can only be
helped by progress in the overall search
for a Middle East peace. The problems

of Lebanon are distinct and must be ad-
dressed whenever possible separately
from our Middle East peace initiative,
but both tasks must be carried on with-
out delay. The President will, therefore,
dispatch Ambassador Draper to
Lebanon this weekend, while we also
continue to work on the overall peace
initiative.

U.S Initiative

When I was before you in the confir-
mation hearings, I noted our commit-
ment to solving the Palestinian problem
within the Camp David framework.
Right after your vote to report my
nomination favorably to the full Senate,
the President instructed me that he
wished high priority be placed on ad-
dressing the underlying Arab-Israeli
dispute, especially the Palestinian issues.

The President's statement last week
began a fresh start on the Arab-Israeli
dispute. The fundamental problems in-
volved are of universal concern not just
to the people of the region but to the
United States and other countries as
well. The events of the last month have
demonstrated that we Americans have a
special responsibility in the efforts to
bring peace to the area. No one else has
the credibility — and therefore the
ability — to provide the crucial link to all
sides.

The President's Middle East peace
initiative is based on an intensive and
detailed review of the problem. We have
discussed the issues in detail with
members of this committee and others
in the Congress, with former govern-
ment officials, and many other knowl-
edgeable people. The paramount conclu-
sions of that review are that (1) it is
time to address, forcefully and directly,
the underlying Palestinian issues, and (2)
genuine success depends upon broaden-
ing participation in the negotiations to
include, as envisaged in the Camp David
accords, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the
representatives of the Palestinian
people.

In taking this initiative, the Presi-
dent established two conditions — we will
remain fully committed to both the prin-
ciples of the Camp David accords and to
the security of Israel. The Camp David
framework has one key element that all

itober1982

THE SECRETARY

other peace plans lack: It has been suc-
cessful. It produced the only treaty of
peace between Israel and an Arab coun-
try and the completion of the disengage-
ment and return of the Sinai. Moreover,
the Camp David framework has the
necessary room for negotiations to fulfill
the legitimate rights of the Palestinian
people and to reach peace treaties be-
tween Israel and its neighbors. As Presi-
dent Carter said a week ago, "There is
absolutely nothing in the President's
speech . . . nor in the information he
sent to the Israelis which is contrary to
either the letter or the spirit of Camp
David. It is absolutely compatible with
the Camp David agreement." Our initia-
tive will give the provisions of Camp
David their full meaning and a new
dynamism.

This renewed dynamism for the
Camp David negotiations will insure
Israeli security, and we emphatically will
require the product of the negotiations
to do so. As the President's speech
noted, this country, this Administration,
and the President personally are com-
mitted to Israel's security. This same re-
newed dynamism also will provide ap-
propriate regard to the "legitimate
rights of the Palestinian people and their
just requirements." Camp David itself
calls for the residents of the West Bank
and Gaza and other Palestinians as
agreed to participate in negotiating the
two primary means of achieving those
rights — a 5-year transitional period of
autonomous self-government and final
status after the 5-year transitional
period. By renewing the process, we
seek to fulfill the hope of Camp David:
Israel and its neighbors, Jordan, Egypt,
and the Palestinians, engaged in fair,
direct, and successful negotiations on
how they will all live together.

The Camp David accords provide
that these negotiated arrangements on
final status must be "just, comprehen-
sive, . . . durable," and "based on Securi-
ty Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all
their parts." Security Council Resolution
242 sets forth the two key principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces
from territories occupied. . . .

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of
belligerency and respect for and acknowl-
edgement of the sovereignty, territorial in-
tegrity and political independence of every
State in the area and their right to live in
peace within secure and recognized boun-
daries free from threats or acts of force.

As it has often been summarized,
peace for territory.

We believe these principles apply on
all fronts, but our position on the extent
of withdrawal will be significantly in-
fluenced by the extent and nature of the
peace and security arrangements being
offered in return. Israel, Jordan, Egypt,
and the elected representatives of the in-
habitants of the West Bank and Gaza
will negotiate the final boundaries,
recognizing Palestinian legitimate rights,
and securing what Resolution 338 calls a
"just and durable peace." We will sup-
port positions in those negotiations
which we believe are fair. Those posi-
tions include:

Israeli Sovereignty/Palestinian
State. It is the President's belief that
the Palestinian problem cannot be re-
solved through Israeli sovereignty or
control over the West Bank and Gaza.
Accordingly, we will not support such a
solution. We will also not support the
formation of a Palestinian state in those
negotiations. There is no foundation of
political support in Israel or in the
United States for such a solution and
peace cannot be achieved by that route.
The preference we will pursue in the
final status negotiations is some form of
association of the West Bank and Gaza
with Jordan.

Self-Determination. In the Middle
East context, the term "self-deter-
mination" has been identified exclusively
with the formation of a Palestinian
state. We will not support this definition
of self-determination. We do believe that
the Palestinians must take a leading role
in determining their own future and ful-
ly support the provision in the Camp
David agreement providing for the
elected representatives of the inhabi-
tants of the West Bank and Gaza to
decide how they shall govern themselves
consistent with the provisions of their
agreement in the final status negotia-
tions.

Jerusalem. We will fully support the
position that Jerusalem must be undivid-
ed and that its status must be deter-
mined through negotiations. We do not
recognize unilateral acts with respect to
final status issues.

Settlements. The status of Israeli
settlements must be determined in the
course of the final status negotiations.
We will not support their continuation
as extraterritorial outposts, but neither
will we support efl'orts to deny Jews the
opportunity to live in the West Bank
and Gaza under the duly constituted
governmental authority there, as Arabs
live in Israel.

Negotiations on the final status of
the area will not start until a self-
governing authority for the territories j
firmly in place. Negotiations about the
transitional phase have been in progresf"'
for the last 3 years. In those negotia-
tions we have consistently expressed OB *
views to our negotiating partners, Isra« *'
and Egypt, as issues arose. Most recent "
ly, we informed our partners of how
these separate expressions fit into our
overall view of Palestinian self-govern-
ment during a transitional period.

In our view, the objective of the
transitional period is the peaceful and
orderly transfer of authority from Isra* "
to the Palestinian inhabitants, while in-
suring that all necessary measures are
taken to assure Israeli security.

We have emphasized that this perio
is transitional, not final, and that, there ^
fore, the provisions relating to it should *^
not prejudice the final status. In light c
those views, we have told our partners
that we have supported and will con-
tinue to support:

• The definition of full autonomy
giving the Palestinian inhabitants real
authority over themselves, the land, arj^f
its resources subject to fair safeguards
on water;

• The inclusion of economic, com-
mercial, social, and cultural ties among|(]
the West Bank, Gaza, and Jordan;

• Participation by the Palestinian
habitants of east Jerusalem in the elec
tion for the West Bank/Gaza authority
and

• Progressive Palestinian respon-
sibilty for internal security based on
capability and performance.

Using those same standards, we
have opposed and will continue to op-
pose:

• Dismantlement of existing settle
ments; and

• Provisions which represent a
threat to Israel's security.

As the President noted in his
speech, we are attempting to reinvigo
ate the autonomy negotiations. That
effort would be assisted to a great ex-
tent by a freeze of the Israeli settle-
ments in the occupied territories, whic
was requested during the Camp David
negotiations. Our concern is not with
their legality or illegality but with thei
effects on the peace process.

The President's initiative follows
over 3 years of active negotiations, co
tinuous discussions of the issues invob
over the same period, and, most recer|?i(
ly, two trips to the Middle East by th« fc

Department of State Bullel

sot

irid

THE SECRETARY

icretary of State this year and addi-
mal trips by Ambassador Fairbanks
jecial negotiator for the Middle East
ace process] and by others wortcing on
e negotiations. We have put these
las in some detail to the Israelis and
e key Arab states, including Jordan
liid Egypt. They are now examining the
ijoposals. It would be surprising if they
I ed or disliked all of them. We have
jceived reactions from some of our in-
trlocutors. We are studying those reac-
l)ns. We confidently expect to continue
( r discussions, with the Israelis, with
(e Arab countries, and with other
lendly governments.

The President has now articulated a
lasonable basis for a negotiated com-
jomise among the parties. We em-
I asize that any agreement must be
ised on the free give-and-take of the
I gotiating process. We do not
J arantee to any party the outcome of
t i negotiations on any issue. The Presi-
cnt has now stated publicly some U.S.
I sitions on key issues. We now call for
t i parties contemplated by the Camp
] vid agreement to join us in seeking
{ ice.

1 ne for Quiet Diplomacy

:I '. Chairman [Senator Charles H. Per-
c , I am very grateful for the words of
t jport and encouragement that you
I d the members of this committee have
i en. Your emphasis in several inter-
■\ ws on the deep yearning for peace in
t ! countries and peoples of this area;
i nator Cranston's and Senator Bosch-
V ;z's support for the effort to broaden
t ^ process and involve the Jordanians
B 1 representatives of the Palestinians;
i 1 Senator Mathias' emphasis on the
i id for all to address this problem ob-
I tively are indications that the Con-
I ;ss and the Administration are
;ether, focused on this essential task,
you put it, "There just isn't an alter-
;ive for finding a basis for lasting
ace. . . . Think what could happen to
s area in the Middle East if peace is
md, and a basis for working together
:h its Arab neighbors is found by
ael and its Arab neighbors."
We now have the initial formal reac-
ns from the Israeli Government and
; Arab League summit. The Israeli
vernment, supported by a vote of the
esset, has opposed the President's
)posals. While not directly addressing
! President's proposals, the Arab
ague summit has put forward its own
)posals, key elements of which are at

tober1982

variance with our proposals. The Presi-
dent stands firmly behind his proposals.
The reactions of the Israeli Government
and of the Arab League are clear and
graphic evidence that the position of
both sides must be negotiated if we are
to bring genuine peace and security to
this troubled region.

The opening positions have been an-
nounced. Now is the time for quiet
diplomacy to pursue the President's initi-
ative and bring it to fruition.

In launching this initiative, the
President determined that he would stay
fully involved and fully committed to the
principles he enunciated. We will be
working hard over the next weeks in
light of the new dynamic the initiative
introduces to bring the peace process
forward. I pledge to you that we will be
exercising the creativity, the per-

sistence, and the dogged determination
to succeed which marked the successful
effort in Beirut. I also emphasize to you
that we recognize that our effort is to
bring a lasting, effective, and just peace
to this area. That goal can hardly be ac-
complished in a few short weeks. We
ask you to stay with the President in his
determination to sustain this effort and
to look for the long-term, just solution.
We believe, deeply and purposefully,
that peace can come between Arabs and
Jews. No greater purpose can be placed
before us all than a just and lasting
peace.

'Press release 277. The complete
transcript of the hearings will be published
by the committee and will be available from
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C. 20402. ■

Secretary Interviewed on
"Meet the Press"

Secretary Shultz was interviewed on
NBC-TV's "Meet the Press" on
August 22, 1982. by Bill Monroe,
moderator; Marvin Kalb, NBC News;
Rowland Evans, The Chicago Sun
Times; Karen Elliott House, The
Wall Street Journal; and Bernard
Gwertzman, The New York Times.'

Q. This is the second day of the
Palestinian evacuation from west
Beirut, and there appears to be a prob-
lem. The latest reports have two
Israeli gunboats blocking the con-
tinued evacuation of the Palestinians,
claiming that the Palestinians have
loaded 10 jeeps and rocket-propelled
grenade launchers onto the boats, and
they say that's not allowed by the
agreement. Is the holdup still in ef-
fect?

A. The last I know, it is still in ef-
fect.

Q. What are you going to do about
it?

A. Phil Habib [Ambassador Philip
C. Habib, the President's special
emissary to the Middle East] is working
on it. It's not the first problem that he's
had, I'm sure it won't be the last, and
we expect it to get resolved.

Q. Do you expect it to get resolved
today?

A. I should think so, yes.

Q. What does this suggest to you
about the incredible delicacy of the
operation in which you're involved?

A. It is a delicate operation. There
are all sorts of things that can go
wrong, but so far it's gone off quite well.

Q. Quite well, and yet a problem
on the second day?

A. Oh, well, there are problems on
the first day; there are problems all
along. The question is whether or not
you have the capacity and willpower and
cooperation to resolve the problems.
There are always going to be problems.

Q. Are you confident that the
evacuation will be completed on
schedule?

A. I certainly expect it to be and
hope it will be.

Q. I'm rather surprised at the
mildness of your response to the first
question. You imply that Phil Habib is
a miracle worker, that he can solve
this, but isn't it a fact that it took the
President of the United States to solve
the question of the Israeli bombard-
ment of Beirut? Phil Habib didn't
solve that. It took the President. Don't
you think this situation might become
serious enough to engage the Presi-
dent of the United States?

A. No, I don't. I think that Phil will
work this out. There are all kinds of

THE SECRETARY

things that can be developed to get
through this problem, and there is
nothing in this situation that needs to
directly involve the President. The Presi-
dent is aware of what's going on, of
course, but this is something to be han-
dled by the people in the field.

Q. Let me ask you a different
question, and that is a very long state-
ment by the President of Egypt today
published in The Washington Post.
Mubarak said: "The right of the
Israeli people to live in their country
does not contradict the right of the
Palestinian people to live in their
country." Uo you agree with that as a
general starting point for trying to get
Camp David back on the track?

A. I read President Mubarak's arti-
cle, and I thought it was a very con-
structive contribution to discussion on
this issue and, I think, gave a good in-
dication of his own attitude toward mov-
ing these discussions along. Precisely
what position various people will take on
that question, among others, remains to
be seen. But I do think that the
establishment of a situation where the
Palestinian people can have some sense
of dignity and control over their lives is
very important and an essential part of
any agreement.

Q. You're not going to tell us
whether you agree with that state-
ment by Mr. Mubarak?

A. Not categoriciilly yes or no to
the various questions you might ask me.

Q. You said yourself in your
testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee several weeks
ago: "The legitimate needs ... of the
Palestinian people must be
addressed ... in all their dimensions."
Is self-determination one of those
dimensions, and, if it is, do they have
the same right as the Jewish people
had to set up the State of Israel?

A. Certainly they should have a
part in determining the conditions under
which they're governed. The word self-
determination .somehow in this word
game in the Middle East, I've dis-
covered, has come to be the equivalent
of a Palestinian state, which has a lot of
implications about military forces and
many other things, so I'm not going to
bite on that one, but rather say that the
main point is that the Palestinian people
have a voice in determining the condi-
ti(ms under which they're governed.

Q. You said in your press con-
ference that there is a lot of room for
flexibility in the language of Camp

David. Are there points of dispute be-
tween Kgypt and Israel in the
autonomy talks where you think an
addition of American views would be
helpful, and, if so, what are they?

A. I think that as this process
resumes — and I think we have to bear in
mind it's been pretty much stopped for
some period of time now — we will be
putting forward views, others will be,
and as I see it there is a delicate in-
terplay between, you might say,
substance and process here. So we'll
want to be trying as best we can to
manage that from our standpoint in a
way designed to give a constructive
result.

Q. One of the areas of dispute has
been what would be the potential for a
final solution on the West Bank.

A. Yes.

Q. And Israel has made it very
clear that while Camp David says that
the process is based on U.N. Resolu-
tion 242 that they do not interpret
that resolution to mean that Israel
must withdraw from that territory. Do
we interpret 242 to mean that Israel
must withdraw from some of the West
Bank and Gaza or all?

A. I should think so, yes.

Q. Why hasn't anyone in this Ad-
ministration said that?

A. I think that's been said.

Q. Can you say it today?

A. I've said it just now.

Q. That we do believe it means
withdrawal?

A. I think 242 has that implication
in it, myself. That's a matter of inter-
pretation, no doubt, and various points
of view have been taken. Having said
that leaves still lots of room for negotia-
tion. The language of Camp David itself,
I think when you read it, obviously can
be interpreted many ways, but certainly
one of those ways is that some shift in
what are the practical borders now will
take place.

Q. Do you believe that you can get
those talks going again between
Egypt and Israel, or do you have to
get some broader Arab participation
before the Egyptians are willing to
return.

A. We'll have to see what we can
bring about in this process, and I don't
want to make a forecast, but ob-
viously— I would say obviously — for
there to be a genuine peaceful outcome

that is widely accepted in the region
there have to be more countries involved^,'
than Egypt, Israel, and the United
States.

Q. Yesterday you had a meeting
with a number of experts on the
Soviet Union. I'd like to ask you about
some aspects of policy toward the
Soviet Union. There has been talk
before of a possible summit — perhaps
by the end of this year — between
President Reagan and President
Brezhnev. Do you think this is at all
likely or should be sought?

A. It depends upon whether or not
there are some identifiable constructive L
results to be obtained from the summit,
and if there are, then probably it would
be constructive. If not, I don't really see
that there is that much point in it. And
believe that's been the President's posi-
tion all along.

Q. Do you plan to discuss this
possibility with Mr. Gromyko at the
United Nations this fall?

A. I hope to meet Mr. Gromyko in
the United Nations — expect to —
although there hasn't been any time
worked out, and quite possibly the sub- ^
ject might come up.

Q. On another area of Soviet-
American difficulties which involves
the allies, it's the question of
American sanctions against the SovieLj
Union over Poland. You yourself hav' L]
written, before you took office, of
course, that such sanctions are hardi
likely to be successfully used as a
lever against the Soviet Union. Have
you changed your position any, or ar
you trying to educate the Administra
tion along your position?

A. When you read that, it soundec
like the word "such" was describing or
referring to the sanctions that Preside:
Reagan has impo.sed. That wasn't the
case. That article was written several
years ago and was referring to some
other sanctions that were put on, take)
off, put on, taken off, back and forth ii
a matter of a few months and that I
labeled light-switch diplomacy and said
wouldn't work.

In the case of the sanctions impose
by President Reagan, they have had a
very broad purpose, particularly focus-
ing on Poland, but other similar things
that the Soviet Union — Soviet Union
behavior, and I fully support the idea (
expressing ourselves in this manner

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THE SECRETARY

Q. But do you see any way of
esolving this growing dispute with
he allies over this question, barring a
elaxation of tensions in Poland?

A. That is the way we would hope it
I'ould occur.

Q. Do you regard Israel, in light
tf what has happened in Beirut, as a
rue and trusted friend and ally of the
Jnited States?

A. Oh, yes, and I believe that we
nust, in all of the things that we do, be
Iways cognizant and careful about the
ecurity of Israel.

Q. On Saudi Arabia, there have
een a number of reports in the last 2
lonths that King Fahd or some other
laudi leaders have hinted about a
k'ithdrawal of the very substantial
iaudi financial assets in the United
tates. Do you know whether that's
rue?

A. No, I don't. There hasn't been
ny evidence of such a withdrawal.

Q. Has there been any kind of
/arning or threat from the Saudis on
his issue?

A. I've read some in the news-
apers, but I haven't— nothing has come
irectly to me in any official way.

Q. On the Mubarak statement,
gain, in The Washington Post today,
ou've called it very constructive, and
et the Egyptian President said that it
'ould be "most difficult for Egypt to
esume the autonomy talks or revive
tie peace process," and then he cited
iree preconditions: "Unless first the
' nited States recognizes the right of
'■ le Palestinians to self-determina-
' on" — and he's quite specific that it
lust take place in the West Bank and
ie Gaza Strip. Are you going to be
ble to move it on that one point?

A. I'm sure we'll want to talk with
resident Mubarak directly and others
hdut their views and what it takes to
et this process moving, and I think that
'e'll be able to do it.

Q. You seemed to make an assump-
ion in answer to another question
liat you already have Egypt and Israel
nd you're seeking others for the
utonomy talks. This—

A. No, I said that for the kind of
esult that we would all like to see out
tiere take place, you have to have more
arties to it than the three countries.

Q. Do you right now have in your
lind even a general plan on how
ou're going to proceed on the
utonomv talks?

ctober1982

A. We've thought about it a lot, and
we've heard a lot of advice from people,
so I suppose it's fair enough to say that
there are general ideas that we have in
our minds. But we're not freezing onto
anything, because, as I said in response
to an earlier question, I think success
here involves a sort of delicate interplay
between the processes that are involved
and the substance that you're trying to
achieve.

Q. At the end of the framework,
the general idea that you have in
mind, is there a homeland for the
Palestinian people on the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip?

A. Certainly that is a place that
many of them call home and a place that
they'll live, and they should have a par-
ticipation in determining the conditions
under which they live.

Q. Can I assume that the answer
is yes to that question?

A. I tried to give an answer in my
own words.

Q. You said recently that the
Israeli settlements in the West Bank
"have not reached a conclusion," but,
you said, they are not constructive.
Have you told Mr. Begin that you
want the Israelis to stop creating new
settlements— Jewish settlements— on
the West Bank?

A. I'm the new man on the block
here and I've been struggling with the
Beirut problem. I did respond to that
question yesterday at the press con-
ference— or day before yesterday — hav-
ing thought about it quite a bit and hav-
ing listened to the President talk about
it. I believe my response was that I'd
heard the President say that whether
the settlements were legal or illegal,
they were not constructive.

Q. You've also said "I am a quiet
person, but I do believe in saying
what I think." Could you tell us what
you think about Israeli settlements on
the West Bank?

A. I agree with the President.

Q. You have said you hate to
see — you used the word hate — the
Israeli Government fire all those
mayors of Palestinian cities and towns
on the West Bank. Have you ex-
pressed that sentiment to the Israeli
Government?

A. I have expressed myself publicly
several times, I think, in my confir-
mation hearings, and I have expressed
myself privately. I'm just trying to recall
literally whether I said that in so many

words to an official of the Israeli
Government, and I can't recall precisely
whether I have, but I certainly do feel
that way — that these are people who
achieved a certain legitimacy as rep-
resentatives of Palestinians living on the
West Bank, and one of the things that
we're looking for, we must be looking
for if this negotiation is to succeed, is
Palestinians who are legitimate to repre-
sent them.

Q. Do you think that the Israeli
Government has any right, as an
occupying power, to prevent the
Mayor of Bethlehem, who is not a
member of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), is not even very
enthusiastic about the PLO, from
apearing on this program that you're
on today?

A. I think it's unfortunate that that
took place.

Q. Why is it unfortunate?

A. Because he should be allowed to
come and express his views. I think we
all gain from an open expression of
views, and that's a person who has
some.

Q. Is that worth following up?

A. There's no reason to shut that

Q. Is that worth following up as
Secretary of State?

A. There are many things worth
following up. I don't want to have a tone
left in the interchange between you and
me that all of the problems here repre-
sent problems created by Isreal. There
are many problems in the area, and
you've identified some of them. There
are many others. There are a lot of
violations of the cease-fire taking place
by the Palestinians in Lebanon right
now that I don't consider to be very con-
structive under the circumstances. So
we can go and list a lot of things that
we would rather see not happen.

Q. We're jerking you around the
world, but I would like to jerk you
back to the Soviet Union.

A. Sounds like my normal day in
the State Department.

Q. As we all know, the Soviets are
in the middle of a succession struggle.
Are there any economic and political
issues between us and the Soviets that
you believe will affect the outcome of
that struggle?

A. I wouldn't think so. I find, after
listening to experts talk about how that
may come out, that they don't know
much more about it than I do, which is
not much.

THE SECRETARY

Q. A year from now, w hat would
you like to have accomplished as
Secretary of State or as the
President's spokesman on foreign
policy?

A. I think that the big objectives
have to do with peace, with justice
around the world, and there are many
troublesome areas that we have an in-
terest in, in which we would like to see
that achieved. Certainly, the area of
arms control and the problem of nuclear
proliferation I think are tremendous
sorts of mankind-level problems that we
should address ourselves to. So those
are two general subjects that I think are
terribly important. Beyond that, on the
world economic scene, we have a danger
that the rise of protection all around the
world will gradually change and erode
the rules of the game in trade that have
been responsible for the huge increase in
world trade and a great benefit to all
countries. I think it's very important to
fight against this and try to maintain
the openness of trade and investment
around the world, and I intend to give a
lot of attention to that.

Q. What are you prepared to do to
avoid that?

A. We want to identify the prob-
lems and try to meet them and create a
sense of new objectives that will further
open the way. Whether we can get any
real momentum going at the GATT
[General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade] ministerial in November remains
to be seen, but that is one place where
I'm sure the U.S. representatives will
register these views.

Q. You said earlier that you inter-
preted 242 as meaning Israel had to
make some withdrawals, but, of
course, the ("amp David agreement
tries to, I think, finesse this question
by setting up an interim Palestinian
autonomy for .5 years and then a nego-
tiation on the ultimate outcome of the
whole area. I just wanted to make
sure that you weren't trying to in-
dicate a desire to revise that basic
principle of the Camp David frame-
work agreement.

A. Not a bit. I think the Camp
David framework, as I read it and have
heard about the background of it —
Resolutions 242 and 3.SH are ample bases
and good bases for any ongoing negotia-
tion. What they do, I think, is make
these questions that you've raised open
questions and open for negotiation.

JA.

Q. On the question of PLO
recognition, which has been a sore
point. Dr. Kissinger in 1975 said the
United States would not recognize or
negotiate with the PLO until it met
certain conditions, such as the right of
Israel to exist. Now, certainly the
United States has been negotiating
with the PLO, albeit indirectly, over
the last 2 months. The Kissinger
statement did not seem to make a
distinction between indirect or direct.
I just wondered if you think it's worth
maintaining that agreement, which, of
course, arouses emotions in Israel and
elsewhere, when, in fact, it's really
been breached in the literal sense of
negotiation.

A. 1 think that the President's posi-
tion on this has been well stated, and
we'll maintain it and I think it's impor-
tant to maintain it. It isn't vitiated in
any way by the practical fact that if you
are, for example, going to be successful
in having the PLO depart from west
Beirut under these circumstances, you
have to have some method of being in
touch with them. The way that it has
been done is Phil has talked to various
representatives of the Government of
Lebanon, and they've talked to the PLO
leaders and so forth, as you know.

Q. Can we expect you to name a
chief negotiator on these broad ques-
tions of Palestinian autonomy or other
things in the near future, someone of
the stature of Dr. Kissinger or some-
thing like that?

A. It remains to be seen just how
we think the best way will be to conduct
the U.S. aspect of these negotiations.
We do have Ambassador [Richard]

Fairbanks who's helping me on this and
who's very knowledgeable.

Q. Let me get back for a moment
to the situation now existing in Beirut
with Israeli gunboats blocking the
departure of a ship containing Pales-
tinian refugees because, according to
the report we heard earlier, there
were jeeps aboard and some kind of
weapons — rocket launchers or grenade
launchers. Does your information con
firm that report?

A. Yes.

lb,
Q. There are jeeps aboard and

weapons aboard?

A. Jeeps aboard, and it is said by
the Israelis that there are, I think,
shoulder-held-type weapons, which I sup^lo
pose one can argue whether they're per-
sonal weapons or crew-type weapons. So W
here we have some issues that are
perhaps on the borderline of what the
agreement envisages as prohibited and
allowed weapons.

Q. One side has brought jeeps andi
possibly weapons aboard; the other
side is holding up the evacuation us-
ing gunboats. Is either side in viola-
tion of the Habib agreement?

A. Let's not play this up like it's a
big issue that's going to bring down the
world. It's a problem, and Phil Habib is
working on it. As I said earlier, this is
not the first problem that he's run into
and it's not going to be the last, I'm
sure. You said do I think he's a magi-
cian? Yes, he's a magician. He is terrific
a great American, and we all owe him .■^ir
wonderful debt of thanks.

'Press release 260 of Aug. 24. 1982.

Secretary Interviewed on
"Face the Nation"

Secretary Shullz was interviewed on
CBS-TV's "Face the Nation" cm.
September 5, 1982, by George Herman.
CBS News; Leslie Stalh, CBS News; and
Robert Pierpoint, CBS News. '

Q. Various Israeli and Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) forces
rumbling around in parts of Lebanon
outside of Beirut have raised some
predictions of new fighting in that
country. Do you expect new battles in
Lebanon? And if they should occur,
would the U.S. Marines still leave as
scheduled?

A. The Marines will leave as sched
uled. We certainly hope there isn't new
fighting. There are many armed people
in the area, so it's always a possibility
On the other hand. 1 think that
everyone, perhaps, is ready for peace a
this point.

Q. You say you hope there will b
no further fighting and expect, I
gather, that there will be no further
fighting in Lebanon. What do you
think is the expectable future for
those PLO forces still there? How is
that problem to be solved?

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THE SECRETARY

A. Either they have to lay down
their arms and make themselves subject
to the authority of the Government of
Lebanon or leave.

Q. But what if they don't? Then
we have more of a conflagfration. And
what next?

A. Our effort, of course, and desire
is to see the emergence of a strong cen-
tral Government of Lebanon, and every-
one has expressed that view. We're do-
ing it as other countries are. A strong
central Government of Lebanon will be
able to control situations in its own
jountry.

Q. But wasn't one of the reasons
for sending the U.S Marines in there
to assure that there would be a stabili-
sation and the imposition of a strong
Lebanese Government?

A. The multinational force has had
is its purpose the safe evacuation of the
'ighters — Syrian and Palestinian — in
vest Beirut and the emergence of stable
•onditions in the area, particularly look-
up- tdward the families of the fighters
villi were there and trying to get the
>elianese forces in charge. By and large,
hat has gone well, and we expect that
he Marines will leave probably around
September 10.

Q. Does the U.S. Government
avor a peace treaty signed between
..ebanon and Israel, and do you think
hat is possible, given the situation in
>ebanon?

A. I think it's possible; I think it's
esirable. We're in favor of it if it comes
bout in the right way — that is there
as to be a strong central Government
f Lebanon that has control of the coun-
ry, that has the people behind it, and
hen it's a government that has to decide
ir itself how it wants to conduct its
ireign affairs. Personally, I think it
-'ould be very desirable for such a
overnment to make peace with Israel.

Q. That goes on to the next issue
f peace between Israel and the Pales-
inians and President Reagan's pro-
osals this week. Let me ask you, first
f all, the Israeli Cabinet has today
nnounced that it will formally reject
he President's proposals; it is going
9 dispatch a letter from Prime
linister Begin to the President doing
0. It seems to me that puts President
leagan in a difficult position now.
Jow that he has been rejected in
everal different approaches to Prime
linister Begin, what is he going to
10? Is he going to put any pressure on
he Israelis?

Bl »ctober1982

A. I think there is a tremendous
pressure not only on the Israelis but on
the Arabs in the area, and it is pressure
that is reflected in the response to the
President's proposals. That pressure
comes from the possibility of peace and
what peace can mean in that region, as
it means anywhere. It is a prospect of
tremendous importance not only to the
security of Israel and Israel's neighbors
but also to the development of their
economic, social, and cultural well-being.
So it is a tremendously important objec-
tive, and I think it is the objective that
the President will be holding out in front
of the Israelis and the Arabs alike as the
reason v/hy they should be taking action.

Q. Is there any chance, though,
that the State Department, the Presi-
dent, will try to use American aid to
pressure them, specifically the send-
ing eventually of the F-16 fighters?
And secondly, are the Israelis trying
to bargain with you over that by with-
holding military intelligence infor-
mation in exchange for the F-16s?

A. Our emphasis will be, as I said,
on the importance of peace. I think
that's a tremendous pressure. "Pressure"
isn't the right word; it's a tremendous
objective that people have.

Q. Are you saying that you won't
deny that you might use the with-
holding of aid?

A. We don't have any plans to try
to maneuver people in a peace negotia-
tion by talking about withholding aid or
anything like that. I think the emphasis
has to be on the positive side of this,
and that's where it has to be.

Q. Could you not even make it
more positive? Last Monday at an
evening briefing, a senior official of
your Department did not consider that
that was the way to go, putting pres-
sures— economic or military — on
Israel.

A. I think that's right. I think that
senior official hit it right on the head.

Q. So you are ruling it out. the
use of —

A. I'm saying that the objective of
peace is so important that when that is
fully realized — and, of course, I think it
will make a critical difference whether
or not King Hussein and other Arabs
respond favorably to the President's ini-
tiative— then the prospect of peace with
neighbors becomes much more real.

Q. What do you expect will
happen tomorrow when the Arab
leaders meet in Fez, Morocco, to
discuss this very issue? As you may

know, both King Hussein's brother.
Prince Hassan, and the President of
Sudan — President Nimeiri — have, in
effect, endorsed Mr. Reagan's pro-
posals, but that doesn't mean that the
PLO, which is still the spokesman for
its own cause, will buy it. What is go-
ing to happen tomorrow?

A. I am a believer in letting other
people speak for themselves.

Q. What do you think the impor-
tance of the PLO is right now? Are
they a force that must absolutely be
dealt with in this situation, or, as a
political entity, have they been ren-
dered virtually impotent?

A. Obviously, the Palestinian issue
is very much with us, and they are seen
as part of that issue and standing for it,
to a certain extent. I think as a military
force, they have been reduced drastically
in importance. The support that they
were getting from the Russians was just
not there. I think also, even more pro-
foundly, that the pattern that they have
represented of terror, of violence as a
way of doing something for the Palestin-
ian cause, has been shown not to work.

What we have as a result of that is a
tremendous number of people who have
been killed, who have been wounded,
who have been made homeless. So I
would hope that the leaders of the PLO
and everyone in the area will start look-
ing at the peace initiatives and the peace
process rather than the violence and war
process as the answer.

Q. But as to the question in the
sort of jargon of the State Department
and of the diplomats, does the PLO
have legitimacy as leaders of the
Palestinian people?

A. As far as the United States is
concerned, the President has made very
clear on numerous occasions, most
recently in his last press conference, the
conditions under which we would be will-
ing to talk to the PLO. Until those con-
ditions are met, we are not willing to
talk to them.

Q. There are some analysts who
say that what [PLO Chairman Yasir]
Arafat does and what he tries to put
forth no longer is a factor in the Mid-
dle East. Other people say that he has
become more of a factor and that he is
now the central figure in all of this in
what happens to the President's plan.
What is your analysis of it? Is he more
powerful politically than he was or
not?

THE SECRETARY

A. My analysis of it is that, if King
Hussein decides to come forward in
these negotiations, that will represent a
general consensus on the part of the
Arab leaders that it's time to do that
and a good thing to do that. Just what
complexion of debate and discussion and
who says what and whose vote counts
more than somebody else's vote, I
wouldn't speculate on.

No doubt the views of the PLO are
going to be taken into account. The
Arabs have all said so, so I assume that
they will.

Q. We're talking about pressures
on the Israeli Government. There is a
theory that the President's proposals
are parallel to and very close to those
of the Labor Party— Mr. Begin's op-
position in Israel. In fact, the Labor
Party appears to have endorsed the
President's proposals. Was this not
somewhat of a Machiavellian plot on
the part of the Reagan Administration
to get Mr. Begin out of power?

A. No, absolutely not. The construc-
tion of the Government of Israel and
who is to represent the people of Israel
is the busines of the people of Israel. We
do not have any views about that. That's
their business, not our business. The
President's proposals were designed to
put forward things that he thought were
just and fair and likely to help bring
about a negotiation and a peaceful result
in the area. That was the standard by
which he judged what he should put for-
ward.

Q. In that aforementioned briefing
by the senior State Department of-
ficial, the senior official said "Be
careful how you define the West Bank
when you talk about it," implying
strongly that it did not necessarily
mean the 1967 borders.

The President, in his speech, in-
serted at the last minute after the text
had been distributed to the press and
to the newspapers, two sentences
which said: "In the pre-1967 borders.
Israel was barely 10 miles wide at its
narrowest point. The bulk of Israel's
population lived within artillery range
of hostile Arab armies. I'm not about
to ask Israel to live that way again."

Artillery range today is something
on the order, if I am correct, of about
15 miles. If there is going to be no
Israeli population within artillery
range, you are going to have to cut
what used to be thought of as the
West Bank almost in half.

J2_

A. You're going to have to look at
the borders— defensible borders are
what people are talking about— and ap-
propriate security arrangements that
must include the notion of a totally
demilitarized area throughout the West
Bank in terms of any possible offensive
capabilities. I think that just is for sure.
So those are all things that would con-
tribute to making good on the statement
that the President made.

I think you picked out something
very interesting— and you're the first
person that I've run into that's noticed
it— that this paragraph was inserted at
the last minute, and it was a result of
discussions with the President and his
advisers about the importance in this
whole picture of an absolutely deter-
mined statement and recognition of the
importance of the security of Israel.

As we looked at the speech, as the
President looked at the speech— of
course, that's in there and in there and
in there— he felt that one more state-
ment, particularly calling attention to
the fact that Israel is, after all,
geographically a small country. When
you're in a country that small, surround-
ed by hostility, you're bound to have
security right in the front of your mind.

So the President sought again and
again in that speech, and in that
paragraph that you picked out, to lay
special emphasis on the importance to
him and to the whole group that was
working on this with him of that factor.

Q. It's a little hard for many of us
to understand why the present Admin-
istration talks about Israeli security
when, after all, Israel has perhaps the
third or fourth largest military might
in the world and is perfectly able to
take care of its own security for the
foreseeable future. Why does this Ad-
ministration keep talking about Israeli
security?

A. Because it's important and
because it has been a concern of Israel,
and rightly so, as I just got through say-
ing.

If you are a very small country and
you're surrounded by hostile states,
you're bound to worry. States that say
that they don't agree with your ex-
istence, you're bound to worry about
your security. It's very natural.

Q. You wouldn't care to speculate
that if 10 miles is too narrow a wasp
waist for Israel, what would be an ac-
ceptable distance?

A. What I said was that there needs
to be attention to security as borders
are drawn. Of course, it's very impor-

tant that the whole of what we refer to
as the West Bank, under whatever ar-
rangements, would be demilitarized.

Q. The Administration continues
to hold up the shipment of F-16s to
Israel. When are you going to let that
shipment go out, and what is holding
it up?

A. The President will decide that,
and he will decide it in his own good
time.

Q. That doesn't sound to me like
he's about to send it off right now,
number one. And, number two, what
about this question of the Israelis try-
ing to trade military intelligence,
what they were able to learn about
Soviet military equipment during this
Lebanese war, for those planes and
for other aid? Is that a fact?

A. I don't think that's the sort of
thing that you set up in terms of a
trade, and to the extent that anybody
suggests that "if you do this, we'll do
that," as far as sharing intelligence is
concerned, that's not the way to go
about it. There is a vast sharing of in-
telligence, and that is the way I'm sure
it will finally emerge.

Q. But have the Israelis tried that
approach?

A. There are all sorts of discussions'
about the equipment that's been cap-
tured and the things learned in the war,
having to do with Russian equipment
and U.S. equipment, and I expect that
we'll learn a lot from the whole process.

Q. I have to inform you that
Israel's Government-controlled radio
has just announced three new settle-
ments—Israeli settlements— two of
them in the West Bank and one in thfr
Gaza strip, this coming so shortly
after President Reagan's demand for
freeze on settlements. I presume this
is not a welcome development.

A. It's a very unwelcome develop-
ment, and, if it's so, I think it's inconsis
tent with the objective of peace in the
area.

Q. What can we do? What can th.
U.S. Government do about that?

A. We will hold up the objective of
peace before everybody. The more
positive responses that are given to it
think the more importance the reality c
that possibility will be, and it will start
to exert its own pressure in the area.

Q. Under the President's request
for a freeze, obviously he meant no
more new settlements. But did he als

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THE SECRETARY

lean that the existing settlements
hould not be expanded, more people
ut in them?

A. By a "freeze," he meant that the
L'rritory encompassed by the settlement
(It lit' expanded at all.

Q. As I'm sure you're well aware,
former American diplomat who
erved in Cuba as our representative
lere for the last several years has
'ritten an article in Foreign Affairs
Quarterly in which he strongly con-
emns the present Administration,
rimarily for its refusal to seriously
it down and negotiate with Fidel
astro.

Mr. Wayne Smith claims that
hen Secretary Haig, your prede-
jssor, met with the Vice President of
uba in Mexico and again when
eneral Walters, the President's
nissary, met with Mr. Castro in
uba, on both occasions these two
jntlemen simply laid down condi-
ons to the Cubans and said: "You've
•)t to meet these conditions before
e will seriously negotiate our prob-
ms with you." I'd like to ask you if
at is, in fact, the Administration's
irrent attitude toward Cuba?

A. The trouble with Cuba is its
havior. When the behavior of Cuba
anges, when it stops trying to export
volution, when it stops sending ar-
aments to places like Nicaragua, and
jps feeding these guerrilla movements
at are designed to disrupt duly consti-
ted governmental processes in its
ea, then there's something to talk
. out. There's nothing to talk about in
e pattern of behavior that we see with
' iba right now.

Q. But the United States sits
I wn and talks with the Soviet Union
; ross the board, and yet the Soviet
' lion exports revolution all over the
' jrld wherever it can. In fact it does
1 )re than that; it carries out military
I nquest in places like Afghanistan
i d Poland, and we still have closer
ilations with the Soviet Union than
' ? do with Cuba. What is the reason
]r this?

A. The reason is that Cuba has
)lated all sorts of conditions that we
)uld attach to tolerable behavior in the
;ernational arena — in Central
nerica, in the Caribbean, in its efforts
roughout South America, in the
esence of Cuban troops in Africa,
lere are many examples of behavior.

I'm not talking about what some-
dy says. I'm talking about what they
— behavior that is disruptive — and we

HtnhAr 1Qft9

As far as the Soviet Union is con-
cerned, I think the President has made
it very clear what his views are there.
The behavior in Afghanistan and the
events that we see in Poland very
recently stand behind the President's
very firm intention to register a view
about the reprehensible manner of that
behavior, and he's done so.

Q. There's been talk that you're
looking forward to a meeting with Mr.
Gromyko at the United Nations.

A. I am planning to have a meeting
with Mr. Gromyko in the United Na-
tions, and there are many important
things that we need to talk about, I'm
sure.

Q. Are there no important things
we need to talk about with the
Cubans?

A. I think the best strategy — and
I'm sure the President does — with
respect to Cuba is right where we are,
and when they evidence some desire and
willingness to change their behavior,
then we'll respond to that.

Q. Mr. Smith says the evidence
that they were sending all those
military arms to the Central American
countries is not very solid.

A. That's his opinion, and he's en-
titled to his opinion.

Q. He read all the intelligence
documents.

A. I have looked these things over
and talked to people too, and there are
lots of people who have a different opin-
ion than Mr. Smith.

Q. And you're one of them?

A. And I'm one of them.

Q. I'm a little confused about the
Cubans have to change their ways
before we'll talk to them; the Russians
apparently don't. There's no sign, I
gather, that the sanctions that we
have placed on the companies of our
allies has changed Soviet behavior in
Poland. In fact, if anything, their
behavior— the Polish military govern-
ment under Soviet stimulus — has been
even more rigorously repressive. How
can you call this a success? How can
you say that they're modifying their
behavior?

A. What is happening in Poland is a
very discouraging, but at the same time
a dramatic, illustration of the bank-
ruptcy of the Soviet system.

The Polish people are wonderful peo-
ple, productive people. There are great
resources in that country, and the place-
ment on it of the Soviet system has
brought it to its knees. It's a terrible in-
dictment of their system.

Q. But this happened after we
began our sanctions.

A. No. This has been happening for
many, many, many years, and it has
continued. It's very discouraging that it
continues, but the Polish people have not
given up, and we certainly should
stand —

Q. Let's talk about the sanctions
themselves. What good have they real-
ly done except to benefit the Soviet
Union, because it's split us from our
allies?

A. I'm sure that they have imposed
a cost on the construction of that
pipeline. They have dramatized our
strong feelings about the subject, and, to
a degree one can say that because they
have had costs in the United States and
costs in our allies, they only dramatize
how important the President feels this is
and how strongly he feels about it.

Q. The allies are so disturbed
they've been holding a meeting on it.
Do you plan to send some senior State
Department official — yourself or
anybody else — to talk to our allies
about reducing these sanctions?

A. I'm sure the President will hold
firmly to the strategy implied by the
sanctions. To the extent that you can
view the sanctions as an important tac-
tic, if we can work out things that are
more effective and have all of our allies
with us, we're certainly willing to look at
them.

■Press release 270 of Sept. 7, 1982.

AFRICA

Visit of Cameroon President Ahidjo

President Ahmadou Ahidjo of
Cameroon made an official working visit
to Washington, D.C., July 25-28, 1982.
Folloudng are remarks made by
Presidents Reagan and Ahidjo after
their meeting on July 26.

President Reagan

It has been an honor and a pleasure to
meet with President Ahmadou Ahidjo of
Cameroon and to discuss the views and
hopes of a major U.S. trading partner in
Africa.

Our discussions today reconfirm the
mutual respect both our countries have
enjoyed for over 20 years. Our meeting
covered a wide range of issues. Par-
ticularly useful was our discussion of
southern Africa and the Middle East. I
listened with interest to President
Ahidjo's views on those difficult issues,
and I hope he has also gained a better
understanding of the role that we're try-
ing to play.

We also had a useful discussion of
the enormous economic burdens faced
by Africa's developing countries and a
possible role for the U.S. private sector
in addressing these problems. An
American trade and investment mission,
headed by Secretaries [Secretary of
Commerce Malcolm] Baldrige and
[Secretary of Agriculture John R.]
Block, visited Cameroon and several
other African countries last January.
We continue to believe that private
enterprise is the most effective means
for fostering sound economic develop-
ment. I'm very pleased that Cameroon
has opened its doors to American
businessmen. I hope that both our coun-
tries will enjoy increasingly close
economic and trade relations in the
years ahead.

Finally, our discussion gave me an
opportunity to commend President
Ahidjo for his outstanding leadership
concerning the refugee problem. Over
the past several years, Cameroon has
hosted over 200.000 refugees fleeing
civil wars and harsh regimes in
neighboring countries. The United
States has tried to help where it could,
working through the U.N. High Com-
missioner for Refugees, to alleviate the
heavy burden that this has brought to
Cameroon. We urge other nations to
contribute to the international effort and
give continuing support to the countries
of first asylum and to the refugees
themselves.

I know that the President will be
meeting with a wide range of Ad-
ministration officials and Members of
the House and Senate during his
Washington stay. I am certain that he
will find them eager to expand the ex-
cellent working relations that we have
with the Government of Cameroon. His
discussions here are laying a foundation
for enhanced cooperation and ever
closer ties of friendship between the
United States and Cameroon. And we're
delighted to welcome him here to the
United States.

President Ahidjo

I am pleased after my last visit to the
United States of America in 1967 to
have been given this opportunity to
come back once more to this great and
beautiful country on the kind invitation
of President Ronald Reagan, with whom
I have just had cordial and fruitful
discussions.

With regard to our bilateral rela-
tions, the discussions were an opportuni-
ty to reaffirm the esteem that the
Cameroonian and American people have
for each other and to express our
satisfaction with the close links of
mutually advantageous cooperation ex-
isting between both our countries for
over 20 years now.

With regard to the determinations
expressed on both sides and with the
potentials of our countries, there is no
doubt that this cooperation will grow
and be consolidated in the future. This is
already evident in the four agreements
recently signed in Yaounde by our
governments to finance interior agricul-
tural projects and training programs for
a total amount of $12,000,200.

We also carried out a wide review of
problems of common interest in Africa
and the world. With regard to Africa,
we expressed the need to accelerate the
accession of Namibia to independence
and to work toward the elimination of
apartheid for the advent of majority rule
in South Africa. We also expressed the
hope that the present crisis in Chad and
within the Organization of African Unity
will be satisfactorily solved as soon as
possible.

With regard to world affairs, we ex-
pressed our common determination to
support, in all circumstances, the right

of peoples to progress, peace, and self-
determination. In this connection, we
acknowledge the need to work in a con-
certed manner to insure respect for the
basic principles of international relations
such as nonrecourse to force, the
peaceful settlement of conflicts, and
peaceful coexistence, as well as the pro-
motion of a more just, balanced, and
stable framework of cooperation be-
tween industrialized and developing
countries as part of global negotiations
to usher in a new international economic
order.

Finally, I wish to seize this oppor-
tunity to extend my sincere thanks to
President Reagan and to the govern-
ment and the people of the United
States for the warm welcome accorded

•Made at the South Portico of the White
House (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Aug. 2, 1982). ■

(r.

ior

iipi

iVVhiU' House photo Ijy Bill Fitz-f'atnckl

-,( Ctota Riillotj

EPARTMENT

Role of the U.S. Ambassador

y Richard T. Kennedy

Statement before the Senate Foreigti
't'Idtions Committee on April 28, 1982.
Ir. Kennedy is Under Secretary for
[iiiiagement.^

am happy to appear before the com-
littee today to present the Administra-
Kiii's views on the role of the ambassa-
or in today's world and to discuss
. 1886, which would require that not
'ss than 85% of the total number of
ositions of chiefs of mission shall be oc-
upied by career members of the
'oreign Service.

This Administration firmly believes
lat the best possible individuals must
e appointed to represent this nation
broad. We agree with former Ambas-
ador Kingman Brewster that, because
f greatly expanded communications and
iniplexities and a need for ambassadors
ho can explain developments to both
;des, "the Ambassador is more impor-
mt than he or she was when the
overnment of the United States had

I nly one Department engaged in foreign

! slations."

The President has recently indicated
1 his letter to all chiefs of mission, the
mportance he attaches to the am-

.ssadorial role. He has assigned to the
imbassador very broad responsibilities
3 "protect and advance the United
'tates' interests abroad" and made it
lear that he views the ambassador as
is personal representative to the host
overnment. We do not accept the
ometimes stated convention that the

' mbassador is just a messenger for the
3reign policy decisionmakers in
Washington.

tole of the Ambassador

'he ambassadorial role is multifaceted.
Ve seek ambassadorial candidates who
lOt only are at ease in a foreign environ-
lent, carrying out their representation-
,1 functions, but who also can con-
ribute, through their perspective, re-
lorting and analyses to the policy
leliberations in Washington. The am-
lassador is not only our eyes and ears
•ut a significant part of the brain.

It must be remembered that the am-
)assador is not, and never has been,
imply the senior Department of State
)fficial accredited to a foreign country.
Phis factor was stressed in the 1975

report of the Commission on the Organi-
zation of the Government for the Con-
duct of Foreign Policy (the Murphy
Commission). That commission, com-
posed of such distinguished persons as
the late Vice President Rockefeller,
Chairman Clement Zablocki, Am-
bassador Mike Mansfield, and former
Ambassador Anne Armstrong, noted
that:

Our concept of the role of the Am-
bassador flows from one basic principle: the
Ambassador is, and must be, the central
representative of the United States, and of
the President. All other embassy personnel
. . . are extensions of the Ambassador. ... It
is imperative for the Ambassador to serve as
the representative of the President and the
entire government, rather than simply as the
senior Department of State official, if he is to
coordinate effectively all U.S. activities in the
country to which he is accredited. . . . These
responsibilities will require Ambassadors who
are at once broad-gauged and knowledgeable,
who can as the head of mission fulfill both
managerial and analytic roles and as personal
representatives of the President, advise on
policy matters.

The demands of all ambassadorial
assignments are not the same. In some
cases decades of expertise in the area
and country should be the primary
criterion, while in others it will be more
important for the host government to
know without question that the am-
basador does, in fact, speak directly for
the President. We seek to tailor am-
bassadorial choices to'meet the unique
circumstances of our relations with a
particular country. We agree with the
study prepared last year for the commit-
tee by the Congressional Research Serv-
ice that "the issue here is qualifications
and not the career or non-career status
of the candidate."

Let me now turn to our view of
S. 1886 in the light of this background.
The Administration opposes the passage
of S. 1886 for three reasons. Briefly
stated, the bill is unnecessary, it is
counterproductive, and it can be con-
sidered to be an infringement on the
constitutional authority of the President
to nominate ambassadors.

S. 1886 is unnecessary because it is
not needed either to assure the quality
of ambassadorial nominees or to correct
an inappropriate mix of career and non-
career appointees.

The quality of ambassadorial
nominees is assured by the high concern
of the President and his foreign policy

advisers to seek the most qualified per-
sons to represent the President and the
United States abroad. Beyond this con-
cern, however, the Constitution provides
a check-and-balance mechanism to
assure that appropriate individuals are
appointed. The Senate must, of course,
review the President's nominations pur-
suant to its constitutional "advice and
consent" responsibility. The Senate, and
specifically this committee, has never
been other than diligent in its review of
presidential nominations.

Indeed, the current provisions of law
provide an appropriate and helpful aid
to the Senate to perform its function of
advice and consent. Specifically, Section
304(a) of the Foreign Service Act of
1980 outlines the attributes a chief of
mission is expected to have, states in
view of these attributes he or she should
normally be a career member of the
Foreign Service, makes it clear that
political contributions are not to be a
factor in ambassadorial appointments,
and requires that a statement shall be
provided to the Senate with a report on
the "demonstrated competence" of the
nominee for the duties of the position
for which nominated. This kind of proc-
ess helps to insure ambassadorial com-
petence, while preserving the unques-
tioned right of the President to present
his nominations to the Senate.

Career and Noncareer Representatives

As to the mix of career and noncareer
officers, I can assure you that the record
of the Reagan Administration is consis-
tent with that of other Administrations
in recent years in regard to the percent-
age of career officers occupying ambas-
sadorial positions. In this light, I think it
is instructive to examine the historical
trend, which shows that the percentage
of career officers appointed as Am-
bassadors has risen over the past
several decades. In President Truman's
Administration, for example, only about
50% of ambassadors were career ap-
pointees. This number has risen to a
range of between 65% and 75% since
the Administration of President
Eisenhower.

As of today, 83 ambassadors to
other countries are career officers while
34 are noncareer, a mix of 71% career
and 29% noncareer. Indeed, I would
note that the percentage of ambassadors
to other countries today who are career
officers is equal to or greater than in 10
of the last 20 years from 1961 through
1980. Additionally, the percentage of
career Ambassadors to other countries

DEPARTMENT

today is within three percentage points
of the career percentage in an additional
5 of the last 20 years. In short, the mix
of ambassadors appointed or retained by
President Reagan is consistent with the
mix of all other Presidents for the last
20 years.

As to our multilateral posts, I would
note that many multilateral appoint-
ments, such as to the United Nations,
UNESCO, and the U.N. Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC) are traditional-
ly noncareer. Nevertheless, the Presi-
dent has nominated or retained career
officers in some of the most significant
multilateral posts. Specifically, the Presi-
dent has nominated Ambassador
Abraham Katz to serve at the U.S. Mis-
sion to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD)
in Paris and Ambassador George Vest to
the U.S. Mission to the European Com-
munities in Brussels.

President Reagan has also retained
outstanding career officers— W. Tapley
Bennett, Jr., as the U.S. Ambassador to
NATO and Roger Kirk as the U.S. rep-
resentative to the U.N. Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO) and
the deputy U.S. representative to the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) in Vienna. Other career appoint-
ments by the President to important
multilateral posts include William
Sherman as the deputy representative in
the U.N. Security Council, Warren Clark
as the deputy representative to
ECOSOC, and Maynard Glitman as the
deputy negotiator for intermediate-
range nuclear forces (INF).

President Reagan's nominations of
noncareer appointees to multilateral
organizations and other ambassadorial
appointments include such outstanding
people as Jeane Kirkpatrick to the
United Nations, J. William Middendorf
to the Organization of American States
(OAS), Gen. Vernon Walters as
Ambassador-at-Large, Paul Nitze as the
intermediate-range nuclear force
negotiator, and Edward L. Rowny as
head of delegation to the START
[Strategic Arms Reduction Talks]
negotiations.

That the President has the highest
confidence in and respect for the career
service is shown by his selection of
career officers to represent U.S. in-
terests in areas and at posts where our
most vital concerns are engaged —
NATO, China, Israel, Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, the U.S.S.R., and El Salvador.
Our embassy in New Delhi is headed by
a career officer for the first time since
1954. Within the Department of State

U.S. Ambassadors
(as of September 22, 1982)

Name

U.S. Embassies

Afghanistan

(Vacant)

Algeria

Michael H. Newlin

Antigua and Barbuda

Milan D. Bish*

Argentina

Harry W. Shiaudeman

Australia

Robert Dean Nesen*

Austria

(Vacant)

Bahamas

(Vacant)

Bahrain

Peter Adams Sutherland

Bangladesh

Jane Abell Coon

Barbados

Milan D. Bish*

Belgium

Charles H. Price II

Belize

(Vacant)

Benin

(Vacant)

Bolivia

Edwin Gharst Corr

Botswana

Theodore C. Maino (nominated)

Brazil

Langhorne A. Motley

Bulgaria

Robert L. Barry

Burma

Patricia M. Byrne

Burundi

Frances D. Cook

Cameroon

Hume Alexander Horan

Canada

Paul Heron Robinson, Jr.

Cape Verde

Peter Jon de Vos*

Central African Republic

Arthur H. Woodruff

Chad

••

Chile

James Daniel Theberge

China

Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.

Colombia

Thomas D. Boyatt

Comoros

Fernando E. Rondon*

Congo

Kenneth Lee Brown

Costa Rica

Francis J. McNeil

Cyprus

Raymond C. Ewing

Czechoslovakia

Jack F. Matlock, Jr.

Denmark

John Langeloth Loeb, Jr.

Djibouti

(Vacant)

Dominica

Milan D. Bish*

Dominican Republic

Robert Anderson

Ecuador

(Vacant)

Egypt

Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.

El Salvador

Deane R. Hinton

Equatorial Guinea

Alan M. Hardy

Ethiopia

(Vacant)

Fiji

Fred J. Eckerf

Finland

Keith Foote Nyborg

France

Evan Griffith Galbraith

Gabon

Francis Terry McNamara"

The Gambia

Sharon Erakamp Ahmed

Germany, East

Rozanne L. Ridgway

(nominated)

Germany, West

Arthur F. Burns

Ghana

Thomas W.M. Smith

Greece

Monteagle Stearns

Grenada

(Vacant)

Guatemala

Frederic L. Chapin

Guinea

Allen Clayton Davis

Guinea-Bissau

Peter Jon de Vos*

Guyana

Gerald E. Thomas

Haiti

Ernest Henry Preeg

Honduras

John Dimitri Negroponte

Hungary

Harry E. Bergold, Jr.

Iceland

Marshall Brement

India

Harry G. Barnes, Jr.

Indonesia

(Vacant)

Career

Noncareer

Department of State Bulletii

DEPARTMENT

Name

Career

Noncareer

reland

Peter H. Dailey

srael

Samuel W. Lewis***

taly

Maxwell M. Rabb

vory Coast

Nancy V. Rawls

amaica

William A. Hewitt (nominated)

apan

Michael J. Mansfield

ordan

Richard Noyes Viets

Lenya

William Caldwell Harrop

Kiribati

Fred J. Eckert*

[orea

Richard L. Walker

luwait

Francois M. Dickman

-aos

(Vacant)

-ebanon

Robert Sherwood Dillon

,esotho

Keith Lapham Brown

■iberia

William Lacy Swing

,ibya

****

.uxembourg

John E. Dolibois

ladagascar

Fernando E. Rondon*

lalawi

John A. Burroughs, Jr.

lalaysia

Ronald DeWayne Palmer

laldives

John Hathaway Reed*

lali

Parker W. Borg

[alta

James Malone Rentschler

lauritania

(Vacant)

lauritius

Robert C.F. Gordon* **

[exico

John A. Gavin

[orocco

Joseph Verner Reed, Jr.

lozambique

(Vacant)

auru

Robert Dean Nesen*

\ epal

Carleton S. Coon

1 etherlands

William Jennings Dyess

ew Zealand

H. Monroe Browne*

icaragua

Anthony C.E. Quainton

iger

William Robert Casey, Jr.

igeria

Thomas R. Pickering

orway

Mark Evans Austad

man

John R. Countryman

akistan

Ronald L Spiers

anama

Everette Ellis Briggs
(nominated)

apua New Guinea

M. Virginia Schafer*

araguay

Arthur Davis

eru

Frank V. Ortiz, Jr.

hilippines

Michael Hayden Armacost

oland

Francis J. Meehan

ortugal

Henry Allen Holmes

atar

Charles E. Marthinsen

omania

David B. Funderburk

wanda

John Blane (nominated)

anta Lucia

Milan D. Bish*

aint Vincent and

Milan D. Bish*

the Grenadines

ao Tome and Principe

Francis Terry McNamara*

audi Arabia

Richard W. Murphy

enegal

Charles W. Bray HI

eychelles

David Joseph Fischer
(nominated)

lierra Leone

Theresa Ann Healy

[ingapore

Harry E.T. Thayer

lolomon Islands

M. Virginia Schafer*

omali

Robert Bigger Oakley
(nominated)

outh Africa

Herman W. Nickel

I pain

Terence A. Todman

{ ri Lanka

John Hathaway Reed*

'udan

C. William Kontos

uriname

Robert W. Duemling

waziland

Robert H. Phinny

weden

Franklin S. Forsberg

witzerland

Faith Ryan Whittlesey

ctober 1982

itself, the President has nominated
career officers to key positions as the
Deputy Secretary, the Under Secretary
for Political Affairs, and to foiu- of the
five regional assistant secretary posi-
tions. These officials are serving with
the greatest distinction and have the
President's full confidence.

The Administration believes that
S. 1886 could be counterproductive. It
would limit the ability of the President
to appoint outstanding noncareer can-
didates, while at the same time, it would
not contribute to arresting the alleged
tendency to downgrade the importance
of the position of ambassador.

Because the ambassadorial role is of
such consequence, we think it would be
a serious mistake to limit those eligible
for appointment to any one category of
citizens. We need the David Bruces,
Ellsworth Bunkers, and Mike Mansfields
as well as the Chip Bohlens, Llewelyn
Thompsons, and Philip Habibs.

Some commentators in recent years
have remarked that ambassadors today
may be less important than they once
were and that Washington tends to
bypass them to deal directly with other
governments. It can be argued that im-
position on ambassadorial appointments
of a set percentage of career officers, if
it meant the President could not
nominate his first choice to be am-
bassador, would tend to insure that such
comments become self-fulfilling proph-
ecies and thereby diminish the role of
the ambassador as the representative of
the President to foreign countries.

S. 1886 can be considered to be an
infringement on the President's constitu-
tional authority, because it places an ar-
bitrary limitation on the President's
prerogative to nominate ambassadors. I
have not come prepared today to discuss
the details of constitutional interpreta-
tion, but I must point out that the Presi-
dent's ambassadorial nomination authori-
ty is founded directly on the Constitu-
tion, not on statute. Specifically, Article
II, Section 2, provides that the Presi-
dent "shall nominate, and by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors. ..." The
Administration believes strongly that
any attempt to place an arbitrary limit
on the authority of the President to for-
ward to the Senate a nomination of his
own choosing raises serious constitu-
tional questions.

Finally, there has been consistent
opposition to the enactment of arbitrary
percentages in order to encourage the
nomination of career Foreign Service of-
ficers to ambassadorships. Perhaps the

ii2.

DEPARTMENT

strongest statement is that of the
Murphy Commission itself which stated
that:

The Commission, therefore, believes that
reserving a certain percentage for Foreign
Service Officers is an inappropriate means of
reaching the laudable goal of greater Am-
bassadorial competence. While we would ex-
pect the majority— perhaps a large ma-
jority—of Ambassadors to be foreign affairs
professionals, we do not advocate that they
necessarily be drawn from the Foreign Serv-
ice. Rather, the individual with the best
qualifications for a given position should be
selected.

Even Malcolm Toon, in his recent
article in the Foreign Service Journal,
published by the American Foreign
Service Association, stated that:

I don't think you can legislate percent-
ages of political appointees. I think it is up to
the Foreign Relations Committee and the
White House to make sure the people they
are sending to important posts are qualified.

We agree wholeheartedly with both
of these sentiments, and for these and
the other reasons stated above we must
reiterate our opposition to the arbitrary
limitation of S. 1886.

In closing, I also wish to reiterate
the President's and the Secretary of
State's deep personal respect for the
dedication and solid professionalism of
the Foreign Service. Our opposition to
S. 1886 is in no way intended to reflect
adversely on the service. We recognize
that the service provides an outstanding
cadre of experienced Foreign Service
professionals for ambassadorial appoint-
ments. We recognize that the great ma-
jority of ambassadorial appointments
have been, and will continue to be,
drawn from the service.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

U.S. Ambassadors
(continued)

Post

Name

Syria

Robert P. Paganelli

Tanzania

David Charles Miller, Jr.

Thailand

John Gunther Dean

Togo

Howard Kent Walker

Tonga

Fred J. Eckerf

Trindidad and Tobago

Melvin Herbert Evans

Tunisia

Walter Leon Cutler

Turkey

Robert Strausz-Hupe

Tuvalu

Fred J. Eckerf

Uganda

Gordon Robert Beyer

U.S.S.R.

Arthur Adair Hartman

United Arab Emirates

George Q. Lumsden, Jr.

United Kingdom

John J. Louis, Jr.

Upper Volta

Julius Waring Walker, Jr

Uruguay

Thomas Aranda, Jr.

Venezuela

George W. Landau

Western Samoa

H. Monroe Browne*

Yemen

David Eugene Zweifel

Yugoslavia

David Anderson

Zaire

Peter Dalton Constable

(nominated)

Zambia

Nicholas Piatt

Zimbabwe

Robert V. Keeley

International Organizations

United Nations

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

Organization of American

J. William Middendorf II

States

International Atomic

Richard T. Kennedy

Energy Agency

NATO

W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.

Organization for Econom-

Abraham Katz

mic Cooperation and

Development

European Office of the

Geoffrey Swaebe

U.N.

European Communities

George Southall Vest

UNESCO

Jean Broward Shevlin Ge

International Civil Avia-

Edmund Stahr

tion Organization

Career

•Accredited to more than one country.

**The United States maintains diplomatic relations with Chad, but the U.S. Embassy wi
closed on March 24, 1980. The embassy was reopened in January 1982.

** 'Retired Foreign Service officer.

••••On May 2, 1980, all embassy working activities were suspended, and all American
personnel were withdrawn from the embassy. ■

Department of State Bulleli

EAST ASIA

U.S.-China Joint Communique

Folloiving is a statement by John H.
Holdridge. Assistant Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the
House Foreign Affairs Committee on
August 18, 1982.^ Also included are the
tt-'xts of the U.S.-China joint communique
ami President Reagan's statement of
Augiist 17.

Yesterday the United States and the
People's Republic of China simultaneous-
ly issued a joint communique. During the
past months, the Administration has
benefited from consultations with
members of this committee on this sensi-
tive subject. I am glad to be able to con-
tinue our discussion of these issues in a
public forum. I would also like to ex-
press our appreciation for the way the
committee has cooperated with us in
maintaining the confidentiality of our
discussions with the Chinese; this has
aeen vital, and we appreciate it.

As we went into these negotiations
vve had two things in mind — our historic
ibligations to the people of Taiwan and
lur important and growing relations
■vith the People's Republic of China.
Throughout the entire period of our dis-
;ussions with Beijing, we were guided
Dy these dual considerations. It is a
"undamental national interest of the
Jnited States to preserve and advance
ts strategic relations with China. At the

> same time, we have obligations to old
■'riends; and we are not going to turn
)ur back on them.

I am glad that we have been able to
irrive at a communique with the
Chinese that demonstrated their recog-
lition of our determination on this
^core. Despite the difficulties it obviously
•auses them, they were willing to join
vith us in a modus vivendi which will
>nable us to continue our relationship
lecause of the important interests in-
/olved for them. Such an outcome is of
-'ital importance to our national interest.

", Three Administrations before us have
.vorked very hard to establish and ex-
pand this relationship, and we would
lave been derelict if we had not made
;very effort to find a way around the

hroblem that threatened it.

j|4 Valued Relationship

;,'. think it would be useful to take a few
Tiinutes to examine the reasons why we

>alue this relationship so highly. One of
:he major reasons is strategic. Prior to

1971 we had a hostile relationship with
China. It was costly. We fought the
Chinese in Korea. We almost came to a
major war over Quemoy and Matsu. The
Chinese worked hand in hand with the
Soviets against us in Vietnam. We had
to maintain a naval presence between
Taiwan and the mainland. China identi-
fied itself with support for guerrilla
movements on the soil of many of our
allies and friends. Furthermore, a large
part of our defense resources were allo-
cated on the premise of a hostile China.
Last, and perhaps most important, these
1 billion people were not identified with
our interests as we faced the Soviet
Union.

Starting in 1971 we have changed
this situation. Thanks to a productive
relationship between the United States
and China, Taiwan has never been more
secure and prosperous. We no longer
have to plan for China as an enemy. We
can now think about China as a country
with which we might cooperate in cer-
tain significant areas. China's relations
with our allies in Asia have improved.
These 1 billion people are cautiously
moving into the mainstream of the
world's cultural and economic life. Their
isolation is dissolving. Trade has in-
creased. Eight thousand Chinese
students are now studying in the United
States. Investment opportunities are
opening and our parallel interests in con-
taining, the Soviet Union have been re-
peatedly reaffirmed.

All of these things represent solid,
vital benefits to our security and well-
being. We were not going to let these
achievements disappear into rancor and
hostility if we could possibly avoid it. We
went after both of the objectives I men-
tioned at the outset, and I believe we
have succeeded.

Reaffirming Fundamental Principles

Let me now turn to yesterday's com-
munique. The communique reaffirms the
fundamental principles which have guid-
ed U.S.-China relations since the incep-
tion of the normalization process over 10
years ago. This reaffirmation is signifi-
cant; it illustrates the strength and the
durability of these principles.

On this foundation, the United
States established relations with China
which have been economically beneficial
to us and which have greatly enhanced
our vital strategic interests. At the same

time, we have maintained and strength-
ened our commercial and cultural rela-
tions with the people of Taiwan. We
have achieved these important goals
without impairing the security of the
people of Taiwan, and, indeed, because
of these improved relations between
China and the United States, Taiwan
has never been more secure.

The communique also addresses an
issue which was not resolved at the time
of normalization of relations — the ques-
tion of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Dur-
ing discussions leading to normalization,
China demanded that arms sales be ter-
minated. We refused. I can say here
that our negotiations almost foundered
over this issue. China ultimately agreed
to proceed with normalization despite
this disagreement but reserved the right
to raise this issue again. When it did so,
we agreed to engage in discussion to
determine whether an understanding
could be reached. The alternative to our
agreeing to hold such discussions would
clearly have been the beginning of a
process of deterioration in our rela-
tions— deterioration that could have led
us back toward hostility since the issue
itself was volatile and basic. We would
have been irresponsible had we allowed
such a process to start.

We undertook these discussions,
therefore, with the hope that a formula
could be found which would permit the
continued growth of our relations with
China, but also with the firm resolve
that there were principles regarding the
security of Taiwan which could not be
compromised. Those principles, em-
bodied in the Taiwan Relations Act,
commit the United States to sell to
Taiwan arms necessary to maintain a
sufficient self-defense capability.

Aware of our consistent and firm op-
position to the use of force against
Taiwan, the Chinese during these discus-
sions agreed to state in very strong
terms their policy of pursuing a peaceful
resolution of the Taiwan issue and de-
scribed this policy as "fundamental." The
Chinese insisted, however, that we agree
to the ultimate termination of arms
sales. We refused because the level of
our arms sales must be determined by
the needs of Taiwan, and we could not
agree to a termination date, as the
Chinese demanded, which might impair
our ability to meet those needs.

,J)ct

ober1982

EAST ASIA

At the same time, we recognized
that China's peaceful policy bore directly
on the defense needs of Taiwan. So long
as that policy continued, the threat to
Taiwan would be greatly diminished. As
I have just noted, assurances of such a
continuity were provided when the
Chinese began to describe their peaceful
policy on the resolution of the Taiwan
question as, as I have just said, "funda-
mental," which contains the connotation
of unchanging and long term. We were
thus able to consider a policy under
which we would limit our arms sales to
the levels reached in recent years and
would anticipate a gradual reduction of
the level of arms sales. We were not
willing, however, to adopt such a course
unconditionally.

While the Chinese were willing to
state their peaceful policy in strong
terms, they at first resisted any relation-
ship between that policy and our arms
sales to Taiwan. The Chinese resisted
this relationship because of their view
that the sale of arms to Taiwan consti-
tutes an interference in China's internal
affairs. We rejected any language to this
effect in the communique.

We also stressed that as a matter of
fact and law, any adjustments in our
arms sales to Taiwan had to be premised
on a continuation of China's peaceful
policy. We therefore maintained, and the
Chinese ultimately agreed, that the
statement of our policy in paragraph 6
be prefaced by a phrase that related it
to the continuation of China's peaceful
approach. This is the genesis and pur-
pose of the phrase "Having in mind the
foregoing statements of both sides"
which precedes our statements in that
paragraph. Thus, our policy is predi-
cated on China's commitment in para-
graph 4 to a peaceful approach and our
acknowledgment of that approach in
paragraph 5.

Let me summarize the essence of
our understanding on this point: China
has announced a fundamental policy of
pursuing peaceful means to resolve the
longstanding dispute between Taiwan
and the mainland. Having in mind this
policy and the consequent reduction in
the military threat to Taiwan, we have
stated our intention to reduce arms sales
to Taiwan gradually and said that in
quantity and quality we would not go be-
yond levels established since normaliza-
tion. This follows from a literal reading
of the communique. While we have no
reason to believe that China's policy will
change, an inescapable corollary to these
mutually interdependent policies is that

U.S.-China Joint Communique,
August 17, 1982

1. In the Joint Communique on the Establish-
ment of Diplomatic Relations on January 1,
1979, issued by the Government of the
United States of America and the Govern-
ment of the People's Republic of China, the
United States of America recognized the
Government of the People's Republic of
China as the sole legal government of China,
and it acknowledged the Chinese position
that there is but one China and Taiwan is
part of China. Within that context, the two
sides agreed that the people of the United
States would continue to maintain cultural,
commercial, and other unofficial relations
with the people of Taiwan. On this basis,
relations between the United States and
China were normalized.

2. The question of United States arms
sales to Taiwan was not settled in the course
of negotiations between the two countries on
establishing diplomatic relations. The two
sides held differing positions, and the Chinese
side stated that it would raise the issue again
following normalization. Recognizing that this
issue would seriously hamper the develop-
ment of United States-China relations, they
have held further discussions on it, during
and since the meetings between President
Ronald Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang and
between Secretary of State Alexander M.
Haig, Jr., and Vice Premier and Foreign
Minister Huang Hua in October, 1981.

3. Respect for each other's sovereignty
and territorial integrity and non-interference
in each other's internal affairs constitute the
fundamental principles guiding United States-
China relations. These principles were con-
firmed in the Shanghai Communique of Feb-
ruary 28, 1972 and reaffirmed in the Joint
Communique on the Establishment of Diplo-
matic Relations which came into effect on
January 1, 1979. Both sides emphatically
state that these principles continue to govern
all aspects of their relations.

4. The Chinese Government reiterates
that the question of Taiwan is China's inter-
nal affair. The Message to Compatriots in
Taiwan issued by China on January 1, 1979
promulgated a fundamental policy of striving
for peaceful reunification of the Motherland.
The Nine-Point Proposal put forward by
China on September 30, 1981 represented a
further major effort under this fundamental
policy to strive for a peaceful solution to the
Taiwan question.

5. The United States Government at-
taches great importance to its relations with
China, and reiterates that it has no intention
of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and ter-
ritorial integrity, or interfering in China's in-
ternal affairs, or pursuing a policy of "two

Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." The
United States Government understands am
appreciates the Chinese policy of striving fi
a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan questio
as indicated in China's Message to Com-
patriots in Taiwan issued on January 1, 19'
and the Nine-Point proprosal put forward \
China on September 30, 1981. The new siti
tion which has emerged with regard to the
Taiwan question also provides favorable co
ditions for the settlement of United States- Jj
China differences over the question of Unit
States arms sales to Taiwan.

6. Having in mind the foregoing state-
ments of both sides, the United States
Government states that it does not seek to
carry out a long-term policy of arms sales
Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will
exceed, either in qualitative or in quantital
terms, the level of those supplied in recent
years since the establishment of diplomati<
relations between the United States and
China, and that it intends to reduce gradu
its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a
period of time to a final resolution. In so
stating, the United States acknowledges
China's consistent position regarding the
thorough settlement of this issue.

7. In order to bring about, over a peri |i!l
of time, a final settlement of the question
United States arms sales to Taiwan, whic

an issue rooted in history, the two govern
ments will make every effort to adopt me:
ures and create conditions conducive to th
thorough settlement of this issue.

8. The development of United States-
China relations is not only in the interest:
the two peoples but also conducive to pea
and stability in the world. The two sides !
determined, on the principle of equality a
mutual benefit, to strengthen their ties in
economic, cultural, educational, scientific,
technological, and other fields and make |8!i(
strong, joint efforts for the continued dev
opment of relations between the governn
and peoples of the United States and Chi

9. In order to bring about the healthy
development of United States-China rela-
tions, maintain world peace, and oppose i
gression and expansion, the two governn-
reaffirm the principles agreed on by the t
sides in the Shanghai Communique and t!
Joint Communique on the Establishment
Diplomatic Relations. The two sides will
maintain contact and hold appropriate co
sultations on bilateral and international i:
of common interest.

at!

Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidi
tial Documents of Aug. 23, 1982. ■

'jm

-20.

DeDartment of State Bui I

ould that happen, we will reassess
ITS. Our guiding principle is now and
,11 continue to be that embodied in the
liwan Relations Act: the maintenance
a self-defense capability sufficient to
eet the military needs of Taiwan, but
ith the understanding that China's
aintenance of a peaceful approach to
e Taiwan question will permit gradual
ductions in arms sales.

Questions have been raised concern-
g whether the wording of the corn-
unique adequately conveys the mean-
g which we ascribe to it. I believe that
does or I would have recommended
:ainst its approval. The present word-
a; evolved from 10 months of intense
gotiations in which fundamental prin-
Dles were at stake on both sides. The
nguage necessarily reflects the difficult
mpromises which were reached.
We should keep in mind that what
have here is not a treaty or agree-
ent but a statement of future U.S.
flicy. We intend to implement this
ilicy in accordance with our under-
anding of it. I hope I have made that
lint abundantly clear in my remarks to-
ly. I can further assure you that, hav-
g participated closely in the negotia-
ins, I am confident that the Chinese
e fully cognizant of that understand-

Returning now to the document it-
Lf, let me recapitulate and emphasize a
A' key features.

First, the document must be read as
>vhole, since the policies it sets forth
e interrelated.

Second, as I have previously noted,
e communique contains a strong
linese statement that its fundamental
licy is to seek to resolve the Taiwan
estion by peaceful means (paragraph
In this context, I would point out
ain that the reference to their "funda-

-1 sntal" policy carries the connotation in
linese of "unchanging and long term."
Third, the U.S. statements concern-
g future arms sales to Taiwan (para-
aph 6) are based on China's state-

(jents as to its fundamental peaceful

1 »licy for seeking a resolution to the
dwan question and on the "new situa-

ci »n" created by those statements (para-

« raph 5). This situation is new because,
T the first time, China has described
I) peaceful policy toward Taiwan in the

;j,rms I have outlined. Thus, our future
tions concerning arms sales to Taiwan
e premised on a continuation of

-nina's peaceful policy toward a resolu-
5n of its differences with Taiwan. This
indicated by the words at the begin-

:toberig82

ning of paragraph 6 that "Having in
mind the foregoing statements of both
sides, the United States Government
states. . . ." We have no reason to think
that the Chinese will change this funda-
mental policy, but if they should, we
would, of course, reexamine our posi-
tion.

Fourth, we did not agree to set a
date certain for ending arms sales to
Taiwan and the statements of future
U.S. arms sales policy embodied in the
communique do not provide either a
time frame for reductions of U.S. arms
sales or for their termination. The U.S.
statements are fully consistent with the

EAST ASIA

Taiwan Relations Act, and we will con-
tinue to make appropriate arms sales to
Taiwan based on our assessments of
their defense needs, as specified by the
act.

Substance of Discussions

So much for what is in the actual com-
munique. Over the past several months,
there has been considerable speculation
about the substance of our discussions
with the Chinese. As you know, we have
not felt free to comment on such specu-
lation while our talks were underway.
Therefore, it might be useful at this

President's Statement,
Aug. 17, 1982

The U.S. -China joint communique issued
today embodies a mutually satisfactory
means of dealing with the historical
question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
"This document preserves principles on
both sides and will promote the further
development of friendly relations be-
tween the Governments and peoples of
the United States and China. It will also
contribute to the further reduction of
tensions and to lasting peace in the
Asia/Pacific region.

Building a strong and lasting rela-
tionship with China has been an impor-
tant foreign policy goal of four con-
secutive American Administrations.
Such a relationship is vital to our long-
term national security interests and con-
tributes to stability in East Asia. It is in
the national interest of the United
States that this important strategic rela-
tionship be advanced. This communique
will make that possible, consistent with
our obligations to the people of Taiwan.

In working toward this successful
outcome, we have paid particular atten-
tion to the needs and interests of the
people of Taiwan. My longstanding per-
sonal friendship and deep concern for
their well-being is steadfast and un-
changed. I am committed to maintaining
the full range of contacts between the
people of the United States and the peo-
ple of Taiwan — cultural, commercial,
and people-to-people contacts — which
are compatible with our unofficial rela-
tionship. Such contacts will continue to
grow and prosper and will be conducted
with the dignity and honor befitting old
friends.

Regarding future U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan, our policy, set forth clearly in
the communique, is fully consistent with
the Taiwan Relations Act. Arms sales
will continue in accordance with the act
and with the full expectation that the
approach of the Chinese Government to
the resolution of the Taiwan issue will
continue to be peaceful. We attach great
significance to the Chinese statement in
the communique regarding China's "fun-
damental" policy; and it is clear from
our statements that our future actions
will be conducted with this peaceful
policy fully in mind. The position of the
U.S. Government has always been clear
and consistent in this regard. The
Taiwan question is a matter for the
Chinese people, on both sides of the
Taiwan Strait, to resolve. We will not
interfere in this matter or prejudice the
free choice of, or put pressure on, the
people of Taiwan in this matter. At the
same time, we have an abiding interest
and concern that any resolution be
peaceful. I shall never waver from this
fundamental position.

I am proud, as an American, at the
great progress that has been made by
the people on Taiwan, over the past
three decades and of the American con-
tribution to that process. I have full
faith in the continuation of that process.
My Administration, acting through ap-
propriate channels, will continue strong-
ly to foster that development and to con-
tribute to a strong and healthy invest-
ment climate, thereby enhancing the
well-being of the people of Taiwan.

Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents of Aug. 23, 1982. ■

EAST ASIA

point to clarify our stand on a number of
issues which have surfaced in such spec-
ulations.

As to our position on the resolution
of the Taiwan problem, we have consist-
ently held that it is a matter to be
worked out by the Chinese themselves.
Our sole and abiding concern is that any
resolution be peaceful. It follows that we
see no mediation role for the United
States nor will we attempt to exert
pressure on Taiwan to enter into negoti-
ations with the People's Republic of
China (P.R.C.).

I would also call your attention to
the fact that there has been no change
in our longstanding position on the issue
of sovereignty over Taiwan. The com-
munique (paragraph 1) in its opening
paragraph simply cites that portion of
the joint communique on the establish-
ment of diplomatic relations between the
United States and the P.R.C. in which
the United States "acknowledged the
Chinese position" on this issue (i.e., that
there is but one China and Taiwan is a
part of China).

It has been reported in the press
that the Chinese at one point suggested
that the Taiwan Relations Act be re-
vised. We have no plans to seek any
such revisions.

Finally, in paragraph 9 the two sides
agree to "maintain contact and hold ap-
propriate consultations on bilateral and
international issues of common interest."
This should be read within the context
of paragraphs 8 and 9, which deal with
the two sides' desire to advance their
bilateral and strategic relations. It
should not be read to imply that we have
agreed to engage in prior consultations
with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan.

We hope and expect that this com-
munique, and the step forward which it
represents in the resolution of U.S.-
Chinese differences on this issue, will
enhance the confidence of the people of
Taiwan, whose well-being and prosperity
continue to be of the utmost importance
to us. From the President on down, we
have acted in a way which seeks to
enhance the future security and pros-
perity of the people of Taiwan, and I call
your attention to the emphasis on this
matter in the President's statement
which was released simultaneously with
the release of the communique yester-
day.

Removal of the arms question as a
serious issue in U.S. -China relations will
help to insure that both countries can
continue to cooperate on mutually
shared international objectives, e.g., de-
terring Soviet aggression in Ecist Asia

and removal of Vietnamese troops from
Kampuchea. It will ease fears by Ameri-
can friends and allies that the general
peace and stability in the AsiayPaCific
region could be undermined. By defusing
the difficult issue of arms sales, we will
open the way for an expansion of U.S.-
China relations in a broad range of eco-
nomic, cultural, scientific, and techno-
logical areas as well as in people-to-
people contact.

In conclusion, I would like to quote a
paragraph from the statement issued by
President Reagan yesterday:

Building a strong and lasting reiationshi |ii
with China has been an important foreign in-
policy goal of four consecutive American Ac ni
ministrations. Such a relationship is vital to
our long-term national security interests an< hr
contributes to stability in East Asia. It is in
the national interest of the United States
that this important strategic relationship be
advanced. This communique will make that
possible, consistent with our obligations to
the people of Taiwan.

The complete transcript of the hearinHL||,

will be published by the committee and
be avaikible from tne Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

krc

U.S.-China Relations, 1981

The following chronology was
prepared by the Office of Chinese Affairs
in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs. A chronology covering 1979-80
was published in the February 1981
Bulletin.

January 12

Fang Yi (Vice Premier and Minister of the
State Scientific and Technological Commis-
sion) meets delegation led by Congressman
Donald Fuqua (D.-Fla.), chairman of the
House Committee on Science and Technol-
ogy-
January 13

Social Sciences and Humanities Planning
Commission delegation, led by Kenneth
Prewitt, arrives in Beijing to discuss ex-
changes in these fields with Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences.

January 20

Xinhua reports that a U.S. Department of
State spokesman announced that the only
representative from China officially invited to
attend the inauguration of President-elect
Ronald Reagan is Ambassador to the U.S.
Chai Zemin.

Premier Zhao Ziyang congratulates Presi-
dent Reagan on his inauguration, citing prin-
ciples of the Shanghai communique.

January 26

Civil Aviation Administration of China
(CAAC) opens air service between China and
the U.S.

January 28

Pan American World Airways opens air serv-
ice between the U.S. and China.

February 11

Huang Hua (Vice Premier and Minister of
Foreign Affairs) meets with outgoing U.S.
Ambassador Leonard Woodcock.

February 15

Bank of America delegation arrives in Beiji
to attend the opening ceremony of its Beij;
office.

February 17

Deng Xiaoping (Vice Chairman) meets Bar
of America delegation. ^

February 19 Ft

Educational Testing Service President
William Turnbull arrives in Beijing with hi Jj,,,
party to hold discussions with the Ministrj
Education on the administration of Americ ^j
standardization tests in China. (A six-perS' .yj
Chinese delegation from the Ministry of
Education reciprocates the visit in April.)

February 20

A 50-member delegation, led by President
the National Council for U.S.-China Trade
Christopher H. Phillips, meets with Ye
Jianying (Vice Chairman. Standing Comm
tee of the National People's Congress— N!
and Zhang Wenjin (Vice Minister of Forei
Affairs).

Secretary of State Haig meets in
Washington with Ambassador Chai. Xinht
describes the meeting as "very friendly."

February 25

At the invitation of Panam, Shen Tu {CAj
director) leads delegation to U.S. to celebi
the inauguration of air services between
China and the U.S. Delegation visits
Washington, New York, Orlando, and San
Francisco.

March 14

Vice President Bush meets with Ambassat ^"
Chai and Ji Chaozhu (Deputy Director of i
Foreign Ministry '.s Department of Americ
and Oceanian Affairs). Meeting described
Xinhua as "cordial."

itsi

Department of State BulhJB-j

EAST ASIA

larch 16

Ixxon Corp. chairman of the board C. Garvin
■ads delegation to Beijing.

larch 18

arvin meets with Yu Qiuh (Vice Premier)
mi Qin Wencai (Deputy General Manager,
etroleum Corp. of China).

National Council for U.S. -China Trade
lairman of the board David S. Tappan car-
e.-^ Iftter from President Reagan to the
luiuil affirming the Administration's desire
' "improve prospects for the development of
•ade with the P.R.C."

arch 19

XXI in delegation meets with Yao Yilin (Vice
renuer).

President Reagan holds first formal
eeting with Ambassador Chai, who is ac-
impanied by Deputy Director Ji. The Presi-
mt pledges to promote Sino-U.S. relations
n the basis of the principles laid down" in
e 1979 joint communique on the establish-
ent of diplomatic relations between the two
un tries.

arch 22-27

)rmer President Gerald Ford visits China at
e invitation of the Chinese Government. He
sets with Premier Zhao, Vice Chairman
>ng. Vice Premier and Foreign Minister
iang, and Vice Minister Zhang. On March 23,
ird delivers an "oral, friendly message"
Vice Chairman Deng and a letter to
eniier Zhao from President Reagan during
•iendly" conversations with them in Beijing.

arch 26

) Yiho (Vice Premier), addressing the
legation from the board of directors and its
airman Tappan of the National Council for
•S. -China Trade in Beijing, says he ap-
eciates President Reagan's position on pro-
itmg trade between China and the U.S.

arch 30- April 2

S Coast Guard Commandant Adm. John
Hayes visits China at the invitation of the
ni.-^try of Communications. He meets with
HI .lian (Vice Minister of Communications)
di.scuss implementation of the Sino-U.S.
intime transportation agreement.

arch 31

emier Zhao sends a message to President
jagan expressing his concern over the
•esident's health following the assassination
tempt.

iril 1

linese Society of Astronautics delegation,
i by Chen Bin, arrives in Washington to
lit the U.S. and watch the launching and
* iding of the space shuttle. Delegation was
vited by Congressman Fuqua.

ay 6-21

Fengping (Governor of Zheijiang Province)
rives in the U.S. to sign a sister State-prov-
ce relationship agreement between New
irsey and Zhejiang.

jll!:tober1982

May 7

Delegation of women leaders from the Na-
tional Committee for U.S. -China Relations ar-
rives in Beijing for a 3-week visit, hosted by
the All Chinese Women's Federation.

American Film Week opens at the Na-
tionalities Cultural Palace in Beijing begin-
ning a five-city tour. Fay Kanin, president of
the Academy of Motion Pictures Arts and
Sciences, leads the delegation and meets with
Chinese cinema counterparts. Zao Zhongming
(Vice Minister of the Commission of Cultural
Relations with Foreign Countries — CCRFC)
and Chen Huangmei (Vice Minister of
Culture) attend the opening.

May 12

Ding Bo (chairman, China National Publica-
tions Import/Export Corp.) opens a 2-week
exhibition in Beijing of 18,000 American
books, organized by the Assn. of Anierican
Publishers, Assn. of American University
Presses, U.S. Government Printing Office,
and the Learned Societies. Duplicate exhibi-
tions open concurrently in Changhai, Wuhan,
Chengdu, Shenyang, and Lanzhou. A delega-
tion of 40 American publishers visits China
for approximately 2 weeks in conjunction
with these exhibitions.

Presidential counselor Edwin Meese HI
says that the U.S. would carry out in its en-
tirety the provisions of the Taiwan Relations
Act.

May 13

U.S. trade union delegation, led by Louis
Goldblatt, arrives in Beijing for a visit at the
invitation of the All-China Federation of
Trade Unions.

May 15

U.S. trade union delegation meets with Vice
Premier Bo and Kang Yonghe (vice presi-
dent, All-China Federation of Trade Unions).

State Department spokesman Dean
Fischer clarifies the remarks of Presidential
counselor Meese on May 12 that the U.S.
would carry out in its entirety the provisions
of the Taiwan Relations Act. Fischer explains
that this does not imply that the U.S. has an
official relationship with Taiwan. He also ex-
plains that by "official visitors," Meese meant
representatives of the Coordination Council
for North American Affairs (CCNAA).

May 20

Vice President Bush meets with Zhejiang
Province Governor Li at the White House.
Also present are Ambassador Chai, Secretary
of Commerce Malcolm Baldridge, Assistant
for National Security Affairs Richard V.
Allen, and Under Secretary of State Walter
J. Stoessel, Jr.

May 21

Vice Premier Bo meets with T.A. Wilson,
chairman of the board of Boeing Corp., and
his party in Beijing.

May 25

Sino-American editorial review board meets
in Beijing on the Chinese-language version of
Encyclopedia Britannica's Micropaedia.

May 30

President Reagan sends a message to Vice
Chairman Ye expressing his personal con-
dolences over the death of Madame Soong
Chingling, honorary State Chairman of
China.

June 2

Vice Premier Bo meets with the chairman of
the board of directors of the R.J. Reynolds
Industrial Group. Delegation visits China at
the invitation of Song Jiwen (Minister of
Light Industry).

June 2-5

First international trade symposium, spon-
sored by the International Trade Institute
under the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade
and the Stanford Research Institute Interna-
tional, held in Beijing where experts ex-
change information to help both parties bet-
ter understand Chinese and foreign markets.

June 3

President Reagan makes China eligible, as a
friendly country, to purchase military equip-
ment; he also liberalizes the export of
technology to China and removes restrictive
clauses from U.S. legislation, which treat
China and the Soviet Union equally.

June 4

A copyright delegation, led by David Ladd of
the Library of Congress and Harvey Winter
of the State Department, arrives in Beijing
for 10 days of lectures and discussions spon-
sored by the China Publishers Assn.

June 12

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman says
that China remains opposed to the sale of
U.S. arms to Taiwan. Cnina views such sales
as interference in its internal affairs and a
violation of the agreement on normalizing
Sino-L'.S. relations.

June 14-17

Secretary Haig visits China at the invitation
of Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Huang.
He meets with Premier Zhao, Vice Chairman
Deng, Vice Premier Bo, and Geng Biao (Vice
Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party —
CCP— and Minister of Defense). He delivers
to Zhao a letter from President Reagan and
also an invitation on the President's behalf to
visit the U.S. During this visit, it was agreed:

• To hold a second LI. S. -China Joint
Economic Committee meeting to be headed
by Treasury Secretary Donald T. Regan and
Vice Premier Bo;

• To establish separate joint commissions
on commerce and trade; and

• That exchanges between U.S. and
Chinese defense establishments will continue
to expand. Liu Huaqing (Deputy Chief of the
General Staff of the People's Liberation
Army — PLA) would lead China's delegation
to the U.S. this year.

EAST ASIA

June 15

Committee of Scholarly Communication with
the P.R.C. sponsors an international con-
ference on educational exchanges with China
in Bellagio, Italy. Representatives from eight
countries attend.

Dalian Training Center for Science and
Technologj' Management (a I'.S. project to
help China train senior economic planners,
administrators, and managers) begins its sec-
ond course. (Under the umbrella of the
science and technology agreement, the center
is granted under a protocol between China's
State Scientific and Technological Commis-
sion and the U.S. Department of Commerce.)

June 16

China and the U.S. reach agreement and ex-
change notes in Beijing on the establishment
of three additional consulates general in each
other's country; Vice Premier and Foreign
Minister Huang and Secretary Haig attend
the ceremony. China will set up consulates
general in New York, Chicago, and Honolulu;
the U.S. will establish them in Shenyang,
Wuhan, and Chengdu.

June 17

Xinhua article states President Reagan said
in June 16 news conference that U.S. wants
to improve relations with P.R.C. and that the
lifting of restrictions on military equipment
sales to China "is a normal part of the proc-
ess of improving our relations there."

Taiwan authorities describe as "unfor-
tunate" the U.S. decision to sell weapons to
China.

June 26

Li Xiannian (Vice Chairman) and Vice
Premier Bo meet David Rockefeller, chair-
man of the board of the Chase Manhattan
Bank, who is in Beijing to preside over the
opening ceremony of the bank's Beijing of-
fice.

Vice Premier Yao meets with Richard E.
Lyng, Deputy Secretary of Agriculture, and
his delegation.

Nebraska Governor Charles Thone ar-
rives in Beijing, heading delegation at the in-
vitation of the China Council for the Promo-
tion of International Trade.

June 28

During televised public affairs program.
Secretary Haig says that Beijing
"understood" the U.S. obligations to the peo-
ple of Taiwan, including "the provision of
defense armaments." China's opposition to
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is reiterated.

July 1

Governor Thone's delegation meets with Gu
Mu (Vice Premier).

Julys

Attending the U.S. Independence Day recep-
tion at the American Embassy in Beijing are
Minister in charge of the CCRFC Huang,
Vice Minister Zhang, Deputy Chief of the
PLA General Staff Liu, and Ambassador
Chai.

Vice Chairman Deng meets with the
visiting delegation from the Occidental
Petroleum Corp., led by chairman of the
board Armand Hammer.

Julys

Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security
adviser, and his party arrive in Shanghai.

July 15

In 'Taiwan, President Chiang Ching-kuo, in a
speech to the Kuomintang Central Standing
Committee, expresses satisfaction with the
current pace of improvement of relations
with the U.S.

July 16

Brzezinski and party arrive in Beijing after a
10-day tour of China's southwest provinces
and are hosted by Vice Minister Zhang.

July 29

Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., is confirmed as U.S.
Ambassador to China.

August 10

Nine American economists, led by D. Gale
Johnson, arrive in Beijing to hold an eco-
nomics development workshop for 80 Chinese
economists.

August 15-22

Congressman Clarence Long (D.-Md.), chair-
man of the Government Operations Subcom-
mittee of the House Appropriations Commit-
tee, and a congressional delegation visit
China at the invitation of the Chinese
People's Institute of Foreigfn Affairs.

August 20

Vice Premier Bo meets with the visiting
House Ways and Means Committee delega-
tion led by Sam M. Gibbons (D., Fla.).

August 22

Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Com-
mittee, Mark Hatfield (R.-Ore.), leads delega-
tion to Beijing at the invitation of the
Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs.
On August 24 Vice Premier Bo meets the
delegation.

August 23

Vice President and Secretary of the World
Bank Timothy T. Thahane arrives in Beijing.
On August 26 he meets with Vice Premier
Gu and Li Peng (Vice Minister of Finance).

August 24-September 3

Former President Jimmy Carter visits China,
where he meets Premier Zhao, Vice Chair-
man Deng, and Hu Yaobang (Chairman). The
delegation tours Beijing, Xian, Suzhou, and
Shanghai.

August 26

Xinhua commentary criticizes Congressman
Clement Zablocki's (D.-Wis.) statement made
at the end of his visit to Taiwan. Zablocki,
chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee, refers to Taiwan as the "Republic of
China" and tells the press that the U.S. is

willing to sell advanced weapons to Taiwan
and would reach a decision early next yeai
sale of F-X jet fighters.

Senator John Glenn (D.-Ohio) arrives ir
Hong Kong from China. At an airport newi
conference on August 28, before departing
for Taipei, he states that Sino-U.S. relatiot
could retrogress if the issue of U.S. arms
sales to Taiwan is not resolved to Beijing's
satisfaction. t

August 31-September 10

Chief Justice of the United States Warren
Burger visits China at the invitation of th«
Ministry of Justice. On September 1 he mi
with Jiang Hua (President, Supreme Peopi !ii
Court) and on September 4 with Vice Chai n
man Deng.

September 1

Zhong Xidong (Vice Foreign Minister) staik
at a news conference that in order to reall
peaceful reunification, the CCP does not n ip
quire the Taiwan authorities to practice
socialism. He states that China hopes onlj
that the Taiwan authorities will practice f' at
Yat-sen's revolutionary "Three Principles
the People." f({il

September-October

An exhibition of American paintings fron"
Boston Museum of Fine Arts opens at the i
China Art Gallery in Beijing for 1 month,
followed by another month in Shanghai.
Minister in charge of the CCRFC Huang,
Chief Justice Burger, and U.S. Internatic
Communication Agency (USICA) Directo
Charles Z. Wick open the exhibition.

September 2

A seven-member Bureau of Urban Const %m
tion delegation, led by Qiu Zhongfang, ai
in New York for a 3-week official visit hi
by the U.S. National Park Service.

ipti

fiti

September 3

A delegation of the American Assn. of
Railroads, led by association Vice Presid
W.J. Harris, arrives in Beijing for a visi
the invitation of the Ministry of Railway
the China Railway Society. On Septemb
the delegation meets with Vice Premier

September 4

USICA Director Wick and Jan Fontein,
Director of the Boston Museum of Fine
meet with Vice Chairman Deng.

(piti

■ait

ilia

Kdir

September 5

A 1982-83 cultural exchange accord is s
by Minister in charge of CCRFC Huang
USICA Director Wick. The accord i.s thifiest
ond since the signing of the cultural agr
ment between the two countries in Idli

September 7

Choreographer Jerome Robbins and his
of ballet dancers arrive in China for 3 v
of official cultural performances and me
classes in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guang ssl

oftt
imiaai

Department of State Bu fc.

"til a

EAST ASIA

A White House Fellows Assn. delegation,
sd by Dana Mead, arrives in Beijing for a
isit at the invitation of the Chinese People's
nstitute of Foreign Affairs.

The U.S. -China People's Friendship Assn.
oncludes its eighth national convention in
louston.

eptember 9

Lccording to Xinhua, former President
larter says his trip to China has convinced
im that China attaches great importance to
;s friendship with the U.S. and that it is im-
ortant that the Reagan Administration does
ot harm those relations in dealing with
'aiwan. Carter says the U.S. must be "very
rudent, careful" on the issue of selling
'eapons to Taiwan and insure that the
eapons sold to Taiwan are of a defensive
ature and "will not be used against the
lainland."

eptember 11

. new 5-year $5 billion grain purchasing con-
•act is signed in Chicago by 'Taiwan repre-
entatives.

leptember 16

Pengfei (Vice Premier) meets with the
isiting delegation from the U.S. National
ssn. of Attorneys General. The delegation is
d by John Ashcroft, President of the
Bsociation and Attorney General of Missouri.

eptember 17

, i ice Premier and Minister of the State Scien-
fic and Technological Commission Fang
eets with a visiting group of U.S. nuclear
;perts led by Assistant Secretary of State
imes L. Malone. The delegation visits at the
\ nation of the commission.

1 eptember 24
mbassador Hummel presents his credentials
i Deng Yingchao (Vice Chairman, Standing
onimittee of the NPC).

,; eptember 28

:;, or the first time, Chinese representatives
,-f tend the IBRD/IMF annual meeting in
i^ 'ashington.

■t
eptember 30

ice Chairman Ye outlines a nine-point pro-
)sal to bring about peaceful reunification
ith Taiwan. He states that Taiwan could
aintain its own armed forces and its own
:onomy and local government and invites
ip Koumintang leaders to take up positions
the central government in Beijing. Ye's
)eech represents China's most authoritative
jblic statement on reunification to date.

ctober 1

he first Eximbank loan to China is signed in
'ashington.

ctober 3

aiwan spokesman Sung Chu-yu says Ye's
J eaceful reunification proposal is a continua-
on of the Communists' united-front prop-
i;anda and contains nothing new. He

iiMCtober1982

specifically derides Beijing's offer of economic
assistance to Taiwan. On October 3 Sung's
dismissal of the Chinese offer is broadcast to
the China mainland from Matsu.

The General Administration of Civil Avia-
tion of China announces that it is already to
negotiate at any time with the aviation
departments on Taiwan to establish air
transport between the mainland and Taiwan.

The Washington, D.C., chapter of the
U.S. -China People's Friendship Assn. and the
National Assn. of Chinese Americans hold a
joint gathering to celebrate the 32d anniver-
sary of the founding of the P.R.C. Am-
bassador Chai attends.

October 7

Taipei's central news agency reports Presi-
dent Chiang stated Taiwan will never "nego-
tiate" with the Chinese Communists.

October 8

Harold Brown, former U.S. Secretary of
Defense, and his party arrive in China at the
invitation of the Beijing Institute for Interna-
tional Strategic Studies.

October 9

Brown's delegation meets with Deputy Chief
of the PLA General Staff Liu, Wu Xiuquan
(director of the institute), and Vice Premier
and Defense Minister Geng.

For the first time, China celebrates the
October 10 anniversary of the 1911 revolu-
tion, traditionally celebrated by Taiwan as its
National Day. Chairman Hu delivers a speech
praising Sun Yat-sen and others for contribu-
tions to the revolution and invites President
Chiang and other leaders on Taiwan to visit
the mainland.

October 12

Xinhua criticizes national security adviser
Allen's remarks on Taiwan reunification with
the mainland. Allen had stated that the level
of the U.S. relationship with Taiwan would
continue to be governed by the Taiwan Rela-
tions Act until some permanent solution is
found.

October 14

A 10-member delegation of PLA and medical
officers, led by Zhang Xiang (Director, Public
Health Department of the General Logistics
Department), leaves Beijing for the U.S. at
the invitation of the Department of Defense.

October 15

China Film Week opens at the American
Film Institute in Washington, D.C., begin-
ning a seven-city tour. Cheng Yin (President,
Beijing Film Institute) leads delegation to at-
tend opening and meets with American
cinema counterparts.

October 15-17

The second meeting of the U.S.-P.R.C. Joint
Commission on Scientific and Technological
Cooperation is held in Washington. Vice
Premier and Minister of the State Scientific
and Technological Commission Fang and Dr.

George Keyworth, science adviser to the
President, cochair the meeting. Three addi-
tional protocols to the U.S.-P.R.C. Agree-
ment on Cooperation in Science and
Technology are signed.

October 16

Education delegation from China, sponsored
by USICA, visits U.S. and agrees on imple-
mentation of educational exchange accords of
the science and technology agreement.

October 16-18

Secretary of Agriculture John Block visits
China at the invitation of the Ministry of
Agriculture. He meets with Lin Hijia
(Minister of Agriculture), Wan Li (Vice
Premier), and Minister of Light Industry
Song.

October 18

Pu Tongxiu (Vice Minister of Education)
begins a 2-week tour to visit American
universities and educational organizations
following the meeting of the Joint Commis-
sion on Scientific and Technological Coopera-
tion.

Former Defense Secretary Brown meets
with Vice Chairman Deng.

October 19

Vice Premier Yao meets with a delegation
from the U.S. Allied Bank International, led
by the president of the bank. The delegation
came at the invitation of the Bank of China.

October 20

Boston Museum of Fine Arts exhibition of
American paintings opens in Shanghai for a
1 -month showing.

October 21

At Cancun, Mexico, Premier Zhao and Presi-
dent Reagan meet for lunch. Secretaries Haig
and Regan and Vice Premier and Foreign
Minister Huang also attend.

Eleven-member provincial higher educa-
tional delegation, led by Lin Chuan (Director,
Guangdong Province's Bureau of Higher
Education), arrives for a 3V2-week visit
hosted by the American Assn. of State Col-
leges and Universities (AASCU). This visit
reciprocates the 3V2-week visit to China by
AASCU President Allan Ostar and his
delegation of American educators. An educa-
tional exchange agreement is signed between
the AASCU and the Ministry of Education.

October 22-23

Premier Zhao attends the international
meeting on cooperation and development held
in Cancun, Mexico.

October 23

The Chinese delegation to the second meeting
of the Joint Commission on Scientific and
Technological Cooperation returns to Beijing
after stops in Los Angeles and San Fran-
cisco.

EAST ASIA

October 23-31

A nuclear technologj' exhibit, sponsored by
the American Nuclear Society, opens in Bei-
jing. On October 27 the president of the soci-
ety, Corwin L. Richard, expresses satisfac-
tion with the Chinese response to the exhibi-
tion.

October 28-31

Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Huang
visits Washington, D.C., at the invitation of
Secretary Haig. He meets with President
Reagan. Vice President Bush, Treasury
Secretary Regan, and holds two rounds of
meetings with Haig, who describes these
discussions as an extension of the Cancun
talks.

October 28-November 12

An 11 -member delegation of the national
committee of the Communist Party Central
Committee (CPCC) visits the U.S. at the in-
vitation of the National Committee for
U.S.-China relations. The delegation is led by
Wang Shoudao (Vice Chairman, CPCC na-
tional committee) and Ping Jiesan (Standing
Committee member of the national commit-
tee). The delegation visits San Francisco,
Minneapolis, Washington, New York, and
meets with Vice President Bush.

November 2

Taiwan National Assembly members send
cables to President Reagan, senators, and
congressmen urging the U.S. not to sell arms
to the P.R.C. The assemblymen point out
that the P.R.C. has never given up its ambi-
tion to "liberate" Taiwan by force.

November 2-6

A symposium sponsored by the Office of
Earthquake Resistance under the State
Capital Construction Commission of China
and the U.S. National Science Foundation is
held in Beijing. (A Sino-American protocol for
scientific and technical cooperation in earth-
quake studies was signed last January.)

November 10

Xinhua reports that a New York Times arti-
cle says that the U.S. was close to approving
the sale of advanced fighter planes to Taiwan
and that a recent Wall Street Journal article
urges the Administration to sell arms quickly
to Taiwan. The Chinese notes that the dispo-
sition of this issue would show whether the
U.S. Government respects the sovereign
rights of China or any other state.

U.S. Under Secretary of Sute Walter J.
Stoessel, Jr., and party arrive in Beijing.

November 11

Under Secretary Stoessel meets with Vice
Minister of Foreign^ Affairs Zhang.

November 12

Under Secretary Stoessel meets with Vice
Premier and Foreign Minister Huang.

A Xinhua article quotes Stoessel as say-
ing that he and Chinese officials "have found
in general a remarkable compatibility of
views" on issues of mutual interest in the
talks held in the past 2 days. The talks cover
all of the major areas in the world including
Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Central
America, and Southeast Asia. U.S. arms sales
to Taiwan "was only touched in passing."

November 14

Xinhua article criticizes the Governor of
Georgia for designating November 12 as the
"day of the Republic of China." The
governor's proclamation refers to Taiwan as
"free China" and the "Republic of China."

November 15

The China-U.S. metallurgical conference
opens in Beijing. The U.S. delegation consists
of a team of 40 experts. Zhou Peiyuan
(member of the presidium of the Chinese
Academy of Science) attends the opening
ceremony.

November 16

Vice Premier Yu meets with a delegation
from the U.S. Committee on Scholarly Com-
munication with the P.R.C, led by its chair-
man, Charles Townsend. Professor Townsend
visits China to discuss bilateral academic ex-
changes.

November 16-19

Treasury Secretary Regan visits China to
cochair the 3-day second annual meeting of
the Joint Economic Committee with Vice
Premier Bo. He also meets with Wang
Binggian (Minister of Finance) and discusses
expansion of Sino-U.S. economic relations
with Vice Chairman Deng and Premier Zhao.

November 18

Colorado Lt. Governor Nancy Dick and Vice
Minister of the CCRFC Yao preside at the
opening ceremony of the Denver Driscol
Gallery exhibition of western art at the Bei-
jing exhibition center.

Secretary Regan and Finance Minister
Wang sign an agreement providing reciprocal
exception from taxation of shipping earnings.

November 19

A 2-month exhibition, combining works from
the Museum of the American Indian and the
Auschutz Collection of U.S. western art,
opens at the Chinese History Museum in Bei-
jing. Mrs. Joan Mondale, Vice Minister Yao,
and Roland Force, curator of the Museum of
American History in New York, preside at
the opening.

November 21

A delegation of executives of educational
foundations, led by the dean of UCLA's
Graduate School of Education John Goodlad,
arrives in Beijing for a visit hosted by the
Ministry of Education.

November 22

Former Vice President Walter Mondale visit
China and meets with Vice Chairman Deng.

November 23

International tax counsel Alan W. Granwell
of the Treasury Department and Liu
Zhicheng (Director, China's General Taxatiof
Bureau) initial a treaty concerning the mutu;
exception from taxation of airline and ship-
ping income.

November 27

Wang Tiao (Taiwan military spokesman) say
that the Chinese Communists' united front
peace overture is another form of war de-
signed to split the solidarity of Taiwan and
soften the people's opposition to communisn*!!

December 10

U.S.-China Education Clearinghouse release-|ui,
publication on P.R.C. Institutional Profiks,
adding to other publications released earliei
this year entitled China Bound, Assisting
Students and Scholars from the P.R.C, and
American Study Programs in China.

December 11-12

American standardized examinations— the
TOEFL and the GRE — are administered in
Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou to both (
ficially sponsored and privately sponsored
Chinese students and scholars.

December 16

Coca-Cola bottling plant opens in Guangzhc

December 22

('hinese Consulate General opens in New
York. ■

Department of State Bullet

If pi
hi

EAST ASIA

U.S. Consultations With ASEAN

Deputy Secretary of State Walter J.
Stix'fisel, Jr., represented the United
Stiites at the postministerial consulta-
tions of the Association of South East
.4 .<((!« Nations (ASEAN) in Singapore
mJune 17-18, 1982. Following are his
rremarks before that session on June 18.

Il most appreciate this opportunity to
Imeet with the Foreign Ministers of the
Association of South East Asian Nations
ASEAN). My government places great
importance on your organization and on
3ur relations with each of its individual
members.

Dynamic, Well-Tended Societies

The front pages of newspapers these
Says may lead some to believe that the
Jnited States is so busy fighting brush
"ires and larger conflagrations around
he world that it does not place value on
ts longstanding relations in noncrisis
ireas. As a brush fire fighter for the
ieagan Administration, I wish to dis-
agree. Not far from us here today are
irt'as with dangerously low flashpoints.
lu'se concern us all very deeply, and I
v'ill say more about them later. But I
vant first to pay tribute to the dynamic,
veli-tended societies of ASEAN.

While we must deal with crises and
hreats to protect our common interests
.nd preserve peace in the world, we
nust also sustain and strengthen these
elationships which are not necessarily
ried by daily crisis. As Prime Minister
^ee Kuan Yew [Singapore] so eloquently
lointed out, ASEAN is an exception in
he Third World by reason of its success
n(i its stability.

The emphasis that ASEAN has
ijaced since its inception on cooperation
or economic and social development has
mproved not only your peoples' stand-
.rds of living but also their security. To-
.ay we find ASEAN growth rates to be
mong the highest and longest sustained
a the world. Clearly you have a great
ieal to be proud of — and to protect.

^he Rewards of a Cooperative,
Competitive System

Ve place value not just on economic
:rowth rates themselves, of course, but
Iso on the system from which they
pring. Foreign Minister Ghazali
Malaysia] has well-focused our thoughts

on the central importance of the private
enterprise system characteristic of your
societies and mine. Indeed, there is one
remarkable factor about the phenomenal
economic growth we witnessed earlier in
Northeast Asia and are seeing today in
Southeast Asia. Each successful country
has competed within the world market
in its own way without sacrificing the
key values that comprise national identi-
ty. Competition has been within the con-
text of cooperation between like-minded
states. The system which provides these
mutual benefits has thus been main-
tained.

My words describing your ac-
complishments reflect some of the basic
values which underlie all Americans'
thinking and which have been given par-
ticular emphasis by the Reagan Ad-
ministration. Primary among these is
the belief that both social and economic
progress depends in great part on giving
free rein to local initiative. We believe
this is a system which is on the one hand
competitive, and thus efficient, and on
the other cooperative, and thus con-
structive.

The success of our Asian — and par-
ticularly ASEAN— friends reinforces
this belief. Nowhere has the effec-
tiveness of local initiative been more
salient than in the ASEAN countries' in-
dividual records of raising their popula-
tions' standard of living and, more
recently, in their cooperative endeavor
to focus the world's attention on a
peaceful solution for Kampuchea.

Threats of Our Cooperative
Economic System

My government recognizes that threats
to which I have labeled our cooperative,
competitive system can come from
within, that imbalances can lead nations
to withdraw from both competition and
cooperation.

The current world slump highlights
the exposed situation of those lesser
developed countries overly dependent on
the export of commodities with volatile
prices. It increases the temptation to
enter into cartels in situations where
such measures are certain to be self-
defeating. It dramatizes the need to
make room for the exports of those
countries newly moving into industrial
production. It accentuates the harmful
aspect of long-term trade imbalances

between developed countries. In par-
ticular, I would note that we, too, are
very concerned by the growing tendency
toward protectionism.

We fully realize the degree to which
the massive U.S. economy affects the
world environment. In good part for this
reason, the Reagan Administration has
placed top priority on getting its
domestic economy into order. In so do-
ing, we have eschewed controls in favor
of incentives for local initiative and com-
petition. At a time when pressures for
increased protectionism have escalated
in most countries, leaders of the world's
major economic powers in their just con-
cluded Versailles summit firmly commit-
ted their nations to keep the system
open. We look forward to the GATT
[General Agreement on Tariffs and

Access to bases in Viet-
nam has extended the
Soviet military reach,
which could now
challenge sea passage
between the Pacific and
Indian Oceans.

Trade] ministerial in the fall, where our
goal is to extend the multilateral system
for a still freer flow of trade, services,
investment, and technology — all matters
of importance to your countries as well
as ours. We look to these and other ac-
tions in the coming months to bring a
turn-around in world economic pros-
pects.

My government is seeking means of
strengthening our trade relationship
with ASEAN, which, as a group, is
already our fifth largest partner. This
was, of course, a focus of our dialogue
with ASEAN in Washington last March
when I was pleased to be able to meet
and talk with your delegations. We wish
to work out the differences which
naturally arise from our role as a major
consumer of commodities, of which some
of the ASEAN countries are principal
producers.

October 1982

EAST ASIA

Competition With the Other World

Although free market economies may
now be going through one of the most
difficult periods of the postwar era, the
lead they have long held over Com-
munist economies is growing even
greater. Nowhere is this more evident
than in Asia, where Vietnam's and
North Korea's misdirected and misman-
aged economies contrast starkly with
the prosperity of their neighbors. The
extraordinary difficulty of presenting
these systems as a model for economic
and social development in Asia has
brought the export market for revolu-
tion near to collapse.

There is, nevertheless, more reason
for concern than complacency.
Totalitarian regimes have established a
clear historical pattern of compensating
for economic failure with military adven-
turism. And the poor market for revolu-
tion can well lead certain states to take
more direct routes to their goals.

The Soviet Union, in many respects,
has deepened its confrontational cast.
Military arms constitute its leading
foreign exchange earner as well as,
overwhelmingly, the largest component
of its foreign assistance. Domestic
growth of the Soviet military sectors has
kept pace with arms exports.

This has been particularly evident in
Asia, where the Soviet Pacific fleet is
characterized by greatly improved
capabilities. Formidable Soviet land
forces are backed up by over 3,000 air-
craft. Access to bases in Vietnam has
extended the Soviet military reach,
which could now challenge sea passage
between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
We are also deeply concerned by the ex-
port of Soviet chemical warfare
technology to Laos and Vietnam and the
use of lethal chemical agents by those
regimes against civilian populations.

The United States remains dedicated
to meeting the Soviet challenge. We will
address our difficult problems of
economic recovery — yet we will continue
to accord our defenses high priority. Our
policy, however, is not one of confronta-
tion in purely military terms but of
demonstrating to the Soviet Union the
need for moderation and restraint in the
international arena.

Mutual reduction of nuclear arma-
ments is one important route toward
reduction of tensions. President Reagan
and Secretary Haig are this week in
New York at the U.N. Special Session
on Disarmament to pursue this goal

which, we are convinced, is far prefer-
able to unrestrained nuclear competition.
We shall continue this endeavor while
remaining militarily strong.

Kampuchea and ASEAN's
Contribution to Peace

Vietnam's intransigence and ag-
gressiveness remain one of our principal
concerns and the major destabilizing ele-
ment in the region. The aging Viet-
namese leadership has shattered its own
promises and its talented peoples'
dreams of peaceful reconstruction. Their
misallocation of resources for militaristic
foreign adventures has badly hurt the
Vietnamese economy. Persecution, cor-
ruption, and despair still drive thousands
of Vietnamese to seek refuge outside
their homeland. Vietnamese policies and
military forces deny the other peoples of
Indochina the same independence and
freedom which, according to Ho Chi
Minh, the Vietnamese cherish for
themselves. Their ambitions have
aligned them with external powers, not

The Vietnamese
Government has said it
accepts our position that
[accounting for the U.S.
servicemen missing-in-
action] is a humani-
tarian issue which is not
linked to political and
economic matters.

their natural neighbors in ASEAN, and
introduced Sino-Soviet rivalry to
Southeast Asia.

The United States has followed
ASEAN's lead in seeking a comprehen-
sive political solution to the Kampuchean
problem which would result in a with-
drawal of Vietnamese forces from Kam-
puchea and Khmer self-determination.
We will continue to support you strongly
because we believe your approach is cor-
rect and, over time, effective. We share
your view that continued international
pressure is required to induce Vietnam
to negotiate a settlement based on the
declaration of the international con-

ference and repeated U.N. General
Assembly resolutions. We share your
support for efforts to the Khmer to
form a coalition to facilitate realization
of the conference's declaration.

ASEAN has had many successes in
carrying out its strategy on Kampuchea.
The U.N. General Assembly resolution
on Kampuchea last fall, the well-
attended international conference on
Kampuchea in New York, and the post-
ponement of OPEC [Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries] and
other multilateral assistance to Vietnam
are excellent examples. You have been
very effective in assembling interna-
tional support for your position, par-
ticularly from the nonaligned states.

Neither you nor we wish to bleed or
punish Vietnam. They have brought
their suffering on themselves through
their actions. Last year. Secretary of
State Haig stated that Vietnam has a
choice. We believe that choice remains
available to that country. It can agree t(
consider the rights of the Khmer people
to live free from foreign domination anc
to determine their own future. It can
consider the just concerns of ASEAN
and its other neighbors in the region. 0
it can continue to bear the severe conse
quences of its self-imposed diplomatic
and economic isolation. We hope that
Hanoi will eventually realize that its ow
national interests would be served best
by seeking a solution to the Kampuchea
problem which meets the legitimate in-
terests of all concerned countries.

In any event, ASEAN can continue
to count on full American support for
ASEAN's strategy for dealing with the
Kampuchea problem. As Foreign
Minister Dhanabalan [Singapore] point*
out, patience and perseverance in this
effort are essential.

Humanitarian Concerns

Bilaterally with Vietnam, we will con-
tinue to seek a complete accounting for
the U.S. servicemen missing-in-action i
Laos and Vietnam. President Reagan
has a personal abiding interest in resol
tion on this issue.

The Vietnamese Government has
said it accepts our position that this is
humanitarian issue which is not linked
political and economic matters. We can
only hope that the Vietnamese will tat
actions in accordance with this principl
We would welcome assistance of the
ASEAN nations by whatever means,

The continued granting of first
asylum to Indochinese refugees by
neighboring countries is a humanitariai

EAST ASIA

response to tragedy which earns
worldwide respect. The United States
will share this heavy burden by continu-
iiic its resettlement programs and, with
the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), by urging other
resettlement countries to do their fair
share.

The United States, as well as some
other principal resettlement countries,
seeks an enlargement of the orderly
departure program so that potential
refugees will not have to resort to
dangerous clandestine flight. Some prog-
ress has been made in this direction, and
we want more. We also strongly support
the UNHCR's efforts to establish
agreements leading to voluntary
repatriation of refugees. But until order-
ly departure is a realistic option for
potential refugees, and voluntary
repatriation is a reasonable choice for
actual refugees, first asylum clearly is
needed.

In the same way, the United States
will continue to support humanitarian
relief to the Khmer people. We are con-
fvinced that current emergency needs in
the interior of Kampuchea are being
met. Requirements for those people in
the border areas persist, however. We
Lir^re other donors to contribute on a
timely basis to meet this need.

Conclusion

The emergence of common purpose from
common geography is not, as we are all
aware, a common occurrence. The unity
ASEAN has achieved is all the more im-
pressive when one considers your very
different histories and the legacy of
itf misunderstanding and quarrels left from
earlier eras.

You have demonstrated the power
pf constructive local initiative, which we
Ibelieve to be the key to peace as well as
■economic and social development. For
this reason, we do not push forward our
own solutions to the regional issues we
face together. This is not, I would em-
phasize, a sign of indifference or
!'^ neglect. It is a testimony of our trust
and respect as well as our recognition
that ASEAN, with its unique consensus
apiiroach, has forged a leadership role in
the region. Through meetings such as
.' these and other increased contact, we
'<' will be following closely your plans and
; :• sharing our own with you. We will strive
to insure that the efforts of the United
States and of ASEAN are mutually rein-
forcing. It is our hope that in difficult
times as in good, you will have no cause
*'ito doubt our support. ■

Dctober1982

U.S. Dialogue with ASEAN and ANZUS

by John H. Holdridge

Statement before the Subcommittee
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
July 15, 1982. Ambassador Holdridge is
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs.'^

On the eve of my departure for Asia
with Deputy Secretary of State [Walter
J., Jr.] Stoessel June 9, I appeared
before this subcommittee to review the
Administration's policy toward South-
east Asia. As promised at that time, I
am reporting to you today on the results
of the Deputy Secretary's attendance at
the ASEAN [Association of South East
Asian Nations] post-ministerial consulta-
tions in Singapore, June 17-18, and at
the ANZUS Council in Canberra, June
21-22. Our participation in these two
conferences significantly furthered the
objectives of U.S. policy in Southeast
Asia and the South Pacific. The Deputy
Secretary also met in Manila with Presi-
dent [Ferdinand E.] Marcos, in
Singapore with Prime Minister Lee
Kuan Yew, in Canberra with Prime
Minister Malcolm Eraser, and in Well-
ington with Prime Minister [Robert D.]
Muldoon.

Taken together, these detailed
multilateral and bilateral consultations
were timely and extremely useful. They
served to highlight the importance which
the Administration attaches to the U.S.
relationship with our friends and allies
in two strategically vital regions of Asia.
During this period, there also occurred
an event of major political significance
regarding Kampuchea: the announce-
ment of the agreement for a coalition of
the three Khmer resistance groups,
together with the meeting in Kuala
Lumpur of their leaders.

ASEAN POST-MINISTERIAL
CONSULTATIONS

Following the practice which has become
standard, the five ASEAN Foreign
Ministers, after their private delibera-
tions, met with the Foreign Ministers of
ASEAN's six "dialogue partners"— the
United States, Japan, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, and the Euro-
pean Community (EC)— for 2 days of in-
tensive discussions. These took place in
the plenary "Five-Plus-Six" session,
where all were present; in the "Five-

Plus-One" session, where the ASEAN
Ministers met with individual dialogue
counterparts; and in various bilateral
meetings. Deputy Secretary Stoessel
had the opportunity to meet bilaterally
with all the ASEAN delegations, with
the Foreign Minister of Japan, and with
EC representatives, including Belgian
Foreign Minister [Leo] Tindemans. We
established beforehand several U.S. ob-
jectives for these consultations at
ASEAN.

U.S. Objectives

First, we sought to emphasize that the
United States sees ASEAN as the cen-
tral element in our policies in Southeast
Asia and to dispel any impression that
U.S. interest in the region had lessened
because of preoccupations with pressing
crises elsewhere. Second, we wanted to
reiterate U.S. support for ASEAN's
strategy for finding a political solution
to the Kampuchea problem. Finally, we
wanted to address and discuss frankly a
number of specific ASEAN concerns.
Although these were mainly in the
economic area, we knew that Law of the
Sea, Indochinese refugees, and the U.S.
bilateral relationship with China would
also be important issues to our hosts.

U.S.-ASEAN Relationship

In his remarks at the Five-Plus-One
meeting, Deputy Secretary Stoessel
underscored U.S. support for ASEAN
and our trust in and respect for
ASEAN's regional leadership role. Here,
our firm backing of ASEAN's Kam-
puchea strategy, including maintaining
economic and political pressure on Viet-
nam to negotiate a peaceful solution,
received special emphasis. The Deputy
Secretary pledged to continue mutually
reinforcing U.S.-ASEAN efforts on a
broad range of endeavors. He expressed
confidence that, in difficult times as in
good, ASEAN will have no cause to
doubt U.S. support. In our judgment,
the ASEAN nations were reassured in
Singapore concerning U.S. reliability,
our determination to take their interests
fully into account, and the emphasis we
give our ASEAN relationship.

EAST ASIA

Kampuchean Issue

Without exception, the ASEAN
representatives made clear their firm
agreement that their goals regarding
Kampuchea were total withdrawal of
Vietnamese troops and a neutral, in-
dependent Kampuchea. They stressed
their goal of a political settlement of the
problem. They reaffirmed their commit-
ment to the Declaration of the Interna-
tional Conference on Kampuchea as both
the instrument and framework for
ASEAN's policy objectives.

Deputy Secretary Stoessel declared
that ASEAN was the keystone of U.S.
policy toward Kampuchea and Indo-
china. We fully support ASEAN's
strategy and respect its leadership role
in the region. We would continue to
work closely with ASEAN on regional
issues.

We share ASEAN's goals as
elaborated in the Declaration and work
with ASEAN to realize the objectives of
total Vietnamese withdrawal and a
neutral, independent Kampuchea. We
also strongly favor a comprehensive
political settlement. In both the public
and private sessions, the ASEAN
Ministers expressed clear appreciation
for the firm political support from the
United States on the Kampuchean issue.

Prior to the conference, there had
been indications that the three Khmer
resistance factions — the KPNLF [Kam-
puchea People's National Liberation
Front] under Son Sann, Prince
Sihanouk, and the Khmer Rouge — were
near agreement on terms for a coalition
to work for an end to the Vietnamese
occupation and the restoration of Khmer
self-determination. The success by the
Khmer leaders in joining a coalition was
hailed by ASEAN governments at the
joint press conference June 20. Actual
formation of the Coalition Government
of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) was
expected to take place subsequently in-
side Kampuchea. This occurred July 9.

Deputy Secretary Stoessel welcomed
agreement on a coalition. He reiterated
that the United States would continue to
provide political and moral support for
the non-Communist Khmer resistance
and promised to consult closely with
ASEAN on how we could be of further
help. The Deputy Secretary stated that,
in any event, the United States would
provide no military assistance. He em-
phatically ruled out aid to, or contact
with, the Khmer Rouge.

International reaction to the coali-
tion has generally been positive. The
EC, Japan, and Canada are among those

nations which have warmly welcomed
the coalition agreement.

While not involved in the process or
negotiations for the coalition, we have
welcomed the Khmer coalition as a step
toward a peaceful political settlement in
Kampuchea as envisioned in the Declara-
tion on Kampuchea.

Following the ASEAN post-minis-
terials, Hanoi surfaced a revamped pro-
posal which offered a unilateral
withdrawal of an unspecified number of
its troops from Kampuchea, called for
the Thais to disarm the Khmer
resistance, and renewed Hanoi's call for
a conference on Southeast Asia with ex-
panded participation including the
United States and the U.N. Secretary
General, in his private capacity.

Despite the new packaging, the pro-
posal incorporates Hanoi's standard posi-
tions. Evidently, Hanoi's economic
deterioration and political isolation, com-
pounded by the formation of the coali-
tion, led Hanoi to refurbish its pro-
posals. The proposals, however, fail to
deal with the core issues — Vietnamese
military occupation of Kampuchea and
the denial of Khmer self-determination
as called for in the Declaration on Kam-
puchea, which we continue to support
fully.

Indochinese Refugees

All five ASEAN Foreign Ministers
sought continued international support
on the refugee problem and emphasized
that the granting of first asylum
depends on the commitment of resettle-
ment in third countries and the
avoidance of a residual refugee prob-
lem— those persons not resettled under
any of the national or international pro-
grams. The Foreign Ministers were con-
vinced that the boat refugee problem
needs to be tackled at its source and
urged Vietnam, the U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and re-
settlement countries to strive for an ef-
fective implementation of the orderly
departure program.

On Khmer refugees, the Foreign
Ministers reiterated their support for a
safe, voluntary repatriation program
while urging the international communi-
ty to help resettle those Khmer who are
unable to return to their country. They
noted, with appreciation, that contribu-
tions by donor countries to the U.N.
Kampuchean Emergency Relief Pro-
gram have saved millions of Kam-
pucheans from famine and disease.

The Deputy Secretary said we would
continue to do our part to ease the

burden on the first asylum countries and
urged others to contribute as well. We
are also continuing our efforts through
UNHCR for a fuller utilization of the
orderly departure program.

In his press conference, Deputy
Secretary Stoessel also addressed the
reported remarks of Vietnamese
Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, say-
ing that Vietnam would release all in-
mates in reeducation camps if the
United States and others would accept
them. Ambassador Stoessel stressed
that we would consider all those who
qualify under the orderly departure pro-
gram, currently targeted at 1,000 per
month.

We are seeking clarification of
Minister Thach's remarks through the
UNHCR. Should the proposed UNHCR-
Vietnam discussions concerning the
possible consideration of some reeduca-
tion camp inmates for the orderly depar
ture program indicate a need for addi-
tional refugee numbers for East Asia,
we are hopeful that the Congress would
view this need with understanding.

Economic Issues

Although Kampuchea tended to
monopolize the spotlight in Singapore,
economic matters, as we had an-
ticipated, received more prominent bill-
ing at the meetings and in the media
than in the past. The ASEAN nations
have been hit by the world recession,
and they find the markets for their key
products and their growth and prosperi
ty severely affected. At the "Five-Plus-
One" session Philippine Foreign Ministe
[Carlos P.] Romulo presented ASEAN's
economic concerns.

Romulo noted the "cloud of interna-
tional economic gloom" — high interest
rates, unemployment, protectionism, ar
discrimination. He urged the United
States not to succumb to protectionism
citing U.S. textile and sugar quotas anc
"signs of further restrictions." Romulo
said ASEAN was worried about the
future of the U.S. program of general-
ized system of preferences (GSP). He
protested the restrictions found in our
GSP and the uncertainty of product-by-
product graduation. Romulo echoed
statements by others which stressed
standard concerns about commodities,
especially GSA [General Services Ad- ^
ministration] tin sales, and U.S. cuts in
appropriations for international lending
agencies. Romulo said some progress
has been made on economic matters vii^Fii
the U.S. -ASEAN dialogue but added
that ASEAN would like to strengthen
this dialogue.

Department of State Bulletin*'*!

Throughout the meetings, there was
ecurring concern about the effects of
he recession in the United States and
ilsewhere and its imphcations for
\SEAN. Some delegates were disturbed
It what they described as a trend in the
Jnited States toward hardening or even
■egression of views on international
ommodity arrangements and the com-
non fund. While some of the ASEAN
ountries were encouraged by the strong
J.S. stand on free trade, they also ex-
)ressed skepticism about the industrial
ountries' ability to improve the GATT
General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade] system in the near term.

In comments to the ASEAN nations,
lur delegation acknowledged that we
ealized the degree to which the massive
J.S. economy affects the world environ-
nent and that this is a major reason
i'hy the present Administration has
ilaced top priority on getting its
omestic economy in order. We stressed
hat in doing so, the United States has
schewed controls and resisted
ressures for increased protectionism,
'he United States also looks forward to
lie GATT ministerial in the fall where
ur goal is to foster a freer tlow of
rade, investment, and technology, all
latters of importance to the ASEAN
Duntries as well as the United States.
Ve also repeated our offer to hold
Ipecial consultations on GSA tin disposal
*ith the ASEAN tin-producing coun-
"ies.

The ASEAN countries did not take
confrontational stance on these issues
ut handled them in a spirit of in-
rdependence and mutual cooperation,
/e assured them that we will be atten-
ve to their concerns, that we value our
•ade relationships with ASEAN — our
fth largest trading partner — and
jcognize the need to oppose protec-
onist trends.

onclusion

ur participation in the ASEAN post-
linisterial consultations in Singapore
'as highly successful. The content and
BHor of the discussions confirmed the
orrectness of our policy of making
.SEAN the keystone of U.S. interests
1 Southeast Asia. Our basic approach of

;, upporting ASEAN was appreciated.
'he delegation's public statements had a
fositive effect. As planned, the Deputy
lecretary's arrival statement, his speech
1 the Five-Plus-One, his intervention in

jj he Five-Plus-Six, the remarks in the
sint press conference, and his departure

press conference stressed the key role
ASEAN occupies in our Asia policy.
This theme was well represented in the
Singapore media and other ASEAN
capitals. Likewise, press reports and
statements by ASEAN leaders at the
close of the conference indicated an end
to earlier concerns about a possible
downgrading of U.S. involvement in the
region.

On some economic and trade mat-
ters and Law of the Sea, it was ap-
parent that the ASEAN nations have
reservations about, if not clear opposi-
tion to, a number of U.S. positions. Yet,
the media reflected the ASEAN dele-
gate's perceptions that we had listened
seriously to ASEAN's views, that the
Deputy Secretary would carry those
views back to Washington, and that
ASEAN's concerns would be carefully
considered in future decisions affecting
Asia. I am confident that as a result of
this year's ASEAN post-ministerial
dialogue, the ASEAN countries, as well
as other dialogue partners, are
reassured about ASEAN's importance
and the high priority we give Southeast
Asia and our relationship with the five
ASEAN countries.

ANZUS [AUSTRALIA,
NEW ZEALAND,
UNITED STATES PACT]
COUNCIL MEETING

Background on ANZUS

Under the ANZUS security treaty,
Australia and New Zealand cooperate on
a wide range of defense and other mat-
ters as fully and closely with the United
States as any of America's other allies.
Our ANZUS allies' highly trained and
well-equipped armed forces make a vital
contribution to the Western strateg^ic
posture in the Pacific Indian Ocean
regions. Australia and New Zealand par-
ticipate in military exercises with the
United States, seek to adopt mutually
compatible defense equipment and doc-
trines, exchange military personnel, and
welcome port calls by all U.S. Navy
ships. In addition, Australia and the
United States jointly operate several
electronic installations in Australia that
are critical to the Western alliance, the
defense of Australia, and the national
defense of the United States.

Within their own region, Australia
and New Zealand make important
security and economic contributions to
the ASEAN nations and to the new
countries of the Southwest Pacific which

EAST ASIA

complement American efforts and con-
tribute substantially to stability in this
region. Australia and New Zealand play
particularly valuable roles in the five
power defense arrangement — with
Malaysia, Singapore, and the United
Kingdom. Moreover, Australian
economic assistance to South Pacific na-
tions this year is about $300 million as
compared with $4.2 million for the
United States, while New Zealand's
economic assistance is $53 million
despite its small size and economic dif-
ficulties. The level of economic
assistance which our ANZUS allies are
providing to the island countries of the
Southwest Pacific is both generous and
supportive of our shared interest in the
stability of the region.

Although it is directly related to
ANZUS commitments, it is worth noting
that Australia and New Zealand have
contributed an air services unit to the
Sinai multinational force and observers
(MFO). In doing this, both the
Australian and New Zealand Govern-
ments overcame domestic political op-
position in order to make a positive con-
tribution to the peace process in the
Middle East.

Results of Council Meeting

Deputy Secretary of State Stoessel met
with Australian Foreign Minister
Anthony Street and New Zealand
Foreign Minister Warren Cooper in
Canberra June 21-22, 1982, for the 31st
ANZUS Council, which all sides agree
was an unqualified success. The mood of
the Council meeting was appropriate to
a meeting of close allies who view world
and regional issues in essentially the
same way. Foreign Minister Street set
the tone of the meeting by pointing to
the success of the ANZUS alliance over
30 years and noting its continued validi-
ty and general acceptance. The useful
and full discussions covering a wide
spectrum of issues and the resulting
communique reflect both the high
degrees of congruence in the policies of
the three ANZUS partners and the
remarkable openness and vitality of
ANZUS and the relationships between
the three allies.

The validity of the alliance was
underscored by the willingness and abili-
ty of the partners to grapple with the
sensitive political issues of port access
for nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed
warships. The leaders of the opposition
Australian Labor Party (ALP) have
called into question continued port ac-
cess for U.S. Navy ships, thus triggering

ictober1982

EAST ASIA

a heated public controversy on this issue
on the eve of the Council. This was not a
problem at the Council meetings, and
the final communique stated une-
quivocally that Australia and New
Zealand "declared their continued will-
ingness to accept visits to their ports by
United States Naval vessels whether
conventional or nuclear-powered." Im-
mediately following the communique,
William Hayden, leader of the ALP
parliamentary opposition, made a
dramatic reversal of his earlier opposi-
tion to visits by nuclear-armed warships.
His statement also made clear that the
ALP supports ANZUS. Subsequently,
the ALP party conference endorsed
Hayden's position.

The Council also addressed and
reached agreement on broad interna-
tional issues. Regarding the U.N.
Special Session on Disarmament,
members reaffirmed their commitment
to the negotiation of effective, balanced,
and verifiable measures of arms control,
including reductions of the nuclear ar-
maments. They welcomed the agreement
between the United States and the
Soviet Union on the opening of negotia-
tions on strategic arms reductions. The
Council members also were in complete
agreement on the need for continuing ef-
forts to inhibit the spread of nuclear
weapons as well as for action by the in-
ternational community toward the con-
clusion of a verifiable and effective ban
on chemical weapons.

The South Pacific region received
special attention, and the importance of
a stable security environment to regional
development was underscored. Similarly,
the members reaffirmed their support
for ASEAN and its efforts to strengthen
peace and security in the region.

Addressing the world economy,
Council members specifically agreed on
the need to strengthen their efforts to
stop the slide toward protectionism, in-
cluding agricultural protectionism, to
support measures to dismantle protec-
tionist barriers, and to strengthen and
improve the multilateral trading system.
They added that economic relations with
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
should be consistent with political and
security interests. F'inally, they under-
lined the importance of assisting the
developing countries to overcome their
difficulties and to participate fully in the
Western economic system.

Despite a difference of opinion on
Law of the Sea— Australia and New
Zealand want the United States to sign
— the ANZUS Council meeting can be
called an unqualified success.

During his visit to Canberra, Deputy
Secretary Stoessel also met separately
with Australian Prime Minister J.
Malcolm Eraser and with ALP leader
Hayden to discuss issues of mutual con-

New Zealand Visit

Following the ANZUS Council, Deputy
Secretary Stoessel visited New Zealand
June 23-25. He had an excellent and
productive meeting with Prime Minister
Robert Muldoon followed by a luncheon
hosted by the Prime Minister, and a
series of useful meetings with Foreign
Minister Cooper, Attorney General Mc-
Clay, and other senior New Zealand
Government officials. During these
meetings. New Zealand officials noted
the importance of completing the
ratification process on the four Pacific
Island treaties currently pending before
the Senate and expressed interest in
discussions on a possible antitrust
cooperation agreement. In addition,
Deputy Secretary Stoessel also had a
cordial meeting and valuable exchange
of views with Wallace "Bill" Rowling,
leader of the opposition Labor Party in
New Zealand.

Conclusion

Finally, I would mention that I engaged
in extensive consultations elsewhere in
Southeast Asia immediately following
the ASEAN and ANZUS meetings,
visiting Jakarta, Bangkok, and Rangoon,
for calls on ranking host government of-
ficials. In Jakarta, I was received by

Foreign Minister [Kusumaatmadja]
Mochtar for an extremely useful discus-
sion on a range of bilateral and regional
issues, and also met with other cabinet
officials of the Indonesian Government.
In Thailand, I called on the King
[Bhumibol Adulyadej], and then met
with Prime Minister [Tinsulanonda]
Prem and senior Thai military officials. I
visited Chiang Mai for briefings on the
Golden Triangle area from which comes
a significant portion of heroin entering
the international drug market. I also
visited refugee camps in eastern
Thailand for a firsthand look at this
tragic problem which remains important
in our relations with ASEAN, especially
Thailand. In my talks with the Thai, I
reiterated Deputy Secretary Stoessel's
assurances given at the ASEAN
meetings that the United States would,
in cooperation with the international ef-
fort, sustain a substantial resettlement
program to permit a continued reductior
of the heavy refugee burden on
Thailand. The 2-day visit to Burma was
my first as Assistant Secretary and pro-
vided the opportunity for excellent talks
with the Burmese Foreign Minister U
Chit Hlaing and other high-ranking of-
ficials of the Burmese Government, with
particular emphasis on narcotics control
our development assistance programs,
and the quiet warming of U.S. -Burmese
relations.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the conimittee and wifl
be available from tlie Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government F'rinting Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

U.S. Economic Relations
With ASEAN

by Anthony C. Albrecht

Stafrmcrit hi'fnre thr Subrommittee
on EitsI Asiini iitiil ['(iiil'ir Ai'i'inrs i>f the
Senate Fiircign Rfhituitis ( '(uminttec on
June 10, 1982. Mr. Albrecht is Deputy
Assistant Secretary for EaM Asian and
Pacific Affairs. '

I am pleased to be with you today to
discuss our economic relations with
Southeast Asia. Our ties with the
Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) are increasing in imporUince
as our economic interdependence with
this dynamic region expands and
demands priority attention.

tn)

itri

«tsl

Our contacts with the Biu-mese
Government have expanded significantl
since oiu- cooperative narcotics progran
began in 1974. Agency for Internationa
Development (AID) programs, beginnin.|»tp
in 1980, have further expanded these
contacts at the same time that Burma
has been refusing lucrative approaches lis
by the Soviet Union. Although we do n(
expect a change in Burma's basic com
mitment to neutrality, it is in our in-
terest to encourage a continued, quiet
Burmese opening toward the United
States and the West. Brunei — a small
oil-rich country on the north coast of
Kalimantan (Borneo) — will become fullj|fctiiii
independent next year and will probabb

Department of State Bullet

invited to join ASEAN at that time.
^ith respect to Vietnam, the United
bates has actively cooperated with the
SEAN efforts to restrict multilateral
3velopment aid so long as Vietnamese
irces continue their occupation of Kam-
achea.

Since its establishment in Augnst
)67, ASEAN — comprising Indonesia,
alaysia, Singapore, the Philippines,
id Thailand— has emerged as a grow-
g economic and political force in
jutheast Asia and on the world scene.
SEAN's announced goals are to
rengthen regional cohesion and self-
iliance while promoting economic
jvelopment. The organization
veloped slowly during the first decade

its existence due to the diverse
ickground of its member states and the
mpetitive nature of their economies,
at it gained rapid momentum following
e first summit conference of ASEAN
iders in Bali in 1976. Since that time,
! political cohesiveness has strength-
led and regional cooperation activity
eatly expanded. Our cooperation with
SEAN on Kampuchea has become
pecially important.

Agriculture and the production of
.sic commodities remain the principal
lonomic activities in ASEAN, with the
itable exception of the highly in-
istrialized city state of Singapore. As a
Bult, commodity market issues — such

price stabilization and market
owth — are of vital importance. Tin,
.tural rubber, vegetable oils, tropical
nber, and sugar are especially impor-
nt. Our decision not to join the Sixth
ternational Tin Agreement and GSA
les of excess tin stocks have become
pecially contentious issues over the
,st year.

The real annual GNP growth of
Dre than 7% over the past decade has
rned ASEAN a well deserved reputa-
>n as one of the most promising
owth areas in the developing world.
le private sector has played a key role

this economic dynamism. The ASEAN
untries recognize that private enter-
ise must be involved in the develop-
ent process and that foreign invest-
ent should play an important role.
SEAN looks to the United States, as
3ll as to other developed nations, for
pport and cooperation in providing
arket access, investment capital, and
onomic assistance to help promote its
lonomic development goals.
i The ASEAN nations now must cope
th lagging sales of export com-
] Ddities, increasing costs in financing
/estment, and slower growth in the

members of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD). ASEAN needs a prosperous
and open U.S. market if it is to continue
to grow — but we also need ASEAN for
vital raw materials as a growing market
for U.S. exports and as an attractive
home for U.S. private investment.

Importance of ASEAN

The population of ASEAN is about 256
million people — comparable to that of
the United States and Canada combined.
Estimated per capita GNP's range from
$420 in Indonesia to $4,480 in
Singapore. ASEAN's total GNP is near-
ly $200 billion. It is rich in natural and
human resources and occupies a key
strategic position astride vital sea lanes.

ASEAN countries are important
suppliers of essential U.S. imports. For
example, in 1980, 89% of our natural
rubber, 65% of our tin, 6% of crude
petroleum, 28% of our hardwood
lumber, as well as 99% of our palm oil
and 95% of our coconut imports came
from ASEAN. Most of our tantalum/
niobium and much of our tungsten is im-
ported, and the region is a vital supplier
of these minerals. But ASEAN is not
only a source of key resources needed by
the United States to assure our security
and prosperity; ASEAN is likewise an
important and rapidly growing market
for a wide range of U.S. machinery,
chemicals, and foodstuffs. Thus, in 1981
our exports reached nearly $9 billion, an
increase of 30% since 1979. Total two-
way U.S. trade with the ASEAN coun-
tries was about $22 billion last year,
making ASEAN our fifth most impor-
tant trade partner. Total trade has more
than doubled since 1977. The U.S.
Export-Import Bank, with an exposure
of over $2 billion, has fostered increased
exports to ASEAN.

The ASEAN countries appreciate
that their economic advance requires
close cooperation with and financial sup-
port from foreign investors. We
estimate that total U.S. investment in
ASEAN, including the expenditures of
U.S. oil companies in exploration and
development in oil and gas production-
sharing arrangements with Indonesia
and Malaysia, now amounts to about $10
billion.

ASEAN-U.S. Business Council

Because all of the ASEAN governments
perceive a major role for business and
strive to foster it, cooperation within
ASEAN and with the international

EAST ASIA

business community has grown rapidly.
The ASEAN Chambers of Commerce
and Industry are playing an increasingly
important role in ASEAN. The ASEAN-
U.S. Business Council — which joins the
business communities of the United
States and ASEAN in the fostering of
trade, investment, and cooperative proj-
ects— has given a new and important
dimension to our relationship with
Southeast Asia. We look increasingly to
the council to help promote closer ties
with ASEAN and consider its activities
to be an important complement to the
official dialogue. Recognition of this role
was emphasized by Secretary Haig in his
address before the U.N. General
Assembly last September when he
pointed out that the "U.S.-ASEAN
Business Council is a model of how our
private sectors can work together for
mutual benefit."

We will continue to support and en-
courage the Business Council. It carries
out activities and programs which
governments cannot do, especially in the
fields of training and technology
transfer. It also fosters direct contacts
and cooperation between business people
which results in increased trade and in-
vestment and greater understanding.

Since its establishment in July 1979,
the council has undertaken various pro-
grams which have increased the flow of
information, people, and ideas between
the United States and ASEAN. Among
the more notable accomplishments were
an ASEAN-U.S. seminar on science and
technology for development held in
Singapore in October 1980 and a
seminar on ASEAN-U.S. automotive
developments held in Detroit in June
1981. Working groups on technology,
education, and training to facilitate
technology transfer between the United
States and ASEAN have been formed,
and a financial conference was held in
Kuala Lumpur in November 1981. We
look forward to the fall meeting of the
ASEAN-U.S. Business Council which
will bring about 100 of ASEAN's leading
business figures to Washington.

Consultations with ASEAN

The United States has found that it
works well with ASEAN and that we
are able to cooperate to promote
economic growth and to solve mutual
problems because our approach to most
basic economic issues is similar. At the
June 1981 meeting of ASEAN Foreign
Ministers, Secretary Haig stressed that
U.S. policy toward ASEAN rests on
three important commitments: to

;tober1982

EAST ASIA

economic development and commerce
for mutual benefit, to fruitful bilateral
relations, and to a genuine dialogue be-
tween equals on matters of common con-
cern. Indeed, the term "dialogue" has
been the name given to the special kind
of relationship ASEAN carries on with
its major world partners. Our economic
dialogue with ASEAN is a continuous
operation at all levels. Since 1977 the
United States and representatives of the
ASEAN nations have had four formal
meetings at ministerial or subministerial
level to discuss common concerns and to
seek solutions to problems in the
economic, social, and cultural spheres.
Unlike many international conferences,
our ASEAN dialogues have been char-
acterized by straight talk and an honest
attempt to deal with issues that trouble
both sides. For example, at the March
1982 dialogue in Washington, ASEAN
representatives clearly and frankly told
us of their serious concern over our
GSA tin disposal policy and the new
Caribbean Basin initiative. On tin, we
were able to offer further consultations,
and we are willing to discuss modifica-
tion in GSA sales practices that may go
some way to meet their concerns. On
the Caribbean Basin initiative, we ex-
plained U.S. goals carefully and tried to
reassure them that their interests would
not be neglected in the pursuit of our
Caribbean efforts.

That meeting also reviewed our
cooperative regional development
assistance program with ASEAN, as
well as special educational / cultural ex-
changes. We now cooperate to enhance
regional institutions in areas of non-
conventional energy, tropical medicine,
plant quarantine, and agricultural
development planning. We are looking
at the possibility for technical, scientific,
and administrative fields." In addition,
ASEAN government representatives
have tended to work together as a group
to formulate common positions in the
United Nations and other international
fora on issues such as commodity policy,
global negotiations, refugees, and Kam-
puchea. Their ability to take common

positions has been a source of enhanced
strength and influence for the ASEAN
nations. Though clearly associated with
the so-called Third World group, the
ASEAN countries have tended toward a
moderate role on most North-South
issues, a factor of great interest to us as
we strive for their resolution. ASEAN
has also operated as an effective unit
and enhanced its bargaining power by
establishing bilateral economic dialogues
with third countries such as the United
States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand,
Canada, and with the EC.

ASEAN's future seems bright.
ASEAN's rich resource base and its
proven economic vitality and success
make it a leading candidate for strong
economic growth in the next decade.
While there are no major proposals for
an economic union of the five, ASEAN
economic ministers have agreed recently
to study establishment of an ASEAN-
wide free trade area.

But regardless of what organiza-
tional forms it takes and how
cooperative efforts evolve in ASEAN,
we feel confident that the ASEAN-U.S.
economic relationship will continue to be
one of increasing interdependence.
There will be problems typical of new
ways to cooperate such as in marine
science and to promote small- and
medium-scale industry.

ASEAN Organization

Because the nature of ASEAN as an
organization may not be fully
understood, I want to conclude with a
brief view of how it operates and where
we perceive ASEAN to be going. Most
importantly ASEAN should be seen as a
pragmatic, cooperative organization that
is sui generis. It is not like the Euro-
pean Community (EC), and its success
should not be judged by criteria applied
to the EC. It has a wide variety of
cooperative economic and technical ac-
tivities and joint industrial projects, and
there are increasing efforts to lower
trade barriers within ASEAN. ASEAN
functions mainly through regular

meetings of its foreign ministers and C
economic and other ministers, through
national secretariats in each of the
foreign ministries, and through a series
of technical intergovernmental commit-
tees in areas such as food and
agriculture; finance and banking; and in-
dustry, minerals, and energy. There is a
small ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta,
but the governments have until now
strictly limited its size and role.

The ASEAN secretariat and most o;
the committee structure is focused on
the original nonpolitical goals of the
organization as outlined in the ASEAN
declaration of 1967 — fostering of col-
laboration in "economic, social, cultural,
any close relationship." In a period of
slower world growth, there will be pro-
tectionist pressures on both sides, whicl"
must be resisted. However, in the light
of our shared goals and our common in-
terests in an open world economic
system and our common approach
toward peace and stability in Southeast
Asia, it is in the U.S. interest to con-
tinue to support the demonstrated in-
dependence, self-reliance, and economic
dynamism of ASEAN.

'The complete transcript of the hearings-
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Department of State Bulletl

ECONOMICS

Economic Regulation and International
Jurisdictional Conflict

iy Davis R. Robinson

Remarks to the Parker School of
'foreign and Comparative Law, Colum-
)ia University, New York, on June 30,
'9S2. Dr. Davis is Legal Adviser of the
Department of State.

'. would like to speak on a subject that
'.'we found to be of great importance dur-
ng the past year as the Legal Adviser
it the State Department: jurisdictional
jonflict in the regulation of transna-
■jonal economic activity.

This issue has recently involved the
lighest levels of our Government. On
Fune 18, President Reagan decided that
.he continuation of martial law and the
fiuppression of human rights in Poland,
I ind the continuing deep involvement of
he Soviet Union in events there, re-
[uired further U.S. economic sanctions
Lgainst the Soviet Union. The sanctions
mposed bear directly upon economic ac-
ivity outside the United States. The
^resident decided to extend existing
J.S. controls on the export of oil and
;'as production, transmission and refin-
; ng equipment to the U.S.S.R. "to in-
lude equipment produced by sub-
idiaries of the U.S. companies abroad
is well as equipment produced abroad
mder licenses issued by U.S.
ompanies."

President Reagan's action was
lirectly linked to the continuing Soviet
nvolvement in and responsibility for
vents in Poland. As his June 18 state-
nent on the new U.S. sanctions ex-
ilains:

The objective of the United States in im-
losing the sanctions has been and continues
o be to advance reconciliation in Poland.
Jince December 30, 1981, little has changed
oncerning the situation in Poland; there has
leen no movement that would enable us to
indertake positive reciprocal measures. The
lecision taken today will, we believe, advance
lur objective of reconciUation in Poland.

I do not want to say much more
ibout the details of our recent extension
)f U.S. oil and gas controls to foreign
subsidiaries and licensees of U.S.
;echnology. There is a great deal of cur-
rent discussion and diplomatic activity
concerning the new U.S. controls, and
;he ensuing dust will not settle for quite
iwhile. Rather, I would like to address.

I 3ctober1982

more generally, the broad range of areas
where conflicting international claims to
jurisdiction may be reconciled and a
framework for seeking such reconcilia-
tion.

The problem of jurisdictional conflict
between the United States and other
countries is an unavoidable outgrowth of
the nature and functioning of govern-
mental systems. In order to advance its
national interests, the United States
regulates a broad range of economic ac-
tivities through its statutes and regula-
tions. Sometimes matters of broad na-
tional importance are involved;
sometimes more limited interests are at
stake.

Much of our regulation is confined in
scope or effect to conduct on U.S. ter-
ritory. Some, however, reach beyond our
borders to affect persons or conduct out-
side our territory. This "reaching
beyond" frequently poses jurisdictional
conflicts with other governments with
competing claims or interests in the par-
ticular activities involved.

There is no single "conflicts of
jurisdiction" problem. There are dif-
ferent problems involving differing in-
terests and facts. A variety of U.S.
regulatory measures affects persons or
transactions abroad. They are for-
mulated and enforced by many different
agencies. A listing of a few of our con-
flicts of recent years demonstrates the
breadth of this problem.

Antiboycott Regulation

Consider, first, the area of the anti-
boycott regulation. Conflicts between
the U.S. and the foreign governments
often involve agencies' discretionary ap-
plication of U.S. requirements to con-
duct abroad. The reach of antiboycott
regulation, however, is not a matter of
substantial agency discretion. Section 8
of the Export Administration Act of
1979 specifically requires application to
conduct abroad. That section bars U.S.
persons engaged in interstate or foreign
commerce from taking or knowingly
agreeing to take any of a long list of
specified actions "with intent to comply
with, further or support any boycott
fostered or imposed" by a foreign
government against a country friendly
to the United States. The act then

defines "United States person" to em-
brace foreign subsidiaries or affiliates
which are found to be controlled, in fact,
by domestic concerns.

Congress judged that section 8 had
to be extended to U.S. subsidiaries
abroad in order to avoid evasion and
frustration of the section's purposes.
The application of section 8 to foreign
subsidiaries, however, has been objec-
tionable to some other governments,
particularly the United Kingdom. The
United Kingdom argues that subsidiaries
incorporated in that country are U.K.
persons, bound to follow only the law
and policies of the United Kingdom. In
the antiboycott area, the conscious and
deliberate policy of the British Govern-
ment is to leave decisions on compliance
with foreign boycotts to the firms con-
cerned. Hence, the United Kingdom
argues, U.S. regulation of the boycott
behavior of U.K. subsidiaries constitutes
an unacceptable substitution by the
United States of its own policy for
British policy.

Commerce Department Controls

This dispute is not academic. Commerce
Department enforcement actions involv-
ing sanctions against a number of
foreign subsidiaries have prompted
vigorous protests from some of our
allies.

The Export Administration Act.

The Export Administration Act also pro-
vides broad authority to impose controls
on exports for U.S. national security or
foreign policy purposes or to meet prob-
lems of domestic short supplies. Such
controls have produced recurring con-
flicts with foreign jurisdictions. The
potential for conflict has increased since
1977, when Congress amended the act
to give the President the authority to
control the export of goods or technical
data "subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States or exported by any person
subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States."

Controls imposed under the Export
Administration Act can have far-
reaching effects on foreign economic ac-
tivity involving transactions in
U.S. -origin goods or technology. The
Export Administration Regulations
regulate re-exports — or sometimes even
in-country transfers — of exported com-
modities and technical data. Foreign
consignees may be required to obtain
authorization before re-exporting or
transferring U.S. -origin commodities or

ECONOMICS

data, or in some cases, products manu-
factured using them. Under the act and
regulations, failure to comply with such
requirements may expose foreign per-
sons to U.S. criminal penalties.

Denial Order. In practice, the
United States usually enforces its con-
trols on foreign firms through Com-
merce Department action denying vio-
lators the right to receive future exports
from the United States. Such "denial
orders" promote compliance with U.S.
requirements abroad for established
firms which are dependent upon con-
tinued access to U.S. goods and tech-
nology.

A denial order normally operates to
deprive the foreign person subject to the
order of access to U.S. goods from
either the United States or foreign sup-
pliers. For example, a September 1981
Commerce Department denial order bar-
ring further U.S. exports to UAA, a
Libyan airline, also prohibited foreign
persons from transferring any
U.S. -origin goods or technology to UAA.
These prohibitions covered U.S. goods,
even if they had been exported from the
United States before the denial order.

Treasury Department Regulations

Certain Treasury Department regula-
tions raise many of these same issues.
Treasury maintains a variety of blocking
controls, prohibitions on trade, and
restrictions on financial transactions
with several countries and their na-
tionals, including Cuba, North Korea,
and Vietnam. These are "grandfathered"
vestiges of the President's authority
under section 5Cb) of the Trading with
the Enemy Act. The International
Emergency Economic Powers Act of
1977 and the National Emergencies Act
have continued the substance of the
President's broad emergency economic
powers under the Trading with the
Enemy Act but place significant pro-
cedural and substantive restrictions on
new future uses of these powers.

These controls all involve extensive
U.S. regulation of conduct in foreign
territory by persons the United States
regards as subject to its jurisdiction.
U.S. nationals in the United States and
abroad are barred from trading with
proscribed countries or with their na-
tionals. The controls also extend to sub-
sidiaries of U.S. firms abroad. The most
noted recent use of the President's
broad emergency powers was the
November 1979 blocking of Iranian
assets in U.S. banks and their overseas

branches and subsidiaries under the In-
ternational Emergency Economic
Powers Act.

The U.S. Antitrust Law

In the areas I've sketched so far, the
U.S. actions have been conceived and
applied to serve foreign policy or na-
tional security ends. However, U.S.
regulatory actions taken for essentially
domestic purposes may also produce
conflicts of jurisdiction.

The most familiar and widely noted
illustration of this is U.S. antitrust law.
Most of the professional writing and
public and intergovernmental discussion
of international conflicts of jurisdiction
has dealt with antitrust.

The international conflicts regarding
U.S. antitrust jurisdiction follow from
the long course of U.S. judicial decisions
holding that U.S. antitrust jurisdiction
extends to conduct abroad having direct
and substantial effects upon U.S. com-
merce. The Federal Republic of Ger-
many, the European Economic Com-
munity, and other jurisdictions also
make use of effects principles in defining
their own antitrust jurisdiction. Indeed,
some commentators have suggested that
conflicts over "effects" jurisdiction may
eventually disappear. For the foresee-
able future, however, major U.S. trading
partners, including the United Kingdom,
Canada, and Australia, can be expected
to have reservations with respect to the
exercise of U.S. antitrust regulation on
the basis of effects in the United States.
Moreover, the possibility of private
treble damage actions in the United
States, which foreign officials often like
to describe as "that rogue elephant,"
probably insures the continuation of
jurisdictional conflicts in the antitrust
area.

Securities

Another prominent example of essential-
ly domestic regulation raising conflicts
with foreign jurisdictions is in the
securities field. For example, with
respect to the enforcement activities of
the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, foreign bank secrecy legislation has
impeded the Commission's ability to
detect and correct insider trading or
other abuses in U.S. markets. The prob-
lems involved are illustrated in two
widely noted recent insider trading
cases, SEC v. Banco delki Srizzera
haliana, referred to as the "St. Joe"
case because it involves options in St.
Joe Minerals Corporation, and SEC v.
Certain Unknoum Purchasers, referred

to as the Santa Fe case because it in-
volves stock and options of the Santa Fe
International Corporation. Both cases in-
volve allegations that insiders used
Swiss banks to effect purchases of stock
and options in U.S. markets prior to the
public announcement of takeover bids
for these companies.

Heretofore, the identities of prin-
cipals in insider trading transactions
often have been shielded by Swiss penal
laws barring disclosure of confidential
banking information. However, in St.
Joe, the judge indicated his intention to
order the Swiss bank to disclose its prin-
cipals notwithstanding the possibility of
sanctions under Swiss law. A client
waiver was subsequently obtained, and
the information sought was produced. In
Santa Fe, the SEC believes that exten-
sive insider trading was carried on
through several Swiss banks and has
sought disclosure of the bank's prin-
cipals.

Protecting the U.S. Commodity
Market

Measures to protect the integrity of U.S
commodity markets have also posed
jurisdictional conflicts. The Commodity
Futures Trading Commission must seek
information from foreign commodities
traders about their principals in trans-
actions on U.S. markets or other infor-
mation necessary' for the commission to
meet its regulatory responsibilities. Sue
measures have resulted in conflict with
other countries. Including particularly
the United Kingdom, both because of
the importance of British commodities
markets and because of continuing U.K
objections to U.S. activities affecting
persons or transactions in the United
Kingdom. Thus, a call by the commissio
for information from a party in the
United Kingdom triggered the first in-
vocation of the 1980 British Protection
of Trading Interests Act.

Many other agencies and areas of
regulation create similar conflicts of
jurisdiction, but I think that this survey
should give you an idea of the scope of
the problem of conflicts of jurisdiction.

jils

iiiir

ltd

Reactions of Foreign Governments
to Claims

Claims to regulatory jurisdiction by one
country' may, of course, give rise to ob-
jections from other countries. In this
connection, it is important to recognize
that exercises of jurisdiction do not
always present legal issues in the
abstract. Rather, foreign governments'

Department of State Bulletli

«i

ECONOMICS

,jws of such actions will be affected by
i factual and political context. Govern-
»nts tend to be more receptive toward
mtrols in situations in which common
^itical objectives suggest that restraint
gl tolerance would be appropriate. For
sample, in the November 1979 blocking
.Iranian assets, conflicts were mini-
. :t'.i because of a shared concern for
,;■ jilight of the American hostages in
firan.
In other contexts, the reactions of
eign governments may be different,
me countries, such as the United
igdom, France, Canada, and Aus-
lia, which have objected at one time
another to broad assertions of U.S.
isdiction, have enacted or are con-
ering "blocking statutes." These vary
Form, but all permit foreign govern-
nts to block their nationals' or com-
lies' compliance with foreign demands
document production or other
Tilatory measures.
To date, the blocking statutes have,
haps, involved more symbol than
istance. The British Protection of
iding Interests Act, enthusiastically
icted by Parliament in 1980 as a
ponse to perceived American ex-
ses has, until today, only been in-
;ed in the Commodity Futures
iding Commission investigation
viously mentioned. However, the
ential for enactment or implementa-
1 of blocking statutes stands as a
("ning to U.S. regulators. Indeed,
ne U.S. agencies have modified their
( estigatory actions to avoid triggering
If eign blocking action. Such self-
t )osed limitations naturally help to
I id international controversy, but they
I y also be a complicating factor and,
;ome cases, impair valid U.S. law en-
;ement interests.

.te Department's Approach

- starting point is an analysis quite
lilar to that being followed by many
5. courts. U.S. courts have recognized
need to take into account, in the ex-
ise of jurisdiction, both the interests
;he United States and the interests of
er states concerned with a given
nsaction. We have supported the
'elopment of a "rule of reasonable-
:s" in various fact situations involving
eatening conflicts of jurisdiction.
This approach was articulated in
6 in the Ninth Circuit's decision in
now famous Timberlane case. The
urt there set out a range of factors to
weighed in situations involving com-
ing state interests. The substance of

!ober 1982

the Timberlane balancing approach was
subsequently taken up by the Third Cir-
cuit in the Mannington Mills case.
Again, the Court set out a variety of il-
lustrative factors to be considered in
determining whether jurisdiction is prop-
er. The balancing approach also has
been adopted by the Tenth Circuit in the
Amax case, a case dismissing an an-
titrust claim on the basis of a balancing
analysis. Most recently, the Fifth Cir-
cuit, in the Mitsui case, noted and com-
mended the Timberlane analysis. This
balancing approach is likewise reflected
in section 403 of the draft Restatement
of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, as revised under the auspices of
the American Law Institute.

This developing approach in given
fact situations of weighing and balancing
competing national interests in assessing
a proposed exercise of jurisdiction is
based on the recognition that a given
transaction may be of legitimate interest
to more than one state. The factors to
be considered include:

• The links, such as nationality,
residence, or economic activity between
the regulating state and the persons
principally responsible for the activity to
be regulated;

• The importance of regulation to
the regulating state;

• The extent of other states' in-
terest in regulating the activity; and

• The existence of potential or ac-
tual conflict with regulation by other
states.

The State Department has sought to
use this kind of approach in its own
legal analyses and in our work with
other agencies on their activities. In
testimony and in comments on pending
legislation, we have commended the
principles reflected in the Timberlane
decision to Congress. We have also sup-
ported the proper application of such
principles in litigation. In the uranium
litigation, my predecessor at the State
Department wrote to the Seventh Cir-
cuit in the spring of 1980 that "in future
proceedings in this and other cases, the
courts should give due consideration to
the views of interested foreign govern-
ments and take into account appropriate
considerations of comity where there is
possible conflict between the laws or
policies of nation states."

The balancing approach is clearly
not a failsafe procedure for resolving or
preventing jurisdictional controversies.
There will inevitably be instances in
which the U.S. Government's national
security needs and other predominant

policy interests demand action even
though it may create a conflict with
foreign interests and claims to jurisdic-
tion. The balancing approach to the
resolution of jurisdictional conflict can-
not prevent such outcomes. What it can
do is help to insure that decisions which
implicate significant foreign concerns
follow an informed and careful evalua-
tion and weighing of the relevant U.S.
and foreign interests.

Practical Steps To Resolve Conflicts

There is also a wide range of practical
steps that we are taking in order to pre-
vent or resolve jurisdictional conflicts. In
some instances, there are established
procedures of intergovernmental
cooperation which help, significantly, to
prevent or mitigate conflicts. Both the
Justice Department and the Federal
Trade Commission regularly give,
through our embassies, prior notice to
other governments potentially concerned
before taking antitrust enforcement ac-
tions implicating their interests. The an-
titrust agencies likewise regularly con-
sult with foreign governments concern-
ing particular enforcement activities.

These practices derive from a set of
agreed OECD [Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development]
guidelines on notice and consultation in
the antitrust area. They are sometimes
supplemented by bilateral agreements
with foreign governments. Notifications
under these institutional arrangements
have helped to prevent unpleasant sur-
prises, while consultations have some-
times brought about modernization of
either U.S. actions or foreign objections.

There has been an important recent
development in this area. Yesterday, the
U.S. and Australian Governments took a
long step forward by concluding an
agreement for antitrust cooperation con-
taining significant provisions on notice
and consultation, private treble damage
actions, and blocking statutes.

• The agreement provides for each
party to notify the other of antitrust-
related actions or policies with implica-
tions for the interests of the other party.

• The two Governments agreed to
consult with respect to potential con-
flicts, to take each other's interests into
account during such consultations, and
to give the fullest consideration to modi-
fying their policies or enforcement ac-
tions in the interest of avoiding jurisdic-
tional conflict.

• Of particular interest to the Aus-
tralian Government is the provision con-

ECONOMICS

cerning private litigation. Where private
antitrust proceedings are pending in a
U.S. court relating to conduct which has
been the subject of intergovernmental
consultation under the agreement, the
Australian Government may request the
U.S. Government to participate in that
litigation. The U.S. Government has
agreed that, in such cases, it shall report
to the court on the substance and out-
come of the consultations.

• Of importance to the United
States is Australia's agreement that the
mere seeking by legal process of infor-
mation or documents located in its ter-
ritory shall not per se be regarded as
constituting a basis for invoking
Australia's blocking statute, provided
that it has received prior notice of the
issuance of such process.

Outside the antitrust area, other
agencies engage in notification and con-
sultation with affected foreign govern-
ments on an informal basis. For exam-
ple, in the SEC's Santa Fe case, to
which I referred earlier, the SEC and
the Justice and State Departments have
carried on discussions with Swiss
Government officials to attempt to
devise a mutually acceptable procedure
to identify suspected insider traders.
Significant progress has been made on
this issue. The Office of Antiboycott
Compliance at the Commerce Depart-
ment, too, has recognized the utility of
the notice and consultation process as a
means to deal with foreign interests and
concerns involved in particular cases.

Information Flow

There is an additional area to which the
people in my office devote a lot of atten-
tion and energy. Foreign interests can
be taken into account in a given situa-
tion only if the right people are aware of
the right facts. State Department or
other agency officials familiar with
potential international ramifications
must know about potential agency ac-
tions which may pose jurisdictional con-
flicts. Agency officials in a position to
shape agency action to properly reflect
foreign interests must know what those
interests are. Too often jurisdictional
conflicts have come about needlessly
because the government as an institu-
tion failed to insure that the right people
were in touch with each other.

The problem is one of information
flow. Both within and among agencies.
Accordingly, it is a matter of priority for
my staff to develop and expand their
working relationships with other govern-

ment departments and agencies involved
in transnational economic regulation.
Through these relationships, we can help
to insure that other agencies carry out
their responsibilities with the broadest
possible knowledge and appreciation of
affected foreign interests.

International jurisdictional conflicts
are a problem and a challenge for both
the sound administration of our laws
and the wise conduct of our foreign
policy. Because jurisdictional conflicts
may emerge in areas of broad political
or security concern to our country, they
cannot always be avoided. The interests
of the United States may compel us to
assert our jurisdiction in ways that our
friends and allies may oppose. Never-
theless, we in the Department of State
and in my office are determined to
strengthen the framework for avoiding
or mitigating conflicts whenever possi-
ble, in light of our fundamental policy
objectives and national security re-
quirements. ■

Trade in the 1980s

by Denis Lamb

Address at the Iowa State Trade
Conference in Ames, Iowa, on May 20,
1982. Mr. Lamb is Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Economic and Business
Affairs.

The next several years pose enormous
challenges for trade policy and for U.S.
Government efforts to assist exporters.
I would like to discuss both challenges
with you today, beginning with the
challenge to policy.

Slow growth, high unemployment,
and inflation in many countries— plus in-
creased international competition and
new trade and investment distortions-
are imposing growing strains on the
trading system.

The pace of liberalization has
slowed, and pressure for increased pro-
tectionism is rising both here and
abroad. There is sentiment in Europe to
restrict imports from Japan, the
developing countries, and the United
States. Advanced developing countries,
having chosen the path of export-led
growth, nevertheless erect barriers to
developed-country exports. Japan bars
imports to a degree that we believe is in-
consistent with its role as a major par-
ticipant in the trading system.

In the United States, feelings are
running high over other countries'
moves to restrict our exports and thet it
use of subsidies to compete with us in "
third markets. At the same time, we
protect certain sectors of our economj <;
and there is talk of extending protecti
to others. As a result, we have come i
for our share of foreign criticism.

The resurgence of protectionism a \i,
the resulting negative tone of the inte
national debate reflect two simple fac;
First, most developed countries are
under enormous political pressure to
alleviate current economic problems,
particularly high unemplojinent, and
do it quickly. Second, most countries,
and many companies, have seen their
dependence on exports grow in recen
years. The need to pay for expensive
ported oil has been a principal reason, mi
is true for us, but it is particularly tn-
for many developing countries.

Against this backdrop of worldwi
economic stagnation, and an increase
need to export, we also face a rapidlj
changing trade evironment. Major
changes we can see now and which v,
accelerate in the coming decade inclu

• The growing importance of hig
technology trade and investment;

• The emergence of the newly ir
dustrializing developing countries as
jor competitive forces in the interna-
tional economy; and

• The expanding role of services

Our task is complex. We must h<
the gains of the postwar period and
adapt to the future. In short, we mu
resist pressures for short-term meas
that offer no solutions, tackle emerg
problems, and plan for the long-tern
Our objectives are linked. The risk t
governments will take new measure;
protect domestic markets can only b
avoided by renewed international co
mitment to work for a freer, more o
trading system— a system which car
meet the needs of the 1980s and bey j
and a system that will insure equital (j
opportunities for all.

The United States is working
toward an international consensus ti
dress the key issues. Three meeting: |i
the Organization for Economic Coof
tion and Development (OECD) minis
terial, which took place last week, tl
Versailles summit in June, and the
General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) ministerial in Novemi
—are the focal points of our campai
Discussions and decisions taken at t
meetings will have a strong influenc
the direction of international trade i
tions for the 1980s.

ECONOMICS

Our medium-term goals are well
fined, although in some cases, we are
11 considering how best to achieve
3m. Let me describe briefly what we
B seeking in several areas.

gh Technology

though no precise definition of high
Sinology industries is possible, they

generally intensely research depend-
t and innovative in applying research
suits to new products and processes,
eir products or services usually in-
ve a high level of research and
/elopment and technically sophis-
ited production methods.

The introduction of new tech-
ogies, such as microprocessors and
)otics, will increase the pace of struc-
al change. On balance, this is a
sitive development. In contrast to the
ustments we have had to make as
!rgy costs rose, technological change
imises to create new jobs and pro-
te economic growth. The introduction
jome new technologies involves
ther kind of change as well — the in-
nationalization of production. At a re-
t technological fair in Chicago, none
;he newest products on display was
eloped or produced in a single coun-

Looking ahead, we need to find
/s to minimize the trade frictions
ch arise because of varying degrees
government involvement in promoting
h technology products. Much work
) needs to be done to facilitate the
V of new technologies across national
itiers. The United States is pressing
the formation on working groups in
OECD and the GATT to look at
le barriers and problems in the high
inology area. The unique characteris-
of this trade suggest that distortions
>t that have not been previously cen-
tred internationally, such as industry
feting and government financed
aarch and developmenmt. As we see
he first task of the proposed GATT
•king group will be to identify these
ortions and recommend which of
m can be handled under existing
TT rules and procedures.

^eloping Countries

' newly industrializing countries will

Isent major challenges and oppor-
ities in this decade. An anticipated
id increase in manufactured imports
n these countries will add to existing
iei ssures to adjust output and employ-
it in our traditional labor-intensive

industries. The need to adjust will broad-
en and intensify as their numbers in-
crease and they begin to move up the
technological ladder.

Growth in the newly industrializing
countries also can provide increased op-
portunities for developed country ex-
ports and investment. In the 1970s,
developed country exports to the newly
industrializing countries grew at roughly
the same pace as trade among developed
countries. The major policy challenge for
us is to find ways to induce and encour-
age these countries to become full part-
ners in the liberal trading system. We
hope the GATT ministerial will address
this issue creatively, recognizing that the
basic bargain that needs to be struck in-
volves safeguarding their access to our
markets, in return for which they should
be willing to reduce barriers to
developed country exports.

Services

The third key area is services. As other
countries experience the shift to services
which occurred in the United States dur-
ing the 1970s, we can expect heightened
international competition in a number of
sectors. At present, there is no interna-
tional framework of agreed rules for
trade in services, although the OECD
has already undertaken studies in a
number of services sectors. We have
strongly supported this work and have
urged the organization to broaden its
consideration of services barriers and
possible ways to reduce or eliminate
them.

We continue to encourage our major
trading partners to examine their serv-
ices sectors and define their interests
and objectives for future international
negotiations. At the GATT ministerial in
November, our goal is agreement to pur-
sue a serious work program on services
trade.

Trade-Related Investment Practices

The fourth area is investment practices.
Just as in services, there is no interna-
tional framework of agreed investment
rules. Until recently, this did not cause
serious problems. Investment issues
tended to be intermittent and country
specific. With the global economic
downturn, resorting to interventionist
policies has increased.

Our goal is to reverse that trend by
establishing international understand-
ings and rules which support an open in-
vestment climate. Among our specific
goals are better market access and na-

ober1982

tional treatment for U.S. investors
abroad. Trade distorting practices,
which we seek to minimize, are re-
quirements for local content, mandatory
exports, and domestic hiring, as well as
limitations on the right of establishment.

Agriculture

We have not, of course, neglected
agriculture. We want to see a major new
effort in the GATT to bring agricultural
trade closer to the disciplines that apply
to trade in goods. I would be less than
candid, however, if I did not tell you
that our ability to launch significant new
work depends on our ability to manage
successfully a range of current issues we
have with the European Community.
I believe you will agree that the
trade agenda for international action is
extensive. The opportunities are great,
and, if we take an ambitious and
positive approach, I am confident that
progress is possible.

Domestic Challenges

Domestically, we have challenges to
meet as well. Over the next decade, we
will face a world which differs greatly
from the one in which today's trade
policies and rules were developed. Com-
petition from Japan and the newly in-
dustrializing nations will be particularly
intense. We will need a strong domestic
economy to meet it. Increased invest-
ment, research and development, and
productivity are essential.

A major and creative export promo-
tion effort will also be required to take
advantage of our competitiveness and
the trade opportunities we hope to
create internationally. Strong support
for U.S. business abroad, creative use of
export financing and promotion pro-
grams, and identification of growing
markets in the developing world for
special promotional efforts and attention
will be particularly important.

At home, the Administration has
worked with the Congress to improve
the tax treatment of Americans working
overseas, to lessen the burden of com-
plying with the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act, and to shape new export
trading company legislation.

Much has been done but more can be
done. Tax treatment of Americans living
and working abroad was liberalized in
August 1981 with the passage of the
Economic Recovery Act. Before this
legislation was passed, the United States
was the only major industrial country
that taxed income earned abroad on the

basis of citizenship. The effect, now
eliminated, was to invite U.S. companies
to replace American employees with
foreign nationals and to make U.S. ex-
ports less price competitive.

The Administration is actively sup-
porting legislation to change the ac-
counting controls and bribery provisions
in the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act. Our intent is to make the account-
ing requirements less onerous and to im-
pose liability for circumvention of the
regulations, not mere failure to observe
them to the letter. Also, we want the
antibribery provisions of the act to apply
only where there is proven intent to
make a corrupt payment. These changes
would produce the result the law in-
tended but remove an important
disincentive to export.

Another proposal receiving active
Administration support in Congress en-
courages the formation and development
of U.S. export trading companies. The
idea is to permit commercial banks to
own equity in trading companies and to
allow such companies to "preclear" their
activities under our antitrust laws.
There is continuing discussion in Con-
gress about how to deal with the an-
titrust issue, but the Congress and the
Administration are agreed on the princi-
ple that antitrust concepts require
change to lessen their effect on exports.

Outside the realm of legislation, the
U.S. Government has a number of pro-
grams to assist firms doing business
abroad.

• A wide range of export promotion
programs can help in selecting and ex-
ploring foreign markets.

• At our embassies and consulates,
officials of the Departments of Com-
merce, Agriculture, and State conduct
overseas market research, gather com-
mercial data, and offer on-the-spot
assistance to U.S. businessmen.

• In the area of finance, there are
U.S. Government programs which offer
some assistance. The Export-Import
Bank and the Commodity Credit Cor-
poration facilitate U.S. exports and help
exporters meet foreign competition for
third markets.

• On the investment side, the
Overseas Private Investment Corpora-
tion (OPIC) provides political risk in-
surance and financing services for U.S.
companies that make direct investments
in developing countries.

EUROPE

Support for American Business
Abroad

I would like to touch briefly on one
other matter — the State Department's
unique role in support of American
business abroad. One of Secretary
Haig's first actions as Secretary of State
was to instruct each ambassador that a
major purpose of his or her stewardship
must be to lead personally the U.S.
Government's commercial effort in that
country. I am pleased that we are
receiving an increasing number of com-
ments from companies which are
pleasantly surprised to find ambassadors
and embassy staffs giving a top priority
to assisting American companies.

In cooperation with Secretaries
Baldrige and Block [Malcolm Baldrige of
Commerce and John R. Block of
Agriculture] and T^ade Representative
Brock, the Department of State is com-
mitted to assist companies in Iowa and
in every State to be successful exporters
and competitors abroad. Not that you
are not doing well. In 1981 Iowa ranked
first as an exporter of farm products

with receipts of $3.74 billion. Exports
manufactured goods were even larger
totaling $3.78 billion.

Let me add that I have also been
pressed during the past year with the
growth in the number of State trade
missions going abroad to aggressively
seek export markets for their com-
panies. The State Department is fully
prepared to assist you in whatever W£
we can in this overall effort.

Adoption and implementation of a
comprehensive trade policy approach,
both domestically and internationally,
will strengthen the U.S. economy and
our competitiveness in world markets
To succeed we will need to muster bo
national determination and commitme
to rely on competition and free mark*
The government can help create an e
vironment conducive to efficient and
profitable production. It can make la\
and regulations less onerous, and it c
offer some direct support. But privat
individuals and enterprises have to ta
the initiative to seize economic oppor
tunities. We are relying on you. ■

U.S.-Soviet Grain Sales Agreement

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
JULY 30, 1982'

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. grain agreement,
which has governed our grain trade with
the Soviet Union since 1976, is due to
expire September 30. After discussion in
the Cabinet, I have authorized U.S. of-
ficials to explore the possibility with the
Soviet Union of a 1-year extension of
the existing grain agreement. I have fur-
ther authorized them to explore in the
consultations with the Soviets, normally
conducted under the agreement, the
possibility of additional grain sales to
the Soviet Union.

In this decision, I have ruled out any
negotiation of a new long-term agree-
ment at this time. On December 29, I
postponed such negotiations until the
Soviet Union indicates that it is
prepared to permit the process of recon-
ciliation in Poland to go forward and
demonstrates this desire with deeds and
not just words. My decision reinforces
this objective. The Soviets should not be
afforded the additional security of a new
long-term grain agreement as long as
repression continues in Poland.

At the same time, American fan
will not be made to bear alone the
burdens of this policy toward the So
Union. In the spring of 1981, I lifted
grain embargo imposed by the previ
Administration, because it was not
having the desired effect of serioush
penalizing the U.S.S.R. for its bruta
vasion and occupation of Afghanista
Instead, alternative suppliers of this
widely available commodity stepped
make up for the grain which would 1
been normally supplied by U.S. farn
These developments substantially ur
cut the tremendous sacrifices of our
farmers, and I vowed at that time n
impose a grain embargo unilaterally
less it was part of a general cutoff c
trade between the United States ant
Soviet Union.

I renew that pledge to Americai
farmers today. American farmers C£i
assured that they will continue to hi
fair opportunity to export grain to t
U.S.S.R. on a cash basis. Other sup-
pliers, who sometimes criticize our g***
sales, also supply grain to the Sovic *"
Union. Grain sales have little impacM'-'
Soviet military and industrial capab
ities. They absorb hard currency eai
ings and feed the people of the Sovi

Deoartment of State Bui W '

Union, who are suffering most from the
disastrous economic pohcies of the
Soviet Government.

FACT SHEET
JULY 30, 19822

Background

The U.S. -Soviet long-term grain agree-
ment, which originally covered the
1976-81 period, was extended last
August for a sixth year, through Sep-
tember 30, 1982. The President has now
decided to explore the possibility with
the Soviets of a simple extension of the
agreement for a seventh year, with no
changes in its substantive provisions.
^ Article I of the agreement commits the
f Soviets to purchase at least 6 million
tons of U.S. grain annually (3 million
'1 tons each of wheat and corn and allows
them to purchase an additional 2 million
tons without prior consultations with the
U.S. Government. Article II guarantees
these 8 million tons against U.S. discre-
tionary controls. Other provisions pro-
vide for semiannual consultations, spac-
ing of purchases, and an "escape clause"
in the event of very short supplies in the
U.S. grain sales to the Soviets under the
long-term grain agreement are made by
the private trade at prevailing market
prices.

Except during the period of the par-
tial grain embargo, which was in effect
from January 1980 to April 1981 and ap-
plied only to amounts above 8 million
tons, the United States has always of-
fered the Soviets access to additional
amounts of U.S. grain. For instance, for
this agreement year, the Soviets have
been authorized to purchase up to 23
million tons of U.S. grain, of which they
have bought about 14 million tons. The
United States now supplies about 30%
of Soviet grain imports (compared with
about 70% before the embargo). Other
key suppliers are Argentina, Canada,
Australia, and the European Economic
Community (EEC). Canada and Argen-
"Itina also have long-term grain agree-
'"Vents with the U.S.S.R.

In December 1981, the United
States postponed the negotiation of a
new long-term grain agreement with the
"Soviet Union. It did not suspend the ex-
isting agreement nor did it embargo
.grain to the Soviet Union. The decision
1 today extends the existing agreement as

is on a short-term basis for 1 year.
, j The President further authorized his
' negotiators to explain in the consulta-
' tions with the Soviets, normally con-

ducted under the agreement, the possi-
bility of additional grain sales to the
Soviet Union.

History of the Grain Agreement

An unfavorable climate, poor soil,
backward technology, and an extremely
inefficient agricultural system make
periodic crop failures in the Soviet
Union a virtual certainty. As a result,
the Soviets have, during the last 20
years, imported increasing amounts of
grain to accommodate their domestic
needs.

The United States first sold grain to
the Soviet Union in 1963, when a poor
crop compelled the Soviets to import
10.4 million metric tons (mmt) of grain,
including 1.8 mmt from the United
States and 8 mmt from Canada. The
Soviets bought no more U.S. grain dur-
ing the 1960s.

Conditions in the early 1970s
rekindled Soviet interest in American
grain. The Soviets committed them-
selves to upgrading their diet, and the
United States had ample supplies of
grain to export.

In 1971 the Soviet Union purchased
3 mmt of U.S. feedgrains, principally to
help increase their livestock and poultry
production.

In 1972 the Soviets offset a signifi-
cant reduction in their grain crop by
entering the U.S. market and buying,
over a 2-3 month period, 19 mmt of
U.S. grain, including one-fourth of the
total U.S. wheat crop. The Soviets made
their purchases quietly and early, before
prices adjusted to the sudden increase in
demand. The Soviets also were able to
capitalize on the U.S. Department of
Agriculture's wheat export subsidy pro-

EUROPE

gram and a credit arrangement just
negotiated with the United States.
These circumstances, as well as the
domestic market disruption caused by
the massive grain purchases, led critics
to label the U.S. sales as the "great
Soviet grain robbery."

The Grain Agreement

The summer of 1975 brought new
reports of a looming Soviet crop failure.
These reports, coupled with the desire to
avoid a repeat of the 1972 scenario,
prompted the Ford Administration to
suspend grain sales to the Soviet Union
until an arrangement could be worked
out that would prevent Soviet disruption
of U.S. domestic markets and guarantee
U.S. farmers a reasonable share of the
Soviet market.

The ensuing negotiations with the
Soviet Union produced an agreement
with the following provisions.

• The Soviets agreed to purchase 6
mmt of U.S. wheat and corn, in approx-
imately equal proportions, during each
of the 5 years covered by the agree-
ment.

• The Soviets could purchase up to
2 mmt more of U.S. grain during any
year without consultations with the
United States.

• The United States agreed not to
embargo exports of up to 8 mmt of
grain to the Soviet Union.

• The Soviets were required to con-
sult with the United States (to deter-
mine a higher supply level) before buy-
ing more than 8 mmt of grain in any
given year; however, such sales in ex-
cess of 8 mmt were not covered by the
safeguard against embargoes.

Total U.S.S.R.

U.S. Grain

U.S

Share of

Grain Imports

Exports to U.S.S.R.

Total U.S.S.R.

(mmt)

Grain Imports

(%)

FY 1973

22.5

14.1

FY 1974

5.7

4.5

FY 1975

7.7

3.2

FY 1976

25.6

14.9

FY 1977

8.4

6.1

FY 1978

22.5

14.6

FY 1979

19.6

15.3

FY 1980

27.0

8.3

FY 1981

38.8

9.5

FY 1982

45.0

17.8

(projected)

FY 1983

40-50

(estimated)

October 1982

EUROPE

• There was an escape clause for
the United States in the event of a ma-
jor U.S. crop shortfall.

• Soviet purchases were to be made
at prevailing market prices and in
accordance with normal commercial
terms.

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. grain agreement
eased the way for major expansion of
U.S. grain trade with the Soviets.
Moreover, the agreement created more
consistency in sales of American grain
to the Soviets, thus avoiding the uncer-
tainty which had plagued the U.S.
market before 1975.

Soviet Grain Embargo of 1980

On January 4, 1980, in response to the
Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan,
President Carter canceled contracts for
the sale of grain beyond the 8 mmt
assured against embargo by the agree-
ment. The canceled contracts included
the sale of 13.5 mmt of U.S. corn and
wheat to the Soviet Union. The United
States also denied the Soviets access to
an additional 3.5 mmt of grain which
had been offered to but not yet pur-
chased by the Soviets. Finally, ship-
ments of soybeans, broilers, and some
other agricultural products were halted.

The Soviets were able to minimize
the effects of the embargo by drawing
down their grain stocks and by increas-
ing grain, soybean, rice, flour, and meat
imports from non-U. S. origins, primarily
Argentina, Canada, Australia, and the
EEC. The Soviets have since entered in-
to new long-term purchasing agreements
with Argentina, Brazil, Canada,
Hungary, and Thailand in an attempt to
diversify their sources of supply and
reduce the threat of future embargoes.

In April 1981, President Reagan
lifted the Soviet grain embargo. This
was followed by an agreement in August
to extend the expiring U.S.-U.S.S.R.
grain accord for an additional year,
through September 30, 1982. In October

1981, the United States offered the
Soviets an additional 15 mmt of grain,
raising to 23 mmt the amount of U.S.
grain available to the Soviets during FY

1982. To date, the Soviets have pur-
chased a total of 13.9 mmt of U.S.
wheat and corn.

U.S. Sanctions Against the Soviets

Discussions concerning negotiation of a
new U.S.-U.S.S.R. long-term grain

.iZ.

agreement were underway within the
Administration when the Polish Govern-
ment declared a state of martial law in
December 1981. In response to that
situation, the President announced a
number of sanctions against the Soviets,
including postponement of negotiations

on a new grain agreement. He did not
suspend the existing 1-year agreement
nor embargo the sale of any grain.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Aug. 2, 1982.
^Text from White House press release.

Soviet Active Measures:
An Update

This report describes Soviet "active
measures" which have come to light since
the publication of the last report in the
November 1981 Bulletin (p. 52).

The Soviet Union uses the term "active
measures" (aktivnyye meropriyatiya) to
cover a broad range of activities de-
signed to promote Soviet foreign policy
goals, including undercutting opponents
of the U.S.S.R. Active measures include
disinformation, manipulating the media
in foreign countries, the use of Com-
munist Parties and Communist front
groups, and operations to expand Soviet
political influence. In contrast to public
diplomacy, which all nations practice,
Soviet active measures often involve de-
ception and are frequently implemented
by clandestine means. Active measures
are carried out not only by the KGB but
also by the International Department
and the International Information De-
partment of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union.

The active measures discussed in
this report are necessarily limited to
those that have been publicly exposed.
They make clear that these activities
take place worldwide. The open societies
of many industrialized and developing
countries afford the Soviets oppor-
tunities to use active measures to in-
fluence opinions in favor of Soviet
policies and against those of the United
States and its allies. It is our hope that
this report will increase public aware-
ness and understanding of Soviet active
measures and thereby reduce the likeli-
hood that people will be deceived.

Forgeries

Forgeries are a frequently used active
measures technique. Several have come
to light in recent months. Their appear-
ance has been timed to influence West-
ern opinion on current sensitive issues.
As far as we are aware, only one of
these recent forgeries achieved uncriticc ^
publication.

Forgeries are usually sent through
the mail to journalists, officials, or othe: ,
persons who might make them availabli'
to the media. Forgeries normally do no« '
carry a return address, nor is the send«
identified in a way that can be checked.
How the document was acquired invari
ably is vague.

The NATO Information Service
Documents. In late October 1981, Spa:
ish journalists living in Brussels receivi
form letters purporting to come from
the NATO Information Service. The le
ters enclosed a publicity packet that h£
been updated to include Spain as a nev
member of the alliance. As the Spanisl
Parliament was still debating Spain's a
plication to join NATO, the letter coul(
impress Spaniards as showing contemj
for Spain's democratic institutions. Thi
journalists checked with NATO, and ■,
stories in the Spanish press reported a ^
forgery designed to influence Spain's
domestic debate on NATO.

The President Reagan Letter to
the King of Spain. In November 1981
an attempt was made in Madrid to sur
face a forged letter from President
Reagan to the King of Spain. In term:
likely to offend Spanish sensitivities, tl
letter urged the King to join NATO ar
to crack down on groups such as the
"OPUS DEI pacifists" and the "left-wii
opposition."

After an initial mailing to Spanish
journalists failed to obtain publication
the forgery was circulated on Novem-

SSUj

Department of State Bullei ^

EUROPE

ber 11 to all delegations (except the U.S.
and Spanish) to the Conference of
Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE), then meeting in Madrid. This
time several Madrid newspapers ran
stories that exposed the letter as a
fabrication probably of Soviet origin.

The Clark-Steams Letter. In

January 1982, a forged letter and an ac-
companying research analysis dated
September 23, 1981, from Judge William
I Clark, then Deputy Secretary of State,
to the U.S. Ambassador to Greece,
Monteagle Stearns, circulated in Athens.
This forgery indicated U.S. support for
the conservatives in the October Greek
elections and alluded to a possible mili-
tary coup if Socialist leader Andreas
Papandreou won at the polls. On the
Dasis of U.S. Embassy assurances that
;he letter was a fake, it was not initially
published. Several weeks later, after
;opies had been circulated at the CSCE
n Madrid, the Athens daily Vrathini
)ublished a story describing the letter as
)f doubtful authenticity and probably at-
ributable to a "third-country" intelli-
gence service.

The Swedish Mailgrams. During
he week of November 8, 1981, at least
0 mailgrams— initiated by telephone
alls to Western Union — were circulated
0 journalists in the Washington, D.C.,
rea. Supposedly sent by U.S. Govern-
lent officials, the mailgrams offered to
lake available the text of an alleged
ecret agreement for U.S. use of the
wedish base at Karlskrona for intelli-
ence purposes.

The mailgrams were sent immediate-
' after the furor caused by the ground-
ig of a Soviet submarine in restricted
'aters off the Karlskrona naval base,
heir timing supports the conclusion
lat the effort was an attempt to offset
le bad publicity the Soviets received
■om the incident.

The Haig-Luns Letter. The

-pril 22, 1982, edition of the Belgian
iftist weekly De Nieuwe published a let-
;r supposedly sent in June 1979 by re-
ring NATO Commander Alexander
;aig to NATO Secretary General
Dseph Luns. Both NATO and U.S.
fficials branded the letter a fabrication.
The forged letter discussed a possi-
le nuclear first-strike and called for "ae-
on of a sensitive nature" to "jolt the
lint hearted in Europe" opposed to
itermediate-range nuclear force mod-
-nization. The timing of the false letter
as related to the many antinuclear

il!tober1982

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demonstrations which took place in
Europe in the spring of 1982. The letter
appeared again in the Luxembourg Com-
munist Party newspaper, Zeitung, on
May 10.

The Department of Commerce
Document. In late May 1982, just before
the Versailles economic summit, an
alleged U.S. Government document
dated February 18, 1982, circulated in
Brussels. Purporting to be the recom-
mendations of a working group on stra-
tegic economic policy chaired by the
Secretary of Commerce, the document
twisted U.S. policy on sensitive trade
issues in a way likely to stimulate fric-
tion between the United States and its
European allies. Several journalists
brought the matter to the attention of
U.S. officials, who promptly branded it a
forgery. As far as the United States is
aware, the media have not reported the
fabricated document.

Media Manipulation/Disinformation

The purpose of disinformation efforts is
to gain public acceptance for something
that is not true. Since Soviet media lack
credibility, the goal is to achieve publica-
tion of false news in reputable non-
Communist media. Soviet media, such as
TASS or Radio Moscow, are then able
to cite credible sources in replaying a
story in the hope that it will be picked
up by other non-Communist media. Dis-
information also is frequently placed in
pro-Soviet news outlets outside the
Eastern bloc in the hope that it will be
replayed by independent media or simp-
ly gain acceptance through repetition.

Angola/Zaire/South Africa. One

Soviet campaign has been to discredit
U.S. policy in southern Africa— in par-
ticular, the credibility of U.S. efforts to
solve the Namibia problem — by media
stories that the United States is trying
to oust the Government of Angola. A
number of recent examples illustrate
this effort.

• On September 15 and 23-24,
1981, the Portugal Hoje of Lisbon, a
paper close to the Socialist Party, pub-
lished reports that U.S., Zairian, and
South African representatives had met
secretly to conspire against the Angolan
regime. The source for the story, an
Angolan traveling to Lisbon, claimed he
had stolen Zairian documents as proof,
but he never made the documents avail-
able. Both Zaire and the United States
denied the allegations. TASS promptly
picked up the Hoje story, and in turn it

was replayed in a number of African
papers, including the Jomal de Angola.

• On December 22, 1981, Diario de
Lisboa, a pro-Communist paper, re-
ported that the United States was sup-
porting "2,000 specially trained gunmen"
based in Zaire to attack Angola. The
State Department denied the story
December 24, but TASS nonetheless
picked it up. In turn, a number of
African papers and radio stations and
the Flemish Socialist daily De Morgen
replayed the allegations on the basis of
the TASS account.

• A similar story was carried in the
April 17, 1982, Congolese newspaper
Etumba, which alleged a meeting in
1981 among the United States, South
Africa, and others to plot against
Angola. The U.S. Embassy in Brazza-
ville promptly denied the report.

The Seychelles Coup Attempt. A

day after the November 25, 1981, at-
tempt by a group of mercenaries to
overthrow the Government of the Sey-
chelles, Soviet news reports were imply-
ing that the CIA was responsible. In
keeping with frequent Soviet practice,
these accusations were attributed to un-
named, and therefore unverifiable,
"African radio commentaries." Despite a
statement by Seychelles President
France Albert Rene on December 2 that
his government had no indication of any
foreign involvement other than South
African, Soviet media continued to ac-
cuse the United States. In December,
several African newspapers (among
them the Nairobi Nation and Lagos
Daily Times, the leading dailies in
Kenya and Nigeria, respectively) re-
peated the story. Soviet media then re-
played the allegations, citing the African
papers as sources.

The Pakistani Mosquitoes. In the

wake of compelling evidence that the
Soviets are using chemical weapons in
Afghanistan and supplying mycotoxins
for use in Laos and Kampuchea,
Moscow has launched a disinformation
effort focused on Pakistan. The Febru-
ary 2, 1982, Literatumaya Gazeta
alleged that the antimalaria program of
the Pakistan Malaria Research Center in
Lahore was a CIA-financed effort to
breed special mosquitoes "which infect
their victims with deadly viruses as part
of U.S. plans to introduce biological war-
fare into Afghanistan." In fact, the
Pakistan Malaria Research Center has
been conducting antimalaria research for
20 years. Much of the funding comes
from the U.S. National Institutes of
Health and the Agency for International
Development (AID) through a contract

with the University of Maryland. The
State Department promptly labeled the
Soviet charges "utterly baseless."

The American Center Director Dr.
David Nalin told the Baltimore Sun on
February 9, 1982, that the allegations
were a Soviet disinformation effort to
counter U.S. "yellow rain" charges.
Nonetheless, TASS continued to carry
the false stories, which were replayed
not only by regular disinformation out-
lets, such as Bombay's Blitz and the
New Delhi Patriot, but also by independ-
ent newspapers not usually associated
with Soviet propaganda, such as the in-
fluential Times of India, the Pakistani
daily Jarig, and the Muslim News of
Capetown, South Africa.

A Moscow-Funded Greek News-
paper? Another way to exert media in-
fluence is by secretly subsidizing a news-
paper. This may have occurred recently
in Greece. In May 1982, the Athens
daily Messimvrini charged that a new
large circulation daily. To Ethnos, had
begun publication in September 1981
thanks to a secret Soviet subsidy of ILSfrf
million; Messimvrini alleged that covert
payments were continuing. The Greek
Government has ordered an investiga-
tion.

Military Base Hoaxes. A disinfor-
mation staple is to float false stories
about U.S. military cooperation. Recent
examples from Soviet and Communist
media have included false stories that
the United States has or intends to
establish bases on the Honduran island
of Amapala, the Colombian island of Sa-
Andres, and in the Comoros Islands off
the east coast of Africa. Although these
have not gained credence, one relating
to Pakistan attracted more attention. A
a result, the Pakistan Foreign Ministry
on December 10, 1981, found it
necessary to deny Radio Moscow's asse:'
tion that the United States would seek
military bases in Pakistan during a visit
by Secretary of State Haig. Among
other things, the Radio Moscow accoun
falsely asserted that Indian Foreign
Minister Rao had claimed in the Indian
Parliament that Pakistan had agreed to
provide bases for the U.S. rapid deploy
ment force.

licti

ie(

livi

Front Groups/Pro-Moscow Communis
Parties

Front groups are nominally independen
organizations that are controlled by the
Soviets, usually through the Interna-
tional Department of the Central Com

Department of State Bulletl

MIDDLE EAST

mittee of the CPSU.' These organiza-
tions have long sought to build support
for Soviet foreign policy goals. In recent
months the main thrust of front activity
has been to try to see that the peace
movement in Western Europe and the
United States is directed solely against
U.S. policy and that it avoids any criti-
cism of the Soviet nuclear threat. The
1982 program of the World Peace Coun-
cil, for example, calls for:

• "Further intensification of actions
against the dangers of nuclear war and
the deployment of new U.S. weapons of
mass destruction in Western

Europe. ..."

• "National events (demonstrations,
seminars, coUoquia, etc.) with interna-
tional participation 'against nuclear arms
build-up and the deployment of U.S.
missiles in Europe; for peace and
detente in Europe.' "

• "International meeting of mayors
and elected representatives (city coun-
cilors, muncipalities, etc.) and of peace

"'orces from European tov/ns and regions
tivhere new U.S. nuclear missiles are to
)e deployed. . . ."^

Communist parties linked with
«loscow have pursued the same path.
7he impact of the fronts and local Com-
nunist groups varies markedly from
ountry to country and is difficult to
evaluate. Nevertheless, awareness is in-
reasing that the Communists and their
upporters are attempting to channel

' he peace and antinuclear movements to
erve Moscow's purpose. This has led to

* riction within the movement in some
ountries.

In West Germany, after efforts by
Ihe German Communist Party (DKP) in

" larly April 1982 produced anti-U.S.
Slogans without mentioning the Soviet
uclear arsenal as a threat to peace,
'etra Kelly, a prominent leader of the
Invironment Party (the "Greens"),
ublicly criticized the Communists. She
epeated this criticism when interviewed
n CBS television during President
Reagan's visit to Bonn. Similarly, in
lUStria, the original platform adopted
y the organizers of a peace march on
lay 15 under pressure from pro-
loscow Communists avoided criticism
f Soviet atomic weapons. The non-
'ommunists later regrouped; as a result,
le Austrian Youth Council issued a less
ne-sided platform.

Political Influence Operations

Political influence operations, especially
those using agents of influence, are
harder to detect than other active meas-
ures. In these operations, individuals dis-
guise their KGB connection while taking
an active role in public affairs. Ex-
posure, when it occurs, is frequently the
result of an espionage investigation. The
scale of improper Soviet activities is re-
flected in the publicized expulsion of 19
Soviet officials involved in espionage and
active measures cases from 10 countries
during the first 5 months of 1982.
Among these were the expulsion of the
Soviet military attache from Washington
and the uncovering of spy nets in Indo-
nesia and Singapore.

Denmark. In October 1981, the
Danish Government expelled Vladimir
Merkulov, a KGB officer serving as a
second secretary of the Soviet Embassy,
for improper conduct, including direct-
ing the activities of Danish agent-of-
influence Arne Herloev Petersen. An
April 17, 1982, Danish Ministry of
Justice statement detailed Petersen's
work with the KGB.

• In the summer of 1981, the
Soviets arranged to cover Petersen's ex-
penses for a series of advertisements in
which Danish artists expressed support
for a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone.

• Petersen brought foreign policy
documents provided by the Soviet Em-
bassy to the North Korean Embassy; on
Soviet instructions he misrepresented
the documents as coming from an
American journalist.

• Petersen provided information
several times to the Soviet Embassy on
the Danish "left wing" and on "pro-
gressive" journalists who were not Com-
munist Party members.

• Petersen arranged for the print-
ing of a pamphlet attacking British
Prime Minister Thatcher. The text was
supplied by the Soviet Embassy.

The Ministry of Justice noted that
clandestine meetings between Petersen
and a succession of three Soviet "diplo-
mats" (of whom Merkulov was the
latest) had extended over several years.
Petersen specifically was requested by
his KGB handlers not to join the Danish
Communist Party.

The Danish Government decided not
to prosecute Petersen, although it de-
clared that he violated Danish law. In a
television interview 2 days after the
official statement, the Danish Foreign
Minister challenged Petersen to sue for
slander so that the full extent of the
government's evidence could be made
public.

Sweden. Soviet Third Secretary
Albert Liepa was expelled in April 1982.

Secretary's Letter to Jordan's King

August 11, 1982

Your Majesty,

It is my pleasure to extend best wishes to
you and to the people of Jordan on the thir-
tieth anniversary of your accession to the
Throne. The length and success of your reign
ranks as one of the great achievements of
modern statesmanship. Seven Presidents and
ten Secretaries of State have benefitted from
the wisdom of your counsel and from the
strength of your support for our shared ob-
jectives.

You became King at a most difficult
period for your country and for your region.
Jordan has since made long strides on the
road to economic and social development and
is today one of the examples of success held
out to those just setting out toward creating
prosperity for their people. You have done
this with strength, great economic freedom
and willpower, characteristics Americans
greatly admire.

Despite all of our best efforts, however,
these are still very difficult times for the
cause of peace. We will not rest until we
have achieved a just and comprehensive

peace in your troubled area. As we have so
often in the past, we will look to you for ad-
vice and support as we pursue our goal.

On this auspicious occasion it is also ap-
propriate to note again that the Government
and people of the United States support the
territorial integrity, sovereignty and in-
dependence of Jordan, as well as Jordan's
unique and enduring character. These prin-
ciples have formed the basis of our mutually
beneficial relationship for thirty years. You
may rest assured that they are the rock upon
which our future relations will be built as
well.

I trust that in the years ahead the
dreams we hold in common come to life for
our two peoples and for all of those whose
lives are touched by our deeds.

Sincerely,

George P. Shultz

Made available to news correspondents by
acting Department spokesman Alan
Romberg. ■

ctober 1982

MILITARY AFFAIRS

According to a Swedish Foreign Minis-
try spokesman, Liepa had made syste-
matic efforts to collect information on
and exert influence over the Latvian ex-
ile community in Sweden. Before his
assignment to Stockholm, Liepa had
been chairman of a committee based in
Riga concerned with maintaining
"cultural ties" with Latvians living out-
side the Soviet Union.

'See Foreign Affairs Note, The World
Peace Cmincil. Instrument ofSoinet Foreign
Policy. Department of State, April 1982.
Other well-known international fronts are the
International Institute for Peace (IIP), the

World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU),
the World Federation of Democratic Youth
(WFDY), the International Union of Students
(lUS), the Women's International Democratic
Federation (WIDF), the International Associ-
ation of Democratic Lawyers (lADL), the
World Federation of Scientific Workers
(WFSW), the International Organization of
Journalists (lOJ), the Christian Peace Con-
ference (CPC), the International Federation
of Resistance Fighters (FIR), and the
Women's International League for Peace and
Freedom (WILPF).

'World Peaee Council: Programme of
Action 1982 published by the Information
Center of the WPC, Helsinki. ■

Chemical Weapons:

Arms Control and Deterrence

by Jonathan T. Howe

Statement before the Subcommittee
on International Security and Scientific
Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee on July 13, 1982. Rear
Admiral Howe is Director of the Bureau
of Politico-Military Affairs.^

I am pleased to have the opportunity to
address foreign policy and arms control
aspects of chemical weapons. The policy
of the United States in this area is clear.
Our goal remains to stop the current use
of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and
Southeast Asia and to obtain a complete
and verifiable ban on the development,
production, and stockpiling of them.

Arms Control Efforts

The Geneva protocol of 1925, to which
the United States is a party, prohibits in
war the use of asphyxiating, poisonous,
or other gases and of biological methods
of warfare. Unfortunately, the agree-
ment bans only the use of chemical
weapons— not their possession. It is,
furthermore, essentially a ban only on
first use, since most of the important
military powers, including the United
States and the Soviet Union, have
reserved the right to retaliate in kind to
an enemy's use of chemical weapons.
Our eventual objective is the achieve-
ment of a new, multilateral treaty that
bans chemical weapons altogether and
requires effective verification and com-
pliance.

Achievement of such a treaty would
be a significant milestone for mankind.
But it will not be easy. The critical
obstacle to forward movement has been
Soviet intransigence on verification and
compliance issues. Any effective
chemical weapons agreement must in-
sure the destruction of chemical stocks
and must contain adequate monitoring
provisions so that no party clandestinely
retains or produces chemical weapons.
Recent Soviet violations have underlined
the absolute necessity for effective veri-
fication and monitoring of any chemical
weapons agreement.

As a means of moving the process
forward, we have shifted our effort from
bilateral U.S. -Soviet negotiations to the
U.N. Committee on Disarmament. The
bilateral negotiations, begun in 1977,
lapsed in deadlock in mid-1980. The
Soviet Union was unwilling to accept
reasonable provisions for verifying the
destruction of existing stocks of chemi-
cal weapons and disposition of their
places of manufacture. In addition, the
Soviets were not prepared to agree to
effective procedures for assuring con-
tinued compliance.

P'or these reasons, we are focusing
our current efforts in Geneva. It is the
role of the U.N. Committee on Disarma-
ment to develop multilateral arms con-
trol agreements. The United States is an
active participant in ongoing efforts
there toward elaborating a comprehen-
sive agreement banning chemical
weapons.

We have conducted this arms control
effort against a background of unilateral

restraint. Since 1969, we have not
manufactured any lethal or incapacitat-
ing chemical weapons. Successive U.S.
administrations have repeatedly assured
that we will never initiate chemical war-
fare.

Soviet Buildup

However, our restraint has not been
matched by the Soviet Union. During
this same 13-year period, the Soviets
have continued to strengthen their mili-
tary chemical warfare capability. This
Soviet buildup extends well beyond
reasonable deterrence requirements.

This threat to our security has re-
cently been brought into sharper focus
by the actual use of chemical weapons in
Afghanistan and chemical and toxin
weapons in Southeast Asia. Compelling
evidence was presented to Congress on
March 22 and May 13 of this year; that
evidence continues to accumulate. We
are analyzing indications that these at-
tacks are continuing unabated, despite
international efforts to stop them. Such
attacks are illegal. The use of chemical
weapons is a violation of the 1925
Geneva protocol and related rules of in-
ternational law. Possession alone of
toxin weapons is a violation of the 1972
Biological Weapons Convention. On
June 17, 1982, President Reagan speci-
fically called attention to such violations
in his address to the Second Special Ses
sion of the United Nations Devoted to
Disarmament.

Unfortunately, our numerous de-
marches to the Soviets have been re-
buffed. Despite overwhelming evidence,
the Soviets continue to deny these illega
acts are taking place. A paper of re-
buttal, attributed to experts from the
IJ.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, the
U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health, and other
Soviet organizations, which was submit-
ted to the United Nations on May 21,
has been described in a recent issue of
Science magazine, an independent, non-
governmental scientific publication, as
containing "extravagant conjectures."

Despite this discouraging back-
ground, we remain actively interested ii
achieving our goal of a universal and
comprehensive chemical weapons ban.
We intend, in the upcoming session of
the U.N. Committee on Disarmament ii
July, to explore fully all areas of the
Soviet proposal recently submitted to
the U.N. Special Session on Disarma-
ment. Preliminary analysis of this pro-
posal indicates that most of it is not
new. However, it contains a few ele-
ments of potential interest. The signifi-

Department of Stafe Bullet!

MILITARY AFFAIRS

iiu'c of these new elements is not clear;
wiiuld be premature to conclude that
itrc had been a breakthrough. Frankly,
e have not resumed the bilateral
siussions because there is little pros-
■it for productive negotiations under
listing circumstances. Should the
ivii'ts demonstrate a willingness to ac-
•[it u'^enuinely effective verification and
iiii[iliance arrangements, and should
ifV demonstrate a willingness to abide
/ existing international obligations on
lemical, biological, and toxin weapons,
e prospects for serious bilateral work
ould be enhanced.

.S. Initiatives

II executive agencies of this Admini-
ration concerned with national securi-
, as well as previous Congresses, have
■ncluded that we can no longer forego
odernization of our chemical warfare
'terrent, which is a modest one meas-
ed against Soviet capabilities. Our na-
)nal security policy must address the
alities of the world we live in. Our
ilitary forces must have the capability
deter threats to ourselves and our
ies. This requires maintaining ade-
.late U.S. stocks. It also requires im-
(ovement of protective and defensive
easures against chemical attack, which
the primary emphasis of our program.

The report to Congress on the U.S.
«emical warfare deterrence program
(bmitted by the U.S. Department of
efense in March of this year presents
J- situation in detail. The difficult deci-
)n to modernize our chemical weapons
pability was undertaken only with
luctance, after long and painstaking
amination of our obsolete and
teriorating assets. The Congress,
lich actually moved ahead of the ex-
utive branch in encouraging moderni-
tion of our chemical deterrent, con-
lues to review each step of this pro-
am carefully.

S. Cooperation With Allies

le United States has kept its allies ful-
informed of its program and of its
cisions, over the past several years, to
gin modernization of U.S. chemical
irfare capabilities. In March 1981, we
formed our allies of the Administra-
)n's decision to seek funding for the
cility at Pine Bluff, Arkansas. In Feb-
ary of this year, we informed our
lies of our decision to seek funding for
oduction. We believe it is inappro-
iate to ask allies to share responsi-

;tober1982

Production of the MX Missile

PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO
THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE,
JULY 16, 1982'

I am writing to you and your colleagues to
enlist your support in a bipartisan effort that
I feel is essential to our national security and
indeed the security of the free world in the
troubled decades ahead. We have begun to
negotiate with the Soviet Union what we
earnestly hope will be an equitable and
verifiable Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. I
know that you will agree with me that we
must maintain a position of unity and
strength during these talks which are so vital
to mankind.

Last fall I presented my Strategic
Modernization Program to you for approval. I
am pleased to say that since then we have
taken the critical first steps needed to put
the plan into action. Our initiatives for
bomber modernization, strategic communica-
tions improvement, the Trident II program,
and strategic defense are well under way. Im-
plementation of our plan for ICBM [intercon-
tinental ballistic missile] modernization,
however, is not keeping pace with the overall
program. I believe that we need positive and
prompt action to correct that situation.

With respect to M-X basing, I set forth a
plan for resolving this issue by the spring of
1984. The Senate has now asked us to modify
this plan. In its recent Defense Authorization
Report the Senate expressed a desire for us
to select a permament basing mode by
December of this year. I believe we can, with
your help, meet that date.

As you know, however, the Senate failed
to authorize the production funds needed to
begin the production of the M-X missile
itself. I cannot over-emphasize to you the
serious negative impact this can have on our
negotiations with the Soviets and our
modernization program. Failure to authorize
these funds will delay the program a year
and increase the cost. Thus, it is essential
that the House act to approve the production
funds and that this action prevail in con-
ference.

I believe that we must make a solid com-
mitment this year to deploy the M-X missile.
We simply cannot allow the land-based leg of
the triad to remain vulnerable. We must also
show our Allies that we can make the hard
decisions necessary to modernize our strate-
gic nuclear capacity — decisions that promise
to have great influence on the pace of ongo-
ing Theater Nuclear Force modernization ini-
tiatives within NATO. And while it is my in-
tention that the M-X not be a "bargaining

chip" in the START negotiations, we need to
secure the powerful leverage that a commit-
ment to produce the M-X would provide as
we begin effective arms reduction talks with
the Soviets. Finally, we need to capitalize on
the sizeable investment of some $4.5 billion
that has already been made in the M-X pro-
gram. These goals can only be achieved if
decisive action is taken now to proceed with
M-X production and deployment.

As you review this issue, I want to assure
you that we intend to propose a final basing
mode for the M-X by December. Some
Members of Congress have expressed con-
cern over the approval of basing funds before
the basing mode is announced in December. I
recognize that concern and will cooperate
fully if the Congress wishes to place restric-
tions on the use of these funds until the bas-
ing decision is made in December. I urge you,
however, to send a clear signal of strong U.S.
resolve to the Soviets by fully authorizing
and appropriating the funds I have requested
for the M-X, especially those funds needed to
begin production of the M-X this year. I need
your full support of this vital program so that
we can make the critical decisions we must in
December to implement this much needed
element to our modernization program. I fur-
ther urge you to support restoration of the
research and development budget for Ballistic
Missile Defense to the level I have requested
so that this program can maintain its proper
place in relation to the M-X.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
JULY 21, 19821

I am most gratified by today's House
vote approving funds for production of
the MX missile. This strong, bipartisan
action demonstrates clearly the commit-
ment of the Congress to improving
America's defenses, thereby providing
important support for Ambassador
Rowny [Edward L. Rowny, head of the
U.S. delegation to the START negotia-
tions] in his negotiations with the Soviet
Union on strategic arms reductions. I
look forward to working with House and
Senate conferees to insure final passage
of the MX authorization.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of July 26, 1982.

bility for a U.S. national security deci-
sion and have not done so. No allied
government has expressed opposition to
these steps or otherwise commented on
the substance of the decision to seek
funds for production.

For many years, it has been agreed
NATO doctrine that an effective chemi-
cal warfare retaliatory capability is an
essential part of the continuum of deter-
rence. We have informed our allies, as
we have informed the Congress, that

there has been no decision on forward
deployment of binary chemical weapons,
and none is currently under considera-
tion. Our allies have been assured we
will consult fully with any other nation
involved prior to making such a decision.
Since it will be several years before pro-
duction begins, and several years there-
after before stockpiles are accumulated,
no consideration of deployment else-
where is likely for some time to come.
Our allies understand and accept that
we have no plans at this time to deploy
any binary chemical munitions in any
foreign country.

Our allies, like ourselves, are com-
mitted to seeking through arms control
a complete ban on the production and
stockpiling of chemical weapons. To-
gether we are pressing for progress
toward such an agreement in the U.N.
Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.
They also recognize that the principal
hurdle to be overcome is that of verifica-
tion and the need to assure effective
compliance.

The Need for Deterrence

We are well aware that chemical
weapons are an emotional issue, in allied
countries as well as our own. But as
leader of the free world, the United
States has a particular obligation to
demonstrate resolve in maintaining the
peace. One can debate whether posses-
sion of a particular weapon will deter
the use of similar weapons by others,
and one can debate what types and
levels of arms should be maintained. But
debate about chemical warfare has yet
to identify a deterrent that does not in-
clude a chemical weapons component,
without posing the additional risks of
undesirable escalation or unacceptable
accommodation. The history of World
War II bears witness to the effectiveness
of chemical weapons as a component of
such a deterrent. According to postwar
testimony by enemy officials, Allied
possession of chemical weapons effec-
tively deterred the Axis powers from us-
ing their chemical weapons, though they
had accumulated large stocks.

In sum, we seek to achieve through
negotiations a verifiable ban on all
chemical weapons. Until success is
achieved, we must reduce or eliminate
Soviet incentives to use chemical
weapons against us or our allies. This
can be done by modernizing and main-
taining an adequate chemical warfare
deterrent posture. Our chemical
weapons modernization actions do not
represent a decision to place greater em-

OCEANS

phasis upon chemical warfare, nor do we
plan to match Soviet capabilities. Our
objective is to have the safest, smallest
level of chemical munitions that provides
us the deterrent we need.

Law of the Sea
and Oceans Policy

by James L. Malone

Statement before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee on August 12, 1982.
Ambassador Malone is special represent-
ative to the President for the Third U.N.
Conference on Law of the Sea.'^

Today, I'd like to review the results of
the 11th session of the Law of the Sea
Conference. You asked that I briefly
summarize our efforts to achieve the
President's objectives at that session and
also indicated an interest in the future
oceans policy alternatives available to
the United States.

As you are aware, the President an-
nounced his decision to not sign the Law
of the Sea treaty on July 9. With your
permission, I would like the President's
statement to be made a part of the
record.^

When the President indicated last
January 29 that the United States would
return to the Law of the Sea negotia-
tions and work in good faith with other
countries to achieve an acceptable trea-
ty, we hoped that the final draft conven-
tion would be one that the United States
could sign. At that point, the President
emphasized that the United States re-
mained strongly committed to the multi-
lateral process for reaching agreement.

It was in this spirit that the United
States went to the 11th session of the
Law of the Sea Conference. The U.S.
delegation repeatedly demonstrated its
flexibility in a wide variety of ways and
exerted every effort to find compromise
solutions. Proposals were adjusted in
timing and format to meet the concerns
of the Group of 77. Midway through the
conference, in fact, we sought and were
authorized to change our instructions in
order to break the negotiating deadlock.

>The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be avaikble from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Despite these efforts, and the effort
of a number of other countries trying t<
encourage negotiations, I must report
that no meaningful negotiations took
place on our proposed changes to
Part XI. The attitude of many was ac-
tively resistant to change that might
have made it possible to alleviate our
concerns. As a result, we are left with
Law of the Sea treaty which, as Presi-
dent Reagan recently stated, fails to
meet U.S. objectives.

There are, of course, positive
elements in the treaty. These elements
demonstrate what can be accomplished
through multilateral diplomacy when a j|„
serious effort to find solutions and to
reach compromises is made.

I emphasize strongly that the Unit« ^
States went to the conference fully pre „
pared to work— and negotiate— to fine
mutually acceptable solutions that wou
have satisfied our objectives and that
provided a fair and balanced system fo
promoting the development of deep
seabed resources as a benefit to all na-
tions.

I can't say what the result might
have been had such negotiations taken
place. It is certainly possible that the
final outcome would have been the
same. However, I believe it possible th
the majority of delegations would have
recognized that the United States and
the cosponsors of its final amendment;
were not seeking to change the basic
structure of the draft treaty. We did n
try to destroy the system. Instead, we
sought to make it work to the benefit
all nations to enhance, not resist, seab
resource development.

The Vote

On April 30, the conference adopti
the treaty text by a vote of 130 in favi
4 against, with 17 abstentions. The thi
states other than the United States th
voted against the treaty's adoption we
Israel, Turkey, and Venezuela and the

17 states abstaining included the United
Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany,
Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg,
[taly, Spain, Thailand, and the Soviet
jIoc, except for Romania. While the
■easons which prompted these countries
;o abstain or to vote against the treaty
,vere varied, and not necessarily the
ame as ours, the number and economic
mportance of countries expressing
displeasure with the treaty text was of
jreat significance.

As President Reagan noted, those
;ountries produce more than 60% of the
vorld's gross national product. They
ilso provide more than 60% of the con-
ributions to the United Nations. In-
cluded in these countries are most of
hose who have, or are likely to develop,
;eabed mining technology. I would,
herefore, have to say that the negotia-
ions on the seabed mining provisions
■epresent a major failure of interna-
ional diplomacy, in that important con-
:erns of those countries most closely
elated to seabed mining were not taken
nto account.

The decision to call for a vote and to
ast our vote against the treaty was not
aken lightly. The United States has
>een centrally involved in the conference
irocess at every stage since its incep-
ion. We did not easily dismiss the per-
onal commitment and great dedication
■f hundreds of delegates who worked
ears for this agreement — even when
lany of them, in the end, opposed the
J.S. proposals.

In addition to the support of our
Hies, I would like to take special note of
he effort of the so-called Group of 11
/Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark,
'inland, Iceland, Ireland, New Zealand,
lorway, Sweden, and Switzerland),
'hese countries prepared their own
mendments, which they hoped would
erve as a basis for negotiations be-
ween the United States and the Group
f 77. The Group of 1 1 proposals pro-
ided a useful basis for addressing some
J.S. concerns. Other elements, however,
ell considerably short of the U.S. objec-
ives. Most importantly, many U.S. con-
erns were not addressed at all by the
iroup of 1 1 proposals. When the Group
•f 77 insisted that the United States and
ts allies accept the Group of 11 pro-
losals as an exhaustive negotiating
genda, we were unable to accede.

J.S. Assessment

Next, I would like to make the
bllowing general assessment regarding
he text of the Law of the Sea conven-

tion as it was finally adopted on
April 30. We were successful in working
with others to insure that no adverse
changes were made to navigation and
overflight provisions. Portions of the
treaty dealing with these issues, and
many other nonseabed provisions, while
not optimal, remain consistent with U.S.
interests.

The deep seabed mining provisions,
on the other hand, do not even minimal-
ly meet U.S. objectives. I would like to
recall at this point that the President set
out six objectives in his statement of
January 29, 1982. I must report that
none of these objectives was achieved.
As a result, the Law of the Sea treaty is
seriously flawed.

The regime created by the treaty
would seriously discourage private in-
vestment in deep seabed mineral produc-
tion. A fundamental lack of certainty
would exist with regard to the granting
of mining contracts and mandatory tech-
nology transfer requirements. These
provisions violate a basic principle that
owners of technology have rights in its
sale and use. Beyond even that, the trea-
ty would impose burdensome financial
requirements on the mining operations.
The rules and regulations to be devel-
oped in the preparatory commission can-
not cure these defects.

For the United States, the resolution
on preparatory investment protection
might have been acceptable had negotia-
tions on seabed mining portions of the
treaty led to improvement of its defects.
But the resolution fails to correct these
defects of the treaty and creates addi-
tional problems of its own. The resolu-
tion would require a pioneer investor,
such as one of our existing U.S. mining
companies, to assume heavy financial
obligations in addition to those contained
in the convention. It also allows the
U.S.S.R., Japan, and other countries to
achieve pioneer investor status, even
though their seabed mining activities
have been extremely limited to date.

The financial obligations of the
resolution on preparatory investment
protection would include payment of
$250,000 upon registration with the
preparatory commission, the accrual of a
$1 million annual fee payable upon ap-
proval of a plan of work when the con-
vention enters into force, payment of
$250,000 for processing a plan of work,
and expenditures to meet diligence re-
quirements to be established by the pre-
paratory commission.

Additional obligations for a pioneer
investor include exploration of the

OCEANS

reserved area — on a reimbursable
basis — at the request of the preparatory
commission, training of personnel
designated by the preparatory commis-
sion, and the transfer of technology
prior to entry into force of the treaty.

Beyond the practical problems which
it creates for seabed mining, the conven-
tion presents other serious difficulties.
The decisionmaking system of the Inter-
national Seabed Authority would be
structured so that the United States and
other potential deep seabed mineral pro-
ducers and consumers would be given in-
adequate protection against adverse
policy and operational decisions.

The treaty provides for a review
conference which, after 5 years of
negotiations, may adopt amendments to
the deep seabed mining regime that
could automatically enter into force for
the United States upon approval by
three-fourths of the states parties and
thus effectively bypass U.S. approval, in-
cluding congressional advice and con-
sent. Our only recourse would be denun-
ciation of the convention — an unaccep-
table choice.

The convention would allow funding
for national liberation groups, such as
the Palestine Liberation Organization
and the South West Africa People's
Organization.

The convention would artificially
limit deep seabed mineral production
and would permit discretionary and dis-
criminatory decisions by the Authority if
there is competition for limited produc-
tion allocations.

The treaty would, in effect, create
far too many privileges for the Enter-
prise, the seabed mining arm of the In-
ternational Seabed Authority— advan-
tages which would make it extremely
difficult, and perhaps impossible, for
private ventures to compete, at least
without national subsidies. A monopoly
over deep seabed mineral production
could thus result. In effect, this could
destroy the parallel system which, as
you may recall, was the central com-
promise worked out several years ago.
These provisions would tend to discour-
age or prevent any other kind of deep
seabed mining under the treaty.

I believe it accurate to say that
there is a clear preponderance of feeling
among those involved in deep seabed
consortia companies that they could not
and would not carry out commercial
mining under the treaty. Naturally, this
is a great disappointment to all those
who have worked for years to create
conditions that encouraged the develop-
ment of a new industry able to benefit
the nations of the world.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

It was for these reasons that the
United States could not agree to the
adoption of the final text by consensus.
Instead, it asked for a vote; then, on
April 30, voted against the treaty's
adoption.

I have provided to the committee
copies of the unclassified U.S. delegation
report which describes the conference
session, our negotiating efforts, and our
assessments of the text in greater detail.

Some have suggested that we should
have agreed to the treaty because it is
our only means of assured access to sea-
bed minerals. As I have noted earlier,
this treaty does not, in fact, provide
assured access. The procedures for
granting contracts are not automatic.
There is no way that a company or na-
tion can be certain that it will secure
mining authorization by the Interna-
tional Seabed Authority. In reality, it is
highly unlikely that there will by any in-
vestment in seabed mining under the
treaty, unless governments are willing
to subsidize their companies or mining
entities.

It has been suggested that we have
sacrificed commercial interests in the
deep seabed for some goal of ideological
purity. This factually misrepresents the
aims of this Administration. We have
dealt largely with concrete issues. The
treaty creates real practical problems
for deep seabed mining, which have
nothing to do with ideology. There are
important matters of principle involved,
but these are important not only to us
but to other nations as well. One cannot
dismiss these widespread concerns as in-
significant. They were of overriding im-
portance to many members of the Group
of 77, who saw these issues as directly
relevant to other North-South negotia-
tions and their underlying goal of a new
international economic order.

The mandatory technology transfer
issue is a case in point. The implications
of agreement in the Law of the Sea con-
text go far beyond these negotiations.
Other delegations recognized that fact
from the beginning. It would have been
foolish or naive to have pretended that
this wasn't true.

Clearly, the United States could not
go along with a treaty that failed to sup-
port so many important U.S. oceans in-
terests. Further, I don't believe that the
treaty adopted on April 30 had any
chance of approval by the Congress. In
my considered opinion, to have voted for
the treaty would have been a breach of
faith with our allies and friends but
mostly with the American people, whose

future is irrevocably linked to the
elements of any treaty on the use of the
sea.

Looking ahead, three stages of the
conference remain. First, the drafting
committee has been meeting in Geneva
this month and last to complete review
of the text. Second, an informal plenary
will meet in New York on Septem-
ber 22-24 to adopt final drafting com-
mittee changes. 'Third, the final act will
be opened for signature and interpretive
statements in Caracas in early Decem-
ber. The United States will participate
in the remaining conference process at a
technical level and will be concerned
with those provisions that serve U.S. in-
terests.

This Administration will continue
developing national oceans policy, ex-
amining the actions which the United
States needs to take to protect and
enhance its oceans interests outside the

Law of the Sea convention. It is too ear- ^
ly now to state what these actions might "
be. We do believe that we must be
prepared not only to meet any chall-
enges to traditional maritime activities
but to take new initiatives to assure the
orderly development of oceans resources
in response to market forces. We will
continue to consult with other countries
who have common oceans interests, as
bilateral and multilateral cooperation
will be an essential element of the new
policy.

We will also continue to work closeh
with this committee and with other com
mittees in Congress concerned with the
Law of the Sea and with related oceans
policy.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402.

2For text see Bulletin of Aug. 1982,
p. 71. ■

Conventional Arms Transfers in
the Third World, 1972-81

FOREWORD

Sales and deliveries of major conven-
tional arms — tanks, warplanes, artillery,
and naval ships — to the developing na-
tions have led to rising arms inventories
and growing military capabilities in the
Third World. Some of these have been
stabilizing, some destabilizing; some in
the U.S. national interest, and some not.
Many nations, large and small, engage
in the transfer of arms as part of their
foreign policies, but the U.S.S.R., the
United States, France, the United
Kingdom, Italy, West Germany, and the
East European Communist nations are
by far the most significant suppliers.

The United States, however, is not,
by any reasonable measure, the leading
supplier of weaponry to the Third World
that many people believe it is. If they il-
lustrate anything, trends in the Third
World arms trade illustrate the degree
of U.S. restraint. \n the first half of the
decade covered by this report, which in-
cluded the last years of the Vietnam
war, the United States delivered larger
quantities than other exporting nations
or groups of nations in 7 of the 12 cate-
gories of major conventional weapons
used in this report. In the second half-
decade, however, the United States did
not lead in any category and in one cate-
gory (missile-equipped patrol boats) dur-

iles

ing these years did not export anything mi
at all. The Soviets, by contrast, led in
four categories between 1972 and 1976 leaf
and in the last half-decade led in seven.
Similarly, the major West European
arms exporters as a group were first in
only one category of arms between 197
and 1976 but between 1977 and 1981 le
in five categories.

We ourselves are partly to blame fc
the misconceptions that abound on this
subject. First of all, nowhere else in the
world are arms transfers the subject of
so much governmental disclosure, of
such intensive legislative scrutiny, or sc
extensive a public debate. This is as it
should be, because we are a free societjltof
and because decisions to supply or not 1 i\x
supply weapons to states not firmly
linked to us by shared history, values,
and security alliances must be made onj
after the most serious deliberation. Sec
ondly, our reports of "military sales" in
elude a large proportion of transactions
having little directly to do with the
transfer of arms. For example, military
sales, as normally reported, include con
struction (sometimes of hospitals), train
ing, and various management services,
along with weapons systems and their
spare parts and support equipment. Bu
one result of this way of doing business
as contrasted with that of other nations

H
surf
We
Ill-

Department of State Bulletli tlotif

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

3 the impression of the United States as
he Third World's leading armorer. That
mpression, as the following report
nakes clear, is significantly off the
nark.

We recognize arms transfers as a
' egitimate and sometimes necessary in-
trument of foreign and national securi-
y policy. To suggest, however, that the
f.S. Government in this or in past Ad-
ninistrations has sought indiscriminately

0 press arms upon Third World nations
^ IV it supported by the facts. Other na-
idiis do not disclose the nature and
?vels of their foreign military sales or

: ssistance to the same extent. Our
; nowledge of their activities, particular-
/ those of the Communist states, is not
omplete. The data on their arms trans-
ers contained in this report must, there-
3re, be regarded as the best minimum,
ut nonetheless reliable, estimate we can
lake.

Few activities are as difficult to
■ leasure as arms transfers. Data are in-
omplete, and estimates in monetary
?rms, the most commonly used
leasure, are fraught with many prob-
, 'ms. These difficulties include the large

1 ifferences in the composition of arms
iles and security assistance programs
•om one arms-exporting nation to
nother, down to such technical prob-
•ms as accurate foreig^n exchange con-

e srsion and varying prices charged in

itferent situations for any given foreign
: eapons system, particularly the more
; xpensive ones.

For these reasons, the following
r. ;port presents arms transfer data
': rimarily in terms of the numbers of
e; lajor conventional weapons systems
elivered to the Third World over the
ecade 1972-81. Because they are con-
: -ete, these data are less subject to
t nalytic misinterpretation and technical
i: roblems than dollar estimates. Further,
i is niore difficult for any arms supplier
) conceal, for example, the delivery of a
^uadron of interceptor aircraft than it
to hide the existence, substance, and
alue of an arms agreement. Our data
ase from this perspective, while still
ot all encompassing, is more nearly
jmplete. And the numbers involved in
lis mode of estimating are more tangi-
le and thus more easily understood.
The following report makes clear
lat, while dollar estimates of arms
ansfer agreements have in fact been
ising, constant dollar estimates have
een more nearly level over the past
ecade, though both have fluctuated
'idely from year to year (Figure 1). Ac-

|)ctober1982

tual deliveries of the major conventional
weapons systems covered in this report
show the absence of any significant up-
ward trend (Figure 2), although many of
the newer systems are significantly
more effective — as are the defenses
against them.

The data demonstrate that far from
the popular image of upwardly spiraling
conventional arms trade, that trade, at
least as measured by the number of
weapons actually delivered, is at best er-
ratic but reasonably level over any
significant period of time. They do not,
however, take into account reductions in
Third World arms inventories caused by
war losses, obsolescence, or simple in-
ability to maintain and repair increasing-
ly complex and expensive equipment.
Data in numbers of weapons cannot, of
course, take account of increases in the
sophistication, military effectiveness, and
cost burden of modern weapons. Thus
the rising cost of modern military equip-
ment may well serve to restrain ag-
gregate transfers to the poorer coun-
tries if not actually to reduce them.

Figure 3, summarizing the cate-
gories of major weapons delivered to the
Third World over the past decade from
all sources, bears this out. Naval vessels
and ground force weapons deliveries
were nearly level over the decade
(though again varying widely from year
to year), and military aircraft show a
slight downward trend.

Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate quite
clearly the second major conclusion we
draw from these data: The United
States is not, by and large, the leading
source of major items of military equip-
ment to the Third World. Figure 4
shows U.S. transfers of military aircraft
and helicopters, for example, clearly
declining from a Vietnam war peak at
the beginning of the decade. By con-
trast, Soviet and other European Com-
munist aircraft transfers rose rather
steadily over the same period to levels
roughly three to four times those of the
United States in recent years. West
European and other suppliers constitute
another very substantial source of
military aircraft during this entire
period, delivering more than twice the
U.S. levels of recent years.

Figure 5, showing deliveries of ma-
jor items of ground force equipment,
also underscores the wide margin by
which Soviet deliveries in this area have
exceeded those by the United States
over much of the decade. It is further
evident that these transfers varied wide-

ly from year to year and that here also,
there is no clear upward or downward
trend.

Figure 4 combines Soviet and other
European Communist transfers, which is
an appropriate basis for comparison
given the responsiveness of Warsaw
Pact actions to Soviet policy direction.
Figure 5, by contrast, counts Warsaw
Pact transfers in the "Other" category,
yet even then, Soviet deliveries alone
significantly exceed those of the United
States.

Finally, Figure 6 demonstrates the
substantial degree to which Soviet and
Soviet plus other European Communist
deliveries of the tanks and self-propelled
guns have exceeded those of the United
States.

This report makes clear that several
popular misconceptions about the U.S.
role in arms transfers to the Third
World are not based on fact. And it will
thus provide a more accurate footing for
future debates over U.S. policy. It does
not, however, help us determine the wis-
dom of particular arms transfers. Those
decisions can only come from the in-
formed public and congressional con-
sideration of Administration proposals
that is uniquely possible in the United
States. To insure that that consideration
is as well-informed as possible, the Con-
gress has been and will continue to be
provided more detailed classified reports
on conventional arms transfers to the
Third World as required by the Arms
Export Control Act.

This report is intended to be the
first of a regular series, making public
as much of such data as is possible. It,
as well as the classified reports
presented to the Congress, presents con-
clusions and data which are fully shared
by all relevant agencies of the U.S.
Government.

James L. Buckley

Under Secretary of State for Security
Assistance, Science, and Technology

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

FIGURE 1

Dollar Value of Arms Agreements

x' \ Constant 1972
^^ dollars

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981

Year

FIGURE 2

Total Arms Deliveries

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

Department of State Bulle

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

FIGURES

Ground Weapons, Naval Vessels, and Air Weapons Delivered

15,000

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1500

•i 1000

FIGURE 4

Military Aircraft Delivered

/^^ U.S.S.R. and other

/' ^N^European Communist

Other

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

9000
8000
7000

I 6000

■S 5000

I 4000

3000
2000
1000

FIGURES

Major Ground Weapons Delivered

• V

Vr^

• .

^^ ^^^ '^

1 "-^^ ^"^

"^Os

/ "^ ^ ^^

<Jr/ ^^^ /

'o'/ ^^''^^ "" ~ '

\ V

Ov ^^^ — ^^.^

\ N_

/ ^s^^^-""^ ^"""-^

1 1 1 1 I

11)1

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981

3000

2600

2200

Tanks, sell -propel led guns, light armor, and artillery
Includes European Communist countries excluding U S S R

FIGURES

Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns Delivered

iii

1800

n
E

1400

1000

600

200

/ \

' \ U.S.S.R. and other
/ I European Communist
/ ^

U.S.S.R.

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981

_cj_

Department of State Bulletin

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

ANALYSIS OF DATA

The estimated constant-dollar value and
quantities of conventional weapons sold
and delivered to countries other than
members of the major military alliances
or states closely associated with them
have remained fairly constant from year
to year throughout the past decade. At
the same time, patterns of supply have
changed significantly. There has been a
net growth in the military inventories of
Third World countries; however, this
report does not take into account reduc-
tions caused by combat losses, obsolete
equipment scrapped, or weaponry not
usable for lack of spare parts and sup-
port.

As the term is used here, the "Third
World" includes all nations except
members of NATO and the Warsaw
Pact; other European countries not
belonging to either alliance; and Japan,
Australia, and New Zealand. Other
definititions of "Third World" could
significantly affect summaries of this
sort, but this one is broad enough to en-
compass most parts of the world where
limited, conventional military conflicts
have been occurring and in which the
buying of weaponry may have a social
and economic impact disproportionate to
the size of the purchases.

Problems in Measurement and Data

Few activities are as difficult to measure
as arms sales. The arms trade abounds
in rumors, in part because most nations
consider military sales or purchases as
national security information and
restrict disclosure of their activities. The
United States, uniquely, publishes con-
siderable data on its security assistance
programs and arms transfers; in no
other nation are arms exports subjected
to such close legislative control and
public scrutiny. Other free-world sup-
pliers and recipients disclose enough in-
formation, either officially or through in-
formation media and public debate, for
reasonable estimates to be made. In con-
trast. Communist states — and many
countries to which they provide arms —
not only reveal little or no information
to the general public but actively at-
tempt to conceal their security
assistance programs and arms sales or
purchases from other governments. The
estimated arms agreement dollar values
i and the quantities of Communist arms
i delivered, as presented here, undoubted-
I ly err on the conservative side, but we
cannot judge precisely how much lower
than the reality they in fact are.

October 1982

The most commonly used denomina-
tors of the arms trade are the monetary
values and the quantities of weapons
sold or delivered. Each has short-
comings and neither is a true measure of
military capability. The price of foreign
weapons is not always known, forcing
analysts to rely upon estimates of cost
or upon the known prices of similar
weapons. Even if a price may be reliably
reported in one case, prices vary with
the terms and conditions of other trans-
actions— one purchaser may acquire a
weapon as a grant or on highly conces-
sional terms, whereas a more affluent
buyer, or a less effective bargainer, may
pay more. In other cases, the price —
particularly of major weapons such as
aircraft, armor, and warships — may be
lowered by production offsets, commodi-
ty barter, payment in soft currencies, or
even by a supplier's eagerness to make a
sale for political or economic reasons. A
weapon's unit price also can be affected
by the quantities bought, varying pur-
chaser requirements for training in its
use and maintenance, or differing levels
of spare parts and ammunition ordered.

Third World purchasing patterns, if
measured only in current dollars and
over only a few years, appear to be
sharply rising and increasingly erratic
because of multibillion dollar, multiyear
arms agreements, reflecting not only in-
flation but also growing exports of high-
technology (hence, very expensive) mili-
tary equipment. Nowhere in the Third
World is this phenomenon more evident
than in the Near East and South Asia,
but it is apparent in other regions as
well.

It should be noted that, in the
earlier years covered by this study,
prices estimated for Soviet weapons
were considerably lower than those
charged for similar Western weaponry.
Since 1977 and possibly earlier, how-
ever, Soviet prices appear to have been
increasing, so that they now roughly
equal or sometimes exceed those of com-
parable Western arms. This is reflected
in the rising dollar estimates, year by
year, of Soviet arms agreements com-
pared to the more nearly constant esti-
mated number of Soviet weapons
delivered.

Estimates of numbers and types of
weapons delivered, particularly of the
large systems, provide a more interest-
ing and more concrete measure of mili-
tary capability transferred. They do not,
however, take into account the varying
levels of sophistication within a category
of weapons — an F-5 or MiG-21 fighter,
for example, is less capable for most
missions than is an F-16 or MiG-23.

Nor do the numbers and kinds of
weapons in a country's inventory neces-
sarily reflect their appropriateness to
the type of conflict in which they might
be used or to the buyer's ability to main-
tain them and use them effectively in
combat. Again, it must be noted that
our data base is not complete on all reci-
pients.

The Arms Exporters

Inevitably, a report of this kind will in-
vite a comparison of the arms sales of
different nations. Here, too, a warning is
appropriate, particularly where mone-
tary values are the unit of measurement.
Security assistance and arms transfer
programs vary significantly from coun-
try to country.

• U.S. arms transfer programs
often involve military construction of
significant value, undertaken in and for
foreign nations, whereas the Soviets do
little or no construction abroad not
directly for their own forces.

• The United States provides con-
siderable military training for the reci-
pients of its security assistance. This
training is broad based, involving not
only instruction in the use and mainte-
nance of the weaponry but also in wider
areas of military study such as logistics
and the doctrines under which U.S.
weapons are designed to be used. We
know relatively little about Soviet
military training for foreign students
and even less abouc its costs.

• The United States is intensely
maintenance conscious. It supplies spare
parts and technical assistance needed to
service and maintain for its usable life-
time the military equipment it sells in
the Third World, generally on the same
basis that it supports weapons for its
own forces. In contrast, the U.S.S.R.
supplies major arms packages containing
minimal spare parts and follows up later
as needed or according to predicted
parts failure rates. This, too, reflects the
practice with its own forces, which often
are supported from great distances
behind the front lines. The same pat-
terns are generally true of East Euro-
pean programs. Deliveries of spare
parts, ammunition, and other weapons-
support items of non-U. S. origin are ex-
tremely difficult to detect.

• Soviet military equipment com-
prises virtually all of our estimates of
Soviet arms transfers, as well as being
by far the largest portion of all Soviet
foreign aid. Because U.S. arms transfers
covers more than weaponry, its dollar
value is shown on three lines: weapons

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Arms Agreements Made by Third World Nations, 1972-81'

($ millions')

1S72

1973

H74

197S

1*78

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

TOTAL

%ol
TOTAL

Then-year Ooliars

USSR.

2.350

3.320

5.970

3.670

6.610

9.750

2.920

8.880

14,770

6.630

64.870

27.2

Other European Communist
US

Weapons

200

260

780

420

960

810

640

1.090

940

3.360

9.460

4,0

3.710

5.390

7.700

4.420

5.420

3.720

4,520

4,910

5,040

3,310

48.140

202

Military Construction

1.040

590

4.710

5.460

370

670

1,300

2,000

1.350

17.494

Other

1.090

1.490

1.240

1.370

1.560

2.330

2,280

2.690

3,440

290

17.780

7.4

Major West European

1.000

2,140

3.840

5.240

2.740

4,840

8,720

6,860

14,480

4,190

54.050

227

Minor West European

140

300

440

550

790

600

380

1,160

2.390

970

7.720

Other

1.010

560

820

1.000

1.410

1,010

1,280

2,400

1,720

7,420

18.630

Total

9.504

14.500

21.380

24,950

23,430

21,410

29,290

44,780

27,520

238.144

Constant 1972 Ooilars

USSR

2.350

3.160

5.060

2,840

4.860

6.720

1.880

5,130

7.500

3,060

42.560

268

Other European Communist
US

Weapons

200

250

660

330

710

560

410

630

480

1,550

5,780

3.6

3,710

5.130

6.530

3.430

3.990

2.570

2.920

2,840

2.560

1,530

35.210

22.2

Military Construction

990

500

3.650

4.010

260

430

750

1.020

620

12.234

Other

1,090

1.420

1.050

1.060

1.150

1.610

1.470

1.550

1.750

130

12.280

7 7

Major West European

1.000

2.040

3.250

4.060

2.010

3.340

5.630

3.970

7.350

1,930

34.580

21.8

Minor West European

140

290

370

430

580

410

250

670

1.210

450

4.800

Other

1.010

530

690

780

1.040

700

830

1.390

870

3.420

1 1 .260

7.1

Total

9.504

13,810

18.110

16.580

18,350

16.170

13.820

16,930

22.740

12.690

158.704

' "Arms" IS an all-inciusive term covering the broad range of military security assistance.
It includes new. used, or refurbished conventional lethal weapons (including those capable of
delivering both conventional and chemical/nuclear munitions) and nonlethal military support
equipment such as radar or military uniforms and accouterments Also included are military
training, arms production or assembly facilities, and military base or fortification construction,
although data on these aspects of foreign military programs are especially "soft." Because it
IS a uniquely large element of American security assistance programs. US military construc-
tion IS shown separately. Costs of troops from a ma)or supplier country stationed in Third
World countries are excluded where it is possible to separate their costs and equipment from
other military assistance.

' Estimate rounded to nearest $10 million except where entry is less than $10 million
Percentages may not total due to rounding. U.S. data are for fiscal year, other data are for
calendar year

Department of State Bulletin

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

id weapons-related items such as am-
unition and spares, military construe-
on, and "other" (defense articles and
srvices, consisting mostly of training),
nly the U.S. weapons and weapons-
lated dollar values are comparable to
le estimated values of other countries'
•ms sales. The United States also pro-
des significant balance-of -payments
id project development aid through the
onomic support fund (ESF). Although
icurity related in a broad sense, ESF is
:cluded from this report because such
reign counterparts as exist are con-
iered economic assistance.

The speed with which weapons, once
dered, can be delivered is an import-
it factor in the Third World arms
ade. As a consequence of the industrial
pacity created to support the huge
)viet conventional force modernization
ogram, Moscow has important advant-
;es over all other arms-exporting na-
)ns. The U.S.S.R. can deliver signifi-
nt amounts of weaponry very quickly,
it showed recently in Ethiopia and
etnam and is now doing in Cuba,
oscow also can offer much more at-
ictive loans than can Western sup-
lers. For nations not desiring the
■-est equipment, the U.S.S.R. has kept
en the production lines for selected
ms, such as the MiG-21 fighter, which
no longer in first-line Soviet units; it
io maintains large quantities of older,
furbished weaponry. The Soviets have
veloped variations of many first-line
iapons specifically for export. Other
ppliers, in contrast, often must choose
tween providing new equipment to
sir own forces or risk losing a sale by
ing unable to deliver until the
;aponry comes oflF the line 2-4 years
,er. Moreover, most suppliers do not
ve large pools of used but still effec-
e arms — as the United States once
d — which can be provided quickly to
sir security assistance partners with-
t adversely affecting the capability of
eir own front-line or reserve forces.

There are also diflFerences among the
ograms of the major West European'
ms suppliers.

• France, the third largest exporter
the Third World, follows a policy of
reloping on its own the full range of
litary hardware, usually of totally
ench design and of a quality and
Dhistication equal to that produced
ewhere. French forces, however, con-
tute too small a market to provide the
jnomies of scale needed to produce

tober1982

sophisticated weaponry at reasonable
unit cost. For this reason, France pur-
sues arms exports and, because its prod-
ucts span the entire range of sophisti-
cated weaponry, offers potential Third
World buyers desiring this level of arma-
ment an alternative to buying U.S. or
Soviet weapons.

• West Germany has for many
years followed a restrictive arms export
policy which eschews the sale of major
lethal weapons to areas of tension. Bonn
may now be moving toward a somewhat
less stringent policy in which potential
sales may be considered individually in
the light of West Germany's broader
world interests. Most of West
Germany's arms exports, however, have
been to European nations and are out-
side the scope of this report. Bonn's
largest Third World market is in Latin
America. West Germany does not pro-
duce a complete range of weapons-
Bonn's primary combat aircraft, for ex-
ample, are built under foreign license or
within European consortia. Although
other members of these consortia export
arms containing West German com-
ponents, in this report the dollar values
of such sales are attributed to the selling
nation.

• Italian and U.K. arms exports are
significantly smaller than those of the
United States, U.S.S.R., and France.
Although both nations can manufacture
the full range of weaponry, each has
limited the types of arms it produces,
probably for financial reasons.

Two important supplier groups will
be shown separately: the smaller West
European nations^ and those of Eastern
Europe.^ The smaller Western arms ex-
porters compete against the United
States, the major West European sup-
pliers, and one another in the Third
World within the limited range of high-
technology arms they can afford to
develop. To a degree not found in the
West, weapons design and production in
the Warsaw Pact are standardized
under the aegis of the Soviet Union.
Pact members are allocated specific ma-
jor systems to produce for the entire
organization's forces and for re-export.
This further broadens Moscow's arms
production and supply base. The
U.S.S.R., like any other licensor but to a
far greater degree than any Western
one, can orchestrate the arms exports of
its allies. The latter often can provide
weaponry, spares, and ammunition com-
patible with Soviet equipment in cases,
such as the Iran-Iraq war, where
Moscow for political reasons does not

wish to be seen as a supplier. Within the
Warsaw Pact, only Romania appears to
act with some independence from
Moscow. Yugoslavia is not a Warsaw
Pact member but for convenience is in-
cluded in the category "Other European
Communist." Belgrade produces many
weapons of Soviet design but pursues a
much more independent arms export
policy than other countries in this
category.

Although this report concentrates on
the arms exports of the major producers
or producer groups, many industrializing
nations also export military hardware on
a small scale. In any given year, 60 or
more countries sell some weaponry.
Many, if not most, of the major weapons
systems transferred by these "other"
arms suppliers are actually re-exports of
older weapons acquired elsewhere. A
few Third World countries, however, are
beginning to emerge as suppliers of
new, domestically produced weaponry.
Brazil, Israel, and China are noteworthy
lesser exporters of new arms, although
China is unique in that it supplies a wide
range of 1960s-vintage, Soviet-designed
arms.

Private arms dealers, ranging from
legitimate merchants to outright con-
fidence tricksters, probably account for a
far smaller share of the Third World's
arms trade than is generally supposed.
Although these dealers can probably fur-
nish, licitly or otherwise, significant
quantities of small arms, mortars, auto-
matic weapons, ammunition, and the
like, they generally cannot supply or
support major systems. The con men,
however, frequently allege that they can
provide — given money in advance — such
systems, complete with apparently legiti-
mate end-user certification. Most, how-
ever, do not control the weaponry they
are offering; rather, they solicit sales of
used arms (which they often describe as
new or of the latest model) that they
only hope to acquire later, through
middlemen and ultimately from govern-
mental arms disposal programs.

The Recipients

Within our broad definition of the Third
World, there are important differences
in the size and patterns of supply among
the four major regional arms markets:
the Near East and South Asia, sub-
Saharan Africa, East Asia, and Latin
America. Moreover, the nature of the
weaponry — types, sophistication, new or
refurbished — purchased in each region
differs significantly.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Summary— Conventional Weapons Delivered to the Third World, 1972-81'

(number of weapons)

1»72

1973

1874

197S

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

TOTAL

%o(
TOTAL

GROUND WEAPONS

Tanks/self-propelled guns

USSR

770

2,220

1.500

590

1,075

1,430

1,150

2,435

990

1,060

13,220

41.5

Other European Communist

280

525

215

645

695

435

560

530

340

325

4,550

14.2

U.S.

430

760

1,110

1,030

890

850

930

450

735

255

7,440

23 3

Major West European

205

265

420

210

260

325

275

110

2,195

Minor West European

—

165

150

140

650

Other

700

575

480

255

420

305

130

280

185

455

3,785

11,8

Total

2,385

4,345

3,725

2,730

3,385

3,400

3,210

3,915

2.400

2,345

31,840

Light armor

USSR

955

1,225

955

1.090

1.340

1,855

2.250

1,915

1.635

1,005

14,225

37.6

Other European Communist

300

125

250

110

—

965

2.5

910

1,060

1,565

905

1,820

2,560

1.275

1,025

2.890

470

14,480

382

Maior West European

540

185

195

250

600

425

775

930

640

885

5,425

14.3

Minor West European

—

230

0,6

Other

110

130

190

185

320

_4_60

145

800

2,515

Total

2,815

2,660

3,080

2,680

4,175

5,410

4,480

4,720

5,345

2,475

37.840

Artillery (over 100mm)

USSR

730

1,300

1,555

2,190

1,035

2,590

2,100

2,220

1,620

1,060

16.400

30.1

Other European Communist

1,275

545

1.210

245

160

470

545

220

310

590

5.570

102

1,150

1,170

1,060

1,510

180

375

1,030

595

775

380

8.225

15.1

Maior West European

310

360

530

235

125

375

710

160

155

120

3.080

Minor West European

230

380

355

685

600

1,220

125

455

325

305

4.680

Other

4,695

1,830

445

1,090

1,340

1,120

1.335

1,310

1,660

1.775

16,600

304

Total

8,390

5,585

5,155

5,955

3,440

6,150

5,845

4.960

4,845

4.230

54,555

NAVAL WEAPONS

Major surface warships

USSR

17.8

Other European Communist

—

U.S.

103

399

Major West European

275

Minor West European

—

4.6

Other

—

5.0

Total

258

Minor surface warships

USSR

189

187

Other European Communist

—

1.4

222

21.9

Major West European

323

31.9

Minor West European

—

Other

187

18.4

Total

107

111

211

115

116

1.011

Gulded-misslle patrol boats

U.SS.R.

64.6

Other European Communist

U.S.

Major West European

—

233

Minor West European

—

Other

—

9.3

Total

150

Submarines

USSR

—

23.6

Other European Communist

—

333

Major West European

36 1

Minor West European

—

1.3

Other

—

5.5

Total

Department of State Bulleti

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Conventional Weapons Delivered (Continued)

1972

1S73

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

TOTAL

% ol
TOTAL

AIR WEAPONS

Supersonic combat aircraft

USSR

235

395

280

250

310

440

355

525

490

425

3,705

558

Other European Communist

—

0.5

U.S.

150

175

220

235

190

160

125

165

1,540

232

Ma\oi West European

110

625

9.4

Minor West European

—

0.3

Other

125

too

120

705

10.6

Total

475

760

525

640

625

725

665

805

745

665

6,630

Subsonic combat aircraft

USS.R

too

120

570

276

Other European Communist

—

4.3

170

230

115

145

135

115

1,060

51.2

Major West European

—

150

7.2

Minor West European

—

0.2

Other

—

195

9.4

Total

255

390

220

270

225

260

130

too

140

2,070

Helicopters

USSR

105

185

270

190

195

1,345

245

Other European Communist

—

100

1.8

U.S.

550

740

145

120

155

1,935

35.3

Maior West European

170

150

165

245

275

205

250

170

155

145

1,930

352

Minor West European

—

0.9

Other

—

115

2.1

Total

815

1,005

395

500

525

345

505

480

400

5,475

Other military aircraft

USSR.

510

8.8

Other European Communist

480

8.3

550

350

240

170

240

290

180

2,175

37.6

Major West European

110

160

145

155

130

150

105

1,165

20 1

Minor West European

105

130

665

11.5

Other

140

105

780

13.5

Total

780

625

580

540

640

540

630

405

500

535

5,775

Surface-to-air missiles

USSR

1,340

1,900

2,180

2,500

3,650

6,015

920

3,845

600

300

23.250

65.0

Other European Communist

—

300

0.8

400

—

115

870

645

2,340

965

2,780

1,295

480

8.890

24.8

Major West European

210

235

230

125

485

915

510

2.785

7.8

Minor West European

—

130

0.4

Other

—

180

—

200

380

1.1

Total

1,950

2,135

2.755

3,545

4,830

9,320

1,960

6,730

2,490

1,020

35.735

' "Weapons" in this table means major systems, aggregated into broad categories.
Ground weapons include heavy armor (light, medium, and heavy tanks and self-propelled
guns), light armor (armored personnel carriers, infantry combat and armored reconnaissance
vehicles, scout cars), artillery (tube artillery, multiple-rocket launchers, mortars and recoilless
rifles over 100mm). Naval weapons include major surface warships (warships of destroyer
escort and larger size, tank landing ships, and larger amphibious warfare units) and minor sur-
face warships (patrol escorts and smaller naval vessels, including minesweepers and landing
craft) Submarines and guided-missile patrol boats are listed separately. Combat aircraft in-
clude bombers, fighters, attack aircraft, and armed trainer/light strike planes Other aircraft in-
clude transports, communications or utility, antisubmarine warfare, and unarmed trainers.

Note: Estimated weapon quantities for all tables are rounded to the nearest 5, except for naval
ships Percentages may not total due to rounding.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Near East and South Asia. By far

the greatest Third World regional arms
market is the Near East and South
Asia. In recent years, this region has ac-
counted for nearly three-quarters of the
dollar value of arms agreements made
with the major world suppliers. The
Near East and South Asian states pur-
chase the largest quantities; the most
sophisticated kinds; and the widest
variety of air, naval, and ground force
arms. Over the last decade, the region
has received about 85% of the surface-
to-air missiles and some 70% of the
heavy and light armor and the super-
sonic fighters exported. About half the
artillery, missile-equipped patrol boats,
and military helicopters have been
shipped to the region, as well as about
40% of the subsonic combat aircraft and
roughly 30% of the major and minor
surface warships and other military air-
craft. The Near East and South Asia ac-
quired just under one-fourth of the sub-
marines provided during the decade.
That the region does not acquire a share
of each of these types of arms propor-
tional to the money expended suggests
the high level of sophistication (and
hence the high cost) of the armaments
purchased.

Although almost all states in the
region have a rudimentary arms-making
capability, Israel, Egypt, and India are
developing, with foreign licensing and
technical assistance, major weapons or
arms industries of their own. Only
Israel, however, is emerging as an im-
portant supplier, although many of its
major arms transfers have been used or
refurbished weapons originally produced
elsewhere.

Sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast to
the Near East and South Asia, the sub-
Saharan African states do not — Soviet
sales to Ethiopia excepted — possess
either large or highly advanced arsenals,
and much weaponry sold there is re-
furbished. In dollar values, the region
has accounted for a little over 5% of
Third World arms agreements concluded
in the past few years. Nevertheless, sub-
Saharan Africa has acquired about one-
quarter of the minor surface warships
delivered to the Third World during the
past decade, approximately one-fifth of
the artillery, and roughly one-eighth of
the major surface warships, light armor,
and subsonic combat and other types of
military aircraft. In other types of
weapons, sub-Saharan Africa accounts
for 10% or less of the heavy armor,
supersonic combat aircraft, military heli-

copters, and surface-to-air missiles
delivered. Less than 5% of the missile-
equipped patrol boats and only 1% of
the submarines are transferred to na-
tions of this region.

Nor is there any significant in-
digenous arms industry, apart from that
of South Africa. Because of the U.N.
arms embargo of 1977, Pretoria is con-
centrating upon developing a high-tech-
nology military industry to support na-
tional arms independence but has not
yet emerged as a significant exporter.

Latin America. Once an almost ex-
clusively U.S. -dominated arms market
and a large purchaser of used and ob-
solescent military equipment, Latin
America for the last decade has been ac-
quiring the more sophisticated weapons
systems primarily from the major West
European arms exporters, albeit in small
numbers. In recent years, Latin America
has accounted for a little over 7.5% of
the Third World's arms agreements with
the major suppliers. Army materiel pur-
chases, represented by heavy and light
armor and artillery, account for 7% or
less of the region's acquisitions over the
last decade. In naval weaponry,
however, Latin America has received
nearly 60% of the submarines delivered,
nearly one-third of the major and one-
fifth of the minor surface warships, and
one-eighth of the missile-equipped patrol
boats. Latin American purchases ac-
count for only about 6%-8% of the
supersonic combat aircraft and military
helicopters delivered but nearly one-
eighth of the subsonic combat aircraft
and one-fifth of the other military air-
craft supplied to the Third World. Less
than 3% of the surface-to-air missiles
have been exported to Latin America.

Of the major exporters, the U.S.S.R.
is unusual in that it has few customers
in the region, namely Cuba and Peru
and, most recently, Nicaragua. Moscow
is now upgrading the Cuban military
forces with new military materiel, most
of it far more capable than that pos-
sessed by other Caribbean nations. Latin
America is also the most important ex-
port market for both Israel and West
Germany.

Several South American states,
notably Argentina and Brazil, are
vigorously developing their own
domestic and export arms industries.
Brazil, though not yet offering a com-
plete range of weapons, is a particularly
active arms exporter both within the
region and in the Third World.

East Asia. Arms deliveries to East
Asia over the past decade reflect the
turmoil that has plagued Indochina. The
early years reflect not only large U.S.
arms supplies to the former Governmeniji
of South Vietnam but also Chinese and
later, Soviet deliveries to North Viet-
nam. Although a brief slackening in
arms deliveries by all suppliers occurred
after 1975, the later years of the decade
reflect significant Soviet arms sales to
Vietnam after the 1978 Vietnamese in-
vasion of Kampuchea and the subse-
quent incursion by China into northern
Vietnam. In recent years, East Asia has
accounted for about 10.5% of the Third
World arms agreements made with the
major suppliers.

Over the decade. East Asia has ac-
counted for more than one-third of the
subsonic combat aircraft and military
helicopters delivered, as well as some-
what less than one-fifth of the super-
sonic warplanes and over 40% of other
types of military aircraft. Just under
one-fourth of the Third World's artillerj
and about 18% of the heavy armor hav«
gone to East Asia, as well as about one
tenth of the light armor. Similarly, the
region's navies have accounted for abou
one-quarter of the missile-equipped
patrol boats and minor surface warship
exported, nearly 30% of the major sur-
face warships, and about 17% of the
submarines. Only 5% of the surface-to-
air missiles have gone to East Asia.

Only China has an important
domestic arms industry in East Asia.
China's arms industry is unique in that
is the largest producer outside the War
saw Pact of older weapons of Soviet or
modified-Soviet pattern. Beijing has
recently begun to export arms in the
Third World much more actively than i
the past and is seeking Western tech-
nology to upgrade its weaponry. Taiwa
North Korea, and South Korea also are
vigorously pursuing self-suflSciency in
arms, although Taiwan and South Kon
remain particularly dependent on out-
side sources of supply as well as produ>
tion licenses. Taiwan is not a significan
arms exporter. Although South Korea's
military exports have consisted largely
of "soft" quartermaster items such as
uniforms and other personal equipment
both North and South Korea are begin
ning to export some weaponry.

iln

■i\l

ijfe

m
kk
Jally

'J'ear

Department of State Bullet) *«"3

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

tlook

s virtually impossible to predict what
occur in such a complex and some-
es contradictory mixture of political,
nomic, social, and emotional factors
s the Third World arms trade. The
iposition of the weaponry sold may
nge; although some of the wealthier
rd World nations may continue to
the latest weapons regardless of
t, the poorer states may increasingly
k less complex or secondhand
iponry. Both major and emerging
pliers may strive to tailor a still
rer variety of weaponry to Third
rid requirements.

Some factors may increase the pace
irms buying and selling.

• Several nations developing
lestic arms industries, like many
iller established arms exporters, do
have a home market large enough to
et their investments in plants, re-
-ch, and development and will push
xport their first-line weaponry, not

' to offset these costs but to reap
*' :eived political benefits.

• Military modernization programs
ie supplier nations and in Third

'Id countries with large forces may
:e available larger quantities of
srseded arms to be disposed of at the
, possible price to help amortize the
of new weapons.

• The performance of high-tech-
igy weapons in recent conflicts may
2 whetted Third World appetites for
roved or more effective arms.

• In specific instances, war losses
be made up by fresh orders, notably
n Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Argentina.

Political considerations — including
iges of government and the poten-
if not the reality, of armed con-
— may heighten national perceptions
le kind of arms security assistance
d World states believe they will re-
e.

Other factors might slow the pace of
Third World arms trade.

• Several large multiyear arms con-
ts in the Near East and South Asia
have some time to run, which may
y fresh orders from some of the big-
; customers. However, because of
luction backlogs created by the

rally high level of arms orders over
past 3-4 years, weapons deliveries
certainly continue to be brisk for
e years.

• Many Third World nations that
have already purchased large amounts
of arms, particularly advanced types,
may find that they face a more time-
consuming process than they had
thought for training and integrating the
new equipment into their armed forces
and, in consequence, may limit or slow
down their buying.

• Although not the sole driving fac-
tor in Third World arms sales, future oil
prices will exert a significant influence.
If the oil glut continues, net exporting
countries — some of them among the
largest arms purchasers— may cut back
on new orders, while net importers may
find they have more resources than they
had anticipated for some modest mili-
tary purchases. Rising oil prices, how-
ever, would have the reverse effect.

• Continuing inflation and the in-
creasing cost and complexity of conven-
tional arms designed by the major pro-
ducers primarily for a potential Euro-
pean battlefield may reduce the level of
orders for the latest weaponry.

General Third World Arms Trade Data

The attached tables present an estimate
of the numbers of major weapons and
dollar values of military assistance pro-
vided by major world arms suppliers or
groups of suppliers to the Third World
between 1972 and 1981. They are fol-
lowed by further data on arms delivered
to each major region of the Third World.
Estimated values are first presented
in then-year dollar terms and then in
constant 1972 dollars to reduce, to the
degree possible, the effects of inflation
on weapons prices. Dollar estimates for
more recent years later may be revised,
since major multiyear arms contracts
are often modified during their course
and because retrospective information
sometimes becomes available. These
figures should not be interpreted as
equating to the cost of the weapons

delivered. They represent the value of
military agreements in which the cost of
weapons is only a part.

Weapons are aggregated into broad
categories without regard to perform-
ance differences within any given family.
The numbers presented (for other than
the United States) for each major
weapons system delivered in any year
represent simply the total of those
deliveries which are believed to be
reliably reported. Quantities are rounded
to the nearest 5, except for naval ships.
They should be regarded as minimum
estimated numbers, not precise tallies.
The term "major weapons" does not in-
clude all conventional lethal weapons:
Small arms, light automatic weapons,
mortars, and artillery of less than
100mm caliber are excluded, as are a
few categories of major weapons such as
battlefield missile systems, which are ex-
ported by a few nations in very small
numbers.

'France, West Germany, Italy, and the
United Kingdom.

^Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.

'Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East
Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and
Yugoslavia. ■

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Near East and South Asia'

(number of weapons and regional share

%])

Weapon

% of Third World supply for decade

Suppliers

USSR

Olhef European Communist

Major WesI European

Minor West European

Other

Total

Weapon

% of Third World supply lor decade

Suppliers

USSR

Other European Communist

Maior West European

Minor West European

Other

Total

Weapon

% of Third World supply for decade

Suppliers

USSR

Other European Communist

US.

Major West European

Minor West European

Other

Total

Weapon

% of Third World supply for decade

Suppliers

USSR

Other European Communist

Maior WesI European

Minor West European

Other

Total

Weapon

% of Third World supply lor decade

Suppliers

USSR

Other European Communist

Maior West European

Minor West European

Other

Total

Weapon

% of Third World supply for decade

Suppliers

USSR

Other European Communist

Maior West European

Minor West European

Other

Total

Tanks and self-propelled guns
69.8%

40 5
20 5
220

Light armor
71.3%

32.9
123

Artillery (over lOOmm)
49.0%

34 5
160

11 5
25,3

Major surface warships
29.8%

406
125

Minor surface warships

30.4%

482
18 1
22 5

42 3
134

152
22.4

422
17 7
15.5
24 4

128

53 6

43 4

193

15.6

17.8

179

129

Guided-

missile patrol boats

56.6%

350
7.0

' Countries in this region are Alghanistan. Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh. Egypt, India. Iran Iraq Israel
Jordan, Kuwait. Lebanon, Libya. Morocco. Nepal. Oman. Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia. Sri Lanka Syria
Tunisia. United Arab Emirates, North Yemen, and Soutti Yemen

Submarines
23.6%

1 12.5

Supersonic combat aircraft
69.5%

470 224

430

200 9 5

240

135 6.4

215

2.090

2.520

Subsonic combat aircraft

40.5%

210 35.2

150

40 6.7

290 48,7

—

5.8

595

245

Helicopters

47.4%

280

20 8

620

—

285

21 1

760

565

540

—

1.4

1.345

1,255

Other military

aircraft

28.2%

100

16.6

195

210

350

285

155

25 8

200

19i

13.3

125

5.8

125

600

1.030

Surface-toalr missiles

84.4%

10.595

80 1

9,495

150

1 1

150

1.695

128

5.595

780

5.9

1.390

—

130

—

200

13,220

16,960

Department of State Bu

lie

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

•ub-Saharan Africa'

;>er of weapons and regional share [%])

/eapon

Tanks and sell-propelled guns

0 of Third World supply lor decade

1.3%

uppliers

475

62 9

1,140

605

- Luiopean Communist

230

122

Ji>

1 3

ajor West European

2 1

inor West European

—

thier

205

27.1

450

23.8

3TAL

755

1,885

'eapon

Light armor

1 of Third World supply lor decade

12.4%

jppliers

SSR

910

61 6

1,590

489

ther European Communist

1 5

ajoc West European

355

24 0

920

28 3

inor West European

—

her

145

9,8

515

15.8

iTAL

1,475

3.245

eapon

Artillery (over 100mm)

ol Third World supply lor decade

19.1%

.ippliers

SSR

1.595

43 1

3,510

52 0

her European Communist

105

515

255

.ijor West European

235

300

4 4

not West European

her

1,655

44 7

2,110

31 2

TAL

3,700

6,745

;apon

ol Third World supply lor decade

.ppliers

5SR

ler European Communist

•ijor West European
nor West European

Major surlace warships
12.0%

iapon

ol Third World supply lor decade

Minor surlace warships
23.0%

ppliers

iSR

24 17 9

45 4

ler European Communist

7 5.2

|0r West Euiopean

38 28 3

303

lOr West European

31 23 1

13 1

ler
TAL

34 25 3

11
99

11 1

•sapon

Guided

-missile patrol boats

o( Third World supply lor decade

4.6%

ppliers

JSR

2 100 0

80 0

ler European Communist

— —

—

|0r West European

20 0

lor West European

— —

—

lei
rAL

— —

—

' Countries in this region are Angola,

nin, Botswana. Burundi, Cameroon.

Cape Verde

Central African

:)ublic, Chad, Congo. Djibouti, Equatorial G

uinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia. Ghana. Guinea

inea-

sau. Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho. Libe

la.

Madagasca

r. Malawi. Mali, Maurita

nia

Mauritiu

3, Mozambique,

er, Migeria. Rwanda, Sao Tome and Pr

pe. Senega

. Seychelles, Siena Leone,

Somalia.

Sol

th Africa,

Ian, Swaz'land, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Upper Volta

Zaire, Zambia, and Zim

babwe

ctober1982

Submarines

1.3%

Supersonic combat aircraft
7.8%

250

15.0

200

Subsonic combat aircraft

10.3%

600

100

Helicopters

8.7%

578
13 1
52

Other military aircraft
12.3%

33 0
154

78
17.1

69.5
4.3

26-0

22,5

2,0

11.2

12.9

250

625

100

32.2

100

250

12.9

8.0

400

310

Surface-to-a

r missiles

7.7%

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Latin America'

(number ol weapons and regional share

[%])

1972

-76

1977-81

1972

1977

No.

Weapon

Tanks and self-propelled guns

Submarines

% of Third World supply lor decade

4.1%

58.3%

Suppliers

USSR

330

41 2

158

—

23 (

Other European Communisl

—

295

36 8

65.5

15:

Maior Wesi European

165

20 6

109

345

61,:

Minor West European

—

185

366

—

Other

1 2

170

33 6

—

Total

800

505

Weapon

Light armor

Supersonic combat aircraft

% of Third World supply for decade

5.1%

5.8%

Suppliers

USSR

175

31 2

258

130

Other European Communist

—

■

910

67 1

—

Major West European

165

122

230

41 0

45,1

'>:

Minor West European

12.9

—

Other

155

11 4

110

196

16 1

Total

1,355

560

155

230

Weapon

Artillery (over 100mm)

Subsonic combat

aircraft

)ll

% of Third World supply for decade

7.3%

11.8%

-.0

Suppliers

•PP

USSR

215

11 3

420

199

—

Other European Communisl

1 8

610

32 2

1,010

47 8

115

74 1

77 IS

Major West European

365

193

170

129

l«

Minor West European

140

190

—

Other

480

25 3

280

132

Total

1.890

2.110

155

Weapon

Major surface warships

Helicopters

% of Third World supply for decade

29.4%

8.1%

ill

Suppliers

USSR

Other European Communist

Major West European

Minor West European

Other

Total

82 5
125

138
58 3
194

Weapon

% of Third World supply for decade

Suppliers

USSR

Other European Communist

Major West European

Minor West European

Other

Total

IMinor surface warships
19.3%

32 6
54 7

Weapon

% of Third World supply for decade

Suppliers

USSR

Other European Communist

Major West European

Minor West European

Other

Total

Guided-missile patrol boats

12.6%

«f

163

120

48 9

34 6

120

—

r«

—

245

200

Other military aircraft

lip(

19.1%

111

0 1

125

23,8

130

■i

165

31 4

tt(

145

175

33,3

160

2"/

»«!

525

580

"1.

Surlacetoair

missiles

lux

2.7%

380

853

435

««

—

li
Of

146

100

—

445

535

' Countries in this region are Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guvana, Haiti, Hon-
duras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago,
Uruguay, and Venezuela,

Department of State Bulletl Holiei

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

East Asia and the Pacific'

number of weapons and regional share

%])

1972-76

1977

-81

1972

1977

-81

No.

No.
Submarines

No.

Vaapon

Tanks and sell-propelled guns

^0 of Third World supply lor decade

17.8%

16.6%

uppllers

SSR

710

199

640

30.6

40 0

—

)ther European Communist

—

1,395

39 0

750

35,8

20 0

—

^ajor West European

0.4

3,1

—

100.0

^inor West European

260

12.4

—

)ther

1,410

394

375

17.9

40 0

—

OTAL

3,575

2.090

Veapon

Light armor

Supersonic combat alrcratt

'o ol Third World supply lor decade

11.2%

16.7%

uppllers

SSR

315

120

395

246

250

46,3

ilher European Communist

—

2,045

77 9

930

57.9

380

66.6

225

41.6

lajor West European

230

143

—

linor West European

1 2

—

Iher

240

1.8

135

23 7

12.0

3TAL

2,625

1.605

570

540

feapon

Artillery (over 100mm)

Subsonic combat aircraft

0 ol Third World supply lor decade

24.4%

37.2%

uppllers

SSR

545

165

21 1

ther European Communist

1,185

11 8

—

3,670

365

880

265

390

765

160

61.5

ajor West European

110

120

3.6

4,9

inor West European

535

1.9

—

ther

4,000

398

1.700

51.3

166

13.4

3TAL

10.045

3.310

510

260

'eapon

Major surface warships

Helicopters

> of Third World supply lor decade

28.7%

35.3%

uppllers

SSR

—

18 9

5,5

130

27 1

ther European Communist

—

972

540

1.285

88 3

175

364

ajor West European

140

292

inor West European

—

ther

—

13,5

2.1

)TAL

1.455

480

eapon

Minor surlace warships

Other military aircraft

. ol Third World supply lor decade

27.2%

40.4%

jppllers

SSR

—

42.7

120

110

15,9

ther European Communist

—

105

6,3

4.3

129

75.0

25.2

1.200

729

165

23.9

lajor West European

—

15,5

135

100

14.5

■inor West European

—

100

14,5

ther

25.0

15.5

3,6

185

26.8

5TAL

172

103

1.645

690

'eapon

Gulded-mlsslle patrol boats

Surface-to-aIr missiles

> ol Third World supply lor decade

26.0%

5.1%

uppllers

SSR

50 0

347

—

175

12.2

ther European Communist

—

335

859

1.260

87 8

aior West European

37 5

13,0

14 1

—

inor West European

—

174

—

ther

125

34 7

—

3TAL

390

1.435

' Countries in this region ate Bangladesh.

Brunei, Burma. China

Fiji. Indonesia

North Korea. South

)rea, Malaysia, Nepal. Papua New Guinea. Philippines, Singapore,

Solomon Islands. Thailand.

Tonga, and

etnam.

ctober 1982

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Building Peace in Central America

by Thomas O. Enders

Address before the Commonwealth
Club in San Francisco on August 20,
1982. Ambassador Enders is Assistant
Secretary for Inter- American Affairs.

The obstacles to peace in Central Ameri-
ca stand more clearly exposed with
every new crisis. Central America has
deep political divisions, among nations
as well as within them. It suffers severe
economic troubles, with the world reces-
sion devastating economies already
weakened by high oil prices and internal
inefficiencies. And it is fragmented by
social tensions, with population growth
straining public services and popular
aspirations outrunning the historically
possible.

But the tangle of violence that has
taken so many lives traces directly to
the clash of two polar approaches to
these problems. One is the way of the
violent right — to ignore socioeconomic
problems and, when that proves impossi-
ble, to shoot the messengers of despair.
The other is the way of the violent
left — to magnify injustices and provoke
confrontations so as to rationalize
shooting their way to power.

The persistence with which extrem-
ist minorities seek to resolve the region's
problems by the use of violence domi-
nates the outside world's perception of
Central America. Yet the real story of
Central America's last 3 years is that
first the right and now the left have
steadily lost ground to those who believe
democracy and the rule of law — not
violence — are the only feasible path to
progress.

An Outline

Let me take a minute to outline that
story, for it provides a key to the real
opportunities now emerging to end the
violence and build the peace. We used to
think of Central America as a collection
of petty dictatorships. And so— if you
except Costa Rica's vigorous democracy
and allow for the coarseness of the
stereotype — it often was. That does not
mean that there was not economic
growth and social change. Often, indeed,
vigorous economic development and
social change collided with unchanging,
unresponsive, and sometimes repressive
political institutions.

The old order cracked with the flight
of Somoza in July 1979. f"or more than
40 years, the Somozas ruled Nicaragua.
But little by little the regime lost sup-
port—of the church, of the press, and of
businessmen and professionals, many of
whose sons and daughters took to the
hills or the streets— and in the end it
was making war on its own people.

A few months later, the repressive
government of General Romero in El
Salvador, the latest in a string of mili-
tary governments that had run that
country since the 1930s, was overthrown
by a group of young officers pledged to
create democratic institutions and
reform the cruelly unequal landholding
system.

It is one of history's less happy pat-
terns that extremism breeds extremism.
Instead of seeing the weakening of
traditional dictatorships as an oppor-
tunity to organize democracy, the fall of
Somoza and the troubles of other estab-
lished governments whetted the appe-
tites of radicals with motivations rang-
ing from the Utopian to the cynical. In
Nicaragua, a hard core of Marxist-
Leninist ideologues began to consolidate
a monopoly of force with Cuban assist-

Within each state
there should be a proc-
ess of reconciliation in
which adversaries can
substitute political com-
petition for armed com-
petition.

ance, building the largest military estab-
lishment in Central American history.

Convinced their own power would be
safe only if similar governments were in-
sUilled elsewhere in Central America,
Nicaragua's new caudillos joined with
Cuba to train and supply violent leftists
in El Salvador attempting to seize
power by exploiting the turbulence un-
leashed by the breakdown of traditional
order and the new government's reform
efforts.

Central America's violent left burst
on stage claiming to have history on its
side. The claim reflected two practical
advantages. One was psychological. The
combination of ignorance and revulsion
with which the outside world views Cen-
tral America enabled men and women
trained mainly in the arts of terror to
portray themselves as liberators. The
other was military. Government forces
were certainly authoritarian, but they
were also weak, garrison bound, and in-
ternationally isolated. As of 1979, the
armies of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and
Guatemala were all cut off from U.S.
training, sales, or even purchases; then,
as now, Costa Rica had no army. In con
trast, guerrilla forces could draw upon
local alienation, extensive support from
Cuba — in training, arms, and propa-
ganda—and the help of terrorists from
South America and even the Middle
East.

Ironically, these advantages back-
fired. Overconfidence in both their popu-
lar appeal and their outside arms sup-
plies led the Salvadoran guerrillas to
militarize their strategy. In early 1981,
they launched a "final offensive" that
failed disastrously. In March 1982 they
tried to prevent elections and instead
provoked a massive turnout of voters in
repudiation of what the guerrillas stood
for. Although many of them fight on, E
Salvador's guerrillas stand revealed as ci
destructive minority rejected by Salva-
doran society.

Similar misjudgments have also
warped the Sandinista regime in Nica-
ragua. Little by little the Sandinistas
have pushed aside those whose sacrifice'' *'
helped bring down Somoza — the free
press, the church, political parties,
unions, the private sector. Some 2,000
Cuban and Eastern-bloc military and
security advisers have merged with the
regime's leadership. With disenchant-
ment spreading even among Sandinista
heroes like Eden Pastora, "Comman-
dante Cero," there is now open repres-
sion against religious leaders and ethnic
minorities — the very groups whose pro-
tection is the essence of pluralism.
History is beginning to repeat itself.
Elections have been postponed, demon-
strations are increasingly frequent, and
some groups have even taken up arms.
The new Nicaraguan regime is turning
into a new dictatorship based once agaii
on a privileged and militarized caste.
Like the Somoza regime before it, Nica-
ragua's government is beginning to
make war on its own people.

kff

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

alternatives to Violence

iut if the violent left is not sweeping
lie isthmus, the beneficiaries have not
eeii its traditional rival, the violent
ifjht. When the military government of
]\ Salvador was overthrown nearly 3
ears ago, the new reforming junta was
hallenged not only by the extreme left's
uerrillas but also by the extreme right
t'tiiig through death squads and some
leiiients of the security forces. The
esult was an explosion of violence,
ighteen months ago anywhere from
30 to 2,000 civilians were losing their
ves each month, depending on whose
gures you accept. The country was sick
ith political violence.

That sickness has not yet been
ired. But its virulence has been
lecked. In the last few months, non-
■ )mbatant deaths have averaged 300 to
)0 a month — again, depending on
hom you believe — and appear to be
I 'dining steadily. This is still a horrible
•11 in a country of 5 million people, but
:i0 to 1,500 fewer deaths a month is un-
iTiiahly a positive trend.

Why is political violence declining in
. Salvador? It has partly been a matter
I the consolidation of the new reform-
1 5 government, which has gradually
( ntained guerrilla violence and in-
( eased its authority over security
1 rces, gradually creating a climate in
' lich violence is less and less expedient,
< en if it is still not adequately deterred
-i d controlled and punished.

But I think there is something even
I ire important at work here. Nascent
cmocratic institutions are providing an
a ernative to violence as a means of
I litical expression. In the March elec-
n, six parties ranging from extreme
ht to center left competed in a cam-
ign that was not violence free but
lich was not meaningfully influenced
the use of force. The new Salvadoran
mocracy is doing what it is supposed
do — bringing a broad spectrum of
•ces and factions into a functioning
litical system.

At the same time, a broad land re-
■m has for the first time given campe-
los a personal stake in society. Twenty
rcent of all farmland has been redis-
buted from some 2,000 owners, many
them absentees, to 60,000 poor farm-
rkers and their families.
Perhaps the most striking measure
progress is the transformation of the
litary from an institution dedicated to

status quo to one that spearheads
id reform and supports constitutional
tnocracy.

j,i,tober1982

The shift toward democracy is not
limited to El Salvador. In November
1981 a massive turnout voted in a new
democratic government in Honduras
after many years of military rule. This
February, a similar turnout reaffirmed
Costa Rican democracy and voted the
Social Democratic opposition into
government. Not incidentally, in demo-
cratic Costa Rica and Honduras, as in El
Salvador, the extreme left received prac-
tically no popular support in the elec-
tions.

Meanwhile in Guatemala a coup
overthrew a repressive government that
was fighting organized guerrillas with
increasingly indiscriminate violence. The
new government — although still mili-
tary— has greatly reduced official
abuses, is discussing Constituent
Assembly elections, and has replaced the
old hostility and suspicion toward rural
villagers with efforts to give them the
means to develop and defend their com-
munities.

In a word, alternatives have ap-
peared to the violent extremes of Cen-
tral America's past.

U.S. Role

The United States has played a key role
in nurturing these alternatives. Belated-
ly and at first fitfully, but with a steadi-
ness all the more striking for the fact
that we have kept our basic course
under two quite different U.S. Admini-
strations, we have thrown our weight
behind the well-being and security of our
neighbors.

The great bulk of our effort has been
economic and political. No less than 85%
of all aid authorized by or requested of
the Congress for fiscal years 1981 to
1983 is economic. To enable the coun-
tries of the area to earn their own way
in the future, the President has pro-
posed an innovative program of tariff
concessions and tax incentives, the
Caribbean Basin initiative, which Con-
gress is now considering. Its passage
would provide a vital impulse to confi-
dence and peace in the region.

Equally important has been our
political commitment. Agrarian reform
was a Salvadoran idea, but it could not
have gotten off the ground in 1980 if we
had not backed it. And it might have
died this spring if we had not persisted
in our support. The elections in Hon-
duras and El Salvador were also devel-
oped locally, but they easily could have
derailed had we not backed them so
strongly. Nor are human rights an im-
port from the United States. The great
majority of Central Americans long for

an end to lawlessness. But we do believe
that the constancy of our interest has
helped them make progress toward con-
trolling human rights abuses.

At the same time, we have not ig-
nored legitimate needs for security
assistance. Faced with the guerrilla
offensive in El Salvador and realizing
that a Communist network was funnel-

Between states there
should be an end to the
export of subversion.

ing weapons and ammunition in support
of that offensive, President Carter
authorized military sales to El Salvador.
President Reagan has continued to pro-
vide military assistance. The amounts
have been and remain much less than
our economic aid and the items un-
sophisticated.

We have no wish or intention to pro-
long or spread the conflict — quite the
opposite. But we could not and we will
not stand idly by and watch, in El Salva-
dor or elsewhere, internationally
recognized governments — undertaking
reforms we support— having to throw
untrained recruits short of ammunition
into battle against Cuban-trained guer-
rillas supplied and coordinated from
abroad.

By the same token, we are giving
limited military assistance to Honduras,
which has become a new Cuban and
Nicaraguan target for terror and armed
intimidation. Even Costa Rica, a country
without an army, has come to us to
discuss security assistance. Its people,
too, fear the threat of an aggressive
Nicaragua with mushrooming armed
might and dedicated to the export of
violent revolution.

What Remains To Be Done

If much has been accomplished, much
remains to be done. In El Salvador, the
democratic transformation must be com-
pleted: presidential elections held, the
system of justice reestablished, the land
reform defended, the violence and de-
struction ended, and the still dangerous
guerrillas convinced that they cannot
shoot their way to power and that they
will have to compete for it at the polls.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

In Guatemala, the democratic trans-
formation must be begun, the abuses of
Indians and others in the countryside
ended, and the campesinos enabled to
develop in peace.

In Honduras and Costa Rica and El
Salvador and Guatemala, weak,
bankrupt, or near-bankrupt economies
must be refloated and helped to attract
new investment and trade.

In Nicaragua, a way back must be
found from ever greater concentration
of power and militarization — and from
ever greater repression of its own
citizens and ever greater danger to its
neighbors.

Of all these problems, it is Nica-
ragua that is the most worrisome. It
was the new Sandinista government that
regionalized the conflict in Central
America by backing the violence in El
Salvador. Sandinista leader Daniel
Ortega once told me that the FMLN
[Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front], the Salvadoran guerrilla coal-
tion, is "nuestro escudo" — "Nicaragua's
shield," And Sandinista support has not
lessened. The FMLN's headquarters are
in Nicaragua. It receives sustained
logistic support from Nicaragua, above

There should be an
end of heavy arms
buildups that threaten
neighbors and disrupt
the traditional regional
military equilibrium.

all by airdrop and sea delivery but also
by land. Its training camps are in
Nicaragua.

And now Nicaragua is expanding the
violence to Costa Rica and Honduras. As
more and more Nicaraguans have voted
with their feet— 1,3,000 Miskito and
Sumo Indians and thousands of ex-
Sandinistas have followed anti-Sandi-
nistas into neighboring havens —
Managua has begun to pressure and
threaten its neighbors. In downtown San
Jose, Nicaraguan intelligence officers
operating out of the Nicaraguan Em-
bassy organize terrorism, including
bombing an airline office, while Nica-
raguan troops cross into Costa Rican
territory and harass small farm owners,
and Nicaraguan planes violate Costa
Rican airspace. In Tegucigalpa, the

Sandinista-backed Salvadoran FMLN re-
cently blacked out the capital by dyna-
miting the electrical system, while
Nicaragua threatens Honduras overtly,
mobilizing its army and militia and re-
deploying troops along the Honduran
frontier.

What can be done to sustain and de-
velop the alternatives to the irre-
sponsible spread of violence? Clearly, so
long as violent minorities from within —
or hostile neighbors from without — as-
sert the right to use force, there can be
no alternative to military preparedness
and the maintenance of security. The
United States will help its friends in the
area to defend themselves from both
threats, as long as it is necessary.

But this response alone is not
enough. We must also seek out and ex-
plore every opportunity for reconcilia-
tion and peace. His Holiness, Pope John
Paul II, recently emphasized this moral
imperative in separate letters to the
bishops of Nicaragua and El Salvador.
In both, he called for reconciliation and
unity. The letter to Nicaragua was cen-
sored by the Sandinistas, who first
officially prevented its publication, then
reversed themselves. In his letter to El
Salvador, after noting the "new institu-
tional perspectives recently opened" by
the elections, the Pope said that "an in-
dispensable condition for accommodation
[is] the ceasing of all hostilities and the
renunciation of the use of arms."

This is not an impossible dream.
Steps are available to give substance to
the Pope's vision. The opportunities for
reconciliation are most evident in El
Salvador. Out of that country's travail
have come a constituent assembly, a
provisional coalition government, and a
commitment to continued democratiza-
tion. Some of the forces previously
enamored of violent solutions — mainly
from the far right — have begun to abide
by the law and participate in the politi-
cal process. Others — mainly from the
far left— have yet to find a way to with-
draw from their commitment to
violence.

The new government in El Salvador
has seen the opportunity. On August 3,
at President Magana's initiative, the
leaders of the political parties joined
with the President to adopt a united ac-
tion plan to end divisions within El
Salvador. One of the plan's key elements
is the creation of a new Commission for
Peace. The commission is to comprise in-
stitutions, groups, and respected in-
dividuals charged specifically with evalu-
ating the requirements for peace and
proposing solutions. Together with
similar new commissions on human

rights and on the political process, the
Commission for Peace is an important
further step toward national reconcilia-
tion.

These are all very positive signs.
The important thing is to do them
seriously. Amnesty must offer genuine
security with the participation of the
church and international organizations.
And dialogue must involve listening as
well as talking, giving an opportunity to
adversaries to explain how they could
participate in the new democratic insti-
tutions. The United States very much
hopes the new government will act with
speed and imagination in this vital area.

Regional Proposals

Building the peace on a regional basis is
even more complex. Order among na-
tions requires order within nations as
well as arrangements that respect their
territorial integrity and national identi-
ty. The regionalization of tensions
derives from crises in all these areas.

Here too, bases for progress exist.
The issues are too numerous to be sub-
ject to simple sweeping solutions. But
many individual proposals and possibili-
ties exist to deal with particular pieces
of the problem.

Honduras has put forward a pro-
posal for peace with Nicaragua calling
for an end to border incursions, a freeze
on imports of heavy weapons, and com-
prehensive verification. These proposals
have been endorsed by its partners in
the Central American Democratic Com-
munity— Costa Rica and El Salvador.

The United States has also made
proposals. Beginning nearly a year ago
and more intensively since April, we
have attempted to engage Nicaragua in
a dialogue. We have tried to respond to
Nicaragua's concerns, while meeting
those of Nicaragua's neighbors, and our
own.

The Sandinistas tell us that they
fear an invasion by the United States.
So we have offered to enter into a for-
mal nonaggression agreement. The San-
dinistas tell us that ex-Somocistas are
training in the United States to invade
Nicaragua. We have assured them that
we are enforcing our Neutrality Act,
which makes it a federal crime to launch
an attack on, or to conspire to attack,
another country from the United States

The Sandinistas tell us we are
regionalizing the conflict, preparing
Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica
as bases for action against them. So we
have suggested that each country in
Central America agree to put a reason-

Department of State Bulletir

htk

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

able, low limit on the numbers of foreign
military and security advisers it has, and
we have suggested that each country
pledge not to import any additional
heavy offensive weapons. Both commit-
ments, of course, would have to be sub-
ject to international verification.

Nicaragua would also have to meet
the concerns that its neighbors and we
share. We asked that Nicaragua cease
its involvement in the conflict in El
Salvador. The Sandinistas say that they
are not aware of any such involvement,
but are willing to end it if we just give
them the information we have. In our
most recent exchanges we suggested
that removing the combined guerrilla
headquarters from Nicaragua would be a
good place to start and offered to help
the Sandinistas locate it. For example,
the point from which guerrilla opera-
tions in El Salvador are being directed
was recently in a Managua suburb. We
are confident that although it moves
around a great deal within Nicaragua it
can be found. Nicaragua has yet to
respond.

Similarly, Nicaragua must cease its
terrorist and other aggressive actions
against Honduras and Costa Rica.

We have raised a second issue,
which also deeply concerns Nicaragua's
neighbors. This is the trend in the
organization and use of state power in
Nicaragua. It is, of course, for Nica-
ragua to decide what kind of govern-
ment it has. No one challenges that. We
don't. Its neighbors don't.

But we believe we are all entitled to
ask what assurance can any of us have
that promises of noninterference will be
kept if the Nicarag^Jan state remains the
preserve of a small Cuban-advised elite
of Marxist-Leninists, disposing of grow-
ing military power and hostile to all
forms of social life but those they domi-
nate? And we are also entitled to ask
what is to become of internationally
recognized human rights under these
conditions? Such questions are not a
defense, secret or otherwise, for a
return to a discredited Somocismo. They
could be answered in the fulfillment of
the Sandinistas' own original commit-
ments to democracy and regional peace.

The Need for Action

These are some of the ideas we have ad-
vanced, not in any prescriptive sense but
to start a dialogue to generate a re-
sponse, to try to create a climate. There
is no one way to guarantee peace in
Central America. But our collective ex-
periences suggest action is necessary on
each of four fronts.

October 1982

• Within each state there should be
a process of reconciliation in which
adversaries can substitute political com-
petition for armed competition. This im-
plies, as indicated by His Holiness the
Pope, a renunciation of violence and in-
corporation within the civic process.
Given the deep divisions in each country,
this requires that democratic, or at least
pluralistic, institutions be respected or
established and broad participation in
them encouraged.

• Between states there should be an
end to the export of subversion. This
means the removal, subject to compre-
hensive verification, of the headquarters,
logistical support, and training camps of
guerrilla movements installed outside
the country of their origin.

• There should be an end to heavy
arms buildups that threaten neighbors
and disrupt the traditional regional mili-
tary equilibrium. The easiest way would
seem to be a commitment by all coun-
tries in the area not to bring in specified
weapons, such as more tanks or combat
aircraft— also subject, of course, to veri-
fication.

• Finally, there should be limits to
foreign involvement, particularly in mat-
ters affecting security, to help the region
forge its own peaceful equilibrium on its
own terms. Each country should put a
common ceiling on the number of out-
side military and security advisers and

troops, subject to reciprocity and full
verification. Why not make it zero?

A number of democratic countries—
the United States, Honduras, Costa
Rica, and others— have all attempted a
dialogue with Nicaragua this past year.
We have little to show for it. But we
should not abandon this idea. Rather,
perhaps the democratic countries should
come together and see whether they
cannot formulate a common approach.
The potential cornerstones of peace are
there. The question is how to put them
together.

In the past the United States has
generally neglected Central America-
only to send in the troops when things
got out of hand. U.S. troops are no solu-
tion now. What can help is sustained
U.S. commitment— not only in helping to
overcome violence and not only in help-
ing restore and develop economies but in
the development of democratic institu-
tions. For everything we know about the
20th century tells us that governments
that must face the people in elections do
not long abuse their human rights. Nor
do they often threaten their neighbors.

I will grant you that that is a tall
order. But in a region important to us
because of its strategic position, because
of its proximity, because of our human
ties with it, nothing less will do. We can-
not walk away. ■

Visit of Costa Rican President IVIonge

President Luis Alberto Monge of
Costa Rica made an official working
visit to Washington, D.C., June 21-2U,
1982. Following are remarks made by
Presidients Reagan and Monge after their
meeting on June 22. '

President Reagan

Ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted to
welcome President Monge of Costa Rica.

Costa Rica is an old and valued
friend of the United States. Its dramatic
tradition has made that country a
natural partner of the United States in
the Caribbean and, in fact, in the whole
hemisphere. Our meeting is in keeping
with my policy of working very closely
with our democratic friends in this
hemisphere. And I most appreciated the
President's views on his country's pros-
pects and problems.

I personally pledge my Administra-
tion's support for Costa Rica's efforts at
economic recovery. I'm also deeply ap-
preciative of the President's strong sup-
port for the Caribbean Basin initiative
and understand that he's going to make
that support known to our Congress.

We discussed the prospects for
democracy in the region. We noted that
fair and free elections have been held
this year in his own country — Costa
Rica — and Colombia, where they've long
been a tradition, Honduras, El Salvador,
and the Dominican Republic as well.
We've also discussed the threat to this
welcome development by forces of the
extreme right and the extreme left, the
latter aided and abetted by Nicaragua
and Cuba.

We candidly assessed the inter-
American system in light of the recent
conflict in the South Atlantic. We agreed
that the system and its ability to re-
spond to threats to the peace must be

fi»

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

preserve in peace this democratic base
which is Costa Rica.

I confirm that in order to defend
democracy, something that is one of my
deep convictions — that in order to de-
fend democracy, the best tool we have in
this unceasing struggle is an unceasing
struggle against poverty, a struggle in
favor of social justice, a struggle for
economic growth. I believe that no mat-
ter how harsh or difficult the circum-
stances may be, that we, as I told Presi
dent Reagan, feel optimistic. I think thai
at the end of the day that the validity of
these concepts in the conscience of our
peoples will be intact — these shared
ideals of freedom, of justice, and of
peace that have always been defended
by the people of the United States and
the people of Costa Rica.

Thank you very much. President
Reagan, for having accepted my ratifica
tion of this alliance between tiny Costa
Rica and the powerful United States for
the continuation of the struggle for
freedom and justice for the good of our
peoples.

strengthened and that this required our
urgent attention.

And, finally, let me say again, it's
been my great pleasure in meeting and
talking with you. I look forward to our
working together in the common prob-
lems that face us in this hemisphere. It's
a pleasure to welcome you to America.

President Monge

I've expressed my deep appreciation to
President Reagan for this invitation to
come here in representation of the
government and the people of Costa
Rica. I pointed out, in my words of ap-
preciation to the President, that this
was a great indication of the sympathy
and the support for Costa Rican
democracy, that is, the fact that this in-
vitation was extended to me the very
day that I took office this past May 8th.

It has been my privilege to come
here to reiterate and to ratify an alliance
that has existed from the very early
days of our country with the United
States of America. And so, this small
democracy without an army has always

been a sincere ally of this great power
called the United States of America,
because we have always identified with
the ideals and the conceptions of
freedom of justice and for the good of
all of the peoples throughout the Earth.

This alliance has become a matter of
great importance for our countries
thoughout the past, but never more than
now. In this dramatic occasion, its im-
portance is of really dramatic sig-
nificance, because we are caught in a
pincer now — that is, the democratic
forces — between the extremes of
political thinking now more than ever
before. I have conveyed to President
Reagan the harsh realities of our pres-
ent economic and social crisis and a true
information as to the fact that there is,
indeed, a massive offensive on the part
of totalitarian Marxism-Leninism in the
areas of Central America and the Carib-
bean.

I have repeated to President Reagan
our need for solidarity and for
assistance in order to enable us to over-
come these economic difficulties and
social problems that we are undergoing
at the present time and in order to

'Made on South Grounds of White Housf
(Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents of June 28, 1982.) ■

ire

Department of State Bullet '"»i

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

/isit of Honduran President Suazo

President Roberto Suazo Cordova of
londuras made an official working visit
0 Washington, D.C., July 13-15, 1982.
'allowing are remarks made by
'residents Reagan and Suazo after their
neeting on July i^.'

'resident Reagan

'm pleased to welcome President Suazo
f Honduras to the White House.

Honduras is a good and valued
riend and partner of the United States.
'resident Suazo's leadership has re-
amed Honduras to democracy. His
overnment has embarked on a prompt
nd courageous effort to return the
ountry to economic health.

We had a good discussion about the
ituation in his country and elsewhere in
antral America. I told the President of
ur shock on learning of the recent ter-
jrist attack against power stations in
londuran territory, which cut off vital
iectricity to hospitals, water, and to
ther essential facilities. Faced with
ireats of this kind, the people of Hon-
iiras should be able to rely on their
•iends for help; they can count on us.
ftie United States will provide assist-
nce so that Hondurans can defend
■lemselves from aggression.

President Suazo has been a strong
Dice for peace and democracy in Cen-
tal America. He has put forward a plan
) reduce tensions between states by
greement on the reduction of arms and
le number of foreign advisers and by
Iternational supervision of borders,
Irfields, and ports so that each country
»n be free of the fear of aggression
cm its neighbors. It's a concrete plan
ir peace which we fully support.

President Suazo also has explained,
ankly, the seriously depressed
;onomy of his country and the austerity
leasures he has adopted. The proposals
sfore our Congress for the Caribbean
asin would substantially increase our
Mlity to be of help to the people of
onduras.

I told President Suazo that I was
ire the Congress would respond with
Tong, bipartisan support for a program
lat is obviously in the interest of both
le United States and his country. I'm
appy to say that he will be speaking to
[embers of the Congress on the Carib-
Ban Basin initiative while he is here.

ctober1982

I hope you return to Honduras confi-
dent that the United States — its people
and its government — remains a reliable
friend and good neighbor. And that is
my personal pledge to you.

President Suazo

Before I read my statement that I have
prepared, I would like to make the
following statement. And that is that
there was, according to the history
books, when Benjamin Franklin was
walking out of Independence Hall, a
woman in the crowd asked, "What have
you done? Have you created a republic
or a monarchy?" And this outstanding
American patriot said, "We have created
a republic. But the important thing will
be how to preserve it."

And so, I want to first of all, thank
you for your very kind invitation to visit
here. I want to say to the people of the
United States — of this great democracy
of the north — that we admire and we
have great affection for the two cen-
turies in which you've been able to con-
serve your republic here— this system of
democratic government that you have—
and have been able to project it on a
worldwide basis and have become an
unswerving bulwark in defense of free-
dom, of justice, and of democracy.

I have come to this country inspired
by the best wishes— of achieving under-
standing and friendship. I have come,
thus, to work in favor of these purposes.

With all clearness, I have expressed
to President Reagan what Honduras
means in these critical times for Central
America, for this hemisphere, and for

(White House photo by Michael Evans)

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

the very development of present interna-
tional relations.

I have reaffirmed to him that Hon-
duras, governed by a government that is
bom out of the will of the people — the
free will of its people — because of its
geopolitical location, represents a fun-
damental element in order to achieve
democratic stability in Central America
by peaceful means and to achieve eco-
nomic progress and social change. We
have wanted this to be understood com-
pletely and objectively without any
reticence.

I said, when I took over as President
of the republic a little less than 6
months ago, and I repeat it now: Hon-
duras does not seek, does not wish to
become the arbiter of regional expecta-
tions, anguish, and hopes. This is not
our role. But we do aspire, being faithful
to the principles of nonintervention and
self-determination, to be a factor of the
balance and of concord in the search for
a common destiny for Central America.
With this conviction, we respect the
others with a same firmness with which
we will defend and will earn the respect
for our democratic system of life and of
government.

I bring with me on my visit to the
United States members of my govern-
ment who are responsible for basic areas
of public affairs, as well as members of
our armed forces, in order that you will
understand better that the Government
of Honduras is as one and is asking for
cooperation and requiring understanding
in its struggle in favor of participatory
and pluralistic democracy, for an authen-
tic peace for the good of the entire
region, and unrestricted respect for
human dignity.

We have nothing to hide, because
this is the conduct that is proper for a
democractic government based on
popular sovereignty. But we do have a
lot to say to the leaders of this coun-
try—to those who run international
organizations— as to the social and
economic realities of Honduras and the
solution of its problems; on the opera-
tion of its republican institution; and of
the danger that they might be under-
mined if the menace of violence is not
faced with a genuine spirit of coopera-
tion in favor of peace, of progress, and
of democracy.

It is for this reason that we hope for
the friendship; that the friendship of-
fered to us be frank, realistic, and effec-
tive, as is the content of our friendship
toward you. The present and the future
of Honduras depend, therefore, on a

combination of two basic factors: self-
effort and the honest cooperation from
friendly nations and the international
community.

I have come to this country, then,
with this spirit in order to better guide
the path of our conversations and our
objectives. With this spirit, I bear

witness also of my faith in the mass
media and the organs of information to
which I attribute the virtue of being
bulwarks of objective truth, of construc-
tive criticism, of freedom, and of peace.

'Made on South Grounds of the White
House (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of July 19, 1982.) I

U.S. Relations With Brazil

by Thomas O. Enders

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Inter-American Affairs of the Hoiise
Foreign Affairs Committee on July H,
1982. Ambassador Enders is Assistant
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. '

I welcome the opportunity to appear
before you today to discuss U.S. rela-
tions with Brazil. Brazil is a great and
fascinating country full of achievements
and underlying strength. Yet, Brazil also
sometimes seems one of the best-kept
secrets in the United States. Let me
therefore beg^n by saying a few words
about Brazil itself.

The Economy

Brazil's territorial extension is larger
than that of the continental United
States. Geography and history gave
Brazil a 5,000-mile coastline. But it is
Brazil's own genius that not one of the
almost 8,000 miles of land frontiers-
borders that Brazil shares with every
South American country except Ecuador
and Chile— is disputed. Within this vast
and peaceful expanse, Brazil's natural
resources are bountiful— fertile
agricultural lands, mammoth deposits of
metallic minerals, and enormous hydro-
electric reserves.

With a $250 billion GNP, Brazil's
economy is today the world's eighth
largest market-based center of produc-
tion. Brazil's sophisticated industrial sec-
tor produces a large part of its capital
goods as well as most of the country's
consumer goods. Industrialized products
account for roughly half of Brazil's $23
billion in exports, with the balance made
up by exports of unprocessed minerals
and agricultural commodities. Brazilian
agriculture has changed substantially
from the days when it was known pri-
marily as a producer of coffee and
sugar. Today Brazilian farmers also

grow enormous quantities of the most
varied commodities. They have made
Brazil, like the United States, one of the
world's prime agricultural exporters.

Many— perhaps most— of these
economic gains have been registered in
the last 20 years. The raw production
statistics that have been achieved are
impressive, but it is important to
remember that about half of Brazil's na-
tional territory remains undeveloped.
National development as a whole re-
mains highly uneven. In parts of Brazil's
north and northeast, social and economic
indices rival those of some of the
poorest countries of the world.

Brazil's self-identification as a
developing country is not arbitrary.
Moreover, like many other oil-importing
developing nations, Brazil faces substan-
tial economic difficulties in the short
term. The oil price rises of 1979-80,
combined with the high prevailing world
interest rates, now force Brazil to spend
almost half of its export earnings for oil
and most of the remainder for debt serv
ice. Brazil recognizes that this balance-
of-payments position is a key to its
short-term economic prospects. To
develop, Brazil must borrow; to borrow,
it must maintain its creditworthiness on
the international money markets; to
maintain its creditworthiness, Brazil
must control its balance of payments.

In late 1980, Brazil faced a crisis— a
trade account deficit close to $3 billion
loomed on the heels of a $2.7 billion
deficit in 1979; domestic inflation, which
later peaked in March 1981 at 121%,
was accelerating. In response, the
government put in place a program of
stringent monetary and fiscal restraint
and import demand management. Infla-
tion dropped steadily in the last part of
1981, and extensive export incentives
produced a trade surplus of $1.2 billion
by year's end. However, the national
economy went into a deep recession wit;
GDP growth at - 2% or - 3% for the
year— the first such result since the
beginning of Brazilian statistical series.

Departnnent of State Bulletlr

xal

Sou
iepli

JOUgfc

'elopi
Bam
iliiiiili

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

This year will be a difficult one for
Brazil. The domestic recession appears
o be abating somewhat, but the continu-
ng economic slump in the outside world
nakes it difficult for Brazil to increase
larkets for industrial products or to
ceive good prices for traditional com-
odity exports.

Those of us who have watched
razil deal with its massive problems of
lonomic development over the years
nnot but believe that it has the talent
nd fortitude to deal with its current
roblems. There is every reason to
elieve that the Brazilian economy will
;ach new heights over the balance of
lis century and that Brazil will rise
ven higher on the ladder of the world's
3onomic giants.

Politically, Brazil is emerging from
Imost 20 years of relatively closed and
ighly centralized politics. A program of
emocratic evolution, known in Por-
iguese as abertura or "opening," is
radually moving Brazil toward greater
^centralization and more direct citizen
articipation in the political process,
nder President Figueiredo, Brazil will
old direct gubernatorial and congres-
onal elections this coming November,
iorth America can view this evolving
Kperiment in democracy with great
spect and admiration.

he Foreign Policy

razil's foreign policy reflects directly
lie many strands of its domestic
;onomy and society. With an excellent
oreign Service to complement dynamic
atrepreneurs and competent adminis-
lators, Brazilian leaders, in recent
;ars, have worked hard and successful-
to diversify their country's interna-
>nal relationships. Brazil's need for
itroleum imports, and the high costs of
■reign borrowing to finance economic
•owth, have made the development of
reign markets a central objective of
razilian foreign policy. Brazil's
;onomic and trade relationships now
ke place on a global scale. They have
irned Brazil respected positions
iroughout Europe, Africa, and in the
iddle East.

Brazilian foreign policy also prom-
ently features Brazil's role as a
iveloping country. In the United Na-
ons and elsewhere, Brazil's technical
id diplomatic skills have proved a ma-
r asset to the many countries seeking
•oadened Third World participation and
isponsibilities in international economic
■fairs.

Brazil— A Profile

Geography

Area: 3,290,000 sq. mi. Cities:

Capital — Brasilia (pop. 1.2 million). Other

Cities — Sao Paulo (8.5 million), Rio de

Janeiro (5.1 million), Belo Horizonte (1.8

million), Salvador (1.5 million), Fortaleza (1.3

million), Recife (1.2 million), Porto Alegre

(1.1 million). Novo Iguacu (1.1 million),

Curitiba(l.l million).

People

Population: 119 million (1980). Annual
Growth Rate: 2.5%. Ethnic Groups: Por-
tuguese, Italian, German, Japanese, African,
American Indian. Religion: Roman Catholic.
Languages: Portuguese (official), English.
Literacy: 78% of adult population (1978).

Government

Type: Federal republic. Independence:

Sept. 7, 1822. Constitution: Jan. 24, 1967.

Branches: Executive — president (chief of
state and head of government) elected to a
single 6-yr. term. Legislative — Senate (66
members elected to 8-yr. terms), Chamber of
Deputies (420 members elected to 4-yr.
terms). Judicial — Supreme Federal Tribunal.
Suffrage: Compulsory over 18, except for il-
literates. Subdivisions: 22 states, 4 ter-
ritories, federal district (Brasilia).

Economy

GDP: $237 billion (1980). Annual Growth

Rate: 8% (1980). Per Capita GDP: $1,995

(1980).

Natural Resources: Iron ore, manganese,
bauxite, nickel, uranium, gemstones.

Agricultural Products: Coffee, soybeans,
sugarcane, cocoa, rice, beef, com.

Industries: Steel, chemicals, petro-
chemicals, machinery, motor vehicles, con-
sumer durables, cement, lumber, ship-
building.

Trade (1980): Alports— $20.1 billion:
manufactures, coffee, soybeans, iron ore,
sugar. Major Markets — U.S., F.R.G., Japan,
Netherlands, Argentina. Imports — $23
billion: oil and other fuels, capital goods, con-
sumer goods. Major Non-Oil Suppliers —
U.S., F.R.G., Japan, Canada, Argentina.

Official Exchange Rate: 90.95
cruzeiros = US$1.00 (June 1981; changes fre-
quently).

Atlantic
Ocean

XfmY^'-^

BRAZIL

1 r"*^

]y<

BKUAY ^

l/mm„^ J

j\ um^

Membership in
International Organizations

U.N., General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), Group of 77, International
Monetary Fund (IMF), Organization of
American States (OAS), Rio pact, Latin
American Integration Association (ALADI),
International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD), International Sugar
Organization, International Cocoa Organiza-
tion, INTELSAT. ■

While expanding its global reach,
Brazil retains an obvious identification
with Latin America. Over the past 10
years, Brazilian ties with the other
countries of South America have im-
proved steadily. Brazil's undeniable suc-
cess in maintaining peaceful, construc-
tive relations with its South American
neighbors is an achievement that bodes
well for the hemisphere and the world.

U.S.-Brazil Ties

Bilateral ties between Brazil and the
United States are both rich and endur-
ing. During World War II, Brazilian
soldiers fought side by side with Amer-
ican forces in Italy. In the 1950s, the ini-
tiative of a Brazilian President,
Juscehno Kubitschek— who was perhaps

best known as the visionary founder of
Brasilia and originator of Brazil's
modern drive to national develop-
ment—paved the way for the Alliance
for Progress. During the 1960s and ear-
ly 1970s, the two countries enjoyed what
was widely believed to be a special rela-
tionship. Much of that confidence
dissolved in the mid-1970s. In 1977
U.S. -Brazilian relations hit a historical
low point when Brazil abrogated
longstanding bilateral security assistance
and cooperation agreements in the midst
of controversy over the U.S. approach
to human rights and nuclear issues.
Since then relations have again im-
proved steadily. Today our ties are again
sound and characterized by basic shared
values, mutual respect, and increasing
political and economic interaction.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

The May 11-14 state visit of Presi-
dent Figueiredo to Washington— the
first visit to the United States by a
Brazilian president since 1971— reflected
the cordial state of our relations today.
His exchange of views with President
Reagan on global, regional, and bilateral
issues was extensive, candid, and excep-
tionally constructive. Our basic conver-
gence on many major issues was reaf-
firmed; where there was not agreement,
there was understanding and respect.

The historic convergence of U.S. and
Brazilian views reflects the unique vigor
that innovation and the frontier give to
our common roots in Western values
and civilization. Both countries are at
once optimistic and pragmatic. Both are
committed to a stable and just interna-
tional environment with open markets
and free economic competition. We both
condemn outside intervention in the af-
fairs of sovereign nations and reject the
use of force to resolve disputes. We both
have a vested interest in a peaceful
hemisphere, free from outside in-
terference.

Our shared interest in a peaceful
hemisphere was heightened by the South
Atlantic crisis. Even though it erupted
long after the dates of the visit had been
established, the conflict between Argen-
tina and the United Kingdom was a ma-
jor topic of discussion during President
Figueiredo's visit. The exchange made
clear that our respective positions dif-
fered but that our basic interests and ob-
jectives were similar. Unlike the United
States, which has refrained from taking
a position on the question of sovereign-
ty, Brazil recognizes Argentina's
sovereignty over the disputed islands.
Like the United States, however, Brazil
does not — and did not — support the use
of force to validate it. And like the
United States, Brazil was and is con-
cerned that the South Atlantic conflict
not result in instability or polarization in
Argentina or elsewhere in the
hemisphere. Brazil supported Secretary
Haig's efforts to find a peaceful resolu-
tion of the conflict. When these efforts
did not succeed, Brazil gave its full sup-
port to the efforts of the U.N. Secretary
General and advanced specific proposals
of its own to promote a negotiated solu-
tion within a U.N. framework. Now that
the fighting has ended, we expect that
Brazil will use its influence to promote a
permanent solution that takes into con-
sideration the interests of all of the par-
ties and contributes to the stability of
the hemisphere. This is our objective as
well.

In stating that we have a con-
vergence of views on many major issues,
I do not mean to suggest that there are
no differences between us; there are
quite a few. In considering them, it is
important to understand that both
governments are making a serious effort
to resolve or contain them without los-
ing sight of our basic interests.

Difference of Views

A conflict in our respective nuclear
legislation and policies has prevented the
satisfactory implementation of our
nuclear supply relationship under a
bilateral nuclear agreement signed in
1972. Under our Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion Act of 1978, we can supply nuclear
materials and services only if the recip-
ient country maintains International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards on all its nuclear facilities at
the time of the export from the United
States. Brazil takes the view that it will
accept international safeguards only on
those facilities in which foreign
materials or technology are used and
argues that under our 1972 agreement,
we should not deny supply based on
safeguards that do not concern
U.S. -supplied materials or equipment.

Because of this conflict, the United
States was unable to supply the first
fuel reload of a Westinghouse reactor
that is due shortly to come on line. Dur-
ing Vice President Bush's visit to Brazil
in October, we were able to find a
mutually acceptable means to set aside
the problem for later solution. But it is
clear that substantial adjustments be-
tween the two countries' policies must
be sought if the way to developing
nuclear cooperation is to be opened.

Our governments also diverge on a
number of global political issues. In most
of these cases, the objectives of the
United States and of Brazil are similar,
but our perspectives and approaches dif-
fer. In southern Africa, for example, our
objectives are fully compatible, but we
view differently some points of the
overall problem, such as the presence of
Cuban troops in Angola. The Brazilian
Government understands the efforts of
the United States to find a peaceful solu-
tion to the Namibia problem as a
member of the contact group, but it has
avoided identifying itself with the con-
tact group's approach to the problem. In
the Mideast, Brazil has its own perspec-
tives and interests based on strengthen-
ing relationships with the Arab states
and identification with the claims of the
Palestinians.

ill!

U.S. -Brazil Economic Relations

Americans make up the largest single
group of foreign investors in Brazil.
U.S. direct investment in Brazil is ap-
proximately $8 billion. American banks
hold at least $16 billion of Brazil's
roughly $62 billion foreign debt. This
financial interaction is largely governed
by market circumstances; official in
volvement on the U.S. side is quite
limited.

In trade we are Brazil's most imporLj(
tant single customer and purchase ap-
proximately 18% of Brazilian exports.
Although traditional agricultural prod-
ucts like sugar and coffee are still very
important, manufactured goods, iron,
and steel are the principal Brazilian
products sold to the United States. In
turn Brazil is an important market for
U.S. products and buys about 19% of it
imports from us. In dollar terms, this
bilateral trade totals about $8 billion ar
is growing. The United States tradi-
tionally has had a modest surplus in
trade with Brazil — $510 million in
1980— but Brazil had a surplus in 1981
of $670 million.

Many of our day-to-day bilateral co
cerns relate to trade. Brazil has a
critical need for increasing trade sur-
pluses to help finance development. Ac
cordingly Brazil often provides protec-
tion for its infant industries and less
competitive producers and sometimes
seeks to stimulate exports through sub If
sidies. Brazil does not follow these pra t^
tices across the board, but they arise
frequently enough to create recurring
bilateral frictions; all the more so as tY
United States must be concerned abou
the integrity of the worldwide effort t(
prevent distortions of trade resulting
from subsidies.

The other side of the coin is that
some U.S. practices— for example, our
use of quotas to protect our own
domestic sugar producers and heavy
U.S. tariffs on ethanol imports— affect
products important to Brazil. Brazilian
believe that our sugar quota will cost
their exports no less than $400 million
1982. We believe this figure is much tc
high but do not doubt that there will b
a cost. Certain U.S. Government actio
in response to complaints by Americar
firms over Brazilian trade practices ar
also a continuing concern to the Cover
ment of Brazil.

To the extent that it is appropriate
and feasible, we attempt to sort out
these trade policy differences in the
framework of the General Agreement
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), of which be
Brazil and the United States are

ijiil

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

nembers. We also have annual or semi-
innual bilateral trade consultations dur-
ng which we seek reconciliation of our
rade policy differences.

"Graduation" — switching from
leveloping to developed country roles in
nternational trade and finance — is also
I difference between us. In our general-
' zed system of preferences (GSP), we
lach year "graduate" those Brazilian in-
lustries that appear to have reached a
irorld standard of competitiveness, in
iddition to those that meet the absolute
ompetitive need test. We take such ac-
ions because we believe that the excep-
ional opportunities inherent in tariff
references should be reserved for in-
lustries in developing countries at the
larly stages of development. The World
5ank also has a graduation policy with
enchmarks which we accept and which
Jrazil continues to resist.

To some considerable degree, dif-
erences on "graduation" are more mat-
ers of perception and principle than of
act. For example, the United States
xaduated products carrying $27 million
f exports to the United States in 1981
s against total exports to the U.S.
nder the GSP of $515 million. And the
raduation policy of the World Bank will
nly come into play later in the decade,
nd then it will be applied pragmatically,
/ith a significant transition period.

"he Security Relationship

^ 'he security or military side of our rela-
ionship is recovering from the 1977

■ hock of the cancellation of our
' jngstanding bilateral security and

'■ lilitary assistance agreements. In

' etrospect I think we would all agree
hat the specific agreements in question
ad been overtaken by history and
vents and that they were no longer ap-

' ropriate to the conduct of a mutually
atisfactory security relationship,
loreover, I think both governments
/ould agree that our present security
elations — although not especially
lose — are in most respects adequate to
ur current needs. We undertake an an-
lUal security review in which our Joint
'hiefs of Staff discuss issues of mutual
nterest and concern with their Brazilian
ounterparts. We have a fairly constant
wo-way flow of high-level military of-
icials visiting their counterparts in
kazil and the United States. And ex-
ept for this year, our navies participate
ointly in exercises within the UNITAS
ramework.

gt Ictober 1982

What is sorely lacking from the
security relationship at this point is
mutual exposure among junior and mid-
level officers at operational levels. From
the 1940s through 1977, the Brazilian
and U.S. military services enjoyed a
broad exchange relationship in which of-
ficers from each country were exposed
to the other's doctrines, systems, and
operational techniques. These inter-
changes were a healthy, broadening ex-
perience. They generated mutual con-
fidence, understanding, and respect be-
tween the respective services, as well as
among the individuals who participated
in them. Today training exchanges are
effectively blocked by the Symington
and Glenn amendments to the Foreign
Assistance Act, which prohibit us from
funding military education for a country
that receives nuclear enrichment or
reprocessing equipment, materials, or
technology. Unless we are prepared to
allow our institutions and the future
generations of military leaders of both
nations to forego these advantages, we
will need to find a way to restore our
ability to learn to cooperate.

Brazil's dependency on the United
States for military supply is a thing of
the past. At first, the break in the sup-
ply relationship was mainly a conse-
quence of our own restrictions on U.S.
arms transfers and of the unavailability
of U.S. military export credits on com-
petitive terms. Today, however, Brazil
has emerged as an important arms pro-
ducer and exporter in its own right.
Those high-technology systems and
equipment that Brazil is not yet ready to
produce itself are obtained from Euro-
pean suppliers. It is not likely that
Brazil will turn back to the United
States for major military purchases, ex-
cept possibly as a supplier of specific
technologies for production in Brazil
under licensing arrangements. The
United States has arrangements of this
kind with a number of close allies.
Perhaps it would be worth considering
whether they would not be appropriate
with Brazil.

Brazil and the United States are
among the few countries that conduct
worldwide foreign policies. It is in-
evitable, given our different stages of
economic development, geographic loca-
tion, and perceived global roles, that
those policies should in some cases be in-
consistent with each other. I have cited
examples in the nuclear, trade, financial,
and military sectors. Neither country
can be expected to challenge the integri-
ty of its worldwide policies and substi-
tute for them "Brazil-specific" or
"U.S. -specific" policies.

That said, it may well be that some
of the policies— let me speak for the
United States — some of our policies
have effects not intended when applied
to Brazil, for no other country is like
Brazil. It has an economic potential as
great as the United States— yet many
parts of it are at an early stage of devel-
opment. It is Western in its values,
strongly anti-Communist, vigorously free
in enterprise, yet reasonably independ-
ent in its stance in the world.

Our goal should be to develop eco-
nomic, military, and political relations
with Brazil characterized by the richness
and mutual confidence of the relation-
ships we have with other major friendly
nations. We should review our policies,
not to challenge their principles which
are essential to U.S. well-being but to
see how they can be applied in such a
way as to contribute to development of
such a relationship.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from tlie Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Grenada

by Stephen W. Bosworth

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Inter-American Affairs of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee on June 15,
1982. Mr. Bosworth is Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.'^

It is a pleasure to meet with you and the
members of the committee to discuss
our relations with Grenada. The Eastern
Caribbean subregion has become increas-
ingly important to the United States.
During the past 16 years, six countries
of the Eastern Caribbean have peaceful-
ly achieved their independence from the
United Kingdom. With the exception of
Grenada, all have freely elected,
democratic governments characterized
by their respect for individual rights and
the rule of law. Small in both size and
population, most still depend substantial-
ly on tourism and the export of a nar-
row range of agricultural products for
their economic livelihood. In addition to
their economic vulnerability, the social
problems of these island nations have
been exacerbated by high unemployment
and the emigration of skilled labor.
Strategically, this region sits astride ma-

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

jor shipping lanes which are important
to the commerce and security of the
United States.

The President's announcement of the
Caribbean Basin program in February
was tangible recognition of this region's
importance not only to the United States
but to other major countries of the area.
In cooperation with Mexico, Venezuela,
Colombia, and Canada, our nation has
proposed a major and integrated pro-
gram of trade, investment, and
assistance to promote the economic
development and social well-being of
these island nations, as well as the other
countries of the Caribbean Basin. To
underscore the importance we attach to
the Caribbean, President Reagan visited
Barbados in April and personally met
with elected leaders of many of these
new nations.

Proud and independent, the
democratic governments of this region
are seeking to improve the welfare of
their peoples within a commitment to
freedom, democracy, and respect for
human rights. This commitment stands
in contrast to the situation in Grenada.

Maurice Bishop's New JEWEL
[Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education,
and Liberation] Movement overthrew
the constitutional government of Prime
Minister Eric Gairy in March 1979. The
new government initially promised early
elections and improved observance of
human rights. Its actual performance,
however, has been quite different. It has
postponed elections indefinitely and has
taken a number of actions which have
seriously eroded the human rights of the
Grenadian people. Basic freedoms and
due process of law have been effectively
denied in Grenada. At the same time,
Grenada's people's revolutionary govern-
ment has adopted a militant foreign
policy harshly critical of the United
States and has openly aligned itself with
Cuba and the Soviet Union.

The New JEWEL Movement's coup
d'etat sent shock waves throughout the
Eastern Caribbean as it marked the first
nonconstitutional change of government
in the Commonwealth Caribbean. Since
the coup, Grenada has continued to par-
ticipate in regional institutions like the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean
States, the Eastern Caribbean Currency
Authority, and the Caribbean Develop-
ment Bank but not in the West Indies
Supreme Court, from which Grenada
withdrew shortly after the New JEWEL
Movement suspended the constitution
and judicial guarantees. While maintain-
ing such traditional institutional links,

the government has taken positions con-
trary to those of most of its neighbors
on issues fundamental to the region and
to the hemisphere.

Democracy

At the celebration of the third anniver-
sary of his coup in March, Bishop again
said publicly that Westminster-style
democracy is dead in Grenada. Govern-
ment leaders ridicule the system favored
by all other Commonwealth Caribbean
islands as "democracy for 5 seconds
when votes are cast every 5 years." In
Grenada, political pluralism and the
legal organization of freely competing
political parties have been replaced by a
"people's democracy" of grassroots
parish assemblies, controlled by the New
JEWEL Movement, which serves as an
instrument of, rather than as a check
on, the government.

Human Rights

The human rights situation has shown
continued deterioration since the

Atlantic
Ocean

people's revolutionary government came
to power. No independent press is
allowed to operate. Shortly after coming
to power, the government shut down the
island's major newspaper. Torchlight,
which had originally supported the
ouster of Gairy. Another independent
newspaper was closed just last summer
after only one edition. There is no
freedom of assembly, no due process of
law. Over 100 political prisoners remain
under detention, and many have never
been formally charged with any crime.
The Department of State's 1981 human
rights report to the Congress gives
details on the situation and merits
careful reading.

Economic Development

Grenada's economy is in trouble. Like
those of its neighbors, it has been af-
fected seriously by the worldwide reces
sion and depressed prices for its export
crops. While employing increasingly
authoritarian measures to consolidate u
temal political control, the government
has permitted the continued existence c
private sector economic activity. But
private investment is at a standstOl, in
part because most of Grenada's scarce
foreign exchange is devoted to public
projects, like the Cuban-constructed
Point Salines International Airport.
Although the government recently
returned to its owners a Coca-Cola plai
confiscated in September 1979, the
climate for private investment remains
uncertain. The country relies heavily oi
foreign assistance — much of it from
Cuba and other radical Soviet bloc coui
tries — for the modest rate of current
economic growth. Tourism, traditionaU
the most dynamic industry, has been
declining much more than in other
Caribbean countries. The government's
anti-capitalist, anti-American rhetoric lit
has hardly helped to encourage foreign «n;
investment or tourism.

roll
ill

!ri

Foreign Policy

Unlike its neighbors, the people's revol
tionary government maintains close rel
tions with Cuba, Soviet bloc countries,
and radical Arab states, which are
primary sources of aid. The oversized
airport project at Point Salines is beinj
built principally with Cuban assistance.
In turn, Grenada has adopted foreign
policy positions closely linked to those
Cuba and the Soviet Union, and it has
strongly criticized U.S. policies like the
Caribbean Basin initiative. Grenada, fo
example, voted with Cuba and the
Soviet Union in the United Nations on
Afghanistan and Kampuchea. In stark
contrast to its Commonwealth Caribbe: Jesi
neighbors, Grenada has followed the
Cuban lead on the South Atlantic crisis
deriding "British colonialism." We expefetlii
Grenada will repay its debt to Cuba wi
more than verbal support and votes by
providing Cuba access to the Point
Salines airport for transit flights to
Africa and other military uses.

II *i

Security

Grenada's neighbors have watched
carefully as the government has becom
a center for "solidarity" meetings and
established close ties to small, radical
movements from elsewhere in the Cari

Deoartment of State Bullet

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

an. Grenada, to some degree, acts as
)ridge for Cuba to radical or, as some
)uld prefer to say, "progressive"
oups in the Eastern Caribbean. Cuba
s provided training to Grenada's vast-
expanded security forces and has sta-
ned small numbers of military ad-
iers on the island. Cuba and the Soviet
lion have provided arms, transporta-
n, and communications equipment to
3 Grenadian security forces.

At the same time, Cuba's role in the
nstruction of the Point Salines air-
rt — a field which will be capable of
ndling advanced military aircraft —
ds a new and serious dimension to our
:urity concerns. It is difficult, if not
possible, to identify any economic
itification for the enormous invest-
mt being undertaken in the construc-
n of this airfield.

S.-Grenada Relations

Nations between the United States and
enada are seriously strained and have
en so for some time. As I have in-
rated, the United States has signifi-
nt differences with the Government of
lenada on fundamental issues.

Since it took power, the people's
/olutionary government has viewed

United States with hostility and
spicion. Relations were strained under

t i previous Administration. With no

n ange in the attitude or policies of
enada, they remain cool and are con-
cted at a level appropriate to the
vernment's conduct. Despite the

ij vernment's professed interest in a
gh-level dialogue," we have seen no
t ;dible evidence that it is seriously in-

1 -ested in improving relations.
On the contrary, Grenada's anti-
nerican rhetoric and baseless charges
ainst the United States seem designed
ecisely to foster a climate of confron-
3on with the United States. For exam-
;, Prime Minister Bishop has called

«| esident Reagan a "fascist" and has
en quoted in the press as describing
e Caribbean Basin initiative as

sfjiickenfeed" and "an insult" which is
nly aimed at achieving military in-
rests." Moreover, Grenada has charged
numerous occasions and without a
red of evidence that the United States
preparing an invasion of Grenada and
at various U.S. military and naval ex-
cises in the region are part of those
eparations.

U.S. direct interests in Grenada are
t significant. We maintain diplomatic
lations but not at the ambassadorial
/el. Private sector linkages are

minimal — primarily some tourism activ-
ity and a medical school which has some
600 U.S. students. Nevertheless, we
would be seriously concerned should
Grenada become a base for subversion in
the Eastern Caribbean. In particular, we
would be concerned if Grenada were to
permit Cuba military access to the Point
Salines airport when it is completed. We
have made these concerns known to the
government.

U.S. Interests in

the Eastern Caribbean

At the same time, we are strengthening
our relations with the democratic na-
tions of the Eastern Caribbean and are
working with them to address their
economic problems. Most face critical
problems such as unemployment rates of
over 30%, severe shortages of skilled
workers and managers, dependence on a
single crop and a single market, low
agricultural productivity, and small
domestic markets.

The United States is working to ad-
dress those problems with assistance in
such areas as skills training, agricultural
diversification and marketing, and in-
frastructural improvements which would
permit goods to be produced and moved
to market. Our total proposed assistance
to the Eastern Caribbean region in
FY 1982 is $54 million, plus the $10
million supplemental proposed under the
Caribbean Basin initiative. The Presi-
dent had the opportunity to listen first-
hand to the concerns of the Eastern
Caribbean leaders in April and to
describe his proposals for the Caribbean
Basin initiative.

We are also increasing our coopera-
tion in the area of security. Most
Eastern Caribbean countries maintain
no armed forces. With only modest con-
stabulary forces for defense, these coun-
tries are potentially vulnerable to
takeovers by armed groups on the left,
like Maurice Bishop's New JEWEL
Movement, or by criminal elements,
such as the group that tried to stage a
coup in Dominica last December.

These countries need our help.
Enactment of the Caribbean Basin pro-
gram would provide quick-disbursing
assistance to address their most im-
mediate infrastructure and development
needs. At the same time it would offer
trade and investment benefits to achieve
self-sustaining growth, which will
strengthen democratic institutions.

The United States desires mutually
beneficial relations with all the countries
of the region, and Grenada is no excep-
tion. Our interest in improved relations
with Grenada, however, can only be
realized if there are changes on the part
of the government — changes that would
show that Grenada wants good relations
and is prepared to take concrete steps to
that end. For example, if Grenada is
serious about having a normal relation-
ship with the United States, it should
halt its unrelenting stream of anti-
American propaganda and false
statements about U.S. policies and ac-
tions. Grenada should restore con-
stitutional democracy, including prompt
free and fair elections as was promised
on numerous occasions by the New
JEWEL Movement in the early days
after the coup. There should be a return
to the high standard of human rights
observance that is typical of the
Commonwealth Caribbean islands. Final-
ly, Grenada should practice genuine
nonalignment rather than continuing its
present role as a surrogate of Cuba.
These changes or even significant prog-
ress toward them would indicate a
serious interest on Grenada's part in
building good relations with the United
States and playing a responsible role in
the region. We would respond to them
positively.

•The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the comniittee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

The South Atlantic Crisis:
Background, Consequences,
Documentation

Following are a statement by
Thomas 0. Enders, Assistant Secretary
for Inter- American Affairs, submitted to
the Subcommittee on Inter-American Af-
fairs of the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee on August 5, 1982, and an annex
on the legal aspects of the crisis negotia-
tions submitted to that committee;^ U.S.
proposals for an agreement made to
Argentina and the United Kingdom of
April 27; an Argentine note of May 28
transmitting a letter from the Argentine
Foreign Minister to the Secretary of
State of April 29; the Peru-U.S. proposal
of May 5; a British Government docu-
ment of May 21, with annex; and an
Argentine diplomatic note to the Depart-
ment of State of May 26.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS'
PREPARED STATEMENT,
AUG. 5, 1982'

I was delighted to receive your invita-
tion to review with this committee the
impact of the Falkiands/Malvinas Islands
conflict on the inter-American system
and specifically on U.S. relations with
Latin America.

The clash between Argentina and
the United Kingdom erupted suddenly,
then as quickly disappeared from the
headlines. It left in its wake some haunt-
ing questions— about how to prevent
war in the hemisphere, about the future
of inter-American cooperation, even
about regional stability and progress.

This is not the first time that these
islands have vividly illustrated the risk
of massive repercussions from modest
origins. These "few spots of earth which,
in the desert of the ocean, had almost
escaped notice" once brought "the whole
system of European empire" to the point
of convulsion. The remark is from
Thoughts on the Late Transactions
Respecting Falkland's Islands, written
by Samuel Johnson in 1771.

This prepared statement addresses
the disturbing consequences of the 1982
Falkiands/Malvinas crisis and records
something of the origins and course of
the conflict itself.

Origins of the Conflict

The territory immediately at issue con-
sists of two main islands and some 200
smaller ones located in the South Atlan-
tic 480 miles northeast of Cape Horn.
The islands cover a total area of 4,700
square miles. Their terrain is alternately
boggy and hilly, the environment wind-
swept and virtually treeless. Samuel
Johnson described it as "a bleak and bar-
ren spot in the Magellanick Ocean of
which no use could be made." But
Johnson never went there to see for
himself. A U.S. Foreign Service officer
who did so more than two centuries
later in the course of her consular duties
reported that "work is hard but life is
simple and not uncomfortable." Accord-
ing to the 1980 census, the population
was 1,813— down from the 1931 peak of
2,392. The predominant economic activi-
ty is the production of fine wool.

It is their relationship to the outside
world rather than their marginal pro-
fitability that has made these islands a
source of seemingly endless contention.
Even their name reflects
disagreement— though in English they
are known as the Falklands, in the
Spanish-speaking world they are in-
variably known as the Malvinas. There
is even controversy over which Euro-
pean first sighted the islands in the 16th
century.

But the central dispute has always
been over sovereignty. In 1770 England,
France, and Spain almost went to war
over small outposts embodying com-
peting claims txj exclusive dominion on
the islands. That crisis was resolved
pragmatically when Spain restored to
England the settlement of Port Egmont
on Saunders Island off West Falkland,
founded originally by English settlers in
1766, then seized by Spain. In turn,
Spain kept Port Louis, which had
originally been founded by France in
1764 on East Falkland. Both Spain and
England maintained their broader
sovereignty claims.

In 1774, apparently for reasons of
economy, England withdrew from Port
Egmont, leaving behind a leaden plaque
declaring that "Falkland's Island" was
the "sole right and property" of King
George III. From 1774 to 1811, the
islands were administered without

challenge by a succession of Spanish
governors under the authority of the
Vice Royalty of La Plata in Buenos
Aires.

In 1820 Argentina formally claimed
sovereignty over the then-uninhabited
islands as the successor to Spain. In one
of the many ironies of this history, the
Frigate Heroina, sent to enforce Argen-
tina's control, was commanded by David
Jewett, one of the many British subjects
who fought in the Wars of Liberation in
the service of the Argentine Republic. I:
1826 Argentina established a new
capital at the protected harbor of
Stanley on East Falkland. In 1833, afte
a series of incidents over fishing rights,
one of which had led to action by the
U.S.S. Lexington against Argentine
authorities, the corvette H.M.S. Clio
reasserted Britain's claim.

For nearly a century and a half—
until an Argentine naval force invaded
Port Stanley last April 2— Britain ad-
ministered the islands, first as a Crown
Colony, then as a self-governing
dependency. The royally chartered
Falklands Islands Company undertook
the first large-scale settlement of the
islands and provided ships that made
four or five round trips a year to Britai
exchanging the islands' wool and hides
for everything from chocolates to
building materials.

Argentina's Claims

Argentina's commitment to recover ter
ritories Argentines believe were illegal i
wrested from them by force is
documented in countless pamphlets, ar
tides, and books, some of them
distributed widely in Latin America. F
the past 40 years or so, the claim to th "
"Malvinas" has been an important com ""^
ponent of Argentine nationalism, en-
dorsed by prominent civilian and
military leaders across the political sp€
trum.

Immediately after World War II
Argentina moved its claims beyond thf
bilateral exchanges that had marked it
efforts to recover the islands in the 19
and early 20th centuries. At inter-
American conferences in Rio in 1947,
Bogota in 1948, Washington in 1953,
and Caracas in 1954, Argentine delega
tions introduced resolutions pressing
Argentina's claims within a general
framework of decolonization. In the ar
tic summer of 1947-48, an Argentine
task force of two cruisers and six
destroyers conducted maneuvers off ti *
islands but left when Britain dispatche
warships in response.

all

;llt

Department of State Bullet

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Argentine diplomacy registered a
Ignificant gain in 1964. Since 1946 the
'nited Nations had treated the United
-ingdom as the administering authority
nder Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter.
.N. General Assembly Resolution
065(XX) called upon Argentina and the
nited Kingdom to initiate talks with a
jiew to resolving their conflicting
jjvereignty claims peacefully. Confiden-
jal bilateral talks began in 1966. With
rimierous ups and downs and occasional
iterruptions, Argentine-U.K. negotia-
ons continued for 16 years,
greements were reached providing for
rgentine facilitation of air travel and
Dmmunications, postal and medical
?rvices, education, and oU supply. The
vo sides remained far apart, however,
n the basic issue of sovereignty and
ich related issues as land ownership
nd residence by Argentines. The last
recrisis round of talks took place in
ew York in February 1982, ending
irely 6 weeks before Argentina at-
?mpted to settle the matter by force.

It has been said that Britain's ap-
roach reflected a stubborn colonialist
jflex. The fact that over the last
sneration, no fewer than nine members
' the Organization of American States
ive received their independence in
jace and good will from the United
ingdom suggests that the situation was
ither more complex. The resident
landers— hardy individuals
-edominantly of Scottish and Welsh ex-
action—proved to be satisfied with
ritish rule and adamantly united in op-
)sing Argentine claims. Throughout
le negotiations, Britain stood by the
-oposition that the rights and views of
le inhabitants must be respected in any
iture disposition of the islands.

The standoff became rooted in prin-
ple as well as nationality— Britain
"guing for self-determination, Argen-
na for territorial integrity.

.S. Position

he United States has at no time taken
legal position on the merits of the
)mpeting sovereignty claims. In the
9th century, U.S. officials made clear
lat- because the British claims
ntedated 1823— the United States did
ot consider the reassertion of British
jntrol a violation of the Monroe Doc-
•ine. The United States, however,
jfused to become embroiled in the
3vereignty issue and took no position
n Argentine and British sovereignty
iaims.

Thirty-five years ago, at the signing
of the final act of the 1947 Rio con-
ference which created the Rio treaty,
the U.S. delegation, headed by
Secretary of State George C. Marshall,
made clear our view that the Rio treaty
is without effect upon outstanding ter-
ritorial disputes between American and
European states— and explicitly refused
to endorse Argentina's claims.

U.S. neutrality on the question of
sovereignty has been confirmed
repeatedly since then— at the Organiza-
tion of American States and the United
Nations, as well as during the recent
fighting. I reassert it again today,
before this body: The United States
takes no position on the merits of the
competing claims to sovereignty, nor on
the legal theories on which the parties
rely.

For the record, I would like to add
that although we, of course, have an in-
terest in peace there as elsewhere, the
United States has no direct interest in
the islands. Because some comments
abroad have suggested otherwise, I state
explicitly that the United States has
never had, and does not now have, any
interest in establishing a military base of
any kind on these islands. The only occa-
sion on which any U.S. military presence
has ever been contemplated was in
April-May 1982 as a contribution to a
peaceful resolution had one been agreed
to between Argentina and the United
Kingdom.

The Occupation and Response

Argentina's surprise military occupation
of the islands beginning April 2 pro-
voked dismay and apprehension
throughout the international community.
The next day, April 3, the U.N. Security
Council adopted Resolution 502, de-
manding immediate cessation of
hostilities and withdrawal of Argentine
troops and calling on Argentina and the
United Kingdom to resolve their dif-
ferences diplomatically. Invoking the
right of self-defense under Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter, the United Kingdom
dispatched a war fleet toward the
islands.

The looming military confrontation
put the inter-American system under
great stress. Some said liiat because
war would pit an American republic
against an outside power, the Rio treaty
required that all its members come to
the assistance of the American republic.

Others said that the inter-American
system— which protects regional order
based on law and the peaceful settle-

ment of disputes— could in no way be in-
terpreted to support the resort to force
to settle a dispute.

The U.S. position was that because
the unlawful resort to force did not
come from outside the hemisphere, this
was not a case of extracontinental ag-
gression against which we were— and
are— all committed to rally.

These different responses to a con-
flict for which the inter- American
system was not designed led to heated
exchanges among foreign ministers at
the meeting of the Rio treaty Organ of
Consultation that began April 26. Two
days later, the organ adopted, by a vote
of 17-0-4 (the United States abstaining),
a resolution that urged an immediate
truce, recognition of the "rights of
sovereignty of the Republic of Argentina
over the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands and
the interests of the islanders," and called
for "negotiation aimed at a peaceful
settlement of the conflict."

Negotiation of a peaceful settlement
of the conflict had, in fact, been the cen-
tral objective of the U.S. response to the
crisis.

U.S. efforts to encourage a nego-
tiated settlement began even before the
initial use of force. In late March, we of-
fered to the two sides our good offices
to help find a peaceful solution to an in-
cident on South Georgia Island on
March 19 when an Argentine salvage
team was threatened with expulsion for
operating without British permission. On
April 1, learning that Argentine military
action appeared imminent. President
Reagan called President Galtieri to urge
that Argentina desist from the use of
force.

After Argentina forcibly occupied
the islands, both President Galtieri and
Prime Minister Thatcher encouraged the
United States to see whether it could be
of assistance in finding a solution. At
President Reagan's direction. Secretary
Haig undertook two rounds of intense
discussions in each capital.

On April 27, as prospects for more
intense hostilities increased, the United
States put forward a proposal of its
own. It represented our best estimate of
what the two parties could reasonably
be expected to accept. It was founded
squarely on U.N. Security Council
Resolution 502, which both sides
asserted they accepted.

The U.S. proposal called for negotia-
tions to remove the islands from the list
of non-self-governing territories under
Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter. It
specified that the definitive status of the
islands must be mutually agreed, with
due regard for the rights of the in-

^'°^«^ -"^"^

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

habitants and for the principle of ter-
ritorial integrity. And it referred both to
the purposes and principles of the U.N.
Charter and to the relevant resolutions
of the U.N. General Assembly.

Those negotiations were to be com-
pleted by the end of the year. Pending
their conclusion, an interim authority
composed of Argentina, Britain, and the
United States was to oversee the tradi-
tional local administration to be sure
that no decision was taken contrary to
the agreement. Argentine residents of
the islands were to participate in local
councils for this purpose. During the in-
terim period travel, transportation, and
movement of persons between the
islands and the mainland were to be pro-
moted and facilitated without prejudice
to the rights and guarantees of the in-
habitants.

The proposed interim authority of
the three countries was to make pro-
posals to facilitate the negotiations, in-
cluding recommendations on how to take
into account the wishes and interests of
the inhabitants and on what the role of
the Falkland Islands Company should
be. Should the negotiations not have
been completed by year's end, the
United States was to be asked to engage
in a formal mediation/conciliation effort
in order to resolve the dispute within 6
months.

The British Government indicated
that our proposal presented certain real
difficulties but that it would seriously
consider it. However, the proposal was
not acceptable to the Argentine Govern-
ment, which continued to insist that any
solution must have a predetermined out-
come.

On April 30, in light of Argentina's
continued unwillingness to compromise,
we took concrete measures to under-
score that the United States could not
and would not condone the unlawful use
of force to resolve disputes. The Presi-
dent ordered limited economic and
military measures affecting Argentina
and directed that we would respond
positively to requests for materiel sup-
port for British forces but without any
direct U.S. military involvement.
Secretary Haig's statement announcing
these measures emphasized our belief
that no strictly military outcome could
endure, that a negotiated settlement
would be necessary in the end, and that
the United States remained ready to
assist the parties in finding that settle-
ment.

On May 5 President Belaunde of
Peru took the initiative to put forward a
new peace plan, drawing also on the

fundamental elements of Resolution 502.
We worked closely with him. The
simplified text forwarded by Peru to
Buenos Aires and London called for an
immediate cease-fire, concurrent
withdrawal and nonreintroduction of
forces, administration of the islands by a
contact group pending definitive settle-
ment in consultation with the elected
representatives of the islanders,
acknowledgement of conflicting claims,
acknowledgement in the final settlement
of the aspirations and interests of the
islanders, and an undertaking by the
contact group to insure that the two
parties reached a definitive agreement
by April 30, 1983.

Britain made clear that it could
seriously consider the proposal. Argen-
tina asked instead for the U.N.
Secretary General to use his good offices
as, of course, it was its full privilege to
do.

By this time, however, the military
tempo was rapidly overtaking the
negotiators. On May 2 two torpedoes
from a British submarine sank the
General Belgrano, Argentina's only
cruiser. On May 4 a sea-skimming
missOe from an Argentine jet devastated
the H. M.S. Sheffield, a modem British
destroyer. Despite intense new efforts
by the U.N. Secretary General, the war
we had worked so hard to avoid had
come in earnest.

By June 14, when the Union Jack
was again raised over Port Stanley,
what Horace Walpole had in 1770 called
"a morsel of rock that lies somewhere at
the very bottom of America" had
become the improbable scenario of bitter
fighting. More than 1,000 men and
women were dead. Billions of dollars
had been expended. Emotions had sur-
faced in both countries that promise to
make this issue and others even harder
to resolve in the future.

The Future

I said at the onset that the South Allan-
tic war faces us with several haunting
questions.

Perhaps the most fundamental is
how better to prevent war in the future
in this hemisphere.

Many of us feared as soon as Argen-
tina acted April 2 that the fighting
would escalate. Argentina, it is true, did
not cause casualties in its takeover. But
that did little to diminish the shock. Any
use of force invites further use of force.
The shock in this case was increased
because the two countries were both
linked in friendship to us and to each

other. It grew when brave men on both
sides began to risk and lose their lives.
But perhaps the deepest shock came
because war between states had been
virtually unknown in the Americas in
our time.

In the world as a whole, some 4
million persons have lost their lives in
armed action between states since the
Second World War. Including the toll in
the South Atlantic, fewer than 4,000 of
them have died in the Western
Hemisphere. The countries of Latin
America spend less of their national
resources for arms than any other area
in the world. Their military expenditure:
come to only 1.4% of GNP— a quarter o
the average in the Third World as a
whole.

The South Atlantic war— the fact ol
major fighting and the clear advantages
demonstrated by modern weapons —
means that military institutions,
throughout the hemisphere but especial-
ly in South America, have powerful new
claims to resources. Because Latin
America's military institutions and
arsenals are relatively modest in size,
demands for advanced weapons system;
and for the expertise to maintain and
employ them are likely to increase.
Governments will also look for self-
sufficiency in defense industries, for
bigger stocks of weapons.

Budgetary limitations will, of cours^
constrain purchases, but we would be
mistaken to expect arms modernization
to be deferred as a result of the South
Atlantic conflict. On the contrary'. The
duration and intensity of the fighting
called into question the assumption tha
the inter-American system guarantees
that interstate conflicts in this
hemisphere would be limited to a few
days of actual fighting.

A new emphasis on military
preparedness in a region long plagued
by territorial disputes and military in-
volvement in politics would undeniably
challenge every member of the inter-
American system.

The hemisphere is laced with ter-
ritorial (juestionniarks. The prevalence
of territorial tensions (e.g., among
Argentina-Chile-Peru-Bolivia-Ecuador,
Colombia-Venezuela-Guyana, Nicaragu;
Colombia, (luatemala-Belize) puts a
premium on the peaceful settlement of
disputes. To take just one example, ter
sions between Guatemala and Belize—
the only place in the hemisphere other
than the Falklands where the United
Kingdom stations combat troops— will
continue to fester if unresolved.

«!■

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

The challenge to regional peacekeep-
)ff is far from hopeless, however. The
.S. response to the crisis may serve to
v\'-T others from resorting to force.
Icireover, the inter-American system
4uips the New World with the means
I [irevent or control the conflicts that
■d\v kept other continents from realiz-
\^ their potential.

Machinery exists to anticipate
(sputes and permit their peaceful and
I'finitive settlement— various inter-
.merican arbitration and conciliation
(^cements, OAS peacekeeping mecha-
isms, the International Court of
iistice, even the treaty of Tlatelolco,
'hich established the world's first
uclear-free zone in a populated area.
'Tiat appears lacking is the vnll to use
' is machinery to prevent and resolve
( ntentious problems. The United States
lid other countries of the area have at
lie time or another been involved in
(Iming or negotiating most of them,
lit this is a branch of hemispheric
olomacy that deserves fresh attention.
The interest of American states is
( 'arly to avoid arms races. Even where
( mpetitive procurement cannot be
i oided altogether, they will want to see
lat existing disputes are not needlessly
I acerbated. U.S. arms sales as a pro-
rtion of South American purchases
1 from 75% in 1960 to 25% in 1970
d 7% percent in 1980. The reduction
training and in-depth contacts be-
een the United States and most South

inerican militaries has been equally
ecipitous.
These patterns raise a question
I )rth pondering in the wake of the
iJklands/Malvinas episode. Can the
I lited States maintain a degree of
litary access and communication with

states of South America so as to
Ip maintain the regional balance of
wer with such limited personnel, doc-
nal, and materiel relationships?

A related challenge is to prevent
gional conflicts from having strategic
nsequences, changing the East- West
lance. This is a real problem, for
tory shows the Soviet Union and its
oxies are ready and eager to take ad-
ntage of instability. Should Moscow be
Uing to provide arms at bargain prices
it did to Peru in the 1970s, economic
nstraints on Latin American pur-
ases of military equipment from tradi-
mal Western sources could give the
iviets a unique opportimity to forge
)ser links with established govem-
snts in South America. Cuba— and
caragua— rushed forward to exploit
e Falklands crisis. In Argentina some
Iked of playing the Cuban card. We do

:tober1982

not believe Argentina will turn to the
country that harbors in its capital the
extremely violent Argentine terrorist
organization— the Montoneros. But Cuba
will be working hard to use the crisis to
lessen its current isolation wathin the
hemisphere.

Overcoming Resentments

A second legacy of the conflict is the
need to overcome resentments of the
United States that were triggered by
the crisis.

Although the immediate emotional
strains of the crisis are already receding,
the perception of the United States as a
reliable ally to Latin American nations
in times of crisis will take time to
restore.

The commitment of the United
States to the hemisphere and its institu-
tions has been called into question. I
have already noted the importance we
attach to the OAS, that we have taken
no position on the question of sovereign-
ty, and that in our view no Rio treaty
action could apply to this particular con-
tingency. Nonetheless, U.S. support for
what on May 29 the second meeting of
the Rio treaty Organ of Consulation con-
demned as an "unjustified and dispropor-
tionate" U.K. military response was
taken by some to mean that the U.S.
commitment to the inter-American
system was superficial at best.

The fact that the conflict remained
localized and ended relatively rapidly
helped mitigate damage to U.S. in-
terests. Nonetheless, our bilateral rela-
tionships with certain countries have un-
questionably been affected adversely.
The most severe impact is obviously on
relations with Argentina. But Venezuela,
Panama, and Peru were also highly
critical of our support for the United
Kingdom's military response and will be
watching closely the future evolution of
the sovereignty issue. In contrast, U.S.
relations with most other South
American countries, Mexico, and the
Caribbean Basin appear less affected.

The lasting effects of this mood,
which varies from country to country,
will depend on how the postcrisis situa-
tion evolves and what posture we adopt.
Reactions may change as the position
taken by the United States is better
understood. But the widespread view
that the United States does not take
Latin America seriously could increase
North-South and nonaligned rhetoric
and inhibit cooperation in support of
U.S. interests. The argument that the
United States and United Kingdom
acted as industrialized powers

cooperating to keep a developing coun-
try "in its place" makes us once again a
target for anticolonialist and anti-
imperialist emotions that will make it
harder for us to accomplish our objec-
tives.

It would be wrong to conclude from
such reactions that the United States
should not have acted as it did. There
can be no position for the United States
other than to oppose the unlawful use of
force to settle disputes.

The first lesson for U.S. policy is
that this is a time for steadiness of pur-
pose rather than for grandiose gestures,
statements, or proposals. During the
coming months, it will be especially im-
portant that we meet our commitments,
protect our interests, and respond to
those of our neighbors in a meaningful
and resourceful manner.

The Caribbean Basin initiative is
vitally important in this regard. Many
basin countries now wonder whether our
contribution to the initiative will ever
materialize. If Congress were not to act,
the concerns these countries now ex-
press about their future and our commit-
ment to them would deepen, widening
opportunities for Soviet and Cuban
adventurism. It is now up to the United
States to deliver.

We must maintain our commitment
in Central America, where democratic
processes are vulnerable and where
fragile government institutions face a
major challenge from Cuban-supported
guerrilla movements. Our political,
economic, and security assistance are
essential to help them meet this
challenge and make progress toward
democracy, economic development, and
the effective protection of human rights.

While we must continue to seek in-
novative solutions to the problems of our
immediate neighborhood, we must
understand what is happening in South
America is also important to us. This
was evident in the midst of the
Falklands conflict — for example, in the
visit of President Figueiredo to
Washington. The conflict between
Argentina and the United Kingdom was
a major topic of discussion. The ex-
change made clear that the positions of
the United States and Brazil differed
but that our basic interests and objec-
tives were similar. For several years
now, we have simply not given South
America the attention its place in the
world and our interests warrant.

U.S. -Argentine Relations

This brings me to a third challenge — the
conundrum of our relations with Argen-

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

tina. Despite our many similarities,
U.S.-Argentine relations have seldom
been close.

The President's vision of region-wide
cooperation had led us to make efforts
to improve ties to South America, in-
cluding Argentina. In the case of Argen-
tina, however, those efforts had not yet
borne fruit by the time of the crisis. We
must continue to seek a dialogue that
can develop the bilateral and multilateral
framework for more fully cooperative
relations.

During the South Atlantic crisis, our
ties with Argentina proved too weak to
promote effective cooperation in support
of common interests. Repeated efforts
were made by us and by others— before
the Argentine landing on the islands,
again when the British fleet was ap-
proaching, and again when the U.S. and
Peruvian and U.N. peace plans were ad-
vanced in turn— to explain to Argentine
leaders what would happen if they did
what they proposed to do. Although our
predictions consistently proved accurate,
they were not believed. Communication
failed utterly.

Our objectives with Argentina today
include encouraging economic recovery,
peaceful resolution of the dispute be-
tween the United Kingdom and Argen-
tina, and, of course, political comity. Yet
our ties to the government in Buenos
Aires are now more limited than
previously. How long this vnll last
depends on several factors. But the
fundamental point is that we all share a
compelling interest in an Argentina that
is true to hemispheric traditions and
free of foreign Communist influence. We
do not want the Soviets to be their only
alternative. Neither do they. We all
should be prepared to help Argentina
maintain conditions in which its people
can realize their free world vocation.

So we must begin, in orderly fashion,
to build the solid, realistic relationship
so evidently lacking until now.

Hemispheric Relationships

Finally, the South Atlantic crisis has
highlighted economic problems in South
America and throughout the
hemisphere.

Even before the crisis, many of the
region's countries were feeling the ef-
fects of the world recession on their
development. The problems vary. Vir-
tually all depend heavily on international
trade and on access to international
financial markets. Some have contracted
substantial debt. The South Atlantic
crisis could crystallize doubts about

R2-

stability and creditworthiness on a
region-wide level, particularly if arms
procurement were to divert resources
from development priorities.

The major lesson here is the need
for cooperation in economic
management— not merely with Argen-
tina but with Brazil, Venezuela, and
Mexico.

Many of the problems now asso-
ciated with the South Atlantic crisis
have been developing for some time. The
growdng assertiveness and needs of ma-
jor developing countries are not new.
Let us hope that the crisis will
strengthen our ability to work more
realistically together.

Before the crisis erupted in the
South Atlantic, we had already begun to
develop more sustained hemispheric
relationships.

• We had started to achieve with
Mexico a relationship that reflects its ex-
ceptional importance to the United
States and its role in world affairs. Now
comes the harshest test of that new rela-
tionship, as the economic slowdown in
both countries threatens to aggravate all
our joint accounts— trade, finance, im-
migration. We must be steadfast.

• We had committed ourselves to
help countries of the Caribbean Basin
protect themselves against outside in-
tervention, strengthen or develop
democratic institutions, and overcome
economic disasters. Now we must
deliver.

• We were beginning to respond to
new realities in South America,
rebuilding close bilateral relations with
each country after a decade of drift,
when the shadow of the South Atlantic
crisis fell across our efforts. Now we
must relaunch those efforts, joining
others to maintain the network of con-
structive relationships that is essential
to peace.

What this crisis may ultimately
mean for the United States is not that
our recent decisions were wrong— they
were right— but that the accumulation
from our past decisions reveals a flaw in
our outlook. We have pursued an a la
carte approach, ignoring our friends
when it suited us, yet demanding their
help or agreement when it served our in-
terest. We took too much for granted
and invested too little. When we needed
close and effective dialogue on April 2,
we didn't have it.

When a fight in distant islands
reverberates around the world, the fun-
damental lesson is not how little we
need each other but how closely con-

nected we are. Our task is to make in-
terdependence work, not against us but
for us. This requires long-term com-
mitments that will enhance our ability tc
influence events and protect our in-
terests.

ANNEX-LEGAL ASPECTS OF
THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS
CRISIS NEGOTIATIONS

This paper addresses three aspects of
the negotiations which occurred during
April and May of 1982 to avert the war
in the South Atlantic— the U.S. posture
on the underlying dispute over sov-
ereignty of the islands; the content of
the three most intensive settlement
efforts, focusing on the two in which tht
United States was most closely involvec
and the consideration given to use of th
International Court of Justice (ICJ).

U.S. Position on Claims
to the Islands

Throughout the more than 200-year
history of this dispute, the United Statt
has maintained a legal neutrality on tht
competing U.K. and Argentine claims t
the Falklands/Malvinas, urging that
their dispute be resolved through peace
ful means in accordance with interna-
tional law. In the post- World War II
era, the United States has abstained or
U.N. or Organization of American
States (OAS) resolutions that implied a
position on the merits.

U.S. neutrality is also reflected in
the U.S. position on the nonapplicabilit
of the Monroe Doctrine. Because the d
pute over the islands predated the
Monroe Doctrine, and because the
United States took no position on the
dispute over sovereignty, the Depart-
ment of State long ago expressed the
view that the reinsertion of a British
presence on the islands in 1833 was no T
a new attempt at colonization and that
the doctrine is, thus, inapplicable.

In addition to declining to take a
position on the merits, the United Stat
has not taken a position on the under
lying legal theories on which the partie
rely. Specifically, the United States ha
taken no view on the relative weight t(
be given to Britain's position on self-
determination for the islanders and
Argentina's emphasis on the principle ■
territorial integrity with the mainland.
The application of the principle of self-
determination to the Falklands has
raised a number of legal questions in
view of the size and orig^in of the popu
tion, the existence of other legal prin-
ciples which may be applicable given tl

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

istory and nature of the dispute, and,
1 particular, the interpretation placed
y Argentina on the principle of terri-
rial integrity contained in U.N.
ineral Assembly decolonization resolu-
ons, such as Resolution 1514 (XV).

This U.S. position of neutrality was
laintained throughout and facUitated
ur attempts to mediate the crisis.
While remaining neutral on the
lerits of the dispute, the United States
as acknowledged the fact of longstand-
ig U.K. administration of the islands.
he United States has, accordingly,
salt with the United Kingdom on mat-
;rs related to the islands and has, on
ccasion, acquiesced in U.K. accession to
ilateral agreements and international
inventions on behalf of them. The U.S.
• osition in such instances has been con-
' stent with acknowledgment of the
1 nited Kingdom's de facto responsibility
)r the islands' foreign relations as the
dministering authority in peaceful
assession. This pragmatic policy of
aaling with the administrator in defac-
1 control is also that of the United Na-
ons, which has accepted from the
:, nited Kingdom, as the administering
1. ithority, annual reports under Chapter
' I of the U.N. Charter regarding non-
!lf-goveming territories.

pril-May 1982 Negotiations

t here were three intensive efforts after
le Argentine occupation of the islands

I 1 avert the coming military confronta-
on; each resulted in textual elabora-
ons of the positions of both sides on ac-

i iptable outcomes on the range of issues

i volved in a package to promote a
jaceful settlement. All of these efforts
Idressed four common elements:

• A cease-fire, linked to a mutual
ithdrawal of forces within a short
jriod, and a commitment on nonrein-
oduction of forces, subject to third-
arty verification (this element was con-
stent with U.N. Security Council Reso-
tion 502, operative paragraphs 1 and 2
' which called for an immediate cessa-
on of hostilities and withdrawal of
rgentine forces from the islands);

• Interim administrative arrange-
lents for the islands, based on some
)rm of third-party supervision of local
Dvernment, including provision for
rgentine access to the islands during
lis period;

• The composition and definition of
le functions of the third-party mech-
nism to assist the parties in imple-
lentation of an agreement; and

;,jCtober1982

• A framework for negotiations to
reach a definitive settlement, including a
deadline or target date, and the role in
such negotiations for third-party assist-
ance.

Each side, of course, approached
these common elements from a different
perspective, which in some cases shifted
as the diplomatic and military situation
changed over time. The United Kingdom
was willing to consider variations on the
form of administration of the islands,
subject to certain basic guarantees in re-
spect of local rights and institutions. It
was prepared to accept third-party as-
sistance in implementation of an agree-
ment, subject to inclusion of some role
for the United States. U.K. insistence on
a cease-fire coupled with immediate
withdrawal of Argentine forces from the
islands remained firm, consistent with
its legal position based on Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter relating to self-defense
and U.N. Security Council Resolution
502. The United Kingdom also insisted
that nothing in an agreement prejudice
the final outcome of the negotiations.
This insistence focused in particular on
the drafting of a formula on future
negotiations that was neutral on the
issue of sovereignty and on provisions to
control Argentine intercourse with the
islands at prewar levels, consistent with
a 1971 agreement between the two
countries.

Argentina, in turn, sought either
effective interim control of the islands'
administration, including freedom of ac-
cess to the islands, or assurance that the
formula on a definitive settlement would
automatically result in confirmation of
Argentine sovereignty over the islands
at some fixed future time. While accept-
ing the concept of a cease-fire linked to
mutual withdrawal of forces, Argentina
sought an immediate U.K. withdrawal of
its units to home bases; the United
Kingdom viewed such a formula for the
withdrawal period as imbalanced (since
Argentine forces would remain within
close range of the islands) and as re-
moving a necessary deterrent to Argen-
tine violation of the terms of an agree-
ment. Argentina sought drafting of the
negotiation mandate to emphasize de-
colonization and the principle of terri-
torial integrity with the mainland and
resisted references to a right of self-
determination on the part of the island-
ers which were desired by the United
Kingdom. Argentina, in light of the long
history of prior talks with the United
Kingdom, took the position that the
mandate had to be placed under a firm
and short deadline date.

Both sides shared an evaluation that
provisions on interim arrangements and
the framework for reaching a definitive
settlement were interlinked elements of
the negotiation, each prepared to be
flexible in one area for gains in the
other.

The three principle initiatives are
discussed below, and the resulting texts
follow.

U.S. Proposal of April 27. The first
effort, that of Secretary Haig, culmi-
nated in a fairly detailed set of proposals
to the two parties on April 27. It was
based on the 3 strenuous weeks of con-
sultations he had held in London,
Buenos Aires, and Washington and our
best perception of what might ultimately
prove acceptable to each side. Its ap-
proach, and many of its elements, re-
appeared in subsequent proposals to and
by the two parties.

The U.S. draft memorandum of
agreement provided for an integral
cease-fire and withdrawal linkage. The
formula for providing for balanced with-
drawals proved troublesome in each of
the three negotiations, given the vastly
different geographic perspectives of each
side. The U.S. proposal resolved the
problem by a formula based on parity in
reinsertion time, rather than on conven-
tional but more difficult geographic with-
drawal distances. These commitments,
and that of nonreintroduction of forces
into the islands and defined surrounding
areas, were to be vei ified by the United
States.

The proposal called for immediate
steps to terminate simultaneously the
various economic and financial measures
each party had adopted and for the
United Kingdom to request termination
of similar measures taken by its allies.

Local self-government on the islands
was to be restored. The office of gover-
nor was to remain vacant, and its
powers exercised by the next-ranking
official, appointed by the United King-
dom. The local Executive and Legisla-
tive Councils were to be retained but
augmented by representation of the
small local Argentine resident population
by means of at least one representative
in each councO and by inclusion of two
Argentine Government representatives
in the upper. Executive Council. A
Special Interim Authority was to be
created, composed of a representative of
each side and of the United States. The
flags of each constituent country were to
be flown at its headquarters. The
authority was to have supervision over
island administration, exercised by
means of a veto power in the event the

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

authority, by majority vote, deemed an
act of the local government to be incon-
sistent with the agreement. In all other
cases, the authority was called upon to
ratify expeditiously all local decisions,
laws, and regulations.

The proposal called for decoloniza-
tion of the islands as the negotiation ob-
jective. This was framed in terms of re-
moving the islands from the list of non-
self-governing territories under Chapter
XI of the U.N. Charter. The potential
means were not limited, but the condi-
tions for their definitive status had to be
mutually agreed. The negotiation man-
date maintained neutrality on the com-
peting legal positions of the two sides,
noting that of each by short-hand refer-
ences to due regard for the rights of the
inhabitants and the principle of terri-
torial integrity. Reference was made to
relevant U.N. General Assembly resolu-
tions (which would include general de-
colonization resolutions and specific reso-
lutions on the subject of the Falklands/
Malvinas).

Foreshadowing the contact group
concept utilized in later proposals, the
U.S. formulation provided a role for the
Special Interim Authority to catalyze the
negotiations with recommendations to
the two sides, in particular on the sensi-
tive issues of how to take into account
the wishes of the islanders and the role
of the Falkland Islands Company. If the
negotiations did not prosper by the
deadline date (December 31, 1982), a
second phase of negotiations, under a
new 6-month target date, was to occur
in which the United States would act as
a mediator/conciliator to press for an
agreement.

With respect to contacts with the
mainland, the draft agreement stated a
principle of promotion and facilitation of
nondiscriminatory travel, commercial,
communications, and other links. The
proposal provided for recommendation
by the authority to the two governments
of specific measures on such matters and
for securing the views of the local coun-
cils on the recommendations. These pro-
visions were balanced by an obligation to
respect the traditional rights and guar-
antees of the islanders.

The United Kingdom, which had not
yet landed on the Falklands/Malvinas or
suffered any serious combat losses,
found the proposal difficult but was will-
ing to give it "serious consideration."
This was the only time the United King-
dom considered a proposal to cover the
South Georgia and South Sandwich de-
pendencies, as well as the Falklands/
Malvinas (sensitivity to the implications
of use of the English and Spanish names

for the islands resulted in the U.S. pro-
posal defining the island groups by co-
ordinates).

Despite many attractive features for
the Argentines, the Argentine Foreign
Minister replied on April 29 that the
Government of Argentina could not ac-
cept the formulation since it gave them
neither eflfective interim control nor
assurances of obtaining sovereignty as a
result of the negotiation process.

Peni-U.S. Proposal. At the initia-
tive of the President of Peru, and with
our cooperation, another effort was
launched, culminating on May 5 with a
more skeletal proposal, limited in geo-
graphic scope to the Falklands/Malvinas.
A cease-fire and withdrawal of forces
were inseparably linked, but all imple-
menting detail was to be deferred for
decision by a contact group composed of
representatives of Brazil, Peru, the
Federal Republic of Germany, and the
United States.

The contact group was to verify the
military provisions of an agreement. It
would assume administration of the
government of the islands in consulta-
tion with the elected representatives of
the islanders and insure that no actions
were taken inconsistent with the agree-
ment. All details on implementation of
administration— financial questions, ap-
plicable law, administrative, legal and
appointive links to Britain, the role of
the councils, the exercise of powers of
the office of governor— were to be de-
ferred for later decision by the contact
group. The result conceivably might
have paralleled the U.S. proposal once
elaborated, but the door was open to
other variations of third-party admini-
stration and the role to be played there-
under by the existing local institutions.
The existence of the parties' differ-
ing legal positions was noted; the pro-
posal also included an acknowledgment
that the "aspirations and interests" of
the islanders were to be "included" in a
definitive settlement.

Finally, the contact group assumed a
responsibility to attempt to insure that
the two governments reached a negoti-
ated agreement on the future of the
islands by April 30, 1983. Again, the
detail of modalities for the negotiation,
and the role and procedures of the con-
tact group in facilitating a result, were
deferred for later decision. The negotia-
tion formula was neutral but included a
deadline date as Argentina desired.

The United Kingdom indicated that
it was willing to give this proposal
serious consideration; Argentina, after
the initiation of talks under the auspices

of the U.N. Secretary General, preferred
to shift the focus of negotiations to New
York.

U.N. Negotiations. With continued
change in the military situation and,
from the United Kingdom's perspective,
in the wake of failure to secure agree-
ment on the basis of substantial conces-
sions reflected in the U.S. and Peruvian
proposals, the positions of both sides
hardened in a number of respects as evi
denced by the texts each side publicly
released at the breakdown of these talk
in late May.

Both sides accepted the concept of ;
U.N. administration with generally
defined authority. This formulation re-
flected a substantial concession by the
United Kingdom on maintenance of ad-
ministrative links to Britain in favor of
local self-rule under U.N. supervision.
Again, critical details would have had t
be defined in implementing agreements
or by U.N. Security Council resolution.
U.N. verification of military disengage- frf
ment provisions was also accepted by
both sides in principle, as well as the
auspices of the U.N. Secretary General P
to conduct the negotiations. F

The publicly released positions per- ju(
mitted identification of very limited
other common ground. The United Kin,
dom sought to subject a U.N. admini-
stration to local law and practices "in
consultation with" the islands' repre-
sentative institutions, which Argentina
resisted. Argentina sought immediate,
expanded access to the islands, which
the United Kingdom would not accept
for fear that the population and char-
acter of the islands might be unilateral
altered during the interim period. Ar- _
gentina desired a firm deadline for neg '^,
tiation to be followed, if necessary, by
reference of the dispute to the U.N.
General Assembly for decision; the
United Kingdom rejected recourse to t
General Assembly and continued to coi
sider a rigid timetable unrealistic. On
these and other points (e.g., extent of
geographical coverage, military with-
drawal details, self-determination refer
ences), the two sides ended far apart.
The Secretary General made last-
minute proposals to the two sides befoi
the talks unraveled. Prime Minister
Thatcher, as events overtook these sug
gestions, simply noted that Argentina
could not possibly have accepted them.
We are unaware of any formal Argen-
tine response. To our knowledge, the
content of these suggestions was not
publicly released.

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Department of State Buiietii,

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Subsequent Developments. The

Jnited Kingdom and Argentine texts
abled at the conclusion of the Secretary
General's first round of negotiations re-
nain the final textual elaboration of
heir views on settlement issues. There
bllowed efforts in the Security Council

0 negotiate a resolution that would sub-
ititute for an agreement, notably involv-
ng a useful Brazilian draft text. None
vas the subject of intensive substantive
legotiation. These efl^orts culminated in

'^ he Security Council's adoption on
llay 26 of Resolution 505, which asked
he Secretary General to renew his good
)ffices to secure a cease-fire; and in the
J.K.-U.S. veto on June 4 of a Spanish/
-"anamanian draft resolution that sought

1 cease-fire and implementation of the
)revious Security Council resolutions,
mder verification of the Secretary
jeneral but with inadequate detail on
vithdrawal procedures and other ele-
nents to serve as a mutually agreeable
■ehicle for settlement of the conflict.

''ossible Role for

he International Court of Justice

''he focus of U.N. General Assembly
esolutions on the subject, the efforts of
oth countries over 16 years, and of the
peacemaking efforts in the spring was
n a negotiated settlement of the dis-
lUte.

The U.S. Government is committed
0 the use of the International Court of
ustice to resolve legal disputes, consis-
ent with Article 36(3) of the U.N.
Charter. The submission to a Chamber
f the Court of our differences with
Canada over delimitation of a maritime
oundary in the Gulf of Maine is a con-
rete example. The dispute on sovereign-
y over the Falklands/Malvinas is an
3sue which the Court could appropriate-
/ decide. U.S. negotiators this spring
aised this matter with both sides.
Jeither has ever indicated a willingness
0 have recourse to the Court over the
'alklands/Malvinas. The case does not
all within the compulsory jurisdiction of
he Court, and the agreement of both
arties is thus necessary to submit the
oijase for binding decision.

The United Kingdom on two occa-
ions since World War II sought to sub-
nit to the Court the related dispute on
overeignty over the South Georgia and
louth Sandwich Island dependencies,
lut Argentina did not agree to do so.

The United States continues to be-
ieve that a peaceful solution to this
Dngstanding controversy is required,
onsistent with the U.N. Charter obliga-

tions of both parties, and it may be that
possible use of the Court vnll be recon-
sidered among the other possible settle-
ment options, including renewed negoti-
ations, that would be consistent with Ar-
ticle 33 of the Charter.

U.S. PROPOSALS,
APRIL 27, 1982

His Excellency

Estanislao Valdes Otero

President of the Twentieth Meeting

of Consultation of Ministers of

Foreign Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Excellency:

In light of interest expressed by pro-
posals made to the Government of Argentina
and Great Britain on April 27, 1982, by the
United States Government, I would like to
ask that you circulate the enclosed document
containing those proposals among the delega-
tions accredited to the Twentieth Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
Both English and Spanish texts are included.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my
highest consideration.

J. William Middendorf

Ambassador

Special Delegate

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

Preamble:

On the basis of United Nations Security
Council Resolution 502, and the will of the
Argentine Republic and of the United King-
dom to resolve the controversy which has
arisen between them, renouncing the use of
force, both Governments agree on the follow-
ing steps, which form an integrated whole:

PARAGRAPH 1

1. Effective on the signature of this
Agreement by both Governments, there shall
be an immediate cessation of hostilities.

PARAGRAPH 2

2. Beginning at 0000 hours local time of
the day after the day on which this Agree-
ment is signed, and pending a definitive set-
tlement, the Republic of Argentina and the
United Kingdom shall not introduce or deploy
forces into the zones (hereinafter, "zones"),
defined by circles of 150 nautical miles' radius
from the following coordinate points (herein-
after, "coordinate points"):

A) LAT. 5r40' S
LONG. 59°30' W

B) LAT. 54° 20' S
LONG. 36°40' W

C) LAT. 57° 40' S
LONG. 26°30' W

2.L Within 24 hours of the date of this
Agreement, the United Kingdom will suspend
enforcement of its "zone of exclusion" and
Argentina will suspend operations in the
same area.

2.2. Within 24 hours of the date of this
Agreement, Argentina and the United King-
dom will commence the withdrawal of their
forces in accordance with the following
details:

2.2.1. Within seven days from the
date of this Agreement, Argentina and the
United Kingdom shall each have withdrawn
one-half of their military and security forces
present in the zones on the date of this
Agreement, including related equipment and
armaments. Within the same time period, the
United Kingdom naval task force will stand
off at a distance equivalent to seven days'
sailing time (at 12 knots) from any of the co-
ordinate points, and Argentine forces that
have been withdrawn shall be placed in a con-
dition such that they could not be reinserted
with their equipment and armament in less
than seven days.

2.2.2. Within fifteen days from the
date of this Agreement, Argentina shall re-
move all of its remaining forces from the
zones and redeploy them to their usual
operating areas or normal duties. Within the
same period, the United Kingdom shall like-
wise remove all of its remaining forces from
the zones and shall redeploy such forces and
the naval task force and submarines to their
usual operating areas or normal duties.

2.3. In accordance with its letter of ac-
ceptance of even date, the United States shall
verify compliance with the provisions of this
paragraph, and the two Governments agree
to cooperate fully with the United States in
facilitating this verification.

PARAGRAPH 3

3. From the date of this Agreement, the
two Governments will initiate the necessary
procedures to terminate simultaneously, and
without delay, the economic and financial
measures adopted in connection with the cur-
rent controversy, including restrictions re-
lating to travel, transportation, communica-
tions, and transfers of funds between the two
countries. The United Kingdom at the same
time shall request the European Community
and third countries that have adopted similar
measures to terminate them.

PARAGRAPH 4

4. The United Kingdom and Argentina
shall each appoint and the Ignited States has
indicated its agreement to appoint, a repre-
sentative to constitute a Special Interim
Authority (hereinafter "the Authority") which
shall verify compliance with the obligations in
this Agreement (with the exception of para-
graph 2), and undertake such other responsi-
bilities as are assigned to it under this Agree-
ment or the separate Protocol regarding the
Authority signed this date. Each representa-
tive may be supported by a staff of not more
than ten persons on the islands.

^fa

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

PARAGRAPH 5

5.1. Pending a definitive settlement, ail
decisions, laws and regulations hereafter
adopted by the local administration on the
islands shall be submitted to and expeditious-
ly ratified by the Authority, except in the
event that the Authority deems such deci-
sions, laws or regulations to be inconsistent
with the purposes and provisions of this
agreement or its implementation. The tradi-
tional local administration shall continue, ex-
cept that the Executive and Legislative
Councils shall be enlarged to include:

(A) two representatives appointed by the
Argentine Government to serve in the Execu-
tive Council; and

(B) representatives in each Council of the
Argentine population whose period of resi-
dence on the islands is equal to that required
of others entitled to representation, in pro-
portion to their population, subject to there
being at least one such representative in each
Council, Such representatives of the resident
Argentine population shall be nominated by
the Authority.

The flags of each of the constituent
members of the Authority shall be flown at
its headquarters.

5.2. Pending a definitive settlement,
neither Government shall take any action
that would be inconsistent with the purpose
and provisions of this Agreement or its im-
plementation.

PARAGRAPH 6

6.1. Pending a definitive settlement,
travel, transportation, movement of persons
and, as may be related thereto, residence and
ownership and disposition of property, com-
munications and commerce between the
mainland and the islands shall, on a non-
discriminatory basis, be promoted and facili-
tated. The Authority shall propose to the two
Governments for adoption appropriate
measures on such matters. Such proposals
shall simultaneously be transmitted to the
Executive and Legislative Councils for their
views. The two (Jovernments undertake to
respond promptly to such proposals. The
Authority shall monitor the implementation
of all such proposals adopted.

6.2. The provisions of paragraph 6.1 .shall
in no way prejudice the rights and guarantees
which have heretofore been enjoyed by the
inhabitants on the islands, in particular rights
relating to freedom of opinion, religion, ex-
pression, teaching, movement, property,
employment, family, customs, and cultural
ties with countries of origin.

PARAGRAPH 7

7. December 31, 1982 will conclude the
interim period during which the two Govern-
ments shall complete negotiations on removal
of the islands from the list of Non-Self-
Governing Territories under Chapter XI of
the United Nations Charter and on mutually
agreed conditions for their definitive status,

including due regard for the rights of the in-
habitants and for the prirjciple of territorial
integrity, in accordance with the purposes
and principles of the United Nations Charter,
and in light of the relevant Resolutions of the
United Nations General Assembly. The nego-
tiations hereabove referred to shall begin
within fifteen days of the signature of the
present Agreement.

PARAGRAPH 8

8. In order to assist them in bringing
their negotiations to a mutually satisfactory
settlement by the date stipulated in the pre-
ceding paragraph, the Authority shall, after
consultation with the Executive Council,
make specific proposals and recommendations
as early as practicable to the two Govern-
ments, including proposals and recommenda-
tions on:

8.1. The manner of taking into ac-
count the wishes and interests of the
islanders, insofar as islands with a settled
population are concerned, based on the
results of a sounding of the opinion of the in-
habitants, with respect to such issues relating
to the negotiations, and conducted in such
manner, as the Authority may determine;

8.2. Issues relating to the develop-
ment of the resources of the islands, in-
cluding opportunities for joint cooperation
and the role of the Falkland Islands Com-
pany; and

8.3. Such other matters as the two
Governments may request, including possible
arrangements for compensation of islanders,
or matters on which the Authority may wish
to comment in light of its experience in
discharging its responsibilities under this
Agreement.

8.4. The Governments have agreed on
the procedure in sub-paragraph 8.1 without
prejudice to their respective positions on the
legal weight to be accorded such opinion in
reaching a definitive settlement.

PARAGRAPH 9

9. Should the Governments nonetheless
be unable to conclude the negotiations by
December 31, 1982, the United States has in-
dicated that, on the request of both CJovern-
ments, it would be prepared at such time to
seek to resolve the dispute within six months
of the date of the request by making specific
proposals for a settlement and by directly
conducting negotiations between the (Govern-
ments on the basis of procedures that it shall
formulate. The two Governments agree to re-
spond within one month to any formal pro-
posals or recommendations submitted to
them by the United States.

PARAGRAPH 10

10. 'I'his Agreement shall enter into force
on the date of signature.

ARGENTINE NOTE OF
MAY 28, 1982, AND LETTER
OF APRIL 29, 1982

May 28, 19

Mr. President of the

Twentietli Meeting of Consultation

of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

D. ESTANISLAO VALDES OTERO

Mr. President:
1 have the honor to address Your Excellenc f
with respect to the document of this Meetir
of Consultation bearing the title "Texts of t
Proposals for Agreement Made by the
Government of the United States to the
Governments of Argentina and of the Unitt
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland" (doc. 74/82), to present a copy of t
letter that, in my capacity as Minister of
Foreign Affairs and Worship of the Argen-
tine Republic, I sent on April 29, 1982, to
Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Jr., in-
forming him of the Argentine Government'
views on the proposals for agreement made
by the Government of the United States.

In making known this reply, the Argen
tine Government wishes to state, as the at
tached letter shows, that at no time did it
term unacceptable the proposals of the
United States Secretary of State. Instead i
objection was directed primarily at certain
specific points, including some changes tha
had been made in the document compared
previous drafts, and it suggested that othe
formulas be sought. It added that if "Arge
tina's position were encompassed, agreemt
would be facilitated enormously and the fit
text of the document would not pose any
insurmountable problems."

The Argentine Government wishes thi
important point to be made clear, in view
the statements that have been made in th(
sessions of the General Committee of this
Meeting of Consultation, which were ratifi
by circulation of the document cited.

I request that this note with its attach
ment be distributed immediately as an offi ^J
document of the Twentieth Meeting of Co
sulfation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed
assurances of my highest consideration.

Nic.ANDR Costa Men

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Wor

of the Argentine Repi

Attached: copy of the letter from the
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship t
the Argentine Republic Dr. Nicanor Costa
Mendez

oes

April 29,

Wo
»•»]

ostisr
h

lbs I)

Dear Mr. Secretary of State:
We have carefully reviewed the documen
you sent us and have compared it with on j^
previous proposals and with the viewpoin
we have maintained in our various meetir
From that review, significant differences
have emerged, some of which give rise to
difficulties that it is essential to overcome
As my (k)vemment has already state
you, the objective the Argentine Govemn

->t r\( Qfo»o Dull

tifso
rttit

liityl

IkiUj,

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

las set is recognition of its sovereignty over
he Malvinas Islands. This central element of
)ur discussions is the ultimate justification of
;he actions taken by my country, and as I
lave had occasion to tell you many times,
institutes for us an unrenounceable goal.

Along with the question of sovereignty,
;he current crisis gives rise immediately to
he need to establish a provisional regime for
idministration of the islands, as an essential
itep in the process of separating the two
nilitary forces and as a reasonable pause in
he face of the logical impossibility of forma-
izing their final fate at this time.

The conversations we have held have
)een based primarily on these two ques-
ions— recognition of sovereignty and a provi-
jonal administrative regime. Solution of the
emaining problems will be simpler if there is
igreement on the two points that I have just
nentioned.

The one certain thing is that the two are
ntimately connected to each other. To the
xtent that the provisions relating to the
ecognition of our sovereignty are imprecise,
or us it is necessary— if we do not want to
etum to the frustrating situation that pre-
ailed before April 2— to establish mecha-
isms that give us broader powers in admini-
tration of the islands.

On the other side of the coin, if it were
lear that Argentina's sovereignty would be
ecognized in the end, then we could be more
exible regarding the matter of temporary
dministration.
* The document sent by the Secretary of
tate falls short of Argentine demands and
' f oes not satisfy its minimal aspirations for
ither of the two points. To the contrary, un-

iivorable changes have been made to both,
he number of Argentine representatives in-
olved in administration of the islands has
> een decreased, and the opportunity of ex-
anding my country's control in the event
lat negotiations on the basic issue go on
■ ndlessly without a solution has been barred,
hus we are faced with the real possibility of
tablishing a predominantly British admini-
^^rration with no fixed expiration date.

As concerns the matter of sovereignty,
le concept of territorial integrity has been
Gripped of all meaning. Further, the new ele-
lent of a virtual referendum to determine
le "wishes" of the inhabitants has been in-
oduced in open opposition to United Na-
ons Resolution 2065 and the unwavering
osition sustained by Argentina.

The Secretary knows that we cannot ac-
spt these changes. In my opinion, other for-
lulas must be found. For this effort, we will
Iways be at the disposal of the Secretary,
hese formulas should provide for the
alance that I referred to above in order to
eigh properly the data relating to the mat-
!r of sovereignty against the provisions
sgulating temporary administration of the
Jands. These provisions should have a fixed
rm and include gradually larger Argentine
arJarticipation or, in lieu of this, the provisions
hould be made precise enough to offer
scurity for recognition of Argentina's rights
ithin a specific period.

)ctober1982

If Argentina's position were encom-
passed, agreement would be facilitated enor-
mously and the final text of the document
would not pose any insurmountable problems.

Thank you once again for your arduous
and difficult negotiations.

Accept, Mr. Secretary, the renewed as-
surances of my highest consideration.

NicANOR Costa Mendez

His Excellency
Alexander Haig, Jr.
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

PERU-U.S. PROPOSAL,
MAY 5, 1982

Draft Interim Agreement on the
Falkland/Malvinas Islands

1. An immediate ceasefire, concurrent with:

2. Mutual withdrawal and non-reintroduc-
tion of forces, according to a schedule to be
established by the Contact Group.

3. The immediate introduction of a Con-
tact Group composed of Brazil, Peru, The
Federal Republic of Germany and the United
States into the Falkland Islands, on a tem-
porary basis pending agreement on a defini-
tive settlement. The Contact Group will
assume responsibility for:

(A) Verification of the withdrawal;

(B) Ensuring that no actions are taken
in the Islands, by the local administration,
which would contravene this interim agree-
ment; and

4. Britain and Argentina acknowledge the
existence of differing and conflicting views
regarding the status of the Falkland Islands.

5. The two Governments acknowledge
that the aspirations and interests of the
Islanders will be included in the definitive
settlement of the status of the Islands.

6. The Contact Group will have responsi-
bility for ensuring that the two Governments
reach a definitive agreement prior to

April 30, 1983.

BRITISH GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT,
MAY 21, 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS: NEGOTIATIONS
FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

Argentine Aggression

1. It is now almost seven weeks since Argen-
tina invaded the Falkland Islands. This un-
lawful use of force in unprovoked aggression
threatened not only to destroy the democratic
way of life freely chosen by the Falkland
Islanders but also the basis on which interna-

tional order rests. The inva.sion was also a
singular act of bad faith: it took place when
Britain and Argentina were engaged in ne-
gotiations in accordance with requests from
the United Nations.

2. On 1 April the President of the United
Nations Security Council had formally ap-
pealed to Argentina not to invade the Falk-
land Islands. Yet on 2 April Argentina invad-
ed. On 3 April the United Nations Security
Council passed its mandatory Resolution 502,
demanding a cessation of hostilities and an
immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces
from the Islands. The same day, Argentina
took South Georgia. In the ensuing weeks she
has shown no sign of complying with the
Security Council Resolution: on the contrary,
she has continued a massive build up of the
occupying forces on the Falkland Islands.
There could hardly be a clearer demonstra-
tion of disregard for international law and for
the United Nations itself.

The British Response

3. Britain need have done nothing more than
rest on the mandatory Resolution of the
Security Council Indeed, Britain's inherent
right of self-defence under Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter would have justified
the Government in adopting a purely military
policy for ending the crisis. But, in pursuit of
a peaceful settlement, Britain adopted a
policy, frequently explained by the Govern-
ment in Parliament, of building up pressure
on Argentina.

Military pressure was exerted by the
rapid assembly and despatch of the British
Naval Task Force. Diplomatic pressure, first
expressed in Security Council Resolution 502,
was built up by the clear statements of con-
demnation of Argentine aggression which
were made by many countries across the
world. It was widely recognised that aggres-
sion could not be allowed to stand, since
otherwise international peace and order
would be dangerously prejudiced in many
regions. The members of the European Com-
munity, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and
Norway joined Britain in rapidly imposing
economic measures against Argentina.

Efforts for a Negotiated Settlement

4. Britain dedicated her maximum diplomatic
efforts to the search for a negotiated solution,
and the Government kept Parliament as fully
informed as the confidentiality of difficult
negotiations would allow. Efforts for an in-
terim agreement to end the crisis were first
undertaken by the United States Secretary of
State, Mr Alexander Haig. His ideas for an
interim agreement were discussed repeatedly
with Argentina and Britain. The Government
expressed their willingness to consider Mr
Haig's final proposals, although they pre-
sented certain real difficulties. Argentina re-
jected them. The next stage of negotiations
was based on proposals originally advanced
by President Belaunde of Peru and modified
in consultations between him and the United
States Secretary of State. As the Foreign
and Commonwealth Secretary informed

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Parliament on 7 May, Britain was willing to
accept the final version of these proposals for
an interim agreement. But Argentina re-
jected it.

5. Since then, the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, Senor Perez de Cuellar,
has been conducting negotiations with Bri-
tain, represented by our Permanent Repre-
sentative at the United Nations, Sir Anthony
Parsons, and Argentina, represented by the
Deputy Foreign Minister, Senor Ros. In these
negotiations, as in earlier ones, Britain made
repeated efforts to establish whether Argen-
tina was willing to be sufficiently flexible to
make a reasonable interim agreement possi-
ble. But it became increasingly clear that
Argentina was not seeking an agreement but
was playing for time in the negotiation in the
hope of holding on to the fruits of aggression,
with all that this would imply for the interna-
tional rule of law. There was an important
meeting of British Ministers, attended by Sir
Anthony Parsons and the British Ambassador
in Washington, Sir Nicholas Henderson on
Sunday 16 May. On the following day, Sir
Anthony Parsons returned to New York and
handed to the United Nations Secretary-
General two documents:

• A draft interim agreement between
Britain and Argentina which set out the
British position in full,

• A letter to the Secretary-General mak-
ing clear the British position that the Falk-
land Islands dependencies were not covered
by the draft interim agreement.

6. Sir Anthony Parsons made clear to the
Secretary-General that the draft agreement
represented the furthest that Britain could go
in the negotiations. He requested that the
Secretary-General should give the draft to
the Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister. The
Secretary-General did this, and asked for a
response within two days. Argentina's first
response to the Secretary-General, late on

18 May, was equivocal and contained points
known to be unacceptable to the United
Kingdom. Early on 19 May, Sir Anthony Par-
sons pointed this out to the Secretary-
General and requested that Argentina's final
position should be conveyed within the two
day period originally set for a reply to the
British draft agreement.

7. Argentina's response, which HMG re-
ceived late on 19 May, represented a harden-
ing of the Argentine position and amounted
to a rejection of the British proposals.

Britain's Fundamental Principles
in Negotiations

8. The Government's approach in all the
negotiations has been based on important
principles, which ministers have set out re-
peatedly in Parliament;

A. International Law; Argentina's unlaw-
ful aggression must end and Security Council
Resolution 502 must be implemented. Ag-
gression must not be rewarded, or small
countries across the world would feel threat-
ened by neighbours with territorial ambitions.

B. Freedom: The Falkland Islanders are
used to enjoying free institutions. The execu-
tive and legislative councils were established
with their agreement and functioned with
their participation. Britain insisted that any
interim administration in the Falkland
Islands must involve democratically elected
representatives of the Islanders, so as to
enable the latter to continue to participate in
the administration of their affairs and to en-
sure that they could express freely their
wishes about the future of the Islands, in ac-
cordance with the principle of self-determina-
tion.

C. Sovereignty: Britain has no doubt of
her sovereignty over the Falkland Islands,
having administered them peacefully since
1833. Nevertheless, successive British
Governments have been willing, without prej-
udice, to include the question of sovereignty
in negotiations with Argentina about the
future of the Falkland Islands. In the recent
negotiations, the Government have been will-
ing that an interim agreement should provide
for new negotiations about the future of the
Islands, which likewise could discuss sover-
eignty in good faith, so long as there was no
prejudgement as to the outcome of negotia-
tions. Although Argentina seemed, at one
point in the United Nations Secretary-
General's negotiations, to be accepting a for-
mula about not pre-judging the outcome of
future negotiations, she continued to insist on
other provisions nmning counter to this, thus
casting grave doubt on the seriousness of this
acceptance. This doubt was reinforced by
repeated public statements by Argentine
leaders.

9. Britain upheld these principles in the
draft agreement which we presented on

17 May to the United Nations Secretary-
General:

• The agreement provided for complete
Argentine withdrawal from the Falkland
Islands within 14 days, thus terminating the
aggression and upholding international law.

• It provided that the legislative and ex-
ecutive councils representing the Falkland
Islanders would continue in existence and be
consulted by the UN interim administrator,
thus maintaining the democratic structure of
the administration.

• It provided explicitly that the outcome
of negotiations about the future of the
Islands was not prejudged, thus safeguarding
the British position on sovereignty. Britain,
in participating in those negotiations, would
have been guided by the wishes of the
Islanders.

10. In the Secretary-General's negotia-
tions, Britain has insisted that the Falkland
Islands dependencies should not be covered
by an interim agreement to end the crisis.
South Georgia and the South Sandwich
Islands are geographically distant from the
Falkland Islands themselves. They have no
settled population. The British title to them,
of which the Government have no doubt, does
not derive from the Falkland Islands, and
these territories have been treated as de-
pendencies of the Falkland Islands only for
reasons of administrative convenience.

11. Throughout the negotiations, Britain
has been firm on the essential principles but
willing to negotiate on matters where these
principles were not breached. In particular:

A. In return for Argentine withdrawal
from the Falkland Islands, Britain was will-
ing (Article 2(3)) (see following annex] to
withdraw her task force to a distance of 150
nautical miles. She was also willing to have
international verification (Article 6(4)) of the
mutual withdrawal, in which the United Na-
tions might have made use of surveillance aii
craft from third countries.

B. Britain was wdlling that the exclusion
zones (Article 3) declared by herself and
Argentina, and the economic measures (Arti
cle 5) introduced during the present crisis,
should be lifted from the moment of cease-
fire, although these actions would give more
comfort to Argentina than to Britain.

C. Britain was prepared to accept the aj
pointment of a UN Administrator (Article
6(3)) to administer the government of the
Falkland Islands. Britain wanted him to dis
charge his functions in consultation with the
representative institutions in the islands— th
legislative and executive councils— which
have been developed in accordance with the
terms of Article 73 of the UN Charter. (Thi;
makes clear that the interests of the inhabi-
tants of non-self-goveming territories are
paramount and refers to the need to take dt
account of the political aspirations of the
peoples.) It is inconceivable that Britain, or
any other democratic country, could accept
that her people should be deprived of their
democratic rights. Britain was nevertheless
willing to accept that one representative fr<
the Argentine population of the Islands (soi
30 people out of 1800) should be added to
each of the councils.

Additionally, Britain was willing to acc<
the presence of up to 3 Argentine observer
on the Islands in the interim period.

D. Britain was willing (Article 7) to agr
to re-establishment of communications,
travel, transport, postage, etc, between the
Falkland Islands and the Argentine mainlai |tts
on the basis existing before the invasion.

E. Britain was wrilling to enter into
negotiations (Article 8) under the auspices
the UN Secretary-General for a peaceful se
tlement of the dispute with Argentina abot
the Falkland Islands and to seek the compl
tion of these negotiations by the target dat
of 31 December 1982. Our position was tha
no outcome to the negotiations should be
either excluded or predetermined.

12. Argentina's final position in the
negotiations speaks for itself. In particular

A. Argentina insisted that South Georg
and the South Sandwich Islands be coverec
by the interim agreement. One effect of th
would be that British forces would have to
withdraw from the British territory of Sou
Georgia.

B. Argentina wanted thirty days for th ttmi
completion of the withdrawal of forces. Sh fe*
wanted all forces to return to their normal fii
bases and areas of operation, thus requirin
British forces to be enormously further aw
than Argentine ones.

ltd

Department of State Bulle

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

C. Argentina wanted the administration
the Islands to be exclusively the responsi-

lity of the United Nations. There would
ive been Argentine and British observers,
le administration would have been free to
ipoint advisers from the population of the
lands, in equal numbers from the Argentine
pulation and from the population of British
igin. The flags of Britain and Argentina
3uld have flown together with that of the
lited Nations.

D. Argentina wanted free access for her
.tionals to the Islands, with respect inter

a to residence, work and property. Argen-
la also opposed a provision in the British
aft agreement (end of Article 6(3)) but the
V Administrator exercising his powers in
nformity with the laws and practices tradi-
inally observed in the Islands. It was evi-
nt that Argentina hoped to change the
ture of Falklands society and its demo-
aphic make-up in the interim period, and
as prejudge the future.

E. Argentina proposed a formula about
gotiations on the future of the Islands
lich stated that they should be 'initiated'
thout prejudice to the rights and claims

d positions of the two parties. Argentina
>uld not accept an additional phrase stating
o that the outcome would not be pre-
Iged. Argentine leaders continued in public
say that Argentina insisted on having sov-
'ignty. In the negotiations Argentina also
listed a provision in the British draft (be-
ining of Article 9) which would have en-
•ed that the interim arrangements should
y in place until a definitive agreement
5Ut the future of the Islands could be im-
mented. Argentina's evident aim in resist-
; this was that, if no definitive agreement
i been reached by the target date of 31
cember 1982, the interim administration
uld cease to exist and a vacuum be created
ich Argentina could hope to fill.

13. The present crisis was brought about
Argentina's unlawful act of aggression. In
•ir subsequent attitude the Argentine
vernment showed that they had no respect
ner for democratic principles or for the
e of law. Britain stands firmly for both.

4NEX— FALKLAND ISLANDS:
lAFT INTERIM AGREEMENT

i Government of the Republic of Argen-
i and the Government of the United
igdom of Great Britain and Northern
land, responding to Security Council
rgjsolution 502 (1982) adopted on 3 April
i2 under Article 40 of the Charter of the
ited Nations,

Having entered into negotiations through
,iii good offices of the Secretary-General of

United Nations for an interim agreement
li icerning the Falkland Islands (Islas
Ivinas), hereinafter referred to as 'The
inds'.

Having in mind the obligations with
:ard to non-self governing territories set

in Article 73 of the Charter of the United
tions, the text of which is annexed hereto.

Have agreed on the following;

:tober1982

Article 1

1 . No provision of this Interim Agreement
shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims
and positions of either party in the ultimate
peaceful settlement of their dispute over the
Islands.

2. No acts or activities taking place
whilst this Interim Agreement is in force
shall constitute a basis for asserting, suppor-
ting or denying a claim to territorial
sovereignty over the Islands or create any
rights of sovereignty over them.

Article 2

1. With effect from a specified time, 24
hours after signature of this Agreement
(hereinafter referred to as Time 'T'), each
party undertakes to cease and thereafter to
refrain from all firing and other hostile ac-
tions.

2. Argentina undertakes:

(A) To commence withdrawal of its
armed forces from the Islands with effect
from Time 'T';

(B) To withdraw half of its armed
forces to at least 150 nautical miles away
from any point in the Islands by Time 'T' plus
seven days; and

3. The United Kingdom undertakes:

(A) To commence withdrawal of its
armed forces from the Islands with effect
from Time 'T';

(B) To withdraw half of its armed
forces to at least 150 nautical miles away
from any point in the Islands by Time 'T' plus
seven days; and

Article 3

With effect from Time 'T', each party under-
takes to lift the exclusion zones, warnings
and similar measures which have been
imposed.

Article 4

On the completion of the steps for
withdrawal specified in Article 2, each party
undertakes to refrain from reintroducing any
armed forces into the Islands or within 150
nautical miles thereof.

Article 5

Each party undertakes to lift with effect
from Time 'T' the economic measures it has
taken against the other and to seek the lift-
ing of similar measures taken by third
parties.

Article 6

1. Immediately after the signature of the
present Agreement, Argentina and the
United Kingdom shall jointly sponsor a draft
resolution in the United Nations under the
terms of which the Security Council would
take note of the present Agreement,
acknowledge the role conferred upon the
Secretary-General of the United Nations

therein, and authorise him to carry out the
tasks entrusted to him therein.

2. Immediately after the adoption of the
resolution referred to in paragraph 1 of this
Article, a United Nations administrator,
being a person acceptable to Argentina and
the United Kingdom, shall be appointed by
the Secretary-General and will be the officer
administering the government of the Islands.

3. The United Nations administrator
shall have the authority under the direction
of the Secretary-General to ensure the con-
tinuing administration of the government of
the Islands. He shall discharge his functions
in consultation with the representative in-
stitutions in the Islands which have been
developed in accordance with the terms of
Article 73 of the Charter of the United Na-
tions, with the exception that one represent-
ative from the Argentina population normally
resident on the Islands shall be appointed by
the administrator to each of the two institu-
tions. The administrator shall exercise his
powers in accordance with the terms of this
Agreement and in conformity with the laws
and practices traditionally obtaining in the
Islands.

4. The United Nations administrator
shall verify the withdrawal of all armed
forces from the Islands, and shall devise an
effective method of ensuring their non-
reintroduction.

5. The United Nations administrator
shall have such staff as may be agreed by
Argentina and the United Kingdom to be
necessary for the performance of his func-
tions under this Agreement.

6. Each party may have no more than
three observers in the Islands.

Article 7

Except as may be otherwise agreed between
them, the parties shall, during the currency
of this Agreement, reactivate the Exchange
of Notes of 5 August 1971, together with the
Joint Statement on Communications between
the Islands and the Argentine mainland
referred to therein. The parties shall accord-
ingly take approp-iate steps to establish a
special consultative committee to carry out
the functions entrusted to the Special Con-
sultative Committee referred to in the Joint
Statement.

Article 8

The parties undertake to enter into negotia-
tions in good faith under the auspices of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations for
the peaceful settlement of their dispute and
to seek, with a sense of urgency, the comple-
tion of these negotiations by 31 December
1982. These negotiations shall be initiated
without prejudice to the rights, claims or
positions of the parties and without prejudge-
ment of the outcome.

Article 9

This Interim Agreement shall enter into force
on signature and shall remain in force until a
definitive agreement about the future of the
Islands has been reached and implemented by
the parties. The Secretary-General will im-
mediately communicate its text to the Securi-

ty Council and register it in accordance with
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Na-
tions.

ARGENTINE DIPLOMATIC NOTE
TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
MAY 26, 1982

The Embassy of the Argentine Republic
presents its compliments to the Department
of State and has the honor to inform, with
regard to the proposal of the United Nations
Secretary General referred to the conflict
over the Islas Malvinas and its dependencies,
the position of the Government of the Argen-
tine Republic was clearly stated in the Pro-
posed Agreement submitted in the course of
the negotiations held at the United Nations,
which text reads as follows;

"The Government of the Argentine
Republic and the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, hereinafter referred to as "the
Parties",

In response to the provisions of Security
Council Resolution 502 (1982) of April 3,
1982, and taking into account the Charter of
the United Nations, Resolution 1514 (XV)
2065 and other Resolutions of the General
Assembly on the question of the Malvinas
(Falkland) Islands, have accepted, in accord-
ance with Article 40 of the Charter of the
United Nations, the assistance of the
Secretary General of the United Nations and
have engaged in negotiations and arrived at
the following provisional agreement relating
to the Malvinas, South Georgia and South
Sandwich Islands, hereinafter referred to as
"The Islands" for the purposes of this agree-
ment.

I. 1. The geographical scope of the area
within which the withdrawal of troops is to
be carried out shall comprise the Malvinas,
South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands.

2. The withdrawal of the forces of both
parties shall be gradual and simultaneous.
Within a maximum period of thirty days, all
armed forces shall be in their normal bases
and areas of operation.

II. With effect from the signature of this
agreement, each party shall cease to apply
the economic measures which it has adopted
against the other and the United Kingdom
shall call for the same action by those coun-
tries or groups of countries which, at its re-
quest, adopted similar measures.

III. 1. Supervision of the withdrawal of
the forces of both countries shall be carried
out by specialized personnel of the United
Nations, whose composition shall be agreed
with the parties.

2. The interim Administration of the
Islands while the negotiations for final settle-
ment of the dispute are in progress shall con-
form to the following provisions:

A) The Administration shall be ex-
clusively the responsibility of the United Na-
tions with an appropriate presence of
observers of the parties.

B) The said Administration shall per-
form all functions (executive, legislative,
judicial and security) through officials of dif-
ferent nationality from that of the parties.

C) Notwithstanding the provisions of
2(A) and (B), and in order not to cause un-
necessary changes in the way of life of the
population during the period of the interim
Administration by the United Nations, local
judicial functions may be exercised in accord-
ance with the legislation in force on April 1 ,
1982 to the full extent compatible with this
agreement. Similarly, the United Nations in-
terim Administration may appoint as advisers
persons who are members of the population
of British origin and Argentines resident in
the Islands, in equal numbers.

D) The flag of the parties shall fly
together with that of the United Nations.

E) During the period of interim Ad-
ministration, communications shall be kept
open, without discriminatory restrictions of
any kind for the parties, including freedom of
movement and equality of access with respect
to residence, work and property.

F) Freedom of communication shall
also include the maintenance of freedom of
transit for the state airline (Lade) and for
merchant ships and scientific vessels, in addi-
tion, telephone, telegraph and telex com-
munications, Argentine television transmis-
sions and the state petroleum (YPF) and gas
services shall continue to operate freely.

IV. The customs, traditions and way of
life of the inhabitants of the Islands, and
their social and cultural links with their coun-
tries of origin, shall be respected and
safeguarded.

V. 1. The parties undertake to enter im-
mediately into negotiations in good faith
under the auspices of the Secretary General
of the United Nations for the peaceful and
final settlement of the dispute and. with a
sense of urgency, to complete these negotia-
tions by December 31, 1982, with a single op-
tion to extend until June 30, 1983, in order to
comply with the Charter of the United Na-
tions, Resolutions 1514 (XV), 2065 (XX) and
other relevant resolutions of the General
Assembly on the question of the Malvinas
Islands. These negotiations shall be initiated
without prejudice to the rights and claims or
positions of the two parties and in recogni-
tion of the fact that they have divergent posi-
tions on the question of the Malvinas, South
Georgia and South Sandwich Islands.

2. The negotiations shall be held in
New York.

3. The Secretary General of the United
Nations may be assisted in the negotiations
by a contract group composed of representa-
tives of four States members of the United
Nations. To that end, each party shall
nominate two States and shall have the right
to a single veto of one of the States
nominated by the other.

4. The Secretary General of the United
Nations shall keep the Security Council
assiduously informed of the progress of the
negotiations.

VI. If the period specified in point V(l)
above expires with out the attainement of a

TREATIES

final agreement, the Secretary (Jeneral shal W"
draw up a report addressed to the General
Assembly of the United Nations, in order
that the latter may determine, as appropria* H;
and with greater urgency, the lines to whid g
the said final agreement should conform in |j2
order to achieve a speedy settlement of the
question."

The Argentine Government, in the light "*"
of the position stated in the aforementioned *
proposed agreement, which reflects the
reasonableness which has continuously in
spired its negotiating behaviour, deeply
regrets that the peace efforts carried out tl' j
U.N. Secretary General, in which pursuanc4 '!
and final success the Argentine Republic
trusted, have been frustrated as a result of
the imilateral decision of the British Goven^dC
ment announced on May 20th.

The real possibilities of reaching a
peaceful settlement to the conflict and of
avoiding, with the responsibility that the
situation demanded, further bloodshed and
imminent breaking of peace and security in) k!
the hemisphere, finally proved to be
disregarded by the intransigence and stub-
bornness with which the Government of thn g
United Kingdom has tried to make the use
force prevail over reason and peace.

The Government of the Argentine
Republic, therefore, formally holds the
Government of the United Kingdom of Gre^
Britain and Northern Ireland responsible ft
the serious consequences which in the futui< nn
may stem from its denial to exhaust the
available means towards a peaceful settle-
ment, and expressly reserves its rights to i
legitimate defense recognized by the Unite
Nations Charter.

The Embassy of the Argentine Republi
avails itself of this opportimity to renew tc
the Department of State the assurances of
highest consideration.

•The complete transcript of the hearint
will be publisned by the committee and will
be avaikble from tne Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol on the authenic quadrilingual text
the convention on international civil aviatic
(TIAS 1.591), with annex. Done at Montrea
Sept. 30, 1977.'
Signature: Australia,^ Aug. 4, 1982.

Memorandum of understanding concerning
transatlantic scheduled service air fares, w
annexes. Done at Washington May 2, 1982
Entered into force Aug. 1, 1982, for Belgii
the F.R.G., France, Greece, Ireland, Italy.
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland.
U.K., U.S., and Yugoslavia.

ape

i{li

TREATIES

Isheries

invention for the conservation of salmon in
(e Ncirth Atlantic Ocean. Done at Reykjavik
tir. 2. 1982.1
atifii-.Uion deposited: Iceland, June 21,

jUritime Matters

yiiK'iiiiments to the convention of Mar. 6,
' ■■ IS amended, on the International

i;c Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285,
■ >ti06). Adopted at London Nov. 14,
Entered into force May 22, 1982, ex-
Dt for Art. 51 which entered into force
ly 28, 1982.
oclaimed by the President: Aug. 5, 1982.

■d Cross

Botocol additional to the Geneva conventions
oAug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364,
^35), and relating to the protection of vic-
8is of international armed conflicts (Pro-
•^ol I), with annexes. Adopted at Geneva
sjie 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7,
178.'

■^cessions deposited: Mauritius, Mar. 22,
%2: Zaire, June 3, 1982.

E itocol additional to the Geneva conventions
oAug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364,
^ '^). and relating to the protection of vic-
,- f noninternational armed conflicts (Pro-
• \ II). Adopted at Geneva June 8, 1977.
e tetfd into force Dec. 7, 1978.'
•5 -fssion deposited: Mauritius, Mar. 22,

libber

1: ernational natural rubber agreement,
■l.'9. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979. Entered
'l ) force definitively April 15, 1982.
- iclaimed by the President: July 23, 1982.

.IDG

_1 istitution of the U.N. Industrial Develop-
,1 at Organization, with annexes. Adopted at
"j nna Apr. 8, 1979.'
( ifications deposited: Haiti, Upper Volta,

re, July 9, 1982; Burundi, Aug. 9, 1982.

apons

ivention on prohibitions or restrictions on

use of certain conventional weapons

ch may be deemed to be excessively in-

ous or to have indiscriminate effects, with

lexed protocols. Adopted at Geneva

. 10, 1980.'

:ification and acceptances deposited:

■man Democratic Republic, July 20, 1982.

ights and Measures

ivention concerning the creation of an in-
national office of weights and measures,
ulations (Annex 1) and transient provi-
is (Annex 2), as amended. Signed at Paris
y 20, 1875. Entered into force Jan. 1,
6; for the U.S. Aug. 2, 1878. TS 378, TS
; 20 Stat. 709, 43 Stat. 1686.
:ession deposited: Korea, Dem. People's

3., May 7, 1982.

!tober1982

Whaling

International whaling convention and
schedule of whaling regulations, as amended.
Done at Washington Dec. 2, 1946. Entered
into force Nov. 10, 1948. TIAS 1849, 4228.
Notification of adherence deposited: Antigua
and Barbuda, July 21, 1982.

Wheat

1981 protocol for the sixth extension of the
wheat trade convention, 1971 (TIAS 7144).
Done at Washington March 24, 1981.
Entered into force July 1, 1981. TIAS 10350.
Ratifications deposited: France, Aug. 9,
1982; Venezuela, Aug. 16, 1982.

1981 protocol for the first extension of the
food aid convention 1980 (TIAS 10015). Done
at Washington March 24, 1981. Entered into
force July 1, 1981. TIAS 10351.
Ratification deposited: France, Aug. 9, 1982.

BILATERAL

Australia

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa-
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with
respect to taxes on income. Signed at Sydney
Aug. 6, 1982. Enters into force upon ex-
change of instruments of ratification.

China

Memorandum of understanding on the de-
velopment of bilateral tourism relations.
Signed at Beijing Aug. 5, 1982. Entered into
force Aug. 5, 1982.

Costa Rica

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, with memorandum of understand-
ing. Signed at San Jose Mar. 25, 1982.
Entered into force: Apr. 28, 1982.

El Salvador

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of
Jan. 22, 1981. Signed at San Salvador
Mar. 15, 1982.
Entered into force: Mar. 26, 1982.

France

Memorandum of understanding covering
cooperation in the field of geological sciences.
Signed at Orleans and Reston July 8 and 23,
1982. Entered into force July 23, 1982.

Iceland

Memorandum of understanding for scientific
and technical cooperation in earth sciences.
Signed at Reykjavik and Reston Jan. 28 and
Apr. 9, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 9,
1982.

Mexico

Agreement amending the agreement of
Nov. 9, 1972, as amended (TIAS 7697, 9436,
9647, 10159, 10234), concerning frequency
modulation broadcasting in the 88-108 MHz
band. Effected by exchange of notes at Mex-
ico and Tlatelolco Mar. 18 and July 2, 1982.
Entered into force July 2, 1982.

Agreement extending the agreement of
July 31, 1970, as amended and extended
(TIAS 6941, 7927), for a cooperative
meteorological observation program in Mex-
ico. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico
and Tlatelolco June 17 and July 16, 1982.
Entered into force July 16, 1982; effective
Aug. 1, 1982.

Netherlands

Arrangement concerning the installation and
support of a USAFE LORAN C/D transmit-
ter site, with annex. Signed at Ramstein and
The Hague May 17 and July 12, 1982.
Entered into force July 12, 1982.

Pakistan

Agreement concerning general security of
military information. Effected by exchange of
notes at Islamabad Apr. 6, June 21 and 24,
1982. Entered into force June 24, 1982.

Panama

Agreement concerning transfer of the Ancon
District Court (Building 310) from the U.S. to
Panama. Effected by exchange of notes at
Panama July 13, 1982. Entered into force
July 13, 1982.

Poland

Agreement extending the agreement of
Aug. 2, 1976 concerning fisheries off the
coast of the United States (TIAS 8524). Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Washington
May 20 and 24, 1982. Entered into force
July 27, 1982.

Sierra Leone

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of August
31, 1978 (TIAS 9210), with memorandum of
negotiations. Signed at Freetown July 28,
1982. Entered into force July 28, 1982.

Spain

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coast
of the U.S. with annexes and agreed minutes.
Signed at Washington July 29, 1982. Enters
into force on a date to be agreed upon by ex-
change of notes, following the completion of
internal procedures of both governments.

Sudan

Mutual defense assistance agreement. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Khartoum
Apr. 8 and 22, 1981. Entered into force
Apr. 22, 1981.

Agreement concerning the grant of defense
articles and services under the military
assistance program. Effected by exchange of
notes at Khartoum Aug. 24 and 30, 1981.
Entered into force Aug. 30, 1981.

U.S.S.R.

Agreement extending the agreement of
Nov. 26, 1976, as amended, concerning
fisheries off the coast of the U.S. (TIAS
8528). Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington Apr. 22 and 29, 1982.
Entered into force: August 6, 1982.

CHRONOLOGY

Yugoslavia

Agreement relating to the air transport
agreement of Dec. 15, 1977 (TIAS 9364), and
the nonscheduled air services agreement of
Sept. 27, 1973 (TIAS 7819, 9460), with
memorandum of understandings. Effected by
exchange of notes at Belgrade Mar. 1 7 and
May 19, 1982. Entered into force May 19,
1982; effective April 1, 1982.

Zaire

Agreement amending the agreement for sales
of agricultural commodities of Apr. 3, 1982.
Effected by exchange of notes at Kinshasa
June 21 and July 7, 1982. Entered into force
July 7, 1982.

Zambia

Agreement amending the agreement for sales
of agricultural commodities of June 20, 1982.
Signed at Lusaka July 16, 1982. Entered into
force July 16, 1982.

'Not in force.
^Subject to acceptance.
'Not in force for the U.S.

August 1982

August 1

Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi announces
the quelling of an attempted coup, the first
attempted military takeover in that country.
Responding to Israel's military strikes in
Beirut, the U.N. Security Council unanimous-
ly adopts Resolution 516 reaffirming and
recalling its earlier resolutions on Lebanon,
since the June 6 invasion, and demanding
that a new cease-fire be put immediately into
effect.

August 2

President Reagan tells Israel's Foreign
Minister that it is crucial that the violence
ends in order to stop the bloodshed and pro-
vide food and medical supplies to the civilian
population of west Beirut. Israel receives
renewed assurance from Ambassador Philip
Habib, the President's special emissary to the
Middle East, that the PLO has agreed in
principle to depart Beirut.

United Kingdom opposes Reagan Ad-
ministration embargo against providing U.S.
technology to Soviet Union for use in con-
structing a natural gas pipeline from Siberia
to Western Europe. This action follows
similar moves by France and Italy.

Soviet Foreign Ministry withdraws
credentials of U.S. journalist Andrew Nagor-
ski, a Nevisweek correspondent, causing his
departure from that country for allegedly
violating Soviet standards for covering news.
Nagorsky is accused of "passing himself off
as a Soviet newspaper editor and a Polish
tourist" and of traveling to a section of the
Soviet Union which is off limits to foreigners.
U.S. responds by expelling a Soviet jour-
nalist.

August 3-5

Meeting in Washington, U.S. and European
Community (EC) officials reach a preliminary
agreement that would limit EC exports of 1 1
steel products into the U.S. market over the
next 3 years.

August 4

In response to an Israeli attack on west
Beirut, President Reagan calls on Prime
Minister Begin to scrupulously observe a
cease-fire in place.

By a vote of 14 to 0, with 1 abstention
(U.S.), U.N. Security Council adopts Resolu-
tion 517 calling for an immediate cease-fire,
withdrawal of Israeli forces, censure of Israel
for failing to comply with Resolutions 508,
509, 512, 513, 515, and 516, and calling for
the return of Israeli troops to their August 1
positions.

August 5

Senior Lebanese officials report that the PLO
has submitted a new proposal, which includes
a timetable for the withdrawal of PLO forces
from west Beirut.

August 6

According to Lebanese officials, the PLO ac-
cepts all major points regarding the
withdrawal as negotiated by Ambassador
Habib.

U.S. vetoes draft resolution presented by
the Soviet Union to the U.N. Security Coun-
cil condemning Israel for "not implementing
Resolutions 516 (1982) and 517 (1982) and
calling for suspension of military aid to
Israel."

By a vote of 204-202, U.S. House of
Representatives backs the Administration's
arms control policy against proponents of an
immediate nuclear freeze. The resolution calls
on the U.S. and the Soviet Union to reduce
their nuclear weapons and conclude "an
equitable and verifiable agreement which
freezes strategic nuclear forces at equal and
substantially reduced levels." The nonbinding
measure requires no action on the part of the
President.

August 7

Following the Socialist Party's withdrawal of
support, Italy's coalition government, headed
by Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini, col-
lapses.

August 8

Ambassador Habib presents a departure plan
for the PLO from Beirut to Israeli Defense
Minister Ariel Sharon and returns to Beirut
to brief Lebanese leaders on the meeting.

August 9

U.S. formally presents to Israel a departure
plan for west Beirut which calls for a
multinational force to assist in facilitating the
withdrawal of PLO offices, leaders, and com-
batants from west Beirut.

U.S. Embassy in Damascus is attacked by
a crowd protesting the U.S. position on
Israel's invasion on Lebanon.

In Vienna, U.S. and West Germany sigp ,js
a "memorandum of understanding" to
establish a mission to study celestial objects
in space.

Second U.N. Conference on the Explora
tion and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(LINISPACE '82) is held in Vienna, Austria,
August 9-21. James Beggs, Administrator (
NASA, heads the U.S. delegation.

August 12

The Lebanese Government suspends negotis
tions after Israeli jets bomb west Beirut for
11 hours.

By unanimous vote, U.N. Security Coun
cil adopts Resolution 518 recalling its earlie:
resolutions since the June 6 invasion and "e
pressing its most serious concerns about
Israel's continued military activities in
Lebanon and particularly in and around
Beirut."

In a formal protest, the EC charges tha-
President Reagan's ban on pipeline equip-
ment sales to the Soviet Union is "an unac-
ceptable interference in European Economi
Community affairs." Key Western allies an-
nounce they will defy ban.

August 13

Berlin marks 21st anniversary of the Berlir
Wall.

Lebanon negotiations resume. PLO
leaders send Ambassador Habib a list of thi
guerrillas to leave Beirut and the Arab cou;
tries willing to accept them.

92.

August 15

Israeli Cabinet announces acceptance of pla
for the deployment of a multinational
peacekeeping force in Lebanon.

August 16

Ambassador Habib returns to Beirut from
Israel and briefs Prime Minister Wazzan oi
the Israeli concessions.

U.S. and China sign new communique-
August 16, and issue it August 17 — goverr
ing both countries' relations with Taiwan. I
the communique, China pledges to peaceful
seek reunification with 'Taiwan, and the U.I
promises to gradually reduce and not to ex
ceed current levels of arms sales to Taiwan

Liberian head of state and Commander
in-Chief, Samuel Kanyon Doe, makes officii
working visit to Washington, D.C., Au-
gust 16-19, 1982.

Salvador Jorge Blanco is sworn in as
President of the Dominican Republic. U.S.
delegation representing President Reagan
his inauguration include Ellsworth Bunker,
head of the delegation; Robert Anderson,
U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republ
Rep. Mickey Edwards of Oklahoma; Am-
bassador J. William Middendorf, II, Perma
nent Representative of the U.S. to the
Organization of American States; Thomas <
Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs; Otto J. Reich, Assi
ant Administrator of the Agency for Inten
tional Development; Weston Adams, memb
U.S. National Committee of UNESCO;
Edwin W. Thomas, Regional Administrate)

DsDartment of State Bullel

ipi

PRESS RELEASES

■ i 'III Services Administration; John Ellis
]-' [iresident, Intr-America Investments,
. Michael Cardenas, CPA/financial consul-
'!• , 1-resno, California; William C. Doherty,
< ::nve director, American Institute for
■ff Labor, and James P. Regan of Beverly
ills. California.

ujjust 18

;i\ iiiK approved the plan for deploring a
lultmational peacekeeping force to oversee
■e withdrawal of guerrillas from west
..'irut. the Lebanese Government asks the
j.S., France, and Italy to contribute troops
I the force.

igust 19

raeli Cabinet approves withdrawal plan for
destinian and Syrian forces in west Beirut.

iigust 20

•esident Reagan announces that agreement
IS been reached to end the west Beirut
isis and orders a force of 800 U.S. Marines
• participate in a multinational force to
militate the evacuation of FLO offices,
iders, and combatants from west Beirut.
With the current grain sales agreement
e to expire September 30, the Soviet Union
.cepts President Reagan's offer of a 1-year
■ • tension.

..Igust 21

' le first group of about 400 FLO combatants
' ' gin their departure from Lebanon by ship
r Cyprus. Elements of the French multina-
■nal force arrive in Beirut.

igust 23

ishir Gemayel is elected President of
■banon.

1. igust 25

ght-hundred combat-equipped U.S. Marines
' id in Lebanon as part of the multinational

rce facilitating the implementation of the
' parture plan.

: .Igust 26

"'. 'agan Administration orders trade sanc-
ns against a major French Government-
lu'ii company and the French subsidiary of

_, .Xriierican oil-equipment company for defy-
r the U.S. embargo against the delivery of
uipment for the Soviet-Western Europe
tural gas pipeline.

igust 30

isir Arafat, FLO chairman, departs Beirut
und for Greece. ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No. D«t» Subject

•233 8/2 Conventional arms transfers to
the Third World report
released.

234 8/2 Shultz; statement before the

Committee on Finance on
the Caribbean Basin.

235 8/3 U.S., Mexico implement new

visa agreement for
businessmen.

•236 8/3 Shipping Coordinating Com-
mittee (SCC), Subcommittee
on Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS), working group on
the carriage of dangerous
goods, Aug. 17.

•237 8/3 U.S. Organization for the In-
ternational Telegraph and
Telephone Consultative Com-
mittee (CCITT), message
handling systems working
party, Aug. 24.

•238 8/3 CCITT, integrated services
digital network, Aug. 26.

•239 8/3 CCITT, study group D,
Aug. 25.

•240 8/3 SCC, SOLAS, Sept. 8

•241 8/3 SCC, SOLAS, panel on bulk
cargoes, Sept. 15.

•242 8/5 U.S., Sri Lanka amend tex-
tile agreement, Apr. 20 and
29.

•243 8/6 CCITT, study group A,
Aug. 24.

•244 8/6 CCITT, modem working party,
study group D, Aug. 24.

•245 8/6 Advisory Committee on Inter-
national Investment,
Technology, and Develop-
ment, Sept. 14.

•246 8/12 U.S., Haiti sign textile agree-
ment, Mar. 25 and Apr. 1.
247 8/13 Foreign Relations of the

United States, 1952-1954,
Volume XIII: Indochina
released (in two parts),
Aug. 21.

•248 8/13 Program for the official work-
ing visit of Commander in
Chief Samuel Kanyon Doe of
Liberia, Aug. 16-21.

•249 7/29 George S. Vest sworn in as
Ambassador to the Euro-
pean Communities, Oct. 30,
1981 (bio. data).

•250 8/16 SCC, SOLAS, Sept. 8.

•251 8/16 CCITT and U.S. Organization
for the International Radio
Consultative Committee
(CCIR), Sept. 8.

•252 8/17 James Daniel Theberge sworn
in as Ambassador to Chile,
Mar. 4 (bio. data).

•253 8/17 Arthur H. Davis, Jr., sworn
in as Ambassador to
Paraguay, July 28 (bio.
data).

•254 8/17 Robert Werner Duemling

sworn in as Ambassador to
Suriname, July 29 (bio.
data).

•255 8/17 George W. Landau sworn in
as Ambassador to
Venezuela, July 30 (bio.
data).

•256 8/18 U.S., Sri Lanka amend textile
visa system, July 14 and 20.
257 8/20 Shultz: news conference.

•258 8/20 John Hughes sworn in as
Assistant Secretary for
Public Affairs and Depart-
ment spokesman (bio. data).

•259 8/23 Robert H. Phinny sworn in as
Ambassador to Swaziland
(bio. data).
260 8/24 Shultz: interview on "Meet
the Press," Aug. 22.

•261 8/26 U.S., Canada extend tele-
communications arrange-
ment to transborder fixed
satellite services.

•262 8/26 Regional Foreign PoHcy Con-
ference, Los Angeles,
Sept. 10.

•263 8/26 U.S., Palau sign new compact
of free association.

•264 8/28 SCC, SOLAS, Sept. 23.

•265 8/28 SCC, SOLAS, working group
on radiocommunications,
Sept. 15.
•266 8/28 SCC, SOLAS, working group
on stab'lity, load lines, and
safety of fishing vessels,
Sept. 14.
•267 8/27 SCC, SOLAS, working group
on safety of navigation,
Sept. 27.
•268 8/30 Program for the official

working visit of President
Vigids Finnbogadottir of
Iceland, Sept. 7-10.

•Not printed in the Bulletin. ■

itober 1982

PUBLICATIONS

Foreign Relations
Volume Released

The Department of State released on
August 21, 1982, Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1952-1954, Vol. XIII.
Indochina (in two parts). This is the
third volume to be released of 16 record-
ing the years 1952-54. The Foreign
Relations series has been published con-
tinuously since 1861 as the official
record of American foreign policy.

The volume presents 2,497 pages of
documentation, most of it previously un-
published and newly declassified, on
U.S. policy in Indochina during the
period. Arrangement of the material is
chronological. Part 1 covers the period
from January 1952 to April 1954; Part 2
carries the story to the end of 1954. The
documentation is accompanied by
scholarly aides, including a complete list
of sources. The index to both parts is in
Part 2.

Developments covered in Part 1 in-
clude U.S. military assistance to French
Union forces; U.S. military, economic,
and diplomatic support rendered to the
Associated States of Indochina in the
face of the Viet Minh insurgency in Viet-
nam; and the Viet Minh invasion of Laos
in 1953. Part 2 contains extensive
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tervention in the seige of Dienbienphu;
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Geneva conference period); the increased
U.S. role in the state of Vietnam follow-
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The documents in this volume are
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published in 1981, and in Volume XII,
Part 1, East Asia and the Pacific,
scheduled for subsequent publication.
The events recorded in this volume were
documented in brief in the Department
of Defense study United States-Vietnam
Relations 19J,5-1967 (Pentagon Papers),
Book 1. The comprehensive diplomatic
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authoritative record of the developments
of 1952-54.

Foreign Relations, 1952-54, Volume
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Press release 247 of Aug, 13, 1982.

Department of State

Free, single copies of the following Depart-
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Washington, D.C. 20520.

President Reagan

A New Opportunity for Peace in the Middle
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Policy #417).

Secretary Shultz

U.S. Approach to Problems in the Caribbean
Basin, Senate Committee on Finance,
Aug. 2, 1982 (Current Policy #412).

Africa

Background Notes on South Africa (July
1982).

Canada

U.S.-Canada Relations (GIST, Aug. 1982).

East Asia

U.S. -China Joint Communique, Assistant
Secretary Holdridge, House Foreign Af-
fairs Committee, Aug. 18, 1982 (Current
Policy #413).

Europe

Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act:
Twelfth Semiannual Report, President's
report to the Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, Aug. 1982 (Special
Report #100).

General

U.S. National Security, Atlas of U.S. Foreign
Relations, May 1982 {Bulletin Reprint).

Human Rights

Human Rights Conditions in K\ Salvador,
Assi.stant Secretary Abrams, House
Foreign Affairs Committee, July 29, 1982
(Current Policy #411),

Middle East

Lebanon: Plan for the PLO Evacuation from
West Beirut, President's statement,
Secretary's news conference (excerpts, fact
sheet on arrangements, texts of departure
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States and Lebanon, and President's letters
to the II.N. Secretary General and the U.S.
Congress, Aug. 1982 (Current Policy #41.')).

Narcotics

Drug Problem: Americans Arrested Abroad
(GIST, Aug. 1982). International Narcotics
Control (GIST, Sept, 1982).

Refugees

Afghan Refugees in Pakistan (GIST, Sept.
1982),

Western Hemisphere

Certification of Progress in El Salvador,
Assistant Secretary Enders, House Foreig,
Affairs Committee, July 29, 1982 (Curren
Policy #410.)

Building the Peace in Central America,
Assistant Secretary Enders, Com-
monwealth Club, San Francisco, Aug, 20, Jsj
1982 (Current Policy #414),

South Atlantic Crisis: Background, Con-
sequences, Documentation, Apr. 27-Aug.
1982 (Selected Documents #21).

Background Notes on Paraguay (July
1982). ■

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Department of State Bulle

NDEX

'October 1982
'V)lume 82, No. 2067

^entina. The South Atlantic Crisis: Back-
ground, Consequences, Documentation
(Enders, proposals, notes, letters, an-
nexes) 78

ms Control. U.S. Dialogue With ASEAN

and ANZUS (Holdridge) 29

i. Consultations With ASEAN (Stoessel) 27

'. Dialogue With ASEAN and ANZUS

(Holdridge) 29

Economic Relations With ASEAN

' (Albrecht) 32

istralia. U.S. Dialogue With ASEAN and
ANZUS (Holdridge) 29

3izil. U.S. Relations With Brazil (Enderst 73

ImtToon. Visit of Cameroon Presicient

Ahidjo (Ahidjo, Reagan) 14

ina

5. -China Joint Communique (Holdridge,

Reagan, text of communique) 19

5.-Chma Relations, 1981 22

mmodities

Dnomic Regulation and International Juris-
dictional Conflict (Robinson) 35

5. -Soviet Grain Sales Agreement (Reagan,

fact sheet) 40

ngress

^mical Weapons: Arms Control and Deter-
rence (Howe) 46

nada (Bosworth) 75

f! of the Sea and Oceans Policy (Malone) . 48

idle East Peace Initiative (Shultz) 5

)duction of the MX Missile (Reagan, letter

to the Speaker of the House) 47

e of the U.S. Ambassador (Kennedy) ... 15
?. -China Joint Communique (Holdridge,
Reagan, text of communique) 19

5. Dialogue With ASEAN and ANZUS
(Holdridge) 29

i. Economic Relations With ASEAN
(Albrecht) 32

5. Relations With Brazil (Enders) 73

sta Rica. Visit of Costa Rican President
Monge (Monge, Reagan) 69

Iba. Secretary Interviewed on "Face the
Nation" . . ," 10

ipartment and Foreign Service. Role of the
U.S. Ambassador (Kennedy) 15

veloping Countries

nventional Arms Transfers in the Third
World, 1972-81 (Buckley) 50

ide in the 1980s (Lamb) 38

onomics

onomic Regulation and International Juris-
dictional Conflict (Robinson) 35

retary Interviewed on "Meet the Press" . 7

ide in'the 1980s (Lamb) 38

3. Consultations With ASEAN (Stoessel) 27

5. Dialogue With ASEAN and ANZUS

(Holdridge) 29

. Economic Relations With ASEAN
(Albrecht) 32

enada. Grenada (Bosworth) 75

induras. Visit of Honduran President Suazo
(Reagan, Suazo) 71

dustralized Democracies. Trade in the
Ut)SUs(Lamb) 38

formation Policy. Soviet Active Measures:
An Update . . .'. 42

ternational Law. Economic Regulation and
International Jurisdictional Conflict
(Robinson) 35

Jordan. Secretary's Letter to Jordan's

King 45

Kampuchea. II. S. Dialogue With ASEAN and

ANZUS (Holdridge) 29

Latin America and the Caribbean. Building

Peace in Central America (Enders) ... .66

Law of the Sea. Law of the Sea and Oceans

Policv (Malone) 48

Middle fiast

Middle East Peace Initiative (Shultz) 5

The Quest for Peace (Shultz) 1

Secretary Interviewed on "Face the

Nation" 10

Secretary Interviewed on "Meet the Press . 7
MilitaryAffairs

Chemical Weapons: Arms Control and Deter-
rence (Howe) 46

Production of the MX Missile (Reagan, letter

to the Speaker of the House) 47

New Zealand. U.S. Dialogue With ASEAN

and ANZUS (Holdridge) 29

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Chem-
ical Weapons: Arms Control and Deter-
rence (Howe) 46

Oceans. Law of the Sea and Oceans Policy

(Malone) 48

Presidential Documents

Production of the MX Missile (Reagan, letter

to the Speaker of the House) 47

U.S. -China Joint Communique (Holdridge,

Reagan, text of communique) 19

Visit of Cameroon President Ahidjo (Ahidjo,

Reagan) 14

Visit of Costa Rican President Monge (Monge,

Reagan) 69

Visit of Honduran President Suazo (Reagan,

Suazo) 71

Publications

Department of State 94

Foreign Relations Volume Released 94

Refugees

U.S. Consultations With ASEAN (Stoessel) 27

U.S. Dialogue With ASEAN and ANZUS

(Holdridge) 29

Security Assistance. Conventional Arms
Transfers in the Third World, 1972-81

(Buckley) 50

Trade

Economic Regulation and International Juris-
dictional Conflict (Robinson) 35

Trade in the 1980s (Lamb) 38

Visit of Cameroon President Ahidjo (Ahidjo,

Reagan) 14

Treaties. Current Actions 90

U.S.S.R.

Chemical Weapons: Arms Control and Deter-
rence (Howe) 46

Secretary Interviewed on "Face the

Nation" 10

Secretary Interviewed on "Meet the Press" . 7

Soviet Active Measures: An Update 42

U.S. Consultations With ASEAN (Stoessel) 27
U.S. Dialogue With ASEAN and ANZUS

(Holdridge) 29

U.S. -Soviet Grain Sales Agreement (Reagan,
fact sheet) 40

United Kingdom. The South Atlantic Crisis:
Background, Consequences, Documenta-
tion (Enders, proposals, notes, letters, an-
nexes) 78

United Nations.' U.S.' 'Oiaiogue With' ASEAN
and ANZUS (Holdridge) 29

Vietnam. U.S. Dialogue With ASEAN and
ANZUS (Holdridge) 29

Name Index

Ahidjo, Ahmadou 14

Albrecht, Anthony C 32

Bosworth, Stephen W 75

Buckley, James L 50

Costa Mendez, Nicanor 78

Enders, Thomas 0 66, 73, 78

Holdridge, John H 19, 29

Howe, Jonathan T 46

Kennedy, Richard T 38

Lamb, Denis 38

Malone, James L 48

Middendorf, J. William 78

Monge, Luis Alberto 69

Reagan, President 14, 19, 40, 47, 69, 71

Robmson, Davis R 35

Shultz, Secretary 1, 5, 7, 10, 45

Stoessel, Walter J. Jr 27

Suazo Cordova, Roberto 71

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MW9'p

buUetEn

\e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volunae_,B2 / Nunnber 2068

OtC 81982 I IMovember 1982

UKrw«f'*"

^^)

^^m

U.N. General Assembly / 1

Arms Control / 16

Philippines / 23

MBvparimvni of Sinte

bulletin

Volume 82 / Number 2068 / November 1982

The DEPAFiTMENTOF StATE BULLETIN,

published by the Office of Public
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Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
forei^ policy. Its purpose is to provide the
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in U.S. foreign relations and the work of
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Service.

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

Secretary of State

JOHN HUGHES

As.si.slant Secretary for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD

Director,

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NORMAN HOWARD

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nei

CONTENTS

FEATURE

U.N. General Assembly:

1 U.S. Foreign Policy: Realism and

Progress (Secretary Shultz)
8 United Nations Day, 1982 (Procla-
mation)

^m^^

OB; 81982

DEPOSfTORY

1ie President

1 News Conference of September 28
(Excerpts)

/^rica

1 Africa: Economic Prospects and
Problems (Chester A. Crocker)

1 Visit of Liberian Commander in
Chief Doe

/ms Control

1 Nuclear Arms Control and the

Future of U.S. -Soviet Relations
(Eugene V. Rostow)

2 Arms Control Negotiations

(President Reagan)

East Asia

2 Visit of Philippine President

Marcos (Ferdinand E. Marcos,

< President Reagan, Arrival-

Ceremony, Dinner Toasts.
Department Announ-cement)
2 Philippines— A Profile
2 U.S., Philippines Conclude Tax-
ation and Air Agreements

2 Situation in East Timor (John H.

Holdridge)

3 Kampuchea and American In-
terests (John H. Holdridge)

Secretary Meets With Thai
Foreign Minister (Department
Statement)

hergy

U.S. Energy Strategies (E. Allan
Wendt)

Europe

38 Visit of Iceland's President

Finnbogadottir (Vigdis Finn-
bogadottir. President Reagan)

40 NATO Ministers Meet in Canada

40 10th Report on Cyprus (Message

to the Congress)

41 Forced Labor in the U.S.S.R.

(Department Statement)

41 Poland (White House and Depart-

ment Statements)

l\/liddle East

42 Secretary Shultz Interviewed on

the "Today" Show

43 Assistant Secretary Veliotes

Interviewed on "Meet the Press"
46 Situation in Lebanon (Fouad

Boutros, Robert S. Dillon, Elias
Freij, Philip C. Habib, Presi-
dent Reagan, White House and
Department Statements, Ex-
changes of Letters)

Narcotics

51 International Narcotics Control

(Secretary Shultz)

Science and Technology

52 Technology Transfer Controls

(Gerhard Mally)

54 U.S. and France Review Scien-

tific Cooperation

United Nations

55 U.N. Adopts Resolutions on

Lebanon Situation (Texts of
Resolutions)

56 Namibia (Contact Group Com-

munique)

Western Hemisphere

57 Areas of Challenge in the

Americas (Thomas 0. Enders)
60 Recent Developments in Honduras
(Stephen W. Bosworth)

63 Situation in Guatemala (Stephen

W. Bosworth)

64 Guatemala— A Profile

Treaties

65 Current Actions

Chronology

68 September 1982

Press Releases

70 Department of State

Publications

70 Department of State

Index

"... When we see aggression, we will call it aggression. When we
see subversion, we will call it subversion. When we see repression, we
will call it repression. "

Addressing the U.N. General Assembly. Seeretarv Shultz emphasizes the necessitv fr

realism, persistence, and steadfastness of purpose in dealing with the woHrf-s Dlohle

ti?:ZT r'^" ""'i"' ^""""^ '"""' '' '»^«' "P"" four fundamentaMde'as' ?eali m

negolfau o„Z:LruesTd°th 'hV"^.'!.'" ''""''' '"■"^"'' '"'"' a^ree^ents and
negouaie on Key issues, and the belief that progress is possible.

FEATURE

U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

U.S. Foreign Policy:
Realism and Progress

by Secretary Shuitz

Address before the 37th session

of the U.N. General Assembly

in New York on September 30, 1982^

I begin by paying tribute to our new
Secretary General, who has brought
great distinction to the office during his
brief tenure. Dag Hammarskjold once
told the General Assembly that "inde-
pendence, impartiality, objectivity— they
all describe essential aspects of what,
without exception, must be in the atti-
tude of the Secretary General." Javier
Perez de Cuellar, a man of the Third
World and, I am proud to note, of the
New World as well, has already demon-
strated his strict adherence to this most
exacting standard. In so doing, he has
earned the esteem of my government
and the gratitude of all who believe in
the purposes of the charter.

I congratulate, as well, Mr. Hollai
[Imre Hollai, Deputy Foreign Minister]
of Hungary upon his election as Presi-
dent of the 37th Session of the General
Assembly.

As I stand before you today, I can-
not help but reflect on my relation to
this city and to this hall. I was born
about 4 miles from here. 1 was reared
and educated not tar away, just across
the Hudson River. And I took a tour
through this building just after it opened
in 1952 marveling at the reality of a
temple erected in the hope, at least, of
abolishing war.

When I took that tour back in the
early fifties, there was great public in-
terest in what was called "the Medita-
tion Room." I understand the room is

still here. But in the years since then,
this institution has become more famous
for talk than for meditation. This hall
has heard great ideas eloquently ex-
pressed. It has also heard doubletalk,
platitudes, and ringing protestations of
innocence — all too often aimed at
camouflaging outrageous and inhuman
acts.

But we must not ridicule words. I
believe that the greatest advance in
human history was not the wheel, the
use of electricity, or the internal com-
bustion engine. Indispensable to prog-
ress as these have been, our most re-
markable achievement was the slow,
clumsy but triumphant creation of
language. It is words that released our
ancestors from the prison of the soli-
tary. Words gave us the means to trans-
mit to our children and the future the
crowning jewel of human existence:
knowledge. The code of Hammurabi, the
Bible, the analects of Confucius, the
teachings of the Buddha, the Koran, the
insights of Shakespeare, the creed of
Mahatma Gandhi or Martin Luther
King— all these are arrangements of
words.

Is it not profoundly revealing that
the first victims of tyrants are— words?
No people better know the meaning of
freedom than those who have been ar-
rested, beaten, imprisoned, or exiled be-
cause of what they said. A single man

'Sinbei

speaking out— a Lech Walesa for ex-
ample—is more dangerous than an ar-
mored division.

All of us here— whether we arrived
after a short 1-hour flight, as I did, or
came from the other side of the globe,
as many of you did — enter this audi-
torium for one main purpose: to talk
about what our governments see as the
problems ahead and how they should be
solved. On one point, at least, we can all
agree: The problems are many and diffi-
cult. I shall not try, in the minutes allot-
ted me, to deal with each— or even
most— of those issues in detail. Instead,
I want to give you some sense of the
principles and general approach the
United States will take toward our com-
mon problems.

Americans are, by history and by in-
clination, a practical and pragmatic
people — yet a people with a vision. It is
the vision — usually simple and some-
times naive — that has so often led us to
dare and to achieve. President Reagan's
approach to foreign policy is grounded
squarely on standards drawn from the
pragmatic American experience. As De
Tocqueville pointed out, "To achieve its
objective, America relies on personal in-
terest, and gives full reign to the
strength and reason of the individual."
That is as true now as when it was said
150 years ago. Our principal instrument,
now as then, is freedom. Our adver-
saries are the oppressors, the totali-
tarians, the tacticians of fear and
pressure.

On this foundation. President
Reagan's ideas and the structure of his
foreign policy are so straightforward
that those of us enmeshed in day-to-day
details may easily lose sight of them.
The President never does; he consistent-
ly brings us back to fundamentals. To-
day, I will talk about those funda-
mentals. They consist of four ideas that
guide our actions.

• We will start from realism.

• We will act from strength, both in
power and purpose.

• We will stress the indispensable
need to generate consent, build agree-
ments, and negotiate on key issues.

• We will conduct ourselves in the
belief that progress is possible, even
though the road to achievement is long
and hard.

Reality

If we are to change the world we must
first understand it. We must face
reality — with all its anguish and all its
opportunities. Our era needs those who,
as Pericles said, have the clearest vision
of what is before them, glory and
danger alike, and, notwithstanding, go
out to meet it.

Reality is not an illusion nor a
sleight of hand, though many would
have us believe otherwise. The enor-
mous, grinding machinery of Soviet

. . . realism shows
us a world deeply
troubled, yet with
reason for hope. There is
one necessary condition:
The only way we can
enhance and amplify the
human potential is by
preserving, defending,
and extending those
most precious of condi-
tions— freedom and
peace.

propaganda daily seeks to distort reali-
ty, to bend truth for its own purposes.
Our world is occupied by far too many
governments which seek to conceal truth
from their own people. They wish to im-
prison reality by controlling what can be
read or spoken or heard. They would
have us believe that black is white and
up is down.

Much of present-day reality is un-
pleasant. To describe conditions as we
see them, as I do today and as President
Reagan has over the course of his presi-
dency, is not to seek confrontation. Far
from it. Our purpose is to avoid mis-
understanding and to create the
necessary preconditions for change. And
so, when we see aggression, we will call
it aggression. When we see subversion,

:lv

we will call it subversion. When we see
repression, we will call it repression.

• Events in Poland, for example,
cannot be ignored or explained away.
The Polish people want to be their own
master. Years of systematic tyranny
could not repress this desire, and neith'
will martial law. But in Poland today,
truth must hide in corners.

• Nor can we simply turn our heac
and look the other way as Soviet divi-
sions brutalize an entire population in
Afghanistan. The resistance of the
Afghan people is a valiant saga of our
times. We demean that valor if we do
not recognize its source.

• And Soviet surrogates intervene
in many countries, creating a new era
colonialism at the moment in history
when peoples around the globe had
lifted that burden from their backs.

• Nor will we shy away from speai ''!
ing of other problems affecting the fre- "f
and developing worlds. Much of the de
veloping world is threatened by a crisi

(if confidence in financial institutions ai
the stultifying effects of state-controllM ,g
economies. The naturally vibrant econ
mies of many Western nations and tra
between the world's major trading par
ners are threatened by recession and i
ing protectionism. The great alliances
that shore up world stability and
growth — our hemispheric partnership
and NATO, and the Western and
Japanese industrial democracies — are
challenged by new as well as chronic
strains.

• Finally, the shadow of war still
darkens the future of us all. There is r
ultimate safety in a nuclear balance of
terror constantly contested. There is r
peace of mind at a time when increasii
numbers of nations appear willing to
launch their armies into battles for
causes which seem local but have
ramifications for regional and even
global harmony.

The list of troubles is long; the
danger of despair great. But there is
another side to the present reality; it i
a reality of hope. We are living in a fa
tastic time of opportunity.

Historians in the future will surelj
marvel over the accomplishments
achieved by human beings in the last
half of this century. We have expande

Department of State Bulla

y^ FEATURE

^ U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

frontiers of thought — in science,
)gy, and engineering; in painting,
ic, and mathematics; in technology
architecture — far beyond the point
jne could have dared predict, much
hoped for. We know much today
it the oceans and forests and the
ogical strata that lock in the story of
past. We know more about a baby —
he brain— than was accumulated in
nillenia before our time. We are
ning to produce food for all of us; we
no longer helpless before the threat
isease; we explore our universe as a
ter of course. We are confronting
nature of nature itself. The oppor-
ties are grand. This, too, is a clear
ity.

Thus, realism shows us a world
i)ly troubled, yet with reason for
;. There is one necessary condition:
only way we can enhance and
lify the human potential is by pre-
ring, defending, and extending those
It precious of conditions — freedom
peace.

sngth

9rica's yearning for peace does not
us to lie hesitant in developing our
ngth or in using it when necessary.
ed, clarity about the magnitude of
T problems we face leads inevitably to
; alistic appreciation of the import-
n> (if American strength. The strength
If free world imposes restraint, in-
■ accommodation, and reassures
1 (_' wlio would share in the creative
ik that is the wonderful consequence
flicrty,

Sirt-ngth means military forces to in- ^
J; that no other nation can threaten |
jur interests, or our friends. But ^
n I speak of strength, I do not mean |
tary power alone. To Americans, i

ngth derives as well from a solid -S"

lomic base and social vitality at J

le and with our partners. And, most -
iamentally, the true wellspring of
ngth lies in America's moral commit-
it.

The bulwark of America's strength
lilitary power for peace. The

erican people have never accepted
kness, nor hesitancy, nor abdication,
will not put our destiny into the

rem be r 1982

hands of the ruthless. Americans today
are emphatically united on the necessity
of a strong defense. This year's defense
budget will insure that the United States
will help its friends and allies defend
themselves — to make sure that peace is
seen clearly by all to be the only feasible
course in world affairs.

Along with military readiness and
capability must come the willingness to
employ it in the cause of peace, justice,
and security. Today in Beirut the U.S.
Marines — together with our allies Italy
and France — are helping the Lebanese
Government and Armed Forces assure
the safety of the peoples of that

Secretary Shultz with Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N.
and U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar.

Secretary's Bilateral
Meetings

Secretary Shultz was in New York
September 26-October 1 and Octo-
ber 3-7, 1982, for the opening of the
37th session of the U.N. General
Assembly. While there he held bilateral
meetings with foreign leaders from
around the world, some of whom are il-
lustrated here.

September 27. 1982. Foreign
Minister Ramlro Saraiva Guerreiro
(Brwil)

(Photos by Kriitin Hodooi

P»). Commissioner of Foreign Affairs
FWion Idriss Miskine (Chad).
I ™ Hre.gn Affairs Said Madi Kafe
£'■ l^ommissioner of Sute for Foreien
fUcos Mba Ondo (Equatorial
■»cretar, t„r Foreign Affairs Obed

»"a). Minister of Foreign Affairs
, H« n ?''?'• "'"'ster of Foreign Af-
n . K « 1982 The Secretao' „ L?."''' ""'"P" (L-^^otho), Minister
October G 'SSf- TJ^^ ^ („„ H> "'„*«"'« He„r, Boimah FahnbuUeh

S'zi:ter„rE':Uau«;jj--^^^^^^^^

Alberto Chissano (Mozambique), Minister of
Education and Culture Joaquim Rafael Branc
(Sao Tome and Principe), Minister of Foreign
Affairs Abdulai Conteh (Sierra Leone),
Minister of Foreign Affairs Ja
durahman (Somalia), Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs Muhammad Mirghani Mubarak (Sudan).

• of Foreign Affairs Salim A. Salim
(Tanzania). Minister of State for Foreign Af-
fairs Albert W. Picho-Owiny (Uganda).
Minister of Foreign Affairs Lameck K. H.
Goma (Zambia), and Minister of Foreign
Affairs Witness Mangwende (Zimbabwe).

September 29, 1982. (Left to
right) Foreign Minister Suppiah
I Dhanabalan (Singapore), Foreign
I Minister Muhammad Ghazali bin
f Shafie (Malaysia). Deputy Prime
Minister for Foreign Affairs Sin-
nathamby Rajaratnam (Singa*
pore), Secretary Shultz, Foreign
Minister Carlos P. Romulo
(Philippines). Foreign Minister
Sawetsila Siddhi (Thailand),
Foreign Minister Kusumaatmaja
Mochtar (Indonesia)

We are seldom con-
fronted with simple
issues of right and
wrong, between good
and evil. Only those who
do not bear the direct
burden of responsibility
for decision and action
can indulge themselves
in the denial of that
reality.

tormented capital. Our Marines repre-
sent an extension of American power,
not for war but to secure the peace.
They are there to speed the moment
when all foreign forces depart from
Lebanon. There must be early agree-
ment on a timetable for the full appli-
cation of Lebanon's independence,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity.
Lebanon deserves the world's help — to
secure peace and to rebuild a thriving
society.

America will continue to use its
strength with prudence, firmness, and
balance. We intend to command the re-
spect of adversaries and to deserve the
confidence of allies and partners.

The engine of America's strength
is a sound economy. In a time of reces-
sion, industrialized and less developed
nations alike are bedeviled by excessive
inflation, restricted markets, unused
capacity, stagnating trade, growing
pressure for protectionism, and the most
potent enemy of expansion— pervasive
uncertainty.

The United States, with its vast
human and scientific resources, can sur-
vive an era of economic strife and decay.
But our moral commitment and our self-
interest require us to use our technologi-
cal and productive abilities to build last-
ing prosperity at home and to contribute
to a sound economic situation abroad.

President Reagan has instituted a
bold program to get the American
economy moving. Our rate of inflation is
down markedly, and we will keep it
down. This will add stability to the value
of the dollar and give greater confidence
to international financial markets.

The recent drop in U.S. interest
rates will stimulate new investments
within and beyond our shores. Conserva-
tion through market pricing of energy
has reduced U.S. demand for world
energy supplies. We are putting the
recession behind us. A growing and
open American economy will provide
new markets for goods and services pro-
duced elsewhere and new opportunities
for foreign investment. Just as we have
a stake in worldwide recovery, others
will prosper as our recovery develops.

For wider prosperity to take hold,
we must cooperatively attend these in-
ternational issues.

• The lure of protectionist trade
policies must be resisted— whether in the
form of overt import restrictions and ex-
port subsidies or by more subtle domes-
tic programs. These can only distort
world trade and impair growth every-
where. Let us determine to make the
November ministerial meeting of the
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade] a time to stem these protec-
tionist pressures and reinvigorate posi-
tive efforts for a more open trading
system.

• The implications of the external
debt of many nations must be under-
stood. Immediate debt problems are
manageable if we use good sense and
avoid destabilizing actions. But the
magnitude of external debt will almost
inevitably reduce resources available for
future lending for development pur-
poses. Economic adjustment is im-
perative. The International Monetary
Fund can provide critical help and guid-
ance in any country's efforts to smooth
the adjustment process. The new
borrowing arrangement proposed by the
United States can be crucial to this ef-
fort.

• And the necessity of reducing
government interference in the market
must be recognized. Every nation has

the right to organize society as its in- lia
habitants wish, but economic facts can-fiBi
not be ignored. Those facts clearly
demonstrate that the world's commanc
economies have failed abysmally to me' W
the needs of their peoples. The newly
prosperous industrialized nations are
those with the most free and open
markets.

The bedrock of our strength is oi
moral and spiritual character. The

sources of true strength lie deeper tha
economic or military power— in the de<
cation of a free people which knows its
responsibility. America's institutions aj
those of freedom accessible to every p*
son and of government as the account-
able servant of the people. Equal oppo
tunity; due process of law; open trial b
jury; freedom of belief, speech, and
assembly— our Bill of Rights, our
guarantees of liberty and limited goveii J'
ment— were hammered out in centurie-
of ordeal. Because we care about thes«
human values for ourselves, so must w
then be concerned, and legitimately so ^

tcii

le!

U.S. Delegation

to the 37th

U.N. General Assembly

Representatives

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
Kenneth L. Adelman
J. Bennett Johnston, U.S. Senator fro

the State of Louisiana
Robert W. Kasten, Jr., U.S. Senator

from the State of Wisconsin
John D. Lodge

Alternate Representatives

Gordon C. Luce
Hernan Padilla
Jose S. Sorzano
Charles M. Lichenstein
William C. Sherman

USUN press release 69 of Sept. 24, 1982.

Department of State Bullel

FEATURE

U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

,h abuses of freedom, justice, and
nanitarian principles Seyond our
•ders. This is why we will speak and

for prisoners of conscience, against
rorism, and against the brutal silenc-

of the Soviet Helsinki Watch Com-
ttee. This is why we are anxious to
rticipate in periodic reviews of the
nan rights performance of ourselves
well as others. We welcome scrutiny
our own system. We are not perfect,
i we know it, but we have nothing to

Our belief in liberty guides our
icies here in the United Nations as

fjwhere. Therefore, in this forum the
ited States will continue to insist
jjn fairness, balance, and truth. We
a;e the debate on human rights serious-
Ij We insist upon honesty in the use of
It guage; we will point out inconsist-
i 'ies, double standards, and lies. We
' 1 not compromise our commitment to
.,lh.

Badiness To Solve Problems

I e world has work to do for the
Tilists, the pragmatists, and the free.
V th a clear understanding of the
t ubled circumstances of the hour and
w;h a strengthened ability to act, we
|ti;d, as well, the vision to see beyond
\'. immediate present.

All of us here represent nations
» ich must understand and accept the
iiperative of fair engagement on the
isues before us and, beyond that, of
c nmon effort toward shared goals.
\:ether we are seeking to bring peace
I regional conflict or a resolution of
enmercial differences, the time of im-
|3ed solutions has passed. Conquest,
2ssure, acquiescence under duress
re common in decades not long past,
t not today. Not everybody who wants
concerns addressed will find us auto-
itically receptive. But when negotia-
ns are in order, America is prepared
go to work on the global agenda and
do so in a way that all may emerge
tter off and more secure than before.
We manage our problems more in-
ligently, and with greater mutual
derstanding, when we can bring our-
ives to recognize them as expressions
mankind's basic dilemma. We are

)vember 1982

Imre Hollai, Deputy Foreign Minister of Hungary and President of the 37th Regular Ses-
sion of the U.N. General Assembly with Secretary Shultz.

seldom confronted with simple issues of
right and wrong, between good and evil.
Only those who do not bear the direct
burden of responsibility for decision and
action can indulge themselves in the
denial of that reality. The task of states-
manship is to mediate between two— or
several— causes, each of which often has
a legitimate claim.

It is on this foundation that the
United States stands ready to try to

solve the problems of our time— to over-
come chaos, deprivation, and the height-
ened dangers of an era in which ideas
and cultures too often tend to clash and
technologies threaten to outpace our in-
stitutions of control.

We are engaged in negotiations and
efforts to find answers to issues affect-
ing every part of the globe and every
aspect of our lives upon it.

The Middle East. The agony of the
Middle East now exceeds the ability of

news bulletins or speeches to express; it
is a searing wound on our consciousness.
The region is in constant ferment.
Unrest flares into violence, terror, insur-
rection, and civil strife. War follows
war. It is clear to everyone in this hall
that international peace, security, and
cooperative progress cannot be truly
achieved until this terrible regional con-
flict is settled.

All of us have witnessed in the past
several months a graphic reminder of
the need for practical peace negotiations
in the Middle East. Of the nations in the
world which need and deserve peace,
Israel surely holds a preeminent place.
Of the peoples of the world who need
and deserve a place with which they can
truly identify, the Palestinian claim is
undeniable.

But Israel can only have permanent
peace in a context in which the Pales-
tinian people also realize their legitimate
rights. Similarly, the Palestinian people

will be able to achieve their legitimate
rights only in a context which gives to
Israel what it so clearly has a right to
demand— to exist, and to exist in peace
and security.

This most complex of international
conflicts cannot be resolved by force.
Neither the might of armies nor the
violence of terrorists can succeed in im-
posing the will of the strong upon the
weak. Nor can it be settled simply by
the rhetoric of even the most carefully
worded document. It can only be re-
solved through the give and take of
direct negotiations leading to the estab-
lishment of practical arrangements on
the ground.

In other words, it can only be re-
solved through hard work. For those
who believe that there is no contradic-
tion between permanent peace for Israel
and the legitimate rights of the Pales-
tinian people — and for those who believe
that both are essential for peace and

United Nations Day, 1982

A PROCLAMATION'

The United Nations was born out of the
massive human suffering and destruction
caused by the Second World War. f>om the
outset, the United States, one of the principal
architects and founders of the United Na-
tions, has worked to make it a forum for
debate among all peace-loving nations and to
support its purpose of preventing war and
conflict through conciliation and cooperation.
Because that goal has not been fully achieved
and because the U.N. has been misu.sed, to-
day's world is too often fraught with strife,
division, and conflict. But, despite the abuse
and shortcomings, the United Nations can
still be instrumental in facilitating and
overseeing agreements to end conflict, in pro-
viding a center for reducing tensions through
dialogue and debate, and in addressing the
problems of underdevelopment which can
spur conflict.

Americans can take pride in having pro-
vided significant moral, political, and finan-
cial support for the United Nations since its
inception. That support will be maintained
and the United States will continue to play a
prominent role in the organization, using it to

champion the values and ideals which under-
lie our own society and which originally
helped to inspire the formation of the United
Nations.

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan,
President of the United States of America,
do hereby designate Sunday, October 24,
1982, as United Nations Day. On this day I
urge all Americans to better acquaint
themselves with the activities and ac-
complishments of the United Nations.

I have appointed Robert Anderson to
serve as 1982 United States National Chair-
man for United Nations Day and welcome the
role of the United Nations Association of the
United States of America in working with
him to celebrate this special day.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto
set my hand this fourteenth day of
September, in the year of our Lord nineteen
hundred and eighty-two, and of the In-
dependence of the United States of America
the two hundred and seventh.

Ronald Reacjan

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Sept. 20. 1982.

that neither can be achieved without thi
other — the task can truly be a labor of
love.

On September 1, President Reagan
challenged the parties to the Arab-
Israeli conflict to make a fresh start on
the road to peace in the Middle East.
The Camp David agreements, resting
squarely on U.N. Security Council
Resolution 242, with its formula of
peace for territory, remain available to
those who would accept the challenge t
make this journey with us. The road wi
not be easy but, in his statement, Presi
dent Reagan made a number of pro-
posals which, for those who are willing
to join the effort, make the journey
safer and easier. I call on all concerned
to accept President Reagan's challenge
and hasten the realization of true peace
in the Middle East.

Arms ControL In addition to the
imperative need to resolve regional
problems, there is an equally significan'
global imperative: to hall, and reverse,
the global arms buildup. As an Ameri-
can, I am aware that arms control and
disarmament are a special responsibilit
of the world's most powerful nations —
the United States and the Soviet Unior
And as an American, I can report that
we are fulfilling our responsibility to
seek to limit and reduce conventional
and nuclear arms to the lowest possibk
levels.

With this goal in mind. President
Reagan has initiated a comprehensive
program for negotiated arms reduction
In central Europe, the most heavily
armed region on this planet, the
Western allies are seeking substantial
reductions in NATO and Warsaw Pact
troops to equal levels. To achieve this
goal, we have recently introduced a ne\
proposal designed to revitalize the talks
in Vienna on mutual and balanced redu
tions in military manpower.

In the area of strategic arms, the
United Stiiles has also taken the initia-
tive iiy calling for a one-third reduction
in the number of nuclear warheads thai
American and Soviet ballistic missiles

Department of State Bulletl

•Of

FEATURE

U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1 deliver. And in the talks in Geneva
intermediate-range nuclear forces,
'. United States has gone even further,
asking the Soviet Union to agree to a
Id proposal for eliminating an entire
tegory of weapons from the arsenals
the two sides.

But as important as these negotia-
ns are, the problem of arms control
nnot be left to the two superpowers,
e threat of nuclear proliferation ex-
ids to every region in the world and
mands the attention and energy of
ery government. This is not solely, or
n primarily, a concern of the super-
wers. The non-nuclear countries will
t be safer if nuclear intimidation is
ded to already deadly regional con-
its. The developing nations will not be
)re prosperous if scarce resources and
entific talent are diverted to nuclear
apons and delivery systems.
Unfortunately, as the task becomes

1 )re important, it also becomes more
ficult. Greater quantities of dangerous
iterials are produced, and new sup-
ers emerge who lack a clear commit-
mt to nonproliferation. But the tech-
ilogy that helped to create the prob-

)i ns can supply answers as well. Vigor-
s action to strengthen the barriers to
gression and to resolve disputes
acefully can remove the insecurities
it are the root of the problem. The
ited States, for its part, will work to
hten export controls, to promote
)ader acceptance of safeguards, to
ye meaningful actions when agree-
nts are violated, and to strengthen
J International Atomic Energy Agen-
As our action last week in Vienna
Duld make clear, we will not accept at-
npts to politicize — and, therefore,
lasculate — such vital institutions.

ogress

rhaps the most common phrase
oken by the American people in our
ore than two centuries of national life
.s been: "You can't stop progress." Our
ople have always been imbued with
e conviction that the future of a free
ople would be good.

America continues to offer that vi-
sion to the world. With that vision and
with the freedom to act creatively, there
is nothing that people of goodwill need
fear.

I am not here to assert, however,
that the way is easy, quick, or that the
future is bound to be bright. There is a
poem by Carl Sandburg in which a
traveler asks the sphinx to speak and
reveal the distilled wisdom of all the
ages. The sphinx does speak. Its words
are: "Don't expect too much."

That is good counsel for all of us
here. It does not mean that great ac-
complishments are beyond our reach.
We can help shape more constructive in-
ternational relations and give our child-
ren a better chance at life. It does mean,
however, that risk, pain, expense, and
above all endurance are needed to bring
those achievements into our grasp.

We must recognize the complex and
vexing character of this world. We
should not indulge ourselves in fantasies
of perfection or unfulfOlable plans or
solutions gained by pressure. It is the
responsibility of leaders not to feed the
growing appetite for easy promises and
grand assurances. The plain truth is
this: We face the prospect of all too few
decisive or dramatic breakthroughs; we
face the necessity of dedicating our
energies and creativity to a protracted
struggle toward eventual success.

Conclusion

That is the approach of my country— be-
cause we see not only the necessity, but
the possibility, of making important
progress on a broad front.

• Despite deep-seated differences
between us and the Soviet Union,
negotiators of both sides are now at

work in a serious, businesslike effort at
arms control.

• President Reagan has issued an
important call for an international con-
ference on military expenditure. The
achievement of a common system for ac-
counting and reporting is the pre-
requisite for subsequent agreement to
limit or curtail defense budgets.

• The Caribbean Basin initiative
establishes the crucial bond between
economic development and economic
freedom. It can be a model for fair and
productive cooperation between econo-
mies vastly different in size and char-
acter.

• And the diplomatic way is open to
build stability and progress in southern
Africa through independence for
Namibia under internationally acceptable
terms.

Realism and a readiness to work
long and hard for fair and freely agreed
solutions— that is our recipe for op-
timism. That is the message and the of-
fer which my government brings to you
today.

I began my remarks here today with
an informal personal word. Let me end
in the same spirit. We must be deter-
mined and confident. We must be pre-
pared for trouble but always optimistic.
In this way the vast bounties produced
by the human mind and imagination can
be shared by all the races and nations
we represent here in this hall.

A predecessor of mine as Secretary
of State, whose portrait hangs in my of-
fice, conveyed the essence of America's
approach to the world's dangers and
dilemmas. He said we would act with "a
stout heart and a clear conscience, and
never despair."

That is what John Quincy Adams
said nearly a century and a half ago. I
give you my personal pledge today that
we wall continue in that spirit, with that
determination, and with that confidence
in the future.

'Department press release 303 of Oct. 1,
1982, and USUN press release 71. ■

THE PRESIDENT

News Conference of September 28
(Excerpts)

Q. When the Palestinian fighters were
forced to leave Beirut, they said that
they had America's word of honor that
those they left behind would not be
harmed. Now comes U.N. Ambassador
Jeane Kirkpatrick who says that
America must share in the blame for
these massacres. My question to you is
do you agree with that judgment?

A. I think the manner in which
Jeane said that — and she's talked to me
about it — was one about the responsibili-
ty of all of us back over a period of time
with regard to the separation and divi-
sions in Lebanon, the whole matter of
the Middle East and not doing more to
bring about the peace that we're trying
so hard now to get.

I don't think that specifically there
could be assigned as a responsibility on
our part for withdrawing our troops.
They were sent in there with one under-
standing: They were there to oversee and
make sure that the PLO [Palestine
Liberation Organization] left Lebanon.
And that mission was completed, virtual-
ly without incident and they left. Then,
who could have foreseen the assassina-
tion of the President-elect that led to the
other violence and so forth.

Q. Why did you gi\e orders to our
representative at the United Nations
to vote against an inquiry to find out
how it happened and why?

A. As I understand it, there were
things additional in that inquiry, things
that we have never voted for and will
not hold still for, such things as sanc-
tions and such things as voting Israel
out of the United Nations.

I can't recall exactly now what it
was that caused our vote to be negative
on that. But the Lebanese and the
Israelis are apparently going forward
with such an inquiry.

Q. Do you have a plan for getting
the United States out of Lebanon if
fighting should break out there, or
could the Marine presence there lead
to another long entanglement, such as
Vietnam?

A. No, I don't see anything of that

kind taking place there at all. And the
Marines are going in there into a situa-
tion with a definite understanding as to
what we're supposed to do. I believe
that we are going to be successful in
seeing the other foreign forces leave
Lebanon. And then at such time as
Lebanon says that they have the situa-
tion well in hand, why, we'll depart.

Q. If fighting should break out
again, would you pull the Marines
out?

A. You're asking a hypothetical
question, and I've found out that I never
get in trouble if I don't answer one of
those. [Laughter]

Q. It has been reported that you
believe that Israel is sabotaging your
peace initiative, and also that you now
believe that Israel has become the
Goliath in the Middle East, and that
the other countries— the Arab coun-
tries— are the David. Did you say
that? Do you believe that?

A. I didn't say it exactly that way.
In fact, I didn't say that I thought they
were the Goliath. I said that one of the
things, as the negotiations approach and
we proceed with this peacemaking busi-
ness, that Israel should understand, as
we have come to understand from talk-
ing to other Arab states, that where
from the very beginning all of us, in-
cluding Israel, have thought of it as a
tiny country fighting for its life sur-
rounded by larger states and hostile
states that want to see it destroyed, that
their military power has become such
that there are Arab states that now
voice a fear that they are expansionist,
that they may be expansionist, and they
have the military power. So all I was
referring to was that.

The first part of your statement
there, though, about Israel and trying to
undermine— no, I don't believe that. I
think that both sides have voiced things
that they feel very strongly about, and
contrary to what I have suggested in my
proposal, and having been a long-time

union negotiator, I happen to think that
some of that might be each side staking
out its position so as to be in a better
position when it comes time to
negotiate.

Q. I just wanted to ask you since
you said you didn't think that Israel
was trying to undermine your peace
initiative whether you are less op-
timistic about its chances since the
massacre and the tragedy in Beirut?

A. No, I'm not less optimistic. I'm
also not deluding myself that it's going
to be easy. Basically what we have, I
think, in this peace proposal is a situa-
tion where on one side, territory is the
goal and on the other side security. Anc
what has to be negotiated out is a kind
of exchange of territory for security. I
meant what I said when I proposed this
plan and that is this country will never
stand by and see any settlement that
does not guarantee the security of
Israel.

dlK

par

Q. You've told us that you're sencf"
ing Marines to Lebanon for a limited
amount of time and yet you haven't
told us what the limit is. Can you giv •
us a general idea of how long you ex-
pect them to stay there and tell us
precisely what you would like to see
them accomplish before they
withdraw?

A. I can't tell you what the time eh
ment would be. I can tell you what it is
that they should accomplish, and I hope
sooner rather than later.

One, they're there along with our
allies — the French and the Italians — to
give a kind of support and stability whil
the Lebanese Government seeks to
reunite its people, which have been
divided for several years now into
several factions, each one of them with
its own army, and bring about a unified
Lebanon with a Lebanese Army that
will then be able to preserve order in it;
own country. And during this time,
while that's taking place, the
withdrawal, as quickly as possible, to
their own borders of the Israelis and th<
Syrians.

Now there we've had declarations

Department of State Bulleti

THE PRESIDENT

m both countries that they want to do
,t. So I am reasonably optimistic

1)Ut that. I have no way to judge about
en the Lebanese Government — the
banese Government will be the one
it tells us when it feels that it's in
irge and they can go home.

' Q. Are you then saying that they
'^ II remain there until all foreign
' ces are withdrawn?

A. Yes, because I think that's going
: come rapidly. I think we're going to

the withdrawal— our Marines will go
tomorrow morning, as I've said,
•ause the Israelis have agreed to
;hdraw to that line south of the air-
t.

Q. Taking into account the
etoric on both sides over the situa-
ns in Poland, Afghanistan, the arms
^'nluction talks that are going on in
Birope, the Siberian natural gas
p)eline, and the renewed grain sale
'ireement, how do you assess the
fS. -Soviet relationship now, 20
'ntnths into your term in office?

A. I think there's a pretty good
-cderstanding on their part as to where
'v stand. And I can only say this: In 20
r)nths — and I'm going to knock on
V'od — the Soviet Union, which has been
epanding over the years, vastly in the
„t -ritory and the people coming under
|i' control, they haven't expanded into
I extra square inch since we've been
} re. So maybe we do have an under-
,E mding of each other.

Now today I've just had a call from
( orge Shultz. He had met for 3 hours
\ th Foreign Minister Gromyko, and he
E id it was a serious discussion and a
> de-ranging discussion, and they're go-
i ,•■ 1(1 resume it on Monday. So we're
! t standing off and ignoring each

informally notified Congress that it
was planning to send more F-16s to
Israel. There's been no formal
notification since then. Is the delay
linked to difficulties in relations with
Israel? When do you think formal noti-
fication will go up and under what
conditions?

A. They're still on tap, and we
haven't sent the formal notification up.
And, very frankly, it was simply because
in the climate of things that were going
on, we didn't think it was the time to do
it. However, there has been no interrup-
tion of those things that are in the pipe-
line— the spare parts, ammunition,
things of that kind. The only thing that
we have actually withheld after the con-
troversy that came on in Lebanon was
the artillery shell, the so-called cluster
shell.

Q. I seem to get the impression
from what you are saying about our
relationships with Israel that nothing
has really changed in the wake of the
massacre in Beirut or the temporary
rejection, anyway, of your peace plan.
Is that correct? Is there no change at
all?

A. There's no change in the sense
that we are still going with everything
we can. We're going to try and persuade
the Arab neighbors of Israel to do as
Egypt once did, and Israel to negotiate

out a permanent peace solution, in which
Israel will no longer have to remain an
armed camp, which is making their life
economically unbearable. At the same
time, an answer must be found that is
just and fair for the Palestinians. And I
don't think anything has happened to
change that, if I understood your ques-
tion correctly. Nothing has changed in
our feeling of obligation to bring about,
if we can, such a result.

Q. I really meant our relationship
with the Begin government. Is it as
cordial and friendly? Is it now tense?
Is it— what is the situation?

A. I can tell you one thing it isn't; it
isn't what some of you have said or writ-
ten, that we are deliberately trying to
undermine or overthrow the Begin
government. We have never interfered
in the internal government of a country
and have no intention of doing so, never
have had any thought of that kind. We
expect to be doing business with the
Government of Israel and with Prime
Minister Begin, if that's the decision of
the Israeli people. I think that Frank
Reynolds [ABC News] last night voiced
something that we believe, and that is
that the Israeli people are proving with
their reaction to the massacre that there
is no change in the spirit of Israel. They
are our ally, we feel morally obligated to
the preservation of Israel, and we're go-
ing to continue to be that way.

Text from White House press release.

Q. Shortly before the Israel inva-
pn of Lebanon, the Administration

Dvember 1982

AFRICA

Africa: Economic
Prospects and Problems

by Chester A. Crocker

Address before the National Btisiness
League, Dallas, Texas, on September 1 7.
1982. Mr. Crocker is Assistant Secretary
for African Affairs.

It is an honor to have this opportunity
to discuss the Administration's view of
the economic prospects and problems of
Africa before the National Business
League— the oldest national business
organization and the largest association
of minority business people in America.
It is a pleasure to be here in Texas
speaking on the subject of Africa. At
first glance the two have a good deal in
common. Both are vast in area. Both are
frontiers. Both are endowed with great
mineral and agricultural resources. Both
are marked by human diversity. There
are many differences as well, but one
stands out. Texas, by any standard, is
very, very rich. Africa, by comparison
with other continents, is distressingly
poor.

Today I would like to discuss with
you Africa's economic plight, its implica-
tions for U.S. foreign policy, what we in
government are attempting to do about
it, and how this effort can involve you,
as representatives of the private sector.

The African Economic Crisis

Africa, more than any other region, is
gravely threatened by economic crisis. It
is the only area of the world where na-
tional growth rates are often negative,
with more of the same predicted for the
rest of the 1980s unless there is rapid
improvement. It is the only continent
characterized by declining per capita
food production, the consequence of the
highest population growth rates in the
world combined with stagnating
agricultural production. Increased re-
quirements for food imports, combined
with the soaring cost of imported oil,
have pushed several important countries
close to bankruptcy. Normally, a situa-
tion where a nation's debt payments
amount to more than one-quarter of ex-
port earnings is considered dangerous.
But in two major African countries,
Sudan and Zaire, debt payments due in

1983 will exceed available export earn-
ings, leaving nothing for essential im-
ports. Either the countries will default,
which is unlikely, or their debt will be
"rolled over," or rescheduled. Neither
alternative is satisfactory. Even Africa's
more successful economies are, in
general, faced with unhealthy debt
burdens and insufficient rates of growth.

I could spend the next hour explain-
ing the causes of the African economic
crisis. They include a difficult, disaster-
prone environment, the afterglow of
political instability in many countries,
and a varying mixture of counter-
productive policies and institutional
weaknesses. During the 1960's, Africa
was shielded from the effect of struc-
tural economic weaknesses by relatively
high commodity prices combined with
relatively generous flows of foreign aid.
These conditions also encouraged some
African countries to borrow heavily
from private commercial banks.

With the onset of world recession,
however, the prices of African com-
modities plummeted, while the cost of
most imports remained relatively high.
Aid flows leveled off as the industrial-
ized countries, including the United
States, tightened budgetary belts. But
the debts still had to be paid; indeed,
new borrowing was often imperative.

It is now generally recognized, by
Africans as well as by foreign observers,
that Africa's special vulnerability to
world recession was usually exacerbated
by misguided economic policies. For ex-
ample, pricing systems have typically
been geared to keep food prices low,
penalizing farmer-producers in order to
benefit urban consumers whose political
support is usually critical for regime sur-
vival. Overvalued currencies have in ef-
fect taxed (and discouraged) exports of
all kinds, resulting in chronic balance-of-
payments crises.

From colonial predecessors, new
African governments often inherited
networks of sUite-owned businesses and
marketing boards. Originally designed to
channel colonial products to the mother
country, these so-called "parastatals"
have all too often assumed a new
primary function of providing employ-
ment, leaving productivity a secondary

Fii

ragi

consideration. The classic example is the i
crop marketing board in an East Afric;^
country which now pays its employees
more than it budgets to purchase cropsijure.

Foreign aid programs have ac-
complished much of positive and endur-
ing value in Africa, including the
elimination of several major diseases,
the provision of roads and railroads to
market crops and minerals, and the
creation of much invaluable educational
infrastructure in a continent which at
the time of independence was almost
totally lacking in universities and tech-
nical training facilities of all kinds. At
the same time, however, aid donors, oui^jj,
selves included, sometimes contributed
unwittingly to the growing economic
problem by subsidizing inefficient state
corporations and underwriting elaborate
government programs and "pilot proj-
ects" which— when the aid flows
stopped— governments often could not
afford to operate or maintain.

Impact on U.S. Interests

Africa's economic crisis has a multiple
impact on U.S. interests, which are in-
creasingly related to our most vital con-
cerns. For example, I am now heavily
engaged in negotiations which will, if
successful, achieve a peaceful settlemen
in Namibia and Angola and pave the
way toward reduced conflict and ex-
panded economic growth in southern
Africa. If we fail, we may witness a
spiral of turmoil that could destroy a
number of southern African countries
and would directly benefit our Cuban
and Soviet adversaries. Either way, the
repercussions will be global. Africa is n(
longer on the policy sidelines.

By threatening the stability of some
of our oldest friends and partners on th
continent, the African economic crisis
threatens virtually all of our broader
goals, including the search for peace in
southern Africa. It endangers U.S. and
allied access to valuable resources, in-
cluding the oil fields of West Africa and
the vital strategic minerals of southern
Africa. All too often, economic distress
generates starvation and refugees, prob
lems which can only be addressed
through expensive emergency relief pro
grams. While our government will re-
spond generously to humanitarian im-
peratives of this kind, we cerUiinly
prefer to spend money in a manner
more conducive to long-term develop-
ment. The economic collapse or default
of a major African country would pose

Department of State Bulletir

AFRICA

additional tlireat to the integrity of
" international financial system,
'eady under worrisome pressure else-
ere.

lat We Are Doing

r African economic policy is influ-
|ced by three fundamental facts.

First, U.S. aid to Africa, although
bstantial and increasing, is unlike-
— given budgetary pressures — to
perience dramatic growth. The same
es for other aid donors.

Second, as mentioned earlier, inade-
ate economic policies are one critical
pediment to development in many
rican countries.

Third, the present and potential
ntributions of the private sector — both
•eign and indigenous — to African eco-
mic growth vastly outweigh anything
it foreign aid can contribute.

' Helping People at Risk. The

vrious elements of our policy flow
rturally from consideration of these
t sic facts. Let me elaborate briefly: As
f. natter of highest priority, the United
J itcs continues to take the lead in help-
I ;■— and mobilizing others to help —
I man beings imperiled by strife and
.' irxation in Africa. The United States
\ s been foremost in assistance to inter-
I lidiial refugee programs and in pro-
\lin^^' opportunities for third-country
; ticment (several thousand African
I uuc'cs will come to the United States
1 s year). The Congress has recently ap-
1 imm! .$30 million for new activities de-
t.ned to provide refugee-related devel-
c ment opportunities, so that long-term
1 1'ugees will not be forced to live
J rpetually on the dole. Our refugee aid
1 Africa totaled about $110 million in
J cal year (FY) 1982, a quadrupling of
11' amount expended in 1978, mainly
','■ programs in Somalia, Sudan, and
■ ii-c. and for persons displaced by con-
■t 111 Chad.

Supporting Better Economic

!»licies. Second, under more normal
ndilions we are using our aid to en-
urage the process of policy reform,
aich is another way of saying that we
tend wherever possible to help those
ho have demonstrated a willingness to
'Ip themselves.

I might note that despite budgetary
instraints, U.S. economic aid to Africa
■quested for fiscal 1983 is $840 million
impared to the $737.6 million re-
nested in 1981— not including the
fugee assistance and emergency food

aid which I mentioned earlier. In addi-
tion to our bilateral programs, we are
maintaining a vigorous commitment to
the World Bank and the African Devel-
opment Bank and F'und. We are encour-
aging the World Bank to devote an in-
creasing share of its "soft loan" Interna-
tional Development Association funds to
Africa and are now completing arrange-
ments to join the African Development
Bank, recently opened to non-African
membership. Including our share of aid
disbursed through these multilateral in-
stitutions, total U.S. economic assistance
to Africa is well in excess of $1 billion

take the lead in proposing and support-
ing economic reforms. That is why their
continued health is vital to our own ef-
forts.

Supporting the Private Sector.

Having told you that the private sector
figures heavily in our policy, it is import-
ant that you understand what we mean
by that term in the African context. Our
definition is broad; it includes everything
that is not government owned, and it
most emphatically covers African as well
as foreign enterprise.

Africa's private sector is overwhelm-

The economic collapse or default of a major
African country would pose an additional threat to
the integrity of the international financial system,
already under worrisome pressure elsewhere.

annually. By contrast, total military aid
requested for fiscal 1983 is only one-fifth
of this amount.

Exactly how can we best deploy our
aid to encourage better economic
policies in Africa? This question taxes
our diplomatic skills, and those of our
colleagues in the Agency for Interna-
tional Development (AIID), on a daily
basis. I can assure you it is not a matter
of bribing foreign governments to go
against their own inclinations. Reforms
must come from each government's own
political will. Even in the poorest coun-
tries we have neither the vast sums of
money required, nor the inclination, to
"buy" changes of policy.

Our approval involves working with
Africans to identify potentially success-
ful programs and policies and then using
our resources to support them. Often, as
we well know from our own domestic
experience, the initial phases of an
economic reform measure involve ex-
pense and dislocation. Properly de-
ployed, our aid can ease such burdens
for those governments courageous and
enlightened enough to assume them.

Encouraging policy reform also
means working closely both with other
donors and with the World Bank and In-
ternational Monetary Fund. Because of
their great resources, expertise, and im-
partiality as international institutions,
these multilateral organizations often

ingly a realm of small operators— farm-
ers, fishermen, artisans, cooperatives.
The archetype is that dynamo of small-
scale capitalism, the woman market en-
trepreneur who dominates much
indigenous retailing, the so-called "infor-
mal sector," in West Africa. All too
often such small producers and mer-
chants have been ignored or discouraged
by proliferating and sometimes preda-
tory bureaucracies, and there is little
doubt that on a per capita basis, Africa
has more bureaucracy than any other
continent. More than any other factor,
government-run marketing schemes
combined with government-set prices
have denied the farmer a fair return for
his produce, and that, in a nutshell, is
why Africa today spends even more on
imported food than on imported oil.

For many reasons foreign or multi-
national enterprise is a less significant
element in Africa than such small-scale
local capitalism. In many countries
markets are too small, skills and infra-
structure too scarce, to attract and sus-
tain big business. Nevertheless, Ameri-
can trade and investment is already by
far the most significant element in our
economic presence in Africa, and it has
great potential for further growth.

I should dwell on that word growth
for a moment. It is in large part because
we recognize the overwhelming import-
ance of helping Africa achieve higher
economic growth rates that we want to

ovember 1982

AFRICA

encourage the private sector. For it is
only through the private sector, whether
large or small, indigenous or foreign,
that significant growth will occur. If
African experience over the last decade
proves anything, it is the folly of assum-
ing that one can achieve popular welfare
goals via purely government actions
while neglecting growth. Redistributing
poverty is a dead end.

Let me now describe an imaginary
African case and illustrate for you a few
of the ways in which our policy can re-
spond, partly by engaging and support-
ing the private sector. Our hypothetical
country has just agreed to embark on a
tough, economic stabilization program.
Debts have been rescheduled and cur-
rency devalued in order to restore
balance-of-payments equilibrium. While
temporarily free from the threat of
default, capital resources are perilously
scarce. The government has imposed
tough limits on domestic spending to
keep down inflation. Although these
austerity measures are essential to
restore and maintain stability they in-
volve great hardship, limiting invest-
ment both in development projects and
in private enterprise. At least for the
moment, business firms are starved for
foreign exchange.

In this kind of situation there are a
number of ways that aid donors can
help. They can provide some of the
capital needed for development projects.
Through commodity import programs,
they can ease the damaging impact of
foreign exchange constraints on private
firms by channeling assistance directly
to the most growth-oriented sectors of
the economy. In short, external assist-
ance can help both to alleviate and to
achieve the transition from austerity to
growth. It can, thereby, demonstrate
our awareness of the effort and sacrifice
being made by a friendly government
and our willingness to help.

Once economic stability is achieved
and growth resumes, additional meas-
ures become relevant. We can provide a
range of more traditional aid, including
technical assistance and institution-
building measures which will help small-
scale African farmers and entre-
preneurs. As opportunities for larger
scale investments develop, there will be
an expanding role for U.S. firms and for
the various programs— including the
Overseas Private Investment Corpora-
tion and the Export-Import Bank—
which are available to encourage U.S.
trade and investment. As they interact
with their African partners, U.S. firms

can provide much additional technical
and managerial expertise, all of it rele-
vant to the achievement of economic
growth and welfare. It is for this reason
that African leaders across the political
spectrum, from market-oriented
moderates to old-line Marxists, are to-
day increasingly eager, both in public
and private, for additional U.S. trade
and investment.

Minority Involvement

That, painted in very broad strokes, is
the new dimension of our strategy. Now
I would like to turn briefly to the im-
plications for you, as black Americans
and businessmen. I don't want to gloss
over the difficulties imposed by world
recession and Africa's economic crisis.
Although there are some very signifi-
cant exceptions and bright spots, Africa
is not, in general, an easy place to do
business, even for the largest of multi-
national firms. It takes perseverance, a
great deal of careful preparation and
dialogue with African decisionmakers,
and an underlying faith in Africa's long-
term growth potential. But you do have
a role to play and one which may in-
crease sharply in the future.

To begin with, I would note that the
sympathetic interest of black Americans
in Africa is extremely important as a
sustaining factor in our policy. It en-
courages Congress to provide the aid re-
sources we need, and it sharpens aware-
ness of Africa in the minds of senior
policymakers. So even when black
Americans outside government disagree
with the executive branch on specific
issues, as is sometimes the case, we can
only welcome and encourage their in-
terest.

And despite the present difficulties
which I have described, Africa should
engage your interest as businessmen.
Black American firms such as Johnson
Products of Chicago are already in-
volved in Africa. President Hagans of
the National Business League was
among those who participated in the
first Cabinet-level trade mission to
Africa last January. Mayor Ferre of
Miami is involved in organizing a trade
fair which will introduce African entre-
preneurs to minority businessmen in
Florida with the aim of encouraging
trade between the United States and
Africa, and joint venture partnerships
between Africans and Americans. Both
the Commerce Department and AID

maintain offices which are charged with
encouraging the increased participation- *"'
of minority firms in our export and
foreign assistance programs. Congres-
sional approval of the Administration-
supported bill legalizing export trading
companies would make it much easier
for small and medium businesses of all
kinds to operate in Africa by enabling
smaller operators to share the often
great ovchead costs involved in Africai '*
operations

Among the innovations launched by
this Administration is AID's new Bureai '•
of Private Enterprise, established
specifically to help increase develop-
ment-oriented private sector resources
in the less developed countries (LDCs).
The bureau's program includes new
methods of financing private enterprise
projects, a wide range of advisory ser-
vices, and funding of feasibility studies
through the closely associated Trade an
Development Program, which may be o
particular interest to small and medium
U.S. businesses.

Finally. I would underline that the
impediments imposed by world recessic
will be lessened as our own domestic
economy recovers, increasing the rangt
of business opportunities for all
Americans in Africa. U.S. recovery wil
help to benefit all developing countries
by expanding markets for African as
well as other Third World exporters.
The United States currently takes aboi
half of all the manufactured goods ex-
ported by the non-OPEC developing
countries to the industrialized world. A
President Reagan stated before the Ca '
cun conference, every 1% reduction in
U.S. interest rates due to lower inflatic
improves the balance of payments of th
LDCs by $1 billion.

irk

Conclusion

In concluding, I would like to reempha-
size the extent to which both American
and Africans will gain from acceleratin.:
African economic growth. It has becom
a truism that more than ever before,
I'.S. prosperity depends on trade with
developing countries. Today we export
more to them than to Europe and Japa
combined. However, the developing na-
tions in question are largely the middle
income, high-growth countries— the
Brazils, Mexicos, and Singapores. Our
total exports to sub-Saharan Africa, in-
cluding South Africa, still amount to le;
than 3% of our global total and less tha
one-tenth of our total exports to the
LDCs.

AFRICA

Nevertheless, for a number of
sons, we can be optimistic about the
ure. Although still relatively small,
■ trade with Africa has been growing
a high rate compared to other areas,
•ica's future potential is undeniable
en its enormous resources of
lerals, energy, and unexploited arable
d.

It is important to remember that
■eral of today's more dramatic LDC
:cess stories faced apparently insolu-
economic problems only a few years
ref). In 1960, to cite two examples,
ny American observers regarded
uth Korea as a hopeless case, de-
ved both of natural resources and
;essary entrepreneurial skills by the
ly fact of partition. In India it ap-
ired that we were pouring our aid
lars into an economic quagmire,
itined for perpetual dependency on
,11 lers. Only a few years ago speeches
itten in my own Bureau of African
fairs habitually illustrated Africa's
d problems by drawing gloomy
•allels with India.
Today it seems that things have
mged. The Indians have virtually
lieved food grain self-sufficiency and

increasingly capable of financing
/elopment needs by borrowing from
vate capital markets. The Koreans
/e achieved one of the economic
racles which inflates LDC trade
tistics. Their rapid expansion into
w industrial export sectors is a
illenge to even the most sophisticated
irket economies. These cases are not
ique; a number of other former reci-
■nts of massive U.S. aid have achieved
are approaching self-sustaining
Dwth, providing in the process a bet-
standard of living for their citizens
d a healthy stimulus to world trade.

The African states are at an earlier
ige of the same process, often still in

most profoundly difficult stage of
st independence and far less well
uipped by their colonial experience to
ike a smooth transition to prosperity,
't there can be no doubt that the tran-
ion is already underway. Our
allenge is to speed up the process, for,
the extent that we do so, we will be
long the beneficiaries. ■

Visit of Liberian Commander in Chief Doe

Commander in Chief Samuel Kanvon Doe, head of state of the Republic of Liberia, made
an official working visit to Washington, D.C., August 16-19, 1982. He met with President
Reagan on August 17. ■

ARMS CONTROL

Nuclear Arms Control and

the Future of U.S.-Soviet Relations

by Eugene V. Rostow

Address before the Los Angeles
World Affairs Council, Los Angeles,
California, on September 10, 1982. Mr.
Rostow is Director of the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency.

My assignment is to contemplate the
future of the Soviet-American relation-
ship in the perspective of arms con-
trol—more particularly, in the perspec-
tive of our bilateral negotiations about
nuclear weapons. To recall Dr. Johnson,
nuclear arms control is one of those sub-
jects which concentrate the mind. It is
of special value in revealing the several
realities of the Soviet- American relation-
ship and the way in which they interact.

In attempting to carry out my
assignment, I thought it would be useful
to review the state of our nuclear arms
negotiations with the Soviet Union— to
report on where we are, and to peer
through the glass darkly at the road
ahead. As you know, two parallel Soviet-
American negotiations are going on in
Geneva. One deals primarily with Soviet
intermediate-range nuclear weapons,
those capable of being launched from the
Soviet Union against targets in Western
Europe, Japan, China, and the Middle
East; the other deals with the inter-
continental nuclear weapons on both
sides. The talks on intermediate-range
weapons, called the INF [intermediate-
range nuclear forces] talks, began in
November 1981, and are being con-
ducted for us by Ambassador Paul H.
Nitze. The START [Strategic Arms Re-
duction Talks] talks on nuclear weapons
of intercontinental range began in June
1982 under Ambassador Edward L.
Rowny.

We have agreed with the Soviet
representatives that the details of the
INF and START negotiations be kept
confidential. But we have also made it
clear to them that the Government of
the United States has the duty to keep
our people fully informed about the
broad principles which govern our ap-
proach to the negotiations and the way
in which they are developing. I have pre-
pared my talk with full respect for these
rules.

The INF and START talks are inex-
tricably linked, for reasons both of
security and of technology. The security

reason for that linkage is so obvious that
it is often taken to be self-evident and
left unexplained. But the nuclear balance
has been changing, and we can no
longer take our traditional positions on
these matters for granted. The political
consequences of the changing nuclear
balance should be faced head-on.

Looking back at the cycles of turbu-
lence and stability since 1945, we have
all come to realize, I think, that while
the possibility of nuclear war can never
be altogether excluded, especially in the
case of countries governed by irrational
political leaders, the principal signifi-
cance of nuclear weapons is political.
The political radiation of nuclear
arsenals can be significant either for
defense or for aggression— as a defen-
sive deterrent, on the one hand, or as an
aggressive instrument of political coer-
cion, on the other. It is thus apparent
that the INF and START talks involved
the most fundamental issue of our
foreign policy, the credibility of our
security guaranties. Those guaranties all
turn ultimately on the deterrent power
of the American nuclear umbrella. The
pressures of the Soviet race for nuclear
supremacy during the last 10 years have
intensified doubts about the continued
effectiveness of the American nuclear
deterrent— the rock on which the
renaissance of the West since 1945 was
built and the foundation for its security.
Uncertainties on this basic point could
lead to fatal miscalculations. A most im-
portant goal of our foreign policy as a
whole, and thus of our arms control
policy, is to restore full confidence in
those guaranties on the part of friend
and adversary alike.

The expansionist nature of Soviet
foreign policy and the recent changes in
the Soviet-American military balance —
particularly with regard to nuclear
weapons — directly challenge the major
premise of modern American foreign
policy. That premise is distilled from the
harsh experience of two world wars
which strong allied diplomacy could easi-
ly have prevented. It has been accepted
by every President since 1945, and
spelled out in long series of treaties,
joint resolutions of the Congress, and
other national commitments. Its essence

is that the United States can no longer i
live in neutral isolation but must prote* m
its interest in the world balance of
power by preventing Soviet dominatior
of Western Europe, Asia, or the Middl
East at a minimum. The Concert of
Europe which protected that American
security interest for a century before
1914 does not exist. We can no longer
take shelter behind the British fleet. If:
the job is to be done, we must take theliidi
lead in organizing the coalitions to do ii k
To recall the language of the North
Atlantic Treaty under which NATO is
established, and which is expressed in
other security arrangements as well, a
attack on these vital areas must also b
considered an attack on the United
States. In contemplating the future,
every nation must take this permanent!la[«
and immutable geopolitical interest of
the United States fully into account.

Outside the government, American
who write and speak about foreign
policy may forget this ultimate truth a*
flirt nostalgically with the isolationist
ideas of the 19th century. Occasionally
the government of the day may do so
for a time, under the pressure of even^l
But those who bear the responsibility
government cannot enjoy the luxury o <
escapism. The world should understam i
that the instincts for self-preservation
a politically mature people will always
dominate American foreign policy in tl
end. As President Reagan has made
clear, the I'nited States will not retrea
to "Fortress America" but will defend
alliances and interests throughout the
world. What is at stake in the INF ancipf
START talks is nothing less than our
capacity to carry out that policy throu{>
deterrence based on alliance solidarity
that is, through peaceful means and nci^,
by war.

The technical reason why the INF
and START talks must be viewed
together is equally simple. It is that
intermediate- and intercontinental-ranfi
nuclear weapons do not constitute
separate categories: Soviet weapons
capable of hitting New York or Chicag
could also be fired at London or TokyoL
There is, therefore, no way to evaluate
the INF balance except in'the START
context. We cannot allow the whipsaw ,,

the

4ir

'"!

id I

ARMS CONTROL

;at of Soviet INF and strateg-ic

:es to separate us from our allies and

»p us from defending the security in-
!sts of the nation.
The United States is, therefore,
,ely coordinating the INF and
\RT talks, which are based on the
le analysis. Through these talks in
dem, we are trying to achieve the
le goal — a radical reduction of the
iet and American nuclear arsenals in
lanner conducive to stability.

k'iew of Negotiating Efforts

'ore we can consider how the INF
1 START talks are progressing, we
st agree on the criteria to be applied
udging their utility. To that end, let
briefly recall the analysis from which
negotiating position is derived and
implications of the goal we are try-
to achieve. President Reagan is
ermined to take full advantage of our
as control experience during the
Os. That effort has required a re-
imination of the role of nuclear
apons and the arms control doctrines
;he United States and the Soviet
an.

How should we define what we are
king through the INF and START
iS? The place to begin, we concluded
re than a year ago, is to take a fresh
■k at the nuclear weapon itself. We
re been living with it since 1945. The
■ly assumption that the nuclear
apon was a magic force for peace has
.g since faded away. Even when we
i a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and
•n great nuclear superiority, we had
use conventional forces — and those
ne — to counter a long cycle of ag-
?ssion by the Soviets and their sur-
jates. Save in a few important situa-
ns of extreme tension, we found the
;trine of "massive retaliation" to be an
pty threat.
Since the late 1950s, at least, the
mary strategic goal of the Soviet pro-
am of expansion has been to achieve
rid dominance by separating Western
irope from the United States and
nada. To achieve this goal, the Soviet
lion has been and is seeking to
tflank Europe from the north and the
uth, thus bringing the entire Eurasian
id mass under Soviet control and, on
at basis, taking over Africa and the
ddle East. That done, the Soviet
iders believe, Japan and the other na-
ns of the Pacific basin would accept
viet suzerainty as inevitable; the
oples of Europe would lose hope; and

the United States would be isolated,
with no choice but to aquiesce in Soviet
hegemony. All our experience in our
bilateral nuclear arms talks with the
Soviet Union is consistent with this
hypothesis. Soviet strategy in SALT I
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] and
SALT II, seems to be dominated by two
ideas: to divide the United States from
its allies and to prevent the moderniza-
tion of the American Armed Forces.
These are the main Soviet themes in the
negotiation as they are the main themes
of Soviet arms control propaganda.

Since the end of the Second World
War, the United States and its allies
have never stopped trying to persuade
the Soviet Union that this course was
the classic road to disaster. Nor have

The consequences of nuclear war would
be immeasurably worse.

The United States made its first pro-
posal to eliminate the nuclear threat in
1946, when we had a monopoly of
nuclear arms and nuclear technology. In
the Baruch Plan we offered to put the
whole of nuclear science under interna-
tional control. Looking back, it is ob-
vious that the Soviet refusal even to
consider that offer was one of the most
destructive turning points in the history
of the cold war.

The offer of the Baruch Plan does
not stand alone. During the 1950s,
President Eisenhower proposed the
"open skies" plan, which has had far-
reaching influence even though it was
not formally accepted. The first major

The pressures of the Soviet race for nuclear
supremacy during the last 10 years have inten-
sified doubts about the continued effectiveness of
the American nuclear deterrent — the rock on which
the renaissance of the West since 1945 was built
and the foundation for its security.

they flagged in their efforts to convince
the leaders of the Soviet Union that a
constructive alternative was always
available — the alternative of genuine
East- West cooperation, based on respect
by each side for the legitimate security
interests of the other and for the rules
of the U.N. Charter against aggression.
To this end, with varying degrees of suc-
cess, the allies sought to contain Soviet
expansion and proposed a long series of
agreements designed to induce the
Soviet Union to pursue its ambitions in
world politics only by peaceful means.
Among these proposals, those addressed
to the nuclear menace have been of quite
particular significance.

From the beginning of the nuclear
age nearly 40 years ago, the American
people and their government have been
convinced — and rightly convinced — that
nuclear weapons are revolutionizing both
warfare and world politics and that ex-
traordinary steps are required to protect
civilization from the unthinkable disaster
of nuclear war. Conventional war has
profoundly damaged the fabric of
civilization during this turbulent century.

step in the control of nuclear arms was
achieved in 1963 in the Limited Test
Ban Treaty. The Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty followed in 1968.

Beyond these agreements, there are
treaties barring weapons of mass
destruction from the Antarctic and from
outer space and the cycle of agreements
which are our primary concern today —
the Soviet-American SALT agreements
and the INF and START negotiations.
SALT I comprised two agreements — the
Interim Agreement limiting offensive
strategic weapons, which expired in
1977, and the ABM Treaty, which
severely restricts systems for inter-
cepting and destroying ballistic missiles.
The ABM Treaty is of indefinite dura-
tion. SALT I and SALT II disappointed
the claims made for them and the expec-
tations they generated. Against the
background of the Soviet nuclear build-
up under the SALT I Interim Agree-
ment, SALT II would have sanctioned
continued increases in Soviet nuclear
capabilities to threaten world stability.

What is the moral of this cycle of ex-
perience for the policies President

Dvember1982

ARMS CONTROL

Reagan has proposed in the INF and
START talks? First, we are more con-
vinced than ever that the efforts of the
United States since 1946 to eliminate
the possibility of nuclear war were wise
and necessary. They should be inten-
sified, not relaxed or abandoned. Se-
cond, it is obvious that no impregnable
wall can be erected between nuclear and
conventional war. A nuclear stalemate
will not be worth having if it is treated
simply as a license for conventional wars
of all against all.

In order to eliminate nuclear war,
the nations must also eliminate conven-
tional war: that is, the struggle to save
mankind from nuclear catastrophe must
be conceived as part of a wider struggle
to establish world public order itself.
The issue is not colonialism, or capital-
ism, or communism, or democracy, or
the so-called arms race. It is aggression.

In order to eliminate
nuclear war, the nations
must also eliminate con-
ventional war: that is,
the struggle to save
mankind from nuclear
catastrophe must be con-
ceived as part of a wider
struggle to establish
world public order itself.

The motives for aggression are irrele-
vant. And the arms race is the symptom
and consequence, not the cause, of the
breakdown in world public order. We
live in a small, interdependent, and
dangerous world. In that world, our
world with its ominous nuclear dimen-
sion, aggression should be inadmissible,
and peace should be indivisible.

As President Reagan has said, we
can no longer tolerate a "double stand-
ard" with regard to Soviet aggression or
aggression by any other power. Both we
and the Soviet Union must obey the
same rules with regard to the interna-
tional use of force— the rules to which
we both agreed when we signed the
U.N. Charter. Unless these neutral and
universal principles are generally and
impartially enforced, they will cease to

have any influence on the behavior of
states. In President Reagan's phrase,
the nations must not merely condemn
aggression; they must prevent it and en-
force the rules against it.

Problems of INF and START
Negotiations

I now turn to the specific problems of
INF and START negotiations. A year
ago a consensus emerged within the Ad-
ministration on certain key propositions
as the foundation for our negotiating ap-
proach in the two negotiations. The first
and most important was that we should
discard the premise that the United
States and the Soviet Union shared the
same view of nuclear weapons and the
same goal for nuclear arms control
negotiations. Ten years ago most
Americans took that hypothesis for
granted. Today it cannot be entertained
at all. Officials used to assure us that
the Soviet Union was only interested in
equality, recognition as a great power,
and a place in the sun and that when it
achieved parity with the United States it
would stop enlarging its armed forces.
No one can say that after what hap-
pened during the 1970s.

For the United States, the only ac-
ceptable use for nuclear arms is in
defense of our supreme national in-
terests and those of our allies against
the use of nuclear weapons and other
forms of aggression. Our nuclear arsenal
is defensive in character, and its mission
is to deter aggression by presenting a
visible and credible capacity to retaliate.

It is now obvious that the Soviet
Union marches to a different drummer.
While we in the West have been primari-
ly concerned with deterring both conven-
tional and nuclear attacks, Soviet doc-
trine and forces emphasize the ability to
fight and win a nuclear war. Of course,
the Soviet Government would prefer to
have the fruits of military victory
without having to wage war. To achieve
that end, it believes, the nuclear
superiority it is trying so hard to attain
would be a political force of overpower-
ing influence— the ultimate instrument
of coercion and intimidation. The func-
tion of Soviet military superiority is to
paralyze the American nuclear deterrent
by threatening to overwhelm it, and
thus make Soviet aggression with con-
ventional forces possible. More than 75%
of the Soviet strategic nuclear force con-
sists of intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs)— swift, accurate, and extreme-
ly destructive first-strike weapons which
could destroy missiles deployed in

hardened silos. Less than one-third of
the American force consists of ICBMs.
In addition, the Soviet Union has an
intermediate-range ballistic missile fore
which, as yet, has no American counter
part. The Soviets currently have
deployed at least 324 SS-20 launchers,
265 SS-4S, and 15 SS-5s. They have
1,232 warheads in all. With one refire
missile per launcher, these intermediatii
range missiles may have over 2,000
nuclear warheads, almost all of which
can reach West European targets. The
balance, all deployed on mobile SS-20
launchers, are now targeted from
eastern Siberia. Given the transportabi
ty and range of the SS-20, all of these
could be moved within reach of Europe'
The United States has no weapons at a<
in this class. Partially to counter this
threat, our Pershing II intermediate-
range ballistic missile and ground-basec
cruise missile are in development and
are scheduled for modest deployment ii
Europe late in 1983.

The Soviet lead in ground-based
intermediate-range and intercontinenta
ballistic missiles is one of the most
serious foreign policy problems we fac€
This advantage gives the Soviet Union
the potential to destroy all of Europe o
Japan and many targets in other parts
of the world at a time when a pre-
emptive first strike with its intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles could in theor
also destroy all our ICBM force, that
portion of our submarines that are in
port, and those of our bombers that ar
at their bases.

The combination of these doomsda;
possibilities is a recipe for nuclear coer
cion that could split our alliances and
leave us isolated in the Western Hemi-
sphere. Henry Kissinger deepened
Western anxiety about the nuclear im-
balance a few years ago with his cele-
brated comment that great powers do
not commit suicide on behalf of their
allies. Former President Nixon has nov
made nuclear anxiety in this sense mor
acute. In an article in the New York
Times on August 19, 1982, he says:

The Soviet Union's achievement of
superiority in land-based nuclear missiles ha
made our nuclear strength no longer a credi
ble deterrent against Moscow's creeping ex-
pansionism, in Africa, Asia, Latin America
and the Middle East. We will not again be
able to use the threat of that power as Pres
dent Kennedy did in the Cuban missile crisi;
in 1962, when we had a 15-to-l advantage,
or even as I was able to do during the Arab
Israeli war in 1973, when our advantage wa
far less but still formidable. Even if we

ucei

iet-;

tag-

ler

Department of State Bulleti

»em

ARMS CONTROL

Dre the balance of those nuclear forces,
vill not fully restore their deterrent ef-
for such purposes. A threat of mutual
de is simply not credible.

Political anxieties about the
erican nuclear umbrella would exist
1 if Dr. Kissinger and President
on had not spoken. They are what
ncellor Schmidt has called "sub-
„ nal" emanations of the Soviet
lear arsenal and the state of the
iet-American nuclear balance. They
there because we allowed the
ear balance to deteriorate during the
Os. We shall have to live with the
sequences of that mistake until the
nee is restored by some combination
imerican force modernization and
IS control agreements.
The fears generated by the changing
lear balance are manifest in many
ns— in the antinuclear demonstra-
s and other movements for unilateral
rmament, isolationism, and accom-
lation, on the one hand, and for
lear proliferation, on the other. If
ie movements prevail, here, in
ope, and in Asia, we shall wake up
day soon in a different world.
"' In the light of these considerations,
isident Reagan decided to make the
.3 oval of the destabilizing Soviet ad-
gtage in ground-based ballistic
uiles the first goal of our nuclear
iis control effort and the first aspect
she problem for us to take up with
] Soviet Union. We were slightly
,1'ad of the Soviet Union in the number
v'arheads on deployed ICBMs in
,2.

In 1982 the Soviets have a lead in
crucial area of approximately three
me. It follows that they have the
Dretical capacity to execute a pre-
Dtive first strike by destroying our
!Ms and other nuclear forces with a
;tion of their forces, holding the rest
in ominous reserve which could
alyze our remaining strategic forces,
en the Soviet intermediate-range
istic missiles are counted, the Soviet
antage in this category becomes even
her. Until this Soviet advantage in
lear forces is eliminated, it will not
i possible to achieve political stability.
The New York Times put the issue
1 in an editorial entitled "How Much
Snough?" on April 11, 1982. The task
irms control diplomacy, the Times
j, is to allow the United States to
intain deterrence "which has kept the
ustrial world at peace for the longest
etch in history" and "to forbid the
apons which defy deterrence ....

member 1982

That done, the arms race can subside.
Unless it is done, there will never be
enough."

U.S. Approach to INF Talks

This view of the matter is the basis for
our approach to the INF and START
talks. What we are seeking in these
talks is to establish nuclear stability at
equal and much lower levels of force— a
posture on each side which would permit
us to deter both nuclear war and other
forms of aggression against our supreme
interests. Such a policy would deny the
Soviet Union the capacity for nuclear
blackmail based on its present superiori-
ty in ground-based intermediate-range
and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The U.S. position in these talks was
explained by President Reagan in his
speech of November 18, 1981. During
the first round of the INF talks begin-
ning in November 1981, the U.S. delega-
tion laid out the broad priniciples
underlying the U.S. approach, defined
the elements of an agreement which
would take into account the legitimate
interests of the two sides, and in
February 1982 presented the text of a
draft treaty which would implement
those elements. The Soviet side
elaborated somewhat on the positions
that had been set forth by Chairman
Brezhnev before the negotiations had
begun and offered its criticism of the
U.S. position. Mr. Brezhnev's plan has
two elements: A moratorium for the
duration of the negotiations and a pro-
gram of reductions based on the
assumption that both sides are now
equal in intermediate-range missiles. The
Soviets have proposed a limit of 300
"systems" for each side by 1990.

During the second round, beginning
in May, the Soviet delegation presented
a draft text of an agreement which
would embody the Soviet position. The
United States offered its criticisms of
the Soviet position and a full analysis of
the issues between the sides.

As the third round of the INF
negotiations is scheduled to begin at the
end of this month, it is appropriate to
review some of the major issues as they
have emerged. You will remember that
in 1976 the Soviet Union began the de-
ployment of a new mobile and MIRVed
[multiple independently-targetable re-
entry vehicle] intermediate-range missile
system— the SS-20— as a replacement
for the older fixed single-warhead
systems on which it had relied for many
years. The SS - 20s are highly accurate;

can strike all important targets in
Europe, even from locations in the mid-
dle of Siberia; and have a short time of
flight. They represent a threat different
in kind, not just in degree, from the
systems they have been replacing.

In 1979 the NATO nations unani-
mously agreed that it was necessary to
counter this threat unless it was
withdrawn. It was decided that the
United States should move to deploy in
Europe two somewhat comparable
systems, the Pershing II ballistic missile
and the BGM-109G ground-launched
cruise missile and simultaneously seek
negotiations with the Soviet Union for
the limitation of comparable systems on
both sides. On November 18, 1981,
President Reagan proposed that both
the United States and the U.S.S.R. en-
tirely forego such systems— the zero/
zero solution.

The Soviet Union has not yet gone
beyond its position that the INF talks
are exclusively concerned with stability
in the European theater. The United
States insists that the INF problem is
global and that the cause of world peace
would not be advanced by exporting the
Soviet INF nuclear advantage to Asia.

The Soviet Union also continues to
claim that the United States and the
Soviet Union have approximately the
same number of intermediate-range
nuclear weapons in the European
theater and, therefore, that the NATO
decision to deploy 572 Pershing II and
ground-based cruise missiles in Europe
is "provocative" and "destabilizing." The
Soviet claim rests on two untenable
propositions— first, that the British and
French nuclear forces must be counted
with the American forces and, second,
that American bombers, submarine-
launched missiles, and cruise missiles
should be treated as equivalent to the
Soviet SS-20. The Soviet calculations go
beyond even these errors. In order to
demonstrate the supposed equality of
the two INF forces in Europe, the
Soviet Union must count all American
weapons as relevant— including
American dual-purpose aircraft, as well
as FB-llls, all of which are located in
the United States— and also exclude
many categories of the Soviet arsenal.

The principal issue between the sides
centers on the treatment to be accorded
the SS-20s and comparable missiles on
the Soviet side, and the Pershing II and
BGM-109G on the United States side.
Whereas the United States draft treaty
would ban them on both sides, the
Soviet treaty would eliminate them only

ARMS CONTROL

on the U.S. side; the Soviet side would
be permitted to have up to 300 laun-
chers for such missiles in the European
portion of the Soviet Union and an
unlimited number in the far-eastern por-
tion of the Soviet Union.

In addition to this wholly one-sided
treatment proposed by the Soviets as to
the central issues, their proposed treaty
would have other unequal effects. The
Warsaw Pact has some 7,000 nuclear-
capable aircraft in Europe, of which
some 2,500 are assigned to nuclear com-
bat roles. NATO has approximately one-
third of the latter number; almost all
U.S. nuclear-capable planes located in
Europe are dual capable. The U.S. con-

tribution to the conventional defense of
Europe is almost wholly dependent on
such dual-capable planes. Yet, the Soviet
draft treaty would have the effect of
forcing the almost total withdrawal from
Europe of such U.S. dual-capable air-
craft, while not affecting most Soviet
dual-capable aircraft.

This effect results in part from the
Soviet proposal that U.K. and French
nuclear-capable systems be included
under the aggregate ceiling limiting U.S.
and Soviet intermediate-range missiles
and aircraft. This proposal is both
technically flawed and inequitable in
principle. First, most of these U.K. and
French forces are not, in fact.

intermediate-range (or what the Soviei
call medium-range); they are SLBM
[submarine-launched ballistic missile]
forces identical with Soviet and U.S.
SLBM forces. Most of the remainder i
nuclear-capable aircraft. The Soviet
predominance in intermediate-range,
nuclear-capable systems in Europe is s
great that there would be no justifica-
tion for compensation to the Soviet
Union for British and French nuclear
forces even if they were under NATO
command.

Beyond this technical flaw, the cla
of the Soviet Union for nuclear forces
equal to or superior to those of all oth
nations combined would be unjustified

Arms Control Negotiations

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
SEPT. 21, 1982'

In our efforts to help build a more stable
and peaceful world, there is no more
essential objective than to shape defense
and arms control policies which will
guarantee the safety of our nation and
of our allies. Shortly after assuming of-
fice, I called for a comprehensive evalua-
tion of our arms control policies and pro-
posals for new initiatives. In doing so, I
outlined the general principles which
should guide formation of our arms con-
trol policies.

• Arms control must be an instru-
ment of, and not a substitute for, a
coherent security policy aimed in the
first instance at the Soviet advantage in
the most destabilizing class of weapons
— those on ballistic missiles and especial-
ly intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs). We will work for agreements
that truly enhance .security by reinforc-
ing peace through deterrence.

• We must seek agreements which
involve substantial and militarily signifi-
cant reductions on both sides.

• Agreements must be based on the
principle of equality of rights and limits.

• Arms control agreements must in-
clude effective means of verification.
They cannot be ba.sed on trust alone.

• Our efforts will be guided by
seriousness of purpose, reflected in our
willingness to seek reduction to
significantly lower levels of nuclear
forces based on equal, balanced levels of
comparable systems.

These principles are in full accord
with the basic purpose for both U.S. and
NATO security policy — insuring the
peace through deterrence of aggression.
Deterring nuclear or conventional attack
against ourselves or our allies must
guide our approach to defense and arms
control. These principles also lie at the
heart of the comprehensive and in-
novative arms control approaches which
this Administration has adopted. In each
of the three most important areas of
arms control — strategic nuclear arms,
intermediate-range nuclear forces, and
conventional forces in Europe — we have
presented to the Soviet Union bold and
equitable proposals — proposals which
are in our mutual interest and which
provide the opportunity to enhance
world security and peace by significantly
reducing the arsenals of both sides.

In each of these three negotiations,
the United States has presented con-
sidered and equitable proposals which
seek to establish a military equilibrium
at reduced levels, eliminate the most
destabilizing factors in the existing
military balance, and enhance the secu-
rity of both sides. When our national
security, and that of our allies, is at
stake, we must approach arms control
realistically. We do not seek agreements
for their own sake; we seek them to
build international .security and stability.
This Administration's reductions pro-
posals for strategic and intermediate-
range nuclear forces and for conven-
tional forces reflect this approach. We

are encouraged by the serious and bus
nesslike conduct of these negotiations
thus far. Although much hard bargain
ing lies ahead, I am determined to
bargain in good faith until our objecti\
can be realized. We urge on our Sovie
negotiating partners equal seriousness
of purpose.

Our arms control policies will con-
tinue to receive my close personal attt
tion. Ambassadors Rowny, Nitze, and
Starr [Edward L. Rowny, special repr
sentative for arms control and disarm
ment negotiations; Paul H. Nitze, hea^
of the U.S. delegation to the inter-
mediate-range nuclear force negotia-
tions; and Richard F. Starr, head of tl
U.S. delegation on mutual reduction o
forces and armaments and associated
measures in central Europe] have bee;
in Washington recently during schedu
recesses in the negotiations. In each
area, we have carefully assessed the
status of negotiations and our positior
In each case the negotiations remain c
course, and our three negotiators will
return shortly with a renewed mandat
to pursue our objectives. Prior to theii
departure. Ambassadors Rowny and
Nitze will brief the Congress on the
negotiations. Such regular consultatioi
are also an essential part of our ap-
proach. This Administration can have
higher purpose than to achieve progre
toward meaningful arms control whici"
promotes international peace and secu

ty^

'Text from White House press release.

ARMS CONTROL

3 a demand for absolute security for
country, which is tantamount to ab-
ite insecurity for all other countries.
;hort, it is a Soviet demand for
emony. This will never be acceptable
he United States.

This Soviet demand is inappropriate
.nother way as well. The INF
otiations are bilateral negotiations
kveen the United States and the
I.S.R.; neither the United Kingdom
France has authorized either the
ted States or the Soviet Union to
otiate on their behalf. On the con-
_y, they have stated their refusal to
e their forces limited or compensated
in negotiations between us. From
tr standpoint, their nuclear forces are
itegic; they represent their last line
lefense in a potentially threatened
ition.

There are a number of other impor-
t issues separating the two sides,
ch progress, however, has been
ieved by the two delegations in sort-
out what is important to each side
illuminating the way to possible
Gitions. A serious atmosphere has
vlved in the INF talks. It is clear that
itentiality exists for accommodating
analytic concepts used by both sides.
Vat is not yet clear is whether the
iiiet Union is willing to accept agree-
nt based exclusively on the principle
Jieterrence.

];. Position in START

' ' first 2-month round of the START
(Otiations has now been completed.
' 'y are, of course, at an earlier stage
1- n the INF talks, but the atmosphere
5 orrespondingly serious and business-
1.

The U.S. position was outlined in
^^■sident Reagan's speech at Eureka
lege on May 9, 1982. Its essential
1 is that of equal ceilings at much
er levels of force— ceilings that
jld strengthen deterrence and pro-
te stability by significantly reducing
Soviet lead in ICBMs. Coupled with
dismantling of the Soviet inter-
diate-range ballistic missiles proposed
;he INF talks, such a result would
ible us to maintain an overall level of
ategic nuclear capability sufficient to
er conflict, safeguard our national
urity, and meet our commitments to
es and friends.

To achieve this goal, the President

lounced a practical, phased approach

the negotiation, like the procedure be-

used in the INF talks. It is based on

principle that the two arsenals

)uld be equal both in the number of

vember 1982

weapons and in their destructive capaci-
ty. "The focus of our efforts," the Presi-
dent said, "will be to reduce significantly
the most destabilizing systems— ballistic
missiles, the number of warheads they
carry, and their overall destructive
potential."

While no aspect of the problem is
excluded from consideration and the
United States will negotiate in good
faith on any topics the Soviets wish to
raise, the United States proposes that
the first topic to be considered in the
negotiations should be the reduction of
ballistic missile warheads to equal levels
at least one-third below current
numbers. Both ground-based and
submarine-launched ballistic missiles are
included in this proposal. No more than
half these warheads would be deployed
on land-based missiles. This provision
alone should achieve substantial reduc-
tions in missile throw-weight. Our pro-
posal calls for these warhead reductions,
as well as significant reductions in the
number of deployed missiles, to be
achieved as quickly as possible.

In a second phase, closely linked to
the first, we will seek equal ceilings on
other elements of U.S. and Soviet
strategic forces, including equal limits
on ballistic missile throw-weight at less
than current U.S. levels.

In both START and INF, the United
States has made it clear that verification
measures capable of assuring compliance
are indispensable. For those provisions

If the INF and
START talks are suc-
cessful, the huge Soviet
advantage in ground-
based ballistic missiles
will be eliminated. These
alone are the weapons
which "defy deterrence. "

that cannot be monitored effectively by
national technical means of verification,
we will be proposing cooperative
measures, data exchanges, and collateral
constraints that should provide the
necessary confidence in compliance. The
Soviet Union has indicated that it will be
prepared where necessary to consider
cooperative measures going beyond na-
tional technical means. This is an en-
couraging sign. Without satisfactory

verification provisions, meaningful
agreements will be impossible to
achieve.

The Soviet Union has attacked our
START proposals as unfair, on the
ground that they call for unequal reduc-
tions—indeed, that they call for
"unilateral Soviet disarmament." It is
hardly obvious why this is the case.
Each side now has approximately 7,500
ballistic missile warheads. Under the
American proposal, each side would
have to reduce to no more than 5,000, of
which no more than 2,500 could be on
ICBMs. True, the Soviet Union would
have to dismantle more ICBM warheads
than we would in order to comply with
the ICBM sublimit, while we might have
to dismantle more submarine-based
missiles. But that is the point. There is
nothing inequitable about an equal ceil-
ing which strengthens deterrence and
stability. It is discouraging that this
feature of the American proposal was
not mentioned in a recent article in the
Los Angeles Times by General Starodu-
bov, a senior member of the Soviet
START delegation. By omitting any
reference to SLBMs, General Starodu-
bov gives the reader an incomplete ver-
sion of the American position.

If the INF and START talks are
successful, the huge Soviet advantage in
ground-based ballistic missiles will be
eliminated. These alone are the weapons
which "defy deterrence." If the Soviet
Union accepts nuclear arms control
agreements based on the principle of
"deterrence only," which is the heart of
our negotiating position, a Soviet first
strike would be impossible without ex-
pending most of the Soviet force. Given
such a change in the balance of the two
forces, we could hope to protect our
ICBM force effectively. Then— but only
then— nuclear tension would diminish.

There is another aspect of our
START negotiating position which
deserves emphasis. As President
Reagan's speech at Eureka College
makes clear, the American approach to
START is directed in the first instance
at the most destabilizing weapons and
proposes a new unit of account as the
basis for a treaty dealing with them and
all other intercontinental nuclear
weapons. That unit of account, replacing
the "deployed launchers" used in SALT I
and SALT II, would compare the Soviet
and American forces both in the number
of weapons on each side and their
destructive capacity. The measure of
destructive capacity we propose is that

ARMS CONTROL

of throw-weight— the maximum weight
of weapons a missile can propel. What
we are seeking is an equal throw-weight
limit for each side at levels below the
present American level. This goal would
require a greater reduction on the ,
Soviet side than on the American side.
But the Soviet Union can hardly claim a
right to preserve an advantage which
could only be used for intimidation or
aggression. Nor is there anything ine-
quitable in the idea of unequal reduc-
tions to achieve equality. The United
States made larger reductions than any
other power under the Washington
Naval Treaty of 1922.

The Need for Real Nuclear Parity

If we yield in the end and wearily settle
for INF and START agreements which
allow the Soviet Union to preserve its
overwhelming advantage in ballistic

This would be a most dangerous illu-
sion—the kind of illusion from which
major wars have arisen in the past.
President Reagan's approach to INF and
START calls on the Soviet Union to join
us in recognizing that the quest for
hegemony is the greatest possible threat
to the peace and that real nuclear parity
between the Soviet Union and the
United States— parity, that is, in deter-
rent capacity— is the most feasible foun-
dation for a joint program to establish
world political stability based on the rule
of law.

The state of world politics does not
justify the apocalyptic gloom of those
who believe that resisting Soviet expan-
sionism would be suicidal and, therefore,
counsel an American retreat to isolation
and submission. The Soviet drive for
unlimited power faces insuperable
obstacles. It confronts deep-seated
economic and social problems at home

President Reagan's approach to INF and START
calls on the Soviet Union to join us in recognizing
that the quest for hegemony is the greatest possible
threat to the peace and that real nuclear parity
between the Soviet Union and the United States
. . . is the most feasible foundation for a joint pro-
gram to establish world political stability based on
the rule of law.

missiles, we should find ourselves con-
fronting former President Nixon's bleak
prognosis. Such an outcome would
legitimize the superiority in inter-
mediate-range and intercontinental
ground-based ballistic missiles that the
Soviet Union has achieved under SALT
and authorize it to consolidate and im-
prove that advantage. On that basis, the
Soviet leaders would be justified in con-
tinuing to believe that they could trans-
late their nuclear edge over the United
States into political and diplomatic
hegemony.

and the ineradicable hostility of the na-
tions it is seeking to rule abroad. It has
suffered major defeats in peripheral
campaigns, especially in the Middle
East. And what Mr. Brezhnev has called
"the crisis" in Poland is one of supreme

importance to the future of the Soviet
Union. Even the magnitude of its
nuclear arsenal cannot protect the
Soviet Union from the deeply rooted
yearnings for freedom shared by peoph
everywhere. Finally, and most importa:
of all, the Soviet Union, like every othe
country, must accept the implacable
logic of the nuclear weapon. As Khrus-
chev once said, the nuclear weapon doe
not respect the difference between
socialism and capitalism.

Foreign policy is not a mathematic;
exercise like chess. Like every other
human enterprise, it must take account
of the unforeseen. Chance, heroism, pa
sion, and faith have greater influence i
human affairs than the grim calculus o
the nuclear equation.

The ultimate issue of Soviet-Ameri
can relations since 1917 is defined in ti
nuclear arms talks with chilling clarity
It is whether the Soviet Union is a stal
like the others, willing to live as a
member of the society of nations and t
abide by its rules or, on the other hanc
whether the Soviet Union will persist i
the suicidal view that its mission is to
lead a crusade to spread the "True
Faith" by the sword. When the issue is
raised with Soviet diplomats or pro-
fessors, they say, "You are asking us t
change a foreign policy rooted in the
nature of our society and state." To th
claim, the only possible answer is, "No
at all. So far as we are concerned, you
can preach the gospel of communism e
much as you like. But the rest of the
world cannot tolerate the use of aggre
sion to achieve it."

If the leaders of the Soviet Union
are as rational and cautious as they ar
supposed to be, they should want a
period of peace and stability in their
relationship with the West. On the
whole, I think they will. Like all his
modern predecessors. President Reag;
has made it clear to the Soviet leaders
that he would welcome such a change
and cooperate fully in making it a
reality. ■

EAST ASIA

Visit of Philippine
President IVIarcos

President Ferdinand E. Marcos

of the Republic of the Philippines

made a state visit to the United States

September 15-21, 1982, to meet with

President Reagan and other government officials.

Following are remarks Tuade at the arrival ceremony and the

dinner toasts of September 16^

and a Department announcenfient

of September 20.

ARRIVAL CEREMONY,
SEPT. 16, 19822

President Reagan

Mr. President, Mrs. Marcos, it gives me
special pleasure to welcome you to the
United States. Mrs. Reagan and I have
been long looking forward to returning
the hospitality you showed us on our
1969 visit to your country.

Our two peoples enjoy a close friend-
ship, one forged in shared history and
common ideals. In World War II,
Americans and Filipinos fought side by
side in the defense of freedom — a strug-
gle in which you personally fought so
valiantly.

The values for which we struggled —
independence, liberty, democracy,
justice, equality — are engraved in our
Constitutions and embodied in our
peoples' aspirations. Today our ties re-
main strong, benefiting each of us over
the full range of our relations. Political-
ly, we tend to view many world issues
the same general way. Yours is a re-
spected voice for reason and moderation
in international forums.

The Philippines with its ASEAN

[Association of South East Asian Na-
tions] partners has taken the lead in
search for self-determination for the
people of Kampuchea. In that vein, let
me also pay tribute to you and Mrs.
Marcos' personal leadership and commit-
ment to the care of refugees in South-
east Asia. Under your direct sponsor-
ship, the Philippines' refugee processing
center has become a model of its kind in
encouraging the development of self-
sufficiency and the restoration of human
dignity.

The Philippines and you, Mr. Presi-
dent, play an important role in address-
ing the problems of economic develop-
ment in the world. At Cancun, we made
a new start toward a more effective and
practical dialogue and improved coopera-
tion among industrial and developing
countries. Your leadership in that area
is vital and widely respected. Under
your leadership at home, the Philippines
can boast a record of solid economic
growth over the past decade, attrib-
utable in significant part to its
hospitable attitude toward free enter-
prise and private initiative.

Your country's dedication to improv-
ing the standard of living of your people

EAST ASIA

President and Mrs. Marcos are accompanied bv President and Mrs. Kea^an diirint; thi'
White House arrival ceremony.

is an effort in which we've been de-
iifi^hted to participate through bilateral
and multilateral economic a.ssistance.
Ynur continuing' interest in better nutri
tion has led the Philippines to achieve
self-sufficiency in food grain productior

You can also point with pride to thi
success of your rural electrification pro
gram, now bringing benefits to an in-
creasing number of remote regions. An
I find it a matter of personal satisfactic
that your country and my home State c
California are both pioneers in develop-
ing geothermal power to replace expen
sive energ>' imports.

The United States remains the
Philippines' leading trading partner, an
American firms are the largest foreign
investors in your country, reflecting
their confidence in your progress and
prospects for economic growth.

We have welcomed the growing tw
way trade between our nations and ha\
been pleased that we've been able to
keep our markets for the products of
your growing manufacturing and in-
dustrial sector the most open of any
country in the industrialized world.

America considers itself especially
fortunate to have nearly 1 million per-
sons of Filipino heritage now residing i
our country. They bring with them the
energy and their talents, and they con-
tribute enormously to the rich diversit\
of American society. Similarly, thou-
sands of Americans, enchanted by the
beauty of your nation and by its peopk
have chosen to live in the Philippines.

Our security relationship is an esst
tial element in mainUuning peace in th'
region and is so recognized. This rela-
tionship, one of several we have in the
Western Pacific, threatens no one but
contributes to the shield behind which
the whole region can develop socially
and economically.

Ihider your leadership, the Philip-
pines stands as a recognized force for
peace and security in Southeast Asia
through its bilateral efforts and throug
its role in ASEAN, which is the focus (
our regional policies in Southeast Asia.

The I'nited States deeply values it;
close friendship and alliance with the
Philippines. We seek to use this visit t(
further strengthen our ties with your
country.

Nancy and I are personally delighti
that you are here. And we say, "Wel-
come to the United States. Welcome Ic
our national home."

Department of State Bullet

resident Marcos

behalf of the 50 million people of the
ilippines, Mrs. Marcos and I express
gratitude for your warm welcome to
shington and to the United States of
nerica.
This great and beautiful city that is
of the few cities that was built as a
ital for a great nation is, indeed, as
3 been written, the key to knowing
' secret of America, and this house of
,t i American people, an American fron-
't r that never vanishes. Your beautiful
( y with its grand memorials, its monu-
nts, its walks, is, indeed, a city that
morializes the great achievements of
1; jr people for the past two centuries,
t more than that, it keeps offering to
! enterprising and the talented, the
irageous and the strong, the rewards
effort and of initiative.

At the same time as I stand here on
nerican soil, I realize that I stand on
lat may be the center of the Govern-
nt of the United States of America —
re, where, as I have often stated, the
;ure is being born. The future is being
m depending upon the man who is in
J White House. And the man who is in
; White House today certainly is
mating a new future for our world.
For I come from that part of the
rid wherein the poorest of the world's
jpulation live. I come from that part of
t > world that cherishes an image of
i nerica with its ideals, its dreams, its
iiisions. I come from the Philippines— a
I rt of Asia which has been molded
8 'Ug the principles of American de-
r )cracy. We learned to love these ideals
S i principles, and we lost a million of
c r people fighting for them in the last
\ r.

We have always stood by these
i 'als. We shall continue to do so, what-
ar may be the cost— at the risk of our
f -tunes, our lives. But more important
c all, our honor will stand for the ideals
c democracy that is our legacy from the
I lited States of America.

1 (lid not come to burden you further
\th additional problems, for I know
: U , a.s I have said in many a speech
l'<<rr my own people and before the
.iflii, fate and destiny has decreed that
t ■ I'nited States of America be the
t istee of modern civilization against the
reat of a possible second Dark Ages,
id America cannot fail. And, there-
re, we, the Filipino people, come and
ing to you a prayer that God, in His
/ine providence, may grant you
idance, strengthen both your heart

and hand, so that that hand may be
strong on the lever of power and save
our humanity.

If America fails, then the world is
lost. And thus I can assure you that
throughout all of Asia, there is nothing
but a reservoir of good will for you, the
American people, and the United States
of America.

Once again, may I say thank you for
your warm welcome and your hospitali-
ty, which I know we will never be able
to reciprocate.

EAST ASIA

DINNER TOASTS,
SEPT. 16, 19823

President Reagan

Before I say what I was prepared to say
here, I think that all of us ought to join
in a "Happy Birthday." There is a period
in which you can tell a lady's age —
[laughter] — when it is Irene Marcos, and
its her 22d birthday. Happy birthday.
But tonight we welcome old and

Department Announcement,
September 20, 1982

The President of the Philippines, His
Excellency Ferdinand E. Marcos, met
with President Reagan at the White
House on September 16. In addition,
during the course of his state visit to
Washington, President Marcos met with
the Vice President, Secretary Shultz,
Secretary Weinberger, congressional
leaders, and other prominent U.S.
Government officials. Other members of
his party, including Mrs. Marcos, Prime
Minister Virata, and Foreign Minister
Romulo, also met with Secretary Regan,
Secretary Baldrige, U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative Brock, and other Administra-
tion leaders.

The two Presidents reaffirmed the
strong traditional ties between the
United States and the Philippines, as
well as their commitments under the
Mutual Defense Treaty. They reviewed
the international situation, with special
attention to the Pacific and Southeast
Asia. They also reviewed the full range
of bilateral, political, economic, and
security issues. President and Mrs.
Marcos are proceeding today to New
York and other stops in the United
States.

The Government of the United
States and the Republic of the Philip-
pines have agreed to begin the scheduled
5-year review of the military bases
agreement in April 1983 in Manila. The
review will entail an examination of the
provisions of the military bases agree-
ment to insure that they continue to
meet both countries' current needs and
interests. Agreement was also reached
on conducting periodic strategic con-
sultations at the ministerial level, begin-
ning with a visit to the United States by
Philippine Minister of Defense Juan
Ponce Enrile in February 1983.

The two countries took action on
several specific economic matters during
the visit, including exchanging in-
struments of ratification of a tax treaty,
completing a civil aviation agreement,
concluding an agreement for the promo-
tion of tourism, and signing an
agricultural cooperation agreement. The
Export-Import Bank of the United
States agreed, subject to final congres-
sional concurrence, to provide additional
financial guarantees in the amount of
$204.5 million for the U.S.-designed
Philippine nuclear power plant at
Bataan, a project intended to move the
Philippines closer to energy self-reliance.

As a further cooperative action, the
U.S. Department of the Treasury has
agreed to continue the wider dialogue
begun during this visit through annual
consultations with the Philippine
Ministry of Finance on financial and
related issues of mutual concern. An
agreement recently signed providing $50
million in economic supporting fund
assistance to improve economic condi-
tions for the people living near the U.S.
military bases was also noted. The U.S.
Agency for International Development
and the Philippine Government agreed
to explore new cooperative measures to
reduce loss of life and property due to
typhoons by using the most advanced
tracking and warning technologies. The
U.S. Government also agreed to or-
ganize an investment mission of U.S.
businessmen to the Philippines and other
ASEAN countries in 1983.

The state visit by President Marcos
was a significant milestone in the rela-
tions between the two countries sym-
bolizing the close and constructive rela-
tionship which has long existed between
the United States of America and the
Philippines.

Made available to news correspondents by
Department spokesman John Hughes. ■

Dvember 1982

EAST ASIA

good friends to the White House in a
visit symbolic of the superb relationsiiip
between our two countries. It's a
nostalgic occasion for us, as well. Nancy
and I often think of our 1969 visit to
Manila, when we first experienced that
unexcelled Philippine hospitality as the
guests of our guests here tonight. And
the birthday girl was quite young and
small at that time.

Many things have changed in both
countries since that time, but one thing
remains constant — the basic nature of
the Filipino-U.S. friendship. It remains
solid. Both countries have worked hard

over the years to maintain excellent co-
operation in defense, foreign [Kilicy,
refugee matters, economic assistance,
and many other areas. And I pledge to
you. President Marcos, that the United
States will do its share to strengthen
those ties in the 1930s— the 1980s!
[Laughter] I have been doing a little
reminiscing at the table, forgive me.
Yes, the 1930s was my first job.
[Laughter]

We value the friendship of the
Republic of the Philippines for many
reasons. Our intertwined histories dur-
ing the first 50 years of this century left

its imprint on your institutions of
government, your educational system,
and your public services, such as public
health. The widespread use of the
English language is a result of that era.
So is your flourishing free enterprise
system.

As important as our shared historie
or shared strategic interests which spar
this entire century, in World War II
Filipinos and Americans fought and die
together. And you, yourself, Mr. Presi-
dent, played an unforgettably heroic
part in that conflict. Coming out of that
war, your generation and mine fully
understood the need for collective
security arrangements. Unfortunately,
some of today's young people, blessed b
decades of relative peace, may not havt
this understanding. I think it's our dut\
to impart our historical experience to
them.

Today a strong defense alliance is a
major factor in contributing to the
security of the Philippines and to the
maintenance of peace and security in
Asia. With the next review of the
military bases agreement, which begins
in 1983, we shall continue to modernize
our security relationship to best serve
our mutual security interests.

Both of our economies depend on
vigorous trade and investment. These
ties remain strong, and your presence i
Washington has enabled us to conclude
several outstanding economic matters.

We have accomplished a great deal
together over the years. We will all do
more in the years to come. Common
determination to achieve a better life
doesn't mean that we need to be alike:
we need only to treat one another in a
spirit of generosity and mutual respect
If we do that, our continuing commit-
ment to one another, resting as it does
on many years of close relations, will bi
solid now and for the future.

In that spirit, let me offer a toast: i
the President and Mrs. Marcos and to
the people of the Philippines and to the '
mutual respect, the dedication to peace
ami security in the world and the share
values which unite us.

President Marcos

1 feel I must pay tribute to this elegant
and fairy-like party and dinner which
has reminded me too much not only of
home but of some dreamland at home: ;
tribute to the taste and sen.se of beauty
to — perhaps, primarily, not only to
President Reagan but Mrs. Reagan for

Department of State Bulleti

EAST ASIA

s lovely party, which I shall always
nember as the Firefly Party in the
lite House. [Laughter]

,J You do us great honor with this din-
ff-. Allow me to extend the gratitude of
million people in the Republic of the
ilippines, Mrs. Marcos, and myself for
s hospitality and this generosity. Cer-
nly, we will be unable to reciprocate
s beautiful event. You even had the
igs all prepared, including a Filipino
ig that's a favorite of the First Lady

Ij the Philippines, Dahil Sa lya, which

means "because of you": because of you
must pass through the rigors of difficul-
ty, hardship, before it can claim this ap-
pellation. And I am reminded, too, of
the more — almost a century of relation-
ship between our two countries and the
periods of difficulty, the rigors, perhaps
even of misunderstanding, and battles
that we have fought together. And
perhaps, therefore, it is not too rash to
say that it is proper to use the appella-
tion "friendship" between the American
and the Filipino.

S-retarv and Mrs. Shultz host a luncheon in honor of President and Mrs. Marcos in the
Enjamin Franklin Room at the State Department.

L ove, because of you I live, and because
you I am what I am. And then you
d the other theme song which was a
vorite of both President Reagan and
e other president, I understand, the
erne song of Dr. Zhivago, which is a
ig story, of course, and which I won't
Ik about. [Laughter] It happens to be
le of our theme songs because it was
ng in once of what threatened to be a
agedy, but which was not, and that is
hy we remember it.

Tonight, the Philippines once again
obligated to you for your kind and
■nerous words. I note, too, the use of
e word "friendship," and I am remind-
I of the first President of the United
Dates, the Father of this great nation,
eorge Washington, who said that
iendship is a slow, growing plant that

ovember1982

That friendship — that abiding friend-
ship— we cherish deeply. And this is
why as I come and stand, once again, on
American soil, I cannot but be candid. I
would not be candid if I did not speak,
too, of those misunderstandings and the
adversities which we have faced to-
gether. For the world faces challenge
and change. We are in a period of fer-
ment. As one of your great writers has
said: You have passed through a period
of torment, an ordeal, perhaps, of
tragedy, as you experienced the
assassination of some of your American
leaders, constitutional crisis in the
Presidency, a trauma of Vietnam, and
occasionally doubts about your own
capability.

Certainly as we look around in Asia,

Philippines— A Profile

Geography

Area: 1 If). 707 sq. mi. Capital: Manila (pop. 6
million in metropolitan area) remains the de
facto capital, although Quezon City, located
within the metro Manila area, was designated
the capital by law in 1948. Other Cities:
Davao (600,000), Cebu (450,000).

People

Population: 49.5 million. Annual Growth
Rate: 2.5%. Ethnic Groups: Malay, Chinese.
Religions: Catholic (83%), Protestant (9%),
Muslim (5%). Languages: Filipino (based on
Tagalog), national language; English, lan-
guage of government and instruction in
higher education. Literacy: About 88%.

Government

Type: Republic. Independence: 1946. Con-
stitution: January 1973. Branches: Executive
— President. Legislative — National Assembly.
Judicial — Supreme Court. Suffrage: Univer-
sal; voting compulsory. Administrative Sub-
divisions: 13 regions, 73 provinces, 60
chartered cities.

Economy

GNP: $39.7 billion (1981). Per Capita In-
come: $783 (1981). Annual Inflation Rate:

13% (1981).

Natural Resources: Agricultural lands;
minerals, including copper, gold, chromium;
fisheries; timber.

Agriculture: Rice, corn, sugar, coconut
products, pineapples, bananas.

Industries: Textiles, electronics, phar-
maceuticals, wood products, food processing,
chemicals, mining.

Trade (1981): Exports— $5.72 billion:
electronic components, textiles, coconut prod-
ucts, sugar, wood products, fruit products.
Imports — $7.95 billion: machinery, fuels,
transport equipment, cereals, chemicals, tex-
tile fibers. Major Trading Partners: U.S.,
Japan, EC.

Membership in International Organizations

U.N. and its specialized agencies, World
Bank group (IBRD, IFC, IDA), IMF, GATT,
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN), Asian Development Bank (ADB),
INTELSAT. ■

the historic relation of the United States
with the countries of that part of the
world are marked occasionally with
doubt, mutual distrust, and often there
is fear that perhaps America is weary of
the responsibility that it has for the

EAST ASIA

world community. But the Philippines
has always stood on the firm conviction
that America does not weary, that
America is firm and resolute, that
America may question some of its own
actions but that it faces and confronts
its problems squarely, fairly, justly.

As I stand on American soil and I
see the doubts rising in Asia, I see
another phenomenon that clears my
mind. It is the phenomenon of an
American nation led by a new leader-
ship, earnestly exerting heroic efforts in
order to stop the slide and the loss of
prestige of American leadership
throughout the world.

Yes, out of the dark, out of the
shadows of the decline in even respect
for America and decline for its leader-
ship, there is a rising, an emerging, a
new America — not only in Asia but
perhaps throughout the world — an
emerging, a new America under a new
leader, resurgent, firm, strong, commit-
ted, and forthright. And that leader is
President Ronald Reagan.

The stakes are high. The stakes for
a strong and emergent America are
high. All the nations pray for your suc-
cess, even those that criticize you. For
even the mercantile nations will reap
reward from your success, but they will

U.S., Philippines Conclude
Taxation and Air Agreements

At the conclusion of the luncheon in the
State Department's Benjamin Franklin
Room given by Secretary George Shultz
in honor of visiting President Ferdinand
Marcos and Mrs. Imelda Romualdez
Marcos, two significant accords will be
concluded. Secretary Regan and Philip-
pine Prime Minister (and Finance
Minister) Cesar Virata will exchange in-
struments of ratification of a treaty in-
tended to avoid double taxation and
authorizing closer cooperation between
the tax authorities of the two countries.
The tax treaty was signed at Manila
on October 1, 1976. After a period of
continuing consultations on its final ef-
fects, the U.S. Senate ratified the accord
on December 16, 1981. The measure is
designed to avoid taxation by both coun-
tries of the same income which may be
earned by either individuals or corpora-
tions. It also provides the framework for
greater consultation between tax agen-

cies in both countries. This is intended
to prevent cases of tax evasion on both
sides.

Secretary Shultz and Philippine
Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo will
sign an exchange of notes bringing into
effect an air transport agreement be-
tween the two countries. Its terms allow
competition and pricing flexibility among
the participating lines of both countries.
It also provides for increases in the
potential number of airlines allowed to
fly between the countries and the fre-
quencies of their flights. Because the
Philippines is the third largest air travel
market for the United States in the
Pacific, this agreement is of major im-
portance to the United States as well as
to the Philippines and its national flag
carrier, Philippine Air Lines.

Press release 288 of Sept. 16, 1982.

reap comfort. They will reap an addi-
tional car for a family, a more comfort
able home, more sumptuous dinners.

But the stake of the poorer nations
like mine are greater. Their stake is su
vival. The other option is death. And si
for you we have nothing but prayers, a
I said this morning. And so we look
toward this phenomenon and say: Let
there be strength and greatness for th(
American nation, for only then can the
be hope for us, the poorer nations. Anc
let America reclaim its role, its historic
place, and its historic relationship with
the poorer nations of the world — the
members of the Third World, my work
For that is your rightful place, Mr.
President, and America.

Once again, I say we pray, there-
fore, that God grant to America this
strength and capability to reclaim its
natural place and historic relationship
with all the nations and with other na-
tions reestablish order in our anxious,
troubled world. We pray for this, we
hope for this — not only the big nations,
but especially the small ones.

And so may I ask you to rise and
join me to a toast: To the continued
health and success of the President of
the United States, the prosperity and
the strength of the American people,
and the friendship of the peoples of the
United States and the Philippines.

'Texts from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Sept. 20, 1982.

^Held on the South Lawn of the White
House where President Marcos was acconiei
a formal welcome with full military honors.

^Made in the Rose Carden at the White
House. ■

ituation in East Timor

John H. Holdridge

I Statem.ent before the Subcommittee
^' \sian and Pacific Affairs of the
' ise Foreign Affairs Committee on
''^ tember U, 1982. Ambassador
'" dridge is Assistant Secretary for
"" :( Asian and Pacific Affairs.^

'™ n pleased to have the opportunity to-
"" to discuss with you the situation in
;t Timor. This is the fifth time the
te Department has testified before
House of Representatives on this
eific subject since March 1977. The
3t recent such occasion was in June

0 before the Subcommittee on Inter-
ional Operations. In addition, I com-
Qted on the situation in East Timor
oart of a joint hearing on human

Its in East Asia held in November

1 by your subcommittee and the
man Rights and International Organi-
ions subcommittee.

It is important, as we examine this
iplex situation in East Timor, that
give due note both to the progress
t been achieved in meeting the
nanitarian needs of the Timorese peo-
as well as to the problems that re-
n.

U.S. policy with regard to East
lor has been consistent through three
ministrations. We accept the incor-
•ation of East Timor into Indonesia,
hout recognizing that a valid act of
f-determination has taken place there.
r efforts now are concentrated on do-
what we can to improve the welfare
the Timorese people. Practically we
/e found that progress in achieving
• humanitarian goals can be achieved
y by working closely with the Indone-
n Government and with the interna-
nal organizations active in East
nor.
In addition to our concern regarding
St Timor, there are a number of other
portant elements in our relationship
th Indonesia. Indonesia is the largest
intry in the Association of South East
ian Nations (ASEAN), support for
lich is the cornerstone of U.S. policy
Southeast Asia. It is a moderate voice
the developing world, an important oil
oducer and a major arena for U.S.
ide and investment, and it occupies a
ategic position astride vital sea lanes
nnecting the Indian and Pacific

Oceans. We value highly our cooperative
relationship with Indonesia and expect it
to continue.

Current Conditions

Any consideration of the current food
and health situation in East Timor must
begin by acknowledging the major relief
effort undertaken jointly by the Indone-
sian Government, international agencies,
and the United States and other donors
from mid-1979 to early 1981. Admin-
istered by the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Catholic
Relief Services (CRS), this effort at its
peak in 1980 provided food and /or
medical care to more than 300,000
people — fully half of the Timorese
population. The United States was the
largest contributor to this effort, pro-
viding over $14 million in cash and com-
modities. By April 1981, the involved in-
ternational agencies concluded that the
emergency situation had been overcome
and that the long-term needs of the
Timorese people could best be met by
shifting emphasis from relief to develop-
ment.

In the last year, there have been
reports that the food situation was again
deteriorating, and East Timor was fac-
ing the threat of famine. Since the
economy and agricultural base of East
Timor are extremely fragile, the United
States has been quick to look into any
reports of food shortages. We have
discussed the food situation in detail
with representatives of the involved in-
ternational organizations, which have
trained personnel traveling to East
Timor on a regular basis. Officials from
our embassy in Jakarta have visited
East Timor four times this year, in-
cluding three trips in the last 3 months.

Based on our constant monitoring, it
is our view that East Timor is not now
facing a famine situation nor the threat
of famine in the near future. The food
distribution system in the province is
poor, and the harvest earlier this year
was disappointing, due primarily to bad
weather and pests. Some isolated areas,
particularly in the southeast portion of
the island, have experienced food short-
ages. These areas demand — and are ap-
parently receiving — immediate atten-
tion. The Indonesian Government in
May shipped 1,000 tons of corn to East

EAST ASIA

Timor which is being used to supplement
food supplies of over 25,000 people in
the hardest hit areas.

Serious health problems remain in
East Timor. Malaria is a particularly
acute problem, affecting large numbers
of the population. Like most of rural In-
donesia and, indeed, most of the devel-
oping world, East Timor suffers from a
shortage of doctors, other trained
medical personnel, and medical facilities.
The village health programs set up by
the ICRC in connection with the relief
effort have had a beneficial effect, and
the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI) — the
ICRC's local partner in the relief ef-
fort— remains active in the province. As
I will discuss later, the Indonesian
Government and the international agen-
cies have ongoing programs to address
both food and health problems.

With regard to the military situa-
tion, the Timorese guerrilla group —
Fretilin — does not seriously threaten
overall Indonesian authority. It is com-
posed of no more than a few hundred
armed men plus unarmed support per-
sonnel. Fretilin does, however, retain
the capability to conduct occasional
limited operations, primarily in isolated
or sparsely populated areas such as
those in the highlands on the eastern tip
of Timor. Its operations continue to
result in some Indonesian casualties.
There are unconfirmed reports of a re-
cent upsurge in Fretilin activity, perhaps
designed for propaganda impact in ad-
vance of the upcoming U.N. General
Assembly session.

The Indonesian military conducted
large-scale sweep operations in the prov-
ince in the summer of 1981, designed to
isolate the Fretilin remnants and deny
them access to supplies from sym-
pathizers in the villages and towns.
These operations were concluded by Oc-
tober 1981. Currently, the pace of
Indonesian-initiated military operations
is low, consisting primarily of small foot
patrols.

It is noteworthy that the people of
East Timor turned out in large numbers
in May of this year to participate for the
first time in Indonesian national elec-
tions. The elections in the province were
carried out without disruption, in a com-
pletely peaceful atmosphere.

We remain concerned about reports
of abuses in connection with military
operations. Obtaining solid information
about such alleged military abuses in
East Timor is a most difficult task. One
of the more extreme charges made is
that Indonesian forces have engaged in

EAST ASIA

a systematic effort to kill innocent
Timorese. We have foun<] no evidence to
support such a charge, though some
military abuses may have occurred.

There are also recurring charges of
disappearances and mistreatment of
Timorese. While any abuse of human
rights is deplorable, the number of
allegations of physical mistreatment and
disappearance has declined since the
period of fiercest fighting between In-
donesian and Fretilin forces (1976-78).
Moreover, there have been few allega-
tions of such abuses since the conclusion
of last summer's sweep operations.

Another positive development is that
there is more information available to
the international community on the
numbers and conditions of detainees in
East Timor as a result of the increased
international access permitted by the
Government of Indonesia to the prin-
cipal places of detention— Comarca
prison in Dili and Atauro Island off the
coast of East Timor.

An ICRC team visited East Timor in
February to begin a program of prison
visitation and visited both sites. At that
time, 71 persons were imprisoned at
Comarca, 13 of whom were under con-
trol of the military authorities (i.e., de-
tained primarily for their association
with Fretilin rather than for activities
judged to be criminal by the govern-
ment).

Most persons suspected by the In-
donesian Government of supporting or
sympathizing with Fretilin are detained
on Atauro Island. The ICRC team on its
February trip spent 4 days on Atauro
and reported 3,737 persons had been
temporarily relocated to the island. Most
of these people had been sent to Atauro
during the military sweep operations in
1981. Since the ICRC visit, some per-
sons have been moved from Atauro to
the East Timor mainland, and there
have apparently been some new arrivals
on the island. We have no reliable infor-
mation on the precise current population
on Atauro but have no reason to believe
it has dramatically changed in recent
months.

The facilities on Atauro are not a
prison as such. Barracks-type quarters
have been constructed for the detainees,
but they are free to move about the
island. A recent embassy visitor in-
dicated conditions on Atauro have im-
proved considerably since the ICRC
began its prison visitation program in
February.

Humanitarian Efforts

Let me now report on what is being
done to address the humanitarian and
economic development problems that re-
main in East Timor by the Government
of Indonesia, by the international
organizations, and by the United States.

By far the most active and impor-
tant role is being undertaken by the
Government of Indonesia itself, which
has significantly expanded its develop-
ment activities in East Timor each year
since 1976. For example, the govern-
ment will spend nearly $80 million on
development and other programs in the
province, an increase of more than 50%
over last year.

This Indonesian effort is even more
striking when viewed in the context of
that country's overall development
needs. Although faced in each of its 26
far-flung provinces with enormous
socioeconomic problems, and the
political pressures they engender, the
Government of Indonesia has given top
priority to East Timor. It will spend
more per capita on development in East
Timor than in any other province and
about 50% more per capita than in the
country as a whole.

It must also be noted that the
government's development effort, by
necessity, must be concentrated at this
stage on fundamental infrastructure
projects, since there were almost no
basic facilities— roads, public sanitation,
schools— at the time of the Portuguese
withdrawal. What little infrastructure
existed, moreover, was further damaged
during the civil war. In that context, the
fact that almost all Timorese children
now have access to at least primary
schools is itself a notable achievement.

Supplementing the Indonesian
Government efforts, the international
organizations have made a major con-
tribution to improving the welfare of the
Timorese people. Going about their
tasks in a nonpolitical, nonpolemical
way, they have succeeded where a con-
frontational approach would surely have
failed. I have already mentioned their
past role in the international relief ef-
fort: let me outline their current pro-
grams.

The ICRC has five ongoing activities
in East Timor. First, it is continuing to
provide technical assistance to the PMI
in support of food and health programs
in East Timor. Second, ICRC is serving
as the intermediary for family reunifica-
tion of persons with immediate relatives

in Portugal and elsewhere. Third, sines
April 1981 it has administered a traciri
program to assist Timorese — both in
Timor and abroad— to locate missing o
displaced relatives. This is a traditiona
Red Cross function that can play an in'
portant role in protecting human right
Fourth, as already noted, in February
1982, the ICRC began a program of
prison visitations. This visitation pro-
gram has increased the effectiveness o
the tracing operation, and many persoi
previously reported missing or disap-
peared have been located on Atauro.
Finally, food and medical supplies pro-
vided through the ICRC since March t(
detainees on Atauro have had a signifi
cant positive effect on the conditions o
detention. This program is continuing
CRS, which had the largest progra
in East Timor during the international \
relief efforts, has turned its attention t
agricultural development. It is ad-
ministering a 5-year, $5 million river
basin development plan begun in late
1981 and funded by the I'.S. Agency f'
International Development (AID). The
plan concentrates on improving
agricultural productivity in three
lowland river basins on the north coast
of Timor through a pilot project which
when complete, will increase food pro-
duction in East Timor and reduce the
likelihood of food shortages in the yeai
to come.

A third international agency, the
U.N. International Children's Emergei
cy Fund (l^NICEF). has recently begu
work in East Timor. Under the terms
an agreement signed in June 1982,
UNICEF will work with the PMI in pr
viding primary health care services to
the women and children in seven villap
where health conditions are poorest. T
program will include training of
paramedical personnel so that the
benefits to the people of East Timor u
continue after the program has been
completed.

All three of the agencies listed abo
have expatriate staff in Jakarta who
travel frequently to East Timor and eii
joy good access throughout the provim
The ICRC has its own helicopter, ena-
bling its personnel to reach remote are
of the province. The ICRC, represent-
ative has been making monthly visits o
6 or 7 days' duration each to supervise
his agency's activities there. A CRS
representative frequently visits the pro
ince. The ICRC, CRS, and UNICEF
have resident Indonesian staffs in the

Department of State Bulleti

EAST ASIA

vince and work closely with the large
dent PMI contingent in East Timor.
In addition to the international agen-
jrograms, AID is working directly
h the Indonesian Government in im-
Tienting a malaria control program,
ler a $3.6 million agreement signed in
1-1980, to cover the entire island of
lor, both East and West. Initially, im-
nentation was delayed by logistical
'iculties in getting supplies to affected
as in East Timor, but the project was
cially inaugurated in April 1982. It is
imated that 50,000 people will have
n clinically diagnosed and treated for
laria by the end of this year. By
M983, almost 25,000 households will
e been sprayed to prevent further
ead of the disease. When the project
mplete, an estimated 45% of the

)i)ulation of East Timor will be pro-

«te(i against malaria.

lernational Access and Family
lunification

^lile international access to East Timor
•nains limited, there has been major
r irovement in recent months. In addi-
■ 1 to a continuation of the improved
1 ess to East Timor enjoyed by U.S.
i;sion and international agency person-
1 , tliere has been an increase in the
•] liber of journalists and diplomatic
isoiinel allowed to visit the island.
- iMT.g these have been a U.S. academic
J lup. including Stanley Roth of Chair-
n Sdlarz' staff in November 1981; a
jildiiiatic group, including a U.S. Em-
:^sy representative in December 1981;
f iiier Australian Prime Minister Gough
\ lit lam and journalist Peter Hastings
I. February of this year; West German
jiirnalist 0. G. Roeder, who has written
etensively on Indonesia for many years,
i: March; several European journalists
(da Dutch film crew in April; jour-
t lists from the Philadelphia Inquirer,
■A ian Wall Street Journal, and Reuters
iws agency in May-June; a delegation
the World Council of Churches in
ne; Far Eastern Economic Re^new and
;sociated Press correspondents in July;
0 ambassadors and other members of
e Jakarta diplomatic community in
rly August; and an American Jesuit
ficial in late August 1982. Indeed, one
the reasons for the recent flurry of
ess articles on East Timor is precisely

because the Indonesian Government has
been increasingly willing to let outsiders
into the province to take a look at the
situation firsthand.

Increased access to East Timor is
one of the best examples of how quiet
efforts are most effective in addressing
Indonesian human rights issues. In
numerous conversations with Indonesian
officials over the past months, U.S. of-
ficials have emphasized the value of in-
creased international access and the
need for action on the humanitarian
problems of the Timorese people. Our
conversations have, I believe, played a
role in the improvements that have oc-
curred.

Our embassy in Jakarta also has
followed closely the matter of family
reunions and repatriation of Portuguese
citizens from East Timor, the majority
of whom have been proceeding for
residence either in Portugal or
Australia. Progress is being made but
details have not generally been made
public. A recent ICRC situation report
on its programs in East Timor that was
made public provided limited informa-
tion on family reunification. It stated
that family reunification under the
auspices of ICRC involving 25 persons
(11 going to Portugal and 14 to
Australia) had taken place during the
first 6 months of this year. The ICRC
will continue to exercise a facilitative
role in the area of family reunification.

In conclusion, the record shows
progress in many areas. Programs have
been established to address many of the
serious social and economic problems.
The Indonesian Government has demon-
strated a willingness to come to grips
with some of the most disturbing prob-
lems, as evidenced by increased interna-
tional access, the beginning of the prison
visitation program, and the entry of
UNICEF into the province. We will con-
tinue to follow events in East Timor
closely, taking every appropriate oppor-
tunity to continue our quiet dialogue
with Indonesians who are capable of in-
fluencing developments in the province
and fostering the kind of humanitarian
progress which is our common goal.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Kampuchea and
American Interests

by John H. Holdridge

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee on
September 15, 1982. Ambassador
Holdridge is Assistant Secretary for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs. '■

I am pleased to have the opportunity to
appear before this subcommittee to
review the Administration's policy
toward Kampuchea, including the Kam-
puchean seat in the United Nations.
Since 1970 the Khmer people have suf-
fered immeasurably through the conse-
quences of a destructive war, a complete
restructuring of society, and now the in-
vasion and occupation of their country
by the forces of a stronger, neighboring
country. I welcome the opportunity to
review U.S. policy toward Kampuchea
before you today.

U.N. Credentials

At each U.N. General Assembly since
the Vietnamese invasion and occupation
of Kampuchea in 1978, Vietnam and its
allies have challenged the credentials of
the representative of Democratic Kam-
puchea. The ultimate goal of Vietnam
and its friends is to seat the Heng
Samrin regime, which Vietnam installed
and controls. In every case, the chal-
lenge has been defeated easily through
the efforts of the governments of the
Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN), supported by much of
Western Europe, the nonaligned world,
Japan, and the United States.

After careful consultation with our
friends and allies, particularly the
Southeast Asian countries whose in-
terests are most threatened by the Viet-
namese invasion of Kampuchea, the
United States has again decided to sup-
port the position of ASEAN to continue
accrediting the Democratic Kampuchea
representatives. Our stand remains as in
the past based on the technical ground
that, having granted credentials to a
representative, the United Nations can
withdraw them only if there is a
superior claimant to the seat. The
credentials of Democratic Kampuchea
have been accepted since its assumption
to power in 1975, and there still is no

)vember1982

EAST ASIA

superior claimant. The Heng Sanirin
regime is not a superior claimant
because it was created by Vietnam, is
controlled by Vietnamese officials both
in Phnom Penh and in Hanoi, and is
maintained in Phnom Penh only by the
Vietnamese armed forces that continue
to occupy Kampuchea in violation of the
U.N. Charter and in defiance of General
Assembly resolutions.

Support for seating the Heng
Samrin regime would indicate interna-
tional acceptance of a government im-
posed by foreign aggression in violation
of the U.N. Charter. Further, if Viet-
nam's invasion of Kampuchea was sanc-
tioned by seating the Heng Samrin
representatives in the United Nations,
the incentive would be reduced for a
negotiated settlement as called for by
successive U.N. General Assembly
resolutions on Kampuchea since 1979
and by the declaration of the
U.N. -sponsored International Con-
ference on Kampuchea in July 1981. It is
important to note that those U.N.
resolutions, which call for the
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and
self-determination for the Khmer people,
were proposed by the Third World coun-
tries of ASEAN and supported by the
majority of the Third World and non-
aligned nations. The small and weak na-
tions of the world clearly share
ASEAN's determination to defend the
principles of national integrity and
noninterference, which continue to be so
blatantly violated by Vietnam.

Democratic Kampuchea Coalition

The broadening of the Democratic Kam-
puchea regime into a coalition of leading
indigenous and independent Kampu-
chean political elements opposed to the
Vietnamese occupation and domination
of Kampuchea and broadly representa-
tive of the Khmer people should increase
support for the Democratic Kampuchea
claim to the U.N. seat and ASEAN's ap-
proach within and outside the United
Nations this year. The coalition was
achieved with significant encouragement
by ASEAN. Although the United States
has not been directly involved, we
welcome and endorse its formation. It
brings together two non-Communist
groups — those led by respected na-
tionalist leaders. Prince Sihanouk and
Prime Minister Son Sann— and the
Khmer Rouge. These groups retain their
political and military autonomy. The
coalition obviously strengthens

ASEAN's strategy' of gaining acceptance
for the credentials of Democratic Kam-
puchea in the United Nations, while de-
nying the seat to the Vietnamese-con-
trolled regime in Phnom Penh, but this
is by no means the only reason that the
coalition is important for Kampuchea.

The coalition provides a domestic
and international platform for the non-
Khmer Rouge nationalist Kampucheans
like Prince Sihanouk and Prime Minister
Son Sann and could allow them to ex-
pand significantly their domestic and in-
ternational status and support as true
representatives of the Khmer people.
The fact that Prince Sihanouk will ad-
dress the U.N. General Assembly and
that His Excellency Son Sann will lead
the Kampuchean delegation is an impor-
tant step forward. We believe it of ma-
jor significance that the coalition give
the non-Communist Khmer the platform
to play a leading role in any political set-
tlement in Kampuchea. The Khmer peo-
ple now have the hope of an eventual
choice other than the Vietamese-
controlled Heng Samrin regime or the
return to power of the Khmer Rouge.
The most recent reporting from State
Department officials who have inter-
viewed Khmer who have just arrived at
the Thai border reinforces this view and
indicates that many Khmer are aware of
the coalition, pleased with the
reemergence of Prince Sihanouk and
Prime Minister Son Sann, and hopeful
that they will lead the country again.

The formation of the coalition is
another significant development in the
overall ASEAN strategy of applying
political, diplomatic, and economic
pressure on Vietnam to negotiate a com-
prehensive solution to the Kampuchea
problem. It is an arrangement which has
as its stated purpose implementation of
the declaration of the International Con-
ference on Kampuchea which outlines a
formula for Vietnamese military with-
drawal and restoration of Khmer self-
determination through full U.N. super-
vised elections. It is not a permanent
government. Therefore, for the United
States the ([uestion of recognizing the
coalition does not arise. Nonetheless, I
would reiterate that we welcome the for-
mation of the coalition.

The United States has given moral
and political support to the non-
Communist Khmer and will continue to
do so. We have had and will continue to
have regular contact with the non-Com-
munists. We look forward to welcoming
Prince Sihanouk and His Excellency Son
Sann during their upcoming visits to this

country. We are carefully watching
developments in Kampuchea and in clo^i
consultation with ASEAN and others
are considering how we can be of fur-
ther help. We do not plan to offer
military aid to the coalition or any of it
members. Under no circumstances
would we provide any support to the
Khmer Rouge, and we do not intend to
deal directly with them.

Our support for the non-Communis
Khmer notwithstanding, I would like tc
stress that our decision on the Kampu-
chean U.N. credentials in no way implii
any support for or recognition what-
soever of the Khmer Rouge. The Unite
States has never recognized the Khmei
Rouge /Pol Pot Democratic Kampuchej
regime, and U.S. officials are proscribe
from contact with Khmer Rouge of-
ficials. Our opposition to the Khmer
Rouge has been open and strong. The
U.S. Government has frequently and
emphatically condemned the Khmer
Rouge's heinous record of oppression
and misrule, particularly its abhorrent
human rights practices. I assure you
that the Administration shares the con
cern of the Congress and the Americai
people for the Khmer, who suffered in
extremes under the excess and horrors
of the Pol Pot /Khmer Rouge regime.
There should be no doubt in anybody's
mind about U.S. policy toward the
Khmer Rouge regime. The Administra-
tion opposes the return to power of the
Khmer Rouge.

Recent Developments

In a communique issued .luly 7, \'ietna,
announced that as an "act of goodwill"
would withdraw an unspecified number
of its occupying forces in Kampuchea
during July and that further partial
withdrawals would depend on steps by
Thailand to "reestablish peace and
stability" on the Thai-Kampuchean
border. Vietnam also renewed its pro-
posal for a "safety zone" on that border
and expanded an earlier offer to
organize an international conference to
discuss regional problems which would
be attended by the three Indochinese
countries, the five ASEAN states, Bur-
ma, India, the five permanent U.N.
Security Council members, and, in a
private capacity, the U.N. Secretary
General. In referring to the Hanoi pro-
posal, Vietnamese and Heng Samrin
regime officials have made thinly veiled
threats against .ASEAN by stressing th
"right" of their military forces to "self-
defense and counterattack" if the
ASEAN countries "continue their hostil

Department of State Bulletli

ons and continue to interfere in the
rnai affairs of the Indochinese eoun-

While tactically somewhat different
procedurally somewhat more tlexi-
in tone and style, Vietnam's offer un-
;unately represents no change in its
?ntial position. It does not address
central problem in Kampuchea —
tnamese forces occupy the entire
ntry, and Vietnamese control of the
lom Penh authorities prevents the
Tier from exercising their basic right
ndependence and self-government,
al withdrawal is still tied to "ending
China threat," Hanoi alleges. The
issue of Kampuchea would be con-
jred only by Southeast Asian states,
her than at the international con-
snce. Heng Samrin officials,
reover, have gone one step further
stated that Kampuchea would not
discussed in Vietnam's proposal. The
posal would permit the Heng Samrin

(ime to participate in the conference
if its legitimacy were a fait accompli.
■epting a partial Vietnamese
vhdrawal as a step toward a solution
■« l(i appear to legitimize the continued
) sence of the remaining Vietnamese

"inps.

Ill addition, Hanoi's sincerity on its
1 'lit ions about withdrawal of troops
'i 111 Kampuchea is highly questionable,
vtnam has offered no proof of its ini-
,) "unilateral" troop withdrawal or a
1 reduction in Vietnamese troops in
Miipuchea. We and others have con-
; (led that the alleged withdrawal was
i ;igned only to take advantage of a
1 mu'd. seasonal rotation of troops,

tiiularly involving those units thinned
: disease and casualties or suffering
rail' problems. They were replaced by
si I troops, many of whom came from
nhcrn Vietnam. In fact, there are in-
athins that Vietnam has used the cur-
it wet season to strengthen its forces
Kampuchea.

We still have no sign that Hanoi has
andoned its pursuit of an outdated co-
lialist ambition to dominate its near
ighbors and inherit the mantle of
gemony of France in Indochina. While
inoi obviously wishes to reduce the
sts of its ambitions in Indochina — and
eir recent diplomatic offensive shows
at Hanoi wishes to escape its isola-
m — there is no sign that the Viet-
imese are prepared to abandon their
al of political and economic domina-
)n of Kampuchea and Laos and to in-
grate as closely as feasible those
onomies into that of Vietnam.

Hanoi does not appear to have

realized that its colonialist ambitions
undermine rather than bolster its na-
tional security. Its own policies have
produced its isolation, bankrupted its
economy, and created threats from
various directions, including a threat
Hanoi perceives from China. In fact, the
policies of the leadership in Hanoi are
the greatest threat to the national
security and the well-being of the Viet-
namese people.

ASEAN and most of the internation-
al community, including the United
States, believe that the International
Conference on Kampuchea provides the
framework for negotiation of a compre-
hensive political settlement in Kam-
puchea which could be acceptable to all
concerned governments and groups and
beneficial to the Khmer people. China
also accepts the conference declaration.

As you know, the declaration of the
conference called for negotiations to
achieve a complete withdrawal of Viet-
namese forces, U.N. -supervised elections
free from any form of internal or exter-
nal coercion, and the creation of a

EAST ASIA

neutral, independent Kampuchea which
is no threat to any of its neighbors. A
just settlement on that basis would ad-
dress the security concerns of all states
in the region, including the ASEAN
countries and Vietnam. Through the
declaration, ASEAN and the interna-
tional community have offered Vietnam
an honorable way out of its self-created
dilemma and a framework to protect
best its own national security.

Situation in Kampuchea

With a few exceptions, the situation in-
side Kampuchea remains as it has been
since the Vietnamese invasion in 1978.
Backed by a Vietnamese occupation
force of about 180,000 and thousands of
civilian Vietnamese advisers, the Heng
Samrin regime continues its attempts to
establish legitimacy through the
establishment and expansion of its ad-
ministrative structure and a variety of
state institutions.

With implementation of a compul-
sory military service, it is also attempt-

Secretary Meets With
Thai Foreign IVIinister

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
SEPT. 25, 1982'

Thai Foreign Minister Air Chief Marshal
Siddhi Savetsila has completed 3 days of
discussions with high-level officials here
on a broad range of issues. The Foreign
Minister met with the Vice President,
the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of
State, and the Deputy Secretary of
Defense. He also met with congressional
leaders.

During the discussions with Foreign
Minister Siddhi, both sides reviewed the
situation with regard to ASEAN [As-
sociation of South East Asian Nations],
Kampuchea, the U.S. -Thai security rela-
tionship, and other political and
economic matters including the refugee
issue. As ASEAN standing committee
chairman. Foreign Minister Siddhi re-
quested U.S. Government support on
the Kampuchea issue at the United Na-
tions. He also expressed the continuing
concern of the ASEAN governments
over the threat to peace and stability in
the region caused by the continued
presence of Vietnamese forces in Kam-
puchea.

Secretary Shultz reiterated the full

support of the United States for the
ASEAN approach on the Kampuchea
issue, including full withdrawal of Viet-
namese forces from Kampuchea and
establishment of an independent and
neutral government. Secretary Shultz
also reaffirmed to Foreign Minister
Siddhi the clear U.S. Government com-
mitment to the security of Thailand em-
bodied in the Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty and U.S. support for
Thailand as the ASEAN front-line state.

During the visit, arrangements were
concluded for an additional $9.9 million
in foreign military sales (FMS)
guarantees, increasing the level for 1982
to more than $75 million in FMS
guaranteed credits and grants. These
funds will promote further moderniza-
tion of Thai forces and are another
demonstration of the strong security
relationship between Thailand and the
United States.

The Secretary particularly welcomed
this opportunity for a first meeting with
Foreign Minister Siddhi, one of Asia's
leading statesmen.

'Made available to news correspondents
by Department spokesman John Hughes. ■

Dvember 1982

EAST ASIA

ing to build an indigenous army, but
with only limited success. Desertions and
draft evasion, poor performance and
training, as well as local accommodation
with resistance units hinder these efforts.

The emergency economic and agri-
cultural conditions appear to be over
largely through the efforts of the inter-
national community and the Khmer peo-
ple themselves, and the regime is seek-
ing the means to move from relief and
rehabilitation to reconstruction and de-
velopment in the economic sphere. Inter-
national relief experts are cautiously op-
timistic on the current food situation but
note the probability of pockets of food
shortages. Food production has been
hampered by increasing efforts to collec-
tivize production.

The Phnom Penh regime has gained,
at best, only the tacit acquiescence of its
subjects, who generally are politically
apathetic but fear a return of Khmer
Rouge rule. The Heng Samrin regime
skillfully exploited that fear, claiming
that it and a close association with Viet-
nam represent the only alternative to
the re-emergence of the Khmer Rouge,
but there are signs that this tactic may
be losing its effectiveness. The Heng
Samrin regime is seen as a Vietnamese
creation, and popular sentiment believes
that the Vietnamese are increasing their
influence and control. Fear of undis-
ciplined Vietnamese troops, increasing
suspicions of Vietnamese motives in
Kampuchea, and a resurgence in Khmer
nationalism are causing resentment
toward the Vietnamese presence to rise.
Forced labor and conscription have
heightened popular disaffection toward
the regime and the Vietnamese.

It will be difficult for the Phnom
Penh regime to generate popular enthu-
siasm or attract dedicated adminis-
trators to solve the staggering economic,
social, and political problems still facing
the country. The participation of Prince
Sihanouk and Prime Minister Son Sann
in the coalition further makes it difficult
for the Heng Samrin regime to consoli-
date its control.

The Vietnamese manage their occu-
pation of Kampuchea heavily supported
by Soviet supplies and are engaged in
military operations throughout the coun-
try. We believe that Hanoi recently has
increased its military strength by
upgrading its equipment and improving
its logistics, particularly in the Thai
border area. Vietnamese military and
political objectives are to eliminate or
neutralize the Khmer resistance and con-
solidate the position of the Heng Samrin

regime, including its domestic and inter-
national acceptance.

Khmer Rouge forces were unable to
recover all of the territory in western
Kampuchea taken by the Vietnamese
during the previous dry season. Popular
support for the Khmer Rouge has not
increased and is unlikely to do so. The
Khmer Rouge, however, remain the
principal military resistance to the Viet-
namese occupation, and while pressed
hard during the dry season earlier this
year, their units remain intact, strong,
and a problem for the Vietnamese.

The Khmer People's National
Liberation Front (KPNLF) remains the
largest and most active non-Communist
resistance group operating in Kam-
puchea. The number and efficiency of
Prince Sihanouk's military forces have
increased in recent months. Both non-
Communist groups engage in political
proselytizing work in the interior, where
they reportedly have numerous sym-
pathizers. Both groups say materiel
shortages have inhibited efforts to in-
crease their military and popular sup-
port and their activities. Although they
have attempted to increase their military
activities to a limited degree, they are
aware of their current limitations and
have not sought a major combat role.

It is still too early to assess fully the
impact of the coalition on popular sup-
port for the resistance or the Heng
Samrin regime. Initial reports from in-
side Kampuchea suggest that many
Khmer are taking a wait-and-see at-
titude but that they are aware of the
coalition's formation, pleased with the
more active role being taken by Prince
Sihanouk, and hopeful that the coalition
may offer them an alternative to a Kam-
puchea under a Vietnamese-controlled or
Khmer Rouge regime.

There is a tremendous reservoir of
popular support for Prince Sihanouk
among rural Khmer which has iniprove<l
Khmer perceptions of the coalition.
There is also strong sympathy for Prime
Minister Son Sann among those urban,
educated, and civil servant groups that
survived the Khmer Rouge purges. The
potential support for these two Khmer
nationalists and for the coalition is
strong, but it remains to be fully mobil-
ized. The coalition is not likely to affect
popular distrust for the Khmer Rouge,
which remains anathema to most
Khmer, except to the extent that the
Khmer Rouge are able to make limited
use of the popularity of Prince Sihanouk
and F'rime Minister Son Sann.

The Heng Samrin has reacted
vehemently and self-defensively to the
formation of the coalition. It is going to

great lengths to discredit the coalition
and its members. Its criticism of Princi
Sihanouk has been especially harsh. Th
regime reportedly has given instruction
for all officials in its zones to organize
classes or seminars for people of all agi
designed to discredit the coalition. It hi
also taken strong measures to prevent
Khmer from traveling to resistance
areas along the Thai border. Khmer
suspected of association with any of th(
resistance groups in some cases appear
to be imprisoned summarily without tri
or recourse.

The ASEAN Strategy'

As I mentioned in my statement before
this committee last July 15, the ASEAI
states are in firm agreement that their
goals regarding Kampuchea are total
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and a
neutral, independent Kampuchea. Theii
goal is a political, rather than military,
settlement of the problem, and they an
committed to the declaration of the In-
ternational Conference on Kampuchea
as both an instrument and framework
for ASEAN policy objectives. The
ASEAN strategy involves the applica-
tion of diplomatic, economic, and
military pressure on Vietnam to per-
suade Hanoi that it should negotiate a
comprehensive political settlement in
Kampuchea along the lines of the
declaration.

ASEAN is the keystone of U.S.
policy toward Kampuchea and In-
dochina. We fully support ASEAN's
strategy' and respect ASEAN's leader-
ship role in the region. We share
ASEAN's goals as elaborated in the
declaration and work with ASEAN to
realize its objectives. We, too, strongly
favor a comprehensive political settle-
ment.

Like ASEAN, we remain convinced
that Hanoi itself must realize the
disastrous results its policies have pro-
duced and that those policies must be
changed to reconcile Vietnam's ambi-
tions with its interests. We cannot
predict when such a change of mind
might occur in Hanoi. The choice for
Hanoi does exist, nonetheless. In the
meantime, the international community
must continue to stress the unaccepta-
bility of Hanoi's behavior and the
durability of our opposition to its oc-
cupation of Kampuchea.

'The comnlete transcript of the hearinKi
will he publisned by the committee and wifl
lu' availalik' rnini tlu' SupiTintendent of
Docuiiicnts, t'.S, (loviTiiiiK'nt F'rinting Of-
fice, WashiiiKton, D.C. 20402. ■

NERGY

I.S. Energy
Itrategies

I E. Allan Wendt

Address before the Oxford Energy
rminar, Oxford, United Kingdom, on
rptember 9, 1982. Mr. Wendt is Deputy
ssistant Secretary for International
nergy Policy of the Bureau of Economic
id Business Affairs.

Imost 2 years after the election of
resident Reagan, I think most
jservers are aware that the United
tates has adopted a more market-
■iented approach to energy policy.
ven now, however, I fear there is in-
iequate appreciation of the degree of
ir commitment to reducing U.S.

■ overnment involvement in energy deci-
onmaking. Our program is comprehen-
ve. We have joined the community of

' )untries who have decontrolled oil
'ices; we have foresworn imposition of
jmestic allocation and price controls in
iture supply crises; and we have scaled
5wn spending on synfuels development,
econtrol of natural gas prices remains
high priority.

Let me make clear, however, that
e recognize the need for some excep-
ons to this "hands-off approach,
nergy supply today is too important to
le security of a nation and the welfare
f its populace to be left exclusively to
le marketplace. Government must
3sume at least partial responsibility for
;ockpiling emergency oil supplies,
ipelines— oil, natural gas, and coal— re-
uire some regulation. Long-term
jsearch and development in nuclear
nergy and synthetic fuels merit some
jpport. We must take steps to protect
ur citizens from the external disecon-
mies— harm to the environment, health
nd safety hazards— of energy produc-
on and use.

That being said, I would suggest
nat we, government officials and
nalysts alike, have in recent years
arried the conviction that "the govern-
lent must do something" rather farther
ban is justified.

*ower of Market Forces
p the Oil Market

in our view, it is time to refocus world
ittention on the ability of market forces
.0 locate supplies of energy and deliver
Ihem to consumers. We can take our
ead from the operation of the interna-
ional oil market in the past few years.

In 1975, fresh from the oil market
disruption of 1973-74, the subject of
commodity producer cartels was a
topical item for debate among energy
and economic analysts. Many observers
were convinced that conditions existed
in the international oil market— highly
inelastic demand, producers able and
willing to coordinate their actions and to
sacrifice short-term in favor of long-
term profits— which obstructed normal
market forces and permitted the opera-
tion of an international producer cartel.

Recent events have demonstrated
the limitations of this notion. Perhaps
the oil market is not so different from
others after all. In particular, we see
that there are definite limits to the
range of prices over which demand and
supply remain highly inelastic. The
members of OPEC, encouraged by their
earlier successes, overplayed their hand
in 1978-79. Consumers decided that,
with oil at $35 a barrel and OPEC
threatening further price increases, it
was worth the expense to insulate their
houses, buy more gasoline-efficient
automobiles, convert their machinery to

In our view, it is
time to refocus world at-
tention on the ability of
market forces to locate
supplies of energy and
deliver them to con-
sumers.

coal or natural gas, and develop their
own oil resources. Demand for oil has
plummeted, and there is evidence that
this trend continues. Demand for OPEC
oil has dropped by more than one-third.
All of a sudden, we have a buyer's
market for oil again, and prospects are
for continuing decline in the real price of
oil for some time to come.

I draw one major conclusion from
this series of events. It is in the interest
of all of us, producers and consumers
alike, to show greater respect for the
strength of traditional market forces.
Price increases provoke decreases in de-
mand and increases in supply in the oil

market as in any other; they are just a
little slow in coming.

We in the consuming countries have
sustained some investment losses over
the past year as oil price projections
have been revised steadily downward.
Boom in oil exploration and drilling has
turned to bust. One after another of our
synthetic fuel development projects has
shut down. I suspect we will not be so
quick in the future to act on predictions
based on extrapolations from oil price
increases.

The plight of most oil-producing
countries, however, is even worse. Am-
bitious development plans are being
scaled down. Country balance-of-
payments difficulties are growing. The
members of OPEC are bickering and
underselling one another. Perhaps they
will find it in their interest to exercise a
little more restraint in seeking to push
up prices the next time the oil market
tightens.

Hazards of Government Intervention
in Energy Markets

Having affirmed my confidence in the
role of market forces in the oil market, I
would also explore briefly the costs of
government intervention in that market.
The United States, like many other con-
suming countries, controlled the price
and the domestic allocation of oil
throughout most of the past decade.
There is general agreement that this
program, however well-intentioned, was
a failure. In part, the failure of alloca-
tion may have been due to problems
peculiar to the United States. I have in
mind particularly the size and complexi-
ty of the U.S. oil market. Given the
enormous number of players in this
market, attempting to allocate oil among
them equitably through administrative
fiat over an extended period of time
became a bureaucratic nightmare. Were
the U.S. economy no larger than the
economies of some of its neighbors, the
inefficiency of this process might not
have been so serious. Certainly the ex-
perience of some of the smaller oil-
importing countries with allocation has
not been so disappointing as ours.

Price control, on the other hand, is
likely to prove pernicious under almost
any circumstances. Simple economics
suggest that, provided there is any com-
petition at all in the supply of oil, plac-
ing a ceiling on the price at which it will
be sold institutionalizes disequilibrium
between demand and supply. Controls
inevitably generate all kinds of efforts at

Jovember 1982

ENERGY

circumvention which, in turn, lead to ad-
ditional controls. Countries that prevent
full pass-through to the consumer of the
cost of imported oil see those oil imports
diverted to other, more remunerative
markets. Countries with domestic pro-
duction can obtain short-term benefit by
isolating themselves from the interna-
tional economy and imposing controls
only on domestic production. In the
longer term, however, they must accept
that investment in exploration and
development will shift to projects in
other countries where there are no such
limits on profits and that their valuable
domestic production will stagnate.

Domestic allocation and price con-
trols do not serve our longer term
domestic and national security interests.
Neither, I submit, does intervention in
international oil trade. The comments I
have heard from consuming country
government officials show little sign of
conviction that government-to-govern-
ment oil purchase contracts or efforts to
influence foreign company oil allocation
during oil supply interruptions have
significantly enhanced these countries'
energy security.

Dictates of Energy Security

I have tried to explain the reasons why
the Reagan Administration is predis-
posed against intervention in the energy
market place. I do not wish, however, to
leave the impression that we will refuse
to act under all circumstances. Rather,
we expect advocates of government ac-
tion to demonstrate convincingly that
the benefits of such action outweigh the
inevitable costs.

I noted at the beginning of my
remarks a few examples of government
action we consider justified. I would now
like to explore in greater detail one of
those areas in which I am involved at
the Department of State. This is the
area of energy security, particularly its
international aspects.

In today's interdependent world, vir-
tually all countries rely to an increasing
extent on foreign sources not only for
food and raw materials but also in many
instances for energy. Reliance on
foreigji sources offers welfare gains but
also increases the importing country's
sense of vulnerability. Where the com-
modity in question is one so fundamental
to economic activity as energy, every
government has taken steps to reduce

that vulnerability, although sometimes
only after a dramatic and painful
demonstration of the extent of that
vulnerability.

The U.S. Government is no excep-
tion. We define energy security in terms
of reducing vulnerability to oil import in-
terruptions, although concern about the
potential for interruptions in the supply
of natural gas, not only to the United
States but to our allies, is spreading.

What is the Reagan Administration's
energy security program? I would iden-
tify five interrelated elements.

Reliance on Market Forces. First, I
state it once more, we will rely to the
maximum extent possible on market
forces to solve problems. In a country of
225 million people, centralization of
economic decisionmaking is bound to
create inefficiencies and inequities. One
of President Reagan's first acts in office
was to eliminate oil allocation and price
controls in the United States. Although
the operation of market forces in the
natural gas market is constrained
somewhat by infrastructure rigidities, I
would expect the Administration to
press vigourously next year for ac-
celerated decontrol of natural gas prices.
Permitting producers and consumers to
exercise their own ingenuity and market
preferences in responding to supply in-
terruptions may seem painful in the
short term, but we believe it will
substantially reduce medium and longer
term damage to economic welfare.

Oil Stockpiling. The second element
of our energy security program is oil
stockpiling. For military, political, and
economic reasons, we cannot afford to
"run out" of this indispensable commodi-
ty, no matter how remote the possibility
may seem. Ideally, oil consumers would
stockpile oil products for themselves.
But we recognize the limits of such
behavior and the advantages of some
centralized stockpiling. So, just as we
stockpile other essential commodities for
use in emergencies, we have created a
federally funded Strategic Petroleum
Reserve (SPR).

The Administration is filling this
reserve rapidly and it has just reached
270 million barrels, triple the level of 2
years ago. This quantity represents
almost 20% of total primary oil stocks in
the United States and almost 70 days of
current U.S. oil imports. Current plans
call for filling the reserve to 750 million

barrels— roughly 190 days of current im-
ports—by 1990. The cost of this stock-
piling program is obviously enormous.
But we think the potential benefits— re-
ducing harmful effects of future oil sup-
ply interruptions— are substantially
larger.

Cooperation. The third element of
our energy security program is coopera-
tion with other energy-importing coun-
tries. We attach importance to this
cooperation for two reasons. First, we
recognize that the actions of other con-
suming countries in a supply crisis will
affect us. Second, we recognize that
energy security is related to military
security, and that, to be reliable, the
mutual security guarantees we have ex-
changed with other countries must in-
clude an energy component.

The focus of this effort is, of course,
the 21-member International Energy
Agency (lEA) and, in particular, its oil
crisis response system. This system pro-
vides for a variety of actions in response
to serious oil supply interruptions. One
is drawdown of reserve oil stocks— in
anticipation of which the system re-
quires member countries to stockpile oil
equivalent to 90 days of imports.
Another is the oil allocation scheme,
which seeks to assure that no member
country suffers disproportionately from
a shortfall in oil supplies. To the extent
that a member country finds itself
unable to obtain a fair share of oil sup-
plies during a supply interruption, the
other members of the IE A are com-
mitted to make oil available to that
country so as to rectify the imbalance.

In our view, the oil stockpiling and
stock drawdown requirements are the
most important components of the
emergency system. We will only succeed
in avoiding the harmful effects of an oil
supply crisis if we have alternative sup-
plies of oil to draw on. We believe it im-
portant to cooperate with other consum-
ing countries in the accumulation and
drawdown of oil stockpiles. The lEA
provides a forum for such cooperation.
We would like to see our allies join us in
accumulating stockpiles substantially
above the '.tO-day level. 1 note with
satisfaction movement in this direction
on the part of a number of our lEA
partners.

Most IE A members believe that the
lEA oil allocation system, if ever ac-
tivated, would be cumbersome to
operate. We would, therefore, expect
the lEA to seek to rely in the first in-
stance on market forces, supplemented

Department of State Bulletin

ENERGY

irhaps by more informal government
tions, to allocate oil in supply crises,
id to activate the formal system only if
ich efforts fail. At the same time, the
lited States remains fully committed
the lEA emergency system, including
allocation components. Cooperation
5th our lEA partners will be important
mitigating damage from oil supply
ises, and the lEA allocation system
•ovides the guarantee of mutual
;sistance upon which such cooperation
ust be based.

While I am on the subject of interna-
nal cooperation, I should say a word
lUt U.S. policy concerning the Soviet
.tural gas pipeline, to which our op-
sition is well known. The press has
rried detailed reports on recent
;velopments, and you all know the
lickground. I will simply note that,
:om the energy policy standpoint, which
what interests us here, we believe
'velopment of the indigenous energy
sources of the OECD [Organization for
conomic Cooperation and Develop-
ent] community of nations offers the
'st prospect for assuring security of

ippiy-

Long-term Efforts. This leads me
I tlie fourth major element of the U.S.
lergy security program, which I will
ill the long-term element. Here I have
mind efforts to reduce dependence
.ion imports of energy from insecure
)urces and thus vulnerability to any in-
vidual interruptions. Obviously, where
ich longer term efforts are required,
V 1-an rely on the free market to take
"si (if the initiative. However, there
■f cases where the market response to
iproving economic incentives for pro-
jction and conservation has not been
^ dynamic as it might have been.

The U.S. Government can be of
line assistance in promoting develop-
it'iit and use of new energy sources,
(ir example, we are participating ac-
vely in the lEA's so-called long-term
Kiperation program. Under this pro-
ram, we exchange information with our
artner governments concerning long-
Tin energA' policy options and develop-
R'lit activities, including research and
e\elopment. In addition, we are looking
t ways the U.S. Government can en-
ourage development of neglected
nergy resources in developing coun-
'•ies. We believe commercial interests
nil develop larger energy resources
/ithout official encouragement other
han a receptive investment climate. But
Umaller projects that could contribute
ignificantly to satisfying developing

country internal requirements are less
likely to attract foreign private invest-
ment. We, therefore, are supporting
through our bilateral assistance program
projects designed; (1) to improve energy
planning and management, particularly
in public utilities, (2) to adapt and
develop alternate energy technologies,
and (3) to encourage the development of
traditional fuels, most notably fuelwood.
Bilateral funding for these programs
totaled well over $100 million in 1982
and should continue at similar levels in
1983.

We also support the efforts of the
multinational develoiinient banks, most
notably the Worl(l Bank. In 1978 World
Bank energy lending constituted 15% of
its total lending or slightly over $1
billion. By 1982 that proportion m-
creased to 25% and totaled over $3
billion. We are encouraging the Bank to
concentrate its special talents in areas
that offer the greatest promise of suc-
cess: where coparticipation will give
Bank involvement an important
multiplier effect; in strengthening
management skills of recipient govern-
ment; and in pre-exploration projects
that assist countries to inventory their
resources and collect data.

With respect to alternative fuels, we
are seeking to correct the longstanding
patterns of neglect of coal. Abundant
supplies of coal are available from a
number of secure sources. By sponsor-
ing coal conferences, coal delegations to
foreign countries, discussions and
studies of coal in the lEA, and other
similar activities, the U.S. Government
has reinforced the efforts of private
companies to demonstrate to energy
users that coal is indeed a viable, attrac-
tive fuel. We are also continuing to con-
tribute in a variety of ways to the
development of other alternative
energies — for example, synthetics and
nuclear — where uncertainty or cost may
slow development by the private sector.
The U.S. Administration is contributing
funding to projects with long-term
payoffs, leaving short-term payoff in-
vestments to the private sector.

Promoting Middle East Peace.

The fifth and final element of our
energy security program is the pursuit
of an international environment con-
ducive to stability of world oil trade— as
well as to other trade and to economic
development in general. I have in mind
primarily our efforts to promote peace

in the Middle East. It is one of the
world's great tragedies that the enor-
mous human and natural resources of
this region continue to be dissipated in
internecine struggle. As President
Reagan has made clear, he considers
resolution of these conflicts, to the ex-
tent the United States can contribute to
their resolution, one of his premier
foreign policy objectives. Success in this
effort, perhaps more than any other ac-
tion, will strengthen the energy security
of the entire world.

Future Prospects

I conclude my remarks with a glance at
the future. Whether the various players
like it or not, longer term market forces
have begun to assert themselves, and
will influence heavily energy market
developments over the next several
years. The trend toward conservation
and increased energy efficiency in
response to the 1978-79 price increases
still has some distance to run, assuring
softness in energy demand for some
time. Growing fuel substitution capabili-
ty has produced an increase in the short-
term elasticity of demand for any in-
dividual fuel. Development of oil
deposits in non-OPEC countries has in-
creased supply-side competition in world
oil trade. Economic development proj-
ects in many oil-producing countries
have absorbed the bulk of their oil
revenue and reduced their room for
maneuver in attempting to control sup-
ply and price in world oil trade.

I see no reason why producers and
consumers alike should not welcome this
assertion of market forces. It should
bring greater stability and transparency
to the international oil market, thus
benefiting all of us with large in-
vestments riding on the accuracy of oil
market projections. A vigorous, well-
functioning market should assure ade-
quate supplies at prices fair to con-
sumers and remunerative to producers.

With this future in prospect, I would
urge that government policymakers con-
sider returning energy policy to its
rightful place— as a subset of economic
policy. The emergence of energy policy
as an independent discipline has had the
positive effect of focusing attention on
the importance of energy to economic
life and on the consequent need for at-
tention to energy problems. But it has
also given rise to excesses. Traditional
economic forces are not the only ones af-
fecting the world energy outlook, but in-
creasingly they are the most important
ones. Let us mold our energy policies ac-
cordingly. ■

Jovember 1982

EUROPE

Visit of Iceland's
President Finnbogadottir

President Vigdis Finnbogadottir of
Iceland visited the United States Septem-
ber i-22. While in Washington, D.C.,
September 7-10, she met with President
Reagan and other government officials.

Following are toasts made by
Presidents Reagan and Finnbogadottir
at a White House luncheon on September
8. 1982.^

President Reagan

It is, indeed, a pleasure for me to
welcome you to the White House this
afternoon and to play a part in the
inauguration of Scandinavia Today, a
program which underscores the con-
tributions of Nordic culture and the ties
between the United States and the five
Scandinavian democracies. It is, certain-
ly, a noteworthy occasion when we're
able to host a chief of state, representa-
tives of three royal houses, and the ar-
ray of distinguished government leaders
who are assembled here today.

Madam President, a special greeting
for you. This is the first time a Presi-
dent of Iceland has visited our country,
and it is also your first visit as well. I
know you and your colleagues will see
firsthand just how much your country-
men have contributed to the cultural,
economic, and social development of this
nation.

Charles Lindbergh, the great
pioneer in aviation, once said that short-
term survival may depend on the
knowledge of physicists and the per-
formance of their machines. But, and I
quote, "Long-term survival depends,
alone, on the character of Man." Today,
we recognize together that Scandina-
vians were and continue to be a signifi-
cant force in the shaping of our
American character. Lindbergh himself,
who represented the best qualities of
America to so many, was the son of i

Scandinavian immigrants. I

It's no mere coincidence that your »
five nations share with the people of this ^
country strong democratic traditions. -■_
Your country, Iceland, boasts a history %
that includes a republican constitution I
and an assembly as far back as the year *
930. Now, that's going back pretty far, |
even by my way of counting. [Laughter] i
And just as we've been home to many ^
Scandinavian settlers over the years,
your own nation of Iceland was settled

by proud and independent Nordic people
from the European Continent.

Our peoples share traits that are the
product of our common frontier her-
itage. But something all of us in this
room share is our love of liberty and our
respect for the rights of individuals,
values which place our nations on the
front lines of freedom and democracy.
Along with this freedom, Iceland and
other Nordic countries experience
cultural advances that will be high-
lighted by Scandinavia Today.

I know of your own love for
literature and the theater. And as one
who shares a somewhat similar back-
ground—I'm not going to tell you about
"Bedtime for Bonze )" | laughter) and who
was also elected President — I believe I
can appreciate how deeply you feel

about your country, its people, and its
traditions.

In one of Europe's oldest collections
of literature, "The Edda," there is a saga
with a message that speaks clearly to us
even after a thousand years, "Cattle die,
kinsmen die," the ancient poem says,
"the self dies. But a reputation will
never die for him who gains a good
one." Today, we celebrate the reputation
of the Nordic culture. We're thankful to
have you here to join with us in this
celebration.

And now would you please join me
in a toast to President Vigdis
[Finnbogadottir] and to the traditional
warm bonds that join America and all
these other countries.

President Finnbogadottir

First and foremost, let me thank you for
your warm words for us Nordic nations.
It has for a long time been my con-
viction that the best gift we receive
from society is the gift of literacy. The

I'ri'sidfiits Keaican and I'iiinhoKadottir. President Finnbojcadottir's trip to the I'.S. is the
first l)V a I'resident of Iceland.

Department of State Bulletin

EUROPE

ipacity to read is a richness beyond
easure by our usual standards of
loalth. Yet, too often, it is taken for
fantfd. This gift opened up for us new
Ill-Ids. It is an incentive for our im-
j.iiiation. And through the gift of
-ading is given knowledge, knowledge
hout other peoples.

The people of America and the Nor-
:c people share the fortune of being
:erate from an early age. Through
>ading, children can imagine what the
orld around them looks like. Thus, it is
most half a century since I began to
lagine through books what the United
tates of America were like.

I became a friend of Huckleberry
inn long before knowing the sweet
iste of huckleberries. And the stories of
dgar Allen Poe made my heart jump
cm secret and sheer excitement. And
irough the immigrant stories, I trav-
ed over the wide plains accompanied
y Nordic people. People had come from
lountains and now had nowhere to
tde, not even a rock or a bush. I have
ever been here before, yet some things
ok familiar to me through the depic-
on and the paintings of your great ar-
Bts of the world.

To the best of my knowledge, most
[f the great literature works of
.merican writers have been translated
to our Nordic tongues, works that
bve inspired our own writ-rs and
idened our own horizons. Eugene
^'Neill, Arthur Miller, just to name a
5W of the giants of the theatrical arts
hich we have in common, suddenly
ecome kinsmen to us at the moment
aeir words are translated into our own
ungues.

Yes, we have known about you and
our land for a long time. In fact, we
.ave sources telling us of the new world
llmost a millennium ago. These sources
II us of dew sweet as anything, of
llaces with no dearth of grapevine or
rapes. No wonder the first Western
ravelers to these shores called them
Vineland, the Good."

But the sweetness of the dew and
he abundance of grapes are not the
nly things Nordic people have sought in
he New World. Our scientists have
ome here — for knowledge and know-
low — to this land of scientific ingenuity,
. land known for its great achievements,
n fact, achievements so unbelievable
hat none of my generation would have
magined them when I was growing up.

Our nation is a nation of great
;piritual and practical — I would say,
'our nation is a nation of great spiritual

and practical achievements, not to men-
tion its vastness and power. What then
have we, the smaller nation, to say to
the greater ones? Perhaps the individual
belonging to a small nation is more con-
scious that he or she can contribute to
the contemporary world. In a small na-
tion, every single creative mind is need-
ed. Indeed, each skillful hand that can
contribute to the achievements of a
worthwhile common aim is welcome.

And yet, all would be in vain if not
for the gift of literacy. The capacity to
read and remember words of wisdom,
the words of those who have been at the
plow in the field before we arrived.
Without reading words of those who
came before us, we could hardly be the
people we are today.

Coming generations will read about
the adventures of Huckleberry Finn.
They will read about immigrants and old
explorers of new lands, and they will
read about us. What is the word we
leave them to read? Perhaps the word is
"dull." Perhaps the word is "delightful."
Perhaps it is "good." Perhaps it is "bad."
That is for posterity to judge. Anyhow,
we all know that we are marvelously in-
telligent. [Laughter]

Whatever the judgment will be, we
have given the future a great gift, the
capacity to read about us. American or
Nordic, I have this great ambition for us
all: Let us give our descendants words
to think about, deeds to remember, a
culture to build upon. Let us give the
future a picture of ourselves that can be
reproduced at least as a fragment of an
ideal.

Please accept our heartfelt thanks
for the hospitality you have shown to my
country and all the other Nordic coun-
tries today in your renowned home. We
know that the welfare of our nations is
deeply linked as well as the welfare of
other nations in the world. It is my
sincere wish that our children and forth-
coming generations will be able to read
about how magnificent peacemakers we
were, realistic as we are about the world
situation today.

Let us lift our glasses and drink to
the health and happiness of the Presi-
dent of the United States of America,
Mrs. Reagan, and the American people.

On behalf of all the Nordic nations, I
have the pleasure of presenting to you
the emblem of the Scandinavia Today,
inaugurated here in America.

10th Report on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
SEPT. 24, 1982'

In accordance with the provisions of
Public Law 95-384, I am submitting the
following report on progress made dur-
ing the past 60 days toward reaching a
negotiated settlement of the Cyprus
problem.

Following a summer recess, the in-
tercommunal negotiations resumed dis-
cussion and analysis of the United
Nations "evaluation" of the talks. In re-
cent sessions, the negotiators completed
initial discussion of those sections of the
"evaluation" dealing with aspects of the
possible executive, legislative, and
judicial structure of a federal govern-
ment. The negotiators have maintained
a serious and positive attitude.

We commend the continued earnest
efforts of the Secretary General and his
Special Representative on Cyprus, Am-
bassador Hugo Gobbi, to narrow the dif-
ferences between positions and to pro-
mote negotiating progress. We fully sup-
port the LInited Nations effort to reach
a mutually acceptable agreement for the
Cyprus problem and firmly believe that
the intercommunal negotiations provide
the most useful path towards that goal.
On September 17 the negotiators an-
nounced a recess; negotiations are
scheduled to resume on November 2.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

'Identical letters addressed to Thomas P.
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and Charles H. Percy, chair-
man of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee (text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents "of Sept. 27, 1982). ■

President Reagan

I thank you very much. Maybe I should
have incorporated this in my toast, but
it gives me an opportunity now in thank-
ing all of you to say that this morning-
some of our days that we observe here,
people think, are just automatic, but
every year, by proclamation, they are
reproclaimed— I signed the proclama-
tions declaring Columbus Day and Leif
Ericson Day.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Sept. 13, 1982.

EUROPE

NATO Ministers
Meet in Canada

On October 2 3. 1982. Secretary Shultz
joined other foreign ministers of the NATO
countries and NATO Secretary (ieneral
Joseph M.A.H. Luns at La Sapiniere (a
lodge near Val David, near Montreal.
Canada) to discuss alliance issues. Here
Canada's Secretary of State for External
Affairs Allan J. MacEachen (left) greets
Secretary Shultz. ■

Department of State Bulletin

EUROPE

iorced Labor In the U.S.S.R.

EPARTMENT STATEMENT,
fPT. 22, 1982'

fi ? have received a growing number of
I )orts that the U.S.S.R. has used a
I ge number of prisoners — including
it lusands of pohtical prisoners — to
k irk on massive labor projects. Accord-
i ; to at least one such report, for ex-
: iple, at least 100,000 such forced
I lorers are being used on the heavy in-
I istructure work of clearing swamps,
i ;ting timber, and building access roads
I • the Yamal gas pipeline. These forced
I lorers reportedly include religfious
( sidents and other prisoners of con-
■ ence.

5 These reports have come from a
ijide variety of individuals and organiza-
ttns in Europe, Asia, and the United
Sites. The sources include human
Jlhts organizations, labor organizations,
Ijiorers who have managed to emigrate
£'m the Soviet Union after working
uder these conditions, and letters
riching Asia and the West from the
IS.S.R.

We are not claiming to have
€ dence resembling a "smoking gun."
(i /en the closed nature of Soviet society
ad the official control of the Soviet
f'dia, moreover, there may never be a
"noking gun." But the information be-
i ^ released by this wide range of
t owledgeable individuals and organiza-
t ns spanning three continents, some
(\ th firsthand experience of these labor
|t nditions, goes into considerable detail
I d deserves serious examination.

Reliable estimates place the total
I mber of forced laborers in the Soviet
I lion today at approximately 4 million,
lirther, it is well established that the
£ viet Union has a history of using
i-ced labor on a mass scale — including
[litical prisoners — on major projects,
i rticularly in Siberia, where the official
jess has acknowledged that it is dif-
i ult to persuade Soviet workers to go
tert' voluntarily. To cite only two ex-
: iplt's: Some 250,000 forced laborers
;e lit'lieved to have perished during the
3(is while working on the construction
I tlic Bielomorsk Canal. And in the
'7tis, thousands of forced laborers
\'rv reported to be building the Baikal-
mur railway extension in southeastern
beria.

As regards foreign laborers, the of-
ficial Soviet media itself has admitted
that several thousand Vietnamese and
other Southeast Asian laborers have
been imported into the U.S.S.R. and has
intimated that many thousands more are
likely to be imported in the near future.
Information on the nature of this pro-
gram is fragmentary. We do not know
whether or not the Vietnamese laborers
are working on the Siberian pipeline.
But we are very concerned about indica-
tions that Vietnamese may be coerced
into working in the U.S.S.R. and
Eastern Europe and that a portion of
the salary paid to them might be
deducted to offset Vietnam's debts to
the host country. In addition, we have
received reports that the Soviet
authorities are placing limitations on the
ability of these workers to communicate
with their families and friends outside
the U.S.S.R. We believe it is important
that international attention be given to
this situation, given the obvious possibili-
ty of exploitation of these workers.

The Soviet Government could con-
tribute to establishing the truth about
these very serious charges by permitting
an objective examination of labor condi-
tions on its various Siberian projects and
the conditions in which Soviet political
prisoners live and work. We would
welcome such an independent interna-
tional investigation, but the prospects
for obtaining this are probably not
bright. For example, charges of use of
forced labor have been made in the past
against the U.S.S.R. in the International
Labor Organization (ILO). However, the
Soviet authorities have consistently
refused to allow an ILO mission to visit
the U.S.S.R. to investigate these
charges.

Because of the seriousness of these
charges, and the massive human rights
violations which they imply, we believe
the international community has a
responsibility to investigate them. The
U.S. Government, for its part, is
thoroughly examining the information
being brought to bear on this issue, and
we understand that several other

governments have indicated similar in-
tentions. As our examination proceeds,
we will — wherever possible — make our
findings available to the public. We hope
that other governments and private or-
ganizations will do the same.

'Made available to news correspondents
by Department spokesman John Hughes. ■

Poland

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT.
AUG. 31, 1982'

Today marks the second anniversary of
the signing of the Gdansk Accords, the
formal birthday of the Solidarity labor
movement in Poland.

The emergence of Solidarity was a
dramatically hopeful event for the entire
world. For those of us who live in free-
dom, the formation of Solidarity and its
program for reform revived our hope
that, perhaps, peaceful change and the
enjoyment of basic human rights could
come to a closed Communist society.
And for those who now live in closed
societies but yearn for a greater
measure of freedom to determine their
own destinies, Solidarity awakened the
hope that a free and united organization
of working men and women might pro-
vide the key to a fairer share of the
fruits of their labor and a better future.

Solidarity was born in a setting of
economic mismanagement and decline
and was not, as has often been charged,
its cause. Its detractors who make that
charge are trying to rewrite history.
Long years of growing economic disloca-
tions, official corruption, aggrandize-
ment by the Communist Party bureauc-
racy at society's expense, food and fuel
shortages — in short, a social and
economic crisis of enormous propor-
tions— all played their parts in bringing
about the July 1980 strikes and the birth
of Solidarity.

In autumn 1980 and spring 1981 in
Poland, Solidarity grew and gave the
Polish people a means to influence the
course of national affairs. There were no
riots, no anarchy, no civil war, no bloody
confrontations. There were only deter-
mined workers seeking to bargain ear-
nestly and in good faith with the reluc-
tant government and its agencies.
Solidarity's achievements in its first 16
months of existence include:

• An unprecedented membership of
10 million enrolled members, out of a

bvember1982

MIDDLE EAST

national population of 3(5 million and a
workforce of 20 million;

• Innovative negotiations, by formal
agreements with the government, which
yielded for Polish working men and
women improved working conditions,
hours, and wages; and

• Unparalleled worker unity which
remains to the present day.

Under Lech Walesa's leadership,
Solidarity's prime accomplishment has
been to give dignity to the Polish worker
as a valued and productive member of
his own society — no longer to be dis-
counted merely as part of a working
"mass" or as a "factor of production."

Last December the Polish military
regime, at the behest of the Soviets,
sought to crush the hopes aroused by
Solidarity. The ideas which found ex-
pression in Solidarity, however, will
never die. Simple imperatives — a safe
workplace, a fair wage, a fair division of
time between factory and family — and
more complex yearnings — worker digni-
ty; the right to assemble and to
associate peaceably together; the right
to speak, to read, and to listen; the right
to petition and negotiate grievances —
cannot be forever stifled by force or
stilled behind the prison gate.

Today's demonstrations in Polish
cities show once again that repression
will not solve Poland's problems and that
reconciliation among the authorities, the
church, and Solidarity is urgently
needed.

The world continues to admire Soli-
darity as Polish workers commemorate
its second anniversary and to wish it a
long, fruitful, and successful life.

For our part, and to demonstrate
our respect for the goals of freedom
represented by Solidarity, we will con-
tinue the President's policies aimed at
advancing reconciliation in Poland
through the release of the prisoners, an
end to martial law, and restoration of
the dialogue among Solidarity, the
church, and the government.

WHITK HOUSE STATEMENT,
SEPT. 1. 1982-

The President deeply deplores the acts
of violence which resulted in the tragic
loss of life in Lubin. He deeply regrets
and condemns the use of deadly force to
break up peaceful demonstrations in
Warsaw and other cities on Solidarity's
second anniversary.

These events, once again, point up
the need for reconciliation and restora-
tion by the Government of basic human

rights in Poland. The fact that demon-
strations involving thousands occurred
in eight major cities in the face of
Government warnings that security
forces would use violence to put them
down and dole out summary punish-
ments vividly illustrates and demon-
strates the strength of the dedication of
the Polish people to free trade unions
and other basic liberties.

The deaths of the two individuals in
Lubin can only serve to deepen the
already extensive chasm separating

Polish authorities from the Polish peo-
ple.

The Polish Government's actions
against the demonstrators are the latest
manifestation of martial law in Poland
and dramatize the significance of the
policies which the President announced
last December.

'Read to news correspondents by Depart-
ment spokesman .John Hughes.

^Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Sept. 6, 1982. ■

Secretary Shultz Interviewed
on the "Today" Show

Secretary Shultz was interviewed by
Bryan Gumbel and Marvin Kalb. both of
NBC News, on September 21. 1982.^

Q. King Hussein suggested that fur-
ther moves, in addition to the sending
in of Marines into Lebanon by the
United States, such as sanctions
would be needed to keep U.S.
credibility among Arabs in the area.
Are such sanctions under considera-
tion, or will the Marines be the extent
of the Administration's reaction, for
the time being?

A. The point in the Middle East is,
first, to stop the bloodshed in Lebanon.
That seems to be coming to an end. The
Marines and the multinational force are
designed to help in that regard. Second,
to get a stable central government in
Lebanon, first, taking control of its own
capital in Beirut, and then — promptly,
strongly, and urgently — to clear
Lebanon of foreign forces so that the
country can be governed by its own
government; to set to work on the basic
peace process which must address the
basic needs, problems, and aspirations of
the Palestinian people. That's what our
priorities must be.

Q. In that connection, since we
just heard from King Hussein, is he
the key player in trying to get the
peace process going?

A. Yes.

Q. You've tried to involve him.
What success have you had so far?

A. King Hussein has niadc a
number of comments about the Presi-
dent's fresh start proposals. They have
been basically favorable and positive. He
has been trying to get himself into a
positive position where he has some sup-

port in the Arab community for coming
to discussions, and so I think, basically,
there has been a lot of progress there.

Q. Do you feel that he is able to
break loose from the 1974 Rabat com-
mitment and be able to negotiate on
behalf of the Palestinians?

A. That, of cour.se, is what we
would like to see happen. I think it cer-
tainly is possible. It depends upon his
generating support among Palestinians
and other Arabs.

Q. The Israeli Cabinet is meeting,
I think, as we're speaking right now.
Have you had any word at all on
whether they will agree formally to
the introduction of the multinational
force once again into Beirut?

A. We have h;ul a number of in-
direct suggestions al)()Ut what might
happen, but since the Cabinet is meeting
and is going to make a decision on this,
I think it is best to await their decision.

Q. You do expect a positive
response? We are going to proceed
with this plan, are we not?

A. We arc planning to proceed with
it, and 1 think that we can have some
reason for hoping that the response will
he a positive one from Israel.

(J. Because our NBC sources in
Jerusalem say that they have agreed,
that the Cabinet has, indeed, agreed.

A. We'll wait and hear what the
government has to say, much as I
respect NBC sources. You're probably
right. I hope you are.

Q. The President is described to-
day as believing that Israel cannot be

Departnnent of State Bulletin

MIDDLE EAST

isted in the search for peace right
in the Middle East. 1 wonder if
would comment on that?

A. Israel is clearly a very important
■t of the peace process— right in the
ter of it— and we will work with the
aeli Government; that's the Presi-
:it's intent. So, we certainly intend to
irk with the Israeli Government on the
ice process.

Q. But is there any underlying ef-
•t on the part of the Administration
w, based upon the stories that have
in appearing in the last 48 hours,
it, indeed, you would like to see a
ange of government in Israel, a
mewhat more moderate regime?
, A. The decisions about what the
■aeli Government should be are up to
; citizens of Israel. It's a democracy;
jy have their processes for choosing
jir government. As far as the United
ites is concerned, when we deal with
rael, we deal with the Israeli Govern-
Bnt, just as when we deal with any
ler country, we deal with the duly-
nstituted government of that country.

Q. How long will the Marines stay
ii Beirut? You really are not clear
a out that as yet.

A. It isn't that we're trying to
c dge the question or anything like that;
ii; just that when one sits here right
rw and says that the Marines should be
tM-e to help the Government of
I banon create stability and govern in
t; city of Beirut, one does not know
Iw long that is going to take. It could
c rne about very quickly; it could take a
t itter of more days. I can't tell you
1 re, today, what the situation is going
t l)f like 10, 20, 30, or 40 days from
! \v — I just don't know. I think it is a
t stake to set oneself up right now and
sv as of some date, we're going to
live, because the situation may not be
] opitious at that moment.

Q. But just to be clear, it's not
■tien-ended, or is it?

A. No. It is intended to be and will
, I'm sure, of limited duration, but we
m't want to get in the position of put-
ig some number on it.

Q. During the deliberations on
nding Marines back, did any of
tu — yourself, perhaps — have the feel-
g that you were getting on a slip-
jry slope? Did any memories of Vict-
im come to mind?

A. No, I don't think this has any
lalagous aspect of Vietnam at all.

5vember1982

Q. None? Because so many people
in the Congress wonder whether you
are in for 10 or 40 days, or 40 months.
What is your sense of that?

A. I "don't want to put down a
number of days because we might some-
how be in a position of doing something
that wasn't appropriate at the end of
that number of days, or we might feel
that it is propitious to leave well before
that, and people would then say, "Why
don't you stay longer?" It is a mistake to
put yourself into that trap.

Q. A lot of people with perfect
hindsight are now suggesting that the
troops, in departing on the 10th, left
too early. Do you agree?

A. No, I don't agree. The situation
was stable, and the new Government of
Lebanon was in the process of taking
over. The President, Bashir, was in the
process of bringing about a reconcilia-
tion. The conditions that were presumed
at the time we came in had been met,
and so we left, and I think properly so.

'Press release 291.

Assistant Secretary Veliotes
Interviewed on "Meet the Press'

Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
Nicholas A. Veliotes, was interviewed on
NBC-TV's "Meet the Press" by Bill
Monroe, NBC News; Mannn Kalb, NBC
News; Henry Trewhitt, The Baltimore
Sun; Richard Cohen, The Washington
Post; and Georgie Anne Geyer, Univer-
sal Syndicate on September 26. 1982.

Q. I'd like to start with the question
of when U.S. Marines will actually
land in Beirut. Last Monday a senior
American official said they'd be there
within 72 hours. On Thursday the
State Department spokesman said
they'd be there today and that there
was no relationship, he said, between
the arrival of the Marines and when
the Israelis left. Now there seems to
be that kind of a relationship. Could
you clear this up, please?

A. I believe when we discussed this
earlier, we said that the Marines could
come in on a 72-hour advance notice.
The current status is very simple. The
Marine contingent of the multinational
force (MNF) will be deployed the furth-
est south of any of the three con-
tingents.

We are in the process of working
out the final details of the deployment
with the Government of Lebanon and,
of course, the Government of Israel. The
current situation concerning the begin-
ning of Yom Kippur has had the effect
of delaying the agreement on the final
arrangements.

Q. Are you holding up the disem-
barkment, as well as the deployment
of the Marines, until the Israelis have

pulled out of west Beirut, all of
Beirut, including the airport?

A. Our Marines will come into west
Beirut, most of them in the port, and
immediately be deployed to the southern
part of the city and the airport.

Q. When will they land?

A. I would expect this to be some-
time on perhaps Wednesday, the way
we're currently planning.

Q. Do you have a commitment
from the Israelis that they will pull
out of all of Beirut, including the air-
port, by Wednesday, as reported?

A. Yes, I believe that's accurate.

Q. It appears to me that Ameri-
cans might be most interested in what
the mission of the Marines is this
time. What are the dangers? What are
their instructions? What are they to
do if they are fired upon? Are they to
engage in combat?

A. The mission of the Marines is
primarily to be a part of a three-nation
force in Beirut which, by the presence of
the Marines and this force, will give con-
fidence to the Government of Lebanon
and, thereby, facilitate the government's
reestablishment of its authority
throughout its capital city.

The question of how long the
Marines will be there; this has not been
determined. We have said it would be of
a limited duration and that its mission
would be confined to Beirut itself.

As far as the circumstances under
which the Marines will be deployed, we
do not see that the environment would
be potentially more hostile than the en-
vironment for the initial deployment
which, as you recall, was accomplished
in the context of a shooting war, and

MIDDLE EAST

since that time, 15,000 armed personnel
have been evacuated from Beirut.

Q. What do they do if they're fired
upon? Are they withdrawn?

A. There will be normal peacetime
rules of engagement. Our forces will be
able to defend themselves. No one would
expect anything less.

Q. But would they be withdrawn if
they were under attack?

A. I think you have a definitional
problem here. Being fired upon, you
can't exclude isolated unfortunate in-
cidents, and no one is trying to, and
coming under attack. So I would say
that we would not expect them to come
under attack. We would anticipate, if
there's any trouble, it would be from
isolated incidents— snipers, what have
you — and we would expect the Marines
to fulfill their mission, which is essential-
ly one of giving confidence, not only to
the Lebanese but to the unarmed
Palestinians and others in that area.

Q. At the end of last week, U.N.
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick sort of
indicated that America was in itself
culpable for the massacre of Palestin-
ians because we pulled out the troops
earlier than expected. If American
troops had been on the spot and if
they are going to return and there had
been a similar incident, would it be
the role of American troops to go in
and try to protect Palestinian
civilians?

A. This is all a rather iffy question.
Let me first say I don't believe that's
what Ambassador Kirkpatrick said or
meant to say in her public comments.

As far as the previous deployment of
the multinational force, we believe it
successfully carried out its mission,
which was primarily to monitor the safe
departure of the Syrians, FLO [Palestine
Liberation Organization], and other
armed elements in Beirut and also to
facilitate, through being there, the
beginning of Lebanese reconciliation and
the beginning of the Lebanese author-
ities reasserting their control over west
Beirut. That happened, the mission was
accomplished, and the troops withdrew.

As 1 said, we don't exclude isolated
incidents. We don't expect a repetition
of what happened in the camps. Indeed,
all of the evidence points to the fact that
the Lebanese Army is now moving into
position and also that the Israeli Armed
Forces are, indeed, withdrawing and
turning over positions.

Q. This morning we've been get-
ting reports directly from Beirut that

even while the Marines are waiting to
land, in the wake of the killing of two
Israeli soldiers, large numbers of
Lebanese and Palestinian men have
been removed from that area and
taken south. Also that even after the
massacre, more and more Palestinians
are being taken to the south of
Lebanon, where 7,000 are already be-
ing held. As far as you know, are
these reports true, and does the
United States intend to do anything
about them?

A. We have heard varying reports
about interrogations and, if you will,
deportations of people from west
Beirut — males. We have not been able
to verify that there have, indeed, been
large-scale movements of males from
west Beirut to the south by the Israelis.
I'm not excluding this. It's just that we
have made our inquiries, and we have
been unable to obtain information that
would verify any large-scale movements
to the south.

Q. Do we have any agreement with
the Israeli Government over that in
the wake of the massacre?

A. No, not agreements.

Q. When you say you've made in-
quiries on this subject, do you mean
you've asked the Israelis about it and
you've not gotten an answer?

A. We have asked the Israelis about
the reports. These reports come in in a
variety of sources, and the substance
varies. The answer we have received is
that yes, there have been interrogations,
and, yes, there were large numbers of
people held but that most of these peo-
ple were released, the implication being
that very few of these detainees were
actually taken away. But, again, I can't
verify that.

Q. Were you given figures or ap-
proximate figures?

A. We were given figures of a very
small number, but I do not believe that
this would be considered absolute
verification.

Q. You're an expert on Israeli
politics. You've served there, and
you're now, in part, responsible for
our policy toward Israel. There was a
massive demonstration in Tel Aviv last
night against the government. Do you
expect the collapse of the Begin
regime?

A. I really don't know what will be
the impact of the current obvious unrest
— I suppose is the word — in Israel, and

only time will tell us what, if any, const
quences there will be. I do recall,
however, that during my time in Israel
in early 1974, at the end of the October
war — the Yom Kippur war — there was
a great amount of dissatisfaction with
the lack of preparedness, if you will, of
the Israeli forces at that time, and the
government did have an investigation o
the charges and the allegations.

Q. Do you believe there'll be an in
vestigation this time?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. What do you think the result
will be?

A. I have no idea, but —

Q. What do you think the result
would be based upon what you know
about what happened at the camps?

A. 1 don't want to prejudge what I
believe will be a very serious and impar
tial investigation.

Q. Do you, as a member of this
Administration, feel that the Presi-
dent's peace plan, as outlined on
September 1st, can be moved forward
and implemented while the Begin go\
ernment stays in power?

A. We believe that the President's
peace plan must be moved forward and
implemented. The latest bloodletting
should only reemphasize the need that
this has to stop, and it has to stop now
The way it's going to stop is if people
decide that they're going to come to th(
negotiating table and really talk about
peace very seriously.

Q. You're not quite directing
yourself to my question.

A. The Government of Israel has r
jected the President's plan. The Arabs
have not accepted it. We believe that if
there are serious prospects for early
negotiations for peace between Israel
and the Arabs, that this can and will
substantially alter attitudes.

Q. On the part of Prime Minister
Begin?

A. I would say on the part of
everyone who is concerned.

Q. But do you have an indication
now that King Hussein will join that
process?

A. We have no more indication tha:
the general public has through his
words. We have said and he has said
that he has received the President's pro
posals, and he believes they are very
serious and important proposals worthy

Department of State Bulletir

MIDDLE EAST

serious attention by all concerned, so
i takes them seriously.

Q. Let me extrapolate the question
^ain to the state of Israeli-American
ilations in general. Over the past
tenths. Israel frequently has defied

hat the United States has perceived
) be its interest, and I think most
verybody would agree that that rela-

onship has changed, where there
'ould be a lot of argument about the
egree of that change. Let me ask you
) address yourself specifically to
lat. What is the state of Israeli-

merican relations, and what is the
rospect for the United States taking
lore direct sanctions to try to bring
srael more to its way of thinking?

A. I believe on the public record it's
lear that the state of our relations is
nder significant strain. You can hardly
raw another conclusion from the public
tatements that we believe we had to
lake rather recently, under the cir-
umstances.

As far as the future state of these
slations, of course, we hope that these

ill not stay strained and that we will
e, in the reasonably near future, back
ito essentially a cooperative posture
'ith the Government of Israel.

As far as the question of sanctions,
lis always comes up whenever we have

problem with the Government of
.rael, and, quite frankly, I have always
lelieved that the greatest pressure on

rael, whether it's in the peace process
ontext or anything else, is, indeed, the
ressure of the prospect of peace. So
ather than talk about the prospects of
his or that kind of punitive action, let's
alk about the e.xpectation that in
.ebanon and also in the peace process,
/e will again be working closely
ogether.

Q. Just let me recall that several
lembers of Congress have talked—
, cropping the word sanctions — about
ither a decrease in American
conomic support for Israel or a
leerease in the rate of increase of
conomic support for Israel. Do you
egard that as being in the prospect?

A. I'm not certain that I'm aware of
he congressional attitudes that you've
ust discussed. We believe, however,
vith respect to aid levels for Israel and
'or every other aid recipient, that the

President's budget in an austere year is
really sufficient, and we would hold to
that."

Q. Let me go back to the Presi-
dent's peace plan. Since announcing it.
the Israelis have announced new set-
tlements in the West Bank; they've ap-
parently broken the agreement with
America by going into west Beirut. It
seems to me that in announcing the
peace plan, the President has lost a
certain amount of leverage over Israel.
Is that assessment fair, and. if so.
why did he announce the plan when he
did. with Israeli troops in Lebanon?

A. The purpose of the President an-
nouncing the peace plan was not to sus-
tain or increase leverage on Israel. He
announced the peace plan because it was
right, it was overdue.

As far as the presence of Israeli
troops in Lebanon, this whole Lebanese
tragedy has only reemphasized the need
for moving ahead very quickly on resolv-
ing the broader Palestinian issue, and
that is the essence of the President's
peace plan.

Q. I understand the reason for the
plan, but since being announced, has
it, in fact, gotten anything? It seems
to me that the Israelis have gone their
own way, and the Arabs certainly
haven't stood up and cheered, so what
have we got for it?

A. I think that we have had a vei-y
interesting reaction to the President's
peace plan. There is virtually unanimous
support in Western Europe for the
American posture on Middle East peace
at this time. There have been very
positive reactions amongst important
elements of the Arabs. And let me say
that in my view, the most important
positive reaction has come from the
Palestinians living under Israeli occupa-
tion, coupled with those Palestinian Jor-
danians with whom we are always in
contact. You're talking about 2V2 million
people who are concerned. Their reac-
tion has been very positive, very impor-
tant, and it is being noted by all of the
players.

Q. We've had very positive re-
sponses from g^reat leaders of the
Jewish communities — like Edgar
Bronfman of the World Jewish Con-
gress, Philip Klutznik— who seem to

be out in front supporting the Presi-
dent's plan and also calling for an in-
vestigation in Israel itself. Some peo-
ple believe that President Reagan is
actually lagging behind the lead that
these men are giving. Is this true? Is
this deliberate? Is this a diplomatic
ploy to let others take the lead?

A. Clearly, the people to whom you
refer are public citizens and are free to
express their views. I don't see that
President Reagan is lagging behind
anyone. Indeed, the President has taken
a very visible leadership position, not on-
ly on Lebanon— and this far precedes
the problems and tragedies of the past
few months— but also on the broader
peace process. And I would not say he is
behind or we are behind or they are
ahead. We have policies in Lebanon and
in the peace process; they're the right
policies, and the President is determined
to press ahead with them.

Q. I was referring to the fact that
a week ago, the President demanded,
the same day, that the Israeli troops
be out of west Beirut. Later in the
week in briefings that we had, it was
an attempt to negotiate them out
within 3 weeks. Is there a possibility
or a danger that his pressures or his
peace plan will just sort of be worn
down?

A. No. I don't know where the 3
weeks' negotiations came from. Our
position was, from the beginning when
we heard that the Israelis were going in,
that they shouldn't go in, that if they did
go in, it would be destabilizing, and that
they should leave.

Then, of course, you had this terri-
ble tragedy which we were all numbed
by and focusing on. That then was
followed by the decision of the President
to lead again in this area by committing
the American force to the multinational
force, and that has been the focus of our
attention for the last 4 or 5 days.

Q. But as these reports we were
talking about earlier, which both you
and many of us in the press have been
getting — there may be other atrocities
being committed right now while we
are negotiating.

A. All of our information is that is
not the case. The Lebanese are in the
camps. They are in their positions. We

MIDDLE EAST

have some early arrivals of the French
and the Italians, which is a confidence-
booster. And speaking of confidence-
boosting and helping the Lebanese help
themselves, I frankly believe that the
first positive payoff of the President's
decision on the multinational force was
the unanimous election of the new Presi-
dent of Lebanon — significant impact in
Lebanon and pushing the various fac-
tions together.

Q. I'd like to ask you what the
American position right now is on the
FLO. Recognizing that you're not go-
ing to talk and negotiate with them
until they accept 242 and Israel's right
to e.xist. ('/ cetera, does the U.S.
(iovernment recognize the PLO as the
principal spokesman for the Palestin-
ian people?

A. We recognize that the PLO is
considered to be the sole spokesman of
the Palestinian people officially by the
Arabs. We have always acknowledged
that the PLO has significant support
throughout the Arab world on the
Palestinian community and in that
sense, obviously, is as a voice that must
be heard by the Arabs in the context of
their own deliberations as we look
toward peace.

I would tell you right now, my own
personal view is that the role that the
PLO can play, in the interest of securing
Palestinian rights and peace in the area,
is to encourage the other Arabs to sup-
port an early announcement by King
Hussein that he can come to the
negotiating table. ■

Situation in Lebanon

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT.
AUG. 23, 1982'

The President has noted this morning
the election of a new President in
Lebanon [Bashir Gemayel], and he has
sent a message of congratulations to the
new President. We also congratulate the
Lebanese Parliament in electing the new
President through the traditional, con-
stitutional processes during this difficult
and trying time.

Lebanon's new leadership has a dif-
ficult task ahead. That task is to bring
the country back together again. The
promotion of genuine national reconcilia-
tion and reconstruction are crucial to the
success of the new President.

The United States will continue to
work closely with the Government of
Lebanon on the complex and difficult
task ahead. We believe that the election
holds out the possibility to continue the
process of strengthening the central
Government of Lebanon, and we are
pleased that the process has moved for-
ward.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
AUG. 30. 19822

The U.S. Government is pleased that the
Palestinian problem is receiving priority
attention among the governments in the
Middle East.

We have seen a reaffirmation of
Israel's desire to move ahead with the
peace process on the basis of Camp
David. We continue to have consulta-
tions with both Israel and Egyf)t in an
effort to decide how to proceed in our
common effort to resolve the Palestinian
problem in all of its aspects.

The U.S. — this Administration, as
its predecessors — is committed to the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of
Jordan and our support for its enduring
character. We do not agree that Jordan
is a Palestinian state.

What it l)oils down to is that this is
a matter for future discussion, the
autonomy process under the Camp
David accords.

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS,
SEPT. 5. 1982'

President Reagan's Letter

Mr. Mayor:

I wish to express to you my deepest
gratitude for your message of support
for the proposals which I outlined in my
address on September 1. It is particular-
ly important to have your endorsement
of my approach to peace. You are not
only a recognized and respected Pales-
tinian leader, but you represent Bethle-
hem which has been a glowing symbol o)
peace and brotherhood throughout the
world for the past two thousand years.
May God bless you and your efforts on
behalf of your people and peace and
security for all in the region.

Ronald Reag.'\.n

Mayor Freij's Letter

I wish to convey to you, Mr. President,
from the little town of Bethlehem, our
support for your plan to find a com-
prehensive solution to end the suffering!
of the Palestinian people and to bring
peace and security for all nations in the
Middle East. Please be assured of our
sincere desire for peace with freedom
and for peace with a homeland. May
God give you strength and wisdom to
fulfill our expectations.

Elias Fkkm
Mayor of Bethlehem

REMARKS TO REPORTERS
FOLLOWING A MEETING WITH
AMBASSADOR HABIB.
SEPT. 8, 1982*

President Reagan

I asked Phil Habib to come by today in
order to discuss the next phase of the
I'.S. diplomacy in Lebanon and the pros-
pects for our Middle East initiative. I
want to begin by reaffirming our prin-
cipal objectives in Lebanon.

First, the removal of all foreign
military forces from Lebanon;

Second, the strengthening of the
central government and the establish-
ment of its authority throughout the
country;

Third, Lebanon must not again
become a launching pad for attacks into

Department of State Bulletin

MIDDLE EAST

rael. Indeed, the security of all the
ktes in the area can only be guar-
Iteed through freely negotiated peace
Jaties between Israel and its
|ighbors; and

Finally, I call on all the parties in
fcbanon to maintain the cease-fire so
it diplomacy can succeed.

In the course of his briefing, Phil
d me that a peaceful resolution of the
'irut crisis would not have been possi-
? without a multinational force that in-
.( ided U.S. forces. With the evacuation
mplete and the authorities asserting
eir control throughout Beirut, I am
jased to announce that the multina-
nal force will commence its with-
awal from Beirut, Friday, Septem-
r 10th, day after tomorrow. And the
S. Marine contingent should be among
e first to leave. We're, therefore,
eping our commitment to have them
0 1 within 30 days.
I I'll remain fully and personally
I gaged in support of the next phase of
( r diplomacy in Lebanon. I also am an-
luncing the formation of an inter-
rency steering group on Lebanon. This
joup, under the chairmanship of the
j^puty Secretary of State, (Kenneth
hm], will coordinate the political,
(onomic, and security assistance dimen-
!)ns of our policy. Peter McPherson,
] rector of AID, will assume respon-
!)ility for reconstruction efforts in addi-
1 in to his role as my personal repre-
! ntative for relief in Lebanon. And
; orris Draper, Phil's right hand in
ijbanon, has been accorded the per-
! nal rank of Ambassador; he will
:anage the political working group and
; ortly return to Lebanon to continue
!s work. I want to express my ap-
eciation to him for what he has done
,id what he is going to continue doing.

Once again, I want to extend my
■artfelt congratulations to Phil Habib
r his superhuman efforts throughout
V past year and a half. Phil's suc-
'ssful diplomacy is one reason why
e're now able to inject a fresh start in-
the peace process.

Phil would like to make some re-
ark.s, I know, and I know many of you
(luld like to ask him questions. I'm go-
.g to leave Phil and Morris to you. I
ave a date back in the office that I
lUSt now keep and return to work,
hank you for being here. Phil, again,
lank you. God bless you.

Q. Can you just tell us what you

link about Prime Minister Begin say-

ig to the Knesset today that the West

Bank would be a Jewish homeland
forever?

A. I think that I'll let these
gentlemen handle the questions and take
a question from that. My own personal
reaction is that, because I stressed
negotiations as the settlement to many
of these troublesome issues there, I
think that we have to understand some-
times that maybe positions are being
staked out with those negotiations in
mind.

Q. But do you think Israel will
change? Do you think this initial reac-
tion can be modified in the future?

A. That's up to the negotiators.

[At this point, the President returned to
the Oval Office.]

Q. He's gone now. Tell us every-
thing. [Laughter]

Ambassador Habib. No, it's — first
of all, it's kind of nice to be able to talk
to you fellows without having to just
wave as I go by.

But I'm particularly gratified that
the President is continuing his personal
interest in the Lebanese situation. It's
going to require continued high-level at-
tention in our government as we pursue
the objectives that the President has laid
down for us. And in that regard he and
Secretary Shultz have given Morris and
myself our instructions. Morris has his
marching orders. He'll be taking off very
shortly. And then later in the month, I'll
go out for the inauguration of the new
President and spend a few days with
him.

But basically, we're going to be try-
ing to build upon the initial — I wouldn't
call them successes as much as I would
call them the initial progress that's been
made in the Lebanese situation. There is
a fair, good chance that we can see a
sovereign, integral, free, pluralistic
Lebanon, once again sovereign within its
own territories. And that's what we're
basically going to be working for.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
SEPT. 13, 1982^

For most of the period since the Beirut
agreement was reached last month, all
parties have demonstrated considerable
restraint in their military activities.
However, in the past week there have
been a growing number of incidents
which can only harm the chances for ad-
vancing the peace process.

The United States urges all con-
cerned to avoid provocations, to exercise
restraint, and thereby contribute to the
hopes of the citizens in the region for
progress toward peace.

During the coming days, Ambas-
sador Morris Draper will be meeting
with the parties to discuss ways to
reduce the tension still remaining in
Lebanon and to help strengthen the
authority of the central Lebanese
Government.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
SEPT. 14, 1982"

The news of the cowardly assassination
of Bashir Gemayel, President-elect of
Lebanon, is a shock to the American
people and to civilized men and women
everywhere. This promising young
leader had brought the light of hope to
Lebanon. We condemn the perpetrators
of this heinous crime against Lebanon
and against the cause of peace in the
Middle East. Our deepest sympathy goes
to Mrs. Bashir Gemayel and their son,
the entire Gemayel family, to President
Elias Sarkis, to his government, and to
the people of Lebanon. We join with
them in mourning.

The tragedy will be all the greater if
men of good will in Lebanon and in
countries friendly to Lebanon permit
disorder to continue in this war-torn
country. This must not happen. The U.S.
Government stands by Lebanon with its
full support in this hour of need.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
SEPT. 15, 1982^

This latest violent tragedy only reem-
phasizes the need for urgency in the
search for peace in the Middle East. The
United States intends to continue to
press ahead vigorously with the Presi-
dent's initiative to broaden the participa-
tion at the peace talks.

We have been in frequent touch with
senior officials of the Government of
Lebanon and with other prominent
Lebanese personalities. Our support for
their efforts to maintain order should be
clear. We have also contacted Israeli of-
ficials in Beirut, Washington, and in
Israel. They told us that their military
moves are limited and precautionary.
We have urged they do nothing to in-
crease tensions.

The central Government of Lebanon
remains in place. We will be consulting
with President Sarkis, Prime Minister

lovember 1982

MIDDLE EAST

Wazzan, and other Lebanese Govern-
ment officials to explore ways we can
support their efforts to maintain stabili-
ty. We adhere to the goals we share
with the Government of Lebanon of in-
ternal unity and withdrawal of all
foreign forces.

While we deplore the shocking
assassination of President-elect
Gemayel, it is essential that we not lose
sight of these important objectives
which Lebanon has set for itself. The
restoration of central government
authority remains key to Lebanon's
future. We will do everything we can to
assist this process through this difficult
period in the country's history.

Ambassador Draper has the full sup-
port of the President and will continue
to work closely with the Government of
Lebanon in pursuit of its objectives.
Those objectives parallel our own sup-
port for:

• The withdrawal of all foreign
military forces from Lebanon;

• The strengthening of the central
government and the reestablishment of
its authority throughout Lebanon;

• The creation of conditions which
insure that Lebanon will never again be
a launching pad for attacks against
Israel; and

• The promotion of national unity
and reconciliation, along with
strengthening of all national institutions,
including the army.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
SEPT. 15, 1982^

We deplore the shocking assassination
of President-elect Bashir Gemayel. This
latest violent tragedy only reemphasizes
the need for urgency in the search for
peace in the Middle East.

The central Government of Lebanon
remains in place. We will be consulting
with President Sarkis, Prime Minister
Wazzan, and other Lebanese Govern-
ment officials to explore ways we can
support their efforts to maintain stabili-
ty.

We have been in frequent touch with
senior officials of the Government of
Lebanon and with other prominent
Lebanese personalities. Ambassador
Draper [special negotiator for Lebanon]
is in Lebanon today for meetings with
Lebanese officials. Our support for their
efforts to maintain order is clear. We
have also contacted Israeli officials in
Beirut, Washington, and in Israel. We
have urged they do nothing to increase

tensions and again call on all parties to
exercise restraint.

President-elect Gemayel's death
underscores the need that we not lose
sight of the important objectives which
Lebanon has set for itself. The restora-
tion of central government authority re-
mains key to Lebanon's future. We will
do everything we can to assist this proc-
ess through this difficult period in the
country's history. Ambassador Draper
has the full support of the President and
will continue to work closely with the
Government of Lebanon in pursuit of its
objectives. Those objectives parallel our
own support for:

• The withdrawal of all foreign
military forces from Lebanon;

• The strengthening of the central
government and the reestablishment of
its authority throughout Lebanon;

• The creation of conditions which
insure that Lebanon will never again be
a launching pad for attacks against
Israel; and

• The promotion of national unity
and reconciliation, along with
strengthening of all national institutions,
including the army.

We will continue to pursue the goals
we share with the Government of
Lebanon of internal unity and with-
drawal of all foreign forces. The United
States intends, as well, to continue to
press ahead vigorously with the Presi-
dent's initiative to broaden the participa-
tion at the Middle East peace talks.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
SEPT. 16, 19821^

It appears from press reports and
eyewitness accounts that the Israelis
have now moved into strategic positions
throughout west Beirut and control
much of that sector of the city. This is
contrary to the assurances given to us
by the Israelis both in Washington and
in Israel.

We fully support the Lebanese Gov-
ernment's call for the withdrawal of
Israeli forces, which are in clear viola-
tion of the cease-fire understanding to
which Israel is a party. There is no
justification in our view for Israel's con-
tinued military presence in west Beirut,
and we call for an immediate pullback.

PRESIDENTS STATEMENT,
SEPT. 18. 1982'

I was horrified to learn this morning of
the killing of Palestinians which has

taken place in Beirut. All people of
decency must share our outrage and
revulsion over the murders, which in-
cluded women and children. I express
my deepest regrets and condolences to
the families of the victims and the
broader Palestinian community.

During the negotiations leading to
the PLO withdrawal from Beirut, we
were assured that Israeli forces would
not enter west Beirut. We also
understood that following withdrawal,
Lebanese Army units would establish
control over the city. They were
thwarted in this effort by the Israeli oc-
cupation that took place, beginning on
Wednesday. We strongly opposed
Israel's move into west Beirut following
the assassination of President-elect
Gemayel both because we believed it
wrong in principle and for fear that it
would provoke further fighting. Israel,
by yesterday in military control of
Beirut, claimed that its moves would
prevent the kind of tragedy which has
now occurred.

We have today summoned the
Israeli Ambassador to demand that the
Israeli Government immediately
withdraw its forces from west Beirut tc
the positions occupied on September 14
We also expect Israel, thereafter, to
commence serious negotiations which
will first lead to the earliest possible
disengagement of Israeli forces from
Beirut and, second, to an agreed
framework for the early withdrawal of
all foreign forces from Lebanon.

Despite and because of the addi-
tional bloody trauma which adds to
Lebanon's agonies, we urge the
Lebanese to unite quickly in support of
their government and their constitu-
tional processes and to work for the
future they so richly deserve. We will b
with them.

This terrible tragedy underscores
the desperate need for a true peace in
the Middle East, one which takes full a(
count of the needs of the Palestinian
people. The initiative I announced on
September 1 will be pursued vigorously
in order to achieve that goal.

PRESIDENTS STATEMENT,
SEPT. 20, 1982'

My fellow Americans, the scenes that
the whole world witnessed this past
weekend were among the most heart-
rending in the long nightmare of
Lebanon's agony. Millions of us have
seen pictures of the Palestinian victims
of this tragedy. There is little that

Department of State Bulletir

MIDDLE EAST

Drds can add. But there are actions we
n and must take to bring that night-
are to an end.

It is not enough for us to view this
some remote event in which we
rselves are not involved. For our
lends in Lebanon and Israel, for our
lends in Europe and elsewhere in the
iddle East, and for us Americans, this
agedy, horrible as it is, reminds us of
e absolute imperative of bringing
lace to that troubled country and
gion. By working for peace in the Mid-
s East, we serve the cause of world
ace, and the future of mankind.

For the criminals who did this deed,
I punishment is enough to remove the
ot of their crime. But for the rest of

there are things that we can learn
id things that we must do. The people
Lebanon must have learned that the
cle of massacre upon massacre must
id. Children are not avenged by the
urder of other children. Israel must
ive learned that there is no way it can
ipose its own solutions on hatreds as
■ep and bitter as those that produced
is tragedy. If it seeks to do so, it will
ily sink more deeply into the quagmire
at looms before it. Those outsiders
:) ho have fed the flames of civil war in
ebanon for so many years need to
arn that the fire will consume them,
o, if it is not put out. And we must all
■dedicate ourselves to the cause of
3ace. I reemphasize my call for early
ogress to solve the Palestinian issue
id repeat the U.S. proposals which are
)w even more urgent.

For now is not the time for talk
one. Now is a time for action. To act
igether to restore peace to Beirut; to
>lp a stable government emerge that
m restore peace and independence to
1 of Lebanon; and to bring a just and
sting resolution to the conflict between
;rael and its Arab neighbors, one that
itisfies the legitimate rights of the
alestinians who are all too often its vic-

Our basic objectives in Lebanon have
ot changed, for they are the objectives
f the government and the people of
lebanon themselves. First and fore-
lost, we seek the restoration of a
Lrong and stable central government in
lat country, brought into being by
rderly constitutional processes,
ebanon elected a new president 2 short
eeks ago only to see him murdered
ven before he could assume his office,
his week a distressed Lebanon will
gain be electing a new president. May

God grant him safety as well as the
wisdom and courage to lead his country
into a new and happier era.

The international community has an
obligation to assist the Government of
Lebanon in reasserting authority over
all its territory. Foreign forces and
armed factions have too long obstructed
the legitimate role of the Lebanese
Government's security forces. We must
pave the way for withdrawal of foreign
forces.

The place to begin this task is in
Beirut. The Lebanese Government must
be permitted to restore internal security
in its capital. It cannot do this if foreign
forces remain in or near Beirut. With
this goal in mind, I have consulted with
our French and Italian allies. We have
agreed to form a new multinational
force, similar to the one which served so
well last month, with the mission of
enabling the Lebanese Government to
resume full sovereignty over its capital,
the essential precondition for extending
its control over the entire country.

The Lebanese Government, with the
support of its people, requested this
help. For this multinational force to suc-
ceed, it is essential that Israel withdraw
from Beirut. With the expected coopera-
tion of all parties, the multinational
force will return to Beirut for a limited
period of time. Its purpose is not to act
as a police force but to make it possible
for the lawful authorities of Lebanon to
discharge those duties for themselves.

Secretary Shultz, on my behalf, has
also reiterated our views to the Govern-
ment of Israel through its Ambassador
in Washington. Unless Israel moves
quickly and courageously to withdraw, it
will find itself ever more deeply involved
in problems that are not its own and
which it cannot solve.

The participation of American forces
in Beirut will again be for a limited
period. But I've concluded there is no
alternative to their returning to
Lebanon if that country is to have a
chance to stand on its own feet.

Peace in Beirut is only a first step.
Together with the people of Lebanon,
we seek the removal of all foreign
military forces from that country. The
departure of all foreign forces at the re-
quest of the Lebanese authorities has
been widely endorsed by Arab as well as
other states. Israel and Syria have both
indicated that they have no territorial
ambitions in Lebanon and are prepared
to withdraw. It is now urgent that
specific arrangements for withdrawal of
all foreign forces be agreed upon. This

must happen very soon. The legitimate
security concerns of neighboring states,
including particularly the safety of
Israel's northern population, must be
provided for. But this is not a difficult
task if the political will is there. The
Lebanese people must be allowed to
chart their own future. They must rely
solely on Lebanese Armed Forces who
are willing and able to bring security to
their country. They must be allowed to
do so, and the sooner the better.

Ambassador Draper, who has been
in close consultation with the parties
concerned in Lebanon, will remain in the
area to work for the full implementation
of our proposal. Ambassador Habib will
join him and will represent me at the in-
auguration of the new President of
Lebanon and will consult with the
leaders in the area. He will return
promptly to Washington to report to
me.

Early in the summer our govern-
ment met its responsibility to help
resolve a severe crisis and to relieve the
Lebanese people of the crushing burden.
We succeeded. Recent events have pro-
duced new problems, and we must,
again, assume our responsibility.

I am especially anxious to end the
agony of Lebanon because it is both
right and in our national interest. But I
am also determined to press ahead on
the broader effort to achieve peace be-
tween Israel and its Arab neighbors.
The events in Beirut of last week have
served only to reinforce my conviction
that such a peace is Desperately needed
and that the initiative we undertook on
September 1 is the right way to proceed.
We will not be discouraged or deterred
in our efforts to seek peace in Lebanon
and a just and lasting peace throughout
the Middle East.

All of us must learn the appropriate
lessons from this tragedy and assume
the responsibilities that it imposes upon
us. We owe it to ourselves and to our
children. The whole world will be a safer
place when this region which has known
so much trouble can begin to know
peace instead. Both our purpose and our
action are peaceful, and we are taking
them in a spirit of international coopera-
tion.

Tonight I ask for your prayers and
your support as our country continues
its vital role as a leader for world peace,
the role that all of us as Americans can
be proud of.

MIDDLE EAST

PRESIDENT'S LETTER
TO PRESIDENT-ELECT
AMIN GEMAYEL.
SEPT. 22, 1982^

Dear Mr. President-elect:
The American people join me in con-
gratulating you upon your election as Presi-
dent of Lebanon. We are proud to stand
beside your courageous nation as our friends
in Lebanon again overcome adversity in exer-
cising the democratic and constitutional tradi-
tion that our nations share.

In my September 20 address to the
American people. I restated the basic objec-
tives of the U.S. relationship with Lebanon.
"First and foremost," I said, "we seek the
restoration of a strong and stable central
government" in Lebanon, "brought into being
by orderly constitutional processes." Your
election as President sets Lebanon firmly on
the path to national reconciliation behind a
strong government with a broad mandate
from the people of Lebanon.

You have our pledge that the United
States will remain a staunch partner and
friend to Lebanon as you set out upon the
difficult and challenging tasks ahead. The
American nation and I extend to you and all
Lebanese our very best wishes for the future.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
SEPT. 23, 1982'

The situation in the Middle East— I will
go over some details that have been
talked about in part, or maybe in full, at
the Departments of Defense and State
earlier today. We're still working out the
details of what the Marine force will do
when they arrive and consultations with
the Italian and French liaison officers in
Beirut.

An agreed-upon mandate for the
multinational force reads as follows:

The MNF (multinational force) is to
provide an interposition force at agreed
locations and thereby provide the MNF
presence requested by the Government
of Lebanon to assist it and Lebanon's
armed forces in the Beirut area. This
presence will facilitate the restoration of
Lebanese Government sovereignty and
authority over the Beirut area and
thereby further its efforts to assure the
safety of persons in the area and to
bring to an end the violence which has
tragically recurred.

These agreed-upon locations are be-
ing worked out between the Government
of Lebanon, the P'rench, Italians, and
the Americans. The force of U.S.
Marines, nuniliering about 800, as
previously, will probably go in over the

weekend. They are in the eastern
Mediterranean at this time. The French
are arriving in Beirut.

The Marines are equipped basically
as they were the last time they were in-
volved. The rules of engagement are as
before, normal self-defense rules.

It is our desire and hope and expec-
tation, based on reports that we have
received, that the Israelis will have
withdrawn from west Beirut by the end
of the week.

Ambassadors Habib and Draper are
in Israel today to meet with Israeli of-
ficials to discuss the further
developments in the situation in west
Beirut, as well as looking out into the
future.

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS**

Deputy Prime Minister Boutros' Letter

September 25, nm2

Your Excellency:

1 have the honor to refer to the urgent
discussions between representatives of our
two Governments concerning the recent
tragic events which have occurred in the
Beirut area, and to consultations between my
Government and the Secretary General of the
United Nations pursuant to United Nations
Security Council Resolution 52L On behalf of
the Republic of Lebanon, I wish to inform
your Excellency's Government of the deter-
mination of the Government of Lebanon to
restore its sovereignty and authority over the
Beirut area and thereby to assure the safety
of persons in the area and bring an end to
violence that has recurred. To this end,
Israeli forces will withdraw from the Beirut
area.

In its consultations with the Secretary
General, the Government of Lebanon has
noted that the urgency of the situation re-
quires immediate action, and the Government
of Lebanon, therefore, is, in conformity with
the objectives in U.N. Security Council
Resolution 521, proposing to several nations
that they contribute forces to serve as a tem-
porary Multinational Force (MNF) in the
Beirut area. The mandate of the MNF will be
to provide an interposition force at agreed
locations and thereby provide the multina-
tional presence requested by the Lebanese
Government to assist it and the Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF) in the Beirut area. This
presence will facilitate the restoration of
Lebanese Government sovereignty and
authority over the Beirut area, and thereby

further efforts of my Government to assure
the safety of persons in the area and bring U
an end the violence which has tragically
recurred. The MNF may undertake other
functions only by mutual agreement.

In the foregoing context, I have the
honor to propose that the United States of
America deploy a force of approximately
1200 personnel to Beirut, subject to the
following terms and conditions:

• The American military force shall carr;
out appropriate activities consistent with the
mandate of the MNF.

• Command authority over the Americar
force will be exercised exclu.sively by the
United States Government through existing
American military channels.

• The LAF and MNF will form a Liaisor
and Coordination Committee, composed of
representatives of the MNF participating
governments and chaired by the representa-
tives of my Government. The Liaison and
Coordination Committee will have two essen-
tial components: (A) Supervisory liaison; and
(B) Military and technical liaison and coor-
dination.

• The American force will operate in
close coordination with the LAF. To assure
effective coordination with the LAF, the
American force will assign liaison officers to
the LAF and the Government of Lebanon
will assign liaison officers to the American
force. The LAF liaison officers to the Ameri-
can force will, inter alia, perform liaison with
the civilian population and with the U.N.
observers and manifest the authority of the
Lebanese Government in all appropriate
situations. The American force will provide
security for LAF personnel operating with
the U.S. contingent.

• In carrying out its mission, the
American force will not engage in combat. It
may, however, exercise the right of self-
defense.

• It is understood that the presence of
the American force will be needed only for a
limited period to meet the urgent re-
quirements posed by the current situation.
The MNF contributors and the Government
of Lebanon will consult fully concerning the
duration of the MNF presence. Arrangement
for the departure of the MNF will be the sub
ject of special consultations between the
Government of Lebanon and the MNF par-
ticipating governments. The American force
will depart Lebanon upon any request of the
Government of Lebanon or upon the decision
of the President of the United States.

• The (Jovernment of Lebanon and the
LAF will take all measures necessary to en-
sure the protection of the American force's
personnel, to include securing assurances
from all armed elements not now under the
authority of the Lebanese Government that
they will refrain from hostilities and not in-
terfere with any activities of the MNF.

• The American force will enjoy both the
degree of freedom of movement and the righ;
to undertake those activities deemed
necessary for the performance of its mission
for the support of its personnel. Accordingly,
it shall enjoy the privileges and immunities
accorded the administrative and technical

Department of State Bulletin

NARCOTICS

iff of the American Embassy in Beirut, and
all be exempt from immigration and
■stoms requirements, and restrictions on
JBtering or departing Lebanon. Personnel,
■operty and equipment of the American
rce introduced into Lebanon shall be ex-
npt from any form, of tax, duty, charge or
vy-

I have the further honor to propose, if
e foregoing is acceptable to your Excellen-
's government, that your Excellency's reply
that effect, together with this note, shall
institute an agreement between our two
overnments.

Please accept. Your Excellency, the
surances of my highest consideration.

[fouad boutros]
Deputy Prime Minister /
Minister of Foreign Affairs

mbassador Dillon's Letter

September 25. 1982

our Excellency:

have the honor to refer to your Excellency's
)te of 25 September 1982 requesting the de-
oyment of an American force to the Beirut
ea. I am pleased to inform you on behalf of
y Government that the United States is
epared to deploy temporarily a force of ap-
■■oximately 1200 personnel as part of a
ultinational Force (MNF) to establish an en-
ronment which will permit the Lebanese
nied forces (LAF) to carry out their respon-
liilities in the Beirut area. It is understood
at the presence of such an American force
ill facilitate the restoration of Lebanese
lAtrnment sovereignty and authority over
!■ Kt-irut area, an objective which is fully
lareii by my Government, and thereby fur-
iiT efforts of the Government of Lebanon to
vsure the safety of persons in the area and
m^; to an end the violence which has
^igically recurred.

1 have the further honor to inform you
lat my Government accepts the terms and
in(iitions concerning the presence of the
ni'Tican force in the Beirut area as set
irth in your note, and that Your
xcellency's note and this reply accordingly
)nstitute an agreement between our two
overnments.

[Robert Dillon]

United States Ambassador

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
residential Documents of Aug. 30, 1982.

^Text from Weekly Compilation of
residential Documents of Sept. 6. 1982.

^Texts from Weekly Compilation of
residential Documents of Sept. 13. 1982.

■•Texts from Weekly Compilation of
residential Documents of Sept. 20, 1982.

^Read to news correspondents by Depart-
lent spokesman John Hughes.

"Text from Weekly Compilation of
residential Documents of Sept. 20. 1982.

'Texts from Weekly Compilation of
residential Documents of Sept. 27, 1982.

"Made available to news correspondents
y Department spokesman John Hughes. ■

lovember 1982

International Narcotics Control

SECRETARY'S STATEMENT,
OCT. 5, 1982'

The Federal drug abuse strategy en-
dorsed today by President Reagan em-
phasizes foreign policy initiatives and in-
ternational cooperation as major com-
ponents of the Administration's program
to reduce the effects of drug abuse on
the American people. I too applaud this
emphasis as appropriate and needed;
90% of illicit drugs consumed in the
United States are of foreign origin.

The strategy underlines the impor-
tance of narcotics control as an interna-
tional issue. Drug abuse and drug traf-
ficking not only impact negatively on
consumer nations like the United States
but are undermining the social, political,
and economic stability of countries
where narcotics are produced or traf-
ficked. The strategy effectively reviews
the Administration's efforts to date, the
firm resolve with which it has pursued
more comprehensive drug control pro-
grams, and establishes guidelines for
future action. In the international area,
the concentration is on reducing produc-
tion and trafficking in heroin, cocaine,
and marijuana through a more com-
prehensive, more cooperative effort in-
volving much wider participation by the
international community.

The foundation of our international

narcotics policy is that illicit drugs must
be controlled at the source. We believe,
as explained in the strategy, that the in-
ternational community should assist na-
tions in meeting these obligations.
Under international convention, each
signatory is responsible for controlling
production and trafficking in illicit
substances within its borders. The
United States believes that compliance
with these treaty obligations should be a
matter of governmental priority for all
signatory nations and that other govern-
ments should join in integrating nar-
cotics control into foreign policy. We are
urging a greater sharing of responsibili-
ty and expenditure of both diplomatic ef-
forts and financial resources by other af-
fected nations while continuing to ex-
pand our own significant effort.

In sum the strategy strikes an essen-
tial balance from the foreign policy
perspective. As a concerned, responsible
member of the international community,
the United States is willing to assist pro-
ducer and transit nations. We recognize
and accept the reality of social, political,
and economic circumstances which make
narcotics control difficult to achieve. But
the United States will increasingly
assert that these nations must take
greater action to control the harm they
export to the world.

'Made available to news correspondents
by acting Department spokesman Alan
Romberg. ■

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Bulletin Essay

Technology Transfer Controls

by Gerhard Mally

Dr. Mally is a foreign affairs officer
in the Technology Transfer Group,
Bureau of Nuclear and Weapons Con-
trol, Arms Control and DisarTnament
Agency (ACDA).

Introduction

International technology transfers en-
compass a broad spectrum of transac-
tions at the governmental, nongovern-
mental, and covert levels, including the
following: export of weapons systems,
licensing of advanced technological prod-
ucts, furnishing turnkey factories and
research facilities, providing technical
services, description of production
techniques in commercial literature,
display of products at trade exhibits,
training of foreign nationals (scientists,
engineers, computer experts), and
academic exchanges of faculty and
students.

Restrictions on transfer from the
United States of certain technologies are
imposed for reasons of security or
foreign policy. These export controls fall
in three categories:

• Nuclear items, controlled by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
and the Department of Energy under
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended by the Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion Act of 1978;

• Munitions controlled by the
Department of State under the Arms
Export Control Act of 1976; and

• Items with both civilian and
military applications (dual-use), con-
trolled by the Department of Commerce
under the Export Administration Act of
1979.

Exports of all three categories are
controlled for security purposes to the
Warsaw Fact countries and the Com-
munist countries of East Asia, not only
by the United States but also by other
NATO countries (except Iceland and
Spain) and Japan. The national controls
of these countries are coordinated in the
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral
Security Export Controls (COCOM).

This essay focuses on civilian /
military or "dual-use" technology trans-
fers from COCOM member states to

Warsaw Pact countries. It deals with
unilateral U.S. policies and procedures
to control exports of dual-use items,
covers multilateral COCOM policies and
operations, and presents the rationale
for security export controls — the hemor-
rhage of Western technology to the
East. The conclusion places the issue of
technology transfer controls in the
overall context of foreign policy and
strategy.

U.S. Exports Control Policies
and Mechanisms

Under the Export Administration Act of
1979, the United States controls the ex-
port of "dual-use" commodities and
technical data concerning industrial
processes for reasons of national securi-
ty, foreign policy, and short supply. Ex-
port controls imposed for national
security reasons cover strategic /mili-
tarily critical goods and technologies, ir-
respective of the mechanisms through
which these commodities or technical
data may be transferred. Foreign policy
controls are exercised in support of such
U.S. policies as furthering regional
stability, countering terrorism, and sup-
porting human rights. Short supply con-
trols are imposed on exports of certain
products, such as crude oil.

The Department of Commerce has
jurisdiction over the export of dual-use
items. In exercising this licensing
authority. Commerce obtains advice
from the Departments of Defense and
State and various other agencies, in-
cluding the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency (ACDA). Controversial ap-
plications for high-technology exports
are considered by the operating commit-
tee, a working-level group chaired by
the Department of Commerce. This in-
teragency panel is composed of repre-
sentatives from the Departments of
Commerce, Defense, State, Energy, and
Treasury, as well as from ACDA, the
National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration (NASA), and CIA. Cases that
cannot be resolved at the operating com-
mittee level are "escalated" to the Sub-
Advisory Committee on Export Policy
(SubACEP) (at the level of deputy as-
sistant secretaries), then to ACEP (at
the level of assistant secretaries). Major
issues are referred to the cabinet-level

Export Administration Review Board
(F]ARB) or the President. Commerce's
Export Administration regulations set
forth specific procedures for controlling
commodities listed on a commodity con-
trol list and related technical data. The
Export Administration regulations re-
quire a "validated license" for some ex-
ports; "general licenses" cover com-
modities and technical data which do not
require a specific validated license. For
export control purposes, foreign coun-
tries are divided into separate "country
groups." Most security items are con-
trolled for export to all countries.
Licensing policy, however, varies. Ex-
ports to friendly nations in the
Americas, Europe, Asia, and Africa
(Groups T and V) are controlled in order
to prevent unauthorized reexports to
Communist countries. Licensing policy
for China (Group P) is more liberal than
for the Warsaw Pact countries. Licens-
ing policy for Romania (Group Q) is
marginally more liberal than for the
other Warsaw Pact countries. The vir-
tually total embargo on all exports to
Cuba, Kampuchea, North Korea, and
Vietnam (Group Z) is more restrictive
than policy for the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries. At the moment, policy toward the
U.S.S.R. (in Group Y) and Poland (in
Group W) call for issuing no licenses for
controlled items, following the imposi-
tion of martial law in Poland and is,
therefore, more restrictive than policy
toward Hungary (the other country in
Group W) and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, Albania, Laos, and
Mongolia (the other countries in Group
Y).

The rationale for differential treat-
ment of foreign countries is contained in
Section 5(b) of the Export Administra-
tion Act of 1979, which provides that, in
administering national security export
controls, "United States policy toward
individual countries shall not be deter-
mined exclusively on the basis of a coun-
try's Communist or non-Communist
status but shall take into account such
factors as the country's present and
potential relationship to the United
States, its present and potential relation-
ship to countries friendly or hostile to
the United States, its ability and will-
ingness to control retransfers of United
States exports in accordance with the
United States policy, and such other fac-
tors as the President considers ap-
propriate."

Over the last decade, relations be-
tween the United States (and other
COCOM memliers) and the non-Soviet
Warsaw I'act countries have evolved to

Department of State Bulletin

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

modest extent, based upon the policy
lat Eastern Europe should not be
eated as a monolithic bloc. Limited
nancipation from Moscow is ex-
inplified by Hungary's unorthodox
•diuimic policies, Romania's relatively
idi'pendent foreign policy, and Poland's
-Kperiment with social pluralism prior to
le suppression of Solidarity by the im-
jsition of martial law. The pattern of
fferential treatment of certain East
uropean countries by the West is il-
strated by the fact that various of the
OMECON countries have become
embers of the General Agreement on
ariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Inter-
ational Monetary Fund (IMF) and have
?en granted most-favored-nation (MFN)
eatment by the United States, while
:hers have not.

With regard to dual-use exports to
Dn-Soviet members of the Warsaw
■ct, the United States is taking the
tUowing criteria into consideration:

• For all items controlled for securi-
purposes, the risk of diversion to

lilitary use in East European countries;

• For items which would not be ap-
oved for export to the U.S.S.R., the

isk of diversion to that country; and
' For items of marginal security
oncern, efforts by certain East Euro-
ean countries to distance themselves
fom Soviet foreign or domestic policies,
articularly Romania and Hungary.

The political rationale for this dif-
'jrentiated economic treatment is to en-
ourage diversity in Eastern Europe and
i) reduce dependence on the U.S.S.R.

Following the Soviet invasion of
fghanistan (1979) and the Soviet-
iispired imposition of martial law in
ioland (1981), the United States im-
osed new unilateral export restrictions
I the U.S.S.R. for foreign policy
asons. These measures include a 1980
plicy of making no exceptions for ex-
jort to the U.S.S.R. of items requiring
lOCOM review, except for specified ex-
■aordinary circumstances and a
ecember 30, 1981, cessation of is-
uance of all validated licenses for ex-
ort to the U.S.S.R.

Unilateral U.S. export controls are
ometimes inadequate since many in-
ustrialized countries have the capability
3 substitute similar or identical items
or most controlled U.S. items. In view
f this widespread "foreign availability"
f most high technology items, any uni-
iteral U.S. embargo would be largely

ineffective. Therefore, multilateral con-
trols are imperative to assure mean-
ingful controls on strategic Western
technology transfers to the Communist
world.

Multilateral Export Controls

At their summit conference of Ottawa in
July 1981, the leaders of the United
States, Canada, the United Kingdom,
France, West Germany, Italy, and Japan
agreed, inter alia, that "consultations
and, where appropriate, coordination are
necessary to insure that, in the field of
East-West relations, our economic
policies continue to be compatible with
our political and security objectives."
Moreover, the seven leaders agreed "to
consult to improve the present system of
controls on trade in strategic goods and
related technology with the USSR."
Subsequently, a high-level meeting con-
vened in Paris in January 1982 of
COCOM for export controls to pro-
scribed Communist countries.

COCOM is a multilateral, con-
sultative organization of Western in-
dustrialized nations located in Paris and
charged with coordinating export con-
trols for security purposes. Since its
creation in 1950, COCOM has main-
tained lists of controlled items for the
following proscribed countries: the
U.S.S.R., other Warsaw Pact nations,
Albania, North Korea, Mongolia, Kam-
puchea, Vietnam, and the People's
Republic of China.

Currently, COCOM member govern-
ments control about 150 items. The
United States controls additional items
(about 30) unilaterally for national
security reasons. COCOM reviews its list
of controlled items periodically— ap-
proximately every 3 or 4 years. During
these COCOM list reviews, all members
must agree on items added to or deleted
from multilateral controls. Preceding the
1982-83 list review, COCOM member
governments held a high-level meeting
in Paris (1982). Consistent with the con-
fidential nature of COCOM proceedings,
the following terse press release was
issued.

The coordinating committee for the con-
trol of the export of strategic commodities
held a high level meeting on the 19th and
20th January in Paris.

The aim of that meeting was to review
together, after more than thirty years of the
committee's existence, the means to ensure
the adaptation of its methods to the evolution
of the situation, particularly in the techno-
logical field of strategic importance. In this
respect the committee reached unanimous

agreement. The work was judged successful
by all participants.

The outcome of the 1982-83 review
is uncertain. But, in all likelihood, it will
result in more comprehensive controls.
In addition, COCOM is consulting on
means to improve enforcement and ad-
ministrative procedures.

The Rationale for Export Controls

Throughout the postwar period, the
United States has been a principal
source of technical innovations and a net
exporter of advanced technologies to the
world. During the era of economic
detente in the 1970s, substantially in-
creased amounts of Western goods and
technology were exported to Communist
nations, much of it on credit. The im-
petus to East-West trade was based
upon the assumption that sales promo-
tion would not only improve the
Western balance of trade but also
moderate Soviet political views.

In recent years, however, it became
apparent that increased commercial in-
tercourse with the East would not in-
hibit Soviet strategic expansion.
Capitalizing on the large-scale influx of
advanced Western technologies, the
Soviet Union launched a relentless, un-
precedented build-up of its armed forces,
far beyond legitimate security interests.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
followed by Soviet support for the im-
position of martial law in Poland, has
shown clearly that increased economic
intercourse with the West will not
restrain Soviet imperialism. Hence, it
could be argued that the increased flow
of Western technology (and credits) to
the East has been detrimental to the na-
tional security of all COCOM members,
as it subsidized and reinforced the
military arsenals of their potential
adversaries in the Warsaw Pact.

Over the last decade, COCOM mem-
bers competed for lucrative sales of
sophisticated goods and equipment to
Eastern Europe. The United States re-
quested and received more exceptions to
COCOM controls than any other West-
ern nation. In retrospect it is clear that
Soviet importation of Western tech-
nology, much of it in violation of export
controls, has contributed directly or indi-
rectly to modernization of the Soviet
war machine, including some assistance
in the development of new generations
of "smart" weapons, improved airlift
capability, more accurate and lethal

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

nuclear weapons, and enhancement of
command and control with better com-
puters and communications.

The list of technologies for military
use acquired from the West is a long
one. It includes semiconductor manufac-
turing know-how used to make Soviet
weapons more reliable and precise;
guidance technolo^ for aircraft, ships,
submarines, and missiles; and equipment
to improve the Soviet military/industrial
base— ranging from precision machine
tools to process know-how technology.

Because COCOM controls have been
selective, some critical goods were legal-
ly exported to the Soviet Union. Two ex-
amples are:

• Heavy vehicle construction plants
and plant support facilities, which pro-
vide the Soviets a quantum jump in load
durability and reliability and far better
mobilization potential (for example,
Kama River trucks are used by the
Soviet Army in Afghanistan);

• Western semiconductor and mi-
croelectronic know-how, which provided
the Warsaw Pact with an electronics
manufacturing system operating in sup-
port of the military. In addition, modern
printed circuit facilities were exported to
the Soviet Union.

This manifest dependence on high
technology imports from the West could
be regarded as a serious disadvantage
from the Soviet perspective, given the
notorious rigidity and lack of creativity
of Communist systems. After all, only
the transfer and absorption of skills that
generate indigenous progress in
research and development— rather than
continued imports from the West— could
solve the basic problem of innovation.
Notwithstanding the apparent risks in-
volved in prolonging their technological
dependence, the Soviets have been per-
sistent in encouraging imports of
Western technology (although recent
shortages of hard currency are ap-
parently leading them to reduce imports
from the West).

From the Soviet point of view, there
are immense benefits from exploiting
the West's advanced technology base.
These benefits to the Soviets include:

• Saving billions of dollars by ac-
quiring proven Western technology;

• Saving years of research time;

• Narrowing technological gaps with
the United States, including those
related to the production of weapons
systems;

• Manufacturing countersystems
more rapidly, which have the objective
of neutralizing advanced U.S. weapon
systems;

• Avoiding mistakes and errors that
are costly and time consuming;

• Knowing in advance that new
systems will work properly and, alter-
natively, knowing where to look should a
particular project falter.

In the light of these manifest
benefits, it is not surprising that the
U.S.S.R. continues to favor East-West
trade and technology transfers. This
determined Soviet effort to acquire
Western advanced technology involves
the simultaneous use of the following
methods:

• Legal purchases of licensed items;

U.S. and France Review
Scientific Cooperation

A high-level review of scientific coopera-
tion between the United States and
France was held in Washington, D.C..
on September 17, 1982. The U.S. side
was led by President Reagan's science
adviser. Dr." George Keyworth, who also
heads the Office of Science and Tech-
nology Policy in the White House, while
Minister of Research and Industry Jean-
Pierre Chevenement headed the French
delegation.

The major topics discussed at the
meeting concerned the state of national
activities and bilateral cooperation in
three major subject areas: fundamental
science and engineering research, bio-
medical research, and energy research.
The speakers also discussed science
policy and organization in their respec-
tive countries.

The discussions focused upon the
dependence of future economic growth
and stability on science and technology
and the desirability in each country of
better integrating its industrial, scien-
tific, and technological communities. As
a result, it was agreed that future
cooperation in applied research dis-
ciplines should be emphasized while
maintaining the strong current exchange
in areas of fundamental science. They
also agreed on the importance of
strengthening bilateral exchanges in
such fields as space, oceanology,
biomedicine, and engineering sciences.
They also believed that U.S. scientists
should be encouraged to increase their
participation in the exchange programs.

The two sides concluded that such
reviews are extremely valuable for main-
taining the effectiveness of bilateral
cooperation between the two countries
in science and research. They agreed
that the next review should be held in
Paris in 1984.

The previous review was held in
Paris in .luly 19Si). Representatives of

the two sides have met a number of
times since 1969 when the two countries
agreed to meet periodically to review
bilateral science and technology coopera-
tion.

Assisting Dr. Keyworth were the
following American participants: James
Ebert, Vice President, National
Academy of Sciences; Charles Horner,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Science
and Technology, Department of State;
Donald Langenberg, Deputy Director,
National Science Foundation; John
Marcum, Assistant Director for Energy
and Natural Resources, Office of Science
and Technology Policy, Executive Office
of the President; Edward McGaffigan,
Assistant to the Director, Office of
Science and Technology- Policy, Ex-
ecutive Office of the President and
member of National Security Council
Staff; Alvin Trivelpiece, Director of
Research, Department of Energy; and
James Wyngaarden. Director, National
Institutes of Health.

Besides Minister Chevenement, the
French participants included Francois
Gros, science adviser to the Prime
Minister; Philippe Lazar, President, Na-
tional Institute for Health and Medical
Research; Gerard Renon, Deputy Ad-
ministrator, Atomic Energ>' Commis-
sion; Bernard Dorin, Director, Office of
the Americas, Foreign Ministry; Jean-
Loup Motchane, Director, Office of
Science and Technology Cooperation,
Foreign Ministry; Wladimir Mercouroff,
Director of External Affairs, National
Center for Scientific Research; Jacques
Warin, Director, International Affairs,
Ministry of Research and Industry; and
Philippe Lorino, adviser to the Minister
on International Affairs, Ministry of
Research and Industry.

Press release 209 of Sept. 21. 1982.

Department of State Bulletin

UNITED NATIONS

Exploitation of open sources (such
patents /copyrights, technical agree-
nts, academic conferences, scientific
■hanges, industrial tours, visits to ad-
iced technologT,' exhibitions, scien-
c /technical publications and congres-
nal documents);

Illegal acquisitions of embargoed
)ds and technical data;

Industrial espionage in high
hnology plants and bribery or coop-
>Ji of workers and businessmen; and

Use of third country companies to
mnel Western technologies indirectly
U.S.S.R. (via front or dummy cor-
■ations in allied or neutral countries).

The Soviets also maintain an in-
ligence system keyed strongly to
erging technologies of high military
ue. They keep a close watch on the
est developments in the computer in-
3try, on advanced large-scale in-
^ated circuit design and manufactur-
know-how, on magnetic bubble
mory technology, and on devel-
Snents in genetic engineering, fracture
1 chanics, and superplasticity.

In sum the U.S.S.R. has been en-
^;((l in a massive and centrally coor-
1 att'il effort to acquire advanced
liiKilogy from COCOM countries by

■ al means if possible, by illicit methods
: icrcssary. The clear purpose of this

■ nprfhensive attempt to raid Western
L hniilogical establishments has been,

a i remains, the same: to modernize the
J! viet industrial infrastructure for the
u imate purpose of strengthening the
jviet military. Paradoxically, the West
h ^ assisted its adversary in this effort
: generous credits, technological
a ;istances, and expanding trade, thus
i lirt'ctly financing the very war
nchine NATO is designed to defend
eainst.

( nclusions

J V londuct of foreign policy involves
i judicious use of political, military,
d economic instruments in pursuit of
3 national interest. In the East-West
ntext, national security concerns are
critical importance. In order to gain
Dlomatic leverage vis-a-vis an adver-
ry, the calibrated use of diverse
'ategies is vital to this effort, ranging
Dm military deterrence to political con-
inment to economic pressure.

Effective controls on sensitive tech-
ilogy transfers are an indispensable in-
edient of this multifaceted diplomacy.
|lthough Western exports to the East
live contributed marginally to a

favorable Western balance of trade, in-
asmuch as certain technology transfers
facilitated the modernization of the
Soviet military arsenal, they have been
counterproductive.

Given the structural inefficiency of
Communist economies, the U.S.S.R. and
most East European countries have
been, and will remain, dependent on
technological assistance from the
Western industrialized nations.

Instead of vindicating Lenin's predic-
tion that Western businessmen will sell
Communists the rope to hang the
capitalists, COCOM nations could jointly
exert leverage over the Warsaw Pact

countries in terms of technology exports
to the East. This powerful lever has so
far not been adequately exploited by
allied diplomacy.

A principal objective of this Western
strategy should be to constrain the pace
of Soviet arms production, the capability
to project military force abroad, and
designs for global political expansion.
Finally, this Western strategy could help
to induce the Soviet leaders to come to
terms with the United States in negotia-
tions on genuine arms reductions, aim-
ing at agreements that are equal and
verifiable. ■

U.N. Adopts Resolutions
on Lebanon Situation

SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 520,
SEPT. 17, 1982>

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the
Secretary-General of 15 September 1982
(S/15382/Add.l),

Condemning the murder of Bashir
Gemayel, Lebanon's constitutionally selected
President-elect, and every effort to disrupt
by violence the restoration of a strong, stable
government in Lebanon,

Having listened to the statement by the
Permanent Representative of Lebanon,

Taking note of Lebanon's determination
to ensure the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese
forces from Lebanon,

1. Reaffirms its resolutions 508 (1982),
509 (1982) and 516 (1982) in all their com-
ponents;

2. Condemns the recent Israeli incursions
into Beirut in violation of the cease-fire
agreements and of Security Council resolu-
tions;

3. Demands an immediate return to the
positions occupied by Israel before 15
September 1982, as a first step towards the
full implementation of Security Council
resolutions;

4. Calls again for the strict respect for
Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity,
unity and political independence under the
sole and exclusive authority of the Lebanese
Government through the Lebanese Army
throughout Lebanon;

5. Reaffirms its resolutions 512 (1982)
and 513 (1982) which call for respect for the
rights of the civilian populations without any
discrimination and repudiates all acts of
violence against those populations;

6. Supports the efforts of the Secretary-
General to implement Security Council reso-
lution 516 (1982) concerning the deployment

of United Nations observers to monitor the
situation in and around Beirut and requests
all the parties concerned to co-operate fully in
the application of that resolution;

7. Decides to remain seized of the ques-
tion and asks the Secretary-General to keep
the Council informed on developments as
soon as possible and not later than twenty-
four hours.

SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 521,
SEPT. 19, 1982^

The Security Council,

Appalled at the massacre of Palestinian
civilians in Beirut,

Having heard the report of the Secre-
tary-General (S/1 5400),

Noting that the Government of Lebanon
has agreed to the dispatch of United Nations
Observers to the t;ites of greatest human suf-
fering and losses in and around that city,

1 . Condemns the criminal massacre of
Palestinian civilians in Beirut;

2. Reaffirms once again its resolutions
512 (1982)"and 513 (1982) which call for
respect for the rights of the civilian popula-
tion without any discrimination and
repudiates all acts of violence against that
population;

3. Authorizes the Secretary-General as an
immediate step to increase the number of
United Nations observers in and around
Beirut from 10 to 50 and insists that there
shall be no interference with the deployment
of the observers and that they shall have full
freedom of movement;

4. Requests the Secretary-General, in con-
sultation with the Government of Lebanon, to
ensure the rapid deployment of those
observers in order that they may contribute
in every way possible within their mandate,

I3vember1982

UNITED NATIONS

to the effort to ensure full protection for the
civilian population;

5. Requests the Seerotary-CJerieral as a
matter of urgency to initiate appropriate con-
sultations and in particular consultations with
the Government of Lebanon on additional
steps which the Council might take, including
the possible deployment of United Nations
forces, to assist that Government in ensuring
full protection for the civilian population in
and around Beirut and requests him to report
to the Council within forty-eight hours;

6. hisists that all concerned must permit
United Nations observers and forces
established by the Security Council in
Lebanon to be deployed and to discharge
their mandates and in this connexion solemn-
ly calls attention to the obligation on all
Member States under Article 2.5 of the
Charter to accept and carry out the decisions
of the Council in accordance with the
Charter;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to keep
the Council informed on an urgent and
continuing basis.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTION A/ES 7/9,
SEPT. 27, 1982'

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of
Palestine at its resumed seventh emergency
special session,

Having heard the statement of the
Palestine Liberation Organization, the repre-
sentative of the Palestinian people.

Recalling and reaffirming, in particular,
its resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948,

Appalled at the massacre of Palestinian
civilians in Beirut,

Recnlling Security Council resolutions
.5()« (1982) of .5 .lune "1982, .509 (1982) of
6 .June 1982, ,5i:i (1982) of 4 .July 1982, .520
(1982) of 17 September 1982 and .521 (1982)
of 19 September 1982,

Taking note of the reports of the Secre-
tary-General relevant to the situation, par-
ticularly his report of 18 September 1982,

Noting with regret that the Security
Council has so far not taken effective and
practical mea.sures, in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, to ensure im-
plementation of its resolutions 508 (1982) and
509 (1982),

Referring to the humanitarian principles
of the Geneva Convention relative to the J'ro-
tection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of
12 August 1949, and to the obligations aris-
ing from the regulations annexed to the
Hague Conventions of 1907,

Deeply concerned at the sufferings of the
Palestinian and Lebanese civilian populations.

Noting the homelessness of the Palestin-
ian people.

Reaffirming the imperative need to per-
mit the Palestinian people to exercise their
legitimate rights.

1. Condemns the criminal massacre of
Palestinian and other civilians in Beirut on
17 September 1982;

2. Urges the Security Council to in-
vestigate, through the means available to it,
the circumstances and extent of the massacre
of Palestinian and other civilians in Beirut on
17 September 1982, and to make public the
report on its findings as soon as possible;

.3. Decides to support fully the provisions
of Security Council resolutions 508 (1982) and
509 (1982), in which the Council, inter alia.
demanded that:

(a) Israel withdraw all its military forces
forthwith and unconditionally to the interna-
tionally recognized boundaries of Lebanon;

(b) All parties to the conflict cease im-
mediately and simultaneously all military ac-
tivities within Lebanon and across the
Lebanese-Israeli border;

4. Demands that all Member States and
other parties observe strict respect for the
sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and
political independence of Lebanon within its
internationally recognized boundaries;

5. Reaffirms the fundamental principle of
the inadmissibility of the acquisition of ter-
ritory by force;

6. Resolves that, in conformity with its
resolution 194 (III) and subsequent relevant
resolutions, the Palestinian refugees should
be enabled to return to their homes and prop-
erty from which they have been uprooted and
displaced, and demands that Israel comply
unconditionally and immediately with the
present resolution;

7. Urges the Security Council, in the
event of continued failure by Israel to comply
with the demands contained in resolutions
508 (1982) and 509 (1982) and the present
resolution, to meet in order to consider prac-
tical ways and means in accordance with the
Charter of the llnited Nations;

8. Calls upon all States and international
agencies and organizations to continue to pro-
vide the most extensive humanitarian aid
possible to the victims of the Israeli invasion
of Lebanon;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to
prepare a photographic exhibit of the
massacre of 17 September 1982 and to
display it in the United Nations visitors' hall;

10. Decides to adjourn the seventh
emergency special session temporarily and to
authorize the President of the latest regular
session of the General Assembly to resume
its meetings upon request from Member
States.

'Adopted unanimously
-Adopted unanimously

Israel).

Adotited by a vote of 147 to 2 (U.S. and

Namibia

CONTACT GROUP COMMUNIQUE,
OCT. 1, 1982'

The P'oreign Ministers of Canada, France,
the United Kingdom, and the United States
and the State Secretary of the Foreign Offi.
of the Federal Republic of Germany met in
New York on October 1 to take stock of the
progress made in the Namibia negotiations
since their previous meeting in Luxembourg,
on May 18.

The ministers reviewed the consultation
which took place during July and August in
New York between the contact group and
representatives of the front-line states and
SWAPO [South West Africa People's
Organization], and the concurrent consulta-
tions with South Africa. They expressed
satisfaction with the result of these discus-
sions.

The ministers welcomed the agreement
the parties to the negotiations to the con-
stitutional principles for the Namibian
Constituent Assembly. They noted that all
parties had agreed that the method to be
employed to elect the Constituent Assembly
would be decided in accordance with the
terms of U.N. Security Council Resolution
435 and insisted that the issue should not
cause delay in the implementation of Resoh
tion 435. They expressed appreciation of th
constructive and flexible attitude of the par
ties, which enabled substantial progress to
made on impartiality and the size, composi-
tion, and deployment of the military compo
nent of UNTAG [U.N. Transition AssLstanr
Group]. They noted that on September 24
representatives of the front-line states,
Nigeria, SWAPO, and the contact group h:
reported to the Secretary General on the
results of the consultations which had takei
place.

The ministers reiterated their commit-
ment to the early implementation of U.N.
Security Council Resolution 435 in order t<i
enable the people of Namibia to exercise t h
right to self-determination and to bring pea
and security to the region. They paid tribut
to the efforts already made by the Secretai
General and his staff and agreed that ar-
rangements for the implementation of the
plan were proceeding satisfactorily.

The Ministers agreed that a valuable oj
portunity now existed to achieve a .settlenii
within the timeframe envisaged which woul
strengthen peace and security and foster
economic development in the region. They
noted that the objective of achieving such a
settlement was shared by all contact group
governments.

'U.S. U.N. press relea.se '

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

1^eas of Challenge in the Americas

iThomas O. Enders

Address before the I titer- American
ss Association, Chicago, Illinois, on
temher 30, 1982. Ambassador Enders
[ssistant Secretary for Inter-
erican Affairs.

a privilege to speak to this audi-
. The Inter-American Press Associa-
1 and its members have contributed
atly over the years to our joint quest
a stronger and more united hemi-
ere. It is true that cooperation
jng individual governments of North
South America, Central America,
the Caribbean has sometimes been
ited by misunderstanding and mis-
ulation. But no one has been more
scious than this body that the coun-
ts of the hemisphere are natural
linds and allies in a world that is
i table and often dangerous.
: This year, the Americas face
flllenges and opportunities as daunting
gtny in the past. Our wisdom, unity,
I ability to communicate are con-
nited by no less than three separate
.Ijllenges. They are:

• The crisis in Central America;

• The potential for interstate con-
: exemplified by the South Atlantic
.is; and

• The need to manage high levels of
;ign debt to safeguard the potential
all have for a new sustained expan-

. me address each in turn.

isis in Central America

1979 when Somoza fell to a vast but
rxist-led coalition, many concluded
t the only question was how soon and
V far Central America would be
\fen toward Marxism. And, indeed,

months that followed saw the
nching of a "final offensive" in El
vador by guerrilla forces with strong
(port from Nicaragua and Cuba. In
atemala, there was a new outburst of

rrilla warfare.

Central America seemed ripe for
lence. Only one country was governed
Tiocratically; elsewhere the military
s in charge, in some cases mainly
ough repression. Yet the armies did

look very formidable. In most cases

they were barracks bound, organized for
administration rather than combat.
Foreign disapproval had deprived them
of modern equipment and training. In El
Salvador, a cruelly inequitable landhold-
ing system put 40% of the land in the
hands of 2% of the landholders.
Throughout the isthmus, economic life
was unsettled by the double scourges of
local uncertainty and global recession.

Today the outlook is different. In El
Salvador, the guerrillas and their
foreign backers have lost the initiative.
They now face a Salvadoran Army that
is better equipped and organized and has
learned how to fight in the field. Redis-
tribution of 20% of the country's arable
land has deprived the guerrillas of an
issue they hoped to exploit. And the
massive turnout in the March election —
in the face of insurgent threats —
wrecked their claims to widespread sup-
port. Although it goes on, the guerrillas
can no longer hope to win the war they
began.

Honest elections with massive turn-
outs have also been held in Costa Rica
and Honduras — with extremist parties
winning almost no support. In Guate-
mala, a new government has begun to
limit human rights abuse and to improve
the situation in the Indian highlands.

And though economic conditions are
still often precarious, the outlook for
lasting development has been signifi-
cantly improved by the Caribbean Basin
initiative, through which the United
States is adding its weight to the con-
tributions of the Mexican-Venezuelan oil
facility and the efforts of Canada and
Colombia.

Whatever else they have settled,
these developments have revealed the
vitality of democracy and destroyed the
myth that Central America is moving in-
exorably toward Marxist dictatorship.

In Nicaragua, where the myth was
born, the classic shape of dictatorship is
becoming ever more evident, as the
regime wields its power in crude provo-
cation of the church, in persecution of
its Indian minority, in repression of
press and personal freedoms. Little by
little the original revolutionary coalition
has disintegrated. The Sandinistas,
themselves, have split. And as open
repression and miltarism have re-
emerged, disenchantment and even
armed resistance have also spread.

vember 1982

The Marxist-Leninists show no sign
of drawing the conclusions of these
reverses. Instead of questioning their
false premises, they are reacting with
more of the same — more arms, more
repression, more terrorism.

Nicaragua already has the largest
armed forces in Central American
history and is expanding them further.
In an effort to overcome resistance by
its people — and to build a base for pro-
jecting power in the area — Nicaragua
has imported some 2,000 Cuban military
and security advisers, and some 50-60
Soviet and East European military and
security advisers. Members of the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization's military
arm have also been involved. Having
already imported Soviet tanks, Nicar-
agua is preparing to bring in jet combat
aircraft.

Meanwhile, the regionalization of
terrorism goes on. Arms trafficking
from Nicaragua to El Salvador is active
and at high levels. Terrorist operations
against Costa Rica have intensified. So
blatant are Nicaraguan actions that
Costa Rica — a democracy with no
army — last month issued a libro bianco
detailing official Nicaraguan terrorisms
and other violations against Costa Rica.
The recently concluded hostage incident
in Honduras graphically exposed another
aspect of efforts to spin a regional web
of terror. Over 100 Honduran business-
men were seized in a vain effort to force
the release of a Salvadoran guerrilla
leader, Alejandro Montenegro, arrested
in August while planning operations
against El Salvador from Honduras.

At the same time, Cuba's capability
to project power in the region has been
greatly augmented. Cuba's arsenal now
includes sophisticated Soviet weapons,
such as MiG-23/Floggers, AN-26 trans-
port aircraft, a Koni-class frigate, sub-
marines, guided-missile attack boats,
and hydrofoils. Ominously, Cuba has ex-
panded its airlift capability; there are
even indications that Cuba intends to
strengthen its amphibious capability. In
this context, Cuban construction of a
battalion-size military compound and a
9,000-foot runway in Grenada and the
improvement of airfields in Nicaragua is
additional evidence of Cuba's increased
potential to sustain military operations
well beyond its own shores.

As opposed to the 1960s, when
Moscow generally pursued what it re-
ferred to as a "peaceful path" to change,
armed violence now plays a major role
in Soviet policy in Central America. The

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Soviet Union supports guerrilla move-
ments directly through C^ommunist par-
ties and front organizations and indirect-
ly through Cuba, Nicaragua, and
Grenada. Moscow's huge annual $3
billion economic subsidies — over and
above Soviet military grants — effectively
underwrite Cuba's aggressive behavior
and enable Castro to maintain the
largest per capita military force in the

within the states of the area. Just as it
is wrong to let the Salvadoran guerrillas
shoot their way to a share of power they
are unwilling to compete for at the polls,
so it would be wrong to exclude from
political participation those who may
now be ready to accept peaceful compe-
tition within emerging democratic in-
stitutions. We are encouraged by the ac-
tions of the Salvadoran Government to

As opposed to the 1960s, when Moscow general-
ly pursued what it referred to as a "peaceful path "
to change, armed violence now plays a major role
in Soviet policy in Central America.

hemisphere. Lately Moscow has taken a
more direct role in Grenada, pledging to
buy all of that island's main exports and
promising an impressive array of tech-
nical assistance projects.

These actions by Nicaragua, Cuba,
and the Soviet Union mean that local
struggles in Central America will con-
tinue— more violent, bitter, and long-
lasting than they otherwise would be.
But they do not mean that the Marxist-
Leninists will prevail. On the contrary, it
is clear that they will not prevail — pro-
vided the democracies remain clear-
minded about what they are aiming for
and provided they maintain the effort.

I say clearminded, for it is not too
soon for the democracies to begin to
define the conditions in which Central
America could be at peace. Some of
these conditions are obvious. There can
be no peace if any country in the area
attempts to export revolution to
another, maintaining in its territory the
headquarters, logistical support, and
training grounds of an insurgency
directed against a neighbor— as Nicar-
agua does against El Salvador. Equally,
there can be no peace, if any country im-
ports large numbers of foreign military
and security advisers and heavy offen-
sive weapons— as Nicaragua is also do-
ing.

Should we not then aim at agree-
ment—subject to effective verifica-
tion—that no country in Central
America will import heavy offensive
weapons and that foreign military and
security advisers will be reduced to a
common low level or be removed
entirely?

Equally imporUint is what happens

hold out the hand of reconciliation to its
adversaries.

And unless Nicaragua permits the
development of democratic or, at least,
pluralistic institutions in which power is
allocated by free elections, its neighbors
will never trust it to keep the peace. For
if there is any lesson in the politics of
the 20th century, it is that governments
that must face their people in free elec-
tions do not often make war on their
neighbors.

It is up to Nicaraguans to determine
what government Nicaragua should
have. But an object of our policy should
clearly be to persuade Nicaragua to put
its oft-repeated commitment to plural-
istic democracy into practice. We must
use the dialogue that we proposed to the
Nicaraguans a year ago to explore how
a way can be found back from militariza-
tion to internal reconciliation and peace
with neighbors.

If the democracies hold to these
principles, backing those that adhere to
them with economic and political and
military assistance, peace will come to
Central America. No one expects it to
emerge full blown this fall, or next year,
or maybe even the year after, but it will
come — if the democracies sustain the ef-
fort.

In the past the United Stiites has
generally neglected Central America
only to send in the troops when things
got out of hand. U.S. troops are no solu-
tion now. What can help is a dependable
U.S. commitment. The United States
will help its friends in the area defend
themselves from violent minorities from
within — and hostile neighbors from
without — and as long as it is necessary.

Central America is the land bridge
between the two Americas. The advance

of Marxist-Leninists there would be pr-
foundly threatening to the hemisphere.
The people of Central America have it
their power to prevent that by a com-
bination of resistance and reform. We
must go on helping them.

Potential for Interstate Conflict

From Central America to the South
Atlantic is a considerable distance. Yet
all of us in this room were forced,
earlier this year, to shift our focus fror
one to the other. Perhaps the most
fundamental question arising from the
P^alklands/ Malvinas crisis is how bette
in the future to prevent war in the hen
sphere.

The inter-American system has a
unique record of cooperative action to
preserve the peace. But it was not abl(
to do so in the South Atlantic crisis. V
some, the question that came out of th
South Atlantic crisis is, why didn't the
system provide automatic and unani-
mous support for one of the
belligerents? And because it didn't,
shouldn't it somehow be restructured .^
that it would do so in the future?

For me the questions are different
Why didn't the inter-American system
keep the peace? Should it be restruc-
tured so that it will be more effective?
How can we avoid new wars in the
future, sparked by one of the many
territorial disputes with which the hen
sphere is laced? I think there are aire;:
some tentative answers to these ques-
tions.

First, territorial and other disput
must not be allowed to fester.
Machinery exists to anticipate dispute:
and permit their peaceful and definitiv
settlement: various inter-American arl
tration and conciliation agreements,
Organization of American States peaci
keeping mechanisms, the Internationa
Court of Justice, even the treaty of
TIateloIco, which established the worlc
first nuclear free zone in a populated
area. What appears lacking is the will
u.se this machinery to prevent and
resolve contentious problems. The
United States and other countries of t
area have at one time or another been
involved in calming or negotiating mo;
of them. But this is a branch of hemi-
spheric diplomacy that deserves fresh
tention.

Second, the maintenance of a peai
ful equilil)rium within the hemisphere
everyone's business. The military
expenditures of the countries of Latin
America come to only 1.4% of gross n
tional product (GNP) — a (juarter of th"

Department of State Bullet "«

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

i*|i*rage in the developing- world as a
iffi ole. We all share an interest in main-
ling that record and in avoiding arms
es. And where competitive procure-
He nt cannot be avoided, it is vital that
sting disputes not be exacerbated. My
n country has acted in the last
leratioii almost as if it could simply
ore this problem. U.S. arms sales as
k roportion of South American pur-
If ises fell from 75% in 1960 to 20% in
'0 and to 7% in 1980. The reduction
fn, ;raining and in-depth contacts be-

;en the U.S. and most South
ii,( lerican militaries has also been pre-
itous. Improved contacts and, in some
es, additional arms transfers may be
!ded to help avoid subregional im-
ances of power and preserve the
ice. Others in the hemisphere and in
,|,|, ;ndiy outside countries can similarly
ist.

Third, we must all prevent regional
iflicts from having strategic conse-
■nces, introducing East-West tensions
ere they do not belong, or even
inging the East-West balance. It
uld not be wise for any of us to per-
Moscow to become a major source of
itary modernization. And Cuba is
rking hard to exploit the South Atlan-
conflict to reduce its isolation within
hemisphere.

I doubt that these tasks require in-
;utional changes. But they do require
!ater perceptiveness about the possi-
threats to peace and particularly
3Ut the ways in which American
tes relate to each other.
There was a time when most of us
|)Ught of the inter- American system as
isisting of only two participants-
tin America and North America. It
sn't very long ago that the United
ites and others attempted— and
led— to organize a "new dialogue" on
It basis.
Such formulas have never done
tice to the richness of the
misphere's potential and the variety of
r concerns. They make even less sense
w that Latin American countries have
Dwn so much in economic weight,
pulation, and worldwide influence, and
w that the new countries of the Carib-
an have joined the system. What we
ould strive for is a system which re-
cts our diversity, which lessens ten-
>ns rather than adds to them, and
lich preserves what until now has
len one of the New World's distinctive
hievements— peace among its nations.

Problem of Foreign Debt

The challenge with the widest impact is
the problem of foreign debt. Debt issues
affect virtually every country in this
hemisphere. At stake is the ability of
each of our countries to realize its poten-
tial for sustained expansion.

The hemisphere has an impressive
record of high growth. Taking the
average for the last 20 years, the
economies of Latin America and the
Caribbean have expanded at an annual
rate of 5.7% in real terms. This rate has
been consistently higher than that of
both the developed countries and of the
developing countries as a whole.

Many factors have contributed to
this record. Trade— access to foreign
markets including markets within the
region itself— has been one of the great
motors of growth. U.S. imports from
Latin America and the Caribbean have
grown from $4 billion in 1960 to $39
billion in 1980— which averages out to a
compound growth rate of more than
12% a year for the last 20 years. This is
in nominal terms and includes the price
escalation on petroleum, but even so it is
impressive when compared to U.S. infla-
tion, which averaged about 5% during
this period.

Imported capital has also been vital
to Latin America's growth. Direct

growth potential, should also attract a
major share of world capital flows. With
their great resources, their increasingly
skilled and disciplined work force, and
their growing capacity to export energy
and agricultural and industrial goods,
there can be no doubt that the countries
of the hemisphere are fundamentally
credit worthy.

Each country's situation is different
and must be considered as a separate
case. But there are three themes in the
current situation common to most.

• One is the impact of rising budget
deficits on import demand. The high
growth of the 1970s was obtained in
part through ever higher budget deficits.
In the past 10 years, the combined
deficits of the developing countries of
the hemisphere have more than doubled
in relation to GNP, in some cases
reaching the 15% or even the 20% level.
The resulting high activity and inflation
have fueled an enormous demand for
foreign goods and services.

• The second is the worldwide
recession, which has cut sharply into ex-
port earnings as the prices of basic com-
modities on which the economies of the
hemisphere still depend have fallen,
often precipitously.

• The third is the cumulative effect
of the debt itself, due partly to its size,

What we should strive for is a system [inter-
American] which reflects our diversity, which
lessens tensions rather than adds to them, and
which preserves what until now has been one of the
New World's distinctive achievements— peace
among its nations.

investment from the United States in-
creased from $8.4 billion in 1960 to
$38.3 billion in 1980, and direct foreign
investment by other nations in Latin
America now exceeds $15 billion. Bor-
rowed capital has grown even more
dramatically. The long-term foreign debt
of the developing countries of the hemi-
sphere grew from $39 billion in 1973 to
some $197 billion in 1981; this is
equivalent to roughly 30% of its total
output.

This capital has been put to good
use. Moreover, it is not inappropriate
that Latin America, which has a dis-
proportionate share of the world's

vember 1982

partly to sharp runup of interest rates
over the past 5 years. Governments
everywhere-yes, in the United States
but also in Europe and, indeed, in the
hemisphere as well— have been putting
excessive demands on the small pool of
savings we all generate. In doing so, we
all have contributed to high interest
rates. For example, Latin America
undertook some $28 billion of net new
long-term borrowings in 1981 from
world markets, much of it from the
United States. For comparison, the total
net savings generated by the U.S.
economy during 1981 was $147.4 billion.

I think the adjustments that we all
must undertake are clear. All of us, in-
cluding the United States, have to pare

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

down the growth of public spending and
raise public receipts. All of us, including
the United States, have to hold down
the growth of money supply to prevent
inflationary increases in demand. The
United States is undertaking its own ad-
justment policies— witness President
Reagan's efforts to lower budget deficits
and control money supply— and has em-
pathy for others whose problems are
worse and whose economies are less
flexible. If we do, the pressure on sav-
ings and external balances will abate,
and, as the industrial countries emerge
from recession, both the pool of savings
and their import demand will grow and
the short-term problem will gradually
dissolve.

In the meanwhile, an exceptional ef-
fort of cooperation, mutual understand-
ing, and mutual adjustment must be
undertaken to make sure that access to
capital markets is not needlessly inter-
rupted while basic adjustment measures
are taken. This is basically a question
between borrowing governments and the
markets themselves. But in some excep-
tional cases, other governments can play
a role. Thus, in August the United
States and Mexico cooperated to
mobilize $4.5 billion in financing in order
to allow time for talks with the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and preparation
of a stabilization plan to proceed. The
United States also encouraged and wel-
comed the decision of Argentina and
Britain to remove their mutual financial
sanctions and thus free up resources of
great utility to both countries.

One final remark. In the short term,
as unemployment grows and as the re-
quired adjustments look ever more pain-
ful, the one path which tempts all, in-
cluding some in the United States, is the
escapism of protection. In that direction
lies assured disaster. An open trading
system is and must remain one of our
highest foreign policy priorities. The up-
coming ministerial of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade may be one
of the more important in decades pre-
cisely because the pressures are building
in all of our countries to pursue the il-
lusory goal of trying to save jobs by not
competing.

Potential for Progress

I have outlined three broad areas of
challenge and the guidelines we are us-
ing to confront each of them. I believe
we are making progress. In the past
year:

• The United States and Mexico
have started to achieve a relationship
that reflects their exceptional import-

ance to each other. Now comes the
harshest test, as the economic slowdown
in both countries threatens to aggravate
all our joint accounts: trade, finance, im-
migration. We must be steadfast.

• We have committed ourselves to
help countries of the Caribbean Basin
protect themselves against outside inter-
vention, streng^en or develop demo-
cratic institutions, and overcome eco-
nomic disasters. That effort will succeed
if it is sustained.

• We are beginning to respond to
new realities in South America. We
were rebuilding close bilateral relation-
ships with each country after a decade
of drift, when the shadow of the South
Atlantic crisis fell across our efforts. We

are now relaunching those efforts, join
ing others to maintain the networks of
constructive relationships essential to
peace and to sustained economic devel-
opment.

There are great strengths in the
Americas: a common heritage which re
jects outside interference; enormous
human and natural resources for
growth; and, not least, a pervasive anc
resilient belief in the democratic ideal,
we act consistently, and with a clear
head, on our strengths rather than ex-
acerbate our weaknesses— and if we in
sist that outsiders respect our efforts-
this hemisphere will yet be a model for
the rest of the world. ■

Recent Developments in Honduras

by Stephen W. Bosworth

Statement before the Subcommittee
on Inter- American Affairs of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee on Septem,-
ber 21, 1982. Mr. Bosworth is Deputy As-
sistant Secretary for Inter-American Af-
fairs.^

Thank you for this opportunity to testify
about developments in Honduras. Like
the committee, we have been concerned
by recent events in the region which
threaten the security and well-being of
Honduras and raise the specter of
broader conflict in Central America.

The fundamental development in in-
ternal Honduran politics during the last
year was the accession to power on
January 27, 1982, of Dr. Roberto Suazo
Cordova following that nation's first
honest elections in 18 years. A vigorous
and closely fought campaign inspired
some 1.1 million voters — more than 81%
of those eligible — to cast their ballots.
Dr. Suazo's inauguration culminated a
2V2-year process in which both civilians
and military worked to build the political
attitudes and institutions that made a
democratic outcome possible.

U.S. policies throughout this difficult
transition period explicitly encouraged
the return to democracy in Honduras
and supported the commitment of Hon-
duran leaders to full civil and human
rights.

Now a second fundamental develop-
ment— the expansion of conflict into
Honduras by Nicaragua and its Salva-
doran guerrilla allies — threatens the

peace and well-being of Honduras. Unt
this year, Honduras was involved in th
wider Central American arena mainly
a place of shelter for more than 3,000
refugees and as an unwilling staging
area and supply route for various guer
rilla movements. As the Honduran
Government has taken steps to reasse;
its sovereignty and control its border
regions and frontiers, it, too, has
become a target of externally-supportt
terrorism. During 1982 terrorist in-
cidents have increased dramatically,
border incidents with Nicaragua have
escalated, and tensions have increased
Honduras' dilemma is clear: to passive
accept abuse of its territory by foreigi
guerrillas or to defend itself and incur
new costs in terrorism and destructior
The events of this weekend, in wh
armed terrorists have taken hostage
more than 80 businessmen and two
ministers of the Honduran Governmer
are but the most recent and most
graphic example of the pressure again
Honduras.

The Economy

With a per capita gross domestic prod
uct (GDP) of $708 last year, Honduras
the least developed nation in Central
America and the poorest nation in the
hemisphere except for Haiti. The
prevalence of small farming and a
relative abundance of land have,
nonetheless, enabled Honduras, whost
population today is about 3.8 million, I

Department of State Bulle

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

U )id many of the social tensions that
'e wracked its neighbors.
Like its neighbors, Honduras has
fered a sharp deterioration in its
ms of trade in the past several years.

current account balance declined
m negative $192 million in 1979 to a

" )pling negative $321 million in 1980
1, after certain austerity measures
re implemented, improved marginally

»|iegative $273 million in 1981. During
se 3 years alone, Honduras' exports
short of the nation's import bill by
6 million.

In 1981. in order to partially remedy
imbalance, Honduras reduced im-

to|ts sharply. From 1980-1981, imports
lined from $1,310 million to $1,217
ion — a 7.1% decrease in nominal
Tis but a reduction of more than 15%
eal terms. Nevertheless, net interna-
lal reserves fell from $116 million in
9 to $8 million in 1981. Honduran
P grew by only 2%i in real terms dur-
1980 and showed no growth in 1981.

HI cing into account the rapid inflow of

lb igees and Honduras' normal popula-

growth, real per capita GDP has

ined for 2 consecutive years, with

dent consequences for employment

Is and the quality of life of popula-

The United States has helped to sup-

t Honduras with an economic
istance program totaling $43.3

ion in FY 1982, plus an additional
) million to be obligated under the
^sident's Caribbean Basin initiative,
nduras also recently negotiated a
ndby agreement with the Interna-
lal Monetary Fund which will provide
)stantial additional assistance but will
iuire a program of strict austerity in

foreign, public, and monetary sec-
s. In a move made possible by the Oc-
■er 1980 peace treaty formally ending
■ 1969 hostilities with El Salvador,
de between Honduras and El Salva-
• was officially reopened last week for

first time in 13 years.

The orderly installation of the Suazo
/ernment has also renewed business
ifidence. President Suazo's popularity
1 his government's forthrightness and
nhandedness in calling for belt-
htening have, thus far, minimized
entment at austerity. For example, a
ent nationwide teachers' strike was
icluded peacefully and with full
pular support. Since the inauguration
the Suazo government, Honduras has
icted new mining legislation to attract
eign investors, formed a commission

vember 1982

to negotiate foreign debt problems, and
concluded a long-term agreement with
Texaco. The conclusion of this latter
dispute puts Honduras in a stronger
position to participate in the Mexican /
Venezuelan concessionary petroleum
facility. Despite these positive
developments, short-term economic pros-
pects are mixed.

Refugees

Economic difficulties are sharpened by a
large refugee population, which con-
tributes to the political complexity of the
situation and places additional burdens
on the local economy and social services.

In recent years, Honduras has
become a magnet for refugees from El

As the Honduran Gov-
ernment has taken steps
to reassert its sovereign-
ty and control its border
regions and frontiers, it,
too, has become a target
of externally supported
terrorism.

Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. Al-
though not a signatory of the Geneva
Convention and Protocol Relating to
Refugees, Honduras has demonstrated
its humanitarian concern by working
closely with the U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Refugees to provide protec-
tion, shelter, and food for approximately
30,000 persons who have fled their
homelands. About one-half of these
refugees are Salvadoran. About 500 are
from Guatemala. The fastest growing
and potentially largest group of
refugees, however, is made up of per-
sons displaced from Nicaragua. More
than 12,000 Miskito Indians alone fled to
Honduras following a series of re-
pressive actions taken by the Sandinista
regime. Recently, another influx of
about 3,000 Nicaraguan refugees also
entered Honduras. Most of these
Nicaraguans, displaced by the turmoil of

the past 3 years, have sought shelter in
the border regions of Honduras. Both
Salvadorans and Nicaraguans sometimes
exploit their location close to the fron-
tier to return home for peaceful or
disruptive purposes.

National Security

In the past few months Honduras has
been struck by a wave of kidnapings,
aircraft hijackings, bank robberies, and
bombings of public buildings. To date in
1982, we are aware of 39 terrorist in-
cidents which have occurred in Hon-
duras or were directed at Honduran
facilities outside the country. These in-
clude the placement of more than 30
bombs and attacks on at least three ma-
jor U.S. corporations— Texaco, IBM,
and Air Florida. The most notable occur-
rences were:

• March 10— Texaco office bombed.

• April 5— Shooting attack on the
U.S. Embassy.

• April 20— Argentine and Chilean
Embassies bombed.

• April 28— Attempt to hijack
domestic airliner.

• July 3 — Honduran airlines offices
bombed in San Jose.

• July 4— Bombing of electrical
power substations, temporarily blacking
out Tegucigalpa.

• July 23 — Honduran airlines office
bombed in Guatemala City.

• August 4— Air Florida, IBM, and
TACA Airlines (Salvadoran but U.S.
owned) offices bombed.

Like the current hostage crisis,
these attacks, their timing, their targets,
and their accompanying propaganda
have made it obvious that they were not
motivated by internal Honduran issues.
Rather, they are orchestrated by
Nicaragua's Sandinistas and the
Salvadoran FMLN (Farabundo Marti
People's Liberation Front] to intimidate
the Honduran Government. An intense
series of terrorist attacks immediately
followed the Honduran army's deploy-
ment to defend its border zones against
incursions by FMLN guerrillas. In
subsequent raids on subversive
safehouses, those captured have mainly
been Salvadoran FMLN operatives
assisted by some subordinate Hon-
durans.

The democratic government's reac-
tion to terrorist violence has been
measured but firm. A stronger law

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

against terrorist activities was adopted.
The public security forces have
demonstrated a growing capability to
identify and locate terrorists but have
not provided the Marxist tacticians with
the martyrs which they seek. On
September 11, Honduras expelled the
Nicaraguan economic attache for "ac-
tivities contrary to national interests and
state security."

Popular reactions in Honduras have
been strongly supportive of the Suazo
regime. Hondurans applauded the
passage of the antiterrorism law. On
August 6, close to 10,000 people
marched through the streets of
Tegucigalpa to show their support of the
government and the armed forces and
their rejection of those who would bring
violence to Honduras.

Although its elected government
continues to enjoy widespread popular
support, it is clear that the national
security of Honduras is menaced by the
activities of antigovernment terrorist
groups and by the military might of an
increasingly hostile Nicaragua. Hon-
duras' rugged terrain makes it especially
vulnerable to abuses of its territory. The
utilization of Honduran territory by
Salvadoran guerrillas has already been
mentioned. Honduras has also become a
major thoroughfare for leftist arms traf-
fic in support of the insurgent
movements in El Salvador and
Guatemala. In 1978 and 1979, San-
dinista forces operated freely from bases
within Honduras, in spite of the govern-
ment's efforts to oust them. Now, ter-
rorist operatives of the Sandinista
government have reversed the direction,
exploiting Honduran weaknesses to
stage attacks on Honduras itself.

This weekend's seizure of the San
Pedro Sula Chamber of Commerce il-
lustrates Honduras' predicament. Last
Friday evening, some 15 terrorists
armed with automatic rifles and
dynamite blasted their way into the
Chamber of Commerce building. One
guard was killed and two businessmen
were injured. Revealingly, the terrorists'
demands do not focus on Honiiuran
issues. Their principal demand, as stated
to the press, is that some 60 prisoners
be released. The individuals concerned
are allegedly being held by the Hon-
duran Government, apparently for in-
volvement in arms shipments or other
guerrilla activities tied to conflicts in
neighboring nations. Alejandro
Montenegro, one of the most prominent
among those whose release is sought, is
evidently a commander of the Ejercito
Revolucionario Popular— Popular
Revolutionary Army— the most violent

of the violent factions in El Salvadi)r.

A second demand seeks the repeal of
Honduras' new antiterrorism law,
enacted during a period of public
outrage at an airplane hijacking in prog-
ress at that time. In short, the ter-
rorists' demands serve guerrilla ac-
tivities against neighboring countries
and seek to prevent Honduras from tak-
ing even legislative action to safeguard
its territory.

The Nicaraguan Dimension

Nicaragua has cho.sen with Cuban sup-
port to try to take advantage of Hon-
duras' economic and security weak-
nesses. Although Honduran Foreign
Minister Paz Barnica has repeatedly
reiterated the desire "that relations can
continue normally," the continued suc-
cess of Honduras' democratic experi-
ment is clearly viewed as a threat by the
Marxist-Leninist regime in neighboring
Nicaragua. Along with Havana, the San-
dinistas are training, supplying, and
bankrolling terrorists in Honduras.

Perhaps most revealing, in light of
recent Nicaraguan statements menacing
Honduras, is a brief comparison of the
two nations' military capabilities. Hon-
duras has some 13,500 men under arms;
Nicaragua, with its increasing mobiliza-
tion of reservists and militia, has some
75,000. Although both nations have rein-
forced units along the border,
Nicaraguan forces outweigh the Hon-
duran by approximately three to one.
The deterrent capacity of the Honduran
Air Force, that nation's traditional
defensive mainstay, is in question.

Hondui'as has a few A-37s and a
squadron of Super Mystere aircraft, the
latter purchased in 1969. In contrast,
Nicaragua is rumored to have ordered a
squadron of MiG jets, of unspecified
type and number, whose arrival would
sharply alter the military balance be-
tween the two nations. Reconstruction
of the Nicaraguan airports is already
underway, and Nicaraguan pilots are
presently training in Eastern Europe.

In sum, recent press portraits of the
Honduran military as the strongest in
Central America notwithstanding, Hon-
duran units are undertrained; its total
military force is much smaller than
either of its neighbors, El Salvador and
Nicaragua; and its inventory of
transportation, communications, and air
defense materiel is skimpy and aging.
Indeed, Honduras has not significantly
increased its armed forces during the
last few years.

The Tnited States has attempted t
assist Honduras to improve its national
security capabilities. In FY 1982, in-
cluding the funds authorized in the
recently enacted supplemental appro
priation, we are providing $30 million ii
foreign military sales loans and [militar
assistance program] grants. We have
also agreed to fund an FY 1983-
1985 program, under the Department <
Defense military construction budget,
for improvements in Honduran airport
facilities, to which U.S. aircraft would
have access. U.S. military trainers in
Honduras currently range from 30-50
persons on temporary duty. The con-
trast between these modest numbers
and the 2,000 Cuban, Soviet, and East
European military and security person-
nel stationed in Nicaragua is striking, i
deed.

As this record makes clear,
Nicaragua is the source of many of the
problems confronting Honduras, direct
by its menacing and subversive initia-
tives, and indirectly by its open suppor
for the armed insurgencies in El
Salvador and Guatemala. As the place
refuge for thousands of other Central
Americans, as the crossroads of a
massive clandestine arms traffic by the
violent left, and as a nation which shar
a long land border with Nicaragua, the
security of democratic Honduras is viu
ly important to the peace of Central
America.

Nor is Honduras alone in feeling
pressure from Nicaragua. Democratic
and army-less Costa Rica has also four
Nicaragua to be a dangerous neighbor.
On July 4, coincident with bombings th
day of electric power substations whicl
temporarily blacked out Tegucigalpa, a
terrorist bomb shattered the offices of
the Honduran airline in downtown San
Jose. Investigation by Costa Rican
authorities revealed that the bomb waf
placed by a member of the Colombian
M-19 terrorist group, acting on instru(
tions from the Nicaraguan Embassy.
The Costa Ricans actually tape recordt I
an incriminating conversation between
Nicaraguan Embassy officer and the
Colombian terrorist. As a direct result,
three Nicaraguan diplomats were ex-
pelled by the Costa Rican Government
early August— just as, a month later,
Honduras expelled the Nicaraguan
economic attache on national security
grounds. The Costa Rican Foreign
Ministry has formally detailed the reco
of continuing FSLN abuses: support fo
terrorism and subversion, incursions ai
other activity inside Costa Rican ter-
ritory by armed Sandinista troops, and

Department of State Bullet

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

rassment of Costa Rican commercial

tourist traffic on the San Juan River
ich divides the two countries.

nduran Peace Proposal

March 23, Honduras advanced a six-
nt proposal, later endorsed by the
ited States, the Central American
mocratic Community, and numerous
er nations in the hemisphere, to
ng about peace in Central America.

First, the foundation should be laid
general disarmament in the region,
is would involve not only a halt to the
ns race, which has caused so much
sion and instability, but also a gen-
e reduction in armaments and in
itary personnel to minimum levels
essary for the defense of sovereignty
i territorial integrity and for the
intenance of law and order, in accord-

.(I ;e with criteria acknowledged in all
nocratic societies. There should also
agreement on the type of weapons to
limited and prohibited as part of this
leral disarmament plan.
Second, there should be agreement
reducing, on an objective and
isonable basis, the number of foreign
itary and other advisers, as well as

J/ other elements likely to create suspi-
n and uneasiness or to distort the
ntity of the respective nations.
Third, consideration should be given
and agreement reached on, ap-
ipriate mechanisms to insure that,
ough a process of international super-
ion and monitoring to which Hon-
das is committed, there is comprehen-
e verification of compliance. Such
)ervision and monitoring would cover
mtries where there are conflicts and
isitive areas which may affect peace
the region, such as ports, airports,
•der areas, and strategic sectors. Hon-
das is fully prepared to submit its ter-
)ry, without reservations, to any type
international observation or monitor-
that is agreed upon for the purpose
securing and strengthening regional
ice.
Fourth, there should be discussion
and agreement on, the most appro-
ate procedures and mechanisms for
ting the traffic in arms in the region.
Fifth, there should be absolute
pect for delimited and demarcated
rders and the traditional and jurisdic-
nal frontier lines of states in the
|ion, so that the peace will not be
set by fresh disputes in matters
ating to territory or to the sea.

Sixth, the framework for a perma-
nt multilateral dialogue should be

3vember 1982

defined. Internally such a dialogTje, on
the basis of this initiative, would also
create the right climate for political ar-
rangements to strengthen the demo-
cratic and pluralistic system, which in
turn would reinforce respect for the
freedom of the people and for their right
to free expression of their wishes.

The Honduran peace proposal ar-
ticulates a concrete framework for
regional peace. In early July the Foreign
Ministers of the Central American
Democratic Community, El Salvador,
Costa Rica, and Honduras — all
democratically elected governments —
issued a joint statement condemning
regional terrorism and subversion, ex-
pressing concern over the excessive
arms buildup in Nicaragua, and appeal-
ing to Nicaragua to respect the principle
of nonintervention in the internal affairs
of other countries. The declaration also
specifically endorsed the Honduran plan
for regional peace. The United States
also supports the Honduran initiative.

We are studying, with interest,
similar concerns expressed recently by
the Presidents of Mexico and Venezuela.
To date, however, there has been no
convincing indication that the Sandinista
government is willing to consider con-
crete, practical measures for peace.

Conclusion

At a time of deep economic difficulties
and grave political tensions, Honduras is
a nation striving for democracy and
peace. Hondurans are justifiably proud
that, in recent years, their country has
avoided the violent politics of its
neighbors and has made demonstrable
progress toward establishing a more
equitable society, stronger democratic
institutions, and a truly free press.
The focus of U.S. policy toward
Honduras is to support the well-being
and security of a democratic regime
under pressure from external forces. We
are working to help the Hondurans help
themselves economically and to bolster
the growth and maturity of their
democratic institutions. Like Honduras,
we, too, are searching for and support-
ing those who want peace in embattled
Central America.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Situation in
Guatemala

by Stephen W. Bosworth

Stdtcninil hij'ori' tltv Siiltcommittee
onhltirniilmtiiii I hTrlupimitl nftlie

Hoiviv L'oiniiidtec on. Baiikiitg un Au-
gust 5, 1982. Mr. Bosworth is Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American
Affairs. '

I would like to begin by reviewing brief-
ly overall U.S. policy and objectives in
Central America. Our goal is the evolu-
tion of stable democratic societies, free
to concentrate on their economic and
social development, and secure from ex-
ternal threat. To achieve that goal we
have:

• Supported developing democratic
processes and elections in El Salvador,
Costa Rica, and Honduras;

• Developed a program of compre-
hensive economic cooperation through
the Caribbean Basin initiative and ongo-
ing foreign assistance loans and grants;
and

• Provided security assistance to
some countries to help them defend
themselves against externally supported
subversion and terrorism.

Our goal in Guatemala is the same
as in the other countries of the area. In
fact, as the largest and most populous
country of Central America, Guatemala
has a crucial, even pivotal, role in the
region. It has considerable resources,
but it also has serious economic and
social problems and faces an active,
Cuban-backed guerilla movement.

Our efforts to establish the type of
relationship with Guatemala in which we
could assist in meeting these problems
were largely blocked by the policies pur-
sued by the previous Guatemalan
Government. The deplorable human
rights situation in Guatemala and the
lack of a credible framework for prog-
ress meant that we were able to support
only a few loans promoting basic human
needs. In brief, we could not work with
a regime whose actions were as abhor-
rent as they were counterproductive,
and our bilateral relationship was effec-
tively frozen.

New Government's Actions

This pattern was broken on March 23. A
group of young officers brought to
power a new government determined to

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

eliminate official repression and corrup-
tion, to improve conditions for all of
Guatemala's peoples, to combat the in-
surgency, and to return the country to
democratic rule. Since March 28 a
number of important steps have been
taken.

• The government has reduced
political violence, particularly in urban
areas, where its command and control is
strongest. Political violence in rural
areas continues and may even be in-
creasing, but its use as a political tactic
appears to be a guerrilla strategy, not a
government doctrine. Eyewitness re-
ports of women among the attackers,
embassy interviews with massacre sur-
vivors, the use of weapons not in the
army inventory, and, most importantly,
the increasing tendency of rural
villagei-s to seek the army's protection
all suggest that the guerrillas are
responsible in major part for the rising
levels of violence in rural areas.

• No specific charges of government
torture have been brought to our atten-
tion. In contrast to the past, the new

governfnent has publicly acknowledged,
though in some cases belatedly, deten-
tions. In the two prominent instances in-
volving Dr. Juan Jose Hurtado and 16
students detained in June, the govern-
ment released Dr. Hurtado into the
custody of the Guatemalan Red Cross
and a refjresentative of the Catholic
Churcli: the students were released into
their parents' custody. This kind of ac-
tion is unprecedented in recent
(luatenialan historw

• An amnesty program carried out
in June saw almost 2,000 people step
forward to accept it.

• Exiled religious workers have
been invited back into the country and a
constructive dialogue opened with the
church. For example, Bishop Gerardi,
the former president of the Episcopal
Conference, has returned to Guatemala
from Costa Rica, where he was living
for his own safety. In another instance,
a nun, deported by Honduras for
distributing literature supporting
Salvadoran guerrillas, was quietly
released to church authorities by the
Guatemalan Government.

Guatemala— A Profile

Geography

Area: 4i:,000 sq. mi. (about the size of Tenn.).
Cities: Capitol — Guatemala City (pop. 1.5
million). Other Cities — Quezaltenango
(70,000), Escuintia (60,000).

People

Population: 7.4 million (1981 est.). Annual
Growth Rate: 3.1%. Ethnic Groups: Ladino
(Westernized), Indian. Religions: Roman
Catholic, Protestant, traditional Mayan.
Langiiages: Spanish, 18 Indian languages
(Quiche, Cakchiquel, Kekchi).

Government

Type: Military government. Independence:
Sept. If), 1821. Constitution: 1965 (suspend-
ed). Branches: Executive — president (chief of
state and head of government), Council of
Ministers (cabinet). Legislative — unicameral
61 -seat Congress (dissolved). Suffrage:
Universal over 18. Subdivisions: 22 depart-
ments and Guatemala City.

Economy

GNP: $8.7 billion (1981 est.). Annual Growth
Rate: 1% (1981). Per Capita Income: $1,175.

Natural Resources: Oil, nickel, timber,
shrimp.

Agricultural Products: Corn, beans, cof-
fee, cotton, cattle, sugar, bananas, spices,
essential oils, timber.

Industries: Prepared food, textiles, con-
struction materials, tires, pharmaceuticals.

Trade (1981): A'xporf.s— $1.2 billion: cof-
fee, cotton, .sugar, meat, bananas. Principal

Markets — U.S., Central American Common
Market (CACM), Japan. Imports— $\. 7
billion: fuels and lubricants, industrial
machinery, motor vehicles, iron and steel.
Principal Suppliers — U.S., Japan, CACM,
EEC. Venezuela.

Official Exchange Rate: 1 quetzal =
US$1.00.

U.S. Aid Received: $203 million
(1967-81).

Pacific Ocean

Membership in
International Organizations

U.N. and its specialized agencies, Organiza-
tion of American States (OASl. CACM.
INTELSAT. ■

• In direct contrast to the previous
government's exclusive emphasis on
military action against the guerrillas,
this government is committed to rural
development. Even as overall govern-
ment expenditures are being reduced,
programs to develop the social in-
frastructure of the highlands are being
expanded. Just 2 weeks ago, the govern-
ment announced a $5 million program tc
provide minimum shelter in support of a
food-for-work program to people dis-
placed through political strife.

• Invitations have been extended to
Amnesty International, the Inter-
American Commission on Human
Rights, and the U.N. Human Rights
Commission to visit Guatemala to make
their own evaluations of the situation. Ir
late July, the Guatemalan Foreign
Minister received visiting West German
Social Democrat Guenter Herterich. The
Lucas government had refused all such
contacts.

• The government offered to negoti
ate unconditionally with the guerrilla
forces, a proposal which the guerrillas
rejected without serious exploration.

The guerrilla cadres have responded
to the new government and its policies
with increased violence. They are clearlj
responsible for the massacre of innocent
men, women, and children in Sanquiya,
Chichicastenango in May, and in the
region of the Ixil triangle in June. The
guerrillas appear to have begun a con-
certed campaign to intimidate Indian
villagers from participating in the
community defense forces, a popular
program responding to the traditional
efforts of these close-knit villages to pre
tect themselves from outsiders. The
guerrillas constitute a formidable threat
to any Guatemalan Government. Full-
time, trained, armed guerrillas may
number as many as 3,500. This cadre of
permament military units is supple-
mented by approximately 10,000 ir-
regular "local defense" guerrillas. A sup
port infrastructure of some 30,000-
60,000 sympathizers constitutes a third
level.

Violence and terrorism compound
the economic problems presently con-
fronting the new- government. In the
economy's modern sector, 1982 produc-
tion is running W% below 1981. Tradi-
tional agriculture and handicrafts, \ntal
to the people of the highlands, are beinj
seriously disrupted. Liquid foreign ex-
change reserves are virtually exhausted
Through May of this year, foreign ex-
change available for imports necessary
for industrial production, as well as agr
cultural supplies and consumer goods,
was 42% below the 1981 level for the

Department of State Bullet!

TREATIES

ne period. Although Guatemala is a
.roleum producer, actual current pro-
;tion is only 10%-15% of the
intry's petroleum consumption.

^We welcomed from the start the
directions announced by the Rios
ntt government, and we have en-
1 iraged the new government to make
1,1 istructive changes. However, we
nded to wait for signs of tangible
)gTess on areas of concern to the
ited States before changing our own
icies.

The government's announcement of
' state of seige at the beginning of
t month gave us particular cause for
icern, even though many countries
/e or have had similar measures. Now
it the state of seige has been in effect
' more than a month, the actual im-
mentation appears much less severe
m the rhetoric that accompanied its
eption implied. There have been no
nmary trials and executions.

We have now concluded that the
ord of the past 4 months, while not
rfect, demonstrates that the new
vernment has a commitment to
sitive change and new opportunity in
atemala.

piit
S. Approach

3 have, therefore, decided to move
•ward carefully to reinforce the
sitive developments in Guatemala.
f rther progress is clearly needed, and
II ■ believe U.S. policy can help by
b cognizing the constructive change
« lich has already taken place and by
6 couraging additional progress. By act-
jir now, we can send the message to all
'C latemalan sectors that with im-
ovements in human rights perfor-
ince, the United States is prepared to
operate in ways meaningful to
latemala's needs.
We believe our approach should be
"Pjaasured. We are proposing no
amatic new initiatives. We are, bow-
er, accelerating disbursements in our
jency for International Development
ID) pipeline and reallocating develop-
ent assistance funds from projects
nceled in other countries. We have
■en responsive to Guatemala's request
r help to feed and shelter the
ousands of people displaced by the
jhting in the rural areas. We hope to
ovide further assistance of this kind.
^ We welcome the House Foreign Af-
irs Committee's decision to allot a por-
Dn of the available funds in the Carib-
an Basin initiative to Guatemala to

help meet its critical balance-of-
payments problems. On July 18, Presi-
dent Rios Montt took note of this con-
gressional action, welcomed it as recog-
nition of an improvement in human
rights, and said that Guatemala should
work even harder to improve the human
rights situation. This is precisely the
message we need to confirm to help ob-
tain further progress.

Guatemala is well-placed to take ad-
vantage of the trade and investment in-
centives under the Caribbean Basin ini-
tiative. At the same time, we believe we
should be prepared to support access by
Guatemala to the multilateral develop-
ment banks to assist in financing sound,
well-conceived economic and social
development projects.

Our actions cannot be limited to
economic and development assistance
alone; that would be unrealistic consider-
ing the threat posed by the insurgents.
We hope that the full House and Senate
will support the action of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee in approving
$250,000 in international military educa-
tion and training for FY 1983. To fail to
do so would ignore the security situation
of Guatemala and abrogate our respon-
sibility to help improve the human rights
situation in all sectors of Guatemalan
society. Depending on developments in
Guatemala, we would be prepared to
consider authorizing some military sales
and additional security assistance to help
meet that country's essential security
needs. We will, of course, continue to
consult closely with the Congress in all
aspects of U.S. policy toward
Guatemala.

We cannot ignore the importance of
Guatemala to the stability of Central
America and our own vital national in-
terests in that region. After several
years of escalating violence, an oppor-
tunity now exists for the United States
to use its influence to encourage the
development of a new and more humane
society for all Guatemalans— if we act.
It would be neither fair nor wise to turn
our back on a country which holds so
much potential for the future of its peo-
ple and the region. Inaction would
seriously jeopardize continued human
rights improvements, economic advance-
ment, and political stability.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation, Civil

Memorandum of understanding concerning
transatlantic scheduled service air fares, with
annexes. Done at Washington May 2, 1982.
Entered into force: Aug. 1, 1982.

Coffee

Extension of the international coffee agree-
ment 1976 (TIAS 8683). Done at London
Sept. 25, 1981.

Acceptances deposited: Burundi, July 23,
1982; Ecuador, Aug. 2, 1982; El Salvador,
July 19, 1982; Ivory Coast, July 9, 1982;
Kenya, June 21, 1982; Nicaragua, July 20,
1982; Panama, July 16, 1982; Papua New
Guinea, July 30, 1982; Uganda, Aug. 9, 1982.
Entered into force: Oct. 1, 1982.

Customs

Customs convention on the international
transport of goods under cover of TIR
carnets, with annexes. Done at Geneva
Nov. 14, 1972. Entered into force Mar. 20,
1978; for the U.S. Mar. 18, 1982.
Accession deposited: Spain, Aug. 11, 1982.

Education— UNESCO

Convention on the recognition of studies,
diplomas and degrees concerning higher
education in the states belonging to the
Europe region. Done at Paris Dec. 21, 1979.
Entered into force Feb. 19, 1982.'
Ratification deposited: Netherlands, June 15,
1982.

Environmental Modification

Convention on the prohibition of military or
any other hostile use of environmental
modification techniques, with annex. Done at
Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force
Oct. 5, 1978; for the U.S. Jan. 17, 1980.
TIAS 9614.
Ratification deposited: Belgium, July 12,

1982.

Human Rights

International covenant on civil and political
rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966.
Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.'
Accession deposited: Bolivia, Aug. 12, 1982.

International covenant on economic, social,

and cultural rights. Done at New York

Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3,

1976.'

Accession deposited: Bolivia, Aug. 12, 1982.

Judicial Procedure

Convention on the service abroad of judicial
and extrajudicial documents in civil or com-
mercial matters. Done at The Hague Nov. 15,

TREATIES

1965. Entered into force Feb. 10, 1969. TIAS

6638.

Extended to: Anguilla, July 30. 1982.2

Maritime Matters

Amendment to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended, on the International
Maritime Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285,
6490, 8606, 10374). Adopted at London
Nov. 17, 1977.3

Acceptance deposited: Romania,
Sept. 14, 1982.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
1948, as amended, on the International
Maritime Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285,
6490, 8606, 10374). Adopted at London
Nov. 15, 1979.3

Acceptances deposited: Peru, July 28,
1982; Qatar, June 29, 1982; Romania,
Sept. 14, 1982.

Inter-American convention on facilitation of
international waterborne transportation, with
annex. Signed at Mar del Plata June 7, 1963.
Entered into force Jan. 11, 1981.
Proclaimed by the President: July 23,
1982.

Pollution

Convention on long-range transboundary air

pollution. Done at Geneva Nov. 13, 1979. '

Ratifications deposited: Belgium, F.R.G.,

Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, U.K., July 15,

1982.

Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, July 15,

1982.

Approval deposited: European Economic

Community, July 15, 1982.

Postal

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union,
with Final Protocol. Done at Vienna July 10,
1964. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1966. TIAS
5881.

Additional protocol to the Constitution of the
Universal Postal Union. Done at Tokyo
Nov. 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1,
1961. TIAS 7150.

Second additional protocol to the Constitution
of the Universal Postal Union. Done at
Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force
Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8231.
Accession deposited: Vanuatu, July 5, 1982.

General regulations of the Universal Postal
Union, with final protocol and annex, and the
universal postal convention with final pro-
tocol and detailed regulations. Done at Rio de
Janeiro Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force
July 1, 1981. TIAS 9972.
Apx'rovals deposited: (J.D.R., June 30, 1982;
Norway, .June 18, 1982.
Ratifications deposited: Afghanistan, May 3,
1982; Chile, May 11, 1982.
Accessions deposited: Cape Verde, June 1,
1982; Vanuatu, July 5, 1982.

Money orders and postal travellers' checks
agreement, with detailed regulations and

final protocol. Done at Rio de Janeiro

Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force July 1,

1982. TIAS 9973.

Approval deposited: Norway, June 18, 1982.

Ratification deposited: Chile, May 11, 1982.

Accession deposited: Cape Verde, June 1,

1982.

Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of
all forms of racial discrimination. Adopted at
New York Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force
Jan. 4, 1969.'
Accession deposited: Portugal, Aug. 24, 1982.

Red Cross

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions
of Aug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364,
3365), and relating to the protection of vic-
tims of international armed conflicts (protocol
I), with annexes. Adopted at Geneva June 8,
1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.'
Ratifications deposited: Austria, Aug. 13,
1982;"'' Denmark, June 17, 1982."^

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions
of Aug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364,
3365), and relating to the protection of vic-
tims of noninternational armed conflicts (pro-
tocol II). Adopted at Geneva June 8, 1977.
Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.'
Ratifications deposited: Austria, Aug. 13,
1982;-'' Denmark, June 17, 1982.-^

Rubber

International natural rubber agreement,

1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979. Entered

into force Apr. 15, 1982. TIAS 10379.

Accession deposited: Switzerland, July 22,

1982.

Ratification deposited: Finland, Aug. 24,

1982.

Sea Bed Operations
(Polymetallic Nodules)

Agreement concerning interim arrangements
relating to polymetallic nodules of the deep
sea bed. Done at Washington Sept. 2, 1982.
Entered into force Sept. 2, 1982.
Signatures: France, F.R.G., U.K., U.S.,
Sept. 2, 1982.

Terrorism

International convention against the taking of
hostages. Done at New York Dec. 17, 1979.'
Ratification deposited: Panama, Aug. 19,
1982,

Trade

Protocol extending the arrangement regard-
ing international trade in textiles of Dec. 20,
1973, as extended (TIAS 784(1, 8939). Done
at Geneva Dec. 22, 1981. Entered into force
Jan. 1, 1982. TIAS 10323.
Acceptances deposited: Canada, July 12,
1982; El Salvador, July 2, 1982; Jamaica,
June 22, 1982; Romania, July 12, 1982;
Sweden, Aug. 20, 1982.'

Ratifications deposited: Austria. Aug. 24,
1982; Finland, Aug. 23, 1982.

UNIDO

Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Develop

ment Organization, with annexes. Adopted a

Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.'

Ratifications deposited: Australia, Nov. 20,

1981; Jordan, Aug. 30, 1982; St. Lucia,

Aug. 11, 1982.

Signatures: Canada, Aug. 31, 1982; Angola,

Sept. 3, 1982; Antigua and Barbuda, Sept. 8

1982.

Weapons

Convention on prohibitions or restrictions or
the use of certain conventional weapons
which may be deemed to be excessively in-
jurious or to have indiscriminate effects.
Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980.^
Ratifications deposited: Czechoslovakia,
Aug. 31, 1982; Switzerland, Aug. 20, 1982.

Protocols to the convention on prohibitions (
restrictions on the use of certain convention
weapons which may be deemed to be ex-
cessively injurious or to have indiscriminate
effects. Done at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980.^
Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, Aug. 20
1982.

Women

Convention on the elimination of all forms o
discrimination against women. Adopted at
New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into fore*
Sept. 3. 1981.'

Ratifications deposited: Congo, July 26, 198
Dominican Rep., Sept. 2, 1982; Guatemala,
Aug. 12, 1982; Guinea, Aug. 9, 1982.

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of tht
world cultural and natural heritage. Done a
Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force Dei
17, 1975. TIAS 8226.
Ratification deposited: Benin. June 14, 198z

World Health Organization

Amendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the
Constitution of the World Health Organiza-
tion, as amended. (TIAS 1808, 8086, 8534).
Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976 by the 29'
World Health Assembly.-'
Acceptances deposited: Brazil, Aug. 27, 198
Chile, Aug. 5, 1982; Lebanon, June 21, 1981
Sudan. July 13, 1982.

Amendment to Article 74 of the Constitutio
of the World Health Organization, as amenc
ed. (TIAS 1808, 8086, 8534). Adopted at
Geneva May 18, 1978 by the 31st World
Health Assembly.-'

Acceptances depiisited: Jordan, Aug. 30,
1982; United Arab Emirates. Aug. 18, 1982

Department of State Bulleti

TREATIES

\TERAL

ntina

■enient amending the agreement of Sept.
977, as amended, relating to air
sport services (TIAS 8978). Effected by
ange of letters at Buenos Aires Aug. 13,
Entered into force Aug. 13, 1982.

i^ladesh

■ement amending the agreement for sales
fricultural comniodities of Mar. 8, 1982.
cted by exchange of letters at Dacca

23 and 24, 1982. Entered into force

24, 1982.

indi

■ement relating to the establishment of a
e Corps program in Burundi. Effected
xchange of notes at Bujumbura Aug. 31,
Entered into force Aug. 31, 1982.

jement amending the agreement of
17, 1980, as amended (TIAS 9820,
'1), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and
made fiber textiles and textile products,
cted by exchange of letters at
hington July 16 and 19, 1982. Entered
force July 19, 1982.

ocol amending the agreement of Sept.
1980, relating to civil air transport, with
xes and exchanges of letters (TIAS
16). Signed at Beijing Aug. 19, 1982.
;red into force Aug. 19, 1982.

dnican Republic

sement amending the agreement for sales
^ricultural commodities of May 21, 1982

S 10391). Effected by exchange of notes
anto Domingo Aug. 2 and 26, 1982.

red into force Aug. 26, 1982.

IPt

eement amending the project grant
ement of Sept. 3, 1977 (TIAS 9332), as
nded, for family planning. Signed at
o' June 14, 1982. Entered into force
14, 1982.

t amendment to project grant agreement
ept. 22, 1981 (TIAS 10278), and second
ndment to project loan agreement of
S8|t 29, 1977 (TIAS 9465), as amended, for
o Water Supply, with annex. Signed at
■0 Aug. 16, 1982. Entered into force
16, 1982.

gram grant agreement for decentraliza-
sector support, with annex. Signed at

ro Aug. 29. 1982. Entered into force Aug.
1982.

t amendment to the grant agreement of

5, 1982 (TIAS 10347), for commodity
lorts, with annex. Signed at Cairo
31, 1982. Entered into force Aug. 31,

aty concerning the reciprocal encourage-
nt and protection of investments, with an-
and protocol. Signed at Washington

Sept. 29, 1982. Enters into force 30 days
after date of exchange of instruments of
ratification.

Germany, Federal Republic of

Memorandum of understanding on the Roent-
gensatellit program. Signed at Vienna
Aug. 8, 1982. Entered into force Aug. 8,
1982.

Ghana

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of Apr. 4,
1980 (TIAS 9738). Signed at Accra, Aug. 19,
1982. Entered into force Aug. 19, 1982.

Haiti

Agreement relating to the establishment of a
Peace Corps program in Haiti. Effected by
exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince Aug. 12
and 13, 1982. Entered into force Aug 13,
1982.

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities amending the agreement of May 28,
1982, with memorandum of understanding.
Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au-
Prince Aug. 17 and 18, 1982. Entered into
force Aug. 18, 1982.

Israel

Second amendment to the agreement of
Dec. 31, 1982 (TIAS 10283), relating to a
cash assistance grant to Israel. Signed at
Israel May 18, 1982. Entered into force May
18, 1982. TIAS 10394.

Japan

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coast
of the United States of America, with an-
nexes and agreed minutes. Signed at
Washington Sept. 10, 1982. Enters into force
on a date to be agreed upon in an exchange
of notes between the two governments,
following the completion of their internal pro-
cedures necessary for the entry into force of
the agreement.

Lebanon

Agreement on United States participation in
a multinational force in Beirut. Effected by
exchange of notes at Beirut Aug. 18 and 20,
1982. Entered into force Aug. 20, 1982.

Liberia

Agreement for reciprocal relief from double
taxation on earnings from operation of ships
and aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes
at Monrovia July 1 and Aug. 11, 1982.
Entered into force Aug. 11, 1982.

Madagascar

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
modities, relating to the agreement of
Aug. 19, 1981 (TIAS 10218). Signed at An-
tananarivo Aug. 12, 1982. Entered into force
Aug. 12, 1982.

Mexico

Agreement amending the agreement of June
2, 1977 (TIAS 8952), relating to additional

cooperative arrangements to curb the illegal
traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of
letters at Mexico Aug. 6, 1982. Entered into
force Aug. 6, 1982.

Morocco

Agreement amending the agreement for sales
of agricultural commodities of Jan. 19, 1982
(TIAS 10361). Effected by exchange of let-
ters at Rabat Aug. 13 and 18, 1982. Entered
into force Aug. 18, 1982.

Norway

Basic military support agreement, with an-
nex. Signed at Stuttgart-Vaihingen and Oslo
Jan. 29 and Aug. 20, 1982. Entered into
force Aug. 20, 1982.

Panama

Agreement concerning participation by
members of the Panama Canal Commission
and U.S. forces in the Panamanian social
security system. Effected by exchange of
notes at Panama Mar. 9, 1982. Entered into
force Mar. 9, 1982.

Agreement concerning disposition of the
Mount Hope warehouse and transportation
areas. Effected by exchange of notes at
Panama Feb. 12 and May 7, 1982. Entered
into force May 7, 1982.

Agreement concerning transfer of Mindi and
Coco Solo housing units from the U.S. to
Panama. Effected by exchange of notes at
Panama Aug. 9 and 11, 1982. Entered into
force Aug. 11, 1982.

Philippines

Convention with respect to taxes on income.
Signed at Manila Oct. 1, 1976.
Ratifications exchanged: Sept. 16, 1982.'
Entered into force: Oct. 13, 1982.<5

Agreement continuing the operations of the
U.S. Veterans Administration in the Philip-
pines, Signed at Manila July 28, 1982.
Entered into force July 28, 1982; effective
Oct. 1, 1982.

Agreement on the development and facilita-
tion of reciprocal tourism. Signed at
Washington Sept. 17, 1982. Entered into
force Sept. 17, 1982.

Singapore

Memorandum of understanding on the ex-
change of service personnel between the U.S.
Navy and Republic of Singapore Air Force
and on the general conditions which will ap-
ply to the exchange of such personnel. Signed
at Singapore and Washington July 19 and
Sept. 1, 1982. Entered into force Sept. 1,
1982.

Spain

Agreement extending the treaty of friendship
and cooperation of Jan. 24, 1976 (TIAS
8360). Effected by exchange of notes at
Madrid Sept. 4, 1981. Entered into force pro-
visionally Sept. 4, 1982; definitively May 10,
1982.
Ratified by Spain: May 10, 1982.

CHRONOLOGY

Ratifications exchanged: May 10, 1982.
Proclaimed by the President: Sept. 13, 1982,

Sudan

Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of certain debts owed to,
guaranteed, or insured by the U.S. Govern-
ment and its agencies, with annexes. Signed
at Khartoum July 20, 1982. Entered into
force Aug. 23, 1982.

Switzerland

Arrangement for the exchange of technical
information and cooperation in nuclear safety
matters, with patent addendum. Signed at
Bethesda and Bern July 20 and Aug. 10,
1982. Entered into force Aug. 10, 1982.

Trinidad and Tobago

Agreement on procedures for mutual
assistance in the administration of justice in
connection with matters relating to the in-
vestigation designated as MA- 106. Signed at
Washington June 7, 1982. Entered into force
June 7, 1982.

Tunisia

Mapping, charting and geodesy cooperative
and exchange agreement, with annexes.
Signed at Tunis Dec. 8, 1980. Entered into
force Uec. 8, 1980.

Amendment 1 to the agreement of Dec. 8,
1980. Signed at Tunis and Washington
July 14 and Aug. 31, 1982. Entered into
force Aug. 31, 1982.

U.S.S.R.

Agreement extending the agreement of
Oct. 20, 1975, as extended (TIAS 8206,
10237), on the supply of grain by the U.S. to
the U.S.S.R. Effected by exchange of notes
at Moscow Aug. 4 and 20, 1982. Entered into
force Aug. 20, 1982.

Zaire

Agreement regarding the consolidation and
rescheduling of certain debts owed to,
guaranteed, or insured by the U.S. Govern-
ment and its agencies, with annexes. Signed
at Kinshasa July 23, 1982. Entered into force
Aug. 30, 1982, for the first consolidation
period; enters into force for the second con-
solidation period upon receipt by Zaire of
written notice from the U.S. that the U.S.
considers Zaire in compliance with the condi-
tions stated in Article IV, paragraph 3, of the
Paris agreed minute.

'Not in force for the U.S.
^With declaration(s).
'Not in force.
'With reservation(s).
■''With statement.
''With reservations and under-
standings. ■

September 1982

September 1

Last shipload of Palestinian and Syrian guer-
rillas leaves west Beirut.

President Reagan, in a nationally tele-
vised address, calls for a "fresh start" on a
broader peace in the Middle East. In present-
ing the U.S. position, the President proposes
four key issues:

• Self government by the Palestinians of
the West Bank and Gaza in association with
Jordan;

• A settlement freeze by Israel;

• Guarantees for the security of Israel;
and

• An undivided Jerusalem, with its final
status decided through negotiations.

September 2

In a special session, Israeli Cabinet adopts a
resolution rejecting President Reagan's pro-
posal, asserting that such a plan would help
create a Palestinian state that would en-
danger Israel's security and that Israel, in
response to the settlement freeze, "will con-
tinue to establish them [settlements] in ac-
cordance with our natural right."

Lebanese forces take full control of west
Beirut.

September 6

U.S. issues a temporary denial order pro-
hibiting export of U.S. oil and gas equipment
to an Italian firm for violating a U.S. em-
bargo on pipeline shipments to the Soviet
Union.

September 7

President Reagan presents the Presidential
Medal of Freedom, the nation's highest
civilian award, to Philip C. Habib for "his
skillful diplomacy and tireless activity" in
bringing about a "cease-fire in Lebanon and
the resolution of the west Beirut crisis."
Vigdis Finnbogadottir, President of
Iceland, makes an official working visit to
Washington, D.C. Sept. 7-10, 1982.

September 8

The following newly appointed Ambassadors
present their credentials to President
Reagan: Benjamin T. Romualdez of the
Philippines; Alejandro Begh Villegas of
Uruguay; Sir Robert (Harrington Cotton of
Australia; Lt. General (retired) A. Hasnan
Habib of Indonesia; Lamin Abdou Mbye of
the (lambia; Leonardo ("harles de Zaffiri
Duarte Mathisa of Portugal; and Sir Oliver
Wright of the United Kingdom.

President Reagan announces the second
phase of U.S. diplomacy in Lebanon and the
prospects for the Middle East initiative by
reaffirming the following principal objectives:

• The removal of all foreign military
forces from Lebanon;

• Strengthening the central government
to establish its authority throughout the
country;

• Seeing that Lebanon never again
becomes a launching pad for attacks on
Israel; and

• Calling on all parties in Lebanon to
maintain the cease-fire so that diplomacy i
succeed.

The President also announces formatic
of an interagency steering group on Lebar
to be chaired by Deputy Secretary of Statt
Kenneth W. Dam who will coordinate the
political, economic, and security assistance
dimensions of U.S. policy; the appointmen'
M. Peter McPherson, Director of AID. wh
will, in addition to his role as the Presiden
personal representative for relief in Leban
assume responsibility for reconstruction in
that area; and accorded the personal rank
Ambassador to Morris Draper appointing ' f'
special negotiator for Lebanon. Ambassad'
Draper will return to Lebanon to continue
work already begun.

September 9

U.S. Department of Commerce issues a te
porary denial order prohibiting export of i
U.S. oil and gas equipment, services, and
related technology to a British firm and tl
of its subsidiaries for violating a U.S. em-
bargo against the Soviet Union's natural g
pipeline.

September 10

Multinational peacekeeping force, includin
the U.S. Marine contingent, begins
withdrawal from Beirut.

September 13

Two new developments reported in the
Lebanon fighting— clashes in Beirut betw.
government and leftist militia forces and
Israeli air strikes against Syrian positions
Lebanon— create growing concern by the
U.S. The White House issues a statement
"urging all concerned to avoid provocation
exercise restraint," thereby contributing h
for peace by the citizens in that area. Con
menting on the Israeli strikes, the State
Department again calls "on all involved to
with the greatest restraint and to refrain
from further military actions."

September 14

Lebanon's president-elect, Bashir Gemayel
killed in a bomb blast at his party head-
quarters.

September 15

Philip[iines President Ferdinand E. Maro
makes a state visit to the U.S. Septem-
ber 15-27 and to Washington, D.C.
September 15-20, 1982.

State Department issues a statement
deploring the assassination of Gemayel am
urging Israeli officials to "do nothing to in
crease tensions," again calling on all partie
to "exercise restraint," and expressing full
support of the Lebanese Government for "
ternal unity and withdrawal of all foreign
troops."

Israeli troops and tanks move into wes
Beirut. Israeli officials state that their acti

Department of State Bullet

CHRONOLOGY

ted to restore order and stability.
Minister Shaffik al-Wazzan calls for
ithdrawal of the Israeli troops.

mber 16

■ts say that Israeli troops seize control
St of west Beirut. In Jerusalem, the
nnient says that troops would withdraw
Lebanese forces are ready to take over,
lite House and State Department state-
;, the U.S. expresses its full support for
jbanese Government's "call for the with-
il of Israeli forces which are in clear
ion of the cease-fire understanding to

Israel is a party."

Tehran, former Iranian Foreign
ter Sadegh Ghotzbadeh is executed for
ig to overthrow and kill the Ayatollah

mber 16-18

lese Christian militiamen are reported

e killed about 300 or more Palestinian
women, and children in the Shatila and

refugee camps on the southern edge of
Beirut.

-esident Reagan, in a statement, ex-
;s "outrage and revulsion" over the
icre, demands that the Israeli Govern-
"immediately withdraw its forces," and

the Lebanese to "unite quickly in sup-
■f their government and their constitu-

processes and to work for the future
;o richly deserve."

rmber 17

3-year coalition government of West
iny, headed by Chancellor Schmidt, col-
, after the resignation of four cabinet
■ers from the Free Democratic Party,
idt proposes new elections; however,
it Khol, the leader of the opposition
;ian Democrats, states that his party
ttempt to put together a new govern-
with the Free Democrats,
y unanimous vote, the U.N. Security
•il adopts Resolution 520 which "con-
3 the recent Israeli incursion" into west
t and demands an immediate with-
il.

mber 19

lanimous vote, U.N. Security Council
s Resolution 521 which:

Condemns the "criminal massacre of
tinian civilians in Beirut";

Reaffirms Resolutions 512 and 513;

Authorizes the Secretary General "as
mediate step to increase the number of
■d Nations observers in and around
t from 10 to 50 . . . ";

Requests the Secretary General and
,ebanese Government to consult in order
isure the rapid deployment of those
vers . . . ";

Requests the Secretary General to "ini-
appropriate consultations and in par-

r consultations with the Government of
non on additional steps which the Coun-
ight take . . . "; and
Insists that "all concerned must permit

the lUiited Nations observers and forces
established by the Security Council in
Lebanon to be deployed and to discharge
their mandates. . . ."

In Sweden's parliamentary elections, the
Social Democrats Party, led by former Prime
Minister Olaf Palme, is given 166 seats.
Coupled with the coalition Communist Party's
20 seats, this gives Palme a 23-seat majority
in the 349-member legislature.

September 20

Responding to the Beirut massacre, the
Lebanese Cabinet requests the U.S., France,
and Italy to send troops for a new multina-
tional (MNF) force to return to west Beirut.
President Reagan announces agreement
among the three nations to form a new force
and that Israel must give its permission for
the MNF and agree to withdraw its forces
from that city.

A rightist group calling itself "The Front
for the Liberation of Lebanon from
Foreigners" claims responsibility for the
massacre.

September 21

Thirty-seventh annual session of the U.N.
General Assembly opens in New York.

Amin Gemayel, 40-year-old brother of the
assassinated Bashir, is elected President of
Lebanon by near consensus vote.

Israel accepts U.S. proposal to send a
three-nation peacekeeping force into Beirut
but rejects a call by the parliamentary opposi-
tion to establish an independent commission
of inquiry into the Beirut massacre.

September 23

Amin Gemayel is sworn in as President of
Lebanon for a 6-year term succeeding Presi-
dent Elias Sarkis.

September 24

The following newly appointed Ambassadors
present their credentials to President
Reagan; Christian Lingama-Toleque of the
Central African Republic; Layachi Yaker of
Algeria; Nuno Aguirre de Career of Spain;
Carlos Despradel Rogues of the Dominican
Republic; and Lucio Garcia del Solar of
Argentina.

At a resumed meeting of its seventh
emergency special session, U.N. General
Assembly adopts a Resolution:

• Condemning the "criminal massacre of
Palestinian and other civilians in Beirut . . . ";

• Urging the Security Council to "in-
vestigate," the circumstances surrounding the
massacre and to make its findings available
to the public . . . ";

• Supporting "fully the provisions of
Security Council resolutions 508 (1982) and
.509(1982)";

• Urging the Security Council, that il
Israel continues failure to comply with resolu-
tions 508 and 509 and the present resolution,
"to meet in order to consider practical ways
and means in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations";

• Reaffirming the "fundamental principle

(if the inadmissibility of the acquisition of ter-
ritory by force";

• Resolving that "in conformity with its
resolution 194 (III) and subsequent relevant
resolutions," Palestinian refugees be allowed
to return to their homes and property and
that Israel immediately and unconditionally
comply with the present resolution;

• Calling upon "all States and interna-
tional agencies and organizations" to continue
providing extensive humanitarian aid to the
victims of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon";
and

• Requesting the "Secretary General to
prepare a photographic exhibit of the
massacre ..." and to display it in the U.N.
visitors' hall.

Following a vote which rejected Israel's
credentials, the U.S. delegation, led by Depu-
ty Secretary of Energy W. Kenneth Davis,
withdraws from the 26th General Conference
of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), being held in Vienna. The U.S.,
voting along with 38 other delegations to ac-
cept Israel's credentials (41 votes against),
asserts "that Israel is a member in good
standing and that its credentials were proper-
ly presented," considers such "action to be il-
legal and to have resulted from highly ir-
regular voting procedures," and also believes
that the "introduction of strictly political
issues into a credentials procedure" damages
the IAEA's integrity as well as the entire
U.N. system.

September 25

Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila of Thailand
makes official working visit to Washington,
D.C. September 23-25, 1982, to discuss with
high-level officials a broad range of topics
which included ASEAN, Kampuchea,
U.S. -Thai security relationship, and other
political and economic issues, including the
refugee problem.

September 26

Secretary Shultz departs Washington for
New York to attend the 37th annual session
of the U.N. General Assembly.

September 28 ^ ,, o

Third U.N. Conference of the Law of the Sea
approves a draft final act and accepts an in-
vitation from Jamaica to host the formal sign-
ing ceremony December 6-10, 1982.

Israeli Government agrees to establish a
judicial commission to carry out a thorough
investigation of the Beirut massacre.

Israeli Army completes withdrawal from
Port of Beirut, but some soldiers remain posi-
tioned at the airport, south of the city.

International Telecommunication Union
holds nth Plenipotentiary Conference
September 28-November 5, in Nairobi,
Kenya. Chairman of U.S. delegation is at-
torney Michael R. Gardner.

September 29

President Ricardo de la Espriella of Panama
makes an official working visit to Wash-
ington, D.C. September 29-October 2, 1982.
After a 3-day delay, U.S. Marines land in
Beirut to join Italian and French soldiers

3mber1982

PRESS RELEASES

PUBLICATIONS

charged with helping the Lebanese Govern-
ment establish its authority over all of Beirut
which includes assuring the safety of the
civilian population in the city.

U.S. and Eg>-pt sign a bilateral invest-
ment treaty. Principal provisions of the trea-
ty include:

• National or most-favored-nation treat-
ment for investments of nationals and com-
panies of each party;

• Free transferability of capital, returns,
and other funds;

• Standards of expropriation and com-
pensation; and

• Dispute settlement procedures.

The treaty is the U.S. first bilateral invest-
ment treaty.

September 30

A U.S. Marine is killed and three others
wounded by unexploded cluster munitions at
Beirut International Airport. ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 2().S20.

No. Date Subject

•269 9/2 Shultz: interview on ABC-TV's
"Good Morning America."
270 9/7 Shultz; interview on CBS-TV's
"Face the Nation," Sept. 4.

*271 9/8 U.S. Organization for the In-
ternational Telegraph and
Telephone Consultative Com-
mittee (CCITT), study group
C, Sept. 23.

•272 9/8 Advisory Committee to U.S.
Section, International North
Pacific Fisheries Commis-
sion, Sept. 23.

•273 9/8 Advisory Committee to the

U.S. National Section of the
Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission, Sept. 28.

•274 9/8 Advisory Committee to the

U.S. National Section of the
International Commission
for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas, Oct. 5 and 6.

•275 9/8 Robert H. Phinny sworn in as
Ambassador to Swaziland,
Aug. 23 (biographic data).

•276 9/9 Shultz; statement before the
House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee.

277 9/10 Shultz; statement before the

Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.

278 9/13 Shultz; address before the

United Jewish Appeal, N.Y.,
Sept. 12.
•279 9/13 Shipping Coordinating Com-
mittee (SCC), committee on
ocean dumping, Sept. 16.

•280 9/13 U.S. Organization for the In-
ternational Radio Con-
sultative Committee (CCIR),
study group U, Oct. 6.
•281 9/13 SCC, Subcommittee on Safety
of Life at Sea (SOLAS),
working group on radioeom-
munications, Oct. 7.
•282 9/13 SCC, SOLAS, working group
on standards of training and
watchkeeping, Oct. 12.
•283 9/13 SCC, SOLAS, Oct. 12.
•284 9/13 Advisory Committee on Inter-
national Investment, Tech-
nology, and Development,
Nov. 3.
•285 9/13 Program for the state visit of
Philippine President
Ferdinand E. Marcos,
Sept. 15-21.
•286 9/15 Shultz; remarks on two De-
partment of State nominees,
Sept. 14.
•287 9/lU U.S., Japan sign new fisheries

agreement.
288 9/16 Marcos visit spurs conclusion
of avoidance of double taxa-
tion and air transport agree-
ments.
•289 9/17 Abbot Washburn appointed

chairman of the U.S. delega-
tion to the regional Admini-
strative Radio Conference
for Planning the Broad-
casting-Satellite Service in
Region 2.
•290 9/21 U.S., France review scientific
cooperation.
291 9/21 Shultz; interview on NBC-TV's

"Today" show.
•292 9/21 Presidential Commission on
Broadcasting to Cuba,
Sept. 30.
•293 9/24 U.S., Japan amend arrange-
ment concerning trade in
textiles, Sept. 1.
•294 9/24 U.S., Thailand amend textile
agreement, Aug. 26 and 27.
•295 9/24 U.S., Singapore amend textile
agreement, Aug. 26 and
Sept. 20.
•296 9/24 U.S., Mexico amend textile
agreement, Julv 26 and
Aug. 19.
297 Not issued.

•298 9/24 U.S., Sri Lanka amend textile

agreement, Aug. 20.
•299 9/24 U.S., Colombia amend textile
agreement, June 10 and 16.
300 9/27 U.S. submits its pleadings to
the ICJ concerning the mari-
time boundary with Canada.
•301 9/28 Program for the visit of Pana-
manian President Ricardo de
la Esprilla, Sept. 29-Oct. 2.
•302 9/30 Passport validity doubled to 10
years; fees to rise.

Department of State

Free, single copies of the following
Department of State publications are
available from the Public Information Serv
ice. Bureau of Public Affairs, Department
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

President Reagan

Law of the Sea and Oceans Policy. July-
August 1982, President Reagan, July 8
1982, and Special Representative of th
President for the Third U.N. Conferen
on Law of the Sea, James L. Malone.
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
August 12, 1982 (Current Policy #416)

Secretary Shultz |^

President Reagan's Middle East Initiative ■*

Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

September 10, 1982 (Current Policy

#418).
The Quest for Peace, United Jewish Appe.

New York, September 12, 1982 (Curre

Policy #419).
U.S. Foreign Policy: Realism and Progress

U.N. General Assembly, September 30

1982 (Current Policy #420).

Africa

Africa; Economic Prospects and Problems
Assistant Secretary for African Affair
Crocker, National Business League,
Dallas, Texas, September 17, 1982 (Ci
rent Policv #422).
Chad; U.S. Policy (GIST, September 1982
Background Notes on Nigeria (August 19i-

Middle East

Background Notes on Bahrain (August 19
Background Notes on Iraq (August 1982).
Background Notes on Qatar (August 1982
Background Notes on the United Arab Er
rates (August 1982).

Western Hemisphere

Atlas of the Caribbean Basin, September

1982.
Background Notes on Paraguay (August

1982). ■

•Not printed in the Bili.ktin.

Department of State Bulle

OEX

li»vember 1982
tlume 82, No. 2068

;i-a Africa; Economic Prospects and Prob-

■ms (Crocker} 12

nrican Principles. U.S. Foreign Policy:

lealism and Progress (Shultz) 1

-K Control

< ^ Control Negotiations (Reagan) 20

,1 ;ar Arms Control and the Future of U.S.-

ioviet Relations (Rostow) 16

■'1 Foreign Policy: Realism and Progress

Shultz) 1

I tion. U.S., Philippines Conclude Taxation

nd Air Agreements 27

neBs. U.S., Philippines Conclude Taxation

nd Air Agreements 27

a^esB

jipuchea and American Interests

Holdridge) 31

^■iit Developments in Honduras

H..vworth) 60

cti-ii in East Timor (Holdridgie) 29

c .li"n in Guatemala (Boswortn) 63

: IJeport on Cyprus (message to the

oiigress) 40

fMs. 10th Report on Cyprus (message to

he Congress) 40

ciomics

fl'a: Economic Prospects and Problems

Crocker) 12

flent Developments in Honduras

.; Bosworth) 60

.; Foreign Policy: Realism and Progress

Shultz) 1

i\-g\\ U.S. Energy Strategies (Wendt) . .35
nice. U.S. and France Review Scientific

■ "ooperation 54

a emala

u emala— A Profile 64

1 it ion in Guatemala (Bosworth) 63

(duras. Recent Developments m Honduras

Bosworth) 60

I lan Rights

;c ed Labor in the U.S.S.R. (Department

' ;tatement) 41

H ition in East Timor (Holdridge) 29

rand. Visit of Iceland's President
"innbogadottir (Finnbogadottir,

! -leagan) . 38

aonesia. Situation in East Timor

Holdridge) 29

imational Organizations and Confer-
ences. United Nations Day, 1982 (proc-
amation) 8

II el

i stant Secretary Veliotes Interviewed on
'Meet the Press" 43

I ;ident Reagan's News Conference of Sep-
tember 28 (excerpts) 10

Secretary Shultz Interviewed on the "Today"
Show 42

Kampuchea. Kampuchea and American Inter-
ests (Holdridge) 31

Labor. Forced Labor in the U.S.S.R. (Depart-
ment statement) 41

Latin America and the Caribbean. Areas of
Challenge in the Americas (Enders) . . .57

Lebanon

Assistant Secretary Veliotes Interviewed on
"Meet the Press" 43

President Reagan's News Conference of Sep-
tember 28 (excerpts) 10

Secretary Shultz Interviewed on the "Today"
Show 42

Situation in Lebanon (White House and De-
partment statements, exchanges of letters,
Boutros, Dillon, Freij, Habib, Reagan) .46

U.N. Adopts Resolutions on Lebanon Situation
(texts of resolutions) 55

Liberia. Visit of Liberian Commander in Chief
Doe 15

Middle East

Assistant Secretary Veliotes Interviewed on
"Meet the Press" 43

Secretary Shultz Interviewed on the "Today"
Show 42

U.S. Foreign Policy: Realism and Progress
(Shultz) 1

Namibia. Namibia (contact group com-
munique) 56

Narcotics. International Narcotics Control
(Shultz) 51

Nicaragua. Recent Developments in Honduras
(Bosworth) 60

North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. NATO Min-
isters meet in Canada 40

Philippines

Philippines— A Profile 25

U.S., Philippines Conclude Taxation and Air
Agreements 27

Visit of Philippine President Marcos (arrival
ceremony, dinner toasts. Department an-
nouncement) 23

Poland. Poland (White House and Department
statements) 41

Presidential Documents

Arms Control Negotiations (Reagan) 20

Poland (White House and Department state-
ments) 41

President Reagan's News Conference of Sep-
tember 28 (excerpts) 10

Situation in Lebanon (White House and De-
partment statements, exchanges of letters,
Boutros, Dillon, Freij, Habib, Reagan) .46

10th Report on Cyprus (message to the
Congress) 40

United Nations Day, 1982 (proclamation) . . .8

Visit of Iceland's President Finnbogadottir
(Finnbogadottir, Reagan) 38

Visit of Philippine President Marcos (arrival
ceremony, dinner toasts. Department an-
nouncement) 23

Publications. Department of State 70

Refugees. Recent Developments in Honduras
(Bosworth) 60

Science and Technology

Technol(ig>- Transfer Controls (Mally) 52

U.S. and 'France Review Scientific Cooper-
ation 54

Security Assistance. Recent Developments in
Honduras (Bosworth) 60

Thailand. Secretary Meets With Thai Foreign
Minister (Department statement) 33

Treaties

Current Actions 65

U.S., Philippines Conclude Taxation and Air
Agreements 27

U.S.S.R.

Areas of Challenge in the Americas
(Enders) 57

Arms Control Negotiations (Reagan) 20

Forced Labor in the U.S.S.R. (Department
statement) 41

Nuclear Arms Control and the Future of U.S.-
Soviet Relations (^Rostow) 16

President Reagan's News Conference of Sep-
tember 28 (excerpts) 10

Technology Transfer Controls (Mally) 52

United Nations

Kampuchea and American Interests
(Holdridge) 31

Namibia (contact group communique) 56

U.N. Adopts Resolutions on Lebanon Situation
(texts of resolutions) 55

United Nations Day, 1982 (proclamation) . . .8

U.S. Foreign Policy: Realism and Progress
(Shultz) 1

Vietnam

Forced Labor in the U.S.S.R. (Department
statement) 41

Kampuchea and American Interests
(Holdridge) 31

Nanw Index

Bosworth, Stephen W 60, 63

Boutros, Fouad 46

Crocker, Chester A 12

Dillon, Robert S 46

Enders, Thomas 0 57

Finnbogadottir, Vigdis 38

Freij, Elias 46

Habib, Philip C 46

Holdridge, John H 29, 31

Mally, Gerhard 52

Marcos, Ferdinand E 23

Reagan, President 8, 10, 20, 23, 40, 46

Rostow, Eugene V 16

Shultz, Secretary 1, 42, 51

Veliotes, Nicholas A 43

Wendt, E. Allan 35

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th^pai'liitviii

"2- JOS'?

buUetin

r 3 Official IVIonthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 82 / Number 2069

December 1982

i^iwfiiiw^ffiTd

m 2 I 1983

DEPOSITORY

The President / 1

Lebanon / 41

OAS / 64

M^pparttnvni of Siait*

bulletin

Volume 82 / Number 2069 / December 1982

Cover:

Presidential Seal
Secretary Shultz
Lebanese Flag

The Department of State Bvlletin,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreifjfii policy. Its purpose is to provide the
public, the Congress, and government
agencies with information on developments
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of
the Department of State and the Foreign
Service.

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

Secretary of State

JOHN HUGHES

A.'^.si.stant Secretary fur I'uhlic Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD

Director,

Office of Public Communication

NORMAN HOWARD

Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

Editor

JUANITA ADAMS

Assistant Editor

The Secretary of State has fletermined that the
pubhcation of this periodical is necessary in the
tran.saction of the public business required by law of
this Department. U.se of funds for printing this
periodical has been approved by the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget through March :U,
1987.

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted
and items contained herein may he reprinted. Citation
of the Dkfaktmknt ok Statf, Bii.i.f.tin as the source
will be appreciated. The Bi'l.l.KTiN is indexed in the
Headers' (Juide to Periodical Literature.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents. U.
Government Printing Office. Washington, DC.
20402 Price: 12 i.ssues plus annual inde.\— $21.00
(domestic) $26.25 (foreign) Single copy — $.'?.7.^)
(domestic) $4.70 (foreign) Index, single copy — $2.
(domestic) $;?. 1.5 (foreign)

ih*pai'inu'n /

ouUetBiB

e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 82 / Number 2069

December 1982

The President / 1

Lebanon / 41

OAS / 64

Cover:

Presidential Seal
Secretary Shultz
Lebanese Flag

Dvpartntfmt of SUtte

huUetin

Volume 82 / Number 2069 / December 1982

The Department OF State Bulletin,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the
public, the Congress, and government
agencies with information on developments
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of
the Department of State and the Foreign
Service.

The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials; selected
press releases issued by the White House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to
the United Nations; and treaties and other
agreements to which the United States is
or may become a party. Special features,
articles, and other supportive material
(such as maps, charts, photogTai)hs, and
graphs) are published frequently to
provide additional information on current
issues but should not necessarily be
interpreted as official U.S. policy
statements.

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

Secretary of State

JOHN HUGHES

A.-^sistant Secretary for F'liblic Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD

Director,

Office of Public Communication

NORMAN HOWARD

Chief. Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

Editor

JUANITA ADAMS

Assistant Editor

The Secretary of State has determined that the
liublication of thi.s periodical i.s nece.ssary in the
tran.saction of the public business required by law of
this Department. ILse nf funds for printing this
periodical has been approved by the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget through March .'il ,
1987.

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted
and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation
of the Df.partmknt ok Statk Bii.letin as the .source
will be appreciated. The Bui.i.ktin is indexed m Ihe
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents. U.l
Government Printing Office, Washington. D.C.
20402 Price: 12 issues plus annual index— .$21.00
(domestic) $26.25 (foreign) Single copy — Si. 75
(domestic) $4.70 (foreign) Index, single copy — $2.i
(domestic) $.■?. 15 (foreign)

CONTENTS

|e President

Paths Toward Peace: Deterrence

and Arms Control
Meeting With Mexico's President-

Elect (Exchange of Toasts.

Remarks)
Solidarity and U.S. Relations

With Poland
Grain Exports to the Soviet Union

e Secretary

Visit to Canada {News Conference)
Opening of Conference on Free

Elections
Interview for U.S. News & World

Report

Irica

U.S. Response to the Challenge of
Regional Security in Africa
(Chester A. Crocker)

Ams Control

a Freezing Chances for Peace
I (James L. Buckley)

fast Asia

Visit of Indonesian President
Soeharto (Arrival Ceremony,
Dinner Toasts)

jrope

3 Situation in Poland (White House
Statement)

General

President Reagan's Framework
for Peace (William P. Clark)

bod

World Food Day, 1982 (Proc-
lamation)

Human Rights

35 Personal Liberties and National
Security (William P. Clark)

38 Nuclear Weapons: What is the
Moral Response? (Elliott
Abrams)

Middle East

41 Visit of Lebanese President

(President Gemayel, President
Reagan)

42 War Powers Resolution and U.S.

Troops in Lebanon (Message to
the Congress)

43 Arab League Delegation Meets

With the President (King
Hassan //, President Reagan)

Military Affairs

44 Chemical Warfare in Southeast

Asia and Afghanistan: An Up-
date (Secretary Shultz)

Population

53 Population Growth and the Policy
of Nations (Richard Elliot
Benedick)

Refugees

56 Proposed Refugee Admissions for
FY 1983 (Kenneth W. Dam. H.
Eugene Douglas, President
Reagan's Memorandum)

United Nations

63 Israel's Participation in the
United Nations (Secretary
Shultz)

Western Hemisphere

64 Reflections Among Neighbors
(Secretary Shultz)

68 System of Justice in El Salvador

(Deane R. Hinton)

69 Declaration on Democracy in

Central America (Department
Statement. Final Act, Summary
of Final Act)

Treaties

72 Current Actions

Chronology

75 October 1982

Press Releases

76 Department of State

76 U.S.U.N.

Publications

77 Department of State
77 GPO Sales

Index

The prevention of conflict
and the reduction of weapons
are the most important public
issues of our time.

Unless we demonstrate the
will to rebuild our strength,
the Soviets have little
incentive to negotiate.

THE PRESIDENT

Paths Toward Peace

Deterrence and

Arms Control

by President Reagan

Address to the nation

broadcast from the White House,

November 22, 19 82 A

The week before last was an especially
moving one here in Washington. The
Vietnam veterans finally came home
once and for all to America's heart.
They were welcomed with tears, with
pride, and with a monument to their
great sacrifice. Many of their names,
like those of our Republic's greatest
citizens, are now engraved in stone in
this city that belongs to all of us. On
behalf of the nation, let me again thank
the Vietnam veterans from the bottom
of my heart for their courageous service
to America.

Seeing those moving scenes, I know
mothers of a new generation must have
worried about their children and about
peace. And that's what I would like to
talk to you about tonight— the future of
our children in a world where peace is
made uneasy by the presence of nuclear
weapons.

A year ago I said the time was right
to move forward on arms control. I out-
lined several proposals and said nothing
would have a higher priority in this Ad-
ministration. Now, a year later, I want
to report on those proposals and on
other efforts we are making to insure
the safety of our children's future.

The prevention of conflict and the
reduction of weapons are the most im-
portant public issues of our time. Yet,
on no other issue are there more mis-
conceptions and misunderstandings.
You, the American people, deserve an
explanation from your government on

what our policy is on these issues. Too
often the experts have been content to
discuss grandiose strategies among
themselves and cloud the public debate
in technicalities no one can understand.
The result is that many Americans have
become frightened, and, let me say, fear
of the unknown is entirely understand-
able. Unfortunately, much of the infor-
mation emerging in this debate bears
little semblance to the facts.

To begin, let's go back to what the
world was like at the end of World
War II. The United States was the only
undamaged industrial power in the
world. Our military power was at its
peak, and we alone had the atomic
weapon. But we didn't use this wealth
and this power to bully; we used it to
rebuild. We raised up the war-ravaged
economies, including the economies of
those who had fought against us. At
first, the peace of the world was un-
threatened, because we alone were left
with any real power, and we were using
it for the good of our fellow man. Any
potential enemy was deterred from ag-
gression because the cost would have far
outweighed the gain.

As the Soviets' power grew, we still
managed to maintain the peace. The
United States had established a system
of alliances with NATO as the center-
piece. In addition, we grew even more
respected as a world leader with a
strong economy and deeply held moral
values. With our commitment to help

THE PRESIDENT

shape a better world, the United States
always pursued every diplomatic channel
for peace. And for at least 30 years
after World War II, the United States
still continued to possess a large military
advantage over the Soviet Union. Our
strength deterred— that is, prevented—
aggression against us.

This nation's military objective has
always been to maintain peace by pre-
venting war. This is neither a Demo-
cratic nor a Republican policy. It's sup-
ported by our allies. And most impor-
tant of all, it has worked for nearly 40
years.

What do we mean when we speak of
nuclear deterrence? Certainly we don't
want such weapons for their own sake.
We don't desire excessive forces, or
what some people have called "overkill."
Basically, it is a matter of others know-
ing that starting a conflict would be
more costly to them than anything they
might hope to gain. And, yes, it is sadly
ironic that in these modern times it still
takes weapons to prevent war. I wish it
did not.

We desire peace, but peace is a goal
not a policy. Lasting peace is what we
hope for at the end of our journey; it
doesn't describe the steps we must take,
nor the paths we should follow to reach
that goal. I intend to search for peace
along two parallel paths— deterrence
and arms reductions. I believe these are
the only paths that offer any real hope
for an enduring peace.

And, let me say, I believe that if we
follow prudent policies, the risk of
nuclear conflict will be reduced. Certain-
ly the United States will never use its
forces except in response to attack.
Through the years, Soviet leaders have
also expressed a sober view of nuclear
war; and if we maintain a strong deter-
rent, they are exceedingly unlikely to
launch an attack.

The Military Imbalance

Now, while the policy of deterrence has
stood the test of time, the things we
must do in order to maintain deterrence
have changed. You often hear that the
United States and the Soviet Union are
in an arms race. The truth is that, while
the Soviet Union has raced, we have
not. As you can see from this blue U.S.
line (see "Defense Spending"), in con-
stant dollars our defense spending in the
1960s went up because of Vietnam, and
then it went downward through much of
the 1970s. Now, follow the red line,
which is Soviet spending. It has gone up
and up and up. In spite of a stagnating

DEFENSE SPENDING

BILLIONS
OF CONSTANT

275 T

200-

USSR

100

1962

1972

1982

DEFENSE SHARE
OF FEDERAL BUDGET

50%
46%

20%

1962

1982

Department of State Builel

THE PRESIDENT

'iet economy, Soviet leaders invest
'o-14% of their country's gross na-
lal product in military spending, two
;hree times the level we invest.

I might add that the defense share
)ur U.S. Federal budget has gone
y' down, too. Watch the blue line
dn (see "Defense Share of Federal
iget"). In 1962, when John Kennedy
3 President, 46%, almost half of the
leral budget, went to our national
ense. In recent years, about one-
irter of our budget has gone to
ense, while the share for social pro-
ims has nearly doubled. And most of

defense budget is spent on people,
, weapons.

The combination of the Soviets
'nding more and the United States
■nding proportionately less changed
' military balance and weakened our
;errent. Today, in virtually every
■asure of military power, the Soviet
lion enjoys a decided advantage.

This chart (see "Strategic Missiles
d Bombers") shows the changes in the
al number of intercontinental missiles
d bombers. You will see that in 1962
d in 1972, the U.S. forces remained
out the same, even dropping some by
32. But take a look now at the Soviet
.. In 1962, at the time of the Cuban
ssile crisis, the Soviets could not com-
re with us in terms of strength. In
72, when we signed the SALT I
;rategic Arms Limitation Talks] Trea-

we were nearly equal. But in 1982,
•11, that red Soviet bar stretching
ove the blue American bar tells the
)ry.

I could show you chart after chart
lere there is a great deal of red and a
ich lesser amount of U.S. blue. For
ample, the Soviet Union has deployed
third more land-based intercontinental
.Uistic missiles than we have. Believe it

not, we froze our number in 1965 and
ive deployed no additional missiles
ice then.

The Soviet Union put to sea 60 new
dlistic missile submarines in the last 15
!ars. Until last year we hadn't commis-
oned one in that same period. The
Dviet Union has built over 200 modern
ackfire bombers and is building 30
ore a year. For 20 years, the United
tates has deployed no new strategic
jmbers. Many of our B-52 bombers are
3W older than the pilots who fly them.

The Soviet Union now has 600 of the
lissiles considered most threatening by
3th sides— the intermediate-range
lissiles based on land. We have none,
he United States withdrew its inter-

STRATEGIC
MISSILES AND BOMBERS

3000

2000-

1000-

1962

1972

1982

mediate-range land-based missiles from
Europe almost 20 years ago.

The world has also witnessed un-
precedented growth in the area of
Soviet conventional forces; the Soviets
far exceed us in the number of tanks,
artillery pieces, aircraft, and ships they
produce every year. What is more, when
I arrived in this office, I learned that in
our own forces we had planes that
couldn't fly and ships that couldn't leave
port, mainly for lack of spare parts and
crew members.

The Soviet military buildup must not
be ignored. We've recognized the prob-
lem, and, together with our allies, we
have begun to correct the imbalance.
Look at this chart (see "Projected
Defense Spending," p. 4) of projected
real defense spending for the next
several years. Here's the Soviet line. Let
us assume the Soviets' rate of spending
remains at the level they have followed
since the 1960s. The blue line is the
United States. If my defense proposals
are passed, it will still take 5 years
before we come close to the Soviet level.
Yet the modernization of our strategic
and conventional forces wOl assure that
deterrence works and peace prevails.

Decision To Proceed With MX Missile

Our deployed nuclear forces were built
before the age of microcircuits. It's not
right to ask our young men and women
in uniform to maintain and operate such
antiques. Many have already given their
lives in missile explosions and aircraft
accidents caused by the old age of their
equipment. We must replace and
modernize our forces, and that is why I
have decided to proceed with the pro-
duction and deployment of the new
ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile]
known as the MX.

Three earlier Presidents worked to
develop this missile. Based on the best
advice I could get, I concluded that the
MX is the right missile at the right time.
On the other hand, when I arrived in of-
fice, I felt the proposal on where and
how to base the missile simply cost too
much in terms of money and the impact
on our citizens' lives.

I have concluded, however, it is ab-
solutely essential that we proceed to
produce this missile, and that we base it
in a series of closely based silos at War-
ren Air Force Base near Cheyenne,
Wyoming. This plan requires only half
as many missiles as the earlier plan and
will fit in an area of only 20 square
miles. It is the product of around-the-
clock research that has been underway

THE PRESIDENT

PROJECTED
DEFENSE SPENDING

BILLIONS
0F$

300

200

USSR

1982

1987

since I directed a search for a better,
cheaper way. I urge the Members of
Congress, who must pass this plan, to
listen and examine the facts before they
come to their own conclusion.

Increasing Prospects for
Arms Reductions

Some may question what modernizing
our military has to do with peace. Well,
as I explained earlier, a secure force
keeps others from threatening us and
that keeps the peace. And just as
important, it also increases the pros-
pects of reaching significant arms reduc-
tions with the Soviets, and that's what
we really want. The United States wants
deep cuts in the world's arsenal of
weapons.

But unless we demonstrate the will
to rebuild our strength and restore the
military balance, the Soviets— since
they're so far ahead— have little incen-
tive to negotiate with us. Let me repeat
that point, since it goes to the heart of
our policies. Unless we demonstrate the
will to rebuild our strength, the Soviets
have little incentive to negotiate. If we
hadn't begun to modernize, the Soviet
negotiators would know we had nothing
to bargain with except talk. They would
know we were bluffing without a good
hand, because they know what cards we
hold— just as we know what's in their
hand.

You may recall that in 1969 the
Soviets didn't want to negotiate a treaty
banning antiballistic missiles. It was only
after our Senate narrowly voted to fund
an antiballistic missile program that the
Soviets agreed to negotiate. We then
reached an agreement.

We also know that one-sided arms
control doesn't work. We've tried time
and again to set an example by cutting
our own forces in the hope that the
Soviets will do likewise. The result has
always been that they keep building.

I believe our strategy for peace will
succeed. Never before has the United
States proposed such a comprehensive
program of nuclear arms control. Never
in our history have we engaged in so
many negotiations with the Soviets to
reduce nuclear arms and to find a stable
peace. What we are saying to them is
this: We will modernize our military in
order to keep the balance for peace, but
wouldn't it be better if we both simply
reduced our arsenals to a much lower
level?

Let me begin with the negotiations
on the intermediate-range nuclear forces
that are currently underway in Geneva.
As I said earlier, the most threatening
of these forces are the land-based
missiles, which the Soviet Union now
has aimed at Europe, the Middle East,
and Asia.

This chart shows the number of
warheads on these Soviet missiles (se(
"Missile Warheads"). In 1972, there w ei
600. The United States was at zero. lit
1977, there were 600. The United Sta
was still at zero. Then the Soviets beg
deploying powerful new missiles with
three warheads and a reach of
thousands of miles— the SS-20. Since
then the bar has gone through the
roof— the Soviets have added a missile
with three warheads every week. Still
you see no U.S. blue on the chart.
Although the Soviet leaders earlier thi
year declared they had frozen deploy-
ment of this dangerous missile, they
have, in fact, continued deployment.

Last year, on November 18, I pro-
posed the total, global elimination of a
these missiles. I proposed that the
United States would deploy no com-
parable missiles— which are scheduled
for late 1983— if the Soviet Union wou
dismantle theirs. We would follow agn
ment on the land-based missiles with
limits on other intermediate-range
systems.

The European governments stronj;
support our initiative. The Soviet Unio
has thus far shown little inclination to
take this major step to zero levels. Yet
believe and I am hoping that— as the
talks proceed and as we approach the
scheduled placement of our new syster
in Europe— the Soviet leaders will see
the benefits of such a far-reaching
agreement.

This summer we also began negoti.
tions on strategic arms reductions, the
proposal we call START [Strategic
Arms Reduction Talks]. Here we're tal
ing about intercontinental missiles— thi
weapons with a longer range than the
intermediate-range ones I was just
discussing. We are negotiating on the
basis of deep reductions. I proposed in
May that we cut the number of
warheads on these missiles to an equal
number, roughly one-third below currei
levels. I also proposed that we cut the
number of missiles themselves to an
equal number, about half the current
U.S. level. Our proposals would elimi-
nate some 4,700 warheads and some
2,2.50 missiles. I think that would be
quite a service to mankind.

This chart (see "Strategic Ballistic
Missiles") shows the current level of
U.S. ballistic missiles, both land and sea
based. This is the Soviet level. We in-
tend to convince the Soviets it would he
in their own best interest to reduce
these missiles. Look at the reduced
numbers both sides would have under
our proposal— quite a dramatic change.

Department of State Bulletir

THE PRESIDENT

Iso seek to reduce the total destruc-
)ower of these missiles and other
nts of U.S. and Soviet strategic

n 1977, when the last Administra-
s proposed more limited reductions,
ioviet Union refused even to discuss
1. This time their reaction has been
' : different. Their opening position is
ious one, and even though it doesn't
; our objective of deep reductions,
;'s no question we're heading in the
; direction. One reason for this
ge is clear. The Soviet Union knows
we are now serious about our own
«gic programs and that they must
repared to negotiate in earnest.
Ne also have other important arms
rol efforts underway. In the talks in
na on mutual and balanced force
ctions, we've proposed cuts in mUi-
personnel to a far lower and equal
. And in the 40-nation [U.N.] Com-
ae on Disarmament in Geneva, we're
ring to develop effective limitations
iuclear testing and chemical
93ons. The whole world remains out-
gd by the Soviets' and their allies' use
ological and chemical weapons
^Qst defenseless people in Afghani-
i, Kampuchea, and Laos. This ex-
imce makes ironclad verification all
BTiore essential for arms control.

iucing the Risks of Accident
i Misunderstanding

(•e is, of course, much more that
ils to be done. In an age when inter-
I inental missiles can span half the
le in less than half an hour, it's
I ial that Soviet and American leaders
i; a clear understanding of each
I r's capabilities and intentions.
I Last June in Berlin and again at the

. Special Session on Disarmament, I
led that the United States would

e every effort to reduce the risks of
ident and misunderstanding and thus
trengthen mutual confidence be-
an the United States and the Soviet
on. Since then, we've been actively
lying detailed measures to implement

Berlin initiative.

Today, I would like to announce
.e of the measures, which I've pro-
ad in a special letter just sent to the
iet leadership and which I've in-
icted our ambassadors in Geneva to
uss with their Soviet counterparts.
y include but also go beyond some of
suggestions I made in Berlin.

MISSILE WARHEADS

INTERMEDIATE RANGE'LAND BASED

USSR

1200-1

600-

USSR

1972

1977

1982

STRATEGIC
BALLISTIC MISSILES

2000-

1000-

NOW

U.S. PROPOSAL

US USSR

3mber1982

THE PRESIDENT

The first of these measures involves
advance notification of all U.S. and
Soviets test launches of intercontinental
ballistic missiles. We will also seek
Soviet agreement on notification of all
sea-launched ballistic missiles as well as
intermediate-range land-based ballistic
missiles of the type we're currently
negotiating. This would remove surprise
and uncertainty at the sudden ap-
pearance of such missiles on the warn-
ing screens of the two countries.

In another area of potential mis-
understanding, we propose to the
Soviets that we provide each other with
advance notification of our major
military exercises. Here again, our ob-
jective is to reduce the surprise and
uncertainty surrounding otherwise sud-
den moves by either side.

These sorts of measures are de-
signed to deal with the immediate issues
of miscalculation in time of crisis. But
there are deeper, longer term problems
as well. In order to clear a way some of
the mutual ignorance and suspicion be-
tween our two countries, I wall propose
that we both engage in a broad-ranging
exchange of basic data about our nuclear
forces. I am instructing our ambassa-
dors at the negotiations on both strate-
gic and intermediate forces to seek
Soviet agreement on an expanded ex-
change of information. The more one
side knows about what the other side is
doing, the less room there is for surprise
and miscalculation.

Probably everyone has heard of the
so-called hotline, which enables me to
communicate directly with the Soviet
leadership in the event of a crisis. The
existing hotline is dependable and rapid
with both ground and satellite links. But
because it is so important, I've also
directed that we carefully examine any
possible improvements to the existing
hotline system.

Now, although we've begun negotia-
tions on these many proposals, this
doesn't mean we've exhausted all the ini-
tiatives that could help to reduce the
risk of accidental conflict. We'll leave no
opportunity unexplored, and we'll con-
sult closely with Senators Nunn,
Jackson, and Warner, and other
Members of the Congress who've made
important suggestions in this field.

We are also making strenuous ef-
forts to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons to additional countries. It
would be tragic if we succeeded in re-
ducing existing arsenals only to have
new threats emerge in other areas of
the world.

Reaffirming America's Destiny

Earlier I spoke of America's contribu-
tions to peace following World War II,
of all we did to promote peace and pros-
perity for our fellow man. Well, we're
still those same people. We still seek
peace above all else. I want to remind
our own citizens and those around the
world of this tradition of American
good will, because I am concerned about
the effects the nuclear fear is having on
our people. The most upsetting letters I
receive are from schoolchildren who
write to me as a class assignment. It's
evident they've discussed the most night-
marish aspects of a nuclear holocaust in
their classrooms. Their letters are often
full of terror. This should not be so.

The philosopher Spinoza said,
"Peace ... is a virtue, a state of mind, a
disposition for benevolence, confidence,
justice." Those are the qualities we want
our children to inherit, not fear. They
must grow up confident if they are to
meet the challenges of tomorrow, as we
will meet the challenges of today.

I began these remarks speaking of
our children, and I want to close on the
same theme. Our children should not

grow up frightened. They should not
fear the future. We are working to
make it peaceful and free. I believe ti
future can be the brightest, most ex-
citing of any generation. We must re
assure them and let them know that
their parents and the leaders of this
world are seeking above all else to ke
them safe and at peace. I consider th
to be a sacred trust.

My fellow Americans, on this
Thanksgiving when we have so much
be grateful for, let us give special tha
for our peace, our freedom, and our f
good people. I've always believed thai
this land was set aside in an uncomm
way, that a divine plan placed this gr
continent between the oceans to be
found by a people from every corner
the Earth who had a special love of
faith, freedom, and peace. Let us rea
firm America's destiny of goodness ai
good will. Let us work for peace, and
we do, let us remember the lines of tl
famous hymn, "0 God of love, 0 King
peace, make wars throughout the woi
to cease."

'Text from White House press relea.se

President's Letter to Congress,
November 22, 1982

For many years, U.S. strategic forces have
helped protect our Nation and the Free
World by providing a capable and effective
deterrent. Maintenance of these forces has
historically enjoyed broad bipartisan support.

In recent years, our deterrent has be-
come increasingly vulnerable in the face of a
relentless Soviet military buildup. As part of
our program to modernize the U.S. deterrent,
I asked last year that you support improving
the capability and survivability of the land-
based component of our strategic forces by
authorizing development and deployment of
the MX intercontinental ballistic missile. I
also agreed earlier this year to provide you
with a permanent basing decision by
December 1.

In response to this requirement, the
Department of Defense forwarded to me a
series of basing options, with associated
analyses of technical, environmental, arms
control, and other factors. I have also re-
ceived the counsel of my senior advisers,
former Presidents and Administration of-
ficials, and Members of Congress. After
careful study. 1 have decided to emplace 100
MX missiles, now known as "Peacekeeper," in
superhard silos in a closely-spaced basing
mode at Francis E. Warren Air Force Base
near Cheyenne, Wyoming. Given Congres-
sional support, these missiles will have an in-
itial operational capability late in 1986. I am
prepared al.so to consider deception and

possibly ballistic missile defense, which an
options if the Soviet Union continues its
military buildup.

We all hope, however, that the Soviets
will join us in seeking meaningful progress
arms control negotiations. This MX decisic
supports and complements the U.S. appro;
to arms control. While the U.S. must and '
improve its forces to maintain a credible
deterrent, we remain fully committed to oi
standing proposals for significant reductioi
in both sides' nuclear arsenals. We seek to
reduce ballistic missiles by about one-half a
ballistic missile warheads by about one-thir

Under separate cover, I am sending yo
copy of my full statement on the decision
outlined above. I ask that you keep an opei
mind on this complex and important questi'
and permit the Administration to make its
case for the decision. We are prepared to r
spond. at your convenience, to forma! and i
formal requests for additional information
that you may desire. I look forward to rece
ing your counsel and assistance as we work
toward our common goal of improving the
security of our Nation.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Text from White House press release.

THE PRESIDENT

President's Statement,
November 22, 1982

' nearly 2 years my Administration
1 examined the matter of the MX
J ssile, the development of which has
m supported by my three immediate
decessors, Presidents Carter, Ford,
i Nixon. We all have strongly agreed
•Ii .t strengthening our land-based
-,j ;sile system is absolutely essential to
■ intain America's deterrent capability
ji deter war and to protect our nation.
^, I have sought the counsel of my
ifi jdecessors, the opinion of Members of

ngress, and the advice of the best
r 'hnical and scientific minds in the

Id. My Administration, as well as the
3j es before it, has examined a wide
j[ riety of options, including smaller or
J fger missiles, the development of one
tl ssile for common use on land or at
J 1, and the possibility of greater mobili-
And, like the preceding Administra-
ins, we have concluded that MX is the
fht missile and that now is the time.
Deciding how to deploy the missile
s not been that easy. A variety of bas-
g modes has been studied by previous
iministrations and by ours. The con-
pt of deceptive basing, as employed in
evious planning, was a fundamentally
und one for assuring the stability of
nd-based ICBM [intercontinental
llistic missile] forces in times of crisis.
It complied with our strategic arms
ntrol objectives. Other sensible growth
)tions were studied as well. As these
ans progressed through the two
evious Administrations, however, they
•ew enormously in cost. Not only was
e financial cost high— $40-50 billion —
it the cost to our western citizens in
rms of water, land, social disruption,
id environmental damage seemed
areasonable.

For these reasons, we considered
her approaches while proceeding with
le development of the MX missile
self. The missile work is now nearly
Dmplete. The first test flight is sched-
led for early next year. While test
ights are just that — tests— I have no
oubts about the technical success, in
let, excellence, of this missile.

In reexamining how to base the
nissiles, we concluded that by pulling
he launch sites much closer together
.nd making them a great deal harder,
ve could make significant savings. We
vould need fewer silos, much less land,
ind, in fact, fewer missiles. We would
ichieve a system that could survive

against the current and projected Soviet
rocket inventory. Deployment of such a
system would require the Soviets to
make costly new technical developments
if they wish to even contemplate a sur-
prise attack. Most of the Soviet counter-
measures proposed are really no more
than technical dreams on which no
Soviet planner or politician would bet
the fate of his country. Thus, closely
spaced basing is a reasonable way to
deter attack, which is our objective.

Now let me outline our overall plan
for our ICBM force.

First, we recognize that the best
survivability, and thus the best deter-
rence, lies in the modernization of all
three legs of the triad: submarines,
bombers, and land-based ballistic
missiles. Each gains security as all are
rendered less susceptible to technologi-
cal or operational surprise.

Second, we are closing down our
force of huge Titan missiles at the rate
of one missile every month or two. Their
immense warheads and antiquated fuels
have no place in our current inventory.

Third, we will maintain an ap-
propriate Minuteman force, but many of
these could be removed if we reach
agreement with the Soviets on strategic
arms reductions.

Fourth, we plan to produce the MX
missile, now named "Peacekeeper," and
deploy it in superhard silos at Francis E.
Warren Air Force Base, near Cheyenne,
Wyoming. That seems to be the most
cost-effective location, but I appreciate
the enthusiastic offers by the citizens of
Nevada to base the missile in their
State.

We will emplace 100 of these
missiles (versus the 200 in some of the
earlier plans) in launch canisters which
can be moved, if necessary, between
closely spaced superhard silos. We plan
to build only 100 such silos, but we will
design the system so that we can add
more silos later, again within the con-
fines of a small land area, if the Soviets
will not agree to strategic arms reduc-
tions, or if they persist in the develop-
ment and production of more powerful
and deadly weapons. We would prefer
that the Soviets dismantle SS-18s,
rather than we build more holes. But we
can accommodate either and maintain
stability.

As far as an active defense is con-
cerned, we do not wish to embark on

any course of action that could endanger
the current ABM [antiballistic missile]
Treaty so long as it is observed by the
Soviet Union. Likewise, we do not wish
to build even the minimal ABM system
allowed us by the treaty, even though
the Soviets have done so.

We plan to continue research on
ballistic missile defense technology— the
kind of smart, highly accurate, hopefully
non-nuclear, weapons that utilize the
microelectronic and other advanced tech-
nologies in which we excel. The objective
of this program is stability for our ICBM
forces in the 1990s, a hedge against
Soviet breakout of the ABM Treaty, and
the technical competence to evaluate
Soviet ABM developments. We currently
have no plan to deploy any ballistic
missile defense system.

The entire missile and basing pro-
gram will cost about $26 billion in 1982
dollars, commencing with this fiscal
year. That's a reduction by half, both in
cost and in numbers of missiles de-
ployed, from the other plans on the
drawing boards when I entered office.
The ongoing ballistic missile defense re-
search and development will cost about
$2.5 billion. Both of these programs are
already reflected in the FY 1983 budget
projections, but the specific decisions an-
nounced today allow us to proceed with
the reductions from my February budget
request for this year of a billion dollars,
which we have so carefully worked out
with the Congress.

Continuity of effort in national
security affairs is essential. Turbulence
is wasteful beyond words. These pro-
grams to increase the stability and
security of our strategic nuclear forces
are urgently needed. The planning by
my predecessors made them possible,
but it is for my successor that I make
these decisions. With every effort, the
Peacekeeper missile still vail not be fully
deployed until the late 1980s when yet
another president shoulders these
burdens.

I urge the Congress, and all
Americans, to support this program,
developed under several presidents:
those in the past who conceived and
urged the deployment of MX and the
current President who has made these
difficult decisions. It is only by such
steadfastness of purpose that we can
maintain the peace which every nation
needs to work out the hopes and dreams
of its own people.

Text from white House press release.

ecember 1982

THE PRESIDENT

President Reagan and Mexican President-elect Miguel de la Madrid. (White House photo by Mary Anne Fackeiman)

Department of State Bulleti

THE PRESIDENT

President Reagan Meets
With Mexico's
President-Elect

On October 8, 1982, President Reagan met
with Mexico's President-elect Miguel de la Madrid
in Tijuana, Mexico, and Coronado, California.

Following are the texts of the luncheon toasts
and remarks nfiade at the conclusion of their meetings,
both in Coronado.'^

TOASTS

President Reagan

Buenos tardes and welcome. I'm aware,
Mr. President, that today instead of
welcoming you, I should be saying
welcome back. My country is most
honored that the Mexican people have
selected as their new President a man
who studied for a time at one of our
universities. And this should be no sur-
prise to any of us. The citizens of our
two countries are inextricably linked. In
commerce and in culture, we're both
proud and independent; yet, at the same
time, each of our societies is enriched
and strengthened by its relationship
with the other.

Here in the Southwest, and especial-
ly California, we're keenly aware of our
debt to Mexico — the fountainhead of so
much of our heritage. It's fitting that we
began our day by placing a wreath at
the statue of Benito Juarez — a man who
also visited the United States before
emerging as a great Mexican leader.
Juarez, a contemporary of Lincoln, a
man acclaimed in the highest levels of
our diplomatic community, once said
that respect for the rights of others, be-
tween individuals as between nations, is
the basis of peace.

Today, his words still ring true.
With the mutual respect of which he
spoke, we wdll continue the peaceful,
amicable, and mutually beneficial rela-
tions that are the pride of our two na-
tions.

Juarez led your country in a period
of great uncertainty. Both Mexico and
the United States were engulfed in civil
strife. And today, again, both of our
people suffer — this time from serious
economic problems, a malady which is
worldwide in scope.

You and your country, as we in the
United States, are dedicated to restoring
health to a troubled economy. Each na-
tion must confront the crisis in its own
way. But as your friend, we stand ready
to work with you, recognizing that in
times such as these, friendships are put
to the test.

Let there be no doubt that our affec-
tion will not only withstand these dif-
ficulties but triumph over them. Indeed,
out of economic adversity may spring
new incentives to expand the vast
economic potential that exists on this
proud continent.

Our meetings today continue a tradi-
tion which began in the first decade of
this century. My meetings as President-
elect with the incumbent President of
Mexico opened lines of communication
and established a personal relationship
that proved indispensable. And after
getting acquainted today, I am certain
that the same cordiality and trust that
have played such a significant role in
Mexican- American cooperation during
these last 21 months will continue and,
hopefully, expand.

I know of your admiration for Jose
Maria Morales, a leader in your
country's fight for independence and a

THE PRESIDENT

man who championed constitutional
government. We must never forget that
the United States and Mexico represent
more than friendly neighbors— some-
thing to be proud of in itself — but also
two peoples who are dedicated to certain
ideals of freedom found in only a few
countries.

Over these last 21 months, my Ad-
ministration has worked closely with its
counterpart in Mexico City in many
areas of concern, with particular atten-
tion to the stability and independence of
Western Hemisphere nations. Your
generous contributions to the Caribbean
Basin have been much appreciated. And
while we've not always agreed on every-
thing, we've developed a firm respect for
your opinions and for the vital role that
Mexico plays in international affairs.

It's my sincere hope that we can
build upon the current spirit of coopera-
tion and that with respect for the rights
and dignity of each other, with recogni-
tion of our affection and common in-
terests, the friendship of our two coun-
tries will serve as a model for free na-
tions everywhere and that our personal
relationship will be marked with trust
and admiration. I'm confident that will
be the case, because even after our short
meetings today, I know you're a man in
whom I can confide as a friend.

So now, I ask all of you to join with
me in a toast to Miguel de la Madrid,
the next President of Mexico.

President-Elect De la Madrid

I do appreciate the kind and cordial
hospitality that you have shown me
throughout this meeting. I particularly
thank you for your willingness to begin
our meeting with a ceremony in honor
of President Benito Juarez, a gesture
that represents a symbol providing a
good auspice for our personal relations.
Benito Juarez represents for the Mex-
ican people a precious piece of our
history and everlasting values. He con-
solidated our national independence in
the face of foreign intervention, and he
led a generation of brillant Mexicans
who laid the foundations for our modern
democratic and liberal state.

I consider our meeting highly
beneficial. It is a good prologue to the
relations we are to have once I become
President of Mexico next December 1st.
This personal and friendly contact has
allowed a free and spontaneous ex-
change of opinions, without formalities
or stiffness, in an atmosphere of cor-
diality and dignity— elements that
should be the cornerstones in the rela-

tions between countries that are
neighbors and friends.

Mexico and the United States have
been building throughout different
periods of time — some of them not
always easy or pleasant — a relation
based on the reciprocal recognition of
our respective sovereignty and interests.

Our long border unites us, and the
divergence of our cultures and of the
stages of our economic and social
development compel us to get to know
and understand each other better each
day. We have differences and simi-
larities. If we recognize them and
understand them, we can continue
developing our relations for the benefit
of our peoples.

We have, although in a different ex-
pression, the same goals — democracy,
liberty, and social justice. Each nation
works in its own way to obtain those ob-
jectives, just as every man should have
the right to guide his own destiny. In
the dignity of our conduct lies the
strength and favorable outlook for our
relations.

I have asserted the Mexican peoples'
conviction that the solution for our
economic problems should be based,
essentially, on our own efforts. We will
do this with responsibility and energy.
The Mexican people are capable of fac-
ing adversity and rise above it through
our strength and organized effort.

But I have also pointed out that in
the interdependent world in which we
live, international cooperation is
necessary so as to insure that nations
may effectively solve their own prob-
lems. A negative international environ-
ment, such as the one we live in today,
makes the internal efforts of each coun-
try more difficult.

It is in the interest of Mexico that
the United States has a healthy and
prosperous economy and that it becomes
a stable and vigorous market for Mex-
ican goods and services. I know that
you're working hard to achieve these
aims.

It is in the interest of the United
States, as you know, that Mexico over-
come its current difficulties and that it
regain its strength for economic growth
and for the creation of jobs. It is only
natural that the United States should
watch with a constructive interest a
country which is its third most impor-
tant client. The Mexican recovery is also
an important element in world economic
development and in international trade.

I am absolutely confident with
respect to the future of my country. We
have amply and varied natural resources
and a significant progress in our social

i?l

development. That is not to say we do
not have inequality. But we have the
most precious wealth of any nation — i
strong and nationalistic people, each d
better prepared for the tasks of devek
ment. I am sure that with effort, with
equality, and discipline, we will over-
come the crisis in which we find our-
selves, which is not a crisis of stagnati
or decline but a crisis of growth and
dynamism.

We Mexicans have, moreover, a
solid asset— a stable and dynamic
political system, the product of our
historical tradition. It binds together t
strongest political forces of the nation
and unites Mexicans around a vigorou;
and deeply rooted nationalism. Our na
tionalism does not imply hostility or e>
clusivism; it attends to the understand
ing of our problems, to the optimum u
of our resources, to the defense of our
political independence, to the assuranc
of our economic independence, and tht
continuity and advance of our culture.

We Mexicans want peace for all m
tions, the peaceful solution of conflicts
respect for the principle of nonintervei
tion, and the strengthening of interna-
tional economic cooperation. We also
want to live in peace and friendship wi
our neighbors, enjoying friendly,
respectful, and fruitful relations with
dignity.

I am sure that the friendship and
personal relationship we have built dut
ing this meeting will contribute to thos
goals and shall benefit both our great
peoples. I leave testimony of the good
will and sympathy from the people of
Mexico that you have expressed to me
on this opportunity. I believe that this
the prologut' and the preamble to a rel
tionship of friendship.

I wish to raise my glass and toast i
the friendship and prosperity of the
United States and Mexico. I toast to th
people of the United States, to your pe
sonal happiness, Mr. President, and to
your well-being.

REMARKS

President Reagan

I was pleased to meet with President-
elect de la Madrid today, continuing a
longstanding tradition in which the
President -elect of each of our respectiv
nations meets with the incumbent Pres
dent of the other. Our conversations en
compassed a broad range of issues of
importance to both our countries. The
talks were carried out in a spirit of
warmth and mutual respect, as befits
close friends and neighbors.

Departnnent of State Buileti

THE PRESIDENT

Our meetings today establish the
nework for a close and durable rela-
iship, and I look forward to working
I President-elect De la Madrid when

,j issumes office. And we've been

r, ghted to have you here.

(sident-Elect De la Madrid

;em that the informal meeting which
ive just held with President Ronald
igan has been most fruitful. I feel
t this type of gathering is useful, for
stablishes a framework of dignity

I cordial friendship between the heads
state of two neighboring countries — a
itionship of cordiality and of close
logue.

We have held a personal and friend-
:onversation, characterized by a free
i spontaneous exchange of ideas
;hout formalities or restrictions of any
t. Dialogue and communication have
in established between us. I have ex-
issed to President Reagan my intent
give a positive accent to relations be-
een Mexico and the United States.
r countries are linked not only geo-
iphically but by multiple relations and
erests.

Both our countries can derive great
lefit from this relationship if a mutual
owledge of our problems exists as

II as the political will to solve them,
r friendship is based on respect and
^ity. Good friends do not always

1 nk alike, but when understanding
jevails, differences are overcome.
■ Mexico wishes that the United
iates will continue to be a prosperous
ighbor with a free and democratic
ciety. I am aware that the United
ates shares the same interest with
gard to Mexico.

Finally, I would like to underscore
y personal satisfaction at having held
is interview in San Diego, California,
lis is a region of the United States
nich is particularly close to the history
id the hearts of us Mexicans. This is a
gion of the United States where many
mericans of Mexican descent have
iled to generate the prosperity of a
•eat nation.

And, lastly, I wish to thank the
edia of both the United States and
exico for the interest they have shown
this meeting between Mexico and the
nited States.

Solidarity and U.S.
Relations With Poland

'The President-elect spoke in Spanish,
d his remarks were translated by an inter-
eter (texts from Weekly Compilation of
esidential Documents of Oct. 18, 1982). ■

President Reagan's radio address to
the nation broadcast from Rancho del
Cielo, his ranch near Santa Barbara,
California, on October 9, 1982.^

Yesterday the Polish Government, a
military dictatorship, took another far-
reaching step in their persecution of
their own people. They declared
Solidarity, the organization of the work-
ing men and women of Poland, their
free union, illegal.

Yes, I know Poland is a faraway
country in Eastern Europe. Still, this ac-
tion is a matter of profound concern to
all the American people and to the free
world.

Ever since martial law was brutally
imposed last December, Polish author-
ities have been assuring the world that
they're interested in a genuine recon-
ciliation with the Polish people. But the
Polish regime's action yesterday reveals
the hoUowness of its promises. By
outlawing Solidarity, a free trade
organization to which an overwhelming
majority of Polish workers and farmers
belong, they have made it clear that
they never had any intention of restor-
ing one of the most elemental human
rights — the right to belong to a free
trade union.

The so-called new trade union
legislation under which this contrary and
backward step has been taken claims to
substitute a structure and framework
for the establishment of free trade
unions in Poland. But the free world can
see this is only a sham. It is clear that
such unions, if formed, will be mere ex-
tensions of the Perish Communist Party.

The Polish military leaders and their
Soviet backers have shown that they will
continue to trample upon the hopes and
aspirations of the majority of the Polish
people. America cannot stand idly by in
the face of these latest threats of repres-
sion and acts of repression by the Polish
Government.

I am, therefore, today directing
steps to bring about the suspension of
Poland's most-favored-nation-tariff
status as quickly as possible. This will in-
crease the tariffs on Polish manufac-
tured goods exported to the United
States and thus reduce the quantities of
these goods which have been imported
in the past.

The Polish regime should under-
stand that we're prepared to take fur-

ther steps as a result of this further
repression in Poland. We are also con-
sulting urgently with our allies on steps
we might take jointly in response to this
latest outrage. While taking these steps,
I want to make clear, as I have in the
past, that they are not directed against
the Polish people. We will continue to
provide humanitarian assistance to the
people of Poland, through organizations
such as Catholic Relief Service and
CARE [Cooperative for American Relief
Everywhere Inc.] as we have since the
beginning of martial law.

At the same time, I stand by my
earlier offer to provide recovery
assistance to help the Polish economy
back on its feet, once Warsaw restores
to the Polish people their human rights.

There are those who will argue that
the Polish Government's action marks
the death of Solidarity. I don't believe
this for a moment. Those who know
Poland well understand that as long as
the flame of freedom burns as brightly
and intensely in the hearts of Polish men
and women as it does today, the spirit of
Solidarity will remain a vital force in
Poland.

Surely, it must be clear to all that
until Warsaw's military authorities move
to restore Solidarity to its rightful and
hard-won place in Polish society, Poland
will continue to be plagued by bitterness,
alienation, instability, and stagnation.

Someone has said that when anyone
is denied freedom, then freedom for
everyone is threatened. The struggle in
the world today for the hearts and
minds of mankind is based on one simple
question: Is man born to be free, or
slave? In country after country, people
have long known the answer to that
question. We are free by divine right.
We are the masters of our fate, and we
create governments for our convenience.
Those who would have it otherwise com-
mit a crime and a sin against God and
man.

There can only be one path out of
the current morass in Poland and that is
for the military regime to stand up to its
own statements of principle, even in the
face of severe outside pressure from the
Soviet Union; to lift martial law; release
Lech Walesa and his colleagues now
languishing in prison; and begin again
the search for social peace through the
arduous but real process of dialogue and
reconciliation with the church and
Solidarity.

cember 1982

THE PRESIDENT

I join with my countrymen, including
millions of Americans whose roots are in
Poland, in praying for an early return to
a path of moderation and personal free-
dom in Poland.

Thanks for listening. I'll be back
next week. Let Poland be Poland. God
bless you.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Oct. 18, 1982.

Grain Exports to the Soviet Union

Excerpts from President Reagan's
radio address to the nation broadcast
from the White House on October 15.
1982.^

I'd like to discuss with you for a few
moments the plans our Administration
has to meet important agricultural
challenges we face together. I'm talking
about increasing American farm ex-
ports, restoring our reputation as
reliable suppliers, and regaining our
world market share.

As you know, our Administration
moved early on to end that grain em-
bargo which had hurt farmers so badly.
Before the Soviet embargo, American
farmers were supplying about 70% of
Soviet needs. After the embargo, our
market share dropped to less than 25%.
Other nations had quickly moved in to
fill the gap left by the embargo, so that
our farmers, and our farmers almost
alone, bore the brunt of the embargo.
This year, we've fought our way back to
35% of the Soviet market. We're on our
way back up. We can and we will do bet-
ter there and around the world.

Nothing is more crucial to the long-
term health of agriculture than restoring
this nation's reputation as a reliable sup-
plier of agricultural products around the
world. During the past 20 months, we've
pursued an agricultural export policy
making three things plain: No restric-
tions will be imposed on farm exports
because of rising domestic prices; no
farm exports will be singled out as an
instrument of foreign policy, except in
extreme situations, and then, only as
part of a broad embargo supported by
our trading partners; and world markets
must be freed of trade barriers and un-
fair trade practices.

On that last point, we've mounted a
united front by the Departments of
Agriculture, State, Treasury, Com-
merce, and the U.S. Trade Representa-
tive to speak out and act against the un-
fair trade practices of our competitors

abroad. We're committed to more open
agricultural markets in all countries, and
we're challenging others in negotiations,
particularly our friends in Europe and
Japan, to fully match this commitment.

It's imperative that all of us work
together to reduce the growing tide of
protectionism and export subsidies
overseas. If other countries can't under-
stand an evenhanded approach is in
everybody's best interest, if they're not
willing to play by the rules of the game,
then let there be no mistake: We must
and we will counter with strong meas-
ures of our own to permit American
farmers to realize the benefits of their
extraordinary productivity.

In spite of my strong commitment, I
know there is still concern in the farm
community that we've not given suffi-
cient assurance of delivery of our farm
exports. I can understand farmers' skep-
ticism. You've been burned so often in
the past. But our new agricultural ex-
port policy means exactly what it says:
We will honor our word.

Today, I am directing Secretary of
Agriculture Block to take two additional
steps. Two weeks from now, U.S. repre-
sentatives will meet with the Soviets in
Vienna for talks concerning additional
grain purchases beyond the 8 million
metric tons stipulated in article 1 of the
existing U.S.-U.S.S.R. grain agreement.
I am instructing the Secretary to make
available a total of 23 million metric tons
for purchase during the October 1 ,
1982-September 30, 1983, time period.

Second, the Secretary of Agriculture
will extend to the additional purchases
the same assurances of reliable delivery
that the 8 million metric tons are afford-
ed under article 2 of the agreement, if
the U.S.S.R. will contract for additional
tonnage during the month of November,
and provided that it is shipped within
180 days from the date of the contract.

These same assurances, of course,
also apply to soybean and other
agricultural exports. We have a large
crop. We need commitments to move
that crop and strengthen markets. Now,
of course, we can't guarantee the
Soviets will make these purchases, but

we know they're shopping, and they st
have large needs.

We want to demonstrate that ac-
tions speak louder than words, and
we're taking tangible actions to restore
this market. Year-in, year-out, there is
no better, more reliable producer of fo'
anywhere than the United States of
America.

Some will say that by offering to st
the Soviets more grain we're sending a
weak signal. That's wrong. We're askir
the Soviets to give us cash on the line
for the food they buy. We're not pro-
viding them with any subsidies or puni] ^i
ing any Western currencies into Soviet
pockets.

It's always seemed ironic to me tha
many people who are so quick to sacri-
fice the interest of farmers in an effort
to seem tough are unwilling to do the
real things we need to send a signal of
national will and strength.

During the last decade, we had two
grain embargoes. But during those sarr
years, we were also reducing our com-
mitment to a strong national defense,
while the Soviets were undertaking the
most massive military buildup in histor
We're not making that mistake in 1982
we have our priorities straight.

I wish I could tell you today that
we've turned everything around for
American farmers. I can't. I can only
say that we're doing everything we can
as rapidly as we can, to make things
right.

Thank you for keeping up the strug
gle. Thank you for your strength, your
vision, and your faith. I know we can r
turn prosperity to our heartland and to
America. God has blessed us with a
strong spirit and rich soil. With His he!
and yours we can make America once
again the source of all the dreams and
opportunities it was placed on this gooo
Earth to provide.

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Oct. 18, 1982.

Department of State Bulletir

IE SECRETARY

Bcretary Shultz Visits Canada

Secretary Shultz visited Ottawa,
'.ada, October 24~25, 1982. Following
he text of a news conference he held
-e with Canadian journalists on
ober 25. '

Can you start by telling us whether

actually did teach Allan
cEachen [Canadian Secretary of
•te for External Affairs] economics
university?

A. I think we taught each other— it
s usually sitting around in the even-
puzzling over something or other. I
nk we were both interested in in-
itrial relations as much as economics
;hat aspect of economics — and the
partment of Economics at M.I.T. in
ise days had an industrial relations
)up that was a very interesting one
i a very good one, and they still do. It
s a combination of those things, and
las struck me, in looking back at it,
it the combination of economics as a
mal discipline that has a kind of
entless logic to it, on the one hand,
d the study and work on industrial
Btions problems which get you into
dity immediately, is a pretty good
mbination. Both Allan and I had that
Tibination tossed at us at M.I.T. after
brld War II.

Q. How do you feel about the
i nadian attitude on foreign invest-
i;nt now? Do you sense a softening?
!> you sense that your visit here and
)her things that are going on repre-
int a change in the attitude of the
knadian Government?

A. I don't think my visit represents
y change on the part of the Canadian
)vernment at ail.

Q. On the part of your government?

A. There has been — well, on the
rt of my government, I'm merely
llowing the President's lead. He's met
th the Prime Minister seven times
ice he's been in office — that's a little
5s than 2 years' time — and has con-
iered that the United States has a
emendous stake in its neighborhood
here we live, just as you do, and that
e should be paying attention to our
jighborhood. It seems to me the Presi-
int is absolutely right about that, and
re just been following his lead in com-
g here, and it's my own natural in-
inct anyway. I've been here many
nes and know lots of people here. So
e visit is really in keeping with that

As far as the economic relationships
between the two countries are con-
cerned, there are certain areas of strain.
If you put the whole thing in context, I
think we have to keep reminding our-
selves there's a huge amount of trade
between the two countries. Canada is,
by far, the biggest trading partner of
the United States, and the same is true
in the other direction. There is a very
large foreign investment in Canada, and
I don't have the figures on this but I'd
be surprised if it weren't true that Cana-
dian foreign investment is overwhelm-
ingly oriented to the United States, and
there's a lot in the United States — lots
of Canadian investment in the United
States. So there are many strong rela-
tionships there.

As far as the Foreign Investment
Review Act is concerned, that's a ques-
tion I'll undoubtedly be talking with Mr.
MacEachen about. But there are some
problems in it for the United States, but
it seems to me that we all have to
recognize that every country has certain-
ly a complete sovereign right to decide
on the rules for investment, and what
foreigners, I think, properly can ask is
that the rules be applied fairly, be ap-
plied expeditiously, and be applied, let's
say, prospectively rather than retro-
actively so that you don't get the rules
changed on you after you have made an
investment. Then, once an investment is
made according to the rules, that that
Canadian dollar of investment, whether
it comes from inside or outside, be
treated the same way — nondis-
criminatory treatment. Those are, I
think, fairly standard items, and those
are the things that we would tend to
look for.

Q. You were referring to the
retroactive features that the United
States might object to. For a country
like Canada, with a huge dispropor-
tionate amount of foreign investment,
are you suggesting that we remain
locked into that framework?

A. The future is a long time. So if
you change things prospectively, over a
period of time that can make a change.
Let me make a pitch in the other direc-
tion. We'll take all of the Canadian
investment we can get. The United
States, under President Reagan, is doing
everything it can to make itself attrac-
tive to investment— whether it's from in-
side or outside. We've been trying to
stimulate the pool of savings in the

United States. Our savings rate is lower
than we think is desirable. We've been
trying to enlarge that, and we all know
that in the end you can't invest what you
haven't saved. So one way of dealing
with that problem is to attract, in effect,
the savings from outside your country to
come in. And so we have been doing
everything we can to make ourselves as
attractive as possible to the flow in of
investment from other countries. Let me
plug the United States as a place for
you Canadian investors to take a look
around and consider if you don't get a
good rate of return and find it attrac-
tive.

Q. That doesn't seem to have been
the attitude of the U.S. Congress last
year.

A. In general, I think the United
States is very receptive to foreign in-
vestment.

Q. I suggest a view in Canada,
which is very common, several
takeovers — takeover attempts — in the
American economy by Canadian in-
terests that set off a wave of reaction
in Congress that has led to almost
record numbers of what we might
view here as anti-Canadian bills.

A. I don't think that takeovers, as
such, are a problem. We've become ac-
customed to a lot of that kind of activity
in our economy. It's a question of
whether or not takeovers take place on
a special basis. If a takeover is spon-
sored by government, that's a problem.
As a matter of fact, I believe my-
self— and I'm getting out of my jurisdic-
tion— if I were Secretary of the
Treasury again I might talk more about
this. But I think the takeover of a
private company by a government from
another country, that you have to
scratch your head about. We had the
Kuwait Government take over one of
our companies — Santa Fe Interna-
tional— and I think the Canadians and
the French played chess with some of
our companies, and its gone ahead. But
it's not thrilling to have that happen.
But that's different from private invest-
ment entirely.

Q. Earlier this year there were
harsh words said by officials on both
sides of the border. Have you and Mr.
MacEachen considered any— I guess I
would use the words — institutional ar-
rangements to anticipate, iron-out,
whatever, these kinds of problems?

cember 1982

THE SECRETARY

A. We've had three moments of
conversation so far — in New York, La
Sapiniere, and here. In the first two set-
tings, we were part of the groups, and
we didn't really have a chance to talk in-
tensively with each other. In our
schedule of talks here, we sort of divid-
ed the times into different subject mat-
ter areas.

The one yesterday was concentrated
on common international and diplomatic
matters, you might say, so we didn't get
into that. But I think it's a good subject,
and I know that when I was in the gov-
ernment before, I worked quite hard
with my Canadian counterpart, who was
at the time, John Turner, Minister of
Finance. We tried, not through some
formal mechanism but through informal
means, to develop an atmosphere that
did not eliminate problems but it made it
possible for us to discuss them im-
mediately, quickly, candidly, and decide
how we were going to deal with them
together.

On the whole, I think that the record
would show that after we got going on
that, the financial area between the
United States and Canada went along
quite smoothly in spite of the fact that
we had some very tough problems to
contend with. So maybe there is some
formal thing; we'll probably talk about
it. But I think, surely, we have already
said to each other that we want to pay
attention to each other, we want to stay
in touch, we want to create an at-
mosphere of easy discussion and con-
sultation. I am certain that we can do
that— there's no problem at all — and we
will.

Q. A great deal has been written
lately, at least in this country, about
the low ebb of U.S. -Canadian rela-
tions, but I was in Washington 20
years ago, I guess, this weekend when
the Cuban missile crisis began. I
wonder if you could try to put in some
kind of historical perspective the rela-
tionships, at that time, compared with
now; specifically, how the Reagan Ad-
ministration would be likely to re-
spond to that kind of situation and
what sort of response you would ex-
pect from Canada, diplomatically,
militarily?

A. You're positing some problem
with the Soviet Union and then how
would the United States and Canada
relate to it. Is that what your question
is?

Q. Yes, or something more specifi-
cally, like the Cuban missile crisis, a
threat to this hemisphere.

A. I don't want to speculate about
possible threats to the hemisphere. I
would say that, as a general proposition,
the defense arrangements between the
United States and Canada are outstand-
ing— strong, collaborative. I think if
there were some major problem that
constituted a threat to this hemisphere,
we would, undoubtedly, work on it
together.

Q. Would you be satisfied today
with the kind of response that the
Diefenbaker government gave the
Kennedy Administration?

A. You're too good a historian for
me. I know there's been a lot of TV
things on the missile crisis lately, but
one of the problems of this job is that I
don't have much chance to look at things
like that; I'm so busy reading memos,
and things. So I do not want to make
comparisons with that time. I'm just not
up on it enough.

Q. You mentioned the defense ar-
rangements between the two countries
being strong, and I know there's quite
a lot of concern in the United States
that Canada isn't doing as much as it
should be to maintain its NATO and
defense commitment. Could you —

A. I think, in general, we believe in
the United States that the alliance
should be doing more to build and main-
tain its strength. We are critical of
ourselves and critical of the whole thing.
Somehow we have had a period of a
decade or so in which we did not ade-
quately pay attention to the importance
of our military capabilities. There has
been a tremendous effort in the Reagan
Administration to look to the amount
and the quality of our defense capability.
We have made a lot of noise about that
all over the world. We have talked in
Europe about the importance of it, here,
Japan, and elsewhere. I think that it is
true, that we wish that Canada would do
more, and we think that Canada should
do more. We believe the United States
should do more. We think the European
countries should do more. We believe
that all of us have confronting us a very
threatening situation that comes out of
the huge buildup of the Soviet Union,
and the demonstrated willingness of the
Soviet Union to use that strength, ruth-
lessly and without compunction. And so
we have in front of us Afghanistan and
Poland.

I read the paper this morning about
Lech Walesa and how he is being
treated. Imagine in Canada treating a
trade union leader like that. You cannot
imagine it. It is so completely outside

the realm of possibility. But all of this
backed by the formidable military
capability, and we have to look to our
own capability if we are going to ade-
quately defend and look after our in-
terests. That is the point of the whole
thing.

Q. You were talking about the
hemisphere a minute ago in the
related context of Canada-U.S. I
wonder if you could tell me what is
happening to the Caribbean Basin in
tiative and in the case of two coun-
tries: Jamaica, which, of course, is
very much on the self-help road but
with a great deal of difficulties in th
regard. During the IMF, I had a cha
with the governor of the Central Bai
of the Dominican Republic, and they
feel they have done everything that
they're supposed to do for the kind o
program that the initiative is meant
be and, yet, they are being discrimi-
nated against on sugar imports to th
United States and the obviously terri
ble problems with the high cost of
energy imports. So that's a sort of re
joinder.

I wonder if you could tell me,
where it is, if it's going to move for-
ward, and if there will be any change
in it vis-a-vis this kind of response
from some of the potential donor
countries in the Caribbean?

A. Perhaps we could divide the su
ject into three parts. First there's the
financial part. The funds — and I'll spe;
about it from the standpoint of U.S.
funds — that were to be proposed and
made available for help in the Car-
ibbean, some $350 million; we have bee
successful with the Congress in per-
suading them that this should be forth
coming.

Second, there are certain kinds of
trade and investment matters designee
to encourage the investment and eco-
nomic activity which we are working o
with our Congress. There is going to b^
a special session of the Congress, not f
this reason but it's going to take place,
and we are working to get the Congre^
to go along with those parts of the pro
gram. P\)r example, a U.S. firm that
makes an investment in one of the coui
tries designated would get an invest-
ment tax credit against its tax in the
United States. That's an incentive to in
vest there — certain kinds of preferenti;
tariff arrangements and a variety of
things like that which need congres-
sional action in order to take place. An(
of course, in this day and age, with
everyone so concerned about their own
industries, naturallv, it takes a little

THE SECRETARY

liji ing for the Congress to open up trade

ire, from an^'where, in particular in-
if stries. Textiles and shoes are very
jf. isitive industries, as we know. At any
V le, the Administration is working hard
iJ that, and I think that we have a
(Bsonable chance of getting some
lount of those changes.

Now, of course, the third thing,
lich is a major one, is the general
tte of economic activity around the
irld, in the United States, and Canada,
d we are coming out of a recession.
e last two quarters, according to the
itistics, have been slide-up quarters,
t there has been no feel to the
3nomy at all. The ambassador [Paul
)binson, U.S. Ambassador to Canada]
ows, having been a businessman,
Itistics are one thing but when you're
the marketplace you can feel it. And
ere hasn't been any feel to the
onomy until very recently, and in the
it few weeks with the people I know
d keep in touch with, there's begin-
ng to be a slight feel to the economy
)W that maybe things are beginning to
3ve. At any rate, from the standpoint
the Caribbean countries, if our
onomy were stronger and your
onomy were stronger and the world
onomy were going better, obviously
eir economic activity would be better,
they have felt the effects of that.
In the case of Jamaica that you men-
)ned, the fact that the demand for
aminum is very low and they are a big
urce of bauxite is a problem. The
nited States has purchased a lot of
tuxite and sort of stored it, but there's
ily so much of that activity that you
n do. The answer, in the end, is for
|.e economies to move forward and for
;mand naturally to take place. Sugar
•iotas are a big problem in that part of
16 world, and I think you properly iden-
fy something I wish were different, but
lere has been a surge in the production
i' sugar, not only including in Europe,
id there is a lot of it available on the
orld market. The U.S. market is a very
esirable market to sell into because I
on't think particularly to the benefit of
ur own consumers but, if I'm not mis-
iken, the price of sugar in the United
tates is about double what it is on the
'orld market because of the quota
y'stem, so everybody wants a piece of
lat market, naturally. It is true that
'ith the price higher than you can get
nywhere in the world, even though you
lay be restricted somewhat, as com-
ared with the past, as to the volume
lat you put in, the amount of dollars

Secretary Shultz Opens
Conference on Free Elections

Secretary Shultz's remarks before the
Conference on Free Elections at the
Department of State on November Jf,
1982.^

I'm very pleased to have this honor of
opening the Conference on Free Elec-
tions and to welcome you on behalf of
President Reagan, the Department of
State, and our cosponsors, the American
Enterprise Institute. I'm particularly
pleased to greet our honored guests —
President Monge of Costa Rica, Prime
Minister Spadolini of Italy, and Alhaji
Shehu Musa, the personal representative
of President Shagari of Nigeria.

President Reagan announced plans
for this conference in his speech to the
British Parliament last June. In that ad-
dress, the President held out his hand to
join other nations in a global campaign
for peaceful democratic change.

Gathered here today are many of
the leaders of the "Campaign for
Democracy" of which the President
spoke — men and women who helped
forge institutions in their own countries
and who want to help other people lay
the foundations for political freedom.
This conference will consider what you
have accomplished and what we can do
together to further the spread of
democracy.

We are not here to challenge other
countries but to extend an offer to share
our experience and our expertise in
making freedom work. Our objective is
not to criticize but to consider what we
can do to help other nations realize their
democratic aspirations. In that regard,
let me ask you to consider three areas
for action.

First, we should provide concrete
assistance to countries interested in
establishing free elections. We can help
others learn from our experiences and
overcome the initial hurdles of
establishing electoral democracy. Some
governments and private organizations
are already heavily engaged in providing
technical assistance to strengthen the
electoral process. More are now taking
up the challenge.

One month ago in San Jose, eight
Central American, Caribbean, and An-
dean nations resolved to establish a
regional elections institute as part of

their program for peace and democracy
in Central America. Other nations and
regions might follow their example. This
conference should consider what addi-
tional programs might be most effective
and how disparate efforts to support the
spread of free elections could become
more mutually self-supportive.

Second, we need to advocate the
right to free elections more actively and
to affirm that political freedom is a
human rights issue. Individuals have a
right to participate in their own govern-
ance, just as they have the right to be
free from state harassment. The ques-
tion is not how to create this right, for it
already exists; the question is how to
put it into practice on the widest possi-
ble basis.

We need to expand human rights
discussions and activities to include
positive steps that foster free institu-
tions. Only free democratic institu-
tions— including elections, the press, and
labor unions — can break longstanding
patterns of human rights violations,
assure individual liberty, and satisfy the
right to self-government.

Third, we can do more to publicize
the success of democracy and draw at-
tention to the comparative performances
of democratic and nondemocratic na-
tions.

Democracies have, with few excep-
tions, enjoyed greater peace, prosperity,
and stability than their nondemocratic
counterparts. Young democratic nations,
in particular, can play a key role in mak-
ing others recognize that democratic
government is both desirable and work-
able. The experiences and success of
nascent democracies can be both instruc-
tive and encouraging to those who do
not yet share political freedom.

You have a challenging task before
you. You will be considering how the
people of this democratic world can help
bring liberty to the millions who are not
yet permitted to choose their own
leaders. We look to you for fresh,
creative, and concrete ideas that will
help translate our beliefs and com-
mitments into action.

'Press release 344.

cember1982

THE SECRETARY

you get from it can still be substantial
and, while there tends to be a complaint
about the strength of the dollar, those
dollars that you win, you're glad to have
the dollar strong if you happen to have
some, that way. So you identify a
legitimate problem.

It's a problem we're conscious of,
working at, and, I think, in the broader
scheme of things, the Caribbean Basin
initiative is taking shape but, as in all
these things, you can't just wave a wand
and everything suddenly is transformed.
You have to decide on a course of action
and then get going on it and then stick
with it and keep after it. And that's the
key.

Q. There's been statements made
and signals that the Cubans are in-
terested in talking, or were interested
in talking. Are you interested in talk-
ing to the Cubans?

A. The problem isn't talk, it's
behavior. There is a large flow of ar-
maments, much of it coming through
Cuba, not all, but much of it coming
through Cuba, basically originating in
the Soviet Union, that's flowing in to
various countries, particularly in South
America to Nicaragua and from
Nicaragua elsewhere. And, goodness
knows, those countries have enough
problems on their own without a flow of
arms and disruptive activity taking place
that only upsets the area, makes
economic development more difficult,
and so on. There's a pattern of behavior
there that I think is reprehensible.

We also see Cuban troops out
around in other parts of the world—
Angola, for instance, and other places.
The problem isn't talk; the problem is
behavior and that's what one would like
to see change. That's the object. And I
think there's been some record of when,
in the Carter Administration, a pattern
of talk emerged, the result of that was
the behavior got worse, not better.

Q. The Middle East has been
desperately volatile all spring and
summer and is likely to continue that
way. You may not be able to comment
too much, but can you give us some in-
sight as to how you hope things are
going to develop in resolving the
serious problems that exist there?

A. There are plenty of problems in
the Middle East, and we shouldn't forget
that there is a war on between Iraq and
Iran. When you say Middle East, you
are probably thinking about the Arab-
Israeli conflict in Lebanon and so on.
But I remind you that there is that prob-
lem, and it has a lot of repercussions to

it. But, swinging over from that and in
the Middle East — I don't know whether
you include Afghanistan and that set of
problems and the implications for what
surrounds the gulf, but I just put those
markers out there in case you think I've
forgotten about them. But, as far as
Lebanon is concerned, I will comment
on that first.

We had a very good visit with Amin
Gemayel [President of Lebanon] last
week. And, of course, we have been
working with the Lebanese and others
to help get the foreign forces out of
Lebanon and help the government take
control — put together a reconciliation of
the various confessional groups in
Lebanon and start the process of re-
building and reconstructing their culture
and economy and life.

You couldn't help but feel good
about your exposure to Amin Gemayel.
He has a tremendous amount of faith in
his people and told the President and
told others that you just give Lebanon
half a chance and you'll be amazed at
what the people of Lebanon can do and
how they will rebuild and become again
a crossroad to the commercial and trans-
portation and cultural center in the Mid-
dle East. And I believe they will, but
they need a chance.

We have set in our minds an objec-
tive of trying to get the foreign forces
out of Lebanon by the end of this year.
And that's a do-able proposition— I don't
mean by that to say it's easy, or that it's
probable, but it's do-able. And it's a good
objective, and we are going to try hard
to help in every way to bring that off.
There are many angles to that and I'd
be glad to talk about them if you like. I
don't know how much you want to do
that.

Among the things that Gemayel is
very conscious of and talked about a lot
was the importance of the basic peace
process. And if you think about it for a
second, it's easy to see why — because of
all the countries in the Middle East that
have been hit hard by the lack of a solu-
tion to the Palestinian problem and the
conflict resulting from it, Lebanon has
been the one that's been hurt the most,
almost an innocent bystander. Hut they
have been clobbered by all of that, going
way back for almost 10 years now. He
has and feels a great stake in the peace
process and was quite forthcoming in
the strength of his support for President
Reagan's initiatives.

The interest in the peace process is
very much alive. The visit that we had in
Washington on Friday from King
Hassan [of Morocco] as a leader of an

rei

Arab League delegation that included :
complete spectrum of views in the Ar?.
world was evidence of that. I would sa
the overall result of that meeting was ;
constructive one, and it was evidence
that on the Arab side they are very
much interested in trying to work out
peace. I'm sure the Israelis are in-
terested in peace.

We're always being asked about ou
strategy and what sort of leverages ar
we going to be using as whatever help
we can give in bringing about a peacef
situation. The President, though, puts
up front in that that the big lever is
peace. If you've lived in an area that h:
seen lots of war, seen lots of bloodshec
and the ravishing of the countrj'side,
and you live in that atmosphere all the
time, the possibility of peace is a big
thing. We're so accustomed to it here i
Canada and the United States that we
take it for granted like air. But, if you
live out there, you don't take it for
granted and you think that, that if
there's a possibility of that it's just ter-
rific. That we count on as the big objec
tive and the more we can get that
possibility up into people's minds and
consciousness, the better chance, I
think, we'll have of people being willin;
to make the compromises and take the
chances and risks that they have to tal
if a peaceful resolution is to emerge.

Q. You found Gemayel impressec

A. Yes.

Q. More so than you would have
found his brother —

A. I never met his brother. His
brother was a ver>' impressive and
strong person, and it's a tragedy that 1
was killed. Anyway, Amin Gemayel is
the President of Lebanon. He's a good
person and a person with a great
amount of strength and understanding
He has a verj- positive outlook on the
prospects for his country. We're worki
with him.

Q. [Inaudible]

A. Canada has been very supporti^
in a general way, and that's been quite
helpful. Of course, working on some-
thing like this has many dimensions to
it. For example, the Arab onslaught to
get Israel removed from the United Na
tions has not been particularly helpful.
And, as you know, we have fought ver;
hard about that. Canada has been right
there. We have worked in tandem on
that subject.

Q. Canada has been supportive ol
the peace plan—
A. Yes.

Department of State Bulleti

THE SECRETARY

Q. —in very general terms, it is
eed to be specifically supportive of
peace plan.

A. I have the feeling from the talks
had with Mr. MacEachen so far that
ere's something specific that needs

3e done, it's possible to consider it.

t, I don't know what you have in

id, if there is some particular thing

t you are asking about.

Q. Did you take that to mean that
nada would be willing to provide
ops for the multinational force or —

A. That subject didn't come up.
lat the missions for the multinational
ce will be as this process unfolds is

being talked about. We have had
cussions with the French and the
ians with whom we are partners
re in that multinational force. Each
intry has not committed itself to do
ything different than it is now doing,
t each has said that it's willing to con-
er having its forces used if there is
•ne definable, constructive mission —
d everyone will take a look at that.
nin Gemayel has asked that the
mbers in the multinational force be in-
ased very substantially — by as much
10 times the current amount. That's
ite a lot, and I think it's a question of
lether that's really necessary. But
re are some additional things that
ed to be done and probably a role for
mewhat expanded forces. There's also
question of what the UNIFIL [U.N.
terim Force in Lebanon] force will do.
1 those things would be looked at.

There have been several countries
at have indicated to us that they
)uld be willing to consider contributing
that force.

Q. You responded that King
issan did not say the Arab countries
lere prepared to recognize Israel, but
ily if Israel would move the bound-
ies would they recognize Israel.

A. What people's perception of
ovement is always an interesting one.
think in the eyes of the Arabs, they
ive moved dramatically. That is,
ley've come together, they were all
lere at once. King Hassan spoke of
)existence, he spoke of Resolutions
i2, 338, the President's peace initiative,
id the Fez initiative as being the basis
)r peace. I don't know what other im-
lication you can draw than that the
rabs accept the fact that Israel is there
nd that's a permanent part of the
igion. Now the effort is to figure out
Dw to make an arrangement that is
eaceful with Israel. As they see it, they
lade a lot of movement, and they have.

Q. Do you foresee some time when
Mr. Reagan's plan will be different
from what is on the table?

A. What we are working for is the
emergence of another Arab leader. King
Hussein, to join [Egyptian] President
Mubarak, ourselves, and [Israeli] Prime
Minister Begin in a discussion— bargain-
ing you might say, negotiation. The
Arabs pointed out that in the end it's
very difficult for anyone other than
someone with a label "Palestinian" on
him to make concessions on behalf of
Palestinians. Just as I'm sure it's true
that somehow people think that the
United States can speak for Israel. That
is not true at all. Only Israel can make
bargains on behalf of Israel properly.
Just as no one can make bargains on
behalf of Canada except Canadians or
the United States except the United
States. That's part of life. How you con-
struct a Palestinian association with
[Jordanian] King Hussein is something
he's struggling with.

It is worth pointing out that in the
Camp David accords, it is expressedly
foreseen that there would be at the
bargaining table representatives of Jor-
dan and the Palestinians. That's right in
there. This is not some far off point at
all, but it is getting people into the
negotiating context that's the key, and
the President has set out positions that
the United States will take in that
negotiation. Other people, obviously,
have announced other positions that
they'll take.

Generally speaking, if you don't have
different positions around, there's no
need for a negotiation. That's what you
talk about. I think it is being missed by
many that the process envisaged is kind
of a two-stage one — stage one, where in-
terim or transition arrangements are
established and stage two, where a final
status is arrived at. The widely varying
positions that have been set out are all
about final status. I think it may well be
possible to work out transition arrange-
ments that really provide a better situa-
tion for the Palestinian people of the
West Bank and Gaza and give a chance
for that situation to mature a little bit
and probably be helpful in thinking
about what will work in a final status.

Q. The Israeli Defense Minister,
Mr. Sharon, has told the public in-
quiry in Israel that he takes personal
responsibility for the Christians to
enter the camps. He had no idea what
would occur. Have you got any reac-
tion to that?

A. No. I don't want to get into
Canadian internal politics; I don't want
to get into Israeli internal politics either.
They are investigating the massacre,
and I think that's a healthy thing for
Israel to do. We'll follow that investiga-
tion with great interest.

Q. When the Reagan peace fund
came out, Mark MacGuigan at that
point was the Minister of External Af-
fairs. He said he was very supportive
of the plan, with one possible excep-
tion and that is that Canada does not
exclude the possibility of an independ-
ent Palestinian state. What are the
Administration's objectives to full
self-determination on the West Bank
or Gaza?

A. Self-determination and full self-
determination — those are tricky con-
cepts. We're always having it put to us,
isn't the United States for self-
determination, and how can you be
against self-determination everywhere,
and so on. We had a Civil War in the
United States upon self-determination,
and we think that there are constraints
upon that. Certainly you have self-
determination within some framework. I
don't think there's any logical incon-
sistency in the position we've taken. I
think it is a question of whether that
strip of land called the West Bank and
the disconnected other parts of land
called the Gaza Strip can somehow con-
stitute a country and be able to have the
kind of capability that you think a coun-
try ought well to have. That, on the
economic side, is one point.

Second, I think there is a legitimate
concern, considering all the background
and statements made by the PLO [Pales-
tinian Liberation Organization] in Israel
about what it would mean to have a unit
with that much hostility established as
an independent state on its border.
What would be its objective? Israel has
taken the position that it won't go along
with that.

Then it seems as though there are
better alternatives. The West Bank has
been and to a certain extent is now
associated with Jordan. Jordanian law
still applies as a general proposition
there. There is a tremendous amount of
movement of people and goods between
Jordan and the West Bank. There's a
natural economic unity there. The Presi-
dent has put forward the idea of the
West Bank having a capacity for self-
government as a province here would, or
I don't want to try to define the precise
way in which that would take place but
in association with Jordan — and also you

!cember1982

THE SECRETARY

would expect there to be a free flow of
goods and people with Israel. And you
would have something that could work
and, on the one hand, not constitute a
potential destabilizing force. On the
other, an economic entity that could
operate well. At the same time, I think
it's important that there be something
that Palestinians can identify with. It's
not only the people who live in the West
Bank and Gaza that you have to have in
your mind but Palestinians who live else-
where who essentially have no passport
and no identity and something needs to
be created that will provide that for
them. I think it could be done that way.

Q. Are you going to be talking
about the Middle East with Mr.
MacEachen or are you going to be
talking about bilateral issues?

A. We talked some in our first ses-
sion about the Middle East, and I'd
doubt that we'd spend much more time
on that. I understand that the Prime
Minister may well be at lunch — he may
want to discuss it some, in which case
we would.

Q. In your discussion of bilateral
issues — going back to where we
started — could you describe how in-
tense you regard the problems you
describe with Foreign Investment
Review Act —

A. There are a great variety of
problems. It seems to me any two major
countries that are as large as our two
countries and with as much interaction
between them and interdependence be-
tween them as ours, there's going to be
a continuing flow of problems through
time. It seems to me there are two
aspects in working on those problems.

First is to address yourself to the
general atmosphere within which an in-
dividual problem is worked out. And,
then second, to work on that individual
problem separate from all the other
problems. On the one hand, I'm sure Mr.
MacEachen and I will look at these
various issues and talk about them
some, although we don't have the time
to sort of go into each one in a lot of
detail. But we are also trying to con-
struct a general umbrella, you might
say, of constructive spirit and outlook
that has historically been the case be-
tween the United States and Canada
and is today. We can improve on it so
that we create an atmosphere within
which those who are going to take up
these individual issues can do so in a
constructive spirit.

Q. It is my understanding that
that constructive spirit does not exist.
Problems are rather more intense
than —

A. No, I don't think that's a fair
statement. It is the amount of aggra-
vation and tension over things that
varies as time goes along. Perhaps it's a
little higher than it has been — than
usual, but when you compare the rela-
tionship between the United States and
Canada with the relationship of most
neighboring countries that have a lot of
interdependence with each other around
the world, our relationship, relatively
speaking, looks terrific. It can go up and
down somewhat, but basically it's a good
strong relationship and sometimes in our
preoccupation with individual issues —
not that those aren't important and not
that they shouldn't fight about them — it
can cause us to lose the perspective of
the overall picture. And we need to keep
that in front of us once in a while.

I'm a great believer, incidentally,
that you don't improve a relationship by
failing to represent yourself strongly in
the discussion of particular issues. The
worst thing in the world that I could do
is to say, "Well, in the interest of better
U.S. -Canadian relationships, I'll forget
about some issue that is of great impor-
tance to the United States and U.S. in-
terests." That's the way, in the end, to
undermine a relationship. I'm sure the
Canadians would feel the same way.

We have to put these issues up on
the table and confront them and work at
them and argue about them and even-
tually resolve them. That's the way to
build a strong relationship; in fact, it's
the measure of a strong relationship
that you can surface problems and argue
about them, and the relationship re-
mains strong.

This goes back to the subject that
Allan MacEachen and I studied together
years and years and years ago — labor
relations problems, the same thing be-
tween labor and management. The
woods are full of relationships between a
union and the management that were
superb and people became so enamoured
with what a good relationship it was
that they wouldn't discuss any issue —
even though it was an important
issue — because they didn't want to spoil
the relationship. And in the end that's
what brings a relationship down. I think
the way to have a good and strong rela-
tionship is that you do discuss the prob-
lems, but you discuss them within the
framework of the expectation that our
ties and our involvement with each other
are so strong and enduring that in the
end we'll find answers to these things.

Q. You and MacEachen have a
totally different philosophy; I submit
you may have gone to the same schoc
You're much more a private enter-
priser than he is. Reagan is much
more a private enterpriser than
Trudeau is. So you start talking; hov
do you ag^ree to disagree on the mixe
sort of economy we have and your
dedication to private enterprise?

A. We're not trying to tell you hov
to run your country, and don't try to t(
us how to run ours. But each running '
our countries the way we want, we,
nevertheless, have successfully worked
at the issues that have come up betwee
us. The fact of the matter is that with ^
whatever differences there have been,
there has been a very worthwhile and
constructive — for everybody — relation-
ship between these two countries. Lest
we overemphasize whatever philosophu
differences there may be — and I don't
expect that they're that great — let's no
forget the tremendous commonality of
basic values — of democratic values, of
concern for the individual human being
of religious freedom, shall we note the
right of people to form unions, just to
contrast with it some other countries,
and to assemble and to express them-
selves, and all of these things that we
have in common. When you look arount
the world today and ask yourself how
many major countries are there that
share these values, I wish the number
were higher. So we have tremendous,
deep values in common that we both
cherish and that we want to see flourisl

'Press release 336. 1

Department of State Bulletin

THE SECRETARY

ecretary Interviewed for
.S. News & World Report

Secretary Shultz was interviewed for
3. News & World Report, published
Ivember 8. 1982.

President Reagan said recently that
Soviets have not gained a single
itional inch of foreign territory
iiice he took office. Does this mean

t the Soviet threat is not as
4ngerous as the Administration had
sumed?

A. The threat is still great, but the
esident has put forward a strong and
nfident American voice. He has
)rked hard to develop American
•ength and to develop the strength of
r alliances.

All of this has not gone unnoticed
ound the world. The Soviets must
low that they have a very realistic,
ugh-minded President on their hands
t the moment.

Q. Are you saying that this has
oterred the Soviets from military
ilventures that they must have con-
tmplated?

A. You would have to ask them.
' le fact of the matter is that before
-esident Reagan took office, they
emed to be moving in here, there, and
sewhere all the time. Since his arrival,
ie picture has been different.

Q. Where do the Soviets pose the
reatest threat now?

A. The most important overall prob-
m that we have to contend with is the
•emendous military buildup that they've
istained over the last 10 years. In
jlative terms, we've not conducted any-
ling like that.

The balance of armaments has
lifted somewhat, and it is the military
apability — plus their demonstrated
dllingness to use it without compunc-
lon if they see an opportunity — that has
3 constitute the main threat. You can
oint to particular areas where they
ave exercised that power directly, such
s in Afghanistan. There are other
laces that are well known. But the
verall problem is the massive military
uildup, and we are now responding to
lat.

Q. The President and others have
poken of the Soviet Union's being in
historical decline — teetering on the
dge of social, political, and economic

collapse. Will internal weakness in-
hibit Soviet behavior, or is it likely to
provoke more foreign adventures in
years to come?

A. Of course, to the extent that
your economy and society aren't func-
tioning well, it limits your options. The
Soviets have chosen to build up their
military capability dramatically, and, of
course, that's been at the expense of im-
provement in the lives of their people.
The less well their economy works, the
more that kind of allocation of resources
will cause difficulties for them.

It is by now very apparent that the
Communist type of command economy
simply doesn't work very well. Look at
the countries that have taken on that
kind of system and look at their eco-
nomic performances. Compare them
with those economies where the people
can operate with a little more freedom,
where the market system is permitted to
function. The comparisons are quite
dramatic and quite unpleasant for
anyone within a Communist economy.

Q. Is this influencing global at-
titudes—perhaps in the Third
World — toward a turn from Soviet to
Western values?

A. There is an awareness of what is
going on. People and their leaders can
see it around them.

Take Asia. Where are the bright
spots? Japan, of course. But look at the
comparison of North Korea and South
Korea. Look at economic development in
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore. Those
are success stories. Market economies
have done better.

What the agony of Poland shows as
vividly as anything one could imagine is
the total and absolute bankruptcy of the
way in which Communist leaders go
about things. The Polish people are
wonderful people, and their courage is
something you have to admire. Imagine
taking people like that and, through
government intervention, creating such
chaos! Any system of government that
achieves that must have something
drastically and fatally wrong with it.

Q. Just what is the Administra-
tion's objective in pressing for tougher
restrictions on credit and trade with
the Soviet Union?

A. There are two basic points.
First, given the Soviet military buildup
and the challenge it poses to us, can

anyone think of any reason why we
should indulge in trade that helps them
in their military capacity? The answer is
no, we shouldn't deliver technological
benefits to Moscow.

Second, we are spending lots of
money on defense and so are our allies.
Why are we doing that? There's only one
reason: Russia's military buildup. Why
should we subsidize its economy, on
which that very buildup depends?

We want to tailor the trade policies
of ourselves and of our allies to avoid
either of these two activities.

Q. Aside from the possible effect
on the Soviet military buildup, are
these policies also aimed at compelling
international political change in
Russia or influencing its international
behavior?

A. What the outcome of these
policies will be and how far they go re-
main to be seen.

The Soviets' military buildup seems
to continue very strong. They appear
determined to keep going in that regard.
Will we be successful in negotiating gen-
uine arms reductions with them, as
President Reagan has proposed? That's
an open question, but the greater this
sense of economic constraint, the more
likely it is that the Soviets might be
tempted to reduce this buildup of arma-
ments. We can stop subsidizing them
and stop giving them high technology
that is difficult to develop and most
helpful to their military buildup. I'm not
going to predict that :;his is going to
bring down their system. That is not the
point of the exercise.

Q. The President recently pro-
posed replacing sanctions against the
Soviet-European natural gas pipeline
with a different set of restrictions on
trade and credits to the Soviet Union.
Does that imply that he has accepted
the argument that the pipeline sanc-
tions hurt the West more than they do
the Russians?

A. No. What he is saying is that the
United States wants the most effective
possible program. A program that com-
mands wide support from our allies —
which the pipeline sanctions lacked — will
be far more effective than one that we
have to carry on by ourselves. If we find
agreement on a significant set of prop-
ositions, we prefer that. It's only sensi-
ble. This kind of agreement would be
much more effective. The President will
only shift if he's shifting to something
better.

icember1982

THE SECRETARY

Q. How do you answer the criti-
cism that the President's eagerness to
sell U.S. grain to the Soviets under-
mines the credibility of this whole
policy of economic sanctions?

A. We've given the answer many
times, but I'll give it again. With grain,
the United States is selling something
for hard currency, and that forces the
Soviets to spend their scarce foreign ex-
change. So that's a benefit for us and a
drag on Russia economically. Grain is
not a military good, whereas high
technology contributes to the Soviets'
military and strategic capabilities. So
selling grain is not a drag on the West
militarily.

Concerning the gas pipeline
specifically, the problems that we have
with that are that it is subsidized at very
cheap credit rates, saving Russia a great
deal of money. When all is said and
done, the West will have given the
Soviet Union a device that will produce
an even greater flow of foreign ex-
change. In addition, it will lead to Euro-
pean dependency on Soviet gas in cer-
tain areas.

Q. Some argue that by selling
them grain, the United States relieves
the Soviets of having to invest more in
their own agriculture —

A. The fact that they have to spend
their money for the grain means that
they have to make an allocation decision
for foreign exchange, which is very
scarce for them. We also have to face
the fact that we are not the only country
that produces grain. It's a competitive
market.

Q. Given Leonid Brezhnev's im-
pending exit from the scene, will
changes in the Soviet leadership bring
significant shifts in how Moscow
operates abroad?

A. It is very difficult for us to
speculate intelligently about what
changes may come about in the Soviet
leadership after the Brezhnev era. We
know a fair amount about the in-
dividuals, but nothing can be said with
certainty.

What we can know is our own
policies and the kinds of respon.ses we're
willing to make to their behavior. This is
what we want to say to whatever leader-
ship emerges: "Insofar as the United
States is concerned, here is what you
confront and here are your choices."
That's the way we can make an impact
on their thinking.

Q. What sort of options, specifical-
ly, are we leaving open for Brezhnev's
successor or successors in Moscow?

A. It's very clear that the United
States is a strong country. We are
determined to build and maintain our
strength— and that strength is military,
that strength is economic, that strength
is moral and political. So we have that
strength, and our allies are strong. And
under those circumstances, with our
willpower, we will be able to take care
of our interests and look after them
well. We can compete in the area of
power. If that's the kind of world they
want, we can do just fine.

We can say, also, that that kind of
world is not necessarily inevitable. There
are outstanding proposals for arms re-
ductions. There are all sorts of ways in
which a different relationship can
develop, depending on their behavior
toward military might, toward agres-
sion, toward human values.

"If you change your behavior, Mr.
Soviet Union, you can get a good re-
sponse from us. But in the meantime,
you have an adversary that is strong
and is determined and can take care of
itself." That's what we're saying.

Q. Only a few months ago, Arab
nations were shunning any sort of col-
laboration with Washington. Now
even radical states such as Syria and
Algeria have just sent their foreign
ministers to Washington to discuss
prospects for a Middle East peace.
How do you explain this shift?

A. There are many influences. The
President's "fresh-start" Mideast peace
proposals are among them. It is impor-
tant to emphasize that the President's
proposals all fall squarely within the
framework of Camp David. The more
you look at and study the Camp David
accords, the more respect you have for
them and their ingenuity.

The President's initiative — with its
guarantee of the security of Israel and
its clear recognition of absolute necessi-
ty of the legitimate rights of the
Palestinian people— has been read with
great interest in the Arab world. It
seems to me also that by this time peo-
ple can see that a military option to
peace in the Middle East doesn't look
very promising, either to Arabs or
Israelis. The area is ripe for peace,
wants peace, needs peace, and knows
that continual warfare is — literally and
figuratively — a dead end.

Q. But now that the key Arab and
Israeli representatives have been here
to meet with the President and you, ,
what do you see as the next step in i
the process? i

A. The next step in the process is
for King Hussein of Jordan, with sup- 1
port from the Arab world and participa-
tion of some form of Palestinian rejire-
sentation, to express a willingness to sit
down and negotiate with Israel on t lu'
future of the occupied West Bank and
Gaza Strip areas. This is something that
has to take place. If he does so, it will bi
very difficult for any Government of
Israel to say no. And I'm quite certain
that it wouldn't say that.

In the meantime, of course, the
problems of Lebanon are still to be dealt
with. It was interesting to me to see
how attentive Lebanon's President Amir f
Gemayel was to the peace process and
how central he sees it to the future of
Lebanon. If any people have suffered
from the lack of any resolution to the
Palestinian problem, it's the Lebanese.

Q. From what you know of the re-
cent meetings between King Hussein
and Palestine Liberation Organization
leader Yasir Arafat, do you expect
Jordan to be given the mandate to
negotiate peace on behalf of the
Palestinians, as the United States
desires?

A. We're clearly not there just yet.
We have lots of reports, and the reports
we have are suggestive in many ways.
Rather than speculating about what
somebody else is saying, we should wait
for them to say what the outcome of
their discussions might be.

Q. Will Hussein be coming to
Washington soon?

A. The King is very welcome here,
and he certainly knows that. I'm sure
that he wants to come and talk directly
with the President. And the question is:
What is the right time?

Q. Doesn't the Reagan peace plan
face an insurmountable obstacle in
Israel's flat rejection not only of the
idea of a Palestinian state but of any
surrender of sovereigntv in the West
Bank?

A. It is a difference of opinion about
what is the right answer to what is
generally called the "final status" issues.
They are just that: issues about the final
status of the region. It's seldom the case

Department of State Bulletin

THE SECRETARY

"ftt people enter negotiations with
'ftrybody agreed on everything. There
'A differences of view, and they are im-
•tant ones.

We beheve that the important thing
;o get into the direct discussions and
,rt talking about the positions that
jple take and why they take them and
at their objectives are and then start
king for the kind of compromises that
1 bring about a peaceful resolution.

The process that is envisaged is one
it first establishes a transition or in-
•im arrangement. And that interim ar-
igement itself should be very bene-
ial to the people who live on the West
,nk and Gaza.

Q. Will expanding the multina-
tmal peacekeeping force in Lebanon

Jd extending its stay, as President
(mayel requested, mean that the
is. military force in Lebanon will re-
iiin beyond the end of the year and
grhaps even be strengthened?

A. The end of year has been set in
f ople's minds as a time when we'd like
i see the foreign forces out. That's a
omment made not only by us but by
Irael. I don't think anyone has said the
ultinational force itself has to be out
I that time. We're not committed to a
Inger stay, but we're certainly willing
1 look at it to see whether or not it's
! mething that we think we could do.

Q. Are you concerned about recent
:eetings between the Soviets and
iiiinese and the possibility of rap-
■ochement between their countries?

A. Our decision to have a strong
lationship with the Chinese stands on
3 own feet as something desirable to

do. It is desirable regardless of their
relationship with the Russians, whatever
that might be. Of course, we're in-
terested in Sino-Soviet relations. If, for
example, as a result of those negotia-
tions there is an improvement in the
situation in Kampuchea or Afghanistan,
we're for that. China and Russia have
been at odds in those two places for
some time.

Q. But do you see a danger that
Russia and China could draw so
closely together again that it would
jeopardize our interests?

A. We could sit here and play "20
Questions" and conjure up all sorts of
things. I won't play that game.

The question is: What is going on
now? They are having discussions about
many things. For example, we know
that the Chinese are very concerned, as
we are, about Russian activities, directly
and indirectly, in Kampuchea and
Afghanistan. If, through their discus-
sions, Vietnamese and Russian influence
is removed from Kampuchea, we're for
that. If the Russians leave Afghanistan,
we're for that.

Q. How far, in your view, should
we go to strengthen ties with China?
Should we go to the extent of seeking
some form of strategic cooperation or
wider economic cooperation?

A. We want to build up a strong
relationship with China. And if you take
the perspective of the last 10 years, we
are gradually doing that. It's an impor-
tant country, and the Chinese people are
a marvelous people. So we want to have
our relationship with them develop on
economic fronts and strategic fronts.

Q. In the past couple of months,
we've seen a general lowering of ten-
sion in U.S. relations with a wide
spectrum of nations— China, European
allies, the Arab world. To what do you
attribute this? The difference in per-
sonal style between yourself and
former Secretary of State Alexander
Haig or something else?

A. All the things you mentioned, as
well as others, are the result of the
President's policies. I have been working
with him, but whatever happens is
basically ascribable to the President.
Those are all good moves, and they
reflect what the President has been
doing.

I've worked with the President. He's
the same person that I've worked with
over many years; I don't see any dif-
ference. It's the same Ronald Reagan
that was Governor of California and that
I knew during the campaign and before
the campaign. He's a tough guy, and
he's very decisive. He has a definite
point of view, and he works for it in a
constructive way.

Q. In the 4 months you have been
Secretary of State, how have you man-
aged to prevent a splurge of stories
about friction between you and the
White House and you and the Pen-
tagon?

A. It's just a tribute to the underly-
ing penchant of the press for accuracy.

Q. Do you mean there is no fric-
tion to report?

A. Appearances are not deceiv-
ing. ■

3cember 1982

AFRICA

U.S. Response to the Challenge
of Regional Security in Africa

by Chester A. Crocker

Address before the Baltimore Council
on Foreign Relations on October 28,
1982. Mr. Crocker is Assistant Secretary
for African Affairs.

You in Baltimore do not have to be told
about the economic interdependence of
nations or about our need to expand
trade links in the Third World, which
has been the main area of expansion for
American exports in recent years. Yet in
considering today the security problems
facing Africa, we are also discussing the
interaction of political, economic, and
security factors that comprise American
interests in Africa. Security is one com-
ponent of an equation.

We too often consider our relations
with the 50 nations of Africa in one of
two highly simplistic ways. The
globalists would have us believe that
events in Africa are explainable as re-
actions to initiatives and manipulations
from the key centers of world power.
African goals, motives, and dynamics
are, in this view, of only minor impor-
tance. Conversely, the regionalists stress
the complex array of strictly African
factors to explain events in the region.
They suggest that the role of external
motivations and power relationships is
superficial and ephemeral. Both views
are seriously flawed and — when pressed
to extremes — potentially dangerous.
Most African events are obviously ex-
plainable in local terms and to ignore or
be insensitive to these factors is folly.
Yet it is equally true that Africa is a full
participant in the global economic and
political system. Africa is directly in-
fluenced by — just as it also helps
shape— the competitive arena of world
politics.

Just to state that we have security
interests in Africa is not to say that we
seek to promote East- West confronta-
tion there, which we do not. We have no
mandate to be the gendarme of Africa
nor do we seek that role. Certainly we
have no economic or political interests in
Africa that are served by local arms
races or by instability itself. On the con-
trary, our interests are best served by

political and economic stability, which
foster the peaceful development of
modern African economic and political
institutions that can interact with our
own to mutual advantage. Our overarch-
ing strategic goal in Africa is to help
establish the rules of the game that will
limit and discourage the application of
outside force in African conflicts.

There is a security challenge in
Africa because there are real security
threats to individual African nations and
regions. Internal instability, often in
tandem with external adventurism,
plagues many African countries. Border
struggles, which have often evolved
from uncertain colonial arrangements,
create serious regional problems. Ethnic
rivalries have precipitated civil wars,
sometimes leading to cross-border
violence. The mere management of
modest security forces overtaxes the
meager resources of many states. These
circumstances are often exploited by
outside powers unfriendly to us, and in
this manner a problem having clearly
African roots can acquire broader global
implications.

When this occurs, we face a new
factor in the global balance we cannot
ignore. Neither we in the West nor
African states can gain when one out-
side power seeks unilateral advantage
through the projection or application of
military force in Africa. Africa, like the
West, is the loser when regional actors
are encouraged to pursue violent rather
than negotiated solutions. In such cir-
cumstances, we believe that unilateral
self-denial by Western countries cannot
strengthen African security or nonalign-
ment; instead, it erodes the climate of
confidence necessary to achieve them.
The United States cannot be a credible
partner if it ignores friendly African
states who turn to us in real defensive
need. The solution to conflicts in Africa
does not rest with U.S. abstinence while
others rush in to exploit regional strife.
This Administration stands ready to help
bolster the security of countries so af-
fected.

The sobering fact is that it is not the
West but the Soviet bloc that has sup-
plied Africa with 60%-70% of its arms
In 1981 the United States was only in
fifth place as a source of arms for
Africa. Instead, we continue to em-
phasize economic over military
assistance at a ratio of 3 to 1. Next
fiscal year we have planned roughly $1
billion in assistance for sub-Saharan
Africa. Of this only $243 million is for
military sales and training. This con-
trasts sharply with the Soviet bloc's
overwhelming preponderance of military
over economic assistance.

Peaceful development is the only
way Africa will find solutions to the
critical social and economic challenges it
faces. Africa is struggling to survive its
worst economic crisis since World
War II. This explains our emphasis on
economic assistance. We clearly
recognize that even minimal conditions
of security in Africa will be elusive
unless African states can stabilize their
economies and regain the path of
development. But instability and in-
securi^ frustrate this effort. When in-
security is fueled by external forces, we
promote African, as well as our own, in-
terests in helping African friends to re-
sist and overcome it.

Organization of African Unity
and Chad

This is the key to an effective policy, the
fact that Africans and we both seek
peaceful change and the security condi-
tions needed for development and nation
building. This is an essential element in
our support for the Organization of
African Unity (OAU), whose charter and
foreign policy principles we endorse. The
OAU is dedicated to protecting Africa's
territorial integrity' and defending the
continent from external aggression and
subversion. We give strong support to
its mediation and peacekeeping activities
within Africa, as do our allies.

Our cooperative efforts with the
OAU have paid off. For example, U.S.
policy toward Chad, aimed at countering
Libyan military adventurism, has yielded

Department of State Bulletin

AFRICA

iportant dividends over the past 12
lonths. In 1980, 7,000 Libyan troops in-
irvened in the Chadian civil war and
luickly became a major source of
egional instability, posing a direct
hreat along Sudan's border and
ti reating great worry among the other
. tates bordering Chad. Seriously con-
, erned by the Libyan presence, we and
ithers encouraged the Chadians to ask
or Libya's withdrawal and to seek OAU
lelp in solving internal problems. In late
981, the then provisional Chadian
Government, headed by former Presi-
■ lent Goukouni called upon Libya to
•emove its military force. We then work-
ed closely with the OAU to prepare the
vay for an African peacekeeping force
.0 maintain order in Chad once the Lib-
yans left. An African peacekeeping
'orce— organized by the OAU Chairman,
Kenya's President Daniel Arap
Woi— was subsequently deployed into
'Zhad in record time before serious fac-
tional violence could break out in the
raid left behind by the Libyans. This re-
markable achievement reflects favorably
on Chairman Moi and the troop donor
countries— Nigeria, Zaire, and Senegal.

For our part, the United States
moved directly to facilitate and support
this peacekeeping effort. We allocated
'$12 million to support the Nigerian and
Zairian contingents with nonlethal equip-
ment and to aid transport of supplies to
Chad. We also supported OAU efforts to
promote reconciliation among various
Chadian factions. By June 1982,
Goukouni, who refused reconciliation ef-
forts proposed by the OAU, had been
forced out of Chad and replaced by his
principal rival, Hissene Habre. The OAU
concluded that its troops could be with-
drawn. For the past 4 months Habre has
consolidated his control over the entire
country and actively pursued the goal of
internal political reconciliation. The
United States has been responding to
the urgent humanitarian needs in Chad
with emergency food shipments, air
transport of food to hard-hit areas in
rural Chad, and provision of emergency
assistance.

Chad's problems are far from over.
Libya still occupies a band of territory
which it claims across the north of the
country and seems prepared to support
insurrection again. The country's
economy and infrastructure are shat-
tered and the political fissures from
many years of civil war will not be
bridged overnight.

Chad's reconstruction and reconcilia-
tion must proceed apace if Libya is to be
denied another opportunity for foreign
meddling in a sensitive area. Recogniz-
ing this, the United States has just
signed an agreement to provide $2.8
million in rehabilitation assistance over
the coming year. We will also be sup-
porting an international donors' con-
ference which the United Nations and
OAU are organizing to get urgently
needed economic assistance flowing. The
initial international response to Chad's
plight has been heartening, particularly
the massive international food airlift,
which took place in September and cer-
tainly was responsible for saving many
hundreds, if not thousands, of lives.

Southern Africa

Perhaps nowhere in Africa have our
security concerns, and our security
policies, been more intensely engaged
than in southern Africa. This region,
from Zaire to the Cape of Good Hope,
contains the bulk of Africa's mineral
wealth, its most developed industrial
structure, and almost two-thirds of the
continent's gross national product. It is
also a region threatened with the pros-
pect of heightened violence and polariza-
tion that could lead to great power con-
frontation. It is precisely to avoid that
possibility of violence and confrontation
that we have fashioned a major effort to
bring about regional peace and security.
Southern Africa is a complex region
and its many characteristics and con-
flicts cannot be easily summarized. But
two major sources of tension dominate
the scene. One is that South Africa — the
richest and most powerful state in the
region, governed by a white minority
that has erected a structure of legally
entrenched racial separation to protect
itself — feels surrounded and threatened
by its black-ruled neighbors. South
Africa believes that it must preempt any
armed threat — guerrOla or conven-
tional— from its neighbors and is
prepared to use its military superiority
to that end. Until there develops a struc-
ture of understanding — some reciprocal-
ly understood basis for coexistence — be-
tween South Africa and its neighbors,
this situation will remain a major source
of instability and could result in growing
violence across borders. To say this is
not to downplay the urgency or the
gravity of South Africa's own domestic
agenda. Movement toward a system

based on consent, shaped by South
Africans of all races, is essential for that
country's stability and survival. But that
process is unlikely to occur peacefully in
conditions of heightened international
violence across South African borders.

The second great source of tension
came with the collapse of the Portu-
guese empire in southern Africa in
1974-75 and the decision of the U.S.S.R.
to inject its power into the vacuum that
resulted. Soviet arms had been fed to in-
surgent movements in this part of
Africa for many years, but in 1975 the
U.S.S.R. supported the deployment of
25,000 Cuban troops to Angola. This
direct injection of Soviet and proxy
military force in southern Africa posed a
challenge to the future of the region. It
exacerbated South Africa's feelings of
threat from its neighbors and it
threatened long-term Western access to
the region's minerals and economic
resources. Without question, it raised to
a new threshold the tension between
South Africa and its neighbors and af-
fected the calculations of all who live in
this region.

It is not overstatement to note that
the political future of Africa will be
shaped by the ways in which the deep
tensions and problems of southern
Africa are eventually resolved. It is for
these reasons that this Administration
has adopted a policy of constructive
engagement in southern Africa. The
search for a more stable, secure, and
prosperous southern Africa will be a
long and arduous process, but there is
no other responsible course for
American policy. There are many
aspects to this effort, but we judged that
the place to start was with the inter-
related conflicts in Namibia and Angola.

A year ago, we were in the initial
stages of the revived negotiations on
Namibian independence on the basis of
U.N. Security Council Resolution 435.
Working closely with our Western five
contact group partners and the other
parties to the negotiations, we have
come a long way since then. On July 12,
we were able to conclude phase I of the
negotiations— agreement on a set of
principles concerning the constituent
assembly and the constitution for an in-
dependent Namibia. Since then, we have
also made considerable progress on re-
maining questions, including the impar-

December 1982

AFRICA

tiality of all parties in U.N.-supervised
elections and the size, deployment, and
composition of UNTAG-the U.N. Tran-
sition Assistance Group, which would be
responsible for monitoring implementa-
tion of the U.N. plan for Namibian in-
dependence embodied in Security Coun-
cil Resolution 435. With the exception of
the electoral system for the constituent
assembly and final agreement on the
battalions for UNTAG, we are close to
implementation of the U.N. plan.

At the same time, we have always
made clear that there is also a vitally im-
portant Angolan agenda which must be
addressed. Seven years after Angola's
independence from Portugal, thousands
of Cuban combat forces and a substan-
tial number of Soviet advisers remain in
that country, as participants in a tragic
and prolonged civil war. The presence of
these forces has— since their introduc-
tion in 1975— profoundly affected the
balance of security in the region and has
inevitably shaped the security calcula-
tions of other countries in southern
Africa.

From the outset, we have recognized
that Namibia does not exist in a vacuum
and that in practice the chances for a
negotiated settlement of the Namibian
question would be decisively influenced
by parallel progress toward withdrawal
of the Cuban troops from Angola. This
is not an issue which we contrived on
our own. The South African Govern-
ment—which, all parties agree, holds the
key to a settlement— has long made
clear its deep concern over the presence
of these forces.

It would be idle to argue that the
United States has no interest in ending
the presence of Cuban troops in
southern Africa. The introduction of
Cuban combat forces into Angola
changed strategic reality and upset the
delicate fabric of reciprocal restraint
maintained since World War II in the
developing world. It was one of a series
of events, all of us know too well, that
led us to the period of aggravated ten-
sion we face with the Soviet Union to-
day. Regaining that balance is in
Africa's interest, our interest, and in the
interest of a more stable and positive
U.S. -Soviet relationship as well.

We have, for nearly a year now,
been engaged in an intensive high-level
dialogue with the Angolan Government
in an effort to reach a broadly accep-
table formula for Cuban withdrawal.
These bilateral discussions have been
held outside the framework of Security
Council Resolution 435 and are not part

of the contact group's mandate. Our ef-
forts have attempted to respond to
Angola's security concerns while dealing
squarely with the reality of South
African concerns as well. We believe
that this is a viable means of achieving
the goal to which we are profoundly
committed: a stable and peaceful
regional context in which Namibia can
achieve its independence under the free
and fair process envisaged in the U.N.
plan.

We have achieved real progress in
our talks with the Angolans, and we will
spare no effort in continuing our quest
for a comprehensive, peaceful settle-
ment. However, this complicated and
difficult effort involves fundamental
issues and choices for both sides, and it
will take time. In the final analysis,
there will be no agreement unless the
key security concerns of the principal
parties are dealt with. We have sought
and will continue to seek an understand-
ing that meets the basic concerns of all
parties and opens a new and brighter
chapter in southern Africa's troubled
history.

East Africa

East Africa and the adjacent Indian
Ocean area represent another region
which is of major concern to the United
States in global security terms. The
states in this region realize that their
first priority is to overcome serious
economic problems that hobble develop-
ment and interfere with productive
political relations. The United States and
other Western countries — together with
the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, and other international
financial institutions — are currently
working with countries in East Africa to
overcome their severe economic dif-
ficulties. We consider this effort, which
will require painful reform by the coun-
tries themselves and extraordinary steps
by their creditors, as well as the donor
community, to be our most imporUint
long-term "security" program. It is to
this effort that the overwhelming part of
our assistance goes.

We are working closely with our
allies on these problems. France, the
United Kingdom, and Italy also have im-
portant interests in the region.
Moreover, these countries have con-
siderable experience in East Africa and
are prepared to devote substantial re-
sources to assist the development of the
region. Several friendly Middle Eastern
countries are also prepared to assist.
European and Arab economic assistance
to East Africa is significant and is often

larger than that provided by the United
States.

Serious political problems exist in
the region, however, which cause in-
stability and unrest. Last summer we
witnessed attempted coups in Kenya and
the Seychelles and major clashes be-
tween Ethiopia and Somalia. In Uganda,
years will be needed to overcome the
debilitating consequences of former
President Idi Amin's tyranny. Ethiopia,
second only in Africa to Nigeria in
population, is still in the throes of in-
surgency and civil war in parts of its
territory. These local problems are
especially troublesome because of this
region's considerable strategic
significance to the West. East Africa
and the Arabian Peninsula lie astride the
Red Sea and the major oil tanker lanes
leading to Europe.

An important example of regional
security concern is the Horn. Tensions
within this strategically important part
of Africa, an area astride key transport
routes through the Red Sea, go back at
least to the 19th century. They are sus-
tained by foreign intervention, domestic
civil striJFe, and ethnic irredentism that
pose a grave challenge to the African
structure of order enshrined in the
Charter of the OAU. In recent years,
this source of tension has sparked major
outside involvement. Somalia in 1977 at-
tacked Ethiopia in an effort to take over
the Ogaden region and Ethiopia called
upon Moscow and Cuba for assistance.
Today, 11,000 Cuban troops remain in
Ethiopia, and the U.S.S.R. has estab-
lished a position of influence in Ethiopia
through massive arms shipments total-
ing around $4 billion in 5 years. In
return, the U.S.S.R. has acquired naval
and air facilities in Ethiopia.

The United States has an important
interest in this region. Following
the revolution in Iran and the threat to
oil supplies in the Middle East, the
United States entered into a series of
agreements with countries in Africa and
the Middle East for use of facilities to
support our rapid deployment force.
Somalia is one of those countries. At the
same time, the United States has con-
sistently supported the OAU position of
the sanctity of colonial borders and has
limited our military assistance to
Somalia to quite modest levels geared to
the defense of internationally recognized
Somali territory.

But security in the region is now
threatened from the Ethiopian side.
With the massive shipments of Soviet
arms, and a major expansion of its

Department of State Bulletin

AFRICA

ilitary forces, Ethiopia now has the
Tgest standing army in sub-Saharan
frica and is far superior to Somalia in
lumbers and weapons. In 1981, Ethiopia
igned a treaty with Libya and South
emen which has led to Libyan-
thiopian cooperation in subversion and
rmed attack against both Sudan and
omalia. This past summer, Ethiopian
egular troops — supporting a smaller
lumber of Somali dissidents trained and
rmed in Ethiopia — occupied two Somali
owns. Evidence indicates that Ethio-
>ian actions are intended to foster in-
tability and insurrection in Somalia and
he overthrow of the Somali Govern-
nent.

African security is not served if
)Oviet arms, Cuban reserve forces, and
ibyan money and arms are combined to
)verthrow legitimate governments in the
lorn. The United States has acted
juickly in this situation. We have
lirlifted several shipments of arms to
omalia and indicated that we are not
prepared to countenance subversive ac-
;ion and armed aggression against our
'riends in the region. Our actions,
iogether with Somali nationalist senti-
nent against the Ethiopian attacks, has
served to strengthen Somalia in this
crisis, though several areas remain oc-
upied by Ethiopian forces.

We are at the same time looking at
a wider basis for resolution of the ten-
sions in this region. We have no inten-
tion or desire to refuel Somali ambitions
against Ethiopia, nor do we wish to see
Somalia and Sudan have to allocate
greater resources to defense when their
economic needs are so great. We are
making clear to all the parties in the
region that we are interested in pro-
moting a modus vivendi among the
countries in the area and are doing
everything within our power to en-
courage better relations among those
countries with which we have close ties,
e.g., Somalia and Kenya. We would
welcome signs from Ethiopia that it,
too, seeks a better structure for relation-
ships in the region and an end to policies
of confrontation. As a clear indication of
where we think priorities should be
placed, during this same period we have
been actively engaged with our allies in
Europe and with the international finan-
cial institutions, such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, to promote more com-
prehensive economic programs for
Sudan, Kenya, and Somalia.

In summary we have provided a
limited but important and timely

military assistance response to a serious
security threat in the region. We will
not shrink from helping our friends, nor
from defending own own strategic
assets in the region. But our policy ob-
jectives are broader. We are not building
up threatening forces. We are giving our
full weight to the accepted African posi-
tion on borders and are making
ourselves available for diplomatic efforts
that can reduce the security threats in
the area.

West Africa

In West Africa, as well, the United
States has important political and securi-
ty interests to protect. Most countries in
this region are moderate in outlook and
Western oriented. They comprise a large
block of votes in the United Nations and
other international bodies. Their views
are important factors in reaching an
African — or OAU — consensus on issues
of great importance to the United States
and the West. Additionally, our strategic
interests include access to petroleum.
Nigeria is our second largest foreign
supplier of oil— only Saudi Arabia pro-
vides us more.

But these countries are facing
severe economic problems, which can
result in political instability, outside
adventurism, and the loss to the West of
some supportive and moderate friends.
In Ghana, for example, a deteriorating
economic situation eroded support for a
weak but pro-Western democratic
government and led directly to its
downfall.

In Liberia, rampant corruption and
an economic crisis led to a military coup
in 1980. As one of its earliest acts, the
Reagan Administration developed a pro-
gram of sustained support for the new
government to resist the blandishments
of the Soviets and their surrogates
designed to destroy the special relation-
ship which has existed between Liberia
and the United States for almost a 150
years. Our assistance, primarily
economic but including military loan
credits, has increased tenfold during the
last 4 years.

Other West African nations confront
real and serious external security
threats, notably those emanating from
Libya. As neighbors of Col. Qadhafi,
several West African countries have suf-
fered from his adventurism and
destabilizing efforts. For example,
Qadhafi has publicly threatened the
moderate government of Niger as his
next target for subversion. Similarly, his
government is engaged in the training of

dissidents who are helped to return to
their home countries to work against
established governments.

The United States has been respon-
sive to requests for help against such
threats. In Niger, we have established a
modest foreign military sales loan pro-
gram and a military training program.
We have also asked the Congress to ap-
prove a small balance-of-payments grant
to help Niger meet its budget shortfall
stemming from the collapse of the
uranium market, the country's leading
foreign exchange earner.

Conclusion

All these U.S. security programs in sub-
Saharan Africa are in support of our
strategic goal of helping to establish and
maintain the limits of outside force that
is applied in Africa. We are not Africa's
self-appointed policeman, but we are its
partner in economic growth and nation
building. As such, we cannot ignore the
real security threats facing our African
partners, especially when these are
prompted or fueled by our global adver-
saries. Moreover, the presence of Soviet-
bloc forces and bases in parts of Africa
that would threaten our communications
with the Middle East and the gulf are a
serious challenge to vital U.S. security
interests. The answer is neither to ig-
nore the problem nor to overreact and
provoke an essentially East- West arms
race in Africa. The proper answer is for
the United States and our allies, in close
consultation with our African friends, to
provide just the amount of security
assistance to afflicted African nations
for them and us to achieve our mutual
strategic goals.

We Americans— especially in leading
commercial centers— have become in-
creasingly sophisticated in our apprecia-
tion of our major stake in the economic
success of Africa and the rest of the
Third World. We know that we cannot
afford unlimited amounts of economic
assistance to countries unable to support
themselves, that we need a number of
commodities only they can provide in
abundance, and that our future pros-
perity depends in large part on the
growth of their economies. This is why
the Reagan Administration believes it is
equally important for all of us to under-
stand the critical role that security con-
siderations play in the economic develop-
ment equation. It is a challenge that we
and our African friends must meet and
overcome. ■

December 1982

ARMS CONTROL

Freezing Chances for Peace

by James L. Buckley

Address before the Commonwealth
Chub of California in San Francisco an
October 27, 1982. Mr. Buckley is Coun-
selor of the Department of State.

I want to talk to you today about
nuclear arms and the Administration's
policy for reducing the risks of nuclear
war. It is a subject replete with paradox.
Nuclear war is too gruesome to contem-
plate or to ignore. The intricacies of the
nuclear balance require great expertise
to master; and yet we don't always trust
the experts. No subject places so great
demand on calm, rational thought; but
few subjects so stir our emotions.

Let me begin with two simple but
often overlooked truths: First, we all
want peace. Yet in the intensity of the
current debate over nuclear policy, it
sounds at times as if some groups
believe they hold a monopoly on the
abhorrence of nuclear war. Let there be
no such confusion here. We are all
united in our desire to avoid a nuclear
holocaust. President Reagan spoke for
all Americans when he said, "A nuclear
war cannot be won and must never be
fought. So to those who protest against
nuclear war, I can only say, I'm with
you. ... No one feels more than I the
need for peace."

A second simple but often over-
looked truth is that despite the outbreak
of more than 100 military conflicts in
the 37 years that have elapsed since
World War II, the general peace has
been preserved.

The policy that has maintained the
general peace for so long is known as
deterrence. It is not a Democratic or
Republican policy; it has been American
policy in every Administration since the
Second World War. The basic premise
of deterrence is simple: No matter how
strong our enemies become, or how suc-
cessful a surprise attack they may
launch, enough of our nuclear forces
must survive to inflict such terrible
losses that no one could ever benefit
from attacking us.

Deterrence— the prevention of war
by making the cost of aggression unac-
ceptably high— is the only strategy that
makes sense in the nuclear age. But
while its premise is simple enough, it is
not always so easy to determine whether
we are, in fact, strong enough to suc-

cessfully deter any attack. Because
enough of our forces must survive an at-
tack to inflict unacceptable costs on our
enemies, the sufficiency of our strength
depends in part on how strong our
adversaries become; and, because the
stakes are so great, there must never be
any room for doubt.

Unfortunately, over the last decade
the strength of our deterrent has steadi-
ly eroded. The balance that has kept the
peace for over 35 years is today en-
dangered.

The Soviet Challenge

Our current danger — mankind's current
danger — stems from two long-term
trends: one well known, one more
obscure. It is well known that over the
last 20 years the Soviets have engaged
in the greatest arms buildup the world
has ever seen. It is less frequently ap-
preciated that during most of this period
the United States chose not to keep
pace. As the Soviets raced forward, we
sat on our hands. As a result, while over
three-quarters of Soviet strategic forces
were built within the last 5 years, over
three-quarters of ours are 15 years old
or older.

• Since 1972, the Soviets have de-
veloped and deployed three new types
of intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs)— the SS-17, SS-18, and
SS-19 — capable of a first strike. The
most destructive of these weapons car-
ries up to three times the number of
warheads as our most powerful missile.
All of them pose a major threat to our
land-based ICBMs. Yet, it will be 4
years before we begin deployment of the
MX, our first new U.S. intercontinental
ballistic missile in 16 years.

• Since 1972, the U.S.S.R. has add-
ed over 60 missile-firing submarines in
four new or improved classes. The com-
missioning of the first U.S. Trident sub-
marine earlier this year marked the end
of a 15-year period during which the
United States did not build a single new
ballistic-missile submarine.

• Since 1975, the Soviets have pro-
duced more than 250 modern bombers
and are continuing to build them at a
rate of more than 2 a month. By con-
trast, the newest U.S. heavy bomber
was built more than 20 years ago. Mean-

while, the Soviet Union has built a
massive air defense system, while the
United States has no effective defense
against Soviet bombers.

As a result of their massive buildup,
the Soviets now surpass the United
States in most significant measures used
to judge nuclear weapons, including
total number of systems, total number
of ballistic missiles, and total destructive
potential. For example, the Soviets
possess 40% more delivery systems than
we and surpass us in missile throw-
weight, an important measure of their
nuclear punch, by a factor of over 2V2 to
1. Their most advanced weapons have
the capacity to destroy our land-based
missiles and command, control, and com-
munications systems, while their own
hardened installations remain relatively
immune to U.S. counterattack.

Because for the first 25 years of the
nuclear era America had the mightiest
arsenal in the world, it is tempting to
disbelieve the awesome change the last
decade has witnessed. It is tempting to
assume our technical advantages
counterbalance Soviet advances. It is
tempting to disbelieve claims that our
land-based missiles and bombers are in-
creasingly vulnerable to Soviet attack.
Yet these are facts accepted even by
groups that oppose this Administration's
policies.

The massive Soviet buildup in
strategic forces, coupled with a similar
buildup in the conventional forces, is
significant in two major ways. First, to
the degree that it diminishes the credi-
bility of our deterrent, it increases the
danger that the Soviets may see force as
an attractive option. But just as impor-
tantly, the Soviet increases allow them
to exercise leverage over countries
which once felt secure because of the
assumed reliability of the American
nuclear ambrella.

Thus the prices we pay for ignoring
a 20-year surge in Soviet strength are
these: The nuclear balance has shifted
greatly; our forces are less secure; and
Soviet influence in the world has grown.
These are facts undisputed by serious
analysts. Where opinions— and policies-
differ is in our assessment of what we
must do about these facts.

Department of State Bulletin

ARMS CONTROL

'he Response

resident Reagan's response to the
hallenge of the Soviet buildup has been
wofold. One track of that response has
"P een a vigorous commitment to reducing

trategic arms; the other, to launching
'* n overdue modernization of our strate-
ic forces to protect and strengthen our
' ,bility to deter attack.
' ' In a bold stroke to open the Strate-
gic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in
'» jeneva, the President proposed, as an
nitial step, a one-third reduction in
trategic missile warheads together with
eductions in the numbers of missiles
)er side to almost half the current U.S.
evels, such reductions to be verifiable.

I emphasize verification because it is
essential to the goal of long-term stabili-
;y. Trust, even in the best of situations,
IS not an adequate safeg^uard where the
safety of the world is concerned.

But the critical reason why we can-
not rely on trust is that the Soviets so
constantly prove themselves unworthy
of trust. We have conclusive proof that
the Soviets are currently violating inter-
national arms control agreements by us-
ing chemical weapons in Afghanistan
and supplying biochemical weapons for
use in Southeast Asia. Ask an Afghan if
Soviet agreements on arms control can
be trusted.

In March, the Soviets announced a
temporary unilateral ban on further
deployment of intermediate-range
missiles — a not so grand gesture con-
sidering that the Soviets have raced to
an advantage of over 600 missiles to
none. Even so, we have conclusive evi-
dence that the Soviets promptly violated
even this announcement.

In other areas the Soviets have
proven themselves no less unreliable.
Soviet violation of the Helsinki accords
are only the most visible recent in-
stances of Soviet disregard for interna-
tional accords.

The U.S. START proposal points the
way to a more stable strategic balance
at equal and reduced levels of strategic
forces. Its terms would be verifiable and
fair and its limits in the mutual interest
of both East and West. If the Soviets
are indeed serious about seeking
substantial reduction in forces, there is
much that they can work with here.

Moreover, an agreement along the
lines of the U.S. proposal would be an
historic first. No arms control agree-
ment to date — not SALT I [Strategic

Arms Limitation Talks], not SALT II—
has ever led to such fundamental cut-
hacks in existing strategic forces. An
agreement such as that envisaged by the
START proposals would be the first.
Despite the necessarily cautious pace of
the initial START negotiations, they of-
fer the prospect for dramatic and funda-
mental progress.

But. as sensible as the U.S. arms
proposals are, there will be little prog-
ress in the negotiations unless the
Soviets are convinced that the United
States has the will to restore and then
maintain the nuclear balance. What is
essential to remember, however, is that
in the past, the Soviets have made con-

marines in 15 years — will insure the
continued viability of our sea-based
forces. Only the B-1 and Stealth
bombers — our first new models in over
20 years— will protect our ability to
penetrate Soviet airspace into the
future. Only with these new forces can
we revitalize the balance that has main-
tained the peace for three decades.

Thus do the two tracks of President
Reagan's response to the massive Soviet
arms buildup reinforce one another. The
President's commitment to modernize
and strengthen U.S. nuclear forces is
essential to the preservation of deter-
rence. At the same time, that commit-
ment greatly enhances our prospects for

Deterrence — the prevention of war by making
the cost of aggression unacceptahly high — is the
only strategy that makes sense in the nuclear age.

cessions in arms control negotiations
only when the United States threatened
to redress imbalances.

• The Soviets agreed to negotiate
an antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty only
when the U.S. Senate approved an ABM
system.

• Having unilaterally introduced
new and revolutionary intermediate-
range nuclear weapons into the Euro-
pean nuclear balance, the Soviets agreed
to negotiate limits on such missiles only
when it was made clear that NATO
would deploy similar missiles.

• In 1977 the Soviets rejected out-
of-hand LI.S. proposals for deep reduc-
tions in nuclear forces. Only now, after
the United States had shown its deter-
mination to modernize its forces, have
the Soviets begun to take arms reduc-
tions seriously.

The President's proposal to moder-
nize our forces in response to the
massive Soviet buildup will maintain the
effectiveness of our deterrent in years to
come. Only the production of the MX —
our first new type of intercontinental
missile in 16 years — and the proposed
Trident Il-launched D-5 missile will give
us survivable forces capable of destroy-
ing hardened military targets. Only the
Tridents — our first new nuclear sub-

achieving Soviet agreement to major
reductions in our respective nuclear in-
ventories.

Yet these twin objectives, which all
Americans share, would be placed in
jeopardy by a nuclear freeze of the kind
now being urged as an alternative to the
Administration's policies. Freeze pro-
ponents argue that it is safe for both the
United States and the Soviets to "stop
where they are," freeze all testing, pro-
duction, and deployment of missiles and
then proceed to negotiate reductions.
While there are many versions of freeze
proposals, all are based on three
assumptions.

• First, they assume that the credi-
bility of our deterrent would not be en-
dangered by a freeze.

• Second, they assume that the
Soviets are eager to reduce the level of
their nuclear arms but have been pre-
vented from making such reductions be-
cause of the arms race.

• Third, they assume that changes
in nuclear forces make the balance less
stable and more destructive.

If any one of these assumptions
were questionable, a nuclear freeze
would prove not only unwise but danger-
ous. In fact, all three assumptions are
not only questionable, they are wrong.

December 1982

ARMS CONTROL

Credibility of U.S. Deterrent. The

first assumption is that the credibility of
our deterrent would not be endangered
by a freeze. Freeze proponents
acknowledge the Soviets' massive
buildup over the last decade but argue
that even sizable inequalities are irrele-
vant given the vast destructive power at
our disposal. If we simply total all of our
missiles, this is probably true. But the
key to deterrence is the ability of our
forces to survive a surprise attack in
sufficient numbers to inflict unaccept-
able losses on the Soviets and the plaus-
ible will to do so. Here, the picture
becomes more murky.

For over three decades our strategy
of deterrence has been based on a de-
fensive triad of intercontinental missiles,
bombers, and nuclear submarines. In the
past, this triad has proven stable be-
cause a Soviet buildup or technological
breakthrough that would defeat one ele-
ment would still leave two able to carry
out their missions. A freeze, however,
would put the future of our triad in
grave doubt.

Due to just such a technological
breakthrough in missile accuracy in com-
bination with the huge size of Soviet
warheads, the first leg of our triad — in-
tercontinental missiles — is already in
jeopardy. The Soviets can today destroy
as much as 90% of our ICBM's.

The second leg, bombers, may not
fare much better. As I've noted, our in-
tercontinental bombers are already over
20 years old and rapidly reaching the
point where they must be retired. In ad-
dition, the Soviets have invested huge
sums in erecting air defenses.

Fortunately, the third leg of our
triad — our submarine fleet — still re-
mains relatively safe. But, with the ex-
ception of our two new Trident sub-
marines, our current fleet of missile-
launching submarines was built in the
mid-1960s and will need to be replaced.
If the Soviets should achieve the
breakthrough in antisubmarine warfare
on which they are concentrating so
great an effort, our nuclear deterrent
would be fragile indeed.

Thus a freeze would leave us with
one leg of our triad greatly vulnerable,
one increasingly so, and our overall
forces faced with dangerous deteriora-
tion. In short, we cannot assume that
freezing current forces will be safe even
into the near future.

Soviet Motivations. The second
assumption critical to freeze proposals
concerns Soviet motivations. The freeze
assumes that only the arms race has

forced the Soviets to build as many
missiles as they have; therefore, once
the arms race ends, the Soviets will be
eager to reduce their forces. Unfor-
tunately, Soviet deeds, as opposed to
Soviet words, show that the freeze pro-
ponents are wrong in their assessment.

First, the Soviets' recent buildup is
vastly greater than what would be need-
ed either for a policy of deterrence or to
"keep up" with American efforts. We
voluntarily froze the number of our
delivery systems in the mid-1960s. By
1972 the Soviets had achieved an equal
number, except that theirs were
substantially more powerful. Today, as a
result of cutbacks in ours and increases
in theirs, their delivery systems exceed
ours by about 40%. They are not a reluc-
tant party to the current arms race;
they are its cause.

Second, the character of the Soviet
arms buildup belies a passive role. The
Soviets have concentrated on developing
land-based missiles having a first-strike
capability and, therefore, the type of
missile most likely to intimidate. This is
not the effort of a reluctant nation
forced to build arms for defense but of a
nation which seeks the political benefits
of intimidating force.

Third, if the Soviets are only
building arms to counter our buildup,
then why did the Soviets introduce inter-
mediate-range nuclear missiles into
Europe? NATO has no intermediate-
range missiles in Europe. Yet the
Soviets have built 600 of them, most of
which are now deployed and targeted
against West European capitals. The
Soviets did not reluctantly continue an
arms race in Western Europe. They
started one where there had been none.
They did so to garner the benefits of in-
timidation.

The Soviets are not likely to relin-
quish the advantages they have worked
so hard to achieve if we agree to a
freeze. Far from speeding reductions, as
a practical matter a freeze would
preclude them.

Impact of Technological Improve-
ments. The third assumption that under-
lies the freeze is that technological im-
provements will increase both the quan-
tity and megatonnage of our nuclear
forces, thus feeding visions of a reckless,
runaway spiraling of destructive power.
Thus advocates of the freeze would stop
all further improvements in our weapons
and delivery systems. But in the case of
the United States, new technology has
actually resulted in a net decrease in the
destructive power of our strategic
forces. In the past 10 years, technologi-

cal advances have allowed us to reduce
our total megatonnage by almost 30%
and by roughly 60% since the peak
levels of the early 1960s; reductions, in-
cidentally, a freeze 10 years ago would
have made impossible.

Other advances that we contemplate
would make weapons safer and less
vulnerable to attack or to unauthorized
or accidental use. The freeze movement,
for example, would have us forego more
survivable land-based missiles, the
deployment of less vulnerable sub-
marines, and other measures designed
to insure their survival and hence the
credibility of deterrence.

By condemning all technological ad-
vances, in short, the freeze movement
throws out the baby with the bathwater.

Conclusion

In sum, a freeze only makes sense if it
will preserve our security and quickly
lead to significant reductions in arms.
This assumes that our deterrent would
not be endangered by the freeze, that
the Soviets would be willing to reduce
their forces, and that further improve-
ments in weaponry would make the
peace less stable. These assumptions are
not only questionable but false — par-
ticularly as it would remove incentives
for serious Soviet participation in arms
reductions talks. As a result, a freeze
would not only prove unwise, it could
prove disastrous.

In 1934, England, paralyzed by the
prospective horror of war, refused to
maintain its defenses. Winston Church-
ill, then merely a Member of Parliament
warned his country of the danger posed
by a growing Nazi Germany in these
words:

Everyone would be glad to see the
burden of armaments reduced in every coun-
try. But history shows on many a page that
armaments are not necessarily a cause of wai
and that the want of them is no guarantee of
peace. . . . This tnith may be unfashionable,
unpalatable, unpopular. But it is the truth . .
the only choice open is the old grim choice
our forebears had to face, namely, whether
we shall submit to the will of a stronger na-
tion or whether we shall prepare to defend
our rights, our liberties, and, indeed, our
lives.

President Reagan's twin policies of
force modernization and arms reduction
will leave us a secure and stable deter-
rent at greatly reduced levels and will
work to prevent war by accident. Deter-
rence is a proven, effective policy. It is
our safest and wisest course. It is also
our boldest. ■

Department of State Bulietir

;AST ASIA

/isit of Indonesian President Soeharto

President Soeharto of the Republic of
Klnnesia made a state visit to the
'lilted States October 10-15, 1982. While
■I Washington, D.C.. October 12-13, he
let with President Reagan and other
ovemment officials.

Following are remarks made by
'residents Reagan and Soeharto at the
rrival ceremony on October 12 and
yasts exchanged at the state dinner that
vening.'^

lrrival ceremony^

"resident Reagan

take particular pleasure in welcoming
'ou and Madam Soeharto to the United
states and to the White House. And
*Irs. Reagan joins me in extending per-
lonal hospitality on this important occa-
ion.

You're no stranger to these shores,
laving visited the United States twice
)efore as a leader of your great nation.
\s one of the world's longest serving
hief executives, indeed, as a senior
tatesman of Asia, your views on world
affairs carry special authority and add
pecial meaning to our discussions to-
day. Your viewpoints and wise counsel
will be greatly appreciated.

I warmly recall my last meeting with
you. My visit to Jakarta and private
talks with you in 1973 were among the
highlights of my international experience
as Governor of California. And although
I have not had the opportunity to visit
your country since then, I know of the
great strides made by Indonesia in na-
tion building under your leadership.

I'm sure that our talks during your
state visit will further strengthen the
bonds of friendship and mutual respect
between our two countries. The United
States applauds Indonesia's quest for
what you call "national resilience." No
nation in our era has shown itself more
firmly committed to preserving its own
independence than Indonesia; and yet,
no nation has pursued that goal in a
more responsible manner.

Indonesia has lived by and brought
credit to the concept of genuine, con-
structive nonalignment. The United

December 1982

EAST ASIA

States, too, fought for its independence
and over the years has jealously guarded
certain fundamental principles. We, con-
sequently, understand the striving of In-
donesia for national resilience. We
wholeheartedly respect it. It is this
respect which lies at the heart of our ex-
cellent bilateral relationship.

The challenges confronting our na-
tions are great indeed. Both strive for
world peace, whether in important areas
of Asia such as Kampuchea or in the
Middle East, where particularly vexing
problems await lasting solutions. The
United States regards Indonesia as an
important force for peace, stability, and
progress. We value our bilateral rela-
tionship with your country most highly,
and we hope to broaden and deepen that
relationship.

On the economic front, I believe it is
in the clear interest of both our coun-
tries to maintain and improve our eco-
nomic and trade relations. Mutually
beneficial economic cooperation, equita-
ble two-way trade, and investment in
enterprises which involve the transfer of
technology to meet your country's press-
ing development needs are part of the
fabric of healthy U.S. -Indonesian
economic relations.

The United States will also continue
to provide appropriate development and
food assistance in the framework of the
Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia.
I am proud to say this consortium has
had wholehearted American backing
since its founding. Let me also assure
you that the United States wishes to
pursue actively joint collaboration in
science and technology for the economic
development of your country.

It is particularly fitting today to
make special mention of the Association
of South East Asian Nations—
ASEAN— and of Indonesia's important
role in it. The success which ASEAN
has enjoyed during the 16 years of its
existence would have been impossible
without Indonesia's farsighted and en-
thusiastic participation. As one of
ASEAN's founding fathers, you deserve
a great measure of credit for the ac-
complishments of that organization in
the economic and social areas. These ac-
complishments have far surpassed the
expectations of most observers a decade
and a half ago when ASEAN was
established.

Since that time, the most important
milestone for ASEAN has been the 1976
summit meeting in Bali, which demon-
strated your personal commitment. In-
deed, ASEAN now stands as a model
for regional cooperation and, if I may
use your term, Mr. President, of re-
gional resilience. Let me assure you that
support for ASEAN has been and will
continue to be the keystone of American
policy in Southeast Asia.

As we pursue our overall policy in
Asia and the Pacific, we will never lose
sight of ASEAN's concerns or neglect
our commitments to the ASEAN coun-
tries. Let me also stress our full support
for the important initiatives which
ASEAN has undertaken to resolve the
tragic situation in Kampuchea.

I also extend a special warm wel-
come to Madam Soeharto. Her good
works on behalf of charitable organiza-
tions for handicapped, needy, and disad-
vantaged people are recognized at home
and abroad. These activities are in line
with the spirit of voluntarism which
Mrs. Reagan and I have encouraged in
our own country.

And, once again, I welcome you,
President Soeharto, and you, Madam
Soeharto, in a spirit of friendship and
respect. Mrs. Reagan and I are person-
ally delighted with your visit. Welcome
to Washington and, again, welcome to
the White House.

President Soeharto

I'm deeply moved and would like to ex-
tend my heartfelt appreciation for the
warm hospitality accorded me at this
moment, and also by the kind words of
Your Excellency, Mr. President. All of
this reflects the profound sense of
friendship existing between our two
countries and, indeed, it is to promote
the close, friendly relations and to rein-
force the mutual understanding between
our two countries that truly become the
principal objective of my visit to this
great country.

My present visit to the United
States is actually for the third time. I
have deep impressions about my
previous visits, particularly from the ex-
change of views with prominent leaders
of this country and leaders of various
circles. These have all added to my
understanding about the United States,
namely its views, its attitudes, and its
steps.

Today, 7 years have passed since my
last visit to this country. The world has
changed considerably. The political and
economic map of the world has under- i
gone great changes. This is the reason '
that on my current visit to the United
States, I will use it to have an exchange j
of views with Your Excellency and )

leaders of this country based on iden- i
tical, fundamental attitudes of aspiring
for a world which is more peaceful and
prosperous for the whole of mankind. I
attach great importance to this visit,
because the world is presently under-
going various, successive upheavals that
are long drawn out. Our two countries
and all countries in the world have the
common responsibility to exert all their
will and ability to overcome those up-
heavals for the sake of the tranquility
and the safety of all.

With a different weight, because our
respective capabilities are also different,
our two countries should nevertheless
have the common duty and hold the re-
sponsibility of contributing to the efforts
of preserving world stability and peace
in order that we can bequeath a better
world — a world filled with peace, pros-
perity, and justice — to generations
which hold together the future of the
world.

It is my sincere hope that my visit to
the United States this time will further
reinforce the bonds of friendship and
enhance the mutual understanding be-
tween our two countries, as well as ex-
pand the cooperation in various fields
which are mutually beneficial to both our
peoples.

TOASTS

President Reagan

Tonight, we welcome good friends back
to the White House, friends who have
been too long absent.

In the years since your last visit,
much has transpired in your country and
in ours, and in Asia and the Pacific,
where we both share so many interests.
Yet, during these dynamic and often tur-
bulent years, there have been elements
of stability— important elements.

Foremost among these has been the
wise and steadfast leadership which you
have given Indonesia since 1966. Out of

Department of State Bulletin

EUROPE

period of uncertainty and disorder,
iU have guided your country into the
refront of the Asian community of na-
ons and made its influence felt
roughout the world.

You will pardon me I hope, if I
cognize here tonight what is already
pparent to the nations of the world-
hat Indonesia, under your leadership,
as assumed its rightful position as a
reat nation of Asia and of the world.

The second factor of stability since
he 1960s has been the excellent bi-
iteral relations which have existed be-
ween Indonesia and the United States.
)ur relationship has stood the test of
ime in a changing world. It's firmly
ooted in mutual respect and a clear-
lighted recognition of where the in-
,erests of both our nations lie.

I fully share the importance that you
ittach to the further strengthening and
ixpansion of the relationship between
)ur two countries. To that end, it is my
)leasure to announce tonight my deci-
sion to nominate as my personal repre-
sentative to your government someone
veil known to you, and in whom I have
;he utmost confidence— Assistant
Secretary [for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs] John H. Holdridge.

As you are aware, Assistant Secre-
tary Holdridge is our most senior dip-
lomat experienced in East Asian affairs.
I In commending him to the Senate for its
advice and consent, I shall do so assured
that no one is better qualified to con-
tinue, on my behalf, the frank and
mutually beneficial dialogue which has
marked your visit here and which is so
essential to the advancement of mutual
understanding between our two coun-
iihs and the achievement of our com-
II mil purposes.

During our most fruitful discussions
till lay, I've had the benefit of your ex-
licrience and insight. You've clearly
I lilt lined the great challenges facing your
iiiurtry, the Association of South East
.Asian Nations, and the other nations of
.Vsia which seek to live in peace. I come
away from our talks more convinced
tlian ever that we share this common
view— that the greatest need for the
countries of Southeast Asia is for rapid,
equitable development free from outside
interference and in an atmosphere of
peaceful change.

I also appreciated your views on the
situation in the Middle East. The special
interests of both our nations in that
troubled region make it imperative that
peace be pursued vigorously. Lasting

solutions will not come easily, however,
and I earnestly ask that all nations sup-
port efforts in this pursuit of peace.

In our talks, we devoted much atten-
tion to global economic recovery. I'm
convinced the world economic conditions
will improve with national self-restraint
and sound financial management for
continued growth. These qualities have
characterized Indonesia's economic
policies since 1966 and serve as a per-
suasive example for other nations of the
developing world.

I would also take note of the impor-
tant role which Indonesia plays in the
Association of South East Asian Na-
tions. In our view, ASEAN offers the
best hope for the fulfillment of national
aspirations in the region, and it provides
an important example of common pur-
pose for us all.

Finally, I wish to compliment the
wide range of charitable and humanitar-
ian programs inspired by Madam
Soeharto.

Nancy and I personally wish you
both good health and the utmost success
in realizing the aspirations of your peo-
ple.

President Soeharto

Once again, I would like to express my
heartfelt appreciation for the warm
welcome and hospitality accorded me
during my present visit to the United
States in accepting the invitation of
Your Excellency, Mr. President.

Your kind words have impressed me
as indication of the close friendly rela-
tions and mutual understanding between
our two countries. As I have said this
morning, the main purpose of my cur-
rent visit is to reiterate the friendship
between our two countries.

The friendship between our two
countries has a solid foundation because
of the similarity of our two nations with
regard to the noble values which we
hold dearly — such as freedom and in-
dependence, democracy and humanitar-
ianism. We perceive the manifestation of
such friendship from the deep under-
standing and support of the American
nation when we struggled for and
defended our national independence 37
years ago. We acknowledge such deep
understanding again is, among other
things, the willingness of the United
States, together with other IGGI [In-
tergovernmental Group on Indonesia]
countries a dozen of years ago, to assist
our economic and social development.

Situation in Poland

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
OCT. 13, 19821

On this sad anniversary of 10 months of
martial law in Poland, the apparently
spontaneous actions of the workers in
Gdansk and elsewhere speak eloquently
of their support of democracy and free
trade unions. At the same time, the
government's actions speak just as clear-
ly of their position on those issues and
underlie the validity of the President's
views on the situation in Poland as he
addressed them Saturday. Clearly the
workers are expressing their will and
determination to have a say in their own
future, particularly in the wake of the
government's delegalization of an orga-
nization which had represented the vast
majority of all Polish workers.

'Made by the Principal Deputy Press
Secretary to the President Larry Speakes to
news correspondents during his daily press
briefing. ■

For all this, I would like to avail
myself of this opportunity to extend
once again the highest appreciation of
the Government and people of Indonesia
to the Government and people of the
United States of America.

We consider that the problem of de-
velopment that we face is also actually a
part of the problem of the human race.
If until now, two-thirds of the human
race are still striving in the struggle
against poverty, backwardness, ig-
norance, and disease, this clearly in-
dicates the real situation of what I have
said earlier. It is, therefore, necessary to
create an international climate that
enables the unhindered development of
all nations. But today such a climate is
still far from expectation. Today the
world is suffering from a long, drawn
out economic recession beside the
upheavals occurring in various regions.

Indeed, there have been many ef-
forts made to overcome these various
disturbances. But the outcome has not
insured its total solution. In the frame-
work of trying to find a fundamental
solution and to achieve an overall im-
provement of the inequalities in the
world, the one and only answer is that
all nations, big or small, strong or weak,
strive together, motivated by the firm
determination to build a new world

December 1982

FOOD

order which guarantees political justice,
economic justice, and social justice.

Unavoidably, it must be the common
stand and concerted efforts of all na-
tions on our unitary planet, because with
the growing closer relations amongst na-
tions, due to the progress brought about
by the human civilization at present and
in the future, whether we like it or not,
we must consider the world as the com-
mon homeland of all nations.

I'm aware that it is not easy to build
a new world order. There must be,
therefore, concrete steps which will at
least prevent the deterioration of world
developments, which may cause our
solitary world to fall into the abyss of
greater disaster, which may probably
terminate the history of man and man-
kind. In such a world situation, filled
with anxiety, obviously the world's at-
tention, particularly of the developing
countries, is focused for its umpteenth
time on the United States.

We hope and believe that under the
wise leadership of Your Excellency, Mr.
President, the United States will try
unceasingly to create world stability and
peace and to prevent catastrophe to the
human race. "The strengths of this great
nation, its glorious past history, its com-
mitments to mankind, provide ample
chance to the United States to play an
important role in the endeavors of the
whole of mankind to create a stable,
peaceful, and prosperous world.

It is primarily to carry the common
responsibility of creating such a world
that I consider as highly significant the
exchange of views that I have had with
Your Excellency, Mr. President, and
other American leaders during my cur-
rent visit. I am convinced that my pres-
ent visit will further reinforce the
friendship, enhance the mutual under-
standing, and expand the cooperation
between our two countries, particularly
in the economic field.

In conclusion, permit me to kindly
invite the distinguished guests to raise
your glass and join me in a toast to the
health and happiness of His Excellency,
Mr. President, and Mrs. Reagan, to the
prosperity of the people of the United
States of America, and to the ever-
lasting friendship between our two coun-
tries.

World Food Day, 1982

PROCLAMATION 4983,
OCT. 5, 19821

Food is basic to life. Achieving and maintain-
ing an adequate, reliable food supply is a high
priority to every nation.

From the first, the United States has
supported the principle that a strong nation
requires a strong agricultural foundation. Out
of our westward pioneer movement emerged
a sound system of agriculture firmly based on
the concepts of private enterprise and the
primacy of the independent family farm. The
result has been a food production system well
able to feed our own population while
meeting the needs of others throughout the
world.

Not all nations are blessed with
America's agricultural endowments, nor have
many nations adopted the incentives that are
critical to fueling such a successful
agriculture. The Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations estimates
that as many as 400 to 500 million people suf-
fer from poverty-induced malnutrition, par-
ticularly in the Third World.

The people of the United States have
long been committed to sharing this country's
agricultural bounty and technology with other
nations in times of need. We have provided
more than $30 billion in food aid, plus an ad-
ditional $10 billion for shipping costs, since
the "Food-for-Peace" program was initiated
28 years ago. We have also made available
thousands of agricultural experts, a diversity
of training programs, and benefits of our in-

tensive agricultural research. The United
States is also doing its part to improve world
food security by maintaining high levels of
production and reserve stocks and by making
agricultural products available in the world
market so that other countries can meet their
food requirements.

We have not been alone in focusing atten-
tion on the problems of hunger in the world.
More than 100 countries participated in
observing the first World Food Day last year.
We particularly salute the Food and
Agriculture Organization which, on World
Food Day this year, celebrates 37 years of
dedication to the elimination of hunger and
malnutrition.

Let us continue our mutual efforts to
define the causes of world food problems and
vigorously pursue their solutions. Toward this
end, the Congress of the United States has
again responded with a Joint Resolution
designating October 16, 1982, as World Food
Day.

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan,
President of the United States of America,
do hereby proclaim October 16, 1982, "World
Food Day" and do call upon the people of the
United States to observe this day with ap-
propriate ceremonies and activities.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto
set my hand this .5th day of Oct., in the year
of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-two,
and of the Independence of the United States
of America the two hundred and seventh.

Ronald Reagan

'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Oct. 11, 1982.

'President Soeharto spoke in Indonesian,
and his remarks were translated by an inter-
preter (texts from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents o"f Oct. 18, 1982).

^Made on the South Lawn of the White
House where President Soeharto was ac-
corded a formal welcome with full military
honors. ■

Departnnent of State Bulletin

3ENERAL

President Reagan's Framework for Peace

by William P. Clark

Address before the City Club and
IChamber of Commerce in San Diego on
lOctober 29. 1982. Judge Clark is Assist-
jant to the President for National Secu-
rity Affairs.

It is a special honor for me to join you
today. I'll attempt to provide a status
report on the President's efforts to
restore U.S. leadership in the resolution
of the many difficult issues facing us in
international affairs. To set the stage
for that, it is useful to recall the agenda
before us when the President entered of-
fice and to recall the climate in which we
had to operate.

As you know, the decade of the
1970s was not a happy one— as
measured by U.S. fortunes in interna-
tional politics. This reality was the con-
sequence of many factors. The political
legacy of the Vietnam war included,
among other things, a serious question-
ing of the reliability of the United States
as an ally. A separate and unrelated fac-
tor was the dramatic and very visible ex-
pansion of Soviet military power. This
military ascendancy was accompanied by
an increased Soviet willingness to take
risks in its efforts to expand its in-
fluence beyond its borders. Starting with
their sponsorship of Cuban activities in
Angola and proceeding more visibly in
their subversive efforts in Ethiopia and
South Yemen, the Soviets became ever
more bold in the absence of any ap-
parent U.S. opposition. This trend of
reticence, and uncertainty on our part,
called into question our sense of purpose
and resolve among our friends in
Europe and elsewhere.

Another important factor was a sub-
stantial increase in our reliance, and
that of oiu- allies, on overseas resources
for fueling our economies. The effect of
this and other events at home— with no
apparent answers on our part— led us to
the brink of economic catastrophe.
These events and trends led the United
States to be viewed from abroad— by the
Soviet Union as well as our friends— as
a nation in decline. We were seen as
unreliable and, basically, as unable to
solve problems, either our own or theirs.

The challenge facing President
Reagan at the outset of his Administra-
tion was to rally the Western world by

demonstrating that the United States
could once more lead in the resolution of
these problems and play a positive role
in international affairs.

Getting Our Own House in Order

Faced with this agenda, the President
charted his course toward basic objec-
tives which individually and collectively
were designed to restore a measure of
stability and peace within the interna-
tional community and to foster economic
growth and development among nations.
There were compelling domestic reasons
for devoting foremost attention to
restoring economic stability here at
home. Clearly, our economy and the
American people were at a breaking
point with interest rates above 20% and
double-digit inflation. But it is equally
true that no nation can deserve the
respect of others in the resolution of
problems if it cannot solve its own. It is
also true, that the commanding position
of the dollar and the diversity and reach
of U.S. industry are essential to sustain
recovery internationally.

For all of these reasons, the Presi-
dent set to work to put our own house
in order. It is gratifying today to note
evidence that we have clearly turned the
corner. Who would have thought, 20
months ago, that interest rates would
drop 50% and that inflation would drop
by an even greater percentage? That is
progress and, as the President has said,
there is more in store if we only stay the
course.

Rebuilding the Foundation

The second essential task to keeping the
peace was to restore the foundation of
strength which underwrites the concept
of deterrence. For a number of reasons,
the United States had allowed its invest-
ment in defense to decline steadily in
real terms throughout the decade of the
1970s. We had not designed a new
strategic missile since the late 1960s;
our newest B-52 was built more than 20
years ago. Conversely, the average age
of Soviet systems is less than 5 years.

This decline took place at a time
when the Soviet Union was accelerating
the most dramatic expansion of military
power in the history of mankind. The
U.S.S.R. passed the United States in
terms of defense spending in 1971; in

the course of that decade, their military
investment exceeded ours by over $200
billion.

This dramatic expansion of Soviet
power was translated into political effect
by the very apparent increase in Soviet
willingness to take risks, such as those
in adventures I have already mentioned
in developing countries from Africa to
Afghanistan.

As a result of the President's ini-
tiatives, the program of rebuilding is
now well launched, and if we will show
the resolve to sustain it in years ahead,
there is every promise that effective
deterrence will endure and that peace
can be preserved for our own and future
generations.

Reciprocity and Restraint

The next important goal, in the Presi-
dent's judgment, was the reestablish-
ment of a firm basis for U.S. -Soviet
relations. In the course of his first year
in office, the President made clear to
Soviet leadership that he is willing to
work seriously with them toward resolu-
tion of the full range of international
problems on the basis of reciprocity and
restraint. At the same time, he has
made it equally clear that we will not
stand mute in the face of Soviet-inspired
repression, subversion, or direct aggres-
sion whether it takes place in Poland,
Central America, or Afghanistan. It is in
this area that the President has drawn
criticism for his actions— specifically on
sanctions imposed following the Soviet-
inspired crackdown in Poland. To the
President, those events before last
Christmas provided contemporary con-
firmation that the Soviet Union has not
altered its commitment to extend its
false revolution, wherever possible,
beyond its borders. That choice is ob-
viously theirs to make; but there is
another way — should they wish to take
it. The opportunity for enjoying the
benefits of free trade and peaceful
discourse within the international com-
munity is clearly an option they could ef-
fect.

For as long as the Soviet Union con-
tinues to deprive its people and to divert
its resources into a massive military
buildup, the United States — at a
minimum — will not contribute to that
process by providing the technology,
hardware, or credits to make the Soviet

December 1982

GENERAL

tasks easier. In this commitment, we
believe it is reasonable to expect the
support of other nations which share our
values and our principles.

Arms Control

In the nuclear age— and particularly
after a decade of such astonishing Soviet
expansion of its arsenal— it remains the
leading priority of every American presi-
dent to prevent conflict and to seek to
reduce the level of nuclear armament.
The same concern is being expressed to-
day by g^-owing numbers of Americans.
This emerging public interest in the con-
trol of nuclear weapons is an extremely
healthy and welcome phenomenon. It
can serve to enlighten the American
people on the basic concepts and
systems which determine the stability or
instability of peace in the nuclear age.
However, throughout the past 37 years,
the subject of strategic nuclear weapons
has been shrouded in secrecy, jargon,
and rather arcane concepts which most
people would find difficult to under-
stand. The result has been that on the
most important public policy issue of
their generation, the American people
have been uninformed. Thus, for that
reason alone, the current debate
represents a very useful exercise.

Let me digress for a moment to give
you a couple of examples of the kind of
misinformation that has clouded public
attitudes on this subject. If I were to ask
you whether the United States today
possesses more or less explosive power
(megatonnage) than it did 20 years ago,
I am sure most of you would respond
that we have more. The truth is that to-
day's level is less than half that which
existed during the Kennedy Administra-
tion. Similarly, if I were to ask whether
we have more- or fewer — warheads
than we had 10 years ago, I am sure
most would respond that we must have
more. The truth, however, is that in the
course of the past decade, we have
reduced the number in our arsenal by
about one-third.

But my point is not to belabor
statistics. The President believes that
regardless of the level, it remains too
high and that we must do everything we
can to reduce it. It is toward this objec-
tive that the President directed the
development of sound, equitable arms
control positions with which to seek to
engage the Soviet Union in a serious
program of reductions. That directive
was to serve two purposes: first, to deal
with strategic weapons and, second, ef-

fect reductions of intermediate-range
weapons such as the Soviet SS-20 which
threaten our friends in Europe and
elsewhere.

With regard to intermediate-range
weapons, the President has proposed to
the Soviet Union that if they will agree
to dismantle all of their land-based
missiles, now numbering more than 300
globally, we will forego deployment of
corresponding systems to counter. In
other words, we propose a zero-zero
balance. Our negotiators are now en-
gaged in Geneva with their Soviet
counterparts in an effort to persuade
them of the benefits of this outcome, not
only for their security but for all
mankind. We hope that before long they
wUl see the wisdom in this proposal.

With respect to strategic or inter-
continental weapons, the President has
proposed dramatic reductions to equal
numbers on both sides— approximately a
one-third reduction in the number of
ballistic missile warheads and a reduc-
tion in deployed ballistic missile launch-
ers to one-half of the current U.S. level.
Here again, our negotiators are hard at
work in Geneva seeking to reach Soviet
agreement on this proposal.

It is in the context of these negotia-
tions that it is worthwhile to consider a
proposal that has been made both by
President Brezhnev and by large
numbers of well-meaning people in this
country. They have urged that we adopt
an immediate freeze on the production,
testing, and deployment of nuclear
weapons. The very simplicity of the
freeze proposal has made it attractive,
especially by those who are put off by
the perceived complexity of the issue.
But it takes little more than common
sense to identify the flaws in such an ap-
proach.

For example, if you were asked if
you would support a unilateral freeze, I
am sure most of you would say no. But
if we could not verify Soviet compliance
with a bilateral freeze agreement, it
would effectively constitute a unilateral
freeze agreement. How could we be sure
that the Soviet Union was abiding by a
freeze proposal? Frankly, our experience
in this area is not encouraging, and, as a
consequence, it behooves us not to take
for granted Soviet good faith where the
margin for error is very small indeed.

Apart from the question of verifica-
tion, it is also reasonable to ask whether
it is sensible to freeze in place an im-
balance which has resulted from a
decade of Soviet building and U.S.
decline. Here again, it is instructive to
consider the existing imbalance in the

category of intermediate-range forces. I
mentioned earlier that the Soviet Union
now possesses more than 300 SS-20
missiles which can reach all of Western
Europe and many other parts of the
world. Neither the United States— nor
any of our allies— possesses any corre-
sponding land-based system which can
reach the Soviet Union. An imbalance of
300-0, which grows to 600-0 when the
other Soviet INF [intermediate-range
nuclear forces] land-based missiles are
included, is neither fair nor does it con-
tribute to stable peace. It is for this
reason that we are in negotiations in
Geneva in an effort to persuade the
Soviets to dismantle those systems.

And this leads me to my third point.
What would be the effect of a freeze on
our hopes for progress in these arms
control talks? To answer this I need only
to ask you to put yourself in the place of
the Soviet Union. If you are in a position
where the balance is in your favor in a
600-0 ballgame and the other side
agreed to freeze that imbalance, what
possible incentive would you have for
continuing to negotiate or play ball at
all?

In short, because an immediate or
instant freeze presents extremely prob-
lematical verification questions, because
it would freeze a substantial imbalance
in place, and because it would remove
incentives for the Soviet Union to nego-
tiate reductions, a freeze would not con-
tribute to effective arms control. And it
is for this reason that the President has
proposed that we first reduce nuclear
weapons to equal levels before adopting
a freeze.

President Reagan is deeply con-
vinced that with persistence and
seriousness of purpose we can reach
agreements which truly reduce the size
of the nuclear arsenals on both sides. He
is reinforced in this conviction by the
record of negotiations which have taken
place thus far, and with your support he
will continue to pursue them to a suc-
cessful conclusion.

Relations With Developing Countries

The fifth objective of this Administra-
tion in foreign affairs is to establish a
new basis for conducting our relations
with the developing countries of the
world. The President's approach relies
heavily on the energy of the private sec-
tor. It is most graphically represented in
the program known as the Caribbean
Basin initiative. Under this program, the
President has blended a combination of
trade, aid, and incentives for investment

Department of State Bulletin

HUMAN RIGHTS

nto a carefully balanced arrangement to
'acilitate the self-help effort of the peo-
)le of the Caribbean region. We hope
luring the special session of the Con-
■ jress— commencing next month— to

Ichieve enactment of the trade and tax
irovisions of this program, providing in-
entives for U.S. businesses to invest in
he Caribbean area. Through this proc-
ess, together with modest amounts of
lid and improved access to overseas
narkets, we believe we can give hope to
;he people of this area who have lived
or so long in despair, experiencing
vorsening conditions of trade with no
hange in sight.

Peacemaking

The sixth goal of President Reagan's
foreign policy— and perhaps its center-
piece—concerns our responsibility as a
peacemaker. Since the earliest days of
his Administration, the President has
directed that a maximum effort be
devoted to lending U.S. prestige and
resources to the resolution of disputes
throughout the world. Most recently we
have devoted extremely intense efforts
to furthering the peace process in south-
ern Africa and in the Middle East.
For longer than any of us can
remember, the people of the Middle
East have lived from war to war with no
apparent prospect for any alternative
future. Because it is our moral obliga-
tion and because of our important in-
terests in the area, the President has
focused his personal attention on the
history of this dispute and all of its com-
plexities. The results of his analysis
were reflected in his remarks to the
American people on September 1. In a
nutshell, the President was asking a
very simple question to each of the three
forces in the region.

• To Israel, which in 34 years has
experienced five wars, he asked: How is
your security best assured? Is it by
maintaining control over territory with
the virtually certain expectation of war
every few years, or is your security not
better assured by reaching a political ac-
commodation with your neighbors?

• To the Palestine Liberation
Organization, which has experienced
devasting defeat three times in the past
12 years, the President asked: Is arms
struggle truly the best way to establish
Palestinian identity?

• And more generally to the Arab
states of the area, he asked: Has con-
frontation with Israel for the past
generation truly served your interest?

The President believes deeply that
we face an historic opportunity which
must not be missed. In his exchanges
thus far since September 1, we have
received encouraging sigjis from many
quarters. He is hopeful that in the weeks
aiiead we will succeed in reopening talks
for establishing transitional arrange-
ments in the West Bank and Gaza
district through such a process which
must involve the participation of other
Arab countries. The peoples of this area
can bring to an end this dark chapter of
their history and look forward to a new
era of development and prosperity. The
President has pledged his best efforts to
make this dream come true.

In some parts of the world, the word
"peace" is lightly said, because peace in
those parts is a reality— a reality more
or less taken for granted. In the Middle
East, the word "peace" is weighty,
almost palpable, because the reality
seems so out of reach. We in the United
States need to remind ourselves of the
importance of shaping a perfect peace
that may be only a goal, if in seeking
that goal we are able to keep or improve
on the peace we have.

I wish now to speak briefly on a
related matter. In a speech 2 days ago,
Mr. Leonid Brezhnev addressed the top
Soviet military command. He spoke of
the Soviet Union's dedication to a peace
threatened by American "adventurism."
We perceive the purpose of his speech
was to reassure the Soviet military
establishment that it continues to retain
its favored place in Soviet society. His
remarks about improved Soviet-China
relations were meant to create an im-
pression of improving international rela-
tions. All of this was predictable.

But to represent the Soviet Union as
the advocate of a meaningful peace
threatened by the United States is hard-
ly convincing. If the Soviet Union con-
tinues year after year to pour some 15%
of its gross national product, two-and-
one-half times our own, into its military
establishment, it is not because it faces
external threat but because it needs this
kind of a force to keep its own popula-
tion under control, to intimidate its
neighbors, and to support imperial
adventures in far-away Africa, Central
America, and Southeast Asia.

Although Mr. Brezhnev is not run-
ning for office, he is nevertheless a
politician, and his appeal to nationalism
and militarism must be interpreted in
these terms. But how can we take
seriously unfounded accusations clearly
designed as nothing but an excuse for
intensifying still further the Soviet
Union's already enormous military
buildup?

The U.S. record is clear. It did not
use its nuclear power when it enjoyed a
nuclear monopoly. It has offered, time
and again, meaningful proposals of arms
limitations and reductions. It has
scrupulously adhered to the terms of
treaties and accords. It has— without
reciprocity from Moscow— reduced its
military budget for years. Our current
military effort has— as its principal pur-
pose—assurance of a credible deterrent
in the face of prodigious military ad-
vances the Soviet Union has made dur-
ing the years of U.S. self-restraint. We
make no apologies for our role in the
pursuit of peace, which we continue to
pursue. ■

Personal Liberties
and National Security

by William P. Clark

Address before the American Bar
Association in San Francisco on Au-
gust 6, 1982. Judge Clark is Assistant to
the President for National Security
Affairs.

There was a time, which seems many
years ago, when I was a judge in this
fair city of San Francisco. During
deliberations in that court, I was often
aware of an anomaly that you have ex-
perienced as lawyers. The fundamental
principles of law and justice are simple.

All the great codes of justice, from the
Ten Commandments to the U.S. Con-
stitution, are concisely stated. But a
sophisticated legal system is required to
put the great codes into effect, assuring
the faithful transfer of principle into
policy. Were that not the case, many of
us would be employed in a different pro-
fession today.

There is no better illustration of this
contrast between the simplicity of basic
principles and the complexity of im-
plementation than in dealing with what
has been termed "human rights." While
that term is of relatively recent deriva-

December 1982

HUMAN RIGHTS

tion, the concept was much earlier
recognized by scripture and later in the
Magna Carta. Our Founding Fathers
called the concept the rights of man and
it is, I believe, more aptly described for
our purposes as individual and personal
liberties.

Like the great codes of justice, the
principles of personal liberties are simple
and obvious. Murder is wrong. Torture
is wrong. Censorship is wrong. In
Abraham Lincoln's view, "The leading
principle, the sheet-anchor of American
republicanism" is that "no man is good
enough to govern another man without
that other's consent." In other words,
totalitarian dictatorships are wrong, and
we support democracy and the expan-
sion of democracy as the best vehicle to
insure worldwide personal liberty. There
can be no real disagreement on these
goals here.

But to convert these principles into
policy is a complex, difficult task. And it
engenders a dispute over method— not
the principles themselves. Those who
disagree with the Administration's cur-
rent methods of conversion argue that
the means they propose are, in fact, as
simple and obvious as the principles we
all subscribe to. I only wish that it
were so.

Today I would like to discuss one
vital part of this debate: the complex
relationship between promoting the
cause of personal liberty and the im-
peratives of national security. I especial-
ly address our government's concerns
with personal liberty in those countries
where our own national security in-
terests are manifestly at stake.

Compatibility of National Security
and Personal Liberty

Notwithstanding assertions by some that
conflicting demands of personal liberty
and national security are irreconcilable,
this is so only in a superficial sense. The
Administration believes that a strong
America — an America whose national
security is assured— is good for personal
liberties throughout the world. No na-
tion will succeed in pressing for personal
liberties if it is seen by the world as
weak, retreating, and unsure of itself. In
the 19th century, Britain succeeded in
eliminating the slave trade because it
was at the height of its power and at the
peak of its sense of self-assurance. We
in the United States achieved one of our
greatest victories for freedom — the
democratization of Germany and Japan
— at a moment of overwhelming
strength. Of the two major powers to-

day, only the United States cares about
personal liberty in a more than super-
ficial way. The enormous power of the
Soviet Union is used to suppress, not en-
courage, personal freedoms. This fact, it
seems to me, is the beginning of
geopolitical wisdom in our age. It is
verifiable by inquiry— ask the Poles, ask
the Afghans, ask the Kampucheans. If
the United States were to exercise op-
tions that would weaken our national
strength, as some would have us do,
then the Soviet Union would gain
greater worldwide influence and the
cause of liberty would suffer all over the
world.

U.S. Commitment to the Cause of
Personal Liberty

A hundred and twenty years ago
Abraham Lincoln said: "I hold that while
man exists, it is his duty to improve not
only his own condition, but to assist in
ameliorating mankind's. . . ." We have
been fulfilling President Lincoln's com-
mitment. The United States supported
positive change toward democracy in
Spain and Portugal. The United States
strongly supported free elections held in
the past year in Honduras, El Salvador,
Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic.
The United States strongly supports the
Government of Turkey in its plans to re-
establish constitutional democracy this
coming year.

We have also sought to fulfill our
traditional commitment to personal
liberties in those areas of the world
where our influence is of necessity less
readily exercised. Eastern Europe is far
removed from us in distance as well as
political philosophy. There were those
who thought that we would prove indif-
ferent to the struggle for freedom in
this area. After four decades of war, oc-
cupation, and totalitarianism, Poland
was just beginning to emerge into the
fresh air of liberty; this movement
toward freedom caused the Soviet Union
to fear not only the loosening of its grip
on Poland but contagion of its whole em-
pire. We responded vigorously to the
declaration of war by the Polish Govern-
ment on its own people. We have put in
place sanctions against the Polish
Government as well as against the
Soviet Government whose bullying was
largely responsible for the events of
December 13. Our sanctions, however
costly they are to the perpetrators of
the outrages of Poland, did not come
free of charge. The embargoes on
critical industrial goods have cost our in-

dustries hundreds of millions of dollars,
and this at a time of widespread
unemployment in this country. Our in-
sistence on strict application of the sanc-
tions has brought us friction with our
allies, something we very much wish to
avoid at all times. On December 29 we
felt we had no choice: At stake are the
highest principles. The liberties of the
Poles in an indirect but tangible way
safeguard our own liberties; their loss is
our loss. Sacrificing our commitment to
freedom for short-term economic or
even political gains would cast us adrift
from the very heritage that has made us
a strong and admired people.

So that we will understand what is
really at stake here, let me read from a
Reuters' wire service report with an
August 6 dateline:

The French Government today instructed its
Embassy in Moscow to investigate a report
by a Frankfurt-based human rights organiza-
tion that thousands of Soviet prisoners are
working on the new Siberian gas pipeline.
The association was quoted as saying about
100,000 prisoners had been put to work in
camps set up along the route of the pipeline
across Siberia and west beyond the Ural
Mountains. Some 10,000 of the prisoners
were alleged to be serving sentences for
political offenses.

Fulfillment of U.S. Commitment in
the Interests of Personal Liberty

To review my thesis: I hold that the
claim of an irreconcilable conflict be-
tween personal liberty and national
security is misleading, particularly when
we examine the ultimate goals of each.
American power and strength can
achieve as much for humanity and for
personal liberties as it does for national
security. But these achievements can be
realized only if, first, America is
strong— militarily, morally, politically,
and economically — and, second, other
nations perceive our commitment to be
firm in the defense of principle, in-
cluding the defense of personal liberties
in the international arena. The record of
this Administration provides ample
evidence of fulfilling that commitment.

Support of Personal Liberty as
Aiding National Security

I would now like to examine the corol-
lary of the proposition that a strong
America is good for personal liberties.
That corollary proposition is that our ac-
tive support for international personal
liberties is also good for our national
security.

Department of State Bulletin

HUMAN RIGHTS

We start with recognition that our
est important alUes are all democ-
acies, while none of the Soviet Union's
lies is. A more democratic world will

a world in which we are likely to find
riends and greater assurances for na-
ional security.

A word of caution here. We recog-
lize that concepts of freedom are usual-
y deeply rooted in a society's history
ind politics, and, for that very reason,
)roblems relating to personal liberty
»nnot be swiftly solved. Attempts at
sudden transformation or violent
political and social change often lead to
;ven greater violations of personal
•ights. The Shah, for example, was over-
;hrown quickly, and the Ayatollah im-
Tiediately set upon a massive suppres-
sion of personal liberty. This and other
instances, such as Nicaragua, caution us
there is no quick fix in building
democracy.

To build a democracy for the first
time in an emerging country requires
comprehensive transformation and
political reform. While it is a task re-
quiring patience and dedication, it is also
the surest ultimate guarantee of person-
al liberties. In Spain, for instance, the
growth of democracy was gradual, but it
was successful — and it was accomplished
despite obstacles once regarded as too
much for the advocates of democracy to
overcome. We need to remember that
the most opportune time to work for
reform is before a crisis, not in the
midst of it. It is unworthy of the United
States to discover that personal liberties
are being violated only when the alarm
bell rings. As in other areas of foreign
relations, we must have long-term, con-
sistent policy — one that works quietly to
diminish problems before they become
acute, and one that will not swerve or
reverse in a crisis.

We pause here to note that
America's commitment to exercising its
power on behalf of personal liberties car-
ries with it special responsibilities, which
some smaller countries may well be able
to avoid. Frankly, it is easy for countries
playing a lesser role in world affairs to
urge strident uncompromising perfec-
tionism in situations not directly affec-
ting them. Such countries can — and
sometimes do — insist on absolute purity
in Turkey or El Salvador or some other
country where our security interests are
at risk. For these countries the cost of
such rhetoric is nil.

Let me relate what I have said to
the Reagan Administration. When this
Administration arrived in Washington,
extreme views on human rights were

prevalent. One extreme said that human
rights as practiced in other nations
should in no way affect our relations
with them. The other extreme said:
Disregard our national security concerns
in condemning human rights violations
within those other nations. The extreme
views nevertheless had something in
common: They agreed that human liber-
ties and national security impose incon-
sistent demands and that we were re-
quired to choose one to the exclusion of
the other.

This Administration disagrees. We
must seek and do seek to protect our na-
tional security even in those areas of the
world where there may be regrettable
violations of personal liberty. Why?
Because our own national security
depends on insuring freedom and per-
sonal liberties throughout the world.

Guidelines To Implementing
Personal Liberties

Let me elaborate on my broad observa-
tions about personal liberties and na-
tional security by mentioning seven
guidelines this Administration looks to
in its attempt to encourage individual
liberties abroad while adhering to na-
tional security needs. They are:

First, a commitment to effec-
tiveness— to accomplish good rather
than to look good. Pronouncements and
speeches do not alone create an effective
policy. I was recently reminded of this
by the Vatican Secretary of State who
in referring to the Soviet Union said,
"... human liberty and peace must be
more than mere words."

Second, our effectiveness is based
on greater use of traditional
diplomacy rather than on public con-
demnation.

Third, commitment that the
United States will remain a constant
and reliable force in international af-
fairs. Other governments must know we
will be a reliable friend and, if need be, a
resolute adversary.

Fourth, positive reliance upon
human nature to achieve idealistic
aims. I stated in an address at West
Point last fall:

We seek to build on the very features of
international life that some seek to abolish —
national differences, national interests, and
national pride. Properly channeled, these
facts of international life can be used to
create and support a just and peaceful world
order. It is on such constructive use of human
nature, rather than repudiation of it, that the
major intervals of peace in world history
have been based.

We do not wish to remake man or
redefine the elements of human inter-
course. We seek to appeal to basic
human needs and to direct other nations
toward peace, democracy, and personal
liberty.

Fifth, concern for violations of
personal liberties from all sources
whether government or otherwise. An
opposition group to a government — if it
engages in terrorism, murder, torture,
suppression of a free press, or in-
terference with the judiciary — is as
burdensome to its victims as official sup-
pression. It is a tragic fact that extreme
means used by revolutionary movements
produce brutality proportional to the
means used to attain them. This was
understood long ago by Edmund Burke,
who said of the textbook revolutionaries
of his time, "In the groves of their
academy, at the end of every vista, you
see nothing but the gallows."

Sixth, commitment to resist the
expansion of dictatorship. Direct ag-
gression, guerrilla war, and terrorism
are used by the U.S.S.R. and Libya to
undermine democracies and to help their
brands of dictatorship.

Seventh, commitment to the global
campaign for democracy that the
President outlined in his recent
speech to the British Parliament. We
must help strengthen democratic institu-
tions such as the free press, independent
judicial systems, democratic political
parties, free churches and universities.
Democracy is built on free insititutions:
This is the lesson of our history. Person-
al liberty policy cannot be just a matter
of critiques and sanctions; at its heart
must be encouragement and help for
those who are actually building
democracies throughout the world.

In El Salvador today, people are ac-
tually building democracy amid the cruel
obstacles of violent insurgency and
economic crisis. The long lines of
peasants waiting to vote in the face of
violence and death threats demonstrated
that liberties neither should be taken for
granted nor seen as a hopeless dream by
those who have not heretofore enjoyed
them. This Administration finds it an
honor to assist in the birth of democracy
in El Salvador. The right of a people to
govern themselves is perhaps the most
cherished of personal freedoms. By
assisting the people of El Salvador to
secure this right, we have a rare oppor-
tunity to secure other personal liberties
as well. Where democracy prevails there
are traditionally fewer violations of
other liberties. Again, in the absence of
self-government, the fulfillment of per-
sonal liberties is never assured.

December 1982

HUMAN RIGHTS

Conclusion

Let us conclude. American strength and
will are essential to the expansion of
personal liberty around the globe. These
are prerequisites to making the cause of
personal liberties a centerpiece of our
foreign policy. We adopt a "forward
strategy" in this cause. We must be will-
ing to use our influence to promote
democratic initiatives in all likely areas
of the world. And, in order to maintain
our international credibility in all of this,
we must avoid idle posturing or fruitless
utopianism. We must remember Jeffer-
son's warning: "The ground of liberty is
to be gained by inches. We must be con-
tented to secure what we can get from
time to time, and eternally press for-
ward for what is yet to get."

In all of this there is one underlying
reality: Anyone who wishes to work ef-
fectively on behalf of personal liberties
must do so wfith the clear understanding
of the greatest threat to those liber-
ties—the growth of totalitarian power
and the onrush of an idealogy that
justifies any violation of personal liberty
so long as it is done in the name of the
state. It is inconsistent — and this was
the great shoal upon which the last Ad-
ministration's well-intentioned human
rights policy foundered — to speak of an
"inordinate fear of communism" while at
the same time promoting the cause of
personal liberties. The Marxist-Leninists
do not by definition believe in human
rights or personal liberties or individual
conscience. They believe in the accumu-
lation of state power and the eventual
extension of that power to every nation
on the face of the Earth. As the Presi-
dent remarked recently in his Captive
Nations Proclamation, this attempt at a
worldwide repression of freedom is the
tragedy of our time and the most impor-
tant new event of our generation.

This is the central reality that con-
fronts any honest effort to extend per-
sonal liberties, the alpha and omega of
any intelligent discussion of how best to
extend the guarantees of personal liber-
ties to all mankind. ■

Nuclear Weapons:

What is the Moral Response?

by Elliott Abrams

Address before the Chicago World Af-
fairs Council on September 29, 1982. Mr.
Abrams is Assistant Secretary for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Af-
fairs.

Nuclear war is the greatest evil over-
hanging our times. This simple proposi-
tion is one with which everyone ulti-
mately must agree. It is the proper
starting point whenever we begin to
think together about how we can best
avert this evil.

I am not here today as an expert on
strategic weapons. My responsibility in
government and my experience have
been quite different. My responsibility as
Assistant Secretary for Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs has been to
insure that American values are ade-
quately weighed in our foreign policy. So
I will begin not by talking about nuclear
deterrence but about ethics. I have the
feeling that the complexities of the
nuclear balance are often discussed but
the complexities of morality are often
left out.

All morality has two aspects: feeling
that we are on the right side when we
act and knowing that our action will
have a good result. You could call these
the morality of intention and the morali-
ty of result. When moral dilemmas arise,
it is often because these aspects of
morality seem to contradict one another:
the just result can only be achieved by
unjust means or following our moral in-
stincts will result in the end in injustice
and suffering.

In foreign policy we unfortunately
do face such dilemmas. At one extreme
the morality of result can be used to ex-
cuse a man like Stalin, who committed
enormous cruelties in the name of what
he and apologists for him thought was a
good result. At the other extreme, there
can arise equally strange paradoxes re-
garding the morality of intention. The
philosopher Kant, arguing from the fact
that it i.s wrong to tell a lie, presents a
situation in which a madman appears at
your door with a gun and asks: "Where
is your wife? I want to kill her." Kant
says that the most the moral man can do
in this situation is to remain silent, be-
cause it is wrong to lie even for a cause
so certainly good.

I think we sense that this position is
extreme— for though the intent is pure,
the result would be senseless. The good
man cannot be a man who destroys
everything else that is good by his good-
ness. But the opposing claims of these
two aspects of morality do pose many
dilemmas, especially for those who have
to make decisions in foreign policy. We
face these dilemmas all the time. To
take one example, it has long been con-
sidered a simple moral position that the
United States should give all the food
that we can afford to poor nations. Now
experts tell us that in nations such as
Bangladesh, such aid destroys any incen-
tive to increase local production and
guarantees a future of endless depend-
ence and poverty. Yet to reduce food aid
means, in the short run, more misery
there.

So what is the moral position? Our
intentions in giving the aid have been
pure but the results may have been very
harmful. To take another example, some
argue that simple morality requires a
clean break in relations with South
Africa. But we believe our relations with
that government and society offer us a
chance to help improve conditions there.
If we were to stop talking with the
South African Government out of moral
intentions, is it at all clear that the
result would be improvements there? Or
would our search for purity lead to harm
in the real world?

I hope that this introduction has re-
minded you of what all of us realize:
that being good is not simple. In many
things, whether in ordinary life or in
foreign policy, it requires painful choices
and reflection. Morality is the monopoly
of no one; no one can say in complex
issues, "I've mastered morality, and I'll
deliver it to you neatly packaged."

These dilemmas and conflicts be-
tween seeking the good result and doing
the thing that feels right wOl continue.
But there has been an important histori-
cal movement in the last 200 years that
has evolved some morally helpful solu-
tions in practice. This has been a move-
ment away from satisfaction with the
morality of intention by itself.

• In responding to injustice, the old
answer was to exhort rulers to be more
virtuous. The answer evolved by our
Founding Fathers — and since success-

Department of State Bulletin

HUMAN RIGHTS

Jly followed around the Western
orld — was to insure the result of
■eater justice by a carefully written
mstitution. Intentions were matched
ith a pragmatic study of how to
ifeguard liberty.

• In responding to poverty, the old
nswer was to give charity to the poor
nd the crippled— beggars, for example,
his certainly is, in itself, a purer act of
ompassion than any other way of
ilieving suffering. But it has very little
esult in ending poverty. The modern
Lmerican way has been to create an
conomic system of free enterprise that
irill banish poverty not only for one per-
on but for all, not only at one instant
lut for the whole future. This answer
las not ended the need for compassion
ind charity, but it has created the condi-
ions in which charity could be more
han a gesture. This solution made eco-
lomic justice a reality and not just a
lope.

This has been the American path: to
jive particular attention, in morality, to
nsuring that the result of our actions is
moral. This approach has given Ameri-
cans a reputation in the world as people
who are both highly moral and highly
pragmatic.

Having said all this, let me now be-
gin to apply it to nuclear weapons. In
the confusing debate over nuclear
.veapons, it is essential to understand
what responsible American voices agree
on and where we disagree with one
another.

To begin with the area of agree-
ment, every sane person in this country
agrees that nuclear weapons are a terri-
ble evil. It is the tragedy of our times
that we are cursed with this unwelcome
gift of technology. The United States,
like other Western countries, did not
develop modern physics in order to build
nuclear weapons. Rather, it was modern
physics that suddenly presented us with
this possibility in the midst of a war
whose stakes were the very
highest— the survival of civilization or
the triumph of Fascist barbarism. It was
in these desperate circumstances that
atomic bombs became part of the stock
of man's invention. And, ever since, we
have been faced with the difficulty of
subtracting the atomic bomb from this
stock.

The difficulty we face is not alto-
gether different from the difficulty we
would face in "abolishing" any other
human invention. Those who maintain
that it requires only goodwill to dispense
with nuclear weapons should reflect on
how easy it would be to get rid of any

other invention— the automobile, for ex-
ample—if we suddenly decided it was a
bad thing. In fact, there is no modern in-
vention we have yet succeeded in
abolishing. The weapons of chemical and
biological warfare come the closest, but
they continue to be used by the Soviet
Union and its proxies in Southeast Asia
and in Afghanistan.

The basic fact is that all responsible
Americans do regard nuclear weapons
as evil. Thus, when the antinuclear
movement says it is against these
weapons, it is saying nothing new.
Where this Administration differs from
some in the antinuclear movement is in
saying that we cannot simply feel good
because we are against nuclear war, but
that the only moral course is to concen-
trate on insuring that a nuclear war
never happens. In other words, the only
truly moral approach to nuclear war is
to deter it. Deterrence of nuclear war-
not just denunciation of nuclear
weapons— must be the focus of anyone
who is truly serious about the great
moral issues nuclear war raises. This is
also the approach that conforms to the
trend of the last two centuries in ad-
dressing moral problems with effective
solutions and the approach that takes
advantage of the American aptitude for
pragmatic solutions.

We will be more serious about de-
terrence if we realize that it is not easy.
To make the problem of deterrence clear
requires a little history. Most people do
not realize how great the danger of
nuclear war once was. In the mid-1950s
the U.S. strategic air command could
have been wiped out by as few as 56
Soviet bombers if they struck first. On
the other hand, Soviet nuclear forces
were even weaker and more likely to
have been eliminated if we struck first.
This state of affairs was hideously
dangerous. Whoever struck first could
destroy his opponent with little damage
to himself. Thus, in a crisis, if it ever
seemed to either side that there might
eventually be a nuclear war, there would
be an overwhelming incentive to go
first, to start a war. Such nuclear
forces, rather than a deterrent to
nuclear war, were an incentive for war.
Fortunately, this frightening situa-
tion is not the one we face now — con-
trary to the view that "the arms race" is
bringing greater and greater danger. In
fact, any country that tried to disarm its
opponents with a nuclear first strike
could do so only in part and would be
exposed to devastating retaliation. This
is a very different set of facts. Even
though American land-based strategic

missiles are already vulnerable to a
Soviet first strike, the overall strategic
balance provides both countries with a
substantial incentive not to strike first.

If we are as concerned as we should
be about preventing nuclear war, we
should ask what it was that changed a
situation of hideous danger into one of
substantial, if declining, safety. It was
primarily two things that saved us from
the danger of nuclear war we faced in
the 1950s. The first was the develop-
ment in the mid-1950s of an intellectual
understanding of deterrence — that what
deters nuclear war is not simply more
weapons but a protected strategic force

Deterrence of nuclear
war . . . must be the
focus of anyone who is
truly serious about the
great moral issues
nuclear war raises.

that can strike back even if it is attacked
first. Such a force removes the tempta-
tion to strike first. If we are to be
serious, it is vital to realize that the
development of the theory of deterrence
was the most important act of arms con-
trol in the postwar era— more important
than any negotiation or treaty we have

The second thing that kept nuclear
annihilation at a distance was the devel-
opment of new weapons that were
shaped by this theory of deterrence. I
will cite only three examples of weapons
that played a key role in creating stable
deterrence. These are:

• The missile silo, which buried
missiles in concrete and thus made
them — for many years— able to last out
a first strike and retaliate;

• The ballistic missile submarine,
which was more invulnerable because it
was hidden in the depths of the sea; and

• The "spy" satellite, which for the
first time gave an accurate accounting
of the other side's strategic forces, thus
reducing uncertainty and nervousness.
Arms control agreements like SALT I
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] would
not have been possible without this
weapon, because they would have been
wholly impossible to verify.

These facts constitute a genuine
paradox: that the moral result of avoid-

December1982

HUMAN RIGHTS

ing nuclear war was achieved through
certain weapons. I believe we must face
this paradox squarely. Many members of
the antinuclear movement will not face
it at all. These people argue that it is im-
moral even to have nuclear weapons. In
the words of one churchman: "It is
morally wrong to threaten to use
nuclear weapons as a deterrent." But
the very purpose of a nuclear deterrent
is to prevent nuclear war. This argu-
ment— that deterrence is morally
wrong — amounts to saying that the
avoidance of the immoral is immoral.
Such a mode of reasoning is exceedingly
strange. It would finally sever the link
between morality and human reason.
It is simplistic because it ignores
half of morality— that the good man
must be concerned about achieving a
good result through his actions. It is
based on an extreme exaggeration of the
morality of intention. And this view flies
in the face of the moral experience of
our country. When we try to decide
whether it is right to use nuclear
weapons and nuclear deterrence to pre-
vent nuclear war, we face a dilemma
similar to that faced by opponents of
slavery in the 1840s. They had to decide
whether it was right to prevent the ex-
tension of slavery by voting for Henry
Clay, a slaveholder. The extreme aboli-
tionists argued on the basis of the princi-
ple "We are not to do evil that good may
come." To this argument Abraham Lin-
coln wrote to an abolitionist:

This general proposition is doubtless cor-
rect; but did it apply? If by your votes you
could have prevented the extension ... of
slavery would it not have been good, and not
evil, so to have used your votes, even though
it involved the casting of them for a slave-
holder? By the fruit the tree is to be known.
An evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit.
[Letter to Williamsun Durley, October S,
18J,5.]

At any given time, it is hard to
know who is right in such a dilemma.
But in retrospect we know that Lincoln
was right. The extreme abolitionist posi-
tion was as highly moral as it was im-
practical, and it was Lincoln who suc-
ceeded in freeing black Americans from
bondage. The same choice faces
members of the antinuclear movement
today. Theirs is the choice between a
moralism that is ultimately self-
indulgent, on one side, and working with
their government to devise practical
steps that will prevent nuclear war, on
the other side.

These practical measures will have
to involve further work on the proper
configuration of nuclear weapons. We
face an appalling danger in nuclear war

and have limited resources to cope with
it. Since the 1950s, one of the resources
that has been most useful is the redesign
of weapons so that they will contribute
to a true deterrent. In our dangerous
situation, to reject this resource would
be astonishingly frivolous.

I think we can understand this para-
dox, by which certain weapons achieve a
moral end, particularly well from the ex-
perience of human rights work. In this
work we want to stop human rights
violations by governments throughout
the world. We use our diplomatic in-
fluence, when our relationship with a
country gives us any, and we use our
foreign assistance budget to create
pressure for better behavior. The ques-
tion could be raised whether we should
have good diplomatic relations with, or
give aid to, any nondemocratic regime at

When we try to decide
whether it is right to use
nuclear weapons and
nuclear deterrence . . .
we face a dilemma
similar to that faced by
opponennts of slavery in
the 1840 s.

all. One could argue that this itself is im-
moral. Should we give one dollar in aid
to a regime which is not fully demo-
cratic, no matter how poor its popula-
tion? But only by these tools can we
diminish far greater evils, such as
murder or torture. Most people who
care about human rights have decided
that it is worth using these tools.

The same is true of deterrence. Only
by having the right kind and number of
nuclear weapons can we, in practice,
avert nuclear war. There is no simple
solution and denouncing nuclear
weapons is no solution at all.

It is for this reason in particular
that this Administration opposes the
current campaign for a "nuclear freeze."
Leaving aside the Soviet buildup, a
nuclear freeze is indiscriminate; it does
not allow us to choose the configuration
of weapons that is most likely to
diminish the chances of nuclear war.
And this indiscriminate character is evi-
dent from the manner in which a
nuclear freeze has been advocated. Ask
yourselves if you do not constantly hear
that a nuclear freeze is "a way" of stop-

ping the arms race. Do you ever hear it ,
advocated as the most carefully designee u
way to deal with the specific dangers of
the present nuclear balance? Yet, does
not a real commitment to peace demand
of us that we use all our ingenuity to
safeguard it?

In turning to proposals for a nuclear
freeze, we meet problems somewhat dif-
ferent from the ones I discussed first.
The advocates of a "mutual and veri-
fiable" freeze are quite different from
those extreme elements who oppose the
very idea of deterrence. The freeze
advocates support deterrence, but do
they understand the complexity of the
requirements for deterrence? Maintain-
ing deterrence requires a host of ele-
ments reaching far beyond the realm of
nuclear weapons as we normally think ol
it. For example, the missile silo was a
crucial invention for deterrence. That is,
cement— the most mundane and civilian
of products— was crucial for nuclear
deterrence. Today it is of vital import-
ance for deterrence whether a sub-
marine engine is quiet or noisy, because
a noisy submarine can be tracked by
enemy antisubmarine warfare (ASW)
and would no longer constitute a sur-
vivable deterrent.

None of the freeze proposals yet ad-
vanced is complex enough to control all
of these factors that affect, and easily
threaten, deterrence. It is a question
whether any freeze proposal could be
complex enough unless it tried to stop
all technological development in every
field, military and civilian.

We do have valuable experience of
how to preserve deterrence from having
preserved it in the past. What preserved
deterrence then was a process of tech-
nological innovation when necessary—
precisely what the freeze proposals at-
tempt to stop in a crude and limited
way. For example, the U.S. deterrent
depended for many years on bombers.
Our first nuclear bombers— B-29s—
could deter because they had the ability,
when replying to a first strike, to pene-
trate to their targets. But Soviet air de-
fense improved to a point that threat-
ened this ability. (No strategic freeze
would have limited, by the way, this im-
provement in fighters.) We then
changed from piston-engined to jet
bombers. The Soviet Union made strides
to limit the deterrent power of our early
jets, and we developed the B-52. P'or
the same reason, that bomber went
through many new models; decoys and
standoff missiles were added to it. The
lesson of this history is that deterrence
is not, once established, carved in stone;

Department of State Bulletin

ari

MIDDLE EAST

continuous effort is required to main-
lin it.

Even if the Soviet Union accepted a
eeze and allowed it to be verified— two
ighly unlikely eventualities— such a
reeze would not prevent developments
n other areas from threatening deter-
** ence. To take a simple example, the
nost secure part of our deterrent— the
ea-based force— depends on the fact
hat antisubmarine warfare does not
vork very well today. But a break-
'■' hrough in ASW is hardly impossible in
he century of the Wright brothers,
such a breakthrough would be a major
■ 3I0W to our deterrent, returning us to
'" ;he hair-trigger situation of the early
1950s. Yet a nuclear freeze would do
"■ lothing to rule it out. It would prevent
is from replying to such a breakthrough
sr evading it beforehand.

I think, when you really look at the
freeze, you see that it ignores complex-
ities inherent in deterrence. It is not a
policy but a slogan. I deeply believe that
the question of nuclear arms control is
too serious to allow for moral posturing
or simplistic sloganeering. If I may
quote from the words of Pope John
Paul II in his message to the U.N.
Special Session on Disarmament:

In this context there is what I would call
the phenomenon of rhetoric. In an area so
tense and fraught with unavoidable dangers,
there is no place for any type of exaggerated
speech or provocative posture. Indulgence in
rhetoric, in inflamed and impassioned vocabu-
lary, in veiled threat and counterthreat or
dishonest means can only exacerbate a prob-
lem that requires sober and attentive exami-
nation.

In conclusion, when we see the dis-
maying alternatives, we are forced to be
serious. To be serious is to see that our
immediate task is nuclear deterrence.
Deterrence is moral. To take again the
words of Pope John Paul II from the
message delivered by Cardinal Casaroli
at the United Nations: "In current condi-
tions, deterrence based on balance— cer-
tainly not as an end in itself but as a
stage on the way to progressive dis-
armament—may still be deemed to be
morally acceptable."

In our era it is deterrence that con-
serves human civilization and prevents
unimaginable suffering. The United
States, as the first nation to understand
the requirements of stable deterrence
and develop a true deterrent, has con-
tinued its tradition of practical, ap-
propriate solutions to the most terrify-
ing moral problems. By developing this
tradition, we will some day be able to
banish the threat of nuclear war alto-
gether. ■

Visit of Lebanese President

President Arwin Gemayel of the
Republic of Lebanon made an official
visit to Washington, D.C., October 18-19,
1982, to meet with President Reagan and
other government officials.

Following are remarks made by the
two Presidents after their meeting on
October 19.^

President Reagan

Our talks have covered a full range of
issues with particular focus on our
shared objective of prompt withdrawal
of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

We also discussed Lebanon's goals in
restoring authority and control of the
central government in all parts of the
country. In this regard, I reaffirmed
U.S. support for the sovereignty, unity,
territorial integrity, and freedom of
Lebanon. And I am pleased to have had
the opportunity to establish a close
working dialogue with President
Gemayel who deserves all of our support
as he and the people of Lebanon work to
rebuild their nation.

President Gemayel can rely upon the
help of the United States. It is my hope
that our mutual efforts will lead to
restored peace and prosperity for all the
people of Lebanon and, indeed, all the
Middle East. He has been most welcome
here, and we are pleased to have had
him with us.

President Gemayel

I am honored to be the first President of
Lebanon to make an official visit to the
United States. The Lebanese people
deeply appreciate and will never forget
your gracious and decisive efforts to
help bring an end to the suffering of my
country. American commitment to the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of a
free democracy in J^ebanon has been
fundamental to our survival. We see the
U.S. role as the indispensable ingredient
to bring peace, not only to Lebanon but
also to the whole region as well. We
firmly believe that President Reagan's
initiative has created unprecedented op-
portunities for peace.

We in Lebanon intend to be active in
the search for peace with all nations of
the region. The relations between the
United States and Lebanon are not only
between our two governments; they are
between our two peoples who share the
same heritage and adhere to the same
values and principles of democracy and
liberty.

The 2V2 million Lebanese have al-
most equal numbers of close relatives in
the United States. We value enormously
the unique tie provided by these Ameri-
can-Lebanese, among the most loyal of
all Americans, and we believe they have
a leading role in keeping our two coun-
tries together.

Lebanon has been the most recent,
and for us the most painful, example of

Decennber 1982

MIDDLE EAST

the assault upon free men by the forces
of darkness and occupation. We have
fought to retain our freedom, and the
strength of our resistance has earned
for us not only a restated pride in
ourselves but also a reentry into the
ranks of the free world.

With equal resolve, I, together with
my people, am committed to the im-
mediate removal of all foreign forces
from our soil and to work hand-in-hand
with all sectors of Lebanese society to
build a nation in which all citizens have
equal privileges, rights, and respon-
sibilities.

The historic U.S. -Lebanon relation-
ship is the cornerstone of building this
new Lebanon. America's friendship and
assistance, not only in peacekeeping and
peacemaking but also in reconstruction
and rebuilding our armed forces, are
vital. We, for our part, intend to carry
our share of the responsibility of this
partnership by a full and reciprocal con-
tribution to all U.S. goals in its many
noble endeavors as the leader of the free
world.

'Made on the South Grounds of the White
House (text from White House press
release). ■

War Powers Resolution
and U.S. Troops in Lebanon

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
SEPT. 29, 1982'

On September 20, 1982, the Government of
Lebanon requested the Governments of
France, Italy, and the United States to con-
tribute forces to serve as a temporary
Multinational Force, the presence of which
will facilitate the restoration of Lebanese
Government sovereignty and authority, and
thereby further the efforts of the Govern-
ment of Lebanon to assure the safety of per-
sons in the area and bring to an end the
violence which has tragically recurred.

In response to this request, I have
authorized the Armed Forces of the United
States to participate in this Multinational
Force. In accordance with my desire that the
Congress be fully informed on this matter,
and consistent with the War Powers Re.solu-
tion, I am hereby providing a report on the
deployment and mission of these members of
the United States armed forces.

On September 29, approximately 1200
Marines of a Marine Amphibious Unit began
to arrive in Beirut. Their mission is to pro-
vide an interposition force at agreed locations
and thereby provide the multinational
presence requested by the Lebanese Govern-
ment to assist it and the Lebanese Armed
Forces. In carrying out this mission, the
American force will not engage in combat. It
may, however, exercise the right of self-
defense and will be equipped accordingly.
These forces will operate in close coordina-
tion with the Lebanese Armed Forces, as
well as with comparably sized French and
Italian military contingents in the Multina-
tional Force. Although it is not possible at
this time to predict the precise duration of
the presence of U.S. forces in Beirut, our
agreement with the Government of Lebanon
makes clear that they will be needed only for
a limited period to meet the urgent re-
quirements posed by the current situation.

I want to emphasize that, as was the case
of the deployment of U.S. forces to Lebanon
in August as part of the earlier multinational
force, there is no intention or expectation
that U.S. Armed Forces will become involved
in hostilities. They are in Lebanon at the for-
mal request of the Government of Lebanon,
and our agreement with the Government of
Lebanon expressly rules out any combat
responsibilities for the U.S. forces. All armed
elements in the area have given assurances
that they will refrain from hostilities and will
not interfere with the activities of the
Multinational Force. Although isolated acts of
violence can never be ruled out, all ap-
propriate precautions have been taken to en-
sure the safety of U.S. military personnel
during their temporary deployment in
Lebanon.

This deployment of the United States
Armed Forces is being undertaken pursuant
to the President's constitutional authority
with respect to the conduct of foreign rela-
tions and as Commander-in-Chief of the
United States Armed Forces.

I believe that this step will .support the
objective of helping to restore the territorial
integrity, sovereignty, and political in-
dependence of Lebanon. It is part of the con-
tinuing efforts of the United States Govern-
ment to bring lasting peace to the troubled
country, which has too long endured the
trials of civil strife and armed conflict.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

'Identical letters addressed to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President p?-o tempore of the Senate (text
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents of Oct. 4, 1982). ■

Department of State Bulletin

MIDDLE EAST

Vrab League Delegation
eets With the President

A delegation from the Arab League,
eaded by King Hassan II (Morocco), met
nth President Reagan on October 22,
982. The other members of the delega-
ion were Arab League Secretary Gen-
ral Chedli Klibi (Tunisia), Foreign
linister Mohammed Boucetta (Morocco),
'oreign Minister Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi
Algeria), Foreign Minister Afarwaw al-
losem (Jordan). Foreign Minister
''rince Saud Al-Faisal (Saudi Arabia),
deputy Prime Minister and Foreign
dinister Abdel Halim Khaddam (Syria),
nd Foreign Minister Beji Caid Essebsi
Tunisia).

Following are remarks by the Presi-
ient and King Hassan at the conclusion
)/ their meeting. '

President Reagan

3ur meeting today with King Hassan
ind the delegation is an important mile-
stone along the road toward a common
objective — a just and lasting peace in
the Middle East. His Majesty King
Hassan and his colleagues were forth-
right and helpful to us in clarifying the
positions of the Arab League, adopted
last month in Fez, Morocco. I've clarified
for His Majesty and the delegation a
number of points concerning the peace
initiative that I announced September
1st.

We listened to one another's views
in the spirit of good will, understanding,
and mutual respect. Peace in the Middle
East means achieving security for all the
states in that troubled region— security
for the Arab states and security for
Israel and a sense of identity for the
Palestinian people. We must pursue
these goals rigorously, thoughtfully, and
in close consultation with all here.

And like our guests today, we all
share the hope of peace. Our mutual
goal of peace and the road to it lies
through a negotiating process which I
hope can be resumed in the very near
future. I hope they realize — all the
delegation and His Majesty — how wel-
come they are here in the United States
and how much we appreciate their com-
ing here.

King Hassan IP

I and my colleagues, I would like to
assure you, express our gratitude for
this wonderful reception we received to-
day and the hospitality which we have
received here today.

We also would like to thank you for
the depth and the good will which we
have witnessed here today as we re-
viewed with you the hopes of the Arabs
and their objectives, which is peace with
justice and dignity. I personally believe
that we will find in the framework of
Security Council Resolutions 242 and
338 and your program— your plan for
peace — and the decisions of the Fez con-
ference, we will find in all these, which
will save us a lot of time in order to
achieve our noble aim and objective
which is peace and coexistence and con-
struction for the welfare of the region
and all mankind.

Front row (left to right): Foreign Minister
Khaddam (Syria), King Hassan II (Moroc-
co), President Reagan, Prince Faisal
(Saudi Arabia), and Secretary Shultz. Sec-
ond row (left to right): Arab League
Secretary General Klibi (Tunisia), Vice
President Bush, Foreign Minister Boucetta
(Morocco), Foreign Minister Ibrahimi
(Algeria), Foreign Mrnister Essebsi
(Tunisia), and Foreign Minister Kasem

(Jordan). (White House photo by Bill Fitz-Patricli)

'Made at the Diplomatic Entrance at the
White House (text from White House press
release).

^His Majesty spoke in French, and his
remarks were translated by an interpreter. ■

December 1982

MILITARY AFFAIRS

Chemical Warfare in
Southeast Asia and
Afghanistan: An Update

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
AND MEMBER STATES OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

Chemical and toxin weapons are of special concern to mankind. Used against
civilian populations, or even against soldiers with protective equipment, they can
cause protracted and indiscriminate physical and psychological suffering and, as we
witnessed in World War I, widespread death as well. For such reasons, the mter-
national community has outlawed the use of these weapons. The 1925 Geneva Pro-
tocol, one of the oldest arms control agreements still in force, forbids the use of
chemical and biological weapons in war. The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention prohibits the mere possession of toxin weapons. In an effort to extend
such legal constraints still further, the United States— together with other coun-
tries in the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva— is seeking an outright ban on
the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

I regret, then, to report that chemical and toxin weapons are nevertheless be-
ing used today in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and its
allies. In March of this year, we reported on this subject to the Congress, the
United Nations, and to the members of the international community. Our report,
which contained a comprehensive and detailed compilation of the evidence available
to the United States Government, was designed to bring the issue to the attention
of the world community. In presenting it, we invited others to join us in examining
the evidence and in confirming the truth.

These efforts have not led the Soviets and their allies to halt their illegal use
of chemical and toxin weapons. Instead, they continue to deny the truth about
their illegal activities. The world cannot be silent in the face of such human suffer-
ing and such cynical disregard for international law and agreements. The use of
chemical and toxin weapons must be stopped. Respect for existing agreements
must be restored and the agreements themselves strengthened. Respect for the
dignity of humanity must be restored. Failure to achieve these goals can only have
serious implications for the security of the world community, particularly for the
security of smaller nations, like those whose people are being attacked. If such
basic elements of human rights can be so fundamentally ignored, how can we
believe any pledges to respect human rights?

All who would seek to promote human rights, and all who would seek to main-
tain the credibility of international agreements, have a duty to call world attention
to the continuing use of chemical and toxin weapons, and to seek a halt to their
use. It is for this purpose that the United States provides the following report.

Sincerely,

George P. Shultz

This report presents conclusions based .
on further evidence about chemical and '■
toxin warfare activities in Laos, Kam- \
puchea, and Afghanistan that has be- j
come available to the U.S. Government ■
since publication of the special report on
this subject on March 22, 1982. The
evidence includes new information on
events occurring since the first of this
year as well as additional information
from a variety of sources on activities
described in that report. The current
report is accompanied by tables listing
recent and newly reported attacks and
annexes providing additional sample
analysis results, medical evidence, and
other supporting data.

UPDATED FINDINGS

Based on a thorough analysis of this
new information, we are able to con-
clude the following:

• Reports of chemical attacks from
February through October 1982 indicate
that Soviet forces continue their selec-
tive use of chemicals and toxins against
the resistance in Afghanistan. More-
over, new evidence collected in 1982 on
Soviet and Afghan Government forces'
use of chemical weapons from 1979
through 1981 reinforces the previous
judgment that lethal chemical agents
were used on the Afghan resistance.
Physical samples from Afghanistan also
provide new evidence of mycotoxin use.

• Vietnamese and Lao troops,
under direct Soviet supervision, have
continued to use lethal and in-
capacitating chemical agents and toxins
against the H'Mong resistance in Laos
through at least June 1982.

• Vietnamese forces have continued
to use lethal and incapacitating
chemical agents and toxins against
resistance forces in Kampuchea through
at least June 1982.

• Trichothecene toxins were found
in the urine, blood, and tissue of victims
of "yellow rain" attacks in Laos and
Kampuchea and in samples of residue
collected after attacks.

• We continue to find that a com-
mon factor in the evidence is Soviet in-
volvement in the use of these weapons
in all three countries. Continued analy-
sis of prior data and newly acquired in-
formation about Soviet mycotoxin re-
search and development, chemical war-
fare training in Vietnam, the presence
of Soviet chemical warfare advisers in
Laos and Vietnam, and the presence of
the same unusual trichothecene toxins

jff

Department of State Bulletir

MILITARY AFFAIRS

ITRODUCTION

samples collected from all three coun-
ies reinforce our earlier conclusion
[out the complicity of the Soviet

lion and about its extent.

TABLE 1

Afghanistan: Reported Attacks, 1982

IT March study showed that casualties
id deaths resulted from chemical at-
cks in Southeast Asia and Afghani-
an and that trichothecene toxins were
ied in both Laos and Kampuchea. The
!w evidence shows that these attacks
•e continuing in all three countries and
lat trichothecene toxins have been
ed in Afghanistan as well.

The same rigorous analytical proc-
3ses employed in our March study, and
Litlined in detail there, were followed
) arrive at the judgments contained in
lis update. In light of the widespread
ublicity given the March report,
pecial efforts were made by U.S.
k)vernment analysts to preclude being
id astray by any possible false reports
lat might be generated for propaganda
r other purposes and to eliminate the
ossibility of making erroneous
adgments about the chemical or toxin
gents involved because of tampering
pr improper handling. Every report has
)een carefully checked.

The evidence in the March study
vas based on a broad range of data, in-
■luding testimony by physicians,
•efugee workers, journalists, and
)thers. Although some of the new
•eports are anecdotal, we have been
ible to corroborate most of them by
jther sources and sample analysis.
Moreover, personal testimony tends to
add credence to other accounts which,
taken together, form a coherent pic-
ture. The material presented in this
report represents only a relatively small
amount of the total accumulated
evidence. This additional information is
examined in greater detail in the an-
nexes. Improved sample collection pro-
cedures, a better quality of medical
histories and physical examinations,
documentation including photographs of
lesions and hospital charts from South-
east Asia, and interviews by trained
personnel have reinforced our earlier
conclusions and led to new discoveries.
As international concern about this
subject has increased, based on the
development of evidence from many
countries, independent analyses have
been initiated by foreign chemical war-
fare experts, physicians, journalists, and
independent nongovernmental scientists
and laboratories. Analysts in the United

Dale

Village
Location

Method of
AttacK

Form of
Material

Persons
Killed

Persons
Talien III

early
Feb.

north of
Shindand

aircraft

yellow
substance

Feb. 4. 5

south of
Shindand

helicopter

yellow
substance

Feb. 19

Badakhshan
Province

aircraft

yellow
crystals

May-
June

Qandahar
Province

helicopter
rockets

black, yellow,
white gases

June

Farah
Province

aircraft
bombs

red, black,
white smoke

June 11

Qandahar
Province

aircraft
bombs

June

Baghlan
Province

helicopter

July

Panjsher
Valley

aircraft

nerve gas

Sept. 13

Lowgar
Province

pumped from
armored vehicle

gas

Sept. 20

Lowgar
Province

pumped from
armored vehicle

gas

Sept.

Lowgar
Province

late Sept./
early Oct.

Baghlan
Province

aircraft
bombs

?= Undetermined

States have found this research very
helpful both in supporting their own
conclusions and, more importantly, in
expanding on them.

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

Afghanistan

Evidence indicates that the Soviets
have continued the selective use of toxic
agents in Afghanistan as late as Oc-
tober 1982. For the first time we have
obtained convincing evidence of the use
of mycotoxins by Soviet forces through
analyses of two contaminated Soviet
gas masks acquired from Afghanistan.
Analysis and quantification of material
taken from the outside surface of one
mask have shown the presence of tri-
chothecene mycotoxin. Analysis of a
hose from a second Soviet mask showed
the presence of several mycotoxins. In
addition, a vegetation sample from
Afghanistan shows preliminary evidence
of the presence of mycotoxins. (See An-
nex A.)

Our suspicions that mycotoxins have
been used in Afghanistan have now
been confirmed. Reports during 1980
and 1981 described a yellow-brown mist
being delivered in attacks which caused
blistering, nausea, vomiting, and other
symptoms similar to those described by
"yellow rain" victims in Southeast Asia.
Because of limited access to survivors
who still exhibited symptoms, as well as
great difficulties in collecting environ-
mental and other physical samples from
attack sites, we were unable to con-
clude with certainty in the March 22
report that mycotoxins were being used
in Afghanistan. We have now concluded
that trichothecene mycotoxins have
been used by Soviet forces in Afghani-
stan since at least 1980.

A number of reports indicate that
chemical attacks are continuing in 1982.
While we cannot substantiate every
detail, the pieces of evidence in these
reports add up to a consistent picture.
For example, a physician in a facility
treating casualties among the mu-
jahidin (resistance fighters) has re-

December 1982

MILITARY AFFAIRS

ported that he treated 15 mujahidin for
red skin lesions that he said were
caused by Soviet chemical attacks in
Qandahar Province in May-June 1982.
Three mujahidin died within 12 hours
of one attack in the general area of
Maharijat south of Qandahar. The mu-
jahidin claimed that Soviet helicopters
fired rockets that emitted black, yellow,
and white gases on impact. The physi-
cian said that the surviving victims
failed to respond to conventional
medical treatment.

We have received reports that on
September 20, 1982, Soviet soldiers
poisoned underground waterways in
Lowgar Province south of Kabul where
the mujahidin were hiding. According
to a mujahidin commander in Pakistan,
a similar event occurred in the same
province on September 13, 1982, result-
ing in the deaths of 60 adults and 13
children. These two independent ac-
counts described a Soviet armored vehi-
cle pumping a yellow gas through a
hose into the waterways.'

According to the accounts of the
September 1982 attacks, the victims'
bodies decomposed rapidly, and the
flesh peeled away when attempts were
made to move the bodies. Since 1979,
mujahidin resistance leaders, refugees,
journalists, and Afghan defectors have
described chemical attacks causing
almost identical symptoms. Most
reports have described the skin as being
blue-black after death. Although such
symptoms seem bizarre, the large
number of reports from a variety of
sources since 1979 suggests that they
cannot be dismissed (see our March 22
report, p. 16).

In 1982, a Soviet soldier who
defected to the mujahidin said in an in-
terview with a British journalist that a
Soviet toxic agent, termed "100 percent
lethal," causes the flesh to become very
soft. The Soviet defector stated that the
Soviets maintained stores of "picric
acid" (probably chloropicrin, a potential-
ly lethal tear gas), the "100 percent
lethal" agent, and an incapacitating
agent near the cities of Qonduz and
Kabul. The defector also reported that:

• Unidentified toxic agents had
been used in June 1982 on the highway
between Termez and the Salang Pass
north of Kabul;

• The "100 percent lethal" agent
was delivered by rockets; and

• "Picric acid" and an in-
capacitating agent were delivered by
air-dropped canisters.

The defector stated that the Soviets
have been preoccupied with protecting
the roads and that chemicals were
sprayed by planes along the areas adja-
cent to highways. Chemical grenades
reportedly have been used, but the data
are inadequate to allow us to hypothe-
size about the contents, although some
symptoms are indicative of mycotoxins.

The reports of rapid skin decom-
position as quickly as 1-3 hours after
death continue to concern us. There is
no recognized class of chemical or bio-
logical toxin agents we know of that
could affect bodies in such a way. If we
assume occasional inaccuracies in re-
porting by journalists and survivors of
attacks, it is possible that phosgene or
phosgene oxime could cause such ef-
fects after 3-6 hours but with much
less softening of tissues than is consist-
ent with stories of "fingers being
punched through the skin and limbs fall-
ing off." The reported medical effects of
other toxic agent attacks are consistent
with use of the nerve agent tabun. We
have information that both phosgene
oxime and tabun are stored by the
Soviets in Afghanistan.

The British journalist, who inter-
viewed the Soviet defector, also re-
ported on two attacks described to him
by the mujahidin, which have not yet
been confirmed. One was an attack in
the spring of 1982 on Kaiba, where
Soviet soldiers reportedly shot victims
already rendered unconscious by a gas;
the other was in the summer of 1982
near Herat where Soviet troops
reportedly loaded the bodies from a gas
attack onto a truck and removed them.
Reliable information indicates that the
Soviets used chemical bombs against
mujahidin forces in late September
1982 and in early October 1982 in
Baghlan Province.

Our earlier findings are reinforced
by several reports received this year
about earlier attacks not covered in our
March report:

• According to a former Afghan
Army officer, in September 1981 a
Soviet helicopter sprayed a yellow mist
in Paktia Province (Sheikn Amir) caus-
ing 16 deaths. The survivors had bloody
noses and tears; extensive bleeding was
reported in those who died. The Afghan
officer described a similar attack in
Nangarhar Province during the same
month in which four persons were
killed.

• In early December 1981, according
to interviews with survivors, 15
refugees attempting to escape to Paki-
stan were attacked by a helicopter us-
ing gas; four or five people were killed

(the youngest and the eldest), while the^j
rest became unconscious for 5-6 hours.
The attack occurred about 60
kilometers northwest of Jalalabad.

• According to a Soviet soldier who
served in Afghanistan in 1980 and per-
sonally observed the use of chemical
weapons, the Soviets dispersed chemi-
cals from fighter-bombers and assault
helicopters. He said that an aircraft or
helicopter first would drop a container
and then, on a second run, drop a
bomb, resulting in a mixture of two dif-
ferent chemicals that killed everything
within the contaminated area. We
believe that the soldier may have been
describing the delivery of two separate
chemical agents, an occurrence
described by other eyewitnesses.

• An Afghan veterinarian recently
has described an incident in May 1979
in which 20 people and a number of
sheep were killed near Qandahar. Sovie'
lab technicians explained that the mci-
dent resulted from anthrax, but the
doctor knew that the explanation did
not fit the effects observed. Local
Afghans told the veterinarian that
Soviet vehicles had been in the area
spraying a yellow/white powder before
the incident.

• In June 1980, an airport official
described seeing 200-300 gas container
painted in greens and browns at Qan-
dahar Airport. The containers averaged
35-40 inches high and 26-30 inches in
diameter. A subordinate reported three
types of gases in the containers: one
causing burning in the throat as well a;
suffocation; one causing what looked
like smallpox and blistering; and one
making victims tired and sleepy and
unable to run or fight. Further, the
subordinate stated that the containers
were placed in special casings that wer"
dropped from aircraft and exploded on
impact, emitting a large cloud of smoke
usually yellow but sometimes other col-
ors. He said he had heard mujahidin
describe these gas attacks and had
himself seen animals that had been
killed by the gases. We lend credence ti
this report because we know from othei
evidence that chemicals are stored at
Qandahar Airport, which is an impor-
tant staging area for Soviet military
operations.

• Finally, information received this
year revealed that a Soviet adviser in-
specting sites for housing Soviet troops
before the Afghan invasion indicated
that Soviet chemical defense forces
entering Afghanistan would bring in ex
tensive stores of toxic materials. The
adviser indicated that a proposed gar-

Department of State Bulletin

MILITARY AFFAIRS

in in Kabul would be inappropriate
the Soviet chemical defense unit be-
je the materials it transported could
■astate the city if an accident oc-
rred.

Mong refugees, recounting details of
dc agent attacks and exhibiting
vere medical symptoms from ex-
sure to the agents, fled to Thailand
ery month from January through
ne 1982. They brought out more
mples contaminated by a yellow,
icky substance described as a "yellow
in" dropped by aircraft and heli-
pters on their villages and crops. We
ive preliminary reports on attacks as
icent as October 1982. We now know
iiat the yellow rain contains
lichothecene toxins and other
uhstances that cause victims to ex-
?rience vomiting, bleeding, blistering,
I'vere skin lesions, and other lingering
:gns and symptoms observed by
ialified physicians. Experts agree that
lese people were exposed to a toxic
Tent and that no indigenous natural
isease, plant, or chemical caused these
nique physical effects.^

Laboratory analyses of blood
imples from these victims and studies
n experimental animals have shown
lat trichothecene toxins are retained in
le body for much longer periods of
me than previously thought. Scientific
esearch has shown that the multiple-
hase distribution pattern in animals in-
ludes a secondary half-life of up to 30
ays. We believe that the severe skin
?sions observed on victims by doctors
re also relevant. Victims whose blood
■roved on analysis to have high levels
if trichothecene mycotoxins exhibit
uch skin lesions.

Descriptions of the 1982 attacks
lave not changed significantly from
lescriptions of earlier attacks. Usually
he H'Mong state that aircraft or heli-
•opters spray a yellow rain-like material
)n their villages and crops. In some
-eports the symptoms are similar to
;hose described in our March 22 study,
md we attribute them to the use of
trichothecene toxins. However, in many
:ases there was no bleeding, only ab-
dominal pains and prolonged illness.
These symptoms, described in previous
years, suggest that another agent or
combination of agents is still being
used. The explanation is complicated be-
cause different symptoms are ascribed
to men, women, children, and animals.

TABLE 2

Laos: Reported Attacks, 1982

Date

village
Location

Metliod o(
Attack

Form of
Material

Persons
Killed

Persons
Taken III

Jan. 3, 6, 11

Phou Bia*

helicopter spray

yellow rain

Jan. 4

Phou Bia

aircraft

green chemical*

Jan. 9

Phou Bia

artillery

white/yellov\/
cloud

Feb. 13

Phou Bia

aircraft spray

yellow rain

Feb. 21, 22

Phou Bia

helicopter

white powder

Feb. 28

Phou Bia

helicopter

white powder

Mar. 10

Phou Bia

helicopter
aircraft

red, yellow/
white clouds

many

Mar. 17

Phou Bia

helicopter

spray

yellow rain**

Mar. 25

Phou Bia

helicopter

spray

yellow rain**

40
families

late Mar.,
early Apr.
Apr. 1

Phou Bia

Phou Bia
(3 villages)

aircraft
?

yellow rain**
yellow rain

many

many
4

Apr. 17, 18, 30

Phou Bia

aircraft

yellow rain

Apr. /May

Phou Bia

aircraft,
helicopters

yellow rain

many

May 20

Phou Bia

aircraft

yellow rain

100

May 24

Phou Bia

aircraft

yellow rain

many

May

Phou Bia

poisoned

river

many

June 17

Phou Bia

aircraft spray

yellow rain

many

= Undetermined

"Phou Bia refers to mountain area wtiere H'Mong villages are located,

•Samples from this attack contained mycotoxin (see Annex A)

It is possible that different agents,
lower concentrations of the same
agents, or climatic conditions have af-
fected the efficacy of the agents.

Medical personnel in Lao refugee
camps in Thailand were much better
organized in 1982 to screen victims
than in past years. Doctors now
routinely use extensive questionnaires
and conduct comprehensive medical ex-
aminations, including some onsite, pre-
liminary blood analysis. Skilled para-
medical personnel oversee preparation
of blood and serum samples for proper
transport and shipment to the United
States or other countries for chemical
analysis. Some patients with active
symptoms are now being monitored ex-
tensively over time.

A number of blood samples have
been collected from Laos for analysis in
the United States. All biological speci-
mens were drawn by qualified medical
personnel, and samples were refriger-

ated until analyzed in the United
States. Analysis of these samples shows
that trichothecene mycotoxins continue
to be used against H'Mong villages. In
addition to blood and urine specimens
from victims exposed to chemical war-
fare, we have collected additional
physical samples this year. These
physical samples consist of more residue
of yellow rain containing mycotoxins
from the same attacks that yielded
human biological specimens positive for
these same toxins. (See Annex A).

The number of reported attacks in
Laos in 1982 did not differ significantly
from the frequencies reported for com-
parable periods in the years 1977
through 1981. Reported fatalities per
attack during 1981 and 1982 showed an
apparent decrease, suggesting the possi-
bility that less lethal toxic agents, or
lower concentrations of the same
agents, are now being used. This ap-
parent decrease, however, was not
statistically significant and could have
been caused by a number of other fac-
tors, including the following:

December 1982

MILITARY AFFAIRS

• Due to emigration and the high
number of fatalities since at least 1976,
the H'Mong were living in smaller,
more scattered communities.

• H'Mong survivors still in Laos
were warier and quicker to take cover
and to use rudimentary protective
measures at the first sign of attack.

• The H'Mong were not taking time
to count victims— this is supported by
the existence of very few reports that
indicate the precise number of people
affected by a toxic agent attack.

As stated in the March report, the
Soviet Union maintains in Laos signifi-
cant numbers of advisers who provide
maintenance assistance, technical sup-
port, and training in both conventional
and chemical warfare. A former Lao
transport pilot who defected early this
summer has described the aerial move-
ment, under Soviet supervision, of toxic
agents within Laos.

Kampuchea

Most reports of toxic attacks in Kam-
puchea for the period 1978- June 1982
come from Democratic Kampuchean
(DK) sources, including interviews with
DK military personnel. Evidence from
other sources confirmed most of these
reports. In 1982, most reported attacks
occurred near the Thai border, making
it easier to obtain samples and other
direct evidence of toxic agent use.

In the first 6 months of 1982, the
number of reported toxic agent attacks
in Kampuchea was about half the
number reported during the same
periods in 1980 and 1981. The number
of reported deaths per attack also
decreased, but data were insufficient to
determine if this decrease was
statistically significant. We also have
preliminary reports on attacks through
early November 1982.

In F'ebruary and March 1982,
several attacks occurred just across the
Kampuchean border in Thailand.
Analysis of samples collected from the
attacks was performed in Canada,
Thailand, and the United States.
Although differing sampling techniques
give rise to significant sampling error
and lead to slightly different analytical
results, both the U.S. and Thai
analysts, using different analytical tech-
niques, found trichothecene mycotoxins
in their samples.^ The Canadian team
investigating these attacks has pub-
lished a detailed medical assessment of
the victims' symptoms; it concluded that
illness had in fact occurred and was
caused by a toxic agent, although pre-

TABLE 3

Kampuchea and Thailand: Reported Attacks, 1982

Date

village
Location

Method ol
Attack

Form of
Material

Persons
Killed

Persons
Taken III

Kampuchea

Feb. 13

border near
Khao Din

artillery

1**

100

Feb. 23

border near
Pailin

spread along
border

yellow
powder

Mar. 3

Battambang
Province

artillery

Mar. 5, 7

Pailin area

aircraft spray,
artillery

white powder*

Mar. 7-11

Sokh Sann

artillery,
ground spray

yellow
substance

many

Mar. 10

Battambang
Province

aircraft

toxic
substance

Mar. 10-13

Battambang
Province

aircraft,
artillery

toxic
substance

Mar. 17

Sokh Sann

artillery

yellow/white
powder

many

Mar. 24

Battambang
Province

poisoned water

yellow powder

Apr. 29

Battambang
Province
near border

aircraft
spray

yellow powder

May 23, 26

Sokh Sann

aircraft spray

June

Preah Vihear
Province

poisoned food
and water

many

June 24

border near
Nong Chan

mortar

yellow cloud

Thailand

Feb. 19

Pong Nam Ron
District

aircraft spray

yellow
powder*

many

Mar. 3

southeast of
Pong Nam Ron
District near
border

aircraft (powder
wind-blown
over border)

powder

many

Mar. 5

Pong Nam Ron
District

mortars

gray/black
smoke

Mar, 6, 8

southeast of
Pong Nam Ron
District near
border

aircraft
spray

yellow
powder

many

^ = Undetermined
"Samples from this attack contained mycotoxin (see Annex A).
"See Annex B for detailed analysis of autopsy results of the victim.

liminary tests for trichothecenes proved
inconclusive in the Canadian sample.

Blood and urine samples from Kam-
puchean victims of a toxic agent ar-
tillery attack on February 13, 1982,
contained trichothecene toxins (Annex
A). In addition, post-mortem tissue
from a victim of this same attack con-
firmed the presence of trichothecene

toxins (Annex B). Analysis of additiona
samples showing the presence of
trichothecenes taken from other attack
is also found in Annex A.

The Vietnamese conducted toxic
agent attacks this year against another
resistance group, the Kampuchean Peo
pie's National Liberation Forces. On
several occasions in March-May 1982,
the resistance camp at Sokh Sann was

Departnnent of State Bulleti

MILITARY AFFAIRS

with toxic artillery shells and bombs
nples of contaminated vegetation
yellow residue from these attacks
now being analyzed. Attacks oc-
red in Kampuchea through June
2, providing new samples; qualita-
; tests indicate that the presence of
:hothecenes is probable. The results
jonfirmatory analyses are pending.
Several Vietnamese military defec-
s from Kampuchea have provided
uable information in 1981 and 1982
chemical weapons use and on the
'tnamese chemical warfare program
1 have reported that some types of
mts are supplied by the Soviet
ion. Information from other sources
0 confirms our earlier view that the
jtnamese possess toxic agent muni-
ns and are equipping their own
lops with additional protective
lipment.

4NEX A

JALYSis OF Samples for
BEMicAL Warfare Agents and

'I)XINS

'le identity of the agents and toxins
t ing used in Laos, Kampuchea, and
j'ghanistan cannot be determined with-
< t collection and analysis of at least
<,e of the following: environmental or
]iysical samples contaminated with
rent, the munitions used to deliver
.'rents, or biological specimens from at-
ick victims.

The likelihood of detection of
iiemical agents and toxins in con-

minated samples depends on a
imber of factors. These include the
jrsistency of the agent; the ambient
■mperature; rainfall; wind conditions;
le media on which the toxic agent was
Bposited; and the time, care, and
ickaging of the sample from collection

laboratory analysis. Many standard
iiemical warfare agents and toxins dis-
ppear from the environment within a
iw minutes to several hours after be-
ig dispersed. These include, for exam-
le, the nerve agents sarin and tabun,
le blood agents hydrogen cyanide and
yanogen chloride, the choking agents
hosgene and diphosgene, and the urti-
ant phosgene oxime. Other standard
gents— such as the nerve agents VX
nd thickened soman and the blistering
gents sulfur mustard, nitrogen
lustard, and lewisite— may persist for
everal days to weeks depending on

weather conditions. The trichothecene
toxins are stable under laboratory con-
ditions but degrade in field samples due
to metabolism by micro-organisms con-
tained in the sample. To maximize the
chances of detection, sample collections
should be made as rapidly as possible
after a toxic agent assault; with many
agents this means minutes to hours.
Given the situation in Southeast Asia
and Afghanistan, this usually has not
been possible. Although numerous
samples were collected, few held any
realistic prospect for yielding results.
However, when immediately collected
and properly handled and using the ad-
vanced technology now available, tricho-
thecenes may be detected in both
physical and biological materials up to
several months after the attack.

Samples have been collected from
Southeast Asia since mid-1979 and from
Afghanistan since May 1980. To date,
more than 350 individual samples— of
greatly varying types and utility for
analytical purposes— have been collected
and analyzed for the presence of tradi-
tional chemical agents. About 100 addi-
tional samples are pending completion
of analysis. All environmental and non-
medical samples were submitted to the
U.S. Army Chemical Systems
Laboratory for analysis for traditionally
recognized chemical warfare agents and
other toxic materials. Tissue specimens
and body fluids from attack victims
were submitted to the Armed Forces
Medical Intelligence Center. Under the
sponsorship of that organization, the
biomedical specimens were analyzed for
the presence of trichothecene myco-
toxins and other toxins by Dr. Chester
Mirocha, University of Minnesota; Dr.
Joseph Rosen, Rutgers University; and
Dr. Tim Phillips, Texas A&M
University.

To date, biomedical samples (blood,
urine, and/or tissue) from 33 alleged
victims have been screened. Specimens
from 16 of these individuals show the
presence of trichothecene mycotoxins.
In addition, six environmental samples
from alleged attack sites have been
analyzed by Dr. Mirocha. Five show the
presence of unusually high concentra-
tions and combinations of trichothecene
mycotoxins.

Evidence of Chemical and Toxin
Agent Use in Southeast Asia and
Afghanistan, 1982

Sample

Laos

blood trichothecene toxin

blood (post-mortem) trichothecene toxin
yellow residue trichothecene toxin

vegetation trichothecene/

aflatoxin B1

Kampuchea/Thailand

blood

trichothecene toxin

urine

trichothecene toxin

tissue (autopsy)

trichothecene/

aflatoxin B1

yellow residue

trichothecene toxin

vegetation

trichothecene toxin

water

trichothecene toxin

water

cyanide

Afghanistan

gas mask (two sets)

trichothecene toxin

vegetation

trichothecene toxin

Details concerning samples analyzed
since the March report— including the
circimistances of their collection,
analysis, and the results— are provided
in this annex. Results of analysis of
earlier samples were included in our
March 22, 1982 report.

POSITIVE SAMPLE RESULTS

Afghanistan

One-quarter of the external surface of a
Soviet gas mask, obtained near Kabul
in September 1981, was recently proc-
essed for analysis, employing techniques
not previously used, and showed the
presence of T-2 toxin. This analysis has
been verified by two other laboratories.
Similar analysis of material from the
hose connections of another Soviet gas
mask removed from a dead Soviet
soldier in December 1981 in Afghani-
stan is indicative of the presence of the
trichothecene toxins, T-2, DAS, verri-
carol, and another type of mycotoxin—
zearalenone. It is believed that these
protective masks were worn during
operations in which a toxin agent was
used.

Preliminary analysis of a third sam-
ple acquired in February 1982 also in-
dicates the presence of trichothecenes.

)ecember 1982

MILITARY AFFAIRS

Laos

1) Blood samples were drawn from an
ill H'Mong couple on March 21, 1982,
by a physician in the Ban Vinai refugee
camp. The victims were exposed to tox-
in agent attacks on November 11, 1981,
and January 4, 1982. They remained ill
and under treatment on March 21,
1982, when blood samples were ob-
tained. During the November 1981 at-
tack, an aircraft sprayed a yellowish
agent. Although no one died in the
village, symptoms such as bloody diar-
rhea were experienced by most of those
exposed. In the January 1982 attack, a
greenish chemical was sprayed from an
airplane. Vomiting with blood, bloody
diarrhea, blurred vision, chest pain, eye
irritation, and skin rash were reported.
Lingering effects included rash, pain in
the joints, and fatigue. The blood
samples were analyzed for three tricho-
thecene toxins: DAS, T-2, and HT-2.
The blood sample from the male was
found to contain 13.5 ppb T-2 toxin.
The female was negative for all toxins
analyzed.

2) Three blood samples were drawn
by a U.S. physician on April 17, 1982,
from three H'Mong refugees: Bloc Her,
an 8-year-old boy; Tong Her, a 6-year-
old boy; and Xia Sue Xiong, a young
girl. They were among a group exposed
to a toxic agent attack in late March
1982 in Laos. The agent used was de-
scribed as being yellow to reddish
brown. It was sticky and dried to a
powder. Bloc Her had been severely ill
with bloody diarrhea and coughing of
blood. Xia Sue Xiong was suffering
from bloody diarrhea and abdominal
pain. The blood samples were analyzed
for three trichothecene toxins: DAS,
T-2, and HT-2.

Trichothecene Toxin Analysis

Bloc Her negative

Tong Her negative
Xia Sue

Xiong negative 46 ppb

negative
110 ppb

negative
296 ppb

negative

ppb = parts per billion

3) Post-mortem blood samples were
taken from a 25-year-old H'Mong
refugee who had been admitted earlier
to a refugee hospital at Ban Vinai,
Thailand. Just before death he had suf-
fered from a massive gastrointestinal
hemorrhage. He had claimed exposure

to a toxic agent attack sometime earlier
in Laos. The blood was drawn in the
hospital on April 17, 1982, and analyzed
for three trichothecene toxins: DAS,
T-2, and HT-2.

Trichothecene Toxin Analysis

Specimen

Type DAS T-2 HT-2

tieparinized
blood negative

15 ppb

19 ppb

4) Blood was drawn on April 6,
1982, from Neng Xiong, a H'Mong
refugee in Thailand. She was suffering
from the effects from a toxic agent at-
tack that occurred in Phou Bia, Laos,
on March 25, 1982. The entire popula-
tion of the village (40 families) suffered
from vomiting, fever, backaches, head-
aches, and chest pain after a helicopter
dropped a yellowish agent. Many
villagers also developed swollen eyes. It
was reported that one woman and
several animals died. Neng Xiong's
blood was analyzed for three trichothe-
cene toxins: DAS, T-2, and HT-2.

Trichothecene Toxin Analysis

Specimen

Types DAS

T-2

HT-2

heparinized

blood negative

100 ppb

8 ppb

non-tiep-

arinized

blood negative

33 ppb

34 ppb

5) A H'Mong refugee reported being
subjected to a toxic agent attack on
March 17, 1982, in Phou Bia, Laos. The
agent, which "looked like yellow rain,"
was sprayed by a helicopter at low
altitude. The sticky yellow spots dried
to a powder in 3-4 hours. Immediately
after the attack, the victim developed
stomach and chest pains and vomited.
Vomiting with blood began later and
continued over the next 24 hours. Other
symptoms included headache, shortness
of breath, dizziness, eye irritation, and
vision disturbances. The refugee also
developed a rash and blisters. Blood
samples were drawn by a physician at
Ban Vinai refugee hospital in Thailand
on March 31, 1982. The samples were
analyzed for three trichothecene toxins:
DAS, T-2, and HT-2.

Trichothecene Toxin Analysis _

Specimen

Types DAS T-2 HI-}

tieparinized

blood negative 19 ppb negativ(

non-tiep-

arinized

blood negative 3 ppb 2 ppb

6) Results of analysis of two en-
vironmental samples from attack sites
in Laos were reported in our March 22
report and are not repeated here. An
additional set of environmental samples
taken from an allegedly contaminated
area in Laos near Phu He was obtainec
for analysis. Although symptoms were
manifested in individuals collecting and
handling the sample, no trichothecenes
were detected upon analysis.

Kampuchea/Thailand

1) On February 13, 1982, at least 100
Kampuchean soldiers were subjected tc
an artillery-delivered toxic attack by
Vietnamese forces and became ill. The
attack took place near the village of
Tuol Chrey in an area north of Khao
Din, about 300 meters from the Thai-
Kampuchean border. One individual
subsequently died (see autopsy results,
Annex B). Reported symptoms include<
burning eyes, blurred vision, shortness
of breath, chest pains, vomiting, and
vertigo. Some victims also trembled ani
generally felt weak. Blood and urine
samples were taken from a number of
victims at various times after the attac
as well as from a control group of in-
dividuals living under similar condition
but not subject to the toxic agent at-
tack. Blood and urine samples from tb
control group were negative for all
analyzed toxic agents, including tricho-
thecene toxins.

On February 14, 1982, 1 day after
the attack, blood samples were taken
from two victims: Pen Nom and Prek
Reth. On February 15, a urine sample
was taken from Pen Nom, while on
F'ebruary 16, a urine sample was taker
from Prek Reth. Both blood and urine
samples were analyzed for the preseno
of the trichothecene mycotoxins T-2
and HT-2.

Trichothecene Toxin Analysis

Victim Specimen

T-2

HT-2

Prek Reth blood

18 ppb

22 ppb

urine

negative

Pen Nom blood

11 ppb

10 ppb

urine

trace

18 ppb

Department of State Bulletii

MILITARY AFFAIRS

On March 4, 1982, 19 days after the
lent, some victims still showed ef-
s of the attack and were being
ted in Nong Pru hospital in Kam-
ea. Further blood samples were
wn at that time from Prek Reth and
additional victims.

hothecene Toxin Analysis

< Reth
Ving
I Sereth
g Nem
ig Soeum
m Ron

negative
7 ppb
negative
negative
negative
3 ppb

alysis of tissue samples from a victim
he February 13 attack is described
^nnex B.

2) On March 5, 1982, a small Viet-
nese aircraft sprayed a white powder
m area near Pailin, Kampuchea. On
rch 6, 1982, 10 of a group of 15
tnpucheans were unable to continue
king due to illness after passing
ough the area. Symptoms included
isea, vomiting, shortness of breath,
rred vision, diarrhea, bloody dis-
trge from the nose, and burning sen-
ion in the chest and abdomen. A sec-
i attack occurred on March 7, 1982,
en some of the same Kampucheans
re subjected to Vietnamese toxic ar-
ery shelling. The agent produced
Usea, dry mouth, and blurred vision
d also caused loss of consciousness
id muscle twitching. Despite medical
atment, a number of the victims
'd.

Samples were taken from three sur-
'ors exposed to the contaminated
2a on March 6 and 7. Blood and urine
■re taken on March 13, 1982.

iciiotliecene Toxin Analysis

iung

Hon urine negative 5 ppb 2 ppb

blood negative 7 ppb negative

Saran urine negative 4 ppb 1 ppb

blood negative negative 8 ppb

Thoeum urine negative 22 ppb 7 ppb

blood negative negative negative

•Blood samples were heparinized.

3) A sample of contaminated
jgetation was obtained following
)raying by a Vietnamese aircraft in

Pong Nam Ron District near the Thai-
Kampuchean border on February 19,
1982. Analysis of this sample for known
chemical agents was negative. How-
ever, the trichothecene toxin T-2 was
present at a level of 86 ppb. DAS was
also present at 30 ppb. The sample was
of insufficient size to analyze accurately
for the toxins nivalenol and deoxyni-
valenol.

ANNEX B

Autopsy Results of a Chemical
Warfare Attack Victim in
Kampuchea

Chan Mann was one of several victims
of a February 13, 1982, toxic agent at-
tack in the area of Khao Din. The vic-
tim, being treated at Nong Pru
Hospital, reportedly made a brief re-
covery on March 12 and 13, followed by
a relapse when he became anuric,
feverish, restless, and slightly jaun-
diced. On March 16, he lapsed into a
coma and died. A urinary catheter was
inserted approximately 4 hours before
death, but only minimal blood-tinged
urine was obtained. Shortly before
death the victim vomited blood. Kam-
puchean physicians performed a necrop-
sy. Tissue sections of heart, esophagus/
stomach, liver, kidney, and lung were
taken and fixed in formaldehyde. Tissue
samples were given to both U.S. and
Canadian officials for analysis.

The samples delivered to the United
States were submitted to several U.S.
laboratories for gross, microscopic,
histopathological, and chemical-
toxicological analysis.

Results of Analysis of Tissue
Samples for DAS, T-2, and HT-2^

Material Amount

Toxins Detected

(g)

DAS' T-2 HT-2

Heart 7.9

— —' 1 ppm

Stomach 13.5

— 25 ppb 4 ppm

Liver 9.5

— — —

Kidney 10.4

3 ppm' 7 ppb —

Lung 4.5

— 9 ppb —

Intestine 5.3

— 88 ppb 1 0 ppb

'DAS (Diacetoxyscirpenol), a trichothecene tox-
in: T-2, a trichothecene toxin; HT-2, a metabolic
product of T-2.

'DAS was used as internal standard — i.e.. DAS
was added to eacti tissue sample as a standard to
check accuracy of analysis Only the kidney had a
concentration of DAS greater than the amount
added.

^Toxins were not detected. Concentration of
DAS was no greater than the added internal
standard,

"Endogenous DAS in sample detected in con-
centration greater than the standard.

Note: Tissues were analyzed for trichothecene tox-
ins by Dr C.J. Mirocha, University of Minnesota A
parallel analysis performed by Dr. J. Rosen,
Rutgers University, also revealed the presence of
high levels ol trichothecene toxins.

A high incidence of natural aflatox-
in contamination of food in Southeast
Asia has been well documented.
Linderfelser and coworkers (1974) have
shown that aflatoxin and T-2 toxin in
combination have a sjrnergistic effect
and, therefore, it was of interest to
determine the extent of aflatoxin in
tissue of this individual.

Results of Analysis of

Samples for Aflatoxin

Material

Weight of
Sample fg)

Sample

Adjusted'
(ng/g)

Actual
(ngfg)'

Stomach 3.04 19.8 22.5

Liver 3.00 20.2 23.2

Kidney 7.50 15.3 17.4

Intestine 3.02 11.2 12.7

'Nanograms per gram.

'Values adjusted on basis of 88''/o recovery-
that portion of aflatoxin found when a known
amount is added to the sample.

Note: Aflatoxin analyses were conducted by Dr.
Phillips, Texas A&M University.

Levels of aflatoxin detected in the
tissues were so high that it seemed pru-
dent to investigate the possibility that
this individual exposure to aflatoxin was
not due to a natural contamination but
may have been related to the chemical
attack. To this end, portions of the sam-
ple of yellow rain from Laos previously

ecember1982

MILITARY AFFAIRS

shown to contain 143 ppm of T-2 toxin
and 27 ppm of DAS were submitted to
Dr. Mirocha and Dr. Phillips for
analysis for aflatoxin Bl. Independent
thin-layer chromatography and high-
performance liquid chromatography
analyses were negative for aflatoxin,
supporting a hypothesis that this toxin
is not always a component of a yellow
rain sample and that the victim's ex-
posure to aflatoxin may have been due
to contamination of the food source. It
does not, however, rule out the possi-
bility that aflatoxin is a component of
some yellow rain attacks. Preliminary
analysis of some more recent yellow
rain samples indicates the presence of
aflatoxin not consistent with a natural
contamination. In any case, the findings
of aflatoxin in these tissues is important
since the high incidence of exposure to
natural outbreaks of aflatoxin con-
tamination in Southeast Asia may in-
duce a greater susceptibility to
trichothecenes in this population.

Portions of each tissue sample were
submitted to Dr. Charles Stahl, Univer-
sity of Tennessee Medical School, for
histopathological examination. A sum-
mary of the pathology found included:
hemorrhage into the heart tissue with
evidence of cell destruction and inflam-
mation, cirrhosis of the liver, hemor-
rhage and cellular destruction of kidney
tubules, hemorrhage in the bronchi, and
congestion and destruction of the lung.
The details of these results and similar
findings by other pathologists are con-
sistent with results of analysis of
animals exposed to trichothecenes.

No single post-mortem finding
proves cause and effect of toxin ex-
posure and death, but these data taken
together provide objective evidence
that:

• Reports from witnesses of yellow
rain attacks are valid and that bleeding
sometimes occurs in the lung, stomach,
intestine, and kidney or bladder.

• Persons already debilitated by
disease or exposure to other toxins
have a greater risk of death from
trichothecene toxicosis.

• Microscopic examination shows
that tissue damage occurs in humans
after moderate-to-heavy exposure to tri-
chothecenes. The damage is similar to
that found in experimental animals.

• Microscopic damage persists for 1
month or longer.

• Trichothecenes are known to
cause long-term damage to rapidly
dividing tissue. These toxins accumulate
and persist at least in the organs that
were examined.

• Aflatoxin found in the tissues
may be foodborne and is not necessarily
a component of the yellow rain
substance. However, aflatoxins and
trichothecene toxins act synergistically,
and they could be components of a toxic
crude extract mixture. Emerging data
from several sources lend credibility to
such a hypothesis; therefore, investiga-
tion seems warranted.

ANNEX C

Discussion of
Analytical Findings'*

The finding of T-2 toxin and HT-2
toxin in blood, urine, and tissue samples
from yellow rain victims is highly
significant in view of the fact that no
trichothecenes could be detected in
similar samples from the control popula-
tion who were not exposed to yellow
rain. The finding of such high levels of
trichothecenes weeks after exposure is
surprising and raises questions concern-
ing the distribution, metabolism, and
excretion of these toxins as well as
their long-term effects.

Only limited research concerned
with elimination rates of the trichothe-
cenes has been conducted. Ueno, et al.,
1971, reported that orally administered
fusarenon-x was rapidly distributed to
the tissues and reached peak levels by 3
hours after dosing. The kidney was
believed to be the major organ of excre-
tion. Matsumoto, et al., 1978, conducted
studies with T-2 toxin which led him to
conclude that the liver and biliary
system were the major organs of T-2
excretion. Chi, et al., 1978, ad-
ministered oral doses of T-2 to broiler
chickens. Peak tissue levels were
reached by 4 hours after dosing, and
the liver contained the greatest amount
of toxin. By 12 hours after dosing, how-
ever, the muscle, skin, and bile con-
tained the highest amounts of detec-
table toxin. By 48 hours, 82% of the ad-
ministered dose had been excreted.
Robinson, et al., 1979, showed that T-2
toxin was excreted into cow milk at
levels up to IfiO ppb after daily ad-
ministration of 0.6 mg/kg doses.

Studies concerned with meUibolism
of the trichothecenes have also been
limited in number. Yoshizawa, et al.,
1980, reported that in rat liver in vitro
studies with the S-9 fraction of rat
liver homogenates, HT-2 made up 50%
of the metabolic products. Other
metabolites included TMR-1 (19%),

TMR-2 (2%), and T-2 tetraol (4%). In
in vivo studies, HT-2 was one of the
major products eliminated in the ex-
creta of chickens (Yoshizawa, et al.,
1980) as well as urine, feces, milk, and
blood of dairy cattle (Yoshizawa, et al.,
1981).

The finding of T-2 toxin and HT-2
in the blood and tissue of humans
weeks after their exposure to the toxins
would seem to indicate that enough tox-
in remains bound in body tissues to
allow detection by sensitive instrumen-
tation. Trichothecenes have been shown
to bind to ribosomal proteins (Ueno,
197.5) and to react with sulfhydryl con-
taining compounds such as glutathione
(Foster, et al., 1975) and with proteins
such as albumin (Chu, et al., 1979). It
would appear that although most of the
toxin would normally be expected to be
excreted within 48 hours after ex-
posure, small amounts of the toxin and
its metabolites remain bound to body
tissues for much longer periods. The
size of the dose administered and the
route of exposure may have a signifi-
cant effect on the proportion bound,
since a sudden, rapidly absorbed,
massive dose may overload normal ex-
cretion and detoxification mechanisms,
resulting in greater tissue binding of
the toxin. Similar apparent long-term
storage of mycotoxins has been
reported previously for aflatoxin B.
Although most of the administered dose
of aflatoxin is rapidly metabolized.
Shank, et al., 1971, demonstrated in
studies of monkeys that unmetabolized
aflatoxin B could be detected up to 6
days after administration of a sublethal
dose.

Additional significant findings lie in
the trichothecenes found in the leaf
samples (T-2, DON, nivalenol) and
yellow powder (T-2, DAS). The concen-
trations found and their combination
are not normally found in nature and it
would appear that these mycotoxins
found their way into the environment
by the intervention of man. The most
compelling evidence is the presence of
T-2 and DAS in the yellow powder.
Both toxins are infrequently found in
nature and rarely occur together. In
our experience copious producers of
T-2 toxin (F. tririnctum) do not pro-
duce DAS and, conversely, good pro-
ducers of DAS (F. roseum 'Gibbosum')
do not produce T-2. This is also sup-
ported by our experience that a good
producer of DON does not produce T-2
or DAS but could produce nivalenol.
Thus, we have more than just the quan-

Department of State Bulletin

POPULATION

ty of toxins produced to explain, but
Iso the kinds that respective species
nd their isolates produce. Theoretical-
^, it is possible to genetically
lanipulate or select an isolate that
ifould produce copious amounts of two
r more of these toxicants, but this
I'ould require a sophisticated research
ffort and sophisticated technology
IS lased on experience.

It is difficult to explain the presence
f trichothecenes on leaf surfaces,
'usarium is not a leaf pathogen, and so
ve would not expect it to colonize
eaves indiscriminately. Fusarium does
olonize the roots and vascular tissue
causes wilt diseases) of some plants,
md it would have to produce the toxins
n situ and translocate them to the
eaves. This has never been
lemonstrated in the pathogenesis of
i^'usarium-infected plants. If a pathogen
ike F. oxysporwm f. lycopersici,
Dathogenic to tomatoes, were to pro-
iuce trichothecenes and translocate
them to the leaves, one would not ex-
pect such high concentrations and com-
binations of toxins. Moreover, we are
not certain that pathogenic isolates of
the latter produce trichothecenes during
^pathogenesis. It is a well known plant
! pathological principle that production of
toxins by pathogens in laboratory
culture does not signify that these tox-
ins also are produced in the host.

Apart from the controversy of the
trichothecenes occurring on the leaves,
it is difficult to imagine a reasonable
explanation for the appearance of T-2
and DAS in the yellow powder. To
those who claim that they dropped onto
the soil and rocks from overhanging
, leaves, this is contrary to any known
! facts about trichothecene occurrence or
[ distribution. The burden of proof re-
mains with those alleging such an
unlikely hypothesis.

The finding of T-2 toxin, diacetox-
yscirpenol, deoxynivalenol, zearalenone,
and Fusarium pigments in leaves,
water, yellow powder, and fragments
originating at sites of yellow rain at-
tacks in Southeast Asia and their
absence in background samples (leaves,
corn, rice, water, soil) from areas not
exposed to yellow rain strongly im-
plicates their use as warfare agents.
Moreover, the finding of T-2 toxin and
HT-2 toxin (a metabolite of T-2 toxin
in animals) in the blood, urine, and
tissue of victims of these attacks pro-
vides unequivocal evidence of their use
as weapons.

Details of the experimental pro-
cedures used in these analyses were
presented at the Society of Toxicology
meeting in Louisville, Kentucky, on
August 16, 1982; at an international
mycotoxin symposium in Vienna, on
September 1, 1982; and at the Associa-
tion of Analytical Chemistry meeting in
Washington, D.C., on October 28, 1982.

Two scientific manuscripts describ-
ing those analyses have been submitted
for publication in refereed journals and
other studies pertaining to nongovern-
mental analyses are in press.

'We know from other sources that Soviet
chemical agent delivery methods include this
technique, as reported, for example, by a
Cuban emigre trained by the Soviets in the
use of chemical weapons.

^See Canadian report to the United Na-
tions: "Study of the Possible Use of Chemical
Warfare Agents in Southeast Asia," Dr. H.
B. Shiefer, University of Saskatchewan.

'It was thought initially that a harmless
yellow powder had been dropped on Thai
villages as part of a disinformation campaign
attempting to discredit U.S. sample analysis
results. Within days of such an attack, the
Thai Ministry of Health announced that only
ground-up flowers had been found. However,
Thai officials later stated that further
analysis showed traces of toxin and that the
earlier Health Ministry announcement was
based on incomplete investigation.

■•Based on excerpts from a paper by
Dr. C.J. Mirocha and Dr. S. Watson,
presented at an international symposium on
mycotoxins in Vienna on September 1,
1982. ■

Population Growth and
the Policy of Nations

by Richard Elliot Benedick

Address before the Bangladesh In-
stitute of Strategic Studies in Dacca,
Bangladesh, on October 5, 1982. Am-
bassador Benedick is Coordinator of
Population Affairs.

When future historians take stock of
this century, perhaps no event will stand
out as vividly as the unprecedented ex-
pansion in the number of people on this
Earth. I would like today to examine the
dimensions of this phenomenon and to
indicate some policy implications for the
international community.

It is now generally established that
the annual growth rate of world popula-
tion peaked at approximately 2% in the
1960s and, since then, has begun a
perceptible decline, an event which has
elicited — perhaps premature — sighs of
relief from some quarters. According to
U.N. estimates, the population growth
rate ciurently stands at about 1.7% an-
nually— a rate which, at first glance,
may not appear alarming in a world ac-
customed to double-digit inflation, 20%
interest rates, and tripling of oil prices.

But the power of compound interest
is awesome, especially when the base
numbers involved are so huge. Consider
this.

• In the first quarter of the 20th
century, population growth, at 0.8% an-
nually, resulted in a total net addition of
360 million to the world's population.

• By the third quarter, 1950-75, the
average annual growth was 1.9%, and
1.5 billion people were added during
these 25 years.

• For the last quarter of our cen-
tury, we project a continuing drop in the
growth rate to 1.5% by century's end.
Yet, despite this growth rate decline,
the addition to the world's population in
these 25 years will rise to 2.2 billion.

Demographers agree that between
now and the end of this century — less
than 20 years away— the world's popula-
tion, barring unforeseen catastrophe,
will probably increase from about 4.5
billion to over 6 billion — an increment
which approximates the total population
of the world as recently as 1930. This is
equivalent to adding 20 new countries of
the size of Bangladesh, and 90% of this
population growth will occur in the
world's low-income countries.

In the industrialized countries,
women currently bear, on the average,
two children during their lifetime; at
which rate a population replaces itself,
without further growth. In the Third
World, in contrast, the average number
of children per family is much larger,

Decennber 1982

POPULATION

and 40%-45% of the total population is
under 15 years of age, i.e., not yet even
in their reproductive years. Even if
tomorrow's parents have fewer children
than the current generation, their sheer
numbers are so great that it will take
many decades before a given country's
population ceases to increase.

Let us take India as an example. Its
population has grown from approximate-
ly 250 million in 1920 to about 700
million at present. But this is only the
beginning. Indian women currently bear,
on the average, approximately five
children during their lifetime. Even if
this number were to decline within the
next 20 years to an average of a little
over two children per woman, the popu-
lation of India would nevertheless con-
tinue to grow over the following decades
and would not level off until it reached
about 1.4 biUion around the middle of
the next century.

Moreover, if the two-child norm
were not reached until 2020, the even-
tual population would reach almost 1.9
billion. Where India's eventual popula-
tion will fall within this 1.4-1.9 billion
range will depend on the date at which
the average of two children per woman
is reached. The only factors, other than
fertility reduction, which could influence
the eventual size of India's population
would be an unforeseen increase in
emigration to other countries or an un-
fortunate rise in mortality.

I would like to emphasize that the
number two represents an average — it
is understood that many women, many
families, would have more than two
children. Nor am I recommending a two-
child average family size. I am merely
pointing out a mathematical verity, i.e.,
what would happen if the average were
reduced from five children per family to
two within a certain time.

This phenomenon of demographic
momentum, which is not generally well
understood by policymakers, neverthe-
less has profound implications for policy.
For all but a handful of less developed
countries are a long way from replace-
ment-level fertility. African women, for
example, currently bear on average
more than six children over their repro-
ductive lifetime; those in South Asia
more than five.

Because millions more people are
entering their reproductive years in the
coming decades than are leaving, family
planning information and services need
to reach ever-larger numbers of families
just to stay even in terms of population
growth. This explains the shock experi-

2,000

'A 2040

1,870 million*'

1,419 million'

1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100

A Year replacement level fertility is reached.

After replacement-level fertility is reached a population continues to
expand for several decades but eventually stops growing. Replacement-
level fertility usually equals a little over two ctiildren per woman Based
on 1975-80 data, Indian women are currently bearing, on the average.
5 1 children per woman

* Population size at stabilization.

Source: Tomas Fre)ka, The Population Council

enced last summer by India's leaders,
when a census revealed that, despite a
10% drop in the birth rate during the
1970s, India's population growth rate
was still as high as in the 1960s — nearly
2.5% annually, at which rate India's
population would double in only three
decades.

The difficulty in reaching a replace-
ment level of fertility may also be
gauged from the fact that the experi-
ence of many countries has shown that

the two-child average norm is not
reached until about 70-80% of a coun-
try's married couples in reproductive
ages practice family planning; in the
Third World (excluding China) the 1976
average was less than 20%; for many
countries in the Near East and Africa, it
is under 5%.

What are some consequences for the
modern world of these new demographic
realities? In recent years, we find that

Department of State Bulletin

POPULATION

uch of the economic gains and in-
ireased food output of the Third World
ere canceled out by the steady rise in
>opulation. During the 1960-80 period,
he per capita income gap between
'Jorth and South widened, despite
ubstantial overall economic growth in
he South. The crucial factor was the
lifference in population growth over this
)eriod: under 200 million in the North,
rersus 1.2 billion in the South. Taking
iccount of the demographic momentum
rinciple discussed earlier, some econo-
ists conclude that, during the next
0-year period, 1980-2000, a further
idening of the North-South income gap
s highly probable.

Almost 700 million additional people
will be seeking jobs in the Third World
between now and the end of the cen-
tury; these people are already born and
exceed the entire current labor force of
the industrialized countries. Many of the
prospective unemployed will move to
already overcrowded slums, contributing
to a virtual urban explosion. According
to U.N. projections, this phenomenon
may bring Mexico City and Sao Paulo to
a population of 26-30 million by the year
2000; Tehran, Cairo, and Karachi to the
14-16 million range; and turn a large
number of urban areas from small towns
to megacities within a relatively short
time span — for example, Baghdad and
Lima from 600,000 in 1950 to 11-12
million in 2000, Kinshasa and Lagos
from 200-300,000 to over 9 million.

World Health Organization studies
indicate that the health of both women
and children is undermined by preg-
nancies during teenage and late in life
by close spacing of children and by high
orders of birth. It has been estimated
that, for every five births in the world
today, there are probably two induced
abortions. The consequences of pregnan-
cy and abortion of unwanted children
are a major cause of death and disability
among young women in many develop-
ing countries, especially where family
planning is unavailable. Data from Latin
America indicate that abortion declines
after family planning programs are in-
troduced, providing women with alterna-
tive means of spacing children and
limiting fertility.

Demographic growth will also inter-
act with, and complicate, such global
problems as inflation; higher priced
energy; and the environment, including
water pollution, soil erosion, and
deforestation. On balance, these develop-
ments seem to point to a potential for
social unrest, political instability, urban

crime, and mass migration, which must
concern the international com.munity. It
is clear that most developing countries
will at least double their current popula-
tion level within the next two to three
decades. It is also clear that there is a
distinct urgency in undertaking greater
efforts now to reduce fertility, in order
to avoid a tripling, or worse.

In certain academic circles, it is
fashionable to postulate theoretically
unlimited resources in the long run,
which might imply that the population
problem is irrelevant. While we are con-
fident in the ingenuity of mankind to
continue technological advances, there
is, nevertheless, a growing international
consensus that the cumulative effects of
some 30 years of extremely rapid popu-
lation growth cannot be ignored, in
either short-term or long-term strategies
for development. It is also becoming
more evident that past demographic ex-
periences of Western countries are a
poor guide for the currently modernizing
economies. Because of the unprece-
dented demographic momentum factor
discussed earlier, many developing coun-
tries simply cannot depend on general
economic development alone to
moderate population growth to sus-
tainable levels at a decent standard of
life.

Many world leaders recognize this
situation. Chinese Vice Premier Chen
Muhua wrote in 1979 that, "We must
squarely face the fact that rapid popula-
tion increase obstructs economic
development." Indira Gandhi, in
reiterating India's "total commitment to
voluntary family planning," stated in
1981 that, "We cannot afford to wait for
social and economic changes to bring
about an appropriate motivational en-
vironment in which a small family norm
becomes the rule." President Soeharto of
Indonesia — the third largest developing
country — stated in 1981 that, "Suc-
cessful implementation of family plan-
ning programs will be a key to the sur-
vival of the world." And President
Mubarak of Egypt announced this year:
"We cannot ignore the fact that the cur-
rent rate of increase in population will
hinder our efforts to achieve develop-
ment, will dissipate our hopes for chang-
ing the quality of life of every Egyptian
and confine our ambitions to preventing
the deterioration and aggravation of our
situation."

Similar statements have come within
this past year from such varied sources
as the King of Nepal; the heads of state
of Burundi, Cameroon, and Tanzania;

the annual reports of the World Bank
and the Inter-American Development
Bank; Vice President Kibaki of Kenya;
President Marcos of the Philippines; the
U.N. Economic and Social Council; the
Director General of the OPEC fund; and
the Paris Conference on Least
Developed Countries.

Unfortunately, however, rhetoric has
not always been followed by commen-
surate action. Only 2% of donors'
development assistance goes into
population-related programs. In the
Third World, very few countries devote
more than 1% of their national budgets
to population or family planning efforts,
and these are often marginal activities
buried in the health ministry. Even
though at least 35 countries have an of-
ficial policy to reduce the growth of
population, it is estimated that over one-
half, and perhaps as many as two-thirds,
of married couples in the Third World
(outside of China) still lack knowledge
of, or access to, modern methods of con-
trolling fertility.

On the positive side, it is significant
that declines in traditionally high fertili-
ty levels have occurred in a number of
countries which are strikingly different
in terms of religious, cultural, and
political systems. Moreover, evidence
from Indonesia, Colombia, Thailand,
China, Kerala State in India, and Sri
Lanka indicates that even relatively poor
and predominantly rural people can
change their fertility behavior within a
short time frame— contradicting the
theory that modernization must precede
smaller family size.

It thus seems clear that demograph-
ic trends can be responsive to public
policy. Nevertheless, the fertility reduc-
tions which were achieved during the
1970s may represent the relatively easy
phase— reaching primarily city dwellers
and the better educated classes. Bring-
ing fertility dovra further will involve
much more intensive, and expensive, ef-
forts in terms of education, motivation,
and extension of services throughout the
countryside. The sheer logistical dif-
ficulties in reaching tens of thousands of
rural villages with information, com-
modities, and foUowup and in training
adequate numbers of paramedical per-
sonnel should not be underestimated.
Programs are also affected by inefficient
administration and absence of commit-
ment in the bureaucracy, and by opposi-
tion or indifference to family planning
by the medical profession.

December 1982

REFUGEES

Finally, the role of science cannot be
ignored. Additional funds are urgently
needed for biomedical research and
development of better and safer
methods of family planning, as well as
for solutions to problems of infertility, a
condition which also brings anguish to
many families worldwide.

A word of conclusion: Despite a
natural tendency to focus on the almost
overwhelming numerical aspects of
population growth, we must not allow
ourselves to lose sight of the fundamen-
tal objective of all population policies: a
betterment of the human condition and
an improvement in the quality of life for
individuals, for mothers and children,
for families. Family planning programs
should be integrated within an overall
development effort, should be linked
with measures to reduce child mortality,

and should be consistent with principles
of voluntarism, free choice by families,
and concern for human dignity and
spiritual values. Improvements in the
role, status, and education of women are
of particular importance to the develop-
ment process and to reduce population
growth.

The situation I have just described is
certainly serious, but it is not hopeless.
The solutions to these problems will de-
pend on the attention and resources
which the population issue can com-
mand, now and over the next few years,
from Third World governments, foreign
aid donors, international agencies, and
the scientific community. I am hopeful
that we of this generation will meet this
responsibility to the generations that
will follow us. ■

Proposed Refugee Admissions
for FY 1983

Following are statements by Kenneth
W. Dam, Acting Secretary of State, and
Ambassador H. Eugene Douglas, U.S.
Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, before
the Seriate Judiciary Committee on
September 29, 1982,^ as well as President
Reagan's memorandum of October 11
1982.

ACTING SECRETARY DAM

These annual consultations are held with
the purpose of reaching agreement on
the admission of refugees into the
United States during the coming fiscal
year. The world refugee problem re-
mains serious, affecting the lives and
health of many people in most parts of
the globe. Approximately 7.5 million of
the world's people in 1982 are refugees,
and the great majority of these people
have been in that unfortunate status for
many years.

In Southeast Asia, there have been
continuing, though diminished, refugee
flows from the Communist-dominated
states of Indochina.

In Europe, the imposition of martial
law in Poland on December 13, 1981,
served, in effect, to make refugees of

many thousands of Poles residing tem-
porarily in Austria and other countries
of Western Europe.

Longstanding patterns of discrimina-
tion and persecution in the Soviet Union
continue to cause Jews and other
minorities to assert their human right of
emigration, although restrictions im-
posed by the Soviet authorities caused
sharp reductions in permitted emigra-
tion from that country in 1982.

Aggressive Soviet policies are also
responsible for the continued massive
exodus of Afghans fleeing the occupa-
tion of their homeland. More than 3
million Afghans have taken refuge
abroad, over 2.7 million of them in
Pakistan.

It is no accident of history that the
countries from which most refugees flee
continue to be those under Communist
domination or leadership, for it is in
those countries that the basic aspirations
of life— which we sum up in the term
human rights— are most persistently
violated.

It is inescapable that the United
States has a vital leadership role to play
in this grave situation. But let me stress
that this role does not necessarily re-
quire refugees to be admitted into the
United States, except in cases involving
particular foreign policy imperatives or
in situations of special concern. The pru-

dent management of refugee programs
worldwide should make it possible to
reduce significantly the numbers of
refugees in need of third-country re-
settlement. This has been a major objec-
tive of our policies in the past year and
an objective, I can report, shared by the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and by the international com-
munity as a whole.

The most desirable resolution of a
refugee problem, of course, is for the
refugees to be enabled to return — volun-
tarily and freely— to their homelands.
Frequently this cannot take place in the
near term, but with time the situation
that caused refugees to flee may change
sufficiently to permit voluntary repatria-
tion.

The High Commissioner and we
believe that refugee situations should be
resolved, wherever possible, in the place
or region where the refugees themselves
have their roots. In many cases a neigh-
boring country has links of geography,
language, and ethnic character which
ease the acceptance of refugees when
they arrive and may facilitate their
longer term integration. The world com-
munity and the refugees are thus spared
the costs and difficulties of resettlement
in distant countries and different
cultures.

We acknowledge the major contribu-
tion of the countries providing refuge.
These countries provide land, access to
roads and infrastructure, and public
health care and often even confer citi-
zenship or other legal status upon
refugees. They need and deserve the
help of the concerned international com.-
munity.

International Relief Efforts

In 1982 and again in 1983 and future
years, a higher portion of the total U.S.
funds allocated to refugee programs will
go for care and maintenance of refugees
in camps and other temporary settle-
ments. Where feasible and acceptable to
the host country, funds support more
permanent facilities to ease the transi-
tion to durable solutions.

We cooperate with like-minded coun-
tries in sharing the financial and
material costs of refugee assistance.
Burdensharing is central to a successful
international approach to refugee
assistance. We look to the UNHCR to
take the lead in defining and organizing
assistance programs that respond to the
needs of the refugees and of the host
countries, to preserve the possibility of
voluntary repatriation, and to look
ahead to effective long-term solutions.

Department of State Bulletin

REFUGEES

We also work closely with other in-
ternational bodies— the World Food Pro-
gram; the U.N. Children's Fund
(UNICEF); the World Health Organiza-
tion; the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC); and, for the Palestin-
ians, the U.N. Relief and Works Agency
(UNRWA). Through them, as well as
directly, we provide support to a broad
range of private humanitarian organiza-
tions.

Some of the major ongoing assist-
ance programs that we help support in-
clude:

Thailand and Kampuchea. Since

1982, the World Food Program has
taken the lead in meeting food emergen-
cy needs on the Thai-Kampuchean
border and inside Kampuchea. Although
the numbers of Khmer at the border re-
mained substantial, the rate of new ar-
rivals has slowed to a trickle.

Pakistan. The Government of Paki-
stan deserves high commendation for its
key role in assuring basic life support
for 2.7 million Afghan refugees inside its
borders. The UNHCR is the lead agency
for the international community, coordi-
nating the programs of some 28 volun-
tary agencies.

Central America. The United States
contributes one-third of the support for
LTSIHCR and World Food Program
operations which assist El Salvadorans
and Nicaraguans who have taken refuge
in Honduras and other countries of the

Africa. The largest share of our
assistance programs for refugees is allo-
cated to Africa. In Somalia, CARE and
Save the Children are key operating
arms for the UNHCR and cooperate
closely with the Government of Somalia.
The United States funds a number of
special projects in such fields as educa-
tion and health for African refugees and
is a leading contributor to the ICRC pro-
gram which reaches refugees in areas of
armed conflict and civil strife, such as
Chad and Angola.

Our total refugee relief assistance
programs will claim some $270 million in
fiscal year (FY) 1982 — in addition to
Food for Peace (PL 480, Title II— $75
million in 1982)— and $238 million in FY

1983. The amounts provided to these
programs are essential to enable the
United States to carry its share of the
costs of assisting refugees who have
found asylum in various regions of the
world. By enabling refugees to be cared
for in areas near their home countries,

these funds reduce the need to resettle
refugees in distant places, including the
United States.

International Resettlement
Cooperation

Situations continue to exist, however, in
which third-country resettlement is
necessary and in which the United
States and other nations will continue to
be called on to admit refugees who can-
not return to their homeland without
fear of persecution. The United States
will be asked to do its fair share, but the
responsibility for accepting refugees for
resettlement outside their regions is one
which properly falls on the entire inter-
national community.

During the past year there have
been continuing actions directed at
maintaining a wide range of resettle-
ment opportunities. The UNHCR has
conducted special consultations on re-
settlement of refugees from Indochina,
encouraging states that previously ac-
cepted Indochinese to maintain or
restore their programs. Significant
numbers of Indochinese continue to be
accepted by Australia, Canada, and
France. Some countries taking smaller
numbers— Switzerland, for example— ac-
cept refugees needing long-term medical
care and rehabilitation. Several govern-
ments contribute to a pool of numbers to
facilitate the resettlement of refugees
rescued at sea by foreign flag ships.

Resettlement has been international-
ly shared for non-Indochinese as well.
The Federal Republic of Germany has
granted refuge to large numbers of
ethnic Germans from the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe, as well as Poles
unable to return to their homeland.
Australia and Canada continue their
generous admissions programs for
refugees from Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union. Efforts continue to ar-
range resettlement for refugees in Latin
American and other developing coun-
tries.

Third-country resettlement is not
easy. Countries which in the past ac-
cepted larger numbers now find it
necessary to restrict admission for eco-
nomic reasons similar to those facing the
United States. All the traditional
refugee-receiving countries are facing in-
creased domestic costs for refugee re-
settlement at a time of economic
trouble.

Proposed Admissions Levels

The admissions levels we are proposing
for FY 1983 represent our considered
effort to balance our international obli-
gations with the constraints of domestic
impact. The numbers recommended for
FY 1983 are as follows:

East Asia 68,000

Africa 3,000

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 17,000

Latin America and the Caribbean 2,000

Near East and South Asia 8,000

Total 98,000

These proposed numbers continue
the downward trend for admissions in
recent years. In FY 1981, some 158,000
refugees were admitted to the United
States. This was 57,000 fewer than the
215,000 who arrived in FY 1980. Admis-
sions in FY 1982 are expected to be
98,500, almost 60,000 fewer than in FY
1981 and some 42,000 below the admis-
sions ceilings agreed to in the past
year's consultations. Far from seeking to
expand refugee admissions, we accept
only refugees of special concern to the
United States, who meet our admissions
criteria, for whom there are no alter-
native solutions, and whose admission is
required by compelling foreign policy
considerations.

East Asia. There continue to be
urgent foreign policy reasons for the
proposed number of admissions from
East Asia— 68,000. The countries of the
area offering temporary refuge remain
under heavy domestic pressure to limit
the numbers of refugees in their ter-
ritory. Some of the Indochinese refugee
groups also kindle historic ethnic and
political tensions.

The countries of the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
have been our partners in handling the
Indochinese refugee problem. They
share our interest in reducing the
refugee influx and have cooperated with
us toward this end. They now fear,
however, that the efforts of resettlement
countries are diminishing faster than the
problem, thus leaving the ASEAN na-
tions with a significant permanent
refugee population. Thailand, in par-
ticular, has indicated that in such
circumstances it might change its first-
asylum policies.

Given the current downward trend
in new arrivals in countries of East
Asia, our proposed program — combined

Decennber1982

REFUGEES

with those of other resettlement coun-
tries— should result in a continued
reduction in the refugee population and
thus help maintain first asylum. As in
the past, we will make every effort to
operate our Indochinese refugee re-
settlement program at prudent levels.

The Vietnamese military presence in
Kampuchea and Laos is a constant mili-
tary threat to the area. The United
States has a special concern for the
refugees from Indochina. We have sup-
ported programs to reduce the refugee
flow, such as the food program for Kam-
pucheans on the Thai-Kampuchean
border and inside Kampuchea. We also
support UNHCR-supported voluntary re-
patriation programs for Kampucheans
and Laotians. We have acted to reduce
any possible magnet effect of the U.S.
program by limiting our admissions to
refugees in first-asylum countries who
have relatives in the United States or
who have demonstrated past ties to the
United States. Voice of America broad-
casts make clear the reduced scope of
the U.S. program. We believe our new
narrower processing priorities enable us
to select for admission those refugees
for whom resettlement in the United
States is truly the necessary option.
At the same time we have made
clear our readiness to accept increased
numbers of Indochinese through the
orderly departure program as refugees
or, for those who qualify, as immigrants.
(About one-quarter to one-third of those
admitted in 1982 entered the United
States not as refugees but wdth immi-
gration visas.)

We would like to see the orderly
departure program expanded. It pro-
vides a means to process some eligible
political prisoners from so-called re-
education camps— many held since 1975
under grim conditions in what amount
to concentration camps. Many of these
persons were associated with former
governments of Vietnam or with U.S.
programs in the area.

We are also prepared to process
Amerasians— the children of American
fathers and Vietnamese mothers. Amer-
asians wdll be admitted either as
refugees or under proposed legislation
providing relief for such cases.

While we have reduced the numbers
of refugees coming to the United States,
we have expanded and improved our
overseas programs to prepare refugees
for self-sufficiency. About 88% of all
working-age Indochinese refugees com-
ing here now receive extended EngHsh-
as-a-second-languagc training and
cultural orienUition in the refugee proc-
essing centers in the area— at less than

one-half of the cost of such training in
the United States. Some 17,000 refugees
approved by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) in FY 1982
are now in the centers and will be
moved in FY 1983 as part of the FY
1983 admissions.

We are also strengthening our
medical screening of refugees in South-
east Asia with improved followup meas-
ures, where needed, by local public
health officials in the United States. It is
clear that the costs of treating medical
problems overseas are significantly
lower than the costs of comparable
treatment after refugees arrive in the
United States.

Africa. The 3,000 refugees pro-
posed to be admitted from Africa enable
us to relieve pressures in specific areas
and to assist refugees who cannot be
cared for in the region. This would in-
clude certain skilled, urban refugees who
cannot be assimilated in rural areas;
former political prisoners needing the
security of resettlement abroad; and
other refugees requiring third-country
resettlement for political or other
reasons. Many of those expected to ap-
ply for admission to the United States
are Ethiopians, with small numbers com-
ing from southern Africa and other
areas. We are responsive to the concern
of African leaders that overseas resettle-
ment programs not encourage a "brain
drain" of persons whose skills are need-
ed in Africa.

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Our proposed ceiling for refugees from
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is
17,000. These refugees have long been a
special concern of the United States and
have benefited from various admissions
programs since the end of World
War II.

The declaration of martial law in
Poland on December 13, 1981, created a
new situation for refugees from that
country. Many Poles found themselves
in Western Europe when the Polish
authorities moved against the liberaliz-
ing tendencies represented by the Soli-
darity trade union movement. Uncertain
of what awaited them if they returned
to their country, many Poles obtained
refuge in countries such as Austria, the
Federal Republic of Germany, France,
the United Kingdom, and the Scandi-
navian countries. Although most have
chosen to remain in these countries, a
substantial number— estimated at 18,000
for FY 1983— are expected to seek re-
settlement in third countries, about half
of them in the United States. In addi-

tion, a small number of political de-
tainees are being released by the Polish
Government and permitted to travel to
Western countries, including the United
States.

Events in Poland overshadowed the
situations in other Eastern European
countries, but there continues to be a
substantial refugee flow from them as
well. Although predictions are uncertain,
we project a total flow from Eastern
Europe other than Poland of 10,000 in
FY 1983, of whom half are likely to seek
admission to the United States.

Our concern for refugees from the
Soviet Union is also longstanding. In the
past year, the Soviet authorities have
further restricted the emigration of all
groups. The number of Soviet Jews ar-
riving in the West fell below 4,000 in FY
1982, and there are renewed reports of
harsh treatment of Jews seeking permis-
sion to emigrate. Family reunification
continues to be the only officially ac-
cepted reason for emigration from the
Soviet Union; most of the small number
of Jews permitted to leave do so on
visas for Israel, even though many of
those departing or seeking to leave want
to settle elsewhere. There have also
been sharp reductions in the numbers of
Armenians departing the Soviet Union,
and this group, too, is limited to cases of
family reunion. Fewer than 400 Arme-
nians reached the United States in FY
1982, and the numbers for these and
other groups in FY 1983 are likely to
continue at a low level, barring major
changes in the overall state of
U.S. -Soviet relations.

Latin America and the Caribbean.

In Latin America substantial numbers of
refugees and persons displaced by fight-
ing and civil strife have received refuge
in neighboring countries. We are recom-
mending that a maximum of 2,000
refugees be admitted to the United
States. We have played an active role in
supporting UNHCR programs of care
and maintenance in Latin America. Most
of those affected by the strife do not,
however, require resettlement outside
Latin America, thanks to the longstand-
ing tradition of granting asylum within
the region. Our programs are designed
to encourage and support that tradition,
while relieving situations of special con-
cern by admitting persons such as
former and current political prisoners,
immediate relatives of refugees already
in the United States, and persons in
especially compelling circumstances. One
such group consists of former political
prisoners from Cuba who have found

Department of State Bulletin

REFUGEES

temporary refuge in Spain and Costa
Rica. Through a considered balance of
assistance and limited admissions, our
refugee programs can continue to con-
tribute to the peace and stability of the
area.

Near East and South Asia. The

Near East and South Asia area is char-
acterized by large refugee populations
requiring assistance and relatively small
numbers in need of resettlement. The
prt)posed admission ceiling for the
region is 8,000.

Over 3 million Afghans have left
their country since the Soviet invasion
of late 1979, the vast majority of whom
are tribal people who look forward to
the possibility of repatriation and, there-
fore, prefer to remain in Pakistan or
Iran. In these circumstances, the pri-
mary response of the United States has
been to support the international relief
programs being implemented by the
Government of Pakistan with the help of
private voluntary agencies. The admis-
sion of a small number of urban Afghans
to the United States is carried out on an
individual basis and is limited to those
with close family or other ties to the
United States. This program helps to
support the Pakistani policy of providing
refuge for the tribal refugees.

Iranians constitute another group
forced to live in exile from their home-
land. Tens of thousands left Iran follow-
ing the overthrow of the Shah and the
rise to power of the Ayatollah Khomeini.
Many have found refuge. A large
number have been admitted to the
United States on humanitarian parole or
long-term nonimmigrant visa status. A
hmited number of Iranians who have a
fear of persecution under the current
regime in Iran are included under our
Near Eastern and South Asian refugee
admission ceiling during FY 1983. Those
admitted under this program would have
to (1) meet the definition of a refugee,
(2) stOl be in a transient status, and (3)
have close associations with or relatives
in the United States.

We also expect to continue to admit
small numbers of refugees from other
countries in that region who have faced
persecution or have a well-founded fear
of persecution in their homelands. The
United States will continue to provide
major amounts of assistance for Pales-
tinian refugees, and we are contributing
major amounts for reconstruction efforts
in Lebanon itself. We have earmarked
$39.5 million for emergency relief in
Lebanon and an additional $66 million
for the long-term rehabilitation and
reconstruction of that country.

Domestic Program

Our most important objective in the
coming year is to strengthen and im-
prove the domestic aspects of our
refugee programs. The Departments of
State and of Health and Human Serv-
ices have developed a placement policy
designed to achieve a more rational
distribution of refugees in the United
States. The policy results from consulta-
tions with private voluntary agencies,
with State and local governments, and
with concerned national organizations.
Its adoption follows actions taken by the
voluntary agencies themselves to limit
the placement of refugees in areas of
high impact: places where there are
large concentrations of refugees and
high public assistance costs.

This placement policy anticipates
provisions of the Refugee Act amend-
ments by limiting the resettlement of
new arrivals to areas outside the high
impact zones. Exceptions continue to be
made for close family reunification
cases, but the policy would bar anchor
relatives on welfare from serving as
sponsors. Although the high proportion
of family reunion cases among new ar-
rivals will moderate the impact of the
policy, this will be offset by the expected
lower rate of arrivals, which by itself
will reduce the numbers going to the
areas of highest concentration.

The Department of State has ini-
tiated a program of direct monitoring of
performance by the voluntary agencies
under its cooperative agreements. This
program would involve on-site visits to
American cities to review agency
performance and gather information on
the role of other programs, public and
private, that assist the resettlement of
refugees. The monitoring program has
the objective of assuring full implemen-
tation of the services specified in the
cooperative agreements and effective
utilization of the reception and place-
ment grants. We also have reviewed the
accumulations of funds held by some
agencies as a result of the reception and
placement grants. The agencies have
provided additional information on these
funds and their plans for using them to
assist refugees. Tightened procedures
regarding the use of these funds will
assure their timely expenditure for pro-
grams of direct benefit to refugees.

We continue to work closely with
the Center for Disease Control (CDC)
and the Public Health Service to aug-
ment overseas screening and medical
treatment programs. Our aim is to
reduce the need for such care for

refugees after they arrive in the United
States and to assure adequate followup
screening and health services. Health
assessments funded by CDC help pre-
vent public health problems and identify
personal health problems that interfere
with self-sufficiency. In the past 2 years,
about 85% of all arriving Indochinese
refugees have received health
assessments.

Conclusion

Our refugee programs form an essential
part of our foreign policy and continue a
generous and humane tradition in which
all Americans can take pride and satis-
faction. The President's admissions pro-
posals for FY 1983 represent the essen-
tial minimum needed to support the far
greater numbers of refugees being
assisted overseas and take full account
of the burdens borne by our states and
communities at home. The proposed pro-
gram is prudent and balanced, and we
hope it will have your concurrence.

AMBASSADOR DOUGLAS

I am pleased to be here today to consult
with you on the proposed refugee admis-
sions numbers for FY 1983. Although
the consultation process is required by
the Refugee Act, it is, nonetheless, a
process I seek because of the vital im-
portance of congressional input to the
success of the refugee program. The
President has mado an initial recommen-
dation on refugee admissions numbers
for FY 1983. The President's final deci-
sion, however, awaits our consultations
here with you.

Before I describe to you our recom-
mendations for refugee admissions
numbers for FY 1983, I would like to
briefly state where we think the Ameri-
can refugee program is going in the
next several years. Since 1975, as we all
know, this country has resettled an ex-
traordinary number of refugees: almost
650,000 Indochinese refugees since 1975
and 160,000 Cuban-Haitian entrants
since 1980. This great flow of refugees
and entrants, particularly the Indo-
Chinese, set the stage for the Refugee
Act, which sought to give direction and
control to the program.

Our acceptance of this great number
of refugees admirably reflects a tradi-
tional feeling among the American peo-
ple that the United States is a haven for
the oppressed. This tradition has com-
mitted us in the past to a generous

December 1982

REFUGEES

refugee policy. Our most current ex-
perience, however, has brought with it a
realization that things have changed
since the last great waves of open immi-
gration into this country.

In the first decades of the century,
there was no welfare system to retard
the initiative of the new arrivals to
achieve early self-sufficiency; nor was
there the industrial stagnation and lack
of job opportunities that we have seen in
recent years. These domestic develop-
ments coincide with an international
climate in which freedom and regard for
individual liberties is growing ever
shorter in supply, and more and more
people want to come to the United
States. In addition, we are pressured
not only by the increasing numbers of
refugees but by ever-increasing illegal
immigration into our country.

Given these circumstances, we must
ask ourselves some hard questions and
make choices among refugee groups, all
of whose claims merit our compassion.
We feel that the refugee admissions
numbers we have recommended reflect
careful and thoughtful planning. In mak-
ing these choices we have been guided
by the following principles.

• For purposes of resettlement we
will give priority to refugees with close
ties to the United States, such as past
employment with the U.S. Government
or to those who have relatives in this
country.

• Overall refugee admissions
numbers must be more closely related to
the domestic resources available to re-
settle them.

• Resettlement in the United States
is the solution of last resort for dealing
with refugee crises and is to be used
only in cases of special humanitarian
need or when assistance in place or re-
patriation are not feasible.

• Promoting stability in democratic
countries of first asylum is an important
objective of our refugee program.

Refugee Admissions

For resettlement in FY 1983, we are
proposing that the United States admit
a total of 98,000 refugees, composed of
68,000 from East Asia; 17,000 from
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union;
8,000 from the Near East and South
Asia; .3,000 from Africa; and 2,000 from
Latin America. In addition, we propose
that up to 5,000 aliens granted asylum
in the United States be permitted to ad-
just their status to become permanent
resident aliens.

Southeast Asia. The greatest share
of our refugee population will still come
from Southeast Asia. The reasons are
twofold. In the first place, out of the
current major refugee groups. Southeast
Asian refugees have the strongest
association with the United States
through relatives here or previous
employment. In the second place, they
are unable to return home and must ex-
ist in increasingly untenable first-asylum
situations.

There has been a substantial reduc-
tion in the first-asylum refugee popula-
tions in Southeast Asia over the recent
past. In Thailand, for instance, the
refugee population declined from a high
of 307,000 in mid-1980 to about 180,000
in mid-1982. While the United States
cannot be expected to take the re-
mainder of these refugees, we do take
seriously the commitment of the interna-
tional community to insure that, over
time, refugee populations in the first-
asylum countries will be reduced. The
United States has not and will not with-
draw from this joint undertaking. I
believe the consultation request for FY
1983 Indochinese refugees reflects the
seriousness of our firm commitment to
help resolve this difficult problem. The
Southeast Asian countries of first
asylum deserve our reassurance that
they will not be faced with a large re-
sidual population of Indochinese
refugees.

This Administration is aware that, in
the past, refugee ceilings easily became
self-fulfilling targets. In our view, the
national refugee program requires care-
ful management to insure that the inter-
national pressures are balanced by
available domestic capabilities. We have
planned the FY 1983 Indochinese
refugee admissions as carefully and
knowledgeably as possible. There are,
however, several somewhat difficult-to-
predict situations that we must take into
consideration.

First, we are assuming that the flow
of Indochinese refugees out of the area
will continue to decline. We believe that
recent policies have helped temper the
flow. While first-asylum refuge remains
for those who must flee, the decreased
expectation of resettlement in the
United States and other countries does
not provide the same strong attraction
as before.

Second, the orderly departure pro-
gram from Vietnam, which we hope will
be seen as an increasingly viable alter-
native to flight by sea, may grow some-
what faster than we had earlier ex-
pected.

Third, in an effort to promote the
maximum number of voluntary repatria-
tions from among Kampuchean refugees
in Thailand, their resettlement was
deferred earlier in the fiscal year to per-
mit the UNHCR to attempt an agree-
ment with Phnom Penh on voluntary
repatriation. Unfortunately, this effort
was unsuccessful. While maximizing
voluntary repatriation remains the first
priority of the UNHCR, we have to bear
in mind that the situation of the Kam-
puchean refugees in Thailand is par-
ticularly fragile.

Fourth, there is the prospect of re-
sponding to a problem with which I
believe most Americans have particular
sympathy: the Amerasian children who
face discrimination in Indochina. We
would like to help as many of these
children as possible who can provide
documentation regarding their citizen-
ship or relationship to American citizen
fathers. In the absence of legislation
which would allow Amerasian children
direct entry into the United States as
immigrants, the State Department will
begin processing eligible children under
the orderly departure program. It is im-
portant to understand, however, that
while the U.S. Government is willing to
consider these children for entry, the
Government of Vietnam must also allow
them to exit. There is no firm assurance
yet from Vietnamese officials that the
children will be allowed to leave Viet-
nam.

Finally, you are aware of speculation
about the possible release of Vietnamese
prisoners in "re-education camps." It is
likely that many of these prisoners
would be eligible to enter the United
States under our refugee criteria. I
believe it is prudent to have some
refugee numbers available for a group
whose close association with the United
States has caused them to suffer special
persecution.

Eastern Europe. With regard to
Eastern Europe, particularly Poland and
the Soviet Union, we propose to admit
up to 6,000 Soviet refugees and 11,000
from Poland and several other countries
including Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania. In
Poland, the military declaration of mar-
tial law in December 1981 occurred at a
time when approximately 200,000 Poles
were in Western Europe. Many were
able to remain there in indefinite status,
while thousands of others sought perma-
nent asylum elsewhere. These move-
ments have placed considerable
pressures on countries of first asylum.

Department of State Bulletin

During the past year, the Ad-
ninistration has taken a hard look at the
Romanian third-country processing
)peration and concluded that several
•hanges were in order. First, the De-
jartment of State will attempt to im-
3rove INS processing access to Roma-
lian applicants and to improve the
iiedical screening of all applicants. The
second improvement objective is to
?ndeavor to process as many Romanian
applicants as qualify for immigration
.status rather than refugee status. The
Romanian third-country processing pro-
gram should be used only for the most
deserving refugee cases. And finally, we
would like to see improvements in the
Romanian Government's treatment of its
citizens who make known their desire to
emigrate from Romania.

In the past year, the emigration of
Soviet Jews has reached its most critical
point since 1970. Last year the Soviet
Union allowed the smallest number of
Jews in a decade to leave. At the same
time, increased harassment, oppression,
and anti-Semitism have been imposed
upon the lives of over 2 million Jews still
living in Russia. About 200 a month
were given visas and, of those, 150 a
month came to the United States. We
deplore this low level of Soviet emigra-
tion and hope that our continued com-
mitment to offer resettlement to
refugees from the Soviet Union will
serve as a strong signal of our condem-
nation of persecution, the low level of
emigration, and a signal of hope for
thdse who remain behind.

Near East and South Asia. In the

Near East and South Asia, nearly 3
million people have fled Soviet aggres-
sion and atrocities in Afghanistan. These
refugees have been well received by the
Government of Pakistan. Despite its
own struggles with economic develop-
ment, Pakistan has committed its
limited resources to help support the
refugees now living within its borders.
Because of Pakistan's generosity and the
support of the international community,
we anticipate entry into the United
States of only a small number of Afghan
refugees who qualify under family re-
unification or prior association with the
United States.

The President has proposed for FY
1983 the inclusion of Iranian refugees
for admission to the United States under
the ceiling for refugees from the Near
East and South Asia. This inclusion of
Iranians under the Refugee Act replaces
the practice of the past several years of
admitting them through the Attorney
General's parole authority.

Palestinian refugees in the Near
East are being assisted by the UNRWA.
It is our policy to support
UNRWA and the other relief organiza-
tions helping the Palestinians and
assisting in the rehabilitation of
Lebanon, but with individual exceptions
we would not expect to admit such per-
sons to the United States.

Africa. In the area of Africa,
although the number of refugees is
large, the nations there have established
some of the most progressive and open
refugee policies anywhere in the world.
Although serious refugee situations per-
sist in Chad, Djibouti, Sudan, Cameroon,
and in southern Africa, most of the
refugees are being cared for in neigh-
boring countries. There are, however, a
few cases where the refugees are under
threat in countries of asylum or have
close relatives in the United States —
such as Ethiopians. For these cases, the
United States anticipates admitting a
small number of refugees, not to exceed
3,000.

Latin America. The nations of Latin
America also have a generous refugee

REFUGEES

policy. Most of those fleeing political tur-
moil in the hemisphere are sheltered in
neighboring countries. Because of this
only a few of those will need to be
settled here.

We estimate a $175 million cost to
the Federal Government for processing,
transporting, training overseas, and ini-
tially placing the refugees we propose to
admit in FY 1983. In addition, we
estimate that the cost of cash, medical,
and other Federal assistance to these
refugees who will be admitted in FY
1983 will be about $225 million. The pro-
jected total cost of all U.S. refugee
assistance in FY 1983 will be approxi-
mately $1.7 billion, which includes over
$300 million in assistance for millions of
refugees and displaced persons overseas
who may never come to the United
States, as well as $900 million for
assistance to refugees in the United
States who entered this country in prior
years. In consultation with my office,
the Department of Health and Human
Services administers the bulk of
domestic assistance to refugees with the
Department of State concentrating on
overseas programs and the processing,
initial reception, and placement of

President Reagan's
Memorandum, October 11, 1982

Presidential
Determination No. 83-2

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE
H. EUGENE DOUGLAS

United States Coordinator for

Refugee Affairs

SUBJECT: FY 1983 Refugee Ceilings

Pursuant to Sections 207(a) and 207.1(aX3)
and in accordance with Section 209(b) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), after
appropriate consultations with the Congress,
I hereby determine that:

• the admission of up to 90,000 refugees
to the United States during FY 1983 is justi-
fied by humanitarian concerns or is otherwise
in the national interest;

• the 90,000 refugee admission ceiling
shall be allocated as 64,000 for East Asia;
15,000 for the Soviet Union/Eastern Europe;
6,000 for the Near East/South Asia; 3,000 for
Africa; and 2,000 for Latin America/Carib-
bean; and

• an additional 5,000 refugee admission
numbers to be available for the adjustment to
permanent residence status of aliens who
have been granted asylum in the United
States is justified by humanitarian concerns
or is otherwise in the national interest.

Pursuant to Section 101(aX42)(B) of the INA
and after appropriate consultations with the
Congress, I hereby specify that special cir-
cumstances exist such that, for the purposes
of admission under the limits established
herein, the following persons, if they other-
wise qualify for admission, may be considered
refugees of special humanitarian concern to
the United States even though they are still
within their countries of nationality or
habitual residence:

• persons in Vietnam with past or pres-
ent ties to the United States; and

• present and former political prisoners,
and persons in imminent danger of loss of
life, and their family members, in countries of
Latin America and the Caribbean.

You will inform the appropriate commit-
tees of the Congress of these determinations.

This memorandum shall be published in
the Federal Register.

Ronald Reagan

cc: The Honorable George P. Shultz
The Honorable William French Smith
The Honorable Richard S. Schweiker ■

December 1982

REFUGEES

refugees in the United States.

Early in 1983, the UNHCR must
also begin to think about consolidation
of refugee camps in Southeast Asia. As
refugee flows out of Southeast Asian
countries continue to diminish, I believe
we should phase out and close refugee
camps as they become less and less cost
efficient or as training programs can be
consolidated in fewer camps. These con-
solidations may require some expansion
of the refugee processing center
facilities at Bataan. The Philippine
Government has agreed in principle to
the expansion of this facility if it is
necessary. We will determine during the
next 4 to 6 months whether an expan-
sion of the refugee processing center is
necessary or practical.

Promoting Refugee Self-Sufficiency

The cost of the refugee program brings
me to an area which has taken on in-
creasing importance in the last 2 years
and which is a chief priority of mine —
the problems of our domestic refugee re-
settlement program and, in particular,
the continuing high refugee dependency
rates. While one can argue over the best
method of calculating a dependency
rate, the factual result remains the
same: public assistance for refugees re-
mains the largest cost of the domestic
refugee resettlement program. I do not
question the need to provide assistance
to refugees who honestly require assist-
ance or who are eligible for these pro-
grams. I am seriously concerned, how-
ever, about the apparent misuse or over-
utilization of our refugee public assist-
ance programs. Many refugees appear
to regard public assistance as an entitle-
ment. Voluntary resettlement agencies
and local welfare officials often do little
to discourage this attitude. Refugee
public assistance is not an entitlement,
nor do I believe it was the intent of Con-
gress to establish an entitlement pro-
gram.

My observation of our domestic re-
settlement program over the last 6
months inclines me to believe that we
have lost the distinction between
refugees and other dependent groups in
this country that has been evident in vir-
tually all refugee movements to the
United States since World War II. The
reality of that distinction was that
refugees should not be viewed as long-
term dependent populations.

The tools needed to adapt to a new
society include employment services,
practical problem-solving orientation and
adjustment services, temporary main-
tenance while preparing for employ-

ment, English-language training inte-
grated with employment, and health
services. While there are mainstream
programs for others in our society who
need some of the same tools, it is
arguable that those programs are not
typically equipped to handle the distinc-
tions posed by a refugee population.
Therefore, while some ongoing pro-
grams can be tapped and "sensitized,"
new approaches are necessary in other
human service fields.

I have heard many comments from
people who cope with refugee resettle-
ment at the community level. I have
been told many times that they want a
resettlement program, not a welfare
program. It is clear to me that despite
our efforts to the contrary we have a
welfare program. There is no more
urgent task in the coming year than
making significant and visible progress
in reducing the prolonged use of cash
and medical assistance among refugees.

While I recognize that we cannot
totally remove refugee resettlement ef-
forts from traditional public assistance
programs, I want to assure this commit-
tee that one of my major priorities for
FY 1983 will be a serious effort — in con-
cert with Congress, government agen-
cies, States, and the private voluntary
sector — to redefine, develop, and imple-
ment a domestic refugee resettlement
program that is innovative, efficient,
sustainable, and which provides realistic
and more effective incentives to self-
sufficiency than are now available.

Americans have been traditionally
sympathetic to refugees. We are moved
by what has happened to the Kampu-
cheans since 1975 or to the Vietnamese
who make a perilous voyage across the
South China Sea. But we must once
again understand the promise of
refugees as much as we respond to their
trauma. And so must the refugees them-
selves. Both parties should begin to ad-
just their expectations accordingly, but
it is our special responsibility to give the
refugees who come to this country the
self-respect that comes from knowing
that, in spite of and because of what
they have been through, the American
people expect them to succeed here.
Consequently, self-sufficiency should be
the fundamental goal of all refugee re-
settlement programs in the United
States.

During FY 1983, we will engage in a
thorough review of our refugee pro-
grams in an attempt to eliminate many
of the serious problems facing the pro-
gram. We have already begun some
specific program changes and will
review other modifications during 1983.

We are undertaking a series of ini-
tiatives that will enhance our efforts to
assist refugees in more quickly achieving
self-sufficiency. I intend to focus on ef-
forts on improving the health and skills
of those refugees we will accept before
they arrive in the United States. For
certain groups, we are expanding the
English-language training and cultural
orientation program overseas from 14 tc
24 weeks and propose to bring back to
the camps as instructors refugees
already resettled in the United States. I
believe that successfully resettled
refugees, who have gone through the
painful experience of resettlement, will
have an important impact on those
refugees yet to come.

In the area of health care, the
Japanese Government has agreed in
principle to donate substantially in-
creased resources to design, equip, and
staff new clinical and laboratory
facilities in the Bataan refugee process-
ing center. They have similarly agreed
to build and equip a dental clinic. These
activities will substantially improve the
physical health of refugees before they
arrive and will reduce our domestic
health costs.

The Japanese have also agreed to
provide equipment and personnel for a
vocational training program in the
refugee processing center. This program
will be developed in coordination with
the States, industry, and labor to insure
refugees are better prepared for work
that is actually available in areas where
they settle. These efforts will enhance
and improve the crucial linkages be-
tween our overseas and domestic pro-
grams. If we can more effectively
prepare refugees for the demands of
resettlement in the United States
through health programs, vocational
training, and language and cultural
orientation programs that are conducted
overseas, we will be better able to
enhance prospects for refugee self-
sufficiency at less cost than has been the
case in the past.

We see a much greater role for
refugee mutual assistance associations
here in the United States — to help other
refugees help themselves, including
those who have been here for some time
but have not successfully integrated. As
an example, we want to see more efforts
like the Khmer Cluster Project in which
the associations played key roles.
Welfare dependency and secondary
migration — two of our biggest prob-
lems— were significantly reduced among
the Khmer who resettled under this pro-
gram. Success was also due to preselect-
ing resettlement sites and by advance

Department of State Bulletin

UNITED NATIONS

.onsultation with state and local govern-
(fients who received those refugees.
'; Dr. Hawkes, the Director of the Of-
vice of Refugee Resettlement at the
department of Health and Human Serv-
ces, and members of my staff have
ijecently visited Canada to review their
liefugee program. We are hopeful that
ilome aspects of the Canadian resettle-
ment experience may be applicable to
•mproving our performance in the
United States.

We intend to review the relationship
)etween medical assistance and cash
issistance and how the impact of these
wo programs on refugee resettlement
night be improved. I will review the
financial and program relationships of
:he voluntary and public sectors, the
role of state governments, and review
; again the reception and placement
grants to see if we can more effectively
utilize this resource.

Self-sufficiency should be the prin-
cipal goal of all refugee resettlement
nrograms in the United States. It is not
only a government effort but a coopera-
tive venture deeply involving the volun-
tary resettlement agencies of this coun-
try. Our refugee programs have
historically been an effort of the com-
munity and its representatives of the
voluntary resettlement agencies. Their
past efforts and accomplishments should
be recognized by this committee. They
should, as well, recognize our fervent
desire to see them direct a greater por-
tion of their energies to assist those
refugees who have already been brought
here— often languishing in despair and
confusion— while at the same time
developing a process that will increase
the success of incoming refugees to ad-
just and to reach early self-sufficiency.

Summary

In summary, let me say that I believe
the international refugee problem is one
that will be with us for some time— cer-
tainly for the remainder of this century.
The refugees who are waiting in camps
throughout the world for a just resolu-
tion of their plight are the direct and
human result of man's inability to
resolve his political conflicts. This Ad-
ministration, consistent with those
before it, maintains that refugees are
the responsibility of not one or a few na-
tions but of the entire world community.
We are prepared to contribute our fair
share and to accept into this country our
fair quota of those needing resettlement.

Israel's Participation
in the United Nations

SECRETARY'S STATEMENT.
OCT. 16, 19821

Recently there have been proposals at
the U.N. General Assembly in New York
and at the plenipotentiary conference of
the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU) in Nairobi against the con-
tinued participation of Israel in those
organizations. The United States views
these threats with grave concern.

The exclusion of Israel from the
General Assembly or the ITU in these
circumstances would be contrary to the
principles of the United Nations. In the
case of the General Assembly, it would
be a clear-cut violation of the U.N.
Charter. Such action defeats the very
purpose of the United Nations— to
resolve disputes among nations— by
creating further conflict and division. It
would do grave damage to the entire
U.N. system, and it would hurt us all.

The exclusion of Israel from U.N.
bodies would also be a serious setback
for progress toward peace in the Middle
East, to which the United States and
virtually all members of the United Na-
tions are committed. It would be a
tragic irony if such moves against Israel
in the U.N. system were to succeed just
at the time when there is renewed hope
for progress in the Middle East.

The United States has always made
clear that any attack on Israel's right to
participate in any U.N. organization, if
successful, would have grave conse-
quences for our own continued participa-
tion and support. As evidence of our
determination to oppose such actions,

we withdrew our delegation from the
conference of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) following the
wrongful rejection of Israel's credentials
on September 24, announced that we
would reassess our participation in the
IAEA, and suspended participation in a
broad range of agency activities. Pend-
ing the outcome of our reassessment, we
are making no further payments to the
IAEA. We will take such action in other
U.N. organizations if there are similar
moves.

If Israel were excluded from the
General Assembly, the United States
would withdraw from participation in
the Assembly and would withhold pay-
ments to the United Nations until
Israel's right to participate was
restored.

We would also withdraw our delega-
tion from the ITU plenipotentiary con-
ference in Nairobi if Israel were ex-
cluded and suspend further payments to
that organization. The ITU, the IAEA,
and other technical agencies must not be
undermined or destroyed by such polit-
ical attacks on the rights of member
states.

We trust that the majority of nation
members of the United Nations and all
its agencies recognize the grave dangers
of any further atta^-ks on Israel's right
to participate in U.N. bodies and will
work to turn aside such initiatives.

We do not expect to bear the refugee
burden alone. In this regard, the Ad-
ministration continues to effect its inter-
national refugee program through inter-
national organizations, primarily
UNHCR, UNRWA, Intergovernmental
Committee for Migration, UNICEF, and
the ICRC. Together with like-minded
governments we work for the protection
of and assistance to refugees worldwide.

We believe, furthermore, that a
strong human rights policy and pressure
to end the injustices that create refugees
must be major parts of any Administra-
tion's foreign policy. Ultimately, the fun-
damental solution to the world's refugee

'Made available to news correspondents
by acting Department spokesman Susan
Pittman. ■

problem is not resettlement but the
reversal of the current political climate
in the world today where the number of
countries affording their citizens basic
human rights and dignity continues to
shrink.

'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be avaifeble from tlie Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

December 1982

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Reflections Among
Neighbors

by Secretary Shultz

Address before the
Organization of American States (OAS)
General Assembly on November 17, 1982^

I'm here more to listen than to talk.
Moreover, though I have visited nearly
all of the countries represented in our
organization — some of them many
times — this is the first time I have par-
ticipated in a meeting of the OAS.

Last February, in the speech before
the OAS Permanent Council in which he
announced the Caribbean Basin initia-
tive, President Reagan emphasized the
major themes of his Administration's
Latin American policy: democracy, self-
determination, economic development,
and collective security. "These two great
land masses north and south," he said,
"... can show the world that our many
nations can live in peace, each with its
own customs and language and culture
but sharing a love for freedom and a
determination to resist outside ideologies
that would take us back to colonialism."
Less than 2 weeks from now the Presi-
dent will begin a visit to Latin America
that is a personal expression of this vi-
sion of a cooperative effort aimed at full
development of the enormous human
and economic potential concentrated in
this hemisphere.

I come today before this General
Assembly convinced that the inter-
American system is vital to peace and
security for the nations of this hemi-
sphere. We have, over the years, formu-
lated a juridical base for keeping the
peace, for resolving disputes, and even
for the sovereignty of our nations. Inde-
pendence, sovereignty, and noninterven-

Secretary Shultz and Ambassador J.
William Middendorf II, U.S. Permanent
Representative to the OAS. (Department of sute

photo)

Department of State Bulletin

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

ion are themes that run through our
barter, the record of our meetings, and
ur inter- American experience. We have
dvanced these ideas further than other
oUective bodies, and we have been well
erved by them.

I don't propose even to try to cover
very issue before this assembly but
ather to concentrate on a few of my
nain reflections as I join this discussion
mong neighbors and friends.

Var and Peace

)ne set of reflections is about the nature
)f the Inter-American system itself — of
vhich this unique organization is the for-
nal expression, and the OAS Charter
md Rio treaty the formal guarantees,
)Ut which also consists of a great net-
work of bilateral and multilateral rela-
donships among the American states.

Geography makes us neighbors.
Sistory, religion, and the shared ex-
perience of the frontier make us friends.
rhere is far more that unites us in this
hemisphere than can ever divide us.
That in itself is enough to explain why
each of us participates in the system.
:But it is probably not what has made the
system durable and valuable.

The striking thing to me, thinking
over what has occurred in our lifetimes,
is the success the American states have
had in preventing war. True enough,
there was the Chaco war in the 1930s;
then conflicts between Costa Rica and
Nicaragua, Ecuador and Peru, and El
Salvador and Honduras; most recently,
the tragic South Atlantic crisis we tried
so hard to prevent. Also, there have
been violent insurgencies, often manipu-
lated from outside.

But for all the territorial disputes
that divide us, for all the internal strug-
gles that threaten us, these are the only
instances of war between states in a half
century in which every other part of the
world has been convulsed in war. In a
climate of general security, we each
have been able to avoid the levels of
military expenditures that countries in
other less fortunate regions could not
dispense with. The developing countries
of the Americas have been able to limit
defense spending to 1.4% of gross na-
tional product, a quarter of what the
developing world as a whole spends on
mOitary preparations. And although our
global responsibilities impose a heavy
burden of military expenditures, the
United States does not and need not for-
tify borders with its neighbors.

One reason why the inter-American
system has proved so durable and
valuable must be that in most cases it
has kept the peace. Since 1948, the OAS
has been called upon formally or infor-
mally on no less than 50 separate occa-
sions involving the settlement of
disputes. From the Cuban missile crisis
to local border conflicts, the inter-
American system has contributed, often
decisively, to keeping the peace.

But will it in the future? We know
that war came to the South Atlantic
despite our efforts. We know that turbu-
lence in Central America, where local
conflicts have been exploited from the
outside, can threaten the peace. And
despite a variety of agreements and
even treaties, we are well aware that it
has been a long time since one of the
territorial disputes among us has been
definitively settled.

Once actually confronted with crisis,
I have no doubt that we will all react
with good intentions, urging negotia-
tions, offering good offices. But recent
experience suggests that could be too
late. Good intentions matter, but they
are not enough.

Take Central America as an exam-
ple. Everyone seems to be talking peace.
Yet most states in this area are chal-
lenged by insurgency. They are threat-
ened by economic and political strife.
They have brought in foreign military
advisers, in one country in very large
numbers.

Clearly, no strategy for peace can
succeed if those who take up arms
against their fellow citizens and neigh-
bors go unopposed. That principle ap-
plies in Central America as well as else-
where. Peace is impossible without
security. Our security assistance pro-
grams, for El Salvador and for our
other threatened friends, stem from that
basic consideration. Neither democracy,
nor human rights, nor socioeconomic
equity are possible in a climate of in-
security, where hostile neighbors or
violent internal minorities make war on
society.

But if peace requires strength,
strength in turn infuses an obligation to
make peace. Fortunately, not all of the
conditions for war are present in Cen-
tral America. Most states still lack the
major offensive weapons that would be
needed for an attack on their neighbors.
That may give us our opening. Why
shouldn't we encourage the governments
of Central America to agree, all of them,
on a basis of reciprocity and strict verifi-
cation, not to import major offensive
weapons?

Clearly that's only part of the solu-
tion, but it would be a start. There will
be danger to peace as long as foreign
troops or military advisers are present.
Why not go for agreement among Cen-
tral American countries, again on a
basis of reciprocity and verification, to
reduce their numbers to some low
agreed level or to zero? The same
treatment— reciprocity and verifica-
tion—could be applied to practical
mutual undertakings to end any and all
support for violent activity on the ter-
ritory of others.

As you think about it, other steps
would be necessary as well. Internal con-
flicts threaten to spill over borders, so
each state should be encouraged to
create processes by which internal
adversaries can be reconciled, human
rights respected, and political competi-
tion substituted for violent confronta-
tion.

Reconciliation leads to that funda-
mental value, democracy. We all know
that in the end there is no enduring
stability and legitimacy without it. We
also know that democracies are far less
likely to go to war than governments
whose leaders need not obtain the con-
sent of the people. In Central America
the democratic transformation of all the
states in the area is not only a desirable
step that each may set for itself; it may
well be a precondition for a durable
peace.

A number of countries, meeting in
San Jose recently, went through a
similar thought process, trying to iden-
tify the conditions for peace in the area.
If the countries of Central America
could all agree on these conditions, the
next step would be to begin to discuss
how they could be implemented. My
point is simple. If you can identify the
fundamental elements of a problem, you
have some chance of solving it. If you
can't, no amount of negotiations or good
offices will help.

And, of course, should one Central
American country attack another, the
Rio treaty is there to protect the victim
and restore peace. If it is clear in ad-
vance that it will be invoked, the treaty
will have a deterrent effect — as it has
had in so many circumstances since it
was signed.

Of course, the Central American
situation is not the only threat to hemi-
spheric peace. The South Atlantic war of
this spring has reminded us of how
many boundary and territorial disputes
remain unsettled in our region and of
the potential cost of leaving these un-
addressed.

December 1982

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

The United States, while traditional-
ly neutral on the particular claims
asserted in regional territorial and boun-
dary disputes, is not neutral on the over-
riding principle of peaceful dispute
settlement. This implies an obligation on
both parties to a dispute to seek effec-
tive means of peaceful resolution, either
by negotiations, perhaps with OAS
assistance, or by recourse to the various
means of judicial, arbitral, conciliation,
and other third-party devices available
under multilateral and regional agree-
ments or ad hoc. International law pro-
vides a variety of means; the will to use
these means has been too often lacking.
The OAS pioneered the development of
international mechanisms for such pur-
poses throughout this century; it must
now show leadership in promoting their
use.

This is advice that the United States
itself follows: We are currently in litiga-
tion with Canada, in a special chamber
of the International Court of Justice,
over the delineation of our important
maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine.

Earlier this month we were pleased
to support a balanced resolution on the
Falklands/Malvinas question in the
United Nations. We could support in this
body a similar resolution. We hope that
both actions will prove effective in pro-
moting a peaceful solution to this
dispute.

Finally, let me take one more case —
nuclear explosives. We are undertaking
a new effort to persuade the Soviet
Union that its security and that of the
United States can be protected and
enhanced by reducing the numbers of
nuclear weapons. While that effort pro-
ceeds, there is a strategy open to us to
avoid the introduction or creation of
nuclear arms in those countries of the
hemisphere which have so far been free
of them. This is the strategy conceived
and launched at Tlatelolco in 1967 to
protect against the use or threat of
nuclear weapons and which led to a trea-
ty already in effect for 22 Latin Ameri-
can and Caribbean countries. One of the
most potentially serious sources of ten-
sion and war could be eliminated if the
nuclear-weapons-free zone of the
Tlatelolco treaty were to be ratified by
all eligible states.

In sum, the inter-American system
has helped produce a great achievement:
a general if not total freedom from war.
Preserving that achievement is a major
challenge for the future.

Economic Management

My second group of reflections concerns
the management of our economies. We
are all members of the world economy
and not dependent on the inter-Ameri-
can system for the management of our
economies in the same way we are for
the preservation of peace. Yet what
each of us does— in the management or
mismanagement of our domestic
economies — can greatly affect others in
the hemisphere positively or negatively.

For the developing countries of the
hemisphere, this last generation has
been a period of soaring growth. The
motors of that growth— savings and in-
vestment—have been largely fueled from
within. For example, gross savings are
now about 22% of gross national prod-
uct, among the highest in the world. But
external factors— substantial expansion
of markets in the United States for
hemispheric exports; the opening up of
trade within South America, within Cen-
tral America, and within the Caribbean;
the development of new markets in
Europe and Japan; major increases in
private investment, in borrowings from
multilateral development banks, and
above all in commercial bank loans-
have contributed much too. U.S. imports
from Latin America and the Caribbean
have grown from $4 billion in 1960 to
$39 billion in 1980, which averages out
to a compound growth rate of more than
12% a year for the last 20 years. This is
in nominal terms and includes the price
escalation on petroleum, but even so it is
impressive when compared to U.S. infla-
tion, which averaged about 5% during
this period.

The mix between internal and exter-
nal factors has varied from country to
country. In some cases favorable exter-
nal conditions have compensated for
domestic rigidities; in others, un-
favorable external developments have
undermined otherwise sound develop-
ment plans. One point is evident: Size
has not been a determinant of success.
You don't have to be large to succeed.

Until recently, the balance was posi-
tive: We were all enjoying the fruits of
growth— the developing countries of the
hemisphere at the phenomenal rate of
nearly 6% a year in real terms for 20
years. Put another way, the economic
size of Latin America has tripled in ab-
solute terms since 1960. And although
much of the conventional wisdom em-
phasizes diversification of trade.
Western Hemisphere countries still mat-
ter enormously to each other. In 1980,

trade within the hemisphere as a
whole— including Canada— came to $151
billion, 42% of the hemisphere's total
trade with the world. Latin America
taken as a whole is the United States'
biggest customer.

Now we are all in a period of adjust
ment, including the United States. Mam
of us, including the United States, must
compress our budget deficits and contro
our money supply if we are to master in
flation and create the conditions for
renewed growth. This is a process that
begins at home, where we must each ac
cept primary responsibility for correct-
ing the excesses of the recent past. But
falling world trade volume; interest
rates that, though falling, are still high;
the threat of protectionism; the backlash
of one country's cutback on another's
trade; and the ripple effects of one coun
try's financial difficulties on another— aL
complicate our individual adjustment.

Nothing would be more devastating
than a wave of import protectionism
now. Yet such a wave threatens to bursi
in a number of countries, including my
own. As is often the case, the way to
avoid going backward is to go forward.
Our best collective tactic, it seems to
me, is to build in new worldwide de-
fenses through the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)-a joint
standstill in protectionist measures and
a commitment to broaden and deepen
the GATT in North-South trade and
trade in services. That is the task of the
GATT ministerial that convenes next
week. It is a task to which each and
every one of us must contribute, for the
inevitable alternative to keeping the
world trading system mutually open is
the kind of disaster that engulfed the
world in the 1930s.

It would be equally devastating if
debtors and creditors were to fail to find
those mutual accommodations that will
permit borrowing countries to have sus-
tained access to the financial markets.
Just as borrowers must cut their current
account deficits, raise domestic interest
rates, and keep exchange rates realistic,
so lenders should in some cases be ready
to restructure or, in exceptional cases,
reschedule. Borrowers must look
realistically to their responsibilities. And
lenders should recognize that stabiliza-
tion programs will be more likely to suc-
ceed if accompanied by net flows of new
money.

The International Monetary Fund
can play an essential role in this process
by providing new money on a selective
basis while helping countries to define

Departnnent of State Bulletin

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

abilization programs. And in some
jj ises individual countries can ap-
•opriately facilitate the adjustment by
•oviding short-term credit to allow time
1 negotiate a Fund agreement, as in
le case of the credit arranged for Mex-
0 in August.

This is a long chain of actions that
ust be taken in a mutually supportive
ay. It starts at home. It requires sacri-
ces. It involves both private entities
id governments. And it will require a
gh order of mutual confidence to suc-
>ed. But we must succeed. It is quite
ear that the penalties for failure could
; enormous.

Beyond the adjustment, of course,
ill come the recovery. The U.S.
;onomy is now poised for just that. As
'ways it will succeed only if there is
ew investment and new savings. But it
not too early to begin thinking
irough the requirements for sustained
rowth in the hemisphere. Having a dis-
roportionate share of the world's
., rowth potential, this hemisphere should
rovide a substantial impulse to the re-
ewed momentum for global expansion.

"he Balance of Interdependence

'hat brings me to my third set of reflec-
ions, on what you might call the
alance of our interdependence. No one
oubts that we depend vitally on each
ther, for our prosperity, for our securi-
y, for peace. We can celebrate it— or we
an deplore it— but it is a fact. This
lar's crises— in finance, in the South
Atlantic, in Central America— have
mderscored it.

But it is also natural that we should
:ach be concerned about the balance of
nutual accommodation. Some of the
nost difficult and important questions in
nternational relations revolve around
elations among neighbors. If we have
,0 adjust our economies, who should ad-
ust more or most? If we must compro-
Tiise to keep the peace, who should go
:he longest way? And how do you meas-
ure it?

I think we all agree that matters
uch as these must not be decided simp-
ly by might or size but by principle and
concept. I do not mean by that that we
should attempt to write a book of codes
anticipating every situation and dic-
tating pre-agreed rules of the game. But
we should always be prepared to ex-
amine together the justice and consist-
ency of our actions, so that a balance ac-
ceptable to all can emerge.

One important way of extending the
range of long-term options— at least for
some of the most vulnerable states— is
the Caribbean Basin initiative. President
Reagan's trade and investment pro-
posals will be up for decision in the Con-
gress later this month. These trade and
investment incentives exemplify the
creative mutual adjustments needed to
spur growth. They will help to unleash
in behalf of long-term growth the drive
of the private sector as an engine of
development financing, technical innova-
tion, and productive employment. The
stimulus they will provide will go far to
insuring the productivity of the
emergency assistance already being dis-
bursed.

The breadth and originality of the
Caribbean Basin initiative have led to
some interesting side effects. One is that
we have decided to increase special
funds to the OAS to provide training op-
portunities for Caribbean Basin coun-
tries. Another is the realization that
most of the peoples of the hemisphere
now live in countries that have attained
relatively advanced levels of develop-
ment. These so-called middle-income
countries properly receive less tradi-
tional public assistance than do poorer
countries — yet they are also, precisely
because of their relative development,
countries that are ready for new kinds
of partnership to accelerate balanced
development. The issue here, it seems to
me, is less one of money rather than of
dynamism, creativity, and entrepreneur-
ship. But it is an issue very much worth
keeping in mind as we seek ways to
develop greater balance within the hemi-
sphere.

Democracy

Finally, let me conclude with a word
about democracy in the hemisphere. Our
record is uneven. For some countries —
Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Vene-
zuela, Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad, in-
deed most of the Caribbean — democratic
institutions have functioned without in-
terruption for a generation and more.
Other countries have faced instability
despite long democratic periods. A few
have experienced only interludes of
democratic governance.

But what is most striking is that
democracy is everywhere the hemi-
sphere's recurring ideal and practical
standard. In fact, our collective commit-
ment is so strong that sometimes I think

even the criticism of our failings is in-
tensified by it. Certainly, the Inter-
American Human Rights Commission
has no equal in any other region of the
world.

Am I not right in thinking that our
practice of democracy is making prog-
ress? In the last few years, Ecuador,
Honduras, and Peru have all fully re-
affirmed their democratic traditions.
The Dominican Republic has sustained
its newer tradition. Brazil's abertura, so
strikingly underscored by Monday's elec-
tions, has been underway for a decade.
And today, Argentina's and Uruguay's
commitment to a return to democratic
politics, Bolivia's new elected govern-
ment, and the democratic transforma-
tion in El Salvador — all offer genuine
hope for the future.

I know that much remains to be ac-
complished, that sharp swings have
taken place in the past, that gains
already made have not in all cases been
fully consolidated. But more than two-
thirds of our membership — 21 — now
have governments chosen through open,
competitive elections. And more will
soon join that list.

One of the principal reasons for
President Reagan's trip to several coun-
tries of Latin America beginning the end
of this month is, in fact, to underscore
this democratic momentum, to bolster it,
and to emphasize our own firm commit-
ment to that process.

If this trend holds, it will be the
greatest achievement of the Americas. I
can think of no more urgent business for
this organization than to find ways in
which the gains for democracy already
made can be protected and additional
gains made. For democracy strengthens
both the peace and the ability to
cooperate.

^Press release 350.

December 1982

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

System of Justice in El Salvador

by Deane R. Hinton

Address prepared for delivery before
the American Chamber of Commerce in
San Salvador on October 29, 1982. Mr.
Hinton is U.S. Ambassador to El
Salvador.

It is an honor and a pleasure to be
speaking once again at the American
Chamber of Commerce. Fifteen months
ago, I spoke to you in my initial address
in El Salvador about U.S. policy and its
compatability with the goals so elo-
quently expressed in the armed forces
proclamation of October 15, 1979.

Today I want to stress the constancy
of American policy, to assess briefly
progress made and set-backs borne
these last 15 months, and then to ad-
dress a critical issue which in my opinion
requires a solution if the democratic
process in El Salvador is not to be
frustrated.

U.S. Policy Aims

The aims of our policy remain exactly as
I outlined them to you on July 31, 1981:

• To help a friendly neighbor defend
itself against an armed insurrection
aided and manipulated by Cuba;

• To help resolve the structural
problems which beset this country;

• To help the people to decide their
own destiny through the electoral proc-
ess; and

• To stimulate political reconcilia-
tion in El Salvador.

In these past 15 months. El Salva-
dor and Salvadorans have come a long
way. Although much remains to be
done, the democratic process is working.
March 28, 1982, is a day that will live
forever in all of our memories.

Progress and Set-Backs

Fifteen months ago in discussing the
war and paying deserved tribute to your
armed forces, I urged on you the need
for unity in the face of the common
enemy. Since I spoke, the armed forces,
in defending our common heritage
against Marxist subversives supported
by Nicaragua, Cuba, and others of
similar totalitarian persuasion, have in-
curred over 4,000 additional casualties.
The price is a heavy one, but El
Salvador's Army is slowly but surely
winning the war.

This war effort is now supported by
a government of national unity. Four
political parties share a common commit-
ment to the objectives of President
Magana's Administration. As spelled out
in the Apeneca pact, these objectives are
peace, democratization, human rights,
economic recuperation, consolidation of
the reforms, confidence and security,
and the improvement of El Salvador's
image abroad. The United States is
proud to be cooperating with and assist-
ing a government dedicated to achieve-
ment of such aims.

Much is required for success. The
democratic reform process so stunningly
progressing here, despite civil conflict,
depends not only on political tolerance,
freedom of expression, economic re-
covery, commitment to social justice,
and resolute military defense but also on
civic commitment to make the rule of
law a living reality. It is not enough that
El Salvador's Constitution and laws pro-
tect individual rights, that El Salvador
subscribes to a long list of international
human rights conventions. The reality
must change to more closely match the
ideal.

Reflecting today on my experiences
in El Salvador, I would no doubt be well
advised to talk of other things— perhaps
to talk of the economy, of the private
sector's determined efforts to keep
working despite everything, including
the sad practice of some Salvadorans
blowing up the economic infrastructure
and other Salvadorans keeping desper-
ately needed capital outside the country;
of what I consider to be, in war
economy conditions, sound governmental
policy; and of American economic as-
sistance—over $230 million this year. Or
perhaps I should analyze basic issues
posed by enormous population pressure
and rapid population growth. Another
subject, for another day, might be reflec-
tions on educational requirements to
prepare citizens for their critical role in
a functioning democracy.

But, for better or worse, today I
want to talk of a subject so many of you,
because of indifference or shame or fear
or for what other reason 1 know not,
leave in eloquent silence.

Criminal System Issue

Neither internal confidence nor external
support can long survive here in the
absence of an effective system of

criminal justice. Until all are protected
by the law, until all are subject to the
law. El Salvador will lack a fundaments
prerequisite for a healthy society and, I
might add, for a healthy economy.

In the first 2 weeks of this month,
at least 68 humans beings were
murdered in El Salvador under cir-
cumstances which are familiar to
everyone here. Every day we receive
new reports of disappearances under
tragic circumstances. American citizens
in El Salvador have been among the
murdered, among the disappeared. Is it
any wonder that much of the world is
predisposed to believe the worst of a
system which almost never brings to
justice either those who perpetrate thes
acts or those who order them? The
"Mafia" must be stopped. Your survival
depends on it. The guerrillas of this
Mafia, every bit as much as the guer-
rillas of Morazan and Chalatenango, an
destroying El Salvador.

The battle has been joined. Both thi
civilian and military authorities of the
Government of El Salvador have spoke
out unequivocally against the abuses of
basic human rights. They have backed
up their words with action. They have
begun the process of bringing to justice
those who commit crimes under what-
ever banner— no matter who they migh
be.

In spite of the fact that determined
efforts have cut the number of deaths
attributable to political violence to a
third or less of what it was a few years
ago, by no stretch of the imagination
can current levels be considered accept-
able by any civilized person.

Extremists of left and right continu
to murder wantonly, apparently basing
their despicable actions on rumor, ideo-
logical persuasion, heresay, and persont
animosity. Common criminals are havin
a field day. There is no doubt that El
Salvador's political agony provides cove i
for common thugs. Everyone here
knows that kidnapping for criminal gair
has been carried out under the guise of
political action. The problem exists at
everj' step of the criminal justice proc-
ess. Who among you is not intimidated
by it?

Who dares to speak out when you
witness a person being dragged off by
"heavily armed men in civilian clothes"
in the middle of the night? Who will
bear witness to murder? Where are suf-
ficiently trained detectives to investigate
the wave of crimes committed daily?

Departnnent of State Bulletin

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Are there anywhere near enough
roperly trained and rewarded pros-
tutors to deal with the violence in the
jciety as to make successful prosecu-
on virtually impossible for any but a
?lf-confessed criminal? Are judges suffi-
" lently protected and isolated so as to
ssure verdicts based neither on bribery
or on fear? Can the prison system ab-
3rb and control those who should be
Dnvicted?

These are questions with which all
ivilized societies must deal, but it is sad
3 see a society in which the answers are
0 painfully and consistently inadequate.

If you are not convinced that I am
liking about a fundamental and critical
roblem, consider these facts. Since
979 perhaps as many as 30,000 Salva-
orans have been killed illegally; that is,
ot in battle. Less than 1,500 cases of
crimes against the person" —
hat is, homicide, assault, and bat-
ery — have been prosecuted before your
ourts. Most striking of all, there have
leen less than 200 convictions for these
■'' rimes.

Vhat Can the U.S. Do?

■This is El Salvador's problem. El
' Salvador must solve it. The United
states can do some things to help. We,
'or instance, can and do insist on our
egitimate right to assure that justice is
ione in the case of murdered American
;itizens. We hope that successful pros-
ecution of these crimes will open the
loor for similar success in crimes involv-
ng Salvadoran citizens. That is why I
relieve that the successful prosecution of
these cases is just as essential for the
future of the Salvadoran criminal justice
system as it is for the continuance of
U.S. assistance.

To further this cause, we can pro-
vide the technical assistance of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in
using modern investigation techniques.
We stand ready to provide assistance to
the Government and courts of El
Salvador in the reform of the criminal
justice system. Personally, however, I
believe needed assistance could better
come from other Latin countries where
a modernized Napoleonic Code applies.
But all will come to naught unless the
will exists in this country to make it
happen, unless the will exists to punish
those who are responsible, regardless of
their station in life.

Finally, as the representative of the
United States in El Salvador, I can try

to communicate as clearly and honestly
as I can the sentiments of the American
people, the Congress, and the Adminis-
tration on this subject. The message is
simple: El Salvador must have substan-
tial progress on bringing the murders of
our citizens, including those who ordered
the murders, to justice; in advancing
human rights; and controlling the abuses
of some elements of the security forces.
If not, the United States, despite our
other interests and our commitment to
the struggle against communism, could
be forced to deny assistance to El
Salvador.

Beyond all of this, a more effective
justice system is essential to ending the
war. Your government has announced
that it is trying to develop a mechanism
whereby those guerrillas can lay down
their arms and return to the democratic
fold. This is a supremely difficult task.
Years of destruction and killing are not
forgotten overnight.

We in the United States know this.
The bitterness of our Civil War, which
left over 350,000 dead and almost that
many wounded, continued for the better

part of a century— even with uncondi-
tional amnesty and full political par-
ticipation for virtually every rebel.

Nevertheless the fighting here will
end someday. And when it does, those
who lay down their arms must be able to
do so with the knowledge that they will
be fairly treated in accordance with the
laws and procedures established by the
elected representatives of the Salva-
doran people.

In closing I would like to commend
to you some words spoken by a man at
the head of a nation racked by armed
rebellion; a man who, in spite of his
loathing for armed force, used armed
force to suppress that rebellion; a man
who eventually died at the hands of a
political assassin.

With malice toward none, with
charity for all, with firmness in the
right ... let us strive on to finish the
work we are in, to bind up the nation's
wounds, to care for him who shall have
borne the battle and for his widow and
his orphan, to do all which may achieve
and cherish a just and lasting peace
among ourselves and with all nations. ■

Declaration on Democracy
in Central America

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
OCT. 5, 1982^

Yesterday in San Jose, Costa Rica, there
was a meeting of foreign ministers of
countries interested in promoting
democracy in Central America and the
Caribbean. The meeting was attended by
the Prime Minister of Belize, who con-
currently holds the foreign minister
portfolio, and five other foreign
ministers — Colombia, El Salvador, Hon-
duras, Jamaica, and Costa Rica. Assist-
ant Secretary for Inter-American Af-
fairs [Thomas 0.] Enders attended as a
special representative of the Secretary
of State, and Panama and the Domin-
ican Republic designated special
observers.

The final act of the meeting empha-
sized the importance of representative
democracy and pluralism to the peoples
of the region and as an essential element
in bringing about peace in Central
America. It also set forth certain other
conditions and actions to achieve peace
in the region:

• National reconciliation in a
democratic framework;

• Respect for the principle of
nonintervention;

• An end to arms trafficking and
foreign support for terrorism and
violence;

• Limitation of armaments;

• Control of frontiers under
reciprocal and verifiable conditions in-
cluding international supervision;

• Withdrawal under effective condi-
tions of reciprocity of foreign troops and
military and security advisers; and

• A halt to the importation of heavy
offensive weapons.

The conference also established a
forum for peace and democracy that
would analyze within the framework of
the declaration the different peace pro-
posals and initiatives that emerged and
transmit the results to other interested
states. The conference also resolved to
create an office to provide technical elec-
toral assistance to those countries desir-
ing to hold free and honest elections.

December 1982

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

The Government of the United
States believes that this initiative of
these regional democracies marks an im-
portant step forward in the promotion of
representative democracy and the
resolution of regional tensions within a
peaceful framework. We hope other
governments in the region will seriously
address the concepts set forth in the
final act of the conference. They provide
a blueprint for peace in the region.

FINAL ACT,
OCT. 4, 19822

Final Act

OF THE Meeting of Foreign

Mi.MSTEKs OF Countries Interested

IN THE Promotion of Democracy in

Central America

AND the Caribbean

The representatives of the Governments of
the Republics of Belize, Colombia, El
Salvador, the United States of America, Hon-
duras, Jamaica, and Costa Rica, and the
observer representative of the Government of
the Dominican Republic, convinced that
direct dialogue among democratic countries is
the appropriate way to review the situation
in their states and, therefore, to search for
solutions to common problems, met in San
Jose, on October 4, 1982, represented as
follows;

BELIZE

His Excellency George Price
Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign
Affairs

COLOMBIA

His Excellency Rodrigo Lloreda Caicedo

Minister of Foreign Affairs

His Excellency Carlos Borda Mendoza
Ambassador of Colombia in Costa Rica

Ambassador Julio Londono
General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs

Ambassador Luis Carlos Villegas
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs

Mr. Julio Riano Velandia
Deputy Chief of Protocol

EL SALVADOR

His Excellency F^idel Chavez Mena

Minister of Foreign Affairs

His Excellency Carlos Matamoros Guirola
Ambassador of El Salvador in Costa Rica

His Excellency Oscar Castro Araujo
Director General of Foreign Policy

Mr. Alvaro Menendez Leal
I )irector General of Culture and Communica-
tions

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
His Excellency Thomas 0. Enders
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs

His Excellency Francis McNeil
Ambassador of the United States in Costa
Rica

Advisers

Mr. Arthur Giese

Deputy Director, Central American Affairs

Mr. Ronald Godard

First Secretary, Embassy of the United
States in Costa Rica

Mr. Scott Gudgeon

Legal Adviser, Department of State

Mr. Donald Barnes

HONDURAS

His Excellency Edgardo Paz Barnica

Minister of Foreign Affairs

His Excellency Ricardo Arturo Pineda Milla
Ambassador on Special Mission

His Excellency Jorge Roman Hernandez

Alcerro
Ambassador on Special Mission

His Excellency Herminio Pineda B.
Charge dAffaires a.i. of Honduras in Costa
Rica

JAMAICA

His Excellency Neville Gallimore
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign
Trade

His Excellency Louis Heron Boothe
Ambassador of Jamaica in Costa Rica

His Excellency Neville Clark

Consul General of Jamaica in Costa Rica

COSTA RICA

Mr. Fernando Volio Jimenez

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship

Mr. Ekhart Peters Seevers

Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship

Mr. Alvar Antillon Salazar
Senior Director General of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Worship

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
His Excellency Jose Marcos Iglesias Inigo
Ambassador of the Dominican Republic in
Costa Rica

The opening session was held in San Jose
at 9:30 a.m. and was attended by the Presi-
dent of the Republic of Costa Rica, Luis
Alberto Monge, who delivered the inaugural
address.

In order to have a moderator for the
discussions, the meeting of Ministers
unanimously elected Mr. Fernando Volio
Jimenez, Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Worship of Costa Rica, as Chairman.

The participants agreed on the following
points as the final result of their delibera-
tions:

1. They expressed their conviction that
is the ineludible task of governments that
have been legitimized by the will of the peo-
ple, expressed at the polls, to defend, pro-
mote, and develop a democratic, representa
tive, pluralistic, and participatory system,
and that the time has come to define the coi
ditions that will permit the reestablishment
of a lasting and stable peace in Central
America;

2. They recognized the challenges facinj
the democratic institutions of our countries,
and the unavoidable duty to face them firml

3. They likewise recognized that it is
necessary and desirable to establish organiz
tions to help maintain and improve demo-
cratic institutions;

4. They noted that democratic institu-
tions, in addition to serving as a means of e
pressing the sovereignty of the people, shot
contribute to the strengthening of peace an(
solidarity among peoples and the promotion
of economic development, freedom, and soci
justice;

5. They reaffirmed the fundamental im-
portance of respect for international law an
treaties as the basis of regional cooperation
and security;

6. They stated that the maintenance of
peace and democratic institutions requires
respect for the fundamental values of huma
dignity emanating from the Supreme Being
and the elimination of existing conditions ol
social injustice;

7. They stressed the need for the preve
tion and solution of conflicts between states
to be channeled through the mechanisms fo
peaceful settlement recognized by interna-
tional law, and emphasized that it is the dui
of governments to use such mechanisms am
if necessary, to create special mechanisms t
achieve that end;

8. They noted that the current world
economic crisis produces phenomena such a
disproportionate foreign indebtedness, a
deterioration of the international financial
system, and an increasing imbalance in the
terms of trade among states;

9. They considered that such phenomei
result in unemployment, inflationary trends
serious financial problems, and political,
economic, and social conflicts which are ex-
ploited by totalitarianism for the purpose oi
destabilizing the democratic way of life and
government;

10. They noted the objective enunciatec
this year by the Chiefs of State and Govern
ment on the occasion of the inauguration of
the President of Honduras, Dr. Roberto
Suazo Cordova, on January 27; of the Presi
dent of Costa Rica, Mr. Luis Alberto Monge
on May 8; of the President of Colombia, Dr.
Belisario Betancur, on August 7; of the Pre
dent of the Dominican Republic, Dr. Salvad^
Jorge Blanco, on August 16; and in the Join
Communiques of the Presidents of Costa Ri
and El Salvador of June 17, of the Presiden
of Honduras and El Salvador, of June 10, ai
of the Presidents of Costa Rica and Panama
of September 26, of this same year, and tha
such objectives point to the adoption of

Department of State Bulleti

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

leasures for the achievement of peace,
^ ^mocracy, security, development, freedom,
id social justice.

HEY Therefore Declare:

I: Their faith in and support for the prin-
ples of representative, pluralistic, and par-
cipatory democracy which, when properly
derstood, constitute a way of life, of
linking, and of acting which can accom-
odate within its scope different social and
onomic systems and structures having a
jmmon denominator, which is respect for
Jfe, for the security of the individual, for
eedom of thought, and for freedom of the
ress, as well as the right to work and to
eceive proper remuneration, the right to fair

ng conditions, to the free exercise of suf-
-age, and of other human, civil, political,
conomic, social, and cultural rights.

II. Their concern about the serious
eterioration of the conditions of the present
iternational economic order and interna-
ional financial system, which gives rise to a
irocess of destabilization, anguish, and fear,
ffecting, in particular, those countries that
lave a democratic system of government. In
his regard, they appeal to the industrialized
lemocratic countries to step up their coopera-
ion with the democratic countries of the area
)y implementing bold and effective initiatives
.0 strengthen the recovery and economic and
;ocial development efforts of the various in-
erested countries in the area. As part of this
•ooperation, the initiative of the President of
he United States of America with regard to
he Caribbean Basin is especially urgent and
should be encouraged and fully implemented
IS soon as possible. Likewise, those present
recognize the economic cooperation and
assistance efforts undertaken by the Govern-
ments of the Nassau Group: Canada, Colom-
bia, Mexico, the United States, and
Venezuela.

They support current efforts towards
subregional economic integration, including
the Central American Common Market and
the Caribbean Community and point out the
urgency of updating and improving those in-
tegration processes which are now in trouble
in order to place them in an appropriate
political, economic, juridical, and institutional
framework.

III. Their conviction that, in order to pro-
mote regional peace and stability, it is
necessary to support domestic political
understandings that will lead to the establish-
ment of democratic, pluralistic, and par-
ticipatory systems; to the establishment of
mechanisms for a continuing multilateral
dialogue; to absolute respect for delimited
and demarcated borders, in accordance with
existing treaties, compliance with which is

Summary of the Final Act

In this final act, the democratic states of
the region, for the first time, set forth
the conditions they regard as essential
to achieve peace in Central America.
These conditions include:

• An end to foreign support for ter-
rorist and subversive elements operating
toward the violent overthrow of other
countries;

• An end to arms trafficking;

• A ban on the importation of heavy
weapons and limitations on all arma-
ments and forces to those required for
defense;

• Withdrawal of all foreign military
and security advisers and troops under
fully verifiable and reciprocal conditions;

• Respect for the principle of nonin-
tervention and peaceful solution of
disputes;

• Respect for human rights, in-
cluding fundamental freedoms such as
freedom of speech, assembly, and
religion and the right to organize
political parties, labor unions, and other
organizations; and

• Establishment of democratic, rep-
resentative, and participatory institu-
tions through free and regular elections
in an atmosphere of political reconcilia-
tion within each state.

The final act called on each state of
the region to implement these condi-
tions, which will be presented to other
interested countries as indispensable to
the establishment of a lasting peace. The
final act also established a Forum for
Peace and Democracy to analyze pro-
posals for ending the conflict in Central
America against the overall framework
of these essential conditions and author-
ized the Costa Rican Foreign Minister to
transmit the results of the conference to
other states of the region.

The participating states noted that
legitimately elected democratic govern-
ments have a responsibility to defend
and develop democratic values. One im-
portant step toward the promotion of
democracy in the region is the par-
ticipants' resolve to create a body for
democratic electoral assistance, available
on request to advise countries wishing to
hold democratic elections. ■

the proper way to prevent border disputes
and incidents, observing, whenever ap-
plicable, traditional lines of jurisdiction; to
respect for the independence and territorial
integrity of states; to the rejection of threats
or the use of force to settle conflicts; to a
halt to the arms race; and to the elimination,
on the basis of full and effective reciprocity,
of the external factors which hamper the con-
solidation of a stable and lasting peace.

In order to attain these objectives, it is
essential that every country within and
without the region take the following actions:

a) Create and maintain truly democratic
government institutions, based on the will of
the people as expressed in free and regular
elections, and founded on the principle that
government is responsible to the people
governed;

b) Respect human rights, especially the
right to life and to personal integrity, and the
fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of
speech, freedom of assembly, and religious
freedom, as well as the right to organize
political parties, labor unions, and other
groups and associations;

c) Promote national reconciliation where
there have been deep divisions in society
through the broadening of opportunities for
participation within the framework of
democratic processes and institutions;

d) Respect the principle of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of states,
and the right of peoples to self-determination;

e) Prevent the use of their territories for
the support, supply, training, or command of
terrorist or subversive elements in other
states, end all traffic in arms and supplies,
and refrain from providing any direct or in-
direct assistance to terrorist, subversive, or
other activities aimed at the violent over-
throw of the governments of other states;

f ) Limit arms and the size of military and
security forces to the levels that are strictly
necessary for the maintenance of public order
and national defense;

g) Provide for international surveillance
and supervision of all ports of entry, borders,
and other strategic areas under reciprocal
and fully verifiable arrangements;

h) On the basis of full and effective
reciprocity, withdraw all foreign military and
security advisers and forces from the Central
American area, and ban the importation of
heavy weapons of manifest offensive capabili-
ty through guaranteed means of verification.

The preceding actions represent the
essential framework that must be established
in each State in order to promote regional
peace and stability.

The signing countries call on all the
peoples and governments of the region to em-

December1982

TREATIES

brace and implement these principles and
conditions as the basis for the improvement
of democracy and the building of a lasting
peace.

They note with satisfaction the efforts be-
ing made in that direction, and deem that the
achievement of these objectives may be
reached more fully through the reestablish-
ment of the rule of law and the organization
of election processes that will guarantee full
participation of the people, without any
discrimination whatsoever.

They Resolve

IV. To create a democratic organization to
provide development assistance and advisory
services for elections, the purpose of which
organization will be to maintain the electoral
system and to develop, strengthen, and stim-
ulate its utilization in the inter-American
area, providing advice to countries that re-
quest it about its practice and implementa-
tion. The organization will operate either
autonomously, sponsored by the countries
represented in the meeting and by other in-
terested countries, or as a section or branch
of the Inter-American Institute of Human
Rights, since suffrage is an essential part of
the theory and practice of human rights.

To request the Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs and Worship of Costa Rica, Mr.
Fernando Volio Fernandez, to prepare an ap-
propriate document, containing the comments
of the participants in this meeting and of the
representatives of other democratic countries
and to circulate it among them and imple-
ment it as soon as possible.

V. Lastly, they agree to participate in a
Forum for Peace and Democracy, the pur-
pose of which will be to contribute to the
implementation of the actions and the attain-
ment of the objectives contained in this docu-
ment, and, within the framework of this
declaration, to study the regional crisis and
analyze the various peace proposals or ini-
tiatives aimed at solving it. The Forum may
be broadened by the inclusion of the col-
laboration of other democratic States.

The Forum may entrust specific tasks to
representatives of given participating coun-
tries, who will report on the results; and will
transmit the final act of this meeting, so that
comments and opinions deemed advisable,
may be presented to the Forum.

The representatives requested the
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship of
Costa Rica, on behalf of the participating
governments, to transmit this declaration to
the governments of the region and other in-
terested governments, and to obtain their
views on the principles and conditions for
peace that it contains.

They agreed to convene a new meeting as
soon as possible, in order to evaluate the
development of the objectives of the declara-
tion.

VII. The Plenary Session in this meeting
of Foreign Ministers noted with pleasure the
presence of Panama and the Dominican
Republic as observers.

The representatives expressed their ap-
preciation to the Government of the Republic
of Costa Rica for the courtesies it extended
to them, which made possible the successful
completion of their deliberations.

Signed at San Jose, Republic of Costa
Rica, on October 4, 1982.

For Belize

For El Salvador

For Honduras

For Costa Rica

For Colombia

For the United States of America

For Jamaica

True copy of the original.
Alvar Antillon S.

Director General of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Worship of Costa Rica

For the Dominican Republic

'Read to news correspondents by acting
Department spokesman Alan Romberg.

^The Panamanian observer at this
meeting did not sign the final act. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

International agreement for the creation at
Paris of an International Office for
Epizootics, with annex. Done at Paris
Jan. 25, 1924. Entered into force Jan. 17,
1925; for the U.S. July 29, 1975. TIAS 8141.
Accession deposited: Uganda, Aug. 10, 1982.

Aviation

International air services transit agreement.
Signed at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into
force Feb. 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693, EAS 487.
Acceptance deposited: Panama, Oct. 8, 1982.

Child Abduction

(Convention on the civil aspects of interna-
tional child abduction. Done at The Hague
Oct. 25, 1980'
Approval deposited: France, Sept. 16, 1982.

Commodities

Agreement on the establishment of the Com-
mon Fund for Commodities, with schedules.
Done at Geneva June 27, 1980.'
Ratification deposited: Ireland, Aug. 11,
1982.
Signature: Argentina, Sept. 22, 1982.

Conservation

Convention on the conservation of Antarctic

manne living resources, with annex for an ar

bitral tribunal. Done at Canberra May 20,

1980. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1982. TIAS

10240.

Ratification deposited: France, Sept. 16,

1982.2

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations.
Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the
U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.
Notification of succession deposited: Tuvalu,
Sept. 15, 1982.

Cotton

Articles of agreement of International Cotton
Institute. Done at Washington Jan. 17, 1966.
Entered into force Feb. 23, 1966. TIAS 5964.
Notification of withdrawal deposited: Spain,
Oct. 26, 1982; effective Dec. 31, 1982.

Cultural Relations— UNESCO

Protocol to the agreement on the importation

of education, scientific, and cultural materials

of Nov. 22, 1950 (TIAS 6129). Adopted at

Nairobi Nov. 26, 1976. Entered into force

Jan. 2, 1982.3

Senate advice and consent to ratification:

Sept. 30, 1982.

Ratifications deposited: Luxembourg,

June 22, 1982; U.K., June 9, 1982.^

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations.
Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into
force Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13,
1972. TIAS 7502.

Notification of succession deposited: Tuvalu,
Sept. 15, 1982.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development
formulated at the Bretton Woods Conference
July 1-22, 1944. Entered into force Dec. 27,
1945. TIAS 1502.

Signature and acceptance deposited: St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, Aug. 31, 1982.

Articles of agreement establishing the Asian
Development Bank. Done at Manila Dec. 4,
1965. Entered into force Aug. 22, 1966.
TIAS 6103.

Acceptances deposited: Bhutan, July 28,
1982; Vanuatu, July 28, 1982.

Fisheries

Convention for the conservation of salmon in
the North Atlantic Ocean. Open for signature
at Reykjavik Mar. 2 to Aug. 31, 1982.'
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
Sept. 30, 1982.

Instrument of ratification signed by President:
Oct. 19, 1982.

Department of State Bulletin

TREATIES

nan Rights

rnational covenant on civil and political
Its. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966.
ered into force Mar. 23, 1976.^
ession deposited: Vietnam, Sept. 24,

srnational covenant on economic, social,
'. cultural rights. Adopted at 'Nev/ York

16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3,
6.3
lession deposited: Vietnam, Sept. 24,

!2.

rititne Matters

er-American convention on facilitation of
ernational waterborne transportation, with
lex. Signed at Mar del Plata June 7, 1963.
tered into force Jan. 11, 1981.
tification deposited: Argentina, Sept. 22,
i2.

ernational agreement regarding the
intenance of certain lights in the Red Sea.
ne at London Feb. 20, 1962. Entered into
ce Oct. 28. 1966. TIAS 61.50.
cession deposited: Portugal, Sept. 16,
B2.

nendments to the convention of Mar. 6,

48, as amended, on the International

iritime Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285,

90, 8606, 10374). Adopted at London

>v. 17, 1977.1

:ceptance deposited: Seychelles, July 7,

82.

nendments to the convention of Mar. 6,
48, as amended, on the International
iritime Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285,
90, 8606, 10374). Adopted at London
)v. 15, 1979.1

:eptances deposited: Egypt, Sept. 14,
■82; Seychelles, July 7, 1982.

aclear Weapons — Nonproliferation

eaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear
apons. Done at Washington, London, and

oscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force

ar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.
cession deposited: Uganda, Oct. 20, 1982.

stents — Plant Varieties

iternational convention for the protection of

5W varieties of plants of Dec. 2, 1961, as

■vised. Done at Geneva Oct. 23, 1978.

ntered into force Nov. 8, 1981. TIAS

3199.

cceptance deposited: Japan, Aug. 3, 1982.

honograms

onvention for the protection of producers of

honograms against unauthorized duplication

f their phonograms. Done at Geneva

ct. 29, 1971. Entered into force Apr. 18,

373; for the U.S., Mar, 10, 1974. TIAS

B08.

ccession deposited: Venezuela, Aug. 18,

982.

Postal

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union,
with Final Protocol. Done at Vienna July 10,
1964. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1966. TIAS
5881.

Additional protocol to the Constitution of the
Universal Postal Union. Done at Tokyo
Nov. 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1,
1961. TIAS 7150.

Second additional protocol to the Constitution
of the LIniversal Postal Union. Done at
Lusanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force
Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8231.
Accession deposited: Belize, Aug. 6, 1982.

General regulations of the Universal Postal
Union, with final protocol and annex, and the
universal postal convention with final pro-
tocol and detailed regulations. Done at Rio de
Janeiro Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force
July 1, 1981. TIAS 9972.
Approval deposited: France, Sept. 3, 1982.
Accessions deposited: Belize, Aug. 6, 1982;
Laos, Aug. 23, 1982.

Ratifications deposited: Iraq, Aug. 2, 1982;
Oman, July 29, 1982.

Money orders and postal travelers' checks
agreement, with detailed regulations wdth
final protocol. Done at Rio de Janeiro
Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force July 1,
1981. TIAS 9973.
Approval deposited: France, Sept. 3, 1982.

Property — Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellec-
tual Property Organization. Done at
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force
Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S., Aug. 25, 1970.
TIAS 6932.
Accession deposited: Somalia, Aug. 18, 1982.

Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of
all forms of racial discrimination. Adopted at
New York Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force
Jan. 4, 1969.1
Accession deposited: Vietnam, June 9, 1982.''

Refugees

Convention relating to the status of refugees,
with schedule and annex. Signed at Geneva
July 28, 1951. Entered into force Apr. 22,
1954.3

Protocol relating to the status of refugees.
Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered in-
to force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S., Nov. 1,
1968. TIAS 6577.
Accession deposited: China, Sept. 24, 1982.

Shipping

U.N. convention on the carriage of goods by
sea, 1978. Done at Hamburg Mar. 31, 1978.i.
Ratification deposited: Chile, July 9, 1982.

Telecommunications

Radio regulations, with appendices and final
protocol. Done at Geneva Dec. 6, 1979.

Entered into force Jan. 1, 1982.^
Approvals deposited: Netherlands, July 21,
1982;'* Switzerland, July 9, 1982.

Trade

Agreement on technical barriers to trade.
Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into
force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9616.
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, Aug. 18,
1982.

International dairy arrangement. Done at

Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force

Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9623.

Ratification deposited: Argentina, Oct. 1,

1982.

Agreement on implementation of art. VI of

the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

(antidumping). Done at Geneva Apr. 12,

1979. Entered into force Jan. 1980. TIAS

9650.

Acceptance deposited: Australia, Sept. 21,

1982.

Protocol extending the arrangement regard-
ing international trade in textiles of Dec. 20,
1973, as extended (TIAS 7840, 8939). Done
at Geneva Dec. 22, 1981. Entered into force
Jan. 1, 1982. TIAS 10323.
Acceptances deposited: Bangladesh, Sept. 16,
1982; Czechoslovakia, Sept. 30, 1982;
Guatemala, Oct, 6, 1982; Israel, Sept. 16,
1982.

Agreement on implementation of art. VII of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(customs valuation). Done at Geneva Apr. 12,
1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1981. TIAS
10402.

Protocol to the agreement on implementation

of art. VII of the General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade (custo..ns valuation). Done

at Geneva Nov. 1, 1979. Entered into force

Jan. 1, 1981. TIAS 10402.

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, Aug. 18,

1982.

UNIDO

Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Develop-
ment Organization, with annexes. Adopted at
Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.i
Ratification deposited: Peru, Sept. 13, 1982.

Weapons

Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on
the use of certain conventional weapons
which may be deemed to be excessively in-
jurious or to have indiscriminate effects, with
annexed protocols. Adopted at Geneva Oct.
10, 1980.1

Ratifications and acceptances deposited:
Czechoslovakia, Aug. 31, 1982; U.S.S.R.,
June 10, 1982.

Wills

Convention providing a uniform law on the
form of an international will, with annex.
Done at Washington Oct. 26, 1973. Entered
into force Feb. 9, 1978.^
Accession deposited: Cyprus, Oct. 19, 1982.

ecember 1982

TREATIES

Women

Convention on the elimination of all forms of
discrimination against women. Adopted at
New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force
Sept. 3, 1981.3
Ratification deposited: Peru, Sept. 13, 1982.

BILATERAL

Bahrain

International express mail agreement, with
detailed regulations. Signed at Bahrain and
Washington Apr. 22 and July 28, 1982.
Entered into force Aug. 1, 1982.

Bangladesh

Agreement amending the agreement for sales
of agricultural commodities of Mar. 8, 1982.
Effected by exchange of notes at Dacca
Oct. 14, 1982. Entered into force Oct. 14,
1982.

Bolivia

Agreement amending the agreement for sales
of agricultural commodities of May 31, 1978
(TIAS 9518). Effected by exchange of notes
at La Paz Aug. 14, 1982. Entered into force
Aug. 14, 1982.

Canada

Agreement respecting cooperation in radioac-
tive waste management. Signed at Ottawa
Aug. 25, 1982. Entered into force Aug. 25,
1982.

EURATOM

Agreement for exchange of information con-
cerning a cooperative program in the field of
management of radioactive wastes. Signed at
Brussels Oct. 6, 1982. Entered into force
Oct. 6, 1982.

France

Agreement regarding the nuclear qualifica-
tion of polymer base materials, with appen-
dix. Signed at Bethesda and Fontenay-aux-
Roses Apr. 23 and May 24, 1982. Entered in-
to force May 14, 1982.

Germany, Federal Republic of

Agreement amending and extending the
agreement of Sept. 22, 1976 (TIAS 8457), on
cooperation in the field of biomedical
research and technology. Effected by ex-
change of letters at Washington Aug. 20 and
Sept. 14, 1982. Entered into force Sept. 14,
1982; effective Sept. 22, 1981.

Greece

Agreement amending the agreement of
Aug. 3, 1979 (TIAS 9583, 583), concerning
the grant of defense articles and services
under the military assistance program. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Athens
Aug, 13 and 26, 1982. Entered into force
Aug. 26, 1982.

Haiti

Agreement for the interdiction of narcotics
trafficking. Signed at Port-au-Prince Aug. 28,
1981. Entered into force Aug. 28, 1981.

Agreement amending and extending the
agreement of Aug. 28, 1981, as extended, for
the interdiction of narcotics trafficking. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince
Feb. 18, 1982. Entered into force Feb. 18,
1982.

India

Project loan and grant agreement for
Maharashtra social forestry. Signed at New
Delhi Aug. 31, 1982. Entered into force
Aug. 31, 1982.

Project loan and grant agreement for
Maharashtra irrigation technology and
management. Signed at New Delhi Aug. 31,
1982. Entered into force Aug. 31, 1982.

Japan

Agreement amending and extending the ar-
rangement of Aug. 17, 1979 (TIAS 9564),
concerning trade in cotton, wool, and man-
made fiber textiles, with record of discus-
sions. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington Sept. 1, 1982. Entered into force
Sept. 1, 1982; effective Jan. 1, 1982.

Interim agreement relating to the civil air
transport agreement of Aug. 11, 1952, as
amended (TIAS 2854. 7333, 8882), with
record of consultations, memorandum of un-
derstanding, and exchange of letters relating
to the agreement of Sept. 20, 1980 (TIAS
9861), and other matters. Effected by ex-
change of letters at Washington Sept. 7,
1982. Entered into force Sept. 7, 1982.

Jordan

Agreement amending the agreements of
Aug. 27, 1979, and Aug. 14 and 30, 1980
(TIAS 9597, 9850), concerning the grant of
defense articles and services under the
military assistance program. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Amman Aug. 18 and
Sept. 20, 1982. Entered into force Sept. 20,
1982.

Korea

Memorandum of understanding for coopera-
tion in science and technology. Signed at
Washington and Seoul May 24 and June 23,
1982. Entered into force June 23, 1982; ef-
fective May 24, 1982.

Lebanon

Agreement on U.S. participation in a multina-
tional force in Beirut. Effected by exchange
of notes at Beirut Sept. 25, 1982. Entered in-
to force Sept. 25, 1982.

Maldives

Arrangement relating to a visa system for
exports of cotton, wool, and manmade fiber
apparel products from the Republic of
Maldives. Effected by exchange of letters at
Colombo and Male Dec. 29, 1981, and
Mar. 22, 1982. Entered into force Mar. 22,
1982; effective Oct. 1, 1982.

Mexico

Convention for the recovery and return of
stolen or embezzled vehicles and aircraft.
Signed at Washington Jan. 15, 1981.'

Senate advice and consent to ratification
Sept. 30, 1982.

Instrument of ratification signed by PresK i
Oct. 22. 1982.

Agreement amending the agreement of
Nov. 9, 1982, as amended (TIAS 7697, 9436, f
9647, 10159, 10234), concerning frequency p
modulation broadcasting in the 88 to 108
MHz band. Effected by exchange of notes at "
Mexico and Tlatelolco Aug. 11 and Sept. 8,
1982. Entered into force Sept. 8, 1982.

Agreement amending the agreement of
Apr. 18, 1982, as amended (TIAS 5043, 8185
9641, 9746), relating to the assignment and
use of television channels along the
U.S. -Mexican border. Effected by exchange
of notes at Washington Dec. 22, 1981, and
Aug. 17, 1982. Entered into force Aug. 17,
1982.

Agreement amending the agreement of
Feb. 26, 1979, as amended and extended
(TIAS 9419, 10324), relating to trade in cot-
ton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and
textile products. Effected by exchange of let-
ters at Washington July 26 and Aug. 19,
1982. Entered into force Aug. 19, 1982.

Netherlands

Arrangement for the exchange of technical
information and cooperation in regulatory
and safety research matters, with appendices
and patent addendum. Signed at The Hague
Sept. 15, 1982. Entered into force Sept. 15,
1982.

Panama

Treaty concerning the treatment and protec-
tion of investments, with annex and agreed
minutes. Signed at Washington Oct. 27, 1982
Enters into force 30 days after the date of
exchange of ratifications.

Philippines

Agreement, with memorandum of consulta-
tion, concerning air transport services, with
exchanges of letters. Effected by exchange ol
notes at Washington Sept. 16, 1982. Entered
into force Sept. 16, 1982.
Supersedes interim agreement of Aug. 8 and
10, 1974 (TIAS 7919). Memorandum of
understanding on cooperation in the field of
agricultural science and technologj'. Signed at
Washington Sept. 17, 1982. Entered into
force Sept. 17, 1982.

Portugal

Agreement concerning general security of
military information. Effected by exchange of
notes at Lisbon Aug. 19 and Sept. 10, 1982.
Entered into force Sept. 10, 1982.

Singapore

Agreements amending the agreement of
Aug. 21, 1981, as amended, relating to trade
in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles
and textile products. Effected by exchanges
of letters June 11 and 22, 1982;" July 26 and
Aug. 3. 1982; and Aug. 26 and Sept. 20.
1982. Entered into force June 22, 1982.
Aug. 3, 1982, and Sept. 20, 1982.

Department of State Bulletin

HRONOLOGY

i Lanka

p^ement amending the agreement of
ly 7, 1980, as amended (TIAS 9869, 10168,
387), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and
uimade fiber textiles and textile products.
fected by exchange of letters at Wash-
jton Aug. 20, 1982. Entered into force
ig. 20, 1982.

idan

jreement amending the agreement of
ig. 24 and 30, 1981. concerning the grant
defense articles and services under the
ilitary assistance program. Effected by ex-
lange of notes at Khartoum Aug. 30 and
;pt. 25, 1982. Entered into force Sept. 25,
>82.

hailand

greements amending and extending the
jreement of Oct. 4, 1978, as amended (TIAS
il:\ 9462, 9643, 9717, 9937, 10153, 10368),
'lating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-
lailf fiber textiles and textile products. Ef-
•cti'd by exchanges of letters at Bangkok
ug. 26 and 27, 1982; Sept. 2 and 14, 1982;
ept. 3 and 22, 1982; entered into force
ug. 27, 1982, Sept. 14, 1982, and Sept. 22,

:t82.

nited Kingdom

greement extending the Polaris sales agree-
lent of Apr. 6, 1963 (TIAS 5313), to cover
It' sale of Trident II weapon system. Ef-
'Cted by exchange of notes at Washington
ct. 19, 1982. Entered into force Oct. 19,

:»82.

upersedes amendment of Sept. 30, 1980
:TaS 9879).

'Not in force.
^With declaration(s).
sNot in force for the U.S.
*With declarations and reservations.
^For the Kingdom in Europe and the
letherlands Antnles. ■

October 1982

•etober 1

Vest German parliament ousts Chancellor
lelmut Schmidt. He is replaced by Helmut
Cohl, leader of the conservative Christian
)emocratic Party.

)ctober 2

Secretary Shultz joins other NATO ministers
)ctober 2-3, 1982, at La Sapiniere (a lodge
n Val David, north of Montreal, Canada) to
iiscuss alliance issues.

October 6

J.S. imposes sanctions on two West German
'irms for violating the U.S. embargo against
;he European-Soviet natural gas pipeline.

U.S. -Soviet arms talks resume in Geneva.
Viktor P. Karpov, chief Soviet negotiator
meets with Edward L. Rowny, head of the
U.S. delegation, in their first talks since
August.

October 8

Poland's parliament overwhelmingly approves
banning Solidarity and all other labor unions.

President Reagan meets with Mexican
President-elect Miguel de la Madrid in Ti-
juana, Mexico and Coronado, California.

October 10

In La Paz, Bolivia's Congress re-elects
Hernan Siles Zuazo for president, bringing a
return to civilian government to that country.
Mr. Siles Zuazo was elected in 1980 but was
prevented from taking office by a military
coup.

October U

In Tel Aviv, a three-member commission
opens inquiry into the massacre of Palestin-
ian civilians in Beirut in mid-September.

October 12

Indonesian President Soeharto makes a state
visit to Washington, D.C. October 12-15,
1982, to meet with President Reagan and
other U.S. officials.

Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki
resigns.

October 13

After 4 years in office, Dutch Prime Minister
Andreas van Agt resigns. He is replaced by
former economics minister Ruud Lubbens as
chairman of the Christian Democratic Party.

Citing two 1982 resolutions passed
separately by the Houses of Congress
U.S. U.N. Ambassador Jean J. Kirkpatrick
states that the U.S. would withdraw from the
U.N. General Assembly should Israel's right
to participate be denied. The statement came
after several Arab bloc countries asked and
received permission from the 37th session's
President that the credentials vote be
postponed from October 18 to 25 in hopes of
drumming up support to challenge Israel's
credentials in an effort to suspend that coun-
try from participation in the U.N. body. The
U.S. opposes Israel's suspension for several
reasons:

• It is a violation of the U.N. Charter
and rule of law;

• It undermines the principle of univer-
sality which should characterize the U.N.;
and

• It is incompatible with serious Middle
East peace efforts.

October 15

President Reagan offers to sell the Soviet
Union up to 23 million metric tons of grain
for purchase during October 1, 1982, through
September 30, 1983.

October 16

The second World Food Day, sponsored by
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.N.
Food and Agriculture Organization, and
private voluntary organizations, is observed
by 150 countries.

Responding to the recent proposals at the
U.N. General Assembly and the Plenipoten-
tiary Conference of the International
Telecommunication Union against continued
participation of Israel in those U.N. bodies.
Secretary Shultz issues a statement declaring
that if Israel were.excluded from the General
Assembly or any U.N. body, the United
States would withdraw from participation
and withhold payments from the body until
Israel's right to participate was restored.

October 18

Lebanese President Amin Gemayel makes of-
ficial visit to Washington, D.C, October
18-19, 1982, to hold talks with President
Reagan and other U.S. officials.

Secretary Shultz meets with Norway's
Foreign Minister Svenn Stray to discuss
East- West relations, Middle East develop-
ments, and other international issues of
mutual concern.

By a vote of 13-0 with 2 abstentions
(Poland and the Soviet Union), the U.N.
Security Council passes a resolution to ex-
tend the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL) for a 3-month period.

October 19

Government of Sri Lanka holds presidential
elections. President J.R. Jeyewardene, receiv-
ing 53% of the votes, wins a new 6-year
term.

October 22

By a vote of 119 to 1 (Iran), with 15 absten-
tions, U.N. General Assembly passes a resolu-
tion calling for an immediate cease-fire in the
Iran-Iraq war and withdrawal of forces to in-
ternationally recognized boundaries as the
preliminary step toward settlement of the
dispute by peaceful means. The resolution
also calls upon other states to avoid any ac-
tion which might contribute to the continua-
tion of the conflict.

At President Reagan's invitation, a
delegation of the Arab League visits
Washington, D.C. October 20-22, 1982, to
hold discussions with the President focusing
on prospects for peace in the Middle East in
light of recent initiatives taken by the Presi-
dent and the Arab League summit conference
held in Fez, Morocco. The delegation, headed
by King Hassan II of Morocco, also included
Secretary General Chedli Klibi; Foreign

December 1982

PRESS RELEASES

Ministers M'Hamed Boucetta. Morocco;
Prince Saud Al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia; Ahmed
Taieb Ibrahimi, Algeria; Marwan al-Kasem,
Jordan; Beji Caid es-Sebsi. Tunisia; and
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister
Abdel Halim Khaddam, Syria.

By a vote of 85-31, the plenipotentiary
conference of the ITU adopts an amended
resolution condemnatory of Israel. The
resolution as amended omitted a provision
which would have e.xcluded Israel from fur-
ther participation in ITU meetings. The U.S..
while considering the resolution "objec-
tionable and unbalanced" notes that Israel's
rights in the ITU have not been jeopardized
and will, therefore, continue to participate in
the meetings.

October 24

At the invitation of Allan MacEachen,
Canada's Secretary of State for External Af-
fairs, Secretary Shultz visits Ottawa October
24-25, 1982, to hold discussions covering a
wide range of bilateral and international
issues of mutual concern.

October 25

In response to the Polish Government's ban
of Solidarity, President Reagan, using his
authority under Section 125 (c) of the 1974
Trade Act, signs a proclamation suspending
Poland's most-favored-nation status.

October 28

Spain holds general elections. The Socialist
Party, headed by Felipe Gonzales, wins 201
seats in the 350-seat lower house. ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

No. Date Subject

303 10/1 Shultz: statement before the
U.N. General Assembly,
Sept. 30.

•304 10/1 U.S. OrganiEation for the In-
ternational Telegraph and
Telephone Consultative
Organization (CCITT), study
group A, Oct. 20.

•305 10/1 U.S. Organization for the
International Radio Con-
sultative Committee (CCIR),
study group 7, Oct. 22.

*306 10/5 Thomas C. Maino sworn in as
Ambassador to Botswana
(bio. data).

•307 10/5 George W. Landau sworn in as
Ambassador to Venezuela,
.luly 30 (bio. data).

•308 10/7 Program for the state visit of
Indonesian President
Soeharto, Oct. 12-15.

•310
•311

•312
•313

•317
•318

•320
•321

•323
•324

•327
•328

10/8
10/8

•315 10/18

10/19
10/19

10/19
10/20

•322 10/20

10/21
10/21

•325 10/21

10/21

329

10/25

330

10/25

331

10/25

332

10/25

Shipping Coordinating Com-
mittee (SCC), Subcommittee
on Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS), Nov. 3
CCITT. study group B, Nov. 4.
Advisory Committee on Inter-
national Investment, Tech-
nology, and Development
working group on trans-
border data flows, Nov. 10.

SCC, SOLAS, panel on bulk
cargoes, Nov. 17.

Peter D. Constable sworn in as
Ambassador to Zaire (bio.
data).

David Joseph Fischer sworn in
as Ambassador to Seychelles
(bio. data).

Program for the Official visit
of Lebanese President Amin
Gemayel, Oct. 18-19.

Shultz: remarks at the Confer-
ence on Democratization of
Communist Countries.

U.S., Singapore amend textile
agreement. May 17 and 20.

U.S., Singapore amend textile
agreement. May 17 and
June 14.

U.S., Singapore amend textile
agreement. July 26 and
Aug. 3.

U.S., Thailand amend textile
agreement, Aug. 26 and 27.

James N. Purcell, Jr., appoint-
ed Director, Bureau of
Refugee Programs (bio.
data).

Shultz: remarks at the Amer-
ican Foreign Service As-
sociation annual awards
ceremony, Oct. 19.

Traveler tips publications.

Publications available on travel
abroad.

Advisory Committee on His-
torical Diplomatic Documen-
tation, Nov. 5.

Advisory Committee on Oceans
and International Environ-
mental and Scientific Af-
fairs, Nov. 8 (partially
closed).

SCC, SOLAS, working group
on ship design and equip-
ment, Nov. 9.

Advisory Committee on Oceans
and International Environ-
mental and Scientific Af-
fairs, Antarctic section,
Nov. 16 (partially closed).

CCIR, study groups 10 and 11,
Nov. 15.

CCITT, working party on inte-
grated services dig^ital net-
work and study group D,
Nov. 19.

CCIR, study group 1, Nov. 18.

Overseas Schools Advisory
Council, Dec. 15.

•333 10/25 Conference on Free Election
Nov. 4-6.

•334 10/26 Christian A. Chapman appoi;
ed special Cyprus coor-
dinator (bio. data).

•335 10/27 Shultz: toast, Ottawa, Oct. 2
336 10/27 Shultz: news conference, Ot-
tawa, Oct. 25.

•337 10/27 U.S., Thailand amend textile
agreement, Sept. 3 and 22.,

•338 10/28 Kenneth W. Dam sworn in a»
Deputy Secretary of State,
Sept. 23 (bio. data).

•Not printed in the Bulletin.

U.S.U.N

Press releases may be obtained from the
Public Affairs Office. U.S Mission to the
United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza,
New York, N.Y. 10017.

No. Date Subject

U.S. delegation to the Secon^

Special Session on Disarm;

ment.
Stratton: disarmament, ad h

committee of the Second

Special Session on Disarm;

ment.
Stratton: disarmament, ad h

committee of the Second

Special Session on Disarm;

ment.
Stratton: disarmament, ad h

committee in the Second

Special Session on Disarms

ment.
Sorzano: U.N. system,

ECOSOC.
Liehenstein: information, Co

mittee on Information.
Feulner: disarmament, Secoi

Special Session on Disarm;

ment.
Sherman: Iran-Iraq war. Sec

rity Council.
Dewey: donors' conference o

Kampuchean relief.
Kirkpatrick: Lebanon, Secur

Council.
Gershman: Lebanon, Securit

Council.
Liehenstein: Lebanon, Secur

Council.
Liehenstein: question of Pale

tine, seventh emergency

special session.
Dewey: donors' conference o

Kampuchean relief.
Situation in west Beirut.
Sorzano: global negotiations.

General Assembly.

'50

6/28

6/29

6/30

7/8

7/9

7/10

7/12

7/26

7/29

8/4

8/6

8/12

8/19

•64 9/16

•65 9/18
•66 9/20

Department of State Bullet I

PUBLICATIONS

9/22 Kirkpatrick: Puerto Rico, gen-
eral committee.

9/24 Padilla: Puerto Rico, General
Assembly (in Spanish).

9/24 U.S. delegation to the 37th
session of the General
Assembly.

9/24 Lichenstein: question of Pales-
tine, seventh emergency
special session.

9/30 Shultz: address before the

37th session of the General
Assembly.

10/1 Kirkpatrick: South African
ANC members. General
Assembly.

10/1 Western contact group com-
munique.

10/7 Johnston: Vietnam, General
Assembly.

10/8 Johnston: assessments, Com-
mittee V.

10/8 Gershman: racial discrimina-
tion, Committee III.

10/8 Adelman: arms shipments,
General Assembly.

10/11 Padilla: propaganda. General
Assembly.

10/13 Goodman: economic sanctions,
Committee II.

10/14 Lodge: Afghanistan, General
Assembly.

10/15 Schwab: protection of diplo-
matic missions and repre-
sentatives, Committee IV.

10/15 Papendorp: contributions.
Committee V.

10/15 Gershman: self-determination.
Committee III.

10/15 Gershman: Puerto Rico, Com-
mittee III.

10/15 Adelman: Nicaragua, General
Assembly.

10/15 Adelman: Central America,
General Assembly.

10/18 Sorzano: World Food Day,
ECOSOC.

10/20 Phillips: International Year of
Youth, Committee III.

10/20 Lodge: Poland, Committee I.

10/21 McDonald: World Assembly on
Aging, Committee III.

10/21 Luce: apartheid. General As-
sembly.

10/25 Kirkpatrick: Kampuchea cre-
dentials. General Assembly.

10/25 Plattner: international cooper-
ation, ECOSOC.

10/25 Sherman: foreign economic
activities. Committee IV.

10/27 Rostow: arms control.
Committee I.

10/27 Sherman: Kampuchea, General
Assembly.

10/27 Gershman: racial discrimina-
tion. Committee III.

10/28 Lodge: arms control, Commit-
tee I.

[Not issued.]

10/29 Sorzano: economy. Commit-
tee II.

•101 10/29 Lichenstein: information.

Special Political Committee.

•102 10/29 Schwab: settlement of dis-
putes /strengthening the
U.N., Committee VI.

•103 10/29 Barthelemy: Soviet military
buildup, Committee I.

•Not printed in the Bulletin.

Department of State

Free, single copies of the following Depart-
ment of State publications are available from
the Public Information Service, Bureau of
Public Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Africa

Background Notes on Kenya (Oct. 1982).

Arms Control

Nuclear Arms Control and the Future of
U.S.-Soviet Relations, ACDA Director
Rostow, Los Angeles World Affairs Coun-
cil, Sept. 10, 1982 (Current Policy #425).

Arms Control: MBFR Talks (GIST, Oct.
1982).

Energy

U.S. Energy Strategies, Deputy Assistant for
Economic and Business Affairs Wendt, Ox-
ford Energy Seminar, Oxford, England,
Sept. 9, 1982 (Current Policy #423).

Siberian Gas Pipeline and U.S. Export
Controls (GIST, Oct. 1982).

Europe

Madrid CSCE Negotiations, 1980-81,
September 1982 (Selected Documents #20).

Human Rights

Personal Liberties and National Security,
National Security Adviser to the President
Clark, American Bar Asso., San Francisco,
Aug. 6, 1982 (Current Policy #421).

Refugees

African Refugees (GIST, Oct. 1982).

Western Hemisphere

Areas of Challenge in the Americas, Assist-
ant Secretary Enders, Inter-American
Press Asso., Chicago, Sept. 30, (Current
Policy #424).

Background Notes on Peru (Sept. 1982). ■

GPO Sales

Publications may be ordered by catalog or
stock number from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20J,02. A 25% discount is
made on orders for 100 or more copies of any
one publication mailed to the same address.
Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of
Documents, must accompany orders. Prices
shown below, which include domestic postage,
are subject to change.

Agriculture Commodities. Agreement with
Sudan. TIAS 10075. 6 pp. $1.75. (Cat.
No. 89.10:10075.)

International Military Education and Train-
ing (IMET). Agreement with St. Vincent
and the Grenadines. TIAS 10076. 5 pp.
$1.75. (Cat. No. 89.10:10076.)

Fisheries off the Coasts of the United
States. Agreement with Norway. TIAS

10077. 38 pp. $2.75. (Cat. No.
89.10:10077).

Patents— Deposit of Microorganisms. Agree-
ment with Other Governments. TIAS

10078. 11 pp. $2. (Cat. No. 89.10:10078.)
International Tin Agreement, 1975. Agree-
ment with Other Governments. TIAS

10079. 2 pp. $1.50. (Cat. No.
89.10:10079.)

Atomic Energy— Retransfer of Nuclear
Power Light Water Reactor Tech-
nology. Agreement with France. TIAS

10080. 15 pp. $2.25. (Cat. No.
89.10:10080.)

International Military Education and Train-
ing (IMET). Agreement with St. Lucia.
TIAS 10081. 7 pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.
89.10:10081.)

Narcotic Drugs— Illicit Crop Detection
System. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS
10082. 5 pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.
89.10:10082.)

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with
Egypt. TIAS 10083. 3 pp. $1.75. (Cat.
No. 89.10:10083.)

Defense — Hickam Air Force Base. Memo-
randum of Understanding with the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland. TIAS 10084. 12 pp. $2.
(Cat. No. 89.10:10084.)

Aviation— Air Transport Services. Agree-
ment with the Socialist Republic of
Romania, TIAS 10085. 7 pp. $1.75. (Cat.
No. 89.10:10085.)

Atomic Energy— Research Participation
and Technical Exchange in Loss of
Fluid Test (LOFT) Program. Agreement
with Other Governments. TIAS 10086.
3 pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. 89.10:10086.)

Commerce— Embassy Branch Offices.
Agreement with the German Democratic
Republic. TIAS 10087. 8 pp. $1.75. (Cat.
No. 89.10:10087.)

December 1982

PUBLICATIONS

Space Cooperation — Vehicle Tracking and
Communication Facility. Agreement
with Senegal, TIAS 10088. 5 pp. $1.75.
(Cat. No. 89.10:10088.)

Agricultural Commodities. Agreements with
Egypt. TIAS 10089. 17 pp. $2.25. (Cat.
No. 89.10:10089.)

Trade in Textiles and Textile Products.
Agreement with Haiti. TIAS 10090. 6 pp.
$1.75. (Cat. No. 89.10:10090.)

Finance— Consolidation and Rescheduling
of Certain Debts. Implementing Agree-
ment with Turkey. TIAS 10091. 18 pp.
$2.25. (Cat. No. 89.10:10091. )'

Peace Corps. Agreement with Montserrat.
TIAS 10092. 5 pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.
89.10:10092.)

Peace Corps. Agreement with the Cook
Islands. TIAS 10093. 13 pp. $2. (Cat. No.
89.10:10093.)

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with
Morocco. TIAS 10094. 6 pp. $1.75. (Cat.
No. 89.10:10094.)

Scientific Cooperation— Earth Resources.
Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 10095.
7 pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. 89.10:10095.)

Atomic Energy— Application of Safeguards
by the IAEA to the United States-Vene-
zuela Cooperation Agreement. Protocol
with Venezuela and the International
Atomic Energy Agency. TIAS 10096.
5 pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. 89.10:10096.)

Atomic Energy — Continuation of Safe-
guards and Guarantee Provisions of the
Agreement of October 8, 1958, as
Amended. Agreement with Venezuela.
TIAS 10097. 5 pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.
89.10:10097.)

Maritime Transport. Agreement with the
People's Republic of Bulgaria. TIAS
10098. 17 pp. $2.25. (Cat. No.
89.10:10098.)

Atomic Energy— Technical Exchange and
Cooperative Arrangement in Nuclear
Safety Research and Development.
Agreement with Sweden. TIAS 10099.
9 pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. 89.10:10099.)

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with
Mozambique. TIAS 10100. 22 pp. $2.25.
(Cat. No. 89.10:10100.)

Trade in Textiles and Textile Products.
Agreement with Malaysia. TIAS 10101.
18 pp. $2.25. (Cat No. 89.10:10101.)

Aviation— Search and Rescue. Memoran-
dum of Understanding with Papua New
Guinea. TIAS 10102. 3 pp. $1.75. (Cat.
No. 89.10:100102.)

Agricultural Trade and Cooperation. Joint
Statement with the Hungarian People's
Republic. TIAS 10103. 9 pp. $1.75. (Cat.
No. 89.10:10103.)

Technical Cooperation— Tax Administra-
tion and Training. Agreement with
Saudi Arabia. TIAS 10104. 12 pp. $2.
(Cat. No. 89.10:10104.)

Atomic Energy— Reprocessing of Special
Nuclear Material. Agreements with
Japan. TIAS 10105. 10 pp. $1.75. (Cat.
No. 89.10:10105.)

Narcotic Drugs— Additional Cooperative
Arrangements to Curb Illegal Traffic.
Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 10106.
5 pp. $2. (Cat. No. 89.10:10106.)

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with
Portugal. TIAS 10107. 25 pp. $2.50. (Cat.
No. 89.10:10107.)

Finance — Consolidation and Rescheduling
of Certain Debts. Agreement with Zaire.
TIAS 10108. 15 pp. $2.25. (Cat. No.
89.10:10108.)

Defense— Security of Military Information.
Agreement with Denmark. TIAS 10109.
8 pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. 89.10:10109.)

Privileges and Immunities. Agreement with
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
TIAS 10110. 5 pp. $1.75. (Cat. No.
89.10:10110.)

North America Aerospace Defense Com-
mand (NORAD). Agreements with
Canada. TIAS 10111. 24 pp. $2.50. (Cat.
No. 89.10:10111.)

Defense— Use of RAAF Base Darwin.
Agreement with Australia. TIAS 10112.
5 pp. $2. (Cat. No. 89.10:10112.)

Postal— Express Mail Service. Agreement, '

with detailed regulations, with France. |

TIAS 10113. 47 pp. $2.75. (Cat. No.

89.10:10113.)
Postal— Express Mail Service. Agreemtui,

with detailed regulations, with Kuwait.

TIAS 10114. 25 pp. $2.50. (Cat. No.

89.10:10114.)
Aviation— Reduced Fares and Charter

Services. Agreement with Mexico. TIA,^

10115. 10 pp. $2.25. (Cat. No.

89.10:10115.)
Scientific and Technical Cooperation. Memc

randum of Understanding with Pakistan.

TIAS 10116. 4 pp. $2. (Cat. No.

89.10:10116.)
Trade in Textiles and Textile Products.

Agreement with Hong Kong. TIAS

10117. 5 pp. $2. (Cat. No. 89.10:10117.)
Environmental Protection. Memorandum o)

Understanding with the Netherlands.

TIAS 10118. 4 pp. $2. (Cat. No.

89.10:10118.)
Telecommunication — Radio Communica-
tions Between Amateur Stations on

Behalf of Third Parties. Agreement

with The Gambia. TIAS 10119. 4 pp. $2.

(Cat. No. 89.10:10119.)
Territory Status— Quita Sueno, Roncador

and Serrana. Treaty with Colombia.

TIAS 10120. 28 pp. $2.50. (Cat. No.

89.10:10120.)
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Protocol with Other Governments. TIAS

10121. 28 pp. $2.50. (Cat. No.
89.10:10121.)

Aviation— Provision of Services. Memoran
dum of Agreement with Uruguay. TIAS

10122. 6 pp. $2. (Cat. No. 89.10:10122.)
Trade in Textiles and Textile Products.

Agreement with the Polish People's
Republic. TIAS 10123. 29 pp. $3.50. (Ca
No. 89.10:10123.)
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement wit!
Jamaica. TIAS 10124. 7 pp. $2.25. (Cat.
No. 89.10:10124.) ■

Department of State Bulletir

^DEX

3(cember 1982
Hume 82, No. 2069

Uianistan. Chemical Warfare in Southeast
f\<ia and Afghanistan: An Update
Shultz) 44

lica. U.S. Response to the Challenge of
Regional Security in Africa (Crocker) . .22

fiiculture. Grain Exports to the Soviet
I'ninn (Reagan) 12

r'rican Principles. Secretary Shultz Opens
('(.nfrrence on Free Elections 15

ns (dntrol

r ■yiuv: Chances for Peace (Buckley) 26

loar Weapons: What is the Moral
Rrs|Hinse? (Abrams) 38

SIS Toward Peace: Deterrence and Arms
Control (Reagan, letter to the Congress) 1

ridfiit Reagan's Framework for Peace
(Clark) .- -^

a. ( 'hemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and
.Muhanistan: An Update (Shultz) 44

i ada. Secretary Shultz Visits Canada ... 13

Ina. Secretary Interviewed for U.S. News &
World Report 19

tigress

tmic.al Warfare in Southeast Asia and
AlVhanistan: An Update (Shultz) 44

; IS Toward Peace: Deterrence and Arms
( ■ontrol (Reagan, letter to the Congress) 1

i|iosod Refugee Admissions for FY 1983
(Ham Douglas, President's memoran-
dum) 56

V I'owers Resolution and U.S. Troops in
l.cliaiion (message to the Congress) ... .42
la. Secretary Shultz "Visits Canada 13

, momics
I. Ml ions Among Neighbors (Shultz) ... .64

iiritary Interviewed for U.S. News & World

i:r,,.:,i 19

, icl.irv Shultz Visits Canada 13

,,d;uity and U.S. Relations With Poland
(Reagan) -H

Salvador. System of Justice in El Salvador
(Hinton) 68

)d. World Food Day, 1982 (proclamation) 32

man Rights

laration on Democracy in Central America
(Department statement, final act, sum-
mary of final act) 69

clear Weapons: What is the Moral
Response? (Abrams) 38

■sonal Liberties and National Security

(Clark) 35

retary Shultz Opens Conference on Free
Elections 15

item of Justice in El Salvador (Hinton) . . 68

lonesia. Visit of Indonesian President
Soeharto (arrival ceremony, dinner

ael. Israel's Participation in the United
Nations (Shultz) 63

Latin America and the Caribbean

Declaration on Democracy in Central America
(Department statement, final act, sum-
mary of final act) 69

President Reagan's Framework for Peace

(Clark) 3.3

Reflections Among Neighbors (Shultz) .... 64
Lebanon

Secretary Shultz Visits Canada 13

Visit of Lebanese President (Gemayel,

Reagan) 41

War Powers Resolution and U.S. Troops in

Lebanon (message to the Congress) .... 42

Mexico. President Reagan Meets With

Mexico's President-Elect (exchange of

toasts, remarks) 9

Middle East

Arab League Delegation Meets With the

President (Hassan, Reagan) 43

President Reagan's Framework for Peace

(Clark) 33

Secretary Interviewed for U.S. News & World

Report 19

Secretary Shultz Visits Canada 13

Military' Affairs

Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and

Afghanistan: An Update (Shultz) 44

Paths Toward Peace: Deterrence and Arms

Control (Reagan, letter to the Congress) 1

President Reagan's Framework for Peace

(Clark) 33

War Powers Resolution and U.S. Troops in

Lebanon (message to the Congress) 42

Morocco. Arab League Delegation Meets With

the President (Hassan, Reagan) 43

Organization of American States. Reflec-
tions Among Neighbors (Shultz) 64

Poland

Situation in Poland (White House state-
ment) 31

Solidarity and U.S. Relations With Poland

(Reagan) 1 1

Population. Population Growth and the Policy

of Nations (Benedick) 53

Presidential Documents
Grain Exports to the Soviet Union (Reagan) 12
Paths Toward Peace: Deterrence and Arms
Control (Reagan, letter to the Congress) 1
President Reagan Meets With Mexico's Presi-
dent-Elect (exchange of toasts, re-
marks) 9

Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY 1983
(Dam, Douglas, President's memoran-
dum) • • 56

Solidarity and U.S. Relations With Poland

(Reagan) H

Visit of Indonesian President Soeharto (arrival

ceremony, dinner toasts) 29

Visit of Lebanese President (Gemayel,

Reagan) 41

War Powers Resolution and U.S. Troops in

Lebanon (message to the Congress) 42

World Food Day, 1982 (proclamation) 32

Publications

Department of State 77

GPO Sales 77

Refugees. Proposed Refugee Admissions for
FY 1983 (Dam, Douglas, President's mem-
orandum) 56

Trade. Grain Exports to the Soviet Union
(Reagan) 12

Treaties. Current Actions 72

U.S.S.R.

Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and
Afghanistan: An Update (Shultz) 44

Freezing Chances for Peace (Buckley) 26

Grain Exports to the Soviet Union (Reagan) 12

President Reagan's Framework for Peace
(Clark) 33

Paths Toward Peace: Deterrence and Arms
Control (Reagan, letter to the Congress) 1

Secretary Interviewed for U.S. News& World
Report 19

United Nations

Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and
Afghanistan: An Update (Shultz) .44

Israel's Participation in the United Nations
(Shultz) 63

Name Index

Abrams, Elliott 38

Benedick, Richard Elliot 53

Buckley, James L 26

Clark, William P 33, 35

Crocker, Chester A 22

Dam, Kenneth W 56

de la Madrid, Miguel 9

Douglas, H. Eugene 56

Gemayel, Amin 41

King Hassan II 43

Hinton, Deane R 68

Reagan, President . 1, 9, 11, 12, 29, 32, 41, 42,
43, 56

Shultz, Secretary 13, 15, 19, 44, 63, 64

Soeharto, President 29

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IDEX

:3cember 1982
k^Dlume 82, No. 2069

t^hanistan. Chemical Warfare in Southeast

Asia and Afghanistan: An Update

(Shultz) 44

V'ica. U.S. Response to the Challenge of

Regional Security in Africa (Crocker) . . 22
kriculture. Grain" Exports to the Soviet

Union (Re;igan) A' ■ ^^

V erican Principles. Secretary Shultz Opens

Cotit'erence on Free Elections 15

ns Control

,'7iim Chances for Peace (Buckley) 26

:lear Weapons: What is the Moral

Response? (Abrams) ■ . 38

'hs Toward Peace: Deterrence and Arms

Control (Reagan, letter to the Congress) 1
'■sident Reagan's Framework for Peace

(Clark) .•••33

i a. Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and

Afghanistan: An Update (Shultz) 44

Jiada. Secretary Shultz Visits Canada ... 13
Cina. Secretary Interviewed for U.S. News &

Wi'Hd Report 19

ingress

J'mical Warfare in Southeast Asia and

" Afghanistan: An Update (Shultz) 44

P;hs Toward Peace: Deterrence and Arms

Control (Reagan, letter to the Congress) 1
Piposed Refugee Admissions for FY 1983

(Dam, Douglas, President's memoran-
dum) 56

Vir Powers Resolution and U.S. Troops in

Lebanon (message to the Congress) .... 42

Cba. Secretary Shultz Visits Canada 13

Bonomics

Fflt'ctions Among Neighbors (Shultz) 64

.-■rotary Interviewed for U.S. News & World

i;,l„:rt 19

I", lary Shultz Visits Canada 13

■lidarity and U.S. Relations With Poland

(Reagan) H

I Salvador. System of Justice in El Salvador

(Hinton) 68

tod. World Food Day, 1982 (proclamation) 32

hman Rights

Iclaration on Democracy in Central America

(Department statement, final act, sum-
mary of final act) 69

hclear Weapons: What is the Moral

Ri'sponse? (Abrams) 38

u-soiial Liberties and National Security
((l.^irk) 35

> i-riary Shultz Opens Conference on Free

l.l.'ctions 15

, -inii of Justice in El Salvador (Hinton) . .68

Idonesia. Visit of Indonesian President

Soeharto (arrival ceremony, dinner

toasts) 29

Irael. Israel's Participation in the United
Nations (Shultz) 63

Latin America and the Caribbean

Declaration on Democracy in Central America
(Department statement, final act, sum-
mary of final act) 69

President Reagan's Framework for Peace

(Clark) 33

Reflections Among Neighbors (Shultz) .... 64
Lebanon

Secretary Shultz Visits Canada 13

Visit of Lebanese President (Gemayel,

Reagan) 41

War Powers Resolution and U.S. Troops in

Lebanon (message to the Congress) .... 42

Mexico. President Reagan Meets With

Mexico's President-Elect (exchange of

toasts, remarks) 9

Middle East

Arab League Delegation Meets With the

President (Hassan, Reagan) 43

President Reagan's Framework for Peace

(Clark) 33

Secretary Interviewed for U.S. News & World

Report 19

Secretary Shultz Visits Canada 13

Military Affairs

Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and

Afghanistan: An Update (Shultz) 44

Paths Toward Peace: Deterrence and Arms

Control (Reagan, letter to the Congress) 1

President Reagan's Framework for Peace

(Clark) 33

War Powers Resolution and U.S. Troops in

Lebanon (message to the Congress) .... 42

Morocco. Arab League Delegation Meets With

the President (Hassan, Reagan) 43

Organization of American States. Reflec-
tions Among Neighbors (Shultz) 64

Poland

Situation in Poland (White House state-
ment) 31

Solidarity and U.S. Relations With Poland

(Reagan) H

Population. Population Growth and the Policy

of Nations (Benedick) 53

Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY 1983
(Dam, Douglas, President's memoran-
dum) 56

Solidarity and U.S. Relations With Poland

(Reagan) H

Visit of Indonesian President Soeharto (arrival

ceremony, dinner toasts) 29

Visit of Lebanese President (Gemayel,

Reagan) 4-^

War Powers Resolution and U.S. Troops in

Lebanon (message to the Congress) 42

World Food Day, 1982 (proclamation) 32

Publications

Department of SUite 77

GPO Sales 77

Refugees. Proposed Refugee Admissions for
FY 1983 (Dam, Douglas, President's mem-
orandum) 56

Trade. (Jrain Exports to the Soviet Union
(Reagan) 12

Treaties. Current Actions 72

U.S.S.R.

Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and
Afghanistan: An Update (Shultz) 44

Freezing Chances for Peace (Buckley) 26

Grain Exports to the Soviet Union (Reagan) 12

President Reagan's Framework for Peace
(Clark) 33

Paths Toward Peace: Deterrence and Arms
Control (Reagan, letter to the Congress) 1

Secretary Interviewed for U.S. News & World
Report 19

United Nations

Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and
Aighanistan: An Update (Shultz) 44

Israel's Participation in the United Nations
(Shultz) 63

Name Index

Abrams, Elliott 38

Benedick, Richard Elliot 53

Buckley, James L 26

Clark, William P 33, 35

Crocker, Chester A 22

Dam, Kenneth W 56

de la Madrid, Miguel 9

Douglas, H. Eugene 56

Gemayel, Amin 41

King Hassan II 43

Hinton, Deane R 68

Reagan, President . 1, 9, 11, 12, 29, 32, 41, 42,
43, 56

Shultz, Secretary 13, 15, 19, 44, 63, 64

Soeharto, President 29

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U.S. Governnnent Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

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.3'

Ih'iMirtnu'iH
of Sliiiv

WD,

etm

jne Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Vol. 82 / Nos. 2058-2069

Index 1982

Organization of
American States

The Netherlands

Lebanon

Korea

Econonnic Sunnmit

Department of State

bulletin

Volume 82 / Nos. 2058-2069 / Index 1982

The Department of State Bulletin,
published by the Office of PubHc
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and government
agencies with information on developments
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of
the Department of State and the Foreign
Service.

The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials; selected
press releases issued by the White House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to
the United Nations; and treaties and other
agreements to which the United States is
or may become a party. Special features,
articles, and other supportive material
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and
graphs) are published frequently to provide
additional information on current issues
but should not necessarily be interpreted
as official U.S. policy statements.

ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
GEORGE P. SHULTZ

Secrettiries of State

DEAN FISCHER

JOHN HUGHES

Assistant Secretaries for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD

Director,

Office of Public Communication

NORMAN HOWARD

Chiel'. Kditorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG

Editor

JUANITA ADAMS

Assistant Editor

The Secretary of State has determined that the
publication of this periodical is necessary in the
transaction of the public business required by law of
this Department. Use of funds for printing this
periodical has been approved by the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget through March .31.
1987.

NOTE; Contents of this publication are not copy-
righted and items contained herein may be reprinted.
Citation of the Department of State Bulletin as the
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.l
Government Printing Office. Washington, D.C.
20402

INDEX: Vol. 82, Nos. 2058-206!

MAY I 9 1983

DEPQ.qtTnqY

.)rams, Elliott, Apr. 68, 69, Sept. 41, 43,

Dec. 38
Assistant Secretary of State for Human
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs,
swearing in, PR 211, 7/1
j;heson. Dean: June 40 (quoted); Keefer,

Aug. 48; Sanford, June 21
.i;id rain. See Environmental problems and

control: Transboundary air pollution
Jams. Abigail, May 7 (quoted)
Jams, John: Reagan, May 25; Wells,

May 2, 6
.iams, John Quiney: (quoted), Nov. 9; Wells,

May 6
.ielman, Kenneth, Jan. 60
.fghanistan:

History, summary, profile. Mar. 13
Pakistan, relations. Mar. 7
Political settlement, need for, Apr. 86
Political situation (Van Hollen), Mar. 22
Soviet occupation and need for withdrawal:
Feb. 13, Mar. 2, Apr. 75: Adelman,
Jan. 62; General Assembly resolution,
Jan. 59; Haig, Apr. 34, 40, 41, Aug. 65;
Kirkpatrick, Jan. 57; NAC, Aug. 67, 69;
Reagan, Mar. 17, June 35, July 33;
Shultz, Nov. 2; Stoessel, Apr. 85; Van
Hollen, Mar. 19; Veliotes, July 73
Soviet use of chemical weapons. See Chemi-
cal and antipersonnel weapons, reports
of use
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 89,

June 90, Nov. 66
U.S. relations, summary. Mar. 1
Afghanistan Day," 1981: Feb. 13; Haig,

Apr. 34, PR 80, 3/1; Stoessel, Apr. 85
.frica {see also under Refugees and names of

individual countries):
Japanese interests (Holdridge), Apr. 58
Nonaligned movement: Crocker, Jan. 25;

NATO, July 10
Southern, Soviet anti-U.S. propaganda,

Oct. 44
' Soviet and Cuban presence {see also
Angola): Crocker, Jan. 26, June 46,
Dec. 23; Department, Feb. 69; Haig,
Jan. 17, Apr. 44; Reagan, June 34, 35
U.S. economic and security assistance:
' Buckley, July 79; Crocker, Jan. 25, July
61, Nov. 13; Lyman, Jan. 28;
Wolfowitz, Sept. 36
U.S. interests, policy, role: Crocker,
Jan. 23, Feb. 27, June 46, Nov. 12,
Dec. 22; Haig, PR 14, 1/11, PR 75,
2/23; Reagan, Oct. 14
U.S. Investment and Trade Commission

(Haig), PR 14, 1/11
Western Sahara: Aug. 70; Crocker, July 61;

Haig, Mar. 29, Apr. 34, 46
African Development Fund, Agreement

(1972), accession, Austria, Mar. 67
igency for International Development (AID),
representation overseas, Aug. center sec-
tion

Agriculture {see also Wheat):
Agricultural commodities, sales of. bilateral
agreements: Bangladesh, May 79, Sept.
80, Nov. 67, Dec. 74; Bolivia, Dec. 74;
Costa Rica, June 91, Oct. 91; Domini-
can Republic, Aug. 79, Nov. 67; Egypt,
Mar. 69, Apr. 92, Aug. 79; El Salvador,
July 92, Oct. 91; Ghana, Nov. 67;
Guinea, Aug. 79; Haiti, Nov. 67; Hon-
duras, Sept. 80; Indonesia, Jamaica,
Liberia, July 92; Madagascar, Nov. 67;
Mauritius, June 91, Sept. 81; Morocco,
Apr. 92, Nov. 67; Pakistan, Peru, July
92; Sierra Leone, Oct. 91; Somalia, Sri
Lanka, Sept. 81; Sudan, June 92; Tan-
zania, Tunisia, Aug. 80; Zaire, July 93;
Oct. 92; Zambia, Sept. 81, Oct. 92
Agricultural science and technology, coop-
eration, bilateral agreements with
France, Federal Republic of Germany,
June 91; Philippines, Dec. 74
Caribbean Basin. See Latin America:

Caribbean Basin Development Plan
Foot-and-mouth disease, bilateral agree-
ments with Colombia (1979), Jan. 91;
(1973, 1974 agreements, termination),
Jan. 91
Import grant and loan for agricultural
commodities and equipment, bilateral
agreement with Pakistan, July 92
Inter- American Institute for Cooperation in
Agriculture, convention (1979):
Dominica, Mar. 67; Dominican Republic,
May 77; St. Lucia, Suriname, Mar. 67
International Fund for Agricultural Devel-
opment (1976 agreement): Ivory Coast,
Apr. 90; Tonga, Aug. 77
International Office for Epizootics, inter-
national agreement (1924): Libya, July
91; Uganda, Dec. 72
International plant protection convention
(1951), revised text (1979), acceptance,
U.S., Sept. 79
Maharastra social forestry and irrigation
technology and management, project
loan and bilateral agreements with In-
dia, Dec. 74
Mediterranean fruit fly eradication,

cooperation, bilateral agreements with:
Guatemala, Feb. 83; Mexico, Feb. 83,
84
Plant pest damage and plant diseases, crop
protection, bilateral agreement with
Peru, Mar. 69
U.S. agricultural export policy (Reagan),

Dec. 12
U.S.-EC policies, differences: Haig, PR 33,
1/27, PR 76, 2/23; Hormats, Mar. 37,
43
Ahidjo, Ahmadou, Oct. 14
Albrecht, Anthony C, May 47, Oct. 32
Algeria, treaties, agreements, etc.. May 77,

June 90
Ali, Kamal Hassan, remarks, PR 19, 1/19,

PR 20, 1/18, PR 35, 2/2, PR 36, 2/3
American ideals: Abrams, Dec. 38; Haig,
June 43; Pope John Paul II, July 22;
Reagan, July 28, 39; Shultz, Nov. 6

Anderson, David, Ambassador to Yugoslavia,

swearing in, PR 217, 7/14
Anderson, Robert, Ambassador to Dominican

Republic, swearing in, PR 199, 6/16
Anderson, Stanton D., Jan. 63
Angola: Crocker, Jan. 26, June 46, Dec. 24;
Department, Mar. 34; Haig, Jan. 17 Apr
44, 45, PR 80, 3/1, PR 99, 3/17; Reagan,
June 35
UNIDO constitution (1979), signature,

Nov. 66
U.S. economic assistance, FY 83 request,

July 62
U.S. recognition, question of (Haig),
Apr. 45
Anguilla, service abroad of judicial and extra-
judicial documents in civil or commercial
matters, convention extended to, Nov.
65-66
Antarctic Treaty (1959), Spain, accession,
July 91
Principles and objectives, recommendations
for furtherance (1977): Argentina, Feb.
82; Norway, Aug. 77
Principles and objectives, recommendations
for furtherance (1979): Norway, Aug.
77
Principles and objectives, recommendations
for furtherance (1981): Apr. 90;
Australia, July 91; Belgium, Sept. 79;
New Zealand, Norway, Aug. 77
Antarctica:
Antarctic marine living resources, conven-
tion (1980): Argentina, Aug. 77; Euro-
pean Economic Community, July 91;
France, Dec. 72; German Democratic
Republic, June 90; Federal Republic of
Germany, July 91; New Zealand, May
77; U.S., Feb. 82, Apr. 90, May 77,
June 50
LT.S. Antarctic program (White House),
June 49
Antigua, Voice of America program, bilat-
eral agreement, Jan. 90
Antigua and Barbuda, treaties, agreements,
etc., Jan. 89, Feb. 82, Mar. 68, Apr. 92,
May 77, June 90, Aug. 79, Oct. 91, Nov.
66
ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, U.S.):
Bush, Aug. 43, 44; Stoessel, Aug. 57
Origins of Treaty and Council: Holdridge,

Oct. 31; Keefer, Aug. 46

31st meeting (Holdridge), Oct. 31

Arab-Israeli conflict {see also Lebanon):

Enders, Oct. 74; Haig, July 44;

Mitterrand, May 56

Arab League delegation, U.S. visit:

Dec. 43; Shultz, Dec. 16
Arab position: Mubarak (quoted), Oct. 8, 9;
Reagan, Sept. 24; Shultz, Sept. 13, Oct.
2-3; Veliotes, June 66
Autonomy talks:
Camp David process: Jan. 47; Draper,
July 75; Haig, Jan. 17, Mar. 28, May
36, July 56, PR 26, 1/27; Reagan,
Apr. 77, 78, Sept. 23; Shultz, Aug.
52, Sept. 13, Oct. 2, 5, 10, PR 276,
9/9; Veliotes, July 72

ndex 1982

Arab-Israeli conflict (Cont'd)
Autonomy talks (Cont'd)

Declaration of principles, proposed: Haig,
Mar. 28, Apr. 81, 82; Reagan, Apr.
78
Jordanian participation, need for:

Reagan, Sept. 24; Shultz, Oct. 4, Dec.
20, PR 276, 9/9
Palestinian participation, need for:

General Assembly, Sept. 19; Reagan,
Sept. 24; Shultz, Aug. 52, Sept. 11,
Oct. 4, 6, 8, 9, Nov. 17, PR 269, 9/2;
Veliotes, Jan. 47
Prospects: Haig, Jan. 17, Mar 31,

Apr. 80, 82, May 36, July 45, 55, PR
19, 1/19, PR 20, 1/18, PR 21, 1/18,
PR 27, 1/19, PR 35, 2/2, PR 36, 2/3,
PR 41, 2/2, PR 74, 2/22; Reagan, Jan.
10, Mar. 26, May 30, July 43, Sept.
23, 24; Shultz, Sept. 10, Oct. 2, 6, 8,
PR 276, 9/9, PR 403, 12/28; Veliotes,
Jan. 47, July 72; White House, Nov.
46
Cuban training of Palestinians (Depart-
ment), Feb. 79m
Golan Heights, Israeli annexation: Depart-
ment, Jan. 60; Haig, Feb. 26, Apr. 83;
Reagan, Jan. 10, 11; Security Council
resolution 497, Jan. 60
Habib mission (see also under Lebanon):

Shultz, Oct. 3
Israel, right to exist: Reagan, Jan. 9,

Sept. 24; Shultz, Oct. 3
Jerusalem, religious significance: Haig,
Apr. 82; Reagan, Sept. 25; Shultz, Oct.
6, PR 276, 9/9
Jordan, territorial integrity (White House),

Nov. 46
Palestinian issue: General Assembly,
Sept. 19; Mubarak, Apr. 78; Reagan,
Aug. 36, Sept. 23, 27; Shultz, Sept. 10,
12, Oct. 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, Dec. 17, PR
276, 9/9
Self-governing unit, form of, question:

Haig. Apr. 80; Reagan, Sept 25; Shultz,
Oct. 2, 3, 6, PR 276, 9/9
Palestinian refugees: General Assembly,

Nov. 56; Vine, June 76
Palestinian Liberation Organization:
Japanese contacts (Holdridge), Apr. 57
U.S. position: Haig, Apr. 80, July 46;
Reagan, Sept. 27; Shultz, Sept. 11,
Oct. 10, 11, PR 269, 9/2; Veliotes,
Nov. 46
Saudi eight-point peace plan (Reagan),

Jan. 9
Sinai, return to Egypt: Bush, Aug. 39;
Draper, July 75; Haig, Feb. 26, Mar.
28, Apr. 35, May 36; Reagan, Aug. 37,
Sept. 23; Veliotes, Jan. 47
Transfer of base camp title, agreement,
Aug. 79
Sinai multinational peace force, partici-
pants: July 24; Bush, Aug. 44; Haig,
Jan. 17, Mar. 28, July 45, PR 19, 1/19,
PR 26, 1/27, PR 155, 5/3; Holdridge,
Oct. 31; Reagan, July 23; Shultz, Oct. 1;
Veliotes, July 72
U.S. forces, deployment and mission: May

79; Reagan, June 68
U.S. -Israeli statement, Jan. 46

Arab-Israeli conflict (Cont'd)
Autonomy talks (Cont'd)
U.S. peace initiative: Carter, Oct. 6

(quoted): Clark, Dec. 35; Freij, Nov. 46;
Gemayel, Dec. 41; Reagan, Sept. 23,
Nov. 10, 46; Shultz, Oct. 2, 5, 11, Nov.
8, 42, Dec. 17, 20, PR 269, 9/2, PR 276,
9/9; Veliotes, Nov. 44
U.S. special representative (Fairbanks):
Haig, Feb. 26, Mar. 28, Apr. 83;
Reagan, Sept. 23; Shultz, Oct. 7, 10
Visits of Secretary Haig: Mar. 28; Haig,
Mar. 28, 31, PR 19, 1/19, PR 20, 1/18,
PR 21, 1/18; Reagan, Mar. 26, Sept. 23;
Shultz, Oct. 6-7
Visits of Secretary Weinberger (Haig),

Apr. 45, PR 70, 2/17
West Bank and Gaza:
Israeli replacement of Arab mayors:
Haig, May 37; Reagan, May 30;
Shultz, Oct. 9
Israeli settlements, effect on peace

process: Reagan, Sept. 24-25; Shultz,
Sept. 10, Oct. 4, 6, 9,12, PR 269, 9/2,
PR 276, 9/9
Arab League, delegation to Washington:

Dec. 43; Shultz, Dec. 16
Arafat, Yasir, May 76 (quoted)
Arbitral awards, foreign, recognition and
enforcement, convention (1958): Monaco,
Aug. 77; Yugoslavia, May 77
Argentina (see also Falkland Islands (Mal-
vinas war))
Cuban-backed terrorism (Department),

Feb. 78
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 89, Feb.
82, 83, Mar. 68, May 78, June 90, July
91, Aug. 77, 78, Nov. 67, Dec. 72, 73
U.S. interests, relations (Enders), Sept. 74,
Oct. 81
Ariyoshi, George R., PR 75, 2/23
Armacost, Michael H., swearing in as Am-
bassador to the Philippines, PR 79, 2/25
Armaments (see also Defense and national
security): U.S. sales policy, PR 233, 8/2;
Buckley, Apr. 84, Oct. 50, 55; Depart-
ment, Feb. 39; Enders, Sept. 74; Haig,
July 50, 51
Arms control and disarmament (see also
Chemical and antipersonnel weapons,
reports of use; Europe: Mutual and
balanced force reductions; and under
Soviet Union): Feb. 13; Bush, Jan. 15;
Haig, Apr. 49; Reagan, July 39; Rostow,
Feb. 32, Nov. 16; Shultz, Oct. 10, Nov. 8
Chemical weapons convention, proposed:
Fact Sheet, May 58; Haig, June 44;
Holdridge, Oct. 32; Howe, Oct. 46;
NATO, July 10; Reagan, June 36;
Rostow, May 43
Prohibition or restriction on use of certain
conventional weapons, convention
(1980): Afghanistan, Argentina,
Australia, Austria. Belgium, Bulgaria,
June 90; Byelorussian Soviet Socialist
Republic, June 90, Sept. 80; Canada,
China, Cuba, June 90; Czechoslovakia,
June 90, Nov. 66, Dec. 73; Denmark,
June 90, Sept. 80; Ecuador, Egypt.
Finland, France. June 90; German
Democratic Republic, June 90, Oct. 91;
Federal Republic of Germany, Greece,
June 90; Hungary, June 90, Aug. 78;

Arms control and disarmament (Cont'd)
Prohibition or restriction on use of cer-
tain conventional weapons, conven-
tion (1980) (Cont'd)
Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, June 90;
Japan, June 90, Aug. 78; Liechtensteir
Luxembourg, Mexico, June 90;
Mongolia, June 90, Aug. 78; Morocco,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sierra
Leone, Spain, June 90; Soviet Union,
June 90, Dec. 73; Sudan, June 90;
Sweden, June 90, Sept. 80;
Switzerland, June 90, Nov. 66; Togo,
Turkey, June 90; Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic, June 90, Sept. 80;
U.K., U.S., Vietnam, Yugoslavia, June
90
Prohibitions or restrictions on use of
certain conventional weapons, conven
tion (1981): Ecuador, July 92
Protocols I, II, III (1980): China, Finland,
Mexico, June 90; Switzerland, Nov. 66
Radiological weapons prohibition, proposec

convention (Rostow), May 44
U.N. Committee on Disarmament, prin-
ciples and means (Rostow), May 39
U.N. Second Special Session on Disar-
mament: Haig, July 58; Holdridge, Oct
32; NATO, July 9, 10-11, Aug. 68, 69;
Reagan, July 22, 39; Stoessel, Oct. 28
Arthur, Chester A. (Schwar), June 10, 12
Asencio, Diego C, Feb. 37, Mar. 53
Asia (see also Refugees and names of in-
dividual countries):
Chemical weapons in. See Chemical and

antipersonnel weapons, reports of use
Conventional arms market (Buckley), Oct.

60
Pacific Islands region (Holdridge), Feb. 59

Oct. 32
Soviet interests, influence: Crocker, July

62; Stoessel, Aug. 55, Oct. 28
U.S. economic and security assistance, FY
83 requests: Buckley, July 78, 79;
Holdridge, July 65, Aug. 58; Stoessel,
May 46
Asian Development Bank, articles of agree-
ment (1965), acceptances: Bhutan.
Vanuatu, Dec. 72
Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN): Albrecht. Oct. 32; Bush, Aug.
43; Haig, Mar. 29; Holdridge, Apr. 57,
July 65, Aug. 58, Oct. 30
Ministerial meeting, Washington (March
9-11): joint press statement. May 46;
Stoessel, May 45
Post ministerial consultations, Singapore
(June 17-18): Holdridge, Oct. 29;
Stoessel, Oct. 27
Asylum, political:
Rurarz, Dr. Zdzislaw and Eva Rurarz

(Department), Feb. 7
Spasowski. Romuald: Haig, Feb. 24;
Reagan, Feb. 3
Austad, Mark Evans, swearing in as Ambas

sador to Norway, PR 218, 7/14
Australia:
Antitrust matters, bilateral agreement:
Sept. 80; Robinson, Oct. 37

Department of State Bulletir

^stmlin (Cont'd)

ift'ense modernization (Stoessel), Aug. 57
reaties. agreements, etc., Apr. 91, May
7S, June 90, 91, July 91, Aug. 77, 79,
Sept. 79, 80, Oct. 91, Nov. 66, Dec. 73
ijj.S. enrichment technology transfer, pro-
posed (Malone). Feb. 55
^isit of Vice President Bush, Aug. 43
stria, treaties, agreements, etc.. Mar. 67,
68, Apr. 91, June 90, 91, July 91, Aug.
77, 78, 79, Oct. 90, Nov. 66
iation:

dr transport, bilateral agreements: Bar-
bados, July 92; Colombia, Aug. 78;
Czechoslovakia, Feb. 83, Mar. 69; El
Salvador, June 91; Philippines, Nov. 28;
Yugoslavia, Oct. 92
Lir transport services, bilateral agree-
ments: Argentina, Nov. 67; Brazil,
Sept. 80; Philippines, Dec. 74
Airworthiness certificates, bilateral agree-
ment with Denmark, Mar. 69
livil air transport, bilateral agreements:
China, Nov. 67; Japan, Dec. 74;
Romania, Mar. 69
livil aviation, agreement with Japan

(Haig), July 18
international air services transit agreement
(1944): Panama, Dec. 72; Sweden
(denunciation), July 91
[ntemational civil aviation, convention
(1944):
Protocol (1968) re authentic trilingual

text, Antigua and Barbuda, Jan. 89
Protocol (1977) re amendment, U.S.,

Feb. 82
Protocol (1977) re authentic quadrilingual
text: Austria, Oct. 90; U.S., Feb. 82,
Apr. 90
Protocol (1977) to add Russian as an
authentic language, U.S., Apr. 90,
May 77
Protocol (1980) re amendment concerning
lease, charter, and interchange; Bar-
bados, Bulgaria, Egypt, Ethiopia,
Hungary, Republic of Korea,
Netheriands, Oman, U.K., May 77;
U.S., Feb. 82, Apr. 90, May 77
Pakistani Department of Civil Aviation,
bilateral agreement to provide parts
and services (1975), amendment, June
91

Suppression of unlawful acts against safety
of civil aviation, convention (1971):
Sayre, Aug. 3
Current actions: Liberia, Apr. 90; Luxem-
bourg, Solomon Islands, July 91;
Tunisia, Feb. 82; Uganda, Sept. 79
Suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft,
convention (1970): Sayre, Aug. 2
Current actions: Liberia, Apr. 90;
Tunisia, Feb. 82
Transatlantic scheduled service air fares,
agreement (1982): Nov. 65; Belgium,
France, Federal Republic of Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, U.K.,
U.S., Yugoslavia, Oct. 90

Bahamas: Apr. 8; Department, Feb. 78

Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 90, May 77
Bahrain, treaties, agreements, etc., Aug. 78,

Dec. 74
Balance of payments: Brock, PR 364, 12/7;
Enders, July 84; Versailles summit,
July 6
Bangladesh (McPherson), Jan. 83
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 90,

Feb. 83, Mar. 67, 68, Apr. 90, 91, May
79, Sept. 80, Nov. 67, Dec. 73, 74
U.S. development assistance, proposed
(Veliotes), July 74
Barbados, Apr. 10
Treaties, agreements, etc.. Mar. 67, May

77, July 92, Aug. 79
Visit of President Reagan (Reagan), June
38
Barry, Robert L., swearing in as Ambassador

to Bulgaria, PR 113, 4/1
Baxter, William F., Jan. 34
Beatrix, Queen of the Netherlands, May 25,

27
Begin, Menahem, Sept. 45
Belgium:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 89, 90,
Feb. 82, Mar. 67, 68, Apr. 91, 92, May
77, June 90, Aug. 79, Sept. 79, Oct. 90,
Nov. 65, 66
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Martens, pro-
gram, PR 64, 2/12
Behze, Apr. 11
Treaties, agreements, etc.. Mar. 67, Apr.
92, May 77, 78, June 90, July 91, 92,
Sept. 80, Dec. 73
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed (Haig), July 49
Benedick, Richard Elliot, Feb. 63, Dec. 53
Benin:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 90, Nov. 66
U.S. economic assistance (PL 480), FY 83
request, July 62
Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr. (Kennedy), Oct. 16
Bergold, Harry E., Jr., swearing in as Am-
bassador to Hungary, PR 5, 1/5
Beriin: NATO, July 10, Aug. 68, 69; Reagan,

July 25, 35, 38
Bhutan, treaties, agreements, etc.. May 78,

Aug. 78, Dec. 72
Big-power responsibility. Bums, June 61;
Haig, June 40; Rostow, Nov. 16; Shultz,
Aug. 50, Nov. 3
Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day and
Week, 1981, proclamation (Reagan), Feb.
46
Bills of lading, unification of certain rules,
international convention (1924): Bolivia,
Sept. 79; Netherlands (denunciation),
Sept. 79; Solomon Islands, Mar. 67
Protocol to amend (1968): Netherlands,
Sept. 79; Sri Lanka, Mar. 67
Bingham, John A. (Schwar), June 5
Biological and toxic weapons convention
(1972): Howe, Oct. 46
Current actions: Japan, Aug. 77; Kenya,
Mar. 67; Libya, May 77; Tonga, Mar.
67
Bitterman, Chester Allen (Department), Feb.
79n

Blaine, James G. (Schwar), June 9
Blair House, closing for repairs, announce-
ment, PR 206, 6/25
Blane, John, swearing in as Ambassador to

Rwanda, PR 340, 10/26
Blix, Hans (Marshall), Sept. 51
Bohlen, Charles E. (Sanford), June 22
Bolivia:
Drug control program: Linnemann, Feb.

50; Stoessel, Sept. 47, 48
Treaties, agreements, etc.. Mar. 68, Apr.
91, May 79, Sept. 79, Nov. 65, Dec. 74
Bosworth, Stephen W., Oct. 75, Nov. 60, 63
Botswana:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 82, July 91
U.S. Ambassador (Maino), swearing in, PR

306, 10/5
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed, July 62
Boudinot, Ellas (Wells), May 18, 21
Boutros, Fouad, Nov. 50
Brazil:
Arms exports (Enders), Oct. 75
Brazilian astronaut, space shuttle flight,

proposed (Shultz), PR 364, 12/7
Democratic progress (Enders), Sept. 72
Drug control program (Linnemann), Feb.

50
Economy and trade: Brock, PR 364, 12/7;

Enders, Sept. 75, Oct. 72
Nuclear relations: Bush, Jan. 15; Enders,
Oct. 74; Malone, Feb. 54; Shultz, PR
364, 12/7
Profile, Oct. 73
Textile agreement with U.S., amendment,

June 91, PR 135, 4/19
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 83, Mar.
68, Apr. 92, June 90, July 91, 92, Aug.
79, Sept. 80, Nov. 66
U.S. relations (Enders), Oct. 72, 81
U.S. visit of President Figueiredo: Enders,

Oct. 74; program, PR 159, 5/7
Visit of Vice Presiden' Bush, Jan. 14
Brement, Marshall, swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Iceland, PR 216, 7/14
British Virgin Islands, Apr. 12
Brock, William: May 64, PR 33, 1/27, PR

364, 12/7; Reagan, Apr. 77
Brown, Keith L., swearing in as Ambassador

to Lesotho, PR 96, 3/15
Browne H. Mon-oe, swearing in as Ambassa-
dor to New Zealand, PR 81, 3/2
Brunei (Albrecht), Oct. 32
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Mar. 12
Buckley, James L., Apr. 83, June 57, 78,
July 77, Aug. 71, Sept. 37, Oct. 51, Dec.

Counselor of the Department, proposed
(Haig), PR 165, 5/10
Bulgaria;
Treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 91, May

77, June 90, July 91
U.S. Ambassador (Barry), swearing m, PR
113, 4/1
Burke, Edmund, Dec. 37 (quoted)
Burma:
Drug control program: Albrecht, Oct. 32;
Holdridge, Oct. 32; Linnemann, Feb.
47; Stoessel, Sept. 47
U.S. economic assistance, proposed
(Holdridge), July 69

Index 1982

Burns, Arthur L., June 60
Burt, Richard R., Jan. 31, 52, Feb. 42, Apr.
65, May 42, 50
Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs, proposed (Haig), PR 165, 5/10
Burundi:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Aug. 77, 78,

Oct. 91, Nov. 65, 67
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed, July 62
Bush, George:
Ambassador for Micronesian Status Nego-
tiations (Zeder), swearing in, PR 73,
2/18
Soviet Union (address), Aug. 40
Visit to East Asia and Pacific, Aug. 39
Visit to Latin America, Jan. 12
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,

treaties, agreements, etc., June 90, Sept.
80
Byroade, Henry, Mar. 10

Calkoen, Hendrik (Wells), May 8, 14
Cameroon;
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed, July 62
U.S. visit of President Ahidjo: Oct. 14; pro-
gram, PR 225, 7/22
Canada:
Caribbean and Central America, interests
in: Apr. 25, May 67; MacGuigan, May
65
Energy policy: Hormats, June 51; Johnston,

Jan. 32
Gulf of Maine boundary delimitation: Jan.
91, Apr. 92; Hormats, June 51; Niles,
Apr. 50; Shultz, Dec. 66
National minerals policy proposals

(Hormats), June 52, 54
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 89, 91,
Feb. 82, 83, Mar. 67, 68, Apr. 92, May
78, 79, June 90, 91, .July 91, 92, Nov.
66, Dec. 74
U.S. Amba.ssador (Robinson), swearing in,

PR 3, 1/5
U.S. immigration changes, proposed

(Asencio), Mar. 53
U.S. relations: Niles, Apr. 50; Shultz, Dec.

14, 18, 66
U.S. trade and investment: Hormats, June
50; Johnston, Jan. 32; Shultz, Dec. 13
Visit of Secretary Shultz, Dec. 13, PR 335,
10/27
Cape Verde:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Nov. 66
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed, July 62
Carlisle, Rodney P., Jan. 20 (quoted)
Carter, Hodding, Mar. 12 (quoted)
Carter, Jimmy, Oct. 6 (quoted)
Casey, William R., Jr., swearing in as Am-
bassador to Niger, PR 98, 3/16
Castaneda de la Rosa, Jorge, May 64, 68
Cayman Islands, Apr. 12
Central African Republic:
Treaties, agreements, etc.. Mar. 68, Apr.

90
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed, July 62

Chad: Haig, Apr. 34; Shultz, Oct. 2
Libyan incursion: Adelman, Jan. 61;
Crocker, Jan. 25; Haig, PR 20, 1/18;
Lyman, Jan. 27; Vine, June 76
OAU peacekeeping force: Crocker, Jan. 25,
Dec. 22; Haig, Mar. 29; Lyman, Jan.
29; Vine, June 76
Treaties, agreements, etc.. Feb. 82, June

90
U.S. economic and humanitarian assistance:
July 62; Crocker, Dec. 22
Chapman, Christian A., U.S. Special Cyprus
Coordinator, appointment, PR 334, 10/26
Chemical and antipersonnel weapons, reports
of use: Abrams, Sept. 44; Buckley, Dec.
27; Burt, Jan. 52, Apr. 66; Department,
Jan. 58; General Assembly resolution,
Jan. 59; Haig, Apr. 41; Holdridge, Aug.
59; Howe, Oct. 46; Kirkpatrick, Jan. 57,
58; Reagan, June 36, July 41, Dec. 5;
Rostow, May 44; Shultz, Dec. 44;
Stoessel, Apr. 86, May 57, Oct. 28; Van
Hollen, Mar. 22
Department report to Congress, announce-
ment, PR 357, 11/29
Special report #98 (Stoessel), May 57
Update, text, Dec. 44
Child abduction, international, civil aspects
of, convention (1980): Belgium, Canada,
Mar. 67; France, Mar. 67, Dec. 72;
Greece, Switzerland, U.S., Mar. 67
U.S. ratification urged, PR 53, 2/11, PR 84,
3/3
Chile:
Cuban involvement: Department, Feb. 77;

Enders, Aug. 74
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 89, 90,

Apr. 92, Aug. 77, Nov. 66
U.S. Ambassador (Theberge), swearing in,
PR 252, 8/17
China, People's Republic of:
Arms industry (Buckley), Oct. 60
Nuclear energy production (Marshall), Sept.

50
Pacific stability, role in: Haig, PR 80, 3/1;
Holdridge, Oct. 22; Stoessel, Aug. 58
Shanghai communique, 10th anniversary:

Reagan, Zhao Ziyang, Apr. 60
Sino-Soviet relations: Shultz, Dec. 21;

Stoessel, Aug. 58
Sole legal government of China, Oct. 20
Taiwan (Haig), May 37, July 50
U.S. arms sales policy: Oct. 20; Depart-
ment, Feb. 39; Haig, Mar. 31, July
50; Holdridge, Oct. 19; Reagan, Aug.
45, Sept. 27, Oct. 21; Stoessel, Aug.
58
U.S. -China joint communique, Oct. 20
Textile agreement with U.S., May 79, Nov.

67, PR 229, 7/26

Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 83, Mar.

68, Apr. 90, 92, June 90, 91, Aug. 78,
Oct. 91, Nov. 67, Dec. 73

U.S. economic assistance, proposed:
Buckley, July 80; Holdridge, July 67

U.S. relations: Bush, Aug. 40; Haig, May
37, July 50; Holdridge, Oct. 19; joint
communique, Oct. 19; Reagan, Sept. 27,
Oct. 21; Shultz, Dec. 21; Stoessel, Aug.
58
Chronology, 1981, Oct. 22
Japanese interests (Holdridge), Apr. 56

Visit of Vice President Bush: Bush, Aug.
46; Reagan. Aug. 45; Stoessel, Aug. 58

IIII!

Christmas tree lighting ceremony (Dec. 21,
1981), Haig, PR 442, 1/5; (Dec. 20, 1981
Shultz, PR 404, 12/28
Chronology of world events by month, Jan.
92, Feb. 84, Mar. 70, Apr. 93, May 80,
June 92, July 93, Aug. 80, Sept. 81, Oct
92, Nov. 68. Dec. 75
Churchill, Winston (quoted), Feb. 23, Mar.
40, Apr. 37, June 41, July 25, 26, 29, 3C,
Dec. 28
Claims:
U.S.-Czechoslovakian, agreement re, May

79
U.S. -Iranian, Jan. 49
Clark, Warren (Kennedy), Oct. 16
Clark, William P.: Jan. 46, Dec. 33, 35; Hai^

Mar. 32, PR 100, 3/17
Clayton, William L. (Sanford), June 22
Clements, William P., Jr., PR 75, 2/23
Coffee, international agreement (1976), 1981
extension: Brazil, July 91; Burundi, Nov
65; Colombia, Aug. 77; Ecuador, El
Salvador, Nov. 65; Ethiopia, Guatemala,
July 91; Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nov. 65;
Mexico, June 90; Nicaragua, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Nov. 65; Rwanda,
Spain, Aug. 77; Uganda, Nov. 65; Zim-
babwe, June 90
Cohen, Richard, Nov. 43
Colombia:
Cuban activities: Department, Feb. 68, 76;
Enders, Aug. 73, 74; Haig, Jan. 4;
Johnston, June 56
Drug control program: Linnemann, Feb.

48; Stoessel, Sept. 47
Elections: Enders, Sept. 72; Haig, July 48
Textiles agreement with U.S., amendment
Apr. 92, PR 299, 9/24, PR 369 (un-
dated)
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 91, Feb.
82, 83, Mar. 68, 69, Apr. 90, 91, May
79, July 91, Aug. 77, 78, 79
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro

posed (Enders), July 86
Visit of Vice President Bush, Jan. 14
Commodities and commodity trade (see also
names of commodities):
Common Fund, agreement establishing
(1980) (Stoessel), May 45
Current Actions: Afghanistan, Jan. 89;
Algeria, May 77, June 90; Argentina,
Dec. 72; Botswana, Feb. 82, July 91;
Burundi, Aug. 77; Central African
Republic, Apr. 90; Chad, Feb. 82;
Congo, Jan. 89; Ecuador, July 91;
Egypt, Feb. 82, Aug. 77; Ethiopia,
European Economic Community, Feb
82; Finland, Mar. 67; Gabon, Feb. 82;
Gambia, Jan. 89; India, Mar. 67;
Ireland, Dec. 72; Kenya, May 77,
June 90; Korea, June 90; Republic of
Korea, Kuwait, Liberia, Feb. 82;
Malawi. Feb. 82; Mali, Mar. 67; Mex-
ico, New Zealand, Apr. 90; Niger,
Feb. 82; Pakistan, July 91; Papua
New Guinea, Feb. 82, Apr. 90;
Samoa, June 90; Senegal, Somalia,
Feb. 82; Syria, June 90; Tanzania,
Aug. 77; funi.sia, Uganda, May 77;
United Arab Emirates, Aug. 77;
U.K., Mar. 67; Venezuela, June 90;
Yemen (Aden), Feb. 82; Yugoslavia,
Mar. 67
GSA tin sales: May 47; Albrecht, Oct. 33,
34; Holdridge, Oct. 30, 31

Department of State Bulletin

mmodities and -ommodity trade (Cont'd)
iteel, U.S. -European competition: Haig, PR
33, 1/27. PR 76, 2/23; Hormats, Mar.
37

mores, U.S. economic assistance, proposed,
July 62
ngo:
>eaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 89, June

90, Nov. 66
J.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed, July 62
ngress, U.S.:
legislation:

Foreign Assistance Act, proposed amend-
ment to eliminate prohibition on
assistance to China: Buckley, July 80;
Holdridge, July 67
MX missile authorization (Reagan), Oct.
47, Dec. 3, 6
legislation, proposed:
Agricultural Trade Development and As-
sistance Act, proposed amendment
(Holdridge), July 67
Antiterrorism cooperation program: Aug.

4; Sayre, Aug. 4
Caribbean Basin Development Plan, im-
plementation and supplementary ap-
propriations request: Apr. 8, 11, 16,
May 67; Clark, Dec. 35; Enders, July
84, Sept. 73; Haig, Jan. 3, Apr. 35,
36, PR 86, 3/3; Reagan, Apr. 3;
Shultz, Sept. 28, Dec. 14
Clark amendment, repeal: Department,

Mar. 34; Haig, PR 80, 3/1
Foreign assistance, FY 83: Buckley, July
77; Crocker, July 61; Draper, July 74;
Enders, July 83; Haig, Apr. 35, 36,
July 64, PR 86, 3/3; Holdridge, July
65, Aug. 58; Lyman, Jan. 28; Piatt,
July 80; Thomas, July 70; Veliotes,
July 72
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, anti-
bribery provisions, changes in (Lamb),
Oct. 40
Foreign Service Act of 1980, amend-
ments not recommended (Kennedy),
Oct. 15
Refugee assistance, FY 1983 (Vine), July
75
Senate advice and consent:
International child abduction, civil as-
pects, convention (1980), ratification
urged, PR 53, 2/11, PR 84, 3/3
Pacific Island treaties, ratification urged
(Holdridge), Oct. 32
lonservation {see also Fish and fisheries):
Antarctic marine living resources, conven-
tion (1980): Argentina, Aug. 77; Euro-
pean Economic Community, July 91;
France, Dec. 72; German Democratic
Republic, June 90; Federal Republic of
Germany, July 91; New Zealand, May
77; U.S., Feb. 82, Apr. 90, May 77,
June 50
Endangered species of wild fauna and flora,
international trade, convention (1973):
Current actions: Austria, July 91;

Bangladesh, Guinea, Mar. 67; Malawi,
July 91
U.S. contribution request (Piatt), July 83
Nonstable, Peter D., swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Zaire, PR 313, 10/8

Consular relations:
China, bilateral agreement. Mar. 68, Apr.

92
Consular services to U.S. citizens (Asencio),

Feb. 37
U.S. consular representation, August cen-
ter section
Vienna convention (1963): Indonesia, Aug.
77; Kiribati. Sept. 79; Mozambique,
Mar. 67; Tuvalu, Dec. 72
Copyright, universal convention (1971), v^fith
additional protocols I and II: Austria,
Aug. 77; Guinea, Jan. 89
Corsun, Andrew, Aug. 31
Costa Rica: Apr. 13; Enders, July 85. Sept.
72. Nov. 57; Haig. July 48
Cuban activities: Department, Feb. 68, 74;

Enders, Mar. 66, Aug. 73, 75
Treaties, agreements, etc., June 90, 91,

Oct. 91
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed: Buckley, July 78; Enders, July
84; Haig, Apr. 37, July 49, PR 86, 3/3
U.S. visit of President Monge: Monge,

Reagan, Oct. 69; program, PR 202, 6/21
Cotton, International Cotton Institute, ar-
ticles of agreement (1966), withdrawals:
Argentina, Aug. 77; Spain, Dec. 72
Council of Foreign Relations, and Trilateral

Commission (Haig), PR 80, 3/1
Crocker, Chester A.. Jan. 23, Feb. 27, June

46, 47, July 61, Nov. 12, Dec. 22
Cuadra, Angel (Kirkpatrick), Feb. 67
Cuba:
Biological weapons, allegations of U.S. use

in (Kirkpatrick), Jan. 81
Economic problems (Enders), Feb. 80
Human rights violations (Kirkpatrick), Feb.

66
Narcotics trafficking (Enders), Aug. 74
Radio Marti and budget requests (Enders),

Sept. 68, 70
Regional activities {see also El Salvador
and Nicaragua): Aug. 21. Sept. 64;
Bosworth. Oct. 76; Buckley. Apr. 84;
Bush. Jan. 12. 14; Department, Feb.
68; Enders, Feb. 80, Mar. 61, 64, Apr.
89, July 84, 86, Aug. 73, Nov. 57; Haig,
Jan. 4. Mar. 28. 31. Apr. 34. May 36,
July 48. PR 34, 1/27, PR 80, 3/1, PR
99, 3/17, PR 100, 3/17; Johnston, June
56; Perez. Aug. 25; Reagan. Apr. 4.
May 30, June 34. 35; Shultz. Oct. 13,
Dec. 16
Soviet economic and military support: Sept.
64; Buckley, Apr. 84; Bush, Jan. 12;
Department, Feb. 70; Enders, Aug. 75,
Sept. 68; Haig. Apr. 33. 34. PR 26.
1/27, PR 74, 2/22. PR 76, 2/23
Treaties, agreements, etc.. Mar. 69, June

90
U.S. policy and relations: Enders, July 86,
Sept. 69; Haig, July 49; Shultz, Oct. 13
U.S. trade controls (Johnston), June 55, 56
Cultural relations:
Binational Commission for Educational and
Cultural Exchange, bilateral agreement
with Morocco, June 91, July 92
Cultural, educational, scientific, and tech-
nical cooperation and exchanges for
1981 and 1982, bilateral agreement
with Hungary, Mar. 69
Cultural and educational exchange commis-
sions, U.S. -Morocco: July 92; Haig,
Apr. 46

Cultural relations (Cont'd)
Educational, scientific, and cultural materi-
als, importation, agreement (1950):
Luxembourg, Dec. 72; New Zealand,
Feb. 82; U.K., U.S., Dec. 72; Yugo-
slavia, Feb. 82
International Centre for the Study of the
Preservation and Restoration of Cultur-
al Property. Statutes (1956) as amend-
ed, accession, Finland, Feb. 82
U.S. cultural and information centers, Aug.

center section
World cultural and natural heritage, pro-
tection, convention (1972): Benin, Nov.
66; Burundi, Aug. 78; Greece, Jan. 90;
Malawi, May 79; Oman, Apr. 92; Peru,
June 91; Spain. Aug. 78
Youth exchanges: Haig. July 8; Reagan,
July 5
Customs:
Containers, customs convention (1972), rat-
ification, Poland, Aug. 77
Private road vehicles, temporary importa-
tion, convention (1954). succession.
Solomon Islands. Jan. 89
Safe containers, international convention
(1981). amendments to Annex I. Mar.
67
TIR carnets, international transport of
goods under, customs convention
(1975), Mar. 67
Current actions: Republic of Korea, May
77; Soviet Union, Aug. 77; Spain,
Nov. 65
Cyprus: Haig, Aug. 63; Thomas, July 71;
Turkmen, Aug. 60
Progress reports (Reagan), Jan. 43, Feb.
45, May 49, June 62, Aug. 62, Sept. 39,
Nov. 39
Treaties, agreements, etc., June 90, July

91, Dec. 73
U.S. Special Coordinator (Chapman), ap-
pointment, PR 33.1, 10/26
Czechoslovakia, treaties, agreements, etc.,
Feb. 83, Mar. 69, Apr. 90, 91, May 77,
79, June 90, Aug. 78. Nov. 66. Dec. 73

D-Day anniversary (Reagan). July 20
Dailey. Peter H.. swearing in as Ambassador

to Ireland, PR 214, 7/14
Dam, Kenneth W.: Dec. 56; Reagan, Nov. 47
Deputy Secretary of State, appointment,
PR 338, 10/28
Davis, Arthur H., Jr., swearing in as Am-
bassador to Paraguay, PR 253, 8/17
Debt rescheduling (Shultz), Nov. 6
Bilateral agreements: Liberia, Jan. 91;
Pakistan, Feb. 84; Sudan, Nov. 68;
Togo, Feb. 84; Turkey, Jan. 92, May
79; Uganda, Sept. 81; Zaire, Nov. 68
Poland: Mar. 50; Haig, PR 70. 2/17;

Hormats. Apr. 61; Meissner. Sept. 31
Declaration of Independence. 1776. Apr. 73
Defense and national security: Burt, Feb. 44;
Haig, PR 196, 6/16; Reagan, July 43;
Shultz, Nov. 3; Stoessel, Oct. 28;
Wolfowitz. Sept. 36
B-1 bomber: Buckley, Dec. 27; Reagan,

Jan. 9
Budget: Haig, PR 80, 3/1; Reagan, Mar. 26;
Shultz, Aug. 50

ndex 1982

Defense and national security (Cont'd)
Chemical weapons: Fact Sheet, May 58;

Howe, Oct. 47
MX missile: Buckley, Dec. 27; Burt, Feb.
44; Reagan, Jan. 9, Oct. 47, Dec. 3, 6,
7; Shultz, PR 364, 12/7
Nuclear deterrence strategy: Abrams, Dec.
39; Buckley, Dec. 26; Clark, Dec. 33;
Haig, May 32; Reagan. Dec. 1. 6
Nuclear weapons freeze, disadvantages:
Abrams, Dec. 40; Buckley, Dec. 26;
Burt, May 42, 52; Clark, Dec. 34; Haig,
May 32, 35, June 45, July 53, 54, Aug.
65; Nitze, May 44; Reagan, May 29, 38,
June 39, July 34, Aug. 65; Rostow,
Feb. 35; Shultz, PR 384, 12/15;
Speakes, May 38; White House, Aug.
53; Wolfowitz, Sept. 32
Nuclear weapons technology, national
security issue (Marshall), Sept. 52
Personal liberties and (Clark), Dec. 35
Trident II D-5 missile (Buckley), Dec. 27
U.S. national security, atlas. May center
section
de la Madrid, Miguel, Dec. 10, 11
Democracy and democratic principles: Apr.
73; Burt, Apr. 66; Clark, Dec. 35;
Eagleburger, Mar. 46; Haig, Jan. 2, June
43, July 49; Kirkpatrick, Feb. 65;
Reagan, July 27, 32; Rostow, Feb. 34, 35
Conference on constitutionalism and self-
government, proposed (Reagan), July
28
Conference on Democratization of Com-
munist Countries (Shultz), PR 316,
10/18
Conference on Free Elections (Reagan),
July 28
Announcement, PR 333, 10/25
Opening remarks (Shultz), Dec. 15
San Jose foreign ministers meeting (Oct.
4), final act: Department, Dec. 69; sum-
mary, Dec. 71; text, Dec. 70
Denmark:
Mutual support, bilateral agreement with

U.S., Aug. 79
Soviet anti-U.S. propaganda, Oct. 45
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 82, Mar.

69, June 90, Aug. 79, Sept. 80, Nov. 66
U.S. Ambassador (Loeb), swearing in, PR

215, 7/14
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Schluter, pro-
gram, PR 374, 12/10
Dependents of government employees, em-
ployment, bilateral agreements: Bolivia,
May 79; New Zealand, Norway, Feb. 84;
Sweden, Jan. 92
Developing countries {see also names of in-
dividual countries): Eagleburger, May 49;
Haig, PR 75, 2/23
Development needs and strategy for
growth: Enders, Sept. 75; Haig, June
40, 42; Lamb, Oct. 39; Shultz, Nov. 2,
Dec. 66; Versailles summit, July 6
Energy problems: Anderson, Jan. 64;

Lamb, Oct. 38
Population growth (Benedick), Dec. 53
Soviet and other conventional arms sales:
PR 233, 8/2; Buckley, Apr. 84, Oct. 50
U.N. Conference on Least Developed
Countries, Paris, Sept. 1-14, 1981
(McPherson), Jan. 82

Developing countries (Cont'd)
U.S. and other Western interests, aid:
Anderson, Jan. 65; Burt, Apr. 66;
Crocker, Nov. 14; Haig, Jan. 16, Apr.
37, June 42, PR 80, 3/1; Holdridge,
Apr. 55, Oct. 32; Hormats, Mar. 40;
McPherson, Jan. 83; NAC, Aug. 68, 69;
Versailles summit, July 6; Wolfowitz,
Sept. 35
Development assistance: Anderson, Jan. 65;
Lyman, Jan. 28; McPherson, Jan. 83
Appropriations requests, FY 1983: Crocker,
July 61; Haig, Apr. 37, PR 86, 3/3;
Holdridge, July 65; Veliotes, July 72
Caribbean area. See Latin America:
Caribbean Basin Development Plan
Dickman, Francois M., swearing in as Am-
bassador to Kuwait, PR 13, 1/8
Dillon, Robert, Nov. 51
Diplomatic relations:
U.S. Ambassadors (as of Sept. 22, 1982),

list, Oct. 16
U.S. representation, Aug. center section
Vienna convention (1961): Indonesia, Aug.
77; Kiribati, July 91; Mozambique, Mar.
67; Tuvalu, Dec. 72
Disabled Persons, International Year of

(Reich), Mar. 58
Djibouti:
International Maritime Organization con-
vention, amendments (1979), accept-
ance, Aug. 77
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed: Buckley, July 79; Crocker, July
62
Dolibois, John E., swearing in as Ambassador

to Luxembourg, PR 1, 1/6
Dominica, treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 90,

Mar. 67, Aug. 78, Sept. 80
Dominican Republic: Apr. 14; Department,
Feb. 76
Elections: Enders, July 85, Sept. 72; Haig,

July 48
Treaties, agreements, etc.. May 77, Aug.

79, Nov. 66, 67
U.S. Ambassador (Anderson), swearing in,

PR 199, 6/16
Visit of Vice President Bush, Jan. 12
Donaldson, Sam, July 55
Double taxation, avoidance of:
Americans abroad, proposed revisions

(Lamb), Oct. 39
Bilateral agreements: Argentina, Feb. 83,
Mar. 68; Australia, Oct. 91; Austria,
Aug. 79; Bangladesh, Jan. 90, Feb. 83;
China, Feb. 83; Egypt, Jan. 91; Federal
Republic of Germany, Jan. 91, Feb. 83;
Jamaica, Feb. 83; Liberia, Nov. 67;
Malta, Feb. 83, Sept. 81; Morocco, Jan.
91, Feb. 84; New Zealand, Sept. 81;
Norway, Jan. 91, Feb. 84; Phillippines,
Nov. 28; U.K. Aug. 80
Douglas, H. Eugene, June 73, Dee. 59
Ambassador-at-Large and U.S. Coordinator
for Refugee Affairs, swearing in, PR
119, 4/7
Dozier, James: Haig, Feb. 26, PR 41, 2/2;

Reagan, June 64, July 23
Draper, Morris: July 74; Shultz, Sept. 9,

Oct. 5
Dreyer, June T., appointment to Board of
Governors of East-West Center, an-
nouncement, PR 394, 12/17

Dreyfus, Lee S., PR 75, 2/23
Dreyfus, Louis G., Jr., Mar. 4
Drugs, narcotic:
Cuban-Colombian trafficking (Enders), A

74
Interdiction on suspicion of narcotics trai
ficking, bilateral agreements: Feb. 49
Haiti, Dec. 74; U.K., Feb. 84
International narcotics control: Haig, PR
74, 2/22; Linnemann, Feb. 46; Shultz,
Nov. 51; Stoessel, Sept. 46
Mexico, illegal drug traffic, efforts to con
trol: Jan. 91, Feb. 84, Apr. 92, June {
Nov. 67; Linnemann, Feb. 48; Stoess<
Sept. 47

Psychotropic substance convention (1971)
(Colombian ratification urged

(Linnemann), Feb. 51
Current actions: Australia, Aug. 77;
Gabon, Feb. 82
Single convention (1961): Gabon, Apr. 91;
Solomon Islands, May 77
Dubs, Adolph, Mar. 12
Duemling, Robert W., swearing in as Am-
bassador to Suriname, PR 254, 8/17
Dulles, John Foster (Keefer), Aug 46
Dumas, Charles Guillaume Frederic (Wells),

May 2, 8, 12, 20
Duncan, Evan, May 63
Dyess, William J., May 26
Ambassdor to the Netherlands, swearing
in, PR 2, 1/5

Eagleburger, Lawrence S., Jan. 31, 36, Feb
13, Mar. 46, May 48, 53
Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, swearing in, PR 221, 7/19
Earth resources and geologic sciences, bilat
eral agreements: France, Iceland, Oct. i:
East-West Center, Board of Governors,

appointments, PR 183, 6/1, PR 394, 12/
East-West relations: Haig, Mar. 27, June 41
Aug. 65, PR 26, 1/27, PR 76, 2/23, PR
196, 6/16; NATO, July 9, Aug. 67, 69;
Reagan, June 34; Thatcher, July 31;
Wolfowitz, Sept. 34
Economic: July 24; Haig, June 41, July 4,
8, 12, PR 18, 1/12; Holdridge, Oct. 32;
Hormats, Mar. 38; Meissner, Sept. 30;
NATO, Feb. 20, July 10, Aug. 68;
Shultz, PR 384, 12/15, PR 403, 12/28;
Versailles communique, July 6
Military expenditures, atlas of U.S. foreigr
policy. May center section
Eckert, Fred J., swearing in as Ambassador
to Fiji, Kiribati, Tonga, and Tuvalu, PR
68, 2/16; biography, PR 114, 4/1
Economy, domestic: May 47; Bush, Jan. 13,
15; Clark, Dec. 33; Crocker, Feb. 30;
Haig, PR 33, 1/27; Holdridge, Oct. 31;
Lamb, Oct. 39; Reagan, Feb. 2, July 4;
Regan, July 2, 3; Shultz, Aug. 50, Sept.
29, Nov. 6, Dec. 15; Stoessel, May 46,
Oct. 27
Budget: Haig, July 15; Regan, July 3
Reaganomics (Reagan), July 16
Economy, world: Feb. 13; Enders, Sept. 75;
Haig, Apr. 48, PR 75, 2/23; Holdridge,
Aug. 59; Lamb, Oct. 38; NATO, July 10;
Shultz, Nov. 2; Stoessel, Oct. 27

Department of State Bulletir

rwmy. world (Cont'd)

ancun summit meeting: Bush, Jan. 13;

Crocker, Feb. 27; Haig, Jan. 2, 16;

Reagan, Jan. 9
iternationai Economy and Consumers,

announcement of speakers, PR 141,

4/23

J.N. Conference on Restrictive Business
Practices, agreed principles and rules,
U.S. interpretation: Baxter, Hormats,
Robinson, Jan. 34
ersailles summit meeting: July 1, PR 181,
6/1; Haig, July 4, 7, 8, 15, 18, 56;
Meissner, Sept. 30; Mitterrand, May 55;
Reagan, July 4, 16, 24; Regan, July 1, 3
Final communique, July 5
Soviet anti-U.S. propaganda, Oct. 44
lador:

)rug control program (Linneman), Feb. 49
'reaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 90, Mar.
69, June 90, July 91, 92, Aug. 77, Nov.
65

J.S. assistance, proposed (Enders), July 86
ucation:
iilateral agreement with Republic of

Korea, Jan. 91
Jinational Commission for Educational and
Cultural Exchanges, bilateral agree-
ment with Morocco, June 91, July 92
aribbean Basin literacy rates, September

center section
hinese students in U.S. (Haig), July 51
Cultural, educational, scientific, and tech-
nical cooperation and exchanges for
1981 and 1982, bilateral agreement
with Hungary, Mar. 69
ultural and educational exchange commis-
sions, U.S. -Morocco: July 92; Haig,
Apr. 46
Cypriot students in U.S., scholarship pro-
gram (Thomas), July 71
Educational, scientific, and cultural mate-
rials, importation, agreement (1950):
Luxembourg, Dec. 72; New Zealand,
Feb. 82; U.K., U.S., Dec. 72;
Yugoslavia, Feb. 82
Exchange programs, bilateral agreement

with Peru, May 79
Recognition of studies, diplomas, and

degrees concerning higher education in
Europe, convention (1979): Byelorus-
sian Soviet Socialist Republic, June 90;
Finland, May 77; German Democratic
Republic, Israel, Feb. 82; Netherlands,
Nov. 65; Soviet Union, May 77; Vatican
City State, Sept. 79
gypt (see also Arab-Isaeli conflict and

Sadat, Anwar al-):
Aswan High Dam Power Station, project

grant agreement, July 92
Mubarak policies: Haig, Apr. 82; Veliotes,

Jan. 48
Nuclear energy, cooperative agreement
with U.S.: Malone, Feb. 54; Marshall,
Sept. 50
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 91, Feb.
82, 83, Mar. 67, 69, Apr. 91, 92, May
77, 78, June 90, 91, July 92, Aug. 77,
79, Nov. 67, Dec. 73
U.S. economic and security assistance:
Apr. 79, 92; Buckley, July 78, 79; Haig,
Apr. 80, 81, 82; Veliotes, July 73

idex1982

Egypt (Cont'd)
U.S. visit of President Mubarak: Haig, Apr.
80; Mubarak, Apr. 78, 79; Reagan, Apr.
77, 78; program, PR 38, 2/2; statement
of principles, Apr. 79
Visit of Secretary Haig: Mar. 28, PR 20,
1/18, PR 41, 2/2
Arrival statements, PR 19, 1/19, PR 35,

2/2
Departure statement, PR 36, 2/3
Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Mar. 9, 10, July 39

(quoted); Queen Beatrix, May 27
El Salvador:
Americans killed in: Enders, Sept. 63;

Haig, May 72
Background, Apr. 16
Criminal justice system (Hinton), Dec. 68
Elections: Abrams, Sept. 41; Clark, Dec.
37; Enders, Mar. 63, July 85, Aug. 76,
Sept. 63, 72; Haig, Mar. 29, 32, Apr.
34, 41, May 35, 71, 74, July 48, PR 70,
2/17, PR 74, 2/22, PR 80, 3/1; Reagan,
Apr. 6, May 30, June 38, July 26
OAS endorsement: Department, Jan. 6;
Enders, Feb. 81, Mar. 64, 66, Apr.
88, 89; Haig, Apr. 34; text of OAS
resolution, Jan. 7
U.S. observer delegation (Department),
Apr. 88
Foreign intervention and arms supplies:
May 72, 75, Aug. 19; Department, Feb.

68, 72, Apr. 89; Enders, Feb. 81, Aug.

73, Sept. 73, Nov. 57; Haig, May 68,

69, 70, July 49, PR 70, 2/17, PR 100,
3/17; Reagan, Apr. 6, June 38

Nicaraguan soldier captured in (Haig),
PR 99, 3/17, PR 100, 3/17
Land reform program: Enders, Mar. 63,
Apr. 88, July 83; Haig, July 49;
Reagan, Sept. 27
National reconciliation, need for (Enders),

Aug. 76
Treaties, agreements, etc., June 91, July

92, Oct. 91, Nov. 65, 66
U.S. economic and security assistance,
proposed: Abrams, Sept. 42; Buckley,
July 78, 79; Enders, Feb. 81, July 84,
85; Haig, Jan. 18, Apr. 37, May 36, PR
86, 3/3; Reagan, Jan. 8
Certification for: Abrams, Apr. 68;
Department, Mar. 62; Enders, Apr.
87, Sept. 60, 72; Reagan, Sept. 27
U.S. emergency security assistance, pro-
posed: Department, Mar. 62; Enders,
Mar. 61, 64
U.S. military assistance, extent of: De-
partment, Feb. 79?i; Enders, Aug. 76,
Sept. 61; Haig, May 69, PR 70, 2/7, PR

74, 2/22

U.S. news reports, question of accuracy
(Haig), PR 80, 3/1
Elizabeth H, July 29

Enders, Thomas O., Feb. 80, Mar. 61, 64,

Apr. 87, July 83, Aug. 73, 76, Sept. 60,

68, 70, 72, 75, Oct. 66, 72, 78, Nov. 57

Energy resources and problems (see also

Nuclear energy): Reagan, July 5

Alaskan gas pipeline; Haig, Aug. 54;

Hormats, June 51; MacGuigan, Aug. 54;
Niles, Apr. 50
Aswan High Dam Power Station, rehabili-
tation and modernization, project grant
agreement with Egypt, July 92
Canada, national policy: Hormats, June 51;
Johnston, Jan. 32

Energy resources and problems (Cont'd)
Coal liquefaction (SRC- 11 process), bi-
lateral agreements: Federal Republic of
Germany, Japan (termination), Jan. 91
New and Renewable Sources of Energy,
U.N. Conference, Nairobi (Aug. 10-21):
Anderson, Jan. 63; Reagan, Jan. 63
Program of Action, Jan. 66
Oil:
Caribbean oil imports and production,

Sept. center section
Middle East supplies, protection of: May
center section; Holdridge, Apr. 57;
Reagan, Sept. 27; Veliotes, Jan. 49;
Wendt, Nov. 37
Research and development bilateral agree-
ments: Italy, June 91; Japan, Aug. 79;
U.S.S.R., Aug. 80
Siberian-West Europe natural gas pipeline.

See under Soviet Union
Solar photovoltaic power demonstration,
bilateral agreement with Gabon, May
79
U.S. energy policy (Wendt), Nov. 35
U.S. -European cooperation (Hormats), Mar.
39
Engert, Cornelius Van H., Mar. 3
Environmental problems and control (see also
Oil pollution):
Arid and semiarid land management and
control of desertification, bilateral
agreement with Mexico, June 91, July
92
Deforestation (Anderson), Jan. 64
Environmental modification, prohibition of
military or other hostile use, conven-
tion (1977): Belgium, Nov. 65; Egypt,
June 90; Italy, Feb. 82; Japan, Aug.
77
Forest fires, fighting of, mutual assistance

agreement with Canada, July 92
Prevention of marine pollution by dumping
of wastes and othe- matter, convention
(1972): Brazil, Sept. 80; Gabon, Ireland,
Kiribati, Aug. 78
Prevention of pollution from ships, interna-
tional convention (1973), protocol
(1978): Colombia, France, Federal
Republic of Germany, Aug. 78
Transboundary air pollution problems, U.S.-
Canada: Hcrmats, June 50; joint state-
ment, Apr. 51; Niles, Apr. 50
Transboundary air pollution convention
(1979): Belgium, Nov. 66; Canada, Mar.
68; Denmark, Aug. 80; European
Economic Community, Nov. 66; France,
Jan. 90; German Democratic Republic,
Aug. 78; Federal Republic of Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Nov. 66; Spain, Aug. 78;
U.K., Nov. 66
U.N. Environmental Program, special

session (Buckley), June 57
U.S. principles (Buckley), June 59
Waters of Dixon entrance, joint marine
pollution contingency plan, bilateral
agreement with Canada, May 79
Equatorial Guinea, U.S. economic and se-
curity assistance, proposed, July 62

Ethiopia (Kirkpatriclt), Jan. 81
Refugees (Douglas), June 73
Soviet and Cuban presence: Apr. 75;

Crocker, July 62. Dec. 24
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 82, Apr.

91, May 77, July 91
U.S. economic assistance, proposed, July 62
Europe (see also East-West relations and
names ofindmdual countries):
Confidence-building measures and disar-
mament conference, proposed:
Eagleburger, Jan. 39, Mar. 48; Haig,
Apr. 49; NAC, Aug. 67; NATO, July
10; Reagan, July 36; Rostow, Aug. .53;
Shultz, PR 403, 12/28
Eastern;
CSCE Final Act, implementation: Haig,
Apr. 33, 49, PR ,59A, ,3/2; Rostow,
May 41
Polish situation, effect on: Haig, Apr.
33, 49, PR 59A, 3/2; Rostow, May
41
CSCE Madrid Review Conference: Apr.
72, 76; Eagleburger, Jan. 39, Mar.
48; Haig, Apr. 33, 37, 39, 41, 43, PR
60, 2/17; NAC, Aug. 68, 69
Polish situation, discussions: Apr. 72,
76; Haig, Mar. 27, Apr. 37, 40, 43,
PR 60, 2/17
U.S. level of participation, question of
(Haig), Apr. 40
Marshall Plan, origins and implementation
(Sanford), June 17
Soviet disapproval (Landa), June 24
Mutual and balanced force reductions:

Haig, May 33, June 44, July 12; NATO,
July 9, 10, Aug. 67, 68, 69; Reagan,
June 36, July 34, 3.5, 36, 40, 41, 42,
Dec. 5; Rostow, May 42; Shultz, Nov. 8
Western draft treaty tabled (Rostow),
Aug. 53
Western (.see also North Atlantic Treaty
Organization):
Conventional arms transfers to develop-
ing countries (Buckley), Oct. 50
Foreign Relatione of the United States.
1951, Volume III, Western European
Security and the German Question,
released, Aug. 82
Pacifist and antinuclear movements
(Haig), Jan. 16, Mar. 30, PR 80, 3/1
Soviet anti-U.S. propaganda, Oct. 43,
45
Security of (Eagleburger), Jan. 36
U.S. economic relations: Haig, PR 76,

2/23; Hormats, Mar. 35, 43
U.S. relations (Eagleburger), Mar. 46
European Atomic Energy Community,

treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 92, Dec.
74
European Commission on Human Rights,

Apr. 72
European Communities:
Export credit subsidies (Hormats), Mar.

38, 44
Poland, consensus on (Haig), Feb. 14
Trade benefits for Caribbean countries,

Apr. 28
Trade sanctions against Argentina (Haig),

Aug. 66, 67
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 82, June

90, .July 91, 92, Nov. 66
U.S. Ambassador (Vest): Kennedy, Oct. 16
Swearing in, PR 249, 7/29

European Communities (Cont'd)
U.S. economic relations; Haig, PR 76, 2/23;
Haig, Thorn, PR 33, 1/27; Hormats,
Mar. 36, 43
European Court of Human Rights, Apr. 72
European Parliament (Haig), Apr. 34
Evans, Melvin H., swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Trinidad and Tobago, PR 10,
12/31/81
Evans, Rowland, Oct. 7
Evarts, William M. (Schwar), June 5
Export controls (see also under Science and
technology):
Foreign policy aspects: Buckley, Aug. 71;
Johnston, June 55; Meissner, Sept. 30
Exports:
Caribbean Basin countries, Sept. center

section
U.S.:
Agricultural export policy (Reagan), Dec.

12
Promotion (Lamb), Oct. 39
Extradition, bilateral agreements: Colombia,
Feb. 83, Mar. 69, May 79; Netherlands,
Feb. 84, Mar. 69; Philippines, Feb. 84;
Sweden, Sept. 81

Falkland Islands (Malvinas) war: Enders, Oct.
74, 80, Nov. 58; Haig, June 81, Julv 8,
15, 19, 57, 87, Aug. 61, 65, 66, 67, PR
165, 5/10, PR 173, 5/19, PR 193, 6/16,
PR 194, 6/16, PR 200, 6/18; Kirkpatrick,
July 87; OAS, July 90; Reagan, July 5,
Aug. 37, 38; Shultz, Dec. 65
Background: Enders, Oct. 78; Petersen,

June 88
Brazil, position on (Enders), Oct. 74
Falkland Islands overview and map, June

83
Legal aspects of negotiations, annex, Oct.

82
Peru-U.S. proposal and U.K. reply, Oct. 84,

87
U.S. proposals: Oct. 83; texts, and Argen-
tine reply, Oct. 85
Febiger, John C. (Schwar), June 5
Fiji:
UNIDO Constitution, ratification. Mar. 68
U.S. Ambassador (Eckert), swearing in, PR

68, 2/16, PR 114, 4/1
U.S. security assistance, proposed
(Holdridge), July 70
Finland:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 82, Mar.
67, May 77, June 90, July 92, Nov. 66
U.S. Ambassador (Nyborg), swearing in,
PR 4, 1/5
Finnbogadottir, Vigdis, Nov. 38
Fischer, David Joseph, swearing in as Am-
bassador to Seychelles, PR 314, 10/14
Fish and fisheries;
Bivalve mollusca exports, bilateral agree-
ment with Mexico, Jan. 91
Conservation of salmon in the North Atlan-
tic, convention (1982): Canada, Euro-
pean Communities, July 91; Iceland,
July 91, Oct. 91; Norway, July 91; U.S.
July 91, Dec. 72

F^ish and fifiherieii (Cont'd)
Fisheries off coasts of U.S.:
Allocations for 1982, PR 12, 1/7
Bilateral agreements: Japan, Nov. 67;
Korea, Sept. 81. PR 228, 7/26, PR
287, 9/10; Poland, Oct. 91; Spain,
Sept. 81, Oct. 91, PR 231, 7/29;
Soviet Union. July 92, 93, Oct. 91
Reciprocal agreement with U.K., Feb. 84.

Mar. 69
U.S. -Canadian issues (Hormats), June 51
Whaling:
International convention (1946), with
schedule of whaling regulations: An
tigua and Barbuda, Oct. 91; Belize,
Dominica (withdrawal). Federal
Republic of Germany, Sept. 80;
Kenya, Feb. 82; Monaco, May 78;
Netherlands Antilles, Apr. 91;
Senegal, Sept. 80
International observer scheme, agree-
ment (1975), extension to Japan
(1982), June 91
Food production and shortages:
World Food Day, 1982, proclamation

(Reagan), Dec. 32
World Food Program, appropriations re-
quest, FY 1983 (Piatt), July 82
Foote, Lucius H. (Schwar), June 12
Forberg, Franklin S., swearing in as Ambas

sador to Sweden, PR 7, 1/5
Ford, Gerald (quoted), Apr. 38
Foreign aid, U.S.: Haig, Mar. 82; Reagan,
July 21
Caribbean Basin Development Plan. See

Congress, U.S.: Legislation, proposed
Economic support funds (ESF): Buckley,

Oct. 57
FY 1983 appropriations requests: Buckley,
July 77; Crocker, July 61; Draper, July
74; Enders, July 83; Haig, Apr. 35, 36"
July 64, PR 86, 3/3; Holdridge, July 65
Aug. 58; Lyman, Jan. 28; Piatt, July
80; Thomas, July 70; Veliotes, July 72
Human rights considerations: Mar. 42, Apt
74, 76; Abrams, Sept. 44; Johnston,
Mar. 41
Foreign policy, U.S.: Haig, Mar. 32, PR 26,
1/27; Shultz, Sept. 11, Oct. 10
Executive branch, organization and facili-
ties, Aug. center section
Executive responsibility: Haig, PR 70, 2/17

Reagan, Aug. 36
Principles, objectives, and purposes:

Buckley, July 78; Bush, Aug. 42; Clark,
Dec. 34, 37; Eagleburger, Mar. 47;
Haig, Jan. 16, May 36, June 40, July
47, PR 75, 2/23, PR 80, 3/1, PR 194,
6/16; Reagan, June 39; Rostow, Nov.
16; Shultz, Oct. 1, Nov. 1
Regional policy conferences on U.S. -Soviet
relations, announcement, PR 262, 8/26
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951,
Volume III, We,sier7i European Security
and the German Question, released, Aug.
82
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-
195J,, Volume XIII, Indochina, released,
Oct. 94

,'i

Department of State Bulletin

eign Service, Aug. 27

nnual award presentation (Shultz), PR

322, 10/20
oreign Service Day (Reagan, Haig), PR

160, 5/7
Y 1983 request (Haig), July 64
.S. Ambassador, role of (Kennedy), Oct.

nee (Haig), Jan. 16
rms transfers policy, Oct. 57
reaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 89, 90,

Feb. 82, Mar. 67, 68, Apr. 90, May 78,

79, June 90, 91, July 91, Aug. 78, Oct.

90, 91, Nov. 66, Dec. 72, 73, 74
.S. visit of President Mitterrand, May 55
isit of President Reagan; Haig, July 15,

18; Mitterrand, July 17; Reagan, July

15,20
■isit of Secretary Shultz, PR 384, 12/15
inklin, Benjamin: Oct. 71 (quoted): Wells,
May 2ff
iedication of statue, announcement, PR

158, 5/7
jedom of information (Buckley), June 78
slinghuysen, Frederick T. (Schwar), June
4ff

nderburk, David, swearing m as Am-
bassador to Romania, PR 219, 7/14

bon:

Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 82, Apr.

90, 91, May 79, July 91, Aug. 78
J.S. security Assistance, proposed, July 62
imbia, The:
3ommon Fund for Commodities agreement,

signature, Jan. 89
U.S. economic assistance, proposed, July 62
indhi, Indira, Sept. 54
irdner, Michael R., appointment as Chair-
man of U.S. delegation to the Plenipoten-
tiary Conference of the International
Telecommunications Union, PR 148, 4/28
is and bacteriological warfare, Geneva con-
vention (1925): Howe, Oct. 46
aulle, Charles de (Reagan), July 20
ayman, Gweneth, appointment to East-West

Center Board of Governors, PR 183, 6/1
lemayel, Amin, Dec. 41
eneral Assembly, U.N.:
Resolutions, texts:
Kampuchea, Jan. 80
Lebanon, Sept. 18, Nov. 56
37th session (Shultz), Nov. 1

U.S. delegation, Nov. 6
eneva conventions (1949) on treatment of
armed forces, civilian persons, and
prisoners of war: Dominica, St. Lucia,
Solomon Islands, Jan. 90
Protocol I re protection of victims of inter-
national armed conflicts: Austria, Den-
mark, Nov. 66; Korea, May 78;
Mauritius, Oct. 91; Norway, Switzer-
land, May 78; Vietnam, Jan. 90; Zaire,
Oct. 91
Protocol II re protection of victims of non-
international armed conflict: Austria,
Denmark, Nov. 66; Korea, May 78;
Mauritius, Oct. 91; Norway, Switzer-
land, May 78

Genocide convention (1948): Cyprus, June 90;
Papua New Guinea, Apr. 90; St. Vincent
and the Grenadines, Jan. 89
German Democratic Republic (Shultz), PR
316, 10/18
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 82, June
90, Aug. 78, Oct. 91, Nov. 66
Germany, Federal Republic of:
Arms exports, Oct. 57
Chancellor Schmidt's Bundestag speech,
question of U.S. press coverage (Haig),
Feb. 16, 18
Nuclear proliferation concerns (Haig), Mar.

30
Poland, position on (Haig), Feb. 15, PR 16,

1/12
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 89, 90, 91,
Feb. 82, 83, Apr. 90, 91, 92, May 77,
June 90, 91, July 91, 92, Aug. 78, Sept.
80, Oct. 90, Nov. 66, 67, Dec. 74
U.S. AFE A-10 aircraft at Forward Oper-
ating Locations (FOLS), bilateral agree-
ment, Feb. 83
U.S. relations: Burns, June 60; Haig, Feb.

15, PR 196, 6/16; Reagan, Sept. 26
U.S. visit of Chancellor Kohl, program, PR

348, 11/12
U.S. visit of Chancellor Schmidt: Haig,

Feb. 13; joint statement, Feb. 12
Visit of President Reagan (Reagan), July

32, 35, 38
Wartime host nation support agreement
with U.S., signature: joint statement,
June 61; Reagan, July 23
Geyer, Georgie Anne, Nov. 43
Ghana:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 19, Nov.

67
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed, July 62
Glitman, Maynard (Kennedy), Oct. 16
Gonzalez, Felix (Felipe): Haig, Apr. 43, 45,

PR 70, 2/17
Graham, D. Robert, PR 75, 2/23
Great Seal, 200th anniversary celebration,

announcement, PR 190, 6/15
Greece:
Aegean dispute with Turkey (Haig), Aug.

61, 63
Soviet anti-U.S. propaganda, Oct. 43, 44
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 90, Feb.
82 Mar. 67, 68, Apr. 90, May 78, June
90, July 91, Sept. 80, Oct. 90, Dec. 74
U S economic and security assistance, pro-
posed: Buckley, July 78, 79; Haig, Apr.
36, PR 86, 3/3; Thomas, July 71
Visit of Secretary Haig (Haig), Aug. 62,
PR 171, 5/18
Grenada: Apr. 17; Boswell. Oct. 75
Cuban influence: Sept. 65; Bosworth, Oct.
76; Department, Feb. 76; Enders, Nov.
58; Reagan, June 38
International telecommunications conven-
tion, accession, Apr. 91
Guatemala: Apr. 20; Bosworth, Nov. 63;
Enders, July 85; Haig, July 49
Cuban/Nicaraguan intervention: Depart-
ment, Feb. 74; Enders, Aug. 73, 74, 76
Sept. 63; Haig, July 49, PR 80, 3/1
Development bank loans, proposed

(Johnston), Mar. 41
Terrorist groups, Aug. 19
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 83, Apr.
91, July 91, Nov. 66, Dec. 73

Guatemala (Cont'd)
U.S. economic and security assistance,
proposed: Bosworth, Nov. 65; Enders,
July 86
Guinea:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 89, Mar.

67, Apr. 91, Aug. 79, Nov. 66
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed, July 62
Guinea-Bissau, U.S. economic and security

assistance, proposed, July 62
Gumbel, Bryant, Nov. 42
Guyana, Apr. 21

Cuban intervention (Department), Feb. 76
Gwertzman, Bernard, July 52, Oct. 7

Habib, Philip C. (see also under Arab-Israeli
conflict and Lebanon), biographical
details, Sept. 17
Haig, Alexander: Reagan, Jan. 9; Shultz,
Oct. 1
Addresses, remarks, statements, and cor-
respondence:
Afghanistan, Soviet occupation, Apr. 34,

40, 41, Aug. 65
Afghanistan Day, PR 80, 3/1
Africa, U.S. Investment and Trade Com-
mission, PR 14, 1/11
Alaska gas pipeline, Aug. 54
Angola, Jan. 17, Apr. 44, 45, PR 80,

3/1, PR 99, 3/17
Arab-Israeli conflict (for details, see Arab-
Israeli conflict) Apr. 45, July 44, PR
19, 1/19, PR 26, 1/27
Autonomy talks, Jan. 17, Mar. 28, 31,
Apr. 80, 81, 83, May 36, PR 19,
1/19, PR 20, 1/18, PR 21, 1/18, PR

27, 1/19, PR 36, 2/3, PR 41, 2/2,
PR 74, 2/22

Golan Heights, Isrieli annexation,

Feb. 26, Apr. 83
Sinai Multinational Force and

Observers, signature, PR 155, 5/3
Sinai return to Egypt, Feb. 26, Mar.

28, Apr. 35, May 36

West Bank and Gaza, Israeli replace-
ment of Arab mayors. May 37
Arab-U.S. relations. Mar. 31
Chad, Mar. 29, Apr. 34, PR 20, 1/18
Chemical weapons, Soviet use of, Apr. 41
China:
Taiwan, May 37, July 50
U.S. arms sales policy. Mar. 31,
July 50
U.S. relations. May 37, July 50, PR 80,
3/1
Clark, William, Mar. 32, PR 100, 3/17
Council on Foreign Relations, and Tri-
lateral Commission, PR 80, 3/1
Cuba, interventionism and Soviet sup-
port: Jan. 4, Mar. 28, 31, Apr. 34,
May 36, July 48, PR 26, 1/27, PR 34,
1/27 PR 74, 2/22, PR 76, 2/23, PR
80, 3/1, PR 99, 3/17, PR 100, 3/17
Cyprus, Aug. 63

Defense, May 32, PR 80, 3/1, PR 196,
6/16

ndex1982

Haig, Alexander (Cont'd)

Developing countries, Jan. 16, Apr. 37,

June 40, 42, PR 75, 2/23, PR 80, 3/1
Disarmament, U.N. role, Apr. 49
Drugs, international control programs,

PR 74, 2/22
East-West relations. Mar. 27, June 41,
July 4, 8, 12, Aug. 65, PR 18, 1/12,
PR 26, 1/27, PR 76, 2/23, PR 196,
6/16
Economy, domestic, July 4, 15, PR 33,

1/27
Economy, world, June 41, PR 75, 2/23
Cancun summit, Jan. 2, 16
Versailles summit, July 4, 7-8, 15, 18,
56
Egypt:
U.S. economic and security assistance,

proposed, Apr. 80, 81, 82
Visit to. See under Egypt
El Salvador: Jan. 18, Apr. 37, May 36,
68, 72, July 49, PR 70, 2/17, PR 74,
2/22, PR 80, 3/1, PR 86, 3/3, PR 98,
3/17, PR 100, 3/17
Elections, Mar. 29, 32, Apr. 34, 41,
May 35, 71, 74
Europe:
Antinuclear peace movement, Jan. 16,

Mar. 30, PR 80, 3/1
Confidence-building measures, French

proposal, Apr. 49
CSCE, Madrid conference, Apr. 33, 37,

39, 40, 43, 48
Mutual and balanced force reductions,
May 33, June 44, July 12
European Economic Community, U.S.
relations, PR 33, 1/27, PR 76, 2/23
European Parliament, Apr. 34
Falkland Islands, June 81, July 8, 15, 19,
57, 87, Aug. 61, 65, 66, 67, PR 165,
5/10, PR 173, 5/17, PR 193, 6/16, PR
194, 6/16, PR 200, 6/18
Foreign aid, Jan. 18, Apr. 35, 36, July

64, PR 86, 3/3
Foreign policy, Jan. 16, Mar. 32, June 40,
PR 26, 1/27, PR 74, 2/22, PR 75,
2/23, PR 80, 3/1
Foreign Service, authorization request,

FY 1983, July 64
France, Jan. 16

Visit of President Reagan, July 15, 18
General Dozier, Feb. 26, PR 41, 2/2
Germany, Federal Republic of, Feb. 15,
18, Mar. 30
U.S. visit of Chancellor Schmidt, Feb.
13
Greece, Apr. 36, PR 86, 3/3, PR 171,
5/18
Greek-Turkish relations, Aug. 61, 63
High technology of potential military
application, control of, July 8, 12,
Aug. 65, PR 33, 1/27, PR 76, 2/23
Immigration quotas, PR 75, 2/23
Iran-Iraq war, Apr. 82, July 15, 44, 45,

Aug. 66
Israel:
Strategic cooperation agreement. Mar.

31
U.S. relations, Feb. 25, Mar. 28, PR 21,
1/18, PR 27, 1/19, PR 443, 1/5, PR
70, 2/17, PR 194, 6/16

Haig, Alexander (Cont'd)

Japan, Reagan-Suzuki discussions, July 18
Kampuchea, Mar. 29, Apr. 34
Latin America, PR 80. 3/1, PR 200, 6/18
Caribbean and Central America, Mar.
32, Apr. 41, July 47, PR 70, 2/17,
PR 74, 2/22
Caribbean Basin economic development
proposals, Jan. 2, 18, Mar. 28, Apr.
34, 35, 36, May 64, 68, 71, July 48,
PR 75, 2/23, PR 86, 3/3, PR 99,
3/17
Protocol I of Treaty of Tlatelolco, U.S.
ratification, Jan. 85
Lebanon, Jan. 17, Feb. 26, Apr. 82,
July 44, 46, 60, PR 26, 1/27, PR 70,
2/17, PR 193, 6/16, PR 194, 6/16, PR
195, 6/16, PR 196, 6/16, PR 197A,
6/18, PR 197B, 6/11, PR 200, 6/18
Israeli incursions, July 7, 13, 46, 55
Libya, Feb. 26, Mar. 29, 31, Apr. ,34, 46,

Aug. 62, PR 26, 1/27, PR 33, 1/27
Middle East, U.S. strategic concern,
Jan. 17, Mar. 31, Apr. 36, 47, 81, PR
86, 3/3
Morocco, U.S. relations, Apr. 45
Namibia, Jan. 17, Mar. 29, Apr. 34, 44,

PR 80, 3/1, PR 99, 3/17
Nicaragua, Jan. 4, Mar. 28, 32, 69, Apr.
34, 43. May 68, 69, 71, PR 74, 2/22,
PR 80, 3/1, PR 100, 3/17
North Atlantic Council ministerial
meetings:
Bonn (June 10), July 8, 11, PR 197A,

6/18
Brussels (Jan. 10-12), Feb. 14, 20, PR

17, 1/12, PR 18, 1/12
Luxembourg (May 17-18, 1982), Aug.
64
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, May
31, June 41, July 12, 58, Aug. 61, 63,
65, PR 196, 6/16, PR 200, 6/18
Poland, position on, Jan. 42, Feb. 14,
Mar. 30, Apr. 43, PR 16, 1/12, PR
37, 2/3
Spain, accession, Apr. 42, 44, July 11,
Aug. 64, PR 26, 1/27
Nuclear non-first-use, Soviet proposal.
May 32, 37, July 58, PR 200, 6/18
Nuclear war, reduction of risk by miscal-
culation or accident, proposed, PR
197A, 6/18
OAS, 11th regular session, St. Lucia,

Jan. 1
Pakistan, Jan. 17, Apr. 36, July 44, PR

86, 3/3
Poland {for details, see Poland), Jan. 40,
Feb. 13, 20, Apr. 37, 40, July 4, PR
28, 1/25, PR 34, 1/27. PR 59A, 3/2,
PR 442, 1/5
Ambassador Spasowski, asylum in U.S.,

Feb. 24
Debt situation, PR 70. 2/17
NATO, position, Feb. 14, 22. Mar. 30,
Apr. 43, PR 16, 1/2. PR 18, 1/12,
PR 37, 2/3
Solidarity Day, Mar. 32, PR 39, 2/2
U.S. economic sanctions. Mar. 27, 30.
33. Apr. 33, May 35. July 57. PR
443. 1/5, PR 18, 1/12, PR 74, 2/22.
PR 76. 2/23. PR 80. 3/1

Haig, Alexander (Cont'd)

Portugal. Apr. 43, 44, Aug. 67, PR 60,

2/17, PR 61, 2/19
Qadhafi, Muammar, Apr. 46
Refugees. PR 75. 2/23. PR 80. 3/1
Romania. Apr. 47

Soviet Union {for details, see Soviet
Union). Apr. 40, 45, 49, 81, 82, Maj
32, 37, June 40, 42, July 4, 8, 12, li
PR 197A, 6/18
Intermediate-range nuclear weapons
(INF), negotiations, Jan. 16, 30,
Feb. 14, Mar. 29, May 33, June 4
July 58, Aug. 65, PR 18, 1/12. PF
26, 1/27, PR 28, 1/25, PR 34, 1/2'
PR 76, 2/23
Siberian gas pipeline project, Feb. 18,

Apr. 43, July 57, PR 76, 2/23
Strategic arms reduction talks

(START), negotiations. Mar. 27, 2
Apr. 33, May 33, 34, 36, June 44,
July 53, 54, 58, Aug. 65, PR 26,
1/27
U.S. grain sales, Feb. 17, PR 18, 1/12
PR 74, 2/22, PR 76, 2/23, PR 80,
3/1
U.S. sanctions, Feb. 16, 17, 22, Mar.
30, Apr. 33, May 35, July 8, 57. F
39. 2/2, PR 74, 2/22, PR 80, 3/1
Spain, Apr. 42, PR 59A, 3/2
Terrorism, international. Feb. 26, Apr.

83, July 65, PR 160, 5/7
Totalitarianism, May 36, PR 75, 2/23
Trade, Jan. 3, Mar. 29, Apr. 35, July 18

PR 76, 2/23
Turkey, Jan. 17, Apr. 35, 36, Aug. 60,

PR 33, 1/27, PR 86, 3/3, PR 168, 5/
Vietnam, PR 80, 3/1
Weinberger. Caspar, PR 70, 2/17
Western Sahara, Mar. 29, Apr. 34. 46
Interviews, transcripts. Mar. 29, May 35
News conferences and press briefings, Fe
13, Apr. 39, 42, 43, 47, 80, July 11,
Aug. 62. 64, PR 18, 1/12, PR 26, 1/27
PR 27, 1/19, PR 33, 1/27, PR 34, 1/27
PR 74, 2/22, PR 75, 2/23, PR 99, 3/17
PR 100, 3/17, PR 193, 6/16. PR 194.
6/16, PR 195, 6/16, PR 196, 6/16, PR
197A, 6/18, PR 197B. 6/11
Question-and-answer sessions, Jan. 40, PR

75, 2/23, PR 80, 3/1
Re.signation: Haig, Aug. 52; Reagan, Aug.

36, 37, 52
Special briefing, PR 165, 5/10
Television interviews, Feb. 24, PR 443, 1/i
PR 16, 1/12, PR 70, 2/17, PR 200, 6/1!
Visits to:
Europe, Mar. 28, Apr. 37, Aug. 60. PR
37, 2/3 (London), PR 59A. 3/2, PR 6(
2/17. PR 61, 2/19, PR 65, 2/18
Arrival statement, Brussels, PR 17,

1/12, PR 168, 5/17, PR 171, .5/18
Press conferences. PR 33, 1/27, PR 34
1/27
Middle East: Mar. 28; Haig, Mar. 28, 31,
PR 19. 1/19, PR 20. 1/18; Reagan,
Mar. 26; Shultz. Oct. 6-7
North Africa. Apr. 37. PR 63. 2/19

Department of State Bulleti

ti. Apr. 22
'extile agreement with U.S., July 92, PR
246, 8/12
Treaties, agreements, etc.. Mar. 69, Oct.

91, Nov. 67, Dec. 74
arlan, Josiah, Mar. 2
arriman, W. Averell (Sanford), June 23
artman, Arthur A., swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Soviet Union, PR 9, 1/5
assan II, King of Morocco, Dec. 43
ealth and medical research:
Alcohol-related problems, scientific coopera-
tion on, bilateral agreement with Mex-
ico, May 79
Biomedical research and technology, co-
operation, bilateral agreement with
Federal Republic of Germany, Dec. 74
Cairo water supply, amendment of project
grant agreement with Egypt, Feb. 83,
Nov. 67
International health regulations (1969), ad-
ditional regulations (1981), entry into
force, June 90
Saudi Arabian national guard medical serv-
ices project, bilateral agreement with
Saudi Arabia, May 79
World Health Organization:
Constitution (1946), acceptance, Bhutan,
May 78
Amendment to article 74: Bahrain,
Bhutan, Aug. 78; Jordan, Nov. 66;
Mauritania, Sept. 80; Netherlands,
Apr. 92; Soviet Union, July 92;
United Arab Emirates, Nov. 66;
Yemen (Sanaa), May 79
Amendments to articles 24 and 25:
Bhutan, Aug. 78; Brazil, Chile,
Nov. 66; China, Gabon, Aug. 78;
Ireland, Apr. 92; Democratic
Republic of Korea, May 79;
Lebanon, Nov. 66; Liberia, Libya,
Sept. 80; Mauritania, Aug. 78;
Mongolia, Feb. 83; Sao Tome and
Principe, July 92; Sudan, Nov. 66;
Vietnam, Apr. 92; Yemen (Aden),
Sept. 80; Yemen (Sanaa), May 79
Disabled persons (Reich), Mar. 59
Tribute to (Shultz), PR 342, 11/12
Herman, George, Feb. 24, July 52, Oct. 10
Herrera Campins, Luis, Jan. 87, 88
Herter, Christian A. (Sanford), June 25
Hewitt, William Alexander, swearing in as
Ambassador to Jamaica, PR 343, 11/3
Hinton, Deane R., Dec. 68
Hoffman, Paul (Sanford), June 26
Holcombe, Chester (Schwar), June 9, 10
Holdridge, John H., Feb. 59, Apr. 52, July
65, Aug. 58, Oct. 19, 29, Nov. 29, 31
Ambassador to Indonesia, swearing in, PR
401, 12/27
Honduras, Apr. 23
Cuban-Nicaraguan intervention: Bosworth,
Nov. 60; Department, Feb. 75; Enders,
Feb. 80, Aug. 73, 75
Democratic progress: Bosworth, Nov. 60;
Enders, July 85, Sept. 72, 74, Nov. 57;
Haig, July 48
Treaties, agreements, etc., Sept. 80
U.S. economic and security assistance:
Enders, Mar. 66, July 84, Sept. 74;
Haig, Apr. 37, July 49, PR 86, 3/3

Honduras (Cont'd)
U.S. use of certain facilities, bilateral

agreement, Sept. 80
U.S. visit of President Suazo (Reagan,
Suazo) Oct. 71, PR 212, 7/12
Hong Kong, textile agreement with U.S.,

amendment, Sept. 81, PR 223, 7/20
Hormats, Robert D., Jan. 34, Feb. 40, Mar.

35, 43, Apr. 61, June 50
Hornibrook, William H., Mar. 4
House, Karen Elliott, May 35, Oct. 7
Howe, Jonathan T., Oct. 46
Director of Bureau of Politico-Military Af-
fairs (Haig), PR 165, 5/10
Hughes, John, swearing in as Assistant Sec-
retary for Public Affairs, and Department
Spokesman, PR 258, 8/20
Human rights: Apr. 75; Ford, Apr. 38
(quoted); Kirkpatrick, Feb. 65; Reagan,
July 21, 39; Shultz, Nov. 7, PR 316,
10/18, PR 342, 11/2
Afghanistan (Stoessel), Apr. 86
American convention on human rights

(1969), ratification, Barbados, Mar. 67
Country Reports on Human Rights Prac-
tices for 1981, introduction (in full),
Apr. 71
Cuba (Kirkpatrick), Feb. 66
East Asia and Pacific (Holdridge), July 65
Eastern Europe. See Europe: CSCE Final

Act
El Salvador: Abrams, Apr. 68, Sept. 41;
Enders, Mar. 62, Apr. 87, Sept. 60;
Hinton, Dec. 68
Ethiopia (Kirkpatrick), Jan. 81
Foreign policy considerations: Abrams,
Sept. 43; Clark, Dec. 35; Haig, May 65;
Johnston, June 55
Free political systems: Apr. 75; Shultz,

Dec. 15
Grenada (Bosworth), Oct. 76
Human Rights Day and Week, 1981, proc-
lamation (Reagan), Feb. 46
International covenant on civil and politi-
cal rights (1966): Bolivia, Nov. 65;
Egypt, Mar. 67; St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Jan. 89; Vietnam, Dec. 73
Optional protocol (1966), accession, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, Jan. 89
International covenants on economic, social,
and cultural rights (1966): Bolivia, Nov.
65; Egypt, Mar. 67; St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Jan. 89; Solomon Islands,
May 77; Vietnam, Dec. 73
Korea, Republic of (Holdridge), July 66
Latin America, Apr. 72
Libya (Adelman), Jan. 62
Nicaragua: Abrams, Apr. 69; Haig, PR 74,

2/22
Personal liberties (Clark), Dec. 35
Poland: Feb. 12, Apr. 76; Department,
Feb. 4, Apr. 67, May 56; Haig, Feb. 20,
23, 25, Mar. 27, 33, Apr. 37, 43, 49, PR
443, 1/5, PR 39, 2/2; NAC, Feb. 19,
Aug. 67, 68, 69; Reagan, Jan. 10, Feb.
2, July 33, Aug. 64, Dec. 11; Rostow,
May 41
Religious intolerance and discrimination
based on belief, elimination of, draft
declaration, Apr. 72

Hungary:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 69, Apr.
90, 91, May 77, June 90, July 91, 92,
Aug. 78, Sept. 80
U.S. Ambassador (Bergold), swearing
in, PR 5, 1/5
Hussein I, King of Jordan, Jan. 50

Iceland:

Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 82, Mar.
67, Apr. 90, June 90, July 91, Oct. 91

U.S. Ambassador (Brement), swearing in
PR 216, 7/14

U.S. visit of President Finnbogadottir: Nov.
38; Reagan, Nov. 38, 39
Program, PR 268, 8/30
Immigration {see also Refugees):

Caribbean countries, Sept. center section

Demographic impact: Asencio, Mar. 53;
Benedick, Feb. 63

U.S. policy: Dam, Dec. 56; Douglas, June
73, Dec. 59; Haig, PR 75, 2/23; Reagan,
Dec. 61; Vine, July 75
Imports, U.S., injury tests and countervailing

duties (Brock), PR 364, 12/7
Income taxes:

Americans abroad, proposed taxation revi-
sions (Lamb), Oct. 39

Bilateral agreements: Israel, Malta, Jan.
91; Philippines, Feb. 84, Mar. 69 (with
reservation)

Reimbursement, bilateral agreements: In-
ternational Cotton Advisory Council,
Feb. 83; Inter-Parliamentary Union,
Mar. 69; Philippines, Nov. 67; South
Pacific Commission, Aug. 79; World
Tourism Organization, Feb. 84

Transportation income of shipping and air
transport enterprises, mutual exemp-
tion from, bilateral agreement with
China, June 91
India:

Economic development (Crocker), Nov. 15

Population growth (Benedick), Dec. 54

Profile, Sept. 56

Tarapur atomic power station, use of

French-supplied uranium (Department),
Sept. 58

Textile agreement with U.S., amendment,
June 91, July 92, PR 127, 128, 129,
4/14, PR 149, 4/30

Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 91, Feb.
83, Mar. 67, 68, May 78, June 90, Aug.
79, Dec. 74

U.S. development assistance, proposed
(Veliotes), July 74

U.S. visit of Prime Minister Gandhi: De-
partment, Sept. 58; Gandhi, Reagan,
Sept. 54, 55; program, PR 226, 7/26
Indochina, Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1952-195J,. Volume XHI, In-
dochina, released, Oct. 94
Indonesia:

East Timor (Holdridge), Nov. 29

Family planning (McPherson), Jan. 83

Treaties, agreements, etc.. Mar. 69, July
92, Aug. 77, 78

U.S. Ambassador (Holdridge), swearing in,
PR 401, 12/27

U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed (Holdridge), July 66, 69

Index 1982

Indonesia (Cont'd/
U.S. visit of President Soeharto: Dec. 29;
program, PR 308, 10/7
Industrial property:
Nice agreement (1977): Austria, Aug. 78;
German Democratic Republic, June 90;
Federal Republic of Germany. Jan. 90;
Hungary, Portugal, Aug. 78
Phonograms, protection of producers
against unauthorized duplication of
their phonograms, convention (1971):
Austria, Aug. 78; Costa Rica, June 90;
Venezuela, Dec. 73
Protection of (Convention of Paris, 1883),
as revised (1967): Guinea, Oct. 91;
Saudi Arabia, June 90; Zimbabwe, Jan.
90
Vienna agreement and protocol (1973) for
protection of typefaces and their inter-
national deposit. Federal Republic of
Germany, Apr. 91
World Intellectual Property Organization,
convention establishing (1967): Mali,
Aug. 78; Somalia, Dec. 73; Zimbabwe,
Jan. 90
Intelligence services (Haig), PR 80, 3/1
Inter-American Commission on Human

Rights (lAHRC), Apr. 73
Interdependence of modern world:
Crocker. Dec. 22; Haig, June 42;
Rostow, Nov. 18; Shultz, Aug. 50, Dec.
66; Versailles summit, July 6
International Atomic Energy Agency, U.S.

contribution, proposed (Piatt), July 82
International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (World Bank): Apr. 28;
Anderson, Jan. 65
Articles of agreement (1944): Belize, June
90; Hungary, Sept. 80; St. Vincent and
the Grenadines, Dec. 72
International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC):
East Timor, activities in (Holdridge), Nov.

30
Lebanon, Sept. 2, 7

U.S. contribution, proposed (Vine), July 76
International Cotton Advisory Committee,
income tax reimbursement, bilateral
agreements with U.S., Feb. 83
International Development Association
(IDA): McPherson, Jan. 84; Versailles
summit, July 6
Guatemala, proposed loans to (Johnston),
Mar. 41
International Monetary Fund: Apr. 28;
Crocker, Feb, 29; Reagan, July 4; Shultz,
Nov. 6, Dec. 66; Versailles summit,
July 7
Articles of agreement, current actions:
Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, May 77;
Hungary, Sept. 80
International Year of Disabled Persons

(Reich), Mar. 58
Inter-Parliamentary Union, income tax reim-
bursement procedure, bilateral agree-
ment. Mar. 69
Investment of private capital abroad:
Enders, Sept. 75; Hormats, June 51;
Johnston, Jan. 32; McPherson, Jan. 84
Africa (Crocker), Jan. 24, Feb. 29, Nov. 13
ASEAN: May 47; Albrecht, Oct. 33;
Stoessel, May 46

Investment of private capital abroad (Cont'd)
Caribbean Basin countries (see also Latin
America: Caribbean Basin Development
Plan): Reagan, Apr. 4
Investment code, need for: Lamb, Oct. 39;

Reagan, July 3
Latin America (Enders), Sept. 77, Nov. 59
U.S. -EC cooperation, proposed (Hormats),

Mar. 39
Zimbabwe (Crocker), June 47
Iran:
Muslim fundamentalist movement (Haig),

July 56
Terrorist activities, Aug. 21
U.S. claims against, Jan. 49
U.S. relations, question of (Veliotes), June

66
Iran-Iraq conflict: July 24; Department, Sept.
59; Haig, Apr. 82, July 15, 44, 45; Aug.
66; Johnston, June 56; Reagan, July 5;
Security Council, Sept. 59; Sherman,
Sept. 59; Veliotes, Jan. 48, June 66, July
72; White House, Sept. 59
Iraq, Aug. 21
Universal postal convention, ratification,

Dec. 73
U.S. export controls adjustments

(Johnston), June 56
Ireland:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 89, Feb.

82, Mar. 68, Apr. 92, June 90. Aug. 78,

Oct. 90, Nov. 66, Dec. 72
U.S. Ambassador (Dailey), swearing in, PR

214, 7/14
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Haughey, pro-
gram, PR 97, 3/16
Israel:
Arms industry (Buckley), Oct. 60
Cash assistance grant, bilateral agreement,

Apr. 92, June 91
Golan Heights, annexation of: Department,

Jan. 60; Haig, Feb. 26. Apr. 83;

Reagan, Jan. 10, 11; Security Council

resolution 497, Jan. 60
Internal affairs: Shultz, Oct. 12, Nov. 43;

Veliotes, Nov. 44
Security, U.S. commitment (see also U.S.

economic and security assistance,

infra): Reagan, Sept. 25, 27, Nov. 10;

Shultz, Aug. 52, Oct. 9, 12; Veliotes,

Jan. 48
Strategic cooperation, memorandum of un-
derstanding with U.S.: Feb. 83; Haig,

Mar. 31; joint press statement, Jan. 45;

test, Jan. 45
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 90, 91,

Feb. 82, 83, Apr. 91, 92, May 77, Nov.

67, Dec. 73
U.N. membership, question of (Shultz),

Dec. 63
U.S. economic and security assistance:

Buckley, July 78, 79; Draper, July 74;

Reagan, Apr. 83; Veliotes, July 73
U.S. F-16s, shipment delay: Reagan, Nov.

11; Shultz, Oct. 11, 12
U.S. policy, question of change: Haig, PR

70, 2/17; Reagan, Nov, 11; Shultz, Nov.

42, PR 403, 12/28
U.S. relations: Department, .Ian. 60; Haig,

Feb. 25
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Begin: Begin,

Reagan, Sept. 45; program, PR 201,

6/21
Visit of Secretary Haig: Mar. 28; Haig, PR

21, 1/18, PR 27, 1/19

Italy:
Terrorist kidnaping of General Dozier:

Haig, Feb. 26, PR 41, 2/2; Reagan,

June 64, July 23
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 91, Feb.

82, Mar. 67, June 90, 91, July 91, Sep

80, Oct. 90, Nov. 66
U.S. visit of Council of Ministers: Preside:

Spadolini, program, PR 339, 11/1
U.S. visit of President Pertini: Pertini,

June 64; Reagan, June 63; program, F

102. 3/23
Visit of President Reagan: Haig, PR 193,

6/16; Pope John Paul II, July 21;

Reagan, July 20, 23; joint statement,

July 24
Ivory Coast:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 89, Feb.

82, Apr. 90, Nov. 65
U.S. security assistance, proposed, July 6i

Jamaica: Apr. 24; Bush, Jan. 13; Departmen
Feb. 75; Reagan, Apr. 4; Shultz, Dec. 15
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 83, Apr.

91, 92, July 92, Nov. 66
U.S. Ambassador (Hewitt), swearing in, P]

343, 11/3
U.S. barter agreement (White House), Ma'

68, June 37
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro

posed: Buckley, July 78; Enders, July

84, 85; Haig, Apr. 31, PR 86, 3/3
Visit of President Reagan (White House),

June 37
Japan:
Economic relations with U.S.: Bush, Aug.

40; Haig, July 18; Holdridge, Apr. 52;

Hormats. Feb. 40; Lamb, Oct. 38
Profile, Apr. 53
Textile agreement with U.S., amendment,

Dec. 74. PR 293, 9/24
Tokai-Mura reprocessing operations

(Malone), Feb. 53
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 91, Feb.

82, Mar. 68, June 90, 91, July 92, Aug.

77, 78, 79, Sept. 81, Nov. 67, Dec. 73,

74
U.S. -Japan meetings on nuclear energy

matters, PR 50, 2/4
U.S. security relationship: Holdridge, Apr.

53, 58; Stoessel, Aug. 56
Visit of Vice President Bush, Aug. 39
World role: Apr. 28; Bush, Aug. 40;

Holdridge, Apr. 55; Stoessel, Aug. 57
Johnson, Lyndon, Mar. 11
Johnston, Ernest B., Jr., Jan. 32, Mar. 41,

Apr. 62, June 55
Jones, John Paul (Wells), May 4
Jordan:
Profile, Jan. 51
30th anniversary of accession of King

Hu.s.sein (Shultz), Oct. 45
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 83, Nov.

66, Dec. 74
U.S. arms sales, question of: Haig. PR 70,

2/17; Reagan, Apr. 83
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed: Buckley, July 78; Veliotes, July

73
U.S. visit of King Hussein: Jan, .50; pro-
gram, PR 393, 12/17

Department of State Bulletin

in Carlos I, King of Spain, Jan. 44
licial matters:

Joeing Company, mutual assistance agree-
ment with India, amendments to in-
clude other companies, Jan. 91, Feb. 83
«, Criminal matters, mutual assistance treaty
^ with U.S., Netherlands, Feb. 84, Mar.'
69
conomic regulation and international jur-
isdictional conflict (Robinson), Oct. 35
General Tire and Rubber Company and
Firestone Tire and Rubber Company
matters, mutual assistance in the ad-
ministration of justice, bilateral agree-
ment with Mexico, Apr. 92
-.etters rogatory, additional protocol to the
inter-American convention, Ecuador,
Aug. 77

lVIA-106 investigation, mutual assistance in
administration of justice, bilateral
agreement with Trinidad and Tobago,
Nov. 68

Mutual legal assistance, treaty with Colom-
bia, Feb. 83. Mar. 69
Service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial
documents in civil or commercial mat-
ters, convention (196.5): Anguilla, Nov.
65; Italy, Mar. 67
Taking of evidence, bilateral agreement
with Federal Republic of Germany, Jan.
91

Taking of evidence abroad in civil and com-
mercial matters, convention (1970),
ratification, Italy, Sept. 80

alb, Marvin, May 35, Oct. 7, Nov. 42, 43
ampuchea {see also Refugees: Indochinese):
ASEAN goal of political settlement: Haig,
Mar. 29; Holdridge, Aug. 59, Oct. 29,
30; Stoessel, May 45, Oct. 28, Nov. 32
Chemical weapons. See Chemical weapons,

reports of use
Khmer resistance groups coalition

(Holdridge), Oct. 29, 30, Nov. 32
U.N. credentials (Holdridge), Nov. 31
U.N. international conference: General
Assembly resolution, Jan. 80;
Holdridge, Nov. 33; Kirkpatrick, Jan.
79
U.S. export controls (Johnston), June 55
Vietnamese occupation and Soviet support:
Buckley, July 79; Bush, Aug. 43; Haig,
Mar. 29, Apr. 34; Holdridge, July 65,
67, Nov. 33; Kirkpatrick, Jan. 78;
Reagan, June 34
Casselbaum, Nancy: Department, Apr. 88;

Reagan, May 30
Catz, Abraham (Kennedy), Oct. 16
Ceefer, Edward C, Aug. 46
Cennan, George (Sanford), June 21
Kennedy, John F., Mar. 10 (quoted), Apr. 1

(quoted). May 41 (quoted)
Cennedy, Richard T., Feb. 56, June 69,
Oct. 15
Ambassador-at-Large, appointment
(Shultz), PR 286, 9/15

Kenya (Crocker), Dec. 24
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 90, Feb.

82, Mar. 67, May 77, June 90, Nov. 65
U.S. economic and security assistance,
proposed: July 62; Buckley, July 79;
Crocker, July 62
Keyworth, George, Nov. 54
Kiribati:
Treaties, agreements, etc., July 91, Aug.

78, Sept. 79

U.S. Ambassador (Eckert), swearing in, PR
68, 2/16
Kirk, Roger (Kennedy), Oct. 16
Kirkpatrick, Jeane J.: Haig, July 57, PR 194,
6/16; Kennedy, Oct. 16
Statements:
Afghanistan, Jan. 57
Ethiopia, Jan. 81
Falkland Islands, July 87
Human rights, Feb. 65
Kampuchea, Jan. 78
Lebanon, Sept. 15, 20
UNIFIL, extension, Sept. 16
U.S. representative to 37th U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly, Nov. 6
Kissinger, Henry A.: Mar. 11, Aug. 41

(quoted): Haig, PR 75, 2/23; Rostow, Nov.
18; Shultz, Sept. 11
Kondracke, Morton, May 35
Korea, reunification proposals: Bush, Aug.

42; Holdridge, July 66
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of:
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 78, 79, Oct.

91
U.S. trade controls (Johnston), June 55
Korea, Republic of: Crocker, Nov. 15;
Holdridge, Apr. 56, July 65
Establishment of U.S. -Korean diplomatic
relations, centennial (Schwar), June 1
Fisheries agreement with U.S., Sept. 81,

PR 228, 7/26
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 91, Feb.
82, 83, Mar. 69, Apr. 92, May 77, 78,

79, June 90, 91, July 92, Aug. 78, Sept.
81, Dec. 74

U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed: Buckley, July 79; Holdridge,
July 66; Stoessel, Aug. 57

Visit of Vice President Bush, Aug. 41
Krug, Julius A. (Sanford), June 23
Kuwait:

Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 82, June
90

U.S. Ambassador (Dickman), swearing in,
PR 13, 1/8

Labor, International Labor Organization:
Constitution (1946), acceptance, Antigua

and Barbuda. June 90
Instrument for amendment of the Consti-
tution (1946), acceptance, Belize, Mar.
67
Technical rehabilitation assistance program
(Reich), Mar. 60
Lamb, Denis, Oct. 38
Lamm, Richard B., PR 75, 2/23
Landa, Ronald D., June 24
Landau, George W., swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Venezuela, PR 255, 8/17, PR
307, 10/5

Laos {see also Refugees: Indochinese):
Reagan, June 34
Chemical weapons. See Chemical weapons,

reports of use
Treaties, agreements, etc.. May 77, Dec. 73
U.S. missing-in-action: Holdridge, Aug. 59;
Stoessel, Oct. 28
Latin America {see also Organization of Am-
erican States and names of individual
countries):
Arms imports (Buckley), Oct. 60
Cape Horn, strategic importance (Enders),

Sept. 74
Caribbean and Central America: Apr. 4;
Enders, Apr. 89, July 83; Haig, Mar.
32, Apr. 41, July 47, PR 70, 2/17, PR
74, 2/22, PR 75, 2/23, PR 80, 3/1;
Mitterrand, May 56; Reagan, May 55;
Shultz, Dec. 65
Background, summary, Apr. 7
Honduran peace proposal (Bosworth),

Nov. 63
San Jose foreign ministers meeting
(Oct. 4), final act: Department, Dec.
69; summary, Dec. 71; text, Dec. 70
U.S. economic and security assistance:
Apr. 15, 18; Buckley, July 78;
Enders, July 83, Aug. 76; Haig, Jan.
18
Caribbean Basin, atlas, Sept. center section
Caribbean Basin Development Plan: Apr. 7,
22, May 67; Bosworth, Oct. 76, Nov.
65; Bush, Jan. 13; Clark, Dec. 34;
Douglas, June 74; Enders, Mar. 66, Ju-
ly 84. 86, Sept. 73, 76, Oct. 81, Nov.
60; Haig, Jan. 2, 3, Mar. 28, Apr. 34,
35, 36, 37, May 66, 68, 71, July 48, PR
86, .3/3, PR 99, 3/17; MacGuigan, May
65; Reagan, Apr. 1, June 38, Oct. 71;
Shultz, Aug. 50, Sept. 28, Nov. 9, Dec.
14, 67; White House, June 38
ASEAN exports to U.S., effect: May 47;

Albrecht, Oct. 34
Cuba and Nicaragua, question of aid to:

Castaneda. May 65; Haig, May 65
Joint meeting of foreign ministers in
New York: Brock, Castaneda, Haig,
Lemos, MacGuigan, Zambrano, May
64
Caribbean Trade, Investment, and Develop-
ment, Miami Conference, program, PR
341, 11/2
Central American Democratic Commu-
nity: Enders, Apr. 89, July 86; Haig,
Mar. 29, May 71; Reagan, Apr. 6
Cuban-Soviet activities. See Cuba: Regional

activities; El Salvador; and Nicaragua
Democratic progress: Enders, July 84, Aug.
76, Sept. 72, Nov. 57; Haig, Jan. 2, July
48; Reagan, July 27, Oct. 69; Shultz,
Dec. 67
Foreign direct investment, need for

(Enders), Sept. 77, Nov. 59
Inter-American system: Enders, Sept. 74,

Nov. 58; Shultz, Dec. 65
TIateloIco treaty (nuclear free zone). Pro-
tocol I: Reagan, June 71; Shultz, Dec.
66
U.S. ratification: Jan. 86; Haig, Jan. 85;
Malone, Feb. 54; text, Jan. 85
Entry into force, Jan. 89

ndex 1982

Latin America (Cont'd)
U.S. policy, interests, role: Enders, Sept.
72, Oct. 82; Haig, PR 80, 3/1, PR 200,
6/18; Reagan, Apr. 1, ,July 21; Shultz,
Dec. 64
Visit of Vice President Bush, Jan. 12
Laurens, Henry (Wells), May 5, 8
Law of the sea conference: Holdridge, Oct.
32; Malone, May 61, Oct. 48; Reagan,
Mar. 54; White House Fact Sheet, Mar.
54
Treaty, U.S. nonratification: Malone, Oct.
48; Reagan, Aug. 71
Lebanon: July 24; Draper, July 75; Habib,
Nov. 47; Haig, Jan. 17, Feb. 26, July 7, 8,
44; Pope John Paul H, July 22; Reagan,
July 5, 22, 43; Veliotes, Jan. 47
Draper mission: Reagan, Nov. 47, 49;

Shultz, PR 276, 9/9; White House, Nov.
47
Habib mission: Haig, Apr. 82, July 7, 47,
60, PR 26, 1/27, PR 193, 6/16, PR 195,
6/16, PR 196, 6/16, PR 197A 6/18, PR
197B, 6/11; Miller, Sept. 19; Reagan,
Aug. 37, Sept. 1, 22, 23, 26, Oct. 2, 5,
7, 10, Nov. 47, 49; Shultz, Aug. 52,
Sept. 8, 9, PR 403, 12/28; Thatcher,
July 31; Veliotes, July 72; White House,
Sept. 22
Humanitarian needs: General Assembly,
Nov. 56; Kirkpatrick, Sept. 20; Lichen-
stein, Sept. 16, 18; Security Council,
Sept. 16, 21; White House, Sept. 22
Inter-agency steering group on, formation

(Reagan), Nov. 47
Israeli military incursion: Begin, Sept. 45;
General Assembly resolution, Sept. 18;
Haig, July 7, 13, 46, 60, PR 70, 2/17,
PR 193, 6/16, PR 194, 6/16, PR 195,
6/16, PR 196. 6/16. PR 197B, 6/11, PR
200, 6/18; Miller, Sept. 18; Reagan,
Aug. 36, 37, 38, Sept. 23; Security
Council resolutions, Sept. 14, 15, 16,
20, 21; Shultz, Aug. 51. Sept. 12;
Veliotes, Nov. 45
Bombardment of West Beirut: Haig, PR

165, 5/10; White House, Sept. 22
Massacre of Palestinians (Sept. 17):
General Assembly resolution, Nov.
56; Reagan, Nov. 10, 48; Security
Council, Nov. 55; Veliotes, Nov. 44;
White House, Nov. 48
U.S. -Arab relations, question of effect:
Haig, July 14; Shultz, Sept. 8, 12, 13
Israeli use of cluster bombs (Reagan), Aug.

38
Multinational force (MNF): Sept. 2, 3, 4, 6;
Boutros, Nov. 50; Shultz, Nov. 42, Dec.
17, 21, PR .384, 12/15
Participation of U.S. troops: Nov. 67,
Dec. 74; Dillon, Nov. 51; Reagan,
Sept. 1, 7, 23, Nov. 10, 47, 49, Dec.
42; Shultz, Sept. 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, Oct.
5, 10, Nov. 3, 43, PR 276, 9/9;
Veliotes, Nov. 43, 45; White House,
Nov. 50
Palestinian Liberation Organization depar-
ture: Fact sheets, Sept. 5; Reagan,
Sept. 1, 7, 22, 23; Shultz, Sept. 8, 10,
11, 12, Oct. 3, 7, 9, 10; White House,
Sept. 5
Schedule and exchange of notes, Sept. 2

Lebanon (Cont'd)
President Amin Gemayel, election (Reagan),

Nov. 50
President-Elect Bashir Gemayel: Shultz,
Oct. 5; Veliotes, Nov. 46; White House,
Nov. 46
Assassination of: Department, Nov. 48;
Reagan, Nov. 10, 47; White House,
Nov. 47
Profile, Sept. 15
Soviet involvement, question of: Haig, Apr.

82, July 13, 56; Shultz, Oct. 12
Syrian forces (Haig), July 46, PR 194, 6/16,
PR 195, 6/16, PR 196, 6/16, PR 197B,
6/11
Departure plan: Sept. 5, 6; Shultz, Sept.
9
Treaties, agreements, etc., Nov. 66, 67,

Dec. 74
U.N. Interim Force (UNIFIL): Haig, PR
194. 6/16, PR 195, 6/16, PR 196, 6/16;
Miller. Sept. 18; Shultz, Dec. 17
Extension of mandate: Kirkpatrick, Sept.
16; Security Council, Sept. 15
U.N. observers (Security Council), Nov. 55
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed: Buckley, July 78; Lichenstein,
Sept. 18; Reagan, Aug. 36; Veliotes.
July 74
U.S. visit of President Gemayel: Reagan,
Gemayel, Dec. 41; Shultz, Dec. 16
Program, PR 315, 10/18
Withdrawal of all foreign forces, need for:
Department, Nov. 48; General
Assembly, Sept. 20, Nov. 56; Haig, July
55, 60; Lichenstein, Sept. 17; Reagan,
July 27, 31, Aug. 36, Nov. 10, 46, 47,
48, 49; Shultz, Sept. 8, 9, Oct. 5, Nov.
42, Dec. 16, PR 276, 9/9; White House,
Nov. 48
Lee, William (Wells), May 5
Lemos Simmonds, Carlos, May 64
Lesotho:
Universal postal convention (1979), ap-
proval, July 91
U.S. Ambassador (Brown), swearing in, PR

96, 3/15
U.S. economic assistance, proposed, July 62
Li Hongzhang (Li Hungchang): Schwar,

June 5ff
Liberia:
Profile, Jan. 19
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 91, Feb.

82, Apr. 90, July 92, Sept. 80, Nov. 67
U.S. Ambassador (Swing), biographical

details, Jan. 20
U.S. economic and security assistance: July
62; Buckley, July 79; Crocker, July 62,
Dec. 25; Swing, Jan. 18
U.S. visit of Commander-in-Chief Doe: Nov.
15; program PR 248, 8/13
Libya:
Air attack on U.S. planes, 1981 (Adelman),

Jan. 62
Qadhafi militarism: Aug. 12, 20; Adelman,
Jan. 60; Crocker. Dec. 25; Haig, Feb.
26, Mar. 29, 31, Apr. 34, 46, PR 26,
1/27; Johnston, June 56, 57; Lyman,
Jan. 27; Perez, Jan. 56, Aug. 25;
Reagan, Jan. 11
Treaties, agreements, etc., May 77, 78, July
91, Sept. 80

Libya (Cont'd)
Turkey, relations (Haig), Aug. 62
U.S. citizens recalled: Clark, Jan. 46; Hai;
PR 26, 1/27, PR 33, 1/27; Reagan, Jai
11
U.S. economic measures: Department, Ju:
68; Johnston, June 57
Lichenstein, Charies M., Sept. 14, 16, 17
Liechtenstein, convention on prohibitions oi'
restrictions on use of certain conventior
weapons (1980), signature, June 90
Lincoln, Abraham (quoted), Oct. 4, Dec. 36,

Linnemann, Joseph H., Feb. 46

Livingston, Robert R. (Wells), May 19

Load lines, international convention (1966):

Amendments (1971): Federal Republic of

Germany, Hungary, Apr. 90
Amendments (1979): Greece, Hungary,
Apr. 90
Loeb, John L., Jr., swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Denmark, PR 215, 7/14
Low, Frederick C. (Schwar), June 5ff
Lubbers, Jan Hendrik, biographical details,

May 27
Luxembourg:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 82, June

90, July 91, Nov. 66, Dec. 72
LT.S. Ambassador (Dolibois), swearing in,
PR 1, 1/6
Luzac, Johan (Wells), May 8, 11, 13
Lyman, Princeton, Jan. 27

MacArthur, Douglas (quoted), Aug. 50
MacGuigan, Mark, May 64
Madagascar:
Agricultural commodities sales agreement

Nov. 67
U.S. economic and security assistance, pre
posed, July 62
Mahler, Halfdan, tribute to (Shultz), PR 342

11/2
Maino, Theodore C, swearing in as Ambass

dor to Botswana, PR 306, 10/5
Malawd:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 82, May

79, July 91
U.S. economic and security assistance, pre
posed. July 62
Malaysia:

Treaties, agreements, etc.. May 78, July 9

U.S. economic and security assistance, pro

posed, (Holdridge), July 69

Maldives, textile visa system, bilateral agree

ment with U.S., Dec. 74, PR 169, 5/19
Mali:
Treaties, agreements, etc.. Mar. 67, Aug.

78
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro
posed, July 62
Mally, Gerhard, Nov. 52
Malone, James L., Feb. 52, May 61, Oct. 48
Malta, treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 91,

Feb. 83, Sept. 81
Marcos, Ferdinand E., Nov. 25, 26
Marine pollution. See Environmental prob-
lems and control and Oil pollution

Department of State Bulletir

ritime boundary treaties:
uba, provisional application. Mar. 69
\x ;ulf of Maine boundary dispute settlement
^ treaty, U.S. -Canada: Jan. 91, Apr. 92;
Horniats, June 51; Niles, Apr. 50;
Shultz, Dec. 66
.ritime matters:

\,ssistance and salvage at sea, unification
of certain rules, convention (1910),
Solomon Islands, Mar. 68
larriage of goods by sea, convention
(1978): Chile, Dec. 73; Romania, Mar.
68
ntergovernmental Maritime Consultative

Organization convention (1948), May 77
Amendments (1975): May 77; Ireland,
Ivory Coast, Jan. 89; Malaysia, July
91; Philippines, Mar. 67
Amendments (1977): May 77; Ireland,
Ivory Coast, Jan. 89; Philippines,
Mar. 67; Romania, Nov. 66;
Seychelles, Dec. 73; United Arab
Emirates, Jan. 89
Amendments (1979): Djibouti, Aug. 77;
Egypt, Dec. 73; Hungary, July 91;
Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jan. 89;
Nicaragua. May 77; Oman, Sept. 80;
Peru, Nov. 66; Philippines, Mar. 67;
Qatar, Romania. Nov. 66; Seychelles,
Dec. 73; United Arab Emirates, Jan.
89
Amendments (1982), U.S., proclamation,
Oct. 91
International maritime traffic, facilitation
of, convention (1965), acceptance,
Ireland, Feb. 82
Amendment to article VII (1973): Iceland,
Mar. 67; Israel, May 77; Monaco,
Apr. 90
International waterborne transportation,
facilitation of, inter-American conven-
tion (1963): Argentina, Dec. 73; U.S.,
Nov. 66
Jurisdiction over vessels utilizing Louisiana
Offshore Oil Port, bilateral agreements:
Federal Republic of Germany, Jan. 91;
Greece, Sept. 80; Netherlands, Jan. 91
Maritime search and rescue, international
convention (1979), with annex: Argen-
tina, Chile, Jan. 89; Norway, Mar. 67
Red Sea lights, international agreement re-
garding maintenance, accession, Por-
tugal, Dec. 73
Standards of training, certification, and
watchkeeping for seafarers, convention
(1978): Bangladesh, Apr. 90; Bulgaria,
July 91; China, Colombia, Czecho-
slovakia, Gabon, Mexico, Norway, Apr.
90
U.S. nuclear warships, access to ANZUS
ports (Holdridge), Oct. 31
ilarshall, George C. (Sanford), June 17
darshall, Harry R., Jr., Sept. 49
tiartens, Wilfried, July 1
Hauritania:
Treaties, agreements, etc.. May 78, Aug.

78, Sept. 80
U.S. Ambassador (Peck), swearing in, PR

390, 12/15
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed, July 62

Mauritius:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 91, Feb.

82, June 91, Sept. 81, Oct. 91

U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed: July 62; Buckley, July 79;
Crocker, July 62
McPherson, M. Peter: Jan. 82; Reagan, Nov.

47; Shultz, Sept. 9
Meehan, Francis J.:
Ambassador to Poland, swearing in, PR 6,

1/5
Biography, Feb. 3
Meissner, Charles, Sept. 30
Merchant, Livingston T., Mar. 10
Meteorology:
Atmospheric research sounding rockets and
balloon cooperation, bilateral agreement
with Brazil, Aug. 79
Hurricane warning, bilateral agreement

with Haiti, Mar. 69
Meteorological observation program, bilat-
eral agreement with Mexico, May 79,
Oct. 91
World Meteorological Organization:
Convention (1947): Belize, July 91;

Vanuatu, Aug. 78
Voluntary cooperation program, appropri-
ations request (Piatt), July 83
Mexico:
Caribbean Basin initiative, support: April
26, May 67; Haig, May 68; Reagan,
Dec. 10
Central American crisis, proposals (Haig),

May 68, PR 99, 3/17, PR 100, 3/17
Cuban relations (Department), Feb. 71
Drug control programs: Jan. 91, Feb. 84,
Apr. 92, June 91, Nov. 67; Linnemann,
Feb. 48; Stoessel, Sept. 47
Minute 266 of the International Boundary

and Water Commission, Feb. 84
Nuclear cooperation: Malone, Feb. 53;

Marshall, Sept. 50
Population projections (Benedick), Feb. 63,

64
Recovery and return of stolen vehicles and

aircraft, bilateral convention, Dec. 74
Textile agreement with U.S., amendments,
Apr. 92, Dec. 74, PR 42, 2/2, PR 296,
9/24
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 91, Feb.

83, Apr. 90, 92, May 79, June 90, 91,
July 92, Aug. 79, Oct. 91, Nov. 67

U.S. immigration quota changes, proposed:

Asencio, Mar. 53; Haig, PR 75, 2/23
U.S. relations: Enders, Oct. 82, Nov. 60;
de la Madrid, Dec. 10, 11; Reagan, Dec.
9, 10
Visa agreement for U.S., Mexican, busi-
nessmen, Sept. 78, PR 138, 4/20
Micronesia (Trust Territory of the Pacific

Islands): Holdridge, Feb. 59
Middendorf, J. William, II: June 84, July 90;
Kennedy, Oct. 16
Biography, Jan. 3
Middle East (see also names of individual
countries):
Japanese energy interests (Holdridge), Apr.

57
Muslim fundamentalist movement (Haig),

July 56
Persian Gulf (Veliotes), June 65
Military balance. May center section

Middle East (Cont'd)
U.S. security assistance, appropriations re-
quests: Buckley, July 78; Haig, Apr. 36,
46, PR 80, 3/3; Veliotes, July 72
U.S. strategic concerns: Jan. 45; Haig, Jan.
17, Mar. 31, Apr. 36, 47, 81, July 44,
56; Reagan, Apr. 77, 78, Sept. 23;
Veliotes, Jan. 47, June 67
Military assistance. See Security assistance
Military expenditures, proposed international
conference on: Reagan, July 41; Shultz,
Nov. 9
Military information, general security of, bi-
lateral agreements: Colombia, Mar. 69;
Egypt, June 91; Jordan, Feb. 83;
Pakistan, Oct. 91; Portugal, Dec.74;
Sweden, Mar. 69
Miller, James E., Sept. 18
Mitterrand, Francois, May 55, July 1, 17
Monaco, treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 90,

May 78, Aug. 77
Monge, Luis Alberto, Oct. 69, 70
Mongolia, treaties, agreements, etc., Feb.

83, June 90, Aug. 78
Monroe, Bill, May 35, Oct. 7, Nov. 43
Moore, Powell A., swearing in as Assistant
Secretary of State for Congressional
Relations, PR 213, 7/14
Morocco:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 91, Feb.
84, Apr. 92, June 90, 91, July 92, Aug.
79, Nov. 67
U.S. Ambassador (Reed), swearing in, PR

90 (undated)
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed: Haig, Apr. 36, 46; Veliotes, July
73
U.S. -Moroccan joint military commission,

establishment, Apr. 46
U.S. use of certain facilities in: Aug. 79;

Haig: Apr. 46
U.S. visit of King Hassan II: Aug. 70; Haig,

Apr. 46; program, PR 167, 5/17
Visit of Secretary Haig (Haig), Apr. 45, PR
63, 1/19
Mozambique:
U.S. economic assistance, proposed, July 62
Vienna convention on consular relations,
accession. Mar. 67
Mubarak, Mohamed Hosni, Apr. 78, 79, Oct.

8 (quoted), Oct. 9 (quoted)
Murphy, Richard W., swearing in as Am-
bassador to Saudi Arabia, PR 115, 4/5
Murray, Wallace Smith, Mar. 3
Muskie, Edmund (quoted), May 76

Namibia: Contact Group communique, Nov.
56; Crocker, Jan. 26, June 46, July 61,
Dec. 23; Enders, Oct. 74; Haig, Jan. 17,
Mar. 29, Apr. 34, 44, PR 80, 3/1, PR 99,
3/17; Reagan, June 35, Aug. 37; Shultz,
Oct. 2, Nov. 9, PR 384, 12/15

Nauru, overview, profile. Mar. 56

Near and Middle East. See Middle East

Nepal (McPherson), Jan. 83
U.S. development assistance, proposed
(Veliotes), July 74

ndex 1982

Netherlands:

Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 89, 91,
Feb. 82, 84, Mar. 69, Apr. 91, 92, May
77, 78, June 90, July 91. 92, Sept. 79,
Oct. 90, 91. Nov. 65, 66, Dec. 74

200th anniversary of establishment of diplo-
matic relations: May 25: Wells, May 1

U.S. Ambassador (Dyess), swearing in, PR
2, 1/5

U.S. visit of Queen Beatrix: May 25; pro-
gram, PR 132, 4/16
Netherlands Antilles, Apr. 2.'<

Money orders and postal travellers' checks
agreement (1979), approval, Apr. 91
New Zealand {see also Australia-New Zea-
land-U.S.): Stoessel, Aug. 57

Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb, 82, 84,
Apr. 90, May 77, June 90, Aug. 77, 78,
Sept. 81

U.S. Ambassador (Browne), swearing in,
PR 81, 3/2

Visit of Vice President Bush, Aug. 44
Newell, Gregory J., appointment as Assist-
ant Secretary of State for International
Organization Affairs, PR 184, 6/4
Nicaragua:

Cuban and Soviet influence: May 72;
Abrams. Apr. 70, Sept. 45; Buckley,
Apr. 84; Bush, Jan. 13; Department,
Feb. 68, 72, Apr. 89; Enders, Feb. 80,
Mar. 61, 64, July 84, Aug. 73, 75, Nov.
57; Haig, Mar. 28, Apr. 34, PR 80, 3/1;
Reagan, Apr. 5

Military intervention in Latin America:
Abrams, Apr. 69; Bosworth, Nov. 62;
Enders, Sept.- 63, Nov. 57; Haig, Jan. 4,
Mar. 28, 32, Apr. 43

Miskito, Sumo, and Rama Indians: Abrams,
Apr. 70; Department, Apr. 89; Haig,
PR 74, 2/22, PR 80, 3/1; Reagan,
Apr. 5

Negotiated settlement, proposed: Enders,
Aug. 76; Haig, Mar. 69

Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 90, May
77, June 90, Nov. 65

U.S. Ambassador (Quainton), swearing in,
PR 104, 3/23

U.S. diplomatic relations, question of:

Enders, Sept. 73; Haig, Jan. 6, May 71

U.S. policy: Enders, July 86, Nov. 58;
Haig, PR 100, 3/17

U.S. travel advisory (Department), Mar. 65
Nickel, Herman W., swearing in as Ambas-
sador to South Africa, PR 118, 4/6
Niger (Adelman), Jan. 61

Common Fund agreement (1980), signa-
ture, Feb. 82

U.S. Ambassador (Casey), swearing in,
PR 98, 3/16

U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed: July 63; Crocker, Dec. 25
Nigeria (Crocker), Dec. 25

Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee
(U.S. -Nigeria): Crocker, Feb, 30

Treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 91, June
90

U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed: July 63; Crocker, Jan. 24
Niles. Thomas M. T., Apr. 50, 51
Nitze, Paul H.: May 44; Kennedy, Oct. 16

Biography, Jan. 30

Nixon, Richard M., Mar. 10, Nov. 18 (quoted)
North Atlantic Council:
Ministerial meeting, Bonn (June 10): July 1;
Haig, July 8, 11, PR 197A, 6/18;
Reagan, July 25, 32, 36
Declaration, July 9

Document on Arms Control and Disarm-
ament, July 10
Document on Integrated NATO Defense,
July 1 1
Ministerial meeting, Brussels (Dec. 10-11,

1981), final communique, Aug. 68
Ministerial meeting, Brussels (Jan. 10-12):
Mar. 28; Haig, Feb. 14, 20, PR 17,
1/12, PR 18, 1/12
Declaration on Poland: Haig, Feb. 22;
text, Feb. 19
Ministerial meeting, Luxembourg (May
17-18, 1982): Haig, Aug. 64; final com-
munique, Aug. 67
North Atlantic Treaty Organization: July 24;
Buckley, July 78; Burt, Feb. 42, Apr. 65;
Haig, Mar. 30, June 41, Aug. 60, 61, 64,
PR 80, 3/1, PR 196, 6/16, PR 200, 6/18;
Reagan, July 28, 33; Rostow, Feb. 36
NAMSCO (NATO Maintenance and Supply
Organization), basic agreement (1982)
on mutual support, Apr. 92
Out-of-area deployment of forces, proposed:

Haig, July 12; NATO, July 11
Spain, accession: Feb. 82, Oct. 42; Haig,
Apr. 42, 44, July 11, Aug. 64, PR 26,
1/27; NATO, July 9, 11, Aug. 68;
Thomas, July 70
Protocol (1981), current actions: Aug. 67;
Belgium, Feb. 82, May 77; Canada,
Feb. 82, Mar. 67; Denmark, Feb. 82,
June 90; France, Feb. 82, July 91;
Federal Republic of Germany, Feb.
82, June 90; Greece, Feb. 82, July 91;
Iceland, Feb. 82, Apr. 91; Italy, Feb.
82, July 91; Luxembourg, Feb. 82,
June 90; Netherlands, Feb. 82, July
91; Norway, Feb. 82, Apr. 91; Por-
tugal, Feb. 82, July 91; Spain (acces-
sion deposited), Aug. 77; Turkey,
Feb. 82, July 91; U.K., Feb. 82, May
77; U.S., Feb. 82, May 77, June 90
Status of forces with respect to foreign
forces stationed in the Federal Republic
of Germany, agreement (1959), amend-
ment (1981): Belgium, Canada, Jan. 89;
France, Jan. 89, Apr. 91; Federal
Republic of Germany, Jan. 89, Sept. 80;
Netherlands, U.K., Jan. 89; U.S., Jan.
89, May 77
Theater nuclear forces modernization: Burt,
Feb. 43; May 50; Eagleburger, Jan. 37;
Haig, May 31, July 58, Aug. 65; NAC,
Aug. 70; Reagan, Jan. 8, Oct. 47;
Speakes, May 38
U.S. consultations on INF negotiating
position: Burt, Jan. 31; Eagleburger,
Jan. 31; Haig, July 58; NAC, Aug. 70
U.S. -NATO defense relationship: Eagle-
burger, May 48; NATO, July 9
U.S. sale of Trident II missile system to
U.K.: Dec. 75; White House, May 59
Exchange of letters: Reagan. Thatcher,
May 59; Weinberger, Nott, May 60
Warsaw Pact comparison: May center

section; Haig, July 12; Reagan, June 35

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Cont'dji
Wartime host nation support agreement.
Federal Republic of Germany-U.S.:
NATO, July 11; Reagan, July 33
Signature, joint statement, June 61, July(
92
Norway:
Nuclear cooperation Jigreement with U.S.,

proposed (Malone), Feb. 53
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 91, Feb.
82, 84, Mar. 67, Apr. 90, 91, May 78,
June 90, July 91, Aug. 77, Nov. 66, 67
U.S. Ambassador (Austad), swearing in, PI
218, 7/14
Notices of meetings:
Advisory Committee on Historical Diplo-
matic Documentation, PR 325, 10/21
Advisory Committee on International Intel
lectual Property:
International Copyright Panel, PR 105,

3/23
International Industrial Property Panel,
PR 25, 1/18
Advisory Committee on International In-
vestment, Technology, and Develop-
ment, PR 284, 9/13
Working group on accounting standards,

PR 85, 3/3
Working group on energy and develop-
ment, PR 55, 2/11, PR 406, 12/28
Working group on multilateral invest-
ment standards for MNEs and U.N.
activities, PR 152, 4/30
Working group on transborder data
flows, PR 58, 2/11, PR 245, 8/6, PR
311, 10/8
Working group on transfer of technology.

PR 48. 2/2. PR 152, 4/30
Working group on treatment of invest-
ment and special investment prob-
lems. PR 83, 3/3, PR 405, 12/28
Advisory Committee on Law of the Sea,

PR 43. 2/2. PR 207, 6/28
Advisory Committee on Oceans and Inter-
national Environmental and Scientific
Affairs, PR 326, 10/21
Antarctic Section, PR 49, 2/2, PR 328,
10/21
Advisory Committee to U.S. National Sec-
tion of the Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission, PR 273, 9/8
Advisory Committee to U.S. National Sec-
tion of the International Commission
for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna,
PR 274, 9/8
Advisory Committee to U.S. Section, Inter-
national North Pacific Fisheries Com-
mission, PR 272, 9/8
Fine Arts Committee, PR 57, 2/11
Joint Working Party of the National Orga-
nization of the International Radio Con-
sultative Cnmmittet' and the Interna-
tional Telegraph and Telephone Con-
sultative Committee. PR 109, 3/30, PR
151. 4/30, PR 185, 6/7, PR 251, 8/16
Overseas Schools Advisory Council, PR
332, 10/25
Executive Committee, PR 145, 4/26
Presidential Commission on Broadcasting
to Cuba, PR 71, 2/17, PR 91, 95, un-
dated, PR 123, 4/9, PR 292, 9/21

Department of State Bulletin

tices of meetings (Cont'd)
lecretary of State's Advisory Committee
on Private International Law, PR 84,
3/3
Study group on arbitration, PR 386,

12/16
Study group on international child ab-
duction, PR 53, 2/11
Study group on negotiable instruments,

PR 387, 12/16
Study group on trusts, PR 355, 11/23
shipping Coordinating Committee:
Committee on Ocean Dumping: PR 22,
1/18, PR 279, 9/13, PR 354, 11/23,
PR 388, 12/16
National Committee for Prevention of

Marine Pollution, PR 110, 3/30
Subcommittee on SOLAS. PR 47. 2/2, PR
153, 4/30, PR 240, 8/3, PR 250, 8/16,
PR 264, 8/28, PR 283, 9/13, PR 309,
10/8
Working group on bulk chemicals,

PR 111, 3/30, PR 346, 11/9
Working group on carriage of dan-
gerous goods, PR 44. 2/2, PR 164,
5/10, PR 236, 8/3, PR 381, 12/14
Working group on containers and car-
goes, panel on bulk cargoes, PR 92,
undated, PR 144, 4/26, PR 241, 8/3,
PR 312, 10/8, PR 382, 12/14, PR
407, 12/28
Working group on fire protection, PR

163, 5/10, PR 389, 12/16
Working group on radiocommuni-
cations, PR 45, 2/2, PR 143, 4/26,
PR 186, 6/7, PR 265, 8/28, PR 281,
9/13
Working group on safety of navigation,

PR 23, 1/18, PR 267, 8/27
Working group on ship design and
equipment, PR 162, 5/10, PR 327,
10/21
Working group on stability, load lines,
and safety of fishing vessels, PR
266, 8/28, PR 347, 11/9
Working group on standards of training
and watchkeeping, PR 56, 2/11, PR
282, 9/13
Working group on subdivision, stability,
and load lines, PR 46, 2/2
U.S. National Committee for the Inter-
national Radio Consultative Committee
(CCIR):
Study group 1. PR 331, 10/25
Study group 2, PR 120, 4/9
Study group 4, PR 121, 4/9, PR 154,

4/30
Study group 5, PR 379, 12/4
Study group 6, PR 204, 6/23, PR 380,

12/14
Study group 7, PR 187, 6/7, PR 305, 10/1
Study group 9, PR 280, 9/13
Study group 10, 11, PR 329, 10/25
Study group CMTT, PR 358, 11/30
U.S. National Committee for the Inter-
national Telegraph and Telephone Con-
sultative Committee (CCITT);
Integrated services digital network
working party. PR 24, 1/18, PR 93,
3/12, PR 238. 8/3, PR 330, 10/25

Notices of meetings (Cont'd)
U.S. National Committee for the Inter-
national Telegraph and Telephone Con-
sultative Committee (CCITT) (Cont'd)
Message handling systems working party.

PR 237, 8/3
Study group A, PR 72, 2/17, PR 112,
3/30, PR 161, 5/10, PR 209, 210, 7/1,
PR 243, 8/6, PR 304, 10/1, PR 345,
11/9, PR 396, 12/21
Study group B. PR 209, 7/1, PR 310,

10/8
Study group C, PR 271, 9/8
Study group D, PR 94, undated, PR 239,
8/3, PR 330, 10/25
Modem working party, PR 122, 4/9,
PR 205, 6/23, PR 244, 8/6, PR 395,
12/21
Nott, John, May 60

Nuclear energy (see also Nuclear nonprolifer-
ation):
Cooperation, bilateral agreements: Bangla-
desh, Jan. 90, Sept. 80; Brazil (Bush),
Jan. 15. Apr. 92; Canada, Dec. 74;
China. Feb. 83; EAEC, Apr. 92; Egypt,
Jan. 91, Mar. 69; EURATOM (Reagan).
June 71, Dec. 74; Indonesia. Mar. 69;
Peru. July 92; Switzerland. Nov. 68
IAEA safeguards: Kennedy. Feb. 56;

Marshall. Sept. 51, 53; Reagan, June 71
Physical protection of nuclear material,

convention (1979): Sayre, Aug. 3
Current actions: Czechoslovakia, Korea,

May 77, Aug. 78; Philippines, May 77
Reprocessing:
Plutonium use policy: Department,

Sept. 52; Kennedy, June 70; Marshall,
Sept. 51
Special material of U.S. ongin, bilateral
agreement, Japan, Jan. 91, Sept. 81
Taiwan Power Company, listing of reactors
supplied from Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Federal Republic of Germany-
U.S. agreement, Jan. 91
U.S. enrichment technology transfer to
Australia, proposed (Malone), Feb. 55
Nuclear nonproliferation: Holdridge, Oct. 32;
Kennedy, June 69; Malone. Feb. 52; Mar-
shall. Sept. 49; Reagan. Dec. 6;
Shultz, Oct. 10. Nov. 9
Atlas of U.S. foreign policy. May center

section
Treaty (1968): Reagan, July 40
Current actions: Papua New Guinea, Mar.
67-68; Uganda. Dec. 73; Vietnam,
Sept. 80
Nuclear test ban, comprehensive, proposed

(Rostow), May 43
Nuclear war, dangers of (see also Defense:
deterrence strategy and Nuclear non-
proliferation): Eagleburger, Jan. 36;
Reagan, Jan. 8, June 35, 39, July 25, 33;
Rostow, Feb. 32, Nov. 17; Shultz, Nov. 2;
Wolfowitz, Sept. 33
Reduction of risk, proposals: Haig, PR
197A, 6/18; Reagan, July 37, 40, Dec.
5; Rostow, Mar. 42; Shultz, PR 403,
12/28
Nuclear weapons, non-first-use:
Soviet proposals: Haig, May 32, 37, July
58, PR 200, 6/18; Reagan, July 43;
Rostow, Feb. 32
U.S. position (Rostow), May 44
Nyborg, Keith F.. swearing in as Ambassador
to Finland, PR 4, 1/5

Oakley, Robert B., swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Somalia, PR 400, 12/23
Oceans:
Ocean drilling of deep sea, international
phase of, bilateral agreements: P>ance,
May 79; Federal Republic of Germany,
Apr. 92; Japan, Aug. 79; U.K., Apr. 93
Oceanographic research in South Pacific,
agreement (1982): Australia, New
Zealand, U.S., June 90
Polymetallic nodules of the deep sea bed,
interim arrangements, agreements
(1982): France, Federal Republic of
Germany, U.K., U.S., Nov. 66
World ocean studies, bilateral agreement
with Soviet Union, Mar. 69
Oil Pollution:
International fund for compensation for oil
pollution damage, international conven-
tion (1971): Gabon, Spain, Oct. 91
Intervention on the high seas in cases of
oil pollution casualties, international
convention (1969): Bangladesh, Gabon,
Apr. 90
Prevention of pollution of the sea by oil,
international convention (1954):
Bangladesh, Jan. 89; Colombia,
Yugoslavia, Apr. 91
Oman:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 84, Apr.

92, May 77, Sept. 80, Dec. 73
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed (Veliotes), July 74
Organization of African Unity: Crocker, July
61; Haig, Apr. 47
Chad, peacekeeping force in: Crocker, Jan.
25, Dec. 22; Haig. Mar. 29; Lyman,
Jan. 29; Vine, June 76
Charter of Human and People's Rights,
Apr. 73
Organization of American States: Haig, Jan.
1; Shultz, Dec. 64
Caribbean Basin program, proposed: Apr.

8; Haig, May 66
Charter (1948): Antigua and Barbuda, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, Mar. 68
Protocol (1967): Antigua and Barbuda,
Mar. 68; Bahamas, May 77; St. Vin-
cent and the Grenadines, Mar. 68
Profile, Jan. 5
U.S. Ambassador (Middendorf), biography,

Jan. 3
Voluntarily funded programs, appropria-
tions requests (Piatt), July 80, 82
Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development: Hormats, Mar. 36;
Meissner, Sept. 30
Data declaration, U.S. proposal: Buckley,

June 78; Versailles communique, July 6
International investment and national treat-
ment principles, Canadian FIRA
discriminatory policy: Hormats, June
51, 54; Johnston, Jan. 32
Services sector, studies in (Lamb), Oct. 39
U.S. Ambassador (Katz): Kennedy, Oct. 16
Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC): Lamb, Oct. 40

Index 1982

Pacific Island treaties, ratification urged

(Holdridge), Oct. 32
Pakistan:
Afghan refugees; Dam, Dec. 57; Stoessel,

Apr. 86; Vine, June 75, July 77
U.S. agreement, June 91
Drug control programs; Linnemann, Feb.

48; Stoessel, Sept. 47, 48
Nuclear weapons potential; Malone, Feb.

55; Marshall, Sept. 52
Soviet anti-U.S. propaganda, Oct. 44
Textile agreement with U.S., amendment,

Apr. 92, May 79, June 92, July 92, PR

108, 3/29, PR 133, 134, 4/19
Treaties, agreements, etc.. Feb. 84, Apr.

92, June 90, 91, July 91, 92, Oct. 91
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed; Buckley, July 78, 79; Haig, Jan.

17, Apr. 36, PR 86, 3/3; Malone, Feb.

55; Marshall, Sept. 52; Veliotes, June

67, July 73

U.S. relations (Haig), July 44
U.S. visit of President Zia, program, PR
360, 12/3
Palau, compact of free association with U.S.,
announcement of signature, PR 263, 8/26
Palmer, Ely E., Mar. 5
Panama, Apr. 27
Cuban relations (Department), Feb. 71, 78
Social security system, participation in,

bilateral agreement, Nov. 67
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 90, Aug.

79, Oct. 91, Nov. 65, 66, 67, Dec. 72, 74
U.S. visit of President de la Espriella,
program, PR 301, 9/28
Papua New Guinea;
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 82, Mar.

68, Apr. 90, 91, Nov. 65

U.S. security assistance (Holdridge), July
70
Paraguay;
UNIDO constitution (1979), ratification,

Feb. 82
U.S. Ambassador (Davis), swearing in, PR
253, 8/17
Passports, U.S.;
Increased processing time, announcement,

PR 157, .5/4
Validity and fees, PR 302, 9/30, PR 368,
12/7
Patents;
Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations

(1970), accession, Sri Lanka, Mar. 68
Plants, international convention for protec-
tion of new varieties (1961), as revised,
acceptance, Japan, Dec. 73
Peace Corps program;
Current actions. Barbados, Aug. 79; Burun-
di, Nov. 67; Ch.le (termination), Apr.
92; Haiti, Nov. 67; Liberia (Swing), Jan.
22
Representatives overseas, Aug. center
section
Pearson, James B., appointment to Board
of Governors of East- West Center, an-
nouncement, PR 394, 12/17
Peck, Edward L., swearing in as Ambassador
to Mauritania, PR 390, 12/15

Perez, Frank H., Jan. 55, Aug. 23

Biographical details, Aug. 24
Pertini, Alessandro, June 63
Peru;
('uba, relations (Department), Feb. 78
Drug control program; Linnemann, Feb.

48; Stoessel, Sept. 47
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 69, May
79, June 91, July 92. Nov. 66, Dec. 73,
74
U.S. security assistance, proposed
(Enders), July 86
Petersen. Neal H., June 88
Philippines;
Profile, Nov. 27

Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 84, Mar.
67, 68, 69, May 77, June 90, 92, July
92, Nov. 28, 67, Dec. 64
U.S. Ambassador (Armacost), swearing in,

PR 79, 2/25
U.S. economic and security assistance,
proposed; Buckley, July 79; Depart-
ment, Nov. 25; Holdridge, July 65, 66,
67
U.S. relations; Marcos, Nov. 25, 26;

Reagan, Nov. 23, 25
U.S. Veterans Administration, bilateral

agreement, Nov. 67
U.S. visit of President Marcos; Nov. 23;
program, PR 285, 9/13
Phillips, Christopher H. (Haig). July 51
Phillips, William. Mar. 3
Phinny, Robert H., swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Switzeriand, PR 259, 8/23, PR
275, 9/8
Phonograms, protection of producers against
unauthorized use of their phonograms,
convention (1971); Austria, Aug. 78;
Costa Rica. June 90; Venezuela, Dec. 73
Pierpoint, Robert, Feb. 24, July 52, Oct. 10
Piatt, Nicholas, July 80
Ambassador to Zambia, swearing in, PR
230, 7/30
Pogue, Forrest C, June 18
Poland {see also under Human rights); Burt,
Apr. 66; Bush, Jan. 12; Haig, PR 442,
1/5, PR 59A, 3/2; Reagan, July 25;
Shultz, Nov. 2, Dee. 19, PR 3i6, 10/18
Ambassador Rurarz and Spasowski, asylum
in U.S. embassies; Department, Feb. 7;
Haig, Feb. 24; Reagan, Feb. 3
Debt situation; Mar. 50; Haig, PR 70,

2/17; Hormats, Apr. 61; Meissner, Sept.
31
Ea.st-West relations, effect on; Department.
Jan. 42; Haig. Jan. 42, Mar. 27, 29,
Apr. 33. Aug. 65, PR 18, 1/12, PR 28,
1/25, PR .34. 1/27, PR .39, 2/2
Financial and economic situation; Haig.
Feb. 25; background paper. Mar. 49
Humanitarian aid; Haig, Feb. 15, 18, 22;
Meissner, Sept. 31; NAC, Feb 20;
Reagan, Jan. 11, Feb. 2, May 30. July
22, Aug. 64, Dec. 11
Martial law; Department, Jan. 41, 42; Haig,
Jan. 40, Feb. 25; Reagan. .Ian. 10, 11.
Feb. 1
NATO position on; Haig, Feb. 22, Mar. 30.
Apr. 43, PR 16, 1/12, PR 18. 1/2, PR
37, 2/3; NATO Declaration, text, Feb.
19
Political prisoners, emigration (Depart-
ment), Apr. 67

Poland (Cont'd)
Situation reports; Department, Jan. 41, 42.
Feb. 4-12 (Dec. 18-Jan. 13), Mar. 52,
Apr. 67; Haig. Feb. 24; Reagan, Mar.
26; White House, Dec. 31
Solidarity Day; Haig, Mar. 32, PR 39, 2/2;
Reagan (quoted), PR 39, 2/2
Proclamation (Reagan), Feb. 17
Second anniversary; Department, Nov.
41; WTiite House, Nov. 42
Solidarity movement declared illegal

(Reagan), Dec. 11
Soviet responsibility for situation; Feb. 12;
Eagleburger, Jan. 39; Haig, Feb. 13,
14, 21, 22, 24, Mar. 31, 33, Apr. 33. 38,
40, 41, July 8, PR 28, 1/25; Hormats,
Apr. 61; NAC, Feb. 19; Reagan, Feb. 2,
8, May 30, June 35, Aug. 37; Rostow,
May 41; Shultz, Sept. 11, Oct. 13
Treaties, agreements, etc.. Mar. 69, June

90, July 92, Aug. 77, 78, Oct. 91
U.S. Ambassador (Meehan); biography,

Feb. 3; swearing in, PR 6, 1/5
U.S. and allied economic sanctions; Oct. 42;
Clark, Dec. 36; Department, Feb. 8;
Haig, Mar. 27, 30, 33, Apr. 33, May 35,
July 57, PR 443, 1/5, PR 18, 1/12, PR
74, 2/22, PR 76, 2/23, PR 80, 3/1;
Holdridge, Apr. 56; Hormats, Apr. 61;
Meissner, Sept. 31; NAC, Feb. 20;
Reagan, Feb. 3, Aug. 64; Wolfowitz,
Sept. 36
Conditions for lifting; Department, Sept.
38; Haig, Feb. 14, Mar. 27; Reagan,
July 22, Aug. 64, Sept. 26; Shultz, PR
403, 12/28
Romanian position (Haig), Apr. 47, 48,
49
U.S. economic aid, question of; Haig, Apr.
40, June 43, July 4; Reagan, June 35,
Dec. 11; Rostow, May 42
U.S. travel advisory (Department), Jan. 42
Voice of America, Soviet jamming (Depart-
ment), Feb. 9, 10
Pope John Paul II, July 21, 22, Dec. 41

(quoted)
Population growth and problems (Benedick),
Dec. 53
Refugees and immigrants, effect
(Benedick), Feb. 63
Portugal (Haig), Apr. 44, 45, Aug. 67
Treaties, agreements, Jan. 90, Feb 82, June
90, July 91, Aug. 78, Oct. 90, Nov. 66,
Dec. 73, 74
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed; Buckley, July 78, 79; Haig, PR
60, 2/17; Thomas, July 71
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Balsemao;

Haig, Apr. 44; program PR 378, 12/13
Visit of Secretary Haig (Haig), Apr. 43,
PR60, 2/17, PR61, 2/19
Postal matters;
International express mail, bilateral agree-
ments; Australia, June 91; Bahrain,
Dec. 74
Money orders and postal travellers' checks,
agreements (1979); Austria, Belgium,
Apr. 91; Cape Verde, Chile, Nov. 66;
Cyprus, July 91

Department of State Bulletin

tal matters (Cont'd)

istal convention with detailed regulations,
bilateral agreement with Canada (1981),
entry into force, Feb. 83
Universal Postal Union, constitution
and final protocol (1964), Laos, May
77
Protocol (1974): Belize, Dec. 73;

Vanuatu, Nov. 66
General regulations, with final protocol
and annex (1979): Afghanistan, Nov.
66; Australia, Austria, Belgium, Apr.
91; Belize, Dec. 73; Cape Verde,
Chile, Nov. 66; Cyprus, July 91;
Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Apr. 91;
France, Dec. 73; German Democratic
Republic, Nov. 66; Federal Republic
of Germany, Apr. 91; Hungary, July
91; India, May 78; Iraq, Dec. 73;
Jamaica, Apr. 91; Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, May 78;
Laos, Dec. 73; Lesotho, July 91;
Libya, Malaysia, Mauritania, May 78;
Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles,
Apr. 91; Norway, Nov. 66; Oman,
Dec. 73; South Africa, Swaziland.
Apr. 91; United Arab Emirates, July
91; Vanuatu, Nov. 66; Yugoslavia,
July 91

isoners of war/civilian internees, transfer
of, bilateral agreement, Korea, May 79
ivate Law, International Institute for
Unification of, Statute (1940), Chile. Aug.
I 77

|"OcIamations by the President:
TBill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day and
Week, 1981 {4885). Feb. 46
Solidarity Day (J,891), Feb. 17
United Nations Day, 1982, H970), Nov. 8
World Food Day, 1982 (J,983), Dec. 32
ublic Law 480, Food for Peace:
Bilateral agreement with Turkey, May 79
FY 1983 appropriations request: July 62;
[ Crocker, July 61; Holdridge, July 66;

Veliotes, July 73
ublications:
Government Printing Office sales, lists,

Mar. 72, Oct. 94, Dec. 77
Obscene, repression of circulation of, ar-
rangement (1910) and protocol (1949),
accession, Solomon Islands, Jan. 90
Official publications and government docu-
ments, exchange of, convention (1958),
succession, Solomon Islands, Apr. 91
State Department, Jan. 94, Feb. 86, Mar.
72, Apr. 94, May 82, June 94, Aug. 82,
Sept. 82, Oct. 94, Nov. 70, Dec. 76
Country Reports on Human Rights Prac-
tices for 1981, introduction (in full),
Apr. 71
How to order, Apr. 75
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1951, Vol. Ill, Western European
Security and the German Question,
released, Aug. 82
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1952-195J,, Vol. XIII, Indochina,
released, Oct. 94
Press releases, lists, Jan. 93, Feb. 86,
Mar. 70, Apr. 93, May 81, June 93,
July 94, Aug. 81, Sept. 82, Oct. 93,
Nov. 70, Dec. 76

Publications (Cont'd)
State Department (Cont'd)
Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and
Other International Agreements of the
United States in Force on January 1,
1982, released, Sept. 80
USICA periodicals distributed abroad, Aug.

center section
U.S.U.N., Jan. 94, Mar. 71, Aug. 81, Dec.
76
Puerto Rico: Apr. 10, 21; Reagan, Apr. 4
Purcell, James N., Jr., appointment as Direc-
tor of Bureau of Refugee Programs, PR
321, 10/20
Pym, Frances, remarks, PR 173, 5/19

Qadhafi, Muammar (Haig), Apr. 47
Qatar, IMO convention, acceptance, Nov. 66
Quainton, Anthony C. E., swearing in as Am-
bassador to Nicaragua, PR 104, 3/23

Racial discrimination:
Apartheid (Kirkpatrick), Feb. 66
International convention (1965) on elimina-
tion of: China, Mar. 68; Papua New
Guinea, Apr. 91; Portugal, Nov. 66; St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, Jan. 90;
Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, May 78;
Vietnam, Dec. 73
Ray, Charles: Haig, Reagan, PR 160, 5/7
Reagan, Ronald:
Addresses, remarks, and statements:
Afghanistan, Mar. 17, June 35, July 33
Arab-Israeli conflict. Mar. 26, July 43,
Aug. 53 (quoted), Sept. 27
Camp David accords (basis for peace),
Jan. 9, Apr. 78, Aug. 37, Sept. 23
Golan Heights, Israeli annexation, Jan.

10, 11
Israel, military strength, Nov. 10
Saudi peace plan, Jan. 9
Sinai, return to Egypt, Aug. 37, Sept.

23
U.S. peace initiative, Sept. 23, Nov. 10
West Bank and Gaza, Israeli replace-
ment of Arab mayors. May 30
Arms control negotiations, U.S. principles
(see also under Soviet Union), May
29, June 35, July 39, Nov. 20, Dec. 1
Nuclear weapons zero proposal, Apr.
50, May 29, 38, June 36, 39, July
28, 34, 35, 36, 40, Dec. 4
Berlin, July 25, 35, 38
Bonn, Germany, July 32, 38
Chemical weapons, Soviet use of, June

36, July 41, Dec. 5
China:
Shanghai communique, 10th anniver-
sary, Apr. 60
Taiwan, U.S. policy on arms sales, Aug.

45, Sept. 27, Oct. 21
U.S. relations, Sept. 27, Oct. 21
Columbia space shuttle. May 29
D-Day anniversary, July 20

Reagan, Ronald (Cont'd)
Addresses, remarks, and statements
(Cont'd)
Defense, July 43
Budget, Mar. 26
MX missile, Jan. 9, Oct. 47, Dec 3

6, 7
Nuclear deterrence, June 36, Dec. 1, 6
Dozier, General, June 64, July 23
Economic summit, Versailles, July 4 16
24 J' • .

Economy, domestic, Feb. 2, July 4, 16
Economy, world, Jan. 9
El Salvador:
Elections, Apr. 6, May 30, June 38

July 26
U.S. economic aid, Jan. 8, Sept. 27
Eureka College, June 34
Falkland Islands, July 5, Aug. 37, 38
Foreign policy, June 39, Aug. 36
Iran-Iraq conflict, July 5
Israel, Apr. 83, Aug. 36, Sept. 24, 27
Nov. 10
U.S. F-16s, delay of shipment, Nov. 11
Latin America, Apr. 1, June 71, July 21,
27, Oct. 69, Dec. 64 (quoted)
Caribbean Basin initiative, Apr. 1, May

47, June 38, Oct. 71
Central America, Apr. 6, May 55, June
35
Law of the sea, Mar. 54, Aug. 71
Lebanon, July 5, 22, 27, 31, 43, Aug. 36,
Sept. 22, 24, Nov. 46, 47, 49
Assassination of President-elect

Gemayel, Nov. 10, 47
Draper mission, Nov. 47, 49
Habib mission, Aug. 37, Sept. 1, 22, 23,

26, Oct. 2, 5, 7, 10, Nov. 47, 49
Israeli invasion, Aug. 36, 37, 38, Sept.

22, 23
Israeli use of cluster bombs, Aug. 38
Multinational force, U.S. troops, Sept.
1, 7, 23, Nov. 10, 47, 49, Dec. 42
Palestinians, massacre, Nov. 10, 48
PLO departure, Sept. 1, 7, 22, 23
President Amin Gemayel, election, Nov.
50
Libya, Jan. 11
London, England, July 24
Mexico, Dec. 9, 10
Middle East strategic concerns, Apr. 77,

78, Sept. 23
Military expenditures, proposed inter-
national conference, July 41
MX missile, production and basing, Jan.

9, Oct. 47, Dec. 3, 6, 7
Namibia, June 35, Aug. 37
Netherlands. 200th anniversary of diplo-
matic relations with U.S., May 25
Nuclear war, dangers of, Jan. 8, May 29,
June 35, 39, July 25, 33, 34, 37, 40,
Dec. 26 (quoted)
Oklahoma State Legislature, May 38
Organization of American States, Apr. 1
Philippines, U.S. relations, Nov. 23, 25
Poland, July 25
Martial law, Jan. 10. 11, Feb. 1. Mar.

26
Polish asylum in U.S. embassies, Feb. 3
Solidarity Day, Feb. 17, Dec. 11, PR
39, 2/2 (quoted in full)

idex 1982

Reagan, Ronald (Cont'd)
Addresses, remarks, and statements
(Cont'd)
Poland (Cont'd)

U.S. economic sanctions and conditions

for ending, Jan. 10. Feb. 2, 3, 8,

June 35, Aug. 37, 64, Sept. 26

U.S. humanitarian aid, Jan. 11, Feb. 2,

May 30, July 22, Aug. 64, Dec. 1 1

Secretary Haig, resignation, Aug. 36, 37,

52
Secretary Shuitz, Aug. 36, 37
Soviet Union (for details, see Soviet
Union), July 16, 32
Human rights, June 34, July 26, 27, 36,

39
INF negotiations, July 25, 42
Zero-option proposal, Apr. 50, May
29, 38, June 36, 39, July 28, 34,
35, 36, 40, Dec. 4
Marxist-Leninist doctrine, Jan. U.

July 27
Military expansion, June 34, 39, July 5,

36," Aug. 37, Dee. 2, 6,
Nuclear weapons freeze proposals, dis-
advantages. May 29, 38, June 39,
July 34, Aug. 65
Propaganda, May 29
Siberian pipeline, U.S. sanctions on
equipment for, Aug. 37, 38, Sept.
26, 31
START negotiations, May 29, 30, June
36, July 5, 25, 34, 40, 42, 43, .58,
Aug. 54, Nov. 20, Dec. 4
Strategic imbalance. May 29, 38, June

36, 39, Dec. 2
U.S. economic sanctions, F'eb. 8, May

30, July 5, Aug. 38
U.S. grain sales, Sept. 26, Oct. 40,

Dec. 12
U.S. relations, June 34. July 5, 41.
Sept. 35 (quoted). Nov." 11
Staff, relations, Jan. 9
Versailles economic .summit, July 4, 16,
24
Addresses to the Nation, P'eb. 1, June 39,

Sept. 23, Dec. 1
Correspondence, messages, and memos:
China, question of U.S. arms sales to Tai-
wan, Aug. 45
China, 10th anniversary of Shanghai com-
munique, Apr. 60
Foreign Service Day, PR 160, 5/7
Lebanon, congratulations to President-
elect Amin Gemayel, Nov. 50
Military assistance policies for Middle

East, Apr. 83
Secretary Haig, resignation, Aug. 52
Trident II missile system sale to U.K.,

exchange of letters. May 59
U.N. conference on new and renewable

sources of energy, Jan. 63
U.S. Mideast peace proposal, Nov. 46
U.S. participation in multinational force
in Lebanon, Sept. 7
Meetings with Heads of State and officials
of, remarks and joint communiques:
Arab League delegation, Dec. 43;
Cameroon, Oct. 14; CosUi Rica, Oct. 69;
Egypt, Apr. 77; France. May 55; Hon-
duras, Oct. 71; Iceland, Nov" 38; India.

Reagan, Ronald (Cont'd)
Meetings with Heads of State and officials
of, remarks and joint communiques
(Cont'd)

Sept. 54; Indonesia, Dec. 29; Israel.
Sept. 45; Italy, June 63; Jordan, Jan.
50; Lebanon, Dec. 41; Liberia, Nov. 15;
Mexico, Dec. 9; Morocco, Aug. 70;
Netherlands, May 25; Philippines, Nov.
23; Spain, Jan. 43; Venezuela, Jan. 86;
Zaire, Feb. 29
Memorandum (Presidential Determination
No. 83-2), refugees, U.S. admission FY
1983, Dec. 61
Messages and reports to Congress:
Cyprus, progress reports, Jan. 43, Feb.
45. May 49, June 62. Aug. 62. Sept.
39. Nov. 39
MX missile production. Oct. 47
Nuclear cooperation with EURATOM,

June 71
U.S. forces in the Multinational Force
and Observers (MFO), deployment
and mission, June 68
U.S. troops in Lebanon, authorization,

Dec. 42
Zimbabwe, Jan. 26, Feb. 31
News conferences, transcripts, Jan. 8, 10,
Mar. 26, May 29, July 42, Aug. 36,
Sept. 26, Nov. 10
Radio addresses, June 39, Dec. 11, 12
Visits to:
Barbados, June 37, 38
Europe: July 15; Haig, July 15, 18;
Mitterrand, July 17; Pope John Paul
II, July 20; Queen Elizabeth, July 29;
Reagan, June 34, July 15, 20, 23, 24,
30, 31, 32, 35, 38; Thatcher, July 31
Jamaica, June 37
Reed, Joseph V., Jr.. swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Morocco, PR 90, undated
Refugees (Eagleburger), Jan. 37
Afghanistan: Dam, Dec. 57; Douglas, June
73; Stoessel. Apr. 86; Vine, June 75,
July 77
U.S. -Pakistan assistance, agreement,
June 91
African: Crocker, Nov. 13; Dam, Dec. 57,
58; Douglas, June 73, Dec. 61; Reagan,
Oct. 14; Vine, June 76, July 76
Central American: Abrams, Sept. 44. 45;
Bosworth. Nov. 61; Dam, Dec. 57;
Douglas, June 73, Dec. 61; Haig, PR
75, 2/23; Vine, June 77, July 77
Cuban: Abrams, Sept. 44; Douglas, June 73
Demographic impact (Benedick), Feb. 65
Indochinese: Dam, Dec. 57; Douglas, June
73, Dec. 60; Haig, PR 75, 2/23, PR 80,
3/1; Holdridge, July 68, Aug. .59. Oct.
.30; Stoessel. May 45, Oct. 28; Vine,
June 75, July 76
Palestinian: General Assembly, Nov. 56;

Vine, June 76, July 76
Philippine processing center (Reagan),

Nov. 25
Polish: Dam, Dec. 58; Douglas, June 73,
Dec. 69; Haig, PR 75, 2/23; NAC, Feb.
20; Reagjin, Feb. 3; Vine, June 76
Status of, convention (1951), accession,
Japan, Veh. 82
Protocol (1967): Bolivia, Apr. 91; China.
Dec. 73; Japan, Mar. 68; Kenya, Jan.
90

;l(!f

Refugees (Cont'd)
U.S. immigration policy: Asencio, Mar. 53)
Dam, Dec. 56; Douglas, June 73, Dec.
59; Reagan, Dec. 61; Vine, July 75
U.S. policy, aid: Apr. 76, PR 78, 2/25;
Abrams, Sept. 43; Douglas, June 73;
Holdridge, Oct. 32; Stoessel, May 45,
Oct. 29; Vine, June 74, July 75, 77
Vietnamese: Holdridge, Oct. 30;

Kirkpatrick, Jan. 78; Stoessel, Oct. 28l
Vine. June 75
Regan. Donald T.. statement. Versailles

summit. July 1, 5
Reich, Alan A., Mar. 58
Robinson, Davis, Jan. 34, Oct. 35
Robinson, Paul H., Jr., swearing in as Am-
bassador to Canada, PR 3, 1/5
Rockefeller. David. June 37
Rogers. William P.: Mar. 10. 11; Stoessel,

Apr. 85
Romania (Haig), Apr. 48, 49
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 68, 69,

May 79, June 90, Nov. 66
U.S. Ambassador (Funderburk), swearing

in, PR 219, 7/14
Visit of Secretary Haig, Apr. 47, PR 65,
2/18
Roosevelt, Eleanor (quoted), July 39
Roosevelt, Franklin D.: May 27 (quoted);

Wolfowitz. Sept. 32
Roosevelt, Selwa, swearing in as Chief of

Protocol, PR 175, 5/24
Rostow, Eugene V., Feb., 32, May 39. Aug.

53. Nov. 16
Rotary International (Reich), Mar. 60
Rowny, Edward L.: Kennedy, Oct. 16;

Reagan, Aug. 54, Oct. 47
Rubber, international agreement (1979):
Australia, May 78; Belgium. Brazil, June
90; Canada, Mar. 68; European Economi(
Community. June 90; Finland. Nov. 66;
France. Mar. 68; Italy. June 90; Ivory
Coast. Feb. 82; Luxembourg, June 90;
Netherlands, Soviet Union. May 78;
Switzerland. Nov. 66; Thailand. June 90;
U.K.. Mar. 68; U.S., Oct. 91
Rurarz, Zdzislaw (Department), Feb. 7
Rwanda:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 91, Aug.

77
U.S. Ambassador (Blane), swearing in, PR

340, 10/26
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed. July 63

Sadat. Anwar al-: Oct. 3 (quoted); Adelman,

Jan. 60
Safety at sea:
Collisions at sea, unification of certain
rules, international convention (1910).
current actions. Solomon Islands. Mar.
67
International regulations for preventing
collisions at sea, convention (1972): Co-
lombia, Gabon, Solomon Islands, July
91
Amendments (1981), entry into force,
Apr. 90

Department of State Bulletin

fety at sea (Cont'd)

Safety of life at sea. international conven-
tion (1974): Bangladesh, Philippines,
Mar. 68; Switerzland, Jan. 90
Amendment (1981), entry into force, Aug.

78
Protocol (1978): Argentina, July 91;
Hungary, Israel, South Africa, Apr.
91; Switzerland, July 91
Lucia (Enders), Sept. 72
treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 90, Mar.

67, May 79, Nov. 66
Vincent and the Grenadines, treaties,
agreements, etc., Jan. 89, 90, Mar. 68,
Dec. 72
kharov, Andrei: June 34 (quoted), Sept. 37
(quoted); Eagleburger, Mar. 49; Kirk-
patrick, Feb. 66
moa, Common Fund Agreement, signature,

June 90
nford, William F., Jr., June 17
o Tome, U.S. economic assistance, pro-
posed, July 63
o Tome and Principe, WHO Constitution,
amendments to articles 24 and 25, accept-
ance, July 92
irgent, Aaron (Schwar), June 5
(itellites:
JActive magnetospheric particle tracer

explorers, project, bilateral agreement
with memorandum of understanding
with Federal Republic of Germany,
Feb. 83

EARTHNET system for processing NASA
LANDSAT data, bilateral agreement
with European Space Agency, Sept. 80
Geostationary operational environmental
satellite, use for data collection,
bilateral agreement with Brazil, Sept.
80
International Maritime Satellite Organiza-
tion (INMARSAT), agreement and
operating agreement (1976), accession,
Sri Lanka, May 78
International Telecommunication Satellite
Organization (INTELSAT), head-
quarters agreement, PR 188, 6/11
IRIS payload, satellite launching and asso-
ciated services, bilateral agreement
with Italy, Jan. 91
LANDSAT, access by Indian ground

station, bilateral agreement with India,
Aug. 79
Observation and tracking of satellites and
space tracking, bilateral agreement
with Ecuador, Mar. 69
OMEGA navigation system, monitoring
facility, bilateral agreement with South
Africa, Aug. 79
Rawinsonde observation stations at
Bogota and on San Andres Island,
bilateral agreement with Colombia,
Feb, 83
Satellite-aided search and rescue project,
agreements (1979): Canada, France,
Soviet Union, U.S., May 78
Norwegian participation, agreement
(1981): Canada, France, Norway,
U.S., May 78
USAFE LORAN C/D transmitter site,
bilateral arrangement with Nether-
lands, Oct. 91

Saudi Arabia:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 93, May

79, June 90, Aug. 79
U.S. Ambassador (Murphy), swearing in,

PR 115, 4/5
U.S. AWACS deployment (Veliotes), June

66, 67
U.S. Embassy complex, funding (Haig),

July 64
U.S. military facilities, construction, agree-
ment, Apr. 93, Aug. 79
U.S. relations (Haig), July 56
Sayre, Robert M., Aug. 1

Biographical details, Aug. 2
Schmidt, Helmut, July 1
Schwar, Harriet D., June 1
Science and technology (Shultz), Nov. 3
Advanced technology trade and investment:

Enders, Sept. 77; Lamb, Oct. 38
Atmosphere research sounding rockets and
balloon cooperation, bilateral agreement
with Brazil, Aug. 79
Cooperation:
Bilateral agreements: Brazil, Sept. 80;
France, Oct. 91; Korea, Republic of,
Feb. 83, Dec. 74; Hungary, July 92;
Iceland, Oct. 91; Poland, Mar. 69;
Romania, May 79; Somalia, Jan. 92
U.S.-France, review, Nov. 54, PR 290,
9/21
Cultural, educational, scientific, and tech-
nical cooperation and exchanges for
1981 and 1982, bilateral agreements
with Hungary, Mar. 69
Educational, scientific, and cultural
materials, importation, agreement
(1950): Luxembourg, Dec. 72; New
Zealand, Feb. 82; U.K., U.S., Dec. 72;
Yugoslavia, Feb. 82
International communications and infor-
mation objectives: Buckley, June 78;
NATO, July 10; Robinson, Oct. 36, 38
Mapping, charting, and geodesy, coopera-
tion in, bilateral agreements: Morocco,
Aug. 79; Tunisia, Nov. 68
Nuclear qualification of polymer base
materials, bilateral agreement with
France, Dec. 74
Regulatory and safety research matters,
exchange of technical information and
cooperation, bilateral arrangements
with: Korea, Mar. 69; Netherlands, Dec.
74
Technology development working group,
proposed: Regan, July 2; Versailles
summit, July 6
Technology transfers to Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe, export controls;
Buckley, Aug. 71; Haig, July 8, 12,
Aug. 65, PR 33, 1/27, PR 76, 2/23;
Johnston, June 57; Mally, Nov. 52;
NATO, July 9, 11; Robinson, Oct. 35;
Versailles summit, July 6
Security assistance (see also narrws of individ-
ual, countries):
Appropriations request, FY 1983: Buckley,
July 77; Crocker, July 62; Enders, July
83; Haig, Apr. 46, PR 86, 3/3;
Holdridge, July 65; Thomas, July 70;
Veliotes, July 73
Construction of facilities at 2nd ID USA,
bilateral agreement with Korea, June
91

Security assistance (Cont'd)
Defense articles and services under military
assistance program, bilateral
agreements: Greece, Jordan, Dec. 74;
Sudan, Oct. 91, Dec. 75
1950-1980, May center section
Training related to defense articles, IMET
program, bilateral agreements: Antigua
and Barbuda, Belize, Apr. 92; Oman,
Feb. 84; Sierra Leone, Aug. 79
Security Council, U.N.:
Resolution, draft, on Lebanon, Sept. 14, 16
Resolution, texts:
Falkland Islands, July 87
Golan Heights, opposition to Israeli

annexation, Jan. 60
Iran-Iraq war, Sept. 59
Lebanon, Sept. 14, Nov. 55
Humanitarian issues, Sept. 16, 20, 21
U.N. Interim Force, Sept. 15
Seitz, Raymond G. H., appointment as Exec-
utive Assistant to the Secretary, PR 227,
7/26
Senegal:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 82, Mar.

69, Sept. 80
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed, July 63
Seychelles (Crocker), Dec. 24
Soviet anti-U.S. propaganda, Oct. 44
Treaties, agreements, etc., June 90, Dec.

73
U.S. Ambassador (Fischer), sweanng m,

PR 314, 10/14
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed: July 63; Buckley, July 79;
Crocker, July 62
Shawcross, William, May 76
Sherman, William C: Sept. 59; Kennedy,

Oct. 16
Shufeldt, Robert W. (Schwar), June Iff
Shultz, George P. (Reagan), Aug. 36
Addresses, correspondence, and remarks:
Afghanistan, Nov. 2

Arab-Israeli conflict (for details, see Arab-
Israeli conflict):
Palestinian issue, Aug. 53, Sept. 9, 11,

12, Oct. 8, 11, Nov. 17
U S. peace initiative, Oct. 2, 5, Nov. 8,
42, Dec. 17, 20, PR 269, 9/2, PR
276 9/9
Brazil, relations, PR 364, 12/7
Canada:
Relations, Dec. 13, 18, 66
Visit to, PR 335, 10/27
Caribbean and Central America, Dec. 65
Caribbean Basin Development Plan, Aug.

50, Sept. 28, Nov. 9, Dec. 14, 67
Chemical and toxin weapons, reports of

Soviet use, Dec. 44
China, U.S. relations, Dec. 21
Christmas tree lighting ceremony, PR

404, 12/28
Cuba, Oct. 13, Dec. 16
Democratization of Communist Countries,

Conference, PR 316, 10/18
Developing countries, Nov. 2, Dec. 66
East-West trade, PR 384, 12/15, PR 403,

12/28
Economy, domestic and global, Aug. 50,
Sept. 29, Nov. 6, Dec. 15

Index 1982

Shultz, George P. (Cont'd)
Addresses, correspondence, and remarks
(Cont'd)
Foreign policy, Aug. 50, Oct. 1, 10, Nov.
1, Dec. 14
Secretary of State advisory responsi-
bilities, Sept. 11
Foreign Service annual award presenta-
tion, PR 322, 10/20
Free Elections, Conference, Dec. 15
Habib, Philip, Sept. 9, Oct. 7
Human rights, Nov. 7, Dec. 15, PR 316,

10/18, PR 342, 11/2
Interdependence of modern world, Aug.

50, Dec. 66
Israel:
Exclusion from U.N., question of, Dec.

63
U.S. policy and relations, Aug. 52,
Sept. 8, Oct. 3, 5, 9, 11, 12, Nov.
43, PR 403, 12/28
Jordan, 30th anniversary of accession of

King Hussein, Oct. 45
Kennedy, Richard T., Ambassador-at-

Large, PR 286, 9/15
Kissinger, Henry, Sept. 11
Latin America, Dec. 64
Lebanon:
Israeli incursion, Aug. 51, Sept. 8, 12
Multinational forces, U.S. Marines in,
Sept, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, Oct. 5, 10,
11, Nov. 3, 42, Dec. 17, 21, PR 276,
9/9, PR 384, 12/15
PLO departure, Sept. 8, 10, Oct. 3, 5,

7, 9, 10

Withdrawal of foreign forces and res-
toration of central authority, Sept.

8, 9, 10, Oct. 5, Nov. 42, Dec. 16,
PR 276, 9/9

Namibia, Oct. 2, Nov. 9, PR 384, 12/15
Narcotic control, international coopera-
tion, Nov. 51
Poland, Sept. 11, Oct. 13, Nov. 2, Dec.

19, PR 316, 10/18, PR 403, 12/28
Secretary of State:
Official arrival before State Depart-
ment employees (Shultz, Stoessel),
PR 224, 7/20
Preconfirmation statement before

Senate, Aug. 49
Swearing in ceremony, remarks, PR
220, 7/16
Soviet Union:
Andropov government, PR 403, 12/28
INF zero option, U.S. proposal, PR 403,

12/28
Military activities, Oct. 1, 13, Nov. 2,

Dec. 14, 19
New leadership, question of, Dec. 20
U.S. arms control position, Aug. 50,
Oct. 2, Nov. 8, Dec. 66, PR 384,
12/15
U.S. economic sanctions, Sept. 11, Oct.
8, 13, Dec. 19, 20
Terrorism, PLO, Sept. 12
Trade, U.S. policy, Oct. 10, Nov. 6, Dec.

66
U.N., 37th anniversary, PR 342, 1 1/2
Van Gorkom, Jerome, Under Secretary

for Management, PR 286, 9/15
World Health Organization, tribute to,

PR 342, 1 1/2
World peace, Oct. 1, 10

Shultz. George P. (Cont'd)
Biographical details, Aug. 51
News conferences, Sept. 8, PR 403, 12/28
TV and other interviews, Oct. 7, 10, Nov.

42, Dec. 19, PR 269, 9/2
Visits to:
Canada, Dec. 13, PR 335, 10/27
Europe, PR 403, 12/28
France, PR 384, 12/15
Spain, PR 391, 12/16
Sierra Leone;
Treaties, agreements, etc., June 90, Aug.

79, Oct. 91
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed, July 63, Aug. 79
Singapore (Albrecht), Oct. 33
Exchange of service personnel, bilateral

agreement with U.S., Nov. 67
Textile agreements with U.S. amendments.
May 79, Aug. 79, Sept. 81, Dec. 74, PR
29, 30, 31, 32, 1/27, PR 222, 7/20, PR
295, 9/24, PR 317, 318, 319, 10/19
U.S. security assistance, proposed

(Holdridge), July 69
Visit of Vice President Bush, Aug. 43
Slavery convention (1926) and protocol
(1953): Papua New Guinea, Apr. 91;
Solomon Islands, Jan. 90
Supplementary convention (1956), acces-
sion, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
Jan. 90
Smith, Louis J., Mar. 12
Sneath, William, June 37
Social security program, agreement with

Belgium, Apr. 92
Solomon Islands, treaties, agreements, etc.,
Jan. 89, 90, Mar. 67, 68, Apr. 91, May
77, 78, July 91
Somalia:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 92, Feb.

82, Sept. 81, Dec. 73
U.S. Ambassador (Oakley), swearing in,

PR 400, 12/23
U.S. economic and security assistance
(Crocker), Dec. 24
FY 1983 request: July 63; Buckley, July
79; Crocker, July 62
U.S. visit of President Siad Barre, program
PR 88, 3/9
South Africa:
Arms industry (Buckley), Oct. 60
Nuclear safeguards, question of (Malone),

Feb. 55
Treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 91, Aug.

79
U.N. role(Haig), Jan. 17
U.S. Ambassador (Nickel), swearing in, PR

118, 4/6
U.S. export controls, adjustments

(Johnston), June 56
U.S. policy and role (Crocker), Jan. 26,
June 46, Dec. 23
South (leorgia Islands. June 85
South Pacific Commission, income tax reim-
bursement, bilateral agreement with
U.S., Aug. 79
South Sandwich Islands, June 87
Southern Africa Development Coordinating
Committee (Crocker), Jan. 26

Soviet Union: Haig, July 12; NATO, July \W
Andropov government (Shultz), PR 403,

12/28
Arms sales to developing countries: PR

233, 8/2, Buckley, Oct. 50
Brezhnev-U.S. and Reagan-Soviet televisio
programs, proposed: Haig, PR 194,
6/16; Reagan, July 28
Chemical and biological warfare programs
Dec. 44, PR 357, 11/29; Abrams, Sept.
44; Burt, Jan. 52, Apr. 66; Department
Jan. 58; Fact Sheet, May 58; General
Assembly, Jan. 59; Haig, Apr. 41;
Holdridge, Aug. 59; Howe, Oct. 46;
Kirkpatrick, Jan. 57, 58; Reagan, June
36, July 41, Dec. 5; Rostow, May 44;
Shultz, Dec. 44; Stoessel, Apr. 86, May
57, Oct. 28
Economic problems: Bush, Aug. 40; Haig,
July 54, PR 80, 3/1, PR 197A, 6/18;
Reagan, July 26; Shultz, Dec. 19
Human rights: Apr. 75; Department, Nov.
41; Eagleburger, Jan. 37; Haig, PR 34,
1/27; Reagan, June 34. July 26, 27, .36,
39; Wolfowitz, Sept. 37
Intermediate-range nuclear weapons (INF)
negotiations: July 24; Burt, Jan. 31,
Feb. 42, 44, May 50; Eagleburger, Jan,
31, Mar. 48; Haig, Jan. 16, 30, May 33.
June 44, Aug. 65, PR 76, 2/23; Nitze,
May 44, NAC, Aug. 69; NATO, July 9;
Reagan, Apr. 50, May 29, June 36. Jul;
25, 42, Nov. 20; Rostow, Feb. 35, May"
42, Nov. 16
Polish situation, question of effect on:
Burt, May 53; Haig, Feb. 14, Mar. 29
PR 443, 1/5, PR 16, 1/12, PR 18,
1/12, PR 34, 1/27; NAC, Feb. 19
Rights, privileges, and immunities of
delegates, bilateral agreement with
Switzerland, Feb. 84
U.S. zero option proposal: Burt. Feb. 45,
May 42, 51, 52; Bush, Aug. 40; Clark
Dec. 34; Eagleburger, Mar. 48; Haig,
Jan. 16, 30, Apr. 33, May 33, July 58
PR 26, 1/27, PR 34, 1/27, PR 76,
2/23; NATO, July 10, Aug. 68, 69, 70
Nitze, May 44; Reagan, Apr. 50, May
29, 38, June 36, 39, July 28, 34, 35,
36, 40, Dec. 4; Rostow, May 42, Nov.
19; Shultz, Nov. 9, PR 403, 12/28;
Speakes, May 38
Japan, relations (Holdridge), Apr. 56
Jewish emigration: Dam, Dec. 58; Douglas,
June 73, Dec. 60; Vine, June 77, July
76
Leadership changes, question of: Haig,
June 43; Shultz, Dec. 20; Wolfowitz,
Sept. 36
Lebanon: Brezhnev-Reagan exchange of

letters (Haig), July 13
Marxist-Leninist doctrine: May 36; Abrams,

Sept. 44; Reagan, Jan. 11, July 27
Military activities and deployment:
Abrams, Sept. 44; Buckley, July 77,
Dec. 26; Burt, Jan. 54, Feb. 44, May
51; Bush, Jan 12, Aug. 39; Clark, Dec.
33, 35; Crocker, July 63; Eagleburger,
Jan. 36. Mar. 47; Haig, Mar. 27, Apr.
45, 49, 81, 82, May 32, 37, June 40,
July 8, 59, PR 26, 1/27, PR 76, 2/23,
PR 80, 3/1; Holdridge, Apr. 55; NATO,

Department of State Bulletin

iivirt I 'nion (Cont'd)
Military activities and deployment

iCont'd)

July 9, Aug 67, 69; Reagan, June 34,
i 39, July 5, 36, Aug. 37, Dec. 2, 6;

IRostow, Feb. 33, May 40; Shultz, Oct.
1, 13, Nov. 2, Dec. 14, 19; Stoessel,
Oct. 28; Wolfowitz, Sept. 35
Atlas of U.S. foreign policy. May 40H
Nuclear weapons freeze proposal, U.S. re-
jection. See under Defense and national
security

Propaganda, forgeries: Oct. 42; Burns,
June 60; Reagan, May 29; Rostow, Feb.
35, May 40; Shultz, Nov. 2
Siberian-West Europe gas pipeline: Haig,
Apr. 43, July 57, PR 76, 2/23;
Johnston, Apr. 62; Shultz, Sept. 11,
Oct. 13, Dec. 19, 20
Forced labor, use on: Clark, Dec. 36;

Department, Nov. 41
U.S. sanctions on parts and equipment:
Buckley, Sept. 37; Haig, Feb. 18;
Hormats, Mar. 38; Johnston, Apr. 62,
64 June 57; Meissner, Sept. 31;
Reagan, Aug. 37, 38, Sept. 26, 31;
Shultz, Sept. 11, Oct. 13
Jurisdictional factors (Robinson), Oct.
35
Sino-Soviet relations: Shultz, Dec. 21;

Stoessel, Aug. 58
Strategic arms reduction talks (START)
negotiations: July 24; Buckley, Dec. 26;
Burt, May 42; Haig, Mar. 27, 29, Apr.
33, May 33, 34, 36, June 44, July 53,
54, 58, Aug. 65, PR 26, 1/27; NATO,
July 9, 10, Aug. 67, 69; Reagan, May
29, 30, June 36, July 5, 25. 28, 34, 40,
42, 43, Aug. 54, Nov. 20, Dec. 4;
Rostow, Nov. 16; Speakes, May 39;
White House, Aug. 53
Strategic nuclear parity with U.S.: Jan. 31,
May 40F; Buckley, Dec. 28; Burt, May
50; Eagleburger, Mar. 48, May 49;
Haig, Mar. 30, May 33, PR 76, 2/23,
PR 80, 3/1; Reagan, May 29, 38, June
36, 39, Dec. 2; Rostow, Feb. 35, May
4o! Nov. 16; Wolfowitz, Sept. 35
Summit meeting, question of: Haig, Feb.
14, 15, Mar. 29, July 59, 60, Aug. 65,
PR 16, 1/12; Reagan, May 30, June 36,
Sept. 27; Shultz, Oct. 8
Terrorist activities, Aug. 20
Treaties, agreements, etc., Mar. 69, May
77, 78, June 90, July 92, Aug. 77, 80,
Oct. 91, Nov. 68, Dec. 73
U.S. Ambassador (Hartman) swearing in,

PR 9, 1/5
U.S. arms control position (see also Inter-
mediate-range nuclear weapons (INF)
and Strategic arms reduction talks
(START), infra: Eagleburger, Jan. 39;
Haig, May 33, 37, July 8, 19, 58, Aug.
65, PR 28, 1/25, PR 34, 1/27, PR 196,
6/16; Marshall, Sept. 53; Reagan, May
29, June 36, 39, July 16, 32, 34, 58,
Nov. 20; Rostow, Feb. 33; Shultz, Aug.
50, Oct. 2, Dec. 66; Speakes, May 39;
Wolfowitz, Sept. 36

Soviet Union (Cont'd.)
U.S. economic sanctions (see also under
Siberian-West Europe gas pipeline,
supra): Feb. 12, Oct. 42; Burns, June
63; Department, Feb. 8; Haig, Feb. 16,
17, 22, Mar. 30, Apr. 33, May 35, July
8, 57, PR 39, 2/2, PR 74, 2/22, PR 80,
3/1; Mally, Nov. 53; NAC, Feb. 20;
Reagan, Feb. 8, May 30, June 35, 39,
July 5, Aug. 38; Shultz, Oct. 8, Dec. 19
U.S. grain sales: Haig, Feb. 17, PR 18,
1/12, PR 74, 2/22, PR 76, 2/23, PR 80,
3/1; Reagan, Sept. 26, Oct. 40, Dec. 12;
Shultz, Dec. 20
Bilateral agreement, Nov. 68
Fact Sheet, Oct. 41
U.S. relations: Bush, Aug. 40; Clark, Dec.
33; Eagleburger, Mar. 47; Haig, Jan.
16, Apr. 33, 40, June 42, July 4, 12, 54,
58, Aug. 65, Sept. 35 (quoted), PR 18,
1/12, PR 80, 3/1, PR 99, 3/17, PR 196,
6/16; Reagan, June 34, July 5, 41, Sept.
35 (quoted), Nov. 11; Shultz, Aug. 50,
Oct. 13, PR 403, 12/28; Wolfowitz,
Sept. 33
Regional foreign policy conferences on
U.S. -Soviet relations, announcement,
PR 262, 8/26
Space:
Columbia space shuttle: Haig, May 36;

Reagan, May 29
Exploration and use of outer space, prin-
ciples governing, treaty (1967), ratifica-
tion, India, Mar. 68
Moon treaty (1979): Chile, Jan. 90; India,

Mar. 68; Uruguay, Jan. 90
Registration of objects launched into outer
space, convention (1975): India, Mar.
68; Korea, Republic of, Feb. 82
Space shuttle tracking and communication
facility, bilateral agreement with
Senegal, Mar. 69
Spadolini, Giovanni, July 1
Spain:
Accession to NATO: Feb. 82; Haig, Apr.
42, 44, July 11, Aug. 64, PR 26, 1/27;
NAC, Aug. 67; NATO, July 9, 11, Aug.
68; Thomas, July 70
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 92, Feb.
82, 84, Apr. 91, June 90, July 91, Aug.
77, 78, Sept. 81, Oct. 90, 91, Nov. 65,
67, Dec. 72
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed: Buckley, July 78, 79; Thomas,
July 71
U.S. visit of King Juan Carlos, Jan 43
Visit of Secretary Haig (Haig), Apr. 37, PR

59A, 3/2
Visit of Secretary Shultz, PR 391, 12/16
Speakes, Larry, May 38
Spender, Sir Percy (Keefer), Aug. 46
Sri Lanka:
Textile agreement with U.S., amendment,
Aug. 79, Dec. 75, PR 242, 8/5, PR 256,
8/18, PR 298, 9/24
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 82, Mar.
67, 68, May 78, July 92, Aug. 79, Sept.

U.S. development assistance, proposed
(Veliotes), July 74

Stahl, Leslie, Oct. 10
State Department:
Ambassador-at-Large (Kennedy), appoint-
ment (Shultz), PR 286, 9/15
Assistant Secretary of State for Congres-
sional Relations (Moore), swearing in,
PR 213, 7/14
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs (Wolfowitz), swear-
ing in, PR 397, 12/22
Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs (Burt), proposed (Haig), PR 165,
5/10
Assistant Secretary of State for Human
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
(Abrams), swearing in, PR 211, 7/1
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
national Organization Affairs (Newell),
appointment, PR 184, 6/4
Assistant Secretary of State for Public
Affairs (Hughes), swearing in, PR 258,
8/20
Chief of Protocol (Roosevelt), appointment,

PR 175, 5/24
Counselor of the Department (Buckley),

proposed (Haig), PR 165, 5/10
Deputy Secretary of State (Dam), appoint-
ment, PR 338, 10/28
Deputy Secretary of State (Stoessel),

swearing in, PR 208, 7/1
Director of Bureau of Politico-Military
Affairs (Howe), nomination (Haig), PR
165, 5/10
Director of Bureau of Refugee Programs

(Purcell), announcement, PR 321, 10/20
Economic role: Hormats, Mar. 45; Lamb,

Oct. 40
Executive Assistant to the Secretary
(Seitz), appointment, PR 227, 7/26
Financial management system, announce-
ment of award of contract, PR 116, 4/5
Foreign relations responsibilities: Aug. cen-
ter section; Shultz Sept. 11
Records (1950-1954), availability for re-
search, announcement, PR 353, 11/23
Secretary of State (Shultz), formalities:

Aug. 49, PR 220, 7/16, PR 224, 7/20
Security program, Aug. 28
Spokesman (Hughes), swearing in, PR 258,

8/20
Under Secreta-y for Management (Van
Gorkom), proposed (Shultz), PR 286,
9/15
Under Secretary of State for Political Af-
fairs (Eagleburger), swearing in, PR
221 7/19
Stoessel, Walter, J., Jr.: Apr. 85, May 45, 57,
July 47, 50, Aug. 55, Sept. 46, Oct. 27;
Department, Feb. 10; Shultz, Oct. 1, PR
224,7/20 . .

Deputy Secretary of State, swearing in, PK
208, 7/1
Strategic arms limitation talks (SALT II):
Haig, July 54; Reagan, July 42
Antiballistic missile treaty (1972): Haig,
May 33
Strauz-Hupe, Robert, swearing in as
Ambassador to Turkey, PR 8, 1/5
Suazo Cordova, Roberto, Oct. 71

Index 1982

Sudan:
Libyan threat: Adelman, Jan. 61; Crocker,

July 62; Lyman, Jan. 27
Treaties, agreements, etc., Apr. 93, June
90, 91, Aug. 80, Oct. 91, Nov. 66, 68,
Dec. 75
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed: July 63; Buckley, July 79;
Crocker, Jan. 25, July 62; Haig, Apr.
36, PR 20, 1/18; Lyman, Jan. 28
U.S. temporary personnel, status, agree-
ment with U.S., Apr. 93
Sugar;
International agreement (1977), with
annexes, current actions, Belize, July
91
U.S. quotas; Brock, PR 364, 12/7; Enders,
Sept. 76, Oct. 74
Sullivan, John J. (Enders), Sept. 63
Suriname, Apr. 28
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 90, Mar.

67, May 78
U.S. Ambassador (Duemling), swearing in,
PR 254, 8/17
Susuki, Zenko, July 1
Swaziland:
U.S. Ambassador (Phinny), swearing in,

PR 259, 8/23, PR 275, 9/8
U.S. economic assistance, proposed, July 63
Universal postal union and universal postal
convention (1979), ratification, Apr. 91
Sweden:
Nuclear cooperation agreement, proposed

(Malone), Feb. 53
Soviet anti-U.S. propaganda, Oct. 43, 45
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 92, Mar.
69, June 90, July 91, Sept. 80, 81, Nov.
66
U.S. Ambassador (Forsberg), swearing in,
PR 7, 1/5
Swift, Lawrence W., June 26
Swing, William Lacy, Jan. 18

Biography, Jan. 20
Switzerland:
Nuclear cooperation (Malone), Feb. 53
Rights, privileges, and immunities of dele-
gations to START negotiations,
bilateral agreement, Sept. 81
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 90, Feb.
84, Mar. 67, May 78, June 90, July 91,
92, Sept. 81, Oct. 90, Nov. 66, 68, Dec.
73
Visit of Secretary Haig, arrival statement
(Haig), PR 28 1/25
Symms, Steve (Enders), July 86
Syria;
Common Fund agreement (1980), signa-
ture, June 90
Terrorist activities: Aug. 21; Haig, Apr. 45

Tanzania:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Aug. 77, 80
U.S. economic and security assistance,
proposed, July 63

Tappan, David S., Jr. (Haig), July 51
Telecommunications;

Broadcasting-satellite service in frequency
bands 11.7-12.2 GHz (in Regions 2 and
3) and 11.7-12.5 GHz (in Region 1),
Final Acts (1977) of the World Ad-
ministration Radio Conference, ap-
proval, Greece, Mar. 68

Cuban interference with American broad-
casting (Enders), Sept. 70

Frequency modulation broadcasting in the
88 to 108 MHz band, bilateral agree-
ment with Mexico, Oct. 91, Dec. 74

Geneva radio regulations (1979): Belize,
Federal Republic of Germany, July 92;
India, May 78; Netherlands,
Switzerland, Dec. 73

International telecommunication convention
(1973) with annexes and protocols:
Belize, May 78; Grenada, Apr. 91

International Telecommunications Union:
Conference, appointment of U.S. dele-
gation chairman (Gardner), PR 148,
4/28
International management of electro-
magnetic spectrum, importance
(Buckley), June 79

Land mobile service along borders, bilateral
agreements with: Canada, June 91;
Mexico, Aug. 79

Narrative record interface arrangements,
bilateral agreement with Canada, Feb.
83

Program-carrying signals transmitted by
satellite, convention (1974), ratification,
Austria, July 91

Radio Ceylon facilities, bilateral agreement,
Sri Lanka, Aug. 79

Radio communications between amateur
stations on behalf of third parties,
bilateral agreements: Antigua and Bar-
buda, Australia, Aug. 79; St. Lucia,
May 79

Radio frequencies above 30 megacycles per
second, coordination and use of,
bilateral agreement with Canada, June
91

Regional Administrative Radio Conference
for planning the broadcasting-satellite
service, appointment of U.S. delegation,
PR 289, 9/17

Soesterberg Airfield television transmitter,
establishment, bilateral agreement with
Netherlands, July 92

Television channels, allocation and use
along borders, bilateral agreements:
Canada, June 91; Mexico, Aug. 79, Dec.
74

U.S. Government international broadcast-
ing; Aug. center section; Shultz, PR
316, 10/18

Voice of America:
Radio relay station, bilateral agreement

with Antigua, Jan. 90
Soviet jamming (Department), Feb. 9, 10

World Administrative Radio Conference,
Final Acts (1977), approval, German
Democratic Republic, Aug. 78
Terrorism, international: Apr. 75, July 24;
Haig, Apr. 83; NATO, July 10, Aug. 68;
Reagan, July 23, 27; Shultz. Sept. 12

Terrorism, international (Cont'd) i

Armenian terrorism, profile (Corsun),
Aug. 31

Costa Rica (Department), Feb. 74

Diplomats and diplomatic facilities, attacloj
on: Haig, PR 160, 5/7; Perez, Jan. 55;
Reagan, PR 160, 5/7; Sayre, Aug. 1

Kidnaping of General Dozier: Haig, Feb.
26, PR 41, 2/2; Reagan, June 64, July
23

Patterns of, 1981 (with tables and charts),
Aug. 9

Prevention and punishment of crimes
against internationally protected per-
sons, including diplomatic agents, con-
vention (1973); Argentina, May 78;
Gabon, Feb. 82

Skyjacking: Aug. 9, 18; Sayre, Aug. 3

U.N. convention against taking of hostages"
(1979); Perez, Aug. 27; Sayre, Aug. 3

Current actions: Chile, Jan. 90; Panama,
Nov. 66; Suriname, Jan. 90

U.S. International Communication Agency
office (Pusan) incident (Holdridge), Jij'
67

U.S. official personnel abroad, security of:
Duncan, May 63; Haig, July 65; Perez,
Aug. 23; Sayre, July 76, Aug. 7

U.S. policy and organization: Aug. 3, 6;
Johnston, June 56; Perez, Jan. 56;
Reagan, Aug. 2 (quoted); Sayre, Aug. 1
Textiles;

Cotton, International Cotton Institute, ar-
ticles of agreement (1966), withdrawals
Argentina, Aug. 77; Spain, Dec. 72

Cotton, wool, and manmade textiles, bi-
lateral agreements: Brazil, June 91, PF
135, 4/19; China, May 79, Nov. 67, PR
229, 7/26; Colombia, Apr. 92, PR 299,
9/24, PR 369, undated; Haiti, July 92,
PR 246, 8/12; Hong Kong, Sept. 81, PI
223, 7/20; India, June 91, July 92, PR
127, 128, 129, 4/14, PR 149, 4/30;
Japan, Dec. 74, PR 293, 9/24; Korea,
May 79; Maldives, Dec. 74, PR 169,
5/19; Mauritius, Jan. 91; Mexico, Apr.
92, Dec. 74, PR 42, 2/2, PR 295, 9/24;
Pakistan, May 79, July 92, PR 108,
3/29, PR 133, 134, 4/19; Singapore,
May 79, Aug. 79, Sept. 81, Dec. 74, PR
29, 30, 31, 32, 1/27, PR 222, 7/20, PR
295, 9/24, PR 317, 318, 319, 10/19; Sri
Lanka, Aug. 79, Dec. 75, PR 242, 8/5,
PR 256, 8/18, PR 298, 9/24; Thailand,
Feb. 84, June 92, Dec. 75, PR 294,
9/24, PR 320, 10/19, PR 337, 10/27

Cotton textiles, trade in, bilateral agree-
ment with Pakistan, Apr. 92-93, June
92

International trade arrangement (1973),
protocol extending (1981): Argentina,
Aug. 78; Austria, Aug. 78, Nov. 66;
Bangladesh, Dec. 73; Brazil, July 92;
Canada, Nov. 66; Colombia, Aug. 78;
Czechoslovakia, Dec. 73; Egypt, July
92; El Salvador. Nov. 66; European
Economic Community, Finland, July 92,
Nov. 66; Guatemala, Dec. 73; Hungary,
India, July 92; Indonesia, Aug. 78;
Israel, Dec. 73; Japan, Republic of

Department of State Bulletin

tJJ

uxtUets iCnnt'd)
fnternntioiial trade an-angernent (Cont'd)
Korea, July 92; Malaysia, Aug. 78;
Mexico, July 92; Pakistan. Philippines,
Poland, July 92; Portugal, on behalf of
Macao, Aug. 78; Romania, Nov. 66;
Singapore, Aug. 78; Sri Lanka, July 92;
Sweden, Nov. 66; Switzerland, July 92;
Thailand, Turkey, Aug. 78; U.K., on
behalf of Hong Kong, July 92; U.S.,
Mar. 68
U.S. -Caribbean Basin countries trade, Apr.

13
lailand:
Chemical weapons, reports of use in, Dec.

48, 49, 50
Drug control programs: Linnemann, Feb.

47; Stoessel, Sept. 47

Textile agreement with U.S., amendment,

Feb. 84, June 92, Dec. 75, PR 294,

9/24, PR 320, 10/19, PR 337, 10/27

Treaties, agreements, etc., June 90, Aug.

U.S. economic and security assistance: De-
partment, Nov. 33; Holdridge, July 65;
Stoessel, May 46
U.S. visit of Foreign Minister Savetsila,

discussion topics (Department), Nov. 33
hatcher, Margaret, May 59, July 1, 31
hayer, Charles W., Mar. 4
heberge, James Daniel, swearing in as Am-
bassador to Chile, PR 252, 8/17
homas, Charles H., July 70
hompson, Richard W. (Schwar), June 5
horn, Gaston, July 1
Joint press conference with Secretary Haig,

PR 33, 1/27
ocqueville, Alexis de (quoted), June 40, Nov.

Togo:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 84, June

90
U.S. Ambassador (Walker), swearing in, PR

130, 4/2
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed, July 63
Tonga:
Treaties, agreements, etc.. Mar. 67, Aug.

77
U.S. Ambassador (Eckert), swearing in, PR
68, 2/16
Toon, Malcolm, Oct. 18 (quoted)
Totalitarianism: Abrams, Sept. 44; Bush,
Aug. 40; Haig, May 36, PR 75, 2/23;
Reagan, July 25; Shultz, Nov. 6, PR 316,
10/18; Stoessel, Oct. 28
Touring and tourism:
Bilateral agreement: China, Oct. 91; Philip-
pines, Nov. 67
U.S. travel advisory program: PR 323, 324,

10/21; Asencio,"Feb. 38
World Tourism Organization, income tax
reimbursement, bilateral agreement
with U.S., Feb. 84
Trade:
Bovine meat arrangement (1979), May 77
Current actions: Argentina, Yugoslavia,
Aug. 78
Civil aircraft, trade in, agreement (1979),
May 78

Trade (Confd)
Dairy arrangement, international (1979):
May 78; Argentina, Dec. 73; Poland,
Aug. 78
Free trade and antiprotectionism: Bush,
Aug. 42; Haig, Mar. 29, Apr. 35, July
18, PR 76, 2/23; Holdridge, Oct. 32;
Regan, July 3; Shultz, Oct. 10, Nov. 6,
Dec. 66; Stoessel, Oct. 27; Versailles
summit, July 5
General agreement on tariffs and trade:
Article VI, implementation agreement
(1979): May 77; Australia, Dec. 73;
Yugoslavia, Aug. 78
Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII, interpreta-
tion and application agreement (1979):
Egypt, May 78; Spain, Aug. 78
Article VII, implementation agreement
(1979), acceptance. New Zealand,
Aug. 78
Protocol: Brazil, Mar. 68; New Zealand,
Aug. 78; Yugoslavia, Dec. 73
Canadian Foreign Investment Review
Agency (FIRA), policies, question of
violation of GATT obligations: Hor-
mats, June 53; Johnston, Jan. 33
Changes to schedules:
Third certification, entry into force,

Aug. 78
Fifth certification, May 78
Geneva protocol (1979): Brazil, Zaire,

Mar. 68
Ministerial meetings: Enders, Nov. 60;
Haig, .Jan. 3; Holdridge, Oct. 31;
Lamb, Oct. 39; Shultz, Oct. 10;
Stoessel, Oct. 27
Services system, need for principles and

rules (Enders), Sept. 77
Working group on high technology trade,
proposed (Lamb), Oct. 39
High technology transfers. See Science and

technology
Import licensing procedures, agreement
(1979): May 78; Yugoslavia, Aug. 78
Technical barriers to trade, agreement
(1979): May 78; Rwanda, Apr. 91;
Yugoslavia, Dec. 73
U.N. Conference on Restrictive Business
Practices, agreed principles and rules,
U.S. interpretation: Baxter, Hormats,
Robinson, Jan. 34
U.S.:
ASEAN: May 47; Albrecht, Oct. 33;

Stoessel, May 46, Oct. 27
Automobiles and auto parts industry

(Hormats), Feb. 40
Brazil (Enders), Oct. 74
China (Haig), July 51
Europe, Western: Haig, PR 76, 2/23;

Hormats, Mar. 35, 43
Generalized system of preferences (GSP):
Enders, Sept. 76, Oct 75; Holdridge,
Oct. 30; Shultz, Sept. 29
Mexico, U.S. businessmen, visa procedure

agreement, Sept. 78
Promotion offices abroad, Aug. center
section
World trade: Enders, Sept. 75; Lamb, Oct.
38

Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Current actions, Jan. 89, Feb. 82, Mar. 67,
Apr. 90, May 77, June 90, July 91,
Aug. 77, Sept. 79, Oct. 90, Nov. 65,
Dec. 72
Importance of compliance with (Rostow),

May 44
Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and
Other International Agreements of the
United States in Force on January 1,
1982, released, Sept. 80
Treaty of amity and commerce with

Netherlands (1782): Wells, May 15
Vienna convention of law of treaties (1969):
Congo, June 90; Egypt, Apr. 91;
Uruguay, May 78
Treptow, Martin (Reagan), July 17
Trewhitt, Henry, Nov. 43
Trinidad and Tobago, Apr. 29
Procedures for mutual assistance in admin-
istration of justice re MA-106 investiga-
tion, agreement, entry into force, Nov.
68
U.S. Ambassador (Evans), swearing in, PR
10, 12/31, 1981
Trudeau, Pierre-Elliott, July 1
Truman, Harry S.: (quoted), June 34, July 41;

Keefer, Aug. 47; Sanford, June 20, 24
Tucker, William E., May 47
Tunisia:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 82, May

77, Aug. 80, Nov. 68
U.S. aid, proposed: Haig, Apr. 36; Veliotes,

July 73
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Mzali, pro-
gram, PR 142, 4/26
Turkey: Jan. 17, Apr. 40; Haig, July 44, PR
33, 1/27
Armenian terrorists: Corsun, Aug. 31;

Haig, Aug. 60
Financial stability and economic recovery,
balance-of-payments assistance agree-
ment with U.S., \pr. 93
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 92, Feb.
82, Apr. 93, May 79, June 90, July 91,
92, Aug. 78
U.S. Ambassador (Strauz-Hupe), swearing

in, PR 8, 1/5
LI.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed: Buckley, July 78, 79; Haig, Apr.
35, 36, PR 86, 3/3; Thomas, July 71
Visit of Secretary Haig: Haig, Turkmen,
Aug. 60, PR 168, 5/17
Turks and Caicos Islands, Apr. 30
Tuvalu:
U.S. Ambassador (Eckert), swearing in, PR

68, 2/16
Vienna convention on diplomatic relations
(1961), succession, Dec. 72

Uganda (Crocker), Dec. 24
Treaties, agreements, etc.. May 77, Sept.

79, 81, Nov. 65, Dec. 72, 73
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed, July 63
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, treaties,
agreements, etc.. June 90, Sept. 80

ndex 1982

United Arab Emirates, treaties, agreements,
etc., Jan. 89, Feb. 82, July 91, Aug. 77,
Nov. 66
United Kingdom (see also Falkland Islands
(Malvinas) war):
Drug control, bilateral agreement, Feb. 49,

84
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 89, Feb.
82, 84, Mar. 67, 68, 69, Apr. 93, May
77, June 90, July 92, Aug, 80, Oct. 90,
Nov. 66, Dec. 72, 75
U.S. sale of Trident II missile system,
agreement, Dec. 75
Exchange of letters (Reagan, Thatcher),
May 59; (Weinberger, Nott), May 60;
White House, May 59
Visit of President Reagan: Queen Elizabeth
II, July 29; Reagan, July 24, 30, 31;
Thatcher, July 31
Visit of Secretary Haig (Haig), PR 37, 2/3
United Nations (Piatt), July 80
Charter, principles: Reagan, July 39, 41;

Rostow, Feb. 33, May 40
Membership, Antigua and Barbuda, Feb.

37th anniversary (Shultz), PR 342. 11/2

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF):

Holdridge, Nov. 30; Reich, Mar. 60

Appropriations request, FY 1983 (Piatt),

July 82
International Children's Festival, announce-
ment, PR 356, 12/2
United Nations Day, 1982, proclamation

(Reagan), Nov, 8
United Nations Development Program
(UNDP):
Appropriations request, FY 1983 (Piatt),

July 82
Disabled persons program (Reich). Mar. 60
United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO): Reich
Mar. 60
Constitution (1945): Bahamas. Western

Samoa, Jan. 90
New World Information Order (Buckley),
June 78
United Nations Educational and Training
Program for Southern Africa, appropria-
tions request, FY 1983 (Piatt), July 83
United Nations Environmental Program,
appropriations request, FY 1983 (Piatt),
July 82
United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees. See Refugees, passim
United Nations Industrial Development

Organization, constitution (1979): Angola,
Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Nov. 66-
Belgium, Jan. 90; Burundi, Oct. 91;
Canada, Nov. 66; Central African
Republic, Mar. 68; Chad, June 90; Chile.
Jan. 90; Colombia, Feb. 82; Dominica,
Aug, 78; Ecuador, June 90; Fiji, Mar. 68;
France, June 90; Gabon. Ghana. Apr. 91;
Haiti, Oct. 91; Ivory Coast, Jan. 90; .Jor-
dan, Nov. 66; Kenya, Jan. 90; Kuwait,
June 90; Mauritius, Paraguay, Feb. 82;
Peru, Dec. 73; St. Lucia, Nov. 66;
Seychelles, June 90; Somalia, Feb. 82;
Turkey, July 92; United Arab Emirates,
Feb. 82; Upper Volta, Oct, 91; Yemen,
Democratic, Apr, 91; Zaire, Oct. 91

United Nations Institute for Namibia, appro-
priations request, FY 1983, (Piatt), July
83
United Nations International Year of Dis-
abled Persons (Reich), Mar. 58
United Nations Relief and Works Agency

(UNRWA): Vine. June 76. July 76
United Nations Voluntary Fund for the Dec-
ade for Women, appropriations request
FY 1983 (Piatt), July 83
Upper Volta:
U.N. Industrial Development Organization,
constitution (1979), ratification, Oct. 91
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed, July 63
Uruguay: Department. Feb. 78: Enders.
Sept. 72
Treaties, agreements, etc.. Jan. 90. May 78

Valladares. Armando (Kirkpatrick). Feb. 67
van Berkel, Pieter Johan (Wells), May 2, 20
Vandenberg, Arthur H. (Sanford), June 25
van der Capellen, Johan Derek (Wells), May

11, 12. 13
van der Kemp, Francois Adrian (Wells), May

11, 12
Van Gorkom, Jerome, nomination for Under
Secretary for Management (Shultz), PR
286, 9/15
Van Hollen, Eliza, Mar. 19
Vanocur, Sander, July 55
Vanuatu, treaties, agreements, etc., Aug 78

Nov. 66, Dec. 72
Vatican City State, recognition of studies,
diplomas, and degrees concerning higher
education, convention (1979), ratification
Sept. 79
Veliotes, Nicholas A., Jan. 47. June 65. July

72. Nov. 43
Venezuela:
Caribbean Basin, aid to, Apr. 26
Cuban relations (Department), Feb. 78
Profile, Jan. 87
Treaties, agreements, etc., June 90, Oct,

91; Dec, 73
U,S. Ambassador (Landau), swearing in

PR 255, 8/17, PR 307, 10/5
U.S. arms sales, proposed (Buckley), Apr

84
U.S. mission, Aug. center section
U.S. visit of President Herrera Campins,
Jan. 86
Vest, George S., swearing in as Ambas-
sador to the European Communities
(Kennedy), Oct. 16, PR 249. 7/29
Vietnam: Albrecht. Oct. 33; Stoessel. Oct. 28
Chemical weapons, use of: Burt, Jan. 53;
Reagan, June 36; Shultz. Dec. 44;
Stoessel. May 57. Oct. 28
Japanese position (Holdridge). Apr. 57
Treaties, agreements, etc. Jan, 90, Apr

91, 92, June 90. Sept, 80, Dec, 73
U,S, export controls (Johnston), June 55
U.S. missing-inaction: Holdridge, Aug. 59;

Stoessel, Oct. 28
U.S. relations, question of (Haig), PR 80
3/1

Vine, Richard D., June 74, July 75
Virgin Islands, U.S.: Apr. 10, 21; Reagan,

Apr. 4
Visas, U.S.-Mexican visa agreement for busi

nessmen. Sept, 78
Voice of America (Enders), Sept, 70
Poland, jammmg (Department), Feb. 9, 10
Relay station, bilateral agreement with
Antigua, Jan. 90

Walcott, John, Feb. 24

Walesa, Lech: Department. Feb. 4, 6- Haig

Feb. 21. 25
Walker. Howard K.. swearing in as Ambas-
sador to Togo, PR 130, 4/2
Walters, Vernon (Kennedy), Oct. 16
Watt, James (Reagan). Sept. 27
Weights and measures, international office
of, convention (1875) with annexes,
Korea, Democratic Republic of, Oct. 91
Weinberger, Caspar: May 60; Haig, PR 70

2/17
Wells, Sherrill Brown, May 1
Wendt, E. Allan, Nov. 35
Western Sahara. See under Africa
Western Samoa, UNESCO constitution

(1945), acceptance, Jan. 90
Wheat:
Food aid convention (1980), Argentina,
Aug. 78
Protocol for the first extension (1981):
Austria, Mar. 68; Finland, July 92;
France, Oct, 91; Ireland, Mar, 68;
Japan, July 92; U,K,, U,S„ Mar. 68
Wheat trade convention (1971). protocol
for the sixth extension (1981): Austria.
Belgium. Bolivia. Mar. 68; Finland. Jul'
92; France. Oct. 91; Ireland. Mar, 68;
Israel. Jan, 90; Japan, July 92; Por-
tugal, Jan, 90; Spain, Feb, 82; U,K,,
U,S,, Mar. 68; Venezuela, Oct. 91
White, Frank, PR 75, 2/23
Wiley, Alexander, June 29 (quoted)
Wills, uniform law on, international conven-
tion (1973): Canada, extension to Sas-
katchewan. June 91; Cyprus. Dec. 73
Wolfowitz. Paul D.. Sept. 32
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, swearing in, PR
397, 12/22
Women:
Discrimination, elimination of, convention
(1979): Austria, June 91; Benin, .Jan,
90; Bulgaria, Apr, 91; Colombia, Mar.
68; Congo. Nov, 66; Czechoslovakia.
Apr, 91; Dominican Republic. Nov, 66;
Ecuador. Jan. 90; Greece. May 78;
Guatemala. Guinea. Nov. 66; Nicaragua.
Panama, Jan, 90; Peru, Dec, 74;
Romania, Mar, 68; Sri Lanka, Feb. 82;
Vietnam, Apr. 91; Yugoslavia. May 78
Political rights, inter-American convention
(194SI, ratification. Suriname. May 78
World Intellectual Property Organization,
convention establishing (1967): Mali. Aug,
78; Somalia. Dec, 73; Zimbabwe, Jan, 90

Department of State Bulletin

orld peace: Pope John Paul II, July 22;
Reagan, May 29, July 31, 32, 39, Dec. 1;
Rostow, May 40; Shultz, Oct. 1, 10;
Wolfowitz, Sept. 32

emen (Aden):

Soviet and Cuban military presence:
Crocker, July 62; Veliotes, July 74

Terrorist activities, Aug. 20

Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 82, Apr.
91, Sept. 80

emen Arab Republic:

U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed (Veliotes), July 74

WHO constitution, amendment to articles
24 and 25, acceptance. May 79

oung, John Russell (Schwar), June 1 1

Yugoslavia:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Feb. 82, Mar.
67, Apr. 91, May 77, 78, June 90, July
91, Aug. 78, Oct. 90, 91, Dec. 73
U.S. Ambassador (Anderson), swearing in,
PR 217, 7/14

Zaire:

Treaties, agreements, etc.. Mar. 68, July
93, Oct. 91, 92, Nov. 78

U.S. Ambassador (Constable), swearing in,
PR 313, 10/8

U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed: July 63; Crocker, July 62

U.S. visit of President Mobutu, Feb. 29

Zambia:
Treaties, agreements, etc., Sept. 81, Oct.

92
U.S. Ambassador (Piatt), swearing in, PR

230, 7/30
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed, July 63
Zambrano Valasco, Jose Alberto, May 64
Zeder, Fred M., President's Personal Repre-
sentative for Micronesian Status Negotia-
tions, swearing in, PR 73, 2/18
Zhao Ziyang, Apr. 50
Zimbabwe (Reagan), Jan. 26, Feb. 31
Treaties, agreements, etc., Jan. 90, June

90, July 93
U.S. economic and security assistance, bi-
lateral agreements, July 93
U.S. economic and security assistance, pro-
posed: July 63; Crocker, Jan. 26, July
62
U.S. private sector, role (Crocker), June 47

Index 1982

PRmTTOC OFFirE- 19B3_ 36.1

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