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Departmpnt 
of State 



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V of state ^^ J ^ 

huuetin 



'he Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 82 / Number 2067 



October 1982 



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The Secretary / 1 
China / 19 
Brazil / 73 



Mh»ptirtnu»ni of Siaie 

bulletin 



Volume 82 ' Number 2067 October 1982 



The Department OF State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreipi policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

JOHN HUGHES 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Actin^r Chiff, F'llitorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Kditor 

JUANITA ADAMS 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State ha.s determined that the 
publication of thi.s periodical is nece.ssary in the 
transaction of the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through March .31, 
19H7. 



NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted 
and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation 
of the DkI'AKtmknt of Statk Bii.i.f.tin as the .source 
will be appreciated. The Bm.r.F.TiN is indexed in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, ' 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
2O402 Price: 12 issues plus annual inde.\ — $21.0 
(domestic) $26.25 (foreign) Single copy — $3.75 
(domestic) $.1.70 (foreign) Index, single copy — i 
(domestic) $3. 15 (foreign) 



CONTENTS 



The Secretary 



Military Affairs 



1 The Quest for Peace 

5 Middle East Peace Initiative 

7 Interview on "Meet the Press" 

10 Interview on "Face the Nation" 

Africa 

14 Visit of Cameroon President 

Ahidjo (Presidents Reagan 
and Ahidjo) 

Department 

15 Role of the U.S. Ambassador 

(Richard T. Kennedy) 

East Asia 



19 



22 
27 



29 



32 



U.S. -China Joint Communique 
(John H. Holdridge. President 
Reagan, Text of Communiqtie) 

U.S.-China Relations, 1981 

U.S. Consultations With ASEAN 
(Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.) 

U.S. Dialogue With ASEAN and 
ANZUS (John H. Holdridge) 

U.S. Economic Relations With 
ASEAN (Anthony C. Albrecht) 



Economics 



35 



38 



Economic Regulation and Inter- 
national Jurisdictional Conflict 
(Davis R. Robinson) 

Trade in the 1980s (Denis Lamb) 



Europe 



40 



42 



U.S. -Soviet Grain Sales Agree- 
ment (President Reagan, Fact 
Sheet) 

Soviet Active Measures: An 
Update 



Middle East 

45 Secretary's Letter to Jordan's 
King 



46 



47 



Chemical Weapons: Arms Control 
and Deterrence (Jonathan T. 
Howe) 

Production of the MX Missile 
(President's Statement and Let- 
ter to the Speaker of the House) 



Oceans 

48 Law of the Sea and Oceans Policy 
(James L. Malone) 

Security Assistance 

50 Conventional Arms Transfers in 
the Third World, 1972-81 
(James L. Buckley) 

Western Hemisphere 

Building Peace in Central Amer- 
ica (Thomas 0. Enders) 

Visit of Costa Rican President 
Monge (Presidents Reagan 
and Monge) 

Visit of Honduran President 
Suazo (Presidents Reagan 
and Suazo) 

U.S. Relations With Brazil 
(Thomas 0. Enders) 

Grenada (Stephen W. Bosworth) 

The South Atlantic Crisis: Back- 
ground, Consequences, 
Documentation (Thomas 0. 
Enders, Proposals, Notes, 
Letters, Annexes) 

Treaties 

90 Current Actions 

Chronology 

92 August 1982 

Press Releases 

93 Department of State 



66 



69 



71 



73 



75 
78 




Publications 

94 Foreign Relations Volume 

Released 
94 Department of State 
94 GPO Sales 



If Israel's adversaries want peace 
and justice, they must recognize, clear- 
ly and explicitly, the right of the State 
of Israel to exist. . . . 

For the moderate Arabs, there is 
the opportunity to demonstrate that the 
course of negotiations can produce 
results and serve their vital interests. 

The Palestinians now confront a 
great decision: whether to continue 
down the self-destructive road of armed 
struggle . . . or to seize the opportunity 
to affect their destiny by way of the 
peace process. 



THE SECRETARY 



The Quest 
for Peace 



by Secretary Shultz 



Address before the 

United Jewish Appeal, 

New York City, September 12, 1982^ 



No theme is more appropriate for my 
first speech as Secretary of State than 
the theme of peace. No objective we 
share is more worthy or more elusive: to 
attain it requires realism, strength, the 
capacity to run risks, and the ability to 
gather trust. It takes sustained goodwill 
to build up that trust. And it takes 
serious, fair, and direct bargaining at 
the negotiating table to hammer out 
workable and durable agreements. 

If we needed any reminder, events 
of this year make it clear that we do not 
live in a world of peace. Scarcely a 
region of the developing world— where 
peace is crucial for social and economic 
growth— has been spared. From Indo- 
china to the Horn of Africa, from the 
Persian Gulf and Afghanistan to the tip 
of South America, wars raged with 
frightening intensity and tragic results. 
Some cases, such as the Soviets' im- 
perialistic war in Afghanistan, are new 
conflicts where one nation is seeking to 
extend its power and control. But much 
of the violence we witnessed this year, 
including the war over the Falklands, 
represented only the latest outbreak of 
long-smouldering disputes. Mankind has 
advanced his capacity to wage war. But 
his ability to settle disputes peacefully 
and to prevent violence remains 
primitive. 

We have clear codes of international 
morality and law. From the words of the 
prophets to the rhetoric of 20th century 
statesmen, mankind has set out stand- 
ards for individual and international 
behavior. Over the last two centuries, 
nations have formed international bodies 
to adjudicate disputes, resolve conflicts. 



and promote peace. But the ideal of a 
world at peace has remained, and will 
remain, a mirage until nations pursue, 
as a matter of course, policies rooted in 
mutual respect and aimed at forging and 
fostering a just international order. 

The formula for peace often requires 
that we convince our adversaries of the 
strength of our forces and of our will to 
defend liberty and security. That same 
formula demands that we stand pre- 
pared to meet with our adversaries and 
work with them to bridge differences. 
Despite the catalogue of troubles around 
the world, there are great opportunities 
and practical possibilities before us to- 
day. 

The pursuit of peace with freedom, 
security, and justice is the essence of 
America's foreign policy. Our country's 
commitment to peace is beyond doubt, 
based on our creative, unrelenting 
efforts in that cause. 

The past year has been a year rich 
in American efforts for peace. At the 
President's direction, and with the com- 
mitment of American peacekeeping 
forces. Secretary Haig took the lead in 
creating the multinational force that 
helped make good on the historic Israeli 
move for peace: withdrawal from the 
Sinai. Deputy Secretary of State Walter 
Stoessel worked intensively in the 
crucial final weeks to assure that 
achievement. Ours was the nation that 
made a major effort to head off the 
tragic war in the South Atlantic. We 
have continued the effort to find peace- 
ful and just settlements to the fighting 
in Indochina and Afghanistan. With all 
America behind him— including once 



THE SECRETARY 



again our dedicated men in uniform- 
Phil Habib [President's special emissary 
to the Middle East] used every ounce of 
his legendary skill and stamina to pre- 
vent a tragic denouement of the war in 
Lebanon. We are currently engaged in a 
major diplomatic effort to achieve Nami- 
bian independence and lasting security 
in southern Africa. We have provided 
vigorous backing for the international 
efforts that secured Libya's withdrawal 
from Chad. And to ease the dangers of 
nuclear war, the President has proposed 
major reductions of U.S. and Soviet 
nuclear weapons and has offered new 
proposals to advance the talks on the 
reduction of conventional forces. 

International institutions and resolu- 
tions for peace need practical efforts to 
give them life. Mankind has made aston- 
ishing technological and material leaps 
in the last 40 years. But we must make 
equally dramatic gains in the political 



The challenge that 
the President has of- 
fered to Israel is to ex- 
tend its hand to welcome 
wider participation in 
the peace process. 



realm if we are to bequeath a safe and 
secure world of peace to our children. 
I believe we can make those gains. 
Strength of arms and of will are essen- 
tial, but no more so than the ability to 
find that winning mixture of courage 
and realism. No matter what the 
obstacles, we must persevere — for there 
are no more noble nor important goals 
than peace, freedom, and security. 

The President's Peace Initiative 
in the Middle East 

These principles apply fully to that set 
of goals foremost in our thoughts 
today— peace in the Middle East and 
security and success for Israel and its 
Arab neighbors. No one who has walked 
the streets of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv 
and who has talked at length with as 
many Israeli people as I have can doubt 
that they want peace and security, and I 
am dedicated to helping them achieve 
both. 



Against the backdrop of confronta- 
tion, despair, and fear that have char- 
acterized the search for peace in the 
Middle East, three key documents spell 
out how peace might be made a reality. 

• The first is U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 242, which established the 
basis for a negotiating process founded 
on the idea of an exchange of territory 
for real peace. 

• The second is the Camp David ac- 
cords, which— in the Egypt-Israel Peace 
Treaty— led directly to the realization of 
such an exchange of territory for peace. 
Camp David calls for a "just, compre- 
hensive, and durable" Middle East peace 

T 'lesolution 242, but builds on it 
a_ well by calling for a solution that 
recognizes "the legitimate rights of the 
Palestinian people and their just require- 
ments" and a "resolution of the Pales- 
tinian problem in all its aspects." 

• And third, there is the President's 
speech of September 1 . This historic ad- 
dress builds on the earlier documents by 
stating categorically that our approach 
to peace will continue to be based on 
Resolution 242, with its concept of an 
exchange of territory for peace, and the 
Camp David accords, which provide for 
Palestinian self-government with full 
guarantees for Israel's security. 

While I cannot summarize for you 
the totality of a rich and complex 
speech, I would like to review four im- 
portant points made by the President. 

First, there should be full safe- 
guards for Israeli security, both internal 
and external, throughout the transitional 
period and beyond. The President has 
made this forcefully clear. 

Second, as stated in Camp David, 
there should be a transitional period of 5 
years during which the Palestinians of 
the West Bank and Gaza should be per- 
mitted to exercise full autonomy. 

Third, the United States believes 
that peace cannot be achieved on the 
basis of Israeli sovereignty over the 
West Bank and Gaza but must be based 
on Resolution 242's formula of an ex- 
change of territory for peace. Our pref- 
erence is for self-government by the 
Palestinians in association with Jordan, 
with the extent of withdrawal deter- 
mined by the quality of peace offered in 
return. 

Fourth, the United States also be- 
lieves that peace cannot be achieved by 
the creation of an independent Pales- 
tinian state on the West Bank and Gaza. 
The President has stated clearly and 
unequivocally that we will not support 
an independent Palestinian state in the 
territories. 



One section of the President's spee« U 
especially deserves reading tonight woi 
for word, because it did not appear in 
the text printed in the New York Timeikii 
But don't blame the Times. The passag i 
was inserted by the President at the 
very last minute— after the press had 
received their copies. It was put in be- 
cause the President wanted to speak 
from his heart to the people of Israel. 
The President said this: 

I have personally followed and supporte 
Israel's heroic struggle for survival ever sin , 
the founding of the State of Israel 34 yeara ™ 
ago. In the pre-1967 borders, Israel was baj ** 
ly 10 miles wide at its narrowest point. The '* 
bulk of Israel's population lived within ar 
tillery range of hostile Arab armies. I am n 
about to ask Israel to live that way again. 

Those words represent the Presi- 
dent's, and America's, fundamental coi 
mitment to Israeli security and to gem 
ine peace. Our commitment grows out 
a sense of moral obligation but also ou 
of strategic interest. A strong, secure 
Israel is in our interests and the inter- 
ests of peace. There will be no peace 
without Israeli security, but Israel will 
never be secure without peace. Our vi- 
sion of the future on the West Bank is 
one guided by a vision of a secure Isr& 
living with defensible borders and by ( 
abiding belief that it is not in Israel's 
long-term interests to try to rule over 
the more than 1 million Palestinians lii 
ing in the West Bank and Gaza. 

Approval for the President's initia' 
tive is gathering force and momentun 
both here at home and abroad. I belie 
it will gather more and more support 
people read and study that speech car 
fully. The same is true of the Camp 
David accords on which the President 
speech is based. Those who do take tl 
time to read those historic documents 
soon recognize the genius of Camp 
David. It is an accomplishment that is p' 
tribute to the statesmanship of the 
leaders of three great nations — Prime 
Minister Begin, the late President 
Sadat, and our own President Carter, 



to 



The Opportunity of the Present 

Despite the many dark periods of staj. ing 
nation, setback, and delay since 1967 
look at the long-term trend in the Mic 
die East is encouraging. After a quar 
century of sterile conflict and confron 
tion, the past decade has seen a build 
momentum toward peace. Three negc 
tiated disengagement agreements hav 
been signed. President Sadat paid his 
historic and stirring visit to Jerusalen ton 
There was the great achievement of t ^ 



ilest 



THE SECRETARY 



3amp David framework and the signing 
n 1979 and fulfillment this past April of 
he first treaty of peace between Israel 
ind an Arab neighbor— a treaty that is 
tribute to the willingness of the people 
if Israel and of Prime Minister Begin to 
ake risks for peace. I say the first trea- 
y because there must be — and there 
vill be — more to come. For only in the 
iontext of true peace, freely negotiated, 
an there be true security for Israel and 
ts neighbors. 

Nothing is more crucial than 
milding on this momentum. But, as has 
•een obvious to all, the stalemate in the 
.utonomy talks over the past 2 or more 
ears, and the outbreak of major mili- 
ary conflict this past summer, pose a 
frave threat to further progress. 

In these circumstances, President 
Heagan decided that the time had come 
lor renewed American leadership. He 
tcted, as well, because the Middle East 
oday is at a moment of unprecedented 
ipportunity: Israel, the moderate Arab 
itates, the Palestinians, and the United 
States are all affected, and all now face 
he choice between hope and frustration, 
letween peace and conflict. 

Israel has demonstrated once again, 
-t trag^ic cost, that it will not be de- 
eated militarily. If Israel's adversaries 
'/ant peace and justice, they must recog- 
lize, clearly and explicitly, the right of 
he State of Israel to exist, and they 
nust enter, as President Reagan said, 
direct, hard, and fair" negotiations with 
erael. When they do, Israel then has 
Ihe chance to translate military strength 
nto peace, the only long-term security. 

For the moderate Arabs, there is 
(le opportunity to demonstrate that the 
Durse of negotiations can produce 
asults and serve their vital interests, 
or Lebanon, there is now a second 
nance; the chance once again to be free, 
rosperous, and democratic, posing no 
ireat to its neighbors and serving as a 
table bridge between the West and the 
.rab world. 

The Palestinians now confront a 
reat decision: whether to continue 
own the self-destructive road of armed 
truggle, which has only produced 
agedy for the Palestinian people, or to 
eize the opportunity to affect their 
estiny by way of the peace process, 
'he Camp David framework upholds the 
nportance of self-government for the 
'alestinians of the West Bank and Gaza, 
ind it provides Palestinian representa- 
ives the right to participate in the 
etermination of their future at every 
tep in that process. 



For the United States, the brilliant, 
dogged diplomatic achievement of Presi- 
dential emissary Phil Habib has shown 
America's determination and ability to 
promote just and peaceful solutions to 
the problems of the area. His work is 
but the latest evidence of how crucial is 
the help of the United States if the 
peoples and nations of the region are to 
stop the fighting, construct solid agree- 



The President has 
offered a fundamental 
challenge to the Arabs 
as well. It is time for the 
Arab world to recognize 
the opportunity provided 
by Camp David. The 
path of rejection has 
achieved nothing but 
tragedy. . . . 



ments, and prevent wars between Arabs 
and Israelis from again threatening to 
become the focal point of global conflict. 

In his historic address to the Israeli 
Knesset, Anwar Sadat spoke of 
"moments in the lives of nations and 
peoples when it is incumbent upon those 
known for their wisdom and clarity of 
vision, to penetrate beyond the past, 
with all its complexities and vain 
memories, in a bold drive toward new 
horizons." The present is such a moment 
for us all. 

The President has offered a chal- 
lenge — the challenge of peace — to 
Israelis and Arabs alike. Everyone talks 
so much about peace that it requires 
some effort to stop and comprehend 
what it really can mean. Relief from the 
horrible burden of war can unleash the 
full development of human potential, 
promising even greater creativity in the 
arts and sciences. Peace offers new eco- 
nomic possibilities — when the defense 
burden is lightened — to build a better 
life at home and contribute to the pros- 
perity of the region and the world. 



Peace can mean fruitful economic co- 
operation between Israel and its neigh- 
bors. Imagine how the genius of the 
Israeli nation could flourish if it were 
freed from the physical and psycho- 
logical burdens imposed by the continu- 
ing state of conflict. Imagine the enorm- 
ous contribution that the peoples of this 
region — so rich in spiritual strength — 
could make to all mankind. 

The Challenge to Israel 

The challenge that the President has 
offered to Israel is to extend its hand to 
welcome wider participation in the peace 
process. Israel has demonstrated once 
more its military strength and bravery. 
But we all recognize that while true 
peace requires military strength, 
strength alone is not enough; true peace 
can only be achieved through lasting 
negotiated agreements leading ultimate- 
ly to friendly cooperation between Israel 
and its neighbors. 

In the 1948 war of independence 
Israel lost 6,000 dead, out of a popula- 
tion that was much smaller than it is to- 
day; it lost nearly 200 dead in 1956, 
nearly 700 in 1967, and hundreds more 
in the war of attrition that lasted until 
1970; 2,800 young Israelis were killed in 
the 1973 war and more than 300 in 
1982. 

That terrible cycle of death and 
suflFering must end. The evacuation of 
the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) from Beirut and the forceful 
demonstration of Israeli capability make 
this an altogether unique moment, a mo- 
ment of opportunity to end this cycle. 
Triumphs of statecraft are decisions 
which join opportunity with action. If 
this opportunity is allowed to pass, it 
may never conie again. 

The challenge Israel faces now is to 
combine diplomacy with power to build 
an enduring political settlement. There 
is nothing that says that Palestinian self- 
government in association with Jordan 
must lead inevitably to a Palestinian 
state. The President has said that we 
will not support such an outcome. It is 
not beyond the reach of diplomacy to 
create, nor Israeli military power to in- 
sure, that agreed arrangements for the 
West Bank will not erode over time. 
U.S. determination that concrete, iron- 
clad arrangements for the security of 
Israel accompany the ultimate resolution 
of the Palestinian question is height- 
ened, not diminished, by the fact that 
we have views on a desirable direction 
for the negotiations. 



THE SECRETARY 



The crucial point is that when it 
comes to safeguarding the long-term 
security of Israel, the friendship and 
resolve of the United States are second 
in importance only to Israel's own reso- 
lution and strength. And, in the final 
analysis, that friendship and resolve 
deserve, in return, to be reciprocated by 
a willingness to listen with an open mind 
to the views of others. But let me be 
clear: We have a right to be heard but 
we have no intention of using our sup- 
port for Israel's security as a way of im- 
posing our views. 

We must not underestimate the 
dilemmas and risks that Israel faces in 
opting for negotiations, but they are 
dwarfed by those created by a continua- 
tion of the status quo. The United States 
recognizes its obligations, as the prin- 
cipal supporter of Israel's security, to be 
understanding of Israel's specific circum- 
stances in the negotiating process. The 
President has urged consideration of his 
proposals in the context of negotiations, 
to be undertaken without preconditions 
and with no thought of imposed solu- 
tions. 

That is why the United States par- 
ticularly asked that the parties them- 
selves not preclude possible outcomes by 
concrete and perhaps irreversible actions 
undertaken before the process of negoti- 
ation is completed. While we support the 
right of Jews to live in peace on the 
West Bank and Gaza under the duly con- 
stituted governmental authority there — 
just as Arabs live in Israel— we regard 
the continuation of settlement activity 
prior to the conclusion of negotiations as 
detrimental to the peace process. 

The Challenge to the Arabs 

The President has offered a fundamental 
challenge to the Arabs as well. It is time 
for the Arab world to recognize the op- 
portunity provided by Camp David. The 
path of rejection has achieved nothing 
but tragedy, particularly for the Pales- 
tinians. Surely, the pattern of agonies of 
this capable and courageous people must 
not be repeated. Alternatively, the 
Camp David process and the President's 
fresh start offers a promise of resolution 
with honor and justice to those with the 
wisdom to join the peace process. But it 
also implies a corollary: Those who fail 
to join will miss a precious oppor- 
tunity — an opportunity for peace that 
may not come again soon. 



The absence of Jordan and repre- 
sentatives of the Palestinian inhabitants 
of the occupied territories from the ne- 
gotiations has been the crucial missing 
link in the Camp David process. Success 
in the peace process depends on Arab 
support for these vital missing partners 
to join the negotiations and become 
partners for peace. We trust that sup- 
port will be forthcoming soon. Our con- 
sultations with the Arab world will be 
designed to encourage such support. We 
recognize the risks to all parties, but the 
risks of failure are even greater. The 
Arab nations missed one chance for 
peace when they rejected the 1947 U.N. 
partition plan. Then, for nearly two 
decades, they rejected the legitimacy of 
the boundaries within which the Israelis 
lived so insecurely prior to 1967. In 1978 
they refused to support Egypt when the 
Camp David accords were signed. To- 
day, the Arabs again have great oppor- 
tunities: to move from belligerency to 
negotiation to peace; and to work 
realistically and practically for the rights 
of the Palestinians. But these oppor- 
tunities, like the previous ones, will not 
last forever. 

A "New Realism" for Us All 

Thus for the Palestinians and other 
Arabs, and for Israel, this is, indeed, the 
moment, as the President said, for a 
"new realism." An element in that 
realism is that the United States has 
decided to state publicly where it stands 
on critical questions. There will be, as I 
have said, no imposed solutions: Any 
point agreed by Israel and its Arab 
neighbors will not be opposed by us. But 
at the same time, the United States is 
now obligated, by reality and morality 
alike, to make known its views on what 
we believe is needed to reach a fair, 
workable, and lasting solution. This the 
President did on the first of September. 
The President's initiative contains firm 
American principles; we will not depart 
from them. As we move ahead the 
United States, as a full partner, will 
reserve the right to support positions on 
either side when we feel this is likely to 
promote fair agreement. And we will 
put forward our own proposals when ap- 
propriate, to the same end. I reiterate, 
however, that no specific negotiated re- 
sult is ruled out: That is the essence of 
the process. 



m 



lesl 



We must also recognize another 
reality: The positions now held by the 
potential partners in negotiations are 
widely at variance. The point however it J 
this: Any participant in this process— in 
eluding the United States as a full part- 
ner—is free to have and to enunciate ib 
positions. Once views are expressed, th« |^ 
place, indeed the only place, to thrash 
out differences is at the bargaining 
table. If there were no differences of 
opinion, there would be no need for 
negotiations. 

The issues are complex, the emo- 
tions deep, the forces in the Middle EaaL', 
contentious, and the stakes so great. 
The wisdom of the peace process must 
spring from recognition of these facts. 
Bitterness dies hard, while trust grows > 
slowly. President Reagan has now set 
out the lines of a fair and realistic solu- 
tion; together with the other parties we [( 
should all come together to discuss and- 
negotiate these matters. 

There is no need now to agree on 
any principle but one: That is the need 
to come together at the bargaining tabC" 
to talk— to talk about differences; to ta ^ 
about aspirations; to talk about peace; 
but in all events to talk. We ask for 
nothing more of any of the participant!!^' 
at the beginning of the process. And wi ^ 
have the deepest duty and obligation t« ^| 
ask for no less. 

If it takes more time, we are pre- 
pared for that. But there are 
limits— this opportunity must not be 
lost. One hundred and twenty years agAj 
Abraham Lincoln, speaking to the Cod ^j 
gress of the United States, said that 
"The dogmas of the . . . past are inade 
quate to the . . . present. The occasion 
piled high with difficulty, and we must 
rise with the occasion. As our case is 
new, so we must think anew and act 
anew." 

In this spirit, and with the vision, 
self-confidence, and mutual trust that 
has marked our relationship at its besi 
moments, Israel and America— and oi 
Arab friends, now and in the future- 
can shape a life of dignity, justice, anc 
true peace. 



il 



'Press release 278 of Sept. 13, 1982. I 



Depart nnent of State Buiiel 



THE SECRETARY 



liddle East Peace Initiative 



Sirretary Shultz's statement before 
1^' Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
hSeptember 10. 1982.^ 

|im very pleased to have this oppor- 
Knity to discuss with you the Admini- 
rat ion's recent poHcy steps in the Mid- 
:■ (-"ast. We have begun actions of a 
\(ii' range and of immense importance. 
le pdsitive bipartisan support for 
iesident Reagan's peace initiative has 
ten evident to us and is deeply appreci- 
£»d. That support is essential to the 
cnduct of a vigorous and creative 
i-eign policy and, accordingly, I deeply 
s predate your willingness to meet with 
r' on short notice. 

A little over 2 months ago, I came 
tfore you as a nominee for Secretary of 
Site. In those hearings, we were all 
( arly concerned about the problems 
{ jsented by the Middle East and the 
I lestinian issues in particular. I empha- 
sed then our efforts to secure a cease- 
i i in Lebanon, as the first step toward 
( r goal of a united, sovereign Lebanon, 
1 'ed from foreign forces. I also empha- 
E ed the importance of Israeli security 
i d overall peace, while recognizing the 
1 itimate rights of the Palestinians and 
1 ?ir just requirements. 

Since then, not just your attention 
\ t the world's attention was focused on 
t ' Middle East and particularly on our 
'( ilomatic efforts there to end the blood- 
s id and to bring a deeper and lasting 
1 ice to the area. With the successful 
< icuation of the Palestine Liberation 
( ganization (PLO) from Beirut, we 
i ve turned to the next steps necessary 
1 • peace: the withdrawal of all foreign 
i -ces from Lebanon and the restoration 
« central authority in that country and, 
( prime importance, the reinvigoration 
the Camp David peace process in an 
ort to resolve fairly the underlying 
ab-Israeli dispute. 

Lebanon, of course, has suffered 
ievously over the last several months, 
alone the last several years. Phil 
ibib's [President's special emissary to 
3 Middle East] and Morris Draper's 
)ecial negotiator for Lebanon] success- 
' negotiation of the withdrawal of the 
^0 from Beirut established the first 
ase of our approach to the problem of 
tenon. The U.S. Marine contingent in 
e multinational force completed its 



withdrawal from Beirut at 2:00 this 
morning, well within the 30-day period 
the President specified in his notification 
to you. The French and Italian contin- 
gents will begin their withdrawal soon. 
■The Government of Lebanon, mean- 
while, is working carefully but surely to 
reestablish authority over all parts of 
Beirut, with the Lebanese Army and 
police increasingly assuming security re- 
sponsibilities in the city. 

The Next Step 

A second phase in our Lebanon 
diplomacy is now before us. As all of 
you know, the Presdent is sending Am- 
bassador Draper to Lebanon to begin 
negotiations on withdrawal of foreign 
forces from that country. The President 
has made it clear that he personally in- 
tends to stay fully engaged in efforts to 
bring about a strong, free, united, and 
healthy Lebanon, sovereign throughout 
all its territories within internationally 
recognized borders. The withdrawal of 
all foreign military forces from Lebanon 
must be accompanied by the creation of 
conditions in southern Lebanon to pre- 
serve Israeli security. In the immediate 
future, we will seek a further stabiliza- 
tion in the situation in Beirut. We must 
create an environment in Lebanon that 
will allow the newly elected Lebanese 
Government — free of outside pressure 
or imposed solutions — to carry on with 
its task of national reconciliation. The 
desperate need for economic reconstruc- 
tion can be well served through such re- 
conciliation and the withdrawal of 
foreign forces. 

The United States is a staunch 
friend of the Lebanese people and will 
be a good partner in Lebanon's courage- 
ous effort to rebuild its economy and to 
strengthen its national institutions. We 
will exercise our responsibility and duty 
to give every opportunity to the 
Lebanese themselves to recreate a 
united but pluralistic society behind 
strong leadership from their newly 
elected president. We also look forward 
to cooperating with appropriate interna- 
tional institutions in the effort to ameli- 
orate the destruction caused by the long 
and most unfortunate fighting. 

These efforts to rebuild Lebanon and 
strengthen its institutions can only be 
helped by progress in the overall search 
for a Middle East peace. The problems 



of Lebanon are distinct and must be ad- 
dressed whenever possible separately 
from our Middle East peace initiative, 
but both tasks must be carried on with- 
out delay. The President will, therefore, 
dispatch Ambassador Draper to 
Lebanon this weekend, while we also 
continue to work on the overall peace 
initiative. 

U.S Initiative 

When I was before you in the confir- 
mation hearings, I noted our commit- 
ment to solving the Palestinian problem 
within the Camp David framework. 
Right after your vote to report my 
nomination favorably to the full Senate, 
the President instructed me that he 
wished high priority be placed on ad- 
dressing the underlying Arab-Israeli 
dispute, especially the Palestinian issues. 

The President's statement last week 
began a fresh start on the Arab-Israeli 
dispute. The fundamental problems in- 
volved are of universal concern not just 
to the people of the region but to the 
United States and other countries as 
well. The events of the last month have 
demonstrated that we Americans have a 
special responsibility in the efforts to 
bring peace to the area. No one else has 
the credibility — and therefore the 
ability — to provide the crucial link to all 
sides. 

The President's Middle East peace 
initiative is based on an intensive and 
detailed review of the problem. We have 
discussed the issues in detail with 
members of this committee and others 
in the Congress, with former govern- 
ment officials, and many other knowl- 
edgeable people. The paramount conclu- 
sions of that review are that (1) it is 
time to address, forcefully and directly, 
the underlying Palestinian issues, and (2) 
genuine success depends upon broaden- 
ing participation in the negotiations to 
include, as envisaged in the Camp David 
accords, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the 
representatives of the Palestinian 
people. 

In taking this initiative, the Presi- 
dent established two conditions — we will 
remain fully committed to both the prin- 
ciples of the Camp David accords and to 
the security of Israel. The Camp David 
framework has one key element that all 



itober1982 



THE SECRETARY 



other peace plans lack: It has been suc- 
cessful. It produced the only treaty of 
peace between Israel and an Arab coun- 
try and the completion of the disengage- 
ment and return of the Sinai. Moreover, 
the Camp David framework has the 
necessary room for negotiations to fulfill 
the legitimate rights of the Palestinian 
people and to reach peace treaties be- 
tween Israel and its neighbors. As Presi- 
dent Carter said a week ago, "There is 
absolutely nothing in the President's 
speech . . . nor in the information he 
sent to the Israelis which is contrary to 
either the letter or the spirit of Camp 
David. It is absolutely compatible with 
the Camp David agreement." Our initia- 
tive will give the provisions of Camp 
David their full meaning and a new 
dynamism. 

This renewed dynamism for the 
Camp David negotiations will insure 
Israeli security, and we emphatically will 
require the product of the negotiations 
to do so. As the President's speech 
noted, this country, this Administration, 
and the President personally are com- 
mitted to Israel's security. This same re- 
newed dynamism also will provide ap- 
propriate regard to the "legitimate 
rights of the Palestinian people and their 
just requirements." Camp David itself 
calls for the residents of the West Bank 
and Gaza and other Palestinians as 
agreed to participate in negotiating the 
two primary means of achieving those 
rights — a 5-year transitional period of 
autonomous self-government and final 
status after the 5-year transitional 
period. By renewing the process, we 
seek to fulfill the hope of Camp David: 
Israel and its neighbors, Jordan, Egypt, 
and the Palestinians, engaged in fair, 
direct, and successful negotiations on 
how they will all live together. 

The Camp David accords provide 
that these negotiated arrangements on 
final status must be "just, comprehen- 
sive, . . . durable," and "based on Securi- 
ty Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all 
their parts." Security Council Resolution 
242 sets forth the two key principles: 

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces 
from territories occupied. . . . 

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of 
belligerency and respect for and acknowl- 
edgement of the sovereignty, territorial in- 
tegrity and political independence of every 
State in the area and their right to live in 
peace within secure and recognized boun- 
daries free from threats or acts of force. 

As it has often been summarized, 
peace for territory. 



We believe these principles apply on 
all fronts, but our position on the extent 
of withdrawal will be significantly in- 
fluenced by the extent and nature of the 
peace and security arrangements being 
offered in return. Israel, Jordan, Egypt, 
and the elected representatives of the in- 
habitants of the West Bank and Gaza 
will negotiate the final boundaries, 
recognizing Palestinian legitimate rights, 
and securing what Resolution 338 calls a 
"just and durable peace." We will sup- 
port positions in those negotiations 
which we believe are fair. Those posi- 
tions include: 

Israeli Sovereignty/Palestinian 
State. It is the President's belief that 
the Palestinian problem cannot be re- 
solved through Israeli sovereignty or 
control over the West Bank and Gaza. 
Accordingly, we will not support such a 
solution. We will also not support the 
formation of a Palestinian state in those 
negotiations. There is no foundation of 
political support in Israel or in the 
United States for such a solution and 
peace cannot be achieved by that route. 
The preference we will pursue in the 
final status negotiations is some form of 
association of the West Bank and Gaza 
with Jordan. 

Self-Determination. In the Middle 
East context, the term "self-deter- 
mination" has been identified exclusively 
with the formation of a Palestinian 
state. We will not support this definition 
of self-determination. We do believe that 
the Palestinians must take a leading role 
in determining their own future and ful- 
ly support the provision in the Camp 
David agreement providing for the 
elected representatives of the inhabi- 
tants of the West Bank and Gaza to 
decide how they shall govern themselves 
consistent with the provisions of their 
agreement in the final status negotia- 
tions. 

Jerusalem. We will fully support the 
position that Jerusalem must be undivid- 
ed and that its status must be deter- 
mined through negotiations. We do not 
recognize unilateral acts with respect to 
final status issues. 

Settlements. The status of Israeli 
settlements must be determined in the 
course of the final status negotiations. 
We will not support their continuation 
as extraterritorial outposts, but neither 
will we support efl'orts to deny Jews the 
opportunity to live in the West Bank 
and Gaza under the duly constituted 
governmental authority there, as Arabs 
live in Israel. 



f 



Negotiations on the final status of 
the area will not start until a self- 
governing authority for the territories j 
firmly in place. Negotiations about the 
transitional phase have been in progresf"' 
for the last 3 years. In those negotia- 
tions we have consistently expressed OB * 
views to our negotiating partners, Isra« *' 
and Egypt, as issues arose. Most recent " 
ly, we informed our partners of how 
these separate expressions fit into our 
overall view of Palestinian self-govern- 
ment during a transitional period. 

In our view, the objective of the 
transitional period is the peaceful and 
orderly transfer of authority from Isra* " 
to the Palestinian inhabitants, while in- 
suring that all necessary measures are 
taken to assure Israeli security. 

We have emphasized that this perio 
is transitional, not final, and that, there ^ 
fore, the provisions relating to it should *^ 
not prejudice the final status. In light c 
those views, we have told our partners 
that we have supported and will con- 
tinue to support: 

• The definition of full autonomy 
giving the Palestinian inhabitants real 
authority over themselves, the land, arj^f 
its resources subject to fair safeguards 
on water; 

• The inclusion of economic, com- 
mercial, social, and cultural ties among|(] 
the West Bank, Gaza, and Jordan; 

• Participation by the Palestinian 
habitants of east Jerusalem in the elec 
tion for the West Bank/Gaza authority 
and 

• Progressive Palestinian respon- 
sibilty for internal security based on 
capability and performance. 

Using those same standards, we 
have opposed and will continue to op- 
pose: 

• Dismantlement of existing settle 
ments; and 

• Provisions which represent a 
threat to Israel's security. 

As the President noted in his 
speech, we are attempting to reinvigo 
ate the autonomy negotiations. That 
effort would be assisted to a great ex- 
tent by a freeze of the Israeli settle- 
ments in the occupied territories, whic 
was requested during the Camp David 
negotiations. Our concern is not with 
their legality or illegality but with thei 
effects on the peace process. 

The President's initiative follows 
over 3 years of active negotiations, co 
tinuous discussions of the issues invob 
over the same period, and, most recer|?i( 
ly, two trips to the Middle East by th« fc 



Department of State Bullel 



sot 



irid 



h. 



THE SECRETARY 



icretary of State this year and addi- 
mal trips by Ambassador Fairbanks 
jecial negotiator for the Middle East 
ace process] and by others wortcing on 
e negotiations. We have put these 
las in some detail to the Israelis and 
e key Arab states, including Jordan 
liid Egypt. They are now examining the 
ijoposals. It would be surprising if they 
I ed or disliked all of them. We have 
jceived reactions from some of our in- 
trlocutors. We are studying those reac- 
l)ns. We confidently expect to continue 
( r discussions, with the Israelis, with 
(e Arab countries, and with other 
lendly governments. 

The President has now articulated a 
lasonable basis for a negotiated com- 
jomise among the parties. We em- 
I asize that any agreement must be 
ised on the free give-and-take of the 
I gotiating process. We do not 
J arantee to any party the outcome of 
t i negotiations on any issue. The Presi- 
cnt has now stated publicly some U.S. 
I sitions on key issues. We now call for 
t i parties contemplated by the Camp 
] vid agreement to join us in seeking 
{ ice. 

1 ne for Quiet Diplomacy 

:I '. Chairman [Senator Charles H. Per- 
c , I am very grateful for the words of 
t jport and encouragement that you 
I d the members of this committee have 
i en. Your emphasis in several inter- 
■\ ws on the deep yearning for peace in 
t ! countries and peoples of this area; 
i nator Cranston's and Senator Bosch- 
V ;z's support for the effort to broaden 
t ^ process and involve the Jordanians 
B 1 representatives of the Palestinians; 
i 1 Senator Mathias' emphasis on the 
i id for all to address this problem ob- 
I tively are indications that the Con- 
I ;ss and the Administration are 
;ether, focused on this essential task, 
you put it, "There just isn't an alter- 
;ive for finding a basis for lasting 
ace. . . . Think what could happen to 
s area in the Middle East if peace is 
md, and a basis for working together 
:h its Arab neighbors is found by 
ael and its Arab neighbors." 
We now have the initial formal reac- 
ns from the Israeli Government and 
; Arab League summit. The Israeli 
vernment, supported by a vote of the 
esset, has opposed the President's 
)posals. While not directly addressing 
! President's proposals, the Arab 
ague summit has put forward its own 
)posals, key elements of which are at 



tober1982 



variance with our proposals. The Presi- 
dent stands firmly behind his proposals. 
The reactions of the Israeli Government 
and of the Arab League are clear and 
graphic evidence that the position of 
both sides must be negotiated if we are 
to bring genuine peace and security to 
this troubled region. 

The opening positions have been an- 
nounced. Now is the time for quiet 
diplomacy to pursue the President's initi- 
ative and bring it to fruition. 

In launching this initiative, the 
President determined that he would stay 
fully involved and fully committed to the 
principles he enunciated. We will be 
working hard over the next weeks in 
light of the new dynamic the initiative 
introduces to bring the peace process 
forward. I pledge to you that we will be 
exercising the creativity, the per- 



sistence, and the dogged determination 
to succeed which marked the successful 
effort in Beirut. I also emphasize to you 
that we recognize that our effort is to 
bring a lasting, effective, and just peace 
to this area. That goal can hardly be ac- 
complished in a few short weeks. We 
ask you to stay with the President in his 
determination to sustain this effort and 
to look for the long-term, just solution. 
We believe, deeply and purposefully, 
that peace can come between Arabs and 
Jews. No greater purpose can be placed 
before us all than a just and lasting 
peace. 



'Press release 277. The complete 
transcript of the hearings will be published 
by the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402. ■ 



Secretary Interviewed on 
"Meet the Press" 



Secretary Shultz was interviewed on 
NBC-TV's "Meet the Press" on 
August 22, 1982. by Bill Monroe, 
moderator; Marvin Kalb, NBC News; 
Rowland Evans, The Chicago Sun 
Times; Karen Elliott House, The 
Wall Street Journal; and Bernard 
Gwertzman, The New York Times.' 

Q. This is the second day of the 
Palestinian evacuation from west 
Beirut, and there appears to be a prob- 
lem. The latest reports have two 
Israeli gunboats blocking the con- 
tinued evacuation of the Palestinians, 
claiming that the Palestinians have 
loaded 10 jeeps and rocket-propelled 
grenade launchers onto the boats, and 
they say that's not allowed by the 
agreement. Is the holdup still in ef- 
fect? 

A. The last I know, it is still in ef- 
fect. 

Q. What are you going to do about 
it? 

A. Phil Habib [Ambassador Philip 
C. Habib, the President's special 
emissary to the Middle East] is working 
on it. It's not the first problem that he's 
had, I'm sure it won't be the last, and 
we expect it to get resolved. 

Q. Do you expect it to get resolved 
today? 

A. I should think so, yes. 



Q. What does this suggest to you 
about the incredible delicacy of the 
operation in which you're involved? 

A. It is a delicate operation. There 
are all sorts of things that can go 
wrong, but so far it's gone off quite well. 

Q. Quite well, and yet a problem 
on the second day? 

A. Oh, well, there are problems on 
the first day; there are problems all 
along. The question is whether or not 
you have the capacity and willpower and 
cooperation to resolve the problems. 
There are always going to be problems. 

Q. Are you confident that the 
evacuation will be completed on 
schedule? 

A. I certainly expect it to be and 
hope it will be. 

Q. I'm rather surprised at the 
mildness of your response to the first 
question. You imply that Phil Habib is 
a miracle worker, that he can solve 
this, but isn't it a fact that it took the 
President of the United States to solve 
the question of the Israeli bombard- 
ment of Beirut? Phil Habib didn't 
solve that. It took the President. Don't 
you think this situation might become 
serious enough to engage the Presi- 
dent of the United States? 

A. No, I don't. I think that Phil will 
work this out. There are all kinds of 



THE SECRETARY 



things that can be developed to get 
through this problem, and there is 
nothing in this situation that needs to 
directly involve the President. The Presi- 
dent is aware of what's going on, of 
course, but this is something to be han- 
dled by the people in the field. 

Q. Let me ask you a different 
question, and that is a very long state- 
ment by the President of Egypt today 
published in The Washington Post. 
Mubarak said: "The right of the 
Israeli people to live in their country 
does not contradict the right of the 
Palestinian people to live in their 
country." Uo you agree with that as a 
general starting point for trying to get 
Camp David back on the track? 

A. I read President Mubarak's arti- 
cle, and I thought it was a very con- 
structive contribution to discussion on 
this issue and, I think, gave a good in- 
dication of his own attitude toward mov- 
ing these discussions along. Precisely 
what position various people will take on 
that question, among others, remains to 
be seen. But I do think that the 
establishment of a situation where the 
Palestinian people can have some sense 
of dignity and control over their lives is 
very important and an essential part of 
any agreement. 

Q. You're not going to tell us 
whether you agree with that state- 
ment by Mr. Mubarak? 

A. Not categoriciilly yes or no to 
the various questions you might ask me. 

Q. You said yourself in your 
testimony before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee several weeks 
ago: "The legitimate needs ... of the 
Palestinian people must be 
addressed ... in all their dimensions." 
Is self-determination one of those 
dimensions, and, if it is, do they have 
the same right as the Jewish people 
had to set up the State of Israel? 

A. Certainly they should have a 
part in determining the conditions under 
which they're governed. The word self- 
determination .somehow in this word 
game in the Middle East, I've dis- 
covered, has come to be the equivalent 
of a Palestinian state, which has a lot of 
implications about military forces and 
many other things, so I'm not going to 
bite on that one, but rather say that the 
main point is that the Palestinian people 
have a voice in determining the condi- 
ti(ms under which they're governed. 

Q. You said in your press con- 
ference that there is a lot of room for 
flexibility in the language of Camp 



David. Are there points of dispute be- 
tween Kgypt and Israel in the 
autonomy talks where you think an 
addition of American views would be 
helpful, and, if so, what are they? 

A. I think that as this process 
resumes — and I think we have to bear in 
mind it's been pretty much stopped for 
some period of time now — we will be 
putting forward views, others will be, 
and as I see it there is a delicate in- 
terplay between, you might say, 
substance and process here. So we'll 
want to be trying as best we can to 
manage that from our standpoint in a 
way designed to give a constructive 
result. 

Q. One of the areas of dispute has 
been what would be the potential for a 
final solution on the West Bank. 

A. Yes. 

Q. And Israel has made it very 
clear that while Camp David says that 
the process is based on U.N. Resolu- 
tion 242 that they do not interpret 
that resolution to mean that Israel 
must withdraw from that territory. Do 
we interpret 242 to mean that Israel 
must withdraw from some of the West 
Bank and Gaza or all? 

A. I should think so, yes. 

Q. Why hasn't anyone in this Ad- 
ministration said that? 

A. I think that's been said. 

Q. Can you say it today? 

A. I've said it just now. 

Q. That we do believe it means 
withdrawal? 

A. I think 242 has that implication 
in it, myself. That's a matter of inter- 
pretation, no doubt, and various points 
of view have been taken. Having said 
that leaves still lots of room for negotia- 
tion. The language of Camp David itself, 
I think when you read it, obviously can 
be interpreted many ways, but certainly 
one of those ways is that some shift in 
what are the practical borders now will 
take place. 

Q. Do you believe that you can get 
those talks going again between 
Egypt and Israel, or do you have to 
get some broader Arab participation 
before the Egyptians are willing to 
return. 

A. We'll have to see what we can 
bring about in this process, and I don't 
want to make a forecast, but ob- 
viously — I would say obviously — for 
there to be a genuine peaceful outcome 



that is widely accepted in the region 
there have to be more countries involved^,' 
than Egypt, Israel, and the United 
States. 

Q. Yesterday you had a meeting 
with a number of experts on the 
Soviet Union. I'd like to ask you about 
some aspects of policy toward the 
Soviet Union. There has been talk 
before of a possible summit — perhaps 
by the end of this year — between 
President Reagan and President 
Brezhnev. Do you think this is at all 
likely or should be sought? 

A. It depends upon whether or not 
there are some identifiable constructive L 
results to be obtained from the summit, 
and if there are, then probably it would 
be constructive. If not, I don't really see 
that there is that much point in it. And 
believe that's been the President's posi- 
tion all along. 

Q. Do you plan to discuss this 
possibility with Mr. Gromyko at the 
United Nations this fall? 

A. I hope to meet Mr. Gromyko in 
the United Nations — expect to — 
although there hasn't been any time 
worked out, and quite possibly the sub- ^ 
ject might come up. 

Q. On another area of Soviet- 
American difficulties which involves 
the allies, it's the question of 
American sanctions against the SovieLj 
Union over Poland. You yourself hav' L] 
written, before you took office, of 
course, that such sanctions are hardi 
likely to be successfully used as a 
lever against the Soviet Union. Have 
you changed your position any, or ar 
you trying to educate the Administra 
tion along your position? 

A. When you read that, it soundec 
like the word "such" was describing or 
referring to the sanctions that Preside: 
Reagan has impo.sed. That wasn't the 
case. That article was written several 
years ago and was referring to some 
other sanctions that were put on, take) 
off, put on, taken off, back and forth ii 
a matter of a few months and that I 
labeled light-switch diplomacy and said 
wouldn't work. 

In the case of the sanctions impose 
by President Reagan, they have had a 
very broad purpose, particularly focus- 
ing on Poland, but other similar things 
that the Soviet Union — Soviet Union 
behavior, and I fully support the idea ( 
expressing ourselves in this manner 



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A.: 

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THE SECRETARY 



Q. But do you see any way of 
esolving this growing dispute with 
he allies over this question, barring a 
elaxation of tensions in Poland? 

A. That is the way we would hope it 
I'ould occur. 

Q. Do you regard Israel, in light 
tf what has happened in Beirut, as a 
rue and trusted friend and ally of the 
Jnited States? 

A. Oh, yes, and I believe that we 
nust, in all of the things that we do, be 
Iways cognizant and careful about the 
ecurity of Israel. 

Q. On Saudi Arabia, there have 
een a number of reports in the last 2 
lonths that King Fahd or some other 
laudi leaders have hinted about a 
k'ithdrawal of the very substantial 
iaudi financial assets in the United 
tates. Do you know whether that's 
rue? 

A. No, I don't. There hasn't been 
ny evidence of such a withdrawal. 

Q. Has there been any kind of 
/arning or threat from the Saudis on 
his issue? 

A. I've read some in the news- 
apers, but I haven't— nothing has come 
irectly to me in any official way. 

Q. On the Mubarak statement, 
gain, in The Washington Post today, 
ou've called it very constructive, and 
et the Egyptian President said that it 
'ould be "most difficult for Egypt to 
esume the autonomy talks or revive 
tie peace process," and then he cited 
iree preconditions: "Unless first the 
' nited States recognizes the right of 
'■ le Palestinians to self-determina- 
' on" — and he's quite specific that it 
lust take place in the West Bank and 
ie Gaza Strip. Are you going to be 
ble to move it on that one point? 

A. I'm sure we'll want to talk with 
resident Mubarak directly and others 
hdut their views and what it takes to 
et this process moving, and I think that 
'e'll be able to do it. 

Q. You seemed to make an assump- 
ion in answer to another question 
liat you already have Egypt and Israel 
nd you're seeking others for the 
utonomy talks. This— 

A. No, I said that for the kind of 
esult that we would all like to see out 
tiere take place, you have to have more 
arties to it than the three countries. 

Q. Do you right now have in your 
lind even a general plan on how 
ou're going to proceed on the 
utonomv talks? 



ctober1982 



A. We've thought about it a lot, and 
we've heard a lot of advice from people, 
so I suppose it's fair enough to say that 
there are general ideas that we have in 
our minds. But we're not freezing onto 
anything, because, as I said in response 
to an earlier question, I think success 
here involves a sort of delicate interplay 
between the processes that are involved 
and the substance that you're trying to 
achieve. 

Q. At the end of the framework, 
the general idea that you have in 
mind, is there a homeland for the 
Palestinian people on the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip? 

A. Certainly that is a place that 
many of them call home and a place that 
they'll live, and they should have a par- 
ticipation in determining the conditions 
under which they live. 

Q. Can I assume that the answer 
is yes to that question? 

A. I tried to give an answer in my 
own words. 

Q. You said recently that the 
Israeli settlements in the West Bank 
"have not reached a conclusion," but, 
you said, they are not constructive. 
Have you told Mr. Begin that you 
want the Israelis to stop creating new 
settlements— Jewish settlements— on 
the West Bank? 

A. I'm the new man on the block 
here and I've been struggling with the 
Beirut problem. I did respond to that 
question yesterday at the press con- 
ference — or day before yesterday — hav- 
ing thought about it quite a bit and hav- 
ing listened to the President talk about 
it. I believe my response was that I'd 
heard the President say that whether 
the settlements were legal or illegal, 
they were not constructive. 

Q. You've also said "I am a quiet 
person, but I do believe in saying 
what I think." Could you tell us what 
you think about Israeli settlements on 
the West Bank? 

A. I agree with the President. 

Q. You have said you hate to 
see — you used the word hate — the 
Israeli Government fire all those 
mayors of Palestinian cities and towns 
on the West Bank. Have you ex- 
pressed that sentiment to the Israeli 
Government? 

A. I have expressed myself publicly 
several times, I think, in my confir- 
mation hearings, and I have expressed 
myself privately. I'm just trying to recall 
literally whether I said that in so many 



words to an official of the Israeli 
Government, and I can't recall precisely 
whether I have, but I certainly do feel 
that way — that these are people who 
achieved a certain legitimacy as rep- 
resentatives of Palestinians living on the 
West Bank, and one of the things that 
we're looking for, we must be looking 
for if this negotiation is to succeed, is 
Palestinians who are legitimate to repre- 
sent them. 

Q. Do you think that the Israeli 
Government has any right, as an 
occupying power, to prevent the 
Mayor of Bethlehem, who is not a 
member of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO), is not even very 
enthusiastic about the PLO, from 
apearing on this program that you're 
on today? 

A. I think it's unfortunate that that 
took place. 

Q. Why is it unfortunate? 

A. Because he should be allowed to 
come and express his views. I think we 
all gain from an open expression of 
views, and that's a person who has 
some. 

Q. Is that worth following up? 

A. There's no reason to shut that 



Q. Is that worth following up as 
Secretary of State? 

A. There are many things worth 
following up. I don't want to have a tone 
left in the interchange between you and 
me that all of the problems here repre- 
sent problems created by Isreal. There 
are many problems in the area, and 
you've identified some of them. There 
are many others. There are a lot of 
violations of the cease-fire taking place 
by the Palestinians in Lebanon right 
now that I don't consider to be very con- 
structive under the circumstances. So 
we can go and list a lot of things that 
we would rather see not happen. 

Q. We're jerking you around the 
world, but I would like to jerk you 
back to the Soviet Union. 

A. Sounds like my normal day in 
the State Department. 

Q. As we all know, the Soviets are 
in the middle of a succession struggle. 
Are there any economic and political 
issues between us and the Soviets that 
you believe will affect the outcome of 
that struggle? 

A. I wouldn't think so. I find, after 
listening to experts talk about how that 
may come out, that they don't know 
much more about it than I do, which is 
not much. 



THE SECRETARY 



Q. A year from now, w hat would 
you like to have accomplished as 
Secretary of State or as the 
President's spokesman on foreign 
policy? 

A. I think that the big objectives 
have to do with peace, with justice 
around the world, and there are many 
troublesome areas that we have an in- 
terest in, in which we would like to see 
that achieved. Certainly, the area of 
arms control and the problem of nuclear 
proliferation I think are tremendous 
sorts of mankind-level problems that we 
should address ourselves to. So those 
are two general subjects that I think are 
terribly important. Beyond that, on the 
world economic scene, we have a danger 
that the rise of protection all around the 
world will gradually change and erode 
the rules of the game in trade that have 
been responsible for the huge increase in 
world trade and a great benefit to all 
countries. I think it's very important to 
fight against this and try to maintain 
the openness of trade and investment 
around the world, and I intend to give a 
lot of attention to that. 

Q. What are you prepared to do to 
avoid that? 

A. We want to identify the prob- 
lems and try to meet them and create a 
sense of new objectives that will further 
open the way. Whether we can get any 
real momentum going at the GATT 
[General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade] ministerial in November remains 
to be seen, but that is one place where 
I'm sure the U.S. representatives will 
register these views. 

Q. You said earlier that you inter- 
preted 242 as meaning Israel had to 
make some withdrawals, but, of 
course, the ("amp David agreement 
tries to, I think, finesse this question 
by setting up an interim Palestinian 
autonomy for .5 years and then a nego- 
tiation on the ultimate outcome of the 
whole area. I just wanted to make 
sure that you weren't trying to in- 
dicate a desire to revise that basic 
principle of the Camp David frame- 
work agreement. 

A. Not a bit. I think the Camp 
David framework, as I read it and have 
heard about the background of it — 
Resolutions 242 and 3.SH are ample bases 
and good bases for any ongoing negotia- 
tion. What they do, I think, is make 
these questions that you've raised open 
questions and open for negotiation. 



JA. 



Q. On the question of PLO 
recognition, which has been a sore 
point. Dr. Kissinger in 1975 said the 
United States would not recognize or 
negotiate with the PLO until it met 
certain conditions, such as the right of 
Israel to exist. Now, certainly the 
United States has been negotiating 
with the PLO, albeit indirectly, over 
the last 2 months. The Kissinger 
statement did not seem to make a 
distinction between indirect or direct. 
I just wondered if you think it's worth 
maintaining that agreement, which, of 
course, arouses emotions in Israel and 
elsewhere, when, in fact, it's really 
been breached in the literal sense of 
negotiation. 

A. 1 think that the President's posi- 
tion on this has been well stated, and 
we'll maintain it and I think it's impor- 
tant to maintain it. It isn't vitiated in 
any way by the practical fact that if you 
are, for example, going to be successful 
in having the PLO depart from west 
Beirut under these circumstances, you 
have to have some method of being in 
touch with them. The way that it has 
been done is Phil has talked to various 
representatives of the Government of 
Lebanon, and they've talked to the PLO 
leaders and so forth, as you know. 

Q. Can we expect you to name a 
chief negotiator on these broad ques- 
tions of Palestinian autonomy or other 
things in the near future, someone of 
the stature of Dr. Kissinger or some- 
thing like that? 

A. It remains to be seen just how 
we think the best way will be to conduct 
the U.S. aspect of these negotiations. 
We do have Ambassador [Richard] 



Bl 



Fairbanks who's helping me on this and 
who's very knowledgeable. 

Q. Let me get back for a moment 
to the situation now existing in Beirut 
with Israeli gunboats blocking the 
departure of a ship containing Pales- 
tinian refugees because, according to 
the report we heard earlier, there 
were jeeps aboard and some kind of 
weapons — rocket launchers or grenade 
launchers. Does your information con 
firm that report? 

A. Yes. 

lb, 
Q. There are jeeps aboard and 

weapons aboard? 

A. Jeeps aboard, and it is said by 
the Israelis that there are, I think, 
shoulder-held-type weapons, which I sup^lo 
pose one can argue whether they're per- 
sonal weapons or crew-type weapons. So W 
here we have some issues that are 
perhaps on the borderline of what the 
agreement envisages as prohibited and 
allowed weapons. 

Q. One side has brought jeeps andi 
possibly weapons aboard; the other 
side is holding up the evacuation us- 
ing gunboats. Is either side in viola- 
tion of the Habib agreement? 

A. Let's not play this up like it's a 
big issue that's going to bring down the 
world. It's a problem, and Phil Habib is 
working on it. As I said earlier, this is 
not the first problem that he's run into 
and it's not going to be the last, I'm 
sure. You said do I think he's a magi- 
cian? Yes, he's a magician. He is terrific 
a great American, and we all owe him .■^ir 
wonderful debt of thanks. 



'Press release 260 of Aug. 24. 1982. 



Secretary Interviewed on 
"Face the Nation" 



Secretary Shullz was interviewed on 
CBS-TV's "Face the Nation" cm. 
September 5, 1982, by George Herman. 
CBS News; Leslie Stalh, CBS News; and 
Robert Pierpoint, CBS News. ' 

Q. Various Israeli and Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) forces 
rumbling around in parts of Lebanon 
outside of Beirut have raised some 
predictions of new fighting in that 
country. Do you expect new battles in 
Lebanon? And if they should occur, 
would the U.S. Marines still leave as 
scheduled? 



A. The Marines will leave as sched 
uled. We certainly hope there isn't new 
fighting. There are many armed people 
in the area, so it's always a possibility 
On the other hand. 1 think that 
everyone, perhaps, is ready for peace a 
this point. 

Q. You say you hope there will b 
no further fighting and expect, I 
gather, that there will be no further 
fighting in Lebanon. What do you 
think is the expectable future for 
those PLO forces still there? How is 
that problem to be solved? 



ijli 



Hon 
ItPr 



ttll 
;ttal 
hill 
I'Isl 
• Isri 



Department of State Bulletl jjk,, 



THE SECRETARY 



A. Either they have to lay down 
their arms and make themselves subject 
to the authority of the Government of 
Lebanon or leave. 

Q. But what if they don't? Then 
we have more of a conflagfration. And 
what next? 

A. Our effort, of course, and desire 
is to see the emergence of a strong cen- 
tral Government of Lebanon, and every- 
one has expressed that view. We're do- 
ing it as other countries are. A strong 
central Government of Lebanon will be 
able to control situations in its own 
jountry. 

Q. But wasn't one of the reasons 
for sending the U.S Marines in there 
to assure that there would be a stabili- 
sation and the imposition of a strong 
Lebanese Government? 

A. The multinational force has had 
is its purpose the safe evacuation of the 
'ighters — Syrian and Palestinian — in 
vest Beirut and the emergence of stable 
•onditions in the area, particularly look- 
up- tdward the families of the fighters 
villi were there and trying to get the 
>elianese forces in charge. By and large, 
hat has gone well, and we expect that 
he Marines will leave probably around 
September 10. 

Q. Does the U.S. Government 
avor a peace treaty signed between 
..ebanon and Israel, and do you think 
hat is possible, given the situation in 
>ebanon? 

A. I think it's possible; I think it's 
esirable. We're in favor of it if it comes 
bout in the right way — that is there 
as to be a strong central Government 
f Lebanon that has control of the coun- 
ry, that has the people behind it, and 
hen it's a government that has to decide 
ir itself how it wants to conduct its 
ireign affairs. Personally, I think it 
-'ould be very desirable for such a 
overnment to make peace with Israel. 

Q. That goes on to the next issue 
f peace between Israel and the Pales- 
inians and President Reagan's pro- 
osals this week. Let me ask you, first 
f all, the Israeli Cabinet has today 
nnounced that it will formally reject 
he President's proposals; it is going 
9 dispatch a letter from Prime 
linister Begin to the President doing 
0. It seems to me that puts President 
leagan in a difficult position now. 
Jow that he has been rejected in 
everal different approaches to Prime 
linister Begin, what is he going to 
10? Is he going to put any pressure on 
he Israelis? 



Bl »ctober1982 



A. I think there is a tremendous 
pressure not only on the Israelis but on 
the Arabs in the area, and it is pressure 
that is reflected in the response to the 
President's proposals. That pressure 
comes from the possibility of peace and 
what peace can mean in that region, as 
it means anywhere. It is a prospect of 
tremendous importance not only to the 
security of Israel and Israel's neighbors 
but also to the development of their 
economic, social, and cultural well-being. 
So it is a tremendously important objec- 
tive, and I think it is the objective that 
the President will be holding out in front 
of the Israelis and the Arabs alike as the 
reason v/hy they should be taking action. 

Q. Is there any chance, though, 
that the State Department, the Presi- 
dent, will try to use American aid to 
pressure them, specifically the send- 
ing eventually of the F-16 fighters? 
And secondly, are the Israelis trying 
to bargain with you over that by with- 
holding military intelligence infor- 
mation in exchange for the F-16s? 

A. Our emphasis will be, as I said, 
on the importance of peace. I think 
that's a tremendous pressure. "Pressure" 
isn't the right word; it's a tremendous 
objective that people have. 

Q. Are you saying that you won't 
deny that you might use the with- 
holding of aid? 

A. We don't have any plans to try 
to maneuver people in a peace negotia- 
tion by talking about withholding aid or 
anything like that. I think the emphasis 
has to be on the positive side of this, 
and that's where it has to be. 

Q. Could you not even make it 
more positive? Last Monday at an 
evening briefing, a senior official of 
your Department did not consider that 
that was the way to go, putting pres- 
sures — economic or military — on 
Israel. 

A. I think that's right. I think that 
senior official hit it right on the head. 

Q. So you are ruling it out. the 
use of — 

A. I'm saying that the objective of 
peace is so important that when that is 
fully realized — and, of course, I think it 
will make a critical difference whether 
or not King Hussein and other Arabs 
respond favorably to the President's ini- 
tiative — then the prospect of peace with 
neighbors becomes much more real. 

Q. What do you expect will 
happen tomorrow when the Arab 
leaders meet in Fez, Morocco, to 
discuss this very issue? As you may 



know, both King Hussein's brother. 
Prince Hassan, and the President of 
Sudan — President Nimeiri — have, in 
effect, endorsed Mr. Reagan's pro- 
posals, but that doesn't mean that the 
PLO, which is still the spokesman for 
its own cause, will buy it. What is go- 
ing to happen tomorrow? 

A. I am a believer in letting other 
people speak for themselves. 

Q. What do you think the impor- 
tance of the PLO is right now? Are 
they a force that must absolutely be 
dealt with in this situation, or, as a 
political entity, have they been ren- 
dered virtually impotent? 

A. Obviously, the Palestinian issue 
is very much with us, and they are seen 
as part of that issue and standing for it, 
to a certain extent. I think as a military 
force, they have been reduced drastically 
in importance. The support that they 
were getting from the Russians was just 
not there. I think also, even more pro- 
foundly, that the pattern that they have 
represented of terror, of violence as a 
way of doing something for the Palestin- 
ian cause, has been shown not to work. 

What we have as a result of that is a 
tremendous number of people who have 
been killed, who have been wounded, 
who have been made homeless. So I 
would hope that the leaders of the PLO 
and everyone in the area will start look- 
ing at the peace initiatives and the peace 
process rather than the violence and war 
process as the answer. 

Q. But as to the question in the 
sort of jargon of the State Department 
and of the diplomats, does the PLO 
have legitimacy as leaders of the 
Palestinian people? 

A. As far as the United States is 
concerned, the President has made very 
clear on numerous occasions, most 
recently in his last press conference, the 
conditions under which we would be will- 
ing to talk to the PLO. Until those con- 
ditions are met, we are not willing to 
talk to them. 

Q. There are some analysts who 
say that what [PLO Chairman Yasir] 
Arafat does and what he tries to put 
forth no longer is a factor in the Mid- 
dle East. Other people say that he has 
become more of a factor and that he is 
now the central figure in all of this in 
what happens to the President's plan. 
What is your analysis of it? Is he more 
powerful politically than he was or 
not? 



J^ 



THE SECRETARY 



A. My analysis of it is that, if King 
Hussein decides to come forward in 
these negotiations, that will represent a 
general consensus on the part of the 
Arab leaders that it's time to do that 
and a good thing to do that. Just what 
complexion of debate and discussion and 
who says what and whose vote counts 
more than somebody else's vote, I 
wouldn't speculate on. 

No doubt the views of the PLO are 
going to be taken into account. The 
Arabs have all said so, so I assume that 
they will. 

Q. We're talking about pressures 
on the Israeli Government. There is a 
theory that the President's proposals 
are parallel to and very close to those 
of the Labor Party— Mr. Begin's op- 
position in Israel. In fact, the Labor 
Party appears to have endorsed the 
President's proposals. Was this not 
somewhat of a Machiavellian plot on 
the part of the Reagan Administration 
to get Mr. Begin out of power? 

A. No, absolutely not. The construc- 
tion of the Government of Israel and 
who is to represent the people of Israel 
is the busines of the people of Israel. We 
do not have any views about that. That's 
their business, not our business. The 
President's proposals were designed to 
put forward things that he thought were 
just and fair and likely to help bring 
about a negotiation and a peaceful result 
in the area. That was the standard by 
which he judged what he should put for- 
ward. 

Q. In that aforementioned briefing 
by the senior State Department of- 
ficial, the senior official said "Be 
careful how you define the West Bank 
when you talk about it," implying 
strongly that it did not necessarily 
mean the 1967 borders. 

The President, in his speech, in- 
serted at the last minute after the text 
had been distributed to the press and 
to the newspapers, two sentences 
which said: "In the pre-1967 borders. 
Israel was barely 10 miles wide at its 
narrowest point. The bulk of Israel's 
population lived within artillery range 
of hostile Arab armies. I'm not about 
to ask Israel to live that way again." 

Artillery range today is something 
on the order, if I am correct, of about 
15 miles. If there is going to be no 
Israeli population within artillery 
range, you are going to have to cut 
what used to be thought of as the 
West Bank almost in half. 



J2_ 



A. You're going to have to look at 
the borders— defensible borders are 
what people are talking about— and ap- 
propriate security arrangements that 
must include the notion of a totally 
demilitarized area throughout the West 
Bank in terms of any possible offensive 
capabilities. I think that just is for sure. 
So those are all things that would con- 
tribute to making good on the statement 
that the President made. 

I think you picked out something 
very interesting— and you're the first 
person that I've run into that's noticed 
it— that this paragraph was inserted at 
the last minute, and it was a result of 
discussions with the President and his 
advisers about the importance in this 
whole picture of an absolutely deter- 
mined statement and recognition of the 
importance of the security of Israel. 

As we looked at the speech, as the 
President looked at the speech— of 
course, that's in there and in there and 
in there— he felt that one more state- 
ment, particularly calling attention to 
the fact that Israel is, after all, 
geographically a small country. When 
you're in a country that small, surround- 
ed by hostility, you're bound to have 
security right in the front of your mind. 

So the President sought again and 
again in that speech, and in that 
paragraph that you picked out, to lay 
special emphasis on the importance to 
him and to the whole group that was 
working on this with him of that factor. 

Q. It's a little hard for many of us 
to understand why the present Admin- 
istration talks about Israeli security 
when, after all, Israel has perhaps the 
third or fourth largest military might 
in the world and is perfectly able to 
take care of its own security for the 
foreseeable future. Why does this Ad- 
ministration keep talking about Israeli 
security? 

A. Because it's important and 
because it has been a concern of Israel, 
and rightly so, as I just got through say- 
ing. 

If you are a very small country and 
you're surrounded by hostile states, 
you're bound to worry. States that say 
that they don't agree with your ex- 
istence, you're bound to worry about 
your security. It's very natural. 

Q. You wouldn't care to speculate 
that if 10 miles is too narrow a wasp 
waist for Israel, what would be an ac- 
ceptable distance? 

A. What I said was that there needs 
to be attention to security as borders 
are drawn. Of course, it's very impor- 



tant that the whole of what we refer to 
as the West Bank, under whatever ar- 
rangements, would be demilitarized. 

Q. The Administration continues 
to hold up the shipment of F-16s to 
Israel. When are you going to let that 
shipment go out, and what is holding 
it up? 

A. The President will decide that, 
and he will decide it in his own good 
time. 

Q. That doesn't sound to me like 
he's about to send it off right now, 
number one. And, number two, what 
about this question of the Israelis try- 
ing to trade military intelligence, 
what they were able to learn about 
Soviet military equipment during this 
Lebanese war, for those planes and 
for other aid? Is that a fact? 

A. I don't think that's the sort of 
thing that you set up in terms of a 
trade, and to the extent that anybody 
suggests that "if you do this, we'll do 
that," as far as sharing intelligence is 
concerned, that's not the way to go 
about it. There is a vast sharing of in- 
telligence, and that is the way I'm sure 
it will finally emerge. 

Q. But have the Israelis tried that 
approach? 

A. There are all sorts of discussions' 
about the equipment that's been cap- 
tured and the things learned in the war, 
having to do with Russian equipment 
and U.S. equipment, and I expect that 
we'll learn a lot from the whole process. 

Q. I have to inform you that 
Israel's Government-controlled radio 
has just announced three new settle- 
ments—Israeli settlements— two of 
them in the West Bank and one in thfr 
Gaza strip, this coming so shortly 
after President Reagan's demand for 
freeze on settlements. I presume this 
is not a welcome development. 

A. It's a very unwelcome develop- 
ment, and, if it's so, I think it's inconsis 
tent with the objective of peace in the 
area. 

Q. What can we do? What can th. 
U.S. Government do about that? 

A. We will hold up the objective of 
peace before everybody. The more 
positive responses that are given to it 
think the more importance the reality c 
that possibility will be, and it will start 
to exert its own pressure in the area. 

Q. Under the President's request 
for a freeze, obviously he meant no 
more new settlements. But did he als 



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ilPc 
lilio 
ido 

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THE SECRETARY 



lean that the existing settlements 
hould not be expanded, more people 
ut in them? 

A. By a "freeze," he meant that the 
L'rritory encompassed by the settlement 
(It lit' expanded at all. 

Q. As I'm sure you're well aware, 
former American diplomat who 
erved in Cuba as our representative 
lere for the last several years has 
'ritten an article in Foreign Affairs 
Quarterly in which he strongly con- 
emns the present Administration, 
rimarily for its refusal to seriously 
it down and negotiate with Fidel 
astro. 

Mr. Wayne Smith claims that 
hen Secretary Haig, your prede- 
jssor, met with the Vice President of 
uba in Mexico and again when 
eneral Walters, the President's 
nissary, met with Mr. Castro in 
uba, on both occasions these two 
jntlemen simply laid down condi- 
ons to the Cubans and said: "You've 
•)t to meet these conditions before 
e will seriously negotiate our prob- 
ms with you." I'd like to ask you if 
at is, in fact, the Administration's 
irrent attitude toward Cuba? 

A. The trouble with Cuba is its 
havior. When the behavior of Cuba 
anges, when it stops trying to export 
volution, when it stops sending ar- 
aments to places like Nicaragua, and 
jps feeding these guerrilla movements 
at are designed to disrupt duly consti- 
ted governmental processes in its 
ea, then there's something to talk 
. out. There's nothing to talk about in 
e pattern of behavior that we see with 
' iba right now. 

Q. But the United States sits 
I wn and talks with the Soviet Union 
; ross the board, and yet the Soviet 
' lion exports revolution all over the 
' jrld wherever it can. In fact it does 
1 )re than that; it carries out military 
I nquest in places like Afghanistan 
i d Poland, and we still have closer 
ilations with the Soviet Union than 
' ? do with Cuba. What is the reason 
]r this? 

A. The reason is that Cuba has 
)lated all sorts of conditions that we 
)uld attach to tolerable behavior in the 
;ernational arena — in Central 
nerica, in the Caribbean, in its efforts 
roughout South America, in the 
esence of Cuban troops in Africa, 
lere are many examples of behavior. 

I'm not talking about what some- 
dy says. I'm talking about what they 
— behavior that is disruptive — and we 



HtnhAr 1Qft9 



register our views about that, and I 
think we're on the right track. 

As far as the Soviet Union is con- 
cerned, I think the President has made 
it very clear what his views are there. 
The behavior in Afghanistan and the 
events that we see in Poland very 
recently stand behind the President's 
very firm intention to register a view 
about the reprehensible manner of that 
behavior, and he's done so. 

Q. There's been talk that you're 
looking forward to a meeting with Mr. 
Gromyko at the United Nations. 

A. I am planning to have a meeting 
with Mr. Gromyko in the United Na- 
tions, and there are many important 
things that we need to talk about, I'm 
sure. 

Q. Are there no important things 
we need to talk about with the 
Cubans? 

A. I think the best strategy — and 
I'm sure the President does — with 
respect to Cuba is right where we are, 
and when they evidence some desire and 
willingness to change their behavior, 
then we'll respond to that. 

Q. Mr. Smith says the evidence 
that they were sending all those 
military arms to the Central American 
countries is not very solid. 

A. That's his opinion, and he's en- 
titled to his opinion. 

Q. He read all the intelligence 
documents. 

A. I have looked these things over 
and talked to people too, and there are 
lots of people who have a different opin- 
ion than Mr. Smith. 

Q. And you're one of them? 

A. And I'm one of them. 

Q. I'm a little confused about the 
Cubans have to change their ways 
before we'll talk to them; the Russians 
apparently don't. There's no sign, I 
gather, that the sanctions that we 
have placed on the companies of our 
allies has changed Soviet behavior in 
Poland. In fact, if anything, their 
behavior— the Polish military govern- 
ment under Soviet stimulus — has been 
even more rigorously repressive. How 
can you call this a success? How can 
you say that they're modifying their 
behavior? 

A. What is happening in Poland is a 
very discouraging, but at the same time 
a dramatic, illustration of the bank- 
ruptcy of the Soviet system. 



The Polish people are wonderful peo- 
ple, productive people. There are great 
resources in that country, and the place- 
ment on it of the Soviet system has 
brought it to its knees. It's a terrible in- 
dictment of their system. 

Q. But this happened after we 
began our sanctions. 

A. No. This has been happening for 
many, many, many years, and it has 
continued. It's very discouraging that it 
continues, but the Polish people have not 
given up, and we certainly should 
stand — 

Q. Let's talk about the sanctions 
themselves. What good have they real- 
ly done except to benefit the Soviet 
Union, because it's split us from our 
allies? 

A. I'm sure that they have imposed 
a cost on the construction of that 
pipeline. They have dramatized our 
strong feelings about the subject, and, to 
a degree one can say that because they 
have had costs in the United States and 
costs in our allies, they only dramatize 
how important the President feels this is 
and how strongly he feels about it. 

Q. The allies are so disturbed 
they've been holding a meeting on it. 
Do you plan to send some senior State 
Department official — yourself or 
anybody else — to talk to our allies 
about reducing these sanctions? 

A. I'm sure the President will hold 
firmly to the strategy implied by the 
sanctions. To the extent that you can 
view the sanctions as an important tac- 
tic, if we can work out things that are 
more effective and have all of our allies 
with us, we're certainly willing to look at 
them. 



■Press release 270 of Sept. 7, 1982. 



AFRICA 



Visit of Cameroon President Ahidjo 



President Ahmadou Ahidjo of 
Cameroon made an official working visit 
to Washington, D.C., July 25-28, 1982. 
Folloudng are remarks made by 
Presidents Reagan and Ahidjo after 
their meeting on July 26. 

President Reagan 

It has been an honor and a pleasure to 
meet with President Ahmadou Ahidjo of 
Cameroon and to discuss the views and 
hopes of a major U.S. trading partner in 
Africa. 

Our discussions today reconfirm the 
mutual respect both our countries have 
enjoyed for over 20 years. Our meeting 
covered a wide range of issues. Par- 
ticularly useful was our discussion of 
southern Africa and the Middle East. I 
listened with interest to President 
Ahidjo's views on those difficult issues, 
and I hope he has also gained a better 
understanding of the role that we're try- 
ing to play. 

We also had a useful discussion of 
the enormous economic burdens faced 
by Africa's developing countries and a 
possible role for the U.S. private sector 
in addressing these problems. An 
American trade and investment mission, 
headed by Secretaries [Secretary of 
Commerce Malcolm] Baldrige and 
[Secretary of Agriculture John R.] 
Block, visited Cameroon and several 
other African countries last January. 
We continue to believe that private 
enterprise is the most effective means 
for fostering sound economic develop- 
ment. I'm very pleased that Cameroon 
has opened its doors to American 
businessmen. I hope that both our coun- 
tries will enjoy increasingly close 
economic and trade relations in the 
years ahead. 

Finally, our discussion gave me an 
opportunity to commend President 
Ahidjo for his outstanding leadership 
concerning the refugee problem. Over 
the past several years, Cameroon has 
hosted over 200.000 refugees fleeing 
civil wars and harsh regimes in 
neighboring countries. The United 
States has tried to help where it could, 
working through the U.N. High Com- 
missioner for Refugees, to alleviate the 
heavy burden that this has brought to 
Cameroon. We urge other nations to 
contribute to the international effort and 
give continuing support to the countries 
of first asylum and to the refugees 
themselves. 



I know that the President will be 
meeting with a wide range of Ad- 
ministration officials and Members of 
the House and Senate during his 
Washington stay. I am certain that he 
will find them eager to expand the ex- 
cellent working relations that we have 
with the Government of Cameroon. His 
discussions here are laying a foundation 
for enhanced cooperation and ever 
closer ties of friendship between the 
United States and Cameroon. And we're 
delighted to welcome him here to the 
United States. 

President Ahidjo 

I am pleased after my last visit to the 
United States of America in 1967 to 
have been given this opportunity to 
come back once more to this great and 
beautiful country on the kind invitation 
of President Ronald Reagan, with whom 
I have just had cordial and fruitful 
discussions. 

With regard to our bilateral rela- 
tions, the discussions were an opportuni- 
ty to reaffirm the esteem that the 
Cameroonian and American people have 
for each other and to express our 
satisfaction with the close links of 
mutually advantageous cooperation ex- 
isting between both our countries for 
over 20 years now. 

With regard to the determinations 
expressed on both sides and with the 
potentials of our countries, there is no 
doubt that this cooperation will grow 
and be consolidated in the future. This is 
already evident in the four agreements 
recently signed in Yaounde by our 
governments to finance interior agricul- 
tural projects and training programs for 
a total amount of $12,000,200. 

We also carried out a wide review of 
problems of common interest in Africa 
and the world. With regard to Africa, 
we expressed the need to accelerate the 
accession of Namibia to independence 
and to work toward the elimination of 
apartheid for the advent of majority rule 
in South Africa. We also expressed the 
hope that the present crisis in Chad and 
within the Organization of African Unity 
will be satisfactorily solved as soon as 
possible. 

With regard to world affairs, we ex- 
pressed our common determination to 
support, in all circumstances, the right 



of peoples to progress, peace, and self- 
determination. In this connection, we 
acknowledge the need to work in a con- 
certed manner to insure respect for the 
basic principles of international relations 
such as nonrecourse to force, the 
peaceful settlement of conflicts, and 
peaceful coexistence, as well as the pro- 
motion of a more just, balanced, and 
stable framework of cooperation be- 
tween industrialized and developing 
countries as part of global negotiations 
to usher in a new international economic 
order. 

Finally, I wish to seize this oppor- 
tunity to extend my sincere thanks to 
President Reagan and to the govern- 
ment and the people of the United 
States for the warm welcome accorded 



•Made at the South Portico of the White 
House (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 2, 1982). ■ 



(r. 



ior 



iipi 




I 



iVVhiU' House photo Ijy Bill Fitz-f'atnckl 



-,( Ctota Riillotj 



i 



EPARTMENT 



Role of the U.S. Ambassador 



y Richard T. Kennedy 

Statement before the Senate Foreigti 
't'Idtions Committee on April 28, 1982. 
Ir. Kennedy is Under Secretary for 
[iiiiagement.^ 

am happy to appear before the com- 
littee today to present the Administra- 
Kiii's views on the role of the ambassa- 
or in today's world and to discuss 
. 1886, which would require that not 
'ss than 85% of the total number of 
ositions of chiefs of mission shall be oc- 
upied by career members of the 
'oreign Service. 

This Administration firmly believes 
lat the best possible individuals must 
e appointed to represent this nation 
broad. We agree with former Ambas- 
ador Kingman Brewster that, because 
f greatly expanded communications and 
iniplexities and a need for ambassadors 
ho can explain developments to both 
;des, "the Ambassador is more impor- 
mt than he or she was when the 
overnment of the United States had 

I nly one Department engaged in foreign 

! slations." 

The President has recently indicated 
1 his letter to all chiefs of mission, the 
mportance he attaches to the am- 

.ssadorial role. He has assigned to the 
imbassador very broad responsibilities 
3 "protect and advance the United 
'tates' interests abroad" and made it 
lear that he views the ambassador as 
is personal representative to the host 
overnment. We do not accept the 
ometimes stated convention that the 

' mbassador is just a messenger for the 
3reign policy decisionmakers in 
Washington. 

tole of the Ambassador 

'he ambassadorial role is multifaceted. 
Ve seek ambassadorial candidates who 
lOt only are at ease in a foreign environ- 
lent, carrying out their representation- 
,1 functions, but who also can con- 
ribute, through their perspective, re- 
lorting and analyses to the policy 
leliberations in Washington. The am- 
lassador is not only our eyes and ears 
•ut a significant part of the brain. 

It must be remembered that the am- 
)assador is not, and never has been, 
imply the senior Department of State 
)fficial accredited to a foreign country. 
Phis factor was stressed in the 1975 



report of the Commission on the Organi- 
zation of the Government for the Con- 
duct of Foreign Policy (the Murphy 
Commission). That commission, com- 
posed of such distinguished persons as 
the late Vice President Rockefeller, 
Chairman Clement Zablocki, Am- 
bassador Mike Mansfield, and former 
Ambassador Anne Armstrong, noted 
that: 

Our concept of the role of the Am- 
bassador flows from one basic principle: the 
Ambassador is, and must be, the central 
representative of the United States, and of 
the President. All other embassy personnel 
. . . are extensions of the Ambassador. ... It 
is imperative for the Ambassador to serve as 
the representative of the President and the 
entire government, rather than simply as the 
senior Department of State official, if he is to 
coordinate effectively all U.S. activities in the 
country to which he is accredited. . . . These 
responsibilities will require Ambassadors who 
are at once broad-gauged and knowledgeable, 
who can as the head of mission fulfill both 
managerial and analytic roles and as personal 
representatives of the President, advise on 
policy matters. 

The demands of all ambassadorial 
assignments are not the same. In some 
cases decades of expertise in the area 
and country should be the primary 
criterion, while in others it will be more 
important for the host government to 
know without question that the am- 
basador does, in fact, speak directly for 
the President. We seek to tailor am- 
bassadorial choices to'meet the unique 
circumstances of our relations with a 
particular country. We agree with the 
study prepared last year for the commit- 
tee by the Congressional Research Serv- 
ice that "the issue here is qualifications 
and not the career or non-career status 
of the candidate." 

Let me now turn to our view of 
S. 1886 in the light of this background. 
The Administration opposes the passage 
of S. 1886 for three reasons. Briefly 
stated, the bill is unnecessary, it is 
counterproductive, and it can be con- 
sidered to be an infringement on the 
constitutional authority of the President 
to nominate ambassadors. 

S. 1886 is unnecessary because it is 
not needed either to assure the quality 
of ambassadorial nominees or to correct 
an inappropriate mix of career and non- 
career appointees. 

The quality of ambassadorial 
nominees is assured by the high concern 
of the President and his foreign policy 



advisers to seek the most qualified per- 
sons to represent the President and the 
United States abroad. Beyond this con- 
cern, however, the Constitution provides 
a check-and-balance mechanism to 
assure that appropriate individuals are 
appointed. The Senate must, of course, 
review the President's nominations pur- 
suant to its constitutional "advice and 
consent" responsibility. The Senate, and 
specifically this committee, has never 
been other than diligent in its review of 
presidential nominations. 

Indeed, the current provisions of law 
provide an appropriate and helpful aid 
to the Senate to perform its function of 
advice and consent. Specifically, Section 
304(a) of the Foreign Service Act of 
1980 outlines the attributes a chief of 
mission is expected to have, states in 
view of these attributes he or she should 
normally be a career member of the 
Foreign Service, makes it clear that 
political contributions are not to be a 
factor in ambassadorial appointments, 
and requires that a statement shall be 
provided to the Senate with a report on 
the "demonstrated competence" of the 
nominee for the duties of the position 
for which nominated. This kind of proc- 
ess helps to insure ambassadorial com- 
petence, while preserving the unques- 
tioned right of the President to present 
his nominations to the Senate. 

Career and Noncareer Representatives 

As to the mix of career and noncareer 
officers, I can assure you that the record 
of the Reagan Administration is consis- 
tent with that of other Administrations 
in recent years in regard to the percent- 
age of career officers occupying ambas- 
sadorial positions. In this light, I think it 
is instructive to examine the historical 
trend, which shows that the percentage 
of career officers appointed as Am- 
bassadors has risen over the past 
several decades. In President Truman's 
Administration, for example, only about 
50% of ambassadors were career ap- 
pointees. This number has risen to a 
range of between 65% and 75% since 
the Administration of President 
Eisenhower. 

As of today, 83 ambassadors to 
other countries are career officers while 
34 are noncareer, a mix of 71% career 
and 29% noncareer. Indeed, I would 
note that the percentage of ambassadors 
to other countries today who are career 
officers is equal to or greater than in 10 
of the last 20 years from 1961 through 
1980. Additionally, the percentage of 
career Ambassadors to other countries 



15 



DEPARTMENT 



today is within three percentage points 
of the career percentage in an additional 
5 of the last 20 years. In short, the mix 
of ambassadors appointed or retained by 
President Reagan is consistent with the 
mix of all other Presidents for the last 
20 years. 

As to our multilateral posts, I would 
note that many multilateral appoint- 
ments, such as to the United Nations, 
UNESCO, and the U.N. Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC) are traditional- 
ly noncareer. Nevertheless, the Presi- 
dent has nominated or retained career 
officers in some of the most significant 
multilateral posts. Specifically, the Presi- 
dent has nominated Ambassador 
Abraham Katz to serve at the U.S. Mis- 
sion to the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
in Paris and Ambassador George Vest to 
the U.S. Mission to the European Com- 
munities in Brussels. 

President Reagan has also retained 
outstanding career officers— W. Tapley 
Bennett, Jr., as the U.S. Ambassador to 
NATO and Roger Kirk as the U.S. rep- 
resentative to the U.N. Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) and 
the deputy U.S. representative to the In- 
ternational Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) in Vienna. Other career appoint- 
ments by the President to important 
multilateral posts include William 
Sherman as the deputy representative in 
the U.N. Security Council, Warren Clark 
as the deputy representative to 
ECOSOC, and Maynard Glitman as the 
deputy negotiator for intermediate- 
range nuclear forces (INF). 

President Reagan's nominations of 
noncareer appointees to multilateral 
organizations and other ambassadorial 
appointments include such outstanding 
people as Jeane Kirkpatrick to the 
United Nations, J. William Middendorf 
to the Organization of American States 
(OAS), Gen. Vernon Walters as 
Ambassador-at-Large, Paul Nitze as the 
intermediate-range nuclear force 
negotiator, and Edward L. Rowny as 
head of delegation to the START 
[Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] 
negotiations. 

That the President has the highest 
confidence in and respect for the career 
service is shown by his selection of 
career officers to represent U.S. in- 
terests in areas and at posts where our 
most vital concerns are engaged — 
NATO, China, Israel, Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt, the U.S.S.R., and El Salvador. 
Our embassy in New Delhi is headed by 
a career officer for the first time since 
1954. Within the Department of State 



16 



U.S. Ambassadors 
(as of September 22, 1982) 



Name 



U.S. Embassies 



Afghanistan 


(Vacant) 


Algeria 


Michael H. Newlin 


Antigua and Barbuda 


Milan D. Bish* 


Argentina 


Harry W. Shiaudeman 


Australia 


Robert Dean Nesen* 


Austria 


(Vacant) 


Bahamas 


(Vacant) 


Bahrain 


Peter Adams Sutherland 


Bangladesh 


Jane Abell Coon 


Barbados 


Milan D. Bish* 


Belgium 


Charles H. Price II 


Belize 


(Vacant) 


Benin 


(Vacant) 


Bolivia 


Edwin Gharst Corr 


Botswana 


Theodore C. Maino (nominated) 


Brazil 


Langhorne A. Motley 


Bulgaria 


Robert L. Barry 


Burma 


Patricia M. Byrne 


Burundi 


Frances D. Cook 


Cameroon 


Hume Alexander Horan 


Canada 


Paul Heron Robinson, Jr. 


Cape Verde 


Peter Jon de Vos* 


Central African Republic 


Arthur H. Woodruff 


Chad 


•• 


Chile 


James Daniel Theberge 


China 


Arthur W. Hummel, Jr. 


Colombia 


Thomas D. Boyatt 


Comoros 


Fernando E. Rondon* 


Congo 


Kenneth Lee Brown 


Costa Rica 


Francis J. McNeil 


Cyprus 


Raymond C. Ewing 


Czechoslovakia 


Jack F. Matlock, Jr. 


Denmark 


John Langeloth Loeb, Jr. 


Djibouti 


(Vacant) 


Dominica 


Milan D. Bish* 


Dominican Republic 


Robert Anderson 


Ecuador 


(Vacant) 


Egypt 


Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. 


El Salvador 


Deane R. Hinton 


Equatorial Guinea 


Alan M. Hardy 


Ethiopia 


(Vacant) 


Fiji 


Fred J. Eckerf 


Finland 


Keith Foote Nyborg 


France 


Evan Griffith Galbraith 


Gabon 


Francis Terry McNamara" 


The Gambia 


Sharon Erakamp Ahmed 


Germany, East 


Rozanne L. Ridgway 




(nominated) 


Germany, West 


Arthur F. Burns 


Ghana 


Thomas W.M. Smith 


Greece 


Monteagle Stearns 


Grenada 


(Vacant) 


Guatemala 


Frederic L. Chapin 


Guinea 


Allen Clayton Davis 


Guinea-Bissau 


Peter Jon de Vos* 


Guyana 


Gerald E. Thomas 


Haiti 


Ernest Henry Preeg 


Honduras 


John Dimitri Negroponte 


Hungary 


Harry E. Bergold, Jr. 


Iceland 


Marshall Brement 


India 


Harry G. Barnes, Jr. 


Indonesia 


(Vacant) 



Career 



Noncareer 



Department of State Bulletii 



DEPARTMENT 



Name 



Career 



Noncareer 



reland 


Peter H. Dailey 




X 


srael 


Samuel W. Lewis*** 






taly 


Maxwell M. Rabb 




X 


vory Coast 


Nancy V. Rawls 


X 




amaica 


William A. Hewitt (nominated) 




X 


apan 


Michael J. Mansfield 




X 


ordan 


Richard Noyes Viets 


X 




Lenya 


William Caldwell Harrop 


X 




Kiribati 


Fred J. Eckert* 




X 


[orea 


Richard L. Walker 




X 


luwait 


Francois M. Dickman 


X 




-aos 


(Vacant) 






-ebanon 


Robert Sherwood Dillon 


X 




,esotho 


Keith Lapham Brown 




X 


■iberia 


William Lacy Swing 


X 




,ibya 


**** 






.uxembourg 


John E. Dolibois 




X 


ladagascar 


Fernando E. Rondon* 


X 




lalawi 


John A. Burroughs, Jr. 


X 




lalaysia 


Ronald DeWayne Palmer 


X 




laldives 


John Hathaway Reed* 




X 


lali 


Parker W. Borg 


X 




[alta 


James Malone Rentschler 


X 




lauritania 


(Vacant) 






lauritius 


Robert C.F. Gordon* ** 






[exico 


John A. Gavin 




X 


[orocco 


Joseph Verner Reed, Jr. 




X 


lozambique 


(Vacant) 






auru 


Robert Dean Nesen* 




X 


\ epal 


Carleton S. Coon 


X 




1 etherlands 


William Jennings Dyess 


X 




ew Zealand 


H. Monroe Browne* 




X 


icaragua 


Anthony C.E. Quainton 


X 




iger 


William Robert Casey, Jr. 




X 


igeria 


Thomas R. Pickering 


X 




orway 


Mark Evans Austad 




X 


man 


John R. Countryman 


X 




akistan 


Ronald L Spiers 


X 




anama 


Everette Ellis Briggs 
(nominated) 


X 




apua New Guinea 


M. Virginia Schafer* 


X 




araguay 


Arthur Davis 




X 


eru 


Frank V. Ortiz, Jr. 


X 




hilippines 


Michael Hayden Armacost 


X 




oland 


Francis J. Meehan 


X 




ortugal 


Henry Allen Holmes 


X 




atar 


Charles E. Marthinsen 


X 




omania 


David B. Funderburk 




X 


wanda 


John Blane (nominated) 


X 




anta Lucia 


Milan D. Bish* 




X 


aint Vincent and 


Milan D. Bish* 




X 


the Grenadines 








ao Tome and Principe 


Francis Terry McNamara* 


X 




audi Arabia 


Richard W. Murphy 


X 




enegal 


Charles W. Bray HI 


X 




eychelles 


David Joseph Fischer 
(nominated) 


X 




lierra Leone 


Theresa Ann Healy 


X 




[ingapore 


Harry E.T. Thayer 


X 




lolomon Islands 


M. Virginia Schafer* 


X 




omali 


Robert Bigger Oakley 
(nominated) 


X 




outh Africa 


Herman W. Nickel 




X 


I pain 


Terence A. Todman 


X 




{ ri Lanka 


John Hathaway Reed* 




X 


'udan 


C. William Kontos 


X 




uriname 


Robert W. Duemling 


X 




waziland 


Robert H. Phinny 




X 


weden 


Franklin S. Forsberg 




X 


witzerland 


Faith Ryan Whittlesey 




X 


ctober 1982 



itself, the President has nominated 
career officers to key positions as the 
Deputy Secretary, the Under Secretary 
for Political Affairs, and to foiu- of the 
five regional assistant secretary posi- 
tions. These officials are serving with 
the greatest distinction and have the 
President's full confidence. 

The Administration believes that 
S. 1886 could be counterproductive. It 
would limit the ability of the President 
to appoint outstanding noncareer can- 
didates, while at the same time, it would 
not contribute to arresting the alleged 
tendency to downgrade the importance 
of the position of ambassador. 

Because the ambassadorial role is of 
such consequence, we think it would be 
a serious mistake to limit those eligible 
for appointment to any one category of 
citizens. We need the David Bruces, 
Ellsworth Bunkers, and Mike Mansfields 
as well as the Chip Bohlens, Llewelyn 
Thompsons, and Philip Habibs. 

Some commentators in recent years 
have remarked that ambassadors today 
may be less important than they once 
were and that Washington tends to 
bypass them to deal directly with other 
governments. It can be argued that im- 
position on ambassadorial appointments 
of a set percentage of career officers, if 
it meant the President could not 
nominate his first choice to be am- 
bassador, would tend to insure that such 
comments become self-fulfilling proph- 
ecies and thereby diminish the role of 
the ambassador as the representative of 
the President to foreign countries. 

S. 1886 can be considered to be an 
infringement on the President's constitu- 
tional authority, because it places an ar- 
bitrary limitation on the President's 
prerogative to nominate ambassadors. I 
have not come prepared today to discuss 
the details of constitutional interpreta- 
tion, but I must point out that the Presi- 
dent's ambassadorial nomination authori- 
ty is founded directly on the Constitu- 
tion, not on statute. Specifically, Article 
II, Section 2, provides that the Presi- 
dent "shall nominate, and by and with 
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
shall appoint Ambassadors. ..." The 
Administration believes strongly that 
any attempt to place an arbitrary limit 
on the authority of the President to for- 
ward to the Senate a nomination of his 
own choosing raises serious constitu- 
tional questions. 

Finally, there has been consistent 
opposition to the enactment of arbitrary 
percentages in order to encourage the 
nomination of career Foreign Service of- 
ficers to ambassadorships. Perhaps the 



ii2. 



DEPARTMENT 



strongest statement is that of the 
Murphy Commission itself which stated 
that: 

The Commission, therefore, believes that 
reserving a certain percentage for Foreign 
Service Officers is an inappropriate means of 
reaching the laudable goal of greater Am- 
bassadorial competence. While we would ex- 
pect the majority— perhaps a large ma- 
jority—of Ambassadors to be foreign affairs 
professionals, we do not advocate that they 
necessarily be drawn from the Foreign Serv- 
ice. Rather, the individual with the best 
qualifications for a given position should be 
selected. 

Even Malcolm Toon, in his recent 
article in the Foreign Service Journal, 
published by the American Foreign 
Service Association, stated that: 

I don't think you can legislate percent- 
ages of political appointees. I think it is up to 
the Foreign Relations Committee and the 
White House to make sure the people they 
are sending to important posts are qualified. 

We agree wholeheartedly with both 
of these sentiments, and for these and 
the other reasons stated above we must 
reiterate our opposition to the arbitrary 
limitation of S. 1886. 

In closing, I also wish to reiterate 
the President's and the Secretary of 
State's deep personal respect for the 
dedication and solid professionalism of 
the Foreign Service. Our opposition to 
S. 1886 is in no way intended to reflect 
adversely on the service. We recognize 
that the service provides an outstanding 
cadre of experienced Foreign Service 
professionals for ambassadorial appoint- 
ments. We recognize that the great ma- 
jority of ambassadorial appointments 
have been, and will continue to be, 
drawn from the service. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



U.S. Ambassadors 
(continued) 



Post 



Name 



Syria 


Robert P. Paganelli 


Tanzania 


David Charles Miller, Jr. 


Thailand 


John Gunther Dean 


Togo 


Howard Kent Walker 


Tonga 


Fred J. Eckerf 


Trindidad and Tobago 


Melvin Herbert Evans 


Tunisia 


Walter Leon Cutler 


Turkey 


Robert Strausz-Hupe 


Tuvalu 


Fred J. Eckerf 


Uganda 


Gordon Robert Beyer 


U.S.S.R. 


Arthur Adair Hartman 


United Arab Emirates 


George Q. Lumsden, Jr. 


United Kingdom 


John J. Louis, Jr. 


Upper Volta 


Julius Waring Walker, Jr 


Uruguay 


Thomas Aranda, Jr. 


Venezuela 


George W. Landau 


Western Samoa 


H. Monroe Browne* 


Yemen 


David Eugene Zweifel 


Yugoslavia 


David Anderson 


Zaire 


Peter Dalton Constable 




(nominated) 


Zambia 


Nicholas Piatt 


Zimbabwe 


Robert V. Keeley 


International Organizations 


United Nations 


Jeane J. Kirkpatrick 


Organization of American 


J. William Middendorf II 


States 




International Atomic 


Richard T. Kennedy 


Energy Agency 




NATO 


W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. 


Organization for Econom- 


Abraham Katz 


mic Cooperation and 




Development 




European Office of the 


Geoffrey Swaebe 


U.N. 




European Communities 


George Southall Vest 


UNESCO 


Jean Broward Shevlin Ge 


International Civil Avia- 


Edmund Stahr 


tion Organization 





Career 



•Accredited to more than one country. 

**The United States maintains diplomatic relations with Chad, but the U.S. Embassy wi 
closed on March 24, 1980. The embassy was reopened in January 1982. 

** 'Retired Foreign Service officer. 

••••On May 2, 1980, all embassy working activities were suspended, and all American 
personnel were withdrawn from the embassy. ■ 



18 



Department of State Bulleli 



EAST ASIA 



U.S.-China Joint Communique 



Folloiving is a statement by John H. 
Holdridge. Assistant Secretary for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
August 18, 1982.^ Also included are the 
tt-'xts of the U.S.-China joint communique 
ami President Reagan's statement of 
Augiist 17. 

Yesterday the United States and the 
People's Republic of China simultaneous- 
ly issued a joint communique. During the 
past months, the Administration has 
benefited from consultations with 
members of this committee on this sensi- 
tive subject. I am glad to be able to con- 
tinue our discussion of these issues in a 
public forum. I would also like to ex- 
press our appreciation for the way the 
committee has cooperated with us in 
maintaining the confidentiality of our 
discussions with the Chinese; this has 
aeen vital, and we appreciate it. 

As we went into these negotiations 
vve had two things in mind — our historic 
ibligations to the people of Taiwan and 
lur important and growing relations 
■vith the People's Republic of China. 
Throughout the entire period of our dis- 
;ussions with Beijing, we were guided 
Dy these dual considerations. It is a 
"undamental national interest of the 
Jnited States to preserve and advance 
ts strategic relations with China. At the 

> same time, we have obligations to old 
■'riends; and we are not going to turn 
)ur back on them. 

I am glad that we have been able to 
irrive at a communique with the 
Chinese that demonstrated their recog- 
lition of our determination on this 
^core. Despite the difficulties it obviously 
•auses them, they were willing to join 
vith us in a modus vivendi which will 
>nable us to continue our relationship 
lecause of the important interests in- 
/olved for them. Such an outcome is of 
-'ital importance to our national interest. 

", Three Administrations before us have 
.vorked very hard to establish and ex- 
pand this relationship, and we would 
lave been derelict if we had not made 
;very effort to find a way around the 

hroblem that threatened it. 



j|4 Valued Relationship 



;,'. think it would be useful to take a few 
Tiinutes to examine the reasons why we 

>alue this relationship so highly. One of 
:he major reasons is strategic. Prior to 



1971 we had a hostile relationship with 
China. It was costly. We fought the 
Chinese in Korea. We almost came to a 
major war over Quemoy and Matsu. The 
Chinese worked hand in hand with the 
Soviets against us in Vietnam. We had 
to maintain a naval presence between 
Taiwan and the mainland. China identi- 
fied itself with support for guerrilla 
movements on the soil of many of our 
allies and friends. Furthermore, a large 
part of our defense resources were allo- 
cated on the premise of a hostile China. 
Last, and perhaps most important, these 
1 billion people were not identified with 
our interests as we faced the Soviet 
Union. 

Starting in 1971 we have changed 
this situation. Thanks to a productive 
relationship between the United States 
and China, Taiwan has never been more 
secure and prosperous. We no longer 
have to plan for China as an enemy. We 
can now think about China as a country 
with which we might cooperate in cer- 
tain significant areas. China's relations 
with our allies in Asia have improved. 
These 1 billion people are cautiously 
moving into the mainstream of the 
world's cultural and economic life. Their 
isolation is dissolving. Trade has in- 
creased. Eight thousand Chinese 
students are now studying in the United 
States. Investment opportunities are 
opening and our parallel interests in con- 
taining, the Soviet Union have been re- 
peatedly reaffirmed. 

All of these things represent solid, 
vital benefits to our security and well- 
being. We were not going to let these 
achievements disappear into rancor and 
hostility if we could possibly avoid it. We 
went after both of the objectives I men- 
tioned at the outset, and I believe we 
have succeeded. 

Reaffirming Fundamental Principles 

Let me now turn to yesterday's com- 
munique. The communique reaffirms the 
fundamental principles which have guid- 
ed U.S.-China relations since the incep- 
tion of the normalization process over 10 
years ago. This reaffirmation is signifi- 
cant; it illustrates the strength and the 
durability of these principles. 

On this foundation, the United 
States established relations with China 
which have been economically beneficial 
to us and which have greatly enhanced 
our vital strategic interests. At the same 



time, we have maintained and strength- 
ened our commercial and cultural rela- 
tions with the people of Taiwan. We 
have achieved these important goals 
without impairing the security of the 
people of Taiwan, and, indeed, because 
of these improved relations between 
China and the United States, Taiwan 
has never been more secure. 

The communique also addresses an 
issue which was not resolved at the time 
of normalization of relations — the ques- 
tion of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Dur- 
ing discussions leading to normalization, 
China demanded that arms sales be ter- 
minated. We refused. I can say here 
that our negotiations almost foundered 
over this issue. China ultimately agreed 
to proceed with normalization despite 
this disagreement but reserved the right 
to raise this issue again. When it did so, 
we agreed to engage in discussion to 
determine whether an understanding 
could be reached. The alternative to our 
agreeing to hold such discussions would 
clearly have been the beginning of a 
process of deterioration in our rela- 
tions — deterioration that could have led 
us back toward hostility since the issue 
itself was volatile and basic. We would 
have been irresponsible had we allowed 
such a process to start. 

We undertook these discussions, 
therefore, with the hope that a formula 
could be found which would permit the 
continued growth of our relations with 
China, but also with the firm resolve 
that there were principles regarding the 
security of Taiwan which could not be 
compromised. Those principles, em- 
bodied in the Taiwan Relations Act, 
commit the United States to sell to 
Taiwan arms necessary to maintain a 
sufficient self-defense capability. 

Aware of our consistent and firm op- 
position to the use of force against 
Taiwan, the Chinese during these discus- 
sions agreed to state in very strong 
terms their policy of pursuing a peaceful 
resolution of the Taiwan issue and de- 
scribed this policy as "fundamental." The 
Chinese insisted, however, that we agree 
to the ultimate termination of arms 
sales. We refused because the level of 
our arms sales must be determined by 
the needs of Taiwan, and we could not 
agree to a termination date, as the 
Chinese demanded, which might impair 
our ability to meet those needs. 



,J)ct 



ober1982 



19 



EAST ASIA 



At the same time, we recognized 
that China's peaceful policy bore directly 
on the defense needs of Taiwan. So long 
as that policy continued, the threat to 
Taiwan would be greatly diminished. As 
I have just noted, assurances of such a 
continuity were provided when the 
Chinese began to describe their peaceful 
policy on the resolution of the Taiwan 
question as, as I have just said, "funda- 
mental," which contains the connotation 
of unchanging and long term. We were 
thus able to consider a policy under 
which we would limit our arms sales to 
the levels reached in recent years and 
would anticipate a gradual reduction of 
the level of arms sales. We were not 
willing, however, to adopt such a course 
unconditionally. 

While the Chinese were willing to 
state their peaceful policy in strong 
terms, they at first resisted any relation- 
ship between that policy and our arms 
sales to Taiwan. The Chinese resisted 
this relationship because of their view 
that the sale of arms to Taiwan consti- 
tutes an interference in China's internal 
affairs. We rejected any language to this 
effect in the communique. 

We also stressed that as a matter of 
fact and law, any adjustments in our 
arms sales to Taiwan had to be premised 
on a continuation of China's peaceful 
policy. We therefore maintained, and the 
Chinese ultimately agreed, that the 
statement of our policy in paragraph 6 
be prefaced by a phrase that related it 
to the continuation of China's peaceful 
approach. This is the genesis and pur- 
pose of the phrase "Having in mind the 
foregoing statements of both sides" 
which precedes our statements in that 
paragraph. Thus, our policy is predi- 
cated on China's commitment in para- 
graph 4 to a peaceful approach and our 
acknowledgment of that approach in 
paragraph 5. 

Let me summarize the essence of 
our understanding on this point: China 
has announced a fundamental policy of 
pursuing peaceful means to resolve the 
longstanding dispute between Taiwan 
and the mainland. Having in mind this 
policy and the consequent reduction in 
the military threat to Taiwan, we have 
stated our intention to reduce arms sales 
to Taiwan gradually and said that in 
quantity and quality we would not go be- 
yond levels established since normaliza- 
tion. This follows from a literal reading 
of the communique. While we have no 
reason to believe that China's policy will 
change, an inescapable corollary to these 
mutually interdependent policies is that 



U.S.-China Joint Communique, 
August 17, 1982 



1. In the Joint Communique on the Establish- 
ment of Diplomatic Relations on January 1, 
1979, issued by the Government of the 
United States of America and the Govern- 
ment of the People's Republic of China, the 
United States of America recognized the 
Government of the People's Republic of 
China as the sole legal government of China, 
and it acknowledged the Chinese position 
that there is but one China and Taiwan is 
part of China. Within that context, the two 
sides agreed that the people of the United 
States would continue to maintain cultural, 
commercial, and other unofficial relations 
with the people of Taiwan. On this basis, 
relations between the United States and 
China were normalized. 

2. The question of United States arms 
sales to Taiwan was not settled in the course 
of negotiations between the two countries on 
establishing diplomatic relations. The two 
sides held differing positions, and the Chinese 
side stated that it would raise the issue again 
following normalization. Recognizing that this 
issue would seriously hamper the develop- 
ment of United States-China relations, they 
have held further discussions on it, during 
and since the meetings between President 
Ronald Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang and 
between Secretary of State Alexander M. 
Haig, Jr., and Vice Premier and Foreign 
Minister Huang Hua in October, 1981. 

3. Respect for each other's sovereignty 
and territorial integrity and non-interference 
in each other's internal affairs constitute the 
fundamental principles guiding United States- 
China relations. These principles were con- 
firmed in the Shanghai Communique of Feb- 
ruary 28, 1972 and reaffirmed in the Joint 
Communique on the Establishment of Diplo- 
matic Relations which came into effect on 
January 1, 1979. Both sides emphatically 
state that these principles continue to govern 
all aspects of their relations. 

4. The Chinese Government reiterates 
that the question of Taiwan is China's inter- 
nal affair. The Message to Compatriots in 
Taiwan issued by China on January 1, 1979 
promulgated a fundamental policy of striving 
for peaceful reunification of the Motherland. 
The Nine-Point Proposal put forward by 
China on September 30, 1981 represented a 
further major effort under this fundamental 
policy to strive for a peaceful solution to the 
Taiwan question. 

5. The United States Government at- 
taches great importance to its relations with 
China, and reiterates that it has no intention 
of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and ter- 
ritorial integrity, or interfering in China's in- 
ternal affairs, or pursuing a policy of "two 



Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." The 
United States Government understands am 
appreciates the Chinese policy of striving fi 
a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan questio 
as indicated in China's Message to Com- 
patriots in Taiwan issued on January 1, 19' 
and the Nine-Point proprosal put forward \ 
China on September 30, 1981. The new siti 
tion which has emerged with regard to the 
Taiwan question also provides favorable co 
ditions for the settlement of United States- Jj 
China differences over the question of Unit 
States arms sales to Taiwan. 

6. Having in mind the foregoing state- 
ments of both sides, the United States 
Government states that it does not seek to 
carry out a long-term policy of arms sales 
Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will 
exceed, either in qualitative or in quantital 
terms, the level of those supplied in recent 
years since the establishment of diplomati< 
relations between the United States and 
China, and that it intends to reduce gradu 
its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a 
period of time to a final resolution. In so 
stating, the United States acknowledges 
China's consistent position regarding the 
thorough settlement of this issue. 

7. In order to bring about, over a peri |i!l 
of time, a final settlement of the question 
United States arms sales to Taiwan, whic 

an issue rooted in history, the two govern 
ments will make every effort to adopt me: 
ures and create conditions conducive to th 
thorough settlement of this issue. 

8. The development of United States- 
China relations is not only in the interest: 
the two peoples but also conducive to pea 
and stability in the world. The two sides ! 
determined, on the principle of equality a 
mutual benefit, to strengthen their ties in 
economic, cultural, educational, scientific, 
technological, and other fields and make |8!i( 
strong, joint efforts for the continued dev 
opment of relations between the governn 
and peoples of the United States and Chi 

9. In order to bring about the healthy 
development of United States-China rela- 
tions, maintain world peace, and oppose i 
gression and expansion, the two governn- 
reaffirm the principles agreed on by the t 
sides in the Shanghai Communique and t! 
Joint Communique on the Establishment 
Diplomatic Relations. The two sides will 
maintain contact and hold appropriate co 
sultations on bilateral and international i: 
of common interest. 



at! 



Ki 



Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidi 
tial Documents of Aug. 23, 1982. ■ 



'jm 



-20. 



DeDartment of State Bui I 



ould that happen, we will reassess 
ITS. Our guiding principle is now and 
,11 continue to be that embodied in the 
liwan Relations Act: the maintenance 
a self-defense capability sufficient to 
eet the military needs of Taiwan, but 
ith the understanding that China's 
aintenance of a peaceful approach to 
e Taiwan question will permit gradual 
ductions in arms sales. 

Questions have been raised concern- 
g whether the wording of the corn- 
unique adequately conveys the mean- 
g which we ascribe to it. I believe that 
does or I would have recommended 
:ainst its approval. The present word- 
a; evolved from 10 months of intense 
gotiations in which fundamental prin- 
Dles were at stake on both sides. The 
nguage necessarily reflects the difficult 
mpromises which were reached. 
We should keep in mind that what 
have here is not a treaty or agree- 
ent but a statement of future U.S. 
flicy. We intend to implement this 
ilicy in accordance with our under- 
anding of it. I hope I have made that 
lint abundantly clear in my remarks to- 
ly. I can further assure you that, hav- 
g participated closely in the negotia- 
ins, I am confident that the Chinese 
e fully cognizant of that understand- 

Returning now to the document it- 
Lf, let me recapitulate and emphasize a 
A' key features. 

First, the document must be read as 
>vhole, since the policies it sets forth 
e interrelated. 

Second, as I have previously noted, 
e communique contains a strong 
linese statement that its fundamental 
licy is to seek to resolve the Taiwan 
estion by peaceful means (paragraph 
In this context, I would point out 
ain that the reference to their "funda- 

-1 sntal" policy carries the connotation in 
linese of "unchanging and long term." 
Third, the U.S. statements concern- 
g future arms sales to Taiwan (para- 
aph 6) are based on China's state- 

(jents as to its fundamental peaceful 

1 »licy for seeking a resolution to the 
dwan question and on the "new situa- 

ci »n" created by those statements (para- 

« raph 5). This situation is new because, 
T the first time, China has described 
I) peaceful policy toward Taiwan in the 

;j,rms I have outlined. Thus, our future 
tions concerning arms sales to Taiwan 
e premised on a continuation of 

-nina's peaceful policy toward a resolu- 
5n of its differences with Taiwan. This 
indicated by the words at the begin- 



:toberig82 



ning of paragraph 6 that "Having in 
mind the foregoing statements of both 
sides, the United States Government 
states. . . ." We have no reason to think 
that the Chinese will change this funda- 
mental policy, but if they should, we 
would, of course, reexamine our posi- 
tion. 

Fourth, we did not agree to set a 
date certain for ending arms sales to 
Taiwan and the statements of future 
U.S. arms sales policy embodied in the 
communique do not provide either a 
time frame for reductions of U.S. arms 
sales or for their termination. The U.S. 
statements are fully consistent with the 



EAST ASIA 



Taiwan Relations Act, and we will con- 
tinue to make appropriate arms sales to 
Taiwan based on our assessments of 
their defense needs, as specified by the 
act. 

Substance of Discussions 

So much for what is in the actual com- 
munique. Over the past several months, 
there has been considerable speculation 
about the substance of our discussions 
with the Chinese. As you know, we have 
not felt free to comment on such specu- 
lation while our talks were underway. 
Therefore, it might be useful at this 



President's Statement, 
Aug. 17, 1982 



The U.S. -China joint communique issued 
today embodies a mutually satisfactory 
means of dealing with the historical 
question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. 
"This document preserves principles on 
both sides and will promote the further 
development of friendly relations be- 
tween the Governments and peoples of 
the United States and China. It will also 
contribute to the further reduction of 
tensions and to lasting peace in the 
Asia/Pacific region. 

Building a strong and lasting rela- 
tionship with China has been an impor- 
tant foreign policy goal of four con- 
secutive American Administrations. 
Such a relationship is vital to our long- 
term national security interests and con- 
tributes to stability in East Asia. It is in 
the national interest of the United 
States that this important strategic rela- 
tionship be advanced. This communique 
will make that possible, consistent with 
our obligations to the people of Taiwan. 

In working toward this successful 
outcome, we have paid particular atten- 
tion to the needs and interests of the 
people of Taiwan. My longstanding per- 
sonal friendship and deep concern for 
their well-being is steadfast and un- 
changed. I am committed to maintaining 
the full range of contacts between the 
people of the United States and the peo- 
ple of Taiwan — cultural, commercial, 
and people-to-people contacts — which 
are compatible with our unofficial rela- 
tionship. Such contacts will continue to 
grow and prosper and will be conducted 
with the dignity and honor befitting old 
friends. 



Regarding future U.S. arms sales to 
Taiwan, our policy, set forth clearly in 
the communique, is fully consistent with 
the Taiwan Relations Act. Arms sales 
will continue in accordance with the act 
and with the full expectation that the 
approach of the Chinese Government to 
the resolution of the Taiwan issue will 
continue to be peaceful. We attach great 
significance to the Chinese statement in 
the communique regarding China's "fun- 
damental" policy; and it is clear from 
our statements that our future actions 
will be conducted with this peaceful 
policy fully in mind. The position of the 
U.S. Government has always been clear 
and consistent in this regard. The 
Taiwan question is a matter for the 
Chinese people, on both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait, to resolve. We will not 
interfere in this matter or prejudice the 
free choice of, or put pressure on, the 
people of Taiwan in this matter. At the 
same time, we have an abiding interest 
and concern that any resolution be 
peaceful. I shall never waver from this 
fundamental position. 

I am proud, as an American, at the 
great progress that has been made by 
the people on Taiwan, over the past 
three decades and of the American con- 
tribution to that process. I have full 
faith in the continuation of that process. 
My Administration, acting through ap- 
propriate channels, will continue strong- 
ly to foster that development and to con- 
tribute to a strong and healthy invest- 
ment climate, thereby enhancing the 
well-being of the people of Taiwan. 



Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Aug. 23, 1982. ■ 



21 



EAST ASIA 



point to clarify our stand on a number of 
issues which have surfaced in such spec- 
ulations. 

As to our position on the resolution 
of the Taiwan problem, we have consist- 
ently held that it is a matter to be 
worked out by the Chinese themselves. 
Our sole and abiding concern is that any 
resolution be peaceful. It follows that we 
see no mediation role for the United 
States nor will we attempt to exert 
pressure on Taiwan to enter into negoti- 
ations with the People's Republic of 
China (P.R.C.). 

I would also call your attention to 
the fact that there has been no change 
in our longstanding position on the issue 
of sovereignty over Taiwan. The com- 
munique (paragraph 1) in its opening 
paragraph simply cites that portion of 
the joint communique on the establish- 
ment of diplomatic relations between the 
United States and the P.R.C. in which 
the United States "acknowledged the 
Chinese position" on this issue (i.e., that 
there is but one China and Taiwan is a 
part of China). 

It has been reported in the press 
that the Chinese at one point suggested 
that the Taiwan Relations Act be re- 
vised. We have no plans to seek any 
such revisions. 

Finally, in paragraph 9 the two sides 
agree to "maintain contact and hold ap- 
propriate consultations on bilateral and 
international issues of common interest." 
This should be read within the context 
of paragraphs 8 and 9, which deal with 
the two sides' desire to advance their 
bilateral and strategic relations. It 
should not be read to imply that we have 
agreed to engage in prior consultations 
with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan. 

We hope and expect that this com- 
munique, and the step forward which it 
represents in the resolution of U.S.- 
Chinese differences on this issue, will 
enhance the confidence of the people of 
Taiwan, whose well-being and prosperity 
continue to be of the utmost importance 
to us. From the President on down, we 
have acted in a way which seeks to 
enhance the future security and pros- 
perity of the people of Taiwan, and I call 
your attention to the emphasis on this 
matter in the President's statement 
which was released simultaneously with 
the release of the communique yester- 
day. 

Removal of the arms question as a 
serious issue in U.S. -China relations will 
help to insure that both countries can 
continue to cooperate on mutually 
shared international objectives, e.g., de- 
terring Soviet aggression in Ecist Asia 



and removal of Vietnamese troops from 
Kampuchea. It will ease fears by Ameri- 
can friends and allies that the general 
peace and stability in the AsiayPaCific 
region could be undermined. By defusing 
the difficult issue of arms sales, we will 
open the way for an expansion of U.S.- 
China relations in a broad range of eco- 
nomic, cultural, scientific, and techno- 
logical areas as well as in people-to- 
people contact. 

In conclusion, I would like to quote a 
paragraph from the statement issued by 
President Reagan yesterday: 



Building a strong and lasting reiationshi |ii 
with China has been an important foreign in- 
policy goal of four consecutive American Ac ni 
ministrations. Such a relationship is vital to 
our long-term national security interests an< hr 
contributes to stability in East Asia. It is in 
the national interest of the United States 
that this important strategic relationship be 
advanced. This communique will make that 
possible, consistent with our obligations to 
the people of Taiwan. 



The complete transcript of the hearinHL||, 



will be published by the committee and 
be avaikible from tne Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



krc 



U.S.-China Relations, 1981 



The following chronology was 
prepared by the Office of Chinese Affairs 
in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs. A chronology covering 1979-80 
was published in the February 1981 
Bulletin. 

January 12 

Fang Yi (Vice Premier and Minister of the 
State Scientific and Technological Commis- 
sion) meets delegation led by Congressman 
Donald Fuqua (D.-Fla.), chairman of the 
House Committee on Science and Technol- 
ogy- 
January 13 

Social Sciences and Humanities Planning 
Commission delegation, led by Kenneth 
Prewitt, arrives in Beijing to discuss ex- 
changes in these fields with Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences. 

January 20 

Xinhua reports that a U.S. Department of 
State spokesman announced that the only 
representative from China officially invited to 
attend the inauguration of President-elect 
Ronald Reagan is Ambassador to the U.S. 
Chai Zemin. 

Premier Zhao Ziyang congratulates Presi- 
dent Reagan on his inauguration, citing prin- 
ciples of the Shanghai communique. 

January 26 

Civil Aviation Administration of China 
(CAAC) opens air service between China and 
the U.S. 

January 28 

Pan American World Airways opens air serv- 
ice between the U.S. and China. 

February 11 

Huang Hua (Vice Premier and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs) meets with outgoing U.S. 
Ambassador Leonard Woodcock. 



February 15 

Bank of America delegation arrives in Beiji 
to attend the opening ceremony of its Beij; 
office. 



February 17 

Deng Xiaoping (Vice Chairman) meets Bar 
of America delegation. ^ 

February 19 Ft 

Educational Testing Service President 
William Turnbull arrives in Beijing with hi Jj,,, 
party to hold discussions with the Ministrj 
Education on the administration of Americ ^j 
standardization tests in China. (A six-perS' .yj 
Chinese delegation from the Ministry of 
Education reciprocates the visit in April.) 



February 20 

A 50-member delegation, led by President 
the National Council for U.S.-China Trade 
Christopher H. Phillips, meets with Ye 
Jianying (Vice Chairman. Standing Comm 
tee of the National People's Congress— N! 
and Zhang Wenjin (Vice Minister of Forei 
Affairs). 

Secretary of State Haig meets in 
Washington with Ambassador Chai. Xinht 
describes the meeting as "very friendly." 

February 25 

At the invitation of Panam, Shen Tu {CAj 
director) leads delegation to U.S. to celebi 
the inauguration of air services between 
China and the U.S. Delegation visits 
Washington, New York, Orlando, and San 
Francisco. 



ut 



March 14 

Vice President Bush meets with Ambassat ^" 
Chai and Ji Chaozhu (Deputy Director of i 
Foreign Ministry '.s Department of Americ 
and Oceanian Affairs). Meeting described 
Xinhua as "cordial." 



itsi 



22 



Department of State BulhJB-j 



EAST ASIA 



larch 16 

Ixxon Corp. chairman of the board C. Garvin 
■ads delegation to Beijing. 

larch 18 

arvin meets with Yu Qiuh (Vice Premier) 
mi Qin Wencai (Deputy General Manager, 
etroleum Corp. of China). 

National Council for U.S. -China Trade 
lairman of the board David S. Tappan car- 
e.-^ Iftter from President Reagan to the 
luiuil affirming the Administration's desire 
' "improve prospects for the development of 
•ade with the P.R.C." 

arch 19 

XXI in delegation meets with Yao Yilin (Vice 
renuer). 

President Reagan holds first formal 
eeting with Ambassador Chai, who is ac- 
impanied by Deputy Director Ji. The Presi- 
mt pledges to promote Sino-U.S. relations 
n the basis of the principles laid down" in 
e 1979 joint communique on the establish- 
ent of diplomatic relations between the two 
un tries. 

arch 22-27 

)rmer President Gerald Ford visits China at 
e invitation of the Chinese Government. He 
sets with Premier Zhao, Vice Chairman 
>ng. Vice Premier and Foreign Minister 
iang, and Vice Minister Zhang. On March 23, 
ird delivers an "oral, friendly message" 
Vice Chairman Deng and a letter to 
eniier Zhao from President Reagan during 
•iendly" conversations with them in Beijing. 

arch 26 

) Yiho (Vice Premier), addressing the 
legation from the board of directors and its 
airman Tappan of the National Council for 
•S. -China Trade in Beijing, says he ap- 
eciates President Reagan's position on pro- 
itmg trade between China and the U.S. 

arch 30- April 2 

S Coast Guard Commandant Adm. John 
Hayes visits China at the invitation of the 
ni.-^try of Communications. He meets with 
HI .lian (Vice Minister of Communications) 
di.scuss implementation of the Sino-U.S. 
intime transportation agreement. 



arch 31 

emier Zhao sends a message to President 
jagan expressing his concern over the 
•esident's health following the assassination 
tempt. 

iril 1 

linese Society of Astronautics delegation, 
i by Chen Bin, arrives in Washington to 
lit the U.S. and watch the launching and 
* iding of the space shuttle. Delegation was 
vited by Congressman Fuqua. 

ay 6-21 

Fengping (Governor of Zheijiang Province) 
rives in the U.S. to sign a sister State-prov- 
ce relationship agreement between New 
irsey and Zhejiang. 



jll!:tober1982 



May 7 

Delegation of women leaders from the Na- 
tional Committee for U.S. -China Relations ar- 
rives in Beijing for a 3-week visit, hosted by 
the All Chinese Women's Federation. 

American Film Week opens at the Na- 
tionalities Cultural Palace in Beijing begin- 
ning a five-city tour. Fay Kanin, president of 
the Academy of Motion Pictures Arts and 
Sciences, leads the delegation and meets with 
Chinese cinema counterparts. Zao Zhongming 
(Vice Minister of the Commission of Cultural 
Relations with Foreign Countries — CCRFC) 
and Chen Huangmei (Vice Minister of 
Culture) attend the opening. 

May 12 

Ding Bo (chairman, China National Publica- 
tions Import/Export Corp.) opens a 2-week 
exhibition in Beijing of 18,000 American 
books, organized by the Assn. of Anierican 
Publishers, Assn. of American University 
Presses, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
and the Learned Societies. Duplicate exhibi- 
tions open concurrently in Changhai, Wuhan, 
Chengdu, Shenyang, and Lanzhou. A delega- 
tion of 40 American publishers visits China 
for approximately 2 weeks in conjunction 
with these exhibitions. 

Presidential counselor Edwin Meese HI 
says that the U.S. would carry out in its en- 
tirety the provisions of the Taiwan Relations 
Act. 

May 13 

U.S. trade union delegation, led by Louis 
Goldblatt, arrives in Beijing for a visit at the 
invitation of the All-China Federation of 
Trade Unions. 

May 15 

U.S. trade union delegation meets with Vice 
Premier Bo and Kang Yonghe (vice presi- 
dent, All-China Federation of Trade Unions). 

State Department spokesman Dean 
Fischer clarifies the remarks of Presidential 
counselor Meese on May 12 that the U.S. 
would carry out in its entirety the provisions 
of the Taiwan Relations Act. Fischer explains 
that this does not imply that the U.S. has an 
official relationship with Taiwan. He also ex- 
plains that by "official visitors," Meese meant 
representatives of the Coordination Council 
for North American Affairs (CCNAA). 

May 20 

Vice President Bush meets with Zhejiang 
Province Governor Li at the White House. 
Also present are Ambassador Chai, Secretary 
of Commerce Malcolm Baldridge, Assistant 
for National Security Affairs Richard V. 
Allen, and Under Secretary of State Walter 
J. Stoessel, Jr. 

May 21 

Vice Premier Bo meets with T.A. Wilson, 
chairman of the board of Boeing Corp., and 
his party in Beijing. 

May 25 

Sino-American editorial review board meets 
in Beijing on the Chinese-language version of 
Encyclopedia Britannica's Micropaedia. 



May 30 

President Reagan sends a message to Vice 
Chairman Ye expressing his personal con- 
dolences over the death of Madame Soong 
Chingling, honorary State Chairman of 
China. 

June 2 

Vice Premier Bo meets with the chairman of 
the board of directors of the R.J. Reynolds 
Industrial Group. Delegation visits China at 
the invitation of Song Jiwen (Minister of 
Light Industry). 

June 2-5 

First international trade symposium, spon- 
sored by the International Trade Institute 
under the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and the Stanford Research Institute Interna- 
tional, held in Beijing where experts ex- 
change information to help both parties bet- 
ter understand Chinese and foreign markets. 

June 3 

President Reagan makes China eligible, as a 
friendly country, to purchase military equip- 
ment; he also liberalizes the export of 
technology to China and removes restrictive 
clauses from U.S. legislation, which treat 
China and the Soviet Union equally. 

June 4 

A copyright delegation, led by David Ladd of 
the Library of Congress and Harvey Winter 
of the State Department, arrives in Beijing 
for 10 days of lectures and discussions spon- 
sored by the China Publishers Assn. 

June 12 

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman says 
that China remains opposed to the sale of 
U.S. arms to Taiwan. Cnina views such sales 
as interference in its internal affairs and a 
violation of the agreement on normalizing 
Sino-L'.S. relations. 

June 14-17 

Secretary Haig visits China at the invitation 
of Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Huang. 
He meets with Premier Zhao, Vice Chairman 
Deng, Vice Premier Bo, and Geng Biao (Vice 
Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party — 
CCP— and Minister of Defense). He delivers 
to Zhao a letter from President Reagan and 
also an invitation on the President's behalf to 
visit the U.S. During this visit, it was agreed: 

• To hold a second LI. S. -China Joint 
Economic Committee meeting to be headed 
by Treasury Secretary Donald T. Regan and 
Vice Premier Bo; 

• To establish separate joint commissions 
on commerce and trade; and 

• That exchanges between U.S. and 
Chinese defense establishments will continue 
to expand. Liu Huaqing (Deputy Chief of the 
General Staff of the People's Liberation 
Army — PLA) would lead China's delegation 
to the U.S. this year. 



23 



EAST ASIA 



June 15 

Committee of Scholarly Communication with 
the P.R.C. sponsors an international con- 
ference on educational exchanges with China 
in Bellagio, Italy. Representatives from eight 
countries attend. 

Dalian Training Center for Science and 
Technologj' Management (a I'.S. project to 
help China train senior economic planners, 
administrators, and managers) begins its sec- 
ond course. (Under the umbrella of the 
science and technology agreement, the center 
is granted under a protocol between China's 
State Scientific and Technological Commis- 
sion and the U.S. Department of Commerce.) 

June 16 

China and the U.S. reach agreement and ex- 
change notes in Beijing on the establishment 
of three additional consulates general in each 
other's country; Vice Premier and Foreign 
Minister Huang and Secretary Haig attend 
the ceremony. China will set up consulates 
general in New York, Chicago, and Honolulu; 
the U.S. will establish them in Shenyang, 
Wuhan, and Chengdu. 

June 17 

Xinhua article states President Reagan said 
in June 16 news conference that U.S. wants 
to improve relations with P.R.C. and that the 
lifting of restrictions on military equipment 
sales to China "is a normal part of the proc- 
ess of improving our relations there." 

Taiwan authorities describe as "unfor- 
tunate" the U.S. decision to sell weapons to 
China. 

June 26 

Li Xiannian (Vice Chairman) and Vice 
Premier Bo meet David Rockefeller, chair- 
man of the board of the Chase Manhattan 
Bank, who is in Beijing to preside over the 
opening ceremony of the bank's Beijing of- 
fice. 

Vice Premier Yao meets with Richard E. 
Lyng, Deputy Secretary of Agriculture, and 
his delegation. 

Nebraska Governor Charles Thone ar- 
rives in Beijing, heading delegation at the in- 
vitation of the China Council for the Promo- 
tion of International Trade. 

June 28 

During televised public affairs program. 
Secretary Haig says that Beijing 
"understood" the U.S. obligations to the peo- 
ple of Taiwan, including "the provision of 
defense armaments." China's opposition to 
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is reiterated. 

July 1 

Governor Thone's delegation meets with Gu 
Mu (Vice Premier). 

Julys 

Attending the U.S. Independence Day recep- 
tion at the American Embassy in Beijing are 
Minister in charge of the CCRFC Huang, 
Vice Minister Zhang, Deputy Chief of the 
PLA General Staff Liu, and Ambassador 
Chai. 



JL 



Vice Chairman Deng meets with the 
visiting delegation from the Occidental 
Petroleum Corp., led by chairman of the 
board Armand Hammer. 

Julys 

Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security 
adviser, and his party arrive in Shanghai. 

July 15 

In 'Taiwan, President Chiang Ching-kuo, in a 
speech to the Kuomintang Central Standing 
Committee, expresses satisfaction with the 
current pace of improvement of relations 
with the U.S. 

July 16 

Brzezinski and party arrive in Beijing after a 
10-day tour of China's southwest provinces 
and are hosted by Vice Minister Zhang. 

July 29 

Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., is confirmed as U.S. 
Ambassador to China. 

August 10 

Nine American economists, led by D. Gale 
Johnson, arrive in Beijing to hold an eco- 
nomics development workshop for 80 Chinese 
economists. 

August 15-22 

Congressman Clarence Long (D.-Md.), chair- 
man of the Government Operations Subcom- 
mittee of the House Appropriations Commit- 
tee, and a congressional delegation visit 
China at the invitation of the Chinese 
People's Institute of Foreigfn Affairs. 

August 20 

Vice Premier Bo meets with the visiting 
House Ways and Means Committee delega- 
tion led by Sam M. Gibbons (D., Fla.). 

August 22 

Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Com- 
mittee, Mark Hatfield (R.-Ore.), leads delega- 
tion to Beijing at the invitation of the 
Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs. 
On August 24 Vice Premier Bo meets the 
delegation. 

August 23 

Vice President and Secretary of the World 
Bank Timothy T. Thahane arrives in Beijing. 
On August 26 he meets with Vice Premier 
Gu and Li Peng (Vice Minister of Finance). 

August 24-September 3 

Former President Jimmy Carter visits China, 
where he meets Premier Zhao, Vice Chair- 
man Deng, and Hu Yaobang (Chairman). The 
delegation tours Beijing, Xian, Suzhou, and 
Shanghai. 

August 26 

Xinhua commentary criticizes Congressman 
Clement Zablocki's (D.-Wis.) statement made 
at the end of his visit to Taiwan. Zablocki, 
chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Com- 
mittee, refers to Taiwan as the "Republic of 
China" and tells the press that the U.S. is 



willing to sell advanced weapons to Taiwan 
and would reach a decision early next yeai 
sale of F-X jet fighters. 

Senator John Glenn (D.-Ohio) arrives ir 
Hong Kong from China. At an airport newi 
conference on August 28, before departing 
for Taipei, he states that Sino-U.S. relatiot 
could retrogress if the issue of U.S. arms 
sales to Taiwan is not resolved to Beijing's 
satisfaction. t 

August 31-September 10 

Chief Justice of the United States Warren 
Burger visits China at the invitation of th« 
Ministry of Justice. On September 1 he mi 
with Jiang Hua (President, Supreme Peopi !ii 
Court) and on September 4 with Vice Chai n 
man Deng. 

September 1 

Zhong Xidong (Vice Foreign Minister) staik 
at a news conference that in order to reall 
peaceful reunification, the CCP does not n ip 
quire the Taiwan authorities to practice 
socialism. He states that China hopes onlj 
that the Taiwan authorities will practice f' at 
Yat-sen's revolutionary "Three Principles 
the People." f({il 

September-October 

An exhibition of American paintings fron" 
Boston Museum of Fine Arts opens at the i 
China Art Gallery in Beijing for 1 month, 
followed by another month in Shanghai. 
Minister in charge of the CCRFC Huang, 
Chief Justice Burger, and U.S. Internatic 
Communication Agency (USICA) Directo 
Charles Z. Wick open the exhibition. 

September 2 

A seven-member Bureau of Urban Const %m 
tion delegation, led by Qiu Zhongfang, ai 
in New York for a 3-week official visit hi 
by the U.S. National Park Service. 



ipti 



fiti 



September 3 

A delegation of the American Assn. of 
Railroads, led by association Vice Presid 
W.J. Harris, arrives in Beijing for a visi 
the invitation of the Ministry of Railway 
the China Railway Society. On Septemb 
the delegation meets with Vice Premier 

September 4 

USICA Director Wick and Jan Fontein, 
Director of the Boston Museum of Fine 
meet with Vice Chairman Deng. 



to 



(piti 



■ait 






ilia 



Kdir 



September 5 

A 1982-83 cultural exchange accord is s 
by Minister in charge of CCRFC Huang 
USICA Director Wick. The accord i.s thifiest 
ond since the signing of the cultural agr 
ment between the two countries in Idli 



September 7 

Choreographer Jerome Robbins and his 
of ballet dancers arrive in China for 3 v 
of official cultural performances and me 
classes in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guang ssl 



oftt 
imiaai 



Department of State Bu fc. 



"til a 



EAST ASIA 



A White House Fellows Assn. delegation, 
sd by Dana Mead, arrives in Beijing for a 
isit at the invitation of the Chinese People's 
nstitute of Foreign Affairs. 

The U.S. -China People's Friendship Assn. 
oncludes its eighth national convention in 
louston. 

eptember 9 

Lccording to Xinhua, former President 
larter says his trip to China has convinced 
im that China attaches great importance to 
;s friendship with the U.S. and that it is im- 
ortant that the Reagan Administration does 
ot harm those relations in dealing with 
'aiwan. Carter says the U.S. must be "very 
rudent, careful" on the issue of selling 
'eapons to Taiwan and insure that the 
eapons sold to Taiwan are of a defensive 
ature and "will not be used against the 
lainland." 

eptember 11 

. new 5-year $5 billion grain purchasing con- 
•act is signed in Chicago by 'Taiwan repre- 
entatives. 

leptember 16 

Pengfei (Vice Premier) meets with the 
isiting delegation from the U.S. National 
ssn. of Attorneys General. The delegation is 
d by John Ashcroft, President of the 
Bsociation and Attorney General of Missouri. 



eptember 17 

, i ice Premier and Minister of the State Scien- 
fic and Technological Commission Fang 
eets with a visiting group of U.S. nuclear 
;perts led by Assistant Secretary of State 
imes L. Malone. The delegation visits at the 
\ nation of the commission. 

1 eptember 24 
mbassador Hummel presents his credentials 
i Deng Yingchao (Vice Chairman, Standing 
onimittee of the NPC). 

,; eptember 28 

:;, or the first time, Chinese representatives 
,-f tend the IBRD/IMF annual meeting in 
i^ 'ashington. 

■t 
eptember 30 

ice Chairman Ye outlines a nine-point pro- 
)sal to bring about peaceful reunification 
ith Taiwan. He states that Taiwan could 
aintain its own armed forces and its own 
:onomy and local government and invites 
ip Koumintang leaders to take up positions 
the central government in Beijing. Ye's 
)eech represents China's most authoritative 
jblic statement on reunification to date. 

ctober 1 

he first Eximbank loan to China is signed in 
'ashington. 

ctober 3 

aiwan spokesman Sung Chu-yu says Ye's 
J eaceful reunification proposal is a continua- 
on of the Communists' united-front prop- 
i;anda and contains nothing new. He 



iiMCtober1982 



specifically derides Beijing's offer of economic 
assistance to Taiwan. On October 3 Sung's 
dismissal of the Chinese offer is broadcast to 
the China mainland from Matsu. 

The General Administration of Civil Avia- 
tion of China announces that it is already to 
negotiate at any time with the aviation 
departments on Taiwan to establish air 
transport between the mainland and Taiwan. 

The Washington, D.C., chapter of the 
U.S. -China People's Friendship Assn. and the 
National Assn. of Chinese Americans hold a 
joint gathering to celebrate the 32d anniver- 
sary of the founding of the P.R.C. Am- 
bassador Chai attends. 

October 7 

Taipei's central news agency reports Presi- 
dent Chiang stated Taiwan will never "nego- 
tiate" with the Chinese Communists. 

October 8 

Harold Brown, former U.S. Secretary of 
Defense, and his party arrive in China at the 
invitation of the Beijing Institute for Interna- 
tional Strategic Studies. 

October 9 

Brown's delegation meets with Deputy Chief 
of the PLA General Staff Liu, Wu Xiuquan 
(director of the institute), and Vice Premier 
and Defense Minister Geng. 

For the first time, China celebrates the 
October 10 anniversary of the 1911 revolu- 
tion, traditionally celebrated by Taiwan as its 
National Day. Chairman Hu delivers a speech 
praising Sun Yat-sen and others for contribu- 
tions to the revolution and invites President 
Chiang and other leaders on Taiwan to visit 
the mainland. 

October 12 

Xinhua criticizes national security adviser 
Allen's remarks on Taiwan reunification with 
the mainland. Allen had stated that the level 
of the U.S. relationship with Taiwan would 
continue to be governed by the Taiwan Rela- 
tions Act until some permanent solution is 
found. 

October 14 

A 10-member delegation of PLA and medical 
officers, led by Zhang Xiang (Director, Public 
Health Department of the General Logistics 
Department), leaves Beijing for the U.S. at 
the invitation of the Department of Defense. 

October 15 

China Film Week opens at the American 
Film Institute in Washington, D.C., begin- 
ning a seven-city tour. Cheng Yin (President, 
Beijing Film Institute) leads delegation to at- 
tend opening and meets with American 
cinema counterparts. 

October 15-17 

The second meeting of the U.S.-P.R.C. Joint 
Commission on Scientific and Technological 
Cooperation is held in Washington. Vice 
Premier and Minister of the State Scientific 
and Technological Commission Fang and Dr. 



George Keyworth, science adviser to the 
President, cochair the meeting. Three addi- 
tional protocols to the U.S.-P.R.C. Agree- 
ment on Cooperation in Science and 
Technology are signed. 

October 16 

Education delegation from China, sponsored 
by USICA, visits U.S. and agrees on imple- 
mentation of educational exchange accords of 
the science and technology agreement. 

October 16-18 

Secretary of Agriculture John Block visits 
China at the invitation of the Ministry of 
Agriculture. He meets with Lin Hijia 
(Minister of Agriculture), Wan Li (Vice 
Premier), and Minister of Light Industry 
Song. 

October 18 

Pu Tongxiu (Vice Minister of Education) 
begins a 2-week tour to visit American 
universities and educational organizations 
following the meeting of the Joint Commis- 
sion on Scientific and Technological Coopera- 
tion. 

Former Defense Secretary Brown meets 
with Vice Chairman Deng. 

October 19 

Vice Premier Yao meets with a delegation 
from the U.S. Allied Bank International, led 
by the president of the bank. The delegation 
came at the invitation of the Bank of China. 

October 20 

Boston Museum of Fine Arts exhibition of 
American paintings opens in Shanghai for a 
1 -month showing. 

October 21 

At Cancun, Mexico, Premier Zhao and Presi- 
dent Reagan meet for lunch. Secretaries Haig 
and Regan and Vice Premier and Foreign 
Minister Huang also attend. 

Eleven-member provincial higher educa- 
tional delegation, led by Lin Chuan (Director, 
Guangdong Province's Bureau of Higher 
Education), arrives for a 3V2-week visit 
hosted by the American Assn. of State Col- 
leges and Universities (AASCU). This visit 
reciprocates the 3V2-week visit to China by 
AASCU President Allan Ostar and his 
delegation of American educators. An educa- 
tional exchange agreement is signed between 
the AASCU and the Ministry of Education. 

October 22-23 

Premier Zhao attends the international 
meeting on cooperation and development held 
in Cancun, Mexico. 

October 23 

The Chinese delegation to the second meeting 
of the Joint Commission on Scientific and 
Technological Cooperation returns to Beijing 
after stops in Los Angeles and San Fran- 
cisco. 



25 



EAST ASIA 



October 23-31 

A nuclear technologj' exhibit, sponsored by 
the American Nuclear Society, opens in Bei- 
jing. On October 27 the president of the soci- 
ety, Corwin L. Richard, expresses satisfac- 
tion with the Chinese response to the exhibi- 
tion. 

October 28-31 

Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Huang 
visits Washington, D.C., at the invitation of 
Secretary Haig. He meets with President 
Reagan. Vice President Bush, Treasury 
Secretary Regan, and holds two rounds of 
meetings with Haig, who describes these 
discussions as an extension of the Cancun 
talks. 

October 28-November 12 

An 11 -member delegation of the national 
committee of the Communist Party Central 
Committee (CPCC) visits the U.S. at the in- 
vitation of the National Committee for 
U.S.-China relations. The delegation is led by 
Wang Shoudao (Vice Chairman, CPCC na- 
tional committee) and Ping Jiesan (Standing 
Committee member of the national commit- 
tee). The delegation visits San Francisco, 
Minneapolis, Washington, New York, and 
meets with Vice President Bush. 

November 2 

Taiwan National Assembly members send 
cables to President Reagan, senators, and 
congressmen urging the U.S. not to sell arms 
to the P.R.C. The assemblymen point out 
that the P.R.C. has never given up its ambi- 
tion to "liberate" Taiwan by force. 

November 2-6 

A symposium sponsored by the Office of 
Earthquake Resistance under the State 
Capital Construction Commission of China 
and the U.S. National Science Foundation is 
held in Beijing. (A Sino-American protocol for 
scientific and technical cooperation in earth- 
quake studies was signed last January.) 

November 10 

Xinhua reports that a New York Times arti- 
cle says that the U.S. was close to approving 
the sale of advanced fighter planes to Taiwan 
and that a recent Wall Street Journal article 
urges the Administration to sell arms quickly 
to Taiwan. The Chinese notes that the dispo- 
sition of this issue would show whether the 
U.S. Government respects the sovereign 
rights of China or any other state. 

U.S. Under Secretary of Sute Walter J. 
Stoessel, Jr., and party arrive in Beijing. 

November 11 

Under Secretary Stoessel meets with Vice 
Minister of Foreign^ Affairs Zhang. 



November 12 

Under Secretary Stoessel meets with Vice 
Premier and Foreign Minister Huang. 

A Xinhua article quotes Stoessel as say- 
ing that he and Chinese officials "have found 
in general a remarkable compatibility of 
views" on issues of mutual interest in the 
talks held in the past 2 days. The talks cover 
all of the major areas in the world including 
Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Central 
America, and Southeast Asia. U.S. arms sales 
to Taiwan "was only touched in passing." 

November 14 

Xinhua article criticizes the Governor of 
Georgia for designating November 12 as the 
"day of the Republic of China." The 
governor's proclamation refers to Taiwan as 
"free China" and the "Republic of China." 

November 15 

The China-U.S. metallurgical conference 
opens in Beijing. The U.S. delegation consists 
of a team of 40 experts. Zhou Peiyuan 
(member of the presidium of the Chinese 
Academy of Science) attends the opening 
ceremony. 

November 16 

Vice Premier Yu meets with a delegation 
from the U.S. Committee on Scholarly Com- 
munication with the P.R.C, led by its chair- 
man, Charles Townsend. Professor Townsend 
visits China to discuss bilateral academic ex- 
changes. 

November 16-19 

Treasury Secretary Regan visits China to 
cochair the 3-day second annual meeting of 
the Joint Economic Committee with Vice 
Premier Bo. He also meets with Wang 
Binggian (Minister of Finance) and discusses 
expansion of Sino-U.S. economic relations 
with Vice Chairman Deng and Premier Zhao. 

November 18 

Colorado Lt. Governor Nancy Dick and Vice 
Minister of the CCRFC Yao preside at the 
opening ceremony of the Denver Driscol 
Gallery exhibition of western art at the Bei- 
jing exhibition center. 

Secretary Regan and Finance Minister 
Wang sign an agreement providing reciprocal 
exception from taxation of shipping earnings. 



November 19 

A 2-month exhibition, combining works from 
the Museum of the American Indian and the 
Auschutz Collection of U.S. western art, 
opens at the Chinese History Museum in Bei- 
jing. Mrs. Joan Mondale, Vice Minister Yao, 
and Roland Force, curator of the Museum of 
American History in New York, preside at 
the opening. 

November 21 

A delegation of executives of educational 
foundations, led by the dean of UCLA's 
Graduate School of Education John Goodlad, 
arrives in Beijing for a visit hosted by the 
Ministry of Education. 

November 22 

Former Vice President Walter Mondale visit 
China and meets with Vice Chairman Deng. 

November 23 

International tax counsel Alan W. Granwell 
of the Treasury Department and Liu 
Zhicheng (Director, China's General Taxatiof 
Bureau) initial a treaty concerning the mutu; 
exception from taxation of airline and ship- 
ping income. 

November 27 

Wang Tiao (Taiwan military spokesman) say 
that the Chinese Communists' united front 
peace overture is another form of war de- 
signed to split the solidarity of Taiwan and 
soften the people's opposition to communisn*!! 

Ik 

December 10 

U.S.-China Education Clearinghouse release-|ui, 
publication on P.R.C. Institutional Profiks, 
adding to other publications released earliei 
this year entitled China Bound, Assisting 
Students and Scholars from the P.R.C, and 
American Study Programs in China. 



December 11-12 

American standardized examinations— the 
TOEFL and the GRE — are administered in 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou to both ( 
ficially sponsored and privately sponsored 
Chinese students and scholars. 

December 16 

Coca-Cola bottling plant opens in Guangzhc 

December 22 

('hinese Consulate General opens in New 
York. ■ 



k 



M 



26 



Department of State Bullet 



If pi 
hi 

k 



EAST ASIA 



U.S. Consultations With ASEAN 



Deputy Secretary of State Walter J. 
Stix'fisel, Jr., represented the United 
Stiites at the postministerial consulta- 
tions of the Association of South East 
.4 .<((!« Nations (ASEAN) in Singapore 
mJune 17-18, 1982. Following are his 
rremarks before that session on June 18. 

Il most appreciate this opportunity to 
Imeet with the Foreign Ministers of the 
Association of South East Asian Nations 
ASEAN). My government places great 
importance on your organization and on 
3ur relations with each of its individual 
members. 



Dynamic, Well-Tended Societies 

The front pages of newspapers these 
Says may lead some to believe that the 
Jnited States is so busy fighting brush 
"ires and larger conflagrations around 
he world that it does not place value on 
ts longstanding relations in noncrisis 
ireas. As a brush fire fighter for the 
ieagan Administration, I wish to dis- 
agree. Not far from us here today are 
irt'as with dangerously low flashpoints. 
lu'se concern us all very deeply, and I 
v'ill say more about them later. But I 
vant first to pay tribute to the dynamic, 
veli-tended societies of ASEAN. 

While we must deal with crises and 
hreats to protect our common interests 
.nd preserve peace in the world, we 
nust also sustain and strengthen these 
elationships which are not necessarily 
ried by daily crisis. As Prime Minister 
^ee Kuan Yew [Singapore] so eloquently 
lointed out, ASEAN is an exception in 
he Third World by reason of its success 
n(i its stability. 

The emphasis that ASEAN has 
ijaced since its inception on cooperation 
or economic and social development has 
mproved not only your peoples' stand- 
.rds of living but also their security. To- 
.ay we find ASEAN growth rates to be 
mong the highest and longest sustained 
a the world. Clearly you have a great 
ieal to be proud of — and to protect. 

^he Rewards of a Cooperative, 
Competitive System 

Ve place value not just on economic 
:rowth rates themselves, of course, but 
Iso on the system from which they 
pring. Foreign Minister Ghazali 
Malaysia] has well-focused our thoughts 



on the central importance of the private 
enterprise system characteristic of your 
societies and mine. Indeed, there is one 
remarkable factor about the phenomenal 
economic growth we witnessed earlier in 
Northeast Asia and are seeing today in 
Southeast Asia. Each successful country 
has competed within the world market 
in its own way without sacrificing the 
key values that comprise national identi- 
ty. Competition has been within the con- 
text of cooperation between like-minded 
states. The system which provides these 
mutual benefits has thus been main- 
tained. 

My words describing your ac- 
complishments reflect some of the basic 
values which underlie all Americans' 
thinking and which have been given par- 
ticular emphasis by the Reagan Ad- 
ministration. Primary among these is 
the belief that both social and economic 
progress depends in great part on giving 
free rein to local initiative. We believe 
this is a system which is on the one hand 
competitive, and thus efficient, and on 
the other cooperative, and thus con- 
structive. 

The success of our Asian — and par- 
ticularly ASEAN— friends reinforces 
this belief. Nowhere has the effec- 
tiveness of local initiative been more 
salient than in the ASEAN countries' in- 
dividual records of raising their popula- 
tions' standard of living and, more 
recently, in their cooperative endeavor 
to focus the world's attention on a 
peaceful solution for Kampuchea. 

Threats of Our Cooperative 
Economic System 

My government recognizes that threats 
to which I have labeled our cooperative, 
competitive system can come from 
within, that imbalances can lead nations 
to withdraw from both competition and 
cooperation. 

The current world slump highlights 
the exposed situation of those lesser 
developed countries overly dependent on 
the export of commodities with volatile 
prices. It increases the temptation to 
enter into cartels in situations where 
such measures are certain to be self- 
defeating. It dramatizes the need to 
make room for the exports of those 
countries newly moving into industrial 
production. It accentuates the harmful 
aspect of long-term trade imbalances 



between developed countries. In par- 
ticular, I would note that we, too, are 
very concerned by the growing tendency 
toward protectionism. 

We fully realize the degree to which 
the massive U.S. economy affects the 
world environment. In good part for this 
reason, the Reagan Administration has 
placed top priority on getting its 
domestic economy into order. In so do- 
ing, we have eschewed controls in favor 
of incentives for local initiative and com- 
petition. At a time when pressures for 
increased protectionism have escalated 
in most countries, leaders of the world's 
major economic powers in their just con- 
cluded Versailles summit firmly commit- 
ted their nations to keep the system 
open. We look forward to the GATT 
[General Agreement on Tariffs and 



Access to bases in Viet- 
nam has extended the 
Soviet military reach, 
which could now 
challenge sea passage 
between the Pacific and 
Indian Oceans. 



Trade] ministerial in the fall, where our 
goal is to extend the multilateral system 
for a still freer flow of trade, services, 
investment, and technology — all matters 
of importance to your countries as well 
as ours. We look to these and other ac- 
tions in the coming months to bring a 
turn-around in world economic pros- 
pects. 

My government is seeking means of 
strengthening our trade relationship 
with ASEAN, which, as a group, is 
already our fifth largest partner. This 
was, of course, a focus of our dialogue 
with ASEAN in Washington last March 
when I was pleased to be able to meet 
and talk with your delegations. We wish 
to work out the differences which 
naturally arise from our role as a major 
consumer of commodities, of which some 
of the ASEAN countries are principal 
producers. 



October 1982 

iL 



27 



EAST ASIA 



Competition With the Other World 

Although free market economies may 
now be going through one of the most 
difficult periods of the postwar era, the 
lead they have long held over Com- 
munist economies is growing even 
greater. Nowhere is this more evident 
than in Asia, where Vietnam's and 
North Korea's misdirected and misman- 
aged economies contrast starkly with 
the prosperity of their neighbors. The 
extraordinary difficulty of presenting 
these systems as a model for economic 
and social development in Asia has 
brought the export market for revolu- 
tion near to collapse. 

There is, nevertheless, more reason 
for concern than complacency. 
Totalitarian regimes have established a 
clear historical pattern of compensating 
for economic failure with military adven- 
turism. And the poor market for revolu- 
tion can well lead certain states to take 
more direct routes to their goals. 

The Soviet Union, in many respects, 
has deepened its confrontational cast. 
Military arms constitute its leading 
foreign exchange earner as well as, 
overwhelmingly, the largest component 
of its foreign assistance. Domestic 
growth of the Soviet military sectors has 
kept pace with arms exports. 

This has been particularly evident in 
Asia, where the Soviet Pacific fleet is 
characterized by greatly improved 
capabilities. Formidable Soviet land 
forces are backed up by over 3,000 air- 
craft. Access to bases in Vietnam has 
extended the Soviet military reach, 
which could now challenge sea passage 
between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. 
We are also deeply concerned by the ex- 
port of Soviet chemical warfare 
technology to Laos and Vietnam and the 
use of lethal chemical agents by those 
regimes against civilian populations. 

The United States remains dedicated 
to meeting the Soviet challenge. We will 
address our difficult problems of 
economic recovery — yet we will continue 
to accord our defenses high priority. Our 
policy, however, is not one of confronta- 
tion in purely military terms but of 
demonstrating to the Soviet Union the 
need for moderation and restraint in the 
international arena. 

Mutual reduction of nuclear arma- 
ments is one important route toward 
reduction of tensions. President Reagan 
and Secretary Haig are this week in 
New York at the U.N. Special Session 
on Disarmament to pursue this goal 



28 



which, we are convinced, is far prefer- 
able to unrestrained nuclear competition. 
We shall continue this endeavor while 
remaining militarily strong. 

Kampuchea and ASEAN's 
Contribution to Peace 

Vietnam's intransigence and ag- 
gressiveness remain one of our principal 
concerns and the major destabilizing ele- 
ment in the region. The aging Viet- 
namese leadership has shattered its own 
promises and its talented peoples' 
dreams of peaceful reconstruction. Their 
misallocation of resources for militaristic 
foreign adventures has badly hurt the 
Vietnamese economy. Persecution, cor- 
ruption, and despair still drive thousands 
of Vietnamese to seek refuge outside 
their homeland. Vietnamese policies and 
military forces deny the other peoples of 
Indochina the same independence and 
freedom which, according to Ho Chi 
Minh, the Vietnamese cherish for 
themselves. Their ambitions have 
aligned them with external powers, not 



The Vietnamese 
Government has said it 
accepts our position that 
[accounting for the U.S. 
servicemen missing-in- 
action] is a humani- 
tarian issue which is not 
linked to political and 
economic matters. 



their natural neighbors in ASEAN, and 
introduced Sino-Soviet rivalry to 
Southeast Asia. 

The United States has followed 
ASEAN's lead in seeking a comprehen- 
sive political solution to the Kampuchean 
problem which would result in a with- 
drawal of Vietnamese forces from Kam- 
puchea and Khmer self-determination. 
We will continue to support you strongly 
because we believe your approach is cor- 
rect and, over time, effective. We share 
your view that continued international 
pressure is required to induce Vietnam 
to negotiate a settlement based on the 
declaration of the international con- 



ference and repeated U.N. General 
Assembly resolutions. We share your 
support for efforts to the Khmer to 
form a coalition to facilitate realization 
of the conference's declaration. 

ASEAN has had many successes in 
carrying out its strategy on Kampuchea. 
The U.N. General Assembly resolution 
on Kampuchea last fall, the well- 
attended international conference on 
Kampuchea in New York, and the post- 
ponement of OPEC [Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries] and 
other multilateral assistance to Vietnam 
are excellent examples. You have been 
very effective in assembling interna- 
tional support for your position, par- 
ticularly from the nonaligned states. 

Neither you nor we wish to bleed or 
punish Vietnam. They have brought 
their suffering on themselves through 
their actions. Last year. Secretary of 
State Haig stated that Vietnam has a 
choice. We believe that choice remains 
available to that country. It can agree t( 
consider the rights of the Khmer people 
to live free from foreign domination anc 
to determine their own future. It can 
consider the just concerns of ASEAN 
and its other neighbors in the region. 
it can continue to bear the severe conse 
quences of its self-imposed diplomatic 
and economic isolation. We hope that 
Hanoi will eventually realize that its ow 
national interests would be served best 
by seeking a solution to the Kampuchea 
problem which meets the legitimate in- 
terests of all concerned countries. 

In any event, ASEAN can continue 
to count on full American support for 
ASEAN's strategy for dealing with the 
Kampuchea problem. As Foreign 
Minister Dhanabalan [Singapore] point* 
out, patience and perseverance in this 
effort are essential. 

Humanitarian Concerns 

Bilaterally with Vietnam, we will con- 
tinue to seek a complete accounting for 
the U.S. servicemen missing-in-action i 
Laos and Vietnam. President Reagan 
has a personal abiding interest in resol 
tion on this issue. 

The Vietnamese Government has 
said it accepts our position that this is 
humanitarian issue which is not linked 
political and economic matters. We can 
only hope that the Vietnamese will tat 
actions in accordance with this principl 
We would welcome assistance of the 
ASEAN nations by whatever means, 

The continued granting of first 
asylum to Indochinese refugees by 
neighboring countries is a humanitariai 



EAST ASIA 



response to tragedy which earns 
worldwide respect. The United States 
will share this heavy burden by continu- 
iiic its resettlement programs and, with 
the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), by urging other 
resettlement countries to do their fair 
share. 

The United States, as well as some 
other principal resettlement countries, 
seeks an enlargement of the orderly 
departure program so that potential 
refugees will not have to resort to 
dangerous clandestine flight. Some prog- 
ress has been made in this direction, and 
we want more. We also strongly support 
the UNHCR's efforts to establish 
agreements leading to voluntary 
repatriation of refugees. But until order- 
ly departure is a realistic option for 
potential refugees, and voluntary 
repatriation is a reasonable choice for 
actual refugees, first asylum clearly is 
needed. 

In the same way, the United States 
will continue to support humanitarian 
relief to the Khmer people. We are con- 
fvinced that current emergency needs in 
the interior of Kampuchea are being 
met. Requirements for those people in 
the border areas persist, however. We 
Lir^re other donors to contribute on a 
timely basis to meet this need. 

Conclusion 

The emergence of common purpose from 
common geography is not, as we are all 
aware, a common occurrence. The unity 
ASEAN has achieved is all the more im- 
pressive when one considers your very 
different histories and the legacy of 
itf misunderstanding and quarrels left from 
earlier eras. 

You have demonstrated the power 
pf constructive local initiative, which we 
Ibelieve to be the key to peace as well as 
■economic and social development. For 
this reason, we do not push forward our 
own solutions to the regional issues we 
face together. This is not, I would em- 
phasize, a sign of indifference or 
!'^ neglect. It is a testimony of our trust 
and respect as well as our recognition 
that ASEAN, with its unique consensus 
apiiroach, has forged a leadership role in 
the region. Through meetings such as 
.' these and other increased contact, we 
'<' will be following closely your plans and 
; :• sharing our own with you. We will strive 
to insure that the efforts of the United 
States and of ASEAN are mutually rein- 
forcing. It is our hope that in difficult 
times as in good, you will have no cause 
*'ito doubt our support. ■ 



Dctober1982 



U.S. Dialogue with ASEAN and ANZUS 



by John H. Holdridge 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
July 15, 1982. Ambassador Holdridge is 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs.'^ 

On the eve of my departure for Asia 
with Deputy Secretary of State [Walter 
J., Jr.] Stoessel June 9, I appeared 
before this subcommittee to review the 
Administration's policy toward South- 
east Asia. As promised at that time, I 
am reporting to you today on the results 
of the Deputy Secretary's attendance at 
the ASEAN [Association of South East 
Asian Nations] post-ministerial consulta- 
tions in Singapore, June 17-18, and at 
the ANZUS Council in Canberra, June 
21-22. Our participation in these two 
conferences significantly furthered the 
objectives of U.S. policy in Southeast 
Asia and the South Pacific. The Deputy 
Secretary also met in Manila with Presi- 
dent [Ferdinand E.] Marcos, in 
Singapore with Prime Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew, in Canberra with Prime 
Minister Malcolm Eraser, and in Well- 
ington with Prime Minister [Robert D.] 
Muldoon. 

Taken together, these detailed 
multilateral and bilateral consultations 
were timely and extremely useful. They 
served to highlight the importance which 
the Administration attaches to the U.S. 
relationship with our friends and allies 
in two strategically vital regions of Asia. 
During this period, there also occurred 
an event of major political significance 
regarding Kampuchea: the announce- 
ment of the agreement for a coalition of 
the three Khmer resistance groups, 
together with the meeting in Kuala 
Lumpur of their leaders. 



ASEAN POST-MINISTERIAL 
CONSULTATIONS 

Following the practice which has become 
standard, the five ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers, after their private delibera- 
tions, met with the Foreign Ministers of 
ASEAN's six "dialogue partners"— the 
United States, Japan, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, and the Euro- 
pean Community (EC)— for 2 days of in- 
tensive discussions. These took place in 
the plenary "Five-Plus-Six" session, 
where all were present; in the "Five- 



Plus-One" session, where the ASEAN 
Ministers met with individual dialogue 
counterparts; and in various bilateral 
meetings. Deputy Secretary Stoessel 
had the opportunity to meet bilaterally 
with all the ASEAN delegations, with 
the Foreign Minister of Japan, and with 
EC representatives, including Belgian 
Foreign Minister [Leo] Tindemans. We 
established beforehand several U.S. ob- 
jectives for these consultations at 
ASEAN. 

U.S. Objectives 

First, we sought to emphasize that the 
United States sees ASEAN as the cen- 
tral element in our policies in Southeast 
Asia and to dispel any impression that 
U.S. interest in the region had lessened 
because of preoccupations with pressing 
crises elsewhere. Second, we wanted to 
reiterate U.S. support for ASEAN's 
strategy for finding a political solution 
to the Kampuchea problem. Finally, we 
wanted to address and discuss frankly a 
number of specific ASEAN concerns. 
Although these were mainly in the 
economic area, we knew that Law of the 
Sea, Indochinese refugees, and the U.S. 
bilateral relationship with China would 
also be important issues to our hosts. 

U.S.-ASEAN Relationship 

In his remarks at the Five-Plus-One 
meeting, Deputy Secretary Stoessel 
underscored U.S. support for ASEAN 
and our trust in and respect for 
ASEAN's regional leadership role. Here, 
our firm backing of ASEAN's Kam- 
puchea strategy, including maintaining 
economic and political pressure on Viet- 
nam to negotiate a peaceful solution, 
received special emphasis. The Deputy 
Secretary pledged to continue mutually 
reinforcing U.S.-ASEAN efforts on a 
broad range of endeavors. He expressed 
confidence that, in difficult times as in 
good, ASEAN will have no cause to 
doubt U.S. support. In our judgment, 
the ASEAN nations were reassured in 
Singapore concerning U.S. reliability, 
our determination to take their interests 
fully into account, and the emphasis we 
give our ASEAN relationship. 



29 



EAST ASIA 



Kampuchean Issue 

Without exception, the ASEAN 
representatives made clear their firm 
agreement that their goals regarding 
Kampuchea were total withdrawal of 
Vietnamese troops and a neutral, in- 
dependent Kampuchea. They stressed 
their goal of a political settlement of the 
problem. They reaffirmed their commit- 
ment to the Declaration of the Interna- 
tional Conference on Kampuchea as both 
the instrument and framework for 
ASEAN's policy objectives. 

Deputy Secretary Stoessel declared 
that ASEAN was the keystone of U.S. 
policy toward Kampuchea and Indo- 
china. We fully support ASEAN's 
strategy and respect its leadership role 
in the region. We would continue to 
work closely with ASEAN on regional 
issues. 

We share ASEAN's goals as 
elaborated in the Declaration and work 
with ASEAN to realize the objectives of 
total Vietnamese withdrawal and a 
neutral, independent Kampuchea. We 
also strongly favor a comprehensive 
political settlement. In both the public 
and private sessions, the ASEAN 
Ministers expressed clear appreciation 
for the firm political support from the 
United States on the Kampuchean issue. 

Prior to the conference, there had 
been indications that the three Khmer 
resistance factions — the KPNLF [Kam- 
puchea People's National Liberation 
Front] under Son Sann, Prince 
Sihanouk, and the Khmer Rouge — were 
near agreement on terms for a coalition 
to work for an end to the Vietnamese 
occupation and the restoration of Khmer 
self-determination. The success by the 
Khmer leaders in joining a coalition was 
hailed by ASEAN governments at the 
joint press conference June 20. Actual 
formation of the Coalition Government 
of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) was 
expected to take place subsequently in- 
side Kampuchea. This occurred July 9. 

Deputy Secretary Stoessel welcomed 
agreement on a coalition. He reiterated 
that the United States would continue to 
provide political and moral support for 
the non-Communist Khmer resistance 
and promised to consult closely with 
ASEAN on how we could be of further 
help. The Deputy Secretary stated that, 
in any event, the United States would 
provide no military assistance. He em- 
phatically ruled out aid to, or contact 
with, the Khmer Rouge. 

International reaction to the coali- 
tion has generally been positive. The 
EC, Japan, and Canada are among those 



nations which have warmly welcomed 
the coalition agreement. 

While not involved in the process or 
negotiations for the coalition, we have 
welcomed the Khmer coalition as a step 
toward a peaceful political settlement in 
Kampuchea as envisioned in the Declara- 
tion on Kampuchea. 

Following the ASEAN post-minis- 
terials, Hanoi surfaced a revamped pro- 
posal which offered a unilateral 
withdrawal of an unspecified number of 
its troops from Kampuchea, called for 
the Thais to disarm the Khmer 
resistance, and renewed Hanoi's call for 
a conference on Southeast Asia with ex- 
panded participation including the 
United States and the U.N. Secretary 
General, in his private capacity. 

Despite the new packaging, the pro- 
posal incorporates Hanoi's standard posi- 
tions. Evidently, Hanoi's economic 
deterioration and political isolation, com- 
pounded by the formation of the coali- 
tion, led Hanoi to refurbish its pro- 
posals. The proposals, however, fail to 
deal with the core issues — Vietnamese 
military occupation of Kampuchea and 
the denial of Khmer self-determination 
as called for in the Declaration on Kam- 
puchea, which we continue to support 
fully. 

Indochinese Refugees 

All five ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
sought continued international support 
on the refugee problem and emphasized 
that the granting of first asylum 
depends on the commitment of resettle- 
ment in third countries and the 
avoidance of a residual refugee prob- 
lem — those persons not resettled under 
any of the national or international pro- 
grams. The Foreign Ministers were con- 
vinced that the boat refugee problem 
needs to be tackled at its source and 
urged Vietnam, the U.N. High Commis- 
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and re- 
settlement countries to strive for an ef- 
fective implementation of the orderly 
departure program. 

On Khmer refugees, the Foreign 
Ministers reiterated their support for a 
safe, voluntary repatriation program 
while urging the international communi- 
ty to help resettle those Khmer who are 
unable to return to their country. They 
noted, with appreciation, that contribu- 
tions by donor countries to the U.N. 
Kampuchean Emergency Relief Pro- 
gram have saved millions of Kam- 
pucheans from famine and disease. 

The Deputy Secretary said we would 
continue to do our part to ease the 



burden on the first asylum countries and 
urged others to contribute as well. We 
are also continuing our efforts through 
UNHCR for a fuller utilization of the 
orderly departure program. 

In his press conference, Deputy 
Secretary Stoessel also addressed the 
reported remarks of Vietnamese 
Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, say- 
ing that Vietnam would release all in- 
mates in reeducation camps if the 
United States and others would accept 
them. Ambassador Stoessel stressed 
that we would consider all those who 
qualify under the orderly departure pro- 
gram, currently targeted at 1,000 per 
month. 

We are seeking clarification of 
Minister Thach's remarks through the 
UNHCR. Should the proposed UNHCR- 
Vietnam discussions concerning the 
possible consideration of some reeduca- 
tion camp inmates for the orderly depar 
ture program indicate a need for addi- 
tional refugee numbers for East Asia, 
we are hopeful that the Congress would 
view this need with understanding. 

Economic Issues 

Although Kampuchea tended to 
monopolize the spotlight in Singapore, 
economic matters, as we had an- 
ticipated, received more prominent bill- 
ing at the meetings and in the media 
than in the past. The ASEAN nations 
have been hit by the world recession, 
and they find the markets for their key 
products and their growth and prosperi 
ty severely affected. At the "Five-Plus- 
One" session Philippine Foreign Ministe 
[Carlos P.] Romulo presented ASEAN's 
economic concerns. 

Romulo noted the "cloud of interna- 
tional economic gloom" — high interest 
rates, unemployment, protectionism, ar 
discrimination. He urged the United 
States not to succumb to protectionism 
citing U.S. textile and sugar quotas anc 
"signs of further restrictions." Romulo 
said ASEAN was worried about the 
future of the U.S. program of general- 
ized system of preferences (GSP). He 
protested the restrictions found in our 
GSP and the uncertainty of product-by- 
product graduation. Romulo echoed 
statements by others which stressed 
standard concerns about commodities, 
especially GSA [General Services Ad- ^ 
ministration] tin sales, and U.S. cuts in 
appropriations for international lending 
agencies. Romulo said some progress 
has been made on economic matters vii^Fii 
the U.S. -ASEAN dialogue but added 
that ASEAN would like to strengthen 
this dialogue. 



Ba 



Department of State Bulletin*'*! 



Throughout the meetings, there was 
ecurring concern about the effects of 
he recession in the United States and 
ilsewhere and its imphcations for 
\SEAN. Some delegates were disturbed 
It what they described as a trend in the 
Jnited States toward hardening or even 
■egression of views on international 
ommodity arrangements and the com- 
non fund. While some of the ASEAN 
ountries were encouraged by the strong 
J.S. stand on free trade, they also ex- 
)ressed skepticism about the industrial 
ountries' ability to improve the GATT 
General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade] system in the near term. 

In comments to the ASEAN nations, 
lur delegation acknowledged that we 
ealized the degree to which the massive 
J.S. economy affects the world environ- 
nent and that this is a major reason 
i'hy the present Administration has 
ilaced top priority on getting its 
omestic economy in order. We stressed 
hat in doing so, the United States has 
schewed controls and resisted 
ressures for increased protectionism, 
'he United States also looks forward to 
lie GATT ministerial in the fall where 
ur goal is to foster a freer tlow of 
rade, investment, and technology, all 
latters of importance to the ASEAN 
Duntries as well as the United States. 
Ve also repeated our offer to hold 
Ipecial consultations on GSA tin disposal 
*ith the ASEAN tin-producing coun- 
"ies. 

The ASEAN countries did not take 
confrontational stance on these issues 
ut handled them in a spirit of in- 
rdependence and mutual cooperation, 
/e assured them that we will be atten- 
ve to their concerns, that we value our 
•ade relationships with ASEAN — our 
fth largest trading partner — and 
jcognize the need to oppose protec- 
onist trends. 

onclusion 

ur participation in the ASEAN post- 
linisterial consultations in Singapore 
'as highly successful. The content and 
BHor of the discussions confirmed the 
orrectness of our policy of making 
.SEAN the keystone of U.S. interests 
1 Southeast Asia. Our basic approach of 

;, upporting ASEAN was appreciated. 
'he delegation's public statements had a 
fositive effect. As planned, the Deputy 
lecretary's arrival statement, his speech 
1 the Five-Plus-One, his intervention in 

jj he Five-Plus-Six, the remarks in the 
sint press conference, and his departure 



press conference stressed the key role 
ASEAN occupies in our Asia policy. 
This theme was well represented in the 
Singapore media and other ASEAN 
capitals. Likewise, press reports and 
statements by ASEAN leaders at the 
close of the conference indicated an end 
to earlier concerns about a possible 
downgrading of U.S. involvement in the 
region. 

On some economic and trade mat- 
ters and Law of the Sea, it was ap- 
parent that the ASEAN nations have 
reservations about, if not clear opposi- 
tion to, a number of U.S. positions. Yet, 
the media reflected the ASEAN dele- 
gate's perceptions that we had listened 
seriously to ASEAN's views, that the 
Deputy Secretary would carry those 
views back to Washington, and that 
ASEAN's concerns would be carefully 
considered in future decisions affecting 
Asia. I am confident that as a result of 
this year's ASEAN post-ministerial 
dialogue, the ASEAN countries, as well 
as other dialogue partners, are 
reassured about ASEAN's importance 
and the high priority we give Southeast 
Asia and our relationship with the five 
ASEAN countries. 



ANZUS [AUSTRALIA, 
NEW ZEALAND, 
UNITED STATES PACT] 
COUNCIL MEETING 



Background on ANZUS 

Under the ANZUS security treaty, 
Australia and New Zealand cooperate on 
a wide range of defense and other mat- 
ters as fully and closely with the United 
States as any of America's other allies. 
Our ANZUS allies' highly trained and 
well-equipped armed forces make a vital 
contribution to the Western strateg^ic 
posture in the Pacific Indian Ocean 
regions. Australia and New Zealand par- 
ticipate in military exercises with the 
United States, seek to adopt mutually 
compatible defense equipment and doc- 
trines, exchange military personnel, and 
welcome port calls by all U.S. Navy 
ships. In addition, Australia and the 
United States jointly operate several 
electronic installations in Australia that 
are critical to the Western alliance, the 
defense of Australia, and the national 
defense of the United States. 

Within their own region, Australia 
and New Zealand make important 
security and economic contributions to 
the ASEAN nations and to the new 
countries of the Southwest Pacific which 



EAST ASIA 



complement American efforts and con- 
tribute substantially to stability in this 
region. Australia and New Zealand play 
particularly valuable roles in the five 
power defense arrangement — with 
Malaysia, Singapore, and the United 
Kingdom. Moreover, Australian 
economic assistance to South Pacific na- 
tions this year is about $300 million as 
compared with $4.2 million for the 
United States, while New Zealand's 
economic assistance is $53 million 
despite its small size and economic dif- 
ficulties. The level of economic 
assistance which our ANZUS allies are 
providing to the island countries of the 
Southwest Pacific is both generous and 
supportive of our shared interest in the 
stability of the region. 

Although it is directly related to 
ANZUS commitments, it is worth noting 
that Australia and New Zealand have 
contributed an air services unit to the 
Sinai multinational force and observers 
(MFO). In doing this, both the 
Australian and New Zealand Govern- 
ments overcame domestic political op- 
position in order to make a positive con- 
tribution to the peace process in the 
Middle East. 

Results of Council Meeting 

Deputy Secretary of State Stoessel met 
with Australian Foreign Minister 
Anthony Street and New Zealand 
Foreign Minister Warren Cooper in 
Canberra June 21-22, 1982, for the 31st 
ANZUS Council, which all sides agree 
was an unqualified success. The mood of 
the Council meeting was appropriate to 
a meeting of close allies who view world 
and regional issues in essentially the 
same way. Foreign Minister Street set 
the tone of the meeting by pointing to 
the success of the ANZUS alliance over 
30 years and noting its continued validi- 
ty and general acceptance. The useful 
and full discussions covering a wide 
spectrum of issues and the resulting 
communique reflect both the high 
degrees of congruence in the policies of 
the three ANZUS partners and the 
remarkable openness and vitality of 
ANZUS and the relationships between 
the three allies. 

The validity of the alliance was 
underscored by the willingness and abili- 
ty of the partners to grapple with the 
sensitive political issues of port access 
for nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed 
warships. The leaders of the opposition 
Australian Labor Party (ALP) have 
called into question continued port ac- 
cess for U.S. Navy ships, thus triggering 



ictober1982 



31 



EAST ASIA 



a heated public controversy on this issue 
on the eve of the Council. This was not a 
problem at the Council meetings, and 
the final communique stated une- 
quivocally that Australia and New 
Zealand "declared their continued will- 
ingness to accept visits to their ports by 
United States Naval vessels whether 
conventional or nuclear-powered." Im- 
mediately following the communique, 
William Hayden, leader of the ALP 
parliamentary opposition, made a 
dramatic reversal of his earlier opposi- 
tion to visits by nuclear-armed warships. 
His statement also made clear that the 
ALP supports ANZUS. Subsequently, 
the ALP party conference endorsed 
Hayden's position. 

The Council also addressed and 
reached agreement on broad interna- 
tional issues. Regarding the U.N. 
Special Session on Disarmament, 
members reaffirmed their commitment 
to the negotiation of effective, balanced, 
and verifiable measures of arms control, 
including reductions of the nuclear ar- 
maments. They welcomed the agreement 
between the United States and the 
Soviet Union on the opening of negotia- 
tions on strategic arms reductions. The 
Council members also were in complete 
agreement on the need for continuing ef- 
forts to inhibit the spread of nuclear 
weapons as well as for action by the in- 
ternational community toward the con- 
clusion of a verifiable and effective ban 
on chemical weapons. 

The South Pacific region received 
special attention, and the importance of 
a stable security environment to regional 
development was underscored. Similarly, 
the members reaffirmed their support 
for ASEAN and its efforts to strengthen 
peace and security in the region. 

Addressing the world economy, 
Council members specifically agreed on 
the need to strengthen their efforts to 
stop the slide toward protectionism, in- 
cluding agricultural protectionism, to 
support measures to dismantle protec- 
tionist barriers, and to strengthen and 
improve the multilateral trading system. 
They added that economic relations with 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
should be consistent with political and 
security interests. F'inally, they under- 
lined the importance of assisting the 
developing countries to overcome their 
difficulties and to participate fully in the 
Western economic system. 

Despite a difference of opinion on 
Law of the Sea— Australia and New 
Zealand want the United States to sign 
— the ANZUS Council meeting can be 
called an unqualified success. 



32 



During his visit to Canberra, Deputy 
Secretary Stoessel also met separately 
with Australian Prime Minister J. 
Malcolm Eraser and with ALP leader 
Hayden to discuss issues of mutual con- 



New Zealand Visit 

Following the ANZUS Council, Deputy 
Secretary Stoessel visited New Zealand 
June 23-25. He had an excellent and 
productive meeting with Prime Minister 
Robert Muldoon followed by a luncheon 
hosted by the Prime Minister, and a 
series of useful meetings with Foreign 
Minister Cooper, Attorney General Mc- 
Clay, and other senior New Zealand 
Government officials. During these 
meetings. New Zealand officials noted 
the importance of completing the 
ratification process on the four Pacific 
Island treaties currently pending before 
the Senate and expressed interest in 
discussions on a possible antitrust 
cooperation agreement. In addition, 
Deputy Secretary Stoessel also had a 
cordial meeting and valuable exchange 
of views with Wallace "Bill" Rowling, 
leader of the opposition Labor Party in 
New Zealand. 

Conclusion 

Finally, I would mention that I engaged 
in extensive consultations elsewhere in 
Southeast Asia immediately following 
the ASEAN and ANZUS meetings, 
visiting Jakarta, Bangkok, and Rangoon, 
for calls on ranking host government of- 
ficials. In Jakarta, I was received by 



Foreign Minister [Kusumaatmadja] 
Mochtar for an extremely useful discus- 
sion on a range of bilateral and regional 
issues, and also met with other cabinet 
officials of the Indonesian Government. 
In Thailand, I called on the King 
[Bhumibol Adulyadej], and then met 
with Prime Minister [Tinsulanonda] 
Prem and senior Thai military officials. I 
visited Chiang Mai for briefings on the 
Golden Triangle area from which comes 
a significant portion of heroin entering 
the international drug market. I also 
visited refugee camps in eastern 
Thailand for a firsthand look at this 
tragic problem which remains important 
in our relations with ASEAN, especially 
Thailand. In my talks with the Thai, I 
reiterated Deputy Secretary Stoessel's 
assurances given at the ASEAN 
meetings that the United States would, 
in cooperation with the international ef- 
fort, sustain a substantial resettlement 
program to permit a continued reductior 
of the heavy refugee burden on 
Thailand. The 2-day visit to Burma was 
my first as Assistant Secretary and pro- 
vided the opportunity for excellent talks 
with the Burmese Foreign Minister U 
Chit Hlaing and other high-ranking of- 
ficials of the Burmese Government, with 
particular emphasis on narcotics control 
our development assistance programs, 
and the quiet warming of U.S. -Burmese 
relations. 



SI 



SE 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the conimittee and wifl 
be available from tlie Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government F'rinting Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



U.S. Economic Relations 
With ASEAN 



by Anthony C. Albrecht 

Stafrmcrit hi'fnre thr Subrommittee 
on EitsI Asiini iitiil ['(iiil'ir Ai'i'inrs i>f the 
Senate Fiircign Rfhituitis ( '(uminttec on 
June 10, 1982. Mr. Albrecht is Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for EaM Asian and 
Pacific Affairs. ' 

I am pleased to be with you today to 
discuss our economic relations with 
Southeast Asia. Our ties with the 
Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) are increasing in imporUince 
as our economic interdependence with 
this dynamic region expands and 
demands priority attention. 



tn) 



itri 



«tsl 



Our contacts with the Biu-mese 
Government have expanded significantl 
since oiu- cooperative narcotics progran 
began in 1974. Agency for Internationa 
Development (AID) programs, beginnin.|»tp 
in 1980, have further expanded these 
contacts at the same time that Burma 
has been refusing lucrative approaches lis 
by the Soviet Union. Although we do n( 
expect a change in Burma's basic com 
mitment to neutrality, it is in our in- 
terest to encourage a continued, quiet 
Burmese opening toward the United 
States and the West. Brunei — a small 
oil-rich country on the north coast of 
Kalimantan (Borneo) — will become fullj|fctiiii 
independent next year and will probabb 



Department of State Bullet 



invited to join ASEAN at that time. 
^ith respect to Vietnam, the United 
bates has actively cooperated with the 
SEAN efforts to restrict multilateral 
3velopment aid so long as Vietnamese 
irces continue their occupation of Kam- 
achea. 

Since its establishment in Augnst 
)67, ASEAN — comprising Indonesia, 
alaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, 
id Thailand— has emerged as a grow- 
g economic and political force in 
jutheast Asia and on the world scene. 
SEAN's announced goals are to 
rengthen regional cohesion and self- 
iliance while promoting economic 
jvelopment. The organization 
veloped slowly during the first decade 

its existence due to the diverse 
ickground of its member states and the 
mpetitive nature of their economies, 
at it gained rapid momentum following 
e first summit conference of ASEAN 
iders in Bali in 1976. Since that time, 
! political cohesiveness has strength- 
led and regional cooperation activity 
eatly expanded. Our cooperation with 
SEAN on Kampuchea has become 
pecially important. 

Agriculture and the production of 
.sic commodities remain the principal 
lonomic activities in ASEAN, with the 
itable exception of the highly in- 
istrialized city state of Singapore. As a 
Bult, commodity market issues — such 

price stabilization and market 
owth — are of vital importance. Tin, 
.tural rubber, vegetable oils, tropical 
nber, and sugar are especially impor- 
nt. Our decision not to join the Sixth 
ternational Tin Agreement and GSA 
les of excess tin stocks have become 
pecially contentious issues over the 
,st year. 

The real annual GNP growth of 
Dre than 7% over the past decade has 
rned ASEAN a well deserved reputa- 
>n as one of the most promising 
owth areas in the developing world. 
le private sector has played a key role 

this economic dynamism. The ASEAN 
untries recognize that private enter- 
ise must be involved in the develop- 
ent process and that foreign invest- 
ent should play an important role. 
SEAN looks to the United States, as 
3ll as to other developed nations, for 
pport and cooperation in providing 
arket access, investment capital, and 
onomic assistance to help promote its 
lonomic development goals. 
i The ASEAN nations now must cope 
th lagging sales of export com- 
] Ddities, increasing costs in financing 
/estment, and slower growth in the 



members of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). ASEAN needs a prosperous 
and open U.S. market if it is to continue 
to grow — but we also need ASEAN for 
vital raw materials as a growing market 
for U.S. exports and as an attractive 
home for U.S. private investment. 

Importance of ASEAN 

The population of ASEAN is about 256 
million people — comparable to that of 
the United States and Canada combined. 
Estimated per capita GNP's range from 
$420 in Indonesia to $4,480 in 
Singapore. ASEAN's total GNP is near- 
ly $200 billion. It is rich in natural and 
human resources and occupies a key 
strategic position astride vital sea lanes. 

ASEAN countries are important 
suppliers of essential U.S. imports. For 
example, in 1980, 89% of our natural 
rubber, 65% of our tin, 6% of crude 
petroleum, 28% of our hardwood 
lumber, as well as 99% of our palm oil 
and 95% of our coconut imports came 
from ASEAN. Most of our tantalum/ 
niobium and much of our tungsten is im- 
ported, and the region is a vital supplier 
of these minerals. But ASEAN is not 
only a source of key resources needed by 
the United States to assure our security 
and prosperity; ASEAN is likewise an 
important and rapidly growing market 
for a wide range of U.S. machinery, 
chemicals, and foodstuffs. Thus, in 1981 
our exports reached nearly $9 billion, an 
increase of 30% since 1979. Total two- 
way U.S. trade with the ASEAN coun- 
tries was about $22 billion last year, 
making ASEAN our fifth most impor- 
tant trade partner. Total trade has more 
than doubled since 1977. The U.S. 
Export-Import Bank, with an exposure 
of over $2 billion, has fostered increased 
exports to ASEAN. 

The ASEAN countries appreciate 
that their economic advance requires 
close cooperation with and financial sup- 
port from foreign investors. We 
estimate that total U.S. investment in 
ASEAN, including the expenditures of 
U.S. oil companies in exploration and 
development in oil and gas production- 
sharing arrangements with Indonesia 
and Malaysia, now amounts to about $10 
billion. 

ASEAN-U.S. Business Council 

Because all of the ASEAN governments 
perceive a major role for business and 
strive to foster it, cooperation within 
ASEAN and with the international 



EAST ASIA 



business community has grown rapidly. 
The ASEAN Chambers of Commerce 
and Industry are playing an increasingly 
important role in ASEAN. The ASEAN- 
U.S. Business Council — which joins the 
business communities of the United 
States and ASEAN in the fostering of 
trade, investment, and cooperative proj- 
ects — has given a new and important 
dimension to our relationship with 
Southeast Asia. We look increasingly to 
the council to help promote closer ties 
with ASEAN and consider its activities 
to be an important complement to the 
official dialogue. Recognition of this role 
was emphasized by Secretary Haig in his 
address before the U.N. General 
Assembly last September when he 
pointed out that the "U.S.-ASEAN 
Business Council is a model of how our 
private sectors can work together for 
mutual benefit." 

We will continue to support and en- 
courage the Business Council. It carries 
out activities and programs which 
governments cannot do, especially in the 
fields of training and technology 
transfer. It also fosters direct contacts 
and cooperation between business people 
which results in increased trade and in- 
vestment and greater understanding. 

Since its establishment in July 1979, 
the council has undertaken various pro- 
grams which have increased the flow of 
information, people, and ideas between 
the United States and ASEAN. Among 
the more notable accomplishments were 
an ASEAN-U.S. seminar on science and 
technology for development held in 
Singapore in October 1980 and a 
seminar on ASEAN-U.S. automotive 
developments held in Detroit in June 
1981. Working groups on technology, 
education, and training to facilitate 
technology transfer between the United 
States and ASEAN have been formed, 
and a financial conference was held in 
Kuala Lumpur in November 1981. We 
look forward to the fall meeting of the 
ASEAN-U.S. Business Council which 
will bring about 100 of ASEAN's leading 
business figures to Washington. 

Consultations with ASEAN 

The United States has found that it 
works well with ASEAN and that we 
are able to cooperate to promote 
economic growth and to solve mutual 
problems because our approach to most 
basic economic issues is similar. At the 
June 1981 meeting of ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers, Secretary Haig stressed that 
U.S. policy toward ASEAN rests on 
three important commitments: to 



4 



;tober1982 



33 



EAST ASIA 



economic development and commerce 
for mutual benefit, to fruitful bilateral 
relations, and to a genuine dialogue be- 
tween equals on matters of common con- 
cern. Indeed, the term "dialogue" has 
been the name given to the special kind 
of relationship ASEAN carries on with 
its major world partners. Our economic 
dialogue with ASEAN is a continuous 
operation at all levels. Since 1977 the 
United States and representatives of the 
ASEAN nations have had four formal 
meetings at ministerial or subministerial 
level to discuss common concerns and to 
seek solutions to problems in the 
economic, social, and cultural spheres. 
Unlike many international conferences, 
our ASEAN dialogues have been char- 
acterized by straight talk and an honest 
attempt to deal with issues that trouble 
both sides. For example, at the March 
1982 dialogue in Washington, ASEAN 
representatives clearly and frankly told 
us of their serious concern over our 
GSA tin disposal policy and the new 
Caribbean Basin initiative. On tin, we 
were able to offer further consultations, 
and we are willing to discuss modifica- 
tion in GSA sales practices that may go 
some way to meet their concerns. On 
the Caribbean Basin initiative, we ex- 
plained U.S. goals carefully and tried to 
reassure them that their interests would 
not be neglected in the pursuit of our 
Caribbean efforts. 

That meeting also reviewed our 
cooperative regional development 
assistance program with ASEAN, as 
well as special educational / cultural ex- 
changes. We now cooperate to enhance 
regional institutions in areas of non- 
conventional energy, tropical medicine, 
plant quarantine, and agricultural 
development planning. We are looking 
at the possibility for technical, scientific, 
and administrative fields." In addition, 
ASEAN government representatives 
have tended to work together as a group 
to formulate common positions in the 
United Nations and other international 
fora on issues such as commodity policy, 
global negotiations, refugees, and Kam- 
puchea. Their ability to take common 



positions has been a source of enhanced 
strength and influence for the ASEAN 
nations. Though clearly associated with 
the so-called Third World group, the 
ASEAN countries have tended toward a 
moderate role on most North-South 
issues, a factor of great interest to us as 
we strive for their resolution. ASEAN 
has also operated as an effective unit 
and enhanced its bargaining power by 
establishing bilateral economic dialogues 
with third countries such as the United 
States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada, and with the EC. 

ASEAN's future seems bright. 
ASEAN's rich resource base and its 
proven economic vitality and success 
make it a leading candidate for strong 
economic growth in the next decade. 
While there are no major proposals for 
an economic union of the five, ASEAN 
economic ministers have agreed recently 
to study establishment of an ASEAN- 
wide free trade area. 

But regardless of what organiza- 
tional forms it takes and how 
cooperative efforts evolve in ASEAN, 
we feel confident that the ASEAN-U.S. 
economic relationship will continue to be 
one of increasing interdependence. 
There will be problems typical of new 
ways to cooperate such as in marine 
science and to promote small- and 
medium-scale industry. 

ASEAN Organization 

Because the nature of ASEAN as an 
organization may not be fully 
understood, I want to conclude with a 
brief view of how it operates and where 
we perceive ASEAN to be going. Most 
importantly ASEAN should be seen as a 
pragmatic, cooperative organization that 
is sui generis. It is not like the Euro- 
pean Community (EC), and its success 
should not be judged by criteria applied 
to the EC. It has a wide variety of 
cooperative economic and technical ac- 
tivities and joint industrial projects, and 
there are increasing efforts to lower 
trade barriers within ASEAN. ASEAN 
functions mainly through regular 



meetings of its foreign ministers and C 
economic and other ministers, through 
national secretariats in each of the 
foreign ministries, and through a series 
of technical intergovernmental commit- 
tees in areas such as food and 
agriculture; finance and banking; and in- 
dustry, minerals, and energy. There is a 
small ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta, 
but the governments have until now 
strictly limited its size and role. 

The ASEAN secretariat and most o; 
the committee structure is focused on 
the original nonpolitical goals of the 
organization as outlined in the ASEAN 
declaration of 1967 — fostering of col- 
laboration in "economic, social, cultural, 
any close relationship." In a period of 
slower world growth, there will be pro- 
tectionist pressures on both sides, whicl" 
must be resisted. However, in the light 
of our shared goals and our common in- 
terests in an open world economic 
system and our common approach 
toward peace and stability in Southeast 
Asia, it is in the U.S. interest to con- 
tinue to support the demonstrated in- 
dependence, self-reliance, and economic 
dynamism of ASEAN. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings- 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



mp 



34 



Department of State Bulletl 



ECONOMICS 



Economic Regulation and International 
Jurisdictional Conflict 



iy Davis R. Robinson 

Remarks to the Parker School of 
'foreign and Comparative Law, Colum- 
)ia University, New York, on June 30, 
'9S2. Dr. Davis is Legal Adviser of the 
Department of State. 

'. would like to speak on a subject that 
'.'we found to be of great importance dur- 
ng the past year as the Legal Adviser 
it the State Department: jurisdictional 
jonflict in the regulation of transna- 
■jonal economic activity. 

This issue has recently involved the 
lighest levels of our Government. On 
Fune 18, President Reagan decided that 
.he continuation of martial law and the 
fiuppression of human rights in Poland, 
I ind the continuing deep involvement of 
he Soviet Union in events there, re- 
[uired further U.S. economic sanctions 
Lgainst the Soviet Union. The sanctions 
mposed bear directly upon economic ac- 
ivity outside the United States. The 
^resident decided to extend existing 
J.S. controls on the export of oil and 
;'as production, transmission and refin- 
; ng equipment to the U.S.S.R. "to in- 
lude equipment produced by sub- 
idiaries of the U.S. companies abroad 
is well as equipment produced abroad 
mder licenses issued by U.S. 
ompanies." 

President Reagan's action was 
lirectly linked to the continuing Soviet 
nvolvement in and responsibility for 
vents in Poland. As his June 18 state- 
nent on the new U.S. sanctions ex- 
ilains: 

The objective of the United States in im- 
losing the sanctions has been and continues 
o be to advance reconciliation in Poland. 
Jince December 30, 1981, little has changed 
oncerning the situation in Poland; there has 
leen no movement that would enable us to 
indertake positive reciprocal measures. The 
lecision taken today will, we believe, advance 
lur objective of reconciUation in Poland. 

I do not want to say much more 
ibout the details of our recent extension 
)f U.S. oil and gas controls to foreign 
subsidiaries and licensees of U.S. 
;echnology. There is a great deal of cur- 
rent discussion and diplomatic activity 
concerning the new U.S. controls, and 
;he ensuing dust will not settle for quite 
iwhile. Rather, I would like to address. 



I 3ctober1982 



more generally, the broad range of areas 
where conflicting international claims to 
jurisdiction may be reconciled and a 
framework for seeking such reconcilia- 
tion. 

The problem of jurisdictional conflict 
between the United States and other 
countries is an unavoidable outgrowth of 
the nature and functioning of govern- 
mental systems. In order to advance its 
national interests, the United States 
regulates a broad range of economic ac- 
tivities through its statutes and regula- 
tions. Sometimes matters of broad na- 
tional importance are involved; 
sometimes more limited interests are at 
stake. 

Much of our regulation is confined in 
scope or effect to conduct on U.S. ter- 
ritory. Some, however, reach beyond our 
borders to affect persons or conduct out- 
side our territory. This "reaching 
beyond" frequently poses jurisdictional 
conflicts with other governments with 
competing claims or interests in the par- 
ticular activities involved. 

There is no single "conflicts of 
jurisdiction" problem. There are dif- 
ferent problems involving differing in- 
terests and facts. A variety of U.S. 
regulatory measures affects persons or 
transactions abroad. They are for- 
mulated and enforced by many different 
agencies. A listing of a few of our con- 
flicts of recent years demonstrates the 
breadth of this problem. 

Antiboycott Regulation 

Consider, first, the area of the anti- 
boycott regulation. Conflicts between 
the U.S. and the foreign governments 
often involve agencies' discretionary ap- 
plication of U.S. requirements to con- 
duct abroad. The reach of antiboycott 
regulation, however, is not a matter of 
substantial agency discretion. Section 8 
of the Export Administration Act of 
1979 specifically requires application to 
conduct abroad. That section bars U.S. 
persons engaged in interstate or foreign 
commerce from taking or knowingly 
agreeing to take any of a long list of 
specified actions "with intent to comply 
with, further or support any boycott 
fostered or imposed" by a foreign 
government against a country friendly 
to the United States. The act then 



defines "United States person" to em- 
brace foreign subsidiaries or affiliates 
which are found to be controlled, in fact, 
by domestic concerns. 

Congress judged that section 8 had 
to be extended to U.S. subsidiaries 
abroad in order to avoid evasion and 
frustration of the section's purposes. 
The application of section 8 to foreign 
subsidiaries, however, has been objec- 
tionable to some other governments, 
particularly the United Kingdom. The 
United Kingdom argues that subsidiaries 
incorporated in that country are U.K. 
persons, bound to follow only the law 
and policies of the United Kingdom. In 
the antiboycott area, the conscious and 
deliberate policy of the British Govern- 
ment is to leave decisions on compliance 
with foreign boycotts to the firms con- 
cerned. Hence, the United Kingdom 
argues, U.S. regulation of the boycott 
behavior of U.K. subsidiaries constitutes 
an unacceptable substitution by the 
United States of its own policy for 
British policy. 

Commerce Department Controls 

This dispute is not academic. Commerce 
Department enforcement actions involv- 
ing sanctions against a number of 
foreign subsidiaries have prompted 
vigorous protests from some of our 
allies. 

The Export Administration Act. 

The Export Administration Act also pro- 
vides broad authority to impose controls 
on exports for U.S. national security or 
foreign policy purposes or to meet prob- 
lems of domestic short supplies. Such 
controls have produced recurring con- 
flicts with foreign jurisdictions. The 
potential for conflict has increased since 
1977, when Congress amended the act 
to give the President the authority to 
control the export of goods or technical 
data "subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States or exported by any person 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States." 

Controls imposed under the Export 
Administration Act can have far- 
reaching effects on foreign economic ac- 
tivity involving transactions in 
U.S. -origin goods or technology. The 
Export Administration Regulations 
regulate re-exports — or sometimes even 
in-country transfers — of exported com- 
modities and technical data. Foreign 
consignees may be required to obtain 
authorization before re-exporting or 
transferring U.S. -origin commodities or 



35 



ECONOMICS 



data, or in some cases, products manu- 
factured using them. Under the act and 
regulations, failure to comply with such 
requirements may expose foreign per- 
sons to U.S. criminal penalties. 

Denial Order. In practice, the 
United States usually enforces its con- 
trols on foreign firms through Com- 
merce Department action denying vio- 
lators the right to receive future exports 
from the United States. Such "denial 
orders" promote compliance with U.S. 
requirements abroad for established 
firms which are dependent upon con- 
tinued access to U.S. goods and tech- 
nology. 

A denial order normally operates to 
deprive the foreign person subject to the 
order of access to U.S. goods from 
either the United States or foreign sup- 
pliers. For example, a September 1981 
Commerce Department denial order bar- 
ring further U.S. exports to UAA, a 
Libyan airline, also prohibited foreign 
persons from transferring any 
U.S. -origin goods or technology to UAA. 
These prohibitions covered U.S. goods, 
even if they had been exported from the 
United States before the denial order. 

Treasury Department Regulations 

Certain Treasury Department regula- 
tions raise many of these same issues. 
Treasury maintains a variety of blocking 
controls, prohibitions on trade, and 
restrictions on financial transactions 
with several countries and their na- 
tionals, including Cuba, North Korea, 
and Vietnam. These are "grandfathered" 
vestiges of the President's authority 
under section 5Cb) of the Trading with 
the Enemy Act. The International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act of 
1977 and the National Emergencies Act 
have continued the substance of the 
President's broad emergency economic 
powers under the Trading with the 
Enemy Act but place significant pro- 
cedural and substantive restrictions on 
new future uses of these powers. 

These controls all involve extensive 
U.S. regulation of conduct in foreign 
territory by persons the United States 
regards as subject to its jurisdiction. 
U.S. nationals in the United States and 
abroad are barred from trading with 
proscribed countries or with their na- 
tionals. The controls also extend to sub- 
sidiaries of U.S. firms abroad. The most 
noted recent use of the President's 
broad emergency powers was the 
November 1979 blocking of Iranian 
assets in U.S. banks and their overseas 



36 



branches and subsidiaries under the In- 
ternational Emergency Economic 
Powers Act. 

The U.S. Antitrust Law 

In the areas I've sketched so far, the 
U.S. actions have been conceived and 
applied to serve foreign policy or na- 
tional security ends. However, U.S. 
regulatory actions taken for essentially 
domestic purposes may also produce 
conflicts of jurisdiction. 

The most familiar and widely noted 
illustration of this is U.S. antitrust law. 
Most of the professional writing and 
public and intergovernmental discussion 
of international conflicts of jurisdiction 
has dealt with antitrust. 

The international conflicts regarding 
U.S. antitrust jurisdiction follow from 
the long course of U.S. judicial decisions 
holding that U.S. antitrust jurisdiction 
extends to conduct abroad having direct 
and substantial effects upon U.S. com- 
merce. The Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, the European Economic Com- 
munity, and other jurisdictions also 
make use of effects principles in defining 
their own antitrust jurisdiction. Indeed, 
some commentators have suggested that 
conflicts over "effects" jurisdiction may 
eventually disappear. For the foresee- 
able future, however, major U.S. trading 
partners, including the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and Australia, can be expected 
to have reservations with respect to the 
exercise of U.S. antitrust regulation on 
the basis of effects in the United States. 
Moreover, the possibility of private 
treble damage actions in the United 
States, which foreign officials often like 
to describe as "that rogue elephant," 
probably insures the continuation of 
jurisdictional conflicts in the antitrust 
area. 

Securities 

Another prominent example of essential- 
ly domestic regulation raising conflicts 
with foreign jurisdictions is in the 
securities field. For example, with 
respect to the enforcement activities of 
the Securities and Exchange Commis- 
sion, foreign bank secrecy legislation has 
impeded the Commission's ability to 
detect and correct insider trading or 
other abuses in U.S. markets. The prob- 
lems involved are illustrated in two 
widely noted recent insider trading 
cases, SEC v. Banco delki Srizzera 
haliana, referred to as the "St. Joe" 
case because it involves options in St. 
Joe Minerals Corporation, and SEC v. 
Certain Unknoum Purchasers, referred 



to as the Santa Fe case because it in- 
volves stock and options of the Santa Fe 
International Corporation. Both cases in- 
volve allegations that insiders used 
Swiss banks to effect purchases of stock 
and options in U.S. markets prior to the 
public announcement of takeover bids 
for these companies. 

Heretofore, the identities of prin- 
cipals in insider trading transactions 
often have been shielded by Swiss penal 
laws barring disclosure of confidential 
banking information. However, in St. 
Joe, the judge indicated his intention to 
order the Swiss bank to disclose its prin- 
cipals notwithstanding the possibility of 
sanctions under Swiss law. A client 
waiver was subsequently obtained, and 
the information sought was produced. In 
Santa Fe, the SEC believes that exten- 
sive insider trading was carried on 
through several Swiss banks and has 
sought disclosure of the bank's prin- 
cipals. 

Protecting the U.S. Commodity 
Market 

Measures to protect the integrity of U.S 
commodity markets have also posed 
jurisdictional conflicts. The Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission must seek 
information from foreign commodities 
traders about their principals in trans- 
actions on U.S. markets or other infor- 
mation necessary' for the commission to 
meet its regulatory responsibilities. Sue 
measures have resulted in conflict with 
other countries. Including particularly 
the United Kingdom, both because of 
the importance of British commodities 
markets and because of continuing U.K 
objections to U.S. activities affecting 
persons or transactions in the United 
Kingdom. Thus, a call by the commissio 
for information from a party in the 
United Kingdom triggered the first in- 
vocation of the 1980 British Protection 
of Trading Interests Act. 

Many other agencies and areas of 
regulation create similar conflicts of 
jurisdiction, but I think that this survey 
should give you an idea of the scope of 
the problem of conflicts of jurisdiction. 



jils 



iiiir 



ltd 



h 



Reactions of Foreign Governments 
to Claims 

Claims to regulatory jurisdiction by one 
country' may, of course, give rise to ob- 
jections from other countries. In this 
connection, it is important to recognize 
that exercises of jurisdiction do not 
always present legal issues in the 
abstract. Rather, foreign governments' 



Department of State Bulletli 



li 



«i 



ECONOMICS 



,jws of such actions will be affected by 
i factual and political context. Govern- 
»nts tend to be more receptive toward 
mtrols in situations in which common 
^itical objectives suggest that restraint 
gl tolerance would be appropriate. For 
sample, in the November 1979 blocking 
.Iranian assets, conflicts were mini- 
. :t'.i because of a shared concern for 
,;■ jilight of the American hostages in 
firan. 
In other contexts, the reactions of 
eign governments may be different, 
me countries, such as the United 
igdom, France, Canada, and Aus- 
lia, which have objected at one time 
another to broad assertions of U.S. 
isdiction, have enacted or are con- 
ering "blocking statutes." These vary 
Form, but all permit foreign govern- 
nts to block their nationals' or com- 
lies' compliance with foreign demands 
document production or other 
Tilatory measures. 
To date, the blocking statutes have, 
haps, involved more symbol than 
istance. The British Protection of 
iding Interests Act, enthusiastically 
icted by Parliament in 1980 as a 
ponse to perceived American ex- 
ses has, until today, only been in- 
;ed in the Commodity Futures 
iding Commission investigation 
viously mentioned. However, the 
ential for enactment or implementa- 
1 of blocking statutes stands as a 
("ning to U.S. regulators. Indeed, 
ne U.S. agencies have modified their 
( estigatory actions to avoid triggering 
If eign blocking action. Such self- 
t )osed limitations naturally help to 
I id international controversy, but they 
I y also be a complicating factor and, 
;ome cases, impair valid U.S. law en- 
;ement interests. 

.te Department's Approach 

- starting point is an analysis quite 
lilar to that being followed by many 
5. courts. U.S. courts have recognized 
need to take into account, in the ex- 
ise of jurisdiction, both the interests 
;he United States and the interests of 
er states concerned with a given 
nsaction. We have supported the 
'elopment of a "rule of reasonable- 
:s" in various fact situations involving 
eatening conflicts of jurisdiction. 
This approach was articulated in 
6 in the Ninth Circuit's decision in 
now famous Timberlane case. The 
urt there set out a range of factors to 
weighed in situations involving com- 
ing state interests. The substance of 



!ober 1982 



the Timberlane balancing approach was 
subsequently taken up by the Third Cir- 
cuit in the Mannington Mills case. 
Again, the Court set out a variety of il- 
lustrative factors to be considered in 
determining whether jurisdiction is prop- 
er. The balancing approach also has 
been adopted by the Tenth Circuit in the 
Amax case, a case dismissing an an- 
titrust claim on the basis of a balancing 
analysis. Most recently, the Fifth Cir- 
cuit, in the Mitsui case, noted and com- 
mended the Timberlane analysis. This 
balancing approach is likewise reflected 
in section 403 of the draft Restatement 
of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States, as revised under the auspices of 
the American Law Institute. 

This developing approach in given 
fact situations of weighing and balancing 
competing national interests in assessing 
a proposed exercise of jurisdiction is 
based on the recognition that a given 
transaction may be of legitimate interest 
to more than one state. The factors to 
be considered include: 

• The links, such as nationality, 
residence, or economic activity between 
the regulating state and the persons 
principally responsible for the activity to 
be regulated; 

• The importance of regulation to 
the regulating state; 

• The extent of other states' in- 
terest in regulating the activity; and 

• The existence of potential or ac- 
tual conflict with regulation by other 
states. 

The State Department has sought to 
use this kind of approach in its own 
legal analyses and in our work with 
other agencies on their activities. In 
testimony and in comments on pending 
legislation, we have commended the 
principles reflected in the Timberlane 
decision to Congress. We have also sup- 
ported the proper application of such 
principles in litigation. In the uranium 
litigation, my predecessor at the State 
Department wrote to the Seventh Cir- 
cuit in the spring of 1980 that "in future 
proceedings in this and other cases, the 
courts should give due consideration to 
the views of interested foreign govern- 
ments and take into account appropriate 
considerations of comity where there is 
possible conflict between the laws or 
policies of nation states." 

The balancing approach is clearly 
not a failsafe procedure for resolving or 
preventing jurisdictional controversies. 
There will inevitably be instances in 
which the U.S. Government's national 
security needs and other predominant 



policy interests demand action even 
though it may create a conflict with 
foreign interests and claims to jurisdic- 
tion. The balancing approach to the 
resolution of jurisdictional conflict can- 
not prevent such outcomes. What it can 
do is help to insure that decisions which 
implicate significant foreign concerns 
follow an informed and careful evalua- 
tion and weighing of the relevant U.S. 
and foreign interests. 

Practical Steps To Resolve Conflicts 

There is also a wide range of practical 
steps that we are taking in order to pre- 
vent or resolve jurisdictional conflicts. In 
some instances, there are established 
procedures of intergovernmental 
cooperation which help, significantly, to 
prevent or mitigate conflicts. Both the 
Justice Department and the Federal 
Trade Commission regularly give, 
through our embassies, prior notice to 
other governments potentially concerned 
before taking antitrust enforcement ac- 
tions implicating their interests. The an- 
titrust agencies likewise regularly con- 
sult with foreign governments concern- 
ing particular enforcement activities. 

These practices derive from a set of 
agreed OECD [Organization for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development] 
guidelines on notice and consultation in 
the antitrust area. They are sometimes 
supplemented by bilateral agreements 
with foreign governments. Notifications 
under these institutional arrangements 
have helped to prevent unpleasant sur- 
prises, while consultations have some- 
times brought about modernization of 
either U.S. actions or foreign objections. 

There has been an important recent 
development in this area. Yesterday, the 
U.S. and Australian Governments took a 
long step forward by concluding an 
agreement for antitrust cooperation con- 
taining significant provisions on notice 
and consultation, private treble damage 
actions, and blocking statutes. 

• The agreement provides for each 
party to notify the other of antitrust- 
related actions or policies with implica- 
tions for the interests of the other party. 

• The two Governments agreed to 
consult with respect to potential con- 
flicts, to take each other's interests into 
account during such consultations, and 
to give the fullest consideration to modi- 
fying their policies or enforcement ac- 
tions in the interest of avoiding jurisdic- 
tional conflict. 

• Of particular interest to the Aus- 
tralian Government is the provision con- 



37 



ECONOMICS 



cerning private litigation. Where private 
antitrust proceedings are pending in a 
U.S. court relating to conduct which has 
been the subject of intergovernmental 
consultation under the agreement, the 
Australian Government may request the 
U.S. Government to participate in that 
litigation. The U.S. Government has 
agreed that, in such cases, it shall report 
to the court on the substance and out- 
come of the consultations. 

• Of importance to the United 
States is Australia's agreement that the 
mere seeking by legal process of infor- 
mation or documents located in its ter- 
ritory shall not per se be regarded as 
constituting a basis for invoking 
Australia's blocking statute, provided 
that it has received prior notice of the 
issuance of such process. 

Outside the antitrust area, other 
agencies engage in notification and con- 
sultation with affected foreign govern- 
ments on an informal basis. For exam- 
ple, in the SEC's Santa Fe case, to 
which I referred earlier, the SEC and 
the Justice and State Departments have 
carried on discussions with Swiss 
Government officials to attempt to 
devise a mutually acceptable procedure 
to identify suspected insider traders. 
Significant progress has been made on 
this issue. The Office of Antiboycott 
Compliance at the Commerce Depart- 
ment, too, has recognized the utility of 
the notice and consultation process as a 
means to deal with foreign interests and 
concerns involved in particular cases. 

Information Flow 

There is an additional area to which the 
people in my office devote a lot of atten- 
tion and energy. Foreign interests can 
be taken into account in a given situa- 
tion only if the right people are aware of 
the right facts. State Department or 
other agency officials familiar with 
potential international ramifications 
must know about potential agency ac- 
tions which may pose jurisdictional con- 
flicts. Agency officials in a position to 
shape agency action to properly reflect 
foreign interests must know what those 
interests are. Too often jurisdictional 
conflicts have come about needlessly 
because the government as an institu- 
tion failed to insure that the right people 
were in touch with each other. 

The problem is one of information 
flow. Both within and among agencies. 
Accordingly, it is a matter of priority for 
my staff to develop and expand their 
working relationships with other govern- 



ment departments and agencies involved 
in transnational economic regulation. 
Through these relationships, we can help 
to insure that other agencies carry out 
their responsibilities with the broadest 
possible knowledge and appreciation of 
affected foreign interests. 

International jurisdictional conflicts 
are a problem and a challenge for both 
the sound administration of our laws 
and the wise conduct of our foreign 
policy. Because jurisdictional conflicts 
may emerge in areas of broad political 
or security concern to our country, they 
cannot always be avoided. The interests 
of the United States may compel us to 
assert our jurisdiction in ways that our 
friends and allies may oppose. Never- 
theless, we in the Department of State 
and in my office are determined to 
strengthen the framework for avoiding 
or mitigating conflicts whenever possi- 
ble, in light of our fundamental policy 
objectives and national security re- 
quirements. ■ 



Trade in the 1980s 



by Denis Lamb 

Address at the Iowa State Trade 
Conference in Ames, Iowa, on May 20, 
1982. Mr. Lamb is Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Economic and Business 
Affairs. 

The next several years pose enormous 
challenges for trade policy and for U.S. 
Government efforts to assist exporters. 
I would like to discuss both challenges 
with you today, beginning with the 
challenge to policy. 

Slow growth, high unemployment, 
and inflation in many countries— plus in- 
creased international competition and 
new trade and investment distortions- 
are imposing growing strains on the 
trading system. 

The pace of liberalization has 
slowed, and pressure for increased pro- 
tectionism is rising both here and 
abroad. There is sentiment in Europe to 
restrict imports from Japan, the 
developing countries, and the United 
States. Advanced developing countries, 
having chosen the path of export-led 
growth, nevertheless erect barriers to 
developed-country exports. Japan bars 
imports to a degree that we believe is in- 
consistent with its role as a major par- 
ticipant in the trading system. 



In the United States, feelings are 
running high over other countries' 
moves to restrict our exports and thet it 
use of subsidies to compete with us in " 
third markets. At the same time, we 
protect certain sectors of our economj <; 
and there is talk of extending protecti 
to others. As a result, we have come i 
for our share of foreign criticism. 

The resurgence of protectionism a \i, 
the resulting negative tone of the inte 
national debate reflect two simple fac; 
First, most developed countries are 
under enormous political pressure to 
alleviate current economic problems, 
particularly high unemplojinent, and 
do it quickly. Second, most countries, 
and many companies, have seen their 
dependence on exports grow in recen 
years. The need to pay for expensive 
ported oil has been a principal reason, mi 
is true for us, but it is particularly tn- 
for many developing countries. 

Against this backdrop of worldwi 
economic stagnation, and an increase 
need to export, we also face a rapidlj 
changing trade evironment. Major 
changes we can see now and which v, 
accelerate in the coming decade inclu 

• The growing importance of hig 
technology trade and investment; 

• The emergence of the newly ir 
dustrializing developing countries as 
jor competitive forces in the interna- 
tional economy; and 

• The expanding role of services 

Our task is complex. We must h< 
the gains of the postwar period and 
adapt to the future. In short, we mu 
resist pressures for short-term meas 
that offer no solutions, tackle emerg 
problems, and plan for the long-tern 
Our objectives are linked. The risk t 
governments will take new measure; 
protect domestic markets can only b 
avoided by renewed international co 
mitment to work for a freer, more o 
trading system— a system which car 
meet the needs of the 1980s and bey j 
and a system that will insure equital (j 
opportunities for all. 

The United States is working 
toward an international consensus ti 
dress the key issues. Three meeting: |i 
the Organization for Economic Coof 
tion and Development (OECD) minis 
terial, which took place last week, tl 
Versailles summit in June, and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) ministerial in Novemi 
—are the focal points of our campai 
Discussions and decisions taken at t 
meetings will have a strong influenc 
the direction of international trade i 
tions for the 1980s. 



38 



ECONOMICS 



Our medium-term goals are well 
fined, although in some cases, we are 
11 considering how best to achieve 
3m. Let me describe briefly what we 
B seeking in several areas. 

gh Technology 

though no precise definition of high 
Sinology industries is possible, they 

generally intensely research depend- 
t and innovative in applying research 
suits to new products and processes, 
eir products or services usually in- 
ve a high level of research and 
/elopment and technically sophis- 
ited production methods. 

The introduction of new tech- 
ogies, such as microprocessors and 
)otics, will increase the pace of struc- 
al change. On balance, this is a 
sitive development. In contrast to the 
ustments we have had to make as 
!rgy costs rose, technological change 
imises to create new jobs and pro- 
te economic growth. The introduction 
jome new technologies involves 
ther kind of change as well — the in- 
nationalization of production. At a re- 
t technological fair in Chicago, none 
;he newest products on display was 
eloped or produced in a single coun- 

Looking ahead, we need to find 
/s to minimize the trade frictions 
ch arise because of varying degrees 
government involvement in promoting 
h technology products. Much work 
) needs to be done to facilitate the 
V of new technologies across national 
itiers. The United States is pressing 
the formation on working groups in 
OECD and the GATT to look at 
le barriers and problems in the high 
inology area. The unique characteris- 
of this trade suggest that distortions 
>t that have not been previously cen- 
tred internationally, such as industry 
feting and government financed 
aarch and developmenmt. As we see 
he first task of the proposed GATT 
•king group will be to identify these 
ortions and recommend which of 
m can be handled under existing 
TT rules and procedures. 

^eloping Countries 

' newly industrializing countries will 

Isent major challenges and oppor- 
ities in this decade. An anticipated 
id increase in manufactured imports 
n these countries will add to existing 
iei ssures to adjust output and employ- 
it in our traditional labor-intensive 



industries. The need to adjust will broad- 
en and intensify as their numbers in- 
crease and they begin to move up the 
technological ladder. 

Growth in the newly industrializing 
countries also can provide increased op- 
portunities for developed country ex- 
ports and investment. In the 1970s, 
developed country exports to the newly 
industrializing countries grew at roughly 
the same pace as trade among developed 
countries. The major policy challenge for 
us is to find ways to induce and encour- 
age these countries to become full part- 
ners in the liberal trading system. We 
hope the GATT ministerial will address 
this issue creatively, recognizing that the 
basic bargain that needs to be struck in- 
volves safeguarding their access to our 
markets, in return for which they should 
be willing to reduce barriers to 
developed country exports. 

Services 

The third key area is services. As other 
countries experience the shift to services 
which occurred in the United States dur- 
ing the 1970s, we can expect heightened 
international competition in a number of 
sectors. At present, there is no interna- 
tional framework of agreed rules for 
trade in services, although the OECD 
has already undertaken studies in a 
number of services sectors. We have 
strongly supported this work and have 
urged the organization to broaden its 
consideration of services barriers and 
possible ways to reduce or eliminate 
them. 

We continue to encourage our major 
trading partners to examine their serv- 
ices sectors and define their interests 
and objectives for future international 
negotiations. At the GATT ministerial in 
November, our goal is agreement to pur- 
sue a serious work program on services 
trade. 

Trade-Related Investment Practices 

The fourth area is investment practices. 
Just as in services, there is no interna- 
tional framework of agreed investment 
rules. Until recently, this did not cause 
serious problems. Investment issues 
tended to be intermittent and country 
specific. With the global economic 
downturn, resorting to interventionist 
policies has increased. 

Our goal is to reverse that trend by 
establishing international understand- 
ings and rules which support an open in- 
vestment climate. Among our specific 
goals are better market access and na- 



ober1982 



tional treatment for U.S. investors 
abroad. Trade distorting practices, 
which we seek to minimize, are re- 
quirements for local content, mandatory 
exports, and domestic hiring, as well as 
limitations on the right of establishment. 

Agriculture 

We have not, of course, neglected 
agriculture. We want to see a major new 
effort in the GATT to bring agricultural 
trade closer to the disciplines that apply 
to trade in goods. I would be less than 
candid, however, if I did not tell you 
that our ability to launch significant new 
work depends on our ability to manage 
successfully a range of current issues we 
have with the European Community. 
I believe you will agree that the 
trade agenda for international action is 
extensive. The opportunities are great, 
and, if we take an ambitious and 
positive approach, I am confident that 
progress is possible. 

Domestic Challenges 

Domestically, we have challenges to 
meet as well. Over the next decade, we 
will face a world which differs greatly 
from the one in which today's trade 
policies and rules were developed. Com- 
petition from Japan and the newly in- 
dustrializing nations will be particularly 
intense. We will need a strong domestic 
economy to meet it. Increased invest- 
ment, research and development, and 
productivity are essential. 

A major and creative export promo- 
tion effort will also be required to take 
advantage of our competitiveness and 
the trade opportunities we hope to 
create internationally. Strong support 
for U.S. business abroad, creative use of 
export financing and promotion pro- 
grams, and identification of growing 
markets in the developing world for 
special promotional efforts and attention 
will be particularly important. 

At home, the Administration has 
worked with the Congress to improve 
the tax treatment of Americans working 
overseas, to lessen the burden of com- 
plying with the Foreign Corrupt Prac- 
tices Act, and to shape new export 
trading company legislation. 

Much has been done but more can be 
done. Tax treatment of Americans living 
and working abroad was liberalized in 
August 1981 with the passage of the 
Economic Recovery Act. Before this 
legislation was passed, the United States 
was the only major industrial country 
that taxed income earned abroad on the 



ja 



basis of citizenship. The effect, now 
eliminated, was to invite U.S. companies 
to replace American employees with 
foreign nationals and to make U.S. ex- 
ports less price competitive. 

The Administration is actively sup- 
porting legislation to change the ac- 
counting controls and bribery provisions 
in the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act. Our intent is to make the account- 
ing requirements less onerous and to im- 
pose liability for circumvention of the 
regulations, not mere failure to observe 
them to the letter. Also, we want the 
antibribery provisions of the act to apply 
only where there is proven intent to 
make a corrupt payment. These changes 
would produce the result the law in- 
tended but remove an important 
disincentive to export. 

Another proposal receiving active 
Administration support in Congress en- 
courages the formation and development 
of U.S. export trading companies. The 
idea is to permit commercial banks to 
own equity in trading companies and to 
allow such companies to "preclear" their 
activities under our antitrust laws. 
There is continuing discussion in Con- 
gress about how to deal with the an- 
titrust issue, but the Congress and the 
Administration are agreed on the princi- 
ple that antitrust concepts require 
change to lessen their effect on exports. 

Outside the realm of legislation, the 
U.S. Government has a number of pro- 
grams to assist firms doing business 
abroad. 

• A wide range of export promotion 
programs can help in selecting and ex- 
ploring foreign markets. 

• At our embassies and consulates, 
officials of the Departments of Com- 
merce, Agriculture, and State conduct 
overseas market research, gather com- 
mercial data, and offer on-the-spot 
assistance to U.S. businessmen. 

• In the area of finance, there are 
U.S. Government programs which offer 
some assistance. The Export-Import 
Bank and the Commodity Credit Cor- 
poration facilitate U.S. exports and help 
exporters meet foreign competition for 
third markets. 

• On the investment side, the 
Overseas Private Investment Corpora- 
tion (OPIC) provides political risk in- 
surance and financing services for U.S. 
companies that make direct investments 
in developing countries. 



EUROPE 



Support for American Business 
Abroad 

I would like to touch briefly on one 
other matter — the State Department's 
unique role in support of American 
business abroad. One of Secretary 
Haig's first actions as Secretary of State 
was to instruct each ambassador that a 
major purpose of his or her stewardship 
must be to lead personally the U.S. 
Government's commercial effort in that 
country. I am pleased that we are 
receiving an increasing number of com- 
ments from companies which are 
pleasantly surprised to find ambassadors 
and embassy staffs giving a top priority 
to assisting American companies. 

In cooperation with Secretaries 
Baldrige and Block [Malcolm Baldrige of 
Commerce and John R. Block of 
Agriculture] and T^ade Representative 
Brock, the Department of State is com- 
mitted to assist companies in Iowa and 
in every State to be successful exporters 
and competitors abroad. Not that you 
are not doing well. In 1981 Iowa ranked 
first as an exporter of farm products 



with receipts of $3.74 billion. Exports 
manufactured goods were even larger 
totaling $3.78 billion. 

Let me add that I have also been 
pressed during the past year with the 
growth in the number of State trade 
missions going abroad to aggressively 
seek export markets for their com- 
panies. The State Department is fully 
prepared to assist you in whatever W£ 
we can in this overall effort. 

Adoption and implementation of a 
comprehensive trade policy approach, 
both domestically and internationally, 
will strengthen the U.S. economy and 
our competitiveness in world markets 
To succeed we will need to muster bo 
national determination and commitme 
to rely on competition and free mark* 
The government can help create an e 
vironment conducive to efficient and 
profitable production. It can make la\ 
and regulations less onerous, and it c 
offer some direct support. But privat 
individuals and enterprises have to ta 
the initiative to seize economic oppor 
tunities. We are relying on you. ■ 



U.S.-Soviet Grain Sales Agreement 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
JULY 30, 1982' 

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. grain agreement, 
which has governed our grain trade with 
the Soviet Union since 1976, is due to 
expire September 30. After discussion in 
the Cabinet, I have authorized U.S. of- 
ficials to explore the possibility with the 
Soviet Union of a 1-year extension of 
the existing grain agreement. I have fur- 
ther authorized them to explore in the 
consultations with the Soviets, normally 
conducted under the agreement, the 
possibility of additional grain sales to 
the Soviet Union. 

In this decision, I have ruled out any 
negotiation of a new long-term agree- 
ment at this time. On December 29, I 
postponed such negotiations until the 
Soviet Union indicates that it is 
prepared to permit the process of recon- 
ciliation in Poland to go forward and 
demonstrates this desire with deeds and 
not just words. My decision reinforces 
this objective. The Soviets should not be 
afforded the additional security of a new 
long-term grain agreement as long as 
repression continues in Poland. 



At the same time, American fan 
will not be made to bear alone the 
burdens of this policy toward the So 
Union. In the spring of 1981, I lifted 
grain embargo imposed by the previ 
Administration, because it was not 
having the desired effect of serioush 
penalizing the U.S.S.R. for its bruta 
vasion and occupation of Afghanista 
Instead, alternative suppliers of this 
widely available commodity stepped 
make up for the grain which would 1 
been normally supplied by U.S. farn 
These developments substantially ur 
cut the tremendous sacrifices of our 
farmers, and I vowed at that time n 
impose a grain embargo unilaterally 
less it was part of a general cutoff c 
trade between the United States ant 
Soviet Union. 

I renew that pledge to Americai 
farmers today. American farmers C£i 
assured that they will continue to hi 
fair opportunity to export grain to t 
U.S.S.R. on a cash basis. Other sup- 
pliers, who sometimes criticize our g*** 
sales, also supply grain to the Sovic *" 
Union. Grain sales have little impacM'-' 
Soviet military and industrial capab 
ities. They absorb hard currency eai 
ings and feed the people of the Sovi 



Deoartment of State Bui W ' 



Union, who are suffering most from the 
disastrous economic pohcies of the 
Soviet Government. 



FACT SHEET 
JULY 30, 19822 

Background 

The U.S. -Soviet long-term grain agree- 
ment, which originally covered the 
1976-81 period, was extended last 
August for a sixth year, through Sep- 
tember 30, 1982. The President has now 
decided to explore the possibility with 
the Soviets of a simple extension of the 
agreement for a seventh year, with no 
changes in its substantive provisions. 
^ Article I of the agreement commits the 
f Soviets to purchase at least 6 million 
tons of U.S. grain annually (3 million 
'1 tons each of wheat and corn and allows 
them to purchase an additional 2 million 
tons without prior consultations with the 
U.S. Government. Article II guarantees 
these 8 million tons against U.S. discre- 
tionary controls. Other provisions pro- 
vide for semiannual consultations, spac- 
ing of purchases, and an "escape clause" 
in the event of very short supplies in the 
U.S. grain sales to the Soviets under the 
long-term grain agreement are made by 
the private trade at prevailing market 
prices. 

Except during the period of the par- 
tial grain embargo, which was in effect 
from January 1980 to April 1981 and ap- 
plied only to amounts above 8 million 
tons, the United States has always of- 
fered the Soviets access to additional 
amounts of U.S. grain. For instance, for 
this agreement year, the Soviets have 
been authorized to purchase up to 23 
million tons of U.S. grain, of which they 
have bought about 14 million tons. The 
United States now supplies about 30% 
of Soviet grain imports (compared with 
about 70% before the embargo). Other 
key suppliers are Argentina, Canada, 
Australia, and the European Economic 
Community (EEC). Canada and Argen- 
"Itina also have long-term grain agree- 
'"Vents with the U.S.S.R. 

In December 1981, the United 
States postponed the negotiation of a 
new long-term grain agreement with the 
"Soviet Union. It did not suspend the ex- 
isting agreement nor did it embargo 
.grain to the Soviet Union. The decision 
1 today extends the existing agreement as 

is on a short-term basis for 1 year. 
, j The President further authorized his 
' negotiators to explain in the consulta- 
' tions with the Soviets, normally con- 



ducted under the agreement, the possi- 
bility of additional grain sales to the 
Soviet Union. 

History of the Grain Agreement 

An unfavorable climate, poor soil, 
backward technology, and an extremely 
inefficient agricultural system make 
periodic crop failures in the Soviet 
Union a virtual certainty. As a result, 
the Soviets have, during the last 20 
years, imported increasing amounts of 
grain to accommodate their domestic 
needs. 

The United States first sold grain to 
the Soviet Union in 1963, when a poor 
crop compelled the Soviets to import 
10.4 million metric tons (mmt) of grain, 
including 1.8 mmt from the United 
States and 8 mmt from Canada. The 
Soviets bought no more U.S. grain dur- 
ing the 1960s. 

Conditions in the early 1970s 
rekindled Soviet interest in American 
grain. The Soviets committed them- 
selves to upgrading their diet, and the 
United States had ample supplies of 
grain to export. 

In 1971 the Soviet Union purchased 
3 mmt of U.S. feedgrains, principally to 
help increase their livestock and poultry 
production. 

In 1972 the Soviets offset a signifi- 
cant reduction in their grain crop by 
entering the U.S. market and buying, 
over a 2-3 month period, 19 mmt of 
U.S. grain, including one-fourth of the 
total U.S. wheat crop. The Soviets made 
their purchases quietly and early, before 
prices adjusted to the sudden increase in 
demand. The Soviets also were able to 
capitalize on the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture's wheat export subsidy pro- 



EUROPE 



gram and a credit arrangement just 
negotiated with the United States. 
These circumstances, as well as the 
domestic market disruption caused by 
the massive grain purchases, led critics 
to label the U.S. sales as the "great 
Soviet grain robbery." 

The Grain Agreement 

The summer of 1975 brought new 
reports of a looming Soviet crop failure. 
These reports, coupled with the desire to 
avoid a repeat of the 1972 scenario, 
prompted the Ford Administration to 
suspend grain sales to the Soviet Union 
until an arrangement could be worked 
out that would prevent Soviet disruption 
of U.S. domestic markets and guarantee 
U.S. farmers a reasonable share of the 
Soviet market. 

The ensuing negotiations with the 
Soviet Union produced an agreement 
with the following provisions. 

• The Soviets agreed to purchase 6 
mmt of U.S. wheat and corn, in approx- 
imately equal proportions, during each 
of the 5 years covered by the agree- 
ment. 

• The Soviets could purchase up to 
2 mmt more of U.S. grain during any 
year without consultations with the 
United States. 

• The United States agreed not to 
embargo exports of up to 8 mmt of 
grain to the Soviet Union. 

• The Soviets were required to con- 
sult with the United States (to deter- 
mine a higher supply level) before buy- 
ing more than 8 mmt of grain in any 
given year; however, such sales in ex- 
cess of 8 mmt were not covered by the 
safeguard against embargoes. 





Total U.S.S.R. 


U.S. Grain 


U.S 


Share of 




Grain Imports 


Exports to U.S.S.R. 


Total U.S.S.R. 




(mmt) 


(mmt) 


Grain Imports 










(%) 


FY 1973 


22.5 


14.1 




63 


FY 1974 


5.7 


4.5 




79 


FY 1975 


7.7 


3.2 




42 


FY 1976 


25.6 


14.9 




58 


FY 1977 


8.4 


6.1 




73 


FY 1978 


22.5 


14.6 




65 


FY 1979 


19.6 


15.3 




78 


FY 1980 


27.0 


8.3 




31 


FY 1981 


38.8 


9.5 




24 


FY 1982 


45.0 


17.8 




40 


(projected) 










FY 1983 


40-50 








(estimated) 











October 1982 



41 



EUROPE 



• There was an escape clause for 
the United States in the event of a ma- 
jor U.S. crop shortfall. 

• Soviet purchases were to be made 
at prevailing market prices and in 
accordance with normal commercial 
terms. 

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. grain agreement 
eased the way for major expansion of 
U.S. grain trade with the Soviets. 
Moreover, the agreement created more 
consistency in sales of American grain 
to the Soviets, thus avoiding the uncer- 
tainty which had plagued the U.S. 
market before 1975. 

Soviet Grain Embargo of 1980 

On January 4, 1980, in response to the 
Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan, 
President Carter canceled contracts for 
the sale of grain beyond the 8 mmt 
assured against embargo by the agree- 
ment. The canceled contracts included 
the sale of 13.5 mmt of U.S. corn and 
wheat to the Soviet Union. The United 
States also denied the Soviets access to 
an additional 3.5 mmt of grain which 
had been offered to but not yet pur- 
chased by the Soviets. Finally, ship- 
ments of soybeans, broilers, and some 
other agricultural products were halted. 

The Soviets were able to minimize 
the effects of the embargo by drawing 
down their grain stocks and by increas- 
ing grain, soybean, rice, flour, and meat 
imports from non-U. S. origins, primarily 
Argentina, Canada, Australia, and the 
EEC. The Soviets have since entered in- 
to new long-term purchasing agreements 
with Argentina, Brazil, Canada, 
Hungary, and Thailand in an attempt to 
diversify their sources of supply and 
reduce the threat of future embargoes. 

In April 1981, President Reagan 
lifted the Soviet grain embargo. This 
was followed by an agreement in August 
to extend the expiring U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
grain accord for an additional year, 
through September 30, 1982. In October 

1981, the United States offered the 
Soviets an additional 15 mmt of grain, 
raising to 23 mmt the amount of U.S. 
grain available to the Soviets during FY 

1982. To date, the Soviets have pur- 
chased a total of 13.9 mmt of U.S. 
wheat and corn. 

U.S. Sanctions Against the Soviets 

Discussions concerning negotiation of a 
new U.S.-U.S.S.R. long-term grain 



.iZ. 



agreement were underway within the 
Administration when the Polish Govern- 
ment declared a state of martial law in 
December 1981. In response to that 
situation, the President announced a 
number of sanctions against the Soviets, 
including postponement of negotiations 



on a new grain agreement. He did not 
suspend the existing 1-year agreement 
nor embargo the sale of any grain. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 2, 1982. 
^Text from White House press release. 



Soviet Active Measures: 
An Update 



This report describes Soviet "active 
measures" which have come to light since 
the publication of the last report in the 
November 1981 Bulletin (p. 52). 

The Soviet Union uses the term "active 
measures" (aktivnyye meropriyatiya) to 
cover a broad range of activities de- 
signed to promote Soviet foreign policy 
goals, including undercutting opponents 
of the U.S.S.R. Active measures include 
disinformation, manipulating the media 
in foreign countries, the use of Com- 
munist Parties and Communist front 
groups, and operations to expand Soviet 
political influence. In contrast to public 
diplomacy, which all nations practice, 
Soviet active measures often involve de- 
ception and are frequently implemented 
by clandestine means. Active measures 
are carried out not only by the KGB but 
also by the International Department 
and the International Information De- 
partment of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union. 

The active measures discussed in 
this report are necessarily limited to 
those that have been publicly exposed. 
They make clear that these activities 
take place worldwide. The open societies 
of many industrialized and developing 
countries afford the Soviets oppor- 
tunities to use active measures to in- 
fluence opinions in favor of Soviet 
policies and against those of the United 
States and its allies. It is our hope that 
this report will increase public aware- 
ness and understanding of Soviet active 
measures and thereby reduce the likeli- 
hood that people will be deceived. 



Forgeries 

Forgeries are a frequently used active 
measures technique. Several have come 
to light in recent months. Their appear- 
ance has been timed to influence West- 
ern opinion on current sensitive issues. 
As far as we are aware, only one of 
these recent forgeries achieved uncriticc ^ 
publication. 

Forgeries are usually sent through 
the mail to journalists, officials, or othe: , 
persons who might make them availabli' 
to the media. Forgeries normally do no« ' 
carry a return address, nor is the send« 
identified in a way that can be checked. 
How the document was acquired invari 
ably is vague. 



a 



The NATO Information Service 
Documents. In late October 1981, Spa: 
ish journalists living in Brussels receivi 
form letters purporting to come from 
the NATO Information Service. The le 
ters enclosed a publicity packet that h£ 
been updated to include Spain as a nev 
member of the alliance. As the Spanisl 
Parliament was still debating Spain's a 
plication to join NATO, the letter coul( 
impress Spaniards as showing contemj 
for Spain's democratic institutions. Thi 
journalists checked with NATO, and ■, 
stories in the Spanish press reported a ^ 
forgery designed to influence Spain's 
domestic debate on NATO. 

The President Reagan Letter to 
the King of Spain. In November 1981 
an attempt was made in Madrid to sur 
face a forged letter from President 
Reagan to the King of Spain. In term: 
likely to offend Spanish sensitivities, tl 
letter urged the King to join NATO ar 
to crack down on groups such as the 
"OPUS DEI pacifists" and the "left-wii 
opposition." 

After an initial mailing to Spanish 
journalists failed to obtain publication 
the forgery was circulated on Novem- 



SSUj 



Department of State Bullei ^ 



H 



EUROPE 



ber 11 to all delegations (except the U.S. 
and Spanish) to the Conference of 
Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE), then meeting in Madrid. This 
time several Madrid newspapers ran 
stories that exposed the letter as a 
fabrication probably of Soviet origin. 

The Clark-Steams Letter. In 

January 1982, a forged letter and an ac- 
companying research analysis dated 
September 23, 1981, from Judge William 
I Clark, then Deputy Secretary of State, 
to the U.S. Ambassador to Greece, 
Monteagle Stearns, circulated in Athens. 
This forgery indicated U.S. support for 
the conservatives in the October Greek 
elections and alluded to a possible mili- 
tary coup if Socialist leader Andreas 
Papandreou won at the polls. On the 
Dasis of U.S. Embassy assurances that 
;he letter was a fake, it was not initially 
published. Several weeks later, after 
;opies had been circulated at the CSCE 
n Madrid, the Athens daily Vrathini 
)ublished a story describing the letter as 
)f doubtful authenticity and probably at- 
ributable to a "third-country" intelli- 
gence service. 

The Swedish Mailgrams. During 
he week of November 8, 1981, at least 
mailgrams— initiated by telephone 
alls to Western Union — were circulated 
journalists in the Washington, D.C., 
rea. Supposedly sent by U.S. Govern- 
lent officials, the mailgrams offered to 
lake available the text of an alleged 
ecret agreement for U.S. use of the 
wedish base at Karlskrona for intelli- 
ence purposes. 

The mailgrams were sent immediate- 
' after the furor caused by the ground- 
ig of a Soviet submarine in restricted 
'aters off the Karlskrona naval base, 
heir timing supports the conclusion 
lat the effort was an attempt to offset 
le bad publicity the Soviets received 
■om the incident. 

The Haig-Luns Letter. The 

-pril 22, 1982, edition of the Belgian 
iftist weekly De Nieuwe published a let- 
;r supposedly sent in June 1979 by re- 
ring NATO Commander Alexander 
;aig to NATO Secretary General 
Dseph Luns. Both NATO and U.S. 
fficials branded the letter a fabrication. 
The forged letter discussed a possi- 
le nuclear first-strike and called for "ae- 
on of a sensitive nature" to "jolt the 
lint hearted in Europe" opposed to 
itermediate-range nuclear force mod- 
-nization. The timing of the false letter 
as related to the many antinuclear 



il!tober1982 














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EUROPE 



demonstrations which took place in 
Europe in the spring of 1982. The letter 
appeared again in the Luxembourg Com- 
munist Party newspaper, Zeitung, on 
May 10. 

The Department of Commerce 
Document. In late May 1982, just before 
the Versailles economic summit, an 
alleged U.S. Government document 
dated February 18, 1982, circulated in 
Brussels. Purporting to be the recom- 
mendations of a working group on stra- 
tegic economic policy chaired by the 
Secretary of Commerce, the document 
twisted U.S. policy on sensitive trade 
issues in a way likely to stimulate fric- 
tion between the United States and its 
European allies. Several journalists 
brought the matter to the attention of 
U.S. officials, who promptly branded it a 
forgery. As far as the United States is 
aware, the media have not reported the 
fabricated document. 

Media Manipulation/Disinformation 

The purpose of disinformation efforts is 
to gain public acceptance for something 
that is not true. Since Soviet media lack 
credibility, the goal is to achieve publica- 
tion of false news in reputable non- 
Communist media. Soviet media, such as 
TASS or Radio Moscow, are then able 
to cite credible sources in replaying a 
story in the hope that it will be picked 
up by other non-Communist media. Dis- 
information also is frequently placed in 
pro-Soviet news outlets outside the 
Eastern bloc in the hope that it will be 
replayed by independent media or simp- 
ly gain acceptance through repetition. 

Angola/Zaire/South Africa. One 

Soviet campaign has been to discredit 
U.S. policy in southern Africa— in par- 
ticular, the credibility of U.S. efforts to 
solve the Namibia problem — by media 
stories that the United States is trying 
to oust the Government of Angola. A 
number of recent examples illustrate 
this effort. 

• On September 15 and 23-24, 
1981, the Portugal Hoje of Lisbon, a 
paper close to the Socialist Party, pub- 
lished reports that U.S., Zairian, and 
South African representatives had met 
secretly to conspire against the Angolan 
regime. The source for the story, an 
Angolan traveling to Lisbon, claimed he 
had stolen Zairian documents as proof, 
but he never made the documents avail- 
able. Both Zaire and the United States 
denied the allegations. TASS promptly 
picked up the Hoje story, and in turn it 



was replayed in a number of African 
papers, including the Jomal de Angola. 

• On December 22, 1981, Diario de 
Lisboa, a pro-Communist paper, re- 
ported that the United States was sup- 
porting "2,000 specially trained gunmen" 
based in Zaire to attack Angola. The 
State Department denied the story 
December 24, but TASS nonetheless 
picked it up. In turn, a number of 
African papers and radio stations and 
the Flemish Socialist daily De Morgen 
replayed the allegations on the basis of 
the TASS account. 

• A similar story was carried in the 
April 17, 1982, Congolese newspaper 
Etumba, which alleged a meeting in 
1981 among the United States, South 
Africa, and others to plot against 
Angola. The U.S. Embassy in Brazza- 
ville promptly denied the report. 

The Seychelles Coup Attempt. A 

day after the November 25, 1981, at- 
tempt by a group of mercenaries to 
overthrow the Government of the Sey- 
chelles, Soviet news reports were imply- 
ing that the CIA was responsible. In 
keeping with frequent Soviet practice, 
these accusations were attributed to un- 
named, and therefore unverifiable, 
"African radio commentaries." Despite a 
statement by Seychelles President 
France Albert Rene on December 2 that 
his government had no indication of any 
foreign involvement other than South 
African, Soviet media continued to ac- 
cuse the United States. In December, 
several African newspapers (among 
them the Nairobi Nation and Lagos 
Daily Times, the leading dailies in 
Kenya and Nigeria, respectively) re- 
peated the story. Soviet media then re- 
played the allegations, citing the African 
papers as sources. 

The Pakistani Mosquitoes. In the 

wake of compelling evidence that the 
Soviets are using chemical weapons in 
Afghanistan and supplying mycotoxins 
for use in Laos and Kampuchea, 
Moscow has launched a disinformation 
effort focused on Pakistan. The Febru- 
ary 2, 1982, Literatumaya Gazeta 
alleged that the antimalaria program of 
the Pakistan Malaria Research Center in 
Lahore was a CIA-financed effort to 
breed special mosquitoes "which infect 
their victims with deadly viruses as part 
of U.S. plans to introduce biological war- 
fare into Afghanistan." In fact, the 
Pakistan Malaria Research Center has 
been conducting antimalaria research for 
20 years. Much of the funding comes 
from the U.S. National Institutes of 
Health and the Agency for International 
Development (AID) through a contract 



with the University of Maryland. The 
State Department promptly labeled the 
Soviet charges "utterly baseless." 

The American Center Director Dr. 
David Nalin told the Baltimore Sun on 
February 9, 1982, that the allegations 
were a Soviet disinformation effort to 
counter U.S. "yellow rain" charges. 
Nonetheless, TASS continued to carry 
the false stories, which were replayed 
not only by regular disinformation out- 
lets, such as Bombay's Blitz and the 
New Delhi Patriot, but also by independ- 
ent newspapers not usually associated 
with Soviet propaganda, such as the in- 
fluential Times of India, the Pakistani 
daily Jarig, and the Muslim News of 
Capetown, South Africa. 

A Moscow-Funded Greek News- 
paper? Another way to exert media in- 
fluence is by secretly subsidizing a news- 
paper. This may have occurred recently 
in Greece. In May 1982, the Athens 
daily Messimvrini charged that a new 
large circulation daily. To Ethnos, had 
begun publication in September 1981 
thanks to a secret Soviet subsidy of ILSfrf 
million; Messimvrini alleged that covert 
payments were continuing. The Greek 
Government has ordered an investiga- 
tion. 



Military Base Hoaxes. A disinfor- 
mation staple is to float false stories 
about U.S. military cooperation. Recent 
examples from Soviet and Communist 
media have included false stories that 
the United States has or intends to 
establish bases on the Honduran island 
of Amapala, the Colombian island of Sa- 
Andres, and in the Comoros Islands off 
the east coast of Africa. Although these 
have not gained credence, one relating 
to Pakistan attracted more attention. A 
a result, the Pakistan Foreign Ministry 
on December 10, 1981, found it 
necessary to deny Radio Moscow's asse:' 
tion that the United States would seek 
military bases in Pakistan during a visit 
by Secretary of State Haig. Among 
other things, the Radio Moscow accoun 
falsely asserted that Indian Foreign 
Minister Rao had claimed in the Indian 
Parliament that Pakistan had agreed to 
provide bases for the U.S. rapid deploy 
ment force. 



1 



licti 



ie( 



livi 



Front Groups/Pro-Moscow Communis 
Parties 

Front groups are nominally independen 
organizations that are controlled by the 
Soviets, usually through the Interna- 
tional Department of the Central Com 



Department of State Bulletl 



H 



MIDDLE EAST 



mittee of the CPSU.' These organiza- 
tions have long sought to build support 
for Soviet foreign policy goals. In recent 
months the main thrust of front activity 
has been to try to see that the peace 
movement in Western Europe and the 
United States is directed solely against 
U.S. policy and that it avoids any criti- 
cism of the Soviet nuclear threat. The 
1982 program of the World Peace Coun- 
cil, for example, calls for: 

• "Further intensification of actions 
against the dangers of nuclear war and 
the deployment of new U.S. weapons of 
mass destruction in Western 

Europe. ..." 

• "National events (demonstrations, 
seminars, coUoquia, etc.) with interna- 
tional participation 'against nuclear arms 
build-up and the deployment of U.S. 
missiles in Europe; for peace and 
detente in Europe.' " 

• "International meeting of mayors 
and elected representatives (city coun- 
cilors, muncipalities, etc.) and of peace 

"'orces from European tov/ns and regions 
tivhere new U.S. nuclear missiles are to 
)e deployed. . . ."^ 

Communist parties linked with 
«loscow have pursued the same path. 
7he impact of the fronts and local Com- 
nunist groups varies markedly from 
ountry to country and is difficult to 
evaluate. Nevertheless, awareness is in- 
reasing that the Communists and their 
upporters are attempting to channel 

' he peace and antinuclear movements to 
erve Moscow's purpose. This has led to 

* riction within the movement in some 
ountries. 

In West Germany, after efforts by 
Ihe German Communist Party (DKP) in 

" larly April 1982 produced anti-U.S. 
Slogans without mentioning the Soviet 
uclear arsenal as a threat to peace, 
'etra Kelly, a prominent leader of the 
Invironment Party (the "Greens"), 
ublicly criticized the Communists. She 
epeated this criticism when interviewed 
n CBS television during President 
Reagan's visit to Bonn. Similarly, in 
lUStria, the original platform adopted 
y the organizers of a peace march on 
lay 15 under pressure from pro- 
loscow Communists avoided criticism 
f Soviet atomic weapons. The non- 
'ommunists later regrouped; as a result, 
le Austrian Youth Council issued a less 
ne-sided platform. 



Political Influence Operations 

Political influence operations, especially 
those using agents of influence, are 
harder to detect than other active meas- 
ures. In these operations, individuals dis- 
guise their KGB connection while taking 
an active role in public affairs. Ex- 
posure, when it occurs, is frequently the 
result of an espionage investigation. The 
scale of improper Soviet activities is re- 
flected in the publicized expulsion of 19 
Soviet officials involved in espionage and 
active measures cases from 10 countries 
during the first 5 months of 1982. 
Among these were the expulsion of the 
Soviet military attache from Washington 
and the uncovering of spy nets in Indo- 
nesia and Singapore. 

Denmark. In October 1981, the 
Danish Government expelled Vladimir 
Merkulov, a KGB officer serving as a 
second secretary of the Soviet Embassy, 
for improper conduct, including direct- 
ing the activities of Danish agent-of- 
influence Arne Herloev Petersen. An 
April 17, 1982, Danish Ministry of 
Justice statement detailed Petersen's 
work with the KGB. 

• In the summer of 1981, the 
Soviets arranged to cover Petersen's ex- 
penses for a series of advertisements in 
which Danish artists expressed support 
for a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone. 



• Petersen brought foreign policy 
documents provided by the Soviet Em- 
bassy to the North Korean Embassy; on 
Soviet instructions he misrepresented 
the documents as coming from an 
American journalist. 

• Petersen provided information 
several times to the Soviet Embassy on 
the Danish "left wing" and on "pro- 
gressive" journalists who were not Com- 
munist Party members. 

• Petersen arranged for the print- 
ing of a pamphlet attacking British 
Prime Minister Thatcher. The text was 
supplied by the Soviet Embassy. 

The Ministry of Justice noted that 
clandestine meetings between Petersen 
and a succession of three Soviet "diplo- 
mats" (of whom Merkulov was the 
latest) had extended over several years. 
Petersen specifically was requested by 
his KGB handlers not to join the Danish 
Communist Party. 

The Danish Government decided not 
to prosecute Petersen, although it de- 
clared that he violated Danish law. In a 
television interview 2 days after the 
official statement, the Danish Foreign 
Minister challenged Petersen to sue for 
slander so that the full extent of the 
government's evidence could be made 
public. 

Sweden. Soviet Third Secretary 
Albert Liepa was expelled in April 1982. 



Secretary's Letter to Jordan's King 



August 11, 1982 

Your Majesty, 

It is my pleasure to extend best wishes to 
you and to the people of Jordan on the thir- 
tieth anniversary of your accession to the 
Throne. The length and success of your reign 
ranks as one of the great achievements of 
modern statesmanship. Seven Presidents and 
ten Secretaries of State have benefitted from 
the wisdom of your counsel and from the 
strength of your support for our shared ob- 
jectives. 

You became King at a most difficult 
period for your country and for your region. 
Jordan has since made long strides on the 
road to economic and social development and 
is today one of the examples of success held 
out to those just setting out toward creating 
prosperity for their people. You have done 
this with strength, great economic freedom 
and willpower, characteristics Americans 
greatly admire. 

Despite all of our best efforts, however, 
these are still very difficult times for the 
cause of peace. We will not rest until we 
have achieved a just and comprehensive 



peace in your troubled area. As we have so 
often in the past, we will look to you for ad- 
vice and support as we pursue our goal. 

On this auspicious occasion it is also ap- 
propriate to note again that the Government 
and people of the United States support the 
territorial integrity, sovereignty and in- 
dependence of Jordan, as well as Jordan's 
unique and enduring character. These prin- 
ciples have formed the basis of our mutually 
beneficial relationship for thirty years. You 
may rest assured that they are the rock upon 
which our future relations will be built as 
well. 

I trust that in the years ahead the 
dreams we hold in common come to life for 
our two peoples and for all of those whose 
lives are touched by our deeds. 

Sincerely, 

George P. Shultz 



Made available to news correspondents by 
acting Department spokesman Alan 
Romberg. ■ 



ctober 1982 



MILITARY AFFAIRS 



According to a Swedish Foreign Minis- 
try spokesman, Liepa had made syste- 
matic efforts to collect information on 
and exert influence over the Latvian ex- 
ile community in Sweden. Before his 
assignment to Stockholm, Liepa had 
been chairman of a committee based in 
Riga concerned with maintaining 
"cultural ties" with Latvians living out- 
side the Soviet Union. 



'See Foreign Affairs Note, The World 
Peace Cmincil. Instrument ofSoinet Foreign 
Policy. Department of State, April 1982. 
Other well-known international fronts are the 
International Institute for Peace (IIP), the 



World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), 
the World Federation of Democratic Youth 
(WFDY), the International Union of Students 
(lUS), the Women's International Democratic 
Federation (WIDF), the International Associ- 
ation of Democratic Lawyers (lADL), the 
World Federation of Scientific Workers 
(WFSW), the International Organization of 
Journalists (lOJ), the Christian Peace Con- 
ference (CPC), the International Federation 
of Resistance Fighters (FIR), and the 
Women's International League for Peace and 
Freedom (WILPF). 

'World Peaee Council: Programme of 
Action 1982 published by the Information 
Center of the WPC, Helsinki. ■ 



Chemical Weapons: 

Arms Control and Deterrence 



by Jonathan T. Howe 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on International Security and Scientific 
Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee on July 13, 1982. Rear 
Admiral Howe is Director of the Bureau 
of Politico-Military Affairs.^ 

I am pleased to have the opportunity to 
address foreign policy and arms control 
aspects of chemical weapons. The policy 
of the United States in this area is clear. 
Our goal remains to stop the current use 
of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and 
Southeast Asia and to obtain a complete 
and verifiable ban on the development, 
production, and stockpiling of them. 

Arms Control Efforts 

The Geneva protocol of 1925, to which 
the United States is a party, prohibits in 
war the use of asphyxiating, poisonous, 
or other gases and of biological methods 
of warfare. Unfortunately, the agree- 
ment bans only the use of chemical 
weapons— not their possession. It is, 
furthermore, essentially a ban only on 
first use, since most of the important 
military powers, including the United 
States and the Soviet Union, have 
reserved the right to retaliate in kind to 
an enemy's use of chemical weapons. 
Our eventual objective is the achieve- 
ment of a new, multilateral treaty that 
bans chemical weapons altogether and 
requires effective verification and com- 
pliance. 



Achievement of such a treaty would 
be a significant milestone for mankind. 
But it will not be easy. The critical 
obstacle to forward movement has been 
Soviet intransigence on verification and 
compliance issues. Any effective 
chemical weapons agreement must in- 
sure the destruction of chemical stocks 
and must contain adequate monitoring 
provisions so that no party clandestinely 
retains or produces chemical weapons. 
Recent Soviet violations have underlined 
the absolute necessity for effective veri- 
fication and monitoring of any chemical 
weapons agreement. 

As a means of moving the process 
forward, we have shifted our effort from 
bilateral U.S. -Soviet negotiations to the 
U.N. Committee on Disarmament. The 
bilateral negotiations, begun in 1977, 
lapsed in deadlock in mid-1980. The 
Soviet Union was unwilling to accept 
reasonable provisions for verifying the 
destruction of existing stocks of chemi- 
cal weapons and disposition of their 
places of manufacture. In addition, the 
Soviets were not prepared to agree to 
effective procedures for assuring con- 
tinued compliance. 

P'or these reasons, we are focusing 
our current efforts in Geneva. It is the 
role of the U.N. Committee on Disarma- 
ment to develop multilateral arms con- 
trol agreements. The United States is an 
active participant in ongoing efforts 
there toward elaborating a comprehen- 
sive agreement banning chemical 
weapons. 

We have conducted this arms control 
effort against a background of unilateral 



restraint. Since 1969, we have not 
manufactured any lethal or incapacitat- 
ing chemical weapons. Successive U.S. 
administrations have repeatedly assured 
that we will never initiate chemical war- 
fare. 



Soviet Buildup 

However, our restraint has not been 
matched by the Soviet Union. During 
this same 13-year period, the Soviets 
have continued to strengthen their mili- 
tary chemical warfare capability. This 
Soviet buildup extends well beyond 
reasonable deterrence requirements. 

This threat to our security has re- 
cently been brought into sharper focus 
by the actual use of chemical weapons in 
Afghanistan and chemical and toxin 
weapons in Southeast Asia. Compelling 
evidence was presented to Congress on 
March 22 and May 13 of this year; that 
evidence continues to accumulate. We 
are analyzing indications that these at- 
tacks are continuing unabated, despite 
international efforts to stop them. Such 
attacks are illegal. The use of chemical 
weapons is a violation of the 1925 
Geneva protocol and related rules of in- 
ternational law. Possession alone of 
toxin weapons is a violation of the 1972 
Biological Weapons Convention. On 
June 17, 1982, President Reagan speci- 
fically called attention to such violations 
in his address to the Second Special Ses 
sion of the United Nations Devoted to 
Disarmament. 

Unfortunately, our numerous de- 
marches to the Soviets have been re- 
buffed. Despite overwhelming evidence, 
the Soviets continue to deny these illega 
acts are taking place. A paper of re- 
buttal, attributed to experts from the 
IJ.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, the 
U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health, and other 
Soviet organizations, which was submit- 
ted to the United Nations on May 21, 
has been described in a recent issue of 
Science magazine, an independent, non- 
governmental scientific publication, as 
containing "extravagant conjectures." 

Despite this discouraging back- 
ground, we remain actively interested ii 
achieving our goal of a universal and 
comprehensive chemical weapons ban. 
We intend, in the upcoming session of 
the U.N. Committee on Disarmament ii 
July, to explore fully all areas of the 
Soviet proposal recently submitted to 
the U.N. Special Session on Disarma- 
ment. Preliminary analysis of this pro- 
posal indicates that most of it is not 
new. However, it contains a few ele- 
ments of potential interest. The signifi- 



Department of Stafe Bullet! 



MILITARY AFFAIRS 



iiu'c of these new elements is not clear; 
wiiuld be premature to conclude that 
itrc had been a breakthrough. Frankly, 
e have not resumed the bilateral 
siussions because there is little pros- 
■it for productive negotiations under 
listing circumstances. Should the 
ivii'ts demonstrate a willingness to ac- 
•[it u'^enuinely effective verification and 
iiii[iliance arrangements, and should 
ifV demonstrate a willingness to abide 
/ existing international obligations on 
lemical, biological, and toxin weapons, 
e prospects for serious bilateral work 
ould be enhanced. 

.S. Initiatives 

II executive agencies of this Admini- 
ration concerned with national securi- 
, as well as previous Congresses, have 
■ncluded that we can no longer forego 
odernization of our chemical warfare 
'terrent, which is a modest one meas- 
ed against Soviet capabilities. Our na- 
)nal security policy must address the 
alities of the world we live in. Our 
ilitary forces must have the capability 
deter threats to ourselves and our 
ies. This requires maintaining ade- 
.late U.S. stocks. It also requires im- 
(ovement of protective and defensive 
easures against chemical attack, which 
the primary emphasis of our program. 

The report to Congress on the U.S. 
«emical warfare deterrence program 
(bmitted by the U.S. Department of 
efense in March of this year presents 
J- situation in detail. The difficult deci- 
)n to modernize our chemical weapons 
pability was undertaken only with 
luctance, after long and painstaking 
amination of our obsolete and 
teriorating assets. The Congress, 
lich actually moved ahead of the ex- 
utive branch in encouraging moderni- 
tion of our chemical deterrent, con- 
lues to review each step of this pro- 
am carefully. 

S. Cooperation With Allies 

le United States has kept its allies ful- 
informed of its program and of its 
cisions, over the past several years, to 
gin modernization of U.S. chemical 
irfare capabilities. In March 1981, we 
formed our allies of the Administra- 
)n's decision to seek funding for the 
cility at Pine Bluff, Arkansas. In Feb- 
ary of this year, we informed our 
lies of our decision to seek funding for 
oduction. We believe it is inappro- 
iate to ask allies to share responsi- 



;tober1982 



Production of the MX Missile 



PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO 
THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, 
JULY 16, 1982' 

I am writing to you and your colleagues to 
enlist your support in a bipartisan effort that 
I feel is essential to our national security and 
indeed the security of the free world in the 
troubled decades ahead. We have begun to 
negotiate with the Soviet Union what we 
earnestly hope will be an equitable and 
verifiable Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. I 
know that you will agree with me that we 
must maintain a position of unity and 
strength during these talks which are so vital 
to mankind. 

Last fall I presented my Strategic 
Modernization Program to you for approval. I 
am pleased to say that since then we have 
taken the critical first steps needed to put 
the plan into action. Our initiatives for 
bomber modernization, strategic communica- 
tions improvement, the Trident II program, 
and strategic defense are well under way. Im- 
plementation of our plan for ICBM [intercon- 
tinental ballistic missile] modernization, 
however, is not keeping pace with the overall 
program. I believe that we need positive and 
prompt action to correct that situation. 

With respect to M-X basing, I set forth a 
plan for resolving this issue by the spring of 
1984. The Senate has now asked us to modify 
this plan. In its recent Defense Authorization 
Report the Senate expressed a desire for us 
to select a permament basing mode by 
December of this year. I believe we can, with 
your help, meet that date. 

As you know, however, the Senate failed 
to authorize the production funds needed to 
begin the production of the M-X missile 
itself. I cannot over-emphasize to you the 
serious negative impact this can have on our 
negotiations with the Soviets and our 
modernization program. Failure to authorize 
these funds will delay the program a year 
and increase the cost. Thus, it is essential 
that the House act to approve the production 
funds and that this action prevail in con- 
ference. 

I believe that we must make a solid com- 
mitment this year to deploy the M-X missile. 
We simply cannot allow the land-based leg of 
the triad to remain vulnerable. We must also 
show our Allies that we can make the hard 
decisions necessary to modernize our strate- 
gic nuclear capacity — decisions that promise 
to have great influence on the pace of ongo- 
ing Theater Nuclear Force modernization ini- 
tiatives within NATO. And while it is my in- 
tention that the M-X not be a "bargaining 



chip" in the START negotiations, we need to 
secure the powerful leverage that a commit- 
ment to produce the M-X would provide as 
we begin effective arms reduction talks with 
the Soviets. Finally, we need to capitalize on 
the sizeable investment of some $4.5 billion 
that has already been made in the M-X pro- 
gram. These goals can only be achieved if 
decisive action is taken now to proceed with 
M-X production and deployment. 

As you review this issue, I want to assure 
you that we intend to propose a final basing 
mode for the M-X by December. Some 
Members of Congress have expressed con- 
cern over the approval of basing funds before 
the basing mode is announced in December. I 
recognize that concern and will cooperate 
fully if the Congress wishes to place restric- 
tions on the use of these funds until the bas- 
ing decision is made in December. I urge you, 
however, to send a clear signal of strong U.S. 
resolve to the Soviets by fully authorizing 
and appropriating the funds I have requested 
for the M-X, especially those funds needed to 
begin production of the M-X this year. I need 
your full support of this vital program so that 
we can make the critical decisions we must in 
December to implement this much needed 
element to our modernization program. I fur- 
ther urge you to support restoration of the 
research and development budget for Ballistic 
Missile Defense to the level I have requested 
so that this program can maintain its proper 
place in relation to the M-X. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Reagan 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
JULY 21, 19821 

I am most gratified by today's House 
vote approving funds for production of 
the MX missile. This strong, bipartisan 
action demonstrates clearly the commit- 
ment of the Congress to improving 
America's defenses, thereby providing 
important support for Ambassador 
Rowny [Edward L. Rowny, head of the 
U.S. delegation to the START negotia- 
tions] in his negotiations with the Soviet 
Union on strategic arms reductions. I 
look forward to working with House and 
Senate conferees to insure final passage 
of the MX authorization. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 26, 1982. 



bility for a U.S. national security deci- 
sion and have not done so. No allied 
government has expressed opposition to 
these steps or otherwise commented on 
the substance of the decision to seek 
funds for production. 



For many years, it has been agreed 
NATO doctrine that an effective chemi- 
cal warfare retaliatory capability is an 
essential part of the continuum of deter- 
rence. We have informed our allies, as 
we have informed the Congress, that 



there has been no decision on forward 
deployment of binary chemical weapons, 
and none is currently under considera- 
tion. Our allies have been assured we 
will consult fully with any other nation 
involved prior to making such a decision. 
Since it will be several years before pro- 
duction begins, and several years there- 
after before stockpiles are accumulated, 
no consideration of deployment else- 
where is likely for some time to come. 
Our allies understand and accept that 
we have no plans at this time to deploy 
any binary chemical munitions in any 
foreign country. 

Our allies, like ourselves, are com- 
mitted to seeking through arms control 
a complete ban on the production and 
stockpiling of chemical weapons. To- 
gether we are pressing for progress 
toward such an agreement in the U.N. 
Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. 
They also recognize that the principal 
hurdle to be overcome is that of verifica- 
tion and the need to assure effective 
compliance. 

The Need for Deterrence 

We are well aware that chemical 
weapons are an emotional issue, in allied 
countries as well as our own. But as 
leader of the free world, the United 
States has a particular obligation to 
demonstrate resolve in maintaining the 
peace. One can debate whether posses- 
sion of a particular weapon will deter 
the use of similar weapons by others, 
and one can debate what types and 
levels of arms should be maintained. But 
debate about chemical warfare has yet 
to identify a deterrent that does not in- 
clude a chemical weapons component, 
without posing the additional risks of 
undesirable escalation or unacceptable 
accommodation. The history of World 
War II bears witness to the effectiveness 
of chemical weapons as a component of 
such a deterrent. According to postwar 
testimony by enemy officials, Allied 
possession of chemical weapons effec- 
tively deterred the Axis powers from us- 
ing their chemical weapons, though they 
had accumulated large stocks. 

In sum, we seek to achieve through 
negotiations a verifiable ban on all 
chemical weapons. Until success is 
achieved, we must reduce or eliminate 
Soviet incentives to use chemical 
weapons against us or our allies. This 
can be done by modernizing and main- 
taining an adequate chemical warfare 
deterrent posture. Our chemical 
weapons modernization actions do not 
represent a decision to place greater em- 



OCEANS 



phasis upon chemical warfare, nor do we 
plan to match Soviet capabilities. Our 
objective is to have the safest, smallest 
level of chemical munitions that provides 
us the deterrent we need. 



Law of the Sea 
and Oceans Policy 

by James L. Malone 

Statement before the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee on August 12, 1982. 
Ambassador Malone is special represent- 
ative to the President for the Third U.N. 
Conference on Law of the Sea.'^ 

Today, I'd like to review the results of 
the 11th session of the Law of the Sea 
Conference. You asked that I briefly 
summarize our efforts to achieve the 
President's objectives at that session and 
also indicated an interest in the future 
oceans policy alternatives available to 
the United States. 

As you are aware, the President an- 
nounced his decision to not sign the Law 
of the Sea treaty on July 9. With your 
permission, I would like the President's 
statement to be made a part of the 
record.^ 

When the President indicated last 
January 29 that the United States would 
return to the Law of the Sea negotia- 
tions and work in good faith with other 
countries to achieve an acceptable trea- 
ty, we hoped that the final draft conven- 
tion would be one that the United States 
could sign. At that point, the President 
emphasized that the United States re- 
mained strongly committed to the multi- 
lateral process for reaching agreement. 

It was in this spirit that the United 
States went to the 11th session of the 
Law of the Sea Conference. The U.S. 
delegation repeatedly demonstrated its 
flexibility in a wide variety of ways and 
exerted every effort to find compromise 
solutions. Proposals were adjusted in 
timing and format to meet the concerns 
of the Group of 77. Midway through the 
conference, in fact, we sought and were 
authorized to change our instructions in 
order to break the negotiating deadlock. 



>The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be avaikble from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Despite these efforts, and the effort 
of a number of other countries trying t< 
encourage negotiations, I must report 
that no meaningful negotiations took 
place on our proposed changes to 
Part XI. The attitude of many was ac- 
tively resistant to change that might 
have made it possible to alleviate our 
concerns. As a result, we are left with 
Law of the Sea treaty which, as Presi- 
dent Reagan recently stated, fails to 
meet U.S. objectives. 

There are, of course, positive 
elements in the treaty. These elements 
demonstrate what can be accomplished 
through multilateral diplomacy when a j|„ 
serious effort to find solutions and to 
reach compromises is made. 

I emphasize strongly that the Unit« ^ 
States went to the conference fully pre „ 
pared to work— and negotiate— to fine 
mutually acceptable solutions that wou 
have satisfied our objectives and that 
provided a fair and balanced system fo 
promoting the development of deep 
seabed resources as a benefit to all na- 
tions. 

I can't say what the result might 
have been had such negotiations taken 
place. It is certainly possible that the 
final outcome would have been the 
same. However, I believe it possible th 
the majority of delegations would have 
recognized that the United States and 
the cosponsors of its final amendment; 
were not seeking to change the basic 
structure of the draft treaty. We did n 
try to destroy the system. Instead, we 
sought to make it work to the benefit 
all nations to enhance, not resist, seab 
resource development. 



The Vote 

On April 30, the conference adopti 
the treaty text by a vote of 130 in favi 
4 against, with 17 abstentions. The thi 
states other than the United States th 
voted against the treaty's adoption we 
Israel, Turkey, and Venezuela and the 



fc 



17 states abstaining included the United 
Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
[taly, Spain, Thailand, and the Soviet 
jIoc, except for Romania. While the 
■easons which prompted these countries 
;o abstain or to vote against the treaty 
,vere varied, and not necessarily the 
ame as ours, the number and economic 
mportance of countries expressing 
displeasure with the treaty text was of 
jreat significance. 

As President Reagan noted, those 
;ountries produce more than 60% of the 
vorld's gross national product. They 
ilso provide more than 60% of the con- 
ributions to the United Nations. In- 
cluded in these countries are most of 
hose who have, or are likely to develop, 
;eabed mining technology. I would, 
herefore, have to say that the negotia- 
ions on the seabed mining provisions 
■epresent a major failure of interna- 
ional diplomacy, in that important con- 
:erns of those countries most closely 
elated to seabed mining were not taken 
nto account. 

The decision to call for a vote and to 
ast our vote against the treaty was not 
aken lightly. The United States has 
>een centrally involved in the conference 
irocess at every stage since its incep- 
ion. We did not easily dismiss the per- 
onal commitment and great dedication 
■f hundreds of delegates who worked 
ears for this agreement — even when 
lany of them, in the end, opposed the 
J.S. proposals. 

In addition to the support of our 
Hies, I would like to take special note of 
he effort of the so-called Group of 11 
/Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, 
'inland, Iceland, Ireland, New Zealand, 
lorway, Sweden, and Switzerland), 
'hese countries prepared their own 
mendments, which they hoped would 
erve as a basis for negotiations be- 
ween the United States and the Group 
f 77. The Group of 1 1 proposals pro- 
ided a useful basis for addressing some 
J.S. concerns. Other elements, however, 
ell considerably short of the U.S. objec- 
ives. Most importantly, many U.S. con- 
erns were not addressed at all by the 
iroup of 1 1 proposals. When the Group 
•f 77 insisted that the United States and 
ts allies accept the Group of 11 pro- 
losals as an exhaustive negotiating 
genda, we were unable to accede. 



J.S. Assessment 

Next, I would like to make the 
bllowing general assessment regarding 
he text of the Law of the Sea conven- 



tion as it was finally adopted on 
April 30. We were successful in working 
with others to insure that no adverse 
changes were made to navigation and 
overflight provisions. Portions of the 
treaty dealing with these issues, and 
many other nonseabed provisions, while 
not optimal, remain consistent with U.S. 
interests. 

The deep seabed mining provisions, 
on the other hand, do not even minimal- 
ly meet U.S. objectives. I would like to 
recall at this point that the President set 
out six objectives in his statement of 
January 29, 1982. I must report that 
none of these objectives was achieved. 
As a result, the Law of the Sea treaty is 
seriously flawed. 

The regime created by the treaty 
would seriously discourage private in- 
vestment in deep seabed mineral produc- 
tion. A fundamental lack of certainty 
would exist with regard to the granting 
of mining contracts and mandatory tech- 
nology transfer requirements. These 
provisions violate a basic principle that 
owners of technology have rights in its 
sale and use. Beyond even that, the trea- 
ty would impose burdensome financial 
requirements on the mining operations. 
The rules and regulations to be devel- 
oped in the preparatory commission can- 
not cure these defects. 

For the United States, the resolution 
on preparatory investment protection 
might have been acceptable had negotia- 
tions on seabed mining portions of the 
treaty led to improvement of its defects. 
But the resolution fails to correct these 
defects of the treaty and creates addi- 
tional problems of its own. The resolu- 
tion would require a pioneer investor, 
such as one of our existing U.S. mining 
companies, to assume heavy financial 
obligations in addition to those contained 
in the convention. It also allows the 
U.S.S.R., Japan, and other countries to 
achieve pioneer investor status, even 
though their seabed mining activities 
have been extremely limited to date. 

The financial obligations of the 
resolution on preparatory investment 
protection would include payment of 
$250,000 upon registration with the 
preparatory commission, the accrual of a 
$1 million annual fee payable upon ap- 
proval of a plan of work when the con- 
vention enters into force, payment of 
$250,000 for processing a plan of work, 
and expenditures to meet diligence re- 
quirements to be established by the pre- 
paratory commission. 

Additional obligations for a pioneer 
investor include exploration of the 



OCEANS 



reserved area — on a reimbursable 
basis — at the request of the preparatory 
commission, training of personnel 
designated by the preparatory commis- 
sion, and the transfer of technology 
prior to entry into force of the treaty. 

Beyond the practical problems which 
it creates for seabed mining, the conven- 
tion presents other serious difficulties. 
The decisionmaking system of the Inter- 
national Seabed Authority would be 
structured so that the United States and 
other potential deep seabed mineral pro- 
ducers and consumers would be given in- 
adequate protection against adverse 
policy and operational decisions. 

The treaty provides for a review 
conference which, after 5 years of 
negotiations, may adopt amendments to 
the deep seabed mining regime that 
could automatically enter into force for 
the United States upon approval by 
three-fourths of the states parties and 
thus effectively bypass U.S. approval, in- 
cluding congressional advice and con- 
sent. Our only recourse would be denun- 
ciation of the convention — an unaccep- 
table choice. 

The convention would allow funding 
for national liberation groups, such as 
the Palestine Liberation Organization 
and the South West Africa People's 
Organization. 

The convention would artificially 
limit deep seabed mineral production 
and would permit discretionary and dis- 
criminatory decisions by the Authority if 
there is competition for limited produc- 
tion allocations. 

The treaty would, in effect, create 
far too many privileges for the Enter- 
prise, the seabed mining arm of the In- 
ternational Seabed Authority— advan- 
tages which would make it extremely 
difficult, and perhaps impossible, for 
private ventures to compete, at least 
without national subsidies. A monopoly 
over deep seabed mineral production 
could thus result. In effect, this could 
destroy the parallel system which, as 
you may recall, was the central com- 
promise worked out several years ago. 
These provisions would tend to discour- 
age or prevent any other kind of deep 
seabed mining under the treaty. 

I believe it accurate to say that 
there is a clear preponderance of feeling 
among those involved in deep seabed 
consortia companies that they could not 
and would not carry out commercial 
mining under the treaty. Naturally, this 
is a great disappointment to all those 
who have worked for years to create 
conditions that encouraged the develop- 
ment of a new industry able to benefit 
the nations of the world. 



49 



SECURITY ASSISTANCE 



It was for these reasons that the 
United States could not agree to the 
adoption of the final text by consensus. 
Instead, it asked for a vote; then, on 
April 30, voted against the treaty's 
adoption. 

I have provided to the committee 
copies of the unclassified U.S. delegation 
report which describes the conference 
session, our negotiating efforts, and our 
assessments of the text in greater detail. 

Some have suggested that we should 
have agreed to the treaty because it is 
our only means of assured access to sea- 
bed minerals. As I have noted earlier, 
this treaty does not, in fact, provide 
assured access. The procedures for 
granting contracts are not automatic. 
There is no way that a company or na- 
tion can be certain that it will secure 
mining authorization by the Interna- 
tional Seabed Authority. In reality, it is 
highly unlikely that there will by any in- 
vestment in seabed mining under the 
treaty, unless governments are willing 
to subsidize their companies or mining 
entities. 

It has been suggested that we have 
sacrificed commercial interests in the 
deep seabed for some goal of ideological 
purity. This factually misrepresents the 
aims of this Administration. We have 
dealt largely with concrete issues. The 
treaty creates real practical problems 
for deep seabed mining, which have 
nothing to do with ideology. There are 
important matters of principle involved, 
but these are important not only to us 
but to other nations as well. One cannot 
dismiss these widespread concerns as in- 
significant. They were of overriding im- 
portance to many members of the Group 
of 77, who saw these issues as directly 
relevant to other North-South negotia- 
tions and their underlying goal of a new 
international economic order. 

The mandatory technology transfer 
issue is a case in point. The implications 
of agreement in the Law of the Sea con- 
text go far beyond these negotiations. 
Other delegations recognized that fact 
from the beginning. It would have been 
foolish or naive to have pretended that 
this wasn't true. 

Clearly, the United States could not 
go along with a treaty that failed to sup- 
port so many important U.S. oceans in- 
terests. Further, I don't believe that the 
treaty adopted on April 30 had any 
chance of approval by the Congress. In 
my considered opinion, to have voted for 
the treaty would have been a breach of 
faith with our allies and friends but 
mostly with the American people, whose 



50 



future is irrevocably linked to the 
elements of any treaty on the use of the 
sea. 

Looking ahead, three stages of the 
conference remain. First, the drafting 
committee has been meeting in Geneva 
this month and last to complete review 
of the text. Second, an informal plenary 
will meet in New York on Septem- 
ber 22-24 to adopt final drafting com- 
mittee changes. 'Third, the final act will 
be opened for signature and interpretive 
statements in Caracas in early Decem- 
ber. The United States will participate 
in the remaining conference process at a 
technical level and will be concerned 
with those provisions that serve U.S. in- 
terests. 

This Administration will continue 
developing national oceans policy, ex- 
amining the actions which the United 
States needs to take to protect and 
enhance its oceans interests outside the 



Law of the Sea convention. It is too ear- ^ 
ly now to state what these actions might " 
be. We do believe that we must be 
prepared not only to meet any chall- 
enges to traditional maritime activities 
but to take new initiatives to assure the 
orderly development of oceans resources 
in response to market forces. We will 
continue to consult with other countries 
who have common oceans interests, as 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
will be an essential element of the new 
policy. 

We will also continue to work closeh 
with this committee and with other com 
mittees in Congress concerned with the 
Law of the Sea and with related oceans 
policy. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

2For text see Bulletin of Aug. 1982, 
p. 71. ■ 



Conventional Arms Transfers in 
the Third World, 1972-81 



FOREWORD 

Sales and deliveries of major conven- 
tional arms — tanks, warplanes, artillery, 
and naval ships — to the developing na- 
tions have led to rising arms inventories 
and growing military capabilities in the 
Third World. Some of these have been 
stabilizing, some destabilizing; some in 
the U.S. national interest, and some not. 
Many nations, large and small, engage 
in the transfer of arms as part of their 
foreign policies, but the U.S.S.R., the 
United States, France, the United 
Kingdom, Italy, West Germany, and the 
East European Communist nations are 
by far the most significant suppliers. 

The United States, however, is not, 
by any reasonable measure, the leading 
supplier of weaponry to the Third World 
that many people believe it is. If they il- 
lustrate anything, trends in the Third 
World arms trade illustrate the degree 
of U.S. restraint. \n the first half of the 
decade covered by this report, which in- 
cluded the last years of the Vietnam 
war, the United States delivered larger 
quantities than other exporting nations 
or groups of nations in 7 of the 12 cate- 
gories of major conventional weapons 
used in this report. In the second half- 
decade, however, the United States did 
not lead in any category and in one cate- 
gory (missile-equipped patrol boats) dur- 



iles 



ing these years did not export anything mi 
at all. The Soviets, by contrast, led in 
four categories between 1972 and 1976 leaf 
and in the last half-decade led in seven. 
Similarly, the major West European 
arms exporters as a group were first in 
only one category of arms between 197 
and 1976 but between 1977 and 1981 le 
in five categories. 

We ourselves are partly to blame fc 
the misconceptions that abound on this 
subject. First of all, nowhere else in the 
world are arms transfers the subject of 
so much governmental disclosure, of 
such intensive legislative scrutiny, or sc 
extensive a public debate. This is as it 
should be, because we are a free societjltof 
and because decisions to supply or not 1 i\x 
supply weapons to states not firmly 
linked to us by shared history, values, 
and security alliances must be made onj 
after the most serious deliberation. Sec 
ondly, our reports of "military sales" in 
elude a large proportion of transactions 
having little directly to do with the 
transfer of arms. For example, military 
sales, as normally reported, include con 
struction (sometimes of hospitals), train 
ing, and various management services, 
along with weapons systems and their 
spare parts and support equipment. Bu 
one result of this way of doing business 
as contrasted with that of other nations 



H 
surf 
We 
Ill- 



Department of State Bulletli tlotif 



SECURITY ASSISTANCE 



3 the impression of the United States as 
he Third World's leading armorer. That 
mpression, as the following report 
nakes clear, is significantly off the 
nark. 

We recognize arms transfers as a 
' egitimate and sometimes necessary in- 
trument of foreign and national securi- 
y policy. To suggest, however, that the 
f.S. Government in this or in past Ad- 
ninistrations has sought indiscriminately 

press arms upon Third World nations 
^ IV it supported by the facts. Other na- 
idiis do not disclose the nature and 
?vels of their foreign military sales or 

: ssistance to the same extent. Our 
; nowledge of their activities, particular- 
/ those of the Communist states, is not 
omplete. The data on their arms trans- 
ers contained in this report must, there- 
3re, be regarded as the best minimum, 
ut nonetheless reliable, estimate we can 
lake. 

Few activities are as difficult to 
■ leasure as arms transfers. Data are in- 
omplete, and estimates in monetary 
?rms, the most commonly used 
leasure, are fraught with many prob- 
, 'ms. These difficulties include the large 

1 ifferences in the composition of arms 
iles and security assistance programs 
•om one arms-exporting nation to 
nother, down to such technical prob- 
•ms as accurate foreig^n exchange con- 

e srsion and varying prices charged in 

itferent situations for any given foreign 
: eapons system, particularly the more 
; xpensive ones. 

For these reasons, the following 
r. ;port presents arms transfer data 
': rimarily in terms of the numbers of 
e; lajor conventional weapons systems 
elivered to the Third World over the 
ecade 1972-81. Because they are con- 
: -ete, these data are less subject to 
t nalytic misinterpretation and technical 
i: roblems than dollar estimates. Further, 
i is niore difficult for any arms supplier 
) conceal, for example, the delivery of a 
^uadron of interceptor aircraft than it 
to hide the existence, substance, and 
alue of an arms agreement. Our data 
ase from this perspective, while still 
ot all encompassing, is more nearly 
jmplete. And the numbers involved in 
lis mode of estimating are more tangi- 
le and thus more easily understood. 
The following report makes clear 
lat, while dollar estimates of arms 
ansfer agreements have in fact been 
ising, constant dollar estimates have 
een more nearly level over the past 
ecade, though both have fluctuated 
'idely from year to year (Figure 1). Ac- 



|)ctober1982 



tual deliveries of the major conventional 
weapons systems covered in this report 
show the absence of any significant up- 
ward trend (Figure 2), although many of 
the newer systems are significantly 
more effective — as are the defenses 
against them. 

The data demonstrate that far from 
the popular image of upwardly spiraling 
conventional arms trade, that trade, at 
least as measured by the number of 
weapons actually delivered, is at best er- 
ratic but reasonably level over any 
significant period of time. They do not, 
however, take into account reductions in 
Third World arms inventories caused by 
war losses, obsolescence, or simple in- 
ability to maintain and repair increasing- 
ly complex and expensive equipment. 
Data in numbers of weapons cannot, of 
course, take account of increases in the 
sophistication, military effectiveness, and 
cost burden of modern weapons. Thus 
the rising cost of modern military equip- 
ment may well serve to restrain ag- 
gregate transfers to the poorer coun- 
tries if not actually to reduce them. 

Figure 3, summarizing the cate- 
gories of major weapons delivered to the 
Third World over the past decade from 
all sources, bears this out. Naval vessels 
and ground force weapons deliveries 
were nearly level over the decade 
(though again varying widely from year 
to year), and military aircraft show a 
slight downward trend. 

Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate quite 
clearly the second major conclusion we 
draw from these data: The United 
States is not, by and large, the leading 
source of major items of military equip- 
ment to the Third World. Figure 4 
shows U.S. transfers of military aircraft 
and helicopters, for example, clearly 
declining from a Vietnam war peak at 
the beginning of the decade. By con- 
trast, Soviet and other European Com- 
munist aircraft transfers rose rather 
steadily over the same period to levels 
roughly three to four times those of the 
United States in recent years. West 
European and other suppliers constitute 
another very substantial source of 
military aircraft during this entire 
period, delivering more than twice the 
U.S. levels of recent years. 

Figure 5, showing deliveries of ma- 
jor items of ground force equipment, 
also underscores the wide margin by 
which Soviet deliveries in this area have 
exceeded those by the United States 
over much of the decade. It is further 
evident that these transfers varied wide- 



ly from year to year and that here also, 
there is no clear upward or downward 
trend. 

Figure 4 combines Soviet and other 
European Communist transfers, which is 
an appropriate basis for comparison 
given the responsiveness of Warsaw 
Pact actions to Soviet policy direction. 
Figure 5, by contrast, counts Warsaw 
Pact transfers in the "Other" category, 
yet even then, Soviet deliveries alone 
significantly exceed those of the United 
States. 

Finally, Figure 6 demonstrates the 
substantial degree to which Soviet and 
Soviet plus other European Communist 
deliveries of the tanks and self-propelled 
guns have exceeded those of the United 
States. 

This report makes clear that several 
popular misconceptions about the U.S. 
role in arms transfers to the Third 
World are not based on fact. And it will 
thus provide a more accurate footing for 
future debates over U.S. policy. It does 
not, however, help us determine the wis- 
dom of particular arms transfers. Those 
decisions can only come from the in- 
formed public and congressional con- 
sideration of Administration proposals 
that is uniquely possible in the United 
States. To insure that that consideration 
is as well-informed as possible, the Con- 
gress has been and will continue to be 
provided more detailed classified reports 
on conventional arms transfers to the 
Third World as required by the Arms 
Export Control Act. 

This report is intended to be the 
first of a regular series, making public 
as much of such data as is possible. It, 
as well as the classified reports 
presented to the Congress, presents con- 
clusions and data which are fully shared 
by all relevant agencies of the U.S. 
Government. 

James L. Buckley 

Under Secretary of State for Security 
Assistance, Science, and Technology 



51 



SECURITY ASSISTANCE 



FIGURE 1 

Dollar Value of Arms Agreements 




x' \ Constant 1972 
^^ dollars 



1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 



Year 



FIGURE 2 

Total Arms Deliveries 




52 



1972 



1973 



1974 



1975 



1976 



1977 



1978 



1979 



1980 



1981 



Department of State Bulle 



SECURITY ASSISTANCE 



FIGURES 

Ground Weapons, Naval Vessels, and Air Weapons Delivered 



15,000 




1972 



1973 



1974 



1975 



1976 



1977 



1978 



1979 



1980 



1981 



1500 



•i 1000 



FIGURE 4 

Military Aircraft Delivered 



/^^ U.S.S.R. and other 

/' ^N^European Communist 




Other 



SECURITY ASSISTANCE 



9000 
8000 
7000 

I 6000 

n 

5 

■S 5000 

o 

a 

I 4000 

z 

3000 
2000 
1000 



FIGURES 

Major Ground Weapons Delivered 



\ 






\ 






\ 






\ 






\o 






t 


• V 




Vr^ 


• . 




\ 

\ 






\ 






^^ ^^^ '^ 




^ 






1 "-^^ ^"^ 


"^Os 


/ 

/ 


/ "^ ^ ^^ 






<Jr/ ^^^ / 




Vn 


'o'/ ^^''^^ "" ~ ' 




\ V 


Ov ^^^ — ^^.^ 




\ N_ 


/ ^s^^^-""^ ^"""-^ 




\ 


' 




\ 


1 1 1 1 I 


11)1 


\ 



1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 



3000 



2600 



2200 



Tanks, sell -propel led guns, light armor, and artillery 
Includes European Communist countries excluding U S S R 



FIGURES 

Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns Delivered 



& 




iii 

5 


1800 


o 




oi 

n 
E 


1400 



1000 



600 



200 



/ \ 

' \ U.S.S.R. and other 
/ I European Communist 
/ ^ 




U.S.S.R. 



1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 



_cj_ 



Department of State Bulletin 



SECURITY ASSISTANCE 



ANALYSIS OF DATA 

The estimated constant-dollar value and 
quantities of conventional weapons sold 
and delivered to countries other than 
members of the major military alliances 
or states closely associated with them 
have remained fairly constant from year 
to year throughout the past decade. At 
the same time, patterns of supply have 
changed significantly. There has been a 
net growth in the military inventories of 
Third World countries; however, this 
report does not take into account reduc- 
tions caused by combat losses, obsolete 
equipment scrapped, or weaponry not 
usable for lack of spare parts and sup- 
port. 

As the term is used here, the "Third 
World" includes all nations except 
members of NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact; other European countries not 
belonging to either alliance; and Japan, 
Australia, and New Zealand. Other 
definititions of "Third World" could 
significantly affect summaries of this 
sort, but this one is broad enough to en- 
compass most parts of the world where 
limited, conventional military conflicts 
have been occurring and in which the 
buying of weaponry may have a social 
and economic impact disproportionate to 
the size of the purchases. 

Problems in Measurement and Data 

Few activities are as difficult to measure 
as arms sales. The arms trade abounds 
in rumors, in part because most nations 
consider military sales or purchases as 
national security information and 
restrict disclosure of their activities. The 
United States, uniquely, publishes con- 
siderable data on its security assistance 
programs and arms transfers; in no 
other nation are arms exports subjected 
to such close legislative control and 
public scrutiny. Other free-world sup- 
pliers and recipients disclose enough in- 
formation, either officially or through in- 
formation media and public debate, for 
reasonable estimates to be made. In con- 
trast. Communist states — and many 
countries to which they provide arms — 
not only reveal little or no information 
to the general public but actively at- 
tempt to conceal their security 
assistance programs and arms sales or 
purchases from other governments. The 
estimated arms agreement dollar values 
i and the quantities of Communist arms 
i delivered, as presented here, undoubted- 
I ly err on the conservative side, but we 
cannot judge precisely how much lower 
than the reality they in fact are. 



October 1982 



The most commonly used denomina- 
tors of the arms trade are the monetary 
values and the quantities of weapons 
sold or delivered. Each has short- 
comings and neither is a true measure of 
military capability. The price of foreign 
weapons is not always known, forcing 
analysts to rely upon estimates of cost 
or upon the known prices of similar 
weapons. Even if a price may be reliably 
reported in one case, prices vary with 
the terms and conditions of other trans- 
actions — one purchaser may acquire a 
weapon as a grant or on highly conces- 
sional terms, whereas a more affluent 
buyer, or a less effective bargainer, may 
pay more. In other cases, the price — 
particularly of major weapons such as 
aircraft, armor, and warships — may be 
lowered by production offsets, commodi- 
ty barter, payment in soft currencies, or 
even by a supplier's eagerness to make a 
sale for political or economic reasons. A 
weapon's unit price also can be affected 
by the quantities bought, varying pur- 
chaser requirements for training in its 
use and maintenance, or differing levels 
of spare parts and ammunition ordered. 

Third World purchasing patterns, if 
measured only in current dollars and 
over only a few years, appear to be 
sharply rising and increasingly erratic 
because of multibillion dollar, multiyear 
arms agreements, reflecting not only in- 
flation but also growing exports of high- 
technology (hence, very expensive) mili- 
tary equipment. Nowhere in the Third 
World is this phenomenon more evident 
than in the Near East and South Asia, 
but it is apparent in other regions as 
well. 

It should be noted that, in the 
earlier years covered by this study, 
prices estimated for Soviet weapons 
were considerably lower than those 
charged for similar Western weaponry. 
Since 1977 and possibly earlier, how- 
ever, Soviet prices appear to have been 
increasing, so that they now roughly 
equal or sometimes exceed those of com- 
parable Western arms. This is reflected 
in the rising dollar estimates, year by 
year, of Soviet arms agreements com- 
pared to the more nearly constant esti- 
mated number of Soviet weapons 
delivered. 

Estimates of numbers and types of 
weapons delivered, particularly of the 
large systems, provide a more interest- 
ing and more concrete measure of mili- 
tary capability transferred. They do not, 
however, take into account the varying 
levels of sophistication within a category 
of weapons — an F-5 or MiG-21 fighter, 
for example, is less capable for most 
missions than is an F-16 or MiG-23. 



Nor do the numbers and kinds of 
weapons in a country's inventory neces- 
sarily reflect their appropriateness to 
the type of conflict in which they might 
be used or to the buyer's ability to main- 
tain them and use them effectively in 
combat. Again, it must be noted that 
our data base is not complete on all reci- 
pients. 

The Arms Exporters 

Inevitably, a report of this kind will in- 
vite a comparison of the arms sales of 
different nations. Here, too, a warning is 
appropriate, particularly where mone- 
tary values are the unit of measurement. 
Security assistance and arms transfer 
programs vary significantly from coun- 
try to country. 

• U.S. arms transfer programs 
often involve military construction of 
significant value, undertaken in and for 
foreign nations, whereas the Soviets do 
little or no construction abroad not 
directly for their own forces. 

• The United States provides con- 
siderable military training for the reci- 
pients of its security assistance. This 
training is broad based, involving not 
only instruction in the use and mainte- 
nance of the weaponry but also in wider 
areas of military study such as logistics 
and the doctrines under which U.S. 
weapons are designed to be used. We 
know relatively little about Soviet 
military training for foreign students 
and even less abouc its costs. 

• The United States is intensely 
maintenance conscious. It supplies spare 
parts and technical assistance needed to 
service and maintain for its usable life- 
time the military equipment it sells in 
the Third World, generally on the same 
basis that it supports weapons for its 
own forces. In contrast, the U.S.S.R. 
supplies major arms packages containing 
minimal spare parts and follows up later 
as needed or according to predicted 
parts failure rates. This, too, reflects the 
practice with its own forces, which often 
are supported from great distances 
behind the front lines. The same pat- 
terns are generally true of East Euro- 
pean programs. Deliveries of spare 
parts, ammunition, and other weapons- 
support items of non-U. S. origin are ex- 
tremely difficult to detect. 

• Soviet military equipment com- 
prises virtually all of our estimates of 
Soviet arms transfers, as well as being 
by far the largest portion of all Soviet 
foreign aid. Because U.S. arms transfers 
covers more than weaponry, its dollar 
value is shown on three lines: weapons 



55 



SECURITY ASSISTANCE 



Arms Agreements Made by Third World Nations, 1972-81' 

($ millions') 





1S72 


1973 


H74 


197S 


1*78 


1977 


1978 


1979 


1980 


1981 


TOTAL 


%ol 
TOTAL 


Then-year Ooliars 


























USSR. 


2.350 


3.320 


5.970 


3.670 


6.610 


9.750 


2.920 


8.880 


14,770 


6.630 


64.870 


27.2 


Other European Communist 
US 

Weapons 


200 


260 


780 


420 


960 


810 


640 


1.090 


940 


3.360 


9.460 


4,0 


3.710 


5.390 


7.700 


4.420 


5.420 


3.720 


4,520 


4,910 


5,040 


3,310 


48.140 


202 


Military Construction 


4 


1.040 


590 


4.710 


5.460 


370 


670 


1,300 


2,000 


1.350 


17.494 


73 


Other 


1.090 


1.490 


1.240 


1.370 


1.560 


2.330 


2,280 


2.690 


3,440 


290 


17.780 


7.4 


Major West European 


1.000 


2,140 


3.840 


5.240 


2.740 


4,840 


8,720 


6,860 


14,480 


4,190 


54.050 


227 


Minor West European 


140 


300 


440 


550 


790 


600 


380 


1,160 


2.390 


970 


7.720 


32 


Other 


1.010 


560 


820 


1.000 


1.410 


1,010 


1,280 


2,400 


1,720 


7,420 


18.630 


78 


Total 


9.504 


14.500 


21.380 


21.380 


24,950 


23,430 


21,410 


29,290 


44,780 


27,520 


238.144 




Constant 1972 Ooilars 


























USSR 


2.350 


3.160 


5.060 


2,840 


4.860 


6.720 


1.880 


5,130 


7.500 


3,060 


42.560 


268 


Other European Communist 
US 

Weapons 


200 


250 


660 


330 


710 


560 


410 


630 


480 


1,550 


5,780 


3.6 


3,710 


5.130 


6.530 


3.430 


3.990 


2.570 


2.920 


2,840 


2.560 


1,530 


35.210 


22.2 


Military Construction 


4 


990 


500 


3.650 


4.010 


260 


430 


750 


1.020 


620 


12.234 


77 


Other 


1,090 


1.420 


1.050 


1.060 


1.150 


1.610 


1.470 


1.550 


1.750 


130 


12.280 


7 7 


Major West European 


1.000 


2.040 


3.250 


4.060 


2.010 


3.340 


5.630 


3.970 


7.350 


1,930 


34.580 


21.8 


Minor West European 


140 


290 


370 


430 


580 


410 


250 


670 


1.210 


450 


4.800 


30 


Other 


1.010 


530 


690 


780 


1.040 


700 


830 


1.390 


870 


3.420 


1 1 .260 


7.1 


Total 


9.504 


13,810 


18.110 


16.580 


18,350 


16.170 


13.820 


16,930 


22.740 


12.690 


158.704 





' "Arms" IS an all-inciusive term covering the broad range of military security assistance. 
It includes new. used, or refurbished conventional lethal weapons (including those capable of 
delivering both conventional and chemical/nuclear munitions) and nonlethal military support 
equipment such as radar or military uniforms and accouterments Also included are military 
training, arms production or assembly facilities, and military base or fortification construction, 
although data on these aspects of foreign military programs are especially "soft." Because it 
IS a uniquely large element of American security assistance programs. US military construc- 
tion IS shown separately. Costs of troops from a ma)or supplier country stationed in Third 
World countries are excluded where it is possible to separate their costs and equipment from 
other military assistance. 

' Estimate rounded to nearest $10 million except where entry is less than $10 million 
Percentages may not total due to rounding. U.S. data are for fiscal year, other data are for 
calendar year 



56 



Department of State Bulletin 



SECURITY ASSISTANCE 



id weapons-related items such as am- 
unition and spares, military construe- 
on, and "other" (defense articles and 
srvices, consisting mostly of training), 
nly the U.S. weapons and weapons- 
lated dollar values are comparable to 
le estimated values of other countries' 
•ms sales. The United States also pro- 
des significant balance-of -payments 
id project development aid through the 
onomic support fund (ESF). Although 
icurity related in a broad sense, ESF is 
:cluded from this report because such 
reign counterparts as exist are con- 
iered economic assistance. 

The speed with which weapons, once 
dered, can be delivered is an import- 
it factor in the Third World arms 
ade. As a consequence of the industrial 
pacity created to support the huge 
)viet conventional force modernization 
ogram, Moscow has important advant- 
;es over all other arms-exporting na- 
)ns. The U.S.S.R. can deliver signifi- 
nt amounts of weaponry very quickly, 
it showed recently in Ethiopia and 
etnam and is now doing in Cuba, 
oscow also can offer much more at- 
ictive loans than can Western sup- 
lers. For nations not desiring the 
■-est equipment, the U.S.S.R. has kept 
en the production lines for selected 
ms, such as the MiG-21 fighter, which 
no longer in first-line Soviet units; it 
io maintains large quantities of older, 
furbished weaponry. The Soviets have 
veloped variations of many first-line 
iapons specifically for export. Other 
ppliers, in contrast, often must choose 
tween providing new equipment to 
sir own forces or risk losing a sale by 
ing unable to deliver until the 
;aponry comes oflF the line 2-4 years 
,er. Moreover, most suppliers do not 
ve large pools of used but still effec- 
e arms — as the United States once 
d — which can be provided quickly to 
sir security assistance partners with- 
t adversely affecting the capability of 
eir own front-line or reserve forces. 

There are also diflFerences among the 
ograms of the major West European' 
ms suppliers. 

• France, the third largest exporter 
the Third World, follows a policy of 
reloping on its own the full range of 
litary hardware, usually of totally 
ench design and of a quality and 
Dhistication equal to that produced 
ewhere. French forces, however, con- 
tute too small a market to provide the 
jnomies of scale needed to produce 



tober1982 



sophisticated weaponry at reasonable 
unit cost. For this reason, France pur- 
sues arms exports and, because its prod- 
ucts span the entire range of sophisti- 
cated weaponry, offers potential Third 
World buyers desiring this level of arma- 
ment an alternative to buying U.S. or 
Soviet weapons. 

• West Germany has for many 
years followed a restrictive arms export 
policy which eschews the sale of major 
lethal weapons to areas of tension. Bonn 
may now be moving toward a somewhat 
less stringent policy in which potential 
sales may be considered individually in 
the light of West Germany's broader 
world interests. Most of West 
Germany's arms exports, however, have 
been to European nations and are out- 
side the scope of this report. Bonn's 
largest Third World market is in Latin 
America. West Germany does not pro- 
duce a complete range of weapons- 
Bonn's primary combat aircraft, for ex- 
ample, are built under foreign license or 
within European consortia. Although 
other members of these consortia export 
arms containing West German com- 
ponents, in this report the dollar values 
of such sales are attributed to the selling 
nation. 

• Italian and U.K. arms exports are 
significantly smaller than those of the 
United States, U.S.S.R., and France. 
Although both nations can manufacture 
the full range of weaponry, each has 
limited the types of arms it produces, 
probably for financial reasons. 

Two important supplier groups will 
be shown separately: the smaller West 
European nations^ and those of Eastern 
Europe.^ The smaller Western arms ex- 
porters compete against the United 
States, the major West European sup- 
pliers, and one another in the Third 
World within the limited range of high- 
technology arms they can afford to 
develop. To a degree not found in the 
West, weapons design and production in 
the Warsaw Pact are standardized 
under the aegis of the Soviet Union. 
Pact members are allocated specific ma- 
jor systems to produce for the entire 
organization's forces and for re-export. 
This further broadens Moscow's arms 
production and supply base. The 
U.S.S.R., like any other licensor but to a 
far greater degree than any Western 
one, can orchestrate the arms exports of 
its allies. The latter often can provide 
weaponry, spares, and ammunition com- 
patible with Soviet equipment in cases, 
such as the Iran-Iraq war, where 
Moscow for political reasons does not 



wish to be seen as a supplier. Within the 
Warsaw Pact, only Romania appears to 
act with some independence from 
Moscow. Yugoslavia is not a Warsaw 
Pact member but for convenience is in- 
cluded in the category "Other European 
Communist." Belgrade produces many 
weapons of Soviet design but pursues a 
much more independent arms export 
policy than other countries in this 
category. 

Although this report concentrates on 
the arms exports of the major producers 
or producer groups, many industrializing 
nations also export military hardware on 
a small scale. In any given year, 60 or 
more countries sell some weaponry. 
Many, if not most, of the major weapons 
systems transferred by these "other" 
arms suppliers are actually re-exports of 
older weapons acquired elsewhere. A 
few Third World countries, however, are 
beginning to emerge as suppliers of 
new, domestically produced weaponry. 
Brazil, Israel, and China are noteworthy 
lesser exporters of new arms, although 
China is unique in that it supplies a wide 
range of 1960s-vintage, Soviet-designed 
arms. 

Private arms dealers, ranging from 
legitimate merchants to outright con- 
fidence tricksters, probably account for a 
far smaller share of the Third World's 
arms trade than is generally supposed. 
Although these dealers can probably fur- 
nish, licitly or otherwise, significant 
quantities of small arms, mortars, auto- 
matic weapons, ammunition, and the 
like, they generally cannot supply or 
support major systems. The con men, 
however, frequently allege that they can 
provide — given money in advance — such 
systems, complete with apparently legiti- 
mate end-user certification. Most, how- 
ever, do not control the weaponry they 
are offering; rather, they solicit sales of 
used arms (which they often describe as 
new or of the latest model) that they 
only hope to acquire later, through 
middlemen and ultimately from govern- 
mental arms disposal programs. 

The Recipients 

Within our broad definition of the Third 
World, there are important differences 
in the size and patterns of supply among 
the four major regional arms markets: 
the Near East and South Asia, sub- 
Saharan Africa, East Asia, and Latin 
America. Moreover, the nature of the 
weaponry — types, sophistication, new or 
refurbished — purchased in each region 
differs significantly. 



57 



SECURITY ASSISTANCE 



Summary— Conventional Weapons Delivered to the Third World, 1972-81' 

(number of weapons) 





1»72 


1973 


1874 


197S 


1976 


1977 


1978 


1979 


1980 


1981 


TOTAL 


%o( 
TOTAL 


GROUND WEAPONS 


























Tanks/self-propelled guns 


























USSR 


770 


2,220 


1.500 


590 


1,075 


1,430 


1,150 


2,435 


990 


1,060 


13,220 


41.5 


Other European Communist 


280 


525 


215 


645 


695 


435 


560 


530 


340 


325 


4,550 


14.2 


U.S. 


430 


760 


1,110 


1,030 


890 


850 


930 


450 


735 


255 


7,440 


23 3 


Major West European 


205 


265 


420 


210 


260 


325 


275 


70 


55 


110 


2,195 


68 


Minor West European 


— 


— 


— 


— 


45 


55 


165 


150 


95 


140 


650 


20 


Other 


700 


575 


480 


255 


420 


305 


130 


280 


185 


455 


3,785 


11,8 


Total 


2,385 


4,345 


3,725 


2,730 


3,385 


3,400 


3,210 


3,915 


2.400 


2,345 


31,840 




Light armor 


























USSR 


955 


1,225 


955 


1.090 


1.340 


1,855 


2.250 


1,915 


1.635 


1,005 


14,225 


37.6 


Other European Communist 


300 


30 


125 


250 


95 


110 


20 


— 


35 


— 


965 


2.5 


US 


910 


1,060 


1,565 


905 


1,820 


2,560 


1.275 


1,025 


2.890 


470 


14,480 


382 


Maior West European 


540 


185 


195 


250 


600 


425 


775 


930 


640 


885 


5,425 


14.3 


Minor West European 


— 


30 


50 


— 


— 


— 


15 


50 


55 


30 


230 


0,6 


Other 


110 


130 


190 


185 


320 


_4_60 


145 


800 


90 


85 


2,515 


66 


Total 


2,815 


2,660 


3,080 


2,680 


4,175 


5,410 


4,480 


4,720 


5,345 


2,475 


37.840 




Artillery (over 100mm) 


























USSR 


730 


1,300 


1,555 


2,190 


1,035 


2,590 


2,100 


2,220 


1,620 


1,060 


16.400 


30.1 


Other European Communist 


1,275 


545 


1.210 


245 


160 


470 


545 


220 


310 


590 


5.570 


102 


US 


1,150 


1,170 


1,060 


1,510 


180 


375 


1,030 


595 


775 


380 


8.225 


15.1 


Maior West European 


310 


360 


530 


235 


125 


375 


710 


160 


155 


120 


3.080 


56 


Minor West European 


230 


380 


355 


685 


600 


1,220 


125 


455 


325 


305 


4.680 


86 


Other 


4,695 


1,830 


445 


1,090 


1,340 


1,120 


1.335 


1,310 


1,660 


1.775 


16,600 


304 


Total 


8,390 


5,585 


5,155 


5,955 


3,440 


6,150 


5,845 


4.960 


4,845 


4.230 


54,555 




NAVAL WEAPONS 


























Major surface warships 


























USSR 


2 


4 


3 


3 


2 


4 


6 


9 


6 


7 


46 


17.8 


Other European Communist 


— 


— 


— 


3 


1 


3 


2 


3 


— 


1 


13 


50 


U.S. 


5 


14 


25 


20 


7 


9 


2 


7 


4 


10 


103 


399 


Major West European 


3 


6 


6 


4 


3 


6 


10 


9 


8 


16 


71 


275 


Minor West European 


— 


1 


— 


— 


1 


— 


1 


1 


5 


3 


12 


4.6 


Other 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


2 


2 


3 


2 


4 


13 


5.0 


Total 


10 


25 


34 


30 


14 


24 


23 


32 


25 


41 


258 




Minor surface warships 


























USSR 


15 


6 


12 


26 


4 


16 


21 


38 


37 


14 


189 


187 


Other European Communist 


1 


4 


— 


4 


— 


— 


— 


— 


5 


— 


14 


1.4 


US 


28 


17 


62 


55 


21 


6 


3 


6 


19 


5 


222 


21.9 


Major West European 


29 


12 


27 


62 


56 


44 


12 


39 


22 


20 


323 


31.9 


Minor West European 


— 


— 


— 


33 


— 


2 


1 


6 


10 


24 


76 


75 


Other 


34 


18 


10 


31 


13 


10 


17 


26 


23 


5 


187 


18.4 


Total 


107 


57 


111 


211 


94 


78 


54 


115 


116 


67 


1.011 




Gulded-misslle patrol boats 


























U.SS.R. 


13 


10 


7 


4 


10 


11 


11 


13 


11 


7 


97 


64.6 


Other European Communist 

U.S. 

Major West European 


- 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


1 


5 


2 





1 


5 


7 


1 


4 


9 


35 


233 


Minor West European 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


4 


— 


— 


4 


26 


Other 


— 


— 


— 


— 


2 


1 


2 


3 


2 


4 


14 


9.3 


Total 


14 


15 


9 


4 


13 


17 


20 


21 


17 


20 


150 




Submarines 


























USSR 


2 


— 


7 


1 


1 





2 


2 


1 


1 


17 


23.6 


Other European Communist 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


_ 


_ 


_ 


_ 


— 


— 


US 


5 


5 


8 


3 


— 


2 


1 


— 


— 


— 


24 


333 


Major West European 


3 


1 


1 


3 


4 


6 


1 


1 


2 


4 


26 


36 1 


Minor West European 


— 


— 


_ 


— 





1 














1 


1.3 


Other 


2 


— 


2 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


4 


5.5 


Total 


12 


6 


18 


7 


5 


9 


4 


3 


3 


5 


72 





58 



Department of State Bulleti 



SECURITY ASSISTANCE 



Conventional Weapons Delivered (Continued) 





1972 


1S73 


1974 


1975 


1976 


1977 


1978 


1979 


1980 


1981 


TOTAL 


% ol 
TOTAL 


AIR WEAPONS 


























Supersonic combat aircraft 


























USSR 


235 


395 


280 


250 


310 


440 


355 


525 


490 


425 


3,705 


558 


Other European Communist 


— 


35 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


35 


0.5 


U.S. 


70 


150 


175 


220 


235 


190 


160 


125 


50 


165 


1,540 


232 


Ma\oi West European 


65 


110 


45 


45 


60 


65 


60 


55 


85 


35 


625 


9.4 


Minor West European 


15 


— 


5 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


20 


0.3 


Other 


90 


70 


20 


125 


20 


30 


90 


too 


120 


40 


705 


10.6 


Total 


475 


760 


525 


640 


625 


725 


665 


805 


745 


665 


6,630 




Subsonic combat aircraft 


























USS.R 


55 


90 


65 


20 


50 


too 


20 


120 


40 


10 


570 


276 


Other European Communist 


5 


5 


— 


15 


30 


30 


— 


— 


— 


5 


90 


4.3 


US 


170 


230 


115 


145 


135 


115 


55 


5 


15 


75 


1,060 


51.2 


Major West European 


5 


40 


10 


10 


10 


5 


— 


5 


35 


30 


150 


7.2 


Minor West European 


— 


— 


— 


5 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


5 


0.2 


Other 


20 


25 


30 


75 


— 


10 


5 


— 


10 


20 


195 


9.4 


Total 


255 


390 


220 


270 


225 


260 


80 


130 


too 


140 


2,070 




Helicopters 


























USSR 


95 


105 


60 


85 


90 


70 


185 


270 


190 


195 


1,345 


245 


Other European Communist 


_ 


— 


_ 


— 


— 


5 


10 


20 


30 


35 


100 


1.8 


U.S. 


550 


740 


145 


120 


155 


55 


30 


30 


95 


15 


1,935 


35.3 


Maior West European 


170 


150 


165 


245 


275 


205 


250 


170 


155 


145 


1,930 


352 


Minor West European 


— 


5 


— 


20 


— 


5 


5 


5 


5 


5 


50 


0.9 


Other 


— 


5 


25 


30 


5 


5 


25 


10 


5 


5 


115 


2.1 


Total 


815 


1,005 


395 


500 


525 


345 


505 


505 


480 


400 


5,475 




Other military aircraft 


























USSR. 


15 


25 


45 


25 


55 


45 


80 


70 


60 


90 


510 


8.8 


Other European Communist 


35 


35 


30 


40 


75 


40 


55 


40 


50 


80 


480 


8.3 


US 


550 


350 


240 


170 


240 


290 


180 


30 


50 


75 


2,175 


37.6 


Major West European 


110 


160 


145 


155 


130 


60 


150 


105 


95 


55 


1,165 


20 1 


Minor West European 


45 


30 


30 


75 


75 


15 


90 


70 


105 


130 


665 


11.5 


Other 


25 


25 


90 


75 


65 


90 


75 


90 


140 


105 


780 


13.5 


Total 


780 


625 


580 


540 


640 


540 


630 


405 


500 


535 


5,775 




Surface-to-air missiles 


























USSR 


1,340 


1,900 


2,180 


2,500 


3,650 


6,015 


920 


3,845 


600 


300 


23.250 


65.0 


Other European Communist 


— 


— 


50 


50 


50 


50 


50 


50 


— 


— 


300 


0.8 


US 


400 


— 


115 


870 


645 


2,340 


965 


2,780 


1,295 


480 


8.890 


24.8 


Major West European 


210 


235 


230 


125 


485 


915 


25 


10 


510 


40 


2.785 


7.8 


Minor West European 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


45 


85 


— 


130 


0.4 


Other 


— 


— 


180 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


200 


380 


1.1 


Total 


1,950 


2,135 


2.755 


3,545 


4,830 


9,320 


1,960 


6,730 


2,490 


1,020 


35.735 





' "Weapons" in this table means major systems, aggregated into broad categories. 
Ground weapons include heavy armor (light, medium, and heavy tanks and self-propelled 
guns), light armor (armored personnel carriers, infantry combat and armored reconnaissance 
vehicles, scout cars), artillery (tube artillery, multiple-rocket launchers, mortars and recoilless 
rifles over 100mm). Naval weapons include major surface warships (warships of destroyer 
escort and larger size, tank landing ships, and larger amphibious warfare units) and minor sur- 
face warships (patrol escorts and smaller naval vessels, including minesweepers and landing 
craft) Submarines and guided-missile patrol boats are listed separately. Combat aircraft in- 
clude bombers, fighters, attack aircraft, and armed trainer/light strike planes Other aircraft in- 
clude transports, communications or utility, antisubmarine warfare, and unarmed trainers. 



Note: Estimated weapon quantities for all tables are rounded to the nearest 5, except for naval 
ships Percentages may not total due to rounding. 



59 



SECURITY ASSISTANCE 



Near East and South Asia. By far 

the greatest Third World regional arms 
market is the Near East and South 
Asia. In recent years, this region has ac- 
counted for nearly three-quarters of the 
dollar value of arms agreements made 
with the major world suppliers. The 
Near East and South Asian states pur- 
chase the largest quantities; the most 
sophisticated kinds; and the widest 
variety of air, naval, and ground force 
arms. Over the last decade, the region 
has received about 85% of the surface- 
to-air missiles and some 70% of the 
heavy and light armor and the super- 
sonic fighters exported. About half the 
artillery, missile-equipped patrol boats, 
and military helicopters have been 
shipped to the region, as well as about 
40% of the subsonic combat aircraft and 
roughly 30% of the major and minor 
surface warships and other military air- 
craft. The Near East and South Asia ac- 
quired just under one-fourth of the sub- 
marines provided during the decade. 
That the region does not acquire a share 
of each of these types of arms propor- 
tional to the money expended suggests 
the high level of sophistication (and 
hence the high cost) of the armaments 
purchased. 

Although almost all states in the 
region have a rudimentary arms-making 
capability, Israel, Egypt, and India are 
developing, with foreign licensing and 
technical assistance, major weapons or 
arms industries of their own. Only 
Israel, however, is emerging as an im- 
portant supplier, although many of its 
major arms transfers have been used or 
refurbished weapons originally produced 
elsewhere. 

Sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast to 
the Near East and South Asia, the sub- 
Saharan African states do not — Soviet 
sales to Ethiopia excepted — possess 
either large or highly advanced arsenals, 
and much weaponry sold there is re- 
furbished. In dollar values, the region 
has accounted for a little over 5% of 
Third World arms agreements concluded 
in the past few years. Nevertheless, sub- 
Saharan Africa has acquired about one- 
quarter of the minor surface warships 
delivered to the Third World during the 
past decade, approximately one-fifth of 
the artillery, and roughly one-eighth of 
the major surface warships, light armor, 
and subsonic combat and other types of 
military aircraft. In other types of 
weapons, sub-Saharan Africa accounts 
for 10% or less of the heavy armor, 
supersonic combat aircraft, military heli- 



60 



copters, and surface-to-air missiles 
delivered. Less than 5% of the missile- 
equipped patrol boats and only 1% of 
the submarines are transferred to na- 
tions of this region. 

Nor is there any significant in- 
digenous arms industry, apart from that 
of South Africa. Because of the U.N. 
arms embargo of 1977, Pretoria is con- 
centrating upon developing a high-tech- 
nology military industry to support na- 
tional arms independence but has not 
yet emerged as a significant exporter. 

Latin America. Once an almost ex- 
clusively U.S. -dominated arms market 
and a large purchaser of used and ob- 
solescent military equipment, Latin 
America for the last decade has been ac- 
quiring the more sophisticated weapons 
systems primarily from the major West 
European arms exporters, albeit in small 
numbers. In recent years, Latin America 
has accounted for a little over 7.5% of 
the Third World's arms agreements with 
the major suppliers. Army materiel pur- 
chases, represented by heavy and light 
armor and artillery, account for 7% or 
less of the region's acquisitions over the 
last decade. In naval weaponry, 
however, Latin America has received 
nearly 60% of the submarines delivered, 
nearly one-third of the major and one- 
fifth of the minor surface warships, and 
one-eighth of the missile-equipped patrol 
boats. Latin American purchases ac- 
count for only about 6%-8% of the 
supersonic combat aircraft and military 
helicopters delivered but nearly one- 
eighth of the subsonic combat aircraft 
and one-fifth of the other military air- 
craft supplied to the Third World. Less 
than 3% of the surface-to-air missiles 
have been exported to Latin America. 

Of the major exporters, the U.S.S.R. 
is unusual in that it has few customers 
in the region, namely Cuba and Peru 
and, most recently, Nicaragua. Moscow 
is now upgrading the Cuban military 
forces with new military materiel, most 
of it far more capable than that pos- 
sessed by other Caribbean nations. Latin 
America is also the most important ex- 
port market for both Israel and West 
Germany. 

Several South American states, 
notably Argentina and Brazil, are 
vigorously developing their own 
domestic and export arms industries. 
Brazil, though not yet offering a com- 
plete range of weapons, is a particularly 
active arms exporter both within the 
region and in the Third World. 



!f 



East Asia. Arms deliveries to East 
Asia over the past decade reflect the 
turmoil that has plagued Indochina. The 
early years reflect not only large U.S. 
arms supplies to the former Governmeniji 
of South Vietnam but also Chinese and 
later, Soviet deliveries to North Viet- 
nam. Although a brief slackening in 
arms deliveries by all suppliers occurred 
after 1975, the later years of the decade 
reflect significant Soviet arms sales to 
Vietnam after the 1978 Vietnamese in- 
vasion of Kampuchea and the subse- 
quent incursion by China into northern 
Vietnam. In recent years, East Asia has 
accounted for about 10.5% of the Third 
World arms agreements made with the 
major suppliers. 

Over the decade. East Asia has ac- 
counted for more than one-third of the 
subsonic combat aircraft and military 
helicopters delivered, as well as some- 
what less than one-fifth of the super- 
sonic warplanes and over 40% of other 
types of military aircraft. Just under 
one-fourth of the Third World's artillerj 
and about 18% of the heavy armor hav« 
gone to East Asia, as well as about one 
tenth of the light armor. Similarly, the 
region's navies have accounted for abou 
one-quarter of the missile-equipped 
patrol boats and minor surface warship 
exported, nearly 30% of the major sur- 
face warships, and about 17% of the 
submarines. Only 5% of the surface-to- 
air missiles have gone to East Asia. 

Only China has an important 
domestic arms industry in East Asia. 
China's arms industry is unique in that 
is the largest producer outside the War 
saw Pact of older weapons of Soviet or 
modified-Soviet pattern. Beijing has 
recently begun to export arms in the 
Third World much more actively than i 
the past and is seeking Western tech- 
nology to upgrade its weaponry. Taiwa 
North Korea, and South Korea also are 
vigorously pursuing self-suflSciency in 
arms, although Taiwan and South Kon 
remain particularly dependent on out- 
side sources of supply as well as produ> 
tion licenses. Taiwan is not a significan 
arms exporter. Although South Korea's 
military exports have consisted largely 
of "soft" quartermaster items such as 
uniforms and other personal equipment 
both North and South Korea are begin 
ning to export some weaponry. 



iln 



■i\l 



ijfe 

m 
kk 
Jally 

m 



'J'ear 



Department of State Bullet) *«"3 



SECURITY ASSISTANCE 



tlook 

s virtually impossible to predict what 
occur in such a complex and some- 
es contradictory mixture of political, 
nomic, social, and emotional factors 
s the Third World arms trade. The 
iposition of the weaponry sold may 
nge; although some of the wealthier 
rd World nations may continue to 
the latest weapons regardless of 
t, the poorer states may increasingly 
k less complex or secondhand 
iponry. Both major and emerging 
pliers may strive to tailor a still 
rer variety of weaponry to Third 
rid requirements. 

Some factors may increase the pace 
irms buying and selling. 

• Several nations developing 
lestic arms industries, like many 
iller established arms exporters, do 
have a home market large enough to 
et their investments in plants, re- 
-ch, and development and will push 
xport their first-line weaponry, not 

' to offset these costs but to reap 
*' :eived political benefits. 

• Military modernization programs 
ie supplier nations and in Third 

'Id countries with large forces may 
:e available larger quantities of 
srseded arms to be disposed of at the 
, possible price to help amortize the 
of new weapons. 

• The performance of high-tech- 
igy weapons in recent conflicts may 
2 whetted Third World appetites for 
roved or more effective arms. 

• In specific instances, war losses 
be made up by fresh orders, notably 
n Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Argentina. 

Political considerations — including 
iges of government and the poten- 
if not the reality, of armed con- 
— may heighten national perceptions 
le kind of arms security assistance 
d World states believe they will re- 
e. 

Other factors might slow the pace of 
Third World arms trade. 

• Several large multiyear arms con- 
ts in the Near East and South Asia 
have some time to run, which may 
y fresh orders from some of the big- 
; customers. However, because of 
luction backlogs created by the 

rally high level of arms orders over 
past 3-4 years, weapons deliveries 
certainly continue to be brisk for 
e years. 



• Many Third World nations that 
have already purchased large amounts 
of arms, particularly advanced types, 
may find that they face a more time- 
consuming process than they had 
thought for training and integrating the 
new equipment into their armed forces 
and, in consequence, may limit or slow 
down their buying. 

• Although not the sole driving fac- 
tor in Third World arms sales, future oil 
prices will exert a significant influence. 
If the oil glut continues, net exporting 
countries — some of them among the 
largest arms purchasers— may cut back 
on new orders, while net importers may 
find they have more resources than they 
had anticipated for some modest mili- 
tary purchases. Rising oil prices, how- 
ever, would have the reverse effect. 

• Continuing inflation and the in- 
creasing cost and complexity of conven- 
tional arms designed by the major pro- 
ducers primarily for a potential Euro- 
pean battlefield may reduce the level of 
orders for the latest weaponry. 

General Third World Arms Trade Data 

The attached tables present an estimate 
of the numbers of major weapons and 
dollar values of military assistance pro- 
vided by major world arms suppliers or 
groups of suppliers to the Third World 
between 1972 and 1981. They are fol- 
lowed by further data on arms delivered 
to each major region of the Third World. 
Estimated values are first presented 
in then-year dollar terms and then in 
constant 1972 dollars to reduce, to the 
degree possible, the effects of inflation 
on weapons prices. Dollar estimates for 
more recent years later may be revised, 
since major multiyear arms contracts 
are often modified during their course 
and because retrospective information 
sometimes becomes available. These 
figures should not be interpreted as 
equating to the cost of the weapons 



delivered. They represent the value of 
military agreements in which the cost of 
weapons is only a part. 

Weapons are aggregated into broad 
categories without regard to perform- 
ance differences within any given family. 
The numbers presented (for other than 
the United States) for each major 
weapons system delivered in any year 
represent simply the total of those 
deliveries which are believed to be 
reliably reported. Quantities are rounded 
to the nearest 5, except for naval ships. 
They should be regarded as minimum 
estimated numbers, not precise tallies. 
The term "major weapons" does not in- 
clude all conventional lethal weapons: 
Small arms, light automatic weapons, 
mortars, and artillery of less than 
100mm caliber are excluded, as are a 
few categories of major weapons such as 
battlefield missile systems, which are ex- 
ported by a few nations in very small 
numbers. 



'France, West Germany, Italy, and the 
United Kingdom. 

^Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. 

'Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East 
Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and 
Yugoslavia. ■ 



61 



SECURITY ASSISTANCE 



Near East and South Asia' 

(number of weapons and regional share 



%]) 



Weapon 

% of Third World supply for decade 

Suppliers 

USSR 

Olhef European Communist 

US 

Major WesI European 

Minor West European 

Other 

Total 



Weapon 

% of Third World supply lor decade 

Suppliers 

USSR 

Other European Communist 

US 

Maior West European 

Minor West European 

Other 

Total 

Weapon 

% of Third World supply for decade 

Suppliers 

USSR 

Other European Communist 

US. 

Major West European 

Minor West European 

Other 

Total 



Weapon 

% of Third World supply for decade 

Suppliers 

USSR 

Other European Communist 

US 

Maior WesI European 

Minor West European 

Other 

Total 



Weapon 

% of Third World supply lor decade 

Suppliers 

USSR 

Other European Communist 

US 

Maior West European 

Minor West European 

Other 

Total 



Weapon 

% of Third World supply for decade 

Suppliers 

USSR 

Other European Communist 

US 

Maior West European 

Minor West European 

Other 

Total 



Tanks and self-propelled guns 
69.8% 



40 5 
20 5 
220 



Light armor 
71.3% 



32.9 
123 



Artillery (over lOOmm) 
49.0% 



34 5 
160 



11 5 
25,3 



Major surface warships 
29.8% 



406 
125 



Minor surface warships 

30.4% 



482 
18 1 
22 5 



42 3 
134 



152 
22.4 



422 
17 7 
15.5 
24 4 



23 


128 


10 


77 


96 


53 6 


56 


43 4 


2 


11 


25 


193 


28 


15.6 


23 


17.8 


179 




129 




Guided- 


missile patrol boats 






56.6% 









350 
7.0 



' Countries in this region are Alghanistan. Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh. Egypt, India. Iran Iraq Israel 
Jordan, Kuwait. Lebanon, Libya. Morocco. Nepal. Oman. Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia. Sri Lanka Syria 
Tunisia. United Arab Emirates, North Yemen, and Soutti Yemen 



Submarines 
23.6% 



1 12.5 



Supersonic combat aircraft 
69.5% 



470 224 


430 


200 9 5 


240 


135 6.4 


215 


2.090 


2.520 


Subsonic combat aircraft 




40.5% 




210 35.2 


150 


40 6.7 


25 


290 48,7 


35 



62 



_ 


_ 


— 


- 


35 


5.8 


5 


2. 


595 




245 




Helicopters 








47.4% 








280 


20 8 


620 


49 


_ 


— 


55 


4 


285 


21 1 


15 


1 


760 


565 


540 


43 


— 


_ 


10 





20 


1.4 


15 


1 


1.345 




1,255 




Other military 


aircraft 






28.2% 








20 


33 


100 


9 


100 


16.6 


195 


18 


210 


350 


285 


27 


155 


25 8 


200 


19i 


80 


13.3 


125 


12 


35 


5.8 


125 


12 


600 




1.030 




Surface-toalr missiles 






84.4% 








10.595 


80 1 


9,495 


56 


150 


1 1 


150 


0, 


1.695 


128 


5.595 


32 


780 


5.9 


1.390 


8 


— 


_ 


130 





— 


— 


200 


1 


13,220 




16,960 






Department of State Bu 


lie 



SECURITY ASSISTANCE 



•ub-Saharan Africa' 

;>er of weapons and regional share [%]) 



/eapon 


Tanks and sell-propelled guns 






of Third World supply lor decade 


1.3% 








uppliers 












475 


62 9 


1,140 


605 


- Luiopean Communist 


10 


13 


230 


122 


Ji> 


10 


1 3 


25 


13 


ajor West European 


55 


72 


40 


2 1 


inor West European 


— 


— 


— 


— 


thier 


205 


27.1 


450 


23.8 


3TAL 


755 




1,885 




'eapon 


Light armor 








1 of Third World supply lor decade 


12.4% 








jppliers 










SSR 


910 


61 6 


1,590 


489 


ther European Communist 


35 


23 


85 


26 


S 


30 


20 


50 


1 5 


ajoc West European 


355 


24 


920 


28 3 


inor West European 


— 


— 


85 


26 


her 


145 


9,8 


515 


15.8 


iTAL 


1,475 




3.245 






. 









eapon 


Artillery (over 100mm) 






ol Third World supply lor decade 


19.1% 








.ippliers 










SSR 


1.595 


43 1 


3,510 


52 


her European Communist 


105 


28 


515 


76 


b 


20 


05 


255 


37 


.ijor West European 


235 


63 


300 


4 4 


not West European 


90 


24 


55 


08 


her 


1,655 


44 7 


2,110 


31 2 


TAL 


3,700 




6,745 





;apon 

ol Third World supply lor decade 

.ppliers 

5SR 

ler European Communist 

•ijor West European 
nor West European 



Major surlace warships 
12.0% 



iapon 

ol Third World supply lor decade 



Minor surlace warships 
23.0% 



ppliers 
















iSR 






24 17 9 




45 




45 4 


ler European Communist 






7 5.2 




- 




- 


|0r West Euiopean 






38 28 3 




30 




303 


lOr West European 






31 23 1 




13 




13 1 


ler 
TAL 






34 25 3 




11 
99 




11 1 




34 




•sapon 




Guided 


-missile patrol boats 










o( Third World supply lor decade 




4.6% 












ppliers 
















JSR 






2 100 




4 




80 


ler European Communist 






— — 




— 




— 


|0r West European 











1 




20 


lor West European 






— — 




— 




— 


lei 
rAL 






— — 




5 




— 




2 




' Countries in this region are Angola, 


Be 


nin, Botswana. Burundi, Cameroon. 


Cape Verde 


Central African 


:)ublic, Chad, Congo. Djibouti, Equatorial G 


uinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia. Ghana. Guinea 


Gl 


inea- 


sau. Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho. Libe 


la. 


Madagasca 


r. Malawi. Mali, Maurita 


nia 


Mauritiu 


3, Mozambique, 


er, Migeria. Rwanda, Sao Tome and Pr 


nc 


pe. Senega 


. Seychelles, Siena Leone, 


Somalia. 


Sol 


th Africa, 


Ian, Swaz'land, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Upper Volta 


Zaire, Zambia, and Zim 


babwe 






ctober1982 

















Submarines 

1.3% 



Supersonic combat aircraft 
7.8% 





50 


250 




30 


15.0 




200 




Subsonic combat aircraft 


10.3% 








60 


600 




10 


100 



Helicopters 

8.7% 



578 
13 1 
52 



Other military aircraft 
12.3% 



33 
154 



78 
17.1 



69.5 
4.3 

26-0 



20 


50 


70 


22,5 


10 


2,0 


35 


11.2 


10 


20 


40 


12.9 


250 


625 


100 


32.2 


100 


250 


40 


12.9 


10 


20 


25 


8.0 


400 




310 




Surface-to-a 


r missiles 






7.7% 









63 



SECURITY ASSISTANCE 




















Latin America' 




















i 


(number ol weapons and regional share 


[%]) 


















'' 




1972 


-76 


1977-81 




1972 


76 


1977 


81 






No. 


% 


No. 


% 


No. 




% 


No. 


% 




Weapon 


Tanks and self-propelled guns 






Submarines 










« 


% of Third World supply lor decade 


4.1% 








58.3% 










S 


Suppliers 




















Sa 


USSR 


330 


41 2 


80 


158 


— 




— 


3 


23 ( 




Other European Communisl 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 




— 


— 


- 


J 


US 


295 


36 8 


15 


29 


19 




65.5 


2 


15: 


iS 


Maior Wesi European 


165 


20 6 


55 


109 


10 




345 


8 


61,: 


n 


Minor West European 


— 


— 


185 


366 


— 




— 


— 


— 


In 


Other 


10 


1 2 


170 


33 6 


— 




— 


— 


- 


» 


Total 


800 




505 




29 






13 




r 


Weapon 


Light armor 








Supersonic combat aircraft 






n 


% of Third World supply for decade 


5.1% 








5.8% 










, 


Suppliers 




















* 


USSR 


55 


40 


175 


31 2 


40 




258 


130 


56 




Other European Communist 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 




— 


— 


- 


■ 


US 


910 


67 1 


30 


53 


— 




— 


15 


6 




Major West European 


165 


122 


230 


41 


70 




45,1 


40 


17 


'>: 


Minor West European 


70 


51 


15 


26 


20 




12.9 


— 


- 


Ik 


Other 


155 


11 4 


110 


196 


25 




16 1 


45 


19 


K 


Total 


1,355 




560 




155 






230 






Weapon 


Artillery (over 100mm) 






Subsonic combat 


aircraft 






)ll 


% of Third World supply for decade 


7.3% 








11.8% 










-.0 


Suppliers 




















•PP 


USSR 


215 


11 3 


420 


199 


— 




— 


5 


5 




Other European Communisl 


80 


42 


40 


1 8 


5 




32 


5 


5 


'K 


US 


610 


32 2 


1,010 


47 8 


115 




74 1 


70 


77 IS 


Major West European 


365 


193 


170 


80 


20 




129 


5 


5 


l« 


Minor West European 


140 


74 


190 


90 


— 




— 


— 




'K 


Other 


480 


25 3 


280 


132 


15 




96 


5 


5 


ft 


Total 


1.890 




2.110 




155 






90 






Weapon 


Major surface warships 






Helicopters 












% of Third World supply for decade 


29.4% 








8.1% 








ill 



Suppliers 

USSR 

Other European Communist 

US 

Major West European 

Minor West European 

Other 

Total 



82 5 
125 



138 
58 3 
194 



Weapon 

% of Third World supply for decade 

Suppliers 

USSR 

Other European Communist 

US 

Major West European 

Minor West European 

Other 

Total 



IMinor surface warships 
19.3% 



32 6 
54 7 



Weapon 

% of Third World supply for decade 

Suppliers 

USSR 

Other European Communist 

US 

Major West European 

Minor West European 

Other 

Total 



Guided-missile patrol boats 

12.6% 











«f 


40 


163 


35 


17 


is 


120 


48 9 


35 


17 




85 


34 6 


120 


6C 


10 


— 


— 


— 




r« 


— 


— 


10 


E 


> 


245 




200 




\ 


Other military aircraft 






lip( 


19.1% 








111 


5 


01 


65 


11 


ii 


5 


1 


5 


C 


f 


125 


23,8 


130 


2i 


■i 


165 


31 4 


75 


1i 


tt( 


50 


95 


145 


2e 


nx 


175 


33,3 


160 


2"/ 


»«! 


525 




580 




"1. 


Surlacetoair 


missiles 






lux 


2.7% 










380 


853 


435 


8- 


«« 


— 


— 


— 




li 
Of 


65 


146 


100 


If 


_ 


_ 


_ 




** 


— 


— 


— 




k 


445 




535 




k 



' Countries in this region are Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guvana, Haiti, Hon- 
duras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela, 



Department of State Bulletl Holiei 















SECURITY ASSISTANCE 




East Asia and the Pacific' 

number of weapons and regional share 


%]) 




















1972-76 




1977 


-81 


1972 


76 


1977 


-81 






No. 


% 


No. 


% 


No. 
Submarines 


% 


No. 


% 




Vaapon 


Tanks and sell-propelled guns 










^0 of Third World supply lor decade 


17.8% 








16.6% 










uppllers 




















SSR 


710 


199 


640 


30.6 


4 


40 


— 


— 




)ther European Communist 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 




,S 


1,395 


39 


750 


35,8 


2 


20 


— 


— 




^ajor West European 


15 


0.4 


65 


3,1 


— 


— 


2 


100.0 




^inor West European 


45 


12 


260 


12.4 


— 


— 


— 


— 




)ther 


1,410 


394 


375 


17.9 


4 


40 


— 


— 




OTAL 


3,575 




2.090 




10 




2 






Veapon 


Light armor 








Supersonic combat alrcratt 








'o ol Third World supply lor decade 


11.2% 








16.7% 










uppllers 




















SSR 


315 


120 


395 


246 


55 


96 


250 


46,3 




ilher European Communist 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 




S 


2,045 


77 9 


930 


57.9 


380 


66.6 


225 


41.6 




lajor West European 


20 


08 


230 


143 


— 


— 


— 


— 




linor West European 


5 


02 


20 


1 2 


— 


— 


— 


— 




Iher 


240 


91 


30 


1.8 


135 


23 7 


65 


12.0 




3TAL 


2,625 




1.605 




570 




540 






feapon 


Artillery (over 100mm) 






Subsonic combat aircraft 








ol Third World supply lor decade 


24.4% 








37.2% 










uppllers 




















SSR 


545 


54 


545 


165 


10 


20 


55 


21 1 




ther European Communist 


1,185 


11 8 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 




S 


3,670 


365 


880 


265 


390 


765 


160 


61.5 




ajor West European 


110 


11 


120 


3.6 


25 


4,9 


10 


38 


- 


inor West European 


535 


53 


65 


1.9 


— 


— 


— 


— 




ther 


4,000 


398 


1.700 


51.3 


85 


166 


35 


13.4 




3TAL 


10.045 




3.310 




510 




260 






'eapon 


Major surface warships 






Helicopters 










> of Third World supply lor decade 


28.7% 








35.3% 










uppllers 




















SSR 


— 


— 


7 


18 9 


80 


5,5 


130 


27 1 




ther European Communist 


— 


— 


1 


27 


— 


— 


25 


52 




S. 


36 


972 


20 


540 


1.285 


88 3 


175 


364 




ajor West European 


1 


27 


1 


27 


55 


37 


140 


292 




inor West European 


— 


— 


3 


81 


— 


— 


— 


— 




ther 


— 


— 


5 


13,5 


35 


24 


10 


2.1 




)TAL 


37 




37 




1.455 




480 






eapon 


Minor surlace warships 






Other military aircraft 








. ol Third World supply lor decade 


27.2% 








40.4% 










jppllers 




















SSR 


— 


— 


44 


42.7 


120 


73 


110 


15,9 




ther European Communist 


— 


— 


— 


— 


105 


6,3 


30 


4.3 


u 


S. 


129 


75.0 


26 


25.2 


1.200 


729 


165 


23.9 


\l 


lajor West European 


— 


— 


16 


15,5 


135 


82 


100 


14.5 


!5 


■inor West European 


— 


— 


1 


01 


25 


15 


100 


14,5 


V 


ther 


43 


25.0 


16 


15.5 


60 


3,6 


185 


26.8 




5TAL 


172 




103 




1.645 




690 






'eapon 


Gulded-mlsslle patrol boats 






Surface-to-aIr missiles 








> ol Third World supply lor decade 


26.0% 








5.1% 










uppllers 




















SSR 


8 


50 


8 


347 


— 


— 


175 


12.2 




ther European Communist 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 


— 




S 


— 


— 


— 


— 


335 


859 


1.260 


87 8 




aior West European 


6 


37 5 


3 


13,0 


55 


14 1 


— 


— 




inor West European 


— 


— 


4 


174 


— 


— 


— 


— 




ther 


2 


125 


8 


34 7 


— 


— 


— 


— 




3TAL 


16 




23 




390 




1.435 




' 


' Countries in this region ate Bangladesh. 


Brunei, Burma. China 


Fiji. Indonesia 


North Korea. South 












)rea, Malaysia, Nepal. Papua New Guinea. Philippines, Singapore, 


Solomon Islands. Thailand. 


Tonga, and 












etnam. 


















et 


ctober 1982 
















65 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Building Peace in Central America 



by Thomas O. Enders 

Address before the Commonwealth 
Club in San Francisco on August 20, 
1982. Ambassador Enders is Assistant 
Secretary for Inter- American Affairs. 

The obstacles to peace in Central Ameri- 
ca stand more clearly exposed with 
every new crisis. Central America has 
deep political divisions, among nations 
as well as within them. It suffers severe 
economic troubles, with the world reces- 
sion devastating economies already 
weakened by high oil prices and internal 
inefficiencies. And it is fragmented by 
social tensions, with population growth 
straining public services and popular 
aspirations outrunning the historically 
possible. 

But the tangle of violence that has 
taken so many lives traces directly to 
the clash of two polar approaches to 
these problems. One is the way of the 
violent right — to ignore socioeconomic 
problems and, when that proves impossi- 
ble, to shoot the messengers of despair. 
The other is the way of the violent 
left — to magnify injustices and provoke 
confrontations so as to rationalize 
shooting their way to power. 

The persistence with which extrem- 
ist minorities seek to resolve the region's 
problems by the use of violence domi- 
nates the outside world's perception of 
Central America. Yet the real story of 
Central America's last 3 years is that 
first the right and now the left have 
steadily lost ground to those who believe 
democracy and the rule of law — not 
violence — are the only feasible path to 
progress. 

An Outline 

Let me take a minute to outline that 
story, for it provides a key to the real 
opportunities now emerging to end the 
violence and build the peace. We used to 
think of Central America as a collection 
of petty dictatorships. And so— if you 
except Costa Rica's vigorous democracy 
and allow for the coarseness of the 
stereotype — it often was. That does not 
mean that there was not economic 
growth and social change. Often, indeed, 
vigorous economic development and 
social change collided with unchanging, 
unresponsive, and sometimes repressive 
political institutions. 



66 



The old order cracked with the flight 
of Somoza in July 1979. f"or more than 
40 years, the Somozas ruled Nicaragua. 
But little by little the regime lost sup- 
port—of the church, of the press, and of 
businessmen and professionals, many of 
whose sons and daughters took to the 
hills or the streets— and in the end it 
was making war on its own people. 

A few months later, the repressive 
government of General Romero in El 
Salvador, the latest in a string of mili- 
tary governments that had run that 
country since the 1930s, was overthrown 
by a group of young officers pledged to 
create democratic institutions and 
reform the cruelly unequal landholding 
system. 

It is one of history's less happy pat- 
terns that extremism breeds extremism. 
Instead of seeing the weakening of 
traditional dictatorships as an oppor- 
tunity to organize democracy, the fall of 
Somoza and the troubles of other estab- 
lished governments whetted the appe- 
tites of radicals with motivations rang- 
ing from the Utopian to the cynical. In 
Nicaragua, a hard core of Marxist- 
Leninist ideologues began to consolidate 
a monopoly of force with Cuban assist- 



Within each state 
there should be a proc- 
ess of reconciliation in 
which adversaries can 
substitute political com- 
petition for armed com- 
petition. 



ance, building the largest military estab- 
lishment in Central American history. 

Convinced their own power would be 
safe only if similar governments were in- 
sUilled elsewhere in Central America, 
Nicaragua's new caudillos joined with 
Cuba to train and supply violent leftists 
in El Salvador attempting to seize 
power by exploiting the turbulence un- 
leashed by the breakdown of traditional 
order and the new government's reform 
efforts. 



Central America's violent left burst 
on stage claiming to have history on its 
side. The claim reflected two practical 
advantages. One was psychological. The 
combination of ignorance and revulsion 
with which the outside world views Cen- 
tral America enabled men and women 
trained mainly in the arts of terror to 
portray themselves as liberators. The 
other was military. Government forces 
were certainly authoritarian, but they 
were also weak, garrison bound, and in- 
ternationally isolated. As of 1979, the 
armies of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and 
Guatemala were all cut off from U.S. 
training, sales, or even purchases; then, 
as now, Costa Rica had no army. In con 
trast, guerrilla forces could draw upon 
local alienation, extensive support from 
Cuba — in training, arms, and propa- 
ganda—and the help of terrorists from 
South America and even the Middle 
East. 

Ironically, these advantages back- 
fired. Overconfidence in both their popu- 
lar appeal and their outside arms sup- 
plies led the Salvadoran guerrillas to 
militarize their strategy. In early 1981, 
they launched a "final offensive" that 
failed disastrously. In March 1982 they 
tried to prevent elections and instead 
provoked a massive turnout of voters in 
repudiation of what the guerrillas stood 
for. Although many of them fight on, E 
Salvador's guerrillas stand revealed as ci 
destructive minority rejected by Salva- 
doran society. 

Similar misjudgments have also 
warped the Sandinista regime in Nica- 
ragua. Little by little the Sandinistas 
have pushed aside those whose sacrifice'' *' 
helped bring down Somoza — the free 
press, the church, political parties, 
unions, the private sector. Some 2,000 
Cuban and Eastern-bloc military and 
security advisers have merged with the 
regime's leadership. With disenchant- 
ment spreading even among Sandinista 
heroes like Eden Pastora, "Comman- 
dante Cero," there is now open repres- 
sion against religious leaders and ethnic 
minorities — the very groups whose pro- 
tection is the essence of pluralism. 
History is beginning to repeat itself. 
Elections have been postponed, demon- 
strations are increasingly frequent, and 
some groups have even taken up arms. 
The new Nicaraguan regime is turning 
into a new dictatorship based once agaii 
on a privileged and militarized caste. 
Like the Somoza regime before it, Nica- 
ragua's government is beginning to 
make war on its own people. 



4 



kff 



dc 



in 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



alternatives to Violence 

iut if the violent left is not sweeping 
lie isthmus, the beneficiaries have not 
eeii its traditional rival, the violent 
ifjht. When the military government of 
]\ Salvador was overthrown nearly 3 
ears ago, the new reforming junta was 
hallenged not only by the extreme left's 
uerrillas but also by the extreme right 
t'tiiig through death squads and some 
leiiients of the security forces. The 
esult was an explosion of violence, 
ighteen months ago anywhere from 
30 to 2,000 civilians were losing their 
ves each month, depending on whose 
gures you accept. The country was sick 
ith political violence. 

That sickness has not yet been 
ired. But its virulence has been 
lecked. In the last few months, non- 
■ )mbatant deaths have averaged 300 to 
)0 a month — again, depending on 
hom you believe — and appear to be 
I 'dining steadily. This is still a horrible 
•11 in a country of 5 million people, but 
:i0 to 1,500 fewer deaths a month is un- 
iTiiahly a positive trend. 

Why is political violence declining in 
. Salvador? It has partly been a matter 
I the consolidation of the new reform- 
1 5 government, which has gradually 
( ntained guerrilla violence and in- 
( eased its authority over security 
1 rces, gradually creating a climate in 
' lich violence is less and less expedient, 
< en if it is still not adequately deterred 
-i d controlled and punished. 

But I think there is something even 
I ire important at work here. Nascent 
cmocratic institutions are providing an 
a ernative to violence as a means of 
I litical expression. In the March elec- 
n, six parties ranging from extreme 
ht to center left competed in a cam- 
ign that was not violence free but 
lich was not meaningfully influenced 
the use of force. The new Salvadoran 
mocracy is doing what it is supposed 
do — bringing a broad spectrum of 
•ces and factions into a functioning 
litical system. 

At the same time, a broad land re- 
■m has for the first time given campe- 
los a personal stake in society. Twenty 
rcent of all farmland has been redis- 
buted from some 2,000 owners, many 
them absentees, to 60,000 poor farm- 
rkers and their families. 
Perhaps the most striking measure 
progress is the transformation of the 
litary from an institution dedicated to 

status quo to one that spearheads 
id reform and supports constitutional 
tnocracy. 



j,i,tober1982 



The shift toward democracy is not 
limited to El Salvador. In November 
1981 a massive turnout voted in a new 
democratic government in Honduras 
after many years of military rule. This 
February, a similar turnout reaffirmed 
Costa Rican democracy and voted the 
Social Democratic opposition into 
government. Not incidentally, in demo- 
cratic Costa Rica and Honduras, as in El 
Salvador, the extreme left received prac- 
tically no popular support in the elec- 
tions. 

Meanwhile in Guatemala a coup 
overthrew a repressive government that 
was fighting organized guerrillas with 
increasingly indiscriminate violence. The 
new government — although still mili- 
tary — has greatly reduced official 
abuses, is discussing Constituent 
Assembly elections, and has replaced the 
old hostility and suspicion toward rural 
villagers with efforts to give them the 
means to develop and defend their com- 
munities. 

In a word, alternatives have ap- 
peared to the violent extremes of Cen- 
tral America's past. 

U.S. Role 

The United States has played a key role 
in nurturing these alternatives. Belated- 
ly and at first fitfully, but with a steadi- 
ness all the more striking for the fact 
that we have kept our basic course 
under two quite different U.S. Admini- 
strations, we have thrown our weight 
behind the well-being and security of our 
neighbors. 

The great bulk of our effort has been 
economic and political. No less than 85% 
of all aid authorized by or requested of 
the Congress for fiscal years 1981 to 
1983 is economic. To enable the coun- 
tries of the area to earn their own way 
in the future, the President has pro- 
posed an innovative program of tariff 
concessions and tax incentives, the 
Caribbean Basin initiative, which Con- 
gress is now considering. Its passage 
would provide a vital impulse to confi- 
dence and peace in the region. 

Equally important has been our 
political commitment. Agrarian reform 
was a Salvadoran idea, but it could not 
have gotten off the ground in 1980 if we 
had not backed it. And it might have 
died this spring if we had not persisted 
in our support. The elections in Hon- 
duras and El Salvador were also devel- 
oped locally, but they easily could have 
derailed had we not backed them so 
strongly. Nor are human rights an im- 
port from the United States. The great 
majority of Central Americans long for 



an end to lawlessness. But we do believe 
that the constancy of our interest has 
helped them make progress toward con- 
trolling human rights abuses. 

At the same time, we have not ig- 
nored legitimate needs for security 
assistance. Faced with the guerrilla 
offensive in El Salvador and realizing 
that a Communist network was funnel- 



Between states there 
should be an end to the 
export of subversion. 



ing weapons and ammunition in support 
of that offensive, President Carter 
authorized military sales to El Salvador. 
President Reagan has continued to pro- 
vide military assistance. The amounts 
have been and remain much less than 
our economic aid and the items un- 
sophisticated. 

We have no wish or intention to pro- 
long or spread the conflict — quite the 
opposite. But we could not and we will 
not stand idly by and watch, in El Salva- 
dor or elsewhere, internationally 
recognized governments — undertaking 
reforms we support— having to throw 
untrained recruits short of ammunition 
into battle against Cuban-trained guer- 
rillas supplied and coordinated from 
abroad. 

By the same token, we are giving 
limited military assistance to Honduras, 
which has become a new Cuban and 
Nicaraguan target for terror and armed 
intimidation. Even Costa Rica, a country 
without an army, has come to us to 
discuss security assistance. Its people, 
too, fear the threat of an aggressive 
Nicaragua with mushrooming armed 
might and dedicated to the export of 
violent revolution. 

What Remains To Be Done 

If much has been accomplished, much 
remains to be done. In El Salvador, the 
democratic transformation must be com- 
pleted: presidential elections held, the 
system of justice reestablished, the land 
reform defended, the violence and de- 
struction ended, and the still dangerous 
guerrillas convinced that they cannot 
shoot their way to power and that they 
will have to compete for it at the polls. 



67 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



In Guatemala, the democratic trans- 
formation must be begun, the abuses of 
Indians and others in the countryside 
ended, and the campesinos enabled to 
develop in peace. 

In Honduras and Costa Rica and El 
Salvador and Guatemala, weak, 
bankrupt, or near-bankrupt economies 
must be refloated and helped to attract 
new investment and trade. 

In Nicaragua, a way back must be 
found from ever greater concentration 
of power and militarization — and from 
ever greater repression of its own 
citizens and ever greater danger to its 
neighbors. 

Of all these problems, it is Nica- 
ragua that is the most worrisome. It 
was the new Sandinista government that 
regionalized the conflict in Central 
America by backing the violence in El 
Salvador. Sandinista leader Daniel 
Ortega once told me that the FMLN 
[Farabundo Marti National Liberation 
Front], the Salvadoran guerrilla coal- 
tion, is "nuestro escudo" — "Nicaragua's 
shield," And Sandinista support has not 
lessened. The FMLN's headquarters are 
in Nicaragua. It receives sustained 
logistic support from Nicaragua, above 



There should be an 
end of heavy arms 
buildups that threaten 
neighbors and disrupt 
the traditional regional 
military equilibrium. 



all by airdrop and sea delivery but also 
by land. Its training camps are in 
Nicaragua. 

And now Nicaragua is expanding the 
violence to Costa Rica and Honduras. As 
more and more Nicaraguans have voted 
with their feet— 1,3,000 Miskito and 
Sumo Indians and thousands of ex- 
Sandinistas have followed anti-Sandi- 
nistas into neighboring havens — 
Managua has begun to pressure and 
threaten its neighbors. In downtown San 
Jose, Nicaraguan intelligence officers 
operating out of the Nicaraguan Em- 
bassy organize terrorism, including 
bombing an airline office, while Nica- 
raguan troops cross into Costa Rican 
territory and harass small farm owners, 
and Nicaraguan planes violate Costa 
Rican airspace. In Tegucigalpa, the 



68 



Sandinista-backed Salvadoran FMLN re- 
cently blacked out the capital by dyna- 
miting the electrical system, while 
Nicaragua threatens Honduras overtly, 
mobilizing its army and militia and re- 
deploying troops along the Honduran 
frontier. 

What can be done to sustain and de- 
velop the alternatives to the irre- 
sponsible spread of violence? Clearly, so 
long as violent minorities from within — 
or hostile neighbors from without — as- 
sert the right to use force, there can be 
no alternative to military preparedness 
and the maintenance of security. The 
United States will help its friends in the 
area to defend themselves from both 
threats, as long as it is necessary. 

But this response alone is not 
enough. We must also seek out and ex- 
plore every opportunity for reconcilia- 
tion and peace. His Holiness, Pope John 
Paul II, recently emphasized this moral 
imperative in separate letters to the 
bishops of Nicaragua and El Salvador. 
In both, he called for reconciliation and 
unity. The letter to Nicaragua was cen- 
sored by the Sandinistas, who first 
officially prevented its publication, then 
reversed themselves. In his letter to El 
Salvador, after noting the "new institu- 
tional perspectives recently opened" by 
the elections, the Pope said that "an in- 
dispensable condition for accommodation 
[is] the ceasing of all hostilities and the 
renunciation of the use of arms." 

This is not an impossible dream. 
Steps are available to give substance to 
the Pope's vision. The opportunities for 
reconciliation are most evident in El 
Salvador. Out of that country's travail 
have come a constituent assembly, a 
provisional coalition government, and a 
commitment to continued democratiza- 
tion. Some of the forces previously 
enamored of violent solutions — mainly 
from the far right — have begun to abide 
by the law and participate in the politi- 
cal process. Others — mainly from the 
far left— have yet to find a way to with- 
draw from their commitment to 
violence. 

The new government in El Salvador 
has seen the opportunity. On August 3, 
at President Magana's initiative, the 
leaders of the political parties joined 
with the President to adopt a united ac- 
tion plan to end divisions within El 
Salvador. One of the plan's key elements 
is the creation of a new Commission for 
Peace. The commission is to comprise in- 
stitutions, groups, and respected in- 
dividuals charged specifically with evalu- 
ating the requirements for peace and 
proposing solutions. Together with 
similar new commissions on human 



rights and on the political process, the 
Commission for Peace is an important 
further step toward national reconcilia- 
tion. 

These are all very positive signs. 
The important thing is to do them 
seriously. Amnesty must offer genuine 
security with the participation of the 
church and international organizations. 
And dialogue must involve listening as 
well as talking, giving an opportunity to 
adversaries to explain how they could 
participate in the new democratic insti- 
tutions. The United States very much 
hopes the new government will act with 
speed and imagination in this vital area. 

Regional Proposals 

Building the peace on a regional basis is 
even more complex. Order among na- 
tions requires order within nations as 
well as arrangements that respect their 
territorial integrity and national identi- 
ty. The regionalization of tensions 
derives from crises in all these areas. 

Here too, bases for progress exist. 
The issues are too numerous to be sub- 
ject to simple sweeping solutions. But 
many individual proposals and possibili- 
ties exist to deal with particular pieces 
of the problem. 

Honduras has put forward a pro- 
posal for peace with Nicaragua calling 
for an end to border incursions, a freeze 
on imports of heavy weapons, and com- 
prehensive verification. These proposals 
have been endorsed by its partners in 
the Central American Democratic Com- 
munity — Costa Rica and El Salvador. 

The United States has also made 
proposals. Beginning nearly a year ago 
and more intensively since April, we 
have attempted to engage Nicaragua in 
a dialogue. We have tried to respond to 
Nicaragua's concerns, while meeting 
those of Nicaragua's neighbors, and our 
own. 

The Sandinistas tell us that they 
fear an invasion by the United States. 
So we have offered to enter into a for- 
mal nonaggression agreement. The San- 
dinistas tell us that ex-Somocistas are 
training in the United States to invade 
Nicaragua. We have assured them that 
we are enforcing our Neutrality Act, 
which makes it a federal crime to launch 
an attack on, or to conspire to attack, 
another country from the United States 

The Sandinistas tell us we are 
regionalizing the conflict, preparing 
Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica 
as bases for action against them. So we 
have suggested that each country in 
Central America agree to put a reason- 



Department of State Bulletir 



htk 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



able, low limit on the numbers of foreign 
military and security advisers it has, and 
we have suggested that each country 
pledge not to import any additional 
heavy offensive weapons. Both commit- 
ments, of course, would have to be sub- 
ject to international verification. 

Nicaragua would also have to meet 
the concerns that its neighbors and we 
share. We asked that Nicaragua cease 
its involvement in the conflict in El 
Salvador. The Sandinistas say that they 
are not aware of any such involvement, 
but are willing to end it if we just give 
them the information we have. In our 
most recent exchanges we suggested 
that removing the combined guerrilla 
headquarters from Nicaragua would be a 
good place to start and offered to help 
the Sandinistas locate it. For example, 
the point from which guerrilla opera- 
tions in El Salvador are being directed 
was recently in a Managua suburb. We 
are confident that although it moves 
around a great deal within Nicaragua it 
can be found. Nicaragua has yet to 
respond. 

Similarly, Nicaragua must cease its 
terrorist and other aggressive actions 
against Honduras and Costa Rica. 

We have raised a second issue, 
which also deeply concerns Nicaragua's 
neighbors. This is the trend in the 
organization and use of state power in 
Nicaragua. It is, of course, for Nica- 
ragua to decide what kind of govern- 
ment it has. No one challenges that. We 
don't. Its neighbors don't. 

But we believe we are all entitled to 
ask what assurance can any of us have 
that promises of noninterference will be 
kept if the Nicarag^Jan state remains the 
preserve of a small Cuban-advised elite 
of Marxist-Leninists, disposing of grow- 
ing military power and hostile to all 
forms of social life but those they domi- 
nate? And we are also entitled to ask 
what is to become of internationally 
recognized human rights under these 
conditions? Such questions are not a 
defense, secret or otherwise, for a 
return to a discredited Somocismo. They 
could be answered in the fulfillment of 
the Sandinistas' own original commit- 
ments to democracy and regional peace. 

The Need for Action 

These are some of the ideas we have ad- 
vanced, not in any prescriptive sense but 
to start a dialogue to generate a re- 
sponse, to try to create a climate. There 
is no one way to guarantee peace in 
Central America. But our collective ex- 
periences suggest action is necessary on 
each of four fronts. 



October 1982 



• Within each state there should be 
a process of reconciliation in which 
adversaries can substitute political com- 
petition for armed competition. This im- 
plies, as indicated by His Holiness the 
Pope, a renunciation of violence and in- 
corporation within the civic process. 
Given the deep divisions in each country, 
this requires that democratic, or at least 
pluralistic, institutions be respected or 
established and broad participation in 
them encouraged. 

• Between states there should be an 
end to the export of subversion. This 
means the removal, subject to compre- 
hensive verification, of the headquarters, 
logistical support, and training camps of 
guerrilla movements installed outside 
the country of their origin. 

• There should be an end to heavy 
arms buildups that threaten neighbors 
and disrupt the traditional regional mili- 
tary equilibrium. The easiest way would 
seem to be a commitment by all coun- 
tries in the area not to bring in specified 
weapons, such as more tanks or combat 
aircraft— also subject, of course, to veri- 
fication. 

• Finally, there should be limits to 
foreign involvement, particularly in mat- 
ters affecting security, to help the region 
forge its own peaceful equilibrium on its 
own terms. Each country should put a 
common ceiling on the number of out- 
side military and security advisers and 



troops, subject to reciprocity and full 
verification. Why not make it zero? 

A number of democratic countries— 
the United States, Honduras, Costa 
Rica, and others— have all attempted a 
dialogue with Nicaragua this past year. 
We have little to show for it. But we 
should not abandon this idea. Rather, 
perhaps the democratic countries should 
come together and see whether they 
cannot formulate a common approach. 
The potential cornerstones of peace are 
there. The question is how to put them 
together. 

In the past the United States has 
generally neglected Central America- 
only to send in the troops when things 
got out of hand. U.S. troops are no solu- 
tion now. What can help is sustained 
U.S. commitment— not only in helping to 
overcome violence and not only in help- 
ing restore and develop economies but in 
the development of democratic institu- 
tions. For everything we know about the 
20th century tells us that governments 
that must face the people in elections do 
not long abuse their human rights. Nor 
do they often threaten their neighbors. 

I will grant you that that is a tall 
order. But in a region important to us 
because of its strategic position, because 
of its proximity, because of our human 
ties with it, nothing less will do. We can- 
not walk away. ■ 



Visit of Costa Rican President IVIonge 



President Luis Alberto Monge of 
Costa Rica made an official working 
visit to Washington, D.C., June 21-2U, 
1982. Following are remarks made by 
Presidients Reagan and Monge after their 
meeting on June 22. ' 



President Reagan 

Ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted to 
welcome President Monge of Costa Rica. 

Costa Rica is an old and valued 
friend of the United States. Its dramatic 
tradition has made that country a 
natural partner of the United States in 
the Caribbean and, in fact, in the whole 
hemisphere. Our meeting is in keeping 
with my policy of working very closely 
with our democratic friends in this 
hemisphere. And I most appreciated the 
President's views on his country's pros- 
pects and problems. 



I personally pledge my Administra- 
tion's support for Costa Rica's efforts at 
economic recovery. I'm also deeply ap- 
preciative of the President's strong sup- 
port for the Caribbean Basin initiative 
and understand that he's going to make 
that support known to our Congress. 

We discussed the prospects for 
democracy in the region. We noted that 
fair and free elections have been held 
this year in his own country — Costa 
Rica — and Colombia, where they've long 
been a tradition, Honduras, El Salvador, 
and the Dominican Republic as well. 
We've also discussed the threat to this 
welcome development by forces of the 
extreme right and the extreme left, the 
latter aided and abetted by Nicaragua 
and Cuba. 

We candidly assessed the inter- 
American system in light of the recent 
conflict in the South Atlantic. We agreed 
that the system and its ability to re- 
spond to threats to the peace must be 



fi» 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 




preserve in peace this democratic base 
which is Costa Rica. 

I confirm that in order to defend 
democracy, something that is one of my 
deep convictions — that in order to de- 
fend democracy, the best tool we have in 
this unceasing struggle is an unceasing 
struggle against poverty, a struggle in 
favor of social justice, a struggle for 
economic growth. I believe that no mat- 
ter how harsh or difficult the circum- 
stances may be, that we, as I told Presi 
dent Reagan, feel optimistic. I think thai 
at the end of the day that the validity of 
these concepts in the conscience of our 
peoples will be intact — these shared 
ideals of freedom, of justice, and of 
peace that have always been defended 
by the people of the United States and 
the people of Costa Rica. 

Thank you very much. President 
Reagan, for having accepted my ratifica 
tion of this alliance between tiny Costa 
Rica and the powerful United States for 
the continuation of the struggle for 
freedom and justice for the good of our 
peoples. 



strengthened and that this required our 
urgent attention. 

And, finally, let me say again, it's 
been my great pleasure in meeting and 
talking with you. I look forward to our 
working together in the common prob- 
lems that face us in this hemisphere. It's 
a pleasure to welcome you to America. 



President Monge 

I've expressed my deep appreciation to 
President Reagan for this invitation to 
come here in representation of the 
government and the people of Costa 
Rica. I pointed out, in my words of ap- 
preciation to the President, that this 
was a great indication of the sympathy 
and the support for Costa Rican 
democracy, that is, the fact that this in- 
vitation was extended to me the very 
day that I took office this past May 8th. 

It has been my privilege to come 
here to reiterate and to ratify an alliance 
that has existed from the very early 
days of our country with the United 
States of America. And so, this small 
democracy without an army has always 



been a sincere ally of this great power 
called the United States of America, 
because we have always identified with 
the ideals and the conceptions of 
freedom of justice and for the good of 
all of the peoples throughout the Earth. 

This alliance has become a matter of 
great importance for our countries 
thoughout the past, but never more than 
now. In this dramatic occasion, its im- 
portance is of really dramatic sig- 
nificance, because we are caught in a 
pincer now — that is, the democratic 
forces — between the extremes of 
political thinking now more than ever 
before. I have conveyed to President 
Reagan the harsh realities of our pres- 
ent economic and social crisis and a true 
information as to the fact that there is, 
indeed, a massive offensive on the part 
of totalitarian Marxism-Leninism in the 
areas of Central America and the Carib- 
bean. 

I have repeated to President Reagan 
our need for solidarity and for 
assistance in order to enable us to over- 
come these economic difficulties and 
social problems that we are undergoing 
at the present time and in order to 



'r 



'r 



'Made on South Grounds of White Housf 
(Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of June 28, 1982.) ■ 



ire 



[m 



^ 



Department of State Bullet '"»i 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



/isit of Honduran President Suazo 



President Roberto Suazo Cordova of 
londuras made an official working visit 
Washington, D.C., July 13-15, 1982. 
'allowing are remarks made by 
'residents Reagan and Suazo after their 
neeting on July i^.' 



'resident Reagan 

'm pleased to welcome President Suazo 
f Honduras to the White House. 

Honduras is a good and valued 
riend and partner of the United States. 
'resident Suazo's leadership has re- 
amed Honduras to democracy. His 
overnment has embarked on a prompt 
nd courageous effort to return the 
ountry to economic health. 

We had a good discussion about the 
ituation in his country and elsewhere in 
antral America. I told the President of 
ur shock on learning of the recent ter- 
jrist attack against power stations in 
londuran territory, which cut off vital 
iectricity to hospitals, water, and to 
ther essential facilities. Faced with 
ireats of this kind, the people of Hon- 
iiras should be able to rely on their 
•iends for help; they can count on us. 
ftie United States will provide assist- 
nce so that Hondurans can defend 
■lemselves from aggression. 

President Suazo has been a strong 
Dice for peace and democracy in Cen- 
tal America. He has put forward a plan 
) reduce tensions between states by 
greement on the reduction of arms and 
le number of foreign advisers and by 
Iternational supervision of borders, 
Irfields, and ports so that each country 
»n be free of the fear of aggression 
cm its neighbors. It's a concrete plan 
ir peace which we fully support. 

President Suazo also has explained, 
ankly, the seriously depressed 
;onomy of his country and the austerity 
leasures he has adopted. The proposals 
sfore our Congress for the Caribbean 
asin would substantially increase our 
Mlity to be of help to the people of 
onduras. 

I told President Suazo that I was 
ire the Congress would respond with 
Tong, bipartisan support for a program 
lat is obviously in the interest of both 
le United States and his country. I'm 
appy to say that he will be speaking to 
[embers of the Congress on the Carib- 
Ban Basin initiative while he is here. 



ctober1982 



I hope you return to Honduras confi- 
dent that the United States — its people 
and its government — remains a reliable 
friend and good neighbor. And that is 
my personal pledge to you. 



President Suazo 

Before I read my statement that I have 
prepared, I would like to make the 
following statement. And that is that 
there was, according to the history 
books, when Benjamin Franklin was 
walking out of Independence Hall, a 
woman in the crowd asked, "What have 
you done? Have you created a republic 
or a monarchy?" And this outstanding 
American patriot said, "We have created 
a republic. But the important thing will 
be how to preserve it." 



And so, I want to first of all, thank 
you for your very kind invitation to visit 
here. I want to say to the people of the 
United States — of this great democracy 
of the north — that we admire and we 
have great affection for the two cen- 
turies in which you've been able to con- 
serve your republic here— this system of 
democratic government that you have— 
and have been able to project it on a 
worldwide basis and have become an 
unswerving bulwark in defense of free- 
dom, of justice, and of democracy. 

I have come to this country inspired 
by the best wishes— of achieving under- 
standing and friendship. I have come, 
thus, to work in favor of these purposes. 

With all clearness, I have expressed 
to President Reagan what Honduras 
means in these critical times for Central 
America, for this hemisphere, and for 




(White House photo by Michael Evans) 



71 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



the very development of present interna- 
tional relations. 

I have reaffirmed to him that Hon- 
duras, governed by a government that is 
bom out of the will of the people — the 
free will of its people — because of its 
geopolitical location, represents a fun- 
damental element in order to achieve 
democratic stability in Central America 
by peaceful means and to achieve eco- 
nomic progress and social change. We 
have wanted this to be understood com- 
pletely and objectively without any 
reticence. 

I said, when I took over as President 
of the republic a little less than 6 
months ago, and I repeat it now: Hon- 
duras does not seek, does not wish to 
become the arbiter of regional expecta- 
tions, anguish, and hopes. This is not 
our role. But we do aspire, being faithful 
to the principles of nonintervention and 
self-determination, to be a factor of the 
balance and of concord in the search for 
a common destiny for Central America. 
With this conviction, we respect the 
others with a same firmness with which 
we will defend and will earn the respect 
for our democratic system of life and of 
government. 

I bring with me on my visit to the 
United States members of my govern- 
ment who are responsible for basic areas 
of public affairs, as well as members of 
our armed forces, in order that you will 
understand better that the Government 
of Honduras is as one and is asking for 
cooperation and requiring understanding 
in its struggle in favor of participatory 
and pluralistic democracy, for an authen- 
tic peace for the good of the entire 
region, and unrestricted respect for 
human dignity. 

We have nothing to hide, because 
this is the conduct that is proper for a 
democractic government based on 
popular sovereignty. But we do have a 
lot to say to the leaders of this coun- 
try—to those who run international 
organizations— as to the social and 
economic realities of Honduras and the 
solution of its problems; on the opera- 
tion of its republican institution; and of 
the danger that they might be under- 
mined if the menace of violence is not 
faced with a genuine spirit of coopera- 
tion in favor of peace, of progress, and 
of democracy. 

It is for this reason that we hope for 
the friendship; that the friendship of- 
fered to us be frank, realistic, and effec- 
tive, as is the content of our friendship 
toward you. The present and the future 
of Honduras depend, therefore, on a 



72 



combination of two basic factors: self- 
effort and the honest cooperation from 
friendly nations and the international 
community. 

I have come to this country, then, 
with this spirit in order to better guide 
the path of our conversations and our 
objectives. With this spirit, I bear 



witness also of my faith in the mass 
media and the organs of information to 
which I attribute the virtue of being 
bulwarks of objective truth, of construc- 
tive criticism, of freedom, and of peace. 



'Made on South Grounds of the White 
House (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 19, 1982.) I 



U.S. Relations With Brazil 



by Thomas O. Enders 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Inter-American Affairs of the Hoiise 
Foreign Affairs Committee on July H, 
1982. Ambassador Enders is Assistant 
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. ' 

I welcome the opportunity to appear 
before you today to discuss U.S. rela- 
tions with Brazil. Brazil is a great and 
fascinating country full of achievements 
and underlying strength. Yet, Brazil also 
sometimes seems one of the best-kept 
secrets in the United States. Let me 
therefore beg^n by saying a few words 
about Brazil itself. 



The Economy 

Brazil's territorial extension is larger 
than that of the continental United 
States. Geography and history gave 
Brazil a 5,000-mile coastline. But it is 
Brazil's own genius that not one of the 
almost 8,000 miles of land frontiers- 
borders that Brazil shares with every 
South American country except Ecuador 
and Chile— is disputed. Within this vast 
and peaceful expanse, Brazil's natural 
resources are bountiful— fertile 
agricultural lands, mammoth deposits of 
metallic minerals, and enormous hydro- 
electric reserves. 

With a $250 billion GNP, Brazil's 
economy is today the world's eighth 
largest market-based center of produc- 
tion. Brazil's sophisticated industrial sec- 
tor produces a large part of its capital 
goods as well as most of the country's 
consumer goods. Industrialized products 
account for roughly half of Brazil's $23 
billion in exports, with the balance made 
up by exports of unprocessed minerals 
and agricultural commodities. Brazilian 
agriculture has changed substantially 
from the days when it was known pri- 
marily as a producer of coffee and 
sugar. Today Brazilian farmers also 



grow enormous quantities of the most 
varied commodities. They have made 
Brazil, like the United States, one of the 
world's prime agricultural exporters. 

Many— perhaps most— of these 
economic gains have been registered in 
the last 20 years. The raw production 
statistics that have been achieved are 
impressive, but it is important to 
remember that about half of Brazil's na- 
tional territory remains undeveloped. 
National development as a whole re- 
mains highly uneven. In parts of Brazil's 
north and northeast, social and economic 
indices rival those of some of the 
poorest countries of the world. 

Brazil's self-identification as a 
developing country is not arbitrary. 
Moreover, like many other oil-importing 
developing nations, Brazil faces substan- 
tial economic difficulties in the short 
term. The oil price rises of 1979-80, 
combined with the high prevailing world 
interest rates, now force Brazil to spend 
almost half of its export earnings for oil 
and most of the remainder for debt serv 
ice. Brazil recognizes that this balance- 
of-payments position is a key to its 
short-term economic prospects. To 
develop, Brazil must borrow; to borrow, 
it must maintain its creditworthiness on 
the international money markets; to 
maintain its creditworthiness, Brazil 
must control its balance of payments. 

In late 1980, Brazil faced a crisis— a 
trade account deficit close to $3 billion 
loomed on the heels of a $2.7 billion 
deficit in 1979; domestic inflation, which 
later peaked in March 1981 at 121%, 
was accelerating. In response, the 
government put in place a program of 
stringent monetary and fiscal restraint 
and import demand management. Infla- 
tion dropped steadily in the last part of 
1981, and extensive export incentives 
produced a trade surplus of $1.2 billion 
by year's end. However, the national 
economy went into a deep recession wit; 
GDP growth at - 2% or - 3% for the 
year— the first such result since the 
beginning of Brazilian statistical series. 



Departnnent of State Bulletlr 



xal 



Sou 
iepli 

JOUgfc 



'elopi 
Bam 
iliiiiili 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



This year will be a difficult one for 
Brazil. The domestic recession appears 
o be abating somewhat, but the continu- 
ng economic slump in the outside world 
nakes it difficult for Brazil to increase 
larkets for industrial products or to 
ceive good prices for traditional com- 
odity exports. 

Those of us who have watched 
razil deal with its massive problems of 
lonomic development over the years 
nnot but believe that it has the talent 
nd fortitude to deal with its current 
roblems. There is every reason to 
elieve that the Brazilian economy will 
;ach new heights over the balance of 
lis century and that Brazil will rise 
ven higher on the ladder of the world's 
3onomic giants. 

Politically, Brazil is emerging from 
Imost 20 years of relatively closed and 
ighly centralized politics. A program of 
emocratic evolution, known in Por- 
iguese as abertura or "opening," is 
radually moving Brazil toward greater 
^centralization and more direct citizen 
articipation in the political process, 
nder President Figueiredo, Brazil will 
old direct gubernatorial and congres- 
onal elections this coming November, 
iorth America can view this evolving 
Kperiment in democracy with great 
spect and admiration. 

he Foreign Policy 

razil's foreign policy reflects directly 
lie many strands of its domestic 
;onomy and society. With an excellent 
oreign Service to complement dynamic 
atrepreneurs and competent adminis- 
lators, Brazilian leaders, in recent 
;ars, have worked hard and successful- 
to diversify their country's interna- 
>nal relationships. Brazil's need for 
itroleum imports, and the high costs of 
■reign borrowing to finance economic 
•owth, have made the development of 
reign markets a central objective of 
razilian foreign policy. Brazil's 
;onomic and trade relationships now 
ke place on a global scale. They have 
irned Brazil respected positions 
iroughout Europe, Africa, and in the 
iddle East. 

Brazilian foreign policy also prom- 
ently features Brazil's role as a 
iveloping country. In the United Na- 
ons and elsewhere, Brazil's technical 
id diplomatic skills have proved a ma- 
r asset to the many countries seeking 
•oadened Third World participation and 
isponsibilities in international economic 
■fairs. 



Brazil— A Profile 



Geography 

Area: 3,290,000 sq. mi. Cities: 

Capital — Brasilia (pop. 1.2 million). Other 

Cities — Sao Paulo (8.5 million), Rio de 

Janeiro (5.1 million), Belo Horizonte (1.8 

million), Salvador (1.5 million), Fortaleza (1.3 

million), Recife (1.2 million), Porto Alegre 

(1.1 million). Novo Iguacu (1.1 million), 

Curitiba(l.l million). 

People 

Population: 119 million (1980). Annual 
Growth Rate: 2.5%. Ethnic Groups: Por- 
tuguese, Italian, German, Japanese, African, 
American Indian. Religion: Roman Catholic. 
Languages: Portuguese (official), English. 
Literacy: 78% of adult population (1978). 

Government 

Type: Federal republic. Independence: 

Sept. 7, 1822. Constitution: Jan. 24, 1967. 

Branches: Executive — president (chief of 
state and head of government) elected to a 
single 6-yr. term. Legislative — Senate (66 
members elected to 8-yr. terms), Chamber of 
Deputies (420 members elected to 4-yr. 
terms). Judicial — Supreme Federal Tribunal. 
Suffrage: Compulsory over 18, except for il- 
literates. Subdivisions: 22 states, 4 ter- 
ritories, federal district (Brasilia). 

Economy 

GDP: $237 billion (1980). Annual Growth 

Rate: 8% (1980). Per Capita GDP: $1,995 

(1980). 

Natural Resources: Iron ore, manganese, 
bauxite, nickel, uranium, gemstones. 

Agricultural Products: Coffee, soybeans, 
sugarcane, cocoa, rice, beef, com. 

Industries: Steel, chemicals, petro- 
chemicals, machinery, motor vehicles, con- 
sumer durables, cement, lumber, ship- 
building. 



Trade (1980): Alports— $20.1 billion: 
manufactures, coffee, soybeans, iron ore, 
sugar. Major Markets — U.S., F.R.G., Japan, 
Netherlands, Argentina. Imports — $23 
billion: oil and other fuels, capital goods, con- 
sumer goods. Major Non-Oil Suppliers — 
U.S., F.R.G., Japan, Canada, Argentina. 

Official Exchange Rate: 90.95 
cruzeiros = US$1.00 (June 1981; changes fre- 
quently). 





^ 


Atlantic 
Ocean 


XfmY^'-^ 


BRAZIL 


y 


1 r"*^ 


j 


]y< 


BKUAY ^ 


-^ 


l/mm„^ J 




j\ um^ 


^ 





Membership in 
International Organizations 

U.N., General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), Group of 77, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), Organization of 
American States (OAS), Rio pact, Latin 
American Integration Association (ALADI), 
International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), International Sugar 
Organization, International Cocoa Organiza- 
tion, INTELSAT. ■ 



While expanding its global reach, 
Brazil retains an obvious identification 
with Latin America. Over the past 10 
years, Brazilian ties with the other 
countries of South America have im- 
proved steadily. Brazil's undeniable suc- 
cess in maintaining peaceful, construc- 
tive relations with its South American 
neighbors is an achievement that bodes 
well for the hemisphere and the world. 

U.S.-Brazil Ties 

Bilateral ties between Brazil and the 
United States are both rich and endur- 
ing. During World War II, Brazilian 
soldiers fought side by side with Amer- 
ican forces in Italy. In the 1950s, the ini- 
tiative of a Brazilian President, 
Juscehno Kubitschek— who was perhaps 



best known as the visionary founder of 
Brasilia and originator of Brazil's 
modern drive to national develop- 
ment—paved the way for the Alliance 
for Progress. During the 1960s and ear- 
ly 1970s, the two countries enjoyed what 
was widely believed to be a special rela- 
tionship. Much of that confidence 
dissolved in the mid-1970s. In 1977 
U.S. -Brazilian relations hit a historical 
low point when Brazil abrogated 
longstanding bilateral security assistance 
and cooperation agreements in the midst 
of controversy over the U.S. approach 
to human rights and nuclear issues. 
Since then relations have again im- 
proved steadily. Today our ties are again 
sound and characterized by basic shared 
values, mutual respect, and increasing 
political and economic interaction. 



73 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



The May 11-14 state visit of Presi- 
dent Figueiredo to Washington— the 
first visit to the United States by a 
Brazilian president since 1971— reflected 
the cordial state of our relations today. 
His exchange of views with President 
Reagan on global, regional, and bilateral 
issues was extensive, candid, and excep- 
tionally constructive. Our basic conver- 
gence on many major issues was reaf- 
firmed; where there was not agreement, 
there was understanding and respect. 

The historic convergence of U.S. and 
Brazilian views reflects the unique vigor 
that innovation and the frontier give to 
our common roots in Western values 
and civilization. Both countries are at 
once optimistic and pragmatic. Both are 
committed to a stable and just interna- 
tional environment with open markets 
and free economic competition. We both 
condemn outside intervention in the af- 
fairs of sovereign nations and reject the 
use of force to resolve disputes. We both 
have a vested interest in a peaceful 
hemisphere, free from outside in- 
terference. 

Our shared interest in a peaceful 
hemisphere was heightened by the South 
Atlantic crisis. Even though it erupted 
long after the dates of the visit had been 
established, the conflict between Argen- 
tina and the United Kingdom was a ma- 
jor topic of discussion during President 
Figueiredo's visit. The exchange made 
clear that our respective positions dif- 
fered but that our basic interests and ob- 
jectives were similar. Unlike the United 
States, which has refrained from taking 
a position on the question of sovereign- 
ty, Brazil recognizes Argentina's 
sovereignty over the disputed islands. 
Like the United States, however, Brazil 
does not — and did not — support the use 
of force to validate it. And like the 
United States, Brazil was and is con- 
cerned that the South Atlantic conflict 
not result in instability or polarization in 
Argentina or elsewhere in the 
hemisphere. Brazil supported Secretary 
Haig's efforts to find a peaceful resolu- 
tion of the conflict. When these efforts 
did not succeed, Brazil gave its full sup- 
port to the efforts of the U.N. Secretary 
General and advanced specific proposals 
of its own to promote a negotiated solu- 
tion within a U.N. framework. Now that 
the fighting has ended, we expect that 
Brazil will use its influence to promote a 
permanent solution that takes into con- 
sideration the interests of all of the par- 
ties and contributes to the stability of 
the hemisphere. This is our objective as 
well. 



74 



In stating that we have a con- 
vergence of views on many major issues, 
I do not mean to suggest that there are 
no differences between us; there are 
quite a few. In considering them, it is 
important to understand that both 
governments are making a serious effort 
to resolve or contain them without los- 
ing sight of our basic interests. 

Difference of Views 

A conflict in our respective nuclear 
legislation and policies has prevented the 
satisfactory implementation of our 
nuclear supply relationship under a 
bilateral nuclear agreement signed in 
1972. Under our Nuclear Nonprolifera- 
tion Act of 1978, we can supply nuclear 
materials and services only if the recip- 
ient country maintains International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
safeguards on all its nuclear facilities at 
the time of the export from the United 
States. Brazil takes the view that it will 
accept international safeguards only on 
those facilities in which foreign 
materials or technology are used and 
argues that under our 1972 agreement, 
we should not deny supply based on 
safeguards that do not concern 
U.S. -supplied materials or equipment. 

Because of this conflict, the United 
States was unable to supply the first 
fuel reload of a Westinghouse reactor 
that is due shortly to come on line. Dur- 
ing Vice President Bush's visit to Brazil 
in October, we were able to find a 
mutually acceptable means to set aside 
the problem for later solution. But it is 
clear that substantial adjustments be- 
tween the two countries' policies must 
be sought if the way to developing 
nuclear cooperation is to be opened. 

Our governments also diverge on a 
number of global political issues. In most 
of these cases, the objectives of the 
United States and of Brazil are similar, 
but our perspectives and approaches dif- 
fer. In southern Africa, for example, our 
objectives are fully compatible, but we 
view differently some points of the 
overall problem, such as the presence of 
Cuban troops in Angola. The Brazilian 
Government understands the efforts of 
the United States to find a peaceful solu- 
tion to the Namibia problem as a 
member of the contact group, but it has 
avoided identifying itself with the con- 
tact group's approach to the problem. In 
the Mideast, Brazil has its own perspec- 
tives and interests based on strengthen- 
ing relationships with the Arab states 
and identification with the claims of the 
Palestinians. 



ill! 



U.S. -Brazil Economic Relations 

Americans make up the largest single 
group of foreign investors in Brazil. 
U.S. direct investment in Brazil is ap- 
proximately $8 billion. American banks 
hold at least $16 billion of Brazil's 
roughly $62 billion foreign debt. This 
financial interaction is largely governed 
by market circumstances; official in 
volvement on the U.S. side is quite 
limited. 

In trade we are Brazil's most imporLj( 
tant single customer and purchase ap- 
proximately 18% of Brazilian exports. 
Although traditional agricultural prod- 
ucts like sugar and coffee are still very 
important, manufactured goods, iron, 
and steel are the principal Brazilian 
products sold to the United States. In 
turn Brazil is an important market for 
U.S. products and buys about 19% of it 
imports from us. In dollar terms, this 
bilateral trade totals about $8 billion ar 
is growing. The United States tradi- 
tionally has had a modest surplus in 
trade with Brazil — $510 million in 
1980— but Brazil had a surplus in 1981 
of $670 million. 

Many of our day-to-day bilateral co 
cerns relate to trade. Brazil has a 
critical need for increasing trade sur- 
pluses to help finance development. Ac 
cordingly Brazil often provides protec- 
tion for its infant industries and less 
competitive producers and sometimes 
seeks to stimulate exports through sub If 
sidies. Brazil does not follow these pra t^ 
tices across the board, but they arise 
frequently enough to create recurring 
bilateral frictions; all the more so as tY 
United States must be concerned abou 
the integrity of the worldwide effort t( 
prevent distortions of trade resulting 
from subsidies. 

The other side of the coin is that 
some U.S. practices— for example, our 
use of quotas to protect our own 
domestic sugar producers and heavy 
U.S. tariffs on ethanol imports— affect 
products important to Brazil. Brazilian 
believe that our sugar quota will cost 
their exports no less than $400 million 
1982. We believe this figure is much tc 
high but do not doubt that there will b 
a cost. Certain U.S. Government actio 
in response to complaints by Americar 
firms over Brazilian trade practices ar 
also a continuing concern to the Cover 
ment of Brazil. 

To the extent that it is appropriate 
and feasible, we attempt to sort out 
these trade policy differences in the 
framework of the General Agreement 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), of which be 
Brazil and the United States are 



ijiil 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



nembers. We also have annual or semi- 
innual bilateral trade consultations dur- 
ng which we seek reconciliation of our 
rade policy differences. 

"Graduation" — switching from 
leveloping to developed country roles in 
nternational trade and finance — is also 
I difference between us. In our general- 
' zed system of preferences (GSP), we 
lach year "graduate" those Brazilian in- 
lustries that appear to have reached a 
irorld standard of competitiveness, in 
iddition to those that meet the absolute 
ompetitive need test. We take such ac- 
ions because we believe that the excep- 
ional opportunities inherent in tariff 
references should be reserved for in- 
lustries in developing countries at the 
larly stages of development. The World 
5ank also has a graduation policy with 
enchmarks which we accept and which 
Jrazil continues to resist. 

To some considerable degree, dif- 
erences on "graduation" are more mat- 
ers of perception and principle than of 
act. For example, the United States 
xaduated products carrying $27 million 
f exports to the United States in 1981 
s against total exports to the U.S. 
nder the GSP of $515 million. And the 
raduation policy of the World Bank will 
nly come into play later in the decade, 
nd then it will be applied pragmatically, 
/ith a significant transition period. 

"he Security Relationship 

^ 'he security or military side of our rela- 
ionship is recovering from the 1977 

■ hock of the cancellation of our 
' jngstanding bilateral security and 

'■ lilitary assistance agreements. In 

' etrospect I think we would all agree 
hat the specific agreements in question 
ad been overtaken by history and 
vents and that they were no longer ap- 

' ropriate to the conduct of a mutually 
atisfactory security relationship, 
loreover, I think both governments 
/ould agree that our present security 
elations — although not especially 
lose — are in most respects adequate to 
ur current needs. We undertake an an- 
lUal security review in which our Joint 
'hiefs of Staff discuss issues of mutual 
nterest and concern with their Brazilian 
ounterparts. We have a fairly constant 
wo-way flow of high-level military of- 
icials visiting their counterparts in 
kazil and the United States. And ex- 
ept for this year, our navies participate 
ointly in exercises within the UNITAS 
ramework. 



gt Ictober 1982 



What is sorely lacking from the 
security relationship at this point is 
mutual exposure among junior and mid- 
level officers at operational levels. From 
the 1940s through 1977, the Brazilian 
and U.S. military services enjoyed a 
broad exchange relationship in which of- 
ficers from each country were exposed 
to the other's doctrines, systems, and 
operational techniques. These inter- 
changes were a healthy, broadening ex- 
perience. They generated mutual con- 
fidence, understanding, and respect be- 
tween the respective services, as well as 
among the individuals who participated 
in them. Today training exchanges are 
effectively blocked by the Symington 
and Glenn amendments to the Foreign 
Assistance Act, which prohibit us from 
funding military education for a country 
that receives nuclear enrichment or 
reprocessing equipment, materials, or 
technology. Unless we are prepared to 
allow our institutions and the future 
generations of military leaders of both 
nations to forego these advantages, we 
will need to find a way to restore our 
ability to learn to cooperate. 

Brazil's dependency on the United 
States for military supply is a thing of 
the past. At first, the break in the sup- 
ply relationship was mainly a conse- 
quence of our own restrictions on U.S. 
arms transfers and of the unavailability 
of U.S. military export credits on com- 
petitive terms. Today, however, Brazil 
has emerged as an important arms pro- 
ducer and exporter in its own right. 
Those high-technology systems and 
equipment that Brazil is not yet ready to 
produce itself are obtained from Euro- 
pean suppliers. It is not likely that 
Brazil will turn back to the United 
States for major military purchases, ex- 
cept possibly as a supplier of specific 
technologies for production in Brazil 
under licensing arrangements. The 
United States has arrangements of this 
kind with a number of close allies. 
Perhaps it would be worth considering 
whether they would not be appropriate 
with Brazil. 

Brazil and the United States are 
among the few countries that conduct 
worldwide foreign policies. It is in- 
evitable, given our different stages of 
economic development, geographic loca- 
tion, and perceived global roles, that 
those policies should in some cases be in- 
consistent with each other. I have cited 
examples in the nuclear, trade, financial, 
and military sectors. Neither country 
can be expected to challenge the integri- 
ty of its worldwide policies and substi- 
tute for them "Brazil-specific" or 
"U.S. -specific" policies. 



That said, it may well be that some 
of the policies— let me speak for the 
United States — some of our policies 
have effects not intended when applied 
to Brazil, for no other country is like 
Brazil. It has an economic potential as 
great as the United States— yet many 
parts of it are at an early stage of devel- 
opment. It is Western in its values, 
strongly anti-Communist, vigorously free 
in enterprise, yet reasonably independ- 
ent in its stance in the world. 

Our goal should be to develop eco- 
nomic, military, and political relations 
with Brazil characterized by the richness 
and mutual confidence of the relation- 
ships we have with other major friendly 
nations. We should review our policies, 
not to challenge their principles which 
are essential to U.S. well-being but to 
see how they can be applied in such a 
way as to contribute to development of 
such a relationship. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from tlie Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Grenada 



by Stephen W. Bosworth 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Inter-American Affairs of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee on June 15, 
1982. Mr. Bosworth is Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.'^ 

It is a pleasure to meet with you and the 
members of the committee to discuss 
our relations with Grenada. The Eastern 
Caribbean subregion has become increas- 
ingly important to the United States. 
During the past 16 years, six countries 
of the Eastern Caribbean have peaceful- 
ly achieved their independence from the 
United Kingdom. With the exception of 
Grenada, all have freely elected, 
democratic governments characterized 
by their respect for individual rights and 
the rule of law. Small in both size and 
population, most still depend substantial- 
ly on tourism and the export of a nar- 
row range of agricultural products for 
their economic livelihood. In addition to 
their economic vulnerability, the social 
problems of these island nations have 
been exacerbated by high unemployment 
and the emigration of skilled labor. 
Strategically, this region sits astride ma- 



75 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



jor shipping lanes which are important 
to the commerce and security of the 
United States. 

The President's announcement of the 
Caribbean Basin program in February 
was tangible recognition of this region's 
importance not only to the United States 
but to other major countries of the area. 
In cooperation with Mexico, Venezuela, 
Colombia, and Canada, our nation has 
proposed a major and integrated pro- 
gram of trade, investment, and 
assistance to promote the economic 
development and social well-being of 
these island nations, as well as the other 
countries of the Caribbean Basin. To 
underscore the importance we attach to 
the Caribbean, President Reagan visited 
Barbados in April and personally met 
with elected leaders of many of these 
new nations. 

Proud and independent, the 
democratic governments of this region 
are seeking to improve the welfare of 
their peoples within a commitment to 
freedom, democracy, and respect for 
human rights. This commitment stands 
in contrast to the situation in Grenada. 

Maurice Bishop's New JEWEL 
[Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education, 
and Liberation] Movement overthrew 
the constitutional government of Prime 
Minister Eric Gairy in March 1979. The 
new government initially promised early 
elections and improved observance of 
human rights. Its actual performance, 
however, has been quite different. It has 
postponed elections indefinitely and has 
taken a number of actions which have 
seriously eroded the human rights of the 
Grenadian people. Basic freedoms and 
due process of law have been effectively 
denied in Grenada. At the same time, 
Grenada's people's revolutionary govern- 
ment has adopted a militant foreign 
policy harshly critical of the United 
States and has openly aligned itself with 
Cuba and the Soviet Union. 

The New JEWEL Movement's coup 
d'etat sent shock waves throughout the 
Eastern Caribbean as it marked the first 
nonconstitutional change of government 
in the Commonwealth Caribbean. Since 
the coup, Grenada has continued to par- 
ticipate in regional institutions like the 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the 
Organization of Eastern Caribbean 
States, the Eastern Caribbean Currency 
Authority, and the Caribbean Develop- 
ment Bank but not in the West Indies 
Supreme Court, from which Grenada 
withdrew shortly after the New JEWEL 
Movement suspended the constitution 
and judicial guarantees. While maintain- 
ing such traditional institutional links, 



76 



the government has taken positions con- 
trary to those of most of its neighbors 
on issues fundamental to the region and 
to the hemisphere. 

Democracy 

At the celebration of the third anniver- 
sary of his coup in March, Bishop again 
said publicly that Westminster-style 
democracy is dead in Grenada. Govern- 
ment leaders ridicule the system favored 
by all other Commonwealth Caribbean 
islands as "democracy for 5 seconds 
when votes are cast every 5 years." In 
Grenada, political pluralism and the 
legal organization of freely competing 
political parties have been replaced by a 
"people's democracy" of grassroots 
parish assemblies, controlled by the New 
JEWEL Movement, which serves as an 
instrument of, rather than as a check 
on, the government. 



Human Rights 

The human rights situation has shown 
continued deterioration since the 






Atlantic 
Ocean 




people's revolutionary government came 
to power. No independent press is 
allowed to operate. Shortly after coming 
to power, the government shut down the 
island's major newspaper. Torchlight, 
which had originally supported the 
ouster of Gairy. Another independent 
newspaper was closed just last summer 
after only one edition. There is no 
freedom of assembly, no due process of 
law. Over 100 political prisoners remain 
under detention, and many have never 
been formally charged with any crime. 
The Department of State's 1981 human 
rights report to the Congress gives 
details on the situation and merits 
careful reading. 



Economic Development 

Grenada's economy is in trouble. Like 
those of its neighbors, it has been af- 
fected seriously by the worldwide reces 
sion and depressed prices for its export 
crops. While employing increasingly 
authoritarian measures to consolidate u 
temal political control, the government 
has permitted the continued existence c 
private sector economic activity. But 
private investment is at a standstOl, in 
part because most of Grenada's scarce 
foreign exchange is devoted to public 
projects, like the Cuban-constructed 
Point Salines International Airport. 
Although the government recently 
returned to its owners a Coca-Cola plai 
confiscated in September 1979, the 
climate for private investment remains 
uncertain. The country relies heavily oi 
foreign assistance — much of it from 
Cuba and other radical Soviet bloc coui 
tries — for the modest rate of current 
economic growth. Tourism, traditionaU 
the most dynamic industry, has been 
declining much more than in other 
Caribbean countries. The government's 
anti-capitalist, anti-American rhetoric lit 
has hardly helped to encourage foreign «n; 
investment or tourism. 

roll 
ill 



!ri 



uj 



Foreign Policy 

Unlike its neighbors, the people's revol 
tionary government maintains close rel 
tions with Cuba, Soviet bloc countries, 
and radical Arab states, which are 
primary sources of aid. The oversized 
airport project at Point Salines is beinj 
built principally with Cuban assistance. 
In turn, Grenada has adopted foreign 
policy positions closely linked to those 
Cuba and the Soviet Union, and it has 
strongly criticized U.S. policies like the 
Caribbean Basin initiative. Grenada, fo 
example, voted with Cuba and the 
Soviet Union in the United Nations on 
Afghanistan and Kampuchea. In stark 
contrast to its Commonwealth Caribbe: Jesi 
neighbors, Grenada has followed the 
Cuban lead on the South Atlantic crisis 
deriding "British colonialism." We expefetlii 
Grenada will repay its debt to Cuba wi 
more than verbal support and votes by 
providing Cuba access to the Point 
Salines airport for transit flights to 
Africa and other military uses. 



II *i 



Security 

Grenada's neighbors have watched 
carefully as the government has becom 
a center for "solidarity" meetings and 
established close ties to small, radical 
movements from elsewhere in the Cari 



Deoartment of State Bullet 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



an. Grenada, to some degree, acts as 
)ridge for Cuba to radical or, as some 
)uld prefer to say, "progressive" 
oups in the Eastern Caribbean. Cuba 
s provided training to Grenada's vast- 
expanded security forces and has sta- 
ned small numbers of military ad- 
iers on the island. Cuba and the Soviet 
lion have provided arms, transporta- 
n, and communications equipment to 
3 Grenadian security forces. 

At the same time, Cuba's role in the 
nstruction of the Point Salines air- 
rt — a field which will be capable of 
ndling advanced military aircraft — 
ds a new and serious dimension to our 
:urity concerns. It is difficult, if not 
possible, to identify any economic 
itification for the enormous invest- 
mt being undertaken in the construc- 
n of this airfield. 

S.-Grenada Relations 

Nations between the United States and 
enada are seriously strained and have 
en so for some time. As I have in- 
rated, the United States has signifi- 
nt differences with the Government of 
lenada on fundamental issues. 

Since it took power, the people's 
/olutionary government has viewed 

United States with hostility and 
spicion. Relations were strained under 

t i previous Administration. With no 

n ange in the attitude or policies of 
enada, they remain cool and are con- 
cted at a level appropriate to the 
vernment's conduct. Despite the 

ij vernment's professed interest in a 
gh-level dialogue," we have seen no 
t ;dible evidence that it is seriously in- 

1 -ested in improving relations. 
On the contrary, Grenada's anti- 
nerican rhetoric and baseless charges 
ainst the United States seem designed 
ecisely to foster a climate of confron- 
3on with the United States. For exam- 
;, Prime Minister Bishop has called 

«| esident Reagan a "fascist" and has 
en quoted in the press as describing 
e Caribbean Basin initiative as 

sfjiickenfeed" and "an insult" which is 
nly aimed at achieving military in- 
rests." Moreover, Grenada has charged 
numerous occasions and without a 
red of evidence that the United States 
preparing an invasion of Grenada and 
at various U.S. military and naval ex- 
cises in the region are part of those 
eparations. 

U.S. direct interests in Grenada are 
t significant. We maintain diplomatic 
lations but not at the ambassadorial 
/el. Private sector linkages are 



minimal — primarily some tourism activ- 
ity and a medical school which has some 
600 U.S. students. Nevertheless, we 
would be seriously concerned should 
Grenada become a base for subversion in 
the Eastern Caribbean. In particular, we 
would be concerned if Grenada were to 
permit Cuba military access to the Point 
Salines airport when it is completed. We 
have made these concerns known to the 
government. 

U.S. Interests in 

the Eastern Caribbean 

At the same time, we are strengthening 
our relations with the democratic na- 
tions of the Eastern Caribbean and are 
working with them to address their 
economic problems. Most face critical 
problems such as unemployment rates of 
over 30%, severe shortages of skilled 
workers and managers, dependence on a 
single crop and a single market, low 
agricultural productivity, and small 
domestic markets. 

The United States is working to ad- 
dress those problems with assistance in 
such areas as skills training, agricultural 
diversification and marketing, and in- 
frastructural improvements which would 
permit goods to be produced and moved 
to market. Our total proposed assistance 
to the Eastern Caribbean region in 
FY 1982 is $54 million, plus the $10 
million supplemental proposed under the 
Caribbean Basin initiative. The Presi- 
dent had the opportunity to listen first- 
hand to the concerns of the Eastern 
Caribbean leaders in April and to 
describe his proposals for the Caribbean 
Basin initiative. 

We are also increasing our coopera- 
tion in the area of security. Most 
Eastern Caribbean countries maintain 
no armed forces. With only modest con- 
stabulary forces for defense, these coun- 
tries are potentially vulnerable to 
takeovers by armed groups on the left, 
like Maurice Bishop's New JEWEL 
Movement, or by criminal elements, 
such as the group that tried to stage a 
coup in Dominica last December. 

These countries need our help. 
Enactment of the Caribbean Basin pro- 
gram would provide quick-disbursing 
assistance to address their most im- 
mediate infrastructure and development 
needs. At the same time it would offer 
trade and investment benefits to achieve 
self-sustaining growth, which will 
strengthen democratic institutions. 



The United States desires mutually 
beneficial relations with all the countries 
of the region, and Grenada is no excep- 
tion. Our interest in improved relations 
with Grenada, however, can only be 
realized if there are changes on the part 
of the government — changes that would 
show that Grenada wants good relations 
and is prepared to take concrete steps to 
that end. For example, if Grenada is 
serious about having a normal relation- 
ship with the United States, it should 
halt its unrelenting stream of anti- 
American propaganda and false 
statements about U.S. policies and ac- 
tions. Grenada should restore con- 
stitutional democracy, including prompt 
free and fair elections as was promised 
on numerous occasions by the New 
JEWEL Movement in the early days 
after the coup. There should be a return 
to the high standard of human rights 
observance that is typical of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean islands. Final- 
ly, Grenada should practice genuine 
nonalignment rather than continuing its 
present role as a surrogate of Cuba. 
These changes or even significant prog- 
ress toward them would indicate a 
serious interest on Grenada's part in 
building good relations with the United 
States and playing a responsible role in 
the region. We would respond to them 
positively. 



•The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the comniittee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



77 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



The South Atlantic Crisis: 
Background, Consequences, 
Documentation 



Following are a statement by 
Thomas 0. Enders, Assistant Secretary 
for Inter- American Affairs, submitted to 
the Subcommittee on Inter-American Af- 
fairs of the House Foreign Affairs Com- 
mittee on August 5, 1982, and an annex 
on the legal aspects of the crisis negotia- 
tions submitted to that committee;^ U.S. 
proposals for an agreement made to 
Argentina and the United Kingdom of 
April 27; an Argentine note of May 28 
transmitting a letter from the Argentine 
Foreign Minister to the Secretary of 
State of April 29; the Peru-U.S. proposal 
of May 5; a British Government docu- 
ment of May 21, with annex; and an 
Argentine diplomatic note to the Depart- 
ment of State of May 26. 



ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS' 
PREPARED STATEMENT, 
AUG. 5, 1982' 

I was delighted to receive your invita- 
tion to review with this committee the 
impact of the Falkiands/Malvinas Islands 
conflict on the inter-American system 
and specifically on U.S. relations with 
Latin America. 

The clash between Argentina and 
the United Kingdom erupted suddenly, 
then as quickly disappeared from the 
headlines. It left in its wake some haunt- 
ing questions— about how to prevent 
war in the hemisphere, about the future 
of inter-American cooperation, even 
about regional stability and progress. 

This is not the first time that these 
islands have vividly illustrated the risk 
of massive repercussions from modest 
origins. These "few spots of earth which, 
in the desert of the ocean, had almost 
escaped notice" once brought "the whole 
system of European empire" to the point 
of convulsion. The remark is from 
Thoughts on the Late Transactions 
Respecting Falkland's Islands, written 
by Samuel Johnson in 1771. 

This prepared statement addresses 
the disturbing consequences of the 1982 
Falkiands/Malvinas crisis and records 
something of the origins and course of 
the conflict itself. 



Origins of the Conflict 

The territory immediately at issue con- 
sists of two main islands and some 200 
smaller ones located in the South Atlan- 
tic 480 miles northeast of Cape Horn. 
The islands cover a total area of 4,700 
square miles. Their terrain is alternately 
boggy and hilly, the environment wind- 
swept and virtually treeless. Samuel 
Johnson described it as "a bleak and bar- 
ren spot in the Magellanick Ocean of 
which no use could be made." But 
Johnson never went there to see for 
himself. A U.S. Foreign Service officer 
who did so more than two centuries 
later in the course of her consular duties 
reported that "work is hard but life is 
simple and not uncomfortable." Accord- 
ing to the 1980 census, the population 
was 1,813— down from the 1931 peak of 
2,392. The predominant economic activi- 
ty is the production of fine wool. 

It is their relationship to the outside 
world rather than their marginal pro- 
fitability that has made these islands a 
source of seemingly endless contention. 
Even their name reflects 
disagreement— though in English they 
are known as the Falklands, in the 
Spanish-speaking world they are in- 
variably known as the Malvinas. There 
is even controversy over which Euro- 
pean first sighted the islands in the 16th 
century. 

But the central dispute has always 
been over sovereignty. In 1770 England, 
France, and Spain almost went to war 
over small outposts embodying com- 
peting claims txj exclusive dominion on 
the islands. That crisis was resolved 
pragmatically when Spain restored to 
England the settlement of Port Egmont 
on Saunders Island off West Falkland, 
founded originally by English settlers in 
1766, then seized by Spain. In turn, 
Spain kept Port Louis, which had 
originally been founded by France in 
1764 on East Falkland. Both Spain and 
England maintained their broader 
sovereignty claims. 

In 1774, apparently for reasons of 
economy, England withdrew from Port 
Egmont, leaving behind a leaden plaque 
declaring that "Falkland's Island" was 
the "sole right and property" of King 
George III. From 1774 to 1811, the 
islands were administered without 



challenge by a succession of Spanish 
governors under the authority of the 
Vice Royalty of La Plata in Buenos 
Aires. 

In 1820 Argentina formally claimed 
sovereignty over the then-uninhabited 
islands as the successor to Spain. In one 
of the many ironies of this history, the 
Frigate Heroina, sent to enforce Argen- 
tina's control, was commanded by David 
Jewett, one of the many British subjects 
who fought in the Wars of Liberation in 
the service of the Argentine Republic. I: 
1826 Argentina established a new 
capital at the protected harbor of 
Stanley on East Falkland. In 1833, afte 
a series of incidents over fishing rights, 
one of which had led to action by the 
U.S.S. Lexington against Argentine 
authorities, the corvette H.M.S. Clio 
reasserted Britain's claim. 

For nearly a century and a half— 
until an Argentine naval force invaded 
Port Stanley last April 2— Britain ad- 
ministered the islands, first as a Crown 
Colony, then as a self-governing 
dependency. The royally chartered 
Falklands Islands Company undertook 
the first large-scale settlement of the 
islands and provided ships that made 
four or five round trips a year to Britai 
exchanging the islands' wool and hides 
for everything from chocolates to 
building materials. 

Argentina's Claims 

Argentina's commitment to recover ter 
ritories Argentines believe were illegal i 
wrested from them by force is 
documented in countless pamphlets, ar 
tides, and books, some of them 
distributed widely in Latin America. F 
the past 40 years or so, the claim to th " 
"Malvinas" has been an important com ""^ 
ponent of Argentine nationalism, en- 
dorsed by prominent civilian and 
military leaders across the political sp€ 
trum. 

Immediately after World War II 
Argentina moved its claims beyond thf 
bilateral exchanges that had marked it 
efforts to recover the islands in the 19 
and early 20th centuries. At inter- 
American conferences in Rio in 1947, 
Bogota in 1948, Washington in 1953, 
and Caracas in 1954, Argentine delega 
tions introduced resolutions pressing 
Argentina's claims within a general 
framework of decolonization. In the ar 
tic summer of 1947-48, an Argentine 
task force of two cruisers and six 
destroyers conducted maneuvers off ti * 
islands but left when Britain dispatche 
warships in response. 



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78 



Department of State Bullet 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Argentine diplomacy registered a 
Ignificant gain in 1964. Since 1946 the 
'nited Nations had treated the United 
-ingdom as the administering authority 
nder Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter. 
.N. General Assembly Resolution 
065(XX) called upon Argentina and the 
nited Kingdom to initiate talks with a 
jiew to resolving their conflicting 
jjvereignty claims peacefully. Confiden- 
jal bilateral talks began in 1966. With 
rimierous ups and downs and occasional 
iterruptions, Argentine-U.K. negotia- 
ons continued for 16 years, 
greements were reached providing for 
rgentine facilitation of air travel and 
Dmmunications, postal and medical 
?rvices, education, and oU supply. The 
vo sides remained far apart, however, 
n the basic issue of sovereignty and 
ich related issues as land ownership 
nd residence by Argentines. The last 
recrisis round of talks took place in 
ew York in February 1982, ending 
irely 6 weeks before Argentina at- 
?mpted to settle the matter by force. 

It has been said that Britain's ap- 
roach reflected a stubborn colonialist 
jflex. The fact that over the last 
sneration, no fewer than nine members 
' the Organization of American States 
ive received their independence in 
jace and good will from the United 
ingdom suggests that the situation was 
ither more complex. The resident 
landers— hardy individuals 
-edominantly of Scottish and Welsh ex- 
action—proved to be satisfied with 
ritish rule and adamantly united in op- 
)sing Argentine claims. Throughout 
le negotiations, Britain stood by the 
-oposition that the rights and views of 
le inhabitants must be respected in any 
iture disposition of the islands. 

The standoff became rooted in prin- 
ple as well as nationality— Britain 
"guing for self-determination, Argen- 
na for territorial integrity. 

.S. Position 

he United States has at no time taken 
legal position on the merits of the 
)mpeting sovereignty claims. In the 
9th century, U.S. officials made clear 
lat- because the British claims 
ntedated 1823— the United States did 
ot consider the reassertion of British 
jntrol a violation of the Monroe Doc- 
•ine. The United States, however, 
jfused to become embroiled in the 
3vereignty issue and took no position 
n Argentine and British sovereignty 
iaims. 



Thirty-five years ago, at the signing 
of the final act of the 1947 Rio con- 
ference which created the Rio treaty, 
the U.S. delegation, headed by 
Secretary of State George C. Marshall, 
made clear our view that the Rio treaty 
is without effect upon outstanding ter- 
ritorial disputes between American and 
European states— and explicitly refused 
to endorse Argentina's claims. 

U.S. neutrality on the question of 
sovereignty has been confirmed 
repeatedly since then— at the Organiza- 
tion of American States and the United 
Nations, as well as during the recent 
fighting. I reassert it again today, 
before this body: The United States 
takes no position on the merits of the 
competing claims to sovereignty, nor on 
the legal theories on which the parties 
rely. 

For the record, I would like to add 
that although we, of course, have an in- 
terest in peace there as elsewhere, the 
United States has no direct interest in 
the islands. Because some comments 
abroad have suggested otherwise, I state 
explicitly that the United States has 
never had, and does not now have, any 
interest in establishing a military base of 
any kind on these islands. The only occa- 
sion on which any U.S. military presence 
has ever been contemplated was in 
April-May 1982 as a contribution to a 
peaceful resolution had one been agreed 
to between Argentina and the United 
Kingdom. 



The Occupation and Response 

Argentina's surprise military occupation 
of the islands beginning April 2 pro- 
voked dismay and apprehension 
throughout the international community. 
The next day, April 3, the U.N. Security 
Council adopted Resolution 502, de- 
manding immediate cessation of 
hostilities and withdrawal of Argentine 
troops and calling on Argentina and the 
United Kingdom to resolve their dif- 
ferences diplomatically. Invoking the 
right of self-defense under Article 51 of 
the U.N. Charter, the United Kingdom 
dispatched a war fleet toward the 
islands. 

The looming military confrontation 
put the inter-American system under 
great stress. Some said liiat because 
war would pit an American republic 
against an outside power, the Rio treaty 
required that all its members come to 
the assistance of the American republic. 

Others said that the inter-American 
system— which protects regional order 
based on law and the peaceful settle- 



ment of disputes— could in no way be in- 
terpreted to support the resort to force 
to settle a dispute. 

The U.S. position was that because 
the unlawful resort to force did not 
come from outside the hemisphere, this 
was not a case of extracontinental ag- 
gression against which we were— and 
are— all committed to rally. 

These different responses to a con- 
flict for which the inter- American 
system was not designed led to heated 
exchanges among foreign ministers at 
the meeting of the Rio treaty Organ of 
Consultation that began April 26. Two 
days later, the organ adopted, by a vote 
of 17-0-4 (the United States abstaining), 
a resolution that urged an immediate 
truce, recognition of the "rights of 
sovereignty of the Republic of Argentina 
over the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands and 
the interests of the islanders," and called 
for "negotiation aimed at a peaceful 
settlement of the conflict." 

Negotiation of a peaceful settlement 
of the conflict had, in fact, been the cen- 
tral objective of the U.S. response to the 
crisis. 

U.S. efforts to encourage a nego- 
tiated settlement began even before the 
initial use of force. In late March, we of- 
fered to the two sides our good offices 
to help find a peaceful solution to an in- 
cident on South Georgia Island on 
March 19 when an Argentine salvage 
team was threatened with expulsion for 
operating without British permission. On 
April 1, learning that Argentine military 
action appeared imminent. President 
Reagan called President Galtieri to urge 
that Argentina desist from the use of 
force. 

After Argentina forcibly occupied 
the islands, both President Galtieri and 
Prime Minister Thatcher encouraged the 
United States to see whether it could be 
of assistance in finding a solution. At 
President Reagan's direction. Secretary 
Haig undertook two rounds of intense 
discussions in each capital. 

On April 27, as prospects for more 
intense hostilities increased, the United 
States put forward a proposal of its 
own. It represented our best estimate of 
what the two parties could reasonably 
be expected to accept. It was founded 
squarely on U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 502, which both sides 
asserted they accepted. 

The U.S. proposal called for negotia- 
tions to remove the islands from the list 
of non-self-governing territories under 
Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter. It 
specified that the definitive status of the 
islands must be mutually agreed, with 
due regard for the rights of the in- 



^'°^«^ -"^"^ 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



habitants and for the principle of ter- 
ritorial integrity. And it referred both to 
the purposes and principles of the U.N. 
Charter and to the relevant resolutions 
of the U.N. General Assembly. 

Those negotiations were to be com- 
pleted by the end of the year. Pending 
their conclusion, an interim authority 
composed of Argentina, Britain, and the 
United States was to oversee the tradi- 
tional local administration to be sure 
that no decision was taken contrary to 
the agreement. Argentine residents of 
the islands were to participate in local 
councils for this purpose. During the in- 
terim period travel, transportation, and 
movement of persons between the 
islands and the mainland were to be pro- 
moted and facilitated without prejudice 
to the rights and guarantees of the in- 
habitants. 

The proposed interim authority of 
the three countries was to make pro- 
posals to facilitate the negotiations, in- 
cluding recommendations on how to take 
into account the wishes and interests of 
the inhabitants and on what the role of 
the Falkland Islands Company should 
be. Should the negotiations not have 
been completed by year's end, the 
United States was to be asked to engage 
in a formal mediation/conciliation effort 
in order to resolve the dispute within 6 
months. 

The British Government indicated 
that our proposal presented certain real 
difficulties but that it would seriously 
consider it. However, the proposal was 
not acceptable to the Argentine Govern- 
ment, which continued to insist that any 
solution must have a predetermined out- 
come. 

On April 30, in light of Argentina's 
continued unwillingness to compromise, 
we took concrete measures to under- 
score that the United States could not 
and would not condone the unlawful use 
of force to resolve disputes. The Presi- 
dent ordered limited economic and 
military measures affecting Argentina 
and directed that we would respond 
positively to requests for materiel sup- 
port for British forces but without any 
direct U.S. military involvement. 
Secretary Haig's statement announcing 
these measures emphasized our belief 
that no strictly military outcome could 
endure, that a negotiated settlement 
would be necessary in the end, and that 
the United States remained ready to 
assist the parties in finding that settle- 
ment. 

On May 5 President Belaunde of 
Peru took the initiative to put forward a 
new peace plan, drawing also on the 



fundamental elements of Resolution 502. 
We worked closely with him. The 
simplified text forwarded by Peru to 
Buenos Aires and London called for an 
immediate cease-fire, concurrent 
withdrawal and nonreintroduction of 
forces, administration of the islands by a 
contact group pending definitive settle- 
ment in consultation with the elected 
representatives of the islanders, 
acknowledgement of conflicting claims, 
acknowledgement in the final settlement 
of the aspirations and interests of the 
islanders, and an undertaking by the 
contact group to insure that the two 
parties reached a definitive agreement 
by April 30, 1983. 

Britain made clear that it could 
seriously consider the proposal. Argen- 
tina asked instead for the U.N. 
Secretary General to use his good offices 
as, of course, it was its full privilege to 
do. 

By this time, however, the military 
tempo was rapidly overtaking the 
negotiators. On May 2 two torpedoes 
from a British submarine sank the 
General Belgrano, Argentina's only 
cruiser. On May 4 a sea-skimming 
missOe from an Argentine jet devastated 
the H. M.S. Sheffield, a modem British 
destroyer. Despite intense new efforts 
by the U.N. Secretary General, the war 
we had worked so hard to avoid had 
come in earnest. 

By June 14, when the Union Jack 
was again raised over Port Stanley, 
what Horace Walpole had in 1770 called 
"a morsel of rock that lies somewhere at 
the very bottom of America" had 
become the improbable scenario of bitter 
fighting. More than 1,000 men and 
women were dead. Billions of dollars 
had been expended. Emotions had sur- 
faced in both countries that promise to 
make this issue and others even harder 
to resolve in the future. 



The Future 

I said at the onset that the South Allan- 
tic war faces us with several haunting 
questions. 

Perhaps the most fundamental is 
how better to prevent war in the future 
in this hemisphere. 

Many of us feared as soon as Argen- 
tina acted April 2 that the fighting 
would escalate. Argentina, it is true, did 
not cause casualties in its takeover. But 
that did little to diminish the shock. Any 
use of force invites further use of force. 
The shock in this case was increased 
because the two countries were both 
linked in friendship to us and to each 



other. It grew when brave men on both 
sides began to risk and lose their lives. 
But perhaps the deepest shock came 
because war between states had been 
virtually unknown in the Americas in 
our time. 

In the world as a whole, some 4 
million persons have lost their lives in 
armed action between states since the 
Second World War. Including the toll in 
the South Atlantic, fewer than 4,000 of 
them have died in the Western 
Hemisphere. The countries of Latin 
America spend less of their national 
resources for arms than any other area 
in the world. Their military expenditure: 
come to only 1.4% of GNP— a quarter o 
the average in the Third World as a 
whole. 

The South Atlantic war— the fact ol 
major fighting and the clear advantages 
demonstrated by modern weapons — 
means that military institutions, 
throughout the hemisphere but especial- 
ly in South America, have powerful new 
claims to resources. Because Latin 
America's military institutions and 
arsenals are relatively modest in size, 
demands for advanced weapons system; 
and for the expertise to maintain and 
employ them are likely to increase. 
Governments will also look for self- 
sufficiency in defense industries, for 
bigger stocks of weapons. 

Budgetary limitations will, of cours^ 
constrain purchases, but we would be 
mistaken to expect arms modernization 
to be deferred as a result of the South 
Atlantic conflict. On the contrary'. The 
duration and intensity of the fighting 
called into question the assumption tha 
the inter-American system guarantees 
that interstate conflicts in this 
hemisphere would be limited to a few 
days of actual fighting. 

A new emphasis on military 
preparedness in a region long plagued 
by territorial disputes and military in- 
volvement in politics would undeniably 
challenge every member of the inter- 
American system. 

The hemisphere is laced with ter- 
ritorial (juestionniarks. The prevalence 
of territorial tensions (e.g., among 
Argentina-Chile-Peru-Bolivia-Ecuador, 
Colombia-Venezuela-Guyana, Nicaragu; 
Colombia, (luatemala-Belize) puts a 
premium on the peaceful settlement of 
disputes. To take just one example, ter 
sions between Guatemala and Belize— 
the only place in the hemisphere other 
than the Falklands where the United 
Kingdom stations combat troops— will 
continue to fester if unresolved. 



«!■ 



^ 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



The challenge to regional peacekeep- 
)ff is far from hopeless, however. The 
.S. response to the crisis may serve to 
v\'-T others from resorting to force. 
Icireover, the inter-American system 
4uips the New World with the means 
I [irevent or control the conflicts that 
■d\v kept other continents from realiz- 
\^ their potential. 

Machinery exists to anticipate 
(sputes and permit their peaceful and 
I'finitive settlement— various inter- 
.merican arbitration and conciliation 
(^cements, OAS peacekeeping mecha- 
isms, the International Court of 
iistice, even the treaty of Tlatelolco, 
'hich established the world's first 
uclear-free zone in a populated area. 
'Tiat appears lacking is the vnll to use 
' is machinery to prevent and resolve 
( ntentious problems. The United States 
lid other countries of the area have at 
lie time or another been involved in 
(Iming or negotiating most of them, 
lit this is a branch of hemispheric 
olomacy that deserves fresh attention. 
The interest of American states is 
( 'arly to avoid arms races. Even where 
( mpetitive procurement cannot be 
i oided altogether, they will want to see 
lat existing disputes are not needlessly 
I acerbated. U.S. arms sales as a pro- 
rtion of South American purchases 
1 from 75% in 1960 to 25% in 1970 
d 7% percent in 1980. The reduction 
training and in-depth contacts be- 
een the United States and most South 

inerican militaries has been equally 
ecipitous. 
These patterns raise a question 
I )rth pondering in the wake of the 
iJklands/Malvinas episode. Can the 
I lited States maintain a degree of 
litary access and communication with 

states of South America so as to 
Ip maintain the regional balance of 
wer with such limited personnel, doc- 
nal, and materiel relationships? 

A related challenge is to prevent 
gional conflicts from having strategic 
nsequences, changing the East- West 
lance. This is a real problem, for 
tory shows the Soviet Union and its 
oxies are ready and eager to take ad- 
ntage of instability. Should Moscow be 
Uing to provide arms at bargain prices 
it did to Peru in the 1970s, economic 
nstraints on Latin American pur- 
ases of military equipment from tradi- 
mal Western sources could give the 
iviets a unique opportimity to forge 
)ser links with established govem- 
snts in South America. Cuba— and 
caragua— rushed forward to exploit 
e Falklands crisis. In Argentina some 
Iked of playing the Cuban card. We do 



:tober1982 



not believe Argentina will turn to the 
country that harbors in its capital the 
extremely violent Argentine terrorist 
organization— the Montoneros. But Cuba 
will be working hard to use the crisis to 
lessen its current isolation wathin the 
hemisphere. 

Overcoming Resentments 

A second legacy of the conflict is the 
need to overcome resentments of the 
United States that were triggered by 
the crisis. 

Although the immediate emotional 
strains of the crisis are already receding, 
the perception of the United States as a 
reliable ally to Latin American nations 
in times of crisis will take time to 
restore. 

The commitment of the United 
States to the hemisphere and its institu- 
tions has been called into question. I 
have already noted the importance we 
attach to the OAS, that we have taken 
no position on the question of sovereign- 
ty, and that in our view no Rio treaty 
action could apply to this particular con- 
tingency. Nonetheless, U.S. support for 
what on May 29 the second meeting of 
the Rio treaty Organ of Consulation con- 
demned as an "unjustified and dispropor- 
tionate" U.K. military response was 
taken by some to mean that the U.S. 
commitment to the inter-American 
system was superficial at best. 

The fact that the conflict remained 
localized and ended relatively rapidly 
helped mitigate damage to U.S. in- 
terests. Nonetheless, our bilateral rela- 
tionships with certain countries have un- 
questionably been affected adversely. 
The most severe impact is obviously on 
relations with Argentina. But Venezuela, 
Panama, and Peru were also highly 
critical of our support for the United 
Kingdom's military response and will be 
watching closely the future evolution of 
the sovereignty issue. In contrast, U.S. 
relations with most other South 
American countries, Mexico, and the 
Caribbean Basin appear less affected. 

The lasting effects of this mood, 
which varies from country to country, 
will depend on how the postcrisis situa- 
tion evolves and what posture we adopt. 
Reactions may change as the position 
taken by the United States is better 
understood. But the widespread view 
that the United States does not take 
Latin America seriously could increase 
North-South and nonaligned rhetoric 
and inhibit cooperation in support of 
U.S. interests. The argument that the 
United States and United Kingdom 
acted as industrialized powers 



cooperating to keep a developing coun- 
try "in its place" makes us once again a 
target for anticolonialist and anti- 
imperialist emotions that will make it 
harder for us to accomplish our objec- 
tives. 

It would be wrong to conclude from 
such reactions that the United States 
should not have acted as it did. There 
can be no position for the United States 
other than to oppose the unlawful use of 
force to settle disputes. 

The first lesson for U.S. policy is 
that this is a time for steadiness of pur- 
pose rather than for grandiose gestures, 
statements, or proposals. During the 
coming months, it will be especially im- 
portant that we meet our commitments, 
protect our interests, and respond to 
those of our neighbors in a meaningful 
and resourceful manner. 

The Caribbean Basin initiative is 
vitally important in this regard. Many 
basin countries now wonder whether our 
contribution to the initiative will ever 
materialize. If Congress were not to act, 
the concerns these countries now ex- 
press about their future and our commit- 
ment to them would deepen, widening 
opportunities for Soviet and Cuban 
adventurism. It is now up to the United 
States to deliver. 

We must maintain our commitment 
in Central America, where democratic 
processes are vulnerable and where 
fragile government institutions face a 
major challenge from Cuban-supported 
guerrilla movements. Our political, 
economic, and security assistance are 
essential to help them meet this 
challenge and make progress toward 
democracy, economic development, and 
the effective protection of human rights. 

While we must continue to seek in- 
novative solutions to the problems of our 
immediate neighborhood, we must 
understand what is happening in South 
America is also important to us. This 
was evident in the midst of the 
Falklands conflict — for example, in the 
visit of President Figueiredo to 
Washington. The conflict between 
Argentina and the United Kingdom was 
a major topic of discussion. The ex- 
change made clear that the positions of 
the United States and Brazil differed 
but that our basic interests and objec- 
tives were similar. For several years 
now, we have simply not given South 
America the attention its place in the 
world and our interests warrant. 



U.S. -Argentine Relations 

This brings me to a third challenge — the 
conundrum of our relations with Argen- 



81 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



tina. Despite our many similarities, 
U.S.-Argentine relations have seldom 
been close. 

The President's vision of region-wide 
cooperation had led us to make efforts 
to improve ties to South America, in- 
cluding Argentina. In the case of Argen- 
tina, however, those efforts had not yet 
borne fruit by the time of the crisis. We 
must continue to seek a dialogue that 
can develop the bilateral and multilateral 
framework for more fully cooperative 
relations. 

During the South Atlantic crisis, our 
ties with Argentina proved too weak to 
promote effective cooperation in support 
of common interests. Repeated efforts 
were made by us and by others— before 
the Argentine landing on the islands, 
again when the British fleet was ap- 
proaching, and again when the U.S. and 
Peruvian and U.N. peace plans were ad- 
vanced in turn— to explain to Argentine 
leaders what would happen if they did 
what they proposed to do. Although our 
predictions consistently proved accurate, 
they were not believed. Communication 
failed utterly. 

Our objectives with Argentina today 
include encouraging economic recovery, 
peaceful resolution of the dispute be- 
tween the United Kingdom and Argen- 
tina, and, of course, political comity. Yet 
our ties to the government in Buenos 
Aires are now more limited than 
previously. How long this vnll last 
depends on several factors. But the 
fundamental point is that we all share a 
compelling interest in an Argentina that 
is true to hemispheric traditions and 
free of foreign Communist influence. We 
do not want the Soviets to be their only 
alternative. Neither do they. We all 
should be prepared to help Argentina 
maintain conditions in which its people 
can realize their free world vocation. 

So we must begin, in orderly fashion, 
to build the solid, realistic relationship 
so evidently lacking until now. 

Hemispheric Relationships 

Finally, the South Atlantic crisis has 
highlighted economic problems in South 
America and throughout the 
hemisphere. 

Even before the crisis, many of the 
region's countries were feeling the ef- 
fects of the world recession on their 
development. The problems vary. Vir- 
tually all depend heavily on international 
trade and on access to international 
financial markets. Some have contracted 
substantial debt. The South Atlantic 
crisis could crystallize doubts about 



R2- 



stability and creditworthiness on a 
region-wide level, particularly if arms 
procurement were to divert resources 
from development priorities. 

The major lesson here is the need 
for cooperation in economic 
management— not merely with Argen- 
tina but with Brazil, Venezuela, and 
Mexico. 

Many of the problems now asso- 
ciated with the South Atlantic crisis 
have been developing for some time. The 
growdng assertiveness and needs of ma- 
jor developing countries are not new. 
Let us hope that the crisis will 
strengthen our ability to work more 
realistically together. 

Before the crisis erupted in the 
South Atlantic, we had already begun to 
develop more sustained hemispheric 
relationships. 

• We had started to achieve with 
Mexico a relationship that reflects its ex- 
ceptional importance to the United 
States and its role in world affairs. Now 
comes the harshest test of that new rela- 
tionship, as the economic slowdown in 
both countries threatens to aggravate all 
our joint accounts— trade, finance, im- 
migration. We must be steadfast. 

• We had committed ourselves to 
help countries of the Caribbean Basin 
protect themselves against outside in- 
tervention, strengthen or develop 
democratic institutions, and overcome 
economic disasters. Now we must 
deliver. 

• We were beginning to respond to 
new realities in South America, 
rebuilding close bilateral relations with 
each country after a decade of drift, 
when the shadow of the South Atlantic 
crisis fell across our efforts. Now we 
must relaunch those efforts, joining 
others to maintain the network of con- 
structive relationships that is essential 
to peace. 

What this crisis may ultimately 
mean for the United States is not that 
our recent decisions were wrong— they 
were right— but that the accumulation 
from our past decisions reveals a flaw in 
our outlook. We have pursued an a la 
carte approach, ignoring our friends 
when it suited us, yet demanding their 
help or agreement when it served our in- 
terest. We took too much for granted 
and invested too little. When we needed 
close and effective dialogue on April 2, 
we didn't have it. 

When a fight in distant islands 
reverberates around the world, the fun- 
damental lesson is not how little we 
need each other but how closely con- 



nected we are. Our task is to make in- 
terdependence work, not against us but 
for us. This requires long-term com- 
mitments that will enhance our ability tc 
influence events and protect our in- 
terests. 



ANNEX-LEGAL ASPECTS OF 
THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS 
CRISIS NEGOTIATIONS 

This paper addresses three aspects of 
the negotiations which occurred during 
April and May of 1982 to avert the war 
in the South Atlantic— the U.S. posture 
on the underlying dispute over sov- 
ereignty of the islands; the content of 
the three most intensive settlement 
efforts, focusing on the two in which tht 
United States was most closely involvec 
and the consideration given to use of th 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). 

U.S. Position on Claims 
to the Islands 

Throughout the more than 200-year 
history of this dispute, the United Statt 
has maintained a legal neutrality on tht 
competing U.K. and Argentine claims t 
the Falklands/Malvinas, urging that 
their dispute be resolved through peace 
ful means in accordance with interna- 
tional law. In the post- World War II 
era, the United States has abstained or 
U.N. or Organization of American 
States (OAS) resolutions that implied a 
position on the merits. 

U.S. neutrality is also reflected in 
the U.S. position on the nonapplicabilit 
of the Monroe Doctrine. Because the d 
pute over the islands predated the 
Monroe Doctrine, and because the 
United States took no position on the 
dispute over sovereignty, the Depart- 
ment of State long ago expressed the 
view that the reinsertion of a British 
presence on the islands in 1833 was no T 
a new attempt at colonization and that 
the doctrine is, thus, inapplicable. 

In addition to declining to take a 
position on the merits, the United Stat 
has not taken a position on the under 
lying legal theories on which the partie 
rely. Specifically, the United States ha 
taken no view on the relative weight t( 
be given to Britain's position on self- 
determination for the islanders and 
Argentina's emphasis on the principle ■ 
territorial integrity with the mainland. 
The application of the principle of self- 
determination to the Falklands has 
raised a number of legal questions in 
view of the size and orig^in of the popu 
tion, the existence of other legal prin- 
ciples which may be applicable given tl 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



istory and nature of the dispute, and, 
1 particular, the interpretation placed 
y Argentina on the principle of terri- 
rial integrity contained in U.N. 
ineral Assembly decolonization resolu- 
ons, such as Resolution 1514 (XV). 

This U.S. position of neutrality was 
laintained throughout and facUitated 
ur attempts to mediate the crisis. 
While remaining neutral on the 
lerits of the dispute, the United States 
as acknowledged the fact of longstand- 
ig U.K. administration of the islands. 
he United States has, accordingly, 
salt with the United Kingdom on mat- 
;rs related to the islands and has, on 
ccasion, acquiesced in U.K. accession to 
ilateral agreements and international 
inventions on behalf of them. The U.S. 
• osition in such instances has been con- 
' stent with acknowledgment of the 
1 nited Kingdom's de facto responsibility 
)r the islands' foreign relations as the 
dministering authority in peaceful 
assession. This pragmatic policy of 
aaling with the administrator in defac- 
1 control is also that of the United Na- 
ons, which has accepted from the 
:, nited Kingdom, as the administering 
1. ithority, annual reports under Chapter 
' I of the U.N. Charter regarding non- 
!lf-goveming territories. 

pril-May 1982 Negotiations 

t here were three intensive efforts after 
le Argentine occupation of the islands 

I 1 avert the coming military confronta- 
on; each resulted in textual elabora- 
ons of the positions of both sides on ac- 

i iptable outcomes on the range of issues 

i volved in a package to promote a 
jaceful settlement. All of these efforts 
Idressed four common elements: 

• A cease-fire, linked to a mutual 
ithdrawal of forces within a short 
jriod, and a commitment on nonrein- 
oduction of forces, subject to third- 
arty verification (this element was con- 
stent with U.N. Security Council Reso- 
tion 502, operative paragraphs 1 and 2 
' which called for an immediate cessa- 
on of hostilities and withdrawal of 
rgentine forces from the islands); 

• Interim administrative arrange- 
lents for the islands, based on some 
)rm of third-party supervision of local 
Dvernment, including provision for 
rgentine access to the islands during 
lis period; 

• The composition and definition of 
le functions of the third-party mech- 
nism to assist the parties in imple- 
lentation of an agreement; and 



;,jCtober1982 



• A framework for negotiations to 
reach a definitive settlement, including a 
deadline or target date, and the role in 
such negotiations for third-party assist- 
ance. 

Each side, of course, approached 
these common elements from a different 
perspective, which in some cases shifted 
as the diplomatic and military situation 
changed over time. The United Kingdom 
was willing to consider variations on the 
form of administration of the islands, 
subject to certain basic guarantees in re- 
spect of local rights and institutions. It 
was prepared to accept third-party as- 
sistance in implementation of an agree- 
ment, subject to inclusion of some role 
for the United States. U.K. insistence on 
a cease-fire coupled with immediate 
withdrawal of Argentine forces from the 
islands remained firm, consistent with 
its legal position based on Article 51 of 
the U.N. Charter relating to self-defense 
and U.N. Security Council Resolution 
502. The United Kingdom also insisted 
that nothing in an agreement prejudice 
the final outcome of the negotiations. 
This insistence focused in particular on 
the drafting of a formula on future 
negotiations that was neutral on the 
issue of sovereignty and on provisions to 
control Argentine intercourse with the 
islands at prewar levels, consistent with 
a 1971 agreement between the two 
countries. 

Argentina, in turn, sought either 
effective interim control of the islands' 
administration, including freedom of ac- 
cess to the islands, or assurance that the 
formula on a definitive settlement would 
automatically result in confirmation of 
Argentine sovereignty over the islands 
at some fixed future time. While accept- 
ing the concept of a cease-fire linked to 
mutual withdrawal of forces, Argentina 
sought an immediate U.K. withdrawal of 
its units to home bases; the United 
Kingdom viewed such a formula for the 
withdrawal period as imbalanced (since 
Argentine forces would remain within 
close range of the islands) and as re- 
moving a necessary deterrent to Argen- 
tine violation of the terms of an agree- 
ment. Argentina sought drafting of the 
negotiation mandate to emphasize de- 
colonization and the principle of terri- 
torial integrity with the mainland and 
resisted references to a right of self- 
determination on the part of the island- 
ers which were desired by the United 
Kingdom. Argentina, in light of the long 
history of prior talks with the United 
Kingdom, took the position that the 
mandate had to be placed under a firm 
and short deadline date. 



Both sides shared an evaluation that 
provisions on interim arrangements and 
the framework for reaching a definitive 
settlement were interlinked elements of 
the negotiation, each prepared to be 
flexible in one area for gains in the 
other. 

The three principle initiatives are 
discussed below, and the resulting texts 
follow. 

U.S. Proposal of April 27. The first 
effort, that of Secretary Haig, culmi- 
nated in a fairly detailed set of proposals 
to the two parties on April 27. It was 
based on the 3 strenuous weeks of con- 
sultations he had held in London, 
Buenos Aires, and Washington and our 
best perception of what might ultimately 
prove acceptable to each side. Its ap- 
proach, and many of its elements, re- 
appeared in subsequent proposals to and 
by the two parties. 

The U.S. draft memorandum of 
agreement provided for an integral 
cease-fire and withdrawal linkage. The 
formula for providing for balanced with- 
drawals proved troublesome in each of 
the three negotiations, given the vastly 
different geographic perspectives of each 
side. The U.S. proposal resolved the 
problem by a formula based on parity in 
reinsertion time, rather than on conven- 
tional but more difficult geographic with- 
drawal distances. These commitments, 
and that of nonreintroduction of forces 
into the islands and defined surrounding 
areas, were to be vei ified by the United 
States. 

The proposal called for immediate 
steps to terminate simultaneously the 
various economic and financial measures 
each party had adopted and for the 
United Kingdom to request termination 
of similar measures taken by its allies. 

Local self-government on the islands 
was to be restored. The office of gover- 
nor was to remain vacant, and its 
powers exercised by the next-ranking 
official, appointed by the United King- 
dom. The local Executive and Legisla- 
tive Councils were to be retained but 
augmented by representation of the 
small local Argentine resident population 
by means of at least one representative 
in each councO and by inclusion of two 
Argentine Government representatives 
in the upper. Executive Council. A 
Special Interim Authority was to be 
created, composed of a representative of 
each side and of the United States. The 
flags of each constituent country were to 
be flown at its headquarters. The 
authority was to have supervision over 
island administration, exercised by 
means of a veto power in the event the 



83 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



authority, by majority vote, deemed an 
act of the local government to be incon- 
sistent with the agreement. In all other 
cases, the authority was called upon to 
ratify expeditiously all local decisions, 
laws, and regulations. 

The proposal called for decoloniza- 
tion of the islands as the negotiation ob- 
jective. This was framed in terms of re- 
moving the islands from the list of non- 
self-governing territories under Chapter 
XI of the U.N. Charter. The potential 
means were not limited, but the condi- 
tions for their definitive status had to be 
mutually agreed. The negotiation man- 
date maintained neutrality on the com- 
peting legal positions of the two sides, 
noting that of each by short-hand refer- 
ences to due regard for the rights of the 
inhabitants and the principle of terri- 
torial integrity. Reference was made to 
relevant U.N. General Assembly resolu- 
tions (which would include general de- 
colonization resolutions and specific reso- 
lutions on the subject of the Falklands/ 
Malvinas). 

Foreshadowing the contact group 
concept utilized in later proposals, the 
U.S. formulation provided a role for the 
Special Interim Authority to catalyze the 
negotiations with recommendations to 
the two sides, in particular on the sensi- 
tive issues of how to take into account 
the wishes of the islanders and the role 
of the Falkland Islands Company. If the 
negotiations did not prosper by the 
deadline date (December 31, 1982), a 
second phase of negotiations, under a 
new 6-month target date, was to occur 
in which the United States would act as 
a mediator/conciliator to press for an 
agreement. 

With respect to contacts with the 
mainland, the draft agreement stated a 
principle of promotion and facilitation of 
nondiscriminatory travel, commercial, 
communications, and other links. The 
proposal provided for recommendation 
by the authority to the two governments 
of specific measures on such matters and 
for securing the views of the local coun- 
cils on the recommendations. These pro- 
visions were balanced by an obligation to 
respect the traditional rights and guar- 
antees of the islanders. 

The United Kingdom, which had not 
yet landed on the Falklands/Malvinas or 
suffered any serious combat losses, 
found the proposal difficult but was will- 
ing to give it "serious consideration." 
This was the only time the United King- 
dom considered a proposal to cover the 
South Georgia and South Sandwich de- 
pendencies, as well as the Falklands/ 
Malvinas (sensitivity to the implications 
of use of the English and Spanish names 



84 



for the islands resulted in the U.S. pro- 
posal defining the island groups by co- 
ordinates). 

Despite many attractive features for 
the Argentines, the Argentine Foreign 
Minister replied on April 29 that the 
Government of Argentina could not ac- 
cept the formulation since it gave them 
neither eflfective interim control nor 
assurances of obtaining sovereignty as a 
result of the negotiation process. 

Peni-U.S. Proposal. At the initia- 
tive of the President of Peru, and with 
our cooperation, another effort was 
launched, culminating on May 5 with a 
more skeletal proposal, limited in geo- 
graphic scope to the Falklands/Malvinas. 
A cease-fire and withdrawal of forces 
were inseparably linked, but all imple- 
menting detail was to be deferred for 
decision by a contact group composed of 
representatives of Brazil, Peru, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, and the 
United States. 

The contact group was to verify the 
military provisions of an agreement. It 
would assume administration of the 
government of the islands in consulta- 
tion with the elected representatives of 
the islanders and insure that no actions 
were taken inconsistent with the agree- 
ment. All details on implementation of 
administration— financial questions, ap- 
plicable law, administrative, legal and 
appointive links to Britain, the role of 
the councils, the exercise of powers of 
the office of governor— were to be de- 
ferred for later decision by the contact 
group. The result conceivably might 
have paralleled the U.S. proposal once 
elaborated, but the door was open to 
other variations of third-party admini- 
stration and the role to be played there- 
under by the existing local institutions. 
The existence of the parties' differ- 
ing legal positions was noted; the pro- 
posal also included an acknowledgment 
that the "aspirations and interests" of 
the islanders were to be "included" in a 
definitive settlement. 

Finally, the contact group assumed a 
responsibility to attempt to insure that 
the two governments reached a negoti- 
ated agreement on the future of the 
islands by April 30, 1983. Again, the 
detail of modalities for the negotiation, 
and the role and procedures of the con- 
tact group in facilitating a result, were 
deferred for later decision. The negotia- 
tion formula was neutral but included a 
deadline date as Argentina desired. 

The United Kingdom indicated that 
it was willing to give this proposal 
serious consideration; Argentina, after 
the initiation of talks under the auspices 



i 



of the U.N. Secretary General, preferred 
to shift the focus of negotiations to New 
York. 

U.N. Negotiations. With continued 
change in the military situation and, 
from the United Kingdom's perspective, 
in the wake of failure to secure agree- 
ment on the basis of substantial conces- 
sions reflected in the U.S. and Peruvian 
proposals, the positions of both sides 
hardened in a number of respects as evi 
denced by the texts each side publicly 
released at the breakdown of these talk 
in late May. 

Both sides accepted the concept of ; 
U.N. administration with generally 
defined authority. This formulation re- 
flected a substantial concession by the 
United Kingdom on maintenance of ad- 
ministrative links to Britain in favor of 
local self-rule under U.N. supervision. 
Again, critical details would have had t 
be defined in implementing agreements 
or by U.N. Security Council resolution. 
U.N. verification of military disengage- frf 
ment provisions was also accepted by 
both sides in principle, as well as the 
auspices of the U.N. Secretary General P 
to conduct the negotiations. F 

The publicly released positions per- ju( 
mitted identification of very limited 
other common ground. The United Kin, 
dom sought to subject a U.N. admini- 
stration to local law and practices "in 
consultation with" the islands' repre- 
sentative institutions, which Argentina 
resisted. Argentina sought immediate, 
expanded access to the islands, which 
the United Kingdom would not accept 
for fear that the population and char- 
acter of the islands might be unilateral 
altered during the interim period. Ar- _ 
gentina desired a firm deadline for neg '^, 
tiation to be followed, if necessary, by 
reference of the dispute to the U.N. 
General Assembly for decision; the 
United Kingdom rejected recourse to t 
General Assembly and continued to coi 
sider a rigid timetable unrealistic. On 
these and other points (e.g., extent of 
geographical coverage, military with- 
drawal details, self-determination refer 
ences), the two sides ended far apart. 
The Secretary General made last- 
minute proposals to the two sides befoi 
the talks unraveled. Prime Minister 
Thatcher, as events overtook these sug 
gestions, simply noted that Argentina 
could not possibly have accepted them. 
We are unaware of any formal Argen- 
tine response. To our knowledge, the 
content of these suggestions was not 
publicly released. 



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Department of State Buiietii, 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Subsequent Developments. The 

Jnited Kingdom and Argentine texts 
abled at the conclusion of the Secretary 
General's first round of negotiations re- 
nain the final textual elaboration of 
heir views on settlement issues. There 
bllowed efforts in the Security Council 

negotiate a resolution that would sub- 
ititute for an agreement, notably involv- 
ng a useful Brazilian draft text. None 
vas the subject of intensive substantive 
legotiation. These efl^orts culminated in 

'^ he Security Council's adoption on 
llay 26 of Resolution 505, which asked 
he Secretary General to renew his good 
)ffices to secure a cease-fire; and in the 
J.K.-U.S. veto on June 4 of a Spanish/ 
-"anamanian draft resolution that sought 

1 cease-fire and implementation of the 
)revious Security Council resolutions, 
mder verification of the Secretary 
jeneral but with inadequate detail on 
vithdrawal procedures and other ele- 
nents to serve as a mutually agreeable 
■ehicle for settlement of the conflict. 

''ossible Role for 

he International Court of Justice 

''he focus of U.N. General Assembly 
esolutions on the subject, the efforts of 
oth countries over 16 years, and of the 
peacemaking efforts in the spring was 
n a negotiated settlement of the dis- 
lUte. 

The U.S. Government is committed 
the use of the International Court of 
ustice to resolve legal disputes, consis- 
ent with Article 36(3) of the U.N. 
Charter. The submission to a Chamber 
f the Court of our differences with 
Canada over delimitation of a maritime 
oundary in the Gulf of Maine is a con- 
rete example. The dispute on sovereign- 
y over the Falklands/Malvinas is an 
3sue which the Court could appropriate- 
/ decide. U.S. negotiators this spring 
aised this matter with both sides. 
Jeither has ever indicated a willingness 
have recourse to the Court over the 
'alklands/Malvinas. The case does not 
all within the compulsory jurisdiction of 
he Court, and the agreement of both 
arties is thus necessary to submit the 
oijase for binding decision. 

The United Kingdom on two occa- 
ions since World War II sought to sub- 
nit to the Court the related dispute on 
overeignty over the South Georgia and 
louth Sandwich Island dependencies, 
lut Argentina did not agree to do so. 

The United States continues to be- 
ieve that a peaceful solution to this 
Dngstanding controversy is required, 
onsistent with the U.N. Charter obliga- 



tions of both parties, and it may be that 
possible use of the Court vnll be recon- 
sidered among the other possible settle- 
ment options, including renewed negoti- 
ations, that would be consistent with Ar- 
ticle 33 of the Charter. 



U.S. PROPOSALS, 
APRIL 27, 1982 

His Excellency 

Estanislao Valdes Otero 

President of the Twentieth Meeting 

of Consultation of Ministers of 

Foreign Affairs 
Washington, D.C. 

Excellency: 

In light of interest expressed by pro- 
posals made to the Government of Argentina 
and Great Britain on April 27, 1982, by the 
United States Government, I would like to 
ask that you circulate the enclosed document 
containing those proposals among the delega- 
tions accredited to the Twentieth Meeting of 
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. 
Both English and Spanish texts are included. 

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my 
highest consideration. 

J. William Middendorf 

Ambassador 

Special Delegate 



MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 



Preamble: 

On the basis of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 502, and the will of the 
Argentine Republic and of the United King- 
dom to resolve the controversy which has 
arisen between them, renouncing the use of 
force, both Governments agree on the follow- 
ing steps, which form an integrated whole: 

PARAGRAPH 1 

1. Effective on the signature of this 
Agreement by both Governments, there shall 
be an immediate cessation of hostilities. 



PARAGRAPH 2 

2. Beginning at 0000 hours local time of 
the day after the day on which this Agree- 
ment is signed, and pending a definitive set- 
tlement, the Republic of Argentina and the 
United Kingdom shall not introduce or deploy 
forces into the zones (hereinafter, "zones"), 
defined by circles of 150 nautical miles' radius 
from the following coordinate points (herein- 
after, "coordinate points"): 

A) LAT. 5r40' S 
LONG. 59°30' W 

B) LAT. 54° 20' S 
LONG. 36°40' W 

C) LAT. 57° 40' S 
LONG. 26°30' W 



2.L Within 24 hours of the date of this 
Agreement, the United Kingdom will suspend 
enforcement of its "zone of exclusion" and 
Argentina will suspend operations in the 
same area. 

2.2. Within 24 hours of the date of this 
Agreement, Argentina and the United King- 
dom will commence the withdrawal of their 
forces in accordance with the following 
details: 

2.2.1. Within seven days from the 
date of this Agreement, Argentina and the 
United Kingdom shall each have withdrawn 
one-half of their military and security forces 
present in the zones on the date of this 
Agreement, including related equipment and 
armaments. Within the same time period, the 
United Kingdom naval task force will stand 
off at a distance equivalent to seven days' 
sailing time (at 12 knots) from any of the co- 
ordinate points, and Argentine forces that 
have been withdrawn shall be placed in a con- 
dition such that they could not be reinserted 
with their equipment and armament in less 
than seven days. 

2.2.2. Within fifteen days from the 
date of this Agreement, Argentina shall re- 
move all of its remaining forces from the 
zones and redeploy them to their usual 
operating areas or normal duties. Within the 
same period, the United Kingdom shall like- 
wise remove all of its remaining forces from 
the zones and shall redeploy such forces and 
the naval task force and submarines to their 
usual operating areas or normal duties. 

2.3. In accordance with its letter of ac- 
ceptance of even date, the United States shall 
verify compliance with the provisions of this 
paragraph, and the two Governments agree 
to cooperate fully with the United States in 
facilitating this verification. 

PARAGRAPH 3 

3. From the date of this Agreement, the 
two Governments will initiate the necessary 
procedures to terminate simultaneously, and 
without delay, the economic and financial 
measures adopted in connection with the cur- 
rent controversy, including restrictions re- 
lating to travel, transportation, communica- 
tions, and transfers of funds between the two 
countries. The United Kingdom at the same 
time shall request the European Community 
and third countries that have adopted similar 
measures to terminate them. 



PARAGRAPH 4 

4. The United Kingdom and Argentina 
shall each appoint and the Ignited States has 
indicated its agreement to appoint, a repre- 
sentative to constitute a Special Interim 
Authority (hereinafter "the Authority") which 
shall verify compliance with the obligations in 
this Agreement (with the exception of para- 
graph 2), and undertake such other responsi- 
bilities as are assigned to it under this Agree- 
ment or the separate Protocol regarding the 
Authority signed this date. Each representa- 
tive may be supported by a staff of not more 
than ten persons on the islands. 



^fa 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



PARAGRAPH 5 

5.1. Pending a definitive settlement, ail 
decisions, laws and regulations hereafter 
adopted by the local administration on the 
islands shall be submitted to and expeditious- 
ly ratified by the Authority, except in the 
event that the Authority deems such deci- 
sions, laws or regulations to be inconsistent 
with the purposes and provisions of this 
agreement or its implementation. The tradi- 
tional local administration shall continue, ex- 
cept that the Executive and Legislative 
Councils shall be enlarged to include: 

(A) two representatives appointed by the 
Argentine Government to serve in the Execu- 
tive Council; and 

(B) representatives in each Council of the 
Argentine population whose period of resi- 
dence on the islands is equal to that required 
of others entitled to representation, in pro- 
portion to their population, subject to there 
being at least one such representative in each 
Council, Such representatives of the resident 
Argentine population shall be nominated by 
the Authority. 

The flags of each of the constituent 
members of the Authority shall be flown at 
its headquarters. 

5.2. Pending a definitive settlement, 
neither Government shall take any action 
that would be inconsistent with the purpose 
and provisions of this Agreement or its im- 
plementation. 

PARAGRAPH 6 

6.1. Pending a definitive settlement, 
travel, transportation, movement of persons 
and, as may be related thereto, residence and 
ownership and disposition of property, com- 
munications and commerce between the 
mainland and the islands shall, on a non- 
discriminatory basis, be promoted and facili- 
tated. The Authority shall propose to the two 
Governments for adoption appropriate 
measures on such matters. Such proposals 
shall simultaneously be transmitted to the 
Executive and Legislative Councils for their 
views. The two (Jovernments undertake to 
respond promptly to such proposals. The 
Authority shall monitor the implementation 
of all such proposals adopted. 

6.2. The provisions of paragraph 6.1 .shall 
in no way prejudice the rights and guarantees 
which have heretofore been enjoyed by the 
inhabitants on the islands, in particular rights 
relating to freedom of opinion, religion, ex- 
pression, teaching, movement, property, 
employment, family, customs, and cultural 
ties with countries of origin. 

PARAGRAPH 7 

7. December 31, 1982 will conclude the 
interim period during which the two Govern- 
ments shall complete negotiations on removal 
of the islands from the list of Non-Self- 
Governing Territories under Chapter XI of 
the United Nations Charter and on mutually 
agreed conditions for their definitive status, 



including due regard for the rights of the in- 
habitants and for the prirjciple of territorial 
integrity, in accordance with the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations Charter, 
and in light of the relevant Resolutions of the 
United Nations General Assembly. The nego- 
tiations hereabove referred to shall begin 
within fifteen days of the signature of the 
present Agreement. 

PARAGRAPH 8 

8. In order to assist them in bringing 
their negotiations to a mutually satisfactory 
settlement by the date stipulated in the pre- 
ceding paragraph, the Authority shall, after 
consultation with the Executive Council, 
make specific proposals and recommendations 
as early as practicable to the two Govern- 
ments, including proposals and recommenda- 
tions on: 

8.1. The manner of taking into ac- 
count the wishes and interests of the 
islanders, insofar as islands with a settled 
population are concerned, based on the 
results of a sounding of the opinion of the in- 
habitants, with respect to such issues relating 
to the negotiations, and conducted in such 
manner, as the Authority may determine; 

8.2. Issues relating to the develop- 
ment of the resources of the islands, in- 
cluding opportunities for joint cooperation 
and the role of the Falkland Islands Com- 
pany; and 

8.3. Such other matters as the two 
Governments may request, including possible 
arrangements for compensation of islanders, 
or matters on which the Authority may wish 
to comment in light of its experience in 
discharging its responsibilities under this 
Agreement. 

8.4. The Governments have agreed on 
the procedure in sub-paragraph 8.1 without 
prejudice to their respective positions on the 
legal weight to be accorded such opinion in 
reaching a definitive settlement. 

PARAGRAPH 9 

9. Should the Governments nonetheless 
be unable to conclude the negotiations by 
December 31, 1982, the United States has in- 
dicated that, on the request of both CJovern- 
ments, it would be prepared at such time to 
seek to resolve the dispute within six months 
of the date of the request by making specific 
proposals for a settlement and by directly 
conducting negotiations between the (Govern- 
ments on the basis of procedures that it shall 
formulate. The two Governments agree to re- 
spond within one month to any formal pro- 
posals or recommendations submitted to 
them by the United States. 

PARAGRAPH 10 

10. 'I'his Agreement shall enter into force 
on the date of signature. 



ARGENTINE NOTE OF 
MAY 28, 1982, AND LETTER 
OF APRIL 29, 1982 



May 28, 19 



Mr. President of the 

Twentietli Meeting of Consultation 

of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 

D. ESTANISLAO VALDES OTERO 

Mr. President: 
1 have the honor to address Your Excellenc f 
with respect to the document of this Meetir 
of Consultation bearing the title "Texts of t 
Proposals for Agreement Made by the 
Government of the United States to the 
Governments of Argentina and of the Unitt 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland" (doc. 74/82), to present a copy of t 
letter that, in my capacity as Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and Worship of the Argen- 
tine Republic, I sent on April 29, 1982, to 
Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Jr., in- 
forming him of the Argentine Government' 
views on the proposals for agreement made 
by the Government of the United States. 

In making known this reply, the Argen 
tine Government wishes to state, as the at 
tached letter shows, that at no time did it 
term unacceptable the proposals of the 
United States Secretary of State. Instead i 
objection was directed primarily at certain 
specific points, including some changes tha 
had been made in the document compared 
previous drafts, and it suggested that othe 
formulas be sought. It added that if "Arge 
tina's position were encompassed, agreemt 
would be facilitated enormously and the fit 
text of the document would not pose any 
insurmountable problems." 

The Argentine Government wishes thi 
important point to be made clear, in view 
the statements that have been made in th( 
sessions of the General Committee of this 
Meeting of Consultation, which were ratifi 
by circulation of the document cited. 

I request that this note with its attach 
ment be distributed immediately as an offi ^J 
document of the Twentieth Meeting of Co 
sulfation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed 
assurances of my highest consideration. 

Nic.ANDR Costa Men 

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Wor 

of the Argentine Repi 

Attached: copy of the letter from the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship t 
the Argentine Republic Dr. Nicanor Costa 
Mendez 



fc 



oes 



April 29, 



Wo 
»•»] 

ostisr 
h 

lbs I) 

^1 



Dear Mr. Secretary of State: 
We have carefully reviewed the documen 
you sent us and have compared it with on j^ 
previous proposals and with the viewpoin 
we have maintained in our various meetir 
From that review, significant differences 
have emerged, some of which give rise to 
difficulties that it is essential to overcome 
As my (k)vemment has already state 
you, the objective the Argentine Govemn 



->t r\( Qfo»o Dull 



tifso 
rttit 



liityl 

IkiUj, 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



las set is recognition of its sovereignty over 
he Malvinas Islands. This central element of 
)ur discussions is the ultimate justification of 
;he actions taken by my country, and as I 
lave had occasion to tell you many times, 
institutes for us an unrenounceable goal. 

Along with the question of sovereignty, 
;he current crisis gives rise immediately to 
he need to establish a provisional regime for 
idministration of the islands, as an essential 
itep in the process of separating the two 
nilitary forces and as a reasonable pause in 
he face of the logical impossibility of forma- 
izing their final fate at this time. 

The conversations we have held have 
)een based primarily on these two ques- 
ions— recognition of sovereignty and a provi- 
jonal administrative regime. Solution of the 
emaining problems will be simpler if there is 
igreement on the two points that I have just 
nentioned. 

The one certain thing is that the two are 
ntimately connected to each other. To the 
xtent that the provisions relating to the 
ecognition of our sovereignty are imprecise, 
or us it is necessary— if we do not want to 
etum to the frustrating situation that pre- 
ailed before April 2— to establish mecha- 
isms that give us broader powers in admini- 
tration of the islands. 

On the other side of the coin, if it were 
lear that Argentina's sovereignty would be 
ecognized in the end, then we could be more 
exible regarding the matter of temporary 
dministration. 
* The document sent by the Secretary of 
tate falls short of Argentine demands and 
' f oes not satisfy its minimal aspirations for 
ither of the two points. To the contrary, un- 

iivorable changes have been made to both, 
he number of Argentine representatives in- 
olved in administration of the islands has 
> een decreased, and the opportunity of ex- 
anding my country's control in the event 
lat negotiations on the basic issue go on 
■ ndlessly without a solution has been barred, 
hus we are faced with the real possibility of 
tablishing a predominantly British admini- 
^^rration with no fixed expiration date. 

As concerns the matter of sovereignty, 
le concept of territorial integrity has been 
Gripped of all meaning. Further, the new ele- 
lent of a virtual referendum to determine 
le "wishes" of the inhabitants has been in- 
oduced in open opposition to United Na- 
ons Resolution 2065 and the unwavering 
osition sustained by Argentina. 

The Secretary knows that we cannot ac- 
spt these changes. In my opinion, other for- 
lulas must be found. For this effort, we will 
Iways be at the disposal of the Secretary, 
hese formulas should provide for the 
alance that I referred to above in order to 
eigh properly the data relating to the mat- 
!r of sovereignty against the provisions 
sgulating temporary administration of the 
Jands. These provisions should have a fixed 
rm and include gradually larger Argentine 
arJarticipation or, in lieu of this, the provisions 
hould be made precise enough to offer 
scurity for recognition of Argentina's rights 
ithin a specific period. 



)ctober1982 



If Argentina's position were encom- 
passed, agreement would be facilitated enor- 
mously and the final text of the document 
would not pose any insurmountable problems. 

Thank you once again for your arduous 
and difficult negotiations. 

Accept, Mr. Secretary, the renewed as- 
surances of my highest consideration. 

NicANOR Costa Mendez 

His Excellency 
Alexander Haig, Jr. 
Secretary of State 
Washington, D.C. 



PERU-U.S. PROPOSAL, 
MAY 5, 1982 

Draft Interim Agreement on the 
Falkland/Malvinas Islands 

1. An immediate ceasefire, concurrent with: 

2. Mutual withdrawal and non-reintroduc- 
tion of forces, according to a schedule to be 
established by the Contact Group. 

3. The immediate introduction of a Con- 
tact Group composed of Brazil, Peru, The 
Federal Republic of Germany and the United 
States into the Falkland Islands, on a tem- 
porary basis pending agreement on a defini- 
tive settlement. The Contact Group will 
assume responsibility for: 

(A) Verification of the withdrawal; 

(B) Ensuring that no actions are taken 
in the Islands, by the local administration, 
which would contravene this interim agree- 
ment; and 

(C) Ensuring that all other provisions of 
the agreement are respected. 

4. Britain and Argentina acknowledge the 
existence of differing and conflicting views 
regarding the status of the Falkland Islands. 

5. The two Governments acknowledge 
that the aspirations and interests of the 
Islanders will be included in the definitive 
settlement of the status of the Islands. 

6. The Contact Group will have responsi- 
bility for ensuring that the two Governments 
reach a definitive agreement prior to 

April 30, 1983. 



BRITISH GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT, 
MAY 21, 1982 

FALKLAND ISLANDS: NEGOTIATIONS 
FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT 

Argentine Aggression 

1. It is now almost seven weeks since Argen- 
tina invaded the Falkland Islands. This un- 
lawful use of force in unprovoked aggression 
threatened not only to destroy the democratic 
way of life freely chosen by the Falkland 
Islanders but also the basis on which interna- 



tional order rests. The inva.sion was also a 
singular act of bad faith: it took place when 
Britain and Argentina were engaged in ne- 
gotiations in accordance with requests from 
the United Nations. 

2. On 1 April the President of the United 
Nations Security Council had formally ap- 
pealed to Argentina not to invade the Falk- 
land Islands. Yet on 2 April Argentina invad- 
ed. On 3 April the United Nations Security 
Council passed its mandatory Resolution 502, 
demanding a cessation of hostilities and an 
immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces 
from the Islands. The same day, Argentina 
took South Georgia. In the ensuing weeks she 
has shown no sign of complying with the 
Security Council Resolution: on the contrary, 
she has continued a massive build up of the 
occupying forces on the Falkland Islands. 
There could hardly be a clearer demonstra- 
tion of disregard for international law and for 
the United Nations itself. 

The British Response 

3. Britain need have done nothing more than 
rest on the mandatory Resolution of the 
Security Council Indeed, Britain's inherent 
right of self-defence under Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter would have justified 
the Government in adopting a purely military 
policy for ending the crisis. But, in pursuit of 
a peaceful settlement, Britain adopted a 
policy, frequently explained by the Govern- 
ment in Parliament, of building up pressure 
on Argentina. 

Military pressure was exerted by the 
rapid assembly and despatch of the British 
Naval Task Force. Diplomatic pressure, first 
expressed in Security Council Resolution 502, 
was built up by the clear statements of con- 
demnation of Argentine aggression which 
were made by many countries across the 
world. It was widely recognised that aggres- 
sion could not be allowed to stand, since 
otherwise international peace and order 
would be dangerously prejudiced in many 
regions. The members of the European Com- 
munity, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and 
Norway joined Britain in rapidly imposing 
economic measures against Argentina. 



Efforts for a Negotiated Settlement 

4. Britain dedicated her maximum diplomatic 
efforts to the search for a negotiated solution, 
and the Government kept Parliament as fully 
informed as the confidentiality of difficult 
negotiations would allow. Efforts for an in- 
terim agreement to end the crisis were first 
undertaken by the United States Secretary of 
State, Mr Alexander Haig. His ideas for an 
interim agreement were discussed repeatedly 
with Argentina and Britain. The Government 
expressed their willingness to consider Mr 
Haig's final proposals, although they pre- 
sented certain real difficulties. Argentina re- 
jected them. The next stage of negotiations 
was based on proposals originally advanced 
by President Belaunde of Peru and modified 
in consultations between him and the United 
States Secretary of State. As the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Secretary informed 



87 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Parliament on 7 May, Britain was willing to 
accept the final version of these proposals for 
an interim agreement. But Argentina re- 
jected it. 

5. Since then, the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations, Senor Perez de Cuellar, 
has been conducting negotiations with Bri- 
tain, represented by our Permanent Repre- 
sentative at the United Nations, Sir Anthony 
Parsons, and Argentina, represented by the 
Deputy Foreign Minister, Senor Ros. In these 
negotiations, as in earlier ones, Britain made 
repeated efforts to establish whether Argen- 
tina was willing to be sufficiently flexible to 
make a reasonable interim agreement possi- 
ble. But it became increasingly clear that 
Argentina was not seeking an agreement but 
was playing for time in the negotiation in the 
hope of holding on to the fruits of aggression, 
with all that this would imply for the interna- 
tional rule of law. There was an important 
meeting of British Ministers, attended by Sir 
Anthony Parsons and the British Ambassador 
in Washington, Sir Nicholas Henderson on 
Sunday 16 May. On the following day, Sir 
Anthony Parsons returned to New York and 
handed to the United Nations Secretary- 
General two documents: 

• A draft interim agreement between 
Britain and Argentina which set out the 
British position in full, 

• A letter to the Secretary-General mak- 
ing clear the British position that the Falk- 
land Islands dependencies were not covered 
by the draft interim agreement. 

6. Sir Anthony Parsons made clear to the 
Secretary-General that the draft agreement 
represented the furthest that Britain could go 
in the negotiations. He requested that the 
Secretary-General should give the draft to 
the Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister. The 
Secretary-General did this, and asked for a 
response within two days. Argentina's first 
response to the Secretary-General, late on 

18 May, was equivocal and contained points 
known to be unacceptable to the United 
Kingdom. Early on 19 May, Sir Anthony Par- 
sons pointed this out to the Secretary- 
General and requested that Argentina's final 
position should be conveyed within the two 
day period originally set for a reply to the 
British draft agreement. 

7. Argentina's response, which HMG re- 
ceived late on 19 May, represented a harden- 
ing of the Argentine position and amounted 
to a rejection of the British proposals. 

Britain's Fundamental Principles 
in Negotiations 

8. The Government's approach in all the 
negotiations has been based on important 
principles, which ministers have set out re- 
peatedly in Parliament; 

A. International Law; Argentina's unlaw- 
ful aggression must end and Security Council 
Resolution 502 must be implemented. Ag- 
gression must not be rewarded, or small 
countries across the world would feel threat- 
ened by neighbours with territorial ambitions. 



B. Freedom: The Falkland Islanders are 
used to enjoying free institutions. The execu- 
tive and legislative councils were established 
with their agreement and functioned with 
their participation. Britain insisted that any 
interim administration in the Falkland 
Islands must involve democratically elected 
representatives of the Islanders, so as to 
enable the latter to continue to participate in 
the administration of their affairs and to en- 
sure that they could express freely their 
wishes about the future of the Islands, in ac- 
cordance with the principle of self-determina- 
tion. 

C. Sovereignty: Britain has no doubt of 
her sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, 
having administered them peacefully since 
1833. Nevertheless, successive British 
Governments have been willing, without prej- 
udice, to include the question of sovereignty 
in negotiations with Argentina about the 
future of the Falkland Islands. In the recent 
negotiations, the Government have been will- 
ing that an interim agreement should provide 
for new negotiations about the future of the 
Islands, which likewise could discuss sover- 
eignty in good faith, so long as there was no 
prejudgement as to the outcome of negotia- 
tions. Although Argentina seemed, at one 
point in the United Nations Secretary- 
General's negotiations, to be accepting a for- 
mula about not pre-judging the outcome of 
future negotiations, she continued to insist on 
other provisions nmning counter to this, thus 
casting grave doubt on the seriousness of this 
acceptance. This doubt was reinforced by 
repeated public statements by Argentine 
leaders. 

9. Britain upheld these principles in the 
draft agreement which we presented on 

17 May to the United Nations Secretary- 
General: 

• The agreement provided for complete 
Argentine withdrawal from the Falkland 
Islands within 14 days, thus terminating the 
aggression and upholding international law. 

• It provided that the legislative and ex- 
ecutive councils representing the Falkland 
Islanders would continue in existence and be 
consulted by the UN interim administrator, 
thus maintaining the democratic structure of 
the administration. 

• It provided explicitly that the outcome 
of negotiations about the future of the 
Islands was not prejudged, thus safeguarding 
the British position on sovereignty. Britain, 
in participating in those negotiations, would 
have been guided by the wishes of the 
Islanders. 

10. In the Secretary-General's negotia- 
tions, Britain has insisted that the Falkland 
Islands dependencies should not be covered 
by an interim agreement to end the crisis. 
South Georgia and the South Sandwich 
Islands are geographically distant from the 
Falkland Islands themselves. They have no 
settled population. The British title to them, 
of which the Government have no doubt, does 
not derive from the Falkland Islands, and 
these territories have been treated as de- 
pendencies of the Falkland Islands only for 
reasons of administrative convenience. 



11. Throughout the negotiations, Britain 
has been firm on the essential principles but 
willing to negotiate on matters where these 
principles were not breached. In particular: 

A. In return for Argentine withdrawal 
from the Falkland Islands, Britain was will- 
ing (Article 2(3)) (see following annex] to 
withdraw her task force to a distance of 150 
nautical miles. She was also willing to have 
international verification (Article 6(4)) of the 
mutual withdrawal, in which the United Na- 
tions might have made use of surveillance aii 
craft from third countries. 

B. Britain was wdlling that the exclusion 
zones (Article 3) declared by herself and 
Argentina, and the economic measures (Arti 
cle 5) introduced during the present crisis, 
should be lifted from the moment of cease- 
fire, although these actions would give more 
comfort to Argentina than to Britain. 

C. Britain was prepared to accept the aj 
pointment of a UN Administrator (Article 
6(3)) to administer the government of the 
Falkland Islands. Britain wanted him to dis 
charge his functions in consultation with the 
representative institutions in the islands— th 
legislative and executive councils— which 
have been developed in accordance with the 
terms of Article 73 of the UN Charter. (Thi; 
makes clear that the interests of the inhabi- 
tants of non-self-goveming territories are 
paramount and refers to the need to take dt 
account of the political aspirations of the 
peoples.) It is inconceivable that Britain, or 
any other democratic country, could accept 
that her people should be deprived of their 
democratic rights. Britain was nevertheless 
willing to accept that one representative fr< 
the Argentine population of the Islands (soi 
30 people out of 1800) should be added to 
each of the councils. 

Additionally, Britain was willing to acc< 
the presence of up to 3 Argentine observer 
on the Islands in the interim period. 

D. Britain was willing (Article 7) to agr 
to re-establishment of communications, 
travel, transport, postage, etc, between the 
Falkland Islands and the Argentine mainlai |tts 
on the basis existing before the invasion. 

E. Britain was wrilling to enter into 
negotiations (Article 8) under the auspices 
the UN Secretary-General for a peaceful se 
tlement of the dispute with Argentina abot 
the Falkland Islands and to seek the compl 
tion of these negotiations by the target dat 
of 31 December 1982. Our position was tha 
no outcome to the negotiations should be 
either excluded or predetermined. 

12. Argentina's final position in the 
negotiations speaks for itself. In particular 

A. Argentina insisted that South Georg 
and the South Sandwich Islands be coverec 
by the interim agreement. One effect of th 
would be that British forces would have to 
withdraw from the British territory of Sou 
Georgia. 

B. Argentina wanted thirty days for th ttmi 
completion of the withdrawal of forces. Sh fe* 
wanted all forces to return to their normal fii 
bases and areas of operation, thus requirin 
British forces to be enormously further aw 
than Argentine ones. 



V 



'i 



* 



ltd 



« 



Hi 



88 



Department of State Bulle 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



C. Argentina wanted the administration 
the Islands to be exclusively the responsi- 

lity of the United Nations. There would 
ive been Argentine and British observers, 
le administration would have been free to 
ipoint advisers from the population of the 
lands, in equal numbers from the Argentine 
pulation and from the population of British 
igin. The flags of Britain and Argentina 
3uld have flown together with that of the 
lited Nations. 

D. Argentina wanted free access for her 
.tionals to the Islands, with respect inter 

a to residence, work and property. Argen- 
la also opposed a provision in the British 
aft agreement (end of Article 6(3)) but the 
V Administrator exercising his powers in 
nformity with the laws and practices tradi- 
inally observed in the Islands. It was evi- 
nt that Argentina hoped to change the 
ture of Falklands society and its demo- 
aphic make-up in the interim period, and 
as prejudge the future. 

E. Argentina proposed a formula about 
gotiations on the future of the Islands 
lich stated that they should be 'initiated' 
thout prejudice to the rights and claims 

d positions of the two parties. Argentina 
>uld not accept an additional phrase stating 
o that the outcome would not be pre- 
Iged. Argentine leaders continued in public 
say that Argentina insisted on having sov- 
'ignty. In the negotiations Argentina also 
listed a provision in the British draft (be- 
ining of Article 9) which would have en- 
•ed that the interim arrangements should 
y in place until a definitive agreement 
5Ut the future of the Islands could be im- 
mented. Argentina's evident aim in resist- 
; this was that, if no definitive agreement 
i been reached by the target date of 31 
cember 1982, the interim administration 
uld cease to exist and a vacuum be created 
ich Argentina could hope to fill. 

13. The present crisis was brought about 
Argentina's unlawful act of aggression. In 
•ir subsequent attitude the Argentine 
vernment showed that they had no respect 
ner for democratic principles or for the 
e of law. Britain stands firmly for both. 



4NEX— FALKLAND ISLANDS: 
lAFT INTERIM AGREEMENT 

i Government of the Republic of Argen- 
i and the Government of the United 
igdom of Great Britain and Northern 
land, responding to Security Council 
rgjsolution 502 (1982) adopted on 3 April 
i2 under Article 40 of the Charter of the 
ited Nations, 

Having entered into negotiations through 
,iii good offices of the Secretary-General of 

United Nations for an interim agreement 
li icerning the Falkland Islands (Islas 
Ivinas), hereinafter referred to as 'The 
inds'. 

Having in mind the obligations with 
:ard to non-self governing territories set 

in Article 73 of the Charter of the United 
tions, the text of which is annexed hereto. 

Have agreed on the following; 

:tober1982 



Article 1 

1 . No provision of this Interim Agreement 
shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims 
and positions of either party in the ultimate 
peaceful settlement of their dispute over the 
Islands. 

2. No acts or activities taking place 
whilst this Interim Agreement is in force 
shall constitute a basis for asserting, suppor- 
ting or denying a claim to territorial 
sovereignty over the Islands or create any 
rights of sovereignty over them. 

Article 2 

1. With effect from a specified time, 24 
hours after signature of this Agreement 
(hereinafter referred to as Time 'T'), each 
party undertakes to cease and thereafter to 
refrain from all firing and other hostile ac- 
tions. 

2. Argentina undertakes: 

(A) To commence withdrawal of its 
armed forces from the Islands with effect 
from Time 'T'; 

(B) To withdraw half of its armed 
forces to at least 150 nautical miles away 
from any point in the Islands by Time 'T' plus 
seven days; and 

(C) To complete its withdrawal to at 
least 150 nautical miles away by Time 'T' plus 
fourteen days. 

3. The United Kingdom undertakes: 

(A) To commence withdrawal of its 
armed forces from the Islands with effect 
from Time 'T'; 

(B) To withdraw half of its armed 
forces to at least 150 nautical miles away 
from any point in the Islands by Time 'T' plus 
seven days; and 

(C) To complete its withdrawal to at 
least 150 nautical miles away by Time 'T' plus 
fourteen days. 

Article 3 

With effect from Time 'T', each party under- 
takes to lift the exclusion zones, warnings 
and similar measures which have been 
imposed. 

Article 4 

On the completion of the steps for 
withdrawal specified in Article 2, each party 
undertakes to refrain from reintroducing any 
armed forces into the Islands or within 150 
nautical miles thereof. 

Article 5 

Each party undertakes to lift with effect 
from Time 'T' the economic measures it has 
taken against the other and to seek the lift- 
ing of similar measures taken by third 
parties. 

Article 6 

1. Immediately after the signature of the 
present Agreement, Argentina and the 
United Kingdom shall jointly sponsor a draft 
resolution in the United Nations under the 
terms of which the Security Council would 
take note of the present Agreement, 
acknowledge the role conferred upon the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations 



therein, and authorise him to carry out the 
tasks entrusted to him therein. 

2. Immediately after the adoption of the 
resolution referred to in paragraph 1 of this 
Article, a United Nations administrator, 
being a person acceptable to Argentina and 
the United Kingdom, shall be appointed by 
the Secretary-General and will be the officer 
administering the government of the Islands. 

3. The United Nations administrator 
shall have the authority under the direction 
of the Secretary-General to ensure the con- 
tinuing administration of the government of 
the Islands. He shall discharge his functions 
in consultation with the representative in- 
stitutions in the Islands which have been 
developed in accordance with the terms of 
Article 73 of the Charter of the United Na- 
tions, with the exception that one represent- 
ative from the Argentina population normally 
resident on the Islands shall be appointed by 
the administrator to each of the two institu- 
tions. The administrator shall exercise his 
powers in accordance with the terms of this 
Agreement and in conformity with the laws 
and practices traditionally obtaining in the 
Islands. 

4. The United Nations administrator 
shall verify the withdrawal of all armed 
forces from the Islands, and shall devise an 
effective method of ensuring their non- 
reintroduction. 

5. The United Nations administrator 
shall have such staff as may be agreed by 
Argentina and the United Kingdom to be 
necessary for the performance of his func- 
tions under this Agreement. 

6. Each party may have no more than 
three observers in the Islands. 

Article 7 

Except as may be otherwise agreed between 
them, the parties shall, during the currency 
of this Agreement, reactivate the Exchange 
of Notes of 5 August 1971, together with the 
Joint Statement on Communications between 
the Islands and the Argentine mainland 
referred to therein. The parties shall accord- 
ingly take approp-iate steps to establish a 
special consultative committee to carry out 
the functions entrusted to the Special Con- 
sultative Committee referred to in the Joint 
Statement. 

Article 8 

The parties undertake to enter into negotia- 
tions in good faith under the auspices of the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations for 
the peaceful settlement of their dispute and 
to seek, with a sense of urgency, the comple- 
tion of these negotiations by 31 December 
1982. These negotiations shall be initiated 
without prejudice to the rights, claims or 
positions of the parties and without prejudge- 
ment of the outcome. 

Article 9 

This Interim Agreement shall enter into force 
on signature and shall remain in force until a 
definitive agreement about the future of the 
Islands has been reached and implemented by 
the parties. The Secretary-General will im- 
mediately communicate its text to the Securi- 



89 



ty Council and register it in accordance with 
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Na- 
tions. 



ARGENTINE DIPLOMATIC NOTE 
TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
MAY 26, 1982 

The Embassy of the Argentine Republic 
presents its compliments to the Department 
of State and has the honor to inform, with 
regard to the proposal of the United Nations 
Secretary General referred to the conflict 
over the Islas Malvinas and its dependencies, 
the position of the Government of the Argen- 
tine Republic was clearly stated in the Pro- 
posed Agreement submitted in the course of 
the negotiations held at the United Nations, 
which text reads as follows; 

"The Government of the Argentine 
Republic and the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, hereinafter referred to as "the 
Parties", 

In response to the provisions of Security 
Council Resolution 502 (1982) of April 3, 
1982, and taking into account the Charter of 
the United Nations, Resolution 1514 (XV) 
2065 and other Resolutions of the General 
Assembly on the question of the Malvinas 
(Falkland) Islands, have accepted, in accord- 
ance with Article 40 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, the assistance of the 
Secretary General of the United Nations and 
have engaged in negotiations and arrived at 
the following provisional agreement relating 
to the Malvinas, South Georgia and South 
Sandwich Islands, hereinafter referred to as 
"The Islands" for the purposes of this agree- 
ment. 

I. 1. The geographical scope of the area 
within which the withdrawal of troops is to 
be carried out shall comprise the Malvinas, 
South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands. 

2. The withdrawal of the forces of both 
parties shall be gradual and simultaneous. 
Within a maximum period of thirty days, all 
armed forces shall be in their normal bases 
and areas of operation. 

II. With effect from the signature of this 
agreement, each party shall cease to apply 
the economic measures which it has adopted 
against the other and the United Kingdom 
shall call for the same action by those coun- 
tries or groups of countries which, at its re- 
quest, adopted similar measures. 

III. 1. Supervision of the withdrawal of 
the forces of both countries shall be carried 
out by specialized personnel of the United 
Nations, whose composition shall be agreed 
with the parties. 

2. The interim Administration of the 
Islands while the negotiations for final settle- 
ment of the dispute are in progress shall con- 
form to the following provisions: 

A) The Administration shall be ex- 
clusively the responsibility of the United Na- 
tions with an appropriate presence of 
observers of the parties. 



90 



B) The said Administration shall per- 
form all functions (executive, legislative, 
judicial and security) through officials of dif- 
ferent nationality from that of the parties. 

C) Notwithstanding the provisions of 
2(A) and (B), and in order not to cause un- 
necessary changes in the way of life of the 
population during the period of the interim 
Administration by the United Nations, local 
judicial functions may be exercised in accord- 
ance with the legislation in force on April 1 , 
1982 to the full extent compatible with this 
agreement. Similarly, the United Nations in- 
terim Administration may appoint as advisers 
persons who are members of the population 
of British origin and Argentines resident in 
the Islands, in equal numbers. 

D) The flag of the parties shall fly 
together with that of the United Nations. 

E) During the period of interim Ad- 
ministration, communications shall be kept 
open, without discriminatory restrictions of 
any kind for the parties, including freedom of 
movement and equality of access with respect 
to residence, work and property. 

F) Freedom of communication shall 
also include the maintenance of freedom of 
transit for the state airline (Lade) and for 
merchant ships and scientific vessels, in addi- 
tion, telephone, telegraph and telex com- 
munications, Argentine television transmis- 
sions and the state petroleum (YPF) and gas 
services shall continue to operate freely. 

IV. The customs, traditions and way of 
life of the inhabitants of the Islands, and 
their social and cultural links with their coun- 
tries of origin, shall be respected and 
safeguarded. 

V. 1. The parties undertake to enter im- 
mediately into negotiations in good faith 
under the auspices of the Secretary General 
of the United Nations for the peaceful and 
final settlement of the dispute and. with a 
sense of urgency, to complete these negotia- 
tions by December 31, 1982, with a single op- 
tion to extend until June 30, 1983, in order to 
comply with the Charter of the United Na- 
tions, Resolutions 1514 (XV), 2065 (XX) and 
other relevant resolutions of the General 
Assembly on the question of the Malvinas 
Islands. These negotiations shall be initiated 
without prejudice to the rights and claims or 
positions of the two parties and in recogni- 
tion of the fact that they have divergent posi- 
tions on the question of the Malvinas, South 
Georgia and South Sandwich Islands. 

2. The negotiations shall be held in 
New York. 

3. The Secretary General of the United 
Nations may be assisted in the negotiations 
by a contract group composed of representa- 
tives of four States members of the United 
Nations. To that end, each party shall 
nominate two States and shall have the right 
to a single veto of one of the States 
nominated by the other. 

4. The Secretary General of the United 
Nations shall keep the Security Council 
assiduously informed of the progress of the 
negotiations. 

VI. If the period specified in point V(l) 
above expires with out the attainement of a 



TREATIES 



final agreement, the Secretary (Jeneral shal W" 
draw up a report addressed to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, in order 
that the latter may determine, as appropria* H; 
and with greater urgency, the lines to whid g 
the said final agreement should conform in |j2 
order to achieve a speedy settlement of the 
question." 

The Argentine Government, in the light "*" 
of the position stated in the aforementioned * 
proposed agreement, which reflects the 
reasonableness which has continuously in 
spired its negotiating behaviour, deeply 
regrets that the peace efforts carried out tl' j 
U.N. Secretary General, in which pursuanc4 '! 
and final success the Argentine Republic 
trusted, have been frustrated as a result of 
the imilateral decision of the British Goven^dC 
ment announced on May 20th. 

The real possibilities of reaching a 
peaceful settlement to the conflict and of 
avoiding, with the responsibility that the 
situation demanded, further bloodshed and 
imminent breaking of peace and security in) k! 
the hemisphere, finally proved to be 
disregarded by the intransigence and stub- 
bornness with which the Government of thn g 
United Kingdom has tried to make the use 
force prevail over reason and peace. 

The Government of the Argentine 
Republic, therefore, formally holds the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Gre^ 
Britain and Northern Ireland responsible ft 
the serious consequences which in the futui< nn 
may stem from its denial to exhaust the 
available means towards a peaceful settle- 
ment, and expressly reserves its rights to i 
legitimate defense recognized by the Unite 
Nations Charter. 

The Embassy of the Argentine Republi 
avails itself of this opportimity to renew tc 
the Department of State the assurances of 
highest consideration. 



•The complete transcript of the hearint 
will be publisned by the committee and will 
be avaikble from tne Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Protocol on the authenic quadrilingual text 
the convention on international civil aviatic 
(TIAS 1.591), with annex. Done at Montrea 
Sept. 30, 1977.' 
Signature: Australia,^ Aug. 4, 1982. 

Memorandum of understanding concerning 
transatlantic scheduled service air fares, w 
annexes. Done at Washington May 2, 1982 
Entered into force Aug. 1, 1982, for Belgii 
the F.R.G., France, Greece, Ireland, Italy. 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland. 
U.K., U.S., and Yugoslavia. 



ape 



i{li 



TREATIES 



Isheries 

invention for the conservation of salmon in 
(e Ncirth Atlantic Ocean. Done at Reykjavik 
tir. 2. 1982.1 
atifii-.U ion deposited: Iceland, June 21, 



jUritime Matters 

yiiK'iiiiments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
' ■■ IS amended, on the International 

i;c Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 
■ >ti06). Adopted at London Nov. 14, 
Entered into force May 22, 1982, ex- 
Dt for Art. 51 which entered into force 
ly 28, 1982. 
oclaimed by the President: Aug. 5, 1982. 



■d Cross 

Botocol additional to the Geneva conventions 
oAug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 
^35), and relating to the protection of vic- 
8is of international armed conflicts (Pro- 
•^ol I), with annexes. Adopted at Geneva 
sjie 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 
178.' 

■^ cessions deposited: Mauritius, Mar. 22, 
%2: Zaire, June 3, 1982. 

E itocol additional to the Geneva conventions 
oAug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 
^ '^). and relating to the protection of vic- 
,- f noninternational armed conflicts (Pro- 
• \ II). Adopted at Geneva June 8, 1977. 
e tetfd into force Dec. 7, 1978.' 
•5 -fssio n deposited: Mauritius, Mar. 22, 



libber 

1: ernational natural rubber agreement, 
■l.'9. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979. Entered 
'l ) force definitively April 15, 1982. 
- iclai med by the President: July 23, 1982. 

.IDG 

_1 istitution of the U.N. Industrial Develop- 
,1 at Organization, with annexes. Adopted at 
"j nna Apr. 8, 1979.' 
( ifications deposited: Haiti, Upper Volta, 



re, July 9, 1982; Burundi, Aug. 9, 1982. 

apons 

ivention on prohibitions or restrictions on 

use of certain conventional weapons 

ch may be deemed to be excessively in- 

ous or to have indiscriminate effects, with 

lexed protocols. Adopted at Geneva 

. 10, 1980.' 

:ification and acceptances deposited: 



■man Democratic Republic, July 20, 1982. 

ights and Measures 

ivention concerning the creation of an in- 
national office of weights and measures, 
ulations (Annex 1) and transient provi- 
is (Annex 2), as amended. Signed at Paris 
y 20, 1875. Entered into force Jan. 1, 
6; for the U.S. Aug. 2, 1878. TS 378, TS 
; 20 Stat. 709, 43 Stat. 1686. 
:ession deposited: Korea, Dem. People's 



3., May 7, 1982. 



!tober1982 



Whaling 

International whaling convention and 
schedule of whaling regulations, as amended. 
Done at Washington Dec. 2, 1946. Entered 
into force Nov. 10, 1948. TIAS 1849, 4228. 
Notification of adherence deposited: Antigua 
and Barbuda, July 21, 1982. 

Wheat 

1981 protocol for the sixth extension of the 
wheat trade convention, 1971 (TIAS 7144). 
Done at Washington March 24, 1981. 
Entered into force July 1, 1981. TIAS 10350. 
Ratifications deposited: France, Aug. 9, 
1982; Venezuela, Aug. 16, 1982. 

1981 protocol for the first extension of the 
food aid convention 1980 (TIAS 10015). Done 
at Washington March 24, 1981. Entered into 
force July 1, 1981. TIAS 10351. 
Ratification deposited: France, Aug. 9, 1982. 



BILATERAL 

Australia 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa- 
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on income. Signed at Sydney 
Aug. 6, 1982. Enters into force upon ex- 
change of instruments of ratification. 

China 

Memorandum of understanding on the de- 
velopment of bilateral tourism relations. 
Signed at Beijing Aug. 5, 1982. Entered into 
force Aug. 5, 1982. 

Costa Rica 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, with memorandum of understand- 
ing. Signed at San Jose Mar. 25, 1982. 
Entered into force: Apr. 28, 1982. 

El Salvador 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of 
Jan. 22, 1981. Signed at San Salvador 
Mar. 15, 1982. 
Entered into force: Mar. 26, 1982. 

France 

Memorandum of understanding covering 
cooperation in the field of geological sciences. 
Signed at Orleans and Reston July 8 and 23, 
1982. Entered into force July 23, 1982. 

Iceland 

Memorandum of understanding for scientific 
and technical cooperation in earth sciences. 
Signed at Reykjavik and Reston Jan. 28 and 
Apr. 9, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 9, 
1982. 

Mexico 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Nov. 9, 1972, as amended (TIAS 7697, 9436, 
9647, 10159, 10234), concerning frequency 
modulation broadcasting in the 88-108 MHz 
band. Effected by exchange of notes at Mex- 
ico and Tlatelolco Mar. 18 and July 2, 1982. 
Entered into force July 2, 1982. 



Agreement extending the agreement of 
July 31, 1970, as amended and extended 
(TIAS 6941, 7927), for a cooperative 
meteorological observation program in Mex- 
ico. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico 
and Tlatelolco June 17 and July 16, 1982. 
Entered into force July 16, 1982; effective 
Aug. 1, 1982. 

Netherlands 

Arrangement concerning the installation and 
support of a USAFE LORAN C/D transmit- 
ter site, with annex. Signed at Ramstein and 
The Hague May 17 and July 12, 1982. 
Entered into force July 12, 1982. 

Pakistan 

Agreement concerning general security of 
military information. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Islamabad Apr. 6, June 21 and 24, 
1982. Entered into force June 24, 1982. 

Panama 

Agreement concerning transfer of the Ancon 
District Court (Building 310) from the U.S. to 
Panama. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Panama July 13, 1982. Entered into force 
July 13, 1982. 

Poland 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
Aug. 2, 1976 concerning fisheries off the 
coast of the United States (TIAS 8524). Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Washington 
May 20 and 24, 1982. Entered into force 
July 27, 1982. 

Sierra Leone 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of August 
31, 1978 (TIAS 9210), with memorandum of 
negotiations. Signed at Freetown July 28, 
1982. Entered into force July 28, 1982. 

Spain 

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coast 
of the U.S. with annexes and agreed minutes. 
Signed at Washington July 29, 1982. Enters 
into force on a date to be agreed upon by ex- 
change of notes, following the completion of 
internal procedures of both governments. 

Sudan 

Mutual defense assistance agreement. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Khartoum 
Apr. 8 and 22, 1981. Entered into force 
Apr. 22, 1981. 

Agreement concerning the grant of defense 
articles and services under the military 
assistance program. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Khartoum Aug. 24 and 30, 1981. 
Entered into force Aug. 30, 1981. 

U.S.S.R. 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
Nov. 26, 1976, as amended, concerning 
fisheries off the coast of the U.S. (TIAS 
8528). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Apr. 22 and 29, 1982. 
Entered into force: August 6, 1982. 



91 



CHRONOLOGY 



Yugoslavia 

Agreement relating to the air transport 
agreement of Dec. 15, 1977 (TIAS 9364), and 
the nonscheduled air services agreement of 
Sept. 27, 1973 (TIAS 7819, 9460), with 
memorandum of understandings. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Belgrade Mar. 1 7 and 
May 19, 1982. Entered into force May 19, 
1982; effective April 1, 1982. 

Zaire 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales 
of agricultural commodities of Apr. 3, 1982. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Kinshasa 
June 21 and July 7, 1982. Entered into force 
July 7, 1982. 

Zambia 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales 
of agricultural commodities of June 20, 1982. 
Signed at Lusaka July 16, 1982. Entered into 
force July 16, 1982. 



'Not in force. 
^Subject to acceptance. 
'Not in force for the U.S. 



August 1982 

August 1 

Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi announces 
the quelling of an attempted coup, the first 
attempted military takeover in that country. 
Responding to Israel's military strikes in 
Beirut, the U.N. Security Council unanimous- 
ly adopts Resolution 516 reaffirming and 
recalling its earlier resolutions on Lebanon, 
since the June 6 invasion, and demanding 
that a new cease-fire be put immediately into 
effect. 

August 2 

President Reagan tells Israel's Foreign 
Minister that it is crucial that the violence 
ends in order to stop the bloodshed and pro- 
vide food and medical supplies to the civilian 
population of west Beirut. Israel receives 
renewed assurance from Ambassador Philip 
Habib, the President's special emissary to the 
Middle East, that the PLO has agreed in 
principle to depart Beirut. 

United Kingdom opposes Reagan Ad- 
ministration embargo against providing U.S. 
technology to Soviet Union for use in con- 
structing a natural gas pipeline from Siberia 
to Western Europe. This action follows 
similar moves by France and Italy. 

Soviet Foreign Ministry withdraws 
credentials of U.S. journalist Andrew Nagor- 
ski, a Nevisweek correspondent, causing his 
departure from that country for allegedly 
violating Soviet standards for covering news. 
Nagorsky is accused of "passing himself off 
as a Soviet newspaper editor and a Polish 
tourist" and of traveling to a section of the 
Soviet Union which is off limits to foreigners. 
U.S. responds by expelling a Soviet jour- 
nalist. 



August 3-5 

Meeting in Washington, U.S. and European 
Community (EC) officials reach a preliminary 
agreement that would limit EC exports of 1 1 
steel products into the U.S. market over the 
next 3 years. 

August 4 

In response to an Israeli attack on west 
Beirut, President Reagan calls on Prime 
Minister Begin to scrupulously observe a 
cease-fire in place. 

By a vote of 14 to 0, with 1 abstention 
(U.S.), U.N. Security Council adopts Resolu- 
tion 517 calling for an immediate cease-fire, 
withdrawal of Israeli forces, censure of Israel 
for failing to comply with Resolutions 508, 
509, 512, 513, 515, and 516, and calling for 
the return of Israeli troops to their August 1 
positions. 

August 5 

Senior Lebanese officials report that the PLO 
has submitted a new proposal, which includes 
a timetable for the withdrawal of PLO forces 
from west Beirut. 

August 6 

According to Lebanese officials, the PLO ac- 
cepts all major points regarding the 
withdrawal as negotiated by Ambassador 
Habib. 

U.S. vetoes draft resolution presented by 
the Soviet Union to the U.N. Security Coun- 
cil condemning Israel for "not implementing 
Resolutions 516 (1982) and 517 (1982) and 
calling for suspension of military aid to 
Israel." 

By a vote of 204-202, U.S. House of 
Representatives backs the Administration's 
arms control policy against proponents of an 
immediate nuclear freeze. The resolution calls 
on the U.S. and the Soviet Union to reduce 
their nuclear weapons and conclude "an 
equitable and verifiable agreement which 
freezes strategic nuclear forces at equal and 
substantially reduced levels." The nonbinding 
measure requires no action on the part of the 
President. 

August 7 

Following the Socialist Party's withdrawal of 
support, Italy's coalition government, headed 
by Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini, col- 
lapses. 

August 8 

Ambassador Habib presents a departure plan 
for the PLO from Beirut to Israeli Defense 
Minister Ariel Sharon and returns to Beirut 
to brief Lebanese leaders on the meeting. 

August 9 

U.S. formally presents to Israel a departure 
plan for west Beirut which calls for a 
multinational force to assist in facilitating the 
withdrawal of PLO offices, leaders, and com- 
batants from west Beirut. 

U.S. Embassy in Damascus is attacked by 
a crowd protesting the U.S. position on 
Israel's invasion on Lebanon. 



at 



In Vienna, U.S. and West Germany sigp ,js 
a "memorandum of understanding" to 
establish a mission to study celestial objects 
in space. 

Second U.N. Conference on the Explora 
tion and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(LINISPACE '82) is held in Vienna, Austria, 
August 9-21. James Beggs, Administrator ( 
NASA, heads the U.S. delegation. 

August 12 

The Lebanese Government suspends negotis 
tions after Israeli jets bomb west Beirut for 
11 hours. 

By unanimous vote, U.N. Security Coun 
cil adopts Resolution 518 recalling its earlie: 
resolutions since the June 6 invasion and "e 
pressing its most serious concerns about 
Israel's continued military activities in 
Lebanon and particularly in and around 
Beirut." 

In a formal protest, the EC charges tha- 
President Reagan's ban on pipeline equip- 
ment sales to the Soviet Union is "an unac- 
ceptable interference in European Economi 
Community affairs." Key Western allies an- 
nounce they will defy ban. 



August 13 

Berlin marks 21st anniversary of the Berlir 
Wall. 

Lebanon negotiations resume. PLO 
leaders send Ambassador Habib a list of thi 
guerrillas to leave Beirut and the Arab cou; 
tries willing to accept them. 



92. 



August 15 

Israeli Cabinet announces acceptance of pla 
for the deployment of a multinational 
peacekeeping force in Lebanon. 

August 16 

Ambassador Habib returns to Beirut from 
Israel and briefs Prime Minister Wazzan oi 
the Israeli concessions. 

U.S. and China sign new communique- 
August 16, and issue it August 17 — goverr 
ing both countries' relations with Taiwan. I 
the communique, China pledges to peaceful 
seek reunification with 'Taiwan, and the U.I 
promises to gradually reduce and not to ex 
ceed current levels of arms sales to Taiwan 

Liberian head of state and Commander 
in-Chief, Samuel Kanyon Doe, makes officii 
working visit to Washington, D.C., Au- 
gust 16-19, 1982. 

Salvador Jorge Blanco is sworn in as 
President of the Dominican Republic. U.S. 
delegation representing President Reagan 
his inauguration include Ellsworth Bunker, 
head of the delegation; Robert Anderson, 
U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republ 
Rep. Mickey Edwards of Oklahoma; Am- 
bassador J. William Middendorf, II, Perma 
nent Representative of the U.S. to the 
Organization of American States; Thomas < 
Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Inter-American Affairs; Otto J. Reich, Assi 
ant Administrator of the Agency for Inten 
tional Development; Weston Adams, memb 
U.S. National Committee of UNESCO; 
Edwin W. Thomas, Regional Administrate) 



DsDartment of State Bullel 



ipi 



m 



PRESS RELEASES 



■ i 'III Services Administration; John Ellis 
]-' [iresident, Intr-America Investments, 
. Michael Cardenas, CPA/financial consul- 
'!• , 1-resno, California; William C. Doherty, 
< ::nve director, American Institute for 
■ff Labor, and James P. Regan of Beverly 
ills. California. 

ujjust 18 

;i\ iiiK approved the plan for deploring a 
lultmational peacekeeping force to oversee 
■e withdrawal of guerrillas from west 
..'irut. the Lebanese Government asks the 
j.S., France, and Italy to contribute troops 
I the force. 

igust 19 

raeli Cabinet approves withdrawal plan for 
destinian and Syrian forces in west Beirut. 

iigust 20 

•esident Reagan announces that agreement 
IS been reached to end the west Beirut 
isis and orders a force of 800 U.S. Marines 
• participate in a multinational force to 
militate the evacuation of FLO offices, 
iders, and combatants from west Beirut. 
With the current grain sales agreement 
e to expire September 30, the Soviet Union 
.cepts President Reagan's offer of a 1-year 
■ • tension. 

..Igust 21 

' le first group of about 400 FLO combatants 
' ' gin their departure from Lebanon by ship 
r Cyprus. Elements of the French multina- 
■nal force arrive in Beirut. 

igust 23 

ishir Gemayel is elected President of 
■banon. 

1. igust 25 

ght-hundred combat-equipped U.S. Marines 
' id in Lebanon as part of the multinational 

rce facilitating the implementation of the 
' parture plan. 

: .Igust 26 

"'. 'agan Administration orders trade sanc- 
ns against a major French Government- 
lu'ii company and the French subsidiary of 

_, .Xriierican oil-equipment company for defy- 
r the U.S. embargo against the delivery of 
uipment for the Soviet-Western Europe 
tural gas pipeline. 

igust 30 

isir Arafat, FLO chairman, departs Beirut 
und for Greece. ■ 



Department of State 



Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. D«t» Subject 

•233 8/2 Conventional arms transfers to 
the Third World report 
released. 

234 8/2 Shultz; statement before the 

Committee on Finance on 
the Caribbean Basin. 

235 8/3 U.S., Mexico implement new 

visa agreement for 
businessmen. 

•236 8/3 Shipping Coordinating Com- 
mittee (SCC), Subcommittee 
on Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS), working group on 
the carriage of dangerous 
goods, Aug. 17. 

•237 8/3 U.S. Organization for the In- 
ternational Telegraph and 
Telephone Consultative Com- 
mittee (CCITT), message 
handling systems working 
party, Aug. 24. 

•238 8/3 CCITT, integrated services 
digital network, Aug. 26. 

•239 8/3 CCITT, study group D, 
Aug. 25. 

•240 8/3 SCC, SOLAS, Sept. 8 

•241 8/3 SCC, SOLAS, panel on bulk 
cargoes, Sept. 15. 

•242 8/5 U.S., Sri Lanka amend tex- 
tile agreement, Apr. 20 and 
29. 

•243 8/6 CCITT, study group A, 
Aug. 24. 

•244 8/6 CCITT, modem working party, 
study group D, Aug. 24. 

•245 8/6 Advisory Committee on Inter- 
national Investment, 
Technology, and Develop- 
ment, Sept. 14. 

•246 8/12 U.S., Haiti sign textile agree- 
ment, Mar. 25 and Apr. 1. 
247 8/13 Foreign Relations of the 

United States, 1952-1954, 
Volume XIII: Indochina 
released (in two parts), 
Aug. 21. 

•248 8/13 Program for the official work- 
ing visit of Commander in 
Chief Samuel Kanyon Doe of 
Liberia, Aug. 16-21. 

•249 7/29 George S. Vest sworn in as 
Ambassador to the Euro- 
pean Communities, Oct. 30, 
1981 (bio. data). 

•250 8/16 SCC, SOLAS, Sept. 8. 

•251 8/16 CCITT and U.S. Organization 
for the International Radio 
Consultative Committee 
(CCIR), Sept. 8. 



•252 8/17 James Daniel Theberge sworn 
in as Ambassador to Chile, 
Mar. 4 (bio. data). 

•253 8/17 Arthur H. Davis, Jr., sworn 
in as Ambassador to 
Paraguay, July 28 (bio. 
data). 

•254 8/17 Robert Werner Duemling 

sworn in as Ambassador to 
Suriname, July 29 (bio. 
data). 

•255 8/17 George W. Landau sworn in 
as Ambassador to 
Venezuela, July 30 (bio. 
data). 

•256 8/18 U.S., Sri Lanka amend textile 
visa system, July 14 and 20. 
257 8/20 Shultz: news conference. 

•258 8/20 John Hughes sworn in as 
Assistant Secretary for 
Public Affairs and Depart- 
ment spokesman (bio. data). 

•259 8/23 Robert H. Phinny sworn in as 
Ambassador to Swaziland 
(bio. data). 
260 8/24 Shultz: interview on "Meet 
the Press," Aug. 22. 

•261 8/26 U.S., Canada extend tele- 
communications arrange- 
ment to transborder fixed 
satellite services. 

•262 8/26 Regional Foreign PoHcy Con- 
ference, Los Angeles, 
Sept. 10. 

•263 8/26 U.S., Palau sign new compact 
of free association. 

•264 8/28 SCC, SOLAS, Sept. 23. 

•265 8/28 SCC, SOLAS, working group 
on radiocommunications, 
Sept. 15. 
•266 8/28 SCC, SOLAS, working group 
on stab'lity, load lines, and 
safety of fishing vessels, 
Sept. 14. 
•267 8/27 SCC, SOLAS, working group 
on safety of navigation, 
Sept. 27. 
•268 8/30 Program for the official 

working visit of President 
Vigids Finnbogadottir of 
Iceland, Sept. 7-10. 

•Not printed in the Bulletin. ■ 



itober 1982 



93 



PUBLICATIONS 



Foreign Relations 
Volume Released 



The Department of State released on 
August 21, 1982, Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1952-1954, Vol. XIII. 
Indochina (in two parts). This is the 
third volume to be released of 16 record- 
ing the years 1952-54. The Foreign 
Relations series has been published con- 
tinuously since 1861 as the official 
record of American foreign policy. 

The volume presents 2,497 pages of 
documentation, most of it previously un- 
published and newly declassified, on 
U.S. policy in Indochina during the 
period. Arrangement of the material is 
chronological. Part 1 covers the period 
from January 1952 to April 1954; Part 2 
carries the story to the end of 1954. The 
documentation is accompanied by 
scholarly aides, including a complete list 
of sources. The index to both parts is in 
Part 2. 

Developments covered in Part 1 in- 
clude U.S. military assistance to French 
Union forces; U.S. military, economic, 
and diplomatic support rendered to the 
Associated States of Indochina in the 
face of the Viet Minh insurgency in Viet- 
nam; and the Viet Minh invasion of Laos 
in 1953. Part 2 contains extensive 
materials on the question of U.S. in- 
tervention in the seige of Dienbienphu; 
the search for concerted allied action in 
the spring and summer of 1954 (the 
Geneva conference period); the increased 
U.S. role in the state of Vietnam follow- 
ing the Geneva accords; and the begin- 
nings of American aid programs in all 
three of the Indochinese nations. 

The documents in this volume are 
closely related to those included in 
Volume XVI, the Geneva conference, 
published in 1981, and in Volume XII, 
Part 1, East Asia and the Pacific, 
scheduled for subsequent publication. 
The events recorded in this volume were 
documented in brief in the Department 
of Defense study United States-Vietnam 
Relations 19J,5-1967 (Pentagon Papers), 
Book 1. The comprehensive diplomatic 
record published represents the 
authoritative record of the developments 
of 1952-54. 

Foreign Relations, 1952-54, Volume 
XIII, was prepared in the Office of the 
Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
Department of State. Copies of Volume 
XIII (Department of State publication 



94 



9211) may be obtained for $35.00 
(domestic postpaid). Checks or money 
orders should be sent to the U.S. 
Government Book Store, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 



Press release 247 of Aug, 13, 1982. 



Department of State 



Free, single copies of the following Depart- 
ment of State publications are available from 
the Public Information Service, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

President Reagan 

A New Opportunity for Peace in the Middle 
East, Burbank, Sept. 1, 1982 (Current 
Policy #417). 

Secretary Shultz 

U.S. Approach to Problems in the Caribbean 
Basin, Senate Committee on Finance, 
Aug. 2, 1982 (Current Policy #412). 

Africa 

Background Notes on South Africa (July 
1982). 

Canada 

U.S.-Canada Relations (GIST, Aug. 1982). 

East Asia 

U.S. -China Joint Communique, Assistant 
Secretary Holdridge, House Foreign Af- 
fairs Committee, Aug. 18, 1982 (Current 
Policy #413). 

Europe 

Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act: 
Twelfth Semiannual Report, President's 
report to the Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, Aug. 1982 (Special 
Report #100). 

General 

U.S. National Security, Atlas of U.S. Foreign 
Relations, May 1982 {Bulletin Reprint). 

Human Rights 

Human Rights Conditions in K\ Salvador, 
Assi.stant Secretary Abrams, House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, July 29, 1982 
(Current Policy #411), 

Middle East 

Lebanon: Plan for the PLO Evacuation from 
West Beirut, President's statement, 
Secretary's news conference (excerpts, fact 
sheet on arrangements, texts of departure 
plan, exchange of notes between the United 
States and Lebanon, and President's letters 
to the II.N. Secretary General and the U.S. 
Congress, Aug. 1982 (Current Policy #41.')). 



Narcotics 

Drug Problem: Americans Arrested Abroad 
(GIST, Aug. 1982). International Narcotics 
Control (GIST, Sept, 1982). 

Refugees 

Afghan Refugees in Pakistan (GIST, Sept. 
1982), 

Western Hemisphere 

Certification of Progress in El Salvador, 
Assistant Secretary Enders, House Foreig, 
Affairs Committee, July 29, 1982 (Curren 
Policy #410.) 

Building the Peace in Central America, 
Assistant Secretary Enders, Com- 
monwealth Club, San Francisco, Aug, 20, Jsj 
1982 (Current Policy #414), 

South Atlantic Crisis: Background, Con- 
sequences, Documentation, Apr. 27-Aug. 
1982 (Selected Documents #21). 

Background Notes on Paraguay (July 
1982). ■ 



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Department of State Bulle 



NDEX 



'October 1982 
'V)lume 82, No. 2067 



^entina. The South Atlantic Crisis: Back- 
ground, Consequences, Documentation 
(Enders, proposals, notes, letters, an- 
nexes) 78 

ms Control. U.S. Dialogue With ASEAN 

and ANZUS (Holdridge) 29 

la 

i. Consultations With ASEAN (Stoessel) 27 

'. Dialogue With ASEAN and ANZUS 

(Holdridge) 29 

Economic Relations With ASEAN 

' (Albrecht) 32 

istralia. U.S. Dialogue With ASEAN and 
ANZUS (Holdridge) 29 

3izil. U.S. Relations With Brazil (Enderst 73 

ImtToon. Visit of Cameroon Presicient 

Ahidjo (Ahidjo, Reagan) 14 

ina 

5. -China Joint Communique (Holdridge, 

Reagan, text of communique) 19 

5.-Chma Relations, 1981 22 

mmodities 

Dnomic Regulation and International Juris- 
dictional Conflict (Robinson) 35 

5. -Soviet Grain Sales Agreement (Reagan, 

fact sheet) 40 

ngress 

^mical Weapons: Arms Control and Deter- 
rence (Howe) 46 

nada (Bosworth) 75 

f! of the Sea and Oceans Policy (Malone) . 48 

idle East Peace Initiative (Shultz) 5 

)duction of the MX Missile (Reagan, letter 

to the Speaker of the House) 47 

e of the U.S. Ambassador (Kennedy) ... 15 
?. -China Joint Communique (Holdridge, 
Reagan, text of communique) 19 

5. Dialogue With ASEAN and ANZUS 
(Holdridge) 29 

i. Economic Relations With ASEAN 
(Albrecht) 32 

5. Relations With Brazil (Enders) 73 

sta Rica. Visit of Costa Rican President 
Monge (Monge, Reagan) 69 

Iba. Secretary Interviewed on "Face the 
Nation" . . ," 10 

ipartment and Foreign Service. Role of the 
U.S. Ambassador (Kennedy) 15 

veloping Countries 

nventional Arms Transfers in the Third 
World, 1972-81 (Buckley) 50 

ide in the 1980s (Lamb) 38 

onomics 

onomic Regulation and International Juris- 
dictional Conflict (Robinson) 35 

retary Interviewed on "Meet the Press" . 7 

ide in'the 1980s (Lamb) 38 

3. Consultations With ASEAN (Stoessel) 27 

5. Dialogue With ASEAN and ANZUS 

(Holdridge) 29 

. Economic Relations With ASEAN 
(Albrecht) 32 

enada. Grenada (Bosworth) 75 

induras. Visit of Honduran President Suazo 
(Reagan, Suazo) 71 

dustralized Democracies. Trade in the 
Ut)SUs(Lamb) 38 

formation Policy. Soviet Active Measures: 
An Update . . .'. 42 

ternational Law. Economic Regulation and 
International Jurisdictional Conflict 
(Robinson) 35 



Jordan. Secretary's Letter to Jordan's 

King 45 

Kampuchea. II. S. Dialogue With ASEAN and 

ANZUS (Holdridge) 29 

Latin America and the Caribbean. Building 

Peace in Central America (Enders) ... .66 

Law of the Sea. Law of the Sea and Oceans 

Policv (Malone) 48 

Middle fiast 

Middle East Peace Initiative (Shultz) 5 

The Quest for Peace (Shultz) 1 

Secretary Interviewed on "Face the 

Nation" 10 

Secretary Interviewed on "Meet the Press . 7 
MilitaryAffairs 

Chemical Weapons: Arms Control and Deter- 
rence (Howe) 46 

Production of the MX Missile (Reagan, letter 

to the Speaker of the House) 47 

New Zealand. U.S. Dialogue With ASEAN 

and ANZUS (Holdridge) 29 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Chem- 
ical Weapons: Arms Control and Deter- 
rence (Howe) 46 

Oceans. Law of the Sea and Oceans Policy 

(Malone) 48 

Presidential Documents 

Production of the MX Missile (Reagan, letter 

to the Speaker of the House) 47 

U.S. -China Joint Communique (Holdridge, 

Reagan, text of communique) 19 

Visit of Cameroon President Ahidjo (Ahidjo, 

Reagan) 14 

Visit of Costa Rican President Monge (Monge, 

Reagan) 69 

Visit of Honduran President Suazo (Reagan, 

Suazo) 71 

Publications 

Department of State 94 

Foreign Relations Volume Released 94 

Refugees 

U.S. Consultations With ASEAN (Stoessel) 27 

U.S. Dialogue With ASEAN and ANZUS 

(Holdridge) 29 

Security Assistance. Conventional Arms 
Transfers in the Third World, 1972-81 

(Buckley) 50 

Trade 

Economic Regulation and International Juris- 
dictional Conflict (Robinson) 35 

Trade in the 1980s (Lamb) 38 

Visit of Cameroon President Ahidjo (Ahidjo, 

Reagan) 14 

Treaties. Current Actions 90 

U.S.S.R. 

Chemical Weapons: Arms Control and Deter- 
rence (Howe) 46 

Secretary Interviewed on "Face the 

Nation" 10 

Secretary Interviewed on "Meet the Press" . 7 

Soviet Active Measures: An Update 42 

U.S. Consultations With ASEAN (Stoessel) 27 
U.S. Dialogue With ASEAN and ANZUS 

(Holdridge) 29 

U.S. -Soviet Grain Sales Agreement (Reagan, 
fact sheet) 40 



United Kingdom. The South Atlantic Crisis: 
Background, Consequences, Documenta- 
tion (Enders, proposals, notes, letters, an- 
nexes) 78 

United Nations.' U.S.' 'Oiaiogue With' ASEAN 
and ANZUS (Holdridge) 29 

Vietnam. U.S. Dialogue With ASEAN and 
ANZUS (Holdridge) 29 

Name Index 

Ahidjo, Ahmadou 14 

Albrecht, Anthony C 32 

Bosworth, Stephen W 75 

Buckley, James L 50 

Costa Mendez, Nicanor 78 

Enders, Thomas 66, 73, 78 

Holdridge, John H 19, 29 

Howe, Jonathan T 46 

Kennedy, Richard T 38 

Lamb, Denis 38 

Malone, James L 48 

Middendorf, J. William 78 

Monge, Luis Alberto 69 

Reagan, President 14, 19, 40, 47, 69, 71 

Robmson, Davis R 35 

Shultz, Secretary 1, 5, 7, 10, 45 

Stoessel, Walter J. Jr 27 

Suazo Cordova, Roberto 71 



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U.N. General Assembly / 1 

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MBvparimvni of Sinte 

bulletin 



Volume 82 / Number 2068 / November 1982 



The DEPAFiTMENTOF StATE BULLETIN, 

published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
forei^ policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
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or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

JOHN HUGHES 

As.si.slant Secretary for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public ( 'onimunicatiDn 

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Editor 

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nei 



CONTENTS 




FEATURE 



U.N. General Assembly: 

1 U.S. Foreign Policy: Realism and 

Progress (Secretary Shultz) 
8 United Nations Day, 1982 (Procla- 
mation) 



^m^^ 



OB; 81982 



DEPOSfTORY 



1ie President 

1 News Conference of September 28 
(Excerpts) 

/^rica 

1 Africa: Economic Prospects and 
Problems (Chester A. Crocker) 

1 Visit of Liberian Commander in 
Chief Doe 

/ms Control 

1 Nuclear Arms Control and the 

Future of U.S. -Soviet Relations 
(Eugene V. Rostow) 

2 Arms Control Negotiations 

(President Reagan) 

East Asia 

2 Visit of Philippine President 

Marcos (Ferdinand E. Marcos, 

< President Reagan, Arrival- 

Ceremony, Dinner Toasts. 
Department Announ-cement) 
2 Philippines— A Profile 
2 U.S., Philippines Conclude Tax- 
ation and Air Agreements 

2 Situation in East Timor (John H. 

Holdridge) 

3 Kampuchea and American In- 
terests (John H. Holdridge) 

Secretary Meets With Thai 
Foreign Minister (Department 
Statement) 

hergy 

U.S. Energy Strategies (E. Allan 
Wendt) 



Europe 

38 Visit of Iceland's President 

Finnbogadottir (Vigdis Finn- 
bogadottir. President Reagan) 

40 NATO Ministers Meet in Canada 

40 10th Report on Cyprus (Message 

to the Congress) 

41 Forced Labor in the U.S.S.R. 

(Department Statement) 

41 Poland (White House and Depart- 

ment Statements) 

l\/liddle East 

42 Secretary Shultz Interviewed on 

the "Today" Show 

43 Assistant Secretary Veliotes 

Interviewed on "Meet the Press" 
46 Situation in Lebanon (Fouad 

Boutros, Robert S. Dillon, Elias 
Freij, Philip C. Habib, Presi- 
dent Reagan, White House and 
Department Statements, Ex- 
changes of Letters) 

Narcotics 

51 International Narcotics Control 

(Secretary Shultz) 

Science and Technology 

52 Technology Transfer Controls 

(Gerhard Mally) 



54 U.S. and France Review Scien- 

tific Cooperation 

United Nations 

55 U.N. Adopts Resolutions on 

Lebanon Situation (Texts of 
Resolutions) 

56 Namibia (Contact Group Com- 

munique) 

Western Hemisphere 

57 Areas of Challenge in the 

Americas (Thomas 0. Enders) 
60 Recent Developments in Honduras 
(Stephen W. Bosworth) 

63 Situation in Guatemala (Stephen 

W. Bosworth) 

64 Guatemala— A Profile 

Treaties 

65 Current Actions 

Chronology 

68 September 1982 

Press Releases 

70 Department of State 

Publications 

70 Department of State 

Index 



"... When we see aggression, we will call it aggression. When we 
see subversion, we will call it subversion. When we see repression, we 
will call it repression. " 




Addressing the U.N. General Assembly. Seeretarv Shultz emphasizes the necessitv fr 

realism, persistence, and steadfastness of purpose in dealing with the woHrf-s Dlohle 

ti?:ZT r'^" ""'i"' ^""""^ '"""' '' '»^«' "P"" four fundamentaMde'as' ?eali m 

negolfau o„Z:LruesTd°th 'hV"^.'!.'" ''""''' '"■"^"'' '"'"' a^ree^ents and 
negouaie on Key issues, and the belief that progress is possible. 




FEATURE 

U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY 



U.S. Foreign Policy: 
Realism and Progress 

by Secretary Shuitz 



Address before the 37th session 

of the U.N. General Assembly 

in New York on September 30, 1982^ 



I begin by paying tribute to our new 
Secretary General, who has brought 
great distinction to the office during his 
brief tenure. Dag Hammarskjold once 
told the General Assembly that "inde- 
pendence, impartiality, objectivity— they 
all describe essential aspects of what, 
without exception, must be in the atti- 
tude of the Secretary General." Javier 
Perez de Cuellar, a man of the Third 
World and, I am proud to note, of the 
New World as well, has already demon- 
strated his strict adherence to this most 
exacting standard. In so doing, he has 
earned the esteem of my government 
and the gratitude of all who believe in 
the purposes of the charter. 

I congratulate, as well, Mr. Hollai 
[Imre Hollai, Deputy Foreign Minister] 
of Hungary upon his election as Presi- 
dent of the 37th Session of the General 
Assembly. 

As I stand before you today, I can- 
not help but reflect on my relation to 
this city and to this hall. I was born 
about 4 miles from here. 1 was reared 
and educated not tar away, just across 
the Hudson River. And I took a tour 
through this building just after it opened 
in 1952 marveling at the reality of a 
temple erected in the hope, at least, of 
abolishing war. 

When I took that tour back in the 
early fifties, there was great public in- 
terest in what was called "the Medita- 
tion Room." I understand the room is 



still here. But in the years since then, 
this institution has become more famous 
for talk than for meditation. This hall 
has heard great ideas eloquently ex- 
pressed. It has also heard doubletalk, 
platitudes, and ringing protestations of 
innocence — all too often aimed at 
camouflaging outrageous and inhuman 
acts. 

But we must not ridicule words. I 
believe that the greatest advance in 
human history was not the wheel, the 
use of electricity, or the internal com- 
bustion engine. Indispensable to prog- 
ress as these have been, our most re- 
markable achievement was the slow, 
clumsy but triumphant creation of 
language. It is words that released our 
ancestors from the prison of the soli- 
tary. Words gave us the means to trans- 
mit to our children and the future the 
crowning jewel of human existence: 
knowledge. The code of Hammurabi, the 
Bible, the analects of Confucius, the 
teachings of the Buddha, the Koran, the 
insights of Shakespeare, the creed of 
Mahatma Gandhi or Martin Luther 
King— all these are arrangements of 
words. 

Is it not profoundly revealing that 
the first victims of tyrants are— words? 
No people better know the meaning of 
freedom than those who have been ar- 
rested, beaten, imprisoned, or exiled be- 
cause of what they said. A single man 



'Sinbei 



speaking out— a Lech Walesa for ex- 
ample—is more dangerous than an ar- 
mored division. 

All of us here— whether we arrived 
after a short 1-hour flight, as I did, or 
came from the other side of the globe, 
as many of you did — enter this audi- 
torium for one main purpose: to talk 
about what our governments see as the 
problems ahead and how they should be 
solved. On one point, at least, we can all 
agree: The problems are many and diffi- 
cult. I shall not try, in the minutes allot- 
ted me, to deal with each— or even 
most— of those issues in detail. Instead, 
I want to give you some sense of the 
principles and general approach the 
United States will take toward our com- 
mon problems. 

Americans are, by history and by in- 
clination, a practical and pragmatic 
people — yet a people with a vision. It is 
the vision — usually simple and some- 
times naive — that has so often led us to 
dare and to achieve. President Reagan's 
approach to foreign policy is grounded 
squarely on standards drawn from the 
pragmatic American experience. As De 
Tocqueville pointed out, "To achieve its 
objective, America relies on personal in- 
terest, and gives full reign to the 
strength and reason of the individual." 
That is as true now as when it was said 
150 years ago. Our principal instrument, 
now as then, is freedom. Our adver- 
saries are the oppressors, the totali- 
tarians, the tacticians of fear and 
pressure. 

On this foundation. President 
Reagan's ideas and the structure of his 
foreign policy are so straightforward 
that those of us enmeshed in day-to-day 
details may easily lose sight of them. 
The President never does; he consistent- 
ly brings us back to fundamentals. To- 
day, I will talk about those funda- 
mentals. They consist of four ideas that 
guide our actions. 

• We will start from realism. 

• We will act from strength, both in 
power and purpose. 

• We will stress the indispensable 
need to generate consent, build agree- 
ments, and negotiate on key issues. 

• We will conduct ourselves in the 
belief that progress is possible, even 
though the road to achievement is long 
and hard. 



Reality 

If we are to change the world we must 
first understand it. We must face 
reality — with all its anguish and all its 
opportunities. Our era needs those who, 
as Pericles said, have the clearest vision 
of what is before them, glory and 
danger alike, and, notwithstanding, go 
out to meet it. 

Reality is not an illusion nor a 
sleight of hand, though many would 
have us believe otherwise. The enor- 
mous, grinding machinery of Soviet 



. . . realism shows 
us a world deeply 
troubled, yet with 
reason for hope. There is 
one necessary condition: 
The only way we can 
enhance and amplify the 
human potential is by 
preserving, defending, 
and extending those 
most precious of condi- 
tions — freedom and 
peace. 



propaganda daily seeks to distort reali- 
ty, to bend truth for its own purposes. 
Our world is occupied by far too many 
governments which seek to conceal truth 
from their own people. They wish to im- 
prison reality by controlling what can be 
read or spoken or heard. They would 
have us believe that black is white and 
up is down. 

Much of present-day reality is un- 
pleasant. To describe conditions as we 
see them, as I do today and as President 
Reagan has over the course of his presi- 
dency, is not to seek confrontation. Far 
from it. Our purpose is to avoid mis- 
understanding and to create the 
necessary preconditions for change. And 
so, when we see aggression, we will call 
it aggression. When we see subversion, 



« 



:lv 



we will call it subversion. When we see 
repression, we will call it repression. 

• Events in Poland, for example, 
cannot be ignored or explained away. 
The Polish people want to be their own 
master. Years of systematic tyranny 
could not repress this desire, and neith' 
will martial law. But in Poland today, 
truth must hide in corners. 

• Nor can we simply turn our heac 
and look the other way as Soviet divi- 
sions brutalize an entire population in 
Afghanistan. The resistance of the 
Afghan people is a valiant saga of our 
times. We demean that valor if we do 
not recognize its source. 

• And Soviet surrogates intervene 
in many countries, creating a new era 
colonialism at the moment in history 
when peoples around the globe had 
lifted that burden from their backs. 

• Nor will we shy away from speai ''! 
ing of other problems affecting the fre- "f 
and developing worlds. Much of the de 
veloping world is threatened by a crisi 

(if confidence in financial institutions ai 
the stultifying effects of state-controllM ,g 
economies. The naturally vibrant econ 
mies of many Western nations and tra 
between the world's major trading par 
ners are threatened by recession and i 
ing protectionism. The great alliances 
that shore up world stability and 
growth — our hemispheric partnership 
and NATO, and the Western and 
Japanese industrial democracies — are 
challenged by new as well as chronic 
strains. 

• Finally, the shadow of war still 
darkens the future of us all. There is r 
ultimate safety in a nuclear balance of 
terror constantly contested. There is r 
peace of mind at a time when increasii 
numbers of nations appear willing to 
launch their armies into battles for 
causes which seem local but have 
ramifications for regional and even 
global harmony. 

The list of troubles is long; the 
danger of despair great. But there is 
another side to the present reality; it i 
a reality of hope. We are living in a fa 
tastic time of opportunity. 

Historians in the future will surelj 
marvel over the accomplishments 
achieved by human beings in the last 
half of this century. We have expande 



Department of State Bulla 



m 




y^ FEATURE 

^ U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY 



frontiers of thought — in science, 
)gy, and engineering; in painting, 
ic, and mathematics; in technology 
architecture — far beyond the point 
jne could have dared predict, much 
hoped for. We know much today 
it the oceans and forests and the 
ogical strata that lock in the story of 
past. We know more about a baby — 
he brain— than was accumulated in 
nillenia before our time. We are 
ning to produce food for all of us; we 
no longer helpless before the threat 
isease; we explore our universe as a 
ter of course. We are confronting 
nature of nature itself. The oppor- 
ties are grand. This, too, is a clear 
ity. 

Thus, realism shows us a world 
i)ly troubled, yet with reason for 
;. There is one necessary condition: 
only way we can enhance and 
lify the human potential is by pre- 
ring, defending, and extending those 
It precious of conditions — freedom 
peace. 

sngth 

9rica's yearning for peace does not 
us to lie hesitant in developing our 
ngth or in using it when necessary. 
ed, clarity about the magnitude of 
T problems we face leads inevitably to 
; alistic appreciation of the import- 
n> (if American strength. The strength 
If free world imposes restraint, in- 
■ accommodation, and reassures 
1 (_' wlio would share in the creative 
ik that is the wonderful consequence 
flicrty, 

Sirt-ngth means military forces to in- ^ 
J; that no other nation can threaten | 
jur interests, or our friends. But ^ 
n I speak of strength, I do not mean | 
tary power alone. To Americans, i 

ngth derives as well from a solid -S" 

lomic base and social vitality at J 

le and with our partners. And, most - 
iamentally, the true wellspring of 
ngth lies in America's moral commit- 
it. 

The bulwark of America's strength 
lilitary power for peace. The 

erican people have never accepted 
kness, nor hesitancy, nor abdication, 
will not put our destiny into the 



rem be r 1982 



hands of the ruthless. Americans today 
are emphatically united on the necessity 
of a strong defense. This year's defense 
budget will insure that the United States 
will help its friends and allies defend 
themselves — to make sure that peace is 
seen clearly by all to be the only feasible 
course in world affairs. 



Along with military readiness and 
capability must come the willingness to 
employ it in the cause of peace, justice, 
and security. Today in Beirut the U.S. 
Marines — together with our allies Italy 
and France — are helping the Lebanese 
Government and Armed Forces assure 
the safety of the peoples of that 




Secretary Shultz with Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N. 
and U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar. 



Secretary's Bilateral 
Meetings 

Secretary Shultz was in New York 
September 26-October 1 and Octo- 
ber 3-7, 1982, for the opening of the 
37th session of the U.N. General 
Assembly. While there he held bilateral 
meetings with foreign leaders from 
around the world, some of whom are il- 
lustrated here. 




September 27. 1982. Foreign 
Minister Ramlro Saraiva Guerreiro 
(Brwil) 



(Photos by Kriitin Hodooi 



P»). Commissioner of Foreign Affairs 
FWion Idriss Miskine (Chad). 
I ™ Hre.gn Affairs Said Madi Kafe 
£'■ l^ommissioner of Sute for Foreien 
fUcos Mba Ondo (Equatorial 
■»cretar, t„r Foreign Affairs Obed 

»"a). Minister of Foreign Affairs 
, H« n ?''?'• "'"'ster of Foreign Af- 
n . K « 1982 The Secretao' „ L?."''' ""'"P" (L-^^otho), Minister 
October G 'SSf- TJ^^ ^ („„ H> "'„*«"'« He„r, Boimah FahnbuUeh 

S'zi:ter„rE':Uau«;jj--^^^^^^^^ 



Alberto Chissano (Mozambique), Minister of 
Education and Culture Joaquim Rafael Branc 
(Sao Tome and Principe), Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Abdulai Conteh (Sierra Leone), 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Ja 
durahman (Somalia), Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs Muhammad Mirghani Mubarak (Sudan). 

• of Foreign Affairs Salim A. Salim 
(Tanzania). Minister of State for Foreign Af- 
fairs Albert W. Picho-Owiny (Uganda). 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Lameck K. H. 
Goma (Zambia), and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Witness Mangwende (Zimbabwe). 



September 29, 1982. (Left to 
right) Foreign Minister Suppiah 
I Dhanabalan (Singapore), Foreign 
I Minister Muhammad Ghazali bin 
f Shafie (Malaysia). Deputy Prime 
Minister for Foreign Affairs Sin- 
nathamby Rajaratnam (Singa* 
pore), Secretary Shultz, Foreign 
Minister Carlos P. Romulo 
(Philippines). Foreign Minister 
Sawetsila Siddhi (Thailand), 
Foreign Minister Kusumaatmaja 
Mochtar (Indonesia) 



We are seldom con- 
fronted with simple 
issues of right and 
wrong, between good 
and evil. Only those who 
do not bear the direct 
burden of responsibility 
for decision and action 
can indulge themselves 
in the denial of that 
reality. 



tormented capital. Our Marines repre- 
sent an extension of American power, 
not for war but to secure the peace. 
They are there to speed the moment 
when all foreign forces depart from 
Lebanon. There must be early agree- 
ment on a timetable for the full appli- 
cation of Lebanon's independence, 
sovereignty, and territorial integrity. 
Lebanon deserves the world's help — to 
secure peace and to rebuild a thriving 
society. 

America will continue to use its 
strength with prudence, firmness, and 
balance. We intend to command the re- 
spect of adversaries and to deserve the 
confidence of allies and partners. 

The engine of America's strength 
is a sound economy. In a time of reces- 
sion, industrialized and less developed 
nations alike are bedeviled by excessive 
inflation, restricted markets, unused 
capacity, stagnating trade, growing 
pressure for protectionism, and the most 
potent enemy of expansion— pervasive 
uncertainty. 

The United States, with its vast 
human and scientific resources, can sur- 
vive an era of economic strife and decay. 
But our moral commitment and our self- 
interest require us to use our technologi- 
cal and productive abilities to build last- 
ing prosperity at home and to contribute 
to a sound economic situation abroad. 



President Reagan has instituted a 
bold program to get the American 
economy moving. Our rate of inflation is 
down markedly, and we will keep it 
down. This will add stability to the value 
of the dollar and give greater confidence 
to international financial markets. 

The recent drop in U.S. interest 
rates will stimulate new investments 
within and beyond our shores. Conserva- 
tion through market pricing of energy 
has reduced U.S. demand for world 
energy supplies. We are putting the 
recession behind us. A growing and 
open American economy will provide 
new markets for goods and services pro- 
duced elsewhere and new opportunities 
for foreign investment. Just as we have 
a stake in worldwide recovery, others 
will prosper as our recovery develops. 

For wider prosperity to take hold, 
we must cooperatively attend these in- 
ternational issues. 

• The lure of protectionist trade 
policies must be resisted— whether in the 
form of overt import restrictions and ex- 
port subsidies or by more subtle domes- 
tic programs. These can only distort 
world trade and impair growth every- 
where. Let us determine to make the 
November ministerial meeting of the 
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade] a time to stem these protec- 
tionist pressures and reinvigorate posi- 
tive efforts for a more open trading 
system. 

• The implications of the external 
debt of many nations must be under- 
stood. Immediate debt problems are 
manageable if we use good sense and 
avoid destabilizing actions. But the 
magnitude of external debt will almost 
inevitably reduce resources available for 
future lending for development pur- 
poses. Economic adjustment is im- 
perative. The International Monetary 
Fund can provide critical help and guid- 
ance in any country's efforts to smooth 
the adjustment process. The new 
borrowing arrangement proposed by the 
United States can be crucial to this ef- 
fort. 

• And the necessity of reducing 
government interference in the market 
must be recognized. Every nation has 



the right to organize society as its in- lia 
habitants wish, but economic facts can-fiBi 
not be ignored. Those facts clearly 
demonstrate that the world's commanc 
economies have failed abysmally to me' W 
the needs of their peoples. The newly 
prosperous industrialized nations are 
those with the most free and open 
markets. 

The bedrock of our strength is oi 
moral and spiritual character. The 

sources of true strength lie deeper tha 
economic or military power— in the de< 
cation of a free people which knows its 
responsibility. America's institutions aj 
those of freedom accessible to every p* 
son and of government as the account- 
able servant of the people. Equal oppo 
tunity; due process of law; open trial b 
jury; freedom of belief, speech, and 
assembly— our Bill of Rights, our 
guarantees of liberty and limited goveii J' 
ment— were hammered out in centurie- 
of ordeal. Because we care about thes« 
human values for ourselves, so must w 
then be concerned, and legitimately so ^ 



tcii 



le! 



U.S. Delegation 

to the 37th 

U.N. General Assembly 



Representatives 

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick 
Kenneth L. Adelman 
J. Bennett Johnston, U.S. Senator fro 

the State of Louisiana 
Robert W. Kasten, Jr., U.S. Senator 

from the State of Wisconsin 
John D. Lodge 

Alternate Representatives 

Gordon C. Luce 
Hernan Padilla 
Jose S. Sorzano 
Charles M. Lichenstein 
William C. Sherman 



USUN press release 69 of Sept. 24, 1982. 



Department of State Bullel 



5a 




FEATURE 

U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY 



,h abuses of freedom, justice, and 
nanitarian principles Seyond our 
•ders. This is why we will speak and 

for prisoners of conscience, against 
rorism, and against the brutal silenc- 

of the Soviet Helsinki Watch Com- 
ttee. This is why we are anxious to 
rticipate in periodic reviews of the 
nan rights performance of ourselves 
well as others. We welcome scrutiny 
our own system. We are not perfect, 
i we know it, but we have nothing to 

Our belief in liberty guides our 
icies here in the United Nations as 

fjwhere. Therefore, in this forum the 
ited States will continue to insist 
jjn fairness, balance, and truth. We 
a;e the debate on human rights serious- 
Ij We insist upon honesty in the use of 
It guage; we will point out inconsist- 
i 'ies, double standards, and lies. We 
' 1 not compromise our commitment to 
.,lh. 

Badiness To Solve Problems 

I e world has work to do for the 
Tilists, the pragmatists, and the free. 
V th a clear understanding of the 
t ubled circumstances of the hour and 
w;h a strengthened ability to act, we 
|ti;d, as well, the vision to see beyond 
\'. immediate present. 

All of us here represent nations 
» ich must understand and accept the 
iiperative of fair engagement on the 
isues before us and, beyond that, of 
c nmon effort toward shared goals. 
\:ether we are seeking to bring peace 
I regional conflict or a resolution of 
enmercial differences, the time of im- 
|3ed solutions has passed. Conquest, 
2ssure, acquiescence under duress 
re common in decades not long past, 
t not today. Not everybody who wants 
concerns addressed will find us auto- 
itically receptive. But when negotia- 
ns are in order, America is prepared 
go to work on the global agenda and 
do so in a way that all may emerge 
tter off and more secure than before. 
We manage our problems more in- 
ligently, and with greater mutual 
derstanding, when we can bring our- 
ives to recognize them as expressions 
mankind's basic dilemma. We are 



)vember 1982 




Imre Hollai, Deputy Foreign Minister of Hungary and President of the 37th Regular Ses- 
sion of the U.N. General Assembly with Secretary Shultz. 



seldom confronted with simple issues of 
right and wrong, between good and evil. 
Only those who do not bear the direct 
burden of responsibility for decision and 
action can indulge themselves in the 
denial of that reality. The task of states- 
manship is to mediate between two— or 
several— causes, each of which often has 
a legitimate claim. 

It is on this foundation that the 
United States stands ready to try to 



solve the problems of our time— to over- 
come chaos, deprivation, and the height- 
ened dangers of an era in which ideas 
and cultures too often tend to clash and 
technologies threaten to outpace our in- 
stitutions of control. 

We are engaged in negotiations and 
efforts to find answers to issues affect- 
ing every part of the globe and every 
aspect of our lives upon it. 

The Middle East. The agony of the 
Middle East now exceeds the ability of 



news bulletins or speeches to express; it 
is a searing wound on our consciousness. 
The region is in constant ferment. 
Unrest flares into violence, terror, insur- 
rection, and civil strife. War follows 
war. It is clear to everyone in this hall 
that international peace, security, and 
cooperative progress cannot be truly 
achieved until this terrible regional con- 
flict is settled. 

All of us have witnessed in the past 
several months a graphic reminder of 
the need for practical peace negotiations 
in the Middle East. Of the nations in the 
world which need and deserve peace, 
Israel surely holds a preeminent place. 
Of the peoples of the world who need 
and deserve a place with which they can 
truly identify, the Palestinian claim is 
undeniable. 

But Israel can only have permanent 
peace in a context in which the Pales- 
tinian people also realize their legitimate 
rights. Similarly, the Palestinian people 



will be able to achieve their legitimate 
rights only in a context which gives to 
Israel what it so clearly has a right to 
demand— to exist, and to exist in peace 
and security. 

This most complex of international 
conflicts cannot be resolved by force. 
Neither the might of armies nor the 
violence of terrorists can succeed in im- 
posing the will of the strong upon the 
weak. Nor can it be settled simply by 
the rhetoric of even the most carefully 
worded document. It can only be re- 
solved through the give and take of 
direct negotiations leading to the estab- 
lishment of practical arrangements on 
the ground. 

In other words, it can only be re- 
solved through hard work. For those 
who believe that there is no contradic- 
tion between permanent peace for Israel 
and the legitimate rights of the Pales- 
tinian people — and for those who believe 
that both are essential for peace and 



United Nations Day, 1982 



A PROCLAMATION' 

The United Nations was born out of the 
massive human suffering and destruction 
caused by the Second World War. f>om the 
outset, the United States, one of the principal 
architects and founders of the United Na- 
tions, has worked to make it a forum for 
debate among all peace-loving nations and to 
support its purpose of preventing war and 
conflict through conciliation and cooperation. 
Because that goal has not been fully achieved 
and because the U.N. has been misu.sed, to- 
day's world is too often fraught with strife, 
division, and conflict. But, despite the abuse 
and shortcomings, the United Nations can 
still be instrumental in facilitating and 
overseeing agreements to end conflict, in pro- 
viding a center for reducing tensions through 
dialogue and debate, and in addressing the 
problems of underdevelopment which can 
spur conflict. 

Americans can take pride in having pro- 
vided significant moral, political, and finan- 
cial support for the United Nations since its 
inception. That support will be maintained 
and the United States will continue to play a 
prominent role in the organization, using it to 



champion the values and ideals which under- 
lie our own society and which originally 
helped to inspire the formation of the United 
Nations. 

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, 
President of the United States of America, 
do hereby designate Sunday, October 24, 
1982, as United Nations Day. On this day I 
urge all Americans to better acquaint 
themselves with the activities and ac- 
complishments of the United Nations. 

I have appointed Robert Anderson to 
serve as 1982 United States National Chair- 
man for United Nations Day and welcome the 
role of the United Nations Association of the 
United States of America in working with 
him to celebrate this special day. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto 
set my hand this fourteenth day of 
September, in the year of our Lord nineteen 
hundred and eighty-two, and of the In- 
dependence of the United States of America 
the two hundred and seventh. 

Ronald Reacjan 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 20. 1982. 



that neither can be achieved without thi 
other — the task can truly be a labor of 
love. 

On September 1, President Reagan 
challenged the parties to the Arab- 
Israeli conflict to make a fresh start on 
the road to peace in the Middle East. 
The Camp David agreements, resting 
squarely on U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 242, with its formula of 
peace for territory, remain available to 
those who would accept the challenge t 
make this journey with us. The road wi 
not be easy but, in his statement, Presi 
dent Reagan made a number of pro- 
posals which, for those who are willing 
to join the effort, make the journey 
safer and easier. I call on all concerned 
to accept President Reagan's challenge 
and hasten the realization of true peace 
in the Middle East. 

Arms ControL In addition to the 
imperative need to resolve regional 
problems, there is an equally significan' 
global imperative: to hall, and reverse, 
the global arms buildup. As an Ameri- 
can, I am aware that arms control and 
disarmament are a special responsibilit 
of the world's most powerful nations — 
the United States and the Soviet Unior 
And as an American, I can report that 
we are fulfilling our responsibility to 
seek to limit and reduce conventional 
and nuclear arms to the lowest possibk 
levels. 

With this goal in mind. President 
Reagan has initiated a comprehensive 
program for negotiated arms reduction 
In central Europe, the most heavily 
armed region on this planet, the 
Western allies are seeking substantial 
reductions in NATO and Warsaw Pact 
troops to equal levels. To achieve this 
goal, we have recently introduced a ne\ 
proposal designed to revitalize the talks 
in Vienna on mutual and balanced redu 
tions in military manpower. 

In the area of strategic arms, the 
United Stiiles has also taken the initia- 
tive iiy calling for a one-third reduction 
in the number of nuclear warheads thai 
American and Soviet ballistic missiles 



Department of State Bulletl 



k 



•Of 




FEATURE 

U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY 



1 deliver. And in the talks in Geneva 
intermediate-range nuclear forces, 
'. United States has gone even further, 
asking the Soviet Union to agree to a 
Id proposal for eliminating an entire 
tegory of weapons from the arsenals 
the two sides. 

But as important as these negotia- 
ns are, the problem of arms control 
nnot be left to the two superpowers, 
e threat of nuclear proliferation ex- 
ids to every region in the world and 
mands the attention and energy of 
ery government. This is not solely, or 
n primarily, a concern of the super- 
wers. The non-nuclear countries will 
t be safer if nuclear intimidation is 
ded to already deadly regional con- 
its. The developing nations will not be 
)re prosperous if scarce resources and 
entific talent are diverted to nuclear 
apons and delivery systems. 
Unfortunately, as the task becomes 

1 )re important, it also becomes more 
ficult. Greater quantities of dangerous 
iterials are produced, and new sup- 
ers emerge who lack a clear commit- 
mt to nonproliferation. But the tech- 
ilogy that helped to create the prob- 

)i ns can supply answers as well. Vigor- 
s action to strengthen the barriers to 
gression and to resolve disputes 
acefully can remove the insecurities 
it are the root of the problem. The 
ited States, for its part, will work to 
hten export controls, to promote 
)ader acceptance of safeguards, to 
ye meaningful actions when agree- 
nts are violated, and to strengthen 
J International Atomic Energy Agen- 
As our action last week in Vienna 
Duld make clear, we will not accept at- 
npts to politicize — and, therefore, 
lasculate — such vital institutions. 



ogress 

rhaps the most common phrase 
oken by the American people in our 
ore than two centuries of national life 
.s been: "You can't stop progress." Our 
ople have always been imbued with 
e conviction that the future of a free 
ople would be good. 



America continues to offer that vi- 
sion to the world. With that vision and 
with the freedom to act creatively, there 
is nothing that people of goodwill need 
fear. 

I am not here to assert, however, 
that the way is easy, quick, or that the 
future is bound to be bright. There is a 
poem by Carl Sandburg in which a 
traveler asks the sphinx to speak and 
reveal the distilled wisdom of all the 
ages. The sphinx does speak. Its words 
are: "Don't expect too much." 

That is good counsel for all of us 
here. It does not mean that great ac- 
complishments are beyond our reach. 
We can help shape more constructive in- 
ternational relations and give our child- 
ren a better chance at life. It does mean, 
however, that risk, pain, expense, and 
above all endurance are needed to bring 
those achievements into our grasp. 

We must recognize the complex and 
vexing character of this world. We 
should not indulge ourselves in fantasies 
of perfection or unfulfOlable plans or 
solutions gained by pressure. It is the 
responsibility of leaders not to feed the 
growing appetite for easy promises and 
grand assurances. The plain truth is 
this: We face the prospect of all too few 
decisive or dramatic breakthroughs; we 
face the necessity of dedicating our 
energies and creativity to a protracted 
struggle toward eventual success. 

Conclusion 

That is the approach of my country— be- 
cause we see not only the necessity, but 
the possibility, of making important 
progress on a broad front. 

• Despite deep-seated differences 
between us and the Soviet Union, 
negotiators of both sides are now at 



work in a serious, businesslike effort at 
arms control. 

• President Reagan has issued an 
important call for an international con- 
ference on military expenditure. The 
achievement of a common system for ac- 
counting and reporting is the pre- 
requisite for subsequent agreement to 
limit or curtail defense budgets. 

• The Caribbean Basin initiative 
establishes the crucial bond between 
economic development and economic 
freedom. It can be a model for fair and 
productive cooperation between econo- 
mies vastly different in size and char- 
acter. 

• And the diplomatic way is open to 
build stability and progress in southern 
Africa through independence for 
Namibia under internationally acceptable 
terms. 

Realism and a readiness to work 
long and hard for fair and freely agreed 
solutions— that is our recipe for op- 
timism. That is the message and the of- 
fer which my government brings to you 
today. 

I began my remarks here today with 
an informal personal word. Let me end 
in the same spirit. We must be deter- 
mined and confident. We must be pre- 
pared for trouble but always optimistic. 
In this way the vast bounties produced 
by the human mind and imagination can 
be shared by all the races and nations 
we represent here in this hall. 

A predecessor of mine as Secretary 
of State, whose portrait hangs in my of- 
fice, conveyed the essence of America's 
approach to the world's dangers and 
dilemmas. He said we would act with "a 
stout heart and a clear conscience, and 
never despair." 

That is what John Quincy Adams 
said nearly a century and a half ago. I 
give you my personal pledge today that 
we wall continue in that spirit, with that 
determination, and with that confidence 
in the future. 



'Department press release 303 of Oct. 1, 
1982, and USUN press release 71. ■ 



THE PRESIDENT 



News Conference of September 28 
(Excerpts) 



Q. When the Palestinian fighters were 
forced to leave Beirut, they said that 
they had America's word of honor that 
those they left behind would not be 
harmed. Now comes U.N. Ambassador 
Jeane Kirkpatrick who says that 
America must share in the blame for 
these massacres. My question to you is 
do you agree with that judgment? 

A. I think the manner in which 
Jeane said that — and she's talked to me 
about it — was one about the responsibili- 
ty of all of us back over a period of time 
with regard to the separation and divi- 
sions in Lebanon, the whole matter of 
the Middle East and not doing more to 
bring about the peace that we're trying 
so hard now to get. 

I don't think that specifically there 
could be assigned as a responsibility on 
our part for withdrawing our troops. 
They were sent in there with one under- 
standing: They were there to oversee and 
make sure that the PLO [Palestine 
Liberation Organization] left Lebanon. 
And that mission was completed, virtual- 
ly without incident and they left. Then, 
who could have foreseen the assassina- 
tion of the President-elect that led to the 
other violence and so forth. 

Q. Why did you gi\e orders to our 
representative at the United Nations 
to vote against an inquiry to find out 
how it happened and why? 

A. As I understand it, there were 
things additional in that inquiry, things 
that we have never voted for and will 
not hold still for, such things as sanc- 
tions and such things as voting Israel 
out of the United Nations. 

I can't recall exactly now what it 
was that caused our vote to be negative 
on that. But the Lebanese and the 
Israelis are apparently going forward 
with such an inquiry. 



Q. Do you have a plan for getting 
the United States out of Lebanon if 
fighting should break out there, or 
could the Marine presence there lead 
to another long entanglement, such as 
Vietnam? 

A. No, I don't see anything of that 



kind taking place there at all. And the 
Marines are going in there into a situa- 
tion with a definite understanding as to 
what we're supposed to do. I believe 
that we are going to be successful in 
seeing the other foreign forces leave 
Lebanon. And then at such time as 
Lebanon says that they have the situa- 
tion well in hand, why, we'll depart. 

Q. If fighting should break out 
again, would you pull the Marines 
out? 

A. You're asking a hypothetical 
question, and I've found out that I never 
get in trouble if I don't answer one of 
those. [Laughter] 



Q. It has been reported that you 
believe that Israel is sabotaging your 
peace initiative, and also that you now 
believe that Israel has become the 
Goliath in the Middle East, and that 
the other countries— the Arab coun- 
tries — are the David. Did you say 
that? Do you believe that? 

A. I didn't say it exactly that way. 
In fact, I didn't say that I thought they 
were the Goliath. I said that one of the 
things, as the negotiations approach and 
we proceed with this peacemaking busi- 
ness, that Israel should understand, as 
we have come to understand from talk- 
ing to other Arab states, that where 
from the very beginning all of us, in- 
cluding Israel, have thought of it as a 
tiny country fighting for its life sur- 
rounded by larger states and hostile 
states that want to see it destroyed, that 
their military power has become such 
that there are Arab states that now 
voice a fear that they are expansionist, 
that they may be expansionist, and they 
have the military power. So all I was 
referring to was that. 

The first part of your statement 
there, though, about Israel and trying to 
undermine— no, I don't believe that. I 
think that both sides have voiced things 
that they feel very strongly about, and 
contrary to what I have suggested in my 
proposal, and having been a long-time 



union negotiator, I happen to think that 
some of that might be each side staking 
out its position so as to be in a better 
position when it comes time to 
negotiate. 



Q. I just wanted to ask you since 
you said you didn't think that Israel 
was trying to undermine your peace 
initiative whether you are less op- 
timistic about its chances since the 
massacre and the tragedy in Beirut? 

A. No, I'm not less optimistic. I'm 
also not deluding myself that it's going 
to be easy. Basically what we have, I 
think, in this peace proposal is a situa- 
tion where on one side, territory is the 
goal and on the other side security. Anc 
what has to be negotiated out is a kind 
of exchange of territory for security. I 
meant what I said when I proposed this 
plan and that is this country will never 
stand by and see any settlement that 
does not guarantee the security of 
Israel. 



dlK 



par 



10 



Q. You've told us that you're sencf" 
ing Marines to Lebanon for a limited 
amount of time and yet you haven't 
told us what the limit is. Can you giv • 
us a general idea of how long you ex- 
pect them to stay there and tell us 
precisely what you would like to see 
them accomplish before they 
withdraw? 

A. I can't tell you what the time eh 
ment would be. I can tell you what it is 
that they should accomplish, and I hope 
sooner rather than later. 

One, they're there along with our 
allies — the French and the Italians — to 
give a kind of support and stability whil 
the Lebanese Government seeks to 
reunite its people, which have been 
divided for several years now into 
several factions, each one of them with 
its own army, and bring about a unified 
Lebanon with a Lebanese Army that 
will then be able to preserve order in it; 
own country. And during this time, 
while that's taking place, the 
withdrawal, as quickly as possible, to 
their own borders of the Israelis and th< 
Syrians. 

Now there we've had declarations 



Department of State Bulleti 



THE PRESIDENT 



m both countries that they want to do 
,t. So I am reasonably optimistic 

1)Ut that. I have no way to judge about 
en the Lebanese Government — the 
banese Government will be the one 
it tells us when it feels that it's in 
irge and they can go home. 

' Q. Are you then saying that they 
'^ II remain there until all foreign 
' ces are withdrawn? 

A. Yes, because I think that's going 
: come rapidly. I think we're going to 

the withdrawal— our Marines will go 
tomorrow morning, as I've said, 
•ause the Israelis have agreed to 
;hdraw to that line south of the air- 
t. 



Q. Taking into account the 
etoric on both sides over the situa- 
ns in Poland, Afghanistan, the arms 
^'nluction talks that are going on in 
Birope, the Siberian natural gas 
p)eline, and the renewed grain sale 
'ireement, how do you assess the 
fS. -Soviet relationship now, 20 
'ntnths into your term in office? 

A. I think there's a pretty good 
-cderstanding on their part as to where 
'v stand. And I can only say this: In 20 
r)nths — and I'm going to knock on 
V'od — the Soviet Union, which has been 
epanding over the years, vastly in the 
„t -ritory and the people coming under 
|i' control, they haven't expanded into 
I extra square inch since we've been 
} re. So maybe we do have an under- 
,E mding of each other. 

Now today I've just had a call from 
( orge Shultz. He had met for 3 hours 
\ th Foreign Minister Gromyko, and he 
E id it was a serious discussion and a 
> de-ranging discussion, and they're go- 
i ,•■ 1(1 resume it on Monday. So we're 
! t standing off and ignoring each 



informally notified Congress that it 
was planning to send more F-16s to 
Israel. There's been no formal 
notification since then. Is the delay 
linked to difficulties in relations with 
Israel? When do you think formal noti- 
fication will go up and under what 
conditions? 

A. They're still on tap, and we 
haven't sent the formal notification up. 
And, very frankly, it was simply because 
in the climate of things that were going 
on, we didn't think it was the time to do 
it. However, there has been no interrup- 
tion of those things that are in the pipe- 
line — the spare parts, ammunition, 
things of that kind. The only thing that 
we have actually withheld after the con- 
troversy that came on in Lebanon was 
the artillery shell, the so-called cluster 
shell. 



Q. I seem to get the impression 
from what you are saying about our 
relationships with Israel that nothing 
has really changed in the wake of the 
massacre in Beirut or the temporary 
rejection, anyway, of your peace plan. 
Is that correct? Is there no change at 
all? 

A. There's no change in the sense 
that we are still going with everything 
we can. We're going to try and persuade 
the Arab neighbors of Israel to do as 
Egypt once did, and Israel to negotiate 



out a permanent peace solution, in which 
Israel will no longer have to remain an 
armed camp, which is making their life 
economically unbearable. At the same 
time, an answer must be found that is 
just and fair for the Palestinians. And I 
don't think anything has happened to 
change that, if I understood your ques- 
tion correctly. Nothing has changed in 
our feeling of obligation to bring about, 
if we can, such a result. 

Q. I really meant our relationship 
with the Begin government. Is it as 
cordial and friendly? Is it now tense? 
Is it— what is the situation? 

A. I can tell you one thing it isn't; it 
isn't what some of you have said or writ- 
ten, that we are deliberately trying to 
undermine or overthrow the Begin 
government. We have never interfered 
in the internal government of a country 
and have no intention of doing so, never 
have had any thought of that kind. We 
expect to be doing business with the 
Government of Israel and with Prime 
Minister Begin, if that's the decision of 
the Israeli people. I think that Frank 
Reynolds [ABC News] last night voiced 
something that we believe, and that is 
that the Israeli people are proving with 
their reaction to the massacre that there 
is no change in the spirit of Israel. They 
are our ally, we feel morally obligated to 
the preservation of Israel, and we're go- 
ing to continue to be that way. 



Text from White House press release. 



Q. Shortly before the Israel inva- 
pn of Lebanon, the Administration 



Dvember 1982 



11 



AFRICA 



Africa: Economic 
Prospects and Problems 



by Chester A. Crocker 

Address before the National Btisiness 
League, Dallas, Texas, on September 1 7. 
1982. Mr. Crocker is Assistant Secretary 
for African Affairs. 

It is an honor to have this opportunity 
to discuss the Administration's view of 
the economic prospects and problems of 
Africa before the National Business 
League— the oldest national business 
organization and the largest association 
of minority business people in America. 
It is a pleasure to be here in Texas 
speaking on the subject of Africa. At 
first glance the two have a good deal in 
common. Both are vast in area. Both are 
frontiers. Both are endowed with great 
mineral and agricultural resources. Both 
are marked by human diversity. There 
are many differences as well, but one 
stands out. Texas, by any standard, is 
very, very rich. Africa, by comparison 
with other continents, is distressingly 
poor. 

Today I would like to discuss with 
you Africa's economic plight, its implica- 
tions for U.S. foreign policy, what we in 
government are attempting to do about 
it, and how this effort can involve you, 
as representatives of the private sector. 

The African Economic Crisis 

Africa, more than any other region, is 
gravely threatened by economic crisis. It 
is the only area of the world where na- 
tional growth rates are often negative, 
with more of the same predicted for the 
rest of the 1980s unless there is rapid 
improvement. It is the only continent 
characterized by declining per capita 
food production, the consequence of the 
highest population growth rates in the 
world combined with stagnating 
agricultural production. Increased re- 
quirements for food imports, combined 
with the soaring cost of imported oil, 
have pushed several important countries 
close to bankruptcy. Normally, a situa- 
tion where a nation's debt payments 
amount to more than one-quarter of ex- 
port earnings is considered dangerous. 
But in two major African countries, 
Sudan and Zaire, debt payments due in 



12 



1983 will exceed available export earn- 
ings, leaving nothing for essential im- 
ports. Either the countries will default, 
which is unlikely, or their debt will be 
"rolled over," or rescheduled. Neither 
alternative is satisfactory. Even Africa's 
more successful economies are, in 
general, faced with unhealthy debt 
burdens and insufficient rates of growth. 

I could spend the next hour explain- 
ing the causes of the African economic 
crisis. They include a difficult, disaster- 
prone environment, the afterglow of 
political instability in many countries, 
and a varying mixture of counter- 
productive policies and institutional 
weaknesses. During the 1960's, Africa 
was shielded from the effect of struc- 
tural economic weaknesses by relatively 
high commodity prices combined with 
relatively generous flows of foreign aid. 
These conditions also encouraged some 
African countries to borrow heavily 
from private commercial banks. 

With the onset of world recession, 
however, the prices of African com- 
modities plummeted, while the cost of 
most imports remained relatively high. 
Aid flows leveled off as the industrial- 
ized countries, including the United 
States, tightened budgetary belts. But 
the debts still had to be paid; indeed, 
new borrowing was often imperative. 

It is now generally recognized, by 
Africans as well as by foreign observers, 
that Africa's special vulnerability to 
world recession was usually exacerbated 
by misguided economic policies. For ex- 
ample, pricing systems have typically 
been geared to keep food prices low, 
penalizing farmer-producers in order to 
benefit urban consumers whose political 
support is usually critical for regime sur- 
vival. Overvalued currencies have in ef- 
fect taxed (and discouraged) exports of 
all kinds, resulting in chronic balance-of- 
payments crises. 

From colonial predecessors, new 
African governments often inherited 
networks of sUite-owned businesses and 
marketing boards. Originally designed to 
channel colonial products to the mother 
country, these so-called "parastatals" 
have all too often assumed a new 
primary function of providing employ- 
ment, leaving productivity a secondary 






Fii 



ragi 



consideration. The classic example is the i 
crop marketing board in an East Afric;^ 
country which now pays its employees 
more than it budgets to purchase cropsijure. 

Foreign aid programs have ac- 
complished much of positive and endur- 
ing value in Africa, including the 
elimination of several major diseases, 
the provision of roads and railroads to 
market crops and minerals, and the 
creation of much invaluable educational 
infrastructure in a continent which at 
the time of independence was almost 
totally lacking in universities and tech- 
nical training facilities of all kinds. At 
the same time, however, aid donors, oui^jj, 
selves included, sometimes contributed 
unwittingly to the growing economic 
problem by subsidizing inefficient state 
corporations and underwriting elaborate 
government programs and "pilot proj- 
ects" which— when the aid flows 
stopped— governments often could not 
afford to operate or maintain. 

Impact on U.S. Interests 

Africa's economic crisis has a multiple 
impact on U.S. interests, which are in- 
creasingly related to our most vital con- 
cerns. For example, I am now heavily 
engaged in negotiations which will, if 
successful, achieve a peaceful settlemen 
in Namibia and Angola and pave the 
way toward reduced conflict and ex- 
panded economic growth in southern 
Africa. If we fail, we may witness a 
spiral of turmoil that could destroy a 
number of southern African countries 
and would directly benefit our Cuban 
and Soviet adversaries. Either way, the 
repercussions will be global. Africa is n( 
longer on the policy sidelines. 

By threatening the stability of some 
of our oldest friends and partners on th 
continent, the African economic crisis 
threatens virtually all of our broader 
goals, including the search for peace in 
southern Africa. It endangers U.S. and 
allied access to valuable resources, in- 
cluding the oil fields of West Africa and 
the vital strategic minerals of southern 
Africa. All too often, economic distress 
generates starvation and refugees, prob 
lems which can only be addressed 
through expensive emergency relief pro 
grams. While our government will re- 
spond generously to humanitarian im- 
peratives of this kind, we cerUiinly 
prefer to spend money in a manner 
more conducive to long-term develop- 
ment. The economic collapse or default 
of a major African country would pose 



Department of State Bulletir 



AFRICA 



additional tlireat to the integrity of 
" international financial system, 
'eady under worrisome pressure else- 
ere. 



lat We Are Doing 

r African economic policy is influ- 
|ced by three fundamental facts. 

First, U.S. aid to Africa, although 
bstantial and increasing, is unlike- 
— given budgetary pressures — to 
perience dramatic growth. The same 
es for other aid donors. 

Second, as mentioned earlier, inade- 
ate economic policies are one critical 
pediment to development in many 
rican countries. 

Third, the present and potential 
ntributions of the private sector — both 
•eign and indigenous — to African eco- 
mic growth vastly outweigh anything 
it foreign aid can contribute. 

' Helping People at Risk. The 

vrious elements of our policy flow 
rturally from consideration of these 
t sic facts. Let me elaborate briefly: As 
f. natter of highest priority, the United 
J itcs continues to take the lead in help- 
I ;■— and mobilizing others to help — 
I man beings imperiled by strife and 
.' irxation in Africa. The United States 
\ s been foremost in assistance to inter- 
I lidiial refugee programs and in pro- 
\lin^^' opportunities for third-country 
; ticment (several thousand African 
I uuc'cs will come to the United States 
1 s year). The Congress has recently ap- 
1 imm! .$30 million for new activities de- 
t.ned to provide refugee-related devel- 
c ment opportunities, so that long-term 
1 1'ugees will not be forced to live 
J rpetually on the dole. Our refugee aid 
1 Africa totaled about $110 million in 
J cal year (FY) 1982, a quadrupling of 
11' amount expended in 1978, mainly 
','■ programs in Somalia, Sudan, and 
■ ii-c. and for persons displaced by con- 
■t 111 Chad. 

Supporting Better Economic 

!»licies. Second, under more normal 
ndilions we are using our aid to en- 
urage the process of policy reform, 
aich is another way of saying that we 
tend wherever possible to help those 
ho have demonstrated a willingness to 
'Ip themselves. 

I might note that despite budgetary 
instraints, U.S. economic aid to Africa 
■quested for fiscal 1983 is $840 million 
impared to the $737.6 million re- 
nested in 1981— not including the 
fugee assistance and emergency food 



aid which I mentioned earlier. In addi- 
tion to our bilateral programs, we are 
maintaining a vigorous commitment to 
the World Bank and the African Devel- 
opment Bank and F'und. We are encour- 
aging the World Bank to devote an in- 
creasing share of its "soft loan" Interna- 
tional Development Association funds to 
Africa and are now completing arrange- 
ments to join the African Development 
Bank, recently opened to non-African 
membership. Including our share of aid 
disbursed through these multilateral in- 
stitutions, total U.S. economic assistance 
to Africa is well in excess of $1 billion 



take the lead in proposing and support- 
ing economic reforms. That is why their 
continued health is vital to our own ef- 
forts. 

Supporting the Private Sector. 

Having told you that the private sector 
figures heavily in our policy, it is import- 
ant that you understand what we mean 
by that term in the African context. Our 
definition is broad; it includes everything 
that is not government owned, and it 
most emphatically covers African as well 
as foreign enterprise. 

Africa's private sector is overwhelm- 



The economic collapse or default of a major 
African country would pose an additional threat to 
the integrity of the international financial system, 
already under worrisome pressure elsewhere. 



annually. By contrast, total military aid 
requested for fiscal 1983 is only one-fifth 
of this amount. 

Exactly how can we best deploy our 
aid to encourage better economic 
policies in Africa? This question taxes 
our diplomatic skills, and those of our 
colleagues in the Agency for Interna- 
tional Development (AIID), on a daily 
basis. I can assure you it is not a matter 
of bribing foreign governments to go 
against their own inclinations. Reforms 
must come from each government's own 
political will. Even in the poorest coun- 
tries we have neither the vast sums of 
money required, nor the inclination, to 
"buy" changes of policy. 

Our approval involves working with 
Africans to identify potentially success- 
ful programs and policies and then using 
our resources to support them. Often, as 
we well know from our own domestic 
experience, the initial phases of an 
economic reform measure involve ex- 
pense and dislocation. Properly de- 
ployed, our aid can ease such burdens 
for those governments courageous and 
enlightened enough to assume them. 

Encouraging policy reform also 
means working closely both with other 
donors and with the World Bank and In- 
ternational Monetary Fund. Because of 
their great resources, expertise, and im- 
partiality as international institutions, 
these multilateral organizations often 



ingly a realm of small operators— farm- 
ers, fishermen, artisans, cooperatives. 
The archetype is that dynamo of small- 
scale capitalism, the woman market en- 
trepreneur who dominates much 
indigenous retailing, the so-called "infor- 
mal sector," in West Africa. All too 
often such small producers and mer- 
chants have been ignored or discouraged 
by proliferating and sometimes preda- 
tory bureaucracies, and there is little 
doubt that on a per capita basis, Africa 
has more bureaucracy than any other 
continent. More than any other factor, 
government-run marketing schemes 
combined with government-set prices 
have denied the farmer a fair return for 
his produce, and that, in a nutshell, is 
why Africa today spends even more on 
imported food than on imported oil. 

For many reasons foreign or multi- 
national enterprise is a less significant 
element in Africa than such small-scale 
local capitalism. In many countries 
markets are too small, skills and infra- 
structure too scarce, to attract and sus- 
tain big business. Nevertheless, Ameri- 
can trade and investment is already by 
far the most significant element in our 
economic presence in Africa, and it has 
great potential for further growth. 

I should dwell on that word growth 
for a moment. It is in large part because 
we recognize the overwhelming import- 
ance of helping Africa achieve higher 
economic growth rates that we want to 



ovember 1982 



13 



AFRICA 



encourage the private sector. For it is 
only through the private sector, whether 
large or small, indigenous or foreign, 
that significant growth will occur. If 
African experience over the last decade 
proves anything, it is the folly of assum- 
ing that one can achieve popular welfare 
goals via purely government actions 
while neglecting growth. Redistributing 
poverty is a dead end. 

Let me now describe an imaginary 
African case and illustrate for you a few 
of the ways in which our policy can re- 
spond, partly by engaging and support- 
ing the private sector. Our hypothetical 
country has just agreed to embark on a 
tough, economic stabilization program. 
Debts have been rescheduled and cur- 
rency devalued in order to restore 
balance-of-payments equilibrium. While 
temporarily free from the threat of 
default, capital resources are perilously 
scarce. The government has imposed 
tough limits on domestic spending to 
keep down inflation. Although these 
austerity measures are essential to 
restore and maintain stability they in- 
volve great hardship, limiting invest- 
ment both in development projects and 
in private enterprise. At least for the 
moment, business firms are starved for 
foreign exchange. 

In this kind of situation there are a 
number of ways that aid donors can 
help. They can provide some of the 
capital needed for development projects. 
Through commodity import programs, 
they can ease the damaging impact of 
foreign exchange constraints on private 
firms by channeling assistance directly 
to the most growth-oriented sectors of 
the economy. In short, external assist- 
ance can help both to alleviate and to 
achieve the transition from austerity to 
growth. It can, thereby, demonstrate 
our awareness of the effort and sacrifice 
being made by a friendly government 
and our willingness to help. 

Once economic stability is achieved 
and growth resumes, additional meas- 
ures become relevant. We can provide a 
range of more traditional aid, including 
technical assistance and institution- 
building measures which will help small- 
scale African farmers and entre- 
preneurs. As opportunities for larger 
scale investments develop, there will be 
an expanding role for U.S. firms and for 
the various programs— including the 
Overseas Private Investment Corpora- 
tion and the Export-Import Bank— 
which are available to encourage U.S. 
trade and investment. As they interact 
with their African partners, U.S. firms 



14 



can provide much additional technical 
and managerial expertise, all of it rele- 
vant to the achievement of economic 
growth and welfare. It is for this reason 
that African leaders across the political 
spectrum, from market-oriented 
moderates to old-line Marxists, are to- 
day increasingly eager, both in public 
and private, for additional U.S. trade 
and investment. 

Minority Involvement 

That, painted in very broad strokes, is 
the new dimension of our strategy. Now 
I would like to turn briefly to the im- 
plications for you, as black Americans 
and businessmen. I don't want to gloss 
over the difficulties imposed by world 
recession and Africa's economic crisis. 
Although there are some very signifi- 
cant exceptions and bright spots, Africa 
is not, in general, an easy place to do 
business, even for the largest of multi- 
national firms. It takes perseverance, a 
great deal of careful preparation and 
dialogue with African decisionmakers, 
and an underlying faith in Africa's long- 
term growth potential. But you do have 
a role to play and one which may in- 
crease sharply in the future. 

To begin with, I would note that the 
sympathetic interest of black Americans 
in Africa is extremely important as a 
sustaining factor in our policy. It en- 
courages Congress to provide the aid re- 
sources we need, and it sharpens aware- 
ness of Africa in the minds of senior 
policymakers. So even when black 
Americans outside government disagree 
with the executive branch on specific 
issues, as is sometimes the case, we can 
only welcome and encourage their in- 
terest. 

And despite the present difficulties 
which I have described, Africa should 
engage your interest as businessmen. 
Black American firms such as Johnson 
Products of Chicago are already in- 
volved in Africa. President Hagans of 
the National Business League was 
among those who participated in the 
first Cabinet-level trade mission to 
Africa last January. Mayor Ferre of 
Miami is involved in organizing a trade 
fair which will introduce African entre- 
preneurs to minority businessmen in 
Florida with the aim of encouraging 
trade between the United States and 
Africa, and joint venture partnerships 
between Africans and Americans. Both 
the Commerce Department and AID 



maintain offices which are charged with 
encouraging the increased participation- *"' 
of minority firms in our export and 
foreign assistance programs. Congres- 
sional approval of the Administration- 
supported bill legalizing export trading 
companies would make it much easier 
for small and medium businesses of all 
kinds to operate in Africa by enabling 
smaller operators to share the often 
great ovchead costs involved in Africai '* 
operations 

Among the innovations launched by 
this Administration is AID's new Bureai '• 
of Private Enterprise, established 
specifically to help increase develop- 
ment-oriented private sector resources 
in the less developed countries (LDCs). 
The bureau's program includes new 
methods of financing private enterprise 
projects, a wide range of advisory ser- 
vices, and funding of feasibility studies 
through the closely associated Trade an 
Development Program, which may be o 
particular interest to small and medium 
U.S. businesses. 

Finally. I would underline that the 
impediments imposed by world recessic 
will be lessened as our own domestic 
economy recovers, increasing the rangt 
of business opportunities for all 
Americans in Africa. U.S. recovery wil 
help to benefit all developing countries 
by expanding markets for African as 
well as other Third World exporters. 
The United States currently takes aboi 
half of all the manufactured goods ex- 
ported by the non-OPEC developing 
countries to the industrialized world. A 
President Reagan stated before the Ca ' 
cun conference, every 1% reduction in 
U.S. interest rates due to lower inflatic 
improves the balance of payments of th 
LDCs by $1 billion. 



irk 



Conclusion 

In concluding, I would like to reempha- 
size the extent to which both American 
and Africans will gain from acceleratin.: 
African economic growth. It has becom 
a truism that more than ever before, 
I'.S. prosperity depends on trade with 
developing countries. Today we export 
more to them than to Europe and Japa 
combined. However, the developing na- 
tions in question are largely the middle 
income, high-growth countries— the 
Brazils, Mexicos, and Singapores. Our 
total exports to sub-Saharan Africa, in- 
cluding South Africa, still amount to le; 
than 3% of our global total and less tha 
one-tenth of our total exports to the 
LDCs. 



AFRICA 



Nevertheless, for a number of 
sons, we can be optimistic about the 
ure. Although still relatively small, 
■ trade with Africa has been growing 
a high rate compared to other areas, 
•ica's future potential is undeniable 
en its enormous resources of 
lerals, energy, and unexploited arable 
d. 

It is important to remember that 
■eral of today's more dramatic LDC 
:cess stories faced apparently insolu- 
economic problems only a few years 
ref). In 1960, to cite two examples, 
ny American observers regarded 
uth Korea as a hopeless case, de- 
ved both of natural resources and 
;essary entrepreneurial skills by the 
ly fact of partition. In India it ap- 
ired that we were pouring our aid 
lars into an economic quagmire, 
itined for perpetual dependency on 
,11 lers. Only a few years ago speeches 
itten in my own Bureau of African 
fairs habitually illustrated Africa's 
d problems by drawing gloomy 
•allels with India. 
Today it seems that things have 
mged. The Indians have virtually 
lieved food grain self-sufficiency and 

increasingly capable of financing 
/elopment needs by borrowing from 
vate capital markets. The Koreans 
/e achieved one of the economic 
racles which inflates LDC trade 
tistics. Their rapid expansion into 
w industrial export sectors is a 
illenge to even the most sophisticated 
irket economies. These cases are not 
ique; a number of other former reci- 
■nts of massive U.S. aid have achieved 
are approaching self-sustaining 
Dwth, providing in the process a bet- 
standard of living for their citizens 
d a healthy stimulus to world trade. 

The African states are at an earlier 
ige of the same process, often still in 

most profoundly difficult stage of 
st independence and far less well 
uipped by their colonial experience to 
ike a smooth transition to prosperity, 
't there can be no doubt that the tran- 
ion is already underway. Our 
allenge is to speed up the process, for, 
the extent that we do so, we will be 
long the beneficiaries. ■ 



Visit of Liberian Commander in Chief Doe 




Commander in Chief Samuel Kanvon Doe, head of state of the Republic of Liberia, made 
an official working visit to Washington, D.C., August 16-19, 1982. He met with President 
Reagan on August 17. ■ 



15 



ARMS CONTROL 



Nuclear Arms Control and 

the Future of U.S.-Soviet Relations 



by Eugene V. Rostow 

Address before the Los Angeles 
World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, 
California, on September 10, 1982. Mr. 
Rostow is Director of the U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency. 

My assignment is to contemplate the 
future of the Soviet-American relation- 
ship in the perspective of arms con- 
trol—more particularly, in the perspec- 
tive of our bilateral negotiations about 
nuclear weapons. To recall Dr. Johnson, 
nuclear arms control is one of those sub- 
jects which concentrate the mind. It is 
of special value in revealing the several 
realities of the Soviet- American relation- 
ship and the way in which they interact. 

In attempting to carry out my 
assignment, I thought it would be useful 
to review the state of our nuclear arms 
negotiations with the Soviet Union— to 
report on where we are, and to peer 
through the glass darkly at the road 
ahead. As you know, two parallel Soviet- 
American negotiations are going on in 
Geneva. One deals primarily with Soviet 
intermediate-range nuclear weapons, 
those capable of being launched from the 
Soviet Union against targets in Western 
Europe, Japan, China, and the Middle 
East; the other deals with the inter- 
continental nuclear weapons on both 
sides. The talks on intermediate-range 
weapons, called the INF [intermediate- 
range nuclear forces] talks, began in 
November 1981, and are being con- 
ducted for us by Ambassador Paul H. 
Nitze. The START [Strategic Arms Re- 
duction Talks] talks on nuclear weapons 
of intercontinental range began in June 
1982 under Ambassador Edward L. 
Rowny. 

We have agreed with the Soviet 
representatives that the details of the 
INF and START negotiations be kept 
confidential. But we have also made it 
clear to them that the Government of 
the United States has the duty to keep 
our people fully informed about the 
broad principles which govern our ap- 
proach to the negotiations and the way 
in which they are developing. I have pre- 
pared my talk with full respect for these 
rules. 

The INF and START talks are inex- 
tricably linked, for reasons both of 
security and of technology. The security 



16 



reason for that linkage is so obvious that 
it is often taken to be self-evident and 
left unexplained. But the nuclear balance 
has been changing, and we can no 
longer take our traditional positions on 
these matters for granted. The political 
consequences of the changing nuclear 
balance should be faced head-on. 

Looking back at the cycles of turbu- 
lence and stability since 1945, we have 
all come to realize, I think, that while 
the possibility of nuclear war can never 
be altogether excluded, especially in the 
case of countries governed by irrational 
political leaders, the principal signifi- 
cance of nuclear weapons is political. 
The political radiation of nuclear 
arsenals can be significant either for 
defense or for aggression— as a defen- 
sive deterrent, on the one hand, or as an 
aggressive instrument of political coer- 
cion, on the other. It is thus apparent 
that the INF and START talks involved 
the most fundamental issue of our 
foreign policy, the credibility of our 
security guaranties. Those guaranties all 
turn ultimately on the deterrent power 
of the American nuclear umbrella. The 
pressures of the Soviet race for nuclear 
supremacy during the last 10 years have 
intensified doubts about the continued 
effectiveness of the American nuclear 
deterrent— the rock on which the 
renaissance of the West since 1945 was 
built and the foundation for its security. 
Uncertainties on this basic point could 
lead to fatal miscalculations. A most im- 
portant goal of our foreign policy as a 
whole, and thus of our arms control 
policy, is to restore full confidence in 
those guaranties on the part of friend 
and adversary alike. 

The expansionist nature of Soviet 
foreign policy and the recent changes in 
the Soviet-American military balance — 
particularly with regard to nuclear 
weapons — directly challenge the major 
premise of modern American foreign 
policy. That premise is distilled from the 
harsh experience of two world wars 
which strong allied diplomacy could easi- 
ly have prevented. It has been accepted 
by every President since 1945, and 
spelled out in long series of treaties, 
joint resolutions of the Congress, and 
other national commitments. Its essence 



is that the United States can no longer i 
live in neutral isolation but must prote* m 
its interest in the world balance of 
power by preventing Soviet dominatior 
of Western Europe, Asia, or the Middl 
East at a minimum. The Concert of 
Europe which protected that American 
security interest for a century before 
1914 does not exist. We can no longer 
take shelter behind the British fleet. If: 
the job is to be done, we must take theliidi 
lead in organizing the coalitions to do ii k 
To recall the language of the North 
Atlantic Treaty under which NATO is 
established, and which is expressed in 
other security arrangements as well, a 
attack on these vital areas must also b 
considered an attack on the United 
States. In contemplating the future, 
every nation must take this permanent!la[« 
and immutable geopolitical interest of 
the United States fully into account. 

Outside the government, American 
who write and speak about foreign 
policy may forget this ultimate truth a* 
flirt nostalgically with the isolationist 
ideas of the 19th century. Occasionally 
the government of the day may do so 
for a time, under the pressure of even^l 
But those who bear the responsibility 
government cannot enjoy the luxury o < 
escapism. The world should understam i 
that the instincts for self-preservation 
a politically mature people will always 
dominate American foreign policy in tl 
end. As President Reagan has made 
clear, the I'nited States will not retrea 
to "Fortress America" but will defend 
alliances and interests throughout the 
world. What is at stake in the INF ancipf 
START talks is nothing less than our 
capacity to carry out that policy throu{> 
deterrence based on alliance solidarity 
that is, through peaceful means and nci^, 
by war. 

The technical reason why the INF 
and START talks must be viewed 
together is equally simple. It is that 
intermediate- and intercontinental-ranfi 
nuclear weapons do not constitute 
separate categories: Soviet weapons 
capable of hitting New York or Chicag 
could also be fired at London or TokyoL 
There is, therefore, no way to evaluate 
the INF balance except in'the START 
context. We cannot allow the whipsaw ,, 



the 



4ir 



h 



'"! 



id I 



ARMS CONTROL 



;at of Soviet INF and strateg-ic 

:es to separate us from our allies and 

»p us from defending the security in- 
!sts of the nation. 
The United States is, therefore, 
,ely coordinating the INF and 
\RT talks, which are based on the 
le analysis. Through these talks in 
dem, we are trying to achieve the 
le goal — a radical reduction of the 
iet and American nuclear arsenals in 
lanner conducive to stability. 

k'iew of Negotiating Efforts 

'ore we can consider how the INF 
1 START talks are progressing, we 
st agree on the criteria to be applied 
udging their utility. To that end, let 
briefly recall the analysis from which 
negotiating position is derived and 
implications of the goal we are try- 
to achieve. President Reagan is 
ermined to take full advantage of our 
as control experience during the 
Os. That effort has required a re- 
imination of the role of nuclear 
apons and the arms control doctrines 
;he United States and the Soviet 
an. 

How should we define what we are 
king through the INF and START 
iS? The place to begin, we concluded 
re than a year ago, is to take a fresh 
■k at the nuclear weapon itself. We 
re been living with it since 1945. The 
■ly assumption that the nuclear 
apon was a magic force for peace has 
.g since faded away. Even when we 
i a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and 
•n great nuclear superiority, we had 
use conventional forces — and those 
ne — to counter a long cycle of ag- 
?ssion by the Soviets and their sur- 
jates. Save in a few important situa- 
ns of extreme tension, we found the 
;trine of "massive retaliation" to be an 
pty threat. 
Since the late 1950s, at least, the 
mary strategic goal of the Soviet pro- 
am of expansion has been to achieve 
rid dominance by separating Western 
irope from the United States and 
nada. To achieve this goal, the Soviet 
lion has been and is seeking to 
tflank Europe from the north and the 
uth, thus bringing the entire Eurasian 
id mass under Soviet control and, on 
at basis, taking over Africa and the 
ddle East. That done, the Soviet 
iders believe, Japan and the other na- 
ns of the Pacific basin would accept 
viet suzerainty as inevitable; the 
oples of Europe would lose hope; and 



the United States would be isolated, 
with no choice but to aquiesce in Soviet 
hegemony. All our experience in our 
bilateral nuclear arms talks with the 
Soviet Union is consistent with this 
hypothesis. Soviet strategy in SALT I 
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] and 
SALT II, seems to be dominated by two 
ideas: to divide the United States from 
its allies and to prevent the moderniza- 
tion of the American Armed Forces. 
These are the main Soviet themes in the 
negotiation as they are the main themes 
of Soviet arms control propaganda. 

Since the end of the Second World 
War, the United States and its allies 
have never stopped trying to persuade 
the Soviet Union that this course was 
the classic road to disaster. Nor have 



The consequences of nuclear war would 
be immeasurably worse. 

The United States made its first pro- 
posal to eliminate the nuclear threat in 
1946, when we had a monopoly of 
nuclear arms and nuclear technology. In 
the Baruch Plan we offered to put the 
whole of nuclear science under interna- 
tional control. Looking back, it is ob- 
vious that the Soviet refusal even to 
consider that offer was one of the most 
destructive turning points in the history 
of the cold war. 

The offer of the Baruch Plan does 
not stand alone. During the 1950s, 
President Eisenhower proposed the 
"open skies" plan, which has had far- 
reaching influence even though it was 
not formally accepted. The first major 



The pressures of the Soviet race for nuclear 
supremacy during the last 10 years have inten- 
sified doubts about the continued effectiveness of 
the American nuclear deterrent — the rock on which 
the renaissance of the West since 1945 was built 
and the foundation for its security. 



they flagged in their efforts to convince 
the leaders of the Soviet Union that a 
constructive alternative was always 
available — the alternative of genuine 
East- West cooperation, based on respect 
by each side for the legitimate security 
interests of the other and for the rules 
of the U.N. Charter against aggression. 
To this end, with varying degrees of suc- 
cess, the allies sought to contain Soviet 
expansion and proposed a long series of 
agreements designed to induce the 
Soviet Union to pursue its ambitions in 
world politics only by peaceful means. 
Among these proposals, those addressed 
to the nuclear menace have been of quite 
particular significance. 

From the beginning of the nuclear 
age nearly 40 years ago, the American 
people and their government have been 
convinced — and rightly convinced — that 
nuclear weapons are revolutionizing both 
warfare and world politics and that ex- 
traordinary steps are required to protect 
civilization from the unthinkable disaster 
of nuclear war. Conventional war has 
profoundly damaged the fabric of 
civilization during this turbulent century. 



step in the control of nuclear arms was 
achieved in 1963 in the Limited Test 
Ban Treaty. The Nuclear Nonprolifera- 
tion Treaty followed in 1968. 

Beyond these agreements, there are 
treaties barring weapons of mass 
destruction from the Antarctic and from 
outer space and the cycle of agreements 
which are our primary concern today — 
the Soviet-American SALT agreements 
and the INF and START negotiations. 
SALT I comprised two agreements — the 
Interim Agreement limiting offensive 
strategic weapons, which expired in 
1977, and the ABM Treaty, which 
severely restricts systems for inter- 
cepting and destroying ballistic missiles. 
The ABM Treaty is of indefinite dura- 
tion. SALT I and SALT II disappointed 
the claims made for them and the expec- 
tations they generated. Against the 
background of the Soviet nuclear build- 
up under the SALT I Interim Agree- 
ment, SALT II would have sanctioned 
continued increases in Soviet nuclear 
capabilities to threaten world stability. 

What is the moral of this cycle of ex- 
perience for the policies President 



Dvember1982 



17 



ARMS CONTROL 



Reagan has proposed in the INF and 
START talks? First, we are more con- 
vinced than ever that the efforts of the 
United States since 1946 to eliminate 
the possibility of nuclear war were wise 
and necessary. They should be inten- 
sified, not relaxed or abandoned. Se- 
cond, it is obvious that no impregnable 
wall can be erected between nuclear and 
conventional war. A nuclear stalemate 
will not be worth having if it is treated 
simply as a license for conventional wars 
of all against all. 

In order to eliminate nuclear war, 
the nations must also eliminate conven- 
tional war: that is, the struggle to save 
mankind from nuclear catastrophe must 
be conceived as part of a wider struggle 
to establish world public order itself. 
The issue is not colonialism, or capital- 
ism, or communism, or democracy, or 
the so-called arms race. It is aggression. 



In order to eliminate 
nuclear war, the nations 
must also eliminate con- 
ventional war: that is, 
the struggle to save 
mankind from nuclear 
catastrophe must be con- 
ceived as part of a wider 
struggle to establish 
world public order itself. 



The motives for aggression are irrele- 
vant. And the arms race is the symptom 
and consequence, not the cause, of the 
breakdown in world public order. We 
live in a small, interdependent, and 
dangerous world. In that world, our 
world with its ominous nuclear dimen- 
sion, aggression should be inadmissible, 
and peace should be indivisible. 

As President Reagan has said, we 
can no longer tolerate a "double stand- 
ard" with regard to Soviet aggression or 
aggression by any other power. Both we 
and the Soviet Union must obey the 
same rules with regard to the interna- 
tional use of force— the rules to which 
we both agreed when we signed the 
U.N. Charter. Unless these neutral and 
universal principles are generally and 
impartially enforced, they will cease to 



18 



have any influence on the behavior of 
states. In President Reagan's phrase, 
the nations must not merely condemn 
aggression; they must prevent it and en- 
force the rules against it. 

Problems of INF and START 
Negotiations 

I now turn to the specific problems of 
INF and START negotiations. A year 
ago a consensus emerged within the Ad- 
ministration on certain key propositions 
as the foundation for our negotiating ap- 
proach in the two negotiations. The first 
and most important was that we should 
discard the premise that the United 
States and the Soviet Union shared the 
same view of nuclear weapons and the 
same goal for nuclear arms control 
negotiations. Ten years ago most 
Americans took that hypothesis for 
granted. Today it cannot be entertained 
at all. Officials used to assure us that 
the Soviet Union was only interested in 
equality, recognition as a great power, 
and a place in the sun and that when it 
achieved parity with the United States it 
would stop enlarging its armed forces. 
No one can say that after what hap- 
pened during the 1970s. 

For the United States, the only ac- 
ceptable use for nuclear arms is in 
defense of our supreme national in- 
terests and those of our allies against 
the use of nuclear weapons and other 
forms of aggression. Our nuclear arsenal 
is defensive in character, and its mission 
is to deter aggression by presenting a 
visible and credible capacity to retaliate. 

It is now obvious that the Soviet 
Union marches to a different drummer. 
While we in the West have been primari- 
ly concerned with deterring both conven- 
tional and nuclear attacks, Soviet doc- 
trine and forces emphasize the ability to 
fight and win a nuclear war. Of course, 
the Soviet Government would prefer to 
have the fruits of military victory 
without having to wage war. To achieve 
that end, it believes, the nuclear 
superiority it is trying so hard to attain 
would be a political force of overpower- 
ing influence— the ultimate instrument 
of coercion and intimidation. The func- 
tion of Soviet military superiority is to 
paralyze the American nuclear deterrent 
by threatening to overwhelm it, and 
thus make Soviet aggression with con- 
ventional forces possible. More than 75% 
of the Soviet strategic nuclear force con- 
sists of intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs)— swift, accurate, and extreme- 
ly destructive first-strike weapons which 
could destroy missiles deployed in 



hardened silos. Less than one-third of 
the American force consists of ICBMs. 
In addition, the Soviet Union has an 
intermediate-range ballistic missile fore 
which, as yet, has no American counter 
part. The Soviets currently have 
deployed at least 324 SS-20 launchers, 
265 SS-4S, and 15 SS-5s. They have 
1,232 warheads in all. With one refire 
missile per launcher, these intermediatii 
range missiles may have over 2,000 
nuclear warheads, almost all of which 
can reach West European targets. The 
balance, all deployed on mobile SS-20 
launchers, are now targeted from 
eastern Siberia. Given the transportabi 
ty and range of the SS-20, all of these 
could be moved within reach of Europe' 
The United States has no weapons at a< 
in this class. Partially to counter this 
threat, our Pershing II intermediate- 
range ballistic missile and ground-basec 
cruise missile are in development and 
are scheduled for modest deployment ii 
Europe late in 1983. 

The Soviet lead in ground-based 
intermediate-range and intercontinenta 
ballistic missiles is one of the most 
serious foreign policy problems we fac€ 
This advantage gives the Soviet Union 
the potential to destroy all of Europe o 
Japan and many targets in other parts 
of the world at a time when a pre- 
emptive first strike with its intercon- 
tinental ballistic missiles could in theor 
also destroy all our ICBM force, that 
portion of our submarines that are in 
port, and those of our bombers that ar 
at their bases. 

The combination of these doomsda; 
possibilities is a recipe for nuclear coer 
cion that could split our alliances and 
leave us isolated in the Western Hemi- 
sphere. Henry Kissinger deepened 
Western anxiety about the nuclear im- 
balance a few years ago with his cele- 
brated comment that great powers do 
not commit suicide on behalf of their 
allies. Former President Nixon has nov 
made nuclear anxiety in this sense mor 
acute. In an article in the New York 
Times on August 19, 1982, he says: 

The Soviet Union's achievement of 
superiority in land-based nuclear missiles ha 
made our nuclear strength no longer a credi 
ble deterrent against Moscow's creeping ex- 
pansionism, in Africa, Asia, Latin America 
and the Middle East. We will not again be 
able to use the threat of that power as Pres 
dent Kennedy did in the Cuban missile crisi; 
in 1962, when we had a 15-to-l advantage, 
or even as I was able to do during the Arab 
Israeli war in 1973, when our advantage wa 
far less but still formidable. Even if we 



ucei 



iet-; 



tag- 



ler 



Department of State Bulleti 



»em 



ARMS CONTROL 



Dre the balance of those nuclear forces, 
vill not fully restore their deterrent ef- 
for such purposes. A threat of mutual 
de is simply not credible. 

Political anxieties about the 
erican nuclear umbrella would exist 
1 if Dr. Kissinger and President 
on had not spoken. They are what 
ncellor Schmidt has called "sub- 
„ nal" emanations of the Soviet 
lear arsenal and the state of the 
iet-American nuclear balance. They 
there because we allowed the 
ear balance to deteriorate during the 
Os. We shall have to live with the 
sequences of that mistake until the 
nee is restored by some combination 
imerican force modernization and 
IS control agreements. 
The fears generated by the changing 
lear balance are manifest in many 
ns— in the antinuclear demonstra- 
s and other movements for unilateral 
rmament, isolationism, and accom- 
lation, on the one hand, and for 
lear proliferation, on the other. If 
ie movements prevail, here, in 
ope, and in Asia, we shall wake up 
day soon in a different world. 
"' In the light of these considerations, 
isident Reagan decided to make the 
.3 oval of the destabilizing Soviet ad- 
gtage in ground-based ballistic 
uiles the first goal of our nuclear 
iis control effort and the first aspect 
she problem for us to take up with 
] Soviet Union. We were slightly 
,1'ad of the Soviet Union in the number 
v'arheads on deployed ICBMs in 
,2. 

In 1982 the Soviets have a lead in 
crucial area of approximately three 
me. It follows that they have the 
Dretical capacity to execute a pre- 
Dtive first strike by destroying our 
!Ms and other nuclear forces with a 
;tion of their forces, holding the rest 
in ominous reserve which could 
alyze our remaining strategic forces, 
en the Soviet intermediate-range 
istic missiles are counted, the Soviet 
antage in this category becomes even 
her. Until this Soviet advantage in 
lear forces is eliminated, it will not 
i possible to achieve political stability. 
The New York Times put the issue 
1 in an editorial entitled "How Much 
Snough?" on April 11, 1982. The task 
irms control diplomacy, the Times 
j, is to allow the United States to 
intain deterrence "which has kept the 
ustrial world at peace for the longest 
etch in history" and "to forbid the 
apons which defy deterrence .... 



member 1982 



That done, the arms race can subside. 
Unless it is done, there will never be 
enough." 

U.S. Approach to INF Talks 

This view of the matter is the basis for 
our approach to the INF and START 
talks. What we are seeking in these 
talks is to establish nuclear stability at 
equal and much lower levels of force— a 
posture on each side which would permit 
us to deter both nuclear war and other 
forms of aggression against our supreme 
interests. Such a policy would deny the 
Soviet Union the capacity for nuclear 
blackmail based on its present superiori- 
ty in ground-based intermediate-range 
and intercontinental ballistic missiles. 

The U.S. position in these talks was 
explained by President Reagan in his 
speech of November 18, 1981. During 
the first round of the INF talks begin- 
ning in November 1981, the U.S. delega- 
tion laid out the broad priniciples 
underlying the U.S. approach, defined 
the elements of an agreement which 
would take into account the legitimate 
interests of the two sides, and in 
February 1982 presented the text of a 
draft treaty which would implement 
those elements. The Soviet side 
elaborated somewhat on the positions 
that had been set forth by Chairman 
Brezhnev before the negotiations had 
begun and offered its criticism of the 
U.S. position. Mr. Brezhnev's plan has 
two elements: A moratorium for the 
duration of the negotiations and a pro- 
gram of reductions based on the 
assumption that both sides are now 
equal in intermediate-range missiles. The 
Soviets have proposed a limit of 300 
"systems" for each side by 1990. 

During the second round, beginning 
in May, the Soviet delegation presented 
a draft text of an agreement which 
would embody the Soviet position. The 
United States offered its criticisms of 
the Soviet position and a full analysis of 
the issues between the sides. 

As the third round of the INF 
negotiations is scheduled to begin at the 
end of this month, it is appropriate to 
review some of the major issues as they 
have emerged. You will remember that 
in 1976 the Soviet Union began the de- 
ployment of a new mobile and MIRVed 
[multiple independently-targetable re- 
entry vehicle] intermediate-range missile 
system— the SS-20— as a replacement 
for the older fixed single-warhead 
systems on which it had relied for many 
years. The SS - 20s are highly accurate; 



can strike all important targets in 
Europe, even from locations in the mid- 
dle of Siberia; and have a short time of 
flight. They represent a threat different 
in kind, not just in degree, from the 
systems they have been replacing. 

In 1979 the NATO nations unani- 
mously agreed that it was necessary to 
counter this threat unless it was 
withdrawn. It was decided that the 
United States should move to deploy in 
Europe two somewhat comparable 
systems, the Pershing II ballistic missile 
and the BGM-109G ground-launched 
cruise missile and simultaneously seek 
negotiations with the Soviet Union for 
the limitation of comparable systems on 
both sides. On November 18, 1981, 
President Reagan proposed that both 
the United States and the U.S.S.R. en- 
tirely forego such systems— the zero/ 
zero solution. 

The Soviet Union has not yet gone 
beyond its position that the INF talks 
are exclusively concerned with stability 
in the European theater. The United 
States insists that the INF problem is 
global and that the cause of world peace 
would not be advanced by exporting the 
Soviet INF nuclear advantage to Asia. 

The Soviet Union also continues to 
claim that the United States and the 
Soviet Union have approximately the 
same number of intermediate-range 
nuclear weapons in the European 
theater and, therefore, that the NATO 
decision to deploy 572 Pershing II and 
ground-based cruise missiles in Europe 
is "provocative" and "destabilizing." The 
Soviet claim rests on two untenable 
propositions— first, that the British and 
French nuclear forces must be counted 
with the American forces and, second, 
that American bombers, submarine- 
launched missiles, and cruise missiles 
should be treated as equivalent to the 
Soviet SS-20. The Soviet calculations go 
beyond even these errors. In order to 
demonstrate the supposed equality of 
the two INF forces in Europe, the 
Soviet Union must count all American 
weapons as relevant— including 
American dual-purpose aircraft, as well 
as FB-llls, all of which are located in 
the United States— and also exclude 
many categories of the Soviet arsenal. 

The principal issue between the sides 
centers on the treatment to be accorded 
the SS-20s and comparable missiles on 
the Soviet side, and the Pershing II and 
BGM-109G on the United States side. 
Whereas the United States draft treaty 
would ban them on both sides, the 
Soviet treaty would eliminate them only 



19 



ARMS CONTROL 



on the U.S. side; the Soviet side would 
be permitted to have up to 300 laun- 
chers for such missiles in the European 
portion of the Soviet Union and an 
unlimited number in the far-eastern por- 
tion of the Soviet Union. 

In addition to this wholly one-sided 
treatment proposed by the Soviets as to 
the central issues, their proposed treaty 
would have other unequal effects. The 
Warsaw Pact has some 7,000 nuclear- 
capable aircraft in Europe, of which 
some 2,500 are assigned to nuclear com- 
bat roles. NATO has approximately one- 
third of the latter number; almost all 
U.S. nuclear-capable planes located in 
Europe are dual capable. The U.S. con- 



tribution to the conventional defense of 
Europe is almost wholly dependent on 
such dual-capable planes. Yet, the Soviet 
draft treaty would have the effect of 
forcing the almost total withdrawal from 
Europe of such U.S. dual-capable air- 
craft, while not affecting most Soviet 
dual-capable aircraft. 

This effect results in part from the 
Soviet proposal that U.K. and French 
nuclear-capable systems be included 
under the aggregate ceiling limiting U.S. 
and Soviet intermediate-range missiles 
and aircraft. This proposal is both 
technically flawed and inequitable in 
principle. First, most of these U.K. and 
French forces are not, in fact. 



intermediate-range (or what the Soviei 
call medium-range); they are SLBM 
[submarine-launched ballistic missile] 
forces identical with Soviet and U.S. 
SLBM forces. Most of the remainder i 
nuclear-capable aircraft. The Soviet 
predominance in intermediate-range, 
nuclear-capable systems in Europe is s 
great that there would be no justifica- 
tion for compensation to the Soviet 
Union for British and French nuclear 
forces even if they were under NATO 
command. 

Beyond this technical flaw, the cla 
of the Soviet Union for nuclear forces 
equal to or superior to those of all oth 
nations combined would be unjustified 



Arms Control Negotiations 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 21, 1982' 

In our efforts to help build a more stable 
and peaceful world, there is no more 
essential objective than to shape defense 
and arms control policies which will 
guarantee the safety of our nation and 
of our allies. Shortly after assuming of- 
fice, I called for a comprehensive evalua- 
tion of our arms control policies and pro- 
posals for new initiatives. In doing so, I 
outlined the general principles which 
should guide formation of our arms con- 
trol policies. 

• Arms control must be an instru- 
ment of, and not a substitute for, a 
coherent security policy aimed in the 
first instance at the Soviet advantage in 
the most destabilizing class of weapons 
— those on ballistic missiles and especial- 
ly intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs). We will work for agreements 
that truly enhance .security by reinforc- 
ing peace through deterrence. 

• We must seek agreements which 
involve substantial and militarily signifi- 
cant reductions on both sides. 

• Agreements must be based on the 
principle of equality of rights and limits. 

• Arms control agreements must in- 
clude effective means of verification. 
They cannot be ba.sed on trust alone. 

• Our efforts will be guided by 
seriousness of purpose, reflected in our 
willingness to seek reduction to 
significantly lower levels of nuclear 
forces based on equal, balanced levels of 
comparable systems. 



20 



These principles are in full accord 
with the basic purpose for both U.S. and 
NATO security policy — insuring the 
peace through deterrence of aggression. 
Deterring nuclear or conventional attack 
against ourselves or our allies must 
guide our approach to defense and arms 
control. These principles also lie at the 
heart of the comprehensive and in- 
novative arms control approaches which 
this Administration has adopted. In each 
of the three most important areas of 
arms control — strategic nuclear arms, 
intermediate-range nuclear forces, and 
conventional forces in Europe — we have 
presented to the Soviet Union bold and 
equitable proposals — proposals which 
are in our mutual interest and which 
provide the opportunity to enhance 
world security and peace by significantly 
reducing the arsenals of both sides. 

In each of these three negotiations, 
the United States has presented con- 
sidered and equitable proposals which 
seek to establish a military equilibrium 
at reduced levels, eliminate the most 
destabilizing factors in the existing 
military balance, and enhance the secu- 
rity of both sides. When our national 
security, and that of our allies, is at 
stake, we must approach arms control 
realistically. We do not seek agreements 
for their own sake; we seek them to 
build international .security and stability. 
This Administration's reductions pro- 
posals for strategic and intermediate- 
range nuclear forces and for conven- 
tional forces reflect this approach. We 



are encouraged by the serious and bus 
nesslike conduct of these negotiations 
thus far. Although much hard bargain 
ing lies ahead, I am determined to 
bargain in good faith until our objecti\ 
can be realized. We urge on our Sovie 
negotiating partners equal seriousness 
of purpose. 

Our arms control policies will con- 
tinue to receive my close personal attt 
tion. Ambassadors Rowny, Nitze, and 
Starr [Edward L. Rowny, special repr 
sentative for arms control and disarm 
ment negotiations; Paul H. Nitze, hea^ 
of the U.S. delegation to the inter- 
mediate-range nuclear force negotia- 
tions; and Richard F. Starr, head of tl 
U.S. delegation on mutual reduction o 
forces and armaments and associated 
measures in central Europe] have bee; 
in Washington recently during schedu 
recesses in the negotiations. In each 
area, we have carefully assessed the 
status of negotiations and our positior 
In each case the negotiations remain c 
course, and our three negotiators will 
return shortly with a renewed mandat 
to pursue our objectives. Prior to theii 
departure. Ambassadors Rowny and 
Nitze will brief the Congress on the 
negotiations. Such regular consultatioi 
are also an essential part of our ap- 
proach. This Administration can have 
higher purpose than to achieve progre 
toward meaningful arms control whici" 
promotes international peace and secu 

ty^ 

'Text from White House press release. 



\\ 



ARMS CONTROL 



3 a demand for absolute security for 
country, which is tantamount to ab- 
ite insecurity for all other countries. 
;hort, it is a Soviet demand for 
emony. This will never be acceptable 
he United States. 

This Soviet demand is inappropriate 
.nother way as well. The INF 
otiations are bilateral negotiations 
kveen the United States and the 
I.S.R.; neither the United Kingdom 
France has authorized either the 
ted States or the Soviet Union to 
otiate on their behalf. On the con- 
_y, they have stated their refusal to 
e their forces limited or compensated 
in negotiations between us. From 
tr standpoint, their nuclear forces are 
itegic; they represent their last line 
lefense in a potentially threatened 
ition. 

There are a number of other impor- 
t issues separating the two sides, 
ch progress, however, has been 
ieved by the two delegations in sort- 
out what is important to each side 
illuminating the way to possible 
Gitions. A serious atmosphere has 
vlved in the INF talks. It is clear that 
itentiality exists for accommodating 
analytic concepts used by both sides. 
Vat is not yet clear is whether the 
iiiet Union is willing to accept agree- 
nt based exclusively on the principle 
Jieterrence. 

];. Position in START 

' ' first 2-month round of the START 
(Otiations has now been completed. 
' 'y are, of course, at an earlier stage 
1- n the INF talks, but the atmosphere 
5 orrespondingly serious and business- 
1. 

The U.S. position was outlined in 
^^■sident Reagan's speech at Eureka 
lege on May 9, 1982. Its essential 
1 is that of equal ceilings at much 
er levels of force— ceilings that 
jld strengthen deterrence and pro- 
te stability by significantly reducing 
Soviet lead in ICBMs. Coupled with 
dismantling of the Soviet inter- 
diate-range ballistic missiles proposed 
;he INF talks, such a result would 
ible us to maintain an overall level of 
ategic nuclear capability sufficient to 
er conflict, safeguard our national 
urity, and meet our commitments to 
es and friends. 

To achieve this goal, the President 

lounced a practical, phased approach 

the negotiation, like the procedure be- 

used in the INF talks. It is based on 

principle that the two arsenals 

)uld be equal both in the number of 



vember 1982 



weapons and in their destructive capaci- 
ty. "The focus of our efforts," the Presi- 
dent said, "will be to reduce significantly 
the most destabilizing systems— ballistic 
missiles, the number of warheads they 
carry, and their overall destructive 
potential." 

While no aspect of the problem is 
excluded from consideration and the 
United States will negotiate in good 
faith on any topics the Soviets wish to 
raise, the United States proposes that 
the first topic to be considered in the 
negotiations should be the reduction of 
ballistic missile warheads to equal levels 
at least one-third below current 
numbers. Both ground-based and 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles are 
included in this proposal. No more than 
half these warheads would be deployed 
on land-based missiles. This provision 
alone should achieve substantial reduc- 
tions in missile throw-weight. Our pro- 
posal calls for these warhead reductions, 
as well as significant reductions in the 
number of deployed missiles, to be 
achieved as quickly as possible. 

In a second phase, closely linked to 
the first, we will seek equal ceilings on 
other elements of U.S. and Soviet 
strategic forces, including equal limits 
on ballistic missile throw-weight at less 
than current U.S. levels. 

In both START and INF, the United 
States has made it clear that verification 
measures capable of assuring compliance 
are indispensable. For those provisions 



If the INF and 
START talks are suc- 
cessful, the huge Soviet 
advantage in ground- 
based ballistic missiles 
will be eliminated. These 
alone are the weapons 
which "defy deterrence. " 



that cannot be monitored effectively by 
national technical means of verification, 
we will be proposing cooperative 
measures, data exchanges, and collateral 
constraints that should provide the 
necessary confidence in compliance. The 
Soviet Union has indicated that it will be 
prepared where necessary to consider 
cooperative measures going beyond na- 
tional technical means. This is an en- 
couraging sign. Without satisfactory 



verification provisions, meaningful 
agreements will be impossible to 
achieve. 

The Soviet Union has attacked our 
START proposals as unfair, on the 
ground that they call for unequal reduc- 
tions—indeed, that they call for 
"unilateral Soviet disarmament." It is 
hardly obvious why this is the case. 
Each side now has approximately 7,500 
ballistic missile warheads. Under the 
American proposal, each side would 
have to reduce to no more than 5,000, of 
which no more than 2,500 could be on 
ICBMs. True, the Soviet Union would 
have to dismantle more ICBM warheads 
than we would in order to comply with 
the ICBM sublimit, while we might have 
to dismantle more submarine-based 
missiles. But that is the point. There is 
nothing inequitable about an equal ceil- 
ing which strengthens deterrence and 
stability. It is discouraging that this 
feature of the American proposal was 
not mentioned in a recent article in the 
Los Angeles Times by General Starodu- 
bov, a senior member of the Soviet 
START delegation. By omitting any 
reference to SLBMs, General Starodu- 
bov gives the reader an incomplete ver- 
sion of the American position. 

If the INF and START talks are 
successful, the huge Soviet advantage in 
ground-based ballistic missiles will be 
eliminated. These alone are the weapons 
which "defy deterrence." If the Soviet 
Union accepts nuclear arms control 
agreements based on the principle of 
"deterrence only," which is the heart of 
our negotiating position, a Soviet first 
strike would be impossible without ex- 
pending most of the Soviet force. Given 
such a change in the balance of the two 
forces, we could hope to protect our 
ICBM force effectively. Then— but only 
then— nuclear tension would diminish. 

There is another aspect of our 
START negotiating position which 
deserves emphasis. As President 
Reagan's speech at Eureka College 
makes clear, the American approach to 
START is directed in the first instance 
at the most destabilizing weapons and 
proposes a new unit of account as the 
basis for a treaty dealing with them and 
all other intercontinental nuclear 
weapons. That unit of account, replacing 
the "deployed launchers" used in SALT I 
and SALT II, would compare the Soviet 
and American forces both in the number 
of weapons on each side and their 
destructive capacity. The measure of 
destructive capacity we propose is that 



21 



ARMS CONTROL 



of throw-weight— the maximum weight 
of weapons a missile can propel. What 
we are seeking is an equal throw-weight 
limit for each side at levels below the 
present American level. This goal would 
require a greater reduction on the , 
Soviet side than on the American side. 
But the Soviet Union can hardly claim a 
right to preserve an advantage which 
could only be used for intimidation or 
aggression. Nor is there anything ine- 
quitable in the idea of unequal reduc- 
tions to achieve equality. The United 
States made larger reductions than any 
other power under the Washington 
Naval Treaty of 1922. 

The Need for Real Nuclear Parity 

If we yield in the end and wearily settle 
for INF and START agreements which 
allow the Soviet Union to preserve its 
overwhelming advantage in ballistic 



This would be a most dangerous illu- 
sion—the kind of illusion from which 
major wars have arisen in the past. 
President Reagan's approach to INF and 
START calls on the Soviet Union to join 
us in recognizing that the quest for 
hegemony is the greatest possible threat 
to the peace and that real nuclear parity 
between the Soviet Union and the 
United States— parity, that is, in deter- 
rent capacity— is the most feasible foun- 
dation for a joint program to establish 
world political stability based on the rule 
of law. 

The state of world politics does not 
justify the apocalyptic gloom of those 
who believe that resisting Soviet expan- 
sionism would be suicidal and, therefore, 
counsel an American retreat to isolation 
and submission. The Soviet drive for 
unlimited power faces insuperable 
obstacles. It confronts deep-seated 
economic and social problems at home 



President Reagan's approach to INF and START 
calls on the Soviet Union to join us in recognizing 
that the quest for hegemony is the greatest possible 
threat to the peace and that real nuclear parity 
between the Soviet Union and the United States 
. . . is the most feasible foundation for a joint pro- 
gram to establish world political stability based on 
the rule of law. 



missiles, we should find ourselves con- 
fronting former President Nixon's bleak 
prognosis. Such an outcome would 
legitimize the superiority in inter- 
mediate-range and intercontinental 
ground-based ballistic missiles that the 
Soviet Union has achieved under SALT 
and authorize it to consolidate and im- 
prove that advantage. On that basis, the 
Soviet leaders would be justified in con- 
tinuing to believe that they could trans- 
late their nuclear edge over the United 
States into political and diplomatic 
hegemony. 



and the ineradicable hostility of the na- 
tions it is seeking to rule abroad. It has 
suffered major defeats in peripheral 
campaigns, especially in the Middle 
East. And what Mr. Brezhnev has called 
"the crisis" in Poland is one of supreme 



importance to the future of the Soviet 
Union. Even the magnitude of its 
nuclear arsenal cannot protect the 
Soviet Union from the deeply rooted 
yearnings for freedom shared by peoph 
everywhere. Finally, and most importa: 
of all, the Soviet Union, like every othe 
country, must accept the implacable 
logic of the nuclear weapon. As Khrus- 
chev once said, the nuclear weapon doe 
not respect the difference between 
socialism and capitalism. 

Foreign policy is not a mathematic; 
exercise like chess. Like every other 
human enterprise, it must take account 
of the unforeseen. Chance, heroism, pa 
sion, and faith have greater influence i 
human affairs than the grim calculus o 
the nuclear equation. 

The ultimate issue of Soviet-Ameri 
can relations since 1917 is defined in ti 
nuclear arms talks with chilling clarity 
It is whether the Soviet Union is a stal 
like the others, willing to live as a 
member of the society of nations and t 
abide by its rules or, on the other hanc 
whether the Soviet Union will persist i 
the suicidal view that its mission is to 
lead a crusade to spread the "True 
Faith" by the sword. When the issue is 
raised with Soviet diplomats or pro- 
fessors, they say, "You are asking us t 
change a foreign policy rooted in the 
nature of our society and state." To th 
claim, the only possible answer is, "No 
at all. So far as we are concerned, you 
can preach the gospel of communism e 
much as you like. But the rest of the 
world cannot tolerate the use of aggre 
sion to achieve it." 

If the leaders of the Soviet Union 
are as rational and cautious as they ar 
supposed to be, they should want a 
period of peace and stability in their 
relationship with the West. On the 
whole, I think they will. Like all his 
modern predecessors. President Reag; 
has made it clear to the Soviet leaders 
that he would welcome such a change 
and cooperate fully in making it a 
reality. ■ 



22 




EAST ASIA 



Visit of Philippine 
President IVIarcos 



President Ferdinand E. Marcos 

of the Republic of the Philippines 

made a state visit to the United States 

September 15-21, 1982, to meet with 

President Reagan and other government officials. 

Following are remarks Tuade at the arrival ceremony and the 

dinner toasts of September 16^ 

and a Department announcenfient 

of September 20. 



ARRIVAL CEREMONY, 
SEPT. 16, 19822 

President Reagan 

Mr. President, Mrs. Marcos, it gives me 
special pleasure to welcome you to the 
United States. Mrs. Reagan and I have 
been long looking forward to returning 
the hospitality you showed us on our 
1969 visit to your country. 

Our two peoples enjoy a close friend- 
ship, one forged in shared history and 
common ideals. In World War II, 
Americans and Filipinos fought side by 
side in the defense of freedom — a strug- 
gle in which you personally fought so 
valiantly. 

The values for which we struggled — 
independence, liberty, democracy, 
justice, equality — are engraved in our 
Constitutions and embodied in our 
peoples' aspirations. Today our ties re- 
main strong, benefiting each of us over 
the full range of our relations. Political- 
ly, we tend to view many world issues 
the same general way. Yours is a re- 
spected voice for reason and moderation 
in international forums. 

The Philippines with its ASEAN 



[Association of South East Asian Na- 
tions] partners has taken the lead in 
search for self-determination for the 
people of Kampuchea. In that vein, let 
me also pay tribute to you and Mrs. 
Marcos' personal leadership and commit- 
ment to the care of refugees in South- 
east Asia. Under your direct sponsor- 
ship, the Philippines' refugee processing 
center has become a model of its kind in 
encouraging the development of self- 
sufficiency and the restoration of human 
dignity. 

The Philippines and you, Mr. Presi- 
dent, play an important role in address- 
ing the problems of economic develop- 
ment in the world. At Cancun, we made 
a new start toward a more effective and 
practical dialogue and improved coopera- 
tion among industrial and developing 
countries. Your leadership in that area 
is vital and widely respected. Under 
your leadership at home, the Philippines 
can boast a record of solid economic 
growth over the past decade, attrib- 
utable in significant part to its 
hospitable attitude toward free enter- 
prise and private initiative. 

Your country's dedication to improv- 
ing the standard of living of your people 



23 



EAST ASIA 




President and Mrs. Marcos are accompanied bv President and Mrs. Kea^an diirint; thi' 
White House arrival ceremony. 



24 



is an effort in which we've been de- 
iifi^hted to participate through bilateral 
and multilateral economic a.ssistance. 
Ynur continuing' interest in better nutri 
tion has led the Philippines to achieve 
self-sufficiency in food grain productior 

You can also point with pride to thi 
success of your rural electrification pro 
gram, now bringing benefits to an in- 
creasing number of remote regions. An 
I find it a matter of personal satisfactic 
that your country and my home State c 
California are both pioneers in develop- 
ing geothermal power to replace expen 
sive energ>' imports. 

The United States remains the 
Philippines' leading trading partner, an 
American firms are the largest foreign 
investors in your country, reflecting 
their confidence in your progress and 
prospects for economic growth. 

We have welcomed the growing tw 
way trade between our nations and ha\ 
been pleased that we've been able to 
keep our markets for the products of 
your growing manufacturing and in- 
dustrial sector the most open of any 
country in the industrialized world. 

America considers itself especially 
fortunate to have nearly 1 million per- 
sons of Filipino heritage now residing i 
our country. They bring with them the 
energy and their talents, and they con- 
tribute enormously to the rich diversit\ 
of American society. Similarly, thou- 
sands of Americans, enchanted by the 
beauty of your nation and by its peopk 
have chosen to live in the Philippines. 

Our security relationship is an esst 
tial element in mainUuning peace in th' 
region and is so recognized. This rela- 
tionship, one of several we have in the 
Western Pacific, threatens no one but 
contributes to the shield behind which 
the whole region can develop socially 
and economically. 

Ihider your leadership, the Philip- 
pines stands as a recognized force for 
peace and security in Southeast Asia 
through its bilateral efforts and throug 
its role in ASEAN, which is the focus ( 
our regional policies in Southeast Asia. 

The I'nited States deeply values it; 
close friendship and alliance with the 
Philippines. We seek to use this visit t( 
further strengthen our ties with your 
country. 

Nancy and I are personally delighti 
that you are here. And we say, "Wel- 
come to the United States. Welcome Ic 
our national home." 



Department of State Bullet 



resident Marcos 

behalf of the 50 million people of the 
ilippines, Mrs. Marcos and I express 
gratitude for your warm welcome to 
shington and to the United States of 
nerica. 
This great and beautiful city that is 
of the few cities that was built as a 
ital for a great nation is, indeed, as 
3 been written, the key to knowing 
' secret of America, and this house of 
,t i American people, an American fron- 
't r that never vanishes. Your beautiful 
( y with its grand memorials, its monu- 
nts, its walks, is, indeed, a city that 
morializes the great achievements of 
1; jr people for the past two centuries, 
t more than that, it keeps offering to 
! enterprising and the talented, the 
irageous and the strong, the rewards 
effort and of initiative. 

At the same time as I stand here on 
nerican soil, I realize that I stand on 
lat may be the center of the Govern- 
nt of the United States of America — 
re, where, as I have often stated, the 
;ure is being born. The future is being 
m depending upon the man who is in 
J White House. And the man who is in 
; White House today certainly is 
mating a new future for our world. 
For I come from that part of the 
rid wherein the poorest of the world's 
jpulation live. I come from that part of 
t > world that cherishes an image of 
i nerica with its ideals, its dreams, its 
iiisions. I come from the Philippines— a 
I rt of Asia which has been molded 
8 'Ug the principles of American de- 
r )cracy. We learned to love these ideals 
S i principles, and we lost a million of 
c r people fighting for them in the last 
\ r. 

We have always stood by these 
i 'als. We shall continue to do so, what- 
ar may be the cost— at the risk of our 
f -tunes, our lives. But more important 
c all, our honor will stand for the ideals 
c democracy that is our legacy from the 
I lited States of America. 

1 (lid not come to burden you further 
\th additional problems, for I know 
: U , a.s I have said in many a speech 
l'<<rr my own people and before the 
.iflii, fate and destiny has decreed that 
t ■ I'nited States of America be the 
t istee of modern civilization against the 
reat of a possible second Dark Ages, 
id America cannot fail. And, there- 
re, we, the Filipino people, come and 
ing to you a prayer that God, in His 
/ine providence, may grant you 
idance, strengthen both your heart 



and hand, so that that hand may be 
strong on the lever of power and save 
our humanity. 

If America fails, then the world is 
lost. And thus I can assure you that 
throughout all of Asia, there is nothing 
but a reservoir of good will for you, the 
American people, and the United States 
of America. 

Once again, may I say thank you for 
your warm welcome and your hospitali- 
ty, which I know we will never be able 
to reciprocate. 



EAST ASIA 



DINNER TOASTS, 
SEPT. 16, 19823 

President Reagan 

Before I say what I was prepared to say 
here, I think that all of us ought to join 
in a "Happy Birthday." There is a period 
in which you can tell a lady's age — 
[laughter] — when it is Irene Marcos, and 
its her 22d birthday. Happy birthday. 
But tonight we welcome old and 



Department Announcement, 
September 20, 1982 

The President of the Philippines, His 
Excellency Ferdinand E. Marcos, met 
with President Reagan at the White 
House on September 16. In addition, 
during the course of his state visit to 
Washington, President Marcos met with 
the Vice President, Secretary Shultz, 
Secretary Weinberger, congressional 
leaders, and other prominent U.S. 
Government officials. Other members of 
his party, including Mrs. Marcos, Prime 
Minister Virata, and Foreign Minister 
Romulo, also met with Secretary Regan, 
Secretary Baldrige, U.S. Trade Repre- 
sentative Brock, and other Administra- 
tion leaders. 

The two Presidents reaffirmed the 
strong traditional ties between the 
United States and the Philippines, as 
well as their commitments under the 
Mutual Defense Treaty. They reviewed 
the international situation, with special 
attention to the Pacific and Southeast 
Asia. They also reviewed the full range 
of bilateral, political, economic, and 
security issues. President and Mrs. 
Marcos are proceeding today to New 
York and other stops in the United 
States. 

The Government of the United 
States and the Republic of the Philip- 
pines have agreed to begin the scheduled 
5-year review of the military bases 
agreement in April 1983 in Manila. The 
review will entail an examination of the 
provisions of the military bases agree- 
ment to insure that they continue to 
meet both countries' current needs and 
interests. Agreement was also reached 
on conducting periodic strategic con- 
sultations at the ministerial level, begin- 
ning with a visit to the United States by 
Philippine Minister of Defense Juan 
Ponce Enrile in February 1983. 



The two countries took action on 
several specific economic matters during 
the visit, including exchanging in- 
struments of ratification of a tax treaty, 
completing a civil aviation agreement, 
concluding an agreement for the promo- 
tion of tourism, and signing an 
agricultural cooperation agreement. The 
Export-Import Bank of the United 
States agreed, subject to final congres- 
sional concurrence, to provide additional 
financial guarantees in the amount of 
$204.5 million for the U.S.-designed 
Philippine nuclear power plant at 
Bataan, a project intended to move the 
Philippines closer to energy self-reliance. 

As a further cooperative action, the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury has 
agreed to continue the wider dialogue 
begun during this visit through annual 
consultations with the Philippine 
Ministry of Finance on financial and 
related issues of mutual concern. An 
agreement recently signed providing $50 
million in economic supporting fund 
assistance to improve economic condi- 
tions for the people living near the U.S. 
military bases was also noted. The U.S. 
Agency for International Development 
and the Philippine Government agreed 
to explore new cooperative measures to 
reduce loss of life and property due to 
typhoons by using the most advanced 
tracking and warning technologies. The 
U.S. Government also agreed to or- 
ganize an investment mission of U.S. 
businessmen to the Philippines and other 
ASEAN countries in 1983. 

The state visit by President Marcos 
was a significant milestone in the rela- 
tions between the two countries sym- 
bolizing the close and constructive rela- 
tionship which has long existed between 
the United States of America and the 
Philippines. 



Made available to news correspondents by 
Department spokesman John Hughes. ■ 



Dvember 1982 



25 



EAST ASIA 



good friends to the White House in a 
visit symbolic of the superb relationsiiip 
between our two countries. It's a 
nostalgic occasion for us, as well. Nancy 
and I often think of our 1969 visit to 
Manila, when we first experienced that 
unexcelled Philippine hospitality as the 
guests of our guests here tonight. And 
the birthday girl was quite young and 
small at that time. 

Many things have changed in both 
countries since that time, but one thing 
remains constant — the basic nature of 
the Filipino-U.S. friendship. It remains 
solid. Both countries have worked hard 



over the years to maintain excellent co- 
operation in defense, foreign [Kilicy, 
refugee matters, economic assistance, 
and many other areas. And I pledge to 
you. President Marcos, that the United 
States will do its share to strengthen 
those ties in the 1930s— the 1980s! 
[Laughter] I have been doing a little 
reminiscing at the table, forgive me. 
Yes, the 1930s was my first job. 
[Laughter] 

We value the friendship of the 
Republic of the Philippines for many 
reasons. Our intertwined histories dur- 
ing the first 50 years of this century left 




its imprint on your institutions of 
government, your educational system, 
and your public services, such as public 
health. The widespread use of the 
English language is a result of that era. 
So is your flourishing free enterprise 
system. 

As important as our shared historie 
or shared strategic interests which spar 
this entire century, in World War II 
Filipinos and Americans fought and die 
together. And you, yourself, Mr. Presi- 
dent, played an unforgettably heroic 
part in that conflict. Coming out of that 
war, your generation and mine fully 
understood the need for collective 
security arrangements. Unfortunately, 
some of today's young people, blessed b 
decades of relative peace, may not havt 
this understanding. I think it's our dut\ 
to impart our historical experience to 
them. 

Today a strong defense alliance is a 
major factor in contributing to the 
security of the Philippines and to the 
maintenance of peace and security in 
Asia. With the next review of the 
military bases agreement, which begins 
in 1983, we shall continue to modernize 
our security relationship to best serve 
our mutual security interests. 

Both of our economies depend on 
vigorous trade and investment. These 
ties remain strong, and your presence i 
Washington has enabled us to conclude 
several outstanding economic matters. 

We have accomplished a great deal 
together over the years. We will all do 
more in the years to come. Common 
determination to achieve a better life 
doesn't mean that we need to be alike: 
we need only to treat one another in a 
spirit of generosity and mutual respect 
If we do that, our continuing commit- 
ment to one another, resting as it does 
on many years of close relations, will bi 
solid now and for the future. 

In that spirit, let me offer a toast: i 
the President and Mrs. Marcos and to 
the people of the Philippines and to the ' 
mutual respect, the dedication to peace 
ami security in the world and the share 
values which unite us. 



President Marcos 

1 feel I must pay tribute to this elegant 
and fairy-like party and dinner which 
has reminded me too much not only of 
home but of some dreamland at home: ; 
tribute to the taste and sen.se of beauty 
to — perhaps, primarily, not only to 
President Reagan but Mrs. Reagan for 



26 



Department of State Bulleti 



EAST ASIA 



s lovely party, which I shall always 
nember as the Firefly Party in the 
lite House. [Laughter] 

,J You do us great honor with this din- 
ff-. Allow me to extend the gratitude of 
million people in the Republic of the 
ilippines, Mrs. Marcos, and myself for 
s hospitality and this generosity. Cer- 
nly, we will be unable to reciprocate 
s beautiful event. You even had the 
igs all prepared, including a Filipino 
ig that's a favorite of the First Lady 

Ij the Philippines, Dahil Sa lya, which 



means "because of you": because of you 
must pass through the rigors of difficul- 
ty, hardship, before it can claim this ap- 
pellation. And I am reminded, too, of 
the more — almost a century of relation- 
ship between our two countries and the 
periods of difficulty, the rigors, perhaps 
even of misunderstanding, and battles 
that we have fought together. And 
perhaps, therefore, it is not too rash to 
say that it is proper to use the appella- 
tion "friendship" between the American 
and the Filipino. 




S-retarv and Mrs. Shultz host a luncheon in honor of President and Mrs. Marcos in the 
Enjamin Franklin Room at the State Department. 



L ove, because of you I live, and because 
you I am what I am. And then you 
d the other theme song which was a 
vorite of both President Reagan and 
e other president, I understand, the 
erne song of Dr. Zhivago, which is a 
ig story, of course, and which I won't 
Ik about. [Laughter] It happens to be 
le of our theme songs because it was 
ng in once of what threatened to be a 
agedy, but which was not, and that is 
hy we remember it. 

Tonight, the Philippines once again 
obligated to you for your kind and 
■nerous words. I note, too, the use of 
e word "friendship," and I am remind- 
I of the first President of the United 
Dates, the Father of this great nation, 
eorge Washington, who said that 
iendship is a slow, growing plant that 



ovember1982 



That friendship — that abiding friend- 
ship — we cherish deeply. And this is 
why as I come and stand, once again, on 
American soil, I cannot but be candid. I 
would not be candid if I did not speak, 
too, of those misunderstandings and the 
adversities which we have faced to- 
gether. For the world faces challenge 
and change. We are in a period of fer- 
ment. As one of your great writers has 
said: You have passed through a period 
of torment, an ordeal, perhaps, of 
tragedy, as you experienced the 
assassination of some of your American 
leaders, constitutional crisis in the 
Presidency, a trauma of Vietnam, and 
occasionally doubts about your own 
capability. 

Certainly as we look around in Asia, 



Philippines— A Profile 



Geography 

Area: 1 If). 707 sq. mi. Capital: Manila (pop. 6 
million in metropolitan area) remains the de 
facto capital, although Quezon City, located 
within the metro Manila area, was designated 
the capital by law in 1948. Other Cities: 
Davao (600,000), Cebu (450,000). 

People 

Population: 49.5 million. Annual Growth 
Rate: 2.5%. Ethnic Groups: Malay, Chinese. 
Religions: Catholic (83%), Protestant (9%), 
Muslim (5%). Languages: Filipino (based on 
Tagalog), national language; English, lan- 
guage of government and instruction in 
higher education. Literacy: About 88%. 

Government 

Type: Republic. Independence: 1946. Con- 
stitution: January 1973. Branches: Executive 
— President. Legislative — National Assembly. 
Judicial — Supreme Court. Suffrage: Univer- 
sal; voting compulsory. Administrative Sub- 
divisions: 13 regions, 73 provinces, 60 
chartered cities. 

Economy 

GNP: $39.7 billion (1981). Per Capita In- 
come: $783 (1981). Annual Inflation Rate: 

13% (1981). 

Natural Resources: Agricultural lands; 
minerals, including copper, gold, chromium; 
fisheries; timber. 

Agriculture: Rice, corn, sugar, coconut 
products, pineapples, bananas. 

Industries: Textiles, electronics, phar- 
maceuticals, wood products, food processing, 
chemicals, mining. 

Trade (1981): Exports— $5.72 billion: 
electronic components, textiles, coconut prod- 
ucts, sugar, wood products, fruit products. 
Imports — $7.95 billion: machinery, fuels, 
transport equipment, cereals, chemicals, tex- 
tile fibers. Major Trading Partners: U.S., 
Japan, EC. 

Membership in International Organizations 

U.N. and its specialized agencies, World 
Bank group (IBRD, IFC, IDA), IMF, GATT, 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
INTELSAT. ■ 



the historic relation of the United States 
with the countries of that part of the 
world are marked occasionally with 
doubt, mutual distrust, and often there 
is fear that perhaps America is weary of 
the responsibility that it has for the 



27 



EAST ASIA 



world community. But the Philippines 
has always stood on the firm conviction 
that America does not weary, that 
America is firm and resolute, that 
America may question some of its own 
actions but that it faces and confronts 
its problems squarely, fairly, justly. 

As I stand on American soil and I 
see the doubts rising in Asia, I see 
another phenomenon that clears my 
mind. It is the phenomenon of an 
American nation led by a new leader- 
ship, earnestly exerting heroic efforts in 
order to stop the slide and the loss of 
prestige of American leadership 
throughout the world. 



Yes, out of the dark, out of the 
shadows of the decline in even respect 
for America and decline for its leader- 
ship, there is a rising, an emerging, a 
new America — not only in Asia but 
perhaps throughout the world — an 
emerging, a new America under a new 
leader, resurgent, firm, strong, commit- 
ted, and forthright. And that leader is 
President Ronald Reagan. 

The stakes are high. The stakes for 
a strong and emergent America are 
high. All the nations pray for your suc- 
cess, even those that criticize you. For 
even the mercantile nations will reap 
reward from your success, but they will 



U.S., Philippines Conclude 
Taxation and Air Agreements 



At the conclusion of the luncheon in the 
State Department's Benjamin Franklin 
Room given by Secretary George Shultz 
in honor of visiting President Ferdinand 
Marcos and Mrs. Imelda Romualdez 
Marcos, two significant accords will be 
concluded. Secretary Regan and Philip- 
pine Prime Minister (and Finance 
Minister) Cesar Virata will exchange in- 
struments of ratification of a treaty in- 
tended to avoid double taxation and 
authorizing closer cooperation between 
the tax authorities of the two countries. 
The tax treaty was signed at Manila 
on October 1, 1976. After a period of 
continuing consultations on its final ef- 
fects, the U.S. Senate ratified the accord 
on December 16, 1981. The measure is 
designed to avoid taxation by both coun- 
tries of the same income which may be 
earned by either individuals or corpora- 
tions. It also provides the framework for 
greater consultation between tax agen- 



cies in both countries. This is intended 
to prevent cases of tax evasion on both 
sides. 

Secretary Shultz and Philippine 
Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo will 
sign an exchange of notes bringing into 
effect an air transport agreement be- 
tween the two countries. Its terms allow 
competition and pricing flexibility among 
the participating lines of both countries. 
It also provides for increases in the 
potential number of airlines allowed to 
fly between the countries and the fre- 
quencies of their flights. Because the 
Philippines is the third largest air travel 
market for the United States in the 
Pacific, this agreement is of major im- 
portance to the United States as well as 
to the Philippines and its national flag 
carrier, Philippine Air Lines. 



Press release 288 of Sept. 16, 1982. 



reap comfort. They will reap an addi- 
tional car for a family, a more comfort 
able home, more sumptuous dinners. 

But the stake of the poorer nations 
like mine are greater. Their stake is su 
vival. The other option is death. And si 
for you we have nothing but prayers, a 
I said this morning. And so we look 
toward this phenomenon and say: Let 
there be strength and greatness for th( 
American nation, for only then can the 
be hope for us, the poorer nations. Anc 
let America reclaim its role, its historic 
place, and its historic relationship with 
the poorer nations of the world — the 
members of the Third World, my work 
For that is your rightful place, Mr. 
President, and America. 

Once again, I say we pray, there- 
fore, that God grant to America this 
strength and capability to reclaim its 
natural place and historic relationship 
with all the nations and with other na- 
tions reestablish order in our anxious, 
troubled world. We pray for this, we 
hope for this — not only the big nations, 
but especially the small ones. 

And so may I ask you to rise and 
join me to a toast: To the continued 
health and success of the President of 
the United States, the prosperity and 
the strength of the American people, 
and the friendship of the peoples of the 
United States and the Philippines. 



'Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 20, 1982. 

^Held on the South Lawn of the White 
House where President Marcos was acconiei 
a formal welcome with full military honors. 

^Made in the Rose Carden at the White 
House. ■ 



28 



ituation in East Timor 



John H. Holdridge 



I Statem.ent before the Subcommittee 
^' \sian and Pacific Affairs of the 
' ise Foreign Affairs Committee on 
''^ tember U, 1982. Ambassador 
'" dridge is Assistant Secretary for 
"" :( Asian and Pacific Affairs.^ 

'™ n pleased to have the opportunity to- 
"" to discuss with you the situation in 
;t Timor. This is the fifth time the 
te Department has testified before 
House of Representatives on this 
eific subject since March 1977. The 
3t recent such occasion was in June 

before the Subcommittee on Inter- 
ional Operations. In addition, I com- 
Qted on the situation in East Timor 
oart of a joint hearing on human 

Its in East Asia held in November 

1 by your subcommittee and the 
man Rights and International Organi- 
ions subcommittee. 

It is important, as we examine this 
iplex situation in East Timor, that 
give due note both to the progress 
t been achieved in meeting the 
nanitarian needs of the Timorese peo- 
as well as to the problems that re- 
n. 

U.S. policy with regard to East 
lor has been consistent through three 
ministrations. We accept the incor- 
•ation of East Timor into Indonesia, 
hout recognizing that a valid act of 
f-determination has taken place there. 
r efforts now are concentrated on do- 
what we can to improve the welfare 
the Timorese people. Practically we 
/e found that progress in achieving 
• humanitarian goals can be achieved 
y by working closely with the Indone- 
n Government and with the interna- 
nal organizations active in East 
nor. 
In addition to our concern regarding 
St Timor, there are a number of other 
portant elements in our relationship 
th Indonesia. Indonesia is the largest 
intry in the Association of South East 
ian Nations (ASEAN), support for 
lich is the cornerstone of U.S. policy 
Southeast Asia. It is a moderate voice 
the developing world, an important oil 
oducer and a major arena for U.S. 
ide and investment, and it occupies a 
ategic position astride vital sea lanes 
nnecting the Indian and Pacific 



Oceans. We value highly our cooperative 
relationship with Indonesia and expect it 
to continue. 

Current Conditions 

Any consideration of the current food 
and health situation in East Timor must 
begin by acknowledging the major relief 
effort undertaken jointly by the Indone- 
sian Government, international agencies, 
and the United States and other donors 
from mid-1979 to early 1981. Admin- 
istered by the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Catholic 
Relief Services (CRS), this effort at its 
peak in 1980 provided food and /or 
medical care to more than 300,000 
people — fully half of the Timorese 
population. The United States was the 
largest contributor to this effort, pro- 
viding over $14 million in cash and com- 
modities. By April 1981, the involved in- 
ternational agencies concluded that the 
emergency situation had been overcome 
and that the long-term needs of the 
Timorese people could best be met by 
shifting emphasis from relief to develop- 
ment. 

In the last year, there have been 
reports that the food situation was again 
deteriorating, and East Timor was fac- 
ing the threat of famine. Since the 
economy and agricultural base of East 
Timor are extremely fragile, the United 
States has been quick to look into any 
reports of food shortages. We have 
discussed the food situation in detail 
with representatives of the involved in- 
ternational organizations, which have 
trained personnel traveling to East 
Timor on a regular basis. Officials from 
our embassy in Jakarta have visited 
East Timor four times this year, in- 
cluding three trips in the last 3 months. 

Based on our constant monitoring, it 
is our view that East Timor is not now 
facing a famine situation nor the threat 
of famine in the near future. The food 
distribution system in the province is 
poor, and the harvest earlier this year 
was disappointing, due primarily to bad 
weather and pests. Some isolated areas, 
particularly in the southeast portion of 
the island, have experienced food short- 
ages. These areas demand — and are ap- 
parently receiving — immediate atten- 
tion. The Indonesian Government in 
May shipped 1,000 tons of corn to East 



EAST ASIA 



Timor which is being used to supplement 
food supplies of over 25,000 people in 
the hardest hit areas. 

Serious health problems remain in 
East Timor. Malaria is a particularly 
acute problem, affecting large numbers 
of the population. Like most of rural In- 
donesia and, indeed, most of the devel- 
oping world, East Timor suffers from a 
shortage of doctors, other trained 
medical personnel, and medical facilities. 
The village health programs set up by 
the ICRC in connection with the relief 
effort have had a beneficial effect, and 
the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI) — the 
ICRC's local partner in the relief ef- 
fort — remains active in the province. As 
I will discuss later, the Indonesian 
Government and the international agen- 
cies have ongoing programs to address 
both food and health problems. 

With regard to the military situa- 
tion, the Timorese guerrilla group — 
Fretilin — does not seriously threaten 
overall Indonesian authority. It is com- 
posed of no more than a few hundred 
armed men plus unarmed support per- 
sonnel. Fretilin does, however, retain 
the capability to conduct occasional 
limited operations, primarily in isolated 
or sparsely populated areas such as 
those in the highlands on the eastern tip 
of Timor. Its operations continue to 
result in some Indonesian casualties. 
There are unconfirmed reports of a re- 
cent upsurge in Fretilin activity, perhaps 
designed for propaganda impact in ad- 
vance of the upcoming U.N. General 
Assembly session. 

The Indonesian military conducted 
large-scale sweep operations in the prov- 
ince in the summer of 1981, designed to 
isolate the Fretilin remnants and deny 
them access to supplies from sym- 
pathizers in the villages and towns. 
These operations were concluded by Oc- 
tober 1981. Currently, the pace of 
Indonesian-initiated military operations 
is low, consisting primarily of small foot 
patrols. 

It is noteworthy that the people of 
East Timor turned out in large numbers 
in May of this year to participate for the 
first time in Indonesian national elec- 
tions. The elections in the province were 
carried out without disruption, in a com- 
pletely peaceful atmosphere. 

We remain concerned about reports 
of abuses in connection with military 
operations. Obtaining solid information 
about such alleged military abuses in 
East Timor is a most difficult task. One 
of the more extreme charges made is 
that Indonesian forces have engaged in 



29 



EAST ASIA 



a systematic effort to kill innocent 
Timorese. We have foun<] no evidence to 
support such a charge, though some 
military abuses may have occurred. 

There are also recurring charges of 
disappearances and mistreatment of 
Timorese. While any abuse of human 
rights is deplorable, the number of 
allegations of physical mistreatment and 
disappearance has declined since the 
period of fiercest fighting between In- 
donesian and Fretilin forces (1976-78). 
Moreover, there have been few allega- 
tions of such abuses since the conclusion 
of last summer's sweep operations. 

Another positive development is that 
there is more information available to 
the international community on the 
numbers and conditions of detainees in 
East Timor as a result of the increased 
international access permitted by the 
Government of Indonesia to the prin- 
cipal places of detention— Comarca 
prison in Dili and Atauro Island off the 
coast of East Timor. 

An ICRC team visited East Timor in 
February to begin a program of prison 
visitation and visited both sites. At that 
time, 71 persons were imprisoned at 
Comarca, 13 of whom were under con- 
trol of the military authorities (i.e., de- 
tained primarily for their association 
with Fretilin rather than for activities 
judged to be criminal by the govern- 
ment). 

Most persons suspected by the In- 
donesian Government of supporting or 
sympathizing with Fretilin are detained 
on Atauro Island. The ICRC team on its 
February trip spent 4 days on Atauro 
and reported 3,737 persons had been 
temporarily relocated to the island. Most 
of these people had been sent to Atauro 
during the military sweep operations in 
1981. Since the ICRC visit, some per- 
sons have been moved from Atauro to 
the East Timor mainland, and there 
have apparently been some new arrivals 
on the island. We have no reliable infor- 
mation on the precise current population 
on Atauro but have no reason to believe 
it has dramatically changed in recent 
months. 

The facilities on Atauro are not a 
prison as such. Barracks-type quarters 
have been constructed for the detainees, 
but they are free to move about the 
island. A recent embassy visitor in- 
dicated conditions on Atauro have im- 
proved considerably since the ICRC 
began its prison visitation program in 
February. 



Humanitarian Efforts 

Let me now report on what is being 
done to address the humanitarian and 
economic development problems that re- 
main in East Timor by the Government 
of Indonesia, by the international 
organizations, and by the United States. 

By far the most active and impor- 
tant role is being undertaken by the 
Government of Indonesia itself, which 
has significantly expanded its develop- 
ment activities in East Timor each year 
since 1976. For example, the govern- 
ment will spend nearly $80 million on 
development and other programs in the 
province, an increase of more than 50% 
over last year. 

This Indonesian effort is even more 
striking when viewed in the context of 
that country's overall development 
needs. Although faced in each of its 26 
far-flung provinces with enormous 
socioeconomic problems, and the 
political pressures they engender, the 
Government of Indonesia has given top 
priority to East Timor. It will spend 
more per capita on development in East 
Timor than in any other province and 
about 50% more per capita than in the 
country as a whole. 

It must also be noted that the 
government's development effort, by 
necessity, must be concentrated at this 
stage on fundamental infrastructure 
projects, since there were almost no 
basic facilities— roads, public sanitation, 
schools— at the time of the Portuguese 
withdrawal. What little infrastructure 
existed, moreover, was further damaged 
during the civil war. In that context, the 
fact that almost all Timorese children 
now have access to at least primary 
schools is itself a notable achievement. 

Supplementing the Indonesian 
Government efforts, the international 
organizations have made a major con- 
tribution to improving the welfare of the 
Timorese people. Going about their 
tasks in a nonpolitical, nonpolemical 
way, they have succeeded where a con- 
frontational approach would surely have 
failed. I have already mentioned their 
past role in the international relief ef- 
fort: let me outline their current pro- 
grams. 

The ICRC has five ongoing activities 
in East Timor. First, it is continuing to 
provide technical assistance to the PMI 
in support of food and health programs 
in East Timor. Second, ICRC is serving 
as the intermediary for family reunifica- 
tion of persons with immediate relatives 



in Portugal and elsewhere. Third, sines 
April 1981 it has administered a traciri 
program to assist Timorese — both in 
Timor and abroad— to locate missing o 
displaced relatives. This is a traditiona 
Red Cross function that can play an in' 
portant role in protecting human right 
Fourth, as already noted, in February 
1982, the ICRC began a program of 
prison visitations. This visitation pro- 
gram has increased the effectiveness o 
the tracing operation, and many persoi 
previously reported missing or disap- 
peared have been located on Atauro. 
Finally, food and medical supplies pro- 
vided through the ICRC since March t( 
detainees on Atauro have had a signifi 
cant positive effect on the conditions o 
detention. This program is continuing 
CRS, which had the largest progra 
in East Timor during the international \ 
relief efforts, has turned its attention t 
agricultural development. It is ad- 
ministering a 5-year, $5 million river 
basin development plan begun in late 
1981 and funded by the I'.S. Agency f' 
International Development (AID). The 
plan concentrates on improving 
agricultural productivity in three 
lowland river basins on the north coast 
of Timor through a pilot project which 
when complete, will increase food pro- 
duction in East Timor and reduce the 
likelihood of food shortages in the yeai 
to come. 

A third international agency, the 
U.N. International Children's Emergei 
cy Fund (l^NICEF). has recently begu 
work in East Timor. Under the terms 
an agreement signed in June 1982, 
UNICEF will work with the PMI in pr 
viding primary health care services to 
the women and children in seven villap 
where health conditions are poorest. T 
program will include training of 
paramedical personnel so that the 
benefits to the people of East Timor u 
continue after the program has been 
completed. 

All three of the agencies listed abo 
have expatriate staff in Jakarta who 
travel frequently to East Timor and eii 
joy good access throughout the provim 
The ICRC has its own helicopter, ena- 
bling its personnel to reach remote are 
of the province. The ICRC, represent- 
ative has been making monthly visits o 
6 or 7 days' duration each to supervise 
his agency's activities there. A CRS 
representative frequently visits the pro 
ince. The ICRC, CRS, and UNICEF 
have resident Indonesian staffs in the 



30 



Department of State Bulleti 



EAST ASIA 



vince and work closely with the large 
dent PMI contingent in East Timor. 
In addition to the international agen- 
jrograms, AID is working directly 
h the Indonesian Government in im- 
Tienting a malaria control program, 
ler a $3.6 million agreement signed in 
1-1980, to cover the entire island of 
lor, both East and West. Initially, im- 
nentation was delayed by logistical 
'iculties in getting supplies to affected 
as in East Timor, but the project was 
cially inaugurated in April 1982. It is 
imated that 50,000 people will have 
n clinically diagnosed and treated for 
laria by the end of this year. By 
M983, almost 25,000 households will 
e been sprayed to prevent further 
ead of the disease. When the project 
mplete, an estimated 45% of the 

)i)ulation of East Timor will be pro- 

«te(i against malaria. 

lernational Access and Family 
lunification 

^lile international access to East Timor 
•nains limited, there has been major 
r irovement in recent months. In addi- 
■ 1 to a continuation of the improved 
1 ess to East Timor enjoyed by U.S. 
i;sion and international agency person- 
1 , tliere has been an increase in the 
•] liber of journalists and diplomatic 
isoiinel allowed to visit the island. 
- iMT.g these have been a U.S. academic 
J lup. including Stanley Roth of Chair- 
n Sdlarz' staff in November 1981; a 
jildiiiatic group, including a U.S. Em- 
:^sy representative in December 1981; 
f iiier Australian Prime Minister Gough 
\ lit lam and journalist Peter Hastings 
I. February of this year; West German 
jiirnalist 0. G. Roeder, who has written 
etensively on Indonesia for many years, 
i: March; several European journalists 
(da Dutch film crew in April; jour- 
t lists from the Philadelphia Inquirer, 
■A ian Wall Street Journal, and Reuters 
iws agency in May-June; a delegation 
the World Council of Churches in 
ne; Far Eastern Economic Re^new and 
;sociated Press correspondents in July; 
ambassadors and other members of 
e Jakarta diplomatic community in 
rly August; and an American Jesuit 
ficial in late August 1982. Indeed, one 
the reasons for the recent flurry of 
ess articles on East Timor is precisely 



because the Indonesian Government has 
been increasingly willing to let outsiders 
into the province to take a look at the 
situation firsthand. 

Increased access to East Timor is 
one of the best examples of how quiet 
efforts are most effective in addressing 
Indonesian human rights issues. In 
numerous conversations with Indonesian 
officials over the past months, U.S. of- 
ficials have emphasized the value of in- 
creased international access and the 
need for action on the humanitarian 
problems of the Timorese people. Our 
conversations have, I believe, played a 
role in the improvements that have oc- 
curred. 

Our embassy in Jakarta also has 
followed closely the matter of family 
reunions and repatriation of Portuguese 
citizens from East Timor, the majority 
of whom have been proceeding for 
residence either in Portugal or 
Australia. Progress is being made but 
details have not generally been made 
public. A recent ICRC situation report 
on its programs in East Timor that was 
made public provided limited informa- 
tion on family reunification. It stated 
that family reunification under the 
auspices of ICRC involving 25 persons 
(11 going to Portugal and 14 to 
Australia) had taken place during the 
first 6 months of this year. The ICRC 
will continue to exercise a facilitative 
role in the area of family reunification. 

In conclusion, the record shows 
progress in many areas. Programs have 
been established to address many of the 
serious social and economic problems. 
The Indonesian Government has demon- 
strated a willingness to come to grips 
with some of the most disturbing prob- 
lems, as evidenced by increased interna- 
tional access, the beginning of the prison 
visitation program, and the entry of 
UNICEF into the province. We will con- 
tinue to follow events in East Timor 
closely, taking every appropriate oppor- 
tunity to continue our quiet dialogue 
with Indonesians who are capable of in- 
fluencing developments in the province 
and fostering the kind of humanitarian 
progress which is our common goal. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Kampuchea and 
American Interests 



by John H. Holdridge 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
September 15, 1982. Ambassador 
Holdridge is Assistant Secretary for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs. '■ 

I am pleased to have the opportunity to 
appear before this subcommittee to 
review the Administration's policy 
toward Kampuchea, including the Kam- 
puchean seat in the United Nations. 
Since 1970 the Khmer people have suf- 
fered immeasurably through the conse- 
quences of a destructive war, a complete 
restructuring of society, and now the in- 
vasion and occupation of their country 
by the forces of a stronger, neighboring 
country. I welcome the opportunity to 
review U.S. policy toward Kampuchea 
before you today. 

U.N. Credentials 

At each U.N. General Assembly since 
the Vietnamese invasion and occupation 
of Kampuchea in 1978, Vietnam and its 
allies have challenged the credentials of 
the representative of Democratic Kam- 
puchea. The ultimate goal of Vietnam 
and its friends is to seat the Heng 
Samrin regime, which Vietnam installed 
and controls. In every case, the chal- 
lenge has been defeated easily through 
the efforts of the governments of the 
Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), supported by much of 
Western Europe, the nonaligned world, 
Japan, and the United States. 

After careful consultation with our 
friends and allies, particularly the 
Southeast Asian countries whose in- 
terests are most threatened by the Viet- 
namese invasion of Kampuchea, the 
United States has again decided to sup- 
port the position of ASEAN to continue 
accrediting the Democratic Kampuchea 
representatives. Our stand remains as in 
the past based on the technical ground 
that, having granted credentials to a 
representative, the United Nations can 
withdraw them only if there is a 
superior claimant to the seat. The 
credentials of Democratic Kampuchea 
have been accepted since its assumption 
to power in 1975, and there still is no 



)vember1982 



31 



EAST ASIA 



superior claimant. The Heng Sanirin 
regime is not a superior claimant 
because it was created by Vietnam, is 
controlled by Vietnamese officials both 
in Phnom Penh and in Hanoi, and is 
maintained in Phnom Penh only by the 
Vietnamese armed forces that continue 
to occupy Kampuchea in violation of the 
U.N. Charter and in defiance of General 
Assembly resolutions. 

Support for seating the Heng 
Samrin regime would indicate interna- 
tional acceptance of a government im- 
posed by foreign aggression in violation 
of the U.N. Charter. Further, if Viet- 
nam's invasion of Kampuchea was sanc- 
tioned by seating the Heng Samrin 
representatives in the United Nations, 
the incentive would be reduced for a 
negotiated settlement as called for by 
successive U.N. General Assembly 
resolutions on Kampuchea since 1979 
and by the declaration of the 
U.N. -sponsored International Con- 
ference on Kampuchea in July 1981. It is 
important to note that those U.N. 
resolutions, which call for the 
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and 
self-determination for the Khmer people, 
were proposed by the Third World coun- 
tries of ASEAN and supported by the 
majority of the Third World and non- 
aligned nations. The small and weak na- 
tions of the world clearly share 
ASEAN's determination to defend the 
principles of national integrity and 
noninterference, which continue to be so 
blatantly violated by Vietnam. 

Democratic Kampuchea Coalition 

The broadening of the Democratic Kam- 
puchea regime into a coalition of leading 
indigenous and independent Kampu- 
chean political elements opposed to the 
Vietnamese occupation and domination 
of Kampuchea and broadly representa- 
tive of the Khmer people should increase 
support for the Democratic Kampuchea 
claim to the U.N. seat and ASEAN's ap- 
proach within and outside the United 
Nations this year. The coalition was 
achieved with significant encouragement 
by ASEAN. Although the United States 
has not been directly involved, we 
welcome and endorse its formation. It 
brings together two non-Communist 
groups — those led by respected na- 
tionalist leaders. Prince Sihanouk and 
Prime Minister Son Sann— and the 
Khmer Rouge. These groups retain their 
political and military autonomy. The 
coalition obviously strengthens 



32 



ASEAN's strategy' of gaining acceptance 
for the credentials of Democratic Kam- 
puchea in the United Nations, while de- 
nying the seat to the Vietnamese-con- 
trolled regime in Phnom Penh, but this 
is by no means the only reason that the 
coalition is important for Kampuchea. 

The coalition provides a domestic 
and international platform for the non- 
Khmer Rouge nationalist Kampucheans 
like Prince Sihanouk and Prime Minister 
Son Sann and could allow them to ex- 
pand significantly their domestic and in- 
ternational status and support as true 
representatives of the Khmer people. 
The fact that Prince Sihanouk will ad- 
dress the U.N. General Assembly and 
that His Excellency Son Sann will lead 
the Kampuchean delegation is an impor- 
tant step forward. We believe it of ma- 
jor significance that the coalition give 
the non-Communist Khmer the platform 
to play a leading role in any political set- 
tlement in Kampuchea. The Khmer peo- 
ple now have the hope of an eventual 
choice other than the Vietamese- 
controlled Heng Samrin regime or the 
return to power of the Khmer Rouge. 
The most recent reporting from State 
Department officials who have inter- 
viewed Khmer who have just arrived at 
the Thai border reinforces this view and 
indicates that many Khmer are aware of 
the coalition, pleased with the 
reemergence of Prince Sihanouk and 
Prime Minister Son Sann, and hopeful 
that they will lead the country again. 

The formation of the coalition is 
another significant development in the 
overall ASEAN strategy of applying 
political, diplomatic, and economic 
pressure on Vietnam to negotiate a com- 
prehensive solution to the Kampuchea 
problem. It is an arrangement which has 
as its stated purpose implementation of 
the declaration of the International Con- 
ference on Kampuchea which outlines a 
formula for Vietnamese military with- 
drawal and restoration of Khmer self- 
determination through full U.N. super- 
vised elections. It is not a permanent 
government. Therefore, for the United 
States the ([uestion of recognizing the 
coalition does not arise. Nonetheless, I 
would reiterate that we welcome the for- 
mation of the coalition. 

The United States has given moral 
and political support to the non- 
Communist Khmer and will continue to 
do so. We have had and will continue to 
have regular contact with the non-Com- 
munists. We look forward to welcoming 
Prince Sihanouk and His Excellency Son 
Sann during their upcoming visits to this 



country. We are carefully watching 
developments in Kampuchea and in clo^i 
consultation with ASEAN and others 
are considering how we can be of fur- 
ther help. We do not plan to offer 
military aid to the coalition or any of it 
members. Under no circumstances 
would we provide any support to the 
Khmer Rouge, and we do not intend to 
deal directly with them. 

Our support for the non-Communis 
Khmer notwithstanding, I would like tc 
stress that our decision on the Kampu- 
chean U.N. credentials in no way implii 
any support for or recognition what- 
soever of the Khmer Rouge. The Unite 
States has never recognized the Khmei 
Rouge /Pol Pot Democratic Kampuchej 
regime, and U.S. officials are proscribe 
from contact with Khmer Rouge of- 
ficials. Our opposition to the Khmer 
Rouge has been open and strong. The 
U.S. Government has frequently and 
emphatically condemned the Khmer 
Rouge's heinous record of oppression 
and misrule, particularly its abhorrent 
human rights practices. I assure you 
that the Administration shares the con 
cern of the Congress and the Americai 
people for the Khmer, who suffered in 
extremes under the excess and horrors 
of the Pol Pot /Khmer Rouge regime. 
There should be no doubt in anybody's 
mind about U.S. policy toward the 
Khmer Rouge regime. The Administra- 
tion opposes the return to power of the 
Khmer Rouge. 

Recent Developments 

In a communique issued .luly 7, \'ietna, 
announced that as an "act of goodwill" 
would withdraw an unspecified number 
of its occupying forces in Kampuchea 
during July and that further partial 
withdrawals would depend on steps by 
Thailand to "reestablish peace and 
stability" on the Thai-Kampuchean 
border. Vietnam also renewed its pro- 
posal for a "safety zone" on that border 
and expanded an earlier offer to 
organize an international conference to 
discuss regional problems which would 
be attended by the three Indochinese 
countries, the five ASEAN states, Bur- 
ma, India, the five permanent U.N. 
Security Council members, and, in a 
private capacity, the U.N. Secretary 
General. In referring to the Hanoi pro- 
posal, Vietnamese and Heng Samrin 
regime officials have made thinly veiled 
threats against .ASEAN by stressing th 
"right" of their military forces to "self- 
defense and counterattack" if the 
ASEAN countries "continue their hostil 



Department of State Bulletli 



ons and continue to interfere in the 
rnai affairs of the Indochinese eoun- 



While tactically somewhat different 
procedurally somewhat more tlexi- 
in tone and style, Vietnam's offer un- 
;unately represents no change in its 
?ntial position. It does not address 
central problem in Kampuchea — 
tnamese forces occupy the entire 
ntry, and Vietnamese control of the 
lom Penh authorities prevents the 
Tier from exercising their basic right 
ndependence and self-government, 
al withdrawal is still tied to "ending 
China threat," Hanoi alleges. The 
issue of Kampuchea would be con- 
jred only by Southeast Asian states, 
her than at the international con- 
snce. Heng Samrin officials, 
reover, have gone one step further 
stated that Kampuchea would not 
discussed in Vietnam's proposal. The 
posal would permit the Heng Samrin 

(ime to participate in the conference 
if its legitimacy were a fait accompli. 
■epting a partial Vietnamese 
vhdrawal as a step toward a solution 
■« l(i appear to legitimize the continued 
) sence of the remaining Vietnamese 

"inps. 

Ill addition, Hanoi's sincerity on its 
1 'lit ions about withdrawal of troops 
'i 111 Kampuchea is highly questionable, 
vtnam has offered no proof of its ini- 
,) "unilateral" troop withdrawal or a 
1 reduction in Vietnamese troops in 
Miipuchea. We and others have con- 
; (led that the alleged withdrawal was 
i ;igned only to take advantage of a 
1 mu'd. seasonal rotation of troops, 

tiiularly involving those units thinned 
: disease and casualties or suffering 
rail' problems. They were replaced by 
si I troops, many of whom came from 
nhcrn Vietnam. In fact, there are in- 
athins that Vietnam has used the cur- 
it wet season to strengthen its forces 
Kampuchea. 

We still have no sign that Hanoi has 
andoned its pursuit of an outdated co- 
lialist ambition to dominate its near 
ighbors and inherit the mantle of 
gemony of France in Indochina. While 
inoi obviously wishes to reduce the 
sts of its ambitions in Indochina — and 
eir recent diplomatic offensive shows 
at Hanoi wishes to escape its isola- 
m — there is no sign that the Viet- 
imese are prepared to abandon their 
al of political and economic domina- 
)n of Kampuchea and Laos and to in- 
grate as closely as feasible those 
onomies into that of Vietnam. 

Hanoi does not appear to have 



realized that its colonialist ambitions 
undermine rather than bolster its na- 
tional security. Its own policies have 
produced its isolation, bankrupted its 
economy, and created threats from 
various directions, including a threat 
Hanoi perceives from China. In fact, the 
policies of the leadership in Hanoi are 
the greatest threat to the national 
security and the well-being of the Viet- 
namese people. 

ASEAN and most of the internation- 
al community, including the United 
States, believe that the International 
Conference on Kampuchea provides the 
framework for negotiation of a compre- 
hensive political settlement in Kam- 
puchea which could be acceptable to all 
concerned governments and groups and 
beneficial to the Khmer people. China 
also accepts the conference declaration. 

As you know, the declaration of the 
conference called for negotiations to 
achieve a complete withdrawal of Viet- 
namese forces, U.N. -supervised elections 
free from any form of internal or exter- 
nal coercion, and the creation of a 



EAST ASIA 



neutral, independent Kampuchea which 
is no threat to any of its neighbors. A 
just settlement on that basis would ad- 
dress the security concerns of all states 
in the region, including the ASEAN 
countries and Vietnam. Through the 
declaration, ASEAN and the interna- 
tional community have offered Vietnam 
an honorable way out of its self-created 
dilemma and a framework to protect 
best its own national security. 

Situation in Kampuchea 

With a few exceptions, the situation in- 
side Kampuchea remains as it has been 
since the Vietnamese invasion in 1978. 
Backed by a Vietnamese occupation 
force of about 180,000 and thousands of 
civilian Vietnamese advisers, the Heng 
Samrin regime continues its attempts to 
establish legitimacy through the 
establishment and expansion of its ad- 
ministrative structure and a variety of 
state institutions. 

With implementation of a compul- 
sory military service, it is also attempt- 



Secretary Meets With 
Thai Foreign IVIinister 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 25, 1982' 

Thai Foreign Minister Air Chief Marshal 
Siddhi Savetsila has completed 3 days of 
discussions with high-level officials here 
on a broad range of issues. The Foreign 
Minister met with the Vice President, 
the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of 
State, and the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense. He also met with congressional 
leaders. 

During the discussions with Foreign 
Minister Siddhi, both sides reviewed the 
situation with regard to ASEAN [As- 
sociation of South East Asian Nations], 
Kampuchea, the U.S. -Thai security rela- 
tionship, and other political and 
economic matters including the refugee 
issue. As ASEAN standing committee 
chairman. Foreign Minister Siddhi re- 
quested U.S. Government support on 
the Kampuchea issue at the United Na- 
tions. He also expressed the continuing 
concern of the ASEAN governments 
over the threat to peace and stability in 
the region caused by the continued 
presence of Vietnamese forces in Kam- 
puchea. 

Secretary Shultz reiterated the full 



support of the United States for the 
ASEAN approach on the Kampuchea 
issue, including full withdrawal of Viet- 
namese forces from Kampuchea and 
establishment of an independent and 
neutral government. Secretary Shultz 
also reaffirmed to Foreign Minister 
Siddhi the clear U.S. Government com- 
mitment to the security of Thailand em- 
bodied in the Southeast Asia Collective 
Defense Treaty and U.S. support for 
Thailand as the ASEAN front-line state. 

During the visit, arrangements were 
concluded for an additional $9.9 million 
in foreign military sales (FMS) 
guarantees, increasing the level for 1982 
to more than $75 million in FMS 
guaranteed credits and grants. These 
funds will promote further moderniza- 
tion of Thai forces and are another 
demonstration of the strong security 
relationship between Thailand and the 
United States. 

The Secretary particularly welcomed 
this opportunity for a first meeting with 
Foreign Minister Siddhi, one of Asia's 
leading statesmen. 



'Made available to news correspondents 
by Department spokesman John Hughes. ■ 



Dvember 1982 



33 



EAST ASIA 



ing to build an indigenous army, but 
with only limited success. Desertions and 
draft evasion, poor performance and 
training, as well as local accommodation 
with resistance units hinder these efforts. 

The emergency economic and agri- 
cultural conditions appear to be over 
largely through the efforts of the inter- 
national community and the Khmer peo- 
ple themselves, and the regime is seek- 
ing the means to move from relief and 
rehabilitation to reconstruction and de- 
velopment in the economic sphere. Inter- 
national relief experts are cautiously op- 
timistic on the current food situation but 
note the probability of pockets of food 
shortages. Food production has been 
hampered by increasing efforts to collec- 
tivize production. 

The Phnom Penh regime has gained, 
at best, only the tacit acquiescence of its 
subjects, who generally are politically 
apathetic but fear a return of Khmer 
Rouge rule. The Heng Samrin regime 
skillfully exploited that fear, claiming 
that it and a close association with Viet- 
nam represent the only alternative to 
the re-emergence of the Khmer Rouge, 
but there are signs that this tactic may 
be losing its effectiveness. The Heng 
Samrin regime is seen as a Vietnamese 
creation, and popular sentiment believes 
that the Vietnamese are increasing their 
influence and control. Fear of undis- 
ciplined Vietnamese troops, increasing 
suspicions of Vietnamese motives in 
Kampuchea, and a resurgence in Khmer 
nationalism are causing resentment 
toward the Vietnamese presence to rise. 
Forced labor and conscription have 
heightened popular disaffection toward 
the regime and the Vietnamese. 

It will be difficult for the Phnom 
Penh regime to generate popular enthu- 
siasm or attract dedicated adminis- 
trators to solve the staggering economic, 
social, and political problems still facing 
the country. The participation of Prince 
Sihanouk and Prime Minister Son Sann 
in the coalition further makes it difficult 
for the Heng Samrin regime to consoli- 
date its control. 

The Vietnamese manage their occu- 
pation of Kampuchea heavily supported 
by Soviet supplies and are engaged in 
military operations throughout the coun- 
try. We believe that Hanoi recently has 
increased its military strength by 
upgrading its equipment and improving 
its logistics, particularly in the Thai 
border area. Vietnamese military and 
political objectives are to eliminate or 
neutralize the Khmer resistance and con- 
solidate the position of the Heng Samrin 



34 



regime, including its domestic and inter- 
national acceptance. 

Khmer Rouge forces were unable to 
recover all of the territory in western 
Kampuchea taken by the Vietnamese 
during the previous dry season. Popular 
support for the Khmer Rouge has not 
increased and is unlikely to do so. The 
Khmer Rouge, however, remain the 
principal military resistance to the Viet- 
namese occupation, and while pressed 
hard during the dry season earlier this 
year, their units remain intact, strong, 
and a problem for the Vietnamese. 

The Khmer People's National 
Liberation Front (KPNLF) remains the 
largest and most active non-Communist 
resistance group operating in Kam- 
puchea. The number and efficiency of 
Prince Sihanouk's military forces have 
increased in recent months. Both non- 
Communist groups engage in political 
proselytizing work in the interior, where 
they reportedly have numerous sym- 
pathizers. Both groups say materiel 
shortages have inhibited efforts to in- 
crease their military and popular sup- 
port and their activities. Although they 
have attempted to increase their military 
activities to a limited degree, they are 
aware of their current limitations and 
have not sought a major combat role. 

It is still too early to assess fully the 
impact of the coalition on popular sup- 
port for the resistance or the Heng 
Samrin regime. Initial reports from in- 
side Kampuchea suggest that many 
Khmer are taking a wait-and-see at- 
titude but that they are aware of the 
coalition's formation, pleased with the 
more active role being taken by Prince 
Sihanouk, and hopeful that the coalition 
may offer them an alternative to a Kam- 
puchea under a Vietnamese-controlled or 
Khmer Rouge regime. 

There is a tremendous reservoir of 
popular support for Prince Sihanouk 
among rural Khmer which has iniprove<l 
Khmer perceptions of the coalition. 
There is also strong sympathy for Prime 
Minister Son Sann among those urban, 
educated, and civil servant groups that 
survived the Khmer Rouge purges. The 
potential support for these two Khmer 
nationalists and for the coalition is 
strong, but it remains to be fully mobil- 
ized. The coalition is not likely to affect 
popular distrust for the Khmer Rouge, 
which remains anathema to most 
Khmer, except to the extent that the 
Khmer Rouge are able to make limited 
use of the popularity of Prince Sihanouk 
and F'rime Minister Son Sann. 

The Heng Samrin has reacted 
vehemently and self-defensively to the 
formation of the coalition. It is going to 



great lengths to discredit the coalition 
and its members. Its criticism of Princi 
Sihanouk has been especially harsh. Th 
regime reportedly has given instruction 
for all officials in its zones to organize 
classes or seminars for people of all agi 
designed to discredit the coalition. It hi 
also taken strong measures to prevent 
Khmer from traveling to resistance 
areas along the Thai border. Khmer 
suspected of association with any of th( 
resistance groups in some cases appear 
to be imprisoned summarily without tri 
or recourse. 

The ASEAN Strategy' 

As I mentioned in my statement before 
this committee last July 15, the ASEAI 
states are in firm agreement that their 
goals regarding Kampuchea are total 
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and a 
neutral, independent Kampuchea. Theii 
goal is a political, rather than military, 
settlement of the problem, and they an 
committed to the declaration of the In- 
ternational Conference on Kampuchea 
as both an instrument and framework 
for ASEAN policy objectives. The 
ASEAN strategy involves the applica- 
tion of diplomatic, economic, and 
military pressure on Vietnam to per- 
suade Hanoi that it should negotiate a 
comprehensive political settlement in 
Kampuchea along the lines of the 
declaration. 

ASEAN is the keystone of U.S. 
policy toward Kampuchea and In- 
dochina. We fully support ASEAN's 
strategy' and respect ASEAN's leader- 
ship role in the region. We share 
ASEAN's goals as elaborated in the 
declaration and work with ASEAN to 
realize its objectives. We, too, strongly 
favor a comprehensive political settle- 
ment. 

Like ASEAN, we remain convinced 
that Hanoi itself must realize the 
disastrous results its policies have pro- 
duced and that those policies must be 
changed to reconcile Vietnam's ambi- 
tions with its interests. We cannot 
predict when such a change of mind 
might occur in Hanoi. The choice for 
Hanoi does exist, nonetheless. In the 
meantime, the international community 
must continue to stress the unaccepta- 
bility of Hanoi's behavior and the 
durability of our opposition to its oc- 
cupation of Kampuchea. 



'The comnlete transcript of the hearinKi 
will he publisned by the committee and wifl 
lu' availalik' rnini tlu' SupiTintendent of 
Docuiiicnts, t'.S, (loviTiiiiK'nt F'rinting Of- 
fice, WashiiiKton, D.C. 20402. ■ 



NERGY 



I.S. Energy 
Itrategies 

I E. Allan Wendt 

Address before the Oxford Energy 
rminar, Oxford, United Kingdom, on 
rptember 9, 1982. Mr. Wendt is Deputy 
ssistant Secretary for International 
nergy Policy of the Bureau of Economic 
id Business Affairs. 

Imost 2 years after the election of 
resident Reagan, I think most 
jservers are aware that the United 
tates has adopted a more market- 
■iented approach to energy policy. 
ven now, however, I fear there is in- 
iequate appreciation of the degree of 
ir commitment to reducing U.S. 

■ overnment involvement in energy deci- 
onmaking. Our program is comprehen- 
ve. We have joined the community of 

' )untries who have decontrolled oil 
'ices; we have foresworn imposition of 
jmestic allocation and price controls in 
iture supply crises; and we have scaled 
5wn spending on synfuels development, 
econtrol of natural gas prices remains 
high priority. 

Let me make clear, however, that 
e recognize the need for some excep- 
ons to this "hands-off approach, 
nergy supply today is too important to 
le security of a nation and the welfare 
f its populace to be left exclusively to 
le marketplace. Government must 
3sume at least partial responsibility for 
;ockpiling emergency oil supplies, 
ipelines— oil, natural gas, and coal— re- 
uire some regulation. Long-term 
jsearch and development in nuclear 
nergy and synthetic fuels merit some 
jpport. We must take steps to protect 
ur citizens from the external disecon- 
mies— harm to the environment, health 
nd safety hazards— of energy produc- 
on and use. 

That being said, I would suggest 
nat we, government officials and 
nalysts alike, have in recent years 
arried the conviction that "the govern- 
lent must do something" rather farther 
ban is justified. 

*ower of Market Forces 
p the Oil Market 

in our view, it is time to refocus world 
ittention on the ability of market forces 
.0 locate supplies of energy and deliver 
Ihem to consumers. We can take our 
ead from the operation of the interna- 
ional oil market in the past few years. 



In 1975, fresh from the oil market 
disruption of 1973-74, the subject of 
commodity producer cartels was a 
topical item for debate among energy 
and economic analysts. Many observers 
were convinced that conditions existed 
in the international oil market— highly 
inelastic demand, producers able and 
willing to coordinate their actions and to 
sacrifice short-term in favor of long- 
term profits— which obstructed normal 
market forces and permitted the opera- 
tion of an international producer cartel. 

Recent events have demonstrated 
the limitations of this notion. Perhaps 
the oil market is not so different from 
others after all. In particular, we see 
that there are definite limits to the 
range of prices over which demand and 
supply remain highly inelastic. The 
members of OPEC, encouraged by their 
earlier successes, overplayed their hand 
in 1978-79. Consumers decided that, 
with oil at $35 a barrel and OPEC 
threatening further price increases, it 
was worth the expense to insulate their 
houses, buy more gasoline-efficient 
automobiles, convert their machinery to 



In our view, it is 
time to refocus world at- 
tention on the ability of 
market forces to locate 
supplies of energy and 
deliver them to con- 
sumers. 



coal or natural gas, and develop their 
own oil resources. Demand for oil has 
plummeted, and there is evidence that 
this trend continues. Demand for OPEC 
oil has dropped by more than one-third. 
All of a sudden, we have a buyer's 
market for oil again, and prospects are 
for continuing decline in the real price of 
oil for some time to come. 

I draw one major conclusion from 
this series of events. It is in the interest 
of all of us, producers and consumers 
alike, to show greater respect for the 
strength of traditional market forces. 
Price increases provoke decreases in de- 
mand and increases in supply in the oil 



market as in any other; they are just a 
little slow in coming. 

We in the consuming countries have 
sustained some investment losses over 
the past year as oil price projections 
have been revised steadily downward. 
Boom in oil exploration and drilling has 
turned to bust. One after another of our 
synthetic fuel development projects has 
shut down. I suspect we will not be so 
quick in the future to act on predictions 
based on extrapolations from oil price 
increases. 

The plight of most oil-producing 
countries, however, is even worse. Am- 
bitious development plans are being 
scaled down. Country balance-of- 
payments difficulties are growing. The 
members of OPEC are bickering and 
underselling one another. Perhaps they 
will find it in their interest to exercise a 
little more restraint in seeking to push 
up prices the next time the oil market 
tightens. 

Hazards of Government Intervention 
in Energy Markets 

Having affirmed my confidence in the 
role of market forces in the oil market, I 
would also explore briefly the costs of 
government intervention in that market. 
The United States, like many other con- 
suming countries, controlled the price 
and the domestic allocation of oil 
throughout most of the past decade. 
There is general agreement that this 
program, however well-intentioned, was 
a failure. In part, the failure of alloca- 
tion may have been due to problems 
peculiar to the United States. I have in 
mind particularly the size and complexi- 
ty of the U.S. oil market. Given the 
enormous number of players in this 
market, attempting to allocate oil among 
them equitably through administrative 
fiat over an extended period of time 
became a bureaucratic nightmare. Were 
the U.S. economy no larger than the 
economies of some of its neighbors, the 
inefficiency of this process might not 
have been so serious. Certainly the ex- 
perience of some of the smaller oil- 
importing countries with allocation has 
not been so disappointing as ours. 

Price control, on the other hand, is 
likely to prove pernicious under almost 
any circumstances. Simple economics 
suggest that, provided there is any com- 
petition at all in the supply of oil, plac- 
ing a ceiling on the price at which it will 
be sold institutionalizes disequilibrium 
between demand and supply. Controls 
inevitably generate all kinds of efforts at 



Jovember 1982 



35 



ENERGY 



circumvention which, in turn, lead to ad- 
ditional controls. Countries that prevent 
full pass-through to the consumer of the 
cost of imported oil see those oil imports 
diverted to other, more remunerative 
markets. Countries with domestic pro- 
duction can obtain short-term benefit by 
isolating themselves from the interna- 
tional economy and imposing controls 
only on domestic production. In the 
longer term, however, they must accept 
that investment in exploration and 
development will shift to projects in 
other countries where there are no such 
limits on profits and that their valuable 
domestic production will stagnate. 

Domestic allocation and price con- 
trols do not serve our longer term 
domestic and national security interests. 
Neither, I submit, does intervention in 
international oil trade. The comments I 
have heard from consuming country 
government officials show little sign of 
conviction that government-to-govern- 
ment oil purchase contracts or efforts to 
influence foreign company oil allocation 
during oil supply interruptions have 
significantly enhanced these countries' 
energy security. 

Dictates of Energy Security 

I have tried to explain the reasons why 
the Reagan Administration is predis- 
posed against intervention in the energy 
market place. I do not wish, however, to 
leave the impression that we will refuse 
to act under all circumstances. Rather, 
we expect advocates of government ac- 
tion to demonstrate convincingly that 
the benefits of such action outweigh the 
inevitable costs. 

I noted at the beginning of my 
remarks a few examples of government 
action we consider justified. I would now 
like to explore in greater detail one of 
those areas in which I am involved at 
the Department of State. This is the 
area of energy security, particularly its 
international aspects. 

In today's interdependent world, vir- 
tually all countries rely to an increasing 
extent on foreign sources not only for 
food and raw materials but also in many 
instances for energy. Reliance on 
foreigji sources offers welfare gains but 
also increases the importing country's 
sense of vulnerability. Where the com- 
modity in question is one so fundamental 
to economic activity as energy, every 
government has taken steps to reduce 



that vulnerability, although sometimes 
only after a dramatic and painful 
demonstration of the extent of that 
vulnerability. 

The U.S. Government is no excep- 
tion. We define energy security in terms 
of reducing vulnerability to oil import in- 
terruptions, although concern about the 
potential for interruptions in the supply 
of natural gas, not only to the United 
States but to our allies, is spreading. 

What is the Reagan Administration's 
energy security program? I would iden- 
tify five interrelated elements. 

Reliance on Market Forces. First, I 
state it once more, we will rely to the 
maximum extent possible on market 
forces to solve problems. In a country of 
225 million people, centralization of 
economic decisionmaking is bound to 
create inefficiencies and inequities. One 
of President Reagan's first acts in office 
was to eliminate oil allocation and price 
controls in the United States. Although 
the operation of market forces in the 
natural gas market is constrained 
somewhat by infrastructure rigidities, I 
would expect the Administration to 
press vigourously next year for ac- 
celerated decontrol of natural gas prices. 
Permitting producers and consumers to 
exercise their own ingenuity and market 
preferences in responding to supply in- 
terruptions may seem painful in the 
short term, but we believe it will 
substantially reduce medium and longer 
term damage to economic welfare. 

Oil Stockpiling. The second element 
of our energy security program is oil 
stockpiling. For military, political, and 
economic reasons, we cannot afford to 
"run out" of this indispensable commodi- 
ty, no matter how remote the possibility 
may seem. Ideally, oil consumers would 
stockpile oil products for themselves. 
But we recognize the limits of such 
behavior and the advantages of some 
centralized stockpiling. So, just as we 
stockpile other essential commodities for 
use in emergencies, we have created a 
federally funded Strategic Petroleum 
Reserve (SPR). 

The Administration is filling this 
reserve rapidly and it has just reached 
270 million barrels, triple the level of 2 
years ago. This quantity represents 
almost 20% of total primary oil stocks in 
the United States and almost 70 days of 
current U.S. oil imports. Current plans 
call for filling the reserve to 750 million 



barrels— roughly 190 days of current im- 
ports—by 1990. The cost of this stock- 
piling program is obviously enormous. 
But we think the potential benefits— re- 
ducing harmful effects of future oil sup- 
ply interruptions— are substantially 
larger. 

Cooperation. The third element of 
our energy security program is coopera- 
tion with other energy-importing coun- 
tries. We attach importance to this 
cooperation for two reasons. First, we 
recognize that the actions of other con- 
suming countries in a supply crisis will 
affect us. Second, we recognize that 
energy security is related to military 
security, and that, to be reliable, the 
mutual security guarantees we have ex- 
changed with other countries must in- 
clude an energy component. 

The focus of this effort is, of course, 
the 21-member International Energy 
Agency (lEA) and, in particular, its oil 
crisis response system. This system pro- 
vides for a variety of actions in response 
to serious oil supply interruptions. One 
is drawdown of reserve oil stocks— in 
anticipation of which the system re- 
quires member countries to stockpile oil 
equivalent to 90 days of imports. 
Another is the oil allocation scheme, 
which seeks to assure that no member 
country suffers disproportionately from 
a shortfall in oil supplies. To the extent 
that a member country finds itself 
unable to obtain a fair share of oil sup- 
plies during a supply interruption, the 
other members of the IE A are com- 
mitted to make oil available to that 
country so as to rectify the imbalance. 

In our view, the oil stockpiling and 
stock drawdown requirements are the 
most important components of the 
emergency system. We will only succeed 
in avoiding the harmful effects of an oil 
supply crisis if we have alternative sup- 
plies of oil to draw on. We believe it im- 
portant to cooperate with other consum- 
ing countries in the accumulation and 
drawdown of oil stockpiles. The lEA 
provides a forum for such cooperation. 
We would like to see our allies join us in 
accumulating stockpiles substantially 
above the '.tO-day level. 1 note with 
satisfaction movement in this direction 
on the part of a number of our lEA 
partners. 

Most IE A members believe that the 
lEA oil allocation system, if ever ac- 
tivated, would be cumbersome to 
operate. We would, therefore, expect 
the lEA to seek to rely in the first in- 
stance on market forces, supplemented 



36 



Department of State Bulletin 



ENERGY 



irhaps by more informal government 
tions, to allocate oil in supply crises, 
id to activate the formal system only if 
ich efforts fail. At the same time, the 
lited States remains fully committed 
the lEA emergency system, including 
allocation components. Cooperation 
5th our lEA partners will be important 
mitigating damage from oil supply 
ises, and the lEA allocation system 
•ovides the guarantee of mutual 
;sistance upon which such cooperation 
ust be based. 

While I am on the subject of interna- 
nal cooperation, I should say a word 
lUt U.S. policy concerning the Soviet 
.tural gas pipeline, to which our op- 
sition is well known. The press has 
rried detailed reports on recent 
;velopments, and you all know the 
lickground. I will simply note that, 
:om the energy policy standpoint, which 
what interests us here, we believe 
'velopment of the indigenous energy 
sources of the OECD [Organization for 
conomic Cooperation and Develop- 
ent] community of nations offers the 
'st prospect for assuring security of 

ippiy- 

Long-term Efforts. This leads me 
I tlie fourth major element of the U.S. 
lergy security program, which I will 
ill the long-term element. Here I have 
mind efforts to reduce dependence 
.ion imports of energy from insecure 
)urces and thus vulnerability to any in- 
vidual interruptions. Obviously, where 
ich longer term efforts are required, 
V 1-an rely on the free market to take 
"si (if the initiative. However, there 
■f cases where the market response to 
iproving economic incentives for pro- 
jction and conservation has not been 
^ dynamic as it might have been. 

The U.S. Government can be of 
line assistance in promoting develop- 
it'iit and use of new energy sources, 
(ir example, we are participating ac- 
vely in the lEA's so-called long-term 
Kiperation program. Under this pro- 
ram, we exchange information with our 
artner governments concerning long- 
Tin energA' policy options and develop- 
R'lit activities, including research and 
e\elopment. In addition, we are looking 
t ways the U.S. Government can en- 
ourage development of neglected 
nergy resources in developing coun- 
'•ies. We believe commercial interests 
nil develop larger energy resources 
/ithout official encouragement other 
han a receptive investment climate. But 
Umaller projects that could contribute 
ignificantly to satisfying developing 



country internal requirements are less 
likely to attract foreign private invest- 
ment. We, therefore, are supporting 
through our bilateral assistance program 
projects designed; (1) to improve energy 
planning and management, particularly 
in public utilities, (2) to adapt and 
develop alternate energy technologies, 
and (3) to encourage the development of 
traditional fuels, most notably fuelwood. 
Bilateral funding for these programs 
totaled well over $100 million in 1982 
and should continue at similar levels in 
1983. 

We also support the efforts of the 
multinational develoiinient banks, most 
notably the Worl(l Bank. In 1978 World 
Bank energy lending constituted 15% of 
its total lending or slightly over $1 
billion. By 1982 that proportion m- 
creased to 25% and totaled over $3 
billion. We are encouraging the Bank to 
concentrate its special talents in areas 
that offer the greatest promise of suc- 
cess: where coparticipation will give 
Bank involvement an important 
multiplier effect; in strengthening 
management skills of recipient govern- 
ment; and in pre-exploration projects 
that assist countries to inventory their 
resources and collect data. 

With respect to alternative fuels, we 
are seeking to correct the longstanding 
patterns of neglect of coal. Abundant 
supplies of coal are available from a 
number of secure sources. By sponsor- 
ing coal conferences, coal delegations to 
foreign countries, discussions and 
studies of coal in the lEA, and other 
similar activities, the U.S. Government 
has reinforced the efforts of private 
companies to demonstrate to energy 
users that coal is indeed a viable, attrac- 
tive fuel. We are also continuing to con- 
tribute in a variety of ways to the 
development of other alternative 
energies — for example, synthetics and 
nuclear — where uncertainty or cost may 
slow development by the private sector. 
The U.S. Administration is contributing 
funding to projects with long-term 
payoffs, leaving short-term payoff in- 
vestments to the private sector. 

Promoting Middle East Peace. 

The fifth and final element of our 
energy security program is the pursuit 
of an international environment con- 
ducive to stability of world oil trade— as 
well as to other trade and to economic 
development in general. I have in mind 
primarily our efforts to promote peace 



in the Middle East. It is one of the 
world's great tragedies that the enor- 
mous human and natural resources of 
this region continue to be dissipated in 
internecine struggle. As President 
Reagan has made clear, he considers 
resolution of these conflicts, to the ex- 
tent the United States can contribute to 
their resolution, one of his premier 
foreign policy objectives. Success in this 
effort, perhaps more than any other ac- 
tion, will strengthen the energy security 
of the entire world. 

Future Prospects 

I conclude my remarks with a glance at 
the future. Whether the various players 
like it or not, longer term market forces 
have begun to assert themselves, and 
will influence heavily energy market 
developments over the next several 
years. The trend toward conservation 
and increased energy efficiency in 
response to the 1978-79 price increases 
still has some distance to run, assuring 
softness in energy demand for some 
time. Growing fuel substitution capabili- 
ty has produced an increase in the short- 
term elasticity of demand for any in- 
dividual fuel. Development of oil 
deposits in non-OPEC countries has in- 
creased supply-side competition in world 
oil trade. Economic development proj- 
ects in many oil-producing countries 
have absorbed the bulk of their oil 
revenue and reduced their room for 
maneuver in attempting to control sup- 
ply and price in world oil trade. 

I see no reason why producers and 
consumers alike should not welcome this 
assertion of market forces. It should 
bring greater stability and transparency 
to the international oil market, thus 
benefiting all of us with large in- 
vestments riding on the accuracy of oil 
market projections. A vigorous, well- 
functioning market should assure ade- 
quate supplies at prices fair to con- 
sumers and remunerative to producers. 

With this future in prospect, I would 
urge that government policymakers con- 
sider returning energy policy to its 
rightful place— as a subset of economic 
policy. The emergence of energy policy 
as an independent discipline has had the 
positive effect of focusing attention on 
the importance of energy to economic 
life and on the consequent need for at- 
tention to energy problems. But it has 
also given rise to excesses. Traditional 
economic forces are not the only ones af- 
fecting the world energy outlook, but in- 
creasingly they are the most important 
ones. Let us mold our energy policies ac- 
cordingly. ■ 



Jovember 1982 



37 



EUROPE 

Visit of Iceland's 
President Finnbogadottir 



President Vigdis Finnbogadottir of 
Iceland visited the United States Septem- 
ber i-22. While in Washington, D.C., 
September 7-10, she met with President 
Reagan and other government officials. 

Following are toasts made by 
Presidents Reagan and Finnbogadottir 
at a White House luncheon on September 
8. 1982.^ 

President Reagan 

It is, indeed, a pleasure for me to 
welcome you to the White House this 
afternoon and to play a part in the 
inauguration of Scandinavia Today, a 
program which underscores the con- 
tributions of Nordic culture and the ties 
between the United States and the five 
Scandinavian democracies. It is, certain- 
ly, a noteworthy occasion when we're 
able to host a chief of state, representa- 
tives of three royal houses, and the ar- 
ray of distinguished government leaders 
who are assembled here today. 

Madam President, a special greeting 
for you. This is the first time a Presi- 
dent of Iceland has visited our country, 
and it is also your first visit as well. I 
know you and your colleagues will see 
firsthand just how much your country- 
men have contributed to the cultural, 
economic, and social development of this 
nation. 

Charles Lindbergh, the great 
pioneer in aviation, once said that short- 
term survival may depend on the 
knowledge of physicists and the per- 
formance of their machines. But, and I 
quote, "Long-term survival depends, 
alone, on the character of Man." Today, 
we recognize together that Scandina- 
vians were and continue to be a signifi- 
cant force in the shaping of our 
American character. Lindbergh himself, 
who represented the best qualities of 
America to so many, was the son of i 

Scandinavian immigrants. I 

It's no mere coincidence that your » 
five nations share with the people of this ^ 
country strong democratic traditions. -■_ 
Your country, Iceland, boasts a history % 
that includes a republican constitution I 
and an assembly as far back as the year * 
930. Now, that's going back pretty far, | 
even by my way of counting. [Laughter] i 
And just as we've been home to many ^ 
Scandinavian settlers over the years, 
your own nation of Iceland was settled 



by proud and independent Nordic people 
from the European Continent. 

Our peoples share traits that are the 
product of our common frontier her- 
itage. But something all of us in this 
room share is our love of liberty and our 
respect for the rights of individuals, 
values which place our nations on the 
front lines of freedom and democracy. 
Along with this freedom, Iceland and 
other Nordic countries experience 
cultural advances that will be high- 
lighted by Scandinavia Today. 

I know of your own love for 
literature and the theater. And as one 
who shares a somewhat similar back- 
ground—I'm not going to tell you about 
"Bedtime for Bonze )" | laughter) and who 
was also elected President — I believe I 
can appreciate how deeply you feel 



about your country, its people, and its 
traditions. 

In one of Europe's oldest collections 
of literature, "The Edda," there is a saga 
with a message that speaks clearly to us 
even after a thousand years, "Cattle die, 
kinsmen die," the ancient poem says, 
"the self dies. But a reputation will 
never die for him who gains a good 
one." Today, we celebrate the reputation 
of the Nordic culture. We're thankful to 
have you here to join with us in this 
celebration. 

And now would you please join me 
in a toast to President Vigdis 
[Finnbogadottir] and to the traditional 
warm bonds that join America and all 
these other countries. 

President Finnbogadottir 

First and foremost, let me thank you for 
your warm words for us Nordic nations. 
It has for a long time been my con- 
viction that the best gift we receive 
from society is the gift of literacy. The 




I'ri'sidfiits Keaican and I'iiinhoKadottir. President Finnbojcadottir's trip to the I'.S. is the 
first l)V a I'resident of Iceland. 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



ipacity to read is a richness beyond 
easure by our usual standards of 
loalth. Yet, too often, it is taken for 
fantfd. This gift opened up for us new 
Ill-Ids. It is an incentive for our im- 
j.iiiation. And through the gift of 
-ading is given knowledge, knowledge 
hout other peoples. 

The people of America and the Nor- 
:c people share the fortune of being 
:erate from an early age. Through 
>ading, children can imagine what the 
orld around them looks like. Thus, it is 
most half a century since I began to 
lagine through books what the United 
tates of America were like. 

I became a friend of Huckleberry 
inn long before knowing the sweet 
iste of huckleberries. And the stories of 
dgar Allen Poe made my heart jump 
cm secret and sheer excitement. And 
irough the immigrant stories, I trav- 
ed over the wide plains accompanied 
y Nordic people. People had come from 
lountains and now had nowhere to 
tde, not even a rock or a bush. I have 
ever been here before, yet some things 
ok familiar to me through the depic- 
on and the paintings of your great ar- 
Bts of the world. 

To the best of my knowledge, most 
[f the great literature works of 
.merican writers have been translated 
to our Nordic tongues, works that 
bve inspired our own writ-rs and 
idened our own horizons. Eugene 
^'Neill, Arthur Miller, just to name a 
5W of the giants of the theatrical arts 
hich we have in common, suddenly 
ecome kinsmen to us at the moment 
aeir words are translated into our own 
ungues. 

Yes, we have known about you and 
our land for a long time. In fact, we 
.ave sources telling us of the new world 
llmost a millennium ago. These sources 
II us of dew sweet as anything, of 
llaces with no dearth of grapevine or 
rapes. No wonder the first Western 
ravelers to these shores called them 
Vineland, the Good." 

But the sweetness of the dew and 
he abundance of grapes are not the 
nly things Nordic people have sought in 
he New World. Our scientists have 
ome here — for knowledge and know- 
low — to this land of scientific ingenuity, 
. land known for its great achievements, 
n fact, achievements so unbelievable 
hat none of my generation would have 
magined them when I was growing up. 

Our nation is a nation of great 
;piritual and practical — I would say, 
'our nation is a nation of great spiritual 



and practical achievements, not to men- 
tion its vastness and power. What then 
have we, the smaller nation, to say to 
the greater ones? Perhaps the individual 
belonging to a small nation is more con- 
scious that he or she can contribute to 
the contemporary world. In a small na- 
tion, every single creative mind is need- 
ed. Indeed, each skillful hand that can 
contribute to the achievements of a 
worthwhile common aim is welcome. 

And yet, all would be in vain if not 
for the gift of literacy. The capacity to 
read and remember words of wisdom, 
the words of those who have been at the 
plow in the field before we arrived. 
Without reading words of those who 
came before us, we could hardly be the 
people we are today. 

Coming generations will read about 
the adventures of Huckleberry Finn. 
They will read about immigrants and old 
explorers of new lands, and they will 
read about us. What is the word we 
leave them to read? Perhaps the word is 
"dull." Perhaps the word is "delightful." 
Perhaps it is "good." Perhaps it is "bad." 
That is for posterity to judge. Anyhow, 
we all know that we are marvelously in- 
telligent. [Laughter] 

Whatever the judgment will be, we 
have given the future a great gift, the 
capacity to read about us. American or 
Nordic, I have this great ambition for us 
all: Let us give our descendants words 
to think about, deeds to remember, a 
culture to build upon. Let us give the 
future a picture of ourselves that can be 
reproduced at least as a fragment of an 
ideal. 

Please accept our heartfelt thanks 
for the hospitality you have shown to my 
country and all the other Nordic coun- 
tries today in your renowned home. We 
know that the welfare of our nations is 
deeply linked as well as the welfare of 
other nations in the world. It is my 
sincere wish that our children and forth- 
coming generations will be able to read 
about how magnificent peacemakers we 
were, realistic as we are about the world 
situation today. 

Let us lift our glasses and drink to 
the health and happiness of the Presi- 
dent of the United States of America, 
Mrs. Reagan, and the American people. 

On behalf of all the Nordic nations, I 
have the pleasure of presenting to you 
the emblem of the Scandinavia Today, 
inaugurated here in America. 



10th Report on Cyprus 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
SEPT. 24, 1982' 

In accordance with the provisions of 
Public Law 95-384, I am submitting the 
following report on progress made dur- 
ing the past 60 days toward reaching a 
negotiated settlement of the Cyprus 
problem. 

Following a summer recess, the in- 
tercommunal negotiations resumed dis- 
cussion and analysis of the United 
Nations "evaluation" of the talks. In re- 
cent sessions, the negotiators completed 
initial discussion of those sections of the 
"evaluation" dealing with aspects of the 
possible executive, legislative, and 
judicial structure of a federal govern- 
ment. The negotiators have maintained 
a serious and positive attitude. 

We commend the continued earnest 
efforts of the Secretary General and his 
Special Representative on Cyprus, Am- 
bassador Hugo Gobbi, to narrow the dif- 
ferences between positions and to pro- 
mote negotiating progress. We fully sup- 
port the LInited Nations effort to reach 
a mutually acceptable agreement for the 
Cyprus problem and firmly believe that 
the intercommunal negotiations provide 
the most useful path towards that goal. 
On September 17 the negotiators an- 
nounced a recess; negotiations are 
scheduled to resume on November 2. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Reagan 



'Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. 
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and Charles H. Percy, chair- 
man of the Senate Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents "of Sept. 27, 1982). ■ 



President Reagan 

I thank you very much. Maybe I should 
have incorporated this in my toast, but 
it gives me an opportunity now in thank- 
ing all of you to say that this morning- 
some of our days that we observe here, 
people think, are just automatic, but 
every year, by proclamation, they are 
reproclaimed— I signed the proclama- 
tions declaring Columbus Day and Leif 
Ericson Day. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 13, 1982. 



39 



EUROPE 

NATO Ministers 
Meet in Canada 



On October 2 3. 1982. Secretary Shultz 
joined other foreign ministers of the NATO 
countries and NATO Secretary (ieneral 
Joseph M.A.H. Luns at La Sapiniere (a 
lodge near Val David, near Montreal. 
Canada) to discuss alliance issues. Here 
Canada's Secretary of State for External 
Affairs Allan J. MacEachen (left) greets 
Secretary Shultz. ■ 




40 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



iorced Labor In the U.S.S.R. 



EPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
fPT. 22, 1982' 

fi ? have received a growing number of 
I )orts that the U.S.S.R. has used a 
I ge number of prisoners — including 
it lusands of pohtical prisoners — to 
k irk on massive labor projects. Accord- 
i ; to at least one such report, for ex- 
: iple, at least 100,000 such forced 
I lorers are being used on the heavy in- 
I istructure work of clearing swamps, 
i ;ting timber, and building access roads 
I • the Yamal gas pipeline. These forced 
I lorers reportedly include religfious 
( sidents and other prisoners of con- 
■ ence. 

5 These reports have come from a 
ijide variety of individuals and organiza- 
ttns in Europe, Asia, and the United 
Sites. The sources include human 
Jlhts organizations, labor organizations, 
Ijiorers who have managed to emigrate 
£'m the Soviet Union after working 
uder these conditions, and letters 
riching Asia and the West from the 
IS.S.R. 

We are not claiming to have 
€ dence resembling a "smoking gun." 
(i /en the closed nature of Soviet society 
ad the official control of the Soviet 
f'dia, moreover, there may never be a 
"noking gun." But the information be- 
i ^ released by this wide range of 
t owledgeable individuals and organiza- 
t ns spanning three continents, some 
(\ th firsthand experience of these labor 
|t nditions, goes into considerable detail 
I d deserves serious examination. 

Reliable estimates place the total 
I mber of forced laborers in the Soviet 
I lion today at approximately 4 million, 
lirther, it is well established that the 
£ viet Union has a history of using 
i-ced labor on a mass scale — including 
[litical prisoners — on major projects, 
i rticularly in Siberia, where the official 
jess has acknowledged that it is dif- 
i ult to persuade Soviet workers to go 
tert' voluntarily. To cite only two ex- 
: iplt's: Some 250,000 forced laborers 
;e lit'lieved to have perished during the 
3(is while working on the construction 
I tlic Bielomorsk Canal. And in the 
'7tis, thousands of forced laborers 
\'rv reported to be building the Baikal- 
mur railway extension in southeastern 
beria. 



As regards foreign laborers, the of- 
ficial Soviet media itself has admitted 
that several thousand Vietnamese and 
other Southeast Asian laborers have 
been imported into the U.S.S.R. and has 
intimated that many thousands more are 
likely to be imported in the near future. 
Information on the nature of this pro- 
gram is fragmentary. We do not know 
whether or not the Vietnamese laborers 
are working on the Siberian pipeline. 
But we are very concerned about indica- 
tions that Vietnamese may be coerced 
into working in the U.S.S.R. and 
Eastern Europe and that a portion of 
the salary paid to them might be 
deducted to offset Vietnam's debts to 
the host country. In addition, we have 
received reports that the Soviet 
authorities are placing limitations on the 
ability of these workers to communicate 
with their families and friends outside 
the U.S.S.R. We believe it is important 
that international attention be given to 
this situation, given the obvious possibili- 
ty of exploitation of these workers. 

The Soviet Government could con- 
tribute to establishing the truth about 
these very serious charges by permitting 
an objective examination of labor condi- 
tions on its various Siberian projects and 
the conditions in which Soviet political 
prisoners live and work. We would 
welcome such an independent interna- 
tional investigation, but the prospects 
for obtaining this are probably not 
bright. For example, charges of use of 
forced labor have been made in the past 
against the U.S.S.R. in the International 
Labor Organization (ILO). However, the 
Soviet authorities have consistently 
refused to allow an ILO mission to visit 
the U.S.S.R. to investigate these 
charges. 

Because of the seriousness of these 
charges, and the massive human rights 
violations which they imply, we believe 
the international community has a 
responsibility to investigate them. The 
U.S. Government, for its part, is 
thoroughly examining the information 
being brought to bear on this issue, and 
we understand that several other 



governments have indicated similar in- 
tentions. As our examination proceeds, 
we will — wherever possible — make our 
findings available to the public. We hope 
that other governments and private or- 
ganizations will do the same. 



'Made available to news correspondents 
by Department spokesman John Hughes. ■ 



Poland 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT. 
AUG. 31, 1982' 

Today marks the second anniversary of 
the signing of the Gdansk Accords, the 
formal birthday of the Solidarity labor 
movement in Poland. 

The emergence of Solidarity was a 
dramatically hopeful event for the entire 
world. For those of us who live in free- 
dom, the formation of Solidarity and its 
program for reform revived our hope 
that, perhaps, peaceful change and the 
enjoyment of basic human rights could 
come to a closed Communist society. 
And for those who now live in closed 
societies but yearn for a greater 
measure of freedom to determine their 
own destinies, Solidarity awakened the 
hope that a free and united organization 
of working men and women might pro- 
vide the key to a fairer share of the 
fruits of their labor and a better future. 

Solidarity was born in a setting of 
economic mismanagement and decline 
and was not, as has often been charged, 
its cause. Its detractors who make that 
charge are trying to rewrite history. 
Long years of growing economic disloca- 
tions, official corruption, aggrandize- 
ment by the Communist Party bureauc- 
racy at society's expense, food and fuel 
shortages — in short, a social and 
economic crisis of enormous propor- 
tions — all played their parts in bringing 
about the July 1980 strikes and the birth 
of Solidarity. 

In autumn 1980 and spring 1981 in 
Poland, Solidarity grew and gave the 
Polish people a means to influence the 
course of national affairs. There were no 
riots, no anarchy, no civil war, no bloody 
confrontations. There were only deter- 
mined workers seeking to bargain ear- 
nestly and in good faith with the reluc- 
tant government and its agencies. 
Solidarity's achievements in its first 16 
months of existence include: 

• An unprecedented membership of 
10 million enrolled members, out of a 



bvember1982 



41 



MIDDLE EAST 



national population of 3(5 million and a 
workforce of 20 million; 

• Innovative negotiations, by formal 
agreements with the government, which 
yielded for Polish working men and 
women improved working conditions, 
hours, and wages; and 

• Unparalleled worker unity which 
remains to the present day. 

Under Lech Walesa's leadership, 
Solidarity's prime accomplishment has 
been to give dignity to the Polish worker 
as a valued and productive member of 
his own society — no longer to be dis- 
counted merely as part of a working 
"mass" or as a "factor of production." 

Last December the Polish military 
regime, at the behest of the Soviets, 
sought to crush the hopes aroused by 
Solidarity. The ideas which found ex- 
pression in Solidarity, however, will 
never die. Simple imperatives — a safe 
workplace, a fair wage, a fair division of 
time between factory and family — and 
more complex yearnings — worker digni- 
ty; the right to assemble and to 
associate peaceably together; the right 
to speak, to read, and to listen; the right 
to petition and negotiate grievances — 
cannot be forever stifled by force or 
stilled behind the prison gate. 

Today's demonstrations in Polish 
cities show once again that repression 
will not solve Poland's problems and that 
reconciliation among the authorities, the 
church, and Solidarity is urgently 
needed. 

The world continues to admire Soli- 
darity as Polish workers commemorate 
its second anniversary and to wish it a 
long, fruitful, and successful life. 

For our part, and to demonstrate 
our respect for the goals of freedom 
represented by Solidarity, we will con- 
tinue the President's policies aimed at 
advancing reconciliation in Poland 
through the release of the prisoners, an 
end to martial law, and restoration of 
the dialogue among Solidarity, the 
church, and the government. 



WHITK HOUSE STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 1. 1982- 

The President deeply deplores the acts 
of violence which resulted in the tragic 
loss of life in Lubin. He deeply regrets 
and condemns the use of deadly force to 
break up peaceful demonstrations in 
Warsaw and other cities on Solidarity's 
second anniversary. 

These events, once again, point up 
the need for reconciliation and restora- 
tion by the Government of basic human 



rights in Poland. The fact that demon- 
strations involving thousands occurred 
in eight major cities in the face of 
Government warnings that security 
forces would use violence to put them 
down and dole out summary punish- 
ments vividly illustrates and demon- 
strates the strength of the dedication of 
the Polish people to free trade unions 
and other basic liberties. 

The deaths of the two individuals in 
Lubin can only serve to deepen the 
already extensive chasm separating 



Polish authorities from the Polish peo- 
ple. 

The Polish Government's actions 
against the demonstrators are the latest 
manifestation of martial law in Poland 
and dramatize the significance of the 
policies which the President announced 
last December. 



'Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
ment spokesman .John Hughes. 

^Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 6, 1982. ■ 



Secretary Shultz Interviewed 
on the "Today" Show 



Secretary Shultz was interviewed by 
Bryan Gumbel and Marvin Kalb. both of 
NBC News, on September 21. 1982.^ 

Q. King Hussein suggested that fur- 
ther moves, in addition to the sending 
in of Marines into Lebanon by the 
United States, such as sanctions 
would be needed to keep U.S. 
credibility among Arabs in the area. 
Are such sanctions under considera- 
tion, or will the Marines be the extent 
of the Administration's reaction, for 
the time being? 

A. The point in the Middle East is, 
first, to stop the bloodshed in Lebanon. 
That seems to be coming to an end. The 
Marines and the multinational force are 
designed to help in that regard. Second, 
to get a stable central government in 
Lebanon, first, taking control of its own 
capital in Beirut, and then — promptly, 
strongly, and urgently — to clear 
Lebanon of foreign forces so that the 
country can be governed by its own 
government; to set to work on the basic 
peace process which must address the 
basic needs, problems, and aspirations of 
the Palestinian people. That's what our 
priorities must be. 

Q. In that connection, since we 
just heard from King Hussein, is he 
the key player in trying to get the 
peace process going? 

A. Yes. 

Q. You've tried to involve him. 
What success have you had so far? 

A. King Hussein has niadc a 
number of comments about the Presi- 
dent's fresh start proposals. They have 
been basically favorable and positive. He 
has been trying to get himself into a 
positive position where he has some sup- 



42 



port in the Arab community for coming 
to discussions, and so I think, basically, 
there has been a lot of progress there. 

Q. Do you feel that he is able to 
break loose from the 1974 Rabat com- 
mitment and be able to negotiate on 
behalf of the Palestinians? 

A. That, of cour.se, is what we 
would like to see happen. I think it cer- 
tainly is possible. It depends upon his 
generating support among Palestinians 
and other Arabs. 

Q. The Israeli Cabinet is meeting, 
I think, as we're speaking right now. 
Have you had any word at all on 
whether they will agree formally to 
the introduction of the multinational 
force once again into Beirut? 

A. We have h;ul a number of in- 
direct suggestions al)()Ut what might 
happen, but since the Cabinet is meeting 
and is going to make a decision on this, 
I think it is best to await their decision. 

Q. You do expect a positive 
response? We are going to proceed 
with this plan, are we not? 

A. We arc planning to proceed with 
it, and 1 think that we can have some 
reason for hoping that the response will 
he a positive one from Israel. 

(J. Because our NBC sources in 
Jerusalem say that they have agreed, 
that the Cabinet has, indeed, agreed. 

A. We'll wait and hear what the 
government has to say, much as I 
respect NBC sources. You're probably 
right. I hope you are. 

Q. The President is described to- 
day as believing that Israel cannot be 



Departnnent of State Bulletin 



MIDDLE EAST 



isted in the search for peace right 
in the Middle East. 1 wonder if 
would comment on that? 

A. Israel is clearly a very important 
■t of the peace process— right in the 
ter of it— and we will work with the 
aeli Government; that's the Presi- 
:it's intent. So, we certainly intend to 
irk with the Israeli Government on the 
ice process. 

Q. But is there any underlying ef- 
•t on the part of the Administration 
w, based upon the stories that have 
in appearing in the last 48 hours, 
it, indeed, you would like to see a 
ange of government in Israel, a 
mewhat more moderate regime? 
, A. The decisions about what the 
■aeli Government should be are up to 
; citizens of Israel. It's a democracy; 
jy have their processes for choosing 
jir government. As far as the United 
ites is concerned, when we deal with 
rael, we deal with the Israeli Govern- 
Bnt, just as when we deal with any 
ler country, we deal with the duly- 
nstituted government of that country. 

Q. How long will the Marines stay 
ii Beirut? You really are not clear 
a out that as yet. 

A. It isn't that we're trying to 
c dge the question or anything like that; 
ii; just that when one sits here right 
rw and says that the Marines should be 
tM-e to help the Government of 
I banon create stability and govern in 
t; city of Beirut, one does not know 
Iw long that is going to take. It could 
c rne about very quickly; it could take a 
t itter of more days. I can't tell you 
1 re, today, what the situation is going 
t l)f like 10, 20, 30, or 40 days from 
! \v — I just don't know. I think it is a 
t stake to set oneself up right now and 
sv as of some date, we're going to 
live, because the situation may not be 
] opitious at that moment. 

Q. But just to be clear, it's not 
■tien-ended, or is it? 

A. No. It is intended to be and will 
, I'm sure, of limited duration, but we 
m't want to get in the position of put- 
ig some number on it. 

Q. During the deliberations on 
nding Marines back, did any of 
tu — yourself, perhaps — have the feel- 
g that you were getting on a slip- 
jry slope? Did any memories of Vict- 
im come to mind? 

A. No, I don't think this has any 
lalagous aspect of Vietnam at all. 



5vember1982 



Q. None? Because so many people 
in the Congress wonder whether you 
are in for 10 or 40 days, or 40 months. 
What is your sense of that? 

A. I "don't want to put down a 
number of days because we might some- 
how be in a position of doing something 
that wasn't appropriate at the end of 
that number of days, or we might feel 
that it is propitious to leave well before 
that, and people would then say, "Why 
don't you stay longer?" It is a mistake to 
put yourself into that trap. 



Q. A lot of people with perfect 
hindsight are now suggesting that the 
troops, in departing on the 10th, left 
too early. Do you agree? 

A. No, I don't agree. The situation 
was stable, and the new Government of 
Lebanon was in the process of taking 
over. The President, Bashir, was in the 
process of bringing about a reconcilia- 
tion. The conditions that were presumed 
at the time we came in had been met, 
and so we left, and I think properly so. 



'Press release 291. 



Assistant Secretary Veliotes 
Interviewed on "Meet the Press' 



Assistant Secretary for Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 
Nicholas A. Veliotes, was interviewed on 
NBC-TV's "Meet the Press" by Bill 
Monroe, NBC News; Mannn Kalb, NBC 
News; Henry Trewhitt, The Baltimore 
Sun; Richard Cohen, The Washington 
Post; and Georgie Anne Geyer, Univer- 
sal Syndicate on September 26. 1982. 

Q. I'd like to start with the question 
of when U.S. Marines will actually 
land in Beirut. Last Monday a senior 
American official said they'd be there 
within 72 hours. On Thursday the 
State Department spokesman said 
they'd be there today and that there 
was no relationship, he said, between 
the arrival of the Marines and when 
the Israelis left. Now there seems to 
be that kind of a relationship. Could 
you clear this up, please? 

A. I believe when we discussed this 
earlier, we said that the Marines could 
come in on a 72-hour advance notice. 
The current status is very simple. The 
Marine contingent of the multinational 
force (MNF) will be deployed the furth- 
est south of any of the three con- 
tingents. 

We are in the process of working 
out the final details of the deployment 
with the Government of Lebanon and, 
of course, the Government of Israel. The 
current situation concerning the begin- 
ning of Yom Kippur has had the effect 
of delaying the agreement on the final 
arrangements. 

Q. Are you holding up the disem- 
barkment, as well as the deployment 
of the Marines, until the Israelis have 



pulled out of west Beirut, all of 
Beirut, including the airport? 

A. Our Marines will come into west 
Beirut, most of them in the port, and 
immediately be deployed to the southern 
part of the city and the airport. 

Q. When will they land? 

A. I would expect this to be some- 
time on perhaps Wednesday, the way 
we're currently planning. 

Q. Do you have a commitment 
from the Israelis that they will pull 
out of all of Beirut, including the air- 
port, by Wednesday, as reported? 

A. Yes, I believe that's accurate. 

Q. It appears to me that Ameri- 
cans might be most interested in what 
the mission of the Marines is this 
time. What are the dangers? What are 
their instructions? What are they to 
do if they are fired upon? Are they to 
engage in combat? 

A. The mission of the Marines is 
primarily to be a part of a three-nation 
force in Beirut which, by the presence of 
the Marines and this force, will give con- 
fidence to the Government of Lebanon 
and, thereby, facilitate the government's 
reestablishment of its authority 
throughout its capital city. 

The question of how long the 
Marines will be there; this has not been 
determined. We have said it would be of 
a limited duration and that its mission 
would be confined to Beirut itself. 

As far as the circumstances under 
which the Marines will be deployed, we 
do not see that the environment would 
be potentially more hostile than the en- 
vironment for the initial deployment 
which, as you recall, was accomplished 
in the context of a shooting war, and 



43 



MIDDLE EAST 



since that time, 15,000 armed personnel 
have been evacuated from Beirut. 

Q. What do they do if they're fired 
upon? Are they withdrawn? 

A. There will be normal peacetime 
rules of engagement. Our forces will be 
able to defend themselves. No one would 
expect anything less. 

Q. But would they be withdrawn if 
they were under attack? 

A. I think you have a definitional 
problem here. Being fired upon, you 
can't exclude isolated unfortunate in- 
cidents, and no one is trying to, and 
coming under attack. So I would say 
that we would not expect them to come 
under attack. We would anticipate, if 
there's any trouble, it would be from 
isolated incidents— snipers, what have 
you — and we would expect the Marines 
to fulfill their mission, which is essential- 
ly one of giving confidence, not only to 
the Lebanese but to the unarmed 
Palestinians and others in that area. 

Q. At the end of last week, U.N. 
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick sort of 
indicated that America was in itself 
culpable for the massacre of Palestin- 
ians because we pulled out the troops 
earlier than expected. If American 
troops had been on the spot and if 
they are going to return and there had 
been a similar incident, would it be 
the role of American troops to go in 
and try to protect Palestinian 
civilians? 

A. This is all a rather iffy question. 
Let me first say I don't believe that's 
what Ambassador Kirkpatrick said or 
meant to say in her public comments. 

As far as the previous deployment of 
the multinational force, we believe it 
successfully carried out its mission, 
which was primarily to monitor the safe 
departure of the Syrians, FLO [Palestine 
Liberation Organization], and other 
armed elements in Beirut and also to 
facilitate, through being there, the 
beginning of Lebanese reconciliation and 
the beginning of the Lebanese author- 
ities reasserting their control over west 
Beirut. That happened, the mission was 
accomplished, and the troops withdrew. 

As 1 said, we don't exclude isolated 
incidents. We don't expect a repetition 
of what happened in the camps. Indeed, 
all of the evidence points to the fact that 
the Lebanese Army is now moving into 
position and also that the Israeli Armed 
Forces are, indeed, withdrawing and 
turning over positions. 

Q. This morning we've been get- 
ting reports directly from Beirut that 



even while the Marines are waiting to 
land, in the wake of the killing of two 
Israeli soldiers, large numbers of 
Lebanese and Palestinian men have 
been removed from that area and 
taken south. Also that even after the 
massacre, more and more Palestinians 
are being taken to the south of 
Lebanon, where 7,000 are already be- 
ing held. As far as you know, are 
these reports true, and does the 
United States intend to do anything 
about them? 

A. We have heard varying reports 
about interrogations and, if you will, 
deportations of people from west 
Beirut — males. We have not been able 
to verify that there have, indeed, been 
large-scale movements of males from 
west Beirut to the south by the Israelis. 
I'm not excluding this. It's just that we 
have made our inquiries, and we have 
been unable to obtain information that 
would verify any large-scale movements 
to the south. 

Q. Do we have any agreement with 
the Israeli Government over that in 
the wake of the massacre? 

A. No, not agreements. 

Q. When you say you've made in- 
quiries on this subject, do you mean 
you've asked the Israelis about it and 
you've not gotten an answer? 

A. We have asked the Israelis about 
the reports. These reports come in in a 
variety of sources, and the substance 
varies. The answer we have received is 
that yes, there have been interrogations, 
and, yes, there were large numbers of 
people held but that most of these peo- 
ple were released, the implication being 
that very few of these detainees were 
actually taken away. But, again, I can't 
verify that. 

Q. Were you given figures or ap- 
proximate figures? 

A. We were given figures of a very 
small number, but I do not believe that 
this would be considered absolute 
verification. 

Q. You're an expert on Israeli 
politics. You've served there, and 
you're now, in part, responsible for 
our policy toward Israel. There was a 
massive demonstration in Tel Aviv last 
night against the government. Do you 
expect the collapse of the Begin 
regime? 

A. I really don't know what will be 
the impact of the current obvious unrest 
— I suppose is the word — in Israel, and 



only time will tell us what, if any, const 
quences there will be. I do recall, 
however, that during my time in Israel 
in early 1974, at the end of the October 
war — the Yom Kippur war — there was 
a great amount of dissatisfaction with 
the lack of preparedness, if you will, of 
the Israeli forces at that time, and the 
government did have an investigation o 
the charges and the allegations. 

Q. Do you believe there'll be an in 
vestigation this time? 

A. Oh, yes. 

Q. What do you think the result 
will be? 

A. I have no idea, but — 

Q. What do you think the result 
would be based upon what you know 
about what happened at the camps? 

A. 1 don't want to prejudge what I 
believe will be a very serious and impar 
tial investigation. 

Q. Do you, as a member of this 
Administration, feel that the Presi- 
dent's peace plan, as outlined on 
September 1st, can be moved forward 
and implemented while the Begin go\ 
ernment stays in power? 

A. We believe that the President's 
peace plan must be moved forward and 
implemented. The latest bloodletting 
should only reemphasize the need that 
this has to stop, and it has to stop now 
The way it's going to stop is if people 
decide that they're going to come to th( 
negotiating table and really talk about 
peace very seriously. 

Q. You're not quite directing 
yourself to my question. 

A. The Government of Israel has r 
jected the President's plan. The Arabs 
have not accepted it. We believe that if 
there are serious prospects for early 
negotiations for peace between Israel 
and the Arabs, that this can and will 
substantially alter attitudes. 

Q. On the part of Prime Minister 
Begin? 

A. I would say on the part of 
everyone who is concerned. 

Q. But do you have an indication 
now that King Hussein will join that 
process? 

A. We have no more indication tha: 
the general public has through his 
words. We have said and he has said 
that he has received the President's pro 
posals, and he believes they are very 
serious and important proposals worthy 



Department of State Bulletir 



MIDDLE EAST 



serious attention by all concerned, so 
i takes them seriously. 

Q. Let me extrapolate the question 
^ain to the state of Israeli-American 
ilations in general. Over the past 
tenths. Israel frequently has defied 

hat the United States has perceived 
) be its interest, and I think most 
verybody would agree that that rela- 

onship has changed, where there 
'ould be a lot of argument about the 
egree of that change. Let me ask you 
) address yourself specifically to 
lat. What is the state of Israeli- 

merican relations, and what is the 
rospect for the United States taking 
lore direct sanctions to try to bring 
srael more to its way of thinking? 

A. I believe on the public record it's 
lear that the state of our relations is 
nder significant strain. You can hardly 
raw another conclusion from the public 
tatements that we believe we had to 
lake rather recently, under the cir- 
umstances. 

As far as the future state of these 
slations, of course, we hope that these 

ill not stay strained and that we will 
e, in the reasonably near future, back 
ito essentially a cooperative posture 
'ith the Government of Israel. 

As far as the question of sanctions, 
lis always comes up whenever we have 

problem with the Government of 
.rael, and, quite frankly, I have always 
lelieved that the greatest pressure on 

rael, whether it's in the peace process 
ontext or anything else, is, indeed, the 
ressure of the prospect of peace. So 
ather than talk about the prospects of 
his or that kind of punitive action, let's 
alk about the e.xpectation that in 
.ebanon and also in the peace process, 
/e will again be working closely 
ogether. 

Q. Just let me recall that several 
lembers of Congress have talked— 
, cropping the word sanctions — about 
ither a decrease in American 
conomic support for Israel or a 
leerease in the rate of increase of 
conomic support for Israel. Do you 
egard that as being in the prospect? 

A. I'm not certain that I'm aware of 
he congressional attitudes that you've 
ust discussed. We believe, however, 
vith respect to aid levels for Israel and 
'or every other aid recipient, that the 



President's budget in an austere year is 
really sufficient, and we would hold to 
that." 

Q. Let me go back to the Presi- 
dent's peace plan. Since announcing it. 
the Israelis have announced new set- 
tlements in the West Bank; they've ap- 
parently broken the agreement with 
America by going into west Beirut. It 
seems to me that in announcing the 
peace plan, the President has lost a 
certain amount of leverage over Israel. 
Is that assessment fair, and. if so. 
why did he announce the plan when he 
did. with Israeli troops in Lebanon? 

A. The purpose of the President an- 
nouncing the peace plan was not to sus- 
tain or increase leverage on Israel. He 
announced the peace plan because it was 
right, it was overdue. 

As far as the presence of Israeli 
troops in Lebanon, this whole Lebanese 
tragedy has only reemphasized the need 
for moving ahead very quickly on resolv- 
ing the broader Palestinian issue, and 
that is the essence of the President's 
peace plan. 

Q. I understand the reason for the 
plan, but since being announced, has 
it, in fact, gotten anything? It seems 
to me that the Israelis have gone their 
own way, and the Arabs certainly 
haven't stood up and cheered, so what 
have we got for it? 

A. I think that we have had a vei-y 
interesting reaction to the President's 
peace plan. There is virtually unanimous 
support in Western Europe for the 
American posture on Middle East peace 
at this time. There have been very 
positive reactions amongst important 
elements of the Arabs. And let me say 
that in my view, the most important 
positive reaction has come from the 
Palestinians living under Israeli occupa- 
tion, coupled with those Palestinian Jor- 
danians with whom we are always in 
contact. You're talking about 2V2 million 
people who are concerned. Their reac- 
tion has been very positive, very impor- 
tant, and it is being noted by all of the 
players. 

Q. We've had very positive re- 
sponses from g^reat leaders of the 
Jewish communities — like Edgar 
Bronfman of the World Jewish Con- 
gress, Philip Klutznik— who seem to 



be out in front supporting the Presi- 
dent's plan and also calling for an in- 
vestigation in Israel itself. Some peo- 
ple believe that President Reagan is 
actually lagging behind the lead that 
these men are giving. Is this true? Is 
this deliberate? Is this a diplomatic 
ploy to let others take the lead? 

A. Clearly, the people to whom you 
refer are public citizens and are free to 
express their views. I don't see that 
President Reagan is lagging behind 
anyone. Indeed, the President has taken 
a very visible leadership position, not on- 
ly on Lebanon— and this far precedes 
the problems and tragedies of the past 
few months— but also on the broader 
peace process. And I would not say he is 
behind or we are behind or they are 
ahead. We have policies in Lebanon and 
in the peace process; they're the right 
policies, and the President is determined 
to press ahead with them. 

Q. I was referring to the fact that 
a week ago, the President demanded, 
the same day, that the Israeli troops 
be out of west Beirut. Later in the 
week in briefings that we had, it was 
an attempt to negotiate them out 
within 3 weeks. Is there a possibility 
or a danger that his pressures or his 
peace plan will just sort of be worn 
down? 

A. No. I don't know where the 3 
weeks' negotiations came from. Our 
position was, from the beginning when 
we heard that the Israelis were going in, 
that they shouldn't go in, that if they did 
go in, it would be destabilizing, and that 
they should leave. 

Then, of course, you had this terri- 
ble tragedy which we were all numbed 
by and focusing on. That then was 
followed by the decision of the President 
to lead again in this area by committing 
the American force to the multinational 
force, and that has been the focus of our 
attention for the last 4 or 5 days. 

Q. But as these reports we were 
talking about earlier, which both you 
and many of us in the press have been 
getting — there may be other atrocities 
being committed right now while we 
are negotiating. 

A. All of our information is that is 
not the case. The Lebanese are in the 
camps. They are in their positions. We 



45 



MIDDLE EAST 



have some early arrivals of the French 
and the Italians, which is a confidence- 
booster. And speaking of confidence- 
boosting and helping the Lebanese help 
themselves, I frankly believe that the 
first positive payoff of the President's 
decision on the multinational force was 
the unanimous election of the new Presi- 
dent of Lebanon — significant impact in 
Lebanon and pushing the various fac- 
tions together. 

Q. I'd like to ask you what the 
American position right now is on the 
FLO. Recognizing that you're not go- 
ing to talk and negotiate with them 
until they accept 242 and Israel's right 
to e.xist. ('/ cetera, does the U.S. 
(iovernment recognize the PLO as the 
principal spokesman for the Palestin- 
ian people? 

A. We recognize that the PLO is 
considered to be the sole spokesman of 
the Palestinian people officially by the 
Arabs. We have always acknowledged 
that the PLO has significant support 
throughout the Arab world on the 
Palestinian community and in that 
sense, obviously, is as a voice that must 
be heard by the Arabs in the context of 
their own deliberations as we look 
toward peace. 

I would tell you right now, my own 
personal view is that the role that the 
PLO can play, in the interest of securing 
Palestinian rights and peace in the area, 
is to encourage the other Arabs to sup- 
port an early announcement by King 
Hussein that he can come to the 
negotiating table. ■ 



Situation in Lebanon 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT. 
AUG. 23, 1982' 

The President has noted this morning 
the election of a new President in 
Lebanon [Bashir Gemayel], and he has 
sent a message of congratulations to the 
new President. We also congratulate the 
Lebanese Parliament in electing the new 
President through the traditional, con- 
stitutional processes during this difficult 
and trying time. 

Lebanon's new leadership has a dif- 
ficult task ahead. That task is to bring 
the country back together again. The 
promotion of genuine national reconcilia- 
tion and reconstruction are crucial to the 
success of the new President. 

The United States will continue to 
work closely with the Government of 
Lebanon on the complex and difficult 
task ahead. We believe that the election 
holds out the possibility to continue the 
process of strengthening the central 
Government of Lebanon, and we are 
pleased that the process has moved for- 
ward. 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
AUG. 30. 19822 

The U.S. Government is pleased that the 
Palestinian problem is receiving priority 
attention among the governments in the 
Middle East. 

We have seen a reaffirmation of 
Israel's desire to move ahead with the 
peace process on the basis of Camp 
David. We continue to have consulta- 
tions with both Israel and Egyf)t in an 
effort to decide how to proceed in our 
common effort to resolve the Palestinian 
problem in all of its aspects. 

The U.S. — this Administration, as 
its predecessors — is committed to the 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
Jordan and our support for its enduring 
character. We do not agree that Jordan 
is a Palestinian state. 

What it l)oils down to is that this is 
a matter for future discussion, the 
autonomy process under the Camp 
David accords. 



46 



EXCHANGE OF LETTERS, 
SEPT. 5. 1982' 

President Reagan's Letter 

Mr. Mayor: 

I wish to express to you my deepest 
gratitude for your message of support 
for the proposals which I outlined in my 
address on September 1. It is particular- 
ly important to have your endorsement 
of my approach to peace. You are not 
only a recognized and respected Pales- 
tinian leader, but you represent Bethle- 
hem which has been a glowing symbol o) 
peace and brotherhood throughout the 
world for the past two thousand years. 
May God bless you and your efforts on 
behalf of your people and peace and 
security for all in the region. 

Ronald Reag.'\.n 



Mayor Freij's Letter 

I wish to convey to you, Mr. President, 
from the little town of Bethlehem, our 
support for your plan to find a com- 
prehensive solution to end the suffering! 
of the Palestinian people and to bring 
peace and security for all nations in the 
Middle East. Please be assured of our 
sincere desire for peace with freedom 
and for peace with a homeland. May 
God give you strength and wisdom to 
fulfill our expectations. 

Elias Fkkm 
Mayor of Bethlehem 



REMARKS TO REPORTERS 
FOLLOWING A MEETING WITH 
AMBASSADOR HABIB. 
SEPT. 8, 1982* 

President Reagan 

I asked Phil Habib to come by today in 
order to discuss the next phase of the 
I'.S. diplomacy in Lebanon and the pros- 
pects for our Middle East initiative. I 
want to begin by reaffirming our prin- 
cipal objectives in Lebanon. 

First, the removal of all foreign 
military forces from Lebanon; 

Second, the strengthening of the 
central government and the establish- 
ment of its authority throughout the 
country; 

Third, Lebanon must not again 
become a launching pad for attacks into 



Department of State Bulletin 



MIDDLE EAST 



rael. Indeed, the security of all the 
ktes in the area can only be guar- 
Iteed through freely negotiated peace 
Jaties between Israel and its 
|ighbors; and 

Finally, I call on all the parties in 
fcbanon to maintain the cease-fire so 
it diplomacy can succeed. 

In the course of his briefing, Phil 
d me that a peaceful resolution of the 
'irut crisis would not have been possi- 
? without a multinational force that in- 
.( ided U.S. forces. With the evacuation 
mplete and the authorities asserting 
eir control throughout Beirut, I am 
jased to announce that the multina- 
nal force will commence its with- 
awal from Beirut, Friday, Septem- 
r 10th, day after tomorrow. And the 
S. Marine contingent should be among 
e first to leave. We're, therefore, 
eping our commitment to have them 
1 within 30 days. 
I I'll remain fully and personally 
I gaged in support of the next phase of 
( r diplomacy in Lebanon. I also am an- 
luncing the formation of an inter- 
rency steering group on Lebanon. This 
joup, under the chairmanship of the 
j^puty Secretary of State, (Kenneth 
hm], will coordinate the political, 
(onomic, and security assistance dimen- 
!)ns of our policy. Peter McPherson, 
] rector of AID, will assume respon- 
!)ility for reconstruction efforts in addi- 
1 in to his role as my personal repre- 
! ntative for relief in Lebanon. And 
; orris Draper, Phil's right hand in 
ijbanon, has been accorded the per- 
! nal rank of Ambassador; he will 
:anage the political working group and 
; ortly return to Lebanon to continue 
!s work. I want to express my ap- 
eciation to him for what he has done 
,id what he is going to continue doing. 

Once again, I want to extend my 
■artfelt congratulations to Phil Habib 
r his superhuman efforts throughout 
V past year and a half. Phil's suc- 
'ssful diplomacy is one reason why 
e're now able to inject a fresh start in- 
the peace process. 

Phil would like to make some re- 
ark.s, I know, and I know many of you 
(luld like to ask him questions. I'm go- 
.g to leave Phil and Morris to you. I 
ave a date back in the office that I 
lUSt now keep and return to work, 
hank you for being here. Phil, again, 
lank you. God bless you. 

Q. Can you just tell us what you 

link about Prime Minister Begin say- 

ig to the Knesset today that the West 



Bank would be a Jewish homeland 
forever? 

A. I think that I'll let these 
gentlemen handle the questions and take 
a question from that. My own personal 
reaction is that, because I stressed 
negotiations as the settlement to many 
of these troublesome issues there, I 
think that we have to understand some- 
times that maybe positions are being 
staked out with those negotiations in 
mind. 

Q. But do you think Israel will 
change? Do you think this initial reac- 
tion can be modified in the future? 

A. That's up to the negotiators. 

[At this point, the President returned to 
the Oval Office.] 

Q. He's gone now. Tell us every- 
thing. [Laughter] 

Ambassador Habib. No, it's — first 
of all, it's kind of nice to be able to talk 
to you fellows without having to just 
wave as I go by. 

But I'm particularly gratified that 
the President is continuing his personal 
interest in the Lebanese situation. It's 
going to require continued high-level at- 
tention in our government as we pursue 
the objectives that the President has laid 
down for us. And in that regard he and 
Secretary Shultz have given Morris and 
myself our instructions. Morris has his 
marching orders. He'll be taking off very 
shortly. And then later in the month, I'll 
go out for the inauguration of the new 
President and spend a few days with 
him. 

But basically, we're going to be try- 
ing to build upon the initial — I wouldn't 
call them successes as much as I would 
call them the initial progress that's been 
made in the Lebanese situation. There is 
a fair, good chance that we can see a 
sovereign, integral, free, pluralistic 
Lebanon, once again sovereign within its 
own territories. And that's what we're 
basically going to be working for. 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 13, 1982^ 

For most of the period since the Beirut 
agreement was reached last month, all 
parties have demonstrated considerable 
restraint in their military activities. 
However, in the past week there have 
been a growing number of incidents 
which can only harm the chances for ad- 
vancing the peace process. 



The United States urges all con- 
cerned to avoid provocations, to exercise 
restraint, and thereby contribute to the 
hopes of the citizens in the region for 
progress toward peace. 

During the coming days, Ambas- 
sador Morris Draper will be meeting 
with the parties to discuss ways to 
reduce the tension still remaining in 
Lebanon and to help strengthen the 
authority of the central Lebanese 
Government. 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 14, 1982" 

The news of the cowardly assassination 
of Bashir Gemayel, President-elect of 
Lebanon, is a shock to the American 
people and to civilized men and women 
everywhere. This promising young 
leader had brought the light of hope to 
Lebanon. We condemn the perpetrators 
of this heinous crime against Lebanon 
and against the cause of peace in the 
Middle East. Our deepest sympathy goes 
to Mrs. Bashir Gemayel and their son, 
the entire Gemayel family, to President 
Elias Sarkis, to his government, and to 
the people of Lebanon. We join with 
them in mourning. 

The tragedy will be all the greater if 
men of good will in Lebanon and in 
countries friendly to Lebanon permit 
disorder to continue in this war-torn 
country. This must not happen. The U.S. 
Government stands by Lebanon with its 
full support in this hour of need. 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 15, 1982^ 

This latest violent tragedy only reem- 
phasizes the need for urgency in the 
search for peace in the Middle East. The 
United States intends to continue to 
press ahead vigorously with the Presi- 
dent's initiative to broaden the participa- 
tion at the peace talks. 

We have been in frequent touch with 
senior officials of the Government of 
Lebanon and with other prominent 
Lebanese personalities. Our support for 
their efforts to maintain order should be 
clear. We have also contacted Israeli of- 
ficials in Beirut, Washington, and in 
Israel. They told us that their military 
moves are limited and precautionary. 
We have urged they do nothing to in- 
crease tensions. 

The central Government of Lebanon 
remains in place. We will be consulting 
with President Sarkis, Prime Minister 



lovember 1982 



47 



MIDDLE EAST 



Wazzan, and other Lebanese Govern- 
ment officials to explore ways we can 
support their efforts to maintain stabili- 
ty. We adhere to the goals we share 
with the Government of Lebanon of in- 
ternal unity and withdrawal of all 
foreign forces. 

While we deplore the shocking 
assassination of President-elect 
Gemayel, it is essential that we not lose 
sight of these important objectives 
which Lebanon has set for itself. The 
restoration of central government 
authority remains key to Lebanon's 
future. We will do everything we can to 
assist this process through this difficult 
period in the country's history. 

Ambassador Draper has the full sup- 
port of the President and will continue 
to work closely with the Government of 
Lebanon in pursuit of its objectives. 
Those objectives parallel our own sup- 
port for: 

• The withdrawal of all foreign 
military forces from Lebanon; 

• The strengthening of the central 
government and the reestablishment of 
its authority throughout Lebanon; 

• The creation of conditions which 
insure that Lebanon will never again be 
a launching pad for attacks against 
Israel; and 

• The promotion of national unity 
and reconciliation, along with 
strengthening of all national institutions, 
including the army. 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 15, 1982^ 

We deplore the shocking assassination 
of President-elect Bashir Gemayel. This 
latest violent tragedy only reemphasizes 
the need for urgency in the search for 
peace in the Middle East. 

The central Government of Lebanon 
remains in place. We will be consulting 
with President Sarkis, Prime Minister 
Wazzan, and other Lebanese Govern- 
ment officials to explore ways we can 
support their efforts to maintain stabili- 
ty. 

We have been in frequent touch with 
senior officials of the Government of 
Lebanon and with other prominent 
Lebanese personalities. Ambassador 
Draper [special negotiator for Lebanon] 
is in Lebanon today for meetings with 
Lebanese officials. Our support for their 
efforts to maintain order is clear. We 
have also contacted Israeli officials in 
Beirut, Washington, and in Israel. We 
have urged they do nothing to increase 



tensions and again call on all parties to 
exercise restraint. 

President-elect Gemayel's death 
underscores the need that we not lose 
sight of the important objectives which 
Lebanon has set for itself. The restora- 
tion of central government authority re- 
mains key to Lebanon's future. We will 
do everything we can to assist this proc- 
ess through this difficult period in the 
country's history. Ambassador Draper 
has the full support of the President and 
will continue to work closely with the 
Government of Lebanon in pursuit of its 
objectives. Those objectives parallel our 
own support for: 

• The withdrawal of all foreign 
military forces from Lebanon; 

• The strengthening of the central 
government and the reestablishment of 
its authority throughout Lebanon; 

• The creation of conditions which 
insure that Lebanon will never again be 
a launching pad for attacks against 
Israel; and 

• The promotion of national unity 
and reconciliation, along with 
strengthening of all national institutions, 
including the army. 

We will continue to pursue the goals 
we share with the Government of 
Lebanon of internal unity and with- 
drawal of all foreign forces. The United 
States intends, as well, to continue to 
press ahead vigorously with the Presi- 
dent's initiative to broaden the participa- 
tion at the Middle East peace talks. 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 16, 19821^ 

It appears from press reports and 
eyewitness accounts that the Israelis 
have now moved into strategic positions 
throughout west Beirut and control 
much of that sector of the city. This is 
contrary to the assurances given to us 
by the Israelis both in Washington and 
in Israel. 

We fully support the Lebanese Gov- 
ernment's call for the withdrawal of 
Israeli forces, which are in clear viola- 
tion of the cease-fire understanding to 
which Israel is a party. There is no 
justification in our view for Israel's con- 
tinued military presence in west Beirut, 
and we call for an immediate pullback. 



PRESIDENTS STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 18. 1982' 

I was horrified to learn this morning of 
the killing of Palestinians which has 



taken place in Beirut. All people of 
decency must share our outrage and 
revulsion over the murders, which in- 
cluded women and children. I express 
my deepest regrets and condolences to 
the families of the victims and the 
broader Palestinian community. 

During the negotiations leading to 
the PLO withdrawal from Beirut, we 
were assured that Israeli forces would 
not enter west Beirut. We also 
understood that following withdrawal, 
Lebanese Army units would establish 
control over the city. They were 
thwarted in this effort by the Israeli oc- 
cupation that took place, beginning on 
Wednesday. We strongly opposed 
Israel's move into west Beirut following 
the assassination of President-elect 
Gemayel both because we believed it 
wrong in principle and for fear that it 
would provoke further fighting. Israel, 
by yesterday in military control of 
Beirut, claimed that its moves would 
prevent the kind of tragedy which has 
now occurred. 

We have today summoned the 
Israeli Ambassador to demand that the 
Israeli Government immediately 
withdraw its forces from west Beirut tc 
the positions occupied on September 14 
We also expect Israel, thereafter, to 
commence serious negotiations which 
will first lead to the earliest possible 
disengagement of Israeli forces from 
Beirut and, second, to an agreed 
framework for the early withdrawal of 
all foreign forces from Lebanon. 

Despite and because of the addi- 
tional bloody trauma which adds to 
Lebanon's agonies, we urge the 
Lebanese to unite quickly in support of 
their government and their constitu- 
tional processes and to work for the 
future they so richly deserve. We will b 
with them. 

This terrible tragedy underscores 
the desperate need for a true peace in 
the Middle East, one which takes full a( 
count of the needs of the Palestinian 
people. The initiative I announced on 
September 1 will be pursued vigorously 
in order to achieve that goal. 



PRESIDENTS STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 20, 1982' 

My fellow Americans, the scenes that 
the whole world witnessed this past 
weekend were among the most heart- 
rending in the long nightmare of 
Lebanon's agony. Millions of us have 
seen pictures of the Palestinian victims 
of this tragedy. There is little that 



48 



Department of State Bulletir 



MIDDLE EAST 



Drds can add. But there are actions we 
n and must take to bring that night- 
are to an end. 

It is not enough for us to view this 
some remote event in which we 
rselves are not involved. For our 
lends in Lebanon and Israel, for our 
lends in Europe and elsewhere in the 
iddle East, and for us Americans, this 
agedy, horrible as it is, reminds us of 
e absolute imperative of bringing 
lace to that troubled country and 
gion. By working for peace in the Mid- 
s East, we serve the cause of world 
ace, and the future of mankind. 

For the criminals who did this deed, 
I punishment is enough to remove the 
ot of their crime. But for the rest of 

there are things that we can learn 
id things that we must do. The people 
Lebanon must have learned that the 
cle of massacre upon massacre must 
id. Children are not avenged by the 
urder of other children. Israel must 
ive learned that there is no way it can 
ipose its own solutions on hatreds as 
■ep and bitter as those that produced 
is tragedy. If it seeks to do so, it will 
ily sink more deeply into the quagmire 
at looms before it. Those outsiders 
:) ho have fed the flames of civil war in 
ebanon for so many years need to 
arn that the fire will consume them, 
o, if it is not put out. And we must all 
■dedicate ourselves to the cause of 
3ace. I reemphasize my call for early 
ogress to solve the Palestinian issue 
id repeat the U.S. proposals which are 
)w even more urgent. 

For now is not the time for talk 
one. Now is a time for action. To act 
igether to restore peace to Beirut; to 
>lp a stable government emerge that 
m restore peace and independence to 
1 of Lebanon; and to bring a just and 
sting resolution to the conflict between 
;rael and its Arab neighbors, one that 
itisfies the legitimate rights of the 
alestinians who are all too often its vic- 

Our basic objectives in Lebanon have 
ot changed, for they are the objectives 
f the government and the people of 
lebanon themselves. First and fore- 
lost, we seek the restoration of a 
Lrong and stable central government in 
lat country, brought into being by 
rderly constitutional processes, 
ebanon elected a new president 2 short 
eeks ago only to see him murdered 
ven before he could assume his office, 
his week a distressed Lebanon will 
gain be electing a new president. May 



God grant him safety as well as the 
wisdom and courage to lead his country 
into a new and happier era. 

The international community has an 
obligation to assist the Government of 
Lebanon in reasserting authority over 
all its territory. Foreign forces and 
armed factions have too long obstructed 
the legitimate role of the Lebanese 
Government's security forces. We must 
pave the way for withdrawal of foreign 
forces. 

The place to begin this task is in 
Beirut. The Lebanese Government must 
be permitted to restore internal security 
in its capital. It cannot do this if foreign 
forces remain in or near Beirut. With 
this goal in mind, I have consulted with 
our French and Italian allies. We have 
agreed to form a new multinational 
force, similar to the one which served so 
well last month, with the mission of 
enabling the Lebanese Government to 
resume full sovereignty over its capital, 
the essential precondition for extending 
its control over the entire country. 

The Lebanese Government, with the 
support of its people, requested this 
help. For this multinational force to suc- 
ceed, it is essential that Israel withdraw 
from Beirut. With the expected coopera- 
tion of all parties, the multinational 
force will return to Beirut for a limited 
period of time. Its purpose is not to act 
as a police force but to make it possible 
for the lawful authorities of Lebanon to 
discharge those duties for themselves. 

Secretary Shultz, on my behalf, has 
also reiterated our views to the Govern- 
ment of Israel through its Ambassador 
in Washington. Unless Israel moves 
quickly and courageously to withdraw, it 
will find itself ever more deeply involved 
in problems that are not its own and 
which it cannot solve. 

The participation of American forces 
in Beirut will again be for a limited 
period. But I've concluded there is no 
alternative to their returning to 
Lebanon if that country is to have a 
chance to stand on its own feet. 

Peace in Beirut is only a first step. 
Together with the people of Lebanon, 
we seek the removal of all foreign 
military forces from that country. The 
departure of all foreign forces at the re- 
quest of the Lebanese authorities has 
been widely endorsed by Arab as well as 
other states. Israel and Syria have both 
indicated that they have no territorial 
ambitions in Lebanon and are prepared 
to withdraw. It is now urgent that 
specific arrangements for withdrawal of 
all foreign forces be agreed upon. This 



must happen very soon. The legitimate 
security concerns of neighboring states, 
including particularly the safety of 
Israel's northern population, must be 
provided for. But this is not a difficult 
task if the political will is there. The 
Lebanese people must be allowed to 
chart their own future. They must rely 
solely on Lebanese Armed Forces who 
are willing and able to bring security to 
their country. They must be allowed to 
do so, and the sooner the better. 

Ambassador Draper, who has been 
in close consultation with the parties 
concerned in Lebanon, will remain in the 
area to work for the full implementation 
of our proposal. Ambassador Habib will 
join him and will represent me at the in- 
auguration of the new President of 
Lebanon and will consult with the 
leaders in the area. He will return 
promptly to Washington to report to 
me. 

Early in the summer our govern- 
ment met its responsibility to help 
resolve a severe crisis and to relieve the 
Lebanese people of the crushing burden. 
We succeeded. Recent events have pro- 
duced new problems, and we must, 
again, assume our responsibility. 

I am especially anxious to end the 
agony of Lebanon because it is both 
right and in our national interest. But I 
am also determined to press ahead on 
the broader effort to achieve peace be- 
tween Israel and its Arab neighbors. 
The events in Beirut of last week have 
served only to reinforce my conviction 
that such a peace is Desperately needed 
and that the initiative we undertook on 
September 1 is the right way to proceed. 
We will not be discouraged or deterred 
in our efforts to seek peace in Lebanon 
and a just and lasting peace throughout 
the Middle East. 

All of us must learn the appropriate 
lessons from this tragedy and assume 
the responsibilities that it imposes upon 
us. We owe it to ourselves and to our 
children. The whole world will be a safer 
place when this region which has known 
so much trouble can begin to know 
peace instead. Both our purpose and our 
action are peaceful, and we are taking 
them in a spirit of international coopera- 
tion. 

Tonight I ask for your prayers and 
your support as our country continues 
its vital role as a leader for world peace, 
the role that all of us as Americans can 
be proud of. 



49 



MIDDLE EAST 



PRESIDENT'S LETTER 
TO PRESIDENT-ELECT 
AMIN GEMAYEL. 
SEPT. 22, 1982^ 

Dear Mr. President-elect: 
The American people join me in con- 
gratulating you upon your election as Presi- 
dent of Lebanon. We are proud to stand 
beside your courageous nation as our friends 
in Lebanon again overcome adversity in exer- 
cising the democratic and constitutional tradi- 
tion that our nations share. 

In my September 20 address to the 
American people. I restated the basic objec- 
tives of the U.S. relationship with Lebanon. 
"First and foremost," I said, "we seek the 
restoration of a strong and stable central 
government" in Lebanon, "brought into being 
by orderly constitutional processes." Your 
election as President sets Lebanon firmly on 
the path to national reconciliation behind a 
strong government with a broad mandate 
from the people of Lebanon. 

You have our pledge that the United 
States will remain a staunch partner and 
friend to Lebanon as you set out upon the 
difficult and challenging tasks ahead. The 
American nation and I extend to you and all 
Lebanese our very best wishes for the future. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Reagan 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 23, 1982' 

The situation in the Middle East— I will 
go over some details that have been 
talked about in part, or maybe in full, at 
the Departments of Defense and State 
earlier today. We're still working out the 
details of what the Marine force will do 
when they arrive and consultations with 
the Italian and French liaison officers in 
Beirut. 

An agreed-upon mandate for the 
multinational force reads as follows: 

The MNF (multinational force) is to 
provide an interposition force at agreed 
locations and thereby provide the MNF 
presence requested by the Government 
of Lebanon to assist it and Lebanon's 
armed forces in the Beirut area. This 
presence will facilitate the restoration of 
Lebanese Government sovereignty and 
authority over the Beirut area and 
thereby further its efforts to assure the 
safety of persons in the area and to 
bring to an end the violence which has 
tragically recurred. 

These agreed-upon locations are be- 
ing worked out between the Government 
of Lebanon, the P'rench, Italians, and 
the Americans. The force of U.S. 
Marines, nuniliering about 800, as 
previously, will probably go in over the 



weekend. They are in the eastern 
Mediterranean at this time. The French 
are arriving in Beirut. 

The Marines are equipped basically 
as they were the last time they were in- 
volved. The rules of engagement are as 
before, normal self-defense rules. 

It is our desire and hope and expec- 
tation, based on reports that we have 
received, that the Israelis will have 
withdrawn from west Beirut by the end 
of the week. 

Ambassadors Habib and Draper are 
in Israel today to meet with Israeli of- 
ficials to discuss the further 
developments in the situation in west 
Beirut, as well as looking out into the 
future. 



EXCHANGE OF LETTERS** 

Deputy Prime Minister Boutros' Letter 

September 25, nm2 

Your Excellency: 

1 have the honor to refer to the urgent 
discussions between representatives of our 
two Governments concerning the recent 
tragic events which have occurred in the 
Beirut area, and to consultations between my 
Government and the Secretary General of the 
United Nations pursuant to United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 52L On behalf of 
the Republic of Lebanon, I wish to inform 
your Excellency's Government of the deter- 
mination of the Government of Lebanon to 
restore its sovereignty and authority over the 
Beirut area and thereby to assure the safety 
of persons in the area and bring an end to 
violence that has recurred. To this end, 
Israeli forces will withdraw from the Beirut 
area. 

In its consultations with the Secretary 
General, the Government of Lebanon has 
noted that the urgency of the situation re- 
quires immediate action, and the Government 
of Lebanon, therefore, is, in conformity with 
the objectives in U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 521, proposing to several nations 
that they contribute forces to serve as a tem- 
porary Multinational Force (MNF) in the 
Beirut area. The mandate of the MNF will be 
to provide an interposition force at agreed 
locations and thereby provide the multina- 
tional presence requested by the Lebanese 
Government to assist it and the Lebanese 
Armed Forces (LAF) in the Beirut area. This 
presence will facilitate the restoration of 
Lebanese Government sovereignty and 
authority over the Beirut area, and thereby 



further efforts of my Government to assure 
the safety of persons in the area and bring U 
an end the violence which has tragically 
recurred. The MNF may undertake other 
functions only by mutual agreement. 

In the foregoing context, I have the 
honor to propose that the United States of 
America deploy a force of approximately 
1200 personnel to Beirut, subject to the 
following terms and conditions: 

• The American military force shall carr; 
out appropriate activities consistent with the 
mandate of the MNF. 

• Command authority over the Americar 
force will be exercised exclu.sively by the 
United States Government through existing 
American military channels. 

• The LAF and MNF will form a Liaisor 
and Coordination Committee, composed of 
representatives of the MNF participating 
governments and chaired by the representa- 
tives of my Government. The Liaison and 
Coordination Committee will have two essen- 
tial components: (A) Supervisory liaison; and 
(B) Military and technical liaison and coor- 
dination. 

• The American force will operate in 
close coordination with the LAF. To assure 
effective coordination with the LAF, the 
American force will assign liaison officers to 
the LAF and the Government of Lebanon 
will assign liaison officers to the American 
force. The LAF liaison officers to the Ameri- 
can force will, inter alia, perform liaison with 
the civilian population and with the U.N. 
observers and manifest the authority of the 
Lebanese Government in all appropriate 
situations. The American force will provide 
security for LAF personnel operating with 
the U.S. contingent. 

• In carrying out its mission, the 
American force will not engage in combat. It 
may, however, exercise the right of self- 
defense. 

• It is understood that the presence of 
the American force will be needed only for a 
limited period to meet the urgent re- 
quirements posed by the current situation. 
The MNF contributors and the Government 
of Lebanon will consult fully concerning the 
duration of the MNF presence. Arrangement 
for the departure of the MNF will be the sub 
ject of special consultations between the 
Government of Lebanon and the MNF par- 
ticipating governments. The American force 
will depart Lebanon upon any request of the 
Government of Lebanon or upon the decision 
of the President of the United States. 

• The (Jovernment of Lebanon and the 
LAF will take all measures necessary to en- 
sure the protection of the American force's 
personnel, to include securing assurances 
from all armed elements not now under the 
authority of the Lebanese Government that 
they will refrain from hostilities and not in- 
terfere with any activities of the MNF. 

• The American force will enjoy both the 
degree of freedom of movement and the righ; 
to undertake those activities deemed 
necessary for the performance of its mission 
for the support of its personnel. Accordingly, 
it shall enjoy the privileges and immunities 
accorded the administrative and technical 



50 



Department of State Bulletin 



NARCOTICS 



iff of the American Embassy in Beirut, and 
all be exempt from immigration and 
■stoms requirements, and restrictions on 
JBtering or departing Lebanon. Personnel, 
■operty and equipment of the American 
rce introduced into Lebanon shall be ex- 
npt from any form, of tax, duty, charge or 
vy- 

I have the further honor to propose, if 
e foregoing is acceptable to your Excellen- 
's government, that your Excellency's reply 
that effect, together with this note, shall 
institute an agreement between our two 
overnments. 

Please accept. Your Excellency, the 
surances of my highest consideration. 

[fouad boutros] 
Deputy Prime Minister / 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 

mbassador Dillon's Letter 

September 25. 1982 

our Excellency: 

have the honor to refer to your Excellency's 
)te of 25 September 1982 requesting the de- 
oyment of an American force to the Beirut 
ea. I am pleased to inform you on behalf of 
y Government that the United States is 
epared to deploy temporarily a force of ap- 
■■oximately 1200 personnel as part of a 
ultinational Force (MNF) to establish an en- 
ronment which will permit the Lebanese 
nied forces (LAF) to carry out their respon- 
liilities in the Beirut area. It is understood 
at the presence of such an American force 
ill facilitate the restoration of Lebanese 
lAtrnment sovereignty and authority over 
!■ Kt-irut area, an objective which is fully 
lareii by my Government, and thereby fur- 
iiT efforts of the Government of Lebanon to 
vsure the safety of persons in the area and 
m^; to an end the violence which has 
^igically recurred. 

1 have the further honor to inform you 
lat my Government accepts the terms and 
in(iitions concerning the presence of the 
ni'Tican force in the Beirut area as set 
irth in your note, and that Your 
xcellency's note and this reply accordingly 
)nstitute an agreement between our two 
overnments. 

[Robert Dillon] 

United States Ambassador 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
residential Documents of Aug. 30, 1982. 

^Text from Weekly Compilation of 
residential Documents of Sept. 6. 1982. 

^Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
residential Documents of Sept. 13. 1982. 

■•Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
residential Documents of Sept. 20, 1982. 

^Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
lent spokesman John Hughes. 

"Text from Weekly Compilation of 
residential Documents of Sept. 20. 1982. 

'Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
residential Documents of Sept. 27, 1982. 

"Made available to news correspondents 
y Department spokesman John Hughes. ■ 



lovember 1982 



International Narcotics Control 



SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, 
OCT. 5, 1982' 

The Federal drug abuse strategy en- 
dorsed today by President Reagan em- 
phasizes foreign policy initiatives and in- 
ternational cooperation as major com- 
ponents of the Administration's program 
to reduce the effects of drug abuse on 
the American people. I too applaud this 
emphasis as appropriate and needed; 
90% of illicit drugs consumed in the 
United States are of foreign origin. 

The strategy underlines the impor- 
tance of narcotics control as an interna- 
tional issue. Drug abuse and drug traf- 
ficking not only impact negatively on 
consumer nations like the United States 
but are undermining the social, political, 
and economic stability of countries 
where narcotics are produced or traf- 
ficked. The strategy effectively reviews 
the Administration's efforts to date, the 
firm resolve with which it has pursued 
more comprehensive drug control pro- 
grams, and establishes guidelines for 
future action. In the international area, 
the concentration is on reducing produc- 
tion and trafficking in heroin, cocaine, 
and marijuana through a more com- 
prehensive, more cooperative effort in- 
volving much wider participation by the 
international community. 

The foundation of our international 



narcotics policy is that illicit drugs must 
be controlled at the source. We believe, 
as explained in the strategy, that the in- 
ternational community should assist na- 
tions in meeting these obligations. 
Under international convention, each 
signatory is responsible for controlling 
production and trafficking in illicit 
substances within its borders. The 
United States believes that compliance 
with these treaty obligations should be a 
matter of governmental priority for all 
signatory nations and that other govern- 
ments should join in integrating nar- 
cotics control into foreign policy. We are 
urging a greater sharing of responsibili- 
ty and expenditure of both diplomatic ef- 
forts and financial resources by other af- 
fected nations while continuing to ex- 
pand our own significant effort. 

In sum the strategy strikes an essen- 
tial balance from the foreign policy 
perspective. As a concerned, responsible 
member of the international community, 
the United States is willing to assist pro- 
ducer and transit nations. We recognize 
and accept the reality of social, political, 
and economic circumstances which make 
narcotics control difficult to achieve. But 
the United States will increasingly 
assert that these nations must take 
greater action to control the harm they 
export to the world. 



'Made available to news correspondents 
by acting Department spokesman Alan 
Romberg. ■ 



51 



SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 



Bulletin Essay 

Technology Transfer Controls 



by Gerhard Mally 

Dr. Mally is a foreign affairs officer 
in the Technology Transfer Group, 
Bureau of Nuclear and Weapons Con- 
trol, Arms Control and DisarTnament 
Agency (ACDA). 

Introduction 

International technology transfers en- 
compass a broad spectrum of transac- 
tions at the governmental, nongovern- 
mental, and covert levels, including the 
following: export of weapons systems, 
licensing of advanced technological prod- 
ucts, furnishing turnkey factories and 
research facilities, providing technical 
services, description of production 
techniques in commercial literature, 
display of products at trade exhibits, 
training of foreign nationals (scientists, 
engineers, computer experts), and 
academic exchanges of faculty and 
students. 

Restrictions on transfer from the 
United States of certain technologies are 
imposed for reasons of security or 
foreign policy. These export controls fall 
in three categories: 

• Nuclear items, controlled by the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
and the Department of Energy under 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended by the Nuclear Nonprolifera- 
tion Act of 1978; 

• Munitions controlled by the 
Department of State under the Arms 
Export Control Act of 1976; and 

• Items with both civilian and 
military applications (dual-use), con- 
trolled by the Department of Commerce 
under the Export Administration Act of 
1979. 

Exports of all three categories are 
controlled for security purposes to the 
Warsaw Fact countries and the Com- 
munist countries of East Asia, not only 
by the United States but also by other 
NATO countries (except Iceland and 
Spain) and Japan. The national controls 
of these countries are coordinated in the 
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral 
Security Export Controls (COCOM). 

This essay focuses on civilian / 
military or "dual-use" technology trans- 
fers from COCOM member states to 



Warsaw Pact countries. It deals with 
unilateral U.S. policies and procedures 
to control exports of dual-use items, 
covers multilateral COCOM policies and 
operations, and presents the rationale 
for security export controls — the hemor- 
rhage of Western technology to the 
East. The conclusion places the issue of 
technology transfer controls in the 
overall context of foreign policy and 
strategy. 

U.S. Exports Control Policies 
and Mechanisms 

Under the Export Administration Act of 
1979, the United States controls the ex- 
port of "dual-use" commodities and 
technical data concerning industrial 
processes for reasons of national securi- 
ty, foreign policy, and short supply. Ex- 
port controls imposed for national 
security reasons cover strategic /mili- 
tarily critical goods and technologies, ir- 
respective of the mechanisms through 
which these commodities or technical 
data may be transferred. Foreign policy 
controls are exercised in support of such 
U.S. policies as furthering regional 
stability, countering terrorism, and sup- 
porting human rights. Short supply con- 
trols are imposed on exports of certain 
products, such as crude oil. 

The Department of Commerce has 
jurisdiction over the export of dual-use 
items. In exercising this licensing 
authority. Commerce obtains advice 
from the Departments of Defense and 
State and various other agencies, in- 
cluding the Arms Control and Disarma- 
ment Agency (ACDA). Controversial ap- 
plications for high-technology exports 
are considered by the operating commit- 
tee, a working-level group chaired by 
the Department of Commerce. This in- 
teragency panel is composed of repre- 
sentatives from the Departments of 
Commerce, Defense, State, Energy, and 
Treasury, as well as from ACDA, the 
National Aeronautics and Space Admin- 
istration (NASA), and CIA. Cases that 
cannot be resolved at the operating com- 
mittee level are "escalated" to the Sub- 
Advisory Committee on Export Policy 
(SubACEP) (at the level of deputy as- 
sistant secretaries), then to ACEP (at 
the level of assistant secretaries). Major 
issues are referred to the cabinet-level 



Export Administration Review Board 
(F]ARB) or the President. Commerce's 
Export Administration regulations set 
forth specific procedures for controlling 
commodities listed on a commodity con- 
trol list and related technical data. The 
Export Administration regulations re- 
quire a "validated license" for some ex- 
ports; "general licenses" cover com- 
modities and technical data which do not 
require a specific validated license. For 
export control purposes, foreign coun- 
tries are divided into separate "country 
groups." Most security items are con- 
trolled for export to all countries. 
Licensing policy, however, varies. Ex- 
ports to friendly nations in the 
Americas, Europe, Asia, and Africa 
(Groups T and V) are controlled in order 
to prevent unauthorized reexports to 
Communist countries. Licensing policy 
for China (Group P) is more liberal than 
for the Warsaw Pact countries. Licens- 
ing policy for Romania (Group Q) is 
marginally more liberal than for the 
other Warsaw Pact countries. The vir- 
tually total embargo on all exports to 
Cuba, Kampuchea, North Korea, and 
Vietnam (Group Z) is more restrictive 
than policy for the Warsaw Pact coun- 
tries. At the moment, policy toward the 
U.S.S.R. (in Group Y) and Poland (in 
Group W) call for issuing no licenses for 
controlled items, following the imposi- 
tion of martial law in Poland and is, 
therefore, more restrictive than policy 
toward Hungary (the other country in 
Group W) and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
East Germany, Albania, Laos, and 
Mongolia (the other countries in Group 
Y). 

The rationale for differential treat- 
ment of foreign countries is contained in 
Section 5(b) of the Export Administra- 
tion Act of 1979, which provides that, in 
administering national security export 
controls, "United States policy toward 
individual countries shall not be deter- 
mined exclusively on the basis of a coun- 
try's Communist or non-Communist 
status but shall take into account such 
factors as the country's present and 
potential relationship to the United 
States, its present and potential relation- 
ship to countries friendly or hostile to 
the United States, its ability and will- 
ingness to control retransfers of United 
States exports in accordance with the 
United States policy, and such other fac- 
tors as the President considers ap- 
propriate." 

Over the last decade, relations be- 
tween the United States (and other 
COCOM memliers) and the non-Soviet 
Warsaw I'act countries have evolved to 



52 



Department of State Bulletin 



SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 



modest extent, based upon the policy 
lat Eastern Europe should not be 
eated as a monolithic bloc. Limited 
nancipation from Moscow is ex- 
inplified by Hungary's unorthodox 
•diuimic policies, Romania's relatively 
idi'pendent foreign policy, and Poland's 
-Kperiment with social pluralism prior to 
le suppression of Solidarity by the im- 
jsition of martial law. The pattern of 
fferential treatment of certain East 
uropean countries by the West is il- 
strated by the fact that various of the 
OMECON countries have become 
embers of the General Agreement on 
ariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Inter- 
ational Monetary Fund (IMF) and have 
?en granted most-favored-nation (MFN) 
eatment by the United States, while 
:hers have not. 

With regard to dual-use exports to 
Dn-Soviet members of the Warsaw 
■ct, the United States is taking the 
tUowing criteria into consideration: 

• For all items controlled for securi- 
purposes, the risk of diversion to 

lilitary use in East European countries; 

• For items which would not be ap- 
oved for export to the U.S.S.R., the 

isk of diversion to that country; and 
' For items of marginal security 
oncern, efforts by certain East Euro- 
ean countries to distance themselves 
fom Soviet foreign or domestic policies, 
articularly Romania and Hungary. 

The political rationale for this dif- 
'jrentiated economic treatment is to en- 
ourage diversity in Eastern Europe and 
i) reduce dependence on the U.S.S.R. 

Following the Soviet invasion of 
fghanistan (1979) and the Soviet- 
iispired imposition of martial law in 
ioland (1981), the United States im- 
osed new unilateral export restrictions 
I the U.S.S.R. for foreign policy 
asons. These measures include a 1980 
plicy of making no exceptions for ex- 
jort to the U.S.S.R. of items requiring 
lOCOM review, except for specified ex- 
■aordinary circumstances and a 
ecember 30, 1981, cessation of is- 
uance of all validated licenses for ex- 
ort to the U.S.S.R. 

Unilateral U.S. export controls are 
ometimes inadequate since many in- 
ustrialized countries have the capability 
3 substitute similar or identical items 
or most controlled U.S. items. In view 
f this widespread "foreign availability" 
f most high technology items, any uni- 
iteral U.S. embargo would be largely 



ineffective. Therefore, multilateral con- 
trols are imperative to assure mean- 
ingful controls on strategic Western 
technology transfers to the Communist 
world. 

Multilateral Export Controls 

At their summit conference of Ottawa in 
July 1981, the leaders of the United 
States, Canada, the United Kingdom, 
France, West Germany, Italy, and Japan 
agreed, inter alia, that "consultations 
and, where appropriate, coordination are 
necessary to insure that, in the field of 
East-West relations, our economic 
policies continue to be compatible with 
our political and security objectives." 
Moreover, the seven leaders agreed "to 
consult to improve the present system of 
controls on trade in strategic goods and 
related technology with the USSR." 
Subsequently, a high-level meeting con- 
vened in Paris in January 1982 of 
COCOM for export controls to pro- 
scribed Communist countries. 

COCOM is a multilateral, con- 
sultative organization of Western in- 
dustrialized nations located in Paris and 
charged with coordinating export con- 
trols for security purposes. Since its 
creation in 1950, COCOM has main- 
tained lists of controlled items for the 
following proscribed countries: the 
U.S.S.R., other Warsaw Pact nations, 
Albania, North Korea, Mongolia, Kam- 
puchea, Vietnam, and the People's 
Republic of China. 

Currently, COCOM member govern- 
ments control about 150 items. The 
United States controls additional items 
(about 30) unilaterally for national 
security reasons. COCOM reviews its list 
of controlled items periodically— ap- 
proximately every 3 or 4 years. During 
these COCOM list reviews, all members 
must agree on items added to or deleted 
from multilateral controls. Preceding the 
1982-83 list review, COCOM member 
governments held a high-level meeting 
in Paris (1982). Consistent with the con- 
fidential nature of COCOM proceedings, 
the following terse press release was 
issued. 

The coordinating committee for the con- 
trol of the export of strategic commodities 
held a high level meeting on the 19th and 
20th January in Paris. 

The aim of that meeting was to review 
together, after more than thirty years of the 
committee's existence, the means to ensure 
the adaptation of its methods to the evolution 
of the situation, particularly in the techno- 
logical field of strategic importance. In this 
respect the committee reached unanimous 



agreement. The work was judged successful 
by all participants. 

The outcome of the 1982-83 review 
is uncertain. But, in all likelihood, it will 
result in more comprehensive controls. 
In addition, COCOM is consulting on 
means to improve enforcement and ad- 
ministrative procedures. 

The Rationale for Export Controls 

Throughout the postwar period, the 
United States has been a principal 
source of technical innovations and a net 
exporter of advanced technologies to the 
world. During the era of economic 
detente in the 1970s, substantially in- 
creased amounts of Western goods and 
technology were exported to Communist 
nations, much of it on credit. The im- 
petus to East-West trade was based 
upon the assumption that sales promo- 
tion would not only improve the 
Western balance of trade but also 
moderate Soviet political views. 

In recent years, however, it became 
apparent that increased commercial in- 
tercourse with the East would not in- 
hibit Soviet strategic expansion. 
Capitalizing on the large-scale influx of 
advanced Western technologies, the 
Soviet Union launched a relentless, un- 
precedented build-up of its armed forces, 
far beyond legitimate security interests. 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
followed by Soviet support for the im- 
position of martial law in Poland, has 
shown clearly that increased economic 
intercourse with the West will not 
restrain Soviet imperialism. Hence, it 
could be argued that the increased flow 
of Western technology (and credits) to 
the East has been detrimental to the na- 
tional security of all COCOM members, 
as it subsidized and reinforced the 
military arsenals of their potential 
adversaries in the Warsaw Pact. 

Over the last decade, COCOM mem- 
bers competed for lucrative sales of 
sophisticated goods and equipment to 
Eastern Europe. The United States re- 
quested and received more exceptions to 
COCOM controls than any other West- 
ern nation. In retrospect it is clear that 
Soviet importation of Western tech- 
nology, much of it in violation of export 
controls, has contributed directly or indi- 
rectly to modernization of the Soviet 
war machine, including some assistance 
in the development of new generations 
of "smart" weapons, improved airlift 
capability, more accurate and lethal 



53 



SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 



nuclear weapons, and enhancement of 
command and control with better com- 
puters and communications. 

The list of technologies for military 
use acquired from the West is a long 
one. It includes semiconductor manufac- 
turing know-how used to make Soviet 
weapons more reliable and precise; 
guidance technolo^ for aircraft, ships, 
submarines, and missiles; and equipment 
to improve the Soviet military/industrial 
base— ranging from precision machine 
tools to process know-how technology. 

Because COCOM controls have been 
selective, some critical goods were legal- 
ly exported to the Soviet Union. Two ex- 
amples are: 

• Heavy vehicle construction plants 
and plant support facilities, which pro- 
vide the Soviets a quantum jump in load 
durability and reliability and far better 
mobilization potential (for example, 
Kama River trucks are used by the 
Soviet Army in Afghanistan); 

• Western semiconductor and mi- 
croelectronic know-how, which provided 
the Warsaw Pact with an electronics 
manufacturing system operating in sup- 
port of the military. In addition, modern 
printed circuit facilities were exported to 
the Soviet Union. 

This manifest dependence on high 
technology imports from the West could 
be regarded as a serious disadvantage 
from the Soviet perspective, given the 
notorious rigidity and lack of creativity 
of Communist systems. After all, only 
the transfer and absorption of skills that 
generate indigenous progress in 
research and development— rather than 
continued imports from the West— could 
solve the basic problem of innovation. 
Notwithstanding the apparent risks in- 
volved in prolonging their technological 
dependence, the Soviets have been per- 
sistent in encouraging imports of 
Western technology (although recent 
shortages of hard currency are ap- 
parently leading them to reduce imports 
from the West). 

From the Soviet point of view, there 
are immense benefits from exploiting 
the West's advanced technology base. 
These benefits to the Soviets include: 

• Saving billions of dollars by ac- 
quiring proven Western technology; 

• Saving years of research time; 

• Narrowing technological gaps with 
the United States, including those 
related to the production of weapons 
systems; 



• Manufacturing countersystems 
more rapidly, which have the objective 
of neutralizing advanced U.S. weapon 
systems; 

• Avoiding mistakes and errors that 
are costly and time consuming; 

• Knowing in advance that new 
systems will work properly and, alter- 
natively, knowing where to look should a 
particular project falter. 



In the light of these manifest 
benefits, it is not surprising that the 
U.S.S.R. continues to favor East-West 
trade and technology transfers. This 
determined Soviet effort to acquire 
Western advanced technology involves 
the simultaneous use of the following 
methods: 

• Legal purchases of licensed items; 



U.S. and France Review 
Scientific Cooperation 



A high-level review of scientific coopera- 
tion between the United States and 
France was held in Washington, D.C.. 
on September 17, 1982. The U.S. side 
was led by President Reagan's science 
adviser. Dr." George Keyworth, who also 
heads the Office of Science and Tech- 
nology Policy in the White House, while 
Minister of Research and Industry Jean- 
Pierre Chevenement headed the French 
delegation. 

The major topics discussed at the 
meeting concerned the state of national 
activities and bilateral cooperation in 
three major subject areas: fundamental 
science and engineering research, bio- 
medical research, and energy research. 
The speakers also discussed science 
policy and organization in their respec- 
tive countries. 

The discussions focused upon the 
dependence of future economic growth 
and stability on science and technology 
and the desirability in each country of 
better integrating its industrial, scien- 
tific, and technological communities. As 
a result, it was agreed that future 
cooperation in applied research dis- 
ciplines should be emphasized while 
maintaining the strong current exchange 
in areas of fundamental science. They 
also agreed on the importance of 
strengthening bilateral exchanges in 
such fields as space, oceanology, 
biomedicine, and engineering sciences. 
They also believed that U.S. scientists 
should be encouraged to increase their 
participation in the exchange programs. 

The two sides concluded that such 
reviews are extremely valuable for main- 
taining the effectiveness of bilateral 
cooperation between the two countries 
in science and research. They agreed 
that the next review should be held in 
Paris in 1984. 

The previous review was held in 
Paris in .luly 19Si). Representatives of 



the two sides have met a number of 
times since 1969 when the two countries 
agreed to meet periodically to review 
bilateral science and technology coopera- 
tion. 

Assisting Dr. Keyworth were the 
following American participants: James 
Ebert, Vice President, National 
Academy of Sciences; Charles Horner, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Science 
and Technology, Department of State; 
Donald Langenberg, Deputy Director, 
National Science Foundation; John 
Marcum, Assistant Director for Energy 
and Natural Resources, Office of Science 
and Technology Policy, Executive Office 
of the President; Edward McGaffigan, 
Assistant to the Director, Office of 
Science and Technology- Policy, Ex- 
ecutive Office of the President and 
member of National Security Council 
Staff; Alvin Trivelpiece, Director of 
Research, Department of Energy; and 
James Wyngaarden. Director, National 
Institutes of Health. 

Besides Minister Chevenement, the 
French participants included Francois 
Gros, science adviser to the Prime 
Minister; Philippe Lazar, President, Na- 
tional Institute for Health and Medical 
Research; Gerard Renon, Deputy Ad- 
ministrator, Atomic Energ>' Commis- 
sion; Bernard Dorin, Director, Office of 
the Americas, Foreign Ministry; Jean- 
Loup Motchane, Director, Office of 
Science and Technology Cooperation, 
Foreign Ministry; Wladimir Mercouroff, 
Director of External Affairs, National 
Center for Scientific Research; Jacques 
Warin, Director, International Affairs, 
Ministry of Research and Industry; and 
Philippe Lorino, adviser to the Minister 
on International Affairs, Ministry of 
Research and Industry. 



Press release 209 of Sept. 21. 1982. 



54 



Department of State Bulletin 



UNITED NATIONS 



Exploitation of open sources (such 
patents /copyrights, technical agree- 
nts, academic conferences, scientific 
■hanges, industrial tours, visits to ad- 
iced technologT,' exhibitions, scien- 
c /technical publications and congres- 
nal documents); 

Illegal acquisitions of embargoed 
)ds and technical data; 

Industrial espionage in high 
hnology plants and bribery or coop- 
>Ji of workers and businessmen; and 

Use of third country companies to 
mnel Western technologies indirectly 
U.S.S.R. (via front or dummy cor- 
■ations in allied or neutral countries). 

The Soviets also maintain an in- 
ligence system keyed strongly to 
erging technologies of high military 
ue. They keep a close watch on the 
est developments in the computer in- 
3try, on advanced large-scale in- 
^ated circuit design and manufactur- 
know-how, on magnetic bubble 
mory technology, and on devel- 
Snents in genetic engineering, fracture 
1 chanics, and superplasticity. 

In sum the U.S.S.R. has been en- 
^;((l in a massive and centrally coor- 
1 att'il effort to acquire advanced 
liiKilogy from COCOM countries by 

■ al means if possible, by illicit methods 
: icrcssary. The clear purpose of this 

■ nprfhensive attempt to raid Western 
L hniilogical establishments has been, 

a i remains, the same: to modernize the 
J! viet industrial infrastructure for the 
u imate purpose of strengthening the 
jviet military. Paradoxically, the West 
h ^ assisted its adversary in this effort 
: generous credits, technological 
a ;istances, and expanding trade, thus 
i lirt'ctly financing the very war 
nchine NATO is designed to defend 
eainst. 

( nclusions 

J V londuct of foreign policy involves 
i judicious use of political, military, 
d economic instruments in pursuit of 
3 national interest. In the East-West 
ntext, national security concerns are 
critical importance. In order to gain 
Dlomatic leverage vis-a-vis an adver- 
ry, the calibrated use of diverse 
'ategies is vital to this effort, ranging 
Dm military deterrence to political con- 
inment to economic pressure. 

Effective controls on sensitive tech- 
ilogy transfers are an indispensable in- 
edient of this multifaceted diplomacy. 
|lthough Western exports to the East 
live contributed marginally to a 



favorable Western balance of trade, in- 
asmuch as certain technology transfers 
facilitated the modernization of the 
Soviet military arsenal, they have been 
counterproductive. 

Given the structural inefficiency of 
Communist economies, the U.S.S.R. and 
most East European countries have 
been, and will remain, dependent on 
technological assistance from the 
Western industrialized nations. 

Instead of vindicating Lenin's predic- 
tion that Western businessmen will sell 
Communists the rope to hang the 
capitalists, COCOM nations could jointly 
exert leverage over the Warsaw Pact 



countries in terms of technology exports 
to the East. This powerful lever has so 
far not been adequately exploited by 
allied diplomacy. 

A principal objective of this Western 
strategy should be to constrain the pace 
of Soviet arms production, the capability 
to project military force abroad, and 
designs for global political expansion. 
Finally, this Western strategy could help 
to induce the Soviet leaders to come to 
terms with the United States in negotia- 
tions on genuine arms reductions, aim- 
ing at agreements that are equal and 
verifiable. ■ 



U.N. Adopts Resolutions 
on Lebanon Situation 



SECURITY COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION 520, 
SEPT. 17, 1982> 

The Security Council, 

Having considered the report of the 
Secretary-General of 15 September 1982 
(S/15382/Add.l), 

Condemning the murder of Bashir 
Gemayel, Lebanon's constitutionally selected 
President-elect, and every effort to disrupt 
by violence the restoration of a strong, stable 
government in Lebanon, 

Having listened to the statement by the 
Permanent Representative of Lebanon, 

Taking note of Lebanon's determination 
to ensure the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese 
forces from Lebanon, 

1. Reaffirms its resolutions 508 (1982), 
509 (1982) and 516 (1982) in all their com- 
ponents; 

2. Condemns the recent Israeli incursions 
into Beirut in violation of the cease-fire 
agreements and of Security Council resolu- 
tions; 

3. Demands an immediate return to the 
positions occupied by Israel before 15 
September 1982, as a first step towards the 
full implementation of Security Council 
resolutions; 

4. Calls again for the strict respect for 
Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
unity and political independence under the 
sole and exclusive authority of the Lebanese 
Government through the Lebanese Army 
throughout Lebanon; 

5. Reaffirms its resolutions 512 (1982) 
and 513 (1982) which call for respect for the 
rights of the civilian populations without any 
discrimination and repudiates all acts of 
violence against those populations; 

6. Supports the efforts of the Secretary- 
General to implement Security Council reso- 
lution 516 (1982) concerning the deployment 



of United Nations observers to monitor the 
situation in and around Beirut and requests 
all the parties concerned to co-operate fully in 
the application of that resolution; 

7. Decides to remain seized of the ques- 
tion and asks the Secretary-General to keep 
the Council informed on developments as 
soon as possible and not later than twenty- 
four hours. 



SECURITY COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION 521, 
SEPT. 19, 1982^ 

The Security Council, 

Appalled at the massacre of Palestinian 
civilians in Beirut, 

Having heard the report of the Secre- 
tary-General (S/1 5400), 

Noting that the Government of Lebanon 
has agreed to the dispatch of United Nations 
Observers to the t;ites of greatest human suf- 
fering and losses in and around that city, 

1 . Condemns the criminal massacre of 
Palestinian civilians in Beirut; 

2. Reaffirms once again its resolutions 
512 (1982)"and 513 (1982) which call for 
respect for the rights of the civilian popula- 
tion without any discrimination and 
repudiates all acts of violence against that 
population; 

3. Authorizes the Secretary-General as an 
immediate step to increase the number of 
United Nations observers in and around 
Beirut from 10 to 50 and insists that there 
shall be no interference with the deployment 
of the observers and that they shall have full 
freedom of movement; 

4. Requests the Secretary-General, in con- 
sultation with the Government of Lebanon, to 
ensure the rapid deployment of those 
observers in order that they may contribute 
in every way possible within their mandate, 



I3vember1982 



55 



UNITED NATIONS 



to the effort to ensure full protection for the 
civilian population; 

5. Requests the Seerotary-CJerieral as a 
matter of urgency to initiate appropriate con- 
sultations and in particular consultations with 
the Government of Lebanon on additional 
steps which the Council might take, including 
the possible deployment of United Nations 
forces, to assist that Government in ensuring 
full protection for the civilian population in 
and around Beirut and requests him to report 
to the Council within forty-eight hours; 

6. hisists that all concerned must permit 
United Nations observers and forces 
established by the Security Council in 
Lebanon to be deployed and to discharge 
their mandates and in this connexion solemn- 
ly calls attention to the obligation on all 
Member States under Article 2.5 of the 
Charter to accept and carry out the decisions 
of the Council in accordance with the 
Charter; 

7. Requests the Secretary-General to keep 
the Council informed on an urgent and 
continuing basis. 



GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
RESOLUTION A/ES 7/9, 
SEPT. 27, 1982' 

The General Assembly, 

Having considered the question of 
Palestine at its resumed seventh emergency 
special session, 

Having heard the statement of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization, the repre- 
sentative of the Palestinian people. 

Recalling and reaffirming, in particular, 
its resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 

Appalled at the massacre of Palestinian 
civilians in Beirut, 

Recnlling Security Council resolutions 
.5()« (1982) of .5 .lune "1982, .509 (1982) of 
6 .June 1982, ,5i:i (1982) of 4 .July 1982, .520 
(1982) of 17 September 1982 and .521 (1982) 
of 19 September 1982, 

Taking note of the reports of the Secre- 
tary-General relevant to the situation, par- 
ticularly his report of 18 September 1982, 

Noting with regret that the Security 
Council has so far not taken effective and 
practical mea.sures, in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, to ensure im- 
plementation of its resolutions 508 (1982) and 
509 (1982), 

Referring to the humanitarian principles 
of the Geneva Convention relative to the J'ro- 
tection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 
12 August 1949, and to the obligations aris- 
ing from the regulations annexed to the 
Hague Conventions of 1907, 

Deeply concerned at the sufferings of the 
Palestinian and Lebanese civilian populations. 

Noting the homelessness of the Palestin- 
ian people. 

Reaffirming the imperative need to per- 
mit the Palestinian people to exercise their 
legitimate rights. 



56 



1. Condemns the criminal massacre of 
Palestinian and other civilians in Beirut on 
17 September 1982; 

2. Urges the Security Council to in- 
vestigate, through the means available to it, 
the circumstances and extent of the massacre 
of Palestinian and other civilians in Beirut on 
17 September 1982, and to make public the 
report on its findings as soon as possible; 

.3. Decides to support fully the provisions 
of Security Council resolutions 508 (1982) and 
509 (1982), in which the Council, inter alia. 
demanded that: 

(a) Israel withdraw all its military forces 
forthwith and unconditionally to the interna- 
tionally recognized boundaries of Lebanon; 

(b) All parties to the conflict cease im- 
mediately and simultaneously all military ac- 
tivities within Lebanon and across the 
Lebanese-Israeli border; 

4. Demands that all Member States and 
other parties observe strict respect for the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and 
political independence of Lebanon within its 
internationally recognized boundaries; 

5. Reaffirms the fundamental principle of 
the inadmissibility of the acquisition of ter- 
ritory by force; 

6. Resolves that, in conformity with its 
resolution 194 (III) and subsequent relevant 
resolutions, the Palestinian refugees should 
be enabled to return to their homes and prop- 
erty from which they have been uprooted and 
displaced, and demands that Israel comply 
unconditionally and immediately with the 
present resolution; 

7. Urges the Security Council, in the 
event of continued failure by Israel to comply 
with the demands contained in resolutions 
508 (1982) and 509 (1982) and the present 
resolution, to meet in order to consider prac- 
tical ways and means in accordance with the 
Charter of the llnited Nations; 

8. Calls upon all States and international 
agencies and organizations to continue to pro- 
vide the most extensive humanitarian aid 
possible to the victims of the Israeli invasion 
of Lebanon; 

9. Requests the Secretary-General to 
prepare a photographic exhibit of the 
massacre of 17 September 1982 and to 
display it in the United Nations visitors' hall; 

10. Decides to adjourn the seventh 
emergency special session temporarily and to 
authorize the President of the latest regular 
session of the General Assembly to resume 
its meetings upon request from Member 
States. 



'Adopted unanimously 
-Adopted unanimously 



Israel). 



Adotited by a vote of 147 to 2 (U.S. and 



Namibia 



CONTACT GROUP COMMUNIQUE, 
OCT. 1, 1982' 

The P'oreign Ministers of Canada, France, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States 
and the State Secretary of the Foreign Offi. 
of the Federal Republic of Germany met in 
New York on October 1 to take stock of the 
progress made in the Namibia negotiations 
since their previous meeting in Luxembourg, 
on May 18. 

The ministers reviewed the consultation 
which took place during July and August in 
New York between the contact group and 
representatives of the front-line states and 
SWAPO [South West Africa People's 
Organization], and the concurrent consulta- 
tions with South Africa. They expressed 
satisfaction with the result of these discus- 
sions. 

The ministers welcomed the agreement 
the parties to the negotiations to the con- 
stitutional principles for the Namibian 
Constituent Assembly. They noted that all 
parties had agreed that the method to be 
employed to elect the Constituent Assembly 
would be decided in accordance with the 
terms of U.N. Security Council Resolution 
435 and insisted that the issue should not 
cause delay in the implementation of Resoh 
tion 435. They expressed appreciation of th 
constructive and flexible attitude of the par 
ties, which enabled substantial progress to 
made on impartiality and the size, composi- 
tion, and deployment of the military compo 
nent of UNTAG [U.N. Transition AssLstanr 
Group]. They noted that on September 24 
representatives of the front-line states, 
Nigeria, SWAPO, and the contact group h: 
reported to the Secretary General on the 
results of the consultations which had takei 
place. 

The ministers reiterated their commit- 
ment to the early implementation of U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 435 in order t<i 
enable the people of Namibia to exercise t h 
right to self-determination and to bring pea 
and security to the region. They paid tribut 
to the efforts already made by the Secretai 
General and his staff and agreed that ar- 
rangements for the implementation of the 
plan were proceeding satisfactorily. 

The Ministers agreed that a valuable oj 
portunity now existed to achieve a .settlenii 
within the timeframe envisaged which woul 
strengthen peace and security and foster 
economic development in the region. They 
noted that the objective of achieving such a 
settlement was shared by all contact group 
governments. 



'U.S. U.N. press relea.se ' 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



1^eas of Challenge in the Americas 



iThomas O. Enders 

A. 



Address before the I titer- American 
ss Association, Chicago, Illinois, on 
temher 30, 1982. Ambassador Enders 
[ssistant Secretary for Inter- 
erican Affairs. 

a privilege to speak to this audi- 
. The Inter-American Press Associa- 
1 and its members have contributed 
atly over the years to our joint quest 
a stronger and more united hemi- 
ere. It is true that cooperation 
jng individual governments of North 
South America, Central America, 
the Caribbean has sometimes been 
ited by misunderstanding and mis- 
ulation. But no one has been more 
scious than this body that the coun- 
ts of the hemisphere are natural 
linds and allies in a world that is 
i table and often dangerous. 
: This year, the Americas face 
flllenges and opportunities as daunting 
gtny in the past. Our wisdom, unity, 
I ability to communicate are con- 
nited by no less than three separate 
.Ijllenges. They are: 

• The crisis in Central America; 

• The potential for interstate con- 
: exemplified by the South Atlantic 
.is; and 

• The need to manage high levels of 
;ign debt to safeguard the potential 
all have for a new sustained expan- 

1. 

. me address each in turn. 



isis in Central America 

1979 when Somoza fell to a vast but 
rxist-led coalition, many concluded 
t the only question was how soon and 
V far Central America would be 
\fen toward Marxism. And, indeed, 

months that followed saw the 
nching of a "final offensive" in El 
vador by guerrilla forces with strong 
(port from Nicaragua and Cuba. In 
atemala, there was a new outburst of 

rrilla warfare. 

Central America seemed ripe for 
lence. Only one country was governed 
Tiocratically; elsewhere the military 
s in charge, in some cases mainly 
ough repression. Yet the armies did 

look very formidable. In most cases 



they were barracks bound, organized for 
administration rather than combat. 
Foreign disapproval had deprived them 
of modern equipment and training. In El 
Salvador, a cruelly inequitable landhold- 
ing system put 40% of the land in the 
hands of 2% of the landholders. 
Throughout the isthmus, economic life 
was unsettled by the double scourges of 
local uncertainty and global recession. 

Today the outlook is different. In El 
Salvador, the guerrillas and their 
foreign backers have lost the initiative. 
They now face a Salvadoran Army that 
is better equipped and organized and has 
learned how to fight in the field. Redis- 
tribution of 20% of the country's arable 
land has deprived the guerrillas of an 
issue they hoped to exploit. And the 
massive turnout in the March election — 
in the face of insurgent threats — 
wrecked their claims to widespread sup- 
port. Although it goes on, the guerrillas 
can no longer hope to win the war they 
began. 

Honest elections with massive turn- 
outs have also been held in Costa Rica 
and Honduras — with extremist parties 
winning almost no support. In Guate- 
mala, a new government has begun to 
limit human rights abuse and to improve 
the situation in the Indian highlands. 

And though economic conditions are 
still often precarious, the outlook for 
lasting development has been signifi- 
cantly improved by the Caribbean Basin 
initiative, through which the United 
States is adding its weight to the con- 
tributions of the Mexican-Venezuelan oil 
facility and the efforts of Canada and 
Colombia. 

Whatever else they have settled, 
these developments have revealed the 
vitality of democracy and destroyed the 
myth that Central America is moving in- 
exorably toward Marxist dictatorship. 

In Nicaragua, where the myth was 
born, the classic shape of dictatorship is 
becoming ever more evident, as the 
regime wields its power in crude provo- 
cation of the church, in persecution of 
its Indian minority, in repression of 
press and personal freedoms. Little by 
little the original revolutionary coalition 
has disintegrated. The Sandinistas, 
themselves, have split. And as open 
repression and miltarism have re- 
emerged, disenchantment and even 
armed resistance have also spread. 



vember 1982 



The Marxist-Leninists show no sign 
of drawing the conclusions of these 
reverses. Instead of questioning their 
false premises, they are reacting with 
more of the same — more arms, more 
repression, more terrorism. 

Nicaragua already has the largest 
armed forces in Central American 
history and is expanding them further. 
In an effort to overcome resistance by 
its people — and to build a base for pro- 
jecting power in the area — Nicaragua 
has imported some 2,000 Cuban military 
and security advisers, and some 50-60 
Soviet and East European military and 
security advisers. Members of the Pales- 
tine Liberation Organization's military 
arm have also been involved. Having 
already imported Soviet tanks, Nicar- 
agua is preparing to bring in jet combat 
aircraft. 

Meanwhile, the regionalization of 
terrorism goes on. Arms trafficking 
from Nicaragua to El Salvador is active 
and at high levels. Terrorist operations 
against Costa Rica have intensified. So 
blatant are Nicaraguan actions that 
Costa Rica — a democracy with no 
army — last month issued a libro bianco 
detailing official Nicaraguan terrorisms 
and other violations against Costa Rica. 
The recently concluded hostage incident 
in Honduras graphically exposed another 
aspect of efforts to spin a regional web 
of terror. Over 100 Honduran business- 
men were seized in a vain effort to force 
the release of a Salvadoran guerrilla 
leader, Alejandro Montenegro, arrested 
in August while planning operations 
against El Salvador from Honduras. 

At the same time, Cuba's capability 
to project power in the region has been 
greatly augmented. Cuba's arsenal now 
includes sophisticated Soviet weapons, 
such as MiG-23/Floggers, AN-26 trans- 
port aircraft, a Koni-class frigate, sub- 
marines, guided-missile attack boats, 
and hydrofoils. Ominously, Cuba has ex- 
panded its airlift capability; there are 
even indications that Cuba intends to 
strengthen its amphibious capability. In 
this context, Cuban construction of a 
battalion-size military compound and a 
9,000-foot runway in Grenada and the 
improvement of airfields in Nicaragua is 
additional evidence of Cuba's increased 
potential to sustain military operations 
well beyond its own shores. 

As opposed to the 1960s, when 
Moscow generally pursued what it re- 
ferred to as a "peaceful path" to change, 
armed violence now plays a major role 
in Soviet policy in Central America. The 



57 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Soviet Union supports guerrilla move- 
ments directly through C^ommunist par- 
ties and front organizations and indirect- 
ly through Cuba, Nicaragua, and 
Grenada. Moscow's huge annual $3 
billion economic subsidies — over and 
above Soviet military grants — effectively 
underwrite Cuba's aggressive behavior 
and enable Castro to maintain the 
largest per capita military force in the 



within the states of the area. Just as it 
is wrong to let the Salvadoran guerrillas 
shoot their way to a share of power they 
are unwilling to compete for at the polls, 
so it would be wrong to exclude from 
political participation those who may 
now be ready to accept peaceful compe- 
tition within emerging democratic in- 
stitutions. We are encouraged by the ac- 
tions of the Salvadoran Government to 



As opposed to the 1960s, when Moscow general- 
ly pursued what it referred to as a "peaceful path " 
to change, armed violence now plays a major role 
in Soviet policy in Central America. 



hemisphere. Lately Moscow has taken a 
more direct role in Grenada, pledging to 
buy all of that island's main exports and 
promising an impressive array of tech- 
nical assistance projects. 

These actions by Nicaragua, Cuba, 
and the Soviet Union mean that local 
struggles in Central America will con- 
tinue — more violent, bitter, and long- 
lasting than they otherwise would be. 
But they do not mean that the Marxist- 
Leninists will prevail. On the contrary, it 
is clear that they will not prevail — pro- 
vided the democracies remain clear- 
minded about what they are aiming for 
and provided they maintain the effort. 

I say clearminded, for it is not too 
soon for the democracies to begin to 
define the conditions in which Central 
America could be at peace. Some of 
these conditions are obvious. There can 
be no peace if any country in the area 
attempts to export revolution to 
another, maintaining in its territory the 
headquarters, logistical support, and 
training grounds of an insurgency 
directed against a neighbor— as Nicar- 
agua does against El Salvador. Equally, 
there can be no peace, if any country im- 
ports large numbers of foreign military 
and security advisers and heavy offen- 
sive weapons— as Nicaragua is also do- 
ing. 

Should we not then aim at agree- 
ment—subject to effective verifica- 
tion—that no country in Central 
America will import heavy offensive 
weapons and that foreign military and 
security advisers will be reduced to a 
common low level or be removed 
entirely? 

Equally imporUint is what happens 



58 



hold out the hand of reconciliation to its 
adversaries. 

And unless Nicaragua permits the 
development of democratic or, at least, 
pluralistic institutions in which power is 
allocated by free elections, its neighbors 
will never trust it to keep the peace. For 
if there is any lesson in the politics of 
the 20th century, it is that governments 
that must face their people in free elec- 
tions do not often make war on their 
neighbors. 

It is up to Nicaraguans to determine 
what government Nicaragua should 
have. But an object of our policy should 
clearly be to persuade Nicaragua to put 
its oft-repeated commitment to plural- 
istic democracy into practice. We must 
use the dialogue that we proposed to the 
Nicaraguans a year ago to explore how 
a way can be found back from militariza- 
tion to internal reconciliation and peace 
with neighbors. 

If the democracies hold to these 
principles, backing those that adhere to 
them with economic and political and 
military assistance, peace will come to 
Central America. No one expects it to 
emerge full blown this fall, or next year, 
or maybe even the year after, but it will 
come — if the democracies sustain the ef- 
fort. 

In the past the United Stiites has 
generally neglected Central America 
only to send in the troops when things 
got out of hand. U.S. troops are no solu- 
tion now. What can help is a dependable 
U.S. commitment. The United States 
will help its friends in the area defend 
themselves from violent minorities from 
within — and hostile neighbors from 
without — and as long as it is necessary. 

Central America is the land bridge 
between the two Americas. The advance 



of Marxist-Leninists there would be pr- 
foundly threatening to the hemisphere. 
The people of Central America have it 
their power to prevent that by a com- 
bination of resistance and reform. We 
must go on helping them. 

Potential for Interstate Conflict 

From Central America to the South 
Atlantic is a considerable distance. Yet 
all of us in this room were forced, 
earlier this year, to shift our focus fror 
one to the other. Perhaps the most 
fundamental question arising from the 
P^alklands/ Malvinas crisis is how bette 
in the future to prevent war in the hen 
sphere. 

The inter-American system has a 
unique record of cooperative action to 
preserve the peace. But it was not abl( 
to do so in the South Atlantic crisis. V 
some, the question that came out of th 
South Atlantic crisis is, why didn't the 
system provide automatic and unani- 
mous support for one of the 
belligerents? And because it didn't, 
shouldn't it somehow be restructured .^ 
that it would do so in the future? 

For me the questions are different 
Why didn't the inter-American system 
keep the peace? Should it be restruc- 
tured so that it will be more effective? 
How can we avoid new wars in the 
future, sparked by one of the many 
territorial disputes with which the hen 
sphere is laced? I think there are aire;: 
some tentative answers to these ques- 
tions. 

First, territorial and other disput 
must not be allowed to fester. 
Machinery exists to anticipate dispute: 
and permit their peaceful and definitiv 
settlement: various inter-American arl 
tration and conciliation agreements, 
Organization of American States peaci 
keeping mechanisms, the Internationa 
Court of Justice, even the treaty of 
TIateloIco, which established the worlc 
first nuclear free zone in a populated 
area. What appears lacking is the will 
u.se this machinery to prevent and 
resolve contentious problems. The 
United States and other countries of t 
area have at one time or another been 
involved in calming or negotiating mo; 
of them. But this is a branch of hemi- 
spheric diplomacy that deserves fresh 
tention. 

Second, the maintenance of a peai 
ful equilil)rium within the hemisphere 
everyone's business. The military 
expenditures of the countries of Latin 
America come to only 1.4% of gross n 
tional product (GNP) — a (juarter of th" 



Department of State Bullet "« 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



i*|i*rage in the developing- world as a 
iffi ole. We all share an interest in main- 
ling that record and in avoiding arms 
es. And where competitive procure- 
He nt cannot be avoided, it is vital that 
sting disputes not be exacerbated. My 
n country has acted in the last 
leratioii almost as if it could simply 
ore this problem. U.S. arms sales as 
k roportion of South American pur- 
If ises fell from 75% in 1960 to 20% in 
'0 and to 7% in 1980. The reduction 
fn, ;raining and in-depth contacts be- 

;en the U.S. and most South 
ii,( lerican militaries has also been pre- 
itous. Improved contacts and, in some 
es, additional arms transfers may be 
!ded to help avoid subregional im- 
ances of power and preserve the 
ice. Others in the hemisphere and in 
,|,|, ;ndiy outside countries can similarly 
ist. 

Third, we must all prevent regional 
iflicts from having strategic conse- 
■nces, introducing East-West tensions 
ere they do not belong, or even 
inging the East-West balance. It 
uld not be wise for any of us to per- 
Moscow to become a major source of 
itary modernization. And Cuba is 
rking hard to exploit the South Atlan- 
conflict to reduce its isolation within 
hemisphere. 

I doubt that these tasks require in- 
;utional changes. But they do require 
!ater perceptiveness about the possi- 
threats to peace and particularly 
3Ut the ways in which American 
tes relate to each other. 
There was a time when most of us 
|)Ught of the inter- American system as 
isisting of only two participants- 
tin America and North America. It 
sn't very long ago that the United 
ites and others attempted— and 
led— to organize a "new dialogue" on 
It basis. 
Such formulas have never done 
tice to the richness of the 
misphere's potential and the variety of 
r concerns. They make even less sense 
w that Latin American countries have 
Dwn so much in economic weight, 
pulation, and worldwide influence, and 
w that the new countries of the Carib- 
an have joined the system. What we 
ould strive for is a system which re- 
cts our diversity, which lessens ten- 
>ns rather than adds to them, and 
lich preserves what until now has 
len one of the New World's distinctive 
hievements— peace among its nations. 



Problem of Foreign Debt 

The challenge with the widest impact is 
the problem of foreign debt. Debt issues 
affect virtually every country in this 
hemisphere. At stake is the ability of 
each of our countries to realize its poten- 
tial for sustained expansion. 

The hemisphere has an impressive 
record of high growth. Taking the 
average for the last 20 years, the 
economies of Latin America and the 
Caribbean have expanded at an annual 
rate of 5.7% in real terms. This rate has 
been consistently higher than that of 
both the developed countries and of the 
developing countries as a whole. 

Many factors have contributed to 
this record. Trade— access to foreign 
markets including markets within the 
region itself— has been one of the great 
motors of growth. U.S. imports from 
Latin America and the Caribbean have 
grown from $4 billion in 1960 to $39 
billion in 1980— which averages out to a 
compound growth rate of more than 
12% a year for the last 20 years. This is 
in nominal terms and includes the price 
escalation on petroleum, but even so it is 
impressive when compared to U.S. infla- 
tion, which averaged about 5% during 
this period. 

Imported capital has also been vital 
to Latin America's growth. Direct 



growth potential, should also attract a 
major share of world capital flows. With 
their great resources, their increasingly 
skilled and disciplined work force, and 
their growing capacity to export energy 
and agricultural and industrial goods, 
there can be no doubt that the countries 
of the hemisphere are fundamentally 
credit worthy. 

Each country's situation is different 
and must be considered as a separate 
case. But there are three themes in the 
current situation common to most. 

• One is the impact of rising budget 
deficits on import demand. The high 
growth of the 1970s was obtained in 
part through ever higher budget deficits. 
In the past 10 years, the combined 
deficits of the developing countries of 
the hemisphere have more than doubled 
in relation to GNP, in some cases 
reaching the 15% or even the 20% level. 
The resulting high activity and inflation 
have fueled an enormous demand for 
foreign goods and services. 

• The second is the worldwide 
recession, which has cut sharply into ex- 
port earnings as the prices of basic com- 
modities on which the economies of the 
hemisphere still depend have fallen, 
often precipitously. 

• The third is the cumulative effect 
of the debt itself, due partly to its size, 



What we should strive for is a system [inter- 
American] which reflects our diversity, which 
lessens tensions rather than adds to them, and 
which preserves what until now has been one of the 
New World's distinctive achievements— peace 
among its nations. 



investment from the United States in- 
creased from $8.4 billion in 1960 to 
$38.3 billion in 1980, and direct foreign 
investment by other nations in Latin 
America now exceeds $15 billion. Bor- 
rowed capital has grown even more 
dramatically. The long-term foreign debt 
of the developing countries of the hemi- 
sphere grew from $39 billion in 1973 to 
some $197 billion in 1981; this is 
equivalent to roughly 30% of its total 
output. 

This capital has been put to good 
use. Moreover, it is not inappropriate 
that Latin America, which has a dis- 
proportionate share of the world's 



vember 1982 



partly to sharp runup of interest rates 
over the past 5 years. Governments 
everywhere-yes, in the United States 
but also in Europe and, indeed, in the 
hemisphere as well— have been putting 
excessive demands on the small pool of 
savings we all generate. In doing so, we 
all have contributed to high interest 
rates. For example, Latin America 
undertook some $28 billion of net new 
long-term borrowings in 1981 from 
world markets, much of it from the 
United States. For comparison, the total 
net savings generated by the U.S. 
economy during 1981 was $147.4 billion. 

I think the adjustments that we all 
must undertake are clear. All of us, in- 
cluding the United States, have to pare 



59 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



down the growth of public spending and 
raise public receipts. All of us, including 
the United States, have to hold down 
the growth of money supply to prevent 
inflationary increases in demand. The 
United States is undertaking its own ad- 
justment policies— witness President 
Reagan's efforts to lower budget deficits 
and control money supply— and has em- 
pathy for others whose problems are 
worse and whose economies are less 
flexible. If we do, the pressure on sav- 
ings and external balances will abate, 
and, as the industrial countries emerge 
from recession, both the pool of savings 
and their import demand will grow and 
the short-term problem will gradually 
dissolve. 

In the meanwhile, an exceptional ef- 
fort of cooperation, mutual understand- 
ing, and mutual adjustment must be 
undertaken to make sure that access to 
capital markets is not needlessly inter- 
rupted while basic adjustment measures 
are taken. This is basically a question 
between borrowing governments and the 
markets themselves. But in some excep- 
tional cases, other governments can play 
a role. Thus, in August the United 
States and Mexico cooperated to 
mobilize $4.5 billion in financing in order 
to allow time for talks with the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund and preparation 
of a stabilization plan to proceed. The 
United States also encouraged and wel- 
comed the decision of Argentina and 
Britain to remove their mutual financial 
sanctions and thus free up resources of 
great utility to both countries. 

One final remark. In the short term, 
as unemployment grows and as the re- 
quired adjustments look ever more pain- 
ful, the one path which tempts all, in- 
cluding some in the United States, is the 
escapism of protection. In that direction 
lies assured disaster. An open trading 
system is and must remain one of our 
highest foreign policy priorities. The up- 
coming ministerial of the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade may be one 
of the more important in decades pre- 
cisely because the pressures are building 
in all of our countries to pursue the il- 
lusory goal of trying to save jobs by not 
competing. 

Potential for Progress 

I have outlined three broad areas of 
challenge and the guidelines we are us- 
ing to confront each of them. I believe 
we are making progress. In the past 
year: 

• The United States and Mexico 
have started to achieve a relationship 
that reflects their exceptional import- 



60 



ance to each other. Now comes the 
harshest test, as the economic slowdown 
in both countries threatens to aggravate 
all our joint accounts: trade, finance, im- 
migration. We must be steadfast. 

• We have committed ourselves to 
help countries of the Caribbean Basin 
protect themselves against outside inter- 
vention, streng^en or develop demo- 
cratic institutions, and overcome eco- 
nomic disasters. That effort will succeed 
if it is sustained. 

• We are beginning to respond to 
new realities in South America. We 
were rebuilding close bilateral relation- 
ships with each country after a decade 
of drift, when the shadow of the South 
Atlantic crisis fell across our efforts. We 



are now relaunching those efforts, join 
ing others to maintain the networks of 
constructive relationships essential to 
peace and to sustained economic devel- 
opment. 

There are great strengths in the 
Americas: a common heritage which re 
jects outside interference; enormous 
human and natural resources for 
growth; and, not least, a pervasive anc 
resilient belief in the democratic ideal, 
we act consistently, and with a clear 
head, on our strengths rather than ex- 
acerbate our weaknesses— and if we in 
sist that outsiders respect our efforts- 
this hemisphere will yet be a model for 
the rest of the world. ■ 



Recent Developments in Honduras 



by Stephen W. Bosworth 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Inter- American Affairs of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee on Septem,- 
ber 21, 1982. Mr. Bosworth is Deputy As- 
sistant Secretary for Inter-American Af- 
fairs.^ 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify 
about developments in Honduras. Like 
the committee, we have been concerned 
by recent events in the region which 
threaten the security and well-being of 
Honduras and raise the specter of 
broader conflict in Central America. 

The fundamental development in in- 
ternal Honduran politics during the last 
year was the accession to power on 
January 27, 1982, of Dr. Roberto Suazo 
Cordova following that nation's first 
honest elections in 18 years. A vigorous 
and closely fought campaign inspired 
some 1.1 million voters — more than 81% 
of those eligible — to cast their ballots. 
Dr. Suazo's inauguration culminated a 
2V2-year process in which both civilians 
and military worked to build the political 
attitudes and institutions that made a 
democratic outcome possible. 

U.S. policies throughout this difficult 
transition period explicitly encouraged 
the return to democracy in Honduras 
and supported the commitment of Hon- 
duran leaders to full civil and human 
rights. 

Now a second fundamental develop- 
ment — the expansion of conflict into 
Honduras by Nicaragua and its Salva- 
doran guerrilla allies — threatens the 



peace and well-being of Honduras. Unt 
this year, Honduras was involved in th 
wider Central American arena mainly 
a place of shelter for more than 3,000 
refugees and as an unwilling staging 
area and supply route for various guer 
rilla movements. As the Honduran 
Government has taken steps to reasse; 
its sovereignty and control its border 
regions and frontiers, it, too, has 
become a target of externally-supportt 
terrorism. During 1982 terrorist in- 
cidents have increased dramatically, 
border incidents with Nicaragua have 
escalated, and tensions have increased 
Honduras' dilemma is clear: to passive 
accept abuse of its territory by foreigi 
guerrillas or to defend itself and incur 
new costs in terrorism and destructior 
The events of this weekend, in wh 
armed terrorists have taken hostage 
more than 80 businessmen and two 
ministers of the Honduran Governmer 
are but the most recent and most 
graphic example of the pressure again 
Honduras. 

The Economy 

With a per capita gross domestic prod 
uct (GDP) of $708 last year, Honduras 
the least developed nation in Central 
America and the poorest nation in the 
hemisphere except for Haiti. The 
prevalence of small farming and a 
relative abundance of land have, 
nonetheless, enabled Honduras, whost 
population today is about 3.8 million, I 



Department of State Bulle 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



U )id many of the social tensions that 
'e wracked its neighbors. 
Like its neighbors, Honduras has 
fered a sharp deterioration in its 
ms of trade in the past several years. 

current account balance declined 
m negative $192 million in 1979 to a 

" )pling negative $321 million in 1980 
1, after certain austerity measures 
re implemented, improved marginally 

»|iegative $273 million in 1981. During 
se 3 years alone, Honduras' exports 
short of the nation's import bill by 
6 million. 

In 1981. in order to partially remedy 
imbalance, Honduras reduced im- 

to|ts sharply. From 1980-1981, imports 
lined from $1,310 million to $1,217 
ion — a 7.1% decrease in nominal 
Tis but a reduction of more than 15% 
eal terms. Nevertheless, net interna- 
lal reserves fell from $116 million in 
9 to $8 million in 1981. Honduran 
P grew by only 2%i in real terms dur- 
1980 and showed no growth in 1981. 

HI cing into account the rapid inflow of 

lb igees and Honduras' normal popula- 

growth, real per capita GDP has 

ined for 2 consecutive years, with 

dent consequences for employment 

Is and the quality of life of popula- 

The United States has helped to sup- 

t Honduras with an economic 
istance program totaling $43.3 

ion in FY 1982, plus an additional 
) million to be obligated under the 
^sident's Caribbean Basin initiative, 
nduras also recently negotiated a 
ndby agreement with the Interna- 
lal Monetary Fund which will provide 
)stantial additional assistance but will 
iuire a program of strict austerity in 

foreign, public, and monetary sec- 
s. In a move made possible by the Oc- 
■er 1980 peace treaty formally ending 
■ 1969 hostilities with El Salvador, 
de between Honduras and El Salva- 
• was officially reopened last week for 

first time in 13 years. 

The orderly installation of the Suazo 
/ernment has also renewed business 
ifidence. President Suazo's popularity 
1 his government's forthrightness and 
nhandedness in calling for belt- 
htening have, thus far, minimized 
entment at austerity. For example, a 
ent nationwide teachers' strike was 
icluded peacefully and with full 
pular support. Since the inauguration 
the Suazo government, Honduras has 
icted new mining legislation to attract 
eign investors, formed a commission 



vember 1982 



to negotiate foreign debt problems, and 
concluded a long-term agreement with 
Texaco. The conclusion of this latter 
dispute puts Honduras in a stronger 
position to participate in the Mexican / 
Venezuelan concessionary petroleum 
facility. Despite these positive 
developments, short-term economic pros- 
pects are mixed. 

Refugees 

Economic difficulties are sharpened by a 
large refugee population, which con- 
tributes to the political complexity of the 
situation and places additional burdens 
on the local economy and social services. 

In recent years, Honduras has 
become a magnet for refugees from El 



As the Honduran Gov- 
ernment has taken steps 
to reassert its sovereign- 
ty and control its border 
regions and frontiers, it, 
too, has become a target 
of externally supported 
terrorism. 



Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. Al- 
though not a signatory of the Geneva 
Convention and Protocol Relating to 
Refugees, Honduras has demonstrated 
its humanitarian concern by working 
closely with the U.N. High Commis- 
sioner for Refugees to provide protec- 
tion, shelter, and food for approximately 
30,000 persons who have fled their 
homelands. About one-half of these 
refugees are Salvadoran. About 500 are 
from Guatemala. The fastest growing 
and potentially largest group of 
refugees, however, is made up of per- 
sons displaced from Nicaragua. More 
than 12,000 Miskito Indians alone fled to 
Honduras following a series of re- 
pressive actions taken by the Sandinista 
regime. Recently, another influx of 
about 3,000 Nicaraguan refugees also 
entered Honduras. Most of these 
Nicaraguans, displaced by the turmoil of 



the past 3 years, have sought shelter in 
the border regions of Honduras. Both 
Salvadorans and Nicaraguans sometimes 
exploit their location close to the fron- 
tier to return home for peaceful or 
disruptive purposes. 

National Security 

In the past few months Honduras has 
been struck by a wave of kidnapings, 
aircraft hijackings, bank robberies, and 
bombings of public buildings. To date in 
1982, we are aware of 39 terrorist in- 
cidents which have occurred in Hon- 
duras or were directed at Honduran 
facilities outside the country. These in- 
clude the placement of more than 30 
bombs and attacks on at least three ma- 
jor U.S. corporations— Texaco, IBM, 
and Air Florida. The most notable occur- 
rences were: 

• March 10— Texaco office bombed. 

• April 5— Shooting attack on the 
U.S. Embassy. 

• April 20— Argentine and Chilean 
Embassies bombed. 

• April 28— Attempt to hijack 
domestic airliner. 

• July 3 — Honduran airlines offices 
bombed in San Jose. 

• July 4— Bombing of electrical 
power substations, temporarily blacking 
out Tegucigalpa. 

• July 23 — Honduran airlines office 
bombed in Guatemala City. 

• August 4— Air Florida, IBM, and 
TACA Airlines (Salvadoran but U.S. 
owned) offices bombed. 

Like the current hostage crisis, 
these attacks, their timing, their targets, 
and their accompanying propaganda 
have made it obvious that they were not 
motivated by internal Honduran issues. 
Rather, they are orchestrated by 
Nicaragua's Sandinistas and the 
Salvadoran FMLN (Farabundo Marti 
People's Liberation Front] to intimidate 
the Honduran Government. An intense 
series of terrorist attacks immediately 
followed the Honduran army's deploy- 
ment to defend its border zones against 
incursions by FMLN guerrillas. In 
subsequent raids on subversive 
safehouses, those captured have mainly 
been Salvadoran FMLN operatives 
assisted by some subordinate Hon- 
durans. 

The democratic government's reac- 
tion to terrorist violence has been 
measured but firm. A stronger law 



61 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



against terrorist activities was adopted. 
The public security forces have 
demonstrated a growing capability to 
identify and locate terrorists but have 
not provided the Marxist tacticians with 
the martyrs which they seek. On 
September 11, Honduras expelled the 
Nicaraguan economic attache for "ac- 
tivities contrary to national interests and 
state security." 

Popular reactions in Honduras have 
been strongly supportive of the Suazo 
regime. Hondurans applauded the 
passage of the antiterrorism law. On 
August 6, close to 10,000 people 
marched through the streets of 
Tegucigalpa to show their support of the 
government and the armed forces and 
their rejection of those who would bring 
violence to Honduras. 

Although its elected government 
continues to enjoy widespread popular 
support, it is clear that the national 
security of Honduras is menaced by the 
activities of antigovernment terrorist 
groups and by the military might of an 
increasingly hostile Nicaragua. Hon- 
duras' rugged terrain makes it especially 
vulnerable to abuses of its territory. The 
utilization of Honduran territory by 
Salvadoran guerrillas has already been 
mentioned. Honduras has also become a 
major thoroughfare for leftist arms traf- 
fic in support of the insurgent 
movements in El Salvador and 
Guatemala. In 1978 and 1979, San- 
dinista forces operated freely from bases 
within Honduras, in spite of the govern- 
ment's efforts to oust them. Now, ter- 
rorist operatives of the Sandinista 
government have reversed the direction, 
exploiting Honduran weaknesses to 
stage attacks on Honduras itself. 

This weekend's seizure of the San 
Pedro Sula Chamber of Commerce il- 
lustrates Honduras' predicament. Last 
Friday evening, some 15 terrorists 
armed with automatic rifles and 
dynamite blasted their way into the 
Chamber of Commerce building. One 
guard was killed and two businessmen 
were injured. Revealingly, the terrorists' 
demands do not focus on Honiiuran 
issues. Their principal demand, as stated 
to the press, is that some 60 prisoners 
be released. The individuals concerned 
are allegedly being held by the Hon- 
duran Government, apparently for in- 
volvement in arms shipments or other 
guerrilla activities tied to conflicts in 
neighboring nations. Alejandro 
Montenegro, one of the most prominent 
among those whose release is sought, is 
evidently a commander of the Ejercito 
Revolucionario Popular— Popular 
Revolutionary Army— the most violent 



62 



of the violent factions in El Salvadi)r. 

A second demand seeks the repeal of 
Honduras' new antiterrorism law, 
enacted during a period of public 
outrage at an airplane hijacking in prog- 
ress at that time. In short, the ter- 
rorists' demands serve guerrilla ac- 
tivities against neighboring countries 
and seek to prevent Honduras from tak- 
ing even legislative action to safeguard 
its territory. 

The Nicaraguan Dimension 

Nicaragua has cho.sen with Cuban sup- 
port to try to take advantage of Hon- 
duras' economic and security weak- 
nesses. Although Honduran Foreign 
Minister Paz Barnica has repeatedly 
reiterated the desire "that relations can 
continue normally," the continued suc- 
cess of Honduras' democratic experi- 
ment is clearly viewed as a threat by the 
Marxist-Leninist regime in neighboring 
Nicaragua. Along with Havana, the San- 
dinistas are training, supplying, and 
bankrolling terrorists in Honduras. 

Perhaps most revealing, in light of 
recent Nicaraguan statements menacing 
Honduras, is a brief comparison of the 
two nations' military capabilities. Hon- 
duras has some 13,500 men under arms; 
Nicaragua, with its increasing mobiliza- 
tion of reservists and militia, has some 
75,000. Although both nations have rein- 
forced units along the border, 
Nicaraguan forces outweigh the Hon- 
duran by approximately three to one. 
The deterrent capacity of the Honduran 
Air Force, that nation's traditional 
defensive mainstay, is in question. 

Hondui'as has a few A-37s and a 
squadron of Super Mystere aircraft, the 
latter purchased in 1969. In contrast, 
Nicaragua is rumored to have ordered a 
squadron of MiG jets, of unspecified 
type and number, whose arrival would 
sharply alter the military balance be- 
tween the two nations. Reconstruction 
of the Nicaraguan airports is already 
underway, and Nicaraguan pilots are 
presently training in Eastern Europe. 

In sum, recent press portraits of the 
Honduran military as the strongest in 
Central America notwithstanding, Hon- 
duran units are undertrained; its total 
military force is much smaller than 
either of its neighbors, El Salvador and 
Nicaragua; and its inventory of 
transportation, communications, and air 
defense materiel is skimpy and aging. 
Indeed, Honduras has not significantly 
increased its armed forces during the 
last few years. 



The Tnited States has attempted t 
assist Honduras to improve its national 
security capabilities. In FY 1982, in- 
cluding the funds authorized in the 
recently enacted supplemental appro 
priation, we are providing $30 million ii 
foreign military sales loans and [militar 
assistance program] grants. We have 
also agreed to fund an FY 1983- 
1985 program, under the Department < 
Defense military construction budget, 
for improvements in Honduran airport 
facilities, to which U.S. aircraft would 
have access. U.S. military trainers in 
Honduras currently range from 30-50 
persons on temporary duty. The con- 
trast between these modest numbers 
and the 2,000 Cuban, Soviet, and East 
European military and security person- 
nel stationed in Nicaragua is striking, i 
deed. 

As this record makes clear, 
Nicaragua is the source of many of the 
problems confronting Honduras, direct 
by its menacing and subversive initia- 
tives, and indirectly by its open suppor 
for the armed insurgencies in El 
Salvador and Guatemala. As the place 
refuge for thousands of other Central 
Americans, as the crossroads of a 
massive clandestine arms traffic by the 
violent left, and as a nation which shar 
a long land border with Nicaragua, the 
security of democratic Honduras is viu 
ly important to the peace of Central 
America. 

Nor is Honduras alone in feeling 
pressure from Nicaragua. Democratic 
and army-less Costa Rica has also four 
Nicaragua to be a dangerous neighbor. 
On July 4, coincident with bombings th 
day of electric power substations whicl 
temporarily blacked out Tegucigalpa, a 
terrorist bomb shattered the offices of 
the Honduran airline in downtown San 
Jose. Investigation by Costa Rican 
authorities revealed that the bomb waf 
placed by a member of the Colombian 
M-19 terrorist group, acting on instru( 
tions from the Nicaraguan Embassy. 
The Costa Ricans actually tape recordt I 
an incriminating conversation between 
Nicaraguan Embassy officer and the 
Colombian terrorist. As a direct result, 
three Nicaraguan diplomats were ex- 
pelled by the Costa Rican Government 
early August— just as, a month later, 
Honduras expelled the Nicaraguan 
economic attache on national security 
grounds. The Costa Rican Foreign 
Ministry has formally detailed the reco 
of continuing FSLN abuses: support fo 
terrorism and subversion, incursions ai 
other activity inside Costa Rican ter- 
ritory by armed Sandinista troops, and 



Department of State Bullet 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



rassment of Costa Rican commercial 

tourist traffic on the San Juan River 
ich divides the two countries. 

nduran Peace Proposal 

March 23, Honduras advanced a six- 
nt proposal, later endorsed by the 
ited States, the Central American 
mocratic Community, and numerous 
er nations in the hemisphere, to 
ng about peace in Central America. 

First, the foundation should be laid 
general disarmament in the region, 
is would involve not only a halt to the 
ns race, which has caused so much 
sion and instability, but also a gen- 
e reduction in armaments and in 
itary personnel to minimum levels 
essary for the defense of sovereignty 
i territorial integrity and for the 
intenance of law and order, in accord- 

.(I ;e with criteria acknowledged in all 
nocratic societies. There should also 
agreement on the type of weapons to 
limited and prohibited as part of this 
leral disarmament plan. 
Second, there should be agreement 
reducing, on an objective and 
isonable basis, the number of foreign 
itary and other advisers, as well as 

J/ other elements likely to create suspi- 
n and uneasiness or to distort the 
ntity of the respective nations. 
Third, consideration should be given 
and agreement reached on, ap- 
ipriate mechanisms to insure that, 
ough a process of international super- 
ion and monitoring to which Hon- 
das is committed, there is comprehen- 
e verification of compliance. Such 
)ervision and monitoring would cover 
mtries where there are conflicts and 
isitive areas which may affect peace 
the region, such as ports, airports, 
•der areas, and strategic sectors. Hon- 
das is fully prepared to submit its ter- 
)ry, without reservations, to any type 
international observation or monitor- 
that is agreed upon for the purpose 
securing and strengthening regional 
ice. 
Fourth, there should be discussion 
and agreement on, the most appro- 
ate procedures and mechanisms for 
ting the traffic in arms in the region. 
Fifth, there should be absolute 
pect for delimited and demarcated 
rders and the traditional and jurisdic- 
nal frontier lines of states in the 
|ion, so that the peace will not be 
set by fresh disputes in matters 
ating to territory or to the sea. 

Sixth, the framework for a perma- 
nt multilateral dialogue should be 



3vember 1982 



defined. Internally such a dialogTje, on 
the basis of this initiative, would also 
create the right climate for political ar- 
rangements to strengthen the demo- 
cratic and pluralistic system, which in 
turn would reinforce respect for the 
freedom of the people and for their right 
to free expression of their wishes. 

The Honduran peace proposal ar- 
ticulates a concrete framework for 
regional peace. In early July the Foreign 
Ministers of the Central American 
Democratic Community, El Salvador, 
Costa Rica, and Honduras — all 
democratically elected governments — 
issued a joint statement condemning 
regional terrorism and subversion, ex- 
pressing concern over the excessive 
arms buildup in Nicaragua, and appeal- 
ing to Nicaragua to respect the principle 
of nonintervention in the internal affairs 
of other countries. The declaration also 
specifically endorsed the Honduran plan 
for regional peace. The United States 
also supports the Honduran initiative. 

We are studying, with interest, 
similar concerns expressed recently by 
the Presidents of Mexico and Venezuela. 
To date, however, there has been no 
convincing indication that the Sandinista 
government is willing to consider con- 
crete, practical measures for peace. 

Conclusion 

At a time of deep economic difficulties 
and grave political tensions, Honduras is 
a nation striving for democracy and 
peace. Hondurans are justifiably proud 
that, in recent years, their country has 
avoided the violent politics of its 
neighbors and has made demonstrable 
progress toward establishing a more 
equitable society, stronger democratic 
institutions, and a truly free press. 
The focus of U.S. policy toward 
Honduras is to support the well-being 
and security of a democratic regime 
under pressure from external forces. We 
are working to help the Hondurans help 
themselves economically and to bolster 
the growth and maturity of their 
democratic institutions. Like Honduras, 
we, too, are searching for and support- 
ing those who want peace in embattled 
Central America. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Situation in 
Guatemala 

by Stephen W. Bosworth 

Stdtcninil hij'ori' tltv Siiltcommittee 
onhltirniilmtiiii I hTrlupimitl nftlie 

Hoiviv L'oiniiidtec on. Baiikiitg un Au- 
gust 5, 1982. Mr. Bosworth is Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American 
Affairs. ' 

I would like to begin by reviewing brief- 
ly overall U.S. policy and objectives in 
Central America. Our goal is the evolu- 
tion of stable democratic societies, free 
to concentrate on their economic and 
social development, and secure from ex- 
ternal threat. To achieve that goal we 
have: 

• Supported developing democratic 
processes and elections in El Salvador, 
Costa Rica, and Honduras; 

• Developed a program of compre- 
hensive economic cooperation through 
the Caribbean Basin initiative and ongo- 
ing foreign assistance loans and grants; 
and 

• Provided security assistance to 
some countries to help them defend 
themselves against externally supported 
subversion and terrorism. 

Our goal in Guatemala is the same 
as in the other countries of the area. In 
fact, as the largest and most populous 
country of Central America, Guatemala 
has a crucial, even pivotal, role in the 
region. It has considerable resources, 
but it also has serious economic and 
social problems and faces an active, 
Cuban-backed guerilla movement. 

Our efforts to establish the type of 
relationship with Guatemala in which we 
could assist in meeting these problems 
were largely blocked by the policies pur- 
sued by the previous Guatemalan 
Government. The deplorable human 
rights situation in Guatemala and the 
lack of a credible framework for prog- 
ress meant that we were able to support 
only a few loans promoting basic human 
needs. In brief, we could not work with 
a regime whose actions were as abhor- 
rent as they were counterproductive, 
and our bilateral relationship was effec- 
tively frozen. 

New Government's Actions 

This pattern was broken on March 23. A 
group of young officers brought to 
power a new government determined to 



63 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



eliminate official repression and corrup- 
tion, to improve conditions for all of 
Guatemala's peoples, to combat the in- 
surgency, and to return the country to 
democratic rule. Since March 28 a 
number of important steps have been 
taken. 

• The government has reduced 
political violence, particularly in urban 
areas, where its command and control is 
strongest. Political violence in rural 
areas continues and may even be in- 
creasing, but its use as a political tactic 
appears to be a guerrilla strategy, not a 
government doctrine. Eyewitness re- 
ports of women among the attackers, 
embassy interviews with massacre sur- 
vivors, the use of weapons not in the 
army inventory, and, most importantly, 
the increasing tendency of rural 
villagei-s to seek the army's protection 
all suggest that the guerrillas are 
responsible in major part for the rising 
levels of violence in rural areas. 

• No specific charges of government 
torture have been brought to our atten- 
tion. In contrast to the past, the new 



governfnent has publicly acknowledged, 
though in some cases belatedly, deten- 
tions. In the two prominent instances in- 
volving Dr. Juan Jose Hurtado and 16 
students detained in June, the govern- 
ment released Dr. Hurtado into the 
custody of the Guatemalan Red Cross 
and a refjresentative of the Catholic 
Churcli: the students were released into 
their parents' custody. This kind of ac- 
tion is unprecedented in recent 
(luatenialan historw 

• An amnesty program carried out 
in June saw almost 2,000 people step 
forward to accept it. 

• Exiled religious workers have 
been invited back into the country and a 
constructive dialogue opened with the 
church. For example, Bishop Gerardi, 
the former president of the Episcopal 
Conference, has returned to Guatemala 
from Costa Rica, where he was living 
for his own safety. In another instance, 
a nun, deported by Honduras for 
distributing literature supporting 
Salvadoran guerrillas, was quietly 
released to church authorities by the 
Guatemalan Government. 



Guatemala— A Profile 



Geography 

Area: 4i:,000 sq. mi. (about the size of Tenn.). 
Cities: Capitol — Guatemala City (pop. 1.5 
million). Other Cities — Quezaltenango 
(70,000), Escuintia (60,000). 

People 

Population: 7.4 million (1981 est.). Annual 
Growth Rate: 3.1%. Ethnic Groups: Ladino 
(Westernized), Indian. Religions: Roman 
Catholic, Protestant, traditional Mayan. 
Langiiages: Spanish, 18 Indian languages 
(Quiche, Cakchiquel, Kekchi). 

Government 

Type: Military government. Independence: 
Sept. If), 1821. Constitution: 1965 (suspend- 
ed). Branches: Executive — president (chief of 
state and head of government), Council of 
Ministers (cabinet). Legislative — unicameral 
61 -seat Congress (dissolved). Suffrage: 
Universal over 18. Subdivisions: 22 depart- 
ments and Guatemala City. 

Economy 

GNP: $8.7 billion (1981 est.). Annual Growth 
Rate: 1% (1981). Per Capita Income: $1,175. 

Natural Resources: Oil, nickel, timber, 
shrimp. 

Agricultural Products: Corn, beans, cof- 
fee, cotton, cattle, sugar, bananas, spices, 
essential oils, timber. 

Industries: Prepared food, textiles, con- 
struction materials, tires, pharmaceuticals. 

Trade (1981): A'xporf.s— $1.2 billion: cof- 
fee, cotton, .sugar, meat, bananas. Principal 



Markets — U.S., Central American Common 
Market (CACM), Japan. Imports— $\. 7 
billion: fuels and lubricants, industrial 
machinery, motor vehicles, iron and steel. 
Principal Suppliers — U.S., Japan, CACM, 
EEC. Venezuela. 

Official Exchange Rate: 1 quetzal = 
US$1.00. 

U.S. Aid Received: $203 million 
(1967-81). 




Pacific Ocean 



Membership in 
International Organizations 

U.N. and its specialized agencies, Organiza- 
tion of American States (OASl. CACM. 
INTELSAT. ■ 



64 



• In direct contrast to the previous 
government's exclusive emphasis on 
military action against the guerrillas, 
this government is committed to rural 
development. Even as overall govern- 
ment expenditures are being reduced, 
programs to develop the social in- 
frastructure of the highlands are being 
expanded. Just 2 weeks ago, the govern- 
ment announced a $5 million program tc 
provide minimum shelter in support of a 
food-for-work program to people dis- 
placed through political strife. 

• Invitations have been extended to 
Amnesty International, the Inter- 
American Commission on Human 
Rights, and the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission to visit Guatemala to make 
their own evaluations of the situation. Ir 
late July, the Guatemalan Foreign 
Minister received visiting West German 
Social Democrat Guenter Herterich. The 
Lucas government had refused all such 
contacts. 

• The government offered to negoti 
ate unconditionally with the guerrilla 
forces, a proposal which the guerrillas 
rejected without serious exploration. 

The guerrilla cadres have responded 
to the new government and its policies 
with increased violence. They are clearlj 
responsible for the massacre of innocent 
men, women, and children in Sanquiya, 
Chichicastenango in May, and in the 
region of the Ixil triangle in June. The 
guerrillas appear to have begun a con- 
certed campaign to intimidate Indian 
villagers from participating in the 
community defense forces, a popular 
program responding to the traditional 
efforts of these close-knit villages to pre 
tect themselves from outsiders. The 
guerrillas constitute a formidable threat 
to any Guatemalan Government. Full- 
time, trained, armed guerrillas may 
number as many as 3,500. This cadre of 
permament military units is supple- 
mented by approximately 10,000 ir- 
regular "local defense" guerrillas. A sup 
port infrastructure of some 30,000- 
60,000 sympathizers constitutes a third 
level. 

Violence and terrorism compound 
the economic problems presently con- 
fronting the new- government. In the 
economy's modern sector, 1982 produc- 
tion is running W% below 1981. Tradi- 
tional agriculture and handicrafts, \ntal 
to the people of the highlands, are beinj 
seriously disrupted. Liquid foreign ex- 
change reserves are virtually exhausted 
Through May of this year, foreign ex- 
change available for imports necessary 
for industrial production, as well as agr 
cultural supplies and consumer goods, 
was 42% below the 1981 level for the 



Department of State Bullet! 



TREATIES 



ne period. Although Guatemala is a 
.roleum producer, actual current pro- 
;tion is only 10%-15% of the 
intry's petroleum consumption. 

^We welcomed from the start the 
directions announced by the Rios 
ntt government, and we have en- 
1 iraged the new government to make 
1,1 istructive changes. However, we 
nded to wait for signs of tangible 
)gTess on areas of concern to the 
ited States before changing our own 
icies. 

The government's announcement of 
' state of seige at the beginning of 
t month gave us particular cause for 
icern, even though many countries 
/e or have had similar measures. Now 
it the state of seige has been in effect 
' more than a month, the actual im- 
mentation appears much less severe 
m the rhetoric that accompanied its 
eption implied. There have been no 
nmary trials and executions. 

We have now concluded that the 
ord of the past 4 months, while not 
rfect, demonstrates that the new 
vernment has a commitment to 
sitive change and new opportunity in 
atemala. 



piit 
S. Approach 

3 have, therefore, decided to move 
•ward carefully to reinforce the 
sitive developments in Guatemala. 
f rther progress is clearly needed, and 
II ■ believe U.S. policy can help by 
b cognizing the constructive change 
« lich has already taken place and by 
6 couraging additional progress. By act- 
jir now, we can send the message to all 
'C latemalan sectors that with im- 
ovements in human rights perfor- 
ince, the United States is prepared to 
operate in ways meaningful to 
latemala's needs. 
We believe our approach should be 
"Pjaasured. We are proposing no 
amatic new initiatives. We are, bow- 
er, accelerating disbursements in our 
jency for International Development 
ID) pipeline and reallocating develop- 
ent assistance funds from projects 
nceled in other countries. We have 
■en responsive to Guatemala's request 
r help to feed and shelter the 
ousands of people displaced by the 
jhting in the rural areas. We hope to 
ovide further assistance of this kind. 
^ We welcome the House Foreign Af- 
irs Committee's decision to allot a por- 
Dn of the available funds in the Carib- 
an Basin initiative to Guatemala to 



help meet its critical balance-of- 
payments problems. On July 18, Presi- 
dent Rios Montt took note of this con- 
gressional action, welcomed it as recog- 
nition of an improvement in human 
rights, and said that Guatemala should 
work even harder to improve the human 
rights situation. This is precisely the 
message we need to confirm to help ob- 
tain further progress. 

Guatemala is well-placed to take ad- 
vantage of the trade and investment in- 
centives under the Caribbean Basin ini- 
tiative. At the same time, we believe we 
should be prepared to support access by 
Guatemala to the multilateral develop- 
ment banks to assist in financing sound, 
well-conceived economic and social 
development projects. 

Our actions cannot be limited to 
economic and development assistance 
alone; that would be unrealistic consider- 
ing the threat posed by the insurgents. 
We hope that the full House and Senate 
will support the action of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee in approving 
$250,000 in international military educa- 
tion and training for FY 1983. To fail to 
do so would ignore the security situation 
of Guatemala and abrogate our respon- 
sibility to help improve the human rights 
situation in all sectors of Guatemalan 
society. Depending on developments in 
Guatemala, we would be prepared to 
consider authorizing some military sales 
and additional security assistance to help 
meet that country's essential security 
needs. We will, of course, continue to 
consult closely with the Congress in all 
aspects of U.S. policy toward 
Guatemala. 

We cannot ignore the importance of 
Guatemala to the stability of Central 
America and our own vital national in- 
terests in that region. After several 
years of escalating violence, an oppor- 
tunity now exists for the United States 
to use its influence to encourage the 
development of a new and more humane 
society for all Guatemalans— if we act. 
It would be neither fair nor wise to turn 
our back on a country which holds so 
much potential for the future of its peo- 
ple and the region. Inaction would 
seriously jeopardize continued human 
rights improvements, economic advance- 
ment, and political stability. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Aviation, Civil 

Memorandum of understanding concerning 
transatlantic scheduled service air fares, with 
annexes. Done at Washington May 2, 1982. 
Entered into force : Aug. 1, 1982. 

Coffee 

Extension of the international coffee agree- 
ment 1976 (TIAS 8683). Done at London 
Sept. 25, 1981. 

Acceptances deposited: Burundi, July 23, 
1982; Ecuador, Aug. 2, 1982; El Salvador, 
July 19, 1982; Ivory Coast, July 9, 1982; 
Kenya, June 21, 1982; Nicaragua, July 20, 
1982; Panama, July 16, 1982; Papua New 
Guinea, July 30, 1982; Uganda, Aug. 9, 1982. 
Entered into force : Oct. 1, 1982. 

Customs 

Customs convention on the international 
transport of goods under cover of TIR 
carnets, with annexes. Done at Geneva 
Nov. 14, 1972. Entered into force Mar. 20, 
1978; for the U.S. Mar. 18, 1982. 
Accession deposited: Spain, Aug. 11, 1982. 

Education— UNESCO 

Convention on the recognition of studies, 
diplomas and degrees concerning higher 
education in the states belonging to the 
Europe region. Done at Paris Dec. 21, 1979. 
Entered into force Feb. 19, 1982.' 
Ratification deposited : Netherlands, June 15, 
1982. 

Environmental Modification 

Convention on the prohibition of military or 
any other hostile use of environmental 
modification techniques, with annex. Done at 
Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force 
Oct. 5, 1978; for the U.S. Jan. 17, 1980. 
TIAS 9614. 
Ratification deposited : Belgium, July 12, 

1982. 

Human Rights 

International covenant on civil and political 
rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966. 
Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.' 
Accession deposited : Bolivia, Aug. 12, 1982. 

International covenant on economic, social, 

and cultural rights. Done at New York 

Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 

1976.' 

Accession deposited : Bolivia, Aug. 12, 1982. 

Judicial Procedure 

Convention on the service abroad of judicial 
and extrajudicial documents in civil or com- 
mercial matters. Done at The Hague Nov. 15, 



65 



TREATIES 



1965. Entered into force Feb. 10, 1969. TIAS 

6638. 

Extended to : Anguilla, July 30. 1982.2 

Maritime Matters 

Amendment to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, on the International 
Maritime Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 
6490, 8606, 10374). Adopted at London 
Nov. 17, 1977.3 

Acceptance deposited : Romania, 
Sept. 14, 1982. 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, on the International 
Maritime Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 
6490, 8606, 10374). Adopted at London 
Nov. 15, 1979.3 

Acceptances deposited: Peru, July 28, 
1982; Qatar, June 29, 1982; Romania, 
Sept. 14, 1982. 

Inter-American convention on facilitation of 
international waterborne transportation, with 
annex. Signed at Mar del Plata June 7, 1963. 
Entered into force Jan. 11, 1981. 
Proclaimed by the President : July 23, 
1982. 

Pollution 

Convention on long-range transboundary air 

pollution. Done at Geneva Nov. 13, 1979. ' 

Ratifications deposited: Belgium, F.R.G., 

Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, U.K., July 15, 

1982. 

Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, July 15, 

1982. 

Approval deposited: European Economic 

Community, July 15, 1982. 

Postal 

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union, 
with Final Protocol. Done at Vienna July 10, 
1964. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1966. TIAS 
5881. 

Additional protocol to the Constitution of the 
Universal Postal Union. Done at Tokyo 
Nov. 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 
1961. TIAS 7150. 

Second additional protocol to the Constitution 
of the Universal Postal Union. Done at 
Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force 
Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8231. 
Accession deposited : Vanuatu, July 5, 1982. 

General regulations of the Universal Postal 
Union, with final protocol and annex, and the 
universal postal convention with final pro- 
tocol and detailed regulations. Done at Rio de 
Janeiro Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force 
July 1, 1981. TIAS 9972. 
Apx'rovals deposited: (J.D.R., June 30, 1982; 
Norway, .June 18, 1982. 
Ratifications deposite d: Afghanistan, May 3, 
1982; Chile, May 11, 1982. 
Accessions depo s ited: Cape Verde, June 1, 
1982; Vanuatu, July 5, 1982. 

Money orders and postal travellers' checks 
agreement, with detailed regulations and 



66 



final protocol. Done at Rio de Janeiro 

Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force July 1, 

1982. TIAS 9973. 

Approval deposite d: Norway, June 18, 1982. 

Ratification deposited : Chile, May 11, 1982. 

Accession deposited : Cape Verde, June 1, 

1982. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of 
all forms of racial discrimination. Adopted at 
New York Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force 
Jan. 4, 1969.' 
Accession deposited : Portugal, Aug. 24, 1982. 

Red Cross 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions 
of Aug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 
3365), and relating to the protection of vic- 
tims of international armed conflicts (protocol 
I), with annexes. Adopted at Geneva June 8, 
1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.' 
Ratifications deposited: Austria, Aug. 13, 
1982;"'' Denmark, June 17, 1982."^ 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions 
of Aug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 
3365), and relating to the protection of vic- 
tims of noninternational armed conflicts (pro- 
tocol II). Adopted at Geneva June 8, 1977. 
Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.' 
Ratifications deposited: Austria, Aug. 13, 
1982;-'' Denmark, June 17, 1982.-^ 

Rubber 

International natural rubber agreement, 

1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979. Entered 

into force Apr. 15, 1982. TIAS 10379. 

Accession deposited : Switzerland, July 22, 

1982. 

Ratification deposited : Finland, Aug. 24, 

1982. 

Sea Bed Operations 
(Polymetallic Nodules) 

Agreement concerning interim arrangements 
relating to polymetallic nodules of the deep 
sea bed. Done at Washington Sept. 2, 1982. 
Entered into force Sept. 2, 1982. 
Signatures : France, F.R.G., U.K., U.S., 
Sept. 2, 1982. 

Terrorism 

International convention against the taking of 
hostages. Done at New York Dec. 17, 1979.' 
Ratification deposited : Panama, Aug. 19, 
1982, 

Trade 

Protocol extending the arrangement regard- 
ing international trade in textiles of Dec. 20, 
1973, as extended (TIAS 784(1, 8939). Done 
at Geneva Dec. 22, 1981. Entered into force 
Jan. 1, 1982. TIAS 10323. 
Accepta nce s depos i ted: Canada, July 12, 
1982; El Salvador, July 2, 1982; Jamaica, 
June 22, 1982; Romania, July 12, 1982; 
Sweden, Aug. 20, 1982.' 



Ratifications deposited : Austria. Aug. 24, 
1982; Finland, Aug. 23, 1982. 

UNIDO 

Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Develop 

ment Organization, with annexes. Adopted a 

Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.' 

Ratificati ons deposited: Australia, Nov. 20, 

1981; Jordan, Aug. 30, 1982; St. Lucia, 

Aug. 11, 1982. 

Signa t ures : Canada, Aug. 31, 1982; Angola, 

Sept. 3, 1982; Antigua and Barbuda, Sept. 8 

1982. 

Weapons 

Convention on prohibitions or restrictions or 
the use of certain conventional weapons 
which may be deemed to be excessively in- 
jurious or to have indiscriminate effects. 
Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980.^ 
Ratifications deposited: Czechoslovakia, 
Aug. 31, 1982; Switzerland, Aug. 20, 1982. 

Protocols to the convention on prohibitions ( 
restrictions on the use of certain convention 
weapons which may be deemed to be ex- 
cessively injurious or to have indiscriminate 
effects. Done at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980.^ 
Acceptance deposited : Switzerland, Aug. 20 
1982. 

Women 

Convention on the elimination of all forms o 
discrimination against women. Adopted at 
New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into fore* 
Sept. 3. 1981.' 

Ratifications deposited: Congo, July 26, 198 
Dominican Rep., Sept. 2, 1982; Guatemala, 
Aug. 12, 1982; Guinea, Aug. 9, 1982. 

World Heritage 

Convention concerning the protection of tht 
world cultural and natural heritage. Done a 
Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force Dei 
17, 1975. TIAS 8226. 
Ratification deposited : Benin. June 14, 198z 

World Health Organization 

Amendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the 
Constitution of the World Health Organiza- 
tion, as amended. (TIAS 1808, 8086, 8534). 
Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976 by the 29' 
World Health Assembly.-' 
Acceptances deposited: Brazil, Aug. 27, 198 
Chile, Aug. 5, 1982; Lebanon, June 21, 1981 
Sudan. July 13, 1982. 

Amendment to Article 74 of the Constitutio 
of the World Health Organization, as amenc 
ed. (TIAS 1808, 8086, 8534). Adopted at 
Geneva May 18, 1978 by the 31st World 
Health Assembly.-' 

Acceptances depiisited: Jordan, Aug. 30, 
1982; United Arab Emirates. Aug. 18, 1982 



Department of State Bulleti 



TREATIES 



\TERAL 

ntina 

■enient amending the agreement of Sept. 
977, as amended, relating to air 
sport services (TIAS 8978). Effected by 
ange of letters at Buenos Aires Aug. 13, 
Entered into force Aug. 13, 1982. 

i^ladesh 

■ement amending the agreement for sales 
fricultural comniodities of Mar. 8, 1982. 
cted by exchange of letters at Dacca 

23 and 24, 1982. Entered into force 

24, 1982. 

indi 

■ement relating to the establishment of a 
e Corps program in Burundi. Effected 
xchange of notes at Bujumbura Aug. 31, 
Entered into force Aug. 31, 1982. 



jement amending the agreement of 
17, 1980, as amended (TIAS 9820, 
'1), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and 
made fiber textiles and textile products, 
cted by exchange of letters at 
hington July 16 and 19, 1982. Entered 
force July 19, 1982. 

ocol amending the agreement of Sept. 
1980, relating to civil air transport, with 
xes and exchanges of letters (TIAS 
16). Signed at Beijing Aug. 19, 1982. 
;red into force Aug. 19, 1982. 

dnican Republic 

sement amending the agreement for sales 
^ricultural commodities of May 21, 1982 

S 10391). Effected by exchange of notes 
anto Domingo Aug. 2 and 26, 1982. 

red into force Aug. 26, 1982. 

IPt 

eement amending the project grant 
ement of Sept. 3, 1977 (TIAS 9332), as 
nded, for family planning. Signed at 
o' June 14, 1982. Entered into force 
14, 1982. 

t amendment to project grant agreement 
ept. 22, 1981 (TIAS 10278), and second 
ndment to project loan agreement of 
S8|t 29, 1977 (TIAS 9465), as amended, for 
o Water Supply, with annex. Signed at 
■0 Aug. 16, 1982. Entered into force 
16, 1982. 

gram grant agreement for decentraliza- 
sector support, with annex. Signed at 

ro Aug. 29. 1982. Entered into force Aug. 
1982. 

t amendment to the grant agreement of 

5, 1982 (TIAS 10347), for commodity 
lorts, with annex. Signed at Cairo 
31, 1982. Entered into force Aug. 31, 

aty concerning the reciprocal encourage- 
nt and protection of investments, with an- 
and protocol. Signed at Washington 



Sept. 29, 1982. Enters into force 30 days 
after date of exchange of instruments of 
ratification. 

Germany, Federal Republic of 

Memorandum of understanding on the Roent- 
gensatellit program. Signed at Vienna 
Aug. 8, 1982. Entered into force Aug. 8, 
1982. 

Ghana 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of Apr. 4, 
1980 (TIAS 9738). Signed at Accra, Aug. 19, 
1982. Entered into force Aug. 19, 1982. 

Haiti 

Agreement relating to the establishment of a 
Peace Corps program in Haiti. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince Aug. 12 
and 13, 1982. Entered into force Aug 13, 
1982. 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities amending the agreement of May 28, 
1982, with memorandum of understanding. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au- 
Prince Aug. 17 and 18, 1982. Entered into 
force Aug. 18, 1982. 

Israel 

Second amendment to the agreement of 
Dec. 31, 1982 (TIAS 10283), relating to a 
cash assistance grant to Israel. Signed at 
Israel May 18, 1982. Entered into force May 
18, 1982. TIAS 10394. 

Japan 

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coast 
of the United States of America, with an- 
nexes and agreed minutes. Signed at 
Washington Sept. 10, 1982. Enters into force 
on a date to be agreed upon in an exchange 
of notes between the two governments, 
following the completion of their internal pro- 
cedures necessary for the entry into force of 
the agreement. 

Lebanon 

Agreement on United States participation in 
a multinational force in Beirut. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Beirut Aug. 18 and 20, 
1982. Entered into force Aug. 20, 1982. 

Liberia 

Agreement for reciprocal relief from double 
taxation on earnings from operation of ships 
and aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Monrovia July 1 and Aug. 11, 1982. 
Entered into force Aug. 11, 1982. 

Madagascar 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of 
Aug. 19, 1981 (TIAS 10218). Signed at An- 
tananarivo Aug. 12, 1982. Entered into force 
Aug. 12, 1982. 

Mexico 

Agreement amending the agreement of June 
2, 1977 (TIAS 8952), relating to additional 



cooperative arrangements to curb the illegal 
traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of 
letters at Mexico Aug. 6, 1982. Entered into 
force Aug. 6, 1982. 

Morocco 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales 
of agricultural commodities of Jan. 19, 1982 
(TIAS 10361). Effected by exchange of let- 
ters at Rabat Aug. 13 and 18, 1982. Entered 
into force Aug. 18, 1982. 

Norway 

Basic military support agreement, with an- 
nex. Signed at Stuttgart-Vaihingen and Oslo 
Jan. 29 and Aug. 20, 1982. Entered into 
force Aug. 20, 1982. 

Panama 

Agreement concerning participation by 
members of the Panama Canal Commission 
and U.S. forces in the Panamanian social 
security system. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Panama Mar. 9, 1982. Entered into 
force Mar. 9, 1982. 

Agreement concerning disposition of the 
Mount Hope warehouse and transportation 
areas. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Panama Feb. 12 and May 7, 1982. Entered 
into force May 7, 1982. 

Agreement concerning transfer of Mindi and 
Coco Solo housing units from the U.S. to 
Panama. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Panama Aug. 9 and 11, 1982. Entered into 
force Aug. 11, 1982. 

Philippines 

Convention with respect to taxes on income. 
Signed at Manila Oct. 1, 1976. 
Ratifications exchanged : Sept. 16, 1982.' 
Entered into force : Oct. 13, 1982.<5 

Agreement continuing the operations of the 
U.S. Veterans Administration in the Philip- 
pines, Signed at Manila July 28, 1982. 
Entered into force July 28, 1982; effective 
Oct. 1, 1982. 

Agreement on the development and facilita- 
tion of reciprocal tourism. Signed at 
Washington Sept. 17, 1982. Entered into 
force Sept. 17, 1982. 

Singapore 

Memorandum of understanding on the ex- 
change of service personnel between the U.S. 
Navy and Republic of Singapore Air Force 
and on the general conditions which will ap- 
ply to the exchange of such personnel. Signed 
at Singapore and Washington July 19 and 
Sept. 1, 1982. Entered into force Sept. 1, 
1982. 

Spain 

Agreement extending the treaty of friendship 
and cooperation of Jan. 24, 1976 (TIAS 
8360). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Madrid Sept. 4, 1981. Entered into force pro- 
visionally Sept. 4, 1982; definitively May 10, 
1982. 
Ratified by Spain : May 10, 1982. 



67 



CHRONOLOGY 



Ratifications exchanged : May 10, 1982. 
Proclaimed by the President : Sept. 13, 1982, 

Sudan 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, 
guaranteed, or insured by the U.S. Govern- 
ment and its agencies, with annexes. Signed 
at Khartoum July 20, 1982. Entered into 
force Aug. 23, 1982. 

Switzerland 

Arrangement for the exchange of technical 
information and cooperation in nuclear safety 
matters, with patent addendum. Signed at 
Bethesda and Bern July 20 and Aug. 10, 
1982. Entered into force Aug. 10, 1982. 

Trinidad and Tobago 

Agreement on procedures for mutual 
assistance in the administration of justice in 
connection with matters relating to the in- 
vestigation designated as MA- 106. Signed at 
Washington June 7, 1982. Entered into force 
June 7, 1982. 

Tunisia 

Mapping, charting and geodesy cooperative 
and exchange agreement, with annexes. 
Signed at Tunis Dec. 8, 1980. Entered into 
force Uec. 8, 1980. 

Amendment 1 to the agreement of Dec. 8, 
1980. Signed at Tunis and Washington 
July 14 and Aug. 31, 1982. Entered into 
force Aug. 31, 1982. 

U.S.S.R. 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
Oct. 20, 1975, as extended (TIAS 8206, 
10237), on the supply of grain by the U.S. to 
the U.S.S.R. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Moscow Aug. 4 and 20, 1982. Entered into 
force Aug. 20, 1982. 

Zaire 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, 
guaranteed, or insured by the U.S. Govern- 
ment and its agencies, with annexes. Signed 
at Kinshasa July 23, 1982. Entered into force 
Aug. 30, 1982, for the first consolidation 
period; enters into force for the second con- 
solidation period upon receipt by Zaire of 
written notice from the U.S. that the U.S. 
considers Zaire in compliance with the condi- 
tions stated in Article IV, paragraph 3, of the 
Paris agreed minute. 



'Not in force for the U.S. 
^With declaration(s). 
'Not in force. 
'With reservation(s). 
■''With statement. 
''With reservations and under- 
standings. ■ 



September 1982 



September 1 

Last shipload of Palestinian and Syrian guer- 
rillas leaves west Beirut. 

President Reagan, in a nationally tele- 
vised address, calls for a "fresh start" on a 
broader peace in the Middle East. In present- 
ing the U.S. position, the President proposes 
four key issues: 

• Self government by the Palestinians of 
the West Bank and Gaza in association with 
Jordan; 

• A settlement freeze by Israel; 

• Guarantees for the security of Israel; 
and 

• An undivided Jerusalem, with its final 
status decided through negotiations. 

September 2 

In a special session, Israeli Cabinet adopts a 
resolution rejecting President Reagan's pro- 
posal, asserting that such a plan would help 
create a Palestinian state that would en- 
danger Israel's security and that Israel, in 
response to the settlement freeze, "will con- 
tinue to establish them [settlements] in ac- 
cordance with our natural right." 

Lebanese forces take full control of west 
Beirut. 

September 6 

U.S. issues a temporary denial order pro- 
hibiting export of U.S. oil and gas equipment 
to an Italian firm for violating a U.S. em- 
bargo on pipeline shipments to the Soviet 
Union. 

September 7 

President Reagan presents the Presidential 
Medal of Freedom, the nation's highest 
civilian award, to Philip C. Habib for "his 
skillful diplomacy and tireless activity" in 
bringing about a "cease-fire in Lebanon and 
the resolution of the west Beirut crisis." 
Vigdis Finnbogadottir, President of 
Iceland, makes an official working visit to 
Washington, D.C. Sept. 7-10, 1982. 

September 8 

The following newly appointed Ambassadors 
present their credentials to President 
Reagan: Benjamin T. Romualdez of the 
Philippines; Alejandro Begh Villegas of 
Uruguay; Sir Robert (Harrington Cotton of 
Australia; Lt. General (retired) A. Hasnan 
Habib of Indonesia; Lamin Abdou Mbye of 
the (lambia; Leonardo ("harles de Zaffiri 
Duarte Mathisa of Portugal; and Sir Oliver 
Wright of the United Kingdom. 

President Reagan announces the second 
phase of U.S. diplomacy in Lebanon and the 
prospects for the Middle East initiative by 
reaffirming the following principal objectives: 

• The removal of all foreign military 
forces from Lebanon; 

• Strengthening the central government 
to establish its authority throughout the 
country; 



• Seeing that Lebanon never again 
becomes a launching pad for attacks on 
Israel; and 

• Calling on all parties in Lebanon to 
maintain the cease-fire so that diplomacy i 
succeed. 

The President also announces formatic 
of an interagency steering group on Lebar 
to be chaired by Deputy Secretary of Statt 
Kenneth W. Dam who will coordinate the 
political, economic, and security assistance 
dimensions of U.S. policy; the appointmen' 
M. Peter McPherson, Director of AID. wh 
will, in addition to his role as the Presiden 
personal representative for relief in Leban 
assume responsibility for reconstruction in 
that area; and accorded the personal rank 
Ambassador to Morris Draper appointing ' f' 
special negotiator for Lebanon. Ambassad' 
Draper will return to Lebanon to continue 
work already begun. 

September 9 

U.S. Department of Commerce issues a te 
porary denial order prohibiting export of i 
U.S. oil and gas equipment, services, and 
related technology to a British firm and tl 
of its subsidiaries for violating a U.S. em- 
bargo against the Soviet Union's natural g 
pipeline. 

September 10 

Multinational peacekeeping force, includin 
the U.S. Marine contingent, begins 
withdrawal from Beirut. 

September 13 

Two new developments reported in the 
Lebanon fighting— clashes in Beirut betw. 
government and leftist militia forces and 
Israeli air strikes against Syrian positions 
Lebanon— create growing concern by the 
U.S. The White House issues a statement 
"urging all concerned to avoid provocation 
exercise restraint," thereby contributing h 
for peace by the citizens in that area. Con 
menting on the Israeli strikes, the State 
Department again calls "on all involved to 
with the greatest restraint and to refrain 
from further military actions." 

September 14 

Lebanon's president-elect, Bashir Gemayel 
killed in a bomb blast at his party head- 
quarters. 

September 15 

Philip[iines President Ferdinand E. Maro 
makes a state visit to the U.S. Septem- 
ber 15-27 and to Washington, D.C. 
September 15-20, 1982. 

State Department issues a statement 
deploring the assassination of Gemayel am 
urging Israeli officials to "do nothing to in 
crease tensions," again calling on all partie 
to "exercise restraint," and expressing full 
support of the Lebanese Government for " 
ternal unity and withdrawal of all foreign 
troops." 

Israeli troops and tanks move into wes 
Beirut. Israeli officials state that their acti 



68 



Department of State Bullet 



CHRONOLOGY 



ted to restore order and stability. 
Minister Shaffik al-Wazzan calls for 
ithdrawal of the Israeli troops. 

mber 16 

■ts say that Israeli troops seize control 
St of west Beirut. In Jerusalem, the 
nnient says that troops would withdraw 
Lebanese forces are ready to take over, 
lite House and State Department state- 
;, the U.S. expresses its full support for 
jbanese Government's "call for the with- 
il of Israeli forces which are in clear 
ion of the cease-fire understanding to 

Israel is a party." 

Tehran, former Iranian Foreign 
ter Sadegh Ghotzbadeh is executed for 
ig to overthrow and kill the Ayatollah 



mber 16-18 

lese Christian militiamen are reported 

e killed about 300 or more Palestinian 
women, and children in the Shatila and 

refugee camps on the southern edge of 
Beirut. 

-esident Reagan, in a statement, ex- 
;s "outrage and revulsion" over the 
icre, demands that the Israeli Govern- 
"immediately withdraw its forces," and 

the Lebanese to "unite quickly in sup- 
■f their government and their constitu- 

processes and to work for the future 
;o richly deserve." 

rmber 17 

3-year coalition government of West 
iny, headed by Chancellor Schmidt, col- 
, after the resignation of four cabinet 
■ers from the Free Democratic Party, 
idt proposes new elections; however, 
it Khol, the leader of the opposition 
;ian Democrats, states that his party 
ttempt to put together a new govern- 
with the Free Democrats, 
y unanimous vote, the U.N. Security 
•il adopts Resolution 520 which "con- 
3 the recent Israeli incursion" into west 
t and demands an immediate with- 
il. 

mber 19 

lanimous vote, U.N. Security Council 
s Resolution 521 which: 

Condemns the "criminal massacre of 
tinian civilians in Beirut"; 

Reaffirms Resolutions 512 and 513; 

Authorizes the Secretary General "as 
mediate step to increase the number of 
■d Nations observers in and around 
t from 10 to 50 . . . "; 

Requests the Secretary General and 
,ebanese Government to consult in order 
isure the rapid deployment of those 
vers . . . "; 

Requests the Secretary General to "ini- 
appropriate consultations and in par- 

r consultations with the Government of 
non on additional steps which the Coun- 
ight take . . . "; and 
Insists that "all concerned must permit 



the lUiited Nations observers and forces 
established by the Security Council in 
Lebanon to be deployed and to discharge 
their mandates. . . ." 

In Sweden's parliamentary elections, the 
Social Democrats Party, led by former Prime 
Minister Olaf Palme, is given 166 seats. 
Coupled with the coalition Communist Party's 
20 seats, this gives Palme a 23-seat majority 
in the 349-member legislature. 

September 20 

Responding to the Beirut massacre, the 
Lebanese Cabinet requests the U.S., France, 
and Italy to send troops for a new multina- 
tional (MNF) force to return to west Beirut. 
President Reagan announces agreement 
among the three nations to form a new force 
and that Israel must give its permission for 
the MNF and agree to withdraw its forces 
from that city. 

A rightist group calling itself "The Front 
for the Liberation of Lebanon from 
Foreigners" claims responsibility for the 
massacre. 

September 21 

Thirty-seventh annual session of the U.N. 
General Assembly opens in New York. 

Amin Gemayel, 40-year-old brother of the 
assassinated Bashir, is elected President of 
Lebanon by near consensus vote. 

Israel accepts U.S. proposal to send a 
three-nation peacekeeping force into Beirut 
but rejects a call by the parliamentary opposi- 
tion to establish an independent commission 
of inquiry into the Beirut massacre. 

September 23 

Amin Gemayel is sworn in as President of 
Lebanon for a 6-year term succeeding Presi- 
dent Elias Sarkis. 

September 24 

The following newly appointed Ambassadors 
present their credentials to President 
Reagan; Christian Lingama-Toleque of the 
Central African Republic; Layachi Yaker of 
Algeria; Nuno Aguirre de Career of Spain; 
Carlos Despradel Rogues of the Dominican 
Republic; and Lucio Garcia del Solar of 
Argentina. 

At a resumed meeting of its seventh 
emergency special session, U.N. General 
Assembly adopts a Resolution: 

• Condemning the "criminal massacre of 
Palestinian and other civilians in Beirut . . . "; 

• Urging the Security Council to "in- 
vestigate," the circumstances surrounding the 
massacre and to make its findings available 
to the public . . . "; 

• Supporting "fully the provisions of 
Security Council resolutions 508 (1982) and 
.509(1982)"; 

• Urging the Security Council, that il 
Israel continues failure to comply with resolu- 
tions 508 and 509 and the present resolution, 
"to meet in order to consider practical ways 
and means in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations"; 

• Reaffirming the "fundamental principle 



(if the inadmissibility of the acquisition of ter- 
ritory by force"; 

• Resolving that "in conformity with its 
resolution 194 (III) and subsequent relevant 
resolutions," Palestinian refugees be allowed 
to return to their homes and property and 
that Israel immediately and unconditionally 
comply with the present resolution; 

• Calling upon "all States and interna- 
tional agencies and organizations" to continue 
providing extensive humanitarian aid to the 
victims of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon"; 
and 

• Requesting the "Secretary General to 
prepare a photographic exhibit of the 
massacre ..." and to display it in the U.N. 
visitors' hall. 

Following a vote which rejected Israel's 
credentials, the U.S. delegation, led by Depu- 
ty Secretary of Energy W. Kenneth Davis, 
withdraws from the 26th General Conference 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), being held in Vienna. The U.S., 
voting along with 38 other delegations to ac- 
cept Israel's credentials (41 votes against), 
asserts "that Israel is a member in good 
standing and that its credentials were proper- 
ly presented," considers such "action to be il- 
legal and to have resulted from highly ir- 
regular voting procedures," and also believes 
that the "introduction of strictly political 
issues into a credentials procedure" damages 
the IAEA's integrity as well as the entire 
U.N. system. 

September 25 

Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila of Thailand 
makes official working visit to Washington, 
D.C. September 23-25, 1982, to discuss with 
high-level officials a broad range of topics 
which included ASEAN, Kampuchea, 
U.S. -Thai security relationship, and other 
political and economic issues, including the 
refugee problem. 

September 26 

Secretary Shultz departs Washington for 
New York to attend the 37th annual session 
of the U.N. General Assembly. 

September 28 ^ ,, o 

Third U.N. Conference of the Law of the Sea 
approves a draft final act and accepts an in- 
vitation from Jamaica to host the formal sign- 
ing ceremony December 6-10, 1982. 

Israeli Government agrees to establish a 
judicial commission to carry out a thorough 
investigation of the Beirut massacre. 

Israeli Army completes withdrawal from 
Port of Beirut, but some soldiers remain posi- 
tioned at the airport, south of the city. 

International Telecommunication Union 
holds nth Plenipotentiary Conference 
September 28-November 5, in Nairobi, 
Kenya. Chairman of U.S. delegation is at- 
torney Michael R. Gardner. 

September 29 

President Ricardo de la Espriella of Panama 
makes an official working visit to Wash- 
ington, D.C. September 29-October 2, 1982. 
After a 3-day delay, U.S. Marines land in 
Beirut to join Italian and French soldiers 



69 



3mber1982 



PRESS RELEASES 



PUBLICATIONS 



charged with helping the Lebanese Govern- 
ment establish its authority over all of Beirut 
which includes assuring the safety of the 
civilian population in the city. 

U.S. and Eg>-pt sign a bilateral invest- 
ment treaty. Principal provisions of the trea- 
ty include: 

• National or most-favored-nation treat- 
ment for investments of nationals and com- 
panies of each party; 

• Free transferability of capital, returns, 
and other funds; 

• Standards of expropriation and com- 
pensation; and 

• Dispute settlement procedures. 

The treaty is the U.S. first bilateral invest- 
ment treaty. 

September 30 

A U.S. Marine is killed and three others 
wounded by unexploded cluster munitions at 
Beirut International Airport. ■ 



Department of State 



Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 2().S20. 

No. Date Subject 

•269 9/2 Shultz: interview on ABC-TV's 
"Good Morning America." 
270 9/7 Shultz; interview on CBS-TV's 
"Face the Nation," Sept. 4. 

*271 9/8 U.S. Organization for the In- 
ternational Telegraph and 
Telephone Consultative Com- 
mittee (CCITT), study group 
C, Sept. 23. 

•272 9/8 Advisory Committee to U.S. 
Section, International North 
Pacific Fisheries Commis- 
sion, Sept. 23. 

•273 9/8 Advisory Committee to the 

U.S. National Section of the 
Inter-American Tropical 
Tuna Commission, Sept. 28. 

•274 9/8 Advisory Committee to the 

U.S. National Section of the 
International Commission 
for the Conservation of 
Atlantic Tunas, Oct. 5 and 6. 

•275 9/8 Robert H. Phinny sworn in as 
Ambassador to Swaziland, 
Aug. 23 (biographic data). 

•276 9/9 Shultz; statement before the 
House Foreign Affairs Com- 
mittee. 

277 9/10 Shultz; statement before the 

Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. 

278 9/13 Shultz; address before the 

United Jewish Appeal, N.Y., 
Sept. 12. 
•279 9/13 Shipping Coordinating Com- 
mittee (SCC), committee on 
ocean dumping, Sept. 16. 



•280 9/13 U.S. Organization for the In- 
ternational Radio Con- 
sultative Committee (CCIR), 
study group U, Oct. 6. 
•281 9/13 SCC, Subcommittee on Safety 
of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 
working group on radioeom- 
munications, Oct. 7. 
•282 9/13 SCC, SOLAS, working group 
on standards of training and 
watchkeeping, Oct. 12. 
•283 9/13 SCC, SOLAS, Oct. 12. 
•284 9/13 Advisory Committee on Inter- 
national Investment, Tech- 
nology, and Development, 
Nov. 3. 
•285 9/13 Program for the state visit of 
Philippine President 
Ferdinand E. Marcos, 
Sept. 15-21. 
•286 9/15 Shultz; remarks on two De- 
partment of State nominees, 
Sept. 14. 
•287 9/lU U.S., Japan sign new fisheries 

agreement. 
288 9/16 Marcos visit spurs conclusion 
of avoidance of double taxa- 
tion and air transport agree- 
ments. 
•289 9/17 Abbot Washburn appointed 

chairman of the U.S. delega- 
tion to the regional Admini- 
strative Radio Conference 
for Planning the Broad- 
casting-Satellite Service in 
Region 2. 
•290 9/21 U.S., France review scientific 
cooperation. 
291 9/21 Shultz; interview on NBC-TV's 

"Today" show. 
•292 9/21 Presidential Commission on 
Broadcasting to Cuba, 
Sept. 30. 
•293 9/24 U.S., Japan amend arrange- 
ment concerning trade in 
textiles, Sept. 1. 
•294 9/24 U.S., Thailand amend textile 
agreement, Aug. 26 and 27. 
•295 9/24 U.S., Singapore amend textile 
agreement, Aug. 26 and 
Sept. 20. 
•296 9/24 U.S., Mexico amend textile 
agreement, Julv 26 and 
Aug. 19. 
297 Not issued. 

•298 9/24 U.S., Sri Lanka amend textile 

agreement, Aug. 20. 
•299 9/24 U.S., Colombia amend textile 
agreement, June 10 and 16. 
300 9/27 U.S. submits its pleadings to 
the ICJ concerning the mari- 
time boundary with Canada. 
•301 9/28 Program for the visit of Pana- 
manian President Ricardo de 
la Esprilla, Sept. 29-Oct. 2. 
•302 9/30 Passport validity doubled to 10 
years; fees to rise. 



Department of State 



)V 



Free, single copies of the following 
Department of State publications are 
available from the Public Information Serv 
ice. Bureau of Public Affairs, Department 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

President Reagan 

Law of the Sea and Oceans Policy. July- 
August 1982, President Reagan, July 8 
1982, and Special Representative of th 
President for the Third U.N. Conferen 
on Law of the Sea, James L. Malone. 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
August 12, 1982 (Current Policy #416) 

Secretary Shultz |^ 

President Reagan's Middle East Initiative ■* 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 

September 10, 1982 (Current Policy 

#418). 
The Quest for Peace, United Jewish Appe. 

New York, September 12, 1982 (Curre 

Policy #419). 
U.S. Foreign Policy: Realism and Progress 

U.N. General Assembly, September 30 

1982 (Current Policy #420). 

Africa 

Africa; Economic Prospects and Problems 
Assistant Secretary for African Affair 
Crocker, National Business League, 
Dallas, Texas, September 17, 1982 (Ci 
rent Policv #422). 
Chad; U.S. Policy (GIST, September 1982 
Background Notes on Nigeria (August 19i- 

Middle East 

Background Notes on Bahrain (August 19 
Background Notes on Iraq (August 1982). 
Background Notes on Qatar (August 1982 
Background Notes on the United Arab Er 
rates (August 1982). 



Western Hemisphere 

Atlas of the Caribbean Basin, September 

1982. 
Background Notes on Paraguay (August 

1982). ■ 



•Not printed in the Bili.ktin. 



70 



Department of State Bulle 



OEX 



li»vember 1982 
tlume 82, No. 2068 



;i-a Africa; Economic Prospects and Prob- 

■ms (Crocker} 12 

nrican Principles. U.S. Foreign Policy: 

lealism and Progress (Shultz) 1 

-K Control 

< ^ Control Negotiations (Reagan) 20 

,1 ;ar Arms Control and the Future of U.S.- 

ioviet Relations (Rostow) 16 

■'1 Foreign Policy: Realism and Progress 

Shultz) 1 

I tion. U.S., Philippines Conclude Taxation 

nd Air Agreements 27 

neBs. U.S., Philippines Conclude Taxation 

nd Air Agreements 27 

a^esB 

jipuchea and American Interests 

Holdridge) 31 

^■iit Developments in Honduras 

H..vworth) 60 

cti-ii in East Timor (Holdridgie) 29 

c .li"n in Guatemala (Boswortn) 63 

: IJeport on Cyprus (message to the 

oiigress) 40 

fMs. 10th Report on Cyprus (message to 

he Congress) 40 

ciomics 

fl'a: Economic Prospects and Problems 

Crocker) 12 

flent Developments in Honduras 

.; Bosworth) 60 

.; Foreign Policy: Realism and Progress 

Shultz) 1 

i\-g\\ U.S. Energy Strategies (Wendt) . .35 
nice. U.S. and France Review Scientific 

■ "ooperation 54 

a emala 

u emala— A Profile 64 

1 it ion in Guatemala (Bosworth) 63 

(duras. Recent Developments m Honduras 

Bosworth) 60 

I lan Rights 

;c ed Labor in the U.S.S.R. (Department 

' ;tatement) 41 

H ition in East Timor (Holdridge) 29 

rand. Visit of Iceland's President 
"innbogadottir (Finnbogadottir, 

! -leagan) . 38 

aonesia. Situation in East Timor 

Holdridge) 29 

imational Organizations and Confer- 
ences. United Nations Day, 1982 (proc- 
amation) 8 

II el 

i stant Secretary Veliotes Interviewed on 
'Meet the Press" 43 

I ;ident Reagan's News Conference of Sep- 
tember 28 (excerpts) 10 



Secretary Shultz Interviewed on the "Today" 
Show 42 

Kampuchea. Kampuchea and American Inter- 
ests (Holdridge) 31 

Labor. Forced Labor in the U.S.S.R. (Depart- 
ment statement) 41 

Latin America and the Caribbean. Areas of 
Challenge in the Americas (Enders) . . .57 

Lebanon 

Assistant Secretary Veliotes Interviewed on 
"Meet the Press" 43 

President Reagan's News Conference of Sep- 
tember 28 (excerpts) 10 

Secretary Shultz Interviewed on the "Today" 
Show 42 

Situation in Lebanon (White House and De- 
partment statements, exchanges of letters, 
Boutros, Dillon, Freij, Habib, Reagan) .46 

U.N. Adopts Resolutions on Lebanon Situation 
(texts of resolutions) 55 

Liberia. Visit of Liberian Commander in Chief 
Doe 15 

Middle East 

Assistant Secretary Veliotes Interviewed on 
"Meet the Press" 43 

Secretary Shultz Interviewed on the "Today" 
Show 42 

U.S. Foreign Policy: Realism and Progress 
(Shultz) 1 

Namibia. Namibia (contact group com- 
munique) 56 

Narcotics. International Narcotics Control 
(Shultz) 51 

Nicaragua. Recent Developments in Honduras 
(Bosworth) 60 

North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. NATO Min- 
isters meet in Canada 40 

Philippines 

Philippines— A Profile 25 

U.S., Philippines Conclude Taxation and Air 
Agreements 27 

Visit of Philippine President Marcos (arrival 
ceremony, dinner toasts. Department an- 
nouncement) 23 

Poland. Poland (White House and Department 
statements) 41 

Presidential Documents 

Arms Control Negotiations (Reagan) 20 

Poland (White House and Department state- 
ments) 41 

President Reagan's News Conference of Sep- 
tember 28 (excerpts) 10 

Situation in Lebanon (White House and De- 
partment statements, exchanges of letters, 
Boutros, Dillon, Freij, Habib, Reagan) .46 

10th Report on Cyprus (message to the 
Congress) 40 

United Nations Day, 1982 (proclamation) . . .8 

Visit of Iceland's President Finnbogadottir 
(Finnbogadottir, Reagan) 38 



Visit of Philippine President Marcos (arrival 
ceremony, dinner toasts. Department an- 
nouncement) 23 

Publications. Department of State 70 

Refugees. Recent Developments in Honduras 
(Bosworth) 60 

Science and Technology 

Technol(ig>- Transfer Controls (Mally) 52 

U.S. and 'France Review Scientific Cooper- 
ation 54 

Security Assistance. Recent Developments in 
Honduras (Bosworth) 60 

Thailand. Secretary Meets With Thai Foreign 
Minister (Department statement) 33 

Treaties 

Current Actions 65 

U.S., Philippines Conclude Taxation and Air 
Agreements 27 

U.S.S.R. 

Areas of Challenge in the Americas 
(Enders) 57 

Arms Control Negotiations (Reagan) 20 

Forced Labor in the U.S.S.R. (Department 
statement) 41 

Nuclear Arms Control and the Future of U.S.- 
Soviet Relations (^Rostow) 16 

President Reagan's News Conference of Sep- 
tember 28 (excerpts) 10 

Technology Transfer Controls (Mally) 52 

United Nations 

Kampuchea and American Interests 
(Holdridge) 31 

Namibia (contact group communique) 56 

U.N. Adopts Resolutions on Lebanon Situation 
(texts of resolutions) 55 

United Nations Day, 1982 (proclamation) . . .8 

U.S. Foreign Policy: Realism and Progress 
(Shultz) 1 

Vietnam 

Forced Labor in the U.S.S.R. (Department 
statement) 41 

Kampuchea and American Interests 
(Holdridge) 31 



Nanw Index 

Bosworth, Stephen W 60, 63 

Boutros, Fouad 46 

Crocker, Chester A 12 

Dillon, Robert S 46 

Enders, Thomas 57 

Finnbogadottir, Vigdis 38 

Freij, Elias 46 

Habib, Philip C 46 

Holdridge, John H 29, 31 

Mally, Gerhard 52 

Marcos, Ferdinand E 23 

Reagan, President 8, 10, 20, 23, 40, 46 

Rostow, Eugene V 16 

Shultz, Secretary 1, 42, 51 

Veliotes, Nicholas A 43 

Wendt, E. Allan 35 



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"2- JOS'? 



buUetin 



r 3 Official IVIonthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 82 / Number 2069 



December 1982 




i^iwfiiiw^ffiTd 



m 2 I 1983 



DEPOSITORY 






The President / 1 

Lebanon / 41 

OAS / 64 




M^pparttnvni of Siait* 

bulletin 



Volume 82 / Number 2069 / December 1982 



Cover: 

Presidential Seal 
Secretary Shultz 
Lebanese Flag 



The Department of State Bvlletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreifjfii policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official II. S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

JOHN HUGHES 

A.'^.si.stant Secretary fur I'uhlic Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA ADAMS 

Assistant Editor 



i 



The Secretary of State has fletermined that the 
pubhcation of this periodical is necessary in the 
tran.saction of the public business required by law of 
this Department. U.se of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through March :U, 
1987. 



NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted 
and items contained herein may he reprinted. Citation 
of the Dkfaktmknt ok Statf, Bii.i.f.tin as the source 
will be appreciated. The Bi'l.l.KTiN is indexed in the 
Headers' (Juide to Periodical Literature. 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents. U. 
Government Printing Office. Washington, DC. 
20402 Price: 12 i.ssues plus annual inde.\— $21.00 
(domestic) $26.25 (foreign) Single copy — $.'?.7.^) 
(domestic) $4.70 (foreign) Index, single copy — $2. 
(domestic) $;?. 1.5 (foreign) 



ih*pai'inu'n / 



ouUetBiB 

e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 82 / Number 2069 



December 1982 



The President / 1 

Lebanon / 41 

OAS / 64 



Cover: 

Presidential Seal 
Secretary Shultz 
Lebanese Flag 



Dvpartntfmt of SUtte 

huUetin 



i 



Volume 82 / Number 2069 / December 1982 



The Department OF State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photogTai)hs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

JOHN HUGHES 

A.-^sistant Secretary for F'liblic Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief. Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA ADAMS 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that the 
liublication of thi.s periodical i.s nece.ssary in the 
tran.saction of the public business required by law of 
this Department. ILse nf funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through March .'il , 
1987. 



NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted 
and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation 
of the Df.partmknt ok Statk Bii.letin as the .source 
will be appreciated. The Bui.i.ktin is indexed m Ihe 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents. U.l 
Government Printing Office, Washington. D.C. 
20402 Price: 12 issues plus annual index— .$21.00 
(domestic) $26.25 (foreign) Single copy — Si. 75 
(domestic) $4.70 (foreign) Index, single copy — $2.i 
(domestic) $.■?. 15 (foreign) 



CONTENTS 



|e President 

Paths Toward Peace: Deterrence 

and Arms Control 
Meeting With Mexico's President- 

Elect (Exchange of Toasts. 

Remarks) 
Solidarity and U.S. Relations 

With Poland 
Grain Exports to the Soviet Union 

e Secretary 

Visit to Canada {News Conference) 
Opening of Conference on Free 

Elections 
Interview for U.S. News & World 

Report 

Irica 

U.S. Response to the Challenge of 
Regional Security in Africa 
(Chester A. Crocker) 

Ams Control 

a Freezing Chances for Peace 
I (James L. Buckley) 

fast Asia 

Visit of Indonesian President 
Soeharto (Arrival Ceremony, 
Dinner Toasts) 

jrope 

3 Situation in Poland (White House 
Statement) 



General 



33 



President Reagan's Framework 
for Peace (William P. Clark) 



bod 



World Food Day, 1982 (Proc- 
lamation) 



Human Rights 

35 Personal Liberties and National 
Security (William P. Clark) 

38 Nuclear Weapons: What is the 
Moral Response? (Elliott 
Abrams) 

Middle East 

41 Visit of Lebanese President 

(President Gemayel, President 
Reagan) 

42 War Powers Resolution and U.S. 

Troops in Lebanon (Message to 
the Congress) 

43 Arab League Delegation Meets 

With the President (King 
Hassan //, President Reagan) 

Military Affairs 

44 Chemical Warfare in Southeast 

Asia and Afghanistan: An Up- 
date (Secretary Shultz) 

Population 

53 Population Growth and the Policy 
of Nations (Richard Elliot 
Benedick) 

Refugees 

56 Proposed Refugee Admissions for 
FY 1983 (Kenneth W. Dam. H. 
Eugene Douglas, President 
Reagan's Memorandum) 

United Nations 

63 Israel's Participation in the 
United Nations (Secretary 
Shultz) 



Western Hemisphere 

64 Reflections Among Neighbors 
(Secretary Shultz) 

68 System of Justice in El Salvador 

(Deane R. Hinton) 

69 Declaration on Democracy in 

Central America (Department 
Statement. Final Act, Summary 
of Final Act) 



Treaties 

72 Current Actions 



Chronology 

75 October 1982 

Press Releases 

76 Department of State 

76 U.S.U.N. 

Publications 

77 Department of State 
77 GPO Sales 

Index 



The prevention of conflict 
and the reduction of weapons 
are the most important public 
issues of our time. 

Unless we demonstrate the 
will to rebuild our strength, 
the Soviets have little 
incentive to negotiate. 



THE PRESIDENT 



Paths Toward Peace 

Deterrence and 

Arms Control 



by President Reagan 



Address to the nation 

broadcast from the White House, 

November 22, 19 82 A 



The week before last was an especially 
moving one here in Washington. The 
Vietnam veterans finally came home 
once and for all to America's heart. 
They were welcomed with tears, with 
pride, and with a monument to their 
great sacrifice. Many of their names, 
like those of our Republic's greatest 
citizens, are now engraved in stone in 
this city that belongs to all of us. On 
behalf of the nation, let me again thank 
the Vietnam veterans from the bottom 
of my heart for their courageous service 
to America. 

Seeing those moving scenes, I know 
mothers of a new generation must have 
worried about their children and about 
peace. And that's what I would like to 
talk to you about tonight— the future of 
our children in a world where peace is 
made uneasy by the presence of nuclear 
weapons. 

A year ago I said the time was right 
to move forward on arms control. I out- 
lined several proposals and said nothing 
would have a higher priority in this Ad- 
ministration. Now, a year later, I want 
to report on those proposals and on 
other efforts we are making to insure 
the safety of our children's future. 

The prevention of conflict and the 
reduction of weapons are the most im- 
portant public issues of our time. Yet, 
on no other issue are there more mis- 
conceptions and misunderstandings. 
You, the American people, deserve an 
explanation from your government on 



what our policy is on these issues. Too 
often the experts have been content to 
discuss grandiose strategies among 
themselves and cloud the public debate 
in technicalities no one can understand. 
The result is that many Americans have 
become frightened, and, let me say, fear 
of the unknown is entirely understand- 
able. Unfortunately, much of the infor- 
mation emerging in this debate bears 
little semblance to the facts. 

To begin, let's go back to what the 
world was like at the end of World 
War II. The United States was the only 
undamaged industrial power in the 
world. Our military power was at its 
peak, and we alone had the atomic 
weapon. But we didn't use this wealth 
and this power to bully; we used it to 
rebuild. We raised up the war-ravaged 
economies, including the economies of 
those who had fought against us. At 
first, the peace of the world was un- 
threatened, because we alone were left 
with any real power, and we were using 
it for the good of our fellow man. Any 
potential enemy was deterred from ag- 
gression because the cost would have far 
outweighed the gain. 

As the Soviets' power grew, we still 
managed to maintain the peace. The 
United States had established a system 
of alliances with NATO as the center- 
piece. In addition, we grew even more 
respected as a world leader with a 
strong economy and deeply held moral 
values. With our commitment to help 



THE PRESIDENT 



shape a better world, the United States 
always pursued every diplomatic channel 
for peace. And for at least 30 years 
after World War II, the United States 
still continued to possess a large military 
advantage over the Soviet Union. Our 
strength deterred— that is, prevented— 
aggression against us. 

This nation's military objective has 
always been to maintain peace by pre- 
venting war. This is neither a Demo- 
cratic nor a Republican policy. It's sup- 
ported by our allies. And most impor- 
tant of all, it has worked for nearly 40 
years. 

What do we mean when we speak of 
nuclear deterrence? Certainly we don't 
want such weapons for their own sake. 
We don't desire excessive forces, or 
what some people have called "overkill." 
Basically, it is a matter of others know- 
ing that starting a conflict would be 
more costly to them than anything they 
might hope to gain. And, yes, it is sadly 
ironic that in these modern times it still 
takes weapons to prevent war. I wish it 
did not. 

We desire peace, but peace is a goal 
not a policy. Lasting peace is what we 
hope for at the end of our journey; it 
doesn't describe the steps we must take, 
nor the paths we should follow to reach 
that goal. I intend to search for peace 
along two parallel paths— deterrence 
and arms reductions. I believe these are 
the only paths that offer any real hope 
for an enduring peace. 

And, let me say, I believe that if we 
follow prudent policies, the risk of 
nuclear conflict will be reduced. Certain- 
ly the United States will never use its 
forces except in response to attack. 
Through the years, Soviet leaders have 
also expressed a sober view of nuclear 
war; and if we maintain a strong deter- 
rent, they are exceedingly unlikely to 
launch an attack. 



The Military Imbalance 

Now, while the policy of deterrence has 
stood the test of time, the things we 
must do in order to maintain deterrence 
have changed. You often hear that the 
United States and the Soviet Union are 
in an arms race. The truth is that, while 
the Soviet Union has raced, we have 
not. As you can see from this blue U.S. 
line (see "Defense Spending"), in con- 
stant dollars our defense spending in the 
1960s went up because of Vietnam, and 
then it went downward through much of 
the 1970s. Now, follow the red line, 
which is Soviet spending. It has gone up 
and up and up. In spite of a stagnating 



DEFENSE SPENDING 



BILLIONS 
OF CONSTANT 

275 T 



200- 



USSR 



100 




1962 



1972 



1982 



DEFENSE SHARE 
OF FEDERAL BUDGET 

50% 
46% 



20% 



1962 



1982 



Department of State Builel 



THE PRESIDENT 



'iet economy, Soviet leaders invest 
'o-14% of their country's gross na- 
lal product in military spending, two 
;hree times the level we invest. 

I might add that the defense share 
)ur U.S. Federal budget has gone 
y' down, too. Watch the blue line 
dn (see "Defense Share of Federal 
iget"). In 1962, when John Kennedy 
3 President, 46%, almost half of the 
leral budget, went to our national 
ense. In recent years, about one- 
irter of our budget has gone to 
ense, while the share for social pro- 
ims has nearly doubled. And most of 

defense budget is spent on people, 
, weapons. 

The combination of the Soviets 
'nding more and the United States 
■nding proportionately less changed 
' military balance and weakened our 
;errent. Today, in virtually every 
■asure of military power, the Soviet 
lion enjoys a decided advantage. 

This chart (see "Strategic Missiles 
d Bombers") shows the changes in the 
al number of intercontinental missiles 
d bombers. You will see that in 1962 
d in 1972, the U.S. forces remained 
out the same, even dropping some by 
32. But take a look now at the Soviet 
.. In 1962, at the time of the Cuban 
ssile crisis, the Soviets could not com- 
re with us in terms of strength. In 
72, when we signed the SALT I 
;rategic Arms Limitation Talks] Trea- 

we were nearly equal. But in 1982, 
•11, that red Soviet bar stretching 
ove the blue American bar tells the 
)ry. 

I could show you chart after chart 
lere there is a great deal of red and a 
ich lesser amount of U.S. blue. For 
ample, the Soviet Union has deployed 
third more land-based intercontinental 
.Uistic missiles than we have. Believe it 

not, we froze our number in 1965 and 
ive deployed no additional missiles 
ice then. 

The Soviet Union put to sea 60 new 
dlistic missile submarines in the last 15 
!ars. Until last year we hadn't commis- 
oned one in that same period. The 
Dviet Union has built over 200 modern 
ackfire bombers and is building 30 
ore a year. For 20 years, the United 
tates has deployed no new strategic 
jmbers. Many of our B-52 bombers are 
3W older than the pilots who fly them. 

The Soviet Union now has 600 of the 
lissiles considered most threatening by 
3th sides— the intermediate-range 
lissiles based on land. We have none, 
he United States withdrew its inter- 



STRATEGIC 
MISSILES AND BOMBERS 



3000 



2000- 



1000- 




1962 



1972 



1982 



mediate-range land-based missiles from 
Europe almost 20 years ago. 

The world has also witnessed un- 
precedented growth in the area of 
Soviet conventional forces; the Soviets 
far exceed us in the number of tanks, 
artillery pieces, aircraft, and ships they 
produce every year. What is more, when 
I arrived in this office, I learned that in 
our own forces we had planes that 
couldn't fly and ships that couldn't leave 
port, mainly for lack of spare parts and 
crew members. 

The Soviet military buildup must not 
be ignored. We've recognized the prob- 
lem, and, together with our allies, we 
have begun to correct the imbalance. 
Look at this chart (see "Projected 
Defense Spending," p. 4) of projected 
real defense spending for the next 
several years. Here's the Soviet line. Let 
us assume the Soviets' rate of spending 
remains at the level they have followed 
since the 1960s. The blue line is the 
United States. If my defense proposals 
are passed, it will still take 5 years 
before we come close to the Soviet level. 
Yet the modernization of our strategic 
and conventional forces wOl assure that 
deterrence works and peace prevails. 



Decision To Proceed With MX Missile 

Our deployed nuclear forces were built 
before the age of microcircuits. It's not 
right to ask our young men and women 
in uniform to maintain and operate such 
antiques. Many have already given their 
lives in missile explosions and aircraft 
accidents caused by the old age of their 
equipment. We must replace and 
modernize our forces, and that is why I 
have decided to proceed with the pro- 
duction and deployment of the new 
ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] 
known as the MX. 

Three earlier Presidents worked to 
develop this missile. Based on the best 
advice I could get, I concluded that the 
MX is the right missile at the right time. 
On the other hand, when I arrived in of- 
fice, I felt the proposal on where and 
how to base the missile simply cost too 
much in terms of money and the impact 
on our citizens' lives. 

I have concluded, however, it is ab- 
solutely essential that we proceed to 
produce this missile, and that we base it 
in a series of closely based silos at War- 
ren Air Force Base near Cheyenne, 
Wyoming. This plan requires only half 
as many missiles as the earlier plan and 
will fit in an area of only 20 square 
miles. It is the product of around-the- 
clock research that has been underway 



THE PRESIDENT 



PROJECTED 
DEFENSE SPENDING 



BILLIONS 
0F$ 

300 



200 



USSR 



US 



1982 



1987 



since I directed a search for a better, 
cheaper way. I urge the Members of 
Congress, who must pass this plan, to 
listen and examine the facts before they 
come to their own conclusion. 



Increasing Prospects for 
Arms Reductions 

Some may question what modernizing 
our military has to do with peace. Well, 
as I explained earlier, a secure force 
keeps others from threatening us and 
that keeps the peace. And just as 
important, it also increases the pros- 
pects of reaching significant arms reduc- 
tions with the Soviets, and that's what 
we really want. The United States wants 
deep cuts in the world's arsenal of 
weapons. 

But unless we demonstrate the will 
to rebuild our strength and restore the 
military balance, the Soviets— since 
they're so far ahead— have little incen- 
tive to negotiate with us. Let me repeat 
that point, since it goes to the heart of 
our policies. Unless we demonstrate the 
will to rebuild our strength, the Soviets 
have little incentive to negotiate. If we 
hadn't begun to modernize, the Soviet 
negotiators would know we had nothing 
to bargain with except talk. They would 
know we were bluffing without a good 
hand, because they know what cards we 
hold— just as we know what's in their 
hand. 



You may recall that in 1969 the 
Soviets didn't want to negotiate a treaty 
banning antiballistic missiles. It was only 
after our Senate narrowly voted to fund 
an antiballistic missile program that the 
Soviets agreed to negotiate. We then 
reached an agreement. 

We also know that one-sided arms 
control doesn't work. We've tried time 
and again to set an example by cu