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Depart men t 



he Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 83 / Number 2079 



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The President/22 





KAL #007/1 



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Department of State 

bulletin 



Volume 83 / Number 2079 / October 1983 



3over: U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Nations Jeane J. Kirkpatrick 

Secretary Shultz 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

JOHN HUGHES 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

JU ANITA ADAMS 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that the 
publication of this periodical is necessary in the 
transaction of the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through March 31, 
1987. 



NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted 
and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation 
of the Department of State Bulletin as the source 
will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20402 



CONTENTS 



Soviet Downing of Civilian Aircraft (Lawrence S. 
Eagleburger, J. Lynn Helms, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, 
Charles M. Lichenstein, President Reagan, Secretary 
Shultz, Diplomatic Notes, Letters, Proclamation, 
Resolutions) 



The President 



22 



27 
30 
31 
32 
33 



Visit to Mexico (Statements, Toast, 
Joint Communique, Summary of 
Agreement) 
Building Peace Through Strength 
Internationa] Trade 
Central America and Chad 
Situation in Central America 
The Middle East 



The Secretary 

34 Japan and America: International 

Partnership for the 1980s 
37 News Conference of August 31 

Africa 



40 



41 



Visit of Zaire's President (Mobutu 
Sese Seko, President Reagan) 

Visit of Senegal's President (Abdou 
Diouf, President Reagan) 



Arms Control 

41 INF Negotiations (Paul H. Nitze) 

Economics 

42 Bankers and the Debt Crisis: An In- 

ternational Melodrama? (W. Allen 
Wallis) 

44 International Monetary Fund 

(President Reagan) 

Energy 

45 International Energy Security 

(Richard T. Kennedy, E. Allan 
Wendt) 

Europe 

50 CSCE Followup Meeting Concludes 
in Madrid (Secretary Shultz, 
Concluding Document) 



52 Anniversary of Gdansk Agreement 

in Poland (President Reagan) 
60 Soviet Active Measures 

67 U.S. -European Relations 

(Richard R. Burt) 

68 U.S. -Soviet Grain Agreement 

(White House Statement) 

69 15th Report on Cyprus (Message to 

the Congress) 

International Law 

70 Deportation of Nazi War Criminals 

to Israel (Justice Department 
Statement) 

Middle East 

71 The Libyan Problem 

79 Situation in Lebanon (White House 

and Department Statements, Let- 
ter to the Congress) 

Treaties 

80 Current Actions 

Chronology 

83 August 1983 

Press Releases 

85 Department of State 

Publications 

85 Department of State 

86 Foreign Relations Volume Released 

Index 




Secretary Shultz (right) and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko (left) met at the U.S. 
Ambassador's residence in Madrid. 



(Wide World photo) 



KAL #007 



Soviet Downing of 
Civilian Aircraft 



SECRETARY'S 
NEWS BRIEFING, 
SEPT. 1, 1983 1 

At 1400 hours Greenwich Mean Time 
(GMT) yesterday, a Korean Air Lines 
Boeing 747, en route from New York to 
Seoul, Korea, departed Anchorage, 
Alaska. Two hundred and sixty-nine 
passengers and crew were on board, in- 
cluding Congressman Lawrence P. 
McDonald [D.-Ga.]. 

At approximately 1600 hours Green- 
wich Mean Time, the aircraft came to 
the attention of Soviet radar. It was 
tracked constantly by the Soviets from 
that time. 

The aircraft strayed into Soviet 
airspace over the Kamchatka Peninsula 
and over the Sea of Okhotsk and over 
the Sakhalin Island. The Soviets tracked 
the commercial airliner for some 2V2 
hours. 

A Soviet pilot reported visual con- 
tact with the aircraft at 1812 hours. The 
Soviet plane was, we know, in constant 
contact with its ground control. 

At 1821 hours, the Korean aircraft 
was reported by the Soviet pilot at 
10,000 meters. At 1826 hours, the 
Soviet pilot reported that he fired a 
missile, and the target was destroyed. 

At 1830 hours, the Korean aircraft 
was reported by radar at 5,000 meters. 
At 1838 hours, the Korean plane dis- 
appeared from the radar screen. 

We know that at least eight Soviet 
fighters reacted at one time or another 
to the airliner. The pilot who shot the 
aircraft down reported after the attack 
that he had, in fact, fired a missile, that 
he had destroyed the target, and that he 
was breaking away. 

About an hour later, Soviet con- 
trollers ordered a number of their 
search aircraft to conduct search-and- 
rescue activity in the vicinity of the last 
position of the Korean airliner reflected 
by Soviet tracking. One of these aircraft 



reported finding kerosene on the surface 
of the seas in that area. 

During Wednesday night, U.S. State 
Department officials, particularly Assis- 
tant Secretary [for European Affairs 
Richard R.] Burt, were in contact with 
Soviet officials, seeking information con- 
cerning the airliner's fate. The Soviets 
offered no information. 

As soon as U.S. sources had con- 
firmed the shooting down of the air- 
craft, the United States, on its own 
behalf and on behalf of the Republic of 
Korea, called in the Soviet Charge d' Af- 
faires in Washington this morning to ex- 
press our grave concern over the 
shooting down of an unarmed civilian 
plane carrying passengers of a number 
of nationalities. We also urgently 
demanded an explanation from the 
Soviet Union. 

The United States reacts with revul- 
sion to this attack. Loss of life appears 
to be heavy. We can see no excuse what- 
soever for this appalling act. 

Q. Will this make any difference in 
the way the United States deals with 
the Soviet Union, for example, your 
meeting with Foreign Minister 
Gromyko? 

A. I certainly will want to meet 
with Foreign Minister Gromyko and 
hear what he has to say about this. Of 
course, we expect to hear from the 
Soviet Union long before that. 

Q. Was the United States in touch 
with Moscow at all on the hotline or 
any Presidential contact in this case? 

A. No. This information that we 
have has come into our hands after the 
shooting down of this plane. 

Q. Have you spoken to the Presi- 
dent about this matter, and what does 
he say? 

A. I haven't spoken to the President 
as yet, but I should say the President is 
fully informed. I've talked with the west 



KAL #007 



coast, and the President knows all about 
this and has been kept fully informed. I 
haven't personally spoken to him. 

Q. Did the Soviet Union give any 
warning to this aircraft and request it 
to land or try to force it down before 
it shot it down? 

A. We have no evidence of that. 
There was apparently no ability to com- 
municate between the two aircraft. But 
as the statement says, the Soviet plane 
that shot down the commercial airliner 
moved itself into position where it had 
visual contact with the aircraft, so that 
with the eye you could inspect the air- 
craft and see what it was you were look- 
ing at. 

Q. Do we know whether the 
Soviets sought to force the KAL plane 
down without using missiles? 

A. We have no information about 
that. And as I said, as far as we can see, 
there was no communication between 
the two aircraft except that they did 
track this aircraft for 2Vz hours; at least 
eight fighters at one time or another 
were around in the vicinity; and the air- 
craft that shot the plane down was close 
enough for visual inspection of the air- 
craft. 

Q. Were they aware of any par- 
ticular kind of Soviet military exer- 
cises or maneuvers or super-sophisti- 
cated radar that might have been in 
the area and that they had warned 
everybody to stay away from it? 

A. No. 

Q. Is there any explanation that 
you could offer for this? 

A. We have no explanation to offer. 
We can see no explanation whatever for 
shooting down an unarmed commercial 
airliner, no matter whether it's in your 
airspace or not. 

Q. Are you suggesting that the 
decision to shoot this plane down was 
made at a fairly high level since they 
were tracking it a long time? 

A. I'm relating the facts as we have 
them at this point, and I can't go beyond 
the facts that I have here. I'm not going 
to speculate about it. I'm trying to put 
forward the facts as we know them and 
to tell you the U.S. Government's atti- 
tude and my own attitude toward the 
shooting down of an unarmed commer- 
cial airliner. 

Q. Do you have any sense as to 
whether there could be any political 
motivation for this, beyond what you 
know already? 



A. I can't imagine any political 
motivation for shooting down an un- 
armed airliner. 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 

SEPT. 1, 1983 2 

The President is very concerned and 
deeply disturbed about the loss of life 
aboard the Korean Air Lines flight over- 
night. There are no circumstances that 
can justify the unprecedented attack on 
an unarmed civilian aircraft. The Soviet 
Union owes an explanation to the world 
about how and why this tragedy has 
occurred. 

At the direction of the President, 
the Secretary of State is demanding an 
immediate and full account of this tragic 
incident from the Soviet Union. 

The President discussed this matter 
last night at 7:30 with his national 
security adviser, Bill Clark, and again at 
10:30 last night he was briefed in fur- 
ther detail. This morning at 7:10, Ed 
Meese spoke to the President, provided 
him with a morning assessment of the 
situation, and at 8:33 this morning, the 
President spoke for about 15 minutes 
with Secretary Shultz. 

He is being kept abreast and will be 
kept advised throughout the day as the 
assessments proceed by officials in 
Washington. 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 1, 1983 3 

I speak for all Americans and for the 
people everywhere who cherish civilized 
values in protesting the Soviet attack on 
an unarmed civilian passenger plane. 
Words can scarcely express our revul- 
sion at this horrifying act of violence. 

The United States joins with other 
members of the international community 
in demanding a full explanation for this 
appalling and wanton misdeed. The 
Soviet statements to this moment have 
totally failed to explain how or why this 
tragedy has occurred. Indeed, the whole 
incident appears to be inexplicable to 
civilized people everywhere. 

Mrs. Reagan and I want to express 
our deepest sympathy to the families of 
the victims. Our prayers are with them 
in this time of bereavement, and they 
have my personal assurance that I will 
make every effort to get to the bottom 
of this tragedy. 

I have ordered the flags of the 
United States flown at half staff at all 
Federal installations and U.S. military 
bases around the world. 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 1, 1983 4 

The Soviet Foreign Minister has sent a 
message to Secretary Shultz in reply to 
our demand of earlier today for an ex- 
planation of the shooting down of a 
Korean Air Lines 747 by Soviet aircraft 
The message, which was delivered by 
the Soviet Embassy here to the Depart- 
ment of State, is an almost verbatim 
repetition of the TASS item issued frorr 
Moscow today. That TASS message 
reads as follows: 

An unidentified plane entered the air- 
space of the Soviet Union over the Kam- 
chatka Peninsula from the direction of the 
Pacific Ocean and then for the second time 
violated the airspace of the U.S.S.R. over 
Sakhalin Island on the night from August 31 
to September 1. The plane did not have 
navigation lights, did not respond to queries, 
and did not enter into contact with the dis- 
patcher service. 

Fighters of the antiaircraft defense, 
which were sent aloft toward the intruder 
plane, tried to give it assistance in directing 
it to the nearest airfield. But the intruder 
plane did not react to the signals and warn- 
ings from the Soviet fighters and continued 
its flight in the direction of the Sea of Japan 

In addition, Mr. Gromyko's message 
includes a statement that in connection 
with the U.S. request, the Soviets have 
taken measures to search for the air- 
craft and indicates that as a result of 
the search, signs of a possible crash 
have been found in the area of Morenor 
Island. The search, the message says, 
continues in the area. 

The Soviet Charge has been in- 
formed that the U.S. Government finds 
this reply totally inadequate and reiter- 
ates its demand for a satisfactory ex- 
planation. 



U.S. LETTER TO PRESIDENT, 
UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 
SEPT. 1, 1983 5 

Dear Mr. President: 

On urgent instructions from my government 
and in view of the gravity of the situation 
arising from the destruction by fighters of 
the Soviet airforce of a Republic of Korea 
Boeing 747 aircraft carrying civilian 
passengers of different nationalities over 
waters of the Japanese island of Hokkaido, I 
wish to bring the following facts to your at- 
tention and to that of all members of the 
Security Council. 

At 1400 hours, Greenwich Mean Time, 
August 31, 1983, a Korean Airline Boeing 
747 en route from New York to Seoul, Korea 
departed Anchorage, Alaska carrying 269 
passengers and crew. 



KAL #007 



At approximately 1600 hours (GMT), the 
aircraft came to the attention of Soviet radar 
personnel. It was tracked constantly by 
Soviet military authorities from that time. 
According to information available to my 
government, the aircraft strayed into Soviet 
iirspace over the Kamchatka Peninsula, over 
;he Sea of Okhotsk and over Sakhalin Island. 

The Soviets tracked the commercial 
airliner for some two-and-one-half hours. A 
Soviet pilot reported visual contact with the 
aircraft at 1812 hours. The Soviet plane was 
in constant contact with its ground control. 
At 1812 hours the Korean aircraft was 
reported by the Soviet pilot at 10,000 meters. 
At 1826 hours the Soviet pilot reported that 
le fired a missile and the target was 
destroyed. At 1830 hours the Korean aircraft 
,vas reported by radar at an altitude of 5,000 
neters. At 1838 hours the Korean plane 
disappeared from the radar screens. 

The United States Government knows 
;hat at least eight Soviet fighters reacted at 
me time or another to the airliner. The pilot 
vho shot the airliner down reported after the 
ittack that he had, in fact, fired a missile, 
hat he had destroyed the target, and that he 
vas breaking away. 

About an hour later, Soviet controllers 
■rdered a number of their search aircraft to 
onduct search and rescue activity in the 
icinity of the last position of the Korean 
irliner reflected by Soviet tracking. One of 
hese aircraft reported finding kerosene on 
he surface of the seas in that area. 

The United States Government considers 
his action of Soviet military authorities 
gainst a civil air transport vehicle a flagrant 
nd serious attack on the safety of interna- 
lonal civil aviation. 

This action by the Soviet Union violates 
ne fundamental legal norms and standards 
f international civil aviation. These norms 
nd standards do not permit such use of arm- 
d force against foreign civil aircraft. There 
xists no justification in international law for 
le destruction of an identifiable civil air- 
raft, an aircraft which was tracked on radar 
>r two-and-one-half hours, and which was in 
isual contact of Soviet military pilots prior 
) being deliberately shot down. 

It is the considered position of the 
overnment of the United States of America 
lat this unprovoked resort to the use of 
>rce by the Soviet military authorities in 
jntravention of International Civil Aviation 
rganization standards and the basic norms 
f international law must be deplored and 
:>ndemned by the international community 
nd by world public opinion. 

Upon instructions from my government, I 
;quest, in association with the Republic of 
orea, that you convene an urgent meeting 
f the Security Council to consider this 
srious matter. I further request that this let- 
r be circulated as a document of the Securi- 
i Council. 



Sincerely, 



Charles M. Lichenstein 

Acting Permanent 
Representative of the U.S. 



PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, 
SEPT. 2, 1983 6 

First, let me just say that Nancy and I 
were deeply saddened last night to hear 
of the death of Senator Henry Jackson. 
He was a friend, a colleague, a true 
patriot, and a devoted servant of the 
people. He will be sorely missed, and we 
both extend our deepest sympathy to his 
family. 

And now, in the wake of the bar- 
baric act committed yesterday by the 
Soviet regime against a commercial jet- 
liner, the United States and many other 
countries of the world made clear and 
compelling statements that expressed 
not only our outrage but also our de- 
mand for a truthful accounting of the 
facts. 

Our first emotions are anger, 
disbelief, and profound sadness. While 
events in Afghanistan and elsewhere 
have left few illusions about the willing- 
ness of the Soviet Union to advance its 
interests through violence and intimida- 
tion, all of us had hoped that certain ir- 
reducible standards of civilized behavior, 
nonetheless, obtained. But this event 
shocks the sensibilities of people every- 
where. The tradition in a civilized world 
has always been to offer help to 
mariners and pilots who are lost or in 
distress on the sea or in the air. Where 
human life is valued, extraordinary ef- 
forts are extended to preserve and pro- 
tect it, and it's essential that as civilized 
societies, we ask searching questions 
about the nature of regimes where such 
standards do not apply. 

Beyond these emotions, the world 
notes the stark contrast that exists be- 
tween Soviet words and deeds. What 
can we think of a regime that so broadly 
trumpets its vision of peace and global 
disarmament and yet so callously and 
quickly commits a terrorist act to sacri- 
fice the lives of innocent human beings? 
What could be said about Soviet 
credibility when they so flagrantly lie 
about such a heinous act? What can be 
the scope of legitimate and mutual 
discourse with a state whose values per- 
mit such atrocities? And what are we to 
make of a regime which establishes one 
set of standards for itself and another 
for the rest of human kind? 

We've joined in the call for an 
urgent UN Security Council meeting to- 
day. The brutality of this act should not 
be compounded through silence or the 
cynical distortion of the evidence now at 
hand. And tonight I will be meeting with 
my advisers to conduct a formal review 



of this matter, and this weekend I shall 
be meeting with the congressional lead- 
ership. 

To the families of all those on the ill- 
fated aircraft, we send our deepest sym- 
pathy, and I hope they know our 
prayers are with them all. 



AMBASSADOR LICHENSTEIN'S 

STATEMENT, 

UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 

SEPT. 2, 1983 7 

I wish at the outset to read the state- 
ment issued today by the Presidert of 
the United States, as he left California 
on his return to Washington, where at 
1830 hours he has convened an extraor- 
dinary meeting of his National Security 
Council. 

[Ambassador Lichenstein read the Presi- 
dent's statement.] 

This strong and eloquent expression 
of anguish for the families of 269 vic- 
tims, this expression of deep concern for 
what this heinous crime means for inter- 
national peace and security, indeed, for 
the best hopes of decent people every- 
where, this statement by the President 
of my country needs no amplification by 
me. 

What I will try to do this afternoon 
is, first, to provide some framework, 
some context for this tragedy. I will 
then spell out the facts as best we now 
know them— and let me note here that 
hour-by-hour these last 2 l k days, more 
and more facts have become and are be- 
coming available to my government, and 
as they do, our concern deepens and our 
outrage grows. Then, finally, I will draw 
some few, preliminary conclusions about 
the meaning of this tragedy — the 
lessons that it may hold for us here in 
this Council and, more generally, for all 
people everywhere in the world who en- 
joy freedom, who would preserve the 
freedom they enjoy, those who seek 
freedom. 

How can we begin to characterize 
this crime? And a crime worse com- 
pounded by the Soviets' continuing 
denial of any responsibility for it, a 
denial which is in contempt of the truth 
as, gradually, we are learning it and in 
contempt of the opinion of civilized 
mankind. 

On the basis of the facts presently 
available to my government, the crime 
must be characterized as calculated and 
deliberate. From all presently available 
evidence, the pilot of the SU-15 Soviet 
interceptor— the pilot who pulled the 



>ctober1983 



KAL #007 



trigger or pushed the button that 
unleashed the heat-guided missile which 
destroyed Korean Air Lines #007 and 
269 innocent lives along with it— that 
pilot had the Korean 747 in his sights, 
clearly identified as a civilian airliner, 
well within 2 kilometers of the 747, for 
more then 10 minutes running, prior to 
launching the destructive missile. 

The crime committed was, indeed, 
calculated; and, indeed, it was deliber- 
ate; and it was wantonly irresponsible. 
On no conceivable assumption of the 
peril posed by a single commercial 
airliner to the putative security of the 
Soviet Union, a regularly scheduled 
night-time flight, however much off 
course it may have strayed — on no con- 
ceivable such assumption could the 
Soviet reaction be characterized as other 
than incommensurate, as outrageously 
excessive, as wantonly irresponsible. 

Let us call the crime for what clear- 
ly it is: wanton, calculated, deliberate 
murder. 

Most of us by now know the basic 
facts of this criminal act of mass 
murder, but let me again outline them in 
brief. 

At 1400 hours, Greenwich Mean 
Time, August 31, 1983, a Korean Air 
Lines Boeing 747 en route from New 
York to Seoul, Korea, departed An- 
chorage, Alaska, carrying 269 
passengers and crew. 

At approximately 1600 hours, the 
aircraft came to the attention of Soviet 
radar personnel. It was tracked con- 
stantly by Soviet military authorities 
from that time. According to informa- 
tion available to my government, the air- 
craft strayed into Soviet airspace over 
the Kamchatka Peninsula, over the Sea 
of Okhotsk, and over Sakhalin Island. 

The Soviets tracked the commercial 
airliner for some 2V2 hours. A Soviet 
pilot reported visual contact with the 
aircraft at 1812 hours. The Soviet plane 
was in constant contact, was receiving 
orders and instructions from its ground 
control. 

At 1812 hours the Korean aircraft 
was reported by the Soviet pilot at 
10,000 meters, roughly 33,000 feet. At 
1826 hours the Soviet pilot reported that 
he fired a missile, and the target was 
destroyed. At 1830 hours the Korean 
aircraft was reported by radar at an 
altitude of 5,000 meters. At 1838 hours 
the Korean plane disappeared from the 
radar screens. 

The U.S. Government knows that at 
least eight Soviet fighters reacted at one 
time or another throughout this period 
in excess of 2V2 hours to the airliner. 



The pilot who shot the airliner down 
reported after the attack that he had, in 
fact, fired a missile, that he had de- 
stroyed the target, and that he was 
breaking away — as he put it, "I am leav- 
ing the attack." (I must defer to our 
Soviet colleague. It may well be that I 
am not adequately or properly translat- 
ing the Russian. But then he has all of 
the facts in his possession.) It is also of 
interest to note that prior to firing the 
heat-seeking missile, the Soviet SU-15 
interceptor deliberately circled back 
around behind the Korean 747, the bet- 
ter to aim his heat-seeking missile and in 
order to avoid any possibility of being 
hit by flying debris. 

As we reflect on the possible mean- 
ing of this crime, and its possible conse- 
quences, I want very briefly to touch on 
its implications for any reasonable ap- 
proximation to the codes and conven- 
tions of international law. 

First and foremost are the legal 
obligations which flow from what the In- 
ternational Court of Justice — whose 
jurisdiction, needless to say, the Soviet 
Union usually does not accept — has 
called "certain general and well-recog- 
nized principles, namely elementary con- 
siderations of humanity, even more ex- 
acting in peace than in war." 

If there were no other relevant 
rules, these well-recognized principles of 
humanity would rule out shooting down 
a passenger plane, a clearly marked 
airliner engaged in international civil 
aviation. But there are other very rele- 
vant rules. There are the rules of the 
Charter about the prohibition of the use 
of force. There are rules specific to civil 
aviation. Annex 2 to the Chicago con- 
vention on civil aviation contains "Rules 
of the Air." These rules set forth the 
procedures to be used when intercepting 
a foreign aircraft not properly within 
the airspace of the intercepting country, 
that is to say, radio communications, 
rocking of wings, and irregular flashing 
of lights. The "Rules of the Air" do not 
include shooting down a civil airliner. 

Attachment A to Annex 2 of the 
Chicago convention is even clearer: 

Interception of civil aircraft should be 
avoided and should be undertaken only as a 
List resort. If undertaken, the interception 
should be limited to determining the identity 
of the aircraft and providing any navigational 
guidance necessary for the safe conduct of 
tin' flight . . . Intercepting aircraft should 
refrain from the use of weapons in all cases 
of interception of civil aircraft. 

It is interesting to note — as I have 
looked over the detailed log of some 75 
instances — documented instances in 
which Soviet aircraft have strayed into 



Western, into American airspace. I have 
looked over the log carefully to discover 
the response in each case. I wish to 
recite from that long catalogue only two 
rather interesting such flights. Among 
the numerous incidents there was that 
of the Aeroflot flight into Dulles Airport 
on November 8, 1981. This flight 
entered U.S. airspace at an unauthorizec 
entry point in New England, flew over 
New England land area although its 
clearly demarcated route was almost ex- 
clusively over open water. It continued 
to fly according to an unauthorized 
route over the Pease Air Force Base 
and the naval facility at Groton, Connec 
ticut. And then, finally, it landed in 
Dulles, Washington, D.C. Several days 
later, the same aircraft on leaving Dulle 
for its return flight flew a similar 
unauthorized route over New England. 

My government lodged a very firm 
protest. My government then imposed 
what it considered a proportionate 
penalty. It suspended Aeroflot schedule! 
service into Dulles for two flights. It die 
not authorize the use of a heat-seeking 
missile! 

What might we expect that a nor- 
mal, reasonably civilized government 
should do in a situation such as the one 
that confronts us? It would, first of all, 
admit and accept responsibility for the 
act. It would express profound regret 
for the loss of life. It would undertake a 
credible investigation of the circum- 
stances of the act to determine if there 
was individual responsibility, and it 
would discipline the responsible in- 
dividuals. It would also pledge that sucl 
an act would never be repeated, and it 
would demonstrate that appropriate 
steps are being taken to ensure against 
any repetition. 

What, by contrast, has the Soviet 
Union done until now? Has it given the 
slightest indication that it accepts 
responsibility for this heinous act? Has i 
shown the least bit of compassion for 
the families of those innocent people 
who were killed, who were, as I have 
said, murdered? Has it taken any steps 
to initiate a process of investigation to 
determine responsibility? Has it given 
any sign of reassurance to the interna- 
tional community that it appreciates the 
gravity of what has happened and will 
take whatever steps are necessary to en 
sure against its repetition? On the con- 
trary, the Soviet attitude has lacked 
even a trace of contrition. In the face of 
utter disbelief on the part of the entire 
international community, it denies any 
responsibility for shooting down this un- 
armed civilian airliner. It has shown no 
regret over the loss of life. It has in- 



Department of State Bulletii 






KAL #007 



iicated no readiness to punish those 
responsible. It has demonstrated no 
ietermination to avoid a repetition of 
such an incident. 

It has, in other words, behaved with 
;omplete — and I must add, character- 
stic — contempt for the international 
;ommunity and for even minimal stand- 
irds of decency and civilized behavior. 
'.n its refusal to admit the truth — to ac- 
;ept responsibility for this act — it is ly- 
ng openly, brazenly, knowingly. In so 
loing it is — ironically — showing its true 
'ace to the world, the face that is so 
>ften hidden behind the peace offensive 
ind the propaganda machine, behind all 
he talk of brotherhood and human 
olidarity, and international coexistence. 

It is the face of a ruthless 
otalitarian state, a state which has been 
esponsible over the past six-and-one- 
lalf decades for killing more people — 
he latest estimate I have read is be- 
ween 70 and 80 million — and enslaving 
aore nations than any state in the 
istory of mankind; a state that tailors 
;s concept of truth to what will advance 
;s own interests — that and nothing else; 
state that does not accept responsibili- 
Y for a minimally decent international 
rder; a state whose ultimate objective 
; to remake the world in its own image, 
'hich necessarily means a world in 
r hich it will control the lives of people 
nd the fate of nations as completely 
nd as ruthlessly as it exercises control 
ver its own people — and I should add, 
ver those who innocently stray into its 
irspace. 

If we are to learn anything from this 
wful tragedy, it is this message and 
lis terrible warning. 

It is said that we must — and, of 
)urse, we must — live in the same world 
ith the Soviet Union. But if we are to 
we in that world — in freedom and not 
i slavery — and if that world is to con- 
nue to allow room for the individual 
■dstence of nations and the survival of 
eedom and comparable human values, 
len it is best that we recognize now, 
rfore it is far, far, too late, the true 
ature of Soviet totalitarianism and the 
ireat it poses to all people — those liv- 
ig under its yoke and those still free of 
ich domination. 

Let me complete my statement by 
fading the words of a noble and elo- 
jent Russian, formerly a citizen of the 
oviet Union — not atypically a former 
tizen of the Soviet Union now who 
nds it necessary to live outside his 
>untry. I quote from Aleksandr 
olzhenitsyn: 



Let us not forget that violence does not 
and cannot exist by itself. It is invariably in- 
tertwined with the lie. They are linked in the 
most intimate, most organic and most pro- 
found fashion. Violence cannot conceal itself 
behind anything except lies. And lies have 
nothing to maintain them except violence. 
Anyone who has once proclaimed violence as 
Ins methods must inexorably choose the lie as 
his principle. 



SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 2, 1983 8 

The Soviet Union has today issued 
another statement in its continuing ef- 
fort to cover up the facts of the inhuman 
Soviet attack on an unarmed civilian 
airliner. They still will not admit the 
truth — that they shot down an unarmed 
civilian aircraft. The facts are: 

1. The aircraft was a commercial air- 
liner on a regularly scheduled flight— 
and the Soviet fighter came close 
enough to see that; 

2. The passengers on the flight came 
from many nations and included a 
number of women and children; 

3. The airliner in question was not of 
U.S. registry; and 

4. The United States was not aware 
that the Korean airliner was in jeopardy 
until after it was shot down. Our first 
knowledge of this incident was based on 
subsequent analysis of Soviet defense ac- 
tivity. 

TASS also asserts that the Soviet 
aircraft fired warning shots with tracer 
shells along the route of the plane. We 
know the Soviet pilot reported that he 
had fired on the target, and it was de- 
stroyed. There is no indication that the 
Soviets tried to warn the plane by firing 
tracers. 

The Soviet Union is clearly engaged 
in an effort to divert attention from its 
own actions by false claims of a U.S. in- 
telligence connection with the Korean 
civilian airliner. 

None of this can obscure the facts. 
The Soviets Union must accept the 
responsibility for having shot down an 
unarmed commercial airliner, taking the 
lives of 269 human beings. No cover-up, 
however brazen and elaborate, can 
change this reality — or absolve the 
Soviet Union of its responsibility to ex- 
plain its behavior. The world is waiting 
for the Soviet Union to tell the truth. 



PRESIDENT'S RADIO ADDRESS, 
SEPT. 3, 1983 9 

This weekend marks the 189th obser- 
vance of Labor Day, a special day for all 
Americans. Before I get to that topic, 
however, I'm going to speak to you 
briefly about the recent act of brutality 
that continues to horrify us all. 

I'm referring to the outrageous 
Soviet attack against the 269 people 
aboard the unarmed Korean passenger 
plane. This murder of innocent civilians 
is a serious international issue between 
the Soviet Union and civilized people 
everywhere who cherish individual 
rights and value human life. It is up to 
all of us, leaders and citizens of the 
world, to deal with the Soviets in a 
calm, controlled but absolutely firm 
manner. We have joined in this call for 
an urgent UN Security Council meeting. 
The evidence is clear; it leaves no doubt 
it is time for the Soviets to account. 

The Soviet Union owes the world a 
fullest possible explanation and apology 
for their inexcusable act of brutality. So 
far they flunk the test. Even now they 
continue to distort and deny the truth. 

People everywhere can draw only 
one conclusion from their violent 
behavior; there is a glaring gap between 
Soviet words and deeds. They speak 
endlessly about their love of brother- 
hood, disarmament, and peace, but they 
reserve the right to disregard aviation 
safety and to sacrifice human life. 

Make no mistake on this last point; 
this is not the first time the Soviets have 
shot at and hit a civilian airliner when it 
flew over Soviet territory. Our govern- 
ment does not shoot down foreign air- 
craft over U.S. territory even though 
commercial aircraft from the Soviet 
Union and Cuba have overflown sensi- 
tive U.S. military facilities. 

We, and other civilized countries, 
follow procedures to prevent a tragedy 
rather than to provoke one, but while 
the Soviets accuse others of wanting to 
return to the cold war, it's they who 
have never left it behind. 

I met with the National Security 
Council last night. Tomorrow I will meet 
with congressional leaders of both par- 
ties to discuss this issue as well as the 
situation in Lebanon on which the Na- 
tional Security Council met today. We're 
determined to move forward and to act 
in concert with the Congress and other 
members of the international communi- 
ty. We must make sure that the funda- 
mental rules of safety of travel are re- 
spected by all nations, even the Soviet 
Union. 



ictober 1983 



KAL #007 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 4, 1983 10 

A U.S. RC-135 aircraft was in the 
vicinity of the Korean airliner on 
August 31 when the airliner was initial- 
ly detected by Soviet radar. Both air- 
craft were then in international airspace, 
and the U.S. aircraft never entered 
Soviet airspace. The United States 
routinely conducts unarmed RC-135 
flights in international airspace off the 
Kamchatka Peninsula to monitor, by 
technical means, Soviet compliance with 
the SALT treaties. The Soviets conduct 
similar monitoring activities near U.S. 
missile-testing areas. The Soviets are 
aware of our flights and track them 
routinely. They know that our aircraft 
do not enter their airspace. The Korean 
aircraft's inadvertent entry into Soviet 
territory should have been an early and 
strong indication to them that the flight 
was not a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft. 

The Soviets traced the Korean air- 
craft and the U.S. aircraft separately 
and knew there were two aircraft in the 
area, so we do not think this was a case 
of mistaken identity. The closest point of 
approach was approximately 75 nautical 
miles, while the U.S. aircraft was in its 
mission orbit. Later the U.S. aircraft 
crossed the path taken by the Korean 
airliner, but by then the airliner was 
almost 300 miles away. Still later, as the 
Korean airliner strayed off course and 
overflew Kamchatka Peninsula, it was 
initially identified by the Soviets as an 
RC-135 and then as an unidentified air- 
craft. Approximately 1 x k hours after the 
U.S. and Korean aircraft were near each 
other in international space, the Soviets 
shot down the Korean airliner as it was 
exiting — or had exited — their territory 
west of Sakhalin Island, some 1,000 
miles from the operating area of the 
U.S. aircraft. 

During the 2V2 hours of Soviet 
surveillance of the Korean aircraft, the 
Soviets had radar images — both ground 
and air — of the Korean 747. The two 
aircraft are distinctly different in shape 
and size. Their fighter aircraft also had 
visual contact with the Korean aircraft. 
The SU-15 and MiG-23 aircraft pilots, 
whose voices are on the tape obtained by 
the United States and played for the 
congressional leadership, never refer to 
the Korean aircraft as an RC-135, only 
as the "target." They made no serious 
effort to identify the aircraft or to warn 
it. They did not appear to care what it 
was. Instead, they were intent on killing 
it. If the Soviets made a mistake in iden- 
tification, which stretches the imagina- 



tion, they have not said so to date. In 
fact, they have not to date admitted 
shooting down the Korean commercial 
aircraft with 269 people aboard. We con- 
tinue to ask the Soviets for their full ac- 
counting of this incident. 

The presence of a U.S. reconnais- 
sance aircraft on a routine monitoring 
mission to assure Soviet compliance with 
treaty obligations some 1,000 miles and 
2V2 hours flight time from the scene of 
the shootdown in no way excuses or ex- 
plains this act, which speaks for itself. 
In fact, the RC-135 in question, at the 
time KAL #007 was shot down, had 
been on the ground at its home base in 
Alaska for more than 1 hour. 



PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS 
TO THE NATION, 
SEPT. 5, 1983 9 

My fellow Americans, I am coming 
before you tonight about the Korean 
airline massacre — the attack by the 
Soviet Union against 269 innocent men, 
women, and children aboard an unarmed 
Korean passenger plane. This crime 
against humanity must never be forgot- 
ten, here or throughout the world. 

Our prayers tonight are with the vic- 
tims and their families in their time of 
terrible grief. Our hearts go out to 
them — to brave people like Kathryn 
McDonald, the wife of a Congressman, 
whose composure and eloquence on the 
day of her husband's death moved us all. 
He will be sorely missed by all of us 
here in government. 

The parents of one slain couple 
wired me: "Our daughter and her hus- 
band died on Korean Air Lines 
Flight 007. Their deaths were the result 
of the Soviet Union violating every con- 
cept of human rights." The emotions of 
these parents — grief, shock, anger — are 
shared by civilized people everywhere. 
From around the world press accounts 
reflect an explosion of condemnation by 
people everywhere. 

Let me state as plainly as I can: 
There was absolutely no justification, 
either legal or moral, for what the 
Soviets did. One newspaper in India 
said: "If every passenger plane is fair 
game for home air forces, it will be the 
end to civil aviation as we know it." 

This is not the first time the Soviet 
Union has shot at and hit a civilian 
airliner when it overflew its territory. In 
another tragic incident in 1978, the 
Soviets also shot down an unarmed 
civilian airliner after having positively 
identified it as such. In that instance the 
Soviet interceptor pilot clearly identified 



the civilian markings on the side of the 
aircraft, repeatedly questioned the orde 
to fire on a civilian airliner, and was 
ordered to shoot it down anyway. The 
aircraft was hit with a missile and made 
a crash landing. Several innocent peopl 
lost their lives in this attack — killed by 
shrapnel from the blast of a Soviet 
missile. 

Is this a practice of other countries 
in the world? The answer is no. Com- 
mercial aircraft from the Soviet Union 
and Cuba on a number of occasions hav 
overflown sensitive U.S. military 
facilities. They weren't shot down. We 
and other civilized countries believe in 
the tradition of offering help to marinei 
and pilots who are lost or in distress, 01 
the sea or in the air. We believe in 
following procedures to prevent a 
tragedy, not to provoke one. 

But despite the savagery of their 
crime, the universal reaction against it, 
and the evidence of their complicity, th< 
Soviets still refuse to tell the truth. The 
have persistently refused to admit that 
their pilot fired on the Korean aircraft. 
Indeed, they have not even told their 
own people that a plane was shot down 

They have spun a confused tale of 
tracking the plane by radar until it just 
mysteriously disappeared from their 
radar screens; that no one fired a shot 
of any kind. But, then, they coupled thi 
with charges that it was a spy plane 
sent by us and that their planes fired 
tracer bullets past the plane as a warn- 
ing that it was in Soviet airspace. 

Let me recap for a moment and pn 
sent the incontrovertible evidence that 
we have. The Korean airliner, a Boeing 
747, left Anchorage, Alaska, bound for 
Seoul, Korea, on a course south and 
west which would take it across Japan. 
Out over the Pacific, in international 
waters, it was for a brief time in the 
vicinity of one of our reconnaissance 
planes, an RC-135, on a routine missio 
At no time was the RC-135 in Soviet 
airspace. The Korean airliner flew on, 
and the two planes were soon widely 
separated. 

A 747 is equipped with the most 
modern computerized navigation 
facilities, but a computer must respond 
to input provided by human hands. No 
one will ever know whether a mistake 
was made in giving the computer the 
course or whether there was a malfunc 
tion. Whichever, the 747 was flying a 
course further to the west than it was 
supposed to fly — a course which took it 
into Soviet airspace. 

The Soviets tracked this plane for 
2V2 hours while it flew a straight line 
course at 30,000-35,000 feet. Only 



Department of State Bulleti 



KAL #007 



civilian airliners fly in such a manner. 
At one point, the Korean pilot gave 
Japanese air control his position as east 
of Hokkaido, Japan, showing that he 
was unaware they were off course by as 
much as or more than 100 miles. 

The Soviets scrambled jet intercep- 
tors from a base in Sakhalin Island. 

Japanese ground sites recorded the 
interceptor plane's radio transmis- 
sions — their conversations with their 
own ground control. We only have the 
voices from the pilots; the Soviet 
ground-to-air transmissions were not 
recorded. It is plain, however, from the 
pilot's words that he is responding to 
orders and queries from his own ground 
control. 

Here is a brief segment of the tape 
which we're going to play in its entirety 
for the UN Security Council tomorrow. 

[Translations of taped radio 
transmissions from two Soviet pilots to 
"DEPUTAT," the Soviet ground station 
call sign: 

Soviet SU-15 (805) at 1818:34 
GMT: The A.N.O. [air navigation lights] 
are burning. The strobe light is flashing. 

MiG-23 (163) at 1818:56 GMT: 
Roger, I'm at 7500, course 230. 

SU-15 (805) at 1819:02 GMT: I am 
losing on the target. 

SU-15 (805) at 1826:20 GMT: I 
'lave executed the launch. 

SU-15 (805) at 1826:22 GMT: The 
;arget is destroyed. 

SU-15 (805) at 1826:27 GMT: I am 
leaking off attack. 

tVhite House Note: The missile was fired 
by the SU-15, and the MiG-23 was an 
)bserver.] 

Those are the voices of the Soviet 
)ilots. In this tape the pilot who fired 
he missile describes his search for what 
le calls the target. He reports he has it 
n sight; indeed, he pulls up to within 
■ibout a mile of the Korean plane, men- 
ions its flashing strobe light and that its 
lavigation lights are on. He then reports 
le's reducing speed to get behind the 
lirliner, gives his distance from the 
)lane at various points in this maneuver, 
ind finally announces what can only be 
•ailed the Korean airline massacre. He 
;ays he has locked on the radar, which 
urns his missiles, has launched those 
nissiles, the target has been destroyed, 
ind he is breaking off the attack. 

Let me point out something here 
laving to do with his close-up view of 
he airliner on what we know was a 
•lear night with a half moon. The 747 
las a unique and distinctive silhouette 



unlike any other plane in the world. 
There is no way a pilot could mistake 
this for anything other than a civilian 
airliner. And if that isn't enough, let me 
point out our RC-135 I mentioned 
earlier had been back at its base in 
Alaska, on the ground, for an hour, 
when the murderous attack took place 
over the Sea of Japan. 

And make no mistake about it, this 
attack was not just against ourselves or 
the Republic of Korea. This was the 
Soviet Union against the world and the 
moral precepts which guide human rela- 
tions among people everywhere. It was 
an act of barbarism, born of a society 
which wantonly disregards individual 
rights and the value of human life and 
seeks constantly to expand and 
dominate other nations. 

They deny the deed, but in their con- 
flicting and misleading protestations, the 
Soviets reveal that, yes, shooting down 
a plane — even one with hundreds of in- 
nocent men, women, children, and 
babies— is a part of their normal pro- 
cedure if that plane is in what they 
claim as their airspace. 

They owe the world an apology and 
an offer to join the rest of the world in 
working out a system to protect against 
this ever happening again. Among the 
rest of us there is one protective 
measure: an international radio wave 
length on which pilots can communicate 
with planes of other nations if they are 
in trouble or lost. Soviet military planes 
are not so equipped because that would 
make it easier for pilots who might want 
to defect. 

Our request to send vessels into 
Soviet waters to search for wreckage 
and bodies has received no satisfactory 
answer. Bereaved families of the 
Japanese victims were harassed by 
Soviet patrol boats when they tried to 
get near where the plane is believed to 
have gone down in order to hold a 
ceremony for their dead. But we 
shouldn't be surprised by such inhuman 
brutality. Memories come back of 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, the 
gassing of villages in Afghanistan. If the 
massacre and their subsequent conduct 
is intended to intimidate, they have 
failed in their purpose. From every cor- 
ner of the globe, the word is defiance in 
the face of this unspeakable act and de- 
fiance of the system which excuses it 
and tries to cover it up. With our horror 
and our sorrow, there is a righteous and 
terrible anger. It would be easy to think 
in terms of vengeance, but that is not a 
proper answer. We want justice and ac- 
tion to see that this never happens 
again. 



Our immediate challenge to this 
atrocity is to ensure that we make the 
skies safer and that we seek just com- 
pensation for the families of those who 
were killed. 

Since my return to Washington, we 
have held long meetings, the most re- 
cent yesterday with the congressional 
leadership. There was a feeling of unity 
in the room, and I received a number of 
contructive suggestions. We will con- 
tinue to work with the Congress regard- 
ing our response to this massacre. 

As you know, we immediately made 
known to the world the shocking facts 
as honestly and completely as they came 
to us. 

We have notified the Soviets that we 
will not renew our bilateral agreement 
for cooperation in the field of transpor- 
tation so long as they threaten the 
security of civil aviation. 

Since 1981 the Soviet airline 
Aeroflot has been denied the right to fly 
to the United States. We have reaf- 
firmed that order and are examining ad- 
ditional steps we can take with regard 
to Aeroflot facilities in this country. We 
are cooperating with other countries to 
find better means to ensure the safety of 
civil aviation and to join us in not ac- 
cepting Aeroflot as a normal member of 
the international civil air community 
unless, and until, the Soviets satisfy the 
cries of humanity for justice. I am 
pleased to report that Canada today sus- 
pended Aeroflot's landing and refueling 
privileges for 60 days. 

We have joined with other countries 
to press the International Civil Aviation 
Organization to investigate this crime at 
an urgent special session of the council. 
At the same time, we are listening most 
carefully to private groups, both 
American and international, airline 
pilots, passenger associations, and 
others, who have a special interest in 
civil air safety. 

I am asking the Congress to pass a 
joint resolution of condemnation of this 
Soviet crime. 

We have informed the Soviets that 
we're suspending negotiations on several 
bilateral arrangements we had under 
consideration. 

Along with Korea and Japan, we 
called an emergency meeting of the 
UN Security Council which began on 
Friday. On that first day, Korea, Japan, 
Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, 
Pakistan, France, China, the United 
Kingdom, Zaire, New Zealand, and West 
Germany all joined us in denouncing the 
Soviet action and expressing our horror. 
We expect to hear from additional coun- 
tries as debate resumes tomorrow. 



)ctober1983 



KAL #007 



We intend to work with the 13 coun- 
tries which had citizens aboard the 
Korean airliner to seek reparations for 
the families of all those who were killed. 
The United States will be making a 
claim against the Soviet Union within 
the next week to obtain compensation 
for the benefit of the victims' survivors. 
Such compensation is an absolute moral 
duty which the Soviets must assume. 

In the economic area in general, we 
are redoubling our efforts with our allies 
to end the flow of military and strategic 
items to the Soviet Union. 

Secretary Shultz is going to Madrid 
to meet with representatives of 35 coun- 
tries who, for 3 years, have been 
negotiating an agreement having to do 
with, among other things, human rights. 
Foreign Minister Gromyko of the Soviet 
Union is scheduled to attend that 
meeting. If he does come to the 
meeting, Secretary Shultz is going to 
present him with our demands for 
disclosure of the facts, corrective action, 
and concrete assurances that such a 
thing will not happen again and that 
restitution be made. 

As we work with other countries to 
see that justice is done, the real test of 
our resolve is whether we have the will 
to remain strong, steady, and united. I 
believe more than ever, as evidenced by 
your thousands and thousands of wires 
and phone calls in these last few days, 
that we do. 

I have outlined some of the steps 
we're taking in response to the tragic 
massacre. There is something I've 
always believed in, but which now seems 
more important than ever. The Congress 
will be facing key defense issues when it 
returns from recess. There has been 
legitimate difference of opinion on this 
subject, I know, but I urge the members 
of that distinguished body to ponder 
long and hard the Soviets' aggression as 
they consider the security and safety of 
our people, indeed all people who believe 
in freedom. 

Senator Henry Jackson, a wise and 
revered statesman, and one who prob- 
ably understood the Soviets as well as 
any American in history, warned us, 
"the greatest threat the United States 
now faces is posed by the Soviet Union." 
But, Senator Jackson said: "If America 
maintains a strong deterrent — and only 
if it does — this nation will continue to be 
a leader in the crucial quest for enduring 
peace among nations." 

The late Senator made those state- 
ments in July, on the Senate floor, 
speaking in behalf of the MX missile 



program he considered vital to restore 
America's strategic parity with the 
Soviets. 

When John F. Kennedy was Presi- 
dent, defense spending as a share of the 
Federal budget was 70% greater than it 
is today. Since then, the Soviet Union 
has carried on the most massive military 
buildup the world has ever seen. Until 
they are willing to join the rest of the 
world community, we must maintain the 
strength to deter their aggression. 

But while we do so, we must not 
give up our effort to bring them into the 
world community of nations: peace 
through strength as long as necessary 
but never giving up our effort to bring 
peace closer through mutual, verifiable 
reduction in the weapons of war. 

I've told you of negotiations we've 
suspended as a result of the Korean 
airline massacre, but we cannot, we 
must not, give up our effort to reduce 
the arsenals of destructive weapons 
threatening the world. Ambassador 
Nitze [Paul H. Nitze, chairman of the 
U.S. delegation to the intermediate- 
range nuclear forces negotiations] has 
returned to Geneva to resume the 
negotiations on intermediate-range 
nuclear weapons in Europe. Equally, we 
will continue to press for arms reduc- 
tions in the START [strategic arms 
reduction talks] talks that resume in 
October. We are more determined than 
ever to reduce and, if possible, eliminate 
the threat hanging over mankind. 

We know it will be hard to make a 
nation that rules its own people through 
force to cease using force against the 
rest of the world. But we must try. 

This is not a role we sought — we 
preach no manifest destiny. But like 
Americans who began this country and 
brought forth this last, best hope of 
mankind, history has asked much of the 
Americans of our own time. Much we 
have already given. Much more we must 
be prepared to give. 

Let us have faith, in Abraham 
Lincoln's words, ". . . that right makes 
might, and in that faith let us to the end 
dare to do our duty as we understand 
it." If we do, if we stand together and 
move forward with courage, then 
history will record that some good did 
come from this monstrous wrong that 
we will carry with us and remember for 
the rest of our lives. 



AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICKS 

STATEMENT, 

UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 

SEPT. 6, 1983 11 

Most of the world outside the Soviet 
Union has heard by now of the Korean 
flight #007 carrying 269 persons be- 
tween New York and Seoul which 
strayed off course into Soviet airspace, 
was tracked by Soviet radar, was 
targeted by a Soviet SU-15 whose pilot 
coolly, and after careful consultation, 
fired two air-launched missiles which 
destroyed the plane and, apparently, its 
269 passengers and crew. 

This calculated attack on a civilian 
airliner — unarmed, undefended, as 
civilian airliners always are — has 
shocked the world. 

Only the Soviet people have still not 
heard about this attack on Korean Air 
Lines #007 and death of the passengers 
because the Soviet Government has not 
acknowledged firing on the Korean air- 
liner. Indeed, not until September 5 did 
Soviet officials acknowledge that KAL 
#007 had disappeared in its icy waters. 

The Soviet Government has not bee 
silent about the plane; it has merely lied 
On September 1, Foreign Minister 
Gromyko announced that: 

An unidentified plane coming from the 
direction of the Pacific Ocean, entered the ai 
space of the Soviet Union over the Kam- 
chatka Peninsula and then for the second 
time violated the Soviet airspace over the 
Sakhalin Island. The plane did not have 
navigation lights, did not respond to queries 
and did not enter into contact with the radic 
control service. 

Fighters of the antiaircraft defense, 
which were sent aloft toward the intruder 
plane, tried to give it assistance in directing 
it to the nearest airfield. But the intruder 
plane did not react to the signals and warn- 
ings from the Soviet fighters and continued 
its flight in the direction of the Sea of Japan 

The next day, September 2, TASS 
repeated Gromyko's charge that Soviet 
airspace had been rudely violated by "ai 
unidentified plane" which "in violation o 
international regulations . . . flew with- 
out navigation lights. . . ." TASS re- 
ferred to efforts to establish contacts 
with the plane ". . . using generally ac- 
cepted signals and to take it to the 
nearest airfield in the territory of the 
Soviet Union. Over the Sakhalin Island, 
a Soviet aircraft fired warning shots am 
tracer shells along the flying route of 
the plane. Soon after this the intruder 
plane left the limits of Soviet airspace 
and continued its flight toward the Sea 
of Japan. For about 10 minutes, it was 
within the observation zone of radio 



Department of State Bulletin 



KAL #007 



location means, after which it could be 
observed no more." 

Yesterday, when Soviet General 
Romanov finally admitted that the 
Korean plane had crashed killing 
"numerous" people, he also asserted, 
"the jetliner was flying with its lights 
out. . . ." 

This is what TASS said, but we do 
not have to wonder about what really 
happened to the airliner or when it hap- 
pened or what Soviet officials knew 
about its fate. We know, because we 
know what the Soviet pilots who inter- 
cepted the Korean airliners over the 
Sakhalin Island said to their ground con- 
trollers during the 50-minute period 
from 1756 hours to 1846 hours on 
August 31 while they tracked, discussed, 
and destroyed the Korean airliner and 
its passengers. 



(Wide World photo) 



The U.S. Government, in coopera- 
tion with the Government of Japan, has 
decided to spread the evidence before 
this Council and the world. It is 
available on the video tape 1 am about to 
play. On this tape you will hear the 
voices of the pilots of Soviet inter- 
ceptors—which included three SU-15 
Flagons and one MiG-23 Flogger, in- 
cluding the SU-15 pilot who pulled the 
trigger which released the missiles that 
destroyed Korean Air Lines #007. While 
it is obvious that the pilots are 
acknowledging instructions from ground 
controllers, those instructions are not 
audible. What I am about to play back 
for you is the intercepted tape of the ac- 
tual air-to-ground reports; it is, of 
course, in Russian; on the monitor 
screens you will see, simultaneously, the 



original Russian and the English transla- 
tion; through your audio system you will 
listen to these voices in translation into 
all the working languages of the United 
Nations. Immediately following my 
presentation, the Russian-to-English 
transcript will be made available to all 
who may wish to study it. After this ses- 
sion of the Security Council, an audio 
cassette on which voices are still clearer 
will be provided to any interested mis- 
sion. 

Nothing was cut from this tape. The 
recording was made on a voice-actuated 
recorder and, therefore, it covers only 
those periods of time when conversation 
was heard. 

[The video tape was played.] 



Ambassador Kirkpatrick (right) used the TV monitors in the UN Security Council meeting 
September 6 to show members the transcripts (in English and Russian) of the Soviet in- 
terceptor pilots' conversations with their ground station. Soviet Ambassador to the 
United Nations Oleg A. Troyanovskiy is on the left. 




Dctober1983 



KAL #007 



The transcript we have just heard 
needs little explanation. Quite simply, it 
establishes that the Soviets decided to 
shoot down this civilian airliner, shot it 
down, murdering the 269 persons 
aboard, and lied about it. 

The transcript of the pilot's cockpit 
conversations illuminates several key 
points. 

• The interceptor which shot 
KAL #007 down had the airliner in 
sight for over 20 minutes before firing 
his missiles. 

• Contrary to what the Soviets have 
repeatedly stated, the interceptor pilot 
saw the airliner's navigation lights and 
reported that fact to the ground on 
three occasions. 

• Contrary to Soviet statements, 
the pilot makes no mention of firing any 
warning shots, only the firing of the 
missiles which he said struck the 
"target." 

• Contrary to Soviet statements, 
there is no indication whatsoever that 
the interceptor pilot made any attempt 
either to communicate with the airliner 
or to signal for it to land in accordance 
with accepted international practice. In- 
deed, the Soviet interceptor planes may 
be technically incapable of com- 
municating by radio with civilian air- 
craft, presumably out of fear of Soviet 
pilot defections. 

• Perhaps the most shocking fact 
learned from the transcript is that at no 
point did the pilots raise the question of 
the identity of the target aircraft nor at 
any time did the interceptor pilots refer 
to it as anything other than the "target." 
The only activity bearing on the identity 
of the aircraft was a statement by the 
pilot of the attacking interceptor that 
"the target isn't responding to IFF." 
This means the aircraft did not respond 
to the electronic interrogation by which 
military aircraft -identify ,/riends or foes 
(IFF). But, of course, the Korean air- 
liner could not have responded to IFF 
because commercial aircraft are not 
equipped to do so. 

We know the interceptor which shot 
down KAL #007 flew behind, alongside, 
and in front of the airliner— coming at 
least as close as 2 kilometers — before 
dropping back behind the plane and fir- 
ing his missiles. At a distance of 2 kilo- 
meters under the conditions prevailing 
at that time, it was easily possible to 
identify a 747 passenger airliner. Either 
the Soviet pilot knew the Korean plane 
was a commercial airliner, or he did not 
know his target was a civilian passenger 
airliner. If the latter, then he fired his 



deadly missiles without knowing or car- 
ing what they would hit. Though he 
could easily have pulled up to within 
some number of meters of the airliner to 
assure its identity, he did not bother to 
do so. In either case, there was shocking 
disregard for human life and interna- 
tional norms. 

In the days following the destruction 
of KAL #007, Soviet leaders and the 
Soviet press have said they do not 
understand what all the fuss is about. 
They began by accusing the United 
States of creating a "hulabaloo" about 
nothing, and more recently they have ac- 
cused us of a "provocation"— implying, 
though never quite saying, that we "pro- 
voked" them into shooting down an 
airliner that strayed into their space, 
"provoked" them into violating the inter- 
nationally agreed upon standards and 
practices of behavior. They have spoken 
as though a plane's straying off course is 
a crime punishable by death. They have 
suggested that "like any self-respecting 
state, [they] are doing no more than 
looking after [their] sovereignty which 
[they] shall permit no one to violate." 
(From a newscast, September 4, 1983, 
Moscow Domestic Television Series.) 

They have claimed, still without ac- 
knowledging that they shot down the 
Korean airliner, that "our antiaircraft 
defense has fulfilled its duty for the 
defense of the security of our mother- 
land." They have suggested that they 
may have mistaken the Korean airliner 
for an American reconnaissance plane, 
but still do not admit that they attacked 
and destroyed it. 

But none of these lies, half lies, and 
excuses can withstand examination. 
Straying off course is not recognized as 
a capital crime by civilized nations. And 
no nation has the sovereign right to 
shoot down any person or vehicle that 
may stray across its border in 
peacetime. There are internationally 
agreed upon standards for intercepting 
unwelcome aircraft. They call for serious 
efforts at identification, verification, 
warning, and, if the case is serious, for 
intercepting the intruder and forcing it 
to land or to leave one's airspace. 
Sovereignty neither requires nor permits 
shooting down airliners in peacetime. 
Recently the Soviets have implied 
that the KAL #007 may have been 
mistaken for a U.S. aerial reconnais- 
sance flight. But that is no more per- 
suasive. The Korean Boeing 747 was on 
a routine scheduled flight. At the time it 
was shot down, the U.S. reconnaissance 
plane referred to by the Soviets had 
been on the ground 1,500 miles away for 
more than an hour. 



Moreover, the United States does 
not fly reconnaissance missions in Soviet 
airspace. We do regularly operate air- 
craft in international airspace to monitor 
Soviet compliance with SALT and other 
arms control agreements. The Soviets 
know what our usual flight patterns are 
and can readily identify these missions. 

Finally, neither the United States 
nor any other country upset about the 
slaughter of the 269 passengers of 
KAL #007 is creating a "hulabaloo" by 
exaggerating the importance of the 
events. We are protesting very impor- 
tant violations of the norms of civilized 
conduct on which international aviation 
rests, without which it will not be possi- 
ble for any of us to board airliners, fly 
across continents and oceans without 
fear of being the object of a murderous 
attack. To a degree we rarely consider, 
international air travel depends on net- 
works of mutual trust that we will not 
shoot down one another's airliners, kid- 
nap, jail, or poison passengers and 
crews. 

Why did the Soviet Union violate 
these norms; why have they lied about 
it? Two reasons are most often advanced 
to explain why the Soviet pilot shot 
down the airliner. One is that it was a 
mistake— the mistake of a trigger-happy 
pilot who, with his ground controller, 
followed a philosophy of shoot now, 
identify later. 

But if pilot error was responsible for 
this tragic mistake, why has the Soviet 
Government not said so? Why has it 
lied, and why is it complementing the 
murderous attack on KAL #007 with a 
lying attack on the United States for 
provocation and aggression? 

As I considered this question, my 
mind returned to a debate that took 
place in this Security Council 21 years 
ago when my distinguished predecessor, 
Adlai Stevenson, called the attention of 
the Council to the "unmistakable evi- 
dence" that a series of facilities for 
launching offensive nuclear missiles was 
being installed in the Western Hemi- 
sphere. Soviet representative Zorin flat- 
ly denied the charges and, as Soviet 
representatives so often do, coupled his 
lying denial with a vicious attack on the 
United States. Our calling attention to 
threatening Soviet behavior, Zorin as- 
serted, only masked the United States' 
own aggression and piracy. But Adlai 
Stevenson, too, had the photographic- 
evidence to back up his charge— as irre- 
futable as the audio tapes we have to- 
day. 

The fact is that violence and lies are 
regular instruments of Soviet policy. 



10 



Department of State Bulletin 



KAL #007 



Soviet officials regularly behave as 
though truth were only a function of 
force and will — as if the truth were only 
what they said it is; as if violence were 
an instrument of first resort in foreign 
affairs. They occupy Afghanistan and 
accuse the United States of interference 
in internal affairs. They create massive 
new European vulnerabilities with their 
SS-20s and accuse NATO of seeking to 
upset the balance of power. 

We think otherwise. We believe that 
truth is as vital to cooperation and peace 
among nations as among people 

It is depressing to consider seriously 
our global prospects if they must be 
built on relations devoid of truth, devoid 
of trust. It is depressing to consider a 
world in which a major nation equipped 
with the most powerful modern weapons 
believes it has a sovereign right to fire 
on a commercial airliner lost over its 
territory. These Soviet actions and 
claims illuminate the Soviet conception 
of appropriate relations among nations 
in peacetime. They illuminate the world 
in which we live and work and make 
policy. 

Of course, some sophisticated ob- 
servers believe that the destruction of 
KAL #007 was not the work of an iso- 
lated Strangelove, unconcerned about 
human life but was, instead, a deliberate 
stroke designed to intimidate — a brutal, 
decisive act meant to instill fear and 
hesitation in all who observed its ruth- 
less violence much as the destruction of 
Afghan villagers or the imprisonment of 
the Helsinki monitors are intended to 
secure compliance through terror. 

Whichever the case — whether the 
destruction of KAL #007 and its pas- 
sengers reflects only utter indifference 
to human life or whether it was de- 
signed to intimidate — we are dealing 
here not with pilot error but with deci- 
sions and priorities characteristic of a 
system. Not only did Soviet officials 
shoot down a stray commercial airliner 
and lie about it, they have callously re- 
fused offers of international participa- 
tion in search-and-rescue efforts in spite 
of clearly stated "International Stand- 
ards and Recommended Practices" of 
the International Civil Aviation 
Organization, which call on states to 
"grant any necessary permission for the 
entry of such aircraft, vessels, personnel 
or equipment into its territory and make 
necessary arrangements . . . with a view 
to expediting such entry." 

We are reminded once again that 
the Soviet Union is a state based on the 
dual principles of callousness and men- 
dacity. It is dedicated to the rule of 



force. Here is how Lenin described the 
"dictatorship of the proletariat" in 1920: 
"The scientific concept of 'dictatorship' 
means nothing more than unrestricted 
power, absolutely unimpeded by law or 
regulations and resting directly on 
force" (the fifth Russian edition of 
Lenin's collected works, Vol. 41, p. 383). 

It is this principle of force — this 
mentality of force— that lies at the root 
of the Korean airline tragedy. This is 
the reality revealed to the world by this 
horrible tragedy. It is a reality that we 
all must ponder as we consider the 
threats to peace and human rights that 
face all of us today. 

The United States deeply believes 
that immediate steps should be taken 
here in the United Nations to decrease 
the likelihood of any repetition of the 
tragedy of KAL #007. We ask our col- 
leagues to join with us in the coming 
days in the effort to wrest from the 
tragedy of KAL #007 new clarity about 
the character of our world and new con- 
structive efforts to render us all more 
secure in the air and on the ground. 



ACTING SECRETARY 
EAGLEBURGER'S STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 6, 1983 12 

Today the Soviet Government at last ad- 
mitted that its forces shot down KAL 
#007. Their confession comes only after 
the truth was known everywhere, that 
the U.S.S.R., without any justification, 
shot down an unarmed civilian airliner 
with 269 people aboard. And their ad- 
mission was made only after the entire 
civilized world had condemned the 
Soviet action. Yet the Soviet Union has 
still not apologized, nor has it accepted 
responsibility for this atrocity. On the 
contrary, the Soviet Government states 
flatly that it will take the same action in 
the future in similar circumstances. 

The international community is thus 
being asked to accept that the Soviet 
Union is not bound by the norms of in- 
ternational behavior and human decency 
to which virtually all other nations 
subscribe. 

The Soviet Government statement 
claims that the Soviet air defense forces 
concluded that the Korean airliner was a 
reconnaissance plane on a spying mis- 
sion. It strains credulity to accept the 
argument that the Soviets, after more 
than 2V2 hours of tracking, and after the 
SU-15 that later shot down KAL #007 
had moved to approximately 1 mile from 
the Korean aircraft, failed to identify 
the KAL airliner for what it was — a 
distinctively shaped Boeing 747 commer- 



cial aircraft. Despite statements by the 
Soviet Government to the contrary, it is 
clear from the recording of the Soviet 
interceptor pilots' conversations with 
ground control that the Korean airliner's 
navigation lights were, in fact, illumi- 
nated. The recording reveals no warn- 
ings given to the doomed KAL flight. 

The statement that attempts were 
made on the international distress fre- 
quency — 121.5 megacycles — is not borne 
out by the facts. Even if the Soviet air- 
craft had that capability — which we do 
not believe — there is no evidence on the 
tapes of the Soviet pilots making any 
such transmission. The Korean airliner's 
radios were working prior to the shoot- 
down — as evidenced by the position 
reports made by the pilot to Japanese 
ground radio stations up to the time he 
was blasted out of the sky by a Soviet 
fighter. These transmissions were re- 
markable only by the routine nature of 
the conversations. 

Just as there is no indication that 
the Soviet fighters attempted to contact 
the innocent airliner using the estab- 
lished international procedures, there is 
no indication that the airliner was either 
aware of or trying to evade the Soviet 
fighters or even that it was aware of the 
presence of those aircraft. Tragically, 
there is no indication that the Korean 
airliner even thought it was off course. 

Previous Soviet accounts have been 
demonstrated by this most recent state- 
ment to be, at a minimum, grossly mis- 
leading. Today's release continues to lie 
to the world but also raises the most 
serious questions about the competence 
of the Soviet air defense system, with all 
the danger that implies. 

The world community still needs 
straight answers. We are tired of lies 
and half-truths. Decent respect for the 
opinion of mankind requires that: 

• The Soviet Union must provide a 
full accounting of what transpired; 

• It must make an unequivocal 
apology for its actions; 

• It must make restitution for the 
victims' families; and 

• It must cooperate with interna- 
tional efforts to investigate this tragedy 
and to recover its victims. 

The Soviet Union must accept the 
norms of civilized society in respecting 
the lives of innocent travelers. The 
world demands that the Soviet Union 
give assurances and take specific steps 
to ensure that the events of August 31 
cannot occur again. 



October 1983 



11 



KAL #007 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT. 
SEPT. 7, 1983 13 

The Soviet TASS "news analysis" of 
September 7 on "Larry Speakes' 
Strange Logic," has come to my atten- 
tion. In it, their commentator, Yuriy 
Kornilov, writes that his country will 
continue to act "in compliance with 

laws" which call for the shooting 
down of unarmed aircraft which may 
chance to fly over their airspace. This 
comes on the heels of the Soviet Govern- 
ment's admission of yesterday that its 
forces shot down the unarmed airliner of 
another country on August 31 and killed 
269 people from 13 countries. This ad- 
mission came only after the truth was 
known everywhere else in the world— 
and even known to some in the Soviet 
Union through BBC, VOA, and other in- 
ternational broadcast outlets that bring 
the facts to the truth-starved people 
under the control of the Soviet regime. 
The admission, however, was coupled 
with a flat Soviet statement saying they 
will take the same action in the future in 
similar circumstances — in other words, 
that they will shoot down the next off- 
course unarmed aircraft that trans- 
gresses the territory prescribed by 
Soviet law. 

As Under Secretary of State 
Lawrence Eagleburger said yesterday, 
the international community is being 
asked to accept that the Soviet Union is 
not bound by the norms of international 
behavior and human decency to which 
all other nations subscribe. 

Fortunately, the international com- 
munity is not accepting this, and con- 
tinues to ask — at the United Nations in 
particular — that the Soviets provide a 
full accounting of what transpired, an 
unequivocal apology for Soviet actions, 
restitution for the victims' families, full 
cooperation with international efforts to 
investigate this tragedy and recover its 
victims, and assurances that the Soviet 
Union will take specific steps to ensure 
that the massacre of August 31 not oc- 
cur again. The case is in no way closed 
by the Soviet admission of yesterday. 



SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, 
MADRID, SEPT. 7, 1983 14 

1 have a brief comment on Mr. 
Gromyko's address. Foreign Minister 
i iromyko says: "We state"— and I'm 
reading the translation here — "in Soviet 
territory the borders of the Soviet Union 
are sacred." The implication is that if 
anyone strays over them, they are ready 



to shoot them down again. I think that 
illustrates the difference in allocation of 
weight to security on the one hand and 
human values on the other. There is no 
weight given to human values in that 
kind of a statement. 

Secondly, he speaks of a dishonest 
juggling of facts and falsehoods. The 
falsehoods have been continuous, and 
juggling of the facts is too mild a word 
for the way in which the Soviet Union 
has responded to this Korean plane 
shootdown. The falsehoods are on the 
part of the Soviet Union, and they con- 
tinue in Mr. Gromyko's speech. And I 
would have to say that I am very disap- 
pointed to sit here in the hall and hear 
that continued falsehood on such a mat- 
ter of moving importance in the human 
rights area at the conclusion of a con- 
ference that has stressed human rights 
matters so strongly. 



SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, 
MADRID, SEPT. 8, 1983 15 

The unprovoked Soviet destruction of a 
defenseless, unarmed Korean airliner 
has underlined the basic themes of this 
conference in the most distressing con- 
ceivable way. This Madrid conference 
has been about the fundamental relation- 
ship between human rights and security. 
This brutal Soviet action has vividly 
displayed the Soviet Union's lack of con- 
cern for the human lives involved, and 
the preposterous explanation the Soviets 
have offered and continue to offer to a 
disbelieving world has only compounded 
the problem. 

In his formal statement to the con- 
ference yesterday, Foreign Minister 
Gromyko made matters even worse by 
claiming that his country had the right 
to do what it did and has the right to do 
it again. 

My comments in our meeting this 
afternoon were appropriately focused on 
human rights, and particularly on the 
rights of people everywhere who expect 
decent regard for their lives and safety 
when they travel by air. 

Foreign Minister Gromyko's re- 
sponse to me today was even more un- 
satisfactory than the response he gave 
in public yesterday. I find it totally un- 
acceptable. 

This is not the end of the matter. In 
the days and weeks ahead, the United 
States, along with others throughout the 
international community, will press hard 
In)' justice for the families of those 
murdered and safety and security for in- 
nocenl travelers. 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 8, 1983 16 

The governing board of the Interna- 
tional Federation of Air Line Pilots 
Associations (IFALPA) has recom- 
mended to its national associations a 
60-day ban on civil airline flights to 
Moscow. IFALPA notes that this recom- 
mendation was made in response to "the 
action of the Soviet Union in destroying 
a defenseless civilian airliner" — Korean 
Air Lines #007. IFALPA concludes that 
"we expect our members to fully 
comply" with the ban. 

American travelers to the Soviet 
Union should be aware that the pro- 
posed IFALPA ban could seriously 
disrupt air travel to the Soviet Union. 
Flights to and from the Soviet Union 
may be canceled without notice. Arrang- 
ing alternate transportation to and from 
the Soviet Union could potentially in- 
volve substantially higher costs to the 
traveler. Travelers should also anticipate 
lengthy delays in obtaining such 
transportation from Moscow should the 
ban be fully implemented. 



PRESIDENT'S LETTER 

TO THE CHAIRMAN, 

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, 

SEPT. 8, 1983 10 

Dear Dan [Daniel McKinnon], 
The Soviet attack on Korean Air Line 
Flight 7 on Sept. 1, 1983, which resulted in 
the loss of 269 innocent lives, calls for a 
united, firm and measured response from the 
international community. Toward this end, I 
have initiated a number of measures in coor- 
dination with other nations and in interna- 
tional fora to insure that measures are taken 
against the Soviet Union to secure ap- 
propriate redress for this tragic loss of lives 
and property. 

I. therefore, have determined that it is in 
the essential foreign policy interest of the 
I 'nited States to take resolute action against 
the Soviet air carrier, Aeroflot. I have deter- 
mined that it would he appropriate to reaf- 
firm the suspension of Aeroflot flights to and 
from the United States, which has been in ef- 
fect since January 5, 1982. 

In addition, I am requesting the ( livil 
Aeronautics Board to take the following 
steps, effective as of September 12, 1983: 

One: suspend Aeroflot's right to sell any 
air transportation in the United States. 

Two: preclude U.S. air carriers from 
carrying traffic to, from or within the United 
Slates where Aeroflot is on the itinerary. 

Three: prohibit U.S. air carriers from 
selling in the United States any air transpor- 
tation any part of which is on Aeroflot. 

Number four: direct U.S. air carriers to 
suspend any interline service arrangements 



12 



Department of State Bulletin 



KAL #007 



with Aeroflot either effective as of or entered 
into after September 12, 1983. 

And five: prohibit U.S. air carriers from 
accepting any tickets or shipping document 
issued by Aeroflot for air transportation to, 
from or within the United States. 

The board should take appropriate im- 
mediate action to implement this decision. 
These actions will be consistent with the in- 
ternational obligations of the United States. 
These measures should remain in effect until 
further notification. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Reagan 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 

SEPT. 8, 1983 13 

In response to the brutal and unpro- 
voked Soviet attack on Korean Air 
Lines #007 on September 1, 1983, the 
President has requested the Civil Aero- 
nautics Board to take strong action 
against the Soviet airline Aeroflot. In a 
letter sent this morning to CAB Chair- 
man Dan McKinnon, the President 
asked the Board to take the following 
action, effective September 12, 1983: 

(1) To suspend the right of Aeroflot 
to sell tickets in the United States; 

(2) To prohibit U.S. airlines from 
selling tickets in the United States for 
transportation on Aeroflot; 

(3) To preclude U.S. airlines from 
carrying traffic to, from, or within the 
United States where an Aeroflot flight 
i;s on the ticket; 

(4) To direct U.S. airlines to suspend 
iny interline service arrangements with 
Aeroflot; and 

(5) To prohibit U.S. airlines from ac- 
iepting any tickets issued by Aeroflot 
? or air travel to, from, or within the 
United States. 

The President has also reaffirmed 
:he suspension of Aeroflot flights to and 
'rom this country which has been in ef- 
fect since January 5, 1982. The impend- 
ng board decision would prevent 
Aeroflot from marketing any of its serv- 
ces through U.S. carriers or their 
American agents. The President re- 
quests all United States airlines and 
;ravel agents to comply with the letter 
md spirit of these actions. 

The duration of these measures in 
;he civil aviation area will be for a 
jeriod of time, in part dependent upon 
;he extent to which the U.S.S.R. 
iemonstrates its willingness to honor 
jessential standards of civil aviation, 
•nakes a full account of its shootdown of 
;he airliner, and issues an apology as 
>vell as compensation to aggrieved 
Darties. 



Dctober1983 



In another action, as directed by the 
President, Acting Secretary of State 
Lawrence S. Eagleburger informed 
Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin today that 
the Soviet airline Aeroflot must close its 
offices in the United States by 
September 15. Aeroflot airline officials 
must depart this country by that date. 

The United States will continue to 
work with the members of the interna- 
tional community in their efforts to pro- 
mote air safety and to deter such Soviet 
actions from happening again. 



PROCLAMATION, 
SEPT. 9, 1983 10 

September 1, 1983, will be seared in the 
minds of civilized people everywhere as the 
night of the Korean Air Lines Massacre. Two 
hundred sixty-nine innocent men, women and 
children, from 13 different countries, who 
were flying aboard KAL flight 007, were 
stalked, then shot out of the air and sent 
crashing to their deaths by a missile aimed 
and fired by the Soviet Union. 

Good and decent people everywhere are 
filled with revulsion by this despicable deed, 
and by the refusal of the guilty to tell the 
truth. This was a crime against humanity 
that must never be forgotten, here or 
throughout the world. 

We open our hearts in prayer to the vic- 
tims and their families. We earnestly beseech 
Almighty God to minister to them in their 
trial of grief, sorrow, and pain. 

In the memory, we ask all people who 
cherish individual rights, and who believe 
each human life is sacred, to come together 
in a shared spirit of wisdom, unity, courage, 
and love, so the world can prevent such an 
inhuman act from ever happening again. 

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, 
President of the United States of America, in 
tribute to the memory of the slain passengers 
of Korean Air Lines flight 007, and as an ex- 
pression of public sorrow, do hereby apppoint 
Sunday, September 11, 1983, to be a Na- 
tional Day of Mourning throughout the 
United States. I recommend that the people 
assemble on that day in their respective 
places of worship, there to pay homage to the 
memory of those who died. I invite the people 
of the world who share our grief to join us in 
this solemn observance. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto 
set my hand this ninth day of September, in 
the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and 
eighty three, and of the Independence of the 
United States of America the two hundred 
and eighth. 

Ronald Reagan 



PRESIDENT'S RADIO ADDRESS, 
SEPT. 10, 1983 9 

During my first press conference, 9 days 
after being sworn in as your President, I 
was asked a question having to do with 
Soviet intentions. In my answer, I cited 
their own words, that they have openly 
and publicly declared the only morality 
they recognize is what will further world 
communism, that they reserve unto 
themselves the right to commit any 
crime, to lie, to cheat, in order to attain 
that. And I pointed out that we should 
keep this in mind when we deal with 
them. 

I was charged with being too harsh 
in my language. I tried to point out I 
was only quoting their own words. I 
hope the Soviet's recent behavior will 
dispel any lingering doubt about what 
kind of regime we are dealing with and 
what our responsibilities are as trustees 
of freedom and peace. Isn't it time for 
all of us to see the Soviet rulers as they 
are rather than as we would like them 
to be? 

Rather than tell the truth about the 
Korean Air Lines massacre, rather than 
immediately and publicly investigate the 
crash, explain to the world how it hap- 
pened, punish those guilty of the crime, 
cooperate in efforts to find the 
wreckage, recover the bodies, apologize 
and offer compensation to the families, 
and work to prevent a repetition, they 
have done the opposite. They have 
stonewalled the world, mobilizing their 
entire government behind a massive 
cover-up, then brazenly threatening to 
kill more men, women, and children 
should another civilian airliner make the 
same mistake as KAL #007. 

The Soviets are terrified of the 
truth. They understand well and they 
dread the meaning of St. John's words, 
"You will know the truth, and the truth 
will set you free." The truth is mankind's 
best hope for a better world. That's why 
in times like this, few assets are more 
important than the Voice of America 
and Radio Liberty, our primary means 
of getting the truth to the Russian 
people. 

Within minutes of the report of the 
Soviet destruction of the Korean jet, the 
Voice of America aired the story in its 
news programs around the globe. We 
made sure people in Africa, Asia, the 
Middle East, Europe, and, most impor- 
tant, the people in the Soviet bloc itself 
knew the truth. That includes every 
Soviet misstatement, from their initial 
denials through all the tortured changes 
and contradictions in their story, in- 
cluding their UN representative still de- 



13 



KAL #007 



nying they shot down the plane even as 
his own government was finally admit- 
ting they did. 

Accurate news like this is about as 
welcome as the plague among the Soviet 
elite. Censorship is as natural and 
necessary to the survival of their dic- 
tatorship as free speech is to our 
democracy. That's why they devote such 
enormous resources to block our broad- 
cast inside Soviet-controlled countries. 
The Soviets spend more to block 
Western broadcasts coming into those 
countries than the entire worldwide 
budget of the Voice of America. 

To get the news across to the Rus- 
sian people about the Korean Air Lines 
massacre, the Voice of America added 
new frequencies and new broadcast 
times. But within minutes of those 
changes, new Soviet jamming began. 
Luckily, jamming is more like a sieve 
than a wall. International radio broad- 
casts can still get through to many peo- 
ple with the news. But we still face 
enormous difficulties. 

One of the Voice of America's 
listeners in the Middle East wrote: "If 
you do not strengthen your broadcasting 
frequencies, no one can get anything 
from your program." Our radio equip- 
ment is just plain old, some of it World 
War II vintage. I don't mind people get- 
ting older; it's just not so good for 
machines. 

More than 35% of the Voice of 
America's transmitters are over 30 
years old. We have a similar problem at 
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. 
We have 6 antiquated 500-kilowatt 
shortwave transmitters. The Soviets 
have 37, and theirs are neither old nor 
outdated. We regularly receive com- 
plaints that Soviet broadcasts are 
clearer than ours. One person wrote and 
asked why it's not possible for a nation 
that can send ships into space to have 
its own voice heard here on Earth. 

The answer is simple. We are as far 
behind the Soviets and their allies in in- 
ternational broadcasting today as we 
were in space when they launched 
Sputnik in 1957. 

We have repeatedly urged the Con- 
gress to support our long-term modern- 
ization program and our proposal for a 
new radio station, Radio Marti, for 
broadcasting to Cuba. The sums in- 
volved are modest, but for whatever 
reason this critical program has not 
been enacted. 

Today I am appealing to the Con- 
gress, help us get the truth through — 
help us strengthen our international 
broadcasting effort by supporting in- 



14 



creased funding for the Voice of 
America, Radio Free Europe, Radio 
Liberty, and by authorizing the estab- 
lishment of Radio Marti. 

And I appeal to you, especially those 
of you who came from Eastern Europe, 
Russian, and Soviet-dominated countries 
who understand how crucial this issue is, 
let your representatives hear from you. 
Tell them you want Soviet rulers held 
accountable for their actions even by 
their own people. The truth is still our 
strongest weapon. We just have to use 
it. 

Finally, let us come together as a 
nation tomorrow in a National Day of 
Mourning to share the sorrow of the 
families, and let us resolve that this 
crime against humanity will never be 
forgotten anywhere in the world. 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 11, 1983 17 

As part of the policy of the U.S. Govern- 
ment to develop full information on the 
tragic shootdown of KAL #007 by Soviet 
forces on August 31, U.S. Government 
experts have continued to review the 
poor quality transmission on the tape 
which was played at the UN Security 
Council September 6. That review has 
now been completed. After efforts at 
electronic enhancement and hundreds of 
replays of the tape, U.S. Government 
linguists were able to interpret three 
passages more clearly as indicated 
below. 

The first segment at 1819:08 which 
originally was translated "I have enough 
time," now is translated as "They do not 
see me." The second segment was a 
previously unintelligible phrase at 
1820:49, which has now been translated 
as "I am firing cannon bursts." Because 
of the Soviet pilot's reference at 1828:05 
to launching "both" rockets, the linguists 
also rechecked the reference at 1823:37 
which was previously translated as 
"rocket." They were able to clarify that 
the plural was used; thus the transla- 
tions should be "... , now I will try 
rockets." 

The transcript does not indicate 
whether the cannon shots were aimed at 
the KAL plane or were tracer rounds. 
We do note that, according to informa- 
tion made available by the Government 
of Japan to the United Nations, KAL 
#007, in its routine radio transmissions 
to Tokyo at 1823 18 (over 2 minutes after 
the cannons were fired) gave no indica- 
tion it was aware of Soviet aircraft in 
the vicinity or that cannon had been 
fired. The evidence indicates that the 



pilot was totally unaware of the fact 
that he was off course, that he was in- 
tercepted by Soviet fighters, or that any 
warnings — visual, radio, gunfire — were 
given. 

This additional analysis of the tapes 
reinforces our belief that the totality of 
the events remains exactly as stated by 
the United States and Japan. The 
Korean airliner was not aware of the 
Soviet fighters, nor was it aware that 
any warning was given. The Soviets con- 
sciously made the decision to shoot dowr 
the aircraft. The fact is that it was an 
unarmed, civilian airliner, and it cost the 
lives of 269 innocent people. 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 12, 1983 16 

At 10:30 a.m. today, Acting Assistant 
Secretary of State for European Affairs 
John H. Kelly presented the Soviet Em- 
bassy's Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) 
Sokolov with a diplomatic note demand- 
ing compensation from the Soviet Union 
for the lives of U.S. nationals aboard 
Korean Air Lines #007. The note in- 
dicated that the United States considers 
the Soviet Union's destruction of that 
aircraft as a "flagrant and unjustifiable 
breach of applicable principles of inter- 
national law and as a direct violation of 
internationally agreed procedures to be 
followed when an aircraft inadvertently 
intrudes on a state's territorial air- 
space." The note further characterized 
the Soviet Union's action as "wrongful" 
and as giving rise to "responsibility 
under international law to make repara- 
tion." The U.S. diplomatic note did not 
specify an amount of compensation but 
indicated that the United States will 
supplement its claim with specifics at a 
later date. 

Soviet DCM Sokolov refused to ac- 
cept the note. Acting Assistant Secre- 
tary Kelly refused to accept Mr. 
Sokoloff s rejection of the U.S. note. 

At the same time the U.S. note was 
presented to DCM Sokolov, Mr. Kelly 
presented a similar diplomatic note on 
behalf of the Government of the 
Republic of Korea demanding compensa- 
tion for its losses as well. DCM Sokolov 
also rejected that note. 

We shall continue to press the 
Soviets to meet their clear obligation 
under international law to pay compen- 
sation to both the United States and 
Korea. 



Department of State Bulletin 



KAL #007 



U.S. DIPLOMATIC NOTE, 
SEPT. 12. 1983 19 

The United States refers to the Soviet 
Union's action of September 1, 1983 in firing 
upon and destroying an unarmed civil air- 
liner, Korean Air Lines Flight No. 007, in the 
vicinity of Sakhalin Island, thereby causing 
the deaths of 269 innocent persons. The 
United States considers this action as a 
flagrant and unjustifiable breach of applicable 
principles of international law and as a direct 
violation of internationally agreed procedures 
to be followed when an aircraft inadvertently 
intrudes on a state's territorial airspace. The 
United States submits that the Soviet Union's 
action was wrongful and gives rise to re- 
sponsibility under international law to make 
reparation. 

The United States Government therefore 
demands that the Soviet Union provide 
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation 
to the United States Government for the 
lives of United States nationals aboard 
Korean Air Lines Flight No. 007 and for any 
other compensable loss incurred by any 
United States national as a result of the 
Soviet Union's wrongful actions. The United 
States will advise the Soviet Union at a later 
date of the specific losses for which the 
United States considers the Soviet Union 
-esponsible under international law. 

This demand is in addition to any other 
? orm of redress that the United States may 
awfully require from the Soviet Union for its 
iction in firing upon and destroying Korean 
^.ir Lines Flight No. 007. 



J.S. DIPLOMATIC NOTE 
3N BEHALF OF 
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, 
SEPT. 12, 1983 19 

The Government of the Republic of Korea 
las requested that the United States refer to 
he attention of the Soviet Embassy the 
testruction by Soviet military aircraft of a 
Corean Air Lines passenger aircraft, Korean 
Vir Lines Flight No. 007, on September 1, 
983. The Government of the Republic of 
Corea advises the United States that it con- 
;iders the destruction of the Korean Air 
jines aircraft by Soviet military aircraft as 
vrongful under international law and as 
•reating an obligation on the part of the 
Soviet Union to pay reparation to the 
Jovernment of the Republic of Korea. 

The Government of the Republic of Korea 
las further requested that the United States 
lemand from the Soviet Union on behalf of 
he Government of the Republic of Korea 
>rompt, adequate, and effective compensation 
or the lives of Korean nationals aboard 
Korean Air Lines Flight No. 007 and for any 
>ther compensable loss incurred by any 
Korean national or by the Government of the 
tepublic of Korea or any of its agencies or 
nstrumentalities as a result of the Soviet 
Jnion's wrongful action. The Government of 
he Republic of Korea will at a later date 



notify the United States, and through the 
United States the Soviet Union, of specific 
losses for which the Government of the 
Republic of Korea considers the Soviet Union 
responsible under international law. 

The Government of the Republic of Korea 
has further requested the United States to 
advise the Soviet Embassy that the Republic 
of Korea reserves the right to demand any 
other lawful form of redress from the Soviet 
Union for its destruction of Korean Air Lines 
Flight No. 007. 



UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
PROVISIONAL RESOLUTION 
S/15966/REV. 1, 
SEPT. 12, 1983 20 

The Security Council, 

Having considered the letters dated 
1 September 1983 from the Acting Perma- 
nent Representative of the United States of 
America (S/15947), the Permanent Observer 
of the Republic of Korea (S/15948), the 
Charge d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission 
of Canada (S/15949) and the Permanent 
Representative of Japan (S/15950), and the 
letter dated 2 September 1983 from the Act- 
ing Permanent Representative of Australia 
(S/15951), 

Gravely disturbed that a civil air liner of 
the Korean Airlines on an international flight 
was shot down by Soviet military aircraft, 
with the loss of all 269 people on board, 

Ex-pressing its sincere condolences to the 
families of the victims of the incident, and 
urging all parties concerned, as a 
humanitarian gesture, to assist them in deal- 
ing with the consequences of this tragedy, 

Reaffirming the rules of international law 
that prohibit acts of violence which pose a 
threat to the safety of international civil 
aviation, 

Recognizing the importance of the princi- 
ple of territorial integrity as well as the 
necessity that only internationally agreed 
procedures should be used in response to in- 
trusions into the airspace of a State, 

Stressing the need for a full and adequate 
explanation of the facts of the incident based 
upon impartial investigation, 

Recognizing the right under international 
law to appropriate compensation, 

1. Deeply deplores the destruction of the 
Korean air liner and the tragic loss of civilian 
life therein; 

2. Declares that such use of armed force 
against international civil aviation is incom- 
patible with the norms governing interna- 
tional behaviour and elementary considera- 
tions of humanity; 

3. Urges all States to comply with the 
aims and objectives of the Chicago Conven- 
tion on International Civil Aviation; 

4. Welcomes the decision to convene an 
urgent meeting of the Council of the Interna- 
tional Civil Aviation Organization to consider 
the Korean air liner incident; 

5. Urges all States to co-operate fully 
with the International Civil Aviation 



Organization in efforts to strengthen the 
safety of international civil aviation and to 
prevent any recurrence of such use of armed 
force against international civil aviation; 

6. Invites the Secretary-General, making 
use of such expert advice as he deems 
necessary and in consultation with ap- 
propriate international bodies, to conduct a 
full investigation into the circumstances of 
the tragedy; 

7. Further invites the Secretary-General 
to report his findings to the Security Council 
within 14 days; 

8. Calls upon all States to lend their 
fullest co-operation to the Secretary-General 
in order to facilitate his investigation pur- 
suant to the present resolution; 

9. Decides to remain seized of the issue. 



AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK'S 

STATEMENT, 

UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 

SEPT. 12, 1983 21 

The issue that we have been discussing 
now for more than a week bears directly 
on the ability of all of us working 
together, working singly to secure and 
preserve peace in this world. It bears 
also on the readiness of member states 
to take responsibility for achieving a 
civilized and peaceful international 
order. 

Destruction of the civilian airliner, 
KAL #007, was a deeply shocking act. 
But even more disturbing than the deed 
itself has been the behavior of the Soviet 
Government in the days since it shot 
down that plane. Had the Soviet 
Government taken responsibility for the 
action, admitted that a terrible mistake 
had been made, offered compensation to 
the families for the loss of life, and in 
cooperation with other states under- 
taken a review of the incident to ensure 
that such a tragedy would not recur, 
then the consequences of the event 
would have been contained and, to the 
degree possible, minimized. Nothing, to 
be sure, could reclaim the lives of 269 
people. But relations among nations 
would not have suffered, and civilian air 
travel might have been rendered less 
vulnerable to such errors in the future. 

But as we all know, the response of 
the Soviet Government has been quite 
different. Instead of admitting error, it 
has insisted that no error was made. In- 
stead of taking responsibility for the act, 
it has lashed out with groundless accusa- 
tions. Instead of taking steps to ensure 
against a repetition of such an incident, 
it has emphasized that it would do the 
same thing all over again. 



October 1983 



15 



KAL #007 



By taking this position, the Soviet 
Union has magnified the negative conse- 
quences of a tragic incident and has 
damaged anew the already tattered 
fabric of international relations. It has 
further poisoned the international atmo- 
sphere. For this, as for the incident 
itself, the Soviet Union must bear heavy 
responsibility. 

During the past 10 days, the Soviet 
Union has taken a position at once in- 
consistent and contradictory. It has been 
self-justifying and self-defeating in its 
statements. In its determined defense of 
an indefensible act, the Soviet Union has 
demonstrated an attitude that is as con- 
temptuous of the truth as it is callous 
toward human life— an attitude under- 
scored by its veto of the resolution 
before us today. 

For nearly a week, the Soviet Union 
refused to admit it shot down flight 
#007. Then it admitted to having fired 
warning shots. Only after the public 
disclosure of the tape recordings in 
which the Soviet pilot told Soviet ground 
control that he had executed the order 
to destroy "the target," did the Soviet 
Government announce that one of its 
pilots had, in fact, "stopped the flight," 
as they euphemistically put it. 

In the ensuing days, we have heard 
a tangle of charges from the Soviet 
Union. On the one hand, it has been said 
that flight #007 was itself on a spy mis- 
sion and therefore invited destruction. 
But it has also been said that the 
presence, earlier in the evening, of an 
RC-135 reconnaissance plane, which had 
landed more than 1,500 miles away from 
the location of the incident, "caused" the 
Soviet pilot to mistake the two aircrafts, 
thus acknowledging tacitly that the 
Korean 747 was not on a spy mission 
after all. 

Not surprisingly, the testimony of 
the Soviet pilot who shot down KAL 
#007 corroborates the official Soviet ver- 
sion of events. The Korean pilot is dead 
and cannot refute this testimony. But it 
is interesting and significant, I believe, 
to note in this context the testimony 
given to The New York Times by Kim 
Chang Kyu, the pilot of the Korean Air 
Lines plane that strayed over Soviet air- 
space in 1978, thus becoming the target 
of a Soviet missile that sheared off near- 
ly 15 feet of the plane's left wing and 
killed two of the plane's passengers. The 
pilot was able to regain control of the 
plane and was able to make an emergen- 
cy landing on a frozen lake 400 miles 
northeast of Leningrad. 

"After I was shot down," the pilot 
recounts, "the Russians made the same 



claims we're hearing now. They said, 
'We tracked you for more than 2 hours, 
flew around the plane, fired tracers in 
front of you' — all that. It all sounds ex- 
actly the same this time." 

Mr. Kim gives a different version of 
what actually happened. He tells us he 
saw the plane only once, off to the right 
and somewhat behind him. He thought 
this was strange, since international 
guidelines call for intercepting fighters 
to fly to the left of the plane, where the 
pilot sits. When Mr. Kim's copilot, who 
had a clearer view of the plane, reported 
that it bore the red Soviet star, Mr. Kim 
immediately slowed his speed and 
turned his landing lights off and on 
repeatedly, the recognized international 
signal that an aircraft will follow the in- 
terceptor's directions. In addition, 
Mr. Kim tried to establish contact with 
the Soviet craft, but the two planes' 
radios were on different frequencies. In 
any event, the next thing Mr. Kim knew 
a missile fired by the Soviet pilot had 
torn off a good part of his plane's left 
wing. 

In light of this previous incident, and 
in view of the established fact that the 
pilot of KAL #007 made no radio trans- 
missions indicating that he had been in- 
tercepted, one can only conclude that 
there was no communication with the 
pilot of KAL #007 in accordance with 
normal procedures and on normal 
emergency frequencies. 

The fact that the tapes now show 
that the Soviet pilot fired "cannon 
bursts" 6 minutes before he destroyed 
KAL #007 does not alter this conclusion. 
Clearly the Korean pilot was not aware 
of the Soviet fighters, nor was he aware 
that any warning was given. If there 
were shots fired 6 minutes in advance of 
the fatal shot, it, therefore, seems likely 
that they were not tracers but regular, 
normal cannon rounds which are not 
visible. 

Even assuming for the sake of argu- 
ment that the Soviet pilot had tried to 
establish communication with the pilot 
of KAL #007, but for some reason that 
we do not know had failed to get 
through, this would not justify shooting 
down a 7U7 civilian airliner. 

What conceivable harm could the 
plane have done, especially since it was 
within 60 seconds of leaving Soviet air- 
space, a fact that renders absurd the 
statement by one of the Soviet pilots 
that the 747 might have been carrying 
"a bomb that might have fallen, maybe 
on my house" — presumably located in 
the Sea of Japan. 



Let us recall for a moment the inci- 
dent almost 2 years ago when a Soviet 
W-class submarine penetrated deep into 
restricted Swedish waters near 
Karlskrona naval base and ran aground 
there. In response to the protest of the 
Swedish Government, the Soviet 
Government said: 

It was expected, of course, that the 
Swedish authorities would abide by existing 
international norms under which if a foreign 
warship does not even observe the rules of a 
coastal state regarding passage through its 
territorial waters, the only thing the coastal 
state may do with respect to the given war- 
ship is to demand that it leave its territorial 
waters. 

According to this unique interpreta- 
tion of international law, if a Soviet war- 
ship — a warship, mind you — invades the 
territorial waters of another state, that 
state cannot even detain the warship but 
must simply escort it out of its terri- 
torial waters. But if a civilian airliner 
with 269 people aboard happens to stray 
into Soviet airspace, the Soviet Union is 
justified in shooting it down, even as it 
is about to exit that airspace. Mr. 
Leonid M. Zamyatin, the spokesman on 
the Central Committee for General 
Secretary Yuriy Andropov, went so far 
as to say that Soviet air defense forces 
were "humane" to have waited so long 
before destroying KAL #007. How 
callous it is to talk about "humaneness" 
with regard to a ruthless act that 
resulted in 269 deaths. Is a Soviet war- 
ship entitled to more "humane" treat- 
ment than a civilian airplane? 

The Soviet leadership refuses to con- 
cede the possibility that a civilian air- 
liner, traveling a scheduled flight, with 
269 people aboard, might have strayed 
accidentally into its airspace — despite 
the fact that there have been 21 re- 
corded incidents where civilian planes 
with similar navigational equipment 
have strayed off course. Here, too, the 
incident of the Soviet W-class submarine 
offers an interesting analogy. In its 
statement to the Government of 
Sweden, the Soviet Government rejected 
the Swedish charge that this warship 
was engaged in "carrying out impermis- 
sible activities," namely, spying. Accord- 
ing to the Soviet statement, the sub- 
marine "went of course as a result of the 
failure of its navigational instruments 
and resultant mistakes in position find- 
ing" and, therefore, "entered uninten- 
tionally the territorial waters of 
Sweden. . . . The Soviet side, taking into 
consideration the breakdown character 
of the incident, could rightfully expect at 
least a manifestation of correct attitude 



16 



Department of State Bulletin 



KAL #007 



and objective appraisal of what hap- 
pened." Instead, it charged the Swedish 
Government with "distorting facts," and 
it flatly rejected the Swedish demand "to 
prevent the recurrence of such a gross 
violation," saying — and I quote — "In this 
concrete case this sounds like a demand 
to rule out the very possibility of break- 
down situations occurring at sea. This 
demand," said the Soviet Union, "is 
simply out of tune with common sense." 

Yet the Soviet Union finds it is in- 
:onceivable that such a "breakdown 
situation," to use their term, might have 
Dccurred in the case of the civilian air- 
iner, KAL #007. 

Now we come to the final Soviet 
irgument— its ultimate line of defense. 
It was stated in explicit terms last week 
}y Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei 
jromyko: "We state," he said: "Soviet 
:erritory, the borders of the Soviet 
Jnion, are sacred." It is on the basis of 
;his principle that the top Soviet leader- 
ship has defended and, by so doing, has 
issumed responsibility for, the destruc- 
ion of a civilian airliner. 

In this context, we would like to ask 
he Soviet Union: Are the borders of the 
Soviet Union more sacred than, say, the 
•orders of Sweden, not to speak of the 
•orders of Afghanistan? Are they more 
acred than the airspace of the United 
States, which has frequently been 
iolated by Soviet planes flying off route 
ver sensitive military facilities, though 
hese planes have not as a result of such 
iolations been shot down? And how, 
lay we ask, can the Soviet Union recon- 
ile this remarkable doctrine of absolute 
ioviet sovereignty, according to which 
he Soviet Union is within its rights to 
hoot down a civilian airliner that strays 
cross its sacred borders, with its doc- 
rine of "limited sovereignty," which was 
ropounded 15 years ago in relationship 
d the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia? 

In the article in Pravda (Septem- 
ber 26, 1968) where this doctrine of 
limited sovereignty" was propounded, 
ne Soviet Union not only claimed the 
ight to invade any Soviet-bloc country 
hat threatened to deviate from the path 
f fealty to Moscow; it also claimed the 
ight to intervene in the internal affairs 
f states that are not part of the Soviet 
loc. 

This same article explains how the 
•oviet Union reconciles the doctrine of 
bsolute Soviet sovereignty with the 
octrine of 'limited sovereignty" for 
veryone else, as well as with the norms 
f international law. Accordingly, it 
tates that: 



Laws and the norms of law are subordi- 
nated to the laws of the class struggle and 
the laws of social development. . . . The class 
approach to the matter cannot be discarded 
in the name of legalistic considerations. Who- 
ever does so forfeits the only correct, class- 
oriented criterion for evaluating legal norms 
and begins to measure events with the yard- 
sticks of bourgeois law. 

In other words, there are two forms 
of law— "bourgeois law," which includes 
the Charter of the United Nations, and 
"the laws of the class struggle," and 
there is no question that in the Soviet 
view, the former are conditioned by and 
subordinate to the latter. This dual con- 
ception of international law accords to 
the Soviet Union absolute rights but no 
obligation to respect the rights of 
others, while it accords to all other 
states no rights but absolute obligations 
to respect the rights of the Soviet 
Union. 

The destruction of KAL #007, and 
especially the manner in which the 
Soviet Union has defended that action, 
has illuminated as few events in recent 
years the nature of the predicament that 
faces us all. 

I would like to quote from a letter 
written by a Soviet citizen who is surely 
one of the outstanding and most 
courageous persons of our age. I am re- 
ferring to Dr. Andrei Sakharov whose 
letter was secretly transmitted to the 
outside world from within the Soviet 
Union where he has been internally 
exiled. In his letter from exile, Dr. 
Sakharov warns that: 

The world is facing very difficult times 
and cruel cataclysms if the West and the 
developing countries trying to find their place 
in the world do not now show the required 
firmness, unity and consistency in resisting 
the totalitarian challenge. This relates to 
government, to the intelligentsia, business- 
men and to all people. It is important that 
the common danger be fully understood — 
everything else will then fall into place. 

If the destruction of KAL #007 helps 
us to understand the nature of the world 
in which we live and the dangers to our 
rights and laws therein, helps us to 
show the necessary clarity and firmness 
in defending precisely the principles of 
international law contained in the 
Charter of the United Nations, then 
perhaps the 269 people aboard that ill- 
fated airliner will not have died in vain. 

In closing, I should like to say that 
there is one question which above all 
confronts this Council and the world in 
this debate, which is responded to by the 
resolution we have adopted, in spite of 
its veto. Does a nation which is not at 



war have the right to shoot down planes 
that enter their airspace without 
authorization? That is the question with 
which we have been confronted. The 
answer to that question must be no. We 
do not believe that the protection of 
sovereignty of any nation gives that na- 
tion an absolute right in peacetime to 
shoot down any plane flying any place 
over its territory. There are interna- 
tionally agreed on procedures to take 
care of such problems. We believe that 
this view has been endorsed by a majori- 
ty of this Council in the resolution we 
have considered this afternoon. 

We stand ready to work with our 
colleagues to ensure greater safety for 
all passengers and pilots, indeed, for all 
people. 



FAA ADMINISTRATOR 
HELMS' STATEMENT, 
ICAO COUNCIL, 
MONTREAL, SEPT. 15, 1983 

I need not repeat the outrage expressed 
at the highest levels of my government 
at the interception and destruction by 
Soviet military aircraft of Korean Air 
Lines #007. We have expressed our 
deepest sympathy to the families of the 
269 passengers and crew aboard that ill- 
fated aircraft who were killed in this in- 
cident. As we know, from sad experi- 
ence, the attack on KAL #007 was not 
the first time that a civilian passenger 
airline has been intercepted and de- 
stroyed. This Soviet action constitutes a 
grave threat to the safety of the inter- 
national civil aviation system requiring 
urgent remedial measures. 

The civilized world cannot permit 
this type of incident to recur. This extra- 
ordinary session of the ICAO council 
must take action to initiate an investiga- 
tion of this incident, condemn those 
responsible, and clearly reaffirm that 
such use of force against civil aircraft is 
prohibited. 

I need not remind this distinguished 
audience of aviation experts that a 
previous incident involving a Soviet in- 
terception of a Korean Air Lines Boeing 
707 in 1978 prompted ICAO to revise its 
material in Annex 2 governing the inter- 
ception of civil aircraft. 

This latest event and the apparent 
repudiation by the U.S.S.R. of interna- 
tionally accepted legal and humanitarian 
norms for dealing with civil aircraft has 
shattered the confidence in the safety 
and security of air travel that this new 
guidance, in effect only 2 years, was 
designed to restore. We deplore the 



ictober 1983 



17 



KAL #007 



failure of the Soviet Union in its official 
statements to acknowledge the para- 
mount importance of the safety and lives 
of passengers and crew when dealing 
with a civil aircraft in or near its terri- 
torial airspace. The Soviet Union has 
told the world that it would take the 
same action again. The international 
civil aviation community must categori- 
cally reject the appalling threat of 
similar action in future instances. 

The world must insist that the 
Soviet Union offer a formal apology, 
provide full and complete information 
regarding this incident, comply with its 
obligation under international law to 
make appropriate compensation, and 
give credible guarantees to refrain from 
similar action in the future. Elementary 
considerations of humanity dictate that 
the Soviet Union assist the bereaved 
families to visit the site of the incident 
and to return the bodies of the victims 
and their belongings promptly. 

Such threats can only further 
weaken the international community's 
confidence in the safety of flight. We 
have a right to expect the Soviet Union 
to join in an endeavor to ensure that 
such a tragic incident never occurs 
again. 

In this regard, the United States is 
prepared to join with other members of 
this council in putting forward a resolu- 
tion which we believe could make a con- 
structive contribution to preventing such 
use of force against civilian aviation in 
the future. We believe that the Soviet 
Union should be strongly condemned for 
this senseless and irresponsible violation 
of international law which resulted in 
the destruction of a civil aircraft — an ac- 
tion that is an established fact. An in- 
vestigation must be conducted. The Air 
Navigation Commission should study 
ways to facilitate coordination between 
civilian and military aircraft and their 
respective air traffic control systems. 

As one of the founders of the Inter- 
national Civil Aviation Organization, the 
United States looks to this organization 
as the recognized international forum 
for promoting the safe and orderly 
growth of civil aviation. Under the um- 
brella of ICAO's rules and procedures, 
civil aviation has become a singularly im- 
portant factor in international com- 
merce, tourism, and other kinds of 
travel. More than 750 million passengers 
traveled to their international destina- 
tions in 1982. Each of the 151 members 
of l( AO has agreed to respect certain 
principles and obligations, as codified in 
the Convention on International Civil 
Aviation of 1944 and its annexes, to 
facilitate this travel. 



The Soviet Union must, as an ICAO 
member, also respect these principles 
and obligations. It is clear to my dele- 
gation that the Soviet Union not only 
failed to carry out its responsibilities 
with regard to KAL #007 but failed in a 
consistent and comprehensive fashion. 
Let us look at the record in detail. 



Principles and Obligations 

Under the Civil Aviation Convention 

The countries that have joined together 
as parties to the convention have agreed 
that the safety of flight in international 
air navigation is of the highest priority. 
To this end, states have agreed, in the 
exercise of their sovereignty, to work 
together to foster the safety of civil air- 
craft traversing national boundaries. It 
is upon this foundation that the Interna- 
tional Civil Aviation Organization was 
built, and it is with this basic premise in 
mind that the nations of the world have 
carried out their good work under ICAO 
auspices. We have recognized the unique 
vulnerability of the people aboard air- 
craft engaged in international air 
navigation and have promised to conduct 
our activities as sovereign states accord- 
ingly. It has been and continues to be 
unthinkable that a commercial airliner in 
time of peace should operate under 
threat of being shot out of the sky. The 
world community has labeled this type 
of behavior from private individuals and 
organizations as terrorist action. 

For an ICAO member state to take 
such action against airliners which stray 
into their airspace, and to assert their 
intent to do so again, sets an ominous 
example and is fundamentally inimical to 
the aims and objectives of the conven- 
tion. 



Internationally Agreed Upon 
Intercept Procedures 

The ICAO countries have agreed that 
they will "have due regard for the safety 
of navigation of civil aircraft" when issu- 
ing regulations for their military air- 
craft. It is self-evident that intercepts of 
civil aircraft by military aircraft must be 
governed by this paramount concern. 

The international community has re- 
jected deadly assault on a civil airliner 
by a military aircraft in time of peace as 
totally unacceptable. It violates not only 
the basic principles set forth in the con- 
vention but also the fundamental norms 
of international law enshrined in the 
Charter of the United Nations and 
established firmly in the practice of the 
civilized world. This is clear from the 
statements and actions of states in 



response to each time this event has oc- 
curred in the past several decades. One 
example, if I may refresh the memories 
of my distinguished colleagues, is the 
position of the Soviet Union when this 
council examined an incident involving 
the interception of a Libyan airliner in 
1973. On that occasion the Soviet Union 
was "convinced that ICAO could not re- 
main aloof" from such a "barbaric act." 

The Soviet representative insisted 
that ICAO, as a specialized agency of 
the United Nations pledged to the pro- 
motion of air safety in all parts of the 
world, had to strongly condemn that act 
in accordance with the principles em- 
bodied in the Convention on Interna- 
tional Civil Aviation and other interna- 
tional legal instruments. The Soviet 
Union also joined in a unanimous 
General Assembly resolution calling for 
an investigation of the incident. 

As a result of the deplorable attack 
of a KAL airliner by the U.S.S.R. in 
1978, the ICAO council, on April 1, 
1981, approved new and expanded 
material for Annex 2 on the interceptioi 
of civil aircraft. This was a direct effort 
to ensure that such an act would not re- 
cur. The U.S.S.R. was represented on 
the Air Navigation Commission and the 
ICAO council at the time and assisted ii 
the preparation of these new guidelines 

The U.S.S.R.'s Airman's Informatio 
Publication (AIP) indicates that ICAO 
intercept signals are to be used by the 
U.S.S.R. Specifically, the Soviet AIP 
states that, at night, a military aircraft 
will signal the fact that it is interceptin; 
another aircraft by: 

• "Rocking wings from a position ii 
front and normally to the left of the in- 
tercepted aircraft," and 

• "Flashing navigational and, if 
available, landing lights at irregular in- 
tervals." 

The AIP also contains the following 

"An aircraft which is intercepted by 
another aircraft shall immediately: 

"(C) attempt to establish audiocommunic 
tions with the intercepting aircraft or with 
the appropriate intercept control unit, mak- 
ing a general call on the emergency frequen 
cy 121.5 MHz and repeating this call on the 
emergency frequency 243 MHz, if prac- 
ticable. . . ." 

The evidence that we have indicate! 
the U.S.S.R. fighters did not use these 
intercept signals before destroying KA1 
#007. It is clear from communications 
that KAL #007 was unaware that it wa 
being intercepted. We do not know, if 
the Korean airliner chose to broadcast 
on 121.5 MHz, that the appropriate 



18 



Department of State Bulleti 



KAL #007 



U.S.S.R. intercept control unit has that 
frequency capability or, if so, was 
using it. 

Treatment of Civil Aircraft 
in Prohibited Areas 

States reserve the right under Article 9 
to restrict or prohibit operations of 
foreign aircraft over certain areas of 
their territory for reasons of military 
necessity or public safety. These pro- 
hibited areas must be of "reasonable ex- 
tent and location so as not to interfere 
unnecessarily with air navigation." 

Further, Article 9(c) contemplates 
that the remedial measure for aircraft 
entering a prohibited area is a require- 
ment to land within the territory of the 
state in which the prohibited area is 
located. By its actions and words, the 
Soviet Union has declared the right to 
guard its prohibited areas by the 
destruction of civil aircraft, even those 
which have left or are about to leave its 
airspace. Such actions clearly go far 
beyond the rights of states contemplated 
in Article 9, or reflected elsewhere in in- 
ternational law. 

The Obligation To Assist 

A commercial airliner found to be flying 
off course should not be presumed to be 
hostile. It is likely that such an aircraft 
is lost and in need of assistance. Under 
Article 25 of the convention, each 1CAO 
state has promised "to provide such 
measures of assistance to aircraft in 
distress in its territory as it may find 
practicable, and to permit, subject to 
control by its own authorities, the 
owners of the aircraft or authorities of 
the State in which the aircraft is 
registered to provide such measures of 
assistance as may be necessitated by the 
circumstances." 

This obligation to assist is a reaffir- 
mation of basic principles of humani- 
tarian behavior and is also a recognition 
on the part of the international com- 
munity that civil aircraft are uniquely 
vulnerable and should, accordingly, 
regardless of nationality, be helped 
when the situation calls for help. From 
the statements made, it appears that the 
Soviet Union tracked the straying air- 
liner for at least 2 hours. Then, ap- 
parently without adequate warning and 
without any known attempt to assist the 
aircraft back onto its course, the Soviet 
Union fired on the airliner and its 269 
occupants. This action was precisely the 
opposite of what the Chicago convention 
seeks to ensure. 



October 1983 



Obligation To Facilitate Search 
and Rescue 

The precise location of the remains of 
KAL #007 as of this date is not certain. 
However, we do know that the airliner 
went down in either Soviet territorial 
waters or in that portion of the high 
seas contained in the flight information 
region around Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. The 
U.S.S.R. is assigned responsibility for 
this region under the ICAO regional air 
navigation plan and has accepted 
responsibility under Annex 12 to provide 
search and rescue services in this area. 

As an ICAO member state, the 
U.S.S.R. is also obliged to immediately 
acknowledge receipt of requests by 
other states to enter Soviet territory for 
search and rescue purposes. Further, 
the U.S.S.R. has agreed to permit and 
facilitate, in accordance with such condi- 
tions as it may impose, entry into its 
territory by rescue units from other 
states for the purpose of searching for 
the site of an aircraft accident and res- 
cuing any survivors of that accident. To 
date, the U.S.S.R. has refused to permit 
search and rescue units from other coun- 
tries to enter Soviet territorial waters to 
search for the remains of KAL #007. 
Moreover, the Soviet Union has blocked 
access to the likely crash site and has 
refused to cooperate with other inter- 
ested parties to ensure prompt recovery 
of all technical equipment, wreckage, 
and other material that may facilitate 
and expedite completion of an investiga- 
tion. 



Obligation To Investigate 

The Soviet Union destroyed KAL #007 
in the early morning hours of Septem- 
ber 1. Despite widespread demands on 
the part of the international community 
for a confirmation and an explanation, 
the Soviet Union refused to even ac- 
knowledge its action for almost an en- 
tire week. Yet the destruction of an air- 
craft that was engaged in international 
air navigation has multinational ramifi- 
cations and is of utmost international 
concern. Each member of ICAO has 
agreed under Article 26 of the conven- 
tion to institute an investigation into the 
circumstances of an aircraft accident oc- 
curring in its territory. The international 
community defines an accident as an oc- 
currence involving an aircraft resulting 
in death or serious injury. The country 
in which the accident occurs also has the 
obligation under the treaty to invite the 
state of registry to attend the inquiry as 
an observer. 



It is self-evident that the Soviet 
destruction of the Korean airliner has in- 
ternational ramifications. The aircraft 
was registered in Korea and operated by 
a Korean air carrier. The aircraft, a 
Boeing 747, was manufactured in the 
United States. Two hundred sixty-nine 
citizens of 13 countries were on board. 
The safety of all civil aircraft of 
countless nations that fly in or near the 
Soviet Union has been placed in extreme 
jeopardy. The Soviet Union owes the en- 
tire world an accounting as to how and 
why such an unthinkable event occurred. 

North Pacific Composite 
Route System 

KAL #007 was a flight planned on desig- 
nated route R20 in the North Pacific 
composite route system (NOPAC) when 
for some reason it strayed off course. 
NOPAC was developed and implemented 
by the United States and Japan using 
accepted domestic and international pro- 
cedures according to Annex 11. Since 
the route is largely in international air- 
space, it was coordinated using normal 
ICAO procedures for amendment of the 
regional air navigation plans. All inter- 
ested states were asked for comments 
on the route system, including the 
U.S.S.R. The U.S.S.R. had no objection. 

On the contrary, during a meeting 
convened in Montreal November 12-13, 
1981, the U.S.S.R. acknowledged R20 
and agreed to "provide separation, in ac- 
cordance with applicable ICAO provi- 
sions, between aircraft under their con- 
trol and the airspace to be protected in 
respect of ATS routes NOPAC 2/R 20 
(proposed), i.e., the airspace bounded by 
a line 50NM north of the route centre 
line, and without any coordination of in- 
formation on or restrictions to flights 
assigned to operate thereon." By this 
agreement, the U.S.S.R. acknowledged 
the existence of R20 and the relatively 
less precise nature of navigation used on 
long, over-water flights. 

Radio Communications on 
the Emergency Frequency 

Requirements in Annex 10 indicate that 
KAL #007 should have been monitoring 
121.5. Was there any attempt by the 
U.S.S.R. to contact KAL #007? (The 
United States can find no evidence of 
such attempts.) If so, what are the 
details, and what is the evidence? 

There are many unknowns involved 
in this tragic occurrence. We do not 
know, for example, what caused the air- 
craft to stray off course. Some of these 



19 



KAL #007 



questions may never be answered. Some 
may be resolved by a technical investi- 
gation. It cannot, however, be denied 
that there is no answer to any of these 
questions that could possibly justify, 
under international legal and humani- 
tarian norms, the wanton destruction of 
KAL #007. 

U.S. Respect for ICAO 

In contrast to the procedures employed 
by the Soviet Union in the KAL inci- 
dent, the United States and other ICAO 
members do not use deadly force against 
off course civilian airlines of other coun- 
tries. The U.S.S.R. has alleged in its 
communication to the President of ICAO 
that "some Soviet air crews always com- 
ply religiously with the international 
standards and regulations of ICAO when 
engaged in international flights." This 
Soviet claim is not supported by the 
facts. Soviet airliners have strayed from 
their assigned paths and overflown sen- 
sitive U.S. military installations. I have 
here in my hand a detailed list of Aero- 
flot violations in U.S. airspace, showing 
the date and the aircraft. Our response 
to these violations has been to assist the 
offending aircraft back to its assigned 
flight path, to lodge formal protests 
through diplomatic channels with the 
Soviet authorities, and apply an appro- 
priate penalty — the suspension of Aero- 
flot services for a reasonable period of 
time. We certainly have never shot < 
down such an aircraft. 

The United States has firmly sup- 
ported measures to prevent the unjusti- 
fied use of force against civil aviation 
operations. We have actively worked to 
institute procedures to reduce threats 
from terrorists. Likewise, we have 
joined ICAO in responding to downing 
of civil aircraft in 1973 and again in 
1978. 

The perpetrators of this most recent 
tragedy have attempted to downplay 
their action by alleging that they were 
victims of a provocation. They have sug- 
gested that their military forces may 
have mistaken the Korean airliner for an 
American reconnaissance aircraft. My 
government has acknowledged that a 
RC-135 aircraft was conducting a 
routine reconnaissance mission in inter- 
national airspace off the Kamchatka 
Peninsula to monitor compliance with 
the SALT treaties. There was no con- 
nection between the RC-135 mission 
and the KAL flight. 

The closest point of approach of the 
two aircraft was 75 nautical miles. At 
the moment of actual interception of 
KAL #007, the RC-135 had been at its 



base in Alaska for more than an hour. 
Thus, it is absurd to suggest that the 
RC-135 was there to monitor the KAL 
flight or that the planes flew together 
for 10 minutes. This group of aviation 
experts knows well that the silhouette of 
the RC-135 is different from that of the 
Boeing 747. You must also share our 
conclusion that no military pilot using 
accepted intercept procedures could fail 
to recognize the Boeing 747 with its 
distinctive features. 

A majority of the members of the 
UN Security Council supported a full in- 
vestigation into the circumstances of 
this tragedy. But a veto by the Soviet 
Union prevented adoption of this resolu- 
tion. 

This extraordinary session of the 
council has the most important duty of 
reaffirming the principles on which civil 
aviation has developed in an orderly and 
safe manner over the past four decades. 
We cannot shirk that responsibility. To 
preserve and protect those principles, 
we must condemn this violation. We 
must also, through an impartial in- 
vestigation, establish as clear a record 
as we can of the relevant facts. Each of 
ICAO's 151 members has subscribed to 
promoting a system of safe and secure 
international civil aviation. We can 
strengthen that system by taking steps 
to repudiate that violation and prevent 
recurrences. Unless we do so, we will 
have failed to meet our obligation to in- 
ternational civil aviation. 

I call on this council to ensure that 
the "spirit of the Chicago convention" 
endures. That spirit requires that 
violators be warned and the traveling 
public assured that transgressions 
against the international norms of civil 
aviation will not be tolerated. Our suc- 
cess in making the airlines safe from 
such threat of force will be an important 
contribution to international peace and 
security. In that task, the United States 
is pleased to join our colleagues. 



ICAO COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION, 
SEPT. 16, 1983 22 

The Council 

Having considered the fact that a Korean 
Air Lines civil aircraft was destroyed on 
September 1, 1983, by Soviet military air- 
craft, 

Expressing its deepest sympathy with the 
families bereaved in this tragic incident, 

Urging the Soviet Union to assist the 
bereaved families to visit the site of the inci- 
dent and to return the bodies of the victims 
and their belongings promptly, 



Deeply deploring the destruction of an 
aircraft in commercial international service 
resulting in the loss of 269 innocent lives, 

Recognizing that such use of armed fore 
against international civil aviation is incom- 
patible with the norms governing interna- 
tional behavior and elementary consideration 
of humanity and with the rules, standards 
and recommended practices enshrined in the 
Chicago Convention and its annexes and in- 
vokes generally recognized legal conse- 
quences, 

Reaffirming the principle that States, 
when intercepting civil aircraft, should not 
use weapons against them, 

Concerned that the Soviet Union has not 
so far acknowledged the paramount impor- 
tance of the safety and lives of passengers 
and crew when dealing with civil aircraft in- 
tercepted in or near its territorial airspace, 

Emphasizing that this action constitutes 
grave threat to the safety of international 
civil aviation which makes clear the urgency 
of undertaking an immediate and full in- 
vestigation of the said action and the need 
for further improvement of procedures 
relating to the interception of civil aircraft, 
with a view to ensuring that such a tragic in 
cident does not recur, 

(1) Directs the Secretary-General to in- 
stitute an investigation to determine the fact 
and technical aspects relating to the flight 
and destruction of the aircraft and to provide 
an interim report to the Council within 30 
days of the adoption of this resolution and a 
complete report during the 110th session of 
the Council, 

(2) Urges all parties to co-operate fully ir 
the investigation, 

(3) Further directs the Secretary-General 
to urgently report to the Council on the 
status of adherence to, and implementation 
of, the provisions of the Chicago Convention 
its annexes and other related documents as 
they bear upon this incident, 

(4) Directs the Air Navigation Commis- 
sion urgently, 

(a) To review the provisions of the Con 
vention, its annexes and other related 
documents and consider possible amendment 
to prevent a recurrence of such a tragic inci- 
dent; 

(b) To examine ways to improve the co 
ordination of communication systems be- 
tween military and civil aircraft and air traf- 
fic control services and to improve pro- 
cedures in cases involving the identification 
and interception of civil aircraft; 

(5) Instructs the President of the Council 
to report this decision to the 24th session of 
the Assembly of the Organization for the 
Assembly to take the appropriate action. 



20 



Department of State Bulletin 






KAL #007 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 16, 1983 23 

This morning Assistant Secretary for 
European Affairs Richard Burt called in 
Soviet Minister Sokolov and presented 
him with a second diplomatic note 
demanding that the Soviet Union accept 
diplomatic notes which the United 
States has attempted to present the 
Soviet Union on its behalf and on behalf 
of the Republic of Korea. 

These notes demand compensation 
from the Soviet Union for the lives and 
property of U.S. and Korean nationals 
lost as a result of the wrongful shoot- 
down of Korean Air Lines #007 on 
September 1. 

The presentation of claims of this 
nature by one state against another 
through diplomatic communications and 
the consequent payment of appropriately 
substantiated claims is an established in- 
ternational practice with hundreds of 
precedents going back several centuries. 



DIPLOMATIC NOTE, 
SEPT. 16, 1983 4 

The United States refers to two diplomatic 
notes presented by Acting Assistant 
Secretary for European Affairs John H. Kel- 
ly to Deputy Chief of Mission Oleg Sokolov at 
the Department of State on September 12, 
1983 and to the oral representations of Mr. 
Kelly to Mr. Sokolov on that occasion. Copies 
of the two notes are attached hereto. [For 
texts, see p. 15.] 

The first note states the position of the 
United States that the Soviet Union's actions 
in firing upon and destroying Korean Airlines 
Flight No. 007 in the vicinity of Sakhalin 
Island on September 1, 1983 was wrongful 
under international law and gives rise to a re- 
sponsibility on the part of the Soviet Union 
to make reparation. That note further 
demands compensation from the Soviet Union 
for the lives and property of United States 
nationals lost as a result of the Soviet Union's 
wrongful actions. 

The second diplomatic note was pre- 
sented by the United States on behalf of the 
Republic of Korea. That note indicates that 
the Government of the Republic of Korea also 
considers the Soviet Union's actions with 
respect to Korean Airlines Flight No. 007 to 
have been wrongful under international law 
and to create an obligation to make repara- 
tion. The second note demands compensation 
for Korean lives and property lost as a result 
of the Soviet Union's wrongful actions. 

The Soviet Union has now admitted that 
it deliberately destroyed Korean Airlines 
Flight No. 007 and thereby directly caused 
the deaths of 269 innocent persons and the 
destruction of attendant property interests. 
The United States submits that the Soviet 
Union's responsibility under international law 



for these actions and its concomitant obliga- 
tion to make reparation are beyond dispute. 
The only issue that may be properly con- 
sidered as open to discussion is the calcula- 
tion of the amount of compensation owing. 
The United States notes that its position and 
that of Korea are consistent with the position 
of six other states that have now presented 
the Soviet Union with similar claims, and 
that the right of all of these states to repara- 
tion has been publicly affirmed by dozens of 
other states that do not themselves have 
claims. 

The presentation of claims of this nature 
by one state against another through 
diplomatic communications and the conse- 
quent payment of appropriately substantiated 
claims is an established international practice 
with hundreds of precedents going back 
several centuries. The United States submits 
that the Soviet Embassy's refusal to accept 
the attached notes is contrary to this estab- 
lished diplomatic practice. The United States 
demands that the Soviet Union accept the at- 
tached notes and will regard its failure to do 
so as an additional delict giving rise to addi- 
tional redress under international law. 



'Press release 327. 

2 Read to reporters by principal deputy 
press secretary to the President Larry 
Speakes in Santa Barbara (text from White 
House press release). 

3 Read to reporters by principal deputy 
press secretary to the President Larry 
Speakes in Santa Barbara (text from Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents of 
Sept. 5, 1983). 

4 Made available to news correspondents 
by Department spokesman John Hughes. 

6 USUN press release 67. 

6 Made to reporters at Point Mugu Naval 
Air Station, Calif., prior to departure for 
Washington, D.C. (text from Weekly Com- 
pilation of Presidential Documents of 
Sept. 5). 

7 USUN press release 68. 

8 Press release 331 of Sept. 6. 

'Broadcast from the Oval Office (text 
from White House press release). 

10 Made available by the White House 
press office. 

"USUN press release 70/1. 

12 Read to news correspondents. 

,3 Read to reporters by principal deputy 
press secretary to the President Larry 
Speakes (text from White House press 
release). 

"Made to print journalists following 
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's speech to 
the CSCE conference (press release 336 of 
Sept. 9). 

16 Made following his meeting with 
Foreign Minister Gromyko (press release 339 
of Sept. 9). 

16 Read to news correspondents by acting 
Department spokesman Alan Romberg. 

"Made available to news correspondents 
by acting Department spokesman Brian 
Carlson. 

> 8 "1823 GMT (3:23 JST)— KE-007: 
Tokyo Radio Korean Air 007 level 350 (alti- 
tude 35,000 feet). 

RJAA: Korean Air 007 Tokyo Roger." 

From the Sept. 7, 1983 statement by the 
Director General of the Public Information 
and Cultural Affairs Bureau of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 



19 Made available to news correspondents 
by acting Department spokesman Alan 
Romberg. 

20 The resolution was rejected: the vote 
was 2 against (U.S.S.R. and Poland), 9 for 
(France, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Paki- 
stan, Togo. U.K., U.S., and Zaire), with 4 
abstentions (China, Guyana, Nicaragua, and 
Zimbabwe). The resolution received the re- 
quisite votes necessary for adoption. 
However, because the Soviet Union, a perma- 
nent member of the Security Council, cast a 
veto, the resolution was not adopted. 

21 USUN press release 71. 

22 Adopted by a vote of 26 for (Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Colom- 
bia, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, France, 
Federal Republic of Germany, Indonesia, Ita- 
ly, Jamaica, Japan, Madagascar, Mexico, 
Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, 
Spain, Uganda, U.K., U.S., and Venezuela), 2 
against (Czechoslovakia and U.S.S.R.), with 3 
abstentions (Algeria, China, and India) and 2 
absent (Iraq and Lebanon). 

23 Read to news correspondents by 
Department spokesman John Hughes. ■ 



October 1983 



21 



THE PRESIDENT 



President Reagan 
Visits Mexico 



President Reagan met with 

President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado 

in La Paz, Baja California, Mexico, 

on August 11+ , 1983. 

Following are statements, toast, 

text of the joint communique, 1 and 

a summary of the environmental 

agreement the two Presidents signed. 



ARRIVAL CEREMONY 2 



President de la Madrid 3 

It is my great pleasure to welcome you 
and the distinguished members of your 
party to Mexican territory. I am sure 
that our meeting, although brief, will 
contribute to the further strengthening 
of the loyal, dignified, and fruitful 
friendship of our peoples. 

This part of Mexico has been the 
scene of many facets of our history. It 
was here on the shores of Cortez' Ver- 
million Sea that dreams of discovering 
new worlds began to come true, and 
here today we find the scene of a new 
search and affirmation, a search for 
economic and social progress and the 
assertion of a convinced and unwavering 
determination to strengthen our ter- 
ritorial integrity, our will to sovereignty, 
our national identity, and our commit- 
ment to the ideals of freedom, develop- 
ment, and justice that define the 
historical force of the Mexican people. 

You have arrived in a Mexico that 
trusts in the firmness of its destiny, a 
Mexico shaped by its own effort, a Mex- 
ico that has shown its ability to cast 
seed on fertile soil and to convert adver- 
sity into challenge and trust. Our people 
are proud of their heritage and of what 
is theirs today. We are committed to 
their values and to the development of 
our nation. However, we are not a self- 
absorbed people, nor are we engrossed 
in "ur immediate circumstances. 



History and perception open Mexico 
to the world and thus the solidarity and 
constructive contact with other peoples 
and nations. We know that peace and 
progress are now, more than ever, 
shared ideals as well as interlinked 
realities and that their attainment by all 
can only come from shared and equal ef- 
fort based on dignified and respectful 
relations. 

The momentum of history cannot in 
itself remove the obstacles that states 
encounter in their course. It is men and 
peoples who, through their will and their 
action, determine the outlines of history, 
hence the unquestionable value of 
solidarity, sustained international 
cooperation, of negotiation and 
understanding as premises for a concord 
in these times of redefinition and crisis 
that are threatening plural and peaceful 
coexistence and the harmonious develop- 
ment of nations. 

Today, as never before, whatever 
happens in any part of the planet affects 
the peoples of all countries. In the case 
of Mexico and the United States, our 
proximity gives rise to many and com- 
plex relations. Despite our different 
viewpoints and interests, the inescapable 
consequence of our diverse social, 
economic, and cultural backgrounds, the 
border itself creates ample opportunities 
for cooperation and exchange that can 
benefit our two peoples. 

The maturity of a political relation- 
ship which bears witness to our inten- 
tion of achieving coexistence based on 
respect, dignity, and mutual benefit rises 




Pacific Ocean 



22 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



to oppose the many barriers and new 
problems brought about by the unique 
development of the two nations and 
those created by a frankly deteriorating 
world. The maturity is the reflection of 
long and consistent efforts and has not 
been attained without difficulty. At the 
same time it is the sound foundation of 
our desire to comprehend, to under- 
stand, and to cooperate. We trust that it 
will continue to permeate the actions of 
our governments and our societies for 
the good of equitable, respectful, and 
productive bilateral relations. 

Today as you enter Mexico you cross 
the threshold of Latin America. The 
border between the United States and 
Mexico is also the boundary between 
two different components of our conti- 
nent and two different expressions of 
development and culture— both a na- 
tional and a regional boundary, its two 
faces simultanteously express unique- 
ness and reciprocal influence. 

The worlds of North and South 
America, the industrialized and the 
developing worlds, are linked today by 
their complementary potential and their 
manifold contradictions. In Latin 
America, the need for social changes is 
confronted today with the dramatic im- 
pacts of a troubled world that limit its 
long, unsatisfied urge for development, 
freedom, democracy, and justice. 

In the face of social underdevelop- 
ment now aggravated by a profound 
economic crisis and by shows of force 
which threaten to touch off a conflagra- 
tion, we must urgently respond with a 
firm vocation for peace and solidarity by 
showing respect for the law and for the 
institutions of the parties involved and 
by furthering the development and full 
predominance of a balanced, realistic, 
and constructive political dialogue. 

Allow me to express my most fer- 
vent hope that at the conclusion of our 
meeting, we may look forward for the 
good of our two great peoples and of the 
region to an effective contribution 
toward the achievement of that peace 
and solidarity so deeply desired in our 
times. 

President Reagan 

I It's a pleasure to return to your proud 
and beautiful country. 

This will be my first visit with Presi- 
J dent de la Madrid as President. At our 
.j initial meeting last October in San Diego 
A and Tijuana, President de la Madrid 
a observed that personal and friendly con- 
tact encourages a free and open ex- 
a 1 change of ideas. That meeting was very 



constructive, and I look forward to to- 
day's discussion. 

We are neighbors, and as such, we 
are concerned for one another. Our ses- 
sions today should open new avenues to 
put that concern to good use. It's my 
hope that President de la Madrid and I 
will continue to meet periodically. Our 
countries share a host of common objec- 
tives and hopes. Open and friendly com- 
munication between us will benefit us 
both. 

Last October President de la Madrid 
and I had the opportunity to get to 
know each other better and to strength- 
en the cooperation between our two 
countries. Today we will be able to build 
on our relationship and openly discuss 
our differences as well as our many 
areas of agreement. I'm sure that our 
meeting will further strengthen the 
mutual respect and understanding which 
is the cornerstone of relations between 
the United States and Mexico. 



PRESIDENT REAGAN'S 
REMARKS 4 

I'm delighted to be here in La Paz, in 
Baja California Sur, on the Bay of 
Peace. This is a particularly appropriate 
place for us to meet as we work to en- 
sure peace in our hemisphere and in 
other areas of the world. Your cordiality 
and hospitality, Mr. President, are deep- 
ly appreciated. 

You and I have spent a good bit of 
our time this morning discussing the 
future and how we can make sure that 
it's good for both our peoples. Relations 
between our countries are excellent. 
Last October we got off to a good start 
when we met in Tijuana and San Diego 
prior to your inauguration. 

Our sessions have given us a further 
chance to get to know each other as in- 
dividuals. I can tell you that you are a 
man whom I respect and admire. It's a 
pleasure to work with you. I pledge to 
you my best efforts to strengthen and 
broaden our personal and professional 
relations to the benefit of both our 
peoples. 

Mexico and the United States share 
a continent together. We share many 
traditions and values, as well. Coming 
from one of the Southwestern States, I 
greatly appreciate the magnitude of our 
common bonds and of the strong 
Hispanic traditions that we have— some- 
thing of which I've been reminded these 
past few weeks when I met with various 
Hispanic groups in the United States. 



They are keenly aware of our relations 
with Mexico and stressed to me the im- 
portance of strengthening our ties. 
These citizens of Hispanic descent are a 
permanent link for us to the Hispanic 
world. 

I do not minimize the differences be- 
tween our two countries. We have 
every reason to be proud of the distinct 
cultural traditions of our two peoples. 
Yet our differences need never diminish 
our good will and our respect for one 
another, because good will and mutual 
respect always should be the hallmark of 
relations between the United States and 
Mexico. 

We have a 2,000-mile common 
border. I prefer not to look on it as a 
border but instead as a meeting place. It 
provides enormous potential for coopera- 
tion that we can tap. 

Cooperation between our two 
governments has already accomplished 
much. 

Increasingly effective narcotics con- 
trol activities by Mexican authorities 
have made a major contribution to my 
government's efforts to attack this prob- 
lem. We're deeply grateful for your help. 

Over the years, our two govern- 
ments have established a wide spectrum 
of arrangements concerning science and 
technology, educational and cultural ex- 
changes, housing and urban develop- 
ment, and coordinated responses to 
natural disasters. 

In a series of treaties and other 
agreements stretching down through 
this century, the United States and Mex- 
ico have established effective 
mechanisms for an equitable division of 
the border water resources. The Inter- 
national Boundary and Water Commis- 
sion has been exceptionally successful in 
defusing problems and developing 
equitable solutions to difficulties involv- 
ing our precious water resources. 

As one would expect of a friend, 
during Mexico's financial crisis of last 
summer the United States took the lead 
in arranging international support for 
Mexico's recovery efforts. 

I think that we can be pleased with 
the success that we've had. And the 
businesslike atmosphere of today's 
meeting suggests that much more will 
be accomplished in the future. 

Yes, mistakes have been made in the 
past by our governments in their deal- 
ings with one another. Human beings 
err, and that's to be expected. But 
friendship can overcome mistakes, and 
that, too, should be understood. 

I came primarily to listen, to try to 
understand the concerns of the Mexican 



October 1983 



23 



THE PRESIDENT 




^**k , 



nM 



President de la Madrid and President Reagan. 

people and, as our actions have shown, 
to be responsive. 

In the United States, we're just now 
emerging from a long period of 
economic turmoil, and we fully ap- 
preciate the tough job you face in. restor- 
ing economic health. We're impressed 
with the efforts being taken by you, Mr. 
President, and the citizens of your coun- 
try to resolve Mexico's economic prob- 
lems. As you've said on a number of 
occasions, the solution to Mexico's eco- 
nomic difficulties will come from Mexico 
itself. That, clearly, is as it should be, 
and we applaud your determination. 

Our role is to support your efforts as 
best we can. We appreciate that 
droughts and other factors during the 
past 3 years have severely affected 
agricultural production in Mexico, com- 
pounding Mexico's economic problems. 
Therefore, I have approved the exten- 
sion this fiscal year of additional com- 
modity credits to help finance the pur- 
chase of agricultural commodities in the 
United States. We hope that these 
agricultural credits will be useful to 
Mexico in buying the food it needs 
without impeding your economic 
recovery efforts. We also hope to 
negotiate a further purchase of Mexican 
petroleum for our strategic petroleum 
reserve. 

We've demonstrated on several occa- 
sions that we intend to shape our future 



24 



as equal partners. I am pleased that our 
meetings today have been productive 
and that we've laid the groundwork for 
future action along these lines. 

In our discussions today, we dealt 
with a number of significant trade mat- 
ters. Mexico is one of our largest 
markets and a vital source of supply. 
We are Mexico's largest market and sup- 
plier. Despite the current difficulties, 
Mexico rightly looks to our market as 
fundamental to the strength and vitality 
of its own, and I can assure you that we 
consider Mexico's economic health of 
great importance to our prosperity and 
well-being. 

You and I are determined to con- 
tinue working out our trade problems 
and to reduce impediments to commerce 
that prevent our people from enjoying 
its maximum benefits. 

We also see investment as an avenue 
for Mexico to obtain the capital it needs 
to expand its industry and increase effi- 
ciency. I know that you understand this 
and are determined to work out ar- 
rangements that will attract investors. 
We agree that the Maquiladora and the 
Twin Plants program make a contribu- 
tion to the economies of both our na- 
tions by increasing jobs and promoting 
economic activity, especially at the 
border. 

Much of our discussion today related 
to the border. We are looking into ways 



we can work together to foster economic 
stability and prosperity there. We're also 
concerned about protecting the environ- 
ment in the border region, especially 
with respect to pollution of the air, 
water, and land. 

President de la Madrid, you and I 
will sign an agreement today which 
establishes a framework for environ- 
mental action in the border region. We 
expect this agreement to strengthen co- 
operation between our two countries by 
addressing serious pollution problems. 
Our joint International Boundary and 
Water Commission has discussed the 
problem of sewage which affects the 
communities of Tijuana, San Diego, 
Mexicali, Calexico, and other locations. 
We need to solve these problems quick- 
ly, as they affect people in both coun- 
tries. I know you and I are both com- 
mitted to this task. 

Finally, we've discussed the situation 
in Central America and, while we have 
differences, there are substantial areas 
of potential cooperation. I continue to 
believe that a solution to the crisis in 
Central America must encompass four 
basic principles: 

• Establishment and strengthening 
of democratic institutions in order to re- 
solve political differences within each 
state; 

• Respect for nonintervention, in- 
cluding ending support for subversive 
elements seeking to destabilize other 
countries; 

• Removal of the conflict from East- 
West confrontation through such 
measures as the verifiable withdrawal of 
all foreign military and security advisers 
and a freeze on the acquisition of offen- 
sive weapons; and 

• Cooperation to sustain a level of 
economic growth that guarantees the 
basic needs of the people of this area. 

The principle of self-determination is 
as important to citizens of the United 
States as anyone. Our history proves it. 
We've fought wars for that very princi- 
ple. We believe that people should be 
able to determine their own solutions, 
and that's why we've responded to calls 
for help from certain of our Latin 
American neighbors. We will consider it 
a beautiful day in the history of that 
region when all foreign elements, in- 
cluding our own, may be safely 
withdrawn. 

I hope that God, who made us 
neighbors, will look favorably upon us as 
we work closely together to find solu- 
tions to our mutual problems. 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



PRESIDENT REAGAN'S 
LUNCHEON TOAST 5 

There have been many words said today. 
Agreements have been reached, under- 
standings have been reached, but 
perhaps the most significant aspect of 
our talks was our spirit of cooperation. 
And through meetings like this, where 
we treat each other as partners with 
respect and courtesy and, yes, with 
honest good will, we define the mature 
relationship of our two countries. 
This spirit of cooperation and 
business-like approach to the issues of 
concern to us both have been deeply ap- 
preciated on our side. We all have an 
important responsibility, and that is to 
represent the interest of our peoples as 
best we can. 

As President, I understand the 
economic challenges that you face. As a 
matter of fact, they sound very familiar. 
We've had a little economic trouble our- 
selves, and I have every confidence that 
you will succeed. 

Last year when I visited South and 
Central America — I always have be- 
lieved, and even more so after that trip, 
that while we are citizens of our in- 
dividual countries, and no one would 
suggest that we in any way forsake the 
culture, the tradition, the differences 
that make us different countries, we 
should also remember that in this most 
unique double continent, hemisphere 
that we're in — no one else in the world 
could say anything like this — even when 
we cross the borders into one another's 
country, we're still among Americans, 
from the North Pole to the South Pole. 
And this morning, earlier, I told the 
| President of a dream that I have long 
cherished. And that is— that in this 
North and South America and Central 
America — that all of us as Americans 
might one day find a way as equal part- 
ners, neighbors, to set out to develop 
these two great continents, to erase the 
injustices that exist here and there, to 
bring about economic reform to the 
point that one day we can stand there as 
a shining example to all the world, from 
South Pole to North Pole, that we are 
united in our determination to be free, 
to respect each individual in our two 
countries because individual freedom, I 
think, is the thing that sets us apart 
I from so many parts of the world in so 
Kmany areas today. And that if this 
l dream — I won't say "if;" when this 
[j dream comes true — 'cause we're going 
Ito work to make it come true — when it 
Idoes, more than 600 million Americans 
Ihere in the Western Hemisphere will be 



such a force for good throughout the 
world that the world will never have 
seen anything like it. 

And I'm more encouraged than I've 
been in a long time about the fulfillment 
of that dream in the meetings that we've 
had, particularly this one, and we're go- 
ing to have more of them. I also told the 
President that the only time people get 
in trouble is when they're talking about 
each other, not when they're talking to 
each other. And we're going to on a 
regular basis continue to talk to each 
other. 



JOINT COMMUNIQUE 

President Ronald Reagan of the United 
States of America and President Miguel de la 
Madrid of Mexico met in La Paz, Baja 
California, Mexico, on August 14, 1983. This 
meeting was one of a continuing series be- 
tween the Presidents of the United States 
and Mexico that is traditional for the two 
countries. 



Arranged at the invitation of President 
de la Madrid, the current meeting offered 
both Presidents an opportunity to discuss im- 
portant bilateral issues of common concern 
and to strengthen the ties they established 
during their previous meetings. They dis- 
cussed economic, trade and financial matters, 
as well as border issues, narcotics control, im- 
migration, fisheries, ecological and scientific 
and technical cooperation. 

The Presidents also had a useful discus- 
sion on the situation in Central America. 

The two Presidents reaffirmed their de- 
termination to strengthen still further the 
spirit of cooperation, understanding and 
friendship which exists between their two 
countries. 

The Presidents reviewed recent economic 
developments which have taken place in their 
countries. President de la Madrid stated that 
the economic policies of his administration 
are aimed at restoring the necessary condi- 
tions for rapid, just, balanced and independ- 
ent national economic development. President 
Reagan stated that his government recog- 
nized Mexico's efforts to adjust and reorder 
its economy and reaffirmed United States 
support of and assistance to the Mexican 
Government in its efforts to resolve its cur- 
rent economic problems. 



Summary of 
Environmental Agreement 



The Governments of the United States 
and Mexico have formally agreed to 
strengthen and expand both their unilat- 
eral and cooperative efforts to address a 
broad spectrum of environmental prob- 
lems in the border area shared by the 
two nations. A comprehensive 
framework agreement to that effect was 
signed by President Reagan and Mex- 
ican President de la Madrid on August 
14, 1983, during their meeting in La 
Paz, Baja California, Mexico. 

Under the agreement, each govern- 
ment is pledged to cooperate fully, on 
the basis of equality, reciprocity, and 
mutual benefit, to prevent, reduce, and 
eliminate sources of pollution which af- 
fect the air, water, or land of the border 
area of the other country. The "border 
area" is defined as extending 100 
kilometers (approximately 60 miles) on 
each side of the inland and maritime 
boundaries between the United States 
and Mexico. 

Implementation will be carried out 
through a series of specialized 
subagreements (i.e., annexes) to be 
negotiated by U.S. and Mexican 
technical agencies on such subjects as 
border sanitation, air pollution monitor- 
ing, and hazardous waste transport and 



disposal. Cooperation may include scien- 
tific and educational exchanges, joint 
research, environmental impact assess- 
ment, information and data exchange, 
and direct remedial action. Specific pro- 
vision is made for consultations with 
border states and the direct participa- 
tion in agreement activities of state and 
local government, nongovernmental in- 
stitutions, and international organiza- 
tions. 

Central coordination on the U.S. 
side will be the responsibility of the En- 
vironmental Protection Agency, 
operating under the foreign policy 
guidance of the Department of State. 
Bilateral meetings will be convened an- 
nually to review progress and to plan 
future activities. While the agreement 
focuses on environmental pollution, it is 
mutually understood that its scope can 
be expanded at a later time to include 
natural resource issues of common in- 
terest, including improved management 
of national parks, wildlife and wildlife 
habitat, arid lands, and forest eco- 
systems, as well as cooperation on prob- 
lems which exist outside the border 



Press release 313 of Aug. 19, 1983, to which 
the text of the agreement was attached. ■ 



October 1983 



25 



THE PRESIDENT 



The two heads of state also discussed ne- 
gotiations on subsidies and countervailing 
duties and have committed their administra- 
tions to resolving these issues as expeditious- 
ly as possible. They discussed problems 
related to tuna fisheries and stated their hope 
that the issue could be resolved as soon as 
possible. While expressing understanding of 
Mexico's needs to resolve its balance of pay- 
ments problems, President Reagan conveyed 
his hope that Mexico would soon return to 
normal trade patterns. On this subject Presi- 
dent de la Madrid stated that the dynamics of 
trade between the two countries would 
benefit from greater Mexican exports which 
would generate foreign exchange revenue 
and thus help to finance the imports needed 
for the development of Mexico's economy. 



In view of the need for continuing discus- 
sion of bilateral trade issues, they recognized 
the useful role payed by the Joint Commis- 
sion on Commerce and Trade, the con- 
sultative body established by both govern- 
ments in strengthening commercial exchange 
between the two countries. 

Both Presidents recognized the impor- 
tance of trade along the border and agreed to 
continue efforts directed toward solving the 
problems being confronted by border com- 
munities of both countries. To that end, they 
considered a proposal to establish a working 
group for economic and trade matters in the 
border region within the Binational Commis- 
sion. They also discussed sanitation problems 
along the border, a matter which adversely 
affects citizens of both countries. 



Mexico— A Profile 



People 

Noun and adjective: Mexican(s). Population 

(1982 est.): 76 million. Annual growth rate 

(1983 est.): 2.8%. Ethnic groups: Indian- 
Spanish (mestizo) 55%, American Indian 
29 H . I laucasian 10%. Religion: Roman 
Catholic 97%. Language: Spanish. Educa- 
tion: Years compulsory— 10.. Literacy— 74%. 
Health: Infant mortality rate— 55.9/1,000 
(198H). Life expectancy— -65 .4 yrs. (1980). 

Geography 

Area: 1.978 million sq. km. (764,000 sq. mi.); 
about three times the size of Texas. Cities: 
Capital— Mexico City (pop. 15 million, 1979). 
Other cities— Guadalajara (2.5 million). 
Monterrey (2 million), Puebla de Zaragoza 
(710,800), Ciudad Juarez (625,000). Terrain: 
Varies from coastal lowlands to high moun- 
tains. Climate: Varies from tropical to 
desert. 

Government 

Type: Federal republic. Independence: First 
proclaimed September 16, 1810; republic 
established 1822. Constitution: February 5, 
1917. 

Political parties: Institutional Revolu- 
tionary Party (PRI), National Action Party 
(PAN), Popular Socialist Party (PPS), Unified 

Socialist Party of Mexico lI'St'M)', Mexican 
Workers Party ( 1'MT), Socialist Workers Par- 
ty (PRT), Social Democratic Party (PSD), the 
Authentic Partj of the Mexican Revolution 
(PAKM)'. Suffrage: Universal over age 18. 

Economy 

GDP (1982): $162 billion (9.3 trillion pi 
at 57.1757/US$1). Per capita GDP: $2,158 
(123 m i Annual real GDP 



growth rate (1982): -0.2%. Inflation (1982): 
58.9% average for the year; 98.85% annual 
rate in year ending December 1982. 

Natural resources: Petroleum, silver, 
copper, gold, lead, zinc, natural gas, timber. 

Agriculture (7.3% of 1982 GDP, in- 
cluding fishing and forestry): Main prod- 
uct:; — corn, beans, oilseeds, feedgrains, fruit, 
cotton, coffee, sugarcane, winter vegetables. 
Total land in farms — 23 million hectares 
(57.1 million acres). 

Industry (1982): Manufacturing (20.8% of 
GDP), commerce (23.0%), services (28.4%), 
transportation and communications (6.3%), 
petroleum and mining (8.1%). 

Trade (1982): Exports— $21 billion: 
petroleum and derivatives (75%), coffee, cot- 
ton, fruits, vegetables, manufactures, and 
mining (25%). Major markets— US (63.5%), 
EC, Japan. Imports — $15 billion: grains, 
machinery, equipment, industrial vehicles, in- 
termediate goods. Major supplit rs — US 
(74.5%), EC, Japan. 

Average exchange rate (1982): 57.1757 
pesos/US$l; free rate. 147.9-149.4 
pesos/US$l; controlled rate, 108.26-108.36 

pesos/US$l. 



'The PSUM, founded November 8, 1981, 
is a merger of live parties on the left: the 
Communist Party of Mexico, the Socialist 
Revolutionary Party, the Mexican Peoples 
Party, the Movement of Socialist Action and 
Unity, and the Movement of Popular Action 

-The Federal Flections Commission can- 
celed provisionally the registrations of the 
PSD and the PARM because they both failed 
to obtain the minimum 1.5% of the national 
votes in the 1982 presidential election. 

Taken from the Background Notes of June 
1983, published by the Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, Department of State. Editor: Joanne 
Reppert Reams. ■ 



The two heads of state gave special at- 
tention to cultural exchange as well as scien- 
tific and technical cooperation between Mex- 
ico and the United States. They agreed on 
the need to continue the promotion of such 
exchange and cooperation and strengthen ex- 
isting programs and mechanisms in these 
areas. 

The Presidents expressed their satisfac- 
tion with the excellent results of the cam- 
paign carried out by the Mexican Govern- 
ment in cooperation with the Government of 
the United States to combat illegal drug pro- 
duction and trafficking. They agreed on the 
need to continue such cooperation for the 
benefit and the well-being of both their peo- 
ple. 

In this same spirit, they decided to inten- 
sify cooperation between the two govern- 
ments with a view to finding more suitable 
responses to the problems of environmental 
pollution along the border. They noted that a 
cooperation agreement was signed today that 
establishes the framework for bilateral action 
on pollution of water, air and land. 

In the discussion on the situation in Cen- 
tral America the two Presidents agreed on 
the need to contribute to the restoration of 
peace and to the prevention of an even 
greater conflict in the area by promoting fast 
processes of political dialogue and negotia- 
tion. President Reagan reiterated his strong 
support for the Contadora initiative. Presi- 
dent de la Madrid and President Reagan 
agreed also on the importance of helping 
Central American countries to settle their 
conflicts peacefully. The Presidents further- 
more reiterated their strong support of non- 
intervention and the self-determination of 
people. Finally, the Presidents recognized tht 
necessity for equitable social and economic 
development in the region. 

The Presidents ended their talks fully 
convinced that strengthening the friendship 
and cooperation between Mexico and the 
United States remains a common objective oi 
their governments. They reaffirmed their 
desire to hold periodic working meetings be- 
tween themselves and other high officials of 
their governments. 

President Reagan expressed his pleasure 
and appreciation for the hospitable welcome 
accorded to him by the Mexican Government 
and by the authorities of the State of Baja 
California Sur. He also extended a cordial in- 
vitation to President Miguel de la Madrid to 
visit the United States in the near future. 



'Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 22, 1983. 

2 Made at the Palace of Government. 

'President de la Madrid spoke in Spanish 
and his remarks were translated by an inter- 
preter. 

4 Made to reporters assembled in the Baja 
California Sur Legislative Chambers follow 
ing meetings between the two Presidents. 

6 Made at the Governor's Residence in 
response to a toast by President de la 
Madrid. ■ 



26 



Department of State Bulletir 



THE PRESIDENT 



Building Peace 
Through Strength 



President Reagan's address before 
the American Legion in Seattle on 
August 23, 1983. 1 

At home and abroad, our country is on 
the right track again. As a nation, we've 
closed the books on a long, dark period 
of failure and self-doubt and set a new 
course. With your continuing support 
and the support of millions of other 
patriotic, God-fearing Americans, we've 
come a long way. But the task we face 
is still a challenging one, and a lot of 
hard work remains to be done. But let's 
be sure we know what needs to be done. 

Restoring the U.S. Military Posture 

We've got a few people in Washington 
who don't want to hear when we tell of 
our arms control and strategic moderni- 
zation program and America's respon- 
sibility to protect peace and freedom. 
My own concern with these issues is 
nothing new, as many of you know. 
Three years ago at your Boston conven- 
tion, I pledged to restore America's 
military posture so that we could pro- 
mote peace while safeguarding our 
freedom and security. With the help of 
groups like the Legion, we've kept that 
pledge. 

Military Forces. Our military forces 
are back on their feet and standing tall. 
Modern equipment is being delivered to 
the troops, training is way up, and com- 
bat readiness rates have really soared. 
And once again, young Americans wear 
their uniforms and serve their flag with 
pride. We're getting and keeping very 
good people in all of the services. We've 
made great progress, and we're going to 
make more, and I hope that makes you 
as proud as it does me. 

I have to interrupt and tell you a 
little thing, and I don't mean this— that 
these young men and women in our 
Armed Services are hostile or warlike. 
They know that they're the peace- 
keepers. But an ambassador wrote me a 
letter, our Ambassador to Luxembourg, 
and he said that he'd been up in the 
East German frontier and visiting the 
2d Armored Cavalry Regiment. And as 
he went back to his helicopter, he was 
followed by a young 19-year-old trooper, 
and the young man asked him if he 
thought he could get a message to me. 



Well, being an ambassador, he allowed 
as how he could. And the kid says, well, 
will you tell him we're proud to be here, 
and we ain't scared of nothing. 

But while I'm on the subject of our 
military forces, I want to reaffirm our 
determination to account for every 
brave American who served in South- 
east Asia. This Administration has not 
forgotten and will never forget the 
sacrifices that they and their families 
have made. And we will not rest until 
the fullest possible accounting has been 
made. 

Strategic Forces. The other half of 
restoring our military posture concerns 
our strategic forces. In the past, we paid 
a grim price for indecision and neglect — 
for a one-way restraint that was never 
returned by the other side. The resulting 
imbalance weakened the credibility of 
our nuclear deterrent — the deterrent 
that has been the single greatest bul- 



. . . / want to reaffirm 
our determination to ac- 
count for every brave 
American who served in 
Southeast Asia. 



wark for peace in the postwar era. 
While past American leaders hesitated 
or naively hoped for the best, the Soviet 
Union was left free to pile up new 
nuclear arsenals without any real incen- 
tives to seriously negotiate reductions. 

Well, history doesn't offer many 
crystal clear lessons for those who 
manage our nation's affairs. But there 
are a few, and one of them is surely the 
lesson that weakness on the part of 
those who cherish freedom inevitably 
leads to trouble— that it only encourages 
the enemies of both peace and freedom. 
On the other hand, history teaches us 
that by being strong and resolute, we 
can keep the peace and even reduce the 
threats to peace. 

And that was why, at your Boston 
convention in 1980, I pledged to strive 



for arms reduction agreements, not so- 
called arms control agreements that per- 
mitted further growth, but real arms 
reductions. We've kept that pledge, too. 
For the past 2V2 years, this Administra- 
tion has steadfastly followed a dual 
track of deterrence through moderniza- 
tion and the search for a more stable 
peace through arms reduction negotia- 
tions. 

There is no contradiction in this dual 
approach, despite what some of the 
critics in Washington might have you 
believe. The restoration of a credible 
deterrent and the search for real arms 
reductions and stability are two sides of 
the same coin — a coin that is inscribed 
with the words, "peace and security." 

Now, our efforts are designed to 
sustain peace, plain and simple. We 
don't seek an arms race; indeed, we seek 
to reverse the trends that cause it by 
beginning to lower the levels of the 
nuclear arms. But we will not — and we 
cannot — accept anything that would be 
detrimental to our security and to the 
freedom and safety of our children and 
our grandchildren. 

And that's what is so important 
about the MX. The MX Peacekeeper 
missile and our program to develop a 
new, small, single-warhead missile are 
critical to our country's present and 
future safety. They will maintain state- 
of-the-art readiness against the Soviets' 
already modernized systems. They will 
also ensure stability and deterrence, 
making it clear that aggression by the 
Soviet Union would never pay. And 
the/re an essential incentive for the 
Soviets to negotiate seriously for gen- 
uine arms reduction so that we can 
move to a more stable world in which 
the risk of war is reduced. 

Modernization goes hand-in-hand 
with deterrence. Both are necessary in- 
centives for successful negotiations. 
Many of our critics willfully ignore this 
interrelationship. Instead, they focus 
their attention and their criticism on 
some single point which doesn't address 
the central issue. Often, it's based on 
wishful thinking or downright misinfor- 
mation. 

For example, one argument con- 
tends that the MX Peacekeeper would 
pose a first-strike threat to the Soviet 
Union. In the most fundamental sense, 
this argument runs counter to the whole 
history of America. Our country has 
never started a war, and we've never 
sought, nor will we ever develop a 
strategic first-strike capability. Our sole 
objective is deterrence, the strength and 
credibility it takes to prevent war. And, 



October 1983 



27 



THE PRESIDENT 



in any case, there is no way that the 
MX, even with the remaining Minute- 
man force, could knock out the entire 
Soviet ICBM [intercontinental ballistic 
missile] force, so the argument is a false 
one, both philosophically and technically. 

What we really want, and what we 
would have with the MX in place, is 
enough force that tells the enemy we'd 
do them a lot of damage. 

But the example that I've given is 
typical of the twisted logic of the anti- 
MX lobby. It reminds me of the tale told 



by the bipartisan congressional support 
in strategic modernization votes in May 
and July, America has finally begun to 
forge a national consensus for peace and 
security. The MX Peacekeeper program 
and the development program for a 
new, small, single-warhead missile will 
complement the B-l bomber and Tri- 
dent submarine programs, the other legs 
of the triad. But we aren't over the 
hump yet. There's still work to be done, 
and I'm counting on your continuing and 
active support as we approach the next 



Our policy in Central America is to help the 
people of that troubled region help them- 
selves . . . toward liberty and to help them reverse 
centuries of poverty and inequity. 



of an Armed Services poker game which 
took place a few years back on a 
western military base. The MPs were 
tipped off, raided the barracks, and the 
four poker players just managed to hide 
the cards and poker chips in time. When 
the police got there, they were sitting at 
an empty table, staring innocently at 
each other. The MP sergeant asked each 
one in turn if he'd been gambling. And 
the soldier bit his lip and replied, "No, 
sarge, I haven't been gambling." And 
the sailor paused, silently asked the 
Lord's forgiveness, and also said he 
wasn't gambling. And the airman 
answered the same way, and that finally 
brought them to the Marine. And they 
said, "Have you been gambling?" And 
the Marine looked the cop right dead in 
the eye and asked, "Who with?" 

That was quick thinking, but the 
Marine sure avoided a real issue, and 
the real issue is what counts. The real 
national defense issue of our time is 
maintaining deterrence while seeking 
arms reductions. And today I'm pleased 
to be able to report some good news on 
the negotiating front. Our fundamental 
negotiating positions in both the START 
[strategic arms limitation talks) and INF 
[intermediate-range nuclear forces] talks 
have been strengthened by a number of 
related developments that have occurred 
this year. Let me share a few of them 
with you. 

First on the list is that strong bi- 
partisan support is beginning to surface 
for our strategic program. Starting with 
the perceptive recommendations of the 
Scowcrofl commission and strengthened 



28 



legislative round on appropriations for 
the MX this autumn. 

If we see this mission through, the 
combined efforts of this Administration 
and the Congress will restore the 
credibility of America's strategic 
posture— the essential foundation for 
deterrence and successful negotiations. 
We've learned over and over again that 
only common resolve in the West can 
bring responsiveness from the East. 

And fortunately, Western allied uni- 
ty today is a firm reality. Our negotia- 
tions have been preceded by close con- 
sultations with the Congress and with 
our allies. This process has continued 
during the negotiations in Geneva, and 
we've given our negotiators the flexibili- 
ty to explore all possible avenues with 
the Soviets. 

"Peace" is a beautiful word, but it is 
also freely used and sometimes even 
abused. As I've said before, peace is an 
objective, not a policy. Those who fail to 
understand this do so at their peril. 
Neville Chamberlain thought of peace as 
a vague policy in the 1930s, and the 
result brought us closer to World 
War II. Today's so-called peace move- 
ment—for all its modern hype and 
theatrics— makes the same old mistake. 
They would wage peace by weakening 
the free. And that just doesn't make 
sense. My heart is with those who march 
for peace. I'd be at the head of the 
parade if I thought it would really serve 
the cause of peace. But the members of 
the real peace movement, the real peace- 
keepers and peacemakers, are people 
who understand that peace must be built 



on strength. And for that, the American 
people and free people everywhere owe 
all of you a deep debt of gratitude. 

Like you, our allies remain united in 
a common effort to strengthen both 
deterrence and the prospect for arms 
reduction through negotiations. They 
recognize the dangers to allied unity of 
Soviet propaganda and thinly veiled 
threats— at causing NATO to abandon 
its dual- track decision to modernize and 
negotiate. If we lack the will to provide 
a credible deterrent, then we could look 
forward to ever more aggressive Soviet 
behavior in the future. Because NATO 
understands this, NATO will persevere. 

When you add it all up, despite the 
problems, there is strong reason for 
hope. This Administration has worked 
very hard over the course of many 
months to refine our own negotiating 
objectives and positions. We've 
developed a sound, well-thought-out 
strategy to achieve them. We stand 
united with the Congress and our allies. 
Our strategic triad is being modernized. 
We're negotiating arms reductions in 
good faith. And there's been encourag- 
ing movement in these negotiations. For 
the first time, in the START negotia- 
tions, the Soviets are willing to actually 
talk about actual reductions. In Vienna, 
at the mutual and balanced force reduc- 
tion talks, the Soviet negotiators have 
shown movement on the verification 
issues needed to permit us to negotiate 
reductions in the conventional force 
safely. There has also been progress in 
discussing confidence-building measures. 
All these indicators, modest though they 
may seem, point in the same positive 
direction — new hope for arms reductions 
and a more secure world. 

Let's not kid ourselves. There are 
lots of ambiguities, and we've still got a 
long way to go, a long way from agree- 
ment. Plenty of tough, hard bargaining 
remains to be done at the negotiating 
table. But I can assure you that our 
highest priority is focused on this, the 
most challenging and important issue of 
our lifetime, and we're making headway 
for peace. 

U.S. Responsibility as Peacemaker 

Another issue of critical importance to 
all Americans — and one I view as the 
centerpiece of American foreign policy — 
concerns our responsibility as peace- 
maker. We can't build a safer world with 
honorable intentions and good will alone. 
Achieving the fundamental goals our na- 
tion seeks in world affairs — peace, 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



human rights, economic progress, na- 
tional independence, and international 
stability— means supporting our friends 
and defending our interests. Our com- 
mitment as peacemaker is focused on 
these goals. Right now this commitment 
is most visible in Central America, the 
Middle East, and Africa. 

Central America. Our policy in Cen- 
tral America is to help the people of that 
troubled region help themselves, help 
them to build a better life — to help them 
toward liberty and to help them reverse 
centuries of poverty and inequity. 

And that's what they want, too. In 
Costa Rica, democracy and respect for 
human rights are a long and proud 
tradition. In Honduras, democratic in- 
stitutions are taking root. In El Salva- 
dor, democracy is beginning to work 
even in the face of externally supported 
terrorism and guerrilla warfare. 

We know that democracy in Central 
America will not be built overnight. But 
step-by-step, with humanitarian, eco- 
nomic, and private sector assistance 
from the United States, it can and will 
be achieved. 

And that's why we established the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative, a program 
designed to help the people in that 
region help themselves. The Caribbean 
Basin Initiative is based on a combina- 
tion of trade and private investment in- 
centives. We decided to listen and learn 
from what our neighbors have been say- 
ing for a long time— that the best thing 
we could do is to help them build a bet- 
ter, freer life for themselves. We agree, 
and — though you wouldn't know it from 
some of the coverage — by far the great- 
est portion of our aid to Central 
America is humanitarian and economic. 

Now, there are some— in Moscow 
and Havana— who don't want to let our 
Caribbean neighbors solve their prob- 
lems peacefully. They seek to impose 
their alien form of totalitarianism with 
bullets instead of ballots. And that's why 
we're supporting a security shield for 
those nations that are threatened. 
Unless that shield is there, democracy, 
reform, economic development, and con- 
structive dialogue and negotiations can- 
not survive and grow. Other than train- 
ing our own troops, this is the only pur- 
pose behind our military exercises— to 
demonstrate our commitment to the free 
aspirations and sovereign integrity of 
our neighbors. 

I've said it before, and I'll say it 
again: Human rights means working at 
problems, not walking away from them. 
Would America be America if, in their 



hour of need, we abandoned our nearest 
neighbors? From the tip of Tierra del 
Fuego to Alaska's Point Barrow, we're 
all Americans. We worship the same 
God, cherish the same freedom. Can we 
stand idly by and allow a totalitarian 
minority to destroy our common 
heritage? Our concern is justice. Has 
communism ever provided that? Our 
concern is poverty. Has a communist 
economic system ever brought prosperi- 
ty? No. If the United States were to let 
down the people of Central America- 
people who are struggling for the demo- 
cratic values that we share— we would 
have let ourselves down, too. We could 
never be certain of ourselves, much less 
of the future, if we turned our back on 
our nearest neighbors' struggle for 
peace, freedom, and evolving 
democracy. 

Middle East. In the Middle East, 
the pursuit of peace between Israel and 
its Arab neighbors remains another 
fundamental objective of this Ad- 
ministration. Yes, it's a thorny problem, 
and our negotiators have faced serious 
difficulties over the past 2V2 years. But 
there's been real progress. The Sinai 
Peninsula was returned to Egypt in 
April of 1982. This essential step in the 
establishment of peace between Egypt 
and Israel wouldn't have been possible 
without our decision to contribute to the 



we have a responsibility to help our 
friends keep the peace. And we should 
be proud of our achievements and 
especially proud of the fine men and 
women of our Armed Forces who under- 
take these tough yet vital tasks. 

Africa. In Africa, we're engaged in 
a parallel commitment— economic devel- 
opment, the growth of democracies, and 
the peaceful resolution of conflict. And 
here, too, our emphasis is on develop- 
mental and economic assistance. We 
maintain only a handful of military ad- 
visers on the whole African Continent. 
Our economic aid is four times larger 
than what we spend on security assist- 
ance. Contrast this with what the Soviet 
Union is doing. The record shows that 
since the Soviets began their aid pro- 
gram to Africa in 1954, military aid has 
outpaced all other Soviet aid by seven to 
one. Then add more than 40,000 Soviet 
and surrogate military personnel sta- 
tioned in Africa, and it's no wonder that 
Africa is rife with conflict and tension. 

For our part, we're actively working 
to defuse the tensions and conflict in 
Namibia and Angola while we help fight 
poverty in the region. In Chad, the 
United States is a partner in a multi- 
national economic assistance package 
designed to get this tragically poor and 
strife-torn country on its feet. But with- 



. . . since the Soviets began their aid program to 
Africa in 1954, military aid has outpaced all other 
Soviet aid by seven to one. Then add more than 
40,000 Soviet and surrogate military personnel sta- 
tioned in Africa, and it's no wonder that Africa is 
rife with conflict and tension. 



multinational force and observers that 
are currently operating in the Sinai. In 
Lebanon, our Marines continue to serve 
alongside their French. British, and 
Italian comrades as we work for the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from 
that troubled land. Our joint presence 
strengthens the resolve of the Lebanese 
Government to assume the tough task of 
maintaining order. 

We Americans covet no foreign ter- 
ritory, and we have no intention of 
becoming policeman to the world. But as 
the most powerful country in the West, 



out protection from external aggression, 
there can be no economic progress. 

And naked, external aggression is 
what is taking place in Chad today. 
Drawing upon the nearly $10 billion 
worth of Soviet military equipment and 
munitions now in Libya, Colonel Qadhafi 
has been using Soviet-built fighter 
bombers, T-55 tanks, and artillery in a 
blatant attempt to destroy a legitimate 
government. President Habre and the 
people of his country are truly 
beleaguered as they struggle to preserve 
their independence. It is in this context 



October 1983 



29 



THE PRESIDENT 



that we have joined a number of other 
countries in providing emergency securi- 
ty assistance to Chad. 

Yes, in Africa there is real reason 
for concern. But there are also harbin- 
gers of hope. Less than 2 weeks ago, I 
had the pleasure of meeting with Presi- 
dent Diouf of Senegal. He's a great man 
doing a great job. His outstanding 
leadership has brought Senegal fully into 
the community of truly democratic 
states. And a similar democratic success 
story has just taken place in Nigeria, 
Africa's most populous nation, where 
free presidential elections were success- 
fully completed last week. 

The American Heritage 

That's right, there's a democratic revolu- 
tion going on in this world. It may not 
grab the headlines, but it's there, and it's 
growing. The tide of history is with the 
forces of freedom, and so are we. 

That's the real message, and that's 
the overwhelming news story of our 
time, even though it seldom makes the 
front page. The light of the democratic 
ideal is not slowly fading away. It gains 
in brightness with every passing day, 
but it needs our care and cultivation. 
You know, Mark Twain once re- 
marked that he spent $25 to research 
his family tree, and then he had to 
spend $50 to cover it up. Well, America 
is more fortunate. We can be proud of 
our heritage, and we need never hide 
from our roots. The world we live in is 
not an easy one, but we've inherited a 
noble mission, a mission that casts a 
beacon of hope for all the Earth's peo- 
ple. America, more than anything, 
wants lasting peace— peace with liberty, 
with justice, and with the freedom to 
follow the dictates of God and con- 
science. To succeed, we will need 
wisdom; strength, and imagination. 
We'll need patience and vigor. But to 
seek anything less would be to deny our 
heritage and the real meaning of our 
great nation. 

You know, our national anthem is 
probably the only one that asks a ques- 
tion: ". . . does that . . . banner yet 
wave, o'er the land of the free and the 
home of the brave?" When Francis Scotl 
Key wrote that, he was asking if our 
flag was still flying. Well, today we 
know the flag still flies. But what we 
continue to answer is that it does wave 
over a people that are still free and still 
brave and determined to preserve this 
land for generations to come. 



International Trade 



from White House press release. 



President Reagan's radio address to 
the nation of August 6, 198S. 1 

I'd like to talk to you today about 
trade— a powerful force for progress 
and peace, as you well know. The winds 
and waters of commerce carry oppor- 
tunities that help nations grow and 
bring citizens of the world closer 
together. Put simply, increased trade 
spells more jobs, higher earnings, better 
products, less inflation, and cooperation 
over confrontation. The freer the flow of 
world trade, the stronger the tides for 
economic progress and peace among na- 
tions. 

I've seen in my lifetime what hap- 
pens when leaders forget these timeless 
principles. They seek to protect in- 
dustries and jobs, but they end up doing 
the opposite. One economic lesson of the 
1930s is protectionism increases interna- 
tional tensions. We bought less from our 
trading partners, but then they bought 
less from us. Economic growth dried up. 
World trade contracted by over 60%, 
and we had the Great Depression. 
Young Americans soon followed the 
American flag into World War II. 

No one wants to relive that night- 
mare, and we don't have to. The 1980s 
can be a time when our economies grow 
together, and more jobs will be created 
for all. This was the spirit of the 
Williamsburg summit in May. The 
leaders of the industrialized countries 
pledged to continue working for a more 
open trading system. But sometimes 
that's easier said than done. 

Take the case of our own economy. 
Things are looking up for America. In- 
flation has been knocked down to 2.6%. 
Economic growth in the second quarter 
reached 8.7% and 1,700,000 Americans 
have been hired since last December. 
Yesterday we learned that total un- 
employment has dropped to 9.3%. Near- 
ly 500,000 of our fellow citizens found 
jobs in July. More Americans are work- 
ing than at any time in this nation's 
history. This good news restores con- 
fidence in our economy and our cur- 
rency. 

Some people dislike our strong 
dollar and blame it on our interest rates. 
Well, we do not want disorderly curren- 
cy markets, and we've intervened to 
bring back order to otherwise disorderly 
markets. But let's remember something. 
Other countries have higher interest 
rates than we do, yet their currencies 



have fallen in relation to ours. One good 
reason is inflation. It's not the interest 
you earn from holding a currency that 
matters most; it's the confidence you 
have that the value of your money won't 
depreciate from higher inflation. 

America's inflation rate has declined 
dramatically. Now a strong dollar makes 
our purchases from abroad less expen- 
sive, and that's good. 

Winning the war against inflation is 
probably the best economic legacy we 
could leave to the next generation. 
Remember what life was like only a few 
years ago when the value of the dollar 
was being talked down and inflation was 
going through the roof? 

But a strong dollar also brings prob- 
lems. It makes the goods our exporters 
are trying to sell more expensive. Still, 
we're tough competitors. Some $200 
billion worth of goods were sold by 
Americans last year. So, do we listen to 
those who would go back to dead end 
protectionism and to sabotaging the 
value of our currency, or do we go for- 
ward, keeping our faith in the American 
people who made this nation the 
greatest success story the world has 
ever known? 

I believe our challenge is to marshal 
the power of this country's best minds 
and create the technology that will 
restore America's economic leadership. I 
have appointed a Presidential Commis- 
sion on Industrial Competitiveness, ask- 
ing distinguished leaders from business, 
labor, and academia to advise us on how 
best to strengthen our ability to compete 
in world markets. 

We believe the U.S. trade position 
would be strengthened by uniting many 
of this government's trade respon- 
sibilities under one roof, so we proposed 
legislation to create a department of in- 
ternational trade and industry. We're 
also taking action to create opportunities 
for trade. 

Ten days ago, our negotiators 
reached a new, long-term grain agree- 
ment with the Soviet Union. Since 1981 
we've ended the unfair embargo that 
had been slapped on American farmers. 
And now we have an agreement that 
obligates the Soviets to increase their 
minimum purchase of wheat— or gram, 
I should say— by 50%. 

This, along with the likelihood of 
substantial purchases from China, 
represents a major step forward for our 
farmers. It symbolizes our determination 
to help them regain the markets they 
lost. It also proves that while we oppose 
Soviet aggression, we seek to promote 
progress and peace between our peoples. 



30 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



Yesterday I signed legislation to 
stimulate more trade and opportunity— 
the Caribbean Basin Initiative. This 
package of incentives will establish new 
commercial relationships between the 
people of the Caribbean and the United 
States. Stimulating trade will mean new 
jobs for their citizens as well as ours. It 
underscores our belief that economic 
development based on free market prin- 
ciples is the key to helping our neighbors 
build a future of freedom, democracy, 
and peace. 

Finally, let me mention an important 
agreement on textiles we've just reached 
with the People's Republic of China. No 
free market currently exists in textiles, 
and only what is called the multifiber ar- 
rangement, signed by 46 countries. 
We're a party to that arrangement, but 
China is not, and our bilateral agree- 
ment with them expired last December. 
To prevent a flood of imports from 
harming our struggling textile industry, 
we imposed unilateral quotas on China's 
products. They responded with large 
reductions in their purchases of 
American farm products. 

We faced three options: option 1, 
end our restrictions on Chinese textiles, 
which would help our farmers but risk 
further damage to our textile workers; 
option 2, cut back Chinese exports even 
further, which would cost our farmers 
billions more in lost sales; or option 3, 
negotiate a tough but fair 5-year agree- 
ment with China to permit controlled, 
moderate growth of Chinese exports. 
We chose option 3. 

Our textile producers can be assured 
there will be no flood of imports, and 
they can get on with the task of modern- 
izing their industry, which is the best 
long-term assurance of jobs for our own 
people. This new agreement will mean 
more business for our farmers, and it 
promises China the opportunity to sell 
its products here. That's important for 
good relations between our two coun- 
tries. 

Bit by bit, we're restoring America's 
reputation as a reliable supplier and as a 
supporter of free and fair trade for 
progress and for peace. 



Central America and Chad 



'Broadcast from Camp David (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Aug. 15, 1983). ■ 



President Regan's remarks and a 
question- and- answer session with news 
correspondents on August 11, 198S. 1 

I just attended the first meeting with 
the commission chaired by Dr. 
Kissinger— the Commission on Central 
America— and have explained to them— 
if any explanation was needed— what it 
is that we have in mind for that commis- 
sion: that I've believed for a long time 
that this country in the past, even 
though it has suggested plans for better 
neighborly relations with the countries 
in the rest of the Americas, and while 
the intentions were good, somehow 
maybe there was an insensitivity about 
our size and our suggesting something 
as a plan that everyone should adopt; 
that I have been looking for a way in 
which we could get their cooperation, 
their ideas, and bring all of the nations 
of the Americas closer together as equal 
partners and allies; and that this is the 
kind of long-range plan to bring this 
about— to alleviate some of the condi- 
tions that have made many of those 
countries subject to recurring revolu- 
tions, because the revolutions have 
always been — or for the most part have 
been revolutions that simply changed 
one set of rulers for another set of 
rulers. 

And I began this before I'd even 
taken office with regard to our nearest 
neighbor, Mexico, and to see if we can't 
make the borders meeting places instead 
of lines for confrontation or separation. 
And the very fact that we're all 
Americans from South Pole to North 
Pole here in these two continents, with a 
common pioneer heritage, with a com- 
mon desire for individual freedom, is 
such that I just hope that we can begin 
to bring this about and bring together 
the more than 600 million people in our 
two continents and the isthmus, and 
that their job would be to start with 
Central America and see how we could 
have economic and social reforms that 
would help bring this about. 

Q. How far are you willing to go 
militarily to save Chad from falling in- 
to the hands of the rebels backed by 
Libya? 

A. Chad, actually, you might say, is 
in a sphere of interest of the French. 
France, because of its historic relation- 
ship with that area, has made it plain 
that they consider this their principal 
place. We're in consultation with them, 



and we have, in answer to their request, 
provided weapons and some trainers in 
the use of those weapons. 

We are, at the same time now, 
because of the concern of all the north- 
ern African states there, or the central 
African states about the Libyan in- 
tervention— Qadhafi and his adventuring 
down there have them all concerned, 
and for that reason, many of the African 
states are providing troops. We have 
volunteered to some of them to aid in 
the transportation of those troops but 
we're not in any way in line for par- 
ticipating militarily other than that. 

Q. What do you think are the 
chances, in view of the fall today of 
Faya-Largeau, that Chad will survive 
under the present regime? 

A. It's a very volatile situation, and 
I don't know that I could — I'm not going 
to hazard a guess. But Chad looks so 
small on the map when you see it pic- 
tured so often there. We forget the size 
of Africa, because if Chad is superim- 
posed on a map of the United States, 
you find that it's a country that extends 
virtually from the Mexican to the Cana- 
dian border and is a few states wide 
when it's looked at in that way. 

So Faya-Largeau is a city, of course, 
but it's our understanding, as well as we 
can get information out of there, that 
the Habre forces have been withdrawn, 
that they came out not dispersed or cap- 
tured or overrun. But again, I have to 
caution you that any reports we're get- 
ting—there are conflicting reports of all 
kinds coming from there. 

But no, I don't think that this is such 
a key spot that this marks the imminent 
end of the war. The reason I gave you 
the geographical description is that's a 
long way from the capital, N'Djamena, 
where the French paratroop forces have 
gone in and things of that kind. 

Q. Would the United States allow 
Chad to fall to Qadhafi and the Lib- 
yans rather than intervene? 

A. As I've said before, it's not our 
primary sphere of influence; it is that of 
France. We remain in constant consulta- 
tion with them, but I don't see any situa- 
tion that would call for military in- 
tervention by the United States there. 

Q. I wanted to ask you a question 
on the commission [on Central 
America]. Have you decided whether 
to retain or remove the Cuban-Ameri- 



October1983 



31 



THE PRESIDENT 



can member of the commission while 
the allegations remain against him? 

A. There is, as you know, a 
clearance that has to be done for every- 
one that is appointed to any group of 
that kind or to any position. And pend- 
ing such a clearance, which is going on, 
why, I'm not going to comment about 
any. I think it is a fine commission and 
represents a variety of viewpoints, and I 
hope that it will be passed intact. 

Q. You've described Chad as lying 
within the French sphere of influence. 
Do you feel the French are, at the mo- 
ment, doing enough to counter Libyan 
adventurism? 

A. I have to tell you that I'm not 
aware of what their plans might be or 
what it is that they're prepared to do. I 
know they have introduced ground 
forces in there, but I'm just not privy to 
their military planning, and I think 
that's explainable. I think that they 
know that the more something is talked 
about, the more chance there is of leaks, 
and the leaks in this case could benefit 
the wrong people. 

Q. You have said, though, that 
you're in consultation, close consulta- 
tion, with the French. Do you think 
that it would be helpful if they pro- 
vided air support to Chad? And should 
they be providing more than the 
limited ground forces and the trainers 
that they've sent already? 

A. As I say, I don't know what their 
plans are. Frankly, we had believed at 
first that there was going to be some 
aerial activity there. Now, I don't know 
whether they're negotiating at the same 
time with Libya or not. But I know that 
we had thought that because part of 
Libya's forces, and key forces in their 
first advance, not only have been 
motorized troops on the ground but have 
been aerial attacks. 

Q. Why are we so concerned about 
that part of the world? If it is the 
French sphere of influence, what is it 
about Qadhafi and perhaps the Sudan 
or Egypt, why is this an American 
concern? 

A. I think the whole attitude of 
Qadhafi and his empire-building is of 
concern to anyone, but the main concern 
is to the surrounding African states. 
They are all very much alarmed and dis- 
turbed because they believe that Qadhafi 
is intent on adventuring far beyond his 
own borders, and they believe that 
they're all under a threat. 



Q. Are you worried that the U.S. 
forces are being stretched too thin 
around the globe, as I believe the 
Army Chief of Staff put it recently? 

A. I think what he was pointing out 
is that in training the military and in 
planning your own security, you have to 
consider what are all of the contingen- 
cies that could require, for our security, 
some action by us. And then this is why 
you have war games in various parts of 
the world and joint training exercises. 

And what he was pointing out, I 
think, was that today, unlike a previous 
day when weapons weren't quite of the 
kind they are now— the world has 
grown more interdependent— that at 
one time, and within my lifetime, our 
principal protection was shore batteries 
of artillery along our coasts. And I think 
he was pointing out that our miltiary re- 
quirements are different. And in con- 
sidering the possible contingencies and 
where we would feel that our security 
was actually involved is so much more 
widespread than it has ever been, that 
our peacetime forces, yes, if they had to 
be called into action— but I think, also, 
that's considering that they could be 
called into action in all those places at 
once. 

Q. The United States now has 
Marines in Lebanon. We have AWACS 
[airborne warning and control 
systems] planes in North Africa. We 
have a military training mission going 
on with Egypt. And we have a show 
of military force in Latin America. 
And there's an impression now that 
you are responding to trouble spots 
always in a military fashion. Has there 
been a change in your approach to 
problems around the world? Is there a 
shift in our policy? 

A. I don't think so at all. Under a 
previous President, a few Presidents 
back, there was an entire division in 
Lebanon. This was part of our peace 
program there. They're not there in 
combat state; they're there to help while 
the Libyan Government— or the 
Lebanese Government— tries to regain 
control over its own territory. The war 
games in Egypt that are going on or the 
practice maneuvers, joint maneuvers, 
that's an annual thing that we've done 
for a long time. 

I noticed that you changed the tone 
and said that it was a show of force in 
Central America. We have held joint 
maneuvers, both naval and on land, 
repeatedly with our friends and allies 
here in the Americas. As a matter of 
fact, many of you have referred to the 



one in Honduras as the biggest. It's only 
about half as big as the one we held 
within the year in Panama, where there 
were 10,000 troops involved. 

Q. Are you saying that it's not the 
American role to play policeman 
around the world? 

A. No, it is not. It is to recognize 
that the threats can be that widespread, 
and the threats to our security, because 
we know, for example, that a great 
percentage of the strategic minerals that 
are needed for our industrial might 
come from various places in the world. 
The oil that we import— we can't stand 
by and say that we have no considera- 
tion of what might happen in closing off 
the sealanes that are used by the 
tankers supplying us with the oil that we 
must import. So this is all based on what 
we could be, what could involve our own 
security. 



J Held in the Briefing Room at the White 
House (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 15, 1983). ■ 



Situation in 
Central America 



President Reagan's radio address to 
the nation, broadcast from El Paso, on 
August IS, 1983. 1 

I'm speaking to you from El Paso, 
Texas. Tomorrow, I'll be in Mexico 
meeting with President de la Madrid. 

Earlier this week, I met with the 
new National Bipartisan Commission on 
Central America. The commission will 
look at long-range issues and recom- 
mend a truly national approach to them. 

One thing especially impressed me. 
The commission members are all 
distinguished, well-educated people, but 
they've made their first task a concen- 
trated study of Central America. Pro- 
fessor Kissinger has promised to make 
their learning program a tough one. I 
mentioned this because the polls say 
many Americans are confused about 
what we're supporting in Central 
America and about why that region, so 
close to home and to our strategic 
trading arteries, is important to us. 

The mail I receive tells the same 
story. My staff recently put together a 
composite letter that combines the most 
widespread misconceptions. It goes like 
this: 



32 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



"Dear Mr. President: The United 
States has not learned any lessons from 
history. We refuse to understand the 
root causes of violence and revolution. 
El Salvador proves that we continue to 
support ruthless dictators who oppose 
change and abuse human freedom. And 
by refusing to deal decently with the 
Sandinista government in Nicaragua, we 
have forced it into the arms of Cuba and 
the Soviet Union. Military measures will 
just make things worse. Anyway, 
democracy can't work in Central 
America." End of composite letter. 

Sound familiar? I'm sure you've 
heard it all before. But let's look at what 
is really happening. 

We have learned from history. 
Years of poverty and injustice in Central 
America are a root cause of the 
violence. That's why our economic 
assistance there is greater — three times 
greater — than our military aid. 

We are on the side of peaceful, 
democratic change in Central America, 
and our actions prove it daily. But we 
aren't the only ones interested in Cen- 
tral America. The Soviet Union and 
Cuba are intervening there because they 
believe they can exploit the problems so 
as to install ruthless communist dictator- 
ships, such as we see in Cuba. 

We are not supporting dictators 
either of the far right or the far left. 
We're working hard with Costa Rica and 
Honduras, which are true democracies, 
and were helping El Salvador to become 
one. Only democracy can guarantee that 
a government will not turn against its 
own people, because in a democracy, 
people are the masters of government, 
not the servants. 

It's true that^ome members of El 
Salvador's security forces still misuse 
their public trust. You can't instantly 
erase something that's been going on for 
a century or more. But we deplore even 
passive acceptance of such actions, and I 
can assure you great progress is being 
made. Can anyone really believe that the 
situation would improve if our influence 
for moderation were removed? 

Commitment to human rights means 
working at problems, not walking away 
from them. And there are many brave 
Central Americans who, at great per- 
sonal risk, are working to end these 
abuses. President Magana of El 
Salvador is such a man. 

That brings me to Nicaragua. We 
have dealt decently with Nicaragua, 
more decently than the Sandinista 
government there has treated its own 
citizens and neighbors. The Sandinistas 
were not elected. They seized power 



through a revolution that, true enough, 
overthrew a dictatorship, but then the 
Sandinistas betrayed their repeated 
promises of democracy and free elec- 
tions. They betrayed many who fought 
beside them in the revolution, and 
they've set up a communist dictatorship. 
Having seized power, the Sandinista 
bosses revealed they had chosen sides 
with Cuba and the Soviet Union a long 
time ago. We did not push them into 
that camp. 

Unfortunately, there have been such 
distortions about U.S. policy in Central 
America that the great majority of 
Americans don't know which side we're 
on. No wonder a great many sincere 
people write angrily that we should sup- 
port regional dialogue, emphasize 
economic assistance, or take any number 
of other actions, all of which we're 
already doing and have been doing for 
more than 2 years. 

It's time to get away from fairy tales 
and get back to reality. We support the 
elected Government of El Salvador 
against communist-backed guerrillas 
who would take over the country by 
force. And we oppose the unelected 
Government of Nicaragua, which sup- 
ports those guerrillas with weapons and 
ammunition. Now, that, of course, puts 
us in sympathy with those Nicaraguans 
who are trying to restore the democratic 
promises made during the revolution, 
the so-called contras. 

Our neighbors in the Americas are 
important to us, and they need our help. 
We're working hard to provide economic 
and political support for development so 
that ballots will replace bullets in that 
troubled region. That's the reason for 
the Caribbean Basin Initiative and all 
our economic assistance. At the same 
time, we're helping our neighbors create 
a defensive shield to protect themselves 
from communist intervention while they 
go forward with economic reform. We 
do this by providing training, assistance, 
and firm demonstrations of our resolve 
to deter communist aggression. And 
that's the reason for the bipartisan com- 
mission, which has now begun its work. 

If we all look calmly at the facts, we 
can unite to protect our national in- 
terests and give our neighbors the help 
they need without spooking ourselves in 
the process. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 22, 1983. 



The Middle East 



President Reagan's radio address to 
the nation, broadcast from Rancho del 
Cielo, on August 27, 1983. 1 

Last June— the 19th of June to be ex- 
act — a well-known TV network producer 
was the commencement speaker at the 
high school where he had graduated on 
that same day, June 19th, 43 years ago. 
In speaking to this year's graduates, he 
pointed out some things, that should be 
of concern to them regarding the state 
of the world. They were items taken 
from the front page of a June 19th issue 
of The New York Times, their gradua- 
tion day. 

He said, "In Washington, the Ad- 
ministration is asking for more money, 
not to fight cancer or educate young 
people, but more money to build some of 
the most destructive weapons the world 
has ever seen." Not very reassuring for 
a high school graduate hoping to live to 
an old age, and not very reassuring, 
either, to have a President who is called 
a warmonger. 

He went on to say, "In Latin 
America, the Times tells us, the United 
States is prepared to go to war to keep 
unfriendly powers out of this hemis- 
phere. If push comes to shove, a young 
high school graduate could end up 
fighting there." 

"In Europe," he told them, "a people 
not much different from you is being 
crushed in what the Times reports is be- 
ing called an uncompromising and unre- 
lenting fashion. And in Detroit, the 
Japanese threat, among other things, is 
forcing the Ford Motor Company out of 
the car business." 

He pointed out that it didn't seem 
like much a world to look forward to, 
but there it was on page 1, graduation 
day, June 19th. Yes, his graduation day, 
June 19th, 1940. And as he went on to 
say, "We're all still here," although he 
wouldn't have bet on it back in 1940. 

The President being called a war- 
monger was Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 
who kept increasing the defense budget. 
The Japanese threat was military, not 
economic, and Ford was going into the 
fighter plane business. And, oh yes, the 
European country that was being 
crushed was France, not Poland. 

Here it is 43 years later, and as he 
told that class of '83, "A good case can 
be made that the world is better, not 
worse." And the class of 1940 had some- 
thing to do with that, just as the class of 
'83 can have a hand in making things 



October 1983 



33 



THE SECRETARY 



better for graduating classes yet to be, 
even a class 43 years from now. 

Young Americans are already doing 
their share to build a better world. To- 
day our servicemen are participating in 
multinational peacekeeping forces in 
Lebanon and the Sinai Peninsula. 

In the agreement between Lebanon 
and Israel, Israel agreed to withdraw its 
military forces totally. The responsibility 
now rests on others to negotiate in good 
faith on their own arrangements for 
withdrawal. Until this happens, Lebanon 
will remain a potential trouble spot. 

But our current efforts in Lebanon 
are only a small part of our search for 
peace in the Middle East, including a 
compassionate, fair, and practical resolu- 
tion to the Palestinian problem. 

The Middle East peace initiative 
which we announced almost a year ago 
is definitely alive and available to those 
parties willing to sit down together and 
talk peace. We remain committed to the 
positions we set forth, and we stand 
ready to pursue them in the context of 
the Camp David accords. Those posi- 
tions are in the best long-term interests 
of all parties. Most importantly, they're 
the only realistic basis for a solution that 
has thus far been presented. 

The United States continues to sup- 
port UN Security Council Resolutions 
338 and 242. 

The establishment of new Israeli set- 
tlements in the occupied territories is an 
obstacle to peace, and we're concerned 
over the negative effect that this activity 
has on Arab confidence in Israel's will- 
ingness to return territory in exchange 
for security and a freely and fairly 
negotiated peace treaty. 

The future of these settlements can 
only be dealt with through direct 
negotiations between the parties to the 
conflict. The sooner these negotiations 
begin, the greater the chance for a solu- 
tion. 

This Administration, like those 
before it, is firmly committed to the 
security of the State of Israel. We will 
help Israel defend itself against external 
aggression. At the same time, the 
United States believes, as it has always 
believed, that permanent security for the 
people of Israel and all the peoples of 
the region can only come with the 
achievement of a just and lasting peace, 
not by sole reliance on increasingly ex- 
pensive military forces. 

Unfortunately, the opportunities af- 
forded by our initiative have yet to be 
grasped by the parties involved. We 
know the issues are complex, the risks 
for all concerned high, and much 



courageous statesmanship will be re- 
quired. Nevertheless, those complex 
issues can be resolved by creative and 
persistent diplomacy. Those risks can be 
overcome by people who want to end 
this bitter and tragic conflict. And in the 



process, the United States will be a full 
partner, doing everything we can to help 
create a just and lasting peace. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 5, 1983. 



Japan and America: 
International Partnership 
for the 1980s 



Se.cret.a7~y Shultz's address before the 
sixth Shimoda Conference in Warrenton, 
Virginia, on September 2, 1983. 1 

The night before last we first learned 
that a Korean Air Lines plane was miss- 
ing. It is an appalling attack. The air- 
liner was shot down by a Soviet fighter 
in cold blood after 2Vz hours of Soviet 
surveillance. We have demanded an ex- 
planation. No explanation has been pro- 
vided. There is no explanation for this 
act of barbarism. We grieve for those 
lost and their families. We pledge relent- 
less efforts against totalitarian systems 
and the patterns of behavior they pro- 
duce and for a world of freedom and 
decency. We welcomed the instant co- 
operation among the Governments of 
Japan, Korea, and the United States. 
We know and we can see from our own 
activity yesterday and in calling around 
that something like this tends to con- 
sume all of your attention. At the same 
time, it is good to reflect on the fact 
that there was this instant cooperation 
of all of the Japanese people, in effect, 
and the American people and Korean 
people. And to a major degree, I think, 
this is an illustration of the bonds that 
have developed and the confidence that 
exists among our countries. 

The Shimoda conferences are the 
most important nongovernmental forum 
for the discussion of the Japanese- 
American relationship. These meetings 
bring together a truly distinguished body 
of experts in the field of Japanese- 
American relations and people from both 
countries who care about the future of 
our partnership. I am pleased and 
honored to take part today in the sixth 
Shimoda Conference— the first to be 
held in the United States. 



As most of you know, Shimoda has 
a symbolic and historical significance 
that long precedes these conferences. 
Formal relations between Japan and 
America, in fact, began with the Treaty 
of Amity, signed in 1854, which opened 
Shimoda as a port of refuge for 
American shipping. A few years later a 
commercial treaty was signed by our 
first consul, Townsend Harris, who 
opened the first American consulate in 
Japan— at Shimoda. 

Much has changed since then. Both 
our countries have grown from isolated 
agrarian societies into major industrial 
powers actively engaged in the affairs of 
the world. If Shimoda in 1854 repre- 
sents the beginnings of communication 
between us, the Shimoda conferences to- 
day reflect the richness and fullness of 
our cooperation in the modern era. 

I want to say a few words here 
about the importance of our relationship, 
the impressive record of our coopera- 
tion, and the agenda of common action 
that is still before us. 

Importance of the Japanese-American 
Relationship 

It is truly extraordinary that two coun- 
tries so culturally different, so geo- 
graphically distant, have forged a part- 
nership as close and effective as ours. 
Its importance in the last 30 years can 
be measured by some economic 
statistics, which show: 

• Japan took about 10% of our total 
exports last year, a larger share by far 
than any country except Canada; 

• We bought 25% of Japan's total 
exports; 

• In 1976 our two-way trade already 
was a whopping $27 billion, but in 1983 
it is expected to exceed $60 billion, more 



34 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



than double what it was 7 years ago and 
more than triple what it was 10 years 
ago; 

• Our combined gross national prod- 
uct (GNP) now accounts for about 35% 
of the total GNP of the world. That's a 
staggering proportion. We say it to each 
other so much, but we don't quite ap- 
preciate how significant that is. 

Even more important than the 
statistics, however, is the recognition on 
both sides that our ideals and values are 
fundamentally the same and that our 
political, economic, and security in- 
terests are fundamentally congruent. 
We are two great democracies, perma- 
nent friends, firm allies, and partners in 
any number of cooperative endeavors, 
from mutual security, to aid for develop- 
ing countries, to medical research. I can 
tell you that the American people are 
proud to be friends and allies of modern 
Japan. 

But like all good things, our partner- 
ship requires care and attention to main- 
tain it. These conferences, I notice, have 
often convened during times of stress in 
the relationship. In 1967, the first 
Shimoda Conference dwelt on two 
potential problems then looming on the 
horizon: continuation of the security 
treaty and the negotiation on the rever- 
sion of Okinawa. In 1969, at the time of 
the second Shimoda Conference, there 
was much concern about what many re- 
ferred to as the textile "war" that had 
erupted between us. In 1977, con- 
siderable attention was given to tenta- 
tive plans that the United States had for 
withdrawing our ground troops from 
Korea— plans that were later dropped. 

It is well to remember that stress is 
not new to this relationship. As some of 
you may know, Commodore Perry 
brought with him to Japan a letter from 
President Fillmore. Like some of the 
correspondence between the President 
and the Prime Minister today, its subject 
was trade relations. When the 1854 
Treaty of Amity was being negotiated, 
the American side was under pressure 
at home to secure trading rights in 
Japan. And yes, they found the going 
pretty tough. 

But it is also well to remember that 
the problems we have faced from time 
to time in our relationship have been 
met and solved to mutual satisfaction. 
That's the real point. Not just that there 
have been some problems— there are 
always problems in any partnership, 
especially whether or not we press them 
to do something about it. Such solutions 
demand dialogue— of the kind so well ex- 



emplified by this conference. Undoubted- 
ly there are problems of communication; 
because of cultural and linguistic differ- 
ences, there probably always will be. 
Real dialogue is a process of talking and 
listening, and it is clear that this process 
is increasingly characteristic of our rela- 
tionship. 

The frequency of our bilateral con- 
sultations has expanded enormously in 
the past few years. When I meet with 
Foreign Minister Abe during the Presi- 
dent's trip to Japan this November, it 
will be our sixth meeting this year. In 
November the President and Prime 
Minister Nakasone will be meeting for 
the fourth time this year. It was not un- 
til 30 years after the end of World 
War II that an American President first 
visited Japan. Now, when President 
Reagan goes to Japan in November, he 
will be the third consecutive president to 
do so. 

And the dialogue is expanding at 
every level. At our annual aid consulta- 
tions in June, for example, the Japanese 
side suggested, and we agreed, that our 
yearly meetings were not enough to get 
the job done. Henceforth, we will meet 
quarterly. The semiannual Japan-U.S. 
subcabinet economic consultations in- 
volve nine U.S. departments and 
organizations, with their Japanese 
counterparts, in reviews of the full 
range of our economic relations. 

Nongovernmental contacts are ex- 
panding just as fast. I take particular 
personal interest in the newest of 
these— the U.S.-Japan Advisory Com- 
mission—members of which are here 
with us today. This commission has been 
charged by the President and Prime 
Minister to look over the horizon and 
provide ideas and recommendations on 
the problems and opportunities of the 
future and consider how the United 
States and Japan can cooperate in 
meeting them. This is an awesomely 
open-ended mandate, but the commis- 
sion has made considerable progress in 
its first 3 months. And I might say that 
comes as no surprise considering the 
very high quality of the members of the 
commission. 

The United States enthusiastically 
welcomes the expansion of this dialogue. 
It is a reflection of the maturity of the 
relationship as well as of its scope. It 
has helped not only to solve bilateral 
problems but also to prevent a number 
of problems from developing at all. 
Rarely in history have two nations con- 
ferred so fully and so frequently on so 
many subjects. 



The very growth of the dialogue, 
however, can raise problems of its own. 
In an earlier, less complex stage of the 
relationship, all of its important bilateral 
issues were addressed by men and 
women thoroughly conversant with all 
aspects of the relationship— that is, by 
experts on relations between Japan and 
the United States. Today, there simply 
are not enough of you to go around, 
either in government or out. The new 
participants/although they are experts 
on the specific issues on which they 
work, do not always have your broad 
backgrounds or your sensitivity to all 
facts of the relationship. You must be 
educators, therefore, as well as pioneers. 
Perhaps you can help find solutions to 
this problem, which is a byproduct of 
your own success. 

The Record of Cooperation 

The real measure of our success is not 
how much we talk together but what we 
do together. In this respect, something 
else very remarkable has happened, 
which presents us with another, more 
profound, challenge. An increasing 
Japanese perception of Japan's global 
responsibilities; a resurgence of 
American confidence and of confidence 
in America; our combined influence on 
world events; and, indeed, the fact that 
increasingly what we do bilaterally has 
worldwide ramification, have turned our 
partnership into a truly global relation- 
ship. We are faced now with unprece- 
dented opportunities, to act as partners 
on a global scale, and we have an obliga- 
tion to grasp those opportunities and to 
use them for the advantage of present 
and future generations of the entire 
world. 

We must not fail. We will not fail. 
Already there are many examples of the 
good we can accomplish working with 
one another and with our friends and 
allies. The United States and Japan are 
the two largest providers of relief for 
refugees. In July, Japan's Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs announced its intention 
to provide nearly $9 million worth of 
American wheat to Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan through the World Food Pro- 
gram. This generous gift is but one of 
many that both countries make through- 
out the world frequently. (The inter- 
relationship is what I wanted to high- 
light by that example.) The Japanese 
have provided Afghan refugees with 
over $41 million in assistance since 1979. 
In the strategic Persian Gulf, whose 
security is vital not only to Japan and 
the United States but equally to our 



October 1983 



35 



THE SECRETARY 



European allies, Japan's role today is 
already far more important than com- 
monly realized. Indeed, Foreign Minister 
Abe has just returned from a highly con- 
structive mission to Iran and Iraq. 
Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan are three 
key countries close to the Persian Gulf 
region whose stability is critical to the 
security of the gulf itself. Yet they are 
not wealthy oil exporters, and they con- 
front formidable economic problems. 
Significantly, Japan gave more economic 
assistance to Pakistan last year than any 
other donor in the world, including our- 
selves; more economic assistance to 
Egypt than any European donor; and 
more economic assistance to Turkey 
than any European donor except Ger- 
many. Japan has thus assumed, largely 
within the space of the last 5 years, a 
major role in the stability of a vital 
region, a role that reflects both Japan's 
growing assumption of global respon- 
sibilities and the contribution that Japan 
can make to strengthening global stabili- 
ty. 

Other examples of political coopera- 
tion come to mind. On the problem of 
Kampuchea, our two countries not only 
have provided substantial relief for 
Khmer refugees but also have opened 
new opportunities for consultation with 
other concerned nations, particularly the 
ASEAN [Association of South East 
Asian Nations] nations, on the continu- 
ing crisis in Indochina. Japan's decision 
to withhold economic aid from Vietnam 
until all Vietnamese troops withdraw 
from Kampuchea has helped to make the 
dialogue with ASEAN a fruitful one. 

American and Japan also share a 
common goal in promoting China's 
modernization and in encouraging 
China's constructive engagement in 
Asia. The recent Japanese economic aid 
to the Republic of Korea and the steady 
improvement in Korean-Japanese rela- 
tions are contributing significantly to the 
stability of Northeast Asia. 

Japan's more active foreign policy is 
contributing significantly to efforts to 
control and reduce nuclear weapons. At 
the Williamsburg summit, Japan joined 
with the other industrial democracies in 
a common position on theater and 
strategic nuclear weapons and the effort 
to reduce them. Together we have made 
it clear to the Soviet Union that an 
agreement on intermediate-range 
nuclear forces that shifts the threat 
from Europe to Asia is unacceptable; 
limits on these systems must be global if 
they are to be meaningful. The growth 
of Soviet military power in Asia leaves 
us no alternative. For the Soviets are in- 



creasing their Asian deployments of 
nuclear weapons and are continuing to 
build up their naval and ground forces 
well beyond the maximum conceivably 
necessary for defense. President 
Reagan, therefore, has dedicated his Ad- 
ministration to the goal of reducing 
nuclear weapons in negotiations with the 
Soviet Union. We have consulted closely 
and continually with the Japanese 
Government. Japan's views and advice 
on our arms reduction initiatives are 
highly valued. 

Our cooperation, of course, extends 
to many other areas, including medical 
research (particularly cancer research), 
energy, technology transfer to develop- 
ing countries, controlling strategic ex- 
ports, and more. Altogether it is an im- 
pressive record. 

Next Steps in Japanese-American 
Cooperation 

But history never stops. As we face the 
future— as mature partners now on a 
global scale— a number of essential tasks 
remain on our agenda. 

First, we have a responsibility to re- 
affirm by our actions our commitment to 
free trade. At Williamsburg, our coun- 
tries committed themselves to halt pro- 
tectionism as recovery proceeds and to 
reverse it by dismantling trade barriers. 
The strength of Japan's economy clearly 
allows for further action now with 
respect to important trade restrictions 
that remain, such as agricultural import 
quotas and the de facto limitation of ma- 
jor areas of government procurement to 
domestic firms. 

I recognize that such far-sighted ac- 
tions are not easy or without cost. But 
the value of the open trading system is 
immeasurable— to Japan above all— and, 
correspondingly, the damage should it 
break down would be immeasurable. 
Responsibility for the trading system is 
a shared one. Although we experience 
occasional setbacks, President Reagan's 
recent decision on numerically controlled 
machine tools stands as an example of 
his Administration's dedication to main- 
taining the free trading system. 

Recently, the Japanese Government 
has taken several important steps to 
reduce trade barriers in order to in- 
crease access and give more equal treat- 
ment for foreign goods in Japan. We 
welcome these steps. We encourage 
Japan not only to put them into effect 
expeditiously but also to pursue other 
measures for opening markets, for this 
will reduce serious stresses in our rela- 
tionship. We would urge Japan, for ex- 



ample, to act promptly to carry out the 
simplifications of standards and cer- 
tification procedures recently enacted in- 
to law. In anticipation of liberalized ac- 
cess to Japanese markets, the Reagan 
Administration, for its part, pledges to 
continue to oppose protectionist 
measures in the Congress. 

A second important task for the 
future is to work together and with the 
other major industrialized countries to 
create the conditions for a more stable 
international monetary system. This also 
was a commitment at the Williamsburg 
summit. Many in both our countries are 
worried that the current exchange rates 
do not accurately reflect the relative 
trade competitiveness of our two 
economies. In fact, exchange rates in to- 
day's highly interdependent world reflect 
much more than trade relationships. The 
relative conditions in our whole econo- 
mies, and particularly the resulting in- 
ternational flows of capital, now deter- 
mine these rates. 

Last spring our governments agreed 
that bringing about greater convergence 
in economic performance was the essen- 
tial prerequisite for greater exchange 
rate stability. Closer convergence of per- 
formance will also help assure that ex- 
change rates more accurately reflect the 
real comparative advantages of our 
economies. 

We both have some work to do here. 
The United States needs to work harder 
to reduce its budget deficits and to bring 
down interest rates. Japan needs to 
nourish its still-modest recovery, for 
recovery will enable Japan to use more 
of its impressive savings at home. There 
is one important error we must both 
avoid: anxieties over the yen-dollar rate 
must not lead us to take actions, such as 
new restrictions on trade, for such 
restrictions would only make matters 
worse. But we cannot overreact to this 
problem because it is cascading over 
everything else. And the United States 
is headed into a trade deficit on the 
order of $70 billion. This is, in a sense, 
the contribution of our expansion to the 
expansion of other countries. But it is 
very, very large. And when put in the 
light of the high unemployment in the 
United States, I think we can well 
understand the pressures that this 
naturally generates. So it's a problem 
that must be addressed. At least, in my 
judgment, it is importantly connected 
with the yen-dollar relationship and with 
other currency relationships. 

A third task facing us is to help in 
the development of the less developed 
economies of the world. Both Japan and 



36 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



the United States have a vital interest in 
this. At Williamsburg we agreed to work 
for new trade liberalization negotiations 
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, with particular emphasis on ex- 
panding trade with developing countries. 
No single action could contribute more 
to the long-term economic development 
and well-being of the developing world. 
Trade, investment— those are the things 
that really get you somewhere. 

Growing and stable economies in the 
developing world provide the essential 
basis for the growth of democratic 
political institutions, the flourishing of 
which throughout the world is unques- 
tionably of prime importance to both 
Japan and the United States. Our two 
countries are now actively studying how 
to coordinate our foreign assistance pro- 
grams. We applaud the efforts Japan is 
making to open its markets more fully 
to the products of developing countries. 

A fourth task for the future is to 
respond to other opportunities for 
cooperation throughout the world. 
Often, this can be accomplished through 
such institutions as the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment, the General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs, the International Energy 
Agency, the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank, and the regional 
development banks. But in addition, we 
must be prepared to coordinate direc- 
tion, as we have in the past. Our 
responses— along with others— to the in- 
vasion of Afghanistan and to martial law 
in Poland provide good examples. 

Finally, our efforts in the field of 
mutual security require continuing atten- 
tion. Japan has made significant prog- 
ress toward strengthening its 
capabilities for self-defense. We must 
both do more to quicken our pace in 
fulfilling the roles and missions we have 
each adopted. In this regard, the 
Japanese have stated as a matter of 
policy that they will undertake to defend 
the sealanes to a distance of 1,000 
nautical miles from Japan. When Japan 
is ready to perform this mission, it will 
provide a credible deterrent to Soviet 
adventurism in Northeast Asia; and it 
also will allow us more flexibility in re- 
sponding to emergencies in the South- 
west Pacific and Indian Oceans that af- 
fect our mutual interests. 

Conclusion 

The message I want to leave you with 
today is that our current problems, in- 
cluding those in the trade field, should 
be viewed in the perspective of other 



problems we have met and solved over 
the years. But above all, they must be 
viewed in the perspective of our com- 
mon goals. The problems are serious, 
and they may even be more complex 
than those we have solved before. But 
for all our cultural differences, our sense 
of shared values and interests is also 
deeper than in the past. This is why I 
am confident that our two countries 
have the political will to resolve these 
difficulties. This is all the more essential 
as our relationship has grown beyond 
the bounds of the bilateral and become 
global in scope. 

There are far-sighted, dynamic 
leaders in both of our countries who are 
addressing these challenges— challenges 
on the frontiers of scientific research in 
biomedicine, energy, seismology, 
geothermal physics, weather, and other 
sciences; in the enhancement of global 
stability and prosperity; in spreading 
and cultivating the growth of freedom 
and democracy throughout the world. 
The opportunities are almost unlimited. 



But in both our countries— since we are 
democracies— forward-looking policies 
and closer cooperation depend on broad 
public understanding. It would be a 
tragic irony if the very democratic 
system that unites us morally were also 
to prove our political undoing. We must 
look to you, therefore, the distinguished 
participants of the sixth Shimoda Con- 
ference—and to all concerned citizens— 
to help nurture that broad public under- 
standing and support. 

If Japan and the United States 
maintain and strengthen their partner- 
ship, as they should, the 1980s can be a 
period of great achievement. If we act 
wisely, and with foresight, we can 
assure our common prosperity, security, 
and freedom. Not every generation has 
such an opportunity. Not every genera- 
tion has such a responsibility. I thank 
you for your willingness to participate in 
this endeavor. 



'Press release 330. 



News Conference of August 31 



Secretary Shultz held a news con- 
ference at the Department of State on 
August 31, 1983. 1 

I want to begin this press conference by 
talking first about the situation in 
Lebanon, a land that has known too 
much bloodshed and violence for too 
long. 

As we all know, there has been 
widespread fighting recently throughout 
Beirut and it suburbs. At present, we're 
advised by the Lebanese central 
authorities that effective measures are 
being taken to restore order. We all 
pray that they will be successful. 

An historic problem in Lebanon has 
been to find a formula for reconciling 
the various communal and confessional 
groups. President Gemayel has been 
working hard to do just that throughout 
his tenure in office. Today, with his 
Council of Ministers, he issued a call for 
key Lebanese leaders to join in a 
dialogue aimed at constituting a new na- 
tional approach to reconciliation and 
unity. 

The Government of the United 
States firmly supports this effort, con- 
sistent as it is with President Reagan's 
firm policy of support for an independ- 
ent Lebanon, free of all foreign forces 
with appropriate security arrangements 
for Israel's northern border. We intend 



to help President Gemayel in his new 
initiative in every way possible, through 
our own efforts and through cooperation 
with our partners in the multinational 
force (MNF)— France, Italy, and Great 
Britain. 

• We call upon the international 
community in general, and in particular 
on Syria, which has the largest army in 
Lebanon, to respect and support this 
process. 

• We will continue to provide train- 
ing and support for the Lebanese Armed 
Forces. 

• We will continue our active 
diplomatic engagement through Am- 
bassadors McFarlane and Fairbanks 
[Robert C. McFarlane, the President's 
personal representative in the Middle 
East, and Richard A. Fairbanks III, 
special negotiator for the Middle East 
peace process] as we did earlier through 
Ambassadors Habib and Draper. 

• We will continue to maintain our 
support for the multinational force and 
for the U.S. Marine component of that 
force. Let no one doubt that if attacked, 
the Marines will take care of themselves 
with vigor. 

Our goals have been clearly stated 
on many occasions. We will continue to 
work energetically to achieve those 
goals. 



October 1983 



37 



THE SECRETARY 



The outbreak of fighting in recent 
days in Lebanon has been tragic. It 
must be brought to an end. That will not 
be easy. We must recognize that fact, 
but we must also recognize the impor- 
tance to the world as a whole of a 
secure and peaceful Lebanon. Deter- 
mination, patience, and strength of will 
are required in the weeks and months 
ahead. 

The problems of Lebanon, important 
in their own right, are at the same time 
a part of the greater question of peace 
for all the Middle East. President 
Reagan addressed himself to that 
broader issue a year ago on Septem- 
ber 1. The principle behind the Presi- 
dent's initiative— balancing the key re- 
quirements of security for Israel and the 
legitimate rights and aspirations of the 
Palestinian people — is as valid today and 
in the future as it was a year ago. 

The President's initiative was and 
remains a major and creative contribu- 
tion to the peace process and a workable 
basis for negotiation. Any party who 
truly seeks a just, secure, and com- 
prehensive solution to the conflict must 
turn in the direction of the President's 
initiative, based as it is on the Camp 
David accords and Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338. Any serious ef- 
fort at negotiations in the days ahead 
must return to these fundamentals. 

The United States has worked tire- 
lessly for peace in the Middle Eastior 
many, many years. President Reagan 
had no illusions a year ago, nor have we 
any now. The job is long and difficult 
and requires patience and determination. 

The United States is involved in 
Lebanon because our effort is indispens- 
able to freedom, peace, justice, and 
stability. We are involved in the wider 
problem of the Middle East for the same 
reasons. We intend to continue our ef- 
forts with patience and with vigor. 

Q. In light of the concerted 
fighting that has taken place in the 
last 24 hours or so, will the Adminis- 
tration go to Congress, to report to 
Congress on the new combat situation 
there? 

A. The President, of course, notified 
Congress as a matter of common sense 
and as a matter of conformity with the 
War Powers Act when the multinational 
force — when the Marines were intro- 
duced, 1 guess about 11 months ago. The 
Congress has been periodically kept up- 
to-date through testimony and other 
means in the meantime. Most recently 
yesterday the President, again, posted 
Congress formally on the situation 



there. We will continue to consult with 
the Congress and keep them abreast of 
the situation, both in terms of formal 
statements and the innumerable tele- 
phone conversations that have been 
held. 

Q. Will that be within the frame- 
work of the War Powers Act or simply 
because you are seeking political sup- 
port? 

A. No, that is within the framework 
of the War Powers Act when forces are 
sent equipped for combat. It is required 
to have a report, and the President has 
so reported. 

Q. Pledging support for the 
Gemayel government's attempt to 
restore independence to Lebanon, are 
we considering increasing the size of 
the Marine contribution and its role? 

A. We have no plan under con- 
sideration at the moment to change the 
size, the role, or the mission of the 
multinational force or the Marine com- 
ponent of it. We have said on a number 
of occasions that when the process of 
withdrawal of foreign forces from 
Lebanon really gets underway, questions 
can be raised about what changes in the 
role the multinational force might under- 
take, but we don't have that process 
underway right now, as we all know. 

Q. What do you say to those peo- 
ple, mostly from the Hill, who claim 
that it is time for the War Powers Act 
to be invoked because the Marines are, 
in fact, involved in a combat zone? 

A. The War Powers Act is being 
complied with, and the President has 
reported under the War Powers Act for- 
mally, both, as I said, at the time of the 
original introduction of the Marines and 
as recently as yesterday with a formal 
statement to the Speaker and the Presi- 
dent pro tern of the Senate. 

Q. Do you believe that the 
Marines are now involved in a combat 
situation or a combat area? 

A. There is always a question about 
the situation that you go into when 
you're equipped for combat. When they 
went in in the first place, of course, 
Lebanon had the violence of the murder 
of Bashir Gemayel, as you remember. 
The multinational force was reintro- 
duced, and it helped to bring about 
stability. It was a situation in which 
there was a fair amount of violence. 

We have been there for some 1 1 
months, and with the exception of the 
tragic deaths that we are particularly 
aware of right now, the Marine force 
has made a very constructive contribu- 



tion and is very much welcomed, I can 
tell you, by the people in Lebanon and in 
that vicinity. 

In the last 3 or 4 days, there has 
been a renewed outbreak of violence, 
and it's kind of generalized. All of the 
multinational force areas have been hit, 
but so have practically all other areas. 
The question now is whether the efforts 
being made to control and end that 
violence will succeed. As I said in my 
statement, the authorities of the central 
Government of Lebanon are working at 
that, and they are confident that their 
forces are positioned properly. Our ad- 
vice and our own independent observa- 
tion are that they are moving in the 
right direction. 

So assuming this subsides, then I 
think we're back in the situation we 
were in before. But we are watching it 
every day, and I will go from this press 
conference to a meeting with the Vice 
President and others as we daily look at 
the situation and appraise it. 

Q. Do you plan to play any per- 
sonal role in mediation over Lebanon, 
and in particular, might you extend 
your trip to Spain to include the Mid- 
dle East, or might you later this fall 
have parties come here? 

A. I feel as though I'm heavily in- 
volved because it seems to me that life is 
consumed by telephone calls, cables, and 
what-not. We're working very closely 
with Ambassadors McFarlane and Fair- 
banks. I had a lengthy conversation 
with them today. They are very compe- 
tent people, they are doing an outstand- 
ing job, and they are handling the situa- 
tion well. So I have no plan to extend 
the Madrid trip in any way. 

Q. Coming back to the War 
Powers Act, several members of Con- 
gress have said that because of the 
hostilities there, the Administration, 
or the President, should invoke that 
other part of the act, which you did 
not mention— Section 4(a)(1) which 
talks about "imminent hostilities." But 
as I understand it, those people as 
well as Dr. Kissinger, who has said 
this on television, feel that Congress 
now should be asked to vote for any 
prolonged stay of the Marines in 
Lebanon. 

Do you have any feelings either on 
why the Administration has chosen 
not to invoke that first part of Section 
4? And secondly, what about just the 
idea of asking Congress to endorse 
the stay of the Marines? 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



A. As I said, the President has 
reported properly under the War 
Powers Act. We think the situation re- 
mains one essentially of "equipped for 
combat." Obviously, there is a lot of 
violence in the vicinity. We hope, and we 
have some basis for that hope, that the 
violence will subside. So the provision 
under which the President has notified 
the Congress remains the appropriate 
and valid one. As I said, we review this 
all the time, and we'll watch the situa- 
tion very carefully. 

Q. Since American Marines are 
fighting and dying in a combat situa- 
tion, why not call it what it is? 

A. I'm quite ready to call it what it 
is and have in my statement there. They 
are involved in a situation where there is 
violence. It is a generalized pattern of 
violence. They are defending themselves, 
as they must and should. We are report- 
ing to the Congress, as we should, as I 
said, as a matter of common sense as 
well as a matter of law, and we are 
doing so. 

Q. It is your belief that the 
Marines have not been specifically 
targeted? 

A. There are conflicting statements. 
You get an intercept here or there about 
somebody saying to shoot at the 
Marines, and you also get many in- 
tercepts that say, "Oh, the Marines are 
there. Don't shoot at the Marines." I 
believe that there is no concerted effort 
to single out the Marines and target 
them. 

Q. You have made much of the 
President's notification when the 
Marines were first sent there, but at 
the time he said, and I quote, "There 
was no intention or expectation that 
United States forces would become in- 
volved in hostilities." Now the situa- 
tion is completely changed. Don't you 
feel obligated to Congress, in light of 
the changed situation, to now present 
the thing in a more candid way? 

A. We have presented the thing, to 
use your word, in a very "candid" way. 
There is no dearth of publicity about 
precisely what is going on. The Presi- 
dent continues to report as we think is 
appropriate. It is candid, it is in accord- 
ance with the law, and it's in accordance 
with what common sense tells you you 
do in a democracy; that is to consult 
with the Congress and make your views 
known to the American people general- 
ly, and that is precisely what the Presi- 
dent is doing. There is no information 
that isn't available as a general propo- 
sition. 



Q. Since there seems to be this 
repeated call that the President report 
to the Congress, and since there are— 

A. He is reporting to the Congress. 
That's the thing that I keep trying to get 
across here. 

Q. I think that there is a general 
feeling that no one would recommend 
that the Marines come home, that 
what the President would get would 
be a vote of confidence. 

A. I feel myself that people do have 
confidence in our efforts and support 
our efforts in the Middle East very 
broadly. They are efforts very much on 
the high ground. We are there to help in 
the effort for peace, national reconcilia- 
tion, and sovereignty of Lebanon. I don't 
have any doubt about that. 

The President is reporting as ap- 
propriate under the law, and all of the 
facts are available. I'm sure that we will 
hear from people about their views, and 
we do all the time. 

Q. If the President was more 
forthcoming and cooperative at this 
point, it seems [inaudible] 

A. He is forthcoming. There is no 
more forthcoming you can be, or 
cooperative you can be. 

Q. It was predicted, however, by 
Senator Mathias [Charles McC. 
Mathias, R.-Md.] this morning that he 
is generating a confrontation with the 
Congress because of this. 

A. I'm sure everyone worries about 
this— and certainly I do as Secretary of 
State and, for that matter, as a 
Marine — whenever our forces are in- 
volved in a situation where there is 
violence and where there is danger. Of 
course, we've had casualties, so we're all 
worried about that. Senator Mathias is, 
I'm sure. The President's very worried 
about it. 

The facts are all there for everybody 
to see, and we're working at this 
together. We're trying to explain what 
our policies are, what is being done, and 
some measure of success that is taking 
place right now, at least in the sense 
that there is an effort that has some 
possibility of prevailing, of containing 
this violence, and a renewed attempt at 
national reconciliation in Lebanon. I 
hope that that comes off. 

Q. Are you sufficiently satisfied 
with the progress that the Lebanese 
Army has made under the American 
trainers there, that they can bring 
order to Beirut without increased 
danger to the Marines in the months 
to come? 



A. They have made great progress 
in our judgment. I have to rely, of 
course, on the judgment of military peo- 
ple, such as Gen. Cooley, who has been 
over there and very active— that's his 
judgment — and from what we can see in 
the way they are handling themselves in 
the current, very difficult situation, 
where you have to remember they're 
dealing for the most part with people of 
their own population. It's a very difficult 
thing for any armed force to do. But our 
observation is that they're doing it well 
and in a sophisticated manner. 

Q. Does Syria bear any respon- 
sibility today for the political instabili- 
ty or in the physical violence going on 
in Lebanon? 

A. The political instability, I feel, 
would be much less and much easier to 
cope with if all foreign forces would 
withdraw from Lebanon. Israel has 
agreed to withdraw from Lebanon. I 
believe Syria should withdraw from 
Lebanon, as should the PLO [Palestine 
Liberation Organization], and give the 
Lebanese a chance to cope with their 
problems in their own way themselves. 
They have plenty of problems. To a cer- 
tain extent you can say you don't need 
anybody to stir them up, because they're 
there. But I think it would be a major 
contribution if that very large Syrian 
Army were to get out of Lebanon. 

Q. What about Syrian involvement 
in the fighting? The second part of the 
question: Is there any evidence of 
Syrian involvement in the current 
fighting? 

A. There are varying reports on 
that. I don't want to try to make a 
definitive comment because I find the 
evidence something that is not absolute- 
ly clear cut. It is certainly the case that 
some firing has come from Syrian- 
controlled areas, and, of course, it is 
their responsibility as an occupying force 
to contain that. 

Q. As you have noted, it is a year 
since President Reagan began his 
Operation "fresh start" for the Middle 
East. Some people think that is dead, 
others would say at least it's on the 
shelf, and I think it's obvious that 
you started out trying to negotiate 
peace in the Middle East, and you're 
now negotiating a few hilltops just 
outside of Beirut. To what do you at- 
tribute the failure of the Reagan plan 
thus far? 

A. I don't consider it to be a failure, 
but certainly we don't have peace in the 
Middle East either. That's for sure. It's 



October 1983 



39 



AFRICA 



a long, tough struggle, as successive 
Presidents and Secretaries of State, let 
alone heads of state of countries in the 
area, can testify. 

It did seem as though last April we 
were very close to having a kind of 
Palestinian participation with King 
Hussein [of Jordan] that would have 
reinvigorated the negotiating process. 
That failed at the last minute, but 
perhaps we can bring that back. At any 
rate, I think the propositions in- 
volved— 242, 338, the Camp David ac- 
cords, and the President's initiative— are 
very much on people's minds. If you 
think about it at all, where else are you 
going to go but to the ideas involved 
that are contained in those documents? 

Q. Is there anything you would do 
differently in terms of getting more 
directly involved, having a special 
negotiator pressing harder? 

A. We had special negotiators, of 
course, and we worked at it very hard. 
We had numerous meetings here. We 
had our negotiator, Phil Habib, there. 
Always you can look back and scratch 
your head about whether your timing 
could have been different, but I think on 
the whole our effort was a pretty good 
one. Others may have a different judg- 
ment, and I know that they feel free to 
say so. 

Q. Do you think the resignation of 
Prime Minister Begin will slow down 
or will it speed up a broader peace 
process, and how long do you want 
Israel to delay its partial redeploy- 
ment from the Shut? 

A. Any statement about the extent 
of delay of Israel's redeployment will 
have to come from Israel. I don't want 
to make any comment on that. The 
President did ask them to delay, and 
they did, so we're glad about that fact. 
It does give a little more time for this 
process that I spoke about to take place. 

Prime Minister Begin, in my own 
dealings with him, was a person of clear- 
ly strong mind and vigorous. He was a 
very gentlemanly and courteous person 
to deal with, and I wish him well. We 
will deal with the new Government of 
Israel when it appears. 

Q. What role would you expect 
the United States to play in an effort 
to bring about political reconciliation 
in Lebanon? Would you see any special 
effort beyond what's already been 
made public by Mr. McFarlane? What 
can we do to try to settle things down 
politically, aside from sort of a verbal 
reinforcement of Mr. Gemayel's state- 
ment? 



A. I tried to spell out in my state- 
ment a number of things, including the 
diplomatic effort that we are undertak- 
ing, along with others, to rally the inter- 
national community to support this ef- 
fort. 

Beyond that, I think all of the dif- 
ferent things that I listed, plus some 
that I didn't, namely, the potential 
economic support from Lebanon, must 
play a part. 

In the end, it's my belief that 
something like national reconciliation in 
a country is fundamentally something 
that the government of that country has 
to be primarily responsible for. We can 
help them, and we will. But it has to be 
their primary responsibility, and I think 
it's quite striking that President 
Gemayel has stepped up to that respon- 
sibility very strongly in his statement 
made today. 



1 Press release 326. 



Visit of Zaire's 
President 




President Mobutu Sese Seko of the 
Republic of Zaire made an official 
working visit to Washington, D.C., 
August 2-6, 19S;i, to meet with President 
Reagan and other government officials. 

Following are remarks made by 
President Reagan and President Mobutu 
after their meeting on August 4. 1 

President Reagan 

President Mobutu and I have just had a 
warm and useful discussion. And I am 
pleased to have been able to meet again 
with President Mobutu, who's been a 



faithful friend to the United States for 
some 20 years. The President and I took 
this opportunity to review the state of 
U.S.-Zairian relations, and we found a 
large area of agreement on the major 
points we discussed. 

I expressed our admiration for 
President Mobutu's courageous action in 
sending troops to assist the Government 
of Chad in its struggle against Libyan- 
backed rebels. On the home front, the 
President has informed me of progress 
on his government's economic stabiliza- 
tion plan. Zaire is taking the difficult but 
necessary steps to ensure sustained 
economic progress, and it's important 
that we and Zaire's other friends do 
what we can to help. 

President Mobutu and I also dis- 
cussed his country's political situation, 
and I told him of the positive reaction in 
the United States to his recent decision 
to offer amnesty to his political op- 
ponents. 

This visit has permitted the Presi- 
dent and me to reaffirm our common 
desire for peace and stability in Africa. 
And I am confident that the close rela- 
tions between our two countries, based 
on shared interests and perceptions, will 
advance the cause of peace and develop- 
ment in Africa. And we're very pleased 
to have him visit us once again as he did 
a year and a half ago. 

President Mobutu 2 

I have expressed to President Reagan 
during our meeting, first of all, my 
thanks for the wonderful and warm 
welcome extended to us in the atmos- 
phere of great friendship that we have 
experienced throughout our stay in 
Washington. 

We surveyed world events. We 
talked about the economic situation in 
Zaire, about the program for financial 
and economic recovery which is being 
worked out with the IMF [International 
Monetary Fund]. We talked of Chad, of 
the aggression against that country — a 
founder of the OAU [Organization of 
African Unity] and a member of the 
United Nations. We talked also of 
Namibia, South Africa, and Central 
America. In brief, we surveyed world 
events. Some decisions have been made 
for economic aid to Zaire, and some 
more decisions will be made in that con- 
text. 



40 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



I extended to President Reagan and 
to his associates my congratulations and 
thanks for all they have done to 
facilitate our stay in every way during 
our visit here. 



■Made on the South Grounds of the White 
House (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 8, 1983). 

2 President Mobutu spoke in French, and 
his remarks were translated by an inter- 
preter. ■ 



Visit of Senegal's 
President 




President Abdou Dioufofthe 
Republic of Senegal made an official 
working visit to Washington, D.C., 
August 9-12, 1983, to meet with Presi- 
dent Reagan and other government of- 
ficials. 

Following are remarks made by 
President Reagan and President Diouf 
after their meeting on August 10. 1 



President Reagan 

It's been an honor and a pleasure to 
welcome President Abdou Diouf to the 
White House today. And it is especially 
fitting that our meeting takes place on 
the 100th anniversary of our American 
Consulate on the Senegalese island of 
Goree. 

President Diouf is one of Africa's 
most impressive leaders. He's a 
peacemaker and problemsolver, whose 
fine reputation preceded him to 
Washington. After meeting with him, 
working with him, and talking to him, I 
can only say it is a reputation well 
deserved. 

In our conversations this morning 
and at lunch, we discussed many impor- 
tant international problems, particularly 
those of Africa, the Third World, and 
the Middle East. On many of the issues 
our views converge; on others we've 
agreed to differ. We've always done so, 
however, in the spirit of mutual respect 
and in the context of a valued bilateral 
relationship. I have formed a high per- 
sonal regard for President Diouf s 
wisdom and integrity, and I value both 
his views and his counsel. 

Senegal and the United States are 
relative rarities in this troubled world — 
democratic nations living under the rule 
of law and devoted to human rights, 
committed to the search for peaceful 
solutions for international problems. I've 
assured President Diouf of America's 
support for him and for Senegal. I've 
also expressed our admiration for his ac- 
complishments at home and abroad. In 
the months ahead, I look forward to 
both building our personal friendship 
and strengthening the important ties 
that bind our two peoples, knowing our 
relationship can only further the cause 
of world peace. 

President Diouf 2 

I should like, first of all, to thank Presi- 
dent Ronald Reagan, to thank the 
American Government and the Ameri- 
can people for the particularly warm 
welcome that they have extended to me 
and to my delegation on this, my first 
official visit to the United States. The 
fact that my visit coincides, as President 
Reagan so appropriately recalled, with 
the centennial of the first American 
Consulate in Goree bears witness to the 
longstanding relations of friendship and 
cooperation between Senegal and the 
United States, two democratic nations 
attached to respective human rights and 
basic freedoms. 



The fruitful meetings we had this 
morning and during the lunch were the 
occasion for thoroughgoing exchanges of 
views on strengthening and furthering 
our bilateral cooperation. I should like to 
rejoice here, reflecting upon both its 
quality and its effectiveness. We also 
discussed major international issues con- 
fronting the world of today in Africa, 
the Middle East, and the Third World. 
We are agreed, in the spirit of the rela- 
tionship based on confidence that has 
been established between our two coun- 
tries, to pursue and intensify our con- 
sultation in order to find the most effec- 
tive solutions in the interests of peace 
and international security. 

To that end we rely upon the 
wisdom of President Reagan, a leader 
whom we admire for his candor and his 
pragmatism. He has already proved, by 
his actions inside the United States as 
well as outside of the United States, 
that he is a major statesman, fully con- 
sistent with the full measure of the 
American people. And I should like to 
avail myself of this opportunity to renew 
the assurance that we, the people of the 
Third World, are following with great 
interest and comprehension the untiring 
efforts that he is constantly undertaking 
in order to secure the triumph of the 
ideals of peace, democracy, and justice 
in the world. 



'Made at the South Portico of the White 
House (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 15, 1983). 

2 President Diouf spoke in French, and his 
remarks were translated by an interpreter. ■ 



INF Negotiations 
Resume 



The following statement was made at 
the White House by Ambassador Paul H. 
Nitze, chairman of the U.S. delegation to 
the intermediate-range nuclear forces 
(INF) negotiations, on September 3, 
1983. ! 

I have just been to see the President 
about the next round of INF negotia- 
tions, which begins in Geneva on 
September 6. 

We are all deeply concerned about 
the irresponsible Soviet action which led 
to the death of 269 persons, including 
over 50 Americans, aboard the Korean 
Air Lines jet. We must, nevertheless, 
continue our efforts to reduce the threat 



October 1983 



41 



ECONOMICS 



of nuclear conflict through negotiated, 
fair, and verifiable agreements. 

I return to Geneva prepared to pur- 
sue constructive approaches to the 
issues which divide us. The President 
has assured me of his personal and 
strong support as we enter this crucial 
round of talks. We have no illusion that 
the going will be easy. We expect the 
Soviets to stress apparent movement in 
the public press, as they have already 
done. But we will be looking for substan- 
tive movement at the negotiating table, 
where it counts. If the Soviets are 
prepared to address the basic issues 
squarely and seriously, I have the flex- 
ibility for real progress. 

Remember that the United States 
first proposed complete elimination of 
the entire class of intermediate-range 
nuclear weapons to lower dramatically 



nuclear tensions. When the Soviets 
made clear their refusal seriously to ad- 
dress this, we offered a flexible ap- 
proach to an interim solution at lower, 
equal levels. Again they repeated their 
previous arguments in favor of a posi- 
tion that would essentially perpetuate 
the current imbalance in INF missiles. 

The time is at hand for the Soviets 
to move with us promptly to achieve an 
agreement restoring stability and 
nuclear balance in the INF realm. 

We will continue the process of the 
closest consultation with our NATO 
allies. I leave tomorrow to consult with 
Chancellor Kohl in Bonn on Monday and 
will then continue to Geneva later in the 
day. 



'Text from White House press release. 



Bankers and the Debt Crisis: 
An International Melodrama? 



By W. Allen Wallis 

Address before the International 
Summer School of the American Bankers 
Association on August 25, 1983. 
Mr. Wallis is Under Secretary for 
Economic Affairs. 

Bankers have never been popular. They 
are victims of irrational attitudes, fed in 
part by popular melodramas in which 
hard-hearted bankers drive kindly 
widows and lovable children from hearth 
and home. This attitude toward bankers 
and banking inevitably influences public 
policy. We see it today, for example, as 
opponents of the IMF [International 
Monetary Fund] quota legislation— both 
on the right and on the left— call the bill 
a "bail out" for big banks. "They made 
their bed, let them lie in it" is the argu- 
ment. 

Let's take a look tonight at the 
origins of today's "debt problem," paying 
particular attention to the role of private 
banks and other private financial institu- 
tions functioning in international capital 
markets. Then let's think about the way 
private institutions can play a construc- 
tive role in resolving the current situa- 
tion, which is so often described as a 
"crisis." 



The Genesis of the Debt "Crisis" 

Although the economic problems we are 
now experiencing seem to have arisen 
suddenly, they clearly had their roots in 
the economic environment and policies 
of the last two decades. Inflationary 
pressures began mounting during the 
late 1960s and were aggravated by (in- 
deed, may have contributed to) the com- 
modity boom of the early 1970s, in- 
cluding the first oil shock. In most in- 
dustrialized countries, policies adopted 
after the first oil shock led to a surge of 
inflation; to large transfers of real in- 
come and wealth to oil exporters; and to 
a deterioration of the current account 
balances of oil importers. For the oil- 
importing LDCs [less developed coun- 
tries], this process was compounded by 
the decline in export earnings when the 
commodity boom burst. 

For oil-importing countries, in- 
dustrialized and developing alike, the ap- 
propriate policies would have been fiscal 
and monetary restraint to prevent trans- 
mission of the increases in the price of 
oil into increases in the general level of 
prices and adjustment of consumption to 
the lower real income that resulted from 
the higher price of oil. Instead, most oil- 
importing nations— developed and 
developing, including the United 
States— attempted to avoid the painful 
adjustments that were unavoidable by 



adopting inflationary domestic policies 
and by borrowing abroad to cover the 
swollen deficits in their current ac- 
counts. 

Economic policies, our own included, 
did not face up to the need to adjust. In- 
stead, their primary concern was effi- 
cient "recycling" of the OPEC [Organiza- 
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries] 
surpluses— a euphemism for the idea 
that all countries would be able to bor- 
row as much as they needed. The incen- 
tive to borrow rather than to adjust was 
strong. Interest rates were low in rela- 
tion to current and expected inflation; 
liquidity was abundant; and both bor- 
rowers and lenders expected that con- 
tinued inflation would lead to ever- 
increasing export revenues and reduce 
the real burden of foreign debts. These 
conditions persisted well into the second 
oil shock of 1978-79. 

By the end of 1982, the total foreign 
debt of non-OPEC developing countries 
was over $600 billion— more than four 
times as large as it had been 10 years 
earlier. Most of the increases in foreign 
debt reflected borrowing from commer- 
cial banks in industrial countries. Lend- 
ing by these banks to non-OPEC LDCs, 
for example, grew from $130 billion at 
the end of 1978, by $37 billion in 1979, 
by $43 billion in 1980, by $47 billion in 
1981, and by $31 billion in 1982. By the 
end of 1982, the LDCs owed roughly 
$300 billion to commercial banks in the 
industrial countries. Since the early 
1970s, commercial banks have provided 
over 60% of total LDC financing, up 
from 40% in the early 1970s. Thus, it is 
clear that any lasting solution to the 
debt problem must center around the 
commercial banks. 

Day of Reckoning 

Expansionary policies and excessively 
easy monetary conditions were able to 
delay the need to adjust but not to 
eliminate it. For the past 2 years, we 
have been witnessing a collision between 
today's policies of restraint and the infla- 
tionary binge of the 1970s. The im- 
mediate result of this disinflation— nec- 
essary and desirable though it was— has 
been stagnating demand, depressed 
trade, and declining commodity prices. 
Interest rates are high by historical 
standards, in large part because expec- 
tations—based on experience— are that 
governments and central banks will not 
stay the course to eliminate inflation. 

Disinflation has hit the LDCs hard. 
Aggregate real output of the LDCs this 
year is expected to grow by only 
1%-1.5%, the least growth since 1980. 



42 



Department of State Bulletin 



ECONOMICS 



African countries have been especially 
hard hit because of their dependence on 
exports of primary commodities and 
their inability to attract foreign private 
capital. 

Austerity in developing countries 
can, if excessive, cause political turbu- 
lence that jeopardizes U.S. interests in 
various ways. In neighboring countries, 
economic difficulties stimulate illegal im- 
migration into the United States. Eco- 
nomic troubles were probably a factor in 
recent political upheavals in such coun- 
tries as Liberia, Ghana, and the Central 
African Republic. Earlier this year, riot- 
ing in Brazil was laid to debt-related 
austerity measures. The expulsion of im- 
migrant workers from Nigeria was 
based on similar causes. 

I do not want to overemphasize the 
political aspect of the debt crisis. LDCs 
must adjust to the new economic reality. 
But adjustment must take place within 
the limits of what is politically possible, 
with sufficient financial support to 
achieve stability and to permit these 
countries to prepare to take advantage 
of the economic recovery that is now 
starting. 

The Administration's Program 

The debt and liquidity problems did not 
develop overnight and neither will solu- 
tions. We in the Reagan Administration 
are, however, working on a broad-based 
strategy involving all the key par- 
ticipants—governments of the develop- 
ing and industrialized countries, com- 
mercial banks, and the IMF. This 
strategy has five main parts. 

First, and foremost, we must con- 
tinue to work to restore sustainable non- 
inflationary growth in the United States 
and to preserve and strengthen the free 
trading system. The elements for a 
recovery are in place. Interest and infla- 
tion rates are down and inventory run- 
downs are largely complete. There is 
strong evidence that recovery is under- 
way in the United States, and there are 
signs of recovery in Britain, Germany, 
and Japan. We must, however, exercise 
caution at this juncture. Excessive 
monetary or fiscal expansion would 
rekindle inflation. Yielding to protec- 
tionist pressures could abort the 
recovery. 

The second part of our strategy is 
to get borrowing countries to adjust 
their economic policies. They must get 
their economies back on a stable course 
and make sure that their development 
programs are within their means. The 
adjustments cannot be completed over- 



October 1983 



night; in many cases it will take years. 
But impediments to recovery such as 
rigid exchange rates, subsidies, protec- 
tionist measures, uncontrolled govern- 
ment spending, and excessive creation of 
money are obvious places to start ad- 
justing. The need for corrective policies 
has been recognized and is being acted 
on by many borrowers— in many cases 
with support from the IMF. 

The third element of our strategy is 
that official balance-of-payments financ- 
ing must be available to help see bor- 
rowers through the adjustment process. 
The IMF is the key to this. The IMF not 
only provides temporary balance-of- 
payments assistance but also ensures 
that use of its funds is linked to 
necessary changes of policy by bor- 
rowers. No other institution has the 
expertness or the prestige to enforce 
such measures. It is thus extremely im- 
portant that the IMF has sufficient re- 
sources to carry out its mission. For 
that reason, the Administration is urg- 
ing Congress to approve the proposed 
expansion of IMF quotas quickly. 

The fourth element of our strategy 
is that governments and central banks in 
lending countries must be prepared to 
act quickly when debt emergencies oc- 
cur. Recent experience has shown that 
often it is necessary to consider im- 
mediate and substantial short-term 
financing to tide countries over their 
negotiations with the IMF and discus- 
sions with other creditors. It must be 
emphasized that lending of this sort is 
very short-term and can only facilitate, 
not supplant, other arrangements. 

The fifth element of our strategy is 
to encourage continuation of lending by 
commercial banks to countries that are 
pursuing sound adjustment programs. In 
the last few months of 1982, some 
banks, both in the United States and 
abroad, sought to limit or reduce out- 
standing loans to troubled borrowers. 
But an orderly resolution of this present 
situation requires not only a willingness 
by banks to rollover existing debts but 
in some cases even to increase their net 
lending to developing countries, in- 
cluding the most troubled borrowers. 

While I have described these five 
points as the Reagan Administration's 
policy— and they are— I should em- 
phasize that the United States is not 
alone in dealing with the problem. The 
closeness and effectiveness of interna- 
tional cooperation, and of cooperation 
between governments and private finan- 
cial institutions, have been noteworthy, 
even heart warming. 



Role of Commercial Banks 

These five points form a comprehensive 
approach to the debt problems facing us 
today. The fifth element, continued com- 
mercial bank lending, is, however, im- 
possible for a government such as ours 
to control. We cannot, nor do we want 
to, direct or assume responsibility for 
the lending decisions of private financial 
institutions. 

Commercial banks are profit-making 
institutions and are responsible to their 
shareholders to make the best possible 
return. They are not foreign policy agen- 
cies, nor are they intended to provide 
development assistance. They are inter- 
mediaries between sources and users of 
funds. They must have confidence that 
their depositors are protected by 
reasonable prospects that loans will be 
repaid. 

In domestic banking, the use of col- 
lateral contributes to an effective finan- 
cial system. There is also an organized 
procedure for debtors to get out from 
under a burden of debt that is unsup- 
portable. Bankruptcy is not without 
costs to creditor and debtor, but it is a 
proven, functioning mechanism in 
domestic business. 

In the international arena, however, 
neither collateral nor bankruptcy pro- 
cedures are available. Collateral is vir- 
tually meaningless in sovereign lending. 
Bankruptcy and default are not estab- 
lished means of reorganizing govern- 
ment debts. In addition, for reasons of 
foreign policy, governments in the 
banks' home countries get involved when 
payments on loans are in jeopardy. In 
fact, the question is now being asked: 
"How can governments get the banks to 
continue lending to the LDCs?" 

The answer obviously is that if 
banks have reasonable assurance that 
continued lending will be profitable, they 
will continue to lend. That is at the 
heart of the way a market system 
works. Prospects for profit depend on 
medium- and long-run factors, not just 
short-run; just as in domestic lending, it 
is not profitable to precipitate a crisis 
when the borrower has reasonable pros- 
pects of restoring its capacity to pay. 

Rumors of "debtors' cartels," debt 
repudiation, unilateral payments mora- 
toria, and other threats in that vein 
from debtors undermine confidence by 
introducing doubts about the will rather 
than the capacity of borrowers to repay. 
In international banking, even more 
than in domestic banking, confidence is 
essential. 



43 



ECONOMICS 



The proper question, therefore, is 
how can reasonable assurance of re- 
payment be maintained or restored so 
that private banks will continue to par- 
ticipate fully in international lending? 
The IMF clearly has a major role here. 
So do the borrowing countries, which 
must recognize that the banks will re- 
spond, first and foremost, to economic 
and financial incentives. The developed 
countries also have a responsibility. 
Debts cannot be paid unless export 
revenues can be earned. Manufacturing 
exports from developing countries face 
the stiffest of trade barriers. Commodity 
exports are particularly vulnerable to 
recession in the developed countries. 

The next logical step in this line of 
reasoning, therefore, is to explore the 
relations between international finance 
and international trade. After all, inter- 
national finance is simply the medium of 
exchange which facilitates trade. The 
greatest danger to the national welfare 
that would result from a collapse of the 



financial system would not be the losses 
suffered by banks and their stock- 
holders. The greatest damage would be 
the collapse of the trading system that 
has been the driving force of postwar 
economic progress. If, however, I were 
to elaborate on the relation of finance to 
trade, I surely would go on for a full 50 
minutes or more. 

Instead, I will conclude by returning 
to the popular melodrama. It is not use- 
ful to look for a villain in the piece. 
What is useful is for all of the par- 
ticipants to examine their own roles. 
The important question that each par- 
ticipant must ask is whether he is con- 
tributing to the solution or to the prob- 
lem. While governments, including ours, 
had much to do with creating the prob- 
lem, I am satisfied that now our govern- 
ment is making major contributions to 
its solution. I hope that each of you can 
give sincerely a similar answer. I believe 
vou can. ■ 



International Monetary Fund 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
JULY 14, 1983 1 

In meetings here today, I have once 
again asked for congressional approval 
of the American share of an increase, in 
lending resources for the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The Senate has 
already approved the request, and the 
House will take up the measure next 
week. 

The IMF has been a cornerstone of 
U.S. foreign economic policy under 
Republican and Democratic Administra- 
tions for nearly 40 years, and it remains 
a cornerstone of the foreign economic 
policy of this Administration. 

In the past decade, the economy has 
witnessed soaring inflation and interest 
rates, plunging commodity prices, and 
worldwide recession. While the inter- 
national economic outlook is now im- 
proving, the experience of past years 
has contributed to a major international 
debt problem that poses grave risks for 
the United States and world economies. 
We have formulated a strategy for deal- 
ing with this problem, and the IMF 
plays a key role in it. IMF resources, 
however, are running low, and unless ac- 
tion is taken to increase them, the IMF 
may no longer be able to play that role. 

Some argue that increasing IMF 
resources is simply a way to bail out big 



bankers who made imprudent loans. 
This is wrong. In fact, IMF involvement 
has brought more, not less, participation 
by private banks. It is important to 
remember that the IMF makes no gifts, 
that it lends money to governments, and 
that it charges interest on its loans and 
assures that proper economic policies 
are in place to correct the problems and 
to assure that the loans are repaid. 

All of this is very important to the 
American economy. In 1980 U.S. ex- 
ports accounted for 19% of total produc- 
tion of goods and, during the decade of 
the 1970s, export-related jobs rose 75% 
to over 5 million. The ability of the IMF 
to deal with the current strains in the in- 
ternational financial system will have a 
powerful impact on American exports 
and on American jobs. If the IMF is not 
in a position to help countries help them- 
selves, our economic recovery could be 
aborted and unemployment start rising 
again. 

Therefore, I urge the House of 
Representatives to act favorably on this 
legislation. No legislation now before the 
Congress is more important to a healthy 
world economy and to a continuing 
«conomic recovery here in the United 
States. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 18, 1983. 



44 



Department of State Bulletin 



ENERGY 



International Energy Security 



Following are addresses by E. Allan 
Wendt, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Economic and Business Affairs, before 
the Oxford Energy Seminar in Oxford, 
England, on September 2, 198S, and by 
Richard T. Kennedy, Ambassador at 
Large and special adviser to the 
Secretary on nonproliferation policy and 
nuclear energy affairs, before the World 
Energy Conference in Washington, D.C., 
on September 7, 1983. 



MR. WENDT, 
SEPTEMBER 2, 



1983 



It has become a truism that world 
energy markets are in a state of flux. 
Other papers presented at the Oxford 
Energy Seminar this year and over the 
past several years have been remarkable 
in their acknowledgment of the uncer- 
tainty that pervades energy planning 
today. 

The oil market has provided the 
most dramatic example of this uncer- 
tainty, but markets for other forms of 
energy have been affected as well: 
natural gas demand forecasts prepared 
only 2 or 3 years ago, for example, are 
obsolete, and the future of long-haul 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade, at 
least in the Western Hemisphere, is in 
doubt. Coal suppliers whose waters were 
crowded with ships only 2 years ago fall 
under the shadows of reduced electricity 
demand and huge inventories. And the 
once touted future of synthetic fuels is 
in jeopardy. 

Equally important as the dramatic 
changes in world energy markets, 
however, has been the striking— but 
largely unpublicized— evolution in the 
way that Western energy importers 
define the notion of energy security. 
Today I would like to discuss just how 
the meaning of energy security has 
changed in recent years, the dilemmas 
we now face as a result of this evolution 
and changing markets, and where we 
might go from here. 

Evolution of Western 
Energy Security Policy 

The oil embargo of 1973 revolutionized 
the way the West thought about its 
energy supply. After 1973 Western 
energy security was driven by the 
search for measures to offset potential 



oil-supply disruptions and to reduce 
dependence on imported oil through con- 
servation and increased use of alter- 
native fuels such as natural gas, coal, 
and nuclear power. The International 
Energy Agency (IEA) was born of these 
efforts and has played the central role 
both in establishing an international 
emergency oil-sharing system and in 
providing a forum for the development 
of energy strategies that reduced the 
need for imported oil. 

The turning point in the evolution of 
Western energy security policy came at 
the Ottawa summit. That meeting, I 
would argue, marked the beginning of a 
new awareness among the major 
Western energy importers that non-oil 
sources of energy imports could no 
longer be necessarily considered "better" 
or more secure than the oil imports they 
replaced. At Ottawa the United States 
argued that serious energy security risks 
could arise from excessive import 
dependence on fuels other than oil, par- 
ticularly natural gas. The situation that 
concerned us most was the construction 
of the new Soviet gas pipeline to 
Western Europe. At Ottawa President 
Reagan urged European countries to 
consider the security implications of this 
project and to examine indigenous alter- 
natives for increased West European re- 
quirements for natural gas. 

Over the succeeding year, the 
Western dialogue on energy security and 
natural gas dependence fostered at 
Ottawa was often strained by differing 
perspectives on the Siberian pipeline 
itself and by U.S. sanctions on the sale 
of oil and gas equipment. These dif- 
ferences are well known. But beneath 
the headline-making clashes on East- 
West economic relations, a serious 
dialogue emerged about European 
natural gas requirements, the potential 
of such alternative sources as Norway, 
and the need to improve preparedness 
against gas supply disruptions. Meeting 
at the Canadian town of La Sapiniere, 
NATO foreign ministers suggested a 
series of studies on specific aspects of 
East- West economic relations. One of 
the topics they proposed for study was 
alliance energy dependence and energy 
security, with the OECD-IEA the 
preferred forum to undertake such a 
review. 

Although the resulting "Energy Re- 
quirements and Security Study," con- 



ducted by the combined OECD-IEA 
Secretariat, was broadened by the 
OECD and IEA member states to en- 
compass a review of future energy re- 
quirements for all fuels in a global con- 
text, the study's most important analysis 
centered on natural gas in Western 
Europe. IEA and OECD ministers in 
turn endorsed a set of policy conclusions 
drawn from the combined Secretariat 
study, including a set of interrelated 
principles on the secure development 
and use of natural gas. There are four 
major elements in the policy conclusions 
on gas: 

First, recognition of the risks 
associated with high levels of 
dependence on a single supplier and a 
commitment to avoid undue dependence 
on single suppliers; 

Second, emphasis on the importance 
of the early development of secure, in- 
digenous sources. In this regard, for 
example, governments urged their com- 
panies to begin negotiations for the 
development of gas from the Norwegian 
Troll field and additional North 
American gas supplies; 

Third, agreement to strengthen the 
ability of countries to deal with gas 
disruptions that might nonetheless 
occur; and 

Fourth, agreement to hold regular 
reviews on gas security issues, with 
special attention given to whether gas 
imports into the OECD inhibit timely 
development of indigenous resources 
and create vulnerability of supplies. 

This is not to say that the ground- 
breaking OECD-IEA "Energy Require- 
ments and Security" study dealt solely 
with natural gas. In fact, the study con- 
cluded that, for a variety of reasons, an 
oil shortfall is still the main risk to 
OECD energy security in this decade. 
But the study's work on gas and the ac- 
companying ministerial policy conclu- 
sions distinguish it from the countless 
other reviews of Western energy securi- 
ty that have appeared in the recent past. 
And, more importantly, the study marks 
a watershed in the way Western coun- 
tries think about their collective energy 
security. 

Where We Go From Here 

While we have come a long way in 
redefining Western energy security 
since the Ottawa summit in 1981, it is 
more difficult to predict where we will 
go from here in the energy security 
area. Let me venture a few thoughts. 



October 1983 



45 



ENERGY 



Just as many Western policymakers 
no longer assume that non-oil imports 
are necessarily more desirable than 
dependence on foreign oil, it is also clear 
that no longer does the view prevail that 
energy prices inexorably and auto- 
matically move upward as though im- 
mune to market forces. The positive con- 
sequence of this realization has been 
that energy analysts and policymakers 
have learned to concentrate on basic 
economic relationships and fundamental 
requirements, that is, on the market- 
place. Market forces— combined with the 
structural changes in world energy 
markets brought about by frequent and 
precipitous price hikes in world crude 
prices— resulted in the slack global 
energy market and lower energy prices 
we see today. 

The down side of these changes is 
that the need for continued efforts in 
the energy security area is seen by many 
as less compelling. While some observers 
call this "complacency," I would 
characterize it more as a dilemma. On 
the one hand, we are aware that energy 
markets are likely to tighten con- 
siderably when the world economy re- 
bounds. This strengthening, of course, is 
already occurring to a certain extent, 
and such a trend argues for renewed at- 
tention to energy security issues. 

On the other hand, working in con- 
junction with this psychology of com- 
placency, the same economic downturn 
that was in part responsible for declin- 
ing Western energy demand and falling 
prices has also strained the financial 
capacity of our countries and companies 
to continue and to expand energy securi- 
ty efforts. Budgetary stringencies and 
weak demand have presented very real 
disincentives to enhanced energy securi- 
ty measures, calling into question the 
timely development of indigenous 
Western energy alternatives. 

These efforts, however, can and 
must go on. It is the responsibility and, 
indeed, the duty of Western energy 
policymakers to take a reasoned, long- 
term view of our energy security, mind- 
ful, but not overwhelmed, by present 
economic and financial difficulties. Let 
me sketch out what I believe are our 
most pressing tasks. 

In oil, the OECD countries need to 
maintain long-term incentives toward 
the replacement of the most vulnerable 
oil import flows with more secure sup- 
plies of either oil or other energy 
sources, particularly coal. Especially im- 
portant for both the OECD countries 
and developing countries are continuing 
efforts to exploit indigenous oil and 



other energy resources. In addition, we 
need to strengthen our strategic oil 
stock program. The United States is 
continuing to fill its Strategic Petroleum 
Reserve, which now contains 340 million 
barrels of crude oil, nearly half of its 
750-million-barrel target; 

In gas, we need similarly to work 
cooperatively to establish the conditions 
necessary for development of indigenous 
reserves. From the U.S. perspective, we 
are working toward this goal by pushing 
for regulatory reform of our natural gas 
market, which when realized will pro- 
vide incentives for greater domestic gas 
production. In Europe, we believe it is 
most important to develop an eco- 
nomically sound program for the 
development of the Troll field and other 
important indigenous gas reserves of the 
North Sea; 

In coal, which represents the most 
abundant and secure of the fossil fuels 
found in the West, we must promote 
greater use to enhance our energy 
security. Although we have made some 
headway in this regard, further progress 
will be more difficult in the face of 
steady or declining oil prices, together 
with the perception that coal is a dif- 
ficult fuel to use. This problem, as well 
as the growing controversy over how 
much to spend on acid rain abatement, 
will require careful attention from 
government policymakers in the years to 
come so that coal can continue as a 
bulwark of our energy security. 

In synthetic fuels, we face more 
difficult challenges. We think synthetic 
fuels will have a role to play in energy 
security. But the sums involved are 
enormous and raise serious questions 
about the opportunity costs of the 
resources involved. In the United States, 
the Synthetic Fuels Corporation has 
found it difficult to support new projects 
in the face of severe budgetary con- 
straints and the realities of the 
marketplace. 

In sum, the essential policy dilemma 
for the industrialized countries is the 
degree of attention and magnitude of 
funds that should be expended for 
energy security. We recognize that 
energy import dependence of some sort 
is inevitable and that autarky in energy 
is simply not a choice for us. On the 
other hand, we recognize that in today's 
market and with depressed prices and 
ample supplies, priorities are not easy to 
establish. In allocating scarce resources, 
governments find choices very difficult. 
But we believe that within the OECD 
community of nations both governments 
and the private sector must continue to 



pursue sufficient investment in new ex- 
ploration and production, and in alter- 
native sources of energy, to meet our 
essential future needs and to provide for 
the possibility of a return to energy 
scarcity. 



AMBASSADOR KENNEDY, 
SEPTEMBER 7, 1983 

I appreciate this opportunity to meet 
with you and discuss briefly some 
foreign policy aspects of the interna- 
tional energy situation. Manifestly, I 
cannot possibly give you a definitive 
statement on U.S. international energy 
policy in 30 minutes. What I can try to 
do is outline some of the basic elements 
of that policy and, against that 
backdrop, briefly touch on a number of 
specific issues which may be matters 
raised with you by your colleagues in 
New Delhi [at the 12th congress of the 
World Energy Conference, Septem- 
ber 18-23, 1983]. 

International energy policy cannot 
be separated from international 
economic policy, international security 
policy, and, indeed, our international 
relationships as a whole. They are in- 
exorably linked. The oil crises over the 
past decade made that amply clear, if, 
indeed, it needed any specific demon- 
stration. So, too, does the inherent rela- 
tionship between efforts devoted to the 
ever-increasing use of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes and the simultaneous 
efforts to strengthen the international 
nonproliferation regime. These are but 
examples of an obvious truth— that 
energy as a factor in international af- 
fairs is becoming more significant and 
compelling with each passing year. 

Let me begin by outlining briefly 
five basic elements of this Adminstra- 
tion's approach to the international 
energy security question. 

• The first element is reliance on 
market forces and a more market- 
oriented approach to solve the problems 
of supply. 

• The second element is stock- 
piling—creating and maintaining a 
strategic reserve of petroleum sufficient 
to handle a short-term supply interrup- 
tion in the future. 

• The third element is cooperation 
with other energy-importing nations. 
Here we have to look both at coopera- 
tion between the industrialized nations 
and cooperation with the developing na- 
tions, one of which you will be visiting 
this month— India. 



46 



Department of State Bulletin 



ENERGY 



• Fourth is a long-term effort aimed 
at reducing our dependence on energy 
imports. International energy research 
and development— the development of 
nuclear power generally and the fast 
breeder reactor, in particular; the gas 
pipeline; and our energy activities in the 
developing world are all related to this 
effort. 

• The fifth and final element is the 
determination to pursue an international 
environment conducive to stability in the 
world oil trade and world trade general- 
ly. The situation in the Middle East 
comes immediately to mind as an exam- 
ple, but there are others less dramatic 
or obvious. 

Reliance on Market Forces 

As to the first element in the President's 
program— letting the market work- 
there is much to be thankful for. The 
gloom and doom of the early 1970s is 
fading. Within the last year, there have 
been two major international con- 
flicts—the Israeli occupation of parts of 
Lebanon and the Falklands' conflict. 
And during that same year, the grip of 
OPEC has loosened. Prices have de- 
clined even in the face of political tur- 
moil in key oil-producing regions. Even 
OPEC and world oil prices are subject to 
the law of supply and demand. 

Free world oil consumption has gone 
down steadily since 1979. It was 53 
million barrels per day that year. For all 
of 1983, it will be in the neighborhood of 
45 million barrels per day. Since 1979 
U.S. oil consumption has fallen from 
18.5 million barrels per day to 15. In 
1979 we imported almost 8.5 million bar- 
rels per day. Today, we import fewer 
than 5 million barrels a day. 

When the international price of oil 
went to $35 per barrel in 1979, demand 
shrunk; and when that demand proved 
more elastic than OPEC believed possi- 
ble, prices began to fall. OPEC oil has 
been officially pegged since March at 
$29 per barrel, and some suppliers are 
reported to be undercutting the official 
price. 

Acceptance of a market-oriented ap- 
proach, of course, does not mean that 
the government has no role to play at all 
in energy matters. On the contrary, 
there is a need for significant govern- 
mental effort to deal with potential 
energy scarcity. That leads us to the se- 
cond element in the President's ap- 
proach. 



Stockpiling 

The United States cannot afford to run 
out again or be surprised by some new 
interruptions. For political, military, and 
economic reasons, there must be a 
reliable supply of this strategic com- 
modity available at all times. One 
response is the Strategic Petroleum 
Reserve (SPR). By 1990 that reserve 
will have 750 million barrels of oil in it. 
That will equal 190 days of oil imports 
at the current level. 

Right now, it has reached the level 
of 340 million barrels. That represents 
over 85 days of oil imports at the cur- 
rent level. It also represents about 25% 
of the total primary oil stocks in the 
United States today. The cost is enor- 
mous, but the benefits are worth it. Pro- 
tection against future supply interrup- 
tions is a worthwhile investment. 

International Cooperation 

And that in turn points to cooperation 
with other nations— the third major ele- 
ment in the President's program. 
Following the oil embargo and supply 
disruptions of 1973, most of the in- 
dustrialized democracies agreed on an 
emergency-sharing plan to cope with 
significant supply disruptions and to 
strengthen energy cooperation. 

The International Energy Agency 
(IEA), which comprises 21 countries, is 
a principal instrument for this coopera- 
tion. The IEA provides a mechanism for 
specific cooperative actions in response 
to any future oil-supply disruption. 
Members have all agreed to maintain 
strategic stockpiles of oil in amounts 
equivalent of 90 days of imports. If 
there is a severe shortfall, we have 
agreed that no single member should 
suffer disproportionately. So, there is an 
allocation scheme and IEA members 
have agreed in advance to share with 
one another in a crisis, according to a 
preset formula. The IEA sharing plan 
gave America's friends and allies con- 
fidence that the United States would 
share with them if they were the targets 
of oil blackmail. And it gave us the con- 
fidence that we would be supported in 
similar circumstances. It is all too easy 
for us to forget how vulnerable coun- 
tries are to disruptions and how vital 
energy cooperation is to our security 
and our foreign policy interests. 

Thus, we need to continue to 
develop long-term incentives for the 
replacement of the most vulnerable oil 
import flows with more secure sources, 
either geographically in the case of oil or 
equally importantly by substituting with 
other energy sources, particularly coal. 



In addition, industrial countries, in- 
cluding the United States, will need to 
resist the temptation to cut back on 
strategic oil stock-building programs for 
short-term budgetary reasons. 

I have briefly concentrated on inter- 
national energy cooperation in terms of 
the industrialized countries. But it can- 
not stop there. Those countries must 
recognize the plight of less developed 
and developing countries that have also 
felt the sting of increasing costs of im- 
ported oil. Cooperation must extend to 
them as well. 

The less developed countries 
generally tend to see the Western in- 
dustrialized nations as huge consumers 
of scarce resources, like petroleum, and 
they believe that Western consumption 
keeps the pressure on prices. Generally, 
they argue that Western nations ought 
to spend more money on developing new 
energy technologies— nuclear, solar, and 
renewable energy forms— which can be 
made available to everyone in the long 
run and which will take the pressure off 
oil prices. If the Western nations can 
develop new or renewable forms and put 
them quickly into use, the less developed 
countries feel they will be able to get the 
oil they need at cheaper prices. 

The United States is concerned 
about energy development in the 
developing world, particularly in those 
developing countries which must import 
oil. There are about 80 countries in this 
category. Some are among the largest 
countries in the world— India and Brazil, 
for example. Some are among the 
smallest and the poorest. The common 
problem, of course, is the high cost of 
imported energy, especially imported oil. 
On an average, they are spending 30% 
of their export earnings for imported oil. 
In 1981, for example, oil imports ab- 
sorbed over 50% of the total export 
earnings of India and Brazil. 

The cost of oil imports for all these 
countries was roughly $5.5 billion in 
1970. It was almost $50 billion in 1980, 
and the World Bank projects that it will 
be $111 billion by 1990. These costs are 
an enormous problem for these countries 
at whatever stage in development they 
may be. Right now, these countries ac- 
count for a very small percentage of 
world energy demand. But that percent- 
age is growing and the World Bank 
estimates that by 1995 developing coun- 
tries will consume 30% of the world 
total. 

The Bank also estimates that over 
the next decade there can and should be 
massive increases in the total primary 
energy supply originating in the develop- 
ing countries. But in order to achieve 



October 1983 



47 



ENERGY 



that production, a huge investment on 
the order of $90 billion is needed. 

About 80% of this investment should 
come from the private sector sources. 
But the World Bank itself will also have 
to play a big role. In 1982 it lent over $3 
billion for these purposes or 25% of its 
total lending. That level will rise to $4 
billion a year for the period 1983-87. 
Half of this will go to electric power 
projects. About one-fourth, or $1 billion, 
will go for oil exploration and develop- 
ment projects. The remainder will be 
divided between natural gas and coal. At 
the State Department, we are encourag- 
ing the Bank to concentrate on areas 
with the greatest promise of success- 
helping countries to inventory resources, 
collect relevant date, strengthen 
management skills, adopt alternative 
energy sources, and develop, in better 
ways, traditional indigenous fuels. 
On a bilateral basis, over $700 
million in energy-related assistance went 
to non-OPEC developing countries in 
1981. Japan had the largest program 
($200 million) while the United States, 
West Germany, France, Canada, and the 
OPEC countries also were major sources 
of assistance. 

The Administration believes that we 
can best assist developing nations in- 
crease and diversify their energy pro- 
duction in a tangible way through a com- 
bination of private investment and 
through limited but highly targeted, 
assistance administered by the Agency 
for International Development (AID). 

AID funding for this kind of activity 
in the developing world is well over $100 
million this year and should continue at 
similar levels in 1984. But let me em- 
phasize that we also believe that private 
investment by U.S. companies and tap- 
ping the expertise of U.S. industries will 
bring on line new oil and other energy 
sources in the developing world, 
especially if those countries do not inter- 
pose barriers to private investment 
flows. The developing countries 
themselves will need to take the lead in 
addressing many of the barriers to addi- 
tional exploration and production. This 
is a message I hope you will take with 
you to New Delhi. 

Reducing Dependence 
on Energy Imports 

That brings me to element number four 
in the President's program. It is a long- 
term struggle to reduce our dependence 
on imported energy and to help our 
friends in both the developed and the 
developing world to do the same. Ob- 
viously, it is closely related to the ele- 



ment of cooperation which I just dis- 
cussed, but it also encompasses long- 
term research and development and the 
move toward alternatives such as 
nuclear energy. 

But let me start with a brief 
reference to the new Soviet gas pipeline 
to Western Europe now under construc- 
tion and the idea that we should all 
avoid excessive dependence on any one 
source of imported energy. 

At the Ottawa summit in 1981, 
President Reagan raised with our allies 
the serious security risks that result 
from excessive dependence by any na- 
tion on fuel imports from another na- 
tion. What he had in mind, of course, 
was the new natural gas pipeline to 
Western Europe from the Soviet Union, 
financed in part by Western money and 
built with Western hardware. He 
wanted his colleagues in Western 
Europe to reconsider their approach, to 
think about the security implications of 
such an undertaking, to consider the 
likely consequences of an abrupt cutoff 
at some future time, and to consider 
alternative suppliers. 

Now I do not intend at this time to 
rehash the arguments about the restric- 
tions that were imposed for a time by 
the United States on American com- 
panies providing the equipment for the 
Soviet energy development. That there 
were many strains and problems is 
familiar to all. Behind the headlines, 
however, something very salutary 
occurred. Governments, private firms, 
and individuals both here and in Europe 
did what the President had originally 
asked them to do. They did reassess the 
situation. They did look at alternative 
sources of supply. The NATO foreign 
ministers proposed and put in motion a 
series of studies on specific aspects of 
East-West economic relations. One such 
study was a specific look at the energy 
dependence and energy security of the 
OECD prepared by the combined energy 
staff of the IEA and OECD. The com- 
bined energy staff produced a very 
valuable document entitled "Energy Re- 
quirements and Security Study" in May 
of this year. After digesting the study, 
the OECD adopted a set of principles 
which will guide future OECD policy. 
Four elements of it addressing the issue 
of natural gas dependence are: 

• Recognition of the risks associated 
with high levels of dependence on a 
single supplier and a commitment to 
avoid undue dependence on any single 
source of gas imports and ensure that 
no one producer can exercise monopoly 
power; 



• An emphasis on the importance of 
the early development of secure, in- 
digenous alternatives, urging countries 
to begin negotiations for the develop- 
ment of gas from the Norwegian Troll 
field and the North American gas 
resources as soon as possible; 

• Agreement to strengthen the abili 
ty of countries to deal with gas disrup- 
tions that might nonetheless occur; and 

• Agreement to hold regular 
reviews on gas security issues, with 
special attention given to whether gas 
imports into the OECD give rise to con- 
cern about timely development of in- 
digenous resources and the vulnerability 
of supplies. 

The OECD ministerial policy pro- 
nouncement clearly recognized that 
dependence on any single energy source 
is a danger that must be avoided. 

The OECD ministers also issued a 
statement last May about nuclear power. 
They stressed the need for predictable 
and reliable nuclear trade, maintenance 
of reliable nuclear safety standards, and 
enhanced international cooperation in 
nuclear waste disposal programs. This is 
really the other side of the dependence 
interruption argument— the substitution 
of alternative sources such as nuclear- 
generated electricity. 

It has been said that the nuclear in- 
dustry has fallen on hard times. It's 
been subject to twin pressures: falling 
electric power demand on the one hand 
and rising costs on the other. A dearth 
of domestic orders in most of the pro- 
ducing countries has in turn increased 
the pressure in the international market 
place. The struggle among suppliers for 
the few potential orders has become 
more intense. 

Let me reaffirm that this Ad- 
ministration continues to think of 
nuclear energy as a safe, efficient, and 
environmentally sound method of 
generating electric power. We do this 
without apologies or regrets. We do not 
think of nuclear power as an energy 
source of last resort. According to a re- 
cent IEA projection, 11% of the electric 
energy used in the free world will be 
nuclear generated by the turn of the 
century. That translates to a savings of 
10 million barrels a day of oil or oil- 
equivalent fuels. 

Nuclear power must play an increas- 
ingly important role in reducing 
dependence on imported oil here and 
elsewhere around the world. I am sure 
the spokesman for the Department of 
Energy talked to you this morning about 
the Administration's proposals for 
nuclear licensing reform. On the interna- 



48 



Department of State Bulletin 



ENERGY 



tional front, the United States must 
reestablish itself as a reliable and predic- 
table supplier of nuclear fuel and 
technology. But at the same time, there 
also must be guarantees that nuclear 
technology will not be used for produc- 
tion of nuclear explosives. 

To that end, the United States has 
worked with others to develop and put 
into place the international nuclear non- 
proliferation regime. It comprises an in- 
terlocking collection of organizations, 
treaties, norms, and standards, the prin- 
cipal and best known being the Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency— the 
IAEA— and, of course, the Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which has 
just marked its 15th anniversary. 

Our national policy represents a 
broad continuity that goes from the 
Truman Administration to the Reagan 
Administration. As a nation, we think 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
should be available to all mankind but 
with reasonable assurances that the 
equipment and technologies will not be 
converted to destructive purposes or ex- 
plosives. Those twin ideas— peaceful use 
and prohibition on destructive use— are 
embedded in the Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Treaty and in the charter 
and statute of the IAEA, an institution 
which we did much to bring into being 
and an institution which we want to see 
strengthened. I would like you to take 
this message to India. 

President Reagan recently proposed 
what he called comprehensive safe- 
guards. Simply stated, this means that 
no nuclear supplier would permit any 
major new nuclear export without first 
getting assurances that the receiving na- 
tion will place all of its nuclear facilities 
under its jurisdiction under safeguards. 
This is a requirement of our own law, 
and we think it should be adopted as the 
universal standard for nuclear com- 
merce. A commitment of this sort by 
nuclear supplier nations will establish a 
universal norm to which all can 
subscribe and create a climate of trust 
that will allow peaceful nuclear com- 
merce to proceed and prosper. 

Let me note that the international 
regime for preventing the spread of 
nuclear weapons is working. The vast 
majority of the nations on earth accept 
it. More nations are adherents to the 
NPT— 119— than any other international 
treaty in the area of arms control. Our 
objective continues to be universal 
adherence to the NPT. 



Long-Term Research 
and Development 

Let me turn for a moment to the ques- 
tion of long-term research and develop- 
ment, specifically two promising areas of 
international energy cooperation— fusion 
research and breeder reactors. 

Fusion offers a realistic potential for 
an inexhaustible energy source in the 
next century, at a time when known oil 
and gas reserves are likely to begin run- 
ning out. The United States is now 
spending about $400 million a year on 
fusion research and is in the last stages 
of demonstrating basic scientific 
feasibility. The goal is to bring fusion 
energy to a point where private industry 
can determine whether and, more likely, 
when commercial fusion power reactors 
will be feasible. 

A good deal of money and technical 
resources obviously are needed. It also 
requires a major technical infrastructure 
available in only a handful of developed 
countries. No nation has decided to act 
alone in its development. The United 
States now has a number of bilateral 
cooperative arrangements on fusion 
research with the European Community 
countries, Japan, Canada, and the 
U.S.S.R. But more costly projects and 
decisions remain in the future. The most 
exciting project so far is the possible 
creation of a joint fusion materials ir- 
radiation test facility under IEA 
auspices. 

The breeder reactor program is 
reaching a critical juncture. Domestically 
we have the Fast Flux Test Facility 
(FFTF), the Clinch River Breeder Reac- 
tor Project, and a supporting base 
technology and fuels program. The 
FFTF, which began operation in late 
1980, is the largest test reactor in the 
world. 

But the United States is now faced 
with the very difficult issue of where we 
go from here. The development of the 
past decade has brought us to the 
threshold of an era when the breeder 
can become an essential element in our 
expanding power grids. For the next 
demonstration step after Clinch River, 
we will be looking to the private utilities 
to assume their traditional role of taking 
the lead responsibility for financing and 
constructing this commercial-size plant. 
Since the development and demon- 
stration of breeders is technologically 
demanding, very expensive, and requires 
considerable time and experience, com- 
mon sense suggests that nations share 
costs and benefits wherever practical. 
International cooperation in the breeder 
area should be fostered and carried out 
in accordance with normal economic and 



market forces as far as possible. The 
United States is actively pursuing a pro- 
gram of international cooperation in 
breeder reactor research and develop- 
ment and has had discussions with the 
United Kingdom, France, and Japan. 
European nations have been pooling 
their resources in the development of 
breeder reactor technology, a process 
started first by France and the Federal 
Republic of Germany that now also in- 
cludes the Netherlands, Italy, and 
Belgium. The United Kingdom has just 
announced that it intends to open formal 
negotiations looking toward joint 
development of fast reactors with their 
European group. 

Both the fusion and breeder 
research and development programs 
are not only important on their own 
merits, they also directly address an 
issue raised by the developing countries 
which I mentioned earlier. These efforts 
do seek alternative energy sources 
which could substantially reduce the 
developed countries' demands on scarce 
petroleum resources thus making in- 
creased supplies available for the less 
developed countries and relieving the 
pressure on world prices. 

Promoting Stability in World 
Trade and Economic Development 

The fifth and final theme in the Presi- 
dent's energy security program is the 
determination to pursue and, if possible, 
establish an international environment 
conducive to stability in the world oil 
trade and world trade and economic 
development in general. We cannot 
possibly explore this subject in any 
depth here today. Obviously, however, 
one of the keys is the Middle East— the 
region from which so much of the 
world's crude oil comes. Japan and 
Western Europe are heavily dependent 
on the Middle East for their oil, as we 
all know. Peace and security of that 
region is a vital concern. Thus, one of 
the principal foreign policy objectives of 
the United States is to help resolve the 
conflicts of the region. But this is only 
an example. The fostering of trade and 
economic development opportunities, the 
search for peace in all regions of the 
world, and the effort to strengthen 
alliances and reduce frictions are all 
keys to assuring economic well-being 
and the availability of energy resources 
where and when they are needed. These 
concerns are important determinants of 
our policies and relationships throughout 
the world. 

I hope this overview has been useful 
to you, and I wish you every success in 
your upcoming conference. ■ 



October 1983 



49 



EUROPE 



CSCE Followup Meeting 
Concludes in Madrid 



The fnin> session of the followup 
meeting of the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was 
held in Madrid September 7-9, 1983. 
Secretary Shultz represented the United 
States. 

Following are the Secretary's 
remarks made to that session on 
September 9 and the text of the con- 
cluding document agreed to by the 35 
participating countries. 



SECRETARY'S REMARKS 1 

Spain, our gracious and creative host, 
has made a successful— and inspir- 
ing—transition to democracy. That suc- 
cess reminds us by its example that the 
light of freedom can never be ex- 
tinguished and that the aspiration to 
human dignity is basic to all peoples. 
This is what the Helsinki process is all 
about. That is why the United States 
supports continuation of the process, 
strengthened as it is by what has been 
accomplished here at Madrid. 

But we also meet at a time when 
basic human rights remain widely denied 
and in the immediate aftermath of a 
brutal tragedy, shocking to the con- 
science of mankind. The Korean airline 
massacre reminds us all of the extent to 
which the objectives of the CSCE proc- 
ess remain to be achieved. Our meeting 
here must, therefore, mark— as state- 
ment after statement of ministers have 
done— renewed determination in the 
pursuit of these fundamental objectives. 

The Helsinki Process 

The Helsinki process was launched with 
great hopes 10 years ago. It was born at 
what seemed to be an encouraging mo- 
ment in East-West relations: the United 
States and the Soviet Union had just 
reached the first agreements on 
strategic arms limitation. Broad vistas 
of economic cooperation appeared open. 
Progress seemed possible on human 
rights. There was an awareness that 
lasting peace required us to look at the 
totality of our relations. And so Helsinki 
was an attempt to deal comprehensively 
with the problems of security, economic 
relations, contacts between our peoples, 
their basic freedoms, and standards of 
international conduct. 



The Helsinki Final Act is an elo- 
quent statement of aspirations, to which 
the United States gladly subscribed 
because we subscribe to every one of its 
principles. 

• It affirms the most fundamental 
human rights: liberty of thought, con- 
science, and faith; the exercise of civil 
and political rights; the rights of 
minorities. 

• It calls for a freer flow of infor- 
mation, ideas, and people; greater scope 
for the press; cultural and educational 
exchange; family reunification; the right 
to travel and to marriage between na- 
tionals of different states; protection of 
the priceless heritage of our diverse 
cultures. 

• And it reaffirms the basic prin- 
ciples of relations between states: 
nonintervention, sovereign equality, self- 
determination, territorial integrity, and 
the inviolability of frontiers other than 
through peaceful change. 

The United States has always been 
realistic about the Helsinki process. We 
did not expect it to resolve all of the dif- 
ficult security issues we face in an era of 
ideological conflict and military competi- 
tion. We knew, from the beginning, that 
some would distort it to reinforce the 
division of the continent and the domina- 
tion of Eastern Europe by the Soviet 
Union, despite the Final Act's clear 
reaffirmation of freedom, political in- 
dependence, sovereignty, self- 
determination, and noninterference. 

Thus, when heads of state and 
government met in Helsinki in 1975 to 
conclude the first conference and sign 
the Final Act, the United States took 
the position that hope had to be 
tempered by realism and backed up by 
effort. President Ford expressed it well 
on that occasion: "History will judge this 
conference not by what we say here 
today, but by what we do tomor- 
row—not by the promises we make, but 
by the promises we keep." 

Since 1975 

Reflecting on the experience of the last 
8 years, we must be disappointed, but 
we cannot be surprised, that the years 
since then have seen many setbacks for 
our efforts to strengthen security, ex- 
pand cooperation, build mutual con- 



fidence, and protect human rights. The 
record speaks for itself. 

• There are governments in the 
East which have from the outset treated 
their commitments to human rights 
under the Final Act with open contempt. 
The Helsinki monitoring groups that 
citizens created to gauge their govern- 
ments' performance have been sys- 
tematically suppressed. Emigration, 
after an initial rise, has fallen dra- 
matically. Dissidents have been sub- 
jected to ever more brutal treatment. 
And courageous men and women who 
dared to assert their human rights— or 
demonstrate for peace and arms con- 
trol—are rotting in prison or condemned 
to mental hospitals. 

• Similarly, within 2 years of sign- 
ing the document pledging a commit- 
ment to the pursuit of peace, the Soviet 
Union began deploying SS-20 inter- 
mediate-range nuclear missiles with 
multiple warheads on each, aimed at the 
peoples of Europe and Asia, endanger- 
ing the balance of power and creating an 
enormous security problem. 

• Six years after signing a docu- 
ment pledging a commitment to 
sovereignty, independence, and self- 
determination, the Soviet Union coerced 
Poland into suppressing a free trade 
union movement whose only crime was 
to take workers' rights seriously in what 
claims to be a workers' state. 

• And most recently, just days after 
accepting here a new document of still 
stronger commitments than those of the 
Final Act, the Soviet Union has ruthless- 
ly taken the lives of 269 innocent people 
on a defenseless civilian airplane. And 
from this rostrum, its foreign minister 
shamelessly insisted that the Soviet 
Union would do so again, thus again 
demonstrating its callous disregard for 
human life. 

The Basis for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe 

These blatant acts of Soviet defiance 
against the spirit and the letter of the 
Helsinki accords have presented this 
Madrid meeting with its basic challenge. 
By accepting that challenge and insisting 
on injecting an element of accountability 
into the process, Madrid has saved the 
act from becoming an historic 
irrelevancy. 

Let us look at the ideals of Helsinki 
as they relate to the realities of today. 
In the security field, we and our allies 
seek to enhance European security at 
the lowest possible level of arms. We are 
energetically involved in all ongoing 



50 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



negotiations. We welcome the newly 
scheduled conference on confidence- and 
security-building measures and disarma- 
ment. We know that the essence of 
security is mutual security. Unfortunate- 
ly, as the fate of Korean Air Lines #007 
once again reminds us, the Soviet Union 
defines its security in a way so absolute, 
self-centered, and cynical that it poses a 
danger to all other countries. 

The SS-20s targeted on Western 
Europe and Asia dramatize the danger 
to us all. These missiles threaten inter- 
national confidence and international 
stability. They are part of a steady and 
continuing Soviet aim for global military 
power far beyond any conceivable defen- 
sive needs. Their deployment began in 
1977. On November 2, 1977, after about 
a dozen of these weapons had been 
deployed, Soviet President Leonid 
Brezhnev declared: "We do not want to 
upset the approximate equilibrium at 
present . . . between East and West in 
central Europe, or between the U.S.S.R. 
and the United States." 

Whether or not one agreed on the 
precise nature of the military balance at 
that point, a natural question arises as 
to why the Soviet Union has proceeded 
since 1977 to deploy more SS-20s at a 
feverish pace, for a present total of over 
350 launchers and over 1,050 warheads. 
If there was balance then with a dozen 
or so weapons, it is difficult to deny 
that, today, there must be an imbalance 
that requires redress. 

That balance will be redressed by 
the Atlantic alliance in the absence of an 
equal, verifiable agreement to limit 
them. The Soviet response to this, un- 
fortunately, has been less genuine 
negotiation and more unilateral threats. 
The democratic nations will resist such 
threats, which poison the atmosphere 
and are inconsistent with the genuine 
pursuit of security and cooperation. If 
no agreement is reached by the end of 
this year, NATO counterdeployments 
will begin. But we, for our part, are will- 
ing to keep on trying to reach agree- 
ment with the Soviet Union. 

In addition to tipping the military 
balance, the Soviet Union and its allies 
embarked— in the immediate aftermath 
of the Helsinki Final Act— on a course of 
geopolitical aggression in Africa, the 
Middle East, and Southwest Asia. 
Cuban armies under Soviet direction in- 
tervened in Angola, Ethiopia, and South 
Yemen; Vietnamese armies invaded 
Kampuchea, pioneering in the 
technology of chemical and toxin war- 
fare against civilians; and the Soviet 
Army invaded Afghanistan. 



The United States is fully aware 
that the Final Act stresses the "the close 
link between peace and security in 
Europe and in the world as a whole." 
We will work with those who seek 
peaceful solutions in regional conflicts, 
consistent with the desires and interests 
of the peoples concerned in Southeast 
and Southwest Asia, in southern Africa, 
and in Central America and the Carib- 
bean. 

We support that provision of the 
Final Act which treats economic rela- 
tions as "an essential sector" of coopera- 
tion. But "their cooperation in this field," 
says the Final Act, "should take place in 
full respect for the principles guiding 
relations among participating states." 
The steady growth in East- West 
economic exchanges that marked the 
early 1970s has slowed and leveled off. 
The geopolitical developments I have 
just mentioned have contributed to this 
drop. But it is partly the result, as well, 
of the oil crisis and world economic 
recession and partly the result of the 
structural inefficiencies of the East's 
central economic planning. 

It is ironic that a system claiming to 
exemplify the principles of the world's 
only truly "scientific" economic theory 
should have to resort to emulating 
Western methods, borrowing Western 
funds, and purchasing Western food and 
technology in order to sustain its per- 
formance. Nevertheless, we continue to 
hope that nonstrategic trade, proceeding 
on sound commercial terms, can make at 
least some long-range contribution to 
constructive East- West relations. 

In reaching the vital question of 
human rights, the central point to make 
is that they are not just a separate 
"basket" of issues but an integral part of 
the whole subject of security and 
cooperation. As the Final Act declares, 
respect for human rights and fundamen- 
tal freedoms is "an essential factor for 
the peace, justice, and well-being 
necessary to ensure the development of 
friendly relations and cooperation." 

Here we arrive at the heart of the 
matter. What is the real reason that 
progress in the Helsinki process is such 
an uphill struggle? What is it that 
security and cooperation in Europe fun- 
damentally depend upon? What are the 
real, basic obstacles to security and 
cooperation in Europe? 

It all comes down to the question: 
Why is Europe divided? We all know the 
answer. Europe was divided by force, 
and it remains divided by force— the 
force of a system that as a matter of 
both principle and practice is opposed to 



the free movement of people and ideas. 
This is a system that built a wall to keep 
ideas out and people in. This is a system 
that fears foreign radio broadcasts even 
more, perhaps, than it fears missiles. 

Yet experience has shown that no 
wall is high enough, no jamming station 
strong enough, to keep out ideas or to 
keep down the hopes of men and women 
who yearn for freedom. The division of 
Europe is today, as it always was, un- 
natural and inhuman. Therefore, the at- 
tempt to keep Europe divided by raw 
power is inevitably a source of instabili- 
ty. There can be no lasting security or 
cooperation in Europe as long as one 
government is afraid of its own people 
and seeks reassurance in imposing a 
system of force on its people— and on its 
neighbors. 

There will always be heroes who will 
not let us forget and who give their 
would-be masters no rest: Polish 
workers, Czech intellectuals, East Ger- 
man clergy and peace demonstrators, 
and Soviet dissidents of all faiths and 
from all walks of life who risk life and 
livelihood for the cause of liberty. The 
Soviet Union would earn great credit for 
itself in the spirit of Helsinki if it 
allowed these heroes who want to leave 
the Soviet Union to do so. The right to 
emigrate is a vital principle acknowl- 
edged in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. As this Jewish New 
Year begins, let us hope that the coming 
year will see major progress toward 
freer emigration. Yet our concern is not 
only for those who wish to leave but 
those who remain. The condition of their 
lives, in the spirit of Helsinki and 
Madrid, is an important barometer of 
the true condition of security and 
cooperation in Europe. 

In the most profound sense, the 
Helsinki process represents an historic 
effort to erode the cruel divisions be- 
tween East and West in Europe. It is an 
effort that must continue because it em- 
bodies the most basic interests, deepest 
convictions, and highest hopes of all the 
peoples of Europe. Though this con- 
ference is coming to a close, our concern 
for human rights is enduring, and we 
will continue to advance this cause in 
every appropriate forum. We will con- 
tinue to speak the truth. The struggle 
for human rights is unstoppable, and it 
remains a priority of American foreign 
policy. 



October 1983 



51 



EUROPE 



Madrid and the Future 

As the Madrid review meeting nears its 
end, I want to pay tribute here to the 
able leadership of the distinguished head 
of our delegation, Ambassador Max 
Kampelman. In speaking to this 
meeting, he spoke for a united country, 
for an American people united in sup- 
port of peace and united in its commit- 
ment to human dignity. And he helped 
with others to forge the unity among the 
Western democracies without which 
even the modest progress we have made 
would have been impossible. 



After almost 3 years of patient 
negotiation, we have a document that 
will expand and improve upon the 1975 
Final Act. It adds important new com- 
mitments with respect to human rights, 
trade union freedoms, religious liberties, 
reunification of families, free flow of in- 
formation, and measures against ter- 
rorism. It also provides, significantly, 
for followup in the human rights and 
security fields. 

• A human rights meeting is sched- 
uled in Ottawa in 1985, a meeting on 
human contacts in Bern in early 1986, 



Anniversary of Gdansk 
Agreement in Poland 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
AUG. 31, 1983 1 

Three years have passed since the work- 
ing class of Poland challenged the whole 
might of a modern totalitarian state 
and, without shedding one drop of blood, 
won the right to have their own free 
trade unions. In the 15 months of its 
legal existence, Solidarity offered a ray 
of hope that people who had no other 
weapons but their courage and deter- 
mination may gain more freedom for 
themselves and thus bring about a more 
peaceful and secure world. 

It seemed for a moment that such 
hopes were dashed in December 1981, 
when the military regime of Gen. 
Jaruzelski, acting under strong pressure 
from the Soviet Union, introduced a 
state of war, and the legal structure of 
Solidarity was destroyed by force. But 
such an assessment was wrong. 

The 13th of December 1981 did not 
mark the end of the Polish quest for 
freedom. Solidarity leaders were in- 
terned; others were thrown into jail; 
strikes were broken by police; some peo- 
ple were killed, wounded, or badly 
beaten; many thousands lost their jobs 
or were forced to leave their country. 
Solidarity suffered many setbacks, but 
its spirit remained unbroken. 

In spite of all repressive measures, 
the movement has been longer in ex- 
istence now than the era of Solidarity 
itself. The Poles refused to be in- 
timidated. And it is clear today that no 
force can eradicate the memories of the 
historical event of August 31, 1980. As a 
prominent Pole said recently, "Solidarity 
remains alive in the minds and hearts of 
Polish people." 



One more thing has to be said on 
this occasion. In spite of the great inten- 
sity of hostile feelings generated by 
repressive measures, there was not one 
single case of violence against the op- 
pressive regime in Poland. Solidarity has 
remained a nonviolent, massive popular 
movement which is renouncing the use 
of force or any attempts to overthrow 
the government. In our world tormented 
by terrorism, this is in itself a remark- 
able achievement. 

Winston Churchill once said that 
Poland is like a rock. It may, from time 
to time, be submerged for awhile by a 
tidal wave, but it will remain a rock. 

Throughout their thorny history, the 
Poles have never lost hope and have 
never surrendered. Solidarity perseveres 
in its peaceful struggle in a hope that 
one day — sooner or later — the Polish 
Government will have to recognize that 
Polish problems can be solved not by in- 
timidation but only on the basis of 
reconciliation with this proud and 
courageous people. If the Polish Govern- 
ment makes tangible progress toward 
this end, we are prepared to reciprocate 
with concrete steps of our own. 

To us Americans, Solidarity should 
serve as a reminder of the power of 
ideas born out of people's readiness to 
accept sacrifices and to face risks. The 
Poles are struggling for the common 
values which we cherish in our 
democratic society: for dignity and the 
rights of man and nations. They can 
proudly repeat their old motto: For your 
freedom and ours. 



and a full review conference in Vienna 
in late 1986. We hope that the Soviet 
Union will at long last pay heed to the 
concerns frequently expressed by many 
of us in Madrid and respond to those 
concerns. 

• A conference on confidence- and 
security-building measures and disarma- 
ment will convene in Stockholm in early 
1984. The United States will negotiate 
seriously to reach agreement on militari- 
ly significant, politically binding, and 
verifiable measures applicable to the 
whole of Europe. We also looked for- 
ward to the meeting of experts on the 
peaceful settlement of disputes sched- 
uled for Athens in 1984. 

The presence here of a distinguished 
congressional delegation signifies the 
dedication of my country to the Helsinki 
process and to the quest for security and 
cooperation in Europe. 

We challenge the Soviet Union to 
undertake a serious dialogue on the full 
range of outstanding issues, with the 
goal of settling problems and reducing 
tensions. For our part, we will continue 
to negotiate patiently in good faith and 
will consider any proposals that meet 
our basic objective of enhancing true 
security and cooperation. 

As sober realists, we are— and must 
be— prepared for continued and often ar- 
duous competition. Yet we also believe 
that this competition can— and must 
be— conducted in a way that leaves room 
for practical agreements that push back 
the specter of major conflict. In the 
nuclear age, this is our mutual respon- 
sibility. It is my government's solemn 
commitment. 

As President Reagan declared last 
July 15: 

We will not flag in our continued deter- 
mination to work with all governments and 
peoples whose goal is the strengthening of 
peace in freedom. As Madrid has shown, 
dialogue, when based on realistic expecta- 
tions and conducted with patience, can pro- 
duce results. These results are often gradual 
and hard won, but they are the necessary 
building blocks for a more secure and stable 
world. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 5, 1983. 



52 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



CONCLUDING DOCUMENT 

1. The representatives of the participating 
States of the Conference on Security and Co- 
operation in Europe met in Madrid from 

1 1 November 1980 to 9 September 1983 in 
accordance with the provisions of the Final 
Act relating to the Follow-up to the Con- 
ference, as well as the basis of the other rele- 
vant documents adopted during the process 
oftheCSCE. 

2. The participants were addressed on 

12 November 1980 by the Spanish Prime 
Minister. 

3. Opening statements were made by all 
Heads of Delegations among whom were 
Ministers and Deputy Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs of a number of participating States. 
Some Ministers of Foreign Affairs addressed 
the Meeting also at later stages. 

4. Contributions were made by repre- 
sentatives of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (ECE) and UNESCO. 

Contributions were also made by the 
following non-participating Mediterranean 
States: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco and 
Tunisia. 

5. The representatives of the participat- 
ing States stressed the high political 
significance of the Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe and of the proc- 
ess initiated by it as well as of the ways and 
means it provides for States to further their 
efforts to increase security, develop co- 
operation and enhance mutual understanding 
in Europe. They therefore reaffirmed their 
commitment to the process of the CSCE and 
emphasized the importance of the implemen- 
tation of all the provisions and the respect 
for all the principles of the Final Act by each 
of them as being essential for the develop- 
ment of this process. Furthermore, they 
stressed the importance they attach to securi- 
ty and genuine detente, while deploring the 
deterioration of the international situation 
since the Belgrade Meeting 1977. 

Accordingly, the participating States 
agreed that renewed efforts should be made 
to give full effect to the Final Act through 
concrete action, unilateral, bilateral and 
multilateral, in order to restore trust and 
confidence between the participating States 
which would permit a substantial improve- 
ment in their mutual relations. They con- 
sidered that the future of the CSCE process 
required balanced progress in all sections of 
the Final Act. 

6. In accordance with the mandate pro- 
vided for in the Final Act and the Agenda of 
the Madrid Meeting, the representatives of 
the participating States held a thorough ex- 
change of views both on the implementation 
of the provisions of the Final Act and of the 
tasks defined by the Conference, as well as, 
in the context of the questions dealt with by 
the latter, on the deepening of their mutual 
relations, the improvement of security and 
the development of co-operation in Europe, 
and the development of the process of 
detente in the future. 



7. It was confirmed that the thorough ex- 
change of views constitutes in itself a 
valuable contribution towards the achieve- 
ment of the aims set by the CSCE. In this 
context, it was agreed that these aims can 
only be attained by continuous implementa- 
tion, unilaterally, bilaterally and multilateral- 
ly, of all the provisions and by respect for all 
the principles of the Final Act. 

8. During this exchange of views, dif- 
ferent and at times contradictory opinions 
were expressed as to the degree of implemen- 
tation of the Final Act reached so far by par- 
ticipating States. While certain progress was 
noted, concern was expressed at the serious 
deficiencies in the implementation of this 
document. 

9. Critical assessments from different 
viewpoints were given as to the application of 
and respect for the principles of the Final 
Act. Serious violations of a number of these 
principles were deplored during these assess- 
ments. Therefore, the participating States, at 
times represented at a higher level, con- 
sidered it necessary to state, at various 
stages of the Meeting, that strict application 
of and respect for these principles, in all their 
aspects, are essential for the improvement of 
mutual relations between the participating 
States. 

The necessity was also stressed that the 
relations of the participating States with all 
other States should be conducted in the spirit 
of these principles. 

10. Concern was expressed about the 
continued lack of confidence among par- 
ticipating States. 

Concern was also expressed as to the 
spread of terrorism. 

11. The implementation of the provisions 
of the Final Act concerning Confidence- 
Building Measures, Co-operation in the field 
of Economics, of Science and Technology and 
of Environment, as well as Co-operation in 
Humanitarian and other fields was 
thoroughly discussed. It was considered that 
the numerous possibilities offered by the 
Final Act had not been sufficiently utilized. 
Questions relating to Security and Co- 
operation in the Mediterranean were also 
discussed. 

12. The participating States reaffirmed 
their commitment to the continuation of the 
CSCE process as agreed to in the chapter on 
the Follow-up to the Conference contained in 
the Final Act. 

13. The representatives of the par- 
ticipating States took note of the reports of 
the meetings of experts and of the "Scientific 
Forum," and in the course of their delibera- 
tions took the results of these meetings into 
account. 

14. The representatives of the par- 
ticipating States examined all the proposals 
submitted concerning the above questions 
and agreed on the following: 



QUESTIONS RELATING TO 
SECURITY IN EUROPE 

The participating States express their deter- 
mination 

• to exert new efforts to make detente 
an effective, as well as continuing increasing- 
ly viable and comprehensive process, univer- 
sal in scope, as undertaken under the Final 
Act; 

• to seek solutions to outstanding prob- 
lems through peaceful means; 

• to fulfil consistently all the provisions 
under the Final Act and, in particular, strict- 
ly and unreservedly to respect and put into 
practice all the ten principles contained in the 
Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations 
between Participating States, irrespective of 
their political, economic or social systems, as 
well as of their size, geographical location or 
level of economic development, including 
their commitment to conduct their relations 
with all other States in the spirit of these 
principles; 

• to develop relations of mutual co- 
operation, friendship and confidence, refrain- 
ing from any action which, being contrary to 
the Final Act, might impair such relations; 

• to encourage genuine efforts to imple- 
ment the Final Act; 

• to exert genuine efforts towards con- 
taining an increasing arms build-up as well as 
towards strengthening confidence and securi- 
ty and promoting disarmament. 

Principles 

1. They reaffirm their determination fully to 
respect and apply these principles and accord- 
ingly, to promote by all means, both in law 
and practice, their increased effectiveness. 
They consider that one such means could be 
to give legislative expression — in forms ap- 
propriate to practices and procedures specific 
to each country — to the ten principles set 
forth in the Final Act. 

2. They recognize it as important that 
treaties and agreements concluded by par- 
ticipating States reflect and be consonant 
with the relevant principles and, where ap- 
propriate, refer to them. 

3. The participating States reaffirm the 
need that refraining from the threat or use of 
force, as a norm of international life, should 
be strictly and effectively observed. To this 
end they stress their duty, under the relevant 
provisions of the Final Act, to act according- 
ly. 

4. The participating States condemn ter- 
rorism, including terrorism in international 
relations, as endangering or taking innocent 
human lives or otherwise jeopardizing human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and em- 
phasize the necessity to take resolute 
measures to combat it. They express their 
determination to take effective measures for 
the prevention and suppression of acts of ter- 
rorism, both at the national level and through 
international co-operation including ap- 
propriate bilateral and multilateral agree- 



October1983 



53 



EUROPE 



ments, and accordingly to broaden and rein- 
force mutual co-operation to combat such 
acts. They agree to do so in conformity with 
the Charter of the United Nations, the 
United Nations Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Rela- 
tions and Co-operation among States and the 
Helsinki Final Act. 

5. In the context of the combat against 
acts of terrorism, they will take all ap- 
propriate measures in preventing their 
respective territories from being used for the 
preparation, organization or commission of 
terrorist activities, including those directed 
against other participating States and their 
citizens. This also includes measures to pro- 
hibit on their territories illegal activities of 
persons, groups or organizations that in- 
stigate, organize or engage in the perpetra- 
tion of acts of terrorism. 

6. The participating States confirm that 
they will refrain from direct or indirect 
assistance to terrorist activities or to sub- 
versive or other activities directed towards 
the violent overthrow of the regime of 
another participating State. Accordingly, 
they will refrain, inter alia, from financing, 
encouraging, fomenting or tolerating any 
such activities. 

7. They express their determination to 
do their utmost to assure necessary security 
to all official representatives and persons 
who participate on their territories in ac- 
tivities within the scope of diplomatic, con- 
sular or other official relations. 

8. They emphasize that all the par- 
ticipating States recognize in the Final Act 
the universal significance of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, respect for which 
is an essential factor for the peace, justice 
and well-being necessary to ensure the. 
development of friendly relations and co- 
operation among themselves, as among all 
States. 

9. The participating States stress their 
determination to promote and encourage the 
effective exercise of human rights and fun- 
damental freedoms, all of which derive from 
the inherent dignity of the human person and 
are essential for his free and full develop- 
ment, and to assure constant and tangible 
progress in accordance with the Final Act, 
aiming at further and steady development in 
this field in all participating States, irrespec- 
tive of their political, economic and social 
systems. 

They similarly stress their determination 
to develop their laws and regulations in the 
field of civil, political, economic, social, 
cultural and other human rights and fun- 
damental freedoms; they also emphasize their 
determination to ensure the effective exercise 
of these rights and freedoms. 

They recall the right of the individual to 
know and act upon his rights and duties in 
the field of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, as embodied in the Final Act, and 
will take the necessary action in their respec- 
tive countries to effectively ensure this right. 

10. The participating States reaffirm 
that they will recognize, respect and further- 
more agree to take the action necessary to 



54 



ensure the freedom of the individual to pro- 
fess and practise, alone or in community with 
others, religion or belief acting in accordance 
with the dictates of his own conscience. 

In this context, they will consult, 
whenever necessary, the religious faiths, in- 
stitutions and organizations, which act within 
the constitutional framework of their respec- 
tive countries. 

They will favourably consider applications 
by religious communities of believers practis- 
ing or prepared to practise their faith within 
the constitutional framework of their States, 
to be granted the status provided for in their 
respective countries for religious faiths, in- 
stitutions and organizations. 

11. They stress also the importance of 
constant progress in ensuring the respect for 
and actual enjoyment of the rights of persons 
belonging to national minorities as well as 
protecting their legitimate interests as pro- 
vided for in the Final Act. 

12. They stress the importance of ensur- 
ing equal rights of men and women; accord- 
ingly, they agree to take all actions necessary 
to promote equally effective participation of 
men and women in political, economic, social 
and cultural life. 

13. The participating States will ensure 
the right of workers freely to establish and 
join trade unions, the right of trade unions 
freely to exercise their activities and other 
rights as laid down in relevant international 
instruments. They note that these rights will 
be exercised in compliance with the law of 
the State and in conformity with the State's 
obligations under international law. They will 
encourage, as appropriate, direct contacts 
and communication among such trade unions 
and their representatives. 

14. They reaffirm that governments, in- 
stitutions, organizations and persons have a 
relevant and positive role to play in con- 
tributing towards the achievement of the 
above-mentioned aims of their co-operation. 

15. They reaffirm the particular signif- 
icance of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the International Covenants on 
Human Rights and other relevant interna- 
tional instruments of their joint and separate 
efforts to stimulate and develop universal 
respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms; they call on all participating States 
to act in conformity with those international 
instruments and on those participating 
States, which have not yet done so, to con- 
sider the possibility of acceding to the 
covenants. 

16. They agree to give favourable con- 
sideration to the use of bilateral round-table 
meetings, held on a voluntary basis, between 
delegations composed by each participating 
State to discuss issues of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in accordance with an 
agreed agenda in a spirit of mutual respect 
with a view to achieving greater understand- 
ing and co-operation based on the provisions 
of the Final Act. 

17. They decide to convene a meeting of 
experts of the participating States on ques- 
tions concerning respect, in their States, for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, in 
all aspects, as embodied in the Final Act. 



Upon invitation of the Government of 
Canada, the meeting of experts will be held 
in Ottawa, beginning on 7 May 1985. It will 
draw up conclusions and recommendations to 
be submitted to the governments of all par- 
ticipating States. 

The meeting will be preceded by a 
preparatory meeting which will be held in Ot- 
tawa upon the invitation of the Government 
of Canada, starting on 23 April 1985. 

18. In conformity with the recommenda- 
tion contained in the Report of the Montreux 
Meeting of Experts, another meeting of ex- 
perts of the participating States will be con- 
vened, at the invitation of the Government of 
Greece. It will take place in Athens and will 
commence on 21 March 1984, with the pur- 
pose of pursuing, on the basis of the Final 
Act, the examination of a generally accept- 
able method for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes aimed at complementing existing 
methods. The meeting will take into account 
the common approach set forth in the above- 
mentioned report. 

19. Recalling the right of any participat- 
ing State to belong or not to belong to inter- 
national organizations, to be or not to be a 
party to bilateral or multilateral treaties in- 
cluding the right to be or not to be a party to 
treaties of alliance, and also the right to 
neutrality, the participating States take note 
of the declaration of the Government of the 
Republic of Malta in which it stated that, as 
an effective contribution to detente, peace 
and security in the Mediterranean region, the 
Republic of Malta is a neutral State adhering 
to a policy of non-alignment. They call upon 
all States to respect that declaration. 

Conference on Confidence- and 
Security-building Measures 
and Disarmament in Europe 

The participating States, 

Recalling the provisions of the Final Act 
according to which they recognize the in- 
terest of all of them in efforts aimed at 
lessening military confrontation and pro- 
moting disarmament. 

Have agreed to convene a Conference on 
Confidence- and Security-building Measures 
and Disarmament in Europe. 

1. The aim of the Conference is, as a 
substantial and integral part of the 
multilateral process initiated by the Con- 
ference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, with the participation of all the 
States signatories of the Final Act, to under- 
take, in stages, new, effective and concrete 
actions designed to make progress in 
strengthening confidence and security and in 
achieving disarmament, so as to give effect 
and expression to the duty of States to 
refrain from the threat or use of force in 
their mutual relations. 

2. Thus the Conference will begin a proc- 
ess of which the first stage will be devoted to 
the negotiation and adoption of a set of 
mutually complementary confidence- and 
security-building measures designed to reduce 
the risk of military confrontation in Europe. 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



3. The first stage of the Conference will 
be held in Stockholm commencing on 17 
January 1984. 

4. On the basis of equality of right, 
balance and reciprocity, equal respect for the 
security interest of all CSCE participating 
States, and of their respective obligations 
concerning confidence- and security-building 
measures and disarmament in Europe, these 
confidence- and security-building measures 
will cover the whole as well as the adjoining 
sea area 2 and air space. They will be of 
military significance and politically binding 
and will be provided with adequate forms of 
verification which correspond to their con- 
tent. 

As far as the adjoining sea area 2 and air 
space is concerned, the measures will be ap- 
plicable to the military activities of all the 
participating States taking place there 
whenever these activities affect security in 
Europe as well as constitute a part of ac- 
tivities taking place within the whole of 
Europe as referred to above, which they will 
agree to notify. Necessary specifications will 
be made through the negotiations on the 
confidence- and security-building measures at 
the Conference. 

Nothing in the definition of the zone 
given above will diminish obligations already 
undertaken under the Final Act. The 
confidence- and security-building measures to 
be agreed upon at the Conference will also be 
applicable in all areas covered by any of the 
provisions in the Final Act relating to 
confidence-building measures and certain 
aspects of security and disarmament. 

The provisions established by the 
negotiators will come into force in the forms 
and according to the procedure to be agreed 
upon by the Conference. 

5. Taking into account the above- 
mentioned aim of the Conference, the next 
follow-up meeting of the participating States 
of the CSCE, to be held in Vienna, commenc- 
ing on 4 November 1986, will assess the 
progress achieved during the first stage of 
the Conference. 

6. Taking into account the relevant provi- 
sions of the Final Act, and having reviewed 
the results achieved by the first stage of the 
Conference, and also in the light of other 
relevant negotiations on security and dis- 
armament affecting Europe, a future CSCE 
follow-up meeting will consider ways and ap- 
propriate means for the participating States 
to continue their efforts for security and 
disarmament in Europe, including the ques- 
tion of supplementing the present mandate 
for the next stage of the Conference on 
Confidence- and Security-building Measures 
and Disarmament in Europe. 

7. A preparatory meeting, charged with 
establishing the agenda, time-table and other 
organizational modalities for the first stage of 
the Conference, will be held in Helsinki, com- 
mencing on 25 October 1983. Its duration 
shall not exceed three weeks. 

8. The rules of procedure, the working 
methods and the scale of distribution for the 
expenses valid for the CSCE will, mutatis 
mutandis, be applied to the Conference and 



to the preparatory meeting referred to in the 
preceding paragraph. The services of a 
technical secretariat will be provided by the 
host country. 



CO-OPERATION IN THE FIELD OF 
ECONOMICS, OF SCIENCE 
AND TECHNOLOGY AND OF 
THE ENVIRONMENT 

1. The participating States consider that the 
implementation of all provisions of the Final 
Act and full respect for the principles guiding 
relations among them set out therein are an 
essential basis for the development of co- 
operation among them in the field of 
economics, of science and technology and of 
the environment. At the same time they reaf- 
firm their conviction that co-operation in 
these fields contributes to the reinforcement 
of peace and security in Europe and in the 
world as a whole. In this spirit they reiterate 
their resolve to pursue and intensify such co- 
operation between one another, irrespective 
of their economic and social systems. 

2. The participating States confirm their 
interest in promoting adequate, favourable 
conditions in order further to develop trade 
and industrial co-operation among them, in 
particular by fully implementing all provi- 
sions of the second chapter of the Final Act, 
so as to make greater use of the possibilities 
created by their economic, scientific and 
technical potential. In this context and taking 
into consideration the efforts already made 
unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally in 
order to overcome all kinds of obstacles to 
trade, they reaffirm their intention to make 
further efforts aimed at reducing or pro- 
gressively eliminating all kinds of obstacles to 
the development of trade. 

Taking account of the activities of the 
United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe (ECE) already carried out in the field 
of all kinds of obstacles to trade, they recom- 
mend that further work on this subject be 
directed in particular towards identifying 
these obstacles and examining them with a 
view to finding means for their reduction or 
progressive elimination, in order to con- 
tribute to harmonious development of their 
economic relations. 

3. On the basis of the provisions of the 
Final Act concerning business contracts and 
facilities the participating States declare their 
intention to make efforts to enable business 
negotiations and activities to be carried out 
more efficiently and expeditiously and further 
to create conditions facilitating closer con- 
tacts between representatives and experts of 
seller firms on the one hand and buyer as 
well as user firms on the other at all stages 
of transaction. They will also further other 
forms of operational contacts between sellers 
and users such as the holding of technical 
symposia and demonstrations and after-sales 
training or requalification courses for 
technical staff of user firms and organiza- 
tions. 

They also agree to take measures further 
to develop and improve facilities and working 



conditions for representatives of foreign 
firms and organizations on their territory, in- 
cluding telecommunications facilities for 
representatives of such firms and organiza- 
tions, as well as to develop these and other 
amenities for temporarily resident staff in- 
cluding particular site personnel. They will 
endeavour further to take measures to speed 
up as far as possible procedures for the 
registration of foreign firms' representations 
and offices as well as for granting entry visas 
to business representatives. 

4. The participating States declare their 
intention to ensure the regular publication 
and dissemination, as rapidly as possible, of 
economic and commercial information com- 
piled in such a way as to facilitate the ap- 
preciation of market opportunities and thus 
to contribute effectively to the process of 
developing international trade and industrial 
co-operation. 

To this end and in order to make further 
progress in achieving the aims laid down in 
the relevant provisions of the Final Act they 
intend to intensify their efforts to improve 
the comparability, comprehensiveness and 
clarity of their economic and commercial 
statistics, in particular by adopting where 
necessary the following measures: by accom- 
panying their economic and trade statistics 
by adequately defined summary indices based 
wherever possible on constant values; by 
publishing their interim statistics whenever 
technically possible at least on a quarterly 
basis; by publishing their statistical compila- 
tions in sufficient detail to achieve the aims 
referred to above, in particular by using for 
their foreign trade statistics a product 
breakdown permitting the identification of 
particular products for purposes of market 
analysis; by striving to have their economic 
and trade statistics no less comprehensive 
than those previously published by the State 
concerned. 

They further express their willingness to 
co-operate towards the early completion of 
work in the appropriate United Nations 
bodies on the harmonization and alignment of 
statistical nomenclatures. 

The participating States further 
recognize the usefulness of making economic 
and commercial information existing in other 
participating States readily available to enter- 
prises and firms in their countries through 
appropriate channels. 

5. The participating States, conscious of 
the need further to improve the conditions 
conducive to a more efficient functioning of 
institutions and firms acting in the field of 
marketing, will promote a more active ex- 
change of knowledge and techniques required 
for effective marketing, and will encourage 
more intensive relations among such institu- 
tions and firms. They agree to make full use 
of the possibilities offered by the ECE to fur- 
ther their co-operation in this field. 

6. The participating States note the in- 
creasing frequency in the economic relations 
of compensation in all their forms. They 
recognize that a useful role can be played by 
such transactions, concluded on a mutually 
acceptable basis. At the same time they 



October 1983 



55 



EUROPE 



recognize that problems can be crea© by 
the linkage in such transactions between pur- 
chases and sales. 

Taking account of the studies of the ECE 
already carried out in this field, they recom- 
mend that further work on this subject be 
directed in particular towards identifying 
such problems and examining ways of solving 
them in order to contribute to a harmonious 
development of their economic relations. 

7. The participating States recognize that 
the expansion of industrial co-operation, on 
the basis of their mutual interest and 
motivated by economic considerations, can 
contribute to the further development and 
diversification of their economic relations and 
to a wider utilization of modern technology. 

They note the useful role bilateral agree- 
ments on economic, industrial and technical 
co-operation, including where appropriate, 
those of a long-term nature can play. They 
also express their willingness to promote 
favourable conditions for the development of 
industrial co-operation among competent 
organizations, enterprises and firms. To this 
end and with a view to facilitating the iden- 
tification of new possibilities for industrial co- 
operation projects they recognize the 
desirability of further developing and improv- 
ing the conditions for business activities and 
the exchange of economic and commercial in- 
formation among competent organizations, 
enterprises and firms including small and 
medium-sized enterprises. 

They also note that, if it is in the mutual 
interest of potential partners, new forms of 
industrial co-operation can be envisaged, in- 
cluding those with organizations, institutions 
and firms of third countries. 

They recommend that the ECE pursue 
and continue to pay particular attention to its 
activities in the field of industrial co- 
operation, inter alia by further directing its 
efforts towards examining ways of promoting 
favourable conditions for the development of 
co-operation in this field, including the 
organization of symposia and seminars. 

8. The participating States declare their 
readiness to continue their efforts aiming at a 
wider participation by small and medium-size 
enterprises in trade and industrial co- 
operation. Aware of the problems particularly 
affecting such enterprises, the participating 
States will endeavour further to improve the 
conditions dealt with in the preceding 
paragraphs in order to facilitate the opera- 
tions of these enterprises in the above- 
mentioned fields. The participating States 
further recommend that the ECE develop its 
special studies pertaining to these problems. 

9. The participating States recognize the 
increasing importance of co-operation in the 
field of energy, inter alia that of a long-term 
nature, on both a bilateral and multilateral 
basis. Welcoming the results so far achieved 
through such endeavours and in particular 
the work carried out by the ECE they ex- 
press their support for continuing the co- 
operation pursued by the Senior Advisers to 
ECE Governments on Energy aiming at the 
fulfilment of all parts of their mandate. 



56 



10. The participating States reaffirm 
their interest in reducing and preventing 
technical barriers to trade and welcome the 
increased co-operation in this field, inter alia 
the work of the Government Officials Respon- 
sible for Standardization Policies in the ECE. 
They will encourage the conclusion of inter- 
national certification arrangements covering 
where appropriate the mutual acceptance of 
certification systems providing mutually 
satisfactory guarantees. 

11. The participating States recommend 
that appropriate action be taken in order to 
facilitate the use and enlarge the scope of ar- 
bitration as an instrument for settling 
disputes in international trade and industrial 
co-operation. They recommend in particular 
the application of the provisions of the 
United Nations Convention on Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
of 1958 as well as a wider recourse to the ar- 
bitration rules elaborated by the United Na- 
tions Commission on International Trade 
Law. They also advocate that parties should, 
on the basis of the provisions of the Final 
Act, be allowed freedom in the choice of ar- 
bitrators and the place of arbitration, in- 
cluding the choice of arbitrators and the place 
of arbitration in a third country. 

12. The participating States recognize 
the important role of scientific and technical 
progress in the economic and social develop- 
ment of all countries in particular those 
which are developing from an economic point 
of view. Taking into account the objectives 
which countries or institutions concerned pur- 
sue in their bilateral and multilateral rela- 
tions they underline the importance of fur- 
ther developing, on the basis of reciprocal ad- 
vantage and on the basis of mutual agree- 
ment and other arrangments, the forms and 
methods of co-operation in the field of science 
and technology provided for in the Final Act, 
for instance international programmes and 
co-operative projects, while utilizing also 
various forms of contacts, including direct 
and individual contacts among scientists and 
specialists as well as contacts and com- 
munications among interested organizations, 
scientific and technological institutions and 
enterprises. 

In this context they recognize the value 
of an improved exchange and dissemination 
of information concerning scientific and 
technical developments as a means of 
facilitating, on the basis of mutual advantage, 
the study and the transfer of, as well as ac- 
cess to scientific and technical achievements 
in fields of co-operation agreed between in- 
terested parties. 

The participating States recommend that 
in the field of science and technology the 
ECE should give due attention, through ap- 
propriate ways and means, to the elaboration 
of studies and practical projects for the 
development of co-operation among member 
countries. 

Furthermore, the participating States, 
aware of the relevant part of the Report of 
the "Scientific Forum," agree to encourage 

the development of scientific i peration in 

the field of agriculture at bilateral, 



multilateral and sub-regional levels, with the 
aim, inter alia, of improving livestock and 
plant breeding and ensuring optimum use and 
conservation of water resources. To this end, 
they will promote further co-operation among 
research institutions and centres in their 
countries, through the exchange of informa- 
tion, the joint implementation of research 
programmes, the organization of meetings 
among scientists and specialists and other 
methods. 

The participating States invite the ECE 
and other competent international organiza- 
tions to support the implementation of these 
activities and to examine the possibilities of 
providing a wider exchange of scientific and 
technological information in the field of 
agriculture. 

13. The participating States welcome 
with satisfaction the important steps taken to 
strengthen co-operation within the 
framework of the ECE in the field of the en- 
vironment, including the High-Level Meeting 
on the Protection of the Environment (13-16 
November 1979). Taking due account of work 
undertaken or envisaged in other competent 
international organizations, they recommend 
the continuation of efforts in this field, in- 
cluding, inter alia, 

• giving priority to the effective im- 
plementation of the provisions of the Resolu- 
tion on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution adopted at the High-Level Meeting; 

• the early ratification of the Convention 
on Long-Range Transboundary Air-Pollution 
signed at the High-Level Meeting; 

• implementation of the Recommenda- 
tions contained in the Declaration of Low and 
Non-Waste Technology and Reutilization and 
Recycling of Wastes; 

• implementation of Decisions B and C of 
the thirty-fifth session of the ECE concern- 
ing the Declaration of Policy on Prevention 
and Control of Water Pollution, including 
transboundary pollution; 

• support in carrying out the programme 
of work of the ECE concerning the protec- 
tion of the environment, including, inter alia, 
the work under way in the field of the protec- 
tion of flora and fauna. 

14. In the context of the provisions of 
the Final Act concerning migrant labour in 
Europe, the participating States note that re- 
cent developments in the world economy 
have affected the situation of migrant 
workers. In this connection, the participating 
States express their wish that host countries 
and countries of origin, guided by a spirit of 
mutual interest and co-operation, intensify 
their contacts with a view to improving fur- 
ther the general situation of migrant workers 
and their families, inter alia the protection of 
their human rights including their economic, 
social and cultural rights while taking par- 
ticularly into account the special problems of 
second generation migrants. They will also 
endeavour to provide or promote, where 
reasonable demand exists, adequate teaching 
of the language and culture of the countries 
of origin. 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



The participating States recommend that, 
among other measures for facilitating the 
social and economic reintegration of return- 
ing migrant labour, the payment of pensions 
as acquired or established under the social 
security system to which such workers have 
been admitted in the host country should be 
ensured by appropriate legislative means or 
reciprocal agreements. 

15. The participating States further 
recognize the importance for their economic 
development of promoting the exchange of 
information and experience on training for 
management staff. To this end they recom- 
mend the organization, in an appropriate ex- 
isting framework and with the help of in- 
terested organizations such as, for example, 
the ECE and the International Labour 
Organisation, of a symposium of persons 
responsible for services and institutions 
specializing in management training for ad- 
ministrations and enterprises with a view to 
exchanging information on training problems 
and methods, comparing experiences and en- 
couraging the development of relations 
among the centres concerned. 

16. The participating States welcome the 
valuable contribution made by the ECE to 
the multilateral implementation of the provi- 
sions of the Final Act pertaining to co- 
operation in the fields of economics, of 
science and technology and of the environ- 
ment. Aware of the potential of the ECE for 
intensifying co-operation in the fields, they 
recommend the fullest use of the existing 
mechanisms and resources in order to con- 
tinue and consolidate the implementation of 
the relevant provisions of the Final Act in 
the interest of its member countries, includ- 
ing those within the ECE region which are 
developing from an economic point of view. 

17. The participating States, bearing in 
mind their will expressed in the provisions of 
the Final Act, reiterate the determination of 
each of them to promote stable and equitable 
international economic relations in the mutual 
interest of all States and, in this spirit, to 
participate equitably in promoting and 
strengthening economic co-operation with the 
developing countries in particular the least 
developed among them. They also note the 
usefulness, inter alia, of identifying and ex- 
ecuting, in co-operation with developing coun- 
tries, concrete projects, with a view to con- 
tributing to economic development in these 
countries. 

They also declare their readiness to con- 
tribute to common efforts towards the 
establishment of a new international 
economic order and the implementation of 
the Strategy for the Third United Nations 
Development Decade, as adopted. They 
recognize the importance of the launching of 
mutually beneficial and adequately prepared 
global negotiations relating to international 
economic co-operation for development. 



QUESTIONS RELATING TO 
SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

1 . The participating States, bearing in mind 
that security in Europe, considered in the 
broader context of world security, is closely 
linked to security in the Mediterranean areas 
as a whole, reaffirm their intention to con- 
tribute to peace, security and justice in the 
Mediterranean region. 

2. They further express their will 

• to take positive steps towards lessen- 
ing tensions and strengthening stability, 
security and peace in the Mediterranean and, 
to this end, to intensify efforts towards find- 
ing just, viable and lasting solutions, through 
peaceful means, to outstanding crucial prob- 
lems, without resort to force or other means 
incompatible with the Principles of the Final 
Act, so as to promote confidence and security 
and make peace prevail in the region; 

• to take measures designed to increase 
confidence and security; 

• to develop good neighbourly relations 
with all States in the region, with due regard 
to reciprocity, and in the spirit of the prin- 
ciples contained in the Declaration on Prin- 
ciples Guiding Relations between Par- 
ticipating States of the Final Act; 

• to study further the possibility of ad 
hoc meetings of Mediterranean States aimed 
at strengthening security and intensifying co- 
operation in the Mediterranean. 

3. In addition the participating States 
will, within the framework of the implemen- 
tation of the Valletta report, consider the 
possibilities offered by new transport in- 
frastructure developments to facilitate new 
commercial and industrial exchanges, as well 
as by the improvement of existing transport 
networks, and by a wider co-ordination of 
transport investments between interested 
parties. In this context they recommend that 
a study be undertaken, within the framework 
of the ECE, in order to establish the current 
and potential transport flows in the Mediter- 
ranean involving the participating States and 
other States of this region taking account of 
the current work in this field. They will fur- 
ther consider the question of introducing or 
extending, in accordance with the existing 
IMO regulations, the use of suitable tech- 
niques for aids to maritime navigation, prin- 
cipally in straits. 

They further note with satisfaction the 
results of the Meeting of Experts held in 
Valletta on the subject of economic, scientific 
and cultural co-operation within the 
framework of the Mediterranean Chapter of 
the Final Act. They reaffirm the conclusions 
and recommendations of the report of this 
Meeting and agree that they will be guided 
accordingly. They also take note of efforts 
under way aiming at implementing them as 
appropriate. To this end, the participating 
States agree to convene from 16 to 26 Oc- 
tober 1984 a seminar to be held at Venice at 
the invitation of the Government of Italy, to 
review the initiatives already undertaken, or 



envisaged, in all the sectors outlined in the 
report of the Valletta Meeting and stimulate, 
where necessary, broader developments in 
these sectors. 

Representatives of the competent inter- 
national organizations and representatives of 
the non-participating Mediterranean States 
will be invited to this Seminar in accordance 
with the rules and practices adopted at the 
Valletta Meeting. 3 



CO-OPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN 
AND OTHER FIELDS 

The participating States, 

Recalling the introductory sections of the 
Chapter on Co-operation in Humanitarian and 
other Fields of the Final Act including those 
concerning the development of mutual under- 
standing between them and detente and 
those concerning progress in cultural and 
educational exchanges, broader dissc. nation 
of information, contacts between people and 
the solution of humanitarian problems, 

Resolving to pursue and expand co- 
operation in these fields and to achieve a 
fuller utilization of the possibilities offered by 
the Final Act, 

Agree now to implement the following: 

Human Contacts 

1. The participating States will favourably 
deal with applications relating to contacts 
and regular meetings on the basis of family 
ties, reunification of families and marriage 
between citizens of different States and will 
decide upon them in the same spirit. 

2. They will decide upon these applica- 
tions in emergency cases for family meetings 
as expeditiously as possible, for family 
reunification and for marriage between 
citizens of different States in normal practice 
within six months and for other family 
meetings within gradually decreasing time 
limits. 

3. They confirm that the presentation or 
renewal of applications in these cases will not 
modify the rights and obligations of the ap- 
plications or of members of their families con- 
cerning inter alia employment, housing, 
residence status, family support, access to 
social, economic or educational benefits, as 
well as any other rights and obligations flow- 
ing from the laws and regulations of the 
respective participating State. 

4. The participating States will provide 
the necessary information on the procedures 
to be followed by the applicants in these 
cases and on the regulations to be observed, 
as well as, upon the applicant's request, pro- 
vide the relevant forms. 

5. They will, where necessary, gradually 
reduce fees charged in connection with these 
applications, including those for visas and 
passports, in order to bring them to a 
moderate level in relation to the average 
monthly income in the respective par- 
ticipating State. 



October 1983 



57 



EUROPE 



6. Applicants will be informed as ex- 
peditiously as possible of the decision that 
has been reached. In case of refusal ap- 
plicants will also be informed of their right to 
renew applications after reasonably short in- 
tervals. 

7. The participating States reaffirm their 
commitment fully to implement the provi- 
sions regarding diplomatic and other official 
missions and consular posts of other par- 
ticipating States contained in relevant 
multilateral or bilateral conventions, and to 
facilitate the normal functioning of those mis- 
sions. Access by visitors to these missions 
will be assured with due regard to the 
necessary requirements of security of these 
missions. 

8. They also reaffirm their willingness to 
take, within their competence, reasonable 
steps, including necessary security measures, 
when appropriate to ensure satisfactory con- 
ditions for activities within the framework of 
mutual co-operation on their territory, such 
as sporting and cultural events, in which 
citizens of other participating States take 
part. 

9. The participating States will 
endeavour, where appropriate, to improve 
the conditions relating to legal, consular and 
medical assistance for citizens of other par- 
ticipating States temporarily on their ter- 
ritory for personal or professional reasons, 
taking due account of relevant multilateral or 
bilateral conventions or agreements. 

10. They will further implement the rele- 
vant provisions of the Final Act, so that 
religious faiths, institutions, organizations 
and their representatives can, in the field of 
their activity, develop contacts and meetings 
among themselves and exchange information. 

11. The participating States will en- 
courage contacts and exchanges among 
young people and foster the broadening of co- 
operation among their youth organizations. 
They will favour the holding among young 
people and youth organizations of educa- 
tional, cultural and other comparable events 
and activities. They will also favour the study 
of problems relating to the younger genera- 
tion. The participating States will further the 
development of individual or collective youth 
tourism, when necessary on the basis of ar- 
rangements, inter alia by encouraging the 
granting of suitable facilities by the transport 
authorities and tourist organizations of the 
participating States or such facilities as those 
offered by the railway authorities par- 
ticipating in the "Inter-Rail" system. 

Information 

1. The participating States will further en- 
courage the freer and wider dissemination of 
printed matter, periodical and non-periodical, 
imported from other participating States, as 
well as an increase in the number of places 
where these publications are on public sale. 
These publications will also be accessible in 
reading rooms in large public libraries and 
similar institutions. 



2. In particular, to facilitate the improve- 
ment of dissemination of printed information, 
the participating States will encourage con- 
tacts and negotiation between their compe- 
tent firms and organizations with a view to 
concluding long-term agreements and con- 
tracts designed to increase the quantities and 
number of titles of newspapers and other 
publications imported from other par- 
ticipating States. They consider it desirable 
that the retail prices of foreign publications 
are not excessive in relation to prices in their 
country of origin. 

3. They confirm their intention, accord- 
ing to the relevant provisions of the Final 
Act, to further extend the possibilities for the 
public to take out subscriptions. 

4. They will favour the further expansion 
of co-operation among mass media and their 
representatives, especially between the 
editorial staffs of press agencies, newspapers, 
radio and television organizations as well as 
film companies. They will encourage a more 
regular exchange of news, articles, sup- 
plements and broadcasts as well as the ex- 
change of editorial staff for better knowledge 
of respective practices. On the basis of 
reciprocity, they will improve the material 
and technical facilities provided for per- 
manently or temporarily accredited television 
and radio reporters. Moreover, they will 
facilitate direct contacts among journalists as 
well as contacts within the framework of pro- 
fessional organizations. 

5. They will decide without undue delay 
upon visa applications from journalists and 
re-examine within a reasonable time frame 
applications which have been refused. 
Moreover, journalists wishing to travel for 
personal reasons and not for the purpose of 
reporting shall enjoy the same treatment as 
other visitors from their country of origin. 

6. They will grant permanent cor- 
respondents and members of their families 
living with them multiple entry and exit visas 
valid for one year. 

7. The participating States will examine 
the possibility of granting, where necessary 
on the basis of bilateral arrangements, ac- 
creditation and related facilities to journalists 
from other participating States who are per- 
manently accredited in third countries. 

8. They will facilitate travel by jour- 
nalists from other participating States within 
their territories, inter alia by taking concrete 
measures where necessary, to afford them 
opportunities to travel more extensively, with 
the exception of areas closed for security 
reasons. They will inform journalists in ad- 
vance, whenever possible, if new areas are 
closed for security reasons. 

9. They will further increase the 
possibilities and, when necessary, improve 
the conditions for journalists from other par- 
ticipating States to establish and maintain 
personal contacts and communication with 
their sources. 

10. They will, as a rule, authorize radio 
and television journalists, at their request, to 
be accompanied by their own sound and film 
technicians and to use their own equipment. 



Similarly, journalists may carry with 
them reference material, including personal 
notes and files, to be used strictly for their 
professional purposes. 4 

1 1 . The participating States will, where 
necessary, facilitate the establishment and 
operation, in their capitals, of press centres 
or institutions performing the same func- 
tions, open to the national and foreign press 
with suitable working facilities for the latter. 

They will also consider further ways and 
means to assist journalists from other par- 
ticipating States and thus to enable them to 
resolve practical problems they may en- 
counter. 



Co-operation and Exchanges 
in the Field of Culture 

1. They will endeavour, by taking ap- 
propriate steps, to make the relevant infor- 
mation concerning possibilities offered by 
bilateral cultural agreements and pro- 
grammes available to interested persons, in- 
stitutions and non-governmental organiza- 
tions, thus facilitating their effective im- 
plementation. 

2. The participating States will further 
encourage wider dissemination of and access 
to books, films and other forms and means of 
cultural expression from other participating 
States, to this end improving by appropriate 
means, on bilateral and multilateral bases, 
the conditions for international commercial 
and non-commercial exchange of their 
cultural goods, inter alia, by gradually lower- 
ing customs duties on these items. 

3. The participating States will 
endeavour to encourage the translation, 
publication and dissemination of works in the 
sphere of literature and other fields of 
cultural activity from other participating 
States, especially those produced in less wide- 
ly spoken languages, by facilitating co- 
operation between publishing houses, in par- 
ticular through the exchange of lists of books 
which might be translated as well as of other 
relevant information. 

4. They will contribute to the develop- 
ment of contacts, co-operation and joint 
projects among the participating States 
regarding the protection, preservation and 
recording of historical heritage and 
monuments and the relationship between 
man, environment and this heritage; they ex- 
press their interest in the possibility of con- 
vening an inter-governmental conference on 
these matters within the framework of 
UNESCO. 

5. The participating States will en- 
courage their radio and television organiza- 
tions to continue developing the presentation 
of the cultural and artistic achievements of 
other participating States on the basis of 
bilateral and multilateral arrangements be- 
tween these organizations, providing inter 
aim for exchanges of information on produc- 
tions, for the broadcasting of shows and pro- 
grammes from other participating States, for 
co-productions, for the invitation of guest 
conductors and directors, as well as for the 
provision of mutual assistance to cultural film 
teams. 



58 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



6. At the invitation of the Government of 
Hungary a "Cultural Forum" will take place 
in Budapest, commencing on 15 October 
1985. It will be attended by leading per- 
sonalities in the field of culture from the par- 
ticipating States. The "Forum" will discuss in- 
terrelated problems concerning creation, 
dissemination and co-operation, including the 
promotion and expansion of contacts and ex- 
changes in the different fields of culture. A 
representative of UNESCO will be invited to 
present to the "Forum" the views of that 
organization. The "Forum" will be prepared 
by a meeting of experts, the duration of 
which will not exceed two weeks and which 
will be held upon the invitation of the 
Government of Hungary in Budapest, com- 
mencing 21 November 1984. 



Co-operation and Exchanges 
in the Field of Education 

1. The participating States will promote the 
establishment of governmental and non- 
governmental arrangements and agreements 
in education and science, to be carried out 
with the participation of educational or other 
competent institutions. 

2. The participating States will con- 
tribute to the further improvement of ex- 
changes of students, teachers and scholars 
and their access to each other's educational, 
cultural and scientific institutions, and also 
their access to open information material in 
accordance with the laws and regulations 
prevailing in each country. In this context, 
they will facilitate travel by scholars, 
teachers and students within the receiving 
State, the establishment by them of contacts 
with their colleagues, and will also encourage 
libraries, higher education establishments and 
similar institutions in their territories to 
make catalogues and lists of open archival 
material available to scholars, teachers and 
students from other participating States. 

3. They will encourage a more regular 
exchange of information about scientific 
training programmes, courses and seminars 
for young scientists and facilitate a wider 
participation in these activities of young 
scientists from different participating States. 
They will call upon the appropriate national 
and international organizations and institu- 
tions to give support, where appropriate, to 
the realization of these training activities. 

4. The representatives of the partici- 
pating States noted the usefulness of the 
work done during the "Scientific Forum" held 
in Hamburg, Federal Republic of Germany, 
from 18 February to March 1980. Taking into 
account the results of the "Scientific Forum," 
the participating States invited international 
organizations as well as the scientific 
organizations and scientists of the par- 
ticipating States to give due consideration to 
its conclusions and recommendations. 

5. The participating States will favor 
widening the possibilities of teaching and 
studying less widely spread or studied Euro- 
pean languages. They will, to this end, 
stimulate, within their competence, the 
organization of and attendance at summer 



university and other courses, the granting of 
scholarships for translators and the reinforce- 
ment of linguistic faculties including, in case 
of need, the provision of new facilities for 
studying these languages. 

6. The participating States express their 
readiness to intensify the exchange, among 
them and within competent international 
organizations, of teaching materials, school 
textbooks maps, bibliographies and other 
educational material, in order to promote bet- 
ter mutual knowledge and facilitate a fuller 
presentation of their respective countries. 



FOLLOW-UP TO THE CONFERENCE 

1 . In conformity with the relevant provisions 
of the Final Act and with their resolve and 
commitment to continue the multilateral 
process initiated by the CSCE, the par- 
ticipating States will hold further meetings 
regularly among their representatives. 

The third of these meetings will be held 
in Vienna commencing on 4 November 1986. 

2. The agenda, working programme and 
modalities of the main Madrid Meeting will 
be applied mutatis mutandis to the main 
Vienna Meeting, unless other decisions on 
these questions are taken by the preparatory 
meeting mentioned below. 

For the purpose of making the ad- 
justments to the agenda, working programme 
and modalities of the main Madrid Meeting, a 
preparatory meeting will be held in Vienna 
commencing on 23 September 1986. It is 
understood that in this context adjustments 
concern those items requiring change as a 
result of the change in data and place, the 
drawing of lots, and the mention of the other 
meetings held in conformity with the deci- 
sions of the Madrid Meeting 1980. The dura- 
tion of the preparatory meeting shall not ex- 
ceed two weeks. 

3. The participating States further decide 
that in 1985, the tenth Anniversary of the 
signature of the Final Act of the CSCE will 
be duly commemorated in Helsinki. 

4. The duration of the meetings mention- 
ed in this document; unless otherwise agreed, 
should not exceed six weeks. The results of 
these meetings will be taken into account, as 
appropriate, at the Vienna Follow-up 
Meeting. 

5. All the above-mentioned meetings will 
be held in conformity with Paragraph 4 of 
the Chapter on "Follow-up to the Conference" 
of the Final Act. 

6. The Government of Spain is requested 
to transmit the present document to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, to 
the Director-General of UNESCO and to the 
Executive Secretary of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe. The 
Government of Spain is also requested to 
transmit the present document to the 
Governments of the non-participating 
Mediterranean States. 

7. The text of this document will be 
published in each participating State, which 
will disseminate it and make it known as 
widely as possible. 



8. The representatives of the partici- 
pating States express their profound 
gratitude to the people and Government of 
Spain for the excellent organization of the 
Madrid Meeting and warm hospitality ex- 
tended to the delegations which participated 
in the Meeting. 



ANNEX I 

Chairman's Statement: Venice Seminar on 
Economic, Scientific and Cultural Co- 
operation in the Mediterranean within the 
Framework of the Results of the Valletta 
Meeting of Experts 

1 . The Seminar will open on Tuesday, 16 Oc- 
tober 1984 at 10 a.m. in Venice, Italy. It will 
close on Friday, 26 October 1984. 

2. The work of the Seminar, guided by a 
Co-ordinating Committee composed of the 
delegations of the participating States, will 
be divided among three Study Groups 
devoted to Economics, Science and Culture 
respectively. 

3. The first three days of the Seminar 
will be devoted to six sessions of the Commit- 
tee. 

4. The first session of the Committee will 
be public and will be devoted to the opening 
of the Seminar, to be followed by an address 
by a representative of the host country. 

5. The second session of the Committee 
will decide whether to hold further sessions 
of the participating States to guide the work 
of the Study Groups and to take any other 
decisions necessary for the Seminar. 

6. The following four sessions of the 
Committee will be public and will be devoted 
to introductory statements by the representa- 
tives of the participating States which so 
desire (in an order selected by lot in advance) 
and to introductory statements by the 
representatives of the non-participating 
Mediterranean States and the international 
organizations invited. The statements should 
not exceed 10 minutes per delegation. 

7. Beginning on the fourth day and for 
the following three and a half working days, 
simultaneous meetings of the three Study 
Groups will be held. 

8. The last one and a half days will be 
devoted to three sessions of the Committee. 
Two sessions will decide upon the most ap- 
propriate use for the documentation 
presented in the course of the work concern- 
ing the specific sectors indicated in the 
Valletta Report, such as publication of the in- 
troductory statements and distribution of the 
studies to the relevant international organiza- 
tions, and will take any other necessary deci- 
sions. 

The final session of the Committee will be 
public and will be devoted to the official clos- 
ing of the Seminar with an address by a 
representative of the host country. 

9. The Chair at the opening and closing 
sessions of both the Committee and the 
Study Groups will be taken by a represent- 
ative from the delegation of the host country. 
Selection of the successive chairmen by lot 



October 1983 



59 



EUROPE 



will then ensure daily rotation of the Chair, 
in French alphabetical order, among the 
representatives of the participating States. 

10. Participation in the work of the 
Seminar by the non-participating Mediterra- 
nean States (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia) and the 
international organizations (UNESCO, ECE, 
UNEP, WHO, ITU) invited will follow the 
rules and practices adopted at Valletta. This 
means, inter alia, that they will take part in 
the work of the three Study Groups and of 
the four sessions of the Committee on the 
second and third day as well as its opening 
and closing sessions. 

11. Contributions, on the subjects for 
consideration in one more of the working 
languages of the CSCE, may be sent through 
the proper channels — preferably not later 
than three months before the opening of the 
Seminar— to the Executive Secretary, who 
will circulate them to the other participating 
States, and to the non-participating Mediter- 
ranean States and to the international 
organizations which have notified their inten- 
tion of taking part. 

12. The Italian Government will 
designate the Executive Secretary of the 
Seminar. The designation should be agreed to 
by the participating States. The services of a 
technical secretariat will be provided by the 
host country. 

13. Other rules of procedures, working 
methods and the scale of distribution for the 
expenses of the CSCE will, mutatis 
mutandis, be applied to the Seminar. 

14. The arrangements outlined above will 
not constitute a precedent for any other 
CSCE forum. 



ANNEX II 

Chairman's Statement: Bern Meeting of 
Experts on Human Contacts 

The Chairman notes the absence of objection 
to the declaration made by the representative 
of Switzerland on 15 July 1983 extending an 
invitation by the Swiss Government to hold a 
meeting of experts on human contacts. Con- 
sequently, the Chairman notes that there is 
agreement to convene such a meeting to 
discuss the development of contacts among 
persons, institutions and organizations, with 
due account for the introductory part of the 
Chapter of the Final Act entitled Co- 
operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields 
and for the introductory part of section one 
(Human Contacts) of that Chapter, which 
reads inter alia as follows: 

"The participating States, 

Considering the development of contacts 
to be an important element in the strengthen- 
ing of friendly relations and trust among 
peoples, 

Affirming, in relation to their present ef- 
fort to improve conditions in this area, the 
importance they attach to humanitarian con- 
siderations, 



Desiring in this spirit to develop, with 
the continuance of detente, further efforts to 
achieve continuing progress in this 
field; 

The meeting will be convened in Bern, on 
15 April 1986. Its duration will not exceed 
six weeks. The meeting will be preceded by 
preparatory consultations, which will be held 
in Bern commencing on 2 April 1986. The 
results of the meeting will be taken into ac- 
count, as appropriate, at the Vienna Follow- 
up Meeting. 

The Swiss Government will designate the 
Executive Secretary of the meeting. This 
designation should be agreed to by the par- 
ticipating States. The services of a technical 
secretariat will be provided by the host coun- 
try. 

Other rules of procedure, working 
methods and the scale of distribution for the 



expenses of the CSCE will be applied, 
mutatis mutandis, to the Bern meeting. 

The Chairman notes further that this 
statement will be an annex to the concluding 
document of the Madrid Meeting and will be 
published with it. 



'Press release 341 of Sept. 12, 1983. 

2 In this context, the notion of adjoining 
sea area is understood to refer also to ocean 
areas adjoining Europe [text in original]. 

3 The organization of the Venice Seminar 
is set forth in the Chairman's statement of 9 
September 1983 (see Annex I) [text in 
original]. 

4 In this context it is understood that im- 
port of printed matter may be subject to local 
regulations which will be applied with due 
regard to the journalists' need for adequate 
working material [text in original]. ■ 



Soviet Active Measures 



This report, based on unclassified 
sources, describes "active measures" that 
have come to light since publication of 
the last report in the October 1982 
Bulletin (p. 1*2). The Soviet Union 
employs the term "active measures" (a 
direct translation from the Russian 
aktivnyye meropriyatiyaj to cover a 
broad range of deceptive tech- 
niques — such as use of front, groups, 
media, manipulation, disinformation, 
forgeries, and agents of influence — to 
promote Sovi.et foreign policy goals and 
to undercut the position of Soviet op- 
ponents. The active, measures discussed 
in this report are necessarily limited to 
those that have been publicly exposed. 

These often clandestine efforts by the 
Soviets and their surrogates to influence 
political and public opinion in the. non- 
communist world have grown in boldness 
and intensity, reflecting what appears to 
be increased use of active measures as a 
policy instrument by the Soviets and 
their allies. The principal target of 
Soviet active measures continues to be 
the NATO decision to deploy 
intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) 
in Western Europe. Other active 
measures aimed against Europe involve 
the Polish Solidarity movement and the 
effort to discredit a possible Bulgarian 
connection in the attempt to assassinate 
Pope John Paul II. 

In Africa, active measures alleged 
U.S. interference in the internal affairs 
of different countries and implied close 
military cooperation between the United 
States and South Africa. In Nigeria, 



HIGHLIGHTS 

July 1983. Two fake U.S. Embassy 
Rome telegrams depict press coverage of the 
possible "Bulgarian connection" in the 
assassination attempt against the Pope as a 
U.S. -orchestrated campaign. 

June 1983. The triennial gathering of the 
major Soviet front group, the World Peace 
Council, meets in Prague and makes opposi- 
tion to INF deployment its main target. 

April 1983. A forged U.S. Embassy 
Lagos document has Ambassador Thomas 
Pickering ordering the assassination of a 
principal Nigerian presidential candidate in 
"Operation Headache." 

April 1983. The Swiss expel the cor- 
respondent of Novosti, the Soviet news agen- 
cy, for "unacceptable interference in internal 
Swiss affairs," including tunneling of funds 
and guidance to elements of the Swiss peace 
movement. 

March 1983. Ghana, relying on a forged 
West German document, accuses the United 
States of plotting to overthrow the Rawlings 
government. 

February 1983. A fake speech by UN 
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick on U.S. policy 
toward the Third World surfaces in India and 
is reprinted in communist media in the Soviet 
Union, Nicaragua, and elsewhere. 



Ambassador Pickering was accused of 
directing a political assassination plot. 
In Ghana, Ambassador Smith was 
charged with organizing a coup attempt. 
Disinformation efforts used forged 
documents as "evidence" of military links 



60 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



between Washington and Pretoria 
despite the U.S. embargo on military 
sales to South Africa. 

In the Middle East, active measures 
have tried to suggest U.S. collusion with 
Israel in the invasion of Lebanon and 
American animosity toward Islamic 
groups. In South Asia, the most striking 
active measure was the forged 
Kirkpatrick speech with its claim that 
the United States was in favor of 
"balkanizing" India. 

In Latin America, where Cuba func- 
tions as the main Soviet surrogate, front 
groups have been the primary active 
measures vehicle. The fronts have been 
busy trying to generate international 
support for the Sandinista regime in 
Nicaragua and the Farabundo Marti 
National Liberation Front (FMLN) in 
El Salvador and to increase opposition 
to U.S. policy toward Central America. 

In East Asia, the Soviets used front 
groups and disinformation campaigns in 
an effort to deflect the damage to the 
Soviet image from the use by Moscow 
and its surrogates of chemical weapons 
in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea. 
In addition, revelations of former KGB 
Major Stanislav Levchenko spotlighted 
extensive Soviet active measures in 
Japan. 

The First Directorate of the KGB has 
responsibility for developing and im- 
plementing active measures. The Interna- 
tional Department of the Central Com- 
mittee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union participates in active 
measures, especially when these involve 
front groups and foreign communist par- 
ties. The International Information 
Department also may assist. At times it 
is difficult to ascertain if a particular 
active measure is implemented by the 
Soviets or a surrogate intelligence serv- 
ice. However, the distinction is hardly 
significant given the close collaboration 
between the KGB and its sister services. 



EUROPE 

The Peace Movement 

World Peace Assembly. Every 3 
years, the World Peace Council (WPC), 
the major Soviet front organization, 
holds a world peace assembly. This 
year's meeting in Prague, June 21-26, 
faithfully echoed the Soviet line. The 
session focused on opposing NATO 
deployment of U.S. intermediate-range 
nuclear forces (INF) in Western Europe 
as its main goal. At the same time, the 
Czechoslovak hosts made certain there 
was no criticism of Soviet SS-20 missile 
deployment. 



Earlier efforts by noncommunist 
peace groups to equate the SS-20s with 
the NATO missiles drew strong criticism 
from Yuriy Zhukov, chairman of the 
Soviet Peace Committee, alienating 
some West European peace groups from 
the WPC. The problem was further ag- 
gravated when a demonstration of some 
300 young people in downtown Prague 
for "peace and freedom for all nations" 
was quickly suppressed by Czechoslovak 
police. Inside the conference hall, 
several representatives of the West 
German Greens Party walked out in pro- 
test over suppression of the demonstra- 
tion and the refusal of the Czechoslovak 
hosts to permit them to meet with 
members of the Charter '77 dissident 
group. 

Espionage and the Norwegian 
Peace Movement. On June 22, 1983, 

Assistant Soviet Military Attache 
Vladimir Zagrebnev was expelled from 
Norway. The Oslo press reported that, 
in addition to engaging in espionage ac- 
tivities, Zagrebnev had been trying to 
gain influence with the Norwegian peace 
movement. 

Novosti Interferes With Internal 
Swiss Affairs. On April 29, 1983, the 
Swiss Government announced the expul- 
sion of Alexei Dumov, the correspondent 
of Novosti, the Soviet news agency, and 
the closing of the Novosti office in Bern 
for "serious interference in Swiss inter- 
nal affairs." A few days later, Leonid 
Ovchinnikov, the KGB officer who was 
reportedly supervising Dumov's political 
and media influence operations, was also 
expelled. Ovchinnikov was serving osten- 
sibly as a first secretary in the Soviet 
mission in Geneva. According to Swiss 
authorities, the Novosti correspondent's 
activities included: 

• Involvement in the December 5, 
1981, Bern peace demonstration; 

• Involvement in the Swiss Appeal 
for Peace and Against Nuclear War; 

• Close cooperation with an activist 
youth group that became engaged in 
paramilitary training and took part in a 
violent demonstration in Bern; 

• Encouragement of Swiss citizens 
to refuse compulsory military service; 

• Help to organize a demonstration 
in the Swiss parliament in 1982; and 

• Circulation of reports that falsely 
implicated Swiss intelligence in the 
death of Leonid Pantchenko, a Soviet 
delegate to an international coffee con- 
ference in Geneva, who died of natural 
causes there in April 1980. 



Dutch Report on Efforts To In- 
fluence the Peace Movement. On 

November 6 and 13, 1982, the Amster- 
dam daily, De Telegraaf reported on 
analyses by Netherlands intelligence of 
Soviet and East European efforts to in- 
fluence the Dutch peace movement. In 
the November 6 article, De Telegraaf 
spoke of "clear proof of Soviet involve- 
ment" and of close cooperation between 
the Dutch Communist Party and the In- 
ternational Department of the Soviet 
Communist Party in the campaign 
against the NATO nuclear weapons. The 
November 13 article stated, "The Soviet 
authorities are still actively influencing 
the Netherlands debate on NATO 
nuclear weapons modernization." 

De Telegraaf stated that a key in- 
dividual in the Soviet effort was Anatoli 
Popov, who headed a Soviet delegation 
to Holland for talks on the peace move- 
ment in January 1982 and was an of- 
ficial of the International Department of 
the Soviet Communist Party. De 
Telegraaf noted that Popov had been ex- 
pelled from Holland in 1961, when he 
fought with Dutch military police trying 
to protect a Soviet asylum seeker. At 
the time he was second secretary and 
press attache. 

The Assassination Attempt 
Against Pope John Paul II 

In an apparent effort to discredit a 
possible Bulgarian connection in the 
papal assassination attempt, a Rome 
left-wing newsweekly, Pace e Guerra, 
published two fabricated U.S. Embassy 
telegrams in its July 21, 1983, edition. 
The first forgery, dated August 28, 
1982, proposed a large-scale disinforma- 
tion effort — in cooperation with Italian 
intelligence and friendly members of the 
Socialist Party— to implicate the 
Bulgarians and the Soviets in the papal 
assassination attempt. The second, dated 
December 6, 1982, judged the campaign 
a success. The bogus telegram claimed: 
"The European media have enthusias- 
tically developed themes on the lines an- 
ticipated: that the gunman was directed 
by the Bulgarian secret police; that the 
Bulgarians are under the total control of 
the KGB; that the KGB was headed at 
the time by the present Soviet leader." 

The newsweekly, which has close 
links with the Democratic Party of Pro- 
letarian Unity (PDUP), attributed the 
documents to reliable but anonymous 
sources. Its charges were echoed by two 
PDUP members of parliament, who had 
been elected on a joint list with the 
Italian Communist Party. The American 
Embassy promptly branded the cables as 



October 1983 



61 



EUROPE 



Pace e Guerra, July 21, 1983 



■ 



Ma quanti fatti strani intorno 
alia Bulgarian Connection. 















IMMEDIATE 



ACTION COPY jP*j I 



forgeries and pointed out serious errors 
in cable format. The fabrication ap- 
parently was designed to provide "credi- 
ble evidence" for Soviet media allega- 
tions that the United States had or- 
chestrated the arrest of the Bulgarian 
intelligence officer Antonov as part of 
an effort to blame the Soviets and 
Bulgarians for the papal assassination 
attempt. 

Events in Poland 

Forged AFL-CIO Letter. On 

March 31, 1983, a forged letter from 
AFL-CIO official Irving Brown to an 
Italian labor official, Luigi Scricciolo, 
surfaced in the provincial Sicilian week- 
ly, Sette Giorno. A cousin of one of the 
Red Brigade kidnapers of General 
Dozier, Scricciolo was taken into custody 
during the Dozier investigation. He then 
admitted that he had been working as 
an agent for Bulgarian intelligence. The 
fake letter suggested that Scricciolo was 
a CIA agent funneling funds clandestine- 
ly from the AFL-CIO to the Polish 
trade union Solidarity. The forgery's 
purpose was presumably to undermine 
the credibility of Scricciolo's testimony 
about Bulgarian intelligence activities 
and to suggest secret links between 
Solidarity and the CIA. 



.lllli polUO K||Tl» t"jl*»TJ i ft ' t*i!p" *JiGmMIOi 



■ ■ ■ ''■ ' 

a, I .ii.i.i.ii... ■ .1 i-l— ■!•.'■''■■ ' ' ' 

C ""'"^''.m™''™'.4.' 



Fake National Security Council 
Memorandum. The February 7, 1983, 
issue of Tiempo, a Madrid news weekly, 
published extracts from a forged 1978 
National Security Council memorandum 
on Poland from Zbigniew Brzezinski to 
President Carter. The memorandum 
identified Poland as "the weakest link in 
the chain of Soviet domination of 
Eastern Europe" and proposed a de- 
stabilization policy involving "politicians, 
diplomats, labor unions, the mass media 
and covert activity." The State Depart- 
ment denounced the document as a 
forgery. Dr. Brzezinski sent a personal 
letter denying the authenticity of the 
document to Tiempo, which published 
the letter in its May 16, 1983, edition. 
The presumed aim of the forgery was to 
suggest, in line with Soviet propaganda, 
that the United States was responsible 
for the troubles in Poland. 

Project Democracy 

In January 1983 a forged State Depart- 
ment telegram number 249222 dealing 
with the implementation of President 
Reagan's democracy initiative, circulated 
in Austria. The fabricated document 
referred to using the CIA "for training 
and sending to their countries of origin 
activist emigres who have hitherto kept 



themselves out of the limelight." The 
fake cable also called for efforts in allied 
countries to eliminate "communist par- 
ties and parties whose programs are 
alien to our ideals." Friendly govern- 
ments were not to be informed of these 
measures "under any circumstances." 

This active measure mirrored public 
Soviet criticism of the democracy initia- 
tive. The real State Department 
telegram number 249222 provided ad- 
vice to the American Consulate General 
in Shanghai on a visa case. 

Problems With NATO 

NATO Violates Swedish Neutrali- 
ty? On November 2, 1982, a Swedish 
communist paper, Proletarian, carried a 
distorted news report that a consign- 
ment of NATO armored personnel car- 
riers (APCs) had transited Goteborg en 
route to Norway in violation of Swedish 
neutrality. A concerted effort followed 
to ensure that noncommunist media 
were aware of this story. Initially suc- 
cessful, this attempt resulted in other 
Swedish media repeating the alleged 
violation of Swedish neutrality as 
straight news, and, in turn, this was 
replayed by Soviet media. 

The Swedish Foreign Ministry then 
issued a denial, clarifying that the 
shipment— in fact, of Norwegian, not 
NATO, APCs— was entirely consistent 
with Swedish neutrality. The apparent 
goal of this effort was to divert atten- 
tion in Sweden from the controversy 
over the discovery of an unidentified 
submarine, presumed to be Soviet, in 
Swedish territorial waters at the time. 
Mediterranean Air Safety. In July 
1982, while the United States and Italy 
were engaged in talks regarding 
Mediterranean air safety, a fake U.S. 
military document surfaced in Rome. 
The memo stated that, contrary to what 
U.S. authorities were telling their Italiar 
counterparts, NATO air activities posed 
a safety hazard. The U.S. Embassy in 
Rome immediately denounced the docu- 
ment as a fabrication, and a July 23, 
1982, report by ANSA, the Italian news 
agency, labeled it a communist disinfor- 
mation effort. 



JS3; 

bsc 
ice . 



'toi 

0011 



AFRICA 

Assassination Plot in Nigeria 

On April 13, 1983, the two major opposi- 
tion party newspapers in Ibadan, 
Nigeria, the Nigerian Tribune and the 
Daily Sketch, headlined charges that 
Ambassador Thomas Pickering had 



62 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



ordered the assassination of two promi- 
nent Unity Party of Nigeria figures, 
Chief Awolowo, the party's presidential 
candidate, and his colleague Chief 
Abiola. To substantiate these charges, 
the papers published a forged document 
purporting to be an internal U.S. Em- 
bassy memorandum recommending the 
assassination. It stated: "Chief Abiola 
has outlived his usefulness to our serv- 
ice .. . his flirtation with the opposition 
led by Obafemi Awolowo exemplifies the 
need to go ahead with operations Heart- 
burn and Headache to solve the problem 
of these two personalities. . . . The 
Department must be well briefed on 
these wet affairs. ..." The memo en- 
visaged establishing "a friendly military 
government" after purging the present 
"corrupt" regime. 

The United States immediately de- 
nounced the document as a fake and the 
stories based on it as false. KGB author- 
ship was suggested by the use of the 
term "wet affairs" — a direct translation 
of the term in standard Soviet intelli- 
gence lexicon to refer to assassinations. 
Despite U.S. denials, the story gained 
some credence in Nigeria, and press 
wire services circulated it elsewhere in 
African countries. Soviet and Czech 
media quickly replayed the report. Rude 
Pravo carried the deception further, in- 
correctly suggesting that the Nigerian 
Government had made the allegation 
when in fact the charges originated in 
the Nigerian Tribune and the Daily 
Sketch. 

Overthrow of the Ghanaian 
Government 

On March 31, 1983, Kojo Tsikata, 
Special Adviser to the Provisional Na- 
tional Defense Council, called a press 
conference to charge the U.S. Embassy 
in Accra with trying to overthrow the 
Rawlings government. As "proof," 
Tsikata produced a copy of an alleged 
West German Embassy report informing 
Bonn that Ambassador Thomas Smith 
was dissatisfied with his CIA staffers. 
The document has Smith saying that the 
staffers "will only prove themselves if 
they achieve basic changes in the coun- 
try and succeed in overthrowing Rawl- 
ings." The next day, the People's Daily 
Graphic, a government-owned paper, 
reported the story as authentic and 
displayed a photocopy of the document. 

The West German Government 
called the report a fabrication on 
April 2, and the U.S. Government issued 
a sharp protest to the Ghanaian Govern- 
ment. Although Ghana eventually ac- 
cepted the fact that the report was a 



Forged Project Democracy Telegram 
AFL-CIO Letter 



AMERICAN FEDERATION Of LABOR ANO CONGRESS Of INOUSTRIAl ORGANIZATIONS 




Mr. Lulol scrlcclolo 

[ncrMUon.L S.cr«t.Xl*t 

O.I.l. 

via Lucullo i 



0«*r Ullcl. 

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.nclo.lA, • cop, o: =y l.twt to otto. A. you -111 ..«, 
It prov.. tA.t oy «o- •"•!> ATI -CIO 11 r.jdv to Hippo.. 
op.nly th. c.o.. of our Klim frl.ndf. «!■ I™, of 

.inc.r. .y»?«tAy >""• "• t»d.«vorj otO» * *""J- ■ 
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conrld.nc. to t-hl» .ff.et. 



I uv .l.o-tnfora you tA.t otto .»d our oth.r .utu.l 
•r!.»c. ",Sly ..liTrour c.nc.rou. .Ad ■«*•»■"'« j"" 1 ' 
• Ad your cootrliutlon to th. M.torlc .v.ot. pc.ntly 
t.klio pl.c. In poLod. ».■»«• rou r.tura Iroa your i>«*t 
trip, I toon :orv»rd to =..cMi, «Jid t.lilAC vlth you 13 
Pari*. ' 



alta s«»t p«rson*l vl.h«i. 



SlAc.r.ly yours. 
Irvlfly arown 



forgery, the incident had an immediate, 
damaging impact on U.S. -Ghanaian rela- 
tions by creating the false impression 
that the United States was supporting 
Rawling's opponents. 

Relations Between the United States 
and South Africa 

Northrop Sales Letter. The 

November 17, 1982, Jeune Afrique, an 
influential French-language newsweekly 
published in Paris and widely read in 
Francophone Africa, reported that 



despite the U.S. embargo on arms sales 
to South Africa, Northrop Aviation was 
offering to sell South Africa its new 
Tigershark fighter. To "prove" the point, 
Jeune Afrique published a picture of a 
letter ostensibly sent by Northrop's vice 
president for marketing to the com- 
mander of the South African Air Force. 
When Northrop called the letter a fake, 
Jeune Afrique ran a new story on 
January 19, 1983, suggesting that the 
denial was untrue and the original letter 
was authentic. 



October 1983 



63 



EUROPE 



In this case, the perpetrator of the 
active measure apparently obtained a 
copy of a genuine letter that Northrop 
had routinely sent to many countries, 
but not to South Africa, and simply 
typed in the South African addressee. 
The purpose of this active measure was 
to suggest that the U.S. embargo on 
military sales to South Africa was a 
sham. 

Cruise Missiles in Africa. A false 
report that the United States and Israel 
would be testing and later deploying 
Tomahawk cruise missiles in South 
Africa first appeared in Mozambique's 
Noticias on November 29, 1982. Since 
then East German, Bulgarian, and 
Soviet media have repeated the story. It 
has also been reported in the Ethiopian, 
Zambian, Seychelles, and Angolan press. 

Aviation Personnel International 
Letter. The Herald of Zimbabwe of June 
5, 1982, and several other African 
papers reported that U.S. helicopter 
pilots experienced in jungle warfare 
were working with South Africa. This 
was based on a fake letter to the South 
African Air Force from Aviation Person- 
nel International of New Orleans, a com- 
pany specializing in the placement of 
pilots. The company has provided an af- 
fidavit stating that it had no dealings 
with South Africa and assumes that the 
author of the forgery obtained a com- 
pany form letter and substituted its own 
text. The letter's terminology suggests 
that the author was a Soviet. It stated 
that the proposal had the approval of 
"competent bodies" of the U.S. Govern- 
ment. The term would not be used in 
this fashion in American bureaucratic 
jargon, but in Russian it is used to refer 
to official government or party organs. 

Letter to Ambassador Kirkpatrick. 
The November 5, 1982, New Statesman, 
the prominent British newsweekly, 
printed as factual a fake letter to Am- 
bassador Jeane Kirkpatrick from the 
newly arrived press counselor of the 
Embassy of South Africa in Wash- 
ington, D.C. The letter conveyed his per- 
sonal greetings and also those of the 
chief of South African intelligence. 
Although the press spokesman of the 
U.S. Mission to the United Nations im- 
mediately branded the letter as a 
fabrication, the New Statesman 
reiterated its belief in the document's 
authenticity in its December 3, 1982, 
edition. The active measure's purpose, 
like the one noted above, was to provide 
"evidence" of close U.S. -South African 
ties. 



64 



People's Daily Graphic, April 1, 1983 



"It is clear that alt these 
feverish attempts to over, 
throw the government are 
designed to prevent the truth 
about the connections between 
events since the 2itth of October 
last year and certain elements 
connected with the S.t.B." 

— Captain Kojo Tsikata (rtdj— 




Peoples 
Daily Graphic 



FfllOAV. APRIL 1.1983. No 10075. PRICE: C1 00 

CIA ASSEMBLING 
MERCENARIES TO ATTACK 



These malicious and baseless 
allegations have been made 
without regard to the observ- 
able facts and without refe- 
rence to sources which might 
have been able to provide the 
TRUTH. ". 

— Mr Thomas Smith, U.S. 

Ambassador to Ghana. 

jtiruphiv, Marth I. iH/i.fi 



iHc Special Adviser 10 me 


r,UAMA 


r-NOC wHo is also in cnarge ol 




Siaie security has disclosed mat 




«in*»ncan Cenirai intelligence 


paying Ineir collaborators n 


Agency (CiA)tias ai me moment 




iecfuiled Hundreds ol mercena- 


ovennrow ol tne PNOC Govern 


ries m a neignoourmg countries 


ment 


lor an imminent attack on Gna- 






carried out, the Captain said, *n 


He nowever reiterated wnal 


no doubt lead to tne loss ol lives 


me force Commander, Brigadi- 


01 many innocent people mciud 


er Arnold Quainoo, said recently 




■(mi the Ghana Armed Forces 




ire mil prepared lo meet any 


Captain fsitana made inese 




disclosures nniie reacting to a 




cnauenge posed Dy Justice aa 


diso revealed ai a press conle- 


.njr-, nay Craooe on allegations 


rence in Accra yesterday tnat the 


01 C\h involvement * in ine 




I wasn't 

a willing 
participant 

— Baba 

WAftftftNI O-icai Cia 



WEST GERMANY 
TELLS ABOUT CIA 



Tsikata 
throws 
counter- 
challenge 




American Blacks and Links to Africa NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA 



A forged Carter Administration docu- 
ment on Africa, which first appeared in 
1980, suggested U.S. anxiety about the 
links between U.S. blacks and black 
Africans. It previously had surfaced a 
number of times, first in the United 
States in September 1980 when 
presidential press secretary Jody Powell 
denounced it as a forgery. Nonetheless, 
it reappeared in March 1983 in the 
Nigeria Standard and in April 1983 in 
the Upper Volta press. 



U.S. Cooperation With 
Israel on Lebanon 

Communist Fronts. Shortly after 
the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Soviet 
front machinery launched a major cam- 
paign to link the United States with the 
Israeli action. In July 1982 the World 
Peace Council held a special meeting on 
Lebanon in Geneva. In August the 
Soviets called for the creation of an in- 
ternational commission to investigate 
alleged Israeli "crimes" in Lebanon. 



Department of State Bulletii 



EUROPE 



Committees of solidarity with the 
Palestinians appeared in a number of 
countries. The lead, however, was taken 
by local communists rather than Pales- 
tinian Arabs. Throughout the summer of 
1982, there was a spate of demonstra- 
tions in Canada, Europe, and Latin 
America on the Lebanon issue. Once 
more the lead groups appeared to be 
communist fronts rather than genuine 
Arab organizations. 

Soviet Broadcasts. Moscow's 
Arabic-language broadcasts on Radio 
Peace and Progress during the same 
period sought to exploit Arab sen- 
sitivities over Lebanon and the Palestin- 
ians. For example, a July 7, 1982, 
broadcast voiced a typical theme that 
the invasion had been planned long in 
advance by the United States and its 
"Zionist clique." A July 18 broadcast 
charged that the U.S. "military- 
industrial complex" was selling the 
"Zionist aggressors" the most modern 
"weapons of destruction" to perpetrate a 
"bloody massacre" in Lebanon. 

Downstream Operations Memoran- 
dum. In the fall of 1982, "Downstream 
Operations," a forged U.S. Department 
of Defense document purporting to be a 
memo signed by National Security Coun- 
cil Middle East specialist Geoffrey 
Kemp, circulated in a number of Arab 
countries and within Arab communities 
in Europe. The document suggested that 
the United States had prior knowledge 
of, and had given prior approval to, the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon. 

Clandestine Radio Broadcasts on Iran 

Since February 1983, the Soviet Union's 
clandestine National Voice of Iran 
(NVOI), broadcasting from Baku in the 
Caucasus region of the U.S.S.R., has 
grown increasingly critical of the 
Khomeini regime. NVOI has condemned 
Tehran's suppression of the communist 
Tudeh Party, urged the release of Tudeh 
leaders, and warned that "groundless 
charges of espionage" against them will 
damage Iranian-Soviet relations. At the 
same time, NVOI has continued to paint 
the United States as the "Great Satan" 
and to allege American machinations to 
subvert and overthrow the Khomeini 
government. 

Inciting Trouble With Muslims 

Although labeled a forgery in January 
1979, a fabricated academic study by 
Richard Mitchell, a Middle East 
specialist, reappeared in Cairo in 



October 1982. This document, which 
outlines an alleged CIA plan to incite 
trouble within Islamic fundamentalist 
groups, was one of a rash of Soviet 
forgeries during the late 1970s to 
weaken U.S. -Egyptian relations. When 
the document reappeared, Shaykh Tal- 
masani, a leading figure in the Muslim 
Brotherhood, pointed to the study as 
"evidence" that the United States was 
trying to foment differences among 
Islamic groups. 

The Balkanization of India 

On January 25, 26, and 28, 1983, the 
procommunist New Dehli daily 
newspaper, Patriot, published a bogus 
expose of U.S. policy toward the Third 
World by Ambassador Jeane 
Kirkpatrick. The February 6 issue of 
Link, a far-left Indian newsweekly, ran 
a similar story. Both reports preceded 
the meeting of nonaligned nations in 
New Delhi. 



According to these stories, Am- 
bassador Jeane Kirkpatrick had given 
the policy review to the American Con- 
servative Political Action Conference in 
Washington in February 1982. The ar- 
ticles included a fabricated telegram of 
the U.S. Information Agency purported- 
ly transmitting the text of the speech to 
missions overseas. Although the speech 
covered the globe in a manner designed 
to annoy nonaligned nations, the point 
that attracted most attention in India 
was the allegation that the United 
States favored the "balkanization" of 
that country. The speech also included 
unflattering remarks about the govern- 
ment of Indira Gandhi. 

The U.S. Embassy promptly stated 
that the articles were false. Although 
Ambassador Kirkpatrick had attended 
the conference, she made no speech. The 
influential newsweekly India Today and 
the Free Press Journal of Bombay 
described the episode as a Soviet disin- 



New Statesman, December 3, 1982 



UNITED NATIONS 

Kirkpatrick's 
riposte 



On 5 November the NS corned a story 
about At relationship between ike US 
Permanent Representative to the Untied 
Nations, Mrs Jeane Ktrkpatnck, and the 
South. African government. It was bated 
m pan on a letter allegedly sent to Mrs 
Ktrkpatnck by a member of the South 
African Embassy m Washington. The let- 
ter u reproduced on tins page ( the repro- 
duction of the letter with the anginal article 
was compressed for reasons of space). 

We have now received the following 
Utter from Mn Kakpatnck't spokesman at 
the UN: 

United Said Man™ to (he I. 1 mini Nitiocu 



In csae any of your 

antra in the pia 

Claudia Wright'i irti.-lc eniiilnl 

Friend,' publiahed in toe " 



The United Sale) Permanent Re- 
to the United Naomi baa 
a any gift from the Govern- 
ment of South Africa or from any repre- 
sentative of ibii government- 

2 The letter purportedly mi 10 the 
United Smn Penninem Representative 
by ■ South AfnoD diplomat, and repro- 
duced in youi magazine, was never re- 
ceived by Ambtfudoi K-ukpamc* I im 
reliably informed, moreover, thai no such 
letter wu composed ai the South African 
Embuay in Washington, ai alleged in the 

the article, baaed largely on the fjcuOoui 



mail ire concerned to damage Mn Kirkpa- 
trick 's reputatiun 

Other points in the way the Hon has beet) 
presented art relevant Hint, the letter 
headed iiauooery on which, the letter was 
typed ta identical to that used by the South 
African Embassy in Washington. Second, 
the typeface used for the letter appears to be 
identical to the face of a typewriter used in 
the South African Embassy Third, it has 
been suggested thai two mis-spellings in the 
the letter art not mistakes that would have 
been left m an official South African Em 
But, if genuine, [he 
which such a letter would 
huff been typed would have been clandes- 
tine. Fount), tt first Mr Swancpoel claimed 
that a middle- ranking diplomat like himself 
would not hive written such a letter to Am- 
bassador Rirkpmrrick and thai in any case he 
no ul d DM have signed it with his initials Mr 
Swancpoel has subsequently admitted in an 
interview with a US newspaper that (he sig- 



nature on the letter is his normal one 

The denial on Ambassador Kirkpatrick 's 
behalf must be regarded in the light of ear- 
lier statements she ha* made about the secret 
communication! that have passed between 
her and Genera] van der Westhuizen. After 
her clandestine meeting with the General in 
March 1981 , the US press was able to expose 
her spokesmen's statement! as mnlfjlmg 
and false, and retractions were issued (see 
NS 3 April 1981) 

It is also relevant lo note that Mr Swanc- 
poel mined the South African Ministry of 
Information in 1970. From 1973 to 1977 he 
was posted m Australia, and between 1977 
and 1979 he was Information Attache to 
London During that period, as (be reve- 
lation* of the 'Muldergate' scandal have in- 
dicated, his Ministry, Minister, Connie 
Mulder, and Permanent Secretary, Eachel 
Rhoodie, were engaged in in extensive cam- 
paign of secret gifu, bribes and inftuence- 
buying on behalf of that government. D 



nur readert ihould k 

atjftai 



onlyw 









e editnrv of y 



mahcioui fabneat 

□tie. presumably ctraoi by 

journal, a dear in its innuendo and in its graru- 

houi calumny Overall, in fact, the erode ii to 

outrageous that local acooo agaimu your magazine 

ii bong contemplated by the United Stato 

PermanHii Repreaentabve to the Uniied Nations. 

Sincerely, 

Joel Blocker 

Counsellor for Press 

and Pubtk ASain 

The lener referred to by Mr Blocker came 
into the possession of the New Statesman 
from a source in the US State Department. 
which has previously proved reliable If the 
letter is a forgery, therefore, it implies that a 
person or persons within the State Depart- 




October 1983 



65 



EUROPE 



formation effort. Nonetheless, com- 
munist members of the Indian Parlia- 
ment denounced the United States, and 
the pro-Moscow Communist Party of In- 
dia issued a call to resist U.S. "interven- 
tion." Soviet media continue to refer to 
the speech, and the Nicaraguan press 
also used it to criticize U.S. policy. In 
South Asia, some noncommunist papers, 
including Pakistan's conservative Urdu- 
language Jang and Nepal's semiofficial 
Gorkha Patra, carried the story as hard 
news. 



LATIN AMERICA 

The main active measures vehicles have 
been front groups, with many working 
through regional affiliates, mostly head- 
quartered in Havana or Mexico City. 
These include the World Peace Council, 
Christian Peace Conference, World 
Federation of Trade Unions, Interna- 
tional Union of Students, and the Inter- 
national Organization of Journalists. 
Their activities are supplemented by a 
variety of single-issue organizations 
focused on Central America, such as na- 
tional committees for solidarity with 
Nicaragua and with the Salvadoran 
FMLN. 

U.S. Policy in Central America 

• In April 1983, the World Peace 
Council and its Nicaraguan affiliate 
CONIPAZ sponsored the Continental 
Conference for Peace and Sovereignty in 
Central Ameria to criticize U.S. policy. 
Predictably, the final resolution lam- 
basted U.S. support for the "bloody" 
regime in El Salvador and denounced 
the U.S. stance toward Cuba and 
Grenada. 

• On January 27, 1983, Nicaraguan 
media published as factual the fake 
Jeane Kirkpatrick speech on U.S. policy 
toward the Third World. Since it had 
just surfaced in Indian left-wing media, 
the prompt Nicaraguan rerun possibly 
was prearranged. Sections of the bogus 
speech highly critical of Mexican policy 
were highlighted in the Nicaraguan 
replay. 

• In September 1982 a single-issue 
front group linked to the World Peace 
Council— the World Front of Commit- 
tees of Solidarity for the People of El 
Salvador — gathered in Managua to 
castigate U.S. policy toward Central 
America. 



Bacteriological Warfare 

• The Castro regime has tried to ex- 
plain the resurgence of dengue fever in 
Cuba by blaming the Pakistani malaria 
research center in Lahore, which the 
Soviets had charged with implementing 
a CIA-sponsored bacteriological warfare 
program. According to Cuban media, 
the center was not only breeding 
malarial mosquitos for Afghanistan but 
also to carry dengue fever into Cuba. A 
former Cuban health official, Eduardo 
Gomez Cabale, who defected to the 
United States in 1982, has stated that 
the Cuban Government chose this ex- 
planation to divert attention from the 
likely carrier of dengue fever: Cuban 
troops returning from Angola. 

• In March 1983, the Mexico City 
office of the Salvador Human Rights 
Commission, which has ties to the 
FMLN, accused the United States of 
furnishing the El Salvador military with 
chemical and biological weapons. 

• In the summer of 1982, Moscow's 
Radio Peace and Progress made much of 
allegations by an American citizen, Scott 
Barnes, who falsely claimed he had been 
asked by U.S. Special Forces in March 
1982 to assist in the use of chemical and 
biological weapons against the El 
Salvador rebels. Barnes, who has been 
an occasional mouthpiece for Soviet 
disinformation, also incorrectly asserted 
that he was a former Green Beret, FBI 
agent, and CIA officer. 

The Falkland's Campaign 

Reagan-Thatcher Tape. In late 
May 1983, 2 weeks before the U.K. 
general elections, copies of a fabricated 
audiotape of an alleged telephone con- 
versation between President Reagan and 
Prime Minister Thatcher during the 
Falklands campaign circulated in the 
Netherlands under an anonymous cover 
letter. On the tape, the President tries 
to restrain Mrs. Thatcher, who is bent 
on punishing Argentina, and to blame 
her for the loss of the H.M.S. Sheffield. 
Technical analysis of the tape indicated 
that the voices were authentic. Com- 
parison with President Reagan's public 
statements revealed that the President's 
remarks were excerpted from a 
November 22, 1982, speech that was 
broadcast to Europe. In a Dutch 
"transcript" circulated with the tape, 
phrases from the speech were re- 
arranged and taken out of context. 

Weinberger Press Statement. In 

early summer 1982, a false May 5, 1982, 
Department of Defense press release 



66 



No. 217-82 circulated in Latin America. 
Apparently it was intended for private 
distribution. In the bogus statement, 
Secretary Weinberger was outspokenly 
supportive of the British and highly 
critical of Argentina, whose attitude was 
described as "stubborn and selfish." The 
actual DOD release No. 217-82 dealt 
with contract awards. 



EAST ASIA 

Yellow Rain 

In May 1983 the World Federation of 
Trade Unions, the main Soviet trade 
union front group, sponsored a major 
conference in Vietnam to oppose alleged 
U.S. use of chemical warfare. This ac- 
tivity seemed part of a broader Soviet 
effort to divert attention from its use of 
"yellow rain" in Afghanistan, Laos, and 
Kampuchea by claiming that the United 
States itself was engaged in chemical 
warfare. 

Levchenko's Revelations 
About the KGB in Japan 

In December 1982 the U.S. House of 
Representatives Select Committee on 
Intelligence released testimony given 
earlier in the year by former KGB Majoi 
Stanislav Levchenko, who defected to 
the United States in 1979. At the time, 
Levchenko was in charge of Soviet ac- 
tive measures in Japan. 

The testimony made clear that the 
Soviets were making an extensive effort 
to influence Japanese political and public 
opinion through the full panoply of ac- 
tive measures techniques: 

• Use of agents of influence, in- 
cluding senior journalists and politicians 
to spread rumors and disinformation 
(i.e., alleged "serious" splits in the 
Chinese hierarchy over the border 
fighting with Vietnam, rumors of a 
secret nuclear deal between China and 
Italy, a false last political testament of 
the Chinese leader Zhou En-lai, and a 
concerted effort to label President 
Carter "neutron" Carter); and 

• Use of agents of influence in 
Japan's internal politics. (Through such 
agents of influence, Levchenko asserted 
that the KGB played a major behind-the 
scenes role in some Japanese opposition 
groups.) 

Soviet active measures goals, 
prepared annually by the KGB residen- 
cy, according to Levchenko, mirrored 
Soviet policy toward Japan, and active 



Department of State Bulletir 



EUROPE 



measures were designed to support 
specific policy aims to: 

• Improve Soviet-Japanese rela- 
tions; 

• Increase tensions between Japan 
and China; 

• Increase tensions between Japan 
and the United States; 

• Convince the Japanese that it was 
hopeless to work for the return of the 
northern territories. 

Levchenko estimated the strength of 
the KGB residency in Tokyo at about 50 
with 5 officers working full time on ac- 
tive measures. Levchenko, whose own 
cover was as a correspondent of the 
Soviet magazine New Times, said that 
journalist cover was highly regarded 
since it permitted wider access than 
diplomatic cover. According to Lev- 
chenko, 10 of the 12 New Times foreign 
correspondents were KGB officers, and 
a high percentage of overseas represen- 
tatives of other Soviet media were also 
from the KGB. The former intelligence 
officer stated that the Soviets had about 
200 Japanese agents, all of whom could 
be utilized for active measures if the 
KGB felt that this was desirable. 



CONCLUSION 

Assessing the impact of active measures 
is difficult, but they seem to have 
greater success in developing areas, 
such as Africa, than in other regions, for 
example Europe, where their record has 
been uneven. Yet as Under Secretary of 
State Lawrence Eagleburger wrote in 
the April 1983 NATO Review: "In both 
developed and developing countries, 
beyond the success, or lack of it, of par- 
ticular operations, active measures have 
a corrosive effect on open political 
systems." 

In dealing with active measures, 
Under Secretary Eagleburger recom- 
mended in the same article that "While 
recognizing that active measures are but 
one aspect of our complex relationship, 
common sense requires that we counter 
these intrusions not only through effec- 
tive counterintelligence but by keeping 
our citizens as fully informed as possible 
of the deceptive practices to which they 
are exposed." ■ 



U.S.-European Relations 



by Richard R. Burt 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Europe and the Middle East of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
August 1, 1983. Mr. Burt is Assistant 
Secretary for European Affairs. * 

If I am not mistaken, today marks my 
third appearance before this subcommit- 
tee in my capacity as Assistant 
Secretary of State for European Affairs. 
My previous experiences proved to be 
valuable opportunities to provide an Ad- 
ministration perspective and to get a 
better sense of congressional concerns 
and views. I look forward to today's ex- 
change as continuing this useful process. 

What I plan to do today is address 
several aspects of U.S.-European rela- 
tions—our relationship with the Soviet 
Union, the state of play at the Madrid 
CSCE [Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe] meeting, and 
prospects for our principal arms control 
negotiations. 

Relations With the Soviet Union 

Secretary Shultz appeared before your 
Senate colleagues a few weeks ago to 
discuss our policy toward the Soviet 
Union. As then, .our current relations 
with Moscow can only be characterized 
as strained. The divergent goals and 
philosophies of our systems will not soon 
disappear, but our fundamental common 
interest in the avoidance of war impels 
us to work toward a relationship with 
the Soviets that provides a secure and 
stable international environment. 

The difficulties involved in 
establishing a more stable and construc- 
tive U.S. -Soviet relationship are many. 
They remind us that peace must be built 
on strength. We believe that in the past 
2V2 years, this Administration has had 
considerable success in rebuilding our 
military, economic, and moral strength 
and in bolstering our alliance relation- 
ships. We believe we have established a 
solid basis on which to seek political 
solutions to outstanding issues. As the 
Secretary stressed, we do not accept as 
inevitable the prospect of endless, 
dangerous confrontation with the Soviet 
Union. 



In the last 6 months, we have en- 
gaged the Soviet Union in an intensive 
dialogue on all aspects of the U.S. -Soviet 
relationship — with Ambassador 
Dobrynin and his embassy here in 
Washington, through our Ambassador to 
the Soviet Union Arthur Hartman, and 
in a number of other bilateral channels, 
including the established arms control 
fora in Geneva and Vienna. Through this 
dialogue, we have sought to impress 
upon the new Soviet leadership our con- 
cerns about unacceptable aspects of 
Soviet behavior and the obstacles these 
have placed in the path of better East- 
West relations. At the same time, we 
have striven to demonstrate our 
readiness to search for constructive solu- 
tions to our differences and for concrete 
ways to broaden areas of bilateral 
cooperation based on reciprocity and 
mutual interest. Our objective, in short, 
has been to test the willingness of the 
new leadership to make the policy ad- 
justments needed for a lasting turn for 
the better in U.S. -Soviet relations. 

This dialogue has been exceptionally 
frank and broad-ranging, covering arms 
control, regional conflicts, bilateral 
political and economic questions, and 
human rights. Thus far, there have been 
a few small, albeit encouraging, de- 
velopments — Soviet acceptance of the 
Spanish compromise formula on CSCE 
at Madrid, modest adjustments to a 
number of positions in the strategic 
arms reduction talks (START) and the 
mutual and balanced force reductions 
(MBFR) negotiations, the release of the 
Pentecostalists — but no major break- 
throughs. We did not, of course, expect 
any immediate and rapid shifts in long- 
established Soviet policies. But we re- 
main hopeful that progress can be made 
in the year ahead. For our part, U.S. 
policy will remain principled, practical, 
and patient. Secretary Shultz will be 
meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister 
Gromyko at the UN General Assembly 
this fall to continue our dialogue at the 
ministerial level, and there may well be 
an earlier meeting at the time of the 
CSCE signing ceremonies in Madrid. 
The results of these meetings will help 
determine the direction in which the 
relationship evolves. 



October 1983 



67 



EUROPE 



Madrid CSCE Followup Meeting 

The successful achievement of an East- 
West agreement at the Madrid CSCE 
meeting is the culmination of almost 3 
years of difficult negotiation. As the 
President indicated, it is a result with 
which the United States can be pleased. 
But, as with the Helsinki Final Act 
itself, constant attention to the crucial 
matter of implementation will be a must. 

The outcome at Madrid reflects the 
close cooperation between the United 
States and our European allies 
throughout the marathon sessions of the 
conference. At every stage, from the 
development of initial Western positions, 
through the discussion of the implemen- 
tation of past agreements, to the 
negotiations on the final document of 
this meeting, we have had a solid, pro- 
ductive relationship with our allies, one 
which has enabled us to stand firm on 
positions of principle. This close col- 
laboration was particularly important in 
view of the tense international at- 
mosphere which has prevailed during 
the negotiating period. The imposition of 
martial law in Poland had a major effect 



on the conference and caused a lengthy 
break in discussions. Soviet occupation 
of Afghanistan continued. And Soviet 
pressure on the intermediate-range 
nuclear forces (INF) issue, designed to 
overturn the NATO decision and 
preserve the Soviet monopoly in 
intermediate-range nuclear forces, has 
been intense. Under such circumstances, 
unity was essential. 

The Madrid document also repre- 
sents the major contributions by the 
neutral and nonaligned states, which 
prepared the basic text on which 
negotiations were conducted. The final 
document reflects as well a realistic 
judgment by the Soviet Union and its 
allies of the need to come to an accord 
with the West at this time. Assuming 
that last-minute problems caused by 
Maltese refusal to join the consensus can 
be overcome, the draft final document of 
the Madrid conference will be signed at 
a meeting of Foreign Ministers 
September 7-9 in Madrid. 

While we should not exaggerate the 
importance of the agreement, we should 
not minimize it either. The Madrid ac- 
cord will strengthen and expand the 



U.S.-Soviet Grain Agreement 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
JULY 28, 1983 1 

Ambassador William E. Brock, U.S. 
Trade Representative, and Secretary of 
Agriculture John R. Block announced to- 
day that the United States and the 
U.S.S.R. have reached agreement in 
principle on a new long-term grain 
agreement. The agreement will com- 
mence October 1, 1983, and will cover 5 
years. 

Under its terms, the U.S.S.R. will 
purchase from the United States 9 
million metric tons of grain annually in 
approximately equal quantities of wheat 
and corn. Up to 1 million metric tons of 
the minimum could be satisfied by 
Soviet purchases of 500,000 metric tons 
of soybean, and/or soybean meal. If this 
soybean/soybean meal option is exer- 
cised in any year, the minimum of wheat 
and corn for that year will be 8 million 
metric tons. During any year of the 
agreement, the Soviet Union may pur- 
chase 3 million metric tons of wheat and 
corn in addition to the minimum of 9 
million metric tons without prior con- 
sultation. 



The general framework of the new 
agreement follows that of the original 
long-term grain agreement that was 
signed in 1975. The agreement was 
reached on July 28 in Vienna during the 
third round of negotiations regarding a 
new long-term grain agreement. The 
U.S. negotiating team was lead by Am- 
bassador Robert E. Lighthizer, Deputy 
U.S. Trade Representative. Daniel G. 
Amstutz, Under Secretary of the 
Department of Agriculture, was the 
senior official for the Agriculture 
Department on the team. Formal sign- 
ing of the agreement will take place in 
late August. 

The current agreement that expires 
on September 30, 1983, called for a 
minimum annual purchase of 6 million 
metric tons of wheat and corn by the 
U.S.S.R. and provided an option for the 
Soviet Union to purchase an additional 2 
million metric tons per year. The 
original agreement covered a 5-year 
period beginning in 1975. It was ex- 
tended for a 1-year period on two occa- 
sions. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 

Presidential Deeuments nf Au^. 1, 1988. 



Helsinki Final Act. The new provisions 
which it contains deal with the rights of 
workers to organize, human rights, 
Helsinki monitors, religious liberties, 
human contacts and family reunification, 
access to diplomatic and consular mis- 
sions, free flow of information, rights of 
journalists, and measures against ter- 
rorism. 

The agreement also provides for 
convening a Conference on Confidence 
and Security-Building Measures and Dis- 
armament in Europe (CDE) in Stock- 
holm next year. At this conference we 
will attempt to work out detailed 
measures to reduce the danger of sur- 
prise military attack. An important new 
element here is that the measures to be 
discussed at Stockholm will apply to all 
of the European Soviet Union, up to the 
Ural Mountains, rather than only to the 
250-kilometer [150-mile] band provided 
for in the Helsinki Final Act. Measures 
to be considered in the conference 
should, therefore, be more relevant to 
the real security situation in 
Europe — which obviously is affected by 
the strength and capabilities of all 
Soviet forces west of the Urals. We 
believe that the CDE can make an im- 
portant contribution to European securi- 
ty, and we will be working with our 
allies to develop an active and construc- 
tive approach to that meeting. 

In addition, the Madrid agreement 
provides for a series of meetings over 
the next 3 years on human rights, 
human contacts, and on the peaceful set- 
tlement of disputes; a cultural forum; 
and a seminar on economic, scientific, 
and cultural cooperation in the Mediter- 
ranean. The 35 signatory states will also 
gather in Helsinki during 1985 to mark 
the 10th anniversary of the Final Act. 
Finally, the Madrid document provides 
for the continuation of the CSCE proc- 
ess by setting another full followup 
meeting in Vienna in November 1986. 

The task ahead remains difficult. No 
participant in the CSCE process can fail 
to appreciate the profound seriousness 
of the contradictions between Soviet 
totalitarianism and the system of in- 
dividual liberty and dignity which is a 
hallmark of democratic governments. Nc 
agreement, neither the one at Helsinki 
in 1975 nor the one we hope to conclude 
next month at Madrid, can obscure 
those differences or produce miraculous 
changes in the conditions in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe. No one 
should have any illusions that the CSCE 
is a quick fix. 



68 



Department of State Bulletir 



EUROPE 



The Soviet and East European 
record regarding human rights and na- 
tional sovereignty is deplorable. In 
Madrid we and our allies sharply, 
specifically, and repeatedly criticized this 
record. And the concluding document 
reaffirms the importance of the com- 
mitments made by all 35 nations to 
respect all of the principles of the 
Helsinki Final Act. We will be able to 
pursue our concerns further in the 
human rights and human contacts ex- 
perts meeting provided for in the con- 
cluding document; in the 1985 Helsinki 
commemoration, and, of course, in the 
Vienna followup meeting in 1986. We 
are also taking steps to ensure, together 
with our allies, that attention to par- 
ticular issues of Soviet compliance with 
agreements remains focused and that in- 
ternational concern can be effectively 
brought to bear in the period between 
these meetings. 

Arms Control 

The fourth round of START concludes 
August 2. Our delegation has taken a 
number of steps during this round to 
move the neogtiations forward and to 
demonstrate the flexibility emphasized 
by President Reagan on June 8. 

• As the President has indicated, we 
have relaxed our proposal for a limit of 
850 on deployed ballistic missiles, to 
bring our proposal in line with the 
recommendations of the Scowcroft com- 
mission and closer to the Soviet- 
proposed 1,800 limit on missiles and 
bombers. 

• Our delegation has emphasized 
U.S. flexibility in finding ways to ensure 
that a START agreement brings about 
substantial reductions in the destructive 
potential of strategic missile forces. 

• We have tabled the draft text of a 
START treaty, in which we have 
demonstrated our readiness to accept 
equal and lower limits from the outset 
on the number of heavy bombers and 
air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM). 

The Soviets have made a number of 
minor adjustments to their position this 
round and filled in a number of blanks in 
their initial proposal. In themselves, 
these steps have done little to narrow 
the basic differences in the two sides' 
approaches or to address our particular 
concerns about the asymmetries in 
ballistic missile capabilities. Nonetheless, 
we are encouraged that the Soviets have 
begun to show some give in their posi- 



tion and hope to see further Soviet flex- 
ibility on the central issues in the next 
round of START. 

Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces (INF). The single most impor- 
tant issue in U.S. -European relations for 
the remainder of this year is likely to be 
INF. On the one hand, the opponents of 
NATO's two-track policy have indicated 
they they plan major public demonstra- 
tions in an effort to sway allied govern- 
ments. The Soviets will be exerting max- 
imum propaganda pressure, including 
threats of deployments of additional 
nuclear-armed missiles targeted on our 
allies. 

On the other hand, we and our allies 
are, today, in a much stronger position 
to carry through both tracks of the 
December 1979 decision on arms control 
and modernization than at any point in 
the last 3 years. Our position in the 
negotiations is recognized as both 
serious and flexible; our preparations for 
deployments, should those be necessary, 
are moving ahead smoothly in all of the 
basing countries; and alliance unity has 
been solidly reaffirmed through the 
NATO and Williamsburg communiques. 

The United States remains com- 
mitted to seeking an equitable agree- 
ment in the INF talks which would 
either eliminate the entire class of U.S. 
and Soviet land-based LRINF [longer 
range intermediate-range nuclear force] 
missiles — our "zero-zero" proposal — or 
result in significantly lower, equal 
numbers of LRINF warheads for the 
United States and Soviet Union. Our 
allies fully support this negotiating posi- 
tion. 

At the same time, our allies are 
committed to begin deployment of 
ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) 
and Pershing II missiles by the end of 
this year, as called for in the 1979 
NATO two-track decision, if there is no 
agreement making those deployments 
unnecessary. Continuing strong commit- 
ment to the deployment track is 
necessary to give the Soviets an incen- 
tive to negotiate seriously in Geneva and 
to offset their destabilizing monopoly of 
LRINF missiles if agreement cannot be 
reached. 

Unfortunately progress in the 
Geneva talks remains blocked by Soviet 
unwillingness to take account of the 
legitimate security needs of NATO 
which prompted the 1979 dual decision 
in the first place. Although they have 
made minor tactical moves in the 
negotiations, the Soviet goal remains 
what it was when the talks began — to 



retain a sizable portion of the SS-20 
force while denying NATO the right to 
counter that threat through deployments 
of its own. 

The core of the Soviet negotiating 
position is their demand to be compen- 
sated for the British and French in- 
dependent strategic deterrent. The pur- 
pose of this demand is to block U.S. 
deployments and preserve the Soviet 
LRINF monopoly. Our allies are 
unanimous in supporting rejection of 
this demand. As the Soviets well know, 
the British and French forces are na- 
tional deterrents different in nature and 
mission from U.S. and Soviet LRINF. 
The British and French systems cannot 
provide either the protection to the non- 
nuclear states of NATO or the vital 
linkage to the U.S. strategic umbrella 
which is so central to NATO's ability to 



15th Report on Cyprus 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
AUG. 18, 1983 1 

In accordance with Public Law 95-384, I am 
herewith submitting a report on progress 
made in the past sixty days toward a 
negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem. 

Since my last report to you there has 
been little progress toward settlement. It has 
been a period of reevaluation by both sides 
and the intercommunal talks have not re- 
sumed. 

On June 15 the United Nations Security 
Council renewed the mandate of the UN 
Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The report 
issued at that time by the Secretary General 
on UNFICYP's activities and on general 
Cypriot developments is attached. 

On July 4 UN Secretary General Perez de 
Cuellar met in Geneva with Turkish Cypriot 
leader Denktash. Two days later the 
Secretary General's Special Representative, 
Ambassador Gobbi, returned to Nicosia 
where he remained until August 10 attempt- 
ing to reconvene the intercommunal talks. 

Our position continues to be one of full 
support for the Secretary General and his 
Special Representative. We support their ef- 
forts to reconvene the intercommunal talks 
as the best vehicle for an eventual settlement 
of the Cyprus problem. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Reagan 



October 1983 



'Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. 
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and Charles H. Percy, chair- 
man of the Senate Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 29, 1983). ■ 



69 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



deter war. Further the Soviet Union 
already possesses scores more warheads 
than Britain and France. It is simply ab- 
surd for the Soviets to maintain that 
they need SS-20s to counterbalance the 
small British and French forces. 

You have doubtless seen reports in 
the press of the so-called walk-in-the- 
woods proposal. Many of these reports 
have been inaccurate, partly as a result 
of Soviet efforts to conceal their own in- 
transigence and place responsibility for 
closing this informal channel on our 
shoulders rather than their own, where 
it belongs. For this reason, I would like 
to say a few words about the walk-in- 
the-woods episode. 

The package reflected ideas worked 
out on an informal, exploratory basis by 
Ambassador Nitze [Paul H. Nitze, head 
of the U.S. delegation to the INF 
negotiations] with his Soviet counterpart 
last July. We, for our part, had prob- 
lems with the proposal as it stood— in- 
cluding the fact that it would have 
forced us to renounce the Pershing II, 
leaving us without a ballistic missile 
counter to the SS-20 and undermining 
the NATO deployment program in Ger- 
many, which begins with the P-II. 
Nevertheless, we decided that the infor- 
mal channel should be kept open and so 
instructed our Ambassador. 

The Soviet reaction, by contrast, 
was to reject both the substance of the 
proposal and the possibility of such 
talks. The Soviet negotiator made dear 
that he could not accept any agreement 
that provided for U.S. -Soviet equality or 
that accepted any U.S. deployment and 
added that he had been reprimanded for 
having had the initial conversations. 

The next negotiating round begins 
September 6. The United States will 
continue to seek means of moving the 
talks forward, to achieve results which 
will meet the basic principles necessary 
for our security and that of our allies. 
We would hope that the Soviets will 
finally accept the need to negotiate 
seriously. However, we do not regard 
the coming round as the last round, as 
some have suggested. If deployments 
are necessary, we would expect negotia- 
tions to continue after initial U.S. de- 
ployments — as, indeed, they have been 
conducted all along in the face of ex- 
isting and continuing Soviet deploy- 
ments. And, as the Vice President said 
on his European trip earlier this year, 
"what goes in can come out." We are 
perfectly prepared to adjust the level of 
our deployed systems in accordance with 
any agreements which may be reached. 



Mutual and Balanced Force Reduc- 
tions (MBFR). Although it is much less 
in the news, it is well to underline the 
importance of MBFR, where we and our 
allies are increasingly concerned to move 
the negotiations toward our original goal 
of parity in military manpower in cen- 
tral Europe. The importance of reducing 
the massive Soviet advantage in conven- 
tional forces in the heart of the conti- 
nent has not diminished with time. 

Unfortunately, the Soviets and their 
allies have continued to be unwilling to 
agree on the size of their forces in the 
area or to the kind of verification 



Deportation of Nazi 
Criminals to Israel 



JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 

STATEMENT, 

JULY 19, 1983 

The Justice Department announced to- 
day that high-level discussions have 
taken place this week between officials 
of the Department and the Israeli 
Ministry of Justice regarding the depor- 
tation and extradition to Israel of Nazi 
war criminals residing in the United 
States. 

Mark M. Richard, Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General, Criminal Division; 
Neal M. Sher, Acting Director of the Of- 
fice of Special Investigations, Criminal 
Division; and Murray R. Stein, Associate 
Director, Office of International Affairs, 
Criminal Division, met with Israeli At- 
torney General Yitzhak Zamir and other 
representatives of the Israeli 
prosecutor's office to discuss the case of 
Valerian Trifa and other Nazi war 
criminals presently living in the United 
States. The in-depth discussions follow 
earlier visits by Mr. Richard and Mr. 
Sher where these matters were raised. 

The Office of Special Investigations 
is responsible for the investigation and 
prosecution of individuals in the United 
States who participated in acts of 
persecution during World War II in con- 
junction with the Nazi regime. That of- 
fice is presently prosecuting 31 
denaturalization and deportation pro- 
ceedings in American courts. Valerian 
Trifa has been stripped of citizenship 



measures necessary for an effective 
agreement. The latest draft proposal 
tabled by the East last month does make 
some movement toward our verification 
requirements. However, it falls well 
short of what is required for an effective 
treaty. We will be considering jointly 
with our allies what response should be 
made to the Eastern proposal. 






■The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published bv the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



War 



and ordered deported due to his war- 
time position and activities with the 
Fascist and anti-Semitic Romanian Iron 
Guardists. 

In January 1941, there were bloody 
pogroms in Romania during Which many 
Jews were massacred by Iron Guardists 
After the pogroms, Trifa went to 
Gemany where he was given safe-haven 
during the war. He came to the United 
States in 1950 after failing to disclose 
his Iron Guard past. 

The United States is actively at- 
tempting to find a country willing to ac- 
cept Trifa. Under American law, consen 
of the accepting country is required. 

The Office of Special Investigations 
has worked closely with Israeli 
authorities in developing its investiga- 
tion and prosecutions. The current 
round of discussions has focused on the 
viability of Israel procuring custody of 
war criminals— through either deporta- 
tion or extradition — in order to put 
them on trial. Under a 1950 punishment 
of-Nazi law, Israeli courts can try per- 
sons who committed crimes against the 
Jewish people or crimes against humani 
ty during the Nazi era. 

The Israel Government has ex- 
pressed its commitment to continue the 
high-level discussions with American of- 
ficials. A determination of each 
case— including Trifa— will be made 
upon an evaluation of the facts to deter- 
mine if there is authority to prosecute 
under Israeli law. ■ 



- 

in 
■ 

n 

I! 



70 



Department of State Bulletin ' 



MIDDLE EAST 



The Libyan Problem 



'he following is a special report 
ssued by the Department of State in 
October 1983. 

The Libyan regime contributes to in- 
tability in a wide range of states in 
Ifrica, the Middle East, and elsewhere 
n a manner disproportionate to Libya's 
mall population. Its enormous oil 
lealth is at the disposal of an absolute 
"tiler, Muammar al Qadhafi, whose am- 
ition is to expand his power beyond the 
imits of Libya by persuasion, force, or 
ubversion in the name of his self-styled 
evolution. He has failed at most at- 
jmpts at persuasion. He is often erratic 
n his methods, and the constraint of a 
mall population does not permit him to 
dfill his ambition. But he has used 
ibya's wealth to build one of the most 
ighly militarized states per capita in 
le world. His military machine is less 
owerful than some states in the region, 
>r example, Egypt, and clearly does not 
ose a military threat on a global scale, 
at his armed forces have become a 
treat to Libya's other neighbors. A 
'•aphic illustration is Libya's latest in- 
ision of Chad, which has halted that 
mntry's attempt at rehabilitation after 
?ars of civil war. 

Qadhafi has energetically dedicated 
imself to subversion in the pursuit of 
'.s expansionist ambition and his 
Oology of militant/ socialist Islam. He 

funding and arming an array of dissi- 
mt groups on several continents. The ef- 
ct of his international activities, while 
Xen not producing dramatic successes, 
is been to promote radical forces 
yposed to peace in the Middle East and 

undermine moderate regimes in many 
entries. 



WE LIBYAN REVOLUTION 

idhafi's coup and repressive regime 
nstitute, in his eyes, a great revolution 
at must sweep through the Arab 
Drld and Africa. His creed of Islamic 
lity masks an overriding ambition for 
■e expansion of Libyan territory and of 
s own power. 
Before Qadhafi, Libya did not play 

activist role. During most of the 
onarchial period, 1951-69, Libya was 
:ceedingly poor — one of the poorest 
untries in the world — and was not in- 
ned toward international activism, 
scovery of oil brought about the 
>ssibility of building a large army and 

supporting, through financial dis- 
irsements and arms deliveries, an ar- 
y of foreign governments and groups. 



Qadhafi took power in 1969 as a 
zealot with messianic pretensions. The 
mindset that initially guided Qadhafi as 
he planned and persevered in his coup 
continues to inspire him. He sees himself 
as one who has received a special vision 
of religious, social, and political truth to 
bring to the people of Libya and which 
in time will serve as a pattern for global 
revolution. Qadhafi's ethnocentric 
perspective has in no way contained his 
ambitions, which have always projected 
far beyond the confines of Libya. At the 
same time, his desert upbringing in a 
culture historically isolated from Arab 
urban centers has made him relatively 
comfortable in the role of a loner and 
outsider, more prone to confrontation 
than accommodation. 

Qadhafi's guiding slogan after the 
coup was "freedom, socialism, and 
unity." In practice, that slogan has come 
to mean implacable opposition to the 
West and Israel and the rejection of 
compromise in the Middle East; in- 
stituting a military dictatorship and a 
thorough and repressive internal securi- 
ty apparatus; and expanding Libyan ter- 
ritory and Qadhafi's power and influence 
under the guise of "Arab unity" or, in 
the case of southward expansion, 
"Islamic unity." 

Qadhafi's version of pan-Arabism 
has little appeal to other Arabs. Indeed, 
the "Libyan Revolution" — Qadhafi's so- 
called socialist Islamic revolution — is 
confined to his own country. The Libyan 
people may be thoroughly familiar with 
the formulas expounded in Qadhafi's 
Green Book, his "philosophy" of revolu- 
tion, but the Green Book is almost en- 
tirely ignored beyond Libyan borders. In 
fact, ideology is less compelling than re- 
pressive force in mobilizing the popula- 
tion even within his own country. 
Qadhafi's persistent call for unity is seen 
not as a selfless appeal to the Arab or 
Islamic masses but as a transparent at- 
tempt to project Libyan — and particu- 
larly Qadhafi's — influence. 

While Qadhafi's goals have not 
changed since he came to power, his 
youthful optimism has faded. Qadhafi to- 
day is every bit as determined, but he no 
longer places faith in persuasion. He has 
never had qualms about resorting to 
methods of terror and violence, but he 
has increasingly come to rely on military 
might and subversion to achieve his in- 
ternational goals. 



THE RESORT TO TERROR 

In his pursuit of expanded power and in- 
fluence, Qadhafi has repeatedly em- 
ployed tactics of assassination and 
violence. He has established terrorist 
training facilities on Libyan soil, fi- 
nanced and armed known terrorists, and 
murdered opponents. 

Qadhafi repeatedly has demon- 
strated that he is unconstrained by ac- 
cepted standards of international con- 
duct. He has sought the assassination of 
many moderate leaders and Libyan ex- 
iles by financing known terrorists and by 
providing terrorist training in Libya on 
a continuing basis. 

• In 1972, Libya provided sanctuary 
to the perpetrators of the Munich Olym- 
pics murders. 

• Qadhafi gave refuge to the ter- 
rorists who had taken 60 hostages at the 
1975 Vienna OPEC meeting. 

• The Venezuelan terrorist, 
"Carlos," has operated out of Libya for 
some years, despite Qadhafi's denials. 

• At various times, Qadhafi has sup- 
ported the Irish Republican Army as 
well as Corsican, Basque, and other 
violent European separatists. 

• Weapons found on various Euro- 
pean terrorists, for example, Brequet 
and Kopp in 1982, had been sold to the 
Libyan army. In April 1983, the Swiss 
Government expelled the Libyan charge 
d'affaires for supplying arms to two con- 
victed Swiss terrorists. 

• In April 1983, Libya took eight 
German technicians hostage in order to 
blackmail West Germany into releasing 
Libyans charged with violent crime. 

• In June 1983, the Libyan envoy to 
Jordan defected and revealed Qadhafi's 
plan to use missiles to destroy the air- 
craft carrying King Hussein. 

Qadhafi has established a series of 
camps in Libya for training foreign 
revolutionaries. Some training is in con- 
ventional warfare; some is for terrorism 
in the true sense of the word. Several 
camps are devoted entirely to instruct- 
ing terrorists in a range of explosives 
and arms for use in assassination and 
sabotage. Violent fringe Palestinian 
groups have, for example, received such 
training. The terrorist attacks on the 
Athens and Rome airports in 1973, with 
the murder of 35 people, were conducted 
by Libyan-trained Palestinians. 



ctober 1983 



71 



MIDDLE EAST 



Libyan plotting to assassinate 
moderate Arab leaders has been under 
way at least since 1975. Moreover, Lib- 
yan plans to kill American ambassadors 
in several Middle Eastern countries and 
at least one European capital have been 
established beyond doubt. Evidence of a 
Libyan attempt to plant explosives in 
the American Embassy Club in Khar- 
toum was uncovered in November 1981. 
Explosives had been concealed in stereo 
speakers and were to have been set to 
detonate on a Saturday evening when 
scores of people would have been killed, 
including American and third-country 
diplomats and their spouses, who fre- 
quent the club on weekends. 

After 10 years in power, Qadhafi 
had largely failed to stir the Libyan peo- 
ple. He had established "revolutionary 
committees" in 1977— groups charged 
with injecting the appropriate revolu- 
tionary fervor into the existing "people's 
committees" and into the armed 
forces— but they had not been par- 
ticularly active. In 1980 Qadhafi sought 
to use them to orchestrate massive 
purges and corruption trials involving 
thousands of arrests, including influen- 
tial businessmen, high government of- 
ficials, and senior military officers. 
Those arrested were tried before special 
tribunals composed of revolutionary 
committee members and sentenced; 
some, after dramatic televised "confes- 
sions," were released; others vanished. 
At the same time, the regime launched a 
campaign to intimidate dissidents 
abroad. Libyan hit squads embarked on 
a series of murders of exiled Libyans in 
an overall effort to enforce Qadhafi's 
views at all costs. Eleven people were 
killed: four in Rome, two in London, and 
one each in Bonn, Beirut, Athens, Milan, 
and Manchester. Several others were 
wounded, including a student in the 
United States and two children in 
England. In October 1982, Qadhafi once 
again publicly warned Libyan exiles to 
"repent" and return home or face 
renewal of the murder campaign. 1 



LIBYAN ARMAMENTS AND 
ARMED FORCES 

A significant aspect of Qadhafi's policy 
has been to expand and improve the Lib- 
yan Armed Forces. This effort has con- 
sumed a major share of Libya's oil in- 
come and produced one of the largest 
armies per capita in the world. Lacking 
the manpower to operate much of this 
equipment, Qadhafi apparently intends 
to use this huge arms stockpile, pro- 



cured largely from the Soviet Union, to 
equip like-minded revolutionaries around 
the world. The Libyan military buildup 
poses a particular threat to Libya's 
neighbors. 

Today, Libya's military establish- 
ment consists of some 85,000 troops. 
Before the 1969 coup, Libya had 8,500 
men under arms equipped with 6 tanks 
and 90 scout cars. The army (from 
which Qadhafi emerged) was totally in- 
effective as a combat force and was in- 
capable of defending the country. Within 
his first 6 months in power, Qadhafi 
doubled the size of the armed forces 
through a major recruitment effort and 
the transfer of several thousand person- 
nel from the paramilitary National 
Security Force. Over the next 5 years, 
the military's growth was less pro- 
nounced, with the army expanding by 
only 5,000 troops between 1970 and 
1975. By the mid 1970s, it was obvious 
that voluntary enlistments were inade- 
quate to meet Qadhafi's force goals — re- 
portedly a military establishment of 
100,000 personnel. A new conscription 
law, requiring 3-4 years of military 
service for all Libyans between the ages 
of 18 and 35, was promulgated in 1976. 
Subsequently, military service also was 
made compulsory for women. From this 
time on, Libyan armed forces began a 
rapid expansion: from 22,000 personnel 
in 1975 to 35,000 in 1978 to 55,000 in 
1980 to 85,000 in 1983. 

Qadhafi's efforts to recruit additional 
personnel have been paralleled by the 
continued acquisition of military equip- 
ment. Until 1973, Libya obtained most 
significant equipment — fighter aircraft, 
surface-to-air missiles, self-propelled ar- 
tillery — from Western sources. In 1974, 
Qadhafi signed his first major arms 
agreement with the Soviet Union. The 
value of this contract — $2.3 billion — was 
almost $1 billion more than that of all 
the military agreements that Qadhafi 
had signed up to that point. Subsequent 
agreements with Moscow were con- 
cluded in 1977, 1978, and 1980; the 
agreement in 1980 alone may have 
reached $8 billion. By 1983, the total 
value of revolutionary Libya's arms 
deals came to $28 billion— $20 billion 
from Soviet and East European military 
suppliers. Libya is currently negotiating 
a new arms deal with Moscow with a 
price tag of several billion dollars. 

As a result of Qadhafi's arms pur- 
chases, Libya has become very heavily 
armed. There is one tank for every 
1,300 Libyans compared to one tank for 
every 19,000 Americans. Libya has ap- 



proximately the same number of combat 
aircraft as France and West Germany, 
yet Libya's population is only about 5% 
that of either country. Similar com- 
parisons can be drawn for almost every 
type of military equipment in Libya. Be- 
cause of personnel limitations, much of 
this weaponry is not assigned to opera- 
tional units. Of Libya's 2,500 tanks, for 
example, only about 900 are deployed 
with active units. Similarly, 50% of the 
550 jet fighters in Libya are in storage. 

The greatest strength of the Libyan 
Armed Forces is their large amount of 
modern weaponry, particularly when 
compared to other African states. 
Although some arms suppliers have not 
exported state-of-the-art equipment to 
Libya, Qadhafi's arsenal contains ex- 
tremely capable systems. More than one 
half of the air force's fighters are all- 
weather capable, and many can carry 
air-to-air missiles. The army inventory 
includes modern field artillery, including 
highly mobile self-propelled guns, as wel 
as surface-to-surface missiles. The air 
defense forces have the equipment to 
engage high-speed targets at altitudes 
between 50 and 100,000 feet. Libya's 
missile attack boat fleet soon will be the 
largest and most modern in North 
Africa and the Middle East. Many of 
Libya's weapons systems are used in 
front-line service by both NATO and 
Warsaw Pact forces. 

The shortage of qualified Libyan 
military personnel has to some extent 
been counterbalanced by the presence o«i 
foreign military advisers. At present 
nearly 4,000 foreigners, about half of 
them from the Soviet Union, are 
assigned to air, naval, ground, and air 
defense forces. 



• 



LIBYA AND THE U.S.S.R. 

Qadhafi's relationship with the Soviet 
Union has become increasingly close. 
Libya is the foremost Soviet arms 
customer, and in recent years Qadhafi 
has increasingly provided the Soviet 
armed forces access to Libyan facilities. 
Libya serves Soviet aims without a for- 
mal relationship, for Soviet arms find 
their way through Libya to subversive 
groups and terrorists whose aims serve 
Soviet interests. 

A proposed treaty of friendship be- 
tween the Soviet Union and Libya — an- 
nounced following the trip of Qadhafi's 
second-in-command, Abdessalam Jallud, 
to Moscow on March 17-18, 1983— is 
another step in the gradually tightening 
relationship between the two states. As 1 
the Soviet Union's most important arms 



: 

pidl 

... 

.:. 



' 



B.1 



72 



Department of State Bulletir 



MIDDLE EAST 



istomer, Libya is a crucial source of 
ird currency for the Soviet Union, 
ven in a depressed oil market, Qadhafi 
is shown no inclination to reduce 
)ending on Soviet arms. Moscow insists 
Don prompt and full Libyan adherence 
i the terms of its military sales con- 
acts, and with some dickering Libya 
is continued to come up with the 
oney. 

Qadhafi has served Soviet foreign 
>licy purposes even without established 
lannels of formal collaboration. Indeed, 
le Soviets have been somewhat reluc- 
,nt to deepen ties with him. Attempts 
i pressure the Libyan leader— an exer- 
se calculated to antagonize him — have 
;en unnecessary, as his aims, if not his 
mperament and methods, so neatly fit 
jviet purposes. Moscow generally ap- 
•oves of Qadhafi's military and 
:onomic aid to radical states and 
ibversive groups, since it helps to 
ldermine the U.S. position, ensure the 
ilure of attempts at compromise in the 
iddle East, and destabilize pro- 
estern governments around the globe, 
oscow has supplied materiel far 
yond Libya's defense needs or capa- 
ities, providing most of the equipment 
■r Qadhafi's role as an arms supplier. 
) other Middle Eastern state can rival 
ipoli in its potential for dispensing 
^aponry. 

Qadhafi has paid a price for his 
sociation with the Soviet Union. It has 
t been easy for him to justify relating 
an atheist, imperialist superpower 
d acquiescing in the Soviets' invasion 
j Afghanistan, a sister Muslim state. 
I the rest of the Muslim world, it has 

• }ped much of the appeal of Qadhafi's 
' lamic revolution." But Qadhafi's 

I idamental ambition is expansion; he 
f 3 seen that that ambition cannot be 
p lieved without military might; and the 
5 v\et Union has been the only signifi- 
l it military supplier willing to provide 
I ins in the amounts Qadhafi wants. 

The Soviet-Libyan relationship grew 
t (idly after Qadhafi's visit to Moscow 
|i April 1981. On July 25, 1981, a Soviet 
ival task group visited Tripoli, with the 
; lultaneous flight there of two IL-38 
t 'onnaissance airplanes: the first Soviet 
j /al or air visits to Libya since Qadhafi 
a zed power. Since then visits have 
Jjn frequent. In November 1982 the 
Id states carried out a joint naval exer- 

• e, and in January 1983 a Soviet sub- 
■ rine paid a month-long call at Tobruk 
1 maintenance purposes; another joint 
J/al exercise was carried out in July 
1^3. Despite Qadhafi's protestations of 
1 ependence, the Soviets are slowly and 



quietly moving him toward granting 
them virtual basing rights in Libya. 
They have not had permanent land- 
based air-support facilities in the region 
since they were expelled from Egypt by 
Sadat in 1972. 



THE LIBYAN MILITARY THREAT 

The Libyan Armed Forces are greatly 
superior to those of all Libya's neighbors 
except Egypt and Algeria. The continu- 
ing Libyan military buildup far exceeds 
Libyan defense needs and is explicable 
only on grounds of Libya's expansionist 
aims, as manifested by the present inva- 
sion and military occupation of the 
northern third of Chad. 

Qadhafi appears increasingly willing 
to project conventional force beyond Lib- 
yan borders. He came to the aid of Idi 
Amin with an airlift of troops to Uganda 
in 1979, an operation that was a com- 
plete fiasco and very costly in casualties 
to Libya. He has also dispatched troops 
to Lebanon and Syria, most recently in 
1982, although he has not yet played a 
significant military combat role in the 
Levant. 

Qadhafi has been actively involved in 
Chad from the time he came to power. 
In the 1970s his activity was subversive; 
his first military thrust into Chad came 
in late 1980. In 1970 he established 
training camps at Sebha and Kufra for 
Toubou tribesmen, native to the Tibesti 
region of northern Chad, as well as for 
Tuareg, who range further west. These 
camps have continued to play an impor- 
tant role in training Chadian and other 
African dissidents. Qadhafi sought to 
convert the Chadian president, Francois 
Tombalbaye, a southerner, to Islam, and 
with an offer of huge sums of money at- 
tempted to sweeten the occupation of 
the Aozou Strip in northernmost Chad 
in 1973 by the Libyan army. 

The seizure of the Aozou Strip 
placed the rebels from northern Chad in 
a quandary, since their patron was rob- 
bing them of their own land. It was an 
important factor in the bitter rivalry 
that arose between the two principal 
northern Muslim leaders, Hissein Habre 
and Goukouni Oueddei. Habre could not 
accept the Libyan seizure of any Chad- 
ian territory. The weaker of the two as 
a military or political leader, Goukouni 
saw his only route to power as a Libyan 
client, and since the mid-1970s Qadhafi's 
principal subversive and military ac- 
tivities in Chad have been focused on 
Goukouni. 



Qadhafi's logistical assistance to 
Goukouni enabled him to sweep south- 
ward in April 1978 in a campaign 
against President Felix Malloum, who 
had overthrown Tombalbaye. With 
French assistance Malloum stemmed 
Goukouni's advance, but a period of 
great instability ensued which led to 
Malloum's ouster and ultimately to the 
dispatch of Libyan troops to Chad in Oc- 
tober 1980. 

Qadhafi's incursion into Chad sup- 
ported Goukouni in reestablishing con- 
trol at N'Djamena. It was a success as a 
military operation— Qadhafi's 
first— even though Goukouni ultimately 
invited the Libyan forces to leave, and 
Goukouni was toppled by President 
Habre in June 1982. 

The 1980-81 operation and the pres- 
ent Libyan invasion of Chad have 
demonstrated the reality of Libya's mili- 
tary threat toward its weaker neighbors. 
Not only has one-third of Chad been 
seized and the country forced yet again 
to suffer the burden of war, but 
Qadhafi's military power has alarmed 
Libya's other southern neighbors, Sudan 
and Niger, and, indeed, all the militarily 
vulnerable west and central African 
states. 

During the incursion into Chad in 
1980-81, Libya projected and sustained 
a combat force of 7,000-9,000 men at 
distances of up to 700 miles from 
Libya's southern border (already 
600-700 miles from Libya's largest bases 
on the Mediterranean coast). Since then, 
Libya's ability to support such an opera- 
tion has improved. Libya continues to 
acquire Soviet transport aircraft, par- 
ticularly IL-76s and AN-26s, so that 
Libya's military airlift capability has in- 
creased by more than 50% since Sep- 
tember 1982. Libya also has improved 
its logistical facilities in southern Libya 
in order to be better prepared for sus- 
tained operations. The Libyan army 
stored equipment used in Chad in 
1980-81 and built ammunition depots at 
the principal southern bases of Sebha 
and Kufra, and it established petroleum 
storage facilities at the Aozou airbase, in 
the Aozou Strip, and at the new airfield 
at Matan as-Sarra, south of Kufra. The 
Libyans also completed hard-surfacing 
of the 350-mile road from Jalu to Kufra 
and are now hard-surfacing the track 
from Sebha to Chad. 

Qadhafi intended the 1983 phase of 
the Chadian war to appear as purely in- 
digenous. For a year he recruited, 
trained, organized, and armed Chadian 
dissidents under Goukouni's nominal 
leadership. With Libyans manning the 



3tober 1983 



73 



MIDDLE EAST 



heavy artillery that devastated President 
Habre's forces at Faya Largeau on 
June 24, the Libyan-stiffened insurgents 
began well but soon overextended them- 
selves. They were soundly defeated by 
Chadian Government forces at Abeche 
on July 11 and Faya Largeau on 
July 30, following the introduction of 
substantial French and then American 
military supplies as well as Zairian 
troops, at the request of the Chadian 
Government. 

Faced with the collapse of his plan 
to use insurgents to conquer Chad, 
Qadhafi decided that the Libyan military 
would have to intervene immediately in 
force. Libyan fighter aircraft began at- 
tacking Faya Largeau within hours after 
President Habre retook the oasis on 
July 30. Attacks intensified dramatically 
on July 31 and continued for several 
days and nights. Su-22 ground-attack 
fighters and Mirage F-ls participated 
from Aozou airbase along with the 
Tu-22 long-range bombers from Sebha, 
dropping high-explosives, cluster bombs, 
and napalm. The Libyans had total air 
superiority and operated with near im- 
punity, although the defenders brought 
down an Su-22 with machine-gun fire. 2 

During the air bombardment of 
Faya Largeau, Qadhafi— personally 
supervising matters at Sebha and Aozou 
airbase— sent men, armor, and artillery 
by air to Sebha, Kufra, and Aozou air- 
field, and thence by smaller air trans- 
ports or overland to the insurgent bases 
north of Faya Largeau. A large Libyan 
ground force was in place within strik- 
ing distance east and west of Faya 
Largeau within 10 days. It attacked the 
oasis on August 10 and drove the Chad- 
ian Government forces out. The Libyan 
force included mechanized battalions 
equipped with armored personnel car- 
riers, tank companies, field artillery bat- 
teries, multiple rocket launcher bat- 
teries, SA-9 batteries, and logistics 
units. The insurgents played an insignifi- 
cant role in the assault, although 
Qadhafi has continued to disavow any 
Libyan military presence in Chad south 
of the Aozou Strip. 

During this campaign, the Libyans 
have thus far assembled a smaller but 
more heavily equipped invasion force 
than in 1980-81. Instead of using infan- 
try equipped mainly with Land Rovers, 
the Libyans have employed mechanized 
units, and for the first time have sent 
longer range 130mm field guns to Chad. 
Although this force can be rapidly ex- 
panded, Qadhafi may prefer to keep his 
own troop commitment at the present 
size— 4,000-5,000— to stem public and 
military discontent in Libya. The present 



Libyan force, both in terms of men and 
materiel, is ample for the military con- 
quest of most of the country. Without 
external assistance to the insurgents, 
there would be no real contest between 
Goukouni and Habre, and the civil war 
would not have erupted again. Goukouni 
lacks the leadership capability and the 
resources, without Libyan involvement, 
to match Habre's. 

In addition to sponsoring Goukouni's 
forces in northern Chad, Qadhafi has 
been increasingly active in the south. 
Many dissidents recruited by Libyan 
agents in countries neighboring Chad 
and in Benin in the past year have been 
southerners transported by Libyan air- 
craft to Sebha and then grafted onto 
Goukouni's northern force. Even non- 
Chadians have been recruited, often ap- 
parently by force, as exemplified by the 
116 Sudanese captured at Oum 
Chalouba, a northeastern oasis retaken 
by Habre on August 10. Southern dissi- 
dent leader Kamougue has received con- 
siderable arms and funds from Qadhafi, 
as have other southern dissident leaders. 
Habre thus far has contained the disrup- 
tion in the south, but it has been another 
factor sapping his resources. Qadhafi's 
aim has been to pressure Habre as much 
as possible, in order to divert him from 
the central objective of rebuilding Chad. 

The Sahara is not Qadhafi's only 
military focus. Moderate Tunisia is also 
a principal objective, as Qadhafi ponders 
the resolve of Tunisia's Western allies 
and of Algeria to oppose Libyan designs. 
Qadhafi has deployed sizable Libyan 
forces near the border, within striking 
distance of key Tunisian population 
centers. 



LIBYAN SUBVERSION 

Virtually all African and Arab moderate 
regimes are targets of Libyan-supported 
subversion. Unable to persuade or bribe 
other states into submitting to a 
Qadhafi-led "Islamic revolution," and 
unable to use his army to force stronger 
states to submit to his will, Qadhafi has 
armed, funded, and trained a wide range 
of dissident groups to achieve his ends. 
Subversion has become the principal tool 
by which he hopes to fulfill his ambi- 
tions. 

Libyan subversive activities range 
far beyond neighboring states. Libya is a 
potential source of funds, arms, and 
safehaven for virtually any group claim- 
ing to be anti-Israel or anti-United 
States. Qadhafi's focus is on the Middle 
East and Africa, but he has been active 
in Europe and the Far East and has 
recently supported anti-U.S. regimes 
and subversive groups in Latin America. 



k 



si: 



In some cases, Libyan activity may 
take the form of handouts to individuals 
or small groups of dissidents pledging 
loyalty to Qadhafi. In several instances 
it has involved sustained support, with 
substantial payments and deliveries of 
military equipment. Subversive groups 
also frequently receive military training 
in Libya, where thousands of dissidents 
are being trained either in special camp 
created for the purpose or at Libyan 
bases. Most of the dissidents come frorrjal 
countries neighboring Libya, but they 
also are drawn from much further 
afield. Qadhafi's training program relief 
heavily on foreign instructors, including 
Soviets, Palestinians, Cubans, and East 
Germans, as well as Tunisians, Egyp- 
tians, and other foreigners who help 
train dissidents from their own country 
or region. 

Virtually every state in Africa and 
the Middle East has been the object of 
Qadhafi's meddling; the following review 
elaborates on Libyan subversive ac- 
tivities in those countries in which 
subversion has presented the greatest 
threat. 



m 

ltd 



Libya and Africa 

Qadhafi's failure to become chairman ol 
the Organization of African Unity (OAI 
during the abortive OAU summits at 
Tripoli in 1982 and his further rebuff a 
the Addis Ababa summit in June 1983 
have made it abundantly clear that he 
will be unable to achieve pan-African ir 
fluence by legitimate means. Subversio 
continues to be Qadhafi's principal 
modus operandi to expand his domain 
and gain wider African influence, 
although he is increasingly prone to usi- 
military intervention. By dint of militai 
weakness, structural fragility, and ex- 
treme poverty, the Sahelian states pre- 
sent a natural focus for Libyan efforts 
at domination. More distant African 
states offer Libya a similar temptation, 
as they often share the same features ( 
fragility and poverty. 

Sudan. Qadhafi's relationship with 
Sudan began on a hopeful note but soo» 
soured. President Jaafar Nimeiri came 
to power in Sudan only 3 months befop 
Qadhafi's coup in Libya; although 
Qadhafi emphasized unity with Nasser': 
Egypt, he saw Nimeiri as a potential 
ally. As early as December 27, 1969, 
Qadhafi, Nasser, and Nimeiri had signe 
a unity pact. Qadhafi played a part in 
foiling a communist coup attempt 
against Nimeiri on July 19, 1971. 



74 



Department of State Bulleti 



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MIDDLE EAST 



After Nasser's death and Sadat's 
rst years in power in Cairo, Qadhafi 
ist faith in his ability to persuade either 
f his eastern neighbors to accept his vi- 
!on of unity. The ultimate break came 
fter Qadhafi's participation in an at- 
;mpted coup against Nimeiri on July 2, 
976. Diplomatic relations and all 
ilateral agreements were ruptured. 

Qadhafi has played upon inherent 
udanese divisions, aided by geographi- 
il factors— the proximity of Ethiopia 
nd the vast, roadless distances from 
le Sudanese capital to outlying areas — 
) make Nimeiri's control of the country 
3 difficult as possible. Qadhafi has sent 
rms into the western areas bordering 
ibya in an effort to foment dissidence. 
luring the 1980-81 Libyan incursion in- 
) Chad, when Habre had retreated to 
le eastern Chad/western Sudan area, 
ibyan troops and aircraft made 
umerous "hot pursuit" raids on Sudan, 
ibya's present intervention in Chad is a 
irticularly ominous development for 
adan. Qadhafi's use of Sudanese dissi- 
jnts, perhaps numbering in the hun- 
-eds, in the recent fighting in north- 
istern Chad, suggests that one of his 
rjectives is to provide a staging base 
r the infiltration and destabilization of 
estern Sudan. 

Qadhafi has strengthened relations 
ith Ethiopia partly in order to try to 
ing down Nimeiri. Before the 
iperor's fall in 1974, Qadhafi sup- 
irted the Eritrean national liberation 
Dvement. Qadhafi then shifted away 
jm the Eritreans and embraced the 
I w Marxist regime in Addis Ababa. 
1 ie Ethiopians in turn have allowed 
i bya to train and arm thousands of 
1 idanese dissidents in Ethiopia. Qadhafi 
Is continually pressed Ethiopia to take 
I -nore prominent role in supporting 
I ese dissidents. 

Qadhafi's effort to foment a coup in 
jl 'bruary 1983 clearly revealed his interi- 
ms against Sudan. For months, 
idhafi had been funneling arms to a 
.danese dissident group, usually via 
hiopia. Despite the reservations of 
me of the dissident leaders, Qadhafi 
is determined on a coup as soon as 
ssible. Impatient at the delay, he 
I nself set the date. 

I In the weeks preceding February 18, 
Idhafi made conciliatory gestures 
t A-ard Sudan and Egypt in an attempt 
| lull Nimeiri and his Egyptian allies. 
I adence uncovered when the plot was 
1 led makes clear that Qadhafi envi- 
S>ned a rapid coup, effected with Lib- 
in support. Speed was necessary, 
Idhafi felt, in order to avoid drawing 
■ the Egyptians. Several days before 



the planned coup, Qadhafi transferred 
three Tu-22 bombers and a squadron of 
MiG-23 fighters to the airbase at the 
Kufra oasis in southeastern Libya. His 
plan was to bomb Sudanese military gar- 
risons and government buildings in 
Khartoum, while the dissidents took the 
center of the city. Libyan troops were to 
be transported to Khartoum as soon as 
the dissidents had secured a Sudanese 
airbase. 

The Sudanese Government dis- 
covered Qadhafi's plan, and Nimeiri 
called for Egyptian and American assist- 
ance. Egypt deployed F-5s while the 
United States provided AWACS support 
aircraft. These deployments became 
known in the Western press, and 
Qadhafi called a halt to his operation. 

The dissidents involved in the 
February 18 plot are only one of many 
groups supported by Qadhafi. It is clear 
that Qadhafi has now turned his 
energies toward other Sudanese groups 
in his drive to topple Nimeiri. During 
the seizure of European hostages by 
rebels from southern Sudan in June and 
July 1983, for example, the person who 
directed the negotiations for them 
before the hostages were released was a 
Libyan army officer. 

Niger. For years Libyan atlases 
have designated portions of Niger's 
Toummo region bordering Libya as be- 
ing a part of Libya. Thus, while Qadhafi 
has not yet seized this area as he has 
the Aozou Strip of Chad, Libyan inten- 
tions are clear. 

Qadhafi has continually meddled in 
Niger, seeking to play upon ethnic divi- 
sions. Since the early 1970s he has 
stirred up the Tuareg with propaganda 
calling for the union, under Libyan 
auspices, of the 500,000 Tuareg found in 
Niger, Mali, Mauritania, and Algeria 
with the 7,000 in Libya. Military train- 
ing for Niger Tuareg has been provided 
at a camp in Sebha since 1970, and 
Qadhafi has often condemned the "op- 
pression of the Tuareg." 

Qadhafi has intrigued with other 
forces in Niger as well. In March 1976, 
he supported a coup attempt against 
President Seyni Kountche. Libya cur- 
rently continues to support Nigerien 
dissidents based in Benin, to train 
Nigerien dissidents in Libya, and to en- 
courage rebellion by Tuareg nomads. 



Tunisia. Urbanized and well- 
endowed agriculturally, pro-Western and 
militarily weak, Tunisia is exposed to 
Libyan destabilizing efforts. Following 
disillusionment with Sadat and Nimeiri, 
Qadhafi pressed Tunisia's President 
Bourguiba into a merger agreement in 
1974. The accord was quickly renounced 
by the Tunisian leadership, enraging 
Qadhafi and prompting him to cultivate 
Tunisian dissidents. 

For years, many Tunisians, recruit- 
ed primarily from the 73,000 Tunisians 
working in Libya, have been trained in 
paramilitary and sabotage techniques at 
camps in Libya. Since failure of the uni- 
ty attempt, Qadhafi has initiated at least 
six plots against the Tunisian Govern- 
ment, including assassination attempts 
against its leaders. The most dramatic 
effort was the abortive January 1980 
raid on the mining town of Gafsa by 
about 50 Libyan-trained Tunisian dissi- 
dents, meant to be the first step in tak- 
ing over the country. In 1982, several 
Libyan-trained Tunisian dissidents were 
captured at Kasserine, in what appeared 
to be an effort to repeat the Gafsa at- 
tempt. In addition to Tunisians armed 
and trained in Libya, Qadhafi is working 
through Islamic fundamentalists, trade 
unionists, and student agents in Tunisia 
and in Western Europe to foment 
demonstrations and violent disturbances. 

Though Tunisia has bolstered its 
position with a treaty with Algeria in 
March 1983, Qadhafi has not abandoned 
his designs on Tunisia. Indeed, on 
March 2 he called on Tunisia to imple- 
ment longstanding unity agreements, 
threatening that "We will continue to 
agitate the masses for the revolution 
regardless of the existing regimes and 
borders." 3 

Egypt and Algeria. Egypt and 
Algeria, as states contiguous to Libya, 
receive much of Qadhafi's attention. His 
agents were particularly active in Egypt 
in the 1970s. Qadhafi has worked to gain 
the allegiance of Islamic fundamen- 
talists, though with little apparent suc- 
cess thus far. The recent stirrings of 
rapprochement in the Maghreb have 
been underscored by the first summit 
between Moroccan King Hassan and 
Algerian President Bendjedid on Febru- 
ary 26, 1983, and the first between 
Presidents Bendjedid and Bourguiba on 
March 18-20, 1983. They demonstrate 



tober 1983 



75 



MIDDLE EAST 



an Algerian turning away from Libya, 
already heralded by Algeria's attendance 
at the Fez summit in September 1982 
and its hosting of the Palestinian Na- 
tional Council meeting in mid-February 
1983. This Algerian- Libyan divergence, 
if it persists, could cause Qadhafi to in- 
crease subversive activity against 
Algeria. He is already in contact with, 
and financing, former Algerian Presi- 
dent Ben Bella, following the latter's 
release from house arrest and departure 
from Algeria. 

Morocco. Qadhafi is implacably op- 
posed to the Moroccan monarchy on 
principle, but his opposition is exacer- 
bated by King Hassan's pro-Western 
orientation and moderate role in the 
Arab community. Bitterness in the rela- 
tionship goes back to a military-rightist 
coup attempt against the king in 1971, 
to which Qadhafi precipitately pro- 
claimed support. 

Libya has been an important finan- 
cial backer of the Polisario since its 
founding in 1973 and, in recent years, 
has been an important source of heavy 
weaponry for the front. After the failure 
of the attempted OAU summit meetings 
in Tripoli in August and November 
1982, Qadhafi vowed greater support to 
the Polisario, acknowledging that his 
principal aim is to bring down King 
Hassan through the humiliation of 
defeat in the Western Sahara. However, 
Qadhafi seemed angered with the Poli- 
sario when it withdrew from the OAU 
summit at Addis Ababa in June 1983, 
and he announced that the Polisario ho 
longer needed his backing. 4 He then 
visited Morocco on June 30-July 3, lead- 
ing to an exchange of ambassadors on 
August 2 and to discussions about 
economic cooperation. These 
developments reflect a superficial thaw- 
ing of Libyan-Moroccan animosity for 
short-term tactical purposes. 

Mauritania. Qadhafi has been arro- 
gant during his visits to Mauritania, in- 
sisting that it adhere to his narrow con- 
cept of an "Arab, Islamic republic" and 
directing his economic assistance to that 
objective. He warned President Ould 
Daddah against opposing the Polisario 
and applauded Daddah's overthrow in a 
July 1978 coup. Libyans recently have 
been caught plotting against President 
Haidalla, who has expelled Libyan diplo- 
mats and closed down Libyan cultural 
centers in Mauritania. However, 
Haidalla has stopped short of rupturing 
relations with Libya. 



Somalia. Somalia has in recent 
years become a special target of 
Qadhafi's actions because of Somalia's 
friendly relationship with Egypt, Sudan, 
and the United States. In December 
1980, Qadhafi began supporting the 
Somali National Salvation Front, an in- 
surgent group operating out of Ethiopia. 
Infighting within the front ended with 
installation of a leadership chosen by 
Qadhafi. Since then, Libya has provided 
ample military aid. Libyan aircraft have 
ferried large quantities of weapons and 
supplies, including artillery and rockets, 
to the front's tactical headquarters at 
Dire Dawa, Ethiopia. Somali cadres are 
being given conventional military train- 
ing as well as instruction in guerrilla 
warfare and sabotage at Qadhafi's train- 
ing center for African revolutionaries in 
Sebha. The front has been responsible 
for bombings in Somalia's major cities. 

Meanwhile, the Somali-Ethiopian 
war has simmered, with hostilities occur- 
ring sporadically at Ethiopian initiative, 
as Libya has become a major arms sup- 
plier and financial backer for Ethiopia. 
Aid to Ethiopia in the last 2 years, 
following the signing of a Tripartite 
Pact among Libya, Ethiopia, and South 
Yemen in August 1981, has amounted to 
approximately half of Libya's total inter- 
national military and economic aid pro- 
gram. Mengistu's election instead of 
Qadhafi as chairman of the Organization 
of African Unity at its summit in June 
1983 led to friction in the Ethiopian- 
Libyan relationship, which Mengistu has 
partially alleviated by guiding the OAU 
away from an indictment of Libya for its 
intervention in Chad. 

Other African States. Several 
regimes vote with Libya in international 
fora— such as Angola, Madagascar, 
Mozambique, Congo, and Guinea- 
Bissau — but these states receive little 
Libyan aid because they do not serve 
Libyan ends beyond this international 
support. In addition to Ethiopia, the 
regimes that have received most Libyan 
assistance are Benin and Ghana. These 
are located near states that Qadhafi 
wishes to destabilize, such as Ivory 
Coast, Togo, Upper Volta, Niger, and 
Nigeria. Flight Lieutenant Rawlings' 
return to power in Ghana on Decem- 
ber 31, 1980, was bolstered by an im- 
mediate Libyan airlift of food, medicine, 
and arms. Benin is particularly impor- 
tant to Qadhafi; the Libyan People's 



Bureau there now numbers almost 100 ® 
persons and serves as the principal tran j 
sit and recruitment point for West 
Africans going to and returning from 
Libya for subversive training. Benin hasjjoi 
supported Libyan actions in Chad and 
elsewhere. 

In 1979 Qadhafi lost two great 
friends in black Africa: Bokassa of the 
Central African Empire and Idi Amin o: 
Uganda. Libya came to Idi Amin's 
defense during the Tanzanian interven 
tion and as a result suffered hundreds o 
casualties. Subsequently, Libya mounter 
a subversive campaign in both countries 

President Kolingba of the Central 
African Republic restored relations with 
Libya in September 1982 after receiving, 
a substantial Libyan grant and the 
promise of more to come, hoping to ob- 
tain Libyan support without Libyan de- 
stabilization. He acceded to Qadhafi's re 
quest to send a small contingent of Lib- 
yan troops to the Central African 
Republic in October 1982 but asked 
them to leave in May 1983, following ar 
unsatisfactory trip by President 
Kolingba to Tripoli. 

Disruption caused by Muslim funda- 
mentalists, Iranian-inspired but funded 
by Qadhafi, has become a serious prob- 
lem for Nigeria in recent years. 
Qadhafi's support for radicals in Senega 
and Gambia has led to a prolonged rup- 
ture in relations between those two 
countries and Libya. Libyan plotting 
against President Eyadema of Togo has 
employed Muslim radicals, including a 
coup attempt in October 1976. Togo's 
concern about Libyan machinations has 
increased as each of its neighbors has 
become a Libyan ally. Liberia's Presi- 
dent Doe recently revealed that Qadhaf l ^ 
inspired an assassination attempt 
against him in 1981. 

Libyan arming, training, and financ 
ing of Muslim rebels in Upper Volta coi 
tributed to President Zerbo's difficulties 
and may have led to his overthrow in 
November 1982. Qadhafi wooed the ne\ 
regime with arms shipments but focuse 
his efforts on helping President 
Ouedraogo's rival, Col. Sankara. In Ma; 
1983, Sankara was placed under house 
arrest but was soon freed and turned 
the tables with a successful coup on 
August 4. Sankara considers himself a 
"revolutionary" and advocates funda- 
mental change in Voltan society. He is 
known to be an admirer of Qadhafi. 
Sankara has called for the establishmen 
throughout the country of "worker de- 
fense committees"— a concept which 
Sankara has likened to Qadhafi's revolu 
tionary committees. 



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76 



Department of State Bulleti' :l 



bva 



■ 



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Li 



MIDDLE EAST 



Abya and the Middle East 

Jadhafi's foremost ambitions— however 
inrealistic— are to dominate the Arab 
vorld and lead the Arabs in the destruct- 
ion of Israel. His willingness to provide 
.rms and money to Arab groups that 
hare his views has been an important 
actor inhibiting compromise and threat- 
ning the stability of moderate regimes 
i the Middle East. 

The destruction of the Israeli state 

> one of Qadhafi's major policy themes. 
t n equally fundamental, though 
nstated, aspiration is to exert greater 
ower over and to obtain greater 
sspect from his Arab brethren to the 
ast than he has been able so far to 
chieve. An unwillingness to com- 
romise and an unflagging compulsion 

> dominate the Arab world explain his 
itense and ever-strained relationship 
ven with Arab groups which come 
osest to sharing his views. While 
adhafi has not achieved the influence 

i seeks in the Arab world, he has 
ayed an important negative role. Lib- 
m arms and money have flowed to 
ose who have displayed the greatest 
transigence and willingness to resort 
violence. In 1981, for example, 
■liveries of arms and military-related 
lancial disbursements to various Pales- 
lian groups were documented at near- 
$100 million. 

Qadhafi's relationship with the 
ilestinians has been checkered, 
idhafi has counseled the Palestinians 
"fight to the last man"— indeed, in 
idhafi's own words, to commit 
icide— but his own commitment of Lib- 
Tis to the battle has been marginal. 
)t long after he came to power he 
blicly criticized the Palestinians for 
sir lack of valor in the 1967 war. 
rious with the Arab compromises 
th Israel after the 1973 war, Qadhafi 
3ame embittered toward Sadat and 
t off aid to Fatah. After the 1982 
•aeli invasion of Lebanon and the 
lestinian evacuation of Beirut, he 1am- 
sted the Palestinians for cowardice 
d refused to attend the September 
32 Fez summit. 

As early as 1972, Qadhafi estab- 
ned a number of training camps in 
nya for Palestinians. Some were to 
Dvide training in conventional warfare, 
t Qadhafi's main interest was in pro- 
ling terrorist training. A small 
)yan-sponsored Palestinian splinter 
)up, formed after Qadhafi had lost pa- 
nce not only with Fatah's leader Yasir 
afat but also with the more radical 
orge Habash of the Popular Front for 
; Liberation of Palestine, staged ter- 



rorist attacks on the Athens and Rome 
airports in 1973, killing 35 people. After 
Sadat's journey to Jerusalem in Novem- 
ber 1977, Arafat and Qadhafi had a brief 
rapprochement, resulting in the creation 
of the Steadfastness Front. 

However, formation of the Stead- 
fastness Front failed to paper over the 
essential problem: Qadhafi's determina- 
tion to dominate the Palestinian move- 
ment and to prevent any possibility of 
compromise. Qadhafi soon reneged on 
promises of financial support for the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). 
Meanwhile, several of the smaller, more 
radical factions within the PLO have 
continued to come to Tripoli for arms 
and financing. 

Since April 1983, Qadhafi has active- 
ly joined Syria in promoting a revolt 
within Fatah, which culminated in 
Arafat's expulsion from Damascus. 
Although Qadhafi's and Assad's long- 
term objectives are different, their im- 
mediate objectives coincide. Assad seeks 
to maintain maximum Syrian control in 
Lebanon and to regain the Golan 
Heights. To these ends, he wants to pre- 
vent a negotiation between Arafat and 
King Hussein of Jordan or any Israeli- 
Lebanese agreement that gives the 
Israelis gains in Lebanon. Qadhafi's 
goal, on the other hand, is the perma- 
nent radicalization of the PLO with the 
aim of destroying Israel. 

While working with the radical 
Palestinians against Israel, he also has 
threatened the conservative Arab 
monarchies, sultanates, and emirates. 
Qadhafi was a prime mover behind the 
ultimately unsuccessful Dhofar rebellion 
against the Sultan of Oman, and he has 
closely allied himself with the People's 
Democratic Republic of Yemen and sup- 
ported the National Democratic Front, 
the principal insurgent group in North 
Yemen. The recent mellowing of rela- 
tions between South Yemen and Oman 
and the Persian Gulf states has led to a 
cooling of relations between Aden and 
Tripoli. 

Libya supported the Iranian revolu- 
tion from its outset, principally on the 
ground of Khomeini's opposition to 
Israel; Qadhafi also has backed Iran 
since the beginning of the war with Iraq. 
Libyan support was invaluable to Iran in 
preventing the war from being labeled 
an Arab-Persian conflict. Qadhafi's sup- 
port has been far more than verbal, as 
Libya has been one of Iran's major arms 
suppliers. Nevertheless, the relationship 
with revolutionary Iran has been 
troubled. Many Iranian leaders take a 
dim view of Qadhafi due to the 1978 dis- 
appearance of the Shia Imam Musa Sadr 



while visiting Libya. Qadhafi distrusts 
the Iranian revolution because he cannot 
control it, and he resents its wide appeal 
when his own "Islamic revolution" has 
had so little. 

Libya and Latin America 

In the 1980s Qadhafi broadened his ac- 
tivities into Latin America. Nicaragua 
and El Salvador are Qadhafi's focus, but 
Libyan arms, funds, and training are 
becoming available to leftist opposi- 
tionists throughout Latin America. 
Libya provided $100 million to 
Nicaragua in 1981 and since May 1982 
has made several deliveries of Libyan 
arms to the Sandinistas and the 
Salvadoran guerrillas. 

Although he had had a minor arms 
relationship with Brazil, until the 1980s 
Qadhafi had taken relatively little in- 
terest in the Western Hemisphere. With 
the triumph in 1979 of the Sandinistas 
in Nicaragua and the subsequent intensi- 
fication of the guerrilla insurgency in El 
Salvador, Qadhafi began to provide 
significant amounts of military and 
economic aid to selected groups. His ob- 
jective appears to be to try to under- 
mine the position of the United States, 5 
although he demonstrated, by dispatch- 
ing arms aid, including missiles, to 
Argentina during the Falklands conflict, 
April-June 1982, that the United 
Kingdom is also a target. 

Nicaragua has been the main bene- 
factor of Qadhafi's new interest. The 
guerrillas in El Salvador have also bene- 
fited indirectly through the Sandinistas 
and directly through contact with aid- 
dispensing Libyan agents. Leaders of 
both the Sandinistas and Farabundo 
Marti movements have made frequent 
visits to Tripoli. In 1981 Qadhafi dis- 
bursed $100 million in economic aid to 
the Sandinistas. Beginning in May 1982, 
Libya also flew armaments to 
Nicaragua, carrying artillery, small 
arms, ammunition, and several 
helicopters and small aircraft. Libya's at- 
tempt to send three IL-76s and one 
C-130 to Managua, transiting Brazil in 
mid- April 1983, deeply troubled 
Brazilian-Libyan relations. Cuba, for its 
part, has not welded a close alliance 
with Qadhafi, although it also has re- 
ceived important economic aid from him, 
and there are 3,000 Cubans in Libya in- 
volved mainly in construction. 

Libyan aid is not important else- 
where in Latin America, but Qadhafi's 
agents have become increasingly active. 
Since 1979 Libya has attempted to make 
inroads among radicals in the English- 



tober 1983 



77 



MIDDLE EAST 



speaking Caribbean, concentrating on 
Grenada. Qadhafi has offered the Bishop 
regime aid for a large airport now being 
built by Cubans for the probable use of 
Cuban and Soviet planes and provided 
Grenada with fiberglass power patrol 
boats. A Libyan People's Bureau has 
been established in Grenada and is in- 
volved in funneling money to leftist 
groups throughout the Caribbean. Lef- 
tist leaders from the Dominican 
Republic, Dominica, Barbados, Antigua, 
St. Vincent, Grenada, and St. Lucia 
have been invited to "seminars" in 
Tripoli and have been instructed in the 
use of paramilitary forces. 

Leftists in Venezuela, Colombia, 
Chile, Costa Rica, and Honduras have _ 
sought and received Libyan assistance in 
recent years. Qadhafi has opened his 
paramilitary training camps to Latin 
American trainees, including 
Nicaraguans, Salvadorans, Colombians, 
Surinamese, Chileans, Costa Ricans, and 
Hondurans. 



QADHAFI'S NEGATIVE IMPACT 

Qadhafi has been frustrated in many of 
his objectives, and yet he has had an im- 
pact. His machinations throughout 
Africa and the Middle East, and now in 
Latin America, are a destabilizing force. 
Disappointment has in no way deterred 
him. 

For all this effort, Qadhafi has not 
been successful in many of his ventures. 
He remains dissatisfied even with his 
relationship with his few allies: the 
Soviet Union and Eastern bloc, Iran, 
Ethiopia, Benin, Ghana, North Korea, 
Cuba, and Nicaragua. 

Qadhafi's assassination plots have 
usually failed, except for those against 
Libyan exiles. His largesse has been 
dispensed so inconsistently that some of 
his friends, such as Iran and Ethiopia, 
are resentful and distrustful. Potentially 
sympathetic states throughout Africa 
and the Caribbean voice complaints 
about Libyan miserliness and high- 
handedness. 

There is, however, no indication that 
Qadhafi's political and economic setbacks 
have deterred him from international ac- 
tivism. Qadhafi's internal security posi- 
tion apparently has not been weakened, 
thanks to his thorough security forces. 
The economic slump has entailed a ma- 
jor cutback in imports and development 
projects, but it has not forced Qadhafi to 
cease purchases of military hardware or 
to focus on purely internal matters. The 
financing of subversive activities — unlike 
military purchases— has never amounted 



to a major proportion of the Libyan 
budget. More critical is the willingness 
to provide assistance in subversion, and 
that willingness Qadhafi has always 
possessed. No amount of frustration of 
his political ambitions will cause him to 
abandon them. As a fanatic with a 
vaunted self-concept whose accustomed 
stance is that of a beleaguered loner and 
whose accustomed mode of interaction is 
confrontation, Qadhafi is not cowed by 
adversity. 

Qadhafi has altered the power 
balance in northeastern Africa and 
created a permanent state of anxiety on 
the part of his weaker neighbors, 
distracting them from economic develop- 
ment. His machinations throughout 
Africa have contributed to instability 
and encouraged anti-American elements. 
Money and arms have been dispensed 
throughout the continent, available to 
virtually any bidder willing to do 
obeisance to him. In the Middle East, 
Qadhafi is deprecated for his preaching, 
but the ever-present lure of his money 
and his Soviet arms has been a constant 
fixture, tilting the balance away from 
moderation and compromise. Those bent 
on violence and terror have found en- 
couragement, and those inclined to com- 
promise and constructive resolutions to 
complex problems have often been 
bullied into silence. They have had to 
cope with the very real threat of 
Qadhafi-supported terrorism. Qadhafi's 
accomplishment has been to increase 
markedly the level of fear amongst the 
weak or the humane, to set back the 
momentum of accommodation and peace 
in the Middle East, and to sow instabili- 
ty among the poverty-stricken fledgling 
states of Africa. Qadhafi's ambitions and 
hatreds are so ingrained that there is lit- 
tle prospect for change. 



1 "We will not allow any trivial person to 
give Libya a bad reputation abroad. Such 
people are charged with hig^h treason because 
of the their collaboration with the Israelis 
and Americans. They should be killed not be- 
cause they constitute any danger, but be- 
cause of their high treason. It is the Libyan 
people's responsibility to liquidate such scums 
who are distorting Libya's image" (Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service [FBIS], 
October 12, 1982). 



2 The Chadian charge d'affaires in Paris 
announced on August 7 that the pilot of the 
Sukhoi-22 shot down on August 5 was the 
commander of Libyan aerial operations in th 
Aozou Strip (FBIS, August 8, 1983). On 
August 8 the pilot told journalists in 
N'Djamena that "12 Libyan Sukhoi and 
Tupolev warplanes," some based in Aozou 
and some at Sebha, were attacking Faya 
Largeau "daily in twos, dropping fragmenta- 
tion bombs and napalm." He said he himself 
had taken part in "40 to 50 bombing raids." 
When asked the object of the Libyan inter- 
vention, he said, "The forces of the GUNT 
(Goukouni's Transitional Government of Na- 
tional Unity) want to retake Faya Largeau 
and the Libyan air force intervened to pre- 
pare for a ground attack which is supposed ti 
take place soon" (FBIS, August 9, 1983) 

3 FBIS, March 3, 1983. 

4 FBIS, June 17, 1983. See also Qadhafi's 
September 1, 1983, speech: "Frankly, the 
weapons supplied to the Polisario should hav 
been aimed at the hearts of the Israelis and 
the Americans, the real enemies of the 
Polisario, the Moroccans, the Libyans, the 
Algerians, and the Mauritanians" (FBIS, 
September 2, 1983). 

6 Note, for example, Qadhafi's speech on 
the 14th anniversary of his coup: "When we 
ally ourselves with revolution in Latin 
America, and particularly Central America, 
we are defending ourselves. This satan [the 
United States] must be clipped and we must 
take war to the American borders just as 
America is taking threats to the Gulf of Sidr» " 
and to the Tibesti Mountains" (FBIS, 
September 2, 1983). ■ 



Si 



78 



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MIDDLE EAST 



Situation in Lebanon 



VHITE HOUSE STATEMENT. 
lUG. 19, 1983 1 

'our weeks ago, President Reagan reaf- 
rmed his commitment to three fun- 
amental goals in Lebanon — the earliest 
ossible withdrawal of all foreign forces, 
le extension of Lebanese sovereignty 
iroughout its territory, and that 
ebanon shall not again become a source 
f hostile actions against Israel. The 
jreement concluded between Israel and 
ebanon on May 17 is an important step 
ward achievement of these goals. The 
resident directed that U.S. efforts be 
mewed in a mission to the Middle East 
mded by Ambassadors Robert 
cFarlane and Richard Fairbanks 
lichard C. McFarlane, the President's 
Tsonal representative in the Middle 
ast, and Richard H. Fairbanks III, 
■ecial negotiator for the Middle East 
ace process]. 

Since that time, Ambassadors 
cFarlane and Fairbanks have traveled 
tensively throughout the region, 
dertaking intensive talks with Arab 
d Israeli leaders. Several conclusions 
ve emerged from these talks. 

First and foremost is the solid foun- 
tion of support in the Arab world and 
Israel for the principles of full 
thdrawal and full authority for the 
•banese Government. Equally clear is 
3 enormity of the task the Lebanese 
•vernment faces in seeking to 
■engthen the consensus among the 
'erse confessional groups in Lebanon 
dch is so essential to the reconstruc- 
n and revitalization of the Lebanese 
momy and the establishment of 
itical stability. It is clear that Presi- 
it Gemayel is committed to these 
lis. 

In its efforts, the Government of 
banon will soon face an opportunity to 
tore stability and extend the process 
reconstruction and consensus-building 
the districts of Alayh and Shuf as the 
vernment of Israel withdraws its 
ces from these areas. This move by 
ael is the first in a process of with- 
twal envisaged in the May 17 agree- 
nt. In recent weeks, some have ques- 
ned the motives underlying this 
ndrawal by Israel, saying that it 
sages a permanent partition of 
oanon. We are convinced that the 
aeli Government is committed to the 
withdrawal of its forces in Lebanon. 



In this regard, it is instructive to note 
official Israeli statements such as the 
following: 

It is the policy and the intention of the 
Government of Israel to withdraw from the 
whole of Lebanon and that the redeployment 
of our forces along the Awwali line is only 
part of that total withdrawal. 

It is our firm desire to see a strong cen- 
tral government restoring its authority over 
the whole of Lebanon and maintaining securi- 
ty throughout its 10,452 square kilometers; 
thus, all allegations regarding Israeli inten- 
tions of bringing about a partition or division 
of Lebanon are completely baseless and total- 
ly without foundation. 

We are confident that further Israeli 
withdrawal will take place as efforts 
continue to secure the concurrent 
withdrawal of PLO [Palestine Liberation 
Organization] and Syrian forces. 

The United States pledges its best 
efforts to help create conditions which 
will allow these withdrawals to take 
place at the earliest possible moment. 
Within this context, the Governments of 
Israel and Lebanon will coordinate the 
smooth and orderly return of respon- 
sibility in the Alayh-Shuf areas. Concur- 
rently, efforts by the Government of 
Lebanon to strengthen the consensus 
will continue so that stability and 
reconstruction can take hold. 

We call upon Syria and the PLO for 
a corresponding process of withdrawal 
so that Lebanon can be restored as a 
unified, sovereign, independent country. 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
AUG. 29, 1983 2 

We are shocked and grieved by the 
deaths of the U.S. Marines in Lebanon. 
They died while serving the United 
States in its efforts to help the Lebanese 
Central Government restore order to the 
greater Beirut area. We condemn those 
who are responsible for the continuing 
violence, which has claimed many vic- 
tims, including our own Marines. Our 
forces are there at the request of the 
Government of Lebanon in helping to 
provide security for the Lebanese peo- 
ple. Once more we call on all elements to 
end this senseless violence and unite 
behind the Lebanese Government to 
restore national harmony. 

The President was informed this 
morning at 1:55 a.m. Pacific time at the 
ranch by National Security Adviser Bill 
Clark. This notification took place 1 



hour and 6 minutes after the incident oc- 
curred in Beirut. The President ex- 
pressed profound sorrow, terming the 
death of two U.S. Marines as tragic. The 
President paid tribute to the courage of 
the Marines in their role as peace- 
keepers. The President will shortly 
speak by telephone to the families of the 
two Marines, expressing his and Mrs. 
Reagan's personal condolences and 
sorrow. 

The President this morning has con- 
ferred by telephone with Secretary of 
State George Shultz and Secretary of 
Defense Caspar Weinberger, as well as 
Bill Clark. At the President's direction, a 
national security group, composed of 
representatives of the departments and 
agencies most involved in this matter, 
was convened in Washington this morn- 
ing. The purpose was to review the cur- 
rent situation in Beirut and to make ad- 
ditional recommendations on the U.S. 
role in continuing to pursue the peaceful 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from 
Lebanon. 

The President directed a meeting of 
the Administration's most senior officials 
be convened this afternoon in Washing- 
ton to continue the review. I would an- 
ticipate the President will confer with 
the Vice President following that 
meeting. 

In the Middle East, Ambassador 
McFarlane continues his mission. He is 
in Beirut today. His goal is to negotiate 
with all groups in Lebanon to facilitate a 
peaceful withdrawal of all foreign forces. 
The President has directed his staff to 
inform the congressional leadership and 
the chairmen and ranking members of 
the Armed Services Committees and the 
Foreign Relations Committee members 
on the situation. 



PRESIDENT'S LETTER 
TO THE CONGRESS, 
AUG. 30, 1983 3 

On September 29, 1982, I reported to you 
concerning the introduction of United States 
Armed Forces in Lebanon to participate in 
the Multinational Force (MNF) requested by 
the Government of Lebanon. The presence of 
this Force was designed to facilitate the 
restoration of Lebanese Government 
sovereignty and authority, and thereby fur- 
ther the efforts of the Government of 
Lebanon to assure the safety of persons in 
the area and bring to an end the violence that 
had tragically recurred. I directed this 
deployment pursuant to my constitutional 
authority with respect to the conduct of 
foreign relations and as Commander-in-Chief 
of the United States Armed Forces. 



tober1983 



79 



TREATIES 



We have periodically provided Congress 
with updated information on the activities of 
these forces and on the circumstances of 
their deployment in Lebanon. In light of re- 
cent events, I am providing this further 
report on the deployment, in accordance with 
my desire that Congress continue to be in- 
formed on this matter, and consistent with 
Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution. 

On August 28, sporadic fighting between 
Lebanese Armed Forces and various armed 
factions took place in South Beirut; from 
time to time during the course of this 
fighting, positions in the vicinity of the 
Beirut airport manned by U.S. Marines of the 
MNF came under small-arms fire (without in- 
jury to U.S. personnel), and this fire was 
returned. On August 29, fighting erupted 
again. Marine positions came under mortar, 
rocket, and small-arms fire, with the result 
that two Marines were killed and fourteen 
wounded. In addition, several artillery rounds 
fell near the U.S.S. IWO JIMA (an am- 
phibious support vessel lying offshore), with 
no resulting damage or injuries. As con- 
templated by their rules of engagement, U.S. 
Marines returned fire with artillery, small 
arms, and, in one instance, rocket fire from a 
helicopter gunship. There were additional ex- 
changes of fire earlier today, August 30, 
without injury to U.S. personnel. 

Later today, a ceasefire came into effect 
in the area in which the Marines were 
deployed, and firing on Marine positions 
ceased. Diplomatic efforts are underway to 
extend this ceasefire. In the meantime, U.S. 
forces will be prepared to exercise their right 
of self-defense should such attacks recur. 

I believe that the continued presence of 
these U.S. forces in Lebanon is essential to 
the objective of helping to restore the ter- 
ritorial integrity, sovereignty, and political in- 
dependence of Lebanon. It is still not possible 
to predict the duration of the presence of 
these forces in Lebanon; we will continue to 
assess this question in the light of progress 
toward this objective. 

I will keep the Congress informed as to 
further developments with respect to this 
situation. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Reagan 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 4, 1983 4 

The new eruptions of fighting in 
Lebanon threaten to prolong the suffer- 
ing of the Lebanese people. We strongly 
support the call of President Gemayel 
and the Lebanese Government for na- 
tional unity. We call on governments 
which count themselves as friends of 
Lebanon to encourage a positive 
response to this appeal. 

To the Lebanese themselves, we 
pledge our continued active involvement 
in pursuing the goals which we share, in- 
cluding the withdrawal of all foreign 



forces from Lebanon. We urge max- 
imum restraint on the part of factional 
leaders and their cooperation with 
government efforts to achieve a political 
reconciliation and restore the security 
which the people of all religious com- 
munities so earnestly desire. 

Ambassador McFarlane is returning 
to the area today to work with the 
governments and leaders concerned. He 
and Ambassador Fairbanks have our 
fullest support as they work to restore 
and maintain peace in Lebanon. 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 6, 1983 6 

The deaths of the two U.S. Marines and 
wounding of three others in the early 
morning hours of September 6 saddened 
us all. We condemn those responsible for 
the continuing violence that has claimed 
thousands of innocent victims. We are 
proud of our own forces and the impor- 
tant role they are playing to achieve 
security for the Lebanese people. 

The Lebanese Government has 
issued a call to all parties to unite to 
restore national dialogue. We will con- 
tinue to work with them toward that 
end. The goal of a newly united 
Lebanon, free of foreign forces, is a 
dream of the Lebanese people, 
regardless of their religious community. 
Together with our Italian, French, and 
British partners in the multinational 
force, we are performing a critical role 
in support of the effort of the central 
government. No one should mistake our 
determination to continue in this just 
cause. 



■Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 29, 1983. 

2 Made by the principal deputy press 
secretary to the President Larry Speakes in 
Santa Barbara (text from Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents of Sept. 5, 
1983). 

identical letters addressed to Thomas P. 
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and Strom Thurmond, 
President pro tempore of the Senate (text 
from Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Sept. 5, 1983). 

4 Made available to news correspondents 
by acting Department spokesman Robert 
illiams. 

5 Text from White House press release. ■ 



W 



Current Actions 



ilei 
e» 

itii 



MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Antarctic treaty. Signed at Washington 
Dec. 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23, 
1961. TIAS 4780. 
Accession deposited: India, Aug. 19, 1983. 

Recommendations relating to the furtherance 
of the principles and objectives of the Antarc- 
tic Treaty (TIAS 4780). Done at Wellington 
Nov. 10, 1972. Recommendations VII-1 
through VII-3 and VII-6 entered into force 
May 29, 1975. ' TIAS 8500. 
Notification of approval: F.R.G., Aug. 4, 1983 

for VII-4 and VII-9. 

Entry into force of VII-4 and VII-9: Aug. 4, 

1983. 

Recommendations relating to the furtherance 
of principles and objectives of the Antarctic 
Treaty (TIAS 4780). Done at London Oct. 7 
1977; at Washington Oct. 5, 1979; and at 
Buenos Aires July 7, 1981. 2 
Notifications of approval: F.R.G., Aug. 4, 

1983. 



Dtl 
It 

:..■: 
it 



:< 



W 

- 



I* 

•" 
II 

::■: 



■ 
He 



Automotive Traffic 

Convention on road traffic, with annexes and J; 

protocol. Done at Geneva Sept. 19, 1949. 

Entered into force Mar. 26, 1952. TIAS 

2487. 

Accession deposited: Iceland, July 22, 1983 



Aviation 

Convention on international civil aviation. 
Done at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into 
force Apr. 4, 1947. TIAS 1591. 
Adherence deposited: Vanuatu, Aug. 17, 

19S3 

Protocol on the authentic quadrilingual text 
of the convention on international civil avia- 
tion (TIAS 1591) with annex. Done at Mon- 
treal Sept. 30, 1977. 2 
Acceptance deposited: Belgium, Aug. 12, 

1983. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague 
Dec. 16, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 14, 
1971. TIAS 7192. 
Accession deposited: Tanzania, Aug. 9, 1983. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done 
at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into 
force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 
Accession deposited: Tanzania, Aug. 9, 1983. 



Coffee 

International coffee agreement 1976, with an 
nexes. Done at London Dec. 3, 1975. Enterec 
into force Oct. 1. 1976, provisionally; Aug. 1 
1977, definitively. TIAS 8683. 
Accession deposited: Fiji, June 30, 1983. 



80 



iii 

m 
lei 

• 



.: 



TREATIES 



iternational coffee agreement 1983, with an- 
exes. Done at London Sept. 16, 1982. 2 
.atification deposited : El Salvador, Aug. 1, 
983. 

otton 

rticles of agreement of International Cotton 
istitute. Done at Washington Jan. 17, 1966. 
ntered into force Feb. 23, 1966. TIAS 5964. 
ccession deposited: Zimbabwe, Aug. 1, 
983. 

ustoms 

ternational convention on the simplification 
id harmonization of customs procedures, 
ith annexes. Signed at Kyoto May 18, 1973. 
ntered into force Sept. 25, 1974. 3 
strument of accession signed by the Pres- 
ent: Aug. 16, 1983. 4 

sheries 

istern Pacific Ocean tuna fishing agree- 
;nt, with protocol. Done at San Jose 
a.r. 15, 1983. 2 

nate advice and consent to ratification: 
ly 27, 1983. 

nvention on future multilateral cooperation 
the northwest Atlantic fisheries. Done at 
;awa Oct. 24, 1978. Entered into force 
i. 1, 1979. 3 

late advice and consent to ratification: 
to 27, 1983. 

I nocide 

i nvention on the prevention and punish- 

nt of the crime of genocide. Adopted at 
1 ris Dec. 9, 1948. Entered into force 

l. 12, 1951. 78UNTS277. 3 
! session deposited: Senegal, Aug. 4, 1983 



iicial Procedure— Child Abduction 

, ivention on the civil aspects of interna- 
; lal child abduction. Done at The Hague 
..25, 1980. 2 
1 ification deposited: Canada, June 2, 

ks3> 6 

I Iicial Procedure — Documents 

S lvention on the service abroad of judicial 

I I extrajudicial documents in civil or com- 

I rcial matters. Done at The Hague Nov. 15, 
S .5. Entered into force Feb. 10, 1969. TIAS 

.8. 

nature: Greece, July 20, 1983. 

ification deposited: Greece, July 20, 
3. 6 



ernational agreement on jute and jute 
ducts, 1982, with annexes. Done at 
leva Oct. 1, 1982. 2 
ification of provisional application de- 



ited: Greece, July 25, 1983. 



Marine Pollution 

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international 
convention for the prevention of pollution 
from ships, 1973. Done at London Feb. 17, 
1978. Enters into force Oct. 2, 1983. 
Accessions deposited: Bahamas, June 7, 

1983; 7 Gabon, Apr. 6, 1983; Japan, June 9, 
1983. 4 

Postal 

Additional protocol to the constitution of the 

Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964 

(TIAS 5881). Done at Tokyo Nov. 14, 1969. 

TIAS 7150. 

Ratification deposited: Zambia, June 13, 

1983. 

Second additional protocol to the constitution 
of the Universal Postal Union of July 10, 
1964 (TIAS 5881). Done at Lausanne July 5, 
1974. TIAS 8231. 

Ratifications deposited: Bahrain, Mar. 29, 
1983; Zambia, June 13, 1983. 

General regulations of the Universal Postal 
Union, with final protocol and annex, and the 
universal postal convention with final pro- 
tocol and detailed regulations. Done at Rio de 
Janeiro Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force 
July 1, 1981. TIAS 9972. 
Approvals deposited: Byelorussian S.S.R., 

Aug. 4, 1983; U.S.S.R., June 23, 1983; U.K., 

July 26, 1983. 

Ratifications deposited: Bahrain, Mar. 29, 

1983; Jordan, Aug. 3, 1983; Zambia, June 13, 

1983. 

Accession deposited: Sao Tome & Principe, 

July 25, 1983. 

Money orders and postal travelers' checks 
agreement, with detailed regulations with 
final protocol. Done at Rio de Janeiro 
Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force July 1, 
1981. TIAS 9973. 
Ratification deposited: Jordan, Aug. 3, 1983. 

Accession deposited: Sao Tome & Principe, 

July 25, 1983. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life 
at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London 
Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25, 
1980. TIAS 9700. 
Ratification deposited: Ghana, May 19, 1983. 

Acceptance deposited: Iceland, July 6, 1983. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement relating to the International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization 
(INTELSAT), with annexes. Done at 
Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into 
force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532. 

Operating agreement relating to the Interna- 
tional Telecommunications Satellite Organiza- 
tion (INTELSAT), with annex. Done at 
Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into 
force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532. 
Notification of withdrawal deposited: Cape 

Verde, July 27, 1983; effective Oct. 27, 1983. 



Tonnage 

International convention on tonnage measure- 
ment of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at 
London June 23, 1969. Entered into force 
July 18, 1982; Feb. 10, 1983 for the U.S. 
TIAS 10490. 

Acceptance deposited: Venezuela, July 6, 
1983. 
Accession deposited : Maldives, June 2, 1983. 

Trade 

Protocol extending the arrangement regard- 
ing international trade in textiles of Dec. 20, 
1973, as extended (TIAS 7840, 8939). Done 
at Geneva Dec. 22, 1981. Entered into force 
Jan. 1, 1982. TIAS 10323. 
Acceptance deposited: Haiti, Aug. 9, 1983. 

Arrangement regarding bovine meat. Done at 

Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force 

Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9701. 

Acceptance deposited: Guatemala, Aug. 4, 

1983. 

United Nations convention on contracts for 
the international sale of goods. Done at Vien- 
na Apr. 11, 1980. 2 

Accession deposited: Argentina, July 19, 
1983. 

UN Industrial Development Organization 

Constitution of the UN Industrial Develop- 
ment Organization, with annexes. Done at 
Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. 2 
Signature: Nepal, Aug. 11, 1983. 

Ratification deposited: Hungary, Aug. 15, 

1983. 

Instrument of ratification signed by the 

President: Aug. 2, 1983. 8 

Whaling 

Amendments to the schedule to the interna- 
tional convention for the regulation of whal- 
ing, 1946 (TIAS 1849). Adopted at Brighton 
July 18-23, 1983. Enters into force 90 days 
after notification by the International Whal- 
ing Commission to the contracting govern- 
ments, unless any contracting government 
lodges an objection. 

Wheat 

1983 protocol for the further extension of the 
wheat trade convention, 1971 (TIAS 7144). 
Done at Washington Apr. 4, 1983. Entered 
into force July 1, 1983. 
Ratifications deposited: Egypt, Aug. 17, 

1983; Iraq, July 22, 1983; Venezuela, July 29, 

1982. 

Accession deposited: Bolivia, Aug. 8, 1982. 



BILATERAL 

Argentina 

Agreement relating to cooperation and 
mutual assistance in cartography and 
geodesy, with annex. Signed at Buenos Aires 
July 11, 1983. Entered into force July 11, 
1983. 



tober 1983 



81 



TREATIES 



Belgium 

Memorandum of understanding concerning 
the furnishing of balloon launching and 
associated services. Signed at Washington 
June 5 and 15, 1983. Entered into force 
June 15, 1983. 

Belize 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Apr. 6, 1983, for control of illicit production 
and traffic of drugs. Signed at Belize 
Aug. 11, 1983. Entered into force Aug. 11, 
1983. 

Bolivia 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales 
of agricultural commodities of May 31, 1978 
(TIAS 9518). Effected by exchange of notes 
at La Paz July 15, 1983. Entered into force 
July 15, 1983. 

Brazil 

Agreement on cooperation in the field of con- 
trol of illicit traffic of drugs, with annex. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Brasilia 
July 19, 1983. Entered into force July 19, 
1983. 

Chad 

Mutual defense assistance agreement. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at N'Djamena 
Julv 19 and 20, 1983. Entered into force 
July 20, 1983. 

Colombia 

International express mail agreement, with 
detailed regulations. Signed at Washington 
and Bogota June 13 and July 7, 1983. 
Entered into force Sept. 3, 1983. 

Cook Islands 

Treaty on friendship and delimitation of the 
maritime boundary between the United 
States of America and the Cook Islands. 
Signed at Rarotonga June 11, 1980. 2 
Instrument of ratification signed by the 
President: Aug. 16, 1983. 

Denmark 

Agreement amending the air transport serv- 
ices agreement of Dec. 16, 1944, as amended 
(58 Stat. 1458, TIAS 3014, 4071, 6021). Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Washington 
Aug. 2, 1983. Enters into force on the day 
U.S. receives written confirmation that 
Sweden, Denmark, and Norway have become 
parties to the U.S.-ECAC memorandum of 
understanding of Dec. 17, 1982. 

Agreement concerning the inclusion of Den- 
mark, Norway, and Sweden in the memoran- 
dum of understanding between the U.S. and 
members of the European Civil Aviation Con- 
ference of Dec. 17, 1982, with attachments. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
Aug. 2, 1983. Enters into force when U.S. 
receives written confirmation that Sweden, 
Denmark, and Norway have become parties 
to the memorandum of understanding. 



Egypt 

Grant agreement for commodity imports. 
Signed at Cairo July 25, 1983. Entered into 
force July 25, 1983. 

Second amendment to project grant agree- 
ment of Sept. 30, 1978 (TIAS 9556), as 
amended, for Cairo sewerage. Signed at 
Cairo July 25, 1983. Entered into force 
July 25, 1983. 

France 

Agreement for cooperation in the field of 
radioactive waste management. Signed at 
Paris July 26, 1983. Entered into force 
July 26, 1983. 

German Democratic Republic 

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts 
of the U.S. with annexes and agreed minutes. 
Signed at Washington Apr. 13, 1983. 
Entered into force: July 20, 1983. 

India 

Project loan and grant agreement for irriga- 
tion management and training. Signed at 
New Delhi July 30, 1983. Entered into force 
July 30, 1983. 

Project loan and grant agreement for 
Madhya Pradesh minor irrigation. Signed at 
New Delhi July 30, 1983. Entered into force 
July 30, 1983. 

Indonesia 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Apr. 16, 1983, for the sale of agricultural 
commodities, with agreed minutes. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Jakarta Aug. 12, 
1983. Entered into force Aug. 12, 1983. 

Ireland 

Treaty on extradition. Signed at Washington 
July 13, 1983. Enters into force 30 days after 
the exchange of the instruments of ratifica- 
tion. 

Kiribati 

Treaty of friendship, with agreed minute. 
Signed at Tarawa Sept. 20, 1979. 2 
Instrument of ratification signed by the 
President: Aug. 16, 1983. 

Kuwait 

Memorandum of understanding for scienfitic 
and technical cooperation. Signed at Kuwait 
and Reston Jan. 26 and Apr. 29, 1983. 
Entered into force Apr. 29, 1983. 

Luxembourg 

International express mail agreement, with 
detailed regulations. Signed at Luxembourg 
and Washington Apr. 21 and June 14, 1983. 
Enters into force Oct. 1, 1983. 

Mexico 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
July 31, 1970, as amended and extended 
(TIAS 6941, 7927), for a cooperative 
meteorological observation program in Mex- 
ico. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico 
and Tlatelolco July 14 and 15, 1983. Entered 
into force July 15, 1983; effective Aug. 1, 
1983. 



Agreement for cooperation on environment II 
programs and transboundary problems. 
Signed at La Paz (Mexico) Aug. 14, 1983. 
Enters into force upon exchange of notes 
stating that each party has completed its 
necessary internal procedures. 



Morocco 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of May 
17. 1976 (TIAS 8309). Signed at Rabat 
July 15, 1983. Entered into force July 15, 
1983. 

Netherlands 

Extradition treaty, with appendix. Signed ; 
The Hague June 24, 1980. 
Ratifications exchanged: Aug. 16, 1983. 9 

Entered into force: Sept. 15, 1983. 

Treaty on mutual assistance in criminal ma 
ters, with exchange of notes. Signed at Thi 
Hague June 12, 1981. 
Ratifications exchanged: Aug. 16, 1983. 10 

Entered into force: Sept. 15, 1983. 



New Zealand 

Treaty on the delimitation of the maritime 

boundary between Tokelau and the United 

States of America. Signed at Atafu Dec. 2, 

1980. 2 

Instrument of ratification signed by the 

President: Aug. 16, 1983. 

Norway 

Agreement amending the air transport ser 
ices agreement of Oct. 6, 1945, as amendec 
(59 Stat. 1658, TIAS 3015, 4072, 6025). Ei 
fected by exchange of notes at Washingtor 
Aug. 2, 1983. Enters into force on the day 
U.S. receives written confirmation that 
Sweden, Denmark, and Norway have beco 
parties to the U.S.-ECAC memorandum of 
understanding of Dec. 17, 1982. 

Agreement concerning the inclusion of Dei 
mark, Norway, and Sweden in the memorc 
dum of understanding between the U.S. ar 
members of the European Civil Aviation C 
ference of Dec. 17, 1982, with attachments 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washing 
Aug. 2, 1983. Enters into force when U.S. 
receives written confirmation that Sweden 
Denmark, and Norway have become partie 
to the memorandum of understanding. 

Pakistan 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Mar. 9 and 11. 1982 (TIAS 10408), relating 
to trade in cotton textiles and textile prod- 
ucts. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Washington Apr. 15, and May 31, 1983. 
Entered into force May 31, 1983. 

Peru 

Agreement amending the agreement for sa 
of agricultural commodities of Mar. 29, 1 US- 
Effected bv exchange of notes at Lima Jul; 
18, 1983. Entered into force July 18, 1983.' 



iza 

■■■ 
lil 



v 



82 



Department of State Bullel 



CHRONOLOGY 



Stand 

.greement extending the agreement of 
ug. 2, 1976, as extended, concerning 
sheries off the coasts of the U.S. (TIAS 
524, 10533). Effected by exchange of notes 
t Washington Apr. 12 and 21, 1983. 
ntered into force: July 15, 1983. 

enegal 

greement amending the agreement for sales 
F agricultural commodities and memorandum 
: understanding of May 16, 1980 (TIAS 
3239), with aide memoire. Effected by ex- 
lange of letters at Dakar July 22 and 28, 
383. Entered into force July 28, 1983. 

greement regarding the consolidation and 
scheduling of certain debts owed to or 
jaranteed by the U.S. Government and its 
jencies, with annexes. Signed at 
ashington Aug. 11, 1983. Enters into force 
wn receipt by Senegal of written notice 
om U.S. Government that all necessary 
mestic legal requirements for entry into 
rce have been fulfilled. 

ngapore 

greement amending the agreement of 
jg. 21, 1981, as amended, relating to trade 
cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles 
d textile products. Effected by exchange of 
ters at Washington Apr. 15, Apr. 27, and 
jy 11, 1983. Entered into force May 11, 
■83. 

yeden 

rreement amending the air transport serv- 
agreement of Dec. 16, 1944, as amended, 
Stat. 1466, TIAS 3013, 4073, 6026). Ef- 
ted by exchange of notes at Washington 
g. 2, 1983. Enters into force on the day 

receives written confirmation that 
eden, Denmark, and Norway have become 
-ties to the U.S.-ECAC memorandum of 
ierstanding of Dec. 17, 1982. 

reement concerning the inclusion of Den- 
rk, Norway, and Sweden in the memoran- 
n of understanding between the U.S. and 
mbers of the European Civil Aviation Con- 
ence of Dec. 17, 1982, with attachments. 
? ected by exchange of notes at Washington 
g. 2, 1983. Enters into force when U.S. 
eives written confirmation that Sweden, 
amark, and Norway have become parties 
:he memorandum of understanding. 

izania 

reement for the sale of agricultural com- 
dities, with minutes of negotiation. Signed 
Dar es Salaam July 22, 1983. Entered into 
ce July 22, 1983. 

inland 

reement amending and extending the 
eement of Aug. 11, 1965 (TIAS 7378), 
iting to the establishment of certain radio 
emitting and receiving facilities in 
liland. Effected by exchange of notes at 
lgkok Feb. 28 and Mar. 7, 1983. Entered 
) force Mar. 7, 1983. 



Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, 
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod- 
ucts, with annexes. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Bangkok July 27 and Aug. 8, 1983. 
Entered into force Aug. 8, 1983; effective 
Jan. 1, 1983. 

Tuvalu 

Treaty of friendship. Signed at Funafuti 
Feb. 7, 1979. 2 

Instrument of ratification signed by the 
President: Aug. 16, 1983. 

U.S.S.R. 

Agreement amending and extending the 
agreement on scientific and technical 
cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of 
atomic energy of June 21, 1973 (TIAS 7655). 
Effected by exchange of notes at Moscow 
July 5 and Aug. 1, 1983. Entered into force 
Aug. 1, 1983; effective June 20, 1983. 

Venezuela 

Agreement relating to scientific and 
technological cooperation. Signed at Caracas 
Jan. 11, 1980. TIAS 10649. 
Entered into force: July 22, 1983. 

Memorandum of understanding on coopera- 
tion in earth resources and geological 
phenomena. Signed at Washington and 
Caracas Feb. 5 and 7, 1980. TIAS 10650. 
Entered into force: July 22, 1983. 

Agreement for scientific and technological 
cooperation in health. Signed at Caracas 
Aug. 11, 1980. TIAS 10651. 
Entered into force: July 22, 1983. 

Agreement on agricultural cooperation. 

Signed at Caracas Apr. 10, 1980. TIAS 

10652. 

Entered into force: July 22, 1983. 



August 1983 



1 Recommendation VII-5 not in force. 

2 Not in force. 

3 Not in force for the U.S. 

4 With reservation(s). 

5 With declaration. 

6 With designation of central authority. 

7 Not a party to (optional) Annexes III, 
IV, and V to the convention. 

8 With understanding^). 

9 For the Kingdom in Europe and the 
Netherlands Antilles. 

10 With declaration that the treaty shall 
not apply to requests for assistance relating 
to fiscal offenses addressed to the 
Netherlands Antilles. ■ 



August 1 

State Department reports more bombing by 
Libyan planes against Chad with more 
casualties. On July 31, the U.S. confirmed 
Chad's claim that Libyan planes attacked the 
northern oasis of Faya-Largeau and de- 
nounced the action as "a further flagrant and 
unprovoked outside intervention in the inter- 
nal affairs" of that country that represents "a 
dangerous escalation of the situation." 

Two U.S. Navy jet fighters from the air- 
craft carrier U.S.S. Eisenhower have an en- 
counter with two Libyan warplanes over the 
Gulf of Sidra, but the Libyan fighters turn to 
avoid confrontation. No shots are fired. 

August 2-6 

President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire makes 
an official working visit to Washington, D.C., 
to meet with President Reagan, Secretary 
Shultz, and other government officials. 

August 2 

U.S. vetoes Arab-sponsored UN Security 
Council draft resolution on the situation in 
the occupied Arab territories. In explaining 
the U.S. vote, Deputy U.S. Representative 
Lichenstein states that while condemning the 
recent attacks against the Arab civilian 
population, the resolution fails to address 
adequately the "recent series of criminal at- 
tacks in the West Bank." The U.S. Am- 
bassador adds that all attacks against 
civilians should be condemned. The U.S., he 
explains, is "eternally opposed to violence and 
terrorism from whatever quarters such acts 
may come, not only because of the human 
tragedies involved but also because of the 
resulting damage to the spirit of reconcilia- 
tion, which is so necessary to peace." 

Three U.S. military advisers arrive in 
Chad to train government forces in using 
American-supplied antiaircraft rockets. 

August 4 

The United States submits a further report 
on the use of chemical and toxin weapons to 
the UN Secretary General. The report is 
based on the scientific analysis of a series of 
blood samples drawn from victims of earlier 
toxic attacks in Laos, as well as blood 
samples drawn from victims of a toxic attack 
in Kampuchea in March 1983. 

Upper Volta Government of President 
Jean Baptiste Quedraogo is overthrown in a 
coup by former Prime Minister, Capt. 
Thomas Sankara. 

August 5 

President Reagan signs into law a somewhat 
modified version of the Caribbean Basin Ini- 
tiative. Under the free trade provision, the 
President had originally called for duty-free 
treatment for all exports except textiles and 
apparel, but out of concern for high 
unemployment levels in the U.S. because of 
pressures from U.S. producers and labor 
groups, Congress added several other excep- 
tions. 



tober1983 



83 



CHRONOLOGY 



August 7 

Two U.S. airborne warning and control 
systems (AWACS) E-3A aircraft recon- 
naissance planes, accompanied by eight F-15 
(Eagle) all-weather fighter aircraft and air 
and ground logistical support forces, arrive in 
Sudan to monitor the conflict in Chad. The 
F-15 aircraft, equipped for combat, will pro- 
vide protection to the other aircraft, if 
necessary. 

August 8 

Guatemalan Government of Brig. Gen. Efrain 
Rios Montt is overthrown in a coup by the 
military. Brig. Gen. Oscar Humberto Mejia 
Victories is sworn in to succeed him. 

August 8-9 

During a World Communications Year 
seminar of the International Telecommunica- 
tion Union (ITU) in San Jose, Costa Rica, 
U.S. and Cuban representatives meet to ex- 
change views on AM broadcasting issues. The 
U.S. was represented by Kalmann Schaefer, 
International Adviser to the Chairman of the 
Federal Communications Commission, and 
the Cuban spokesman was Rene Hernandes 
Cartaya, First Vice Minister of Communica- 
tions. 

August 9-12 

President Abdou Diouf of Senegal makes an 
official working visit to Washington, D.C., to 
meet with President Reagan, Vice President 
Bush, Secretary Shultz, and other govern- 
ment officials. 

August 11 

Results of August 6 presidential elections in 
Nigeria show President Shehu Shagari is 
reelected. 

August 20 

President Reagan lifts export controls on 
pipeline equipment to the Soviet Union. In 
1978 when the Carter Administration placed 
controls on the exports of oil and gas explora- 
tion and production equipment to the Soviet 
Union, pipelaying tractors bound for that 
country were placed under foreign policy ex- 
port controls. 

August 21 

Within minutes of his return to Manila from 
3 years of self-imposed exile in the U.S., 
Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., Philippines President 
Marcos' strongest political rival, is 
assassinated. In condemning the political 
assassination "in the strongest possible 
terms" and expressing condolences to 
Aquino's family and supporters, the State 
Department expresses the U.S. expectation 
that the Philippines Government will {rack 
down, judge, and punish the perpetrators. 
The Department also announced that the 
U.S. is watching the investigation closely. 

August 2:i 

State Department announces that the U.S. is 
returning two AWACS aircraft to U.S. bases 
explaining that "for the immediate future," 
the U.S. has no need to keep "Air Force 



84 



assets deployed in Sudan." The Department 
cautions that this action is not to be seen "as 
a lessening of concern or a reduction of sup- 
port" for Chad. 

U.S. and Canada sign a memorandum of 
understanding on a new cooperative research 
program called "CAPTEX" [Cross Ap- 
palachian Trace Experiment] which is de- 
signed to improve understanding and model- 
ing of the mechanism of long-distance at- 
mospheric transport and dispersion of air 
pollutants. The memorandum is signed by 
U.S. Ambassador to Canada Paul Robinson, 
Jr., and Canada's Environment Minister 
Charles Caccia. 

August 25 

U.S. and Soviet Union sign a new 5-year 
grain agreement giving the Soviet Union a 
new guarantee that supplies of American 
grain will not be interrupted. The agreement 
is signed by U.S. Secretary of Agriculture 
John R. Block and Soviet Foreign Trade 
Minister Nikolai S. Patolichev. 

August 26 

If the U.S. were to accept the Soviet INF 
position at Geneva, Soviet President An- 
dropov offers to destroy those Soviet SS-20 
missiles to be reduced in Europe. Other unac- 
ceptable elements of the Soviet position are 
unchanged, including refusal to accept U.S. 
deployment of LRINF missiles planned for 
later this year. In response, the State Depart- 
ment issues a statement saying that "if the 
Soviets were to confirm this position at the 
negotiating table in Geneva," the U.S. would 
consider it "a positive sign." Explaining that 
the statement "appears to be similar to 
previous statements," the White House 
declines official comment until the full text of 
the Soviet statement is made available. 

August 29 

In Beirut, two U.S. Marines are killed and 14 
wounded when their position near the airport 
is shelled. The attack follows a day and night 
of sporadic fighting between forces of the 
Lebanese Army and Lebanese Shi'ite militia 
groups and firing from the Druze militia posi- 
tions. The U.S. condemns "those who are 
responsible for the continuing violence" and 
calls upon "all armed elements" to end the 
"senseless violence and unite behind the 
Lebanese Government to restore national 
harmony." 

At President Reagan's direction, Vice 
President Bush chairs a meeting of the 
Special Situation Group — including Secretary 
Shultz, Defense Secretary Weinberger, and 
other senior officials concerned with national 
security affairs — to review the situation in 
Beirut. The group recommends "no change" 
in the status of U.S. participation in the MNF 
in Lebanon, including the number, scope, and 
area of responsibility. 

UN Conference on Palestine opens in 
Geneva. U.S., Canada, and Israel boycott the 
meeting. Several other countries limit their 
participation to observer status. 



if 



August 30 J 

At their positions near the Beirut airport, 
U.S. Marines again come under fire; no in- 
juries are reported. In other areas of Beirut 
the Lebanese Army and the French, British 
and Italian MNF contingents are attacked; 
the French suffer four fatalities. State 
Department spokesman says that specific 
blame cannot be ascribed nor can it be detei 
mined if the MNF were the targets. 

In a letter to the Congress, President 
Reagan provides information on events of tl 
last 3 days in Lebanon and states that "the 
continued presence of these U.S. forces in 
Lebanon is essential to the objective of help 
ing to restore the territorial integrity, 
sovereignty and political independence of 
Lebanon. It is still not possible to predict th 
duration of the presence of these forces in 
Lebanon; we will continue to assess this que 
tion. ..." 



August 31 

At the State Department, former President 
Ford, former Secretaries Vance and Haig, 
and former U.S. Ambassador to Mexico 
Thomas Mann meet with the National Bipar 
tisan Commission on Central America. 

In a news conference, Secretary Shultz 
says that the U.S. intends to help President 
Gemayel, in his new initiative of joining in e 
dialogue with other key Lebanese leaders 
aimed at constituting a new national ap- 
proach to reconciliation and unity, by: 



• Asking the international community, 
particularly Syria, to support President 
Gemayel's initiative; 

• Continuing to provide training and su 
port for the Lebanese Armed Forces; 

• Continuing active diplomatic engage- 
ment; and 

• Continuing to cooperate with and ma 
tain support for the MNF in the area, in- 
cluding the U.S. Marine contingent. 

In Beirut the Lebanese Army counter- 
attacks leftist Moslem militia units and 
regains control of most key parts of the 
city. ■ 



; 



:. 



: 



Department of State Bulleti *t 



D RESS RELEASES 



PUBLICATIONS 



Department of State 



, 'ress releases may be obtained from the Of- 
ice of Press Relations, Department of State 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

» Subject 

Shultz: announcement con- 
cerning personnel changes. 
Program for the official 
working visit of Senegal's 
President Abdou Diouf 
Aug. 9-12. 
Shultz: interview on "Meet 

the Press," Aug. 7. 
Thomas 0. Enders sworn in 
as Ambassador to Spain 
(biographic data). 
Shultz: prepared statement 
before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. 
U.S. Organization for the In- 
ternational Radio Con- 
sultative Committee 
(CCIR), Sept. 8. 
U.S. Organization for the In- 
ternational Telegraph and 
Telephone Consultative 
Committee (CCITT), 
Sept. 8. 
Advisory Committee to the 
U.S. Section of the Inter- 
national North Pacific 
Fisheries Commission, 
Sept. 30 (partially closed.) 
CCITT, Sept. 12. ' 
Shipping Coordinating Com- 
mittee (SCC), Subcommit- 
tee on Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS), working 
group on bulk chemicals, 
Sept. 20. 
U.S. and Mexico agree to 
cooperate in the solution 
of environmental problems 
in the border area. 
Richard T. McCormack, As- 
sistant Secretary for 
Economic and Business 
Affairs (biographic data). 
Thomas R. Pickering sworn 
in as Ambassador to El 
Salvador, Aug. 12 
(biographic data). 
Rear Admiral Jonathan T. 
Howe, Director, Bureau of 
Politico-Military Affairs 
(biographic data). 
Lev E. Dobriansky, Ambas- 
sador to the Bahamas (bio- 
graphic data). 
Hugh Montgomery, Director, 
Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research (biographic data). 
Advisory Committee on In- 
ternational Investment, 
Technology, and Develop- 
ment, Sept. 23. 



"320 8/26 



*32I 8/29 



*322 8/30 
*323 8/30 



*324 8/30 



C( 'ITT, modem working 
party of study group D, 
Sept. 22 and 23. 
Regional foreign policy con- 
ference, Indianapolis, 
Sept. 23. 
SCC, Committee on Ocean 

Dumping, Oct. 5 
Advisory Committee on In- 
ternational Investment, 
Technology, and Develop- 
ment, Sept. 29. (partially 
closed). 
Advisory Committee to the 
U.S. Section of the Inter- 
national Commission for 
the Conservation of Atlan- 
tic Tunas, Oct. 13 and 14 
(partially closed). 



*Not printed in the Bulletin. 



Department of State 



Free, single copies of the following Depart- 
ment of State publications are available from 
the Public Information Service, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

President Reagan 

Building Peace Through Strength, American 
Legion, Seattle, Aug. 23, 1983 (Current 
Policy #504). 

Saving Freedom in Central America, Inter- 
national Longshoremen's Association, 
Hollywood, Florida, July 18, 1983 (Current 
Policy #499). 

Africa 

The U.S. and Liberia (GIST, July 1983). 
Background Notes on Gabon (July 1983). 
Background Notes on Ghana (June 1983). 
Background Notes on Guinea (July 1983). 
Background Notes on Malawi (Aug. 1983). 
Background Notes on the Seychelles 
(June 1983). 

East Asia 

Background Notes on Japan (May 1983). 

Economics 

The World Economy After Williamsburg, 
Under Secretary Wallis, American Cham- 
ber of Commerce, Wellington, New Zea- 
land, June 22, 1983 (Current Policy #498). 

A Collective Approach to East- West Eco- 
nomic Relations, Under Secretary Wallis, 
American Society of Business Press Ed- ' 
itors, Chicago, June 20, 1983 (Current 
Policy #495). 

The Challenge of Economic Growth, Deputy 
Secretary Dam, UNCTAD VI, Belgrade, 
June 13, 1983 (Current Policy #494). 



Europe 

Implementation of Helsinki Final Act De- 
cember 1, 1982-May 31, 1983, Fourteenth 
Semiannual Report, President Reagan to 
the Commission on Security and Cooper- 
ation in Europe, July 1983 (Special Report 

An Assessment of the Madrid CSCE Follow- 
up Meeting, statements by chairman of the 
U.S. delegation Ambassador Kampelman 
and President Reagan, July 1983 (Current 
Policy #500). 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Exchanges (GIST, Aug. 1983) 
U.S.-Soviet Relations. (GIST, July 1983). 
Background Notes on Austria (Aug. 1983) 
Background Notes on Poland (June 1983). 
Background Notes on Romania (July 1983) 
Background Notes on Yugoslavia (June 1983). 

General Foreign Policy 

GIST Index (July 1983). 
Background Notes Index (June 1983). 

Middle East 

Background Notes on Algeria (Aug. 1983). 

Narcotics 

The Drug Problem: Americans Arrested 
Abroad (GIST, Aug. 1983). 

Refugees 

Refugees: A Continuing Concern, Director 
Purcell, Subcommittee on Immigration and 
Refugee Policy, Senate Judiciary Commit- 
tee, June 20, 1983 (Current Policy #496). 

South Asia 

Background Notes on Sri Lanka (June 1983). 

Western Hemisphere 

Comprehensive Strategy for Central Amer- 
ica, Secretary Shultz, Senate Foreign Re- 
lations Committee, Aug. 4, 1983 (Current 
Policy #502). 

Elections in El Salvador, Assistant Secretary 
Motley, Subcommittee on Foreign Opera- 
tions, House Appropriations Committee 
Aug. 3, 1983 (Current Policy #503). 

Fourth Certification of Progress in El Salva- 
dor, Assistant Secretaries Motley and 
Abrams, Subcommittees on Western Hem- 
isphere Affairs and on Human Rights and 
International Organizations, House Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Aug. 3, 1983 (Current 
Policy #501). 
El Salvador: Certification Process (GIST 
July 1983). ■ 



85 



PUBLICATIONS 



Foreign Relations 
Volume Released 



The Department of State on July 7, 
1983, released Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1952-1954, Volume V, 
Western European Security. The 
Foreign Relations series has been 
published continuously since 1861 as the 
official record of U.S. foreign policy. 
This volume is the fifth of sixteen 
volumes covering the years 1952-54. It 
is of particular value to students of in- 
ternational relations and to specialists in 
the diplomacy of the cold war period. 

The volume presents the previously 
classified record of U.S. diplomatic ef- 
forts to encourage and support the 
defense of Western Europe. A key issue 
for Western Europe was the role of 
West Germany. Both the Truman and 
the Eisenhower Administrations sought 
for several years to bring West Ger- 
many back into the community of Euro- 
pean nations and to allay French con- 
cern over German rearmament. To the 
disappointment of the United States and 
other NATO governments, the Euro- 
pean defense community, originally pro- 
posed by France as a means of securing 
West German defense participation, was 
rejected by the French National 
Assembly in August 1954. But with the 
support and encouragement of President 
Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, the 
West European leaders, led by British 
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, soon 
reached a series of agreements which 
brought West Germany into NATO on a 



basis of equality with other member na- 
tions. During the fall of 1954 the North 
Atlantic community established the basic 
defense structure that has remained 
essentially in place for 30 years. 

The volume also includes diplomatic 
correspondence regarding West Euro- 
pean reaction to the Soviet diplomatic 
peace offensive that the new Soviet 
leadership launched after the death of 
Premier Joseph Stalin in March 1953. 
At the Bermuda conference of the heads 
of government of the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and France in 1953, 
Prime Minister Churchill sought to con- 
vene a summit conference with the 
Soviets to seek an East- West detente. 

Documents also are presented on the 
diplomatic background to the un- 
precedented peacetime buildup of 
American forces in Europe within 
NATO, the efforts to bring about the 
long-term rearming of Europe, and the 
evolution of deterrence as a strategy to 
achieve military security within the 
limits of a sound western economy. 

Foreign Relations 1952-1954, 
Volume V, was prepared in the Office of 
the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
Department of State. Copies of Volume 
V (Department of State Publication Nos. 
9288 and 9289; GPO Stock No. 
044-000-01948-5) may be purchased for 
$28.00 (domestic postpaid) from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. Checks or 
money orders should be made payable to 
the Superintendent of Documents. 



Press release 264 of July 7, 1983. 



86 



Department of State Bulleth 



MDEX 



ctober 1983 
olume 83, No. 2079 



rica. Building Peace Through Strength 
(Reagan) 27 

riculture. U.S. -Soviet Grain Agreement 
(White House statement) 68 

ins Control 

Jding Peace Through Strength (Reagan) 27 
Negotiations Resume (Nitze) 41 

5. -European Relations (Burt) 67 

iation. Soviet Downing of Civilian Aircraft 
(Eagleburger, Helms, Kirkpatrick. Lichen- 
stein, Reagan, Shultz, diplomatic notes, 
letters, proclamation, resolutions) 1 

id. Central America and Chad (Reagan) .31 
nmodities. U.S. -Soviet Grain Agreement 

(White House statement) 68 

igress 

h Report on Cyprus (message to the 

Congress) 69 

^national Monetary Fund (Reagan) .... 44 
iation in Lebanon (White House and De- 
partment statements, letter to the 

Congress) 79 

.-European Relations (Burt) 67 

rus. 15th Report on Cyprus (message to 
the Congress) 69 

I nomics 

I kers and the Debt Crisis: An International 
Melodrama? (Wallis) 42 

I rnational Energy Security (Kennedy, 
Wendt) 45 

d rnational Monetary Fund (Reagan) ... .44 

tl rnational Trade (Reagan) 30 

a in and America: International Partnership 
for the 1980s (Shultz) 34 

H ;ident Reagan Visits Mexico (statements, 
toast, joint communique, summary of 
igreement) 22 

',; rgy. International Energy Security 

Kennedy, Wendt) 45 

I ironment. President Reagan Visits Mexico 
statements, toast, joint communique, 
summary of agreement) 22 

it ape 

IS E Followup Meeting Concludes in Madrid 
Shultz, concluding document) 50 

I -European Relations (Burt) 67 

h lan Rights 

!S E Followup Meeting Concludes in Madrid 
Shultz, concluding document) 50 

J. -European Relations (Burt) 67 

rmation Policy. Soviet Active Meas- 
ures 60 



International Law. Deportation of Nazi War 
Criminals to Israel (Justice Department 

statement) 70 

Israel 

Deportation of Nazi War Criminals to Israel 

(Justice Department statement) 70 

Secretary Shultz's News Conference of 

August 31 37 

Japan. Japan and America: International Part- 
nership for the 1980s (Shultz) 34 

Korea. Soviet Downing of Civilian Aircraft 
(Eagleburger, Helms, Kirkpatrick, Lichen- 
stein, Reagan, Shultz, diplomatic notes, 

letters, proclamation, resolutions) 1 

Latin America and the Caribbean 

Building Peace Through Strength (Reagan) 27 

Central America and Chad (Reagan) 31 

Situation in Central America (Reagan) .... 32 

Lebanon 

Secretary Shultz's News Conference of 

August 31 37 

Situation in Lebanon (White House and De- 
partment statements, letter to the 

Congress) 79 

Libya. The Libyan Problem 71 

Mexico. President Reagan Visits Mexico 
(statements, toast, joint communique, sum- 
mary of agreement) 22 

Middle East 

Building Peace Through Strength (Reagan) 27 

The Middle East (Reagan) 33 

Military Affairs. Central America and Chad 

(Reagan) 31 

Monetary Affairs. Bankers and the Debt 
Crisis: An International Melodrama? 

(Wallis) 42 

Petroleum. International Energy Security 

(Kennedy, Wendt) 45 

Poland. Anniversary of Gdansk Agreement 

in Poland (Reagan) 52 

Presidential Documents 

Anniversary of Gdansk Agreement in 

Poland 52 

Building Peace Through Strength 27 

Central America and Chad 31 

15th Report of Cyprus (message to the 

Congress) 69 

International Monetary Fund 44 

International Trade 30 

The Middle East 33 

President Reagan Visits Mexico (statements, 
toast, joint communique, summary of 
agreement) 22 



Situation in Central America 32 

Situation in Lebanon (White House and De- 
partment statements, letter to the Con- 
gress) 79 

Soviet Downing of Civilian Aircraft (Eagle- 
burger, Helms, Kirkpatrick, Lichenstein, 
Shultz, diplomatic notes, letters, proc- 
lamation, resolutions) 1 

Visit of Senegal's President (Diouf) 41 

Visit of Zaire's President (Mobutu) 40 

Publications 

Department of State 85 

Foreign Relations Volume Released 86 

Senegal. Visit of Senegal's President (Diouf, 

Reagan) 41 

Trade. International Trade (Reagan) 30 

Treaties 

Current Actions 80 

President Reagan Visits Mexico (statements, 
toast, joint communique, summary of 

agreement) 22 

U.S. -Soviet Grain Agreement (White House 

statement) 68 

U.S.S.R. 

Soviet Active Measures 60 

Soviet Downing of Civilian Aircraft (Eagle- 
burger, Helms, Kirkpatrick, Lichenstein, 
Reagan, Shultz, diplomatic notes, letters, 

proclamation, resolutions) 1 

U.S. -European Relations (Burt) 67 

U.S. -Soviet Grain Agreement (White House 

statement) 68 

United Nations. Soviet Downing of Civilian 
Aircraft (Eagleburger, Helms, Kirk- 
patrick, Lichenstein, Reagan, Shultz, 
diplomatic notes, letters, proclamation, 

resolutions) 1 

Zaire. Visit of Zaire's President (Mobutu, 
Reagan) 40 

Name Index 

Burt, Richard R 67 

De la Madrid Hurtado, Miguel 22 

Diouf, Abdou 41 

Eagleburger, Lawrence S 1 

Helms, J. Lynn 1 

Kennedy, Richard T 45 

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J 1 

Lichenstein, Charles M 1 

Mobutu Sese Seko 40 

Nitze, Paul H 41 

Reagan, President ... 1, 22, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33 
40, 41, 44, 52, 69, 79 

Shultz, Secretary 1, 34, 37.50 

Wallis, W. Allen 42 

Wendt, E. Allan 45 



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Depart men t 



bulletin 

ie Official Monfhly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 83 / Number 2080 




Dvparimvnt of St a it* 

bulletin 



Volume 83 / Number 2080 / November 1983 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

JOHN HUGHES 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director. 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA ADAMS 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that the 
publication of this periodical is necessary in the 
transaction of the public business required by law of 
this Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through March 31, 
1987. 



NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted 
and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation 
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will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the 
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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20402 



CONTENTS 




FEATURE 

1 Renewing the U.S. Commitment to Peace (President 

Reagan) 
4 United Nations Day, 1983 (Proclamation) 



The President 

6 Economic Progress Through 

Individual Freedom 
9 The Cause of Peace 



The Vice President 

10 Visits to North Africa and Europe 
(Statements, Addresses, Toasts, 
Remarks) 

The Secretary 

24 U.S. Objectives in Lebanon 

Africa 

27 Visit of Zimbabwe's Prime Minis- 
ter Mugabe (Robert G. Mugabe, 
President Reagan) 



Arms Control 



29 



29 



30 



31 



U.S. Offers New START Initia- 
tives (President Reagan) 

NATO Supports U.S. Arms Con- 
trol Initiative (North Atlantic 
Council Statement) 

Arms Control and European 
Public Opinion (Exchange of Let- 
ters Between Mr. Kreisky and 
President Reagan) 

INF Negotiations (President 
Reagan, White House Statement) 



East Asia 



32 



35 



36 



U.S. -Philippine Relations After 

the Aquino Assassination 

(John C. Monjo) 
Kampuchea After 5 Years of 

Vietnamese Occupation 

(John C. Monjo) 
Situation in Kampuchea (White 

House Statement) 



Economics 

38 International Investment Policy 
(President Reagan, Policy 
Statement) 

41 Protecting the World Economy 
(W. Allen Wallis) 

Europe 

45 Soviet Downing of Civilian 

Aircraft (President Reagan, 
White House Statement) 

46 The Eastern Mediterranean and 

U.S. National Security 
(Richard R. Burt) 

49 Visit of Portugal's President 

Eanes (Antonio Ramalho Eanes, 
President Reagan) 

50 U.S. -Spanish Council Meets (Joint 

Statement) 

Human Rights 

51 Human Rights Situation in the 

Philippines (Elliott Abrams) 

Middle East 



Western Hemisphere 

Economic Growth and U.S. Policy 
in Central America (Kenneth W. 
Dam) 

Border-Crossing Documents for 
Mexicans 



60 



63 



Treaties 

64 Current Actions 

Chronology 

66 September 1983 

Press Releases 

69 Department of State 

Publications 

69 Department of State 

Index 



52 



54 



Major U.S. Interests in 

the Middle East (Robert H. 

Pelletreau) 
U.S. Forces in Lebanon 

(President's Statements, Letter 

to the Congress) 



Nuclear Policy 

56 Nuclear Nonproliferation and 
Cooperation (Harry R. 
Marshall, Jr.) 

Pacific 

59 Marshall Islands Voters Approve 
Free Association With U.S. 




President Reagan talks to Lebanese President Gemayel about a cease-fire agreement 
while UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar listens. 





FEATURE 

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY 



Renewing the U.S. 
Commitment to Peace 



by President Reagan 



if' 




/ 





Address before the 38th session 

of the UN General Assembly 

in New York on September 26, 1983. x 



Thank you for granting me the honor of 
speaking today, on this first day of 
general debate in the 38th session of the 
General Assembly. Once again I come 
before this body preoccupied with peace. 
Last year I stood in this chamber to ad- 
dress the Special Session on Disarma- 
ment. I have come today to renew my 
nation's commitment to peace. And I 
have come to discuss how we can keep 
faith with the dreams that created this 
organization. 

The United Nations was founded in 
the aftermath of World War II to pro- 
tect future generations from the scourge 
of war, to promote political self- 
determination and global prosperity, and 
to strengthen the bonds of civility 
among nations. The founders sought to 
replace a world at war with a world of 
civilized order. They hoped that a world 
of relentless conflict would give way to a 
new era, one where freedom from 
violence prevailed. 

Whatever challenges the world was 
bound to face, the founders intended 
this body to stand for certain values, 
even if they could not be enforced, and 
to condemn violence, even if it could not 
be stopped. This body was to speak with 
the voice of moral authority. That was 
to be its greatest power. 

But the awful truth is that the use 
of violence for political gain has become 



more, not less, widespread in the last 
decade. Events of recent weeks have 
presented new, unwelcome evidence of 
brutal disregard for life and truth. They 
have offered unwanted testimony on 
how divided and dangerous our world is, 
how quick the recourse to violence. 

What has happened to the dreams of 
the United Nations' founders? What has 
happened to the spirit which created the 
United Nations? The answer is clear: 
governments got in the way of the 
dreams of the people. Dreams became 
issues of East versus West. Hopes 
became political rhetoric. Progress 
became a search for power and domina- 
tion. Somewhere the truth was lost that 
people don't make wars, governments 
do. 

And today in Asia, Africa, Latin 
America, the Middle East, and the 
North Pacific, the weapons of war shat- 
ter the security of the peoples who live 
there, endanger the peace of neighbors, 
and create ever more arenas of confron- 
tation between the great powers. During 
the past year alone, violent conflicts 
have occurred in the hills around Beirut, 
the deserts of Chad and the Western 
Sahara, in the mountains of El Salvador, 
the streets of Suriname, the cities and 
countryside of Afghanistan, the borders 



Movember 1983 



of Kampuchea, and the battlefields of 
Iran and Iraq. 

We cannot count on the instinct for 
survival to protect us against war. 
Despite all the wasted lives and hopes 
that war produces, it has remained a 
regular, if horribly costly, means by 
which nations have sought to settle their 
disputes or advance their goals. 

The Search for Meaningful 
Arms Control Agreements 

And the progress in weapons technology 
has far outstripped the progress toward 
peace. In modern times, a new, more 
terrifying element has entered into the 
calculations— nuclear weapons. A 



ensure that world security is not under- 
mined by the further spread of nuclear 
weapons. Nuclear nonproliferation must 
not be the forgotten element of the 
world's arms control agenda. 

At the time of my last visit here, I 
expressed hope that a whole class of 
weapons systems — the longer range 
INF (the intermediate-range nuclear 
forces) missiles — could be banned from 
the face of the earth. I believe that to 
relieve the deep concern of peoples in 
both Europe and Asia, the time was 
ripe, for the first time in history, to 
resolve a security threat exclusively 
through arms control. I still believe the 
elimination of these weapons — the zero 
option — is the best, fairest, most prac- 




. . . the awful truth 
is that the use of 
violence for political 
gain has become more, 
not less, widespread in 
the last decade. 



(White House photo by Pete Souza) 



nuclear war cannot be won and must 
never be fought. I believe that if govern- 
ments are determined to deter and pre- 
vent war, there will not be war. Nothing 
is more in keeping with the spirit of the 
UN Charter than arms control. 

When I spoke before the Second 
Special Session on Disarmament, I af- 
firmed the U.S. Government's commit- 
ment, and my personal commitment, to 
reduce nuclear arms and to negotiate in 
good faith toward that end. 

Today, I reaffirm those com- 
mitments. The United States has 
already reduced the number of its 
nuclear weapons worldwide and, while 
replacement of older weapons is 
unavoidable, we wish to negotiate arms 
reductions and to achieve significant, 
equitable, verifiable arms control 
agreements. And let me add, we must 



tical solution to this problem. Unfor- 
tunately, the Soviet Union declined to 
accept the total elimination of this class 
of weapons. 

When I was here last, I hoped that 
the critical strategic arms reduction 
talks (START) would focus, and urgent- 
ly so, on those systems that carry the 
greatest risk of nuclear war — the fast- 
flying, accurate intercontinental ballistic 
missiles which pose a first-strike poten- 
. tial. I also hoped the negotiations could 
reduce by one-half the number of 
strategic missiles on each side and 
reduce their warheads by one-third. 
Again, I was disappointed when the 
Soviets declined to consider such deep 
cuts and refused, as well, to concentrate 
on these most dangerous destabilizing 
weapons. 

Despite the rebuffs, the United 
States has not abandoned and will not 
abandon the search for meaningful arms 



control agreements. Last June, I pro- 
posed a new approach toward the 
START negotiations. We did not alter 
our objective of substantial reductions, 
but we recognized that there are a varie 
ty of ways to achieve this end. During 
the last round of Geneva talks, we 
presented a draft treaty which re- 
sponded to a number of concerns raised 
by the Soviet Union. We will continue tc 
build upon this initiative. 

Similarly, in our negotiations on 
intermediate-range nuclear forces, when 
the Soviet leaders adamantly refused to 
consider the total elimination of these 
weapons, the United States made a new 
offer. We proposed, as an interim solu- 
tion, some equal number on both sides 
between zero and 572. We recommende< 
the lowest possible level. 

Once again, the Soviets refused an 
equitable solution and proposed instead 
what might be called a "half-zero 
option" — zero for us and many hundred: 
of warheads for them. And that's where 
things stand today, but I still have not 
given up hope that the Soviet Union wil 
enter into serious negotiations. 

We are determined to spare no ef- 
fort to achieve a sound, equitable, and 
verifiable agreement. And for this 
reason, I have given new instructions tc 
Ambassador Nitze [head of the U.S. 
delegation to the INF negotiations] in 
Geneva, telling him to put forward a 
package of steps designed to advance 
the negotiations as rapidly as possible. 
These initiatives build on the interim 
framework the United States advanced 
last March and address concerns that 
the Soviets have raised at the bargain- 
ing table in the past. Specifically: 

First, the United States proposes a 
new initiative on global limits. If the 
Soviet Union agrees to reductions and 
limits on a global basis, the United 
States, for its part, will not offset the 
entire Soviet global missile deployment 
through U.S. deployments in Europe. 
We would, of course, retain the right to 
deploy missiles elsewhere. 

Second, the United States is 
prepared to be more flexible on the con- 
tent of the current talks. The United 
States will consider mutually acceptable 
ways to address the Soviet desire that 
an agreement should limit aircraft as 
well as missiles. 



Department of State Bulletir 




FEATURE 

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY 



Third, the United States will ad- 
dress the mix of missiles that would 
result from reductions. In the context of 
reductions to equal levels, we are 
prepared to reduce the number of 
Pershing II ballistic missiles as well as 
ground-launched cruise missiles. 

I have decided to put forward these 
important initiatives after full and ex- 
tensive consultations with our allies, in- 
cluding personal correspondence I've had 
with the leaders of the NATO govern- 
ments and Japan and frequent meetings 
of the NATO Special Consultative 
Group. I have also stayed in close touch 
with other concerned friends and allies. 
The door to an agreement is open. It is 
time for the Soviet Union to walk 
through it. 

I want to make an unequivocal 
pledge to those gathered today in this 
world arena. The United States seeks 
and will accept any equitable, verifiable 
agreement that stabilizes forces at lower 
levels than currently exist. We are ready 
to be flexible in our approach, indeed, 
willing to compromise. We cannot, 
however, especially in light of recent 
events, compromise on the necessity of 
effective verification. 

Reactions to the Korean airliner 
tragedy are a timely reminder of just 
how different the Soviets' concept of 
truth and international cooperation is 
from that of the rest of the world. 
Evidence abounds that we cannot simply 
assume that agreements negotiated with 
the Soviet Union will be fulfilled. We 
negotiated the Helsinki Final Act, but 
the promised freedoms have not been 
provided and those in the Soviet Union 
who sought to monitor their fulfillment 
languish in prison. We negotiated a 
Biological Weapons Convention, but 
deadly yellow rain and other toxic 
agents fall on Hmong villages and 
Afghan encampments. We have 
negotiated arms agreements, but the 
high level of Soviet encoding hides the 
information needed for their verification. 
A newly discovered radar facility and a 
new ICBM [intercontinental ballistic 
missile] raise serious concerns about 
Soviet compliance with agreements 
already negotiated. 

Peace cannot be served by pseudo 
arms control. We need reliable, 
reciprocal reductions. I call upon the 



Soviet Union today to reduce the ten- 
sions it has heaped on the world in the 
past few weeks and to show a firm com- 
mitment to peace by coming to the 
bargaining table with a new understand- 
ing of its obligations. I urge it to match 
our flexibility. If the Soviets sit down at 
the bargaining table seeking genuine 
arms reductions, there will be arms 
reductions. The governments of the 
West and their people will not be 
diverted by misinformation and threats. 
The time has come for the Soviet Union 
to show proof that it wants arms control 
in reality, not just in rhetoric. 

Meaningful arms control agreements 
between the United States and the 



Soviet Union would make our world less 
dangerous; so would a number of 
confidence-building steps we've already 
proposed to the Soviet Union. 

Call for a True Nonalignment 
of the United Nations 

Arms control requires a spirit beyond 
narrow national interests. This spirit is a 
basic pillar on which the United Nations 
was founded. We seek a return to this 
spirit. A fundamental step would be a 
true nonalignment of the United Na- 
tions. This would signal a return to the 
true values of the charter, including the 
principle of universality. The members 




The founders of the 
United Nations expected 
that member nations 
would behave and vote 
as individuals. . . . The 
emergence of blocs and 
the polarization of the 
United Nations under- 
mine all that this 
organization initially 
valued. 



£ Addressing the UN General Assembly. 



November 1983 



of the United Nations must be aligned 
on the side of justice rather than in- 
justice, peace rather than aggression, 
human dignity rather than subjugation. 
Any other alignment is beneath the pur- 
pose of this great body and destructive 
of the harmony it seeks. What harms 
the charter harms peace. 

The founders of the United Nations 
expected that member nations would 
behave and vote as individuals, after 
they had weighed the merits of an 
issue— rather like a great, global town 
meeting. The emergence of blocs and 
the polarization of the United Nations 
undermine all that this organization 
initially valued. 

We must remember that the 
nonaligned movement was founded to 
counter the development of blocs and to 
promote detente between them. Its 
founders spoke of the right of smaller 
countries not to become involved in 
others' disagreements. Since then, 
membership in the nonaligned move- 
ment has grown dramatically, but not all 
the new members have shared the 
founders' commitment of genuine 
nonalignment. Indeed, client govern- 
ments of the Soviet Union, which have 
long since lost their independence, have 
flocked into the nonaligned movement 
and once inside have worked against its 
true purpose. Pseudo nonalignment is no 
better than pseudo arms control. 

The United States rejects as false 
and misleading the view of the world as 
divided between the empires of the East 
and West. We reject it on factual 
grounds. The United States does not 
head any bloc of subservient nations, nor 
do we desire to. What is called the West 
is a free alliance of governments, most 
of which are democratic and all of which 
greatly value their independence. What 
is called the East is an empire directed 
from the center which is Moscow. 

The United States, today, as in the 
past, is a champion of freedom and self- 
determination for all people. We 
welcome diversity; we support the right 
of all nations to define and pursue their 
national goals. We respect their deci- 
sions and their sovereignty, asking only 
that they respect the decisions and 
sovereignty of others. Just look at the 
world over the last 30 years, and then 
decide for yourself whether the United 



States or the Soviet Union has pursued 
an expansionist policy. 

Today, the United States contributes 
to peace by supporting collective efforts 
by the international community. We give 
our unwavering support to the 
peacekeeping efforts of this body, as 
well as other multilateral peacekeeping 
efforts around the world. The United 
Nations has a proud history of pro- 
moting conciliation and helping keep the 
peace. Today, UN peacekeeping forces 
or observers are present in Cyprus and 
Kashmir, on the Golan Heights, and in 
Lebanon. 

In addition to our encouragement of 
international diplomacy, the United 
States recognizes its responsibilities to 



use its own influence for peace. From 
the days when Theodore Roosevelt 
mediated the Russo-Japanese War in 
1905, we have a long and honorable 
tradition of mediating or dampening 
conflicts and promoting peaceful solu- 
tions. In Lebanon, we, along with 
France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, 
have worked for a cease-fire, for the 
withdrawal of all external forces, and 
for restoration of Lebanon's sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. In Chad, we 
have joined others in supporting the 
recognized government in the face of ex- 
ternal aggression. In Central America, 
as in southern Africa, we are seeking to 
discourage reliance upon force and to 
construct a framework for peaceful 
negotiations. We support a policy to 



United Nations Day, 1983 



A PROCLAMATION, 

SEPT. 27, 1983 1 

The United Nations remains today — 38 years 
after its creation — an institution uniquely en- 
dowed to promote international political, 
economic, social, and technical cooperation. 
Conceived during a brutal war and nurtured 
in a troubled peace, the United Nations has 
seen many of its shining promises realized, 
but many others have been frustrated. More 
often than the world community can afford, 
rivalries and divisions among states prompt 
abuse or misuse of the powers and machinery 
of the United Nations. Despite these im- 
perfections, the system and its machinery 
continue to offer opportunities for mediating 
differences which threaten to erupt in 
hostilities; for arranging and overseeing 
agreements to end tensions or conflicts; for 
promoting the technical and scientific 
cooperation essential to meet problems of 
growth and development; and for coping with 
international emergencies of all kinds. 

The people and the Government of the 
United States of America take pride in the 
support — moral, intellectual, political, and 
financial — which we have rendered to the 
United Nations, and in the leadership which 



we have provided to help bring about its 
foremost achievements. We also take pride in 
the knowledge that the principles of the 
United Nations charter are the same ones 
which underlie our liberty, our progress, and 
our development as a democratic society. 

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, 
President of the United States of America, 
do hereby designate Monday, October 24, 
1983, as United Nations Day, and urge all 
Americans to better acquaint themselves with 
the activities and accomplishments of the 
United Nations. 

I have appointed William M. Ellinghaus 
to serve as 1983 United States Chairman for 
United Nations Day, and I welcome the role 
of the United Nations Association of the 
United States of America in working with 
him to celebrate this special day. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto 
set my hand this twenty-seventh day of 
September, in the year of our Lord nineteen 
hundred and eighty-three, and of the In- 
dependence of the United States of America 
the two hundred and eighth. 

Ronald Reagan 



■Text from White House press release. 



Department of State Bulletin 




FEATURE 

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY 



disengage the major powers from Third 
World conflict. 

The UN Charter gives an important 
role to regional organizations in the 
search for peace. The U.S. efforts in the 
cause of peace are only one expression 
of a spirit that also animates others in 
the world community. The Organization 
of American States was a pioneer in 
regional security efforts. In Central 
America, the members of the Contadora 
group are striving to lay a foundation 
for peaceful resolution of that region's 
problems. In East Asia, the Asian coun- 
tries have built a framework for 
peaceful political and economic coopera- 
tion that has greatly strengthened the 
prospects for lasting peace in their 
region. In Africa, organizations such as 
the Economic Community of West 
African States are being forged to pro- 
vide practical structures in the struggle 
to realize Africa's potential. 

From the beginning, our hope for 
the United Nations has been that it 
would reflect the international communi- 
ty at its best. The United Nations at its 
best can help us transcend fear and 
violence and can act as an enormous 
force for peace and prosperity. Working 
together, we can combat international 
lawlessness and promote human dignity. 

The Need to Uphold the 
UN's Original Ideals 

If the governments represented in this 
chamber want peace as genuinely as 
their peoples do, we shall find it. We can 
do so by reasserting the moral authority 
of the United Nations. In recent weeks, 
the moral outrage of the world seems to 
have reawakened. 

Out of the billions of people who in- 
habit this planet, why, some might ask, 
should the death of several hundred 
shake the world so profoundly? Why 
should the death of a mother flying 
toward a reunion with her family or the 
death of a scholar heading toward new 
pursuits of knowledge matter so deeply? 
Why are nations who lost no citizens in 
the tragedy so angry? 

The reason rests on our assumptions 
about civilized life and the search for 
peace. The confidence that allows a 
mother or a scholar to travel to Asia or 
Africa or Europe or anywhere else on 



this planet may be only a small victory 
in humanity's struggle for peace. Yet 
what is peace if not the sum of such 
small victories? 

Each stride for peace and every 
small victory are important for the 
journey toward a larger and lasting 
peace. We have made progress. We have 
avoided another world war. We have 
seen an end to the traditional colonial 



U.S. Delegation 

to the 38th 

UN General Assembly 

Representatives 

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick 

Jose S. Sorzano 

John L. Loeb, Jr. 

Joel Pritchard, U.S. Representative from 

the State of Washington 
Stephen J. Solarz, U.S. Representative from 

the State of New York 

Alternate Representatives 

Charles M. Lichenstein 
William C. Sherman 
Constantine N. Dombalis 
Alan L. Keyes 
Lyn P. Meyerhoff 



USUN press release 74 of Oct. 12, 1983. 



era and the birth of 100 newly sovereign 
nations. Even though development re- 
mains a formidable challenge, we have 
witnessed remarkable economic growth 
among the industrialized and the 
developing nations. The United Nations 
and its affiliates have made important 
contributions to the quality of life on 
this planet, such as directly saving 
countless lives through its refugee and 
emergency relief programs. These broad 
achievements, however, have been over- 
shadowed by the problems that weigh so 
heavily upon us. The problems are old, 
but it is not too late to commit ourselves 
to a new beginning, a beginning fresh 
with the ideals of the UN Charter. 

Today, at the beginning of this 38th 
session, I solemnly pledge my nation to 
upholding the original ideals of the 
United Nations. Our goals are those that 



guide this very body. Our ends are the 
same as those of the United Nations' 
founders, who sought to replace a world 
at war with one where the rule of law 
would prevail, where human rights were 
honored, where development would 
blossom, where conflict would give way 
to freedom from violence. 

In 1956, President Dwight 
Eisenhower made an observation on 
weaponry and deterrence in a letter to a 
publisher. He wrote: 

When we get to the point, as we one day 
will, that both sides know that in any out- 
break of general hostilities, regardless of the 
element of surprise, destruction will be both 
reciprocal and complete, possibly we will 
have sense enough to meet at the conference 
table with the understanding that the era of 
armaments has ended and the human race 
must conform its actions to this truth or die. 

He went on to say: 

... we have already come to the point 
where safety cannot be assumed by arms 
alone . . . their usefulness becomes concen- 
trated more and more in their characteristics 
as deterrents than in instruments with which 
to obtain victory. . . . 

Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, 
as we persevere in the search for a more 
secure world, we must do everything we 
can to let diplomacy triumph. 
Diplomacy, the most honorable of pro- 
fessions, can bring the most blessed of 
gifts, the gift of peace. If we succeed, 
the world will find an excitement and ac- 
complishment in peace beyond that 
which could ever be imagined through 
violence and war. 

I want to leave you today with a 
message I have often spoken about to 
the citizens of my own country, especial- 
ly in times when I have felt they were 
discouraged and unsure. I say it to you 
with as much hope and heart as I have 
said it to my own people. You have the 
right to dream great dreams. You have 
the right to seek a better world for your 
people. And all of us have the respon- 
sibility to work for that better world. 
And as caring, peaceful peoples, think 
what a powerful force for good we could 
be. Distinguished delegates, let us regain 
the dream the United Nations once 
dreamed. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Oct. 3, 1983. I 



November 1983 



THE PRESIDENT 



Economic Progress Through 
Individual Freedom 



President Reagan's address before the 
Board of Governors of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Develop- 
ment (World Bank) and the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund on September 27, 
1983. l 

On behalf of my fellow Americans, I'm 
delighted to welcome you to the United 
States and to our nation's capital. And I 
am honored to have this opportunity to 
speak again to your distinguished 
members. 

I say honored because I believe that 
your institutions, the World Bank and 
affiliates and the International Monetary 
Fund, serve noble purposes. There can 
be no higher mission than to improve 
the human condition and to offer oppor- 
tunities for fulfillment in our individual 
lives and the lives of our national and 
our world communities. 

You are the leaders of the world 
community in bringing a better life to 
the diverse and often tragically poor 
people of our planet. You have worked 
tirelessly to preserve the framework for 
international economic cooperation and 
to generate confidence and competition 
in the world economy. 

The unending quest for economic, 
social, and human improvement is the 
basic drive that inspires and unites all of 
us. In 1945, when your great institutions 
were established, the civilized world had 
been brought to its knees by a wave of 
totalitarian violence that inflicted suffer- 
ing, sacrifice, and the suppression of 
human rights on millions of innocent 
people. 

Security, freedom, and prosperity 
were very much on the minds of the 
citizens of the world in 1945. They 
should be on our minds today. The in- 
stitutions you represent could not have 
been born, could not have flour- 
ished—and, may I add, will not sur- 
vive—in a world dominated by a system 
of cruelty that disregards individual 
rights and the value of human life in its 
ruthless drive for power, No state can 
be regarded as preeminent over the 
rights of individuals. Individual rights 
are supreme. 

In this civilization we've labored so 
faithfully to resurrect, preserve, and 
enhance, let us be ever mindful: it is not 
just development and prosperity but 



ultimately our peace and our freedom 
that are always at stake. Too often the 
demands of prosperity and security are 
viewed as competitors when, in fact, 
they're complementary, natural and 
necessary allies. We cannot prosper 
unless we're secure, and we cannot be 
secure unless we're free. 

The goals of the great international, 
political, and economic institutions— the 
United Nations, where I spoke yester- 
day, and the World Bank, its affiliates, 
and the IMF you represent here 
today — were to be reached by trusting in 
a shared and enduring truth: the keys to 
personal fulfillment, national develop- 
ment, human progress, and world peace 
are freedom and responsibility for in- 
dividuals and cooperation among na- 
tions. When I addressed the delegates of 
the United Nations yesterday, I re- 
minded them: you have the right to 
dream great dreams, to seek a better 
world for your people. And all of us 
have the responsibility to work for that 
better world. As caring, peaceful 
peoples, think what a powerful force for 
good we could be. 

Today, I come before your 
distinguished assembly in that same 
spirit— a messenger for prosperity and 
security through the principles of 
freedom, responsibility, and cooperation. 
When our nations trusted in these great 
principles in the postwar years, the 
civilized world enjoyed unparalleled 
economic development and improvement 
in the human condition. We witnessed a 
virtual explosion of world output and 
trade and the arrival of many free, self- 
determined, independent nation-states as 
new members of the international 
system. 

And, as I said when I last spoke to 
you, the societies that achieved the most 
spectacular, broad-based economic prog- 
ress in the shortest period of time have 
not been the biggest in size, nor the 
richest in resources, and certainly not 
the most rigidly controlled. What has 
united them all was their belief in the 
magic of the marketplace. Millions of in- 
dividuals making their own decisions in 
the marketplace will always allocate 
resources better than any centralized 
government planning process. 

Trust the people, this is the crucial 
lesson of history. Because only when the 



human spirit is allowed to worship, in- 
vent, create, and produce; only when in- 
dividuals are given a personal stake in 
deciding their destiny and benefiting 
from their own risks; only then do 
societies become dynamic, prosperous, 
progressive, and free. 

National Efforts for 
Economic Recovery 

In the turbulent decade of the 1970s, too 
many of us, the United States included, 
forgot the principles that produced the 
basis for our mutual economic progress. 
We permitted our governments to over- 
spend, overtax, and overregulate us 
toward soaring inflation and record in- 
terest rates. Now we see more clearly 
again. We're working and cooperating tt 
bring our individual economies and the 
world economy back to more solid foun- 
dations of low inflation, personal incen- 
tives for saving and investment, higher 
productivity, and greater opportunities 
for our people. 

Our first task was to get our own 
financial and economic houses in order. 
Our countries are interdependent, but 
without a foundation of sound domestic 
policies, the international economic 
system cannot expand and improve. 
Merely providing additional official 
development assistance will not produce 
progress. This is true for all countries, 
developed and developing, without ex- 
ception. As the 1983 development report 
of the World Bank notes: 

International actions will greatly improve 
the external environment confronting 
developing countries, but cannot supplant th« 
efforts that the developing countries must 
make themselves. 

I believe the United States is makinj 
real progress. Since we took office, 
we've reduced the rate of growth in our 
Federal Government's spending by near- 
ly 40%. We have cut inflation 
dramatically, from 12.4% to 2.6% for 
the last 12 months. The prime interest 
rate has been cut nearly in half, from 
21.5% to 11%. Figures released last 
week reveal our gross national product 
grew at an annual rate of almost 10% in 
the second quarter and about 7% is 
estimated for the third. 

In the United States, we still face 
large projected deficits which concern us> 
because deficit Federal spending and 
borrowing drain capital that would 
otherwise be invested for stronger 
economic growth. But as [Treasury] 
Secretary Regan correctly pointed out in 



":: 
tk 
■iii 
to 

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1'. 
It 

I 

"I 

8 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



the Interim Committee on Sunday, the 
deficit is coming down as a result of 
economic growth. Revenues are higher 
than anticipated, and we expect con- 
tinued improvement. We'll continue to 
work for greater restraint in Federal 
spending, but we will not risk sabotag- 
ing our economic expansion in a short- 
sighted attempt to reduce deficits by 
raising taxes. What tax increases would 
actually reduce is economic growth— by 
discouraging savings, investment, and 
consumption. 

One other point about the U.S. 
deficit. Let me make clear that it is 
caused in part by our determination to 
provide the military strength and 
political security to ensure peace in the 
world. Our commitment to military 
security is matched by our resolve to 
negotiate a verifiable nuclear arms 
reduction treaty. Only then can we safe- 
ly reduce military expenditures and their 
drain on our resources. As I mentioned 
at the outset, there can be no lasting 
prosperity without security and freedom. 

Promoting World Economic 
Recovery and Development 

Turning more directly to economic 
development, all signs point to a world 
economic recovery gaining momentum. 
\s early as last February, the Con- 
'erence Board predicted that economic 
growth rates in the United States and 
six major industrial countries spell 
economic recovery in any language. 
Since then, industrial production in the 
)ECD [Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development] countries 
las been moving up. Your own IMF 
■conomists are predicting growth in the 
vorld economy of at least 3% next year, 
^his is the brightest outlook in several 
'ears. 

As the U.S. economy picks up 
team, our imports rise with it. When 
rou consider that half of all non-OPEC 
leveloping-country manufactured goods 
xported to the industrialized countries 
ome to the United States, it's clear 
vhat a strong stimulus our imports pro- 
ide for economic expansion abroad, 
knd as other economies prosper, our ex- 
ports in turn increase. We all gain. 

Many nations are moving steadily 
lorward toward self-sustaining growth, 
knd, like us, they're doing it by relying 
.gain on the marketplace. This period of 
djustment has not been easy for us. In 
act, it's been very painful. But it is the 
•ne way that does work, and it's begin- 
ning to pay dividends. 



Economic recovery is spreading its 
wings and taking flight. We all know 
those wings have not spread far enough. 
And, I would add, recovery alone is not 
good enough. Our challenge is far 
greater— lasting, worldwide economic 
expansion. Together, we must make the 
1980s an historic era of transition 
toward sustained, noninflationary world 
growth. I have every confidence that we 
can, and, with our combined leadership 
and cooperation, we will. 

IMF: International 
Financial Linchpin 

The IMF is the linchpin of the interna- 
tional financial system. Among official 
institutions, it serves as a counselor, 
coaxing the world economy toward 
renewed growth and stability. At 
various times in its history, the IMF has 
provided important temporary balance- 
of-payments assistance to its member 
nations, including my own. At times, it 
must play the "Dutch uncle," talking 
frankly, telling those of us in govern- 
ment things we need to hear but would 
rather not. We know how significant the 
IMF's role has been in assisting troubled 
debtor countries, many of which are 
making courageous strides to regain 
financial health. We warmly applaud the 
efforts of Mr. de Larosiere [IMF Manag- 
ing Director] and his staff. 

My Administration is committed to 
do what is legitimately needed to help 



responsibility and to meet the pledge of 
our government. 

The IMF quota legislation has been 
pending for several months, and I do not 
appreciate the partisan wrangling and 
political posturing that have been 
associated with this issue during recent 
weeks. I urge members of both political 
parties to lay aside their differences, to 
abandon harsh rhetoric and unreason- 
able demands, and to get on with the 
task in a spirit of true bipartisanship. 
The stakes are great. This legislation is 
not only crucial to the recovery of 
America's trading partners abroad and 
to the stability of the entire interna- 
tional financial system, it is also 
necessary to a sustained recovery in the 
United States. 

The sum we're requesting will not 
increase our budget deficit, and it will be 
returned with interest as loans are 
repaid to the IMF. What's more, it will 
keep the wheels of world commerce 
turning and create jobs. Exports ac- 
count for one out of eight manufacturing 
jobs in our country, the United States. 
Forty percent of our agricultural prod- 
ucts are exported. I'm afraid that even 
today too few in the Congress realize 
the United States is interdependent with 
both the developed and the developing 
world. 

Examine the record: the United 
States has been a dependable partner, 
reaching out to help developing coun- 
tries which are laboring under excessive 



When you consider that half of all non-OPEC 
developing-country manufactured goods exported 
to the industrialized countries come to the United 
States, it's clear what a strong stimulus our im- 
ports provide for economic expansion abroad. And 
as other economies prosper, our exports in turn 
increase. 



ensure that the IMF continues as the 
cornerstone of the international financial 
system. Let me make something very 
plain: I have an unbreakable commit- 
ment to increased funding for the IMF. 
But the U.S. Congress so far has failed 
to act to pass the enabling legislation. I 
urge the Congress to be mindful of its 



debt burdens. These major debtor coun- 
tries have already undertaken difficult 
measures in a concerted effort to get 
their economic houses in order. Most of 
them are working closely with the IMF 
to overcome economic hardships. They 
continue to demonstrate a commendable 
willingness to make necessary ad- 
justments. And that's why I can state 



November 1983 



THE PRESIDENT 



that our participation in the IMF quota 
increase is not a government bailout of 
these debtor countries or of the banks 
which are sharing the burden. On the 
contrary, IMF plans to assist financially 
troubled countries call for the banks to 
put up more new money than the IMF 
itself. 

This is by nature a cooperative 
enterprise. If the Congress does not ap- 
prove our participation, the inevitable 
consequence would be a withdrawal by 
other industrialized countries from doing 
their share. At the end of this road 



be considered a complement to, not a 
substitute for, sound policies at home. If 
policies are sound, financing can be 
beneficial. If policies are irresponsible, 
all the aid in the world will be no more 
than money down the drain. 

The Need To Resist 
Protectionist Pressures 

As we work together for recovery, we 
must be on guard against storm clouds 
of protectionist pressures building on 
the horizon. At the recent economic 



. . . our participation in the IMF quota increase is 
not a government bailout of these debtor countries 
or of the banks which are sharing the burden. On 
the contrary, IMF plans to assist financially 
troubled countries call for the banks to put up 
more new money than the IMF itself. 



could be a major disruption of the entire 
world trading and financial systems — an 
economic nightmare that could plague 
generations to come. No one can afford 
to make light of the responsibility we all 
share. 

We strongly support the World 
Bank. In fact, the United States remains 
its largest single contributor. We 
recognize its key role in stimulating 
world development and the vital 
assistance it provides to developing na- 
tions. Here again, I have proposed 
legislation to meet our commitment for 
funding the World Bank and especially 
the International Development Associa- 
tion. It is important that these funds be 
available to help the people in the 
poorest countries raise their standards 
of living. Tomorrow, Secretary Regan 
will be discussing both the Fund and the 
Bank in more detail. Because our invest- 
ment in the World Bank's operations is 
so large, we feel a special responsibility 
to provide constructive suggestions to 
make it even more effective. 

Let me simply underscore again a 
fundamental point. And I say this as a 
spokesman for a compassionate, caring 
people. The heart of America is good 
and its heart is true. We've provided 
more concessional assistance to develop- 
ing nations than any other coun- 
try—more than $130 billion in the last 
three decades. Whether the question at 
hand be bank project financing or fund 
balance-of-payments assistance, it must 



8 



summit in Williamsburg, my fellow 
leaders and I renewed our commitment 
to an open, expanding world trading 
system. The Williamsburg declaration 
reads: "We commit ourselves to halt pro- 
tectionism and as recovery proceeds to 
reverse it by dismantling trade 
barriers." 

Whether such words will prove to be 
empty promises, or symbols of a power- 
ful commitment, depends on the real 
day-to-day actions which each of our 
governments take. Everyone is against 
protectionism in the abstract. That's 
easy. It is another matter to make the 
hard, courageous choices when it is your 
industry or your business that appears 
to be hurt by foreign competition. I 
know; we in the United States deal with 
the problem of protectionism every day 
of the year. 

We are far from perfect, but the 
United States offers the most free and 
open economy in the world. We import 
far more goods than any nation on 



earth. There is more foreign investment 
here than anywhere else. And access to 
our commercial and capital markets is 
relatively free. 

Protectionism is not a problem 
solver; it is problem creator. Protec- 
tionism invites retaliation. It means you 
will buy less from your trading partners, 
they will buy less from you, the world 
economic pie will shrink, and the danger 
of political turmoil will increase. 

You know, I've made this analogy 
before. But we and our trading partners 
are in the same boat. If one partner 
shoots a hole in the bottom of the boat, 
does it make sense for the other partner 
to shoot another hole in the boat? Some 
people say yes and call it getting tough. 
I call it getting wet— all over. 

We must plug the holes in the boat 
of open markets and free trade and set 
sail again in the direction of prosperity. 
No one should mistake our determina- 
tion to use our full power and influence 
to prevent anyone from destroying the 
boat and sinking us all. 

I firmly believe that we can and 
must go forward together, hand in hand, 
not looking for easy villains to explain 
our problems but resolved to pursue the 
proven path on which these institutions 
embarked almost four decades ago — a 
path of economic progress and political 
independence for all countries and for al 
people. 

In closing, let me share with you a 
very deep personal belief I hold. We are 
all sovereign nations and, therefore, fret 
to choose our own way as long as we do 
not transgress upon the sovereign rights 
of one another. But we cannot really be 
free as independent states unless we 
respect the freedom and independence 
of each of our own individual citizens. Ir 
improving their lot, which is the only 
reason you and I hold high offices in our 
lands, we cannot forget that how we 
help them progress economically must 
be consistent with this highest objective 
of all — their personal dignity, their in- 
dependence, and ultimately their 
freedom. That's what this job of ours is 
all about. 



'Text from White House press release. 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE PRESIDENT 



The Cause of Peace 



President Reagan's radio address to 
the nation, broadcast September £4, 
1988. x 

My fellow Americans and fellow citizens 
of the world, this is Ronald Reagan, 
President of the United States, speaking 
to you live from the broadcast studios of 
the Voice of America in Washington, 
D.C. 

In 2 days, I will be going to the UN 
General Assembly to speak for a cause 
that people everywhere carry close to 
their hearts — the cause of peace. This 
subject is so important I wanted to 
share our message with a larger au- 
dience than I usually address each 
Saturday afternoon in the United States. 
So today I am speaking directly to peo- 
ple everywhere, from Los Angeles to 
New Delhi, Cairo, and Bangkok, and I'm 
attempting to speak directly to the peo- 
ple of the Soviet Union. I'd like to talk 
about ideas and feelings all of us share 
which I intend to communicate to the 
United Nations on Monday. 

Let me begin by bringing you 
greetings from the American people and 
our heartfelt wishes for peace. In these 
times of stress, I believe that the people 
of the world must know and understand 
how each other feels, their fears as well 
as their dreams. We Americans are a 
peace-loving people. We seek friendship 
not only with our traditional allies but 
with our adversaries too. We've had 
serious differences with the Soviet 
Government, but we should remember 
that our sons and daughters have never 
fought each other in war, and if we 
Americans have our way, we never will. 
People don't make wars, governments 
do. And too many Soviet and American 
citizens have already shed too much 
blood because of violence by govern- 
ments. The American people want less 
confrontation and more communication 
and cooperation, more opportunity to 
correspond, to speak freely with all peo- 
ple over our respective radio and televi- 
sion programs, and most important to 
visit each other in our homes so we 
could better understand your countries 
and you could know the truth about 
America. 

The treasure we Americans cherish 
most is our freedom — freedom to lead 
our lives the way we choose, freedom to 
worship God, to think for ourselves, and 
freedom to speak our minds even to the 
point of criticizing our own government. 
We do not believe in censorship. When 



another government criticizes us, we 
know about it, and if they ever say 
something good, you can bet we'll know 
that too. The trouble is, we don't always 
have that same freedom to speak to 
others, especially those who live in the 
Soviet Union, and one-way communica- 
tion prevents us from better understand- 
ing each other. 

For example, the Soviet Government 
has taken extraordinary steps to justify 
its firing on a Korean civilian airliner 
killing 269 helpless people from 14 coun- 
tries. But I ask those who have been 
told the United States is responsible: If 
you're hearing the truth, why has the 
outcry been so intense from members of 
the United Nations, the International 
Civil Aviation Organization, and why are 
pilots all over the world boycotting 
flights to Moscow? We have no quarrel 
with you, the Soviet people. But please 
understand, the world believes no 
government has a right to shoot civilian 
airliners out of the sky. Your airline, 
Aeroflot, has violated sensitive U.S. 
airspace scores of times, yet we would 
never fire on your planes and risk killing 
one of your friends or your loved ones. 

I guess the picture painted of me by 
the officials in some countries is pretty 
grim. May I just say — and I speak not 
only as the President of the United 
States but also as a husband, a father, a 
grandfather, and a person who loves 
God and whose heart yearns deeply for 
a better future — my dream is for our 
peoples to come together in a spirit of 
faith and friendship, to help build and 
leave behind a far safer world. But 
dreams for the future cannot be realized 
by words alone. Words must be matched 
by deeds, by an honest, tireless effort to 
reduce the risks of war and the loss of 
life. In this era of nuclear weapons, no 
achievement could be more meaningful 
than a verifiable agreement that would 
dramatically reduce the level of nuclear 
armaments. 

American negotiators in Geneva are 
offering fair-minded, equitable proposals 
in the interests of both our countries. In 
the strategic arms reduction talks, we 
propose deep cuts in both the number of 
warheads carried by intercontinental 
ballistic missiles and in the number of 
missiles themselves. This proposal of- 
fered cuts- too far below current U.S. 
levels. The Soviet Government declined 
to consider them. We tried again. Last 



June, we proposed a more flexible ap- 
proach. Then during the last round of 
talks in Geneva, we presented a draft 
treaty responding to concerns expressed 
by the Soviet Government. 

Also, from the outset of the inter- 
mediate-range nuclear force talks 2 
years ago, I made clear that the United 
States was ready to join with the Soviet 
Union in the total elimination of an en- 
tire class of intermediate-range, land- 
based nuclear missiles. That offer still 
stands. I regret that the Soviet Govern- 
ment continues to reject this proposal. 
What could possibly be better than to 
rid the world of an entire class of 
nuclear weapons? 

But in the effort to move the 
negotiations forward, we proposed an 
interim solution — some number on both 
sides below current levels. Again, the 
Soviet Government refused. I'm deeply 
aware of people's feelings and frustra- 
tions. I share them. And I intend to 
keep trying. On Monday I will go to the 
United Nations to propose another 
package of steps designed to advance 
the negotiations. All we seek are 
agreements to reduce substantially the 
number and destructive power of 
nuclear forces. 

Yes, we insist on balanced 
agreements that protect our security, 
that provide greater stability, and that 
are truly verifiable, but these re- 
quirements are the essence of fairness. 
They would provide greater security for 
all nations. 

We, the American people, deeply 
yearn for peace. If our dreams and 
hopes are to mean anything, we must sit 
down together and speak plainly. Just as 
government censorship is a barrier to 
understanding, the inflexibility of the 
Soviet Government on arms control is 
holding back successful negotiations. I 
have said to my own people, you have 
the right to expect a better world and to 
demand that your government work for 
it. This Monday I will have the honor to 
carry that message to the 38th general 
session of the United Nations. It will be 
a commitment from the heart and one 
that I know all people share. For the 
sake of our children and our children's 
children, I pray that the Soviet Govern- 
ment will not censor my words but will 
let their people listen to them and then 
negotiate with us in good faith. 



•Text from White House press release. 



November 1983 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



Vice President Bush 
Visits North Africa 
and Europe 

Vice President Bush departed Washington, D.C. 
September 11, 1983, to visit Morocco 
(September 11-13), Algeria (September 13-15), 
Tunisia (September 15-16), Yugoslavia 
(September 16-18), Romania (September 18-19), 
Hungary (September 19-20), and 
Austria (September 20-21). He returned to 
Washington on September 21. 

Following are the Vice President's statements, 
addresses, toasts, and remarks he made on various 
occasions during the trip. 1 



MOROCCO 

Arrival Statement, 

Rabat, 

Sept. 11, 1983 

As Vice President, I have traveled 
abroad on many occasions, but this is 
the first time Mrs. Bush and I have had 
the honor of being received in this part 
of the world. We are just delighted that 
our introduction to it begins in 
"Maghreb El Aqsa," for it is "the ex- 
treme west of the Maghreb" that is the 
crossroads of European, Mediterranean, 
Middle Eastern, and African cultures. 

For over 200 years, this country has 
extended the hand of friendship to the 
United States. We look with particular 
gratitude to Morocco's recognition of the 
fledgling United States at the time of 
our independence and, more recently, to 
the assistance Morocco and the Moroc- 
can people provided during World 
War II and have continued to provide 
since. 

President Reagan has asked me to 
visit Morocco not only as a tangible sym- 
bol of this long and close friendship but 



10 



as a mark of the high value that he 
places on the wise counsel of His Majes- 
ty King Hassan II, and I greatly look 
forward to continuing the exchange of 
views with His Majesty that we began 
during His Majesty's visits to the United 
States just last year. 

And I am particularly pleased to 
visit Morocco at a time when determined 
efforts are being made to expand 
regional cooperation and development. 

Once again, Mrs. Bush and I are 
delighted to be here for this, our first, 
visit to Morocco. We are very grateful 
to His Royal Highness and the Ministers 
and the diplomatic corps who came to 
greet us, and we look forward to a stay 
that I am confident will prove both 
useful and pleasant. 



Departure Statement, 

Fez, 

Sept. 13, 1983 

Moroccan hospitality is legendary, and 
Mrs. Bush and I can now attest to the 
truth of the legend. The graciousness of 
His Majesty King Hassan's welcome and 
the generosity extended to us by all of 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 




Vice President Bush with King Hassan II of Morocco. 

(White House photos by Valarie Hodgson) 



the Moroccans whom we met has provid- 
ed us with memories that we will always 
treasure. 

President Reagan and I deeply ap- 
preciate the opportunity I have had to 
talk at length with His Majesty on a 
number of matters of mutual interest on 
the international and regional scene. My 
meetings with Prime Minister Bouabid, 
Foreign Minister Boucetta, and other 
members of the government likewise 
provided opportunities for a highly 
useful exchange of views. 

I took particular interest in His Maj- 
esty's views on regional rapprochement 
and the steps now being taken toward 
resolution of the vexing question of the 
Western Sahara. The United States, like 



other international observers, shares the 
hope that an equitable solution will be 
found and implemented in the very near 
future under the auspices of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU). 

Although my stay has been brief, I 
have been impressed by the diversity of 
participation in the political process. 
Morocco's multiparty system is alive and 
well. Under the guidance of His Majesty, 
democratic processes consistent with 
Moroccan culture are now at work to 
build a better future for the Moroccan 
people. 

Once again, let me express our ap- 
preciation for the hand of friendship 
that we found so warmly extended to us 
during this visit. 



ALGERIA 

Address to 

Government Officials, 
Algiers, 
Sept. 14, 1983 

You have made my wife Barbara and me 
feel very much at home here in Algeria, 
and I want you to know that we ap- 
preciate your warm welcome very much. 
I am honored that you have invited me 
to the beautiful capital of Algiers to 
meet and talk with you about the im- 
portant issues that confront our two 
nations. 

The United States has many valued 



November 1983 



11 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



friends in this part of the world and 
fruitful relations with most of the coun- 
tries of North Africa. So it is a pleasure 
for us to come here and renew our 
diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties. 

Our two countries share a common 
heritage: We both won our independence 
after long and bitter struggles against 
foreign domination. Algeria has shown 
what can be accomplished in nation- 
building in just a generation. It is a 
leader of the Nonaligned Movement, 
with an influential voice for fairness and 
reason in regional and world affairs. In 
this connection, all Americans gratefully 
remember Algeria's help in the resolu- 
tion of the hostage crisis a few years 
ago. You have countless friends in 
America you do not even know. 

Algiers is a most appropriate place, 
therefore, for me to talk about 
America's relations with the newly in- 
dependent and developing countries of 
the world. 

My country is 200 years old, but as 
we have not forgotten the dreams of our 
own beginnings, we have not grown in- 
different to the hopes and desires of the 
younger nations. The United States had 
the first anticolonial revolution; and 
toward the end of the First World War, 
when colonialism still shrouded the 



globe, we were instrumental in begin- 
ning the modern process of decoloniza- 
tion. After World War II, the United 
States continued to champion decoloniza- 
tion, because we remembered our own 
struggle for independence and the prin- 
ciples on which our own nation was 
founded. 

Today, the end of the colonial 
system has transformed international 
politics and international economics. The 
United States is acutely aware that 
much of the world's future is being 
shaped by events in these newly in- 
dependent and developing regions which 
embrace the broad majority of mankind. 
Out of enlightened self-interest and a 
consciousness of common humanity, the 
American people share your aspirations 
for peace, freedom, security, and 
progress. 

We are now more than two decades 
into the postcolonial era. The euphoria 
of the early independence period has 
given way to a sober appreciation of the 
long-term problems of nationbuilding. 
New nations are confronted by serious 
challenges of regional security and 
economic development. Both developed 
and developing nations have learned 
that, politically and economically, our 
destinies are intertwined. Our well-being 



and security are closely interrelated. We 
face many common challenges and op- 
portunities for the future. 

In the political dimension, as a result 
of history, geography, and philosophy, 
America and Algeria have different ap- 
proaches on many issues. How vividly I 
remember this from my days as UN 
Ambassador. But while we often 
disagreed, we were never adversaries. 
This is due not only to the courtesy of 
Algerian diplomats and the skill of 
Algerian diplomacy, it also reflects a 
basic truth about America's conception 
of world order. 

It was President John F. 
Kennedy— a great friend of Algeria — 
who said that America's goal was to help 
"make the world safe for diversity." The 
United States has its interests and ob- 
jectives in the world, just as Algeria has 
its own. But America sees a world of 
truly independent, prospering nations as 
totally compatible with its interests. We 
do not wish to make over the world in 
our image. This is not our way. We 
respect the independence of others even 
when their ways are different. 

Our own political and economic 
systems stress free competition, the 
clash of ideas, tolerance, openness — in a 




With Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid (center, Zaki Asian, interpreter). 



12 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



word, freedom. It is sometimes chaotic, 
but it is a system that gives free rein to 
individual talent and initiative. Likewise 
in the international arena, we see 
pluralism and diversity as a source of 
creativity and dynamism. We seek no ar- 
tificial uniformity or regimentation. We 
are not afraid of spontaneity. We are 
prepared to compete on a fair basis in 
the world of ideas as well as the world 
of economics. This is our tradition and 
our vision of a just international order. 

Therefore we accept, and respect, 
the practice of genuine nonalignment. 
As long as a country is making its own 
independent sovereign decisions and 
respects the sovereignty of other nations 
in the world community, we respect its 
views, even when they differ from ours. 
And we are ready to work constructive- 
ly with those countries on issues on 
which we agree and in areas where our 
interests coincide — even though we may 
not agree totally. 

We welcome the diversity of points 
of view that exists among all coun- 
tries—developed and developing— and 
we know their interests and circum- 
stances are not all identical. 

Every country has its unique poten- 
tial and its unique problems. Therefore, 
we are concerned when some developing 
countries compromise their own in- 
dividual principles to meekly follow a 
single voice or alien ideology or to pre- 
tend a false identity of views on major 
international issues. Such an artificial 
conformity obscures the real nature of 
the problems and blocks realistic solu- 
tions. 

We reject the theory, offered by 
some nations, of a "natural alliance" be- 
tween the nonaligned nations and the 
East bloc. If anything, we believe the 
West has vastly more to offer the na- 
tions of the Third World in terms of 
freedom and economic opportunity. And 
what the West has to offer does not re- 
quire automatic conformity to precon- 
ceived social structures or political posi- 
tions. True nonalignment means to seek 
a position independent of East and West 
and to apply equal objectivity in judging 
the actions and policies of both. If the 
nonaligned nations criticize the West, 
that is fine and healthy for all of us. We 
are always open to constructive 
criticism. Our system is built on debate 
and the free exchange of ideas and opin- 
ions. But objectivity and balance require 
equal care in observing the faults of the 
East. Many governments that call 
themselves nonaligned are remarkably 
myopic in recognizing what communism 



does to human rights wherever it takes 
hold. Religious beliefs and practices, for 
instance, are strictly controlled by the 
state— sometimes outlawed altogether— 
and the faithful are harassed, in- 
timidated, and thrown in jail. 

It detracts from the credibility of the 
Nonaligned Movement when gross viola- 
tions of international law are ignored or 
when human rights violations in the 
West are focused upon while those of 
the East— as in Afghanistan and other 
places— are overlooked. Credibility is 
the movement's currency, and it should 
not be so debased. 

Our desire, and our policy, is to view 
every country in the developing world in 
its own right. Contrary to some 
misconceptions, we do not seek to inject 
East- West controversies into Third 
World issues or to attempt to force the 
countries of the Third World to choose 
between affiliation with the West or the 
East. We not only respect nonalignment, 
we value it as a precious contribution to 
global security, peace, and freedom. 

Sadly, the world is much beset by 
regional conflicts which pose immediate 
dangers to the independence of develop- 
ing countries and sometimes raise the 
grave danger of outside involvement. 
The world community, therefore, has a 
vital stake in strengthening the rule of 
law. It is the smaller countries of the 
world most of all whose well-being 
depends on the rule of law— on the prin- 
ciples of peaceful settlement of disputes, 
noninterference, and respect for the 
sovereign independence of states. 

Recently the world was shocked by 
the tragic events over the Sea of Japan. 
The callous murder of 269 civilians 
aboard a commercial airliner was only 
compounded by the bald and careless 
lies of those responsible and the absolute 
contempt they showed for the just in- 
quiries of the international community. 
The Soviets even threatened that they 
would do it again. No remorse. No ex- 
pression of regret or sorrow. It's ap- 
parent that they don't place the same 
value on human life that we do. Imagine 
saying, "We'd do it again." 

I ask you: Would your own country 
wantonly shoot down an unarmed com- 
mercial airliner filled with innocent men, 
women, and children for any reason at 
all? Never. Nor would mine. When any 
nation shows such brazen disregard for 
the most basic rules of international 
behavior and the most elementary 



humanitarian considerations, it weakens 
the security of all nations and under- 
mines the prospects for peace. 

When developing countries come in- 
to conflict with each other, we believe 
that the best safeguard against expan- 
sion of local conflict is the concerted ac- 
tion of regional countries them- 
selves—whether through institutions 
like the OAU or informally, as the 
Maghreb countries have recently 
demonstrated. Such efforts will always 
have the support of the United States. 
On Lebanon, for instance, we are work- 
ing with all concerned in an attempt to 
secure the peace and integrity of 
Lebanon. We are trying to help, not dic- 
tate. 

Let me turn now to America's 
economic relations with the developing 
world. In the economic dimension, 
Algeria and America start from dif- 
ferent philosophies. But we have learned 
that practical cooperation is not only 
fruitful but essential, because philosophy 
alone won't put a dollar or a dinar in 
your pocket or contribute to a nation's 
economic development. Business is 
business. You need it, and we need it. 

The United States, too, was once a 
developing country, and our approach is 
very much colored by our historical ex- 
perience. We have seen the free market 
system work — as a great liberator of 
talent, energy, initiative, and creativity. 
In our experience, technological innova- 
tion and economic growth came from 
the dynamism of private enterprise, not 
from government. And we saw this 
process of development work most effec- 
tively for us in a political context of 
pluralist, constitutional democracy. 

Other nations, we recognize, having 
a different history and philosophy, have 
chosen different models. Some have 
chosen ours, and we sincerely believe 
our approach has proven the most effec- 
tive for many countries in the develop- 
ing world. But we believe more strongly 
that every people should be free to 
choose their own way. We have no quar- 
rel with those who choose a different 
economic system from ours — only with 
those who seek to impose their choice on 
others or who claim to speak for 
workers without allowing workers to 
speak for themselves. 

As Algerians know, there are no 
shortcuts to development. In the long 
term, trade not aid is the primary 
source of external resources to stimulate 



November 1983 



13 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



growth for all countries. In 1980 the 
developing countries had export earn- 
ings of about $580 billion. This 
amounted to 17 times their net inflow of 
resources from foreign aid. Therefore, 
the openness of the world's trading 
system is of crucial importance. As the 
world economy now moves toward 
recovery, it is most important for all of 
us to resist internal protectionist 
pressures and, indeed, to move ahead on 
new measures of trade liberalization, 
such as we have undertaken with our 
Caribbean Basin Initiative, with special 
care for the opportunities and vulnera- 
bilities of the developing countries. 

The United States has a strong 
tradition of support for development 
through bilateral and multilateral aid, 
through trade liberalization, through 
strengthening international institutions, 
and through technology transfer from 
the private sector. In the decade of the 
1970s, the U.S. Government provided 
$57 billion to the developing world— $43 
billion in official aid, and $14 billion in 
contributions to the multilateral develop- 
ment banks. Our foreign aid program 
has increased each year of the Reagan 
Administration, even while many 
domestic programs for our citizens have 
been cut. The United States continues to 
be the world's largest contributor of of- 
ficial development aid, and over two- 
thirds of our aid goes to the poorest 
countries. We have played an active role 
in multilateral efforts to ease debt prob- 
lems, and we are proud of it. 

The bilateral economic relationship 
between the United States and Algeria 
is proof that cooperation can be mutual- 
ly beneficial for two very different 
economic systems. You have welcomed 
modern technology from the West and 
yet preserved your values, your in- 
dependence, and your nonalignment. 
The United States is happy to have 
cooperated in Algeria's technological 
progress. Our mutual experience shows 
that American private business and 
Algeria's enterprise nationales can work 
as partners, to mutual benefit. As Com- 
merce Secretary Baldrige's recent visit 
demonstrated, we are ready to do more. 

The American economy is now 
launched on a vigorous, sustained 
recovery. This is probably the single 
most important thing we can do to help 
restore growth in the developing world. 
In the United States, inflation and in- 
terest rates are way down from past 



years, and the key indicators of produc- 
tion are up sharply. We are embarked 
on a broad program of regulatory relief, 
to get the Federal Government off peo- 
ple's backs and out of their pockets. 
Growth with low inflation has also 
returned in Britain, Germany, Japan, 
and others, which together with the 
United States account for about three- 
quarters of the production of the in- 
dustrialized nations. If we all maintain 
discipline in our policies and freedom in 
our trading system, the entire world 
may be headed into a new period of 
steady, long-term, noninflationary 
economic expansion. 

We in the United States know that 
our own future is very much bound up 
with the future of the rest of the world. 
Political turmoil and regional conflict af- 
fect international security, which 
threatens us all. And our own economic 
health is very much enhanced by the 
economic vitality of the world economy, 
of which the developing world is an in- 
creasingly important part. 

To any country that seeks freedom, 
peace, and free and fair trade, the 
United States will be a reliable friend. 
We look upon the problems of peace and 
economic development as challenges fac- 
ing us all. We are prepared to do our 
part to help. We hope that others will 
meet us in the same spirit. 

The United States is proud of its 
growing relations with Algeria and its 
long friendship with the people of the 
Maghreb. We are privileged to be able 
to work with you on the common agenda 
facing mankind. If we are at odds, there 
is little that we can accomplish separate- 
ly. If we work together, there is much 
we can do to make the world a better 
place for all our peoples. 



TUNISIA 

Dinner Toast, 

Tunis, 

Sept. 15, 1983 2 

It's a great pleasure for me to be here, 
and sharing a meal represents an impor- 
tant aspect of Arab hospitality 
everywhere, marking as it does, friend- 
ship between individuals. Our gathering 
here today marks a similar bond — the 
spirit of friendship between two nations. 
Tunisia and the United States enjoy 
sturdy relations rooted in trust, mutual 
respect, and common tradition. Our two 



countries, moreover, share a deep and 
binding commitment to the belief in the 
basic dignity of man and in his right to a 
free and productive life. 

Under your wise leadership, 
Mr. President, such values have become 
a fundamental element of the Tunisian 
political tradition, and we in the United 
States applaud this courageous and 
dedicated commitment to democratic 
traditions. President Bourguiba has set 
an example we must all strive to follow 
as we seek to preserve and strengthen 
the very rights we enjoy, so that those 
who come after us might likewise know 
freedom . 

In the United States, we believe that 
political freedoms go hand-in-hand with 
economic choice and that a just social 
order is strong in part because it frees 
the energies of the individual as he 
struggles to overcome material want. 
And here in Tunisia, certainly, you've 
not only established a democratic order 
but made great strides toward pros- 
perity. 

Exercising wisdom and foresight, 
President Bourguiba guided Tunisia 
through the early stages of development 
and into the present, far more dynamic 
era. The United States is proud of the 
role it has played in Tunisia's fight for a 
better life for its people— the Greater 
Jihad, as President Bourguiba has called 
it — and we share in the sense of ac- 
complishment the people of Tunisia take 
in their achievements. 

Close economic cooperation has 
played a key role in Tunisian-American 
relations over the years and, I assure 
you, it will continue to play a key role in 
the years to come. 

As Tunisia builds on its achieve- 
ments, like all countries, it will require 
secure borders and the strength with 
which to counter any outside threats. 
For our part, we in the United States 
remain firmly committed to the ter- 
ritorial integrity of Tunisia and to the 
principle of noninterference in the inter- 
nal affairs of states. And just as 
domestic tranquility is essential to 
economic growth, so regional stability is 
essential to world peace. And I refer to 
the subject you so eloquently spoke on: 
peace in the Middle East— a peace that 
has eluded us for 35 years. 

Let me state clearly that the United 
States remains committed to help the 
people of the region achieve a just and 
durable peace. Here's what our Presi- 
dent said, Mr. President: "A secure and 






14 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



lasting peace for the Arab people and 
Israel, including a resolution of the 
Palestinian problem that satisfies the 
people's rights, is a fundamental objec- 
tive of our foreign policy." We remain 
steadfast in our belief that true peace, 
true security cannot be imposed but 
must be achieved through negotiations. 
I know that you share our deep con- 
cern and the anguish that we feel over 
the violence in Lebanon, and, at this mo- 
ment, our thoughts and prayers are with 
the Lebanese people — Christian and 



Muslim alike— who have already suf- 
fered so much. With the Lebanese 
Government, we are convinced that the 
only solution for all the people of 
Lebanon lies in the withdrawal of all 
foreign forces from Lebanese territory. 

I repeat that all parties should 
withdraw from Lebanon, and that is the 
firmly held position of the U.S. Govern- 
ment. At this critical time, the Lebanese 
Government needs and deserves the sup- 
port of all its friends, and I know that 
the long-suffering people of Lebanon can 




i Vice President and Mrs. Bush are greeted 
by President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia 

t and Mrs. Bourguiba (center. Prime 
Minister Mohamed Mzali). 



count on Tunisia's support and 
understanding now as in the past. 

Therefore, I ask you to join me in a 
toast and all our guests to the spirit of 
friendship and cooperation between our 
two countries and to our common 
destiny for peace in the world. 

Departure Remarks, 

Tunis, 

Sept. 16, 1983 

Our departure today concludes our visit 
to the Maghreb. In many ways, it's fit- 
ting that Tunisia should be the last stop 
in this part of the world. I'd like to just 
take a moment to reflect on my stay 
here in Tunisia. 



Though our stay was short, we were 
able to accomplish much, thanks largely 
to the Prime Minister's skill at getting 
straight to the heart of every matter. 

Even when we disagree, our dif- 
ferences are those of friends. Tunisia 
and the United States share a common 
approach to the world— an approach 
based on the belief that international 
relations should be based, not on subver- 
sion, threats, and mindless calls to arms, 
but on cooperation, mutual respect, and 
reason. And here in the Maghreb— this 
dynamic, youthful, rapidly changing 
region of the world— the United States 
has no stauncher or more important 
friend than Tunisia. 

This is just as true now as it has 
been for the last quarter of a century. 
We admire Tunisia's achievements, in 
which we are gratified to have been able 
to play a part. We support Tunisia's in- 
dependence from external threats and 
pressures, and we respect Tunisia's 
nonaligned status. Our support for 
Tunisia's security reflects not geopolitics 
but our profound belief that the Tunisian 
model of responsible political and 
economic development is one which has 
achieved significant progress and one 
that some others— including those who 
sometimes cast a covetous eye on what 
Tunisia has done — would do well to 
emulate. 

The kind of international environ- 
ment we seek to foster is in essence one 
in which the Tunisias of the world are 
free to progress and develop in accord- 
ance with their particular national 
genius. And I am happy to say that I 
come away from this visit with a re- 
newed and deepened sense of con- 
fidence, both in the underlying strength 
of our friendship and in the achievement 
of Tunisia's institutions and political 
traditions. 

Finally, Mrs. Bush and I want to 
thank President Bourguiba as well as 
our good friends the Prime Minister, the 
Foreign Minister, and all their col- 
leagues for all their wonderful hospitali- 
ty. We really have been deeply im- 
pressed by the history which surrounds 
us here, the dynamism of modern Tunis, 
and the warmth and sincerity of all the 
Tunisians we have been privileged to 
meet. 



November 1983 



15 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 




With Vice President Vidoje Zarkovic of Yugoslavia. 



YUGOSLAVIA 

Statement, 
Belgrade, 
Sept. 17, 1983 

As you know, I arrived in Yugoslavia 
yesterday as the guest of Vice President 
Zarkovic. I have held talks with him and 
with President Spiljak, Prime Minister 
Planinc, Foreign Secretary Mojsov, and 
other Yugoslav officials. I was extreme- 
ly satisfied with our discussions. As 
always, our talks were held in the 
friendly, open, and constructive manner 
which is characteristic of the good 
bilateral relationship between our coun- 
tries. 



As a result of those talks, it is clear 
that the principles that have successfully 
governed the Yugoslav-American rela- 
tionship for so many years — respect for 
independence, sovereignty, equality, and 
noninterference— remain valid today 
and will remain valid in the future. A 
completely independent, truly non- 
aligned Yugoslavia is a positive factor 
for both European security and world 
peace, and the United States supports 
such a role and position of Yugoslavia. 

My Yugoslav hosts discussed 
Yugoslavia's economic prospects and the 
Yugoslav Government's policy of 
economic stabilization. I have expressed 
my government's strong support for 
these determined efforts to place the 
Yugoslav economy on a firm basis. In 
that connection, I discussed the upswing 
in the U.S. economy and recent develop- 



ments in our international economic 
policy. I expressed my conviction that 
these improvements in the U.S. 
economic performance will benefit 
Yugoslavia's own efforts to expand ex- 
ports to the convertible currency area. 
We reviewed recent examples of 
bilateral, political, economic, and 
cultural cooperation and the prospects of 
strengthening such cooperation in the 
future. 

We discussed the problem of ter- 
rorist attacks against Yugoslav 
diplomatic, consular, and other repre- 
sentatives in the United States. The 
United States deplores all such acts of 
terrorism and will not tolerate such acts 
in its territory. We also reviewed the 



16 



Department of State Bulletin 



fci 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



specific measures that the United States 
has taken to prevent such attacks 
against Yugoslav representatives. 

We also discussed pressing interna- 
tional issues. We are both sincerely con- 
cerned abut the problems of peace and 
security in the world today. My govern- 
ment profoundly respects the Yugoslav 
point of view on international issues, on 
which we have had and will continue to 
have a very rewarding and ongoing 
dialogue. 



ROMANIA 

Dinner Toast, 
Bucharest, 
Sept. 18, 1983 3 



Mrs. Bush and I deeply appreciate the 
warm reception that we have already 
received here in Romania and we hope 
to come again and see more of this 
beautiful country and to experience 
more of your rich culture. 

I hope this visit will strengthen our 
traditional friendship. The frank talks I 
have had with you today, Mr. Vice 
President, and with other members of 
your country's leadership have reaf- 
firmed my belief that our relations are 
fundamentally good and that the will ex- 
ists on both sides to assure the con- 
tinued growth and development of 
American-Romanian relations in all 
fields. 

Our two nations do share a common 
desire for a world of peace and prosperi- 
ty. Each of us is engaged in vigorous ef- 
forts, both in our bilateral relations and 
in international forums, to find peaceful 
solutions to world disputes and to fur- 
ther global economic development. 

You mention the question of inter- 
mediate-range nuclear force negotiations 
in Geneva now going on. We appreciate 
a relationship in which President 
Ceausescu feels that he can com- 
municate directly with our President and 
give his advice and suggestions. His con- 
viction on this matter is well known to 
us. The point I wanted to make here is 
that our President is deeply committed 
to significant arms reductions. I am not 
sure we have properly conveyed his con- 
viction to the world at large, but it is a 
deeply held conviction that he feels very, 
very strongly about. The United States 
will stay at that table as long as is 




necessary to achieve the reductions that 
all mankind really truly wants. 

We have just reached agreement in 
Madrid on a concluding document, and 
this is a good negotiation and a good 
result. Now the time has come not only 
for words but for deeds. We must work 
together to ensure that the ideals of 
Helsinki and Madrid are given concrete 
expression, particularly in human rights, 
including human contact and emigration. 
And I appreciate the opportunity we had 
to have a frank exchange on this and a 
wide array of subjects this morning. We 
did exchange views on an array of issues 
of great importance and I am totally 
convinced that the better understanding 
we have achieved will strengthen the 
relations in all the fields. 

And now, please join me in a toast 
to President Ceausescu; to the in- 
dependence and prosperity of a Romania 
that we respect; and to the continued 
strengthening of the bonds of friendship 
between the American and Romanian 
peoples. 



With President Nicolae Ceausescu of 
Romania. 



November 1983 



17 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



HUNGARY 

Dinner Toast, 
Budapest, 
Sept. 20, 1983 4 

Hungary and the United States are 
separated by thousands of miles of land 
and ocean and by different economic and 
political systems — this we all know. 
What we are only beginning to discover, 
however, is the extent of the common 
ground on which Hungarians and 
Americans of good will can meet. 

Human rights represent one such 
ground. We in the United States are 
heartened by Hungary's efforts to ex- 
pand contacts, to foster tolerance, and 
to meet the commitments that bind both 
our countries under the Helsinki Final 
Act. In the relations between our two 
nations, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms have not represented a point 
of discord but, instead, brought us closer 
together. May this aspect of our rela- 
tions serve as an example to the rest of 
the world. 

Trade provides further common 
ground. Our economic relationship is a 
good and active one, and it should ac- 



quire even more regularity and 
dynamism in the years ahead. Both our 
countries are members of the great in- 
tergovernmental commercial and finan- 
cial institutions— the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade, the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund, and the World 
Bank. Both know that trade means a 
better life for all and that the barriers to 
trade should be lowered, even when 
economic conditions lead some to clamor 
for the shortsighted measures of protec- 
tionism. 

We in America understand and ad- 
mire your commitment to fiscal solvency 
and to the reform and revitalization of 
your economy. We further admire your 
efforts to tap the spirit of enterprise and 
creativity in your citizens. 

Our greatest common ground arises 
from our people— from millions of 
Hungarians and Americans, the ordinary 
citizens upon whom our nations are 
founded, who so ardently desire to lead 
their lives and raise their families in 
peace. The United States is deeply com- 
mitted to the construction of a sounder, 
more cooperative and constructive rela- 
tionship with all of the nations with 
which your country is aligned. 



The alliance to which my own coun- 
try belongs is responding and will con- 
tinue to respond to threats to the 
military stability that has for nearly four 
decades kept the peace in Europe and 
much of the rest of the world. We do 
not seek to upset that stability or to 
reestablish it at a higher level of danger. 
We have, instead, put forward pro- 
posals, in good faith, to lower the levels 
of the most dangerous destabilizing . 
weapons now in Europe. We wish to 
negotiate agreements that are in the 
enlightened self-interest of both alliances 
and of all peoples. We look for signs of 
understanding, for a readiness to con- 
struct this new relationship, and we will 
readily respond to the outstretched hand 
that seeks a fair agreement. 

Earlier I mentioned the Helsinki 
Final Act. We must not allow the 
Madrid document to become subject to 
the same disappointments which have 
until now beset the original Helsinki 
agreements. Here is a challenge and an 
opportunity in which we must work 
together. 

I have had long and good talks today 
with you and with First Secretary 
Kadar. I came away from these talks 
convinced that it is possible for the 



Clockwise: Vice President Bush; Adm. Daniel Murphy; Executive Secretary Vice Presi- 
dent's Office, Donald P. Gregg; Hungarian Prime Minister Gyorgy Lazar; Party Secretary 
Janos Kadar; and Gyorgy Banlaki, interpreter. 




18 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



members of our two alliances to talk 
soberly and responsibly in a mutual 
search for understanding and for peace. 

I want to add something that is not 
in the text of the toast. Mr. Prime 
Minister, please thank the First 
Secretary for the meeting we had today. 
You were present at that meeting and 
the conversation was, indeed, 
stimulating, beautifully frank. We came 
away reinforced in our conviction that 
we were with a man of enormous capaci- 
ty and leadership capability. I just did 
not want this toast, drafted before that 
meeting, not to reflect how strongly we 
felt about it. 

I would like to stress that the im- 
provement of Hungarian-American rela- 
tions in recent years is not directed 
against anyone. It is, instead, we deeply 
believe, in the interests of all peace- 
loving states and peoples. What we have 
accomplished together exemplifies what 
must be done in the rest of the world. 

Please join me in a toast to the 
friendship of the American and 
Hungarian peoples and of the American 
and Hungarian Governments. May that 
friendship flourish, and may it serve as 
an example of all that can be accom- 
plished between nations of good will. 



AUSTRIA 

Dinner Toast, 
Vienna, 
Sept. 20, 1983 

Austria has experienced empire and 
dominion, suffered wars and internal 
upheavals, and has itself been dominated 
and occupied. Yet Austria stands today 
as a strong, sovereign, democratic state. 
And although officially neutral, Austria 
leaves no doubt that it shares the values 
and insists on the freedom of the West. 
Austria has long played a large and 
constructive role in world affairs. In 
1956, just 1 year after the conclusion of 
Austria's struggle to regain its own 
sovereignty, this nation opened its 
borders to Hungarian refugees, 
demonstrating moral leadership at grave 
risk. Subsequently, Austria has earned 
the admiration of free nations 
everywhere by offering asylum to 
refugees at times of crisis in 
Czechoslovakia and Poland and by ex- 
tending critical help to Soviet Jews seek- 
ing a new homeland. Your active par- 
ticipation in international forums, par- 
ticularly the United Nations and the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation 



in Europe, has consistently demon- 
strated this nation's willingness to labor 
in the interests of peace. 

Ten days ago, the Foreign Ministers 
of 35 states— from East and West— met 
in Madrid to approve a new document 
that strengthens— modestly but 
significantly— the provisions of the 
Helsinki Final Act on human rights, in- 
formation, and cooperation and ex- 
changes in the fields of culture and 
education. 

We have no illusions, of course, that 
the Soviet Union and those of your 
Eastern neighbors, who have consistent- 
ly violated the Helsinki Final Act, will 
suddenly modify their behavior. But as 
President Reagan has said, such 
agreements are the necessary building 
blocks for a more secure and stable 
world. 

In 1986, in Vienna, there will be 
another Helsinki review session, and we 
will continue to reject the notion that 
Helsinki in some way endorses the pres- 
ent, tragic division of Europe; we will 
steadfastly insist that the heart of 
Helsinki is a commitment to openness 
and a commitment to human rights. 

Our government is pleased and 
gratified by our nation's friendship with 
Austria — a friendship demonstrated this 
year by the visits to the United States of 
former Chancellor Kreisky and then- 
Vice Chancellor Sinowatz, and by the 
reopening of our Consulate General in 
Salzburg by Deputy Secretary of State 
Kenneth Dam. And we look forward 
with pleasure to the first visit to the 
United States by an Austrian head of 
state since the founding of your republic 
when President Kirchschlaeger comes to 
Washington next year. And what, on a 
more personal side, clearer indication 
could there be of the regard with which 
we view Austria than our designation of 
Helene von Damm as our Ambassador? 
True to form, she is working vigorously 
to make the Austrian- American relation- 
ship even closer by stepping up youth 
exchanges and promoting trade between 
our two nations. And for those of you 
who haven't met her or worked with 
her, if you don't want to work hard, stay 
out of her way. 

As I look around this table, I see so 
many friends of the United States. But 
let me close by simply stating that we in 
the United States hold your country in 
the highest esteem. Herr Chancellor, 
you are a small country, you said that, 
but you are our friends, and we are 
proud to be your friends. 

Please join me in a toast to the 
friendship between our two nations and 
to the health of Chancellor Sinowatz. 



Address at 
the Hofburg, 
Vienna, 
Sept. 21, 1983 

It is a pleasure for me to come here and 
speak to you today and it is appropriate 
that the setting be the Ceremony Hall of 
the Hofburg, a hall which has witnessed 
both the full horror of dictatorship and 
the glistening promise, the abundant ac- 
tuality of freedom. 

This beautiful country of Austria is 
now in the full bloom of democracy, but 
others are not so fortunate. I have just 
come from the countries to your east, 
and I have seen in the faces of the peo- 
ple there a yearning for the same 
freedoms and democratic rights enjoyed 
by the people of Austria. I know that 
this is a subject of particular concern to 
Chancellor Sinowatz, whose home in the 
Burgenland sits only a few miles from 
Austria's eastern border. 

Last January I traveled to Germany, 
and in the course of my trip paid what 
for me will always be an unforgettable 
visit to the small village of Moedlareuth. 
Down the main street ran a high con- 
crete wall topped with densely packed 
barbed wire. On the rear side, the 
villagers were peacefully going about the 
ordinary business of their daily lives. On 
the far side, soldiers stood watch with 
machine guns, and attack dogs ran along 
the wall on chains. 

As I looked out to the east, I had 
the momentary impression that I was 
standing in a lonely outpost on the edge 
of western civilization. Given the harsh 
reality of the wall, the impression is 
perhaps understandable; but how true is 
it? 

Historically, of course, it couldn't 
have been more false. That wall— that 
wound which in one form or another 
spans the breadth of the continent- 
runs not along the edge but cuts 
through the very heart of Europe. The 
diverse and complex region through 
which I have just traveled, a region so 
rich in history and culture, has always 
been a part of the European main- 
stream. 

You Austrians so aptly call this part 
of the world Mitteleuropa — central 
Europe. Can a wall, can guard dogs and 



November 1983 



19 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



machine guns and border patrols deny 
hundreds of years of European history? 
Can they create and enforce this fic- 
titious divison down the very center of 
Europe? 

When we think of that monstrous 
wall, we think first of the very personal 
violence it expresses — families divided, a 
people held prisoner in their own coun- 
try. But what of the violence — just as 
real — it does to our history and tradi- 
tions? What of the violence it does to 
Europe? 

Czeslaw Milosz, the Nobel Prize- 
winning Polish poet, is one of the many 
dissident artists, writers, and intellec- 
tuals who were forced to choose exile 
from the language and country they 
loved rather than be exiled from their 
history and cultural traditions within 
their own country. In Milosz's famous 
book, The Captive Mind, he writes about 
the "extinguishment" he sees in the face 
of East European intellectuals. Their 
countries, they know, are rightfully part 
of an ancient civilization, one that is 
derived of Rome rather than Byzantium. 
"It isn't pleasant," he writes, "to sur- 
render to the hegemony of a nation 
which is still wild and primitive, and to 
concede the absolute superiority of its 
customs and institutions, science and 
technology, literature and art. Must one 
sacrifice so much . . . ?", he asks. 

Over a hundred years ago, some 
Tsarist historians spoke with a contempt 
born of envy of the "decadent West." 
One example of such decadence was, no 
doubt, the music of Frederic Chopin. In 
a recent essay, the Czechoslovakian 
author, Milan Kundera, tells of how 14 
years after Chopin's death, Russian 
soliders on the loose in Warsaw hurled 
the composer's piano from a fourth-floor 
window. "Today," writes Kundera, "the 
entire culture of central Europe shares 
the fate of Chopin's piano." 

It has often been remarked that of 
the three great events in European 
history— the Renaissance, the Reforma- 
tion, the Enlightenment— Russia took 
part in none. But Mitteleuropa, the 
region that gave birth to Jan Hus, took 
part in them all. This region has always 
looked west, not east. I was struck by 
the close ties in even its easternmost 
quarter when I heard the beautiful 
romance language, so similar to French 
and Italian, spoken by the people of 
Romania. 



Fortunately, we are beginning to see 
fissures in the wall. During my visit I 
saw that, more and more, the natural 
forces which bring people closer 
together, rather than push them apart, 
are beginning to reassert themselves. 

We in America feel strong and un- 
breakable ties with the people of central 
Europe. So many Americans came to 
our country from this region to escape 
poverty and religious and political 
persecution. Many still do. America was 
built in great part through the industry 
of Hungarians, Germans, Czechs, and 
Poles. Across the street from my office 
in the White House stands a statue of 
Tadeusz Kosciuzko, a hero of our revolu- 
tionary war, whose brilliance as a 
military engineer helped free my coun- 
try from foreign domination. The United 
States, in fact all of the civilized world, 
remembers with the deepest gratitude 
the part played by the free Polish forces 
in World War II, the brave fighters who 
rejected Hitler's and Stalin's infamous 
pact to partition their country. And we 
will never forget the courage of the 
Poles who, after years of suffering the 
ravages of war and the ruthless suppres- 
sion of their people, rose up again in 
Warsaw — they fought to the end, while 
those who called themselves their allies 
cooled their heels on the east bank of 
the Vistula River. 

The ties of my country to central 
Europe are many, our histories are 
often intimately intertwined, The 
founder and President of the first 
Czechoslovak Republic, Thomas 
Masaryk, married an American. Sixty- 
five years ago this October, he wrote the 
Czechoslovak Declaration of Independ- 
ence, a document founded on the same 
"historic and natural" rights that guided 
our own forefathers in writing our 
Declaration of Independence. To quote 
from that document written by Masaryk: 
"We accept and shall adhere to the 
ideals of modern democracy, as they 
have been the ideals of our nation for 
centuries." The "nation of Comenius," he 
said, accepts "the principles of liberated 
mankind, of the actual equality of na- 
tions, and of governments deriving all 
their just power from the consent of the 
governed." 

The Czechoslovak Republic, which 
lasted from 1918 until 1938, was one of 
the most prosperous countries in 
Europe. Its charter guaranteed "com- 
plete freedom of conscience, religion and 



science, literature and art, speech, the 
press, and the right of assembly and 
petition." 

Today, according to their own Con- 
stitution, the Czechs are promised the 
same freedoms; so, too, by written law 
and international treaties to which the 
Soviet Union and the governments of 
Eastern Europe are signatories, are the 
people of other countries in the region 
promised these basic human rights. But 
we have seen how often governmental 
deeds diverge from official promises. 
The people in many parts of Eastern 
Europe must now carry on their culture, 
their traditions, underground and in 
fear. 

But there are groups, such as the 
Charter '77 movement in Czechoslovakia 
and Solidarity in Poland, which have 
sought to persuade their governments to 
abide by their own laws and interna- 
tional commitments. Because of these in- 
dividuals, who courageously demand 
their human rights, and because of the 
more imaginative leaders in some of 
these countries who have listened to the 
just wishes of their people and have 
sought to democratize their social and 
economic systems, European culture on 
the eastern side of the continent will 
never die. 

The United States shares with these 
people a vision of Eastern Europe in 
which respect for human rights becomes 
the norm and not a rare concession to 
international pressure, where prosperity 
and advancement replace economic 
backwardness, and openness overcomes 
barriers to human contacts and 
economic cooperation. In approaching 
the problems of the region, U.S. policy 
is guided by certain constants. First, we 
recognize no lawful division of Europe. 
There is much misunderstanding about 
the substance of the Yalta conference. 
Let me state as clearly as I can: There 
was no agreement at that time to divide 
Europe up into "spheres of influence." 
On the contrary, the powers agreed on 
the principle of the common responsibili- 
ty of the three Allies for all the liberated 
territories. The Soviet Union pledged 
itself to grant full independence to 
Poland and to all other states in Eastern 
Europe and to hold free elections there. 
The Soviet violation of these obligations 
is the primary root of East- West ten- 
sions today. 

A similar misunderstanding exists 
about the Helsinki accords. Some argue 
that Helsinki endorses the statics quo, 



20 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 




With Chancellor Fred Sinowatz of Austria. 



the present division of Europe. We reject 
this notion. At review sessions in 
Belgrade, Madrid, and the upcoming ses- 
sion here in Vienna in 1986, we have 
stated and will continue to insist that 
the heart of Helsinki is a commitment to 
openness and human rights. 

Let me stress here that the United 
States does not seek to destabilize or 
undermine any government, but our at- 
titude toward the region is informed by 
a sense of history — of European history. 



For this reason, we support and will en- 
courage all movement toward the social, 
humanitarian, and democratic ideals 
which have characterized the historical 
development of Europe. We appreciate 
the special role of countries such as 
Yugoslavia and Austria which have con- 
tributed so much to restoring historic 
patterns of trade and communications. 

We share with the people of Eastern 
and central Europe three basic aspira- 
tions—freedom, prosperity, and peace. 
We recognize the diversity and the com- 
plexity of the region. Of Austria's 



November 1983 



21 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



neighbors to the east, some have shown 
a greater measure of independence in 
the conduct of their foreign policy. Some 
have introduced greater openness in 
their societies, lowered barriers to 
human contacts, and engaged in market- 
oriented economic reforms. Others, un- 
fortunately, continue to toe the Soviet 
line. Their foreign policy is determined 
in Moscow, and their domestic policies 
still flagrantly violate the most fun- 
damental human rights. 

In our relations with the countries of 
Eastern Europe, we take these dif- 
ferences into account. Our policy is one 
of differentiation; that is, we look to 
what degree countries pursue 
autonomous foreign policies, independ- 
ent of Moscow's direction, and to what 
degree they foster domestic liberaliza- 
tion — politically, economically, and in 
their respect for human rights. The 
United States will engage in closer 
political, economic, and cultural relations 
with those countries such as Hungary 
and Romania which assert greater open- 
ness or independence. We will strength- 
en our dialogue and cooperation with 
such countries. 

We are not saying that countries 
must follow policies identical to those of 
the United States. We will not, however, 
reward closed societies and belligerent 
foreign policies — countries such as 
Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia which con- 
tinue to flagrantly violate the most fun- 
damental human rights, and countries 
such as East Germany and, again, 
Bulgaria, which act as proxies to the 
Soviets in the training, funding, and 
arming of terrorists and which supply 
advisers and military and technical 
assistance to armed movements seeking 
to destabilize governments in the 
developing world. 

Let me stress once more that our 
hopes for Eastern Europe are peaceful. 
But we believe that reform is essential. 
Over the span of many years, the United 
States has provided hundreds of millions 
of dollars of loans and credits for the 
Polish economy in the hope that this aid 
would help build a more plentiful and 
open society. We cannot, however, be 
expected to shore up a nation's economy 
when the government refuses to in- 
stitute the most basic economic reforms. 



If countries insist on following the 
Soviet economical model, even dollars, 
francs, and marks cannot prevent the 
certain failure of their economies. 

It is by now abundantly clear that 
highly centralized, command economies 
cannot fulfill the basic needs of their 
populations, let alone remain competitive 
in world markets or keep pace with 
technological advancement. Just as 
retarded industrial development 
relegated much of 19th century central 
Europe to a backwater of agricultural 
poverty, there is ample evidence that the 
unfolding information revolution will 
sweep past an unprepared Soviet Union 
and much of Eastern Europe — unless 
there is basic change. For example, 
Hungary's relative prosperity demon- 
strates the practical, positive results 
that follow on social and economic 
liberalization. 

The countries of Eastern Europe 
have a choice to make. They can close 
themselves off or they can open up and 
join the world economy positively as 
traders rather than debtors. Think about 
this: 25% of all Soviet farm output 
comes from private plots that occupy 
less than 3% of the Soviet Union's 
agricultural land. It's doubtful whether 
Soviet agriculture could survive without 
this concession to private enterprise. 

Freedom is the essential component 
of progress — the freedom of each in- 
dividual to bring his knowledge and 
wisdom to bear on the economic deci- 
sions that will directly affect his life. 
This requires freedom of information, 
the free flow of ideas, and the free 
movement of people. We take these 
freedoms to be fundamental moral 
precepts, but they are also practical 
necessities. If a society revises history to 
suit ideological needs, if it censors infor- 
mation, if it punishes imaginative and 
creative individuals and discourages ini- 
tiative in its people, that society con- 
demns itself to ignorance and backward- 
ness and poverty. 

Just as freedom and prosperity go 
hand-in-hand so too are freedom and 
prosperity linked to peace. I know that 
the people of central Europe, who have 
such an intimate experience of the waste 
and horror of war, ardently yearn for 
peace. President Reagan and I and the 
American people share in your hopes 
and desires. Our commitment to nuclear 



arms reduction— not just arms control 
but the reduction of these terribly 
destructive weapons— is unshakeable. 
The United States has already uni- 
laterally withdrawn 1,000 nuclear 
warheads from Europe. The implemen- 
tation of the 1979 NATO decision to 
deploy INF will not increase by even one 
the number of nuclear weapons in 
Europe. But while we've been withdraw- 
ing nuclear weapons, the Soviets have 
been engaged in an unprecedented and 
relentless military buildup in conven- 
tional and nuclear arms. 

One of the most dangerous and 
destabilizing new elements is the Soviet 
Union's monopoly of intermediate-range 
nuclear missiles— missiles which can 
strike any target in Europe within a few 
minutes. The Soviets have already more 
than sufficient INF weapons in place to 
meet their security requirements, and 
yet they seek to further intimidate the 
people of Europe by dire warnings of 
counterdeployments in Eastern Europe 
should NATO go ahead with deploy- 
ments in December. 

It is our hope that the Soviet leader- 
ship will have the courage and vision to 
reverse their dangerous arms buildup. If 
they show some flexibility at the 
bargaining table and a balanced ap- 
proach is adopted, agreement in Geneva 
is still possible before the end of this 
year. Here in Vienna, at the negotia- 
tions for mutual and balanced force 
reductions, after many years of 
stalemate, there are some signs of move- 
ment for verifiable reduction in conven- 
tional forces in central Europe. 

But a prerequisite for peace is 
respect for international law. Regret- 
tably, the Soviet Union and most of the 
Warsaw pact countries continue to flout 
the human rights agreements to which 
they are all signatories. And the world is 
still in shock from the brutal murder of 
269 civilians aboard a commercial 
airliner which strayed off course and 
was unlucky enough to pass over Soviet 
territory. 

Let me ask you this question: Would 
the United States, would Austria, ever 



22 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE VICE PRESIDENT 



wantonly shoot down a commercial 
airliner? Never. But the Soviets resolute- 
ly state they would do it again. These 
are not the actions and words of a 
civilized system. The European tradition 
stresses, above all things, a respect for 
human life. Those traditions, sadly, are 
not universal. 

What are we to think of leaders who 
compound such brutal deeds with bald 
and careless lies and who respond to the 
just inquiries of the international com- 
munity with utter contempt? This use of 
brute force is exactly the kind of Soviet 
behavior in Eastern Europe that the 
United States has been protesting for 
years. 

Recognition of the true nature of the 
Soviet system doesn't make our desire 
for peace any less strong. If anything, it 
makes it stronger. But we enter all 
negotiations with the Soviets with our 
eyes open. We will never give up in our 
attempts to use reason and whatever 



reassurances we can give to persuade 
the Soviets to join truly constructively 
the community of nations. Our desire for 
peace is strong and unfailing. With your 
help, with the help of all nations, I'm 
certain we can make that hope a reality. 
I'd like to close with the words of a 
great Mitteleuropean, His Holiness Pope 
John Paul II. In just three lines he 
pointed out the road toward a better 
future. 

Persons over Things 
Ethics over Technology 
Spirit over Matter. 

I have visited four important nations 
in central Europe — nations rich in 
culture and history; nations with differ- 
ing systems and perspectives. But in my 
talks with the leaders and people of 
these countries, I've become convinced 
that we all share a common goal — to 
heal the wounds that separate us, to 
remove the artificial barriers which 
divide us, and to reduce the level of fear 
and terror in the world through arms 
reduction. 

I come away from Eastern Europe 
with a strong sense of its diversity, a 



strong sense of the uniqueness of each 
country. With some, our ties are already 
greatly improved — my visit is one in- 
dication of that. But we are not about to 
write off a single country. We are ready 
to respond to each to the extent that 
they are meeting their own people's 
aspirations, are pursuing their own in- 
dependent foreign policy, and are willing 
to open up to the rest of the world. 
I am an optimist. I see a bright 
future for central Europe— a future of 
peace, prosperity, and freedom. I am 
positive the barriers will come down and 
that the desire of our neighbors to the 
east to become once more a full part of 
Europe will finally, after many hard bit- 
ter years, be fulfilled. In this spirit of 
reconciliation, we must all work 
together to make this optimistic vision a 
reality — to once again make Europe 
whole. 



J Texts from the Vice President's Office of 
the Press Secretary. 

z Made at a dinner hosted by Prime 
Minister Mzali. 

3 Made at a dinner hosted by President 
Ceausescu. 

4 Made at a dinner hosted by Prime 
Minister Lazar. 

B Made at a dinner hosted by Chancellor 
Sinowatz. ■ 



November 1983 



23 



THE SECRETARY 



U.S. Objectives in Lebanon 



Secretary Shultz's statement before 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
September 21, /9S3. 1 

I welcome this chance to talk with you 
about our objectives in Lebanon and 
about the importance President Reagan 
attaches to cooperating with the Con- 
gress in pursuit of these objectives. The 
challenge in Lebanon is a challenge we 
face together, as a nation. The issues 
are not partisan issues. At stake are 
goals and principles of American foreign 
policy on which, I dare say, there is a 
broad measure of consensus. Whatever 
legitimate differences there may be over 
tactics or prerogatives, our leadership in 
the world is clearly impaired if the 
President and the Congress attempt to 
conduct two different foreign policies. 
We must work together to meet our 
common, national responsibility or else 
our common, national interests in the 
world will suffer. In the last 15 years, 
there have been instances of deadlock 
between our two branches of govern- 
ment which resulted in harm to our for- 
eign policy and human tragedy. The 
President is determined that this will 
not be such a case. 

This is the spirit in which we ap- 
proach this problem, and I am heartened 
by the similar spirit I have seen in the 
Congress. As President Reagan said 
yesterday, we support the bipartisan 
leadership agreement that has been 
reached. This agreement, in my view, 
serves the national interest. 

Let me explain the Administration's 
view of what is at stake in the Middle 
East and in Lebanon; what our 
diplomacy is attempting to accomplish 
there; and why the presence of our 
Marines has been of enormous impor- 
tance. 

Our Policy in the Middle East 

It is almost 10 years since the October 
1973 war, and for the past decade the 
United States has been vigorously and 
almost continuously engaged in Middle 
East diplomacy. Given our strong moral 
and political commitment to Israel and 
our many strong friendships in the Arab 
world, we have always perceived that a 
negotiated solution to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict was in the national interest of 
the United States. Israel and its Arab 



neighbors deserve to live in peace and 
security; the Palestinian people deserve 
a just solution to their legitimate rights 
and aspirations; all the nations of the 
region deserve a future free of external 
intervention or superpower confronta- 
tion. 

The road to peace is long and hard, 
and we have no illusions about it. But 
we can be proud of the role our country 
has played in bringing about many 
significant steps toward peace in the 
past 10 years. Just over a year ago, 
President Reagan addressed himself to 
the broader questions of Middle East 
peace in a major initiative, which of- 
fered—and still offers— the most prac- 
tical and workable and hopeful basis for 
negotiation. Anyone in the Middle East 
who truly seeks a just, secure, and com- 
prehensive solution to the conflict will 
have to turn in the direction of the 
President's initiative, firmly grounded as 
it is in the Camp David accords and UN 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 
338. 

The crisis in Lebanon cannot be 
isolated from the larger Middle East 
crisis. It involves many of the same par- 
ties concerned with the broader issues of 
Middle East peace. It involves similar 
questions of security, respect for sover- 
eignty, and peaceful settlement of 
disputes. To advance toward a peaceful 
solution in Lebanon will contribute to 
the broader peace process; setbacks in 
Lebanon will make the broader effort 
that much harder. 

Our Objectives and Policy in Lebanon 

Our objectives in Lebanon have, from 
the beginning, been essentially threefold: 

• The withdrawal of all external 
forces from Lebanon; 

• A sovereign, independent Lebanon 
dedicated to national unity and able to 
exercise control throughout its national 
territory; and 

• Security for Israel's northern 
border, so that the inhabitants of north- 
ern Israel can live in safety and without 
fear of artillery or rocket attacks. 

These objectives are not changing. 
They are, and have been, a constant of 
our policy. The latest outbreak of fight- 
ing should not cause us to lose sight of 
them. 



Lebanon is a proud and beautiful 
country, whose people have contributed 
much to the world. Yet it has also had a 
complex and turbulent history. The roots 
of enmity in that country go very deep 
indeed. Nevertheless, for many years 
Lebanon thrived because political 
rivalries were accommodated and a 
delicate balance maintained. Our coun- 
try, too, suffered a tragic civil war, but 
we survived and overcame it. The people 
of Lebanon remember a happier time 
when their nation was a dynamic, pro- 
gressive, and prosperous democracy. 
The yearning for peace, too, runs deep 
in Lebanon. 

With the end of the terrible ordeal 
of Beirut last summer and the election 
of President Amin Gemayel shortly 
thereafter, it appeared that Lebanon 
would get a second chance after all. 
Almost all of Lebanon's many confes- 
sional groups pledged their loyalty to 
their new leader and seemed ready to 
bury their differences in the name of 
political and economic renewal. War 
damage was quickly being removed from 
Beirut and reconstruction seemed well 
underway. 

To consolidate this hopeful begin- 
ning, it was clear that Lebanon had, as a 
matter of top priority, to see to the 
withdrawal of all non-Lebanese armed 
forces from its soil. Whatever in- 
digenous barriers to national reconcilia- 
tion the Lebanese may face and however 
prepared they may be to overcome them 
if given a chance, that process can never 
really get underway so long as Lebanon 
remains occupied by foreign armies, 
foreign paramilitary forces, and foreign 
terrorist groups. The United States re- 
sponded favorably to the request of the 
Lebanese Government— and of many of 
our Arab friends— to help Lebanon and 
Israel reach an agreement that would be 
a first step toward this objective. Israel 
was prepared to withdraw, and Lebanon 
was willing to negotiate an agreement 
that also met Israel's legitimate need for 
security on its northern border. After 
lengthy negotiations, and with a great 
deal of good will on both sides, Lebanon 
and Israel reached such an agreement 
on May 17. 

In parallel with this effort, we put 
our weight behind President Gemayel's 
movement toward political accommoda- 
tion among Lebanon's confessional com- 
munities. On August 31, President 
Gemayel, with his Council of Ministers, 
issued a call for key Lebanese leaders to 
join in a dialogue on a new national ap- 
proach to reconciliation and unity. He 



24 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE SECRETARY 



has made clear his willingness to 
broaden the base and composition of his 
government to reflect a true sharing of 
power. This is a policy we have strongly 
urged, supported, and assisted, and we 
have no doubt of President Gemayel's 
sincerity. Ambassadors Robert 
McFarlane [President's personal repre- 
sentative to the Middle East] and 
Richard Fairbanks [special negotiator 
for the Middle East peace process] have 
devoted considerable time and effort to 
this enterprise, as has Saudi Arabia as 
well. 

The problem, of course, has been 
Syria. The two tracks of Lebanon's 
policy— foreign troop withdrawal and na- 
tional reconciliation— have both been 
blocked by Syria, which has been heavily 
rearmed by the Soviet Union since 
Syria's defeats in battle last summer. No 
one questions Syria's legitimate security 
concerns with respect to Lebanon. But 
Syria, unlike Israel, has been unwilling 
to negotiate with Lebanon over how to 
reconcile its security concerns with 
Lebanon's sovereign right to follow its 
own path. The question arises whether 
Syria's aim is to assure its security or 
assure its domination of Lebanon. 

• Syria now has the largest army in 
Lebanon, but it has refused to negotiate 
the withdrawal of its forces, reneging on 
repeated pledges that it would do so 
once the Israelis did. Syria has persisted 
in this course even in defiance of the 
Lebanese Government's formal requests 
at the beginning of September to Syria, 
the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO), and the Arab League that all ex- 
ternal force withdraw. Israel has stated 
its unwillingness to withdraw totally as 
long as Syrian forces are there; thus 
Syria is in the ironic position of keeping 
Israeli forces in Lebanon. Syria is also 
permitting the reentry of armed Pales- 
tinian groups into the Aleyh/Shuf area 
in violation of the agreements reached 
through Ambassador Habib's mediation 
last year. 

• At the same time, Syria is using 
its leverage within Lebanon to obstruct 
the process of national reconciliation. In- 
deed, Syria has instigated political op- 
position within Lebanon and armed 
several factions engaged in military ac- 
tions against the legitimate government. 

Therefore, the immediate focus of 
our diplomacy, conducted by Am- 
bassadors McFarlane and Fairbanks, is 
a cease-fire between the various groups 
in Lebanon. Saudi Arabia has been ac- 
tively pursuing the same goal. Jordan, 



Egypt, and other friendly Arab coun- 
tries have been very supportive of these 
diplomatic efforts. 

The outcome of this negotiation, as 
of any negotiation, will depend on the 
balance of forces. Those who seek to im- 
prove their position by force will prob- 
ably not agree to a cease-fire until they 
run up against a stalemate on the battle- 
field. 

This brings me to the military situa- 
tion and to the role of the multinational 
force (MNF) now in Lebanon, which in- 
cludes, as you know, approximately 
1,200 U.S. Marines on the ground in the 
Beirut area. 

The Multinational Force 
and the U.S. Marines 

A year ago, President Reagan dis- 
patched these Marines to participate in 
the multinational force requested by the 
Government of Lebanon. The presence 
of this force was designed to help ensure 



Now the MNF is under challenge by 
those apparently determined to prevent 
an internal political accommodation. The 
President has augmented U.S. naval 
support forces offshore and has 
authorized U.S. forces to exercise their 
right of self-defense should attacks on 
them continue. Our MNF partners have 
taken similar or other measures to 
assure security and self-defense. 

We are concerned that key strategic 
positions in the vicinity of Beirut, which 
are vital to the safety of our Marines, of 
other American military and diplomatic 
personnel, and to the security of Beirut, 
have recently come under attack. We 
have responded to these attacks in order 
to protect our personnel, and will con- 
tinue to do so. 

A cease-fire, as I have suggested, 
will come about only when all parties 
conclude it is in their interest. Our 
strategy in Lebanon is to help create 
conditions that will make it in everyone's 
interest— to help produce a kind of 



Whatever indigenous barriers to national recon- 
ciliation the Lebanese may face and however 
prepared they may be to overcome them if given a 
chance, that process can never really get underway 
so long as Lebanon remains occupied by foreign ar- 
mies, foreign paramilitary forces, and foreign ter- 
rorist groups. 



the Lebanese Government's sovereignty 
and authority; it was also intended to 
further that government's efforts to 
assure the safety of people in the area 
and to end the violence that had 
tragically recurred in the massacres of 
Sabra and Shatila. 

British, French, and Italian forces 
are serving alongside our Marines, and 
thus the MNF is a truly multilateral, 
cooperative effort. Its task is a peace- 
keeping mission, not a war-fighting mis- 
sion. Its job is not to take sides in a war 
but, on the contrary, to help provide a 
sense of security for the legitimate 
Government of Lebanon as it pursues its 
national sovereignty and national unity. 
Most of the key confessional groups and 
friendly Arab countries supported this 
role for the MNF when it was sent to 
Lebanon, and they continue to support 
this role. 



equilibrium which will encourage a 
cease-fire, a political accommodation, 
and ultimately the withdrawal of all 
foreign forces. We are seeking to build a 
structure of stability, on the following 
pillars. 

• The first element is political 
negotiations to bring about national 
reconciliation within Lebanon, to ease or 
resolve the internal rivalries and mutual 
suspicions that are at the heart of 
Lebanon's agony. The United States has 
strongly supported this endeavor. We 
are also concerned for the safety of the 
Palestinian civilians in Lebanon. 

• The second element is diplomacy 
to organize international support for the 
legitimate Government of Lebanon, for 



November 1983 



25 



THE SECRETARY 



its efforts at reconciliation, and for a 
cease-fire. The United States is actively 
engaged in this effort. 

• In the military dimension, the 
primary responsibility rests on the 
Lebanese Armed Forces, which have ac- 
quitted themselves well. We have helped 
train and equip these forces, and we are 
pleased that these forces have been 
reconstituted to take into account the 
confessional balance in Lebanon. An 
army that would be more than adequate 
for its mission of keeping order once 
foreign forces were removed, however, 
is now understandably under severe 
pressures because it is under assault by 
forces protected, armed, and encouraged 
by Syria. It is the external, non- 
Lebanese involvement that is enormous- 
ly exacerbating the problem. 

• Israel continues to have influence 
with many groups in Lebanon and has 
an interest in encouraging national 
reconciliation and stability. Events north 
of the Awwali River must be of concern 
to it, since its long-term security cannot 
but be affected by Syrian and PLO 
dominance of the rest of Lebanon. 

• The MNF, including our Marines, 
provide an added measure of stability in 
the overall equation, as I have described. 

Our Marines, or the MNF as a 
whole, cannot tip the balance of forces 
alone — and it is not their mission to do 
so. But their presence remains one 
crucial pillar of the structure of stability. 



Marines would put both the government, 
and what we are trying to achieve, in 
jeopardy. 

This is why our domestic contro- 
versy over war powers has been disturb- 
ing. The uncertainty about the American 
commitment only weakens our effective- 
ness; doubts about our staying power 
can only cause the aggressors to dis- 
count our presence— or to intensify their 
attacks in hopes of hastening our depar- 
ture. An accommodation between the 
President and Congress to resolve this 
dispute will help dispel those doubts 
about our staying power and strengthen 
our hand. 

The executive and legislative 
branches, as you know, have important 
differences of principle with regard to 
the War Powers Resolution. The execu- 
tive branch has traditionally had ques- 
tions about the requirement of congres- 
sional authorization for presidential 
disposition of our Armed Forces, both in 
light of the President's Commander-in- 
Chief power and on practical grounds. 
Congress, of course, has had a different 
view. We could not expect to resolve 
this basic difference definitively now, 
but the Administration has been pre- 
pared to consider practical proposals 
that enabled us to protect our common, 
national interest in Lebanon without 
prejudging our respective positions on 
the basic issue of principle. 

In this regard, we are gratified that 



Syria now has the largest army in Lebanon, 
but it has refused to negotiate the withdrawal of its 
forces, reneging on repeated pledges that it would 
do so once the Israelis did . . . Israel has stated its 
unwillingness to withdraw totally as long as 
Syrian forces are there; thus Syria is in the ironic 
position of keeping Israeli forces in Lebanon. 



As a former Marine— I have to say, 
there is no such thing as a former 
Marine— I will not allow anyone to cast 
doubt on how formidable even this small 
number of Marines can be. They are an 
important deterrent, a symbol of the in- 
ternational backing behind the legitimate 
Government of Lebanon, and an impor- 
tant weight in the scales. To remove the 



an agreement has been reached among 
the bipartisan leadership of the Con- 
gress to introduce and seek to enact a 
resolution authorizing the continued 
presence and mission of the U.S. peace- 
keeping forces in Lebanon. As the Presi- 
dent stated yesterday, although he has 
substantial reservations about parts of 
this resolution, he would be willing to 
sign the proposed resolution while ex- 
pressing those reservations. We are 
especially pleased that the proposed 



resolution not only supports our policies 
in Lebanon, but now enables us to ad- 
vance our national interests on the solid 
bipartisan basis that has been the tradi- 
tional hallmark of American foreign 
policy. 

What Is at Stake in Lebanon 

At stake in Lebanon are some basic 
principles of international law and inter- 
national morality that have wider rele- 
vance for American foreign policy. 

• At stake is a small country's right 
to decide for itself how to achieve its 
sovereign objectives, free from outside 
pressure, threat, or blackmail. 

• At stake is the principle that in- 
ternational disputes should be settled by 
peaceful means, not by the use or threat 
of force. 

At stake also are some concerns that 
affect our national interest and the 
security of our friends and allies. If 
American efforts for peaceful solutions 
are overwhelmed by brute force, our 
role is that much weakened everywhere. 
Friends who rely on us will be dis- 
heartened and will be that much less 
secure. Moderates in the Arab world, 
whom we are encouraging to take risks 
for peace, will feel it far less safe to do 
so. The Soviet Union's efforts to disrupt 
our diplomacy will have scored a victory; 
radical and rejectionist elements will be 
strengthened. The cause of peace and 
justice will have suffered a setback. 
Israel's security on its northern border 
will be weakened. 

What we are doing in Lebanon is 
right. There are risks involved, but any 
important undertaking involves risks. If 
we want the role and influence of a 
great power, we have to accept the re- 
sponsibilities of a great power. Many 
millions of people around the world look 
to us as the strongest defender of 
freedom, justice, and peace; we cannot 
walk away from responsibilities without 
paying a moral and a political price. 

I prefer to look at it positively: after 
all the experience of the last 15 years, 
nothing would give more reassurance 
and hope to all our friends in the world 
than to see the President and Congress 
working in harmony, united behind a 
strong and purposeful national policy. 
This is our opportunity now. We cannot 
afford to let it slip away. 



26 



■Press release 345. The complete tran- 
script of the hearings will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents. U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402. ■ 



Department of State Bulletin 



AFRICA 



Visit of Zimbabwe's 
Prime Minister Mugabe 



Prime Minister Robert G. Mugabe of 
the Republic of Zimbabwe made an of- 
ficial working visit to Washington, D.C., 
September 12-U, 1983, to meet with 
President Reagan and other government 
officials. 

Following are remarks made by 
President Reagan and Prime Minister 
Mugabe after their meeting on Sep- 
tember IS. 1 

President Reagan 

It's been a great pleasure to have had 
the opportunity today to meet with 
Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of the 
Republic of Zimbabwe. As the first 
Prime Minister of Africa's newest in- 
dependent state, his wise leadership has 
been a crucial factor in healing the 
wounds of civil war and developing a 
new nation with new opportunities. Our 
discussions today have concerned a wide 
range of topics, including our bilateral 
relationship and regional issues. We've 
spoken very frankly and in an at- 
mosphere of mutual respect. We didn't 
always agree but have all gained much 
from hearing your views, Mr. Prime 
Minister. 

I believe that our two countries will 
continue to cooperate on those areas 
where common concerns are shared and 
that we wili come closer to an under- 
standing on those issues where our 
views diverge. The United States and 
Zimbabwe have much in common. We 
both came to independence through a 
revolutionary process. We are both 
multiracial societies. And our constitu- 
tions offer protection to all our citizens, 
black and white, ensuring their political 
freedoms as well as their individual 
rights. 

I'm glad to say that since 
Zimbabwe's independence, relations be- 
tween Zimbabwe and the United States 
have been very good and, strengthened 
by this exchange of views, will become 
even better. 

We look to Zimbabwe for leadership 
in southern Africa. Blessed with natural 
resources, a hard-working, multiracial 
population, and a spirit of national 
reconciliation, Zimbabwe can provide a 
firm foundation of economic viability 




November 1983 



27 



AFRICA 



and political stability and serve as an in- 
spiration in its part of the world. 

Our talks today have confirmed that 
we also share a desire for peace and 
stability in southern Africa, and I know 
that we both look forward to a time 
when all countries there can achieve a 
level of amity which will allow them to 
work toward economic, social, and 
political development, free from the 
threat of attack from whatever quarter. 

The ultimate responsibility for 
resolution of their problems, however, 
rests with the states of the regions 
themselves. And here you've taken a 
leading and constructive role. I know 
that you'll be meeting with a number of 
leaders in all walks of American life dur- 
ing your stay here in Washington and 
elsewhere in our land. I'm sure they will 
benefit as I have from your thoughtful 
views on our bilateral relationship as 
well as on regional and global issues. 

I'm delighted that you accepted our 
invitation to visit Washington, and I 
look forward to meeting you again. 

Prime Minister Mugabe 

May I on behalf of my delegation, on 
behalf of the Government and people of 
Zimbabwe, express to you on this 
historic occasion of our visit — the first 
such by the head of government of the 
Republic of Zimbabwe — express to you 
our heartfelt thanks and appreciation for 
that support which the United States 
has given us all along the way. And this 
support starts, really, from the time we 
were still struggling for our independ- 
ence, as the United States offered itself 
as party to the negotiations that were 
underway to bring about a democratic 
order in Zimbabwe. 

We got pledges from your govern- 
ment, from your predecessors, that upon 
attainment of our independence, the 
United States would not be found want- 
ing in extending to Zimbabwe that 
amount of aid the United States was 
capable of extending to it to enable the 
young state to attend to those problems 
created by the war which the young 
country would feel necessary to attend 
to. 



And so here we are, a young state 
that yesterday was only a toddler but to- 
day is able to do a little more than it 
was able to do yesterday. And this is 
because of the amount of assistance — I 
think the United States contributes the 
largest amount toward our whole pro- 
gram of reconstruction and develop- 
ment. And that input into our own ef- 
forts has enabled us to create the 
necessary base for our socioeconomic 
transformation. 

We have enjoyed excellent relations 
with your country. There has never been 
an occasion when we have had to com- 
plain to the United States on issues of 
bilateral relations falling in the political 
or diplomatic sphere. Yes, as you admit, 
there have been areas of difference. We 
are different on the modality of bringing 
about Namibia's independence, the 
linkage with the Cuban question. But 
generally we have looked at issues 
through the same glasses, one might 
say. And our posture regarding interna- 
tional situations of conflict has been 
identical. We both are opposed to in- 
terference in the domestic affairs of a 
country by another. 

And I'm sure this identity of view- 
point makes for the greater friendship 
and solidarity that we find between our 
two countries and our two people. We 
have enjoyed every minute of our stay in 
your country. We continue our talks 
with leaders of your society. But I'm 
very happy that the discussions we've 
just had have dwelled on those issues 
which are of mutual interest to our two 
sides. 



As you have said, we have discussed 
bilateral relations, the question of 
economic aid to Zimbabwe, the question 
of our original relations, and the fact 
that South Africa continues to destabi- 
lize our region. We have discussed 
Namibia, we have discussed the apart- 
heid system in South Africa, and there 
is a greater measure of agreement. 
There might be some difference here 
and there in respect of the method of 
bringing about change, positive change 
to the area. 

We are very happy, indeed, that this 
visit has taken place. And may I thank 
you and Vice President Bush, who 
visited us not long ago, for extending 
this invitation to me and enabling me, 
therefore, to come to this wonderful 
country with a wonderful people and a 
wonderful tradition and express to them 
the gratitude of the people of Zimbabwe. 

We are a young country. We may 
make mistakes as we move forward, but 
we are prepared that where we err we 
shall correct ourselves and get back on 
course. 

We don't intend to vitiate at all 
those principles which underlie the con- 
stitutional order that we have created. 
We are determined that a nonracial 
society shall exist in Zimbabwe and that 
racism, tribalism, regionalism, and 
whatever other "isms"— these are things 
of the past. What we would uphold as 
fundamental is that principle which 
binds us together and makes us one 
regardless of our race, color, or creed. 

And these are matters on which the 
United States has long made a decision, 
matters of principle which make for 
greater democracy and greater freedom 
in society. We are prepared that this 
shall also be our tradition. 

May I thank you for the kindness 
and hospitality which has been showered 
on me and my delegation since our ar- 
rival. We have come as friends; we go 
back as greater and closer friends still. 



•Made in the East Room at the White 
House (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 19. 1983). 



28 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



U.S. Offers New START Initiatives 



PRESIDENTS REMARKS. 
OCT. 4, 1983 1 

Later today Ambassador Ed Rowny 
[Edward L. Rowny, head of the U.S. 
delegation to the strategic arms reduc- 
tion talks (START)], and the other 
members of the START delegation will 
depart for Geneva for the opening of the 
fifth round of the strategic arms reduc- 
tion talks. They will carry with them a 
new set of instructions. 

From the first day of these negotia- 
tions, our highest goal has been to 
achieve a stable balance at reduced 
levels of nuclear arsenals. We want to 
reduce the weapons of war, pure and 
simple. All our efforts— in both the 
START and the INF [intermediate- 
range nuclear forces] negotiations — con- 
tinue to be guided by that objective. Just 
this morning, I repeated this commit- 
ment to President Carstens of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. As I 
pledged to the United Nations, the 
United States will accept any equitable, 
verifiable agreement that stabilizes 
forces at lower levels than currently ex- 
ist. We want significant reductions, and 
that pledge stands. 

In the last round of negotiations, we 
proposed a number of new initiatives 
which were in harmony with the recom- 
mendations of the Presidential Commis- 
sion on Strategic Forces and which pro- 
vided additional flexibility to our 
negotiators. Those initiatives supported 
our basic goals, and they also responded 
to a number of Soviet concerns. I deeply 
regret that the Soviet Union has yet to 
give any significant response. 

Throughout the negotiating process, 
it is the United States which has had to 
push, pull, probe, and prod in the effort 
to achieve any progress. The heartfelt 
desire shared by people everywhere for 
an historic agreement dramatically 
reducing nuclear weapons could and, in- 
deed, will be achieved provided one con- 
dition changes— the Soviet Government 
must start negotiating in good faith. 

Let me emphasize that the United 
States has gone the extra mile. We have 
removed the dividing line between the 
two phases of our original proposal. 
Everything is on the table. We are still 
most concerned about limits on the fast- 
flying, most dangerous systems. But we 



are also prepared to negotiate limits on 
bomber and air-launched cruise missile 
limits below SALT II levels. We have 
shown great flexibility in dealing with 
the destructive capability of ballistic 
missiles, including their throw-weight. 
We have also relaxed our limits on the 
number of ballistic missiles. We have 
gone a very long way to address Soviet 
concerns, but the Soviets have yet to 
take their first meaningful step to ad- 
dress ours. 

Particularly in the INF talks, but 
also in START, they have been 
stonewalling our proposals. When we 
proposed confidence-building measures 
that could be agreed to right now, they 
said, wait. Apparently they believe that 
time is on their side, that they can ex- 
ploit one democracy against another, 
and that their uncompromising attitude 
and delay will ultimately win out. We 
will prove them wrong. The diversity of 
our democracies is a source of strength, 
not weakness. From free discussion 
among free people comes unity and com- 
mitment. The sooner this is understood, 



the sooner we will reach an agreement 
in the interest of both sides. 

We will continue to press Moscow 
for an equitable, fair, and verifiable 
agreement. When the START negotia- 
tions resume tomorrow, the U.S. delega- 
tion will again have substantial flexibili- 
ty. Within the framework of the basic 
principles that have guided us through 
these negotiations, I am directing Am- 
bassador Rowny to offer the following 
new initiatives. 

• We are incorporating into START 
a series of build-down proposals. The 
United States will introduce a proposal 
for a mutual, guaranteed build-down 
designed to encourage stabilizing 
systems. The proposal will include 
specific provisions for building down 
ballistic missile warheads and concur- 
rently for addressing a parallel build- 
down on bombers. To discuss these ma- 
jor new initiatives, we will also propose 
the establishment of a U.S. -Soviet 
"build-down" working group in the 
Geneva talks. 

• On another front, and in our ef- 
fort, again, to be absolutely as flexible 
as possible, we will be willing to explore 
ways to limit further the size and 



NATO Supports U.S. 
Arms Control Initiative 



NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

STATEMENT, 

SEPT. 28, 1983 

At its meeting today, the North Atlantic 
Council discussed the U.S. -Soviet 
negotiations on intermediate-range 
nuclear forces (INF) and the new U.S. 
initiatives announced by the President of 
the United States in his speech to the 
UN General Assembly on 26th Septem- 
ber. The Council warmly welcomed and 
strongly supported the efforts made by 
the United States to promote progress 
in the negotiations. 

Like the interim solution announced 
in March, these latest initiatives taken 
by the United States are the result of in- 
tensive and continuing consultations 
among allies participating in the Special 
Consultative Group. They represent ad- 
ditional significant steps designed to 
move the INF negotiations toward 



achievement of a balanced, equitable, 
and verifiable agreement before the end 
of the year and respond to concerns ex- 
pressed by the Soviet Union. Allies con- 
cerned consider that these proposals are 
fully consistent with the criteria 
developed by NATO in the December 
1979 two-track decision. It is incumbent 
upon the Soviet Union to consider this 
offer with the utmost seriousness and to 
respond constructively. 

The allies hope that, in the near 
future, a verifiable agreement providing 
for equality between the United States 
and the Soviet Union can be reached in 
Geneva. In the absence of concrete 
results, deployments will proceed in ac- 
cordance with the original schedule as 
foreseen in the 1979 decision. 

The Greek delegation reiterated its 
position as explained in previous 
statements. ■ 



November 1983 



29 



ARMS CONTROL 



capability of air-launched cruise missile 
forces in exchange for reciprocal Soviet 
flexibility on items of concern to us. 

• We seek limits on the destructive 
capability of missiles and recognize that 
the Soviet Union would seek limits on 
bombers in exchange. There will have to 
be trade-offs and the United States is 
prepared to make them, so long as they 
result in a more stable balance of forces. 

The Soviet Union should not doubt 
the bipartisan support for our efforts. 
During our review process, I looked for 
ways to broaden America's bipartisan 
approach to our overall arms control ef- 
fort. We have consulted with many 
Members of the Congress and again 
with the commission headed by Brent 
Scowcroft. Their counsel has been in- 
valuable, and I want to thank them for 
their tireless efforts and helpful advice. 
A solid, national bipartisan consensus, 
sustained from year to year and from 
Administration to Administration, is 
crucial if we are to keep America safe 
and secure and if we are to achieve suc- 
cessful arms reductions. Therefore, I 
have decided to take a number of new 
steps. Among these are to designate a 
member of the Scowcroft commission, 
James Woolsey, as a member at large to 
our START negotiations. 

These actions reflect America's 
democratic process at its best. Am- 
bassador Rowny, as you and your team 
depart for Geneva, you go with the cer- 
tain knowledge that you are negotiating 
with the full support of the American 
people. Our bipartisan support is 
stronger than ever before. And you 
carry with you fair, equitable pro- 
posals—proposals that are in the in- 
terest of both nations and all 
humankind. 

It is fitting today to repeat what I 
said last week: The door to an agree- 
ment is open. All the world is waiting 
for the Soviet Union to walk through. 
Should the Soviet leadership decide to 
join us now in our good-faith effort, the 
fifth round of these negotiations will be 
the one in which, finally, a breakthrough 
was made and finally the world began to 
breathe a bit easier. 



Arms Control and 
European Public Opinion 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Oct. 10, 1983. 



Following is an exchange of letters 
between former Chancellor Bruno 
Kreisky of Austria and President 
Reagan. ' 



MR. KREISKY'S LETTER 

August 10, 1983 

Dear Mr. President, 

When I retired from the Austrian govern- 
ment you wrote me a letter in a spirit of 
friendship which I highly appreciated. This 
spirit has encouraged me to turn to you with 
some of my reflections on the current situa- 
tion about which I am deeply concerned. 

Let me make it very clear that I am not 
interested in publicity. For three months 
now, I have refused almost all requests for 
interviews. You will know that in the 
democratic countries of Europe there are 
enormous differences in public opinion. But 
what I consider much more important is that 
people in these democracies have come to be 
divided by a deep gap over the armament 
issue. I am profoundly convinced of your 
sincere commitment to the idea of peace, but 
I should like to add that I am equally con- 
vinced that Mr. Andropov does not want war. 
Yet, the experience of a long political career 
tells me that such events may occur even 
against the will of leading personalities in 
powerful states. And I am afraid that 
something of the kind might happen some 
day. 

The point in question are the Geneva 
talks for which a deadline has been set. I am 
not under the delusion that I can make any 
contribution to these talks, but I should like 
to urge you not to be guided by prestige 
thinking. If no results should be reached by 
the deadline you have set, do prolong the 
negotiating period for another few months, 
and reasonable people throughout the world 
will understand that you seek to get a result. 
There is no sense in upholding prestige while 
letting negotiations founder. Please consider 
that a prolongation may also induce the other 
party to continue negotiating; and if it is 
made, it will be by far easier to explain to 
people who is responsible for a failure to 
reach a mutually satisfactory solution. 

My particular concern is young people's 
relationship to democracy, because they are 
the main force in the peace movement. I am 
quite simply afraid that democracy may be 
headed for a crisis similar to the one I lived 
through in my youth, and that such a crisis 
might generate developments none of us 
would welcome. Democratic order is a 
delicate structure which cannot be main- 
tained by rough interference from the state's 



law and order forces. What is at stake is the 
relationship of a major part of Europe's 
young generation to democracy, and I appeal 
to you, Mister President, to attribute just 
value to this stake. It will be of decisive and 
profound importance to the relations between 
our democracies, the European and the 
American one. 

I belong to those who know what Euro- 
pean democracy owes to American 
democracy. We are fully aware of the role 
played by the two big American parties. It is 
entirely up to the American people to choose 
their leaders, but the crucial point is solidari- 
ty between the democracies, which can only 
be strong, if democracy is deeply rooted in 
people's minds. 

That is why I ask you to reconsider if you 
really wish to adhere to that deadline. It 
might involve the danger of turning it into a 
"dead line" other than the one implied by 
Anglo-Saxon usage. 

I remain, Mister President, with kind 
regards, 

Sincerely yours, 

Bruno Kreisky 



PRESIDENT'S LETTER 

September 12, 1983 

Dear Mr. Kreisky: 

I appreciated your thoughtful letter concern- 
ing the impact of arms control questions on 
public opinion in Europe. Let me assure you 
that the points you raise are also of great 
concern to me. It is especially troublesome 
that NATO's dual-track decision is not clearly 
understood by young people in Europe, 
despite our constant efforts and those of our 
Allies to articulate and clarify it. 

During your appearance before the Na- 
tional Press Club in Washington last 
February you stated clearly and succinctly 
the principle behind the Alliance decision. 
NATO did not, as you noted, decide to sta- 
tion new weapons in Europe on its own ini- 
tiative. NATO's dual-track decision was 
necessitated by the rapid proliferation of 
Soviet nuclear forces, especially the 
intermediate-range SS-20. The introduction 
of this highly accurate and lethal missile 
system threatened to break the security link 
between the United States and our European 
Allies. This link has served as the underpin- 
ning of European stability for nearly four 
decades. 

In response, the NATO Allies approved 
the deployment of new intermediate range 
weapons, while emphasizing their common 
determination to make every possible effort 
to limit or make these weapons unnecessary 
via negotiations with the Soviet Union. We 
also made it clear that if it proved impossible 



30 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARMS CONTROL 



to achieve a satisfactory arms agreement, we 
would take the steps necessary to protect our 
security by proceeding with the missile 
deployments. Let me underline that we set 
no deadline to the negotiations; only a small 
number of the total planned missiles will be 
deployed at the end of this year and we are 
prepared to continue negotiations thereafter. 
Let me stress as well that any missile that is 
deployed can always be withdrawn, if 
negotiations are eventually successful. 

In this connection, I wish to reiterate 
that the United States adamantly opposes an 
arms race. There are certain facts that 
receive almost no publicity. For example, the 
United States has fewer nuclear warheads to- 
day than we had fifteen years ago. And over 
the last three years we withdrew unilaterally 
1,000 nuclear weapons from Europe. 
Moreover, if we are forced to deploy INF 
missiles, we have agreed with our Allies that 
for every modern warhead introduced, an ex- 
isting nuclear warhead will be withdrawn. 

We are willing, in the interest of arms 
reductions, to consider every option. I reaf- 
firmed this to Ambassador Nitze [Paul H. 
Nitze, head of the U.S. delegation to the 
intermediate-range nuclear forces negotia- 
tions] prior to his return to Geneva for the 
current round of negotiations, which we are 
earnestly pursuing, despite the Korean airline 
tragedy. But the USSR's approach to 
negotiating reductions has been disappoint- 
ing, particularly in that the Soviets have con- 
tinuously refused to acknowledge the security 
interest of the nations on their periphery. 

As you will recall, Moscow initially re- 
fused to negotiate at all. It was NATO's 
modernization decision that brought the 
Soviets to the negotiating table. Since com- 
mencement of the Geneva talks in 1981 the 
Soviet Union, however, has refused to move 
from its insistence on maintaining a missile 
monopoly despite flexible proposals we tabled 
aimed at stimulating progress. Our 
negotiating positions, which have been 
developed through extremely close coopera- 
tion with our NATO Allies, insist only on 
U.S.-Soviet equality, a principle that the 
Soviet Union has so far refused to honor. 
When the Soviets made plain their opposition 
to the zero option, we proposed parity at the 
lowest possible level. The Soviets have said 
this is equally unacceptable. It is Soviet 
intransigence that is blocking progress. 

While I know that some young people are 
opposed to the prospect of new weapons 
deployments, there are much larger numbers 
who support our determination to maintain 
the common defense. If, as you say, we will 
disappoint many of our citizens by beginning 
deployments on schedule, how many more 
will be affected if we go back on our joint 
decision and postpone implementation of the 
dual-track decision? A delay in our 
deployments would only encourage the 
Soviets to believe that NATO's resolve was 



faltering and that they could stretch our 
negotiations endlessly without addressing our 
legitimate security concerns. 

I wholeheartedly agree with your point 
that solidarity among the democracies is our 
objective, a bond that can only be strong 
when it is deeply rooted in people's minds. 
What a striking contrast presented to us by 
the Soviet example, where the leadership can 
commit such a horrible deed as the destruc- 
tion of the KAL civilian airliner and not feel 
compelled to answer to its people. The Soviet 
Union openly professes its desire to impose 
its totalitarian system throughout the world, 
an objective we can repulse by maintaining 
our common defense and resolutely pro- 
moting our democratic ideals. 

I do not believe that the relationship of 
European youth to their democratic systems 
is as tenuous as you suggest. In my travels, I 
have seen strong evidence that young people 
in both Europe and the United States, and 
elsewhere respect both the responsibilities as 
well as the privileges of democracy. Our joint 
task is to demonstrate to them, through both 
words and deeds, the meaning and continued 
validity of Western principles. Securing the 
common defense is one of the most important 
of these responsibilities. 

I assure you that I am deeply committed 
to seeking every possibility for peace, in 
Europe and throughout the world. I know 
that I can count on you and other leaders to 
help Europe's young people find their way 
among the difficult choices facing them to- 
day. 

With warm personal regards. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Reagan 



Released by the Office of the White 
House Press Secretary on Sept. 16, 1983 
(texts from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Sept. 19). ■ 



INF Negotiations 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
Sept. 12, 1983 1 

The United States is constantly review- 
ing the progress of the negotiations to 
see how best to move the talks forward, 
and we are continuing intensive con- 
sultations with our allies on the INF 
[intermediate-range nuclear forces] 
talks. The sixth round of these talks has 
just begun, and the United States is 
engaged in serious negotiating efforts to 
obtain an agreement that meets alliance 
security concerns. Both sides are bound 
to respect the confidentiality of the 
negotiations. Press speculation about the 
substance of the talks is not helpful. 

As in the previous round, U.S. 
negotiators have great flexibility to con- 
sider any serious Soviet proposal accord- 
ing to criteria set forth by the President 
earlier this year. These five criteria re- 
main the basis of our position: equal 
rights and limits for the United States 
and U.S.S.R., no compensation for third 
country systems, global limits with no 
shifting of the threat from Europe to 
Asia, no adverse effect on NATO's con- 
ventional deterrent, and effective 
measures to ensure verifiability. 

We and the allies remain convinced 
that the best long-term results of the 
negotiations would be the elimination of 
all land-based U.S. and Soviet LRINF 
[longer range intermediate-range 
nuclear forces] missiles and that as long 
as the Soviets remain unwilling to ac- 
cept this outcome, the President's in- 
terim agreement proposal provides a 
flexible framework for progress. 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 21, 1983 2 

One of my first decisions in the after- 
math of the tragic shooting down of 
Korean Air Lines Flight 007 was that 
the United States must continue its ef- 
forts in the interest of peace to pursue 
equitable and verifiable arms control 
agreements with the Soviet Union. 

On September 3, I met with Am- 
bassador Nitze [Paul H. Nitze, head of 
the U.S. delegation to the INF negotia- 
tions] to discuss the INF negotiations in 



November 1983 



31 



EAST ASIA 



Geneva and to reaffirm my commitment 
to seeking a successful result in those 
talks. 

Since then, the United States has 
held extensive consultations with our 
NATO allies and Japan regarding the 
U.S. position in the talks. These con- 
sultations have included both direct cor- 
respondence between myself and allied 
leaders, meetings of the NATO Special 
Consultative Group, and bilateral con- 
sultations with the Japanese. 

In those consultations, suggestions 
for U.S. initiatives to move the negotia- 
tions forward were offered. These sug- 
gestions were welcomed by allied 
leaders, who reaffirmed their strong 
support for the U.S. negotiating effort. 
Our NATO allies also reaffirmed their 
commitment to the NATO double-track 
decision. 

Based on the results of these con- 
sultations, Ambassador Nitze has re- 
ceived new instructions to pursue these 
U.S. initiatives with the Soviet 
negotiators in Geneva. These initiatives 
represent significant further develop- 
ment of the U.S. proposal for an interim 
agreement which the U.S. put forward 
last March. They address a number of 
Soviet concerns. 

The U.S. action in taking these addi- 
tional steps is further demonstration of 
U.S. commitment, and that of our allies, 
to achieving a positive outcome in the 
Geneva talks. 

We call on the Soviet Union to re- 
spond in a constructive manner to these 
proposals, so that the Geneva negotia- 
tions can arrive at a positive result. 



U.S.-Philippine Relations After 
the Aquino Assassination 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 19, 1983. 

2 Read to reporters on the President's be- 
half by principal deputy press secretary Larry 
Speakes (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents or Sept. 26). ■ 



by John C. Monjo 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
September 13, 1983. Mr. Monjo is Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs. ' 

I am pleased to address today the situa- 
tion in the Philippines and the state of 
U.S.-Philippine relations following the 
assassination of Senator and opposition 
leader Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., in Manila 
on August 21 which has shocked the 
American people as it has Filipinos of all 
political persuasions. 

I intend to cover today the assassi- 
nation and its impact on public opinion, 
the investigation, U.S. policy in the 
wake of the assassination, the 
President's planned visit to the Philip- 
pines in November, the stability of the 
Marcos government, the U.S. military 
facilities, and the economic situation. 

The Bilateral Relationship 

No discussion of the Philippines and 
U.S.-Philippine relations can begin with- 
out reference to the unique, long-term 
bilateral relationship of our two coun- 
tries. It is vital that we underline the 
need for a policy that looks to the long 
term in our relationship. Close ties be- 
tween the United States and the Philip- 
pines go back to the turn of the century, 
and those ties include the shared suffer- 
ing of World War II as well as that 
exhilarating moment of Philippine inde- 
pendence on July 4, 1946. Strong bi- 
lateral economic relations that still exist 
are a key element— the United States is 
still both the primary source of foreign 
investment in the Philippines and the 
largest market for Philippine goods. 
Both the U.S. Government and the 
private sector have played an important 
role in the economic development of the 
Philippines. 

Perhaps because of our shared 
history, the United States and the 
Philippines have tended to view inter- 
national security and political problems 
and issues in much the same way. In 
good times and bad, the Philippines has 
often stood by our side. A key element 



in our bilateral relationship has been our 
common interest in security and regional 
stability, as manifested in our 1947 Mili- 
tary Bases Agreement, our 1952 Mutual 
Defense Treaty, and continuing close co- 
operation in defense and security mat- 
ters. Just recently we rapidly and 
amicably concluded a review of our 
Military Base Agreement. The two mili- 
tary facilities in the Philippines fulfill a 
vital function in maintaining regional 
security and stability— a role that has 
been noted positively by virtually all of 
the countries of East Asia— and that 
stability in turn contributes to the re- 
markable economic growth of the entire 
area. 

Another essential element of the 
relationship, of course, is people — those 
American teachers and government of- 
ficials who introduced English and new 
institutions in the early days, the com- 
rades in arms in World War II, those 
members of Philippine Governments 
from President Roxas to President 
Marcos with whom a series of U.S. Ad- 
ministrations — both Republican and 
Democrat — have dealt amicably and pro- 
ductively over the years, the 1 million or 
so Filipino-Americans and Filipinos who 
live in the United States today and 
enrich our culture and society. Until last 
August, that number included Senator 
Benigno Aquino, who 3 years earlier 
was released from a Philippine military 
prison for a heart operation in the 
United States, and his family. 

The Assassination 

The Aquino assassination has rocked the 
Philippines. It was a tragic event that 
has beclouded the reputation of the 
Philippine Government. Many Filipinos, 
and not all of them opposed to the cur- 
rent government, suspect the complicity 
of elements of the government in the 
crime. It raises very disturbing ques- 
tions that demand answers. It puts into 
grave doubt the competence of the air- 
port security forces, who themselves are 
suspect of at best gross negligence in 
their duties. We do not have the 
answers to those questions yet. As we 
have stated, we look to the Government 
of the Philippines to provide them. 



32 



Department of State Bulletin 



EAST ASIA 



This is a matter, first and foremost, 
that concerns the Philippine Government 
and the Philippine people. But the U.S. 
Government has made clear to the 
Government of the Philippines, both 
publicly and privately, that, in view of 
our close relationship, the United States 
also has and continues to have the 
deepest concern over the assassination 
of Senator Aquino. We fully expect the 
Philippine Government to act swiftly 
and vigorously to track down the perpe- 
trators of this crime, as President 
Marcos promised in his statement on the 
day of the murder. 

At this point, we still know very lit- 
tle about the assassination that is not 
already a matter of public record. Not 
enough evidence has yet been found to 
substantiate or to rule out any of the 
several possible explanations which have 
been mentioned so far. The circum- 
stances of the murder and the identity 
of the alleged assassin, whom the Philip- 
pine Government describes as "a 
notorious killer, a gun for hire," make us 
doubt that one man alone could have 
been responsible for this clearly political 
assassination. 

The Investigation 

The United States welcomed the idea of 
naming a high-level panel to investigate 
the assassination. The members of the 
commission as it is presently consti- 
tuted, headed by the current Chief 
Justice, are former members of the 
Philippine Supreme Court. Opposition 
leaders and others have expressed con- 
cern that certain of the members are too 
closely identified with the government. 

Despite the international interest in 
the investigation, it will necessarily be a 
domestic Philippine matter which the 
Philippine authorities must carry out to 
its conclusion. The commission, of 
course, must be judged ultimately by its 
work. It is clearly too early now to make 
any judgments when the investigation 
has barely begun. 

U.S. participation in the investiga- 
tion has been limited to the FBI pro- 
viding, in response to a Philippine re- 
quest, technical assistance in tracing the 
alleged murder weapon and in a finger- 
print check. For our part, we have not 
offered any other assistance. 

The Assassination and U.S. Policy 

In the public statement issued on the 
day of the assassination, the U.S. 
Government went on record in denounc- 
ing the assassination as a "cowardly and 



despicable act which the United States 
Government condemns in the strongest 
terms." We stated that "the United 
States Government trusts that the 
Government of the Philippines will swift- 
ly and vigorously track down the 
perpetrators of this political assassina- 
tion, bring them to justice, and punish 
them to the fullest extent of the law." 
We also expressed our condolences to 
Senator Aquino's wife and children and 
to his family, friends, and supporters in 
the Philippines. Ambassador Armacost 
represented the United States at the 
funeral. 

The United States is following the 
investigation of the Philippine 
authorities closely. We have asked the 
Philippine Government to keep us in- 
formed as the investigation, which has 
just begun, develops. The Government 
of the Philippines is fully aware of our 
interest. To supplement our public state- 
ment, we have privately told senior of- 
ficials of the Philippine Government of 
our strong concern that the investiga- 
tion be thorough and impartial. The 
Philippine Government has reacted 
positively to this expression of U.S. in- 
terest. 

Other aspects of our bilateral rela- 
tionship are continuing. There are 
several economic and trade problems 
that need attention. We are also moving 
ahead with the Philippine Government 
to implement provisions of our recently 
concluded review of the Military Bases 
Agreement. 

The Aquino assassination does not 
appear to have changed pre-existing 
Philippine attitudes about the U.S. 
military presence in the Philippines or 
about our economic and security 
assistance programs. There were no 
anti-American manifestations during the 
funeral or when hundreds of thousands 
of mourners accompanied the Aquino 
cortege right past the U.S. Embassy. 
Our embassy in Manila is also in touch 
with broad elements of the Philippine 
body politic in an effort to keep abreast 
of developments and to make our views 
known. 

Following the assassination, much 
media attention has been directed to the 
President's planned visit to the Philip- 



pines, a stop on his trip to East Asia, 
this November. The White House 
responds to all questions about the 
President's travel. What I can say to you 
at this time is that there are no current 
plans to change the President's an- 
nounced itinerary. Naturally any new 
developments would be carefully 
weighed. 

Stability and Elections 

With the assassination of Senator 
Aquino, the opposition has lost its most 
charismatic leader. Senator Aquino had 
hoped to return home to persuade the 
Marcos government and his fellow 
members of the opposition to find elec- 
toral solutions to the Philippines' 
political problems. Now that Senator 
Aquino is gone, the leaders of the 
moderate opposition must decide what 
they will do. The Marcos government, 
for its part, will also have to decide on 
how to deal with the new political situa- 
tion as it prepares for the 1984 
parliamentary election. 

We cannot foretell how the political 
events will play out. For our part, we 
hope that both the government and the 
moderate opposition will deal with this 
new political reality in a way that con- 
tributes to political stability, the 
strengthening of democratic institutions, 
and respect for human rights. In this 
regard it is more important than ever 
that the May 1984 parliamentary elec- 
tion be one in which the legitimate op- 
position will have a free and fair oppor- 
tunity to participate. If the ground rules 
for the election permit the legitimate op- 
position to participate, then it could be 
the most significant electoral exercise in 
the Philippines since the declaration of 
martial law in 1972. 

Elections widely seen as fair and 
equitable can contribute significantly to 
stability and the avoidance of political 
polarization. It is no accident that the 
communists, and their armed force, the 
New People's Army, do not want such 
elections, just as they are the ones who 
gain the most from the political turmoil 
caused by the Aquino assassination. 
Some moderate members of the opposi- 
tion, frustrated by the murder, could 
become more willling to throw in their 
political lot with the extreme left in their 
desire to bring about political change. 
The manner in which the Philippine 
Government and the moderate opposi- 
tion leaders ultimately respond to the 
new political reality and, in particular, 



November 1983 



33 



EAST ASIA 



how they will deal with the 1984 election 
will go a long way toward determining 
whether political polarization will, in 
fact, take place. 

U.S. Military Facilities 
and Philippine Politics 

Over the years, the presence of U.S. 
military facilities and how best to deal 
with the United States on bases issues 
have been an integral part of Philippine 
political life. Some Philippine na- 
tionalists have traditionally viewed the 
bases as remnants of the colonial past. 
Others have taken ambivalent stands on 
the bases, which, with the Mutual 
Defense Treaty, have constituted the 
country's guarantee against foreign at- 
tack since independence in 1946. All ad- 
ministrations in the Philippines have 
favored the presence of the bases, while 
their political opponents have tended to 
be critical of the incumbent's handling of 
the bases issue. 

We fully understand that our vital 
military facilities in the Philippines — as 
such facilities in other countries — cannot 
be effectively operated without at least 
the tacit support of the host government 
and the host peoples. Fortunately, we 
believe that the U.S. facilities continue 
to enjoy substantial support in the 
Philippines and, indeed, throughout the 
East Asia region. 



The Administration intends to con- 
tinue with its plans to ask the Congress 
for the security assistance it pledged to 
seek in connection with this year's 
Military Bases Agreement review. We 
believe the agreement reflects U.S. and 
Philippine interests. 

The Philippine Economy 

My statement would not be complete 
without some comments on the Philip- 
pine economy, which has also received 
considerable attention lately. In the 
decade of the 1970s, the Philippine 
economy, under the guidance of an able 
team of technocrats backed by President 
Marcos, made solid, if not spectacular, 
strides, with growth rates averaging 
6%. Then in this decade, growth 
dropped off sharply, largely as a result 
of the worldwide recession which re- 
duced the demand for the country's 
traditional exports. Most recently, with 
the upturn in the world economy, there 
have been some favorable developments, 
including higher prices for Philippine 
products, which should help in efforts to 
overcome the Philippines' balance-of- 
payments problems. The Philippine 
Government has been willing to take 
some tough measures. Moreover, the 
1984 parliamentary elections, provided 



they have the hoped for political stabiliz- 
ing effect, should significantly support 
investor confidence in the Philippines. 
The Aquino assassination had ini- 
tially led to concerns about possible 
adverse effects on the economy. 
However, we have not seen indications 
that this event has seriously affected 
lending and investing attitudes. In any 
event, the medium- and long-term 
outlook is favorable because the underly- 
ing factors such as the availability of 
trained and capable manpower, 
resources, and geographic location re- 
main conducive to growth and develop- 
ment. 

Conclusion 

Benigno Aquino's murder is a tragedy 
for the Philippines. Filipino political 
leaders in both the government and the 
opposition recognize the gravity of their 
political problems. How they work out 
their differences is, of course, their 
responsibility. We continue to believe 
that a free and fair electoral process in 
which Filipinos can place their con- 
fidence is the key to the resolution of 
the political problems left in the wake of 
the Aquino assassination. We trust that 
all the responsible political leaders of the 
Philippines share this view. 



■The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



34 



Department of State Bulletin 



EAST ASIA 



Kampuchea After 5 Years 
of Vietnamese Occupation 



by John C. Monjo 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
September 15, 1983. Mr. Monjo is Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs. 1 

I am pleased to have the opportunity to 
appear before this subcommittee to 
review the situation in Kampuchea after 
5 years of Vietnamese occupation. Since 
1975 the Khmer people have suffered 
immeasurably, first from the brutal ef- 
forts of the Pol Pot regime to complete- 
ly restructure Khmer society and, since 
1978, from invasion and occupation by 
their stronger neighbor, Vietnam. I 
welcome this chance to review recent 
developments in Kampuchea. 

It has been almost a year since this 
Administration last discussed Kam- 
puchea before this committee. In the 
past year, the strategy by the Associa- 
tion of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) for a political settlement— 
which the United States strongly sup- 
ports — has succeeded in further 
isolating Vietnam because of Hanoi's oc- 
cupation of Kampuchea. This is par- 
ticularly evident in increased voting at 
the United Nations against Vietnam's 
occupation but also in opportunities 
Hanoi has lost in aid and trade with the 
great majority of nations which con- 
demn its Kampuchean policies. 

Inside Kampuchea, Vietnamese occu- 
pying forces have long since worn out 
their welcome. 

• There is increased hostility to the 
occupation, especially as the Vietnamese 
increase their treatment of Kampuchea 
as a colony. 

• Resistance to Hanoi's occupation 
has increased noticeably during the cur- 
rent wet season. In response, the Viet- 
namese in some areas have cracked 
down on local officials and the armed 
forces of the Heng Samrin regime. 

• Heightened repression by the 
Vietnamese has caused large numbers of 
Khmer to flee to the Thai-Kampuchea 
border. 

Despite international condemnation 
and the opposition of the Khmer people, 



Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea con- 
tinues, with no end in sight. Hanoi's of- 
fers to talk avoid the underlying issues, 
and its claims of partial troop with- 
drawals are false. Hanoi refuses to ad- 
dress the widely accepted framework for 
a settlement set forth in the declaration 
of the International Conference on Kam- 
puchea. Hanoi's intention to avoid a 
political settlement and continue with a 
military solution has been nowhere more 
evident than during the past dry season 
when its forces repeatedly launched 
brutal assaults against Khmer civilian 
refugee settlements along the Thai- 
Kampuchean border. 

Increased Hostility 
to the Occupation 

During this past dry season in Indo- 
china, Vietnam continued its efforts to 
destroy the anti- Vietnamese resistance 
forces and consolidate its hold on Kam- 
puchea. Beginning in late January 1983, 
the Vietnamese Army launched a series 
of attacks against resistance positions 
and civilian encampments along the 
Thai-Kampuchean border. These attacks, 
backed by armor and heavy artillery, 
overran several of the border encamp- 
ments, forcing more than 85,000 Khmer 
civilians to seek refuge elsewhere. In 
early April, Vietnamese units entered 
Thai territory in force, prompting the 
Royal Thai Air Force to launch air 
strikes against Vietnamese troops. 
These wanton attacks against civilian 
encampments, and the disregard they 
show for Thai territory, are indications 
that Vietnam has not changed its policy 
of seeking a military solution to the 
problem of Kampuchea. 

Recent intelligence has enabled us to 
refine our estimate of Vietnamese troop 
strength in Kampuchea to 150,000- 
170,000 men, a large portion of them 
concentrated near the Thai-Kampuchean 
border. This changed estimate reflects 
only more precise information now 
available to us, not any change in Viet- 
namese strength. In May 1983, Hanoi 
announced a second partial troop with- 
drawal and said that the Cuu Long, or 
Fourth Corps, with 10,000 troops would 
return to Vietnam. Foreign journalists 
invited to Kampuchea for the event 
observed 2,000-3,000 Vietnamese troops 



leaving the country. Some headquarters 
units were, indeed, withdrawn, but there 
is no indication of a reduction in Viet- 
namese strength in Kampuchea. More 
new personnel have been joining units 
near the Thai border than have 
departed, and the Vietnamese Army ap- 
pears to have been reorganized to in- 
crease its combat power near the 
border. There is no indication of a 
genuine withdrawal. In fact, our infor- 
mation indicates that this was simply a 
troop rotation and unit reorganization 
exercise. 

The Heng Samrin regime's own ar- 
my is weak and ineffective. Widespread 
conscription has brought its strength to 
20,000-30,000 men, but morale is low 
and desertion a widespread problem. 
Even the main force units are consid- 
ered unreliable by the Vietnamese while 
some local militia are apparently sus- 
pected by the Vietnamese of col- 
laborating with the resistance. 

The Vietnamese, however, have 
been unable to eliminate the resistance 
threat and face the prospect of pro- 
tracted conflict. The resistance forces 
have grown in strength and capability. 
The Khmer Rouge maintain more than 
30,000 troops and are apparently able to 
conduct operations over a large area of 
the country. The Khmer People's Na- 
tional Liberation Front (KPNLF) has in- 
creased its strength and has become a 
more effective combat force. It has 
reorganized its command structure to 
pursue a more vigorous guerrilla war. 
The KPNLF has 12,000 armed troops 
and some 6,000 more troops awaiting 
equipment. The pro-Sihanouk forces 
number approximately 5,000 men. 
Shortages of equipment continue to limit 
the effectiveness of the noncommunist 
forces. 

The resistance forces— both Khmer 
Rouge and noncommunist — have been 
more active this wet season than in the 
past. Attacks and ambushes along the 
roads and the railroad between Phnom 
Penh and western Kampuchea have 
been more frequent. The Vietnamese 
Army appears to be facing greater diffi- 
culty in supplying its forces near the 
border. 

We do not see any prospect of the 
Vietnamese destroying the resistance 
forces. The resistance does not pose a 
serious military threat to Vietnam's hold 
on the main population centers, but it is 
a problem for Hanoi and prevents the 
Vietnamese-installed regime from con- 
solidating its control of the country. 



November 1983 



35 



EAST ASIA 



Internal Situation 

Within Kampuchea, there has been some 
improvement in the domestic economy. 
The food situation is better than in past 
years, and there is a prospect of self- 
sufficiency in rice. The requirements for 
international relief assistance have 
already fallen significantly and should 
continue to fall in the future. The rains 
this year, however, have been late and 
below normal. We are watching the 
situation carefully in cooperation with 
the UN Secretary General's Special 
Representative for Khmer Relief. 

Politically, Vietnamese efforts to 
establish the legitimacy of the Heng 
Samrin regime have made little prog- 
ress. The regime is dependent on Viet- 
namese advisers down to the provincial 
level, and all major policy decisions are 
made on sufferance of the Vietnamese. 
Often they seem to serve Vietnam's in- 
terests at the expense of Kampuchea's. 
Hanoi and Phnom Penh recently an- 
nounced an agreement on delimiting 
their common border, which abandoned 
the position held by every Kampuchean 
Government since independence, and ac- 
cepted the Vietnamese view of the 
border's true location. The regime has 
gained, at best, only the tacit ac- 
quiescence of the Khmer. 

Hanoi is concerned about the 
reliability of the Heng Samrin regime's 
civilian administration and the general 
population. In May and June, the Viet- 
namese arrested a number of regime of- 
ficials on suspicion of sympathizing with 
the resistance. Vietnamese military units 
have also carried out pacification cam- 
paigns in the countryside directed at 
villagers believed to support the resist- 
ance. The brutal excesses of these cam- 
paigns have driven several thousand 
Khmer to flee to the Thai-Kampuchean 
border in search of refuge, joining the 
more than 200,000 already in border en- 
campments. 

Interviews with refugees fleeing 
Kampuchea indicate that anti- 
Vietnamese sentiment and support for 
the resistance is on the rise. The Khmer 
Rouge are still widely remembered and 
hated for their bloody excesses while in 
power. The Vietnamese and the Heng 
Samrin regime have used this fear to 
control the country but Khmer na- 
tionalism is reasserting itself. Conscrip- 
tion, forced labor, a fear of the some- 
times undisciplined behavior of Viet- 
namese troops, and increasing suspicion 



of Vietnam's long-term intentions have 
all contributed to the increasing resent- 
ment of the Vietnamese. Moreover, the 
senior levels of Heng Samrin's regime 
are heavily composed of former Khmer 
Rouge officers, including Heng Samrin, 
who broke with Pol Pot before the Viet- 
namese invasion of Kampuchea but who 
share responsibility for the Khmer 
Rouge regime's horrifying record of 
atrocities. The formation of the coalition 
last year, the reemergence of Prince 
Sihanouk, and the leadership also pro- 
vided by Son Sann have given the 
Khmer renewed hope of an eventual 
choice other than the Khmer Rouge or a 
government controlled by the Viet- 
namese. 

The recent influx of Vietnamese 
settlers into Kampuchea will further 
contribute to popular disaffection. 
Estimates of the number of Vietnamese 
immigrants range from the official 
Phnom Penh figure of 40,000 to an im- 
probable 1.2 million. We believe that the 
true number may lie in the 150,000- 
200,000 range. There were some 
500,000 ethnic Vietnamese in Kam- 
puchea before 1970. Most fled between 



1970 and 1979. Some of the Vietnamese 
settlers are undoubtedly returning 
residents. As many as a third, however, 
are new immigrants. When combined 
with Vietnamese-imposed changes to 
Kampuchean administration and Khmer 
society, this officially sponsored Viet- 
namese immigration raises serious ques- 
tions about Hanoi's long-term intentions 
toward Kampuchea. 

Regional Concerns 

The ASEAN members— the countries in 
the region most threatened by Viet- 
namese aggression in Kampuchea — seek 
a political settlement to the problem of 
Kampuchea based on the complete with- 
drawal of Vietnamese troops and the 
establishment of a neutral, independent 
Kampuchea through internationally 
supervised elections. These principles 
were adopted by a majority of the 
world's nations in the declaration of the 
UN-sponsored International Conference 
on Kampuchea. Increasing majorities 
have passed resolutions incorporating 
the conference formula at every UN 
General Assembly since 1979. ASEAN's 



Situation in Kampuchea 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 22, 1983 1 

The United States supports ASEAN's 
[Association of South East Asian Na- 
tions] efforts to achieve a comprehensive 
political settlement of the problem in 
Kampuchea based on the complete 
withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and in- 
ternationally supervised elections. These 
principles have been adopted by the 
great majority of the world's nations in 
the declaration of U.N. -sponsored Inter- 
national Conference on Kampuchea and 
successive resolutions of the UN General 
Assembly. 

The Khmer resistance coalition is an 
important element of ASEAN's 
strategy. The United States was not 
directly involved in the coalition's forma- 
tions, but we have welcomed it as a 
vehicle formed to achieve a political set- 
tlement in Kampuchea. We give moral, 
diplomatic, and political support to the 
coalition's noncommunist elements, led 
by Prince Sihanouk and former Prime 
Minister Son Sann. We provide no 
assistance to and have no contact with 
the Khmer Rouge. 



Last year Prince Sihanouk and Son 
Sann met with Vice President Bush in 
Washington during the UN General 
Assembly. The President will meet with 
Prince Sihanouk and Mr. Son Sann, not 
as representatives of the Government of 
Democratic Kampuchea, which we have 
never recognized, but as respected 
Khmer nationalists and leaders of non- 
communist groups struggling to free 
their country from Vietnamese occupa- 
tion. 

The President will reaffirm our op- 
position to the Vietnamese occupation of 
Kampuchea and our support for 
ASEAN's efforts to achieve a settlement 
which will restore Kampuchea's inde- 
pendence. He will also seek their views 
on the present situation in Kampuchea 
and prospects for the current UN 
General Assembly. We have no plans to 
provide military assistance to the coali- 
tion or any of its members. 



'Made to reporters by the principal depu- 
ty press secretary to the President Larry 
Speakes (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 26, 1983). ■ 



36 



Department of State Bulletin 



EAST ASIA 



strategy includes applying political, 
diplomatic, and economic pressures on 
Vietnam to persuade Hanoi that a politi- 
cal settlement is in its own interests. 

Support for ASEAN and its ap- 
proach to the Kampuchean problem is 
the cornerstone of U.S. policy in South- 
east Asia. We share ASEAN's objective 
of a comprehensive political settlement 
and work with ASEAN to achieve the 
objectives of the Kampuchea conference 
declaration. We share ASEAN's belief 
that only a peaceful solution to the prob- 
lem in Kampuchea can address the con- 
cerns and interests of all the parties in- 
volved. 

Internationally, Vietnam remains 
isolated because of its conduct in Kam- 
puchea. The majority of nonaligned na- 
tions have joined ASEAN, Western 
Europe, Japan, and the United States in 
condemning Vietnam's aggression which 
is in violation of international law and 
the UN Charter. Hanoi's only support 
comes from the U.S.S.R. and Soviet 
allies. The Soviet Union provides Viet- 
nam with military and economic aid ex- 
ceeding $1 billion annually. This aid sup- 
ports Vietnam's war effort in Kam- 
puchea and keeps the Vietnamese 
economy functioning at a minimal level 
but is insufficient to allow Hanoi to re- 
construct and develop the country. 
Moscow has been able to trade on this 
support to obtain access to Vietnamese 
air and naval facilities, notably the 
former U.S. base at Cam Ranh Bay. We 
and ASEAN are concerned at this in- 
creasing Soviet presence in Southeast 
Asia. Some argue we should soften our 
stance toward Vietnam to give it an 
alternative to the Soviets. However, it is 
not the policies of ASEAN or the United 
States which isolate Vietnam and leave 
it dependent on the Soviet Union. It is 
Hanoi's own policy of invading and occu- 
pying a neighbor which leave it without 
friends outside the Soviet camp. Only a 
change in those policies will allow Hanoi 
to expand its contacts with the rest of 
the world. 

Coalition Government 

In 1982, with encouragement from the 
ASEAN nations, the Coalition Govern- 
ment of Democratic Kampuchea was 
formed. It broadened the Democratic 
Kampuchea regime into a coalition join- 
ing noncommunist factions led by re- 
spected Khmer nationalists Prince 
Sihanouk and former Prime Minister 



Son Sann with the Khmer Rouge to op- 
pose the Vietnamese occupation of Kam- 
puchea. These groups retain their own 
political identities and military autonomy 
but are pledged to work together to 
seek implementation of the international 
conference's Declaration on Kampuchea. 

The United States was not directly 
involved in the coalition's formation. We, 
nevertheless, welcomed it as a step in 
the process of achieving a settlement in 
Kampuchea. The United States con- 
tinues to give diplomatic and political 
support to the noncommunist elements 
in the coalition. We welcomed Prince 
Sihanouk and Mr. Son Sann to 
Washington last year during the UN 
General Assembly. They met the Secre- 
tary of State in New York and the Vice 
President here in Washington. We are 
pleased that Son Sann is in Washington 
again and that he will be meeting with 
the Secretary this afternoon. We look 
forward to continuing our contacts with 
Prince Sihanouk during his upcoming 
visit to the United States. We will con- 
tinue our political and humanitarian sup- 
port for the coalition, but we do not plan 
to offer military aid to the coalition or 
any of its members. We do not provide 
aid of any kind or have any contact with 
the Khmer Rouge, and our welcoming of 
the coalition does not imply any support 
for the Khmer Rouge. 

The coalition has greatly enhanced 
international support for ASEAN's 
strategy on Kampuchea. Last year at 
the UN General Assembly, the ASEAN- 
sponsored resolution calling for the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces and in- 
ternationally supervised elections was 
adopted by 105 votes to 29. The United 
States joined the majority which in- 
cluded most nonaligned nations. We 
believe that ASEAN is again in a strong 
position to manage the Kampuchean 
debate in New York, and we will work 
with ASEAN to support moves designed 
to achieve a settlement. 

UN Credentials 

At every General Assembly since 1979, 
the Vietnamese or their supporters have 
challenged the credentials of the Demo- 
cratic Kampuchean delegation. Hanoi's 
ultimate objective is to seat its client 
Heng Samrin regime. In each case, the 
challenge has been defeated easily 
through the efforts of the ASEAN 
governments supported by much of 



Western Europe and the nonaligned 
world, the United States, and Japan. 
The United States will again support 
ASEAN's position in favor of continuing 
to accredit the Democratic Kampuchean 
delegation. 

Our stand remains based on the 
technical ground that Democratic Kam- 
puchea has been accepted as a member 
of the United Nations since its assump- 
tion of power in 1975. Having accepted 
Democratic Kampuchea, the United Na- 
tions can withdraw those credentials 
only if there is a superior claimant to 
the seat. There is no superior claimant 
to the Kampuchean seat. The Heng 
Samrin regime is certainly not a 
superior claimant. It was installed in 
Phnom Penh and is maintained there 
solely by the force of Vietnamese arms. 
Seating representatives of the Heng 
Samrin regime would indicate interna- 
tional acceptance of a government im- 
posed by a foreign aggressor in violation 
of the UN Charter and in defiance of the 
General Assembly. U.S. support for 
Democratic Kampuchea's UN credentials 
does not imply recognition of Demo- 
cratic Kampuchea or support for the 
Khmer Rouge, whose gross misrule and 
atrocities we continue to abhor. 

The Future 

We see no prospects for an early settle- 
ment of the problem of Kampuchea. 
Vietnam has made tactical moves in an 
effort to appear flexible but remains in- 
transigent on the key issues. Hanoi's 
proposals for regional talks have sought 
to gain acceptance of Vietnam's position 
in Kampuchea and recognition for the 
regime installed by Hanoi in Phnom 
Penh. In addition, Vietnam has sought 
to project itself as spokesman for the In- 
dochina bloc. All of these moves are 
designed to support Hanoi's objective of 
an Indochina dominated by Vietnam and 
subservient to its interests. Ultimately, 
Hanoi seeks to establish an Indochinese 
federation. Vietnam has turned aside all 
ASEAN proposals, including an ASEAN 
offer to meet the Vietnamese in Hanoi if 
Vietnam withdrew its forces in Kam- 
puchea 30 kilometers from the Thai 
border. 

Hanoi continues to deny, in fact, 
that there is a Kampuchean problem. 
ASEAN's legitimate security concerns 
are dismissed as border issues amenable 
to resolution through bloc-to-bloc talks 



November 1983 



37 



ECONOMICS 



between ASEAN and the Indochinese 
states. Such an approach is designed to 
draw ASEAN into open-ended talks 
about peace and security in Southeast 
Asia, talks which would serve to grant 
implicit recognition to the Heng Samrin 
regime. Hanoi continues to reject the 
UN Kampuchea conference principles, 
which are supported by a large majority 
of the world's nations. Such an approach 
ignores the fundamental cause of in- 
stability in Southeast Asia— Vietnam's 
occupation of Kampuchea. 

We can expect to see more tactical 
moves by Vietnam, but so far we have 
not seen any genuine willingness on 
Vietnam's part to seek a settlement in 
Kampuchea which would restore Khmer 
self-determination. We, like ASEAN, re- 
main convinced that a political settle- 
ment will be possible only once Vietnam 
realizes the disastrous results its policies 
have produced. Only a change in Hanoi's 
policy will reconcile Vietnam's interests 
with those of its neighbors and bring 
peace to the region. Until then the inter- 
national community must continue to 
maintain the pressure on Vietnam. 

The view from Hanoi, then, cannot 
be encouraging. Vietnam faces a long- 
term struggle in Kampuchea. Its client 
regime is a failure, and popular dissatis- 
faction is rising at Vietnam's treatment 
of Kampuchea as a colony. The Viet- 
namese economy is suffering from mis- 
management and the burden of a 
foreign war. Hanoi is at odds with its 
most powerful neighbor, China, and with 
the nations of ASEAN. It is isolated in- 
ternationally and almost wholly depend- 
ent on Soviet support and assistance. 
Only a settlement of the problem in 
Kampuchea which allows that unhappy 
country to finally chart its own course is 
consistent with Vietnam's own long-term 
interests. 



International Investment Policy 



■The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from tne Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 9, 1983 1 

I am releasing a major statement on in- 
ternational investment. This statement 
was developed by my Senior Inter- 
departmental Group on International 
Economic Policy, chaired by Treasury 
Secretary Regan, and encompasses the 
views of this Administration on interna- 
tional investment. 

The last time such a policy paper 
was released was in July of 1977 — more 
than 6 years ago. Since then, we have 
come to view international investment 
which responds to market forces as a 
vital and necessary ingredient in a 
stable, growing world economy. 

A world with strong foreign invest- 
ment flows is the opposite of a zero-sum 
game. We believe there are only win- 
ners, no losers, and all participants gain 
from it. 

International investment flows 
significantly affect the United States 
and world economies. With the current 
environment of widespread international 
debt problems, foreign direct investment 
flows take on increased importance. As 
the preeminent home and host country 
for foreign direct investment, we have a 
substantial interest in the conditions 
under which those flows occur. 

The statement I am releasing enun- 
ciates the fundamental premise of our 
policy — that foreign investment flows 
which respond to private market forces 
will lead to more efficient international 
production and thereby benefit both 
home and host countries. 

It also highlights three other impor- 
tant points: first, our concern with the 
increasing use of governmental 
measures to distort or impede interna- 
tional investment flows; secondly, our 
strong support for the concept of na- 
tional treatment which extends to 
foreign direct investors in the United 
States; and finally, an enumeration of 
specific multilateral and bilateral steps 
the Administration has taken, and will 
take, to help liberalize international in- 
vestment flows. 

A free and open international invest- 
ment climate will play a key role not 
only in sustaining our own economic 



recovery here at home but also in resolv- 
ing many of the current international 
debt problems. 



INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
POLICY STATEMENT 1 



Executive Summary 

International direct investment plays a vital 
and expanding role in the world economy. To 
ensure its maximum contribution to both 
global and domestic economic well-being, the 
United States believes that international 
direct investment flows should be determined 
by private market forces and should receive 
non-discriminatory treatment consistent with 
the national treatment principle. 

The United States welcomes foreign 
direct investment that flows according to 
market forces. The United States accords 
foreign investors the same fair, equitable, 
and non-discriminatory treatment it believes 
all governments should accord foreign direct 
investment under international law. 

The United States opposes continued and 
increasing government intervention that im- 
pedes or distorts investment flows or at- 
tempts to shift artificially the benefits of 
these flows. These measures include trade- 
related or other performance requirements, 
fiscal or financial incentives, and 
discriminatory treatment of foreign invest- 
ment. 

To counter such measures, the United 
States will pursue an active international in- 
vestment policy aimed at reducing foreign 
government actions that impede or distort in- 
vestment flows and at developing an interna- 
tional system, based on national treatment 
and most-favored-nation principles, that per- 
mits investment flows to respond more freely 
to market forces. The United States will 
work to protect U.S. investment abroad from 
treatment which is discriminatory or other- 
wise inconsistent with international law 
standards. Under international law, no U.S. 
investment should be expropriated unless the 
taking is done for a public purpose, is ac- 
complished under due process of law, is non- 
discriminatory, does not violate previous con- 
tractual arrangements, and is accompanied 
by prompt, adequate, and effective compensa- 
tion. 

In carrying out its international invest- 
ment policy, in multilateral institutions, the 
United States will continue to: 

• encourage OECD [Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development] 
member governments to adhere to, 
strengthen, and extend OECD investment 
and capital liberalization instruments; 

• explore ways of extending the prin- 
ciples embodied in the OECD instruments to 
non-OECD countries; 

• support efforts to increase awareness 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



ECONOMICS 



of the extent and adverse effects of govern- 
ment intervention in order to build a global 
political consensus to reduce such interven- 
tion; 

• work toward increased recognition of 
intellectual property rights; 

• work in the OECD to examine invest- 
ment problems that affect the service in- 
dustries, recognizing that for these sectors 
the opportunity to do business in foreign 
countries is dependent, in many respects, on 
the ability to establish foreign operations that 
are governed by discriminatory investment 
rules; 

• work in the OECD for a "data pledge" 
which would assure that no new barrier to 
data flows will be imposed by developed 
countries and encourage all countries to join 
in adopting more open and liberal policies on 
transborder flows; 

• work to ensure that any technology 
transfers which occur are carried out on a 
sound commercial basis subject to national 
security and foreign policy considerations; 

• encourage the multilateral banks to ex- 
plore ways to strengthen the private sector 
role in facilitating financial flows to the 
developing world; 

• support investor access to third-party 
arbitration to settle investment disputes. 

In its relations with individual countries, 
the United States will: 

• provide services and assistance to 
American investors abroad and offer the full 
support necessary to ensure that their in- 
vestments are treated in accordance with 
standards of international law; 

• seek to ensure that the provisions of 
U.S. Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation 
treaties and bilateral investment treaties and 
agreements are fully observed; 

• seek to conclude bilateral investment 
treaties and agreements with interested coun- 
tries; 

• explore other appropriate ways to sup- 
port private direct investment in developing 
countries; 

• reserve the right to take action against 
the use of performance requirements and 
similar policies, consistent with international 
obligations. The United States will also exer- 
cise its rights under existing international 
agreements. 

The United States believes that a com- 
bination of multilateral and bilateral efforts 
will contribute to a more open global climate 
for investment and thus enhance the pros- 
pects for economic growth in the United 
States and globally. 



U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY 
ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 

I. Setting 

The United States believes that international 
direct private investment plays a vital and 
expanding role in the U.S. and world 
economies. It can act as a catalyst for 
growth, introduce new technology and 



management skills, expand employment, and 
improve productivity. Foreign direct invest- 
ment can be an important source of capital 
and can stimulate international trade. Both 
home and host country economies benefit 
from an open international investment 
system. 

International direct investment can pro- 
vide particular benefits to developing coun- 
tries. Foreign investment capital can help to 
expand the domestic resource base, augment- 
ing locally generated investment and foreign 
concessional flows. Foreign direct investment 
may be of particular value to developing 
countries in that it contributes to domestic 
productive capacity without increasing the 
debt service burden. Further, developing 
countries may look to foreign direct invest- 
ment to create new employment oppor- 
tunities and to provide needed managerial 
and technical skills that cannot be gained 
through foreign trade. 

Under present circumstances, however, 
international direct investment is being 
prevented from making its full contribution 
to global economic growth. While the current 
world trade and monetary systems (as em- 
bodied in the GATT [General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade] and the IMF [Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund] developed after World 
War II remain an important foundation for 
the long-term growth and prosperity of the 
world economy, there unfortunately exists no 
comparable system for international direct in- 
vestment. There has been inadequate collec- 
tive restraint on widespread and distortive in- 
terventions by both developed and developing 
governments, attempting to control the flow 
of foreign direct investment and the benefits 
associated with it. While the effects of in- 
tervention are difficult to quantify, the im- 
pact can be negative for home, host, and 
third countries because intervention distorts 
international investment and trade flows, 
thereby preventing the most efficient alloca- 
tion of resources. 

Useful attempts have been made to ad- 
dress the problem, particularly in the OECD, 
but progress has been slow. The inability to 
arrive at an international consensus on these 
issues has created pressures in many coun- 
tries, including the United States, to abandon 
more traditional economic policies based on 
market forces and to move toward still 
greater government intervention. 

In light of these developments, it is im- 
portant that there be a clear understanding 
both at home and abroad of U.S. policies with 
respect to international direct investment 
issues and how the United States intends to 
implement these policies. 



II. U.S. Policy Precepts 

The United States believes that an open in- 
ternational investment system responding to 
market forces provides the best and most ef- 
ficient mechanism to promote global 
economic development. Government interven- 
tion in the international allocation of invest- 
ment resources can retard economic growth. 



The United States has consistently 
welcomed foreign direct investment in this 
country. Such investment provides substan- 
tial benefits to the United States. Therefore, 
the United States fosters a domestic 
economic climate which is conducive to in- 
vestment. We provide foreign investors fair, 
equitable, and non-discriminatory treatment 
under our laws and regulations. We maintain 
exceptions to such treatment only as are 
necessary to protect our security and related 
interests and which are consistent with our 
international legal obligations. 

The United States believes that U.S. 
direct investment abroad should also receive 
fair, equitable, and non-discriminatory treat- 
ment, consistent with international law stand- 
ards. The basic tenet for treatment of invest- 
ment is the national treatment principle: 
foreign investors should be treated no less 
favorably than domestic investors in like 
situations. Exceptions should be limited to 
those required to protect national security 
and related interests. In these cases, foreign 
direct investment should be accorded treat- 
ment consistent with the most-favored-nation 
principle. 

The United States opposes the use of 
government practices which distort, restrict, 
or place unreasonable burdens on direct in- 
vestment. These include such measures as 
trade-related or other performance re- 
quirements (such as local content, minimum 
export, and local equity requirements), fiscal 
or financial incentives. Interference with the 
market mechanism can cause serious distor- 
tions in trade and investment flows, en- 
courage the retaliatory use of similar 
measures by other governments, and 
precipitate a downward spiral in global in- 
vestment flows. The United States intends to 
continue its efforts to reduce or eliminate 
measures that restrict, distort, or place un- 
due burdens on international direct invest- 
ment flows. In this regard, the United States 
will make a particular effort to prevent the 
introduction by other countries of new 
measures of this type. Moreover, the United 
States will continue to attempt to deal with 
this issue on a multilateral basis, although 
non-multilateral approaches may be ap- 
propriate on a case-by-case basis. 

The United States will continue to work 
for the reduction or elimination of 
unreasonable and discriminatory barriers to 
entry of investment. The United States 
believes that foreign investors should be able 
to make the same kinds of investment, under 
the same conditions, as nationals of the host 
country. Exceptions should be limited to 
areas of legitimate national security concern 
or related interests. Because establishment 
questions are not adequately covered in ex- 
isting multilateral instruments relating to in- 
vestment, the United States will encourage 
broader exploration, identification, and 
discussion of these issues in the OECD and 
elsewhere. 

The United States is particularly concern- 
ed with foreign investment rules that prohibit 
service industries from doing business 



November 1983 



39 



ECONOMICS 



abroad. Service sectors are among the most 
dynamic in today's economy, but there exists 
a number of limitations that inhibit export 
opportunities. For many service sectors, 
there is a universal requirement of establish- 
ment in host countries, with the competitive 
success of these industries heavily dependent 
upon the presence of branches to meet 
peculiar regulatory requirements. Thus, the 
investment policies of foreign countries have 
special importance to the service sectors. 

The United States recognizes that inter- 
national direct investment frequently serves 
as a vehicle for transfer of technology and 
can benefit the economic development goals 
of both home and host countries. Technology 
transfers should be carried on a sound com- 
mercial basis, subject to national security and 
foreign policy considerations. 

The United States places high priority on 
the protection of U.S. investment abroad 
from discriminatory treatment, or treatment 
which is inconsistent with international law 
standards. Under international law, no U.S. 
investment should be expropriated unless the 
taking (a) is done for a public purpose; (b) is 
accomplished under due process of law; (c) is 
non-discriminatory; (d) does not violate any 
previous contractual arrangements between 
the national or company concerned and the 
government making the expropriation; (e) is 
accompanied by prompt, adequate, and effec- 
tive compensation. 

III. General U.S. Objectives 

The United States accords foreign investors 
open access to investment opportunities. 
What we seek is similar access for United 
States investors abroad. A major objective of 
our international investment policy is accept- 
ance of the national treatment principle. 
In addition, the United States seeks to: 

• strengthen multilateral and bilateral 
discipline over government actions which af- 
fect investment decisions, such as incentives 
and performance requirements, particularly 
when such actions distort international trade 
and investment flows; 

• reduce unreasonable and discrim- 
inatory barriers to establishment; 

• create, through cooperation among 
developed and developing nations, an interna- 
tional environment in which direct invest- 
ment can make a greater contribution to the 
development process; 

• foster a domestic economic climate in 
the United States which is conducive to in- 
vestment, ensure that foreign investors 
receive fair and equitable treatment under 
our statutes and regulations, and maintain 
only those safeguards on foreign investment 
which are necessary to protect our security 
and related interests and which are consist- 
i'iit with our international legal obligations. 

IV. Multilateral 

The United States will: 

• continue to adhere to the OECD In- 
vestment Declaration and related Decisions 



on national treatment, international invest- 
ment incentives and disincentives, and 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises as 
adopted in 1976 and reviewed in 1979. We 
also adhere to the OECD Code of Liberaliza- 
tion of Capital Movements, adopted in 1961, 
and support its expansion; 

• encourage OECD governments to abide 
by the OECD investment and capital 
liberalization instruments and to strengthen 
and extend these instruments through 
broader extension of the principle of national 
treatment and the right of establishment; 

• explore ways of extending the prin- 
ciples embodied in the OECD instruments to 
non-OECD countries. To increase the effec- 
tiveness of these instruments on a global 
basis, the developing countries, and in par- 
ticular the newly industrialized countries, 
need to be brought into any multilateral 
understanding on investment; 

• support efforts to increase awareness 
of the extent and adverse effects that 
government intervention, e.g., through per- 
formance requirements, can have on the U.S. 
and world economies. This is essential in 
order to reduce the predatory use of such 
measures, and especially to limit the introduc- 
tion of new measures and the expansion of 
existing measures. The United States will en- 
courage and actively participate in continued 
work in multilateral institutions to address 
these questions; 

• encourage adherence by all countries to 
the Paris Convention for the Protection of In- 
dustrial Property and enactment of effective 
industrial property laws, guaranteeing 
recognition of patent, copyright, and other in- 
dustrial property rights. These are essential 
for the flow of foreign direct investment into 
both developed and developing countries. The 
lack of adequate property rights is a major 
disincentive to investment in manufacturing 
facilities and research and development and 
to the transfer of technologies. The Paris 
Convention for Industrial Property Protec- 
tion is currently undergoing revision under 
the auspices of the World Intellectual Proper- 
ty Organization. The United States will sup- 
port continued efforts aimed at improving 
protection of industrial property rights, fight 
to maintain current protection levels where 
they are adequate and to upgrade protection 
where it is inadequate, and work to ensure 
that such principles are upheld in negotia- 
tions of codes relating to transfer of 
technology and transnational corporations 
which are now underway in the U.N.; 

• continue to work in the OECD for a 
"data pledge" which would assure that no 
new barriers to data flow will be imposed by 
developed countries and encourage all coun- 
tries to join in adopting more open and liberal 
policies on transborder data flows; 

• encourage adherence to the Code of 
Capital Movements and support its expan- 
sion; 

• support the multilateral development 
banks in their efforts to foster more rapid 
economic growth in the developing countries. 
The United States will continue to encourage 
the Banks to explore ways to develop new 



programs to strengthen the private sector 
role in financial flows to the developing 
world; 

• support investor access to third-party 
arbitration to settle investment disputes, such 
as the facilities of the World Bank's Interna- 
tional Centre for the Settlement of Invest- 
ment Disputes. The United States believes 
that governments should effectively support 
investor access by adherence to the Conven- 
tion of the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States or the Inter-American Conven- 
tion on International Commercial Arbitration, 
and by evidencing their commitment to be 
bound by third-country arbitral awards by 
adhering to the Convention of the Recogni- 
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards 

V. In its bilateral relations, the United 
States: 

• in cases of expropriation or nationaliza- 
tion of American investment abroad, will pro- 
vide full support for American investors to 
ensure that standards of international law 
are honored by host governments; 

• will provide appropriate facilitative 
services to assist American investors 
overseas and, in particular, will assist them in 
obtaining information on the host country in- 
vestment climate, economic objectives, and 
investment opportunities; 

• will work to ensure that the relevant 
provisions of our Friendship, Commerce, and 
Navigation treaties are fully observed; 

• as a means to facilitate and protect 
American investment, will seek to conclude 
bilateral investment treaties and agreements 
with interested countries. The treaties will 
contain appropriate provisions on, inter alia, 
treatment of existing and new investment (in- 
cluding national treatment and most-favored- 
nation treatment); transfers; dispute settle- 
ment; use of performance requirements; and 
compensation in the event of expropriation; 

• will explore, through our bilateral 
economic assistance programs with develop- 
ing countries, appropriate ways to increase 
non-official flows and will seek to ensure that 
these programs effectively support private 
direct investment; 

• reserves the right to take unilateral ac- 
tion against the use of performance re- 
quirements and similar policies, consistent 
with our international obligations. The United 
States is now exercising and will continue to 
exercise its rights under existing interna- 
tional arrangements, including the GATT and 
OECD. 

The United States believes that a com- 
bination of multilateral and bilateral efforts 
will contribute to the achievement of a more 
open global climate for investment and thus 
enhance the prospects for economic growth in 
the United States and globally. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 12, 1983. 



40 



Department of State Bulletin 



ECONOMICS 



Protecting the World Economy 



W. Allen Wallis 

Address before the Business Council 
of New York in New York City on Oc- 
tober 1, 1983. Mr. Wallis is Under 
Secretary for Economic Affairs. 

It is a pleasure to be here in New York 
with so many old friends and familiar 
faces. Today, I want to develop two 
ideas with you. First, since the world 
economy is not in good health, I want to 
look back at the economic policies of the 
recent past and try to diagnose the 
causes of the illness in order to draw 
conclusions about various remedies that 
are being prescribed. We will find that 
our policies failed us, not our institutions 
or our system. Second, I want to explore 
in some depth the case for protec- 
tionism. There are simply too many 
fundamental errors and misunderstand- 
ings about protectionism that are ac- 
cepted widely as gospel truth, and too 
many truths that are ignored. 

Where Are We and 
How Did We Get Here? 

Governments are trying to cope with a 
prolonged recession; high unemploy- 
ment; falling rates of inflation, which 
have not yet restored price stability; and 
the increasing fragility of the financial 
structure of the world. Some are propos- 
ing or are being forced toward the 
policies that got them into their present 
troubles in the first place, namely infla- 
tion, and protection for inefficient in- 
dustries. 

To understand what is wrong with 
these ideas, it is necessary to under- 
stand how the present state of affairs 
came about. This means focusing on the 
market-oriented industrial economies, in- 
cluding the United States. Not only has 
their performance deteriorated most 
sharply, but because they are both the 
principal lenders and the principal 
markets for the world economy, their 
deterioration has infected the whole 
world. 

The difficulties in which the in- 
dustrial economies find themselves are, 
fundamentally, a consequence of political 
overcommitment. At least as long ago as 
the 1960s, and in most cases far earlier, 
governments made commitments to full 
employment, to job security, to social 
welfare, and to defense expenditures 
which could not all be fulfilled. Inflation 



was the principal way of reconciling the 
incompatible claims on resources. Infla- 
tionary erosion of nominal wages by in- 
flation, thereby reducing real wages, 
was the technique for securing full 
employment. 

Commitments to full employment 
virtually removed constraints on wage 
bargaining. When inflation failed to 
maintain full employment because of 
distortions in the labor market, a host of 
direct interventions were introduced— 
protection against foreign competition, 
subsidies to "sensitive" industries, job- 
security legislation. All of this delayed 
necessary readjustments and made them 
even more difficult. 

In some countries, fixed rates of ex- 
change for foreign currencies masked 
the consequences of inflation. Resources 
were borrowed from abroad while infla- 
tion was exported. This veil was 
stripped away with the collapse in the 
early 1970s of the "Bretton Woods 
system" of fixed rates of exchange. The 
rise in oil prices in 1973-74 stripped 
away another veil. Where labor markets, 
in particular, and economies as a whole 
did not adjust, growth could not return 
to earlier levels. The rise in oil prices 
made everybody sensitive to inflation. 

An essential feature of the infla- 
tionary "mask" was that it permitted 
negative real rates of interest— rates of 
interest less than the rate of inflation. 
This helped to maintain economic activi- 
ty, though in very inefficient ways, by 
stimulating labor-saving investments. 

Negative real rates of interest 
spurred an explosion of borrowing, led 
not so much by the developing countries 
as by governments of developed market- 
oriented economies. The fact that the 
current international debt problem is 
centered on developing countries should 
not obscure the fact that overindebted- 
ness is a general phenomenon. House- 
holds, firms, local governments, and cen- 
tral governments— in developed and 
developing countries alike— went in- 
creasingly into debt. Almost everywhere 
government deficits rose as a proportion 
of GNP (gross national product). The ac- 
cumulated deficit of the public sector in 



the United States from 1973 to 1982 
amounted to some $460 billion. The 
government deficits of all the member 
countries of the OECD [Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment] over the same 10 years, totaled 
about a trillion-and-a-quarter dollars. 

Inflation damaged economic efficien- 
cy and confused the price system. But 
still more inflation was needed to mask 
the inability of governments to meet 
their commitments. The resulting 
deterioration in economic performance 
led to more and more intervention and 
created an addiction to the inflationary 
policies which were at once a cause and 
a temporary palliative of the underlying 
disease. 

In brief, there has been a vicious cir- 
cle from political commitments to infla- 
tion to economic distortions to further 
commitments to further inflation. The 
oil-price rise exposed the extent of the 
problem, but the concomitant price ex- 
plosion continued to veil its severity. By 
the end of the 1970s, a correction was 
long overdue if the inflationary spiral 
was not to get totally out of hand. 

In February 1981 the new Reagan 
Administration unveiled its program for 
economic recovery. Let me quote a few 
key points from that program. 

Today the Administration is proposing a 
national recovery plan to reverse the debili- 
tating combination of sustained inflation and 
economic distress which continues to face the 
American economy. Were we to stay with ex- 
isting policies, the results would be readily 
predictable: a rising government presence in 
the economy, more inflation, stagnating pro- 
ductivity, and higher unemployment. Indeed, 
there is reason to fear that if we remain on 
this course, our economy may suffer even 
more calamitously. . . . 

The plan is based on sound expenditure, 
tax, regulatory, and monetary policies. It 
seeks properly functioning markets, free play 
of wages and prices, reduced government 
spending and borrowing, a stable and reliable 
monetary framework, and reduced govern- 
ment barriers to risk-taking and enterprise. 
This agenda for the future recognizes that 
sensible policies which are consistently ap- 
plied can release the strength of the private 
sector, improve economic growth, and reduce 
inflation. . . . 

The plan consists of four parts: (1) a 
substantial reduction in the growth of 
Federal expenditures; (2) a significant reduc- 
tion in Federal tax rates; (3) prudent relief of 
Federal regulatory burdens; and (4) a mone- 
tary policy on the part of the independent 
Federal Reserve System which is consistent 
with those policies. These four comple- 
mentary policies form an integrated and com- 
prehensive program. 

The disinflation that occurred soon 
after the President's program was intro- 
duced revealed that the maladjustments 



November 1983 



41 



ECONOMICS 



were even more serious than the Presi- 
dent had said. Disinflation, created pains 
of its own, because of the slowness with 
which expectations, and especially ex- 
pectations of inflation, change. 

The correction of the errors of the 
1970s acted like the blades of a pair of 
scissors. One blade was the recession 
which lowered the nominal yield on 
assets. The other blade was the rise in 
the cost of borrowing which further 
squeezed the return on capital. There 
was thus a large potential for corporate 
and individual bankruptcies and also for 
severe problems in servicing the debts of 
governments. 

It is sometimes suggested that the 
problem with these debts is that now 
they cannot be repaid. But there is no 
more reason for poor countries suddenly 
to move into current-account surpluses 
than for the United States (or, for that 
matter, a corporation) to liquidate its 
debt. The problem is not the debt but 
the income to service it. The problem is 
to ensure continued confidence in the 
capacity of borrowers to service debt 
and thereby justify both the refinancing 
of existing obligations and a continuing 
net inflow of resources. 

It is not possible to determine what 
proportion of existing debt is un- 
salvageable and what proportion of ex- 
isting enterprises face liquidation— or, as 
one banker put it, what part can be 
handled by rescheduling and what part 
must be handled by reserves. The out- 
come depends in large part on the sort 
of economic recovery that now occurs. If 
the real assets that were financed by the 
debt fail to earn adequate returns, the 
debt will have to be written down. Even 
if the highest potential return is earned, 
some such writing-down may be 
necessary where there were major 
mistakes. 



Remedies: False and True 

Where there is illness there are quacks. 
At present there are two types of 
economic quacks. The less sophisticated 
prescribe protection; the more sophisti- 
cated prescribe coordinated reflation. 

Only a few advocates of protection 
really believe that it will resolve the 
problems of their countries. Most simply 
consider it a political necessity in the 
short term, which in the long term will 
be obviated by economic recovery. In 
fact, locking resources into inefficient 
activities compounds maladjustment and 
creates uncertainty that erodes willing- 
ness to make long-term investments. 
Equally important, protection threatens 
the security of many of the investments 
and, therefore, the debt of developing 



countries. Thus each act of protection, 
including subsidies to inefficient in- 
dustry, makes recovery less likely and 
further deterioration more probable. 

The more sophisticated recommend 
reflation. They argue that it is the at- 
tempt to lower inflation which is at the 
root of current difficulties. This is to 
mistake the cure for the disease. The 
cure is painful, but its postponement can 
bring only temporary relief, if that. Ag- 
gregate demand continues to expand 
rapidly. The trouble is that costs— espec- 
ially labor costs— rise as well. There can 
be no reasonable hope that a large part 
of increased monetary demand will go in 
the long term into production rather 
than into prices. Any such rise in infla- 
tion, however, will create further agony 
in the longer term when, once again, 
policy is directed to lower inflation. 
Reflation is the easy way to deal with 
the symptoms of a disease created by 
taking the easy way. 

But quacks, fortunately, are by no 
means the only policymakers today. To 
get out of the vicious circle it is 
necessary to get at the root of the prob- 
lems while, at the same time, dealing 
with the inevitable short-term disruption 
that will result from the disappointment 
of past expectations. 

Economic recovery demands a 
stable, or predictable, institutional en- 
vironment that is conducive to efficient 
use of resources. Price relationship must 
once again give valid signals. This, in 
turn, requires monetary stability, which 
is a necessary condition for exchange- 
rate stability. It also requires the reduc- 
tion, and ultimately the elimination, of 
direct price distortions. Effective steps 
to restore the proper functioning of the 
price system begin with foreign trade. 
Much has been accomplished already. 
As President Reagan said last Tuesday 
to the governors of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank group: 

We are working and cooperating to bring 
our individual economies and the world 
economy back to more solid foundations of 
low inflation, personal incentives for saving 
and investment, higher productivity, and 
greater opportunities for our people. ... I 
believe the United States is making real 
progress. Since we took office, we have 
reduced the rate of growth in our Federal 
Government's spending by nearly 40%. We 
have cut inflation dramatically, from 12.4% 
to 2.6% for the last 12 months. The prime in- 
terest rate has been cut nearly in half, from 
21.5% to 11%. Figures released last week 
reveal our gross national product grew at an 
annual rate of almost 10% in the second 
quarter and about 7% is estimated for the 
third. . . . 

As we work together for recovery, we 



must be on guard against storm clouds of 
protectionist pressures building on the 
horizon. At the recent economic summit in 
Williamsburg, my fellow leaders and I re- 
newed our commitment to an open, expand- 
ing world trading system. The Williamsburg 
declaration reads, "We commit ourselves to 
halt protectionism and as recovery proceeds 
to reverse it by dismantling trade barriers." 
Whether such words will prove to be empty 
promises, or symbols of a powerful commit- 
ment, depends on the real day-to-day actions 
which each of our governments take. 

The politicians and bureaucrats who 
would like to postpone liberalization un- 
til some more prosperous time actually 
have two conflicting ideas in their 
minds. They are genuinely convinced of 
the need for binding rules to govern 
trade between countries. Nonetheless, 
with an equal degree of genuine convic- 
tion, they take it as a hard fact of elec- 
toral politics that they cannot afford to 
abide by such rules, for that would mean 
confronting powerful interest groups. 
Hamlet was a man in a similarly torn 
frame of mind, trying to postpone the 
moment when his contradictory passions 
had to be confronted. For politicians the 
denouement has already come. Now they 
have to decide what it is they want to 
preserve. Do they want a "viable" textile 
or steel industry or a viable interna- 
tional financial and trading system? 



An Analysis of Protectionism 

Hopes that recovery will arrest the 
spread of protectionism and make it 
possible to roll back protectionist 
measures entail the danger that time 
will be wasted in waiting for the "right" 
conditions, which may never come. They 
imply that protection has been an 
unavoidable response to rising 
unemployment and that it will recede 
spontaneously as unemployment recedes. 
In reality, of course, protectionist 
pressures were intensifying well before 
the first substantial increase in 
unemployment in 1974. Protectionist 
measures are a serious threat to the 
recovery in progress. Protection is a 
political act— and a popular one. At the 
risk of being called a starry-eyed 
idealist, I want to go through some of 
the arguments for protection and expose 
the economic innards of this political 
animal. I plan to examine protectionism 
as it relates to the balance of payments 
and to employment. 

Protection and the Current Account 

The United States, the first country to 
experience a vigorous recovery, is run- 
ning a substantial and growing current 



42 



Department of State Bulletin 



ECONOMICS 



account deficit. As often happens in such 
circumstances, exporters overseas fear 
that this current account gap may pro- 
voke measures to restrain imports. At 
the same time, the indebted countries, 
faced with increased costs of debt serv- 
ice and a sharply reduced inflow of 
credit, are trying to "make room" for 
debt service in their current accounts by 
placing additional restrictions on im- 
ports. But the belief that commercial 
policy can have more than a temporary 
influence on the current account balance 
is incorrect. 

Trade policy is often discussed in 
terms of individual products. For exam- 
ple, if the tariff on radios is increased, 
imports of radios will decline. A 
generalization of this argument is tempt- 
ing for governments of countries having 
difficulties with their current accounts. 
They argue that changes in the general 
level of import restrictions or of export 
promotion can alter a country's current 
account balance. 

To study the validity of this argu- 
ment and to identify what actually 
determines the current account balance, 
it is necessary to do the analysis on an 
economy-wide basis. If a country has a 
current account deficit, it imports more 
goods and services from the rest of the 
world than it exports. It follows by sim- 
ple accounting that total spending on 
goods and services, foreign and 
domestic, exceeds its total domestic pro- 
duction. The reverse, of course, holds 
for countries with current account 
surpluses. Looked at in this way, the 
cause of the current account imbalance 
is the difference between domestic 
spending and domestic production, or in 
the economist's jargon, the difference 
between domestic investment and 
domestic saving. To reduce the current 
account deficit there must be some com- 
bination of increased saving (i.e., re- 
duced consumption) and reduced invest- 
ment. Put concisely, the relation of a 
country's savings to its investments 
determines the current account balance. 

Since commercial policy has no 
direct or predictable impact on the rela- 
tion of savings to investment, it cannot 
have a predictable influence on the coun- 
try's current account balance. Trade bar- 
riers will alter the pattern of consumer 
spending, but there is no direct impact 
on the level of spending. Similarly, com- 
mercial policy can affect the pattern of 
investment, but it has no necessary im- 
pact on its level since trade restrictions 
that favor some domestic industries do 
so only at the expense of others. 

This analysis reveals that several 
current policy problems, or approaches 



to problems, rest on a misunderstand- 
ing. Additional restrictions on imports 
will not improve the payments position 
of the heavily indebted developing coun- 
tries nor of the industrial countries 
faced with large current account 
deficits. On the contrary, these restric- 
tions introduce further distortions and 
reduce the economic growth generated 
by each unit of investment. Attempts to 
improve the current account by direct 
controls make it even more difficult for 
these countries to earn foreign exchange 
by profitable exports and to attract 
capital resources from abroad. 

A similar misunderstanding lies be- 
hind the concern frequently expressed 
about Japan's current account surplus 
and the corresponding current account 
deficit of the United States. Despite a 
recent decline, Japan's savings ratio re- 
mains well above those of other large 
countries. With Japan's domestic invest- 
ment temporarily at a low level, the ex- 
cess of domestic saving over domestic 
investment is lent out to finance 
expenditure abroad. This makes it possi- 
ble for growth to occur in countries such 
as the United States, with low savings 
and high public deficits, at lower rates 
of inflation and interest than would 
otherwise have been the case. Japan's 
excess saving can flow out only in the 
form of a current account surplus; cor- 
respondingly, the United States can 
receive it only through a current account 
deficit. The present configuration of cur- 
rent accounts of the two countries 
reflects the difference in the relation of 
savings to investment in the two coun- 
tries. 

Protection and Employment 

A common misunderstanding is that a 
current account deficit reflects GNP 
foregone and jobs lost. In the case of the 
United States, the current account 
deficit has widened because of a rising 
level of domestic expenditure and 
employment, accompanied already by 
some decline in unemployment. 

The combination of trade difficulties 
and the recession no doubt increased the 
list of suffering industries and regions. 
Demands for protection against imports 
therefore intensified, not necessarily be- 
cause imports were the chief source of 
the problem but because protection 
seemed to the suffering parties to be the 
easiest solution. A conspicuous example 
of the demand for protection was the 
proposal for domestic-content legisla- 
tion. The worldwide recession gave rise 
to demands for protection in other coun- 
tries as well, demands which were to 
some extent granted. 



During this period of high general 
unemployment, public discussion has 
tended to focus on trade developments 
as a cause of unemployment or on ex- 
port promotion as a way to increase 
employment. Both aspects of the argu- 
ment are invalid because they fail to 
take account of important repercussions 
of what happens in the field of trade. It 
is true that if in the past 3 years U.S. 
exports had been greater, and if nothing 
else had happened, employment in the 
United States might have been larger. 
But it is not possible for U.S. exports to 
be greater and for nothing else to hap- 
pen. Either imports also increase or our 
net foreign balance increases. If imports 
increase there is an obvious offset to the 
employment-creating effect of the ex- 
ports. But if our net foreign balance in- 
creases, there is an interest-raising ef- 
fect, which depresses employment in 
some domestic industries, such as con- 
struction. 

Total employment is governed by 
certain overall features of the 
economy— the money supply, wage 
rates, and the demand for money. Just 
as trade policy affects the pattern of 
consumption, the behavior of exports af- 
fects the distribution of employment 
among industries but need not affect the 
total. The advantage of trade is not that 
it increases total employment but— if the 
trade is free and unsubsidized— that it 
permits us to employ our workers where 
they are most productive. 

Protection and Industrial Policy 

Those who hope that trade will auto- 
matically loosen up with recovery forget 
that the protectionism of the last 15 
years or so has been more ideological 
than pragmatic in origin. It has been a 
logical concomitant of a particular 
perception of the powers and responsi- 
bilities of governments that emphasized 
the importance of protecting existing 
jobs and existing wage levels, even in 
the face of market pressures for struc- 
tural adaptation. It is now generally 
acknowledged that the plight in which 
virtually all national economies find 
themselves is ultimately due to the dis- 
appearance of a common view of the 
world economy. The understanding of it 
as a positive-sum game, which animated 
the long period of prosperity in the 
1950s and 1960s, has been lost. 

An adequate analysis of how that 
came about would require a tome. To 
state it briefly, the principal cause was 
the great expansion of the role of 
economic policy, based on the belief that 
the main responsibility, as well as the 



November 1983 



43 



ECONOMICS 



requisite means, for maintaining full 
employment were with the government. 
As I said earlier, we came to believe 
that in discharging this responsibility, 
the government determined the speed of 
industrial adjustment, the rate of 
growth of the economy, and the com- 
position of industrial output. 

It is now clear that this conception 
vastly overestimated what governments 
could actually do. Moreover, this concep- 
tion was bound to create frictions among 
governments of otherwise friendly na- 
tions. In the last analysis, it is the at- 
tempt to do too much, beyond the actual 
competence of governments, that ex- 
plains stagflation interrupted by uncer- 
tain, asymmetrical recoveries. If govern- 
ments were to move increasingly in this 
direction, the ability of businesses to 
make reasonable plans for the future 
would continue to deteriorate. 

If we want to understand the end 
toward which so-called industrial policies 
are carrying us, there is no need to im- 
agine fictional examples of industrial 
planning. The world market for agricul- 
tural products is a good illustration of 
the international trade consequences of 
national production planning. In 
agriculture, government interference 
with the market mechanism has a long 
history and is the most elaborate. Con- 
siderably more than one-half of world 
trade in agriculture is dependent on 
government subsidies and credits, trans- 
acted in the form of state trading or 
within politically negotiated ar- 
rangements. Indeed, it is fair to say that 
in agriculture an effective international 
price system no longer exists. Is it sur- 
prising that the bitterest commercial 
conflicts among the large industrial 
countries originate in their agricultural 
trade, causing serious harm to the 
smaller agricultural exporting countries? 
The interdependence of agriculture with 
all other sectors of national economies 
ensures that problems in that area 
spread to the other sectors. Thus the 
difficulties arising from the extensive 
use of price supports, subsidies, and 
border measures affecting trade in agri- 
cultural products have contributed to 
problems that have emerged in recent 
years in several areas of industrial 
trade. 

Protection and the Price System 

All the issues that I have discussed point 
to the decisive importance of stabilizing 
the conditions of international trade. It 
need not be Utopian free trade; a 
reasonable concept of liberal trade must 
have key characteristics. 



44 



First, those industries deemed to 
deserve protection will be protective by 
nonprohibitive tariffs which remain 
stable for long periods or move gradual- 
ly downward. 

Second, competition will not be im- 
paired by quantitative restrictions 
("voluntary" or otherwise) or trade-dis- 
torting subsidies. Together with price 
level stability, these conditions are suffi- 
cient to ensure that the price system of 
each national economy will work effi- 
ciently—indeed, that there will be an ef- 
ficient interantional price system signal- 
ing potential scarcities or surpluses any- 
where in the world economy. They can 
thus be anticipated, and corrective 
measures taken in time. The future does 
not have to come in the form of sur- 
prises and upheavals. 

The World Bank's World Develop- 
ment Report 1983 carries a very impor- 
tant study of the way distortions in the 
price system impede growth. It shows 
that the damage is very substantial. 
These findings from an intensive study 
of a large number of developing coun- 
tries apply with equal force to the 
economies of the developed ones. In the 
last 10 or 15 years these distortions 
have multiplied to the extent that one 
may well ask: What remains of the price 
system? 

Government services, now a 
substantial part of total output every- 
where, are clearly not priced by the 
spontaneous interplay of supply and de- 
mand. The bulk of agricultural output is 
marketed at prices or on terms set by 
the political process. Textiles and 
clothing, industries with vigorous inter- 
nal competition, are effectively sheltered 
by a restrictive, quantitative import 
regime. Shipbuilding in several in- 
dustrial countries continues to exist only 
by virtue of subsidies. Energy supply, 
subject to noncompetitive pricing, has 
been a major source of instability. The 
world's most efficient producer of auto- 
mobiles is severely constrained in 
foreign trade. Extensive international 
political negotiations are going on about 
where and under what conditions the 
latest technological innovations will be 
produced. Most services such as trans- 
portation, insurance, and communica- 
tions are both politically regulated and 
protected against competition from im- 
ports. 

In the final analysis, protection, like 
inflation, damages the functioning of the 
price system. When the price system is 
prevented from working, its failures in- 
evitably lead the political system to 
assume ever more lavish discretionary 



authority over economic activity. Slug- 
gish performance leads to promiscuous, 
day-to-day interventions— controls of 
prices; licences to pursue activities; per- 
missions to make and to cultivate, to 
buy and to sell; distributions of 
privileges and exemptions— in short, 
the kind of power most subject to abuse 
and most damaging to real development. 

Reducing obstacles to trade would 
contribute to economic growth and 
financial stabilization. Trade liberaliza- 
tion would demonstrate that it is better 
economic policy, promoting real output 
throughout the world economy. Yet even 
these strictly economic effects must be 
considered, at this stage, as only secon- 
dary benefits. Protection is not of inter- 
national economic origin; it is a domestic 
political issue. Discretionary trade- 
restrictive and trade-distorting measures 
benefit particular industries and interest 
groups at the expense of other in- 
dustries in the same country. They pro- 
tect a particular conception of economic 
policy and a particular form of politics— 
both of which are unsound— the concep- 
tion that consumers, businessmen, and 
financial managers should react to the 
signals of the allegedly "scientific, dis- 
interested" policymakers at the center. 
Once captured by the pressure groups, 
this concept of policy made it easy for 
political commitments, and thus public 
budgets, to escape control. 

The threat to democratic institutions 
cannot be overlooked. Democracy, after 
all, is only a political method of accom- 
modating change without revolution. It 
must, therefore, rely mainly on pro- 
cedural rules. When the state comes to 
be so involved in the processes of the 
society that it becomes the necessary 
support of existing economic and social 
structures, it has become identified with 
the status quo. When it involves itself by 
curtailing liberty, democracy itself is 
curtailed. The basic function of 
democracy— change without upheaval- 
may then become undischargeable. 

A bit earlier in the quotation from 
President Reagan's speech to the IMF, 
there was a reference to the Williams- 
burg economic summit and the commit- 
ment made there to "reverse protec- 
tionism by dismantling trade barriers." 
As we look toward the 1984 summit in 
London, fulfillment of this commitment 
will be a top priority of the Administra- 
tion at home and with our trading part- 
ners. 

I want to thank you for hearing me 
out on a subject that is not simple or 
entertaining but is, I assure you, vital to 
the economy of New York and the 
world. ■ 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



Soviet Downing of 
Civilian Aircraft 



PRESIDENT'S RADIO ADDRESS. 
SEPT. 17, 1983 1 

Five days after the Soviets shot down 
KAL 007, I went on nationwide televi- 
sion to urge that all of us in the Civilized 
world make sure such an atrocity never 
happens again. And I pledged to you 
that night, we would cooperate with 
other countries to improve the safety of 
civil aviation, asking them to join us in 
not accepting the Soviet airline Aeroflot 
as a normal member of the international 
civil air community — not, that is, until 
the Soviets satisfy the cries of humanity 
for justice. 

On Thursday, an American delega- 
tion lead by Lynn Helms, who heads up 
the Federal Aviation Administration, 
went to Montreal for an emergency ses- 
sion of the ICAO, the International Civil 
Aviation Organization. This meeting was 
called at the request of the Republic of 
Korea, and 32 countries are attending. 
The group immediately went to work on 
a resolution to call for an international 
investigation, to deplore this atrocity, 
and to review procedures to prevent 
civilian aircraft from ever being at- 
tacked again. Yesterday, the resolution 
passed by an overwhelming majority. 

The Soviets have not budged. Ap- 
parently, their contempt for the truth 
and for the opinion of the civilized world 
is equaled only by their disdain for 
helpless people like the passengers 
aboard KAL Flight 007. They reserve 
for themselves the right to live by one 
set of rules, insisting everyone else live 
by another. They're supremely confident 
their crime and coverup will soon be 
forgotten, and we'll all be back to 
business as usual. Well, I believe they're 
badly mistaken. This case is far from 
closed. The Soviets' aggression has pro- 
voked a fundamental and long overdue 
reappraisal in countries all over the 
globe. The Soviet Union stands virtually 
alone against the world. 

Good and decent people everywhere 
are coming together, and the world's 
outrage has not diminished. Repercus- 
sions such as that emergency ICAO 
meeting in Montreal are just beginning. 
Take the example of aviation. Canada 



suspended Aeroflot landing rights for 60 
days and froze the signing of an agree- 
ment for Aeroflot refueling at Gander. 
The Canadian Air Traffic Controllers 
Association has withdrawn from a 
longstanding exchange agreement with 
its Soviet counterpart organization. 

The IFALPA— that's the Interna- 
tional Federation of Air Line Pilots 
Associations — declared the U.S.S.R. an 
offending state. It called for its member 
associations to ban all flights to Moscow 
for 60 days, and it called on related in- 
ternational unions and professional 
associations to take similar actions. It 
demanded Soviet guarantees that similar 
attacks will never be repeated, and what 
is most encouraging because it under- 
scores this reappraisal I mentioned, the 
IFALPA promised to consider further 
actions against the Soviets if no such 
guarantees are given. 

Scandinavian Airlines have suspend- 
ed flights within Soviet airspace for 60 
days. Norwegian pilots and air traffic 



Most countries rebuke the Kremlin. Only 
a few of Moscow's dependables stood up 
for its defense. Nonaligned nations are 
looking to the United States for leader- 
ship. I've instructed our Ambassador to 
the U.N., Jeane Kirkpatrick, to sit down 
with them to seek out new areas of 
cooperation. 

In the Congress, both the House and 
the Senate mobilized overwhelming bi- 
partisan support for a resolution of con- 
demnation. Some would have us lash out 
in another way by canceling our grain 
shipments. But that would punish 
American farmers, not the Soviet ag- 
gressors. The most effective, lasting ac- 
tion against their violence and intimida- 
tion — and it's the one action the Soviets 
would welcome least — will be to go for- 
ward with America's program to remain 
strong. 

I'm confident that if enough of you 
at the grassroots make your voices 
heard, we can and will do just that. We 
may not be able to change the Soviets' 
ways, but we can change our attitude 
toward them. We can stop pretending 
they share the same dreams and aspira- 
tions we do. We can start preparing 
ourselves for what John F. Kennedy 
called a long twilight struggle. It won't 



The Soviets have not budged. Apparently, their 
contempt for the truth and for the opinion of the 
civilized world is equaled only by their disdain for 
helpless people like the passengers aboard KAL 
Flight 007. 



controllers are boycotting all air service 
between Norway and the Soviet Union. 
With the exception of France, Greece, 
and Turkey, all the NATO nations and 
Japan have temporarily suspended civil 
air traffic between their respective na- 
tions and the Soviet Union. Even 
neutral Switzerland and pilots in Finland 
have joined the general boycott. 
Australia and New Zealand are also tak- 
ing strong measures in the area of civil 
aviation. 

In the United Nations, the Security 
Council voted a resolution deploring the 
Soviet attack, forcing the Soviets to cast 
their veto to block its adoption. Here, 
too, we're seeing evidence that a fun- 
damental reappraisal is in the works. 



be quick, it won't make headlines, and it 
sure won't be easy, but it's what we 
must do to keep America strong, keep it 
free, and yes, preserve the peace for our 
children and for our children's children. 
This is the most enduring lesson of 
the Korean Air Lines massacre. If we 
grasp it, then history will say this 
tragedy was a major turning point, 
because this time the world did not go 
back to business as usual. 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 22, 1983 2 

I would like, on behalf of the President, 
to thank the OAS [Organization of 
American States] member countries for 
their extraordinary support regarding 



November 1983 



45 



EUROPE 



the Korean Air Lines tragedy, which 
they expressed at the OAS Permanent 
Council meeting yesterday. As the Presi- 
dent has often said, there is far more 
that unites us in this hemisphere than 
could ever divide us, and the demonstra- 
tion of this was never plainer than at 
yesterday's OAS Permanent Council 
meeting. 

The unanimous message of con- 
dolence, and the deploring of this act by 
all 24 OAS Permament Representatives 
present at the meeting, reconfirms our 
belief that terror and indiscriminate use 
of force will not go unchallenged by the 
nations of the Western Hemisphere. 
This unanimous sign of compassion by 
the OAS members makes us confident 
that the world has learned a bitter 
lesson from this tragedy. 

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 28, 1983 3 

I am grateful to the Congress for its 
swift response to my request that it pass 
a joint resolution condemning the Soviet 
crime of shooting down a Korean 
airliner with 269 innocent persons on 
board. The strength of the joint resolu- 
tion and the unanimity with which it was 
adopted will make clear to the Soviet 
Union that the American people are 
united in their condemnation of this 
dreadful act and in their demand that 
the Soviet Union take full responsibility 
for its action and publicly agree to take 
necessary measures to ensure this 
tragedy is not repeated. In its passage 
of the defense authorization bill the 
same day as this joint resolution, the 
Congress has backed up its expression 
of outrage with a firm statement of 
American resolve. 

I am proud to affix my signature to 
this joint resolution. 



Eastern Mediterranean and U.S. 
National Security 



'Broadcast from Camp David (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents of Sept. 26, 1983). 

2 Made by the principal deputy press 
secretary to the President Larry Speakes 
(text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Sept. 26). 

'Text from White House press release. ■ 



by Richard R. Burt 

Address as prepared for delivery 
before the American Hellenic Educa- 
tional Progressive Association (AHEPA) 
Convention in Chicago, Illinois, on 
August 11, 1983. Mr. Burt is Assistant, 
Secretary for European and Canadian 
Affairs. 

It is a great pleasure to be with you this 
evening and share this celebration of 
Hellenic heritage. AHEPA's splendid 
gift for the restoration of the Statue of 
Liberty and the immigrant museum on 
Ellis Island is a fitting tribute to the vi- 
sion and courage of Greek Americans. 

I am pleased to be able to talk to 
you this evening about the policies of the 
Reagan Administration. I expect that 
many of you are anxious to hear about 
our policies toward the Eastern Mediter- 
ranean—Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. 
But as these can only be understood in 
their larger global context, please bear 
with me as I sketch this larger picture. 

President Reagan was elected — with 
the votes of many of you — because he 
stood for reviving the American 
economy, strengthening the nation's 
security, restoring respect for America, 
and promoting order and peaceful 
changes around the world. His record in 
office testifies to his commitment to 
these goals. The Reagan Administration 
has succeeded in laying the foundation 
for successful policies at home and 
abroad. 

Indeed, we have made some remark- 
able progress. Inflation in the United 
States has plunged. The prime rate has 
been cut by about half. Economic output 
increased nearly 9% in the last quarter. 
Unemployment, although unacceptably 
high, is coming down. There need be no 
doubt about the depth and durability of 
the recovery. Nor should there be any 
doubt about the Administration's com- 
mitment to lowering unemployment and 
decreasing the national debt. 

Strengthening National Security 

Strengthening the nation's security is 
also a principal goal of the Reagan Ad- 
ministration. As you know, President 



Reagan has begun a major effort to 
modernize our military forces. We have 
gone ahead with development of the 
B-1B bomber and the MX missile. We 
are strengthening NATO's conventional 
and nuclear forces. In 1982 alone, 
defense spending increased more than 
7% in real terms. 

But national security rests on more 
than arms. Arms control constitutes an 
essential dimension of our security. 
Nothing is more important to this Ad- 
ministration than a realistic arms con- 
trol policy. Our objective is not simply to 
reduce the likelihood of war but to 
negotiate arms control agreements that 
provide for real reductions, equality, 
verifiability, and enhanced stability. 

Arms control, in turn, is but one ele- 
ment of our relationship with the Soviet 
Union. That relationship touches virtual- 
ly every aspect of our international in- 
volvement. As a result, our dialogue is 
extensive. We seek real progress not 
only on arms control but in human 
rights and regional problems. We seek 
an improved relationship but on a 
reciprocal and realistic basis. We seek 
progress in deeds not simply words. We 
are encouraged by signs of Soviet will- 
ingness to act responsibly and would 
welcome more. 

The United States has a global 
foreign policy which reflects worldwide 
responsibilities. The Reagan Administra- 
tion has stressed American commitment 
to relieve repression in Poland. We are 
working toward a settlement in southern 
Africa and are pledged to seek the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from 
Lebanon. We aim as well to restore in- 
dependence to Afghanistan, end the oc- 
cupation of Kampuchea, and promote 
democracy while halting Soviet- and 
Cuban-sponsored subversion in Central 
America. 



Strategic Importance of the Eastern 
Mediterranean 

Another region of vital importance to 
the United States is the Eastern 
Mediterranean. It is critical geograph- 
ically, located at the nexus of Europe, 
Africa, and the Middle East. It sits 
astride major sea and air routes. The 
security of the Eastern Mediterranean is 



46 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



essential if we are to protect Western 
Europe. For these and other reasons, 
the strategic importance of this region 
to the United States, NATO, and the 
West is immense. 

The Soviet Union also recognizes the 
significance of this region. Access to 
warm water ports has long been a goal 
of Russian and Soviet leaders. Soviet 
naval presence in the Mediterranean, 
virtually nonexistent just 20 years ago, 
today numbers 40 to 50 ships. Long- 
range Soviet bombers can carry conven- 
tional and nuclear armaments anywhere 
over the Eastern Mediterranean. And 
Soviet missiles, including the highly 
modern SS-20 with three accurate 
nuclear warheads apiece, can reach 
Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. 

Soviet military muscleflexing is 
another indication of the importance 
Moscow attaches to this region. In late 
September 1982, the Warsaw Pact 
staged a major military maneuver, 
known as SHIELD-82, in Bulgaria. 
Some 60,000 troops participated, in- 
cluding several Soviet units and a 
substantial number of combat aircraft. 
This exercise was the largest Warsaw 
Pact exercise since the signing of the 
Helsinki accords in 1975 and the largest 
exercise in Bulgaria since the late 1960s. 
These maneuvers can only be inter- 
preted one way — as testing Warsaw 
Pact concepts and capabilities for wag- 
ing an aggressive war against NATO's 
southern flank. 

The Eastern Mediterranean is thus a 
region we must and do care about. We 
have close relations with three countries 
there, two of which are NATO allies. 
But it is also an area of frustration. We 
recognize the problems are serious. They 
are problems which came about over 
many years; neither the Cyprus situation 
nor the strains between Greece and 
Turkey are recent. 

We realize, too, that solutions can- 
not come overnight, even with the best 
intentions in the world. But we are not 
prepared to accept these problems as 
beyond solution. The United States has 
no intention of choosing among its 
friends in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Nor will we abandon the hope that prog- 
ress can be achieved. 

Greece 

I do not have to tell you our relationship 
with Greece, strengthened by our part- 
nership in NATO, is important to the 
United States. Our close relationship 
with Greece has endured because it is 



based on common values— values such 
as a commitment to freedom, to democ- 
racy, and to human rights. Our relation- 
ship is enriched on the personal level by 
ties of kinship and by the experience of 
so many Americans who have spent time 
in Greece. 

The United States and Greece are 
partners in an alliance of democracies, 
where unanimity is neither sought nor 
likely but where reaching a consensus of 
opinion is crucial. Members have the 
obligation to seek a way of working 
together. I am sure you are all aware 
that in some areas we have important 
policy differences with Greece. While we 
respect any country's right to an in- 
dependent foreign policy, we shall, at 
the same time, work to persuade Greece 
that our policies are in the interest of 
the entire West. Indeed, a strong 
America and a strong NATO serve the 
interest of all Greeks. At the same time, 
our ability to deter threats to these com- 
mon interests depends upon our ability 
to remain united. 

The current Greek government was 
elected on a nationalistic platform that 
questioned Greece's strong ties with the 
West, particularly with the United 
States. Nevertheless, immediately after 
the election, the United States extended 
congratulations to the new Prime 
Minister. We assured him of the impor- 
tance the United States attached to our 
relationship and to our longstanding 
commitment to fostering ties which 
benefit both countries. I know that 
President Reagan delivered this message 
personally when he met with Prime 
Minister [Andreas] Papandreou at the 
Bonn NATO summit of June 1982. 

As you know, we have recently suc- 
ceeded in resolving a difficult bilateral 
issue. I speak, of course, of the Defense 
and Economic Cooperation Agreement 
initialed in Athens on July 15. The new 
agreement authorizes the United States 
to maintain existing military facilities in 
Greece. It will run until terminated by 
written notice by either side, which can 
be given at the end of 5 years or any 
time thereafter. This arrangement is 
comparable to agreements we have with 
other allies. Like the product of any 
negotiation, this pact only came about 
from compromise. But we believe that 
the agreement provides a good basis for 
a continuing bilateral defense relation- 
ship on terms acceptable to both govern- 
ments. It should serve as a foundation 
for efforts to improve bilateral relations 
in other areas. 



The new defense agreement also 
contributes to Western security. It is 
based upon existing bilateral and 
multinational arrangements, of which 
our common NATO membership is a ma- 
jor element. Together with security 
assistance provided to Greece by the 
United States, the agreement will help 
both countries to fulfill their mutual 
responsibilities. 

Turkey 

The United States has a close relation- 
ship with Turkey which, like Greece, is a 
NATO ally. A strong and stable Turkey 
is important to the United States and to 
Turkey's other NATO partners. It is 
particularly important to Greece. It 
would be as difficult to defend the 
shores of Greece without Turkey as it 
would be to defend the Straits of the 
Dardanelles without Greece. 

The United States has supported the 
efforts of the Turkish Government over 
the past 3 years to reestablish tranquilli- 
ty and a stable democracy. We are confi- 
dent that return to democracy in Turkey 
will result in the fullest possible expres- 
sion of democratic freedoms and human 
rights. Turkey has also made remark- 
able economic progress; although it still 
faces long-term problems. Again, we 
stand by to help. 

The continuing differences between 
Greece and Turkey are a cause for con- 
cern among their friends and allies. We 
are concerned because these differences 
affect their well-being and the security 
of NATO. We understand the complex 
problems and the mutual fears, rooted in 
a long history, which have strained their 
relations. I would only recall that Greece 
and Turkey have also had periods of 
constructive relations, particularly under 
the inspiration of two great leaders, 
Venizelos and Ataturk. The United 
States will continue to urge both coun- 
tries to work out their differences and 
develop the cooperation which is so 
clearly to their mutual benefit. 

The recent meetings between the 
Greek and Turkish foreign ministers 
have been a positive step. We are 
pleased that these conversations led to 
the recent meeting of experts in 
Ankara. While so far focused on discus- 
sions of trade and tourism, they hold the 
promise of becoming a more productive 
dialogue. I understand there will be 
another meeting in Athens soon. We 
believe that a constructive bilateral rela- 
tionship is in the long-term interest of 



November 1983 



47 



EUROPE 



both Greece and Turkey. It would 
enhance their own security and the role 
they can play in the Western communi- 
ty- 

You are a well-informed audience 

and you know the Administration's posi- 
tion on the 7:10 ratio. While committed 
to preserving a balance of strength in 
the region, the Administration continues 
to oppose the use of a mechanistic ratio 
in determining relative levels of security 
assistance. Such a ratio ignores the 
changing needs of recipient countries. 
Nor does it take into consideration 
either the requirements of the NATO 
alliance or a changing strategic situa- 
tion. We believe that application of an 
automatic formula year after year is an 
unrealistic approach, one that serves 
neither the interests of the recipient 
countries nor the United States. But this 
principled position on our part should 
not be allowed to obscure a central fact: 
The United States, as a friend, as an 
ally, and as the major source of security 
assistance to Greece, remains committed 
to the well-being and security of the 
Greek people. 

Cyprus 

Now let me turn to the question of 
Cyprus. No discussion of U.S. policies 
and efforts in the Eastern Mediter- 
ranean would be complete without 
discussion of that troubled island. Many 
of you have no doubt been there. My 
own visit this spring was extremely 
moving. I had the opportunity to meet 
with President [Spyros] Kyprianou, with 
the leader of the Turkish community, 
Mr. Denktash, and with the representa- 
tives of the United Nations. Perhaps just 
as important, I had a chance to see 
much of Cyprus. Flying in a helicopter, I 
saw the green line which cuts across the 
island. I saw as well the empty cities by 
the sea. I came away with but one 
thought: Cyprus is too small, too special, 
to remain divided forever. 

Let me assure you that this Ad- 
ministration is very much aware of the 
human dimension of the Cyprus problem 
and the suffering caused by the continu- 
ing division of the island. This division 
has added to the mistrust and bitterness 
between the communities, bitterness 
which is creating a generation of Greek 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots who 



know little of each other. Out of such ig- 
norance comes further misunderstanding 
and increased potential for violence. 
This destructive process needs to be 
halted. Indeed, it is for this reason that 
we support Senator [Charles H. Percy, 
R.-Ill.j Percy's proposal for a Cyprus 
University. I know of no better way to 
demonstrate that Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots can coexist peacefully; nor do I 
know of any better way to sow the seeds 
of understanding and trust among the 
island's future leaders. 

U.S. policy has, for the past several 
years, been one of strong support for 
the efforts of the UN Secretary General. 
We endorsed his mandated "good 
offices" role of bringing the two com- 
munities together in the hope that 
discussion can bring about a just and 
lasting settlement. We stand behind the 
efforts of the United Nations to 
reconvene the intercommunal negotia- 
tions. We, too, would like to see them 
proceed on a more substantive basis. 
The objective of hastening that day 
when Cyprus will again be one nation 
with justice, security, and opportunity 
for all is one we strongly endorse. 

This day cannot come too soon. The 
Secretary General's efforts have 
achieved acknowledgment by both sides 
that an eventual reunification of Cyprus 
as an independent, democratic, bicom- 
munal and federal, nonaligned state is 
preferable to any other solution. Fur- 
thermore, the two sides have agreed in 
principle to the general outline of the 
new state in which the concerns of each 
community would be respected. These 
are not small steps — they represent im- 
portant progress toward a solution. On 
the other hand, "agreement in principle" 
is still a considerable distance from a 
settlement in fact. 

U.S. policy is based upon the 
recognition that the Cyprus problem can 
be solved only by the parties themselves. 



To be stable, a settlement must be 
agreed upon by the two communities. 
Dialogue between them is essential. If 
any solution is to endure, it must be 
wanted, not imposed. And if any solu- 
tion is to be possible, it must include 
compromise by all, not simply by some. 
The will to move ahead must be found. 

Conclusion 

We, therefore, call on all parties in- 
volved in the problem: the two Cypriot 
communities; the Greek Government, 
the Turkish Government; and the UN of- 
ficials carrying out the Secretary 
General's mandate, to redouble their ef- 
forts. The limited progress made to date 
in the intercommunal talks cannot be 
allowed to be undone. President Reagan 
believes the momentum must be main- 
tained and built upon. We cannot allow 
the status quo to become permanent. 

This evening I have tried to outline 
our broad goals on the major foreign 
policy issues in the Eastern Mediterra- 
nean. It is in the national interest of the 
United States to have good relations 
with Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. It is 
in our national interest that the 
southern flank of NATO be strong. It is 
in the interest of Greece and Turkey 
that their relationship be constructive 
and that security in the Aegean be 
enhanced. And it is in the interest of 
everyone concerned that there be a set- 
tlement in Cyprus which enables both 
communities to live together in peace. 
These policies may be ambitious. They 
are not, however, unrealistic. 

Indeed, our prospects for realizing 
these objectives will depend in part on 
how broadly they are supported at 
home. American foreign policy has been 
most successful when it has been bipar- 
tisan. An effective foreign policy also re- 
quires a close working relationship be- 
tween the executive and Congress. It re- 
quires as well the support of the 
American people. Greek Americans have 
the potential to contribute a great deal 
to this process. 

You in AHEPA have the respon- 
sibility to determine how you can best 
further the interests of the United 
States and benefit the countries from 
which you derive your heritage. We are 
ready to work with you in this endeavor. 
Together I am confident we can create 
and carry out a policy that is good for 
America and for the people of Greece, 
Turkey, and Cyprus. ■ 



48 



Department of State Bulletin 



Visit of Portugal's President Eanes 



EUROPE 




President Antonio Ramalho Eanes of 
tke Re/public of Portugal made a state 
visit to the United States Septem- 
ber U-20, 198S. While in Washington, 
D.C., September U-17, he met with 
President Reagan and other government 
officials. 

Following are remarks made by 
President Reagan and President Eanes 
at the arrival ceremony on Septem- 
ber 15. > 

President Reagan 

Nancy and I are honored and delighted 
to welcome and you and Mrs. Eanes to 
the United States. Ever since President 
George Washington opened formal 
diplomatic relations between Portugal 
and the new American Republic, our 
history has been one of warm friendship. 
And I know I speak for our people when 
I say a friendship as warm and true as 
ours is more valuable than the richest 
treasure. I've looked forward to this op- 
portunity to get to know you personally 
and to discuss relations between our two 
countries, as well as international mat- 
ters of mutual interest. 

In the 9 years since the revolution of 
April 25, 1974, Portugal has made great 
strides in building a vigorous democracy. 
Today, the fundamental institutions of a 
democratic country — an open press, a 
free economy, and broadly based 
political parties — are in place and 
flourishing. We in the United States 
recognize that the establishment of 
democracy in your country met sharp 
challenges. Portugal's success in sur- 
mounting those challenges demonstrates 
the courage of your leaders and the love 
of your people for freedom. 

And you, yourself, have played a 
large and crucial role during these past 
9 years. You have stated that Portugal 
must have an open, clear democracy. 
And as President, you've labored 
tirelessly to give Portugal just that. 
Your efforts have earned you not only a 
place in your nation's history but a 
chapter in the noble story of freedom 
throughout the world. 

In foreign relations, our two coun- 
tries share a number of vital interests, 
and these will receive due attention dur- 
ing our discussions today. I might note 
in particular that your nation's ex- 
perience in Africa gives Portugal a 



November 1983 



49 



EUROPE 



unique and invaluable perspective on 
current events on that continent, 
especially in Angola and Mozambique. 
Both our nations are actively interested 
in southern Africa, and your country has 
always been generous in sharing with us 
insights drawn from your own wide ex- 
perience. During your stay here, I would 
like to discuss southern Africa, and I 
want you to know that the United 
States not only values the counsel you've 
given to us on this matter in the past 
but intends to remain in close consulta- 
tion with Portugal about it in the future. 

Along with our allies, Portugal and 
the United States share the responsibili- 
ty of defending the Western world. Our 
security relationship is critical to the 
NATO alliance and to both our nations. 
We in the United States take pride in 
our military cooperation with your coun- 
try. Currently, our two governments are 
negotiating a new security cooperation 
agreement that will broaden and 
strengthen our collaboration on common 
defense objectives. The United States 
fully supports Portugal's efforts to 
enlarge its role in Western defense. We 
recognize that as those efforts proceed, 



Portugal will need to modernize its 
armed forces, and we're committed to 
helping you do so. 

We take further pride in the 
economic cooperation that we have 
established with Portugal, particularly in 
recent years. That cooperation expresses 
the concern of the American people for 
the well-being of the Portuguese people 
and this country's unshakeable support 
for your country's economy and 
democracy. 

Fifteen days ago an event took place 
that sickened people throughout the 
world. The Korean Air Lines massacre 
reminds us that although we in the West 
belong to a community of nations that 
strives to do good, others in the world 
do not shrink from doing evil. Let us in 
the Western alliance join together to 
retrieve meaning from those scores of 
innocent deaths, and let us rededicate 
ourselves to the defense of human 
freedom. 

I am confident that your visit to the 
United States will strengthen relations 
between our two countries and reaffirm 
our commitments to shared goals. I 
know that my countrymen are eager to 



U.S.-Spanish Council Meets 



JOINT STATEMENT, 
OCT. 4, 1983 

The U.S.-Spanish Council, as the body 
responsible for supervising the im- 
plementation of the Agreement on 
Friendship, Defense and Cooperation 
between the United States of America 
and Spain, met on Tuesday, October 4, 
1983, in Washington, D.C., under the 
chairmanship of Secretary of State 
George Shultz and Foreign Minister 
Fernando Moran. This is the first 
meeting of the council to be held by both 
parties as allies since the entry into 
force of said agreement. 

The two ministers reviewed the 
work accomplished by the various 
organs that report to the council, as well 
as that which had been carried out in ac- 
cordance with the provisions of the 
agreement. 

In the military field, the accomplish- 
ment of various U.S.-Spanish joint 
military exercises was reported and 
mention was made of the progress 
achieved in programs of military 
cooperation. Special note was taken of 



the establishment of the new Joint Com- 
mittee on Defense Industrial Coopera- 
tion and of the progress made toward 
establishing an industrial cooperation 
program in this area. 

Progress was also noted in the 
reports to the council concerning the 
development of scientific and tech- 
nological cooperation, as well as ad- 
vances realized in the cultural and 
educational area. 

In the economic area the two co- 
chairmen noted negative aspects in com- 
mercial, fishing, and technological rela- 
tions between the two countries and 
agreed to make new efforts to overcome 
the problems raised. 

The two ministers stated their inten- 
tion to adopt the necessary measures to 
increase U.S.-Spanish cooperation in 
fields foreseen in the agreement and in 
any other field of interest of both par- 
ties; to this end, they gave instructions 
to the council's committees to find ap- 
propriate ways to stimulate cooperation 
in the fields of defense, economy, 
science, technology, education, and 
culture. ■ 



give you a warm reception. Nearly half 
a million Portuguese have come to 
America as immigrants, and both they 
and their descendants have earned the 
gratitude of all Americans by con- 
tributing honorably and diligently to the 
building of our country. 

So, once again, on behalf of the 
American people, welcome to the United 
States. 

President Eanes 2 

I wish to thank you for the most 
generous welcome you have extended to 
us and for the words addressed to me as 
the representative of the Portuguese 
people who, as you know, are a loyal 
and firm ally of the United States of 
America. The ties uniting Portugal and 
the United States are indeed strong. 
The Portuguese maritime adventure, the 
Altantic Ocean and the geopolitical con- 
cepts that it imposes, the sharing of the 
same democratic ideals, and the 
presence in the United States of a large 
and significant Portuguese community 
create real affinities and require from 
our countries a mutually advantageous 
approach. 

It is with great pleasure that I pay 
this official visit to your country, certain 
as I am that it affords an opportunity 
for an open and frank exchange of views 
on political and international 
developments and, in a very special way, 
on the most positive means of 
strengthening the relations between our 
two countries. 

It will thus be possible to reaffirm 
our loyalty to mutual commitments and 
to reinforce our longstanding cohesion in 
the defense of our common interests. 
This is an objective that is imposed on 
us by the present and by the future, and 
it is an aim that is all the more impor- 
tant to attain inasmuch as your actions 
have proved, through your courage and 
your consistency in the defense of 
democratic principles, that the values of 
freedom have, in you, a committed 
defender. 

Portugal is a small country with a 
long history and vast political ex- 
perience. With its eight centuries of in- 
dependence, Portugal has participated in 
the long and complex course leading to 
the Europe we know today. But with its 
active presence in various regions of the 
world that it discovered and helped to 



50 



Department of State Bulletin 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



know and to develop, Portugal has 
gained practical political knowledge that 
contributes to our unique way of 
relating to and understanding other 
peoples. From our history, we draw the 
conviction that the assertion of freedom 
of expression and of pluralist 
democracy, as well as the permanent 
guarantee of human rights and firmness 
in the defense of the essential values of 
our society, cannot be called into ques- 
tion. For us, the search for negotiated 
solutions to all conflicts, respecting 
other positions and different cultural 
patterns, is also natural, provided that 
those solutions do not run counter to the 
autonomy and sovereignty of each peo- 
ple and are expressed in terms of a com- 
mon concern for safeguarding the peace. 

In these last few years, the Por- 
tuguese overthrew a dictatorship half a 
century old and managed to overcome 
new totalitarian attempts through the 
rigorous fulfillment of the rules of a 
pluralist democracy, at a time when 
some believed that such an objective was 
already impossible to achieve. The Por- 
tuguese showed that when democracy is 
given an opportunity — a serious, com- 
mitted opportunity— the totalitarianisms 
that deny freedom are defeated by the 
only real and consistent way of ensuring 
victory — the citizens' free choice. 

But the superiority of democracy 
must equally be evidenced in its capacity 
to guide society, adjusting social expec- 
tations to what it is really possible to 
organize. Societies, or some social 
groups, when faced with the impossibili- 
ty of attaining material expectations 
that they consider legitimate or that 
have been promised to them, may ques- 
tion the validity of global models of 
political organization and then nourish 
radical tendencies. 

Only a political power that is 
democratically legitimate, competent, 
and efficient and able to ensure the 
balance of interests, a negotiated con- 
sensus, and conscious participation will 
be able successfully to carry out the 
tasks of economic reorganization. 

In this regard, the greatest concern 
for the present and the immediate 
future lies in the economic area, both in 
respect to Portugal and within the 
framework of the Atlantic alliance and 
of international relations in general. And 
further, it is in that context of global 
democratic concern that it is justified to 
expect the demonstration of the solidari- 



ty of the democratic countries and, first 
of all, of the United States. In this way, 
our security will be reinforced, 
guaranteeing the present and future 
substance of the Atlantic alliance and il- 
lustrating in many other areas and in 
practical realities, that all truly 
democratic forces and programs may 
count on effective support. 

I am certain that our exchange of 
views on these and other subjects, while 
confirming our alliance, will justify a 
future of active and committed coopera- 



tion. I look forward to meeting with you 
and discussing with you means for us to 
carry out this fruitful cooperation in the 
future between the United States and 
Portugal. 



'Made on the South Lawn of the White 
House where President Eanes was accorded 
a formal welcome with full military honors 
(text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Sept. 19, 1983). 

President Eanes spoke in Portuguese, 
and his remarks were translated by an inter- 
preter. ■ 



Human Rights Situation in 
the Philippines 



by Elliott Abrams 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Human Rights and International 
Organizations of the House Foreign Af- 
fairs Committee on September 22, 1983. 
Mr, Abrams is Assistant Secretary for 
Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Affairs. 1 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss 
with you the human rights situation in 
the Philippines, a matter of special con- 
cern to all of us since the assassination 
of Benigno Aquino. 

Our overall assessment of the human 
rights situation in the Philippines was 
most recently given in our annual coun- 
try report on the Philippines, released 
January 31, 1983. Needless to say, 
another comprehensive report will be 
published for next year's volume. The 
country report for 1982 noted the mixed 
human rights picture in the Philippines. 

Positive and Negative Reports 

On the positive side, we can note that 
political opposition is tolerated within a 
limited scope in the Philippines and that 
public criticism of the government is fre- 
quently expressed. Limited criticism of 
the Philippine Government may even be 
found in the Philippine press. Opposition 
parties exist, and vocal opposition has 
existed within the National Assembly. In 
May 1982, village elections for about 
300,000 local government positions were 
held for the first time in a decade and 
appear to have been reasonably fair. 
Freedom of assembly is generally 
observed in the Philippines, as are 
freedom of religion, freedom of travel, 
and freedom of emigration. 



On the negative side, we have noted 
continuing reports of torture and sum- 
mary executions by the military, 
especially in areas in the southern 
Philippines where combat with the NPA 
[National Philippines Army] exists. We 
have noted reports from task force de- 
tainees of summary executions, known 
as "salvagings," and of a small number 
of disappearances. Some persons ar- 
rested on suspicion of subversion have 
reported that they were tortured during 
interrogation, although the government 
denies this and attributes the use of 
physical violence against detainees to in- 
dividual policemen who are misbehaving. 
We have noted the limitations on 
freedom of speech and press, including 
the occasional closing of newspapers and 
prosecution of journalists. 

Clearly, the government mantains 
informal means to influence and 
pressure the media. Direct criticism of 
the Marcos family is likely to lead a jour- 
nal or journalist into confrontation with 
the government. Nevertheless, foreign 
periodicals and newspapers are widely 
circulated and without censorship. There 
is no question that there is limited 
political participation in the Philippines 
due to the domination of politics by 
President Marcos and his associates. 
This is true both de facto and de jure, for 
Philippine law gives the President the 
right to legislate, appoint officials, and, 
in general, control all aspects of the na- 
tional government. 

Freedom House and 
Amnesty International 

It may be of interest to the committee 
to have a sense of the views of two ma- 
jor human rights organizations — 
Freedom House and Amnesty Interna- 



November1983 



51 



MIDDLE EAST 



tional. Freedom House calls the Philip- 
pines "partly free" in its 1982 volume. It 
calls the Philippines "a plebiscitary fami- 
ly dictatorship." It notes that there is 
considerable opposition to political 
organization and some independence for 
the judiciary. Unions have only limited 
independence; the Catholic Church main- 
tains its independence. Prisoners of con- 
science have been held. Military actions 
against insurgents have led to many un- 
necessary arrests, killings, and destruc- 
tion. 

Amnesty International, in its 1982 
report, has several main concerns. The 
first is that although martial law was 
lifted in 1981, the government maintains 
wideranging emergency powers, par- 
ticularly regarding arrest and detention. 
Amnesty International is also concerned 
that security personnel accused of 
abuses are rarely, if ever, prosecuted 
and punished, although they are trans- 
ferred to other duties. Amnesty details a 
number of cases in which it finds 
misbehavior by the Government of the 
Philippines, especially by the military in 
the handling of opponents of the govern- 
ment. In a number of the cases it men- 
tions, the individuals in question were 
released after a period of detention. 

Last week John Monjo, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs, testified before the 
[Senate] Foreign Relations Committee 
about the Aquino assassination and its 
consequences. I am pleased that he is' 
here with me today. 

As we have repeatedly noted, public- 
ly and privately, the United States 
believes that in the long run, stability in 
the Philippines will depend on the sup- 
port of the people for their government. 
For the Philippines, as for every coun- 
try, popular sovereignty expressed in 
free elections is our view of the best 
political system. We have stated publicly 
and privately our belief that next year's 
legislative elections are crucial to the 
development of democracy in the Philip- 
pines. The Philippines is a country, 
unlike many unhappy nations in the 
world, in which democracy has roots. It 
is our view that a free and fair 
legislative election next year can be a 
turning point in restoring full popular 
participation in the political life of the 
Philippines. 



■The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Major U.S. Interests 
in the Middle East 

by Robert H. Pelletreau 

Statement before the Subcommittee 

on Europe and the Middle East of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committer on 
September 26, 1983. Ambassador 
Pelletreau is Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs. ' 

I appreciate this opportunity to testify 
before you today on recent develop- 
ments in the Middle East and to 
describe our current policies. Before we 
begin our discussion, I would like to 
make some brief introductory remarks. 
American diplomacy in the Middle 
East continues to be dedicated to the 
resolution of conflicts which threaten 
both regional and international peace 
and security and endanger critical U.S. 
political, security, and economic in- 
terests. Those conflicts, which we 
discussed at our last meeting in early 
August — the crisis in Lebanon, the 
Arab-Israeli dispute, the war between 
Iran and Iraq, and Libya's aggression in 
Chad— are far from being resolved. 

Lebanon 

Let me turn first to Lebanon. The cease- 
fire announced September 25 gives hope 
that the turmoil and violence in that 
long-suffering country may soon be 
brought to an end and replaced by a 
genuine process of national dialogue and 
reconciliation. Lebanon is important to 
us, not only because of our friendship 
for the Lebanese and our humanitarian 
concern for their plight but because 
events in Lebanon, lying as its does be- 
tween Israel and Syria, affect the peace 
and stability of the entire area. That is 
why we are so deeply involved there. 
The principles governing our policy in 
Lebanon are: 

• The withdrawal of all external 
forces; 

• A sovereign Lebanon under a 
stable central government, dedicated to 
national unity and able to exercise con- 
trol throughout its territory; and 

• Security of Israel's northern 
border. 



One hardly need be reminded that in 
recent weeks, the path toward these 
goals has become even more tortuous. 
Widespread fighting erupted in the Shuf 
and Alayh regions following the 
redeployment of Israeli forces south of 
the Awwali River. Factional fighting 
between PSP [Progressive Socialist Par- 
ty] and Phalange militias was exacer- 
bated and expanded by the introduction 
of Palestinian fighters into the fray and 
by the initiation of attacks on the forces 
of the central government. Syrian forces 
not only have been supplying the PSP 
and Palestinian combatants but also con- 
tinue to occupy eastern and northern 
Lebanon, representing an obstacle to the 
full withdrawal of Israeli forces from the 
South, as foreseen under the May 17 
Agreement. 

Until yesterday's agreement, 
Lebanese confessional leaders had failed 
to respond to President Gemayel's in- 
vitation to enter into a national dialogue 
that could lead to internal reconciliation. 
And Syria had compounded its unhelpful 
role by encouraging such intransigence 
and fueling the continuation of internal 
turbulence in Lebanon. We hope that 
yesterday's agreement marks a new 
beginning among all parties involved and 
that this morning's cease-fire will evolve 
into the basis for a permanent peace. 

Our basic policies have not changed 
in the face of these challenges. We 
believe our goals in Lebanon are just 
and attainable, and we are determined 
to persevere. We have intensified our 
diplomatic efforts, through the mission 
of Ambassadors McFarlane [Robert C. 
McFarlane, the President's personal 
representative in the Middle East], and 
Fairbanks [Richard H. Fairbanks III, 
special negotiator for the Middle East 
peace process], in support of the Govern- 
ment of Lebanon's efforts toward na- 
tional reconciliation and the withdrawal 
of all foreign forces. The first step has 
now been achieved— a negotiated cease- 
fire, as a prelude to a political accom- 
modation among the factions, 
withdrawal of foreign forces, and the 
reestablishment of Lebanese Govern- 
ment authority. The framework of such 
a cease-fire was urgently discussed over 
the past 2 weeks and has not been 



52 



Department of State Bulletin 



MIDDLE EAST 



agreed to by all the parties. Political 
dialogue and reconciliation must now be 
urgently addressed. 

Our Marines, as part of the multina- 
tional force [MNF] in Lebanon, have 
been a stabilizing influence in this proc- 
ess. The Marines are there to provide a 
supporting presence requested by the 
Lebanese Government. Their job has 
been to help the government and the 
Lebanese Armed Forces restore 
Lebanese authority and sovereignty over 
the Beirut area and to end the violence 
there. They have performed this mission 
magnificently. We grieve the loss of the 
four Marines who have given their lives. 
But we can also be proud of the Marines 
and the contribution they are making to 
Lebanon. 

The mission of the Marines has not 
changed, in spite of the recent escalation 
of violence. I want to emphasize, as 
other U.S. spokesmen have, that our 
Marines do not have a combat role. The 
rules of engagement remain that they 
will defend themselves if military action 
from any quarter interferes with their 
mission. We believe there is no con- 
certed effort to target the Marines or 
other MNF contingents. But they are in 
an area where there is violence, and 
they must, therefore, be able to defend 
themselves. I can assure you that they 
will. We have no intention of increasing 
the number of Marines ashore, expand- 
ing their area of operation, or changing 
their role. On the other hand, we will 
provide sufficient military power off- 
shore to bolster the Marines' own means 
of self-defense. 

We are pleased that an agreement 
has been reached among the bipartisan 
leadership of the Congress to introduce 
and seek to enact a resolution authoriz- 
ing the continued presence and mission 
of the U.S. peacekeeping forces in 
Lebanon. While the President has in- 
dicated that he has substantial reserva- 
tions about parts of the resolution, he 
has also indicated that he would be will- 
ing to sign the proposed resolution while 
expressing his reservations if it is 
passed in the form that was presented 
to him. As the President stated, we are 
pleased that this proposed resolution not 
only supports our policies in Lebanon 
but now enables us to advance U.S. 
peacekeeping interests on the solid 
bipartisan basis that has been the tradi- 
tional hallmark of American foreign 
policy. 

In the current debate over the U.S. 
role in Lebanon, it is worth reemphasiz- 
ing that we are engaged in a truly inter- 
national effort there. Our Marines are 



part of a multinational force in which 
French, Italian, and British troops are 
also performing valiantly and suffering 
casualties, on behalf of peace in 
Lebanon. Ambassador McFarlane's good 
offices are part of a larger diplomatic ef- 
fort among many nations. Saudi Arabia, 
for example, which has unique access to 
many of the Lebanese parties, has 
played a consistent and helpful 
diplomatic role and has been particularly 
helpful in engineering the current cease- 
fire. Egypt and Jordan and our Euro- 
pean allies have also been supportive in 
a number of ways. The United States is 
not "going it alone" in Lebanon. 

There are other positive elements 
which also deserve attention as we view 
the current crisis in Lebanon. President 
[Amin] Gemayel is making an earnest 
and urgent effort to restore national 
unity. His statement with his Council of 
Ministers on August 31 calling on the 
leaders of Lebanon's confessional com- 
munities to join him in a dialogue aimed 
at a new national approach to political 
reconciliation was an important initiative 
which has been genuinely advanced and 
maintained and which has our full sup- 
port. 

The worthy performance of the 
Lebanese Armed Forces in supporting 
the government's efforts to restore 
order and reassert its authority is 
another encouraging development. The 
professionalism, unity, and courage of 
this small army, which draws its 
members from all of Lebanon's religious 
communities, is a demonstration of what 
can be achieved on a broader scale in 
Lebanon. U.S. training and the 
assistance we have provided the 
Lebanese Armed Forces have been a 
sound investment. In less than 1 year, 
an army that previously had been 
relegated to the barracks has recruited, 
trained, and fought. Competent leader- 
ship has emerged, and soldiers drawn 
from all of Lebanon's many confessions 
have stood side-by-side in combat. 

Notwithstanding these positive 
elements, the problems which face the 
Government of Lebanon are formidable. 
The hesitancy of some Lebanese leaders 
to accept President Gemayel's call for 
negotiations leading to cease-fire and 
political talks has been discouraging. We 
understand the legacy of mistrust and 
division which lies behind this stub- 
borness; but Lebanon's communities 
have lived together in peace before; they 
can do so again. 



The process of national reconcilia- 
tion can advance, however, only if 
Lebanon's colossus to the east agrees. 
Syria's refusal thus far even to discuss 
terms under which it would withdraw its 
forces has caused Israel to delay 
withdrawal of its own forces. 

Syria has said, in the past, that it 
would withdraw its forces when the 
Government of Lebanon says they are 
no longer needed. On September 1 the 
Lebanese Government said this, loudly 
and clearly, by formally requesting the 
departure of Syrian troops. We hope 
Syria will heed this request. 

The United States recognizes that 
Syria has legitimate security interests in 
Lebanon, but we do not recognize its 
right to destabilize its neighbor or to oc- 
cupy it permanently. We are continuing 
our dialogue with Syria in the hope that 
this will ultimately lead to negotiations 
between Lebanon and Syria and the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces — 
Syrian, PLO [Palestine Liberation 
Organization], and Israeli — from 
Lebanon. 

The Broader Peace in the Middle East 

Although Lebanon has preoccupied our 
diplomacy in the Middle East in recent 
months, our most fundamental goal re- 
mains a broader peace based on Resolu- 
tion 242 and the Camp David frame- 
work. In an address on August 27, 
President Reagan strongly reaffirmed 
the U.S. commitment to the peace ini- 
tiative he first announced on Sep- 
tember 1, 1982. This initiative, he said, 
is "definitely alive and available to those 
parties willing to sit down together and 
talk peace" and the positions set forth in 
that initiative remain "the only realistic 
basis for a solution that has thus far 
been presented." The President's ini- 
tiative embraces our firm commitment 
to the security of Israel and of all the 
states of the region as well as a fair and 
practical resolution of the Palestinian 
problem through negotiations. 

Unfortunately, neither Israel nor its 
Arab neighbors have yet decided to 
grasp the opportunities afforded by the 
the President's initiative. Israel's con- 
tinued settlement activities, which we 
oppose, undermine Arab confidence in 
the willingness of Israel to trade ter- 
ritory for a negotiated peace. Moreover, 
division and mistrust among Palestinians 
and the refusal of the PLO and some 
Arab states to recognize Israel's right to 
exist are serious barriers to rein- 
vigorating the peace process. The 



November 1983 



53 



MIDDLE EAST 



United States stands ready to assist in 
this process and will be in a position to 
act effectively when both Israel and its 
Arab neighbors grasp the opportunity 
for peace the President has offered. 
The recent resignation of former 
Prime Minister [Menahem] Begin and 
the transition in Israel to a new govern- 
ment will not affect our fundamentally 



sound relationship with Israel, our 
steadfast commitment to its security, or 
our hopes that Israel will join its 
neighbors in seeking peace. 

We will also continue to emphasize 
the importance of close and friendly 
relations with Jordan. King Hussein still 
believes that the President's Septem- 
ber 1 initiative is the only practical 



avenue to peace, and Jordan remains 
willing to enter into negotiations with 
Israel if it can obtain adequate Arab 
support. Furthermore, Jordan shares 
with us an interest in the stability of the 
area and has actively aided other 
moderate countries in their defense. We 
must ensure that U.S. policy, including 
our economic and security assistance 



U.S. Forces in Lebanon 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 20, 1983 1 

I have a brief statement here. But I 
won't be able to take any questions, 
because we're running on a very tight 
schedule with regard to our arrival in 
South Carolina. 

An agreement has been reached 
among the bipartisan leadership of the 
Congress to introduce and seek to enact 
a resolution authorizing the continued 
presence and mission of the U.S. peace- 
keeping forces in Lebanon. 

While I have substantial reservations 
about parts of this resolution — reserva- 
tions which I made clear to the leader- 
ship—I am pleased that this agreement 
among the congressional leadership sup- 
porting our presence and policies in 
Lebanon has been reached, and I would 
be willing to sign the proposed resolu- 
tion, while expressing my reservations, 
if it passed in the form that has been 
presented to me this morning. 

I'm especially pleased that this pro- 
posed resolution not only supports our 
policies in Lebanon but now enables us 
to advance U.S. peacekeeping interests 
on the solid bipartisan basis that has 
been the traditional hallmark of 
American foreign policy. 



PRESIDENT'S LETTER 
TO THE CONGRESS, 
SEPT. 17, 1983 2 

I know you were gratified as I with Sunday's 
announcement of a cease fire in Lebanon. 
While there were many things that con- 
tributed to the cease fire, it is my belief that 
your agreement to advance the compromise 
resolution on war powers — and the favorable 
action by the Foreign Affairs and Foreign 
Relations Committees — were particularly im- 
portant. At a crucial point, your agreement 
and the supporting committee actions ex- 
pressed a commitment to bipartisanship in 



U.S. foreign policy. Please accept my thanks. 

Let me also take this opportunity to 
clarify an issue with respect to the inter- 
pretation of the compromise resolution. The 
compromise resolution refers to the require- 
ments of section 4(a) of the Lebanon 
Emergency Assistance Act; I gather that a 
question has arisen as to the Executive 
Branch's understanding and intention in this 
regard. My understanding and intent remain 
exactly as they were when I signed the 
Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act: It would 
be my intention to seek Congressional, 
authorization — as contemplated by the 
Act — if circumstances require any substantial 
expansion in the number or role of U.S. arm- 
ed forces in Lebanon. 

In addition, regarding the Admin- 
istration's intentions with respect to the 
18-month time period, I can assure you that 
if our forces are needed in Lebanon beyond 
the 18-month period, it would be my intention 
to work together with the Congress with a 
view toward taking action on mutually ac- 
ceptable terms. 

Again let me thank you for your support 
for the compromise agreement. I believe its 
prompt enactment will only further improve 
the chances for the stable peace we seek in 
Lebanon. 

Sincerely, 

/s/RON 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 28, 1983 3 

I want to thank the House of Represent- 
atives for its strong, bipartisan vote to- 
day supporting our policies in Lebanon 
and the continued presence of the U.S. 
peacekeeping force. This vote would not 
have been possible without the strong 
leadership of Speaker [Thomas P.] 
O'Neill, Majority Leader [James C] 
Wright, Minority Leader [Robert H.] 
Michel, Chairman of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee [Clement J.] 
Zablocki, and Ranking Minority Member 
[William S.] Broomfield. 

A spirit of cooperation between 



members of the two parties, and be- 
tween the executive and the legislative 
branches of our government, has been 
the traditional hallmark of a successful 
foreign policy. Today, we continue the 
process of restoring that bipartisan 
spirit. Now we look to the Senate for a 
similar demonstration of responsible 
leadership. 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 29, 1983" 

In the last 2 days, Republican and 
Democratic Members of the Congress 
have won a great victory for an 
honorable and all important American 
tradition — a responsible, bipartisan 
foreign policy. 

Today's vote in the Senate, authoriz- 
ing, as the House did yesterday, the con- 
tinued presence of the U.S. peacekeep- 
ing force in Lebanon, sends a strong 
signal to the world; America stands 
united; we speak with one voice; and we 
fulfill our responsibilities as a trustee of 
freedom, peace, and self-determination. 

By working together to promote 
peace in Lebanon, to give Lebanon back 
to the Lebanese people, and to help 
them rebuild their democracy, we are 
strengthening the forces for peace 
throughout the Middle East. This is 
neither a Republican nor a Democratic 
goal. Peace in that troubled region is the 
cause that unites us all. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 22, 1983. 

identical letters addressed to Thomas P. 
O'Neill, Speaker of the House of Represent- 
atives, James C. Wright, Jr., Majority Leader 
of the Senate, Clement J. Zablocki, chairman 
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and 
Charles H. Percy, chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee (text from 
White House press release). 

3 Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Oct. 3, 1983. 

4 Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Oct. 3, 1983. ■ 



54 



Department of State Bulletin 



MIDDLE EAST 



programs, continues to support Jordan. 

Egypt also has an important role in 
the peace process launched at Camp 
David, and our relationship remains one 
of full partnership. We value the support 
President [Mohamed Hosni] Mubarak's 
government has given to the President's 
peace initiative as well as Egypt's sup- 
port for the government of President 
Gemayel in Lebanon. We will continue 
to place a high priority on close coopera- 
tion with Egypt and to support Egypt's 
efforts to advance its economic develop- 
ment and maintain its security. Presi- 
dent Mubarak is aware of the need for 
economic reform and has stimulated new 
thinking on economic policy. We wish to 
support the reform process, and 
deobligation-reobligation authority is an 
important test for us. A strong Egyp- 
tian economy will yield us commercial 
benefits such as the recent $300 million 
sale of Boeing 767 aircraft. 

I am pleased to report that U.S. and 
Egyptian forces recently completed an 
extremely successful joint training exer- 
cise—Bright Star '83— which 
demonstrated the ability of Egyptian 
and American forces to work together in 
ways that would be useful in responding 
to threats to our mutual interests in the 
region. 

Libyan Aggression in Chad 

At our last meeting, I mentioned our 
growing concern with another conflict in 
an area adjoining the Middle East: 
Libya's armed aggression in Chad. Libya 
still occupies a large portion of northern 
Chad, but the French decision to send 
troops and combat aircraft has clearly 
had a deterrent effect on [Muammer] 
Qadhafi's willingness to move further 
south. The United States has been 
assisting with defense articles and serv- 
ices to the Chadian Government under 
the Foreign Assistance Act. The Libyan 



presence hinders efforts toward recon- 
ciliation among the factions in Chad and 
is also a menace to the neighboring 
states. Our policy is to obtain Libya's 
withdrawal, a resolution of this conflict 
by peaceful means, and to preserve 
Chad's territorial integrity. We strongly 
support the efforts of France and multi- 
national efforts by the OAU [Organiza- 
tion of African Unity] and the United 
Nations to achieve Libyan withdrawal 
and stability in Chad. 

Iran-Iraq War 

The war between Iran and Iraq con- 
tinues to take a heavy toll in lives and 
treasure, and it also presents a continu- 
ing threat to U.S. and Western in- 
terests. The prospects for a negotiated 
settlement have not improved. The 
longer this war of attrition lasts, the 
greater the risk will be that either Iran 
or Iraq will risk some desperate military 
escalation in the gulf that would widen 
the war. We would regard as especially 
serious any threat by either party to in- 
terfere with free navigation or act in a 
way that would restrict oil exports from 
the gulf. 

I wish to reemphasize, as we have 
made clear to both Iran and Iraq, that 
the unrestricted flow of oil from the gulf 
is vital to the entire international com- 
munity. Our commitment to freedom of 
commerce and navigation in the interna- 
tional waters of the gulf is firm. Even if 
Iran and Iraq cannot come to grips with 
the basic issues that divide them and to 
make peace, we expect them to respect 
this principle. 

One bright spot amid the warfare 
has been the measured improvement in 
our dialogue with Iraq. Iraqi Under Sec- 
retary Kittani's recent visit to Washing- 
ton included calls on this committee and 
other members of Congress and staffers, 
as well as discussions with senior Ad- 
ministration officials. Ambassador 
Kittani also devoted much of his time to 
interviews with the media and private 



American groups interested in foreign 
affairs. His visit was an eloquent state- 
ment of the value Iraq and the United 
States place upon coming to understand 
each other more accurately than has 
been possible in the past. We are nar- 
rowing the differences that remain in 
our approaches to several issues, and 
there are more important common in- 
terests that provide bases for increased 
cooperation. Of these, the most signifi- 
cant is the strong desire which the 
United States shares with all the peoples 
of the region for an immediate end to 
the Iran-Iraq war, so that both Iranians 
and Iraqis can get back to the develop- 
ment of their countries without outside 
interference. 

Conclusion 

I have only touched on the major con- 
flicts in the Middle East which concern 
us most, without mentioning many other 
important political, economic, and 
strategic issues that affect American in- 
terests in that region. We intend to per- 
sist in our efforts to help solve these 
conflicts, working with other friendly 
nations in the process, and to pursue our 
other interests with patience and firm- 
ness. Our major interests in that region 
will continue to demand a sustained U.S. 
effort, notwithstanding the many dif- 
ficulties we face. We are making that ef- 
fort. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402 ■ 



November 1983 



55 



rmimn iinnmnniiiinmimillimmmHiimi mmimi 



NUCLEAR POLICY 



Nuclear Nonproliferation 
and Cooperation 



by Harry R. Marshall, Jr. 

Address before the International 
Nuclear Law Association in San Fran- 
cisco on September 12, 1983. Mr. 
Marshall is Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Oceans and International En- 
vironmental and Scientific Affairs. 

The meetings of the International 
Nuclear Law Association (INLA) every 2 
years provide a timely opportunity to 
reflect on international nuclear energy 
development and nonproliferation 
policies. As nuclear lawyers, we are 
specialists engaged in negotiating, con- 
tracting, and other pursuits which in 
some manner relate to nuclear energy— 
a technology which can provide the 
answers to our energy security needs 
but a technology which, if misused, can 
lead to profound consequences. Indeed, 
this concern has been a cause of frustra- 
tion in many of our legal endeavors, but 
hopefully we can view it as a challenge 
to be overcome through the exercise of 
our legal skills. The problems posed by 
proliferation obviously cannot be ignored 
in our work in the nuclear field, and, in- 
deed, we have the opportunity, through 
our efforts in international lawmaking, 
to make meaningful contributions to 
preventing the further spread of nuclear 
arms. With this premise in mind, I 
would like to assess what has been ac- 
complished since the beginning of the 
Administration of President Reagan and 
what challenges remain in reaching non- 
proliferation goals and improving inter- 
national nuclear cooperation. Let me 
first reflect on some historical 
background. 

Historical Perspective (1975-81) 

Eight years ago, at the time of the 
INLA meeting in 1975, many of the non- 
proliferation problems the international 
community now faces were already 
before us or were looming on the 
horizon. A nuclear device had been 
detonated the previous year in India, 
and there were growing concerns in 
some quarters that additional prolifera- 
tion would follow. 

In 1977 a new Administration had 



established itself in Washington with 
some strong views on how best to deal 
with proliferation. By the time of the 
INLA meeting that year, that Ad- 
ministration had announced its non- 
proliferation policy and how it would be 
carried out. This policy included some 
approaches which departed quite 
significantly from previous U.S. prac- 
tices. By 1979, when INLA next met, 
the full effect of the new U.S. policy had 
been experienced in varying ways in the 
United States and around the world. 
Many aspects of this policy were not 
well-received by other nations engaged 
in nuclear power development. Much of 
the new U.S. effort centered around an 
initiative to seek abandonment of 
reprocessing spent fuel in favor of a 
once-through cycle. 

In January 1981, when the Reagan 
Administration assumed office in 
Washington, it was immediately con- 
fronted with a number of proliferation 
concerns. One of a serious magnitude 
centered principally on certain extant ac- 
tivities and intentions in South Asia. A 
general problem that was readily ap- 
parent was that cooperation with other 
suppliers had been hampered by their 
dissatisfaction with the policies of the 
previous Administration. This was par- 
ticularly true with respect to controlling 
exports of nuclear equipment of a sen- 
sitive nature and preventing exports for 
unsafeguarded purposes. 

During the first months, we wit- 
nessed increasing politicization of the In- 
ternational Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). The right of Israel and South 
Africa to participate fully in IAEA ac- 
tivities was affected by extraneous 
issues, and the selection of a new Direc- 
tor General created unnecessary 
divisiveness along various regional and 
political lines. 

U.S. policy regarding the exercise of 
control rights under U.S. agreements 
for cooperation had caused considerable 
consternation among our allies and 
friends. Because of this, many nations 
had lost confidence in the United States 
as a supplier that would deliver on a 
predictable basis and in accordance with 
agreements and contracts which had 
been solemnly and duly concluded. 



One other item relates to the inter- 
nationally accepted guidelines with 
respect to exports of nuclear equipment 
and material. Although for the most 
part these guidelines were viewed as 
satisfactory, they had not been seriously 
reviewed on a collective basis since the 
development of the suppliers' guidelines 
in 1975. Collaborative work was needed. 

These were but a few of the non- 
proliferation issues which faced the in- 
coming Administration. 

When I addressed this group at its 
1981 meeting in Palma, the new Ad- 
ministration was in its first year. We 
had recognized that many friends and 
allies of the United States had, during 
recent years, lost confidence in the 
ability — or willingness— of the United 
States to recognize their legitimate 
energy security needs, and this in turn 
created a less than optimum climate for 
cooperation in dealing with proliferation 
issues. To remedy this situation, a 
number of changes and initiatives had 
been announced by President Reagan in 
July 1981. This announcement fore- 
shadowed the emergence, about a year 
later, of a plutonium-use policy designed 
to ensure greater predictability regard- 
ing the exercise of U.S. rights in 
agreements for cooperation, particularly 
approval of reprocessing and use of 
plutonium produced from U.S. -supplied 
material or equipment. Ironically, I 
might add, with this change in policy 
designed to improve international 
cooperation, the international market for 
reactor sales seemed to have ended, in 
most part due to escalating interest 
rates and reduced demands for 
electricity. 

As many of you recall, on the eve of 
the 1981 meeting, a new IAEA Director 
General had just been named with the 
selection of Hans Blix. Although a con- 
sensus choice in the end, the struggle 
over his selection was indicative of prob- 
lems which seemed to be sapping the 
agency's efforts and diverting it from ef- 
fective pursuit of the purposes set out in 
the IAEA statute. In my statement at 
Palma, I made a number of points re- 
garding the new U.S. policy. 

• If universally accepted non- 
proliferation objectives were to be at- 
tained, the nations of the world would 
have to find ways to work together in a 
determined effort. For our part, it had 
become clear to U.S. policymakers that 
past unilateral and nondiscriminatory 
approaches, which impose solutions 



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56 



Department of State Bulletin 



NUCLEAR POLICY 



without recognizing individual cir- 
cumstances, simply would not work. 

• Nonproliferation efforts would 
iiave to be directed at specific, iden- 
tifiable threats on a case-by-case basis, 
ind in doing so, we should address the 
underlying causes which motivate na- 
:ions to develop or acquire nuclear arms. 

• Stronger cooperative efforts on 
;he part of suppliers to inhibit the 
xansfer of sensitive material, equip- 
ment, and technology would be essential. 

• Regarding the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, we would strive 
x> prevent further politicization of the 
)rganization and take steps to 
itrengthen further its technical 
Assistance and safeguards programs. 

• International treaty regimes were 
ntal in encouraging all nations to accept 
nutual nonproliferation goals. Conse- 
juently, we would seek further accept- 
ince of the nonproliferation treaty, and 
've would ratify Protocol I to the treaty 
>f Tlatelolco. 

• To strengthen the international 
mclear cooperation regime, we would 
eek to conclude additional bilateral 
.greements. 

• Underlying our nonproliferation 
.genda, we had announced that to main- 
ain our influence in the international 
ommunity the United States must be a 
iredictable and competitive participant 

n international nuclear cooperation. 

Now with this Administration near- 
ng the end of its third year, I would like 
o point out the accomplishments which 
ave been made in the attainment of 
lonproliferation objectives and note 
/hat remains to be done. The 
enlevements do not benefit the United 
Itates alone, of course, but rather the 
lobal community. Similarly, I should 
;ote, progress in this regard has not 
een possible solely through our efforts 
ut rather through mutual cooperation 
i an increasingly interdependent world. 

iouth Asia 

Since early 1981, the United States has 
ndertaken a major effort in South Asia 
o deal with the underlying causes that 
night lead to proliferation in the subcon- 
inent. The United States has provided 
ignificant foreign assistance to Pakistan 
o improve upon our longtime alliance, 
t "or example, nearly $275 million was 
irovided in 1982 and $585 million is 
stimated for 1983 which amounts to a 



doubling of our efforts — much of this in 
the form of increased military 
assistance. 

Stability in South Asia had become 
understandably shaken in late 1979 by 
the Soviet invasion and occupation of 
neighboring Afghanistan. U.S. 
assistance has permitted Pakistan to 
strengthen its conventional defensive 
capability. This serves to bolster its 
stability and thus reduce its motivation 
for acquiring nuclear explosives. In addi- 
tion there have been discussions be- 
tween our two countries at the highest 
levels which have led to greater 
understanding of the need to avoid ac- 
tivities which raise concerns regarding 
proliferation in the region. 

The United States does remain con- 
cerned with certain Pakistani 
plans — specifically any unsafeguarded 
operation of its new labs reprocessing 
plant and its continued efforts to com- 
plete construction of an unsafeguarded 
enrichment plant. Because of the 
development of these unsafeguarded 
facilities, built in large part through the 
use of imported Western technology and 
equipment, our position has been that 
suppliers should not cooperate in the 
development of the nuclear power sta- 
tion now planned to be built in Pakistan. 
This position is consistent with 
longstanding U.S. policy of seeking to 
have all nations require comprehensive 
safeguards as a condition of major new 
supply. We hardly believe it appropriate 
for Western suppliers to provide 
Pakistan with nuclear technology while 
the government there continues with its 
development of unsafeguarded facilities 
which have a destabilizing effect on the 
global nonproliferation regime. 

What will evolve in Pakistan, and In- 
dia as well, remains to be seen, of 
course. The United States intends for its 
part to continue to take actions to 
bolster security in the South Asian 
region in furtherance of its approach of 
dealing with the underlying causes of 
proliferation. 

International Atomic Energy Agency 

The IAEA in recent years has faced the 
greatest of challenges. Polarization of 
member nations' views on issues such as 
the selection of a Director General and 
Israeli and South African participation 
in agency activities continues to under- 
mine the effectiveness of the IAEA. As 



lawyers we can agree that lawmaking 
through international institutions is most 
effective when there is universal par- 
ticipation by those nations which choose 
to be involved. Excluding nations from 
full IAEA participation for political 
reasons taints the results of the agency's 
endeavors. 

Despite the troubles in recent years, 
U.S. commitment is as strong as ever 
and our material support is increasing. 
Since 1981 the United States will have 
provided by the end of this year approx- 
imately $101.7 million to the agency, of 
which approximately $23.4 million will 
have been for technical assistance. Dur- 
ing this same period, the United States 
will have expended approximately $34.6 
million to assist the IAEA in its 
safeguards activities including the 
development of techniques needed for 
larger and more sophisticated facilities 
which can be anticipated in the future. 
Beyond the contribution of these 
resources, considerable time and effort 
has been expended by U.S. officials in 
dealing with agency problems. 

Treaty of Tlatelolco 

The treaty of Tlatelolco [Treaty for the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin 
America] has been viewed for some time 
as a valuable mechanism for the pursuit 
of nonproliferation objectives in Latin 
America. The United States ratified Pro- 
tocol II to the treaty some years ago— a 
truly one of a kind agreement among all 
the nuclear weapons states. However, 
for a variety of reasons, previous Ad- 
ministrations had not carried out the 
ratification process for Protocol I of the 
treaty which essentially bars nations 
situated outside the region from deploy- 
ing nuclear weapons in Latin American 
territories for which they are interna- 
tionally responsible. The Reagan Ad- 
ministration rapidly completed its con- 
stitutional procedures to permit ratifica- 
tion of Protocol I, and in November 
1981 Secretary Haig deposited the in- 
strument of ratification in Mexico City. 
We are hopeful that the nations which 
have not become full parties to the trea- 
ty will do so in the not too distant 
future. 



Nonproliferation Treaty 

The United States is continuing to seek 
universal acceptance of the Nonprolif- 
eration Treaty (NPT). Since 1981, five 



November 1983 



57 



NUCLEAR POLICY 



additional nations 1 have adhered, bring- 
ing the number or parties to 119 so far. 
These recent adherents include the Arab 
Republic of Egypt, a nation which has 
long been interested in the peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy. 

In 1985, the third review conference 
of the Nonproliferation Treaty will con- 
vene. At the last review conference in 
1980, although the meeting fell short of 
achieving consensus on the final 
documents, many participants expressed 
firm backing for the treaty and em- 
phasized the need to maintain and 
broaden worldwide support for it. It is 
critical now more than ever that there 
be a successful outcome of the review 
conference. The United States is en- 
gaged in its preparation for this impor- 
tant event, and the U.N. General 
Assembly will address this matter this 
fall. 

Agreements for Cooperation 

An area of great interest to me as a 
lawyer has been the negotiation of 
agreements for nuclear cooperation. A 
number of new U.S. agreements have 
entered into force or been negotiated 
since 1981. Those with Morocco, 
Bangladesh, Peru, and Indonesia had 
been negotiated prior to 1981 but were 
brought into force in the last 2 years. 
Negotiations with Egypt were concluded 
early in 1981, and the agreement is now 
in force. Its provisions are tailored to 
limit cooperation, for the most part, to 
research and power applications utilizing 
only low-enriched uranium. It has been 
praised as a model agreement for use in 
regions of political sensitivity. 

Most recently we concluded negotia- 
tions with Sweden and Norway on 
agreements which, upon entering into 
force, provide advance approval by the 
U.S. Government for the transfer of 
U.S. -supplied fuel to the United 
Kingdom or France for the purpose of 
reprocessing. Such understandings with 
the United States are obviously impor- 
tant to nations with well-developed 
nuclear power programs. These are the 
first two agreements negotiated in ac- 
cordance with the plutonium use policy 
of the Reagan Administration which was 
announced in the summer of 1982. 

Negotiations are continuing with 
Japan in an effort to conclude a new 
agreement for cooperation. Such an 
agreement will obviate the need for any 



extension of the U.S. -Japan accord 
regarding continued reprocessing of 
U.S. -supplied fuel at the Tokai 
reprocessing facility. Importantly, it will 
provide objective arrangements for ap- 
proving the reprocessing of U.S. fuel in 
yet to be constructed facilities in Japan. 
It would be an agreement which would 
provide for close cooperation between 
the United States and Japan well into 
the next century. 

International Export Guidelines 

Extended efforts have been undertaken 
to consult among supplier nations to 
refine internationally accepted terms for 
nuclear export controls. Experts from 
several nations constituting the NPT 
Zangger committee have met on a 
number of occasions. These efforts have 
produced improved understandings of 
the procedures which are most effective 
for reasonable export control. Discus- 
sions have focused on a technology-by- 
technology basis, with the most critical 
technologies being addressed first. When 
this work is completed, there will be in 
place an improved, internationally ac- 
cepted regime which contains greater 
detail and clarity. The outcome of this 
important effort should provide increas- 
ed confidence to exporting and import- 
ing nations regarding uniformity of na- 
tional control measures. 



Nuclear Safety 

Let me mention the topic of nuclear 
safety which I think is of particular in- 
terest to this group. Earlier this year, 
Assistant Secretary of State [for Oceans 
and International Environmental and 
Scientific Affairs] James Malone pro- 
posed the concept of an academy to pro- 
vide training on an international scale in 
nuclear safety. Establishment of such a 
facility would introduce a worldwide au- 
dience to nuclear safety training pro- 
grams available in the United States and 



facilitate more effective use of nuclear 
power by helping reduce the possibility 
of safety-related problems. The Depart- 
ment of State is now in the process of 
consulting with representatives from a 
broad spectrum of the nuclear energy 
field, including major equipment 
manufacturers, architect-engineers, na- 
tional laboratories, the university com- 
munity, and other U.S. Government 
agencies. Following these consultations, 
it is hoped that a consensus will emerge 
forming the basis for further detailed 
recommendations leading to the 
establishment of the academy. 

As many of you may know, Manning 
Muntzing, past President of the 
American Nuclear Society, has proposed 
consideration of an international com- 
mission on nuclear safety. The purpose 
of the commission would be to bring 
about a greater degree of uniformity in 
nuclear safety standards throughout the 
world. This idea is being considered in- 
ter alia by a special committee chaired 
by Professor Claude Zangger. The 
United States has taken the position 
that the concept of such a commission 
has considerable merit. We are en- 
couraged by its development so far and 
look forward to its ultimate implementa- 
tion. We will continue to take an active 
part in continuing discussions to give 
further shape to this idea. 

This concludes my remarks— a pre- 
sentation intended to demonstrate the 
accomplishments of this Administration 
since coming to office. In closing, I 
should note the obvious: that while suc- 
cess is often measured by the outcome 
of events, some very positive non- 
proliferation accomplishments are 
measured by events which have not hap- 
pened. I think we all prefer it to remain 
that way. In the course of my remarks, 
I have noted some specific tasks that lie 
ahead. These tasks, in many respects, 
cannot be accomplished without the ac- 
tive support of the nations of this world 
dedicated to the development of nuclear 
power in a safe and proliferation free 
environment. We are confident of suc- 
cess in making substantial progress and, 
in fact, reaching many of these goals in 
the near future and beyond. 



'Egypt (Feb. 1981), Papua New Guinea 
(Jan. 1983), Nauru (June 1982), Vietnam 
(June 1982), and Uganda (Oct. 1982). ■ 



58 



Department of State Bulletin 



PACIFIC 

Marshall Islands Voters Approve 
Free Association With U.S. 



On September 7, the electorate of the 
Marshall Islands voted in significant 
numbers to approve the Compact of 
Free Association. Final unofficial results 
from the U.N. observed plebiscite show 
an approximate 60% approval margin 
for the compact. The vote was preceded 
by a public education program ad- 
ministered by the Marshall Islands 
Government. 

Under the compact and its sub- 
sidiary agreements, which were 
negotiated over a 14-year period, the 
Marshall Islands will be fully self- 
governing and will conduct its own 
foreign and domestic affairs. The United 
States will provide economic assistance 
to the island nation of 32,000 people and 
will guarantee its freedom and ter- 
ritorial integrity through the defense 
and security authority granted it by the 
compact. 

The compact will come into effect 
after it has been approved by the U.S. 
Congress and the present trusteeship ar- 
rangement has been terminated. Presi- 
dent Reagan, in a televised address, has 
committed his support to the compact, 
and the Administration plans an early 
submission to Congress. The Mar- 
shallese people have long sought the ter- 
mination of the trusteeship. Their vote 
in the plebiscite, which is recognized as 
a sovereign act of self-determination, 
will provide the basis for termination of 
the trusteeship status. 



The plebiscite in the Marshall 
Islands was preceded by an intense 
political campaign which highlighted 
several of the issues in the compact. 
Chief among these are the provisions of 
the negotiated settlement which address 
the legacy of the nuclear weapons 
testing program conducted by the 
United States in the Marshall Islands 
between 1946 and 1958. Most of the 
traditional and elected political leader- 
ship of the Marshall Islands urged ap- 
proval of the compact, and in the end 
their advice was followed by a majority 
of the Marshallese people. 

The Marshall Islands is one of the 
three states of the Trust Territory of 
the Pacific Islands (TTPI) to conduct 
plebiscites on the Compact of Free 
Association. Palau, on the western end 
of the Trust Territory, conducted its 
plebiscite on February 10, 1983, and the 
compact was approved by a 62% majori- 
ty. However, conflicts between the Con- 
stitution and the compact must be 
resolved. In the Federated States of 
Micronesia, 79% of the people voted to 
approve the compact on June 21. The 
Federated States has also completed its 
government approval process. 

The compact defines the relationship 



between the United States and the new 
Micronesian states, as well as their in- 
ternational political status after the 
trusteeship is terminated. Now that the 
people of the Marshall Islands have ap- 
proved the compact, it is ready for sub- 
mission to the U.S. Congress where it 
requires majority approval by both 
Houses. After such approval, the United 
States will take up the question of 
trusteeship termination in the United 
Nations. 

The Northern Mariana Islands, a 
fourth political jurisdiction in the Trust 
Territory, voted in 1975 to approve a 
negotiated commonwealth arrangement 
with the United States. Under this ar- 
rangement, the people of the Northern 
Mariana Islands will become U.S. 
citizens and U.S. sovereignty will extend 
to the islands when the trusteeship is 
terminated. All four political jurisdic- 
tions of the Trust Territory now have 
locally elected constitutional govern- 
ments. 

The United States has administered 
the Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands since 1947 under the Trusteeship 
Agreement with the United Nations. 
The islands comprising the TTPI were 
administered by Japan under a League 
of Nations mandate between World 
War I and World War II and were 
liberated from Japanese control by U.S. 
forces during the last years of World 
War II. Today, economic activity in the 
islands is centered in agriculture, 
fishing, and tourism. The compact con- 
tains incentives for investment, trade, 
and business development which will 
assist the islands in developing a 
stronger private sector. The compact 
also guarantees economic development 
assistance from the United States. 



Press release 342 of Sept. 15, 1983. 



November 1983 



59 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Economic Growth and 

U.S. Policy in Central America 



by Kenneth W. Dam 

Address before the Forum Club in 
Houston on September 14, 1983. Mr. 
Dam is Deputy Secretary of State. 

President Reagan spoke on April 27 to a 
special joint session of Congress to ex- 
plain our response to the problems in 
Central America. He outlined a policy 
based on four interlocking elements: 
democracy, dialogue, defense, and 
development. 

First, and I quote the President: 

We will support democracy, reform, and 
human freedom. This means using our 
assistance, our powers of persuasion, and our 
legitimate "leverage" to bolster humane 
democratic systems where they already exist 
and to help countries on their way to that 
goal as quickly as human institutions can be 
changed. . . . We will work at human rights 
problems, not walk away from them. 

Second, we favor negotiations and 
dialogue to resolve conflicts in ways that 
promote the development of democracy. 
The President's special envoy, former 
Senator Richard Stone, is working to 
facilitate negotiations both within and 
among the countries of Central America. 
We welcome the meeting that took place 
August 28 in Bogota, Colombia, between 
representatives of El Salvador's Peace 
Commission and the guerrillas. And we 
support the regional Contadora process, 
in which five Central American nations, 
including Nicaragua, are engaged with 
their nearest neighbors. 

Third, to give diplomacy a chance to 
work, we are using military assistance 
as a shield to help Central American 
countries defend themselves. This shield 
should foreclose a military victory by 
antidemocratic forces supported through 
Nicaragua by Cuba and the Soviet 
Union. 

Fourth, and again I quote the Presi- 
dent: 

In response to the challenge of world 
recession and, in the case of El Salvador, in 
response to the unrelenting campaign of 
economic sabotage by the guerrillas, we will 
support economic development. 

It is this economic dimension of our 
policy toward Central America that I 
should like to focus on today. Amidst all 
the debate over the situation in Central 



America, surprisingly little attention has 
been paid to what should be done about 
the region's pressing economic troubles. 

Few would deny that economic dif- 
ficulties lie at the heart of much of Cen- 
tral America's instability or that sound 
economic growth is vital to the region's 
future. Promoting that growth in a 
framework of equitable development is a 
major focus of our policy. Our assistance 
to the region makes the point: 81C of 
every dollar of U.S. aid to Central 
America this fiscal year is devoted to 
economic goals. And now the National 
Bipartisan Commission on Central 
America, headed by Henry Kissinger, 
has begun to give special attention to 
the region's long-term development 
needs. 

So it is fitting that we take a mo- 
ment to assess both the obstacles to 
growth in Central America and how 
they might be overcome. 

Potential for Economic Growth 

Let me begin with something that is 
often overlooked. Central America is 
clearly capable of strong and sustained 
economic growth. That is the proven 
record of the 1950s, the 1960s, and most 
of the 1970s. 

From 1960 to 1979, real gross 
domestic product (GDP) in the United 
States grew by an average of 3.7% per 
year; the industrialized market 
economies as a whole grew at a rate of 
4.2% per year. During those same 20 
years, Central America did more than 
keep up. According to the World Bank, 
every country in Central America grew 
faster than the United States and faster 
even than the industrial country 
average. Annual growth rates averaged 
from a low of 4.4% in Honduras to a 
high of 6.3% in Costa Rica. 

It is also true, of course, that Cen- 
tral America's population growth during 
those same 20 years was among the 
highest in the world, averaging about 
3%. Even so, per capita income in- 
creased in every country. And, in each 
case, the percentage of total production 
accounted for by manufacturing and 
other industrial activity increased. For 



instance, between 1960 and 1979 in- 
dustrial activity in Honduras rose from 
19% of total production to 26%. 

In the mid-1970s, in fact, Central 
America's economic prospects attracted 
a major Japanese investment campaign. 
In El Salvador, for example, Japanese 
firms were particularly active in textiles 
and electrical appliances. By 1978, Japai 
was El Salvador's second largest foreigr 
investor. 

Against such a favorable back- 
ground, how is it that Central America's 
rapid development lost momentum? Hov 
do economic problems relate to today's 
tragic conflicts? Many factors are in- 
volved, but three stand out: local social 
and political conflicts, the impact of the 
global economic recession, and the 
spread of guerrilla warfare and attacks 
on the economy. Let me take each in 
turn. 

First, local social and political con- 
flicts: in Central America, misrule and 
maldistribution of the benefits of 
development span many years. The 
region was still relatively quiet political- 
ly when I traveled there briefly 5 years 
ago. But even then the underlying 
economic problems and social tensions 
were unmistakable. In major cities, high 
walls separated palatial homes from the 
deepest squalor. Growth was slowly im- 
proving the lot of many people, but 
growth was also increasing expectations 
And except for Costa Rica, there were 
few democratic outlets to help resolve 
frustrations and social tensions peaceful 
ly. The repression and instability that 
ensued proved bad for both business anc 
labor. Over the past 5 years, social con- 
flicts and political uncertainty have in- 
creasingly prevented needed new invest 
ment and have set back development. 

The second obstacle to growth was 
a series of adverse developments in the 
world economy. Beginning in the late 
1970s, the prices of Central America's 
basic export crops plummeted. Consider 
the four principal exports of the region. 
Coffee is the single most important ex- 
port product for most countries in the 
area. Bumper crops in Brazil and Colom 
bia caused world coffee prices to fall by 
more than 26% in nominal terms be- 
tween 1977 and 1980. Cotton is the sec- 
ond most important export of El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. In 
1981, cotton prices stopped keeping pace 
with world inflation and fell by some 
20% in nominal terms in just 9 months. 
The world price for bananas, a mainstay 
for Costa Rica and Honduras, also failed 
to keep pace with world inflation rates. 



60 



Department of State Bulletin 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



The price of sugar, meanwhile, fell near 
its historic lowpoint in real terms. 

The rise in import costs was nearly 
as damaging as this fall in export 
revenues. Two of Central America's 
most important imports are petroleum 
and financial capital borrowed from hard 
currency countries. In 1978 and 1979, 
the second oil shock almost doubled the 
price of imported oil. And in the 1980s, 
the higher cost of capital on world finan- 
cial markets increased the cost of rolling 
over old debt and contracting new debt 
to offset falling export revenues. 

The result was a shocking economic 
dislocation. By 1981, it actually took two 
bags of Central American coffee to buy 
what one bag had bought in 1978. The 
shift in overall terms of trade meant 
that Costa Rica, for example, had to ex- 
port 1.7 times as much to pay for the 
same amount of imports as 3 years 
before. 

Domestic policy responses in Central 
America to these changed circumstances 
were generally slow and sometimes inap- 
propriate. This led to the flight of local 
capital, heavy external indebtedness, 
and vitality-sapping controls. The Cen- 
tral American Common Market, the 
vehicle for preferential trade within the 
region, weakened rapidly as the 
economy of each of its members declined 
and grew more protectionist. The value 
of trade among Central American na- 
tions fell by one-third in nominal terms, 
from a high point of over $1.1 billion in 
1980 to $775 million in 1982. In real 
terms the decline was much greater. 

No Central American nation escaped 
the effects of this general decline. Even 
democratic Costa Rica, which faced 
fewer of the political and social 
challenges prevalent elsewhere in the 
region, went into a deep economic 
slump. Until 1980, Costa Rica's real 
growth rate had averaged more than 6% 
per year— the highest in the region. In 
1982, in contrast, economic activity in 
Costa Rica declined 9%. 

The economy of El Salvador con- 
tracted even faster. The reason is that 
El Salvador has been hit hardest by the 
third— and, in certain cases, the most 
important— factor in Central America's 
economic decline: the disruption of 
economic life by guerrilla violence. 

In a nation where safe drinking 
water is scarce, guerrillas have 
destroyed water pumping stations and 
the transmission towers that carry the 
energy to run them. They have 
destroyed 55 of El Salvador's 260 
bridges and damaged many more. In a 
22-month period ending last November 



they caused over 5,000 electrical inter- 
ruptions—an average of almost 8 a day. 
In 1982 alone, the guerrillas destroyed 
over 200 buses. Less than half the roll- 
ing stock of the railways remains opera- 
tional. 

In a nation where overpopulation is 
endemic, where employment is hard to 
find, and where capital investment must 
be nurtured, guerrilla attacks have 
forced the closing of factories, the aban- 
donment of farms, and the displacement 
of thousands of workers. One out of 
eight of El Salvador's most productive 
land reform cooperatives is either aban- 
doned or operating only sporadically 
because of guerrilla violence. 

The result has been human as well 
as economic disaster. On the average, 
every man, woman, and child in El 
Salvador is one-third poorer today then 
4 years ago. During the off-season, 
agricultural unemployment is now 40%. 
In 1981, El Salvador was able to import 
only two-thirds as much by volume as in 
1977. Critical goods like medicines and 
raw materials have been cut back sharp- 
ly. And to maintain even this reduced 
level of foreign purchases, its central 
bank has had to increase net borrowings 
by almost $300 million. 

El Salvador, moreover, is not the 
only country affected by the conse- 
quences of guerrilla warfare. The spread 
of violence and uncertainty has made in- 
vestors wary of ventures anywhere in 
Central America, even in the most 
stable countries of the region, Honduras 
and Costa Rica. 

U.S. Policy 

The United States is working hard to 
help the Central Americans overcome 
these obstacles and resume strong 
economic growth. Our policy is designed 
to address each of the problems I have 
mentioned. 

First, to combat social tensions and 
the long-term instability of dictatorships, 
whether of the right or the left, we are 
supporting democratic politics and 
reform. Democracy gives people a stake 
in peaceful development. And it gives in- 
vestors the stability they need to plan 
ahead, confident that the future is less 
likely to hold arbitrary shifts in govern- 
ment policies or sudden outbreaks of 
civil strife. 

El Salvador's elected Constituent 
Assembly has, for example, twice ex- 
tended land reform legislation in 



response to popular demand; 500,000 
Salvadorans have now benefited directly 
from the land reform. Both the 
AFL-CIO and the Agency for Interna- 
tional Development are working hard to 
consolidate the reforms and to increase 
agricultural productivity. After initial 
declines, yields are beginning to increase 
again. And by developing a rural middle 
class, with money to spend on 
domestically produced goods, the land 
reform should provide an indispensable 
base for greater national output and 
employment. 

Second, to help cushion adverse 
developments in the world economy and 
complement domestic policy reforms, we 
have increased both bilateral economic 
assistance and other forms of coopera- 
tion. In this fiscal year, we are 
obligating some $625 million in bilateral 
economic assistance for Central 
America. That amount is more than four 
times greater than our military 
assistance. This economic aid includes: 

• Balance-of-payments support to 
permit needed imports of consumption 
and production goods; 

• Project money to build and im- 
prove basic assets like roads and 
bridges; 

• Technical assistance to help the 
Central American governments provide 
services to their people more efficiently; 

• Food aid; and 

• Funds for the construction of low- 
cost housing. 

We are also going beyond traditional 
economic assistance in two ways. We 
are encouraging close cooperation be- 
tween individual countries and the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund (IMF) as well 
as the development banks. This coopera- 
tion should facilitate necessary internal 
adjustments and provide essential exter : 
nal capital flows. At the same time, we 
are creating new market opportunities 
for Central American products. The 
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), which 
received strong bipartisan support in 
Congress and which the President 
signed into law just this past August 5, 
is a hallmark of our efforts to lay a 
sound basis for future growth. I shall 
return to it in a minute. 

Third, because of the guerrillas' ex- 
plicit targeting of the Salvadoran 
economy, our military assistance pro- 
gram is designed to help shield economic 
activity. Behind that shield, the 
Salvadoran economy can function, peo- 
ple can go to work, and vital public serv- 
ices can be restored. Right now a major 



November 1983 



61 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



civil-military operation is underway in 
the two provinces (San Vicente and 
Usulutan) where guerrilla activity has 
been most damaging to coffee, cotton, 
livestock, and dairy farming. This opera- 
tion is expected to permit 28 of El 
Salvador's 42 largest farm cooperatives 
to resume normal operations. Twenty 
schools and eight small hospitals have 
been opened since June. 

It is difficult to quantify the lost 
value of foregone investments and 
disrupted production. We estimate that 
all of our economic assistance since 1980 
does not fully offset guerrilla damage to 
the Salvadoran economy. But it is mak- 
ing a critical difference. 

Future Prospects 

What does the future hold? The answer, 
of course, depends on the ability of our 
friends in Central America to design and 
implement policies that will go beyond 
immediate needs and improve conditions 
for long-term development. 

But we can certainly help. U.S. 
businesses have relatively small stakes 
in Central America. At the end of last 
year, for example, total U.S. direct in- 
vestment in Central America was less 
than one-half of 1% of U.S. investment 
abroad. Nonetheless, economic develop- 
ment in Central America is in the na- 
tional interest of the United States. The 
peace and prosperity of our neighbors is 
a goal worth spending money on, even a 
lot of money. 

So it is not surprising that many 
Americans have recently begun talking 
about a "Marshall Plan" for Central 
America. Americans are every bit as 
committed to the peace and prosperity 
of Central America as they were to the 
reconstruction of Europe after World 
War II. 

But the term "Marshall Plan" should 
not be taken literally. The analogy be- 
tween postwar Europe and present-day 
Central America is less than precise. 
Postwar Europe faced problems of 
reconstruction, not of long-term develop- 
ment and immediate defense. Europe's 
internal conflicts and even occasional 
violence were contained by democractic 
experience and widespread belief in a 
new future. And Europe had a large 
pool of trained manpower with a long in- 
dustrial tradition. For all of these 
reasons, massive infusions of capital 



were quickly useable in postwar Europe. 
The problems of Central America are 
different. 

But if the term "Marshall Plan" is 
used to emphasize the high priority we 
are already giving to economic 
assistance for the region, it is consistent 
with our thinking. Central America 
needs relatively high levels of assistance. 
It needs them now and perhaps for 
some years to come. It needs them for 
both development and defense. And it 
needs them to restore destroyed and 
deteriorated assets. 

As the region recovers its balance, 
however, we will want to ensure that 
Central America's economies do not suc- 
cumb to the tendency of some small, 
developing economies to adjust to large 
inflows of capital in ways that create 
permanent dependence. Massive inflows 
of aid can reduce the incentives for 
domestic saving. They can help maintain 
exchange rates at levels that discourage 
domestic investment. And the necessari- 
ly large role of governments in using 
foreign aid can also inflate the size of 
the public sector at the expense of more 
dynamic private enterprise. 

Looking to the future, then, I would 
suggest six considerations that should be 
kept in mind in determining realistic 
levels of assistance for Central Ameria 
after the present emergency. 

The first is the one I have just 
outlined: the need to avoid impairing 
the region's independent economic 
potential by fostering dependence or 
undermining productivity. Nicaragua 
provides a concrete illustration. Since 
July 1979, Nicaragua has benefited from 
unprecedented levels of economic 
assistance from around the world. Their 
own figures indicate that they received 
more than $500 million in assistance 
loans each year from 1980 to 1982. Dur- 
ing the Sandinistas' first 22 months in 
power, the United States was 
Nicaragua's single largest bilateral donor 
of assistance, and we supported them 
when they applied to the international 
financial institutions for multilateral aid. 

In spite of these high levels of aid, 
and an initial spurt of growth in 1979 
and 1980, the Nicaraguan economy is 
now declining rapidly. We do not know 
just how rapidly because the Nicaraguan 
Government no longer publishes timely 
statistics. We do know that the public 
sector's share of gross national product 
(GNP), which was 15% before the 
revolution, reached 41% in 1980, and is 



even higher today. The indications are 
that the growth of the nationalized sec- 
tor has been accompanied by disastrous 
losses in production. And little of the 
available external assistance has gone 
into developing the productive activities 
that will be needed to sustain 
Nicaragua's praiseworthy new literacy 
and public health programs. Arturo 
Cruz, once the Director of Nicaragua's 
Central Bank and a member of the 
revolutionary government junta, has 
concluded that: "Nicaragua is con- 
demned to be an international beggar." 

A second consideration is that 
private investment, not official aid, is 
the key to growth. Funds for invest- 
ment can come from only two sources: 
domestic savings or foreign savings, the 
latter in the form of foreign investment, 
loans, or economic assistance. To be self 
sustaining, most of the investment must 
come from domestic resources. As I 
noted in presenting the U.S. position to 
the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development in June: "Adequate incen- 
tives for people to produce, save, and in- 
vest are the heart of effective policies 
for sustained growth." 

Domestically, the nations of Central 
America can work to develop the kind ol 
business environment conducive to 
private domestic investment. Political 
stability is a prerequisite. But open 
markets, an equitable and efficient tax 
system, sound monetary and foreign ex- 
change policies, and a government com- 
mitment to encourage new enterprises 
are also needed. Sound government 
policies and nondiscriminatory legal pro- 
cedures can also help attract foreign in- 
vestment, and with it the technology anc 
know-how to increase Central America's 
international competitiveness. 

A third consideration is the 
distribution of investment between in- 
dustry and agriculture. My own convic- 
tion is that industry should be 
developed, but not at the expense of 
agriculture. In country after country, an 
increasingly productive agricultural sec- 
tor has proved to be the force driving 
economic growth. 

Central America's own record is a 
case in point. For the most part, Central 
America has been highly successful in 
selling its agricultural goods to the 
world market: coffee, cotton, sugar, 
bananas. Without disturbing the produc- 
tion of agricultural exports, the Central 
Americans can also increase their in- 
dustrial exports. In the late 1970s, they 



62 



Department of State Bulletin 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



lad already begun to achieve this goal, 
is the statistics I mentioned earlier 
demonstrate. They can do so again, and 
setter. 

This brings me to my fourth con- 
sideration: international trade is key 
to Central America's future growth. 
Although Central American domestic 
markets are relatively small, Central 
America enjoys a similar resource base 
ind shorter transportation lines to 
major markets than the five members of 
the Association of South East Asian Na- 
tions (ASEAN). The ASEAN nations 
tiave had an average growth rate of 
ibout 6% over the last decade. With the 
xception of the Singapore city-state, 
:he ASEAN nations are, like Central 
America, engaged mainly in agriculture 
ind the production of basic commodities. 
But unlike the Central American Com- 
mon Market, they have not protected 
themselves behind a common tariff bar- 
ier. Instead, they have fostered growth 
;hrough open markets and exports, com- 
ained with cooperative economic policies 
ind joint industrial projects. The ex- 
Derience of the ASEAN nations con- 
firms what common sense suggests— 
;hat the Central American nations 
should also be able to compete effective- 
y in world markets. 

A fifth consideration is that we 
should commit ourselves to making 
the benefits of American trade and 
commercial investment available to 

entral America. For years, Latin 
American experts have been telling us 
that what our neighbors wanted and 
needed most was a long-term U.S. com- 
mitment to their stable growth. That is 
why the President worked so hard on 
the Caribbean Basin Initiative. The CBI 
is an innovative 12-year program of one- 
way free trade and tax incentives for 27 
nations in the Caribbean and Central 
America. The CBI provides market- 
Driented incentives for investment and 
business in the region, based on free 
trade and free investment flow. It em- 
phasizes private enterprise and 
recognizes that private investment is the 
engine of development. We expect the 
designation of the first CBI beneficiaries 
to take place in November and the 
12-year free trade provisions to go into 
effect in January. 

By harnessing normal market forces 
to foster a growth pattern appropriate 
to the region, the CBI should attract 



capital and create employment oppor- 
tunities on a lasting basis. It is an ap- 
proach that creates opportunities 
without dependence. I believe it should 
typify much of our thinking about how 
to promote future growth in the area. 

My sixth and final thought is that 
we should do more to help meet the 
basic human needs of the people of 
Central America. On a world scale, 
these are "middle-income" countries. But 
continued technical assistance and other 
forms of cooperation in health, educa- 
tion, and population are still essential. 
Indeed, because they are our neighbors, 
the grounds for a special U.S. effort are 
strong. 

Our private sector could and, I 
believe, should play a major role— both 
independently and in cooperation with 
the Agency for International Develop- 
ment. There is great scope for univer- 
sities, businesses, religious organiza- 
tions, and even local governments to 
cooperate with their counterparts in 
Central America. The needs are great 
for improved training, transfer of tech- 
nology, health services, and other 
cooperation to better the quality of life 
in both urban and rural areas. 

Freedom: The Key to 
Dynamic Growth 

The United States is now on the road to 
a sustained economic recovery; most 
other industrialized nations are not far 



behind. The challenge is to transform 
this revival into a truly global recovery, 
based on renewed growth in world trade 
and investment. 

Central America, which is so close 
and so important to the United States, 
must share fully in this recovery. I think 
it can. The six considerations I have out- 
lined today are designed to do just that. 
Central America can avoid dependency, 
strengthen its private sector, develop 
agriculture as well as industry, and in- 
crease its foreign trade. In turn, the 
United States can ensure the availability 
of American markets and enterprise, 
and cooperate to better meet the basic 
human needs of Central America's 
people. 

The key to establishing this dynamic 
is freedom. Freedom from outside inter- 
vention. Freedom from tyranny. And 
freedom to create. As President Reagan 
stated in his September 1981 speech to 
the IMF and World Bank: 

Only when the human spirit is allowed to 
invent and create, only when individuals are 
given a personal stake in deciding economic 
policies and benefiting from their success- 
only then can societies remain economically 
alive, dynamic, prosperous, progressive, and 
free. 

That is our goal: neighbors who are 
both free and independent. Let us move 
now to an era of economic and political 
cooperation, securely founded on 
peaceful development. ■ 



Border-Crossing Documents for Mexicans 



The Department of State and the Im- 
migration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) will end a pilot program involving 
the issuance of border-crossing 
documents to Mexican applicants on 
August 31, 1983. During this program, 
the INS ceased to issue border-crossing 
documents to Mexicans at places of en- 
try on the border between Del Rio and 
Brownsville, Texas. The INS will resume 
issuance of border-crossing documents. 

American consular officers at 
Matamoros, Ciudad Juarez, Tijuana, 
Nuevo Laredo, and Hermosillo will con- 
tinue issuing border-crossing documents. 
Mexican applicants may now apply at 
the office (either U.S. Consulate or INS 
post) most convenient to them. This is 
the same arrangement which was in ef- 
fect before the pilot program began. 

The border-crossing document per- 
mits citizens of Mexico to enter the 
United States for a maximum period of 
72 hours, within 25 miles of the border. 



It does not permit the holder to work in 
the United States. 

The pilot program was ended early 
because of concern expressed in some 
U.S. border cities that it might reduce 
the number of Mexican visitors to the 
United States. 

As an additional step to facilitate 
cross-border travel, all American con- 
sular offices in Mexico will begin is- 
suance later this year of a new travel 
document to Mexican citizens. This docu- 
ment will combine the advantage of 
faster border inspection of the border- 
crossing card with the greater flexibility 
of tourist or business visas. 

The Department of State and the 
INS will continue to monitor and 
evaluate the overall effectiveness of the 
program for issuance of border-crossing 
documentation. 



Press release 332 of Aug. 30, 1983. 



November 1983 



63 



TREATIES 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Recommendations relating to the furtherance 

of principles and objectives of the Antarctic 

treaty (TIAS 4780). Done at London Oct. 7, 

1977. 

Notification of approval: France, Sept. 8, 

1983. 

Entered into force: Sept. 8, 1983. 

Arbitration 

Convention on the recognition and enforce- 
ment of foreign arbitral awards. Done at 
New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force 
June 7, 1959; for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970. 
TIAS 6997. 
Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, Sept. 9, 

11W3. 

Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague 
Dec. 16, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 14, 
1971. TIAS 7192. 
Ratification deposited: Jamaica, Sept. 16, 

1983. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done 
at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into 
force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7470. 
Ratification deposited: Jamaica, Sept. 16, 

1983. 

Coffee 

International coffee agreement 1983, with an- 
nexes. Done at London Sept. 16, 1982. 1 
Instrument of ratification signed by Pres- 
ident: Sept. 6, 1983. 
Ratifications deposited: Central African 
Republic, July 27, 1983; Ireland, July 28, 
1983; Singapore, Aug. 18, 1983; U.S., 
Sept. 15, 1983. 

Declarations of provisional application 
deposited: Mexico, Aug. 23, 1983; Venezuela, 
Aug. 25, 1983. 

Extension of the international coffee agree- 
ment, 1976 (TIAS 8683). Done at London 
Sept. 25, 1981. Entered into force Oct. 1, 
1982. TIAS 10439. 
Definitive acceptances deposited: Finland, 

Aug. 30, 1983; Ireland, July 28, 1983. 

Commodities — Common Fund 

Agreement establishing the Common Fund 

for Commodities, with schedules. Done at 

Geneva June 27, 1980. 1 

Ratifications deposited: Central African 

Republic, Aug. 2, 1983; Equatorial Guinea, 

July 22, 1983; Syrian Arab Republic, Sept. 8, 

1983. 



Customs 

Convention establishing a Customs Coopera- 
tion Council, with annex. Done at Brussels 
Dec. 15, 1950. Entered into force Nov. 4, 
1952; for the U.S. Nov. 5, 1970. TIAS 7063. 
Accession deposited: China, July 18, 1983. 

Environmental Modification 

Convention on the prohibition of military or 
any other hostile use of environmental 
modification techniques, with annex. Done at 
Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force 
Oct. 5, 1978; for the U.S. Jan. 17, 1980. 
TIAS 9614. 
Accession deposited: Greece, Aug. 23, 1983. 

Finance 

Articles of agreement of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
formulated at the Bretton Woods Conference 
July 1-22, 1944. Entered into force Dec. 27, 
1945. TIAS 1502. 

Signature and acceptance deposited: Antigua 
& Barbuda, Sept. 22, 1983; Malta, Sept. 26, 
1983. 

Fisheries 

Convention on future multilateral cooperation 
in the northwest Atlantic fisheries. Done at 
Ottawa Oct. 24, 1978. Entered into force 
Jan. 1, 1979. 2 
Instrument of accession signed by President: 

Sept. 6, 1983. 

Eastern Pacific Ocean tuna fishing agree- 
ment, with protocol. Done at San Jose 
Mar. 15, 1983. 1 
Signatures: Guatemala, Aug. 5, 1983; 

Honduras, Aug. 22, 1983. 
Instrument of ratification signed by Presi - 
dent: Sept. 6, 1983. 

Human Rights 

International covenant on civil and political 
rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966. 
Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. 2 
Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, Aug. 18, 

1983. 

International covenant on economic, social 
and cultural rights. Done at New York 
Dec. 16, 1966. 
Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, Aug. 18, 

1983. 

Jute 

International agreement on jute and jute 
products, 1982, with annexes. Done at 
Geneva Oct. 1, 1982. ' 
Signature: Turkey, June 30, 1983. 
Definitive signature: Canada, June 30, 1983. 
Approval deposited: China, June 30, 1983. 
Notification of provisional application de- 
posited: Finland, U.K., 3 June 30, 1983. 
Ratifications deposited: Norway, Sweden, 
June 30, 1983. 



Law 

Statute of The Hague Conference on Private ** 
International Law. Done at The Hague 
Oct. 9-31, 1951. Entered into force July 15, 
1955; for the U.S. Oct. 15, 1964. TIAS 5710 
Acceptance deposited: Uruguay, July 27, 
1983. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, on the International 
Maritime Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 
6490, 8606, 10374). Adopted at London 
Nov. 17, 1977. ' 
Acceptance deposited: Indonesia, July 29, 

1983. 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, on the International 
Maritime Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 
6490, 8606, 10374). Adopted at London 
Nov. 15, 1979. 1 

Acceptances deposited: Cape Verde, Aug. 3C 
1983; Indonesia, July 29, 1983; St. Lucia, 
U.K., Sept. 14, 1983. 



Nuclear Material— Physical Protection 

Convention on the physical protection of 
nuclear material, with annexes. Done at 
Vienna Oct. 26, 1979.' 
Signature: Turkey, Aug. 23, 1983. 4 

Patents— Plant Varieties 

International convention for the protection c 

new varieties of plants of Dec. 2, 1961, as 

revised. Done at Geneva Oct. 23, 1978. 

Entered into force Nov. 8, 1981. TIAS 

10199. 

Ratification deposited: U.K., Aug. 24, 1983. 

Phonograms 

International convention for the protection c 
performers, producers of phonograms, and 
broadcasting organizations. Done at Rome 
Oct. 26, 1961. Entered into force May 18, 
1964. 2 

Pollution 

Convention on long-range transboundary air 

pollution. Done at Geneva Nov. 13, 1979. 

Entered into force Mar. 16, 1983. TIAS 

10541. 

Ratification deposited: Greece, Aug. 30, 

1983. 

Property— Industrial 

Convention of Paris for the protection of in- 
dustrial property of Mar. 20, 1883, as re- 
vised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. 
Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970, for the 
U.S. Sept. 5, 1970, except for Arts. 1-12 
entered into force May 19, 1970, for the U.S 
Aug. 25, 1983. TIAS 6923, 7727. 

Property— Industrial— Classification 

Nice agreement concerning the international 
classification of goods and services for the 
purposes of the registration of marks of 



64 



Department of State Bulletir 



TREATIES 



lune 15, 1957, as revised. Done at Geneva 

Way 13, 1977. Entered into force Feb. 6, 

L979. 

instrument of ratification signed by Presi - 

lent: Sept. 6, 1983. 

Property — Intellectual 

onvention establishing the World Intellec- 
;ual Property Organization. Done at 
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force 
Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970. 
TIAS 6932. 

Accessions deposited: Haiti, Aug. 2, 1983; 
Panama, June 17, 1983. 

Refugees 

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. 
Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered in- 
;o force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1, 
1968. TIAS 6577. 
Accession deposited: Peru, Sept. 15, 1983. 

Sugar 

International sugar agreement, 1977, with 
innexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. 
Entered into force provisionally, Jan. 1, 1978; 
jefinitively, Jan. 2, 1980. TIAS 9664. 
Accession deposited ; Uruguay, Sept. 13, 

1983. 

Telecommunications 

Radio regulations, with appendices and final 
protocol. Done at Geneva Dec. 6, 1979. 
Entered into force Jan. 1, 1982, except for 
1) Arts. 25 and 66 and Appendix 43 which 
intered into force Jan. 1, 1981, and (2) cer- 
tain provisions concerning aeronautical 
mobile service which entered into force 
Feb. 1, 1983. 

Instrument of ratification signed by Presi - 
dent: Sept. 6, 1983. "■ 5 

Trade 

Agreement on import licensing procedures. 
Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into 
force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9788. 
Ratification deposited : Egypt. Sept. 6, 1983. 

Agreement on implementation of Article VI 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (anti-dumping). Done at Geneva 
Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 
1980. TIAS 9650. 
Ratification deposited : Egypt. Sept. 6, 1983. 

Treaties 

Vienna convention on the law of treaties, 
with annex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969. 
Entered into force Jan. 27, 1980. 2 
Accession deposited : Malawi, Aug. 23, 1983. 

UNIDO 

Constitution of the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization, with annexes. 



Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. 1 
Signature: Bhutan, Sept. 15, 1983. 
Ratifications deposited: Canada, Sept. 20, 
1983; Lebanon, Aug. 2, 1983; Luxembourg, 
Sept. 9, 1983; U.S., Sept. 2, 1983.» 

Whaling 

International whaling convention, as amended 
by the 1956 protocol, and schedule of whaling 
regulations. Done at Washington Dec. 2, 
1946. Entered into force Nov. 10, 1948. 
TIAS 1849, 4228. 

Notification of withdrawal: Jamaica, Sept. 20, 
1983; effective June 30, 1984. 

Women 

Convention on the elimination of all forms of 
discrimination against women. Adopted at 
New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force 
Sept. 3, 1981. 2 

Ratification deposited : Australia, July 28, 
1983. 4 ' 5 

World Heritage 

Convention concerning the protection of the 

world cultural and natural heritage. Done at 

Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force 

Dec. 17, 1975. TIAS 8226. 

Ratification deposited : Madagascar, July 19, 

1983. 



BILATERAL 

Australia 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa- 
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on income. Signed at Sydney 
Aug. 6, 1982. 
Instrument of ratification signed by Presi - 

dent: Aug. 23, 1983. 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat 
imports from Australia during the year 1983, 
with related letters. Effected by exchange of 
letters at Washington Sept. 8 and 19, 1983. 
Entered into force Sept. 19, 1983. 

Bolivia 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
May 31, 1978, (TIAS 9518) for sale of 
agricultural commodities. Effected by ex- 
change of letters at La Paz Aug. 29, 1983. 
Entered into force Aug. 29, 1983. 

Bulgaria 

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts 
of the United States, with annexes. Signed at 
Washington Sept. 22, 1983. Enters into force 
on a date to be agreed upon by exchange of 
notes following completion of internal pro- 
cedures of both governments. 

Canada 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat 
imports from Canada during the year 1983, 



with related letters. Effected by exchange of 
letters at Washington Aug. 17, 1983. 
Entered into force Aug. 17, 1983. 

Memorandum of understanding for coopera- 
tion in tracer experiment concerning air 
pollution. Signed at Ottawa Aug. 23, 1983. 
Entered into force Aug. 23, 1983. 

China 

Agreement with respect to mutual exemption 
from taxation of transportation income of 
shipping and air transport enterprises. 
Signed at Beijing Mar. 5, 1982. 
Instrument of ratification signed by Presi- 

dent: Sept. 6, 1983. 

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, 
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod- 
ucts, with annexes. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Beijing Aug. 19, 1983. Entered into 
force Aug. 19, 1983; effective Jan. 1, 1983. 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
Sept. 17, 1980, on maritime transport (TIAS 
10244). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Beijing Sept. 1 and 10, 1983. Entered into 
force Sept. 10, 1983. 

Colombia 

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil 
uses of nuclear energy, with annex and ex- 
change of notes. Signed at Bogota Jan. 8, 
1981. 
Entered into force: Sept. 7, 1983. 

Supersedes: Agreement of Mar. 28, 1977 

(TIAS 8555). 

Cook Islands 

Treaty on friendship and delimitation of the 
maritime boundary between the United 
States of America and the Cook Islands. 
Signed at Rarotonga June 11, 1980. 
Instruments of ratification exchanged: 

Sept. 8, 1983. 

Entered into force: Sept. 8, 1983. 



Denmark 

Memorandum of agreement relating to 
cooperation in mapping, charting, and 
geodesy. Signed in Washington Aug. 4, 1983. 
Entered into force Aug. 4, 1983. 

Egypt 

Agreement on the development and facilita- 
tion of tourism. Signed at Cairo Feb. 21, 
1983. 
Entered into force: Aug. 16, 1983. 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Mar. 20, 1979, (TIAS 9683) for the sales of 
agricultural commodities. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Cairo Aug. 17 and 18, 
1983. Entered into force Aug. 18, 1983. 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Nov. 23, 1982, (TIAS 10613) for the sales of 
agricultural commodities. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Cairo Aug. 18, 1983. 
Entered into force Aug. 18, 1983. 



November 1983 



65 



TREATIES 



CHRONOLOGY 



First amendment to project grant agreement 
of June 27, 1979, (TIAS 9573) for canal cities 
water and sewerage. Signed at Cairo 
Sept. 12, 1983. Entered into force Sept. 12, 
1983. 

Second amendment to project grant agree- 
ment for Ismailia thermal power plant of 
May 30, 1976, as amended (TIAS 8335, 
9137). Signed at Cairo Aug. 9, 1983. Entered 
into force Aug. 9, 1983. 

Finland 

Agreement extending project agreement of 
July 23, 1981, (TIAS 10223) for cooperation 
in the field of icebreaking technology. Signed 
at Washington May 9 and June 13, 1983. 
Entered into force June 13, 1983. 

France 

Protocol to the convention with respect to 
taxes on income and property of July 28, 
1967, as amended (TIAS 6518, 7270, 9500). 
Signed at Paris Sept. 19, 1983. Enters into 
force on the first day of the second month 
following exchange of instruments of ratifica- 
tion. 

Greece 

Agreement on defense and economic coopera- 
tion, with annex. Signed at Athens Sept. 8, 
1983. Enters into force no later than Dec. 31, 
1983, upon exchange of notes between the 
parties indicating that their respective con- 
stitutional requirements have been met. 

Macao 

International express mail agreement, with 
detailed regulations. Signed at Macau and 
Washington May 3 and June 14, 1983. 
Entered into force: Oct. 1, 1983. 

Morocco 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
July 15, 1983, for the sale of agricultural 
commodities. Effected by exchange of letters 
at Rabat Aug. 26, 1983. Entered into force 
Aug. 26, 1983. 

New Zealand 

Treaty on the delimitation of the maritime 

boundary between Tokelau and the United 

States of America. Signed at Atafu Dec. 2, 

1980. 

Instrument of ratification exchanged: Sept. 3, 

1983. 

Entered into force: Sept. 3, 1983. 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa- 
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on income, with protocol. 
Signed at Wellington July 23, 1982. 
Instrument of ratification signed by Presi- 

dent: Aug. 23, 1983. 



Agreement relating to the limitation of meat 
imports from New Zealand during the year 
1983, with related letters. Effected by ex- 
change of letters at Washington 
Sept. 8 and 9, 1983. Entered into force 
Sept. 9, 1983. 

Pakistan 

First amendment to commodity import grant 
and loan agreement of Apr. 13, 1983 (TIAS 
10378). Signed at Islamabad July 25, 1983. 
Entered into force July 25, 1983. 

Philippines 

Memorandum of agreement amending the 
agreement of Mar. 14, 1947, as amended 
(TIAS 1775, 9224), concerning military bases, 
with related note. Signed at Manila June 1, 
1983. Entered into force June 1, 1983. 

Senegal 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to or 
guaranteed by the U.S. Government and its 
agencies, with annexes. Signed at 
Washington Aug. 11, 1983. 
Entered into force: Sept. 13, 1983. 

Solomon Islands 

Agreement concerning the provision of train- 
ing related to defense articles under the U.S. 
International Military Education and Train- 
ing (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Port Moresby and Honiara June 7 
and Aug. 18, 1983. Entered into force 
Aug. 18, 1983. 

Sweden 

International express mail agreement, with 
detailed regulations. Signed at Stockholm and 
Washington Aug. 26 and 30, 1983. Entered 
into force Oct. 1, 1983. 

U.S.S.R. 

Agreement on the supply of grain. Signed at 
Moscow Aug. 25, 1983. Entered into force 
Aug. 25, 1983. 



'Not in force. 
2 Not in force for the U.S. 
'Applicable to the Bailiwicks of Jersey 
and Guernsey. 

4 With reservation(s). 
6 With declaration(s). ■ 



September 1983 



September 1 

Secretary Shultz announces that on Au- 
gust 31, a Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 
(KAL #007) was destroyed by a missile fired 
by a Soviet military aircraft. The commercia 
airliner carried 269 passengers and crew, in- 
cluding Congressman Lawrence P. McDonal 
[D-Ga.]. The Secretary adds that "the Unitec 
States reacts with revulsion to this attack" 
and "can see no explanation whatever for 
shooting down an unarmed commercial 
airlines, no matter whether it's in your 
airspace or not." President Reagan, express- 
ing his revulsion at the act, states that "the 
United States joins with other members of 
the international community in demanding a 
full explanation for this appalling and wanto 
misdeed." 

Former President Carter, former 
Secretaries of State Rusk and Rogers, and 
former U.S. Ambassador to the OAS Sol 
Linowitz meet with the National Bipartisan 
Commission on Central America at the Statt 
Department. 

Deputy White House spokesman Larry 
Speakes announces that President Reagan 
orders deployment of a new naval amphibiar 
force to the Mediterranean. The President 
also orders the aircraft carrier USS 
Eisenhower to remain in the Eastern 
Mediterranean "for an undetermined period' 
ready to assist U.S. forces as needed. 

Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir is 
elected to succeed Prime Minister Begin as 
leader of the Herut Party of Israel placing 
him in a favorable position to become the 
next Prime Minister. Prime Minister Begin 
had earlier announced his intention to resigr 

September 2 

In an emergency meeting of the UN 
Secretary Council, requested by the U.S., 
members denounce the Soviet Union for 
destroying KAL #007 and call the act 
"murder" and a "massacre." 

Ambassador Robert C. McFarlane, the 
President's personal representative in the 
Middle East, meets with President Reagan t 
review the situation in that area. 

September 3 

After meeting with Ambassador Nitze, Presi 
dent Reagan issues a statement reaffirming 
his commitment to seek a successful 
breakthrough in the INF negotiations. Am- 
bassador Nitze departs for Geneva to lead th 
U.S. delegation in the next round of talks. 

U.S., U.K. mark 200th anniversary of tb 
signing of the Treaty of Paris. In the treaty, 
the U.K. recognized U.S. independence and 
the end of the Revolutionary War. 

September 4 

State Department officials ask other nations 
to join the U.S. in steps that will make the 
Soviet Union "painfully aware" that its act 



66 



Department of State Bulletir 



CHRONOLOGY 



ias outraged the whole world. The Soviets 
should take the following steps: admit respon- 
ibility; find and punish those who ordered 
;he attack; apologize; pay reparations and 
iamages to the families of the victims; and 
illow other countries to assist in the search 
for bodies and wreckage. 

Heavy fighting continues between Chris- 
tian and Druze militias in the Shuf mountains 
j| ( iround Beirut to secure positions evacuated 
j jy Israeli troops. The Christian militia is 
driven out of Bhamdun by Druze fighters. 
Israel had rejected U.S. requests not to 
evacuate. U.S. calls on Syria to make plans 
for withdrawal. Deputy White House 
, spokesman Larry Speakes says that there are 
still no plans to expand the role, area of 
operations, or mandate of the MNF in 
, Lebanon. 

■ The International Federation of Airline 
Pilots Associations (IFALPA) calls on its 
61,000 member pilots to join in a 60-day ban 
on flights to Moscow. 

September 5 

In a televised address, President Reagan con- 
demns the Soviet Union for the "Korean 
massacre" and plays a portion of a tape (in 
Russian with written English translation pro- 
vided) of the Soviet pilots conversation with 
their ground control station. The President 
announces various U.S. actions against the 
Soviet Union. 

• Nonrenewal of transportation 
agreements and stopping the discussions; 

• Reaffirming the order, in effect since 
1981, denying Aeroflot the right to fly to the 
U.S.; 

• Cooperating with other countries and 
the ICAO [International Civil Aviation 
Organization] in ensuring the safety of civil 
aviation; 

• With other nations, pressing the ICAO 
to investigate "this crime" at an urgent 
special session; 

• Asking Congress to pass a joint resolu- 
tion of condemnation; 

• Suspending discussions on several 
bilateral, cultural, and scientific agreements 
that were under consideration; and 

• Planning to work with the countries 
that had citizens aboard the plane to seek 
reparations. 

September 7 

Secretary Shultz meets with NATO foreign 
ministers in Madrid, and they agree on the 
need for allied action in the KAL incident. 
The Soviet Foreign Minister, at the Madrid 
CSCE meeting, states "the borders of the 
Soviet Union are sacred" and "the U.S. bears 
the responsibility." Secretary Shultz says 
"there is no weight given to human values in 
that kind of statement." 

September 7-9 

Representatives of 35 nations meet in Madrid 
to sign a concluding document updating the 



1975 Helsinki Final Act. Secretary Shultz 
represents the U.S. 

September 8 

Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister 
Gromyko meet for 2 hours in Madrid. The 
Secretary demands that the Soviet Union ac- 
cept blame for the fate of the Korean 
airliner. Afterwards, he says the foreign 
minister's response was "totally 
unacceptable." 

In a letter to the chairman of the Civil 
Aeronautics Board, President Reagan asks 
the board to take additional actions against 
Aeroflot, effective September 12, 1983: 

• Suspend Aeroflot's right to sell any air 
transportation in the U.S.; 

• Preclude U.S. airlines from carrying 
traffic to, from, or within the United States 
where an Aeroflot flight is on the ticket; 

• Prohibit U.S. air carriers from selling 
tickets in the United States for transporta- 
tion on Aeroflot; 

• Direct U.S. airlines to suspend any in- 
terline service arrangements with Aeroflot; 
and 

• Prohibit U.S. carriers from accepting 
any tickets or shipping documents issued by 
Aeroflot for air travel to, from, or within the 
United States. 

President Reagan asks the chairman of 
the Civil Aeronautics Board to suspend 
Aeroflot's right to sell air transportation in 
the U.S. and prohibit U.S. air carriers from 
selling tickets for Aeroflot flights or accept- 
ing tickets or shipping documents issued by 
Aeroflot. The State Department orders 
Aeroflot to close its New York and Wash- 
ington offices. 

In Athens, the U.S. and Greece sign a 
new Defense and Economic Cooperation 
Agreement. Charge d' Affaires Alan D. 
Berlind signs for the U.S. and Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Ioannis Kapsis 
for Greece. 

September 9 

In a Moscow news conference, Chief of Staff 
of the Soviet Armed Forces Marshal Nikolai 
Ogarkov confirms that KAL #007 was shot 
down by two air-to-air missiles, and the deci- 
sion was made by the district commander of 
the Soviet defense forces on the basis of 
standing regulations. 

President Reagan proclaims Sunday, 
September 11, a national day of mourning for 
the KAL victims. 

In a statement issued by the State 
Department, U.S. calls for an immediate 
cease-fire in Lebanon, warning that Druze 
and Christians alike "have fallen victim and 
are equally threatened." 

September 12 

State Department presents two diplomatic 
notes to the Soviet Embassy: one demanding 
compensation for the lives of U.S. nationals; 
the other, presented on behalf of the 
Koreans, demanding compensation for its 
losses. Both notes are rejected. 



Members of the UN Security Council vote 
on a resolution deploring the destruction of 
the Korean airliner and declaring that such 
use of force is incompatible with the norms 
governing international behavior and con- 
siderations of humanity. The Soviet Union 
vetoes the resolution. 

Two thousand additional U.S. Marines ar- 
rive off the coast of Lebanon. Hours later, 
three more U.S. Marines are wounded. Presi- 
dent Reagan authorizes "aggressive self- 
defense" tactics to protect Marines which in- 
volves the use of naval planes and guns if 
necessary. 

September 12-14 

Prime Minister Robert G. Mugabe of Zim- 
babwe makes official working visit to 
Washington, D.C., to meet with President 
Reagan, Secretary Shultz, and other govern- 
ment officials. 

September 13 

Administration announces that Marines in 
Lebanon are now authorized to call on 
American naval and air power not only to de- 
fend themselves and their presence but also 
to defend multinational force partners. 

September 14 

President Reagan meets with the U.S. 
delegation to the ICAO council's emergency 
meeting. The delegation is led by J. Lynn 
Helms, head of the Federal Aviation 
Administration. 

U.S. House of Representatives approves 
416 to a resolution condemning the 
shooting down of the Korean airliner as "one 
of the most infamous and reprehensible acts 
in history." 

September 14-20 

Portuguese President Antonio Ramalho 
Eanes makes a state visit to the U.S. and to 
Washington, D.C., September 14-17. 

September 15 

U.S. Senate, by a vote of 95 to 0, passes a 
resolution "condemning the Soviet criminal 
destruction of the Korean civilian airliner." 

Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin 
formally resigns. 

State Department announces that in a 
September 7 plebiscite, voters in the Marshall 
Islands approve a compact of free association 
with the U.S. Final unofficial results show an 
approval margin of about 60%. The next step 
in the termination of the trusteeship is the 
submission of the compact to the Congress. 
After approval by the Congress, the United 
States would take up the question of trustee 
termination in the UN. 

At Montreal, the 33-member executive 
council of the ICAO votes 26 (U.S.) to 2 
(U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia)— 3 nations 
abstain and 2 are absent — for a resolution 
"deeply deploring " the destruction of 
KAL #007 and expressing its concern " that 
the Soviet Union has not acknowledged the 



November 1983 



67 



rw^^—^^.— .—■,.■■■- 



CHRONOLOGY 



paramount importance of the safety and lives 
of passengers and crew when dealing with 
civil aircraft intercepted in or near its ter- 
ritorial airspace." The resolution also calls for 
an investigation and urges the Soviet Union 
to cooperate. 

September 17 

Soviet Government cancels plans for Foreign 
Minister Gromyko to attend the UN General 
Assembly session. 

September 19-22 

At Secretary Shultz's invitation, Hungarian 
Foreign Minister Peter Varkonyi makes a 
working visit to Washington, D.C., to ex- 
change views on current issues and matters 
of international concern. He also met with 
other U.S. Government officials. 

President Reagan and some congressional 
leaders of both parties accept compromise 
resolution on Lebanon that would authorize 
the continued deployment of U.S. Marines in 
Lebanon for 18 more months under the War 
Powers Act. The President says that he is 
pleased that the proposed legislation "not 
only supports our policies in Lebanon but 
now enables us to advance United States 
peacekeeping interests on the solid bipartisan 
basis that has been the traditional hallmark 
of American foreign policy." 

Thirty-eighth annual session of the UN 
General Assembly begins in New York. 

U.S. and the Sultanate of Oman mark 
150th anniversary of the signing of the Trea- 
ty of Amity and Commerce. The treaty, 
signed on September 21, 1833, pledged "per- 
petual peace" between the two nations. Both 
nations, in honor of the event, hold com- 
memorative ceremonies and special activities 
on September 27 and 28. 

President Reagan issues a statement re- 
affirming his commitment to seeking a suc- 
cessful result in the INF talks. Earlier, 
NATO allies and Japan held consultations 
regarding the U.S. position in the talks which 
suggested initiatives representing significant 
further development of the U.S. proposal for 
an interim agreement and which address a 
number of Soviet concerns. The President in- 
structs Ambassador Nitze to pursue these ini- 
tiatives with Soviet negotiators. 

September 22 

House Foreign Affairs Committee approves 
30 to 6 the compromise resolution that would 
permit continued deployment of U.S. troops 
in Lebanon for an additional 18 months under 
the War Powers Act. 

September 23 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee also ap- 
proves compromise resolution for all U.S. 
Marines to stay in Lebanon. 

In Beirut, four more U.S. Marines are 
wounded. 

UN General Assembly adopts Secu- 
rity Council Resolution 537 admitting 
St. Christopher and Nevis as the 158th 
member state. 



September 24-27 

Finnish President Mauno Koivisto makes of- 
ficial working visit to Washington, D.C., to 
meet with President Reagan and other 
government officials. 

September 25 

In Damascus, Syrian Foreign Minister 
Khaddam and Saudi mediator Prince Band ar 
bin Sultan announce agreement with the 
Lebanese Government for an immediate 
cease-fire to take effect at 0600 local time the 
following morning. Before and after the an- 
nouncement, three more U.S. Marines are 
wounded. State Department says it regards 
the announcement as only "a first step" 
toward the more difficult goals of bringing 
about a strong central government in that 
country and with the withdrawal of all 
Israeli, Syrian, and Palestinian forces. 

September 26 

While attending the UN General Assembly, 
Secretary Shultz announces that the cease- 
fire has "taken effect" in Lebanon. Under the 
terms of the cease-fire, President Gemayel is 
to invite leaders of Lebanon's political and 
religious communities to begin a dialogue on 
national reconciliation. He meets with the 
Foreign Ministers of the MNF countries who 
state their joint view that the cease-fire 
observers for Lebanon have a UN affiliation. 

Following intensive consultations with 
NATO and other allies, including the Govern- 
ment of Japan, the President outlines new in- 
itiatives at the opening of the U.N. General 
Assembly. These initiatives elaborate on the 
U.S. proposal for an interim agreement and 
are designed to flexibly address a number of 
Soviet concerns. The President instructs Am- 
bassador Nitze to pursue these initiatives 
with Soviet negotiators in Geneva. 

• In the context of an agreement pro- 
viding for equal, global limits on LRINF 
missiles, the United States would be willing 
to consider a commitment not to offset the 
entire Soviet global LRINF missile deploy- 
ment by U.S. deployments of LRINF missiles 
in Europe. We would retain the right to 
deploy LRINF missiles elsewhere to reach 
the global ceiling. 

• The United States would assure the 
Soviet Union that, in the context of an agree- 
ment involving significant reductions from 
current Soviet and planned NATO deploy- 
ment levels, the U.S. would be prepared to 
apportion the reductions of Pershing II and 
ground-launched cruise missiles in an ap- 
propriate manner. 

• The United States is prepared to con- 
sider proposals involving aircraft that are 
consistent with allied criteria for an INF 
agreement. Thus, Ambassador Nitze has been 
authorized to explore possible limitations on 
specific INF aircraft and to invite the Soviets 
to offer their views on how such limitations 
could be formulated within the framework of 
the President's criteria. 



The President also notes that "reactions 
to the KAL tragedy are a timely reminder o 
just how different the Soviets' concept of 
truth and international cooperation is from 
that of the rest of the world." He continues 
"if the governments represented in this 
chamber want peace as genuinely as their 
peoples do," we can find it "by reasserting 
the moral authority of the United Nations." 

September 27 

In response to Soviet leader Andropov's 
charges that the U.S. seeks to use its militar 
force to expand its influence, interfere in the 
affairs of others, and install systems around 
the world which suit the U.S., State Depart- 
ment, officials say that "the world will be 
disappointed that Mr. Andropov's response t 
the President's major arms control initiative 
at the United Nations is a threatening 
restatement of their long standing position 
that the Soviets will maintain their monopolj 
of intermediate range missiles in Europe. Fo 
our part, we will continue to work in Geneva 
for a negotiated settlement that strengthens 
international peace and security." 

September 28 

By a vote of 270 to 161, U.S. House of 
Representatives approve legislation that 
would invoke the War Powers Act in 
Lebanon and authorize deployment of U.S. 
Marines in Beirut for an additional 18 
months. 

President Reagan signs congressional 
resolution which condemns the Soviet Union 
for the destruction of the commercial airline) 

September 29 

By a vote of 54 of 46, U.S. Senate adopts a 
resolution and the House agrees to accept th 
Senate bill by a vote of 253 to 156 that woul 
authorize continued deployment of U.S. 
Marines in Lebanon for 18 more months. 

Dr. Henry Kissinger, Chairman of the 
National Bipartisan Commission on Central 
America announces that the Commission will 
visit Central American countries Oct. 9-15 fo 
include Panama, Oct. 9-11; Costa Rica, 
Oct. 11-12; El Salvador, Oct. 12-13; 
Guatemala, Oct. 13-14; Honduras, 
Oct. 14-15; and Nicaragua, Oct. 15. The 
Commission will meet with Government 
heads and high-level officials but will not 
meet with Salvadoran or Nicaraguan rebel 
groups or visit Cuba. 

Egyptian President Mohamed Hosni 
Mubarak makes official working visit to 
Washington, D.C., to meet with President 
Reagan and other government officials. ■ 



68 



Department of State Bulletir 



PRESS RELEASES 



PUBLICATIONS 



Department of State 



3 ress releases may be obtained from the Of- 
Ice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Subject 

Shipping Coordinating Com- 
mittee (SCC), Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS), 
working group on safety 
of navigation, Sept. 29. 

8/31 Shultz: news conference. 

9/1 Shultz: news briefing on 

downing of Korean 
commercial aircraft. 

9/1 U.S., Thailand sign textile 

agreement, July 27 and 
Aug. 8. 

9/2 SCC, SOLAS, working group 

on ship design and equip- 
ment, Sept. 20. 

9/2 Shultz: address before 

Shimoda Conference, War- 
renton, Va. 

9/6 Shultz: statement on down- 
ing of Korean aircraft. 

8/30 Bordercrossing documents 
for Mexicans. 

9/8 SCC, National Committee for 
the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution, Nov. 29. 

9/8 SCC, SOLAS, working group 
on the carriage of 
dangerous goods, Oct. 25. 

9/9 U.S. Organization of the In- 

ternational Radio Con- 
sultative Committee 
(CCIR) adopts worldwide 
standard for the digital 
coding of TV signals at the 
studio. 
Shultz: remarks to print jour- 
nalists, Madrid, Sept. 7. 
Program for the official 
working visit of Zimbabwe 
Prime Minister Robert G. 
Mugabe, Sept. 12-14. 
Shultz: remarks to TV jour- 
nalists, Madrid, Sept. 7. 
Shultz: remarks following 
meeting with Soviet 
Foreign Minister 
Gromyko, Madrid, Sept. 8. 
Program for the state visit 
of Portugal's President 
Ramalho Eanes, 
Sept. 14-20. 



345 


9/21 


*346 


9/21 


*347 


9/21 


*348 


9/22 



341 9/12 Shultz: address at the con- 

cluding session of CSCE, 
Madrid, Sept. 9. 

342 9/15 Marshall Islands voters ap- 

prove free association with 
the U.S. 
*343 9/19 U.S. Organization for the In- 
ternational Telegraph and 
Telephone Consultative 
Committee (CCITT), study 
group D, Oct. 14. 
*344 9/19 Advisory Committee to the 
U.S. National Section of 
the Inter-American 
Tropical Tuna Commis- 
sion, Oct. 6. 

Shultz: statement before the 
House Foreign Affairs 
Committee. 

Shultz: Statement before the 
Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. 

150 years of U.S.-Omani re- 
lations. 

Program for the official 
working visit of Finland's 
President Mauno Koivisto, 
Sept. 24-27. 

Program for the official 
working visit of British 
Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, Sept. 28-30. 

CCITT, joint working party 
on integrated services 
digital network (ISDN), 
Oct. 27. 
9/28 CCITT, Oct. 26 
9/28 SCC, Oct. 26. 
9/28 CCITT, study group A, 
Oct. 25. 
*354 9/28 SCC, SOLAS, working group 
on radio communications, 
Oct. 20. 
*355 9/28 CCITT, ISDN technical 
working group, 
Oct. 17-21. 
*356 9/28 Program for the official 

working visit of Egyptian 
President Mohamed Hosni 
Mubarak, Sept. 29-Oct. 3. 

*Not printed in the Bulletin. ■ 



*349 9/26 



*350 9/28 



*351 
*352 
*353 



Department of State 

Free, single copies of the following 
Department of State publications are 
available from the Public Information Serv- 
ice, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

President Reagan 

Renewing the U.S. Commitment to Peace, 
38th session of the UN General Assembly, 
Sept. 26, 1983 (Current Policy #511). 

Korean Airline Massacre, address to the na- 
tion, White House, Sept. 5, 1983 (Current 
Policy #507). 

Secretary Shultz 

U.S. Objectives in Lebanon, House Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Sept. 21, 1983 (Current 
Policy #510). 

The Challenge of the Helsinki Process, fol- 
lowup meeting of the Conference on Securi- 
ty and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 
Madrid, Spain, Sept. 9, 1983 (Current 
Policy #508). 

Japan and America: International Partner- 
ship for the 1980s, Sixth Shimoda Con- 
ference, Warrenton, Virginia, Sept. 2, 1983 
(Current Policy #506). 

Africa 

Background Notes on Rwanda (August 1983). 

East Asia 

POW/MIAs in Southeast Asia (GIST, 
Sept. 1983). 

Economics 

Bankers and the Debt Crisis: An Interna- 
tional Melodrama? Under Secretary Wallis, 
International Summer School of the 
American Bankers Association, 
Washington, D.C, Aug. 25, 1983 (Current 
Policy #505). 

Europe 

Soviet Active Measures, Department of State 

report, Sept. 1983 (Special Report #110). 
Background Notes on Portugal, August 1983. 

Latin America and the Caribbean 

Economic Growth and U.S. Policy in Central 
America, Deputy Secretary Dam, Forum 
Club, Houston, Texas, Sept. 14, 1983 (Cur- 
rent Policy #509). 

Panama and the 1979 Canal Treaties (GIST, 
Sept. 1983). ■ 



November 1983 



69 



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and charts, it is divided into six sections 
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• International organizations; 

• Elements of the world economy; 

• Development assistance; and 

• Foreign relations machinery. 




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NDEX 



November 1983 
Vol. 83, No. 2080 



Arms Control 

Arms Control and European Public Opinion 
(exchange of letters between Mr. Kreisky 
and President Reagan) 30 

The Cause of Peace (Reagan) 9 

The Eastern Mediterranean and U.S. National 
Security (Burt) 46 

INF Negotiations (Reagan, White House 
statement) 31 

NATO Supports U.S. Arms Control Initiatives 
(North Atlantic Council statement) .... 29 

Renewing the U.S. Commitment to Peace 
(Reagan) 1 

U.S. Offers New START Initiatives 
(Reagan) 29 

Asia. Nuclear Nonproliferation and Cooper- 
ation (Marshall) 56 

Aviation. Soviet Downing of Civilian Air- 
craft (Reagan, White House statement) 45 

Business. International Investment Policy 
(Reagan, policy statement) 38 

Congress 

Human Rights Situation in the Philippines 

(Abrams) 51 

[Kampuchea After 5 Years of Vietnamese 

Occupation (Monjo) 35 

i Major U.S. Interests in the Middle East 
(Pelletreau) 52 

U.S. Forces in Lebanon (President's state- 
ments, letter to the Congress) 54 

U.S. Objectives in Lebanon (Shultz) 24 

U.S. -Philippine Relations After the Aquino 
Assassination (Monjo) 32 

Cyprus. The Eastern Mediterranean and U.S. 
National Security (Burt) 46 

Developing Countries. Vice President Bush 
Visits North Africa and Europe (state- 
ments, addresses, toasts, remarks) .... 10 

Economics 

Economic Growth and U.S. Policy in Central 
America (Dam) 60 

Economic Progress Through Individual Free- 
dom (Reagan) 6 

International Investment Policy (Reagan, 
policy statement) 38 

Protecting the World Economy (Wallis) . . .41 

Egypt. Major U.S. Interests in the Middle 
East (Pelletreau) 52 

Europe 

Arms Control and European Public Opinion 
(exchange of letters between Mr. Kreisky 
and President Reagan) 30 

Vice President Bush Visits North Africa 
and Europe (statements, addresses, toasts, 
remarks) 10 

Greece. The Eastern Mediterranean and U.S. 
National Security (Burt) 46 

Human Rights. Human Rights Situation in 
the Philippines (Abrams) 51 

Immigration. Border-Crossing Documents for 
Mexicans 63 



Industrialized Democracies. Protecting the 

World Economy (Wallis) 41 

International Organizations and 
Conferences 

Economic Progress Through Individual 
Freedom (Reagan) 6 

Nuclear Nonproliferation and Cooperation 
(Marshall) 56 

Iran. Major U.S. Interests in the Middle East 
(Pelletreau) 52 

Iraq. Major U.S. Interests in the Middle 
East (Pelletreau) 52 

Israel. Major U.S. Interests in the Middle 
East (Pelletreau) 52 

Kampuchea 

Kampuchea After 5 Years of Vietnamese 
Occupation (Monjo) 35 

Situation in Kampuchea (White House state- 
ment) 36 

Korea. Soviet Downing of Civilian Air- 
craft (Reagan, White House statement) 45 

Latin America and the Caribbean. Economic 
Growth and U.S. Policy in Central America 
(Dam) 60 

Lebanon 

Major U.S. Interests in the Middle East 
(Pelletreau) 52 

U.S. Forces in Lebanon (President's state- 
ments, letter to the Congress) 54 

U.S. Objectives in Lebanon (Shultz) 24 

Libya. Major U.S. Interests in the Middle 
East (Pelletreau) 52 

Marshall Islands. Marshall Islands Voters 
Approve Free Association With U.S. . .59 

Mexico. Border-Crossing Documents for 
Mexicans 63 

Middle East. Vice President Bush Visits 
North Africa and Europe (statements, ad- 
dresses, toasts, remarks) 10 

Monetary Affairs 

Economic Progress Through Individual Free- 
dom (Reagan) 6 

Protecting the World Economy (Wallis) . . .41 

Non-Self-Governing Territories. Marshall 
Islands Voters Approve Free Association 
With U.S 59 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO 
Supports U.S. Arms Control Initiatives 
(North Atlantic Council statement) .... 29 

Nuclear Policy. Nuclear Nonproliferation and 
Cooperation (Marshall) 56 

Philippines 

Human Rights Situation in the Philippines 
(Abrams) 51 

U.S. -Philippine Relations After the Aquino 
Assassination (Monjo) 32 

Portugal. Visit of Portugal's President Eanes 
(Eanes, Reagan) 49 



Presidential Documents 

The Cause of Peace 9 

Economic Progress Through Individual Free- 
dom 6 

International Investment Policy (policy state- 
ment) 38 

INF Negotiations (White House statement) 31 
Renewing the U.S. Commitment to Peace ... 1 
Soviet Downing of Civilian Aircraft (White 

House statement) 45 

United Nations Day, 1983 (proclamation) . . .4 

U.S. Offers New START Initiatives 29 

Visit of Portugal's President Eanes (Eanes) 49 
Visit of Zimbabwe's Prime Minister Mugabe 

(Mugabe) 27 

Publications. Department of State 69 

Security Assistance. The Eastern Mediter- 
ranean and U.S. National Security 

(Burt) 46 

Spain. U.S. -Spanish Council Meets (joint 

statement) 50 

Syria. Major U.S. Interests in the Middle 

East (Pelletreau) 52 

Treaties. Current Actions 64 

Turkey. The Eastern Mediterranean and U.S. 

National Security (Burt) 46 

U.S.S.R. 

Arms Control and European Public Opinion 
(exchange of letters between Mr. Kreisky 

and President Reagan) 30 

The Cause of Peace (Reagan) 9 

The Eastern Mediterranean and U.S. National 

Security (Burt) 46 

INF Negotiations (Reagan, White House 

statement) 31 

NATO Supports U.S. Arms Control Initiatives 

(North Atlantic Council statement) .... 29 

Soviet Downing of Civilian Aircraft 

(Reagan, White House statement) 45 

U.S. Offers New START Initiatives 

(Reagan) 29 

United Nations 

Marshall Islands Voters Approve Free 

Association With U.S 59 

Renewing the U.S. Commitment to Peace 

(Reagan) 1 

United Nations Day. 1983 (proclamation) ... 4 
Vietnam. Kampuchea Alter 5 Years of 

Vietnamese Occupation (Monjo) 35 

Zimbabwe. Visit of Zimbabwe's Prime 
Minister Mugabe (Mugabe, Reagan) ... 27 

Name Index 

Abrams, Elliott 51 

Burt, Richard R 46 

Bush, Vice President 10 

Dam, Kenneth W 60 

Eanes, Antonio Ramalho 49 

Kreisky, Bruno 30 

Marshall, Harry R, Jr 56 

Monjo, John C 32, 35 

Mugabe, Robert G 27 

Pelletreau, Robert H 52 

Reagan, President ... 1, 4, 6, 9, 27, 29, 30, 31, 

38, 45, 49 
Shultz, Secretary 24 



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Department 



| W of Stale IV IW >_• 

bulletin 



he Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 83 / Number 2081 



December 1983 






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Cover. Clockwise from top: 
President Reagan 
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Department of State 

bulletin 



Volume 83 / Number 2081 / December 1983 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the 
public, the Congress, and government 
agencies with information on developments 
in U.S. foreign relations and the work of 
the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; selected 
press releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations; and treaties and other 
agreements to which the United States is 
or may become a party. Special features, 
articles, and other supportive material 
(such as maps, charts, photographs, and 
graphs) are published frequently to 
provide additional information on current 
issues but should not necessarily be 
interpreted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

JOHN HUGHES 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA ADAMS 

Assistant Editor 



W 



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this Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through March 31, 
1987. 



NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted 
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will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the 
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20402 



CONTENTS 



he President 

America's Commitment to Peace 

Lebanon 

News Conference of October 19 

(Excerpts) 
Update on INF Talks 
NATO Decision on Nuclear Forces 

in Europe 



he Vice President 

) Visit to Jamaica 

irnis Control 

2 Arms Control and Reduction 
Negotiations (White House 
Statement) 

ast Asia 



The Soviet Role in Asia 
(William A. Brown) 



Europe 

24 NATO Defense Ministers Meet 

in Canada (Final Communique, 
With Annex) 

25 Visit of Finland's President 
(Mauno Koivisto, President 

Reagan) 

26 Challenges of U.S. -Soviet Re- 

lations at the 50-Year Mark 
(Kenneth W. Dam) 

29 16th Report on Cyprus (Message 

to the Congress) 

30 Visit of British Prime Minister 

(President Reagan, Margaret 
Thatcher) 

31 Human Rights Activists in the 

Soviet Union (President Reagan, 
Department Statements) 

33 Visit of President of West Ger- 

many (Karl Carstens, President 
Reagan) 

34 Visit of Italy's Prime Minister 

(Bettino Craxi, President 
Reagan) 



conomics 

f The Magic of the Market at Home 
and Abroad (W. Allen Wallis) 

i Continuation of Export Control 
Regulations (Message to 
the Congress) 

) Agricultural Export Promotion 
. and Trade (W. Allen Wallis) 

nvironment 

! Endangered Species Convention 
(James L. Malone) 

I U.S. Seeks Amendment to En- 
dangered Species Convention 
(Message to the Senate) 



Food 

35 World Food Day, 

(Proclamation) 



1983 



Human Rights 

36 The Cuban Revolution and Its 
Impact on Human Rights 
(Elliott Abrams) 

Middle East 

40 Terrorist Attack Against 

U.S. Forces in Beirut (President 
Reagan, White House Statement) 

44 The Situation in Lebanon 
(Secretary Shultz) 

46 U.S. Marine Presence in Beirut 

(Jonathan T. Howe) 

47 The Price of Peace: U.S. Middle 

East Policy (Kenneth W. Dam) 

50 Visit of Egyptian President 

(Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, 
President Reagan) 

51 President Signs MFN in Lebanon 

Resolution (President Reagan) 



Nuclear Policy 

52 Nonproliferation: Where We Are 
and Where We're Going 
(Richard T. Kennedy) 

Population 

58 Issues for the 1984 Population 

Conference (Richard Elliot 
Benedick) 

Refugees 

59 Proposed Refugee Admissions 

for FY 1984 (Edward J. 
Derwinksi, H. Eugene Douglas, 
President Reagan) 

Science & Technology 

65 International Implications of Pro- 
posed Commercialization of 
LANDSAT (Harry R. 
Marshall, Jr.) 

Western Hemisphere 

67 Grenada: Collective Action by the 
Caribbean Peace Force 
(Kenneth W. Dam, Jeane J. 
Kirkpatrick, M. Peter 
McPherson, J. William 
Middendorf II , President 
Reagan, Secretary Shultz) 

83 Renewing the Economic and 

Humanitarian Commitment to 
El Salvador (M. Peter 
McPherson) 

Treaties 

84 Current Actions 

Chronology 

86 October 1983 

Press Releases 

90 Department of State 

91 USUN 

Publications 

92 Department of State 



Index 



l u uuujuu uniimmmi i r HHiiHHtMH HBHBiiHiiiiii 



Not only has Moscow assisted and encouraged the 
violence in [Lebanon and Grenada], but it provides 
direct support through a network of surrogates and 
terrorists. 















*- »i^^» w ^^^^* 




- 


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:^" 



<Q 





.«- 



Upon learning of the tragedy in Beirut on Sunday morning, October 23, President Reagan 
returns to Washington from Georgia. Aboard Air Force One, he directs actions to be taken on 
the situation by Secretary Shultz and national security adviser-designate Robert McFarlane 



(White House photo by Kill Fitz-Patrick) 



oei 



THE PRESIDENT 



America's Commitment 
to Peace 

by President Reagan 



Address to the nation, 
October 27, 1983. 1 



Some 2 months ago, we were shocked 
by the brutal massacre of 269 men, 
women, and children, more than 60 of 
them Americans, in the shooting down 
of a Korean airliner. Now, in these past 
several days, violence has erupted again, 
in Lebanon and Grenada. 



Lebanon 

In Lebanon, we have some 1,600 
Marines, part of a multinational force 
that's trying to help the people of 
Lebanon restore order and stability to 
that troubled land. Our Marines are 
assigned to the south of the city of 
Beirut near the only airport operating in 
Lebanon. Just a mile or so to the north 
is the Italian contingent, and, not far 
from them, the French and a company 
of British soldiers. 

This past Sunday, at 22 minutes 
after 6— Beirut time— with dawn just 
breaking, a truck, looking like a lot of 
other vehicles in the city, approached 
the airport on a busy main road. There 
was nothing in its appearance to suggest 
it was any different than the trucks or 
cars that were normally seen on and 
around the airport. But this one was dif- 
ferent. At the wheel was a young man 
on a suicide mission. The truck carried 
some 2,000 pounds of explosives. But 
there was no way our Marine guards 
could know this. Their first warning that 
something was wrong came when the 
truck crashed through a series of bar- 
riers, including a chain-link fence and 
barbed wire entanglements. The guards 
opened fire, but it was too late. The 
truck smashed through the doors of the 



headquarters building in which our 
Marines were sleeping and instantly ex- 
ploded. The four-story concrete building 
collapsed in a pile of rubble. 

More than 200 of the sleeping men 
were killed in that one hideous, insane 
attack. Many others suffered injury and 
are hospitalized here or in Europe. 

This was not the end of the horror. 
At almost the same instant, another 
vehicle on a suicide-and-murder mission 
crashed into the headquarters of the 
French peacekeeping force, an eight- 
story building, destroying it and killing 
more than 50 French soldiers. 

Prior to this day of horror, there 
had been several tragedies for our men 
in the multinational force. Attacks by 
snipers and mortar fire had taken their 
toll. I called bereaved parents and/or 
widows of the victims to express, on 
behalf of all of us, our sorrow and sym- 
pathy. 

Sometimes there were questions, 
and now many of you are asking: "Why 
should our young men be dying in 
Lebanon? Why is Lebanon important to 
us?" Well, it is true Lebanon is a small 
country more than 5,500 miles from our 
shores, on the edge of what we call the 
Middle East. But every President who 
has occupied this office in recent years 
has recognized that peace in the Middle 
East is of vital concern to our nation 
and, indeed, to our allies in Western 
Europe and Japan. We've been con- 
cerned because the Middle East is a 
powder keg; four times in the last 30 
years, the Arabs and Israelis have gone 
to war, and each time the world has 
teetered near the edge of catastrophe. 



THE PRESIDENT 



The area is key to the economic and 
political life of the West. Its strategic 
importance, its energy resources, the 
Suez Canal, and the well-being of the 
nearly 200 million people living 
there — all are vital to us and to world 
peace. If that key should fall into the 
hands of a power or powers hostile to 
the free world, there would be a direct 
threat to the United States and to our 
allies. 

We have another reason to be in- 
volved. Since 1948 our nation has 



end the fighting there. So, why are we 
there? Well, the answer is straightfor- 
ward: to help bring peace to Lebanon 
and stability to the vital Middle East. To 
that end, the multinational force was 
created to help stabilize the situation in 
Lebanon until a government could be 
established and a Lebanese army 
mobilized to restore Lebanese sovereign- 
ty over its own soil as the foreign forces 
withdrew. Israel agreed to withdraw as 
did Syria, but Syria then reneged on its 
promise. Over 10,000 Palestinians who 



The clear intent of the terrorists was to eliminate 
our support of the Lebanese Government and to 
destroy the ability of the Lebanese people to deter- 
mine their own destiny. 



recognized and accepted a moral obliga- 
tion to assure the continued existence of 
Israel as a nation. Israel shares our 
democratic values and is a formidable 
force an invader of the Middle East 
would have to reckon with. 

For several years, Lebanon has been 
torn by internal strife. Once a pros- 
perous, peaceful nation, its government 
has become ineffective in controlling the 
militias that warred on each other. Six- 
teen months ago, we were watching on 
our TV screens the shelling and bombing 
of Beirut, which was being used as a for- 
tress by PLO [Palestine Liberation 
Organization] bands. Hundreds and hun- 
dreds of civilians were being killed and 
wounded in the daily battles. Syria, 
which makes no secret of its claim that 
Lebanon should be a part of a greater 
Syria, was occupying a large part of 
Lebanon. Today, Syria has become a 
home for 7,000 Soviet advisers and 
technicians who man a massive amount 
of Soviet weaponry, including SS-21 
ground-to-ground missiles capable of 
reaching vital areas of Israel. 

A little over a year ago, hoping to 
build on the Camp David accords, which 
had led to peace between Israel and 
Egypt, I proposed a peace plan for the 
Middle East to end the wars between 
the Arab states and Israel. It was based 
on UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and 
called for a fair and just solution to the 
Palestinian problem, as well as a fair 
and just settlement of issues between 
the Arab states and Israel. 

Before the necessary negotiations 
could begin, it was essential to get all 
foreign forces out of Lebanon and to 



had been bringing ruin down on Beirut, 
however, did leave the country. 

Lebanon has formed a government 
under the leadership of President 
Gemayel. And that government, with 
our assistance and training, has set up 
its own army. In only a year's time, that 
army has been rebuilt. It's a good army 
composed of Lebanese of all factions. 

A few weeks ago, the Israeli Army 
pulled back to the Awali River in 
southern Lebanon. Despite fierce 
resistance by Syrian-backed forces, the 
Lebanese Army was able to hold the line 
and maintain the defensive perimeter 
around Beirut. 

In the year that our Marines have 
been there, Lebanon has made impor- 
tant steps toward stability and order. 
The physical presence of the Marines 
lends support to both the Lebanese 
Government and its army. It allows the 
hard work of diplomacy to go forward. 
Indeed, without the peacekeepers from 
the United States, France, Italy, and 
Britain, the efforts to find a peaceful 
solution in Lebanon would collapse. 

As to that narrower question: What 
exactly is the operational mission of the 
Marines? The answer is: to secure a 
piece of Beirut, to keep order in their 
sector, and to prevent the area from 
becoming a battlefield. Our Marines are 
not just sitting in an airport. Part of 
their task is to guard that airport. 
Because of their presence, the airport 
has remained operational. In addition, 
they patrol the surrounding area. This is 
their part — a limited but essential 
part— in the larger effort that I have 
described. 



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If our Marines must be there, I'm « 
asked, why can't we make them safer': P 
Who committed this latest atrocity 
against them and why? We'll do 
everything we can to ensure that our 
men are as safe as possible. We order 
the battleship New Jersey to join our 
naval forces offshore. Without even 
firing them, the threat of its 16-inch 
guns silenced those who once fired do 1 
on our Marines from the hills. And thai 
are a good part of the reason we sud 
denly had a cease-fire. We're doing ou ite 
best to make our forces less vulnerable i 
to those who want to snipe at them or 
send in future suicide missions. 

Secretary Shultz called me today 
from Europe, where he was meeting 
with the foreign ministers of our allies fii 
in the multinational force. They remai 
committed to our task and plans were 
made to share information as to how \ 
can improve security for all our men. 

We have strong circumstantial 
evidence that the attack on the Marinf 
was directed by terrorists who used th 
same method to destroy our Embassy 
Beirut. Those who directed this atroci' 
must be dealt justice, and they will be. 

The obvious purpose behind the 
sniping and now this attack was to 
weaken American will and force the 
withdrawal of U.S. and French forces 
from Lebanon. The clear intent of the 
terrorists was to eliminate our suppor 
of the Lebanese Government and to 
destroy the ability of the Lebanese pe< 
pie to determine their own destiny. 

To answer those who ask if we're 
serving any purpose in being there, le 
me answer a question with a question. 
Would the terrorists have launched th' ' 
suicide attacks against the multination 
force if it were not doing its job? The 
multinational force was attacked preci 
ly because it is doing a job it was sent 
do in Beirut; it is accomplishing its mi; 
sion. 

Now then, where do we go from 
here? What can we do now to help 
Lebanon gain greater stability so that 
our Marines can come home? I believe 
we can take three steps now that will 

make a difference. 

pal 

First, we will accelerate the searcl 
for peace and stability in that region. 
Little attention has been paid to the fa 
that we've had special envoys there 
working literally around the clock to 
bring the warring factions together. 
This coming Monday in Geneva, Presi- 
dent Gemayel of Lebanon will sit down 
with other factions from his country to 
see if national reconciliation can be 
achieved. He has our firm support. I w j 



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Department of State Bulleti 









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THE PRESIDENT 



■n be announcing a replacement for 
d McFarlane, who was preceded by 
il Habib. Both worked tirelessly and 
st be credited for much, if not most, 
the progress we've made. 

Second, we'll work even more close- 
vith our allies in providing support 

the Government of Lebanon and for 

rebuilding of a national consensus. 

Third, we will ensure that the 
ltinational peacekeeping forces— our 
rines— are given the greatest possible 
tection. Our Commandant of the 
rine Corps, General Kelley, returned 
m Lebanon today and will be advising 
on steps we can take to improve 
urity. Vice President Bush returned 
; last night from Beirut and gave me 
ill report of his brief visit. 

Beyond our progress in Lebanon, let 
<-emember that our main goal and 
pose is to achieve a broader peace in 
af the Middle East. The factions and 
«rness that we see in Lebanon are 
; a microcosm of the difficulties that 
spread across much of that region. 
A peace initiative for the entire Mid- 
East consistent with the Camp David 
ords and UN Resolutions 242 and 338 
offers the best hope for bringing 
ce to the region. 

Let me ask those who say we should 
out of Lebanon: If we were to leave 
ianon now, what message would that 
d to those who foment instability and 
•orism? If America were to walk 
ly from Lebanon, what chance would 
I re be for a negotiated settlement pro- 
i ing a unified, democratic Lebanon? If 
turned our backs on Lebanon now, 
at would be the future of Israel? At 
Lee is the fate of only the second Arab 
i ntry to negotiate a major agreement 
j i Israel. That's another aecomplish- 
lt of this past year— the May 17th ac- 
1 signed by Lebanon and Israel. 
If terrorism and intimidation suc- 
i, it'll be a devastating blow to the 
ce process and to Israel's search for 
uine security. It won't just be 
ianon sentenced to a future of chaos, 
l the United States or the free world, 
that matter, stand by and see the 
idle East incorporated into the Soviet 
:? What of Western Europe and 
an's dependence on Middle East oil 
the energy to fuel their industries? 
■ Middle East is, as I said, vital to 
national security and economic well- 

Brave young men have been taken 
-n us. Many others have been 
jvously wounded. Are we to tell them 
ir sacrifice was wasted? They gave 
ir lives in defense of our national 



security every bit as much as any man 
who ever died fighting in a war. We 
must not strip every ounce of meaning 
and purpose from their courageous 
sacrifice. 

We're a nation with global respon- 
sibilities. We're not somewhere else in 
the world protecting someone else's in- 
terests. We're there protecting our own. 
I received a message from the father of 
a Marine in Lebanon. He told me: 

In a world where we speak of human 
rights, there is a sad lack of acceptance of 
responsibility. My son has chosen the accept- 
ance of responsibility for the privilege of liv- 
ing in this country. Certainly in this country 
one does not inherently have rights unless 
the responsibility for these rights is accepted. 

Dr. Kenneth Morrison said that 
while he was waiting to learn if his son 
was one of the dead. I was thrilled for 
him to learn today that his son, Ross, is 
alive and well and carrying on his duties 
in Lebanon. 

Let us meet our responsibilities. For 
longer than any of us can remember, the 
people of the Middle East have lived 



Grenada and a half dozen other 
Caribbean islands here were, until 
recently, British colonies. They are now 
independent states and members of the 
British Commonwealth. While they 
respect each other's independence, they 
also feel a kinship with each other and 
think of themselves as one people. 

In 1979 trouble came to Grenada. 
Maurice Bishop, a protege of Fidel 
Castro, staged a military coup and over- 
threw the government which had been 
elected under the Constitution left to the 
people by the British. He sought the 
help of Cuba in building an airport, 
which he claimed was for tourist trade 
but which looked suspiciously suitable 
for military aircraft including Soviet- 
built, long-range bombers. 

The six sovereign countries and one 
remaining colony are joined together in 
what they call the Organization of 
Eastern Caribbean States. The six 
became increasingly alarmed as Bishop 
built an army greater than all of theirs 
combined. Obviously, it was not purely 
for defense. 



/ believe our government has a responsibility to go 
to the aid of its citizens if their right to life and 
liberty is threatened. 



from war to war with no prospect for 
any other future. That dreadful cycle 
must be broken. Why are we there? A 
Lebanese mother told one of our am- 
bassadors that her little girl had only at- 
tended school 2 of the last 8 years. Now, 
because of our presence there, she said 
her daughter could live a normal life. 
With patience and firmness, we can help 
bring peace to that strife-torn region 
and make our own lives more secure. 
Our role is to help the Lebanese put 
their country together, not to do it for 
them. 



Grenada 

Now I know another part of the world is 
very much on your minds, a place much 
closer to our shores: Grenada. The 
island is only twice the size of the 
District of Columbia with a total popula- 
tion of about 110,000 people. 



In the last year or so, Prime 
Minister Bishop gave indications that he 
might like better relations with the 
United States. He even made a trip to 
our country and met with senior officials 
of the White House and the State 
Department. Whether he was serious or 
not, we'll never know. On October 12th, 
a small group in his militia seized him 
and put him under arrest. They were, if 
anything, more radical and more 
devoted to Castro's Cuba than he had 
been. 

Several days later, a crowd of 
citizens appeared before Bishop's home, 
freed him and escorted him toward the